Policy Analysis in Ireland 9781447353225

Table of contents :
Front cover
Halftitle Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of figures, tables and boxes
List of abbreviations
Notes on contributors
Editors’ introduction to the series
Acknowledgements
Foreword
Preface
One. Contextualising policy analysis in Ireland
Part One: History, styles and methods of policy analysis in Ireland
Two. The evolution of economic policy analysis in Ireland
Three. The evolution of social policy analysis in Ireland: from a theocentric to an econocentric paradigm?
Four. The changing policy analysis capacity of the Irish state
Five. Introducing evidence into policy making in Ireland
Part Two: Policy analysis at various levels of government: from local to the EU
Six. Ireland’s ‘unique blend’: local government and policy analysis
Seven. Committees and the legislature
Eight. Policy analysis in the civil service
Nine. Europeanised policy making in Ireland
Part Three: Think tanks, interest groups, political parties and gender-based policy analysis
Ten. The social partners and the NESC: from tripartite dialogue via common knowledge events to network knowledge
Eleven. Thinks tanks and their role in policy making in Ireland
Twelve. Civil society organisations and policy analysis
Thirteen. Political parties and the policy process
Fourteen. Gender expertise and policy analysis
Part Four: The public, science and the media: the wider policy analysis environment in Ireland
Fifteen. Democratic innovations and policy analysis: climate policy and Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly (2016–18)
Sixteen. Irish science policy: a case study in evidence-based policy design for small open economies
Seventeen. Media discourses on the economy in Ireland: framing the policy possibilities
Index
Back cover

Citation preview

INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES EDITORS: IRIS GEVA-MAY & MICHAEL HOWLETT

POLICY ANALYSIS IN

Ireland

Edited by John Hogan and Mary P. Murphy

POLICY ANALYSIS IN IRELAND

International Library of Policy Analysis Series editors: Iris Geva-May, Simon Fraser University, Canada, Carleton University, Canada and the Wagner School, NYU, USA and Michael Howlett, Simon Fraser University, Canada This major series brings together for the first time a detailed examination of the theory and practice of policy analysis systems at different levels of government and by non-governmental actors in a specific country. It therefore provides a key addition to research and teaching in comparative policy analysis and policy studies more generally.  Each volume includes a history of the country’s policy analysis which offers a broad comparative overview with other countries as well as the country in question. In doing so, the books in the series provide the data and empirical case studies essential for instruction and for further research in the area. They also include expert analysis of different approaches to policy analysis and an assessment of their evolution and operation. Volumes in the series include the following countries: Australia • Brazil • Czech Republic • France • Germany • Japan • Israel • The Netherlands • Turkey • Ireland • Spain • Mexico • Taiwan • USA • Canada • Belgium and build into an essential library of key reference works. The series will be of interest to academics and students in public policy, public administration and management, comparative politics and government, public organisations and individual policy areas. It will also interest people working in the countries in question and internationally. In association with the ICPA-Forum and the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. See more at comparativepolicy.org/about-jcpa-icpa-forum/ or at policy. bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/international-library-of-policy-analysis.

POLICY ANALYSIS IN IRELAND Edited by John Hogan and Mary P. Murphy

International Library of Policy Analysis, Vol 16

First published in Great Britain in 2021 by Policy Press, an imprint of Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1-9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 e: [email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2021 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-4473-5089-7 hardcover ISBN 978-1-4473-5323-2 ePub ISBN 978-1-4473-5322-5 ePdf The right of John Hogan and Mary P. Murphy to be identified as editors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the editors and contributors and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press and Policy Press work to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: Qube Design Front cover image: iStock Bristol University Press and Policy Press use environmentally responsible print partners. Printed in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of figures, tables and boxes vii List of abbreviations viii Notes on contributors xi Editors’ introduction to the series xv Acknowledgements xvii Foreword by Dermot McCarthy xix xxiii Preface one

Contextualising policy analysis in Ireland John Hogan and Mary P. Murphy

1

Part One: History, styles and methods of policy analysis in Ireland two three

four five

The evolution of economic policy analysis in Ireland Clare O’Mahony The evolution of social policy analysis in Ireland: from a theocentric to an econocentric paradigm? Fiona Dukelow The changing policy analysis capacity of the Irish state Muiris MacCarthaigh Introducing evidence into policy making in Ireland Frances Ruane

19 33

47 63

Part Two: Policy analysis at various levels of government: from local to the EU six seven eight nine

Ireland’s ‘unique blend’: local government and policy analysis Aodh Quinlivan Committees and the legislature Bernadette Connaughton Policy analysis in the civil service Richard Boyle and Joanna O’Riordan Europeanised policy making in Ireland Mary C. Murphy

79 93 107 123

Part Three: Think tanks, interest groups, political parties and gender-based policy analysis ten

The social partners and the NESC: from tripartite dialogue via common knowledge events to network knowledge Rory O’Donnell

141

v

Policy analysis in Ireland eleven

Thinks tanks and their role in policy making in Ireland Chris McInerney twelve Civil society organisations and policy analysis Mary P. Murphy and Orla O’Connor thirteen Political parties and the policy process Maura Adshead and Diarmuid Scully fourteen Gender expertise and policy analysis Pauline Cullen

157 171 187 203

Part Four: The public, science and the media: the wider policy analysis environment in Ireland Democratic innovations and policy analysis: climate policy and Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly (2016–18) Clodagh Harris sixteen Irish science policy: a case study in evidence-based policy design for small open economies Eoin Cullina, Jason Harold and John McHale seventeen Media discourses on the economy in Ireland: framing the policy possibilities Brendan K. O’Rourke

219

Index

263

fifteen

vi

235

249

List of figures, tables and boxes Figures 4.1 4.2 12.1 13.1 13.2 16.1

Percentage of civil servants at higher grade (from Assistant Principal) Public organisations in Ireland, 1922–2015 Policy analysis capacity continuum A simplified model of the policy process Legislative activity of Dáil Éireann, 2004–18 Irish government budget allocations for R&D in current prices, € millions (2007–18)

53 54 173 187 195 236

Callanan ‘justification of local government’ framework, 2018 Organisation Capability Review methodology Think tanks in the EU relative to share of EU GDP and R&D intensity Think tanks operating in/from Ireland The Irish CA’s recommendations on tackling climate change

80 114 164 165 225

Examples of policy innovation The developmental welfare state Climate change policy: getting the process right Agenda setting: the fluidity of local/national politics in health care Policy evaluation: the constraints to committees Teagasc: Agriculture and Food Development Authority Challenges to participation: the case of budgetary policy

89 146 150 189 197 242 253

Tables 6.1 8.1 11.1 11.2 15.1

Boxes 6.1 10.1 10.2 13.1 13.2 16.1 17.1

vii

List of abbreviations CA C&AG CC CCBS CCC CPA CRA CSO CSAP CSEU CRE CVP DBEI DEASP DPER DTTS DV EAPN EIP EBP ECB EEC EI ELI EPP EPTR ESRI ESS EU FDI FPA GB GDPR HRB IBRC ICTU IDA IFAC IGEES IHREC IIEA viii

Citizens’ Assembly Comptroller and Auditor General Constitutional Convention Centre for Cross Border Studies Cork City Council Combat Poverty Agency Charities Regulatory Authority Central Statistics Office Civil Service Action Plan Civil Service Evaluation Unit Comprehensive Review of Expenditure Community and Voluntary Pillar Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection Department of Public Expenditure and Reform Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport Domestic violence European Anti-Poverty Network Evidence-informed policy Evidence-based policy European Central Bank European Economic Community Enterprise Ireland Export-led industrialisation European Poverty Programme Export profits tax relief Economic and Social Research Institute European Statistical System European Union Foreign direct investment Focused Policy Assessment Gender budgeting General Data Protection Regulation Health Research Board Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Irish Congress of Trade Unions Industrial Development Authority Irish Fiscal Advisory Council Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Institute of International and European Affairs

List of abbreviations

ILO IMF IPA IPHI IRC ISI ISS ISSDA JOCCA JPC LAS LCDC LEO LRC NAPP NCPP NERI NESC NESF NGO NIEC NP NPM NSB OCR OECD OEEC PAC PBO PLS PMB POS PPN PR RIA SAEI SFI SIPO SJI SMI SOE SoSP SP

International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund Institute of Public Administration Institute of Public Health in Ireland Irish Research Council Import substitution industrialisation Irish Statistical System Irish Social Science Data Archive Joint Oireachtas Committee on Climate Action Joint Policing Committee Legislative Analysis Service Local Community Development Committee Local enterprise office Law Reform Commission National Action Plan against Poverty National Centre for Partnership and Performance Nevin Economic Research Institute National Economic and Social Council National Economic and Social Forum Non-governmental organisation National Industrial Economic Council New politics New public management National Statistics Board Organisational Capability Review Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Organisation for European Economic Co-operation Public Accounts Committee (formally Committee of Public Accounts) Parliamentary Budget Office Pre-legislative scrutiny Private Members’ Bill Political opportunity structure Public Participation Network Proportional representation Regulatory impact analysis Small Advanced Economies Initiative Science Foundation Ireland Standards in Public Office Commission Social Justice Ireland Strategic Management Initiative Small open economy Science of Science Policy Social partnership ix

Policy analysis in Ireland

SPC SPS STEM STV TASC TD TILDA VFMPR VAW UN

x

Strategic Policy Committee Senior Public Service Science, technology, engineering and mathematics Single transferable vote Think Tank for Action on Social Change Teachtaí Dála – a member of the Dáil Éireann, the lower house of the Oireachtas (the Irish parliament) The Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing Value for Money and Policy Review Violence against Women United Nations

Notes on contributors Maura Adshead is Associate Professor of Politics and Public Administration and Head of Engagement at the University of Limerick, Ireland. She is a former President of the Political Studies Association of Ireland and a regular political commentator in Ireland and internationally. She has authored, co-authored and edited a number of books and articles on Irish politics and public policy, Europeanisation impacts in Ireland and community-engaged research. Richard Boyle is Head of Research at the Institute of Public Administration in Ireland, where he has worked since 1986. He has researched and written extensively on evaluation and public service reform. He has worked with Irish central and local government, the European Commission, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Bank. He is a former board member of the European Evaluation Society and a founder member of the Irish Evaluation Network. Bernadette Connaughton is a Lecturer in Public Administration at the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick. Her main research interests include Europeanisation, public policy process (in particular environmental policy) and relationships between ministers, senior civil servants and political advisers. She has published on those topics in journals including Irish Political Studies, Public Administration and Regional and Federal Studies. Pauline Cullen is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology and Politics at Maynooth University, Ireland. Her research includes analysis of civil society and gender equality at national and European Union (EU) level, women’s movements and gender and political representation. She is co-editor of Producing Knowledge, Reproducing Gender: Power, Production and Practice in Contemporary Ireland (University College Dublin Press, 2020) and has published in the Journal of Civil Society; Social Movement Studies; Gender, Work & Organization; Politics & Gender; and Policy & Society. Eoin Cullina is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Whitaker Institute for Innovation and Societal Change at the National University of Ireland Galway, having previously completed his PhD research with Lero, the Science Foundation Ireland Research Centre for Software. Fiona Dukelow is a Senior Lecturer in Social Policy at University College Cork, Ireland. Her research interests include critical welfare theory and various aspects of historical and contemporary Irish social policy. She is co-author, with Mairéad Considine, of Irish Social Policy: A Critical Introduction (Policy Press, 2017)

xi

Policy analysis in Ireland

and co-editor, with Mary P. Murphy, of The Irish Welfare State in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges and Change (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). Jason Harold is a Lecturer in Economics at the J.E. Cairnes School of Business and Economics at the National University of Ireland Galway. He has previously held positions as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at both the Whitaker Institute for Innovation and Societal Change at the National University of Ireland Galway and at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). Clodagh Harris is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and Politics and the Environmental Research Institute, University College Cork and an expert on democratic innovations. She has served on, or advised on, Ireland’s first Citizens’ Assembly We the Citizens (2011), the G1000 Belgian Citizens’ Summit (2011), Ireland’s Constitutional Convention (2012–14), the Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit (2017), Extinction Rebellion UK’s working group on citizens’ assemblies (2019), and the Research Advisory Group to the Scottish Citizens’ Assembly (2019–20). John Hogan is a Senior Research Fellow and Lecturer at the College of Business, Technological University Dublin, Ireland. Widely published, he has also edited several volumes, including Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) with Michael Howlett. A former Chair of the Midwest Political Science Association’s Comparative Policy Section, he has mainly researched the nature of policy change and global lobbying regulations. He has advised the Irish government, and several other European governments, on lobbying regulations. Muiris MacCarthaigh is Associate Professor of Politics and Public Administration at Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland. His research engages with concerns within and between political science and public sector governance, and has been published in Governance; Public Administration; Public Administration Review; Public Management Review; Public Policy and Administration; and the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. He is a former President of the Political Studies Association of Ireland, and currently a member of the European Group for Public Administration’s Steering Committee. John McHale is Established Professor of Economics and Executive Dean of the College of Business, Public Policy and Law at the National University of Ireland Galway. He served as Chair of the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council from its inception in 2011 to 2016. He has previously held positions as Assistant Professor of Economics and Associate Professor of Economics at Harvard University in the US, and as Associate Professor of Managerial Economics at Queen’s University, Ontario, Canada.

xii

Notes on contributors

Chris McInerney is a Lecturer in Politics and Public Administration at the University of Limerick. He currently teaches undergraduate courses on public administration as well as graduate classes on collaborative governance. His main research interests lie in the areas of democratic participation, state–civil society relationships and role of public administration in promoting social justice. He has also worked in a number of Irish and international development organisations, including the United Nations Development Programme. Mary C. Murphy holds a Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration and is a Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Department of Government and Politics, University College Cork. She researches the relationship between Ireland/ Northern Ireland and the EU, and has published extensively on the subject. Mary is the President of the Irish Association for Contemporary European Studies and is currently working on a three-year project, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, examining Brexit and its constitutional implications for Ireland. Mary P. Murphy is a Professor in Irish Politics and Society in the Department of Sociology, Maynooth University. She has published widely, including (coedited with Fiona Dukelow) The Irish Welfare State in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges and Change (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). An active advocate for social justice and gender equality, she has been a member of numerous national policy bodies and in 2019 was appointed by Michael Higgins, the President of Ireland, to the Council of State. Orla O’Connor is Director of the National Women’s Council of Ireland, the leading national women’s membership organisation in Ireland, with over 190  member groups. She is a former Co-Director of Together for Yes, the national civil society campaign to remove the Eighth Amendment’s constitutional ban on abortion in Ireland. For her role in Together for Yes, she was recognised as one of the 100 Most Influential People by TIME magazine in 2019. Rory O’Donnell is a Research Fellow at the Geary Institute and an Adjunct Professor in the School of Social Policy at University College Dublin (UCD), Ireland. He worked as economist and later as Director of Ireland’s National Economic and Social Council for various periods from 1987 to 2019. He was formerly Jean Monnet Professor of European Business at UCD. Clare O’Mahony lectures in economics and data analysis at Technological University Dublin and is programme chair for the BSc in Economics and Finance there. Her work has been published in a number of journals including The World Economy and Irish Economic and Social History. Her research interests are in foreign direct investment, international trade, economic development and the interface

xiii

Policy analysis in Ireland

between business and government policy. She holds a PhD from Trinity College, Dublin. Joanna O’Riordan has almost 20  years’ experience as a researcher at the Institute of Public Administration (IPA). She carries out research and consultancy work in the area of public management, with a particular focus on reform and modernisation in relation to human resource management. She presents her research findings and teaches on various IPA programmes. She is also the editor of Administration, the journal of the IPA. Brendan K. O’Rourke works at the Technological University Dublin, where he focuses on learning in the area of discourses of the economy, and in particular examining enterprise policy and public discourses on the economy. His scholarly work has been widely published as chapters in edited volumes, encyclopaedia/ handbook entries and in over 20 peer-reviewed academic journals such as the Critical Discourse Studies, Politics and Social Semiotics. Aodh Quinlivan worked at Cork County Council from 1994 to 2000, while pursuing his PhD on a part-time basis. He has lectured at University College Cork since 2000 where he is the Director of the BSc Government degree programme and the MSc Government programme. His main research interests are in the areas of local government and public sector management. He is a leading specialist on local government and has published widely in this area. Frances Ruane served as Director of the ESRI from 2006 to 2015, having previously taught in the Department of Economics at Trinity College, Dublin. She is a member of the Royal Irish Academy and is currently Chair of the National Competitiveness Council and a member of the Board of the European Statistics Governance Advisory Board. Her research interests are in economic development and policy, foreign direct investment and trade. Diarmuid Scully completed his PhD in the causes and consequences of political dynasties in developed democratic states in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Limerick, where he currently lectures on Irish politics and European studies. An elected member and previously Mayor of Limerick City Council, he is a former Chair of the City Development Board and Economic Development Strategic Policy Committee, and a member of the Mid-West Regional Authority.

xiv

Editors’ introduction to the series Professor Iris Geva-May and Professor Michael Howlett, ILPA series editors Policy analysis is a relatively new area of social scientific inquiry, owing its origins to developments in the US in the early 1960s. Its main rationale is systematic, evidence-based, transparent, efficient, and implementable policymaking. This component of policymaking is deemed key in democratic structures allowing for accountable public policies. From the US, policy analysis has spread to other countries, notably in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s and in Asia in the 1990s and 2000s. It has taken, respectively one to two more decades for programmes of public policy to be established in these regions preparing cadres for policy analysis as a profession. However, this movement has been accompanied by variations in the kinds of analysis undertaken as US-inspired analytical and evaluative techniques have been adapted to local traditions and circumstances, and new techniques shaped in these settings. In the late 1990s this led to the development of the field of comparative policy analysis, pioneered by Iris Geva-May, who initiated and founded the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, and whose mission has been advanced with the support of editorial board members such as Laurence E. Lynn Jr., first co-editor, Peter deLeon, Duncan McRae, David Weimer, Beryl Radin, Frans van Nispen, Yukio Adachi, Claudia Scott, Allan Maslove and others in the US and elsewhere. While current studies have underlined differences and similarities in national approaches to policy analysis, the different national regimes which have developed over the past two to three decades have not been thoroughly explored and systematically evaluated in their entirety, examining both sub-national and nonexecutive governmental organisations as well as the non-governmental sector; nor have these prior studies allowed for either a longitudinal or a latitudinal comparison of similar policy analysis perceptions, applications, and themes across countries and time periods. The International Library for Policy Analysis (ILPA) series fills this gap in the literature and empirics of the subject. It features edited volumes created by experts in each country, which inventory and analyse their respective policy analysis systems. To a certain extent the series replicates the template of Policy Analysis in Canada edited by Dobuzinskis, Howlett and Laycock (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). Each ILPA volume surveys the state of the art of policy analysis in governmental and non-governmental organisations in each country using the common template derived from the Canadian collection in order to provide for each volume in the series comparability in terms of coverage and approach. Each volume addresses questions such as: What do policy analysts do? What techniques and approaches do they use? What is their influence on policymaking in that country? Is there a policy analysis deficit? What norms the work done by xv

Policy analysis in Ireland

policy analysts working in different institutional settings? Contributors focus on the sociology of policy analysis, demonstrating how analysts working in different organisations tend to have different interests and to utilise different techniques. The central theme of each volume includes historical works on the origins of policy analysis in the jurisdiction concerned, and then proceeds to investigate the nature and types, and quality, of policy analysis conducted by governments (including different levels and orders of government). It then moves on to examine the nature and kinds of policy analytical work and practices found in non-governmental actors such as think tanks, interest groups, business, labour, media, political parties, non-profits and others. Each volume in the series aims to compare and analyse the significance of the different styles and approaches found in each country and organisation studied, and to understand the impact these differences have on the policy process. Together, the volumes included in the ILPA series serve to provide the basic data and empirical case studies required for an international dialogue in the area of policy analysis, and an eye-opener on the nuances of policy analysis applications and implications in national and international jurisdictions. Each volume in the series is leading edge and has the promise to dominate its field and the textbook market for policy analysis in the country concerned, as well as being of broad comparative interest to markets in other countries. The ILPA is published in association with the International Comparative Policy Analysis Forum, and the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, whose mission is to advance international comparative policy analytic studies. The editors of each volume are leading members of this network and are the best-known scholars in each respective country, as are the authors contributing to each volume in their particular domain. The book series as a whole provides learning insights for instruction and for further research in the area and constitutes a major addition to research and pedagogy in the field of comparative policy analysis and policy studies in general. We welcome to the ILPA series Volume 16, Policy Analysis in Ireland, edited by John Hogan and Mary P. Murphy, and thank the editors and the authors for their outstanding contribution to this important encyclopedic database. Iris Geva-May Professor of Policy Studies, Baruch College at the City University of New York, Professor Emerita Simon Fraser University; Founding President and Editor-in-chief, International Comparative Policy Analysis Forum and Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis Michael Howlett Burnaby Mountain Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, and Yong Pung How Chair Professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore

xvi

Acknowledgements We would like to thank the series editors Michael Howlett and Iris Geva-May for approaching us with the idea of this volume many, many moons ago, and for all of their support, guidance and help as the volume came together. We would like to thank all of the contributing policy analysis scholars for their chapters, their knowledge, their skills and most of all the time that they gave to this project. This is their volume, reflecting their contributions and analysis. We thank Dermot McCarthy for his comprehensive and thoughtful foreword. We would like to thank our respective heads of school, particularly Katrina Lawlor and Etain Kidney at Technological University Dublin, and Mary Corcoran and Sean O’Riain at Maynooth University for their support during the past four years of working on this project. In particular, we would like to thank Sharon Feeney, Director of the Business, Society and Sustainability Research Centre at the College of Business, Technological University Dublin, who made possible, organised and oversaw our Symposium on Policy Analysis in Ireland in late 2019. Finally, we would like to thank all at Policy Press for their guidance, support and advice throughout the process of putting this volume together, a task made difficult by the Covid-19 pandemic.

xvii

Foreword Dermot McCarthy When Tony Blair, after leaving office, was asked what it was like to be Prime Minister of the UK, he said that “You take decisions, all day.” It is the role of governments to take key decisions regarding public affairs. Those who elect them expect, or at least hope, that they will take the right decisions. Governments often decide matters on the basis of well-flagged intent, set out in their programmes. More often, they are required to respond to situations and events for which precedent offers little assistance. The study of how governments set about making policy decisions, which is the field of policy analysis, is of great interest: to practitioners, so that they can improve their art; to those seeking to influence policy on behalf of interests or causes; and to the wider public, whose wellbeing depends on the quality of those decisions. The editors of this important book have brought together a distinguished range of contributors to provide a focus on the organisational processes, institutions and locations that contribute to the construction and supply of ideas, as well as methods of policy analysis and evaluation. They have succeeded admirably in their aim to describe and critique the policy capacity of the key actors engaged in collective problem solving on behalf of Irish society. In concise, accessible and comprehensive chapters, the contributors explore and evaluate the history, styles and methods of policy analysis in Ireland; the types of policy analysis conducted at different levels of government, from local to European; those outside government who contribute to policy analysis, including social partners, think tanks and civil society organisations; and the wider policy analysis environment in Ireland, including the place of deliberative institutions and the influence of media discourse. A number of recurring themes are explored from different perspectives by the contributors. The search for a model of successful economic modernisation has framed Irish policy discourse, in earlier years without the benefit of much analytical capacity and in more recent times shaped by a range of sophisticated technical analysis, both local and international. National sensitivities have coloured attitudes towards acceptable sources of expert advice or models to follow, favouring American over British expertise in the early decades; embracing British social administration traditions when social policy became more central to government ambition; and turning to the experience and practice of other small European countries as the process of Europeanisation developed. The state played a role in developing an infrastructure for policy analysis to match the agencies of economic development it had created, such as the Central Statistics Office (CSO), the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) and the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). A political culture shaped by our strongly proportional electoral system favoured cautious centrism on the part xix

Policy analysis in Ireland

of large political parties, blurred the distinction between the local and national in major policy debates, and created an openness to deliberative processes outside the institutions of government tasked with identifying ‘an external consensus’ on contentious questions that could then be adopted as public policy. Maura Adshead and Diarmuid Scully observe, in their conclusion to Chapter Thirteen, that in the Irish political system ‘the emphasis was placed on stability and capability rather than ideology’ (p  199). In such an environment, one might have expected a greater blossoming of policy analysis than the record, so comprehensively reviewed here, reveals. Traditional party loyalties forged in the struggle for independence are clearly a major explanatory factor, as is the strength of local issues in Irish electioneering. It may be, also, there has been a belief that the scope for discretion in Irish policy making is limited to the opportunities presented by the external environment. Tacking to the international winds, rather than creating a self-sustaining national system of innovation, has been the strategic focus of Irish governments, with greater or lesser success. In his seminal report The Irish Economy in a Comparative Institutional Perspective (NESC, 1992), Lars Mjoset demonstrated how the interaction of economic structure, demographic dynamics and market opportunities had provided Ireland with a persistently weak national system of innovation. Perhaps the success of Irish policy in pursuing growth led by foreign direct investment through the consistent policy approach described by Rory O’Donnell, as former NESC director, – combining macroeconomic, distributional and structural policy – has become an entrenched national system of innovation that shapes and constrains the field of policy analysis. The range of issues covered by the contributors is so wide and the historical perspective so well sketched that readers will have a no difficulty finding topics to capture their interest. For many, it will revive memories of debates and campaigns that dominated the policy agenda for a time. I found much to ponder and very little with which to disagree. Much of the development of policy analysis described here occurred over the course of my own public service career. Many of the personalities and issues sketched by the authors stirred recollections. I remember Séamus Ó Cinnéide’s lectures at the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) in the early 1970s, emphasising that the way in which policy problems were defined largely determined the policy response. Tony Coughlan’s social policy lectures at Trinity College, Dublin (TCD) urged students to always interrogate policies regarding cui bono (for whose benefit?). I was a social policy analyst at NESC in the late 1970s and recall working on reports that were often the first official Irish treatment of policy issues, such as universality. (I was amused to see Fiona Dukelow cite, in Chapter Three, a report I drafted for NESC in 1981 on future priorities for social policy!) I chaired the Irish Bishops’ Council for Social Welfare in the 1980s after its seminal work on poverty, and I was part of the group that prepared the first Statement on Social Policy of the Society of St Vincent de Paul (and memorably presented it to then Taoiseach Charles Haughey). As Director of NESC from 1990 to 1993 and xx

Foreword

Deputy Chair and Chair from then until 2011, I appreciate the accuracy and force of Rory O’Donnell’s account of its work (Chapter Ten), which he did so much to shape. As Secretary General to the Government and of the Department of the Taoiseach from 2000 to 2011, I had a particular insight into the social partnership process, the perspective of politicians and officials on the process, and the Community and Voluntary Pillar in particular, reflected in the policy shifts described by the authors. For what it’s worth, the trends and patterns described by the authors, including factors impinging on policy capacity and analysis, are consistent with my own recollections and assessment. Perhaps more emphasis might be placed on path dependency in describing the policy process; often the most significant influence on a policy decision is the previous decisions on the same topic. I would also highlight the influence of available institutions and instruments in shaping policy decisions, such as confidence in the capacity of Revenue Commissioners and lack of confidence in some other potential channels. I might also have given more prominence to questions of implementation, especially joining up programmes with analogous or complementary policy goals. The quality and effectiveness of policy decisions are almost always dependent on the quality of implementation. In the same vein, I would highlight the importance of officials, analysts and activists who have direct experience of the lived experience of those who are the focus of policy, but who are also fluent in the language of formal policy development, a rarer combination than might be supposed. Finally, I endorse the authors’ emphasis on the problem-solving character of the policy process, the frequent dearth of timely information on which to base decisions and the difficulty for politicians of acknowledging the uncertainty of outcomes as they progress and defend their decisions. The authors make clear that, in the words of Rory O’Donnell in Chapter Ten, ‘the rationalist sequence – involving analysis recommendation–policy decision–implementation – no longer describes the policy process’ (p 149). Yet the search for better policy making through better analysis and better evidence continues even if, as Frances Ruane points out in Chapter Five, the goal is evidence-informed rather than evidence-based policy making. But what counts as evidence? In her review of gender expertise and policy analysis, Pauline Cullen points out in Chapter Fourteen that ‘the types of knowledge that qualify as expertise, the conditions under which such knowledge has resonance with policy makers and can claim policy success’ (p 212) are problematic. Brendan O’Rourke points out in Chapter Seventeen that ‘what evidence counts as good depends on the assessment of experts, and assessing which experts to trust is no easy task’ (p 252). Indeed, trust in experts is so low as to challenge the legitimacy of many established policy routines. So what is to be done? Despite the challenges and pitfalls, better policy analysis is undoubtedly a route to better policy. The enhanced analytical capacity of the civil service and the Oireachtas, the high quality of the data available through the national statistics system, and the policy focus of think tanks and many civil xxi

Policy analysis in Ireland

society organisations described by the authors are undoubtedly welcome additions to the policy process. Yet it is also clear that the culture, institutions and practice of policy making – on the part of government departments, the Oireachtas, local authorities and indeed the European Union – and their reflection in media both old and new are critical to what Mary P. Murphy and Orla O’Connor call, in Chapter Twelve, the policy opportunity structures that enable policy capacity to be effective. How is that combination of capacity and opportunity to be brought about? I may have a certain bias, but I believe that there is a particular responsibility on the civil service, as the locus of independent policy advice to government, to foster a diverse and flourishing network of policy analysis. It is best placed to support, assist and encourage the diverse strands of analysis because it is uniquely placed to appreciate what types of decisions will be improved, by what types of analysis. There are encouraging signs that in its approach to its own strategic development, the civil service is indeed developing an appetite for just such a role. It will require the combination of technical proficiency and creativity that Rory O’Donnell describes as necessary for the policy analysis developed by NESC. I would suggest that it also requires a willingness to see the civil service as an instrument of social learning, engaging in ‘collective puzzlement on society’s behalf ’, in the words of American political scientist Hugh Heclo. In this role, like NESC, it can assist the policy process by reframing the question, rather than changing the subject. The editors set themselves the task of shining a light on those who, in turn, seek to shine a light into the black box of policy making. They have succeeded admirably, proving the importance of policy analysis as a focus of concern and providing an assured account of its state of development in Ireland.

xxii

Preface The chapters set out here constitute the Irish contribution to the International Library of Policy Analysis series, edited by Michael Howlett and Iris Geva-May, and published by Policy Press. The volume is thus one star in the vast constellation being developed by the series editors to enable the comparison of policy analysis across countries. This book presents the evolution of policy analysis in Ireland and the cutting edge of policy analysis research in the country at the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century. The contributors to this volume are the leading scholars and practitioners of policy analysis in Ireland. The Irish state and academia came late to policy analysis, but this volume highlights that there has been significant catch-up, and innovation, over the past four decades. The template for the volume was established in 2007 by Laurent Dobuzinskis, Michael Howlett and David Laycock with Policy Analysis in Canada (published by the University of Toronto Press) and built on by each subsequent volume in the International Library of Policy Analysis series published by Policy Press. As such, this volume is structured similarly to its predecessors, and although it is a country-specific study, the basic data presented here are comparable with those from other volumes, thus contributing to future comparative policy analysis. It is our hope that this book will be of interest to practitioners, scholars and anyone else concerned with the policy-making process in Ireland and its analysis. John Hogan Mary P. Murphy April 2020

xxiii

ONE

Contextualising policy analysis in Ireland John Hogan and Mary P. Murphy

Introduction Policy Analysis in Ireland constitutes the Irish element in the ever-expanding International Library of Policy Analysis series, edited by Michael Howlett and Iris Geva-May, and published by Policy Press. The volume provides unique insights into the state of policy analysis in Ireland, a topic that has only recently received significant attention in this country. It draws together contributions from some of the leading policy analysis experts, both academics and practitioners, to provide a multidimensional set of perspectives on how policy analysis has developed to its current state, almost exactly a century after the country gained independence. Our aim is to ensure that this volume constitutes a window into the research frontier of Irish policy analysis. The chapters examine the range of institutions and actors involved in policy analysis from across government, the private sector and broader civil society. The intention is not to critique specific policy outcomes or policy developments; rather, the book focuses on the organisational processes, institutions and locations that contribute to the construction and supply of policy ideas as well as methods of policy analysis and evaluation. The chapters examine the policy capabilities of the institutions wherein policy development and evaluation is conducted. Overlap between the chapters allows readers to reflect on how different approaches to policy analysis share similar key features, including an underlying informality related to a relatively pragmatic political culture. However, not all of the chapters agree with each other’s analysis. In this introductory chapter, as editors, we offer an overview of concepts and set the scene with a brief summary of the Irish political and economic context. We then sketch the kinds of policy analysis the volume encompasses, providing readers with a guide to the wide-ranging and diverse contributions. Our practitioner authors provide a number of case studies and other examples of policy analysis from their own experiences, and the academic authors provide insights into a variety of approaches to the study of policy analysis applied in Ireland since independence from the British Empire. The chapters are grouped in four parts as follows: • the history, styles and methods of policy analysis; • the variety of policy analysis conducted at various levels of government; 1

Policy analysis in Ireland

• the expanding range of policy analysis advice coming from think tanks, interest groups, political parties and groups concerned with gender equality; • policy analysis emanating from the wider policy analysis environment, encompassing citizens, the scientific community and the media. All chapters are cross-referenced, but each contribution is self-contained. Readers can, by examining just one chapter, gain an insight into an aspect of policy analysis in Ireland, its evolution and current state. In summation, our hope is that readers find this a useful volume in assisting them gain a more comprehensive appreciation of policy analysis in Ireland – a sorely under-researched, and until recently, underappreciated topic. We also hope to encourage readers to investigate further those aspects of policy analysis that interest them, or that they find useful in understanding some aspect of policy making, and in so doing push forward the Irish policy analysis research frontier. Readers will find that policy analysis in Ireland has been primarily shaped by economic logic and largely uncritical empirical thinking, making it relatively one-dimensional. Insufficient social policy capacity has been a persistent feature of public policy analysis. Institutional advancements made to improve social policy analysis in the latter parts of the 20th century were subsequently diluted by 21st-century austerity. Indeed, the impact of many of the 21st-century institutional and policy governance reforms has been to invest in strengthening economic policy analysis and to reinforce economistic forms of reliance on quantitative evidence. The consequences of a state that has somewhat successfully modernised its economy while maintaining a weak welfare state are seen most starkly in two recent events. The 2020 general election, with its focus on housing and health as proxies for dissatisfaction with a weak welfare state, highlighted voters’ dissatisfaction with the outcomes of policy and a governance system characterised by a disjuncture between the elite and the voters. The COVID-19 pandemic subsequently laid bare the underlying fault-lines and inequalities of the Irish economic and social system, arguably fault-lines that had not been sufficiently explored or understood in mainstream processes of policy analysis. Issues such as the gendered and low-paid nature of the essential economy, or the fragile reality that 70% of crèches and 80% of nursing homes were privately owned, were exposed. Attempts to respond to the pandemic also demonstrate the weaknesses of our policy analysis, the lack of core data, the absence of exante gender proofing of key policy decisions, the exclusion of key actors and voices, and the paucity of core public services. The post-pandemic challenge for policy analysis is immense. How to enable policy makers, the political system and society to assess what is needed to enable Ireland to build its resilience to future pandemics, to generate sustainable employment, and to tackle the climate and environmental emergency as well as the challenges of automation and digital transformations, and age-old questions of gender and class inequality and racism? 2

Contextualising policy analysis in Ireland

This book has a relatively narrow focus on the more formal process of policy analysis. The remainder of this chapter outlines some key policy analysis concepts, the Irish context, the structure of the book and the outline of each chapter. We are mindful, however, that much of the recent change in Irish society has been led from outside of formal political or policy institutions. Take, for example, the political vitality generated by the media, academics and activists in aggregating the evidence that would lead to impactful, historic child abuse reports. This book does not include analysis of these broader social movements and the actors who have generated political momentum for social and economic change, and in so doing, have insisted that alternatives are possible and have generated new knowledge and perspectives. Often these imagined alternatives are considered outside the frame of what is considered possible within policy analysis. Indeed, policy analysts, and related actors and institutions, are often vested interests and part of the power dynamic that serve to reinforce the status quo. Such alternatives are increasingly salient and are gaining momentum, thus challenging policy analysis. Those who work to promote such alternatives can also gain from this book’s insight into those who broker knowledge production and frame policy debate.

Some key concepts We distinguish the study of policy from the study of policy analysis. Policy generally refers to a set of ideas, or a plan, while analysis we understand as a process of organised examination of, and judgment about, a topic. Heclo (1974) was interested in the administrative capacity of the state and non-elected policy experts as an independent force in social politics and learning, particularly where uncertainty required the application of intellect to public problems. Greater understanding of how policy analysis happens shines a light into the black box of policy making, which Heclo (1974, pp 305–6) described as a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf. This is consistent with Howlett and Ramesh (2003), who define policy making as a problem-solving activity. Complexity requires reflexivity and capacity to creatively diagnose problems and envision policy alternatives as potential solutions. Howlett (2009) understands policy analysis as processes of applied social and scientific research pursued by government officials and non-governmental organisations. This is usually directed at designing, implementing and evaluating existing policies, programmes and other specific courses of action adopted, or contemplated, by states. The study of policy analysis is concerned with ‘policy capacity’, ‘the ability to provide policy analysis and advice, participate effectively and exert influence in policy development’ (Goodwin and Phillips, 2015, p 249). ‘Policy analytical capacity’ describes the ability of individuals in a policy-relevant organisation to produce valuable, policy-relevant research and analysis on topics asked of them, or of their own choosing (Howlett, 2009, pp 162–3). Communication and influence are part of analysis, hence advocacy skills are also part of policy analysis capacity. 3

Policy analysis in Ireland

Policy analysis traditions, originating in the United States (US), prioritise rational, quantitative, policy cycle-oriented analysis that privileges economic cost–benefit analysis and/or the use of randomised controlled trials in evaluation. However, this is not the case in Ireland where policy analysis has developed in a more pragmatic fashion. Mindful that in most countries policy analysis is evolving as a complex process incorporating different methodological and intellectual approaches, the book encourages a wide variety of approaches to the study of policy analysis (Head and Crowley, 2015). These include institutionalist approaches to policy processes, case-study approaches of the different components, political economy accounts that focus on economic contexts, interpretivist and experiential studies of policy work, and normative, critical and deliberative theories of the policy process. Informing government on policy making is integral to the democratic process (Chari et al, 2019). Differing histories and political institutions influence how each country sources and configures advisers and influence in policy formulation. Countries develop their own unique set of traditions when it comes to the presence and skills of analysts and advisers, and the techniques used in considering policy options. In Canada, for example, modern policy analysis emerged after the Second World War, and was first employed in budgeting defence and urban development (Dobuzinskis et al, 2007). For a long time, policy analysis in the US has been a professional career that can be pursued by graduate students (Meltsner, 1979). Internationally, policy analysis has also become, and its adherents have sought for it to become, more professionalised so as to improve government policy making and implementation. Ireland is something of a laggard in this regard, coming late to the profession of policy analysis.

Irish governing context for policy analysis A key challenge for the authors of this volume is to locate their specific treatment of policy analysis in the changing Irish institutional and governance context, to assess whether Ireland has a ‘policy analytic style’ and whether and how this might be changing. While relevant contexts are discussed in each chapter, the following overview is offered as a guide to the overall context in which policy analysis takes place in Ireland. Ireland is characterised by its post-colonial adoption and adaptation of both the British Westminster model of prime ministerial-led parliamentary government associated with centralised executive power and a compliant legislature, and the Whitehall administrative tradition whereby the civil service is both apolitical and generalist and dominated by a strong and conservative department of finance. The Westminster system stresses ‘the importance of retaining at least part of the traditional political-administrative dichotomy in policy advice in the form of conventions about civil service neutrality’ (Craft and Howlett, 2013, p 192). The legislature (Oireachtas) is bi-cameral; the lower house (Dáil Éireann), with more powerful scrutiny functions, consists of 160 members directly elected 4

Contextualising policy analysis in Ireland

from 39 constituencies. The more limited upper house (Seanad Éireann) has 60  members who are indirectly elected or nominated. The Irish model is institutionally majoritarian, following the Westminster model, but in practice is increasingly informed by consensus political models and cultures. A distinguishing feature that sets Ireland apart from its former colonial master is its relatively unique proportional representation single transferable vote (PR-STV) electoral system, which infused electoral politics with intra-party competition that promoted service over policy and a form of clientelism, or micro-populism, leading to a relatively anti-intellectual political culture (Kirby and Murphy, 2011). The focus on executive power in the Westminister model means policy analysis revolves around government rather than parliamentary cycles. Nonpartisan and professional public service institutions serve governing parties and executives, which traditionally limited competing advice in parliament. This means the relatively small local media had an enhanced role in policy discourse and has proved itself influential in generating both policy knowledge and social change. Power in the unitary state was highly centralised with little regional governance and local institutions that equated more to local administration than to local government. This subnational government, among the weakest in the European Union (EU) 27 member states, has had a lasting impact on local policy analysis capacity. Size is a relatively important determinant in the welfare of countries. Ireland, as a relatively small state, may have underdeveloped innovation, administrative and policy analysis capacities, and was also relatively slow to recognise the merits of learning from other small states. A relatively insular and homogenous society until the mid-20th century, Ireland thereafter reoriented as a small open economy (SOE), but remained relatively mono-cultural until the 1990s. That decade also saw a considerable diminution of what had up to then been a strongly patriarchal society, with negative consequences for women’s presence in public life and their role in policy analysis and with impacts on how policy knowledge has been gendered. Other distinguishing features included a cultural orientation to vocational corporatism, first instituted in the form of subsidiarity and the powerful policy role played by the Irish Catholic Church and then instituted in various forms of corporate institutions, most notably social partnership, from 1987 to 2008. This shift to social partnership was mirrored at a local level and forms of networked governance evolved to address deficits in more formal policy capacity. While networked governance was not even nor necessarily inclusive, non-state actors began to more actively shape public policy as think tanks, civil society organisations and others began to populate the policy analysis space. These more complex spaces required more process-oriented skills and capacity for networked policy analysis as well as innovation and experimentation. So too was internationalisation important. From the 1950s, and particularly from the 1970s, Ireland’s exposure, as an SOE, to international policy processes opened up new policy influences and approaches to policy analysis including Europeanisation, globalisation and policy transfer. Data and evidence from the Organisation for 5

Policy analysis in Ireland

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), along with United Nations (UN) norms, were key markers of this international context. Of note over recent decades is how periods of boom and bust have affected approaches to, and the capacity for, policy analysis. Ireland, in particular, was a state where neoliberal discourse dominates(Phelan, 2007) and the country was heralded as a triumph for neoliberal ideology during the Celtic Tiger period (Powell, 2003). The global financial crisis of 2008 saw the onset of what is referred to as the Great Recession and the subsequent years of austerity. This period is associated with reflection, in Ireland and elsewhere, about failures of policy analysis, particularly economic and financial policy analysis, and consequent attempts to redress capacity deficits. It is notable that as the economy stagnated, and the banks collapsed, Ireland was portrayed as a disaster for neoliberal policies. On emerging from the crisis after the end of the bailout in December 20131, the country has been held up again, as in the late 1980s period of ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’, as a paragon of neoliberal austerity. This economic revival appeared complete when in 2020 Ireland’s gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated to be growing at 3.5% per annum, with unemployment below 5%, and overall GDP significantly higher than at the height of the Celtic Tiger. In this context, and with the focus on new social risks, including demographic factors and particularly climate change, attention had turned to policy innovation, only to be halted by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has both laid bare the fault-lines of previous policies and presented significant new challenges for policy analysis. The 2008 economic crisis had a significant political legacy that over a decade shifted what was a steady 2.5 party system dominated by two competing centrist parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. The 2011 general election saw the incumbent Fianna Fáil lose over two thirds of its parliamentary seats and a new Fine Gael– Labour coalition government win over two thirds of the seats in Dáil Éireann. In 2016, the Labour Party suffered heavy electoral losses, leaving a minority Fine Gael party in government but dependent on a confidence and supply agreement with the partially recovered Fianna Fáil. The increased political fragmentation after the 2020 general election, that led to a new Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and Green Party coalition, was a significant benchmark, signalling an end to almost 100 years of historical ‘civil war’ politics. It also demonstrated that Ireland, like other countries, is now experiencing more political volatility, with complex coalition formation and/or minority governments providing a new and likely permanent context of policy making and policy analysis.

The content and structure of the book ‘Conceptualizing policy advice systematically, in terms of the configuration of the various constituent elements in any given jurisdiction or policy sector is useful for understanding how those parts interact in systems of advice and influence’ (Craft and Howlett, 2013, p 193). This volume presents the results 6

Contextualising policy analysis in Ireland

of a comprehensive examination of policy analysis activities, at all levels of Irish governance, and in the non-governmental sector. Each author has published extensively in their area of expertise, while many also participated in a research symposium2 in Dublin in November 2019 that sought to enable contributors to see and develop linkages between their contributions and areas of expertise and to develop understanding of where policy analysis stands in contemporary Ireland. In line with the series that includes this volume, the authors set out to explain a complex policy analytical and advisory landscape involving the state and the non-governmental sector. History, styles and methods of policy analysis in Ireland In Chapter Two, Clare O’Mahony provides an overview of the emergence of economic policy analysis in Ireland from independence to joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. After independence, the government’s focus was on state building, leaving limited scope for economic policy. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the state adopted a protectionist stance as the rest of the world also looked inwards. However, little in the way of policy analysis from a small and underdeveloped economics profession seems to have influenced this approach. This changed in the late 1940s as outward-looking policies were tentatively adopted and import substitution industrialisation was replaced by export-led industrialisation. This occurred as Western Europe, recovering from the Second World War, moved towards trade liberalisation. This marked the beginning of Ireland’s long relationship with inward foreign direct investment (FDI) that was to transform it into a globally integrated, cosmopolitan society. O’Mahony points out that as the Irish economics profession developed, so did its analytical skills. This resonates with the subsequent contributions of Rory O’Donnell on social partnership in Chapter Ten and Chris McInerney on think tanks in Chapter Eleven. As an SOE, Ireland’s economic policy analysis and advice is framed by the international context. In Chapter Three, Fiona Dukelow situates policy analysis within a social policy context and begins by stressing its early theocratic formation. The chapter is an examination of the history of social policy analysis in Ireland since the 1950s, when the country began its journey towards modernity. The gradual change in social policy analysis from the 1950s ties with Clare O’Mahony’s work on economic policy analysis in Chapter Two, while social policy analysis evolution is linked with Mary C. Murphy’s Chapter Nine on the European influence on Irish policy analysis and policy making, and Rory O’Donnell’s Chapter Ten on social partnership. The chapter reviews the actors and institutions involved and the knowledge deployed as the country moved towards a globalised society with its attendant social policy challenges. Dukelow charts the challenges of social policy analysis under what she characterises as the shift from the dominance of a theocentric paradigm to an econocentric paradigm. This saw the subordination of the social to the economic valuation of social policy by the 1990s. 7

Policy analysis in Ireland

In Chapter Four, Muiris MacCarthaigh examines the development of the state’s capacity for policy analysis. He begins by considering the origins and organisation of the Irish civil service before examining the evolution of its policy analysis capacity, with increasing ‘agencification’ from the early 1970s linking it with O’Donnell’s discussion on social partnership in Chapter Ten. The economic crisis after 2008 exposed failings in policy foresight and planning in the civil service. Thus, the issue of policy analysis in the civil service emerged as of particular salience, resulting in some important reforms. The discussion of civil service reforms from the late 2000s ties with Frances Ruane’s work on evidence-based policy making in Chapter Five and Richard Boyle and Joanna O’Riordan’s study of the civil service in Chapter Eight. The chapter draws on interviews with senior civil servants. In Chapter Five, Frances Ruane discusses how in recent decades Ireland has increasingly used empirical evidence in policy making, a trend that has become prevalent in the EU over the past 30 years. Ireland has favoured an evidenceinformed approach to policy making, as opposed to an evidence-based approach, as this integrates empirical evidence with an acknowledgement that other factors that matter in policy making are not readily quantifiable. The chapter resonates with MacCarthaigh’s work on reforms in the civil service in Chapter Four. An important role in the process of integrating evidence into policy making has been performed by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). This is through the provision of high-quality datasets to inform policy. The chapter also examines the investments made in the skills sets needed to analyse the vast quantities of data available today and reviews the evolution of Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service (IGEES) in this regard. The chapter concludes by assessing the challenges ahead, including the degree to which the prevalence of fake facts endangers and undermines official statistics and carefully researched analyses. Policy analysis at various levels of government: from local to the EU In Chapter Six, Aodh Quinlivan focuses on the experience of policy analysis in local government, a subject he finds more complex than might be expected. While he acknowledges enormous weaknesses within the system – including lack of constitutional protection; low autonomy; few functions; political, administrative, functional and financial centralisation; and the rationalisation of councils – he notes policy analysis potential. He finds that in individual, often uncoordinated ways, local councils play innovative roles in economic development and policy formulation, with local authorities pushing boundaries with a variety of democratic reforms aimed at enhancing participation in policy processes, including Public Participation Networks, which are examined through a case study. This mass of contradictions represents a blend of innovation, incrementalism, but also entrenchment of persistent challenges regarding the form, functioning and financing of policy analysis potential of local government. 8

Contextualising policy analysis in Ireland

In Chapter Seven, Bernadette Connaughton explores the historical and contemporary role of parliamentary and other political committees in policy analysis, and the institutional supports that enable their function in policy making. While she asserts that the dearth of assistance and resources available to Teachtaí Dála (TDs) has contributed to underwhelming legislative performance, she finds that developments since 2011 provide an important context for amending relative deficiencies in earlier reform initiatives and the systemic policy failures highlighted by the crisis. The agenda to introduce political-administrative reform post-2011 included building policy analysis capacity within the Oireachtas and addressing the significant imbalances in executive– legislative relations. In particular, three areas of interest are explored – access to information and research capacity for policy analysis, including the emerging Parliamentary Budget Office, which may encourage more meaningful contributions in the public policy process; the development of the committee system and its activities; and participation in inquiries. In Chapter Eight, Richard Boyle and Joanna O’Riordan examine the development of policy analysis in the civil service. Policy analysis is central to the role of the civil service – developing and testing ideas about policy – at the intersection of politics and administration. In the Whitehall tradition, inherited by Ireland, civil servants were expected to be generalists with unpartisan perspectives. Recruits to the civil service came from the liberal arts rather than professional or technical backgrounds. But the 1960s and 1970s saw the gradual emergence of the policy analysis concept. Policy analysis requires knowledge of the relevant discipline under scrutiny, and some skills in quantitative analysis, combined with the more traditional policy capabilities. Throughout the chapter, which focuses on policy analysis developments in the civil service from the early 2000s, and in particular changes that have taken place since the financial crisis of 2008, a stronger evidence base emerges to better inform policy making. O’Riordan and Boyle find that a balance between generalists with broad conceptual skills and specialists with quantitative analytical skills continues to influence developments with regard to policy analysis in the civil service. In Chapter Nine, Mary C. Murphy reviews the influence of the EU on the policy-making process and policy analysis in Ireland. The country’s membership has been marked by periods of volatility, with support for the institution wavering at times. Membership has aided Ireland’s global positioning and ability to cope with international competition, but has also constrained the policy analysis process as autonomous action by national actors can be limited by legal commitments to EU membership. Policy initiatives emanating from the EU have sometimes challenged conservative domestic constituencies. Resonating with the contribution of MacCarthaigh in Chapter Four, Murphy provides a pair of policy case studies to demonstrate a variety of Europeanisation effects across the Irish policy analysis spectrum. Being part of the EU has produced distinct patterns of adaptation and contestation at the domestic level. The consequences of EU membership have been both expansive and comprehensive, affecting myriad domestic issues, sectors and policies. 9

Policy analysis in Ireland

Think tanks, interest groups, political parties and gender-based policy analysis In Chapter Ten, Rory O’Donnell examines policy analysis in the institutional arrangements created by the state to involve the social partners – employers, unions, framers and voluntary/community organisations – in the policy process, particularly the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). This method of policy analysis was developed in response to interest group dialogue, which in Ireland took the shape of social partnership (1987–2008). The NESC’s early work is examined, followed by a discussion on the significant changes in its role after 1986. Its analysis of the economic crisis of the 1980s in A Strategy for Development 1986–1990 (NESC, 1986) played a central role in the resolution of that crisis. The NESC sees its role as a ‘boundary organisation’, managing the relationship between policy analysis and diverse actors. Despite differences in overall national patterns of policy analysis, and interest group mediation, O’Donnell argues there were similarities between the use of policy analysis in interest group dialogue in Ireland and elsewhere. In Chapter Eleven, Chris McInerney reviews the role of think tanks in policy making. Like most modern democracies, Ireland relies on a range of sources to influence the choices and designs of public policy. Apart from political and administrative influences, a wide variety of civil society, academic and private sector actors seek to access, influence, advise, inform and sometimes embarrass those in power. McInerney focuses on think tanks, defining them, reviewing international experience, examining different types and considering the complex issue of assessing think tank influence. He maps out Ireland’s limited think tank landscape and examines recent developments. Think tanks’ influence on Irish policy making is assessed across a number of indicators. McInerney’s chapter speaks to a range of themes that are also examined in Chapters Three and Chapter Twelve. In Chapter Twelve, Mary P. Murphy and Orla O’Connor assess the relationship between civil society organisations (CSOs) and policy analysis in contemporary Ireland. Since the 1980s, CSOs have assumed an increasingly important role in social, economic and environmental policy and have been resilient and versatile in their approach to engaging with policy formation. Murphy and O’Connor discuss two themes. First, they assert that the variety of CSOs is reflected in their diverse range of models of change. The engagement of CSOs with public policy has not evolve linearly. CSOs adapt their models of change to meet their immediate political environment, in some cases requiring changes in their form of policy analysis capacity. Technological changes also change the context of how social media is used to utilise policy analysis and advocacy. Second, while during social partnership (1987–2008) the CSOs’ space for policy analysis was expansive, it has subsequently downsized. Simultaneously, a ‘new politics’ has emerged that is characterised by new parliamentary and public forms of policy making that require new forms of policy analytical capacity with different implications for CSOs, bringing them closer to the political system. 10

Contextualising policy analysis in Ireland

In Chapter Thirteen, Maura Adshead and Diarmuid Scully examine the role of political parties in the policy process. The chapter employs a model of the policy process stages to examine how Irish political parties operate in each stage. This constitutes an exploration of the extent to which so-called ‘new politics’ might have affected recent political party roles and performance. The authors find that ‘new politics’, governments without a clear majority seeking consensual support for their policies in the Dáil, is not new, with no single-party majority government since 1977. Programmatic government has been normalised and consensus seeking has become the modus operandi for parties. What is new is that long-established parties are now joined by an increasing number of smaller parties in the Dáil, raising the potential to shift the balance of power away from the larger parties, with consequences for the style of, and capacity for, policy analysis. However, the chapter shows that this tendency has been less marked than might have been expected. In Chapter Fourteen, Pauline Cullen explores gender expertise and policy analysis. Gender policy analysis requires the expertise to apply gender as a variable in the processes that generate policy analysis. A variety of individuals and institutions in society, from academic to women’s policy agencies, provide gender expertise through activities including gender audits, gender budgeting, research and analysis, gender consultation, gender training and gender assessments. Considering gender expertise permits us to make visible the types of knowledge that qualify as expertise, the conditions under which such knowledge has resonance with policy makers and can claim policy success. Understanding the barriers preventing the successful application of gender equality policies gives insights into how and why gender inequality persists. The public, science and the media: the wider policy analysis environment in Ireland In Chapter Fifteen, Clodagh Harris focuses on public consultation and participation in Ireland, processes that directly engage citizens beyond the ballot box. Initiatives, including participatory budgeting and deliberative mini-publics such as citizens’ assemblies and citizens’ juries, endeavour to engage citizens more directly in political processes either by widening and/or deepening participation. As exercises in deliberative democracy, and demonstrations of political vitality, they endeavour to place the citizen at the heart of constitutional and policy issues as new types of governance arrangements are required for a complex networked society. The methods used to facilitate public consultation, participation and deliberation in Ireland are critically assessed as to whether they make a difference to public policy, and whether effective consultation mechanisms can extend to regulatory actors. In Chapter Sixteen, Eoin Cullina, Jason Harold and John McHale examine national science policy as a case study in evidence-based policy design. They review the strategy and science of Irish science policy in light of the challenges for such policies in an SOE. The success of knowledge-intensive industries 11

Policy analysis in Ireland

depends on access to knowledge. However, private firms tend to underinvest in basic science where much of the benefit spills over to other firms, highlighting an important role for governments. Governments of SOEs face two challenges in devising a strategy for science policy: first, the benefits of science investments are likely to flow disproportionately to other countries; second, small size may limit the benefits of agglomeration economies that are central to many knowledgeintensive industries. Despite obvious spillover and scale challenges, geographical stickiness of new knowledge production and the capacity to absorb knowledge from the global stock depends on being active at the frontiers of knowledge production. The authors conclude that the national benefit of research is the advantage in being able to access knowledge produced elsewhere. In Chapter Seventeen, Brendan K. O’Rourke argues that a discursive approach can add much to our understanding of what has happened in policy analysis in Ireland. The concept of hyper-specialisation is introduced as an important feature of the context in which policy discourse takes place, and shows the complexities discourses face as they travel across societies. Policy-relevant discourses of media, and actors within the media, are examined, along with what recent developments mean for Irish public policy discourse. An important factor is how such policy discourses are internationalised in Ireland and the impact of that complication on participation in policy debates is examined. Further complexities include the effects of technocratisation and economisation on how we discuss policy. The chapter concludes that the discursive power of economists remains an important feature of our policy discourses.

Conclusion A ‘healthy policy-research community outside government can play a vital role in enriching public understanding and debate of policy issues’ (Anderson, 1996, p 486), and can function to support a government’s policy analysis capacity (Craft and Howlett, 2013). The chapters in this book will certainly acquaint the reader with the policy research and analysis community within and outside government in Ireland. While they point to a range of competencies and deficits, they also highlight the increasingly complex policy environment and the degree to which the context for policy making and the political system is changing rapidly and so requiring constant recasting and reframing of policy.3 The level of uncertainty associated with social risks, and particularly climate change, means policy analysis processes are increasingly challenged to innovate new approaches, new forms of analysis, data and evidence. COVID-19 demonstrates this uncertainty and the scale of responses required of policy analysis also gives us a new base from which to compare Ireland’s response. These responses must be generated in a more demanding political context with more temporary political coalitions requiring often immediate ‘solutions’ to contemporary policy problems. There is, however, room for optimism. The NESC (2010, p 280) reflects that there is a need to compare, analyse and reflect on our policy capacity and in 12

Contextualising policy analysis in Ireland

particular to understand what makes good policy analysis work. In this context, and reflected in the book, various policy institutions offer good practice, adopting new-style information systems, review processes, citizen engagement and new data and evidence bases. Policy capacity, often associated with EU regulations and practices, is also enhanced by international developments, data, evidence and benchmark goals. The UN Sustainable Development Goals offer focus and direction for policy analysis for the next decade. At the time of writing, the long-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was unknown, but it can be expected to change politics, society and economics and to present ongoing challenges for policy analysis in Ireland and internationally, as well as to open up the space for those advocating for alternatives and even more paradigmatic forms of transformation. Looking to the future, wicked problems and grand societal challenges mean that policy makers and policy analysts have to find ways to inform decision making in contexts where there are no answers, or where the answers have significant implication for the distribution of power and resources. Various chapters suggest mixed results from innovative experiments in more deliberative processes of policy analysis. While unique, place-based deliberations and experimentations are more likely to generate realistic assessments of problems and solutions, they cannot necessarily be scaled up and replicated in other contexts. Conversely, national policy often runs the risk of failing in local circumstances without policy mechanisms that can really understand and conceptualise the local context. The challenge remains to broker policy learning back into more formal environments, particularly in the context of weak regional and local governance, for without bringing policy learning back to the centre higher order policy change is less likely to take place. Sabel (2020) argues that increased uncertainty requires a shift from a ‘look before you leap’ style of analysis and decision making to a ‘look as you leap’ approach. This necessarily requires more collaboration, consultation and co‑design, which in turn requires a more complex set of skills, greater reflexivity and innovative institutional processes from policy analysts and from citizens, residents, workers and service users participating in processes of collective puzzlement. This means shifts in power. All policy actors need to ensure that policy analysis incorporates an intersectional lens, including assessment from gender and equality perspectives, and that creative policy processes enable the full range of voices to inform potential analysis and solutions. Clearly defining the contributions of policy analysis to policy development and implementation is challenging. This is because the policy-making process is a black box. Largely unquantifiable factors, such as short-term political calculations, play a significant role in policy decisions and policy making by government, politicians and political entrepreneurs (Hogan and Feeney, 2012). While the application of different styles of policy analysis has become increasingly prevalent in Ireland over the past 30 years, examination of policy analysis is still in its infancy and Ireland would benefit from more research in both the scale and 13

Policy analysis in Ireland

scope. This would enable us to chart more clearly efforts at policy analysis and the influences and objectives behind it. That said, this volume encompasses a great range of issues that are of critical importance to understanding contemporary Irish policy analysis and highlight how, in a modern society, policies are highly complex and integrated entities. Notes 1

2

3

In December 2013 Ireland announced that it would not require further funds from the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and European Central Bank, collectively referred to as the Trioka. This symposium was hosted by Maynooth University and the Technological University Dublin, and supported by the Business, Society and Sustainability Research Centre in the College of Business, Technological University Dublin. The editors draw here on reflections about policy analysis from the conference Knowledge and Policy: Confronting Governance Challenges in the New Decade, NESC and Department of Sociology, Maynooth University, 7 January 2020, Dublin.

References Anderson, G. (1996) ‘The new focus on the policy capacity of the federal government’, Canadian Public Administration, 39(4): 469–88. Chari, R., Hogan, J., Murphy, G. and Crepaz, M. (2019) Regulating Lobbying: A Global Comparison (2nd edn), Manchester: Manchester University Press. Craft, J. and Howlett, M. (2013) ‘The dual dynamics of policy advisory systems: the impact of externalization and politicization on policy advice’, Policy and Society, 32(3): 187–97. Dobuzinskis, L., Howlett, M. and Laycock, D. (2007) ‘Policy analysis in Canada: the state of the art’, in L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett and D. Laycock (eds) Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp 1–24. Goodwin, S. and Phillips, R. (2015) ‘Policy capacity in the community sector’, in B. Head and K. Crowley (eds) Policy Analysis in Australia, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 245–58. Head, B. and Crowley, K. (eds) (2015) Policy Analysis in Australia, Bristol: Policy Press. Heclo, H. (1974) Modern Social Policies in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hogan, J. and Feeney, S. (2012) ‘Crises and policy change – the role of the political entrepreneur’, Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, 4(2): 1–16. Howlett, M. (2009) ‘Policy analytical capacity and evidence-based policy-making: lessons from Canada’, Canadian Public Administration, 52(2): 153–75. Howlett, M. and Ramesh, M. (2003) Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kirby, P. and Murphy, M. (2011) Towards a Second Republic: Irish Politics after the Celtic Tiger, London: Pluto. Meltsner, A.J. (1979) ‘Creating a policy analysis profession’, Society, 16(6): 45–51. 14

Contextualising policy analysis in Ireland

NESC (National Economic and Social Council) (1986) A Strategy for Development 1986–1990: Growth, Employment and Fiscal Balance, Report No. 83, Dublin: NESC. NESC (2010) Re-Finding Success in Europe: The Challenge for Irish Institutions and Policy, Report No. 122, Dublin: NESC. Phelan, S. (2007) ‘The discourses of neoliberal hegemony: the case of the Irish Republic’, Critical Discourse Studies, 4(1): 29–48. Powell, B. (2003) ‘Economic freedom and growth: the case of the Celtic Tiger’, Cato Journal, 22(3): 431–48. Sabel, C. (2020) ‘Governance and wicked problems: environment, climate, human services and quality jobs’, Paper presented at the Knowledge and Policy: Confronting Governance Challenges in the New Decade conference, NESC and Department of Sociology, Maynooth University, Dublin, 7 January.

15

Part One History, styles and methods of policy analysis in Ireland

17

TWO

The evolution of economic policy analysis in Ireland Clare O’Mahony

Introduction This chapter traces the emergence of modern economic policy analysis in Ireland in the critical industrialisation drives in Ireland’s development path from independence in 1922 to joining the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. At independence, Ireland was in political turmoil, having fought a war of independence and subsequently a civil war. The economy was underdeveloped and predominantly agricultural. Living standards were low and emigration was high. The overarching economic problem was job creation. In the early years of the new independent state, given the political climate, the government’s primary focus was on state building and the scope of economic policy was limited. From 1932, a change in government saw the state take a more interventionist role in the economy, adopting an isolationist, protectionist outlook and building economic self-sufficiency through import substitution industrialisation (ISI). This was only vaguely rooted in economic reasoning, founded more on nationalist sentiments than on solid economic analysis. There was a shift in both the use of economic policy analysis and in the approach towards industrialisation from 1948 with a reorientation to outward-looking policies and the encouragement of export-led industrialisation (ELI). This radical change was to transform the country from narrowly focused and insular to outward-looking and cosmopolitan. Irish economic policy is shaped by the interaction of various stakeholders and interest groups, framed by the changing international environment. As a small, dependent, post-colonial economy, Ireland has always been subject to external influences but has limited bargaining power. This limits the scope of domestic policy making. Ireland’s protectionist period largely coincided with the rest of the world looking inwards, following the Great Depression during the 1930s. The shift to outward-looking policy occurred in tandem with the movement towards trade liberalisation after the Second World War. There were also wider domestic social and political influences on economic policy making, including nationalism and the power of the Catholic Church (which was suspicious of economic planning and government intervention, considering these to be aligned with socialism). While today much of the economic policy analysis is conducted by economists, whether in the public or private sector, in the early years of the state, it was 19

Policy analysis in Ireland

largely undertaken by civil servants, with limited contributions from academia and foreign experts. The Irish economics profession was initially small but expanded over time, as did the quantity and quality of economic analysis. The next sections briefly look at Ireland’s experience of industrialising and the significance of its links with Britain. These are followed by a discussion of the dearth of economic policy analysis during the ISI era and its emergence at the same time as the policy approach itself shifted towards ELI. The chapter finishes with some concluding comments.

Industrialisation: the Irish experience Immediately following independence in 1922, there was only a limited drive towards industrialisation, which was supported by low tariffs. The relatively laissez-faire approach to industrialisation can be attributed to the need to focus on state building as well as to the support base of the government party Cumann na nGaedheal, mainly drawn from large-scale farmers and professionals who were in favour of free trade and maintaining the status quo (O’Malley, 1989). Agriculture was viewed as the key to prosperity. The first move to an active industrial policy began with a change in government in 1932. The new Fianna Fáil government’s support base was small-scale farmers and workers (O’Malley, 1989). The emphasis was on self-sufficiency through ISI and protectionism. Tools used included tariffs, quotas and import licensing, together with the Control of Manufactures Acts of 1932 and 1934, which required majority Irish ownership of industry. This policy resulted in some economic growth, but large-scale emigration continued, as jobs were lost in agriculture as quickly as they were created in manufacturing industry (Ryan, 1955). Increases in living standards were attributable as much to emigration as to economic growth per se. By the 1950s, there was frustration with the continued high levels of emigration but few opportunities for ISI remained.1 Rising import demand from both consumers and import-substituting domestic industry, combined with the fall in meat exports following the end of rationing in Britain, led to balance of payments crises in the 1950s (FitzGerald, 1957; O’Malley, 1989). The shift to outward-looking policies and ELI was a three-pronged approach involving trade liberalisation together with fiscal inducements in the form of tax concessions and grants. Given the difficulties that protected domestic industry was likely to experience in building export capacity, this inevitably involved incentivising foreign direct investment (FDI), a policy often referred to as ‘industrialisation by invitation’.

Links with Britain Until 1922, Ireland had effectively been a province of the British Empire. At independence, the Irish economy was heavily intertwined with the British 20

The evolution of economic policy analysis in Ireland

economy and there was institutional continuity, particularly in the civil service (Garvin, 2004). Economic policy analysts looked to Britain as a comparator. This is understandable given the historic ties, geographical proximity, common language, common labour market and very high level of trade between the two countries. In the 1950s, approximately 80% of Irish exports still went to Britain and most of the remainder went to other Commonwealth countries or former British colonies (FitzGerald, 1959). However, there were crucial differences between Ireland and Britain. First, Ireland was a latecomer to industrialisation whereas Britain was the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution. Second, Ireland was a post-colonial economy, unique in Western Europe. O’Malley (1989) discusses the dependency of latecomers on ‘dominant advanced countries’, citing the ideas of the dependency school of economic development. Britain’s dominance played a central role in policy analysis, from the inward-looking self-sufficiency of ISI to the outward-looking policy of ELI. Both policy approaches were partially informed by a political desire to be economically independent from Britain. Kennedy and colleagues (1988) argue that the insularity of the 1930s was a search to find a national identity differentiated from Britain. The political will that production should be in Irish hands therefore weakened understandably in the face of potential United States (US) rather than United Kingdom (UK) ownership (Barry and O’Mahony, 2017). Third, Ireland was relatively poor. Foyle (1959) cites 1956 statistics from the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) – the precursor of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – that record Ireland’s average income per capita as half that of Britain’s and one quarter that of the US.2 Fourth, Britain was a large economy while Ireland had a small domestic market. Ireland’s population in the 1920s, at less than three million, was only a small fraction of the UK’s population of over 44 million. The idea that Ireland was very different from Britain does not seem to have been part of the consciousness. Severing the psychological link was difficult, given that Ireland had been a British colony for centuries. According to Lee (1989, p 628), the Irish situation was seen as ‘only a deviation, from the English norm, and not a difference in kind’. Furthermore, Britain remained an important trading partner and political stability required maintaining a good relationship (Kennedy et al, 1988). Referring to this ‘anglocentricity’, Fanning (1983) cites the Swedish economist, Per Jacobsson who sat on the Banking Commission from 1934 to 1938, remarking that the Irish only knew big economies like Britain and the US, and had to be encouraged to consider countries such as Sweden and Switzerland as suitable models. An important aspect of this openness to the British economy was the freedom to work in Britain. This provided an effective floor to wages and opportunities for Irish emigrants, fostering familial and social connections between the two countries. However, despite strong institutional, economic and social ties, there was a political desire to break the link with the ‘old master’. This was a factor in the drive to self-sufficiency in the 1930s, with Ryan (1955, p 59) arguing that 21

Policy analysis in Ireland

‘political dissatisfaction’ with the importance of Britain in our international trade turned self-sufficiency into a ‘means in itself ’. It was also the backdrop that made it easier to push through outward-looking reforms, particularly after the US took over from Britain as the main global source of FDI.3 Links with the US were politically more palatable (Barry and O’Mahony, 2017).

Industrialisation without economic policy analysis, 1922–47 In the early years, the main observation to be made about economic policy analysis is that it was largely non-existent. Policy making in this period has been variously described as piecemeal, unsophisticated, haphazard and indiscriminate, without a long-term vision and giving an impression of spontaneity (Ryan, 1955; Kennedy et al, 1988; Lee, 1989). Garvin (2004, p 221) claims that empirical research was seen as ‘no substitute for common sense’ while FitzGerald (1959, p 141) argues that the protectionist policy of the 1930s and 1940s was based on assumptions behind which there was ‘virtually no economic research’ so that this policy may have been ‘founded on misconceptions or mis-understandings’. Lee (1989), for example, describes civil servants trawling through lists to find imported products that might be capable of substitution by domestic producers. Fanning (1983) argues that the lack of dynamic policy analysis in the early decades of the state may be attributable to there being no substantial debate among economists prior to independence about the shape of post-independence economic policy, probably owing to the speed at which independence happened. The lack of economic policy analysis can also be attributed to the small pool of economic talent available, limited resources and the contraction of university economics departments in the 1920s and 1930s (Fanning, 1983; Kennedy, 1993). From time to time, university economists acted as advisers to government, but there appears also to have been some unwillingness to use them, and a preference to seek advice from foreign experts, such as the aforementioned Per Jacobsson on the Banking Commission. Fanning (1983, p 139) argues that there were frequent tensions between politicians and economists which were ‘more stultifying than creative’. There was also considerable debate about the role of academic economists in policy analysis. They were criticised for being detached from Irish economic policy analysis (Fanning, 1983; Lee, 1989). However, the academics pointed out that their very limited resources needed to be devoted to teaching-related activities, thereby preventing them from carrying out research on the scale seen in other countries (Fanning, 1983; Kennedy, 1993). In addition, many academic economists did not have the necessary skills, for example in industrial economics (FitzGerald, 1959; Lee, 1989). Furthermore, the political leanings of the university economists, in common with other professions and many civil servants, did not generally align with those of the governments in the 1930s, in some cases being quite hostile (Fanning, 1983; Lee, 1989). Senior university economists were ‘pre-Keynesian’ and against protectionism and state intervention (Fanning, 1983). Lee (1989, p 192) describes self-sufficiency as being 22

The evolution of economic policy analysis in Ireland

‘pushed through the teeth of the public derision of the professional economist and of the somewhat more discrete distaste of many civil servants’. Motivations were not always economic and development theories did not play a role, except for a nod to the infant industry argument.4 The drive to selfsufficiency was primarily motivated by nationalism and the desire for economic independence from Britain. In the 1940s, James Meenan, an academic economist, argued that ‘industrial policy has been one of the most bitterly contested issues in our politics … at no time have the arguments used been purely technical; economics have been thoroughly subordinated to political feeling’ (Meenan, 1943, p 209). The policy horizon was short-term, focusing on the volume of production, jobs and the reduction of emigration, with little consideration given to productivity itself and the building a solid industrial base of efficient industry (Ryan, 1955; FitzGerald, 1957; Kennedy et al, 1988). ISI is a common tool in the early stages of economic development and Irish industry could probably not have achieved the scale it reached without protectionism in this era (FitzGerald, 1959; O’Malley, 1989). Ultimately, however, many of the jobs created were not viable in the long term, as the economy opened up to free trade and a competitive environment. In an evaluation of the ISI era, Ryan (1955) pointed out that the policy had four key economic objectives – job creation, self-sufficiency, maintaining infrastructure and social services on a par with the UK and stemming emigration and the flight from the land – but that none of these had been particularly achieved. Over the years 1946–51, about 800 jobs were created per year compared with annual emigration of around 24,400 (Lynch et  al, 1953). Furthermore, protectionism had not reduced imports, but merely changed their composition with domestic importsubstituting industry importing raw materials and semi-finished goods (Ryan, 1955; Lee, 1989). There was little export activity by domestic manufacturers so that imports were chiefly financed by agricultural exports. Crucially, infrastructure and social services lagged behind the UK, and emigration and flight from the land continued (Ryan, 1955).

Emergence of economic policy analysis, 1948–73 The need for new economic thinking Ireland largely missed out on the prosperity found elsewhere in Western Europe after the Second World War, due to its reliance on agriculture, supply-side weaknesses in manufacturing and a much smaller level of aid from the Marshall Plan (officially titled the European Recovery Program) than other countries.5 The post-war period saw significant changes both in the industrial policy approach and in economic policy analysis. Fanning (1983) takes 1948, the year the Republic was declared,6 as the starting point of the new era, arguing that with the resolution of Irish sovereignty, greater attention could be given to economic policy. At the same time, changes in both the international economic 23

Policy analysis in Ireland

environment, and domestic economic difficulties as the economy reached the exhaustion of ISI, showed the need for new economic policies. After the Second World War, there was a general move internationally towards trade liberalisation as well as discussion on developing a free trade area in Europe. Marshall Aid also required a commitment to trade liberalisation. Free trade therefore appeared to be inevitable, which brought into sharp focus the need to develop export capacity. This posed particular challenges to the Irish economy. ISI encouraged the production of goods in which the country had no comparative advantage, thus raising costs and prices. Higher costs were attributable to the lack of competition (leading to rent seeking), to Ireland’s peripheral location, which pushed up transport costs, and to the small size of the domestic market, which meant that firms could not avail of economies of scale (O’Mahony, 1959). Such supply-side weaknesses meant that firms not only lacked the potential to develop export capacity but were vulnerable in a free trade environment. A number of domestic crises at the time helped fuel a rethink of economic policy. The post-war dollar shortage in Europe, combined with a substantial increase in Irish imports from the US, led the government to establish the Dollar Export Advisory Committee (DEAC) in 1950. The balance of payments crisis of 1955/56, resulting in deflationary measures and recession, and the further decline in population evident in the 1956 Census of Population exacerbated the feeling of despondency in the country and opened up the people’s eyes to the need for change (FitzGerald, 1957; O’Malley, 1989). Furthermore, proximity to Britain and the increasing availability of magazines and ultimately television led to a ‘demonstration effect’ of the welfare state, full employment and rising living standards elsewhere, also evident by the publication at this stage of international league tables (Kennedy et al, 1988). There was a feeling that Ireland was lagging behind. It transpired the Irish people were not satisfied with frugal comforts as had been urged by nationalist leaders. The ISI stage had become exhausted, with few import substitution opportunities remaining and agriculture unlikely to drive strong growth. Most governments employed protectionist measures to protect their farmers, thus limiting the growth potential of Irish agriculture (Kennedy et al, 1988). Furthermore, as demand for food is income-inelastic, growth in economies reliant on agriculture will lag behind other economies. At the time, FitzGerald (1957) cited an OEEC report forecasting an increase of less than 10% in demand for agricultural output, compared with a more than 30% expected rise in demand for consumer durables in northwest Europe over the period 1955–60. There was therefore a broad consensus across society that new thinking was needed. The supply of new ideas in academia had been limited, in part because of the shortage of resources in the universities preventing growth of academic departments. Fanning (1983) notes that of the 12 (broadly defined) chairs of economics in 1958, all but one was appointed before 1932. Lynch and colleagues (1953, p 260) argued that ‘unless constantly nourished by new ideas, public policy becomes a thing stunted and wilted’ concluding that the economist must 24

The evolution of economic policy analysis in Ireland

urge the early adoption of new ideas, citing Keynes’ famous phrase ‘in the long run we are all dead’. Barry and O’Mahony (2017) describe the demand and supply sides in the market for new ideas at the time, placing the 1950s economic crises and renewed political competition on the demand side, with institutional developments and US foreign interests on the supply side.7 Efforts had begun in the late 1940s to develop export-oriented industry through institutional developments, in particular the establishment of the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) in 1949 and Córas Tráchtála (the Export Board) in 1951 to promote exports, as recommended by DEAC. The fiscal tools of export profits tax relief (EPTR) and the extension of new industry grants nationwide were announced in 1956.8 Another institutional development important to the emergence of economic policy analysis was the establishment of the Central Statistics Office (CSO) in 1948 (see Chapter Five, this volume). The sharp change in policy was also achieved through generational change. Politically, too, there was a new generation in power and a dying away of the old generation of nationalist revolutionaries (Garvin, 2004). Younger economists such as Patrick Lynch and Louden Ryan, who held Keynesian views, common elsewhere, came to the fore, while senior economists continued to be anti-interventionist and were as disparaging of Fianna Fáil’s outward-looking policy as they were of its inward-looking policy previously. The publication of Economic Development (Whitaker, 1958) is a landmark in Ireland’s development path, marking an important turning point in policy orientation as well as in economic policy analysis. This was closely followed by the First Programme for Economic Expansion. T.K. Whitaker, the Secretary of the Department of Finance, and Seán Lemass, then Minister for Industry and Commerce, are widely seen as the architects of Ireland’s outward-looking economic policy, although moves towards this had begun earlier.9 Economic Development was the first survey of industrial policy, although there had been in-depth analyses of agriculture and financial policies (FitzGerald, 1959). Lee (1989, p 581) describes it as a ‘major contribution to the supply of organised economic intelligence’, yet it was not as thorough as those other studies, which FitzGerald (1959) attributes to the lack of expertise in industrial economics, as well as to the variety and complex nature of industry and the lack of adequate data. Building economic policy analysis The lack of suitable and high-quality data restricted economic policy analysis generally. Under protectionism, the only data available on which to base price controls (needed due to the lack of competition) related to the costs of current manufacturers, meaning that there was no penalty for inefficiency and no incentive for new entrants to use least-cost methods of production (Ryan, 1955). Lee (1989, p 191) writes that Ireland did collect a lot of economic data for an underdeveloped country, but that these data were not ‘operationally relevant’. 25

Policy analysis in Ireland

Changes in classification and coverage affected the usefulness of the data. FitzGerald (1959) gives the example of the assessment in Economic Development of the numbers of jobs created under protectionism using employment figures from the Census of Industrial Production, but coverage changed so that direct comparisons could not be made between different years. Therefore, according to FitzGerald (1959), over the 31 years between 1926 and 1957, the increase in employment in transportable goods industries was 50–60% and not the two-anda-half times claimed. Lemass later recalled making policy decisions by guesswork due to the lack of useful economic data and that things would have been easier if there had been better knowledge available (Lee, 1989; Garvin, 2004). As data improved, particularly after the establishment of the CSO, so did policy analysis. There was a significant change in attitude towards economic policy analysis in this period and growing recognition of the need for more economic research. The impetus for change came from the civil service rather than academia, the universities only catching up later (Fanning, 1983). Although, Garvin (2004) points out, in the 1950s economic policy analysis was mainly carried out by civil servants rather than by academics, Lynch and colleagues (1953, p 260) argued that civil servants should seek the advice of economists ‘to preserve the principles that have been tested by time and to try, if they can, to enrich the currency of ideas’. Tensions continued, however, between civil servants and university economists over the latter’s lack of applied economics research and disinterest in mathematical and statistical methods (Fanning, 1983; Lee, 1989). Fanning (1983) describes the debate between civil servants and academic economists carried out in the 1940s and early 1950s at the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland. Walsh and Whelan (2010) see the advice from the Capital Investment Advisory Committee in 1956 as the ‘cornerstone’ of Economic Development. The formation of this committee largely bypassed local academic economists, pointedly so according to Lee (1989). The only senior economist on the committee was Charles Carter, a professor from Queen’s University Belfast. It did, however, include Lynch and Ryan. Lynch argued fervently for capital spending and considered the insistence on balanced budgets to be ‘a dangerous fetish’ (Fanning, 1983, p 154). Ryan has been credited with introducing rigour and structures to the provision and analysis of economic data in the civil service (The Irish Times, 2018). Both were to become prominent economists and continued to act as government advisers. Ryan, for example, was a technical director to the Economic Development Board (1959–61) and later an economic consultant (1961–69) to the Department of Finance. Keynesian influence is evident in the attitude to state intervention underpinning Economic Development. This period also saw a number of consultancy reports commissioned from US business consultancies, beginning with the ‘Stacy May’ report of 1952, paid for from Marshall Plan funds. Garvin (2004, p 104) notes that US advice is generally more welcome than that of ‘British or local experts’. Barry and O’Mahony (2017) argue that a passing reference to Puerto Rico in the Stacy May report may have been the basis for EPTR. Puerto Rico had free access to the US market 26

The evolution of economic policy analysis in Ireland

but was outside the US tax system, thereby attracting US industry through tax holidays and other concessions. Following an IDA visit to the US, a 1956 IDA report noted that many US firms had enquired about the availability of similar tax concessions in Ireland (Barry and O’Mahony, 2017). Tensions in policy making Tensions continued to exist between economic policy analysts and politicians. For example, commitments to decentralisation have been part of Irish political policy since independence. In 1952, the first industrial grants were available to firms establishing in areas designated as ‘undeveloped’. However, in drafting Economic Development, Whitaker (1958) saw no rationale for these grants, arguing that the whole country was underdeveloped (FitzGerald, 1959). In a protectionist environment, higher costs in remote locations required higher tariffs and pushed up consumer prices. In a free trade environment, such industries were likely to be uncompetitive. However, the political will did not exist to change this policy and Whitaker was overruled (Barry and Daly, 2011). When grants were extended nationwide in 1956, higher rates remained in the undeveloped areas (O’Malley, 1989; Meyler and Strobl, 2000). FitzGerald (1959, p 140) criticised politicians for clientelism, writing: ‘It is evident that in a country whose public representatives in parliament find it so difficult to rise above local loyalties and to contemplate the country’s problems from a national view-point, undue pressure towards illconsidered decentralization of industry must always be a danger to be guarded against’ (see Chapter Thirteen, this volume). Tensions also existed within the civil service between the Department of Finance and the Department of Industry and Commerce. The latter was responsible for various initiatives such as the establishment of the IDA and Córas Tráchtála, and for introducing EPTR in 1956. Tax concessions for exporters had previously been opposed by the Department of Finance and the Revenue Commissioners (Barry and O’Mahony, 2017). According to Barry and Ó Fathartaigh (2012), both Lee (1989) and FitzGerald (1958) saw Economic Development as a Department of Finance bid to regain power and influence over economic policy. Achieving the shift to export-led industrialisation Although the shift to outward-looking policy is widely viewed today mainly as a way of attracting FDI, this was seen at the time as only one facet of the policy. The main emphasis was on building export capacity. There was a lot of discussion about developing natural resources, especially agriculture. There were also efforts to support existing industry to adapt to a free trade environment. The Committee on Industrial Organisation (CIO) was appointed in 1961, representing industry, trade unions and public servants. It concluded that much of domestic industry would not be competitive under free trade, mainly due to small-scale and short production runs leading to high costs, management deficiencies, lack of 27

Policy analysis in Ireland

training, old buildings and equipment, and poor quality of design, packaging and marketing (Ryan and O’Donoghue, 1965; O’Malley, 1989). The CIO called for adaptation measures, which led to the establishment of Adaptation Councils for each industry and an Adaptation Grants scheme in 1963 (Ryan and O’Donoghue, 1965; O’Malley, 1989). In the event, most export activity in the decades since has been by foreign-owned industry. The transition from ISI to ELI is often politically problematic in developing countries. In Ireland, there was a concerted effort to push through the new policy in the face of expected opposition from vested interests. In a highly unusual move, Economic Development was published under the name of T.K. Whitaker. Barry (2010) argues that this made it appear a national publication, helping provide political cover to protect against pressure from interest groups. The broad consensus across society facilitated the process. FitzGerald (1957) noted that the overwhelmingly positive commentary on the proposed free trade area, in the media and in speeches by politicians, economists and business people, showed a very sudden change in public opinion and a widespread acceptance of the end of protectionism. Barry and O’Mahony (2017) describe policy makers of all parties as ‘inching’ each other towards the reforms. Buy-in was also achieved through the focus on exporters and the continuation of the Control of Manufactures Acts, which were only repealed in 1964. New firms were not seen as competing with incumbent industry (Brock, 1968; Barry and O’Mahony, 2017). There was also a concerted effort to sell the new policy to politicians and vested interests. Garvin (2004, p 138) notes, for example, that a 1957 article by Carter had originally been delivered as a lecture and subsequently distributed to members of the government in what he calls ‘a carefully orchestrated move’. In this article, Carter argued that foreign ownership would bring advanced technology and capital into the country and that large firms had advantages in many industries through their better management, ability to invest in research and development, and greater access to funding, going against ‘favourite illusions’ about domestic ownership and small firms (Carter, 1957, p 140). The establishment of the Economic and Social Research Institute A critical development in economic policy analysis was the establishment of the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) in 1960 with a statistician, Roy Geary, formerly in charge of the CSO, as its first director.10 The work required for Economic Development had shown Whitaker and others the need for more extensive rigorous independent economic analysis in Ireland, as was happening in other countries (FitzGerald, 1959; Kennedy, 1993). FitzGerald (1959, p 141) had argued that the lack of economic research ‘may well prove to be the biggest single bottle-neck in the process of planning and promoting the development of our economic resources’. The ESRI was initially established with funding from the Ford Foundation in the US (Kennedy, 1993). Like many things in Ireland, it was extensively modelled 28

The evolution of economic policy analysis in Ireland

on a British institution, the National Institute for Economic and Social Research, but Geary also visited the National Bureau for Economic Research in the US (Kennedy, 1993). The shortage of economists worldwide, meant some teething problems with Geary finding it difficult initially to recruit and retain senior research staff (Kennedy, 1993). The ESRI was key to the substantial increase in applied, empirical, economic research after 1960 (see Chapter Five, this volume). For example, it contributed to the Second Programme for Economic Expansion. Kennedy (1993, p  232) credits Geary’s introduction of a system of research assistants and postgraduate fellowships to study abroad in order to train young economists as ‘eventually transformed the state of economics’ in Ireland.

Conclusion This chapter has traced the emergence of modern economic policy analysis in Ireland by looking in particular at the contributions of economic policy analysis to industrialisation policies of the 1930s and 1950s. Ireland is a small open economy and policy options are restricted by events in the international environment. Ireland is also unique in Western Europe in being a post-colonial economy and was underdeveloped at the time of independence in 1922. There were no useful models for economic policy design. The critical shift in policy in the 1950s from inward-looking ISI to outward-looking ELI was made possible by a broad consensus for the need for change. It marked the beginning of Ireland’s experience with FDI. Ireland today is one of the most internationalised and FDI-intensive economies in the world. Outward-looking economic policy was to transform all aspects of the country from insularity to being part of the global community. The economic transformation, documented here, later gained momentum after EEC entry in 1973. The important role that FDI plays in the Irish economy was not foreseen at the time. Economic policy analysis was virtually non-existent in the early decades after independence. This was largely due to the small size of the economics profession as well as structural issues such as tensions between policy makers, academic economists and politicians and the shortage of resources in the universities. There was also a lack of adequate data, the CSO finally being established only in 1948. There was a growing recognition of the need for economic policy analysis after the Second World War. The gains from ISI had slowed and the world had changed. Radical reform was required. At the same time, the old guard was being replaced by younger economists who were open to new thinking and methods. Gradually the quality and quantity of information improved and economic policy analysis became more sophisticated and rigorous. Institutions that enabled this change were established in the late 1940s and 1950s, particularly the CSO, IDA and ESRI. These continue to be important today. The universities began to expand their economics departments from the 1950s and the profession grew. Today economists are to be found in the civil service, state bodies, research institutes and academia, as well as in the private sector. 29

Policy analysis in Ireland

Although the emergence of economic policy analysis was gradual and largely non-existent before the 1950s, Ireland seemed to stumble on policies that distinctly resemble those often recommended to late-industrialising countries. ISI was reasonably successful for a time, but eventually encountered difficulties with slower growth and balance of trade deficits, common when the ‘early stage’ of ISI has ended. The adoption of outward-looking policies, together with membership of the EEC in 1973, eventually saw the country ‘catch up’. While in the early decades after independence economic policy analysis was largely undertaken within the civil service, with limited contributions from academia and foreign experts, today it is mostly conducted by economists, whether in the public or private sector. Notes

1

2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9

10

O’Malley (1989) argues that the economy had largely exhausted the ‘easy’ stage of ISI by this time. Indeed, Lee (1989) claims that the domestic market was saturated with Irish-made goods by 1938. The OEEC was established in 1948 to distribute Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program) aid in Europe. As its membership expanded beyond Europe, it became the OECD. Between 1938 and 1950, the US became the major source of outward FDI, and US FDI in Europe increased sharply in the 1950s (Barry and O’Mahony, 2017). Prior to independence, nationalist leaders, in particular Arthur Griffith (the founder of Sinn Féin), had made the infant industry argument for tariff protection, although the technicalities of achieving this were not set out (Kennedy et al, 1988; Lee, 1989). Fianna Fáil’s commitment to protectionism and self-sufficiency went far beyond Griffith’s infant industry argument attributable to the interests of their supporters and to the nationalism of the party leadership (O’Malley, 1989). This was due to Ireland’s neutrality during the Second World War and its subsequent refusal to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This resulted in Ireland exiting the British Commonwealth, an association of mostly former British colonies. Fianna Fáil had been in power almost consistently since 1932 but experienced significant electoral opposition on a number of occasions around this time. EPTR was available on increases in export sales above the 1956 level so it benefitted new firms more than incumbents, as new firms were able to avail of relief on all exports. Lemass was also the architect of the protectionist isolationism of the 1930s. He was essentially interested in economic development. Lee (1989, p 188) outlines how Lemass was capable of shifting course as needed, declaring himself a ‘pragmatic protectionist’. This was originally the Economic Research Institute (ERI) with social research added a few years later.

References Barry, F. (2010) ‘Politics and economic policymaking in Ireland’, in J. Hogan, P. Donnelly and B. O’Rourke (eds) Irish Business and Society, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, pp 28–43. Barry, F. and Daly, M. (2011) ‘Mr. Whitaker and industry: setting the record straight’, Economic and Social Review, 42(2): 159–68.

30

The evolution of economic policy analysis in Ireland

Barry, F. and Ó Fathartaigh, M. (2012) The Industrial Development Authority, 1949– 59: Establishment, Evolution, Expansion of Influence, Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper No. 407, Dublin: Institute for International Integration Studies, Trinity College Dublin. Barry, F. and O’Mahony, C. (2017) ‘Regime change in 1950s Ireland: the new export-oriented foreign investment strategy’, Irish Economic and Social History, 44(1): 46–65. Brock, C. (1968) ‘Public policy and private industrial development’, in J. Bristow and A. Tait (eds) Economic Policy in Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, pp 147–74. Carter, C. (1957) ‘The Irish economy viewed from without’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 46(182): 137–49. Fanning, R. (1983) ‘Economists and governments: Ireland 1922–52’, in A. Murphy (ed) Economists and the Irish Economy from the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day, Newbridge: Irish Academic Press, pp 138–57. FitzGerald, G. (1957) ‘Irish economic problems’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 46(183): 271–94. FitzGerald, G. (1958) ‘Analyst’, The Irish Times, 25 November. FitzGerald, G. (1959) ‘Mr  Whitaker and industry’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 48(190): 138–50. Foyle, J. (1959) ‘The price of Irish economic development’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 48(192): 377–86. Garvin, T. (2004) Preventing the Future: Why was Ireland so Poor for so Long?, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. Kennedy, K. (1993) ‘R.C. Geary and the ESRI’, Economic and Social Review, 24(3): 225–245. Kennedy, K., Giblin, T. and McHugh, D. (1988) The Economic Development of Ireland in the Twentieth Century, London: Routledge. Lee, J. (1989) Ireland, 1912–1985: Politics and Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lynch, P., Coyne, E., King, F., O’Donovan, J. and Quinn, K. (1953) ‘The economist and public policy’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 42(167): 241–74. Meenan, J. (1943) ‘Irish industry and industrial policy 1921–1943’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 32(126): 209–18. Meyler, A. and Strobl, E. (2000) ‘Regional industrial policy and job generation in Ireland’, Economic and Social Review, 31(2): 111–28. O’Mahony, D. (1959) ‘Economic expansion in Ireland’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 48(190): 129–37. O’Malley, E. (1989) Industry and Economic Development: The Challenge for the Latecomer, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. Ryan, L. (1955) ‘Irish manufacturing industry: the future’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 44(173): 57–72. Ryan, L. and O’Donoghue, M. (1965) ‘The Republic of Ireland’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 13(1): 88–101. 31

Policy analysis in Ireland

The Irish Times (2018) ‘Louden Ryan obituary: a spearhead of Ireland’s economic revival’, 8 December. Walsh, P. and Whelan, C. (2010) ‘Hirschman and Irish industrial policy’, Economic and Social Review, 41(3): 283–99. Whitaker, T. K. (1958) Economic Development, Dublin: Stationery Office.

32

THREE

The evolution of social policy analysis in Ireland: from a theocentric to an econocentric paradigm? Fiona Dukelow

Introduction This chapter discusses the history of social policy analysis in the Ireland, tracing its evolution since the late 1950s and tracking Ireland’s emergence from a relatively insular and theocentric context to a much more diverse, wealthy and globalised society. The ongoing challenges of social policy analysis are explored under what might be characterised as a shift from the dominance of a theocentric paradigm to an econocentric paradigm that privileges the economic in how social policy is valued and how social policy analysis is conducted. An econocentric mode of thinking about social policy and society is certainly not exclusive to Ireland but the chapter aims to draw out its localised effects in the Irish context. Framing the history of Irish social policy analysis as a transition from a theocentric to an econocentric paradigm risks being facile and simplifying more complex realities. In each case, I suggest that these are relatively dominant rather than total paradigms and the transition is not necessarily linear. Counter-currents always exist, and the chapter seeks to acknowledge and critically analyse these too (see Chapter Fourteen, this volume). Evoking Dean’s (2018) image of the reach of social policy as a promiscuous magpie, the chapter consequently casts a relatively wide net, including over governmental and academic settings, but also aims to recognise the wider landscape of actors, advocates and forms of knowledge influencing social policy analysis, including social movements, the media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (see Chapter Twelve, this volume). These parameters necessarily mean that a broad sweep is presented, raising many avenues that require further research beyond the scope of this chapter. The chapter proceeds in three sections: first, focusing on the late 1950s and 1960s as a period in which theocentric social policy analysis was beginning to decline; second, looking at the 1970s and the 1980s as a period when more distinct modes of social policy analysis, with a particular focus on poverty and inequality began to emerge; and third, looking at the 1990s to the late 2000s as a time when social change accelerated and significant change to how social policy was analysed took place on many fronts. The chapter concludes with a brief reflection on the contemporary period, noting the more explicit reassertion of econocentric modes of analysis. 33

Policy analysis in Ireland

The late 1950s and 1960s: a waning theocentric paradigm In the words of Kaim-Caudle (1967, p 5), ‘few would think of Ireland primarily in the context of a Welfare Society’. Two factors in particular shaped this situation. The first was the close ties between Britain and Ireland. As such, much scholarship and ideas about social policy development derived from the British context. Jones (1967, p 1), in her introduction to Kaim-Caudle’s text, which was one of the first modern texts on Irish social policy, notes that ‘for some years, teachers of Social Administration have been aware that their subject-matter was draw very largely from the British experience, and have found difficulty in disentangling general issues of social policy from the peculiar accidents of history and tradition in this country’. Moreover, as Coughlan (1966, p 205) claimed, that influence was to Ireland’s detriment because of the United Kingdom (UK) tradition of ‘empirical “social engineering”’. This offered fragmented and piecemeal grounds for reform, or a muddling through over any coherent philosophy that articulated clear social aims for social policy. The second influential factor is the nature of Jones’ socalled ‘accidents of history and tradition’, infused as they were by Catholic social thinking and by which, as Garvin (2004, p 3) maintains, ‘the Church attempted to control, some would say enslave, much of the intellectual and emotional life of the entire country’. The Church and social policy analysis In terms of the prevailing social policy scholarship, Fanning (2008, p 7) refers to the ‘Catholic clerical-university complex that dominated the Irish social sciences’. Within the social sciences, social policy’s predecessor, social administration, was nested within a tradition of applied sociology taught in universities to social work students that was in turn largely controlled by the Catholic Church. From the inception of sociology teaching in Irish universities in the 1930s to the late 20th century, Catholic priests dominated teaching appointments in sociology, with the first lay professorial appointment only occurring in 1971 (Share et al, 2007). Yet, the Church did not have total domination. Other streams of thinking and education were evident on the periphery, for example, in the People’s College, Adult Education Association (originally The People’s College for Continuing Education & Training), promoting workers’ education and founded by trade unionist Ruaihrí Roberts in 1948 (Conroy, 1999). Its ‘secularism’ posed enough of a threat to prompt the establishment of a Catholic Workers College in 1951, subsequently becoming the National College of Ireland. The main journals offering a ‘social scientific’ analysis of Irish society were the Catholic journals Christus Rex and Studies. The longer-standing Journal of the Social and Statistical Inquiry Society of Ireland also pursued ‘social inquiry’. Its positivist vision of generating scientific facts to have a positive impact on society and social problems shared the empiricism of Catholic sociology. However, as Daly (1997) notes, its emphasis during this time was very much on the statistical 34

The evolution of social policy analysis in Ireland

and the economic over the social. There was also some overlap, in actors involved and topics published, between the journal and Administration, a journal founded by a group of civil servants in 1953 as part of a public administration modernisation agenda. Efforts to develop new knowledge and liberal ideas that broke at least somewhat with religious orthodoxies were also expressed by the founding of Tuairim, which published pamphlets between 1958 and 1970 on political, economic and social topics, including a pamphlet on the Aims of Social Policy: Reform of Ireland’s Social Security and Health Services (Coughlan, 1966). The influence of economic growth Institutionally, much was triggered by the impact of Economic Development (Whitaker, 1958). This was a long time in the making, in terms of changing ideas coupled with a growing pressure to act in the 1950s (see Chapter Two, this volume). As Garvin (2004, p 132) puts it, ‘by now everybody was getting into the game of complaining about the Irish economy’. Yet, Economic Development did not envisage a programme of related social development and, in terms of research and knowledge for policy making, the primary concern was the need for economic data and lack thereof. Social research informing social policy and the infrastructure required to produce it remained underdeveloped. However, by the early 1960s there was a sense that Ireland’s economic status was beginning to improve and that the state of social services also needed improvement. At the same time, while living standards were increasing, comparisons with Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK left a sense that the Republic was behind in terms of social policy and social rights (Dukelow and Considine, 2017). Ireland’s attempts at joining the European Economic Community (EEC), which began in the 1960s, also prompted a more outward, comparative mindset. Social policy thus began to become a more significant political issue over the 1960s. Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael both professed cautious leftward intentions and began to compete more on social policy issues. In response, the Labour Party began to assert its socialism with leader Brendan Corish declaring that ‘the seventies will be socialist’. Corish’s shift in position was, as Puirséil (2007, p 241) notes, ‘helped immeasurably by the shift in Church teaching under Pope John, whom Corish later described as “one of the greatest contributors of all change in Irish attitudes”’. In this regard, therefore, the theocentric paradigm driving social policy thinking was also changing in the 1960s, with the Church’s stance on social policy turning from anti- to pro-state action. As guardedly noted by Fahey (2007, pp 156, 161), the Church shifted ‘towards left of centre’ following the Second Vatican Council and its thinking became ‘more assertive, sharp edged and committed to the cause of social justice’. The 1960s therefore witnessed a wider social and cultural turn in Irish society, marked by rising social activism, both radical and reformist, that found social policy and the role of the state wanting. Moreover, this activism and analysis mobilised ideas, issues and values that went beyond 35

Policy analysis in Ireland

Catholic sociology’s purview and assessment of social problems. Among other issues, urban deprivation and the shortage of corporation housing became an issue around which housing action groups organised. A range of feminist activisms, from the long-established Irish Housewives Association to the newly formed Irish Women’s Liberation Movement, as well as the work of other campaign groups, also become influential. Examples of the latter included the Campaign for the Care of Deprived Children, arguing from a perspective of social justice, not charity. Consequently, aside from the growing expansionary thrust of the main social services in the 1960s (most notably in education, as discussed in the following paragraph), policy documents and reports were also published pertaining to a range of more specific groups and areas of social policy. These included Travellers, people with intellectual disabilities, older people, children in residential care, and women. The broader preoccupations with social research and social policy, however, rested with how these could serve and complement economic development. Two developments in the 1960s stand out in particular. The most immediately impactful of these was the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report Investment in Education (1965), marking an early instance of international influence on Irish social policy making (see Chapters One and Nine, this volume). In the OECD’s (1991, p 7) later commentary, the review was hailed as ‘a landmark both in the national and international memory’, for the strides it made in quantitative methodology and for revealing so many gaps in education participation. The report reflected new thinking on education as human capital, chiming with Ireland’s goals for economic development. The report was a breakthrough for education policy hitherto focused on maintaining the status quo and substantially controlled by the Church. As Fanning and Hess (2015, p 43) remark, ‘OECD reports came to replace the papal encyclicals’. The establishment of the Economic Research Institute in 1960 also broke with theocentric policy analysis, expanding to become the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) in 1966. However, even with its new-found social identity, the ESRI was still, in the words of its director Michael Fogarty (1969, p  57), ‘slanted towards the problems of economic growth’ (see Chapter Ten, this volume, for more analysis of the impact of think tanks on social policy). In summary, therefore, this period marks the beginnings of the long wane of the theocentric conditions in how Irish society was conceived, social problems were debated, and social policy developed. In their place, the foundations of an econocentric paradigm, generated by both national and international influences, were already being laid down by the 1960s. This paradigm reflected the primacy of economic needs, economic analysis and economic actors, in which social policy plays a subordinate role; at the same time, alternative actors and analysis appeared by the end of this period.

36

The evolution of social policy analysis in Ireland

The ‘inequality conscious’ 1970s and crisis-ridden 1980s Ireland’s ‘rediscovery of poverty’ Building on the turn towards the social, and towards liberal and leftist leanings for social change, the 1970s, dubbed an ‘inequality conscious’ decade (Sinfield, 1975, p 6), marked Ireland’s ‘rediscovery of poverty’. This generated a phase of social policy analysis that focused relatively less on economic growth and relatively more on issues of distribution. A watershed moment was the publication of research on poverty by Ó Cinnéide (1972), which was presented at a 1971 conference on poverty, held in Kilkenny and organised by the Council for Social Welfare (CSW), a committee of the Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference established in 1970. While attention to poverty and poor housing had been growing in the media and other circles, Ó Cinnéide’s (1972) research was the first set of ‘hard facts’ about poverty in modern Ireland and his findings were widely circulated as the key quantitative reference for poverty in subsequent debate (Dukelow, 2018). The conference was the starting point for sustained attention to poverty and related social policy analysis by actors including the ESRI, among others (Walsh, 1972). The Kilkenny conference galvanised more work on poverty: a working group committee set up to progress action included members of the CSW, along with Ó Cinnéide, other social scientists and Donal Nevin, from the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and a Labour Party activist. Simultaneously, trade unions were also becoming more involved in campaigning on social policy issues, exemplified by ICTU’s (1972) Discussion Document on Economic and Social Development. The working group also made links with activists in the UK (Sinfield, 1975). One of its immediate outcomes was the publication of a Statement on Social Policy (CSW, 1972) and while it had some influence on the 1973–77 Fine Gael–Labour government’s approach to social policy reform, a longer-lasting influence was Ireland’s successful third attempt to become a member of EEC in 1973, a point at which the EEC was also becoming more socially active. This became a new source of reform pressure, initially through the gender equality directives Ireland was required to comply with, albeit reluctantly. On the other hand, as Ó Cinnéide (2010) notes, the EEC’s initial efforts to address the issue of poverty bore the imprint of Irish influence with the launch of the first European Poverty Programme in 1975. Advances in conceptualising Irish social policy Issues of inequality and redistribution were also being deliberated by the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). The authorship and content of its initial social policy reports still bore the mark of British influence as NESC looked to social policy expertise from the UK to generate ideas and analysis. This reflected the paucity of theoretical and conceptual discussion in the Irish literature as well 37

Policy analysis in Ireland

as the periphery–core relationship typical of many academic disciplines in many small states with larger neighbours. NESC’s first report on social policy, An Approach to Social Policy (1975), was written by David Donnison from the London School of Economics, commissioned to advise on the scope and aims of social policy and the NESC’s future work. Drawing on Donnison’s report, NESC took the view that social policy should be understood as more than simply a collection of services and put questions of distribution and the nature of social relations at its core. This report was followed with a set of reports culminating in Irish Social Policies: Priorities for Future Development (NESC, 1981), which articulated six key aims of Irish social policy, focusing on the reduction of wealth and income inequalities; equality of opportunity; ‘provision of employment for those seeking work’; access for all to services; provision for particular disadvantaged groups; and ‘the development of responsible citizenship’ (NESC, 1981, pp 15–16). These reports progressed understanding about the nature of social policy in a way that had not been previously broached in Irish policy discourse. The reassertion of economic issues The translation of many of these advances in social policy analysis into concrete policy reforms was halted by Ireland’s disastrous pro-cyclical policy response to the 1979 oil crisis and by the rise in unemployment and national debt that followed in the 1980s. The state of the economy and the need for economic growth returned to the centre of policy concerns. It is notable, however, that some of the threads of 1970s developments continued. A second Kilkenny conference in 1981 kept poverty on the policy agenda. The first and, to date, only comprehensive review of the social welfare system was commissioned in 1983 and reported in 1986, the same year as the establishment of the Combat Poverty Agency (CPA), which had a mandate to research and promote the abolition of poverty. However, its establishment was the result of the controversial closure in 1980 of the local anti-poverty projects operating under the European Anti-Poverty Programme (EAPP) because of the threat they posed to the status quo. As Brown (1982, p 150) notes, ‘even the limited Irish programme excited the active opposition of bishops, business men and politicians because it sought to stress the powerlessness of the poor and their right to acquire and use power’. Elsewhere, in 1989, the ESRI published the first national survey of poverty (Callan et al, 1989), marking the start of ESRI researchers’ significant contribution to conceptualising and measuring poverty, and to anti-poverty policy in Ireland and the EEC. The 1980s also saw the emergence of other social policy agencies. These included the National Council for the Aged (1981, subsequently becoming, by 1997, the National Council on Ageing and Older People). Among the NGO sector, notable developments included the establishment of the Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed in 1987, giving voice to the lived experience of unemployed people and reflecting the severity of unemployment in the 1980s. 38

The evolution of social policy analysis in Ireland

In addition to the Report of the Commission on Social Welfare (Commission on Social Welfare, 1986), several other documents were produced addressing neglected areas of social policy, including reports on psychiatric services, older people, Travellers, people with disabilities, and young people. While the scope of social policy concerns thus continued to expand and to recognise a greater range of social needs, a consistent theme shared by the outcome of these reports was a lack of implementation. While this was to a large degree attributable to economic exigencies, the 1980s also marked new strains of neoliberal discourse about the welfare state. Yet, whereas Thatcherite thinking had a much deeper effect on social policy in the UK, the 1987 turn to social partnership as a mode of policy making modified its growth in Ireland. Social partnership also became, by the 1990s, a new conduit for the input of civil society expertise into social policy analysis and formation (see Chapters Ten and Twelve, this volume).

Abundant but how embedded? Social policy analysis from the 1990s to the late 2000s The development of the discipline The mid-1990s to the mid-2000s mark an expansionary period on many fronts. The growth of social policy as an academic discipline was marked by the restructuring of more all-encompassing social science departments in many universities, with social policy being rehomed in departments bearing the discipline in their titles (in University College Dublin and Trinity College Dublin), or in departments of applied social studies (in University College Cork and Maynooth University). The expansion of the subject at postgraduate level in particular provided more opportunities for professional development in social policy research and a break with the tradition of completing PhDs abroad. The growth of research capacity was also bolstered by a phase of investment generating new research institutes within higher education. Social policy concerns typically found a space in more all-encompassing social science institutes, reflecting the still limited funding environment for specialised social research inquiry. With these developments, social policy as an applied discipline broke at least somewhat with its entangled association with sociology. An Irish Social Policy Association was founded in 1997 with a small cohort of social policy academics and researchers in social policy-related organisations. Irish social policy texts also began to emerge, providing a more distinctive Irish perspective on social policy and breaking with the reliance on British literature (Kiely et  al, 1999; Quin et  al, 1999; Considine and Dukelow, 2009). The presence of Ireland as case-study material in comparative research also emerged, bringing Ireland out from the shadow of the UK welfare state and highlighting its distinctive, hybrid features (McLaughlin, 1993; Cousins, 1997). The range of areas covered under social policy analysis also widened, branching out from a focus on social services and poverty, and representing greater 39

Policy analysis in Ireland

specialisation in particular issues and stages over the life course, and the new social issues reflecting a globalising society, in particular migration, racism, integration and multiculturalism. Yet, as a small country, these developments remained small in scale in terms of the community of scholars and the relative lack of diversity in methodologies and theoretical perspectives, with a continued focus on applied research and post-positivist approaches. This is not necessarily unusual for a discipline such as social policy, which has a strong focus on analysis for policy and strong ties with the policy-making agendas that come with this terrain. However, it also meant that even in this expansionary period there was relatively little development of alternative streams of scholarship and research located in interpretive and critical paradigms, or pursuing conceptual and theoretical innovation. Equally, little diversity of methods meant relatively little research utilising participatory methods or focusing on the lived experience. Research on the history of Irish social policy also began to emerge, including perspectives that looked more critically on the role of the Catholic Church (Powell, 1992). The critical rethinking and exposure of the role of the Catholic Church became increasingly important over this period, leading to the establishment of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (CICA) in 1999, reporting in 2009 and commonly known as the Ryan report (CICA, 2009). In this case, the role of the media in highlighting lived experience and personal testimony was hugely significant. Particularly notable were the television documentary Dear Daughter (1996), focusing on the experiences of Christine Buckley whose childhood was spent in Goldenbridge orphanage in Dublin, and the later series, States of Fear (1999), produced by journalist Mary Raftery, investigating the wider history of the abuse in industrial and reformatory schools. The growing internationalisation of Irish social policy analysis was also a significant feature of this period. This was marked by the growing role of the European Union (EU) in social policy making, the expansion of OECD reporting on areas of social policy, and the Irish ratification of several United Nations (UN) human rights covenants/conventions. Domestically, the growth of civil society organisations and their inclusion in policy-making processes through social partnership was a notable development, while the growth of ‘agencification’ provided another outlet for social policy research and analysis (see Chapters Four, Five and Ten, this volume). Deepening internationalisation As Mary C. Murphy (see Chapter Nine, this volume) notes, deepening internationalisation of Irish social policy analysis was noticeably Europeanised by the step change in the EU’s remit and interest in social policy, originating with its commitment to ‘combating exclusion’ in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and culminating with the adoption of the Open Method of Coordination in 20001. Yet, as with earlier phases of EU–Irish relations, a two-way process of influence was at play here, with the EU adoption of plans against poverty and 40

The evolution of social policy analysis in Ireland

later plans for social inclusion influenced in part by the 1997 Irish National Action Plan against Poverty. While still a light regime in contrast to the power behind economic policy instruments and institutions, the lexicon of EU social policy and anti-poverty targets certainly became more salient in national analysis. More fundamentally, the development of poverty data collection, starting with the European Community Household Panel in 1994 and transforming into the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions survey by 2003, provided much-needed regular data on poverty in Ireland. For the civil society sector engaged in social policy analysis, the Europeanisation of poverty and social inclusion policy provided much leverage in terms of social policy discourse, evaluation requirements and outcomes as well as new spaces for airing analysis. Yet the continued lack of emphasis on the importance of lived experience, regardless of the actors involved, is a recurring thread from earlier periods. A greater focus on rights, equality and discrimination was another element of the influence of internationalisation. This encompassed the ratification of UN rights treaties, to the implementation of anti-discrimination provisions stemming from the EU’s Treaty of Amsterdam. The leverage these developments offered for a rights-based analysis of social policy was particularly potent in light of Ireland’s historical leaning via the Catholic Church on notions of deservingness and subsidiarity. In this context, the founding of the Equality Authority (EA) in 2000 stands out in particular for promoting equality in policy analysis. As Baker and colleagues (2015, p 183) note, it ‘adopted an expansive understanding of its mandate’, bringing attention in its reports to the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community, older people, carers and Travellers, and furthering a research agenda on data on inequality with the CPA and the Central Statistics Office. Growing agencification The EA was just one of a greatly expanding set of agencies (see Chapter Four, this volume). Thus, intertwined to some extent with the growing reach and influence of international actors on Irish social policy, an equally significant trend for social policy analysis was the growth of agencification (Quinn, 2008). A major expansion in the number of agencies created in specific areas of social policy occurred, reflecting the growing extensity of social policy-related legislation, reports and strategies (particularly notable in health, education, disability and children), and the growing range and complexity of policy interventions in these areas. The increasing focus on social policy issues in social partnership processes and the inclusion of the Community and Voluntary Pillar also played a role. In addition to NESC, CPA and EA, other agencies created with a notable research and social policy analysis role included the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) (1993), the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) (1998), the Irish Human Rights Commission (2000)2, and the National Disability Authority (2000). The related expansion 41

Policy analysis in Ireland

in ESRI activity (which since the late 1980s had to rely less on grant-in-aid funding and more on contract work) reflected a range of research commissioned by such agencies as well as government departments, in areas such as educational inequality, labour market inequalities, racism and discrimination. NGOs evolved on a parallel track, with new organisations and alliances emerging, adding to, and sometimes duplicating, the work of the already large and diverse field reflecting Ireland’s mixed economy of welfare. Indicative new organisations included the Children’s Rights Alliance (1995) and the Immigrant Council of Ireland (2001) (see Chapter Twelve, this volume). Again, international rights discourses and obligations of the Irish state in terms of policy implementation and reporting activities provided new impetus for NGOs. Many were to also occupy spaces opening in social partnership processes and associated bodies such as NESF and NESC, affording new opportunities to contribute to and influence policy analysis. This occurred against the backdrop of increasing interest in the voluntary sector internationally for its contribution to more pluralistic policy making (McCashin et al, 2002). However, throughout the social partnership period, this remained a contested area and a source of conflict and ambivalence for many voluntary actors, who would have to engage as less than equal partners (Larragy, 2014). In short, the landscape of social policy analysis had changed beyond all recognition since the 1980s, and overall the period might be characterised by the word abundance. Ireland experienced major socioeconomic change and became more open, more wealthy and more diverse. In this context, along with the basic fact that more resources were available for social policy analysis, there was a huge expansion of issues on the social policy agenda and major growth in actors and infrastructure at multiple levels, while social issues and social needs previously neglected gained recognition through a multitude of social policy reports and some action. However, while it was a period of abundance, the question lingers as to how embedded these more expansive elements of social policy analysis were. Despite the growth of the social, the dominant policy agendas that articulated Ireland’s ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) focused on economic growth and competitiveness, though they were perhaps less in conflict with basic improvements in social policy during a time of plenty. It is also notable that a retraction of state engagement with and support of actors who were more critical of Ireland’s model precedes the more recent austerity period and can be traced back to the early 2000s (Kelleher and O’Neill, 2018). The limits of the period are reflected in a telling analysis by NESC in its landmark report on the Irish welfare state, The Developmental Welfare State (2005). NESC noted a deepening dualism in the structure of Irish social policy, that is, a basic divide between a growing majority able access private services above and beyond ‘very basic levels of public service provision’ on which a significant minority s depend (NESC, 2005, p 163). At the same time, NESC’s analysis had also shifted significantly since its early reports, with its conception and promotion of the developmental welfare state reflecting the social investment 42

The evolution of social policy analysis in Ireland

paradigm now being promoted by European social policy actors, and which is at heart an econocentric justification of social policy. The more direct dominance of econocentric conditions were to return to Ireland in the most recent period of social policy analysis, which is briefly considered in the concluding section.

Conclusion Ireland’s turbulent times since the 2008 economic crisis have been well rehearsed. In the domain of social policy analysis, harsher econocentric conditions reasserted themselves on many fronts and the economic bottom line returned to the centre of policy analysis and evaluation. The increasing reliance on private and external funding in higher education has created a more precarious and competitive environment for the production of social policy research. An equally damaging trend has been what Baker and colleagues (2015) call ‘cutting back on equality’, whereby several social policy agencies had their budgets severely cut. Agencies focusing on minority groups, such as the NCCRI and the CPA, or with a tradition of dissenting analysis (such as the EA), were abolished outright or merged with other agencies. This is not to say that all critical analysis has disappeared. Ireland’s period of austerity has also generated a more critical turn in social policy analysis and scholarship, not least in areas such as housing and social protection, as well as a notable turn to the lived experience. On the other hand, agencies and modes of analysis focused on economic evaluation and value for money have advanced, including the Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service and the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, both of which were established in 2012 (see Chapters Four and Eight, this volume). External influences on social policy analysis that focus on the economic value and the cost of social policy have grown in weight, most directly with the institution of new fiscal rules and governance structure around the reformed EU Stability and Growth Pact3. While by the mid-2010s the country appeared to be entering a ‘recovery’ phase, these are the legacies that continue to weigh on social policy analysis in post-austerity Ireland. In conclusion, the survey of more than half a century of social policy analysis has demonstrated significant change, paralleling Ireland’s relatively intense waves of economic and social transformation over a comparatively compact period of modernisation. Modern social policy analysis emerged from a context dominated by Catholic social teaching and social action and was propelled forward both by the way in which economic development revealed the limits of Ireland’s social services and by the range of actors highlighting inequalities, injustices and state neglect of many groups. As the theocentric context underpinning social policy analysis faded, an econocentric context took its place, essentially subordinating the social to the economic in terms of the role and benefits of social policy, but not always to the same degree of tension. The social landscape and the importance of social policy undoubtedly changed as Ireland evolved into a substantially wealthier, more open and more liberal society by the 1990s and 43

Policy analysis in Ireland

into the 21st century, with a growing range and types of analyses of and for social policy, reflecting increasingly complex societal challenges. The range of actors and levels of analysis also extended with greater interplay between the national and the international in how social policy issues are conceived and analysed. Yet at the same time, while the nature and drivers of econocentric paradigm also evolve, it continues to have a significant bearing on the nature of social policy analysis. Notes 1 2

3

A form of co-ordinating social policy across EU member states by co-operatively agreeing and monitoring social policy developments, targets and outcomes. By 2013, in the context of austerity, the Irish Human Rights Commission and the EA were dissolved and had their functions transferred to the newly formed Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission. As a method of EU economic governance, the reformed Stability and Growth Pact, strengthened the European Commission’s powers of budgetary and fiscal surveillance and discipline of EU member states, ultimately resulting in the further subordination of social policy objectives.

References Baker, J., Lynch, K. and Walsh, J. (2015) ‘Cutting back on equality’, in R. Meade and F. Dukelow (eds) Defining Events: Power, Resistance and Identity in TwentyFirst-Century Ireland, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp 181–99. Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. (2002) ‘Cities and geographies of “actually existing neoliberalism”’, Antipode, 34(3): 349–79. Brown, T. (1982) ‘Poverty, politics and policies’, in S. Kennedy (ed) One Million Poor?, Dublin: Turoe Press, pp 145–63. Callan, T., Nolan, B., Whelan, B.J., Hannan, D. and Creighton, S. (1989) Poverty, Income and Welfare in Ireland, Dublin: ESRI. CICA (Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse) (2009) Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, Vols 1–5, Dublin: Stationery Office. Commission on Social Welfare (1986) Report of the Commission on Social Welfare, Dublin: Stationery Office. Conroy, P. (1999) ‘From the fifties to the nineties: social policy comes out of the shadows’, in G. Kiely, A. O’Donnell, P. Kennedy and S. Quin (eds) Irish Social Policy in Context, Dublin: UCD Press, pp 33–50. Considine, M. and Dukelow, F. (2009) Irish Social Policy: A Critical Introduction, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. Coughlan, A. (1966) ‘Public affairs 1916–1966: the social scene’, Administration, 14(3): 204–15. CSW (Council for Social Welfare) (1972) ‘Statement on Social Policy’, Social Studies, Irish Journal of Sociology, 1(5): 630–40. Cousins, M. (1997) ‘Ireland’s place in the worlds of welfare capitalism’, Journal of European of Social Policy, 7(3): 223–35. Daly, M.E. (1997) The Spirit of Earnest Inquiry: The Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland 1847–1997, Dublin: IPA. Dean, H. (2018) Social Policy (3rd edn), Cambridge: Polity Press. 44

The evolution of social policy analysis in Ireland

Dukelow, F. (2018) ‘“Some sort of super welfare state”? The “rediscovery of poverty” and Irish welfare state change in the 1970s’, in E. Eklund, M. Oppenheimer and J. Scott (eds) The State of Welfare: Comparative Studies of the Welfare State at the End of the Long Boom, 1965–1980, Oxford: Peter Lang, pp 61–84. Dukelow, F. and Considine, M. (2017) Irish Social Policy: A Critical Introduction (2nd edn), Bristol: Policy Press. Fahey, T. (2007) ‘The Catholic Church and social policy’, in S. Healy and F. Reynolds (eds) Values, Catholic Social Thought and Public Policy, Dublin: CORI Justice, pp 143–63. Fanning, B. (2008) The Quest for Modern Ireland The Battle of Ideas 1912–1986, Dublin: Irish Academic Press. Fanning, B. and Hess, A. (2015) Sociology in Ireland: A Short History, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Fogarty, M. (1969) ‘Future social research in Ireland’, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 22(1): 56–77. Garvin, T. (2004) Preventing the Future: Why was Ireland so Poor for so Long?, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. ICTU (Irish Congress of Trade Unions) (1972) Discussion Document on Economic and Social Development, ICTU: Dublin. Jones, K. (1967) ‘General Editor’s introduction’, in P. Kaim-Caudle (ed) Social Policy in the Irish Republic, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp 1–3. Kaim-Caudle, P. (ed) (1967) Social Policy in the Irish Republic, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Kelleher, P. and O’Neill, C. (2018) The Systematic Destruction of the Community Development, Anti-Poverty and Equality Movement (2002–2015), Cork: Kelleher Associates. Kiely, G., O’Donnell, A., Kennedy, P. and Quin, S. (eds) (1999) Irish Social Policy in Context, Dublin: UCD Press. Larragy, J. (2014) Asymmetric Engagement: The Community and Voluntary Pillar in Irish Social Partnership, Manchester: Manchester University Press. McCashin, T., O’Sullivan, E. and Brennan, C. (2002) ‘The National Economic and Social Forum, social partnership and policy formulation in the Republic of Ireland’, Policy & Politics, 30(2): 263–79. McLaughlin, E. (1993) ‘Ireland: Catholic corporatism’, in A. Cochrane and J. Clarke (eds) Comparing Welfare States: Britain in International Context, London: Sage Publications, pp 205–37. NESC (National Economic and Social Council) (1975) An Approach to Social Policy, Dublin: Stationery Office. NESC (1981) Irish Social Policies: Priorities for Future Development, Dublin: Stationery Office. NESC (2005) The Developmental Welfare State, Dublin: NESC. Ó  Cinnéide, S. (1972) ‘The extent of poverty in Ireland’, Social Studies, Irish Journal of Sociology, 1(4): 381–400. 45

Policy analysis in Ireland

Ó Cinnéide, S. (2010) ‘From poverty to social inclusion: the EU and Ireland’, in R. Hanan, P. Herrmann, P. O’Connor, K. O’Kelly, D. Peelo and L. Richardson (eds) Ireland and the European Social Inclusion Strategy: Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead, Dublin: EAPN Ireland, pp 18–36. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (1965) Investment in Education, Dublin: Stationery Office. OECD (1991) Review of National Policy for Education – Ireland, Paris: OECD. Powell, F. (1992) The Politics of Irish Social Policy 1600–1990, New York, NY: Edwin Mellen. Puirséil, N. (2007) The Irish Labour Party 1922–73, Dublin: UCD Press. Quin, S., Kennedy, P., O’Donnell, A. and Kiely, G. (eds) (1999) Contemporary Irish Social Policy, Dublin: UCD Press. Quinn, O. (2008) Advisers or Advocates? The Impact of State Agencies on Social Policy, Dublin: IPA. Share, P., Tovey, H. and Corcoran, M. (2007) A Sociology of Ireland (3rd edn) Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. Sinfield, A. (1975) ‘We the people and they the poor: a comparative view of poverty research’, Social Studies: Irish Journal of Sociology, 4(1): 3–25. Walsh, B. (1972) Poverty in Ireland: Research Priorities. Account of One-Day Conference held in ESRI, April 18, 1972, Broadsheet No. 7, Dublin: ESRI. Whitaker, T.K. (1958) Economic Development, Dublin: Stationery Office.

46

FOUR

The changing policy analysis capacity of the Irish state Muiris MacCarthaigh

Introduction One of the paradoxes of modern government is that although there has never been as much data and evidence available to inform policy making as there is today, the solutions to the policy problems faced by governments appear more, rather than less, elusive. In part, this is a reflection of the changing nature of citizen expectation of the state, the growing number of ‘actors’ in all policy arenas, and greater recognition of the interdependence between complex policy problems and the mix of solutions required to address them. It remains the case, however, that the weight of responsibility for solving public policy problems rests with political executives, who in turn rely on the capacity of their administrations to present policy options to them. And so the quality of citizen’s lives and experiences of government is heavily dependent on the ability of those administrative systems to recognise, understand and formulate policies that address the problems prioritised by their political masters. The issue of policy analysis is the subject of much academic interest given that, as Lasswell (1970) identified, it is concerned with producing knowledge about policy as well as for policy. Beginning in the period after the Second World War with work by Lindblom (1959), Deutsch (1966), Heclo (1974) and others who sought to better understand the policy process within the public realm, today a variety of models abound to help us understand how and why those in positions of authority (politicians and top bureaucrats) choose to find and use evidence to make judgments on policy options and implement them (see Petridou, 2014 for an overview). For governments, policy analysis carries heavy normative and ideological significance as it involves judgments about what society and the economy should do and how citizens should live and experience public services. Our understanding of how the role of policy analysis in government has developed mirrors the study of policy analysis more generally. For example, Van Nispen and Scholten (2016) propose that the performance of policy analysis has evolved through four stages, following a continuum that begins with a focus on a logic of consequence towards today’s logic of appropriateness. The first stage was concerned with policy that could be implemented, and paid little

47

Policy analysis in Ireland

heed to social research. In the second stage, as implementation studies took hold, issues of political as well as technical feasibility came to be recognised, and social acceptance of policy solutions emerged alongside the emergence of policy legitimacy. The third stage involved the engagement of a wider range of actors (and therefore interests) in the policy analysis process, which in turn led to contestation over not just the nature of the problem and the potential solutions, but also the assumptions underlying these proposals. Finally, the authors propose a more recent ‘argumentative’ turn that emphases the role of symbolism and rhetoric and the search for agreement between interests. The 2008 global financial crisis has presented a unique window of opportunity to more closely study these changes in approaches to policy analysis in the developed world, as the scale of that crisis points to great failings in policy foresight and planning among the world’s wealthiest nations. And in the case of Ireland, the issue of policy analysis in the civil service has emerged as a one of particular salience and attention, resulting in some important reforms documented in several chapters in this volume. To examine these reforms and explore the issue of policy analysis further, this chapter begins by considering the origins and evolution of the Irish civil service as the core of the state’s administration, before considering the place of policy analysis within it. Following this, the chapter looks at the development of policy analysis capacity through organisational means, and specifically through a greater use of state agencies. Reforms that have been made in the context of the crisis to improve the capacity of the state administration to undertake policy analysis are then considered, as well as the drivers for that enhancement: risk, expenditure and politics. The chapter draws on interviews with a number of senior civil servants with experience of working in a variety of public policy domains.

Context Policy analysis capacity within the Irish state has traditionally been dependent on the skills and ability of the civil service, the core of the core of the wider Irish public service. With just over 40,000 people employed in the civil service as of 2018, it forms approximately 12% of the wider public service (excluding those employed in commercial state-owned enterprises). The origin of the Irish civil service dates from the formal transfer of administrative services from British to Irish control in April 1922, following the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty’s provision (Article  17) that the British government would ‘take the steps necessary to transfer to [the Provisional Government] the powers and machinery requisite for the discharge of its duties…’. The structure and organisation of the new Irish civil service did not depart from the established Whitehall administrative model. It was designed to be an apolitical and generalist administrative service, with permanent tenure for staff selected on merit through open competition, institutionalised through the creation of the independent Civil Service Commissioners in 1926. The Weberian systems 48

The changing policy analysis capacity of the Irish state

of ‘grades’ was retained for the purposes of organisation and remuneration, and by 1966 Finlay suggested that there were over 1,000 such grades across the civil service (Finlay, 1966, p 27). The civil service was organised into clusters called departments. Each department had a responsible minister at the top and a pyramid of hierarchically organised civil servants below. The top civil servant (originally named a ‘Secretary’ and later ‘Secretary-General’) was the principal conduit of policy advice to the minister, and the key formal channel of communication between ministers and their departmental civil servants. The term ‘civil servant’ was ambiguous within the new state.1 A distinction was made between the civil servants of the government and the civil service of the state. The latter comprises a small proportion of the civil service and consists of those working in a variety of public agencies that are independent of government. These include, for example, the Oireachtas (parliament), the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General. Rather, the focus of the chapter is on the departmental civil service, that is, those working within ministries for which a cabinet minister of the cabinet is directly responsible to parliament. Definition of the term civil service was avoided until the Civil Service Commissioners Act 1956 stated that the civil service ‘means the civil service of the Government and the civil service of the State’. Those employed as Irish civil servants have thus ranged from tax collectors, to marine biologists and archaeologists employed within departments, to those appointed as special advisers to ministers. And prior to 1984 almost half of those employed in the civil service were involved in the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, that is, responsible for postal and telecommunications services.2 The legal principal of ‘corporation sole’ as set out in the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924 determined that the minister was politically responsible for all actions of their department. It consequently ensured that senior staff were consistently engaged in, rather than detached from, the minutiae of policy detail for which their minister had to account. The inability of senior civil servants to fully divorce themselves from day-to-day issues of management and policy oversight has been a central feature of periodic reviews of the civil service since the late 1960s. Such a divorce would not be without costs, however, including the loss of certain policy expertise. And though the lack of absence of more strategic policy development within the Irish civil service is routinely lamented, the experience Irish civil servants develop over their careers in the management of policy from inception to implementation would be highly prized in other more technocratic administrative systems. Although policy analysis is certainly a skill required by the civil service, with an expectation that improvement in the practice of this skill will enhance promotional opportunities, it has not traditionally been recognised as a prerequisite for entry to the service. As one interviewee reflected:

49

Policy analysis in Ireland

‘In a lot of the changes in recruitment over the years, it would be more explicit that people should have the range of operational but also … policy-making capacity and be able to demonstrate that. And it would be one of the competencies for any interview and I think you would not get to a senior level without being able to demonstrate capacity to do that….’ (Interview B, 2019) However, as the tasks of government have grown, alongside the requirement for better information and evidence to justify public policy actions, the demands for more sophisticated policy analysis within the civil service have been building for some time. Before considering the recent, post-crisis, developments, it is necessary to consider the emergence of policy analysis as a skill within the Irish civil service.

Origins: policy analysis in the Irish civil service In late 2014, following an extensive internal consultation process, the Irish government published The Civil Service Renewal Plan. Signed by all SecretariesGeneral (the most senior grade in the service) as well as the Taoiseach, the plan opened with the statement that the civil service ‘exists as an independent, impartial body to serve the State and the people of Ireland by carrying out the work of Government and delivering public services efficiently and effectively’ (Government of Ireland, 2014, p 5).3 This brief and general statement of the role of the civil service portrays it in a particular way: as the agent of government charged with implementing the will of its political principal. In fact, this Wilsonian perspective masks the fact that the Irish civil service has had, since its inception, a crucial role in helping the executive to come to a decision about what public services it wants to deliver, and how to deliver them. In achieving this, the performance of policy analysis is an integral part of a civil servant’s role, although rarely specified. As mentioned earlier, the Irish civil service fits within the Whitehall model of public administration. Apart from its non-partisan and merit-based system of appointment and promotion, this globally recognised model is characterised by its use of vertically organised ‘grades’, which do not necessarily describe what those within the grades do, but which provide for a system of superior– subordinate relationships in the performance of complex public tasks. This form of organisation is commonly linked with the ideal-type rational/legal bureaucracy proposed by Weber (1947). This type of organisational form involves: • • • •

50

fixed spheres of competence; a defined hierarchy of offices; specialisation and expertise in discrete areas; management through the application of a developing set of rules, knowledge of which is the special technical competence of the officials concerned.

The changing policy analysis capacity of the Irish state

Vertical progression within such a system required ever-better understanding of the rules and more competence in the performance of the requisite skills. In the case of the civil service, the ability to analyse and understand a policy problem, and present viable solutions to that problem that take into account the range of actors and interests that may affect their implementation, is a prized skill. And, of course, civil services are expected to perform their tasks in a manner that is accountable to their political masters, and by extension the public. The sources of information for policy analysis within the civil service were rudimentary, with emphasis placed on experience of personal knowledge rather than active engagement with outside parties. The Central Statistics Office (CSO), an important source of basic data, was established as an independent office in 1949 (see Chapter Five, this volume). And in a system that relied on incrementalism rather than policy innovation, the audit reports of the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General was another source of (financial) data. Otherwise, civil servants relied on an elaborate system of internal records or ‘files’, as inherited from the British system (Tough and Lihoma, 2012) to provide an evidence base for policy analysis. By the 1960s, and in tandem with developments in peer civil service systems including those of Australia and the UK, greater emphasis began to be placed on distinguishing between the policy development and policy implementation tasks of government. Or to use the argot of the time, between administrative work (deliberation on and development of policy) and executive work (which was concerned with implementation, and more easily measurable). The ‘Swedish’ model of administrative organisation came into vogue. This model was based on a division between small ministries shorn of executive work and multiple, separate (and often larger) agencies that engaged in the execution of ministerial policy that often involved more routine, repetitive, transactional work. The argument for such a model was that it offered ministries the advantage of compactness, short communication lines, and the ability to concentrate on strategic questions and, crucially, allowed the minister to engage solely in the political side of governing without having to worry about details of implementation. In the UK, the seminal report in 1968 of the British Committee on the Civil Service (or Fulton Committee [1968]) was influenced by this new wave of thinking, and made the separation of policy making from administrative duties one of its central recommendations. The Fulton report paved the way for Margaret’s Thatcher’s famous Next Steps programme of public sector reform, the centrepiece of which was the establishment of multiple arm’s-length agencies designed to implement ministerial policies. In Ireland, in tandem with a review of the Constitution established in 1966 and only a month after the creation of the Fulton Committee, the Lemass government established a Public Service Organisation Review Group under the chairmanship of Liam St. J. Devlin. Having regard to ‘the growing responsibilities of government’ its remit was, 51

Policy analysis in Ireland

… to examine and report on the organisation of the Departments of State at the higher levels, including the appropriate distribution of functions as between both Departments themselves and Departments and other bodies. (Public Services Organisation Review Group, 1969, p 3) Its final report was a substantial one, replete with criticisms of the existing system and proposals for widespread reform of the service, based on two underlying principles: • a greater emphasis on policy making, as distinction from administration; and • the need for greater integration and coordination across the public service. The report highlighted the burden of administrative work falling on ministers and higher civil servants, and its blueprint for change recommended a new division between civil service activities that were subject to political direction and control, and those that could be left to more independent executive units working through agreed systems towards policy objectives. It was proposed that this would be achieved by means of the division of each government department along policy development and execution lines. The policy-making core of the department (the Aireacht) would assume responsibility for strategy, subject to the minister and government’s approval. The remainder of the department would engage in policy implementation, and be organised via executive agencies. The Devlin report also recommended the establishment of a new department to focus on reform of the public service, and although a Department of Public Service was created in 1973, it became absorbed with industrial relations issues. Apart from the Department of Social Welfare, Devlin’s Aireacht-based model did not take root across the service, but the idea of institutionally separating policy from administration has remained an ambition of calls for reform since. However, there is evidence of an increased concentration of civil servants involved in policy-making activities happening over time. A snapshot of the proportion of those civil servants occupying what are considered to be policymaking positions (Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-General, Principal Officer and Assistant Principal) as a proportion of the total non-industrial civil service4 population identifies an increase from approximately 1% to almost 10% over 60 years (Figure 4.1). The reasons for this expansion cannot be explained here, but undoubtedly are connected to the growth in managerialist practices and associated skills demands, greater functional and personnel-related responsibilities, and general career advancement pressures.

52

The changing policy analysis capacity of the Irish state

Figure 4.1: Percentage of civil servants at higher grade (from Assistant Principal)

9.8

7.1 5 4

1.1

1957

1.8

2

1967

1977

1987

1997

2007

2017

Source: Hardiman and MacCarthaigh (2010, p 377), updated

Agencies and policy analysis capacity In the decades following the Devlin report, and framed by Ireland’s deepening engagement in the EU and its policy demands (see Chapter Nine, this volume), the Irish state grew in size and scope. This was most visibly manifest in the mushrooming of a wide variety of miscellaneous ‘agencies’ alongside departments, using names such as Board, Commission, Authority and Council (MacCarthaigh, 2012a, 2012b). Many of these agencies performed policy analysis and advisory roles, which in turn fed into ‘parent’ departments, but the Irish experience of what is known as ‘agencification’ was not, as elsewhere, a deliberate attempt to separate policy making from implementation (as envisaged by the Devlin report, mentioned earlier). Rather, it occurred in an ad-hoc manner with new functions being assigned to new organisations, and several undertaking their own policy analysis work, albeit not formally required to do so in their mandate. Figure 4.2 identifies the year-on-year aggregate growth in the number of public bodies in Ireland, with a particular acceleration from the early 1990s onwards, and peaking in 2008. This growth was largely driven by the creation of ‘arm’slength’ agencies or ‘quangos’, each with its own variety of policy, financial and functional autonomy from its parent department. The growth in state agency numbers reflects the increasing range of service delivery and regulatory tasks performed by the Irish government. They were also manifestations of shifts in the organisational mode of the state’s response to these new policy demands and the opening up of policy making to incorporate non-state interests through advisory bodies and representative councils. From 2008 onwards, there was a decline and gradual stabilisation in the number of agencies for the first time in the state’s history.

53

Policy analysis in Ireland

Figure 4.2: Public organisations in Ireland, 1922–2015 400 350

2008 financial crisis

300 250 200 150 100 50

192 3 192 6 192 9 193 2 193 5 193 8 194 1 194 4 194 7 195 0 195 3 195 6 195 9 196 2 196 5 196 8 197 1 197 4 197 7 198 0 198 3 198 6 198 9 199 2 199 5 199 8 200 1 200 4 200 7 201 0

0 Source: Hardiman et al (2019), www.isad.ie

Several of these organisations, such as Forfás (the national policy advisory board for enterprise, trade, science, technology and innovation, established in 1994) and the National Competitiveness Council (1997), were primarily concerned with the generation and analysis of data on sectors of Irish society and economy. Many others, such as the Road Safety Authority (2006) and the Pensions Authority (2014), produced new data as a by-product of fulfilling their remit, which then fed into political system directly (via parent departments) or indirectly (via media reporting). Despite the restrictions imposed post-2008 on the creation of such agencies, the range and volume of information produced by existing organisations created new challenges in term of policy overlap and coordination, as well as the challenge of turning it into policy action given a centralised political system.

Post-crisis policy analysis A series of post-crisis reports into the Irish banking sector and regulatory system (Honohan, 2010; Nyberg, 2011; Regling and Watson, 2010) all acknowledged the international dimension to the Irish crisis, but also pointed to domestic factors as playing a significant contributory role. These ranged from institutional failings in corporate governance standards and prudential regulation, to wider socio-cultural issues concerning ‘group-think’ and herd mentalities that left little room for dissenting voices or ‘contrarians’ pointing to the fatal flaws within the Irish property market and banking system to be heard. In reaction, the post-crisis policy-making environment in Ireland has witnessed experimentation with several forms of citizen and interest group engagement in the policy process, most explicitly citizens’ assemblies (Farrell et al, 2019; see 54

The changing policy analysis capacity of the Irish state

also Chapter Fifteen, this volume). As one interviewee put it: “I think there has, post crisis, clearly been an effort to more consciously be open to external voices and criticisms and some of the group-think type critiques” (Interview B, 2019). The same interviewee suggested that in the context of warnings about the Irish economy not being heeded prior to 2008, “… the civil service, post-crisis, is probably a bit more conscious of the need to record evidence-based views about decisions that are being taken … and record facts”. Similarly, a claim that the civil service had diminished or outsourced its policy analysis capacity was also made in the context of the increased use of consultancies to provide policy advice in the years prior to the crisis. The same interviewee suggested that: ‘… there’s been an effort to step away from consultancies [because one] of the criticisms was that we had outsourced too much to consultancy reports. It may be creeping back in a bit, but … under the Enda Kenny government he would have been very strong [in saying] “You should be able to develop this expertise yourselves.”’ (Interview B, 2019) An important institutional development to address this issue has been the creation of the Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service (IGEES) (see Chapters Five and Eight, this volume). Its emergence followed criticism of the Department of Finance specifically (Wright, 2010) and more generally the strategic planning and capacity skills of the Irish government (Christensen, 2013; IGEES, 2016). Commenting on its creation, one official working within IGEES put it that post-crisis there was a “realisation that across the civil service there wasn’t sufficient policy expertise to drive the principles of value for money and do policy analysis that would inform policymaking and policy implementation” (Interview  A, 2019). Officials interviewed by MacCarthaigh (2017, p  206) pointed to IGEES as having had a substantive role in improving the quality of their policy deliberations from early on in its inception: ‘… I think [IGEES] has been very useful in terms of addressing some of the issues in the Wright Report on the Department of Finance … around the kind of internal capacity [for] analysis [and] promoting a kind of plurality of views, you know, and avoiding the emergence of … groupthink or complacency around certain things.’ (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform official) ‘I think [IGEES is] likely to change a lot of the way we do things over time. It’ll take time to bed in. I just see more and more of it now at management board level and when we’re trying to look at new things…. And I think that evaluation culture … is going to become quite important if it really beds down, as it seems to be starting to do….’ (Department of Finance official) 55

Policy analysis in Ireland

An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) review of IGEES published in 2019 also found that it has made a ‘significant difference in strengthening the analytical capacity of the Civil Service in Ireland’ (OECD, 2019, p  8). Other institutional innovations designed to improve the quality of policy analysis through challenging government economic and budgetary proposals include the creation of the independent Irish Fiscal Advisory Council and the Parliamentary Budget Office (see Chapter Eight, this volume).

Drivers of policy analysis in the civil service Policy analysis involves a variety of data sources, motivations and pressures. In this final section, three important influences on the Irish civil service’s policy analysis function are considered: risk, expenditure and politics. Risk-driven policy analysis Contemporary policy analysis in the Irish civil service has been influenced by the desire for more active engagement with external bodies with a view to risk analysis and associated planning. An important initiative in this regard has been the annual publication since 2013 of a National Risk Assessment. This “… is again an effort to more openly say these are risks and listen and talk externally and validate what we think might be risks facing the country, in a way again that’s not always comfortable for our political system” (Interview B, 2019). Again reflecting the desire to address perceived shortcomings in policy development prior to the crisis, the National Risk Assessment seeks to: …  counteract ‘group think’ and to ensure all voices are heard by Government. It seeks to prevent a repeat of the mistakes of the past, when dissenting voices were not heeded, leading to catastrophic consequences for the country. It has helped stimulate a national conversation about risk that takes place at every level from private citizens to civil society groups, industry and public bodies. (Government of Ireland, 2018, p 4) When interviewed about the National Risk Assessment report, one official noted the positive effect it had in developing system-wide awareness of challenges facing the state in the mid- to long term: ‘I wouldn’t exaggerate its influence. But then from where we were in of not doing anything like this to having a government-led process to say “What do we think are risks facing the country?” And it starts by asking departments what’s in their sphere of thinking. And [as] it’s written up [and] goes to government it’s published for consultation [and] we ask for views of external stakeholders. We generally have 56

The changing policy analysis capacity of the Irish state

a seminar or we ask people to come along and to give a sense [of] are we picking up the right things or are we capturing the right things? We did a look-back exercise last year [and] it was one of the first official government documents to highlight Brexit for example.’ (Interview B, 2019) Expenditure-driven policy analysis Prior to the 2008 crisis, Irish public spending grew at a rapid, and ultimately unsustainable, pace. As part of the post-crisis cutbacks, the new coalition government elected in 2011 undertook two ‘root-and-branch’ comprehensive reviews of expenditure, in 2011 and 2014. The first led to the publication of the Comprehensive Expenditure Report 2012–14 (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2011) in December 2011 alongside the coalition’s first Budget, for the calendar year 2012. The report represented a detailed analysis and assessment of all programmes of expenditure across all government departments, with each also tasked with identifying policy options for savings (MacCarthaigh and Hardiman, 2017). The second report, Comprehensive Expenditure Report 2015–2017 (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2014) and an associated plan for capital investment were published in October 2014 as part of Budget 2015. In line with the reformed public spending code, the report set out multi-annual expenditure ceilings for all ‘votes’ for each of the years 2015, 2016 and 2017. In 2017, a different ‘spending review’ process began, although again with a three-year time frame to assist budgetary planning to 2020. As part of this process, departments are required to produce background papers that set out scenarios and justifications for increases in spending for the period in question. Interviews also indicate that the Department of Finance has become more engaged in scenario modelling and forecasting using macro-economic indicators. Also, following a pilot exercise in 2011, a new performance reporting system was introduced across all areas of public expenditure in 2012 (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2019, p  1). The purpose was to more closely align public spending with policy objectives, and involved reformatting budgetary documents to make these connections more explicit, particularly for parliamentarians. An independent review published in 2016 had been quite critical of the lack of performance-based debate and discussion within parliamentary committees, and had recommended greater use of performance information as part of expenditure decision making (OECD, 2016). There is also a strong European dimension to expenditure-based policy analysis, and one interviewee noted that as part of the European budgetary semester process: ‘… the European Commission [come] over here they ask questions about what you’re doing in different areas of policy. They make 57

Policy analysis in Ireland

recommendations and you have to respond to those recommendations. It’s an iterative process but … it’s a European input to policy making.’ (Interview B, 2019) The expenditure-focused nature of much policy analysis work, and particularly by IGEES, naturally stirs wider debate about the provision of rights-based rather than budgetary-based provision of services and benefits, and the bases on which issue of national economic and social development are decided. Thus, the political ‘framing’ of policy decisions and the use of discourse to justify expenditure decisions comes into focus, which is the final influence considered here (see also Chapter Seventeen, this volume). Politics and data analysis Policy analysis in government is laden with political considerations, and elected governments can claim legitimacy to pursue certain policy goals irrespective of the evidence presented to them. The capacity of the political system to absorb policy detail is an important factor in this context, and in the Irish case interviews suggest that “… we are slowly moving away from just people’s opinions around the table to actually discussing the numbers” (Interview A, 2019). With more and more data being produced and becoming available to those involved in public affairs, from lobby groups to politicians themselves, having robust and independent sources of information becomes increasingly important. National statistics offices have a vital role to play in this work. In the Irish case, the CSO (founded in 1949) has long been the established source of partisan-free data on Irish society and economy and its impartiality has never been called into question, (see Chapter Five, this volume). Like IGEES, the CSO has developed a network of statisticians across the civil service as part of the National Data Infrastructure, and seeking to leverage administrative data held by government departments for policy use across government. During 2017 and 2018, there were highly charged political debates concerning housing and homelessness in Ireland, which had at their heart disagreements over the number of new dwellings being built across the state. The CSO was able to assist the government response by developing a new series of housing output figures that conclusively provided information on the subject. From the perspective of one senior official, while IGEES has certainly helped to improve the supply side and quality of decision making, there remains scope for its work to be used more effectively: ‘… we still haven’t built enough of our critical mass to actually do enough of the evidence building. It could be because there’s no data. So there’s a … data infrastructure piece that needs to happen before you can actually do any meaningful analysis. And it could also be because [we’re] trying to change the culture and champion the concept of 58

The changing policy analysis capacity of the Irish state

evidence-based policy making which in some environments is maybe not as advanced as it would be in others.’ ‘… we’ve made big inroads [but] then there is the question of “Is the system using that to actually make decisions or is this actually becoming a part of the information set of the people while making decisions?” And that then raises the question for us [of] “What is the absorptive capacity?”’ (Interview A, 2019) There is also evidence, however, that the demand side of policy analysis has also expanded. It is not unusual for information published by a state agency to make the headlines in national newspapers, or for journalists to use freedom of information requests and open data to publicise shortcomings in public policy that in turn dominate political debates. And politicians themselves are increasingly adept at using such data. One interviewee noted how ministers were now more inclined to get into policy specifics: ‘You [now] have a generation of politicians who are much more comfortable in the detail of policy. So we would have ministers now who would come and give PowerPoint presentations to their colleagues at cabinet committees or government on roads, the broadband plan, our climate change plan … and we’d get into policy, which … reflects a different generation I think.’ (Interview B, 2019)

Conclusion For much of the 20th century, a major task of the Irish civil service involved recording large volumes of information about the ever-more diverse set of public tasks performed by government, and distilling it down to provide coherent information and advice to governments. The recent emergence of ‘digitalera governance’ and more recently the production and use of big data within government, involving machine learning, artificial intelligence and algorithms, challenge the traditional model and the skill set of the civil service. Nowhere is this more evident than in respect of the its policy analysis role, which remains central to the functioning of government yet has never involved as much data and data sources as it does today. This chapter has demonstrated that although it retains the right to present final policy options to government, as a result of criticisms made following the 2008 financial crisis, the Irish state’s administrative system is today formally more open to external input in the policy-making process than at any other time in its history. Ireland has also been a strong advocate of open data and increasing amounts of information are now made available about the work of government and its constituent organisations. Nonetheless, there remains scope for better and more routine flows of information and collaboration between the civil service and research institutes such as universities. Good models to follow include 59

Policy analysis in Ireland

longitudinal studies such as the government-funded Growing up in Ireland and The Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing series, which have yielded major insights for Irish policy makers and which combine experiential and qualitative data with the statistics produced by organisations such as the CSO. Although many public service career patterns are still largely characterised by movements between organisations and the development of skills ‘on the job’, the requirement for ever-more sophisticated policy analysis, particularly within the civil service, suggests that professional career streams will become increasingly important. As it approaches its centenary year, the ability of the Irish state administration to consistently perform policy analysis across an increasingly diverse set of policy arenas remains a vital element of democratic government. So too the study of policy analysis as a distinctive task of government is worthy of greater attention than it has heretofore attracted. Notes 1 2 3

4

The term civil servant was originally coined within the British system to distinguish between those in service of the state but in a non-military – that is, civilian – capacity. In this year, the functions were taken over by two state-owned companies, An Post and Telecom Éireann respectively. The Civil Service Code of Conduct states that: ‘The mission of the Civil Service is the achievement of an excellent service for Government and the other institutions of State as well as for the public as citizens and users of public services….’ This excludes those on civil service terms and conditions of employment working for stateowned companies, but includes those classified as civil servants working in state agencies.

References Christensen, J. (2013) ‘Bureaucracies, neoliberal ideas, and tax reform in New Zealand and Ireland’, Governance, 26(4): 1–22. Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (2011) Comprehensive Expenditure Report 2012–14, Dublin: Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Available at http://www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2012/Documents/CER%20 -%20Estimates%20Final.pdf Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (2014) Comprehensive Review of Expenditure 2015–17, Dublin: Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Available at http://www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2015/Documents/Part%20 I%20Report%20of%20the%202014%20Comprehensive%20Review%20of%20 Expenditure.pdf Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (2019) Public Service Performance Report, Dublin: Department of Public Expenditure and Reform. Available at: https://assets.gov.ie/79853/b74cafdf-2db7-4498-b787-1076499de5c3.pdf Deutsch, K.W. (1966) The Nerves of Government, New York, NY: The Free Press. Farrell, D.M., Suiter, J. and Harris, C. (2019) ‘“Systematizing” constitutional deliberation: the 2016–18 citizens’ assembly in Ireland’, Irish Political Studies, 34(1): 113–23, 10.1080/07907184.2018.1534832 Finlay, I. (1966) The Civil Service, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. 60

The changing policy analysis capacity of the Irish state

Fulton Committee (1968) Report of the Committee on the Civil Service, Cmnd 3638, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Government of Ireland (2014) The Civil Service Renewal Plan, Dublin: Stationery Office. Government of Ireland (2018) 2018 National Risk Assessment: Overview of Strategic Risks, Dublin: Department of the Taoiseach. Hardiman, N. and MacCarthaigh, M. (2010) ‘Organising for growth: Irish state administration 1958–2008’, The Economic and Social Review, 41(3): 367–93. Hardiman, N., MacCarthaigh, M. and Scott, C. (2019) ‘Irish State Administration Database’, ISAD [Online]. Available at: www.isad.ie Heclo, H. (1974) Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Honohan, P. (2010) The Irish Banking Crisis: Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 2003–2008. A Report to the Minister for Finance from the Governor of the Central Bank, Dublin: Central Bank. Available at: https://inquiries.oireachtas. ie/banking/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Honohan-2010.pdf IGEES (Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service) (2016) IGEES Medium Term Strategy (MTS) 2016–2019, Dublin: Department of Public Expenditure and Reform. Available at: https://igees.gov.ie/wp-content/ uploads/2016/10/IGEES-Medium-Term-Strategy-2016-2019.pdf Interview  A (2019) IGEES official, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 13 February. Interview B (2019) Department of An Taoiseach, 7 May. Lasswell, H.D. (1970) ‘The emerging conception of the policy sciences’, Policy Sciences, 1(1): 3–14. Lindblom, C.E. (1959) ‘The science of “muddling through”’, Public Administration Review, 19(2): 79–88. MacCarthaigh, M. (2012a) ‘Politics, policy preferences and the evolution of Irish bureaucracy: a framework for analysis’, Irish Political Studies, 27(1): 23–47, doi:10.1080/07907184.2012.636180 MacCarthaigh, M. (2012b) ‘Mapping and understanding organizational change: Ireland 1922–2010’, International Journal of Public Administration, 35(12): 795–807. MacCarthaigh, M. (2017) Public Sector Reform in Ireland: Countering Crisis, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. MacCarthaigh, M. and Hardiman, N. (2017) ‘Budgetary and financial management reform in Ireland’, in E.M. Ghin, H.F. Hansen and M. Kristiansen (eds) Public Management in Times of Austerity, Abingdon: Routledge, pp 203–21. Nyberg, P. (2011) Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland. Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland, Dublin: Department of Finance. Available at: https://ptfs-oireachtas.s3.amazonaws.com/ DriveF/Data/Library3/NybergMisjudingRisk_124409.pdf OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2016) Review of Budget Oversight by Parliament: Ireland, Paris: OECD.

61

Policy analysis in Ireland

OECD (2019) The Role of Evidence Informed Policy Making in Delivering on Performance: The Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service, Paris: OECD. Petridou, E. (2014) ‘Theories of the policy process: contemporary scholarship and future directions’, Policy Studies Journal, 42(S1): 12–32. Public Services Organisation Review Group (1969) Report of the Public Services Organisation Review Group (Devlin report), Dublin: Stationery Office. Regling, K. and Watson, M. (2010) A Preliminary Report on the Sources of Ireland’s Banking Crisis, Dublin: Government Publications. Tough, A. and Lihoma, P. (2012) ‘The development of recordkeeping systems in the British Empire and Commonwealth, 1870s–1960s’, Archives and Manuscripts, 40(3):191–216. Van  Nispen, F.K.M. and Scholten, P.W.A. (2016) ‘Policy analysis in times of austerity: puzzling in the shadow of powering?’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 18(5): 439–47, doi.org/10.1080/13876988.201 5.1095430 Weber, M. (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons), Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. Wright, R. (2010) Strengthening the Capacity of the Department of Finance: Report of the Independent Review Panel, Dublin: Department of Finance.

62

FIVE

Introducing evidence into policy making in Ireland Frances Ruane

Introduction In recent decades, Ireland has followed the trend (increasingly prevalent in the United Kingdom [UK] and the European Union [EU] from the mid-1990s) towards increased use of empirical evidence in policy making. The evidenceinformed (rather than evidence-based) approach favoured in Ireland recognises that other less easily measurable factors also come into play in policy formulation. The evidence sources and methods adopted are wide-ranging, reflecting the increased access to anonymised micro-data from survey and administrative data, the greater volume of research studies based on econometric, experimental and quasi-experimental approaches, and on qualitative approaches used particularly by sociologists and psychologists. This chapter focuses on the broad approach being adopted in Ireland, with a specific emphasis on the major developments in data quantity, quality and access to official statistics, under the auspices of the Central Statistics Office (CSO), and on the Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service (IGEES), established to build the skills sets needed to analyse data from these new sources. The chapter ends with a short discussion of the new challenges and opportunities ahead. The next section discusses the adoption of a more evidence-informed approach in Ireland. This is followed by a detailed look at an important part of the development of the evidence base for policy in Ireland, namely, the evolution of the Irish Statistical System under the leadership of the CSO and the National Statistics Board (NSB). The chapter continues by exploring how progress is being made in equipping the system with the skills needed to analyse the newly available data through the establishment of the IGEES. The final section looks at some new challenges and opportunities ahead.

The adoption of an ‘evidence approach’ to public policy While the concept of using evidence to inform public policy has been around for several hundred years, the explicit issue of the evidence approach, and the associated set of methodologies used for decision making in public policy, have come strongly to the fore since the mid-1990s (Pawson, 2006; Lunn and Ruane, 2013). At the centre of this focus is a more systematic approach to 63

Policy analysis in Ireland

the use of evidence, with the understanding that better policy decisions and societal outcomes could be achieved by policy makers drawing on objective and comprehensive evidence provided by researchers and analysts, and by policy makers actively seeking and commissioning relevant objective evidence to inform their decisions (see Nutley et al, 2010). There are many factors behind this focus on evidence, and a reflection on these helps to set the context in which the approach has developed in Ireland. An important enabling factor is the digital revolution that has transformed data systems and the methods that can be used to analyse data by large numbers of people. Prior to the 1990s, the high cost of collecting and analysing data meant that many issues were not systematically researched, and large datasets were usually not shared, thereby limiting their use to inform policy. At the same time, the digital revolution provided much easier access to data and information from international sources, allowing existing approaches to be questioned and new comparative analysis on a scale not previously possible. One negative side-effect of the digital revolution is its fuelling a preoccupation (enhanced by media) with immediacy and short-termism, with an overemphasis on the latest information and less questioning about the quality of that information as a basis for policy decisions and design. The short-termism also distracts attention from more indepth analysis. A second factor is the growing requirement for governments to demonstrate their contributions to action in the face of global and national events, to explain these actions to the public at large, and to explain differences in the actions they adopt in current versus previous contexts.1 The need for government to explain its position is also a response to higher levels of education in the population, which have led to calls for greater transparency and accountability of public decision making. This call for greater accountability is also the product of geopolitical changes, such as the weakening of the traditional left–right divide in politics, and multilateral arrangements, such as the way in which the EU develops its policies and engages in cross-country transfers. A third factor is that people increasingly expect evidence to be used and policy actions to be justified especially where tough decisions are required (for example, the consolidation of cancer care in specialist centres in Ireland) in areas subject to vigorous debate in the public media.2 In effect, governments are expected to spell out the implications of major events or of new policies of considerable complexity (for example, the impact of Brexit following the UK referendum in 2016). The quality and use of evidence in making public policy has had increased attention since the 2008 global financial crisis. In Ireland, the commitment to the greater use of evidence in public policy decision making was also associated with EU structural funds, where evidence was required to justify (and appraise) projects and programmes and then to demonstrate the extent to which these projects/programmes achieved their objectives. While the evaluation methods were not particularly sophisticated, they subjected public expenditures to greater scrutiny, in terms of explaining the logic 64

Introducing evidence into policy making in Ireland

for the expenditure and the choice and efficiency of delivery mechanisms. The EU’s more rigorous approach has become more embedded with the establishment of the IGEES, as discussed later in the chapter (see also Chapters Four and Nine, this volume). A further influence on Ireland’s adoption of a more evidence-informed approach in the 1990s came from the Irish civil service’s adoption of the rhetoric used in the UK when the Labour Party came to power in late 1990s (Ruane, 2012). This was reinforced by new public management processes being adopted under the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) from the mid-1990s (Murray, 2001; Rhodes et al, 2012). This found its way into a wider public debate in the policy and academic communities in Ireland under the auspices of the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF, 2007), which also opened up the discussion of how a wider range of evidence (for example, randomised control trials, natural experiments and so on) might be used to inform policy. The approach currently in place in Ireland continues to have two distinct elements. The first is that policy should be ‘evidence-informed’ and not ‘evidence-based’, the latter being seen as suggesting that the evidence alone could determine a policy decision. The evidence-informed approach takes care of any concerns that politically elected leaders might not be (or be seen to be) accountable for key decisions and that judgments might not have a major role to play in decision making; this also ensures that significant powers are retained for those making those judgments. The second element is the broadening and deepening of the range of evidence that is routinely used to inform policy compared with what had previously been used (Lunn and Ruane, 2013).

Emphasis on the evidence base Central to the acceptance of an evidence-informed approach to policy in Ireland is that the evidence will come from trusted, high-quality data that are detailed enough to be informative in relation to decision making and that allow comparisons with other relevant countries, such as those belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This section concentrates on major developments in official statistics in Ireland in the past two decades, clearing the way for the creation of a national data infrastructure that supports evidence-informed policy making. State of official statistics in the 1980s These recent developments stand in stark contrast to the situation 30 years ago, as set out in two major reports published in 1985, one by the Statistical Council (Government of Ireland, 1985) and the second by the NESC (1985).3 John Blackwell (1985), the main author of the NESC (1985) report, was highly critical of the weak link between statistics, research and policy in Ireland, which he saw as causing a dearth of evidence to inform policy decisions. Blackwell saw this as 65

Policy analysis in Ireland

reflected in major gaps in the statistical series available; little or no coordination, quality control or integration in the production of statistics; the underutilisation of administrative records as a basis for statistical evidence; and limited access to data provided to researchers and analysts in Ireland. Denis Conniffe (1985), the Chair of the Statistical Council, drew on its report (Government of Ireland, 1985) to argue that greater flexibility and autonomy be given to the CSO to increase its efficiency and effectiveness in producing statistics and to allow it to coordinate the production and dissemination of statistics in Ireland. This way, he suggested, the CSO could meet the needs of a wider range of data users, as well as the requirements set by Eurostat. He also proposed that the CSO widen its skill base, second staff across civil service departments, employ new statistical methods, and increase computerisation. While it took over a decade to begin to make serious progress in addressing these criticisms, change in the subsequent two decades has been exceptional, with a continuing momentum to improve system.4 In effect, all the criticisms identified in 1985 have been fully addressed; see Ruane (2019). It is instructive to consider how this seismic change in Irish statistics has come about. It started with the decision of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Garret FitzGerald, who had an exceptional interest in and knowledge of Irish official statistics, to set up a Statistical Council. The momentum generated by its report (Government of Ireland, 1985), which focused on producing more evidence, and by the NESC (1985) report, which focused on using that evidence for policy, led FitzGerald to establish the NSB, on an interim basis, in 1986. This action ensured that the criticisms could no longer be ignored, even if there was a change in government in 1987 (as there was) or a diminution in the support for such a move within the civil service. Rapid progress in the 1990s The interim NSB worked with the CSO to develop the Statistics Act 1993, which followed best international practice in terms of its comprehensive and forward-looking vision for official statistics. The Act covered the establishment of the CSO as an independent statutory body, the creation of a statutory NSB (NSB, 2003), and the extended mandate for the CSO to collect data from key sources (including access to administrative records). Inter alia, the legislation made provision for the CSO to cooperate with other bodies in the civil and public sectors to increase the range and quality of Irish national statistics5 and to allow for increased user access to anonymised microdata under new confidentiality standards. The new NSB’s view was that official statistics were a genuine public good, a position was in line with Sexton (1989) and somewhat at variance with the then prevailing orthodoxy that endorsed a ‘user pays’ approach even in the case of official statistics. With the 1993 Act came the adoption of a mission for Irish statistics that was user-focussed, values-driven and transparent. This mission sat well in the overall 66

Introducing evidence into policy making in Ireland

reform process in the Irish civil service, which was by then adopting a more databased approach, and this emphasis became yet stronger following the financial crisis. The CSO’s approach of moving steadily forward, with the strong support of the independent voice of the NSB, ensured that its independence, professionalism and authority have faced no threat as it has implemented its extended mandate. Consolidation of the new vision for the national statistical system in the 2000s From the early 2000s, the NSB and the CSO used their new legal powers to explore how accessing the data holdings of government departments and agencies under the Act might enable greater use of administrative records for statistical purposes, with a view to informing policy. This began with the establishment of the Steering Group on Social and Equality Statistics (SGSES)6 (see Chapter Fourteen, this volume) and continued with a group set up to focus on economic and environmental statistics. These groups led quickly to a set of projects on the statistical potential of administrative records across all relevant government departments, and to plans for each department to have its own data strategy; these projects facilitated the harnessing of administrative data in the following decade, once unique identifiers (individual, spatial and business) were in place to enable data linkage. The CSO’s seconding of statisticians across departments increased awareness of the benefits for departments of improving their data holdings to generate useful evidence to inform policy. As identified in 1985, a significant increase in resources for the CSO was needed to develop official statistics. The major turn-around in the economy in the mid-1990s helped to make this possible, allowing a doubling of the allocation of funds to the CSO for pay and pensions in nominal terms between 1989 and 1999, with an almost further doubling between 1999 and 2004, and an increase of over 40% between 2004 and 2019 (Ruane, 2019). These additional resources facilitated the systematic incorporation of administrative data into the production of official statistics, leading to major new outputs and services, including new high-quality data series; improved timeliness;7 special runs and anonymised research microdata files for key users; and anonymised data for inclusion in the Irish Social Science Data Archive. There was also increased general access to statistical outputs and data series on the CSO website, which provided soft data so that users could undertake their own analyses. Despite access to micro-data being possible from the mid-1990s, user numbers have only grown very recently, reflecting the larger community of analysts and researchers in Ireland, the CSO’s investment in secure methods for accessing research microdata files, and the establishment of the IGEES, which is discussed in the next section (Ruane, 2019; see also Chapters Four and Eight, this volume). While more remains to be done to create a comprehensive national statistical system, there is now recognition of the need for, and benefits of, such progress, at 67

Policy analysis in Ireland

the highest levels in the civil service,8 reflecting the commitment to an evolving vision of the role of evidence in better public policy making.9 Progress has been slowest in creating unique identifiers for government administrative purposes, particularly in relation to spatial identifiers; these are urgently needed to measure the impact of policies and practices where situations vary by location, for example, in relation to health services. There continue to be challenges associated with the regional boundaries used by different public bodies; these will reduce when an implementable system of geo-coding is in place. On foot of the modernisation agenda, the CSO’s position is now closely aligned with developments across the European Statistical System, where increasing numbers of countries are now following Nordic models of making greater use of administrative record data to build national data infrastructure, thereby freeing up resources to undertake new activities. This section has concentrated on developments in official statistics as these are the largest single source of data that can underpin the evidence required to inform policy. The following, final, section discusses the issue of future developments and other sources of data to inform policy.

The contribution of analysts to providing evidence to inform policy As is clear from the previous section, high-quality data are essential to producing evidence to inform policy. However, these data require the application of policyrelevant analysis if they are to be of value to the policy-making process. Paralleling improvements in the national data infrastructure, there has been significant recent investment in analytical skills so that the benefits of such investments in data infrastructure can be realised. However, starting in the late 1980s, the Irish civil service adopted a ‘generalist skills model’ and reduced investment in its analytical capacity, despite the economy growing and becoming more complex. This dearth of expertise meant that when policy ideas emerged internationally, there was often no analysis available to show whether or not specific policies would embed in Ireland (for cultural, economic or social reasons), whether the relevant framework conditions were in place, or whether it was possible or appropriate to evaluate their suitability.10 The consequences of the generalist model The ‘generalist model’ effectively signalled that civil servants who wished to retain and develop their specialist skill set would not be rewarded. Significant numbers with these skills left the civil service to work in the private sector, or in public sector organisations where they could increase and maintain their skill levels, for example, the Central Bank of Ireland, the Economic and Social Research Institute, Forfás (the industrial policy advisory board), the Competition Authority and the regulatory offices (energy, telecoms, aviation and so on). These bodies 68

Introducing evidence into policy making in Ireland

hired economists with master’s degrees and PhDs, with the specific remit of providing technical analyses to inform decision making. From the early 2000s, the supply of graduates with more technical master’s degrees and PhDs in the social sciences in Ireland increased, in line with national policy agreeing with the OECD’s emphasis on building advanced skills in science and technology, and supported by EU funding. Many of these social science graduates were employed in the public service but, for most of the first decade of the new century, not in the civil service, which retained the generalist model. Thus, despite adopting the language of an evidence-based approach, there was little evidence of the civil service adopting such an approach internally. As the economy began to grow more rapidly in the 1990s, government departments increasingly hired economic consultants to meet their analytical and technical needs.11 External calls for greater economic expertise within the civil service were ignored, and even its capacity to set the terms of reference for consultancy projects declined; by the late 1990s, evaluation was almost the only form of technical economic analysis undertaken within the civil service (Ruane, 2012). Change eventually came after the 2008 financial crisis (see Chapter Seven, this volume). The new government in 2011 was pressurised to respond to the growing calls for a government economic service, following continuing criticisms in the media over the dearth of economic expertise within the civil service, and the high costs of external economic consultants. Reintroducing specialist skills Residual resistance to abandoning the generalist model was evident in the title of the new economic service explicitly referring to ‘evaluation’ and hence becoming the Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service. As some of those engaged in evaluation were not necessarily economists, this boosted the numbers in the IGEES and recognised that evaluation was the strongest part of IGEES at the outset. The evaluation focus also reflected the importance attached to value for money in the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, which was responsible for establishing the IGEES.12 To gain acceptance within the civil service, the IGEES was established as an integrated, cross-government service rather than a standalone central service feeding out to departments. According to the Minister for Finance, Pascal Donohoe, in response to a Dáil question, IGEES staff members are ‘an integral part of each Department, adding their skill set to the varied expertise working on policy analysis and formulation as directed by Departmental business plans’ (Donohoe, 2019).13 The same Dáil response also noted that the number of IGEES staff increased from approximately 30 in 2012 to 160 in 2018. Approaching the end of 2019, combined IGEES recruits and pre-existing departmental resources amounted to over 200 analysts. Since most of the earliest recruits were hired at Administrative Officer grade, the dearth of economists at more senior levels delayed the development of the 69

Policy analysis in Ireland

service. The report of the IGEES Oversight Board, based on the first three years of the service’s operation, provides a good picture of how challenging it was for the IGEES to gain traction (IGEES, 2015), and paved the way for employment at higher levels of entry (Assistant Principal and Principal Officer levels) into IGEES in subsequent years. In an approach similar to that adopted by the CSO, the original IGEES Management Board worked by persuasion to engage with each government department in building up its IGEES staff. By 2019, the governance had developed further under the guidance of Internal and External Advisory Groups that supported closer interactions with analysts outside the civil service, shaping how internal and external expertise would be used in research to inform policy in the decade ahead (Best and Holmes, 2010; Lunn and Ruane, 2013). In addition, a Learning and Development Framework now delivers a wide range of training courses that help to balance the work of the IGEES across different domains. These domains include analysis to identify policy challenges and inform policy design and formation (working closely with those engaged in policy delivery); robust economic evaluation of interventions to identify results for future learning; and expenditure reviews, which assist the process of accountability. IGEES economists are now undertaking specific research projects that will help ensure that the work of analysts will deal with social as well as economic policy issues, and link more externally to the wider research community. This latter development raises the issue of how and where research and analysis will take place in the future, and how the IGEES will identify appropriate peer reviews for its work. By the end of 2018, IGEES analysts had produced and published over 200 policy analysis papers across broad policy areas, all seen as contributing to strengthening the evidence base for policy formulation in Ireland. In some instances, these analyses are directly replacing what would previously have been commissioned from consultants. In other cases, they represent the development of a more systematic approach to building an integrated evidence base for policy, often drawing on confidential CSO or departmental datasets. IGEES now covers all government departments but has not yet extended to the wider public sector.14 Its new strategic direction, informed by an extensive internal and external consultation processes (including an OECD review published in late 2019), will be outlined in its next medium-term strategy document for 2020–23.15 This strategy will focus on further strengthening the analytical capacity of the civil service (through recruitment and learning and development programmes), deeper collaboration with CSO statisticians, to unlock the potential of smart administrative data, stronger engagement with the policy-making structures to increase the impact of evidence on policy making, and greater engagement with the national and international policy analysis community. Crucial to success will be that the best data and the widest possible range of methods are applied. 70

Introducing evidence into policy making in Ireland

The future: data gaps, data protection, trust in data, statistical governance As mentioned earlier, the volume of data available from official statistics for research to inform policy has increased very significantly. However, significant gaps remain, such as those identified by a survey of users and reported in the NSB’s strategic priorities report (2015, p 33): ‘… more coherent health sector data, more information about energy and environment issues, better services data and the need for more detail in regional statistics … a growing demand for new social indicators in the context of the increasing priority being given to well-being and social progress’. This list does not refer to data required to address the challenges of globalisation or Brexit. Research on globalisation requires a multi-country approach, with Ireland linked into new macroeconomic frameworks and new data-collection and data-sharing methods, being led by the OECD, Eurostat and the United Nations. This approach will allow international comparisons relevant to policy issues, both macro and micro, with increased sharing of methodologies and potential sources among EU countries. Increasing numbers of international macro-type indicators will help identify where attention should be directed or assumptions should be challenged, and policy interventions will require national data that capture the heterogeneity of the population within countries. Here CSO research relating to microdata files and administrative data (especially that which can be used for longitudinal analyses) will be vital, with data based on unique identifiers to ensure that characteristics and impacts are properly measured sub-nationally. Such analyses allow for informative types of disaggregation, such as by gender, age, education levels, location and so on. The issue of how General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will affect the use of survey and administrative micro-datasets as a basis for research and analysis to inform policy is not clear. Meeting GDPR requirements certainly increases the burden of using micro-data and may limit the extent to which datasets can be combined, both within and across countries. GDPR will also come into play when looking at the potential for collecting data from private sources, such as electronic data on tourism or retail sales (which are derived as a by-product of mobile phone use). While the potential of new ‘Big Data’ sources seems considerable, it raises new ethical and data-continuity issues for researchers, and their use may be limited by the skill sets of those producing evidence to inform policy. The growing demand for data-analytic and modelling skills suggests a skill shortage may emerge if supply does not increase and public sector pay rates do not allow skill retention, thereby delaying the speed of realising the potential benefits from these data sources. The multiple data sources within the CSO place it potentially in a unique situation to undertake policy-related research, making it timely to have an open discussion of the different roles individuals and institutions might play in producing 71

Policy analysis in Ireland

evidence to inform policy, and of providing greater transparency in relation to how data can be combined. Transparency in the analysis undertaken and independence in the collection of data are crucial if an evidence-informed approach is to be robust. External analysts have a key role to play in monitoring progress, or regress, and disseminating this work in academic, policy and media forums. The CSO, like all national statistical offices, faces challenges of relevance, cost and timeliness from the owners of new private sector data sources, whose quality standards are currently not subject to any regulatory standards. While there have been occasions when some have questioned the reliability and value of some CSO data over the years, Irish official statistics remain highly trusted and regarded.16 However, trust must not be presumed and, for example, the negative media coverage associated with the upward revision of the GDP growth rate to 26% in 2015 has the potential to create trust issues unless the CSO provides details and explanations that can be widely understood.17 The acceptance of evidence based on official statistics to inform policy depends critically on the trust in those statistics, and all statistical offices internationally face an urgent imperative to deal with any possible distrust or with public misuse of those statistics. In Ireland, there has been no charge of any political influence on the statistics process, for example, in terms of the timing of releases, the spinning of data or the independent leadership of the CSO. In this regard, Ireland stands in contrast to several EU countries where the appointment to the head of the statistical office appears to be subject to political influence, as can the timing of data releases. In other non-EU countries, most notably the United States, aspersions have been cast on official statistics as being the best sets of measures. This points to the risk of allowing any decline in high governance standards in the statistical system and any reduction in the professional standing or skills of official statisticians. There is also the issue of the misuse of official statistics in some countries (for example, in the UK ahead of the Brexit referendum) and consideration should be given as to how any such development would be handled by the CSO.18 This issue is also of EU-wide concern, especially with the growth of extremist groups that criticise any statistics, including official statistics, that do not align with their views. Ireland must ensure that current high governance standards are maintained and must deal effectively with any potential misuse of official statistics should it arise. In support of good governance, the CSO should continue to improve its engagement with civil society and to build statistical literacy in Ireland. Ultimately, such literacy, supported by accessible infographics, will reduce the risk of individuals being misled by the misuse of official statistics, or become increasingly disconnected from the official measures of economic, social and environmental change.

Concluding comments This chapter has concentrated particularly on the role of official data in providing the material for researchers and analysts to produce evidence to inform policy. 72

Introducing evidence into policy making in Ireland

This should not lead to the conclusion that these are the only data available but rather to an acknowledgement that these are the largest source of continuous statistical data for the country across a multitude of domains. Increasingly, analysis and research for policy design require a combination of methods that use both quantitative and qualitative data. For example, the strength of Ireland’s two national longitudinal studies, Growing Up in Ireland and The Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing, reflect the combined strength of high-quality data that are both quantitative and qualitative, and draw on a wide range of disciplines in their design. Notes 1

2 3

4 5 6

7

8

9

10 11

12

For example, the reference to evidence for policy based on ‘what worked’ was used by the British Labour Party in the 1990s to reposition its stance on many policy positions that it had held for decades. Media, both traditional and social, also contribute to the dissemination of ‘fake facts’ that are taken up in policy discussions. These reports were discussed at a public meeting of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland in 1985, together with the response by the Director of the CSO (Linehan, 1985). The discussion indicated a high level of tension in relation to the paucity of data available to inform policy, which the CSO response attributed entirely to the availability of resources. The delay in implementation was primarily due to resource and organisational demands associated with the relocation of activities to Cork, which affected information technology developments. This range contrasts with what would have been in place prior to 1993, when the CSO mandate related to CSO data only, with no reference to administrative data. The focus on social statistics was significant as they had been the Cinderella of the Irish statistical system up to the 1990s. The SGSES report, Developing Irish Social and Equality Statistics to meet Policy Needs, was published in 2003. Whereas it took typically five years or more to process the full range of census data up to the end of the 1980s, the full range of census volumes are now released in the year after the Census is held. For example, the website of the Department of An Taoiseach in 2019 describes its role as: ‘To offer objective and evidence-informed advice to Government, respond to developments, and deliver Government objectives while striving to achieve optimal outcomes in the long-term national interest. To serve citizens and stakeholders efficiently, equally and with respect, in a system that is open, transparent and accountable.’ See www.gov.ie/en/organisation/departmentof-the-taoiseach/?referrer=/consult_english1.doc An address by Robert Watt, Secretary-General at the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform at the Whitaker Institute in the National University of Ireland Galway (NUIG) in September 2018 provides a current picture of how the overall system is developing. See: https:// www.gov.ie/ga/oraid/0da908-keynote-speech-of-secretary-general-watt-on-making-betterpublic-pol/ The 2011/12 proposal that Ireland should follow the Dutch method of private health insurance was one such example. Consultants served to provide significant protection to civil servants by creating a convenient distance between decision makers and the source of suggested actions when policies were unsuccessful or when proposals were politically unpalatable. The explicit goals set for the IGEES have evolved slightly and are currently to develop a professional economic and evaluation service that will provide high standards of economic and policy analysis to assist the government decision-making process; to ensure application of established best practices in policy evaluation in support of better value for money and 73

Policy analysis in Ireland

13

14 15 16

17

18

more effective policy and programme interventions by state authorities; and to facilitate more open policy dialogue with academia, external specialists and stakeholders across the broad socioeconomic spectrum (IGEES, 2019). Some of those working outside the IGEES have advanced skills that combine well with those members in the IGEES, such a PhDs in sociology, psychology, law and so on, enhancing the richness of approaches that can be used to generate good policy analysis. Such an extension would widen the sphere of influence of analysts and would widen the perceived benefits of a career in the Irish public sector. See IGEES (2016) for its 2016–19 medium-term strategy. For a much fuller discussion of the issues related to trust in statistics in Ireland, see the papers by Pádraig Dalton and Patricia O’Hara at the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society’s Symposium on Safeguarding Trust in Official Statistics (Dalton, 2014; O’Hara, 2014). To get a picture of the complexity of the issues involved, see, for example, the report of the Economic Statistics Review Group (CSO, 2016) and the response to its main recommendations (CSO, 2017). It is important that Ireland does not fall behind in dealing with the misuse of official statistics, recalling the statement in Blackwell (1985, p 1) to the effect that data constitute ‘the currency of democracy’.

References Best, A. and Holmes, B. (2010) ‘Systems thinking, knowledge and action: towards better models and methods’, Evidence & Policy, 6(2): 145–59. Blackwell, J. (1985) ‘The links between statistics, research and policymaking’, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 25(1): 1–10. Conniffe, D. (1985) ‘Statistics for policy and research – the views of the Statistical Council’, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 25(1): 11–22. CSO (Central Statistics Office) (2016) Report of the Economic Statistics Review Group, December 2016, Dublin: CSO. Available at: www.cso.ie/en/media/ csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/ Economic_Statistics_Review_(ESRG)_Report_Dec_2016.pdf CSO (2017) Central Statistics Office (CSO) Response to the Main Recommendations of the Economic Statistics Review Group (ESRG), Dublin: CSO. Available at: www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomic statisticsreviewgroup/ESRG_CSO_response_3_Feb_2017.pdf Dalton, P. (2014) ‘Safeguarding trust in Irish official statistics: a code of practice for the Irish Statistical System’, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 43(1): 34–45. Donohoe, P. (2019) ‘Dáil Éireann Debate, Tuesday, 16 April 2019, Questions [151]’, Houses of the Oireachtas [Online]. Available at: www.oireachtas.ie/en/ debates/question/2019-04-16/151 Government of Ireland (1985) A New Institutional Structure for the Central Statistics Office, Dublin: Stationery Office. IGEES (Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service) (2015) Report to the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform from the IGEES Oversight Board: First Report on the Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service 2012–2014, Dublin: IGEES. Available at: https://igees.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IGEESOVERSIGHT-BOARD-REPORT-TO-MINISTER-2012-2014.pdf 74

Introducing evidence into policy making in Ireland

IGEES (2016) IGEES Medium Term Strategy (MTS) 2016–2019, Dublin: Department of Public Expenditure and Reform. Available at: https://igees.gov. ie/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/IGEES-Medium-Term-Strategy-2016-2019. pdf IGEES (2019) ‘Our goals’, Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service [Online]. Available at: https://igees.gov.ie/about-us/our-goals Linehan, T.P. (1985) ‘Some implications of recent proposals and recommendations particularly affecting the CSO’, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 25(1): 23–41. Lunn, P. and Ruane, F. (2013) ‘When and how can evidence inform policy?’, in P. Lunn and F. Ruane (eds) Using Evidence to Inform Policy, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, pp 1–22. Murray, J. (2001) Reflections on SMI, Working Paper No. 1, Dublin: The Policy Institute, Trinity College Dublin. Available at: www.tcd.ie/policy-institute/ assets/pdf/PIWP01_John%20Murray.pdf NESC (National Economic and Social Council) (1985) Information for Policy, Report No. 78, Dublin: NESC NESF (National Economic and Social Forum) (2007) Evidence-Based Policy: Getting the Evidence, Using the Evidence and Evaluating the Outcomes, Dublin: NESF. NSB (National Statistics Board) (2003) Developing Irish Social and Equality Statistics to Meet Policy Needs. Available at https://www.nsb.ie/media/nsbie/pdfdocs/ Irish_Soc_Equality_Stats_Needs.pdf NSB (2015) A World Class Statistical System for Ireland: Strategic Priorities for Official Statistics 2015–2020, Dublin: NSB. Available at: www.nsb.ie/media/nsbie/ pdfdocs/NSB_Strategy_2015-2020.pdf Nutley, S., Morton, S., Jung, T. and Boaz, A. (2010) ‘Evidence and policy in six European countries: diverse approaches and common challenges’, Evidence & Policy, 6(2): 131–44. O’Hara, P. (2014) ‘The Irish Statistical System: preserving trust through quality standards’, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 43(1): 18–26. Pawson, R. (2006) Evidence-Based Policy: A Realist Perspective, London: Sage Publications. Rhodes, M.L., Biondi, L., Gomes, R., Melo, A.I., Ohemeng, F., Perez-Lopez, G., Rossi, A. and Sutiyono, W. (2012) ‘Current state of public sector performance management in seven selected countries’, International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, 61(3): 235–71. Ruane, F. (2012) ‘Research evidence and policymaking in Ireland’, Administration, 60(2): 119–38. Ruane, F. (2019) ‘The changing patterns of production and consumption of official statistics in Ireland’, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 43(1): 223–40. Sexton, J.J. (1989) ‘On producers and users of statistics’, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 26(1): 163–80.

75

Part Two Policy analysis at various levels of government: from local to the EU

77

SIX

Ireland’s ‘unique blend’: local government and policy analysis Aodh Quinlivan There should be room in a democratic country for two levels of government, each with its area of political responsibility. The local level should not have to be compelled to live in perpetual fear of a centralising vortex. (Marshall, 1967)

Introduction A fundamental argument in favour of local government is the building and expression of community identity. Wilson and Game (2002, p 38) argue that local authorities are the governments of particular communities and the institutions of local government ought to reflect and reinforce people’s sense of place and community. Callanan (2018, p 1) observes that in Ireland the sense of distinctive local identity is strong: ‘Even in a globalised society, it seems as though people continue to attach a higher value to their locality and to localness.’ In its purest form, we are talking about a system whereby councils of elected politicians make policy decisions on behalf of their local communities. Powers are not retained at central level by national government but are held and maintained by citizens of each community (Weeks and Quinlivan, 2009, p  2). Critical to this understanding of local government is the notion of councils having substantial control of local affairs. As will be seen in the following sections, local government in Ireland is characterised by functional and financial centralisation, increasing managerialism and the rationalisation of councils through abolitions and forced mergers. Yet, it continues to provide services that are essential to the everyday lives of citizens. Policy analysis is complex in this environment but it has a crucial role to play if we are to foster a debate to improve local government and local democracy. This chapter is divided into four main parts. After justifying the existence of local government, the first section reviews historical policy analysis functions and capacity in the Irish system. The chapter then outlines the current framework of local government in Ireland. The following section assesses the system’s policy analysis, process, function and capacities. A final section examines recent reforms to build democratic participation into policy analysis processes.

79

Policy analysis in Ireland

Justification for the existence of local government Spreading of power is a rudimentary justification for local government, the argument being that it is hazardous to concentrate too much power in one organ of the state. This is connected to the belief that the primary benefit of local government is that it is local and requires a local analytical frame for policy making. Local government is accessible to the general public in a way that national government can never be. Sharpe (1970, p 160) refers to this as the ‘democratic primacy’ that local government holds over central government. This promotes citizenship and encourages people to take an interest in local policy choices. For example, local forms of policy analysis may include opportunities for people to participate at open public meetings, at citizens’ panels, or through a local development plan process (Weeks and Quinlivan, 2009, p 3). Collins (1954) emphasises the possibility of local government being a ‘school of citizenship’. Setting aside democratic reasons, the need for local government is warranted on the basis of providing local public services. It can be asserted that service provision could come through a system of local administration or functional decentralisation, as opposed to local government but, as noted by Weeks and Quinlivan (2009, p 4), ‘this view misses the point that locally elected representatives, with community knowledge and an understanding of the characteristics of the area, are best placed to develop strategies and provide public services’. Local government can also have a key role to play as an agent of central government and as a local regulator. It is not unusual for central government to make use of its network of local authorities as agents. For example, Irish local authorities act as an agent of central government in collecting motor tax on behalf of the state. In areas such as planning and environmental protection, it is appropriate that local councils play a role in ensuring that national standards are observed (Weeks and Quinlivan, 2009, p 5). Summarising all of the previously mentioned points, Callanan (2018) has produced a useful framework of justifying local government and its diverse and interrelated roles (see Table 6.1). Each of these justifications can be assessed in the context of governance capacity and policy analysis, for example, analysis of policy determination, policy content and policy outcomes.

Table 6.1: Callanan ‘justification of local government’ framework, 2018 Justification 1

Instrument of local democracy

Justification 2

Provider of services

Justification 3

Agent of central government

Justification 4

Local regulator

Justification 5

Local leader and coordinator within local governance

Source: Callanan (2018)

80

Ireland’s ‘unique blend’: local government and policy analysis

The fifth justification has grown in prominence in recent years, with the trend towards local governance, whereby local authorities are working with networks of local actors, itself a new approach to policy analysis. This will be discussed later in the chapter in the context of Local Community Development Committees (LCDCs) and Public Participation Networks (PPNs). Callanan (2018, p 11) argues that local government in Ireland is learning how to develop its roles ‘as a convenor, facilitator, influencer, and persuader, relying on skills such as networking, influencing, negotiating, bargaining, cajoling, joint problem-solving, and the ability to cope with limited control and a degree of uncertainty and risk.’

Local government in Ireland: historical development The Local Government (Ireland) Act 1898 introduced modern and representative local government to Ireland. County councils, urban district councils, and rural district councils were now to be elected on a wide franchise that included women. At the turn of the 19th  century, Ireland’s local government system closely resembled its counterparts in England and Wales with close to 600 local authorities of all kinds, including county councils and rural district councils. After independence, the local government system went through a period of retrenchment. The new Free State government wanted to assert its authority and control and the message was clear – ‘sovereignty and self-government was to be vested in central government accountable to an Irish parliament in Dublin, not dispersed or extended to local areas’ (Callanan, 2018, p 19). An early legislative measure of the new Irish parliament was the Local Government (Temporary Provisions) Act 1923, which provided for the dissolution of local authorities that were not performing effectively and their replacement by government-appointed Commissioners. For example, both Dublin Corporation and Cork Corporation were dissolved in 1924; 23 local authorities were dissolved because of political dissent or financial problems and replaced by Commissioners within the first three years of the legislation (see Quinlivan, 2017). Through the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, ‘intense centralisation and general subordination to central government’ (Barrington, 1991, p 157) were the dominant themes in local government, with consequences for policy analysis. The 1960s brought prosperity and optimism on the back of the 1958 Programme for Economic Expansion. The positive mood was reflected by the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act 1963, which envisaged local authorities expanding their roles into ‘development corporations’. The optimism soon dissipated and the potential of local government at this time was never realised, partly because ‘arteries had grown too hard and bureaucratic sclerosis had become too far advanced’ (Barrington, 1991, p 158). The following decade saw local authorities relieved of their health functions (with the establishment of regional health boards) and also relieved of financial independence. An auction between the main political parties before the 1977 general election resulted in the abolition of rates on domestic dwellings (the primary source of local authority 81

Policy analysis in Ireland

funding) on the basis that the exchequer would meet the costs, a promise that was never fulfilled. The 1985 policy document, The Reform of Local Government (Government of Ireland), proposed a major devolution of functions to local authorities, a relaxation of ultra vires1 and the creation of new town councils for every town with a population of over 2,000. Barrington (1991, p 161) recalls: ‘In 1985 it looked as if a new dawn might be breaking, that the tide of centripetalism might be turned back.’ Alas, Barrington’s optimism was misplaced and he subsequently noted: ‘This programme manifestly evoked no enthusiasm in the central bodies and, when the government went out of office in early 1987, just one function had been transferred – the licensing of dogs! Even central government was not now strong enough to cope with the entrenched centralisers of the central bureaucracy’ (Barrington, 1991, p 161). The Advisory Expert Committee on Local Government Reorganisation and Reform was appointed in 1990, under the chairmanship of the previously cited Tom Barrington. The Barrington report was officially published in March 1991 (Advisory Expert Committee on Local Government Reorganisation and Reform, 1991). The government’s response can be judged by the Local Government Act 1991, which soon followed. The legislation received a lot of criticism for its halfhearted acceptance of the Barrington proposals. Writing in the Irish Independent on 13 May 1991, James Downey described the bill as a ‘legislative monstrosity’ that sent a clear message that the government had no intention of setting up a system of meaningful, powerful local councils. While Downey’s criticism has validity, the Local Government Act 1991 introduced some positive changes in the Irish local government system and the work was continued with legislation in 1993 and 1994. For example, the principle of general competence was extended to local authorities to act in the interest of their areas. Three county councils were created in Dublin, further restrictions to the dual mandate were introduced, in some areas of local government law there was modernisation, and city and county managers were appointed on a fixed-term contract of seven years. Ultimately, however, the results were piecemeal and did not represent a radical overhaul of local government. The year 1996 can be regarded as a watershed in the reform trajectory because a number of key documents were published that year. The most influential document was Better Local Government (Government of Ireland, 1996), which set out a programme that was the basis for significant processual and structural changes. It proposed changes based on four pillars, namely: enhancing local democracy; serving the customer better; developing efficiency; and providing proper resources for local authorities. Its impact was far-reaching and the changes it instigated continue to be influential, particularly those facilitating strategic planning and improving customer service. Constitutional recognition was bestowed on local government following a referendum in 1999, finally enshrining local government’s role in defining local priorities, promoting the interests of community, providing statutory services and making clear provision for local 82

Ireland’s ‘unique blend’: local government and policy analysis

elections every five years. The new millennium continued the impetus for local government reform. Modernising Government – The Challenge for Local Government (Government of Ireland, 2000), published in 2000, outlined how elements of the national Strategic Management Initiative were to be applied at local authority level. The Report of the Task Force on the Integration of Local Government and Local Development Systems (Government of Ireland, 1998) served as a blueprint for a structural reform that resulted in creation of county/city development boards. The plethora of disparate laws relating to local government was consolidated in the Local Government Act 2001, which also served to modernise some of the archaic provisions that were still in force. The unprecedented recession that affected Ireland after the 2008 global financial crisis caused a shrinking of the services and staffing of local authorities (see Chapter Four, this volume). A Report of the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes (Department of Finance, 2009) led to the Report of the Local Government Efficiency Review Group (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2010) and to reports by the Local Government Efficiency Review Implementation Group (2012 and 2013). All advocated a reduction in local government staffing and reform of administration and financing. The local government sector surpassed the recommendations proposed in the 2010 Report of the Local Government Efficiency Review Group (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government) – local authority staffing decreased by 24.2% nationally in the five years to 2013 while gross savings of €839m were achieved in the period 2008–12 (CCMA, 2013). Achieving these savings and efficiencies involved modifying practices, attitudes and resource usage, reforms that have had lasting impact, both positive and negative, including on policy making and policy analysis.

The current nature of local government in Ireland The landmark Local Government Reform Act 2014 provides the context for our understanding of Irish local government today. The legislation was described by the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government, Phil Hogan TD, as the most far-reaching change in structures, functions, operational arrangements and governance in the Irish local government since 1899. The most visible facet of Minister Hogan’s reform package was structural, with a reduction in the number of local authorities from 114 to 31. This was achieved through the complete abolition of the secondary tier of Irish local government comprising 80 town authorities (75 town councils and five borough councils). In addition, there were mergers involving Limerick City and County Councils, Waterford City and County Councils, and North and South Tipperary County Councils. The 2014 reforms also saw a reduction in the number of councillors from 1,627 to 949. Minister Hogan justified his decision to abolish all 80 town authorities on the basis that these councils had 46% of all councillors in the country, while only representing 14% of the population and dealing with a mere 7% of all local government activity. Interestingly, due to the absence of constitutional 83

Policy analysis in Ireland

protection for subnational government in Bunreacht na hÉireann, a whole tier of local government was removed through legislation without reference to the people by way of referendum. Rationalisation of local authorities is not unique to Ireland and there is an ongoing debate about the optimal size of local government and associated issues such as amalgamations, costs and economies of scale. The international research suggests that there is a weak link between size and costs, and that local authority mergers have limited intrinsic efficiency and can involve significant transactional costs and, sometimes, dis-economies of scale (see Byrnes and Dollery, 2002; Elcock et al, 2010; Martin and Schiff, 2011; Callanan et al, 2014). An economic crisis accompanied by fiscal restraints and dramatic reductions in local government budgets invariably leads to a concentration on territorial and functional reforms (for example, boundary changes and amalgamations) and a neglect of democratic dimensions of reform. This was definitely the case in Ireland post-2008. By any standards, a 73% reduction in the number of local authorities was a drastic measure. With 114 local authorities, Ireland already possessed, from a comparative perspective, fewer local authorities than most countries in Europe and had very high citizen-to-council and citizen-tocouncillor ratios. With just 31 councils, an even greater distance has been created between the citizen and the local council. This distance has constrained the scope for local government policy making in conjunction with citizens. The predictable rationale for the structural changes involved economies of scale and cost savings but the international research evidence suggests that large-scale authorities do not necessarily produce efficiencies and savings (Byrnes and Dollery, 2002; Callanan et al, 2014). Once local government stops being local, a democratic deficit is established and the evidence shows that citizen satisfaction with local services tends to be higher in smaller local authorities (see Quinlivan, 2017). Callanan (2018, p 317) identifies four broad categories of territorial structures in international local government: • small local authorities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants on average; • medium-sized local authorities with between 10,000 and 40,000 inhabitants on average; • large local authorities with between 40,000 and 100,000  inhabitants on average; • very large local authorities with an average of over 100,000 inhabitants. With Ireland having a population of just under five million (4,921,500) and 31 local authorities, the average population per council is 158,758. This places Ireland in the ‘very large’ category alongside the United Kingdom (166,000), Northern Ireland (164,500) and Korea (224,500). This contrasts starkly with the Czech Republic (1,500), France (2,000), Hungary (3,000) and Switzerland (3,500). Historically, local authorities in Ireland are responsible for a narrow range of functions (see Callanan and MacCarthaigh, 2008; Collins and Quinlivan, 2010; 84

Ireland’s ‘unique blend’: local government and policy analysis

Loughlin, 2011). As Callanan (2018, p 326) points out, Irish local authorities have only minor responsibilities in education, primary healthcare, transport and policing. While the Local Government Reform Act 2014, did not generally devolve powers from central to local government, it did give local authorities a more overt role in economic development, based on the unique characteristics and strategic position of councils. Following the provisions of the 2014 legislation, each local authority established an LCDC. In addition, each local authority was given the responsibility to prepare a six-year local economic and community plan, to promote development in its functional area. Local enterprise offices would also be created to provide advice, information and support to people in starting or growing their own businesses. In an effort to align local government and local development activity, it was furthermore decided that responsibility for the management of partnership programmes, such as LEADER,2 an EU-funded rural development programme, would transfer to local councils and the LCDCs. This move generated some controversy and it is not yet clear how the alignment of development activity at local level will be supported by a national framework. Quinn (2015, p 17) comments: ‘The local-level reforms will only succeed if there is a whole-of-government approach at national level to programme design, delivery and evaluation.’ If this occurs, there could be positive consequences for policy analysis and capacity at local level. Finance is a major restraint on the development of local government in Ireland. Local government spending as a percentage of general government spending in Ireland is a mere 8.4% (Fórsa, 2019, p 13). The average across the European Union is 23.1%, and in Denmark it is 65.9%. This reinforces the research of Considine and Reidy (2015, p 121) that ‘very few countries spend less on local government than we do’. The majority of money spent by local authorities derives from local revenue sources. This is positive, but the rate for some service charges is set nationally, as is the range for increases or decreases in the local property tax. The proportion of local government income from local taxes is low by international comparative standards and it is hard to disagree with the conclusion by Lee (1989, p 562): ‘The thrust of central government since independence has been to restrict the scope of local authorities and to centralise control over financial resources.’ Given the centralised nature of local government in Ireland, with a narrow range of functions and a low level of local public expenditure, it is hardly a surprise that Ireland fares badly on the International Local Autonomy Index, produced by Ladner and colleagues (2016). Ireland is in the last of five categories based on the degree of autonomy of local government: • • • • •

Category Category Category Category Category

1: High local government autonomy 2: Medium-high local government autonomy 3: Medium local government autonomy 4: Medium-low local government autonomy 5: Low local government autonomy 85

Policy analysis in Ireland

Ireland ranks in 38th position out of 39 in the league table, with only Moldova being more centralised. Perhaps all of the aforementioned issues help to explain the declining turnout of citizens at local government elections. The most recent election, which took place on 24 May 2019, did not generate much enthusiasm among the public at large. From a total electorate of 3,527,800, only one in two people chose to exercise their democratic mandate. The turnout was 1,772,025, representing 50%, the joint lowest in the history of the state with the centenary elections of 1999. Spoiled votes amounted to 34,610, meaning the total valid poll was 1,737,415.

Policy making and policy capacity in Irish local government Local authorities in Ireland operate under the classical politics–administration dichotomy. Councillors, as the democratically elected members of the local authority, are responsible for the policy framework and priorities of the council. Under local government legislation, the functions and powers of local authorities are divided into two classes: reserved functions, performable directly by the elected members, and executive functions, performed by the chief executive (formerly called city or county manager) by order. While the law provides a clear division of functions, it was never the intention that the elected members and the chief executive should operate independently of each other. The fact that the executive functions are assigned to the chief executive is simply intended to provide the elected council with an experienced, wholetime administrator for the prompt and efficient discharge of day-to-day business without making an undue demand on the time of the elected members, who are invariably part-timers. The chief executive is an officer of the city or county council, appointed by the elected members on the recommendation of the Public Appointments Service; the members, with the consent of the minister, may suspend or remove the chief executive from office. The elected council is responsible for all policy decisions – including financial policy – and the chief executive must act in conformity with the general policy laid down by them. In carrying out her/his duties, the chief executive operates under the general supervision of the council. One interesting issue is whether councillors effectively use the powers they possess. The perception among many elected members is that the balance of power in the local government system is skewed in favour of the chief executive. The Fórsa trade union’s More Power To You document (2019, p 7) argues that local government is impeded by ‘executive direction’ with a loss of democratic power due to increased managerialism and new public management (NPM) philosophies. However, as alluded to in the 2008 Green Paper on local government reform (Government of Ireland, 2008, p 103), it can also be argued that councillors over the years have shirked their responsibilities. Callanan (2018, p  59) states: ‘While much rhetoric has been expended on the need to give 86

Ireland’s ‘unique blend’: local government and policy analysis

greater responsibilities to the elected council, more incrementally a series of decisions has resulted in changes in the other direction, effectively transferring responsibility for decision-making in some areas from the elected council to the chief executive.’ He cites powers in relation to Traveller accommodation and waste management. This perspective is supported by former councillor, Brian Bermingham: “We’ve passed the estimates to the city manager. We’ve passed away the issue of Traveller accommodation to the manager. We’ve passed away the issue of waste management to the manager. We’ve done it to ourselves. Councillors give away powers” (cited in Quinlivan, 2011, p 3). Of course, the elephant in the room – in terms of the restricted nature of policy making in local government – continues to be centralisation and the parental approach of central government through the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government, which is responsible for putting forward most of the legislative agenda for local authorities. As Callanan (2018, p 370) concludes: ‘There is not much point taking part in local decision-making if local government operates in a straitjacket and all the key decisions have already been taken at the national level.’ It also has to be recognised that local authorities have relationships with myriad public agencies, government departments, community groups and representative associations, and not just with the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government. Policy emerges through a complex multilevel governance network, comprising many actors. One reform in this regard took place in 1998/99 when Strategic Policy Committees (SPCs) were introduced to assist councils in policy formulation, development and review. The aim of the initiative was to segregate out highlevel issues centred on policy and strategy and to have them dealt with in a forum removed from ‘parish pump’ business. Each SPC should have at least one third of its members drawn from ‘sectoral interests’, that is, representatives from community and voluntary organisations, environmental groups, trade unions and local business associations. SPCs allow for the discussion of new policies between public representatives and involved interests and they reflect a localised version of national social partnership. While the effectiveness of SPCs varies across local councils, a review of the structure in 2004 highlighted the enhanced potential for policy analysis and noted that ‘an important by-product of the SPC process has been a better relationship between elected members and groups representing different interests within the local area’ (IPA, 2004, p 42). Other structures have been introduced in recent years to enhance local democracy and participation in policy making (see also Chapter Fifteen, this volume, for a broader discussion on widening and deepening democracy). These include PPNs, LCDCs, forums for young and elderly people, and Joint Policing Committees. PPNs, in particular, have emerged as an important new local government structure to allow local groups and organisations to contribute to decision making on local government policies. They also serve as a mechanism through which representatives are elected on other local government structures, such as LCDCs and SPCs. 87

Policy analysis in Ireland

Example: Cork City Council (CCC) CCC provides an illustrative example of how a PPN can be used effectively. Cork City PPN comprises community, voluntary, social inclusion and environmental groups in Cork city. It was founded in 2015 as a publicly funded independent body led by the decisions of its members, run by a secretariat (steering committee), and supported by two full-time staff. The PPN comprises over 130 groups and has been growing steadily since 2015. Seeing the potential of the PPN, CCC worked towards becoming a supportive and effective stakeholder in the PPN process. In 2017, the council and the PPN began collaborating to design a consultation model. The purpose of the model was to embed the role of the PPN in the operation of the council, so as to add value to the work of the council. The council engaged to academic help from University College Cork (UCC) to provide a training and capacity enhancement programme for PPN members, councillors and staff of the local authority. There was a desire to move away from co-opted consultation – whereby participation tends to be tokenistic and representatives have no real power or input – to genuine collaboration, colearning, collective action and an alternative approach to policy analysis. Central to this was the nomination of a senior executive assistant within each area of the council to become a ‘PPN champion’. This is a fixed role and each department ensures continuity and succession to secure the relationship with the PPN. The ‘PPN champion’ takes responsibility for ensuring that consideration of the PPN is embedded into the policy processes and procedures within that department. Engaging the community in the work of CCC is now predicated on a consistent flow of information in both directions. This extends from the initial stages, where the PPN is notified of an upcoming consultation opportunity, to the conclusion of that process and the implementation of a decision. The key principles inherent in this dialogue, as agreed by CCC and the PPN, are as follows: • Timely resolution of consultation should not be compromised beyond what is reasonable to ensure clarity. Meaningful consultation should not frustrate achievement of outcomes. • Consultation with the PPN as representatives of the broader community should be carried out in parallel with – rather than sequentially from – internal consultation procedures. • The council should commit to incorporating community consultation into the earliest possible stage of policy and decision making, to secure meaningful input from the community. • The council should recognise the importance of feedback to the PPN on outcomes of the consultation process. This may involve a verbal or written report back to the PPN coordinator on which views and ideas are to be incorporated, wholly or partly into the work, and, where a viewpoint that was strongly held by the PPN has not been taken into account in a policy, an account of why that is the case. 88

Ireland’s ‘unique blend’: local government and policy analysis

• PPN and the city council agree that successful consultation is not synonymous with all views and ideas being incorporated, but rather with a transparent interaction where the community is listened to and consultation contributions are assessed fairly and on merit. CCC has now become a leader in the effective use of its PPN network to enhance the local policy process and policy analysis occurs between the council and the PPN. Senior managers and directors of service of the council now contribute to six-monthly planning meetings with the PPN secretariat to forecast policy priorities in various SPCs and the LCDC in the months ahead. ‘PPN update’ is a standing item on meeting agendas and there is a commitment to the ongoing upskilling of new PPN members through training, mentoring and preparatory introductions. During 2018 and 2019, the PPN in Cork has been centrally involved in many of the council’s policy processes, including in the following areas: • • • • • • • • •

local area plans, conservation areas and flood management; transport and movement strategies, and traffic and road measures; housing and Traveller accommodation; rates; arts, culture and creativity policies; recreation in particular parks, events and public green space; LGBTI issues and other aspects of diversity and social inclusion; funding streams and implementing bodies; Smart Cities and digital initiatives.

Across the local government system, an enormous amount of activity is taking place and collaborations between local councils, third-level educational institutions and the private sector are especially strong. Box 6.1 sets out some examples of policy innovation. Box 6.1: Examples of policy innovation Dublin City Council has been at the forefront with its Rediscover Furniture and Paint Recycling project.The council set up this project as a community employment initiative. Donations of furniture and paint are accepted that might previously have been destined for landfill.The furniture is restored and the paint repotted with the products then being sold at the Ballymun farmers’ market, at environmental events and through Rediscovery Centre. The project has been highly successful in providing training and employment opportunities for long-term unemployed people; it also offers low-cost, high-quality, environmentally sustainable products. There are numerous good news stories in the area of enterprise and employment supports. Mayo County Council has invested substantially in major tourist infrastructure through 89

Policy analysis in Ireland the Great Western Greenway project. The Greenway has already helped to create 38 new full-time jobs and a further 56 full-time jobs have been sustained. Cork County Council has established a joint initiative with the Nimbus Centre in the Cork Institute of Technology (CIT) and Mallow Development Partnership. The aim of the initiative is to create a real-life test-bed in Mallow, County Cork, for a stream of products that have been tested in the laboratory at CIT. This is leading to an enhanced testing infrastructure and environment in Mallow, and it is hoped that this in turn will lead to products from other third level institutions and companies being tested there (see Quinlivan, 2013).

Conclusions Local government in Ireland is more complex than might first appear to be the case. There are enormous weaknesses within the system, including lack of constitutional protection; low autonomy; few functions; political, administrative, functional and financial centralisation; increased managerialism; and the rationalisation of councils. Yet, as mentioned earlier, in an individual, often uncoordinated, way, local councils are playing innovative roles in economic development and policy formulation. Local authorities are also pushing the boundaries with a variety of democratic reforms aimed at enhancing participation in policy making and policy analysis. This chapter has highlighted how CCC has embraced the PPN model and created a proper policy consultation process with community ownership. The synergy from working collaboratively is resulting in better decision making and enhanced policy outcomes. In many ways, Irish local government continues to be a mass of contradictions, as wonderfully summed up by Quinn (2015, p 26): ‘The reform path to date represents a unique blend of innovation, incrementalism and entrenchment aimed at tackling persistent challenges regarding the form, functioning and financing of local government.’ Notes 1 2

The doctrine of ultra vires prohibits local authorities from undertaking any action that is not specifically authorised in statute. Liaison entre actions de développement de l’économie rurale (Links between the rural economy and development actions).

References Advisory Expert Committee on Local Government Reorganisation and Reform (1991) Local Government Reorganisation and Reform, Dublin: Stationery Office. Barrington, T. (1991) ‘Local government in Ireland’, in R. Batley and G. Stoker (eds) Local Government in Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp 155–69.

90

Ireland’s ‘unique blend’: local government and policy analysis

Byrnes, J. and Dollery, B. (2002) ‘Do economies of scale exist in Australian local government? A review of the research evidence’, Urban Policy and Research, 20(4): 391–414. Callanan, M. (2018) Local Government in the Republic of Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. Callanan, M. and MacCarthaigh, M. (2008) ‘Local government reforms in Ireland’, in B.E. Dollery, J. Garcea and E.C. LeSage (eds) Local Government Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Advanced Anglo-American Countries, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 104–32. Callanan, M., Murphy, R. and Quinlivan, A. (2014) ‘The risks of intuition: size, costs and economies of scale in local government’, The Economic and Social Review, 45(3): 371–403. Collins, J. (1954) Local Government in Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. Collins, N. and Quinlivan, A. (2010) ‘Multi-level governance’, in J. Coakley and M. Gallagher (eds) Politics in the Republic of Ireland (5th  edn), London: Routledge, pp 359–80. Considine, J. and Reidy, T. (2015) ‘Baby steps: the expanding financial base of local government in Ireland’, Administration, 63(2): 119–48. CCMA (County and City Managers’ Association) (2013) Submission to Local Government Efficiency Review Implementation Group, Dublin: CCMA. Department of Finance (2009) Report of the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes, Dublin: Department of Finance Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (2010) Report of the Local Government Efficiency Review Group, Dublin: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government Downey, J. (1991) ‘Bill is a legislative monstrosity’, Irish Independent, 13 May. Elcock, H., Fenwick, J. and McMillan, J. (2010) ‘The reorganisation addiction in local government: unitary councils for England’, Public Money and Management, 30(6): 331–8. Fórsa (2019) More Power To You: Democracy Works if You Let it, Dublin: Fórsa. Available at: www.forsa.ie/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/MorePowerReport. pdf Government of Ireland (1985) Reform of Local Government: A Policy Statement, Dublin: Stationery Office Government of Ireland (1996) Better Local Government: A Programme for Change, Dublin: Stationery Office Government of Ireland (1998) Report of the Task Force on Integration of Local Government and Local Development Systems, Dublin: Stationery Office. Government of Ireland (2000) Modernising Government: The Challenge for Local Government, Dublin: Department of the Environment and Local Government. Government of Ireland (2008) Stronger Local Democracy: Options for Change, Dublin: Stationery Office.

91

Policy analysis in Ireland

IPA (Institute of Public Administration) (2004) Review of the Operation of Strategic Policy Committees, Dublin: IPA and Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government. Ladner, A., Keuffer, N. and Baldersheim, H. (2016) ‘Measuring local autonomy in 39 countries’, Regional and Federal Studies, 26(3): 321–57. Lee, J.J. (1989) Ireland 1912–1985: Politics and Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Local Government Efficiency Review Implementation Group (2012) Report to the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government, Dublin: Stationery Office. Local Government Efficiency Review Implementation Group (2013) Further Report to the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government, Dublin: Stationery Office. Loughlin, J. (2011) ‘Ireland: halting steps towards local democracy’, in J. Loughlin, F. Hendriks and A. Lidström (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 48–67. Marshall, A.H. (1967) Management of Local Government Volume 4: Local Government Administration Abroad, London: HMSO. Martin, L.L. and Schiff, J.H. (2011) ‘City-county consolidations: promise versus performance’, State and Local Government Review, 43(2): 167–77. Quinlivan, A. (2011) Inside City Hall Politics: A Year in the Life of Cork City Council, Cork: Echo Publications. Quinlivan, A. (2013) ‘Irish councils fight back against cuts with jobs, tech and collaboration’, The Guardian, 13 November. Quinlivan, A. (2017) ‘Reforming local government – must it always be democracy versus efficiency?’, Administration, 65(2): 109–26. Quinn, B. (2015) ‘Local government reform – plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose?’, Administration, 63(2): 7–29. Sharpe, L.J. (1970) ‘Theories and values of local government’, Political Studies, 18(2): 153–74. Weeks, L. and Quinlivan, A. (2009) All Politics is Local: A Guide to Local Elections in Ireland, Cork: Collins Press. Wilson, D. and Game, C. (2002) Local Government in the United Kingdom (3rd edn), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

92

SEVEN

Committees and the legislature Bernadette Connaughton

Introduction As the legislature, Oireachtas Éireann has three main tasks in policy making: providing legitimacy for public policy; participating in the legislative process; and performing control and scrutiny functions. This chapter focuses on policy analysis and observes these tasks from the perspective of the role of legislators in Dáil Éireann. It also explores the historical and contemporary role of parliamentary and other political committees, and the institutional supports that enable their function in policy making. Arguably, the sheer dearth of assistance and resources available to Teachtaí Dála (TDs) has contributed to an underwhelming legislative performance over time. Developments since 2011 provide an important context for exploring the role of the Irish parliament in policy analysis in this chapter, given the relative deficiencies in earlier reform initiatives and the systemic policy failures highlighted by the crisis. An agenda to introduce political-administrative reform post-2011 included building policy analysis capacity within the Oireachtas and addressing the significant imbalances in executive–legislative relations. The chapter begins with a sketch of the Irish parliament to provide an outline of the constitutional underpinning of the Irish parliament and its relationship to government. It then proceeds to discuss the degree to which Dáil Éireann developed a role in policy analysis, including an outline of key reforms from 2011. In particular, three areas of interest are explored: access to information and research capacity for policy analysis, including the emerging Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), which may encourage more meaningful contributions in the public policy process; the development of the committee system and its activities; participation in inquiries.

A background sketch of the role of the Irish legislature Academic scholarship has considered both the degree to which the design and operation of the Dáil has been influenced by the British Westminster archetype and its capacity to participate in the policy-making process (MacCarthaigh, 2005; Lynch et  al, 2017). Parliaments derived from the Westminster model tend to exhibit powers of appointment and dismissal, scrutiny of the executive branch, and law making. These features correspond with the functions that the Constitution apportions to the Oireachtas. First, the appointment of the Taoiseach 93

Policy analysis in Ireland

and the government (Articles 13 and 28), and second, law-making powers are assigned exclusively to the Oireachtas (Articles 15 to 27). Article 28.4.1 indicates an oversight role, since it states that the ‘government shall be responsible to Dáil Éireann’. Although classical democratic theory states that the legislature makes laws and the executive carries them out, the term ‘Westminster model’ is associated with centralised executive power and a compliant legislature (Lijphart, 2012). In practice the government controls the political agenda and there are few checks on the executive in parliamentary systems as long as the government holds a majority support in the legislature. Commentators on Ireland concur with this and consistently support the view that the Dáil is an exceptionally weak and politically disempowered legislative institution or ‘puny’ parliament whereby reforms fail to address the balance of power between the legislature and the executive (Chubb, 1992; Murphy, 2006). A primary duty of legislatures is to act as representatives and a conduit to those they represent, since part of their participation in policy making is to communicate, represent, debate and provide legitimacy for the system as a whole. In Ireland, executive and party political dominance prevails due to the existence of the whip system whereby members must vote as instructed by the party or else lose their membership; a historical lack of resources and weak committee system; use of standing orders; and Ireland’s own particular brand of an individual legislator that is more likely to be disproportionately engaged in constituency affairs. Party cohesion has remained high in Ireland and it is only in unusual circumstances that a deputy will disobey the party line, since mutiny is harmful for their chances of promotion within the political family. Individual deputies have, however, dissented from party positions on socially sensitive issues such as abortion or controversial economic decisions. There is strong evidence that the electoral system plays a role in encouraging TDs to focus on parochial needs and constituency work above that of legislative/policy work, leading to deputies to direct additional resources into constituency affairs (MacCarthaigh, 2005). The collective impact of these characteristics has reduced the potential for the Dáil to play a proactive role in the policy process (see Chapter Thirteen, this volume).

The role of the legislature in policy analysis: committees, access to information and research capacity, inquiries Policy analysis involves a systematic evaluation of the technical and political implications of the alternatives proposed to resolve public policy issues. In parliamentary systems the legislature undertakes to hold government accountable to the public as opposed to holding sway in making or implementing policies. In practice, the decision-making stage of the policy process is emphasised to the neglect of parliaments in pre- and later policy stages (Russell and Crowley, 2015). As a highly centralised political system, the level of control wielded by the Irish executive in policy making ‘is practically unrivalled anywhere else in Europe’ (MacCarthaigh, 2005, p 217). 94

Committees and the legislature

Parliament’s ability to uphold accountability and act as a transmission belt between parliament and the people, however, is also affected by several factors besides executive dominance, including the pressures of the external environment, such as the influence and insider status of global business in policy formulation. Ireland’s experience of the 2008 financial crisis bore the imprint of global and European influences and was also conditioned by multiple homegrown governance and policy failures. The crisis exposed the significance of not having an effective committee system and the weaknesses in policy-making scrutiny and analysis. This included the manner in which the national parliament conducted its business and the general weakness of the Oireachtas as a ‘regulator of regulators’ (EIU, 2009, p 53). The control of information from the Department of Finance and the enormous information deficit about complex banking and financial developments prevented real debate and oversight of measures such as the September 2008 bank guarantee and the February 2013 liquidation of Irish Bank Resolution Corporation. The emergency nature of some crisis-related measures also placed pressure on the normal conduct of Oireachtas business. Conversely, the Eurocrisis from 2009 resulted in extensive regulatory reforms of European and domestic financial systems and led to the Oireachtas spending substantial time on banking-related legislation. The magnitude of these issues led to further calls for the clarification of accountability roles across the politicaladministrative system and for an increase in the powers of parliamentary committees within a wider political reform process (MacCarthaigh, 2013). This was strongly advocated in the general election in 2011, which brought changes to the political party landscape whereby support for the historically dominant party of government (Fianna Fáil) collapsed. Although the momentum for delivering the promised reforms waned, ‘a number of discrete, but potentially significant, changes to the operation of business in parliament’ were introduced (Lynch et al, 2017, p 38). A minority government established after the 2016 election promised to swing power away from the executive and back to the legislature. It encouraged a more assertive position being taken by opposition parties in the Dáil and reinvigorated the intentions to progress procedural reform and enable legislators under a label of ‘new politics’. A sub-committee on Dáil Reform was formed and its final report made a series of recommendations, a number of which have been implemented. Several reforms focused on allowing more independence for the Dáil and less government ‘grip’, including those on the election of the Speaker (Ceann Comhairle) and legislative input (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016). The impact of these reforms has been less impressive, however, since a greater emphasis on consensus meant that the Dáil was slower to progress a legislative agenda. In the first year of the 32nd Dáil, only 20 Acts were signed into law, which was historically the joint lowest number for an Dáil in its first year (Irish Statute Book, 2016–2017). New politics was characterised by the reality that minority governments are unable to command a majority in the Dáil and reforms in Dáil procedure result in a longer process overall for legislation. The following discussion focuses on the legislature’s role in policy analysis in the post-2011 95

Policy analysis in Ireland

period, as well as considering the reforms and efforts to improve professional research capacity to facilitate budgetary cycle reforms. TDs as legislators and Oireachtas committees This section considers the activities of Teachtaí Dála in the policy cycle through their work as individual legislators proposing legislation and in committees. A Bill must pass through the various stages in both Houses of the Oireachtas (Dáil Éireann, or lower house, and Seanad Éireann, or upper house); it is customary that the executive attempt to exert close control over timing and no substantial amendments are generally made during this process.1 The powerlessness of the Dáil is reflected in both the legislative process and in the committee system, despite the latter’s relatively strong formal powers (Martin, 2010). Prior to the 1980s, Dáil and Seanad committees were few in number, and those that did exist were mere ‘housekeeping’ committees looking after the internal affairs of Leinster House. Between 1983 and 1994 and after 1997, several initiatives were introduced to establish a comprehensive committee system, starting with the Fine Gael–Labour coalition that instigated a debate on Oireachtas reform in early 1983. The government effectively dominated the appointment of chairs, manipulation of the rules of procedure, and little effort was made to promote cross-party consensus on any matter (MacCarthaigh, 2005, p 103). An exception is the Committee of Public Accounts (PAC), which is regarded as the most powerful of all standing committees and examines the accounts of government departments by deliberating the audit reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General on public expenditure. Resources, a minimal secretariat staff complement, and an overwhelming workload further diminished the scrutiny role of committees. For example, the Joint Committee on European Union Affairs – in an earlier format – was originally tasked with the impossible undertaking of scrutinising European Union (EU) secondary legislation. In reality, there is little scrutiny of the use of secondary or ‘delegated legislation’ and statutory instruments in particular. These are used regularly for transposing EU directives into Irish law as ministers and their departments are allowed to make regulations under the European Communities Act 1972. Technical details are worked out by specialised units and authorities with responsibility for delivery away from parliamentary input (Connaughton, 2019). Over time, the EU committee was shaped into a different role through providing a platform for academics, politicians, non-governmental organisations and visiting delegations to debate on policy and interact with legislators on EU affairs. Its function is now more aligned with providing a general oversight function in relation to EU affairs, whereas the EU scrutiny of sectoral issues is mainstreamed across all joint committees and inevitably has added to their workload. The reforms from 2011 aimed to make the Dáil a more significant actor in the policy-making process, and to use committees to examine legislation before, 96

Committees and the legislature

rather than after, it goes to the full parliament. In terms of Irish parliamentary procedure, standing orders have changed only very gradually and often in an unstructured way (Caffrey, 2010), thereby acting as a disincentive to any substantive legislative input from TDs. The reforms include the establishment of a new Business Committee and Committee on Budgetary Oversight; an increase in the number of committees and time allocated to committee hearings; the extension of pre-legislative scrutiny to non-government bills; the introduction of a formal post-legislative scrutiny process; and an increase in scheduled time for Private Members’ Bills (PMBs). Prior to this, the Taoiseach had an exclusive right to set the plenary agenda and the opposition could only influence the agenda through proposals for PMBs. The government has the power to introduce late amendments to Bills in order to ensure control over them and under Dáil standing order any Bill that involves the appropriation of revenue or public money must be initiated by a member of the government. In the Dáil, the government has traditionally managed to control the agenda by using its majority to guillotine debates and dispose of all remaining stages of a Bill in a single vote. During the 31st Dáil, the government used the guillotine power more frequently than its predecessor and this became controversial (Lynch et al, 2017), as it may result in flawed legislation being passed if the opposition does not get the chance to examine a Bill thoroughly, or discuss all proposed amendments. For example, despite the management of water services and charging for water being a politically sensitive and complex policy issue, the Water Services (No. 2) Act 2013 was rushed through all parliamentary stages in the Dáil in just over four hours on 19 December 2013, amid protest from the opposition on the lack of opportunity for debate. The Act provided for the transfer of water services functions and assets from the then 34 water services authorities to a new state utility Irish Water, which became mired in controversy. A business committee established in June 2016 now meets weekly to agree the agenda for Dáil business, including speaking time, and is composed of representatives from all parties and groupings. This diminishes the prospect of the government in unilaterally using the guillotine. The committee structure has been re-established after each election since 1997 and, like other parts of the political-administrative apparatus, has experienced pressures from an expansion in the volume of government policy. Overall, its efforts to monitor departmental work, discuss estimates and deal with the third stage of legislation are generally overstretched. The democratic quality of TDs’ committee membership should enhance their legitimacy and the reforms introduced in 2016 build on the existing committee system. But it is clear that changes to rules alone will not drastically transform the position of parliament within the policy-making system (Gallagher, 2018). Further, even if changes to procedure remove some of the unnecessary blockages to effective committees, the incentives for politicians to prioritise committee work have not changed and that will determine whether reforms support a stronger role for parliament in policy analysis. Political priorities dominate and an example of how committees 97

Policy analysis in Ireland

have been used to make cross-party recommendations on policy options is the Joint Committee on the Future Funding of Domestic Water Services. Water charging was a contentious issue in the negotiations on government formation in 2016 and it was agreed to establish advisory forums on the effectiveness of Irish Water, including an Oireachtas committee to make recommendations to the Dáil. The advisory proposals of the joint committee that heard evidence and legal advice from an array of actors, including European Commission officials, were included in the Water Services Bill 2017. A new Committee on Budgetary Oversight now scrutinises the annual budgetary cycle to provide ex-ante input to the budgetary process, and to complement the ex-post scrutiny undertaken by PAC. Prior to this, the Dáil’s involvement in the budgetary process would generally have consisted of individual TDs making representations to various ministers. The work of the committee involves reviewing macro-economic and fiscal matters that scaffold budgetary considerations, EU fiscal rules, demographic pressures and challenges to ensure the sustainability of public finances. To some extent, its formation can be attributed to European influences since the Euro semester has changed the budgetary timeline and the Oireachtas now has more time to perform a scrutiny role in budgetary affairs. As a result, a ‘whole-of-year’ budgetary cycle involves the Oireachtas and the committees at an earlier stage of the process (see Chapter Seventeen, this volume). The reform with the most potential to augment the role of the Oireachtas in policy analysis is the introduction of pre-legislative scrutiny (PLS), whereby committees can opt to review the ‘general schemes of Bills’ and hear from experts before Bills come to parliament in published format. It was gradually introduced from 2011 and retained in the 32nd Dáil. The benefits include adequate time for more considered, better legislation, and committee’s observations on a draft Bill are sent to the sponsoring minister (Oireachtas Library and Research Service, 2014). Ministers have no obligation to respond to the committee but some ministers have met with the committee to discuss its report (Lynch, 2017, p 78). This more reflective approach and potentially increased capacity for scrutiny should result in more effective implementation at the latter end of the policy cycle. In a study on the impact of PLS, on legislative and policy outcomes, Martin (2018, p 5) identified that PLS can have ‘real and substantive impact on Government legislation in the Irish case’. An example of a Bill ‘fundamentally altered’ by PLS is the Gender Recognition Bill 2014, whereby a revised general scheme was subsequently brought to cabinet and issues raised in PLS framed debate on the legislation at a later stage of the legislative process. In contrast, PLS had much less impact on the Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill 2015 but at the same time the process is deemed to have brought ‘greater clarity to the intentions behind legislative proposals’, thereby improving them (Martin, 2018, p 8). The study also indicated that in a content analysis of 50  PLS cases, 467 unique recommendations were made from committees and ministers accepted 41.7% of these suggestions (Martin, 2018, pp 30–2). The Joint Committee on Justice, 98

Committees and the legislature

Defence and Equality concluded the most PLS exercises. Overall, Bills continued to be amended at the formal committee stage and there was no instance of PLS substituting a committee’s remit in the overall legislative process. In addition, by engaging in PLS, a joint committee may carry out public consultation and involve stakeholders. This serves to deepen TDs’ knowledge of the policy context and should enhance their engagement in the legislative process at a later stage. This is to the benefit of the policy-making system, since it demonstrates democratic legitimacy, and the Irish administration’s experience with engaging stakeholders and citizens in policy consultation is in any case patchy. PLS differs in that it involves the scrutiny of legislation that has been enacted in order to assess whether it is fit for purpose and its legislative objectives are being achieved. An increase in scheduled time and support for PMBs and motions also allows TDs more time to engage in policy analysis. This has traditionally been restrictive, with government rules limiting TDs’ ability to propose PMBs (MacCarthaigh, 2005, pp  112–13); it also prevents independent TDs and small parties from promoting a PMB and means that larger opposition parties can only sponsor one at a time. Whether this facilitates PMBs is questionable and although many pass the second stage, they proceed to stagnate at the committee stage and do not proceed to report and final stages. The observation remains that ‘government departments are unwilling to cede power, over the drafting and content of laws, to the Oireachtas’ (Howlin, 2018). Other issues include the quality of legislation being tabled, since little or no expertise in drafting legislation is required to get a Bill discussed in the Dáil. As a result, the legislation being tabled is perceived to be of poor quality and requiring substantive work to bring it up to scratch. A legal advisory service has thus been established to help TDs with drafting legislation and providing independent legal advice to that offered by the government. Further, Article 17.2 of the Constitution states that any proposed cost to the exchequer in a Bill must be approved by government in advance. Despite the new politics, only five PMBs had become law by 2018 – including a Fianna Fáil Bill to recognise Irish sign language; a Fine Gael Bill banning fracking, and a Bill tabled by a group of independent senators allowing the sale of alcohol on Good Friday. This would indicate that the reforms in this area are neutered and have resulted in a grinding, time-consuming system whereby legislation is effectively languishing. In contrast, previous Dáileanna operated more efficiently in that a majority government was safe in the knowledge that it had the votes to carry the relevant legislation. Access to information and research capacity TDs and committees need access to accurate, quick, independent information in order to undertake policy analysis functions. For decades, the support services in the Dáil and Seanad remained badly under-resourced in their levels of library and research functions and in general resource/staffing services in comparison with other Westminster-style systems, or by international standards (Deloitte and 99

Policy analysis in Ireland

Touche, 2002). The advent of a stronger committee system raised the question of the professional policy analysis demands on TDs required to do their job effectively. Yet in 2002, the Oireachtas had only one legal officer and three researchers for 226 members, and the level of personal support for deputies and senators necessitated assistance from family members and volunteers (O’Halloran, 2010, p 139). A study by Deloitte and Touche (2002) noted that while 88% of members availed of research support, half considered it as poor. The parliamentary reform agenda did, however, progress this issue and in 2004 a new parliamentary Library and Research Service was established, followed by a Legislative Analysis Service (LAS). In terms of direct assistance for TDs, the position of parliamentary assistant was created in 2005. This new political staff appointment was proposed as support to help TDs with speeches, research and legislation, and to coordinate with the media on their behalf. What generally transpired was an extension of TDs’ duties to include constituency work/representations. This poses the question of whether the support was being invested in raising the bar in terms of TDs’ legislative performance, policy acumen, committee work, and ability to contribute substantively to the political issues of the day, or whether the additional resources were being disproportionately directed to constituency matters. The establishment of the PBO in 2017 is an example of how the Oireachtas is striving to develop its research capacity and access to information. The role of the PBO is to provide impartial information, advice and analysis to members of the Oireachtas, in particular those who serve on the Committee on Budgetary Oversight, which steers ex-ante scrutiny of all budgetary matters. The introduction of a PBO forms part of the reforms conducted by the political administrative system in coming to terms with the critical challenges of the crisis decade and for undertaking sound fiscal management. Arguably, several budgetary institutions already perform this budgetary analysis role, namely the Oireachtas Library and Research Service, the Department of Finance, the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, the Central Bank and the Fiscal Advisory Council, which performs a watchdog function in reviewing fiscal issues and debt sustainability. What distinguishes the PBO is that its office is an independent one and it is an institution of the legislature and not, as in the case of the Department of Finance, the executive. One of the experiences of the 2008 financial crisis was the withdrawal of the Department of Finance into a silo, which made the scrutiny role of the Oireachtas even more ineffectual. A PBO, by contrast, is required to appear before committees in order to explain its costings on various policies. At the request of the Oireachtas in 2015, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted a review of budgetary oversight by the Irish parliament. It concluded that Ireland had the lowest level of effective parliamentary engagement in budgeting among the OECD countries and that stakeholders did not consider the Houses of the Oireachtas to engage with the budgetary process in a meaningful or impactful way (OECD, 2015). In particular, the OECD pointed to a deficiency of ex-ante scrutiny of budgetary 100

Committees and the legislature

and financial issues, since virtually all scrutiny of the budget was ex post (OECD, 2015). It recommended scrutiny throughout all stages of the budget cycle and setting up a PBO, as exists in other Westminster-style countries like Australia and Canada. The PBO also complements the work of the Fiscal Advisory Council and enables the Dáil and committees to engage more effectively in fiscal business, such as Estimates of Expenditure and budgetary proposals. The Programme for Government 2016 committed to the establishment of a PBO and the Final Report of the Sub-Committee on Dáil Reform (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016a) recommended that it should be set up on a statutory2 rather than an administrative basis. The PBO is led by a non-partisan and independent director and a technical staff of 13, incorporating a critical mass of economists. It produces a range of information from short notes to lengthy briefing papers, including a Quarterly Economic and Fiscal Commentary, and its director briefs members of the Committee on Budgetary Oversight in advance of meetings with the Minister for Finance or officials. PBO publications have covered issues such as preliminary budget reviews, the economic impacts of a disorderly Brexit, the changing demographics of Irish health expenditure, and the potential exchequer implications of the Climate Action Plan 2019. In terms of impact, the desired effect is to use an independent unit within parliament to enable the legislature to play an effective role throughout the budget cycle and be on a more equal footing with the executive (Anderson, 2009). This remains optimistic, given the technicality of the issues and the volume of expertise resident in the Departments of Finance and Public Expenditure. The PBO, however, serves to corroborate costings analysis and is developing a mechanism for independent evaluation work. The overall objective is to elevate the level of discussion and debate in Dáil committees. Among its challenges is how it can extend its impact beyond the members of the Committee on Budgetary Oversight and communicate effectively with other Oireachtas members to ensure that its work does not end up becoming generally relegated to perceptions of being selective, or an academic exercise. Further, the office needs to build and retain strong skills in economics and policy analysis. Role of inquiries Whereas the committee system is regarded as the potential engine of a robust policy analysis role in the Oireachtas, parliamentary and judicial inquiry has been utilised to diffuse controversies and investigate policy failures. A series of revelations of corruption and policy incompetence in the 1990s in particular drew attention to issues such as tax evasion, corruption in the planning system and the irregularities within the beef industry and overlapping scandals. The various tribunals of inquiry consequently introduced to explore these events proved to be a very expensive and inadequate substitution for an appropriate and timely committee system. The potential for using parliamentary inquiry mechanisms was, however, impeded by a decision of the Supreme Court in Ardagh v Maguire 101

Policy analysis in Ireland

[2002] IR 385. The court endorsed the power of the Oireachtas to hold such committees but confined their investigatory remit and ability to make findings of fact and culpability to within the immediate radar of government departments. This was compounded by a failed referendum held in October 2011 to revise the Constitution to permit each House of the Oireachtas to hold inquiries to make findings of fact against individuals. The government’s reaction was the introduction of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Inquiries, Privileges and Procedures) Act 2013, which states in section 17(3) that a committee may ‘make a finding that any matter relating to systems, practices, procedures or policy or arrangements for the implementation of policy which fall within the subject [of the inquiry] ought to have been carried out in a different manner’. The first inquiry to be set up under this legislative framework was the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis in November 2014, which had been promised by both Fine Gael and Labour in the run-up to the election in 2011. Fundamental to its rationale and remit was the failures of private banking and public policies in the run-up to the crisis, and the bank guarantee decision of September 2008, which had disastrous consequences for the public finances. The inquiry took place over 49 days of hearings, 131 witnesses gave testimony, 57 support staff were employed and €6.6 million were spent in order to explore why the banking crisis cost the Irish taxpayer €64 billion. Its report was published in three volumes (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016b). On completion of the inquiry, two deputies refused to sign the report and some of the committee members commented that no further inquiries should be held under the 2013 Act due to its ‘selfimposed restrictive inquiry structure’ (Donson and O’Donovan, 2016). The inquiry is an illustration of how the poor functioning of parliamentary oversight before the crisis was, ironically, in turn investigated by a committee hamstrung by its terms of reference and procedures. It was also viewed by the public as being shaped by party politics rather than an investigatory culture to secure accountability (Hancock, 2016) or a mechanism for concretely investigating both the underlying political accountability and reform of the policy-making process in a non-partisan manner. The committee members were placed under considerable pressure to produce a substantive report containing analysis and implementable recommendations within the timeframe involved. What transpired were no hard recommendations, gaps in the evidence due to the time-frame, and conflicting evidence about who came up with the bank guarantee decision (Donson and O’Donovan, 2016). The inquiry did make public many documents relating to the crisis that had not previously been in the public domain. It also exposed the myth that if the blanket bank guarantee had not been made that night, the banks would not have been able to open the following morning. It also cast more light on the circumstances around Ireland’s entry into the bail-out programme, the role of the European Central Bank (which did not directly participate), issues around official preparedness for the crisis, and attempts by the Irish government to impose losses on bondholders. However, it failed to make any unfavourable findings 102

Committees and the legislature

against private bankers due to flaws in the legislation covering the work of parliamentary inquiries (Hancock, 2016). In a general sense, the banking inquiry demonstrated that while issues of public controversy and policy fiasco have been routinely directed towards such inquiries, the Oireachtas is not endowed with the competences, capacity and resources to deliver on them.

Conclusion In parliamentary systems, the legislature traditionally plays a restrictive and indirect role in policy making. This is judged on the basis that policy is principally predetermined by the executive and its relationships with policy communities. The performance of the Houses of the Oireachtas is no exception to this assumption and is historically regarded as an exceptionally weak legislature (MacCarthaigh, 2005; Murphy, 2006). The imbalance in executive–legislative relations and how it has served to largely exclude the Irish parliament from playing a meaningful role in policy making has been long observed (MacCarthaigh and Manning, 2010; Lynch, et al, 2017), and yet, despite the executive’s dominance and control of the policy agenda, it would be inappropriate to overlook the role of the Irish parliament in policy analysis. Parliament forms part of the policy advisory system as one of the ‘proximate decision makers’ and it has a procedural and political advisory role to play in policy formulation (Howlett, 2019). This chapter has highlighted that a long-sought, fundamental reform was called for in order to enhance the capacity of the Oireachtas to engage in policy analysis. Although such sentiments were repeatedly suggested over time, there was insufficient political determination to genuinely invest in, and implement, a substantive reform agenda. The reforms from 2011 represent the most serious attempt to enable the Dáil to become a less peripheral actor in the policymaking process and support individual legislators, particularly in the context of the budgetary cycle. A strong parliament’s meaningful input to policy analysis, however, requires a strong committee system and this needs further attention. In general, inquiries have not fostered public confidence or enhanced accountability in the policy-making process. They have, however, spotlighted the failures of the Oireachtas to function with an appropriate oversight of public policy and discontinue abuses in public office. Notes 1

2

There are two types of Bill, namely government Bills and Private Members’ Bills. There is a five-stage process for introducing Bills: initiation; debating the general principles of the Bill; the committee stage where a Bill is examined section by section and amendments made if necessary; the report stage (which is the last opportunity for members to make amendments to the text of a Bill); and the final stage where the Bill is passed by the house (Dáil Eireann). Gallagher (2018, p 174) notes that in effect only the second stage ‘through outright rejection’ and the third stage ‘through amendment offer the house any real opportunity to affect the content of a bill’. Houses of the Oireachtas Commission (Amendment) Act 2018.

103

Policy analysis in Ireland

References Anderson, B. (2009) ‘The changing role of parliament in the budget process’, OECD Journal on Budgeting, 1: 1–11. Caffrey, R. (2010) ‘Procedure in the Dáil’, in M. MacCarthaigh and M. Manning (eds) The Houses of the Oireachtas: Parliament in Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, pp 257–84. Chubb, B. (1992) The Government and Politics of Ireland (3rd  edn), London: Longman. Connaughton, B. (2019) The Implementation of Environmental Policy in Ireland: Lessons from Translating EU Directives into Action, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Deloitte and Touche (2002) Houses of the Oireachtas: Final Report (Strand 2) Members’ Services – International Benchmarking Review (IBR), Dublin: Deloitte and Touche. Donson, F. and O’Donovan, D. (2016) ‘Designing effective parliamentary inquiries: lessons learned from the Oireachtas Banking Inquiry’, Dublin University Law Journal, 39(2): 304–32. EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit) (2009) Review of the Regulatory Environment in Ireland, Dublin: Department of the Taoiseach. Gallagher, M. (2018) ‘The Oireachtas’, in J. Coakley and M. Gallagher (eds) Politics in the Republic of Ireland (6th edn), London: Routledge, pp 164–190. Hancock, C. (2016) ‘The Banking Inquiry: hits and misses’, Irish Times, 30 January. Houses of the Oireachtas (2016a) Final Report of the Sub-Committee on Dáil Reform, Dublin: Houses of the Oireachtas. Houses of the Oireachtas (2016b) Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, Volumes 1–3 [Online]. Available at: https://inquiries. oireachtas.ie/banking/ Howlett, M. (2019) ‘Comparing policy advisory systems beyond the OECD: models, dynamics and the second-generation research agenda’, Policy Studies, 40(3–4): 241–59. Howlin, B. (2018) ‘The passing of bills is as tortuous as it ever was, despite the era of “new politics”’, Irish Examiner, 20 March. Irish Statute Book (2016–2017) Acts of the Oireachtas [Online]. Available at: www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/acts.html Lijphart, A. (2012) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (2nd edn), New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Lynch, C. (2017) ‘The effect of parliamentary reforms (2011–2016) on the Oireachtas committee system’, Administration, 65(2): 59–87. Lynch, C., O’Malley, E., Reidy, T., Farrell, D. and Suiter, J. (2017) ‘Dáil reforms since 2011: pathway to power for the “puny” parliament?’, Administration, 65(2): 37–57. MacCarthaigh, M. (2005) Accountability in Irish Parliamentary Politics, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. MacCarthaigh, M. (2013) ‘Reform of public policy-making in Ireland’, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 42: 89–95. 104

Committees and the legislature

MacCarthaigh, M. and Manning, M. (eds) (2010) The Houses of the Oireachtas: Parliament in Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. Martin, S. (2010) ‘The committee system’, in M. MacCarthaigh and M. Manning (eds) The Houses of the Oireachtas: Parliament in Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, pp 285–302. Martin, S. (2018) The Impact of Pre-Legislative Scrutiny on Legislative and Policy Outcomes, Dublin: Oireachtas Library and Research Service. Murphy, M.C. (2006) ‘Reform of Dáil Éireann: the dynamics of parliamentary change’, Parliamentary Affairs, 59(3): 437–53. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2015) Review of Budget Oversight by Parliament: Ireland, Paris: OECD. O’Halloran, A. (2010) The Dáil in the 21st Century, Cork: Mercier Press. Oireachtas Library and Research Service (2014) Spotlight: Pre-Legislative Scrutiny by Parliament, Dublin: Houses of the Oireachtas. Russell, M. and Crowley, P. (2015) ‘The policy power of the Westminster parliament: the “parliamentary state” and the empirical evidence’, Governance, 29(1): 121–37.

105

EIGHT

Policy analysis in the civil service Richard Boyle and Joanna O’Riordan

Introduction One of the core roles of the civil service is to advise ministers and the government of the day on policy. Policy analysis – developing and testing ideas about policy proposals – is central to this role. In interpreting this policy advice role, the civil servant is operating at the interface of political and administrative systems. The traditional doctrine of ministerial responsibility, set out in the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924, holds the minister to be the ‘corporation sole’, so she or he is legally responsible for every action of the department. In practice, of course, this is a fiction. Murray (1990, p 70) outlines the traditional view of many civil servants on this issue: In our system of parliamentary democracy I see the responsibility for policies lying primarily with ministers, not alone in a formal, legal sense, but also in a practical sense. Civil servants, however, have their own responsibilities. They cannot adopt a passive role, content to operate existing policies without regard to their continuing validity or relevance, refusing to consider whether changes are required by changing circumstances. They have a responsibility to advise ministers on the need for change and to press this advice as forcefully as they can. Within the constitutional and legal requirement of governmental-ministerial accountability with the minister as corporation sole, the Public Service Management Act 1997 introduced a new management structure to the civil service. As MacCarthaigh (2008, p 81) notes: In relation to the policy-administration divide, the Act specifies that the responsibility for policy objectives and agreeing necessary results lies with ministers, while secretaries general advise ministers and ensure their department produces the necessary results…. The managerial role of secretaries general is much more explicit as a result of the Act. Murray (2008, p 112) has identified the vital role of providing advice and wise counsel at the interface of the political and administrative systems: 107

Policy analysis in Ireland

… the delivery of advice inhabits a restricted domain occupied by those who must make decisions central to a country’s wellbeing and those appointed to provide them with counsel that is well judged, independent, evidence-based and timely…. To state the obvious, the delivery of public services ultimately depends on the quality of policy decisions. No amount of capacity to deliver services efficiently will make the wrong service a good one. Yet how the capacity to provide wise counsel is shaped remains unclear. Policy emerges from an unstable brew of political-administrative interaction, analysis, evidence, judgement, expediency and incident. Historically, in the Whitehall tradition inherited by Ireland, a civil servant good at policy advice was required to have strong conceptual skills, be reflective and thoughtful: a ‘generalist’ uncommitted to partisan viewpoints. This led to an emphasis on recruits from the liberal arts and classics rather than professional or technical backgrounds. In the 1960s and 1970s, an alternative viewpoint began to emerge, with the concept of a ‘policy analyst’, a practitioner of policy analysis, defined by Wolf (1982, p 546) as: … the application of scientific methods to problems of public policy, choice and implementation in domestic, international and national security affairs. Its successful pursuit depends on familiarity with the social sciences, economics and the physical sciences, competence in a number of analytical techniques and the ability and confidence to move across disciplinary lines…. The reality is that the complexity of many policy issues means that they can only be addressed by a blend of skills and expertise. Policy analysis requires knowledge of the relevant discipline under scrutiny and some skills in quantitative analysis, combined with the more traditional policy capabilities. However, this distinction between generalists with broad conceptual skills and specialists with quantitative analytical skills, and finding the appropriate balance between them, continues to influence developments with regard to policy analysis in the civil service, as will be seen throughout this chapter. And, of course, as the earlier quote from Murray (2008, p 112) highlights, policy analysis is only one element in the policy process. In the making of policy, many different interests are present who have to be consulted, brought along, and sufficient consensus generated to support implementation. This chapter focuses on policy analysis developments in the civil service from the early 2000s, and in particular on changes that have taken place since the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008. The financial crisis acted as a catalyst for significant reforms in the practice of policy analysis. The following section examines the background to policy analysis developments, exploring the reasons why change was viewed as necessary. The chapter then looks at a number of 108

Policy analysis in the civil service

organisations and supports available to government in developing policy. This is followed by a review of developments in policy analysis in the civil service, with much of the focus on a review of activities in response to the financial crisis. Finally, the chapter draws some conclusions as to the effect of these changes on policy analysis and outline some thoughts on future developments.

Background The quality of policy analysis and advice available from the Irish civil service came under detailed scrutiny at the time of the global financial crisis. A number of official reports (Honohan, 2010; Regling and Watson, 2010; Wright, 2010; Nyberg, 2011) highlighted the limitations of policy advice and analysis carried out in the context of the banking crisis. Wright’s (2010, p 23) critique of policy decision making in the lead-up to the recession in 2008 indicated that the government’s budgetary process was completely overwhelmed by two dominant processes: programmes for coalition governments and the social partnership process. Programmes for government were seen as marginalising the impact of parliament and of the civil service in its scrutiny role, and restricting the scope for rigorous analysis of policy options (Ó Cinnéide, 1999). Social partnership (formal multi-annual agreements between the social partners of government, the main employer groups, the trade unions and representatives of the voluntary and community sector on pay and key social policy issues) had been widely praised as a pre-eminent reason for Ireland’s recovery from the recession of the 1980s and the creation of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ economic boom (see Chapter Ten, this volume). However, as the economic situation deteriorated, the process of social partnership was seen as accelerating the momentum for spending and contributing to the consequent deterioration of competitiveness of the Irish economy. Again, it was seen as limiting the scope of policy analysis, through closing off discussion and assessment of alternative policy options. One commentator noted the view that official policy advice and decisionmaking processes in Ireland were overly secretive and cartelised, with too much power lying with vested interests, including elements of the political establishment and the bureaucracy itself (Barry, 2009). Two former senior civil servants noted the pressures on civil servants to restrict their analysis of policy options, and the impact this has had on the quality of policy analysis: In our view, the quality of the formal analysis of policy issues carried out by the civil service has deteriorated over the years, partly as a result of a tendency towards increased circumspection arising from freedom-of information legislation and partly due to increased work pressures and other factors. It is now more common to find a single policy viewpoint and recommendation formally recorded in the relevant documentation, rather than a range of differing opinions being expressed as to the preferred policy option. This does not mean that there are no differing views or that different options are not considered, just that they are 109

Policy analysis in Ireland

often mediated before a policy submission to ministers is finalised (Lumsden and Mangan, 2013, p 155). The restricted number and role of specialists in the civil service has also been highlighted as a limitation on policy analysis in the civil service: Another institutional factor impacting on the use of research was the balance in analytical expertise between the civil service and the wider public service. Whereas in most countries policy details are designed by specialists within government departments, in Ireland the specialist knowledge became fragmented across a growing number of specialist agencies, and in some cases within private sector consultancies. As a consequence, many government departments had little specialist knowledge or resources to analyse and develop policy. This further reduced the likelihood of research being used. (Ruane, 2012, p 127; see also Chapters Four and Five, this volume) The need for more specialist policy advice was also noted by FitzGerald (2012) when discussing how to restore credibility in policy making in Ireland. He focused mainly on the policy failures in respect of the financial and fiscal systems, and pointed to, among other things, the need for more specialist expertise in the public administration. In the context of the failure of fiscal policy he notes: ‘Lurking behind the weak response of the Department of Finance was a culture that discouraged undue emphasis on economics. The tradition until now has been that for civil servants to progress through the ranks they need to be generalists not specialists’ (2012, p 32). Finally, in a civil service context, it is important to remember that programme managers and special advisers have been a feature of the political-administrative landscape in Ireland for many years and they can have a prominent, and sometimes disputed, role in policy development (see Chapter Seven, this volume). Quinn (2008, p 217), a former cabinet minister, felt that the system of programme managers liaising together worked well. However, others have criticised the system for excessive cost, and politicisation of the administration through the employment of party staff affiliates on the public payroll (Connaughton, 2002, p 14). Special advisers are political appointments; advisers are employed to provide expert advice, and offer guidance of a political nature on individual policy issues (Connaughton, 2002 p 14). As with programme managers, some commentators have identified a positive role for such staff. A review of experience in New Zealand by Eichbaum and Shaw (2007, paragraph 3.2) found: …  many of the senior officials who participated in one of our surveys made it clear that special advisers have an important role to play in protecting them from demands from Ministers which might, were they required to submit to them, expose officials to the risk of politicisation…. Providing everyone is clear about roles and 110

Policy analysis in the civil service

responsibilities, then, it may be that special advisers actually make it easier for officials to conduct themselves in ways which are consistent with traditional understandings of civil service impartiality. In order to support the development of senior managers within the civil service, a Senior Public Service (SPS) was established in 2011, though to date it only includes top management from the civil service. The aim of the SPS is to strengthen senior management, leadership and collaboration across the civil service. A system of coaching and development opportunities have been introduced as well as a mobility programme. In respect of all vacancies to arise at Assistant Secretary level, there is now the possibility of filling them through a lateral move by an Assistant Secretary from elsewhere in the civil service. Despite the turnover in senior management occasioned by this initiative, at present it is seen as a positive development as it broadens the experience of those involved. With high levels of experienced and long-serving managers due to leave the Irish public service over the next decade, succession planning has also emerged as a key area. Within the civil service it has been indicated that up to 10,000 staff are eligible to retire over the next five to ten years (DPER, 2017). The situation is exacerbated by the two major recruitment embargoes during the 1980s and more recently after the financial crisis in 2008. In some organisations, this means that there is a diminished cohort of potential successors for future leadership roles. Furthermore, as noted by Freyens (2010, p 271) ‘leadership is not acquired through leadership seminars and country retreats, but by building in-house experience and mentoring high quality recruits’. There are further associated concerns about the ongoing loss of corporate memory and core skills at middle management level due to retirements. Capturing and in some way retaining the knowledge and expertise of departing employees is as important as recruiting their replacements, but as noted by O’Riordan (2019, p 9), few organisations have policies or initiatives in this regard.

Supports for government in developing policy National Statistics Board An important requirement in improving policy making is better evidence, including data (see Chapter Five, this volume). The National Statistics Board (NSB) was initially set up on a non-statutory basis in 1986. It was established on a statutory basis when the Statistics Act 1993 came into operation in November 1994. Its function, set out in the Act, is to guide the strategic direction of the Central Statistics Office and, in particular to: • establish priorities for the compilation and development of official statistics; • assess the resources of staff, equipment and finance that should be made available for the compilation of official statistics; and 111

Policy analysis in Ireland

• arbitrate, subject to the final decision of the Taoiseach, on any conflicts that may arise with other public authorities relating to the extraction of statistics from records or to the coordination of statistical activities. The NSB prepares five-year strategies for statistics, following an extensive consultative process, for agreement by government. A number of organisations provide advice to government to support the policy-making process. These include organisations such as the Institute of Public Administration and the Economic and Social Research Institute, as well as a wide range of lobby groups and interest groups who offer their views on public policy making and provide a useful source of information, albeit from a particular viewpoint. However, two organisations have a particular mandate to advise government in respect of policy: the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) and the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFAC) (see Chapter Eleven, this volume). National Economic and Social Council The NESC was established in 1973. Its function is to analyse and report to the Taoiseach on policy issues relating to sustainable economic, social and environmental development in Ireland. The members of the NESC are appointed by the Taoiseach, for a three-year term. These members are representatives of business and employers’ organisations, trade unions, agricultural and farming organisations, community and voluntary organisations, and environmental organisations, as well as heads of government departments and independent experts. The composition of the NESC means that it plays an important and unique role in bringing different perspectives from civil society together with government. Its work is supported by the NESC secretariat. The work programme is decided on a three-year basis, by the NESC, with input from the Department of the Taoiseach. Irish Fiscal Advisory Council IFAC is an independent statutory body whose purpose is to provide an independent assessment of official budgetary forecasts and proposed fiscal policy objectives. It comprises five, government-appointed IFAC members and a secretariat. IFAC was established on an interim basis in July 2011 and put on a statutory footing in December 2012 by the Fiscal Responsibility Act. The introduction of the Act was part of a wider agenda of budgetary reform, and the European Union/International Monetary Fund Programme of Financial Support for Ireland. The legislation also guarantees the independence of IFAC, which has a legal obligation to make its views known to government and to publish its assessments. Its areas of responsibility include: 112

Policy analysis in the civil service

• assessing and endorsing, as it considers appropriate, the government’s official macroeconomic forecasts; • assessing budgetary forecasts; • assessing the broader fiscal stance; • monitoring compliance with fiscal rules.

Policy analysis developments in the civil service This section examines a number of the more important developments in policy analysis since the early 2000s, with most significant developments happening in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008 and the bank bailout in late 2010. Regulatory Impact Analysis Regulatory impact analysis (RIA) was introduced in the civil service in 2005. RIA is viewed as a systematic, consistent and transparent framework to assess the impacts of government regulatory action. It is an ex-ante tool for policy analysis in the regulatory sphere, a core element of government work. A review of the operation of RIA in 2008 recommended actions designed to build on progress that had been made in relation to RIA since its introduction. Subsequently in 2009, the government published revised RIA guidelines. The government also issued a statement on economic regulation in 2009. This contained proposals to increase the transparency of strategy and results for regulators, enhance the monitoring capacity of departments over agencies, establish new networking arrangements between departments and agencies and between agencies and stakeholders, and introduce increased support for research and training in regulation. On the regulatory reform front, a former civil servant has suggested that in the absence of a central department overseeing the Better Regulation agenda, no evidence is being assembled and presented regarding the quality of RIAs being produced. Moreover, there is no driving force to disseminate the results of RIAs (Ferris, 2013). RegGov (2012) noted that while the government is committed to requiring departments to publish RIAs before government decisions are taken, ‘There are a number of bills before the Oireachtas with significant regulatory aspects and potential costs for businesses for which no RIA has been published’ (2012, p 2). It is not possible to assess the rigour and depth of analysis prompted by the introduction of RIA, despite it now being in existence for over a decade. Organisational Capability Reviews Organisational Capability Reviews (OCRs) were instigated in Ireland in 2006, broadly following a similar United Kingdom (UK) initiative (O’Riordan, 2011). They were designed to be reviews of organisation capacity focusing on strategy, delivery and evaluation. Seven departments and offices were reviewed 113

Policy analysis in Ireland

before the initiative was suspended in the aftermath of the financial crisis and with considerable pressure on public service resources. Action 20 of the Civil Service Renewal Plan (DPER, 2014, p 31) contained a commitment to relaunch the initiative, the purpose being ‘to embed a culture of regular and objective assessments of the capacity and capability of each Department to achieve its objectives and take the necessary action to close any gaps’. As a result, a new system of OCR to assess and strengthen performance and capacity across departments is being implemented. The new programme is very similar to the original initiative, with the exception of the juxtaposition of leadership and evaluation as an overarching theme and a sub-theme. The new review format is set out in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1: Organisation Capability Review methodology Delivery

Strategy

Leadership

• M anaging performance and stakeholder focus • Governance, organisational structure and risk management • Focus on implementation

• Developing policy and strategy • Decisions grounded in evidence • Focus on outcomes

• Setting strategic direction • Collaborating and building common purpose • People management and HR capability

Source: DTTS (2018)

Reviews have been completed of the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport (DTTS), the Courts Service and the Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation (DBEI). A review of the Department of Culture, Heritage and the Gaeltacht is being finalised in late 2019, while a review in the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government has commenced. Approximately two reviews are undertaken at any one time, with the work being done by a small OCR unit in the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER). In the two published reviews of departments responsible for the development and analysis of policy (DTTS and DBEI), capacity in this regard is highlighted as one of the central conclusions. In both cases, it is suggested that the impact of the recession and high staff turnover are still being experienced. While large numbers of unfilled positions are no longer an issue, the loss of long-serving, experienced and knowledgeable staff, the widespread filling of vacancies within the departments by inevitably less experienced staff, and the ‘churn’ in staff occasioned by the return of promotion and mobility opportunities, represent a cause for concern. In both cases, it was recommended by the review teams that the departments’ capacity to produce policy and strategy required considerable further investment. For example, the DBEI review concludes that ‘the Strategic Policy Division currently lacks the critical mass of specialist staff needed to support the various and diverse policy business units across the Department. As a result, the depth of analysis in individual sectors of the economy has reduced’ 114

Policy analysis in the civil service

(DBEI, 2018, p 9). Similarly, in the case of DTTS, the review team notes that ‘the Department’s capacity to produce policy and strategy needs further investment’ (DTTS, 2018, p 15). In their action plans developed in response to the reviews, both organisations commit to prioritising these concerns. The pace of completion of reviews is slow, with only three reviews published since the scheme was relaunched in 2014. However, departments and offices that have gone through the process have indicated in their action plans that they found them very beneficial as a means of reviewing organisation capacity. In the first iteration of the scheme, composite reviews were carried out by Murray (2010) and Boyle (2012a, 2012b). These were valuable, independent commentaries, with Murray (2010, p 89) commenting: ‘It is noteworthy that a considerable number of the challenges that require organisations to change are ones that have service wide origins and will require a public service wide integrated response.’ It would seem desirable that a similar analysis of the current round of reviews is also undertaken. Evaluation, budgeting and policy analysis The government committed to implementing a number of evaluation-related measures in the context of a revised budgetary and expenditure framework introduced in 2011. These new measures included the following: • the use of evaluations in periodic comprehensive reviews of expenditure, including both departmental-based and thematic evaluation reports; • the introduction of the Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service (IGEES) as a cross-government service to enhance the role of economics and value for money analysis in public policy making; • changes to the programme review process, known as the Value for Money and Policy Review (VFMPR) process, including more targeted reviews, alignment with the expenditure allocation process and greater involvement for parliament in the selection and assessment of reviews; • the introduction of focused policy assessments, more narrowly focused assessments designed to answer specific issues of policy configuration and delivery and complement the VFMPR process; • the introduction of a Public Spending Code to bring together good practice guidance on evaluation and appraisal; • the creation of a public service evaluation network to help build capacity. The IGEES, established in 2012 is a particularly important initiative with regard to policy analysis in the civil service. Economists have been specifically recruited and appointed to the service. After initial training mainly based in the central departments of Public Expenditure and Reform, Finance and the Taoiseach, these recruits are moved into dedicated analytical units in government departments. They remain in a department for a couple of years and then move on to another 115

Policy analysis in Ireland

department or office. The number of IGEES staff increased from approximately 30 in 2012 to 160 in 2018 (see Chapters Four and Five, this volume). The IGEES began to publish its economic evaluations in 2014, exposing policy development in a manner that was previously unusual for Irish government (MacCarthaigh, 2017). Some early public commentary by an academic economist on the work produced by the IGEES suggests it is having as positive impact on policy evaluation (Kinsella, 2014). The DTTS provides an example of good practice in creating a departmental IGEES unit that has produced a number of good quality studies. The IGEES is a specific response to the critique of the civil service that it did not employ enough specialists with strong analytical capacity, particularly economists, after the financial crisis. It draws from the experience of the Government Economic Service that has been in operation in the UK civil service since 1964, and which is responsible for the recruitment and development of economists there. While the plan is that IGEES is here to stay, one challenge for the future will be maintaining the core of expertise developed within this specialist area. Previous efforts to develop a similar cadre of specialists in public policy analysis in the 1970s and again in the 1990s in the Irish civil service were stymied as people were promoted out of the analyst cadre, and maintaining capacity at an adequate level became a problem. This time around, a more structured approach to the development of the service is being applied, which provides some hope that it will be maintained. With regard to the evaluation regime more widely, the VFMPRs are seen as an important source of policy analysis and advice on the efficiency and effectiveness of government expenditure programmes. While these reviews have produced much useful information, Boyle (2014) suggests that many departmental-based evaluations undertaken under the rubric of the VFMPR initiative have been of limited use for resource allocation decisions and prioritisation between competing areas of expenditure. An assessment was undertaken of recommendations contained in 19  VFMPR reports published by government departments between 2011 and June 2014, as well as in five evaluation papers produced by the Central Expenditure Evaluation Unit in DPER on cross-cutting issues. Of the 428 VFMPR recommendations assessed, only 1% recommended programme or part-programme termination and 5% substantial redesign. The overwhelming majority (94%) recommended more modest programme adjustments. By way of contrast, the recommendations produced by the Central Expenditure Evaluation Unit in DPER in its cross-cutting evaluation reports are more likely to suggest substantial redesign of the programme (55% of the 29 recommendations) or programme/part-programme termination (10%). There have been linked efforts to combine policy analysis more effectively with the budgetary process through a reformed budget process introduced following criticism of the process that existed prior to the financial crisis. With regard to policy analysis, a 2005 review by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that budget oversight by the Irish parliament 116

Policy analysis in the civil service

was underdeveloped by international standards. The OECD proposed moving from what it describes as a disconnected series of annual set pieces to an ongoing engagement by parliament throughout the course of the budgetary cycle. A central aim is to rebalance away from the formal authorisation of financial allocations towards ex-ante interactions on policy priorities and performance. The government accepted the OECD recommendations, and has made changes to the budgetary process. The Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), set up in 2017 to provide independent and impartial information, analysis and advice to the Houses of the Oireachtas (parliament), has been particularly active in producing analysis for parliamentarians to enhance budgetary scrutiny. It is a significant new player on the analytical scene, providing analytical papers for parliamentarians on a range of budgetary issues. However, it is too early yet to assess the impact of the PBO (see Chapter Seven, this volume). The Spending Review is another important element of the new budgetary process. The purpose of a Spending Review is to increase the fiscal space available to government for new, high-priority policies. Three-year rolling reviews see departments review government spending over a three-year period. IGEES is core to delivering the work on the Spending Review. The 2019 Spending Review culminated in the publication of 30 analytical papers, published alongside the government’s Budget 2020. This built on the output from 2017 and 2018. These analytical papers can be found on the DPER website1 and on the IGEES website2. While the Spending Review process has been welcomed as a useful and important initiative, in a review of the operation of Spending Reviews, the PBO (2019) noted a number of limitations: • While the Spending Review has a level of political commitment from the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, there is little involvement by ministers of line departments who are affected by the policy implications of the findings and may be responsible for implementing these findings or recommendations. There is also little interaction between the Spending Review process and the Irish parliament. • While the Budget includes a discussion of some of the findings from the Spending Review, the link between findings and budgetary decisions is not clear. Greater clarity around how the results of spending review papers feed into budgetary decisions is needed. • While the participation of line departments in the process has been increasing in recent years, the current process is largely carried out by DPER, the central budget authority on the spending side. Increasing the ownership of line departments in the review process could further improve the quality of reviews, align departmental responsibility with scrutiny of their votes by committees, and achieve greater motivation in terms of implementing review findings. 117

Policy analysis in Ireland

Opening policy analysis to the public As part of the Civil Service Action Plan (DPER, 2014, Action 22: Strengthen policy-making skills and develop more open approaches to policy making), a new system of open policy debates to involve networks of practitioners, academics and experts at the early stages of policy development was introduced in 2015. Since 2015, 46 open policy debates have been held on a range of policy issues including childcare, housing, Food Wise 20253, the River Basin Management Plan, the National Risk Assessment and public investment in research and development. There have also been innovative efforts to engage citizens more broadly in policy deliberation. A prime example is the Constitutional Convention set up to deliberate on proposed amendments to the Constitution, including such issues as provisions for same-sex marriage, reduction of the voting age, and increasing the participation of women in politics (see Chapter Fifteen, this volume). Work is advancing throughout 2019 on the development of guidance for policy making to support departments on the fundamental stages of policy making and ensure a consistent approach is embedded throughout the civil service.

Conclusion That the civil service should play a central role in policy making is a given. While ultimately the government of the day, elected by the people, decides policy, it is a core function of the civil service, particularly at the senior level, to provide well-judged, evidence-informed, independent and timely counsel to government. How well the civil service does this was thrown into sharp relief by the financial crisis and recession of a decade ago. Since then, some notable improvements have been made to enhance policy analysis capability and capacity within the civil service. Wide-ranging initiatives have been developed to enhance policy analysis, particularly in the economic sphere. IGEES in particular represents a positive development. A stronger evidence base is emerging to better inform policy making. However, the impact of these developments is dependent on the interplay between analysis and advice, and the capacity of the political system to process the advice. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, policy analysis is only one factor influencing policy advice given by the civil service, and ultimately a political decision is taken as to what weight is given to that advice. There is also cause for concern that while appropriate initiatives are in place, the manner in which they are implemented means that their impact in practice has been limited. According to one economic commentator, in a recent assessment of civil service project appraisal and the impact of the Public Spending Code: It is time to place the procedures for evaluating and selecting major projects on a statutory basis through a new Public Investment Act, designed to make real the good intentions of the Public Spending 118

Policy analysis in the civil service

Code. Projects above a certain scale should require advance assessment, side by side with competing demands on the capital budget, by an independent agency staffed for the purpose. (McCarthy, 2019) The emergence of the IGEES has meant that more specialists in analysis have been recruited into the civil service, shifting the balance from one where generalists were the norm. Getting the balance right is a difficult challenge, as both specialists and generalists are needed and important in a well-functioning civil service. While the recruitment of more specialists into policy analysis is a welcome development, there is also a need to retain the strengths that generalists can bring in terms of their broad perspectives and wide-ranging experience. Policy analysis and policy making are never easy and never will be, but they are a central responsibility of the civil service and efforts need to be dedicated to these areas by senior managers on an ongoing basis. As the late John Murray, Professor of Business at Trinity College, Dublin, put it so eloquently: The civil and public service is not a value free, amoral, social mechanism of delivery. Its legitimacy and the security of civil society rests in its capacity to preserve and assert its independence, to never fail in its commitment to probity and in its skill in ‘speaking truth to power’. If that capacity is lost, political advisors, consultants, outsourcers and various charlatans and sorcerers quickly begin to drive the strategic management process; ‘spin’ drives government and the legitimacy of the state and government is readily undermined. (Murray, 2008, p 112) Notes 1 2 3

www.per.gov.ie www.igees.gov.ie Food Wise 2025, an initiative of the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine sets out a ten year plan for the agri-food sector. It underlines the sector’s unique and special position within the Irish economy, and illustrates the potential which exists for this sector to grow even further.

References Barry, F. (2009) ‘Towards improved policymaking in Ireland: contestability and the marketplace for ideas’, Irish Journal of Public Policy, 3(2): 11–17. Boyle, R. (2012a) ‘Observations by Dr. Richard Boyle on the third round of the ORP’, in Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Third Report of the Organisational Review Programme, Dublin: Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, pp 144–6. Boyle, R. (2012b) ‘Observations on the ‘look back’ process for rounds one and two of the Organisational Review Programme and general observations on the ORP exercise’, in Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Organisational Review Programme Progress Report on Implementation, Dublin: Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, pp 69–74. 119

Policy analysis in Ireland

Boyle, R. (2014) The State of Policy Evaluation in Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. Connaughton, B. (2002) ‘Politico-administrative relations under coalition government: the case of Ireland’, Paper presented at the 10th Annual NISPAcee Conference, Krakow, 25–27 April. DBEI (Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation) (2018) Capability Review, Dublin: DBEI. Available at: https://dbei.gov.ie/en/Publications/ Publication-files/Capability-Review-DBEI.pdf DPER (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform) (2014) Civil Service Renewal Plan, Dublin: DPER. DPER (2017) People Strategy for the Civil Service, 2017–2020, Dublin: DPER. DTTS (Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport) (2018) Organisational Capability Review, Dublin: DTTS. Available at: https://assets.gov.ie/19179/7c 855e9ffe154077817b16e668aea77b.pdf Eichbaum, C. and Shaw, R. (2007) Memorandum by Dr Chris Eichbaum, Victoria University, New Zealand, and Dr  Richard Shaw, Massey University, New Zealand, in House of Commons Select Committee on Public Administration, Session 2006–07, Third Report, Politics and Administration: Ministers and Civil Servants, HC 122. Ferris, T. (2013) Written Submission to Consultation on Government Policy Statement on Economic Regulation 2013, Dublin: Department of the Taoiseach. FitzGerald, J. (2012) ‘Restoring credibility in policy-making in Ireland’, Public Money & Management, 32(1): 27–34. Freyens, B.P. (2010) ‘Managing skills shortages in the Australian public sector: issues and perspectives’, Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, 48(3): 262–86. Honohan, P. (2010) The Irish Banking Crisis: Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 2003–2008, Report to the Minister for Finance by the Governor of the Central Bank, Dublin: Department of Finance. Kinsella, S. (2014) ‘Think-tank’s economic blueprint a step in the right direction’, Irish Independent, 8 July. Lumsden, J. and Mangan, P. (2013) ‘Civil service reform: an insider’s view from without’, Administration, 60(4): 149–59. MacCarthaigh, M. (2008) Government in Modern Ireland, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. MacCarthaigh, M. (2017) ‘Reforming the Irish public service: a multiple streams perspective’, Administration, 60(2): 145–64. McCarthy, C. (2019) ‘We must make sure what the government builds is proved to be worth public money’, Irish Independent, 25 August. Murray, C. (1990) The Civil Service Observed, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. Murray, J. (2008) ‘Services, counsel and values: managing strategically in the public sector’, in R. Galavan, J. Murray and C. Markides (eds) Strategy, Innovation, and Change: Challenges for Management, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 111–30.

120

Policy analysis in the civil service

Murray, J. (2010) ‘Observations by Professor John Murray, TCD, on four Organisational Reviews’, in Second Report of the Organisational Review Programme, Dublin: Stationery Office. Nyberg, P. (2011) Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland, Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland (‘The Nyberg Report’), Dublin: Government Publications. Ó Cinnéide, S. (1999) ‘Democracy and the Constitution’, Administration, 46(4): 41–58. O’Riordan, J. (2011) Organisational Capacity in the Irish Civil Service: An Examination of the Organisation Review Programme, Research Paper No. 3, State of the Public Service Series, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. Available at: https:// www.ipa.ie/_fileUpload/Documents/ipa_report_no3.pdf O’Riordan, J. (2019) Workforce Planning in the Irish Public Service, Research Paper No. 24, State of the Public Service Series, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. PBO (Parliamentary Budget Office) (2019) The Irish Spending Review: Suggestions from International Experiences, Dublin: PBO. Quinn, R. (2008) ‘Is our public service ready for the future? A response from the political arena’, in M. Callanan (ed) Ireland 2022: Towards One Hundred Years of Self-Government, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, pp 214–21. RegGov (2012) W(h)ither Better Regulation?, Policy Brief, Dublin: UCD Centre for Regulation and Governance. Regling, K. and Watson, M. (2010) A Preliminary Report on The Sources of Ireland’s Banking Crisis, Dublin: The Stationery Office. Ruane, F. (2012) ‘Research evidence and policymaking in Ireland’, Administration, 60(2): 119–38. Wolf, C. (1982) ‘Policy analysis and public management’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Public Management, 1(4): 546–51. Wright, R. (2010) Strengthening the Capacity of the Department of Finance: Report of the Independent Review Panel, Dublin: Department of Finance.

121

NINE

Europeanised policy making in Ireland Mary C. Murphy

Introduction Ireland’s decision to join the European Union (EU) on 1 January 1973 constitutes the most important foreign policy decision by the Irish state since its foundation in 1921. Ireland’s membership of the EU over a period of near five decades has been punctuated by periods of both volatility and stability: Irish economic fortunes have been mixed, public support for the EU has vacillated, policy developments have sometimes been controversial, structural funds have been welcomed, and social progress has transpired. On balance, membership of the EU has been good for Ireland (Murphy and O’Brennan, 2014). Being part of the EU family has aided Ireland’s global positioning and its ability to cope with the demands of international economic competition. EU policy initiatives have sometimes challenged domestic constituencies opposed to change; the civil service and political system have been exposed to new (and better) ways of working and managing common problems; and political elites have acquiesced to EU-inspired models of best practice. Pragmatic engagement with the EU has tended to be the hallmark of the Irish experience (Laffan and Tannam, 1998) and being part of the EU has produced distinct patterns of adaptation and contestation at the domestic Irish level. In other words, the Europeanisation process, as it has played out in Ireland, has produced some (although not always extensive) patterns of convergence with EU approaches, outputs and norms. In short, EU membership has had an impact on myriad domestic issues, sectors and policies. Since accession, the Irish economy, political system, institutions and policies of the state have been influenced and sometimes challenged – to varying degrees – by a series of diverse Europeanising forces. Importantly, domestic policy changes often have broader implications, since the process of problem solving and the use of policy instruments are invariably linked to the wider legal, political and administrative environment (see Héritier et al, 2001). The Europeanisation of public policy therefore is felt and experienced in tandem with some Europeanisation of institutions, and processes and procedures. The resultant process of Europeanisation has played a part in shaping not just Irish public policy, but also the wider Irish polity since 1973 (O’Brennan, 2012, p 94). Using a Europeanisation frame, this chapter measures and explains the process of and impact of EU policy analysis in Ireland. The EU context can constrain the policy analysis process. A capacity for autonomous action by national actors 123

Policy analysis in Ireland

is limited by the legal commitments that attach to EU membership and require the transposition of EU legislation into domestic law. This means that the room for manoeuvre in terms of choosing from a suite of policy options is necessarily limited. The constraints, however, have their limits. The extent to which the EU restricts policy analysis is linked to whether the process of Europeanisation is ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ (Ladrech, 2010). ‘Hard’ EU policy influence relates to those legislative and policy proposals that entail legal responsibilities. ‘Soft’ EU policy influence refers to processes including the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) that are not legally binding but invariably produce an effect at the domestic level. A number of illustrative policy case studies are employed here to demonstrate a variety of Europeanisation effects across the Irish policy analysis spectrum. The chapter identifies the challenges and constraints facing Ireland’s policy analysis landscape as it relates to the EU context and concludes with a critical overview of the relationship between the EU and policy analysis in Ireland.

Europeanisation: the concept ‘Europeanisation’ has enjoyed significant academic press since it was first conceptualised by Ladrech (1994); see also analyses by Featherstone (2003) and Mair (2004). Ladrech’s (1994, p 69) early definition of Europeanisation described it as ‘an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC [European Community] political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making’. Ladrech’s early work focused explicitly on a top-down perspective that sought to determine how the EU shapes institutions, processes and political outcomes in member states (and also third countries). A growing scholarly focus on the Europeanisation concept has progressively added depth and substance to the precise meaning and import of Europeanisation. Some measure of contention, however, still permeates the study of the concept. Nevertheless, Europeanisation is broadly understood as a process of domestic adaptation to European integration (Vink and Graziano, 2008, p 7). It has been utilised across diverse disciplines to the point where it has gradually developed into a distinctive research agenda with its own questions, theories and methods. Studies of Europeanisation have embraced all facets of the political domain, including policies, institutions, political parties and polities themselves, and have been marshalled in different ways by different scholars. A classic definition of the Europeanisation phenomenon is that proposed by Radaelli (2003, p 30), who defines it as consisting of: … processes of a, construction, b, diffusion and c, institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures and policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then 124

Europeanised policy making in Ireland

incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies. Consequently, Europeanisation has wide application and relevance across a variety of domestic domains and emerges as a key mechanism of change affecting the formal practice of national sovereignty and all that entails for individual member states (Radaelli, 2006). Europeanisation effectively involves an examination of ‘whether and how states download EU policies and institutions that subsequently give rise to domestic change’ (Börzel and Panke, 2019, p  116). As the EU has evolved and its policy competences have increased, this type of analysis is consequential for national institutions, policy outputs, political parties, interest groups and public opinion. These aspects of domestic life are – to differing degrees – buttressed, moderated, challenged or antagonised by influences emanating from Brussels. Significantly, however, the Europeanisation process has not produced convergence of national politics, policies or polities. Instead, member states appear to adjust differently to the demands of EU membership and so experience Europeanisation in distinctive ways. Olsen has identified five uses of the term Europeanisation.1 He accepts, however, that the notion of Europeanisation as ‘change in core domestic institutions of governance and politics, understood as a consequence of the development of European-level institutions, identities and policies’ is the most common use of the term (2002, p 932). Radaelli’s (2000) ‘domains of Europeanisation’ specifically identifies areas where the effects of Europeanisation might be experienced. This includes political structures, structures of representation and cleavages, cognitive and normative structures and public policy. Featherstone (2003, p  5) notes that Europeanisation is applied within four broad categories as: ‘an historical process; as a matter of cultural diffusion; as a process of institutional adaptation; and as the adaptation of policy and policy processes’. Ladrech’s (2010) study of Europeanisation and national politics examines the impact of Europeanising forces across multiple facets of national life, including the national court system, executive, parliament and a variety of policy areas. The sweep of Europeanisation literature suggests two important assumptions about how Europeanisation affects EU member states. First, the impact is differential across both member states and policy areas, and second, as noted by Börzel (2005, p 50), ‘the differential impact of Europe is explained by the “goodness of fit” between European and national policies, institutions and processes, on the one hand, and the existence of “mediating factors” or intervening variables that filter the domestic impact of Europe, on the other hand’. A ‘misfit’ manifests itself in one of two ways, as either a policy misfit, where the difference between the domestic and EU policy is significant, or an institutional misfit, which sees an EU proposal or provision challenge domestic rules, procedures and collective understandings. Adaptational pressures to conform and comply with EU policies are dependent on the overall ‘goodness of fit’ between the EU and the domestic level and can vary between being more or 125

Policy analysis in Ireland

less extensive. Such pressures, however, regardless of their strength and intensity, may be resisted by domestic forces. In this context, it has been argued that: ‘a consensus has grown around the need to understand [Europeanisation] as a two-way relationship, but one that has been modelled primarily in terms of the downward flow of effects’ (Bache, 2007, pp 11–12). The Europeanisation process at the domestic level, however, can experience ideological, political and cultural resistance that may limit or derail the impact of Europeanising forces. In effect, domestic resistance is often significant and consequential, and recent Europeanisation studies have recognised the potential strength of the domestic arena as a mediating factor. This is where a process of Irish policy analysis finds its niche. The impact of Europeanisation on public policy necessarily takes different forms and can, in principle, affect all elements of public policy, including actors, resources, policy instruments and policy style. The process of measuring the Europeanisation of public policy, therefore, is not merely a case of judging how well member states implement EU policies; it is more specifically concerned with the (differential) content of policy and what happens during the policy (analysis) process and its implementation at the member state level. The literature broadly notes that the process of the Europeanisation of public policy offers five possible outcomes: inertia, absorption, accommodation, transformation and retrenchment (see, for example, Risse et al, 2001; Radaelli, 2003). The EU policy process, and its application at the domestic level, is influenced and determined by the broader and diverse EU legal framework within which policy is agreed and implemented. Ladrech (2010) distinguishes between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of Europeanisation of public policy. Where the EU policy influence is ‘hard’, this denotes a policy framework that is legally bounded and results in binding commitments. This is linked to ‘market correcting’ and ‘market making’ policies (or what are also known as first-pillar EU competences). Policy influence, however, also has a soft form when EU activities do not have a strong binding or legislative dimension. Policies derived through the OMC generally fit this category. The OMC was created to further the Lisbon Strategy and covers policy areas in the economic, employment and social policy realm. OMC is distinct from the established ‘Community method’ of EU policy making. Where the Community method relies on supranational governance processes, OMC is based on intergovernmentalism and voluntary cooperation that aims not to compel, but instead to induce best practice across member states. Radaelli (2003, p  43) defines OMC as ‘a policy transfer platform rather than a law-making system’. This approach to the policy process leaves room for a deeper process of policy analysis because it allows individual EU member states to formulate tailored and implementable policy that suits specific national needs. A notable dimension of the Europeanisation process is a tendency to characterise the process as one that is based on an inexorable forward momentum. This interpretation of the Europeanisation effect is increasingly invalid and has recently been challenged by events, namely the 2008 global financial crisis and 126

Europeanised policy making in Ireland

the United Kingdom (UK) decision to the leave the EU (Brexit). An emerging de-Europeanisation literature offers some means to capture the extent to which Europeanisation can be challenged, undermined or derailed at the domestic level. Aydin-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016, p 5) define de-Europeanisation as ‘the loss or weakening of the EU/Europe as a normative/political context and as a reference point in domestic settings and national public debates’. It points to a process of dealignment from the EU, involving a reversal from EU rules, norms and values. Copeland (2016, p 1126) identifies de-Europeanization as ‘a process of disengagement combined with the intentional decision to reverse the impact of Europeanization’. The Europeanisation literature has also been criticised for its failure to recognise other (non-EU) factors that might also account for domestic change (see Bulmer and Burch, 2005). In other words, the assumption that policy developments are intrinsically linked to a process of Europeanisation overlooks the possibility that such developments might have evolved organically in the absence of Europeanising forces.

Europeanisation: the Irish experience Europeanisation in Ireland is experienced in multiple ways. Institutions, policies and laws differ in how they respond and react to Europeanising forces, and EU influences can be moderated by domestic and other external developments. This reading of Europeanisation is confirmed by a discrete body of Irish scholarly work that has examined Europeanisation from an Irish perspective. Hayward and Murphy (2010) have studied the impact of Europeanisation on political parties on the island of Ireland. Rees and colleagues (2009) note evidence that Irish institutions and policies have experienced a degree of Europeanisation. Adshead’s (2005) study found that dimensions of Europeanisation were affecting the Irish state’s traditional conservative and clerical character. There are also a number of policy-based explorations of the extent to which specific policies in Ireland have been Europeanised. This broad collection of work suggests that the Irish policy process, political system, state institutions, legislative and non-legislative activities encounter Europeanisation in different ways and to differing degrees. In other words, the impact of Europeanisation is far from uniform. Two illustrative case studies are employed here to sketch out the ways in which different types of policies experience Europeanisation in the distinct Irish setting. In the context of policy analysis, this includes determining how extensive or decisive the EU is, relative to other factors, in shaping that policy landscape. Two different types of policy are explored: policies formulated using the traditional Community method; and policies based on the OMC. Case study 1: Community-method policies The Community method denotes that policies are determined by cooperation between supranational and intergovernmental EU institutions whose outputs 127

Policy analysis in Ireland

are guided by legal rules. The bulk of EU economic, social and environmental matters are subject to the Community method of decision making. In Ireland, these wide-ranging policy areas have experienced degrees of Europeanisation from extensive to limited as seen in the cases of environmental and cohesion policy respectively. Environmental policy In the environmental realm, Ireland is historically noted as an environmental policy latecomer. Flynn (2019, p 93) observes that Ireland has been heavily reliant on EU environmental policy leadership: approximately 76% of environmentrelated statutory instruments introduced in Ireland between 1995 and 2016 originated in the EU. The quantity of EU legislation to which Ireland is subject, however, offers only a partial picture of how the EU has influenced the Irish environmental policy sphere. Having been a traditionally underdeveloped policy area, approaches to environmental policy in Ireland have advanced and there has been some experimentation with new mechanisms and instruments. The National Economic and Social Council (NESC) (2010, p 123) notes that there has been ‘a shift from a relatively centralised, top-down model of regulation – the so-called “hard law” approach – towards combining this with a more collaborative, decentralised approach that puts an emphasis on learning from experience rather than simple compliance with EU law’. For example, the EU’s Water Framework Directive included provisions for increased public participation and triggered major public investment in Ireland’s water system, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were involved in the implementation of the EU Habitats Directive. The environmental policy sphere can also point to the achievement of some progress in terms of the establishment of the independent Climate Change Advisory Council, agreement on a Climate Change Act, and a citizens’ assembly on how the state can make Ireland a leader in tackling climate change (see Chapter Fifteen, this volume). Importantly, however, not all of these developments have been a consequence of ‘hard law’ EU requirements and so do not owe their origins to the EU. In these instances, Europeanisation has been neither instrumental nor influential. Developments were instead influenced by domestic and other external influences. So despite EU membership playing some role in driving an historically laggardly approach to Irish environmental policy, law and institutions, the extent to which this comprises strong evidence of Europeanisation is limited. There has also been some resistance to Europeanisation in the Irish environmental policy sphere’. In her study of the implementation of environmental policy in Ireland, Connaughton (2019) notes that administrative shortcomings and domestic opposition to EU environmental policies challenge the strength and effect of Europeanisation and produce a pattern of weak implementation and non-compliance (see also Torney and O’Gorman, 2019).

128

Europeanised policy making in Ireland

Cohesion policy An examination of EU cohesion policy in Ireland also demonstrates the extent to which EU influence has both benefits and limits. Cohesion policy is one of the most important and financially significant of EU policies, capable of mobilising a large number of institutional and non-institutional supranational, national and subnational actors (Piattoni and Polverari, 2016, p 1). Ireland has benefitted extensively from EU financial support through the EU’s cohesion policy. For the period 2014–20, Ireland received €3.36 billion in European structural and investment funds from the EU to support socioeconomic development through targeted assistance for specific sectors and initiatives. In addition to financial support, however, EU cohesion policy also anticipates policy and institutional impact at the domestic level, which empowers the regions or subnational levels. Adshead, however, (2014, p 428) notes that: ‘despite the acknowledged and extensive role of EU structural and cohesion funds in Ireland, changes to the fundamental policy architecture of the state were minimal’. The recalibration of Ireland’s spatial territory from the late 1980s with the identification of new statistical regions, followed in 2014 by the creation of three regional assemblies and the reform of local government structures, did not radically alter the historically strong, centralised and unitary political character of the Irish state (Adshead, 2014, p 424). Callanan (2019) explicitly notes that Europeanisation pressures to adapt Irish territorial governance (both top-down and bottom-up) have been filtered through domestic traditions and norms that have had limited consequences for national, regional and local government structures. In contrast, however, the impact of EU cohesion policy rules and styles (both formal and informal) have had a more enduring effect. Adshead (2014, pp 424–5) identifies examples of both policy diffusion and policy institutionalisation related to Europeanisation that have become streamlined components of the Irish policy landscape. These include policy principles such as programming, monitoring, control, evaluation and partnership. For other policy areas, the impact of Europeanisation is similarly patchy and distinct in terms of how it effects policy styles and institutional norms. Elliott (2019) notes that Ireland’s specific (geographic) circumstances mean that migration policy has only incrementally converged towards EU norms. In the realm of foreign policy, O’Brennan (2012, p 97) finds that patterns of Europeanisation have reinforced existing tendencies towards executive control of Irish foreign policy. At a macro level, the policy analysis process – as it relates to EU Community method policies – requires the acceptance of policy proposals and prescriptions emanating from Brussels. The Europeanisation literature, however, demonstrates that national policy makers still have some room for manoeuvre in terms of how they navigate and implement EU policy commitments. Overall, the EU policy analysis process in Ireland is attentive to domestic circumstances and can be characterised as pragmatic, selective and sometimes creative, in terms of how it engages with this category of EU policies. 129

Policy analysis in Ireland

Case study 2: OMC policies Early social policy developments in Ireland, based on EU directives (or hard law), included the introduction of legislation in the areas of anti-discrimination, equality, and workplace health and safety. Dukelow and Considine (2017) characterise these developments as important. Since 2000, however, key elements of social policy have been pursued using the OMC. OMC is a core instrument of the EU’s approach to macro-economic, employment and social policies. It allows the EU to coordinate policies in specific fields but without the adoption of binding legislation. Instead, it involves agreeing guidelines at the EU level, which, although non-binding, nevertheless require member states to adopt national action plans designed to give effect to specific policy targets and recommendations. The Europe 2020 initiative (which succeeded the Lisbon Strategy) was launched in 2010 and is designed to coordinate progress towards a series of headline targets, including increasing employment, reducing poverty rates and fighting social exclusion. The strategy employs soft law tools, particularly policy learning, as a key means to achieve policy coordination. Ireland’s response to the OMC European Employment Strategy (EES) demonstrated alignment with key EU guidelines and produced some changes in policy and practice at the national level. This did not extend, however, to improved engagement with the social partners and stakeholders as also proposed by the EES (Murphy, 2002). Nevertheless, from a policy analysis perspective, NESC (2010, p 109) notes that: ‘the [EES] OMC did demonstrate a capacity to prompt significant development in domestic thinking and policy [in Ireland]’. Issues around social inclusion are also subject to the OMC. Notably, Ireland had already established an anti-poverty strategy (during the 1990s) before it was introduced through the EU’s OMC procedure. Later, the Europe 2020 strategy set targets for lifting 20 million people out of poverty (including 200,000 in Ireland). In addressing this challenge, Ireland has taken some note of OMC guidelines. However, this has not extended to wider forms of financial or ideological change. Traditional patterns of welfare expenditure in Ireland have not altered. O’Brien and Ó Fathaigh (2007) note that there has been no ideological or paradigmatic shift in how Ireland approaches, for example, educational disadvantage as a key element of the social inclusion agenda. And NESC’s 2010 (p 14) report notes that in the social inclusion policy sphere, ‘the process of goal setting, data generation, monitoring and review was less effective and led to limited diagnostic inquiry into Ireland’s problems’. There are nevertheless, positive and progressive aspects to engagement with OMC policies. For example, Ireland is considered to have one of the more developed consultation processes among EU countries (Mangan, 2010). Notably, however, engagement with stakeholders was tested pre-OMC when the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) was first rolled out. The EU focus on anti-poverty measures has therefore supported and facilitated development of that approach, but it was not the trigger for its use in Ireland. In her study of the relationship between the NAPS and the OMC, Adshead (2010, 130

Europeanised policy making in Ireland

p 143) shares this view and notes that the EU has helped to shape contemporary Irish attitudes to more deliberative forms of public policy making in the form of social pacts and partnership. However, in terms of policy content and orientation, Ireland’s anti-poverty strategies have not been substantially Europeanised. The policy analysis process linked to OMC policies is less restrictive than its Community method equivalents. There is greater scope for national policy makers to be flexible and selective in terms of how they respond to EU guidelines. Overall, the force of Europeanisation in the OMC policy sphere in Ireland is limited. Although the EU has been influential, particularly in terms of supporting a more deliberative and participative approach to policy development, the domestic arena is the dominant influence. Overall, the EU policy analysis process in Ireland is driven, first and foremost, by domestic practices, pressures and circumstances. In the realm of economic, employment and social policies based on the OMC method, the EU plays a more muted supporting role in Irish policy analysis.

Discussion From a policy analysis perspective, a number of defining observations can be made in relation to the impact of the EU and Europeanisation, and the manner in which policy is formulated, adapted and implemented in the Irish setting. There is a clear distinction evident between the EU’s impact on policy content versus policy approach. It is in relation to the latter where the EU’s influence is experienced most emphatically. In 2010, NESC noted: ‘In many areas where the EU has explicit competence, policy making has become less centralised, hierarchical and uniform; in others where member states have primacy, policy making and implementation increasingly take place in an EU framework’ (p 3). Adshead (2014, p 426) offers a more detailed analysis of how the Europeanisation of processes and procedures has been experienced at the national level. She specifically notes: ‘the move to multi-annual, strategic planning and programmatic government combined with new mechanisms for managing the economy and the advent of ‘government by partnership’ indicate substantive changes in the processes and procedures of governance’. These developments are experienced and encountered in a number of ways. Policy learning Policy learning is a key outcome of Ireland’s experience of the EU policy process. Forty plus years of EU membership and ongoing daily interactions between Ireland and the Brussels political, administrative and policy machinery has produced some important learning moments for Irish policy makers. This form of policy analysis is evident for all EU policies, regardless of their hard or soft law character. For example, Connaughton (2019) observes that processes of learning and adaptation have been features of environmental governance in Ireland while 131

Policy analysis in Ireland

Paraskevopoulos and Leonardi (2004) note the increasing use of independent experts for policy analysis and assessment of EU regional policy in Ireland. Financial incentives The Irish policy process is not blind to financial incentives. EU financial support has clearly been a factor in terms of prompting particular policy responses, and this is most emphatically evident for redistributive policies such as regional and cohesion policy. In these instances, the policy analysis process can be construed as shallow, focused on leveraging material gain without being sufficiently attendant to the detail of policy fit. Regional policy is a case in point here. During the 2000s, a significant impetus for the resurgence in interest on spatial and sub-national regional issues and the reshaping of regional policy in Ireland was motivated primarily by potential financial gain from an increased EU structural fund budget. MacFeely (2016) is critical of how regional policy analysis has been conducted in Ireland, noting that the link between theory and policy development is difficult to discern, specific and detailed definitions are lacking, modelling and empirical testing has been sketchy, and the availability of data has been limited (although it has recently improved) (see Chapter Five, this volume). He determines that: ‘Irish regional policy has been driven primarily by economic and financial considerations rather than by other social, political or democratic concerns’ (2016, p 392). Partnership Although the tone and content of policy analysis may be only marginally or minimally affected by the EU, evidence suggests that new approaches to policy that embrace partnership and greater inclusivity have emerged as features of Ireland’s engagement with the EU – and this is true for both local and community development projects, and at the national level (see Chapter Twelve, this volume). Important new horizontal and vertical EU policy practices are in evidence for a number of policy areas. Partnership is a prominent EU policy instrument, and operates on the principle that decisions are made on the basis of partnerships between state and non-state actors across multiple levels of governance. Generally regarded as a technical device for improving decision making and policy effectiveness, the partnership principle has had valuable political side-effects (see Bache, 2010). This is especially evident in the regional/cohesion policy arena, but partnership has also been evident for aspects of social policy development in Ireland (Murphy, 2014; Quinn, 2014), and it has been emphatically employed in Northern Ireland in the context of rolling out successive EU Peace Programmes. Consultation Processes of consultation and evaluation have also increasingly become an accepted and institutionalised component of the policy analysis process across a 132

Europeanised policy making in Ireland

variety of EU policy areas. The conduct of a consultation process is invariably a formal EU legal requirement, although the practice was pioneered in Ireland prior to it being formalised by the EU. In terms of regional policy, Paraskevopoulos and Leonardi (2004) point to the significant presence of NGOs, especially at the regional and local levels. The EU Water Framework Directive also produced good practice as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed and resourced the implementation of effective local consultation processes. The quality of consultation processes, however, varies according to sector in Ireland. In a study of the marine renewable energy (MRE) sector, Reilly and colleagues (2016, p 39) found that: ‘the consultation process for MRE projects is currently not effective at addressing and resolving concerns that fishermen may have. This remains a barrier to effective consultation.’ The use of consultative processes has also been judged insufficient in terms of the legitimacy challenges to the implementation of the EU Habitats Directive on raised bog peatlands in designated Special Areas of Conservation in Ireland (a highly contested and controversial EU directive for Irish turf cutters) (see O’Riordan et al, 2016), and insufficient consultation was also a criticism of the EU Nitrates Directive implementation process in Ireland (see Flynn, 2009). Benchmarking and targets Benchmarking and targets have formed the context within which some specific policies are developed. The NESC (2010, p 2) notes that: Increasingly, the EU asks that member states benchmark their progress against common objectives, share their learning with each other and reconfigure their practice in light of the insights gained from this process. This need for organisational review and reform is a vital element of Ireland’s ‘new narrative’ of engagement with the EU and needs to be widely understood. In the environmental sphere, Connaughton (2014) notes that EU influence was important in the establishment of a national independent environmental agency with technical expertise. The creation of the EPA in 1993 marked a significant departure for an Irish public administration with little experience or tradition of agencies. In contrast, Flynn (2009) refers to Irish administrative ‘mismanagement’ and ‘politicking’ as impeding the environmental agenda in Ireland. He notes that: ‘There has unquestionably been a dissemination of best practice on environmental policies within both the RoI [Republic of Ireland], and also NI [Northern Ireland]. Yet that process appears to be quite superficial and weak’ (2009, p 53). Ireland’s National Employment Action Plan (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, 2003) notes a number of key measures introduced right after the launch of the EES. These include the Employment Equality Act of 1998 barring discrimination on the grounds of gender and family status, the Parental 133

Policy analysis in Ireland

Leave Act of 1998, and taxation reforms to eliminate disincentives for spouses to enter the labour market (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, 2003). All of these represented significant advances in a new legislative direction, and pointed to a process of policy analysis that was increasingly expansive and innovative in its engagement with the possibilities offered by the wider EU policy domain. However, not all EU-sponsored governance initiatives have been supported. Gender mainstreaming is supported through EU level budgets, but this practice is not fully mirrored at the Irish domestic level, and to some degree has also waned at EU level (Murphy, 2014).

Conclusion Across a panoply of public policy areas, policy analysis processes in Ireland have been influenced – to differing degrees – by Europeanisation processes. Evidence of ‘differential Europeanisation’, ‘partial Europeanisation’ and ‘resistance to Europeanisation’ are features of the broader Ireland–EU policy landscape. In the Irish case, domestic factors are effective and often decisive in mediating and nuancing the impact of the EU on different policies whether Community method or OMC (Murphy and O’Brennan, 2019). On balance, a process of ‘differential Europeanisation’ has come to characterise the Irish policy landscape within an overall context of EU governance. The EU has clearly broadened the scope and potential for innovative, creative and modernised approaches to policy analysis. In Ireland, however, the process of policy analysis as it applies to EU policy competences is differentiated according to policy area and policy type, that is, Community method or OMC. New practices and approaches, including partnership, consultation, and benchmarking, have been largely institutionalised, but tend to be rolled out and received differently depending on the policy area in question. Financial incentives have also been strategically important in terms of influencing select policies, although this hints at a shallow and superficial approach to policy analysis. In the long term (and particularly after Brexit), as the EU shifts towards new (and contested) policy priorities and modes of governance, resistance to the forces of Europeanisation in Ireland may become pronounced. The policy analysis process may find itself in an increasingly challenging space where the need to balance opposing national interests and legal EU commitments will require a wide arsenal of policy analysis tools if the policy process is to enjoy support and legitimacy. This suggests that future EU policy analysis may move towards a more proactive and creative period as the demands of EU membership change and alter. Note 1

These include: changes in external boundaries; developing institutions at the European level; exporting forms of political organisation; a political unification project; and the central penetration of national systems of governance.

134

Europeanised policy making in Ireland

References Adshead, M. (2005) ‘Europeanization and changing patterns of governance in Ireland’, Public Administration, 83(1): 159–78. Adshead, M. (2010) ‘Assessing the Europeanisation dimension of the National Anti-Poverty Strategy in Ireland’, in C. McCall and T. Wilson (eds) Europeanisation and Hibernicisation: Ireland and Europe, European Studies Volume 28, Leiden: Brill, pp 119–48. Adshead, M. (2014) ‘EU cohesion policy and multilevel governance outcomes in Ireland: how sustainable is Europeanization?’, European Urban and Regional Studies, 21(4): 416–31. Aydin-Düzgit, S. and Kaliber, A. (2016) ‘Encounters with Europe in an era of domestic and international turmoil: is Turkey a de-Europeanising candidate country?’ South European Society and Politics, 21(1): 1–14. Bache, I. (2007) Europeanization and Multilevel Governance: Cohesion Policy in the European Union and Britain, Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield. Bache, I. (2010) ‘Partnership as an EU policy instrument: a political history’, West European Politics, 33(1): 58–74. Börzel, T. (2005) ‘Europeanization: how the European Union interacts with its member states’, in S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (eds) The Member States of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 45–69. Börzel, T.A. and Panke, D. (2019) ‘Europeanization’, in M. Cini and N. PérezSolórzano Borragán (eds) European Union Politics (6th edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 115–16. Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (2005) ‘The Europeanization of the UK government: from quiet revolution to explicit step-change?’, Public Administration, 83(4): 861–90. Callanan, M. (2019) ‘Europe and the rescaling of domestic territorial governance in Ireland’, Regional and Federal Studies, 30(2): 175–93. Connaughton, B. (2014) ‘From incidental to integral: forty years of Ireland’s engagement with EU environmental policy’, Administration, 62(1): 47–68. Connaughton, B. (2019) The Implementation of Environmental Policy in Ireland: Lessons from Translating EU Directives into Action, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Copeland, P. (2016) ‘Europeanization and de-Europeanization in UK employment policy: changing governments and shifting agendas’, Public Administration, 94(4): 1124–39. Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (2003) National Employment Action Plan Ireland, 2003–2005, Dublin: Stationery Office. Dukelow, F. and Considine, M. (2017) Irish Social Policy: A Critical Introduction (2nd edn), Bristol: Policy Press. Elliott, A. (2019) ‘Ireland’s evolving migration policies: building alliances and a liberal European identity through the EU migration policy crisis’, Irish Political Studies, 34(4): 551–74.

135

Policy analysis in Ireland

Featherstone, K. (2003) ‘Introduction: in the name of “Europe”’, in K. Featherstone and C.M. Radaelli (eds) The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 3–26. Flynn, B. (2009) ‘Environmental lessons for rural Ireland from the European Union: how great expectations in Brussels get dashed in Bangor and Belmullet’, in J. McDonagh, T. Varley and S. Shortall (eds) A Living Countryside? The Politics of Sustainable Development in Rural Ireland, London: Ashgate Publishing, pp 53–68. Flynn, B. (2019) ‘Irish environmental policy after the economic crisis: more of the same but with less?’, in C. Burns, P. Tobin, and S. Sewerin (eds) The Impact of the Economic Crisis on European Environmental Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 87–110. Hayward, K. and Murphy, M.C. (eds) (2010) The Europeanization of Party Politics in Ireland, North and South, London: Routledge. Héritier, A., Kerwer, D., Knill, C., Lehmkuhl, D., Teutsch, M. and Douillet, A.C. (2001) Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Ladrech, R. (1994) ‘Europeanisation of domestic politics and institutions: the case of France’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(1): 69–88. Ladrech, R. (2010) Europeanization and National Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Laffan, B. and Tannam, E. (1998) ‘Ireland: the rewards of pragmatism’, in K. Hanf and B. Soetendorp (eds) Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union, Abingdon: Routledge, pp 69–83. MacFeely, S. (2016) ‘Opportunism over strategy: a history of regional policy and spatial planning in Ireland’, International Planning Studies, 21(4): 377–402. Mair, P. (2004) ‘The Europeanization dimension’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11(2): 337–48. Mangan, G. (2010) ‘The impact of the OMC: an Irish case study’, in European Anti-Poverty Network (eds) Ireland and the European Social Inclusion Strategy: Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead, Dublin: EAPN Ireland, pp 52–62. Murphy, C. (2002) ‘Assessment of the policy-making process’, in P.J. O’Connell, T. Callan, M. Keeney, H. Russell, B. Gannon, G. Hughes and C.B. Murphy (eds) Impact Evaluation of the European Employment Strategy in Ireland, Dublin: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment and ESRI, pp 103–21. Murphy, M.C. and O’Brennan, J. (2014) ‘Ireland and the EU at forty: pragmatic incrementalism and differential policy convergence within a transformative European landscape’, Administration, 62(1): 1–24. Murphy, M.C. and O’Brennan, J. (2019) ‘Ireland and crisis governance: continuity and change in the shadow of the financial crisis and Brexit’, Irish Political Studies, 34(4): 471–489. Murphy, M.P. (2002) ‘Social partnership – is it “the only game in town”?’, Community Development Journal, 37(1): 80–90. Murphy, M.P. (2014) ‘Forty years of the EU influencing social policy in Ireland – a glass half full?’, Administration, 62(1): 69–86. 136

Europeanised policy making in Ireland

NESC (National Economic and Social Council) (2010) Re-finding Success in Europe: The Challenge for Irish Institutions and Policy, Dublin: NESC. O’Brennan, J. (2012) ‘Government, parliament and civil service’, in M. Kennedy, B. Tonra, J. Doyle and N. Dorr (eds) Irish Foreign Policy, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, pp 84–98. O’Brien, S. and Ó  Fathaigh, M. (2007) ‘Ideological challenges to the social inclusion agenda in the Republic of Ireland’, International Journal of Inclusive Education, 11(5–6): 593–606. Olsen, J.P. (2002) ‘The many faces of Europeanization’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5): 921–52. O’Riordan, M., McDonagh, J. and Mahon, M. (2016) ‘Local knowledge and environmentality fin legitimacy discourses on Irish peatlands regulation’, Land Use Policy, 59(3): 423–33. Paraskevopoulos, C.J. and Leonardi, R. (2004) ‘Introduction: adaptational pressures and social learning in European regional policy – cohesion (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) vs. CEE (Hungary, Poland) countries’, Regional & Federal Studies, 14(3): 315–54. Piattoni, S. and Polverari, L. (2016) ‘Introduction’, in S. Piattoni and L. Polverari (eds) Handbook on Cohesion Policy in the EU, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 1–16. Quinn, B. (2014) ‘Resources and resourcefulness: Ireland and EU regional policy’, Administration, 62(1): 25–45. Radaelli, C.M. (2000) ‘Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change’, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 4. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302761 Radaelli, C.M. (2003) ‘The Europeanization of public policy’, in K. Featherstone and C.M. Radaelli (eds) The politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 27–56. Radaelli, C.M. (2006) ‘Europeanization: solution or problem?’, in M. Cini and A.K. Bourne (eds) Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 56–76. Rees, N., Quinn, B. and Connaughton, B. (2009) Europeanisation and New Patterns of Governance in Ireland, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Reilly, K., O’Hagan, A.-M. and Dalton, G. (2016) ‘Moving from consultation to participation: a case study of the involvement of fishermen in decisions relating to marine renewable energy projects on the island of Ireland’, Ocean and Coastal Management, 134(1): 30–40. Risse, T., Green Cowles, M. and Caporaso, J. (2001) ‘Europeanization and domestic change: introduction’, in T. Risse, M. Green Cowles and J. Caporaso (eds) Transforming Europe, New York, NY: Cornell University Press, pp 1–20. Torney, D. and O’Gorman, R. (2019). ‘A laggard in good times and bad? The limited impact of EU membership on Ireland’s climate change and environmental policy’, Irish Political Studies, 34(4): 575–94.

137

Policy analysis in Ireland

Vink, M.P. and Graziano, P. (2008) ‘Challenges of a new research agenda’, in P.  Graziano and M. Vink (eds) Europeanization: New Research Agendas, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 3–20.

138

Part Three Think tanks, interest groups, political parties and genderbased policy analysis

139

TEN

The social partners and the NESC: from tripartite dialogue via common knowledge events to network knowledge Rory O’Donnell

Introduction This chapter discusses policy analysis within institutions created by the state to involve the social partners in the policy process, particularly the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). From the mid-1980s, a method of policy analysis was developed in response to the pressures of interest group dialogue and the economic, social and environmental problems under discussion. Over time, international thinking and practice in post-positivist social science and policy analysis provided a language to describe NESC practice and, in some ways, inform the approach. This is noted as each phase of the approach to policy analysis is described. The section following this introduction opens with a sketch of the changing institutional landscape in which policy analysis involving the social partners took place. It then notes the NESC’s early work and highlights its view that technical analysis could not be expected to resolve the differences within it, which reflect divergent beliefs, ideologies and interests. The chapter then describes a significant change in the role, method and perspective after 1986. This involved policy analysis based on framing and reframing to create a series of ‘common knowledge events’. A further iteration is then outlined – the move to policy analysis in support of multi-actor, multi-level engagement in the mid-1990s. Faced with complex supply-side challenges – as well as puzzles and doubts about the possibility, nature and location of cooperation between organisations with divergent values and interests – the NESC found in pragmatist thinking an account of how the ‘inner workings of cooperation’ and analysis can support joint action. The penultimate section describes the move towards co-production, network knowledge and the NESC’s adoption of the environmental sustainability agenda in the years from 2008 to the present. In thinking about its position, role and method, the NESC secretariat recognised its role as a ‘boundary organisation’, managing the relationship between policy analysis and diverse actors. The final section reflects on the overall evolution of policy analysis, identifying elements of continuity and change. There were significant similarities between the changing use of policy analysis in interest group dialogue in Ireland and in other countries, especially 141

Policy analysis in Ireland

the Netherlands, despite differences in the wider systems of policy analysis and interest group mediation.1 The changes in method of policy analysis were largely cumulative; the earliest approach – engaging the social partners in discussion of mainstream social scientific analysis and evidence – was never abandoned. New approaches – reframing, interpretive policy analysis, co-production and network knowledge – were added.

The institutional context of policy analysis involving the social partners The features of Ireland’s system have been outlined in Chapter One of this volume. Ireland inherited the British voluntarist and adversarial system of industrial relations, in which the social partner organisations traditionally undertook relatively little policy analysis themselves. As Ireland moved from protectionism in the 1960s (see Chapter Two, this volume), representatives of trade unions and employers were appointed to many public bodies. In 1963, government established the National Industrial Economic Council, which became the NESC in 1973. At that time, it contained representatives of the employers’ associations, trade unions, farm organisations, government departments and independent experts (for details, see NESC, 1977, p ii). With high unemployment in the 1990s, there was pressure to include social non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in policy analysis and dialogue. Rather than widen the NESC, in 1993 the government established a new body, the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF), to focus on issues of long-term unemployment and social exclusion (see Chapter Twelve, this volume). In 1996–97 the Community and Voluntary Pillar (CVP) was added to the NESC. Government also created the National Centre for Partnership and Performance (NCPP), to monitor and promote partnership at enterprise and organisational level. In 2004, the three bodies – NESC, NESF and NCPP – were placed within the new National Economic and Social Development Office (NESDO). In 2011, in the fiscal crisis arising from the Great Recession, both the NESF and the NCPP were closed and their policy analysts transferred to the NESC secretariat. The Sustainable Development Council (Comhar) was also closed and in 2011 an Environmental Pillar was included in the NESC, which was instructed to add sustainable development to its long-standing economic and social remit. This chapter focuses mainly on policy analysis in the NESC.

Early thinking on the relationship between policy analysis and interest group dialogue in an increasingly open economy On its establishment in 1973, the NESC’s task was ‘to provide a forum for discussion of the principles relating to the efficient development of the national economy and the achievement of social justice, and to advise the Government … on their application’ (NESC, 1977, p 29). In its early years, it was one of the 142

The social partners and the NESC

few bodies undertaking strategic, long-term, policy-oriented social scientific analysis, as evidenced in its work on demographic change. It tried to achieve a balance between reports dealing with the short-term issues and those aimed at creating a framework for long-term economic and social development. A recurring theme was the challenge of achieving low inflation and a functional system of wage bargaining. In reviewing its work in 1977, it noted that its role ‘places upon it the obligation to strive towards agreement on any advice which it gives to the Government’ (NESC, 1977, p  22). But it considered that ‘if consensus is treated as a dominant requirement, the unanimous recommendation to which representatives of all major interests can all subscribe may at times be so general and vague as to give Government no clear guide to action’ (NESC, 1977, p 22). It argued that ‘it would be too simplistic to expect’ that differences in beliefs, ideologies and interests can ‘be resolved by the use of technical expertise of an economic and quantitative kind’ (NESC, 1977, pp 22–3). Moreover, it said, it is not clear that such differences ‘can be resolved and consensus reached by discussion in representative bodies such as the Council’. It noted that, in the last resort, such differences may be resolved only by a political process, ‘a responsibility which in a democracy must properly be borne by the Government alone’ (NESC, 1977, p 23; see also Chapter Fourteen, this volume).

Policy analysis in the service of shared understanding among the social partners: framing and reframing The role and prominence of the NESC was reshaped by the long crisis of the 1980s. Its 1986 report, A Strategy for Development, set out the need for both fiscal correction and enhanced action to promote economic development (NESC, 1986). This provided a basis on which government negotiated the first social partnership programme, which ran from 1987 to 1990. The pact facilitated fiscal correction, delivered the kind of wage discipline that had eluded the actors in earlier decades, and played a significant role in Ireland’s recovery. The negotiation of each of the six subsequent partnership programmes, from 1987 to 2008, was preceded by a NESC report – widely referred to as the ‘NESC Strategy’ – which set out a shared analysis of economic and social challenges and the priorities for negotiation of a new programme (O’Donnell et al, 2011; O’Donnell, 2014). Culpepper (2008, pp 13–18) has argued persuasively that the NESC’s 1986 report constituted a ‘common knowledge event’, which changed the strategic interaction between the trade unions and employers. However, he says relatively little about how the ‘common knowledge event’ came about – other than that ‘winning ideas are selected through a process of winnowing’, and a shared view of the economy ‘was hammered out in negotiations in NESC’ (Culpepper, 2008, pp 12–14). I argue here that this emerged from a significant evolution in NESC’s approach to policy analysis and in its understanding of the relationship between policy analysis and interest group dialogue. 143

Policy analysis in Ireland

The method of policy analysis developed in the NESC in the late 1980s and through the 1990s had a number of elements. At its heart lay the duty of the secretariat to prepare papers for the monthly meetings of the Council and, based on that dialogue, to craft reports that the Council could adopt and send to government. The analysis had to encompass a range of social science fields – small open economy macroeconomics, fiscal policy, industrial development, trade, European integration, social policy and wage bargaining. Later it became necessary to include other fields, such as housing, political economy, institutional analysis and, more recently, environmental sustainability. It was necessary to embrace an eclectic range of perspectives. Put simply, it was not possible to sell a straight neoclassical economic analysis to the unions; a post-Keynesian social democratic account to the employers; nor the virtues of unfettered free trade to the farm organisations. The analysis must facilitate some fusion of the horizons of employers, unions and others, who have both conflicting and convergent interests and understandings. This calls for analysts who combine technical proficiency with a degree of creativity. As well as conventional research methods, this involved extensive use of social science’s most powerful tools – the white board, the Venn diagram and the two-by-two table – as concepts and evidence are intensively parsed. Within the analytical team, we used the term ‘dark forest’ to describe that point in a project where the complex evidence and the contending understandings of the various actors and interests had been internalised, but there was, as yet, no sign of a path out. Indeed, past success in breaking out of the thicket offered little reassurance that it could be done once again. We often noted that NESC spells the first four letters of ‘nescience’ – not knowing. An important element of the analysis was narrative. Each of the NESC Strategy reports contained a narrative and agreed analysis of recent, and sometimes longterm, Irish and European Union (EU) development. The articulation and consolidation of this method of policy analysis was informed by thinking on post-positivist social science and policy analysis. Having worked in the NESC from 1987 to 1990, I was puzzled by the degree to which the role of policy analyst differed from the linear view of the expert–policy relationship, based on technical rationality, that I had learned in my formation as an economist. This prompted me to search in the philosophy of social science, and wider philosophical developments, for an articulation of, and foundation for, the kind policy analysis we were doing in NESC. This revealed that from diverse directions – the linguistic turn in analytical philosophy, Continental hermeneutics and critical theory – there was philosophical warrant for policy analysis that was both theoretically serious and treated the understandings of the social partners and other actors as a key part of economic and social reality (Bernstein, 1976). At its heart lies the interpretive nature of the social sciences and what Giddens called the ‘double hermeneutic’ (Gregory, 1984), to which should be added the limits of prediction and falsification, the importance of inter-theoretical debate and dialogue, rejection of the fact–value distinction, dissolution of the strong distinction between theory and practice and rejection of the means–ends 144

The social partners and the NESC

duality – while nevertheless resisting relativism and strong incommensurability (Outhwaite, 1987). In a 1992 article, I outlined the case for policy analysis that is methodologically pluralist and pragmatic, engages with practical problems and actors, takes economic and social theory seriously and brings actors into encounter with economic and social argumentation and conceptualisation, not just the results of research. ‘It may be that the provision of interpretation and argument, which provides groups in the society with means of conceptualising their position, and thereby facilitates debate and formulation of policy, is about as much as economics can hope to achieve’ (O’Donnell, 1992, p 85). Schön and Rein’s (1995) insights on frames and reframing provided a language to describe our practice. Many policy controversies cannot be resolved by appeal to facts or expert opinion, and reflect conflicts between actors’ frames – underlying structures of belief, perception and appreciation. Building on the thinking of Dewey, Forester, Lindblom and Hirschman, they described and advocated a method of ‘frame-critical policy analysis’ and ‘frame-reflective policy practice’, which captured exactly the NESC method (Rein and Schön, 1996, p 88). Policy analysis of this type ‘is directed not only to abstract understanding of the controversy, but to facilitate frame-reflective dialogue among frame sponsors in the discourse so as to increase the likelihood of a reframing that achieves pragmatic resolution’ (Rein and Schön, 1996, p 101). The analyst’s description of the frames need to be recognisable by and acceptable to the sponsors of the frames. The analyst must be willing and able ‘to engage in a process of deliberation that requires a high degree of self-reflection’ (Rein and Schön, 1996, p 100). The theme of reflexivity and self-reflection recurs. Indeed, as noted later, our experience in NESC suggests that as well as self-reflective individuals, it is necessary to create a self-reflective analytical team. Reframing can take several forms, ranging from ‘frame extension’, ‘frame blending’ and ‘frame synthesis’, to creation of a genuinely new framing of a problem. A number of factors enhance the chances of achieving a pragmatic resolution. One is discussion in a forum such as the NESC, with conventions of engagement and dialogue. Another is a focus on ‘situated policy controversies’, which lend themselves to pragmatic resolution, in contrast to generic controversies, abstracted from particular policy situations, which tend to remain intransigent. Culpepper (2008, p 15) is right to say that the 1986 report reflected a new agreement on Ireland as a small open economy and the perspective of ‘small states in world markets’. But this tends to suggest that these ‘theories’, and their application, were available whole. This glosses over the degree and nature of reframing involved in crafting consensus on these, and in working out how these concepts might be applied in Ireland’s distinctive circumstances. Indeed, this brings us to another element of the analysis, which has wider social scientific implications. There was a close connection between the need to reframe and recognising that Ireland was a hybrid with respect to several dominant social scientific theories or classifications, such ‘worlds of welfare’, industrialism, macroeconomic and wage bargaining regimes, and ‘varieties of capitalism’. Later, 145

Policy analysis in Ireland

we discovered that the two – reframing and hybridity – enhanced the possibility of Ireland learning from other countries (O’Donnell, 2010, 2012a). The experience from 1977 to the mid-1990s meant that the participants in NESC’s analysis and deliberations felt the need to go beyond the earlier, sanguine, view concerning ‘differences in beliefs, ideologies and interests’. They no longer trusted that such differences would be adequately resolved by the political process. This modified view on the relationship between policy analysis and interest group dialogue, with greater emphasis on the search for shared understanding, was both a methodological and empirical proposition. NESC’s analysis of Ireland’s experience in the European Community (EC) (NESC, 1989) and its 1996 analysis of the development of the Irish economy and society from 1960 to 1996 (NESC, 1996), identified a link between the cognitive and performative dimensions: limited success in the earlier decades reflected the fact that governments, employers and unions were acting on the basis of divergent understandings of key economic mechanisms. Indeed, the need for a ‘consistent policy approach’ – combining macroeconomic, distributional and structural policy – became a central theme of NESC analysis from 1990 onwards (NESC, 1990, p 415; NESC, 2013). The method of policy analysis using framing and reframing is well illustrated by NESC’s (2005a) report The Developmental Welfare State (see Box 10.1). Other examples include NESC reports on industrial policy (1982), Ireland’s experience in the EC and EU (1989, 1997), rural development (1995), housing (2004, 2014a, b, 2015a, b, 2018), the ‘five-part crisis’ (2009), the euro (2010) and key environmental challenges (see Box 10.2). Box 10.1:The developmental welfare state In the mid-2000s, there was agreement that Ireland’s strengthened economy required to be balanced by more progress in social policy. While discussion initially focused on the merits of rival welfare models – Scandinavian universalism, Continental social insurance and residual liberalism, including the case for a ‘rights-based’ approach – this offered little prospect of convergence or effective advice to government. Out of intense analysis and reframing came an alternative conceptual framework and reform programme. Each welfare system consists of three spheres of activity: income supports, services and innovative measures to address new needs. The Developmental Welfare State is a way of reforming each of these elements, and linking them more closely.The title of the report was chosen, in part, to relate to the fact that, on the economic side, Ireland could be seen as a Networked Developmental State (Ó Riain, 2004). The report also reframed the dominant understanding of the relationship between economic performance and social protection. Good economic performance and improved social protection are not intrinsically opposed, but neither do they inevitably occur together. A central argument was that a radical development of capacitating services is 146

The social partners and the NESC the single most important route to improving social protection in Ireland. But this faces formidable challenges in organisation, skill development and quality enhancement in social services. The report was accompanied by an NESC reframing of the issue of economic and social rights (2003, pp 355–71). The Developmental Welfare State created what is still a widely accepted framework for consideration of social policy enhancement that is supportive of, rather than a drain on, participation and prosperity.

Policy analysis in support of multi-actor, multi-level engagement: pragmatism The method of policy analysis evolved further in the second half of the 1990s and through the first decade of the new century. Up to that point, a key focus of NESC policy analysis was on national-level, macro-distributional challenges and their relationship with Ireland’s development project. Consequently, the focus was largely on high-level economic and social issues and the search for alignment of the peak-level social partner organisations. Over time, and well before the 2008 global financial crisis and the ending of social partnership, there was a significant adjustment in NESC’s focus and thinking. The social partners and government pondered the challenge of maintaining a consistent policy approach in a period of strong economic growth rather than crisis (NESC, 1996, p 21). The substantive policy challenges and locus of cooperation were changing. NESC argued that, within a consistent policy framework, most of the policies affecting prosperity and inclusion are supply-side policies; such policies must produce flexibility; and they ‘depend on the high level social cohesion and co-operation that the state can both call upon and develop’ (NESC, 1996, p 64). Indeed, following a recommendation from the NESC in 1990, government had established a set of local partnership organisations tasked with addressing long-term unemployment and social exclusion (NESC, 1990, pp 74–5). This, alongside EU-funded programmes, generated intense interest in complex, fine-grained, local problems. There was a strong sense that the increasing intensity and breadth of joint analysis, dialogue and cooperation was not just a continuation of the conventions and crisis response created in 1986–87, but was generating new conventions and new institutional relationships – a development that some welcomed, some feared and all were puzzled by. Some within the unions were anxious about the system of high-level bargaining in which they were increasingly embedded. In addition, there was anxiety about the imminent widening to include a new CVP in NESC and social partnership (NESC, 1996 pp 265–7). Might it create a destructive tugof-war on distributive issues, or an abstract debate on normative ones? Conversely, some in the social NGOs feared that participation would require them to abandon their critique of the economic and social system (Larragy, 2016). These developments prompted thought about what form of policy analysis and social partner cooperation was required. In 1995, the government invited the 147

Policy analysis in Ireland

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to review Ireland’s local development approach. By locating the new local partnerships in the context of wider economic development and changes in public governance, the OECD report challenged all the actors, especially the public system (OECD, 1996). In addition, in the course of its work, the OECD team asked the NESC secretariat to investigate the prevalence of new organisational disciplines in Irish business. That task, making NESC analysts familiar with important new pragmatist insights on the conditions and processes of economic and cooperation (Sabel, 1994), had a profound effect on the discussion of these challenges and on subsequent policy analysis in NESC and its sister organisations. Indeed, the approach to policy analysis was also influenced by NESC’s involvement in several international networks. These facilitated frequent dialogue with two influential Dutch institutions – the Social and Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad), where the social partners meet and advise government, and the Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid), which undertakes exploratory and conceptual studies of societal challenges. In 1996–97, the NESF hosted a series of discussions of how to make the widened system of stakeholder engagement effective. The agreed report contained an exploration of how policy analysis, deliberation and representation can be combined in the changing context (NESF, 1997). Building on the experience in the NESC and the NESF, and drawing on pragmatist thinking, it argued that although the process of interest group dialogue and social partnership involves bargaining and an element of solidarity, it extends beyond each. It involves the players in a process of deliberation, interaction and problem solving ‘that has the potential to reshape their understanding, identity and preferences’ (NESF, 1997, p 33). It suggested that ‘In the right institutional context, skilled actors engage with one another in ways which (temporarily and provisionally) resolve conflicts, which are undecidable in more general debate’ (NESF, 1997, p 34). A key task is discovery of the institutional arrangements that can assist this, rather than extended prior discussion of economic and social systems, democracy, solidarity and community (NESF, 1997, p 34).2 These insights were combined with recognition of a number of changes in the economy, society and public governance (NESF, 1997; NESC, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2005a, 2005b) to further develop the approach to policy analysis. ‘New social risks’ were emerging alongside old ones. Diverse new civil society groups were forming, often based on attempts to understand and address new, or previously unrecognised, problems and needs. Consequently, ‘the nature and role of social partners was changing, in ways which accentuate mobilisation, information and action’ (NESF, 1997, p 51). The role of government was also changing, in ways that weakened traditional policy making and administration. ‘The relationship between policy-making, implementation and monitoring is changing, in ways which place monitoring of a new sort at the centre of policy development, and require a new combination of all three’ (NESF, 1997, p 33; see also Dorf and Sabel, 1998). Note was made of the extension of the regulatory 148

The social partners and the NESC

state, with a plethora of public agencies networked in diverse ways (see Chapter Four, this volume). These trends prompted thought about the kind of evidence and policy analysis that is of value to interest group dialogue and policy. It was noted that the relation between analysis and policy was changing. The rationalist sequence – involving analysis–recommendation–policy decision–implementation – no longer described the policy process. Some of the most important policy analysis arises out of problems of implementation. Much policy thinking and analysis was closer to policy making, which is, in turn, closer to policy implementation (see Chapter Five, this volume). These trends suggested that the work must include not only analytical deskbased studies of strategic issues, but also more detailed description and analysis of existing institutions and programmes and greater engagement with those making policy and seeking to address problems in implementation. Indeed, it was noted that when policy analysis in bodies such as the NESC have an impact, it is often through providing a new interpretation of existing and emergent policies and institutions in a way that allows policy actors to identify new possibilities. In the secretariat’s internal discussion in 2010, the term ‘interpretive policy analysis’ was coined to describe this work. These changes had profound implications, especially for a body such as the NESC. On the side of stakeholder engagement, they implied greater contact with organisations working at the front line, and not just the leaders of the peaklevel associations. On the side of policy analysis and advice, they implied a need for greater focus on the public system itself (NESC, 2005a). Indeed, we noted that this approach – working with the most knowledgeable actors in a problemsolving way – has long characterised the most effective parts of the Irish public system, such as the Industrial Development Authority, and has developed strongly in other areas, such as agriculture and food (O’Donnell, 2014).

Co-production, network knowledge and the environmental sustainability agenda The method and content of NESC’s policy analysis continued to develop in the years after the Great Recession. The onset of the crisis prompted intense analysis and discussion within the NESC and the secretariat, yielding the 2009 report Ireland’s Five-Part Crisis – itself a reframing since the focus of some groups on the banking and fiscal crises glossed over the economic crisis of lost competitiveness. While efforts were made to find a partnership way through the crisis, the scale of the adjustment meant that this did not succeed. Social partnership came to an end and, with the arrival of the Troika, government engagement with organised civil society was greatly curtailed (see Chapter Twelve, this volume)3. Although the NESC predated social partnership, it could not, post-social partnership, simply revert to the kind of policy analysis and role it played up to the mid‑1980s. 149

Policy analysis in Ireland

Profound changes in society, the economy and organisation mean that knowledge relevant to policy is more distributed and, in many spheres, effective policy analysis needs to include engagement with organisations working at ground level. Indeed, change in that direction has been evident in the evolution of NESC’s work since the mid-1990s, even when it was still working within the context of the high-level dialogue and the formulation of comprehensive agreements. In recent years, the NESC has returned to a policy issue it examined in great detail back in 2004 – housing. In six reports between 2014 and 2019, it addressed social housing (NESC, 2014a), the balance between home ownership and rental (NESC, 2014b), reform of the rental sector (NESC, 2015a), the land system and active land management (NESC, 2015b, 2018) and transportoriented development (NESC, 2019a). These reports would seem to have had some, limited, influence on government policy, but they certainly shaped the policy discourse: the return to social housing provision, rent stabilisation policy, putting permanent affordable or ‘cost rental’ on the agenda, and the establishment of the Land Development Agency. This work included typical NESC comparative and empirical analysis, bringing a housing system perspective to bear, and reframing of key policy debates – for example, breaking the dualist framing of the choice between secure occupancy and measures to increase supply (NESC, 2015a). But, much of the information in the six housing reports derived from secretariat networking and triangulation with knowledgeable actors in the housing, land and financial systems. At times, the secretariat was a resource used by the Department of Housing, Community and Local Government. The housing work underlines the cumulative and plural nature of the NESC approach to policy analysis. An important change was the addition of the Environmental Pillar in 2011, and the instruction that NESC include environmental sustainability in its work. It was increasingly accepted that economic, social and environmental issues are deeply entwined, and cannot be addressed effectively in isolation. As with the widening to include the Community and Voluntary Pillar in the mid-1990s, it was recognised that this was a profound change, posing challenges for both the policy analysts and NESC members. The approach to policy analysis in this phase is illustrated here, in Box 10.2, by recent work on climate change (see also the report on wind energy, NESC, 2014c). Box 10.2: Climate change policy: getting the process right In 2011, government asked the secretariat to prepare a report on climate change. The secretariat initially shared the assumptions that underpinned the then-dominant, top-down framing of the climate change policy challenge. But its analysis forced it to reframe the policy challenge (O’Donnell, 2012b). In particular, it was deemed necessary to balance the dominant policy emphasis on ‘how much’ emissions reduction to target, with more focus on ‘how to’ decarbonise the economy and society.This would require engagement 150

The social partners and the NESC of actors, through a governance system that animates, learns from and pushes networks of firms, public organisations and communities to ever-greater decarbonisation (NESC Secretariat, 2012). In 2019, the NESC published Climate Change: Getting the Process Right. It highlighted the profound uncertainties about how to tackle climate change – concerning technologies and solutions, their costs, and willingness to bear these costs – and the implications for the core aspects of climate change policy, including policy analysis and its use in the policy process (NESC, 2019b, p 2). The report endorsed the idea of a Climate Action Implementation Board in the Department of the Taoiseach, based on the Action Plan for Jobs (APJ), but it suggested widening the APJ-type approach. As well as checking the implementation of a list of known and defined actions, it would need to create a process that empowers front-line agencies and actors to explore, find, trial and cost new solutions tailored to specific contexts. This would enhance the existing analytical and policy approach, based on prior modelling of putative mitigation measures, in order to cost, rank and choose least-cost policy actions (NESC, 2019b, p 2).

In dialogue with government, in 2016 NESC restated its function and redefined its working methods. On paper, the core characteristics remain remarkably similar to those in place for decades – a focus on problems that are recognised by government as challenging, and on which civil society organisations can be a resource; analysis and ideas that are rigorous, but also reframe problems in ways that allow the actors to see new possibilities; and analysis that explores the economic and social dimensions of issues as well as the environmental and sustainable development perspectives. A new element is mention of work that addresses the public system and institutional challenges facing policy, implementation, monitoring and learning. Yet, the change in context – economic, social, environmental, political, administrative, organisational and representational – means that the practice of policy analysis, NESC deliberation and input to policy has changed a lot since the 1970s, or even the 1990s. NESC now explicitly embraces a diversity of working methods and outputs. These include analysis of the type outlined here, but also hosting open policy debates and workshops involving networks or practitioners, and establishing project working groups involving NESC members and others; identifying and mapping emergent innovations and experiments in the public system, the economy and society that give insight into new ways of addressing challenges, and exploring ways in which these can be generalised; and convening relevant actors to explore institutional challenges related to implementation, monitoring and learning arising from NESC work. As a result, a significant part of NESC’s policy analysis is now based on a form of ‘network knowledge’, and speaks to both the NESC as a collective and a range of government and non-government actors. An in-house term used for this pragmatic method of policy analysis was ‘zig-zag’: between theory and evidence; between analysis and interest group dialogue; between high151

Policy analysis in Ireland

level policy context and the front line; between dialogue within the NESC and networking with external civil society actors; between all of these and officials in relevant government departments. This involves the kind of ‘co-production’ and ‘boundary work’ that is increasingly identified in international discussion of the relationship between knowledge and policy (Owens, 2015).

Conclusion This chapter shows that there have been some enduring characteristics of the policy analysis involving the social partners in NESC and related institutions. The engagement of the social partners was never merely representational and never just consultative, always aiming to influence government policy and support its animation of a network of civil society organisations working in a problemsolving way. Yet, in response to a changing context, there has been significant evolution of the method of policy analysis and its relationship to both interest group dialogue and government policy. One continuity has been continual selfreflection by the policy analysts. In part, this reflexivity is necessary because of the need to provide policy analysis that can generate a fusion of horizons among actors with diverse understandings and interests, or at least analysis that can earn their respect. It was also necessary because of the NESC’s fragile and shifting position with respect to government and the social partners. But it also reflects the increasing complexity of the policy challenges and reflexivity of the economic, social and environmental actors and organisations in society. Indeed, these approaches to policy analysis, and changed understanding of the relationship between knowledge and policy, are not unique to the NESC or Ireland. As analysed in other volumes in this series, similar changes in practice and conception are underway in many democratic states, especially the Netherlands (van Nispen and Scholten, 2015). Among these is the increasing prevalence of ‘co‑production’ and greater focus on ‘boundary work’ and ‘boundary organisations’ (Bijker et al, 2009). What the NESC secretariat describes as zig‑zag, mentioned earlier, suggests its awareness that it is, in part, a ‘boundary organisation’. It has to maintain a flexible but coherent engagement between knowledge (both co‑produced and deriving from ‘expert’ sources), deliberation within the NESC, wider interest group dialogue, public agencies and key government departments. As with all boundary organisations, the ability, standing and credibility of the secretariat with key actors is critical. The story suggests the need for Irish policy actors, analysts and higher education institutions to think further about the relationships between social scientific knowledge and policy. One reason is to clarify the capabilities involved in doing policy analysis in a context of co-production and complex institutional landscapes. Another reason is the likely change in the state’s relations with civil society. The global financial crisis prompted a dramatic centralisation of Irish public policy, accompanied by enhanced reliance on ‘expert’ knowledge and a particular version of evidence-based policy. It is inconceivable that a modern 152

The social partners and the NESC

small European democracy could be permanently governed in such a centralised way, and we are now witnessing a gradual thaw, as the state re-engages with civil society. As this proceeds, we require more analysis and discussion on the diverse ways knowledge is generated and used. Notes 1

2

3

While every effort is made to be objective, the reader should know that the author worked in the NESC secretariat at various periods from 1987 to 2019, was Chief Officer of the National Economic and Social Development Office (NESDO) and worked as a consultant to the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) in 1996–97. In his seminal 1994 piece, ‘Learning by monitoring: the institutions of economic development’, Sabel had drawn attention to the possibility that ‘the inner workings of cooperation might transform the actors’ understanding of one another in relation to the commonly defined world in which their interests are rooted’ (Sabel, 1994, p 155). His key observation – that ‘It is the constant re-elaboration of intent that can produce the fundamental alignment of interests that the sociological account assumes as the precondition of cooperation and the economic account excludes even as a consequence’ – seemed relevant to the deepening engagement of economic and social interests and prompted his invitation to the NESF discussions in 1997 (pp 155–6). In November 2010, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, agreed with the Irish government on a three-year financial aid programme, conditional on budgetary adjustment and reforms. A delegation from the three institutions, colloquially called the Troika, monitored the implementation of the programme.

References Bernstein, R.J. (1976) The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, London: Methuen. Bijker, W.E., Bal, R. and Hendriks, R. (2009) The Paradox of Scientific Authority: The Role of Scientific Advice in Democracies, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Culpepper, P.D. (2008) ‘The politics of common knowledge: ideas and institutional change in wage bargaining’, International Organization, 62(1): 1–33. Dorf, M.C. and Sabel, C.F. (1998) ‘A constitution of democratic experimentalism’, Columbia Law Review, 98(2): 267–473. Gregory, D. (1984) ‘Space, time and politics in social theory: an interview with Anthony Giddens’, Society and Space, 2(1): 123–32. Larragy, J. (2016) Asymmetric Engagement: The Community and Voluntary Pillar in Irish Social Partnership, Manchester: Manchester University Press. NESC (National Economic and Social Council) (1977) The Work of NESC: 1974–1976, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (1982) A Review of Industrial Policy, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (1986) A Strategy for Development, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (1989) Ireland in the European Community: Performance, Prospects and Strategy, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (1990) Strategy for the Nineties: Economic Stability and Structural Change, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. 153

Policy analysis in Ireland

NESC (1995) New Approaches to Rural Development, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (1996) Strategy into the 21st  Century, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (1997) European Union: Integration and Enlargement, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (1999) Opportunities, Challenges and Capacities for Choice, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2002) An Investment in Quality: Services Inclusion and Enterprise: Conclusions and Recommendation, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2003) An Investment in Quality: Services Inclusion and Enterprise, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2004) Housing in Ireland: Performance and Policy, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2005a) The Developmental Welfare State, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2005b) NESC Strategy 2006: People, Productivity and Purpose, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2009) Ireland’s Five-Part Crisis: An Integrated National Response, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2010) The Euro: An Irish Perspective, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2013) Five-Part Crisis, Five Years On: Deepening Reform and Institutional Innovation, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2014a) Social Housing at the Crossroads: Possibilities for Investment, Provision and Cost Rental, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2014b) Homeownership and Rental: What Road is Ireland On?, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2014c) Wind Energy in Ireland: Building Community Engagement and Social Support, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2015a) Ireland’s Rental Sector: Pathways to Secure Occupancy and Affordable Supply, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2015b) Housing Supply and Land: Driving Public Action for the Common Good, Dublin, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2018) Urban Development Land, Housing and Infrastructure: Fixing Ireland’s Broken System, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2019a) Transport-Oriented Development: Assessing the Opportunity for Ireland, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC (2019b) Climate Change Policy: Getting the Process Right, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council. NESC Secretariat (2012) Ireland and the Climate Change Challenge: Connecting ‘How Much’ with ‘How To’, Dublin: National Economic and Social Council.

154

The social partners and the NESC

NESF (National Economic and Social Forum) (1997) A Framework for Partnership: Enriching Strategic Consensus Through Participation, Dublin: National Economic and Social Forum. O’Donnell, R. (1992) ‘Economics and policy: beyond science and ideology’, Economic and Social Review, 24(1): 75–98. O’Donnell, R. (2010) ‘Negotiated governance and hybridity in small European countries: Ireland and Denmark’, in M. Boss (ed) The Nation State in Transformation: Economic Globalisation, Institutional Mediation and Political Values, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, pp 149–62. O’Donnell, R. (2012a) ‘Prospects for mutual learning and policy transfer’, SocioEconomic Review, 10(3): 755–77. O’Donnell, R. (2012b) Reframing the Climate Change Policy Challenge: Background Paper No. 1, Dublin: NESC. O’Donnell, R. (2014) ‘Ireland: the evolving role and work of the National Economic and Social Council’, in The Economic and Social Councils in Latin America and the European Union: Practical Experiences of Social Dialogue, Madrid: CES, pp 175–88. O’Donnell, R., Adshead, M. and Thomas, D. (2011) ‘Ireland: two trajectories of institutionalisation’, in S. Avdagic, M. Rhodes and J. Visser (eds) Social Pacts in Europe: Emergence, Evolution and Institutionalisation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 89–117. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (1996) Ireland: Local Partnerships and Social Innovation, Paris: OECD. Ó  Riain, S. (2004) The Politics of High-Tech Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Outhwaite, W. (1987) New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermeneutics and Critical Theory, London: Macmillan. Owens, S. (2015) Knowledge, Policy and Expertise, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rein, M. and Schön, D. (1996) ‘Frame-critical policy analysis and frame-reflective policy practice’, Knowledge and Policy: The International Journal of Knowledge Transfer and Utilization, 9(1): 85–104. Sabel, C.F. (1994) ‘Learning by monitoring: the institutions of economic development’, in N. Smelser and R. Swedberg (eds) The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp 137–65. Schön, D. and Rein, M. (1995) Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies, New York, NY: Basic Books. van Nispen, F. and Scholten, P. (2015) Policy Analysis in the Netherlands, Bristol: Policy Press.

155

ELEVEN

Thinks tanks and their role in policy making in Ireland Chris McInerney

Introduction Ireland, like most other ‘developed’ countries, draws on a range of sources to influence the design of public policy. Alongside political and administrative influences, a variety of civil society, not-for-profit, academic and private sector actors seek to access, influence, advise, inform and, sometimes, embarrass those in power. This chapter focuses on one particular group, think tanks, organisations that seek to contribute to policy analysis through research, policy development and, in some cases, advocacy. The first part of the chapter reviews the international experience on think tanks. Here, the question of what constitutes a think tank is discussed, different types of think tanks are introduced and the complex question of assessing think tank influence and contribution to policy analysis is considered. The second part of the chapter turns to Ireland, mapping the Irish think tank landscape and categorising Irish think tanks by age, type and resource base. It also considers the issue of influence of think tanks on Irish policymaking and explores data relevant to a number of key influence indicators.

The broader picture It is generally agreed that think tanks are not-for-profit organisations that engage in research on issues of public policy and communicate their research findings, publicly or otherwise, with a view to influencing and enhancing the capacity of policymakers to make informed decisions (Hart and Vromen, 2008; Shaw et al, 2015; McGann, 2018). The research undertaken by think tanks is often more anticipatory, longer term and deeper than may be possible for those preoccupied with the day-to-day realities of policy design and delivery. Think tanks advocate for policy options ‘through intellectual argument rather than through behindthe-scenes lobbying’ or other forms of advocacy from the perspective of the lived experience of the problem under analysis (Pautz, 2010, p 276). Think tanks are usually independent of government – legally, financially and/ or intellectually (Stone and Ullrich, 2003). However, as the geographic spread of think tanks has widened, the relevance of independence as a criteria has been diluted, with think tanks being linked to political parties, to funders, and sometimes to government itself, as in the case of the rapid expansion of think 157

Policy analysis in Ireland

tanks in China (Stone, 2007; Sundararaman, 2008). Think tanks often enjoy some degree of longevity, having adequate resources to enable them to employ sufficient and credible human resources to carry out research and dissemination functions (Boucher and Hobbs, 2004). They have been described by the United Nations Development Programme as ‘the bridge between knowledge and power’ (Andjelković, 2003, p 6), though clearly the span and strength of their bridging capacity depends on their perceived degree of credibility, competence and their ideological compatibility with key decision makers.

Origins and scope Think tanks began to appear on the policy landscape in the early part of the 20th century in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), with some of the most prominent early examples including organisations such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Brookings Institution, Chatham House, The Royal Institute of National Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations. These bodies were established so that understandings of international affairs would be informed by more ‘scientific’ thinking, and in the process would help ‘avoid a repetition of past mistakes and improve prospects for peace in the future’ (Niblett, 2018, p 3). After the Second World War, the think tank nomenclature began to enter into ‘academic parlance’, as institutions emerged to focus on policy making around issues of state security during and after the Cold War (Sundararaman, 2008, p 122). Some of this era’s think tanks, such as the Rand Corporation, initially focused on planning for the military in ‘secure and sealed environments’ (Stone, 2007, p 261). However, by the 1970s, the scope had widened to include organisations with a broader focus on economic and political issues. By the end of the 1970s, some of the most prominent Western European think tanks had emerged, often supported by increasing government expenditure on policy research and analysis (Stone and Ullrich, 2003). Later, a new breed of ‘new generation’ (Vromen and Hurley, 2015, p  173) independent think tanks followed. These were usually smaller, less well funded and more specialised, and sometimes with more distinct ideological orientations. In particular, the arrival of ‘New Right’ think tanks, both in Europe and the US, is of note; at least some of these bodies operated to inform the thinking of more conservative political parties. Finally, it is suggested that a fourth wave of think tanks has emerged in recent years, those that focus their concerns on the transnational policy environment, be it regional or global. Globally, in 2018 it was estimated that over 8,200 think tanks existed, most of these being in the US. The Global Go To Think Tank Index, produced by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (www.gotothinktank.com) and the endnote should be deleted at the Lauder Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, annually provides an assessment of the numbers of think tanks throughout the world. This index puts the number of North American think tanks at 2,058, with 1,872 of these located in the US, the biggest number in 158

Thinks tanks and their role in policy making in Ireland

any single country and one that has ‘more than doubled since 1980’ (McGann, 2018, p 14). By contrast, Europe as a whole accounts for 2,219 think tanks, with the UK and Germany having the largest numbers at 321 and 218 respectively. Between them, North America and Europe account for 51% of the global total number of think tanks, leaving a considerable number focusing on Asia, Australia, Latin America and an increasing number on the African continent (McGann, 2018, p 14). China and India are estimated to have over 500 think tanks each (McGann, 2018; Niblett, 2018).

Typologies of think tanks Given this expansion of the known think tank universe, it is useful to place on it some degree of order. One such typology (Weaver and McGann, 2000) proposes the existence four types of think tank. First, academic think tanks are bodies that emphasise the production of academic research, though not necessarily within academic institutions. A key distinguishing element between university-based research and that carried out in think tanks is the clearer focus in the latter on promoting as well as producing policy relevant analysis. Academic think tanks emphasise the importance of rigorous, objective research using highly qualified researchers, usually at PhD level. Funding for this type of think tank is likely to be made up of support for core costs, often from government, as well as from earned income linked to specific research activities. Given their more academic nature, outputs from this type of think tank are more likely to take the form of research reports, books and academic journals. A second type of think tank is the ‘contract-based’ model. Think tanks in this category may also emphasise academic standards of research, but rely almost entirely on contracts to fund their activities. As such, these think tanks may be more subject to the influence of funders in charting a research direction. However, by virtue of being contracted to address a policy-specific issue, they may be in a stronger position to produce more directly ‘policy-relevant’ conclusions or analysis (Weaver and McGann, 2000, p 8). Their outputs too will differ from those of the more academic think tanks, with a greater emphasis on research reports and more immediately accessible publication forms designed to be of more immediate relevance to policy analysis and public officials. Third, advocacy think tanks, as the name suggests, are more likely to be associated with the pursuit of particular objectives, using research to advance policy making in particular realms, be they ideological, environmental, moral or otherwise. Advocacy think tanks are distinct from non-governmental organisations that may have developed research capacity as a companion to related operational activities. They are also are less likely to recruit from university faculties and, as a result, may be seen as ‘less credentialed’ (Weaver and McGann, 2000, p 7). In terms of outputs, advocacy think tanks are likely to place greater emphasis on shorter, more accessible outputs that may still be relevant to policy analysis and 159

Policy analysis in Ireland

may be specifically designed for that purpose, albeit not achieving the same level of depth as a contract-based model. Finally, political party think tanks share many of the earlier definitional components, but they are more definitively linked to individual political parties and are designed to more directly serve the policy agenda of the party. As such, they will be less independent and possibly more motivated by short-term issues in pursuit of electoral gain. A fifth type of think tank, a government or in-house think tank, is sometimes considered (Hart and Vromen, 2008). However, while enjoying financial security and potentially having greater influence, this variety cannot easily claim to be independent and may be less able to engage with issues that are likely to be politically sensitive. The unique role of public policy-oriented think tanks and their specific contribution to policy analysis is well captured in the following quote from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: Unlike many watchdog organisations or pressure groups, they base their recommendations on solid research. Unlike academic institutions, they produce applied analysis with the aim of improving public policy. As brokers, think tanks can make complex topics more accessible for the general public and help stimulate national policy dialogue. As outsiders to government, they can provide independent monitoring of public policy, propose policy alternatives and have greater room for innovative thinking. In sum, think tanks can nurture development by helping narrow the traditional gap between knowledge and practice. (OECD, 2008, p 1) The issue of independence is a recurring theme in the background information produced by many think tanks, especially those in the Anglo-American and Western European traditions (Boucher and Hobbs, 2004; Shaw et al, 2015), presumably to enable think tanks to assert their capacity to produce more objective and less agenda-tainted research. However, for others, asserting their ideological foundations and values is an essential part of their identity and contribution to policy analysis (Vromen and Hurley, 2015). Considerations of independence, autonomy and objectivity produce an additional, independence-oriented typology to sit alongside the earlier versions that were more concerned with describing function and mode of operation. Thus, think tanks may be: • autonomous and independent – there is significant independence from any one interest group or donor and they are largely autonomous in their operation and funding from government; • quasi-independent – the think tank is ‘autonomous from government but controlled by an interest group, donor, or contracting agency that provides 160

Thinks tanks and their role in policy making in Ireland

• • • • •

most of the funding and has significant influence over operations of the think tank’; government-affiliated – the think tank is ‘a part of the formal structure of government’; quasi-governmental – the think tank is ‘funded exclusively by government grants and contracts but not a part of the formal structure of government’; university-affiliated – that is, ‘a policy research centre at a university’; politically affiliated – allied with a political party; commercially affiliated – that is, a corporate, for-profit, think tank, either affiliated with a corporation or ‘merely operating on a for-profit-basis’. (McGann, 2018, p 13)

We return to these categories in the second part of the chapter.

The purpose of a think tank While the various definitions and typologies suggest some of the roles played by think tanks, it is helpful to spell out their range of functions in greater detail, not least to enable the review of Irish think tanks that follows in the second part of the chapter, but also to ascertain their specific relevance to policy analysis. In the first instance, it is generally agreed that the core purpose of a think tank is to undertake rigorous, scientifically conducted and independent research, testing new ideas and enabling long-term perspectives to be taken on issues, some of which may not as yet be on the policy or political agenda. Think tanks are seen as necessary to enable policy makers to manage the vast array of increasingly complex information being presented about an equally increasingly complex range of problems (McGann, 2007). Moreover, think tanks are expected to be innovative, forward-looking and anticipatory (Stone and Ullrich, 2003), in effect, providing the capacity to balance the short termism and sometimes populist agendas of the political system and the administrative infrastructure it directs (Fraussen and Halpin, 2017). A more far-sighted approach to policy analysis is therefore a key contribution. However, the role of think tanks is not just to carry out research; it is also expected that they play a role in identifying ‘and promoting policy solutions’ (McGann, 2018, p 20). The promotional role requires that think tanks involve themselves in the dissemination of their ideas, organising or participating in events designed to stimulate discussion about the policy analysis they provide. In the past, policy makers may have been the primary target of such analysis. However, increasingly, the broader public is also a key audience, given its capacity to exert influence over political decision making. With the array of information being directed at both policy makers and the public, the need to present data and ideas in a more easily accessible, less technical manner – using policy briefs, infographics, blogs, video presentations and other media – becomes more pressing 161

Policy analysis in Ireland

(Stone and Ullrich, 2003; McGann, 2018). This may involve hosting seminars, lectures or conferences, and certainly involves a visible and active social media presence (Niblett, 2018). It may also require the recruitment of additional skill sets, staff whose talent lies not only in research and policy analysis but also in creative communication, who can translate complex information, both for policy makers and the public (Stone and Ullrich, 2003). Beyond the promotional role, think tanks may also be facilitators of dialogue, creating opportunities for discussion on policy issues, working in some cases with policy makers only, in others, facilitating boundary spanning interactions involving state, private sector and civil society actors (Weaver and McGann, 2000; Stone and Ullrich, 2003). Thinks tanks become brokers of ideas, ‘organising interaction between and discursively connecting suppliers and consumers on the market for policy ideas’ (Hart and Vromen, 2008, p 137). Finally, in terms of their purpose, think tanks may act as independent experts capable of advising the work of parliamentary committees, policy commissions and so on (Fraussen and Halpin, 2017), thereby involving themselves not just in policy analysis but also in oversight, accountability and transparency domains. Understanding and measuring influence While it is relatively easy to describe the purpose of a think tank, resolving ‘the methodological riddle of measuring influence’ is much more challenging (Hart and Vromen, 2008, p 138; Vromen and Hurley, 2015), not least given the extended length of the policy cycle. Some suggest that it may take up to a decade for policy contributions and resulting ‘ideas to be transformed into a specific public policy decision’ (Weidenbaum, 2010, p 135) while a European analysis more optimistically puts the influence window closer to three years (Stone and Ullrich, 2003). Influence is, of course, linked to the capacity to promote and communicate policy analysis to a variety of different audiences – funders, policy makers (who may also be funders) and the general public, to name just three (McGann, 2018). It is important, however, not to assume that high public visibility guarantees influence (Hart and Vromen, 2008). Building profile may not be of equal concern for all think tanks. Governmental or quasi-governmental think tanks, and those affiliated to political parties, may already enjoy the access needed to communicate their research findings and policy suggestions, so self-promotion may not be seen as necessary. However, even this cannot be guaranteed. Research in the UK on the relationship between think tanks and the New Labour government concluded that there were ‘expectations among think tank analysts and academics that the new government would be keen on a regular intellectual exchange. But these hopes were disappointed. With the full power of Whitehall behind it, external advice from thinly staffed think tanks was not required by government’ (Pautz, 2010, p 283). This experience highlights some of the tensions that may exist between those within the administrative system and those offering policy analysis from outside, between those with a 162

Thinks tanks and their role in policy making in Ireland

predominantly operational focus and those perhaps looking at complex issues from a somewhat more abstracted perspective. Despite the complexities in understanding actual influence, it is still necessary to have some way to capture it. In practice, approaches to measuring influence are often confined to those things that can be more easily enumerated: an organisation’s overall budget; the number and types of research outputs; specific requests for publications from ‘key opinion formers’ (Denham and Garnett, 2006, p 164); hits on websites, levels of mainstream and social media interest in the think tank or in a given output; media appearances, events held and the nature and number of attendees participating. Some may go further and seek to identify how their outputs subsequently feature in public policy proposals, though whether they actually generate specific policy change is yet another measurement hurdle.

Think tanks in Ireland1 By comparison with other countries, Ireland is a relative newcomer to the world of think tanks, the earliest being the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), which was founded in 1960 on the inspiration of T.K. Whitaker and other senior civil servants, and with the support of the Ford Foundation. As might be expected, there is a general relationship between population size, gross domestic product (GDP) and the numbers of think tanks in each country, the more populous and wealthier countries having larger numbers of think tanks. However, it is noticeable that Ireland, despite having the same share of European Union (EU) GDP and close to the same population, has only 14 think tanks compared with 51 in Denmark. Finland, which has a similar population to Ireland and a lower proportion of EU GDP, has more than double the number of think tanks. For both of these countries, the levels of recorded research and development (R&D) intensity (expenditure on research measured as a percentage of overall GDP) was considerably higher in 2017, 3.06 in Denmark and 2.76 in Finland, compared to just 1.05 in Ireland (see Table 11.1) (Eurostat, 2019a). Scale of think tank activity Fourteen Irish based think tanks with some level of activity in Ireland since 2015 can be identified. However, two are currently inactive, reducing the number of active think tanks to 12. Table 11.2 describes these organisations in terms of their age, level of funding, staff numbers and legal status. Of the identified think tanks, only three existed before 1990 and can be considered as ‘old generation’ think tanks (Vromen and Hurley, 2015) – the ESRI, the Law Reform Commission (LRC) and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound). All three were sponsored by the government or the EU in line with the trend at the time to increase public spending to enhance capacity for research and analysis, at a more general or specific policy level. The ESRI is 163

164

44

60

51

54

Poland

Denmark

Romania

19.87

5.66

38.01

7.2

9.86

11.26

16.9

9.75

60.8

66.42

81.2

1.2

1.9

3

0.3

0.8

2.9

7.6

2.4

4.8

3.1

11.2

14.9

21.3

15.2

% share of EU GDP, 2017

Source: McGann (2018) and Eurostat (2019a, 2019b)

46

Bulgaria

Netherlands

Austria

Hungary

46.45

83

74

Sweden

66

90

Italy

60

114

France

Spain

203

Germany

Belgium

8.58

218

United Kingdom

64.88

321

Country

Population (millions)

No. of think tanks

0.51

2.52

0.56

0.43

0.96

1.84

1.23

2.42

1.67

3.25

1.13

2.02

2.45

1.62

2007

0.5

3.06

1.03

0.75

1.35

2.58

1.2

3.16

1.99

3.33

1.35

2.25

3.02

1.67

2017

R&D intensity (R&D expenditure as % of GDP)

Table 11.1: Think tanks in the EU relative to share of EU GDP and R&D intensity

Malta

Cyprus

Slovenia

Luxembourg

Croatia

Latvia

Ireland

Estonia

Lithuania

Portugal

Czech Republic

Slovakia

Finland

Greece

Country

0.429

0.847

2.06

0.562

4.23

1.99

4.63

1.31

2.92

10.37

10.54

5.42

5.47

10.86

No of think tanks

4

6

6

8

11

11

14

20

22

25

27

27

29

46

Population (millions)

0.1

0.1

0.3

0.4

0.3

0.2

1.9

0.2

0.3

1.3

1.3

0.6

1.5

1.2

% share of EU GDP, 2017

0.55

0.4

1.42

1.59

0.79

0.55

1.23

1.07

0.8

1.12

1.31

0.45

3.35

0.58

2007

0.55

0.56

1.86

1.26

0.86

0.51

1.05

1.29

0.88

1.32

1.79

0.88

2.76

1.13

2017

R&D intensity (R&D expenditure as % of GDP)

Policy analysis in Ireland

Thinks tanks and their role in policy making in Ireland

Table 11.2: Think tanks operating in/from Ireland Name

Founded

Type

Status

Funding

Staff

ESRI2

1960

Academic

Quasigovernmental

€11.535 million in 2017

119 FTEs in 2017

LRC3

1975

Academic

Quasigovernmental

€1.962 million in 2016

20

Eurofound4

1975

Academic

Quasigovernmental

Almost €21 million in 2018

98

Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA)5

1991

Academic

Autonomous

€1.416 million in 2017

28

Centre for Cross Border Studies (CCBS)6

1999

Advocacy

Autonomous

£457,912

8

Institute of Public Health in Ireland (IPHI) (cross-border)7

1999

Academic

Quasigovernmental

€2.124 million

22

Think Tank for Action on Social Change (TASC)8

2001

Advocacy/ academic

Autonomous

€604,788 in 2017

8 in 2019

Iona Institute9

2007

Advocacy/ academic

Autonomous

€218,798 in 2017

2 in 2019

2011

Advocacy

Autonomous

Not published

Not published

Asia Matters10 (SJI)11

2009

Advocacy

Autonomous

€310,289 in 2018

7

Nevin Economic Research Institute (NERI)12

2012

Advocacy/ academic

Quasiindependent

€564,142

7

Local Government Information Unit Group13 (cross‑jurisdiction)

Unclear

Contract

Contract

Not available

8 core staff across Dublin, Edinburgh and London

Social Justice Ireland

Inactive think tanks

Collins Institute14

Political

Active up to April 2018

Centre for Irish and European Security

Advocacy

Founded in 2008, active up to 2015

the country’s largest think tank, with a budget of over €11 million in 2017 and a staff of over 100 (www.esri.ie). The LRC has been described as ‘the country’s leading legal think-tank’ (McCárthaigh, 2012), and was established in 1975 to keep the country’s laws under review and to make recommendations for law reform. Operating at EU level, but based in Ireland, Eurofound is another wellresourced think tank that provides ‘information, advice and expertise on working conditions and sustainable work, industrial relations, labour market change and quality and life and public services’ (www.eurofound.europa.eu), targeted at EU institutions, member states and social partners. All three are categorised here as ‘academic’ and ‘quasi-governmental’ think tanks. Post-1990, again in line with international trends (Stone and Ullrich, 2003), other mainly autonomous or quasi-independent think tanks began to emerge. One of the most prominent of these, the IIEA, was established in 1991 and is ranked at number 41 among Western European think tanks by the Global Go To Think Tank Index (McGann, 2018). While the IIEA mode of establishment 165

Policy analysis in Ireland

and operation differs from the earlier established bodies, it is still considered an academic think tank, albeit fully autonomous. Another noticeable addition in 1999 was a further quasi-non-governmental, academic think tank, the IPHI, set up to promote health and wellbeing through the provision of evidence and advice on both sides of the border. After 2000, the number of think tanks in Ireland more than doubled. Several organisations emerged with a more distinct advocacy bias, including some with more visible ideological and interest group linkages, though none was as financially well-endowed as the earlier examples. For example, SJI, which grew out of the Conference of Major Religious Superiors and later the Conference of Religious in Ireland, is a high-profile, autonomous think tank, focusing on issues of social justice, equality and sustainability. The TASC is a left-leaning, autonomous body that communicates both its organisational form and purpose in its title. Similarly left-leaning is the NERI, a quasi-independent think tank supported by trade unions affiliated to the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. The Iona Institute, the smallest in terms of budget and staff complement, is often described as a think tank even though it produces limited research outputs. Finally, it is worth highlighting the existence of just one ‘political’ think tank, the Collins Institute, which is associated with Fine Gael, but which has not been active since 2018. Assessing policy influence Of course, the key question is, what influence, if any, do these think tanks have on policy analysis and the design of public policy in Ireland? Most think tanks do not track their influence on policy. To address this question, and building on international practice, a number of proxy indicators of influence must be used: the number and nature of research outputs produced; reference to these in policy documents; visibility of lobbying efforts; the creation/facilitation of public spaces for engagement; and mainstream media and social media presence. A review of data produced by the think tanks using these indicators shows that while some may be considered strong in one area, they may not perform well on others. It is also interesting to observe that while some think tanks go to considerable lengths to present and analyse data about their performance, others are less forthcoming. By far the strongest think tank in terms of research outputs is the ESRI, probably not surprisingly given the level of its human and financial resources. Among these, in 2017, were 24 completed research projects and a further 42 ongoing projects, 40 reports, 62 journal articles, 24 book chapters, and 24 research bulletins, as well as research papers, notes and special articles, emphasising the predominantly academic nature of its approach. A strong output performance was also reported by Eurofound, SJI and the IIEA. Of the think tanks analysed, Eurofound is the only one to trace the presence of its research in policy documents or other sources, reporting use of its policy analysis in 81 out of 272 (30%) key EU policy documents and 720 references in peer-review journals (Eurofound, 2019, p 35). 166

Thinks tanks and their role in policy making in Ireland

Promoting policy analysis The first part of this chapter highlighted the role of think tanks, not just in producing but also promoting policy analysis. Two indicators can be used to capture activity in this area: direct engagement and promotion. The first of these is engagement with policy makers, a key aspect of which is ‘lobbying’. Lobbying can be defined as a matter that relates to the ‘development or modification of any public policy or any public programme’ and to ‘the preparation or amendment of any law’ (Lobbying.ie, 2019). In most cases, engagement in lobbying can now be captured from the lobbying register set up under the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015. Engagement with policy makers may also include activities such as presentations to Dáil committees. The second indicator tries to capture how think tanks promote their policy analysis. This may take place through the organisation of, or participation in, presentations, seminars, conferences and so on, designed to highlight research activity. Taking this latter indicator first, the ESRI again emerges as the strongest performer in delivering presentations and briefings (143 in 2017) as well as organising 28 seminars and conferences. These contributions are documented in its annual review of research report that presents its outputs in an easily accessible fashion. The ESRI, however, does not record any lobbying activities, presumably because it does not see itself as playing an advocacy function. Somewhat surprisingly, given its level of research activity, the ESRI notes only two appearances before Oireachtas committees in 2017 (ESRI, 2018). Eurofound also presents strong data on its role in sharing its research outputs, recording its contribution to policy development events and estimating that of its total of 236 such contributions, 97 (41%) were made at strategic, highvalue ‘priority events’ (Eurofound, 2019, p  35). By contrast, another quasigovernmental think tank, the IPHI, presents little evidence of its efforts to insert its research outputs into the policy process. Clearly, the task of research promotion and data analytics requires additional investment. In the case of the IIEA, which records few lobbying activities, highprofile events are organised, both in Dublin and in Brussels. Of note in this case is the fact that, as well as employing 14 research staff, the IIEA also employs four people in its creative unit and two with responsibility for communications (www. iiea.com/staff). This represents a substantial investment, but does perhaps help to explain why it has the highest ranking of any Irish think tank on the Global Go To Think Tank Index (McGann, 2018). On the engagement indicator, lobbying and research promotion, the data presented by SJI is especially noteworthy, with 129 returns recorded on the lobbying register between January 2016 and July 2019 (www.lobbying.ie). This is the highest level of reported lobbying activity among Irish think tanks and is indicative of proactive advocacy and engagement with policy makers, some formal, much of it informal. Given that the organisation only has seven staff members, it represents a considerable investment of time and energy. However, 167

Policy analysis in Ireland

it is not possible to ascertain whether this translates into a high level of influence on policy formation. Finally, the level of mainstream media and social media presence is often taken as an indicator of influence on policy. Here two streams of potential influence need to be recognised. The first is direct influence on policy makers, whereas the second is the influence on the public who in turn may exert influence on politicians. As with the other indicators, not all think tanks prioritise the capture and reporting of data on their mainstream media or social media presence, with reporting of mainstream media activity being limited to a minority of think tanks. Of those who do report on mainstream media, SJI, the ESRI and the CCBS are the most prominent in reporting high levels participation in radio and TV interviews, with SJI providing a detailed breakdown of press releases issued and stories carried about the organisation in the national and local print media. Most think tanks have a social media presence, with Twitter being the most widely used platform. Eurofound (12,000 followers), ESRI (8,857 followers), IIEA (8,053 followers) and IPHI (6,109) are the most widely followed as of July 2019. Apart from Twitter, some organisations also have a presence on Facebook, Eurofound (9,122 followers), IIEA (8,360) and TASC (1,751) being the most prominent. Interestingly, only two organisations, Eurofound and SJI, actively report on the actual level of engagement with their websites. Eurofound reports almost 2.89 million webpage views in 2018 and almost 162,000 PDF downloads. Meanwhile, SJI’s 2017 annual report notes that there were 4 million hits on the website in that year, with 700 unique visitors recorded each weekday. While the purpose of website usage is not clear, of any indicator, this is one of the most significant, as it suggests a significant number of users actively reaching out to the organisations in question.

Conclusion In presenting this data on the activities of think tanks in Ireland, and on the proxy indicators of influence, it is, of course, important to recognise that the research outputs of quasi-governmental think tanks are likely to exert stronger influence on policy makers than those of other think tanks. It seems logical to think that the outputs of organisations such as the ESRI, the LRC, Eurofound and the IPHI are likely to have greater influence, as these were set up and continue to be heavily funded by the state or the EU. The influence challenge for autonomous or quasi-autonomous think tanks is ever greater. Without greater efforts on the part of these think tanks to trace the presence of their research in policy documents, it will be difficult to know if significant influence does or can ever exist. However, it can be argued that by presenting rigorously researched policy analysis, often challenging mainstream perspectives, such think tanks deliver an important public service. Unfortunately, as is the case with think tanks across the world, there is a constant struggle to resource their activities. 168

Thinks tanks and their role in policy making in Ireland

Notes 1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

The decision on which organisations are considered to be think tanks has been guided by the 2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index and by a database search of media references to think tanks in Ireland between 2000 and 2019. It is further informed by the typologies and definitions presented in the first part of the chapter. As a result, university-based research institutes are excluded. ESRI Financial Statements for the year ended 2017 Law Reform Commission, 38th Annual Report, 2016 Eurofound (2019) Grant Thornton, Financial Statements, The Institute of International and European Affairs for the year ending 2017 Centre for Cross Border Studies, Statement of Financial Activities for the year ended 31 July 2018 Grant Thornton Financial Statements The Institute of Public Health in Ireland for the Financial Year Ended 31 December 2018 TASC Europe Studies, Directors Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 31st December 2017 Lolek Limited, Trading as The Iona Institute, Income and Expenditure Account for the Year Ended 31 December 2017 No Annual Report or financial statements on the organisation website Directors Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 30 June 2018 Financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2017 www.lgiuireland.ie www.collinsinstitute.ie

References Andjelković, B. (2003) Thinking the Unthinkable: From Thought to Policy. The Role of Think Tanks in Shaping Government Strategy: Experiences from Central and Eastern Europe, Bratislava: UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Boucher, S. and Hobbs, B. (2004) ‘Europe and its think tanks: a promise to be fulfilled. An analysis of think tanks specialised in European policy issues in the enlarged European Union’, Notre Europe: Studies and Research, 35: 1–160. Denham, A. and Garnett, M. (2006) ‘“What works”? British think tanks and the “end of ideology”’, The Political Quarterly, 77(2): 156–65. ESRI (Economic and Social Research Institute) (2018) ESRI Review of Research 2017, Dublin: ESRI. Eurofound (2019) Consolidated Annual Activity Report of the Authorising Officer for the Year 2018, Dublin: Eurofound. Eurostat (2019a) ‘R&D expenditure in the EU increased slightly to 2.07% of GDP in 2017’, Eurostat Press Release, 10 January [Online]. Available at: https:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-press-releases/-/9-10012019-AP Eurostat (2019b) ‘Which Member States have the largest share of EU’s GDP?’, Eurostat [Online]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/productseurostat-news/-/DDN-20180511-1?inheritRedirect=true Fraussen, B. and Halpin, D. (2017) ‘Think tanks and strategic policy-making: the contribution of think tanks to policy advisory systems’, Policy Sciences, 50(1): 105–24. 169

Policy analysis in Ireland

Hart, P. and Vromen, A. (2008) ‘A new era for think tanks in public policy? International trends, Australian realities’, The Australian Journal of Public Administration, 67(2): 135–48. Lobbying.ie (2019) Take the Three Step Test, Dublin: Register of Lobying. Available at: www.lobbying.ie/help-resources/information-for-lobbyists/am-i-lobbying McCárthaigh, S. (2012) ‘Set minimum term for murder urges think-tank’, Irish Examiner, 19  January. Available at: www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/icrime/ set-minimum-terms-for-murder-urges-think-tank-180703.html McGann, J.G. (2007) Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the United States: Academics, Advisors and Advocates, Abingdon: Routledge. McGann, J.G. (2018) 2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report. TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports 16, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania. Niblett, R. (2018) ‘Martin Wight Memorial Lecture: The future of think tanks’, Chatham House [Online]. Available at: www.chathamhouse.org/file/martinwight-memorial-lecture-future-think-tanks# OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2008) ‘Endowments for think tanks in developing countries: what role for private foundations and official donors?’, High-level Seminar, OECD headquarters, Paris, 28 April. Available at: www.oecd.org/site/oecdgfd/40234540.pdf Pautz, H. (2010) ‘Think Tanks in the United Kingdom and Germany: actors in the modernisation of social democracy’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 12(2): 274–94. Shaw, S.E., Russel, J., Parsons, W. and Greenhalgh, T. (2015) ‘The view from nowhere? How think tanks work to shape health policy’, Critical Policy Studies, 9(1): 58–77. Stone, D. (2007) ‘Recycling bins, garbage cans or think tanks? Three myths regarding policy analysis institutes’, Public Administration, 85(2): 259–78. Stone, D. and Ullrich, H. (2003) ‘Policy research institutes and think tanks in Western Europe: development trends and perspectives’, Paper prepared for the Local Government Institute, Budapest, January. Available at: https://core.ac.uk/ download/pdf/20539355.pdf Sundararaman, S. (2008) ‘Research institutes as diplomatic actors’, in A.F. Cooper, B. Hocking and W. Maley (eds) Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?, London: Palgrave Macmillian, pp 118–32. Vromen, A. and Hurley, P. (2015) ‘Consultants, think tanks and public policy’, in B. Head and K. Crowley (eds) Policy Analysis in Australia, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 167–82. Weaver, R.K. and McGann, J.G. (2000) ‘Think tanks and civil society in a time of change’, in J.G. McGann and R.K. Weaver (eds) Think Tanks and Civil Society, Abingdon: Routledge, pp 1–36. Weidenbaum, M. (2010) ‘Measuring the influence of think tanks’, Social Science and Public Policy, 47(1): 134–7.

170

TWELVE

Civil society organisations and policy analysis Mary P. Murphy and Orla O’Connor

Introduction Over the past 30  years, civil society organisations (CSOs) have assumed an important role in Irish social, economic and environmental policy and have demonstrated resilience and versatility in their engagement with policy formation. Civil society has arguably led the social transformation of Ireland, as recent referenda have demonstrated, and the political elite has followed civil society’s lead in debating and demanding the type of social change that leads Ireland into the 21st century. The historical and contemporary role of civil society will be particularly important now, at a moment of flux and reflection, as the fault-lines exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and already rehearsed in the historic 2020 general election, are laid bare. A broader public policy story about civil society would affirm and celebrate the political vitality and leadership of civil society; however, this book is not about public policy per se, but is more narrowly focused on ‘policy analysis’ and hence focuses more on CSOs’ engagement with public policy institutions and process – a narrower story. This story is not, however, onedimensional, but should be read in the context of the already proven ideational, campaigning and mobilising power of civil society [and social movements]. This chapter explores the types of capacity CSOs need for the different policy analysis functions, including research, advice, advocacy and communication. Two major themes emerge from the analysis. First, CSOs utilise a diverse range of models of change and their engagement with public policy does not evolve in a linear fashion but ebbs and flows. CSOs adapt their models of change to meet their immediate political environment, in some cases changing how they contribute to policy analysis. Technological changes, particularly Twitter and use of online surveys, also transform the context of how social media is used to utilise policy analysis and advocacy. The second theme relates to changes in the political opportunity structure (POS) CSOs find themselves in. Over the years of social partnership (SP) (see Chapter 10 and later in this chapter) (1987–2008), there was a rich institutional network of policy processes, committees and formal deliberations, albeit not necessarily inclusive. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, CSOs’ overall space for policy analysis has changed and is somewhat reduced. However, post-crisis, ‘new politics’ (NP) is characterised by new parliamentary and public forms of policy making that require new forms of policy-analytical 171

Policy analysis in Ireland

capacity with different implications for CSOs. Recent pandemic consultative processes, while also not always inclusive, have demonstrated the contemporary relevance and capacity of CSOs. This chapter briefly introduces Irish CSOs and offers a typology to assess how diverse CSOs relate to policy analysis and related capacities. It then chronologically traces the past three decades, drawing attention to how key changes in the POS impact on CSOs’ approaches to policy analysis. The chapter then sets out two case studies. The first, complementing Chapter Fifteen, reflects on CSO policy analysis in the post-crisis context of deliberative national policy processes. The second draws attention to the evolution of pre-budget submissions (PBSs) through the new European Semester process. The conclusion reflects on future challenges for policy analysis capacity for the community and voluntary sector in Ireland.

CSOs and policy analysis How do Irish CSOs acquire and utilise knowledge in policy processes (Howlett, 2009)? Following Edwards (2005), we understand CSOs as associations working in the public sphere towards normative goals, but confine our analysis to the domestic ‘community and voluntary’ sector in Ireland. This includes charities as well as a diverse range of bodes including community groups, voluntary and non-profit organisations, and social enterprises, which, while diverse, aspire to the common bond of solidarity (Fraser, 2013). We include organisations that are more activist and social movement in style but that participate in policy processes, particularly in reproductive rights and environmental policy. We confine ourselves to national policy and domestic-oriented CSOs and exclude trade unions or representative sectoral organisations from professional groups, think tanks, and international CSOs. Generally, in the context of increased regulation, recent decades have witnessed a growth in formalisation and professionalisation of CSOs. The past 100 years has seen a growth in the range and type of CSOs, sectoral and interest groups, local, national and international, voluntary and professional, large and small. Benefacts’ (2018) estimate of at least 29,000 non-profit organisations, representing about 11% of all organisations in Ireland, is likely to be a significant underestimate as it does not include many thousands of small, local, non-profit organisations (Visser, 2018). We are hampered by few studies of their approach to policy analysis and have little evidence of their policy capacity. The particular form policy analysis and advocacy takes in CSOs reflects their underlying values and identity. In Ireland, the language of ‘community’ and ‘voluntary’ reflect the important contributions of different traditions, ideologies and models of change over the history of the Irish state. In practice, much CSO activity is driven by volunteering and service provisiontype activities, including sport, rather than political engagement (Murphy, 2011). The traditional relationship between the state and voluntary sector varies but 172

Civil society organisations and policy analysis

often reflects a subservient, clientalistic, political culture where voluntary CSOs operate ‘in the shadow of the state’ (Murphy, 2011, p  170). Community in Ireland is primarily understood as a geographical space, but can also mean a community of interest (for example, lone parents). From the 1970s, community development processes funded by the European Union (EU) generated greater capacity for policy analysis. Since the 2008 crisis, services traditionally delivered by CSOs have been opened up to market actors, and advocacy restrictions (‘gag clauses’) are now common in service-delivery agreements limiting CSOs’ policy capacity and activity (Harvey, 2014; CWI, 2015). CSOs vary considerably in their model of change and, over time, are shaped by and also shape broader processes of dedemocratisation or redemocratisation of Irish public policy processes. The growth of policy-analytical capacity is not linear; capacity has been severely eroded since the economic crisis and over periods of intense austerity, and prior to this was also curtailed in the context of ideological whims of governments. Figure 12.1 offers a basic typology of Irish CSOs as they relate to policy analysis. Most CSOs will more likely find themselves in intersections of this typology rather than as A, B, C, or D as ideal types. We note the false distinction between service and advocacy, with many service organisations engaging in forms of self-advocacy, and with multiple forms and levels of individual, societal and transformational advocacy. At one end of the continuum, A, some CSOs are dominated by service delivery, with policy influencing a more peripheral activity (for example, CSOs that focus on traditional voluntary sector service delivery and may engage in limited policy analysis, such as joining campaigns or submitting a submission to a specific policy process). Some CSOs in B, however, while maintaining services as their dominant function, also invest significantly in policy influencing, often using their experiential learning as a form of policy analysis and expertise (for example, Focus Ireland). Other CSOs found in C provide services to affiliate members, but are primarily focused on policy and political institutions (for example, the National Youth Council of Ireland). Finally, those CSOs in D are largely of the activist type. Their core work is focused on mobilisation, but nonetheless they

Figure 12.1: Policy analysis capacity continuum A Service

Low capacity

B Service and policy

C Institutional policy focus

High capacity

D Activist focus

Low capacity

Source: Authors’ own elaboration

173

Policy analysis in Ireland

utilise and sometimes produce critical policy analysis (for example, Abortion Rights Campaign). This is not a static framework; organisations adapt in the context of changing internal and external environments. In 2019, a national children’s charity closed down its policy and advocacy section in favour of investing those resources in trauma-related services, thus moving from B to B/A. Women’s Aid, a large domestic violence service provider, in the context of reduced funding refocused its policy capacity from internal staff to engaging external consultants, thus moving from B to B/A. The National Women’s Council of Ireland (NWCI), as a consequence of changing POS, new technologies and its own reflection, became more activist in its model of change, shifting from C to C/D. In the 1990s, the Society of St Vincent De Paul responded to the changing POS of SP by building a policy analysis capacity while retaining its core services, moving from A to B. An ongoing tension is the degree to which government-funded service delivery CSOs can and do ‘bite the hand that feeds them’ and engage in advocacy. It is not clear that Irish democracy is mature enough for funders to accept critical engagement from CSOs dependent on government funding. While some CSOs raise unrestricted funding to support advocacy, 75 larger CSOs are more reliant on resourcing policy capacity through the statutory Scheme to Support National Organisations, which spends €10m per annum (Pobal, 2019) for front-line service delivery, organisational development and policy development. Funded CSOs report 30% of the funding invested in awareness raising and advocacy leading to increased staff capacity, and 35% more research and development activity (Pobal, 2019). CSOs also access competitive grants for increasing policy and analytical capacity from the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission and the Irish Research Council’s New Foundations Grant. In 2017, Campus Engage emerged to promote more engaged research involving CSOs, while the EU Horizon 2020 and national funding programmes increasingly reward such practice. Many CSOs demonstrate policy analysis capacity, yet there are deficits. Senior civil servants observe that the capacity to translate lived experience into policy analysis, a unique selling point of CSOs, is often underutilised by CSOs, leaving policy makers to access such perspective from service providers – or directly. Managers and CEOs report capacity deficits and difficulty recruiting relevant skills and experience. Despite shifts towards evidence-based policy and a premium placed on quantitative over qualitative evidence (see Chapter Five, this volume), there are key weakness and skill gaps in quantitative data analysis techniques. So too social media has dramatically changed the focus of policy activity, with Twitter now a key site for utilisation of policy analysis and forum for exchange and influencing government policy analysts (Lovejoy and Saxton, 2012). Visser (2018) argues that CSOs need to continue to evolve and change to meet the new dynamics of campaigning and advocacy, for example galvanising opportunities in ground-up initiatives that have gained traction on social media, as was the case in the participation of NWCI in the ground-up campaign to extend pandemic174

Civil society organisations and policy analysis

era maternity leave (NWCI, 2020). However, social media disintermediation also occurs as people coordinate directly without traditional organisations (see Chapter Seventeen, this volume). CSOs are also faced with technical challenges and the need to develop capacity to meet big data policy developments including increasing regulation requirements such as General Data Protection Regulation. As happens elsewhere (Goodwin and Phillips, 2015) some Irish CSOs have restructured internal social media capacity from policy/advocacy teams to marketing sections, with negative consequences for policy analysis.

CSO political opportunity structures The 2000s have witnessed ‘deep structural changes’ in relationships between civil society and states across Europe, and a devaluation, defunding and reregulation of the contribution of civil society to democratic decision making (Acheson and Visser, 2016). This section traces recent changes in the POS for CSOs in Ireland, moving from a pre-crisis period of social partnership (1987–2002), to a cooling-off period where the state sought to limit the power and influence of civil society (2002–11), onwards though the crisis period that defunded key capacities (2011–14), and ending with a post-crisis period (2014–present) of NP with new opportunities for participative and deliberative public policy processes (Reidy and Buckley, 2017). Pre-crisis: clientalism and corporatism (1987–2002) Murphy (2011) offers state-centred rationales that set the context of civil society policy activism in Ireland; the populist nature of Irish political parties; patterns of interest group formation; clientalism, corporatism and state strategies to silence dissent; and more recently the impact on civil society of the increased marketisation of public goods. Noting the political culture in a small island, and the pressure to ‘wear the green jersey’, she notes the tendency towards conformism. Size is important; the Irish political system and culture is characterised by the informality and accessibility of its politicians. This culture influences how CSOs engage with policy influencing, while many voluntary organisations can be somewhat servile, albeit some CSOs have always had contestatory policy relevance. The SP process is key to understanding Irish policy-making machinery over the past three decades. SP began with the Programme for National Recovery, which came into effect in 1987. SP, a corporatist institutional approach, involved more than centralised wage bargaining; it also included agreement on a wide range of economic and social policies between employers, trade unions, farmers’ organisations and government on wages over a three-year period (see Chapter Ten, this volume). Over time, more, but not all, societal actors were included, first on the margins, and then more centrally as CSOs embarked on a ‘long march through the institutions’ (Allen, 1998, p 274), culminating in 1997 in the creation of the Community and Voluntary Pillar (CVP) (Larragy, 2014). Six 175

Policy analysis in Ireland

national agreements were made over this period, during which CSOs participated intensely in a diverse range of policy forums and rose to the challenge of new forms of policy analysis requiring new skills that included macro-economic policy analysis, fiscal, budgetary and taxation analysis, and capacity to cost proposals and to make succinct and tangible demands. A particular skill set was required to mediate and negotiate demands with government, with other social partners, and perhaps most of all within the CVP. Much has been debated about the merits of civil society engagement with social partnership, with some considering it a co-option into the state, and others considering it a route to power (Kirby and Murphy, 2011), but less has been written about the degree to which entry into SP shaped civil society’s policy and analytical capacity. CSOs had to first demonstrate sufficient policy capacity to merit their presence in relevant processes and institutions. This capacity was developed through the creation of the National Economic and Social Forum in 1993, and over time CSOs contributed to problem solving and policy formation so that, after exposure in the National Economic and Social Council, in 1996 the CVP joined SP (to be followed later by the Environmental Pillar). Unequal CSO capacities to participate (resources, knowledge and skills) led to internal power dynamics within the CVP. At times, collective capacity was enhanced and smaller CSOs were enabled to grow policy capacity, but in other instances, some CSOs with lesser capacity, and often representing more marginalised interests, perceived that they had been excluded from effective participation. Assessing policy capacity of CSOs means distinguishing the particular contributions CSOs might have been expected to bring to the policy arena. It is somewhat ironic that the very fact of participation in SP was to pull some organisations away from, what was for many, a core strength, a form of policy capacity that was grounded in the ability to translate the lived experience of poor policy and/or poor implementation through the policy process. Other CSOs offered a different more macro type of analysis in the form of a political economy critique of distributional policy, while others enacted a more representative role for particular groups, for example youth or women. Regardless of their policy capacity, most non-governmental organisations experienced asymmetric engagement (Larragy, 2014) and required skills of persistence, policy innovation and good analysis, but also capacity to recognise and make tactical use of changes in economic and political cycles (Marks and McAdam, 1996, pp 259–63). A cooling off and a crisis period (2002–13) Regardless of their participation in SP, CSOs faced a more hostile climate with the change of government in 2002. In political economy terms, this resulted in monetary union overlapping with shifts in power associated with rapid financialisation of the Irish economy (O’Riain, 2017). Harvey (2014) found state funders using service-level agreements (SLAs) to curtail policy and advocacy. CSOs fell out of political favour, were characterised in public discourse as the 176

Civil society organisations and policy analysis

‘poverty industry’ and were delegitimised. In the mid-2000s, SP fatigue was apparent and within that a growing exasperation with what some perceived as an unwieldly CSO culture of participation in SP processes. SP did not survive the 2008 financial crisis and was replaced with a much weaker form of social dialogue in which the CVP meets bilaterally with several government departments. CSOs were also damaged disproportionately by the crisis, both financially, as government reduced its funding for the voluntary and community sector by an average of 40% at a time when overall government funding fell by –7.1%, but also politically, as state power was centralised. A July 2008 government circular (S180/20/10/0964B) required the reduction, merger or abolition of 41 state agencies. A ‘bonfire of the quangos’ saw a substantial number of social policyrelated state agencies closed down or merged. Particularly impactful was the loss of Combat Poverty Agency and the Equality Authority, both of which had proactively supported policy capacity building for CSOs, with an emphasis on more marginalised groups. Harvey (2014) finds that the most lasting political change has been the depletion of the state’s social policy infrastructure. Some voluntary organisations have been almost overwhelmed, leaving service delivery an absolute priority. Employment in the policy-relevant CSO sector fell from 53,098 in 2008 to 36,638 in 2015 (Harvey, 2014), and, given that services were protected, a significant number of these losses were in policy capacity. The outcome was a substantial reduction in the institutional capacity of the state in the social policy field. This had consequences for the POS within which many CSOs worked, with less access to policy resources including data, institutional processes and influencing opportunity. Kirby and Murphy (2011) find that Irish civil society became muted over the early to mid-crisis period as the state took a more proactive role in co-opting civil society and shaping its direction. The Charities Act 2009 established the Charities Regulatory Authority, which restricts advocacy to circumstances where ‘promotion of that cause relates directly to the advancement of the charitable purposes of the body’. This and SLA campaigning restrictions combined to create widespread fears among CSOs, and to some degree introduced elements of self-censorship among some CSOs, and a curtailment of advocacy-related policy work. Various CSO-led responses to the threat to CSOs emerged, including the Advocacy Initiative, Is Féidir Linn and Claiming Our Future, all of which sought to recover and defend CSOs place in the Irish public sphere. This period also saw the philanthropic sector exit and trust funding to fall over 80% (Visser, 2018). New philanthropic sources also emerged, for example, Open Society funding of organisations campaigning for reproductive rights (see the case studies later in the chapter regarding legal challenges to CSOs rights to use international funders to fund advocacy). NP in a post-crisis period (2013–19) Post-crisis, what remained of SP was a form of social dialogue or ‘access without influence’. CSOs consequently moved to other forms of influencing that required 177

Policy analysis in Ireland

different policy capacities. They did so in the context of NP, a period of postcrisis democratic reform under a minority coalition governments dependent on the 2016–20 confidence and supply agreement between Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil. NP was characterised by a series of parliamentary reforms that strengthen parliamentary power, widen the capacity for opposition parties to influence the legislative agenda through Private Members’ Bills, improve the resourcing of parliamentary committees and considerably reform the budgetary process (Reidy and Buckley, 2017). This gave CSOs more opportunity to influence the legislative agenda and directly engage with legislative processes, and this in turn required new policy capacities in CSOs (see Chapter Thirteen, this volume). The crisis diminished trust in all public institutions, including CSOs, but most particularly governments and political institutions. Reflecting shifts elsewhere towards more participative and deliberative forms of democracy (see Chapter Fourteen, this volume), Ireland has also experimented with a range of new policy-making processes. These are evident locally in local authority participatory budgeting processes and in public participation networks (see Chapter Six), and nationally in Constitutional Conventions (CCs) and Citizens’ Assemblies (CAs) (see Chapter Fifteen, this volume, and Reidy and Buckley, 2017). NP is also associated with a new regulatory environment designed to restore trust in political and public institutions. Lobbying was regulated under the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015, which introduced an online register of lobbyists. CSOs engaging in lobbying must now complete quarterly lobbying returns. The Electoral Amendment Act 2016 now regulates political donations and controls the operation of third parties, including CSOs, electoral activity, campaigning and advocacy work. The Standards in Public Office Commission’s (SIPO) recent direction that some CSOs return grants judged to have been made for political purposes has been heavily contested by CSOs (led by the Irish Council of Civil Liberties), with Amnesty Ireland recently winning a high-profile court case contesting SIPO’s ruling. CWI (2015) and Murphy and colleagues (2020) note a significant post-crisis increase in commissioning and procurement previously funded through block grants to CSOs. This has consequences for policy capacity. CSOs in the domestic violence sector, for example, found that funding ringfenced for services limited their capacity to engage with relevant national and local policy, while less limiting resources during the pandemic enabled greater collaboration, innovation and influence. CSOs also coordinate to incorporate the demands of other CSOs. A 2018 Children’s Right’s Alliance campaign focusing on child poverty, for example, was echoed by other CSOs and reinforced through its own PBS. Capacity to work together is not generic to CSOs. Both Visser (2018) and Pobal (2019) report insufficient contemporary collaboration among CSOs, particularly among larger organisations, while Murphy and colleagues (2020) find commissioning and procurement processes make it more difficult for organisations to collaborate. Finally, CSOs find that policy consultation processes change as statutory actors make more use of electronic survey instruments such as Survey Monkey. Use of 178

Civil society organisations and policy analysis

such surveys, and increased use of predetermined questions and frames, may limit the depth and range of potential issues that can be raised during consultations. On the other hand, such instruments are potentially time-saving and economic to use, and may, if used effectively, open up consultation to a wider range of participants including service users and citizens (see Chapter Seventeen, this volume).

Case studies of policy-analytical capacity in the community sector The following contemporary case studies explore the relationship between policy analysis, capacity and POS, examining changes in processes and avenues for participation in social policy influencing and their consequences for policyanalytical capacity. The first case study examines the use of new types of participative and deliberative policy making (see Chapter Fifteen, this volume), while the second reflects on the continual process of influencing PBSs and how CSOs have adapted their approach over time (see Chapters Seven and Seventeen, this volume). Case study 1: Policy analysis and capacity in deliberative policy processes This case study reflects on how NCWI both shaped and participated in policy processes related to the successful 2018 referendum to repeal the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Act 1983, which had essentially banned access to abortion in Ireland. After decades of pressure, the government committed in 2016 to establishing a CA to make recommendations to the Oireachtas on further constitutional changes, including the Eighth Amendment. Justice Laffoy was appointed as chairperson and 99 members were randomly selected from the citizens of Ireland. Five meetings of the CA, held from January to April 2017 and totalling more than 90 hours, focused on abortion. CSOs, including NWCI, had previous experience of engaging in a similar deliberative process in the CC that had made recommendations on eight policy areas, including marriage equality and issues relating to gender equality. The CA, however, differed from the CC in that it did not include politicians in its membership. For CSOs, the new process offered a unique way to engage with the public and required many different forms of policy engagement. At the outset, many CSOs including the NWCI were sceptical and questioned whether it was a way for government to avoid providing political leadership. Some questioned whether to engage in a process that might enable government to avoid public pressure to address structural societal issues and/or might risk concrete policy change. The initial questioning of POSs offered by government to CSOs is absolutely valid, and demonstrates analytical capacity for mature reflection to assess the advantages and disadvantages of different POSs. The CA process on the Eighth Amendment required significant investment of policy resources by relevant CSOs. The initial deliberation focused on the form of the CA, engagement with the secretariat, and decisions regarding experts 179

Policy analysis in Ireland

providing advice to the CA. This required drawing on broad knowledge across diverse fields, including experts with legal, constitutional, academic and medical backgrounds. Once the CA was in process, 40 experts discussed issues relating to pregnancy, including crisis pregnancies, fatal foetal anomalies, international evidence, rape, sex education and ethics. The CA request for submissions resulted in 13,000  published submissions (on the CA website). CSOs’ campaigning to repeal the Eighth Amendment used the submissions as an opportunity to influence public debate outside of the CA, an intense process for many CSOs, requiring consultation with their members and challenging those in favour of repeal to propose legislative models for the provision of abortion. This careful and risky balancing act required capacity for judgment. NWCI wanted to push the CA to recommend the widest possible access to abortion while also wanting realistic recommendations that could be carried through the CA voting process and be supported in the subsequent political process of the Joint Oireachtas Committee and ultimately a referendum. The policy capacity and creativity NWCI needed to engage in such a process to some degree developed through the process. Some CSOs, pro- and antirepeal, addressed the CA and participated in a panel discussion during which CA members could pose questions. This unique and unpredictable process gave CSOs insight into how much thought and consideration CA members were investing in the policy process, many of whom used the opportunity to dissect, question and challenge opposing views. A much-needed capacity was the ability to critically engage with evidence and sources. Pro-repeal CSOs argued that the experiences of the women who had suffered under the Eighth Amendment, and had been forced to travel for abortion, needed to be heard. A full day was given to personal testimony of different forms that enabled anonymity (including verbal presentations, audio recordings, and written testimony). Policy analysis aimed at social change requires that the lived experiences of those directly affected by the policy be incorporated into the evidence. This is impactful, but strongest when combined with the relevant analysis of the CSOs. The learned capacity to root policy analysis in lived experience was a feature of the subsequent referendum campaign. This approach will likely become more visible in the campaigning methods of CSOs. The CA was a very concentrated and focused deliberative way for CSOs to engage a microcosm of the public and to attempt to convince them of their desired outcome. A critical learning point from the process is that when certain factors were put in place, CA members gave time, thought and consideration to the issues, and put the needs of those most affected at the centre of their deliberations. This requires investment in space and support for deliberation, and in the provision of facts and comprehensive evidence, personal testimony, international perspectives, and the perspectives of campaigners and credible representative organisations with track records. CSOs, which tend to engage with those already convinced of the desired change, must build a different type of policy capacity to enable them to engage in a style of policy making that 180

Civil society organisations and policy analysis

targets the unengaged public in policy engagement processes. The engagement with the CA in this case also required CSOs to change the way in which they engaged with the media during the process. Most important was the collaboration between the CSOs in the context of the CA; this was instrumental in building trust between organisations and individuals and in laying the foundations for future alliances, including, in this instance, the Together for Yes campaign, the successful civil society campaign that mobilised the Yes vote in the referendum. Case study 2: Influencing budgetary processes and the European Semester process A traditional, somewhat ritualistic, process of CSOs attempting to influence budget resource allocation and policy making takes place through annualised PBSs. The Irish state facilitates this process with the contemporary Department of Social Protection, Community and Rural Development and the lslands hosting Pre-Budget and Post-Budget Forums, formalised processes where budget parameters are presented by the government and CSOs give their views and responses to the presentations in ‘listening’ forums or focus groups. This state-controlled space, while popular with lobby groups, has been critiqued as restricting more meaningful distributional debate and is thought to be as much about controlling CSO expectations as influencing policy (Acheson and Visser, 2016). There is a striking gap in perception between the senders and receivers of PBSs. In practice, few CSOs have sufficient analytical capacity to influence budget policy, and, to the frustration of government, many iterate budget demands for the purposes of communicating their relevance to their own members. Senior civil servants comment critically on the quality of what appear to be ‘cut and paste’ operations likened to ‘single transferable submissions’ (Walsh et al, 2013). However, from a CSO perspective, developing broad PBS often makes sense as a useful way to capture national attention for national budgetary and legislative policy campaigns, and CSOs believe they have capacity to effectively influence. In contemporary times, CSOs report that they use the annual budget process strategically to cohere internal policy positions, to engage with their own members, and to select a small core number of issues for budget campaigns, often in collaboration with other national CSOs. CSOs also knowingly include legislative rather than budget demands reflecting the absence of other opportunities to influence the legislative process. Post-crisis, attention has also turned to relatively new institutional processes supporting the Irish budget including the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, and Parliamentary Budget Scrutiny supported by a Parliamentary Budget Office (Reidy and Buckley, 2017). There are also emerging practices of gender and equality proofing overseen by the Department of Public Expenditure Reform. As Chapter Fourteen of this volume discusses, CSOs such as the NWCI have had to ‘run to stand still’ in developing policy capacity to contribute gender and fiscal expertise to the process of budget proofing, but government departments 181

Policy analysis in Ireland

have also been challenged in their own capacity to generate data and meaningful proofing exercises. In this context, collaboration has been an important part of capacity building between state actors and CSOs. A recent review of the proofing process by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development concluded that supports for policy capacity were needed to further advance and embed proofing processes and practices. A capacity gap is also likely to emerge between those invited inside the process and those left to engage with budget and policy proofing from the outside. A particular post-crisis change relates to the degree to which the Irish budgetary process is now integrated into the EU Semester process,1 which encourages both the member states and the European Commission to take into account the experience on employment and social issues of relevant CSOs in the process of agreeing Annual Growth Surveys, Country Reports and Country Specific Recommendations, all of which inform national budget processes. From a civil society perspective, skills and resources are needed for successful participation in such processes. However, much will also depend on the motivation, skills and context of member state and EU-level policy makers and the degree to consultation processes are not only well designed, but also ‘meaningfully’ engage with civil society. Not all CSOs have the resources or capacity to engage in the European Semester process, but the experiences of the organisations that have engaged in the process offers insights for policy analysis. Some CSOs find the processes opaque and arbitrary with little sense about what might be included in Country Reports. This leaves some CSOs feeling that engagement in the process is an ineffective use of time with little impact. They argue there is little evidence that any significant social issue has been progressed through participation of civic society in the semester process. Some CSOs argue that the issue is not the underlying lack of capacity of social CSOs to participate but the degree to which the underlying dynamic privileges the economic through treaty obligations, legislation and dominant ideology. An example is the experience of homelessness CSOs that have tried to raise housing and homelessness issues through the semester process. The housing crisis, for example, has generally only appeared in the context of the potential impact of mortgage arrears on banks with no discussion of the potential social impact of foreclosing mortgages to stabilise banking. The 2019 Country Report references to housing need and family homelessness were not reflected in the final Country Specific Recommendations. This is the general experience of homelessness in the overall semester process across the EU and points to the need for the European Commission to reform the process so CSOs can more effectively engage and influence outcomes.

Conclusion: innovation and new campaigning This chapter draws attention to diversity within CSOs and the multiple ways that different CSOs respond to similar POSs. In a reinforcing process, once 182

Civil society organisations and policy analysis

CSOs become insiders their potential for policy-analytical capacity grows, with likely consequences for solidarity with those outside (Fraser, 2013). The range of skills includes, among other capacities, tactical and strategic assessment, fiscal policy to identify budget implications, awareness of public interest, use of personalised evidence, rational argumentation and persuasive capacity. Capacity to set agendas, frame narratives, collaborate and network are needed for successful engagement in more recent deliberative processes. Visser’s (2018) post-crisis evaluation of Irish civil society highlights five challenges: funding; capacity, skills and staffing; regulation and compliance; public perception; and innovation and new campaigning, while Pobal (2019) confirms the regulatory environment, recruitment and collaboration as being key challenges. As policy capacity grows in the civil service, some CSOs may feel more exposed (Walsh et al, 2013). That said, COVID-19 responses have demonstrated the best-practice innovation, responsiveness and effectiveness of some civil society actors in Ireland, in, for example, gender, homelessness, domestic violence and reproductive rights (Council of Europe, 2020). The case studies offered in the chapter demonstrate that CSOs are versatile and pragmatic in their policy analysis and capacity to proactively and reactively engage with new forms of policy process and democratisation, including evolving institutional budgetary processes and wholly new deliberative processes. At the same time, many service-dominated CSOs are weaker than the case studies might suggest or are dominated by SLAs that effectively deny them policyinfluencing capacity. Critical public(s), including other CSOs as well as political and state actors, often perceive CSO policy-analytical capacity through their own critical lens and consequently may not always understand the motivation or intent of specific CSOs or why they pursue specific influencing strategies. While some CSOs have poor capacity and/or motivation, overall it appears that, in the context of less institutionalisation, many CSOs may have a more diverse range of opportunities and larger range of tools to use in policy influencing. We end on a positive note, observing that despite funding pressures and regulatory constraints CSOs remain committed to advocacy and influencing public policy (Acheson and Visser, 2016, p 12), and continue to demonstrate considerable capacity and resilience in this regard. It remains to be seen how they will respond to the new political opportunity structure in what may emerge as a quite different post-2020 political environment. We remind the reader that capacity for policy analysis is not one-dimensional, but should be read in the context of the already proven ideational, campaigning and mobilising power of civil society, as well as the capacity and motivation of state and political actors to engage. Note 1

The European Semester is a multi-annual exchange/discussion between the European Commission and member states to achieve the EU’s targets, both in terms of the Europe 2020 Strategy and of the Stability and Growth Pact.

183

Policy analysis in Ireland

References Acheson, N. and Visser, A. (2016) ‘Traditions, identities and beliefs of civil society actors in the reconstitution of the public sphere: the Advocacy Initiative in Ireland’, Paper presented at the 12th ISTR Conference, Stockholm, 28 June– 1 July. Allen, M. (1998) The Bitter Word: Ireland’s Job Famine and its Aftermath, Dublin: Poolbeg. Benefacts (2018) Nonprofit Sector Analysis 2018: Understanding Ireland’s Third Sector, Dublin. Available at: https://www.benefacts.ie/2018/04/19/nonprofit-sectoranalysis-2018-understanding-irelands-third-sector/# Council of Europe (2020) ‘Covid 19 and sexual and reproductive health and rights: challenges and opportunities’, Parliamentary Webinar, 19 May. CWI (Community Work Ireland) (2015) In Whose Interests?, Galway: CWI. Edwards, M. (2005) ‘Civil society’, The Encyclopedia of Informal Education, infed [Online]. Available at: http://infed.org/mobi/?s=Civil+society Fraser, N. (2013) ‘A triple movement? Parsing the politics of crisis after Polanyi’, New Left Review, 81: 119–32. Goodwin, S. and Phillips, R. (2015) ‘Policy capacity in the community sector’, in B. Head and K. Crowley (eds) Policy Analysis in Australia, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 245–58. Harvey, B. (2014) Are We Paying For That?, Dublin: The Advocacy Initiative. Howlett, M. (2009) ‘Policy analytical capacity and evidence-based policy-making: lessons from Canada’, Canadian Public Administration, 52(2): 153–75. Kirby, P. and Murphy, M. (2011) Towards a Second Republic: Irish Politics after the Celtic Tiger, London: Pluto. Larragy, J. (2014) Asymmetric Engagement: The Community and Voluntary Pillar in Irish Social Partnership, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Lovejoy, K. and Saxton, G.D. (2012) ‘Information, community, and action: how nonprofit organizations use social media’, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 17(3): 337–53. Marks, G. and McAdam, D. (1996) ‘Social movements and the changing structure of political opportunity in the European Union’, West European Politics, 19(2): 249–78. Murphy, M.P. (2011) ‘Civil society in the shadow of the Irish state’, Irish Journal of Sociology, 19(2): 170–87. Murphy, M.P., Maher, M. and Irwin, A. (2020) The Impact of Commissioning and Procurement on Irish Civil Society Advocacy and Services, Maynooth: Maynooth University NWCI (National Women’s Council of Ireland) (2020) ‘NWCI supports women workers and maternity rights’, Press Release, NWCI [Online]. Available at: www.nwci.ie/learn/article/nwci_supports_women_workers_and_maternity_ rights_during_Covid-19 [Accessed 8 July 2020].

184

Civil society organisations and policy analysis

O’Riain, S. (2017) ‘The road to austerity’, in G. Connor, T. Flavin and B. O’Kelly (eds), Austerity and Recovery in Ireland: Europe’s Poster Child and the Great Recession, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 23–39. Pobal (2019) Scheme to Support National Organisations in the Community and Voluntary Sector (SSNO): Annual Progress Report 2017–2018, Dublin: Pobal. Reidy, T. and Buckley, F. (2017) ‘Democratic revolution? Evaluating the political and administrative reform landscape after the economic crises’, Administration, 65(2): 1–12. Visser, A. (2018) ‘Ireland: emerging from crisis’, in B. Harvey (ed) 2018 Report on the State of Civil Society in the EU and Russia, Berlin: EU-Russia Civil Society Forum. Walsh, K., Conlan, S., Hearne, R., Joyce, C., Lynch, C., McCormack, C., Mullen, R. and O’Sullivan D. (2013) In Other Words: Policy Makers’ Perceptions of Social Justice Advocacy, Dublin: The Advocacy Initiative. Available at: www. west-info.eu/third-sector-corruption-when-volunteering-becomes-a-business/ final_in_other_words_research_june_2013/

185

THIRTEEN

Political parties and the policy process Maura Adshead and Diarmuid Scully

Introduction This chapter examines the role that political parties play in the policy process. There already exists a wealth of literature characterising the policy process, to which this book is a welcome addition. Since, however, the focus of this chapter is the role that political parties play in the policy process, we use a very simplified model of the various stages in the policy process in order to examine how Irish political parties operate in each of these stages (see Figure 13.1). We exclude consideration of policy implementation, which is not the concern of political parties per se. For each of these stages in the policy process, we summarise the role that might be expected of political parties in theory and how the Irish system operates in practice. We draw attention to the differences in behaviour between larger and smaller parties that are engendered by the political system, pointing in particular to the peculiar impact of localism on the impact and role of Irish political parties. We examine the key issues facing Irish political parties at each stage of the policy process, giving illustrations and examples to elucidate our points. In carrying out this task, we explore the extent to which the so-called ‘new politics’ might have affected political party roles and performance (see also Chapters Four and Twelve, this volume).

Figure 13.1: A simplified model of the policy process Evaluation

Agenda setting

Implementation

Formulation

Adoption Source: Author

187

Policy analysis in Ireland

Our investigation suggests that what we currently refer to as new politics, that is, governments without a clear majority seeking consensual support for their policies in Dáil Éireann, is not in fact such a new phenomenon in Ireland. There has been no majority government since 1977. Fine Gael’s agreement to support the economic reforms proposed by the minority Fianna Fáil government in 1987 – the so-called Tallaght Strategy (Mitchell, 2003) – together with Fianna Fáil’s decision to abandon the principle of never entering a coalition, by going into government with the Progressive Democrats in 1989 (Mitchell, 2000, p 131), means that no party has governed alone since 1989. Programmatic government has been normalised and consensus seeking has become the de facto modus operandi for mainstream Irish political parties. The reality of the single transferable vote (STV) version of proportional representation (PR) used in Ireland means that no candidate seeking election can afford to stray too far from the wishes of the median voter. To stand out on a limb is to alienate oneself from the potential for vote transfers in the final election count. In this highly proportional system, the opportunity for new and small parties to emerge is very real. What is new about new politics is that this potential is finally being fully realised and that longer established parties are now joined by an increasing number of smaller parties and technical groupings in the Dáil. This raises the potential to shift the balance of power away from the larger political parties, but as our analysis shows, this tendency has been less marked than might have been expected.

Political parties and agenda setting The role of political parties is central to the functional running of representative democracy (Mansbridge, 2003). Parties are intended to aggregate societal demands so that they may be represented and reflected in the political agenda (Downs, 1957; Bingham Powell, 2000). The contestation of ideas between political parties is the bulwark of representative democracy. Despite its obvious historical roots in the Westminster model of government, the Irish party system is more of a ‘consensus democracy’ than a ‘majoritarian democracy’. This is due to the STV version of PR used in the Irish electoral system. PR-STV creates as close a relationship as possible between the proportion of votes and seats won by each party, in order to produce a national parliament that is truly representative of the division of political opinion in the country. The result is highly personalised and localised electoral competition. In this system, every vote counts and seats may be won on very small margins in the fifth or sixth rounds of counts. The result is that Irish political parties are unusually attuned to their local constituency views; even small groups hold a real capacity to influence, and so the political agenda is very much subject to popular opinion. The impact on the role of political parties in policy formulation is twofold. First, the STV system of PR, which allows voters to mark as many preferences as there are candidates in multiple-seat constituencies, not only obliges candidates of the same party to compete against each other, but also 188

Political parties and the policy process

offers the opportunity for voters to switch between parties, according to their preferences. This has a marked centripetal effect on policy positions: candidates from different political parties who are hunting for second and third preference votes tend to cluster policy positions in the middle ground, in order to facilitate voters who may be inclined to switch party affiliations down their list of preference. Second, there is an unusual degree of fluidity on the political agenda between local and national political issues. On the one hand, local issues can quickly become significant issues of national concern. Equally significant, on the other hand, is the way in which the electoral system can refract national policy issues into local politics. Health care provides a perfect example. The vignette in Box 13.1 illustrates how this can work out in practice and shows that notwithstanding an independent national policy review on the most appropriate provision of health care, local political demands were a sufficient driver for one Teachta Dála (TD) to stand against the accepted policy of their political party to the point of being expelled – rather than go against local wishes. The eventual decision of the party to admit the TD into cabinet further illustrates a prevailing political culture that not only tolerates and accepts this kind of behaviour from TDs, but is equally willing to support a TD who ignores the policy analysis provided by independent health care experts employed specifically to assess the situation. Box 13.1: Agenda setting: the fluidity of local/national politics in health care Ireland has a long history of electing independent candidates who campaign on local hospital issues. In the 2002 election, for example, three candidates stood on distinctive health-related platforms. Paudge Connolly (Cavan-Monaghan) stood as the ‘hospital action candidate’, with both Jerry Cowley (Mayo) and Liam Twomey (Wexford) seeking improved, dedicated health services (Gallagher, 2003, p 102). In the 2007 general election, Fine Gael won two of the three seats in the newly formed Roscommon-South Leitrim constituency: Denis Naughten, who had been a TD for Roscommon for ten years; and Frank Feighan, who was new to national politics. As the 2011 election approached, concerns were expressed about the continuation of a 24-hour Accident and Emergency (A&E) service in Roscommon hospital. To retain Fine Gael’s two seats in the constituency, party leader Enda Kenny travelled to Roscommon and made a solemn pledge to retain 24-hour A&E services in Roscommon. Both TDs were re-elected in February 2011 and Enda Kenny became Taoiseach. In June 2011, a nationwide review of hospital care, triggered by the deaths of patients in Ennis and Mallow hospitals, recommended ending the practice of providing 24-hour A&E services in small regional hospitals on patient safety grounds (HIQA, 2011). The 189

Policy analysis in Ireland government, acting on this advice, decided to end 24-hour A&E cover in Roscommon and in other small hospitals around the country. The Sinn Féin party put down a motion calling on the government to reverse its decision. Denis Naughten voted against the government and was expelled from Fine Gael. Frank Feighan voted with the government. Denis Naughten contested the next election as an independent and was re-elected. He then went into government with Fine Gael and became a cabinet minister, before resigning from office in 2018 following controversy over his handling of the rural broadband issue. Frank Feighan, who suffered a considerable public backlash over his support of the government decision in 2011, decided not to contest the 2016 election, but was later nominated to the Seanad (upper house) by Enda Kenny.

In another electoral system, hospital closures and specialised care might be considered issues of national policy rather than issues of specific local concern. Moreover, it could be argued that by allowing local constituencies to vent their concerns via the election of independents, the larger parties are able to treat these as local issues and avoid making them the subject of national political debate. This need not be the case. In the 2007 election, the Fine Gael–Labour coalition of opposition against the incumbent Fianna Fáil–Progressive Democrat government made health one of its primary campaign issues (Brandenburg and Zalinski, 2008). The point is that in the PR-STV electoral system, political parties may choose whether to contest the election on local or national issues, thus providing more opportunities for policy formulation to be determined by a wider range of considerations than political party agendas alone. Political parties and internal policy making All Irish political parties are organised on a geographically defined branch (cumann) network with members belonging to branches based in local electoral areas. Higher levels of the organisations – district executive (comhairle ceanntar), constituency executive (comhairle Dáil ceanntar) – comprise delegates selected by these branches. In all parties, the supreme policy-making body is the annual national conference (ard fhéis), open to all members. Between annual conferences (ard fhéiseanna), the national executive – comprising the party leader, senior TDs and party members elected at the conference – is responsible for overseeing the running of the party, including the adoption of policy. In theory, party members through the branch network, through their votes at ard fhéiseanna and through representative forums such as the constituency and national executives, have considerable say over party policy, but in practice this is rarely the case. Most members are ‘convention fodder’ signed up by TDs and aspirant TDs to deliver votes at candidate selection time. TDs cannot risk a rival gaining control of sufficient delegate votes to seize a nomination from them and accordingly ensure that party membership lists are well padded with 190

Political parties and the policy process

family, friends and neighbours. Such members are not expected, or facilitated, to contribute to the policy agenda in any significant way. Policy in Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil has for many years been largely determined by the front benches and approved by the parliamentary parties. Ard fhéiseanna still play a formal role, but they have become largely stage-managed affairs with speakers and motions being chosen by the party headquarters staff. Little if any real debate occurs any more. Local party organisations are primarily concerned with managing intra-party electoral competition and members play little if any role in the development of policy. These traditionally larger parties have a decentralised system of candidate selection and both, typically, run more than one candidate per constituency. This leads to a high degree of intra-party competition. Managing this competition becomes a major focus of the party both locally and nationally and a factor that inhibits the party membership’s role in policy formation. In policy terms, parties now compete as what Katz and Mair (1995) describe as cartel parties: professionalised parties that have become less attached to their (largely symbolic) membership and more a part of ‘the system’, using an effective leadership to compete for the balance of power and often distancing themselves from grass roots. For Fine Gael, the decisive moment came when the party’s 2002 ard fhéis adopted the report of the Strategy Review Group (Flannery, 2002), effectively centralising policy-making power in the office of the party leader. For Fianna Fáil, the strongest demonstration is perhaps Micheál Martin’s decision, in early 2018, to commit the party to supporting the repeal of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution despite the fact that in excess of 80% of members at the party’s ard fhéis, just a few weeks previously, had voted to adopt the opposite policy. Other parties, such as the Labour Party and in particular the Greens, have a very high degree of internal democracy. The Green Party is perhaps the most open to policy proposals from the membership and was so against the idea of being dominated by the centre that for many years operated without a formal party leader, only electing one in 2001, 20 years after the party’s formation and 12 years after it won its first Dáil seat. Labour Party ard fhéiseanna tend to be more openly democratic with decisions on such matters as whether to participate in government being decided by the membership, but in practice most party policy, particularly when the party is in government, is also determined by the parliamentary party. For example, it is party policy that the leader be elected by the membership, but in the 2016 Labour leadership election the parliamentary party managed to ensure that Brendan Howlin was the only candidate nominated. Neither Labour nor the Greens tend to run multiple candidates in constituencies. This lack of intra-party competition at the electoral level may perhaps account, in part, for the greater freedom to engage in policy discussion. In both parties, decisions that are elsewhere made at the centre, for instance on whether to enter government, have long been decided by the membership rather than the parliamentary party. Policies advocated by these parties have a habit of being initially opposed by the main parties only to be adopted by them later. Examples include civil divorce, same-sex marriage and carbon tax. 191

Policy analysis in Ireland

Sinn Féin is a party going through a double transition: from being a small party that did not usually run multiple candidates, to a larger party that occasionally does; and from being a paramilitary-led organisation to parliamentary-led one. Traditionally, policy in Sinn Féin was set by the centre with little direct input by party members. This sort of democratic centralism was also a feature of the former Workers’ Party and continues to be the norm in the parties of the far left where effective input by party members into policy making is often extremely limited. On the one hand, as Sinn Féin makes the journey from the margins of Irish politics to the centre ground, albeit on the left, we can expect party members to play an increasing role. However, as the party grows and the opportunities to run more than one candidate appear, the prevailing logic of centralised party organisation may counter this trend. Ireland is the only country in the European Union (EU) that regularly elects large numbers of independents to its parliament (Ehin et al, 2013). Independent TDs by definition do not have political parties, but by offering their support to parties in need of their number to make up a majority, they may have quite a degree of influence on policy. A case in point would be independent TD Shane Ross, who as Minister for Transport and Tourism in the Fine Gael minority government supported by his group of independents, used his position in government to propose an overhaul of the system of judicial appointments. Typically, however, independents who are policy-driven are less common than those who are locally motivated and their presence in government often does much to shore up the influence of localism in national policy making.

Political parties and policy formulation Notwithstanding the significance of the PR-STV electoral system in Irish politics, it is still the case that Irish governments are formed and run by political parties (Laver, 2005). Still, however, the need for candidates to garner preferences beyond first place does not encourage them to take up policy positions outside the identifiable ‘middle ground’. The political behaviour generated by this system, in terms of the dynamics created by both the inter- and intra-party competition, results in political parties that tend to ‘follow’ public opinion rather than taking an independent lead on policy issues themselves. The likelihood of governing in coalition further encourages this tendency. The result is that a great deal of policy formulation is shunted, whenever possible, to consensus-oriented processes and mechanisms. These may be technocratic, driven by policy experts and civil servants in policy-specific ‘task forces’; or pragmatic, as was the case for many years in the system of national social partnership that lasted from 1987 to the global financial crisis in (Adshead, 2011; see also Chapter Ten, this volume). More recently, the Citizens’ Assembly has served as a means to formulate policy proposals on contentious policy issues (Farrell et al, 2013; Suiter et al, 2014; see also Chapter Fifteen, this volume).

192

Political parties and the policy process

During the period of social partnership (1987–2009), Fianna Fáil-led governments acted in the role of ‘honest broker’, mediating between the interests of the social partners – workers, employers, farmers. There was a short break with the advent of the ‘Rainbow Coalition’ (1994–97), which continued the partnership arrangements in place, while arguably further complicating them by adding a place at the table for the community and voluntary sector (Meade, 2005; Larragy, 2006). These agreements, negotiated with and through government, removed much of the process of policy making away from the Oireachtas and from party political competition (Adshead, 2011). It is notable that Fianna Fáil never lost control of government formation in elections while social partnership was in place. In 2011, Fine Gael replaced Fianna Fáil as the largest party in Ireland, governing first in coalition with Labour and then, after the 2016 general election, with the support of independents and Fianna Fáil. Nevertheless, Fine Gael-led governments have shown an equal tendency to secure a national consensus before embarking on significant policy change. While this is partly due to the party’s weak position in the Dáil, it is equally a consequence of preferring to follow a popular policy consensus on potentially divisive social issues. Despite enjoying the largest majority in the history of the state, the 2011–16 Fine Gael–Labour coalition failed to reach an agreed position on marriage equality – opting instead to kick the issue over to a citizen-led deliberative assembly in the form of the Constitutional Convention (see Chapter Fifteen, this volume). It was through a similar extra-parliamentary body that a policy formulation was eventually proposed to legislate for abortion, enabling the government to finally tackle a policy issue that few political parties had been keen to pursue (see Chapter Twelve, this volume). Both of these issues illustrate the capacity for mainstream political parties to ignore important policy issues, either because they believe there is a consensus in favour of the status quo, or because they perceive an issue to be too divisive to render a ready consensus for policy change. The pressure to pragmatically follow public opinion on key policy issues, rather than provide a principled policy lead, is relieved by the willingness of Irish political parties to shunt divisive policy issues into citizen-led deliberative forums, in the hope that they can build an ‘external consensus’ without larger political parties needing to take a stand before they are certain of where most support lies. It is in this context that independents and smaller political parties are provided with an opportunity to exert influence beyond their numbers because of the dynamics of the Irish electoral system. The effect of this consensus-seeking approach is that among the traditionally mainstream parties (Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil, Labour), electoral competition has been based as much on competence and delivery as it has on any particular political ideology. Within this context, smaller and more ideologically driven parties can enjoy a degree of influence on the public policy process out of proportion to their status or size. Smaller parties often play the role of ‘taste testers’ for new ideas, proposing them in the public domain through both parliamentary and non-parliamentary processess. If these ideas gain public support, the major 193

Policy analysis in Ireland

parties adopt and implement them. This process of policy transmission from minor to major parties has the effect of both increasing the influence of smaller parties while preserving the electoral dominance of the larger.

Policy adoption When it comes to adopting policy, in the Irish system, the balance of power between government and parliament has historically been clearly tipped in the government’s favour. Based as it was on the Westminister model, the Irish parliament was not originally intended to be a policy driver, or initiator, in its own right, but rather to approve draft legislation placed before it by government (Robinson, 1974, p 6). The drafting of legislation is carried out by specialist barristers in the Office of Parliamentary Draftsmen, operating under the auspices of the Attorney General (Donelan, 1992, p 3). Until the 2016 Dáil reforms, the government’s control of the parliamentary agenda, reflected in its standing orders, severely restricted Private Members’ Bills (PMBs), supporting the view that in Ireland the legislative agenda is clearly controlled by government (MacCarthaigh, 2005, p 115; see also Chapter Seven, this volume). Only rarely would a PMB, or amendment to a government law, be accepted, and usually with major revisions by departmental legal drafters, at the request of the relevant minister. The 2016 reforms were intended to shift this balance, giving TDs a new potential to enhance their role as legislators. The 2016 Dáil reforms led to the creation of a Business Committee, meeting weekly to consider the allocation of time to the business of the Dáil. In its weekly report, the Business Committee sets out arrangements for dealing with items of business, including speaking times, taking legislation in the Dáil and Select Committees, and sitting times and adjournments, as well as the selection of business for Thursday afternoons, such as PMBs or committee reports. Essentially, without the power to guillotine debates, the government would require the support of the Dáil to pass its legislation. Although intended to invigorate and empower TDs in their legislative function, the reality has been less ground-breaking. As dozens of new Bills began passing the second stage, the government soon learned that instead of feebly opposing a Bill, it was easier to acquiesce and wave it through, leaving it in legislative limbo at the committee stage. Bills are at best delayed, but sometimes deadened, first, by the reluctance of government departments to cede power, over the drafting and content of laws, to the Oireachtas, and second, by constitutional provisions regarding government control of finances. Article  17.2 of the Constitution provides that any proposed cost to the exchequer in a Bill must be approved, in advance, by government before the Bill can proceed. Notwithstanding the apparent powers to the Dáil, legislation still requires government endorsement to pass. In this context, it is hard to argue that PMBs reflect the triumph of the legislature over the executive in the provision of policy, since in reality they are impossible to pass without the support of government parties and backbenchers. 194

Political parties and the policy process

Figure 13.2: Legislative activity of Dáil Eireann, 2004–18 160

Bills proposed

140

Bills enacted

120 100 80 60 40 20 0

4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 200 200 200 200 200 200 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201

Source: Compiled using Houses of the Oireachtas open data application programming interfaces

As Figure 13.2 illustrates, although there has been a dramatic increase in the number of PMBs presented to the Dáil since 2011, the amount of legislation passed by the Dáil has remained virtually unchanged. In 2018, five PMBs were passed into law, while 100 more languished in committee stage. This is usually because of the government’s use of Article 17.2. For example, a Bill proposed by Labour Party leader Brendan Howlin TD outlawing online harassment was blocked on the grounds that it could give rise to additional administrative costs for the gardaí (police) if they have to investigate a new type of crime (Irish Examiner, 2018). The use of this procedure means that despite the recent capacity of the Dáil to set its own agenda, government still has an effective veto on the progression of legislation. This is not to say that there have been no changes. The post-2011 Dáil reforms did succeed in providing more time to debate PMBs in their first and second stages. While this might not result in more such Bills being passed the very fact that they are being debated at length in the Dáil means that parliament has become a more effective venue for the contestation of policy ideas. The increase in PMBs since 2011 correlates with increasing political party fragmentation, suggesting an opportunity to air a broader range of policy ideas. Still, the fact that these opportunities are often regarded primarily as vehicles to expose policy issues, rather than an effective means to introduce legislative change, suggests that they do not provide a platform for qualitatively increasing policy analysis, as might be expected in the later stages of the passage of a Bill. The government’s habit of taking the broadest possible view of what constitutes an unacceptable cost to implement legislation has further supported this approach to PMBs, and led to the accusation that many PMBs are now 195

Policy analysis in Ireland

used to attract the public’s attention to an issue, rather than to propogate real policy change. The result is that even when bright new policy ideas are given space in PMBs, in their desire to capture the support of the majority, the larger parties tend to be risk-averse, preferring to follow an established policy consensus, rather than take a lead on issues of public concern. Still, as Irish governments track record on abortion demonstrates (see Chapter Twelve, this volume), as soon as popular support becomes apparent, these same parties are often remarkably quick to adopt new policy. In 2011, only the Labour Party was in favour of marriage equality. By 2015, an amendment to the Constitution had been passed with the support of every party in the Dáil. Policies to tackle climate change and even opposition to water charges have shown similar trajectories. In all cases, the larger parties either opposed change or avoided engaging with the issue at all until it was shown to be electorally significant. This tendency reinforces the influence of smaller parties and groups, while maintaining the political dominance of larger parties. Evidence for this idea that Irish governments happily steal popular opposition policies comes from an analysis of some 20,000 campaign promises made in 57 elections across 12 countries (Thomson et al, 2017). A little over 50% of the campaign pledges made by Irish governments since 1977 have been fulfilled. This places Ireland ninth of the 12 countries surveyed, slightly ahead of Bulgaria, Austria and Italy. When Thomson and colleagues (2017) looked at the promises made by the parties that did not get into government, however, they found that in the Irish case a remarkable number of these, almost 40%, were also implemented. This was the second highest rate of opposition pledge fulfilment in the study. Only Germany implements more, though Germany has a much higher rate of government pledge fulfilment. In other words, for every ten of their own policies that Irish governments implement, they implement seven of their opponents’ policies.

Policy evaluation The principal opportunity for political parties to extend their role in terms of policy evaluation is via Oireachtas committees. With the great exception of the Dáil Committee of Public Accounts – known commonly as the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) – political parties have been reticent to expand this opportunity until very recently (see Chapter Seven, this volume). It was not until the Fine Gael–Labour coalition of 1982–87 that ‘the first efforts to construct a meaningful committee system were made’ (O’Halpin, 1998, p 135). Following pre-election promises, the Fine Gael–Labour government increased the number of Oireachtas committees from seven to 16. While some of the impetus for the new committees certainly arose as a consequence of the growing legislative workload arising with EU membership (MacCarthaigh, 2005, p 138), the sheer variety of topics covered – including women’s rights, marriage breakdown, small businesses, cooperation with developing countries, the Irish 196

Political parties and the policy process

language and vandalism – is suggestive of both inter- and intra-party pressures (Chubb, 1992, p 203). Despite this, however, in 1987 the returning Fianna Fáil government did not re-establish them, limiting its creation of new committees to only three (women’s rights, the Irish language and commercial state-sponsored bodies). Chubb (1992, p 203) argues that: A combination of Fianna Fáil’s traditional lack of enthusiasm for intrusive committees; the failure of the Dáil to debate more than a few of the reports that they had produced; the reluctance of all but a few of their members to put much effort into them; and the equivocal attitude of Deputies generally, all combined to spell the end of the first – flawed – attempt at grafting a comprehensive committee system on to the procedures of the Oireachtas. Since 1993, committees have become a permanent feature of the House and have been credited with several important developments (see the vignette in Box 13.2) (MacCarthaigh, 2005, pp 139–47). Most notably in 2006, the Supreme Court upheld the right of an Oireachtas committee set up to inquire into the conduct of Judge Brian Curtin to investigate all allegations against the judge. The judge had been acquitted for possession of child pornography when it was discovered that the warrant under which his computer was seized was out of date (The Irish Times, 2006a). In consequence, the right of the Oireachtas committee under Article 35.4.1 of the Constitution and section 39 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 to consider the impeachment of a judge for ‘stated misbehaviour’ was upheld, creating a significant legal precedent for the removal of judges by the legislature (The Irish Times, 2006b; see also Chapter Seven, this volume). Box 13.2: Policy evaluation: the constraints to committees In 1999, PAC – chaired, as is tradition, by a member of the opposition, in this case Jim Mitchell TD of Fine Gael – conducted 26 days of public hearings into allegations that major banks had been assisting some customers in evading Deposit Interest Retention Tax.The inquiry shone a light on widespread financial malpractice and yielded significant returns to the state in terms of taxes and penalties. Much public praise was heaped on the PAC and Jim Mitchell was named by The Irish Times as ‘Politician of the Year’. A few months later in Abbeylara, County Longford, an armed garda shot dead John Carthy in controversial circumstances. Inquiries into the shooting by the gardaí and by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation exonerated the officers involved but did little to alleviate public concerns. The Oireachtas Committee on Justice, Equality and Women’s Affairs began its own inquiry. Thirty-six individual members of the gardaí challenged the right of the committee to call them to appear before it. This challenge was upheld in the High Court and on appeal to the Supreme Court where it was found 197

Policy analysis in Ireland that Oireachtas committees have no right in law to make findings of fact against named individuals. In 2011, the newly elected Fine Gael–Labour government attempted to amend the Constitution to restore such powers of investigation to Oireachtas committees. The proposed amendment was voted down by the public. In 2014, the PAC, now chaired by Fianna Fáil TD, John McGuinness, held hearings on the use of public money by the Rehab Group. The group’s chief executive officer (CEO), Angela Kerins, appeared before the committee and was questioned about her salary among other matters. She resigned as CEO shortly after citing the impact of the investigation on Rehab and on her personally. In 2016, she took a High Court case arguing that the PAC had exceeded its remit. The High Court found that it had no jurisdiction in this matter. The Supreme Court, on appeal, disagreed and in a preliminary judgment in February 2019 found that the courts could find the actions of the PAC unlawful if either the committee itself or any individual members had acted outside their terms of reference. In the final judgment delivered on 29 May 2019, the Supreme Court found in favour of Ms Kerins. The PAC did act unlawfully in subjecting her to questioning outside the terms of reference of the inquiry. The way is now open for Ms Kerins to seek damages from the state.

The 2016 Dáil reforms, together with the proliferation of smaller parties, technical groups and independents, has meant that Dáil committees now potentially offer a platform to interrogate government action more publicly. Indeed, more recently it has become a common occurrence for the work of Dáil committees to make political headway. This was certainly the case when, during the 2018 presidential election, the PAC announced its decision to investigate presidential expenditure (Morgan, 2018). Still, however, Dáil committees have tended to act as vehicles to highlight individual TD performances and the credit – or otherwise – has been linked only indirectly to the political parties to which they belong.

Conclusion: what’s new about ‘new politics’? Since 1977, no political party has won a majority in an election to Dáil Éireann and no single party government has held power since 1989. Even before these dates, minority governments and consensus-based politics were a necessary feature of Irish politics. The last Cumman na nGaedhal government (1927–32) was supported from the opposition benches by the Farmers’ Party and independents, while the formation of the first Fianna Fáil-led administration (1932–33) was facilitated, from opposition, by the Labour Party. The general election of early February 2020 resulted in the formation of a collation government comprising Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Green Party in late June following months of negotiations. The participation of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael in the same 198

Political parties and the policy process

government was seen by many as signifying the end of civil war politics almost a century after that conflict took place. Thirty-one general elections have been held since independence. In only five of these have voters given a single party a majority of seats. Multi-party coalitions and minority governments reliant on support from opposition parties or independents in the Dáil have held power for more than 70 of the 97 years since the foundation of the state. The idea that political dynamics have changed massively since the financial crisis and the collapse of support for Fianna Fáil directly after it is perhaps a misleading one. The ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement, whereby Fianna Fáil provides support to the minority Fine Gael and independent government elected in 2016 is not unique. The same situation occurred in reverse, in the socalled Tallaght strategy of 1987–89, when the main opposition party, Fine Gael, supported a minority Fianna Fáil government in getting its legislative agenda through the Dáil. This lack of single-party majoritarianism has gone hand in hand with a remarkably stable party system. In every single general election from 1932 to 2007, Fianna Fáil won the largest number of seats and Fine Gael the second largest, with Labour generally taking third place. What is new about new politics, then, is the defenestration of Fianna Fáil and the consequent reordering of political parties, technical groups and independents. In all else, however, the operation of political parties in the policy process is much as it ever was. This combination of the long-term dominance of electoral politics by Fianna Fáil and the ongoing need for Fianna Fáil – and less frequently Fine Gael – to seek support from other parties, independents and even the opposition, is that Irish politics developed in an essentially consensual manner. Fianna Fáil traditionally competed in elections as a catch-all party of the nation, seeking to represent all sections of society. The emphasis was placed on stability and capability rather than ideology and, as this chapter demonstrates, this approach has included a strong willingness to adopt the policy positions of their opponents when they proved popular with the public. Viewed in this light, it was the use of a government majority at the behest of the EU Troika1 to force through controversial measures such as the local property tax and water charges – without first seeking and attaining broad public consensus for these measures – which can be seen as an anomaly in Irish political practice, a factor that goes someway to explain the extent of the public protests engendered by these moves and the recalibration to more usual politicking thereafter. Note 1

Trioka refers to the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that together provided a three year financial aid programme to Ireland, starting in 2010. The aid was conditional on austerity measures being imposed on Irish society so as to reduce government expenditure.

199

Policy analysis in Ireland

References Adshead, M. (2011) ‘An advocacy coalition framework approach to the rise and fall of social partnership’, Irish Political Studies, 26(1): 73–93. Bingham Powell, G. (2000) Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Views, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Brandenburg, H. and Zalinski, Z. (2008) ‘The media and the campaign’, in M. Gallagher and M. Marsh (eds) How Ireland Voted 2007: The Full Story of Ireland’s General Election, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 167–86. Chubb, B. (1992) The Government and Politics of Ireland, London: Longman. Donelan, E.J. (1992) ‘The role of the parliamentary draftsman in the preparation of legislation in Ireland’, Dublin University Law Journal, 14(1): 1–18. Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, NY: Harper. Ehin, P., Madies, U., Solvak, M., Taggepera, R. and Vassil, K. (2013) Independent Candidates in National and European Elections, Brussels: European Parliament, DG for Internal Policies, Policy Department C – Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs. Farrell, D.M., O’Malley, E. and Suiter, J. (2013) ‘Deliberative democracy in action Irish-style: the 2011 We the Citizens pilot Citizens’ Assembly’, Irish Political Studies, 28(1): 99–113. Flannery, F. (2002) Report of the Strategy Review Group, Dublin: Fine Gael Archives, University College Dublin. Gallagher, M. (2003) ‘Stability and turmoil: analysis of the results’, in M. Gallagher, M. Marsh and P. Mitchell (eds) How Ireland Voted 2002, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 88–118. HIQA (Health Information and Quality Authority) (2011) International Review of Data Quality, Dublin: Health Information and Quality Authority. Irish Examiner (2018) ‘Government under fire as over 240 bills in limbo’, 20 March. Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. (1995) ‘Changing models of party organization and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party’, Party Politics, 1(1): 5–28. Larragy, J. (2006) ‘Origins and significance of the Community and Voluntary Pillar in Irish social partnership’, Economic and Social Review, 37(3): 375–98. Laver, M. (2005) ‘Policy and the dynamics of political competition’, American Political Science Review, 99(2): 263–81. MacCarthaigh, M. (2005) Accountability in Irish Parliamentary Politics, Dublin: IPA. Mansbridge, J. (2003) ‘Rethinking representation’, American Political Science Review, 97(4): 515–28. Meade, R. (2005) ‘We hate it here, please let us stay! Irish social partnershp and the community and voluntary sector’s conflicted experiences of recognition’, Critical Social Policy, 25(3): 349–73. Mitchell, P. (2000) ‘Ireland: from single party to coalition rule’, in W.C. Muller and K. Strom (eds) Coalition Governments in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 126–57.

200

Political parties and the policy process

Mitchell, P. (2003) ‘Government formation in 2002: “You can have any kind of government as long as it’s Fianna Fáil”’, in M. Gallagher, M. Marsh and P. Mitchell (eds) How Ireland Voted 2002, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 214–29. Morgan, D.G. (2018) ‘Higgins expenses are not beyond scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee’, The Irish Times, 25  September. Available at: www. irishtimes.com/opinion/higgins-expenses-are-not-beyond-scrutiny-by-thepublic-accounts-committee-1.3640074 O’Halpin, E. (1998) ‘A changing relationship? Parliament and government in Ireland’, in P. Norton (ed) Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe, London: Frank Cass, pp 123–41. Robinson, M.T.W. (1974) ‘The role of the Irish parliament’, Administration, 21(3): 3–25. Suiter, J., Farrell, D.M. and O’Malley, E. (2014) ‘When do deliberative citizens change their opinions? Evidence from the Irish Citizens’ Assembly’, International Political Science Review, 37(2): 198–212. The Irish Times (2006a) ‘Curtin case’, 10 March. Available at: www.irishtimes. com/news/curtin-case-1.1026175 The Irish Times (2006b) ‘The Curtin case’, 14 November. Available at: www. irishtimes.com/opinion/the-curtin-case-1.1028856 Thomson, R., Royed, R., Naurin, E., Artes, J., Costello, R., Ennser-Jedenastick, L., Ferguson, M., Kostandinova, P., Moury, C., Petry, F. and Praprontnik, K. (2017) ‘The fulfilment of parties’ election pledges: a comparative study on the impact of power sharing’, American Journal of Political Science, 61(3): 527–42.

201

FOURTEEN

Gender expertise and policy analysis Pauline Cullen

Introduction Phillips (2007, p 505) defines policy capacity as ‘the ability to provide policy analysis and advice, participate effectively and exert influence in policy development’. Gendering policy analysis requires capacity to have sufficient expertise to apply gender as a variable in the different processes that combine to generate policy analysis, including research and knowledge production. Gender expertise features as a component of policy analysis at different levels of governance and is used to inform and legitimate decisions of corporations, local, regional and national governments, intergovernmental organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Kunz et al, 2019). The individuals and institutions that offer gender expertise vary, as do the activities performed by them. Academics, private consultancy firms, NGOs, women’s policy agencies and bureaucrats provide gender expertise through activities such as gender audits, gender budgeting, research and analysis, gender consultation, gender training and gender assessments. While the number of organisations both seeking and providing expertise seems to have increased, the question of what constitutes gender expertise remains open to debate (Hoard, 2015, p 22). This chapter seeks to answer that and other questions. How is gender expertise understood and operationalised in Irish policy? How has it featured in Irish public policy analysis and to what effect? In conceptual terms, the aim is to characterise gender expertise in terms of its content, objectives and practice, and understand common factors that lead to the advice and recommendations of gender experts being incorporated into public policy. The United Nations (UN), the World Bank and the International Labour Organization, alongside the European Union (EU), are but a few of the most prominent contexts where such gender expertise on issues including gender and violent conflict, gender and labour market participation, gender and health outcomes and gender and education proliferate. As Kunz and Prügl (2019, p 4) in their account of the state of gender expertise observe, ‘the salience given to gender equality in international policymaking, including most recently the sustainable development goals (SDGs), has raised new demands for gender expertise in areas ranging from health and education, to clean water and climate change’. Gender expertise is a form of knowledge that has a material, social and discursive impact (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007; Bacchi, 2009) and that operates 203

Policy analysis in Ireland

within relations and networks of actors across time and space with powerful effects.1 While feminist analysis has been key to gendering the study of expertise, more recently, intersectional perspectives have gained prominence (Azocar and Ferree, 2016). A focus on gender expertise allows us to ask questions about the barriers to the successful application of gender equality policies, as well as the mechanisms through which gender inequality is maintained in practice (Cavaghan, 2017). In this context, norms and values regarding the perception of evidence come together to influence the way gender can be perceived and practised and how it is understood in policy analysis. This framework is applied to an assessment of gender expertise evident in specific policy areas in Ireland. This chapter first reviews literature that has reflected on what gender expertise is, whom gender experts are, how gender expertise is organised and what its potential and limits are (Hoard, 2015; Bustelo et al, 2016; Kunz et al, 2019). Then follows a brief overview of its influence in analysis of policies to combat violence against women (VAW). Gender budgeting (GB) is then detailed as a case study to explore how gender expertise is constrained within institutions, networks and policies, and how it produces multiple and sometimes unintended outcomes with political effects (Kunz et al, 2019, p 23).

What is gender expertise? What constitutes gender expertise and who gets to make the claim to be a gender expert is highly contested (Ferguson, 2015). Kunz and Prügl (2019, pp 7–8) suggest that the understanding of gender expertise is affected by the source and type of knowledge that constitutes gender expertise; the objectives of gender expertise and its relationship with feminism; and the recognition of expertise and the broader context of gender expertise work. Specialist knowledge about gender relations and the packaging of this knowledge as expertise is largely attributed to work of the feminist movement in the 20th century (Kunz and Prügl, 2019, p 4). The intent, although contested, of gender expertise is in part to transfer feminist and gender theory into policy analysis and making. However, feminist knowledge is also often positioned as ‘non-knowledge’ that can be ignored or obscured in organisational contexts in what has been termed strategic ignorance (McGoey, 2012). Knowledge produced by women, feminist and gender scholars is at the same time ‘gendered expertise’, understood in material and embodied ways as feminine, flawed or partial (Pereira, 2017) or ideological and therefore without merit. As such, gender expertise and gender experts are not always successful in influencing policy making. Depending on the audience, gender expert work and knowledge can be characterised as incisive feminist critique, or alternatively feminist ideas that are used by the state or market actors to support their agendas that may undermine gender equality (Griffin, 2015; Fraser, 2016). Either way, these forms of knowledge shape how the meaning of gender equality may be understood and 204

Gender expertise and policy analysis

advanced or resisted (Cullen et al, 2019). Despite contests over who gender experts are and what gender expertise is, research tells us how such work and knowledge have been managed in ways that create important policy changes and deliver on gender equality goals (Ferguson, 2019). In this chapter, gender expertise is linked to policy expertise, where analyses indicate that the effects and objectives of gender expertise (whether feminist or not) are varied and sometimes contradictory. Policy changes can be an outcome of gender expertise, and even the fundamental reframing of social problems (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007), but gender expertise may also underline forms of gender essentialism and be implicated in forms of social control that result in exclusion and discrimination. Whatever the outcome, gender expertise makes its way into policy when it has received recognition and validation. This is a process that occurs within a network of actors and interests, where gender expertise is performed, negotiated and enacted (Dersnah, 2019; Kunz et al, 2019).

Who are gender experts? The development of gender expertise is accompanied by the emergence of a group known as ‘gender experts’ who define a body of knowledge and establish a profession as they market their ideas to governments, businesses, civil society and international organisations (Ferguson, 2019). Their aims are to insert gender considerations into various issues and policy analysis and/or transform organisational practices. Gender experts have been defined as ‘bureaucrats’ and ‘femocrats’ in feminist triangles of cooperation and influence (Woodward, 2004). The policy terrain of gender expertise and analysis is populated by academics, private consultants, gender trainers and public sector employees. The generation of new knowledge, implementation of gender mainstreaming, training and/or ‘gender-sensitive projects’ all feature as elements of the work of gender experts. Gender experts face many pressures to affirm feminist principles in their work and or align with the institutions and organisations that hire them and may have other agendas (Bustelo et al, 2016).

Gender expertise and knowledge about gender Gender expertise may mark the professionalisation of feminist knowledge when the intent to achieve deep structural changes end up as box-ticking, mapping and scoping exercises that are apolitical, technical and managerial (Marx, 2018). Gender mainstreaming in particular has been critiqued for how it can be a superficial administrative exercise that tends to ‘evaporate’ within institutional contexts (McGauran, 2005; Newman, 2013). Feminists and women’s organisations that provide gender expertise to, or legitimate that produced for, the state by gender experts can find their goals displaced by other agendas, including state commitments to economic liberalism and of austerity (O’Dwyer, 2018). While gender expertise was sought as a way of solving the governance deficits 205

Policy analysis in Ireland

of the post-2008 economic crisis, with a push for more women in economic decision making (Hozić and True, 2016), in reality austerity was dependent on the absorption of unpaid care work by women and social disinvestment more broadly (in cutting public spending), which has had significant and deleterious gendered effects (Kantola and Lombardo, 2017). As such, the application of a specific kind of gender expertise in the absence of a systematic gendered analysis of policies aimed at economic ‘reform’ has delivered deeply gendered unequal outcomes for women, particularly migrants and minority ethnic groups, and those who are poor (Emejulu and Bassel, 2017). These developments are also linked to long-term moves in new public management as applied to policy analysis that view the community sector, including women’s organisations, as sources of policy evidence and expertise (on policy evidence, see Chapter Five, this volume). The search for expert knowledge, including forms of gender expertise, that fits with market logics may be at the expense of community knowledge, and may privilege larger organisations or eclipse the advocacy role of civil society more broadly (Harvey, 2014; Milbourne and Murray, 2017) (see Chapter Twelve, this volume). The deprioritisation of gender equality as a policy goal, justified in part by the post-2008 economic crisis (Karamessini and Rubery, 2014; Jacquot, 2017) and now assumed solvable by ‘recovery’ also raises issues for the role of gender expertise in policy analysis. Social conservatism, neoliberalism and nationalism (Elomäki and Kantola, 2018), as well as populist right-wing social and political formations (Verloo, 2018) that oppose greater gender equality, may be read as an indication of the perceived success of gender expertise (Kunz et al, 2019). However, it also complicates how gender experts and gender expertise is viewed, where and in what form it is deployed, and to what effect. The next section outlines the context for gender expertise in policy analysis in Ireland and then, through case studies of policies to combat VAW and GB, explores the factors that facilitate the policy success of gender expertise and how best to understand its variable outcomes.

Gender equality and gender expertise in Ireland Ireland is a highly globalised economic regime with a hybrid welfare system that combines strong liberal characteristics with conservative and Catholic features and a strong male breadwinner regime (Murphy and Cullen, 2018a). Gender is coded in constitutional protections for women in the home, which sit in tension with the activation of women in labour markets (Devitt, 2016). As a relatively lowtax economy, Ireland also lacks capacity to fund socially necessary reproductive and care work, and as a result such work remains feminised in the sphere of the private household (and even more so since austerity). Social disinvestment in the wider care infrastructure, exacerbated by forms of permanent austerity, also leaves women responsible for unpaid care work while many work in low-paid care work (Murphy and Cullen, 2018a). 206

Gender expertise and policy analysis

Despite the introduction in 2016 of a gender quota for national electoral candidates, Ireland occupies 80th place in the global league of parliamentary inequality. Women currently make up just 22% of the national parliament and 24% of local elected politicians. The deficit in gender representation combines with other gendered penalties, such as high-cost childcare and until recently restrictive access to reproductive rights, to reinforce gender inequality. While there is at best a weak tradition of state feminism in Ireland, austerity made possible the eradication of equality infrastructure aimed at gender, poverty and racial discrimination and its replacement with a broader human rights and equality body, the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC). A standalone women’s rights parliamentary committee was also subsumed into the broader ‘equality’ structures, resulting in no specific mandate on gender equality evident within the parliamentary committee structures or policy analysis processes. Other bodies, including a Women’s Health Council, were also closed during austerity, further narrowing the options for the production of gender expertise and the opportunity for gendered policy analysis (Harvey, 2014; Murphy and Cullen, 2018a). Civil society groups including women’s organisations experienced austerity-era cuts in funding (in the order of 40%), which means that the overall gender equality architecture is under-resourced. Women’s organisations have weak capacity to analyse policy and to produce gender expertise, reliant often on external academic or international think tanks, or transnational networks of gender experts. However, the state does procure gender expertise from civil society, including women’s groups, to inform ‘evidence-based’ policy. Such funding has helped organisations survive funding cuts, but also ties them to state or market policy agendas with consequences for the forms of gender expertise produced (Cullen and Murphy, 2016). Mirroring developments at EU level on gender equality, national state action plans on gender equality have been downgraded to the status of strategies that lack targets and timelines (Murphy and Cullen, 2018a). Public policy making overall lacks any systematic gender proofing or gendered analysis, outside of episodic efforts of women’s organisations during pre-budget periods, one-off topical reports and more recent efforts to promote gender budgeting (see Case study 1) (Murphy and Cullen, 2018a, 2018b). Other social justice think tanks do provide research and expertise on low pay, poverty and tax justice (SJI, 2019) that can support gendered policy analysis. Analysis of child poverty, lone parents’ access to the labour market (SSVP, 2019) and family homelessness (Mayock and Bretherton, 2017), alongside reports on the gender pay gap (Doorley, 2018), pensions (SJI, 2018) and care and unpaid labour (Russell et al, 2019), feature elements of gender expertise. While some of these analyses offer valuable and otherwise largely absent gender disaggregated data, they seldom make explicit the gendered dynamics of the issue and are either viewed within a human rights or social justice charity framework, or from the perspective of ‘objective’ think tank analysis. In the absence of national gender expertise and adequate data (on policy evidence, see Chapter Five, this volume), international data, including analysis from the EU 207

Policy analysis in Ireland

Country Specific Recommendations, the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) and UN Convention Against the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) processes, are used by women’s organisations to highlight gender equality issues. State and corporate projects to deal with gender inequality, in higher education (HEA, 2016), corporations (Government of Ireland, 2019) and cultural industries (Donohue et al, 2017), have also emerged, although most involve mapping, scoping and measuring female under-representation. These initiatives and their associated forms of gender expertise are often a product of EU initiatives and/or a response to more proximate domestic feminist activism, usually over decades. Issues tend to gain traction in policy circles when ignited by public scandal or populist, single-issue framing that gains the support of elites in forms of politically motivated opportunism (Cullen and Murphy, 2016). The forms of gender expertise produced by these exercises can include statistical evidence and or survey data to establish the existence of gender inequality but may rely on media-friendly soundbites and personal ‘story telling’ to gain resonance. The development of a statistical evidence base is significant, especially in the absence of gender disaggregated data in Ireland. However, it can also underemphasise the power dimension of gender struggles and or leave prevailing gender constructs untouched (Hoskyns and Rai, 2007) or the circumstances of marginalised women unaddressed (O’Keefe and Courtois, 2019). Case study 1: Gender expertise and VAW A clear example of policy success for gender policy analysis and expertise lie in the areas of policies to combat domestic violence (DV) and VAW. Generating analysis and evidence for policy change is difficult in VAW as definitions of violence vary across jurisdictions, crimes are under-reported to agencies and increases in reporting are often indicators of improved services, all factors that may complicate policy responses (Walby et al, 2017). Data on VAW and DV is particularly poor in Ireland (see Chapter Five, this volume). The Irish Census uses official data on crime from police and judicial authorities under reservation (Lally, 2018) and comparative gender expertise in the area indicates Ireland as having very low levels of reporting and conviction, and limited access to supports and services for victims (FRA, 2014; EIGE, 2018). A national survey in 2002 on sexual abuse and violence (known as the SAVI report) (McGee et al, 2002) had revealed significant issues. Although an update is planned, advocates have raised issues about the timeline and a lack of focus on the experiences of marginal groups (O’Doherty, 2018). Poor data inhibits policy makers from understanding the nature and scale of the issue and undermines the capacity of gender experts and women’s organisations to contribute to policy analysis. In Ireland, an Observatory on Violence against Women, a consortium of women’s organisations, had for decades drawn on international comparative statistical evidence from the EIGE, UN CEDAW and the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights to call for better data collection (NWCI, 2019). 208

Gender expertise and policy analysis

The state had failed to modernise its approach to VAW and also delayed ratifying the main international protocol on the issue known as the Istanbul Convention, widely adopted across the EU.2 Austerity-related public funding cuts added to a stagnant policy context with incremental shifts at best, leaving advocacy and service organisations unable to improve low levels of reporting of sexual violence and deficits in refuge spaces. A coincidence of events, including a widely publicised incident of familial homicide in 2016 and a controversial rape trial in Northern Ireland in 2018, alongside the death of a police officer in a DVrelated incident, revealed problems with deficits in training and legal protections that created public support for legal and policy change. The implications of the global MeToo movement also resonated in the Irish context (Cullen and Corcoran, 2020). These developments created a political opportunity, allowing gender experts to re-emphasise international statistical and survey data3 that illustrated Ireland’s poor record. Alongside this, gender expertise in the form of testimony of individual women victims featured in media and political debates helped to politicise the issue and gain the support of female politicians and bureaucrats. The result was a series of policy responses that strengthened legal protections for victims of violence, widened the definition of sexual violence/abuse, and marked the introduction of new administrative units and gender training in the criminal justice/policing services.4 On 1 July 2019, the Istanbul Convention came into force in Ireland, providing additional opportunities to hold the state responsible for improving data collection to develop the gender expertise required for policy analysis and development. However, aside from modernising legal protections, public awareness campaigns are the most prevalent policy response, alongside a commitment to generate better data, while refuges and services for victims remain underfunded. This example of gendered policy change reveals the politics of gender expertise and the factors that create the impetus for policy success. A constellation of factors are required, including political opportunities, elite support and the mobilisation of critical actors, often feminist activists and bureaucrats, working together to insert gender expertise into diverse policy analysis contexts. In the case outlined here, different forms of gender expertise are part of the process, including statistical evidence, often international and comparative, as well as personal testimony and victim-centred narratives. Case study 2: Gender expertise and GB GB provides an example of a significant advance in policy analysis success in the area of gender expertise, and is endorsed by international bodies including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Downes et al, 2016), the International Monetary Fund (Quinn, 2017) and the European Commission (O’Hagan, 2019). Yet, it is also one that has elicited resistance and/or has been undermined by overly technocratic approaches to such analysis 209

Policy analysis in Ireland

(Marx, 2018). GB has a radical and transformative potential as it draws on feminist political economic expertise to challenge and directly engage technical (macro) economic policy and by extension masculine assumptions underpinning most economic policy making (O’Hagan, 2019). GB aims to correct models of the economy that have largely excluded social reproduction including unpaid care work, and acts as a policy response to women’s unequal economic status (Folbre, 2009). It can be defined as ‘integrating a clear gender perspective within the overall context of the budgetary process, through the use of special processes and analytical tools, with a view to promoting gender-responsive policies’ (Downes et al, 2016, p 6). GB represents expertise aimed at the disaggregation of statistics, including intersectional variables such as sex and gender, race and ethnicity, disability, time use, class and socioeconomic status and paid and unpaid labour, to inform budgetary policy, along with impact analysis that focuses on (differently situated) individuals and households, rather than aggregates (O’Hagan, 2017, p  21). Gender analysis of the policy and resource allocation process in the budget means examining how budgetary allocations affect the economic and social opportunities of women and men, and restructuring revenue and spending decisions to eliminate unequal gendered outcomes (O’Hagan, 2017, pp 19–20). Assessments of where gender budgeting has most influence in policy analysis confirm the importance of the decision-making ‘venue’ and engagement with the core executive as essential to advancing these forms of gender expertise (O’Hagan and Klatzer, 2018). In similar terms to other forms of gender expertise, this requires critical actors, including feminists, inside and outside the state to make use of political opportunities to ensure that GB becomes institutionalised as a norm of budgetary processes (O’Hagan, 2019). The Irish case illustrates the potential and limits of gender expertise as GB to influence policy analysis.

Equality and gender budgeting in Ireland Ireland was once a leader in policy proofing as a form of policy analysis, as a function of its involvement with EU anti-poverty programmes. Ireland has also, under EU institutional requirements, considerable experience in gender impact assessment. A Gender Equality Unit in the Department of Justice and Equality introduced gender impact assessment guidelines for the National Development Plan 2000–06, and an Equality Proofing Working Group of the Department of Justice and Equality was driven by the Equality Authority over the period 2000–08. Some progress was found to have been made on mainstreaming gender under the National Development Plan, although this was uneven (McGauran, 2005). This initiative collapsed with the closure of the Gender Equality Unit and the diminution of the Equality Authority over the period 2009–10 (Murphy, 2017a, p 6). Ireland has had less experience of GB (Murphy, 2017a). Despite this absence of statutory GB processes, academic feminists have analysed the gendered 210

Gender expertise and policy analysis

implications of austerity budgets and policy responses to crisis (Barry and Conroy, 2013). Prompted by Barry and Conroy’s (2013) extensive gendered and feminist analysis of austerity, the Irish Feminist Network, a group of young feminist activists established in 2011, led a broad-based initiative known as the Equality Budgeting Campaign (EBC) in 2013 to promote equality proofing (Fischer, 2014). By 2016, parallel efforts to campaign for budget proofing were advanced by state and academic feminist actors, in their work to promote a form of GB. Policy entrepreneurship by feminist academics in the IHREC working alongside feminist politicians placed the issue on the political agenda and secured a commitment to advance gender and other forms of budgeting in the 2016 Programme for Government. In 2016, the IHREC subsequently funded the National Women’s Council of Ireland (NWCI) to develop tools to advance GB (see Chapter Twelve, this volume). In 2017, the NWCI, the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform and IHREC worked to develop a model of gender and equality proofing to be piloted in five government departments in 2017. The 2016 commitment in the Programme for Government to advance GB was also evident in a 2018 budgetary commitment to resource workshops, training sessions, policy papers and briefing documents supportive of gender budgeting policy and practice (PBO, 2018). These developments marked the first indication of some traction for a form of feminist political economic analysis of austerity and a firmer footing for this form of gender expertise. However, once these processes became the responsibility of state officials, and priorities shifted within the sponsoring body, the IHREC, GB began to decline as a policy goal. Initial assessments suggest that GB is now subject to the bureaucratic logics and timeline of state officials and is weakly institutionalised in the structures of the Parliamentary Budget Office and Parliamentary Budget Scrutiny Committees (Murphy, 2017b; PBO, 2018). As such, policy entrepreneurship of state feminist actors risks becoming marginalised and, in the absence of external feminist pressure, and the lack of topicality of the issue, ambivalence around its adoption within the state policy-making apparatus may emerge. In effect, gender expertise has yet to demonstrate a secure footing in economic and budgetary policy (Murphy and Cullen, 2018a). Once GB became the responsibility of state officials, it became open to depoliticisation, as political demands are translated into matters for technocratic management (Marx, 2018). Equality budgeting has resurfaced, albeit in the form of international oversight by bodies such as the OECD. The NWCI, a body with weak feminist political economic expertise, has now become the sole feminist presence in policy implementation, while the EBC has now been disbanded (EBC, 2013). The Irish GB case illustrates how state feminist actors who aim to disseminate gender expertise are strongly influenced by the moderating dynamics of the policy cycle. As feminist actors engage with the state, the form of expertise shifts from more a radical transformative footing to a state-led response where remedies and action are vulnerable to dilution. 211

Policy analysis in Ireland

Conclusion Thinking about what gender policy analysis and expertise allows us to make visible draws attention to the types of knowledge that qualify as expertise, the conditions under which such knowledge has resonance with policy makers and can claim policy success. The tying together of feminist knowledge with gender expertise raises issues about whether all knowledge and interventions labelled as such have feminist intent. Gender expertise and gender experts are critiqued for professionalising, technicalising and depoliticising feminist knowledge, reducing the struggle for gender equality to checklists, gender-training tool kits or the ‘gender washing’ of documents (Kunz and Prügl, 2019, p 6). However, research shows that gender expertise has enabled the gendering of policy making and has delivered tangible gains for gender equality (Ferguson, 2019). The Irish cases explored here identify the challenges and resistances that gender policy analysis processes face when entering policy-making environments. For VAW and DV policy, technical gender expertise alongside experiential knowledge were used as catalysts to ignite the policy change for which feminist civil society had long campaigned. GB, an innovative and potentially transformative form of gender expertise, illustrates the varieties and complexities of gender expertise (Kunz et al, 2019), yet also how this form of knowledge offers an important pluralisation of expertise input at the heart of economic policy making and public policy analysis. Resistance to adopting GB as a norm of policy analysis indicates how inhospitable some contexts remain to gender expertise and the complex power relations involved in gender-expert work (O’Hagan and Klatzer, 2018). These examples show how gender expertise can play a strategic role in policy analysis and in creating policy change, and how gender expertise is one of the common factors that may be required to facilitate policy influence. The examples also reveal the ways in which resistances can limit gender expertise to scoping and evidential outcomes that may promote change, but at best in the long term. Notes 1

2

3

4

Feminist perspectives focus on how policy actors interpret their roles and contexts, frame problems, and pursue options, and how their work is embedded in social practices that are relational and articulated in systems of governance (Bacchi, 2009). The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention) has requirements for data collection, gendersensitive approaches to immigration and legislative frameworks on gender violence. International comparative survey data report that Ireland has the highest level of claimed sexual harassment in Europe, with 32% of Irish women between the ages of 18 and 34 saying they had experienced some form of sexual harassment in the past 12 months: www.justice.ie/en/ JELR/Pages/PR19000131 These include the Second National Strategy on Domestic, Sexual and Gender-based Violence 2016–2021, and the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act 2018, the Criminal Justice (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 and the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 2017.

212

Gender expertise and policy analysis

References Azocar, M.J. and Ferree, M.M. (2016) ‘Engendering the sociology of expertise’, Sociology Compass, 10(12): 1079–89. Bacchi, C. (2009) Analysing Policy: What’s the Problem Represented to be?, Frenchs Forest: Pearson Education. Barry, U. and Conroy, P. (2013) ‘Ireland in crisis 2008–2012: women, austerity and inequality’, in J. Rubery and M. Karamessini (eds) Women and Austerity: The Economic Crisis and the Future for Gender Equality, London: Routledge, pp 186–206. Bustelo, M., Ferguson, L. and Forest, M. (eds) (2016) The Politics of Feminist Knowledge Transfer: Gender Training and Gender Expertise, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Cavaghan, R. (2017) ‘The gender politics of EU economic policy: policy shifts and contestations before and after the crisis’, in J. Kantola and E. Lombardo (eds) Gender and the Economic Crisis in Europe: Politics, Institutions and Intersectionality, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 49–71. Cullen, P. and Corcoran, M.P. (2020) ‘Speaking gendered knowledge to power’, in P. Cullen and M. P. Corcoran (eds) Producing Knowledge, Reproducing Gender: Power, Production and Practice in Contemporary Ireland, Dublin: University College Dublin Press, pp 17–37. Cullen, P. and Murphy, M.P. (2016) ‘Gendered mobilizations against austerity In Ireland’, Gender, Work and Organisation, 24(1): 83–97. Cullen, P., Marx Ferree, M. and Verloo, M. (2019) ‘Introduction to Special Issue: Gender, knowledge production and dissemination’, Gender Work and Organization, 26(6): 765–71. Dersnah, M.A. (2019) ‘United Nations gender experts and the push to focus on conflict-related sexual violence’, European Journal of Politics and Gender, 2(1): 41–56. Devitt, C. (2016) ‘Mothers or migrants? Labour supply policies in Ireland 1997–2007’, Social Politics, 23(2): 214–38. Donohue, B., Conway, C. and Dean, T. (2017) Gender Counts: An Analysis of Gender in Irish Theatre 2006–15, Ulster University [Online]. Available at: http:// uir.ulster.ac.uk/38613/1/Gender_Counts_WakingTheFeminists_2017.pdf Doorley, K. (2018) Minimum Wages and the Gender Pay Gap, Dublin: ESRI. Available at: https://www.esri.ie/system/files/media/file-uploads/2018-12/ RB201827.pdf Downes, R., von Trapp, L. and Nicol, S. (2016) ‘Gender budgeting in OECD countries’, OECD Journal on Budgeting, 3: 1–37. EBC (Equality Budgeting Campaign) (2013) Equality Budgeting: An Information Booklet, Dublin: Dublin Irish Feminist Network. EIGE (European Institute for Gender Equality) (2018) Women in Economic Decision Making. Available at: https://eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/dgs/indicator/ wmidm_bus_bus__wmid_comp_compbm/bar

213

Policy analysis in Ireland

Elomäki, A. and Kantola, J. (2018) ‘Theorizing feminist struggles in the triangle of neoliberalism, conservatism and nationalism’, Social Politics: International Studies in State, Gender & Society, 25(3): 337–60. Emejulu, A. and Bassel, L. (2017) ‘Whose crisis counts? Women of colour, austerity and activism in France and Britain’, in E. Lombardo and J. Kantola (eds) Gender and the Economic Crisis in Europe: Politics, Institutions and Intersectionality, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 185–208. Ferguson, L. (2015) ‘This is our gender person’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 17(3): 380–97. Ferguson, L. (2019) ‘Exploring privilege through feminist gender training,’ European Journal of Politics and Gender, 2(1): 113–30. Fischer, C. (2014) Equality Budgeting in Ireland: An Information Booklet, Dublin: Irish Feminist Network/Equality Authority. Folbre, N. (2009) Greed, Lust and Gender: A History of Economic Ideas, Oxford: Oxford University Press. FRA (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) (2014) Violence Against Women: An EU-Wide Survey, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Fraser, N. (2016) ‘Progressive neoliberalism versus reactionary populism: a choice that feminists should refuse’, NORA: Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research, 24(4): 281–4. Government of Ireland (2019) Balance for Better Business. Available at: https:// betterbalance.ie Griffin, P. (2015) ‘Crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective’, Feminist Review, 109(1): 49–72. Harvey, B. (2014) Are We Paying for That?, Dublin: The Advocacy Initiative. HEA (Higher Education Authority) (2016) HEA National Review of Gender Equality in Irish Higher Education Institutions, Dublin: HEA. Available at: https:// hea.ie/assets/uploads/2017/06/HEA-National-Review-of-Gender-Equalityin-Irish-Higher-Education-Institutions.pdf Hoard, S. (2015) Gender Expertise in Public Policy: Towards a Theory of Policy Success, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hoskyns, C. and Rai, S.M. (2007) ‘Recasting the global political economy: counting women’s unpaid work’, New Political Economy, 12(3): 297–317. Hozić, A. and True, J. (2016) Scandalous Economics: The Politics of Gender and Financial Crises, New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Jacquot, S. (2017) ‘A policy in crisis. The dismantling of the EU gender equality policy‘, in J. Kantola and E. Lombardo (eds) Gender and the Economic Crisis in Europe: Politics, Institutions and Intersectionality, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 27–48. Kantola, J. and Lombardo, E. (eds) (2017) Gender and the Economic Crisis in Europe: Politics, Institutions and Intersectionality, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Karamessini, M. and Rubery, J. (2014) Women and Austerity: The Economic Crisis and the Future for Gender Equality, London: Routledge. 214

Gender expertise and policy analysis

Kunz, R. and Prügl, E. (2019) ‘Introduction: Gender Experts and Gender Expertise’, European Journal of Politics and Gender, 2(1): 3–21. Kunz, R., Prügl, E. and Thompson, H. (2019) ‘Gender expertise in global governance: contesting the boundaries of a field’, European Journal of Politics and Gender, 2(1): 23–40. Lally, C. (2018) ‘Crime rate increases significantly over past year’ The Irish Times, 28 March. Marx, U. (2018) ‘Accounting for equality: gender budgeting and moderate feminism’, Gender, Work and Organisation, 26(8): 1176–90. Mayock, P. and Bretherton, J. (2017) Women’s Homelessness in Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. McGauran, A.-M. (2005) Plus ça change? Gender Mainstreaming of the Irish National Development Plan, Studies in Public Policy No.  15, Dublin: Policy Institute, Trinity College Dublin. McGee, H., Garavan, R., deBarra, M., Byrne, J. and Conroy R. (2002) The SAVI Report. Sexual Abuse and Violence in Ireland. A National Study of Irish Experiences, Beliefs and Attitudes Concerning Sexual Violence, Dublin: Liffey Press. McGoey, L. (2012) ‘Strategic unknowns: towards a sociology of ignorance,’ Economy and Society, 41(1): 1–16. Milbourne, L. and Murray, U. (eds) (2017) Civil Society Organizations in Turbulent Times: A Gilded Web?, London: UCL Institute of Education Press. Murphy, M.P. (2017a) ‘Editor’s introduction: advancing human rights and equality proofing in Ireland’, Administration, 65(3): 1–13. Murphy, M.P. (2017b) ‘Maximising available resources: equality and human rights proofing Irish fiscal policy’, Administration, 65(3): 59–80. Murphy, M.P. and Cullen, P. (2018a) Irish Feminist Approaches against Austerity Regimes, Brussels: Rosa Luxembourg Foundation. Murphy, M.P. and Cullen, P. (2018b) National Women’s Council of Ireland Gender Budget Assessment Exercise for Budget 2018, Maynooth: MUSSI, Maynooth University. Newman, J. (2013) ‘Spaces of power: feminism, neoliberalism and gendered labor social politics’, Social Politics, 20(2): 200–21. NWCI (National Women’s Council of Ireland) (2019) National Observatory on Violence against Women. Available at: www.nwci.ie/discover/what_we_do/ building_the_womens_movement/convening_and_chairing_womens_rights_ groups/national_observatory_on_violence_against_women O’Doherty C. (2018) ‘Groups concerned at long timeframe for sexual violence report’, Irish Examiner, 22 November. O’Dwyer, M. (2018) ‘Making sense of austerity: the gendered ideas of European economic policy’, Comparative European Politics, 16(5): 745–61. O’Hagan, A. (2017) ‘Gender budgeting in Scotland: a work in progress’, Administration, 65(3): 17–39.

215

Policy analysis in Ireland

O’Hagan, A. (2019) ‘Preserving the radical potential of gender budgeting: an actor-centred approach’, Paper presented at the European Conference on Politics and Gender, Amsterdam, 4–6 July. O’Hagan, A. and Klatzer, E. (eds) (2018) Gender Budgeting in Europe: Developments and Challenges, London: Palgrave Macmillan. O’Keefe, T. and Courtois, A. (2019) ‘“Not one of the family”: gender and precarious work in the neoliberal university’, Gender, Work & Organization, 26(4): 463–79. PBO (Parliamentary Budget Office) (2018) Gender Budgeting, Dublin: Government of Ireland. Pereira, M. (2017) Power, Knowledge and Feminist Scholarship: An Ethnography of Academia, Abingdon: Routledge. Phillips, S. (2007) ‘Policy analysis and the voluntary sector: evolving policy styles’, in L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett and D. Laycock (eds) Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp 497–521. Quinn, S. (2017) ‘Gender budgeting in Europe: what can we learn from best practice?’, Administration, 65(3): 101–21. Russell, H., Grotti, R., McGinnity, F. and Privalko, I. (2019) Caring and Unpaid Work in Ireland, Dublin: ESRI and IHREC. SJI (Social Justice Ireland) (2018) A Universal Sustainable Social Welfare Pension, Recognising the Contribution of all our Senior Citizens, Dublin: SJI. SJI (2019) Poverty Focus 2019, Dublin: SJI. Available at: www.socialjustice.ie/sites/ default/files/attach/publication/5763/2019-04-15-sjipovertyfocus2019final. pdf?cs=true SSVP (Society of St Vincent de Paul) (2019) Working Parenting and Struggling? An Analysis of the Employment and Living Conditions of One Parent Families in Ireland, Dublin: Society of St  Vincent de Paul. Available at: svp.ie/ getattachment/6cd5834e-a8cf-48bf-b14c-82227aa5bc61/Working,-Parentingand-Struggling-Full-Report.aspx Verloo, M. (2018) Varieties of Opposition to Gender Equality in Europe, London: Routledge. Verloo, M. and Lombardo, E. (2007) ‘Contested gender equality and policy variety in Europe: introducing a critical frame analysis approach’, in M. Verloo (ed) Multiple Meanings of Gender Equality: A Critical Frame Analysis of Gender Policies in Europe, Budapest/New York, NY: CEU Press, pp 21–49. Walby, S., Towers, J., Balderston, S., Corradi, C., Francis, B., Heiskanen, M., Helweg-Larsen, K., Mergaert, L., Olive, P., Palmer, E., Stöckl, H. and Strid, S. (2017) The Concept and Measurement of Violence against Women and Men, Bristol: Policy Press. Woodward, A.E. (2004) ‘Building velvet triangles: gender and informal governance’, in T. Christiansen and S. Piattoni (eds) Informal Governance in the European Union, Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, pp 76–93.

216

Part Four The public, science and the media: the wider policy analysis environment in Ireland

217

FIFTEEN

Democratic innovations and policy analysis: climate policy and Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly (2016–18) Clodagh Harris

Introduction In the past decade, Ireland has emerged as a world leader in deliberative democracy as evidenced by its Constitutional Convention (CC) (2012–14) and Citizens’ Assembly (CA) (2016–18). Complementing existing representative institutions and processes, these deliberative democratic innovations have placed citizens at the heart of constitutional change and political reform. Providing opportunities for wider and deeper citizen engagement in the democratic process, they offer citizens the chance to have a role in policy making and policy analysis beyond the ‘ballot box’. Arguably, this is all the more important at a time of rising democratic malaise, in Ireland and elsewhere, characterised by declining levels of trust in politicians and in traditional forms of political engagement (Elstub and Escobar, 2019; Farrell and Suiter, 2019). The emergence of these initiatives in the 2010s was part of a wider governmental response to the profound crises both in global capitalism and in Ireland’s national economic and social situation that strained the relationship between government and the people. These crises acted as a catalyst for Ireland’s new approach to constitutional and political reform, and latterly policy reform (Harris et al, 2013; Farrell and Suiter, 2019). More recently, these government-led initiatives have also started to address policy areas, for example how to respond to climate change and to the challenges and opportunities of an ageing population. This chapter critically evaluates the potential of these deliberative forums (also known as mini-publics) as an innovative method of policy analysis. It focuses on a particular case – the contribution Ireland’s first CA has made to climate policy. The chapter starts with a brief conceptual description of democratic innovations and policy analysis. It then offers an overview of Ireland’s CA (practice and processes) and its link to the wider democratic system. Particular attention is paid to its contribution to climate policy. Finally, the chapter critically assesses the use of Citizens’ Assemblies as a method of policy analysis.

219

Policy analysis in Ireland

Democratic innovations and policy analysis We have witnessed a proliferation of global innovations to reimagine democracy by re-engaging citizens in decisions on matters that affect their daily lives. These innovations can be found at various levels of government across a range of issues and with varying degrees of success. They are drawn from representative, direct, participatory and deliberative understandings of democratic theory. Electoral system reform and the extension of the franchise are but two examples of representative innovations. Others, such as direct initiatives, participatory budgeting and CAs, endeavour to engage citizens more directly in political processes, either by widening and/or deepening participation, and are drawn from theories of direct, participatory and deliberative democracy respectively (Harris, 2019). Elstub and Escobar (2019) provide conceptual clarity and emphasise ‘deeper’ as opposed to ‘wider’ citizen participation. For them, ‘democratic innovations are processes or institutions, that are new to a policy issue, policy role, or level of governance, and developed to reimagine and deepen the roles of citizens in governance processes by increasing opportunities for participation, deliberation and influence’ (2019, p 15). Ireland’s CC and CA were exercises in deliberative democracy. Unlike representative or ‘aggregate’ forms of democracy, deliberative democracy focuses not on individual knowledge and preferences but on ‘civility and argumentative complexity’ (Dryzek et al, 2019, p 1144). Inclusive participation, reason giving, reflection, respect and openness to persuasion are all emphasised in deliberative democratic processes. CAs, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, planning cells and so on, often referred to in the literature as mini-publics, are all examples of deliberative democratic innovations. They involve random selection of participants to ensure diversity and representativeness as well as professional facilitation and ‘civility norms’, such as respectful, reasoned argument. They have been defined as: … a democratic innovation, in which a sub group of citizens (some of whom may be randomly or quasi-randomly selected) engage with experts, witnesses, advocates, stakeholders, and one another, in facilitated informed deliberations on a given matter, and publicly present their opinions and/or recommendations to their commissioning body and wider society. (Harris, 2019, p 47) It is broadly accepted that the goals of deliberation cannot be met in any one institution (Mansbridge et al, 2012). Mini-publics, albeit primarily deliberative, do not operate in a vacuum and to the exclusion of participatory, representative and direct democratic processes. The systemic turn in deliberative democratic theory recognises that deliberation can occur in multiple locations, such as parliament, the media (old and new), social movements, and civil society forums, and involve a diversity of actors. 220

Democratic innovations and policy analysis

With this systemic approach in mind, this chapter turns its attention to the potential of mini-publics to enhance inclusion, expertise, transparency and participation within policy analysis. Acknowledging, that the goal of policy analysis is to ‘improve policy outcomes by applying systematic analytic methodologies to policy problems’ (Howlett and Lindquist, 2004, p  225), particular focus is paid to its success in meeting the democratic principles of evidence based, transparent and accountable decisions (Brans et al, 2016) and deliberative democracy’s virtues of inclusion, justification and reflection (Dryzek, 2016). This section also explores the potential of CAs to provide a systematic approach to identifying possible policy options, evaluating and comparing them, selecting the optimal one, and implementing and monitoring it (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). Increasingly citizens are playing a more significant part in policy formation through a variety of online and face-to-face consultation and other participatory mechanisms. This is driven both from the ‘bottom up’, as citizens seek more input to decisions that affect their lives, and from the ‘top down’, as governments increasingly recognise the democratic benefits of involving stakeholders and the public in designing and implementing policy (Fung, 2015). The participatory turn in policy analysis and academic research towards collaborative co-production and co-decision emphasises inclusion, direct engagement and empowerment. This is a marked departure from more traditional forms of public engagement in policy analysis that view public consultation simply in terms of soliciting people’s views (Aldred, 2009; Mullally et al, 2018). Recognising that knowledge is socially constructed, that there are multiple understandings of a phenomenon and that a plurality of knowledge can exist across multiple spaces and places, participatory approaches are value-based and informed by a strong social justice ethos that incorporates the principles of equality, reciprocity,- and respect (Brydon-Miller et al, 2003; Wynne-Jones et al, 2015). This emphasis on justice, particularly social justice, is one way in which participatory approaches can be ‘a potent means to achieve key democratic values’ (Fung, 2015, p 513). Simultaneously, we have also witnessed a move from technocratic, centralised forms of policy analysis to deliberative policy analysis that recognises modern problems are too complex, contested and fluid to be handled by experts, stakeholders and central governments alone (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Fischer and Boossabong, 2018). The use of democratic innovations to bring more voices, views and information into the policy process can enhance Government legitimacy and effectiveness. Elstub and Escobar’s conceptualisation of democratic innovations, includes ‘alternative imaginaries of citizens as co-producers and problem-solvers’ (2019, p 19). For them, ‘reimagining and deepening the role of citizens in governance processes’ (p 22) is the ‘ineliminable feature’ of democratic innovations. Welldesigned, multi-sectoral participatory and deliberative democratic innovations offer new ways of tackling ‘wicked problems’, such as social and environmental policy challenges (Dryzek, 2010; Fung, 2015). The part played by one such 221

Policy analysis in Ireland

democratic innovation in developing climate policy in Ireland is discussed in the next section.

Deliberative democratic innovations and Ireland’s response to the climate change crisis CAs and conventions have become a common feature of the Irish public policy landscape. The CC established by the then government in response to calls for wider constitutional and political reform, included 66 randomly selected citizens (in theory, broadly reflective of wider society in terms of sex, age, geography, education and socioeconomic status), 33  political representatives (drawn proportionately from parties across the island of Ireland) and an independent chairperson (Suiter et al, 2015). It was tasked with deliberating on a somewhat eclectic array of constitutional issues ranging from marriage equality to reducing the voting age and from electoral system reform to the removal of the offence of blasphemy from the Constitution. The parliamentary resolution that established it also permitted it to consider ‘any other Amendments’, thereby giving the CC specific agendasetting powers. Its remit included public submissions, brief, accessible ‘expert’ presentations, ‘stake-holder’ panel discussions and personal testimonies, and it also facilitated small-group deliberations. The CC made recommendations by majority vote at the end of each meeting and sent a report to the Houses of the Oireachtas to which the government committed to respond within four months. In all, the CC made 38 recommendations, of which it is estimated that 18 would require a referendum. Many of the CC’s recommendations have been or are due to be implemented, and only eight were rejected. Many of those accepted are still awaiting a referendum, for example, lowering the voting age, and votes for those resident outside the state in presidential elections (Farrell, 2018). The CC is best known for facilitating Ireland’s historic referendum on marriage equality. On 22 May 2015, Ireland became the first country in the world to support by popular vote the introduction of marriage equality. It was also the first time a recommendation from a deliberative mini-public had resulted in constitutional change. On the same day, a referendum held to reduce the age of presidential candidates was defeated (73.1% against to 26.9% in favour). A third popular referendum on the removal of the offense of blasphemy from the Constitution was successfully passed on 26 October 2018. One of the CC’s successes has been in carving out a role for deliberative democratic innovations in the political system, and its legacy is evident in the CA’s recommendation to repeal the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which was successfully passed by popular referendum on 25  May 2018 (see Chapter Twelve, this volume). Established by Oireachtas resolution in July 2016, the CA comprised 99 citizens (recruited a by polling company using stratified random sampling across four targets, namely sex, age, geography and social class) 222

Democratic innovations and policy analysis

and an independent chairperson. Notwithstanding some differences in terms of composition (for example, it did not include political representatives), the CA modelled its work closely on that of its precursor (Farrell et al, 2019). It, too, was asked to examine a diverse range of issues, including the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution (concerned with the provision on abortion), how to make the state a leader in tackling climate change, and how to respond to the challenges and opportunities of an ageing population, as well as two political reform measures, namely fixed-terms parliaments and the manner in which referenda are held. One of the unique and arguably more successful aspects of the CC and CA processes was the inclusion of civil society and/or advocacy panels. These sessions recognised multiple forms of knowledge and involved, in some cases, personal testimonies and stories, giving context as well as the lived experience to the dry, technical, legal and academic facts and arguments. Traditionally, CAs have deliberated on constitutional matters; for example, early CAs in British Columbia (2004), Ontario (2007) and the Netherlands (2006) all addressed the issue of electoral reform. Traditionally, policy issues have tended to be addressed by citizens’ juries, the most popular form of deliberative mini-public, but a new trend has started to emerge internationally. From the end of the 2010s, the use of CAs has become increasingly diffuse geographically; so too have the topics they address as they extend into the broader policy space. For its part, the Irish CA addressed two broad policy issues, namely how to make Ireland a leader in tackling climate change and how to respond to the challenges and opportunities of an ageing population. Ireland has blazed a trail here as the first country to use a CA to tackle the issue of climate change. Others are following suit and CAs on climate action have been established in the United Kingdom (UK) and France. This chapter now turns to what the CA contributed to the wider policy analysis process in the area of climate change. As Little and Torney (2017, p 194) note, ‘Ireland has been a site of climate policy change, development and innovation’, yet paradoxically it has also been ‘consistently a climate laggard’ (Torney and O’Gorman, 2019, p 589). Ireland received some recognition for its Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015, which led to the Climate Change Advisory Council , the presentation of an Annual National Transition Statement by the Minister to the Houses of the Oireachtas (first made in December 2016), and the 2017 National Mitigation Plan on reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Little and Torney, 2017). Yet, the Act has come under criticism for not including targets (Torney, 2017) The initial draft Oireachtas resolution that established the CA did not include it as a matter for deliberation. An amendment proposed by the Green Party led to its inclusion. The resulting call to discuss how to make Ireland a leader in tackling climate change was quite ambitious. The CA dedicated two weekends of its deliberations to the matter. The original intention had been to assign one weekend for this final topic. However as the Chair, Justice Mary Laffoy, noted:‘Members’ interest in this topic was clearly demonstrated when they decided back at the January meeting to bring forward our consideration of 223

Policy analysis in Ireland

climate change; The Members then decided that they wanted to dedicate a second weekend to its consideration’ (CA, 2018, p 1). The first weekend addressed climate science, the impact of climate change and energy policy. The second weekend considered the transport and agricultural sectors and developed the CA’s final recommendations. It received 1,205 public submissions on the topic (1,180 of which were received online). These came from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), representative groups, advocacy groups, political parties, commercial entities, academics and individuals. In their research on the public submissions, Devaney and colleagues (2020a) find that the majority of the submissions were a call to action (63%), with 69% of the opinion that the government was responsible for tackling climate change. Very few of the submissions were sceptical of climate change (3%). The authors also observed that individuals were more inclined than experts to present climate justice arguments; experts stressed national policy measures; community engagement was a core focus for NGOs and other groups; and women were more likely than men to raise the issue of waste management (Devaney et al, 2020a) The expertise provided to the CA came from senior officials and/or researchers from a range of agencies and institutions: the Environmental Protection Agency; International Energy Agency; UK Met Office; Met Éireann; Institute of International and European Affairs; Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment; National Dialogue on Climate Action; DirectorateGeneral for Energy (a Directorate-General of the European Commission); National Transport Authority, Teagasc (Agriculture and Food Development Authority); and the Edinburgh Centre for Carbon Innovation. Presentations were also made by the Chair of the Climate Change Advisory Council and a former European Commissioner for Climate Action. Innovatively, each of the weekends incorporated a panel on leadership initiatives at a local and community level. For instance, the first weekend included first-hand experience of leadership in Ireland in the area of energy, at which there were contributions from the Tipperary Energy Agency on community windfarms, officers in the Kilbarrack Fire Station (Ireland’s first-carbon neutral fire station), and energy agency Codema on home energy-saving kits. The second weekend featured an agriculture, food and land use panel discussion on leadership that heard from farmers on the smart farming initiative and from organic farmers. FoodCloud, a social enterprise redistributing surplus food from the food industry to the charity sector, also shared its experience (CA, 2018). Contributions were reflected in some of the final and ancillary recommendations, for example on food waste and supports for organic farming. In all, the CA made 13 recommendations (see Table 15.1), ranging from calls for new governance structures to specific sectoral calls, such as an end to state subsidies on peat extraction. It also called on the state to prioritise investment in public transport over new road infrastructure (at a ratio of no less than 2:1), to introduce a tax on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from agriculture, and to provide more support for planting forests. 224

Democratic innovations and policy analysis

Table 15.1: The Irish CA’s recommendations on tackling climate change Number

Recommendation

1

As a matter of urgency a new or existing independent body should be resourced appropriately, and be given a broad range of new functions and powers in legislation to urgently tackle climate change.

2

The state should take a leadership role in addressing climate change mitigation measures and through adaption measures..

3

The overwhelming majority of members were willing to pay higher taxes on carbon intensive measures.

4

The state should undertake a comprehensive assessment of the vulnerability of all critical infrastructure with a view to building resilience.

5

The state should enable through legislation the selling back into the grid of electricity from micro-generation by private citizens.

6

The state should act to ensure the greatest possible levels of community ownership in all future renewable energy projects.

7

The state should end all subsidies for peat extraction and instead spend the money on peat bog restoration and making proper provision for the protection of the rights of the workers impacted.

8

The number of bus lanes, cycling lanes and park and ride facilities should be greatly increased.

9

The state should take immediate steps to support the transition to electric vehicles.

10

The state should prioritise the expansion of public transport spending over road infrastructure at a ratio of 2:1.

11

There should be a tax on GHG emissions from agriculture.

12

The state should introduce a standard form of mandatory measurement and reporting of food waste at every level of food distribution and supply chain.

13

The state should review and revise supports for land use diversification with attention to supports for planting forests and encouraging farming.

Source: CA (2018)

As Devaney and colleagues (2020b, p 142) observe, ‘the Assembly’s deliberations on climate change received the highest consensus scores of all topics considered, with 80% or more citizens voting in favour of each recommendation proposed’. A number of the recommendations had detailed qualifications attached to them. For example, the first recommendation regarding the independent body specified that it should propose ‘ambitious 5 year national and sectoral targets for emissions reductions to be implemented by the State, with regular review and reporting cycles’, and have the power ‘to pursue the State in legal proceedings to ensure that the State lives up to its legal obligations relating to climate change’ (CA, 2018, p 23). Additionally the CA made four ancillary recommendations that addressed issues such as packaging, waste reduction and information campaigns, to name but a few. They were gathered using a reflective exercise form circulated to members on the final weekend to give them an opportunity to make comments or suggestions for further recommendation. The ‘consensus themes’ were included as ancillary recommendations by the Chair in her report (CA, 2018, pp 19–20). The CA’s recommendations are ambitious. In keeping with the Oireachtas resolution that established it, the CA’s report was forwarded to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Climate Action (JOCCA). The committee’s deliberations 225

Policy analysis in Ireland

took place over seven months and resulted in 42  priority recommendations and 39 ancillary ones. Its work started with a presentation from the CA Chair, and it structured its report according to the CA’s recommendations, providing a considered response to each one. By and large, it supported the CA’s recommendations, with the exception of its recommendations on introducing a tax on GHG emissions from agriculture. Nonetheless cross-party consensus was secured on the bulk of the CA’s recommendations and JOCCA stressed its intention to ‘elevate climate action to the same level of importance as finance and budgetary matters’ (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2019b). This priority was captured in its detailed, radical recommendations around the governance framework, which included the following: • replacing the Climate Change Advisory Council with a Climate Action Council with enhanced functions and resources, including a central advisory role in setting five-yearly carbon budgets with a requirement for government to follow its recommendations or publicly account for not doing so; • establishing a permanent Oireachtas Standing Committee on climate change as the main forum for holding government departments and public bodies to account for targets; • creating a Climate Action Implementation Board with a central coordinating role for the Department of the Taoiseach. Other government departments would report to it on the implementation of action plans in its sector. Described as ‘detailed, ambitious and far-reaching’ (Torney, 2019), the JOCCA report (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2019a) heavily influenced the cross-government Climate Action Plan, which was published in June 2019 It was preceded by the declaration of a climate and biodiversity emergency by Dáil Éireann on 10 May 2019. In January 2020 (some 20 months after the CA had delivered its final report), the then Minister for Communications, Climate Action and Environment, Richard Burton TD, published the draft General Scheme of the Climate Action (Amendment) Bill 2019. It reiterated the government’s commitment to make Ireland net zero by 2050 and echoed the governance and accountability elements prioritised in the Climate Action Plan, which could in turn be traced back to the JOCCA and the CA, and set out the legislation required to underpin the new governance processes on climate action. It included provisions for the replacement of the Climate Change Advisory Council with a Climate Action Council that would enjoy extended powers and expertise. Part of its function would be recommending appropriate carbon budgets and policies and it would establish an advisory committee in relation to climate adaptation. It also envisaged making the adoption of carbon budgets a legal requirement from 2021. The 32nd Dáil was dissolved before the Bill could be presented to it for discussion. The CA did enjoy some success in influencing climate policy, as evidenced in its contribution to the new governance and accountability structures outlined 226

Democratic innovations and policy analysis

in the Climate Action Plan, and its proposed mitigation and adaption measures have been largely endorsed. By contrast, its redistributive recommendations (the carbon tax1 and the tax on GHG emissions from the agricultural sector in particular) did not garner much traction. Having provided an overview of the Irish CA’s contribution to climate policy, the chapter now moves to analyse the role CAs may play as methods of policy analysis.

CAs as a method of policy analysis Fung’s (2015) ‘democracy cube’ provides a valuable framework for analysing various forms of public participation using three axes: participants (who participates and how they are selected); communication and decision modes; and authority and power (2015). Here these axes are applied to the Irish CA processes and practice. Participants The CA’s participants were selected using stratified random sampling and it was they who were the decision makers within the CA. They were chosen by a polling company that had base targets to meet across the following categories; sex, age, socioeconomic cohorts and region.2 The company was relatively successful in meeting the targets relating to sex and age, but enjoyed less success in delivering the socioeconomic and regional targets. Farrell and colleagues (2020) note that the CA’s membership was ‘quite significantly skewed in favour of the middle to upper middle class category, and there was a notable under-representation of farmers’. Additionally, the region of Munster tended to be over-represented in the CA while Connacht/Ulster was quite heavily underrepresented (Farrell et al, 2020). This gap in representation raises questions about the CA’s input legitimacy. The premise behind mini-publics is that they are just that – a small but relatively reflective representation (descriptively at least) of the society in which they live. Inclusion rests at the heart of both participatory and deliberative democratic processes. From the perspective of climate policy, it is of grave concern that lower socioeconomic groups and farmers were under-represented. Irish farmers have a fundamental role in addressing the challenge of climate change, both as custodians of the countryside but also as representatives of a sector whose direct input is required to reduce GHG emissions. There may be a number of reasons these specific cohorts were difficult to recruit. First, and most significantly, CAs operate in a world marked by asymmetries of power, access, wealth and so on. These may act as social and cultural barriers to participation. In the absence of hard data, we can only speculate as to the specific reasons for the under-representation of these cohorts. The fact that the CA did not pay its members honoraria for their participation, coupled with the increasing casualisation of labour and precarious 227

Policy analysis in Ireland

nature of work, may have made weekend attendance impossible for some. It is also possible that the ‘always on duty’ nature of farming made it difficult for members of that community to commit to weekends at a location far removed from their farms. More robust recruitment measures on the part of polling companies as well as specific efforts to target hard-to-reach groups are measures that may address this issue in future CAs (Farrell et al, 2020). Separately, it is worth noting that members of the recently established CA on gender equality (2020) will for the first time, in the Irish context at least, receive a stipend in recognition of the work they do on behalf of the state. Communication and decision making The CA’s participatory and deliberative format provided time and space for public submissions and expert evidence; facilitated small-group discussions at which members identified a range of options and drafted a ballot paper; and finalised recommendations by secret ballot (majority vote). The process allowed for a much deeper form of engagement with the issue than would have been provided under traditional consultation mechanisms, in terms of mapping options and making decisions, thereby leading to more considered judgment on the matter. One of the challenges faced by CA members was tackling a broad, multisectoral issue in such a short period of time. The Chair endeavoured to include other consensus views in the ancillary recommendations but the restrictive amount of time allocated to the topic meant little or no space on the programme for community and/or individual stories on the lived experience of climate change regionally, nationally and internationally. However, it did innovatively include practical examples of local climate leadership to elucidate the concepts highlighted in the expert presentations. In a CA in which certain cohorts are under-represented, there is the real risk that key discourses and perspectives will be excluded from the discussions (albeit inadvertently). This, plus the pressure to ensure a balance between expert evidence and deliberation in a tight time period, increases the risk of the deliberations being framed in a particular fashion. It is worth noting that the CA’s recommendations are silent on climate justice, just transitions and energy poverty, particularly in light of Devaney and colleagues’ (2020a) findings that submissions by individuals more than experts tended to refer to climate justice arguments. This begs questions on the framing of the CAs discussions, the optimal number of topics allocated to a CA in a given time frame, as well as the optimal balance between expert presentations, individual submissions, small-group deliberations and stakeholder panel discussions. These issues notwithstanding, research by Farrell and colleagues (2020) finds that the overwhelming majority of CA members were satisfied with the quality of the deliberative process across all of the 11 weekends. Responding to survey questions, they felt ‘they were free to raise their views, that they had ample 228

Democratic innovations and policy analysis

speaking opportunities, and that other members respected what they had to say’ (Farrell et al, 2020). Authority and power In terms of influence, participants in the CA process advised government on the policy area in question, but did not have final decision-making power. Ultimate authority rests with the government and the Dáil, as is to be expected in a parliamentary democracy. In terms of the policy-making process, CAs can play a role in framing the problem and/or issue; mapping the options; participating in debate and discussion; and presenting a range of informed policy recommendations. In terms of framing, the CA did not have the power to set its own agenda. It did, however, draw on the public submissions, its expert advisory group and its steering committee to frame its deliberations and the CA’s programme for each weekend was agreed by a steering group of CA members working on drafts prepared by the secretariat and the expert advisory group. Arguably CAs’ democratic value lies in their capacity to harness diverse forms of expertise and evidence to develop clear, well-defined policy recommendations, Additionally, it is worth noting the Irish CAs’ participatory underpinning in terms of inclusion of people, perspectives and knowledge through the use of public submissions, membership recruitment, and leader and/or advocacy discussion panels. That the Irish process was public and had a specific responding role for parliamentary committees made it transparent, accountable and legitimate. As noted, it was weak, however, in terms of agenda setting and final decision making, and had no powers of implementation or review. Drawing on Villaverde and García-Rubio’s framework on levels of public participation (2017, p 2483), this chapter categorises CAs as exercises of co‑design to the extent that they give a small group of citizens ‘an active role in the development and the design of policy’. Blending expertise, informed arguments and diverse perspectives, they are potentially a way of harnessing knowledge and provide a forum for the co-creation of solutions to policy problems in ways that are in keeping with Dryzek’s (2010) call for more participatory, deliberative frameworks for policy analysis. More significantly, they can be a ‘powerful segment’ of the deliberative system and contribute to the ‘slow politics’ required to tackle intractable policy challenges that need long-term solutions impervious to short-term electoral cycles (Dryzek et al, 2019).

Conclusion In placing citizens at the heart of the decision making process, deliberative minipublics such as CAs have much to commend them and recent decades have witnessed significant growth in their use worldwide. Traditionally, their greatest challenge has been in achieving impact in terms of contributing to wider public discourses, effecting change and reforming 229

Policy analysis in Ireland

political processes, a point made by Fung (2015, p 514) when he highlighted the following concerns: the ‘absence of systemic leadership’; the lack of ‘popular or elite consensus’ on the part of participatory and deliberative processes; and the ‘limited scope and powers’ of these innovations. The Irish CAs have bucked this trend by showing that deliberative mini-publics can make a difference in terms of constitutional change and political processes. They also highlight how deliberative democratic innovations can successfully complement representative and direct forms of democracy in ways that overcome relative shortcomings. They have become broadly accepted as way of ‘doing politics’, as witnessed by calls from civil society organisations, academics, interest groups and others for CAs on housing, education and so on. Finally, and of particular import for this chapter, they show how they may be used in policy analysis, an arena in which citizens’ juries have been traditionally the more widely used democratic innovation. The use of CAs on the most serious issue of climate change is very new and Ireland has once again paved the way in incorporating this innovation in its policy response to the problem. The Irish CA record of impact on climate policy is strong. It certainly contributed to the new governance and accountability structures outlined in the Climate Action Plan and its proposed mitigation and adaption measures have been largely endorsed. The 32nd Dáil ended before these new structures were underpinned by legislation. The 33rd  Dáil may or may not enact the legislation in its original form. The CA’s redistributive recommendations (namely those on the carbon tax and a tax on GHG emissions from the agricultural sector) have been less impactful and serve as a reminder of the challenges faced by these processes when they encounter governments with a different political agenda and the healthy tension, in terms of checks and balances, that exists in a wider deliberative democratic system with specific powers for representative, direct and participatory institutions. This analysis of the potential of CAs as a method of policy analysis finds that this deliberative democratic innovation can, as a process of co-design, engage citizens in the systematic analysis of policy problems in ways that are inclusive, evidencebased, transparent and accountable. They also have the potential to enhance moments of justification and reflection within the deliberative democratic system (Dryzek et al, 2019), thereby facilitating a deliberative reconstruction of politics that is inclusive, future focused and public spirited (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2019). Its focus on one case study alone, the Irish CA’s contribution to climate policy, is a limitation. At the time of writing, CAs on climate change are taking place in the UK and France. As the evidence emerges from their work, future research may test their impact on policy and their value as a policy analysis method. Nonetheless, the Irish case does highlight CAs’ potential in this regard. It also comes with a timely reminder of the need for these processes to be well designed and for actors ‘in and around deliberative processes’ (Curato et al, 2017) to pay careful attention to the recruitment, duration, number of topics, tone, framing, format and procedures of deliberative processes to ensure that 230

Democratic innovations and policy analysis

inclusion and popular control are protected at all stages in the process and that they are consequential. Notes 1

2

The 2020 Budget increased carbon tax from €20 per tonne to €26 per tonne. The JOCCA committed to implement a carbon tax rate of €80 a tonne by 2030. This was endorsed by Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil, the Labour Party and the Green Party (which favours €100 per tonne) in their election manifestos for 2020. For information on the selection of members, see https://2016-2018.citizensassembly.ie/en/ About-the-Citizens-Assembly/Who-are-the-Members [Accessed 31 January 2020].

References Aldred, R. (2009) ‘From community participation to organizational therapy? World café and appreciative inquiry as research methods’, Community Development Journal, 46(1): 57–71. Brans, M., Geva-May, I. and Howlett, M. (2016) ‘Policy analysis in comparative perspective: an introduction’, in M. Brans, I. Geva-May and M. Howlett (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Comparative Policy Analysis, New York, NY: Routledge, pp 1–24. Brydon-Miller, M., Greenwood, D. and Maguire, P. (2003) ‘Why action research?’, Action Research, 1(9): 1–28. CA (Citizens’ Assembly) (2018) Third Report and Recommendations of the Citizens’ Assembly: How the State can Make Ireland a Leader in Tackling Climate Change, Dublin: Citizens’ Assembly. Curato, N., Dryzek, J.S., Elcan, S.A., Hendriks, C. and Niemeyer, S. (2017) ‘Twelve key findings in deliberative democracy research’, Daedalus, 146(3): 28–38. Devaney, L., Torney, D., Brereton, P. and Coleman, M. (2020a) Deepening Public Engagement on Climate Change: Lessons from the Citizens’ Assembly, Wexford: Environmental Protection Agency. Devaney, L., Torney, D., Brereton, P. and Coleman, M. (2020b) ‘Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly on climate change: lessons for deliberative public engagement and communication’, Environmental Communication, 14(2): 141–6. Dryzek, J.S. (2010) Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dryzek, J.S. (2016) ‘Deliberative Policy Analysis’, in Stoker, G. and Evans, M. (eds) Evidence-Based Policy Making in the Social Sciences: Methods That Matter, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 229–242. Dryzek, J.S. and Niemeyer, S. (2019) ‘Deliberative democracy and climate governance’, Nature Human Behaviour, 3: 411–413. Dryzek, J.S., Bächtiger, A., Chambers, S., Cohen, J., Druckman, J., Felicetti, A., Fishkin, J., Farrell, D., Fung, A., Gutmann, A., Landemore, H., Mansbridge, J., Marien, S., Neblo, M., Niemeyer, S., Setälä, M., Slothuus, R., Suiter, J., Thompson, D. and Warren, M.E. (2019) ‘The crisis of democracy and the science of deliberation’, Science, 363(6432): 1144–6. 231

Policy analysis in Ireland

Elstub, S. and Escobar, O. (eds) (2019) The Handbook of Democratic Innovation and Governance, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Farrell, D. (2018) ‘What happens after a Citizens’ Assembly?’, PSAI, Irish Politics Forum [Blog]. Available at: https://politicalreform.ie/2018/07/18/whathappens-after-a-citizens-assembly Farrell, D.M. and Suiter, J. (2019) Reimagining Democracy: Lessons in Deliberative Democracy from the Irish Front Line, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Farrell, D.M., Suiter, J. and Harris, C. (2019) ‘“Systematizing” constitutional deliberation: the 2016–18 citizens’ assembly in Ireland’, Irish Political Studies, 34(1):113–23. Farrell, D.M., Suiter, J., Harris, C. and Cunningham, K. (2020) ‘Ireland’s deliberative mini-publics’, in D.M. Farrell and N. Hardiman (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Irish Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fischer, F. and Boossabong P. (2018) ‘Deliberative Policy Analysis’, in A. Bächtiger, J.S. Dryzek, J. Mansbridge and M.E. Warren (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 584–594. Fung, A. (2015) ‘Putting the public back into governance: the challenges of citizen participation and its future’, Public Administration Review, 75(4): 513–22. Hajer, M. and Wagenaar, H. (eds) (2003) Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Harris, C. (2019) ‘Deliberative mini-publics: Design choices and legitimacy’, in S. Elstub and O. Escobar (eds) The Handbook of Democratic Innovation and Governance, Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, pp 45–59. Harris, C., Carney, G.M. and Farrell, D.M. (2013) ‘Rule by the people? Alternative perspectives on citizen participation in democratic policymaking’, Administration, 60(3): 201–9. Houses of the Oireachtas (2019a) Climate Change: A Cross-Party Consensus for Action, Dublin: Houses of the Oireachtas. Houses of the Oireachtas (2019b) ‘Committee on Climate Action launches final report; calls for action on climate change’, Press Release, Houses of the Oireachtas [Online]. Available at: www.oireachtas.ie/en/press-centre/pressreleases/20190416-committee-on-climate-action-launches-final-report-callsfor-action-on-tackling-climate-change [Accessed 3 February 2020]. Howlett, M. and Lindquist, E. (2004) ‘Policy analysis and governance: analytical and policy styles in Canada’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 6(3): 225–49. Howlett, M. and Ramesh, M. (2003) Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Little, C. and Torney, D. (2017) ‘The politics of climate change in Ireland: symposium introduction’, Irish Political Studies, 32(2): 191–8. Mansbridge, J., Bohman, J., Chambers, S., Christiano, T., Fung, A., Parkinson, J., Thompson, D.F. and Warren, M.E. (2012) ‘A systemic approach to deliberative democracy’, in J. Parkinson and J. Mansbridge (eds) Deliberative Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 1–26. 232

Democratic innovations and policy analysis

Mullally, G., Dunphy, N. and O’Connor, P. (2018) ‘Participative environmental policy integration in the Irish energy sector’, Environmental Science & Policy, 83(1): 71–8. Suiter, J., Farrell, D.M. and Harris, C. (2015) ‘The Irish Constitutional Convention: high legitimacy’, in J. Suiter and M. Reuchamps (eds) Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe, Colchester: ECPR Press. Torney, D. (2017) ‘If at first you don’t succeed: the development of climate change legislation in Ireland’, Irish Political Studies, 32(2): 247–67. Torney, D. (2019) ‘What’s in Ireland’s landmark climate change report?’, RTE [Online], 29 March. Available at: www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2019/0329/1039327whats-in-irelands-landmark-climate-change-report Torney, D. and O’Gorman, R. (2019) ‘A laggard in good times and bad? The limited impact of EU membership on Ireland’s climate change and environmental policy’, Irish Political Studies, 34(4): 575–94. Villaverde, A.R. and García-Rubio, M.A. (2017) ‘Public participation in European water management: from theory to practice’, Water Resource Management, 31(8): 2479–95. Wynne-Jones, S., North, P. and Routledge, P.J. (2015) ‘Practising participatory geographies: potentials, problems and politics’, Arena, 47(3): 218–21.

233

SIXTEEN

Irish science policy: a case study in evidence-based policy design for small open economies Eoin Cullina, Jason Harold and John McHale

Introduction Science policy is receiving more attention as an instrument for economic development as economic growth becomes increasingly dependent on knowledge-intensive industries. The success of such industries depends on access to knowledge. As captured by modern theories of endogenous growth, new ideas (and associated new products and services) result from combining the existing stock of ideas with research and development (R&D) (Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995). Much of this R&D investment is done by private firms. However, such firms tend to underinvest in basic science and other forms of knowledge creation where much of the benefit spills over to other firms. There is therefore an important role for governments to fund and incentivise knowledge creation where that knowledge is underprovided by the market. However, governments of small open economies (SOEs) such as Ireland face a particular challenge in devising a strategy for science policy. Smallness poses two obvious challenges: first, the benefits of science investments are likely to flow disproportionately to other countries; and second, small size may limit the benefits of agglomeration economies that are central to many knowledge-intensive industries and indeed in the production of science itself (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003). In spending scarce resources on science, governments must establish a social contract with researchers and society at large to ensure the social benefits match the significant social (opportunity) costs. Two broad rationales can be identified for why it may be worthwhile for an SOE to invest in science despite the obvious spillover and scale challenges. The first is the geographical stickiness of new knowledge production: there is a vast literature documenting the localisation of knowledge spillovers and the related tendency for knowledge to diffuse slowly across space over time (Trajtenberg et al, 1992; Agrawal et al, 2006). The second is the importance of ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990): the capacity to absorb knowledge from the vast global stocks of knowledge depends in part on being active at the frontiers in producing new knowledge. The national benefit of research is then not so much in the new knowledge you create, but the advantage that research gives 235

Policy analysis in Ireland

you in being able to access knowledge produced elsewhere, including through research-led teaching. Recognising the importance of science investments, the Irish government has started to scale up its investments in science through funders such as Science Foundation Ireland (SFI), the Health Research Board (HRB) and Enterprise Ireland (EI). Public funding of R&D was €739.3 million in 2017 up from €718.9 million in 2016 and is estimated to have further increased to €751.7 million in 2018 (see Figure 16.1). Also evidence shows investment in science policy analysis where funding agencies such as SFI have funded policy research programmes.

Figure 16.1: Irish government budget allocations for R&D in current prices, € millions (2007–18) 1,000

€ millions

800

894.1

930.4

890.4 824.8

786.6

752.4

600

721.7

726.8

736.3

718.9

739.3

751.7

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018 est

400 200 0

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Source: DBEI (2018)

A large policy evaluation literature exists on effectiveness of R&D and science policies (see Bloom et al, 2019 for a recent survey). These policies include public funding of research, direct investments in the supply of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) graduates, direct R&D grants, R&D tax credits, facilitation of skilled migration and mission-oriented policies. Much of the available research relates to large economies, raising a question about the applicability of the findings to SOEs. This raises a concern that science policy for Ireland is conducted in a relative policy analysis vacuum. This chapter reviews key findings from the science policy literature and the (sparse) literature on Ireland-specific policy evaluation. Given the importance of knowledge intensive sectors to the growth prospects of the Irish economy and the substantial exchequer funds being invested, the recent investments by SFI and other agencies in evidence-based science policy analysis reflects a recognition that much policy making in this area for Ireland is based on a relatively weak evidence base. This chapter reviews the strategy and science of Irish science policy in light of the particular challenges for such policies in an SOE. The strategic approach 236

Irish science policy

followed by the government has focused on policies that involve a focus on applied/translational research, direct industry engagement to maximise local spillovers, the development of research centres to encourage such spillovers and develop scale, and the targeted recruitment of international star scientists to act as catalysts for the development of clusters of excellence in Irish science. This chapter can be read as a case study in policy development to support a modern knowledge-based economy. It reviews the international literature on the rationales for science policy and also the literature on the evaluation of science investments. It also discusses some of the main Irish policy initiatives and the (limited) evaluation literature that exists on the impact of these policies. In addition, SFI has recently launched a major funding programme to study the science of Irish science policy, so the timing is opportune to take stock of evaluation work on science policy. The chapter finally discusses the current and future strategic direction of science policy in light of the particular challenges facing Ireland as an SOE.

Why SOEs should invest in science The funding of scientific research by governments forms part of a social contract. Governments are supported by their citizenry on the basis of a corresponding effort on their part to improve society through capital investment in critical infrastructure. Examples include investments in health care, education, transport and funded scientific research. Funded scientific research seeks to create new knowledge where research funding agencies play a major role in supporting knowledge production (Feldman and Lichtenberg, 1998). Attempts to generate knowledge and capture value from scientific research presents as a complex process where SOEs such as Ireland face a challenge in managing spillovers that arise from the knowledge production process. Governments in SOEs face the problem of funding research where the benefit arising from knowledge does not always rest locally and spills over into global initiatives. The institutions behind science have sought to attain a better understanding of the effects of scientific research on economies and build capacity in the area of science policy analysis (Gluckman, 2009, 2018). Research has examined not only the direct impact of research but also the associated spillover effects from the knowledge produced (Feldman, 1999; Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). This challenge is further complicated by the fact that SOEs do not enjoy the same budgets or abilities to fund the type and scale of research enjoyed by larger nations. Financial support provided by governments to R&D presents as a form of conditional funding; funding is offered in consideration for a return from the scientist in the form of solving societal challenges, where this funding forms part of a social contract. A tension has existed within this social contract between the competing interests of basic frontier science and applied science. With a large emphasis on contemporary research supporting private industry, a challenge is faced by SOEs such as Ireland in supporting basic research (Arnold and Thuriaux, 237

Policy analysis in Ireland

2001). Globally, there is evidence of a move from supporting basic research to investing in more applied approaches that more closely match the needs of industry (Trajtenberg et al, 1992; Hershberg et al, 2007). The need to balance such competing interests presents as a particular challenge for SOEs where limited resources are available to support both approaches. It follows that policy analysis plays a critical role for SOEs in understanding and, in turn, addressing this tension.

Challenges for SOEs to invest in science Ireland forms part of a Small Advanced Economies Initiative (SAEI), featuring input from Denmark, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Singapore and Switzerland. Science funding agencies in these countries share best practices and data for the purposes of forming better science of science policy (SoSP). The constituent nations of the working group share relative similarities in terms of output, focus on the knowledge economy, national population figures, educational ethos, commitments to research integrity and intellectual property (IP) protections for research. The SAEI set out to achieve various goals, including the development of a common language for the concepts surrounding impact and impact assessment across countries, and sharing lessons in implementation of impact evaluation. Smaller economies face a challenge in maximising their position on the global stage and achieving value for money through science technology and innovation (Gluckman et  al, 2012; Padilla-Pérez and Gaudin, 2014). This challenge is represented in the form of various trade-offs made by national funding agencies in SOEs such as Ireland where it is posited that recent governments have chosen to create and support policy for national priority areas over and above frontier basic research to the disdain of the scientific community (Cotter, 2015). One such example is recent pressure placed on the Irish government to pay for membership of Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire (CERN) (Butler, 2018). SOEs face various challenges in funding scientific research, including holding minimal input in international forums; lacking the capabilities or capacities to undertake all domains of research in depth; deciding where to apply limited funds; and managing the balance between research where the primary outcome is enhanced economic growth and research for other possible public good outcomes (Gluckman et al, 2012). Ireland largely avoided significant evolutions in innovation and science policy until the later part of the 20th century where in recent decades, successive governments have sought to maximise their hand with the scarce resources available. It is argued that small economies such as Ireland can least afford to neglect science, although this is not to suggest that they can afford wide-scale research (Trench, 2017). In this context, Irish funders of scientific research have adopted a resourceful yet ambitious approach to the funding of impactful research, effected through science policy. A problem in garnering support for science in SOEs lies in the fact that much of the benefit arising from investment in science spills over to other countries. 238

Irish science policy

This challenge can hold with particular force for SOEs given that only a small fraction of the benefits may be appropriated by the sponsoring country. The output of funded scientific research in terms of knowledge production is viewed as a cumulative process, in that previous existing knowledge is combined into new knowledge (Weitzman, 1998; Arthur, 2009). Central to the economics approach is the idea of an innovation (or knowledge) production function, (see Arrow, 1962; Griliches, 1979; Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995), whereby innovation outputs depend on human and non-human inputs and critically on access to knowledge. The related concept of absorptive capacity, sometimes referred to as the second face of R&D, refers to the capacity to absorb knowledge that is created by others and thus move towards the technological frontier. A growing body of evidence suggests that a key to absorptive capacity for an individual or organisation is being active in frontier research (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Griffith et al, 2004). Thus, the benefits of research are not limited to the direct knowledge created – the first face – but also the indirect benefit of being better positioned to absorb frontier knowledge. Knowledge spillovers are of specific interest to SOEs where both positive and negative effects can be observed (Jaffe et al, 1993; Jaffe, 2013). Accordingly, further analysis is required into science policy surrounding knowledge spillovers.

Evidence on the social return to science investments The real contribution to an economy from investment in science is difficult to measure. Economic analysis and the evaluation of research programmes and outputs presents as a means to examine the return on investments. Firms and organisations are more often concerned with the private returns to R&D investment, while policy makers are generally interested in evidence for social or economy-wide returns, especially when investment in science is publicly funded. Indeed, it is the estimated gap between the social and private rates of return that explains why investment in science is a topic of policy concern in the first place (Jaffe, 2008). The private rate of return measures the return on investment in science that flows directly to the organisation conducting scientific research, whereas the social rate of return takes into account the additional benefits from research to society as a whole. More specifically, investment in science creates knowledge spillovers, whereby there is a positive knowledge externality to society far beyond the knowledge benefits accumulated to any single organisation directly involved in the research. Thus, the difference between the social and private rates of return captures these spillovers to some degree. For this reason, any estimation of the difference in returns is closely associated with a reasonable inference of these spillovers, and a valuable measure for policy makers concerned with public investment in science. Within this context, there is a large body of international literature that aims to estimate the economic returns to investment in science. This, in turn, provides evidence to suggest the social rate of return tends to be much higher 239

Policy analysis in Ireland

than the private rate of return, and that society generally benefits from spillover effects due to an investment in science. Most of these international estimates are based on the seminal approach of Griliches (1979). He proposed a so-called production function framework to help integrate the value of investment in science into economic modelling and to estimate the private and social returns to R&D. In this framework, a production function is employed that relates the quantity produced of a good (output) to the quantities of input required to produce the output – that is, labour, capital and technology. The function is further augmented with a measure of the firm’s own knowledge capital (inhouse R&D) as well as a measure of external knowledge capital (external R&D), where external knowledge capital is either held by other firms in the industry, or by other countries, dependent on the level of aggregation. In the production function framework, the input of external R&D aims to capture the effect of knowledge spillovers on output, while the measure for in-house R&D helps evaluate the private benefit of R&D to a firm’s output. In general, estimates of the social rate of return to R&D are found to range positively from close to zero up to 100% across the different studies and are almost always estimated to be greater than the private returns (Hall et al, 2010). There is also some evidence to suggest that the rate of return could be lower for public R&D investment when compared with private R&D, particularly in manufacturing industries (Hall et al, 2010). Nevertheless, the social rates of return to publicly funded R&D are estimated to range between 20% and 67% in the government-sponsored agricultural sector (Kumar et al, 2009), and are suggested to be between 23% and 28% for worldwide investment in academic research (Mansfield, 1991). Furthermore, in focusing on the difference between actual and optimal R&D expenditures at the firm level, Jones and Williams (1998) reported that optimal investment in R&D is at least two to four times actual investment based on their own estimates of social returns. In terms of international spillovers, there is further empirical evidence to support that foreign R&D has spillover effects on domestic productivity with the effects found to be strongest in SOEs (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Keller, 1998). From a wider perspective, Ugur and colleagues (2016) synthesised the available evidence on returns to R&D investment in Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development (OECD) firms and industries, then conducted a meta-analysis of the 1,253 estimates from 65 primary studies that implement the production function framework. They reported that private and withinindustry social returns are also positive, but smaller and more heterogeneous than estimates in other reviews including that by Hall et al (2010). On the other hand, recent evidence that proposes more robust estimates of the gap between social and private returns by accounting for the dynamic nature of knowledge spillovers suggests that social returns to R&D are about three times as large as the private returns (Colino, 2016). Overall, the large variability found in the values of the social rates of return can be explained by a number of factors across the separate analyses. These include the selected study samples, the treatment 240

Irish science policy

of knowledge spillovers, the time period examined, the sector observed, the econometric specification, and the level of aggregation in the studies.

Irish science policy initiatives The development of science policy in Ireland faces challenges where in recent decades the development of public policy has been under-resourced. MacCarthaigh (2013, p  91), states that ‘the study of public policy making and implementation is not a prominent feature of the Irish social and political sciences’. This coincides with calls for the greater use of economic analysis in evidence-based decision making (Ruane, 2013). However, Irish science policy has shown evidence of progress in recent years. Arising from government policy in science, new research clusters and centres have been created. Industry-matched funding programmes have assisted joint ventures between industry and research centres. Furthermore, research agencies have applied funding to both frontier and applied research projects. Notably, funding agencies have engaged in the funding of research centring on SoSP. Also funding agencies have funded the attraction of star talent to Ireland. Evidence also shows increased sharing and learning with international funding agencies; evidence of increased scientific output quantity and quality; and evidence of strong performance in global research rankings. Research centres were formulated by SFI with a view to linking scientists and engineers in partnerships across academia and industry to address major societal and scientific challenges. National priority areas serve as a guide for prospective research funding applicants and serve to set out the key reasons for a government’s decision to invest in a given domain with evidence of similar approaches globally. Funding agencies have sought to create research policy and research clusters around leading scientific fields of interest such as data analytics. The Irish government’s Action Plan for Jobs 2013 identified ‘big data’ as one of the key areas where Ireland can gain competitive edge over other countries. The Insight Centre for Data Analytics, which brings together both public and private research and industry, was created as a joint initiative between researchers across several universities and other partner institutions. Also, in recent years there is increased evidence of public agencies collaborating with funding agencies such as SFI (see Box 16.1). Currently, 17 research centres are operational with the plan for further expansion in the years to come. The research centres have received major support from industry with matched funding, with some €230 million committed through industry partnerships to facilitate research and training executed through the research centres. An interim report has shown that the SFI Research Centre Programme has met or exceeded most of the targets initially set. Individual studies have also shown that centres have had significant economic impacts on the economy (Lenihan et al, 2018). Ireland has provided specific investments into basic frontier research where in 2018 the government, through the Irish Research Council, provided a €29.6  million investment in frontier research through Laureate Awards. This investment was made on foot of research showing 241

Policy analysis in Ireland

a significant gap in the Irish research and innovation landscape in the area of frontier basic research. Box 16.1:Teagasc: Agriculture and Food Development Authority Agencies such as Teagasc perform an important role in science policy creation and analysis where they engage in strategic relationships with science funders at multiple levels. Teagasc supports PhD research programmes in policy analysis and partners with SFI and other agencies on the SFI Investigators Programme, which supports impactful researchers and collaborators. It also partners with other institutions in supporting the SFI agricultural research centre, Vistamilk, and receives funding for science festivals and public engagement.

Evidence shows that in recent years the government has renewed efforts to develop SoSP research capacity through supporting national and international science policy research. International funding agencies have pressed for the development of evidence-based policy to improve the science behind the evaluation of science and development of new science policy, where, in particular, international efforts aim to advance a more quantitative approach to measuring the impacts of research so as to inform policy creation (Roessner, 2000; Lane, 2009; Lane and Bertuzzi, 2011; Weinberg et al, 2014). Evidence is also available of increased focus from the Irish perspective on European Union (EU) policy analysis in recent years. A not-for-profit think tank, the Institute of International and European Affairs was established to debate, discuss, analyse and share policy options. Moreover, the Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service (IGEES) has in recent years published research covering topics ranging from energy to employment (see Chapters Four and Eight, this volume). IGEES seeks to enhance the role of economics and value for money analysis in public policy making. Furthermore, several Irish academic institutions including University College Cork, Technological University Dublin, Trinity College Dublin, University College Dublin, National University of Ireland Galway and Maynooth University among others have launched courses specifically focused on policy that encompasses reflections on science policy and policy analysis. Irish research funding agencies have also sought to fund and support research surrounding the evaluation of science policy such as the SFI Policy Research Programme and the HRB’s policy investigations. The Economic and Social Research Institute has also examined alternative approaches to building research capacity in domains such as the social sciences (Ruane and Whelan, 2010). Furthermore, the funding agencies have launched programmes to attract star scientists to Ireland such as the SFI Research Professorship Programme. Since its launch in 2003, the SFI Research Professorship Programme has sought to recruit 242

Irish science policy

world-leading researchers in targeted scientific areas. In this context, the work in this chapter forms part of a larger body of research examining the impact of star scientists on institutional output. Along with attracting established talent to Ireland, SFI has launched projects such as the President of Ireland Future Research Leaders Programme to attract to Ireland outstanding new and emerging research leaders in both scientific and engineering domains, representing a net investment of €7.7 million. In recent years, Irish funding agencies also show evidence of increased involvement and sharing with other European entities and institutions in the European Research Area through programmes such as Horizon 2020, the European Commission’s (EC) funding programme for research and innovation. Furthermore, there is substantial joint collaboration among funding agencies and research councils through policy platforms such as Science Europe. Policy efforts have focused on removing barriers and imposing conditions so that scientists can move more easily between member states. Another core aspect of work completed includes the sharing of metrics for benchmarking purposes among member states. Through coordinated interactions and meetings facilitated by the EC, practices are agreed in areas relating to the evaluation of research, excellence in science and the societal impact arising from science. More recently, Irish-funded scientific research has shown benefits arising from informed science policy where various leading international indicators highlight the progress made. The impact of scientists is measured through various metrics, including those relating to national and international funding leveraged; star publications produced; doctoral students graduated; researchers hired; spin-outs created; patents issued; licensing revenue gained; and the number and quality of collaborations initiated. Agenda 2020, SFIs strategy document (SFI, 2015), sets out a vision for science in Ireland, and its focus is specifically on output metrics related to business, spin-outs, the licencing of research technology and the production of a highly educated workforce. As of 2019, Ireland is ranked 12th in the world global scientific ranking (SFI, 2019). Ireland has engaged and participated in various international scientific efforts related to science policy. These efforts have included providing input into global science policy, in particular for the developing world through organisations such as the United Nations and OECD as well as participation both directly and indirectly in discussions between trade blocks such as the EU and Canada. In terms of the European Innovation Scoreboard, in 2020 Ireland was identified as a strong innovator (EC, 2020). Additionally, an EU study on knowledge transfer in 2013 identified Ireland as having strong knowledge transfer policies and good knowledge transfer performance (Arundel et al, 2013). Such improvements coincide with a renewed focus on policy analysis. Organisations such as the IGEES seek to drive further policy analysis and present analytical and statistical outputs. Notwithstanding recent efforts in the domain, it could still be argued that there is evidence of a science policy failure/policy analysis deficit (Hennigan, 2013; McConnell, 2015). This is further strengthened by similar claims that Ireland has a tradition of policy making that lacks research evidence, which can be observed 243

Policy analysis in Ireland

in both science and enterprise policy (Lunn and Ruane, 2013) (see Chapter Five, this volume). Despite limited research focusing on Irish (Boden and Fitzgibbon, 1995; Kane, 2001, 2014) and European (Georghiou, 1995) efforts at formulating policy regarding science evaluation, there is a notable absence of research in the SoSP domain more generally. Science policy has been used to address failures in higher education. For example, some 40 STEM professorships were created in 2019 to address the under-representation of women in STEM areas (see Chapter Fourteen, this volume).

Conclusion Our review of the evidence of the impact of state investments in science suggests both the high (global) social return to investment and also the challenges facing SOEs in recouping such investments due to spillover and scale effects. This creates an understandable challenge for stakeholders in science investments to achieve support for a social contract that prioritises scarce fiscal resources for such investments. Recognising this challenge, this chapter has reviewed various rationales for supporting domestic science in SOE, notably the localisation of knowledge spillovers, absorptive capacity effects and the role of targeted agglomerations. This research serves to motivate government investment in science policy analysis and more specifically the economic analysis of impacts arising from spillover and scale effects. The strategic direction of Irish science policy can be thought of as responses to these rationales. The prioritisation of the applied/translational end over the basic end of the research spectrum can be thought of as an attempt to capitalise on greater localisation effects for this type of research. Efforts to involve industry in research efforts can be further understood as an attempt to maximise such effects. On the other hand, the likely strong absorptive capacity benefits of investments in basic science – especially when it is use-inspired – explains the willingness to continue to invest in basic science even if it remains relatively under-prioritised relative to applied/translational research. The focus on major research centres – especially those tied to industry – can be viewed as an effort to achieve targeted agglomerations or clusters where there are significant economies of scale associated with local research activity. Star-focused research professorship schemes are another example of attempts to catalyse cluster formation in targeted areas where a distinctive advantage is possible. Of course, such targeted efforts must balance the need for broad-based expertise to support a complex knowledge-intensive economic system, the trade-off between the advantages of exploiting areas of distinctive advantage versus exploring possible new areas of potential advantage, and the value of diversity in supporting scientific discovery and innovation when new ideas result from new combinations of existing ideas. Notwithstanding its importance to the development of a knowledge intensive economy, evidence-based research on SoSP has traditionally been relatively neglected compared with other policy areas. However, there are indications that 244

Irish science policy

this is changing. SFI has recently initiated two significant funding rounds on SoSP. These programmes provide additional support to Irish academic institutions to facilitate research in the science policy domain. There is also support at a European level for research in this area, with Horizon 2020 initiatives of the EC covering areas of research where science policy affects society, for example the Science With and For Society work programme. Also greater collaboration in the domain has been achieved through organisations such as Science Europe where the public funders of scientific research engage in strategic sharing and learning. Supported by SFI, the authors of this chapter are currently exploring the catalytic effects of star scientists on the research productivity of receiving institutions. Other SFI-supported projects include research providing a national evaluation and international benchmarking of science policy in Ireland, a study of peer review at SFI and an examination of the role of talent and human capital management in national science foundations. As we enter into the next phase of strategy development for the building of scientific research capacity, these efforts to evaluate what policies work and to understand why they work will be essential to design an effective Irish science research system with broad social support. Acknowledgements This work was supported by Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) grant 17/SPR/5329 to the Whitaker Institute, National University of Ireland Galway from the SFI Science Policy Research Programme.

References Agrawal, A. and Cockburn, I. (2003) ‘The anchor tenant hypothesis: exploring the role of large, local, R&D-intensive firms in regional innovation systems’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(9): 1227–53. Agrawal, A., Cockburn, I. and McHale, J. (2006) ‘Gone but not forgotten: knowledge flows, labor mobility, and enduring social relationships’, Journal of Economic Geography, 6(5): 571–91. Arnold, E. and Thuriaux, B. (2001) ‘Contribution of basic research to the Irish national innovation system’, Science and Public Policy, 28(2): 86–98. Arrow, K.J. (1962) ‘The economic implications of learning by doing’, The Review of Economic Studies, 29(3): 155–73. Arthur, W.B. (2009) The Nature of Technology: What It Is and How It Evolves, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Arundel, A., Es-Sadki, N., Barjak, F., Perrett, P., Samuel, O. and Lilschkis, S. (2013) European Commission, Knowledge Transfer Study 2010–2012. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/knowledge_ transfer_2010-2012_report.pdf Bloom, N., Van Reenen, J. and Williams, H. (2019) ‘A toolkit of policies to promote innovation’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(3): 163–84. Boden, M. and Fitzgibbon, M. (1995) ‘Evaluation of science and technology policy in Ireland’, Research Evaluation, 5(1): 55–62.

245

Policy analysis in Ireland

Breschi, S. and Lissoni, F. (2001) ‘Knowledge spillovers and local innovation systems: a critical survey’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 10(4): 975–1005. Butler, M. (2018) ‘Ireland to join CERN?’, Institute of Physics [Online], 29 October. Available at: www.iopireland.org/news/18/oct/page_72273.html Coe, D.T. and Helpman, E. (1995) ‘International R&D spillovers’, European Economic Review, 39(5): 859–87. Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. (1989) ‘Innovation and learning: the two faces of R&D’, The Economic Journal, 99(397): 569–96. Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. (1990) ‘Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and innovation’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1): 128–52. Colino, D. (2016) ‘Cumulative innovation and dynamic R&D spillovers’, MIT Mimeo. Available at: http://economics.mit.edu/files/12082? Cotter, T. (2015) ‘Funding basic research in science’, The Irish Times [Online], 18  March. Available at: www.irishtimes.com/opinion/letters/funding-basicresearch-in-science-1.2142827 DBEI (Department of Business Enterprise and Innovation) (2018) The Research and Development Budget (R&D) 2017–18, Dublin: Government of Ireland. Available at: https://dbei.gov.ie/en/Publications/Publication-files/The-R-DBudget-2017-2018.pdf EC (European Commission) (2020) European Innovation Scoreboard 2020. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/42981 Feldman, M.P. (1999) ‘The new economics of innovation, spillovers and agglomeration: a review of empirical studies’, Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 8(1–2): 5–25. Feldman, M.P. and Lichtenberg, F.R. (1998) ‘The impact and organization of publicly-funded research and development in the European Community’, Annales d’Économie et de Statistique, 49/50: 199–222. Georghiou, L. (1995) ‘Research evaluation in European national science and technology systems’, Research Evaluation, 5(1): 3–10. Gluckman, P.D. (2009) ‘Improving translation of publicly funded research for economic benefit’, Office of the Prime Minister’s Science Advisory Committee [Online]. Available at: www.pmcsa.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/Report-from14-Sept-workshop-29-Oct-091.pdf Gluckman, P.D. (2018) ‘The role of evidence and expertise in policy-making: the politics and practice of science advice’, Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, 151(1): 91–101. Gluckman, P.D., Goldson, S.L. and Beedle, A.S. (2012) ‘How a small country can use science diplomacy: a view from New Zealand’, Science & Diplomacy, 1(2). Available at: www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2012/how-smallcountry-can-use-science-diplomacy Griffith, R., Redding, S. and Van Reenen, J. (2004) ‘Mapping the two faces of R&D: productivity growth in a panel of OECD industries’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(4): 883–95.

246

Irish science policy

Griliches, Z. (1979) ‘Issues in assessing the contribution of research and development to productivity growth’, The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1): 92–116. Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (1991) ‘Trade, knowledge spillovers, and growth’, European Economic Review, 35(2–3): 517–26. Hall, B.H., Mairesse, J. and Mohnen, P. (2010) ‘Measuring the returns to R&D’, in B.H. Hall and N. Rosenberg (eds) Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp 1033–82. Hennigan, M. (2013) ‘Irish innovation: evidence of science policy failure mounts’, Finfacts Ireland [Online]. Available at: www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/ article_1026400.shtml Hershberg, E., Nabeshima, K. and Yusuf, S. (2007) ‘Opening the ivory tower to business: university-industry linkages and the development of knowledgeintensive clusters in Asian cities’, World Development, 35(6): 931–40. Jaffe, A.B. (2008) ‘The “science of science policy”: reflections on the important questions and the challenges they present’, Journal of Technology Transfer, 33(2): 131–9. Jaffe, A.B. (2013) ‘Science and innovation policy for New Zealand’, New Zealand Science Review, 70(3): 55–61. Jaffe, A.B., Trajtenberg, M. and Henderson, R. (1993) ‘Geographic localization of knowledge spillovers as evidenced by patent citations’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3): 577–98. Jones, C.I. (1995) ‘R&D-based models of economic growth’, Journal of Political Economy, 103(4): 759–84. Jones, C.I. and Williams, J. C. (1998) ‘Measuring the social return to R&D’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4): 1119–35. Kane, A. (2001) Indicators and Evaluation for Science, Technology and Innovation Background Document for ICSTI Task Force on Metrics and Impact, Galway: National University of Ireland Galway. Available at: https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/ download?doi=10.1.1.492.1800&rep=rep1&type=pdf Kane, A. (2014) ‘Rationales for science, technology and innovation policy’, National University of Ireland Galway [Online]. Available at: http://citeseerx. ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.507.8354&rep=rep1&type=pdf Keller, W. (1998) ‘Are international R&D spillovers trade-related?’, European Economic Review, 42(8): 1469–81. Kumar, S., Ravuri, R.R., Koneru, P., Urade, B., Sarkar, B., Chandrasekar, A. and Rao, V.R. (2009) ‘Reconstructing Indian-Australian phylogenetic link’, BMC Evolutionary Biology, 9(1): 509–32. Lane, J. (2009) ‘Assessing the impact of science funding’, Science, 324(5932): 1273–75. Lane, J. and Bertuzzi, S. (2011) ‘Measuring the results of science investments’, Science, 331(6018): 678–80.

247

Policy analysis in Ireland

Lenihan, H., Mulligan, K. and Perez-Alaniz, M. (2018) An Economic Impact Assessment of Lero, Limerick: Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick. Available at: https://www.lero.ie/sites/default/files/FINAL%20Econ%20 impact%20Lero%20v%2027_11_2018.pdf Lunn, P. and Ruane, F. (2013) Using Evidence to Inform Policy, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. MacCarthaigh, M. (2013) ‘Reform of public policy-making in Ireland’, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 42(1): 89–95. Mansfield, E. (1991) ‘Academic research and industrial innovation’, Research Policy, 20(1): 1–12. McConnell, D. (2015) ‘Science is in crisis and scientists have lost confidence in government policy’, The Irish Times, 2 April. Padilla-Pérez, R. and Gaudin, Y. (2014) ‘Science, technology and innovation policies in small and developing economies: the case of Central America’, Research Policy, 43(4): 749–59. Roessner, D. (2000) ‘Quantitative and qualitative methods and measures in the evaluation of research’, Research Evaluation, 9(2): 125–32. Romer, P.M. (1990) ‘Endogenous technological change’, Journal of Political Economy, 98(5): S71–S102. Ruane, F. (2013) ‘Public policy must be based on evidence and not on ideology or anecdotes’, The Irish Times, 13 March. Ruane, F. and Whelan, B. (2010) ‘Building research capacity in the social sciences – alternatives approaches’, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 40(1): 133–51. Available at: www.esri.ie/system/files?file=media/fileuploads/2015-07/jacb201209.pdf Trajtenberg, M., Henderson, R. and Jaffe, A. (1992) Ivory Tower Versus Corporate Lab: An Empirical Study of Basic Research and Appropriability, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. SFI (Science Foundation Ireland) (2015) Agenda 2020: Excellence and Impact. Available at: https://www.sfi.ie/research-news/publications/AGENDA-2020(2018)-WEB.pdf SFI (2019) Annual Report. Available at: http://www.sfi.ie/research-news/news/ annual-report-2019/SFI-Annual-Report-2019.pdf Trench, B. (2017) ‘The rocky road of science communication in Ireland’, in B. Trench, P. Murphy, and D. Fahy (eds) Little Country, Big Talk: Science Communication in Ireland, Dublin: Celsius, pp 1–25. Ugur, M., Trushin, E., Solomon, E. and Guidi, F. (2016) ‘R&D and productivity in OECD firms and industries: a hierarchical meta-regression analysis’, Research Policy, 45(10): 2069–86. Weinberg, B.A., Owen-Smith, J., Rosen, R.F., Schwarz, L., Allen, B.M.F., Weiss, R.E. and Lane, J. (2014) ‘Science funding and short-term economic activity’, Science, 344(6179): 41–3. Weitzman, M.L. (1998) ‘Recombinant growth’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2): 331–60. 248

SEVENTEEN

Media discourses on the economy in Ireland: framing the policy possibilities Brendan K. O’Rourke

Introduction Ireland suffered a lot economically in the Great Recession following the 2008 global financial crisis, yet its policies continued on a neoliberal trajectory, making Irish neoliberalism less a Zombie and more like a reinvigorated Frankenstein’s monster, with ordoliberal transplants from Germany grafted on to an AngloAmerican neoliberal composite body. Yet, along with these continuities came much change. There was political change in party strengths and personnel. There was change in the Irish state’s capacity for policy analysis (MacCarthaigh, 2017), an increase in the number of policy analysts and their specialisms, and an increased stress on evidence-based policy making (see Chapters Four and Eight, this volume). How can a discursive approach help explain these continuities and changes in policy making? Perhaps, more importantly, how do we respond to make Irish policy discourse better? This chapter first argues that a discursive approach can add much to our understanding of what has been happening in policy analysis in Ireland. The concept of hyper-specialisation is then introduced as it is both an important feature of the context in which policy discourse takes place, and because it shows the complexities of what discourses face as they travel across societies. Next, the chapter examines policy-relevant discourses of media and actors within the media, and unpacks recent developments to ascertain what they mean for Irish public policy discourse. It then examines how internationalisation affects such policy discourses and the impact of that complication on participation in policy debates. Further complexities are introduced in the following section, which considers the effects of technocratisation, and particularly economisation, on how policy is discussed. The final section of the chapter draws some conclusions from the earlier exploration of the rather daunting features of our policy discourses.

A more discursive view: beyond pure ideas to interactions and material affordances Along with individuals, interests and institutions, ideas have long been understood as important in shaping policy. Studies informed by discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008) on the discourse of social science experts and analysis of media 249

Policy analysis in Ireland

coverage of the economy (Rieder and Theine, 2019) make clear that such ideas do not enter the policy arena as individually considered and evaluated atomic units. Such work has shown that the view of ideas being mixed and matched until the best possible outcome emerges from a well-functioning marketplace of ideas is just not how this process works. Rather, the means of communication, from the experts whose messages are increasingly packaged for impact, and the format of various traditional and social media outlets, means that these ideas compete embedded in alternative discourses that frame policy possibilities. In studies using a traditional ideological approach, such communications are reduced to their abstract ideas, which are then grouped according to logical consistency. Taking a discursive view, as opposed to an ideational one, means not only examining communications from the rationale of such abstract ideas, but also exploring the way in which the medium, including the structures of language itself and the affordances of technology, allows and inhibits the way the communication plays out in interaction. Logical tensions in debate or discussion, say between the rule of law and the need for freedom, may be viewed as a weakness in the ideology, but viewed as a discourse, the ability of such a tension to energise more similar debate about that tension is revealed as a strength. Contradictory ideas in a discourse can help the discourse reproduce. The technology of broadcast radio, with its one-to-many intimacy, affords different possibilities from those arising from the public interactional nature of Twitter. Though we may be able to abstract the same idea in messages in either medium, how those messages play out in interaction on the different media is likely to be very different. Rather than focus on the ideational content of communication alone, a discourse analysis approach also demands an understanding of how the different parties in that communication interact and the way the structure of the means by which they do shapes the way that communication affects us overall, not just at the surface rational and explicit level. Communications shape our identities, the relations we have with each other and how we represent any realities to ourselves as we act on them (Fairclough, 1993). A discursive view recognises that policy too needs to be communicated and that communication too shapes the way the policy works, even when a different impact might have been intended or anticipated: when a fine was introduced at a day-care centre for lateness in picking up the child, parents’ reaction to the communication, that lateness was something that could be easily paid for, seemed to outweigh the disincentive of the fine (Gneezy et al, 2011). In the Irish case, some have sought an explanation of the continuities in Irish economic policy in the conservative nature of the revolution in which the state was born (for example, O’Rourke and Hogan, 2017) and the institutionalisation of the former colonial master’s ‘treasury model’ linked with the subsequent crowning of economists in the founding of institutions such as the Economic and Social Research Institute (see Chapter Two, this volume). This may at least in part be a good explanation. Yet, the institutional power of economists within the Irish state, in comparison to other states, has been weak (Christensen, 250

Media discourses on the economy in Ireland

2017). FitzGerald and O’Rourke (2018) argue that means that the modern Irish economics profession’s discourse in the media has been, until the 2008 crisis, its chief way of influencing policy. Indeed, the hostility between politicians and economists in Ireland, and some, if relatively quiet warnings from academic economists during the post-2000 Celtic boom period, have probably added more authority to the discourse of Irish economists. The discursive approach draws our attention to some issues, and their interactive impact, pertinent to policy analysis, that might be missed if the focus is only on individuals, interests, institutions and ideas. The next sections focuses on some features of discourse of relevance to policy.

Hyper-specialisation and the dangers of endarkenment Specialisation has been advancing for some centuries and is a key feature of capitalism. Indeed, specialisation and its problems have motivated social scientists to try to understand how such modern societies could operate in comparison to the personal relationship system in traditional societies. Despite being recognised by early social scientists, specialisation and its increasing complexities seem to demand constantly deeper understandings. Arguably, the increasing complexities of specialisation undermined policies based on detailed plans so characteristic of 1945–70. Ireland’s 1958 Programme for Economic Expansion and particularly its 1963/64 successor were both extremely detailed and successful rhetorically, but by 1970 complex input–output model targets had been replaced by the single goal of joining the European Economic Community (Daly, 2016, pp 39–54). For the case of economic planning in Ireland, the complexities of an increasingly internationalised economic world made the future harder to predict, as the oil price shocks of the early 1970s illustrated. Neoliberal ‘talk’ had things to say concerning such increased complexity from specialisation emerging in the 20th century. For example, Hayek’s (1945) world was one where buyers could discover what they wanted as they encountered the various market offerings, oblivious to the details of how a thing was produced, but relying on their market-informed assessment of products and their prices: no one person may know how to make a modern pencil from scratch, but most can assess for themselves if a particular pencil is worth its price (Read, 2015). For the 21st century, there seems to be another leap in the level of specialisation. For Millgram (2015), this change in extent has meant a change in the quality of interdependence that warrants a neologism: ‘hyper-specialisation’ means that we now live in a world where we are not merely dependent on others for what they produce, but we live in a world where we depend on others for their assessments of what is produced. Whereas we can judge among a variety of pencils as to what best suits our needs, choosing which bit of software best suits our needs depends more heavily on the assessments provided by others. Millgram (2015) argues that this reliance on the assessments of specialists undermines the public sphere of the enlightenment that requires individuals 251

Policy analysis in Ireland

capable of making independent assessments, and threatens a new endarkenment. As language is shaped by our tasks and our tasks are becoming more and more specialised, our discourse begins to differentiate itself in important ways. This differentiation in hyper-specialisation may become so great that mutual intelligibility becomes a struggle, especially where relevant discourse is tied to particular specialisations. In terms of the discourse in which policy debates take place, we can see this problem as particularly acute in the striving for evidencebased policy based on the view of experts, with their specialised and differing use of language (see Chapter Five, this volume). Increasingly, what evidence counts as good depends on the assessment of experts, and assessing which experts to trust is no easy task. The communications systems through which we interact on these matters are increasingly complex, where the discourse produced seems as capable of producing general distrust as of encouraging trust and trustworthiness. Communicating the complexities of measuring economic growth in a country dominated by foreign direct investment (FDI) and having low corporate tax rates is a case in point: the various notes on the 2015 economic growth figures (see www.cso.ie), and their revision, did little to quell the impression of ‘Leprechaun economics’.

Media Media is supposed to be one way in which a disintegrated world can be brought back together again. Those who work in the media are supposed to be the specialists at such integration. The difficulty of the task facing such intermediaries in a hyper-specialised world is unprecedented: connecting diverse specialists who are at once more educated and more reliant on the assessments of others. Yet, the media is far from a neutral player in its assessments, and such a lack of neutrality is not dependent on conspiracy or propaganda models (Casey, 2019). The neoliberal bias, at least on economic issues, has been shown in surveys of Irish media (Phelan, 2009; Mercille, 2015; Graham and Silke, 2017). The interplay of academics and politicians in constructing neoliberal austerity as the lesson to be learned from history has been illustrated (O’Rourke and Hogan, 2013). Rieder and Theine (2019) have also shown how economists not stressing the neoliberal line can be sidelined, regardless of academic renown. We also understand how neoliberal framing can construct the entire public service as problematic (Marron, 2019). In addition to this challenge from the changing nature of society in general, and neoliberal bias, the media faces its own upheavals in technologies and organisational forms. Media changes and their impact on discourse are nothing new (Habermas, 1989), but the pace of change makes us almost nostalgic for the problems of old. When it arrived, commercial mass media may have led to reduced participation in the public sphere, as media professionals crowded out ordinary citizens. Yet, the very arrival of these one-to-many media outlets served to provide a commonality for at least important segments of the diversity 252

Media discourses on the economy in Ireland

of specialists that make up modern citizenry. While we are still in an age of commercial mass media, the online world is one in which the long tail of fragmented media markets becomes profitable, where filter bubbles and echo chambers appear as particular affordances of the technology, and fake news has new profit opportunities. Box 17.1 explores the complex process of budgetary policy and the role of the media, and the challenges in enabling a coherent public sphere in the context of complexity and specialisation. Box 17.1: Challenges to participation: the case of budgetary policy Taking the case of the government’s budget process, one can see how issues are often framed by a complex interaction of media, international governance, technocrats and experts in a way that any feeling of democratic participation, or legitimacy, is far from easy to identify. In terms of a yearly cycle, a convenient starting point is the requirement of the government to submit draft budgetary plans to the European Commission (EC) by midOctober of the year prior to the budget.The EC then responds by publishing European Union (EU)-wide economic policy priorities, alerts on macroeconomic imbalances and detailed country reports. All member states are expected to give a response to these EU-level contributions after debates in their parliaments, following which the EU issues country-specific recommendations by July. In recent years, the government has convened a National Economic Dialogue in late June, where select civil societies, invited parties and academics can make contributions concerning the budget to the government.While the media continually reports on matters fiscal, its coverage of the budget has its first peak of the cycle in September, shortly after the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFAC) makes a report on the fiscal space in which it believes the government can prudently decide its revenue and spending decisions. The media’s coverage in early September tends to focus on the policy choices and implications of the budget, but as we move towards October the coverage becomes like that of a horse race. In October, the budget for the following year is announced and the cycle begins all over again. And, of course, this cycle, as described, is considerably simplified: at the EU level, for example, the case study has not considered the role of the Council of Ministers, or the hidden role of the ‘Eurogroup’ of Euro-currency ministers who operate apart from the normal scrutiny of EU institutions. Clearly participating in this discourse, central policy possibilities, requires much work and reliance on media and expertise, making it difficult for citizens to feel they take part in a shared public sphere or even to feel the media is making the process transparent.

Technological changes also present problems for participation and it is important to note how recent and ongoing such technological changes are. The Apple smartphone was introduced to Ireland in 2008, the first year that more households in Ireland than not had a broadband connection (Horgan and Flynn, 2017, pp 256–9). By 2019, over 70% of the population were using the internet for accessing news media (CSO, 2019, Table 4), with the smartphone being the 253

Policy analysis in Ireland

favourite device for doing so (Kirk et al, 2019, Figure 23) and with Twitter seeming, so far, to be the most explicitly political platform in terms of electoral politics (Ó Beacháin, 2014, p 41). As Bruns (2018, p 342) points out, the public sphere must now be understood as ‘a dynamic, changeable, and barely controllable system of interacting forces’ rather than a stable equilibrium dominated by a single type of institute or pattern. Traditional media do remain important actors in the online world; however, their authority and centrality in policy debates, such as that on climate change, is being challenged and replaced by other actors (Häussler, 2019). This disintermediation makes participation in public policy discourse more inclusive, but it also makes it more fragmented, and vulnerable to filter bubbles and echo chambers. More research is needed to know to what extent such effects are empirically important and to what extent there are counter-tendencies. Dahlgren and colleagues (2019) show that while people do seek out news, both in print and online, consistent with their ideologies and that this strengthens their ideological leanings over time, those who seek out online ideologically leaning sources tend to seek out both left and right sources. So, being online seems to encourage crosscutting exposure in a way that might allow a counter-tendency to fall into echo chambers. Yet, we cannot assume that truth can always be found by triangulating it from two biased sources. Micro-targeting, which advertisers find so attractive and so is a major driver of online discourse, is busily and increasingly effectively creating our own customised filter bubbles produced by logics of a few very dominant technology companies. Fake news and carefully customised messages have clearly been evident in recent elections and the percentage of the Irish public concerned about fake news online (61%) is a little above the average EU level (51%), but below North America (64%) and the United Kingdom (UK) (70%) (Kirk et al, 2019, Figure 35). Technologies such as Twitter facilitate our tendency for abrasive interaction without the emotional labour such abrasiveness would cost in person, or the reputational damage it might cost in traditional professional publications. That such technological affordances have a systemic effect is illustrated in the Irish case, when a misattributed tweet played an important role in the 2011 presidential election campaign (Graham and Hogan, 2014). While such incidents are perhaps more visible in electoral contests, they must surely be at work too in more sustained policy discussions. The unfounded claim by the United States (US) President, Donald Trump, that Ireland was considering reducing its corporation tax rate to 8% looks like a case of fake news on Ireland influencing US policy debates on US corporation tax rates (Lynch, 2017). New technologies are creating personal publics where communication is selected and shared by personalised criteria, disseminated through networks rather than at undifferentiated mass publics and has a feeling of the interpersonal and the intimate rather than the rule-bound public sphere. The new technologies simulate more the intimacies of traditional community despite their emergence from and in a modern, or postmodern, society of large-scale impersonal interdependence. 254

Media discourses on the economy in Ireland

While simulating the personal interaction of community, most of our more recent technologies tend to facilitate context collapse, where contextual cues on trustworthiness are undermined (Davis and Jurgenson, 2014). Yet, the blurring of the public and personal continues online generally, whether it be in the viewpoints in personal Facebook pages, or the intimacies whispered by the friendly host of favourite podcasts. Ireland’s fondness for audio media continues into the online age, with 37% of the population having listened to a podcast in the past month compared with the EU’s 33% and North America’s 32% (Kirk et al, 2019, Figure 62). Podcast charts for Ireland in December of 2019 show that while four of the top ten are sourced from traditional broadcast organisations, those with very particular takes on public affairs, including Blindboy of Rubberbandits fame, Eamon Dunphy and David McWilliams, have sufficient personal recognition among the public to also be in the top ten (www.chartable.com). Perhaps the personal and intimate nature of podcast discourse (Murray, 2019) feeds a need to recontextualise and have personal connections in the anonymised world of online discourse.

Internationalisation Since the extent of the specialisation is influenced by the extent of the market, globalisation is clearly an element, and driver, of hyper-specialisation. Yet, international institutions, international commerce and international culture add their own particular possibilities for endarkenment. The intricacies of multilevel governance, debates over jurisdiction and tightly coupled global supply lines, made all the more opaque by cultural differences and distances, add to the confusion and the interdependences. Ireland’s economic openness means it is hugely dependent on this hyper-specialised world. Ireland’s smallness means it does not have available to it the scale of state, culture and dominating institutions of larger states that may alleviate these disintegrating forces. For Ireland, any balance to the globalisation of the market can only be sought in transnational governance arrangements, which also are implicated in the particular forms of globalisation that have already taken place. The discursive construction of Ireland’s globalised environment takes place in what itself is a very internationally open media market, with Irish-based television having less than a 50% share in its home market, UK-based newspapers taking a large share of the print market, and radio being the only traditional medium dominated by Irish producers (Flynn, 2017, p 4) The fact that Irishman Peter Sutherland was the founding Director-General of the World Trade Organization, a local optimum at least for the Anglo-American view on economic governance, is telling. Ireland with its vernacular English, common law tradition and colonial history has been a more receptive home for Anglo-American discourse than most of mainland Europe. High-intensity of FDI (Barry and Bergin, 2013), particularly from the US, shapes discourse. With the benefit of some historical distance, Taylor and Murphy (2002) show this effect 255

Policy analysis in Ireland

in the case of environmental policy making as Ireland built its attractiveness for international investment in its growing pharmaceutical sector in the 1970s and 1980s. The extraordinary length of the interview granted by Apple’s chief Tim Cooke to the country’s agenda-setting morning radio news show and the soft nature of that interview, in contrast to the programme’s usual style, is a recent example of such influence (Graham and O’Rourke, 2019). A survey experiment on how the framing of the corporate tax debate by the news media changes readers’ views shows that such media effects can have dramatic consequences (Kneafsey and Regan, 2019). How the discourse in Ireland is complicated by multi-level governance is also illustrated in the case of corporation taxation where even those who want international agreements for a tax floor differ on what levels of international governance those agreements ought to be made. The EU has clearly been vital in Ireland’s development and has received a boost in its discursive power in Brexit negotiations surrounding the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, with much acknowledgement of the EU’s central role in promoting Ireland’s interest. The geographic adjacency of Ireland and the UK will mean the relationship between Irish and EU levels of governance will continue to be an important part of public policy discussions. During the 2008 economic crisis, Ireland, used to getting its neoliberalism from English-speaking sources, was somewhat surprised in getting a bailout, as newspaper columnist Fintan O’Toole (2010) noted, more akin to ‘Versailles’ than ‘Marshall’ from the EU. Clearly, the compromise of the European model was dominated by its German ordoliberalism and the discourses of its austerity experts (Maesse, 2018). Yet, the openness of Irish media to international influences, and not just anglophone ones, is shown in the way, even during the crisis, German actors featured prominently in Irish media constructions of solidarity (Wallaschek, 2020).

Technocratisation and economisation Albeit particularly associated with the EU, the problems of how technocracy and democracy can be harmonised is probably a more general issue and more to do with hyper-specialisation and problems of unequal access to power generally than with any habits peculiar to Brussels. However, the power of technocrats was made particularly obvious in Europe’s response to the 2008 crisis (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2017) and anti-expert rhetoric seems to have been part of the Brexit debate (Zappavigna, 2019). Yet, both facile tropes and genuine concerns about the problems of rule by science run deeper than the EU (Hayek, 1945) and are not confined to the left or the right. The media use of experts has increased substantially since 2000, with social scientists playing a growing role (Niemi and Pitkänen, 2017, p 357). As Bovens and Wille (2017) argue, democracies are becoming diploma-based, and so too are more of democracies’ media discourses. Irish economists have had a good ‘crisis’ with the prominent post-crisis role of economists at the head of the Central Bank of Ireland, and the formation 256

Media discourses on the economy in Ireland

of the IFAC, IGEES and Parliamentary Budget Office (see Chapters Four and Five, this volume). This suggests that the power of economists within the Irish state is rapidly catching up with that of other states where policy has increasingly been expressed in economics terms (Christensen, 2017). Whether economists are merely the vanguard of experts more generally, or are particularly suited to wielding political influence, to date, technocratic power has largely been expressed in economics discourse. What is clear is that the technocratisation of media is not only driven by this increasing use of experts as sources by the media, but also because official sources that are much relied on are becoming more economised. Despite, or perhaps associated with, the influence of economics on public discourse, trust in economists is low. Giles (2019) reports that in the UK, economists are trusted less than other scientists, albeit a little more than journalists and politicians. The Brexit referendum showed that the position of respondents was a major correlate with trust in economists: remain voters trusted economists at twice the rate of leave voters. Thus, trust in economists seems in itself an area of politicised disagreement, at least in the UK. Clearly, this is a problem in a world where we depend on the assessments of others. This is not merely a problem of the public needing more education, for, as O’Neill (2018) points out, trust needs to be linked to trustworthiness. The financial crash of 2008 exposed various problematics including how conflicts of interests might be tarnishing policy advice, technical weakness within both the economics and media profession and the dominance of neoliberalism within those professions (Plehwe et al, 2018; Casey, 2019; Rieder and Theine, 2019). All these have been damaging to trust, with Edelman (2020, p 42) showing only a 1% recovery in the Global Trust Index this year that masks increases in trust inequality, and a mere 37% of the public trusting the media in Ireland compared with an average of 49% internationally. A traditional way of building trust, or addressing mistrust, particularly regarding conflict of interest, has been the formation of a profession and more particularly the adoption of some code of professional ethics. Journalism’s professionalism and its ethics are threatened by myriad forces, including the participative nature of technology, the outsourcing of journalists and the increasing financial pressures on media institutions (Iggers, 2018). Added to these particular issues faced by media specialisation are the increasing dependence of journalists on all sorts of specialists, but especially economists, in public policy matters. Alas, economists are having their own problems with trust and ethics to which they are paying serious attention (DeMartino and McCloskey, 2016). In this regard, it is interesting to see that the Irish Economics Association now has a statement that, albeit labelled as ‘guiding’, stresses some basic ethical principles including obligations relevant to policy advice (www.iea.ie), although it is also good to see recognition in Irish economics of the importance of engagement with public demands, beyond codes of ethics, with interaction across disciplines and with lived experience (McHale et al, 2017, p 280). 257

Policy analysis in Ireland

Conclusion A discursive approach not only provides a better explanation of what has been happening in Irish policy making, but also points to better models of what role policy analysts and other experts might play in policy discussions and debates, especially in the media. As a discursive approach highlights the operations of the public sphere as it is, it naturally points to the various ethical understandings of that concept. Whereas ethical positions are hard to agree on, being more explicit in public policy discourse about the role of experts and the media, particularly as it relates specialist opinion, is important in achieving democratic legitimacy. A useful step is recognising that discursive interactions are key to what is happening, and that such interactions are shaping public discourse in media. Media’s increasing reliance on experts is key to this, and while journalists often see experts are sources of unquestionable judgments and facts for their stories (FitzGerald and O’Rourke, 2016), such outsourcing of decision making is not appropriate in a democracy. Nor is such uncritical use of experts possible in the age of hyper-specialisation when it is the expert’s assessments that we depend on and not just the expert’s facts. Public policy analysis is not operating from a godlike position external to Irish or any other society. Policy analysis is at least partly about, and should be more explicitly engaged in, producing ‘explanations which relate to common-sense perceptions, even if this consists of a critique of them …’ (O’Donnell, 1992, p 84). For policy analysts steeped in technocratic training, it can be hard to unearth the perceptions that underlie their analysis or connect them to common understandings. Identification of some grand discourses can help here. Recognising policy analysis as embedded in neoliberal, or Keynesian, or neonationalist discourses, could be useful in locating and evaluating arguments. Of course, such labels can be used to dismiss arguments one disagrees with, but if one avoids this temptation, being able to identify the angle from which an interlocutor is coming can be useful. The better one knows the perspective of a contribution, the easier it is to assess the information it provides (Sethi and Yildiz, 2016). Not only have the media a responsibility to act on this knowledge, but so do we as policy experts. A related issue is recognising that policy analysts have vested interests. For users of policy analysis, ethical codes and declarations of conflict of interest would no doubt be useful. However, policy analysts and journalists need to be more conscious of this themselves, in a way that would profit from the traditional right-wing economics concern about scientism (Hayek, 1945), however ironic that caution is coming from that most influential discipline of policy elites. Noneconomists rightly point out the disciplinary imperialism of economics and rightly call for more variety in the type of expertise used in policy analysis. Yet, it is important for all technocrats to remind themselves that technocrats tend to form a far from representative cohort of the general population (Bovens and Wille, 2017). Attempts to overcome problems of representation in policy deliberations have been advanced in Ireland, with Constitutional Conventions and Citizens’ 258

Media discourses on the economy in Ireland

Assemblies aimed at drawing representatives of the general population into concentrated consideration of sensitive issues (see Chapter Fifteen, this volume). The design of such mini-publics is important for both the democratic legitimacy and competence of such policy developments (Harris, 2019). Experience of such deliberations and specialised analysis of them are necessary for such prodemocratic design. So again, there is a dependency on experts and expert analyses informing those design choices in democratising policy discourse. Some of these experiences may be useful in developing media policy in Ireland. In a world where there are bad-faith attacks on experts, and self-interested technocratic calls for more ‘evidence-based’ policy, it would be easy to ignore the complexities of the relationships between experts and the public, or to pretend that there is some simple codifiable fix. Academics are all too aware of the ability to avoid any real responsibility by installing transparency-focused procedures that ensure that little attention can be paid to substantial decisions. As Baghramian (2019) stresses, trustworthy experts need benevolence and this is something that we as a community of policy analysis experts can help build into our discourse, and seek the cooperation of media players in that endeavour. References Baghramian, M. (2019) ‘Trust in experts: why and why not?’, Jericho Chambers [Online]. Available at: https://jerichochambers.com/trust-in-experts-whyand-why-not Barry, F. and Bergin, A. (2013) ‘Offshoring, inward investment and export performance in Ireland’, in A. Bardhan, D.M. Jaffee and C.A. Kroll (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Offshoring and Global Employment, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 311–34. Bovens, M. and Wille, A. (2017) Diploma Democracy: The Rise of Political Meritocracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bruns, A. (2018) Gatewatching and News Curation: Journalism, Social Media, and the Public Sphere, New York, NY: Peter Lang. Casey, C.M. (2019) ‘The Irish newspapers and the residential property price boom’, New Political Economy, 24(1): 144–57. Christensen, J. (2017) The Power of Economists within the State, Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press. CSO (Central Statistics Office) (2019) ‘Information society statistics – households 2019’, CSO [Online]. Available at: www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ ep/p-isshh/informationsocietystatistics-households2019 Dahlgren, P.M., Shehata, A. and Strömbäck, J. (2019) ‘Reinforcing spirals at work? Mutual influences between selective news exposure and ideological leaning’, European Journal of Communication, 34(2): 159–74. Daly, M.E. (2016) Sixties Ireland: Reshaping the Economy, State and Society, 1957– 1973, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davis, J.L. and Jurgenson, N. (2014) ‘Context collapse: theorizing context collusions and collisions’, Information, Communication & Society, 17(4): 476–85. 259

Policy analysis in Ireland

DeMartino, G.F. and McCloskey, D.N. (2016) ‘Introduction, or why this handbook?’, in G.F. DeMartino and D.N. McCloskey (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Professional Economic Ethics, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp 3–12. Edelman (2020) ‘2020 Edelman Trust Barometer’, Daniel J. Edelman Holdings [Online]. Available at: www.edelman.com/trustbarometer Fairclough, N. (1993) Discourse and Social Change, Cambridge: Polity Press. FitzGerald, J.K. and O’Rourke, B.K. (2016) ‘Legitimising expertise: analysing the legitimation strategies used by economics experts in broadcast interviews’, Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 11(3): 269–82. FitzGerald, J.K. and O’Rourke, B.K. (2018) ‘Secular authority: economists in Irish public discourse’, Paper presented at the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics Annual Conference, Kyoto, Japan, 23–25 June. Available at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1180&context=busch marcon Flynn, R. (2017) Media Pluralism Monitor 2016: Monitoring Risks for Media Pluralism in the EU and Beyond. Country Report: Ireland, Florence: European University Institute. Giles, C. (2019) ‘Economists among “least trusted professionals” in UK’, Financial Times, 3 November. Available at: www.ft.com/content/52458788-fcc0-11e998fd-4d6c20050229 Gneezy, U., Meier, S. and Rey-Biel, P. (2011) ‘When and why incentives (don’t) work to modify behavior’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(4): 191–209. Graham, C. and O’Rourke, B.K. (2019) ‘Cooking a corporation tax controversy: Apple, Ireland and the EU’, Critical Discourse Studies, 16(3): 298–311. Graham, C. and Silke, H. (2017) ‘Framing privatisation: the dominance of neoliberal discourse and the death of the public good’, TripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society, 15(2): 796–815. Graham, S. and Hogan, J. (2014) ‘An examination of Seán Gallagher’s presidential campaign in a hybridized media environment’, Irish Communication Review, 14(1): 30–47. Habermas, J. (1989) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge: Polity Press. Harris, C. (2019) ‘Mini-publics: design choices and legitimacy’, in S. Elstub and O. Escobar (eds) Handbook of Democratic Innovation and Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 45–59. Häussler, T. (2019) ‘Civil society, the media and the Internet: changing roles and challenging authorities in digital political communication ecologies’, Information, Communication & Society. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13 69118X.2019.1697338 Hayek, F.A. (1945) ‘The use of information in society’, American Economic Review, 35(4): 519–30. Horgan, J. and Flynn, R. (2017) Irish Media: A Critical History, Dublin: Four Courts Press. 260

Media discourses on the economy in Ireland

Iggers, J. (2018) Good News, Bad News: Journalism Ethics and The Public Interest, London: Routledge. Kirk, N., Culloty, E., Kearns, C. and Suiter, J. (2019) ‘Digital news report Ireland 2019’, Dublin City University Institute of Future Media & Journalism [Online]. Available at: https://fujomedia.eu/digital-news-report-ireland-2019 Kneafsey, L. and Regan, A. (2019) The Role of the Media in Shaping Attitudes Toward Corporate Tax Avoidance: Experimental Evidence from Ireland, Working Paper No. 201904, Dublin: Geary Institute, University College Dublin. Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ucd/wpaper/201904.html Lynch, S. (2017) ‘Trump’s fake Irish news is a real cause for concern’, The Irish Times, 21 October. Available at: www.irishtimes.com/news/world/us/trumps-fake-irish-news-is-a-real-cause-for-concern-1.3263363 MacCarthaigh, M. (ed) (2017) Public Sector Reform in Ireland: Countering Crisis, Cham: Springer. Maesse, J. (2018) ‘Austerity discourses in Europe: how economic experts create identity projects’, Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 31(1): 8–24. Marron, A. (2019) ‘“Overpaid” and “inefficient”: print media framings of the public sector in The Irish Times and The Irish Independent during the financial crisis’, Critical Discourse Studies, 16(3): 282–97. McHale, J., Moore-Cherry, N. and Heffernan, E. (2017) ‘Progressing debates and austerity in Ireland’, in E. Heffernan, J. McHale, and N. Moore-Cherry (eds) Debating Austerity in Ireland: Crisis, Experience and Recovery, Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, pp 270–80. Mercille, J. (2015) The Political Economy and Media Coverage of the European Economic Crisis: The Case of Ireland, Abingdon: Routledge. Millgram, E. (2015) The Great Endarkenment: Philosophy for an Age of Hyperspecialization, New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Murray, S. (2019) ‘Coming-of-age in a coming-of-age: the collective individualism of podcasting’s intimate soundwork’, Popular Communication, 17(4): 301–16. Niemi, M.K. and Pitkänen, V. (2017) ‘Gendered use of experts in the media: analysis of the gender gap in Finnish news journalism’, Public Understanding of Science, 26(3): 355–68. Ó Beacháin, D. (2014) ‘Elections and political communication’, in M. O’Brien and D. Ó  Beacháin (eds) Political Communication in the Republic of Ireland, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, pp 25–44. O’Donnell, R. (1992) ‘Economics and policy: beyond science and ideology’, The Economic and Social Review, 24(1): 75–98. O’Neill, O. (2018) ‘Linking trust to trustworthiness’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 26(2): 293–300. O’Rourke, B.K. and Hogan, J. (2013) ‘Reflections in the eyes of a dying tiger: looking back on Ireland’s 1987 economic crisis’, in A. De Rycker, Z. Mohd Don and G. Myers (eds) Discourse and Crisis: Critical Perspectives, Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins, pp 215–38. 261

Policy analysis in Ireland

O’Rourke, B.K. and Hogan, J. (2017) ‘Frugal comfort from Ireland: marginal tales from an austere isle’, in S. McBride and B.M. Evans (eds) The Austerity State, Toronto: University of Toronto, pp 144–68. O’Toole, F. (2010) ‘Abysmal deal ransoms us and disgraces Europe’, The Irish Times, 29 November. Available at: www.irishtimes.com/opinion/abysmal-dealransoms-us-and-disgraces-europe-1.683289 Phelan, S. (2009) ‘Irish neoliberalism, media, and the politics of discourse’, in D. Ging, M. Cronin and P. Kirby (eds) Transforming Ireland: Challenges, Critique and Resources, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp 73–88. Plehwe, D., Neujeffski, M. and Krämer, W. (2018) ‘Saving the dangerous idea: austerity think tank networks in the European Union’, Policy and Society, 37(2): 188–205. Read, L.E. (2015) ‘I, pencil’, Foundation for Economic Education [Online]. Available at: https://fee.org/resources/i-pencil Rieder, M. and Theine, H. (2019) ‘“Piketty is a genius, but…”: an analysis of journalistic delegitimation of Thomas Piketty’s economic policy proposals’, Critical Discourse Studies, 16(3): 248–63. Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2017) ‘From a deficit of democracy to a technocratic order: the postcrisis debate on Europe’, Annual Review of Political Science, 20(1): 351–69. Schmidt, V.A. (2008) ‘Discursive institutionalism: the explanatory power of ideas and discourse’, Political Science, 11(1): 303–26. Sethi, R. and Yildiz, M. (2016) ‘Communication with unknown perspectives’, Econometrica, 84(6): 2029–69. Taylor, G. and Murphy, C. (2002) ‘Environmental policy in Ireland’, in G. Taylor (ed) Issues in Irish Public Policy, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, pp 80–98. Wallaschek, S. (2020) ‘Framing solidarity in the Euro crisis: a comparison of the German and Irish media discourse’, New Political Economy, 25(2): 231–47. Zappavigna, M. (2019) ‘Ambient affiliation and #Brexit: negotiating values about experts through censure and ridicule’, in V. Koller, S. Kopf, and M. Miglbauer (eds) Discourses of Brexit, London: Routledge, pp 48–68.

262

Index Note: Page numbers for tables appear in italics.

A abortion 179–80, 193 absorptive capacity 235, 239 academic discipline, social policy 39 academic economists 22 academic think tanks 159, 166 Action Plan for Jobs 2013 241 Adaptation Councils 28 Adaptation Grants scheme 28 Administration 35 Adshead, M. 127, 129, 130–1 Advisory Expert Committee on Local Government Reorganisation and Reform 82 advocacy 173 Advocacy Initiative 177 advocacy panels 223 advocacy think tanks 159–60 agencies 53–4 agencification 40, 41, 53 Agenda 2020 243 agenda setting 188–92 agriculture 20, 24, 224 Aims of Social Policy: Reform of Ireland’s Social Security and Health Services (Coughlan) 35 America 159, 254 Amnesty Ireland 178 Anderson, G. 12 An Approach to Social Policy (NESC) 38 Ardagh v Maguire 101–2 audio media 255 austerity 43, 207 Aydin-Düzgit, S. 127

B Bache, I. 126 Baghramian, M. 259 Baker et al 41, 43 banking inquiry 102–3 Barrington, T. 81, 82 Barry, F. 25, 26–7, 28 Barry, U. 211 benchmarking 133–4 Benefacts 172 Bermingham, Brian 87 Better Local Government 82 Big Data 71

Blackwell, J. 65–8 blasphemy 222 Börzel, T. 125 boundary work 152 Bovens, M. 256 Boyle, R. 115, 116 Britain 20–2 Brown, T. 38 Bruns, A. 254 budget proofing 211 budgetary policy 253 budgetary process 98, 100–1, 116–17, 181–2 budgeting, gender 210 Bunreacht na hÉireann 84 Burton, Richard 226 Business Committee 97, 194

C Callanan, M. 79, 80–1, 84, 85, 86–7, 129 Campus Engage 174 Capital Investment Advisory Committee 26 Carter, C. 28 Carthy, John 197 Catholic Church 34–6, 40 CCBS (Centre for Cross Border Studies) 168 CEDAW 208 Celtic Tiger 6 Central Expenditure Evaluation Unit 116 Charities Act 177 Charities Regulatory Authority 177 chief executive, council 86 child abuse 40 Children’s Rights Alliance 42, 178 China 159 Christus Rex 34 Chubb, B. 197 the Church 34–6, 40 Citizens’ Assembly (CA) 179–80, 181, 192, 219, 220, 221–31, 258–9 civil service 26, 27, 48–60, 68, 69, 107–19 Civil Service Action Plan 118 Civil Service Commissioners Act 49 The Civil Service Renewal Plan 50, 114 civil society organisations (CSOs) 171–83, 207 civil society panels 223 Claiming Our Future 177 clientelism 27

263

Policy analysis in Ireland Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 223 Climate Action Council 226 Climate Action Plan 226, 227, 230 climate change 128, 150–1, 196, 223–7, 230 Climate Change Advisory Council 128, 223 Climate Change: Getting the Process Right 151 cohesion policy 129, 132 Collins, J. 80 Collins Institute 166 Combat Poverty Agency (CPA) 38, 177 Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (CICA) 40 Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) 96, 196, 197, 198 Committee on Budgetary Oversight 97, 98 Committee on Industrial Organisation (CIO) 27–8 committees 96–8, 99–100, 101, 196–8 Community and Voluntary Pillar (CVP) 142, 150, 175–6 Community method 126, 127–9 Comprehensive Expenditure Report 2012–14 57 Comprehensive Expenditure Report 2015–2017 57 ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement 199 Connaughton, B. 128, 131–2, 133 Conniffe, Denis 66 Conroy, P. 211 Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire (CERN) 238 conservation, special areas 133 Considine, J. 85 Considine, M. 130 Constitutional Convention (CC) 118, 219, 220, 221, 258–9 consultancies 55 consultation 132–3 ‘contract-based’ model 159 Control of Manufactures Acts 20, 28 Cooke, Tim 256 Copeland, P. 127 co-production 152 Córas Tráchtála 25 Corish, Brendan 35 Cork City Council (CCC) 88–9, 90 Cork Institute of Technology (CIT) 90 corporatism, vocational 5 Coughlan, A. 34 Council for Social Welfare (CSW) 37 councillors 86 COVID-19 pandemic 2, 183 Craft, J. 4, 6

264

CSO (Central Statistics Office) 25, 29, 51, 58, 68, 71–2 and Conniffe 66 funding 67 Culpepper, P.D. 143, 145 Curtin, Brian 197 CWI 178

D Dahlgren et al 254 Dáil Éireann 4–5, 93, 94, 95, 97 Daly, M.E. 34–5 DBEI (Department of Business Enterprise and Innovation) 114–15 Dean, H. 33 Dear Daughter 40 Deloitte and Touche 100 demand side 25, 59 Denmark 163 Deposit Interest Retention Tax 197 deservingness 41 Devaney et al 224, 225, 228 The Developmental Welfare State (NESC) 42, 146–7 Devlin report 51 discrimination 41, 133, 205, 207 discursive institutionalism 249–50 Dollar Export Advisory Committee (DEAC) 24 domestic violence (DV) 208, 209–10 Donnison, David 38 Donohoe, Pascal 69 Downes et al 210 Downey, James 82 DPER (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform) 114, 116 Dryzek, J.S. 229 DTTS (Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport) 114, 115 Dublin City Council 89 Dukelow, F. 130

E echo chambers 254 econocentric paradigm 36, 43 economic crisis, 2008 256 see also financial crisis, 2008 Economic Development (Whitaker) 25, 26, 28, 35 economic performance 146–7 economic policy analysis, building 25–7 economic rights 147 economists 22, 256–7 Edelman 257 Edwards, M. 172

Index EEC (European Economic Community) 35, 37 Eichbaum, C. 110–11 EIGE (European Institute for Gender Equality) 208 Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Act 179–80, 222, 223 Electoral Amendment Act 178 ELI (export-led industrialisation) 20, 21 Elliott, A. 129 Elstub, S. 220, 221 emigration 20, 23 Employment Equality Act 133 Environmental Pillar 142, 150 environmental policy 128, 131 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 133 equality gender 207, 228 and internationalisation 41 marriage 196, 222 Equality Authority (EA) 41, 177, 210 equality budgeting 211 Equality Budgeting Campaign (EBC) 211 equality proofing 211 Equality Proofing Working Group 210 Escobar, O. 220, 221 ESRI (Economic and Social Research Institute) 28–9, 36, 42, 163, 166, 167, 242 budget 165 on poverty 38 and Twitter 168 ethics 257 EU (European Union) 123–4, 256 and gender expertise 203 Habitats Directive 128, 133 Horizon 174, 243, 245 Nitrates Directive 133 Peace Programmes 132 policy analysis 242 and poverty 40–1 secondary legislation 96 Stability and Growth Pact 43 structural funds 64–5 think tanks 164 Water Framework Directive 128, 133 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 208 EU Semester 182 EU Troika 199 Eurocrisis, 2009 95 Eurofound 163, 165, 166, 167, 168 Europe 159 see also EU (European Union) Europe 2020 initiative 130

European Anti-Poverty Programme (EAPP) 38 European Commission (EC) 57–8, 243, 245, 253 European Community Household Panel 41 European Economic Community (EEC) 35, 37 European Employment Strategy (EES) 130 European Poverty Programme, 1975 37 European Statistical System 68 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions survey 41 Europeanisation 124–34 evidence 63–74 expenditure 57–8, 115, 116, 130, 158 experts gender 205, 207, 208, 209, 212 and media 256, 258, 259 export profits tax relief (EPTR) 25, 26 export-led industrialisation (ELI) 19

F Facebook 168 Fahey, T. 35 fake news 254 Fanning, B. 34, 36 Fanning, R. 22, 23, 24, 26 farmers 227, 228 Farrell et al 227, 228–9 Featherstone, K. 125 Feighan, Frank 189, 190 Fianna Fáil 6, 35, 188, 191, 193, 197, 199 Final Report of the Sub-Committee on Dáil Reform 101 Finance, Department of 27 financial crisis, 2008 6, 48, 54, 95, 102–3 financial incentives 132 Fine Gael 6, 35, 188, 189, 191, 193, 199 Finland 163 Finlay, I. 49 FitzGerald, G. 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 66 FitzGerald, J. 110, 251 Flynn, B. 128, 133 Fogarty, Michael 36 FoodCloud 224 foreign direct investment (FDI) 20 foreign policy 129 forests 224 Forfás 54 Foyle, J. 21 frame-critical policy analysis 145 frame-reflective policy practice 145 framing 146, 229 free trade 24

265

Policy analysis in Ireland Freyens, B.P. 111 Fulton report 51 funding agencies 241, 242–3 Fung, A. 221, 227, 230

G Game, C. 79 García-Rubio, M.A. 229 Garvin, T. 22, 26, 28, 34, 35 GDP (gross domestic product) 6, 163 GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) 71 Geary, Roy 28, 29 gender budgeting 210 gender equality 207, 228 Gender Equality Unit 210 gender expertise 203–12 gender experts 205, 207, 208, 209, 212 gender mainstreaming 134 Gender Recognition Bill 98 generalist model 68–9 generic controversies 145 Germany 159, 196 Giles, C. 257 global financial crisis, 2008 6, 48, 54, 95, 102–3 Global Go To Think Tank Index 158–9, 165, 167 globalisation 71, 255 Goodwin, S. 3 governance 129, 205–6, 256 and climate change 226, 230 digital era 59 environmental 131 local government 81 networked 5 statistical 72 government think tank 160 Great Recession 6 Great Western Greenway project 90 Green Party 191 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 224, 225, 227 Griliches, Z. 240 guillotine power 97

H Habitats Directive 128, 133 ‘hard’ EU policy influence 124, 126 Harris, C. 220 Hart, P. 162 Harvey, B. 176, 177 Hayek, F.A. 251 Hayward, K. 127 health care 189–90

266

Heclo, H. 3 Hess, A. 36 Hogan, Phil 83 homelessness 182 Horizon 174, 243, 245 hospitals 189–90 in-house think tank 160 housing 150, 182 Howlett, M. 3, 4, 6, 221 Howlin, Brendan 191, 195 human rights 40 see also IHREC (Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission) hybridity 145, 146 hyper-specialisation 251, 252, 255, 258

I IGEES (Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service) 43, 55–6, 58–9, 69–70, 115–16, 119, 242 IHREC (Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission) 174, 207, 211 IIEA (Institute of International and European Affairs) 165–6, 167, 168, 242 Immigrant Council of Ireland 42 independent TDs 192 India 159 Industrial Development Authority (IDA) 25 industrialisation 7, 19, 20, 27–8 Industry and Commerce, Department of 27 inquiries, role of 101–3 Insight Centre for Data Analytics 241 institutionalism, discursive 249–50 interest group dialogue 146 International Labour Organization 203 International Local Autonomy Index 85–6 internationalisation 5–6, 40–1, 255–6 interpretive policy analysis 149 Investment in Education (OECD) 36 Iona Institute 166 IPHI (Institute of Public Health in Ireland) 166, 167, 168 Ireland’s Five-Part Crisis 149 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) 37 Irish Economics Association 257 Irish Feminist Network 211 Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFAC) 43, 112–13, 253 Irish Human Rights Commission 41 see also IHREC (Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission) Irish National Action Plan against Poverty 41

Index Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed 38 Irish Research Council 174, 241 Irish Social Policies: Priorities for Future Development (NESC) 38 Irish Social Policy Association 39 Is Féidir Linn 177 ISI (import substitution industrialisation) 19, 21, 23, 24, 30 Istanbul Convention 209

J Jacobsson, Per 21 Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis 102–3 Joint Committee on European Union Affairs 96 Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality 98–9 Joint Committee on the Future Funding of Domestic Water Services 98 Joint Oireachtas Committee on Climate Action (JOCCA) 225–6 Jones, C.I. 240 Jones, K. 34 Journal of the Social and Statistical Inquiry Society of Ireland 34–5 journalists 257, 258 justice 207, 221, 224, 228 justifications, local government 80–1

K Kaim-Caudle, P. 34 Kaliber, A. 127 Katz, R.S. 191 Kennedy, K. 29 Kennedy et al 21 Kenny, Enda 189 Kerins, Angela 198 Kirby, P. 177 knowledge spillovers 235, 239, 240, 241 Kunz, R. 203, 204

L Labour Party 35, 191, 196, 199 Ladner et al 85 Ladrech, R. 124, 126 Laffoy, Mary 223–4 Lasswell, H.D. 47 Law Reform Commission (LRC) 163, 165 LCDC (Local Community Development Committee) 85 learning, policy 131–2

Learning and Development Framework 70 Lee, J. 21, 22–3, 25, 26, 27, 85 Legislative Analysis Service (LAS) 100 Lemass, Seán 25, 26 Leonardi, R. 132, 133 Library and Research Service 100 Lindquist, E. 221 Little, C. 223 lobbying 167, 178 local government 79–90 Local Government Act 1991 82 Local Government Act 2001 83 Local Government (Ireland) Act 81 Local Government (Planning and Development) Act 81 Local Government Reform Act 83, 85 Local Government (Temporary Provisions) Act 81 Lynch, P. 26 Lynch et al 24–5, 26, 95

M MacCarthaigh, M. 55, 94, 107, 241 MacFeely, S. 132 Mair, P. 191 Mallow Development Partnership 90 marine renewable energy (MRE) 133 marriage equality 196, 222 Marshall, A.H. 79 Martin, Micheál 191 Martin, S. 98 Mayo County Council 89–90 McCarthy, C. 118–19 McGann, J.G. 160–1 media 249–50, 252–5, 256, 257, 258, 259 Meenan, James 23 micro-data 67, 71 micro-targeting 254 migration policy 129 Millgram, E. 251–2 mini-publics 220, 221, 227, 229, 230, 259 Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill 98 Mitchell, Jim 197 Modernising Government – The Challenge for Local Government 83 More Power To You 86 Murphy, C. 255–6 Murphy, M. 177 Murphy, M.C. 127 Murphy, M.P. 175 Murphy et al 178 Murray, C. 107 Murray, J. 107–8, 115, 119

267

Policy analysis in Ireland N National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) 130–1 National College of Ireland 34 National Competitiveness Council 54 National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) 41 National Development Plan 2000–06 210 National Disability Authority 41 National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) 41, 65, 142, 176 National Employment Action Plan 133–4 National Mitigation Plan 223 National Risk Assessment 56–7 National Women’s Council of Ireland (NWCI) 174–5, 179–81, 211 Naughten, Denis 189, 190 NCPP (National Centre for Partnership and Performance) 142 neoliberal policies 6, 39, 251, 252, 257 NERI (Nevin Economic Research Institute) 166 NESC (National Economic and Social Council) 12–13, 37–8, 42, 112, 130, 141, 142–52, 176 on benchmarking 133 on EU 128, 131 NESC Strategy 143 NESDO (National Economic and Social Development Office) 142 network knowledge 151–2 Networked Developmental State 146 networked governance 5 Nevin, Donal 37 New Foundations Grant 174 new politics (NP) 171–2, 178–9, 188 new technologies 254–5 NGOs 42, 128, 133, 142, 147, 203, 224 Niblett, R. 158 Nimbus Centre 90 Nitrates Directive 133 North America 159 NSB (National Statistics Board) 66, 67, 71, 111–12

O Ó Cinnéide, S. 37 Ó Fathaigh, M. 130 Ó Fathartaigh, M. 27 O’Brennan, J. 129 O’Brien, S. 130 Observatory on Violence against Women, 208 O’Donnell, R. 145, 258

268

OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) 36, 40, 56, 100–1, 116–17, 148, 160, 182 O’Gorman, R. 223 Oireachtas 4, 93, 94, 95, 96, 102, 103 and PBO 100 and PLS 98 Olsen, J.P. 125 O’Mahony, C. 25, 26–7, 28 O’Malley, E. 21 OMC (Open Method of Coordination) 124, 126, 130–1 O’Neill, O. 257 online media 254 Open Society 177 Organisational Capability Reviews (OCRs) 113–15 O’Riordan, J. 111 O’Rourke, B.K. 251 O’Toole, Fintan 256

P PAC (Committee of Public Accounts) 96, 196, 197, 198 Panke, D. 125 Paraskevopoulos, C.J. 132, 133 Parental Leave Act 133 Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) 100, 101, 117 participants 227–8 partnership 132 see also social partnership (SP) Pautz, H. 162 Peace Programmes 132 People’s College 34 Phillips, R. 3 Phillips, S. 203 Pobal 178, 183 podcasts 255 policy capacity and CSOs 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 180–1, 182, 183 definition 3, 203 and local government 86, 89 and networked governance 5 policy learning 131–2 political parties 187–99 political party think tanks 160, 166 politics 58–9 population 21 POSs (political opportunity structures) 175–9 poverty 37, 38, 40–1, 130–1

Index PPNs (public participation networks) 87–9 pre-legislative scrutiny (PLS) 98–9 President of Ireland Future Research Leaders Programme 243 Private Members’ Bills (PMBs) 97, 181, 194–6 private rate of return 239, 240 Programme for Economic Expansion 81, 251 Programme for Government 211 Programme for National Recovery 175 Progressive Democrats 188 proportional representation (PR) 188 protectionism 20, 22, 23, 26 PR-STV 5, 188, 190 Prügl, E. 203, 204 Public Service Management Act 107 Public Service Organisation Review Group 51–2 Public Spending Code 118–19 public transport 224 Puirséil, N. 35

Q Quinlivan, A. 80 Quinn, B. 85, 90 Quinn, R. 110

R Radaelli, C.M. 124–5, 126 Ramesh, M. 3 Rediscover Furniture and Paint Recycling project 89 Rees et al 127 reflexivity 145, 152 The Reform of Local Government 82 reframing 145, 146, 147 RegGov 113 regional policy 132, 133 Regulation of Lobbying Act 178 regulatory impact analysis (RIA) 113 Rehab Group 198 Reidy, T. 85 Reilly et al 133 Rein, M. 145 Report of the Local Government Efficiency Review Group 83 Report of the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes 83 Report of the Task Force on the Integration of Local Government and Local Development Systems 83 research and development (R&D) 235–6, 237–8, 239, 240, 241–2

return on investments 239–41 Rieder, M. 252 rights 41, 147, 207 risk 56–7 Ross, Shane 192 Ruane, F. 110 Ryan, L. 21–2, 26 Ryan report 40

S Sabel, C. 13 Scheme to Support National Organisations 174 Scholten, P.W.A. 47 Schön, D. 145 Science Europe 245 science policy 235–45 Scientific Council for Government Policy (Netherlands) 148 Seanad Éireann 5 self-reflection 145 self-sufficiency 22–3 Senior Public Service (SPS) 111 service-level agreements (SLAs) 176 Sexton, J.J. 66 SFI (Science Foundation Ireland) 236, 237, 241, 242–3, 245 Sharpe, L.J. 80 Shaw, R. 110–11 single transferable vote (STV) 188 see also transferable vote (PR-STV) electoral system Sinn Féin 192 situated policy controversies 145 SJI (Social Justice Ireland) 166, 167–8 Small Advanced Economies Initiative (SAEI) 238 small open economies (SOEs) 5, 235–9, 244 smartphone 253–4 Social and Economic Council (Netherlands) 148 social housing 150 social inclusion 41, 130 social investment paradigm 42–3 social justice 166, 221 social media 168, 174–5 social partners 142, 147–8, 152 social partnership (SP) 5, 39, 40, 108, 175–6, 177, 193 social policy analysis 33–44 social protection 146–7 social rate of return 239–41

269

Policy analysis in Ireland social rights 147 Society of St Vincent De Paul 174 ‘soft’ EU policy influence 124, 126 SoSP (science of science policy) 238, 241, 242, 244–5 special advisers 110–11 Special Areas of Conservation 133 specialisation 251–2 spending, local government 85 Spending Review 117 spillovers 235, 237, 239, 240, 241 Stability and Growth Pact 43 ‘Stacy May’ report 26 Standards in Public Office Commission (SIPO) 178 Statement on Social Policy (CSW) 37 States of Fear 40 statistics, official 65–8, 71, 72–3 Statistics Act 66 Steering Group on Social and Equality Statistics (SGSES) 67 Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) 65, 83 Strategic Policy Committees (SPCs) 87 A Strategy for Development (NESC) 143 Strategy Review Group 191 Studies 34 subsidiarity 5, 41 succession planning 111 supply side 25, 58–9, 147 survey instruments 178–9 Sustainable Development Council 142 Sustainable Development Goals 13 Sutherland, Peter 255

T Tallaght Strategy 188, 199 Taoiseach 97, 112 targets 133–4 TASC (Think Tank for Action on Social Change) 166, 168 Taylor, G. 255–6 Teachtaí Dála (TDs) 93, 94, 97, 99, 100, 189, 190 Teagasc 242 technocratisation 256, 257 technocrats 258 technologies 254–5 Theine, H. 252 theocentric paradigm 35 think tanks 157–68 Thomson et al 196

270

Together for Yes 181 Torney, D. 223 transferable vote (PR-STV) electoral system 5, 188, 190 transport 224 trust 72, 257 Tuairim 35 Twitter 168, 174, 254

U Ugur et al 240 UK, think tanks 159 ultra vires 82 UN (United Nations) 13, 40, 203 CEDAW 208 University College Cork (UCC) 88 US, think tanks 158–9

V Value for Money and Policy Review (VFMPR) 115, 116 Van Nispen, F.K.M. 47 VAW (violence against women) 208–9 Villaverde, A.R. 229 Visser, A. 174, 178, 183 Vistamilk 242 vocational corporatism 5 voluntary sector 42, 172–3 Vromen, A. 162

W Walsh, P. 26 water charges 196 Water Framework Directive 128, 133 Water Services (No. 2) Act 97 website usage 168 Weeks, L. 80 Weidenbaum, M. 162 Whelan, C. 26 Whitaker, T.K. 25, 27 Wille, A. 256 Williams, J.C. 240 Wilson, D. 79 Wolf, C. 108 women, in politics 207 Women’s Aid 174 women’s organisations 207 World Bank 203 Wright, R. 108

Z zig-zag 151, 152

“This timely volume brings alive the fast-changing world of Irish policy making through a varied range of authoritative, accessible and comprehensive contributions. Ground-breaking, it is bound to become an indispensable reference work.” Peadar Kirby, University of Limerick Leading Irish academics and policy practitioners present a current and comprehensive study of policy analysis in Ireland. Contributors examine policy analysis at different levels of government and governance including international, national and local and in the civil service, as well as non-government actors such as NGOs, interest groups and think tanks. They investigate the influential roles of the European Union, the public, science, quantitative evidence, the media and gender expertise in policy analysis. Surveying the history and evolution of public policy analysis in Ireland, this authoritative text addresses the current state of the discipline, identifies post-crisis developments and considers future challenges for policy analysis. Features of the ILPA series • a systematic study of policy analysis systems by government and non-governmental actors • a history of the country’s policy analysis, empirical case studies and a comparative overview • a key reference for research and teaching in comparative policy analysis and policy studies Recent volumes published • Policy analysis in France, edited by Charlotte Halpern, Patrick Hassenteufel and Philippe Zittoun (2018) • Policy analysis in the United States, edited by John A. Hird (2018) • Policy analysis in Canada, edited by Laurent Dobuzinskis and Michael Howlett (2018) • Policy analysis in Turkey, edited by Caner Bakir and Günes Ertan (2018) • Policy analysis in Colombia, edited by Pablo Sanabria-Puildo and Nadia Rubali (2020)

JOHN HOGAN is Lecturer in International Political Economy and Irish Politics at the Technological University Dublin. He is a policy advisor to the Irish government on lobbying regulations and former chair of the comparative policy section of the MPSA. MARY P. MURPHY is Professor in the Department of Sociology at Maynooth University. Previously, she served as Commissioner in the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (2013-2017). She is currently a member of the Council of State.

@policypress

ISBN 978-1-4473-5089-7

PolicyPress policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk @policypress

In association with

International Comparative Policy Analysis Forum and Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis

9 781447 350897 ISSN 2059-0326