On China's Cultural Transformation [1 ed.] 9789004308886, 9789004308879

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On China’s Cultural Transformation

Issues in Contemporary Chinese Thought and Culture Edited by Arif Dirlik Yu Keping

VOLUME 5

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/icct

On China’s Cultural Transformation Edited by

Yu Keping Translated by

Christopher Heselton

LEIDEN | BOSTON

This book is the result of a co-publication agreement between Chongqing Publishing House Co. Ltd and Koninklijke Brill NV. These chapters were translated into English from the original «论中国文化 与文化转型» (Lun Zhongguo wenhua yu wenhua zhuanxing) with financial support from China Book International.

issn 1874-0588 isbn 978-90-04-30887-9 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-30888-6 (e-book) Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents Series Foreword vii Preface ix List of Contributors xi 1 The Logic of Chinese Cultural Development in a Variable World of Modernization and Globalization 1 Yu Keping 2 Philosophical Reflections on the Course of Chinese Cultural Modernization 30 Li Xianghai 3 Cultural Reflections on the Popularity of Chinese Learning 49 Zhao Lin 4 Problems with Confucianism in Building a Modern Culture 68 Peng Yongjie 5 Confucianism, Chinese Marxism, and Chinese Modernization 80 Guo Qiyong 6 The Modern Values of Folklore: Chinese Modern Literature and the Morphology of Folk Culture 100 Wang Guangdong 7 What Is Reality? How Should We Think? One Understanding of the “State of Thought” in Contemporary Literature 112 Wang Yao 8 Between History and Modernity: Thoughts on the State of Modern Literary Studies and Criticism 130 Zhang Qinghua 9 The Contemporary Values of Literary Ecology and Ecological Critique 152 Wang Yuechuan

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A Realm Divided in Six: Chinese Literature Today 181 Wang Xiaoming

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What Is “Anthropology” as I Understand It? 206 Wang Mingming

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The Direction of Modern Chinese Religion 228 Zhuo Xinping

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Rewriting Women: Writing Gender and Cultural Space in the 1980s and 1990s 241 Dai Jinhua

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Deconstructing Ethnic Minorities in China: Eliminating Orientalism or Re-Orientalizing? 250 Pan Jiao

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On the Formation and Evolution of Chinese National Cultural Security Issues in the Twentieth Century 267 Hu Huilin

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A New Understanding of “Soft Power” 295 Liu Xiangping

Series Foreword Arif Dirlik This series of edited volumes is intended to make available to English-language readers debates among prominent Chinese intellectuals and academics over issues of globalization; political, constitutional, and legal reform; modes of governance in urban and rural China; development and ecology; and culture and cultural policy. A basic goal of the Issues in Contemporary Chinese Thought and Culture series is to convey a sense of the issues that are important to Chinese intellectuals and academics, which are often overshadowed in foreign reporting by what Americans and Europeans think should be important. What often follows is a consequent misreading of the Chinese political scene, which is more often than not driven by wishful thinking and tendentious distortion. These intellectuals and academics are, for the most part, committed to the socialist system and the regime that speaks in its name. These volumes seek to let some of the more politically influential intellectuals speak for themselves, with all their ideological inclinations and stylistic idiosyncrasies, which are no less significant as markers of difference than the ideologies themselves. The writers included in the various volumes are individuals whose views have drawn some attention in the formulation of party and government policy. The intellectuals who capture the imagination of European/American commentators usually are those who have achieved prominence for their opposition to the regime, their critical stance, or their free-floating intellectual and cultural activity. But there are also party and government intellectuals, as well as academics committed to the regime, who work to reform the regime from the inside. These “official” intellectuals, as we might describe them, are committed to the system within which they work, but they are not therefore political hacks or uncritical apologists. Their own works are on occasion subject to censure and censorship. And as these volumes should substantiate, they represent a wide range of political and ideological orientations in their approach to questions of systemic reform and transformation. One important thing they share in common, in addition to a shared commitment to the system, is access to information not easily available to outsiders, as well as an insider’s political sense of what is possible and desirable that is a product of their participation in officially sanctioned political discourse. The discourse no doubt limits how far they can go in the imagination of reform. The self-imposed limitation is a condition of access to policy makers, an unfortunate characteristic of most political systems, including our systems in Western countries, but it also renders their ideas important because of their practical political implications.

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This series was conceived during the course of my conversations with Dr. Yu Keping, a prominent party intellectual, vice-director of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau (a party think tank responsible for ideological work), and director of the China Center for Comparative Politics and Economics and the China Center for Government Innovations at Peking University. Keping and I have known each other for two decades, but it was when I was a visiting professor at the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau in the summer of 1986 that the idea took shape of publishing, simultaneously in Chinese and English, a set of volumes on policy discussions in China. Our discussion coincided with a new China orientation at Brill Publishers, whose editor, Albert Hoffstädt, responded with enthusiasm to our proposal and, since then, has given persistent support to the project. Matt Kawecki, who joined Brill as China editor as this project got under way, has been equally supportive. The greatest obstacle to any such undertaking is translation, and the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau helped out with that, although that, too, has presented technical problems that have led to the lagging of the English behind the Chinese publications. Mr. Yan Jian, assistant to Dr. Yu and presently a political science PhD student at People’s University in Beijing, has played an indispensable part in the processing of the volumes. Still, without the meticulous work of the freelance translators and editors hired by Brill, these volumes might not have seen the light of day. The translations have also been difficult because of the aforementioned stylistic idiosyncrasies I referred to (and some of these selections were more like conference presentations than finished papers). A number of these difficulties remain in the texts but hopefully help to convey a flavor of the originals, rather than obscure their meaning.

Preface The economic and political reforms that began in 1978, in fact, restarted China’s process of modernization. Modernization is first and foremost industrialization but is not limited to industrialization. China’s modernization was a process of wide-ranging social transformation in addition to the massive changes in economic life, including many inherent parts of social life, such as political and cultural life. Some of the most profound changes wrought by modernization led to a transition in Chinese culture. China’s economic and political reforms were accompanied by ideological liberation, and this ideological liberation employed new values and concepts to replace older ones. This was a kind of cultural innovation and reformation. Thus, the new wave of modernization that began with economic and political reforms in the 1970s marked not only the rise of the Chinese economy, industrialization, marketization, and urbanization but the gradual formation of a new kind of culture. If we do not understand the profound transition in Chinese culture since the reform era, then it will be truly difficult to understand China’s latest round of modernization. Many major debates have taken place in Chinese society since China’s economic liberalization: over the market economy and central planning, over public ownership and private ownership, over capitalism and socialism as ideologies, over whether certain things could be considered Marxist; and over whether things could be considered “Chinese” or “Western.” All these debates are veiled debates over different cultural values. Modern Chinese culture has three sources: Chinese traditional culture, modern Western culture, and Marxist culture. These three radically different sources have come together in surprising ways as a part of the modern Chinese miracle and have shaped a new Chinese culture. How exactly has this process of remolding Chinese culture occurred? How have these three cultural sources combined to create modern Chinese culture and what was the relationship between them as they did so? These questions form a giant cultural puzzle waiting for scholars to solve. My hope in compiling this book is to provide readers with a relatively clear look at the origins, state, challenges, and direction of modern Chinese culture. Hence, this book attempts to show several representative perspectives from twenty-first-century Chinese scholars on Chinese cultural transition, particularly those dealing with the formation of modern Chinese culture, the impact of globalization and modernization on Chinese culture, Chinese traditional and modern culture, Western and Chinese culture, and the adaption of Marxism to China. These articles have all been published in influential Chinese ­journals,

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and most of the authors are highly esteemed Chinese scholars of culture. I thank all these authors for their contributions to this book. Clearly, in such a limited space, many other influential articles could not be included, making this book far from exhaustive. I hope that readers will understand this. Yu Keping February 13, 2014 Fangyuan Pavilion

List of Contributors Dai Jinhua is a professor at the Institute of Comparative Literature and Culture, Beijing University. Dai is an expert on the history of Chinese film, folk culture, and feminist literature. Among her works is The Scenery Amid Mist: Chinese Film Culture from 1978 to 1998 (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2000). Guo Qiyong is the director of the Institute of Chinese Learning at Wuhan University and the president of the Society of International Chinese Philosophy. His major research interests include Chinese philosophy, Confucianism, and Chinese cultural history in the twentieth century. His works include Selected Works of Guo Qiyong (Guangxi Normal University Press, 1999). Hu Huilin is a professor at the School of Mass Media and Design, Shanghai Jiaotong University. His major research areas include cultural strategy, the theory and politics of cultural industries, and cultural security. His latest book is National Cultural Security of China (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2005). Li Xianghai is a professor at the School of Marxism Studies at Beijing University. He received his PhD in philosophy from Nankai University in 1994. Li has written extensively on Confucianism, the history of Chinese philosophy, and postmodernism. His latest book is Chinese Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2012). Liu Xiangping is a professor in the Department of History, Nanjing University. His major research fields include Taiwan studies and Taiwan-mainland relations. His works include Economic Globalization and Economic and Trade Relationship Across the Taiwan Strait. Pan Jiao is a professor at and the director of the Institute of Anthropology, Chinese Nationalities University. His research areas include ethnic identity, nationalism, and cultural anthropology. His works include The Structure and Functions of Primitive Societies (Chinese Nationalities University Press, 1999).

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Peng Yongjie is a professor of philosophy at Renmin University of China. Peng received his PhD in philosophy from Renmin University in 1997. His major research interests are Chinese philosophy, political philosophy, and Confucianism. His books include A Comparison of Chinese Confucianism and Its Foreign Variants (People’s Publishing House, 1998) and Chinese Daoism (Religion and Culture Publishing House, 1996). Wang Guangdong is the director and professor of the School of Chinese Literature at Shanghai University. His specialty is modern literature studies, with a special focus on contemporary Chinese folk culture. His book Modernity, Romance, and Folklore was published by the Shanghai Century Publishing Company in 2001. Wang Mingming is a professor at the School of Anthropology, Beijng University. Wang’s research focuses include Chinese traditional communities, ethnic groups in the Han-Ni corridor area as well as theories of anthropology. His latest book is From Here to There and From There to Here: Essays on Anthropology (Nationality Press, 2008). Wang Xiaoming is a professor at the School of Chinese Literature, East China Normal University. His areas of interest include Chinese literature in the twentieth century, ­literary theory, and the history of modern Chinese thought. His works include The Silent Twilight (People’s Literature Press, 1996) and A Life Unable to Face: A Biography of Lu Xun (Shanghai Literature and Arts Press, 1993). Wang Yao is a professor in the Department of Chinese Literature at Suzhou University. His research interests include the literature and thought of contemporary China, literature during the Cultural Revolution, and contemporary China. His latest book is Soul of Words (Shandong Friendship Publishing House, 2007). Wang Yuechuan is a professor at the School of Chinese Literature, Beijing University. Wang is the founder of cultural calligraphy theory in China. His research interests include Western literature and arts theory and contemporary cultural criticism. His latest book is Chinese Mirrors (Gansu People’s Painting Press, 2012).

list of contributors

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Yu Keping is a professor at and director of the China Center for Comparative Politics and Economics (CCCPE) as well as at the Center for Chinese Government Innovations, both at Beijing University. He received his PhD in political science from Beijing University in 1988 and was awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of Duisberg-Essen in 2008. His major fields of research include political philosophy, comparative politics, globalization, civil society, governance, and politics in China. Among his works are Democracy Is a Good Thing (2009), Globalization and Changes in China’s Governance (2008), The Institutional Environment of Civil Society in China (2006); Chinese Rural Governance in the Past and Present (2004); Globalization and Sovereignty (2004); Politics and Political Science (2003); Incremental Democracy and Good Governance in China (2003); Globalization and China’s Political Development (2003); The Emergence of Civil Society and Its Significance for Governance (2002); Politics of Public Good or Politics of Rights? (1999); and China’s Contemporary Political System (1998). Yu was a guest professor at Duke University in Durham, NC, and the Free University in Berlin, Germany. Zhang Qinghua is a professor in the Department of Literature Studies at Beijing Normal University. Zhang is a veteran researcher on contemporary Chinese literature. He has written extensively in the field, and his latest book is Diary in Heidelberg (Beijing: Renmin University Press, 2012). Zhao Lin is a professor of philosophy at Wuhan University. He received his PhD in philosophy from Wuhan University in 1988. Zhao’s specialties include Western philosophy and comparative culture. His books include Evolution of Christian Ideas (People’s Publishing House, 2007) and Comparative Theology and Theories of Communication (Guangxi Normal University Press, 2008). Zhuo Xinping is the director of and senior researcher at the Institute of World Religions, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing. His major research interests are Christianity and religious philosophy. His latest book is Globalized Religions and Contemporary China (Social Sciences Documentary Press, 2008).

CHAPTER 1

The Logic of Chinese Cultural Development in a Variable World of Modernization and Globalization Yu Keping Globalization is at a watershed in world history. What characterizes it is a kind of inherently and globally produced interconnectedness based on the foundation of economic integration that is unbreakable and progressively stronger over time. Globalization is first evident in the integration of the economy, but the globalization of economic life inevitably comes to intensely affect the entirety of a society’s productive life, including its politics and culture. Economic globalization greatly changes not only the way in which humanity produces, consumes, and exchanges but also the way in which humanity thinks and behaves, and with this a major blow is dealt to national cultures. The onslaught of globalization on Chinese culture began prominently in the early nineteenth century until the New Culture movement of the early twentieth century, and internal conflicts in Chinese culture have intensified yet again since the 1980s and 1990s. These conflicts occur in a variety of dimensions, such as the conflict between tradition and modernity, conservative and progressive ideologies, nationalism and globalization, and even conflicts between Sinicization and Westernization. These fierce cultural clashes have triggered impassioned and intense debates on culture—the reemergence of a “cultural craze.” This chapter offers a commentary on the most controversial cultural discourses commonly in progress among Chinese intellectuals and thereby to discern the logic of Chinese cultural development in a variable world of modernization and globalization and what its future holds.

Cultural Modernization

The political and market reforms—“opening up and reform”—China undertook after 1978, in terms of the longue durée of historical development, were part of modernization. It was from this moment that China really began to steadily and completely commit itself to the path of modernization. Modernization is an overall process of social transformation. Economically, modernity seeks an industrialized market economy; politically, it seeks to realize a democratic © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004308886_002

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political system; culturally, it pioneers the core values of freedom, equality, and the individual agency. Overall, these political, economic, and cultural elements of modernity are incompatible with Chinese traditional culture. Hence, transforming Chinese traditional culture and creating a modern culture was the first response of Chinese intellectuals to opening and reform. This so-called cultural modernization implements radical transformation to traditional civilizations to conform to the demands of industrial civilization, management systems, and democratic politics. This was a practical development in order to realize a change in Chinese traditional culture, building an advanced modern culture, and make it conform with political and economic modernization. As many scholars have pointed out, cultural modernization at its root is a prerequisite to social modernization and is an organic component of social modernization: The modernization of social life and the individual is invariably accompanied by cultural modernization. Cultural modernization primarily refers to a new culture built on incorporating the best elements of past cultures that can fit with the demands of a modern society. The modernization of economic and social life, the modernization of humanity, and the modernization of culture are three inseparable aspects of modernization. They are interconnected, mutually reinforcing, and irreplaceable.1 The modernization of Chinese culture consists of essentially two dis­ courses: the first is a critical transformation of Chinese culture aimed at removing the depraved and backward dross of tradition and propagating the more rational and useful parts of tradition; the second is learning from other advanced cultures by studying and absorbing the superior fruits of other civilizations in order to assimilate them into Chinese culture. This became an important part of China’s New Culture movement.2 For many Chinese scholars, these two discourses have been indispensable. On the one hand, the continual absorption of all the rational elements of modern Western culture as well as their integration into the reality of Chinese society to make it more digestible in China has been crucial to the modernization of tradition. On the other hand, we cannot avoid a process of continual reviewing and filtering of our tradition in order to burnish the essence of tradition while negating that which is backward until it is gradually extinguished: 1  Qi Zhenhai, “Chuantong wenhua yu xiandaihua,” [Traditional Culture and Modernization] Zhexue yanjiu 6 (1992). 2  Also known as the May Fourth movement.—Trans.

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That is, building a new culture that is modern and meets the demands of history undoubtedly cannot forego learning from more advanced Western culture; however, at the same time, and more importantly, it must also discover and carry forth the essence of our national culture and the spirit of the people.3 Nonetheless, among these scholars are those who place their emphasis differently between the continuity of tradition and learning from the West and advocate different paths of cultural development, which has led to very impassioned cultural debates. For many people, modernizing Chinese tradition begins with a critique of tradition. Even if they do not deny that traditional culture has both rational and positive elements, they still see tradition as antithetical to modernity as well as the greatest obstacle to the modernization of Chinese society. This is particularly the case with Chinese cultural traditions of feudalism and authoritarianism, which have strangled humanity, opposed equality, overemphasized agriculture over commerce, and was overtly patriarchal. This is the natural enemy of modern market economics and democratic politics. If this kind of backward traditional culture is not eliminated, then it will be impossible to allow people to think in ways that fit with the demands of the time, and this will make it impossible for society to modernize. In 1979, just as opening and reform were beginning, the historian Li Shu published his article “Eliminating the Vestiges of Feudalism Is the Most Important Condition for China’s Modernization,” in which he looked at the long social, historical, and intellectual roots of feudal forces that opposed modernization. In it, he bemoaned that “the intellectual revolution in China that attempted to change feudal ways of production overnight was something easily accepted by the people, but in reality it is more difficult than climbing to the sky.” He emphasized that “completing the intellectual revolution that opposed feudalism begun by the May Fourth movement is an important condition if we wish to succeed in creating a modern socialist system in China.”4 This article had a profound effect at the time and helped launch the intellectual liberation movements beginning in the late 1970s.

3  Hai Ze, “Guanyu chuantong wenhua xiandaihua wenti,” [On the Question of Modernizing Traditional Culture] Zhexue yanjiu 4 (1989). 4  Li Shu, “Xiaomie fengjian canyu yingxiang shi Zhongguo xiandaihua de zhongyao tiaojian,” [Eliminating the Vestiges of Feudalism is the Most Important Condition for China’s Modernization] Lishi yanjiu 1 (1979).

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Unlike the pioneering intellectuals of the May Fourth movement, when Chinese intellectuals in the opening and reform era criticized traditional culture, they did not only raise the banner of “Mr. Democracy” and “Mr. Science,”5 but they also added the new banner of “Mr. Law”—that is, the banner of the rule of law. They argued that the modernization they wished to realize should not be built based on democracy and science alone but must also be built based on the rule of law. Chinese traditional culture emphasized rule by law, but never the rule of law. Although rule by law and rule of law may seem the same, their meanings are substantively different. Rule by law emphasized strict adherence to the letter of the law. This is was not lacking in traditional culture. Rule of law, however, emphasizes not only strict adherence to the law but also that no individual or group is above the law. Not only does traditional culture lack such a concept, but it is essentially antithetical to traditional culture. Since traditional culture is essentially a monarchial authoritarian culture, it is premised on the fact that the monarch is always above the law. Modernizing ­traditional Chinese culture, therefore, requires not only democracy and s­ cience but also building a modern state based on the rule of law.

Cultural Revival

If we were to say that cultural modernization based on a critique of traditional culture was the first wave of “cultural debate” in China after the opening and reform, then it is ironic that the next wave is “the revival of Chinese culture,” in sharp contrast to previous criticisms of tradition. Proponents of a cultural revival also advocate the modernization of Chinese traditional culture, but they do not focus on the critique of tradition as a way of pushing forward a modern cultural transition; instead they focus on a revival of tradition. At its root, their argument is that Chinese traditional culture is not antithetical to or in conflict with modernity; the backwardness of China in the recent past indicates not a backwardness of culture but precisely that the brilliance of Chinese culture did not flourish. Modern progress in China not only means that traditional culture should not be subjected to negative criticism but also that allowing traditional culture to flourish is an essential condition of modernizing society. The revival of Chinese culture and realizing a modern China are both two sides of the same coin. They even believe they that they have found 5  “Mr. Democracy” and “Mr. Science” refers to Chen Duxiu’s call in the New Youth magazine during the May Fourth Movement to replace Confucian values with democratic and scientific values.—Trans.

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evidence of this “strength” in a “cultural revival.” In terms of socioeconomic modernization, the four “Asian tigers” of South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have been successful in large part because of the influence of traditional Chinese culture. Not only have they avoided a wholesale negation of traditional culture but they have strived to solidify traditional cultural values. The Chinese cultural revival movement since the opening and reform has three major components: a revival of Confucianism—also called modern neo-Confucianism;6 a revival of Chinese culture; and a revival of Chinese ­learning.7 These three components are linked, but they are also distinct. They seek basically to preserve traditional culture and emphasize the modern value of traditional Chinese culture. They advocate the innovation and transformation of traditional culture while affirming the foundations of tradition, and this will allow Chinese traditional culture to conform with, and, moreover, encourage China to achieve its mission of modernization. The emphasis in these three components, however, is quite different. Neo-Confucianism essentially defines traditional Chinese culture as Confucian doctrine and advocates claim that, by reviving neo-Confucianism, Chinese culture can be revived. Advocates of a revival of Chinese culture emphasize the important role of Chinese culture in a global culture. They hope to recreate the historical glory of Chinese culture and look forward to the twenty-first century as the Chinese century. Pioneers in sinological studies place their sights on the foundational knowledge of traditional culture in an attempt to proliferate Chinese traditional culture through the discovery and transmission of the sagacious values in the ancient classics. The transmission of Confucian “orthodoxy” and reviving the Confucian spirit has become the mission of modern neo-Confucians, which can be traced back to the 1920s with scholars such as Liang Shuming. After 1949, this intellectual strand was active primarily in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States. In the 1980s, with all the changes in mainland China from reforms, modern neo-Confucianism began to have an effect on the mainland, with

6  Modern neo-Confucianism (xiandai xin ruxue), as in a twentieth-century reinterpretation of Confucianism. This school of Confucianism is distinct from, though not entirely unrelated to, the neo-Confucianism (lixue) or Cheng-Zhu orthodox interpretation of Confucianism (cheng zhu lixue) that emerged in the Song dynasty.—Trans. 7  Chinese learning (guoxue) is a movement in China of learning from classical text, philosophies, histories, literature, etc. In order to better understand traditional Chinese culture. The term guoxue more literally means “national learning,” but the term is used exclusively to refer to China and not any other nation.—Trans.

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several i­ ndividuals taking a predominant position.8 Current supporters of the revival of Confucianism not only advocate the complete revival of traditional Confucian thinking but also wish to make neo-Confucianism, after some kind of “transition” or “reformation,” the guiding ideology of China’s modernization; moreover, they believe that this is the only path to China’s revitalization or modernization. Jiang Qingming, a proponent of the revival of Confucianism, argued that over the past hundred years China lost the solidarity of the people and its position in the world, and the reason for this was the decline of the spirit and moral principles of the Confucian tradition. The conclusion they derive from this is that the greatest problem the Chinese mainland now faces is reviving Confucianism. Confucian ethics should be restored to its historically revered status as the orthodox ideology to represent the way of life of the Chinese people and the Chinese spirit for modern China.9 Even worse, some of the more extreme pioneers of a revival of Confucianism openly propose that traditional Chinese Confucianism should be developed into religioConfucianism:10 “A national Confucian heritage tax should be collected to assist in a concerted evangelical effort to established Confucianism as a ‘religioConfucianism,’ and to make ‘religio-Confucianism’ into the ‘state religion.’ ”11 The “revival of Chinese culture” theory begins with two basic premises. The first basic premise argues that the flourishing of Chinese culture and the prosperity of the Chinese people are directly linked; that the destiny of Chinese culture and the destiny of the Chinese people are, for better or worse, linked; and that the golden age of Chinese culture was also the golden age of the Chinese people. Once there was a time in human history when the Chinese people had pride and glory, when it was the most powerful country in the world. Chinese culture once carried many neighboring countries on its shoulders and was one of the greatest civilizations in the world. In terms of historical experience, therefore, in order to make our country into a ­modern ­superpower, 8  See Fang Keli, Xiandai xin ruxue yu Zhongguo xiandaihua [Modern Neo-Confucianism and China’s Modernization] (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1998). For the periodization, personas, important points, meaning, and comments on Confucian revival and modern neo-Confucianism, see many of the other chapters in this book. 9  Jiang Qing, “Zhongguo dalu fuxing ruxue de xianshi yiyi ji qi mianlin de wenti,” [The Real Meaning of the Revival of Confucianism in Mainland China and the Problems it Faces] in E’hu (1989), 170–171; see Fang, Xiandai xin ruxue yu Zhongguo xiandaihua. 10  Religio-Confucianism (rujiao) basically a kind of Confucianism with a strong sense of religiosity. Although the term rujiao is often translated as simply Confucianism, the emphasis here is clearly on Confucianism as a religion instead of Confucianism as a philosophy (ruxue).—Trans. 11  Zhu Xueqin, “2005 nian: Zhongguo wenhua zhi xingse,” [2005: The Form of Chinese Culture] Zhongguo qingnian bao, January 4, 2005.

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there must be a revival of Chinese culture. The second basic premise is that Chinese culture is innately superior to Western culture. Because that inherent superiority of Chinese culture was not allowed to flourish, China became increasingly weaker. Since the opening and reform allowed China to get back onto the road to modernization, China has become stronger; however, if China really wishes to become a world superpower, then China must take its culture out into the world and use its own superior culture to eliminate the flaws of Western culture. Proponents of a Chinese cultural revival argue that Western culture is highly flawed and has come to a dead end, and its ­history of global imperialism is at an end. A restoration of Chinese culture can take its place, and Chinese culture could become the predominant culture in the civilized world. In the early twentieth century, Liang Qichao claimed, with great concern: “across the sea there are millions of people terrified of a bankrupt materialistic civilization. With great sorrow they cry out for help, awaiting your arrival to transcend the vast miles.”12 Similarly, in October 2001 Zhang Dainian, Ji Xianlin, and seventy-six other scholars of Chinese culture signed a Proclamation for the Revival of Chinese Culture (with the subheading “Fighting to Promote the Great Revival of the Chinese People and World Peace and Development in the New Century”). The proclamation declares to the world with passion and pride that the twenty-first century will see the revival of Chinese culture! The revival of Chinese culture cannot be stopped! The cultural clashes of the world today, the proliferation of cult religions, religious extremism, the destruction of nature, the deterioration of morals, and the adverse effects of science all hinder the tranquility and development of society. Chinese culture has an irreplaceable role in eliminating and solving these problems and contradictions that Western civilization has been unable to fulfill. . . . The twenty-first century will not only be a century in which cultural exchange between East and West will occur, but will transition from a century of “Western cultural hegemony” to a century of “Eastern cultural hegemony.” The revival of Chinese culture is not resistance against Western civilization, but implies that as Eastern culture has absorbed Western culture, it has created a new human ­culture that will begin a new civilization.13

12  Liang Qizhao, “Ou you xinying lu,” [Impressions from My Travels in Europe] in Yin bing shi heji: zhuanji, vol. 23, 40. 13  Zhang Dainian and Ji Xianlin et al., Zhonghua wenhua fuxing xuanyan [Proclamation for the Revival of Chinese Culture], as quoted in Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan yuanbao, August 18, 2005.

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Generally speaking, sinology focuses on the corpus of knowledge in Chinese traditional culture. In addition to the traditional ideologies of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, sinology also includes traditional Chinese literature, military studies, medicine, opera, art, astrology, and mathematics. Hence, pioneers in sinology are also reviving traditional Chinese culture in a much broader sense. These pioneers are generally much more practical than proponents of cultural revival and are also much more thorough in terms of reviving traditional culture. They set their eyes on the foundations of knowledge in traditional culture, which leads to research on and imparting traditional culture as a body of knowledge in an attempt to disseminate and revive traditional Chinese culture through the classification, excavation, and teaching of traditional cultural knowledge. The most important initiatives to revive sinology have been sinological research institutes large and small and sinological training courses. The greatest excitement in sinology came in 2005 with the formal opening of Renmin University’s Institute of Sinology and its acceptance of undergraduate students. This is how the dean of the institute introduced its mission: The curriculum is still being determined. In addition to some common courses such as foreign languages, the core curriculum will be divided into three major segments. We are still determining the specific courses, but, of course, the Four Books and Five Classics will certainly be read; moreover, it will surely look not just at Confucian stuff, but also Daoism, legalism, militarism, and various other masters of the Hundred Schools of Thought. All the classical works that have played a part in the historical development of China will be studied and will include classical analysis and commentaries. We will also study Western science.14 Furthermore, in the commercial world, they have established the Chinese Sinology Club. Beijing University has begun the Qianyuan Sinology Classroom— generally called the Boss’s Class—which charges RMB 24,000 (USD $3,800) a year in tuition. Under the influence of this sinological debate among intellectuals, traditional “private schools” have begun to emerge in society. What is thought provoking is that the aforementioned wave to revive culture among Chinese intellectuals has come under considerable attack. Although

14  “Renda xiaozhang xiangjie guoxue fuxing zhi lu,” [The Principal of the NPC Gives a Detailed Explanation to the Road to Restoring National Learning] Huaxia shibao, June 2, 2005.

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there are very ardent supporters, there are far more critics. As one of the more tempered critics pointed out, many parts of Chinese traditional culture still seem to have important values. Allowing these superior traditional values to flourish is important for us as we modernize; hence, we should recognize the role of this notion of cultural revival. However, in general, Chinese traditional culture runs counter to our goal of modernizing. Any attempt to entrust the hopes of the Chinese people to a revival of traditional culture is doomed to failure. Some of the more aggressive critics have directly referred to this idea of cultural revival as “cultural conservatism” or “cultural nationalism.” They believe Confucianism as a representative of Chinese traditional culture at its root is an obstacle to China’s becoming modern. The economic miracle of the four Asian tigers is insufficient to prove that Confucianism can lead to modernity. The road to modernizing traditional culture is not in reviving traditional culture, and certainly not in reviving Confucianism, but instead in wholeheartedly learning from a superior civilization, particularly Western civilization, in order to build a new modern culture.

Cultural Consciousness

In the 1980s and 1990s, globalization began its assault on economic, political, and cultural life in China and thereby led to a fundamental shift in the cultural debate. Chinese intellectuals were gradually confronted with a new set of questions, such as: what challenges to Chinese culture were introduced by globalization? How can Chinese culture interact with a globalized environment? In which direction is Chinese culture heading? How should Chinese culture be positioned in a globalized world? In this environment, a new cultural discourse quickly unfolded among Chinese academics in the 1990s, further fueling the “cultural debate” among Chinese intellectuals. The idea of “cultural consciousness” was first proposed by the well-known sociologist Fei Xiaotong in 1997 at the Second Advanced Research Seminar on Sociology and Anthropology hosted by Beijing University. He said: These two words express the reaction of contemporary thinkers toward economic globalization. People wish to understand why there is this pressing demand, for human attitudes to change as many cultures around the world have come into increasing contact. Now that humanity has developed as it has, we are beginning to want to know where our people come from. How did we come to be? What is our essence? Where will it lead humanity?

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He argued that, whether it was the Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898 and the 1919 “May Fourth” New Culture movement or the many political movements after 1949, these movements revolved around the slogan “destroy the old and erect the new.” They placed “tradition” in opposition to “modernity.” They made traditional culture the enemy of modernization. In his view, the m ­ odernization of culture is not just a matter of “destroying the old and e­ recting the new” but a matter of “the new emerging from the old” or “understanding the new from learning the old.” Modernization, on the one hand, destroys tradition but, on the other hand, is also an inheritor of tradition. This is related to the problems of cultural transition, and cultural transition is a problem now shared by humanity. Subsequently, he said: The idea of “cultural consciousness” can be seen in terms both large and small. This is a shared problem of nationalities with small populations, for the Chinese people and all of humanity. This means that any member of any culture has an “innate understanding” of their culture. They understand where it comes from, how it came to be, what makes it special, and the direction of its development. This innate understanding allows for more autonomy in this cultural transition, which determines its ability to selectively adapt culture to this new environment and era.15 As Fei Xiaotong described it, cultural consciousness is a response to modernity, particularly the challenge presented by globalization to Chinese culture, which is attempting to find a way for Chinese culture in a modern globalized world; however, what characterizes “cultural consciousness?” What is the focal point? How can one expedite the creation of a cultural consciousness? In response to these questions, Chinese intellectuals have answered very differently from a host of perspectives. The first perspective focuses on cultural consciousness in terms of culture’s influence on social development. This perspective holds that the idea of cultural consciousness highlights the importance of cultural construction in realizing modernization. Those holding this perspective believe that in a globalized world culture has an increasingly important role in social modernization. Culture has become an essential force in social development, and the power of culture is vital for the competitiveness of states. This is particularly the case in present-day China, which has developed a substantial economic base and built a good foundation for its system. Whether a people can develop a culture that can transition to modern civilization will determine whether 15  Fei Xiaotong, “Guanyu ‘wenhua zijue’ de yi xie zibai,” [Some Confessions on “Cultural Consciousness”] Xueshu yanjiu 7 (2003).

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it can successfully transition to modernity. Hence, any cultural consciousness must be aware of the vital significance of culture in social development and consciously adjust and perfect their national cultural development strategies according to the demands of social development. As far as these scholars are concerned: Culture is a characteristic force in a people’s survival and development. As globalization progresses and we enter a knowledge economy, which will intertwine culture, economics, and politics, culture will gradually become an important component of a nation’s overall strength, and the role of cultural elements in economic development and social progress will become ever more essential. The competitiveness of a nation overall in a globalized world at its core will be the competitiveness of cultural power in the era of the intellectual economy. States with a cultural advantage will be able to export to the world their values, ideals, science, technology, production standards, and management models. What states at a cultural disadvantage will be able to export will be products produced according to these technological standards. This is the dilemma of developing countries in a globalized world.16 The second perspective focuses on cultural consciousness in terms of the importance of Chinese culture in global culture. Those with this view believe that Chinese culture should be viewed from the larger perspective of world history. As Gan Yang, a scholar dedicated to researching Chinese culture, recently pointed out, “cultural consciousness” has two meanings. The first is that Chinese people need to understand that China’s economic rise is significant not only in economic history but also in the history of world civilization. This is different that the economic rise of the four tigers. The whole world now sees China’s rise as the most important event in the twenty-first century, particularly for the West. Will China’s rise confront a problematic historical order in which the West has had dominion over the world for the past six hundred years? He believes that China’s development may decisively influence and change the entire world order. Chinese people must be consciously aware of China’s current position in the world. They must consciously look at China and the world in terms of the history of world civilization. They must develop a new understanding of China in terms of a global historical perspective and then develop a new understanding of the world. Second, and more important, when they bring up “cultural consciousness,” it means that the current state of Chinese 16  Wang Haiguan, “Xiandaihua yujing xia de wenhua zijue,” [Cultural Consciousness in Modernization Discourse] Wenhui bao, September 14, 2004.

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culture is extremely out of balance with its position in the world. Our cultural foundations are extremely weak. Out cultural clout is seriously deficient. Our cultural historical perspective is relatively limited. Hence, the idea of cultural consciousness is not about encouraging a cultural megalomania. Quite the contrary, it is about opposing cultural megalomania. It is about opposing cultural impulsiveness. It is about opposing cultural pretentiousness. This kind of “cultural consciousness” seeks to build a cultural foundation from very specific circumstances.17 The third perspective focuses on cultural consciousness in terms of a revival of traditional culture. Some argue that cultural consciousness is a conscious understanding of the advantages of traditional culture and want to consciously carry forth Chinese traditional culture. They contend that the transformation and innovation of traditional culture should be promoted, after reflecting on the places where Chinese traditional culture does not adapt to practical needs, and from this a revival of Chinese culture can be realized. Other people further believe that cultural consciousness means a consciousness of Confucianism and that a revival of Confucianism can be achieved by reforming and changing Confucianism. Some scholars say: In order to forge a Chinese cultural consciousness in a globalized world, we need to completely refine what is good in Chinese culture and apply it to practical circumstances to make what is good in our culture into a global thing. Under these new historical circumstances, therefore, in the spirit of our historical cultural mission, our cultural inheritance, our cultural innovation, and our cultural practices—as both knowledge and a way of life—as the core values of a conscious spirit of Confucian culture maintain its unique theoretical significance and practical value, we should actively finish the task of transforming the conscious spirit of Confucian culture to [accord with] modern values. They also point out that what is needed first is to “transform the consciousness of the great way of Confucianism into the cultural consciousness of the people and make it into the cultural task of all the people.”18 The fourth perspective focuses on cultural consciousness in terms of innovating traditional or national culture. They believe that cultural consciousness should approach national culture in rational terms. Awareness promotes 17  Gan Yang, “Wenhua zijue yu Zhongguo daxue de renwen jiaoyu,” [Cultural Consciousness and Humanities Education in Chinese Universities] Dongfang zaobao, September 9, 2005. 18  Zhu Renqiu, “Quanqiuhua beijing xia de rujia wenhua zijue,” [Confucian Cultural Consciousness under Globalization] Fujian Shifan daxue xuebao 5 (2004).

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c­ ultural innovation and development. As they see it, the most essential part of cultural consciousness is not returning to a traditional culture, but innovating and developing traditional culture. For example, Le Daiyun, a professor at Beijing University, claims: Cultural consciousness is not about returning to culture or otherizing culture, but adjusting one’s own culture to adhere to new historical circumstances and, in this process of cultural transition, seeking a new life. This involves the issues of how to view and treat traditional cultural attitudes. If you think about it carefully, is the authentic flavor and taste of culture still there? To put it another way, is there such a thing as pure and even purer? In fact, there are two kinds of traditions. The first are the remnants of formation, which could be called traditional culture. The second are the practicalities of existing, which could be called cultural traditions, which is also a kind of new explanation of tradition. Therefore, the best way to preserve tradition is to allow tradition to develop. This is the most important part of cultural consciousness.19 Li Zonggui, a professor at Zhongshan University, also sees innovating national culture as an essential part of cultural consciousness. He claims: The culture in cultural consciousness is articulated in terms of its significance to the nation. That is, cultural consciousness is the consciousness of the national culture. It is the Chinese people becoming conscious of their own culture. To put it more concretely, cultural consciousness is a rational mastery of the origin, formation, progression, characteristics, and development of our national culture as well as a rational mastery of the relationship between our national culture and the cultures of other nations. In the present world, with economic and cultural globalization becoming more powerful every day, the most essential part of cultural consciousness is in cultivating cultural innovation and a national spirit. It is in rationally uniting the dialectic between the national and global character of culture as well as uniting the inheritance and transcendence of culture.20

19   Le Daiyun, “Duoyuan wenhua yu wenhua zijue” [Cultural Diversity and Cultural Consciousness] (speech delivered at the Central Academy of Music on January 17, 2003). 20  Li Zonggui, “Wenhua zijue yu wenhua fazhan,” [Cultural Consciousness and Cultural Development] Zhongshan daxue xuebao 6 (2004).

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The fifth perspective explains cultural consciousness in terms of building a methodological and theoretical framework. Those with this view argue that cultural consciousness is consciously researching culture as an object of study to make it into a field of study with a theoretical framework. This is how Tang Yijie, a scholar at Beijing University, explained Fei Xiaotong’s notion of cultural consciousness. He said that whether we can say that we have established a field of study or theoretical system should be based on a consciousness of theories and methodologies about an object of study, in particular, consciously making the object of study into an “object” of study, and, moreover, it must contain a system of theories and methodologies that are generally accepted by society. He states: Any field of study is like this. A “consciousness of culture” is much the same. For example, in terms of research on Chinese culture, we must consciously make Chinese culture into an object of study and systematically, creatively, and truthfully study it. Only by doing this can we reveal the true spirit of Chinese culture, understand the advantages and disadvantages of Chinese culture, and consciously unearth the intrinsic spiritual value of Chinese culture, and only then can we have a goal to strive for and actively assimilate and digest the superior parts of other nations’ cultures to conform to the demands of modern social development of humanity.21 If we understand cultural consciousness as a deep reflection on Chinese cultural tradition and status in the face of modernization and globalization and journey to seek a path for the future development of Chinese culture, as many Chinese intellectuals have, then what is most striking is that there seem to be two fundamentally opposed and representative concepts: cultural globalism and cultural nativism.

Cultural Globalization

Cultural globalism is a highly controversial concept, to which many are still opposed. One opponent bluntly pointed out that “cultural globalism” is built based on economic globalism and is synonymous with the spread of Western

21  Tang Yijie, “Guanyu wenhua wenti de jidian sikao,” [Some Points of Consideration in Cultural Issues] Xueshu yuekan 9 (2002).

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culture;22 moreover, “in the Chinese context, cultural globalism has been ­bitterly resisted.”23 Some people are opposed to it simply because they believe that the existence of cultural globalism is conjecture. There is just no such thing, nor is there any possibility of one existing; furthermore, some people oppose it because they do not wish to see Chinese culture come under assault by an outside culture. Nonetheless, the fact is that an increasing number of people are beginning to accept the concept of cultural globalism and are beginning to think deeply about it and have their own opinion and criticism of it. Proponents of cultural globalism first determined that, as economic globalism has progressively expanded, cultural globalism has become or must by necessity become an objective reality. This is not a value judgment but a simple matter-of-fact reality. First, capital, technology, information, commodities, and labor have quickly become fluid around the world, forcing nationstates increasingly to follow the fold of “international norms” and supposed “­international standards” or “global regulation”; therefore, cultural globalism not only destroys the political and economic bastion of the nation-state and profoundly affects the economy and political systems of nation-states, it also mercilessly eradicates the cultural bastion of the nation-state and profoundly changes the consciousness, ideology, and systematic norms of nation-states. Additionally, as developed Western countries and their transnational corporations invest their capital, technology, and products in developing countries, they also bring their values, ideology, literature, arts, and even their way of life to developing countries. When confronted with Western culture, these historically long-lived national cultures are considerably weakened. Many solid cultural traditions are instantly demolished and uprooted. In the end, globalization brings humanity closer together while also threatening the security of humanity’s survival with environmental destruction, terrorism, resource disparities, population explosions, disease, nuclear proliferation, and other problems. These problems have gone beyond the scope of the nation-state and have become the veritable “global problems” they are recognized as today, which require the assistance of all of humanity to resolve, leading to an unprecedented “global consciousness” and giving rise to a kind of “global culture.”

22  Wang Heyu, “ ‘Wenhua quanqiuhua’ zhiyi: jingji quanqiuhua de wenhua sikao,” [Questions about “Cultural Globalization”: Thoughts on Culture in Economic Globalization] Xi’an jiaotong daxue xuebao 3 (2001). 23  Wang Ning, “Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua lunzheng he wenhua duihua,” in Quanqiuhua: xifanghua haishi zhongguohua [Globalization: Westernization or Sinicization], ed. Yu Keping (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002), 267.

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For the majority of proponents of cultural globalism, cultural globalism does not merely unify or homogenize national cultures but produces unbreakable linkages between national cultures and increasingly a “global consensus” or “global consciousness” concerning the common problems faced by humanity. For them, cultural globalism is neither a state nor a process. As one scholar explains: As I see it, at its root, cultural globalism, among the different national cultures of the world, relies on the globalization of information through progressively tighter-knit and frequent interaction, mutual learning, and mutual influence as a process of self-renewal under the auspices of economic globalization; simultaneously, it is also a process of the gradual formation of a consensus on the issues commonly worrying much of humanity through positive interactions between different national culture. In this sense, cultural globalism is a process and a tendency, not the conclusion formed from it or the fate of weaker nations.24 Culture is exceptionally rich and yet extremely difficult to define; however, the core of culture is human values. Hence, some scholars particularly emphasize the substantial value of common human values or global values in culture globalism. They believe that the progress of globalization is not just about making people realize their common fate but a more profound experience and understanding of the commonality of humanity, especially values of freedom, equality, justice, security, welfare, and respect. The pursuit of these common human values is a process of cultural globalization and is also the ultimate goal of cultural globalization. The pursuit of this kind of cultural globalism is the honor of the nation-state: There are already global values such as the Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration of Environmentalism, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Declaration. . . . however, many still cannot tolerate national consciousness, which may lead to conflict. Henceforth, the greatest honor for a nation is to increase the proportion of this nascent global value that it influences. The future of globalization will be the creation of global values and to play a leading role in its formation.25 24  Li Zonggui, “Wenhua quanqiuhua yu dangdai Zhongguo wenhua jianshe,” [Cultural Globalization and the Construction of a Modern Chinese Culture] Nankai daxue xuebao 5 (2002). 25  Yu Keping, ed., Quanqiuhua de bolun [The Paradox of Globalization] (Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 1998), 14–15.

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Compared to historical interactions among national cultures, cultural interactions in a globalized world are clearly unique. Some scholars have attempted to describe this uniqueness in a theoretical framework, concluding that cultural globalism has the following three basic characteristics. First, culture and the economy are increasingly tied together as an integrated whole, which means any economic advantage also produces a cultural advantage. Economic hegemony means cultural hegemony. Second, cultural interactions progressively degenerate cultural exports. Developed countries, relying on their economic and technological superiority, on the one hand, have spread Western culture, penetrating every country on the earth, while, on the other hand, they have done everything conceivably possible to prevent the spread of cultural values contrary to their own. Consequently, the cultural interactions between East and West have to a large degree become a unidirectional relationship of import and export. Third, the function of culture is progressively inflated, which has entirely affected the formation of social life. With the rise of the cultural industry, besides its pedagogical functions, culture also has consumerist, aesthetic, economic, and entertainment functions. Its functions go entirely beyond the ideological formation, which not only affects the ideological and value systems of many people but also deeply affects ways of life, consumption, production, and social psychology.26 Discussions of cultural globalism among Chinese intellectuals are always accompanied by calls to protect native culture. These two ideas superficially appear to be diametrically opposed, but, in Chinese cultural discussions in the era of reform, these ideas are miraculously interwoven.

Cultural Nativism

Cultural nativism is primarily a process of cultural development that highlights local uniqueness. For nation-states, cultural nativism is cultural nationalization. It is a process of cultural development that highlights national uniqueness, as well as the development of national culture or to make cultural development more unique to the nation. Cultural nativism and cultural globalization are two different aspects of the same process. It is a natural reaction to cultural globalization. The two are mutually supporting, forming a “rational paradox” of cultural development in a globalizing world. Hence, cultural nativism is a response to the idea of cultural globalization. Any discussion or thinking about cultural nativism divorced from cultural globalization 26  Feng Ziyi, “Quanqiuhua yu minzu wenhua,” [Globalization and National Culture] Zhexue yanjiu 3 (2001).

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would be historically misplaced. Since the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese intellectuals have again become deeply worried about native Chinese culture and are actively endorsing national culture, but these attempts to return to their roots have been unable to escape the cultural logic of a globalized world. As one scholar stated: The impact of global culture for some countries and regions implies in some way the disruption of native culture. At the same time, we also see that globalization is a process in which the stronger civilization of the West spreads to other regions of the world; therefore, global culture clearly carries with it the characteristics of a stronger Western culture. This sense of being homeless produced by modernization or globalization leads to a cultural identity crisis. As some people have pointed out, since the [beginning of the] twentieth century, the entire philosophical discourse of China has been completely Westernized; in other worlds, it have been completely colonized, and Chinese traditional philosophy has contracted an acute case of aphasia. This identity crisis and sense of community loss leads people again to feel the significance of native culture to the survival of the nation. The return to cultural roots is a precondition to antiglobalization resistance. Furthermore, under these circumstances, it is also difficult to understand the rise of cultural nativism. In this sense, globalization raises questions that are worthy of our attention. It also provides impetus for our renewed attention to Chinese culture.27 For many Chinese scholars, cultural nativism or nationalism is possible only in a globalized world. This is primarily because all the countries in the world are both simultaneously homogeneous and diverse in a global age. Universality and particularity are compatible. Cultural globalism and convergent proclivities fail to eradicate the diversity of the world’s cultures but, instead, give more meaning to local and national uniqueness. Cultural diversity develops alongside the trends of cultural globalization. This kind of cultural diversity is rooted between the differences and diversity of cultural nativism or nationalism. The objective historical reality is that all the forces of globalization are unable to eliminate the differences and uniqueness of human culture. Some scholars have argued that cultural diversity has become a universal characteristic of c­ ulture, because it is an intrinsic requirement for the survival and development of different peoples. Cultural diversity is a prerequisite for the 27  Gong Qun, “Quanqiu wenhua yu bentu wenhua,” [Global Culture and Native Culture] Nankai daxue xuebao 5 (2002).

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­reproduction and development of human culture, and it is this blending between cultures and conflict between cultures that leads human culture to develop further and progress. As one scholar claimed: Since the manner of survival and the practices of humanity are universal, the values behind all native national cultures imply commonality. This is also why the values of diverse cultures can communicate and even blend together. At the same time, since the manner of survival and the practices of humanity are distinct and diverse, the values in all native national ­cultures clearly carry their own independent individuality, which makes then an indispensable component of the values system of human culture. It shows and characterizes the nature of humanity from different angles and in very different ways. The body of native national cultural values is also the builder, constructor, nurturer, as well as protector and guardian of native cultural values. They love, appreciate and cherish native national culture and, from the depths of their heart, confirm the aspirations, motivations, responsibilities, and practices of their native national culture’s existence and development, allowing their native cultural values to continue unabated. This is the “harmony in difference” of world cultures and the root reason for the differences between all national cultural values.28 The essence of Chinese cultural nativism is the defending the uniqueness of national culture as globalization has become an even more severe challenge. Protecting the autonomy of Chinese culture prevents Chinese culture from being relegated to oblivion in the process of cultural globalization. In order to effectively support this kind of Chinese cultural nativism, some Chinese scholars have made many suggestions—three of which I explore below. First, we need to more consciously pay attention to national culture by realizing that Chinese national culture is facing a serious challenge from Western culture in a globalized world; therefore, there is a sense of crisis and responsibility toward Chinese national culture’s survival and development. As one scholar stated, the survival of a nation is pinned to a nation’s culture, and it has its own strong sense of self-preservation. Chinese culture has a five-thousandyear history. No other culture in the world has such a continuous cultural vitality over such a long period of time; hence, in the face of cultural globalism, the 28  Fang Shinan, “Quanqiuhua yu wenhua bentuhua de duoyuan bingcun yu shuangxiang jiegou,” [The Diverse Co-existence of Globalization and Cultural Nativism and Their Bilateral Structure] Makesizhuyi yanjiu 4 (2001).

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vitality of Chinese culture cannot be underestimated. If, however, we fail to consciously pay attention to our own native culture, then it will be scattered to the winds by the prevailing force of global culture. If out national culture is unable to survive, then our nation will lose the cultural roots of its survival.29 Second, we must more actively protect the national identity and autonomy of Chinese culture. Many proponents of national culture emphasize that maintaining the national identity of culture is different from some narrow-minded cultural nationalism. It does not reject positive outside cultural influences but, instead, seeks to protect the national identity and autonomy of Chinese culture by passing down the spirit and advantages of Chinese national cultural traditions as it assimilates global culture. They have even appropriated terminology from political and economic discourse in the cultural sphere, such as “cultural security” and “cultural autonomy.” They believe that if there is no “cultural autonomy,” then there will be no “cultural security” to speak of, and if there is no “cultural security,” then there will be no cultural protection to speak of. “Cultural autonomy” can be maintained in three ways. The first is by establishing a subjective cultural consciousness—in other words, maintaining subjective principles of “we are the masters of ourselves, and we will do as we please” in their interactions with other cultures. The second is by defining a correct cultural strategy to actively develop the construction of native culture as well as resisting outside culture. The third is by increasing protection of cultural industries to develop native cultural industries that can resist the spread of Western cultural influences through cultural products that strengthen colonial policies.30 Finally, only a culture that can maintain its progressiveness and continue to advance will be able to maintain its vitality. The most important thing for Chinese native culture and national identity is to build an advanced culture that is uniquely Chinese. According to most explanations, what they mean by an advanced culture that is uniquely Chinese is chiefly the adaption of Chinese socialist market economics and democratic politics to conform with the national spirit, value system, epistemology, literature, and arts of the Chinese nation. As for how to build an advanced culture that is uniquely Chinese, s­ cholars have proposed an array of measures and propositions, which can be surmised, but not limited to, the following four points (1) There still remain today practical elements that should be propagated and carried on in traditional culture; (2) [we must] open up to outside culture and actively 29  Gong, “Quanqiu wenhua yu bentu wenhua.” 30  Feng Ziyi, “Quanqiuhua yu minzu wenhua de fazhan.” [Globalization and the Development of National Culture] Zhexue yanjiu 3 (2001).

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­ articipate in the process of cultural globalization to excel at learning and p assimilating advanced concepts, values, and knowledge from the outside world and to organically assimilate it into Chinese culture; (3) as we spread the essence of tradition and assimilate the superior aspects of Western civilization, we must attend to the innovation and transformation of Chinese culture to build a new modern Chinese culture; and (4) [we must] strive to bring Chinese culture out into the world so that the unique wisdom of Chinese culture can be assimilated into global civilization, making Chinese culture into an organic ­component of it.

The Logic of Chinese Cultural Development

The cultural debates begun by Chinese scholars in the 1980s have continued to the present, albeit much less tensely today than at their height. In the 1980s, China wholeheartedly invested in market and political reforms, but this process of modernization in fact began in the mid-nineteenth century with the Foreign Affairs movement, whose goals were firmly rooted in ­political, economic, and social modernization.31 Furthermore, the current historical position of Chinese modernization is in the midst of a transition: In the 1980s, humanity began to enter an era of globalization. Chinese reforms were a realization of national modernization in globalized world. Modernization and globalization are deeply intertwined and overlap and are the key to understanding the social transformation in China since it embarked on reforms, and culture is no exception. The cultural debate in reform-era China occurred just as it was modernizing and actively participating in globalization. In order to completely understand the significance of this cultural discussion to Chinese society, one must immerse oneself in the discourse of both modernization and globalization and see it as a cultural response to them in China. It is the resulting transitional logic of a Chinese traditional culture in a modernizing and globalizing context. In terms of modernization, the purpose of this new cultural debate is to adapt modern political and economic life to traditional values, ideologies, and epistemology to ensure that traditional culture makes the transition to modernity—that is, realizes the modernization of traditional culture. What is 31  The Foreign Affairs movement was a period of Qing institutional reforms in the late nineteenth century that sought to strengthen China politically and militarily in the face of Western and Japanese imperialism. The movement focused on military technology and knowledge of foreign countries, languages, and institutions.—Trans.

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most striking is the relationship between traditional and modern culture. In this sense, it is a completion of the goals that the New Culture movement in the early twentieth century failed to accomplish, and the inheritor of the intellectual liberation of the May Fourth movement. This cultural debate shares much of the logic and perspective with the cultural debates that began with the May Fourth movement and reached a high point in the 1920s and 1930s; moreover, it shares much of the same cultural discourse, such as the slogans “tradition and modernity,” “Sinicize and Westernize,” “Chinese essence and Western utility,” “progressive and conservative,” “advanced and backward,” and so on.32 In terms of globalization, the purpose of this cultural debate is to adapt universal values to the value system and epistemology of Chinese culture. On the one hand, universal human values should become an element of Chinese culture; on the other hand, some elements of Chinese culture should also become an organic part of world culture. The basic focus of this is the relationship between national culture and global culture. In this sense, the cultural debate begins to show a different logic and goal from the cultural debate of the May Fourth era and develops a new cultural discourse, such as the slogans of “­globalization and nativization,” “homogeneous and heterogeneous,” “nationalism and universal,” “cultural homogeneity and cultural diversity,” “national identity and global identity,” and so on. Modernization and globalization are two sides of the same coin, making our current discussion of the cultural debate all the more complicated: As some people work to modernize traditional culture, others are proposing the ­globalization of culture; as some people call for cultural nativism, others are criticizing cultural nationalism; as some emphasize the need to innovate traditional culture, others seek to revive traditional culture; as some are actively participating in international cultural exchanges, others are trying to protect national culture; as some people mourn the loss of their own national identity, others are beginning to wave the banner of a global identity; as some people enumerate the many ways in which Chinese culture is backward, others are proudly proclaiming the twenty-first century as the “Chinese century.” If we look at this bewildering collection of cultural phenomena in the context of the recent history of modern China and the world, however, and interpret them through the discourse of both modernization and globalization, then we will get a clearer picture. The Foreign Affairs movement in Chinese history marked the beginning of China’s journey on the road to modernization. China’s modern experience 32  See Yu Keping, Zengliang minzhu yu shanzhi [Incremental Democracy and Good Governance] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005), 27–56.

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is marked by two features. The first has been China’s economic and cultural backwardness, which China has sought to escape by building a wealthy nation and strong military to make it into a modern power; the second has been the rapacious incursions of Western imperialism, making China into a semicolony due to its backwardness and it has striven to remove the yoke of their control through national determination. Hence, modernization and national determination have been the most important goals of modern China.33 At its root, the conflicts between “tradition and modernity,” “progressive and conservative,” and “sinicization and westernization” can be explained through these two features of modern Chinese history and China’s historical goals. Objectively speaking, modern global civilization—mainly industrial civilization and industrial civilization—is basically the product of Western countries. Modern machines, energy, power, chemistry, medicine, and communication all originated in Western countries. If we narrowly define modernization as industrialization, then modernization would simply be a process of learning advanced science, technology, industrial production, and management systems from Western countries. In this sense, as one gains parity with developed Western countries and learns more from them, society will become more modern as well as advanced. It is no wonder that many Chinese intellectuals have conflated modernization with Westernization. Thus, the country that does not learn from Western countries or learns little from Western countries and maintains many traditional things will progress much more slowly and society will be backward. Since the historical context of modern China defines Western civilization as representative of advanced civilization and Chinese tradition as representative of things backward, the struggle between advanced and backward forces as China has modernized has always been expressed in terms of a fight between “westernization” and “sinicization,” “advanced” and “backward,” and “tradition” and “modernity.” Those with a vested interest in the forces of backwardness always emphasize that Western civilization is declining, that it is incompatible with the unique circumstances of China, and that Chinese traditional civilization is vastly superior, in order to oppose any reform and learning from the West. As Ai Siqi stated, this has been the main tactic of all conservative reactionaries in modern China: denying the laws of humanity’s historical development through ideological isolationism.34

33  Liu Danian, “Zhongguo jindai lishi yundong de zhuti,” [Themes in Modern Chinese Historical Movements] Jindaishi yanjiu 6 (1996). 34  Ai Siqi, “Lun Zhongguo de teshuxing,” in Cong xihua dao xiandaihua [From Westernization to Modernization], ed. Luo Rongqu (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1990), 592–593.

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Besides learning from the West as a means to achieve modernization, ­ owever, modern China has yet another major task, and that is national indeh pendence. These two historical goals to a large degree are in conflict. More accurately speaking, how to handle the relationship between “Westernization” and “sinicization,” and how to effectively learn from Western countries while at the same time maintaining Chinese national independence have been questions that have plagued countless modern Chinese intellectuals and politicians. China’s status as a semicolony was a problem created by Western imperial powers. On the one hand, in order for the Chinese nation to achieve independence, it must escape from the control of Western imperial powers; on the other hand, in order for China to modernize, it is precisely from these Western imperial powers from which China must be learning. This peculiar predicament has made many modern Chinese intellectuals and politicians highly circumspect while, at the same time, advocating learning from the West. While learning from the West, we must not be controlled by the West, reducing China to nothing more than a Western colony. It is because of this that they particularly emphasize the need to “Sinicize” or “nationalize” anything Western for fear that learning anything Western will Westernize China. From the founding of the People’s Republic of China until the end of the 1970s, Chinese politics, economy, and culture experienced earth-shattering changes; however, objectively speaking, China is still economically and culturally backward in comparison with Western developed countries. If China wishes to modernize, it must still earnestly learn from developed Western capitalist countries. Based on this understanding, the Chinese Communist Party, represented by Deng Xiaoping, drastically reformed traditional socialism. Among these reforms was an adjustment to Chinese modernization strategies by making development a “hard truth” and reopening to Western developed countries to learn from Western experience in science, technology, and management and to attract capital from Western countries by actively engaging and cooperating with Western developed countries. The readjustment of Chinese modernization and development strategies resurrected the debate between “Westernization” and “sinicization,” “tradition” and “modernity,” and “advanced” and “backward.” On the one hand, China must learn from advanced Western developed countries; on the other hand, China must maintain its own national sovereignty. This discourse directly resurrected the same predicament that has plagued modern Chinese intellectuals and politicians for a long time: as China learns from Western civilization, how does China avoid being controlled by the West; how does China assimilate the modern civilization of the West while also not becoming dependent on them?

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Since the 1980s and 1990s, humanity has been gradually pulled into a globalized era. Globalization is an unavoidable objective fact and an inevitable reality of global historical development. As soon as any country opens itself to the outside, it is immediately pulled onto the track of globalization. This is necessary to achieve social modernization, and China is no exception. Globalization began in the Western developed countries with the United States at the forefront, and so the rules of globalization are determined by them, and the process of globalization is also directed by the United States and the West; however, no country—the United States included—can entirely control the process of globalization. The influence of China and other developing countries over the process of globalization will inevitably increase. Globalization is not just a double-edged sword to developing countries; it is also a double-edged sword to developed Western countries. Both developed and developing countries can benefit from globalization as well as being harmed by it. In this kind of global environment, Chinese cultural modernization and Chinese cultural globalization are forced together and inseparably entwined, but in the process of cultural globalization, it is bound to make many Chinese intellectuals anxious over the prospects of “Westernization” and, in particular, “Americanization.”35 The nature of globalization is intrinsically paradoxical. It is a unified paradox: it includes a trend toward homogeneity while also maintaining divisive inclinations; although it is homogeneous, it is also diverse; although it is centralized, it is also dispersed; although it is international, it is also nativized. Globalization manifests first as economic integration, but the globalization of economic life inevitably comes to profoundly shape all of social life, including political and cultural life. Deng made internal reform and an openness to the outside into a holistic strategy for China’s modernization. Beginning with reform, he actively participated in economic globalization, and this caused a transition in traditional Chinese culture. Besides the aforementioned profound impact it had on the logic of modernization, it was also profoundly affected by the logic of globalization. The paradox of globalization directly and indirectly became the paradox of Chinese cultural transformation in that some advocate for “cultural globalism” and some advocate for “cultural nativism”; some see “cultural homogeneity” while others see “cultural diversity”; some call for “cultural nationalism” while other call for “cultural worldliness”; some emphasize “national identity” while other emphasize a “global identity”; and there are some that see these diametrically opposed extremes as a part of the entire transformative process of globalization and support it. 35  See Yu, Quanqiuhua, 1–27.

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Any intellectual or politician who is truly paying attention to China’s ­ odernization and globalization is unable to escape this discourse. They must m all directly or indirectly respond to this. In reflecting upon and exploring these issues, some people are more attentive to the meaning of independence to development and the meaning of nationalism to globalism. They believe that economic forces and human values are essential to maintaining national dignity and national culture, that nationalism and globalism at their root are one and the same thing, and that many of the advanced elements of Western culture are universal to humanity, but it is simply that the culture of Western countries has developed one step ahead of everyone else. Hence they tend to place their emphasis on learning from Western civilization so that Chinese people can enjoy the modern civilization that is already enjoyed by Westerners as soon as possible. For them, compared to those who seek to spread traditional culture, what is most important is learning from the West and taking the lead in cultural globalization. In opposition to this point of view, some people are more attentive to the meaning of development to independence and the meaning of globalism to nationalism. They believe that maintaining a pure national culture and national independence is more important than economic development. They are more concerned about losing sovereignty over the nation-state and certainly will not allow China to lose its independence and becoming dependent on developed Western countries in the course of modernization and globalization. They emphasize the importance of spreading Chinese civilization and national culture, not cultural globalism and globalization. Since these two schools of thought are unable to communicate and understand each other, they easily take extreme positions vis-à-vis each other. To the former, the latter’s opinion seems overly conservative and traditional; and to the latter, the former’s opinion seems too progressive and Westernized. We find the same common trends in Chinese intellectual cultural debates since the 1980s and 1990s, and these trends are also an outlet for Chinese culture in the face of the two-sided coin of modernization and globalization. First, since the Self-Strengthening movement of the late nineteenth century, the entire process of China’s modernization has been pervaded by a cultural discourse of “sinicization” and “Westernization,” “tradition” and “modernity,” and “Chinese essence” and “Western utility.”36 The influence of this discourse among intellectuals, however, has increasingly eroded, yielding to other major 36  The Self-Strengthening movement is largely synonymous with the Foreign Affairs movement, but often refers to the earliest period in the 1860s and 1870s, which was largely preoccupied with the modernization of the Qing military.—Trans.

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discourses, such as “globalization” and “nativization,” “globalism” and “nationalism,” and “state identity” and “national identity.” In addition, since the Chinese cultural changes begun by the May Fourth movement, it has nearly succeeded in forming a new mainstream Chinese culture. This new mainstream culture is not a revival of traditional culture, nor is it a transplant of Western culture. It is deeply rooted in Chinese tradition while also assimilating other civilizations. It is both traditional and modern, uniting both the national and the global. To the greatest extent possible, it contains the two extremes of the Chinese cultural transition. Furthermore, Chinese culture is going out into the world just as the culture of the world has entered Chinese culture. Chinese culture is becoming an important element in the mainstream culture of the world, and universal human values of freedom, equality, and self-respect are becoming an organic part of Chinese culture. Generally speaking, globalization will make modern civilization into an abstract globalism, regardless of whether it originated in the East or West, hence learning from modern Western civilization is not the same as “Westernization,” just as learning from modern Eastern civilization is not the same as “Easternization.” The modernization China currently seeks is the modernity of globalization. For the Chinese, globalization is both nationalization and modernization, and modernization in a certain sense is both ­globalization and nativization. If China wishes to maintain its native civilization in the process of modernization, then it must actively participate in globalization. Going further, if China truly wishes to actively participate in globalization, then it must fully support its own native advantages and national uniqueness. Works Cited Ai Siqi. “Lun Zhongguo de teshuxing.” In Cong xihua dao xiandaihua, [From Westernization to Modernization] ed. Luo Rongqu. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1990. Fang Keli. Xiandai xin ruxue yu Zhongguo xiandaihua. [Modern Neo-Confucianism and China’s Modernization] Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1998. Fang Shinan. “Quanqiuhua yu wenhua bentuhua de duoyuan bingcun yu shuangxiang jiegou.” [The Diverse Co-existence of Globalization and Cultural Nativism and Their Bilateral Structure] Makesizhuyi yanjiu 4 (2001). Fei Xiaotong. “Guanyu ‘wenhua zijue’ de yi xie zibai.” [Some Confessions on “Cultural Consciousness”] Xueshu yanjiu 7 (2003). Feng Ziyi. “Quanqiuhua yu minzu wenhua.” [Globalization and the Development of National Culture] Zhexue yanjiu 3 (2001).

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———. “Quanqiuhua yu minzu wenhua de fazhan.” [Globalization and National Culture] Zhexue yanjiu 3 (2001). Gan Yang. “Wenhua zijue yu Zhongguo daxue de renwen jiaoyu.” [Cultural Consciousness and Humanities Education in Chinese Universities] Dongfang zaobao, ­September 9, 2005. Gong Qun. “Quanqiu wenhua yu bentu wenhua.” [Global Culture and Native Culture] Nankai daxue xuebao 5 (2002). Hai Ze. “Guanyu chuantong wenhua xiandaihua wenti.” [On the Question of Modernizing Traditional Culture] Zhexue yanjiu 4 (1989). Jiang Qing. “Zhongguo dalu fuxing ruxue de xianshi yiyi ji qi mianlin de wenti.” [The Real Meaning of the Revival of Confucianism in Mainland China and the Problems it Faces] E’hu, 170–171 (1989). Le Daiyun. “Duoyuan wenhua yu wenhua zijue.” [Cultural Diversity and Cultural Consciousness] Speech delivered at the Central Academy of Music, January 17, 2003. Li Shu. “Xiaomie fengjian canyu yingxiang shi Zhongguo xiandaihua de zhongyao tiaojian [Eliminating the Vestiges of Feudalism is the Most Important Condition for China’s Modernization].” Lishi yanjiu 1 (1979). Li Zonggui. “Wenhua zijue yu wenhua fazhan.” [Cultural Consciousness and Cultural Development] Zhongshan daxue xuebao 6 (2004). ———. “Wenhua quanqiuhua yu dangdai Zhongguo wenhua jianshe.” [Cultural Globalization and the Construction of a Modern Chinese Culture] Nankai daxue xuebao 5 (2002). Liang Qizhao. “Ou you xinying lu.” [Impressions from My Travels in Europe] In Yin bing shi heji: zhuanji. Liu Danian. “Zhongguo jindai lishi yundong de zhuti.” [Themes in Modern Chinese Historical Movements] Jindaishi yanjiu 6 (1996). Qi Zhenhai. “Chuantong wenhua yu xiandaihua.” [Traditional Culture and Modernization] Zhexue yanjiu 6 (1992). “Renda xiaozhang xiangjie guoxue fuxing zhi lu.” [The Principal of the NPC Gives a Detailed Explanation to the Road to Restoring National Learning] Huaxia shibao, June 2, 2005. Tang Yijie. “Guanyu wenhua wenti de jidian sikao.” [Some Points of Consideration in Cultural Issues] Xueshu yuekan 9 (2002). Wang Haiguan. “Xiandaihua yujing xia de wenhua zijue.” [Cultural Consciousness in Modernization Discourse] Wenhui bao, September 14, 2004. Wang Heyu. “ ‘Wenhua quanqiuhua’ zhiyi: jingji quanqiuhua de wenhua sikao.” [Questions about “Cultural Globalization”: Thoughts on Culture in Economic Globalization] Xi’an jiaotong daxue xuebao 3 (2001).

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Wang Ning. “Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua lunzheng he wenhua duihua.” [Globalization: Westernization or Sinicization] In Quanqiuhua: xifanghua haishi zhongguohua, ed. Yu Keping. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002. Yu Keping. Zengliang minzhu yu shanzhi. [Incremental Democracy and Good Governance] Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005. Yu Keping, ed. Quanqiuhua de bolun [The Paradox of Globalization]. Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 1998. Zhang Dainian and Ji Xianlin, et al. Zhonghua wenhua fuxing xuanyan [Proclamation for the Revival of Chinese Culture]. Zhu Renqiu. “Quanqiuhua beijing xia de rujia wenhua zijue.” [Confucian Cultural Consciousness under Globalization] Fujian Shifan daxue xuebao 5 (2004). Zhu Xueqin. “2005 nian: Zhongguo wenhua zhi xingse.” [2005: The Form of Chinese Culture] Zhongguo qingnian bao, January 4, 2005.

CHAPTER 2

Philosophical Reflections on the Course of Chinese Cultural Modernization Li Xianghai It has been over a century and a half since the Opium War forced China onto the road of modernization. At present, with the coming of the new millennium, Chinese cultural development is faced yet again with new problems and opportunities. In this work, it is necessary for us to sort through the ideological themes and developmental logic of China’s modern cultural transition, analyze their results and issues, and better understand trends in contemporary Chinese culture.1

Modernity: The Main Ideological Themes of Modern Chinese Cultural Transition

Chinese cultural modernization historically began by “learning from foreign masters,” even though at its root it cannot be considered “Westernization”; however, due to the objective differences in power between Chinese and Western culture, it was determined that Chinese cultural modernization must accompany study of the West. The quest for modernity became the major ideological theme of China’s cultural transition from tradition to modernity. As to the meaning of “modernity,” there are a variety of opinions in this debate. This essay favors a meaning of modernity that highlights the rational spirit, the rise of individualism, and a teleological view of history.2 Among these three, the “rational spirit”3 is the foundation of modernity. This is not only 1  It should be made clear here that the period since the Opium War is often considered the modern period of world history, and, in fact, Chinese culture since 1840 really began a course of modernization; hence, the period referred to as modern will be considered in this way. 2  See Tang Wenming, “He wei xiandaixing,” [What Is Modernity?] Zhexue yanjiu 8 (2000). 3  “Rationality” has a wide range of meanings. Broadly, it refers to robust human sensibilities, ideas, and knowledge that are opposed to superstition and ignorance. In this case, “rationality” is based on robust knowledge, is mature in the cultural traditions of subjective and objective dichotomy of the West, and makes the scientific method the core of the human spirit.

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because the rational spirit formed a consistent theoretical basis of Western ­cultural ­tradition but is based more on the important role of the rational spirit in the process of modernization. In the Middle Ages, humans were not only consciously made subservient to gods, but also were powerless in the face of nature. After the Renaissance and particularly the Enlightenment, people found that as a creation of God mankind could understand and shape the rational forces of the world and that mankind could and should become the masters of the earth. Hence, humanity set a course of progress and c­ onquest of the world under the direction of rationality. It was the rational spirit that allowed mankind to supplant, in a certain sense, the omnipotent position of the gods: “In face of the unity of such reason the distinction between God and man is reduced to an irrelevance. . . . In their mastery of nature, the creative God and the ordering mind are alike. Man’s likeness to God consists in sovereignty over existence, in the lordly gaze, in the command.”4 Hence, the rational spirit has become the marker distinguishing modern society from premodern society. The emergence of a teleological view of history and the rise of individualism are also built on a foundation confirming the power of rationality. Only with the power of rationality can humanity effectively understand and transform nature and society and, from this, allow human society’s continual development to be possible. Similarly, the rise of modern democratic politics is ­premised on c­ itizens’ possessing a rational consciousness to form independent political bodies. If members of society have not awakened to understand that they have their own basic rights, responsibilities, and freedom, then clearly there would be no individualism. In this sense, science and democracy could be said to be the products of the rational spirit. Therefore, it follows that the rational spirit forms the core of modernity and that there is no part of the successes and d­ ifficulties of modernity that are not in some way related to rationality, and thus any judgment of modernity cannot escape commenting on rationality. Since imitating the West became the main train of thought for Chinese ­cultural modernization and modernity formed the core of Western modern culture, one of the most important and valued goals of the modern Chinese cultural transition manifested itself as a quest for modernity. Closely associated with this, one of the most clearly unique points of modern Chinese culture, as opposed to traditional culture, is that in traditional Chinese culture there is no emphasis on the rational spirit, but in modern Chinese culture, it has gradually emerged. With the continual advancements made 4  Max Horkheimer and Theodore W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 5–6.

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in ­modernization, the “morality” emphasized in traditional Chinese culture is being gradually transformed into “rational” as an invasive value. Although Chinese culture has belatedly modernized and the Chinese have an increasingly clear and profound understanding of modernity, the general course of Chinese cultural modernization has been pervaded by quest for modernity that can be found throughout modern Chinese culture. In this respect, the cultural model that emerged after the Opium War that sought “to learn from foreigners to master their technology to control the foreigners” or “to plan the entirety and change it” as proposed in the Hundred Days’ Reform or even the banner of ­science and democracy in the May Fourth New Culture movement can be seen as a progression of Chinese cultural pursuit of modernity from a purely utilitarian sense to a deeper systematic and ideological sense. Hence, the May Fourth New Culture movement stipulated the spiritual direction of Chinese cultural development in the twentieth century. Although the kind of Chinese Marxist, Chinese liberal, and cultural conservatives that emerged in this period superficially differ greatly in their cultural outlook, their basic ideals and goals, however, all sought to build a modern China5 and made modernity their main ideological theme.

From “External Impact” to “Internal Transition”: The Intrinsic Logic of the Evolution of Modern Chinese Cultural Development

In terms of the inner logic of the evolution of development, the modernization of values and ideals by modern Chinese culture went through a process from “external impact” to “internal transition.” In other words, modernization began as an externalized existence and affected Chinese cultural tradition and, in the end, was internalized as a Chinese cultural value and ideal. In terms of its genesis, since the impetus of modernity was not intrinsic in Chinese culture, the “external impact” was an indispensable stage in the general course of the modernization of Chinese culture. On the one hand, the wave of Westernization reconstructed an inherent open space for the modernization of Chinese cultural values by exposing and criticizing some of the most debased aspects of Chinese culture. For the modern culture that would later emerge, if there has not been this external impact to deconstruct Chinese culture, then the construction of a modern China would have been impossible in any real sense. On the other hand, it was this impact that allowed 5  For a detailed discussion, see Fang Keli, “Xiandai xin ruxue yu Zhongguo xiandaihua,” [Modern Neo-Confucianism and China’s Modernization] Nankai xuebao 4 (1989).

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a passive Chinese culture to take the path of modernization by establishing modern values like science and democracy as a goal for the modernization of Chinese culture. Chinese cultural modernization, of course, did not stop at the stage of passively receiving this external impact but, instead, after experiencing this external impact, Chinese culture gradually began to make this a basic value and goal of modern Chinese cultural life by modernizing internally and thus shifting the course from “external impact” to “internal transition.” The May Fourth New Culture movement represented this historic transition, as can be seen in the following two ways. First, the New Culture movement showed that the impact of modern Western culture on traditional Chinese culture already pervaded the deepest ideological levels of the Chinese and can be seen as a relatively thorough deconstruction of the debased elements of Chinese traditional culture. in the New Culture movement, progressive Chinese intellectuals finally realized that the more profound differences between the Chinese and Western cultures is not at the material and systemic level but at the level of cultural ideals. Upon realizing this, Chen Duxiu saw his awakening to the role of ethics as “my ultimate awakening.”6 Hu Shi went even further and proposed: “We must recognize that everything we do is inferior. Not only are we materially inferior, not only are we technically inferior, but, moreover, we are politically, socially, and morally inferior.”7 Despite Hu’s biased views about Westernization, this theory that “everything we do is inferior” truly indicated that Chinese intellectuals were clearly aware of the impact of modern Western culture on traditional Chinese culture. The May Fourth New Culture movement allowed Western modern culture to critique and deconstruct the core of Chinese cultural traditions and thus truly provided the possibility of constructing a Chinese modern culture. Second, the New Culture movement marked a historical transition in Chinese cultural modernization from “destructive” to “constructive.” In the research, many strongly emphasize a thorough criticism of Chinese cultural traditions, but in fact, this is only one aspect of the matter. As is well known, the New Culture movement as a part of this Chinese cultural modern transition gave rise to the basic goal of modernizing Chinese culture. In this sense, their ardent opposition to tradition was only to fulfill their goals by a ­particular means. We believe that while the New Culture movement generally 6  See Chen Duxiu, “Wu ren zuihou zhi juewu,” [The Final Awakening of My People] in Duxiu wen cun [The Writings of Chen Duxiu] (Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 1987), 41. 7  Hu Shi, “Qing dajia lai zhao jingzi,” [I Invite Everyone to Look in the Mirror] in Hu Shi wen cun, [The Writings of Hu Shi] vol. 3:1 (n.p. [Shanghai]: Dongya tushuguan, 1930), 47.

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was fiercely against tradition, this is precisely why this constitutes a historical turning point from “destructive” to “constructive” in the course of modernizing Chinese culture. This can be seen in the following ways: First, the New Culture movement had thoroughly criticized and deconstructed the offending aspects of Chinese cultural tradition that were backward in terms of the demands of the time. Second, the New Culture movement not only accepted wholesale Western critical attitudes toward tradition but also attempted to reconstruct modern Chinese culture on a nationally based cultural conservatism. From the basic theoretical standpoint that this is all in order to modernize Chinese culture, wholesale Westernization and cultural conservatism should all be considered parts of the “New Culture.” If one says the former is an extreme way of thoroughly deconstructing Chinese cultural traditions, then the latter must be a similarly extreme way to build a modern culture of Chinese nationalism. The coexistence of the two characterized the “destructive” and “constructive” nature of the New Culture movement. Third, the three major intellectual schools of thought in modern Chinese intellectual history— the Westernized liberals of the New Culture movement, the modern conservative neo-­Confucians, and the Chinese Marxists—became the preeminent force in pushing for Chinese cultural modernization. Thus, the New Culture movement has become the historical dividing line between “destructive” and “­constructive” in the course of Chinese cultural modernization. If we say that earlier this was manifested primarily as a process of Chinese culture gradual and continual deconstruction from the outside and then the inside, then afterward the main theme of Chinese cultural development has been the reconstruction of Chinese cultural modernity. Even if this is a wholesale Westernization, its basic theoretical goals are still about the construction of a modern “Chinese” culture despite the fact that its path of wholesale Westernization and its theoretical goals are diametrically opposed. After the May Fourth New Culture movement, the modern reconstruction of Chinese culture certainly did not take a straightforward path. Closely linked to twentieth-century China’s horrific historical fate, the reconstruction of modern Chinese culture could also be described as tortuous. After a long period of discord and disorder, the People’s Republic of China established a strong foundation for the modern reconstruction of Chinese culture, but unfortunately this period was also troubled by extreme leftist ideology. After the political and economic reforms of the 1980s, the modern reconstruction of Chinese culture finally ushered in new historic opportunities in a social-cultural atmosphere that was more rational and tolerant. Reflecting upon the historical lessons of China’s repeated setbacks in modernization and eliminating the extremist left-wing cultural views and the complete carrying out of Marxist cultural

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principles since the reform era, particularly in-depth study of the cultural path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, Chinese have begun to pay more attention to what traditional Chinese culture has given them. Internationally, with the passing of Western-centrism, the place of cultural diversity as historically rational has been affirmed. An industrialized East Asia, to a certain extent, appears to offer a uniquely Eastern model of modernization, and this has also led many Chinese to affirm the urgency of building a nationally unique modern culture. Hence, since the 1990s there has been an important ideological shift in the history of modern Chinese cultural development; people have devoted more rational thought to “cultural reconstruction.” A very clear indication of this was that, after many years of silence, Chinese intellectuals and artists set off a new “sinology craze.” One could say that this “sinology craze” repositioned the center of the modern culture debate. While the focus of previous cultural debates reflected largely upon the culture of the times to criticize Chinese cultural traditions and how to better critique the inheritors of national cultural traditions, in constructing a contemporary Chinese culture, what has become the central discussion of the “sinology craze” is more about embodying the uniqueness of Chinese culture and, moreover, contributing to the current world. As a theorist in the late twentieth century has pointed out: If we say that in the beginning of this century the mission of scholars was to figure out how to “open the window” and let “Western learning spread to the East,” then at the end of this century the mission of scholars will be to figure out how to open the door and let the cultural spirit of China out into the world and add its own voice to the new world order.8 Although it will be very difficult for this “sinology craze” to avoid getting mired in the mud and having few bad eggs mix in, it also has a major significance for the history of modern Chinese culture that should not be refuted. After a long historical period in which “learning from foreign masters” has been the starting point for Chinese cultural modernization to lead to a negation and criticism of Chinese cultural tradition, the rise of a “sinology craze” can be seen as an important indication of completing this historical transition from re-“destructive” to re-“constructive” in building a modern Chinese culture. It forms an intersection between the modern reconstruction of Chinese culture focused on by the May Fourth New Culture movement and completing the transition from

8  “Houxiandai zhuyi taolun zongshu,” [A Review of Post-Modernist Discussions] Zhongguo wenhua bao, April 11, 1993.

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e­ xternal impact to internal transition. This kind of ­transformation will inevitably have a profound effect on the future development of Chinese culture.

The Continuation and Development of National Cultural Wisdom: The Main Achievements of the Modern Transition of Chinese Culture

Looking back on the course of Chinese cultural modernization, one should say that although its path has been exceptionally twisted, it has also been successful, generally speaking, in the following ways. First, under certain historical circumstances, the continuation of Chinese cultural knowledge has opened up historical opportunities for the future of Chinese culture. Although in the past Chinese culture has faced many major and minor crises, in the end, it has never faced the same kind of crisis as in the modern era. This crisis had both internal and external causes. On the one hand, after the golden age of Chinese cultural traditions, Chinese culture declined in the modern era of world history. Many Western sinologists have agreed that Chinese culture has already died. Although this view is not without its biases, it does note the fact that the intrinsic life-force of Chinese culture has declined. On the other hand, this era of cultural transition to modernity in China has also been the height of a “Western-centric” age in the world. Modernization has been the common goal for development for all humanity and, to a degree, has been equivalent to Westernization. Non-Western cultures have come to believe they must adopt wholesale a Western model of modernization based on the assumption that they must abandon their own national culture. It is in these circumstances that the knowledge of Chinese culture has undoubtedly faced an existential crisis. Fortunately, after a very rough and difficult century, Chinese culture has managed to avoid the worst of this crisis, and knowledge of Chinese culture has finally been able to continue and develop. This, of course, is because Chinese cultural traditions have maintained a great long-lasting intrinsic lifeforce, and, at the very least, it is closely linked to how modern inheritors of the wisdom of Chinese culture continue and develop Chinese culture and make conscious efforts. Broadly speaking, since culture is closely linked to politics and the economy, the national independence and efforts at state building in the modern Chinese nation can be seen as laying the foundation for a modern Chinese culture. In terms of a spiritual culture, the three major schools of thought in modern China can all be said to have contributed to the continuation and development of the knowledge of Chinese culture. As the main school

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of thought of modern Chinese cultural ideology, Chinese Marxism protected the force of Chinese cultural knowledge. From elucidating cultural trends since ancient and modern times to the goals of an era of “building the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” this has been clearly reflected by this point. Since the spiritual foundation of conservative national culture formed a basic theoretical position of cultural conservatism as represented by neo-Confucianism, it goes without saying that they fervently seek to protect Chinese culture. It is also closely linked to the unique national consciousness that emerged under particular historic circumstances. Even believers in wholesale Westernization subjectively believe in building a “Chinese” culture. Hu Shi clearly believed that “wholesale” Westernization is impossible since culture is inherently conservative, and the result of wholesale Westernization would, “of course, be a Chinese-based culture.”9 Similarly, even the most radical of wholesale Westernization advocates, Chen Xujing, emphasized that there should be unity between wholesale Westernization and national consciousness.10 After over a century of intense and ceaseless struggle, the Chinese no longer fear the destruction of their culture. The knowledge of Chinese culture has withstood the test of time and survived. What is particularly fortunate, mostly due to historical coincidence, is that modern China has become a place that has brought together Marxism, Chinese traditional culture, and modern Western culture. This has given Chinese culture ample ideological resources to prepare for its future development. With the glorious revival of the Chinese nation, constructing the new culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics must be incorporated into a new and long-lasting vigor and vitality for the cultural knowledge of the Chinese nation. Second, although Chinese culture has not yet completed its transitions to modernity, the lasting infiltration of modern aspects has, to a degree, provided Chinese culture with modern cultural values and an ideological framework. To begin with, the basic values of Chinese culture have already transitioned to modernity. In the modern era, Chinese traditional culture, unlike modern Western culture, has often been subjected to two serious critiques. The focus of these critiques is that Chinese traditional culture has never developed modern science and democracy. The central focus of Chinese culture has been restricted 9  Hu Shi, “Shiping suowei ‘Zhongguo benwei de wenhua jianshe,’” [Comments on Supposed “Base-line Construction of Chinese Culture”] Duli pinglun 145 (1935). 10  See Chen Xujing, “Duiyu yiban huaiyi quanpan xihua de yi ge qianshuo,” [A Brief Discussion on Those Generally Suspicious of Wholesale Westernization] in Qianpan xihua yanlun ji [A Collection of Opinions on Wholesale Westernization] (n.p. [Guangzhou]: Lingnan daxue qingnianhui, 1934), 121.

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in order to seek a meaningful and peaceful life by maintaining harmony. Attention to “technology” and “art” in Chinese culture were subservient to this focus; thus, it was difficult for Chinese culture to develop an independent body of theory and was left to practical matters. In this way, despite the fact that Chinese culture had been materially successful in history, as human society developed into a global history, a Chinese culture that still relied on artisanal crafts was unable to compete with the Western culture that developed a theoretical science to conquer nature. Similarly, although Chinese cultural tradition at its height developed an intricate idea of people’s rights, Chinese society after the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) took a path toward feudalism because its focus was clearly on controlling people and a variety of historical reasons in its development. Under autocratic imperial rule, commoners were seen as devoid of any autonomous rights and existed only thanks to the good grace of autocracy. In this way, on the one hand, autocracy was to most people a form of tyranny; on the other hand, since China never developed modern science and fell into deep poverty, it is easy to see how traditional Chinese society became backward and ignorant. Chinese culture in the premodern era was precisely focused on this basic theoretical premise to legitimize the rationality of this social structure. In this sense, it is understandable that these basic values of traditional Chinese culture were limited by feudal society, and these values had elements that were contrary to modernization. After over a century of conflict with and intrusion by modern culture, the basic values of Chinese culture finally experienced profound changes. Generally speaking, in the course of Chinese cultural modernization, the traditional essence that people sought to resuscitate focused on, either consciously or unconsciously, the parts of Chinese culture that were linked to science and democracy or at the least the parts that were not clearly in opposition to the modern spirit. Conversely, the parts of Chinese culture that were rendered obsolete by the modern spirit were not only rarely supported and largely overlooked but also have been heavily criticized. Today, we can see that Chinese culture, in terms of its basic values, has already transitioned from a premodern to a modern culture. Science, democracy, and freedom have already been internalized as intrinsically Chinese demands. Additionally, Chinese culture from the beginning has been endowed with the ideological framework of modernity. With the pursuit of modernity becoming the basic ideological theme of Chinese culture in the modern era, a general trend in Chinese cultural modernization has been how to let strong cultural “willpower” allow for an “opening” that allows a basic spirit of “ration­ ality.” In other words, how to connect morality and rationality with willpower. How to ensure that the morality in Chinese culture will develop an ­intellectual

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body that bears rationality, establish the rationality inherent in Chinese ­culture, and frame the contemporary issues of Chinese cultural modernization. In this respect, modern neo-Confucianism is a classic example. It may be that Confucianism is to blame for the Chinese failure to develop science and democracy; however, neo-Confucianism has been very active in a discourse on how to restrain the morality in Confucian culture and incorporate science and democracy. The crux of this theoretical record is the “intuitive knowledge will self-destruct” found in the writings of the mid-twentieth century secondgeneration neo-Confucian, Mou Zongsan.11 Although this school of thought has borne the brunt of many critics and many associated theories have a very insecure foundation, in terms of its subjective hopes, the basic tenor of this school of thought reconfirms the objective and subjective dichotomy in the aversion to disharmony found in Confucianism.12 In other words, as a representative of Chinese cultural tradition, Confucianism still contains the ideological framework of modernity. Hence, in terms of its spiritual direction, it not only characterizes in part the basic spirit of Chinese culture’s view of modernity as a relatively rational consciousness but also reflects the adaptation of morality and rationality as well as an effort to build a theoretical basis to establish a rational spirit in Chinese culture. In terms of new development in Chinese cultural modernity, it has an intrinsic inevitability. In comparison with postmodernism, some theorists have pointed out that neo-­Confucianism adapts their entire body of knowledge into a framework of enlightened ­rationality.13 Although this conclusion may be questionable, it has been correct about the need for neo-Confucianism to grasp enlightened rationality as the core of modernity to reshape Confucianism for modernity. In terms of the clearly major significance of rationality, neo-Confucianism refers to itself as the epitome of a modern Chinese culture. Just as a transition to modernity has characterized Confucianism, with the progress of modernization, the restriction of Chinese cultural morality has gradually evolved into an infusion of a rational spirit into the culture. The previously subjective emphasis on Chinese culture ultimately gained a solid basis by incorporating an objectively rational framework. Not only has Chinese culture derived from an objectively scientific rationality, but modern Chinese people have also gone from a concept 11  For discussions on this, see Mou Zongsan, Xianxiang yu wu zishen [Phenomenology and Matter Itself] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1975). 12  Mou Zongsan, Zhengdao yu zhidao [The Way of Governing and the Way of Control] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1983), 53. 13  See Liang Yancheng, “Xifang houxiandai zhuyi yu Zhongguo ruxue zhexue,” [Western Post-Modernism and Chinese Confucian Philosophy] Shehui kexue zhanxian 2 (1994).

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of “subjects of heaven” that lack any consciousness of rights to developing an independent consciousness sufficient to act as a modern citizen of a political system. The cultural values endowed with modern meaning have already been established. Third, the globalization of Chinese culture is proceeding at a solid pace. In the modern era, the history of Chinese and Western cultural interactions has shown that, despite the fact that learning from the West shaped the body of the discourse, the relationship between the two has been a two-way street. In the modern era, the East learning from the West has also been accompanied by clear undercurrents of the West learning from the East. Thus, the modernization of Chinese culture has accompanied globalization, and although in the twentieth century Chinese culture was under extreme distress, it could also be said to be an important period in which Chinese culture gradually went out into the world. At present, Chinese culture has not only been seen as simply a dead “remnant” of the past but also has been integrated among the “civilizations of the world,”14 creating a global impact. This has clearly been seen in the following three respects. First, as a modern nation-state since the 1840s, China, despite the prodigious changes it underwent, still maintains many things that are profoundly unique in the end and the basic spirit of Chinese national culture. Samuel Huntington still refers to contemporary China as a “Confucian country.” Although this is not correct, he does still use a unique method of refracting the intrinsically “unbreakable and rationally chaotic” relationship between contemporary China and Chinese cultural traditions. At present, with the increased international influence of China, Chinese culture will continue to go out into the world. Second, the uniqueness of the basic spirit of Chinese culture after its modern transition to a certain extent has already been incorporated into modern East Asian society as a major force in shaping culture. In the course of modernization, the emergence of an “East Asian model” and the rise of “Asian values” to a certain degree demonstrate this point. Third, with the continued progress of “world history,” Chinese culture has had a larger impact on the West. If we consider Arnold J. Toynbee and Joseph Needham as representatives of the “Boston school of Confucianism,”15 14  For more on the idea of “civilizations of the world,” see Edward M. Burns and Richard W. Hull et al., World Civilizations: Their History and Their Culture (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 2:735. 15  For discussions on Arnold Toynbee and “Asian values” as well as Li Yuehui’s views on Chinese culture, see Li Xianghai, “Lun dangdai Zhongguo de guoji wenhua huanjing,” [On the International Cultural Environment of Modern China] Xueshu yuekan 1 (1998); for discussions on “Boston Confucianism” by Western scholars, see John H. Berthrong, “Transmitting the Tao: The Case of Boston Confucianism,” paper presented at the Third

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who proposed that human culture should revert to Chinese culture, then the following quotation from the modern American philosopher Richard Rorty could be said to represent the thought of contemporary Western intelligentsia toward Chinese culture: Of all the non-Western cultures, Chinese culture is undoubtedly the oldest, most influential, and most colorful. Perhaps because of this people can hope that, in the recent changes occurring in Western understanding of themselves, it will assist Western intellectuals in gaining something from China in many ways.16

The Tension Between Modernity and Postmodernity: The Difficulties Faced by Contemporary Chinese Culture

After over a century of difficult effort, Chinese culture’s transition to modernity has achieved great historical success. This has provided Chinese culture with a solid foundation for future development. In the debate over global cultural exchange, some people have thus claimed that “the twenty-first century will be the Chinese cultural century.” We believe that, although the twenty-first century will not simply continue on the path of Western cultural centrism in human culture, it will also not be one of Chinese cultural centrism. In fact, in the twenty-first century, while Chinese culture has been remarkably successful in making the transition to modernity, it is also profoundly fraught with conflict and problems. Discussing the entirety of the circumstances in contemporary Chinese culture is clearly something to which this article could not do justice. Based on the specific premise of this article, however, we should point out that closely connected to the basic issue of the transition of Chinese culture from tradition to modernity is also this historic challenges confronted by Chinese culture as human culture faces a uniquely historical transition to postmodernity. If we claim that the path to modernization for Chinese culture was previously both rocky and singular in its direction from premodern to modern, and then with the postmodern culture of the West, a Chinese culture based on

International Conference on Neo-Confucianism, Chinese University of Hong Kong, December 28–30, 1994. 16  Li Youzheng, trans., Translator’s Preface to Licha Luodi, Zhexue he ziran zhi jing [Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1981), 16. Chinese translation of Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

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the basic values of modernization will be unable to avoid two major pitfalls as it deals with the tensions among premodernity, modernity, and postmodernity. As history has shown, since the Renaissance, modernization has gradually become the ideal goal pursued by humanity. This not only became the main value in the West but also, through the spread of Western culture across the world, it has become a far-reaching influence. Despite criticisms of modernity from the very beginning, in comparison to the indomitable march toward modernity in human society, these criticisms have been nothing more than a ripple in the long currents of history. With the coming of industrial society, criticisms of modernity finally fermented a new ideological movement in the West—postmodernism. Postmodernism reflects on the development of human society and culture since the Renaissance, the profound challenges faced by mankind today, and criticizes the “modernity” of the core rational ideals of the Enlightenment and operational basis of industrialization that have led Western culture to success; moreover, it proposes an “escape from modernity.” As postmodernist philosophers see it: “If the usage of the term post-modernism has any common grown, then it is that it is a kind of . . . belief that humanity can and must surpass the depression of modernity.” Because, although until very recently the word “modernity” has been used mostly in a positive sense, over the course of time, “people no long see modernity as a historical struggle nor as a social model for all human societies should conform; instead, modernity is increasingly seen as an aberration.” Hence, “people increasingly feel that we can and should abandon modernity, and in fact, we must do so; otherwise, we and the majority of life on the planet will be unable to escape inevitable extinction.”17 Although as a social ideology postmodernism has its limitations, we cannot overlook its ideological significance for this reason. To a degree, the emergence of postmodernism is a significant milestone in the history of human social development. It marks a reflection of humanity’s future fate as already post “modern” to arrive at a new historical height. It is for this reason that, soon after the appearance of postmodernism, it quickly went on to have a major impact as a particularly hot issue generally followed by academics around the world. In China, postmodernism has also evoked a rapid response—to the point that at a time when many are reflecting on the turn of the century, the rise of postmodernism at the end of the twentieth century has been an ideological trend “highly noted” among Chinese intellectuals.18 17  David Ray Griffin, Foreword to The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 16. 18  See, “20 shiji mo Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu zhongda wenti jiantao zhi qi: xin ruxue yanjiu ‘bianzhe’an,’” [A Study of Discussions on Major Questions in Late-Twentieth Century

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The rise of postmodernism and its influence has undoubtedly complicated the current circumstances of Chinese culture. Just when Chinese culture is on the cusp of enjoying the benefits of modernity, the West has begun to sharply criticize the ills of modernization. This shows the potential temporal differences between contemporary Chinese cultural development and Western culture; therefore, the main thing in the course of Western cultural development is the diachronic sequence of the emergence of premodern, modern, and postmodern phenomena, while in contemporary China, to a large degree, all of these phenomena were synchronically and simultaneously crammed onto one plane. This made it unavoidable that the future development of Chinese culture would face profound difficulties and serious challenges. Generally speaking, these difficulties and challenges include the following. First, in terms of basic values, how can Chinese culture escape its current predicament caught between “modernity” and “postmodernity”? In light of modernity and postmodernity, on the one hand, since modernity is historically more progressive than premodernity and the “modern” stage cannot be skipped over, there is no reason for contemporary Chinese culture to deconstruct and overthrow modernity and terminate its historical progress toward modernization; on the other hand, in terms of the direction of the future of human cultural development, modernization is already under criticism and has been surpassed. If Chinese culture simply relies on pursuing Westernstyle modernity, then will China forever be stuck following in the footprints of Western culture? Second, in terms of critical standards, how can we more rationally understand and interpret the basic values, ideological framework, and intellectual discourse of Chinese culture? How can we better understand the basic theoretical uniqueness of Chinese culture as well as its positive and defective aspects? In the long run, a basic point in research has been that as Chinese culture modernizes, modernity is used as the basic value standard to balance this. To a degree, postmodernism is currently overturning the basic values of modernity. In light of modernity and postmodernity, how can the basic model of Chinese culture be more rationally, timely, and expediently evaluated? Third, in terms of ideological resources, how can the relationship between all the cultural resources—ancient, modern, Western, and Eastern—in the contemporary construction of Chinese culture be better managed? The rise of postmodernism allows a more complicated relationship to emerge between Chinese culture and Western culture. On the one hand, some of the unique theories of postmodernism, as the newest development in Western culture, are Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 7: Studies on Neo-Confucian “Editor’s Notes”] Qiu shi xuekan 2 (2001).

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starkly opposed to Chinese cultural tradition (e.g., nihilism, antifoundationalism, fragmentism, and planarism); on the other hand, some of the ideological themes (shifting from a center that externalized nature to an emphasis on the inner meaning of a tranquil human life), values (emphasizing the harmony between man and nature), and discourses (Enlightenment philosophy as literary philosophy) of postmodernism shares some relation and commonality with Chinese cultural tradition.19 At the same time, differences and even dislocation have emerged to a considerable degree between the modernity and postmodernity of Western culture. In these circumstances, how should Chinese culture confront the challenge of Western postmodernism while assimilating the superior points of modern Western culture? What can Chinese culture learn from postmodernism? Correspondingly, how should we better criticize our own cultural tradition that we have inherited. In an era when we face human diversity and development, what kind of intellectual resources can Chinese culture contribute to humanity? The difficulties and challenges faced by contemporary Chinese culture show that the modern transition of Chinese culture has arrived at a new historical juncture. Due to core challenges that emerged in this tension between modernity and postmodernity, our creative responses to these challenges will be an important issue in determining how Chinese culture will be constructed to deal with the twenty-first century.

Conclusion: The Dual Historical Task Facing Chinese Culture in the Twenty-First Century

The two aforementioned challenges now faced by Chinese culture prove the correctness of cultural principles of “integrated innovation.” The three main ideological schools in modern China—Marxism, Western liberalism, and conservative neo-Confucianism—respectively created the basic cultural ­proposals of “integrated innovation,” “wholesale Westernization,” and “Chinese essence and Western utility.” If we say that the idea of “Chinese essence and Western utility,” due to the impossibility of its actually creating a basic spirit that blends Chinese and Western culture, has completely exposed its intrinsic limitations in the course of historical progress, then the postmodern transition will benefit us in truly seeing the limitations of “wholesale Westernization.” Westernizers proposed entirely copying a clearly modern Western culture. 19  For the full discussion, see Li Xianghai, “Lun xiandai xin ruxue yu houxiandai zhuyi,” [On Modern Neo-Confucianism and Post-Modernism] Jiaoxue yu yanjiu 9 (1998).

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Undoubtedly, in light of postmodernity, modernity has lost all its inherited value and meaning. Unlike the biases of Westernizers and neo-Confucians, in the intellectual spirit of a Chinese Marxism based on a “conformity in different ideas, the same ends by different paths” and “assimilating in order to surpass,” China clearly exhibits a synthesis of the advantages of Chinese and Western culture in order to create a new Chinese cultural spirit that fits the needs of both the time and the nation. If we say the road to Chinese cultural modernity shows that there is opposition and interaction between the culture of the times and the nation (Westernizers and neo-Confucians both used paranoia to emphasize the indispensable importance of Chinese cultural modernization to the times and the nation), and thus in actuality this is manifested as a historical process of “integrated innovation,” then, besides consciously taking the path of integrated innovation with which we are much more theoretically familiar, the two problems facing Chinese culture today could be described as having no solution. Based on this understanding, we believe that, in facing the twenty-first century, Chinese culture must consider how to escape its problem of being trapped between modernity and postmodernity, and so the following task should not be taken lightly. First, we must effectively bolster the preeminence of the national cultural spirit. Wholesale Westernization had had wide influence over Chinese culture’s transition to modernity. A major ideological bias of Westernizers was that they maintained a nihilistic attitude toward their own national culture and understood only a need to replicate the West. If we say that since the process of Chinese cultural modernization was learned from West, the cultural ideas of the Westernizers were to some extent positive in terms of making modernity a basic value pursued in Chinese culture, then at present, if we are unable to establish the preeminence of the national cultural spirit and confront the tensions between modernity and postmodernity, Chinese culture will be caught in the middle of this conflict and will be unable to adapt. For this reason we must act according to the practical needs of a great revival of the Chinese nation and establish the preeminence of a national cultural spirit based on the principles of “focusing on our own needs,” in order to guide, choose, assimilate, and ­integrate different Western cultural resources into a more active, conscious, open, and pragmatic cultural attitude. This is an indispensable theoretical premise for avoiding these two problems. Second, we must clarify the historical tasks that should be completed by a Chinese culture facing the twenty-first century based on new integration and new innovation. New integration and new innovation chiefly refer to a core cultural principle of integrated innovation. They are also an intrinsic requirement for progress in Chinese culture as it confronts the twenty-first

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century. As described in the analysis above, since the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese c­ ulture in its transition from tradition to modernity has experienced a process of growth from extreme distress to revival. The intrinsic logic of this process was manifested as progress from “external impact” to “internalization.” If we claim that, in this “external impact,” the modern transition of Chinese culture could adopt only a basic model based on Western modernity, then, as we shifted to “internalization,” the modern transition of Chinese culture established a preeminent position for national culture through the theoretical possibility of developing and succeeding at making a “focus on our own needs” for their own unique modern culture. Thus, the progress of Chinese cultural knowledge in the face of the twenty-first century and based on the historical success of the modern transition logically points to a new integration and new innovation. Since “modernity” is currently embodied only in the success and problems of Western culture, it is neither perfect nor closed, and thus it is completely possible that in the future of human culture a more rational and healthy form of modernity may emerge from the interaction and mixing of the cultures of the world. In this sense, we agree with Jurgen Habermas’s comment that modernity is an incomplete project. Based on this understanding, we believe that in order to truly escape these dilemmas, Chinese culture as it confronts the twenty-first century must leave the path of achieving modernization by learning from and surpassing the West while also still basing itself on learning from the West. To this end, we must complete our historical task: on the one hand, we must continue a historical process of learning from the West by using Western modernity as a basic frame of reference to truly realize a transition of values from premodern to modern; on the other hand, we must go beyond any kind of Western cultural-centrism, join in the development of a culturally diverse world of exchange, and learn from the paradoxes of postmodernism. We must build a new culture that represents the spirit of our times while also being proud of Chinese national customs and beliefs by confronting the eyes and hearts of the world by exhuming what is unique and good about Chinese cultural traditions so that we can go beyond Western modernity and contribute a more rational kind of “modernity” that will provide an alternative to “tradition” for humanity. Third, in order to succeed in this mission, we must abandon modes of thinking that are vestiges of an era of a mechanical one-dimensionalism and ­disabuse ourselves of rigid absolutism by forming a highly dialectical link between the many cultural resources of East and West, past and present. As others have already noted, since it is an overly apparent dimension of the period, modernism has always maintained an absolutist mode of thinking caught between premodernity and modernity, leading the two to fall into stark opposition. Similarly, this kind of thinking has perpetuated as their thinking of the

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relationship between modern and postmodern. If we argue that highlighting the opposition between premodern and modern as a particular historical period in which humanity’s modernization took place through the imposed centrality of Western culture vis-à-vis non-Western cultures, then as we come to reject “Western cultural-centrism” today, a more pertinent question for human culture becomes how to assemble the collective wisdom of a diverse global culture to solve the common problems faced in a “global village.” To achieve this end, we must abandon the aforementioned mechanical thinking of a bygone era and maintains a rigid absolutism and dualism in its way of thinking, despite the multitude of cultural resources from which it could draw. In light of the spiraling progressive relationship among premodernity, modernity, and postmodernity and the astounding parallels between the premodern and postmodern in China’s paradoxical cultural historical mission, we can entirely see these issues of premodernity, modernity, and postmodernity as existing on the same synchronic plane as different segments of looping interpretations. Erecting a Chinese cultural spirit on the foundation of subjectivity forms a selfreinforcing dialectical link between the many cultural resources of the East and West, past and present, by making the great revival of the Chinese nation into a platform of understanding on which things can be mutually understood, interpreted, added, and subtracted. This can be seen as a newly innovative and newly integrated intellectual resource that “focuses on our own needs.” In the face of these difficulties and challenges, the Chinese cultural historical mission is undoubtedly an extremely testing one. We are firmly convinced, however, that current trends toward a more culturally diverse humanity will be on the foundations of a uniquely Chinese spirit safeguarded by the intrinsic vitality of Chinese culture. Through the sweat, blood, and diligence of the current generation of inheritors of Chinese cultural wisdom and with the great revival of the Chinese nation, the mission to build a contemporary Chinese culture will be completed, and Chinese culture will certainly become a pivotal player in the diverse culture of humanity in the twenty-first century. Works Cited “20 shiji mo Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu zhongda wenti jiantao zhi qi: xin ruxue yanjiu ‘bianzhe’an.’” [A Study of Discussions on Major Questions in Late-Twentieth Century Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 7: Studies on Neo-Confucian “Editor’s Notes”] Qiu shi xuekan 2 (2001). Berthrong, John H. “Transmitting the Tao: The Case of Boston Confucianism.” Paper presented at the Third International Conference on Neo-Confucianism, Chinese University of Hong Kong, December 28–30, 1994.

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Burns, Edward M., Richard W. Hull, et al. World Civilizations: Their History and Their Culture, Vol. 2. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Chen Duxiu. “Wu ren zuihou zhi juewu.” [The Final Awakening of My People] In Duxiu wen xun [The Writings of Chen Duxiu]. Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 1987. Chen Xujing. “Duiyu yiban huaiyi quanpan xihua de yi ge qianshuo.” [A Brief Discussion on Those Generally Suspicious of Wholesale Westernization] In Qianpan xihua yanlun ji. [A Collection of Opinions on Wholesale Westernization] N.p. [Guangzhou]: Lingnan daxue qingnianhui, 1934. Fang Keli. “Xiandai xin ruxue yu Zhongguo xiandaihua.” [Modern Neo-Confucianism and China’s Modernization] Nankai xuebao 4 (1989). Griffin, David Ray. Foreword to The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988. Horkheimer, Max, and Theodore W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002. “Houxiandai zhuyi taolun zongshu.” [A Review of Post-Modernist Discussions] Zhongguo wenhua bao, April 11, 1993. Hu Shi. “Chengping suowei ‘Zhongguo benwei de wenhua jianshe.’” [Comments on Supposed “Base-line Construction of Chinese Culture”] Duli pinglun 145 (1935). ———. “Qing dajia lai zhao jingzi.” [I Invite Everyone to Look in the Mirror] In Hu shi wen cun [The Writings of Hu Shi], vol. 3:1. N.p. [Shanghai]: Dongya tushuguan, 1930. Li Xianghai. “Lun dangdai Zhongguo de guoji wenhua huanjing.” [On the International Cultural Environment of Modern China] Xueshu yuekan 1 (1998). ———. “Lun xiandai xin ruxue yu houxiandai zhuyi.” [On Modern Neo-Confucianism and Post-Modernism] Jiaoxue yu yanjiu 9 (1998). Liang Yancheng. “Xifang houxiandai zhuyi yu Zhongguo ruxue zhexue.” [Western PostModernism and Chinese Confucian Philosophy] Shehui kexue zhanxian 2 (1994). Mou Zongsan. Xianxiang yu wu zishen [Phenomenology and Matter Itself]. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1975. ———. Zhengdao yu zhidao [The Way of Governing and the Way of Control]. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1983. Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. Tang Wenming. “He wei xiandaixing.” [What is Modernity?] Zhexue yanjiu 8 (2000).

CHAPTER 3

Cultural Reflections on the Popularity of Chinese Learning Zhao Lin

The Historically Inevitable Emergence of the “Chinese Learning” Craze

Recently, a cultural resurgence has occurred in China that has compelled widespread attention: the emergence of the popularity of Chinese learning.1 Many universities have established sinological academies, sinological research institutes, and a prodigious number of sinological forums with varying interpretations of traditional Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. In every city square, all kinds of old customs and new things are borrowing from prestige of “Chinese learning.” Many major events, such as Confucian rituals at the Temple of Confucius and paying homage to the Tomb of the Yellow Emperor, have made a lot of noise with their massive displays; even the practices of geomancy ( fengshui), divination, and astrology are plying their arts. This inherently complex “Chinese learning craze” has a very strong appeal and tempers the intensity of China’s rapid economic growth and ideals of its revival as an international power. The Chinese learning craze gives the face of the Chinese cultural spirit an image in stark contrast to the “wholesale Westernization” of the early reform period in China. In relation to the global culture that emerged at the end of the cold war, this “Chinese learning craze” seems to possess culturally conservative values, demanding cultural “modernization, not Westernization.” This is manifested as a conscientious national cultural identity while also having imperfections that create unavoidable complications. Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order put forward a thought-provoking concept of “the paradox of Western values.” As he argued:

1  “Chinese learning” (guoxue) (or, more literally, “national learning”) is a blanket term that refers to all philosophy, religion, customs, literature, and cultural practices and beliefs that emerged from pre-twentieth-century China, particularly Confucianism, but also folk beliefs and customs, Buddhism, and Daoism.—Trans.

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Initially, Westernization and modernization are closely linked. . . . In the early phases of change, Westernization thus promotes modernization. In the later phases, modernization promotes de-Westernization and the resurgence of indigenous culture in two ways. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic, military, and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the people of that society to have confidence in their culture and to become culturally assertive. At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and leads to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer.2 This “paradox of Western values” has played a role in that what people have seen in the twenty-first century is not the triumphal march of Western culture across the globe but the revival of traditional religions and cultures in the non-Western world. This is particularly the case in Asia, which is home to three-fifths the world’s population and, it is indisputable that national pride in Muslim and Hindu countries as well as China is strong. According to the latest statistics, as of mid-2008, Christians (regardless of denomination) around the world numbered 2.2 billion, which is about 33 percent of the world’s population (about 6.7 billion). Among them, 556 million Christians live in Europe (about 76 percent of the population) and 220 million in North America (about 64 percent of the population). Another 530 million Christians live in Latin America (about 91 of the population), 423 million in Africa (about 42 percent of the population), and 355 million in Asia (about 8% of the population). It is clear from these statistics that those practicing modern Christianity are not centered in the traditional heartland of Christianity in Europe and North America (and in the twentieth century there was a marked decline in the proportion of the population that is Christian in these traditional centers of Christianity) but, instead, in Latin America and Africa (in particular, sub-Saharan Africa). Extrapolating from the current rate of expansion, by 2025 the population of Latin America and Africa will reach 634 million and 628 million, respectively, replacing Europe (with 537 million Christians by 2025) as the principal areas for Christians and making Latin America and Africa the two areas with the largest Christian population. In Asia, although the total population of Christians will reach 300 million, as a proportion of the continent’s total population of 4 ­billion, Asian Christians will be incomparable with Christians in Latin America, Africa, North America, and Europe. Furthermore, as of mid-2008, there were 1.4 ­billion 2  Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 75–76.

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Muslims around the world, which is about 21 percent of the population, and 888 million Hindus around the world, which is about 13.3 percent of the population. Although Islam and Hinduism are still unable to compete with Christianity, their problems differ from those of Christianity, and over half their practitioners are outside Europe and North America; Muslims and Hindu devotees reside mostly in the area of their traditional civilization, in Asia. In the thirty-eight years between 1970 and 2008, the Muslim population expanded from 549 million to 1.4 billion, and the number of Hindus from 464 million to 888 million. During the same period, the global population of Christians grew from 1.2 billion to 2.2 billion, but this growth was overwhelmingly in Latin America and Africa, where the rate of births and conversion is high.3 These data perfectly demonstrate two different models of postcolonial nonWestern cultural development. The first model is development model of Latin America and Africa (sub-Saharan Africa). In these regions, because they had not built an independent civilization before Western colonialism conquered them (or their ancient civilization fell because they were closed off), their civilization progressed along with colonization, hence Western culture deeply penetrated the core of their being in the process of colonization, making these regions a periphery of Western civilization or cultural dependency. Even though they have achieved political independence, these regions still maintain an unbreakable cultural lineage with the West in that Western religious beliefs (Christianity) have become a pillar of their spirituality.4 Unlike in Latin America and Africa, in Asia cultural development used a different model. In the Muslim regions of Western and Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent, cultural development after political independence has progressed along an essentially conservative path in that as they pursued their own modernization, they rejected or diluted Western culture in favor of reviving their native culture. The reason for this is that before they were conquered by Western powers, these countries already had a deeply rooted traditional civilization. The political domination of colonization did not lead to the destruction of their traditional religious and cultural roots. Thus after they escaped the political and ideological domination of colonization, these regions, while

3  “Missiometrics 2008: Reality Checks for Christian World Communions,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research 32:1 (January 2008): 30. 4  Some scholars even believe that many Latin American and African countries are overly Westernized and insufficiently modernized in the interactive relationship between Westernization and modernization. This is completely opposed to the idea proposed by many Africans that there should be modernization without Westernization.

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trying to construct their own modernity, also rode a wave of conservatism to revive their own indigenous religion and culture. In China, as another ancient civilization of Asia, the cultural development model is very similar to the one in Muslim society and India and different from the one in Latin America and Africa. That is, modern China’s cultural development model includes a revival of native culture and not “wholesale Westernization.” Cultural development in modern China, however, also shows that it is uniquely different from Muslim society and India in one respect: Its cultural revival has not centered on religious belief. In fact, Chinese traditional culture, particularly among the elite culture of Confucian scholars, had atheistic tendencies in that people tended to distance themselves from the spiritual world and dismissed mysticism to focus on more practical matters. Although religious belief could be found in mainstream folk culture, the colorful and varied beliefs and practices of Chinese folk religion never formed a unified religious belief or ecclesiastical system. Its influence remained at the lowest levels of society. Accord to statistics, followers of Chinese folk religion in 1900 comprised 23.5 percent of the world’s religious population. By 1980, the number of believers in Chinese folk religion had fallen to about 4.5 percent. Another relevant statistic is that in 1900 only 0.2 percent of the world population was nonreligious or atheist, but by 1980, about 20.9 percent was in this group.5 This transition from folk religion to atheism, in a certain sense, is related to China’s ancient pragmatic attitude toward religion. Since market reforms and the loosening of restrictions on religious freedom in China began, clear trends of the growing spread of traditional religions and foreign religions have emerged. Comparatively speaking, however, the influence of religious belief on modern Chinese culture will remain limited and will never be on a par with the deeply imbedded traditions of Confucian thought. In these circumstances, as a nation with an enduring major cultural tradition, China is very similar to other Asian societies, such as the Muslim world and India. Along with political independence and economic development, we have strongly pushed to revive and embolden our indigenous culture. However, the influence of religion in China, due to ancient cultural traditions and socialism, will never compare to the impact religion has had on Muslim society and India. Thus, the revival of modern Chinese culture must emphasize Confucian cultural values that focus on human relations and dismiss spirituality. When viewed in this way, the “sinological craze” that has led to the revival of Confucian studies has not just been the musings of a small minority but the 5  Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 64–65.

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inevitable outcome of a fusion between a wave of global cultural conservatism and uniquely Chinese cultural traditions.

Viewing the Practical Importance of Chinese Learning through the Ups and Downs of Confucianism over the Past Century

The concept of “Chinese learning” emerged in the early twentieth century as a response by Chinese essentialism to the strong trend toward Westernization. In 1909, Deng Shi, the founder of the Chinese Learning Preservation Society in Shanghai and of the National Essence Journal, explained the term “Chinese learning” as follows: “What is Chinese learning? It is the study of one’s own nation. Since there is land and a people living on that land, then there is a nation here. Those with a nation have their own learning. It is to learn— to learn the leaning of their nation and use it for the nation to govern the nation.”6 This explanation is clearly very parochial and highlights a unique tradition of learning for practical reasons. Since the emergence of the concept of “Chinese learning,” it has lacked a strict definition; nonetheless, Confucianism is undoubtedly a major part of Chinese learning. After the Emperor Wudi of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) enshrined Confucianism as the state ideology, Confucianism gradually expanded to become a core part of Chinese culture. Confucianism is a teaching focused mainly on moral cultivation while also emphasizing practical issues by combining cultivating the mind of the individual and a political ideology to rule an empire. The pinnacle of Confucianism is that “a sage on the inside will be a king to all”7 and “man and nature are one.” The civil service examination system begun in the Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) dynasties allowed Chinese schools to form a relationship among “understanding the patterns of the universe through the classics,” “obtaining sagehood through moral self-­ cultivation,” and “obtaining office through the way of the scholar” as an integrated system, and it was because of this that Confucianism became the basic foundation of traditional Chinese, particularly Chinese scholars. 6  Deng Shi, “Guoxue Jiangxi ji,” [Notes on a Workshop on Chinese Learning] Guocui xuebao 2:19 (1906). 7  “A sage on the inside will be a king to all” (nei sheng wai wang) can be interpreted more literally as “[one who is] a sage on the inside [will become] a king on the outside [i.e., the real world].” This is an idea that emerged in the Daoist text Zhuangzi, but was appropriated by Confucians. Its meaning is that one who has morally perfected himself in both thought and deed makes a true, good, and legitimate ruler or “sage-king.”—Trans.

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For over two thousand years, Chinese have formed deep-seated values and systems under the influence of Confucianism. After the Opium War in the 1840s, however, isolated Confucian values and systems were challenged by Western culture, and Western learning gradually spread across every level of Chinese society. Because early-modern Chinese learned from Western culture at a time when they were backward and beaten, it appeared to have clearly happened in the blink of an eye, particularly considering the motivations of the West. In the process, China seemed to be uniquely anachronistic or temporally inverted in that at first they studied superficial things in and end results of Western modern culture, and only then did they gradually distance themselves from the rationale and foundations of Western modern culture. This uniquely inverted temporality was demonstrated in three basic ways in Chinese history since the Opium War: learning technical skills from the West to realize a mechanical revolution (e.g., the Foreign Affairs movement, 1861–1895); learning constitutional governance from the West to realize a political revolution (like the Hundred Days’ Reform movement, 1898,8 and the Republican Revolution, 1911–1912);9 learning scientific and democratic ways of thinking from the West to realize a spiritual revolution (like the May Fourth New Culture movement, 191910).11 As many became more invested in this process, Chinese 8  The Hundred Days Reform movement refers to a brief period of feverish political and institutional reform along Western lines in 1898 shortly after the Guangxu Emperor came to majority rule. The Emperor followed the suggestions of radical reformers like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao such as instituting a constitutional monarchy, a modern education system, reforming the civil service examination, and promoting industrialization. This movement was ultimately short lived as the reforms threatened the power of many entrenched officials, which resulted in a coup led by the Empress Dowager and the placement of the Guangxu Emperor under house arrest.—Trans. 9  The Republican Revolution was a political revolution led by Sun Yat-sen’s Tongmenghui that began in 1911, and a year later led to the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China with Sun as its first provisional President.—Trans. 10  The May Fourth New Culture movement refers to two intertwined movements: first, it can refer to Chinese protest against the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which seriously eroded Chinese sovereignty in Shandong Province in favor of Japan despite Chinese participation in World War I on the side of the Allies; second, it refers to an intellectual and literary movement in the 1910s and 1920s that criticized Confucian values, supported Western scientific and democratic values, as well as vernacular writing to make education more accessible.—Trans. 11  In the West, the cultural transition from the Middle Ages to modern society began first with the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and other changes in spirituality and culture, which allowed the spirit of rational science to strengthen; this in turn led to the capitalist revolution across Europe, completing the transition from ­feudal

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attitudes toward Western culture began to change in imperceptible ways, and Westernization was gradually strengthened. After China’s defeat in the Opium War, a great debate emerged over Western learning (astronomy and mathematics), with some advocating the Foreign Affairs movement to self-strengthen by “learning from foreigners to master technology” led by Prince Gong12 while others advocated a conservative approach represented by Woren,13 who believed that “loyalty will be our armor, and rites our shield.” From then on, as China’s gates were gradually pulled open, the discord between Chinese learning (or Chinese studies) and Western learning intensified. Chinese Westernizers progressed from the Foreign Affairs movement to demanding reforms, and their learning from Western culture progressed from the mechanical level to the political level. The conservatives maintained xenophobic pride in China: “the morality, scholarship, system, and literature [of China] are vastly superior to those in the myriad countries of the world.” Some obstinately conservative extremists (e.g., Xu Tong)14 even went so far as to claim: “I’d rather the nation be destroyed than reformed.” In the face of increasingly intense ideological disagreements between the two camps, in 1898 Zhang Zhidong published his “Essay on Encouraging Learning,” in which he argued that China should “learn from the West for its utility but maintain Chinese learning as our essence”15 in an attempt to reach a compromise authoritarianism to democratic constitutionalism (in terms of institutional culture); finally, the transformation in material culture came with the Industrial Revolution, which gave the West its powerful military arsenal. In learning Western culture, this historical process has been completely inverted for modern Chinese. 12  Asin Gioro Yixin (1833–1898), or Prince Gong as he was more commonly referred to in the West, was the half-brother of the Xianfeng Emperor and became a major political figure in the late-nineteenth century in the Qing court. After the Xianfeng Emperor’s death and the coup of 1861 that led to the regency of the Empress Dowager Cixi over the Tongzhi Emperor, Prince Gong was made co-regent with the Empress Dowager and became highly involved in the Foreign Affairs Movement.—Trans. 13  Woren (1804–1871) was a major Manchu political figure in the Qing court in the latenineteenth century, who served as Prime Minister and tutor to the Tongzhi Emperor. He is often viewed as a highly conservative member at court staunchly opposed to most reforms.—Trans. 14  Xu Tong (1819–1900) was a staunch neo-Confucian and xenophobic scholar at the Imperial Hanlin Academy, who is best known for his admiration and support of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. His support for the Boxers ultimately led to an order for his execution, but he committed suicide before he was detained. 15  “Learning from the West for its utility but maintaining Chinese learning as our essence” (zhong ti xi yong) is a major philosophy that emerged in the late nineteenth century that attempted to reconcile Western ideas of science, engineering, and mathematics, with

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between the extremes of conservatives “refusing to eat for fear of choking” and reformists “chasing a dead sheep down every path.” Even then, this “essence” and “utility” maintained very clear biases in their values. It is painfully obvious that the “essence” that Zhang Zhidong wished to protect so much was “the teachings and governance of Confucius”; these were precisely the things, however, that were quickly destroyed in the Republican Revolution and the May Fourth movement. The Republican Revolution did away with the “governance of Confucius” (i.e., the imperial monarchy based on Confucian ethics and principles) and established a republic. Not long thereafter, in response to perverse attempts by Yuan Shikai16 and Zhang Xun17 to reestablish an imperial monarchy, pioneers in the New Culture movement such as Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi moved the direction of their criticism away from “Confucian governance” and toward “Confucian learning,” eventually evolving into the May Fourth movement, which sought to “destroy the house of Confucius” and called for an introduction to “Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy.” Chinese attitudes toward Western cultural learning had shifted from the political level to the spiritual level. The pillar of Chinese traditional culture has been Confucianism or the teachings of Confucius, so the radical approach of “destroying the house of Confucius” and eradicating the vestiges of older morality inevitably led to proposals for the “wholesale Westernization” of Chinese culture. Confronting the urge to maintain a national essence among conservatives and ideas of orthodox Chinese learning. Literally, it means “Chinese for the essence, and the West for utility/usefulness.” It should be noted that Zhang Zhidong’s original phrase in his “Essay on Encouraging Learning,” however, was not “learning from the West for its utility but maintaining Chinese learning as our essence” (zhong ti xi yong) but “Use the old learning as its essence, and the new learning for its utility” ( yi jiuxue wei ti, yi xinxue wei yong). Zhang is often misquoted, and the zhong/xi and ti/yong dichotomy is a generally recognized formula in the late nineteenth-century understanding.—Trans. 16  Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) was a major military and political figure of the late Qing and early Republic. Yuan was made the first official president of the Republic of China by negotiating the abdication of the child Emperor Puyi and recognized by the revolutionary forces of Sun Yat-sen. Within a few years as President, Yuan began dismantling the fledgling democratic institutions established by the Republican Revolution and in 1915 declared himself Emperor, which led may Chinese provinces in the south to declare independence. He died shortly after his coronation, leaving behind a deeply divided republic and weakened national government leading to the chaos of the Warlord period. 17  Zhang Xun (1854–1923) was a Qing-loyalist general who in 1917 unexpectedly sacked Beijing and attempted to restore the child Emperor Puyi to the throne. His attempt was quickly thwarted forcing him to take refuge in the Dutch embassy.

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“Chinese essence and Western utility,” Chen Duxiu clearly responded in La Jeunesse [later called New Youth], stating: “If we seek to remake [China], then it must be by new Western methods. There is no need for a national essence. What bullshit is this about unique national characteristics?”18 Hu Shi pressed Chinese to admit their ignorance before Western culture and demanded that Chinese “admit that we have been inferior in everything” and “be determined to learn from others.”19 Chen Xujing20 believed that Western culture represented the developmental trend of the time, and if Chinese wished to avoid destruction, then they had to undertake “wholesale Westernization.” He rejected the proposals of the “Chinese essence and Western utility” moderates, claiming: Chinese and Western learning both have their essence, and they both have their utility. What gives them utility is dependent on their essence. What makes their essence clear is their utility. Moreover, to have any essence, it must have utility; and to have any utility, it must have an essence. Today, those that say that one has a different essence and the other a different utility have it entirely backward. It is like trying to smell a stench with your eyes, and see something with your nose.21

18  Chen Duxiu, Chen Duxiu wenzhang xuanpian [Selected Essays by Chen Duxiu] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1984), 2:270. 19  Hu Shi, “Qing dajia lai zhaozhao jingzi,” [I Invite Everyone to Look in the Mirror] in Hu Shi wen xuan [The Writings of Hu Shi] (Shanghai: Dongya tushuguan, 1947), 187 and 189. 20  Chen Xujing (1903–1967) was a leading Chinese sinologist, sociologist, and political scientist in the early twentieth century. He received his PhD from the University of Illinoise in 1928 and held positions at Lingnan and Nankai universities, and later served as VicePresident of Zhongshan, and President of Lingnan and Jinan universities. 21  Chen Xujing, Zhongguo wenhua de chulu [The Way Out for Chinese Culture] (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2004). Long before Chen Xujing, Yan Fu revealed the absurd logic of Chinese essence—Western utility: “essence and utility are talked about as if they are one thing. Oxen have an essence (body), which is useful for carrying heavy things. Horses have an essence (body), which is useful for going far. I have never heard of an ox being seen for its essence (body) only and horses being seen for its utility only . . . hence Chinese learning has its essence and utility, and Western learning has its essence and utility. Separate the two stand firm, but when the two are combined they perish. Proponents [of Chinese essence and Western utility] to combine them into one thing; one for its essence and one for its utility. This kind of argument is mistaken, so there is not to talk about. What is there to grumble about?” See Zhou Zhenfu, Yan fu sixiang shuping [A Review of the Thinking of Yan Fu] (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1940), 82–83.

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The debate over the superiority and inferiority of Western learning and Chinese learning and the debates between Western and Eastern culture, science, and metaphysics reached a height in the 1920s as they probed to determine the superiority and inferiority of Western learning and Chinese learning. As proponents of the value of Eastern culture and metaphysics, Du Yaquan,22 Liang Qichao,23 and Zhang Junli24 believed that Eastern and Western cultures were fundamentally different. They believed that the former emphasized morality and ethics while the latter emphasized science and technology. Western scientific progress, however, could not answer questions about the meaning of life, which would bring about moral decay; hence, Confucianism was necessary to assist Chinese in grappling with the adverse predispositions of Western science. In response to this point of view, many Westernizers and believers in scientific progress, such as Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, and Ding Wenjiang, fiercely counterattacked. They believed that the differences between the West and the East were tantamount to the differences between being ancient and modern or backward and progressive; the source of these differences was science and democracy. Only science and democracy “could save China from its political, moral, intellectual, and ideological darkness.”25 As to the position of Confucianism and Chinese learning, it was equivalent to the cultural dregs of a bygone era, such as concubinage and smoking opium, and should be abandoned. In the debates over Western culture, advocates of Westernization clearly had the upper hand. This was mainly because at the height of the intellectual renaissance of the New Culture movement, Western learning was marked by science and democracy, which symbolized progress and openness, while Confucianism as the pillar of Chinese learning was unable to escape claims of 22  Du Yaquan (1873–1933) was a highly respected early twentieth century scholar of Confucianism and Western philosophy responsible for many early translations of Western works. During the May Fourth movement, he vociferously countered Chen Duxiu’s criticisms of Confucian values. 23  Liang Qichao (1873–1929) was a late Qing and early Republican Confucian reformer, politician, journalist, and philosopher. He participated in the Hundred Days Reform movement, after which he fled to Japan. After the Republican Revolution, he established his own political party, which advocated the restoration of the Qing dynasty and the implementation of a constitutional monarchy. 24  Zhang Junli (1886–1969), also known in the West as Carsun Chang, was a Chinese philosopher, public intellectual, and politician. He founded and chaired the Chinese National Socialist Part (unaffiliated or related to the German Nazi Party), which espoused constitutional democracy, human rights, and social democratic principles. 25  Chen Duxiu, “‘ Xin qingnian’ zui’an zhi dabian shu,” [A Defense of the Crimes of “New Youth”] Xin qingnian, January 15, 1919.

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backwardness and ignorance. After the Mukden Incident,26 as the colonization of China by Japan intensified, saving the country from utter destruction replaced the cultural renaissance of the 1920s and became the most important question for Chinese intellectuals. At this point many radical intellectuals who advocated Westernization began to experience a painful “soul separation.” On the one hand, they still strived for scientific rationality and the freedom of democracy, but, on the other hand, in the face of national destruction and genocide, they also felt a powerful abhorrence of Western powers (including Japan) for intimidating and enslaving the Chinese people, and thus they began to enthusiastically cherish exceptional Chinese cultural traditions. Hence, during World War II and the Chinese Civil War, “wholesale Westernization” was forcefully rejected in the spirit of nationalism, and the revival of Chinese learning became an essential part of national survival and self-strengthening. Consequently, in the 1930s and 1940s, a “modern neo-Confucianism” emerged, represented by people such as Liang Shuming,27 Xiong Shili,28 Feng Youlan,29 and He Lin.30 They believed that while China should assimilate modern Western science and a democratic spirit, Chinese traditional culture should be passed on and be a source of pride. They believed that in reforming the “essence” of moralistic teachings in Confucianism, the “utility” of science and democracy could emerge (“Ancient on the inside will give rise to a sage that will produce a new king”). They strived to uncover positive elements in Chinese cultural traditions, particularly the traditional Confucian philosophies of the

26  The Mukden Incident (September 18, 1931) was an intentional bombing of a railroad track in Manchuria orchestrated by the Japanese Kwantung Army, that was blamed on “Chinese Bandits” by the Kwantung Army, which provided a pretext for the Army to instigate an outright invasion of Manchuria. Within two years, the Kwantung Army gradually consolidated its authority over Manchuria and established the puppet state of Manchukuo. 27  Liang Shuming (1893–1988) was a Chinese socialist who rejected Western modernization as doomed to failure and inapplicable to China. Instead, he espoused strengthening China by implementing grassroots socialist reform through the rural reconstruction movement. 28  Xiong Shili (1885–1968) was a Confucian philosopher who espoused the revival of Confucian values as an essential part of national survival and community in the wake of the May Fourth Movement. 29  Feng Youlan (1895–1990) was a Chinese philosopher who attempted to put Cheng-Zhu orthodox neo-Confucianism within a modern rationalistic framework. 30  He Lin (1902–1992) was a Chinese philosopher who attempted to reconcile the “School of the Mind” interpretation of neo-Confucianism within a Hegalian framework, creating a “New School of the Mind.”

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Song (960–1279) and Ming (1368–1644) dynasties. This, to a certain degree, allowed for a revival of Chinese learning. In the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), however, Confucianism came under attack yet again, but Western learning was also derided as “the noxious weeds of capitalism.” After market reforms began in the 1980s, Chinese who were conscious of their backwardness and seeking to strengthen the nation re-enacted the trilogy of learning from Western culture: learning first from Western technological culture, then political system, and then again immersing themselves in its spiritual culture. Similarly, their ideological predisposition toward Westernization was increasingly clear. By the end of the 1980s, a wave of “wholesale Westernization” had reemerged among Chinese intellectuals. By the 1990s, the cold war had ended, and the world order had dramatically changed. Around the world, a wave of cultural conservatism emerged. And as in the early twentieth century, a group of inheritors of modern neo-Confucians who had studied abroad, such as Liu Shuxian, Bo Weixun, and Du Weiming, enjoyed a revival of Confucianism; moreover, they quickly resonated with many Chinese intellectuals. Du Weixin and the followers of his foreign brand of neo-Confucianism praised the 1950s’ Confucian scholar Mou Zongsan’s idea of “three phases of Confucian development” and believed that the revival of Confucianism would lead to a rebirth of Chinese culture. The ideal of this Confucian revival focuses on reestablishing an embattled Confucianism to a position of respect in the lecture halls of Chinese universities with Chinese learning academies and courses based on Confucian thinking as the basis of a Confucian rebirth and even Chinese language academies abroad, using the name of Confucius for “Confucius Institutes.” The recent reemergence of Chinese learning is admittedly closely linked with the major influence of modern media and the celebrity effect of fastfood culture. It has also adapted itself to a wave of global cultural conservatism; however, it is also an inevitable cultural demand reflecting the reality of China’s recent rise to power, the ideal of becoming a major international power, and a revitalized national spirit. Although Confucianism has gone through a tumultuous period in the recent past, when all is said in done, it has successfully forged the unique spirit and values of Chinese over two millennia of history to become the basis upon which the Chinese have settled. The fact that Confucianism has gone through so many ups and downs over the past century also shows that Confucianism has deep roots and vigorous vitality in the Chinese cultural soil. The impact that Confucianism has had on Chinese culture cannot be compared to that of any other traditional resources in China. Confucian values that emphasize qualities such as righteousness, benevolence, fortitude, rectitude, concern for the nation and the people, agnostic distance

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from spirituality, and focusing on pragmatic issues of humanity might lead to a “manufactured transformation” in modern Chinese society.31 As an Eastern country with a historical tradition and spiritual uniqueness inherently distinct from those of Western civilization, China, with the success it has already achieved in the opening-up and reform policies, must maintain its own cultural uniqueness while also staying in step with global trends. It should build its own road to a uniquely Chinese modernization and must utilize Chinese learning, especially Confucian philosophy, as a major spiritual resource for its cultural reconstruction. As we can see, a revival of Chinese studies that focuses primarily on Confucianism undoubtedly has practical significance for the construction of modern Chinese culture.

Critique of the Necessity and Decisiveness of Chinese Cultural Reconstruction in Chinese Learning

Reflecting on the three paths of Chinese response to Western cultural challenges over the past century, it is clear that some kind of antiquarian revival of the past is a dead end. “Wholesale Westernization” is similarly an unnecessary impossibility. That leaves us only with the path of “Chinese essence and Western utility” as any kind of practical possibility.32 A future Chinese culture must still root itself in the stable soil of traditional culture, and thus the revival of Chinese learning is a path to reconstructing a uniquely Chinese culture. 31  The reputable Chinese scholar Lin Yusheng employed the concept of “creative transition” many times. His understanding of it was as thus: “ ‘Creative transition’ is a process. In this process, new things are further transformed by healthy and vital elements in tradition, and are fused with Western concepts and values that we choose to produce something. This creative process based on fact is how traditions can be transformed. Since this transition does not fully negate tradition and is integrally linked to healthy and vital elements of tradition, . . . then on the one hand it gives new meaning and revival to tradition, and on the other hand, it provides a new response to allow us to solve the problems we face.” See Lin Yusheng, Zhongguo chuantong de chuangzaoxing zhuanhua [The Creative Transition of Chinese Tradition] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1988), 388–389. 32  In fact, besides these two extremes of antiquarian revival and “wholesale Westernization,” any other perspective falls into realm of “Chinese essence—Western utility.” Whether it is even views like “Western essence and Chinese utility” or “the interaction between Chinese and Western essence and utility” or any other perspective, they all are unable to escape the strictures of “Chinese essence and Western utility.” This is actually a compromise that seeks to bring together Chinese and Western culture. Here, the crucial question is: what is “Chinese essence” and “Western utility”?

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Nonetheless, we must remain aware of the importance of critiques of Chinese learning and periodic renewal to Chinese cultural reconstruction. This is the only way to avoid the misguided track of antiquarian fundamentalism and narrow-minded nationalism and to take a path that is uniquely Chinese, culturally speaking, and yet also fits with the modern spirit of the times. This gives new meaning to the “Chinese essence and Western utility” of our times. In the past, “Chinese essence and Western utility” attempted to marry the new “utility” of science, democracy, and rule-of-law with the older “essence” of Confucian traditions of family values, human relationships, and principles of government. This, of course, could not succeed; hence, Yan Fu33 referred to it as “riding a cow like a horse.” Were the old “essence” of Chinese culture able to update itself, however, and give rise to new sprouts from the older “essence,” it is completely possible that it would allow Chinese culture to gradually form a new “essence” adaptable to the spirit of our times. In dialectical terms, the crucial issue is not whether the “Chinese essence” can be combined with “Western utility,” but what kind of “Chinese essence” this will be and what kind of “Western utility” it will incorporate. The possible paths to success for “Chinese essence and Western utility,” therefore, comprise how to realize the self-criticism and updating of the “Chinese essence.” This conscientious selfcritical spirit is found precisely at the core of Marxism. First, let us look at the problem with “Western utility.” In the past, the things that were viewed as “Western utility” have, over time with the spread of knowledge and experience, today become common across human civilization and are things that all of humanity pursues equally. However, not everything that originated in the West has become the common pursuit of all of humanity. For example, Christianity, the religious basis of Western society, has not supplanted the religious beliefs and values of non-Western places in the same way that the automobile has replaced the horse-driven cart or democracy has ­supplanted despotism. In modern Chinese society (as well as other non-Western societies), the things that should and, moreover, can be accepted as “Western utility” are primarily those things that originated in the West and have, through practice over time, proven themselves useful for Chinese things, and not everything that originates in the West. This is the difference between “Chinese essence and Western utility” and “wholesale Westernization.”

33  Yan Fu (1854–1921) was a Chinese scholar and translator best known for introducing many Western classics to Chinese readers in the late-nineteenth century, particularly Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection.

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Let us look further at the problem with “Chinese essence.” The main ­system of thought over two thousand years of Chinese culture has undoubtedly been Confucian culture (including its philosophy and system, e.g., “sage on the inside” and thus “king to all”). In the modern era, although Confucian culture has come under criticism many times, these criticisms all occurred during times of either national misfortune (e.g., the May Fourth movement) or political struggle (e.g., the Cultural Revolution). These criticisms concluded every time in some kind of cultural nihilism that sought to deny Confucianism and abandon our cultural heritage. But those who still advocated for a revival of Confucianism always seemed to lack a truly critical spirit. They maintained wishful thinking that eventually “an old sage on the inside will emerge and give rise to a new king [to all].” In fact, neither the young who demanded the “destruction of the house of Confucius” nor those who supported the old essence of Confucianism ever undertook any serious and well-thought-out criticism of Confucian culture. Even the real goal of neo-Confucians who proclaimed that they were “critical of inherited traditional culture” did not engage in self-criticism or update Confucianism, but were “passing down lost knowledge of the sages of the past.” While many parts of the cultural traditions of Confucianism could become important spiritual resources for modernizing China, such as r­ ighteousness and benevolence, many parts of Confucianism can also be ­considered the dregs of a bygone era. These things must be eliminated through self-criticism. For example, the ethical model of the three relationships and six bonds of kinship, the hierarchical ideology of the superior and humble, the misleading and undemocratic concept of the primacy of the people, and an official ideology more akin to caesaropapism are all ideas that run contrary to the values of modern society. The Confucian idea of an “internal sage” is seen mainly as an ethical concept of personal moral cultivation, which could have major implications for today’s utilitarian rational expansionism and materialism; however, once it moves from a mission of personal moral cultivation to a codified law of ethics, it becomes a feudal ritualized religion. Thus, in terms of the essence of the “internal sage,” the spirit of benevolence and righteousness should be maintained and carried on, but any ethical code should be criticized and changed. Furthermore, the traditional Confucian concepts of the way of the “king to all” is seen in the legal institutions and patriarchal organization of ancient China, which was built on the theoretical foundations of an imperial monarchy. This is far from the ideal in modern society of freedom, democracy, and rule of law; therefore, it must be subverted at its very root. Moreover, the general model of the relationship between the internal sage and the king to all must be criticized. We must

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c­ omplete ­traditional models of thinking that believe that “from an old sage on the inside will emerge a new king to all.” Only through self-criticism of and updating the “Chinese essence” can any generally accepted idea of “Western utility” as understood in practice be received. Bo Weixun once divided Chinese culture (or Chinese learning) into two categories: the “greater tradition” and the “lesser tradition.” The “greater tradition refers to the Confucianism revered by ancient scholars and gentry. The “lesser tradition” refers to any kind folk religion of commoners. In terms of the “greater tradition” of Chinese culture, the main harm of Confucian philosophy is moralistic absolutism. Influenced by this morally absolutist mind-set, modern neo-Confucians habitually claim that modern science and democracy are implied in the ideal that “a sage on the inside is a king to all” and Confucian moral values of righteousness and benevolence. Feng Youlan, who was among the first generation of neo-Confucians, attempted to derive a new political ideology from Confucian ethical philosophy and reformulated the Confucian way of the sage king. Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi, in the second generation of neo-Confucians, publicly claimed that Confucianism never lacked the seeds of science and democracy. Confucian ideas of “utility” and “welfare,”34 they argued, were not in contention with science and democracy, and Confucianism “with its moral ideas of the world belonging to all35 and the equality of human dignity36 affirms the inevitability of developing into a democratic system.”37 Furthermore, not only does this concept of “the old sage on the inside will be a king to all” lack any factual basis, it makes no sense 34  “Utility” (liyong) is distinct from the “utility” ( yong) previously used, as it carries an ancient Confucian connotation of utilizing things for their benefit or allowing things/ people to serve their purpose as intended. “Welfare” (housheng) refers to Confucian ideas of providing commoners with sufficient victuals to sustain themselves. Both of these terms are derived from the same passage in the Book of Documents.—Trans. 35  “The world belonging to all” (tianxia wei gong) is a Confucian concept that originates in the Book of Rites. The phrase can be variously translated as “the world/nation/allunder-heaven belongs to/is for everyone/the people/the public.” This passage has been variously interpreted over millennia, but refers to certain obligations the state owes to commoners in order to maintain its legitimacy.—Trans. 36  “Equality of character” (renge pingdeng) is a Confucian concept with unclear origins. The phase can be understood as the equality of humanity’s innate moral character.—Trans. 37  Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and Zhang Junli, “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan,” [A Declaration of Warning to the People of the World on Behalf of Chinese Culture] in Dangdai xin ruxue, [Modern Neo-Confucianism] ed. Feng Zusheng (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1989), 33.

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in any theoretical understanding. Mou Zongsan and others looked at the ­compatibility of Confucian ideas of “utility” and “welfare” with modern science and technology, but neglected to address the over-the-top bigotry and exclusion of Confucianism. The ethical ideas of “the world belonging to all” and “equality of human dignity” in Confucianism simply enhanced the idea of the “­primacy of the people” in Chinese traditional society, but are far from any concept of “popular sovereignty” in modern society. Analyzing this at a deeper level, this kind of moralistic absolutism in this concept of “the old sage is a king to all” perfectly encapsulates the conceited attitude and theocratic sentiments. This sense of moral superiority as a basic consciousness of “moral orthodoxy” very easily produces a kind of intellectual and political orthodoxy and, moreover, marries this sense of moral ­superiority and absolute truth with political privilege, making Confucianism into an official teaching or “state religion.” Professor Lin Yusheng pointed out that “Chinese influenced by Confucian philosophy have always believed that morality and philosophy are the basis of political order.”38 This way of thinking has been described by Lin Yusheng as “a method of borrowing philosophy and culture to solve problems”—a tradition that has been commonly displayed throughout Chinese antiquity, in that it replaced legal authority with moral politics. In traditional society, theocratic states were a common phenomenon, so it was only natural to think that “a sage on the inside” would eventually lead to “a king to all”; however, the foundation of modern society has distanced itself from theocracy, and it is in these circumstances that an “old sage on the inside” will never give rise to “a new king to all.” In modern society, the relationship between the “sage on the inside” (essence) and the “king to all outside” (utility) is not a causal relationship but a correlative relationship. Thus, self-criticism among Confucians today focuses only on making Confucianism a philosophy of personal internal mental learning, and it centers on personal moral cultivation. It should no longer interfere in the academic and political sphere (much like the role of Christianity in modern Western society). For this reason while we should carry forth Chinese learning and the revival of Confucianism, we cannot neglect the building and development of science and democracy. In terms of the “lesser tradition” of Chinese culture, with the rise of the Chinese economy and a new social consciousness, there has been a continued resurgence of all kinds of folk religions, spiritual cults, and divinations in the name of “Chinese learning.” This phenomenon of cultural “lesser ­traditions,” 38  Lin, Zhongguo chuantong de chuangzaoxing zhuanhua, 99.

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while it can provide solace to those in an ambivalent and competitive society that has left their souls weary, runs contrary to the spirit of the times and is incompatible with the spirit of socialism and the idea of scientific development. In response to the pervasive superstitions of temples, monasteries, shrines, and altars as well as the deterministic outlook of people that led them to think of “officialdom as a path to wealth” and “divination” in the early twentieth century, Hu Shi exclaimed: “At this time, we have not worked hard enough to promote science. We have not worked hard to develop the education of science. The power of science that we have worked for still cannot clear away the fetid pestilence that has infested the nation. . . . How could any true believer in science see this and not be distressed? How could they not shout out in defense of science?”39 Even today, we should criticize and discard these ambiguous “lesser traditions” in Chinese learning using Marxist ideas of scientific development. As China has been getting generally stronger, the idea of building a great nation has been gradually revived and, moreover, is beginning to consciously build culture, how we can maintain a calm and unbiased critical approach to the popularity of Chinese learning that is not just blindly jumping on the bandwagon or indulging in sycophantic flattery has become a crucial issue. If we cannot use the scientific rationality of Marxism to direct our critique of Chinese learning, then this craze of Chinese learning could devolve into an anachronistic antiquarian revivalism or fuse into a form of parochial and bigoted ethnonationalism.40 Regardless of what it becomes, none of these options would be beneficial for the reconstruction of modern Chinese culture; similarly, these options vastly differ from the greater goals of building a socialist society with Chinese characteristics. In this sense, the critique of Chinese learning is unquestionably the most essential and crucial path to rebuilding modern Chinese culture.

39  Hu Shi, “Kexue yu renshengguan,” [Science and the Philosophy of Life] in Hu Shi zhexue sixiang ziliao xuan, [A Selection of Sources on the Philiosophical Thoughts of Hu Shi] ed. Ge Maochun and Li Xingzhi (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1981), 2:285. 40  In this respect, the modern rise and evolution of Germany and Japan provide a great historical example for us. Both Germany and Japan were “late modernizers.” Under the pressure and influence of England, France, and the United States, they rose and strengthened themselves through the combination of their own ethnic traditions and universalistic values of the time; however, they later move toward insanity as they were not critical enough of their own strong ethnic traditions, which was a disaster for all of humanity.

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Works Cited Chen Duxiu. Chen Duxiu wenzhang xuanpian [Selected Essays by Chen Duxiu], vol. 2. Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1984. ———. “‘Xin qingnian’ zui’an zhi dabian shu.” [A Defense of the Crimes of “New Youth”] Xin qingnian, January 15, 1919. Chen Xujing. Zhongguo wenhua de chulu [The Way Out for Chinese Culture]. Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2004. Deng Shi. “Guoxue Jiangxi ji.” [Notes on a Workshop on Chinese Learning] Guocui xuebao 2:19 (1906). Hu Shi. “Qing dajia lai zhaozhao jingzi.” [I Invite Everyone to Look in the Mirror] In Hu Shi wen xuan [The Writings of Hu Shi]. Shanghai: Dongya tushuguan, 1947. ———. “Kexue yu renshengguan.” [Science and the Philosophy of Life] In Hu Shi zhexue sixiang ziliao xuan [A Selection of Sources on the Philiosophical Thoughts of Hu Shi], vol. 2, ed. Ge Maochun and Li Xingzhi. Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1981. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. Lin Yusheng. Zhongguo chuantong de chuangzaoxing zhuanhua [The Creative Transition of Chinese Tradition]. Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1988. “Missiometrics 2008: Reality Checks for Christian World Communions.” International Bulletin of Missionary Research 32:1 (January 2008). Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and Zhang Junli. “Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan.” [A Declaration of Warning to the People of the World on Behalf of Chinese Culture] In Dangdai xin ruxue [Modern Neo-Confucianism], ed. Feng Zusheng, ed. Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1989. Zhou Zhenfu. Yanfu sixiang shuping [A Review of the Thinking of Yan Fu]. Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1940.

CHAPTER 4

Problems with Confucianism in Building a Modern Culture Peng Yongjie Problems with Confucianism1 are currently at the forefront of research on Confucian culture and comprise a major issue in scholarship. Of course, saying it is a “major issue” in scholarship is limited to the field of scholarly research on Confucian culture. A discussion of problems with Confucianism has at least two points of entry. The first is research into its historicity to question whether Confucianism has been a religion in Chinese history as well as what kind of religion or what kind of cultural system. The second is as a practical framework that questions whether Confucian culture should be allowed to be incorporated into modern culture as a Confucian religion. Although these two points of entry in academia are different, the focus of academic research has been the building of a modern culture. That is, it is an attempt to clarify what kind of position and role Confucian culture, as the past pillar or mainstream of Chinese culture, should hold in the construction of a modern culture. As soon as Confucianism, usually a safe and uncontroversial topic, concerns the building of modern culture, the outlook of modern culture becomes highly pessimistic and the discussions of and solutions to the issues of Confucianism are suddenly imbued with greater urgency: on the one hand, this problem is created by a culture of media and industrial self-interest and a fast-food mass culture; on the other hand, it is alternately, a glut of vacuity and alienation 1  It is important to note that three different terms are used to denote “Confucianism” that are significant to distinguish in this discussion. First, the one used here and most commonly used in this chapter, is rujiao. Rujiao has a multitude of connotations and can be more literally understood as “the teachings of the [Confucian] scholars”; however, the word “teachings” ( jiao) in rujiao also implies Confucianism in a religious sense. The author of this chapter appears to leave the distinction in Confucianism as religion or secular ideology with this term, rujiao, intentionally ambiguous. Second is the term rujia, which can be understood more literally as “the [Confucian] scholar school of thought” and will be made distinct when it is necessary for context. Third is the term ruxue, which generally refers to Confucianism as a generally secular philosophy and ideology, and not in a religious sense. It will be made clear with the term “Confucian learning” or some other variant to make the context clearer.—Trans.

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throughout society, an uncontainable helplessness in people’s hearts, or the enduring neglect and forsaking of the mainstream culture and religion of society. Yet, the academic system as well as its accompanying perspectives and the baggage of analytical methodology are limited, including the cultural paradigm it formed through continuing criticism, destruction, and rejection, have made it difficult for people today to look at Confucianism beyond their own biases and dogmatic conclusions when expressing opinions on Confucian culture, including Confucianism. These problems with Confucianism have been revisited in modern times to have at least a “fragment of the way” and “to add new meaning to something that already exists” and recover this neglected field. Confucianism gives us another perspective to help us understand what kind of culture Confucian culture is. How has the Confucian heritage bequeathed by venerable forbears and the sages of old been distorted and obfuscated by modernity? As for modern people, what kind of values and meaning does Confucianism have for us today?

Confucianism is a “Teaching of Sages”

Is the “Confucianism” often cited and used by people a religion? Or is Confucianism a “teaching”? And, if so, what kind of “teaching” is it? In previous discussions, people have generally focused on the meaning of the word “­teaching” in Chinese culture and its meaning in Confucian learning in an attempt to understand whether the “teaching” in Confucianism is more of a “teaching” in a philosophical sense or in a religious sense. At the same time, many have noted the religious nature of Confucian culture in their research, particularly research on the concepts of “heaven” or the “heavenly mandate.” The direction of these debates has unquestionably been appropriate and valuable. Based on this, it might be useful to understand this issue by integrating the ideal person in Confucianism—the “sage”—and the personal ideal in Confucianism—“to become a sage.” Classical mainstream Chinese culture has been dominated by three main teachings—Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism—yet the personal ideals in these three teachings contrast starkly. In Buddhism, one pursues “nirvana.” In Daoism, one seeks to become an “immortal.” And in Confucianism, one tries to “become a sage.” As Zhou Lianxi put it: “The sage strives to be like heaven. Heaven strives to be like the sage. The scholar strives to be like the morally virtuous” (in the Book of All Books). The goal of a Confucian is to seek personal cultivation to become a morally virtuous person and then to become a sage. The Confucian learning that they revere is a “learning of sages”; the Confucian

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classics are the “classics of the sages”; the esteemed ancient sage kings and the founder of the Confucian school of thought, Confucius, are all venerated as “sages.” Although at times Daoists and Buddhists used the term “sage” to refer to their own classical documents and holy figures, generally speaking, the word “sage” has been a unique mark of Confucian culture. If we compare the three Chinese religions/teachings (Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism) with Christianity, we find a very interesting phenomenon. Whether in Confucianism, Buddhism, or Daoism, theoretically speaking, this world and the other world do not have absolute gaps that cannot be bridged. A Confucian believes that he can become a sage; a Buddhist believes that he can become a bodhisattva; a Daoist believes that he can become an immortal. Of course, these goals can be achieved only through intense practice and cultivation, but they are still possible. Christians, however, certainly do not claim that a person can become “God”2 or even obtain some sort of spiritual divinity. Sagehood in Confucianism is closely tied to the “heaven” so profoundly revered by Confucians. This “sage” is also one who “aligns himself with heaven,” who obtains “unity between heaven and man” or “moral unity with heaven and man.” It is made particularly clear in the Book of Changes that the great man “aligns his morality with heaven and earth; aligns his brilliance with the sun and the moon; aligns his order with the four seasons; aligns his fortunes with the spirits.”3 The Doctrine of the Mean states that one should be “naturally sincere” like heaven and “innately know” that being “upright is unavoidable.” Here, we can also discuss the difference between Confucianism and Christianity. The difference is not in whether they believe in “heaven” or 2  Translating “God” as shangdi has confused Chinese culture. In Chinese culture, shangdi has its own meaning. Which deity is seen as shangdi or venerated as God has a specific meaning. With Christian believers referring to their ultimate deity as shangdi, it has come to be a word that connotes the God of Christianity in Chinese, which prevents people from understanding their own culture. This kind of confusion is similar to translating the Chinese long into English as “dragon.” In translating Christian culture, they should respect China’s own cultural traditions and customs in their search for expedient methods for conversion and respect the cultural rights of Chinese inherent traditions. Moreover, translating the “Bible” as shengjing or calling “Christmas” shengdanri are all inappropriate. 3  “Great man” (daren) can be understood as “sage” (shengren). In Taiji tushuo [An Illustrated Explanation to the Great Ultimate], Zhou Dunyi claims that lirenji or renji can be understood as the idea of the “three realms” (sancai—i.e., Heaven, Earth, and man) in the Book of Changes. Along with the two realms of Heaven and Earth, humanity is juxtaposed against Heaven and Earth to make three realms. Man “along with Heaven and Earth make three.” Ji can also has the meaning of “ultimate,” and so renji refers to the ultimate moral standard and discipline for people, which also means the standard of being a “sage.”

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“God,” but in the different relationship the two have between the individual and the object of their faith. The first three sentences of the Doctrine of the Mean state: “What heaven has conferred is called nature. Accordance with this nature is called the path. Cultivation of this path is called the teaching”— which clearly indicates that the root of the relationship between heaven and man is “united.” My nature is derived from the order of heaven, and so when I act according to the nature given to me by heaven that is the path, and when I follow the path in accordance with the nature given me by heaven that is the teaching. The “dedication,” “knowing one’s nature,” and “knowing heaven” discussed by Mencius are also about this pursuit of unity between man and heaven. The “nature” given by “heaven’s order” is retrospectively one’s own will, and by reflection on one’s own nature can they reflect on “heaven.” Here, we can more easily find the original “teaching in the religion,” but we also find the “teaching in the teaching” in Confucianism. The two are not mutually exclusive, but are integrally linked. As a religion that idealizes the pursuit of becoming a sage, Confucianism is certainly very unique. One particular scholar who wrote on the life of Confucius, Herbert Fingarette, titled his book Confucius: The Secular Sage or, in Chinese, Confucius: Secular as Sage.4 The ideal pursuit of “sagehood” in Confucianism surely is not any kind of escape from moral existence but a quest for sagehood that one makes in the ethical decisions of their daily lives. As a doctrine, Confucianism is not based on some profoundly mystical logic but the way one comports himself in daily life—that is, the constant way. The constant way is the way “that cannot be departed from for a moment.” Any way that “can be departed from is not the way.” Hegel once said that the words and deeds recorded in the Analects of Confucius are things that can be seen in the everyday aphorisms of all the peoples of the world. Even today, some Chinese and Western scholars claim that they were disappointed by reading the Analects because there isn’t much Confucian “philosophy” in there. In fact, they were doomed to be disappointed to begin with. Understanding Confucius as a philosopher and the Analects as a work of philosophy, while not necessarily wrong, do not yield the most accurate reflection of its value. The aphorisms recorded in Confucian thought certainly are commonly found in other cultures. Although there are unique things about Chinese values and lifestyles, for the most part, we believe that human beings are more or less the same, and so there is a lot of common ground in the wisdom of everyday life among human beings. In nearly every culture, the most basic value of life given to every generation is the mainstream religion. For many Chinese, particularly Han Chinese, 4  Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1998).

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the function of Confucianism is to give every generation the basic values of fatherly love, filial piety, respect among brothers, benevolence, righteousness, ritual, wisdom, and trustworthiness. In history, Confucianism has provided and shaped the basic spirit and values of the Chinese people. Since Confucianism is mainstream religion that provides a basic value system for life, it is also accompanied by a host of relevant problems. Confucianism is ubiquitous in Chinese culture and is not just a “fragment of the way.” Confucianism permeates every aspect of social life, to the point that it even seeps into other religious beliefs—for example, over history Buddhism and Daoism assimilated some basic concepts of Confucianism to accommodate themselves to Confucianism. When we say Confucianism is a kind of religion, however, it appears that Confucianism is a distinct religion that conflicts with other religions, like a distinctly separate part of a diverse landscape, and the function of the basic life values conveyed by Confucianism are somehow in conflict with them. These are issues that even Song dynasty (960–1279) Confucians encountered. As “practical learning” that emphasizes the reasonableness of daily human relationships, Confucianism was challenged by the beliefs that distanced themselves from the expediencies of human relationships presented in the learning of Buddhism and Daoism. In imitating Buddhism and Daoism, Confucianism established an orthodoxy and a message that placed itself on the same level as Buddhism and Daoism while gradually moving toward a more systematic religion. In terms of social function, nonetheless, Buddhism and Daoism could only add to mainstream Confucian culture, but could not unseat it. Of course, these problems brought by neoConfucianism5 could be solved through the status of official Confucian learning; however, how could Confucianism emerge as a mainstream religion when Confucianism is not an official orthodoxy among scholars? How can it act as an incubator of citizenship? This is a question worth pondering.

Confucius Was a Sage

We often hear the argument that, for example, some say that Confucius was not a deity and strongly oppose “deifying” Confucius. There does not seem to be anything wrong with this, but in fact there is a problem. Discussions of Confucius like this just do not grasp the fundamental truth of Confucian culture. Except for the kind of short-lived divination practices in the Han dynasty 5  By neo-Confucianism (lixue), the author is referring to the Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy that emerged in the Song dynasty, and not the neo-Confucians (xinruxue) that appear in the twentieth century.—Trans.

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(206 BCE–220 CE) that deified Confucius, the historical reverence for Confucius, commemoration and veneration of Confucius in the real lives of people, and even among Confucian scholars in China and outside China did not worship Confucius as a “deity,” but honored him as a “sage.” His image was not as the ruler of heaven like the Jade emperor, a wise immortal, a merciful bodhisattva savior, a child-granting avalokitesvara, nor a prosperity granting governor of heaven. As a sage, Confucius did not have any supernatural powers, nor was he an almighty spirit. Confucius was not a “deity” or a “demigod,” but just a simple “sage.” Historically, Confucius was made into a “sage” by later generations of Confucians, but he was not “deified.” “Sage” has a special cultural meaning, with over two thousand years of use in conventional language. Some critics argue that Confucius was just a man, and so they oppose any “deification” (let’s not mince words and suppose that what is really being referred to is making him into a “sage”) or “sage-ification” of Confucius. That is, Confucius himself was not a sage. This is unquestionably correct. Confucius made it his career to ensure the perpetuation of the way of the sage kings, but he never declared himself a “sage.” This truth about Confucius is recognized in the historical writings that have come down through the ages. He was not “born with innate knowledge” because we know the Confucius stated that “when I was fifteen, I set my will to learn.” He was not a perfect person without sin who made a point of pointing out the flaws of others. He was not content with the politics of his day, nor did he travel around the great kingdoms of his day without any employment in order to realize his political ideals. He also understood that “I know that this will not be successful, but still I do it” and helplessly lamented that “the way will not be achieved; it is adrift in the sea.” This is only the historical side, however, and not the full picture. Confucius was a man. This is a historical truth. At the same time, Confucius was also a sage. This is also a historical truth. If we say Confucius could only be a man and not a sage, this would be problematic, because it departs from practical reality. Confucius was not an ordinary person, and later generations venerated Confucius as a sage, because of the contributions he made as well as the needs of Chinese culture. Confucius was revered as a sage out of a need of Confucian culture itself. The political ideals of Confucian tradition are based on the tradition of moral governance. It seeks to perfect society through personal perfection—to create a mature society through the maturation of individuals. The three principles and eight articles6 in the Great Learning form a classic expression of this way of self-cultivation, leading to the notion that someone who is “a sage on the 6  The three principles and eight articles (san gangling ba tiaomu) is a reference to the ChengZhu interpretation of the Great Learning.—Trans.

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inside is a king to all.” The crucial element of the moral governance ideal is that rulers and leaders perfect themselves to set an example and thus transform the populace through education. The path to moral governance depends on the tradition of the sage kings of antiquity. From the time of Confucius onward was a period in which “there is no way in the realm” and the sage kings were no more. The holders of worldly power could no longer bear the responsibility for transforming the populace through education. The Confucian way of “the sage on the inside is a king to all” could be described as “obscure and not bright; radiant yet not ostentatious.” Hence, the cultured and martial ways of Confucius that passed down ideas on the overthrow of tyrants that were replete with notions of the primacy of the people were what made Confucian scholars revere Confucius as a “sage.” Confucius’ sagehood served as a way to transform through education, because he in essence became the epitome of a king who was moral but without any real position. Some people say that Confucius was only a teacher and could not be called a sage. Confucius was a teacher. It is generally said that he was the first to give public lectures, though this is still debated among scholars; nonetheless, he was the most important figure in early history. Confucius argued that “education is for all”; in terms of pedagogy, he believed in teaching the individual and providing constant guidance. With three thousand disciples, he trained a host of disciples, but only seventy-two of them proved virtuous. Confucius’ “learning without getting irritated; instructing without getting tired” led him to be called “the exemplary teacher of the ages.” Many scholars have called for Confucius’ birthday to be made into Teacher’s Day. This is very significant, but its significance is limited. According to Confucius’ educational ideals and practices, establishing his birthday as Teacher’s Day is far better than the current Teacher’s Day, September 10. Confucius’ birthday has cultural and historical meaning, and it has more educational power to encourage people and ­teachers—not to mention the fact that it highlights Chinese traditions of mentorship. The respect that people have for Confucius, however, comes from the fact that he was teacher and was a very successful educator—or did it come just because he happened to be the first teacher to espouse the education of the people? That certainly is not the case! Confucius was not an ordinary teacher. As far as we are concerned, he was more important than that. He was a mentor to the people, he was a source of enlightenment about humanity, and he was an instructor in moral living. Confucius and the school of thought that he founded carried responsibility for teaching the people in China. So what exactly did Confucius teach people? Song dynasty neo-­Confucians dispelled the fog left by the commentaries of Han and Tang (618–907) dynasty scholars and reinterpreted the classics of pre-Qin (221–206 BCE) sages and virtuous men.

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They concluded: “The many words of the sages and virtuous amount to teaching people to be people.” Indeed, this is the reason that Confucius and later Confucians were able to understand this responsibility to transform the people through education in history. It was because they, generation by generation, lectured the people in how to live and the ethical principles of fatherly love, filial piety, and fraternity. This is a logic that we cannot escape in our everyday lives, and there is nothing very profoundly mystical about it, nor is it anything very hard to do. Who, however, can put these everyday ethical values into practice perfectly in their own lives? In a chaotic world in which “there is no way in the realm,” Confucius lamented: “When you leave your home, you cannot leave without passing through a door; so how can it be that you cannot take this way!” When you leave, you certainly cannot avoid passing through a door, but how is it that most people cannot maintain the constant way in their own lives! Many people have used the noble “phoenix” as a metaphor for the moral Confucius and lament that his ideals of benevolence and love were not realized in his lifetime. Confucius, nevertheless, was aware that: “I know that this will not be successful, but still I do it.” In a society “without a way,” in a society in which it was hard to be a good person, Confucius stuck to his own beliefs to encourage others to be moral, to act benevolently, and be a good person. There were people in his time that saw the value of Confucius: “The realm has long been without a way. Heaven will use the master as a wooden bell” (Analects, 8:3). Confucius was the wooden bell to awaken the people of the world. He was a master to teach the people the constant way that “they needed and could not turn their backs on.”

Confucius’ Birthday is “Christmas”

It is common knowledge in daily life and culture that at times, there are contradictions in which two things are not alike. Shengdan ri (Christmas)7 is one of those things. In Christianity, “Christmas” refers to the birthday of Jesus Christ. In Chinese, it is translated as yedan ri (Jesus’ Birthday) or shangdan ri (Christmas). As Christianity expanded its proselytization in China and because of the familiarity of young people with foreign holidays, everyone knows about “Christmas,” but they are unaware that the correct term should be “Jesus’ Birthday.” This has also shaped the common knowledge of people 7  “Christmas” (shengdan ri) in Chinese literally means “the sage’s/saint’s Birthday.” In this section, the author reappropriates this term to refer to Confucius since Confucius is a sage in the original sense of the word.—Trans.

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in their everyday lives: when someone says shengdan ri, it is clear that they are referring to December 25. Jesus’ birthday was purported to have been January 6, but was made December 25 to line up with the birthday of Invictus Sol (the Roman sun god) for historical and religious reasons, but this is not something about which we need to discuss at depth. Most people just need to know it is “Jesus’ Birthday,” and that is enough. The proselytization of Christianity in China and the Chinese-speaking world has led to a Christian discourse built on a dictionary translating Western languages into Chinese, in order to facilitate the evangelical mission. At the same time, Chinese Christians often imbue certain Chinese vocabulary that has a unique meaning in Chinese culture with new Christian meanings so as to allow Chinese people to use their Chinese cultural background to understand Christianity and, at a basic psychological level, more easily accept Christianity. For example, to help Chinese people understand the idea of “God” they appropriated the word shangdi8 and linked it to the Chinese belief in “heaven.” Chinese have commonly venerated “sages” (shengren),9 and so to make it easier for Chinese to understand and accept “Christ,” they borrowed the Confucian idea of “sages” as “saints,” and thus described Jesus as a Western “sage.” Making Jesus’ birthday into “the sage’s birthday” was a very ingenious strategy. We have to admit that evangelical Christians have been very successful in their proselytizing strategy. It has been so successful that now nearly all Chinese believe that, of course, Jesus’ birthday is “the sage’s birthday,” and it would be quite odd to refer to the Sage Confucius’ birthday as such. Nonetheless, the meanings of “Christ” and “sage” are very different, and using “sage” to translate “Christ” and “the sage’s birthday” to refer to “Jesus’ Birthday” are not even consistent with Christian doctrine. I believe that any serious and impartial religious scholar and Christian scholar would agree with this point. The idea of “sagehood” in Chinese culture, particularly Confucian culture, has a very special meaning. Confucius was the pinnacle of humanity and epitome of moral rectitude, and so he has been called a “sage.” The young man who

8  Shangdi is the standard term in Christianity used to describe God, which literally means “the high lord”; however, this term is also the name of a deity widely worshipped by the Shang court from the earliest written records of China until around the eleventh century. The deity Shangdi was latter supplanted by another, very similar deity in Zhou court rituals named Tian—“Heaven.”—Trans. 9  Shengren is used in Confucianism to describe what is often translated into English as a sage, but this term is also used by Chinese Christians to describe Western saints.—Trans.

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loved to read the Spring and Autumn Annals10 under the teachings of the sage grew up to become General Guan Yu, a paragon of loyalty and courage, often called the martial sage. There are even sages of poetry, sages of literature, and sages of tea. In all cases, this is a term honoring the outstanding and successful reputation that these individuals had in their respective vocations. “Sagehood” has even been appropriated by Buddhism and Daoism to refer to their most important spirits or persona. Their birthdays are also called “the sage’s birthday.” The term “the sage’s birthday” has also been used at times to refer to the emperor’s or empress’s birthday. In Confucian culture, “the sage’s birthday” has conventionally been used to refer to Confucius’ birthday. It is Confucius who is “the sage” and is a person of significance and meaning in Chinese culture and for the Chinese people.

Confucianism is the Most Likely Future for Confucian Culture

The modern understanding of Confucian culture has always simplified Confucianism as an all-encompassing Confucian cultural system. In terms of the modern fate of Confucian culture, it has also been simplified into a discussion of the fate of Confucianism. Because it is an official orthodoxy, the fate of Confucianism was linked to imperial political authority. With the dissolution of imperial authority, Confucianism was both fortunately and unfortunately preserved in Chinese philosophical and intellectual history. What is fortunate is that Confucianism in general was preserved in the academic system. What is unfortunate is that, first, Confucianism was preserved in a kind of “metaphysical preservation.” Confucianism culture was distorted and discriminated against as a philosophy. Second, these scholars of Confucianism follow a Western model of academia and practice a language based on Western philosophy. In the study of Confucianism, the discourse has gotten to the point that it is too tragic to watch. Moreover, due to the background of people in the field, the problem of modernizing Confucian culture or problems in the relationship between Confucian culture and modern life has always been a philosophical demand. As people have come to demand this kind of Confucian philosophy, they are presented with a new Western philosophical discourse that ends up being termed a “new interpretation,” or as people have come to demand this kind of Confucian philosophy to respond to, provide solutions for, and grapple with practical problems, they always come back to the foundation and 10  The Spring and Autumn Annals was supposedly written by Confucius.—Trans.

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­ ossibility that “a sage on the inside will be a new king to all.” Whether it is p modern neo-Confucians or other Confucian scholars, both have put a lot of effort into this and hope for some kind of breakthrough. The direction that these two are taking both have problems. First, Confucian learning is certainly not a philosophy. The relationship between Confucian learning and Confucianism, as some scholars have pointed out, is like the relationship between theology and Christianity. Confucianism learning is the core moral doctrine of Confucianism and provides the reasoning for Confucianism. It is a part of Confucianism. Confucian learning is not the same as philosophy. It discusses philosophical history and provides realistic philosophical questions, but it is only concerned with issues related to Confucianism. Furthermore, the continual usage of Western philosophy to interpret the so-called modernization of Confucian learning is like dressing ancient people up in Italian suits and is not a true modernization of Confucian learning. The value of Confucian learning is in its ability to serve Confucianism. The modernization of Confucian learning must revolve around the issue of the modernization of Confucianism. Additionally, the “internal sage” does not necessarily have to give rise to a “new external king.” The so-called new external king at times could also refer to the two banners of the May Fourth movement (1919): democracy and science. Sometimes it could refer to a capitalist economy. There is not much value in this kind of discussion. What is very clear is that, whether it is the politics, economy, ideology, or system in China or the entire East Asian Confucian cultural space, all of this has come from the West; all of this was learned; and none of this developed naturally from within. Hence, it is not an issue of how a new external king can “arise,” but of how a new external king can be “learned.” What Confucian learning seeks to resolve is issues relating to the condition of the “internal sage” that will allow for the emergence of a new external king or king to all. That is, how people in the modern world can find peace, their way in the world, and morally improve themselves. Looking at these problems from a Confucian perspective, we return to the root and nature of Confucianism, and we make of it as we will. Looking at Confucian culture from a Confucian perspective, its main function is still to provide and pass down the basic values of life and transform people through education. The renovation of its moral doctrine, while necessary, is in service to the development of Confucianism, and not the extraction of Confucian learning from Confucian philosophy to find its shortcomings through competition with Western philosophy or social sciences. Thus, as we discuss problems relating to the modernization of Confucianism, this problem becomes

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a ­discussion on how to adapt Confucianism to modern life so that it can play a role in these issues. Work Cited Fingarette, Herbert. Confucius: The Secular as Sacred. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1998. Zhou Dunyi. Taiji tushuo.

CHAPTER 5

Confucianism, Chinese Marxism, and Chinese Modernization Guo Qiyong Traditional Chinese culture without a doubt is very diverse. Confucianism is only one part of it. The historical culture of traditional Chinese society undeniably flowed and changed over time, and Confucian cultural traditions also flowed and changed over time, even interweaving with other cultural ­traditions. After the Opium Wars, with the disintegration of traditional society, Confucianism also waned. People became relatively unfamiliar with Confucian society and Confucian learning, leading to many disagreements on how to understand Confucianism. Hence, the question we discuss will most likely make most people suspicious. People may claim that there is no relationship whatsoever between Confucian learning, the construction of modernity, and Chinese Marxism. I still believe, however, that this issue needs to be earnestly considered and sorted out within certain parameters, thus I cast aside formalities and throw some thoughts out in hopes of sparking a good conversation from which others might learn.

Confucian Culture Was the Soil for Chinese Marxism

The issue of coherence between Chinese society, Confucianism, and Marxism has been a problem greatly debated in Chinese intellectual history for a century.1 Since the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE), Confucius has passed down the great traditions of Chinese antiquity, establishing Confucian learning up to the Qing dynasty (1644–1911). Confucian learning was constantly developing and expanding. After the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), Confucian learning was not limited to study of the mind and texts but expanded its realm 1  In the 1920s, Liang Qichao, Guo Moruo, and others once composed a book discussing the commonality between Marxism and Confucianism. There was also considerable discussion on the link between Chinese society, Confucianism, and Marxism in the social history controversies of the 1930s.

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into the sociopolitical, education, history, and literature ever since the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), permeating every part of society to adapt and direct social development and people’s lives. As Confucianism worked its way into the political system, social customs, and education, as well as cultivating individuals, Confucian learning became the epitome of the way of life, behavior, thinking, and feeling for Chinese people for the past 2,500 years. Confucian learning governed the belief and faith of countless people to the point that, unbeknownst to them, it reached the everyday lives of commoners. Hence, the position of Confucian learning cannot be pinned down by the s­ ubjective intention or sense of a certain individual or a school of thought. The fact that Confucianism became the mainstream of the Chinese populace has been due to its basic essence, broad range, and historical development. Some critics and detractors of Confucian culture have overly simplified and narrowed Confucianism. They have abstracted Chinese society and Chinese historical development. In fact, traditional Chinese society was a Confucian society. The background and flow of traditional Chinese culture was Confucian. The personality of traditional Chinese people was inherently Confucian. At the same time, the role of Confucianism or Confucian learning in China was much akin to Christianity2 and Catholicism in the West, Orthodox Christianity in Russia, Hinduism in India, or Islam in the Arab world. They are all the common core of ethnic cultural identity and ethics. The position of Confucian culture was naturally formed and was certainly not self-appointed. Confucianism was the learning of commoners. It was the product of an official ideology that spread to commoners. In an age in which education on the rituals and official rule had disintegrated, Confucius founded his own academy to take on the mission of transmitting the culture of Chinese antiquity to make education available to the people. Chinese society between the end of the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) and the middle of the Western Han period (206 BCE–9 CE) gradually determined the position of Confucianism among hundreds of schools of thoughts through free choice. Confucian ideology is relatively easy and reasonable in that it is easy to accept the dictates that govern people. It satisfies and conforms to the sentiments of a cohesive society in peace and proactively contributes to the needs of the people. History tells us that “the realm can be conquered on horseback” but it is not applicable to “governing the realm.” Wise rulers of old seeking to govern the realm nearly all chose a form of government that was just and peaceful and policies that provided tranquility for the people. Confucianism was good at passing down the laws and institutions of antiquity for the present while also 2  By Christianity ( jidujiao), the author may have meant to say Protestantism (Xinjiao).—Trans.

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adapting the past to conform to the present world for application. Confucian ethics helped to order, harmonize, and regulate society. Confucianism brought unity, allowing people to prosper and face external threats. Prosperity should be seen in terms of providing peace and stability. Confucianism focuses on the ethical education of rites and music.3 Although at times in practice it ran into some bumps, for the most part it fit well with the people’s demands for stability, peace, and honest dealings. Order and harmony are a basic requirement for the development of prosperity in society. Education in the rites brought order to society. Education in music brought harmony to society. In terms of the distribution of economic resources, in redistributing property and power, Confucians satisfied a basic rational demand for justice held by the people. By emphasizing the livelihood of the people, compassion for the people, enriching the people, and educating the people, Confucians minimized the unequal distribution of wealth and provided protection to the weak, the sick, the handicapped, the widowed, the orphaned, and disaster victims. The kind of meritocratic bureaucracy and educational system they espoused provided commoners and farmers with opportunities for education and political participation. This kind of meritocratic bureaucracy became a core pillar of the empire. It provided each dynasty with a constant flow of new blood at every level of government and gave even the lowliest commoner an avenue of participation. The construction of this system was encouraged by Confucian ideals. The ideals behind this civilizational system were values based on compassion to keep the hearts and minds of the people and to direct the hearts and minds of society. Recently, China and many countries in East Asia have had to face the challenge of the West. Their intrinsic intellectual resources remain pillared by the intellectual traditions of Confucianism. Those that looked with open eyes at the world and encouraged people to learn from the West, including those that promoted Marxism’s spread in China, the forerunners of the Chinese Communist Party, and modern idealists—the very people who actively pushed for ambitious progress and reforms—were the people who had the most Confucian of sentiments, such as concern over the plight of the nation and yearning for greater peace in the world. Their thinking and actions, even their spirit of selflessness and social justice, without a doubt were Confucian in nature. Early Chinese socialism and Marxism originated from Soviet socialist and Marxist foundations with the ideals of harmony in the Confucian 3  Music ( yue) was an important component of Confucianism not so much as an artistic pursuit, but as a metaphor for a harmonious society. Just as beautiful music depends on an ordered harmony, so does society.—Trans.

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­classic The Book of Rites, in particular the chapter “The Conveyance of Rites.” In the process of assimilating Marxism into Chinese culture, not only did the Confucian ideal of society play a major role but the Confucian ideal of personal comportment and conduct drove Chinese Marxists and the pioneers and forerunners of the Communist Party: The determined scholar and the man of virtue will not seek to live at the expense of injuring their virtue. They will even sacrifice their lives to preserve their virtue complete. (Analects, 15:8) The commander of the forces of a large state may be carried off, but the will of even a common man cannot be taken from him. (Analects, 9:25) Be first to concern yourself with the concerns of the realm; be last to delight in the delights of the realm. (Fan Zhongyan, Yueyanglou ji) For this reason several generations of Chinese Marxism have been supported by the people. This is because of their personal cultivation and appeal. People often simply consider traditional culture and Marxism diametrically opposed. In fact, Chinese Marxism included several generations of Chinese progressives who had a strong traditional orientation. For example, ideas that “the rise and fall of the realm is everyone’s responsibility” was an idea that they all had. They had a sense that permeated their being that they should save the world and the people and that the nation belonged to all. They all had indomitable perseverance, a sense of social justice, and the need for self-­ strengthening, pragmatism, and moderation. Theoretically speaking, Chinese traditions of the primacy of the people,4 great harmony, “the sage on the inside is a king to all,”5 knowledge and action must take place together, rational action, dialectical materialism, and dialectics have all played a role in the assimilation of Marxism by the Chinese. Marxism combined with the concrete practices of the revolution and construction of China. This included Confucian culture, which pervaded Chinese society and the populace. The structure of New China was irrevocably linked to the structure of Confucian society. Ideas of developing production, improving living standards, enriching the nation and strengthening the people, pragmatism, prosperity, and well-being were profoundly similar and in continuity with the basic methods of governing the realm emphasized in the Chinese classical 4  Minben.—Trans. 5  Neisheng waiwang.—Trans.

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canon. The cultural heritage of China has a wealth of experience in governing the nation. Modern Chinese political concepts like Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, The Three Represents, scientific development, and harmonious society are integrally linked with the wisdom of Confucian traditions of governance, seeking truth from facts, the unity of knowledge and action, the primacy of the people, and pragmatism as well as the ideas of the unity of man and nature, the way of the middle,6 dynamic balance,7 and specific rationality. Mao Zedong’s On Contradiction and On Practice, Liu Xiaoqi’s How to Be a Good Communist, and the simple manner of Deng Xiaoping all carried the essence, style, and color of Confucian thought. Fei Xiaotong said: We often say that socialism with Chinese characteristics refers to the combination of Marxism and Chinese practices, so after Marxism came to China, it became Mao Zedong Thought, and later it developed into Deng Xiaoping Theory. Behind all of this, the uniqueness of Chinese culture plays a role, but what are these unique points of culture? What kind of role do they play? This is something we cannot clearly say.8 Fei continued on about the opening up and reform and the household contract responsibility system, the handicraft industries, and even “one country, two systems,”9 making several points: (1) they all emphasized the family, the connection between generations, and raising the next generation; (2) they all sought harmony in differences, as something in the marrow of Chinese culture allows things that are different to be fused together; (3) they all accept diversity and coexistence, leaving each to his own; and (4): Thinking about other people and not just oneself. This is something very important in the human relations between Chinese: “If you take care of 6  Zhongyong zhi dao.—Trans. 7  Dongtai pingheng.—Trans. 8  Fei Xiaotong, “Guanyu ‘wenhua zijue’ de yi xie zibai,” [Some Confessions on “Cultural Consciousness”] in Wenhua zijue yu shehui fazhan: 21 shiji zhonghua wenhua shijie luntan wenji, [Cultural Consciousness and Social Development: A Collection of Articles from the World Conference on Chinese Culture in the Twenty-First Century], ed. Editorial Committee of the 21st Century Chinese Cultural World Form (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 2005), 5. 9  One country two systems refers to the People’s Republic of China’s arrangement with Hong Kong and Macao that allows them to maintain a distinct and somewhat autonomous political, economic, and legal framework while still being a part of the People’s Republic of China.—Trans.

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your own elders, the people will do the same for their elders. If you are kind to your young, the people will be kind to their young” and put ­yourself in their place and imagine yourself as them. . . . This is not some hollow statement. This is something that is truly felt in the daily life of every Chinese person. It is an essence that is taught to everyone through the long-lived Chinese culture. . . . We still cannot say that we theoretically understand clearly the characteristics of Chinese culture, but generally speaking, we can say that Chinese people have striven in the Confucian direction that emphasized “honesty, sincerity, self-cultivation, managing one’s own family, and governing the nation.” This is something experiential that has been layered upon layers for several thousand years. If it can be applied to practical circumstances, then it seems it would be playing an active role. There are many things in Chinese culture that are unique to us and resolve many practical and troubling issues.10 In summary, the process of assimilating Marxism in China happened in the soil of Confucian culture. In the early period, not a single person among the first and second generation of Chinese Marxist intellectuals and politicians did not have a Confucian character. Regardless of whether it was the sense of social justice and social ideals of early Chinese communism or the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the building of a harmonious society, they were all steeped in the background and ideological resources of the Confucian ideals of humanity, primacy of the people, the people’s livelihood, justice, caring for the elderly, raising the orphaned, charity, harmony, cherishing the people, harmony in difference, and governing with morality. If there were no Confucian culture, then there could not be any Marxism in China or the assimilation of Marxism. In a certain sense, the “Chinese assimilation of Marxism” was the Confucianization of Marxism. Modern Marxism and Confucianism are united and yet beautifully distinct. Separate, they would both be maimed.

Confucian Culture and Chinese Modernity

The core issue of the assimilation of modern Marxism by the Chinese is the modernization of China. In the face of a modernizing Chinese society, to promote its healthy development, we must reflect on the relationship between Chinese tradition and modernity. 10  Ibid., 6.

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The twenty-first century is an era of globalization. “Globalization” is a process and stage of “modernization.” Globalization is the integration and ­convergence of the economy, commerce, science, and technology. Modernity, however, is diverse and is not equivalent to Westernization or even Americanization. Economic globalization does not imply cultural homogeneity. The recent history of Western modernity and the experience of modernization in other parts of the world, including East Asia, shows that globalization and modernization are not merely the universal spread of Western democracy and rational values. Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory offers a strongly critical review of the Western Enlightenment and a modern Western society centered on the values of utilitarianism and power. Many negative aspects were exposed in postindustrial Western society and clearly reveal the ills of the Western system: ideas and values are biased, unidirectional in nature, and “flat.” China admittedly needs to be aware of and learn from the Western system and its values and transplant some parts of the Western system and values to China in order to assist it in its quest for modernization; however, Chinese modernization has its own path and model and its own uniqueness, due to China’s different society and historical culture. Just as it is difficult for Marxism to transplant itself in other ethnic cultures without culturally assimilating, it is also difficult for modernity to succeed if it does not indigenize. In the face of the maelstrom of Western culture sweeping the region and the pervasiveness of Western religion in every aspect of life, we must have a cultural consciousness and a sense of cultural security. The challenge of globalization in the new era warns us that we must have our own identity and ethical consensus. If in the long term we are unable to form a united multiethnic Chinese cultural identity, then it will be inundated by the wave of globalization and modernization and assimilated out of existence and flooded out of the global market economy. If we do not share this definitive concern and ethical consensus, then we will be unable to create a healthy and modern society based on the rule of law, because the rule of law is based on and supported by a consensus of trust, faith, and ethics. Historically speaking, Confucianism continually integrated the ethnic cultures surrounding it and enriched itself. Many of these ethnic minorities gave the heartland of China vitality. In other words, only with the entrance of ethnic minorities into the heartland of China, such as in the Yuan (1271–1368) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties was Confucian culture able to continue to develop further. Today, Confucianism is still the basic faith and way of life for the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and the tens of millions of Chinese in the diaspora still base their communities on Confucian culture. The path of modernization chosen by China has been the development of the socialist market economy. It is the only path. The market economy

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gives vitality to Chinese development. In a market economy, however, some ­problems with people’s values—profiteering, materialism, money worship, the fetishization of power, and privilege—will form an ever-worsening cancer on the socialist market economy, devouring the improvements made by the market economy as well as the moral resources of society and corrupting the customs and psychological health of society. In the face of the double challenge presented by economic globalization and cultural diversity, how can China complete its mission of modernization, founded on the idea of ethnic diversity without leaving the boulevard of world civilization? This is the major issue of our time. The challenges of this new era call on us to carry forth and cultivate our own national spirit and build our ­multiethnic nation into a shared spiritual community. If we do not have our own national spirit and spirit of the age, then we will lose the pillar of our spirit and with it even the Chinese nation. There is a tension between nationality and temporality—between the national spirit and the spirit of the times. The national spirit places more emphasis on the distinctiveness of their national identity and the continuity and perpetuation of their own nationality. The spirit of the times places more emphasis on the universality of humanity and periodicity of social history. Therefore, these two each contain their own intrinsic unity—that is, there is a link between these outstanding traditions and the spirit of the times. A progressive nation must constantly keep up with developments of their time and carry forth and cultivate their own national spirit. The arrival of the era of economic globalization, world homogeneity, and Internet culture does not mean the dissolution of national identity, nor does it imply that premodern civilization has been rendered worthless. The Chinese nation and their culture formed their own survival knowledge, spiritual system, beliefs, faith, concerns, thoughts, propriety, ethical lifestyle, moral values, ­aesthetics, and interests for several thousand years. Of course, these things were constantly in flux and changing; however, it was all with one consistent spirit. This is the greatest and longest-lasting foundation of the Chinese nation and its culture. Chinese culture has always been diverse. Confucianism, Daoism, Mohism, and many other schools of philosophical thought, as well as Daoism, Buddhism, and all kinds of folk beliefs in Chinese culture over history has been valuable cultural resources. Today they have equal value and significance. We highly respect these cultural resources. Since Confucian culture has the closest relationship with Chinese social life, we cherish it in particular. We emphasize re-exposing the spiritual wealth of Confucian culture to carry forth the national spirit and nurture a spirit of the age. This is not some call to return to some hallowed antiquity, some wholesale return to Confucian culture, nor is it even an attempt to resist or oppose foreign culture with Chinese

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inherited traditions. Confucian cultural traditions certainly had some elements that were lost to time for a reason related to historical change; they became a historical burden. Nonetheless, some elements might contain potential for becoming the embryo of modernity. Hence, people must go through a process of continual rediscovery, uncovering, and winnowing of “Confucian cultural tradition.” We encourage criticism, diversity, and openness to achieve a creative transition in Confucian culture. As discussed above, some elements of Confucian culture could become a significantly beneficial part of the current spirit of civilization and become an organic component of the national spirit and the spirit of the times when added to the everyday life of postreform society within the confines of the scientific and philosophical ideas of the world, globalization, and modernization. The development of human culture in the twenty-first century call for bidding farewell to “Eurocentrism.” This means that a tension will inevitably remain between modernity and originality.11 Every nation will come to a new understanding about its own cultural traditions and rediscover its own cultural canon and spirit. This will be the state of development in the future ­culturally diverse world. It will help all nations modernize and globalize as well as helping human civilization grow on multiple levels. Ideas of loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, compassion, trust, righteousness, harmony, and peace are not just characteristics of the Chinese nation but are the major contribution of Chinese culture to humanity. Its significance will continue to meld with modernity, thus giving Chinese culture more vitality. We must systematically study the dialectical relationship between modernity and its origins. In a globalized world, to fully sort out Confucian culture from the perspective of the national spirit and the spirit of the times, we must explore Confucian cultural heritage and the path of creative transition in modern social life as well as explore a diverse modernities. We fully discover what kinds of intellectual resources are contributed by Confucian culture in the cultivation of a modern national Chinese spirit and spirit of the times. We must extract the ideas and values among the intellectual resources of Confucianism that have universal significance and reevaluate our perspective of Confucian ideology. We must explore what is unique to the Chinese nation and what is special in the Chinese cultural path to modernization in a wave of economic globalization and culturally diverse world and thus re-examine this question of “nationality.” Systematically understanding traditional Confucian culture based on rites and music and its emotional resources will reveal what kinds 11  Originality (gengyuanxing) not in the sense of creativity, but in the sense of having the quality of claiming to be the origin point or root of something.—Trans.

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of intellectual resources it can provide for a modern Chinese society ruled by law and the kinds of core values that can play a positive role in the modernization of Chinese social life, and, moreover, what kind of fodder it can provide for the structuring of civilizational discourse and global ethics. We should consider the relationship between Confucian values and environmental ethics, bioethics, social ethics, and professional ethics; the relationship between Confucianism and modern democracy, a sense of rights, citizenship, and modern politics; the relationship between the supremacy, religiosity, and transcendental issues of Confucianism, the discourse between feminism and Confucianism, and grassroots Confucianism and the world of life. The social framework of traditional agrarian society and political systems has already vanished; however, this does not imply that the ideas, moral values, philosophies, and codes of conduct linked to them have lost their reason for existing. Today, this spiritual wealth could transform itself and provide valuable spiritual resources for the modernization of China. Confucianism is not just the product of an agrarian civilization. It is also the spiritual state of the Chinese people as well as the embodiment of social culture in China and even East Asia. It carries with it the national character, fundamental beliefs, way of life, survival knowledge, and strategies for life among all the peoples of East Asia. The Chinese national spirit is representative of the center of this Confucian culture also because of its reliability in “keeping up with the times” and its unique temporality. As a consciousness of nationality, Confucian culture is still alive. The spirit of Confucianism is, first, a creative spirit for living. It offers a sense of the origin of the universe. In The Book of Changes, the “primordial force”12 is represented by “heaven” and the great virtue it brings forth: “Just as heaven applies its strength, so, too, must the noble man seek to strengthen himself without respite.” The “primordial inertia”13 is represented by “earth” and the vast virtue it brings forth: “Just as the earth conforms with the flow, so, too, must the noble man seek to withstand many things.” Heaven and earth have bestowed on mankind this vast vitality for a creative spirit, hence, mankind has a kind of subjective spirit or strength and endurance. Confucius, Zengzi, and Mencius expanded on the unrelenting strength of mankind and positively contributed to a creative spirit. This can be summed up as the spirit of endurance: “A scholar must be strong and resolute, for his burden is long and his journey is long. Practicing and spreading the teaching benevolence, is that not a heavy responsibility?” And the spirit of a scholar can be summarized as: 12  Qianyuan.—Trans. 13  Kunyuan.—Trans.

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“Neither riches nor honors can corrupt him; neither poverty nor lowly condition can make him swerve from principle.” Confucian culture is not some dead conservative antique but seeks to constantly change and make itself anew with an organically progressive vitality. Confucians emphasize “timeliness.” Confucius was honored as the “sage of the ages.” Confucian culture seeks to “change with the times,” “to govern according to the ways of the time,” “to keep up with the times,” and to “have something new every day.” These can all transform into a progressive and creative spirit for modern Chinese. The human spirit in Confucian culture is the spirit of Confucius’ “benevolence teaching.” On the one hand, “benevolence” is an intrinsic human awareness of morality. It is an inherent characteristic of humanity. It highlights the autonomous nature of human morality. On the other hand, “benevolence” is also the vital synthesis between “heaven, earth, humanity, matter, and the self.” It is the ideal of “all under heaven is as one family; all Chinese are one person.” This kind of ideal seeks a way of forbearance as its principal intention: Now the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself, also seeks to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he also seeks to enlarge others. (Analects, 6:28) Do not impose upon others that which you do not yourself desire. (Analects, 15:23) This ideal also seeks to govern worldly affairs through principles of rituals, justice, and compassion: Govern all-under-Heaven with benevolence and justice. Govern the state with the rites. The rites are useful, and harmony is precious. All within the four seas are brothers. This could be expanded as the way of harmony among people and families, as well as the way of peace among states and nations and the way of ­tolerance among religions and cultures. It could even be extended as a universal value of harmony between humanity, plants, animals, and nature. The idea of “­harmonious yet different” recognizes differences and conforms to it. The “benevolence teachings” of Confucius are the core kernels of the Chinese human spirit. It is a humanitarian value. This is not just guiding principles of universal peace, the mutual coexistence of different nations, or cultural exchange, but is also the knowledge that “everything in heaven and earth are

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one.” It is no w ­ onder that Hans Küng, in drafting the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic, chose Confucius’ “Do not impose upon others that which you do not yourself desire” as the golden rule of global ethics. This was very perceptive. Traditional Chinese scholars have always made it their mission to see to the rise of China and the peace and health of the people. The Confucian ideal of serving the world has infused many with a sense of crisis that is ever vigilant, is concerned about the nation, and loves the people. This plays an essential role in maintaining the dignity of the people, national sovereignty, and opposing external aggression. The statement by the Han dynasty Confucian scholar Dong Zhongshu “rectify one’s sense of justice, and do not plan for one’s own gain” was intended for the personal cultivation of the gentleman and the rulers of nations and was not intended as a requirement of the people and society. From the perspective of Confucian ideology, Confucianism often distinguished between commoners and those who rule (the gentleman). For those who rule, Confucianism has strict requirements. It requires that they “do not seek one’s benefit through profit, but benefit from justice,” hence Confucius claimed “the gentleman understands what is justice” and “one must rule through morality.” For most people, however, Confucianism has very broad and unspecific demands. Confucianism believes that in life there are desires, and material desires are natural: “the things that people desire most are food, drink, and sexual pleasures.” So Confucius has stated “see to the people’s welfare” through “just governance,” “wealth,” and “education.” The Confucian idea of justice and profit has a very constructive significance today. Moreover, ideas espoused by Confucian culture—such as giving life, respecting life, flexibility, relaxed rule, harmony, moderation, honesty, dedication, focus on justice over profit, and managing profit with justice—also have the potential to transform into a precious resources for modern social management and corporate management. Confucians emphasize personal moral cultivation and look to the cultivation of the mind and virtue in particular. In Confucian morality, honesty, trustworthiness, uprightness, and a sense of shame are all profoundly meaningful concepts. This is particularly the case for ideas about official morality as well as including an internal system of oversight in the civilization. This is particularly significant and valuable today. As for the relationship between Confucianism and East Asian modernization, there has been a lot of research done abroad by Lucian Pye, Ezra Vogel, Tu Weiming, Yang Kuo-chu, Lee I-yüan, and King Yeo-Chi. Xia Guang has integrated their arguments and taken them even further in the following ways: (1) There is a close relationship between Confucian traditions and private property. It affirms the profit of the individual and family, as well as management and business. Family and familism is inherently pervaded with values of

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loyalty and trust when it comes to the extension of entrepreneurial ­ventures as well as the relationship between labor and capital. (2) The government actively intervenes in economic life through a variety of means, and the social space for local autonomy, such as the lineage, the family, guilds, and community compact, have been around for a long time in the traditional Confucian world. There is a tension between the two, but if they are integrated well, they can encourage the development of modern economy. (3) An education system that selects upright and capable men and the continuation of a traditional civil ­official system allow the ranks of the political elite to be filled with capable men. (4) The autonomy and participation of grassroots organization as well as the civic and public virtues initiated by Confucian traditions are the basis of the maturity and development of East Asian society. It is also the basis of modern East Asian governments. A market economy with a Confucian character can imbue business elites with the spirit of businesses. Public participation in Confucianism can develop into a modern system of social management and social criticism. All this encourages modern East Asian society to move toward democratic governance.14 In history, the existence of Confucian merchants depended on encouraging greater social space and grassroots society. There is a close relationship between Confucian tradition, whether consciously or unconsciously, and the development of modern politics, economy, and society. At the same time, Confucian tradition also had to be based on the idea of citizenship, rights, rule-of-law, and the spirit of socialist morality in order to lead, transform, and be applied.

The Possible Contributions of Confucian Resources to the Assimilation of Modern Marxism in China

As stated earlier, Confucianism is not completely antithetical to Marxism and modernization. It is an active force participating in modernization; moreover, it not only acts as a panacea to the ills of modernity by treating contemporary social ailments but also provides psychological comfort. The main essence and values of Confucianism are still centered on the things that make us human and the things that make the Chinese Chinese. They are the foundation of 14  Xia Guang, Dongya xiandaixing yu xifang xiandaixing: cong wenhua de jiaodu kan [East Asian Modernity and Western Modernity: As Seen from a Cultural Perspective] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2005), 266–294. This is a summary based on my reading of Chapter 7, titled “Ruxue chuantong yu xiandai dongya shehui zhong de jingji, zhengzhi he wenhua.” [Confucian Traditions and the Economy, Politics, and Culture of Modern East Asian Society]

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modern Chinese cultural identity and ethical consensus. People often do not recognize the mountain of treasure before their eyes, and the inherent wealth of Confucianism is waiting for us to uncover, discover, and transform it. Confucianism is actually a system of education and of civilization. Modern society particularly needs to elevate education for the masses and citizens. A healthy modern civil society needs a temperate, virtuous, respectful, frugal, tolerant, and reverent citizenry. Civil society highlights individual education and public morality and trust in society, hence this education comprises the rites and music for modernity but not just for the gentleman; furthermore, it is necessary for every citizen or, rather, it is necessary for a modern civil society and constructing a foundation for a modern society with civil behavior. The formation of cultural education requires the influence of an environment and atmosphere as well as being built up over several generations. What I would like to say in particular is that one should not be overly critical of Confucianism (in a philosophical or religious sense). Few are overly critical of Christianity (Catholicism), Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, or Daoism, so why must everyone be so critical of Confucianism (in a philosophical or religious sense)? Must Confucianism give us modern values of science, democracy, liberty, and human rights? If it cannot provide these things, then does it have no value? In fact, Confucianism is much like Christianity and other religions. They have not directly led to science, democracy, liberty, and human rights, but they have been made better and absorbed modern values through our constructive criticism and creative transformation and have made modern values healthier to transplant to their own cultural soil. Every generation has its own temporal responsibility, so we cannot shirk our own responsibility, but we also cannot impose this responsibility upon the ancients and make them responsible for everything. Taking an unreasonable attitude of simply abandoning Confucianism or recklessly mutilating, paying lip service to, or regarding Confucianism as a foe is very easy, but that would be intellectually lazy. Any person who thinks this lacks a sense of responsibility. Any ambitious or intelligent young person should strive to learn about his own cultural DNA and soil. The present age is one of openness and dialogue. We openly approach and encourage a new age with many schools of thought. We encourage dialogue between the ancient and the modern, the East and the West, Chinese and Western Marxism, and all the religions and philosophies of the world, such as Confucianism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. In the process of dialogue, we can offer our precious legacy to the world for all to enjoy! Confucianism has a wealth of resource that can be in dialogue with Marxism, liberalism, communitarianism, and feminism, allowing each to understand and enrich the other. This is also an age of reflection: on prevalent customs; on enlightenment; on what people have become accustomed to; on one’s own mind-set; on what

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many public intellectuals have understood about Chinese culture; on biases; on technological civilization; on commercialization and modernity; on globalization; on cultural industrialization, popular culture, and official culture; on a utilitarian age; on the fetishization of money and power; on the deconstruction of anthropocentrism; on today’s system of evaluation; on originality, sacredness, the numinous, the ultimate concerns of people, and the way in which one finds tranquility; and on the disrespectful attitude that some have had toward cultural heritage and the Chinese cultural spirit passed down to us by our ancestors and the reconstruction of reverence, belief, and faith. We should reflect in particular on doctrinarism and wholesale Westernization, and, of course, we should defend the right of any person to speak his mind. This is a cultural ecological balance in that it is “harmonious yet different.” This is still a period of cultural consciousness as well as an age of revival and reconstruction of Chinese culture. Zhang Dainian claimed that: to build a new Chinese socialist culture . . . we must understand the basis of continual long-term development for Chinese culture. Chinese culture has lasted for 5,000 years, thus it must have some spiritual pillar or force. This is something we must all understand. This is the national ­consciousness. . . . If we deny the positive traditions of our own people and see the history of the past as a complete mess, then we’ll also lose the basis for any progress. Development henceforth would be a river with no headwater or a tree with no roots. . . . Only by understanding the positive traditions of one’s own culture can we maintain a highly confident ­people. . . . Traditional culture includes some ideological elements that can play an encouraging role in modernization. We should admit that traditional culture also offers opportunities for inspiring modernization. If people lack any inspiration for opportunities to modernize, then modernization will be hopeless. . . . The only correct path forward for us is to proactively incorporate culturally progressive elements from around the world while also maintaining the independence of our national ­culture. We must understand what is positive in our national cultural traditions and carry forth this creative spirit and create our own new ­culture. . . . Only in this way can we contribute anything to world culture. This is the only way that we can establish ourselves among the cultures of the world. . . . Every nation carries on its own cultural heritage. That is how there is such a remarkably colorful diversity of cultures around the world.15 15  Zhang Dainian, Wenhua yu zhexue [Culture and Philosophy] (Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1988), 38, 55, 61, 69–70, 79.

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Related to this quotation, we know that the positive cultural traditions to which Zhang is referring to are primarily things like: the relationship between man and nature, social cohesion among people, and harmony—the idea that “man and nature are one”; the spirit of continually improving oneself and ­committing oneself to a greater moral purpose; a moral sense that affirms human dignity and individual value; the spirit of learning broadly, interrogating the truth, deliberating on thoughts, discerning value, and ­diligent effort; and the unity of knowledge and action will lead to mutual reinforcement. These concepts come mainly from Confucianism. It is on this basis that Zhang discussed the subjectivity of Chinese culture (including its independence, consciousness, and initiative). He argues that a nation must have a subjective consciousness, in that it has an independent consciousness, selfconsciousness, and an awareness of their own initiative. Only in this way can China establish itself among the nations of the world.16 I have a lot of faith in the openness of Confucianism. Chinese culture, of course, must have its own foothold and establish itself among the nations of the world. Of course, Chinese culture must have its own subjective cultural ­consciousness. It cannot be rootless and fall prey to sharp jaws. Of course, Chinese culture cannot regard a foreign culture as its “essence.” Tradition or culture (cultural mentality, values, or ideas; cultural system; and material culture), however, is constantly in flux and changing. Chinese culture today is founded on traditional Chinese culture; it is founded in particular on the Confucian social culture in traditional Chinese culture, and it is constantly integrating and incorporating new foreign cultures. This new culture is one in which the essence and utility are fused into one, in that it both contains the essence and the utility. At its core, nevertheless, is the same old soul; otherwise, what would we have in common with which to talk to other people? Can I have a conversation with someone if all I do is spit their own remarks back at them? [Otherwise] we would only be “abandoning one’s own infinite wealth to go begging at somebody else’s door.” In short, we need a healthy attitude in facing tradition and modernity and everything in the East and West. One must stick to one’s convictions with a backbone. In building a harmonious society to usher in the coming of an enriched people and powerful nation, one must never forget to carry on one’s traditional teachings and teachers, especially the positive role of Confucian resources. Some say that Confucianism is a “pan-moralism.” This is because they lack an understanding of Confucianism. Mencius said: “Those who wish to do good cannot rely on government alone; and those who wish to have rule of law cannot let it operate on its own accord.” The purview of Confucianism is very 16  Ibid., 83–84.

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broad; it is difficult to restrict it to a system of morality or pan-morality or even politics or pan-politics. In terms of the relationship between Confucianism and ­politics, true Confucianism never clings to power alone. It is not some ancient feudal political authority. Although there have been times historically when Confucianism has been perverted, this is not the mainstream of Confucian learning. Confucianism has a tradition and critical spirit based on “heaven” and “morality” and even criticism of tyrants, as Mencius said: “I’ve heard that someone named Zhou was killed, but never a king.”17 The ideas of the primacy of the people, cherishing the people, providing plenty for the ­people, enriching the people, and sharing in the delights of the people found in the political cultural resources of Confucianism could assist in the modern transition and interpretation. There are many ideas and values in Confucianism that could be linked to and rooted in democratic politics. There are, of course, qualitative distinctions between the idea of “regarding the people as the basis” and the traditional idea of “regarding the people as the root.” Democracy in modern society certainly means something different from “the primacy of the people” in traditional society, but one cannot say that there is no relationship between the two. Confucianism, as a concept, a system, as well as in its ability to transform people through moral education, includes many things that can lead to better politics. It has many important resources that can change rule of law in a modern society and the construction of democratic politics and encourage public intellectuals. In the past, some ideas in Confucianism transformed the system of traditional society. Some systems are worth reflecting upon. Confucianism has a wealth of views that are positive, such as its public consciousness, public morality, and ideas on public and private values—including public morality and private morality or public benefit and private benefit. The views of Confucianism cannot, as some have derisively put it, be boiled down to “individualism” or “collectivism” and things like that. Since the beginning of interactions between China and the West, Confucianism and Western learning, like Confucianism and Marxism, have engaged in a process of complementing and reinforcing each other. From 17  Zhou was the last king of the Shang dynasty and is often remembered as a cruel sadistic tyrant. By stating that “someone named Zhou was killed” and not a “king” named Zhou, Mencius is claiming that Zhou had lost the right or mandate to rule, and so his death was not regicide, but simply the murder of a commoner. This idea is closely associated with the Confucian and particularly Mencian concept of the Mandate of Heaven and the primacy of the people, which is the belief that a ruler can lose the right to rule when he rules unjustly.—Trans.

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the end of the seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, many Western philosophers, such as Gottfried von Leibniz, François-Marie Voltaire, Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieu, and Denis Diderot, highly admired Confucius and Confucianism. Many of the ideas from philosophers like Immanuel Kant, Bertrand Russell, and John Dewey would fit well with Confucianism. Even Christianity and Confucianism have many aspects that could fit together. One of the premier Chinese scholars of Western philosophy, He Ling, also has considerable respect for the intellectual resources of Confucianism, which provides a deeper understanding of Chinese culture, the globalization and modernization of Confucianism, and dialogue between China and the West. The role of Western learning in Chinese development, of course, cannot avoid Chinese culture, and Confucianism is the most important part of Chinese culture. Of this, there is no doubt. In China, the scholars who really understand Western society, culture, philosophy, and religion also have a great respect for their native culture and Confucianism in particular. This also benefits their profound and not superficial understand of the West and Western learning. To advance the assimilation of modern Marxism in China, we must have some kind of consciousness, in that modern Marxism can integrate with Chinese culture, as represented by Confucianism, and Western culture, as represented by political liberalism. At present, the prospects for the integration of Marxism, liberalism, and Confucianism are very bright. In an age of economic globalization in which many different values coexist, despite the inherent tensions between Marxism, Confucianism, and liberalism, the three are clearly objective trends in China’s modernization. Since the third plenary session of the eleventh Central Committee over thirty years ago, China has experienced earth-shattering changes. In 2007, at the seventeenth National People’s Congress, in its political report the party announced that it would seek to improve the basic path of the first phase of socialism, with the goal of building a modern socialist nation of wealth, power, democracy, civilization, and harmony. On this basic path, there are many places where the cultural resources of Confucianism could be particularly helpful in terms of developing the economy, political reform, cultural prosperity, social space, and issues of people’s livelihood and promoting justice. Today the most urgent issues of Marxism in China and modern development are, first, the scientific and sustainable development of the economy and society; second, political and social reform to build an equitable, just, and harmonious society; and third, the core values of Chinese socialism, including the building of an ethical and regulated political system. In grappling with these three issues of ideology, institutions, and inherent mental practices, Chinese wisdom and

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Confucian cultural resources could play a very positive role. There is a wealth of discussion in Confucian culture on issues like the relationship between man and nature and man and society, interpersonal relations, and introspection. It has a plethora of rational historical experience, institutional practices, and approaches to statecraft and human nature that we need to approach with a modern, scientific, and rational spirit that could prove useful for modern man. The expansion of social space through the formation of a larger society gives Confucianism even more space to play a role in modern society, and it could have an even clearer effect on modern society. Confucianism could play a much more positive role in economic and social development, political and social reform, and the construction of civil values in a nation-state. Zhang Kaizhi points out that: The revival of the nation and cultural revival cannot be separated. The core of a culture is its values. The idea of reviving the nation reflects the hopes and wishes of the people. It is the direction of Chinese society. . . . The construction of a system of values for Chinese cultural revival requires the integration of the core values of positive cultural traditions and core values of the progressive culture of socialism. . . . The positive cultural traditions of China are the source of today’s progressive socialist culture. Conversely, the progressive socialist culture in today’s China represents a new extension and development of positive Chinese cultural traditions. The flow and headwaters of the stream of Chinese culture are deep and tends to lend new life to China. It is like a massive river relentlessly flowing. It is the unending driving force of the Chinese spirit.18 The current crisis of trust in China shows us that Chinese citizens today lack the real boundaries of an intuitively Chinese system of belief and values. They lack a consensus of ethics, cultural identity, an overarching mission, or any fixed sense of reverence. This calls into question the effectiveness of doctrinal politics and moral education. If we wish to unite people’s hearts and solve China’s problems, then we cannot do it without a prescription of Confucianism. We need to make more people understand Confucianism correctly. The current need for primers and the Four Books, to a certain degree, present one such opportunity. The basic meaning of the Four Books comprises values of loyalty, filial piety, compassion, trust, justice, and respect. These values are heuristic, 18  Zhang Kaizhi, “Guanyu ‘hexie’ linian de sikao,” [Thoughts on the Idea of “Harmony”] in Yan huang wenhua yanjiu, [Yanhuang Cultural Studies] ed. Wang Junyi (Beijing: Daxiang chubanshe, 2009), 9:4–5.

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introspective, and moralistic. I believe that we should allow more of the Four Books to become part of the curriculum for national education; this will, of course, seep into modern ideology and lead to a innovative transition. This will have a positive effect on the formation of a correct outlook on life and values in the minds of young people and elevate the hearts of minds of people. We want to activate the Chinese humanitarian spirit in present-day society and life, to actively participate in the construction of modernization, to precipitate an innately Chinese system of values, and to contribute to humanity. We have a deep sense of history and a strong sense of pragmatism that is critical of the vices of current social life, reflects on modernity, faces practical problems, and strives to integrate the traditional cultural spirit with modernization in order to construct a materially healthy and rational civilization, institutions, and spirit that includes our strength and wisdom. This should be an essential part of the Chinese assimilation of Marxism. Works Cited Fei Xiaotong. “Guanyu ‘wenhua zijue’ de yi xie zibai.” [Some Confessions on “Cultural Consciousness”] In Wenhua zijue yu shehui fazhan: 21 shiji zhonghua wenhua shijie luntan wenji [Cultural Consciousness and Social Development: A Collection of Articles from the World Conference on Chinese Culture in the Twenty-First Century], ed. Editorial Committee of the 21st Century Chinese Cultural World Forum. Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 2005. Xia Guang. Dongya xiandaixing yu xifang xiandaixing: cong wenhua de jiaodu kan [East Asian Modernity and Western Modernity: As Seen from a Cultural Perspective]. Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2005. Zhang Dainian. Wenhua yu zhexue [Culture and Philosophy]. Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1988. Zhang Kaizhi. “Guanyu ‘hexie’ linian de sikao.” [Thoughts on the Idea of “Harmony”] In Yan huang wenhua yanjiu [Yanhuang Cultural Studies], vol. 9, ed. Wang Junyi. Beijing: Daxiang chubanshe, 2009.

CHAPTER 6

The Modern Values of Folklore: Chinese Modern Literature and the Morphology of Folk Culture Wang Guangdong When discussing the formation, development, and tradition of Chinese ­modern literature, we cannot, of course, overlook their relationship to foreign literature and world culture. Similarly, we cannot brush aside that literature’s association with the morphology of folk culture. This chapter aims to explore the relationship between China’s modern literature and folklore, because if we contain our discussion merely to the living conditions of Chinese literati in the twentieth century, their connection to the rustic origins of folklore is lost in its own native land; thus, folklore has an inherently profound connection to their mental world and literary pursuits. In other words, we can say that the discovery of this rustic birthmark by modern intellectuals is an integral part of new Chinese literature. This is another tradition closely related to the literary enlightenment. If we discuss the problem of folklore within the limits of Chinese literature and modern culture, the most important aspect for us to ponder is in what sense the morphology of folk culture takes part in the construction of modern culture and literature in China. Modern Chinese culture is a rich cornucopia, and its unbridled criticism and fighting spirit of realism are what make it superb. To understand the morphological value of a folk culture, it is incumbent upon us to explore this cultural entity.

The Concept of “Folklore” in Literary History

In past works devoted to literary history and literary critique, the term “folklore” has been frequently mentioned. As a basic concept in literary research and literary critique, however, it emerged into the spotlight for the first time in the 1990s, after it had been expounded in the works of Chen Sihe. In his works, particularly “The Ups and Downs of the Folklore” and “The Folklore in Restoration,” he gave a systematic exposition of folklore in modern Chinese literature. His exploration was aimed at the existing forms, values, and implications of folklore in the development of Chinese literary movements since 1937.

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Because his articles articulated some key questions concerning a renewed understanding of the history of literature, the value of intellectuals, as well as the rebuilding of spirit, he sparked a host of reprisals in intellectual circles, leading to a major controversy. To further explore the relationship between folklore and modern literature in China, we must clarify all these viewpoints in the controversy and suggest our own understanding of this concept. According to Chen Sihe, folklore is a multidimensional and multilayered concept, which he described beginning with literary history. It has the following characteristics. 1. It emerges from domains where state power is relatively weak, so it can remain relatively unbridled and lively and is comparatively authentic in expressing reality in the daily life of the common man and reflect the sentimental world of lower-class society. Although it appears to be in a weak or inferior position in the face of political power, it has always been accommodated by the state to a certain extent and has interacted with state power. Nonetheless, it belongs in the category of the ruled rather than the ruling and has its own independent history and tradition. 2. The essential aesthetic of folklore is a completely untroubled state of “­comfort and freedom.” The folkloric tradition implies a close embrace of primitive human urges found in life itself; whether in love or hate, in real life the pursuit of human desires goes beyond the reach of restraints or confinement determined by any moral doctrine or political mandate. Even civilization, progress, beauty, and other abstract concepts cannot be completely contained by comfort and freedom. In a civilized society, where life’s primitive urges are all ­suppressed, the paramount expression of such an intemperate urge cannot be but something aesthetic. Hence, folklore is the origin of all forms of literature and art. 3. Because folklore is a traditional milieu comprising religion, philosophy, literature, and arts, in political terms, it is a mixture of the democratic cream and the feudal dregs, in a unique coexistence between imperfection and virtue. Hence, it is difficult for us to render a simple conclusion about its value. As we discuss folklore within the history of modern Chinese literature, the implications of folk literature should be at the core of our thoughts. In my opinion, the following problems are worthy of our attention. First, many aspects of the morphology of real folk culture cannot be covered completely in literary history. Second, among literary works with an affinity for folklore that appear in the history of literature, their portrayals vary because of the different stances their authors took when they incorporated the life of the common man. Third, regardless of the stance these authors took when

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incorporating daily life, he or she must establish some sort of tie with cultural ­factors in folklore; otherwise, he or she loses a foothold in the reality of social life because folklore makes up the backbone of the common man’s life. Therefore, at least two basic implications come from this as we try to understand folklore in the light of the history of literature. First, as a lighthearted cultural space in a practical sense (including all implications of folk culture and spirit), folklore is distinguished by its richness and complexity, which provide fertile grounds for authors to conceive and express ideas using a variety of approaches. In this way, the world of folkloric literature becomes a kaleidoscope of diversity. From the enlightened point of view of the modern intellectual, the major concerns are the populace’s ignorance, stupidity, numbness, and decadence. In the eyes of politicians or revolutionaries, civil society has the potential to be a sweeping force of social strife in real life. For the common man living his daily life, folklore is home to an unmatched trove of uninhibited spirit as well as a respect for and understanding of the logic of life in and of itself. Second, a variety of folkloric forms are inseparable from the real origins of their folklore. If that is the case, then which form is the closest to the innermost core of folk culture and artistic roots? Realistically, folk culture’s weak position determines its lack of ample room for independence and freedom. Our admission of this cruel reality is not to deny the instinct for freedom in folklore or the survival of its own culture and logic. In fact, things that do not exist or are suppressed in real life tend to give rise to sacred or irresistible yearnings in the minds of many people. Countless legends, folk rhymes, ballads, p ­ aintings, and other forms of folk art show this. Here, folk culture not only refers to the physical morphology of people’s life but also includes spiritual activities in the social life of everyday people. More importantly, our understanding of a folk culture’s freedom to a degree contains concepts that are consistent with literary a­ esthetics. When discussing anything about folklore in literary history, freedom in literary aesthetics is not insignificant, because this is a fundamental proposition in literature. If an artistic creation is deprived of its own pursuit of beauty and freedom, it is impossible for us to call it art. In addition to being vigorously and vitally free of external restrains because of its roots in the real life origins of folklore, when folklore is valued by intellectuals, it can form a spontaneous artistic world that is immune to any interference from the outside world. The spirit of freedom inherent to intellectuals must consciously or unconsciously project such a creative process. Here we can see that the unbridled state of folklore and the spirit of freedom cherished by people of letters can arrive at a consensus, and herein lies the basic reason for establishing an

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intellectual stand based on folkloric values. With such a stance, not only is the mentality of literati endowed with realistic support but so are our studies of literary history, and thus we can gain more vivid and distinct mastery over the text of folklore to epitomize the spirit of an intellectual. The cultural space of folklore in real life, the aesthetic principles of art, and an intellectual’s stance on folk values constitute a trinity, and the interactions among the three establish the core implications of “freedom and comfort” in folklore. How should we define this “freedom and comfort”? Certainly, this includes both life’s yearning for an unrestrained state and the survival of folkloric logic in and of itself. “Freedom” finds its expression in the process in which the simple and primitive urges of life embrace life itself. Life has an instinctive yearning for freedom, and, in search of this freedom, life has to encounter both distress and misfortune. The common man, however, is resolute in facing or conquering these hardships. Such a spirit is seen everywhere and every day in ways both powerful and common. Freedom presents itself not only in the everyday existence of ordinary people but in folk literature, which has countless connections to the life of the common man. “Comfort” is a morphology presented in folklore through its logic for reproduction, morality, customs, and aesthetic interests. Folklore’s subsistence is infused with and influenced by the enlightening thoughts and ideological doctrines of intellectuals imposed by state power. Despite this, it has its own inherent logic, and the common people have their own gamut of feelings and lifestyles. As soon as this state of “freedom and comfort” becomes familiar to intellectuals, meaning that in terms of these values harbored by the common man, intellectuals come to understand, respect, and recognize the completeness and self-sufficiency of folk culture, as well as, based on the principled values inherent in folklore, understand the life course and lifestyle of folklore. Equipped with such a spiritual character of freedom and comfort, the morphology of a folk culture is part of the process of constructing an unbridled, critical, and aggressive modern culture and literature.

The Morphology of Folk Culture Before World War II

In the 1919 May Fourth movement, Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, and their peers launched the glorious New Literature movement in modern Chinese literature. The key point of the New Literature movement was that it determined the role that intellectuals and common people played as harbingers and recipients of

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Enlightenment ideals. Another implication that cannot be neglected, however, is that intellectuals took full advantage of folkloric resources in advancing the movement. During this period, modern intellectuals in China came to understand the importance of folklore from the following two approaches: (1) They highlighted the value of spoken Chinese and vernacular writing, and (2) in the spring of 1918 they began collecting and compiling folk songs and popular ballads. The two constituted the backdrop of folk culture from which this new literature came into being. Such morphology in folk culture in the view of modern intellectuals was essentially inseparable from intellectual thoughts about the cultural Enlightenment and their standards of modern aesthetics, upon which they wished to build their new literature. According to Hu Shi, Liu Bannong, Shen Yinmo, and other prominent writers, the promotion of vernacular literature was conducive to “the exploitation of the incisive resources of the people” for the “creation of a new literature for the country.” Beginning with these two points, they both used vernacular language from everyday life and folk literature as part of the folk culture deeply rooted in their aesthetic significance. We may say that their interpretation of folklore and folk literature originated from their enlightened stance vis-à-vis folk culture. This is the first kind of relationship between modern writers and folklore. Evidently as they came to understand the value of folklore toward Enlightenment values, these writers discovered that some of the implications of folk culture were consistent with their own thoughts about the Enlightenment and reaffirmed these values through the aesthetic significance of folklore morphology. Lu Xun, Zhou Zuoren, and other writers had a more complicated attitude toward folklore. As they started to understand folklore and its impact on the Enlightenment, they held conflicting attitudes: they criticized folklore in a bid to achieve their Enlightenment imperative while also appropriating and approving positive and healthy elements embraced by folk culture. This is a second kind of the relationship between intellectuals and folklore. In face of these conflicting attitudes, they incorporated two folk worlds into their theories and literary creation. First, in the short story “Village Opera,” Lu Xun depicted a world of folk culture brimming with an overly idyllic, carefree, ­egalitarian, untainted, and humble portrayals. In this world, children were ignorant of any worldly conventions and led a life perfectly in conformity with the laws of nature. Even when a old man was beaten, none of the villagers—old and young—had any knowledge of the idea of “disrespecting the elderly.” Second, in other short stories written by Lu, such as “The True Story of Ah Q” and “The New Year’s Sacrifice,” he gave a vivid description of ignorance, detachment, self-deception, obsequiousness, overly rigid hierarchies, and other negative

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aspects in the morphology of folk life. Of these two perspectives, which is closest to the inherent or authentic morphology of folk culture? The question itself runs counter to the original understanding of the Enlightenment taken by Lu Xun, Zhou Zuoren, and others. This is because their perception or understanding of the life of the common man was useful only to the extent that it demonstrated their enlightened values for renovating Chinese culture and society, and not from the perspective of the common man. These two different perspectives of folk culture that emerge from their work actually resulted from their different points of view for scrutinizing Chinese society and folk culture. The former contains the social ideals beloved by these cultural pioneers of the Enlightenment and their identification of some of the implications it carried for folk culture; the latter was the profound impression of real life in feudalistic and other backward practices within the morphology of folk culture. Here, we can see two implications for folk culture: the first is its wholesomeness, simplicity, independence, and innate resistance to reality; the second is its obscurity, numbness, and self-deception. The interplay of these two becomes inseparable. The question of how to evaluate such a complexity always lays bare the position of values held by modern intellectuals. Li Dazhao, Deng Zhongxia, and other communists represented a third kind of relationship between intellectuals and folklore. By integrating revolutionary practice in succeeding years in addition to further deliberating and unremitting efforts by Qu Qiubai and Mao Zedong, this perspective of folklore became a major component of modern Chinese culture and literature. The integration of folk culture into revolutionary and political ideologies is an essential part of China’s modern culture and literature. What new factors have been brought by literary creations through this kind interpretation of folklore and what kind of relationship existed between this interpretation and the ideals of freedom and well-being in folklore? For writers who really experienced rural life, the regional ambiance, and the unique culture of different localities in person, it left them spellbound and contained an enduring appeal that appeared in their own literary creations, playing an unparalleled role, which could not be replaced by political propaganda. This was certainly the case, for example, in Mao Dun’s novel Spring Silkworm and Ai Wu’s travelogue A Southbound Journey. Shen Congwen, Lao She, and Zhao Shuli were three famous writers who came from humble backgrounds and understood folk culture from the position of the ordinary man, which constitutes a fourth type of relationship. Hu Shi and his colleagues brought to light the meaning of the modern aesthetics through vernacular language and approaches of folklore to express emotional appeals that explore their view of the enlightenment. Shen Congwen depicted

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a ­picturesque, bucolic, unscathed, and folksy world in western Hunan province, which was characterized as the epitome of life as “freedom and well-being” as well as the philosophy of life at the lower rungs of Chinese society. His literary works fused the humanistic ideals in the crucible of folk culture; in other words, he discovered an ideal state of humanity for the common man in that it provided more rational and rigorous ethical norms. Then he dedicated himself to portraying such a state and its implied dignity. Thus in the morphology of folk culture, another characteristic of the wholesome, benevolent, and robust freedom made its debut. This vitality encouraged by this literary giant paid tribute to his hometown’s mythology, folk customs, and primitive rituals, instead of disdaining them. Coming from the same strain of intellectual understanding of folk art, Lao She concentrated his concerns on the common man’s struggle to survive and his yearning for a life free of the fetters of control through social upheaval and change. In his novel Rickshaw Boy, his fictional world is rooted in the struggle to survive, consciousness, and behavior of Xiangzi, the protagonist. Such an approach to literary creation is different from that of those who wrote to enlighten the Chinese people or out of political motivations. For the common man, it introduces to modern Chinese literature a new artistic world richly colored by native culture. Also, it directly inspires us to understand the significance and values inherent in the morphology of folk culture in modern Chinese literature from a new perspective.

The Morphology of Folk Culture Post–World War II

After the outbreak of World War II in China in 1937, the cultural structure of Chinese society underwent a radical change, marked by the importance attached to the morphology of folk culture. Whether it was in the regions ­occupied by the Nationalist Party, the Communist Party, or the Imperial Japanese Army, the morphology of folk culture was associated with the ideology of the state and intellectual elites in a variety of ways. The ways in which folk culture was associated were complex. In this period, the literary works of these intellectuals were very individualized according to the author’s point of view of the common man. To demonstrate this, let us engage in an explorative discussion of, for example, the works of Zhao Shuli and Sun Li. During World War II, the growth of literature for consumption, its intimacy with the common people, and the introduction of various forms of folk arts were prevalent. Many new literary writers strove to incorporate the lives of workers, peasants, and soldiers into the subject of their works—an artistic form generally favored by most ordinary Chinese people. At this time, why was

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the literary orientation of Zhao Shuli favored over that of other authors? One of the key reasons was that he persisted in holding up his ideals in service to the common man of his own accord. His own personal life of rustic simplicity ensured a close lasting bond with the peasants and various forms of folk culture. He did not need to be urged to remold his outlook on the world, as his outlook was inherently embedded in the world of the Chinese peasantry. Since his childhood, he had lived in the countryside, leaving him with a realistic and panoramic knowledge of rural life, such as the economic life of a farmer and a sense of familiarity with village life, including the humble wisdom, habits, personal relationships, dreams, and desires of rural residents as well as how they made ends meet in daily life. In such an environment, folk culture naturally became the starting point for his observations and experiences in society and life. Hence, the logic of a life unfettered by grand schemes and state control cherished by many in the countryside, their yearnings for freedom, and its interrelation with other social ideologies became the major subjects of his literary works. After he joined the Communist Party, Zhao remained in close contact with rural life. As a writer who was exposed to folk culture while growing up, he had a deep understanding of the lives, thoughts, and feelings of farmers. When describing a scene, either narrating an event or breathing life into a character, his writing was always based on a peasant’s perception and impression. He always observed issues through the farmer’s eyes, perceived things as if through a farmer’s mind, and never discussed topics that would be alien to a farmer. Closely related to this was Zhao’s narrative form of artistic expression, which was easily understood and derived from the common man’s language. In this way, his works presented an aesthetic not seen in new literature since the May Fourth movement. From a peasant’s point of view, Zhao made keen observations about society and life as well. In his revolutionary career, he succeeded in creating a layered panorama to express the meaning of folk culture, even though sometimes in a covert and indirect way. Sun Li, by contrast, illustrated his stories with a very different palette of colors from Zhao’s. Sun found that Chinese peasants during the war had a political passion and patriotic spirit. The literary image of Shuisheng’s wife (and a multitude of other noble female characters) portrayed in his story was both eye-catching and lifelike. To what extent these female images represented the genuine significance of women in folk culture, we may have to put aside for the time being. What really interests me is that the relationship between intellectuals and the morphology of folk culture as depicted in Sun’s fictional accounts. In the literary works created before the outbreak of the war, rural men and even rural women, who were represented by folk c­ ulture

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in rural communities, were always those who needed to be enlightened, criticized, or sympathized with. People of letters displayed a spiritual superiority toward them. In the novels written by Sun Li, however, rural people represented in folklore were the objects of eulogy, and their indomitable spirit and conduct made intellectuals feel ashamed of themselves and unworthy of their status. In the eyes of these intellectuals, they were the true agents of human history. The system of values and unique expressions of discourse which intellectuals had owned were replaced by a noble spirit and political passion brought forth by folk culture. What did this fundamental change indicate? We have a bad aftertaste left from our considerations of this change. In this transformation, what relationship was maintained between the folk culture and politics or the intelligentsia? From our previous conversation, we might see that it was necessary to establish a defined folk culture to promote morale during the war, which was fostered by political authorities. In this view, the intellectual perspective had to be abrogated to serve the population of workers, peasants, and soldiers through their literary creation, and such an abridgement was made to extol the virtues of the laboring masses and awaken their patriotic ardor, which encouraged the strengthening of state power. So this triumvirate of intellectuals, folkloric morphology, and political power had these channels of communication between them freed by key political ties. In such a situation, it is understandable for us to criticize or question literary works created by some intellectuals, such as Hu Feng and his stance on intellectuals, or rural authors like Zhao Shuli, who wrote novels for the common man in the countryside. As the common people had been awakened, their own system of cultural values could not have been completely supplanted by politics. Out of this complicated relationship, both the same and different, developed between folklore and politics.

A Perspective Accessible to Folklore and an Analysis of Its Values

There is nothing wrong with saying that any modern Chinese writer, regardless of his political stance, maintains a deep-rooted tie with folklore in one form or another. Since the 1919 May Fourth movement, the morphology of folk culture has been a major concern of all intellectuals, some of whom are searching for aesthetic inspiration from folklore, while others try to ferret out its revolutionary elements for their own political ends, and yet others are trying to extract some folksy spirit that reflects the common man. Their understanding and artistic mastery of folk culture, however, have been limited to two approaches. First, it is the intellectuals who make their way from outsider

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to insider with respect to folk culture, and in the course of this entry into folk culture, the ­morphology of folk culture always clashes with the existing values held by these intellectuals, whose perception of folk culture is built in the course of this conflict. Second, intellectuals live among the ordinary people to uncover the meaning of folk culture from an insiders’ perspective so that they can acquire an intuitive grasp of it. What outlook do these two approaches bring to literature that renovates it? What properties do they bring to Chinese literature? In other words, how is folk culture embodied in modern values? As we discuss the relationship between intellectuals and folklore in the history of modern Chinese literature, the modern values of intellectuals, first of all, epitomize the spirit and emotional depth of the subject in their literary works, bringing about an individualized artistic world full of indigenous color. From the previous discussion, we saw that, when shifting from the outsider to the insider perspective of folklore, Hu Shi, Lu Xun (during the May Fourth movement), Mao Dun, Ding Ling, and Ai Wu in the 1930s, as well as some novelists active in the communist base areas in the 1940s, all showed a distinction in the attitude of their literary works when compared to Lao She, Shen Congwen, and Zhao Shuli, who made themselves understood through the structure of folk culture from the perspective of the common man. Let us take Lu Xun and Lao She as two examples of contrast. When Lu Xun portrayed the average man from his perspective of enlightenment, the folkloric morphology always clashed with the existing system of values cherished by intellectuals. This clash left a deep historical impact on the author’s understanding of reality. In particular, in the case of Lu Xun, a writer of profound thought, when plagued by the entanglement between individualism and communitarianism or between the intellectuals and the common man, he achieved a deeper understanding of the problems and issues concerning “the ordinary Chinese” and hence his works were endowed with a definition of modernity. Unlike Lu Xun, Lao She put himself in the shoes of the common man and discovered the significance of folklore in the life of the average person. So Lao She had a more direct viewpoint of folk culture. Based on this, he exposed the impact of folklore on a person’s fate. Therefore, his works express little about the personal frustrations of intellectuals, but are crammed with the anguish and torment of the common man. This is because the lower class was a vulnerable and marginalized group in society. In their pursuit of survival, they were invariably subject to capricious abuse and coercion. Such abuses and violence became a part of their own psychology, which became a part of the community’s psychology. In this way, intellectuals and the lower class were not in dialogue; rather, they formed a monologue that derived from the same system of values. The same approach might be used to appraise the fictional creations

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of Shen Congwen and Zhao Shuli. The two fused themselves into the cultural world of the common man and told their story from the perspective of a person from a lower social class. They came to appreciate society, life, politics, folk customs, and the plight of the majority by devoting themselves to the spiritual bread and butter of folk culture by narrating the psychological meaning of folk culture to the common man, as well as their yearning for life and behavior. When we look at this from a writer’s position, we may not find a sense of spiritual superiority, which was evident among the Enlightenment intellectuals of the May Fourth movement. The values of these authors were identified more with the ethics of subsistence and moral rules inherent in folk culture. Also, their political or ideological perception and conclusions came from the experience of the common man. Hence, their spiritual presence coexisted in the same cultural space as the rank and file of society and shared some characteristics with folk culture, such as simplicity, vividness, and worldly wisdom for survival. For those who wrote about folk culture as outsiders, their inclinations presented a rather complicated picture. Although they had their own verbal system of values, their relationship with the rank and file had a variety of distinctions and differences. Their cognitive predisposition as “outsiders” led them not to adopt a perspective that embraces the value in the morphology of folk culture. Yet the authenticity and the aesthetic values of customs, popularity, and human feelings in folk culture have been of vital importance to their view as “outsiders.” These perceptual and vividly cultural factors constituted artistic content of the highest importance in the expression of their thoughts and feelings. Next, within literary history, the values of folklore are embodied in the fact that modern writers in China have a clear awareness of folklore as an essential resource, both psychologically and aesthetically, in the formation of new literature. As stated in the Foreword to the Ballads Weekly: We believe that folkloric research is an endeavor of great importance for today’s China. . . . Folk songs are a kind of material for folkloric research, and our compilation of them is reserved exclusively for research. This is the main objective. . . . We can screen these materials for academic research in the light of an artistic critique and compile them into an anthology of the inner aspirations of our people. The Italian critic Vitali once said: “Based on these folk songs, rooted deeply in the true feelings of the people, a new kind of poetry for our nation may come into being.” So, this work of ours is not only to lay bare the benighted brilliance of folklore but also to promote a renaissance in national poetry for the future. This is our secondary objective.

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From this, we see that both folk culture and aesthetics formed in literary works are constantly the targets of common concern for modern writers in literary reconstruction, creating an essential resource of spirituality in the development of a new literature. Third, the morphology of folk culture not only has a powerful impact on the aesthetic form of new literature but also provides real cultural soil for the spiritual genesis of the intelligentsia. Since the beginning of modern China, the awakening of a national consciousness, emergence of enlightened thought, and the influence of world culture have formed an inextricably entangled trinity, playing an important role for intellectuals. More and more Chinese intellectuals, especially since the Opium War in 1840, have sensed the mounting of a national crisis, and thus they turned toward the West in search of the truth for the sake of national salvation by introducing Enlightenment ideology. The final goal of the Enlightenment lies in awakening the populace and making the country powerful. Against such a background, intellectual interest in folk ­culture has become inescapable, as it is an unalienable component of the indigenous culture. The nation, citizens, and folklore form a fundamental link for modern intellectuals to think about “the China question.” And what is the citizen? In China, where the peasantry were the majority of the population, they were the custodians of folk culture in the countryside. Hence, it is natural that farmers were the focus of their concerns. As soon as “peasants” came within sight of modern intellectuals, the logic of subsistence, ethical inspiration, and aesthetic inclinations in folk culture became inseparable from the farmers’ cultural understanding and literary works. Folk culture provides a variety of choices for the peasants’ spiritual rejuvenation, and its lavish artistic residue became the basis of the advancement of the literary careers of nearly all authors. As for other questions, such as the possible negative impacts from folklore on new literature or the relationship between urban folklore and new literature, these topics should be further discussed in other articles elsewhere.

CHAPTER 7

What Is Reality? How Should We Think? One Understanding of the “State of Thought” in Contemporary Literature Wang Yao The relationship between literature and thought as well as the “state of thought”1 in literature has been a rather controversial issue in academia since the beginning of the new century. The debate began with a 2006 report in Southern Weekend titled “Intellectuals Bombard Literature: Modern Chinese Literature is Divorced from Reality and Lacks Any Thought.” The article highlighted the basic issues and the disagreements over this issue. “Intellectuals” argued that modern Chinese literature is divorced from reality and lacks any thought: “Chinese writers have increasingly lost the ability to think and express courage. They have lost a sensitivity to real life and the concerns of humanity. Literature has gradually degenerated into an “Ivory Tower”2 completely irrelevant to the lives of most people.” For these critics, modern literary writers are completely out of touch with real life and have lost the ability and courage to feel the flesh and blood realities of life. In present literary works, we do not see the everyday scenes faced in real life. Literature lacks a concern for public matters today. It is very rare that a writer can directly face the contradictions of Chinese society. A common trend in literature is to serve the market, provide entertainment, and pander to the market. Like literature that was dependent on politics,3 literature that depends on the market has no self-respect to speak of. In contemporary literary works, we do not see any thoughts on the difficulties faced by Chinese in their lives; we see no thought on the meaning of life; and we certainly do not see any thoughts on any overarching values.4 Since 1  The state of thought, sixiang zhuangtai, is a short-hand phrase used throughout this article to refer to the question of the status of an overarching ideology or message in contemporary literature.—Trans. 2  The original term, xiao quanzi youxi, literally means “a game for a small group,” but carries the same connotations as the “ivory tower” in English.—Trans. 3  I believe that the author is indirectly referring to literature in the Mao era where all literature and art had to serve political ideology.—Trans. 4  “Sixiangjie paohong wenxuejie: dangdai Zhongguo wenxue tuoli xianshi, quefan sixiang,” [Intellectuals Eviscerate Literature: Contemporary Chinese Literature Has Become Estranged from Reality and Lacks Thought] Nandu Zhoukan, May 12, 2006. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004308886_008

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then, “literary circles” have responded to the accusations of “intellectuals”: Most literary scholars believe that intellectuals are biased when it comes to their evaluation of Chinese literature; they have made a reckless supposition based on a very limited reading of literature.5 Relatively speaking, the critical response of “literary circles” was not a clearly focused argument like that of these “intellectuals,” and this reflects the unique and complicated circumstance in which literature currently finds itself. As in many of the debates since the 1990s, there is no consensus concerning the problem of the state of thought in literature; however, the discourse of critics and supporters undoubtedly highlights the importance of ideology in literature. The problem mostly centers on the relationship between literature and reality, literature and the market, literature and ideology, and the core issue focuses on the ideological ability of writers and the ideological quality of literature. Hence, in reconstructing the relationship between literature and the world, there should be more discussion on how to understand the “state of thought” in literature that has arisen in the new century. 1 When we discuss what is missing in modern Chinese literature, we often turn back to writers like Lu Xun. Between the late Qing dynasty (i.e., late nineteenth and early twentieth century) and the May Fourth (1919) movement, China experienced an unprecedented period of radical change. Lu Xun and some contemporary writers used their outstanding ideological foundations to participate in the establishing of a modern nation-state and thus achieved the status of “intellectuals.” This is a part of history with which we are all familiar. The “literary revolution” and “ideological revolution” were closely linked, so when we talk about “New Literature,” we cannot escape discussions of the “New Culture movement.” In discussing the rise of modern short-story prose, Yu Dafu said: “One of the greatest successes of the May Fourth movement was, first of all, the discovery of the individual. . . . This idea centered on the ideological awakening and made its essence and utility6 the destruction of the writing 5  “Wenxuejie fanji sixiangjie: bu dong jiu bie xiashuo,” [Literature Counter-Attacks Intellectuals: Don’t Talk about Things You Don’t Understand] Nandu zhoukan, May 29, 2006. 6  Essence and utility is a reference to the ti-yong formula espoused by many late nineteenthand early twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals. This was an idea that Chinese traditions should be preserved as China’s spiritual and ideological essence while Western learning, like science, should be employed for its utility. In this case, the author is referring to the transition in the 1910s and 1920s to writing in the vernacular, as opposed to classical Chinese, as

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of excruciating characters. It was in this environment that modern short-story prose grew up.”7 There is nothing incorrect in this quote on the “growth” of new literature; ideology, the individual, and vernacular writing were three core elements that formed the New Literature movement, and ideology occupied a “central” position. As a modern intellectuals, the same generation of writers as Lu Xun appeared in the public sphere with their independent character and thoughts on liberty; their ideology is inherent in any of their “literature.” If we discuss them as “intellectuals” without starting with their status as persona litteratus, then it would not be a study of literature. When we discuss the “state of thought” in contemporary literature based on this kind of historical narrative and value judgments, we naturally see the literature on the 1980s as a positive example of literature as an ideological force. In fact, many of us have compared the 1980s with the May Fourth period. This is not just because of a nostalgia for the May Fourth period or our new understanding of the meaning of the new literature movement in the May Fourth period, but because of the consensus among intellectual and literary circles; moreover, what is more important is that in the relationship between reality and history, there was a major shift in the individuality, ideology, and writing of literature in the 1980s, which has been called history; and thus, it was presented as history entering the realm of a “new era.” If we examine this more closely, however, we find many questions about the unified discourse on 1980s literature that has formed over many years. Discourse on the link between rebellion and ideological liberation in literary and artistic circles has been a basic concept in examining literary thought and works since the beginning of the new era. When reflecting on the period between the May Fourth movement and the April Fifth movement8 at the 1979 Conference of the Chinese National Association of Literary and Art Workers, Zhou Yang had a very simple perspective discussing the historical development of literature throughout the course of ideological liberation:

c­ ontaining both essence (in that it is still Chinese) while also having utility (in that it is easier to write and comprehend).—Trans. 7  See, Yu Dafu, Foreword to Zhongguo xinwenxue daxi: sanwen er ji [Series on Chinese New Literary Studies: Second Volume On Essays] (Shanghai: Liangyou tushu yinshua gongsi, 1935). 8  The April Fifth movement was a political protest movement that began in Tian’anmen Square on April 5, 1976, to commemorate the death of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and opposed to the excesses of the Gang of Four and other Chinese communist leaders. This movement is also referred to in English as the Tian’anmen Incident, not to be confused with the Tian’anmen protests of 1989.—Trans.

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Realizing the Four Modernizations of socialism is a great transformation in production. It is also a profound transformation in everything from our economic foundation to state of consciousness. This requires a major liberation in people’s thought. From the May Fourth movement to the April Fifth movement, the revolution in literature and art has always been an important wing in the Chinese people’s ideological liberation movement. The forefather of the literary and artistic revolution, Lu Xun, was a great pioneer and vanguard of the ideological liberation movement. Our literary and artistic revolutionaries all played their role in the previous ideological liberation movement. The Literary Rectification Movement of 1942 conformed to the party’s own glorious rectification movement. The poems of the Tian’anmen Revolution of 19769 sounded an alarm that raged against the Gang of Four and opened the floodgates to the ideological liberation of the people. We writers and artist should deeply reflect on our amazing history in the ideological liberation movement of the people in our country. We have been the muse for the continual deepening of this movement. Zhou Yang also gave his thoughts on the story of the ideological liberation movement in the three years following the Cultural Revolution: In the last three years of the Gang of Four, particularly in the last year or two, writers and artists rebelled and criticized Lin Biao and the Gang of Four’s idea of the “Dictatorship of the Black Line”10 and many other fallacies of theirs. Eventually, when the literary and artistic policies first laid out by the central party and Comrade Mao [Zedong] were restored to their correct interpretation and truly upheld, our socialist literature and arts were restored to their former glory and progressed. The spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party and discussions on the issue of standards of truth really advanced the ideological liberation of literary circles. Many works in this period, first with short stories, novels, and plays, began to carry on with the traditions of social realism describing the intense conflict between the people 9  Another term for the April Fifth movement.—Trans. 10  The Dictatorship of the Black Line was an argument by many extreme leftists in the Chinese Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) to criticize film, literary, and artistic circles as being, in the words of Jiang Qing, “completely in opposition to the Chairman’s [Mao’s] Ideology, against the party, and against socialism. [They] are a black line that has taken over our government.”

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and the Gang of Four as well as the many complicated social contradictions of the years of disaster.11 They described older-generation proletarian revolutionaries and the rise of progressive figures in the new Long March. These stories exposed the obstacles and excesses preventing the creation of a modern socialism. Although the stories were different, they all showed in a timely and piercingly astute way the pressing problems of the need for resolution in real life, which strongly reflected the hopes, ideals, sentiment, and demands of the majority of the population. These works were a product of the great ideological currents of the ideological liberation movement and also, conversely, affected and led the direction of these currents.12 Zhou Yang’s comments were on the literary world at the end of the 1970s, but for the most part they applied to the history of the literary and artistic environment of the 1980s. The basis, perspective, thinking, and methodology of his argument not only showed the relationship between literature, art, pragmatic politics, and the ideological liberation movement but also highlighted the structured reconstruction of literary and artistic institutions at this historic juncture. “Scar literature,” “reflective literature,” and “reform literature” in the late 1970s and early 1980s followed the tides of ideological liberation. In this sense, literature has been at the ideological forefront. Despite much criticism at the time, literature coincided, linked to the ideological liberation movement and the modernization of socialism. The literary world participated in the ideological liberation movement, and this was also because literature went back to its own roots. The mark of this literary change was the reconfiguration of the relationship between literature and politics, making intellectuals the main actors in this historic narrative. This comfortable relationship between literature and reality as well as the ideological force of this historical transitional period was in reaction to extreme left-wing politics. As contemporary literature quickly returned to its own little world, the conflicts within its own ideology and ideas became difficult to avoid. With the structured reconstruction of literary and artistic institutions, it was impossible to avoid some kind of discord and even conflict. These two things were woven together in the 1970s and 1980s. The criticism that emerged around the film Unrequited Love shows 11  Most likely he’s referring to the Great Leap Forward.—Trans. 12  Zhou Yang, “Jiwang kailai, fanrong shehuizhuyi xin shiqi de wenyi: yijiuqijiu nian shiyi yue yi ri zai Zhongguo wenxue yishu zongzuozhe disici daibiao dahui shang de baogao,” [Literature and Arts for the Future and New Era of Socialist Prosperity: Report from Fourth Congress of Workers in the Literature and Arts Industry November 1, 1979] Renmin ribao, November 20, 1979.

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the kinds of reprimands doled out by structured literary institutions when it came to literary ideology and works; furthermore, it solidified the interference of “leftist” and “rightist” into the development of socialist literature and art. How to discuss the history of the ideological liberation movement that came out of the criticism and resistance to extreme leftist politics is unresolved, because it encompasses our understanding of the ideological narrative of the period. Thus, the shift in the historical narrative has become an issue of one’s relative perspective on reality. This might be partly because, for many years, there has not been a major breakthrough in the historical narrative of the Cultural Revolution, as well as how one discusses history, infuses reality, and pays attention to creative methods. The debate in the early 1980s surrounding the “modernizers” also highlighted the methodological issues of the modern imagination and the response to Western modernity. From 1981 to 1985, the major debates over modernism (the modernizers), socialism, humanitarianism, alienation discourse, and literary agency led to major philosophical conflicts within the literary world, which also often collided with those outside the literary world. The conclusion of these conflicts was the formation of the 1985 “novel revolution” and the idea generally referred to as the “literary purist school.” Hence, the retreat of literature back into itself was not just in the background of the ideological liberation, but also the subject of unusually intense ideological conflicts within the literary world. The often-cited “scar literature,” “reflective literature,” “reform literature,” “nostalgic literature,” and “avantgarde literature” of the time were shaped by the many internal and external “ideological incidents.” If we see the 1980s as a literary ideological resource, we will see that the impetus of the ideology of the 1980s was unique to a period of historical transition, and this uniqueness was also shown in the 1990s to be limited. The relationship between literary history and intellectual history in the 1980s was unquestionably close. This mutually reinforcing relationship had a profound effect on the currents of later literature; however, at the same time, we cannot ignore that with the arrival of the “new era” there was a major shift in comparison with the past. The transformation of the economic foundation and the overarching superstructure of society was completed. Literature had not received sufficient ideological resources to deal with the realities of this change, revealing the deficiencies of the thoughts, concepts, and knowledge of the “literary purist school.” As to the ideological resources and new literary experience they did have, to a large degree, they were internalized as the ideological quality and aesthetic ideals of the writer. At the same time, there were many misgivings about literature that were made all the more apparent in the frustration and failure of post-1990s writers. At the time, we all hoped that there would be a revival of literature, but the “new enlightenment” of the

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1980s faded, and it was shown that after this historic transition no new “new culture movement” would take its place in China. In this sense, the 1980s were clearly an incomplete decade. One of the greatest challenges it had bequeathed to the 1990s and the twenty-first century, whether in terms of literary institutions or literary agency, has been that it did not produce an ideological mechanism. The difficulties of post-1990s literature arose not just because of a loss of ideological capacity in the 1980s, but the fact that many of the problems of the 1980s are still present. 2 When we compare contemporary literature to that of the 1980s, we cannot deny that the following phenomena exist: Since the 1990s, the united historical narrative has been broken, and in this dislocation, intellectuals have gradually lost their historic agency and ability to master the world. This is reflected in literature with waning “ideological incidents” and the dissipation of “­ideological capacity” in critical literature. Writers in this shifting sand lack the ideological capacity to respond to the diversity of conflicts. The market has corroded the ideals of writers and enticed writers to abandon their pursuit of the humanities and beauty. Although we continue to believe that the position of literature has been marginalized, the value of literature is certainly not marginal; however, the fact is that the influence of literature on the real and social spiritual life has weakened. As the curtain closed on the debate between realism and modernism, the literary world lost its beautifully creative i­nertia through transformative stories. I say these are some phenomena, because these unflattering problems are certainly not the entire picture of current ­literature; they cannot even provide us with an easy glimpse of the true plight facing literature. On a case-by-case basis or by looking at nuance, we can find many exceptions to these phenomena (I discuss some writers who refute the claims of “­intellectuals” below; such cases do exist). What we need to further ask is: what led to these phenomena? What kind of limitations do writers have in their response, and what influence do they have over the ideological quality of literature? The creativity or progressiveness of Chinese literature in the twentieth century has, on many occasions at just the right time, used destruction to establish something. For example, “new literature” was used against “old literature”; the concept of “new literature” was then abandoned for “contemporary literature” to use against “modern literature”; the “vacuity of the International and model

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dramas”13 established the “epochalism” of “Cultural Revolution literature”; and the “new age literature” was used against “Cultural Revolution literature.” These historical periods, of course, represented qualitative changes, but there were similarities in the mechanisms that produced these ideologies. As a part of 1980s literature, “new age literature” was directly produced in a climate of negating the Cultural Revolution. In other words, the road was paved through historical exposition and criticism. After this work was completed, the tensions between writers and history began to ease (of course, how to discuss this history today is still a problem), and how to handle questions of reality became diffuse, ambiguous, and disordered. We are used to the motivation and ideology produced through oppositional tension, but since the 1990s and, especially, the twenty-first century, the state of reality has shown itself to be fragmented; there has been no restoration of a unified holistic narrative of reality. Therefore, the relationship between literature and reality has become fractured with the various different choices made by writers. A partial tension between literature and reality remains, but it does not have the same kind of historical tension overall that was seen in those years. Thus we discover the loss of the ideological capacity of writers in this easing, weakening, and shifting tensions. If we evaluate the literature of the 1990s from the perspective and methodology of the 1980s, then there clearly has been a dislocation. As literature began to transition to its current plight, writers were presented with different choices in their approach to reality, ideological inclinations, and value judgments. Generally speaking, the relationship between literature and reality or, in other words, the state of thought in literature has had no effect on the wider world. Roughly speaking, in the building of political, economic, social, and cultural goals based on the Four Modernizations, the ideal of literature in the 1980s was to escape dependence on politics and retreat to its own literary world; it wanted to establish the agency of the individual and the significance of the individual; it wanted to modernize literature by joining the rest of the world. This is an overly simplistic and partial summary. Since the 1990s, this ideal continued to advance, but it seems to have gone in a way different from our expectations and even quite the contrary to our expectations. The debate among intellectuals in the 1990s over the “humanitarian spirit,” although in the end was inconclusive, showed that some intellectuals maintained the humanitarian ideal in 13  Model operas ( yangban xi) were plays in the Cultural Revolution that portrayed the struggles of the proletariat instead of focusing on elite figures such as kings, ministers, and generals as protagonist.—Trans.

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that they remained cautious and doubtful about “historical processes.” In the end, they were unable to come to a consensus showing the fragmentation of intellectuals as well as ideology in explaining problems in reality. In some sense, the 1990s was a transitional period. Since the twenty-first century, the basic problems with literature, reality, and the world have been fully exposed. The change since the 1990s has not been monolithic but structural. A structural change took place because of the plight and issues faced by literature. In Modern Social Imaginaries, Charles Taylor points out that the primary issue in modern social science is modernity itself, and modernity is an “amalgamated” imagination: [Modernity is] that historically amalgam of new practices and institutional forms (science, technology, industrial production, urbanization), of new ways of living (individualism, secularization, instrumental ration­ ality); and of new forms of malaise (alienation, meaninglessness, a sense of impending social dissolution).14 Although the modernization imperative has not run its course in present-day China, postmodernism is still wreaking havoc; however, the problems caused by the “amalgamation” described by Taylor is where the predicament and difficulty of contemporary literature lie. From an aesthetic point of view, we often categorize culture in a transitional period into mainstream culture, elite culture, and popular culture. We are unable to distinguish and analyze the uniqueness of these three categories and their relationship, but we are certainly aware that, as culture changes, so, too, does the traditional cultural hierarchy change with it. With the formation and growth of the market economy, the long reach of consumer culture occupies a central position in social culture and aesthetics. Although we cannot dismiss one cultural form in favor of another, how to prevent the waning and squeezing of literary aesthetic values is definitely an issue faced in literary creations as well as modern cultural construction. In the pervasive predicament of existence in instrumental rationality and the path of achieving material liberation, we find that the questions of how literature be realized and save itself are simply one typical example of the “Chinese problem.” In this diverse literary period of coexistence, the vast array of concepts, conditions, and distinctiveness in culture, including literature, coexist at the same time. When we make statements like this, we affirm the importance of “pure ­literature” in “elite culture.” We also show the difficult straits in which 14  Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 1.

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“pure literature” finds itself. The entirely new practices, institutions, ways of life, and even frustrations affect writers and literature. In a brief article, Han Shaogong pointed out this example: the institution of copyrights tightly bound literature and market profits in unprecedented ways, giving rise to things like “circulation,” “readership,” and publicity stunts. This brought in capital from advertisers, ­investors, and so on, which in turn allowed a part of the population to control the production and reception of literature. The relationship between literature and the market is naturally more complicated than what is described here. At the same time, Han points to other limitations beyond market forces “that are sufficient to entice and pervert literature. Professionalization, titles, awards, promotion campaigns, foreign travel, and other benefits have all been effective means to control and make the literary world subservient.” Han discusses the effects of the market and legal rights, but not the trade-offs. If we link this to the debate set off in Zhang Wei’s The Spiritual Background, we find out how to view the influence of the market and the law on literature. In fact, there are many major disagreements in the literary world concerning this. Let us set aside the controversy over this issue and focus on how the market and legal rights have influenced the way of life and ideological rigor of writers. Han Shaogong observes, “The lives of writers are quite similar. They have all become middle class after leading a colorful and exciting period in their life, and in a globalized world, middle class life is very identical.” And “On the other hand, as the disparities of people’s material life expand and the divide between social classes grows greater, the ideological outlook of people has become highly homogenized.” Quite a few writers are unwilling to indulge in this stereotypical middle-class life and the popular worship of money. This, of course, has presented a major challenge. As these writers lose their own memory of the past, like a tube of toothpaste gradually being squeezed, how much experience and sentiment will they be left with?”15 As Han has realized, we cannot allow history to stop through wishful thinking. Mainstream literature has always been marked broadly by the middle class. As the influence of institutional and material life becomes unavoidable, the key issue becomes an issue of how writers position themselves. In “Intellectuals 15  Han Shaogong, “Wenxue: mengyou yu suxing,” [Literature: Sleep Walking and Waking] in Zhongguo dangdai zuojia mianmianguan: wenxue de zijue, [A Panorama of Contemporary Chinese Writers: Literary Consciousness] ed. Lin Jianfa (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2010), 11.

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Bombard Literature: Modern Chinese Literature is Divorced from Reality and Lacks Any Thought,” critics of contemporary literature do not differ greatly with Han’s discussion. Since the “spirit of the humanities discussions” in the 1990s, this kind of criticism has not ended. This implies that contemporary literature has not left the public sphere. How to “attack one’s own status with one’s own character,” however, is certainly an “inherent resource” that contemporary writers, including those who support the criticisms of intellectuals, lack in responding to reality. If we exclude the writers and creators who have plainly compromised their values, kowtowed to institutions, and real life, then we need to consider those writers and creators who have not lost their critical faculties and why has the “state of thought” in literature still left so many people unsatisfied and failed to produce any “intellectuals” despite the success these writers have achieved. Before we consider this issue, we should look again at the example of Lu Xun. In “Modernity in Twentieth-Century Chinese History and Literature and Other Questions,” Leo Ou-fan Lee has a very brilliant analysis of the unique “ambiguity” of modern writers. On the one hand, writers maintain an amazing historical perspective on the public; on the other hand, since writers lack an enduring optimism because of their own vexation with and uncertainty toward the present, they are wholly distinct from fanatical ideologues. Lee argues that even the most pain-evoking methods of Lu Xun show the contradictions between these two ambiguous positions: What is worth discussing is that his [Lu Xun’s] entire view is linked to an unresolvable personal pressure: on the one hand, he clearly supports the May Fourth movement as well as the “modern” enlightenment. On the other hand, since he is constantly thinking about the meaning of life, he has shaped a pervading sense of pessimism in his very soul. Hence, he publicly affirms his belief in progress while also refusing to personally invest himself in this tide of positivist history. . . . This kind of uncertainty has provided inherent resources for subjective artistic expression.16 Since there is an innate contradiction and this provides inherent resources for artistic expression, this is an important reason that modern writers have a limited capacity for ideology or lack ideological capabilities. 16  Leo Ou-fan Lee, “Ershi shiji Zhongguo lishi yu wenxue de xiandaixing ji qi wenti [Modernity in Twentieth-Century Chinese History and Literature and Other Questions],” in Li Oufan lun Zhongguo xiandai wenxue, [Leo Ou-fan Lee on Chinese Modern Literature] ed. Li Jin (Shanghai: Shanghai sanlian shushe, 2010), 35.

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3 When we discuss the “state of thought” in literature, we in fact face two circumstances. The first is, as previously discussed, when a writer is an intellectual, how does he think about expressing problems in the public sphere? The second is, as a writer, how does he produce thought in literature or become an intellectual himself? The latter circumstance is to say: how is ideology ­produced and handled in literature? When we discuss “the state of thought” in literature, this point is often either overstated or neglected. In fact, it is not the case that ideologically sensitive contemporary writers have been unaware of this loss of thought and the disastrous impact of this ideological crisis. In “Blank Ideology Is a Literary Tragedy,” Mo Yan described in detail his understanding of independent thought. Wang Anyi also brought up that over her ten-year career in writing: “The twentieth century is an era of energy crisis. The ideological and material aspects of novels have seemingly been exhausted with each generation. The remaining possibilities seem very few.”17 These perspectives show that the idea of “literary purity” that formed in the 1980s had shifted and changed by the 1990s and the twenty-first century, seeing ideology as a part of literature and reactivating the relationship between literature and reality. Unlike for intellectuals or literary critics, for writers the understanding of ideology in writing may be more akin to creative patterns and the inherent structure of text. As Wang Anyi sees it, the novel form is the skin or the peel, the story is the flesh, and thought is the “pit.” “From the peel we enter the flesh— that is, the meat—then we open the pit. Why do we like to use the word “pit”? Because I feel that, for a fruit, the pit is the seed of life. If it is planted, it can sprout and itself become a fruit. That is how I came to refer to the pit of a novel, but to most this is called thought.” Wang describes the thought produced in novels as a process ranging from normal to abnormal and from impossible to possible. The face of the novel is normal to people, and we set off from the normal and must respect the basic rules of the norm. We must stick to its logic, but from there where should we go? That’s when we walk into the abnormal . . . How do we form a thought on the normal life? This is a problem we have always sought to deal with. 17  Wang Anyi, “Wode xiaoshuo guan,” [My Perspective on Novels] in Wang Anyi yanjiu ziliao [Source for Studies on Wang Anyi], ed. Zhang Xinying and Jin Li (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2009), 1:43.

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Hence, here we can distinguish between an outstanding novel and a mediocre one. The difference lies in whether it can go from the normal to the abnormal. The normal logic is the original face of life, and when this normal logic is violated, it becomes the face that life should have. This is an ideological novel or an ideal novel. The difficulty in going from normal to abnormal is linked with the rise of the modern novel and the Chinese novel tradition. Wang Anyi’s understanding of the tradition of modern Chinese novel is: particularly derived from novels that were written under the auspices of ideas from Western humanism and continued to form with the enlightenment movement of the May Fourth period. The significance of the novel got bigger and bigger. I believe that early Chinese novels were primarily novel and exotic and entertained people. They did not bear a hefty obligation to the value of human life, but the novel we inherited has become a tradition that places thought at its core.18 In The Age of Enlightenment, Wang Anyi treated the Cultural Revolution as a unique “ideological event” that reflected her understanding. Mo Yan described the important elements in forming quality thought in novels. He sees the endurance, intricacy, and complexity as the mark of a full novel. It is also the “greatest stylistic dignity” of a novel. Full novels with endurance, intricacy, and complexity have an “enduring mind”: those with an “enduring mind” have in their breast a great ravine, a towering mountain, and a climate that can be felt. It must have a vastly crude countenance and be able to contain the flow of a hundred rivers. The writing brush of the most acclaimed writers expressed the great ravine, the towering mountain, and the climate in their breast to the outside world. They had an amazing spirit full of anguish, compassion, aspirations, and unbridled beliefs plopping down a vast expanse of pure epiphany on the earth—this is the undertone of the enduring mind. The “intricacy” described by Mo Yan refers to the density of events, people, and thought: “the swelling tempest of thought forces people and events to topple mountains and consume the seas in a way that overwhelm the sense of the reader; it is not the kind of novel that can be described in a few words.” What is particularly important is Mo Yan’s understanding of the relationship between thought and text, which to a large extent rectifies the biases of many intellectuals and critics: 18  Wang Anyi, “Xiaoshuo de chuangzuo,” [The Creation of the Novel] Huacheng 6 (2008).

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The intricacy of thought refers to the conflict and stifling of thought. If a novel only contains correct thoughts—good and noble ideas or simplistic and publicly acceptable ideas of good and evil—then the values of this novel deserves our suspicions. Those novels that have progressive significance are very likely to be written by a writer that runs counter with accepted thought. Those novels that have profoundly philosophical thoughts are probably not written by philosophers. A brilliant novel should yell with many voices, have many meanings, have many understandings, and at times even run contrary to the subjective intentions of the author who wrote it. Related to this, Mo Yan also provided an understanding of “ideological” value in novels, including the inherent form of the structure: structure is never a purely simple formula. Sometimes it is the content. The structure of the novel is an important component of the art of the novel. It is an expression of the abundant imagination of the writer. A good structure can highlight the meaning of the story and can also transform the unitary meaning of a story. A good structure can surpass the story and even deconstruct the story. A few years ago I said, “structure is politics.”19 Mo’s own works—Big Breast and Wide Hips, Sandalwood Death, Life and Death Are Wearing Me Out, and others—are testimony of these insights. How to reconstruct the relationship between literature and reality is an essential part of discussing how literature produces ideas. In Six Memos for the Next Millennium, there is an often-cited quote by Italo Calvino: “the contemporary novel [is] as an encyclopedia, as a method of knowledge, and above all as a network of connections between the events, the people, and the things of the world.” The novelist Li Er explained this in the context of the Chinese literary “storytelling tradition”: Right now, this kind of encyclopedic novel has partly deviated from this tradition. I think its goal is to reactivate and reconstruct the relationship between the novel and reality. The background from which it emerged, of course, is first because many novelists have reservations about current historical categories and concepts. They are suspicious of the role of “storytelling traditions” in the complicated discourse of the present. 19  Mo Yan, “Hanwei changpian xiaoshuo de zunyan,” [A Defense of the Dignity of the Novel] Dangdai zuojia pinglun 6 (2006).

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I think that the most important element is probably still an expression of their dissatisfaction and rejection of the homogeneous global discourse. Novelists are seeking dialogue and a dialogue between all the elements of existence upon which the world relies . . . the contents of a novel should be brimming with discursive links and calling into question the individual experience but also praising the individual experience. It can construct an effective relationship between an inherently individual experience and the complexities of reality.20 There are two crucial points in these words: the discourse between the novelist and various elements in the world is a dissatisfaction and rejection of the homogeneous global discourse; the novel can construct an effective relationship between the individual experience and a complicated reality. It is at these two points that literature presents different choices. The first is the kind of relationship between thought and reality described by Wang Anyi: In emphasizing that a novel exist in a soulful world beyond reality and the real world acts to supply the novel with material, ideology is also treated like material for the novel. It determines how this real world material will function in the story world and, therefore, determines the beauty of this soulful world.21 The second choice is the “realism shockwave” of the mid-1990s and the recent “subaltern writings.” These two different choices distinguish two different versions of realism: “an intuitive realism” and a “inherently unified realism.” Their difference is not whether to interpose reality, but how interpose reality. When talking about the literary practices of 1930s China, Leo Ou-fan Lee once compared the differences between “intuitive realism” and “inherently unified realism”: The literary practices of the 1930s always had a doubly important demand of writers and the text, in that it had to be not only sincere but also honest so as to experience a pure role of imagined shared experience between the writer and the reader. In this shared discourse, the literary text becomes difficult to define: the world outside the text to which its 20  Li Er, “Weishenme xie, xie shenme, zenme xie,” [Why Write? What to Write? How to Write?] Dangdai zuojia pinglun 3 (2005). 21  Wang Anyi, “Xiaoshuo de sixiang,” [The Thought of the Novel] in Wang Anyi yanjiu ziliao, 1:127.

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l­ anguage refers (the external real world) is always identical to the literary elements within the text. To elaborate, the awareness of literature or ­formalism has been permeated by the realness of reality and ­sentiment . . . perhaps we could call this kind of perspective “intuitive realism.” This mission of responsibility and remuneration to the real world in the creations of realists allows the reader to indulge in the imaginary world to the point that it completely melds with the real world, because it originates in “the truly real world.”22 What have been called “realism shockwave” and “sub­altern writings” for some intellectuals and critics unquestionably have this sense of mission and responsibility; however, in a moralistic sense, they transcend ideological values. And the theory of “inherently unified realism” demands that the effect of realism “is not through imitation” but through creation. This creation is manufactured through living materials. It reconciles an imagination that comes from reality and transforms it into a higher order.23 Reconstructing the relationship between literature and reality and renewing understanding of the relationship between text and reality clearly reprocesses the relationship between literature and the state of consciousness. In this respect, the ideas of Terrence Eagleton have had a major influence on Chinese critics. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, discussions on the problems of “pure literature” and “literariness” have reflected and amended the basic problem that has influenced literary creations for the past thirty years on a new academic foundation; however, at the same time, there is also an environment of politicization. As I see it, affirming the rationality of “pure literature” is a necessary prerequisite to our discussions today of some basic problems. When reflecting on 1980s literature and “pure literature,” some scholars gave a new interpretation to “de-politicization” at the time by arguing that de-politicization is also a form of politics and went further by raising the issue of the “re-politicization” of literature. In fact, the “de-politicization” of the 1980s was supported by a responsive state of consciousness, but the politics of “de-politicization” at the time was clearly a response to the history of “ultraleftist politics” as well as its control over literature. As we admit the political nature of literature today, granted that it has reprocessed the “aesthetic legacy of revolution” and redefined the meaning of “politics,” we should also be cautious and avoid arbitrarily referring to “re-politicization.” If “re-politicization” 22  Leo Ou-fan Lee, “Lun Zhongguo xiandai xiaoshuo de jicheng yu biange,” [On the Heritage and Transformation of the Modern Chinese Novel] in Li Oufan lun Zhongguo xiandai wenxue, 72. 23  Damian Grant, Realism, as quoted in ibid., 72.

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is used lightly, it could result in the negation and deconstruction of the history of “de-politicization.” The reinterpretation of the “de-politicization” of the 1980s, in a certain sense, also ousts parts of the bastion of 1980s literary complexity in study of literary history. There exists a vast disparity between the historical course of 1980s literature and the historical discourse over it that later formed. The “pure literature” that was central to 1980s literature was borne out of the many “ideological events” of the period; thereby, literature retreated back into itself. This shared process of growth was long stripped of a discourse of literary history, abstracted from an insulated “pure literature” structure; moreover, the interpretation of many works came to focus solely on the aspect of form. Hence, re-highlighting the literary significance of reality and ideology reduces the complexity in 1980s literary history, but this reduction cannot transition to negating the exploratory form and the abundant complexity of humanity. As stated by Nan Fan: Restating expressions like “intervening in the massive social revolution currently happening through uniquely literary means” must come after recognizing the complete rationality of “pure literature.” In other words, the emergence of the concept of “pure literature” was not just some coincidental and misguided mistake. Abnegating the aesthetic individualism sheltered by “pure literature” certainly does not drive literature back to crude sociological works. Protest and criticism do not come at the cost of the literature of sacrifice or the innermost being of characters. On the contrary, the “consciousness of form” shows that the dialogue between literature and the history surrounding it must, precisely for this reason, resort to this profound literary form.24 When reprocessing the relationship between literature and reality, if we go too far in our zeal, our attempts to break the diametric opposition between the “inside” and “outside” may all be for naught. Regardless of the context of reality or the epistemological lineage of literature, they are all in a state of transition. This transition affects the “state of thought” in literature. What is reality? How should we think? For literature, the process of fracturing may be more significant than the actual crumbling.

24  Nan Fan, “Si zhong zou: wenxue, geming, zhishifenzi yu dazhong,” [Four Rhythms: Literature, Revolution, Intellectuals, and the Masses] Wenxue pinglun 2 (2003).

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Works Cited Han Shaogong. “Wenxue: mengyou yu suxing.” [Literature: Sleep Walking and Waking] In Zhongguo dangdai zuojia mianmianguan: wenxue de zijue [A Panorama of Contemporary Chinese Writers: Literary Consciousness], ed. Lin Jianfa. Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2010. Lee Ou-fan Lee. Li Oufan lun Zhongguo xiandai wenxue [Leo Ou-fan Lee on Chinese Modern Literature], ed. Li Jin. Shanghai: Shanghai sanlian shushe, 2010. ———. “Lun Zhongguo xiandai xiaoshuo de jicheng yu biange,” [On the Heritage and Transformation of the Modern Chinese Novel] Li Oufan lun Zhongguo xiandai wenxue, 72. Li Er. “Weishenme xie, xie shenme, zenme xie.” [Why Write? What to Write? How to Write?] Dangdai zuojia pinglun 3 (2005). Mo Yan. “Hanwei changpian xiaoshuo de zunyan.” [A Defense of the Dignity of the Novel] Dangdai zuojia pinglun 6 (2006). Nan Fan. “Si zhong zou: wenxue, geming, zhishifenzi yu dazhong.” [Four Rhythms: Literature, Revolution, Intellectuals, and the Masses] Wenxue pinglun 2 (2003). “Sixiangjie paohong wenxuejie: dangdai Zhongguo wenxue tuoli xianshi, quefan sixiang.” [Intellectuals Eviscerate Literature: Contemporary Chinese Literature Has Become Estranged from Reality and Lacks Thought] Nandu zhoukan, May 12, 2006. Taylor, Charles. Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013. Wang Anyi. Wang Anyi yanjiu ziliao [Source for Studies on Wang Anyi], ed. Zhang Xinying and Jin Li. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2009. ———. “Xiaoshuo de chuangzuo.” [The Creation of the Novel] Huacheng 6 (2008). “Wenxuejie fanji sixiangjie: bu dong jiu bie xiashuo.” [Literature Counter-Attacks Intellectuals: Don’t Talk about Things You Don’t Understand] Nandu zhoukan, May 29, 2006. Yu Dafu. Foreword to Zhongguo xinwenxue daxi: sanwen er ji. [Series on Chinese New Literary Studies: Second Volume On Essays] Shanghai: Liangyou tushu yinshua gongsi, 1935. Zhou Yang. “Jiwang kailai, fanrong shehuizhuyi xin shiqi de wenyi: yijiuqijiu nian shiyi yue yi ri zai Zhongguo wenxue yishu zongzuozhe disici daibiao dahui shang de baogao.” [Literature and Arts for the Future and New Era of Socialist Prosperity: Report from Fourth Congress of Workers in the Literature and Arts Industry November 1, 1979] Renmin ribao, November 20, 1979.

CHAPTER 8

Between History and Modernity: Thoughts on the State of Modern Literary Studies and Criticism Zhang Qinghua For many years, the critique of modern literary criticism has been relentless; the progress achieved by some modern literary research in recent years has received the accolades of many people in the field. It has gotten to the point that in many private discussion there is often a comparison with the prominent modern literary research in previous years, and it is generally argued that, overall, the quality and passion in recent years has “surpassed” research in the past. Of course, to the delight of many, this shows that the misgivings about modern literary long held by many have clearly been addressed. Originally, many considered modern literary research an “excuse for research” just to talk about something and present their own ideas and theories but never considered its own “ontological” position. Now, literature finally has a condition and a reason for its own establishment. The reality, however, is much more complicated than is generally claimed. What is the state of modern literary research and criticism? In what ways have they succeeded or failed? What is the relationship between research and criticism? To answer these questions through careful study, we must start from a realistic perspective that links us to history.

Standpoint and Perspective: How to Evaluate Modern Literary Criticism and Research

There are, of course, many perspectives for investigating the state of modern Chinese literary research and criticism. First and foremost is the perspective of logic. Four problems have borne the brunt of criticism that cannot be neglected. These four problems are actually four different perspectives: s­ cientific, modernity, humanities, and literary. Clearly, three of these ­perspectives—the scientific, humanities, and literary perspectives—are necessary measures to consider in any literary research. The perspective of modernity is something that should be maintained in any investigation of modern literary research and criticism and is the locus of essential traits in “modern literature,” “­modern © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004308886_009

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literary research,” and “modern literary criticism.” At the same time, these four issues, however, evidently are intricately linked. “Scientific” properties, for example, as far as modern literature is concerned, have in recent years expressed themselves a stalwartly “historicized” trend and impulse. One could describe the “historicization” of literature as an expression of the scientific perspective and will of modern literature. Furthermore, in certain circumstances, “modernity” is also a characteristic of the “humanities,” and the “scientific,” as far as literary research is concerned, ought to be included in the “literary.” The truth, however, is often unsatisfactory. These elements can also reject and exclude one another. The scientific, for example, could also exclude modernity and humanities. The recently popular “cultural studies” and “historical criticism,” to varying degrees, have inclined toward weakening literary evaluations. Conversely, an overemphasis on the humanities and literary could also come at the cost of excluding the scientific. There have been many examples of this over the past years. Another perspective of investigation is the historical. If we reflect back on the modern literary research and criticism of the past thirty years, we find a dramatic shift in the historical. Of course, we find a variety of disagreements in historical understanding due to different standpoints. For many of those who personally experience the critical practices of the 1980s, for example, the state of critique in this generation seems almost idealized and mythicized. For many younger critics, it is quite the opposite. This was merely a restoration of the basic function of critique within the bounds of “experience” and “common sense.” If we wish to remain impartial in this, however, we find another aspect to the problem; that is because of critique itself and the relative weakness of methodology, it has come to respect and highlight the ontological position of objects and, moreover, maintained a closely responsive relationship with modern social change. This has been the unique advantage of 1980s literary criticism. In the 1990s, literary research and criticism headed toward professionalization and institutionalization. Many people have been critical of this, arguing that methodology had overwhelmed the object, theory had transgressed the text, and criticism had gradually lost its concern for the literary and aesthetical. Objectively speaking, it was in this period that the quality and cultural content of research and criticism truly improved. Although the position of “literary ontology” fell, the apex of “theoretical ontology” was truthfully a sight to behold. Those in the field of modern literary research and criticism, in a theoretical sense, were seemingly “armed to the teeth.” These are things that cannot be neglected by anyone with any historical sense or knowledgeable insight. Hence, in some ways, the literary criticisms of the 1990s were a practical boot camp for literature in the 1990s. It was also something that was

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borne out of the literary history of the 1980s and before by providing it with complex and profound explanations. As this writer sees it, any evaluation of literary criticism in the 1990s that does not consider this point is not being objective. From this perspective, we find that modern literary research and criticism since the last century perhaps took off in a backlash against the popular “cultural studies” and “cultural criticism” of the 1990s. The cohesion and revision of history itself emerged in the new century as strongly “historicized thought” to methodologically and conceptually revise the repression and disregard of “literary ontology.” At the same time, “historicization” was an inevitable improvement on criticism, research, modernity, and science, and some methods and perspectives in historicized research are actually an extension of cultural studies and criticism. In this sense, “historicized thought” was not just borne out of the literature of the 1980s and before, but has been prepared by the literary critique since 1990s. Its conclusion and critique have a double significance. This way of putting it, however, easily falls into the trap of the simplistic logic of “historical positivism.” In fact, the state of literary criticism and research in recent years been in a serious state of decay or even decline, particularly when it comes to self-criticism. The loud cries of condemnation have also been unavoidable. On the one hand, objectively speaking, the crisis of faith in literary criticism has arisen because of the overly high and inappropriate expectations bestowed on critique by many people, claiming that it could easily stem the tide of the co-optation of literature by market rules or halt a supposed “literary decline.” They have claimed that literary critique can clean out the dust and rubble within literature and provide literature with a clearly defined order. The fact is that it is difficult for literary criticism alone to play the role of a “restored framework” for practical literature, in that it will provide a critical framework like Lu Xun or even the caustic violence in Cultural Revolution literature. It is also unable to exterminate the new kinds of “sensual fiction” or even the literature that acts as a “whoring textbook” by adding perversion and skill.1 What is more of a matter of opinion is that some of the authors who had once been derided by Lu Xun have today been “rehabilitated.” Literary criticism is not a simple moral judgment. Many literary works that have been accused of moral failings or have been politically decried have been reinterpreted as classics. Even many banned “taboo” books from the 1990s, such as Big 1  See Lu Xun, “Geming wenxue,” [Revolutionary Literature] “Hei’an Zhongguo de wenyijie de xianzhuang,” [The Dark State of Chinese Literature] and “Shanghai wenyi zhi yipie,” [A Glance at Shanghai Literature] in Lu Xun xuanji [The Complete Collection of Lu Xun] (Ji’nan: Shandong wenyi chubanshe, 1990), 199, 249, 254.

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Breasts and Wide Hips and Deserted City, have had their bans lifted and have been republished. Otherwise, Li Jianwu would not have said, “the enemy of a great work is never the reader but the critiques from the same generation.”2 The countless tragedies that were once directed by the strong-armed literary criticism of the “seventeen years”3 should caution us that weakness in literary criticism is not necessarily a bad thing. On the other hand, however, we should also have an accurate perspective of the problems of literary criticism itself. At a minimum, it should have a “textual transitivity” that can summarize the literary state and experience of an era through interpretive practices and, moreover, incorporate intellectual genealogy into literary history and become a resource and component of literary research. This kind of function, unfortunately, seems to have vanished recently. If we demand even more, then it would have to have a “realistic transitivity” or an ideological and cultural modernity, in that it formed a transitory or responsive relationship with the thought of an era and the humanities spirit, and thus create and maintain what Hegel referred to as the form and organic component of the zeitgeist. From this perspective, the ideal situation for the literary research and criticism of an era should be a balance among the four dimensions and principles, and the historical sense and modernity of literature in particular should be fully embodied. In fact, in recent years, these dimensions have shown a clear pattern of imbalance, which is expressed in the scientific and historicized dimensions and has become an increasing trend. This has greatly enriched the academic foundation and scientific context of modern literature and greatly expanded the methodological space for literary studies and criticism. In contrast to this is the weakening and inadequacy of dimensions of modernity and humanities, as literary dimensions have nearly been lost and their standards are in disarray. First, this expresses itself as a doubly important criticism of reality and text in vibrant representations. Second, the disjunction between academic research and reality and text are not being mutually sustained in a relationship between background and resources. This leads directly to u ­ ncertainty in the state of literature since the 1990s and evasive narratives. It has led to the near end of the literary interpretive experience from the “new generation” and post-1970s ­writers. Third are the production demands on academic dynamism expressed as technology, professionalization, and knowledge and the birth and 2  Li Jianwu, “Xiandai Zhongguo xuyao de wenxue pipingjia,” [The Literary Critics that Modern China Needs] Da gong bao, December 15, 1934 (128), Literature supplement. 3  The “seventeen years” refers to the PRC from 1949 to 1966, the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.—Trans.

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emergence of very little humanities literary ideology. This has resulted in the gradual loss of a zeitgeist and spirit in modern literary research and criticism. The main analysis here is on the meandering and imbalance between historicization and modernity. This writer does not intend to make an either-or judgment or pros and cons evaluation between historicization and modernity but, rather, to analyze a general imbalance. This imbalance, of course, was not created by “the strengthening of historicization” itself but emerged from the weakness of thought among intellectuals and literary circles in general. The historicization movement in recent years has supported modern literary a­ cademic space and expanded the framework; however, it is clear that this alone will be insufficient to support literature.

The Historicized Wave of Thought: Between Science and the Humanities

“Historicization” is a topic that has only recently emerged from the depths of the academic waters and is one of the clear points of growth in recent literary research and criticism. As this author sees it, however, historicized modern literature is certainly not a praxis, as it is more akin to a continually sustainable movement that has been going on for a long time. Since history goes on forever, the “present” is constantly becoming the “past,” so historicization is unavoidable. It does, at times, accelerate and becomes an intellectual trend due to certain outside environmental factors and the collective desires of people. Since the 1990s, for a variety of reasons—such as the historical sense of closure that emerged at the turn of the century; the “new interpretative” craze that emerged after the “historical detoxification” in “red” narratives and Cultural Revolution literature; the new methodologies and perspectives in cultural studies and literary sociology; the new parsing impulses of modern history and ideological state that were initiated by new perspectives; and even the expansions of the academic scope in institutions of higher education- of course, the most important reasons remain that, since modern literature has already been around for almost half a century it has far surpassed the history of the “thirty years of modern literary,” and thus it has led to a strong compulsion to eliminate the subordinate role of “modern literature” and the properties of “literary critique.” At present, “historicization” expresses itself primarily in two forms. The first is as a concept, in that it is a way of perceiving problems. As early as 1995, at a conference Chen Sihe once described it like this: “the humanistic of literary criticism is the same as the historicity of literary criticism . . . historical interest, historical convictions, and even the simplistic incorporation and massaging

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of historical materials are key for literary criticism to escape its current intellectual impasse.”4 The meaning of this is clearly to reinforce historical consciousness as an important dimensional value in literary critique. Lacking a sensitive comprehension of history and keen observation of historical discourse, literary criticism also lacks realism and literary significance. In the early 1990s, Chen proposed the “folk” theory. The historical logic of the shifting role of modern intellectuals from the “temples” to “city squares” and even to “work units” that Chen described could all be described as keen observations of this historical consciousness and assist in responding to the spiritual realism of the early 1990s. These problems, however, always have a dual nature. In terms of literary historical practices, these historical consciousness and concepts as directed in the Chinese Contemporary Literary History Curriculum, although the invocation of Foucauldian power discourse has allowed many nonmainstream texts or “potential writings” to become part of the framework of literary history, some scholars have also argued that the problem with this methodology is that “it comes at the cost of ‘forgetting’ ‘knowledge in literary history.’ . . . What this kind of literary history tells later generations of scholars is that as people try to ‘purify’ the historical environment and its facade through narrative . . . it is just going back to the starting point of historical understanding in A Three-Way Discussion on Twentieth-Century Literature by Qian Liqun, Huang Ziping, and Chen Pingyuan.”5 What will be the precise historical consciousness that can be seen or the effort to reattempt historical revision in a “historical ontology”? What kinds of disagreements will arise in historical narratives and other fundamental methodologies? Second is a relatively conscious effort to maintain historicized practices, but without manipulating one kind of historical narrative to suppress and overthrow another historical narrative and generally reflecting on the methodology of literary history. The most representative figure in this respect is Hong Zicheng. Since he began lecturing in 1999 and since the publication of his works Chinese Modern Literary History in 1999 and Problems and Methodologies in 2002, his understanding of the practice of historicization concepts has emerged:

4  See Gao Yuanbao, “Wenxue piping zhong lishi kuifanzheng de jiuzhi: fang Chen Sihe,” [The Cure to the Historical Deficiency Syndrome in Chinese Criticism] Dangdai zuojia pinglun 4 (1995). 5  Cheng Guangwei, “Lishi chongshi yu ‘dangdai’ wenxue” [Historical reinterpretation and “Modern” Literature] Wenyi zhengming 7 (2007).

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How were these facts, concepts, and values with which we are all familiar but never questioned in previous literary histories formed? How were they constituted? This is my main thought on the 1990s. . . . Through this kind of “cleansing,” we discover the dislocations and fractures within the exposed cracks of past narratives that have superficially appeared very constricted and monolithic and an overall episteme that have appeared to be smoothed over by terminology and thus uncover the contradictory nature and discrepancies within them. This methodology uncovered problems in the conclusions of the original narrative, or that is to say, to “start” with the “end point” of any given narrative.6 These ideas could be thought of as the basic guiding thought behind “historicized thought” up to the present. This has unquestionably been the habit of thought in modern literary studies since their departure from “literary criticism,” the highlight of their role in “academic research,” and an iconic starting point of their scientific uniqueness. There are, however, aspects of literary history practices that have left some people feeling unsatisfied. For example, the relative “creakiness” in narratives resembles that in other literary history narratives, in that “[they] fail to directly express the substantive meaning of the psychological spiritual culture encapsulated in literary history and the spiritual lineage of writers.”7 Li Yang clearly outlined the general idea of “historicization” in 2002 in the “Epilogue” to A Reinterpretation of Chinese Literary Classics Between the 1950s and 1970s. He argues that, whether we see post-1980s literature as a negation of the political literature of the 1950s and the 1970s as a methodological component of modern literature or the incorporation of the “pretentious” perspective of post-1990s “literary production” and “homogeneity” in literary history methodology, they are both unfair. “Regardless of whether the theoretical basis of these methodologies are derived from Foucault or Bourdieu, their ideological underpinnings no longer have any positive contribution.” Li states: Perhaps I have been heavily influenced by the Fredric Jameson’s idea of “always historicized.” Jameson states his disinterest in the “permanence” and “timelessness” of things. His view of these things starts from history. According to my understanding, “historicization” here refers to any 6  Hong Zicheng, Wenti yu fangfa [Problems and Methods] (Hong Kong: Joint, 2002), 89. 7  Gao Yuanbao, “Zuojia quexi de wenxueshi: dui jinqi san ben ‘Zhongguo dangdai wenxueshi’ jiaocai de jiantao” [The Literary History of Author Absence: A Review of Three Recent “Modern Chinese Literary History” Text Books] Dangdai zuojie pinglun 5 (2006).

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e­ ffective theory that is understood within the historical discourse of the time; moreover, “historicization” not only implies the “historicization” of an object, but also, more importantly should also at the same time “­historicize” oneself.8 This should be described as a node of discourse in recent modern literary “historicized thought.” This perspective is a reflection not only on the criticism of “pure literature mythology” constructed in the literary field of the 1980s but also on the “historical perspective of enlightenment literature” or “the historical perspective of liberal literature.” This perspective has been a theoretical push for a new round of studies in the history of left-wing writers and a theoretical elevation of “reinterpretations of red classics” in the 1990s. This has particularly true for the idea of “historicizing oneself,” which has far-reaching consequences for the repositioning of the subjectivity of modern literary studies. The same problems, however, exist in two directions: upon integrating the research practices of literary history, the reflective and heuristic nature of these concepts may also face the danger of “historical relativism”—in that any textual product is a product of historical discourse and thus returns to the textual interpretation of historical discourse. In the end, this may become a testament to historical rationality and even legitimacy. As a result, all ideological literature, despite their problems, possesses a raison d’être and foundation. Regardless of whether it is the internalizing of “folk culture” or a “concealed folk narrative structure” or the hard shell of consciousness bounded by a “red” text, they all have interpretative significance, and it is difficult for the interpreter not to fall into the ideological framework of “new leftism” or at least fall into the Hegalian relativist historical logic of “that which is real is reasonable.” With respect to 1980s literature, however, this problem is another situation entirely, because literature of the 1980s does not have an issue of “ideological determinism.” When extending the field of historicization, it has a turn for the better. Because of continual calls by scholars recently to “revisit the 1980s,” there has been a gradual flourishing of historicized literary research in the past few years.9 Thus trends in modern literary research have experienced a major 8  Li Yang, postscript to 50–70 niandai Zhongguo wenxue jingdian zaijiedu [A Reinterpretation of 1950s to 1970s Modern Chinese Literary Classics] (Ji’nan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe, 2002). 9  Cheng Guangwei held a seminar on “Revisiting the 1980s” for his graduate students in April 2006. Cha Jianying edited 80 niandai fangtan lu [Discussions on the 1980s] (Joint Publishing); the same year, Cheng Guangwei and Li Yang wrote a column titled “Revisiting the 1980s,” in Dangdai zuojia pinglun [Review of Modern Writers], focused on promoting relevant articles.

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shift and have expanded into new spaces. In Cheng Guangwei’s estimation, looking at 1980s literature through a historicized lens breaks down the overall structure of “new literature” and fixed descriptions, which allows scholars to re-engage in historical discourse and leads to a host of literary phenomena and historical contexts of literary narratives, because: By selecting the 1980s as the core path of re-entry into “the thirty years of new literature,” it has determined the centrality of the 1980s in the literature for thirty years. Our literary concepts, ideas, and perspective of “new literature” has been basically shaped in the 1980s. Hence, we must on the foundation of eliminating the “holistic” theory of new literature that has already formed, “re-defamiliarized” ourselves with the knowledge, concepts, and understanding that we already possess; otherwise, our understanding of new literature will halt with literary criticism and literary thought in the 1980s.10 This idea is similar to the previously discussed idea in Hong Zicheng’s statement that a narrative should “ ‘start’ with the ‘end point,’ ” which is also in the same vein of thought as Li Yang’s description of “historicizing objects” and “historicizing oneself.” He believes that it is undoubtedly inevitable that there will be a shift to objective research in modern literary criticism from a historical position to a re-engagement with historical discourse.

Some particularly relevant articles include Li Yang, “Chongfan bashi niandai: weihe chongfan yiji ruhe chongfan,” [Revisiting the 1980s: Why Revisit and How to Revisit?] Dangdai zuojia pinglun [Review of Modern Writers] 1 (2007); Wang Yao, “‘Chongfan 80 niandai’ yu dangdai wenxueshi lunshu [Revisiting the 1980s and Discourse on Modern Literary History],” Jianghai xuebao 5 (2005); Cheng Guangwei, “Lishi chongshi yu ‘­dangdai’ wenxue” [Historical Reinturpretation and “Modern” Literature]; idem, “Dangdai wenxue xueke de ‘lishihua,’ ” [The “Historicization” of the Field of Modern Literature] Wenyi zhengming 4 (2008). According to Cheng Guangwei’s calculations, over 100 articles have been produced from the seminar he held. See Yang Qingxiang and Chen Huaji, ed., Lishi duihua de kenengxing: renda ketang yu bashi niandai wenxue [The Possibility of Historical Dialogue: The National People’s Congress Lecture on 1980s Literature] (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue wenxueyuan, 2009). 10  Cheng Guangwei, foreword to Yang and Chen, Lishi duihua de kenengxing [The Possibility of Historical Dialogue].

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This also seems to imply a contradiction between an intention and a c­ onclusion: if we say the “reinterpretation of red classics” lends some sort of textual “historical defense” to a specific historical context, then the essence of a “return to the 1980s” has contrary intentions. This intention disrupts hardened identity stereotypes and eliminates the centrally established literary historical narrative through 1980s literary concepts, and this kind of dismantling, although it re-expands a massive historical space, reproduces in the end what might also be another “historical maze.” Is the point of this to describe and establish another historical monolith in an even greater sense? If it is, then what kind of ­historical monolith is this? If it is not, then on what kind of “historical imagination” will people base their understanding of the position of 1980s literature and even the entirety of modern literature? How do we ­specifically imagine and value “red literature,” “1980s literature,” “1990s literature,” and “new c­ entury” literature? This question is difficult to avoid but also difficult to answer. Clearly, historicization and its practice in literary research face a common or similar difficulty. Historicization has launched a scientific process in modern literary studies and has re-defamiliarized itself from many historical phenomena and greatly expanded its ontology of modern literature. However, as it has eradicated a holistic history and begun to doubt the basic nomenclature of received literary historical narratives, it has also allowed the fractured return to the 1980s and unavoidably led to the intellectualization of research; on a deeper level, it even faces ontological and value confusion in that it has neglected the “text” and “literariness” as well as overthrown literary historical narratives that are ideologically driven by enlightenment and liberalism. Whether it is the historical imagination of enlightenment or liberalism, they are two major intellectual models of post-1980s modern literature and even modern literary studies. It has been the most effective path to allow them to cast off the shackles of reality and rewrite politicized historical biases. In a certain sense, this is an organic component of modern literature and a major spiritual legacy of modern Chinese intellectuals. Thus, this reflection on historical narratives inevitably carries with it “scientific” properties and “de-humanistic” trends in the name of science. This is determined by a quiddity that cannot be restored by history itself; therefore, the proper meaning of historicization should also include investigations of established histories of modern literary historical narratives and modern spirituality, mentality, and epistemology of modern intellectuals. Only in this way can we have a relatively objective understanding of the achievements of its humanistic properties, and this is a necessary requisite for any reexamination of history. In this sense, Cheng Guangwei alerts us to an understanding of the limitations of “reexamining” research.

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He argues that reexamining has no ultimate destination, but merely exposes “the possibilities of historical dialogue . . . the so-called ‘conclusions’ of literary history are provisional, fragmentary, and thus temporary.”11 This quotation rationally shows the boundaries of the significance of historicizing concepts.

Cultural Studies: Beyond Literature and Reality—Between Methodology and Ontology

The rise of “cultural criticism” in the 1990s shows that there has been a trend toward integration in recent years. In the early years, scholars often individually employed postmodernism, postcolonialism, deconstructionism, feminism, new historicism, psychoanalysis, and other theories. Recently, cultural sociology, popular culture, and even narratology have been combined into an increasingly complex, interlinked, and seamless theory. Additionally, the conclusions of this cultural criticism spread to China through the travels of European and Western scholars as well as foreign sinologists, which brought with it a host of research angles on things like the cultural imagination of the third world, the background of globalization, and the cultural identity of intellectuals. Cultural criticism has aligned Chinese and foreign scholarship in a way that has been vigorous and lively. For much of modern literary studies and criticism, cultural criticism has gradually become mainstream and is even in the process of growing. One could also say that modern Chinese scholars have greatly grown because of their exposure to the techniques of cultural studies and criticism and taking on a greater interpretative responsibility toward complex modern literary and cultural problems; moreover, on a conceptual level, it has completed a convergence of modern global culture and literary thought. Methodologically, the continued growth of cultural studies and criticism has given force to the “historicization movement,” and the two have formed a corrective relationship. This has proven crucial for the growth and maturation of modern literary studies and criticism. This evaluation is not overly optimistic, because methodology can both override ontologies and highlight the object. This ontological establishment lends more rational meaning to the use of methodology. On this point, the two act to highlight each other. From some of the research already in hand, not only has cultural studies widened our field of view but some have even directly constructed methodologies in historicized studies. For example, literary sociology and historical criticism in some current revisionist studies are widely used, and the two of them have strongly 11  Chen, “Lishi chongshi yu ‘dangdai’ wenxue.”

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r­ einforced each other. For example, Li Yang’s work on the revolutionary narrative discourse between the 1950s and the 1970s, He Guimei’s work on the changing historical circumstances of authors between the 1940s and 1950s, and Meng Fanhua’s cultural sociology of modern Chinese revolutionary literature and cultural production have all clearly integrated two different consciousnesses and methodologies.12 In Hong Zicheng’s Problems and Methodologies, we also see the lessons of this methodology in cultural research, such as the discourse on the literary imagined “communities,” literary institutions, author identity, print media, and classical questions, are all shared perspectives in cultural studies. At the same time, cultural criticism has enriched the essential thesis of literary research through its broad theoretical scope, penetrating literary and cultural questions, building a relationship between its intervention and response in Chinese reality, and thus discovering the meaning of “modernity.” The innate problems of cultural criticism—ontological methodology, ontological practices, and ontological non-objectivism—similarly call for reflection. Since the 1990s, the success achieved by cultural criticism has mainly been limited to a revolution in and construction of methodology. In other words, although the 1990s experienced an unprecedented theoretical vibrancy in Chinese literary and cultural fields, and concepts and perspectives were entirely revised, the degree of its involvement in real problems and its objectivity have been relatively thin. Although Jameson, the main “missionary” of postmodernist theory in China, highly emphasized critical theories in historical dimensions and some scholars in cultural criticism have claimed that they have been heavily influenced by historicism,13 Chinese modern cultural studies and criticism have always uniquely focused on going beyond history. Whether it was the popularity of “postmodernism” in the early 1990s or research theses on “modernity” at the turn of the century, they are all marked by this unique quality, in that they do not generally consider the historical properties of theory, nor do they consider phenomenological and textual markers of reality. It is a classic example of a faddish land grab or “king of the hill” way of doing 12  See He Guimei, Zhuanzhe de shidai: 40–50 niandai zuojia yanjiu [Transitional Period: A Study of 1940s and 1950s Writers] (Ji’nan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003); Meng Fanhua, Chuanmei yu wenhua lingdaoquan: dangdai Zhongguo de wenhua shengchan yu wenhua rentong [Communication and Cultural Leadership: Cultural Identity and Production in Modern China] (Ji’nan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshu, 2003). 13  As Meng Yue put it: “In the past when doing literary criticism, they enjoyed taking h ­ istory as a framework of meaning and analytical perspective in analyzing text. This was the influence of Jameson.” See Ren, lishi, jiayuan: wenhua piping san diao [People, History, Family: Three Tones of Cultural Criticism] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshi, 2006), 420.

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things, so only after many years of discussion first of “postmodernism” were there any later discussions of the problems of “modernity.” This must make a lot of people feel as if time had turned back. In today’s noise over discussions on the problems of “modernity,” recalling the “postmodernity of modern literature,” it has been like a whispering wind in the tunnel of time—full of confusion and imagined phantoms. I am certainly not denying the contributions of many theorists to postmodern theory and textual interpretation but still believe to this day that Chen Xiaoming’s A Boundless Challenge truly opened modern literature to a spatial understanding of new wave literature and avantgarde novels. He helped clarify the hard theoretical exterior of “postmodernism” incisively and broadly interpret the cultural significance of avant-garde novels and textual features. He completely changed the dynamics of “theory being more backward than creations” in modern literature and the awkward position of “interpretations being unable to keep up with the text.” He even deeply shaped the direction of post-avant-garde novels, advancing the entire discursive production of modern literary criticism. In the past dozen years, returning to this topic, the “historical order” will not tolerate questioning it on this theoretical basis. Hence it may be that “nonhistoricization” is a natural problem of contemporary Chinese cultural criticism. The influx of many Western philosophical and cultural ideas in the 1980s and 1990s created a crowding of antiparadigm and illogical theories and an oddly full ideological landscape that directly led to this long-lasting, abundant, yet hectic cornucopia in contemporary Chinese theory and allowed critical practices bred through theory to lose their historical position. The crux of this has had two clear results. The first is that the historically logical relationship among theories has become chaotic. For example, interpretations and research into questions of “modernity” have devolved into a massive theoretical game precisely because of this disorder. For many discussants, modernity is no longer just the “five faces of modernity” but has evolved into a bizarre multifaceted prism. In the context of many discussions, modernity has difficulty in taking into account the historical properties of text and is instead concerned only with uncovering something that will elevate a theoretical framework. Regardless of the perspective or the position of the original work, this kind of discussion in the end can all be linked to modernity, and any linkage also implies a value judgment and classification of legitimacy. This fundamentally vulgarizes an important question and trivialized any major thesis that concerns itself with social practices and historical direction. In the end, whether it is the “modernity of cultural traitor” or the “modernity of authoritarianism,” they all lack boundaries. The right and the left have collided in the maze of concepts and values:

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Literature has devolved into . . . a modern story of Western historic time and space or chivalrous romance. Its historic pain, its floundering restlessness, and its historically deep sigh that lets out a sound that relentlessly continues to the present from the depths of the soul has utterly collapsed in the face of the ravages of post-modernity, becoming the fragments of the story of “modernity.”14 This is certainly not the description of an alarmist. Another result has been the “nonmaterialism” of criticism. Studies based on deconstructionist philosophy or cultural practices guided by deconstruction, regardless of whether they are the newer narratologies of historicism, feminism, deconstructionism, and psychoanalysis or the established narratologies of cultural poetics and aestheticism, as an act of cultural research and criticism, should all have a clear purpose that confronts contemporary Chinese culture and spiritual reality. If we say that cultural studies are by nature a generally left-wing activity, then the core gist of it should be there. They do not rationalize history, legitimize reality, moralize power, nuance cultural phenomenon, or enlarge and symbolize interpreted objects and limitless text through their own interpretation—quite the contrary. The theories of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, regardless of the angle from which one begins—semantics, narrative, language, or form—point in the end to the power and center in history, including the center of concepts and semantics, and not some fetish for the garish floridness of concepts and theories themselves. In contemporary Chinese discourse, it is difficult to produce this kind of multifarious cultural criticism with a cultural purpose and spiritual force. This is the main reason for the superficiality of people’s sense of values and the tenacity of people’s sense of disorientation. It has made it extremely difficult to illuminate the characteristics, values, and meaning of a whole series of cultural events in modern China. When any judgment needs to be made, there is a whole litany of diametrically opposed interpretations and conflicts. We could refer to this chaotic logic in these theories and values as the “structured chaos” of modern Chinese culture. This massive sense of dislocation between this logical chaos and history are mutually derived, often placing cultural criticism in a pointless, maligned, and awkward position. Debates surrounding humanistic problems, for example, a spiritual event of truly profound meaning, have halted on theses of “central morality,” but have been unable to expand our understanding to the level of intellectual cultural identity, authority, and aspirational values. They have also failed to understand disagreements from the perspective of modern 14  Chen, “Lishi chongshi yu ‘dangdai’ wenxue.”

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Chinese historical and cultural structure as well as the socioeconomic structure. Even those involved in the debate have been unable to find a complete and clear value paradigm for themselves and have abstractly delineated moral boundaries based on a “pure spirit” or “refusal to surrender.” Of course, compelling statements on the ambiguity at times are understandable, but ambiguity in theory inevitably leads to a debate that is unable to progress and is also unable to truly intervene and affect real life. Similarly, many works of writing have been imbued with fresh and complicated concepts and models in the name of cultural criticism. The authority, nationalism, ideology, and the cultural desires of the bourgeoisie or citizens have been legitimately rearranged and repackaged, while intellectuals have been thoroughly removed from the values and perspective they really held. There is one more point on the literary thinness and vacuity. At the beginning, cultural criticism was a rejection of aesthetic research, because of its uselessness for studying questions with objectivity and nuance; however, as a study of culture in literary studies, it should search for a “medium of meaning” in literary interpretations that have literary elements; otherwise, this kind of research may very well blur the boundaries between text and history, magnifying textual studies and becoming a neutral or pointless interpretive exercise. For example, studies on “red” narratives in the Maoist era have made tremendous progress in the past decade. Illustrative works have reinterpreted cultural meaning. Scholars have found in the modern nation-state parable interactions between sexuality and politics, and a multitude of variations and possibilities in modernity. These, of course, are very significant, but most research has forgotten the role of literature as an assessment. The result has been that it does not contribute any literary assessments of substantive value to a host of text. It does not show the fictionality of some text through analysis or the participation borne through power narratives and text, but has become a singular quest for “modernity,” whether apparent or concealed. Another point is that there are many works with a relative abundance of narrative structure and text for which criticism has lacked the ability for interpretation. For example, in many “red” text, many elements derive from traditional narratives and Western narrative; however, interpreters have not sought out these basic literary elements and thus are also unable to provide a truly exploratory interpretation of their literary meaning. The previous points, of course, are only able to provide hypercritical points on cultural studies and criticism, but in general, it is undeniable that cultural criticism has elevated and improved contemporary literary studies.

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The Retreat of Criticism: The Scarcity of Ideas and Experiential Stagnation

There are critical activities in addition of cultural criticism that primarily occur in “literary science.” There has been ceaseless debate on the value of this kind of criticism. Its critics and defenders each have reasons, and it is difficult to say which say has the upper hand. As this author sees it, it would not be overly harsh to attribute this all to “sentimental critique” or the commoditized “red envelope critique”,15 but objectively speaking, the transformative trends in literary criticism are markedly clear. From a historical point of view, the “progressive” components of critical methodology, conceptualizations, and technology at the same time contrast with the process of gradual decline in intrinsic spirit and practical function. If we see this kind of decline as merely a Benjaminian “civilizational allegory,” then the question of what the direction of the literary criticism will be over the next few years is certainly worth pursuing. What should be looked at, admittedly, is that as literature has increasingly become “distinct from the globalized mainstream, becoming an orphaned ghost wandering in the spiritual wilderness,” literary theory has “travelled this structural block with the disruption of literature” and has transformed into “a free exposition of diversity and individuality.”16 This is generally better than some theory serving the purpose of political or ideological unity; however, regardless of how many characteristics it has or how free it is, the effectiveness of literary criticism must still be established on the basis of the “experiential public” and “reliable knowledge” that it can completely process the relationship between “literature” and the zeitgeist and between “text” and “reader.” According to this standard, we see the continued decay of “historical allegory”: reminiscing about the 1980s, realistic demands for social change, the rationality and passion of the enlightenment, and, on top of that, the fanaticism of the modernism movement that once inspired the literary criticism of our times, but now this inherent passion has receded, leading to the gradual loss of the soul and spirit of literary criticism. People have often projected this irreversible historical “declining logic” onto the real and common activities of literary criticism, and thus there are other “­preconceptions” 15  By “red envelope critique” the author essentially means a quid-pro-quo positive review in exchange for money.—Trans. 16  Chen Sihe, “Shidai, wenxue, geren,” [Era, Literature, and Individual] Dangdai zuojia ping­ lun 6 (2008).

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besides the ­specifics of textual criticism: irrespective of what the current condition of criticism is or how expert, mature, or sophisticated the vision of a specific text is, they have all been feeble in showing the destiny and tragedy of these conclusions in their massive historic logic. Beginning with this precondition, even in a “specialized” sense, it is very difficult to construct a “positivist narrative” of contemporary literary criticism, and the more historical the perspective, the clearer is this logical decline: Although literary criticism in the 1980s was crude and overstretched in its aesthetic understanding and theoretical methodology, it closely participated in and advanced Chinese intellectual change. It has maintained a close responsive relationship with the cultural ideas of this period and the literary spirit. It has also had a direct impact on a series of literary events. This is something that no later activities of literary criticism have been able to replicate. By the early 1990s, literary criticism had gradually lost its ability to directly intervene in the public intellectual sphere, but criticism still maintains active influence, even leading literary creativity. It clearly still plays a role in adding fuel to the fire and interpreting avant-garde literature, new realism, new historical novels, feminist novels, and other ideas and movements. By the end of the 1990s and the turn of the millennium, literary criticism had gradually lost its role in directing and affecting the literary movement and literary production; however, it still maintains its most basic function in that it is an interpretation and consolidation of the literary experiential paradigm. It was just at this moment that the most important part of historical change in modern literature, such as avant-garde novels, was an intricate and methodical interpretation derived from the hands of a generation of critics born in the 1960s, which allowed it to become a part of the classic paradigm of modern literary experience, and moreover, act as a fixed aesthetic achievement of literary reform over twenty years. When we cast our eyes on the past few years, nonetheless, we find that literary criticism seems to have lost even on this account. As a realistic illustration since “new generation” writings, how did our literary landscape change in the end? What kind of new experiences were provided by this new generation of writers? How were they distinct from previous generations of writers? These days we do not see these predominant interpretations. That is, literary criticism seems to have degraded into a real-time game of wordplay that is unable to act as a reliable intellectual product with traceable roots. Clearly, the effectiveness of on-site and real-time literary criticism has become a problem in our day and age. Among the reasons that have left many weary, could it be that critics are no longer as acute, or has literary creativity truly declined, or could it be that literary criticism no longer intends to strive for apparent communal experience and public memory as its purpose? For many

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writers, the focus should always be placed on the individual experience, but for many intellectuals involved in literary criticism, the responsibility of literature is to expose the most salient public features of a period from which is derived in a thesis of the zeitgeist. And it is precisely on this point that on-site literary criticism has descended into our currently fragmented age. In specific text, literary criticism is perhaps transitive, but in a realistic sense, it is not transitive as public literature. In comparison with criticism in the 1980s, it is indeed quite paradoxical. Of course, the public literary experience in the 1980s was overly powerful rather than arbitrary and crude. Was literary criticism in the 1990s, however, very effective at integrating many literary phenomena in an increasingly individualized environment, correctly summarizing ­public experience or even, in the end, importing many of the experiential paradigms of the cultural abundance in this period? To some extent, the reason so many writers born in the 1950s and 1960s, including avant-garde novelists and “new generation” ­writers, were established so early in such a prominent position is inseparable from the timely and accurate interpretations of many literary critics of the same generation. Only by taking the interpretation of individual writers’ literary experience for the sake of public narrative and even creating cultural memories of a generation can critics truly realize a mutual relationship between them. This requires the coincidence of “current events” and exquisite writing skills of outstanding writers. At the same time, it also requires the intellectual capacity and keen eyesight of an exceptional critic. This honeymoon since the “desire literature” interpretation of the 1970s has completely ended. In the past ten years, critics have even lost the ability to assign generational titles to writers. They are left with only forced titles, like “post-1970s,” “post-1980s,” and “youth writing,” to describe literary generations. There has not been anything new in literary intellectual genealogy for a long time. Besides the old topics harped on by idolized writers, critics have lacked the ability to grasp variable literature. These things have shown the retreat and decline of criticism. The foregoing is my basic assessment of the state of “on-site” criticism in recent years. If this assessment is not overly harsh, then we still need to rediscuss the reasons for it. What exactly led to this kind of inefficient criticism? There are many reasons, of course, but I consider the most important one a lack of ideology. An “excess of methodology” has not led to an improvement of thought in literary criticism, and this rarefied thought has led to the attenuation of the critical spirit and the loss of modernity. Compared to the 1990s, the intellectual spirit in literary criticism seems to have vanished, and what replaced it has revealed a “specialized” identity. Although it is said that generally modern literary criticism has lacked the features of ideology, the spirit of enlightenment encapsulated in the 1980s and the avant-garde consciousness

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imbued in the 1990s maintained a responsive and tense relationship between these periods; moreover, these two periods have an implicit sense of resistance toward older literary systems and literary order in their ardor for literary “forms.” Neither of them has a strongly humanist viewpoint, whether it is the formula of “twentieth-century literature,” or themes of “the clash between civilization and ignorance”; whether it is the metaphorical interpretations of the “temple” or “city square” and “work unit” or the isolated discoveries of “concealed folk narrative structure”; whether it is the appeal of “moral ideals” or the interpretative taste of the “imaginary earth.” In contrast, whether it is the debate over “native experience” or “subaltern writings” in recent years, either they are discussed as isolated problems, mixed in with some practical interest, or tossed and turned in misreading and misinterpretation. It is hard to get to the real interior of contemporary literature and culture to establish a value system for humanistic and relatively stable criticism. There are also examples of stronger criticism, but this kind of criticism is often based on a moralistic vision and standard, and the strong moralistic criticism in today’s cultural discourse often seems superficial and questionable as well. At the same time, writers in their works have been unable to lay bare their attitude toward history and the times, nor do they need to lay it bare. Perhaps the use of irony and satire in a work as well as esthetically a deliberate sense of comedy and absurdity does not imply that its moral quality is vulgar or low brow, because regardless of its idea of humanistic ideology and critique, it invariably assists literary methods in that there was a “complicated truth” and not a “simplistic good.” For example, in narratives of “violence” and “desire,” if our ordained history is replete with punishment and violence and our reality is brimming with chaos and desire, then critics cannot demand that writers turn a blind eye to it and whitewash it. This is a point that we must highlight. If critics demand that writers create clean descriptions according to moralistic principles, then this would not be a method that respects history and criticizes reality. If we look at works since the 1990s, for example, then criticism of works like Deserted City and Big Breasts and Wide Hips or, more recently, Sandalwood Death and Brothers have all had this problem in varying degrees. If we calm down and distance ourselves from this, then it may be that the reality is completely the opposite. Only time will tell how popular these works will be in comparison to others and even which works will have the vitality to carry forth “ideals of goodness.” One point contrary to the previous discussion is that, even though it has been lauded by many, on-site criticism lacks keen sensibilities toward a host of outstanding published works since the 1990s, particularly lengthy novels. At present, this may be a mark of the maturity and success of literary works

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over the past century of publishing of new literature in the Chinese language, but there has yet to be a true artistic and ideological interpretation. This is something that has left people frustrated and regretful. If we were to make a comparison, we would easily find this kind of contrasting relationship: over the past thirty years of “modern literature,” scholars have managed to interpret “the great writers,” but then we must ask what about the “great works”? How many texts can qualify as “great texts”? In over sixty years of “contemporary literature,” although most people do not admit that “great writers” have already emerged, there are clearly works considered “great works.” These works have been continually published since the 1990s in the form of novels: To Live, September Fable, Deserted City, The Song of Everlasting Regret, Chronicle of a Blood Merchant, Big Breasts and Wide Hips, Sandalwood Death, and Her Face is like a Peach Blossom. Regardless of their ideological attitude, artistic complexity, and maturity, these works have far surpassed classical texts of modern literature; however, it seems as if no one is willing to admit this point. The tragedy of critics is that no one is willing to bestow a rational interpretation of outstanding writers and works in their own generation. This situation reminds people of nineteenth-century Russia, when numerous magnificently brilliant writers emerged as well as a completely complimentary corps of critics with a spiritual resonance. Writers and critics mutually reinforced one another’s position and together built an enduring era of literature. Here and now, rarely are there examples of this kind of tacit understanding between writers and critics or a critical relationship that goes beyond personal interest. We have discussed many problems, but we certainly have not come to a conclusion. No one can even predict at present how literary criticism will end. One possibility is that literary criticism will continue to deepen its fragmentation in both identity and textually: one fragment closer to academic criticism, basing its form on academic research and cultural criticism, will continue on; another fragment will become more integrated into the media, free, and individualized, or, frankly speaking, will end up like Douban.com17 with millions of users recklessly generating their own comments full of vulgar ridicule and brash contempt. As for other fragments that cannot be categorized and bounded, they will emerge with the needs of institutions and events of the time.

17  Douban.com is a website where scholarly and nonscholarly publications, articles, dissertations, and even music and films are catalogued and discussions on these sources can be openly held.—Trans.

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Works Cited Cha Jianying, ed. 80 niandai fangtan lu. [Discussions on the 1980s] Joint, 2006. Chen Huaji, Yang Qingxiang eds. Lishi duihua de kenengxing: renda ketang yu bashi niandai wenxue. [The Possibility of Historical Dialogue: The National People’s Congress Lecture on 1980s Literature] Zhongguo renmin daxue wenxueyuan MS, Beijing, 2009. Chen Sihe. “Shidai, wenxue, geren.” [Era, Literature, and Individual] Dangdai zuojia pinglun 6 (2008). Cheng Guangwei. “Dangdai wenxue xueke de ‘lishihua.’ ” [The “Historicization” of the Field of Modern Literature] Wenyi yanjiu 4 (2008). ———. “Lishi chongshi yu ‘dangdai’ wenxue.” [Historical reinterpretation and “Modern” Literature] Wenyi zhengming 7 (2007). ———. Foreword to Lishi duihua de kenengxing: renda ketang yu bashi niandai wenxue. [The Possibility of Historical Dialogue: The National People’s Congress Lecture on 1980s Literature] Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue wenxueyuan, 2009. Gao Yuanbao. “Wenxue piping zhong lishi kuifanzheng de jiuzhi: fang Chen Sihe.” [The Cure to the Historical Deficiency Syndrome in Chinese Criticism] Dangdai zuojia pinglun 4 (1995). ———. “Zuojia quexi de wenxueshi: dui jinqi san ben ‘Zhongguo dangdai wenxueshi’ jiaocai de jiantao.” [The Literary History of Author Absence: A Review of Three Recent “Modern Chinese Literary History” Text Books] Dangdai zuojie pinglun 5 (2006). He Guimei. Zhuanzhe de shidai: 40–50 niandai zuojia yanjiu. [Transitional Period: A Study of 1940s and 1950s Writers] Ji’nan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003. Hong Zicheng. Wenti yu fangfa. [Problems and Methods] Hong Kong: Joint, 2002. Li Jianwu. “Xiandai Zhongguo xuyao de wenxue pipingjia.” [The Literary Critics that Modern China Needs] Da gong bao, December 15, 1934 (128), Literature supplement. Li Yang. Postscript to 50–70 niandai Zhongguo wenxue jingdian zaijiedu. [A Reinterpretation of 1950s to 1970s Modern Chinese Literary Classics] Ji’nan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe, 2002. ———. “Chongfan bashi niandai: weihe chongfan yiji ruhe chongfan.” [Revisiting the 1980s: Why Revisit and How to Revisit?] Dangdai zuojia pinglun 1 (2007). Lu Xun. Lu Xun xuanji. [The Complete Collection of Lu Xun] ( Ji’nan: Shandong wenyi chubanshe, 1990. Meng Fanhua. Chuanmei yu wenhua lingdaoquan: dangdai Zhongguo de wenhua shengchan yu wenhua rentong. [Communication and Cultural Leadership: Cultural Identity and Production in Modern China] (Ji’nan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshu, 2003.

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Meng Yue. Ren, lishi, jiayuan: wenhua piping san diao. [People, History, Family: Three Tones of Cultural Criticism] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshi, 2006. Wang Yao. “ ‘Chongfan 80 niandai’ yu dangdai wenxueshi lunshu.” [Revisiting the 1980s and Discourse on Modern Literary History] Jianghai xuebao 5 (2005). Yang Qingxiang and Chen Huaji, ed. Lishi duihua de kenengxing: renda ketang yu bashi niandai wenxue. [The Possibility of Historical Dialogue: The National People’s Congress Lecture on 1980s Literature] Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue wenxue­ yuan, 2009.

CHAPTER 9

The Contemporary Values of Literary Ecology and Ecological Critique Wang Yuechuan The latest discoveries in Western literary theory have not stopped with the continual overhauls of feminism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, and cultural theory. In the late twentieth century, the Western theories of “cultural ecology” and “ecological criticism” have gradually spread across the globe and have become a new literary methodological theory that transcends conventional disciplinary boundaries. Of course, in terms of its theoretical inheritance, one could say that cultural ecology and ecological criticism are not ordinary literary studies on man and the environment but a newly expanding theoretical field within cultural studies. This is mainly manifested in several important dimensions: As modern Western literary theory has entered a “period of slow theoretical production,” Western literary criticism is no longer flowing in an endless stream of new ideas and is, instead, placing a renewed emphasis on the dual identity of the “world” as both nature and society, revealing the imitative value of nature in literature; since literary criticism remains indeterminate by still focusing on a continual search for a new aesthetic and cultural basis in new histories, understanding political ideologies, and determining the relationship between race and gender, they have redefined the theory of the self.

The Emergence of Cultural Ecology and Its Practical Relevance

Environmentalism and globalization are two major movements that are closely linked. The first is responding a global crisis that has seen the worsening of the natural environment; the second is reacting to a crisis in the ecology of the human spirit because of being infected by a modern consumerism. These two crises originated in modernity. The Severing of Modern Culture and the Symptoms of Consumerism So-called modernity has only been around for only 500 years. Before that, the West was in the Dark Ages. After the Dark Ages, the Renaissance and the Reformation shook the feudal and theocratic foundations of European regimes © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004308886_010

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and opened the path to capitalism as well as the scientific revolution. Since the eighteenth century, the invention of the steam engine allowed the West to begin modernizing quickly. In the nineteenth century, thermodynamics, electromagnetism, and the theory of evolution reduced Asia to timelessly unchanged “stagnant empires,” and the modern West became the central power in human discourse. The invention of the photograph allowed artists to pale in comparison to the realistic depiction of objects; the invention of the steam engine and automobile forever changed people’s perception of space; the refrigerator and electric light radically changed people’s lives and sense of aesthetics; the emergence of movies transformed the ways in which humanity felt and sensed the world. In the twentieth century, the airplane was invented, communications satellites were launched into orbit, the television was born, the computer appeared in every home, and man landed on the moon. These things have granted the West hegemony in science, technology, the military, and the economy. Modernity and technological innovation are integrally linked to the colonization of humanity, which has allowed the West in a short 200 years to gain hegemony over the world. The expansion of modernity has led every country in the East to ride a wave of “wholesale Westernization,” which has proven over a hundred years that modernity was not a gospel of the East and, instead, was the beginning of the homogenization and alienation of humanity. The problems faced by humanity—not to mention the threat of a nuclear holocaust, the depletion of resources, environmental pollution, tsunamis, and a meteor striking the earth—tell us one single fact: the expansion of modernity will ultimately lead to the destruction of humanity. While modernity promises people a beautiful life, it also brings a plethora of ecological disasters—environmental crisis, social ecological c­ risis, spiritual ecological crisis, cultural ecological crisis—which have led to the destruction of our forests, erosion of our soil, contamination of our water, the disappearance of species, the forfeiture of our spirituality, the deterioration of our moral values, and the unhinging of our mental stability, forming an ecological apocalypse that threatens the existence of humanity. Because of the unbalanced spiritual ecology of consumerism and cultural hegemony, some philosophers have called for a spiritual return to a sense of life rooted in the native soil that has greater culturally ecological significance. Today, besides the current environmental crisis, across the globe humanity has produced over nine million robots and nearly 50,000 machines with artificial intelligence. Based on current technology, it is possible to produce about 40 million more within the next ten years or so. It is entirely possible that, in the next half a century, this intelligence that we have implanted into machines could become a global “army of machines,” and, if we were to lose

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control, they could threaten humanity—not to mention clones or cybernetic clones, which have the potential intelligence to become a threat to the existence of humanity. In 1972, the Club of Rome released its well-known report The Limits to Growth on the crises facing humanity.1 The report argued that, if we are unable to control economic overheating and population growth, the earth and human beings living on earth will be destroyed within a hundred years due to environmental pollution and food shortages. The report sent shockwaves around the world. Afterward, countries the world over strived to disarm, slow economic development, control population growth, limit resource utilization, and protect the environment in an attempt to avoid or delay the destruction of the human race. The endangerment of our overwhelmed plants and the limited maturity of the human species not only has failed to alleviate this crisis; rather, it shows signs of worsening. The spiritual ecology of humanity is similarly facing an unprecedented crisis. Led by Western modernity, whether in Asia or Africa, we are heading toward an “era of theoretical overhaul” and an “era of carnal experience.” Thus, upgrades, breakthroughs, expansions, carnality, and consumerism have become the spiritual focus of this generation. Modern man has gone from an “experiential age” to metamorphosing and even aspiring to be a middleman in a “theoretical age.” He has, in the discourse of his life, daily behavior, and attitude toward fashion, made life into an amusement, culturally corporatized, sexualized, and de-spiritualized. Thus, in the monotonization of the daily lives of “new man,” it has transformed the imagination of modern man, the atmosphere of cities, the environment of the periphery, and the evolution of thought. Consumerism has continually produced a “crazed pursuit of the new” among people, which is clearly seen in the recent obsession with “upgrades”: televisions are upgraded; diseases are upgraded; mailboxes are upgraded; junk mail is upgraded; games are upgraded; hackers have upgraded; consumerism has upgraded; terrorism has upgraded; as the body is upgraded through fashion and pop culture (memes, LOMO, hip-hop dancing, and tattoos), the spirit is downgraded (mental illness, suicide, alcoholism, and sexually explicit writing); as the body is upgraded through reforming (changing one’s hair color, liposuction, and plastic surgery), the spirit is sinking; as life is upgraded with limitless freedom and choice, spiritual ecology is downgrading in a blaze of decadence. Mankind must deeply consider and ponder how to avoid making upgrades into a rootless externality, making life instantly into a worthless 1  Donella H. Meadows and Jorgen Randers et al., Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind (New York: Universe Books, 1972).

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commodity, and achieving a true ecological balance that realizes the spirit and existence of humanity. In the excessive expansion of modernity over a couple of centuries and the thoughtless worship of consumerist crazes, humanity has unexpectedly faced two serious issues: the first is the alienation of traditional culture in the “conflict between tradition and modernity”; the second is the false sense of happiness proffered by the “new middle class.” The exponential growth of cities and the gradual decline of the countryside faced by humanity have caused a series of clashes between urban and rural values. On the one hand, the rural population marching into cities with their premodern country values, local beliefs, and ways of life that mark them clashes and struggles with the variegated life in cities. Because in the course of human development agrarian society must transition to industrial society, rural people in this transition enter this true discourse as marginalized and powerless in the social hierarchy. This rural migration has become the global modern dissolution of rural society and the loss of the centrality of the family and communal logic, transforming into the legitimate beginning of individual parochialism. Similarly, the new white-collar middle class has given rise to a carnal tranquility built on a massive architectural space that is unable to find a spiritual home to reside in. In this loss of meaning, the loss of faith has directly led money to become the religion of modern man. As the position of money upgrades, there is a continual feeling that the distance from ineffable happiness is growing. A significant number of modern people of all classes cannot clearly state whether they are happy or why. Many people that have lost their family, leaving their home empty, are unhappy; many people that have massive homes have lost any sense of happiness in their lives. Then how is a happy life possible? Could it be that in this “upgrading,” a bigger house means more money, and more money equals more happiness? This lack of happiness brings us to a major problem: consumerism. Consumerism generated a sense of appropriation that always seeks to obtain the best products and the most enticing worldly pleasures in the world. Consumer is doubly duplicitous. In the past, people emphasized happiness, and now they talk about freedom. It is as if today everyone has the freedom to choose his own path. As long as one has money, one can choose any commodity within one’s purchasing power and access to the ability to upgrade, which allows one similarly to upgrade one’s life. It seems to grant freedom to consumers and can completely achieve their freedom. In fact, this is not the case. In its promise of well-being and happiness, postindustrial consumerism sets up a false proposition that people accept through familiarity without any thought. The deception of consumerism is in its promise of universal

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happiness—as if every person is free to choose. Another of its deceptions is the false proposition it offers: as long as you provide freedom to consume, you can achieve complete freedom. This freedom in fact is a downgrade for the sake of consumption. It disdains the “self-realization of principles.” For people, self-realization is not something material goods can satisfy. Material satisfaction is merely a base need, but spiritual satisfaction, finding one’s identity, and realizing one’s values are not so easy to achieve. The mental illnesses of many modern people are not rooted in a lack of material goods but a spiritual hollowing and withering of values. A consumer society seeks to maximize wealth and to continually produce wants and needs for the population. In the historical scenarios of individual affluence, everyone feels as though a happy life can be achieved by buying more and consuming. Consumption itself becomes a worldly portrayal of a happy life, becoming a discursive platform for people to contend and boast. In response to the problems of brand worship, consumer centrism, conspicuous displays of wealth, and greed in consumer life, people begin to reflect on the meaning of life, realizing that life in the information age is a “complicated life” led by the intelligent. It cannot, however, make people find peace of mind and body and only leads to the loss of the soul. This view places these current phenomena right before our eyes: the massive changes in modern technology, urban space, and daily life have immensely fractured and dislocated the way we feel, our values, our behavior, the way we communicate, our rights to our bodies, the way we deal with questions of life and death, the way we perceive virtual space, and universal ethics. The “digitized” vulgar language of the present as well as the unexpected arrival of “flash mobs” have made the modern view much more bewildering. In the computer age, we have fewer physical experiences. As the senses are increasingly abandoned, physical sensations can be achieved only through abnormal means. These youthful physical senses represent the complete relinquishment of tradition and the assertion of another kind of limitless freedom for the self. The present age of upgrading is a massive educational structure and cultural artistic mechanism, and this has made it exceedingly difficult to curtail the actions and desires of young people, because they ardently believe in two doctrines: a belief in an alternative freedom, and a belief in limitless freedom. The “loss of cultural roots” generated by the shift in ideology and the fragmentation of ways of life has within the span of a century continued to jolt the soul of humanity as it walks toward modernity. In the modern transformation of cities, all migrants have experienced a clash and adaption of their ways of life, thought, and culture. Along with this migration, the ways in which people appreciate art and their domestic setting are similarly on the verge of a major change. This profound transformation has left the structure of aesthetic

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ecology with new possibilities and has left the modern sense of rural nostalgia with an abundance of imaginary space. In this era of “upgrades,” we should not only have a sense of the pace of progress in this era of massive global transformation but also see the overall picture of the future of the world in terms of balance with one’s spiritual ecology. Before there were any real interactions between modernity and rural communities and before any true attention was paid to the intensifying contradictions of the urban-rural divide, it was not enough merely to discuss the carnal sense of “upgrades” among the new urban humanity. As long as nations were left to develop harmoniously and states could develop in a balanced way, the contradictions of the urban-rural divide had a path to resolve this in a rational manner. As carnal senses and a sense of fashion began to upgrade, the spiritual sense also received an upgraded vitality. Only this “mind-body upgrade” has any bearing on sustainable development and has any value for balancing the spiritual ecology of our time. In fact, Westerners have come to realize through their abuse of modernity that it contains many of the dangers of “draining the swamp to catch fish,” “killing the goose that laid the golden egg,” and “seeking instant gratification through hasty effort.” Many Westerners have begun to reflect upon these mistakes and try to rectify them—the beginnings of “cultural ecology.” This implies that in reversing these abuses of modernity, Western philosophers have begun to emphasize the deepening of humanity and the elevation of the cultural spirit, as well as firmly believing that problems in the natural environment must be rectified. At the end of the last century and the beginning of this century, a new trend emerged in the West—dam removal. In 1994, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation announced: “the era of large-scale dam projects has come to an end.” In September 1996, an International Dam Summit was held in Japan and released a statement that “the era of large-scale dam construction projects is heading to an end around the world.” In March 1997, many anti-dam activists from Asia, Europe, North America, and South America gathered in Curitiba, Brazil, to hold the First Annual International Conference for Victims of Reservoirs. On the last day of the conference, March 14, it released the “Declaration of Curitiba,” which marked a milestone of global resistance against dam construction and support for maintaining river ecologies and the sustainable use of water resources. In a survey of over 200 large-scale dam projects between 1998 and 2001 conducted by the International Commission on Large Dams, researchers found a host of deleterious effects: across the globe, dam projects have displaced 40 million to 80 million people, impoverished local communities, led to the severe degradation of the local ecology, and resulted in the disappearance of indigenous cultures. In October 2003, the United States began to remove two major dams on the Penobscot River

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in Maine. Afterward, salmon began to return to the upper reaches of the river, which provided conditions in the natural course of the river and food chain that brought back other freshwater fish, insects, water fowl, and other species to migrate, reproduce, and nest. These two major industrial dams had displaced many residents upstream and downstream and greatly degraded the ecology. Americans realized that the gospel of constructing large dams was not good for human beings, so they began to remove them. According to statistics, the United States has already removed 500 dams. One could say that in first building and then demolishing dams, people are facing a second retaliation from nature, in which they realize that they stand at the edge of a precipice and have begun to pull back the reins.

Confronting the Natural Ecology Crisis and Spiritual Ecology Crisis of Human Beings As I see it, cultural ecology is an interdisciplinary textual criticism of the fate of man and nature. Only upon reflecting on natural ecology do human beings begin to contemplate the cultural ecology. This perspective of natural ecology has allowed Westerners to come to the realization that they cannot rush headlong into disaster when it comes to issues of modernity like a “blind man riding a blind horse.” They realize that they must change and earnestly begin to study cultural ecology, philosophical ecology, aesthetic ecology, and artistic ecology. This implies that the traditional culture that had been repressed by modernity should reassert its assessments and interpretations of its spiritual value to humanity. Modernity includes an “institutional modernity” and an “aesthetic modernity.” These two kinds of modernity are often in opposition. “Institutional modernity” leads to the continual alienation of people. In the past, the making of a single screw, from raw cast iron to its final completion, was the work of one person. From the initial blueprints to the final product, people experience the perfection of construction. However, as in Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times, the industrial division of labor instructs man to twist one screw for the rest of his life. Human beings are simply one link in the industrial assembly line of modernity, alienating humanity. Because of the alienation of humanity by institutional modernity, the aesthetic modernity of art does not willingly follow this alienation and actively subverts this alienation. Thus, aesthetic modernity is guided by a mission to expose and resist this alienation. The way in which it resists is by transforming the “beauty” of art into “ugliness”—no longer does anyone wish to see art that celebrates the beauty of a bucolic life; instead, art becomes a form of resistance—artistic symbols have become fouler than those in real life. Cubist painters have such a third eye. In Edvard Munch’s

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The Scream, the subject stands at the end of a bridge so terrified that its face has been deformed; Fauvist works used this deformation to express a fear of war and the future. These are all works showing the ugliness of modernity. Traditional aesthetics is based on the beautiful harmony of man and nature. Regardless of whether it is in Western or Eastern art, irrespective of whether it is in ancient Greek or Qin dynasty art, and even art in the Renaissance, for the most part, art has exemplified beauty. Many are awed by the exquisiteness of The Birth of Venus by Botticelli, the Mona Lisa by da Vinci, and Barge Haulers on the Volga by the Russian realist painter and sculptor Ilya Repin; people are moved by the symphonically pure music of Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven. When it comes to modern art—similar to the “pity” in art found by Walter Benjamin or the “resistance” in art argued by Herbert Marcuse—Western art suddenly became “ugly.” After art and music became modern, they became disharmonious eyesores and discordant ear sores. The reason for this can be found in Marcuse: “Art is no longer aesthetic. Art has become resistance.” How should we treat these positive and “ugly” aspects of Western modern culture? Would it be acceptable if we made all art a dirty chaotic mess? Of course not—because, other than as a game or putting on a show, there is no more new thought that could come from this, nor does it accurately define the entirety of Western cultural history and art history. This appreciation of the “ugly” in modern art is a form of resistance to Western institutional modernity. It employs “aesthetic modernity” to resist the way in which “­institutional modernity” is dragging them down—art came to be the art of the disgusting and lost its own values—and thus this art of the ugly was gradually loathed and abandoned by most people. We should not follow the West down this road of no return and should reevaluate the possible futures of world art in the spirit of cultural ecology. On the one hand, we should demand a balance in natural ecology; on the other hand, we should demand a balance in our own spiritual ecology. Why in this new century do people wish to see themselves “fractured” and turn art into a kind of madness? Why can we not go beyond the abuses of the West and confront our own identity? Why are we unable to avoid the Western institutional dislocation of modern alienation and heal the spiritual fracture in human art? In the new century, the development of human culture is gradually heading toward a rationalized purity. This implies that the benign, ecological, novelty and boundedness of cultural development abandons the boorish interests of “aficionados” and the “diminuitism” that plays with people’s lives, and thus heads toward an independent spiritual pursuit of discourse with one’s own soul, highlighting the loneliness of the individual soul. Everyone is lonely. In solitude, people can escape the gravity of the bustle and carnality of the

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external world, returning to the tranquility and authenticity of one’s own consciousness. One should think about the meaning of one’s own individual existence in daily life, clarifying the existential spirituality of humanity in the material world and leaving space for man to reflect and regress. I firmly believe that the absence of Eastern thought and Eastern experience has been failure for humanity. The harmony of Eastern experience and tolerance of Eastern discourse could further rectify the unilateralism and consumerism of Western modernity, sowing the world with its own positive experiences and creating happiness. Eastern thought, particularly the philosophical essence of Chinese culture, like environmental harmony, evidentiary studies, stress on origins and differentiation, and emphasis on “compassionate loving people,” can provide the West with sustenance and interaction. Unlike the completely economic calculations of modernity’s emphasis on the conquest of nature by man and maximizing the extraction of surplus value, in a “post-Orientalist” era, the aesthetic ecology and cultural ecology of Eastern thought are currently softening the conflict between man and the other, man and the self, and man and nature. Why did Hegel highlight the philosophy of Laozi’s Daodejing in his later years? Why did Roland Barthes discuss issues of Japanese haiku, calligraphy, and the spiritual space of the emperor? Why Jacques Derrida go to China to talk about issues of “forgiveness” and Chinese culture? Why, while sick in bed with leukemia, did Edward Said become so fascinated with faraway China? What is it about China that interested these people? In addition to the rise of the East economically, there is, of course, the “exoticism” of the culture. This cultural exoticism led many Western intellectuals to gain a completely new understanding of the “Orient.” If we only “import” and do not “export,” then Eastern culture will become imbalanced in cultural ecology. One could say that the West is absorbing the spiritual culture of the East and working to remold the culture of humanity. In other words, Western intellectuals in the new century are shifting their gaze toward the East, which will inevitably provide a new understanding of Eurocentric ways of thinking and an understanding of the social sciences and will give new confidence to the value of Eastern intellectuals marginalized by Eurocentricism and new cultural opportunities for finding future cultural values for humanity. The Emergence and Development of Ecological Theory A cultural ecology emerges from facing this real natural and spiritual ecological crisis. When did cultural ecology arise as an academic theory? Academia has not yet determined this. The word “ecology” comes from the Greek word oicos (home or residence). It first emerged in its modern sense in German as die Okologie and later in

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English as “ecology.” Environmentalism did not emerge from nothing. Its ideological origins are inseparable from the romanticism of the eighteenth century. In 1858, Henry David Thoreau described in his book Walden his own idea of harmony between man and nature. He opposed the bustle of city life on the grounds of maintaining balance with nature and extolled the beauty of the forest and streams of the natural world. In Generelle Morphologie der Organismen, published in 1886, the German biologist Ernst Haeckel described the evolutionary relationship between plants and animals, arguing that there should be a harmonious unity between the spiritual and material: We understand biology as the science of the relationship between organisms and their surrounding environment. Taken a little further, we could also consider all conditions necessary for survival. Ecology emerged as a discipline to study the relationship between ecology and the environment. With this development, modern ecologists gradually came to place humans at the center of their research, with the relationship between man and nature becoming the core focus of ecology. This should be considered the origin of the theory of ecology. Generally speaking, 1970 marked the difficult beginning of cultural ecology with the rise of “environmentalism” in the West. It was in this environment that cultural ecology and ecocriticism emerged. Compared to other Western literary theories, “ecocriticism” emerged quite late, but once it developed it rapidly gained the theoretical interest of people around the world and continued to progress. Simon C. Estok argued that ecocriticism has three different birth dates because of its different perspectives. As an academic term, “ecocriticism” first emerged in a speech William Ruekert delivered in 1978 titled “Literature and Ecology: An Experiment in Ecocriticism”; however, his work did not garner much attention. In 1993—fifteen years later—Patrick Murphy created the academic journal Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment. Its discursive power reinterpreted the importance of ecocriticism, which received much attention and gained it much influence, marking the beginnings of school of ecocriticism, but it lacked any institutional leadership or formal theoretical publications. In 1996, after the publication of Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm’s The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology and Lawrence Buell’s The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the Formation of American Culture, ecocriticism finally found its own theoretical leadership and major aesthetic principles. These works gained a lot of attention and follow-up studies among academics, and a mature theoretical framework developed over time through debate. Since the 1960s, ecophilosophy, ecotheology, ecological politics, ecological economics, ecological humanism, ecofeminism, ecoliterature, ecological art,

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ecosociology, ecological ethics, ecological anthropology, ecological psychology, ecocriticism, and deep ecology have sprouted like bamboo after a spring rain. As Western literary theory hit a plateau, people found a new perspective: they discarded anthropocentricism for ecocentrism, making the harmonious coexistence of humanity and nature the basic principle of ecological theory, eliminating the blasphemous “ecocriticism” of human chauvinism. Compared to the past, the word “ecology” has clearly shown its value and practical implications, and the meaning of the word “ecology” contains a much broader humanistic spirit. Ecophilosophy traces the roots of the ecological crisis to the anthropocentrism of modern civilization and dialectical thinking. It has adapted the ecological ideology and methodology of scientific research into a worldview and existential experience to create an ecological spirit that cultivates a way of thinking, values, beliefs, and cultural view. Basically, today’s cultural ecology movement has already morphed into a cultural movement that integrates the natural sciences and humanities, theoretical research and practical measures, a criticism of modern civilization and a constructive exercise in building a new healthier and more perfect civilization. Unlike other Western literary theories that highlight speculative metaphysics, ecological theory is a pragmatic theory that confronts the real plights of humanity. The majority of ecocritics oppose Derrida’s Philology: This textcentric view believes that “nothing is relevant except the text.” The existence of language or text, however, is merely a cultural representation of the physical world. This does not mean that the material world is inconsequential. There are countless important things besides text, so how can one say that they are inconsequential? Bate believes that postmodernism claims that all measures are textual measures, thus ecopoetry proposes that we must firmly understand one possibility, in that some textual measures that are called poetry can take us back to ancient human knowledge: if there were no earth to measure, then we would cease to exist. Ecological theory is opposed to falling into the trap of modern “linguistic idealism” or “culturalism”; it strives to expose the real crises and current dangers faced by humanity; it seeks to escape the self-imposed “linguistic cage”; it wishes to go beyond the imagined landscape of language and text and actually focus on the problems of our times. James Redfield emphasized in The Celestine Prophecy and The Tenth Insight: Holding the Vision that the corruption and greed of modern societies were caused by the alienation of humanity through the marginalization of spirituality and the centralization of materialism. Corruption comes from the pervasive avarice of “having the most toys” in global materialism, the lack of spiritual transcendence, and irrepressible real anxieties. This series of ills in modern civilization has led to the unhinging of human spirituality overall. In a nutshell, over the past 400 years,

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Westerners has taken a misleading path of cultural intolerance that was only concerned with economic development and consumption. This serious illness of cultural intolerance has led to an obsession with material growth and a loss of humanity and humanistic spirit. Of course, these harsh criticisms are not uncommon even among the cultural criticisms of Western Marxists.

The Characteristics and Values of Ecoliterature

Ecoliterature is an important component of cultural ecology. Cultural ecology has been institutionally marginalized. Environmental issues as well as environmental protection policy, for example, became part of politics only very late, which led to a transformation in productive technology, energy, and way of life for the sake of environmental protection to prevent the worsening of the environment. The spirit of cultural ecology has striven to develop environmental education, ecotechnology, ecophilosophy, ecotheology, ecoliterature, and ecological art. Since there have been written records of human civilization, several thousand years have passed, and the human population has increased from 20 million to 6 billion, and over 10 billion have lived at some point in history. The majority of the plant and animal species that have coexisted with humans have become extinct, and most of those that remain are quickly disappearing. In the face of this global brutality, by the end of the twentieth century intellectuals finally managed to alter the traditional anthropocentric worldview of the West and vociferously called for global environmental awareness. One could say that ecoliterature emphasizes harmony between man and nature and proposes an ecocentric view to oppose anthropocentricism. What characterizes this literature is that it takes environmentalism and an environmental perspective as its starting point, which juxtaposes nature-centered and human-centered literature. Lawrence Buell, a professor of American literature at Harvard University, argues that cultural ecology is “writing for an endangered world.” Cultural ecology, in a certain sense, is a warning light to humanity of impending man-made ecological disaster. It emerges from works that focus and worry about the fate of the world by writers in a global age, and it confronts human ecological values in this global crisis through self-reflection. In fact, in Ernest Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea, this anthropocentric view is very clear: the diametric opposition of “man” and “nature” structures the motivation and baseline of the story. The crux of this story shows that killing and struggle are the basic laws of the universe. In the ocean, jellyfish are eaten by turtles, but even the weakest jellyfish can use its venomous tentacles

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to catch its own prey; in the sea, the old man catches a marlin, but a shark tears into the old man’s catch, and the old man fights with all his strength: But the shark came up fast with his head out and the old man hit him squarely in the center of his flat-topped head as his nose came out of water and lay against the fish. The old man withdrew the blade and punched the shark exactly in the same spot again. He still hung to the fish with his jaws hooked and the old man stabbed him in his left eye. The shark still hung there. . . . he drove the blade between the vertebrae and the brain. It was an easy shot now and he felt the cartilage sever. . . .  They came in a pack and he could only see the lines in the water that their fins made and their phosphorescence as they threw themselves on the fish. He clubbed at heads and heard the jaws chop and the shaking of the skiff as they took hold below. He clubbed desperately at what he could only feel and hear and he felt something seize the club and it was gone. He jerked the tiller free from the rudder and beat and chopped with it, holding it in both hands and driving it down again and again. But they were up to the bow now and driving in one after the other and together, tearing off the pieces of meat that showed glowing below the sea as they turned to come once more. One came, finally, against the head itself and he knew that it was over. He swung the tiller across the shark’s head where the jaws were caught in the heaviness of the fish’s head which would not tear. He swung it once and twice and again. He heard the tiller break and he lunged at the shark with the splintered butt. He felt it go in and knowing it was sharp he drove it in again. The shark let go and rolled away. That was the last shark of the pack that came. There was nothing more for them to eat. By juxtaposing the human and nonhuman, Hemingway points to a relationship between reality and nature or man and animal that is predicated on killing. Neither is stronger, and there is no point. In the end, however, the old man gives his life for the fish, becoming a heap of bones floating in the sea. This announces the death of the old man. Regardless of how much alarming effort people make, it is a small and insignificant effort in the laws of the universe and is wiped away by the waves of the sea without a trace (in a metaphorical timescale). Hemingway also shows the anthropocentric epitome of the “American spirit”—that real people cannot be destroyed even if they fail in their endeavors. The completeness of character in spirit lives on forever and is

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never defeated. The reason that people can be victorious after being destroyed in Conradian fashion can essentially be found in the attitude toward reality after one’s defeat. External forces can only destroy one’s flesh, but they cannot eliminate one’s spirit. This embodies the sophisticated style employed by Hemingway that maintained the real value and dignity of man. This kind of anthropocentric “American spirit” and individual dignity, however, has left ecologists with many misgivings in an era of cultural ecology. One could say this “American spirit” implies a potential discourse: mankind is the master of all things, and all things on earth are subject to conquest and alteration by mankind. Therefore, in the face of this devastating destruction of the natural environment as well as the increasing wrath of nature, people have come to feel a lot of ecological pressure and anxiety. The so-called modern global “progress” witnessed by people has come with immeasurable suffering to people and this tiny overwhelmed planet; thus, the glorified heroism of conquest and killing has gradually given way to harmonious coexistence between man and nature. Of course, not all works on nature can be considered ecoliterature. Some people argue that literary solutions to the relationship between man and nature are the issues addressed in ecoliterature. The relationship between man and nature is manifested in the relationship between human society and the natural world, which involves studies on the relationship between people and the physical environment, ecology, and social environment as well as the exploitation of natural resources by human society, the role of human activity in the natural world, and the role of the environment for humanity and human society. As I see it, ecoliterature mainly shows the sensitivity of the modern global ecological crisis, which has led to strong criticism of anthropocentric values and works reflecting on modern civilization, which led to this ecological crisis. Ecoliterature does not see humanity as the center of the natural world and refuses to see the benefit to humanity as the absolute measure of the natural world. It observes the repeated consequences of ecological disaster and the numerous warnings of impending ecological crisis only by seeing the ultimate future needs and values as the overall interest. Only by including the natural and spiritual global ecosystem can humanity effectively and completely eliminate the ecological crisis that threatens humanity and thus achieve humanity’s long-term basic interest in the harmonious existence of the plant. In the ecoliterature field, ecoliterary works, as broadly defined, chiefly include traditional literary works with a consciousness of cultural ecology, such as Henry David Thoreau’s Walden, William Wordsworth’s The Prelude, and Thomas Hardy’s series of novels in Wessex. These works did not directly

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mention the word “ecology” nor did they discuss the consequences of an ­ecological crisis to the point that it would shock people; however, these works do not lack a consciousness of the harmony of life between man and nature, nor do they lack a profoundly critical view of the alienating opposition between man and nature in modern civilization. In narrowly defined works of ecoliterature, authors have a clear position on cultural ecology that reflects on the relationship between man and nature in an avant-garde way, confront the modern ecological crisis, and share their own critical voice; such works include the American marine biologist Rachel Carson’s The Edge of the Sea and Silent Spring,2 the Kyrgyz author Chinghiz Aitmatov’s White Ship, the American novelist T. Coraghessan Boyle’s A Friend of the Earth, and Kato Sachiko’s Nature in the City and The Enchantment of Forest. From the perspective of cultural ecology, humanity has been torn not only from nature but also from the self and society—stressing carnal pursuits and the derision of soulfulness. It is as if only through sensuality can one be mollified, apathetically casting aside the soul. In Lyudmila Razumovskaya’s Dear Elena, first a play in 1980 and then made into a film in 1988, we see four students who will soon graduate high school going to their teacher’s home on a snowy evening to celebrate her birthday. They arrive singing “Happy Birthday” with gifts and good wishes, but then they express their real reason for coming—to steal the key to her file cabinet from her hand to retrieve their exam papers because they had poor grades. Shocked, the teacher rebuffs them and loses faith in the mission of education as she sees that these students have tried to manipulate her to achieve their goal at any cost. In order to completely intimidate their teacher, the students act hideously: drinking, knocking things over, mocking truth and kindness, ridiculing the plight of their teacher, and pretending to abuse the female students in front of her. The teacher’s mental defenses break down, and she realizes that the entire Soviet education system created a generation of selfish citizens. In this struggle, she can only rely on their basic human conscience, but this proves insufficient. To stop the abuse of the female students, she gives them the key and locks herself in her room. Her anguished cries suddenly reach three of them, and they decide to leave the key hanging outside her bedroom door. In the morning, however, they discover 2  Among these scholars, of particular note are the ideas of Rachel Carson (1907–1964). As essentially the founder of ecoliterature and pioneer of the entire cultural ecology and environmental movement, she described the degradation of the environment, showed the problems due to the ecological predicament, spread environmental concepts, and greatly influenced ecoliterature, the environmental movement, the environmental policies of many countries, and strategic development.

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that she hanged herself in her bedroom. This tragedy is quite affecting! One could say that the failure of modern education, an unreliable spirit, drifting values, and the worship of money are due to modernity’s abandonment of the earthly poetic beauty and spiritual salvation in favor of money, speed, and time. The inevitable goal and spiritual path for studies on ecological art comprise how to return to a new rationality of spiritual reconstruction, return to the original earthly source of life, and search for a source closer to the meaning of the world. The spiritual demands of the “poetic habitation” of humanity set out by ecoliterature has at its core an attempt to master a growing relationship between humanity and nature, considering how nature affects human survival and spirituality. Ecoliterary works stress deep reflection on ecophilosophy, a deepening of the aesthetic embodiment of cultural ecology, an accurate evaluation of ecological values, and an exploration of new perceptions of the “home” in a human world. As to the structure of ecoliterary works, they emphasize a focus on nature and harmony between man and nature in the text, attaining a stronger ecological humanism through textual narrative. In reflecting on literary values, they create an ecoliterature that implies a remolding of the human soul. The reading of ecoliterature centers on an elevation, through reading, of an intrinsically spiritual worldview that exists in nature, sympathy for the decay of nature and the plight of the world, passion for life in nature inspired by a legitimate environmentalism and sense of home, and intrinsic harmony in a restored human relationship between the spiritual world and nature: Collectively, these essays teach us how to read the environment in the literary text and how to read the literary text in the environment. They suggest new ways in which we might read books and, through books, how we might better learn to read the complex, extraordinary text that is the natural world.3 One could say that the crux of creating and reading ecoliterature is to realign the conceited and self-centered thinking and satisfy demands regarding the position of man and nature through literary expression. Many ecoliterary works have already forecast the painful future of humanity and possibilities for escaping this fate. This warning from cultural ecology shows a “perspective with foresight” that reintegrates man and nature and strives for a return to 3  Michael P. Branch et al., eds., Reading the Earth: New Directions in the Study of Literature and Environment (Moscow: University of Idaho Press, 1998), xiv.

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nature to prevent future ecological catastrophe and the extinction of mankind. Thus ecoliterature does not comprise general writings on the comfort and beauty of natural scenery but, rather, for the first time highlights in literary text the major predicaments of humanity and provides an aesthetic interpretation of this crisis and the future catastrophe that awaits all of humanity. It advances and surpasses considerations on specific issues and dives deeply to a more profoundly wise attention to these issues that inspires an inherent sentiment toward the links between humanity and the non-human natural world, seeks a new path that restores a positive global harmony between humanity and nature, and explores a new theory on humanity and nature that allows a more intelligent development of man and nature.

The Development and Characteristics of Ecocriticism

Ecocriticism is a unique discursive corpus with a host of different views. Most recognize the ecocriticism of Cheryll Glotfelty as a critical methodology that explores the relationship between literature and the natural environment. These ecocritics stress that the ecological degradation and the greenhouse effect caused by modernity have already led to deterioration in the global ecology. This serious ecological degradation already threatens the future development and global survival of humanity; therefore, on the one hand, it emphasizes literary studies from the perspective of cultural ecology and ecoliterature; on the other hand, it has an ecological balance that deepens interpretations of sustainable human development by describing ecological degradation from an aesthetic and literary perspective, fulfilling an essential historical mission of literary intellectuals and literary writers in a global era. Most believe that the idea of “ecocriticism” was first proposed by William Rueckert in 1978. In his article “Literature and Ecology: An Experiment in Ecocriticism,” which appeared in winter issue of The Iowa Review, he clearly defined the concept of “ecocriticism” as “the application of ecology and ecological concepts to the study of literature.” In 1992, the Association for the Study of Literature and Environment was founded at the University of Nevada, Reno. In 1994, Karl Kroeber published Ecological Literary Criticism: Romantic Imagining and the Biology of the Mind, which proposed the term “ecological literary criticism” or “ecologically oriented criticism.” In 1995, the University of Colorado held the first academic conference on ecocriticism, and some of the papers presented were published in Reading the Earth: New Directions in the Study of Literature and Environment in 1998. Afterward, works on ecocriticism flooded the literary field like a torrential rain. One could argue that the most

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representative figures in ecocriticism are Cheryll Glotfelty, Lawrence Buell, Jonathan Bate, Eric Todd Smith, Patrick Murphy, and Dominic Hyde.4 In 1996, the first American edited volume on ecocriticism was published, The Ecocriticism Reader, by Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm, which laid out these principles: it discusses disparate ecological as well as ecoliterary theories, the ecocriticism of literature, and the criticism of ecoliterature to allow ecocriticism to borrow more characteristics and models from literary criticism. In the prologue to the book, Glotfelty gave ecocriticism a more succinct definition: “Simply put, ecocriticism is the study of the relationship between literature and the physical environment. Just as feminist criticism examines language and literature from a gender-conscious perspective, and Marxist criticism brings an awareness of modes of production and economic class to its reading of texts, ecocriticism takes an earth-centered approach to literary studies.”5 In 1998, the first British edited volume on ecocriticism, Writing the Environment: Ecocriticism and Literature, was published in London; it was divided into three sections: ecocritical theory, ecocritical history, and ecocritical modernity. The editors of this volume, Richard Kerridge and Neil Sammells, argued that ecocriticism should probe the idea of the environment and the portrayal of the environment in literature. In the summer of 1999, a special issue of New Literary History on ecocriticism contained ten articles that specifically discussed ecocriticism. In 2000, the main publications on ecocriticism included Patrick Murphy’s Farther Afield in the Study of Nature-Oriented Literature, John Tallmadge’s Reading Under the Sign of Nature: New Essays in Ecocriticism, and Jonathan Bate’s The Song of the Earth. Lawrence Buell’s Writing for an Endangered World: Literature, Culture, and Environment in the U.S. and Beyond and David Mazel’s A Century of Early Ecocriticism were released in 2001. In early 2002, University of Virginia Press ceremoniously released a series on ecocriticism called the “Explorations in Ecocriticism Series.” At the end of 2004, Glen A. Love published Practical Ecocriticism: Literature, Biology, and the Environment, and in 2004 Greg Garrard 4  The American critic William Slaymaker once marveled at the rapid spread of ecocriticism to become the predominant trend in modern literary research: since the 1980s and 1990s, environmental literature and ecocriticism have gradually become a global literary phenomenon. The words “ecolit” and “ecocrit” come from journals, academic books, academic conferences, academic events, as well as countless special studies and dissertations, coming at us like a massive flood. 5  Cheryll Glotfelty, The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Criticism (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), xviii.

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published Ecocriticism. As we can see, there has been a major wave of publications in ecocriticism. Many definitions of “ecocriticism” have been proposed, making it hard to pin down. In Reading the Earth: New Directions in the Study of Literature and the Environment, Michael P. Branch wrote: Implicit (and often explicit) in much of this new criticism is a call for cultural change. Ecocriticism is not just a means of analyzing nature in literature; it implies a move toward a more biocentric world-view, an extension of ethics, a broadening of humans’ conception of global community to include nonhuman life forms and the physical environment. Just as feminist and African American literary criticism call for a change in culture—that is, they attempt to move the culture toward a broader world-view by exposing an earlier narrowness of view—so too does ecological literary criticism advocate for cultural change by examining how the narrowness of our culture’s assumptions about the natural world has limited out ability to envision an ecologically sustainable human society.6 In his work, The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the Formation of American Culture, Lawrence Buell, a Professor Emeritus of American Literature, brought the environmental spirit to a deeper level of literary studies and literary series. In this milestone of ecoliterary criticism, Buell aims his spear at the main trend of literary studies and criticism since the twentieth century: the loss of contact with the real world.7 Buell argues that ecocriticism often grows along with the pragmatic spirit of the environmental movement. In other words, ecocritics do not see themselves only as participating in an academic exercise. They are deeply concerned about the environmental crisis, and many actively participate in the environmental movement. They still believe that the humanities, particularly literary and cultural studies, can contribute to our understanding of and salvation from the environmental crisis. The formalism of aestheticism or the self-sufficiency of a discipline do not an ecocritic make. Ecocriticism crosses discipline—science, human geography, developmental psychology, social anthropology, philosophy (axiological, epistemological, and phenomenological), history, religion, gender, and race—and adopts multiple interpretative models, resulting in a major 6  Michael P. Branch, Reading the Earth: New Directions in the Study of Literature and Environment (Boise: University of Idaho Press, 1998), xiii. 7  Lawrence Buell, The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the Formation of American Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

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difference in methodological approaches among different ecocritics. Because of this growing environmental movement, the academic term “ecocriticism” has taken on an increasingly complex meaning. The first to use it were literary scholars studying writings and poetry on nature. These works focused on the relationship between humans and the nonhuman world. Corresponding with this, earlier theoretical hypothesizes on ecocriticism were much simpler than they are today. Many early ecocritics, for example, were strongly opposed to modern textual theories and made it the core task of ecocriticism to emphasize the role of literature in allowing the reader to “reconnect” with nature. Broadly speaking, “ecocriticism” is a theoretical and critical methodology of ecological issues from the perspective of literary criticism. On the one hand, it seeks to resolve issues of the deeper relationship between literature and the natural environment; on the other hand, it concerns the inherent links between literature and art with social ecology, cultural ecology, and spiritual ecology. Ecocriticism concerns how text rejects, shows, or inspires the natural love for life in humanity: the innate [human] tendency to focus on life and lifelike proc­ esses,” the impulse of fascination and affection that inspires our bonds with the nonhuman natural world. Following the securities of religious faith, the anxieties of modernism, and the postmodernist confrontation with fragmentation and chaos, many nature writers explore ways of belonging to the world, new ways of developing an ethic of caution and reciprocity in our interactions with nonhuman nature. Thus, a prime impulse of ecocriticism is to locate, open, and discuss this desire as it is expressed in cultural forms.8 Ecocriticism uses a modern environmental perspective to investigate the relationship between literature and art and nature, society, as well as the human spirit. At the same time, it employs imaginative literary narratives to examine cultural ecology, exploring the poetics of human existence in the world and contemplating the relationship between humanity, nature, art, and criticism— reflecting on the relationship of conquest and vengeance between man and nature, establishing the humanistic principles of ecocritical art, and deducing the central themes and diverse value structure of modernity. On this point I agree with what was said by the editors of Reading the Earth: “One important

8  Branch et al., Reading the Earth, xiii–xiv.

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use of an ecologically sensitive literary criticism, then, lies in its potential to promote greater ecological literacy among all members of the community.”9 As I see it, ecocriticism is characterized by the following basic points. First, ecocriticism primarily studies issues of natural ecology and spiritual ecology in literature, attempting to show the complex movements in literary works in the world of man and nature and understand the interplay of literature and the natural environment. Ecocriticism has increasingly appeared in academic works and has greatly expanded its scope in literary criticism; hence, ecocriticism, as an important academic term in literary theory has been adopted into the lexicon of academic terminology in the West. Second, ecocriticism can also reinterpret classical literary text from a cultural ecology perspective and, from that perspective, interpret hidden meaning in the cultural ecology and aesthetic ecology, which reconstructs a aesthetically poetic relationship between man and the self, the other, society, nature, and the earth. Third, ecocriticism maintains a “politically correct” stance toward issues of human subjectivity in artistic works in that it cannot adopt a anthropocentric stance, yet it cannot adopt an entirely nature-centric stance either. Thus, it emphasizes harmonious coexistence between humanity and nature and pushes for a shift in human consciousness from “self-consciousness” to “environmental consciousness.” There is a tacit relationship between humanity and the earth, in which their life and death are mutually intertwined. Humanity is no longer the master of nature and, instead, is simply one species of many on this planet that shares its fate with other species in the natural world. Fourth, ecocriticism links literature with the life sciences, furthering studies on literature and nature in these two fields and taking a literary form from a perspective concerned with human social development and environmental change, which allows ecocriticism to become a cross-disciplinary literary field. Ecocriticism is a literary reflection on the ecological disasters faced by humanity. It is a repositioning of the place of humanity on earth by authors and artist. It is a repairing of the damage of Western modernity by intellectuals. Fifth, as it contemplates the phenomenon of cultural ecology, ecocriticism has inherited the consciousness of the green revolution, emphasizing that one cannot part from the literary spirit and discourse, and the need to develop a discursive narrative based as much as possible on a literary textual and methodological level with “literary” writing approaches to show the spirit of cultural ecology. 9  Ibid., xiii.

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Sixth, ecocriticism seeks to investigate the past and future existence of humanity from the perspective of the characteristics of life and earth. This perspective links issues from the formalism of literary studies and crises-riddled survival of the earth. With this, literature can abandon the word games of formalism, restore the field through linguistic adoption from all literary criticisms and discourses, and reexamine the meaning of “human” life and the meaning of “world” ecology. Generally speaking, ecocriticism sees the study of the relationship between literature and the natural environment as its own field of study. On the one hand, it must be “literary” study. On the other hand, it must also incorporate issues of the “ecology.” This kind of integrated study of the “literary” and the “ecology” is distinct from other forms of literary criticism and theories. Literary criticism holds hope for the future of humanity, calls for a more poetically positive attitude toward existence, and rejects “despair over the future.” Thus, it shows that ecocriticism has a more positive spirit. Of course, any newly emerging theory will have its places of incompleteness and blind spots. Ecocriticism is no exception. As this new model of criticism has emerged, garnering the attention of many in the literary field, it has also come under fire by society at large. In The Truth of Ecology: Nature, Culture, and Literature in America, Dana Phillips raises several objections about ecocriticism, arguing that it is merely repackaging old ideas, lacking any theoretical creativity, and is exploiting faddish academic terminology to grandstand. Ecocriticism has yet to form an autonomous theoretical system of its own. Its lack of a theoretical basis makes it nothing more than an impassioned narrative discourse. Ecocriticism is wildly ambitious, taking a complex theory of evolution and ecological theory and incorporating these assumptions into literary criticism in a very awkward way. Regardless of the criticism, ecocriticism is a departure from the “textual noise” and “discursive games” of Western literary theories and is leaning toward the life and death of the earth, directly confronting and emphasizing the real struggles of human existence. This is an undeniable fact.

The Significance of Ecocriticism for Modern Literary Theories

The globalization of Western culture initiated the destitution of the abundant diversity of human culture. Human political systems, human rights standards, financial systems, and technological development have been globalized. This has ensured basic human progress across the board; however, cultural forms, aesthetic sentiments, artistic spirit, and religious faith must maintain their

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own unique identity, so losing this point of the spirit of cultural ecology in humanity could lead to major fracturing and dislocation.

The Disruption of Human Values and the Integration of the Leading Discourse in the East and the West The literary theory of ecocriticism not only studies the relationship between literature and the ecosystem of the universe from an environmental perspective, but it also views literary criticism from an environmental perspective, emphasizing the prominence of an environmental perspective over an aesthetic perspective, subordinating aesthetic dimensions to environmental dimensions, leading to mutual interaction and interpretation between ecology and aesthetics. Looking at the spiritual genealogy of human ecology at a deeper level, the “disruption of human values” has plagued humanity. Whether it is in the United States, Europe, Asia, or Africa, the common problems faced by them all is the disruption and great debasement of contemporary ethics, aesthetic interests, intellectual ambition, and tradition. The disruption of traditional values has caused humanity to start again from zero, negating the great material and spiritual wealth created in the past and the profound origin of human values, leading the idealism of “blind pursuit of the new” to become the excuse for “removing the firewood from the cauldron” of tradition. The result has led humanity to be rootless, without origin, without a branch, and homeless, and thus, humanity searches for a home, to return home, to revive its spirit—the search for a home for humanity and house for the spirit has become the true representation of the modern and postmodern life of the human spirit. When it comes to issues of cultural ecology and ecocriticism, there is a major problem that we must bring up. Cultural ecology, on the one hand, seeks to inspire self-reflection from within modernity; on the other hand, it seeks to accommodate a certain degree of Western cultural modernity with Eastern culture. Historically speaking, the source of Western culture has a close bond with Eastern culture. For a long time, ancient Greece has been seen as the source of Western civilization. In fact, this view has come under increasing doubt in contemporary research. To a degree, this is a cultural bias that formed with the emergence of modern Eurocentrism. Greece was a single disruption in Western civilization that later brought forth a brilliant cultural form. Western civilization did not originate on island of Crete but was closely linked to many of the ancient Middle Eastern cultures in the region, particularly Mesopotamia. To be frank, Western civilization was greatly influenced by Eastern civilization. Westerners have seen Greece as the source of Western civilization and have used modern interpretative narratives to reinforce this cultural origin, so that it could further a prejudiced notion that Western culture was the dawn

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of human civilization. In fact, Greek culture, as a once-failed civilization, has been made into an allegedly continuous civilization by the demands of modernity and globalization in recent history. In fact, Western civilization is not a continuous civilization, nor is it a civilization that matured independently but, instead, is a civilization that was deeply influenced by Eastern civilization. In The Story of Civilization: Our Oriental Heritage, Will Durant claimed: Our story begins with the Orient, not merely because Asia was the scene of the oldest civilizations known to us, but because those civilizations formed the background and basis of that Greek and Roman culture which Sir Henry Maine mistakenly supposed to be the whole source of the modern mind. We shall be surprised to learn how much of our most indispensable inventions, our economic and political organization, our science and our literature, our philosophy and our religion, goes back to Egypt and the Orient.10 Westerners were inspired by the way in which Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilization handled human relationships and the relationship with supernatural deities. In terms of writing, art, and religion, Western civilization borrowed heavily from Middle Eastern civilization. Many things in the West, such as architecture, measurement, urban design, military technology, manufacturing, and sculpture, came from Mesopotamia and Egypt, and others, such as astronomy, mathematics, geometry, rhetoric, jurisprudence, art trade, currency, and the signing of international treaties, were all first found in Mesopotamia and Egypt. In this sense, one could say that Western civilization and even religion all have Eastern elements that are inseparable from the East. Western civilization, by integrating the most advanced parts of Eastern civilization, was able to gain its spiritual energy. Only by placing humanity at the center of the universe and emphasizing that “man was the measure of all things” (the ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras) were they able to maintain the humanism of modern Westerners and ancient Greeks, finding a common spirit in their humanity. Thus, cultural ecology today allows Eastern culture once again to influence the vanguard of Western culture. This ecological discourse is fluid and cooperative. In fact, it is the gospel of man’s escape from the ecological and spiritual crisis.11 10  Will Durant, The Story of Civilization: Our Oriental Heritage (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935), 1:viii. 11  Branch et al., Reading the Earth.

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Cultural Ecology Listens to the Warning Bell of Extinction Western artists and aestheticians over the past few years have striven to ­promote cultural ecology and aesthetic. On the one hand, there has been much introspection on the many problems that have emerged from industrial or postindustrial society; on the other hand, there has also been resistance to the foulness and violence in art over the past several decades. This kind of aesthetic ecology has spread across the globe, receiving widespread recognition. Thus the heart of the problem lies in the fact that in the past century over 5,400 species have become extinct under this human regime. Humanity today has gone from a moderate extraction of resources from nature for the sake of survival to a wanton and unrestricted exploitation of nature. Humanity’s reckless massacre of animals has painted the earth with a trail of blood. The number of animal species on the planet is finite, but human desire seems insatiable. This unrestricted, crazed expropriation of nature has devastated the natural food chain and, in the end, risks forcing humanity itself into these very same dire straits. I believe that humanity has unquestionably become the most vicious, barbaric animal on the face of the earth. This unobstructed irresponsible slaughter and lustful pursuit of possessions caused by the “modern” machine threatens to drag humanity onto a path of desolation and suicide. The calls for the ethical treatment of animals is something about which people in this new century should think long and hard. As I see it, in this fraught global relationship between mankind and animals, this violent human nature and social Darwinian appeal have in fact already twisted and distorted the harmonious relationship between man and nature. This has led humanity to come up with all kind of reasons (political, economic, cultural, and even artistic reasons) to justify the continual cold-hearted massacre of nature, going so far as to make the act of murder systematic and even a performance! Because of this, we have lost consensus over and basic principles for the equality of mankind and living creatures. Moreover, the manufacturers of this bloodletting are the very promoters of human hegemony in the imaginary view of anthropocentricism, which sees humanity standing astride all the creatures of the earth with the power to decide the life or death of animals at will and impose its own will upon any animal without any limitations. Humanity is abusing the authority of an absolutist monarch, burying the entire circle of life beneath it in the name of humanity itself. Ecocriticism demands that humanity persistently undermine its own greedy desires, shun the destruction of nature for the sake of its own grand schemes, and in no case whatsoever manufacture for itself any excuse to destroy nature. Those who wear fur coats and mink hats to flaunt their wealth are already derided in the West. To many environmental protection organizations, doing

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so is seen as tantamount to a criminal act. The timetable of nature’s revenge has already been moved up, and the schedule is full. Over 5,400 species have become extinct under humanity’s rule, making it very difficult for humanity to deny the warnings!

New Directions for the Significance of Cultural Ecology to Human Existence For James Redfield, the aesthetic ecological meaning of “the search for cultural roots” is very different from “nostalgic literature” that uncovers or explores the uniqueness of a folksy, traditional ethnic spirit, in that he looks back on human civilization with a macro-conceptual framework in an attempt to awaken people to New Age convictions among authors—a New Age ideological movement. Thus, Western nostalgic literature that emerged at the end of the twentieth century was not only a literary phenomenon but, at the same time, representative of a major cultural phenomenon as a Western popular ideological movement. In the past few decades, the West has come to imitate the Eastern way of life with an emerging belief in the “slow movement” that has been sweeping the world. In 1986, the Italian author Carlo Petrini started the global “slow food movement.” In 1999, the first Cittaslow Conference was held in Orvieto, Italy. Cittaslow seeks more space and green space for people to have a leisurely and slow-paced lifestyle. Since then, over thirty Italian cities have joined Cittaslow. Recently, “slow schools” have begun to emerge in the United States, with Martin Luther King Middle School in Berkeley, California, leading the pack. In this school, there are no high-stakes competitions, strict schedules, or competitive mechanisms. The curriculum and scheduling of classes are determined according to the needs of students. Thus, people are moving slowly, breathing slowly, eating slowly, listening slowly, slooooowly working, gently communicating, truly satisfied, and slowly enjoying what life has to offer. This is a higher realm. Similarly, the ingestion by Westerners of many things from the East has led to the recent emergence of “minimalism.” People have come to understand that they have fallen into a vicious cycle of materialistic accumulation. The more one works, the more one has, and so pace of life speeds up, their lives become busier, their health gets worse, and there is less time for anything else. Thus, Westerners have learned from the East, and, so, they have begun to work toward achieving a “simpler life.” As Laozi said, “the simplest of simplicities is to not do anything, but in not doing anything there is nothing that cannot be done.” People have realized how simple life could be, and, in fact, life has always been this simple!

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In face of the complicated life of consumerism and modernity, environmentalism seeks a simple way of life and consumption that has meaning in a cultural ecology. In fact, the implicit logic of consumerism itself to spread and homogenize the world has made the abuses of consumerism all the more apparent. Many environmentalists opposed to a consumerist way of life have argued that modernity and modern life are not about skyscrapers, cars, disease, desertification, and dust storms. A truly quality life does not need a lot of manmade trappings and superfluous flashy things. Today, many people already understand the drawbacks of a way of life that “desperately struggles to produce and consume.” The middle class has quietly given rise to a “simple life” that moves the family to countryside, builds its own wooden houses, does not use many electric appliances, and earns a small salary, so that the family can enjoy the fresh air and sunshine of nature. Sociologists believe that a “simple life” that gets back to basics and returns to nature and in which less is more will become a common trend in the twenty-first century. Perhaps this simple life and consumption, like the rustic life of Leo Tolstoy’s later years, will have a renewed appeal. In fact, humanity’s endless conquest of external spaces has made people less significant. Now scientists have reached a consensus that our solar system is not the oldest one but that there are tens of thousands of solar systems in the universe. In the face of the end of the vastness of time and space, our universe is not the only one; there is a multiverse with dozens if not hundreds of universes. In this multiverse, those with visible matter only make up 5 percent, and the other 95 percent of the universes that dominate the fate of the universe do not have visible matter. Humanity is only a speck of dust in the immensity of the universe. To this vast universe, anything we do is inconsequential beyond words. Today, Western scientists have warned people that the environment on earth is deteriorating. The final melting of the Antarctic ice shelf will release bacteria that have been frozen under the ice for millions of years—carrying diseases to which humans have no immunity; at the same time, after the polar icecaps have melted, sea levels will rise 20 meters. This implies that countries with long coastlines, like Japan, will sink into the ocean, Venice will be completely under water, and many coastal cities will be flooded. Many of the fertile plains on which human beings have lived for tens of thousands of years will be engulfed by water. If our cities grow and overconsume natural resources, then the greenhouse effect will get worse, and the future of the world will not be pretty. Thus, the future of humanity should be a future in which East and West work together. A future blueprint for the world’s future can also be produced in this discourse between the East and the West.

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Revelations About Cultural Ecology and Overall Innovation in Spiritual Values The Japanese scientist Masaru Emoto conducted an amazing experiment: take an ordinary glass of water and play music from Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven, and then observe this water under a microscope. The structure of the water crystals viewed this way were spectacularly beautiful, full of life and vitality. Similarly, when water subjected to heavy metal music and random discordant sounds is viewed, the structure of the water crystals looked misshapen and deformed as if cancerous. We all know that human beings are 70 percent water. How can we not develop cancer in this unnatural cacophony? Similarly, nonart has become dominant in the political spectrum, and real art has become a diseased art. Today, naturalism has been integrated into the cultural values of the West, and the West is beginning to study cultural ecology, ecophilosophy, aesthetic ecology, and artistic ecology. This implies that humanity has emerged from the gloomy visage of conquering nature to begin learning to respect nature and humanity. Traditional Chinese and Western culture has arrived at the beautiful harmony and moderation of “the oneness of nature and man,” and thus, regardless of whether it is in the spirit of ancient Greece or ancient China, they are all advocating the environmentalism and harmonious spirit of moderation. Ancient Greece had the idea of “moderation”: in The Golden Verse, the mathematician Pythagoras said, “in all things, moderation is the best”; the philosopher Democritus said, “moving from one extreme to another extreme unsettles the soul. It is unstable and unhappy”; Socrates discussed the issue of “moderation”; Plato argued that we need the principle of “moderation” to reveal an absolutely precise truth; Aristotle gave an in-depth analysis in Politics and Nicomachean Ethics, claiming that “The mean lies between the excesses of two extremes. In both feeling and deed, these extremes all have their faults and exceed limitations. The right deed is to strive for and choose the mean. The mean is the best and most beautiful.” One could say that the “way of moderation” of Confucius, other Chinese philosophers, Plato, and Aristotle were coincidentally very close, which shows the central place of moderation in classical ethics in both China and the West and its impact on the development of the Chinese and Western world for a couple of thousand years. Thus, the dualistic opposition of modernity violates the diverse spirit of “tripartite” moderation. When modern art becomes an art of “resistance,” Western art becomes “ugly.” Aesthetic ecology claims that the world today does not need modern “aesthetics” to resist “institutional” modernity but seeks an ecological balance to demand an ecological balance of the human spirit. The fragmented institutional “alienation” that comes with modernity leads to

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a fracturing of the spirit of art. Only through the rehabilitation of cultural ecology can we avoid taking the same disastrous and worn-out path and find a path to reconstruct a human cultural identity. We must discard the crudeness and nihilism of cultural modernity and postmodern art of the West and calmly consider whether humanity’s future can integrate spiritual elements in Eastern and Western culture. In this mutual understanding, we can eliminate cultural misunderstanding and discover the commonality of the soul in cultural differences. In a truly overall innovative ecological culture, we must find the will and courage to solve the problems of the unbalanced spiritual ecology that all humanity faces to allow humanity to bid farewell to cold wars, wars, diseases, and crime, and walk toward a green ecology of nature and society in this new century, allowing humanity to have a green life!12 Works Cited Branch, Michael P., et al., eds. Reading the Earth: New Directions in the Study of Literature and Environment. Moscow: University of Idaho Press, 1998. Buell, Lawrence. The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the Formation of American Culture. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. Coupe, Laurence, ed. The Green Studies Reader: from Romanticism to Ecocriticism. New York: Routledge, 2000. Durant, Will. The Story of Civilization: Our Oriental Heritage, vol. 1. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935. Meadows, Donella H., Jorgen Randers, et al. Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind. New York: Universe Books, 1972.

12  Laurence Coupe, ed., The Green Studies Reader: from Romanticism to Ecocriticism (New York: Routledge, 2000).

CHAPTER 10

A Realm Divided in Six: Chinese Literature Today Wang Xiaoming I In just ten years, the map of mainland Chinese literature has radically changed.1 The first radical change has been “online literature.” This seems to be a uniquely mainland Chinese phenomenon. Although other places in the world may have online literature, the atmosphere is not as vibrant as it is in mainland China, and the assault on “paperback literature” is also not as great as we see here. Including the poetry and novels by “Tuya” and others since about 1992, not even twenty years have passed in mainland Chinese online literature. However, if we scan this data—the word count of novels released on the main online literature websites every day;2 the number of inquiries and posts on some popular online novels;3 the proportion of online novels found on a trip

1  By “ten years” I mean the time in which these radical changes occurred and the time in which it really formed. Of course, this did not happen in just ten years. In the early 1990s, Wang Shuo’s novels left Beijing and were widely accepted by many who were not used to the Beijing accent. This shows that these changes were already beginning to occur. 2  According to data available on the official Shanda Literature Corporation website (www .sd-wx.com.cn), in the third quarter of 2010, the seven online literature websites owned by them had daily uploads averaging 83 million words. In December 2012, the CEO of Shanda, Hou Xiaoqiang, in response to criticism from CCTV, claimed that they have a daily upload of nearly 100 million words. Since this is part of commercial promotion and “crisis management” public relations, these figures are probably exaggerations, but even if we cut this number and compare it to the word count of paperback works (since 2010, every year there are about 1,000 to 1,200 new full-length novels published; at an average of 300,000 words per book, the total paperback publishing in a year is less than the growth rate of Shanda in a week), then the growth of online literary works is truly shocking. 3  Since Thug Cai’s First Intimate Contact [Diyici qinmi jiechu, 1998] came online on the mainland, there have been a host of online novels that have attracted large quantities of comments, like Murong Snowy Village’s Chengdu, Please Forget Me Tonight [Chengdu, qing jiang wo yiwang, 2002], which within a week had over 200,000 comments posted; and Blue Horizon Pharmacist’s 1980s: Sleeping in Dongguan [80 niandai: shui zai Dongguan], which within less than half a year received over two million comments.

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to the new release shelf of any decent-size bookstore;4 the number of online ­novels that have been made into films; as well as the dedication of young people on the subways or hospital wards to reading novels on their phones5—you can certainly say, “today, there is enough online literature to divide the realm of paperback literature.” This is not surprising. China is a highly literate country. Every year, China adds countless new aspiring young authors, but, despite this massive wave of aspiring writers, there are very few places for them to get a foot in the door. There is no need to discuss the big issues, but for the literary field, it seems as if major paperback works all fall under the authority of the government at various levels. Throughout the 1990s, the government generally became more restrictive when it came to any kind of literary works. The “literary world” formed under these long-term institutional constraints, in which regulations were solidified, and the boundaries of genres were closed, and it was just at this time that the cost of entry got higher.6 The book market, formed by the 4  The massive number of literary works that became popular online and later became published as paperbacks still have, besides as a share of the bookstores in which these literary works are directly published into paper form, the possibility of leading to the digitization of conventional literature itself on a much deeper level. The main distinction between online literature and paperback literature is not in its material form (computer screen or paper), but under these different material/technological circumstances, the intrinsic logic of these works created by the depth of intervention in the formation of these works (from creation to reading). If we just compare the differences between “cellphone novels” to the masterworks of authors like Liu Zhenyun and Zhang Wei, then we can understand the clear differences in this intrinsic logic. Bluntly put, if the majority of literary works in bookstores were produced along the lines of the intrinsic logic of online literature (fortunately, this has yet to happen), then regardless of whether these works are published online, they will illustrate the total defeat of the “paper character” of literature. 5  Of course, just because one reads a novel on a cellphone does not make it necessarily an online novel. In July 2008 while I was in the ward of a midsize hospital in northern Shanghai, I randomly interviewed five young patients and their family members. They all liked to read online novels. They felt that it was convenient and cheap, and, among the novels saved on their phones, about one-third were the online versions of paperback literature (the rest were online novels). 6  To take the Chinese Writers Association (CWA), compared to the 1980s, throughout the 1990s, the authors of vibrant works continually had weaker influence over the Writers Association it at both the local and national level. An increasing number of officials (many of which came directly from the Publicity Department at all levels of government) took leadership positions in the CWA and affiliated publications. Even though many of them were enthusiastic about literary works and were quite accomplished individuals, their status was ultimately as officials and not writers. At the same time, the CWA’s influence over new writers also continued

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government, officially sponsored publishers and bookstores, and all kinds of privately funded “secondary channels,”7 despite the fact that they quickly dislodged the predominance of writers associations, have become the chief force affecting literary creativity. Their unspoken restrictions, narrowness, and conservatism are certainly no better than the old writers associations . . . In these circumstances, it is easy to imagine that, after the personal computer became common and the Internet became widely accessible, there would be a surging tide of literature. Thousands upon thousands of young people unable to fulfill their literary dreams in paperback immediately went online. A considerable number of these online authors directly addressed two major topics forbidden in paperback literature: “politics” and “sex.” All kinds of blatant ridicule and contempt, subverting controls and describing unbridled sexuality, have exploded online. In the paperback world, it is not that authors have not attempted to break taboos: Mo Yan’s The Garlic Ballads (1988), Jia Pingwa’s Deserted City (1993), and even Yan Lianke’s steps into both forbidden topics in Serve the People (2005) are all clear examples. All the restrictions and reprimands they face are enough to give authors pause, motivating any who might have followed in their footsteps to think otherwise. The online world is different. As long as one person is willing to raise his head, a whole host of people will follow. If you write one step, I will write ten steps, and after I click on my keyboard to post them, readers will quickly respond. Anyone can change his username. Even if you wanted to fine them, you cannot find them.8 to decline. During this time, the majority of the new writers who emerged did not apply to the CWA, but were invited. 7  This has mainly come in the form of “private” bookstores like “Xizhu Shuwu” Bookstore, which at a time rapidly spread like convenience stores. 8  Of course, the website Rongshu Xia does still have censors working in the background; however, the degree is measurably much more relaxed. See, Qi Ge et al., Shengsheng shuxie diguo [The Sacred Writes about Empire] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 2010). When the Internet started becoming popular in the late 1990s, because of administrative and technological constraints, the government was slow to implement an effective censorship system. At that time, there was a large space for expression, for example, as Murong Snowy Village explained, when he released his most famous online work Chengdu, Please Forget Me Tonight in April 2004 on the Tianya community and gained attention, although the Chengdu Police Department immediately began monitoring this, his own personal freedom was not restricted in any way. Many situations like this led public opinion at the time to believe that “the Internet is free”— so much so that when the Office of News Publication and the Department of the Information Industry jointly released their Interim Regulations to Manage Internet Publication in June 2002, Chen Yongmiao and over a hundred other (most signed with their online name)

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Clearly, the excitement of this kind of free expression has set off the first wave in online literature.9 The first generation of online literary authors that rode this wave of freedom does not hide its challenge to paperback literature. At once, the equivalency of “paperback” with “traditional” was everywhere, and, at the time, the word “traditional” meant “obsolete.” In January 2000, the First Online Original Literary Works Award Ceremony, sponsored by the website Under the Banyan Tree, hosted a group of emerging online authors (Li Xunhuan, Baby Annie, Pacified God of Wealth, and Siege) alongside many established literary writers (Yu Qiuyu, Wang Anyi, and Wang Shuo) as part of the jury for the award.10 This opulent ceremony held at the Shanghai Mall Theater clearly, unequivocally marked the “rise” of a new literary world. II This is only part of the situation. As online literature marches forward holding up the banner of freedom, the hand of capitalism is also extending outward. In mainland China since the mid-1990s, all kinds of “private” capital have directly permeated cultural activity in a variety of ways; however, just as paperback literature felt there was not enough strength in online literature, private capital also felt that the value of the online literature market was not high enough. Thus private capital ultimately did not fully enter the field of online literature. Although foreign capital has explored the market, for the most part there have

released an “indictment” online. This was in strict contrast with the public’s acquiescence in the government’s longtime policy of censorship of paper publishing. Of course, the situation today is completely different. Zhang Xinxin, who started an online forum in 1999 (and was briefly a major author in the 1980s) lamented in 2010 that “what was once a fourth space for freedom of expression and imagination is now a minefield where one needs to be more cautious than in paper publishing.” See Shu Jinyu, “Zhang Xinxin: wo,” [Zhang Xinxin: Myself] Zhonghua dushubao, December 22, 2010. 9  The founder of Rongshu Xia, Zhu Weilian, defined “online literature” thusly: This is “mass literature” online that can bypass the censorship of publishers and print media editors with free expression. The most important online writer, Xing Yusen, in the late 1990s, also described the dynamism of online writing this way: “Before the Internet, many things in my life were suppressed by social roles and daily life. It was the Internet and communicating on the Internet that allowed me to feel something very pure about my own self and liberated” (cited in Luoye Feitian, Lun Zhongguo wangluo wenxue de fazhan yu xianzhuang [On the Development and State of Chinese Online Literature], www.goodmood.cn). 10  http://www.rongshuxia.com/.

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been trial runs and not a major commitment.11 Since 2000, the situation has changed. The constant competition produced by a variety of visual media, from films to online games, has given rise to a host of massive “private” corporations, and as soon as they noticed the continuous growth of online literature over the previous ten years, they immediately sniffed out the massive business potential. In July 2008, the founders of online gaming at Shanda Interactive Entertainment, headquartered in Shanghai, invested several hundred million renminbi immediately to buy the four largest online literature websites on the mainland,12 in addition to their previous purchase of Qidian Online,13 which was bundled into Shanda Literature,14 creating a massive new model for profitable “original literature”: from one-click purchasing to a dazzling array of interactive media, including paperbacks, as well as a variety of profit-sharing methods with authors. The direct infusion of capital and its heavy-handed promotion of a profitable model for its online literature have fundamentally changed the basic direction of online literature. The insatiable desire for capital growth has imperceptibly replaced the positive spirit of “creative freedom,” becoming the first invisible hand in online literature.15 By relying on a close understanding of its potential readers, Shanda Literature as well as other “genre fiction” that quickly followed in its wake have occupied a central position in literature sales. They have shifted the landscape of other established media culture 11  In August 1998, Zhu Weilian established Shanghai Rongshu Xia Computers. When he formally changed his own personal website called Rongshu Xia into an “original literary” work website, he only received investment of only USD 1.2 million. In 2002, Bertelsmann’s China branch bought Rongshu Xia for USD 10 million, which was the largest foreign investment in online literature ever, but after purchasing Rongshu Xia, Bertelsmann did not invest any more into restructuring the website to keep it competitive. 12  Investment in 2008 for Qidian Online totaled only RMB 100 million. 13  They include Hongxiu Tianxiang Online, Jinjiang Literature City, Rongshu Xia, and Xiaoshuo Yuedu Online. Later they would go on to add Xiaoxiang Academy. Qidian Online then established a separate Qidian Women Online. By early 2011, Shanda Literature operated seven different websites for “original literature.” Moreover, Qidian online also established a “mobile website” in an attempt to cover the cellphone market. 14  One could see Shanda Literature as a significantly precise word (Shanda or shengda literally means “gloriously large”) to describe the part that was formed by major capital investment into online literature: it is truly a “gloriously large” literature company, and for this reason it was able to expand so quickly to such a “gloriously large” scale. 15  Under the pressures from the number of views to determine what is written, “whatever readers view is what is written” quickly became the number one principle for contracting writers for the majority of successful online literature websites.

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and technology, particularly visual online products, substantially expanding literature “genres” as well as the multimedia nature of online literature. Qidian Online, for example, lists sixteen different literary genres on its homepage.16 About half these genres did not exist in popular fiction before the advent of online literature or were not stable enough to constitute a genre.17 One-third of these genres clearly have gone beyond the scope of established “literary” genres. They are ostensibly novels but, at the same time, are also some other kind of cultural text: comics, film, MTV, and online games, and so forth.18 This has been a literature business on an industrial scale. The brainpower of online authors, the habitual patterns of popular fiction fans, and the multimedia reading interest of young netizens all produce data. As foreign capital flocks to film, construction, music, art, online gaming, and other industries, and as China attempts to revitalize the “creative industries,” Chinese capital can see things that others cannot and has thus moved to literature in search of gold.19 Its first step is to follow Shanda Interactive in devouring the online literary world. The second and third steps remain. As the CEO of Shanda Interactive, Hou Xiaoqiang, predicted, with the growth of Sanda Literature, online literature and paperback literature will merge into one:

16  Within each major genre, there are a massive number of secondary genres. For example, according to the genres announced in July 2009 on the Qidian Archive, the most popular genre among the 16 major genres they defined is “magical fantasy.” Within magical fantasy, there were three major secondary genres, which included “magic schools,” “Western fantasy,” and “vampire clans.” The next most popular major genre was “mysterious fantasy,” which included six major secondary genres such as “shape-shifting romance” and “Eastern fantasy.” What needs to be stated is that this website changes genre categories according to the submissions of writers and reader responses and, after a while, makes adjustments to the genre categories. Changes between secondary and tertiary genres can sometimes be quite radical, but the major genres have mostly remained unchanged. 17  Such as the majority of the secondary genres of “magical fantasy” and “mysterious fantasy,” some of “military” genre (particularly the “fantasy war” subgenre), sports, as well as all the new genres that incorporate nonliterary elements. 18  Such as the majority of the secondary genres within genres like games, comics, fandom, and scripts. 19  The CEO of Shanda, Chen Tianqiao, stated clearly that “in successfully applying innovations to the Internet model to promote the online gaming industry, Shanda has always been thinking if similar models and approaches could be applied to other conventional culture industries.” See Qian Yijiao, “Wenxue, ‘mengkai de difang’: shengda wenxue gongsi CEO Hou Xiaoqiang zhuanfang,” [Literature, “The Place Where Dreams Begin”: An Exclusive Interview with Shanda CEO Hou Xiaoqiang] Xinmin zhoukan 2 (2009).

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There is neither traditional literature nor online literature. Literature is literature. What we call “online literature” will eventually leave the stage of history. Literature in the future will be completely in sync with online platforms. This is what we are doing at Shanda Literature. We are already working with the Chinese Writers Association, to move forward in gaining recognition in the mainstream.20 Only with massive amounts of capital could there be such great ambition. III At present at least, however, Shanda Literature has been unable to hide the entire online world from the public. Although the appetite of capital is voracious, its interests are also very narrow. Everything seems to boil down to anything that will make it money, but once capital feels something is no longer worthwhile, even if it already has it in hand, it will quickly cast it aside. The immediacy of interactions between authors and readers, for example, is something innovative on the Internet. This is also beginning to be eyed by the literature industry following the Shanda Interactive model, but this volatile and fickle interaction is completely at odds with the model pursued by Shanda Interactive.21 Hence, as of now it is basically still a barren wasteland. It has yet to be greatly invested in by major capital. And it is precisely this interaction, with the retreat of this tide of the freedom of expression that came with the rise of online literature, that continues to be cultivated outside the high walls of Shanda Literature. The borderland of literature is not all that clear, as it has yet to come together as a whole and is in constant transition. It is a bit like the layout of universities in medieval European cities—some building on the east side of town and a few rooms on the west side of town were dispersed like a mosaic in the streets and alleyways. With Shanda Literature’s strategic subjugation of the biggest online literature websites, this frontier seems to have gradually retreated to blogs and small personal websites, publishing on a small scale—in comparison to the massive voice of Shanda Literature and its ilk—like a field of wildflowers around a garden. This does not necessarily have to carry on for long. Currently, these blogs as well as their readership and discussions are in a constant state 20  Ibid. 21  Although this model has been the main expression, it has clearly gone from an increasingly reproducible standard to something more like a once-in-a-lifetime rebranding.

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of flux. There is nothing in the human world, particularly today, that can be permanent—no matter what it is. Anything that does not change can only be realized through the initialization of change. For the moment, I refer to this borderland of writing as “blog literature.” All kinds of people come to this frontier to publish their works: there are highly celebrated authors, retirees, and anonymous bloggers publishing lengthy stories and holding ongoing discussions with dozens of readers on the message board—some from as far away as North America. Is this not delightful? After the first part is written, then they must write the second part. There are seventy-year-old professionals who graduated from the department of politics at a reputable university who should be so busy that they collapse on the floor, but in their free time published a homoerotic novel, and it is a story about lesbians. Age is no limitation. There are also young women from small mountain towns who work as the concierge of a hotel by day, but by night periodically write personal essays on blogs, and after they sees that someone has left a post, they are thrilled and immediately respond. There are countless similar examples, and they vary wildly, but they all share one thing in common: the vast majority of these people do not do this for money. There is no one behind this “blog literature” who is counting the number of words and calculating the number of hits. Although these blogs and personal websites can exist mostly due to the operating logic of capital,22 people young and old continue to scrawl on these blogs mainly because there is something more appealing to them than making money: readers. There are not only readers with capricious interest, randomly clicking to find some relaxation, but also people who are intensely interested and passionate and wish to talk to the author and follow authors over a long time. Crudely speaking, they wish not only to express themselves but to find someone to listen to them and share their concerns. In today’s society, expression is highly limited, and finding someone to listen and share concerns is even rarer. There are truly countless readers. They don’t just read; they comment— many even swearing and making suggestions. Some are very professional, even (especially when the author has not updated in a long while) throwing in 22  For example, popularity gained by commercial websites (Sina.com was the first). There are some literature blogs, in fact, that were established by many large and small companies such as Shanda in order to support and help authors that they wished to see signed or to act as invested in to maintain publicity. There are also some writers of “blog literature” who use these as launching pads to improve their writing or gain popularity, so that they can more smoothly transition into Shanda Literature or other (including paperback) markets.

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the towel, retiring, and making it into a massive collective project of formerly ­passive onlookers! There are also some sites that maintain the same dichotomy between writers and readers that is common in the paperback world, but more often there are relationships of immediacy and unconstrained freedom: ­reader-writer, reader-reader, and even writer-writer. In this relationship the position of the writer and reader constantly changes, even changing places. The kinds of limitations and hierarchies cultivated offline become an imperceptible chaos here. Unpredictable morals and survival of the fittest here evoke a lot of responses and possess a kind of warmth: Many works that go beyond the scope of literature and a relatively stable community identity over a brief period of time are also beginning to form here. This has created two seemingly unique contradictions in “blog literature.” First, due to its geographic dispersion and reader interactions, “blog literature” seems to have quickly adopted a model of orderly disorder. If paperback literature is an upstart garden that is constantly pruned in a rigid hierarchy, then “online literature” is more like the wilderness beyond the walls of the garden, where shrubs and grasses grow together in a constant struggle. For example, when early Chinese newspapers began publishing short-story serials, they quickly became popular, but the dominating presence of authors such as Lu Xun and Zhang Henshui in these serials23 was maintained in the online world. If you think about it, dozens of readers go to these blogs every evening to see if the next chapter of the story has been posted and harass the author to hurry up, particularly those who are slow writers. If those few people who constantly give advice and encouragement and are thus seen by you as loyal readers are suddenly nowhere to be seen, how could you not be depressed and frustrated? Nowhere in the world is truly a disorderly place. If the closest order to you vanishes, then a more distant place with less order will emerge indistinctly to replace it. Many post-1980s generation online writers have claimed that “real online literature” is not an alternative; it is “entertainment for all,” and it is “a relaxation, diversion, and escape.”24 The quality of “blog literature” remains variable. Ultimately it is an amateur movement, which is beginning to be a subject of complaint among many readers. Particularly when it comes 23  Although serial stories and other columns in newspapers often adjust the plot or author and even discontinue them according to reader responses, generally speaking newsprint serials more often reflect the influence of authors and newspaper managers and even adjust the readership (“hanging the taste of reader”). 24  In December 2010, Chinese Online’s “Let’s Read Novels Online” held its Fourth Annual Writers Conference in Beijing. Many young online authors expressed many opinions like this at the conference. See “Wangluo shidai” [Internet Age] Zhonghua dushubao.

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to the ­imagination and innovation, at least at present, “blog literature” does not exhibit the kind of progress seen in the early period, such as the novels of the 1980s, in either form or content. Today, “blog literature” seems to be quite ­conservative.25 Witnessing this, could one not help but feel that this is the strong arm of man? Though it is now free, it cannot escape the narrowness and bareness of long-term imprisonment. How could it be that even now in an online world we still remain far removed from being unshackled. There is another contradiction. Although, in this wilderness, the soil is not good enough to grow literary flowers, and weeds grow in the cracks, the boundary that separated literature from non-literature is actually being broken down. In the paperback world, the institutions are set in stone: the divisions in the Chinese department at universities, columns in literary magazines, the scope of the publishing business, the categories in bookstores, and constituents of the Chinese Writers Association have all clearly marked and maintained this boundary, but online these institutions are essentially powerless. Conversely, it is more amorphous elements that influence the feeling of people about this “boundary”: the rapid clicks that lead online readership, the multimedia interactions in the online world that affect sentiments and habitual expression, and the inspiration of marvelous ideas in the interactions between writers and reader are all natural consequences that cross boundaries, which fuels the passion of the writer. Of course, “blog literature” goes back and forth across these boundaries. IV This online inspiration to cross boundaries has been an enormous part of online literature, but there are numerous and diverse possibilities for its future direction. Online literature is not as calm as “blog literature”; all kinds of capital investments—big and small—have been competing to enter this space. Yet because of this, some ideas that started off as impulsive have not jumped on the bandwagon to create new kinds of text and even major new media. As long as there is no winner-take-all, the dynamism of capital will at times push others forward and even provide the impetus for action. 25  Ostensibly, “blog literature” varies greatly—there are blogs on everything under the sun—but if we see things “that are different and challenge mainstream social values, ideology, sentiment, and means of expression” as the essential element of literary imagination, then the imagination of “blog literature” today is generally conservative. This is something that is still very clear.

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One clear trend in this is the mixing of textual, pictorial, and musical expression: there are many comic books whose primary element is the art work but also incorporate quite a lot of textual and musical elements. There are also works such as The Lama Song26 and The Gallery of Slogans from Chongqing’s Foreign Street that, while primarily textual, are dressed up with images and music. Many are commercial, but there are also noncommercial works. Most are quite disciplined albeit a little taboo, but they are also humorous and edgy.27 Even though they are mostly textual works, they increasingly intermix literature and nonliterature. Various kinds of textual works with unclear categorizations continue to emerge, from lengthy works such as That Year’s Moon’s That Stuff in the Ming Dynasty28 to short satirical works of all kinds: pseudocelebrity speeches, allegorical humor, couplets, song lyrics, and rewritten poetry.29 This sharp, incisive, and lively textual expression that brazenly explores the core meaning of words amazes me. To a high degree, they bring together many unique parts of modern life and cut through historical euphemisms. For example, “get some soy sauce”30 and passive sentence constructions are often employed in these works and popularized. If the referential symbols of denuded words are power, when everything, including words, are merely seen as tools and an important way of resisting repression, these ambiguous works overall comprise the poetry of our age. 26  Can also be translated as Fuck Your Mom Song.—Trans. 27  For example, the March 2010 video Spring Festival Property Market by Netease Realestate Forum over 14 minutes was full of satire that parodied movie lines, song lyrics, voiceovers, people’s names, and place name homophones to summarize that year’s Spring Festival Gala, expressing frustration over sharp rises in housing prices. In January of the same year, Tudou.com also released Kannimei’s highly popular sixty-four-minute film War of Internet Addiction, which was even more filled with social and political criticism. Its popularity eventually won it the “Golden Potato Award” from the 2010 Tudou Film Festival. 28  This series of works’ use of “vernacular essay history” and “historical novels” made it number 9 among the “ten most influential online literature of the decade” according to Southern Weekend in 2010. 29  Strictly speaking, currently popular satirical writings online that incorporate many formats are mostly, except for a few exceptions (such as “pseudo-celebrity speeches”), existed before they became popular online and are not an online product. Instead, since they were able to cover more ground online and even be distributed through text messages to reach places that could not go online, these satirical writings were able to achieve a much greater degree of relevance and freedom, much more so than the kinds of letters and word-of-mouth spread of political humor in the Soviet Union. 30  “Get some soy sauce” is an expression in online slang to express that a certain topic is too sensitive to discuss openly or is irrelevant to the person and thus the recipient declines to reply.—Trans.

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What is really noteworthy is the combination of literature and video games. In mainland China, video games, which have a particularly large impact on young men, have given rise to an industry that is the second largest in the world and design capabilities that are third globally. The abilities of Chinese players are arguably second worldwide. Literature has been one of the foundations of online gaming: In recent years the Chinese online gaming industry has developed a uniquely domestic style that to a large degree adopts literary content and not just that of online literature. A generation or two from now that has grown up with online gaming, in particular and certainly within a decade, will become the main readers—whether online or offline—of literature and possibly the majority of authors. The impact of online gaming on the future of literature will be great. This is not something that needs to be said, but in fact, today a great deal of literature, images, and even architectural work is already modeled after online works.31 The intersection of various kinds of text and media have already been woven into the fabric of literature and art. Nevertheless, you might find that this new space, as seen from the perspective of online literature, is difficult to classify as literature. Most of the new things that have emerged from this space, as they mature, will probably drift away from literature. Even as a separate category, however, they will inevitably come back to influence literature, sharing room with it and many others that are comparable. This influence will be rather substantial and quite possibly occupy a sizable part of the literary space and radically change the direction of literature. The vitality of online gaming, by the same token, will also be dragged into this much expanded literary arena. As the water deepens, this space will have to either sink or swim, and only by swimming across will the currents be able to flow and clear the waters. At the conclusion of War of Internet Addiction, when the character Kannimei delivered a final impassioned soliloquy that was like an epic poem,32 I could not help but think that it may be in this kind of multimedia space that the power of online literature will be able to explode onto the scene. 31  This is clearly seen among the most prominent works at Shanda Literature and the most commonly read and written genres among young people like “Fantasy,” “Magical Warriors,” and “Games.” 32  War of Internet Addiction (2009) is a video using the Blizzard computer game World of Warcraft and appeared on tudou.com in 2009 produced by fans of the computer game. It commiserates over the travails of World of Warcraft players limited by Chinese censorship. Despite the Chinese government’s numerous attempts to block the video, it was extremely popular among Internet users and was awarded tudou.com’s film of the year award in 2010, along with many other awards and recognition. “Kannimei” was a character in the film.—Trans.

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V Look again at paperback literature. The first thing I think is, of course, “serious literature”—if you will bear with me as I use the quite problematic term for the moment—of figures such as Mo Yan and Wang Anyi. These are the immediate successors in Chinese modern literature of the legacy that began a century ago with the New Culture movement. They are also what many people in my generation often recognize as those producing authentic literature. Those comprise the “modern” literary works taught today in Chinese university literature and sinology departments, and they are what is understood by the Chinese Writers Association as well as literary publications and critics as “modern” literature. They all refer to this kind of literature. In 2010, “serious literature” was viewed positively in the media multiple times,33 but, overall, the impact of this kind of literature on society has been waning. The sales of the magazines that primarily publish this kind of literature have shriveled, albeit not at an alarming rate. The sales of these literary figures continue to vacillate at the bottom. It seems as though all the discussions of major public issues, whether online or offline, all have a voice in “serious literature.” This has been going on for over a decade, and last year was no different. The literary imagination, sentimentality, and stories of authors of “serious literature” no longer seem to embody the emotional state of life for the public, despite having been often quoted, borrowed, and rewritten.34

33  For example, because of the passing of Shi Tiesheng, the overall advent of Zhang Wei’s tenvolume series of novels (including many older works), the completion of the new works (the Four Books) of Yan Lianke and others, the massive increase in royalties for Shouhuo and Shanghai Literature (from RMB 60–100 per thousand characters to RMB 150–200 per thousand characters). Thus, Shi Tiesheng’s The Altar of Earth and I was able to jump up to the top ten list of Beijing Sanlian Daofen Bookstore in February 2011. 34  In this respect, I mean the way that the works in the 1920s and 1930s that became a major part of the public imagination, such as The True Story of Ah Q, Diary of a Madman, Home, The Border Town, and Midnight, as well as popular literature between the 1940s and 1960s, sparked the literary imagination of the people, such as Xiao Erhei’s Marriage, A History of Pioneers, Song of Youth, and Tea House. “Serious literature” since the mid-1990s has lacked this power, which is quite glaring. Of course, authors and works in general considered “serious literature” are all different, but there are quite a few that are worth noting; however, “serious literature” is not the focus of this chapter, and I will not go any further into it.

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VI Clearly antithetical to the serenity of “serious literature” is a cacophony of literature. Guo Jingming can be seen as one of the best writers of this kind of literature, and his work editing Zui xiaoshuo and the entire Zui literary magazine series can be seen as the most representative of this kind of paperback media, just as Renmin wenxue and Shouhuo is representative of “serious literature.”35 The history of this kind of literature is quite short. Even if we count its rough beginnings,36 it has not been around for more than fifteen years. In 2010, however, the sales of Zui xiaoshuo surpassed 300,000, going well beyond the sales of Renmin wenxue and Shouhuo. If we compare this to the standards of “serious literature,” you will certainly say, “what does Guo Jingming amount to?” For sure, this young man who brings a makeup artist with him to the annual conference of the Chinese Writers Association does not fit the typical mold of a literary writer in both image and identity: he strives to make himself into a celebrity and has made a conscious effort to make literature into a kind of business. In 2007, his company joined hands with sponsors to promote a national “literary stars” competition for a couple of years with round after round of selections, and it snowballed into an even bigger spectacle. By the final round in 2009, held at a magnet high school in Beijing, there were thousands upon thousands of followers—mostly high school students—screaming in delight. This shows us again clearly something fundamentally unique about this kind of literature: It is a uniquely Chinese product of the “culture industry.” It also shows us something about the identities adopted by Guo Jingming: He is first a capitalist, then a popular celebrity, and last a writer. No wonder introductions in the Zui xiaoshuo series often begin by saying: “In such-and-such a year, so-and-so signed a contract with such-and-such company as an author, and his book, such-and-such-a-title, has been released on the market.”37 It is also no surprise that, after his second major novel was ruled by the courts to have been “plagiarized,” Guo Jingming irreverently stated, 35  Zui xiao-shuo [The Smallest Novel]; Renmin wenxue [People’s Literature]; Shouhuo [Harvest]. 36  For example, starting from the overhaul of Sprouts and “The New Concept Writing Competition.” 37  Hence, “going on the market” became a common expression to describe the publication of works and its placement on bookstore shelves. Han Han, for example, described Party this way.

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“I make no apologies.” A tide of fans wrote posts on his blog in support, stating things such as: “No matter what, even if he did plagiarize, I still like him!”38 This is a new kind of literature, entirely different from “serious literature.” If we use this term, it is also important to point out that it is very distinct from the “popular novels” of the past, such as romance novels popular in the early republican period or the later martial arts novels. This new kind of novel represents a new kind of relationship between the author and his or her work. In this relationship, the more an author is a popular idol, the more he stands out from his or her own work. It is a kind of interaction based more on a relationship between the author/work and the reader. In this relationship, the question of whether the author plagiarizes or whether the work is creative is no longer important. The most essential thing is whether the author can provide readers with something that helps them to identify themselves and further act as symbolic fetishes to reify their identity. In this sense, I would like to say that this literature has already begun to act as an effective contributor toward maintaining social order today, adding an important link to the social hegemony. It acts as a crucial link in social reproduction: continually raising a generation of young people who are certainly not stupid but nonetheless ultimately obedient. It redirects their youthful passion toward ungrounded fantasies and immaterial complaints. If we say that “neocapitalism” makes up the foundational basis of current society, then the kind of literature created by people like Guo Jingming and his Zui xiaoshuo series is “neocapitalist literature.”39 What is interesting is that the overnight growth of “neocapitalist literature” has dramatically shifted the response evoked from “serious literature.” 38   “Jianzheng qiji de shike,” [The Moment a Miracle Was Witnessed] Guo Jingming chaoxi an: mishi zai “xiao si” de youlechang, http://wenxue.xilu.com/2009/0911/news_ 51_15153_2.html. 39  A major characteristic of a mature modern society is the mass production of a kind of new literature through some kind of economy of “industrial culture,” culture, and even political system. The primary function of this kind of literature is not to inspire readers with “beauty” and thus inspiring sensitivity, compassion, and contemplation, but, instead, to satisfy the increasingly recreational spiritual needs of readers though superficially multifarious, yet in reality formulaic stories and images, and subtly and imperceptibly change the basic structure of readers’ spiritual world. Overall, the social effect of this kind of literature is to push readers to adapt to the current social structure in which they reside and, either consciously or unconsciously, makes people obedient and cooperative citizens in the existing social order. The fascist and Nazi literature of the 1930s and the rise of post-1960s consumerist literature and consumerist society are two clear examples of the relationship between literature and the society in which they reside.

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The contempt for it in the past did not last very long; there was, instead, a clear increase in expressions of “amnesty” and even appeasement. Guo Jingming was invited to join the Chinese Writers Association. Despite having one of his most important works found by the court to have been plagiarized, he is still a member, even though he should have been expelled. His latest works have been included in prominent positions in Renmin wenxue and Shouhuo, even though Zui xiaoshuo has continued to exclude literature from the traditions of figures like Mo Yan and Wang Anyi. Some literary authors in their fifties, sixties, seventies, and even eighties enthusiastically participate in the “literary” awards and competitions hosted by Guo—or other figures like him. These veteran authors stand on the sidelines to share in the cheering of the fans: They already realize clearly that in the competition for young people—whether as readers or writers—“neocapitalist literature” is the direction in which the currents are flowing. Although I am reluctant to admit this, I must confess, with respect to how things seem in the present, that the momentum of “neocapitalist literature” in the paperback world, particularly for the foreseeable future,40 is clearly surpassing “serious literature.” VII In the paperback world of literature, there is another form of literature. Regardless of whether it is “serious literature” or “neocapitalist literature,” behind any literature is a system that supports and regularizes it: institutions that produce mainstream literature through the combined efforts of official and semi-official structures41 and institutions that produce the leading paperback materials in the uniquely Chinese “culture industry”—or, its more legal

40  What needs to be made clear is that “neo-capitalist literature” is highly vibrant and thus is multifarious. It will abandon its greatest authors, works, and media as time requires, and, at the same time, it will provide something to replace it; hence, whether it is Guo Jingming or the Zui xiaoshuo series, their “red” period may be very brief—much shorter than the representative works of “serious literature.” However, it can quickly change and readjust its most representative symbols and media. “Neo-capitalist literature” is clearly has a strong sense of survival and competitiveness. 41  These organizations are mainly official periodicals, publishers, publishing distributors, the Central Information Department, the News Publication Office, High School Chinese Departments, University Chinese Departments, the Chinese Writers Association, and bookstores as well as mainstream literary critics and researchers.

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name today, the innovative industry.42 Although these two institutions are highly distinct and even at times are at loggerheads, they are not inexorably separated.43 Hence, they also share a common goal: they all attempt, for their own purposes, to stifle and tame the capacity of literature to resist constraints and norms.44 However, two things make it extremely difficult to tame literature in this way: the first is mainly literary history as formed by the “classics”; the second— and more important—is a constant rejuvenation of the “literary population” every year with young blood.45 This is not just because young people are more energetic, but more because the cruelties of reality repress them, forcing them to gripe and groan. Standardized testing curriculums, competitive job markets, exorbitant housing prices, censorship of information, social corruption, myopia and passivity in government, and the utilitarianism of mainstream culture—as these things gradually converge and seem to have utterly eroded the scorn of the youth, there still remains much capacity for resistance, often headed in a direction beyond what is permissible by the system and to the farthest reaches.

42  Besides the strong push of numerous special organizations—for example, all kinds of unofficial private book publishers and distributers—this system also borrows much from the mainstream production system of literature—including government oversight offices—to operate. Over a decade, this kind of “borrowing a nest to hatch an egg” approach to literature has become more common and clear. What should be explained is that this system of producing publications is not only a producer of “literary works” in a narrow sense, but as long as there is some way to sell a publication, then it will produce it. Therefore, it does not respect any boundaries in publication and will respond strictly according to the publication market, continually attempting to break any boundary and blending and mixing all kinds of genres—and even content that is not generally understood as new and innovative—to produce “new content.” Thus, as this modicum of operation succeeds, it gets larger and unleashes a massive force that strikes at the boundary between literature and nonliterature. 43  See above. Another way of seeing this is, since there is a cautious avoidance of taboo topics and even their own minefields and self-censorship, the print production system led by the “culture industry” in fact have absorbed a part of the very government agencies that engage in censorship. 44  It is this common point that determines their frequent cooperation to a degree. Compared to the early 1990s, this cooperative relationship has in fact become more common and much deeper. 45  It is not just young people who joined as authors, but also young people who joined as readers and critics. In the Internet age, as previously discussed, this kind of dual identity and even multiple identities has become increasingly convenient and common.

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This capacity is far from the sole domain of literature; nonetheless, if one part of the field is too greatly constrained or dangerous, then the young people will more likely turn to literature.46 When the cultural support of an overly oppressive social structure becomes increasingly great, then conversely it incites more resistance to the structure, and more often than not literature acts as the impetus, and literature is often charging ahead. In this tendency to transition to literature, most are probably turning to the Internet, but there are still many forms of literary resistance that are not online. The Internet has charged forward from the hinterlands of literature in an undisciplined way, but it increasing has the potential to be accepted in paperback literature. The paperback world, while more constrained, ultimately must contain literature, allowing them to gripe and holler outside the established system—or, more precisely, from its marginal space. For over a decade, this kind of literature has lifted its head from every corner.47 You can even sense that were they to come together, they would have the potential for extraordinary capacity; however, at present, it has yet to form a complete and stable profile. Here, I can only provide a few crude generalizations. The majority of these authors are young people, mostly from post-1980s and even post-1990s period. They disparage the writings of Guo Jingming and his ilk as too juvenile,48 but they also seem unwilling to follow in the dust of Mo Yan and other literary works, doing their time in the system before they get their day to apply as members of the Chinese Writers Association. Although this stems from a frustration over inequity, this kind of literature overall seems ashamed of serious emotion and is more willing to adopt a posture of satire and self-abasement. It expresses true—even intense—social and 46  This not only happens in the literary world but generally across culture and to an even greater extent. For example, a larger number of young people reject the “progress” of “neocapitalist” demands to become a standardized and obedient laborer. They stubbornly “inhabit” their homes, sinking deeper into an online world playing games, chatting, opening online stores, observing, commenting, spreading “rumors,” and make satirical video clips. From a certain angle, it shows the capacity of life and its rebellion and resistance: how people are forced into/transferred into the cultural realm and the complexity in which they are consumed, joined, and erupted. 47  In the late 1990s, there emerged a string of terms such as “post-1970s generation” and “post-1980s generation,” which became popular. It was critics who gave a weak response to this kind of comparative groan and shout. In 2010, the publishing of the first issue of Han Han’s Party could be seen as their opening the first relatively independent new space. 48  Although there are still some authors who are “contracted,” for the moment they still rely on the literary companies of the “culture industry.”

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personal sentiments through false modesty, dejection, and impassive “humor.” In this sense, it has a host of expressions. In fact, it has already begun to redefine the meaning of “resistance literature.”49 Like other online literature, its form has a preference for the shocking—the more taboo an issue, the more it takes a position that confuses genres. In the first issue of Party, Han Han filled his pages with illustrated text and started a column called “Everyone Ask Everyone,” with all kinds of artfully crafty questions responding to bureaucratic officialese. This helps hide him to hide in the gap between literature and nonliterature. During the Lunar New Year in 2011, Southern Weekend put out a special issue of sixteen articles with short stories recalling “my father.” In the margin, they printed poems by Bei Dao, Hai Zi, and Rainer Rilke, like a literary magazine, but in fact it is not. Among them were oral accounts from many editors and journalists recounting the year’s hottest news stories to “family,”50 as if they were hiding under the umbrella of literature to more easily express nonliterary concerns.51 At the same time, this is the only way they can open this road so close to the boundary. Many young 49  There is not sufficient room to explain in detail why this happens. Here I will just list a couple of things we should consider: The constant alienation of “sacrosanct” ideals after the destructiveness of “Cultural Revolution” kind of consciousness has created a general malaise and distrust of “serious” expressions because of official corruption as well as all kinds of “hollow” sentiments. Because of increased pressures, physical fatigue, a strong desire to “just relax a little,” a seeming instinctual psychology of avoiding the pain of life, as well as education in schools and homes, media information, and the physical space in cities have infested people with an a mental attitude that is not accustomed to sensing and understanding the “bigger picture.” Moreover, the impact of the popularity of online literature is also a cause of this. When you search online for responses by experienced writers to the question “how should we increase the number of visits by readers to the webpage [of novice writers]?”, they give four main points in this order: “make it a part of daily life,” “make it have feeling,” “find a writing style that fits with you,” and “a sense of humor.” They particularly point out that most people who go online to read novels do so to find entertainment. You cannot write something that will add to their troubles. The relationship between “rebound literature,” and this style is something that is also worth noting. 50  This description brought together four works that dealt with suicides at Foxconn, “nail salons,” forcible demolitions of homes leading to death, and a female university student who was hit by a car on campus. 51  What is interesting is that two days later (February 5) the Shanghai newspaper Liberation Daily also published in its “New Business Weekly” twelve short stories of about a thousand characters each that expressed many ideas about socioeconomic issues, such as choosing a career, housing, and making a family among city residents—particularly young city residents.

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writers—including the singer Zhou Yunpeng—have also driven on this road. By placing them in complete opposition to other articles at the time that were all done up in red for the Lunar New Year52 and, instead, provide an “oral account” that they sing together t but should not sing at all. These writers highlighted, unfortunately, an even smaller gap, in which there will inevitably be conflict. At present, oral accounts have not yet established a stable sheltered space. While the first issue of Party sold over 1.5 million legal copies (not pirated), the second issue was banned, and then the publication was suspended indefinitely. Resistance literature has no choice but to pop up here and there, wandering the four corners of the earth. In this interlocking of gaps and traps and easily interchangeable worlds, it is hard to be leveraged. Its real face is constantly in flux and ambiguously colored in its content and means of distribution. For example, its current representative writer, Han Han, began as a novelist but now uses a mixture of commentaries and blogs to talk to readers. In September 2010, his newest lengthy essay 1988: I Want to Talk to This World About My Feelings only had one printing of, bafflingly, only 100 copies. The sale price was 998 renminbi and included a thin 10-gram stick of gold!53 Although there is a lot of opaqueness and uncertainty, I am still willing to believe that this vast realm, where there is shouting and complaining beyond the confines of established institutions, even in the paperback world, will go on endlessly. Most authors have no choice but to fall into the chaos of the noise, and many will also, because of this, have to change their voice. We should listen more attentively and define them more accurately. An ostensible lack of shape may actually be a unique characteristic of something new. For the paperback world, a major opportunity for Chinese literature may be found here.

52  Among these sixteen short stories, there was a story attributed to the son of the corrupt Chongqing official Wen Qiang, which described his noncorrupt side as a father. Although much of what was written was truthful, it naturally evoked the ire of many readers. 53  This kind of vulgar hype also garnered the resentment of many readers. Immediately, there was a massive wave of criticism online. This clearly shows that many readers see Han Han and Guo Jingming as two distinctly different writers and thus many could not tolerate this kind of hype. “How could they do this!?” On another less-explicit level, the “topical” series The Carp edited by Zhang Yueran since 2008 also expressed this kind of ambiguous approach: the cautious and mindless use of buzzwords (like “lonely,” “addicted,” “hormonal”) are clearly in conflict with some of the works in this series as well as the tension among many different works in the series.

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VIII A “realm divided in six” or “in half” is merely a metaphor. The map of literature should not have been divided numerically. Categories like “great ­literature,” “blog literature,” “serious literature,” and “neocapitalist literature” are simple; as the Buddhist term goes, they are dharmaparyāya—a means of initiation. These are certainly not ideas that will bear intense scrutiny. In fact, the divisions in literature that I have demarcated have many things in common and similarities. Among these commonalities and similarities, some things may be more important than the things that distinguish them. Their similarities may be greater than their differences. For example, the “great literature” online, at least for the most part, is much like works like Zui xiaoshuo in that it can fall under the category of “neocapitalist literature” of the times and might be the strongest part of it. In the past few years, cooperation and response between them have been quickly expanding.54 All interdisciplinary writings online and offline, particularly works with a strong political angle, also seem to be, from the outset, mutually inspired and continually reinforce one another.55 Things that began as an inspiration from literary satire quickly become video clips, song parodies, guitar riffs, and skits, and, within a brief time, spread across the country. These kinds of things seem to happen every day. Corresponding with this, many works from “blog literature” and “serious literature” that are united in their “conservative” approach to literary content and form are clearly represented.56 At present, many outstanding authors—most of them middle-aged or in their later years—still maintain the bottom line of “serious literature” through social criticism,57 in contrast 54  An example of this is that in 2009 Shanda Literature signed Guo Jingming and bought the online rights to his new work Tiny Times (which was a full series on Qidian Online). 55  This kind of mutual inspiration and complementing has developed into cross-media writing. The complicated relationship of promoting cross-media writing in the Chinese “culture industry” as well as Shanda Literature is something worth deeper analysis. 56  The meaning of “conservative” here is simply to say that these works generally will not leave readers with a major sense of uncertainty: “What kind of work is this? A novel? A short story? Or . . .?” Also, it will not give readers a clear sense of “estrangement” in its place (theme, structure, narrative style, and implications). 57  Although “serious literature” in China today is strictly limited by the mainstream system of literary production that regularizes and supports it, the remaining “seriousness” of this literature still continues to be expressed by some authors who are constantly trying to find a way to break through these limitation. From this point of view, the works of these authors is more similar to, than it is different from, the kind of literature that “groans and yells” from outside the system that this chapter discusses.

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to the flourishing prospects of “outside” literature being pushed forward by a younger generation of writers. The relationship between these two is something worth much more study. Nonetheless, there is something very clear that can be concluded from this: Chinese literature has changed remarkably, and we must strive to explain it. IX In the past thirty years, society has changed greatly. Whether it is politically, economically, culturally, or in terms of living standards, regulations, or hegemonic forces, they are all completely different from in the 1970s. Thus, the literary world can be divided into six, fundamentally speaking, because of these major “differences.” Of course, on a much small scale, it is because of several more localized causes, but the overall transformation of politics, economics, and culture has a series of intermediary links between the diverse state of literature, which deserves more of our attention. It is only through these intermediary links that we can clearly state how literature has been transformed and how we can respond to the factors that have changed it. As I see it, these intermediary links occupy the primary position, as they are a new mechanism producing cultural hegemony.58 They quickly formed in the mid-1990s from what was possibly the most important perspective and

58  Generally speaking, a society will always form a dominant culture. Not only does it dominate the culture but, because of its dominance, it also pushes or coerces other cultural forces into the direction it wants, so that it will not be able to sustain influence on society to a significant degree. In this sense, if there is no participation by the dominant culture—even if the dominant culture cannot be clearly identified—then society will not be able to reproduce. The more modern the society, the greater the participation of the dominant culture in social reproduction, even to the point of playing a leading—not just ­participating—role in social reproduction. Corresponding to this, the more modern the society, the less time is needed to form a dominant culture, unlike in ancient societies, and thus it is influenced by many “haphazard” elements. The increasing density of ­complex structures in modern society—even if this “density” is often expressed as an uncertain volatility in form that leaves people feeling there is no rigid structure—­determines the form, transformation, and destructiveness of the dominant culture, which are unable to avoid “artificial” properties. That is to say, they all are limited by the tension/cooperation of all kinds of social systems. Hence, the dominant culture of modern society is often formed in cooperation with all kinds of “unwritten laws” that emerge from this tension/ cooperation, which structures the basic productive mechanisms of the dominant culture.

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fundamentally transformed the basic conditions of “production” in literature, which went on to change the entirety of literature. There is not enough space to explore at length what exactly is “new” about this mechanism of cultural hegemonic production or how this changed the means of production in literature overall. However, I would like to list some crucial parts of this production of cultural hegemony that clearly show which real responsibilities are undertaken by this new mechanism producing cultural hegemony in the state of literature today. Many international and domestic events converged to strengthen a general sense of political ineffectiveness: the turmoil of the late 1980s; the major social changes in the early 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union; the emergence of “crony capitalism” in the mid-1990s; and the destructiveness from global imitation of an imagined “American model.” If we look more closely at the economic life of the average young person, particularly those who live in cities or wish to live in cities, you will find that the role of ideology in their daily life is increasingly strong. Beginning in elementary school, this ideology emphasizes the molding not just of learning abilities, intellectual capacities, and academic proclivities but of the physical and mental inclinations of children through “standardized educational testing.” At every level—not just the physical work of the assembly line, but also white-collar work such as finance and the information technology industry, and even “careers” like education and journalism—a clear change has taken place in the density of wage labor and timetables. The cultural disparities in the urban-rural divide, as well as the homogeneous coastal metropolises, which often claim the title “international metropolises,” have almost entirely alienated the culture of medium-size and small cities and the interior. There has been new communication technology and the nearly universal use of hardware: personal computers, satellite TV, the Internet, highways, and cellphones . . .  The enlarged focus on the system of cultural dissemination and the censorship of information has been a major shift in censorship regime, leaving the “creative freedom” that inspired so many people in the 1980s with timid words that have become essentially meaningless. This has been a major change across literature and beyond, that, while ostensibly small, is a meaningful footnote. I could go on, but these points on the production of cultural hegemony are probably the most important. Among them are a few to which we are not accustomed to paying attention and thus feel distant from. Moreover, there are some from which we have made an unconscious retreat, which is intimately

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related to this distance: “These are all things external to literature. I study ­literature. What does this have to do with me?” Over ten years, we have heard this kind of skepticism many times. If we wish to explain modern Chinese literature and evaluate the possibilities of change today, however, we must pay attention to the things discussed above as well as other potentially important things not discussed in this article, in order to better understand and explain literature. Hence we must greatly expand our knowledge, analysis, and methodology. I am afraid that this implies that the scope of literary research will clearly expand and will become even more complicated. In some ways, the scope of literature is expanding. Whether it is the constraint and exploitation of literature or the struggles and resistance of literature, an even larger part—and clearer part—of literature happens outside the bounds of what we are used to calling “literature.” This reality in fact will allow us to escape our own self-defined prison and indifference. X In the mid-1980s, because the direct influence of literature on society was weakening, the sales of literary magazines quickly declined from several million or hundreds of thousands per issue to just tens of thousands and even a few thousand. The idea that “literature is inherently lonely in modern society” became very popular, and the United States was often cited as an example. Some have even argued that the loss of literary “sensationalism” was evidence of China’s modern progress. Within less than a decade, a larger number of writers and scholars came to accept this idea and gradually came to terms with it—no longer apprehensive, no longer complaining, and, of course, no longer giving it much thought.59 Today we can clearly see that the state of literature in the modern world varies wildly, and it is certainly not homogeneous. In a society like the United States, literature from the likes of William Faulkner or Ernest Hemingway is certainly lonely, but literature still plays a very important part in the spiritual life of people in places like Europe, South America, and Asia and still has a major social impact. This is particularly the case in China today. Since the rise of Internet usage and online literature, the number of people who can be counted as a part of the “literate population” has grown, as they are in the 59  As I see it, the “loneliness” of “serious literature” over the past thirty years has grown. For writers and researchers, this idea that “literature is inevitably lonely” is a major cause of this.

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habit of constantly reading a certain number of literary works online as well as a number of paperback literary works that are formally published. Even from the very crude introduction to this issue in this article, it should be clear that, as the sales of serious paperback literature has declined in the literary world, the map of this literary world has been gradually expanding. That is also to say that there is no fundamental difference in the spiritual capacity of Chinese society between the past century and today; it is still evident at the confluence of the literary world. On this point, like the lions of “great literature,” as we have judged them and they affirmed, at least as we have up to the present for a long time, literature still plays an important role. Of course, there are a variety of perspectives on why literature is important. Many believe that the majority of Chinese “creativity” has been in literature, and, in this day and age, “creativity” is one of the most lucrative things. I certainly do believe that, as society continues to struggle to expand its own modern direction, China will have great literature, just as in nineteenth-century Russia, that will elevate and maintain the spirit of the nation and society, even if the form and appearance of this great literature will most likely not—and probably should not—resemble that of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, or Chekhov. This idea emerged because there is so much disillusionment with modern literature, yet there is still attention paid to it and it even continues to maintain a separation from “outsider” works that boldly demarcate this changing map of literature today, and I believe that new evidence will emerge from this idea of outlining this map. Works Cited “Jianzheng qiji de shike.” [The Moment a Miracle Was Witnessed] Guo Jingming chaoxi an: mishi zai “xiao si” de youlechang, http://wenxue.xilu.com/2009/0911/ news_51_15153_2.html. Luoye Feitian. Lun Zhongguo wangluo wenxue de fazhan yu xianzhuang, [On the Development and State of Chinese Online Literature], www.goodmood.cn. Qi Ge et al. Shengsheng shuxie diguo. [The Sacred Writes about Empire] Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 2010. Qian Yijiao. “Wenxue, ‘mengkai de difang’: shengda wenxue gongsi CEO Hou Xiaoqiang zhuanfang.” [Literature, ‘The Place Where Dreams Begin”: An Exclusive Interview with Shanda CEO Hou Xiaoqiang] Xinmin zhoukan 2 (2009). Shu Jinyu. “Zhang Xinxin: wo.” [Zhang Xinxin: Myself] Zhonghua dushubao, ­December 22, 2010. “Wangluo shidai.” [Internet Age] Zhonghua dushubao.

CHAPTER 11

What Is “Anthropology” as I Understand It? Wang Mingming People are unable to agree on what “anthropology” is. For many scholars in China, anthropology today is still seen as an academic department that is part of the natural sciences (particularly the Academy of Sciences). In these institutions, “anthropology” essentially studies the “primitive anthropology” through historical morphology. In other institutions (particularly institutions of higher education), anthropology is treated as a sub-department of sociology. In some special education and research that focus on “minorities” (particularly minority schools and minority research academies), anthropology is sometimes seen as much the same as “ethnology,” and, at other times, it is seen as antithetical to science (quite a number of people see “ethnology” as “native” and politically useful while anthropology is a useless word game played by Westerners). This scientifically “mistaken and messy” positioning of anthropology in China did not occur independently, but has much to do with the profound impact the “West” has had on us. The belief that anthropology is the study of historical human morphology and that ethnological studies that describe culture are more reputable than anthropology that derives from Europe (including the former Soviet Union). The belief that anthropology is a wing of sociology derives from the French Annales School of sociology as well as British sociology. The belief that anthropology is an all-encompassing “greater discipline” is linked to current American “greater anthropology.” I do not doubt the value of “greater anthropology” (including anthropological studies on human morphology and culture) and have even always believed that, ideally, anthropology should become a bridge between the natural sciences and humanities, just as it has been in the United States. The contradiction is that the anthropological research that I have made a career of is closely linked to humanistic thought, sociology, ethnology, and history, and starkly different from “morphological anthropology,” to the point that it is essentially an “antithetical” discipline.1 1  The reason that this field is categorized as a part of the “humanities” while the general nature of this field does not fall under suspicion, on the one hand, is because it considers one’s own academic interest, convenience of teaching, and limitations of knowledge, and, on the

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The anthropology I am discussing is in its modern academic form. This form of anthropology does not advocate “body measurements,” “racial distinctions,” “anatomy,” and “genetic analysis,” and, instead, focuses on researching humanity as a complete body of meaning. It pays more attention to the “mind of the body” and “things external to the body.” The emphasis is more on the dialectic of the “ego” and the “collective.” It centers more on understanding the relationships between humanity and things, human relationships (including “we,” “the other,” “ancestors,” and “posterity”), freedom and norms, and the inevitability of “separation” and the imperative of “unity.” The Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the scientific revolution in the modern Western world system and the “national awakening” of European countries have given birth to the very “anthropology” that we do not propose as well as the form of anthropology that we employ. People have already demarcated this “soil” as “modernity.” If this definition is appropriate, then our form of anthropology is probably an intrinsic pattern of reflection on “modernity.” “Discussing the present through the lens of the ancients” is the special “game” of this form of anthropology. In the narrative of anthropology, the “plot structure” is ancient history as well as the intellectual world and way of life for “uncivilized races.” Anthropologists are concerned with how things are categorized in unique yet familiar ways, how meaning is assigned to the relationship between oneself to others, what dos and don’ts are emphasized in human relationships, and how these come together to form coherent “wholes” within a social or cultural system. These social and cultural systems followed by anthropologists are clearly marked by “mixing.” Economics, politics, society, law, religion, rituals, myths, and verbal forms of expression all exist in a closely intermingled state. Anthropologists have refined an entire social image through the messiness of ancient history and “uncivilized races” and have compared this with the “hierarchies” imagined by people or the “fragmentation” of modern society, leading our own social image to be further “other”-ized. The anthropology that “focuses on researching humanity as a complete body of meaning” that I am discussing is built on this concept of the “other.” The nineteenth century was a golden age of anthropology. At the time, anthropologists had an impact on the humanities and social sciences in general through comparative cultural research that was well beyond what we could imagine today. other hand, is because this definition conforms to the requirements of the Chinese academic perspective.

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That period gives me a strong sense that “things were better back in the good old days”; however, given that we need to face the reality of our time, my own pedagogical approach to anthropology ultimately rests in twentiethcentury academia. Modern British social anthropology as it emerged in the early twentieth century as well as its “Chinese manifestation” is certainly the main source of anthropology as I understand it;2 however, I am not entirely satisfied with this special category of anthropology and have a place in my heart for finding a synthesized concept of society, culture, race, civilization, and the world in the “ethnological period” of the French Annales school.3 When it comes to this “revival” in the “ethnological period” of the Annales school, I have two thoughts: First, there is an entangled relationship between anthropology and “ethnology”; second, the “ethnological period” was deeply influenced by European (especially German) ethnology as well as prominent benefits from the “specter” of modern American cultural anthropology. The ethnological period of the Annales school selectively preserved classical anthropology through a set of unique methods, and this has particular significance for our complete understanding of the humanistic world. Anthropology devolved from the “three stages of human progress” of the nineteenth century to the “dualistic approach” of the twentieth century. In the eyes of nineteenth-century anthropologists, the world was divided into “uncivilized races,” “ancient societies,” and “modern societies” (these categories are described differently by different anthropologist). By the twentieth century, this middle stage (i.e., ancient societies) was disavowed by anthropologists. Later, a dualistic narrative of savagery and civilized or “uncivilized races” and modern man became quite popular, and thus modern anthropology came to deceive itself.4

2   Wu Wenzao, “Gongnengpai shehui renleixue de youlai yu xianzhuang,” [The Origins and State of Functionalist Social Anthropology] in Wu Wenzao shehuixue renleixue lunji, [A Collection of Wu Wenzao’s Theories on Sociology and Anthropology] ed. Wu Wenzao (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1990), 122–133. 3  Yang Kun, “Faguo shehui xuepai minzuxue shilüe,” [A Brief History of the French Ethnology School of Sociology] in Shehuixue yu minzuxue, [Sociology and Ethnology] ed. Yang Kun (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 142–159. 4  Wang Mingming, “Sanquanshuo: Zhongguo renleixue hanzu, shaoshu minzu yu haiwai yanjiu de yichan,” [Three Stages of Human Progress: The Legacy of Han, Minority, and Foreign Research on Chinese Anthropology] in Zhongguo renleixue pinglun, [Chinese Anthropological Review] ed. Wang Mingming (Beijing: Shijie tushu chuban gongsi, 2009), 13:125–148.

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Of the many forms of anthropology, the anthropology of the French e­ thnology phase of the Annales school fit well with the legacy of the nineteenth century in terms of the inherent academic style of the twentieth century. This anthropological form changed for the better, providing “nourishment” for the growth of anthropology. In China, anthropology is deeply entangled with “sociology” and “­ethnology,” and it is in this entangled relationship that we can find the meaning of anthropology as we are discussing it here. In 1926, Cai Yuanpei (1866–1940) published “On Ethnology,” in which he distinguished ethnology from anthropology. He argued that ethnology “is an investigation into the culture of all ethnicities and dedicated to research that records or compares them,”5 while anthropology “is the study of the entire body of humans through the lens of zoology in the pursuit of discovering biological distinctions between human beings and other animals.”6 Since anthropology seeks to find the characteristics of the entire human body as well as distinguishing it from animals, they “cannot avoid the essential differences among human races,” and hence some scholars have used anthropology and ethnology interchangeably.7 Cai’s definition is clearly in the style of German academic interpretations. Later, in “Sociology and Ethnology” (a speech he delivered at the inaugural meeting of the Chinese Sociological Society on February 28, 1929),8 Cai reaffirmed his interpretation of anthropology and added that American anthropology can be divided into two approaches—physical and ­cultural anthropology—and that between them, cultural anthropology is essentially ethnology. This speech explored the relationship between ethnology and sociology. Cai stated: The object of study in sociology is naturally modern society; however, if we wish to understand the truth about modern society, we must understand the process of how it got this way. We must push back step-by-step, back to its simplest form, and all the way back to society in the age of savages. Yet the history of civilized man does not remember clearly the 5  Cited in Cai Yuanpei, Cai Yuanpei minzuxue lunzhu [Cai Yuanpei on Ethnology] (Taipei: Zhonghua shuju, 1962), 1. 6  Ibid., 6. 7  Ibid. 8  Yang Kun, “Minzuxue yu shehuixue,” [Ethnology and Sociology] in Shehuixue yu minsuxue [Sociology and Folklore], 44–64.

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social circumstances of the savage period. We must push back to the state of prehistory. We must rely on the things that cannot be found among the evidence discovered by archaeologist. We must completely rely upon the state of modern savage races as corroboration. Then can we imagine the most ancient of societies. This is a point on which ethnology can assist sociology.9 .

In Cai’s view, the properties of ethnology and sociology are inherently different from those of “anthropology.” They do not concern themselves with studies of biology but with the “social state” of ancients and moderns. The main difference between the two is that the former is concerned with ancient “savage races” and the latter is concerned with modern “civilized man.” After Cai’s point of view circulated, Yang Kun published an article on the same issue in response (originally published in Sociology 4, no. 3 [April 1934]). Yang viewed the relationship among the categories of “anthropology,” “ethnology,” and “sociology” through the lens of the French Annales school of sociology. He argues that Cai’s definitions based on German academic traditions were acceptable. He goes on to say that Cai defined the relationship between “anthropology,” “ethnology,” and “sociology” more precisely. Yang points out that there are four perspectives on the relationship between ethnology and anthropology: one is a perspective held in the early nineteenth century that sees ethnology and anthropology as interchangeable; another is a perspective popular in the late nineteenth century that saw ethnology as a branch of anthropology; yet another gives ethnology a broader meaning that includes the science of anthropology; and the fourth argues that anthropology and ethnology are different fields of study. Anthropology focuses on the properties of human and racial physiology while ethnology is another field of study that takes race and culture as its object of study. Yang supports this final perspective (shared by Marcel Mauss [1872–1950], a student of the French Annales school, which reflects the “ethnological period”). He believed that ethnology and sociology were in the process of combining and that sociology was limited to research on modern society as a preliminary field of study, which would in the future combine with ethnology to form a comparative discipline. As a field of comparative research, ethnology was not quite the same as Cai had described it—in that ethnology was a comparison of the differences among human groups—and included comparisons of primitive society, rural society, and urban society. This gave ethnology the possibility of becoming the future sociology. 9  Cai, 12.

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The opinions of Cai and Yang on anthropology, ethnology, and sociology are merely two of many different opinions circulating in early twentieth-century China. Of these two intellectual forbearers, one was influenced by German ethnological education while the other was influenced by French sociology and trained in ethnology. These two intellectuals, who came from European humanistic traditions, formed two major distinct yet linked “Eastern manifestations” of these fields of study. At the time, an “Anglo school” already existed among Chinese intellectuals. This school of thought had many views in common with Yang’s perspective. For example, they both believed that anthropology (according to Yang’s definition of ethnology) and sociology should join together. Unlike Cai and Yang, however, this school of thought emphasized a pragmatic approach to ­sociological research and tended more toward the “anthropological” side of sociology. Wu Wenzao (1901–1985), for instance, argued that British sociological anthropology goes beyond ethnology and American cultural anthropology in many places.10 In the thirty years after the 1950s, a decline occurred in intellectual diversity and vigor in anthropology, ethnology, and sociology. With direct intervention in the academy by the state, sociology for a very long time was largely absent, and anthropology and ethnology were defined according to Soviet definitions under a “central plan” that considered these disciplines strictly as the study of physiological anthropology (especially ancient anthropology) as well as “­studies on ethnic issues.”11 Since the 1980s, the diversity that existed in these fields was partially restored, permitting an “honorary revival” to take place in anthropology, ethnology, and sociology, and the distinctions and relationships between these fields of study were given extensive attention once again. Nonetheless, intellectuals were not interested in looking into issues behind their theoretical distinctions and historical formation. Those who believe that the claims of anthropology exceeds ethnology do not understand the reasons for that. Those who believe that ethnology exceeds anthropology do not understand the meaning of ethnology. Those who believe that sociology is more complete do not question its “completeness” and its original relationship with anthropology and ethnology. 10  Wu Wenzao, “Wenhua renleixue,” [Cultural Anthropology] in Wu Wenzao shehuixue renleixue lunji, [A Collection of Wu Wenzao’s Theories on Sociology and Anthropology] 39–74. 11  On the evolution of Chinese anthropology, see Hu Hongbao, ed., Zhongguo renleixue shi [The History of Chinese Anthropology] (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2006).

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The structure of 1950s Soviet-style anthropology and ethnology was in fact very close to the perspective of the Annales school’s brand of sociology and was also widely accepted in 1950s China. Similarly, there were historical reasons for the coexistence of these three fields since the 1980s. The field of anthropology (or ethnology) remained consistent in the twentieth century. While admitting that this is true, I believe that in the current division of disciplines, in which little consideration is given to the meaning of their academic divisions, we are compelled to treat the history of academic disciplines from our own perspective. The return of early twentieth-century Chinese discussions and the reason for inconsistent disciplinary divisions since the late twentieth century are based on this discussion, proposing a catch-all anthropology. In brief, the “anthropology” I am discussing (henceforth I use “anthropology” in this sense and will not reiterate further the differences and relationship between “ethnology” and “sociology”), although it does deal with things Chinese, foreign, ancient, and modern, bears a much greater burden, which has been closely linked to discussions in the early twentieth century on anthropology, ethnology, and sociology (even though this relationship is expressed indirectly). Anthropology in this sense presumably refers to the ethnology in Cai Yuanpei’s understanding or Wu Wenzao’s understanding of cultural anthropology, social anthropology, and sociology, and Yang Kun’s predecessors view that several elements in sociology and ethnology should be selectively integrated. Based on this history of the field and the ways in which it has been defined, anthropology is not a reiteration of the past. Borrowing from the idea of “restoration,” the discipline of anthropology can be expressed using a new interpretation. For example, the word “civilization,” which has been vehemently criticized by many anthropologists since the twentieth century, has now become a key word of study.12 One of the main flaws of twentieth-century anthropology was the dialectical world view of civilization and savagery. The “three stages of human progress” in Western anthropology in the nineteenth century are pervaded by a suspicious sense of Eurocentrism; thus, this perspective was discarded in the twentieth century—an inevitability. It was replaced with “savage races” being seen as “another type” of “civilized man” in anthropology. It was at this point that “civilized man” was equated with “Western people” or “modern man,” and 12  George W. Stocking, Jr., Victorian Anthropology (New York: Free Press, 1987), 8–45.

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the idea of “savage races” fell out of favor. The word “other” replaced the previous existing demarcations as a more precise description. There has been considerable debate among intellectuals about whether this transformation in world view has been right or wrong. Conservative modernists praise modern anthropology while radical postmodernists despise its existence and hope to see it eradicated as soon as possible. When it comes to modern anthropology, I have maintained a “neutral position.” I appreciate its excellence, yet remain suspicious of its problems. From my point of view, modern anthropology established the dichotomy between the “self” and the “other.” This world view leaves us with the possibility of “respecting the other,” but in this field it has “erased” the essential “third” group—research on ancient civilizations between the “savage races” and “modern man.” The disappearance of this “third” group has led to some serious issues. Those who were once considered “civilized” have all become the “other,” which belittles non-Western and nonmodern civilizations.13 If the “three stages of human progress” in nineteenth-century Western anthropology could be described in a cultural or civilizational sense as “I” and “you” (the presence of the “other”), then the twentieth-century shift in mainstream anthropological concepts is characterized by and resulted from the absence of “you.” In the early twentieth century, the Chinese “southern school” of anthropology, which was heavily influenced by German and French ethnology, maintained an interest in studying ancient Chinese history. This made their discussions distinct from the “dialectic” popular in Western anthropology. This kind of anthropology links knowledge on antiquity and “distinctions between Chinese and barbarians” with research on archeology, historical ethnology, mythology, and ethnography, which sees China as “another kind” of system that consists of “Chinese and barbarians.” The “northern school,” led primarily by the sociology department at Yenching University, which described early modern China as consisting of “rural China” and “industrial society” (or “urban society”). The overall state of Chinese society was different from “savage races” as well as “civilized man,” creating yet “another kind” of social system. Since the “northern school” was heavily influenced by the functionalist approach and sought to sinicize the “dichotomy” in Western anthropology, 13  There are people studying “Eastern civilization” (e.g., China, India, Mesopotamia, and Egypt) in the anthropological field; however, these “civilizations” are not described as civilizations in their narratives but defined by many anthropologist at best as an “expanded tribal society” or “integrated tribes.”

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both the “southern school” and “northern school” were focused on showing the “cultural” or “social” uniqueness of China juxtaposed between “savage races” and “civilized man.” In the late 1950s, progressive stages became the guiding theory of mainland Chinese ethnological research. Stage theory divisions were clearly a “restoration” of nineteenth-century Western anthropological evolution, but this kind of division allowed Chinese ethnological discussions no longer to be limited by the “dialectic.” In view of the quagmire of simplistic social Darwinism that still sullies Chinese anthropology today, I advocate the modern Western anthropological framework of the “self” and “other,” though this is by no means beyond reproach, to reevaluate our academic underpinnings. At the same time, nonetheless, I would like to elaborate on the significance of this “third” category of civilization on twenty-first-century anthropology in response to the shortcomings of the “dialectical” approach of Western civilization. This “third” category and this imagined anthropology based on this general picture are potentially relevant to China, but this relevance to China is certainly not a divergence from global processes to establish an independent interpretation. Some sociologists claim that, before “globalization,” the world could be divided into Europe, as a classical model of the nation-state; North America and Australia, as classical examples of colonized states; Asia, Africa, and others, as the main example of postcolonial states; and Germany and Japan, as models of “modernized states.”14 The composition of this system of knowledge has its own logic, but this is frequently tied to “crude orders.” Early modern anthropology was born in these classical European nationstates. European nation-states were formed on the basis of absolutism. They were the cradle of our modern worldviews and political views and the place where these ideas were first questioned. After the early modern period, anthropologists in these countries began quite early to appropriate “other cultures” to reflect on “their own culture” (even in the “classical age” of the nineteenth century, which was reflected in these issues and can generally be seen in positivism and diffusionism). “Other cultures” in this sense were people outside Europe, particularly “savages” and “stateless tribes,” which were distant from the “other kind” of “complete states” in Europe. Colonialism, with North America and Australia at its center, formed through a process of resistance against European imperialism; in terms of their race 14  Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1986), 267–275.

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and civilization, however, colonized states and classical European nationstates had considerable similarities. By “colonized,” scholars mean the “colonization” of some non-European tribes by white European settlers. The success of “colonization” depended on the genocide or marginalization of the nonwhite population by the white population.15 As for race in terms of civilizational systems, the many colonized states of North America and Australia share a system with the classical European nation-state. Although for a period after the eighteenth century colonists from Europe maintained a separation from and animosity toward Europe, by the twentieth century, their historical creativity once again emerged in a cultural identity centered on Greco-Roman and Western Christian symbols and a shared philosophical epistemology.16 The modern discourse in mainstream social science, regardless of whether it is in European nation-states or North America and Australia (as well as New Zealand), has a vast market. In the postwar period, as the central power in the new world order, the United States replaced Europe in its role as disseminator of modern knowledge and way of life. Research done in the name of anthropology in colonized states has qualities distinct from that in their “colonial masters.” Anthropology in the United States, Canada, and Australia, as colonized states, was unique. This anthropology confronted the “native problem,” which veteran European anthropologists never had to face. Native Americans and Australian Aborigines that survived genocidal policies had a special place in the “cultural consciousness” of anthropologists in colonized countries. Although the anthropological concepts used in colonized states largely derived from Europe, in terms of their explicit composition, many anthropologists in these countries gained a “cultural consciousness” from a larger body of research on domestic “natives.” Their reflections on modernity always underlined issues of ethnic and cultural relations. Since this form of anthropology was closely linked to the handling of domestic affairs, they generally had a close relationship with other social sciences. This became an “international trait” (i.e., research on the other) only after the United States gained hegemony over the world system.

15  Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York: Harper & Row, 1984). 16  Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 31–33.

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Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other part of the “third world” (of course, Latin America, like North America and Australia, could also be considered among colonized states) attained their status as modern nation-states mostly only after World War II. Prior to that, they appeared to be either tribes or traditional states (including empires), emerging from colonial or semicolonial systems. Except for Central America, where European immigrants came relatively early and were more profoundly affected by American power, and South Africa, where the distribution of racial populations is relatively equal, the population of immigrants from their former colonial masters since their independence has been exceptionally small. “Postcolonial states” refers to “new states” that gained their independence after the colonial era. The difference between them and colonized states is mainly that the population of European immigrants has largely departed. Since the racially European population in “postcolonial states” does not form a majority, the culture bequeathed in the colonial era is framed in a relationship both contradictory and unified that exists in a state between “native culture” and “mixed culture” through a process of “native” cultural consciousness. In a Latin America that is heavily reliant on the Western economy and a South Africa with a relatively equal racial distribution in the population and racial segregation, the contradictions between culture and ideas of social order often lead to violent conflicts and polarized class struggle. As the European population left the historical stage of postcolonial states, nationalism led to the pursuit of modernity and ethnic traditions as an imperative, which supplanted past struggles between colonialism and anticolonialism. In these countries, an emphasis on preexisting community ties led these newly established governments to view Western knowledge systems (in particular, sociological knowledge systems) with hostility. Nevertheless, at the same time, their eager pursuit to become modern leads them to have anxieties about imitating the West so that they may one day have a place at the table in the world system. Nationstates based on complete colonization more easily accept Western knowledge systems, but nation-states that formed under semicolonialism more easily emphasize the superiority of their own traditions. Third world countries use modern social science theories to reform themselves. They believe in modernization and pay particular attention to political economy and sociology. Western-style anthropology is also given importance in these countries, but their reflections on modernity will not necessarily allow them to “catch up” with the West. The historical concept of the Enlightenment, social progress, and the “survival of the fittest” logic of classical anthropology have long held sway over “mainstream thought” in third world countries. Even if these countries have their own anthropological disciplines, they

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mostly appear to be oriented highly toward political economy, sociology, and applicability. Modern Western anthropology respects the humanistic values of non-Westerners through methodologically rigorous research and expunging them from their genealogy of values. These genealogical values have a different meaning in the West, but also have their own function in non-Western countries. The narrative of a foreign ethnographic genealogy of humanistic values is the basis of the cultural self-identity of these “new countries.” Concepts like “tribe,” “chieftain,” and “kingdom” constantly appear in these texts and have been transformed into national ideas of ethnic unity adapted to concepts like “ethnic minorities,” “natives,” and “citizens.” The “native” plays a particular role (these ideas, after all, are linked to prescribed domestic intercommunity relations).17 Modern states, as exemplified by Germany and Japan, were new models built on the classical European nation-state. The basic character that made them unique was an emphasis on the prominence of modernization and the military in ruling a nation-state. They principally emphasized the need for strategies for industrial and military industrial modernization in building global influence and national strength in a new global environment. Typical examples of modernized nation-states existed around World War II but later were defeated by an alliance among other types of nation-states. Modernized nation-states have been inclined to engage in outdated imperialistic strategies of classical European nation-states. The entire focus of their endeavors centered on reestablishing a transnational “imperial system” in an international system made of nation-states. In modernized nation-states, the position of Enlightenment positivism in anthropology is much lower than diffusionism, which emerged around World War I. In German and Japanese anthropology, diffusionism held great sway. Even though later on other European nation-states produced functionalism, which saw culture as the resulting perspective of the diffusion, civilizing, or decline of ancient culture, it was always popular in Germany and Japan. After World War II, anthropology, characterized by diffusion theory, was supplanted by British- and American-style anthropology and cultural anthropology. Ethnology in Germany and Japan was also renamed “cultural ­anthropology” or “anthropology.” Nonetheless, studies on the geographical distribution of culture remained relatively reputable in anthropology in these countries.

17  Dell H. Hymes, ed., Reinventing Anthropology (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969); Andre Beteille, “The Idea of Indigenous People,” Current Anthropology 39:2 (1998): 187–192.

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In modernized nation-states, the focus has often been on the collection of cultural resources through ethnographic field surveys that show other regions of the world and studies on domestic folklore, but theoretical considerations remained ostensibly limited.18 China is not a “homogeneous” country. Historically, China has vacillated between “unity” and “disunity.” Regardless of its stage of historical development, the idea of “barbarians and Chinese” was not, in fact, a statement of a dichotomy but referred to distinctions and connections among multiple ethnic groups. After experiencing “national humiliations” in the nineteenth century, China confronted in the twentieth century with a mission to renegotiate the relationship between ethnic groups and the state in a new world order. China became a “postcolonial nation-state” relatively early, meaning that its plight was very close to that of other nation-states of this kind; however, China bore the “burden” of several millennia of civilization in the modern world and was under pressure for a long time. China is distinct from states established on the basis of monarchial authority as well as “new nation-states” that consist of a hodgepodge collection of tribes. What distinguishes China is that it was an ill-defined “realm”19 that, at times, was united and, at others, divided. By the twentieth century, China encountered the “inevitability” of joining a world system predominated by nation-states as an ethnically “homogeneous” country. In the modern world order, the essential pursuit of Chinese anthropology was different from the anthropology of classical European nation-states as well as colonized nation-states. Anthropology in the main Western European countries was beholden to research on foreign “savage races,” at times, seeing these people as “prehistoric” Europeans and, at other times, romanticizing them as the European “other.” Until the end of World War II, anthropology in colonized nation-states, including the United States, was long concerned with the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. They also interpreted these “savage races” within the European framework of “self” and “other,” but it must be recognized that these ethnic groups were the “other insider” of colonized 18  Andre Gingerich and Hermann Muckler, “An Encounter with Recent Trends in GermanSpeaking Anthropology,” Social Anthropology 15:1 (1997): 83–90; Nakao Katsumi, “Xiandai Zhongguo yanjiu yu Riben minzuxue,” [Modern Chinese Research and Japanese Ethnology] Renleixue yu minsu yanjiu tongxun 47–48 (1998). 19  “Realm” (tianxia) is often translated as “All-under-heaven,” which was a common term referring to the Chinese empire, the known world to China, or a general idea of the “realm.” Here I have chosen the latter to reflect the amorphous meaning the author is implying.—Trans.

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nation-states in which Europeans were the subject. Chinese anthropology was perhaps more akin to anthropology in colonized nation-states. For a long time, Chinese anthropology concentrated on issues dealing with the “other insider.” Among them were issues of the peasant and ethnic minorities, which were essential to this kind of research. Unlike in the colonized nation-states, however, the groups studied in Chinese anthropology for a long time before the modern period were the subject of interactions with the imperial court and its vaunted “transformation through education” policies.20 The relationship between these groups and the imperial court was nothing like the relationship between white Americans and Native Americans or white Australians and Aborigines. This led Chinese anthropology to adopt a more historicized methodological system than classical nation-states and colonized nation-states in researching these groups. The “national humiliations” in the nineteenth century, nonetheless, pushed China toward a deep-seated aspiration to catch up with classical, colonized, and modernized nation-states. Thus, Chinese anthropology for a long time was concerned with employing many theories and methodologies from these countries and was eager to apply them to political practice in order to assist in achieving China’s modernization. On top of this, China, like many other postcolonial nation-states, often mixed modernization with the restitution of its own traditions; hence, Chinese anthropology was inclined toward historicism (mainly in the “southern school”) as well as pragmatism (chiefly in the “northern school”). This created a bit of a “split personality” in academic culture. The emphasis on “otherness” in anthropology and this “third” component as starting point in civilizational anthropology emerged from this “split personality,” which by necessity has its own characteristics. Anthropology led by the idea of “otherness” emerged in response to one side of this “split personality”—the pursuit of modernization in a positivist worldview. The core of this maintains a humanistic world of “harmony through difference” with anthropological research. Civilizational anthropology emerged from retrospectively inherited narratives of ethnic history or historical ethnology. The core of this seeks a “social science position” through anthropological research concerning the concept, institutional arrangements, and symbolic system of the old world scheme of the “realm.”

20   “Transformation through education” ( jiaohua) was an imperial policy directed at ethnic minorities, particularly in the Southwest, which sought to Sinicize them through Confucian education. This policy has often been seen as akin to the European “civilizing mission” or the “white man’s burden.”—Trans.

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The divisions in twentieth-century anthropology around the world as well as Chinese anthropology’s willing or unwilling participation in this division is closely linked to the cold war.21 In the cold war period, the world was divided into three camps. Industrialized capitalist countries led by the United States and communist countries led by the Soviet Union were two major camps in this international division. These two openly competed militarily, ideologically, politically, and economically. Third world countries stood between these two extremes. Sometimes, they identified with one camp or the other; at other times, they united, forming another camp; and, at yet other times, they were sacrificial offerings to these polarized world powers. Social science in the Soviet Union was Marxist, but it also inherited much from the academic traditions of tsarist Russia, and this tradition was marked by its European character. Any science in the West was probably available in the Soviet Union as well. What was different was the predominance of philosophy and political economy in its social science and weak research into sociology, political science, and microeconomics. “Anthropology” as defined in the Soviet Union was paleoanthropology colored by the “natural science.” Ethnology as defined by the Soviet Union shared much in common with German and French ethnology, but corresponded with British social anthropology and cultural anthropology. In response to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, ethnology in the Soviet Union was marked by studies that focused on the diverse state of the economies and ecologies in different ethnic ways of life at certain stages of development, but social research framed in terms of stages of development always remained in a leading position. The ideological divisions of the cold war affected the social sciences outside these two “superpowers.” For the Eurasian socialist states in the Soviet camp, the theory of social stages of development driven by historical materialism was seen as an unassailable “truth.” In mainland China, for example, disciplines in the Western social sciences, such as sociology, political science, and anthropology, were once regarded as “capitalist disciplines” to be harshly condemned. Their intellectual legacy (including intellectuals) was divided among the disciplines of political economy, history, ethnology. The non-aligned states, however, experienced quite the opposite. These states and regions had a close relationship with the United States, and their brand of anthropological research was similarly pulled into the American “academic cultural sphere.” Taiwan, for 21  Julia Petrova-Averkieva, “Historicism in Soviet Ethnographic Science,” in Soviet and Western Anthropology, ed. Ernest Gellner (London: Duckworth, 1990), 19–58.

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example, until the 1980s, followed European ethnology in its Central Research Academy, only to shift to American cultural anthropology. During the cold war, the third world still comprised postcolonial nationstates. In order to undertake “nation building,” they had to consider the relationship between native culture and foreign culture, but they seemed almost destined to fall into one of the two cold war camps. These countries, in terms of culture and ideology, not only were based on characteristics of an academic culture derived from these “superpowers” but also remained cautious with respect to these characteristics. Since the 1980s, a new transformation has occurred around the world. Some political scientists argue that in the post-cold war world, civilization “was not only a force of division, but also a force of unity. . . . People that were once divided by ideology were now united by culture. . . . Society was united by ideology or historical environment, but were also divided by civilization.”22 There were seven dominant civilizations in a multipolar civilizational world: (1) Chinese; (2) Japanese; (3) Indian; (4) Muslim; (5) Western; (6) Latin American; (7) African.23 The world went from “one world” to “two world” and then to a “different world.” The world has gone from a “Eurocentric global system” to ideological polarization in the cold war and then to a “clash of civilizations.” Ultimately, global “cultural commonality and difference affects national interest, resistance, and unity,” and “power, which had for a long period of time remained in the hands of the West, is shifting to non-Western civilizations.”24 The trend toward a multipolar civilization has already emerged in world politics, but academia has actually been running counter to this. One Russian ethnologist, Valery Tishkov, complained that, increasingly, ­ethnographers trained in the Soviet tradition have been attracted by funding and new ideas and too many have completely abandoned Soviet academic traditions, turning instead to American scholarly traditions. At the same time, as Soviet field work has seeped into American anthropology, American anthropologists have been unaware of the national interest concerns and biased cultural values in these studies and even their complete immersion in the imagination of the cold war–era Soviet Union.25 This is the case in the former Soviet Union, and it is even more so in ­non-Western nation-states. 22  Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 7. 23  Ibid., 23–42. 24  Ibid., 8. 25  Valery Tishkov, “U.S. and Russian Anthropology: Unequal Dialogue in a Time of Transition,” Current Anthropology 39:1 (1998): 1–18.

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After the end of the cold war, the effort to imitate the system of Western social sciences seemed to generally characterize non-Western academia. Reality, nonetheless, always comes in pairs. With this “Westernization,” multi­polar academic trends have intensified. In many non-Western countries, the “native perspective” or “insider anthropology” is becoming a way of gaining an ethnic cultural consciousness. They emphasize understanding the “native” through the “native” (here referring to the society from which the researchers themselves come) and opposing the use of “foreign models” from Western social sciences. This has become a major topic of interest among many social science scholars in non-Western countries. These “native” discussions, at times, invoke Western concepts in the social sciences but used for “national historical” narratives. Anthropology with “cultural consciousness” always sought an “alternative category” that allowed people to go beyond modernity. This kind of anthropology emerged in classical European nation-states and colonized North America and Australia, where the core concept has been “otherness.” Another kind of anthropology is scattered across postcolonial and modernized nation-states. It sees itself as a modern knowledge system (although it does not necessarily fly the banner of modernity), which views anthropology as a component of national “construction.” In each kind of nation-state, two kinds of anthropology have merged, but in postcolonial nation-states as well as non-Western aligned states during the cold war, this integration occurred when it fit the “theoretical needs” of nativism. Multipolar civilizations have existed for a long time. The state of multi­polar civilizations is closely linked to the “imperial” character of states in history. It is the basic cultural characteristic of traditional pre-nation-state states. Many political scientists believed in it as many new questions emerged after the cold war, because the world system centered on Europe and the cold war once grossly simplified a complex humanistic world into one, two, or three worlds. Intellectuals in the many non-Western civilizations are most likely positive about emerging trends in this transitioning world, but they may also be aware that historical transitions do not necessarily bring us civilization and freedom. Over the past seventy years, the newly created nation-states in nonWestern civilizations have weakened the global predominance of colonialism and imperialism, but the memory of colonialism and imperialism in the third world is still fresh. As a result, the cultural identity crisis and totalitarianism among the civilizations in the non-Western world as well as a brand of nationalism that harbors animosity (or fear) toward foreign culture has

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begun to heat up. Conversely, in developed capitalist countries, there is an effort to avoid a “clash of civilizations,” in that they encouraged the production of international political principles and bestowed legitimacy on an expanding system of dominance. “Otherness” and “civilization theory” have profound contradictions. Since the idea of “otherness” emerged in classical European nation-states, ­anthropology influenced by “otherness” brings conflict with “civilizations”26 in a nineteenthcentury sense. When “civilization theory” invokes the word “civilization,” it tends to leave people with a “bad impression,” leading people to feel that it is taking anthropology back down the old nineteenth-century road. The reason I have invoked the concept of “civilization” to think about anthropology is to bring back the nineteenth-century idea of the “three stages of progress.” Bringing this back, however, does not equate to a return to the conceit of nineteenth-century Western European (particularly British and French) “civilizations.”27 What I refer to as “civilization” is a kind of “self-restraint” as well as the dialectic between “self-restraint” and “openness to the foreign” that exists within a prevailing or newly created supranational system. This is part of the broadly defined term of “otherness” in a spiritual sense. As a unique form of anthropology that integrates “otherness” and “civilization,” it has real characteristics of a “split personality.” Nonetheless, in a symbiotic world of integration and differentiation, this characteristic is unavoidable and necessary. Imagine what kind of academia China would have if Chinese academia lacked any self-esteem? And how could we talk about a “consciousness” if we lose tolerance for the presence of “otherness” out of an excess of self-esteem. Anthropology influenced by “otherness” as a reflection on modernity born out of classical European nation-states was originally intended to see knowledge about life as tantamount to Western cultural superiority through a host of theories describing the historical differences between Western and non-Western societies.28 These ambitious theories in fact opened a path for the dialectic of civilization. This is not fundamentally in contradiction to the anthropological discourse that we have called the “third” one. Studies on the history of Western anthropology have linked anthropology to the intellectual achievements of the ancient Greco-Roman world, and many basic concepts in anthropology—concepts like culture and evolution—have 26  Stocking, Victorian Anthropology. 27  Ibid., 25–29. 28  Jack Goody, The East in the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2–3.

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been traced back to ancient European history.29 Since the 1980s, researchers have been working on this tendency toward resisting any anthropological roots in ancient history. They claim that the beginning of anthropology, at best, can be traced back to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. They argue that the foundational concept of “otherness” in “anthropological discourse” originally was about inner “alien-ness,” including demons—that is, Jews—in a predominantly Christian society in the European Renaissance. After the Enlightenment, it gradually came to have a more scientific connotation.30 These two historical perspectives of anthropology are both Eurocentric, but the former believes that only ancient Europe could give rise to anthropology; the latter, however, believes that many of the concepts that are unacceptable in anthropology, as a modern “science,” are simply related to some “incorrect concepts” as a part of its theoretical baggage. I have received much inspiration from these contrary histories of anthropological research. I believe that pursuing the origins of anthropology to ancient European history shows us the ancient foundations of modern knowledge while linking the “ills” of anthropology and modernity; thus, they help us understand where the basic problems in this field reside. At the same time, however, I also think that these two histories of anthropological research that emerged in the twentieth century both see anthropology as a wholly Western product. This I do not accept. The basic ideas in this field have existed in other civilizations across Eurasia. For example, in China, with its ancient texts such as The Book of Changes, The Classic of Mountains and Seas, The Book of Poetry, and The Book of Rites, anthropology includes a plethora of “ethnographic descriptive” elements. Since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), many histories have contained records of “foreign countries” (including biographies and geography). Subsequently, with the expansion of the tributary system in the “mid-imperial period,” textual categories such as “records of countries” and “records of commodities” developed even further. If we say that the foundational research of anthropology is on ethnography, then the local gazetteers and travel journals that have existed broadly throughout Chinese history can generally be classified as Chinese-language anthropological texts among compiled histories. As far as whether these texts feature cultural concepts, progressive ideas, and a sense

29  Clyde Kluckhohn, Anthropology and the Classics (Providence: Brown University Press, 1961). 30  Bernard McGrane, Beyond Anthropology: Society and the Other (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

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of otherness beyond elements of ethnography, Joseph Needham (1900–1995)31 and Jacques Gernet,32 among others, have answered in the affirmative. In the modern era, Chinese anthropology, as in Europe and America, could have established its own ideological genealogy through classical research,33 but in China quite the opposite took place. Western anthropology was introduced in China at the end of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911). After that point, Chinese history is replete with “singing a Western tune with an Eastern voice.”34 Admittedly, the translation of Chinese anthropology primarily uses the Chinese language, but anthropological works in Chinese are thickly colored by a “foreign terminology.” The “singing a Western tune with an Eastern voice” found in the translated Chinese anthropology at the end of the Qing dynasty first originated with Orientalist studies. The foundations of this discipline emerged in the 1920s. This “Western tune” was brought to China directly by Chinese scholars who had studied abroad. At the time, Peking University was the home of the “Anglo-American tune” while the Central Academy sang the “German-French tune,” and these two schools fought vociferously back and forth. By the 1950s, this was replaced by ethnology “singing a Russian tune with a Chinese voice.” After the 1980s, the dominant voice in Chinese anthropology was “singing a British tune with a Chinese voice.” Disregarding their own traditions and adopting “Western doctrine” in China has been a major pursuit of Chinese social sciences since the beginning of the twentieth century. In this regard, Chinese anthropology is no exception. In order to “describe clearly what is good in our culture and allow it to transform things in the world,”35 I believe that we should find other possible anthropological narratives in Chinese ancient history and see the Chinese language as the academic language of anthropology. Nonetheless, the “tone” of this article as always is mixed and unable to escape “alternative categories,” particularly the state of the field in classical European, colonized, and modernized

31  Joseph Needham, The Shorter Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 2:237–285. 32  Jacques Gernet, L’intelligence de la Chine: Le social et le mental (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 75–103. 33  Wang Mingming, Xixue “zhongguohua” de lishi kunjing [This Historical Difficulty of the “Sinicization” of Western Learning] (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2005). 34  “Singing a Western tune with an Eastern voice” (dong qiang xi diao), i.e., Asian scholars participating in a Western discourse, but devoid of any Asian perspective and wholly Western in nature.—Trans. 35  Fei Xiaotong, Lun renleixue yu wenhua zijue [On Anthropology and Cultural Consciousness] (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 2004), 197.

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nation-states. Many publications have “negations” of these forms of anthropology, but there are also many “statements” that aim to show the “uniqueness of Chinese” anthropology. Even though these “statements” and “negations” exist, however, they are all based on a Western anthropological framework. It is difficult for works produced in the shadow of a disciplinary history that “sings a Western tune with an Eastern voice” to avoid having their own unique properties, but this does not mean that we should mindlessly accept these unique properties. Living in a “postcolonial nation-state,” we easily rush to imitate modernity. We also easily “exoticize” our own traditions, divorcing them from reality and blindly dismissing their reasoning. Thus, the duty that should be borne by anthropological research to “liberate our minds” consists of finding places for exchange and compatibility in tradition and finding connections between the past in our current lives. Works Cited Beteille, Andre. “The Idea of Indigenous People.” Current Anthropology 39:2 (1998): 187–192. Cai Yuanpei. Cai yuanpei minzuxue lunzhu. [Cai Yuanpei on Ethnology] Taipei: Zhonghua shuju, 1962. Fei Xiaotong. Lun renleixue yu wenhua zijue. [On Anthropology and Cultural Consciousness] Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 2004. Gernet, Jacques. L’intelligence de la Chine: Le social et le mental. Paris: Gallimard, 1994. Giddens, Anthony. The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1986. Gingerich, Andre, and Hermann Muckler. “An Encounter with Recent Trends in German-Speaking Anthropology.” Social Anthropology 15:1 (1997): 83–90. Goody, Jack. The East in the West. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Hu Hongbao, ed. Zhongguo renleixue shi. [The History of Chinese Anthropology] Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2006. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Hymes, Dell H., ed. Reinventing Anthropology. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969. Kluckhohn, Clyde. Anthropology and the Classics. Providence: Brown University Press, 1961. McGrane, Bernard. Beyond Anthropology: Society and the Other. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. Nakao Katsumi. “Xiandai Zhongguo yanjiu yu Riben minzuxue.” [Modern Chinese Research and Japanese Ethnology] Renleixue yu minsu yanjiu tongxun 47–48 (1998).

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Needham, Joseph. The Shorter Science and Civilization in China, vol. 2, abr. Colin Ronan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Petrova-Averkieva, Julia. “Historicism in Soviet Ethnographic Science.” In Soviet and Western Anthropology, ed. Ernest Gellner. London: Duckworth, 1990, 19–58. Stocking, George W., Jr. Victorian Anthropology. New York: Free Press, 1987. Tishkov, Valery. “U.S. and Russian Anthropology: Unequal Dialogue in a Time of Transition.” Current Anthropology 39:1 (1998): 1–18. Todorov, Tzvetan. The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. New York: Harper & Row, 1984. Wang Mingming, ed. Zhongguo renleixue pinglun, [Chinese Anthropological Review] vol. 13. Beijing: Shijie tushu chuban gongsi, 2009. ———. Xixue “zhongguohua” de lishi kunjing. [This Historical Difficulty of the “Sinicization” of Western Learning] Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2005. Wu Wenzao, ed. Wu Wenzao shehuixue renleixue lunji. [A Collection of Wu Wenzao’s Theories on Sociology and Anthropology] Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1990. Yang Kun. Shehuixue yu minsuxue, [Sociology and Ethnology] ed. Yang Kun. Chengdu: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1997.

CHAPTER 12

The Direction of Modern Chinese Religion Zhuo Xinping Modern Chinese religion has begun a period of developing diversity. Its “diversity” echoes the religious “revival” that followed the reforms of the 1980s, which left people with a lingering impression. Since contemporary development in China in many respects has largely integrated that in with the world, as Chinese society has formed a “global outlook,” so Chinese religion has also developed a “global perspective.” This unavoidable connection between the “world” and the development of religion constructed an exceptionally complicated web of religion, modernity, Chinese society, politics, economics, culture, ideology, belief, spiritual inclinations, and even personal interests. Looking at the development of Chinese religion since the second half of the twentieth century, people are generally used to thinking of the “five major world religions” (Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism) to examine and understand the state of religion in the world. Moreover, influenced by the “revival” of world religions in a “globalized” age as well as the international flows and universal development of all religions, the diverse direction of modern Chinese religion has exhibited an attitude of “religions beyond religions; and sects within religions.” Generally speaking, this kind of diverse development exists in a state of clear tension with the construction of an overview of religion in China and has broken out of this evolving framework. Although according to current laws and statutes the existence of religion in China can be seen as a “violation” or even “illegal,” the flexibility, plasticity, and adaptability of religion have allowed it to find a large space and area of activity in this period of transition despite the fact these new religions float between a “legal” and “illegal” state. Additionally, most religions that have gone through or requested a “legal” status and position or have managed to escape the gaze of the law and officials by quickly developing across society, particularly at the local and lower levels of society. The social influence of religion on the public has continued to strengthen, gaining the attention and discussion of many as well as producing a plethora of questions. In addition to the attention placed on religion by the past politics and consciousness, there must also be an analysis of religious participation and meaning in terms of social management and cultural construction and thus an implementation of appropriate religious

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legislation, a legal framework to manage religion, and the correct and proper resolution of legal “blind spots” that may emerge in the field of religion, which is crucial and the only path for the rationalization of modern Chinese religion and Chinese social relations.

The State of Chinese Religious Consciousness and Developmental Trends in Political Goals

One complicated problem facing modern Chinese religion is that of the relationship in the mainstream state of consciousness at the level of understanding and values of faith. In the traditional understanding, the relationship between consciousness of Marxism and religion or atheism or theism seems to be antithetical relationship and even one of antagonism. At the level of spiritual faith, it is difficult to resolve their mutual opposition. Since the end of the cold war, the opposition and deadlock between China and the West in terms of values and consciousness has continued, and religion has been quite sensitive to the position and implications of these values. In the field of Chinese politics, two major beliefs and goals emerged with respect to how to deal with this problem and rationalize the relationship between Marxism and religion. The first belief holds that religion should be “actively directed” to adapt to “a socialist society” and based on “social” ideals, but religion cannot be truly adapted to “socialist” consciousness and ideological values. This belief is still based on the idea that religion is “inherently” an opposing “adverse” understanding and is generally seen as “negative.” Thus, those who hold this kind of belief think that they can work with “religion” in building unity and cooperation in terms of society and “politics,” but in terms of spiritual “faith,” they can, at best, only maintain “mutual respect,” maintain their distance, and avoid any substantive issues. This is a kind of “qualitative” belief that emphasizes one’s own uniqueness as well as historical heritage by “shelving differences” with a “self-centered approach” that maintains a certain independence and clear boundaries. It should be said that there is considerable sympathy for and consensus on this viewpoint in modern Chinese society. The response of the Chinese religious community is relatively cautious. On many issues and opinions, they have maintained an “aphasic” or “silent” attitude, but their inherent spirituality and guiding values are exceptionally complicated and contradictory concerning their “dualistic truth,” in that there is a core question about whether the “truth” of their values and faith can coexist, intermingle, and grow with the “truth” of political and mainstream social principles. Hence, there is

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a tension between the political “deference” of the religious community and their own sense of “loyalty” to and “holiness” in their faith; but how far can this unidirectional adaption go in society? Can this potential ambiguity proceed unimpeded? Such acute tension and contradiction are relatively typical in the Chinese social structure, and they do not exist in other societies, at least not as noticeably. Hence, there are some fundamental problems in the consciousness of Chinese religion that have gone without any “fundamental” resolution. This deviation from Chinese values and mores in religion is made all the more evident, leaving it open to being “observed” or “exploited” by certain outside influences. The preservation and future of religion are dependent on how the relationship between practical “economic foundation” and religious “consciousness” that touch upon modern Chinese society is handled and seen. Consequently, the answer to such questions of whether religion can fit into a socialist society becomes one of “superstructure,” in that the question is whether religion as a form of consciousness in current Chinese society can act as a “superstructure,” and, if not, then what function does religion play? In fact, an indispensable two-way dialogue, conversation, and adaption exist between religion and the modern Chinese consciousness and political will, and the degree to which the two can accommodate each other will depend on how well they maintain the wisdom and patience of “harmony in differences.” The second belief highlights Marxism as the “liberal” and “developmental concept” of mainstream modern Chinese values and consciousness and emphasizes the “sinicization,” “modernization,” and “progressiveness” of Marxism in China. Its uniqueness lies in that this point of view seeks a “commonality” between Marxism and religion at the social level and carefully picks out possible avenues of “consensus” in terms of ideology and faith. First, although socially this view follows the same line of thought as the abovementioned point of view that “religion should be actively guided to adapt to a socialist society” where religion can “play a positive role promoting social harmony,” it shifts its focus away from former ideas of “conflict” and toward an attitude of a completely new “harmony.” Clearly, there has been a shift from “conflict” with religion to force it to “adapt” to one that allowed for a “harmonious” transition and development of religion. Its emphasis is more on being “actively guided” to allow it to be proactive and “play a positive role.” The government should be “actively guiding harmony between religion and a socialist society to adapt to the building of a harmonious socialist society” and “unite the religious community to contribute to socioeconomic development” where religion “can play an active role.” This kind of adjustment and rebalancing has allowed the mainstream Chinese body politic to completely change its attitude toward religion:

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The religious community can play an active role and should be seen in a more positive light that affirms the positive role religion can play in promoting a harmonious society. This is the latest fundamental leap [in policy]. It shows that even though we in the Communist Party do not believe in religion, we completely understand the social role of religion. Religion brims with confidence and can lead the religious community in positively contributing to the construction of a harmonious society.1 [We wish] to unite to greatest extent possible to unite with the religious community in helping with ambitious goal of building a well-off and healthy society.2 Religious leaders and the religious community can play a positive role in promoting socioeconomic development.3 Additionally, when it comes to faith, the basic attitude of “negation” toward religion in the past has shifted toward a cautious “affirmation” that advocates “the positive parts of religious doctrine that are close to the moral values of a socialist society, such as supporting good over evil, egalitarianism, tolerance, and charity for the poor and needy.”4 Here, by talking about the “positive role” of “religious doctrine,” they are in fact starting a dialogue on a deeper level between Chinese mainstream consciousness and religious consciousness as well as their values; thus they have gone from a “monologue” with themselves to a clear ideological breakthrough and development in maintaining an attitude of “mutual respect.” Of course, this line of thought is still at an “inspirational” or “incipient” stage. It still has not completely and fully developed. Nonetheless, it shows that this “externalized” thought expresses a “possibility” and “openness” 1  Hu Jintao, “Zai quanguo tongzhan gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua,” [A Speech Given at the National United Front Working Conference] as quoted in Ye Xiaowen, “Fahui zongjiao zai cujin shehui hexie fangmian de jiji zuoyong,” [The Positive Role Religion Can Play in Promoting a Social Harmony] Qiushi 11 (2007). 2  Hu Jintao, “Buduan gonggu he zhuangda tongyi zhanxian, gongtong jianshe Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi,” [Continually Solidify and Strengthen the United Front to Jointly Construct Socialism with Chinese Characteristics] Renmin ribao, July 13, 2006. 3  Hu Jintao, Gaoju Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida qizhi, wei duoqu quanmian jianshe xiao­ kang shehui xin shengli er fendou: zai Zhongguo gongchandang di shiqi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao [Raise High the Banner of Socialism with Chinese Chracteristics and Fight to Take the Complete Construction of a Moderately Prosperous Society: A Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2007), 31–32. 4  “Hu Jintao jieshou di shiyi shi ban chan de baijian,” [Hu Jintao Receives an Audience with the Eleventh Panchen Lama] Renmin ribao, February 4, 2005 (International edition).

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to “dialogue” at a more spiritual level. It provides a possibility and space for religion to play a positive role in a crucial way. In the current political environment, Marxist theory is no longer a “cult” as it was during Cultural Revolution (1966–1976); moreover, it has avoided the “mutation” of Marxism at that time that was “closed minded,” “rigid,” and “exclusionary,” which has allowed Marxism to truly play a “scientific” and not a “cult”-like role. In order to have a sincere “dialogue” and true “coexistence,” we should attempt to divide faith into different levels, exploring the concurrent existence of political beliefs, cultural beliefs, national beliefs, and religious beliefs and their potential they for commonality and coexistence. In the religious world, this approach can help break the “silence” and start a “positive” discussion on core questions. Even though some discussions may not necessarily be acknowledged or acceptable in mainstream Chinese society due to the religious nature or religious understanding of some problems, we can still appreciate their understanding and commonality. Social tolerance and openness could promote the positive development of religion in Chinese society and participate in Chinese society, play a dynamic role, and provide potential contributions.

The Adaption of Chinese Religion to Society and the Future Movement Toward Legal Compliance

Traditionally in Chinese history, Chinese popular religion generally took an attitude of cooperation with rulers unless it was alienated and suppressed by the authorities, and many of these heterodox religions or religious sects often went “underground” or existed in “folk culture” in order to survive and grow. This created a tension in society and politics. In modern China, This pattern has continued, but there are also some uniquely new directions. Thus, Chinese religions have a complicated pattern that make it difficult to manage socially. Currently, the religious community takes one of three views when it comes to the adaption of Chinese religion to society and legal compliance. The first view emphasizes the legal status of religion. While ensuring the “legality” of religion, we must prevent any particular religion or religious sect from forming a religious political community based on their own perceived legitimacy or authority, nor can we permit any religion to replace “government” authority in religious matters. In this sense, the government, society, and the religious community have different thoughts and opinions, and so the future development of religion is highly variable and should be observed and researched. The ­second

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view agrees that religious communities should be subject to legal regulation, but only those that emanate from the government. Some religious groups are still “unregistered” but believe that the government is the only executive body that can regulate them, and they hope to achieve legal status by registering with government religious authorities, which shows that some do not want or need other religious organizations to “meddle in their affairs.” While they believe that this political “unity” and religious “democracy” will never happen, these religious groups believe in “freedom of belief,” which gives the rationale that allows them to exist between a “legal” and “illegal” status—a gray area of existence for religion. The third view absolutely refuses any regulation of religion for any reason and thus religion exists with a complicated “illegal” status, constituting, to a certain degree and within a certain realm, a risk to national political security and social stability. This third view plays a crucial role in development as well as determining the kind of policies the government will employ toward religions, which will undoubtedly affect society and the existence of religion in society. In terms of the progress of “democracy” and “rule of law” in modern society, people have very different understandings of “freedom of religious belief” and “freedom of religion.” For people who have a distinct attitude toward society, the demand for “religious freedom” is an “absolute” freedom of religion in that it is a complete “freedom” of spiritual belief and social behavior; however, this is a distortion of “democracy” and “religion” as well as “ignorance” of “rule of law” and “order.” In fact, there has never been an “absolute freedom” of religious belief at any time or in any country. If this kind of “freedom” is imposed, then in essence it supports a state of “anarchy.” Generally speaking, “freedom of religious belief” can be understood at two levels. The first recognizes and protects the “absolute freedom” of individual spiritual belief, which respects the intrinsic, confidential, and private nature of religious belief and rejects any interference or coercion at an ideological level. The second points out and emphasizes a “relative freedom” in religious behavior and organization in society. Religion, as a kind of social organization and permanent part of society, should remain public, comprehensible, transparent, and subject to oversight and should certainly not be left to exist as a kind of “mafia,” “secret society,” or “underground society.” In this sense, religion has a responsibility and obligation to maintain the interests of society and legal order. The orderly and rational basis of Chinese religion in modern society is “­compliance with the law” and acceptance of the legal “regulation” of religion by the authorities. Lately, the legal mechanisms concerning religion in China have made some progress, but some problems still exist: for example, religions are regulated by government authorities according to ­administrative

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r­egulations that lack any legislative mechanism. Thus, the current state of religious regulation still needs to work on improving religious legislation, strengthening the legal framework, and building a complete regulatory and oversight mechanism for religion. Religious legislation is difficult to create because of disagreement and ­disunity over the “concept” of modern Chinese legislation. One group hopes to establish “regulatory legislation over religious affairs,” which will provide a legal basis and assurance for the government to regulate religions; thus, it is legislation for the government to regulate religion. Another group maintains that religious legislation should comprise “laws for the protection of the freedom of religious belief,” in that freedom of religious belief should be ­protected and enshrined as a basic right of all citizens. This seeks to use ­legislation to protect the religious freedoms of citizens. Currently, there are distinctions among administrative legislation, departmental legislation, democratic legislation, and draft legislation on the books that show the real progress that modern China has made in “democracy and rule of law.” In fact, improvements need to be made in both “religious freedom” and “religious regulation,” particularly in establishing a respect for the law, eliminating temporary and self-serving policies, and making decisions on the basis of the social existence of religion and how religion should be treated in society, government, and “legal regulations.”

The Position of Chinese Religion in Modern Communities and Basic Choices in Its Public Role

Chinese religion is a subsystem of the Chinese social structure that has had a certain status and impact on society throughout history. In the Chinese sociopolitical landscape, the relationship between church and state is generally marked by the “state taking the lead with religions following.” Thus historically religions either survived and grew by affiliating with the government or distanced themselves from the government and thrived among the lower classes of society or in politically marginalized areas. With the modernization of and the spread of communication technologies, it is no longer possible for religious communities to hide out in the hills to distance themselves from society, and they have already taken on a unique position as “intermediaries” in civil society; therefore, it is necessary for the position of religion in the community to be defined by their role as a “nongovernmental organization” and “nonprofit organization.” Its “integration” into society to a large degree will be based on the breadth, depth, and choices it makes in “serving” society.

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Although there is still a certain relationship between religion and politics in modern China, religion is not at the center of Chinese politics due to the principle of the “separation of church and state.” On the one hand, religion is separated from politics, but, on the other hand, religion is closer to society; consequently, religion has a fundamental problem in choosing its public role in society. Generally speaking, in modern society, religion has a primary social function in social care and services; moreover, religion plays a positive role in the civil affairs of some countries and regions. This is a relatively appropriate choice for Chinese religion. Due to the changes in political development and the international environment, Chinese religion should retreat from the political realm and actively participate in social services and invest more and contribute more to philanthropy and social welfare. Chinese religion has already been very active in social services, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 blizzard in southern China and the Wenchuan earthquake, in which they clearly showed their ability to provide social services and assistance and their potential in public affairs. Overall, these kinds of investments and social services by Chinese religion are still at a nascent stage. They are still more sporadic and haphazard than professional and prudent in their disaster relief, but this means that they have room for expansion. This kind of social participation by religion already shows a need for adjustment to its own structure so that it can systematize the social services offered, which will allow religious groups to organically integrate long-term shrewd mechanisms with their response to unpredictable crises. From an international perspective, the social services generally provided by religious communities operate on three levels. The first is direct participation by core religious organizations. This is also the main way in which Chinese religions currently offer social services. This approach is undertaken by religious organizations either independently or in concert with government offices that share the same social concerns. The second level is specialized religious social service organizations operated by the religious community, including social services and philanthropic organizations that are run like corporations to deal with alleviation of poverty, personal assistance, social assistance, care giving, psychological treatment and personal comfort, as well as medical treatment, public hygiene, services for the disabled, and special education. In this respect, Chinese religion has only just begun. Although there has been considerable progress, in many of these fields religious social services are still taking shape, and they still lack any professionalization, systematization, institutionalization, corporatization, and foresight. The third level is the function and role of social services at religious foundations. Internationally, this is already quite common, but in Chinese society they are few and far

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between, except for the relatively active Protestant Amity Foundation and the Catholic Jinde Charities. Other religiously based foundations have either remained silent or lack the funding to operate. Currently, the Chinese religious community has a degree of economic power and experience in social services, so there is certainly potential for religions to make a breakthrough and come to the forefront. In modern Chinese society, religion can become a positive part of social development through its active provision of religious services and should avoid digressing or evolving into a negative “cancer” on society just because it cannot adapt or cannot work with society.

Chinese Religion in Cultural Construction and Possible Directions for Spiritual Life

In the framework of modern Chinese social institutions, it is not realistic to allow religion to play a main role in cultural construction and spiritual life, but if mainstream consciousness is singing the “main theme,” Chinese religion can still actively participate in the chorus of social harmony and coexistence of cultural diversity. Religion can even play an important and prominent “part” that “sings” about its “uniqueness.” For example, Chinese religion is inseparable from outstanding cultural traditions, reconstructing spiritual civilization, and Chinese cultural consciousness and cultural insight. Chinese culture has always been an open system in terms of cultural construction and possesses an excellent tradition of “tolerance.” The spiritual uniqueness of Chinese traditional culture is inseparable from the presence of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. These “three teachings” have played a primary role in Chinese cultural history and occupy a crucial position. Modern Chinese society has started a new “wave” in “finding cultural roots” or “tracing cultural origins” in China. This reconstruction of cultural consciousness cannot avoid experiencing the depth and heritage of Chinese religious traditions. This could also assist in the religious understanding of Chinese society and a deeper reflection on the nature of Chinese culture. The symbolic meaning of Chinese religion and the role of cultural construction is undeniable over the 5,000 years of Chinese history. There has never been a systematic sorting or generalization in this regard, to the point that many people, including many noteworthy people, still believe that China is an “atheist” country and what is “unique” about the Chinese nation is that there is no “religious” heritage. In fact, this is a distortion or misunderstanding about the nature of Chinese culture, and so it seems as if Chinese culture has wandered ­outside the bounds of world civilizations, making China into an “exception” or “­marginal” in world civilization. This

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f­undamentally does not match with the historical reality and inadvertently belittles the significance and position of Chinese culture. According to “The Half-Full List of Books,” chapter 5 in The Compendium of Translated Terms, written by the Southern Song monk Fayun as early as the Book of Wu, written in the Three Kingdoms period (220–280), there was the saying: “When the lord of Wu asked about the three teachings, the palace minister of translation replied, ‘Confucius and Laozi established their teachings to follow the ways of Heaven for all to use and dared not violate Heaven; Buddhism was established to pursue the laws of Heaven.’ ” Later on, Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty (502–557) proposed the idea that “the origins of the three teachings are one and the same.” The “three teachings” discussed in Bai Juyi’s On the Balance of the Three Teachings refer to the entire doctrine or ideological system of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. By the end of the Song dynasty (960–1279), Liu Mi’s On Calming the Mind with Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism described the meaning of the “three teachings” in China and claimed that, in fact, they could never “perish”: Confucianism in China has taught people to rectify the world through the three relationships and five virtues; to illuminate the world through human relationships; and through the rites, music, punishment, and governance, one is able to understand without confusion from which all things in Heaven and on earth are borne. Confucianism has contributed much to the world, and thus the Qin emperor attempted to eliminate it, but in the end he could not eliminate it. Daoism in China has taught people to maintain a quiet mind; to keep their moral integrity with a humble bow; it has taught people to wash away their concerns for the world; and to act through quiet inaction. Daoism has benefited the teachings of the world greatly, and thus Emperor Wu of Liang wished to remove Daoism, but in the end he could not remove it. Buddhism in China has taught people to cast aside luxuries in exchange for what matters; to turn their backs on the false and return to the truth; to go from acting through force to build upon action through peace; and to go from self-interest to the interest of others. Buddhism has given something for the people to rely upon that to which nothing can be added, and thus the Three Wu emperors (Taiwu, Wu, and Wuzong) wanted to exterminate Buddhism, but in the end they could not exterminate it. The social and spiritual impact of these “three teachings” on China can also be confirmed in the belief of Emperor Xiaozong of the Song dynasty, “Buddhism is to regulate the mind; Daoism is to regulate the body; and Confucianism is

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to regulate the world,” which is found in Discerning the Original Dao.5 Today, Buddhism and Daoism as well as Confucian thought, which have been maintained in Chinese culture, have a potentially major role to play—this is quite obvious. Although there is debate over their religious nature, there is no unequivocal denial. Furthermore, in Chinese folk religion or popular belief, one cannot neglect local lineages, ancestor worship, and other basic Chinese social practices. These native Chinese beliefs have kept alive the Chinese traditions of respecting nature, following the laws of one’s forefathers, and other deep-rooted cultural elements; moreover, they play a role in unifying the Chinese nation and provide a sense of identity. Therefore, understanding religious elements in Chinese culture is necessary to restore order in today’s cultural reconstruction. Chinese religion can provide Chinese culture with a wealth of meaning in today’s reconstruction and joint construction of Chinese culture, allowing it to shine even more brightly. It can also serve to reconstruct Chinese religious culture and renew the position of Chinese religion in Chinese society. In this respect, intelligent people in the Chinese religious community already understand this significance and prospect but seem not give it sufficient attention; hence, there is still much work to be done here. Additionally, Christianity, Islam, and other “outside religions” can spread their culture and provide cultural exchange, which could enrich Chinese civilization with some of the superior elements of world civilization, allowing Chinese culture to positively participate in dialogue and exchange with other cultures in the world. When it comes to the spread of these two major religions in China, we should offer a calm analysis and take an objective point of view. We cannot “exclude” them, but we must also pay attention to their “penetration” in order to understand and define their missionary activities, and we must actively direct their existence and growth in China, so that they can be completely “assimilated” and positively change to become an integral part of Chinese social culture. In terms of spiritual life, the spiritual world and spiritual pursuits of people cannot be separated from religion. The same goes for modern society. Despite the economic growth, scientific progress, and improved living conditions in modern Chinese society, not only have the existence and effect of religion not diminished, but we are also experiencing and witnessing a “revival” or “wave” of religiosity. This clearly shows that, although the Chinese people 5   Cui Dahua, “ ‘Rujiao’ bian,” [Debate over Confucianism] in Fojiao wenti zhenglun ji, [A Collection of Debates over Issues in Buddhism] ed. Ren Jiyu (Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 2000), 113–114.

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have experienced an improvement in their material life, they are in dire need of an enriched spiritual life. The spiritual pursuits and supernatural beliefs of religion offer a critical examination of and crucial warning about material pursuits and the degradation of the environment. Furthermore, detachment from “the void” and faith in the “afterlife” as expressed in religions also serve a psychological and spiritual function that allows people to regard life with a detached and selfless calm. Human existence is expressed in many spiritual ways, and religious beliefs play an important part in this. This kind of real existence seems to be pervasive throughout the entire existence of humanity and will continue in the future. Religious spirituality has an inalienable value for the health of human society, order, and development. There is also much in religion to contemplate, to elevate, and to inspire. In these ways, there is much potential to exploit in Chinese religion. In summary, religion has gradually shown its promise in modern Chinese society with the deepening of reforms. People’s understanding of the meaning and role of religion has been renewed and added weight to the way in which it is evaluated. It cannot be denied that, because of the diversity and complexity of the current open world, the direction of modern Chinese religion will not be unidirectional but diverse. How the social role of religion will play out will depend on its ability to adapt to circumstances as well as the demands and “guidance” of the social environment. Modern Chinese social transition cannot escape the participation of religion. The views of Chinese society toward religion are also in need of adjustment. In the construction of a harmonious society, the adaptation of religion to society and positive interactions between them can be a win-win situation for both religion and society. Works Cited Cui Dahua. “ ‘Rujiao’ bian.” [Debate over Confucianism] In Fojiao wenti zhenglun ji, [A Collection of Debates over Issues in Buddhism] ed. Ren Jiyu. Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 2000. Hu Jintao. “Buduan gonggu he zhuangda tongyi zhanxian, gongtong jianshe Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi.” [Continually Solidify and Strengthen the United Front to Jointly Construct Socialism with Chinese Characteristics] Renmin ribao, July 13, 2006. ———. Gaoju Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida qizhi, wei duoqu quanmian jianshe xiao­ kang shehui xin shengli er fendou: zai Zhongguo gongchandang di shiqi ci ­quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao. [Raise High the Banner of Socialism with Chinese Chracteristics and Fight to Take the Complete Construction of a Moderately

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Prosperous Society: A Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party] Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2007. “Hu Jintao jieshou di shiyi shi ban chan de baijian.” [Hu Jintao Receives an Audience with the Eleventh Panchen Lama] Renmin ribao, February 4, 2005 (International edition). Ye Xiaowen. “Fahui zongjiao zai cujin shehui hexie fangmian de jiji zuoyong.” [The Positive Role Religion Can Play in Promoting a Social Harmony] Qiushi 11 (2007).

CHAPTER 13

Rewriting Women: Writing Gender and Cultural Space in the 1980s and 1990s Dai Jinhua

The History of Writing the “Other”

In a certain sense, the main trend in 1980s Chinese culture was historical writing supported by a heavily utopian impulse. This was fueled in part by worries about pervasive pleasure and wilderness allegories. They were obsessed with describing the dance of death in a bygone cycle of Chinese history and quiet extinction. A clear and hidden perspective on time and space in the paradigm of the movement to rethink historical culture, nostalgic novels, and Fifth-Generation cinema1 have outlined a tragic perspective on Chinese history. On the one hand, it is cyclical, parochial, conservative, violent, ignorant, and nationalistic; on the other hand, it is linear, tolerant, progressive, democratic, civilized, and global (the West). In the cultural discourse of the 1980s, there was undoubtedly an inclination toward defining these as antithetical. If there is a common narrative motif in mid- to late 1980s’ mainland culture, then the motif would be one of the father-son patriarchal order. Father-son conflicts became the most essential and complicated part of these progressive historical plots, making anxieties over emasculation into a metaphor for political persecution. Among these, the “men without water, without wives, living off dried-up land, starving, and thirsty” became a core symbol of this historical perspective.2 In this unique cultural space and compositional bearing, women have been ostracized in a doubly crucial way. First, in this patriarchal 1  Nostalgic novels (xungen xiaoshuo), also known as the root-seeking school, are thus called because of the author, Han Shaogong’s article “Our Cultural ‘Roots.’ ” Some of the more representative works include Han Shaogong’s Bababa; Acheng’s The Chess Master; Mo Yan’s Red Sorghum; and Wang Anyi’s Bao Town. Fifth-generation films were made by a generation of young directors that emerged after 1983. Representative works include Chen Kaige’s Yellow Earth and King of the Children; Tian Zhuangzhuang’s On the Hunting Ground; and Zhang Yimou’s Red Sorghum. 2  Nostalgic novels include Zheng Yi’s Old Well, and the film adaption directed by Wu Tianming; Yellow Earth; Teng Wenji’s River Elegy (1989); and renown fifth-generation cinematography of Hou Yong’s Heaven Bleeds.

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setting, women have been transcribed as objects of male desires, actions, and values. Women, as forbidden or distressed in narratives, reveal their fate and position of rejection and expulsion from the father-son patriarchal hierarchy of the male protagonist and even history. Furthermore, in historical Chinese parables based on the patriarchal metaphor, women are compelled to accept the cultural identity of men and accept an “individual”—the “making them up” as “­quasi-male”—otherwise they lose any space and opportunity to express themselves in terms of their own subjective historical and discursive identity. Thus, these male composers of historical allegory occupy an imagined personhood and self-fragmented subjectivity: the first is a narrator—that ­ever-watchful storyteller—haunted by the specter of the Western-derived idea of the “individual” and “cultural hero”; the second is a profound recognition in the text in which the son suffers butchery, the son is emasculated, and the son meekly rebels. Thus, we occasionally refer to this cultural narrative of male ­protagonist intellectuals in the 1980s as “stories of the son’s generation.”3 In fact, something like this “other” history must be composed as a personal history of a consanguine family. Although the external gaze is allegedly the star of hope from the Western observer and savior, it nonetheless implies and writes about the extinction and degradation of the flesh and blood of the national culture. Popular culture in the early 1980s was always pursuing and copying elite culture even while attempting to search for a commercial pivot through elite discourse, mainstream consciousness, and popular daily life. By the mid- to late 1980s, in an awkwardly positioned popular culture, many noted the emergence of historical films, television series, and popular novels set in the late Qing period [nineteenth century]; a few of them were quite popular and commercially successful at the time. As a non-Han dynasty that ruled the empire of the Han, the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) became to a large degree an essential part of shaping the history of the “other” in popular cultural identification. As the last imperial dynasty in China, whether in popular consciousness or modernist myths, the Qing dynasty has been an unambiguous symbol of decadence and decline; furthermore, it is indeed an open secret that the history of the final years of the Qing dynasty has been written as one in which a woman, the Dowager Empress Cixi (Yehenara), monopolized power to rule over a male empire. Besides alluding to recent history in the minds of the public (the Cultural Revolution and Jiang Qing), the Dowager Empress’s story in

3  See Dai Jinhua, “Duan qiaozi: zi yi dai de yishu,” [The Child of Broken Bridge: The Art of the Children’s Generation] in Dai Jinhua, Dianying lilun yu piping shouce [A Handbook to Film Theory and Criticism] (Beijing: Keji wenxian chubanshe, 1993).

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elite culture has no scruples about rehashing older lessons about the disaster of women in power. The 1980s comprised a discursive space that organized a national identity made into a grand narrative that was complicated and twisted and ushered in a “new era” of rewriting a cultural course for a generation of women in China through marginalizing the place of women and the subjective discourse of women.

The Emergence of Women

If the cultural writings of elite male intellectuals of the early to mid-1980s maintained an implication of self-imposed cultural exclusion by women—as unobtainable or rejected women allude to exclusion by the patriarchy in the historical event or self-exclusion—then in the writings of the latter half of the decade, women began to emerge in historical events. In nostalgic novels, such as Big Breasts and Wide Hips this takes the form of a maternal;4 in new wave novels,5 women are sinister and morally ambiguous social climbers, interweaving themselves into the web of “other history”; it is not so much that they continue the purity of agnatic succession as that they bring chaos and defile human relations, hierarchy, and the sacredness of kinship in their constant shifting between male guardians. Women were no longer the cave of desire and gateway to maturity in narratives but more like a blockage or obstacle that spurs the young male protagonist/“son” to go outside the bounds of history.6 Nonetheless, even though the writers of new wave novels have a much more essential yet “simplistic” cultural attitude than nostalgic novels, they have been unable to successfully resolve or remove their suspension and anxieties in this particular discourse. Hence, the appearance on stage of women or, as some say the “reproduction,” in Zhang Yimou’s first film, Red Sorghum, seems to be a lonely coincidence. In this instance, women yet again appear in the male protagonist’s sight as an object of desire: at the beginning of the film, seven close-ups of the 4  The maternal image in Big Breasts and Wide Hips is the most crucial image of women in nostalgic novels. It was simplified in 1995 as the newest subject of the most important nostalgic novelist, Mo Yan. See Dazhong wenxue (3–4) (1995), published by the author in 1995. 5  New-wave novels one of the most important literary schools in mainland China around 1987. Representative authors include Su Tong, Yu Hua, Ge Fei, and Ye Zhaoyan. 6  For works like this, see Su Tong’s Poppy Family; Ge Fei, Lost Boat; Ye Zhaoyan, Story of a Date Tree.

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character portrayed by the actress Gong Li represent the desirous glance of males. The debut of women not only successfully disentangled male anxieties about dangling outside the scope of father-son history; at the same time, it also liberated the imagination, reuniting China with the world, and relieved enormous tension between national culture and modernity. What the film presents is no longer a fable of national extinction and more about a rush of primitive vitality and asserting a national myth—no longer a memory of national humiliation but a victory over foreign aggression that heralds a national hero in the land, and women in this film are sacrificial offerings on the altar of male desire and maturity as well as on the altar of national myth. Only by being around fallen women can men become heroes. The last historical catastrophe in 1980s China not only capped the concluding tragedy in the Chinese historical cycle, but also participated in the optimistic delusion of historical human progress. Moreover, it shattered the utopian impulse of elite intellectuals who unconditionally embraced modernist myths. As a post-modernist text supplements itself with a medieval conclusion, anachronistic chaos seems inevitable. The cultural landscape of the mainland in the early 1990s suffered from the torments of aphasia. Thus, women, as something familiar to patriarchy and a well-established signifier, became an effective savior from this “linguistic” aphasiac condition and a release valve for practical pressures and unspecified anxieties. In 1990, the broadcast of the first Chinese soap opera, Aspiration, set off an “aspirational” shockwave across the mainland. It offered the familiar images of humiliation, subservient wives teaching their sons, and submissive women who successfully consolidated and transferred the profound frustrations of society. At the same time, women abruptly crossed into the twilight of history and memory in new wave novels by becoming protagonists in historical narratives. Scenes where gender was central supplanted father-son scenes and occupied center stage in Chinese history. A crucial and interesting change can be seen in the depiction of the Chinese historical landscape as space shifting from a cheery and depraved outside space, like everlasting cliffs of the Loess Plateau and the vast and lush fields of sorghum, to closed and dark interior spaces: for example, the ancient dye house copied from the Ming-dynasty encyclopedia The Exploitation of the Works of Nature (Ju Dou, dir. Zhang Yimou, 1990); the haunted courtyard manor of the Chen family (Wives and Concubines, dir. Su Tong, 1991; Raise the Red Lantern, dir. Zhang Yimou, 1992); the prevalence of ancient imagery that filled the old Cai manor with dark vibes (Red Firecracker, Green Firecracker, dir. He Ping, 1993); the luxury and decadence of the brothels and nunneries along the canals of Jiangnan (Blush, dir. Su Tong, 1991; Blush, dir. Li Shaohong, 1995). These scenes act as caged symbols of Chinese history

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and constructed an “Oriental exoticism” in the eyes of Westerners. These “iron houses” of core symbols in Chinese culture derived from the works of Lu Xun only confine women. In one of the more classic examples of Su Tong’s writings, women are both the inmates and the wardens at these prisons. In these old manors, these women are divided by strife, abuse one another, and are both alienated and connected by a profound sense of hatred and conspiracy. In this historical picture of female protagonists, women become unconscious bearers of history and emasculators of history. The woman is the priestess in this dark history as well as serving as the sacrificial offering. She is always a part of a historical conspiracy and is sacrificed to history. This was one instance of a successful shift in the historical composition of 1980s’ male elite intellectuals: in the classical discourse of patriarchy, women have existed in a nontemporalized space. The image of women and the “generational hierarchy” of women precisely match the particularity and rebirth of the Chinese historical narrative. At the same time, as a permanent “other” in an inherently patriarchal society, women appearing in Chinese historical dramas have supplanted “patriarchal history” and succeeded in building a “history of the other.” In other words, the emergence of women in 1990s’ historical narratives effectively absorbed and eliminated the “otherness” in 1980s’ historical narratives, allowing the male narrator to freely compose the story of the other through a self-history with a historically subjective stance; this denounces Chinese history while not going so far as to get caught in an awkward position. Something that people like Su Tong are not very conscious about is that stories about women drenched in blood and enduring pain have surfaced the unfamiliar and obscure in complicated Chinese male historical narratives, allowing the narrator to join the world and gain a passport to the Western cultural perspective.

The Gender-Switching Game

In 1993 a modernization process began that was propelled by an extremely abrupt wave and the intensification of commercialization. Only at this moment did reality lose the rosy color of 1980s idealism, yet it was did not enter the golden gates of Eden. It clearly pointed to a future saved by materialism that pompously flaunted an avaricious pragmatism. As mainland intellectuals grappled with this shocking transformation, they faced the pressures and temptations of a remorseless reality; they faced an existential debasement and threat to their imagination and reality. Western culture and materialism were no longer presented in a welcoming embrace as they imagined, nor did they offer

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some kind of “template and impetus for a spiritual salvation; instead, it overtly presented itself as a contention and dissuasion. Chinese elite male intellectuals, besides fretting over the compression of reality and existential humiliation, must face another kind of harsh reality that was” the subtle cultural plight of native scholars in the post-cold war global cultural discourse. Like the textual rules of the game among sex, politics, and power that Chinese male intellectuals have made familiar, in this new global cultural discourse, the mutual interchangeability of gender, race, and power as well as metonyms unfold according to these rules in a much broader sense. A very interesting fact is that as Chinese male intellectuals searched for possibilities to displace or circumvent norms in their state of extreme anxiety, Chinese female writers had already learned the secrets of this game through their own gendered encounters and experiences. One of them, Zhang Jie, had already sketched out a world in which the sun shone down on a sordid and not all that different view of the West and East in her novel Only One Sun. In fact, Zhang directly addresses the extreme anxiety and fear that many Eastern and Chinese male intellectuals have about the West. In the novel, the Eastern Asian “witch” successfully uses the “advantages” of her sexualized and racialized role in a passage on marrying a Westerner; and the ending, in which Zhang’s only favorable male protagonist finally treads naked from the beach into the sea under the splendid Western sun, has been trenchantly and bitterly shown that the roles as well as rules of gender and power can be successfully grafted onto models of race and power. Another female author, Wang Anyi, in a short passage in Uncle’s Story, describes a humiliating encounter on Western soil to her “uncle,” a famous author. In an absurd and twisted scene, she describes an Eastern Asian man’s attempt to impose his gender privilege on a Western woman, only to be thwarted and dominated by this Western woman’s racial and linguistic privilege. If we say that this infamous cultural reality also implies a pathetic and open secret of the mind-set of Chinese male intellectuals, then a ­crucial fact about a part of 1990s Chinese culture comes from recognition and submission to these rules on race, gender, and power. In fact, Raise the Red Lantern and Farewell My Concubine, which made impressive showings at the Oscars and even “conquered” the Western world by playing the cultural game of gender and race, exposed this inexorable cultural fate. The visual structure of Raise the Red Lantern omits the dominant male of the Chen family manor transforming the “master” into a prison-like and classical Chinese courtyard manor, where the conflict and abuse among the wives and concubines never inspires any insights among any of the male characters. The woman’s role is as an “objective” camera exposing a picturesque composition that b­ alances both

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the beautiful and the wretched, through which women become the absolute ­protagonists in a historical event as well as the only observable object for perspective in the film. The visual structure of the film successfully shifts historical suffering and interpretation away from the logic of the male-master/ female-slave dichotomy to the framework of the abuser/abused, and the empty position of the absent viewer provided by the camera takes on the Western perspective from the eyes of a Western man. At another level, gender reversal games are played in other ways as well— not so much because the 1990s was a highly active period as, more precisely, because it was a time of yearning. This period, in an imaginative solution to escape the uncertainties of reality, the textual rules of sexuality and politics once again successfully displace anxieties about the emasculation of the male/ subject. As a way to evade and effectively dispel these anxieties about reality, a new and unpleasant image of the hysterical and materially insatiable women was rooted in post-1989 Chinese mainland culture. In Su Tong’s A Guide to Divorce and Yang Bo, A Married Man, as well as Wang Shuo’s Death by Satisfying a Craving in the 1990s,7 the greed, drug abuse, irrationality, and near insanity of women in these narratives throughout their lives seems to cause repeated disasters in the lives of men. In these stories, women have clearly become the origin of real misery and anxiety as well as the perpetrators and instigators of a tragic fate for men. Thus the cause of the shocks, frustrations, barriers, and pressures at the turn of the 1990s was foisted upon women by social reality, transforming the subversion of society, particularly the existing order, to a rectification of the gender order, and shifting reflections on political and historical destinies to the interpretation of individual male suffering. Hence, the narrators have achieved an amnesty for men and the exclusion of women from the text.

Women’s Writing and Cultural Space

In fact, although Chinese culture in this new era in a certain sense presents itself as attacking patriarchal culture, women’s writing is ultimately one of the most important parts of the current cultural reality. The problem is that 7  An interesting fact related to this is that as Wang Shuo was adapting this for the television series Satisfying a Craving in 1993, the screenwriters combined the story with two other novels of Wang Shuo, making the plot into one in which the hysterical heroine, because of her love for a man, finally returns home to the embrace of a man. It was quite a blockbuster at the time.

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as men’s writing takes a blatant stance on gender and become a template for mainstream writing, the gendered identity of female writers becomes an expression of ambiguity and uncertainty. Since 1979, the efforts of female artists have failed to carve out a cultural space for women; at the same time, when it comes to joining and participating in men’s cultural space, they have cleaved the unity of this space with a plethora of dissenting voices. In the mid- to late 1980s, a major trend in women’s writing was the composition of real and historical circumstances of women that explore the tragicomedy of their existence, outlining how a patriarchal society and history constructed a monstrous female ego and how men, as masters of women, changed them into harlequins and puppets of the gender order they created. Here women’s writing often unexpectedly mocks and subverts patriarchal society and gender order. It also intermittently achieves a place for women in their writing on women in history.8 In the 1990s, women’s writing eschewed “grand narratives” and “national allegory” of elite male intellectuals and began writing about women’s ordinary or unconventional daily lives.9 Additionally, women’s writing picked up the thread of women’s cultural traditions of the 1940s and even “boudoir literature” with a degree of consciousness.10 Many have focused on a group of young women born in the 1960s who began to brazenly write about “my body, my ego” in autobiographical and quasi-autobiographical forms; they recorded their own gender and sexual experiences as well as writing about their companionship with other women and homoerotic fears and desires.11 Since 1949, women’s writing has used shocking methods to enter the sights of the world; however, at the same time, a patriarchal culture emerged, particularly a male commercial culture, that attempted to co-opt and sacrifice the cultural resources of women. The women’s own bold and frank words were continually “explored” and bestowed with certain commercialized properties; female authors’ attitudes toward women’s bodies, the brash secrets of their desires, and women’s own questions about “my body, my ego, 8  Works like this include Wang Anyi’s Thirty Chapters on Flowing Water; Tie Ning’s Rose Gate; and Chi Li’s Gazing. 9  Representative authors and works include Chen Ran’s Let’s Pay the Piper for the Past and Nowhere to Bid Farewell; Lin Bai’s A War of One’s Own, The Cloistered Chair, and Water in the Bottle; Xu Xiaobin’s Pisces. 10  Xu Kun, a female writer, interposed her work between documentary, fiction, and discussion: Cong ci yue lai yue mingliang [Henceforth Ever Brighter] in Beijing wenxue (1996). [Beijing Literature] 11  Chen Ran, “Chao xingbie yishi yu wode chuangzuo,” [Beyond Gender Consciousness and My Work] Zhongshan 2 (1995); and her short story “Pokai,” [Breaking Open] Huacheng [City of Flowers] 1 (1996).

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my monster” were constantly “packaged” by male publishers and critics—a packaging that female writers came to rely upon—shifting women’s own words and self-doubt into the peeping eyes of men’s desires. What followed this, however, were much clearer and more forceful women’s voices, as well as resistance to this new cultural exploitation. Not only did women have an unprecedentedly clear and powerful voice of resistance, but it was also fully conscious of the existential gendered state of women, which included profound introspection on women; moreover, it yet again sought to surpass and overthrow gender order at a new cultural level. Sisterhood was no longer homoeroticism in a narrow sense or merely a female utopian evasion of reality, but became a clear expression of a cultural space for women and an ideal society for women. The mature resistance of women in the 1990s was extremely weak and marginal in terms of expressing the hustle and bustle of urban environments and clamor of patriarchal culture; moreover, it was quickly checked by the entirety of patriarchal culture. However, it clearly showed the rupture in the common space of men, women, government, and commerce in an attempt to establish a cultural and real space for women, yet, at the same time, it inevitably experienced a lengthy cultural and real process of escape and struggle. Works Cited Chen Ran. “Chao xingbie yishi yu wode chuangzuo.” [Beyond Gender Consciousness and My Work] Zhongshan 2 (1995). ———. “Pokai.” [Breaking Open] Huacheng 1 (1996). Dai Jinhua. Dianying lilun yu piping shouce. [A Handbook to Film Theory and Criticism] Beijing: Keji wenxian chubanshe, 1993.

CHAPTER 14

Deconstructing Ethnic Minorities in China: Eliminating Orientalism or Re-Orientalizing? Pan Jiao Since the 1990s, discussions about the distinctions among Chinese ethnic minorities and deconstructing the construction of Chinese ethnic minorities by the Chinese government have grown in Western sinology. Studies on these topics have come one after another, dismantling the construction of ethnicity for the Hui, Yi, Zhuang, Hmong, Yao, and Uighur ethnic groups.1 When they will dismantle the construction of ethnicities such as Tibetan or Mongolian or whether there is no longer sense in continuing to dismantle ethnic construction for the remaining forty-nine ethnic groups in China remains unknown. Roughly speaking, this trend in deconstruction has progressed in two respects. The first is that the differences among and incoherence of these ethnic groupings in terms of language, culture, socioeconomics, and geographic distribution, thus indicating that, even though the Chinese government/­ ethnographers have categorized them according to Stalinist definitions of ethnic classification to objectively recognize Chinese ethnic minorities, these distinct ethnic groups do not even fit the classical definition of ethnicity according to Stalinist classifications. The second is research into ethnogenesis or the ethnic process, which reveals that before these ethnic groups were recognized by the Chinese government, they did not have a consistent and unified label nor did they have a common ethnic consciousness; thus they did not have an ethnic group or ethnos in the sense that it has been referred to among Western intellectuals. 1  Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic of China (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991) idem, Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Stevan Harrell, Tianye zhong de zuqun guanxi yu minzu rentong: Zhongguo xinan yi zu shequ kaocha yanjiu (Nanning: Guanxi renmin chubanshe, 2000); Katherine Palmer Kaup, Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Ralph Litzinger, Other Chinas: The Yao and the Politics of National Belonging (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Louisa Schein, Minority Rules: The Miao and Feminine in China’s Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).

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The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that Chinese ethnic minorities have been created through the invention of ethnic identification by the Chinese government. Whether it is a Stalinist theory of ethnicity or a Western theory of ethnicity, neither has been able to interpret the existence of China’s ethnic minorities, because these theories have neglected the construction of these ethnic minorities by the state.2 Ethnicities are not separate groups created by a supernatural God nor are they a naturally formed community of different people; rather, they are homogeneous political structures created by people in this world full of heterogeneity. It is the invention of nationalism that created the ethnic nation, not the ethnic group that gave rise to nationalism. This has been the main premise of research into nationalism by Western scholars since World War II.3 Nationalist politics are a kind of homogeneous politics. The process of nation-building is a political process of sorting, classifying, and constructing homogeneity in a reality full of heterogeneity. During this process of constructing homogeneity, there is also a process of constructing the “other,” because it is only in imagining and constructing “otherness” and the “other” that the homogeneity of “us” can emerge and be affirmed. Thus the politics of nationalism is also the “politics of otherness,” in that the construction, unity, and existence of the nation requires the constant imagining and creation of “others”; otherwise, it will dissolve and be submerged by the heterogeneous forces of regional identity, class, gender, generation, and their particular characteristics. It is in this sense, Brackette F. Williams points out that ethnic minorities are impurities plucked out as the nation-state imagines and constructs its own homogeneity, creating an “other.”4 In the process of nation-building, the perception of the majority population or the real common genealogy and cultural system are made into the basis of the state, celebrating genealogy and culture as the purpose of the state’s existence and struggle. Those that possess this unique genealogy and culture become the backbone that supports the state.

2  Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 76. 3  Benedict Anderson, Xiangxiang de renmen gongtongyi [Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2003); Ernest Gellner, Minzu yu minzuzhuyi [Nations and Nationalism] (Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 2002); Eric Hobsbawm, Minzu yu minzuzhuyi [Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Program, Myth, Reality] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2000); Elie Kedourie, Minzuzhuyi [Nationalism] (Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 2002). 4  Brackette F. Williams, “A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation Across Ethnic Terrain,” Annual Review of Anthropology 18 (1989): 401–444.

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At the same time, groups distinct from the majority that belong to this genealogy and culture are alienated and are made into impurities that impede the homogeneous unity and progress of the nation-state. In the face of this, some of these alienated minority groups demand their own nation-states; some strive to prove themselves as good citizens who had once sacrificed themselves for the state and that their own traditions and culture are not only not a hindrance but a benefit to the unity and progress of the state; and based on this premise, they demand political recognition by the state. This is also why many ethnic minorities strive to adorn and invent their own t­ raditions. Their aim is not so much to satisfy their own national vanity as to escape the ethnic discrimination they face. In fact, they are forced to invent their own traditions to prove that they are not only not a hindrance but are helpful to the civility and progress of the state. Thus, as far as the majority is concerned, the traditional culture of these ethnic minorities, regardless of how it has been adorned and invented, can at least act as the pearls and diamonds to ornament the nation and could never act as the brick and mortar foundation of building a n ­ ation-state. Williams argues that these adornments and inventions of their own cultural traditions by ethnic minorities are in fact a debt that they never owed and could never repay that they are forced to pay to the nation-state. Apparently, the deconstruction of Chinese ethnic minorities over the past few years began with these main theories and were in the end only theories. As far as this writer sees it, however, the meaning of this deconstruction is not so much in affirming these theories of ethnicity as in reifying an imagined and alleged “authoritarian China.” There does not seem to be any great interest in how the example of China does or does not to a certain extent constitute a contradiction or challenge to this theory. For example, the contrast between Williams’s theory of “the debts of ethnic minorities” and the theory that “the Han repay debts” espoused by the Chinese leadership have not only never been analyzed but do not even seem to have been noticed.5 The indiscriminate use of these theories of ethnicity also contains many biases. For example, in Williams’s theory, ethnic minorities are responsive actors created by the “alienation” they suffered, but in the estimations of these sinologists, Chinese ethnic minorities are nothing more than objects left to the devices of the state. Although some have stated that Chinese ethnic relations should be seen more as a dynamic dialogue and negotiated process, the dialogue and negotiation they address refer only to the post-1949 classification of ethnic 5  Zhou Enlai, “Minzu quyu zizhi you li yu minzu tuanjie he gongtong jinbu,” in Zhongguo gongchandang chuyao lingdaoren lun minzu wenti, ed. Guojia minwei zhengce yanjiushi, (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1994), 146–157.

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minorities; there were no political demands for recognition pre-1949 in the construction and production of ethnic minorities by the Republic of China. There was only state ethnic policy molding the ethnic landscape of China (the rise and fall of the proportion of the population of ethnic minorities, etc.), but there were no demands by ethnic minorities for their own rights in facilitating the formulation and modification of national ethnic policies. There was only the majority affirming and constructing itself through its contact with the culture of ethnic minorities or “internal orientalization,” but nothing about ethnic minorities demanding their own special political arrangements with the state by emphasizing distinctions between their culture and the majority, or “self-orientalization.” It should be pointed out that their deconstruction of the political structure of Chinese ethnic minorities does not occur because they believe that, without ethnic classifications, there would be no ethnic minorities in China. Quite the contrary, as they see it, if there were no ethnic classifications, there would be 400 or more ethnic groups in China and not the paltry 55 recognized. As they see it, the process of constructing fifty-five ethnic groups could also be seen as a process of eliminating ethnic distinctions.6 As far as Western liberalism is concerned, the ability to define oneself is a fundamental human right, and the classification of ethnicity by the state through “objective science” negates the self-identification of over 400 ethnic groups, which is the mark of an authoritarian regime; the classification of ethnicity in China, however, has not, in fact, been scientific or objective. If we claim that these groups are certainly unique, then we are claiming that these identities, kinships, and biology constitute a basis for confirming ethnic identity, which in turn is a primary marker of “ethnic nationalism.”7 “Ethnic nationalism” is antithetically referential to “civic nationalism.” Generally speaking, the origin of civic nationalism arose in mainly countries west of the Rhine river that developed capitalism relatively early in history and had a more mature capitalist class, hence many early works on nationalism have been called “Western nationalism.”8 This views the nation as a group that willingly lives under a common law represented by a legislative ­organization

6  Gladney, Dislocating China, 9, 205–228; Paul Hattaway, Operation China (Carlisle, UK: Piquant, 2000). 7  Gladney, Dislocating China; idem, Muslim Chinese. 8  Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background (New York: Macmillan, 1944).

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that has the power to make arrangements with its own government.9 This implies that people can choose their national affiliation according to their own political preferences and define their own identity, thus this has been referred to as “voluntary nationalism” or rational, positive, and liberal nationalism. Distinct from this is ethnic nationalism, which sees the nation as a community of people who share a common origin/ancestor and thus a common culture. This implies that one’s national affiliation is decided at birth and is not elective and thus is also closed and exclusive. Consequently, in apposition to “voluntary nationalism,” early research into this brand of nationalism has often called this “organic nationalism” or irrational elective nationalism. Early scholars argued that the origin of this kind of nationalism arose mainly east of Rhine river, chiefly in Central Europe, eastern Europe, and even later in Asia and Africa; thus, mirroring its cousin “Western nationalism,” this has been called “Eastern nationalism.” Since these regions were primarily aristocratic empires and agrarian society ruled by feudal landlords, they did not have the broader support of the population in their nationalist movements. These nationalist movements were led mainly by a minority of urban elites, marked by clamoring, totalitarianism, and mysticism.10 According to this framework, categorizing Chinese nationalism as constructed by ethnic nationalism clearly means that it is under an “organic” framework of primordialism, mysticism, totalitarianism, and irrationality that is not based on civic society and democracy, and this is determined by the stage of China’s social development and its status as part of the exotic Orient. At present, theories of stages of social development have long since been rendered outdated, but replacing it has been cultural determinism. That is also to say that today some people are more willing to attribute things that happen in China to “ideals” held by Chinese people or Chinese culture and not as a response to the economic, social, and political circumstances in which they find themselves. What is worth noting is that since the 1990s a dramatic shift has taken place in theories of Chinese nationalism in Western academia. For quite some time, traditional China was believed to be a state centered on sinocentrism or cultural universalism, in that race/blood/birth does not fall within the bounds of politics, and instead reverses a Confucian universalism in which “the emperor holds nothing dear except virtue. The people are changeable, but understand compassion.” Even though there was occasionally a sino-barbarian dichotomy 9  Kedourie, Minzuzhuyi, 7; Anthony D. Smith, The Nation in History (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000), 5–26. 10  Smith, Nation in History, 7.

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in this worldview, it only saw the distinctions between Chinese and foreigners as differences in “rites” or culture and did not believe that the boundaries between Chinese and foreigners were insurmountable and immutable. Hence, the kind of racism or nationalism that emerged in modern China at most was a tool borrowed from the West. Since the 1990s, therefore, this perspective has been challenged. Dru Gladney, for example, has referred to the discourse that supported the categorization of Chinese ethnicities as “communal nationalism.” He argues that, even though the discourse on Chinese nationalism is derived mainly from Japan, it is also interfused with older Chinese concepts of “family,” “lineage,” “­person,” “people,” “land,” and “native place.”11 Frank Dikötter argues that ­racism in China has a long tradition. What is worse than Western concepts of race is that traditional China was inclined toward a theory that humanity had multiple origins and saw the distinctions between Chinese and foreigners as the distinction between humans and animals. The reason Western concepts of racism and social Darwinism were able to quickly spread in China was that they fit well with Chinese traditions that emphasized family and genealogy. Overall, it uses genealogy and racial differences to create the social and cultural distinctions between people, imagining different peoples as biological entities with inherently distinct characteristics, which in China has an extraordinarily long tradition. Furthermore, as people began to continually criticize the crimes of Western racism, they neglected the fact that in China and East Asia they have always relied on a race-based sense of community as the foundation of national identity,12 to the point that many of these countries still have official policies that encourage racial discrimination and violate human rights. The Yellow Emperor, for example, has been seen as the common ancestor of the Chinese people; the Chinese people were considered the eternal descendants of the Yellow Emperor; citizens were deprived of the right to marry and reproduce with the help of eugenics (Gansu); and black students in China suffered discrimination and mob violence (Nanjing).13 From this perspective, categorizing ethnicity based on genealogy and biology is even more so strong evidence of the possibility of “race-based ethnicity.” Simply put, it claims that Chinese ethnic categorization as the construction of ethnic nationalism in recent years echoes allegations of “Chinese racism.” Besides affirming an imagined and alleged Chinese totalitarianism, it implies 11  Gladney, Dislocating China. 12  Frank Dikötter, ed., Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997). 13  Ibid., 1–33; idem, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (London: C. Hurst, 1992).

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the deconstruction of China’s ethnic minorities or affirms an imagined and alleged Chinese/East Asian racism. Of course, the distinctions between “civic/Western nationalism” and “ethnic/Eastern nationalism” have been criticized in Western academia. This criticism, moreover, emerged not just from research on China but from the “school of ethnosymbolism” pioneered by Anthony D. Smith as well as attention to ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union researched by other scholars. Smith’s main criticism is that distinctions between “civic/Western” and “ethnic/Eastern” nationalism is nothing more than the theoretical imaginings of Hans Kohn and his followers. In reality, there is no ethnic group or nationalism that is purely “civic” or purely “ethnic.” “Civic-territorial” ideals and “­ethno-cultural” ideals are intricately woven together, in that any ethnic group has a sense of belonging to an “ethnic core” or “ethnic symbolism” and demand “civic-territorialism.”14 Based on this criticism, he attempts to prove that every ethnic group and nationalism has its own ethnic origin that is constructed around an ethno-symbolic complex (common ethnic terminology, myths, history, territorial memory, etc.). In other words, ethnicity cannot be invented beginning with a blank slate. Unsatisfied with Western scholars who attributed ethnic conflict and war in the former Soviet Union to an exotic “Eastern/ethnic nationalism,” some Eastern European scholars in recent years have followed Smith’s criticisms of “civic/Western” and “ethnic/Eastern” nationalism. What they attempt to do is say that Eastern European nationalism could be “civic,”15 Western nationalism has also been “ethnic,”16 and even that ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism are different historical stages of intellectual progress and expanding democracy.17 The criticism of Smith and the others are not unreasonable but are certainly not perfect. It might be just as they described it, that each ethnic group and nationalism have demands for “civic territory” as well as demands for their “ethno-cultural symbolism.” We cannot, however, neglect the biases of nationalist demands in different regions and time periods and completely negate the necessity of distinctions between “ethnic nationalism” and “civic nationalism” 14  Smith, Nation in History, 18, 25–26. 15  Dusko Sekulic, “Civic and Ethnic Identity: The Case of Croatia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27 (2004): 455–483. 16  Eric Kaufmann, “American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Anglo-Saxon Ethnogenesis in the Universal Nation,” Journal of American Studies 33 (1999): 437–458. 17  Taras Kuzio, “The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s Framework of Understanding Nationalism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25 (2002): 20–39.

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in theoretical frameworks. In other words, the true problem with Kohn and his followers is not their classification of “ethnic nationalism” and “civic nationalism,” but their simplistic definition of the former as something inherently Eastern and the latter as something inherently Western. Although Smith and others point to flaws in Kohn and others’ framework, they overlook the fact that the biases of nationalist demands in different circumstances may be different. Generally speaking, the theoretical frameworks of Kohn and Smith both fail to consider that nationalism in a given region may have different demands at different times. For example, in China the nationalism of Sun Yat-sen before the Republican Revolution excluded Manchus and was clearly marked by “­ethnic nationalism,” but after the Republican Revolution he shifted toward “civic nationalism” and strived to construct a “Chinese nation” that included all the ethnic groups within the boundaries of the Chinese state. This is true of many Eastern countries like China. Moreover, within a given region different brands of nationalism can exist simultaneously; furthermore, it becomes hard to say whether “civic nationalism” is more “rational” or more “free and democratic” than “ethnic nationalism.” For example, before the Republican Revolution, the nationalism of figures like Zhang Taiyan18 and Sun Yat-sen was “ethnic nationalism” while the nationalism of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao was uniquely “cultural/civic.” In 1940s China, the Nationalist Party emphasized the homogeneity of the Chinese nation and politically denied any ethnic distinctions within China. This is clearly also the mark of “civic nationalism.” Hence, the Chinese Communist Party faulted this as the political oppression of ethnic minorities by the Nationalist Party and proposed granting autonomy to ethnic minorities. Today, some scholars in China take a “civic nationalism” perspective to emphasize reforming national ethnic policy, changing ethnic autonomy to “ethnic joint governance,” changing the status of the fifty-six ethnicities to “fifty-six ethnic groups” or “de-­politicizing” ethnic minorities that have already been recognized by the national government. Other Chinese scholars believe that these ideas do not fit the reality of China’s circumstances, are overly mechanical, blindly imitate Western theories of civic society, and are politically regressive. Finally, in a given region, nationalism may have different policies for different ethnic groups simultaneously. For example, with respect to some groups that were formed primarily through immigration, as in the United States, 18  Zhang Binglin (1868–1936), popularly known as Zhang Taiyan, was a turn of the century philologist, journalist, and nationalist revolutionary active in the Revolutionary Alliance. He published numerous anti-Qing articles and later articles critical of President Yuan Shikai.

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mainstream public opinion and the policies upheld by authorities could be described as “civic” in nature, in that they oppose discrimination against lineages and cultures distinct from the mainstream and propose that these differences be ignored to ensure that members of these groups receive the same treatment as any other citizens. At the same time, they view Native Americans as distinctly not possessing the same rights as American citizens, and while they granted Native Americans the status of American citizens, they also recognized them as domestic nations and as distinct political bodies with autonomous legislation, police forces, and administrations.19 If we look at the history of racial and ethnic identification in the U.S. national census, we see that American definitions of race evolved from ethno-nationalist to civic nationalist. Early in American history, census takers had the right to classify an individual’s race according to their own observations and understanding. Today, people have the right to self-identify their race on the census and can report multiple ethnicities; however, the U.S. government uses strict definitions of who constitutes a member of a Native American tribe, and even today the proportion of Native American ancestry forms the basis of whether a person can be classified as a member of a Native American tribe. For example, membership in the Pembine Chippewa is still determined by the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). According to the BIA definition, one must be one-fourth Pembina Chippewa to be considered a member of the tribe.20 Thus, we can see that in the 1990 U.S. census, 1.8 million people self-reported as Native American, but only about one million people have been recognized by the federal government as members of Native American tribes.21 According to statistics in the late 1980s, over 600 self-reported Native American tribes existed in the United States, but the federal government recognizes only 502 tribes, and an additional 26 tribes are recognized by state governments. The remaining 100 or so tribes are still awaiting recognition by the government.22 From this, we can see that Chineseness is certainly not culturally determined to be “ethnic.” There has been endless debate in Chinese academia as to whether Chinese nationalism is “civic nationalism” or “ethnic nationalism,” 19  That is, Indian (Native American) reservations.—Trans. 20  CFR, Code of Federal Regulations: Indian, vol. 25 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 215–225. 21  Melissa L. Meyer, “American Indian Blood Quantum Requirements: Blood Is Thicker Than Family,” in Over the Edge: Remapping the American West, ed. Valerie J. Matsumoto and Blake Allmendinger (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 234. 22  Sharon O’Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 90–91.

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with no clear frontrunner. Americanness is also certainly not always “civic” in nature. The classification of Native American tribes is based on a much stricter standard of ethnicity than Chinese classifications. In handling the question of Native American identity, the United States has vacillated between “ethnic nationalism” and “civic nationalism” and then back to “ethnic nationalism.” Today, the United States simultaneously has “civic politics” for a diverse and dispersed population and a “ethnic distinction politics” or “ethnic recognition politics” for indigenous groups in the United States. If this is the case, why are many sinologists inclined to see Chinese nationalism as “ethnic nationalism”? While they criticize the “objective standards” of the classification of ethnicity in China, why do they forget that the U.S. government uses a standard to classify Native Americans that is much more “objective” than the standard employed by the Chinese government? Why is the classification of Native Americans “politics of recognition” while the classification of ethnicity in China is “politics of otherness”? Even though sometimes China is motivated by ethnic nationalism, why can they not see that at other times China is motivated by civic nationalism? Clearly, this is either intentional or unintentional ignorance or blurring of the similarities and complexities between the East and West, and only by blurring these similarities and complexities can an exotic and authoritarian Orient/China distinct from them emerge. Few Chinese scholars have refuted or responded to the rise of criticism among Western intellectuals of Chinese categorizations of ethnicity in recent years. The only exception of which I am aware is that of Li Shaoming at the Sichuan Institute of Ethnic Studies. He published an article in Minzu yanjiu23 in response to Stevan Harrell’s criticism of the categorization of the Yi ethnicity.24 His main point is that even though the Yi ethnicity as recognized by the Chinese government comprises considerable differences in terms of society, economy, culture, and nomenclature, their nomenclature shows certain commonalities (since the Yuan dynasty [1271–1368] the group has been referred to as the Luoluo, although this term was bestowed by outsiders), regional distribution (they are centered in southwestern China, but they are scattered in isolated settlements), language (in terms of similarity in common vocabulary), culture (Bimox Shaman culture), and origin myths (consisting of the earliest ancestor, Zhongmouyou, and his descendants, making up the six branches of the Yi); thus, it is perfectly acceptable to recognize this group of people as belonging to a common Yi ethnicity. 23  Li Shaoming, “Cong yi zu de rentong tan zuti lilun,” Minzu yanjiu (2) (2002). 24  Harrell, Tianye zhong de zuqun guanxi yu minzu rentong.

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Harrell has done a comparison of Chinese concepts of nationality (minzu) and Western concepts of ethnic group (zuqun). As he sees it, the Chinese concept of nationality is almost a product of an exotic Oriental autocracy, in that it is married to Stalinist definitions of ethnicity but not entirely identical to these definitions. They grew out of a national discourse and were manipulated by elites to define the status of others and make these defined groups into fixed objects. The concept of an “ethnic group” is Western European and North American and developed out of local discourses as a concept of commoners and subjects and thus was characterized by fluidity (and openness).25 He argues that although the Yi, Miao, Yao, and other ethnic minorities as recognized by the Chinese government do not fit with Stalinist definitions of ethnicity (though they share four points of commonality), they do not fit with Western concepts of ethnic groups either (self-identification and self-­ nomenclature), and thus he uses this to allege that the word minzu cannot be translated as “nation/nationality” or even “ethnic group” to describe these groups and can only be translated as minzu.26 Li Shaoming’s response to this is that, “regardless of whether it is the term minzu or zuqun, neither are inherently Chinese, but are imported and translated academic terms from abroad,” and thus Harrell’s distinctions between “ ‘minzu’ as Chinese/Russian concepts” and “ ‘zuqun’ as Western European/ North American concepts” are “not relevant” to China. In other words, these terms are not specifically relevant to China and thus are unfounded. Moreover, when specifically discussing standards for classifying ethnicity in China, Li also argues that the concept of ethnicity in China is unique, in that, besides employing Stalinist definitions of ethnicity, Chinese also used ethnic nomenclature, historical origins, and identity preferences as part of a major principle for classifying ethnicity. He emphasizes that “for historical reasons, the distribution of Chinese ethnic groups is often marked by ‘small concentrations of widely scattered groups’; moreover, before the democratic reforms they were at different stages of development, and thus when considering the characteristics of Chinese ethnic groups, they cannot be completely measured against the characteristics of fully developed foreign capitalist ethnic groups.”27 Harrell’s response to this article is that, first, although the categorization of the Yi ethnic group has some scientific basis, for example, some similar characteristics and common historical origins, according to these principles of 25  Ibid., 261–266. 26  Stevan Harrell, “Lun yixie renleixue zhuanmen shuyu de lishi he fanyi,” Shijie minzu (4) (2001): 71–72. 27  Li, “Cong yi zu de rentong tan zuti lilun,” 37–38.

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classification, there is also the possibility that the Bahani, Lisu, Lahu, and Naxi ethnic groups could all be designated as Yi, and internal distinctions within the Yi ethnicity, like the Lipo and Laluo, could be defined as belonging to the Lisu ethnic group. Nonetheless, the Chinese government did not define them this way. Clearly, the classification of Chinese ethnic groups besides scientific considerations, also considered issues to facilitate administration, which had political significance.” Second, the classification of ethnicity in China did not fully respect the preference of people classified or the self-identification of the groups classified. Before these groups were defined by the nation, they did not have a consistent ethnic consciousness. The “Luoluo” was a nomenclature given to these people since the Yuan dynasty. In the past, “the majority of ‘Luoluo’ were not aware that they were ‘Luoluo.’ Even today, there are many branches of the Yi ethnicity that do not recognize themselves as Yi. For example, the Yala in Miyi County, Sichuan and the Sani in Lunan County, Sichuan do not identify with the Yi ethnicity.” Third, with the distinction between “concept of ethnic group in Western Europe/North America” and “the concept of nationalist in China and Russia,” China does stress objectivity over subjectivity, neglecting the subjectivity of groups in categorization.28 It seems that the impact of this Western criticism has garnered slightly more support from Chinese scholars than critical response. These supporters have assumptions that hinder their understanding of the implications of these criticisms by Western scholars. First, they do not have a complete understanding of these Western works. They incorrectly assume that there is no classification of ethnicity in China, and even that there are no ethnic minorities in China; they see only the so-called five races of the Chinese Republic or the idea that China has only one race, as articulated by Chiang Kai-shek’s [Nationalist] regime, which became the fifty-six ethnic groups that make up the multiethnic nation-state [of China] today, neglecting the fact that the criticism by Western scholars is that the Chinese government combined over 400 ethnic groups into 56 ethnic groups. Second, those misguided by Western criticisms believe that Western countries are concerned only with the rights of individual citizens and not with the collective rights of a nation, and that in the West there is only self-identification of ethnic identity and no categorization or recognition of ethnic identity there, neglecting the fact that, within these countries, there can simultaneously exist both politics that recognize ethnic distinctions and ­normal citizenship. They incorrectly assume that only socialist countries can categorize ethnic groups, politically recognize and construct ethnic minorities, 28  Stevan Harrell, “Zai tan ‘minzu’ yu ‘zuqun’: huiying Li Shaoming jiaoshou,” Minzu yanjiu (4) (2002): 36–40.

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and even incorrectly assume that the dissolution of the Soviet Union h ­ appened because of the recognition of ethnic politics, neglecting the historic fact there would never have been a Soviet Union had there been no recognition of ethnic self-determination.29 Third, those terrified by the specter that a China based on a multiethnic state and cultural diversity will sooner or later dissolve as the Soviet Union did incorrectly assume that that it is a question of either “diversity” or “homogeneity,” like a “fish” and a “bear’s paw,” with nothing in between. They see ethnic politics and the inclusion of other cultures as a potential threat to maintaining national unity while also seeing this as an effective means of maintaining national unity. They overlook the fact that this is nationalist fundamentalism, which foments ethnic conflict and national division. They also overlook the fact that national unity through incorporating difference can construct a liberal politics that is able to tolerate others. This is the historical experience of Chinese unity up to the present as well as the current mainstream understanding and pursuit of human rights, truth, freedom, justice, and good in the global mainstream today.30 Since there are misinterpretations of the Western academic view of Chinese ethnic issues and Chinese scholars have misinterpretations of these misinterpretations, we can see that Chinese scholars have recently begun to question Chinese ethnic regional autonomy, hoping to transform ethnic autonomy into “ethnic joint governance”31 or to change the status of the fifty-six ethnicities (minzu) in China to fifty-six ethnic groups (zuqun) to depoliticize ethnicity.32 These proposals appear to be positively responding to Western academic criticisms of the construction of Chinese ethnic minorities in recent years, but these supporters are ignoring the fact that the international community could still be said to be relatively supportive of the Chinese government’s efforts in recognizing and protecting the political, cultural, and economic rights of Chinese ethnic minorities. As far as the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices [issued by the U.S. State Department] are concerned, the efforts of the 29  Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954). 30  Jürgen Habermas, Baorong tazhe [The Inclusion of the Other] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2002); Charles Taylor, “Chengren zhengzhi,” In Wenhua yu gonggongxing, ed. Wang Hui and Chen Yangu (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1998). 31  Zhu Lun, “Minzu gongzhi lun: dui dangdai duominzu guojia zuji zhengzhi shishi de renshi,” Zhongguo shehui kexue (4) (2001). 32  Ma Rong, “Ping Andongni Shimisi guanyu ‘nation’ (minzu) de lunshu,” Zhongguo shehui kexue (1) (2001); idem, Lijie minzu guanxi de xin silu: shaoshu zequn wenti de quzhengzhihua,” Beijing daxue xuebao (6) (2004).

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Chinese government in this regard have been insufficient or even hypocritical. This is also to say, allegations at an international forums of Chinese attempts at ethnic assimilation that have always existed have not diminished in the past decade because of the rise of criticism of the Chinese construction of ethnic minorities. The truly paradoxical question is: how is it possible in Western criticism for the Chinese government to be both the constructor of its ethnic minorities and at the same time the assimilator and demolisher of ethnic minorities? How should Chinese intellectuals understand these two seemingly paradoxical and contradictory allegations? Caught in this shower of criticism, many Chinese scholars have been content with a superficial understanding to encourage the Chinese government to escape these recent criticisms of the construction of ethnic minorities, which could mislead the government and lead to many abuses. Based on this discussion, responses such as those by Li Shaoming to recent deconstructivist criticisms of Chinese ethnic categorization have been insufficient. As I see it, Li’s primary problem is that his discussions are still focused on arguing that the Yi ethnicity is a united genealogy, language, culture, and regional identity to prove the rationality of the classification of the Yi ethnicity, and not on arguing for the political necessity of classifying the Yi ethnicity to respond to Western criticism. Paradoxically, since the 1960s, Western academia seems to believe that ethnicity or nationality can no longer be objectively categorized as distinct units of language, culture, and territory,33 yet demands that the classification of Chinese ethnic groups be objectively scientific. Clearly, the aim of their criticism is not about questioning whether the classification of ethnicity in China is objectively scientific but the extent to which the Chinese government “uses the guise of scientific objectivism” to negate the agency of the ethnic groups classified as well as whether ethnic categorization that has more “political” than “scientific” significance is a phenomenon only of the “Orient/China/Russia.” In this sense, as a response it implies an emphasis not only on the futility of objectively categorizing ethnicity in China in a scientific manner but also risks running in quite the opposite direction. It should be said that Harrell’s rhetoric is tactful, but his ultimate conclusion still emphasizes “scientific objectivity,” neglecting the agency of the ethnic groups classified, the state/object relationship, the concept of ethnicity in China/Russia, and exoticization of an authoritarian Orient/China. In short, since the 1990s, the categorization of ethnicity in China and the political construction of ethnic minorities by the Chinese government have been deconstructed by Western sinologists. In this dismantling of the post­colonial 33  Barth 2002, 1163–1203.

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critique, the politics of tolerance and recognition of ethnic minorities in China have been made into a politics of prejudice and discrimination against ethnic minorities. Issues regarding native Chinese ethnic minorities have been conflated with issues of the diaspora. Issues regarding categorizing Chinese ethnic minorities have been made into issues of internal colonization or internal orientalization. From their critical perspective, if there were no demands for the political recognition of ethnic minorities in China, then there would be no invincible Chinese state power; if there were no political recognition of ethnic minorities by the state, then there would not be states based on the politics of the other to define the self; if there were no ethnic agency to be in dialogue and negotiate with the state, then there would be no ethnic object of national scientific manipulation in categorizing ethnicity; if there were no considerations of politics based on the protection of the rights of ethnic minorities and the operational autonomy of ethnic regions, then there would be no calculations based on administrative considerations. Hence, the paradox remains: even if the ethnic minorities created by the Chinese government are made into an internal Orient, the Chinese government emphasis on “scientific objectivity” has not been “de-orientalized” or seen as the West within China, but has actually been confirmed as the totalitarian Orient. It is worth noting, nonetheless, that this tendency toward authoritarian orientalism in characterizing the modern political recognition of Chinese ethnic minorities has not only not elicited an effective critical response by Chinese intellectuals, but it has actually led to the growth of an imagined Western ideal by depoliticizing ethnic minorities, ethnic joint governance, and the upholding of the rights of individual citizens! Works Cited Anderson, Benedict. 2003. Xiangxiang de renmen gongtongyi [Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism]. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe. Barth, Fredrik (ed.). 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little, Brown. CFR. 2001. Code of Federal Regulations: Indian, vol. 25. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Dikötter, Frank. 1992. The Discourse of Race in Modern China. London: C. Hurst. ——— (ed.). 1997. Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Gellner, Ernest. 2002. Minzu yu minzuzhuyi [Nations and Nationalism]. Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe.

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Gladney, Dru C. 1991. Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic of China. Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University. ———. 2004. Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Habermas, Jürgen. 2002. Baorong tazhe [The Inclusion of the Other]. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe. Harrell, Stevan. 2000. Tianye zhong de zuqun guanxi yu minzu rentong: Zhongguo xinan yi zu shequ kaocha yanjiu. Nanning: Guanxi renmin chubanshe. ———. 2001. “Lun yixie renleixue zhuanmen shuyu de lishi he fanyi.” Shijie minzu (4). ———. 2002. “Zai tan ‘minzu’ yu ‘zuqun’: huiying Li Shaoming jiaoshou.” Minzu yanjiu (4). Hattaway, Paul. 2000. Operation China. Carlisle, UK: Piquant. Hobsbawm, Eric. 2000. Minzu yu minzuzhuyi [Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Program, Myth, Reality]. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe. Kaufmann, Eric. 1999. “American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Anglo-Saxon Ethnogenesis in the Universal Nation.” Journal of American Studies 33. Kaup, Katherine Palmer. 2000. Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Kedourie, Elie. 2002. Minzuzhuyi [Nationalism]. Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe. Keyes, Charles. 2002. “Presidential Speech: ‘People of Asia’—Science and Politics in Classification of Ethnic Groups in Thailand, China and Vietnam.” Journal of Asian Studies 61. Kohn, Hans. 1944. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background. New York: Macmillan. Kuzio, Taras. 2002. “The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s Framework of Understanding Nationalism.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25. Li Shaoming. 2002. “Cong yi zu de rentong tan zuti lilun.” Minzu yanjiu (2). Litzinger, Ralph. 2000. Other Chinas: The Yao and the Politics of National Belonging. Durham: Duke University Press. Ma Rong. 2001. “Ping Andongni Shimisi guanyu ‘nation’ (minzu) de lunshu.” Zhongguo shehui kexue (1). ———. 2004. “Lijie minzu guanxi de xin silu: shaoshu zequn wenti de quzhengzhihua.” Beijing daxue xuebao (6). Meyer, Melissa L. 1999. “American Indian Blood Quantum Requirements: Blood Is Thicker Than Family.” In Over the Edge: Remapping the American West, ed. Valerie J. Matsumoto and Blake Allmendinger, Berkeley: University of California Press. O’Brien, Sharon. 1989. American Indian Tribal Governments. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Pipes, Richard. 1954. The Formation of the Soviet Union. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Schein, Louisa. 2000. Minority Rules: The Miao and Feminine in China’s Cultural Politics. Durham: Duke University Press. Sekulic, Dusko. 2004. “Civic and Ethnic Identity: The Case of Croatia.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27. Smith, Anthony D. 2000. The Nation in History. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Taylor, Charles. 1998. “Chengren zhengzhi.” In Wenhua yu gonggongxing, ed. Wang Hui and Chen Yangu, Beijing: Sanlian shudian. Williams, Brackette F. 1989. “A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation Across Ethnic Terrain.” Annual Review of Anthropology 18. Zhou Enlai. 1994. “Minzu quyu zizhi you li yu minzu tuanjie he gongtong jinbu.” In Zhongguo gongchandang chuyao lingdaoren lun minzu wenti, ed. Guojia minwei zhengce yanjiushi, Beijing: Minzu chubanshe. Zhu Lun. 2001. “Minzu gongzhi lun: dui dangdai duominzu guojia zuji zhengzhi shishi de renshi.” Zhongguo shehui kexue (4).

CHAPTER 15

On the Formation and Evolution of Chinese National Cultural Security Issues in the Twentieth Century Hu Huilin The formation and structure of national cultural security issues are different in every country. Different countries have different rules for the emergence and development of cultural security. China’s current national cultural security issues emerged for historical reasons. Since the rise in China of historical threats and humiliations in the modern era, China has seen the historical emergence and formation of national cultural security policies. In the struggles to save the nation from destruction, resist imperialism, and fight against feudalism, China has consistently pursued the glorious revival of the Chinese nation, which became a theme for China in the modern era. Part of twentiethcentury Chinese history involved the development, intellectual, and spiritual history of saving the Chinese nation from extinction. Existential and developmental security together have constituted the theme of twentieth-century China and cultural security.

The Opium War and the Formation of Chinese National Cultural Security Issues



The Opium War and the Formative Mechanisms of Chinese Cultural Security in the Modern Era The Opium War was a tragedy for Chinese culture. Although superficially the Opium War was a war of imperialist aggression sparked by issues in the opium trade, it cannot be overstated how significantly the impact of this war was to Chinese historical development and distorted its national character. Moreover, it was more of a cultural war in which the forceful expansion of colonialism and capitalism opened China’s door to a cultural invasion. I claim that this was a cultural war because behind the historical imagery were two entirely opposing and conflicting world views and attitudes, as well as two different cultural values that lacked understanding and communication. The dominant

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culture of the West first used the strength of its capital to invade Chinese cultural territory. Cultural security, as part of national existential and developmental security, for the first time in a historically significant sense became an issue of Chinese national cultural security. If, in the long course of Chinese feudal ­society, cultural security in a national security sense was still expressed mainly in terms of the dynastic cycle, a uniquely historical Chinese expression, then the Opium War fundamentally destroyed this rule of Chinese historical development, terminating this cyclical process of decline and revival, and thus the role of Chinese national security in the modern world changed the natural order of cyclical change. External cultural threats and invasion became a crucial force in forming the issues of national cultural security in China. This was a major watershed in the development of Chinese national security. This clash of civilizations pulled back the curtain of modern Chinese history. China was pulled into the global system in the most humiliating way. In terms of the superiority of a culture, accepting the characteristics of a modern industrial civilization reflects the cultural rules of development from the most advanced productive force, which was the inevitable path for Chinese historical development. However, since this inevitable path ushered in the modern era and was unlike any other major historical progress, this was not something that emerged as an inherent expression and demand of Chinese culture, but was a coercive application of force from an external culture. This forced a modern transition in Chinese culture that began with a threat to state and national security. Chinese modernization began this difficult journey with national cultural security to build the dynamic structure of twentieth-century Chinese national cultural security. After the mid-nineteenth century, the capitalist class continued the capitalist mode of production inherited from the sixteenth century to expand into global markets, giving rise to the first round of globalization.1 The unprecedented force of this wave of globalization rapidly led to a shift in global strategies: “With little psychological preparation and constraining mechanisms, human history entered a period of antagonism among civilizations and conflicts between traditions.”2 In this period, capitalist European countries quickly rose up and occupied global markets and the feudal Chinese empire’s lack of preparedness and policies of seclusion created a lot of friction. Because this 1  Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein, Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye all in their theories of the formation of the modern world system and globalization use 1500 as historic starting point. 2  Lu Zhongwei, ed., Feichuantong anquan lun [Theory of Unconventional Security] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2003), 330.

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friction expressed itself primarily as shifts in the properties and structures of two different forces, China, which for a very long stretch of history had been at the center of the world, was ousted by a rising Europe.3 The formation of a world system was marked to a certain degree by the decline of China and the rise of Europe. Here, we do not exclude sharp contradictions in the relationship between advanced modes of production and backward modes of production; however, we must note that differences in national interests, including profound cultural and ideological differences, were the main reason for conflicts between different countries. The Opium War was also a manifestation of a major conflict between foreign forces seeking to quickly open the Chinese market and the Qing government’s pursuit of its own interest in maintaining a natural feudal economy of subsistence. The result of this conflict allowed foreign forces to impose on the Chinese government a recognition of certain rules of the game, [forcing it to] sign unequal treaties and abandon pre-existing national interest priorities, but at the same time foreign powers deployed their government, economy, and culture to transform the national interest embodied in Chinese society as well as its traditional ideology and culture, to adapt it to foreign interests expanding in China. A helpless China passively submitted to the onslaught of the first round of globalization, paying a heavy toll on its national interest in sovereignty and territorial integrity.4 The Opium War had many implications for Chinese cultural security. The Opium War was a war that severed the relationship between modernity and tradition. It was the first conflict and clash that formed a modern world system between two civilizations, which irrevocably changed the path of China’s historical development and the environment and mechanism of Chinese cultural existence and development. It was entirely different from any 3  In André Gunder Frank’s ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkley: University of California Press, 1998), he refers to the “orient in economic globalization” between 1500s to the 1800s as the center of the world economy. That is, then the center of the world economy was not in Europe, but in Asia and particularly China. Fudan University Ming Historian, Pan Shuzhi, once did a comparison of the trade value between Chin and Europe at the time in his article “Wenming de panghuang: wanming lishi da bianju” [A Vacillating Civilization: The Great Transformation in Late Ming History] ( Jiefang ribao, June 28, 2004), and concluded that “all of these new European powers, in their trade with China, were all running a trade deficit, and China ultimately had a trade surplus.” China clearly missed a historic opportunity at this point in history. 4  Lu, Feichuantong anquan lun, 330.

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other conflict between Chinese and Western culture. The invasion of Chinese culture by Western culture was clearly marked by imperialist attitudes. The crisis for Chinese cultural security was precisely Western imperialism. If we see the exploitation of the global market by the capitalist class as a milestone in world history, then the Opium War was the first formal clash between China and globalization, which China ultimately lost. The unstoppable force of globalization gained complete victory over China. In terms of China’s national strength, China had not fallen so far that it could not afford to throw wave after wave of people or even fight wars against aggression; nonetheless, China had lost, and it was a crushing defeat, from which, to a certain extent, China has yet to completely recover. The reason for this is that when Chinese culture had developed in a comparatively modern way, the backwardness of its mode of production was the first thing to be exposed, and it was at this time that Europe was completely invested in the Industrial Revolution. China’s defeat was in terms of culture. The conflict between globalization and China from the outset was manifested as a kind of force that constituted a threat to China’s national security. Simultaneously, it was also in this sense that there existed a relationship between globalization and Chinese cultural security predicated on parallel causality. When Marx discussed this period of history, he lamented: That a giant empire, containing almost one-third of the human race, vegetating in the teeth of time, insulated by the forced exclusion of general intercourse, and thus contriving to dupe itself with delusions of celestial perfection—that such an empire should at last be overtaken by fate on [the] occasion of a deadly duel, in which the representative of the antiquated world appears prompted by ethical motives, while the representative of overwhelming modern society fights for the privilege of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest markets—this, indeed, is a sort of tragic couplet stranger than any poet would ever have dared to fancy.5

Internal Disorder and External Invasion of Culture as the Root Cause of Chinese Cultural Security Issues After losing the Opium War, China was forced to enter the modern world system, which gave rise to the Foreign Affairs movement and, with that, the process of China’s modernization. After nearly twenty years of effort, China’s national strength was greatly restored and developed, but since China paid heed only to economic development and neglected the institutional reforms and cultural innovation closely linked to economic development, it did not establish a legal system and cultural ideology to correspond with economic 5  Karl Marx, “Trade or Opium,” New York Daily Tribune, September 20, 1858.

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development, and thus the Foreign Affairs movement, for which it worked so hard for many years came to naught in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), in which China experienced yet again a crushing defeat. With the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China was under pressure to take a path toward reform, which ultimately came to fruition with the Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao’s Hundred Days’ Reform movement in 1898. Unfortunately, this reform sustained itself for only a hundred days, failing due to internal political infighting with the six martyrs of the reform movement executed in Beijing.6 China, yet again, entered a cultural and political dark age. The Hundred Days’ Reform movement reflects a cultural awakening in China’s development. The Treaty of Shimonoseki dismantled Chinese culture. It was the first time that an international treaty intentionally destroyed Chinese cultural institutions that had existed for millennia, leaving the door to an unprepared China wide open. The reckless invasion of foreign powers intensified conflicts between lower-class Chinese and the culture of Western society, particularly foreign missionaries who had come to proselytize in China, which ultimately ignited the massive anti-imperialist Boxer Movement. The rise of the Boxer Movement gave the state a popular cultural basis for resisting foreign powers; however, the Qing government was unable to shift this popular cultural basis into popular pressure for negotiations and, instead, co-opted the ignorant and irrational passion of the Boxers’ xenophobia, which led to a united foreign intervention that not only led to the defeat of the Boxers and loss in terms of national interests, but also created cultural prejudice on the international stage. This made the international crisis even worse. In the face of this massive national crisis, the Qing government had no choice but to respond to demands for “a new system of governance” by allowing a constitutional monarchy. Cultural passivity eventually led to an ineluctable history of defeat. Throughout China, many millennia of internal disorder and external invasions followed: internal disorder had normally had a much greater impact on Chinese cultural security than external invasions, but this internal disorder often invited external invasions. The emergence and formation of external disorder, to a large degree, are caused by a state’s internal backwardness and weakness. This so-called backwardness comes under attack. An advanced, strong, and healthy state must also be a relatively secure actor. In Chinese history, when external invasions have been the least common or least threatening, these periods have also been times when China was itself was the strongest and most advanced. If we look at this in terms of Chinese 6  The six martyrs of the Hundred Days’ Reform movement were six reformist who refused to flee after the coup led by Cixi and were executed. They included Tan Sitong, Lin Xu, Yang Rui, Yang Shenxiu, Liu Guangdi, Kang Guangren.

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historical development, a basic rule of national cultural security has been that the security of national culture is in inverse proportion to the cultural innovation of a state, particularly the competitiveness of its core, relative to that of an invading foreign culture. A nation’s cultural security follows the ups and downs in the competitiveness of a nation’s core culture; conversely, the insecurity of a nation’s culture caused by the invasion of foreign culture follows the ups and downs in the competitiveness of a nation’s cultural core. As these two aspects interact, when this interaction reaches a tipping point it produces an exponential change. At this time, the insecurity of a state increases. A crisis in national cultural security ensues and even leads to interstate conflicts, which is the ultimate mark of change. The Opium War was a typical example of this. And it was according to these rules that the later problems in Chinese cultural security over the proceeding century unfolded, and it was not until the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that there was a new transition in China’s historical development. In this new relationship among world cultures, many aspects and forces influenced Chinese cultural security, but the most fundamental and glaring has been the resonance between internal and external sources of risk in Chinese culture as well as the cultural crisis and cultural security issues that were produced by it. So-called internal risk to cultures refers to the communal creativity on which a state relies, particularly demands, movements, and hopes for general innovation by the state and its people or the lack thereof, which puts the path and destiny of a state on the shoulders of individuals or the loss of a nation and state’s most fundamental rationale for its existence. So-called external risk to cultures refers to insufficient capacity of the internal cultural sources to resist disease and a lack of a collective immunity disease, which leads to the malicious infringement of externally derived culture and a crisis of colonization upon the host country’s culture. Once these two risk concord, it increases a crisis in Chinese national cultural security and issues of cultural security arise. The Opium War offers a typical historical lesson. Hence, in order to avoid the risk of a resonance among internal and external cultural sources occurring, we must establish as our goal the creation of a national cultural innovation system that improves our collective capacity for innovation, which will improve the health of our national culture. Only in this way can we ensure the security of Chinese culture as we develop.

The Formation of Nationalism and the Concept of the Nation as the Cornerstone of Chinese Cultural Security National cultural security in a modern sense is built upon the integrity of the state and the nation and its ideological foundations. The maintenance of an

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integral national interest through cultural identity and national sovereignty over its culture is its most fundamental characteristic. The Opium War put the kinds of national and state issues of cultural security, such as “saving the race and saving the nation,” before the entire Chinese people. China’s humiliating defeat by Japan and the Eight-Nation Alliance7 [after the Boxer Rebellion] forced the Chinese to consider this question: How can we “save the race and save the nation,” maintain national security, and liberate the nation? “Revere the emperor and expel the barbarians” and “Protect China against barbarians” are both deep-seated cultural slogans of the Chinese people. The traditional theory of cultural nationalism closely links the fate of culture with the fate of the nation, which makes the survival of the culture the most basic and essential assurance of the nation’s survival. Jiang Qing, a Chinese scholar and philosopher, once wrote of the cultural implications of the distinction between Chinese and barbarians in The Spring and Autumn Annals, claiming: The distinction between Chinese and barbarians in The Spring and Autumn Annals contains characteristics of nationalist. . . . however, this kind of nationalism is different from the nationalism that emerged from modern Western nationalism. Modern Western nationalism is based on the nation-state and emphasizes the independence and liberation of the nation and the state to escape the political bonds of oppression from other states. Nationalism in The Spring and Autumn Annals is based on culture, emphasizing that the essentiality of Chinese culture and its irreplaceability. . . . In the nationalism of The Spring and Autumn Annals, culture is superior to the nation and the state.8 From the Chinese perspective, because of the impact of this cultural nationalism on the relationship between culture and the state, the weight of culture at times is greater than that of the state itself. Gu Yanwu’s theory of the relationship between “protecting the state” and “protecting the realm” explained this issue in the clearest terms:

7  The Eight Nation Alliance was an alliance between Japan, Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungry that invaded China during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.—Trans. 8  Jiang Qing, Gongyangxue yinlun [Introductory Treaties on Gongyang Scholarship] (Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995), 228–229.

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There is such a thing as the extinction of the state and the extinction of the realm. What is the difference between an extinct state and extinct realm? I say the extinction of a state is merely a change in the ruling family and a change of title. The extinction of the realm is when virtue and justice are cast aside, leading beast to devour men and men to devour each other. How is it that the idle talk of the people of the Wei and Jin did not lead to the extinction of the realm? This is what Mencius meant when he referred to the teachings of Yang Zhu and Mozi as leading to a realm where there were no fathers and no sovereigns, which is nothing more than going to live with the wild beasts. . . . This is why one first protects the realm and then protects the state.9 For many feudal gentry, the destruction of the state was horrible, but in the end it meant merely a change in the ruling family; the destruction of the Chinese cultural realm (i.e., cultural nationalism), however, was what was truly terrifying. Although this theory is a bit simplistic, it highlights the importance of cultural security to national security, which has been an important characteristic of the traditional Chinese cultural spirit. After the Opium War, particularly after the Sino-Japanese War, this traditional concept of cultural nationalism in China profoundly changed toward something modern. It was a reflection and attention to the state and the fate of the Chinese nation. The consciousness and concept of the nation in a modern sense, along with issues of “saving the nation and the people,” suddenly became a central discussion among people of all social classes. Yan Fu’s translation of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species used Darwin’s theory of evolution and “survival of the fittest,” which not only gave Chinese a new theoretical reference for recognizing their national crisis but also “indirectly promoted a collective concept of individuals that had come together as a society in a nation in order to survive,” which “placed the power of the state over the concept of nationalism.”10 The history of the destruction of the states of Poland and Turkey, which was recounted to many Chinese at the time, led many Chinese people to see Taiwan as a harbinger of China’s being sliced up like a pie and as a threat of imminent destruction before their eyes. As was stated in a June 1903 issue of Jiangsu magazine: “the threat of the destruction of the nation is in the 9  Gu Yanwu, “Zheng shi,” [Pure Beginnings] in Ri zhilu, vol. 13. 10  Guo Zhengzhao, “Daerwenzhuyi yu Zhongguo,” [Darwinism and China] in Gangtai ji haiwai xuezhe lun jindai Zhongguo wenhua [Hong Kongese, Taiwanese, and Foreign Scholars on Modern Chinese Culture] ed. Jiang Yihua et al. (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1987), 129.

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hearts and minds of over 400 million people,”11 and thus, “we must think about the real threat of China’s destruction from an entirely new perspective and a new national political identity to replace the outdated political identity of feudal despotic ‘unity.’” They sought a way to save China, which became a common consensus. As Benjamin Schwartz argued: “Where the commitment to the preservation and advancement of the societal entity known as the nation takes priority over commitment to all other values and beliefs . . . nationalism in a precise sense is already on the scene.”12 This allowed the relationship between national security and cultural security to surpass the limits of cultural nationalism, leading it to form a relationship in the modern nation-state that linked the logic of the sanctity of national sovereignty and the security of an independent sovereignty over culture. This was the emergence of the modern concept of the Chinese state and the beginnings of patriotism. In that issue of Jiangsu, Jing Lu’s “Theory of Regime Evolution” demanded the establishment of a political culture based on a “flawless national republic.” The introduction to the 1905 issue of Twentieth-Century China clearly stated: “we use this massive and special magazine for the ideas of our people: Patriotism!”13 This marks the centrality of the nation-state in a modern sense in the national consciousness and the rise of a patriotic China. “Patriotism is a profound sentiment formed from the separate interests of each patrimony over the course of millennia.”14 It is a mighty cornerstone of the nation and the state. Only when all considerations of national security and cultural security are based on the foundations of the patriotic implications of a nation-state can it broadly produce a social and national identity, bringing together the massive power of the nation. Because imperialist forces, while attempting to divide China, also invaded China with its culture—Japan forced the province of Taiwan to adopt the Japanese language and Russia occupied the northeast, forcing people to speak Russian—people became even more aware that the “abstract division of China” was more threatening than “the physical division of China”: “Those who invade me, although they 11  Shu Lou, “Jiaoyuhui wei mintuan zhi jichu,” [The Education Association Is the Foundation of National Unity] in Jiangsu, no. 3, as cited in Yang Sixing, Wenhua minzuzhuyi yu jindai Zhongguo [Cultural Nationalism and Modern China] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003), 99. 12  Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 19. 13  As cited in Yang, Wenhua minzuzhuyi yu jindai Zhongguo, 102, 101. 14  Zhongyang bianyiju liening sidalin zhuzuo bianyishi, “Dui Liening guanyu ‘aiguozhuyi’ de yi chu lunshu yi wen de dingzheng,” [A Revision of Lenin’s Textual Discussion on “Patriotism”] Guangming ribao, October 13, 1985.

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may kill my body, my spirit is still intact, and thus I never die. If my spirit dies, although my body might live, what use is to me?” It is in this sense that people completely recognized the significance of national security to cultural security, as expressed in the saying “learn [our culture] to survive that the nation may live; should we fail to learn [about our culture], then the nation will falter.” If the culture perishes, the nation will eventually experience “the extinction of the race and the loss of our soul.”15 This set off a national movement to save Chinese culture for the modern nation-state.

The May Fourth Movement and the Theme of Cultural Security in Twentieth-Century China



The Significance of the May Fourth Movement for Modern Chinese Cultural Security The Opium War revealed the mission of modern Chinese cultural security. If the Opium War was a serious national cultural security crisis that took China from a self-imposed seclusion and rejection of entry into the course of global historical development, then at the end of World War I, we see China, as one of the victorious allies, unable to enjoy the fruits of its victory, and the Beiyang government’s16 willingness to sign the Treaty of Versailles, which would have ceded sovereignty over the Shandong peninsula. The harm this caused to nationalist sentiments, for many Chinese who had already experienced multiple instances of national humiliation, particularly those who had opened their eyes to the progress in the world, led many to realize for the first time the significance of national sovereignty and security for the question of nation’s existence or extinction. The May Fourth movement (1919), in this sense, became the first complete national movement to save the nation and resist imperialism and feudalism. Saving the nation from peril as well as the bodies of citizens, for Lu Xun, were not as important as saving the soul of its citizens. In discussions of national questions, the focus was on an internal search for the reasons for 15  Deng Shi, “Ji ming fengyu liu duli shu: renzhong duli diyi,” [The Independence Book from the Crowing Cock and the Man of the Storm Manor: Human Independence First] as cited in Yang, Wenhua minzuzhuyi yu jindai Zhongguo, 104. 16  The Beiyang Government refers to the Beijing government during the politically divided warlord period (1916–1927) in Chinese history. During this period, the government in Beijing, dominated by various Beiyang Army affiliated warlords, was recognized by the international community, even though they had little control over China beyond the surrounding environs of Beijing.—Trans.

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China’s backwardness that caused cultural insecurity. This was the first time in a modern sense that Chinese cultural security was an issue discussed by Chinese intellectuals with respect to national security. Culture has an irreplaceable role in the survival and development of the state and the nation; thus in order to revolutionize the people one must first revolutionize culture, as Liang Qichao stated: “If one wishes to renew the people of the nation, one must first renew the novels of the nation.”17 This has become an essential part of the collective unconsciousness of Chinese elites in modern times. The May Fourth movement transformed from a patriotic movement into a new culture movement. It also became the first time in the history of Chinese development that Chinese formed a movement for the salvation of national cultural security. Resisting imperialism and feudalism for the first time became the theme of Chinese cultural security. Since Confucian culture already proved itself incapable of adapting to development at the time—in other words, in the face of the global expansion of Western culture, Confucianism was unable to maintain national cultural security by uniting the national spirit—the search and creation of a new culture naturally became the historic mission of the May Fourth New Culture movement. This was a new uniting cultural ethos that could maintain the needs of national cultural security. This was the core competitiveness of national culture. This core competitiveness of culture constituted a deterministic role for cultural immunity in cultural security. The strength of this immunity to resist the intrusion of disease was determined entirely by the strength of the immunity of the organism itself and the health and metabolism of the community. China had such a serious cultural security crisis since the end of the Qing dynasty, which ultimately led to a complete national security crisis, mainly because of the Industrial Revolution that began in Europe and the arrival of a capitalist class on the historical stage. As capitalism opened global markets and used new cultural and ideological constructs to rebuild the world order and human civilization, China had fallen behind. Rigid cultural conservatism lacked vitality and core competitiveness, which led China to lose the initiative and strategic opportunity. Although in terms of the gross national product, China still ranked among the top in the world, since China’s superior cultural traditions, which had innovated and accumulated over many millennia, had failed to keep up with the 17  Liang Qichao, “Lun xiaoshuo yu qunzhi zhi guanxi,” [On the Relationship between Novels and Controlling the Masses] in Zhongguo jindai wenlun xuan [A Selection of Modern Chinese Theses] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981), 157.

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modern transition, China was unable to convert economic power into support for its culture. This powerful empire only had a soulless body left. As Mao Zedong stated in “On New Democracy,” it was a revolution that lacked a progressive society. Hence, capitalism developed into the imperialist age. As China faced the onslaught of imperialist culture, the failure of Chinese culture became a historical inevitability. China reentered the world system through humiliation and not because it was willing, as in every other instance in Chinese history when there was social progress. And because of this kind of reentry, China’s role in the global system experienced a dramatic and unprecedented shift: China fell from its core position to become a semiperiphery—from a strong empire to a weak state. As Europe rose, it took China’s place as a core nation. This shift in roles marked a historic shift in China’s cultural security. Questions of cultural security became the main question for Chinese national security in the mid-nineteenth century. China’s claim in the twenty-first century of the glorious revival of the Chinese nation is in fact a reassertion of China’s core status in the world system, entirely transforming the pattern of national security in security trends and the many security issues faced by China. In this goal, realizing national cultural security—in other words, reconstructing the core competitiveness and national spirit of Chinese culture—will have major implications for national security. If there is no cultural security, any other field of security will lack the foundations of innovation and unity of the people. The dissolution of the Soviet Union had nothing to do with military weakness, nor did fall to foreign invasion; rather, it happened because its culture lost the ability to unify, lacking the cultural competitiveness that a mighty nation should have. A state that lacks core cultural competitiveness and relies only on military strength can never guarantee perfect national security and can never have national security in a true sense. The transformation of the May Fourth movement from a patriotic movement to a new cultural movement reconstructed the guaranteeing mechanisms of national security in that it had a profound significance in reconstructing the entire innovation of national culture necessary for national security. The birth of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as a result of the May Fourth movement, fulfilled the cultural duty and historic mission of the May Fourth movement bestowed upon it by history: that culture must bear the responsibility for the enlightened salvation of the security of the nation and the state. Therefore, while “eliminating Confucianism” and “reevaluating the value of everything in the May Fourth movement,” the May Fourth movement also broke from its natural link to traditional Chinese culture. In its search for cultural assurances of Chinese cultural security, the May Fourth movement also led to the loss of China’s natural barrier for cultural security. Because of this

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severing of natural links to traditional culture, especially since maintaining universal ethics negated the core ideological values of Confucianism, a deficiency in intrinsic cultural resources arose in our search for cultural innovation to support the rationality and legality of our endeavors. And as Western culture evolved and did not experience the same kinds of reinvention of the wheel as China, the West was ultimately able to maintain the cultural spirit laid down by Greco-Roman civilization. In a certain sense, the May Fourth movement, unlike the European Renaissance, did not lead to the “the phoenix rising from the ashes” for Chinese culture. It was difficult to build a system of cultural identity that met the demands of modern Chinese development from the marrow of traditional Chinese culture. This may have become an issue left to be resolved by Chinese cultural security and development.

Enlightenment and Salvation: The Construction of a Duality of Themes in National Cultural Security Thus, Chinese intellectuals differed greatly as to what kind of culture should be constructed to bear the historic mission of cultural salvation to save the nation from crisis and save the soul of its citizens. In the cultural reflections of the May Fourth movement, there was a debate over whether “salvation will suppress enlightenment” or “salvation and enlightenment go hand in hand,” reflecting the disagreements on this issue. In fact, these were two oppositional movements that shared a cause-and-effect relationship. There were no considerations of state and national extinction after the Opium War. The modern awakening of the Chinese nation may have occurred even later. Demands for national salvation were delayed until the enlightenment of the public. Thus, we cannot discuss independently debates over “salvation suppressing enlightenment” or “salvation and enlightenment going together” when discussing the development of China after the Opium War. These two themes in modern China progressed together, but we must observe that, with development and shifts in China’s security crisis, salvation and enlightenment evolved together. This was an inevitable choice in Chinese history and was not a transition created by any particular individual. Since the historic inertia of a security movement was determined by the mechanisms and patterns formed by national security, in that until a security threat to a nation is made entirely manifest in security issues, these kinds of security will never end until a conflict erupts. The open invasion of China by Japan and the eruption of World War II in China highlights this pattern. The open invasion of China by Japan allowed the May Fourth cultural enlightenment movement to quickly shift to the salvation of the nation. The dedication of everything to fighting Japan naturally became a strategic demand of Chinese culture. The general formation of a united

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cultural front allowed the modern construction of Chinese culture yet again to be closely linked to the survival or extinction of the state and the nation. Never being the slaves from a defeated nation was not only a mark of Chinese survival but also a mark of the cultural survival of the nation. Demands for national and cultural security unprecedentedly swept the nation under one unified banner. Moreover, it ultimately achieved complete victory for the first time since the Opium War against an aggressor depending entirely upon their own strength. It was in this process of competition between all kinds of cultural forces that new national, popular, and scientific cultural forces represented by the CCP achieved historic recognition, and finally led in the end to the construction of a new Chinese culture. The progressiveness of a culture lies in its ability to a larger degree to achieve security for the survival of the state and the nation. The May Fourth movement was foremost a movement of salvation that turned a national crisis into the inspiration for the complete spiritual liberation of the people. If there is no ideological liberation, then there is no awakening and correct selection of the properties and path to realize national salvation, and thus the enlightenment has a deterministic significance. And it is on this point that the May Fourth movement is entirely distinct from the Hundred Days’ Reform movement and the Republican Revolution, a historically and organically united salvation with enlightenment. In other words, the two shared a reciprocal relationship. Resisting imperialists was about salvation. Resisting feudalism was about enlightenment. At the most desperate hour for the national crisis, salvation had to be enlightenment. If there were no enlightenment, then it would be impossible to complete the historic mission of national salvation. Putting salvation and enlightenment in opposition and limiting the spirit of the May Fourth movement to enlightenment gives people a myopic view of the environment of salvation and enlightenment in China.18 Salvation was an expression of the majority reached by enlightenment. Similarly, in resisting imperialism, the greatest differences between the 18  Li Zehou argues that the task of enlightenment set forth by the May Fourth movement never came to fruition. The task to save the nation from destruction changed the balance between demands for enlightenment and salvation, and the prerogatives of politics suppressed the theme of enlightenment, so in the end the work of the May Fourth movement toward enlightenment was never accomplished (Li Zehou, Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shi lun qimeng yu jiuwang de shuangzhong bianzou [Modern Chinese Intellectual History on the Dual Themes of Enlightenment and Salvation] [Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1987]). Yang Chunshi argued that the dislocation of the social and cultural revolution in historical progress led to the down fall of the “May Fourth” spirit and the breaking of the “May Fourth” tradition (Yang Chunshi, “Wusi jingshen de mingyun,” [The Fate of the May Fourth Spirit] Xuexi yu tansuo, no. 3 [1989]).

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failure of the Boxer movement and World War II in China is the difference between the traditional and modern values embodied by the cultural enlightenment. Hence, extricating oneself from the history of the massive national security crisis faced by China at the time leads us to lose an important perspective in international relations when discussing the “spirit of the May Fourth movement.” In this sense, the national crisis was greater than the modern ideological awakening. The importance of cultural security in national security as a whole received more focused recognition.

Motifs in Twentieth-Century Chinese Cultural Security: Resistance to Imperialism and Feudalism

Imperialism and feudalism were two major thematic mechanisms of Chinese cultural security for half the twentieth century. The former developed from armed invasions of China to the complete colonization of China; the latter developed into a system that hindered Chinese society from becoming modern. Since China did not experience a modern capitalist revolution as Europe did, the first wave of globalization completely reduced China into a semifeudal and semicolonial state. This led the Chinese revolution to face the themes of resisting imperialism and feudalism simultaneously. This was the case politically as well as culturally, because as imperialism was invading China, its culture was also invading China. As the British minister of war openly admitted in 1897: “Military and cultural strength are mutually beneficial . . . regardless of the place, wherever our flag flies, we must civilize, standardize, and show the people the right way. This is the root of our culture. . . . To summarize: We expand our frontiers through war gaining new territory, which allows us to extend our religion and laws, and the strength of our culture supports and gathers the people.”19 Thus, resisting imperialism and feudalism was formed by the “dual security crisis” of the national security crisis and cultural security crisis in the modern era. The “dual security crisis” completely encompasses the national security crisis of the time in China; moreover, only by resolving the fundamental problem of this “dual security crisis” can the Chinese nation truly achieve national liberation and independence in a modern sense, and the solution to all security issues can only be achieved by fundamentally resolving these two

19  “Lun junshi yu wenhua you xiangwei zhi yi,” [On the Mutual Relationship between the Military and Culture] Shiwubao, no. 28, as cited in Yang, Wenhua minzuzhuyi yu jindai Zhongguo, 74.

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essential issues of security. This determined the comportment and mission of the Chinese revolution and Chinese social development for half the twentieth century and even, to some degree, the entire motif of Chinese cultural security throughout the twentieth century. Even today, if intrinsic cultural security is to be maintained, the resistance to feudalism, cultural imperialism, and cultural hegemony is a matter that must be taken seriously, because feudalism is still a major issue in cultural security that is hard to overlook.

Postwar International Cultural Relations and the Formation of Chinese Cultural Security

The problems of Chinese cultural security have formed in the process of history. When looking at Chinese cultural security, we cannot escape the historical processes of Chinese development, nor can we escape world history, particularly post-World War II world history. Because, for China, issues of cultural security were produced, to a large degree, under the influence of the dynamics of world history; in other words, it was a product of world history. Therefore, we must have a clear understanding of the relationship between postwar international cultural relations and Chinese cultural security, which will allow us a more realistic understanding of the historical drivers behind Chinese national cultural security issues today.

The Significance of Changes in the Postwar Global System for Chinese Cultural Security

The cold war was a struggle between ideological discourses. The post-cold war period was a struggle over culture and ideology fought with soft power. The changes in the postwar global system not only fundamentally changed the relative power between East and West but also greatly expanded the role of socialism in the world as both a social institution and an ideological and cultural institution. This undoubtedly changed the historical motivation for the direction and nation building of Chinese social development. China, as a victorious nation, was able to enjoy many of the rights of the victor as it should, but the Yalta conference established, to some degree, a system that split the world between the United States and the Soviet Union, which sacrificed China’s interests. The structure of modern Chinese cultural security issues are a reflection and continuation today of historic cultural security. At a deeper level, the formation of Chinese cultural security issues has a direct causal relationship with this second change in the world system. In other words, as the world

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s­ ystem was changing, the result was that many of the major nations sacrificed the sovereignty of the Chinese nation. Thus, although China emerged victorious in World War II, due to internal problems in China’s national development, the failure of the CCP and the Nationalist Party to negotiate a peaceful future for China led to a total civil war, which led the postwar Chinese government to fail to participate in issues of cultural security. The two possibilities and destinies for China’s future determined two very different values in Chinese cultural security. Although this was quickly resolved through the victory of the Communist Party in the civil war, because of the two institutions and political blocs that emerged in this shift in the postwar world system, the emergence of Chinese cultural security, due to the future choices and possibilities of these two choices, in an ultimate sense, determined China’s choice for its cultural security between these two options. Either of these choices presented a cultural security issue for the other.

Chinese Cultural Security Policy Choices and Positions in Postwar International Cultural Relations

In the beginning, since China was still in the midst of a fierce civil war (although the two sides in the civil war had completely different values and security priorities for Chinese cultural development), these profound changes in postwar international cultural relations did not yet have a clear impact in a strict sense on the choices and position of Chinese cultural security. In terms of the motives behind these changes in postwar international cultural relations for the formation of Chinese cultural security issues, demands over choices in Chinese cultural security did not emerge until after the complete victory of the CCP and the establishment of an independent and sovereign PRC. The change in political regime inevitably led to a change in the ideology of the national government. A result of this change was a shift in the values involved in the management of national cultural security. For a China in which the historic memories of foreign invasion remained fresh, maintaining national independence and security naturally became a high priority for the new Chinese state. Establishing a cultural ideology that conformed to the new political authority naturally became an unavoidable policy choice after the establishment of the new Chinese government. The new political regime needed culture to encourage the people to attack the enemy. First, they united the ideology and works of writers and artist to build a new China. The state and the nation needed high morale and spirits. At the forum held in Yan’an, the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles confirmed Mao Zedong’s proposals for artistic direction and policies. Here it

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is important to say that, before the formulation of a united national cultural security policy just as the state was being founded, this had a major impact on maintaining the unity of Chinese intellectual and cultural circles, striking at the power of imperialism in China, and minimizing imperialism’s influence in intellectual and cultural matters. This had an unparalleled role in supporting national liberation. The choice of socialist national institutions and Marxist beliefs naturally allowed the CCP, upon taking political power, to become an important part of the Soviet-led bloc of socialist states. Although China and the Soviet Union had many cultural differences, at the early stages of the Communist Party’s rule, national security and the livelihood of its citizens were the main priorities. This was particularly the case because the economic sanctions and political pressure imposed upon China by the Western imperialist nations led by the United States forced China to rely upon the socialist bloc for its own survival and development, giving it an important decision and cultural position. The strategic policy decisions and positions of “leaning toward the Soviet bloc” were a historic result of this. Although, in this sense, China paid a certain price for its decision, did in the long run it gained institutional support for Chinese national security and essential national interests. This played an essential role in the establishment of the state, including the role of socialist institutions and security in culture and policies. The choice of national development path and theoretical model was made objectively, not based on the subjective assumptions of any particular individual. In the early years of the PRC, Mao Zedong made the decisions he did for two reasons that had nothing to do with his assumptions: the first was issues in international politics related to the cold war, and the second was a simultaneous internal struggle over domestic reconstruction and solidifying political power. Mao was unable to escape the problems of his time. Some people might question why Mao did not choose a capitalist system but, rather, chose a centralized socialist system. His decision to take a socialist path was a choice to take a democratic path. This has already been clearly explained in his historic discussion with Huang Yanpei. China’s survival on the international stage, including the economic sanctions and ideological opposition from imperialism, the status of China’s economy, and the fact that the imperialist bloc would not accept the Chinese government forced China to focus its energies in an attempt to build socialism. There is no path built by social institutions that can escape their historical circumstances. It is not just the nation’s history that foreshadows the future of its people. Different countries under similar circumstances and structures will make entirely different strategic decisions.

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Based on the historical humiliation and cultural injury perpetrated on the Chinese people by imperialist invasion and based on the aggressive assault of the alluring luxuries of capitalism that threatened the ruling party of China, the criticism of everything from the early PRC film The Life of Wu Xun20 to the idealism of research on The Dream of the Red Chamber,21 as well as criticism of the “Counterrevolutionary Hu Feng Clique”22 all centered on the interests of national security and the implementation of national security measures. This kind of caution not only did not solidify and develop along the lines of socialist institutions but, on the contrary, because of growing disagreements in the international communist movement, the maintenance of national sovereignty and dignity was deferred to another era, it led to an expansion of class conflict on ideological and cultural matters. Because of these two conflicts, China had to fight a war over cultural security on both the domestic and international fronts, which ultimately led to outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. The attempt to achieve absolute cultural security resulted in absolute cultural insecurity; however, there was no fundamental change in the structure of Chinese cultural security due to the domestic and international struggles after the war. All that changed was the content (in terms of cleaning things up and making a new place, including in an ideological and cultural sense). This uniquely affected the long-term strategic direction of Chinese cultural security.

Shifts in the Cultural Strategies of Major Powers and the Strategic Position of Chinese Cultural Security

The shift in strategic trends and relations in international culture in the twentieth century centered primarily on the shifts in the strategic cultural relations 20  The Life of Wu Xun was a film directed by Sun Yi in 1950 based on the life of Wu Xun, a late Qing beggar that raised donations to build a free school for orphans. The film came under intense criticism a year later by Mao Zedong for portraying revolution as unnecessary because social issues could be addresses through philanthropy and individual magnanimity. 21  The Dream of the Red Chamber is a Qing dynasty literary masterpiece by Cao Xueqin set around the rise and fall of the fictional elite Jia family, generally believed to mirror the fortunes of Cao’s own family. The novel became a central part of Chinese literary and historical research in twentieth century, which came under intense scrutiny in the Cultural Revolution for romanticizing the life of Chinese elites. 22  Hu Feng (1902–1985) was an author and literary theorist who openly criticized the Communist Party’s censorship as overly politicizing literature and art in 1954. In 1955, he was attested as a counter-revolutionary, which launched a witch hunt against literary critics.

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among the major powers. Alliances and confrontations between the major powers were the major driving force behind changes in the strategic trends in international culture and cultural relations. The global spoils and trends in global culture that formed after World War I worked much like this. Shifts in international cultural relations and their strategic implications that formed after World War II were also much the same. In every shift in international cultural relations and their strategic trends since the Opium War, China remained in a strategically passive position for a long time. In the face of these sudden shifts in the world, an overall backward China lacked the capacity to independently respond to these major unprecedented challenges to cultural preparedness. Regardless of whether the debates were over “wholesale Westernization” or “borrowing-ism” or “essence versus utility,” they all reflect a strategic deficiency of the national collective in the academic realm and a shift in the values of cultural agency in national institutions. And again and again the uncertainty of issues of national cultural sovereignty and independence and cultural security strategies led to ambiguity for many years. Although many fundamental changes in cultural security took place after the establishment of the PRC, the struggle for hegemony between the United States and the Soviet Union and the disastrous cold war that resulted played a massive role in shaping the strategic position of Chinese cultural security. The strategies of “leaning to one side” at the beginning of the PRC to working with the United States to oppose the Soviet Union in the 1970s, on top of the domestic decisions to fight against “imperialism” and “revisionism,” indicate the general position of Chinese cultural security strategy and the importance of passively resisting enemies all around through cultural security. This trend or strategy continued to develop until there was a major shift in strategy in the 1980s. In the 1970s, the nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union intensified as conflicts between China and the Soviet Union intensified. At the same time, all the security risks created by the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (1966–76) in China were exposed. As national security was encountering a crisis even worse than the one during the Korean War, China was also faced with the massive challenges of the Cultural Revolution. How to greatly reduce these threats to national security to resolve these security challenges became a problem thrust in China’s face that demanded immediate resolution. In its analysis of the cold war politics of the time and strategic international cultural relations and China’s own security interests, China actively chose to expand positive cultural diplomacy with the United States. The image of Mao Zedong’s historic interview with Edgar Snow at Tian’anmen was a major cultural event, and the invitation of the Chinese ping-pong team to the U.S. pingpong team to play in China opened the door to diplomacy between China and

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United States. Ping-pong diplomacy led to global diplomacy. Popular culture effectively broke the ice, melting the long-standing stalemate between the United States and China in strategic national security relations. By establishing mechanisms of dialogue with the United States and using the U.S. need to play the China card in international diplomacy in its fight for hegemony over the Soviet Union, China was able to use cultural diplomacy to effectively relieve the massive security pressure imposed on China by the Soviet Union. Overall, China’s ancient cultural strategy played an irreplaceable role in modern national security. The strategic intelligence that this showed would ultimately lead China to seek international cultural relations that surpassed social institutions and ideology to establish a national cultural security strategy based on a new core national security perspective.

The Essence of National Security in the Sino-Soviet Ideological Split

In the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split was not only the most important political and cultural event of the cold war, but also one of the most important global political and cultural events of the twentieth century. It was also a very special event in the history of cold war. In terms of the general historic logic, both China and the Soviet Union were socialist countries and idolized communism. So why were there ideological disagreements between China and the Soviet Union? Was there such a massive ideological split, which directly led to a break in relations between these major powers, creating a major shift in international trends in the twentieth century? This question has a host of possible answers. The Sino-Soviet split took place in a profoundly shifting global environment. The end of World War II and the birth of the PRC not only transformed the relative balance of power in the world but also radically changed the cultural structure of the Eastern bloc. After testing the waters of the cold war and several hot wars (like the Korean War), East and West were stuck in an evenly matched stalemate. In the “stability” created by this relative balance of power, several new issues emerged. First, the American ambitions to become a world hegemon and the Soviet Union’s attempt to fight for hegemonic control of the world, which led to many conflicts, forced many to reconsider the issue of war and their time. Second, internal issues in the socialist countries as well as ­tensions among socialist countries were exposed, which led many people to reflect and worry about the issue of building socialism itself. The death of Joseph Stalin, particularly the criticism of his legacy at the twentieth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, highlighted many lingering

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problems. This criticism of Stalin’s legacy and how to address the major ­mistakes that emerged in the Stalin era involved a whole series of substantive questions: What is socialism? How should it be built? Does every socialist state have the right to explore its own answer to this question? At the same time, as socialism expanded from one country to many, problems among socialist countries became more pronounced. Conflicts within the socialist camp, particularly conflicts between independent socialist countries and the Soviet Union as the leader of the socialist world, continued to arise, and became even more serious over time (e.g., the Hungarian Revolution). These were new and unprecedented problems. The new trends incited by this series of major questions were sharply put before every Communist Party in the world and demanded a response. Because each of their responses dealt with fundamental questions of national sovereignty and national interests, when these previously mentioned questions could not be resolved through normal channels, a series of ideological disagreements emerged, which devolved into major ideological clashes between the states. They involved core questions concerning an understanding and interpretation of Marxist and socialist theory. The question of whether one could gain interpretative autonomy over Marxist and socialist theory was not just a normal academic and theoretical argument but an argument over the legitimacy and rationale of the ruling party’s governance and course of development, and issues of legitimacy and rationale directly threaten the basis of the ruling party’s control. Hence, in this sense, ideological conflicts were essential to national security. Because maintaining the basic strategic national interests must be expressed primarily in an ideological way, this made ideological conflicts essentially a conflict over maintaining national cultural sovereignty and cultural security. Just as on the eve of the birth of the PRC, when the CCP established its policy of “leaning to one side,” the Sino-Soviet alliance was not simply because they shared a common ideological belief, but mainly because they shared many common strategic interests in national security, diplomacy, and economics. Similarly here, ideology was not the main reason for the Sino-Soviet split. Only when the conflict between the national interests of these two countries began to intensify did the ideological struggle gain prominence, which made the Sino-Soviet split into an ideological battle. In this respect, Deng Xiaoping expressed it very clearly: the Sino-Soviet split was “not an issue of arguments over ideology. In this respect, at the time we never thought that everything we believed was right. The real issue came down to inequality. Chinese people felt humiliated.”23 The “inequality” and 23  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, [A Selection of Writings by Deng Xiaoping] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 3:294–295.

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“­humiliation” ­mentioned here by Deng referred to the tsarist and hegemonic influence exerted by [Russia and then] the Soviet Union. The issues comprised a host of national interests that concerned national pride and independence. Because of these basic conflicts over national interests, the tsarist policies of [Russia and then] the Soviet Union and the confrontation over China’s independent approach led both sides to diverge over their international political policies. This was the most crucial part of the problem and the main reason for the conflict between China and the Soviet Union over ideology. This is also why the ideological conflict between China and the Soviet Union ultimately led to armed conflict on their borders. “History shows that this played a major role in Chinese national security.”24 The Sino-Soviet split and issues of national sovereignty were tied tightly together. This gave the ideological battles major significance for national cultural security. Because the ideological battles between China and the Soviet Union concerned issues of the fundamental path and model of development in the international communist movement, and the interpretation and understanding of these issues were all directly related to the ideological understanding and interpretation of basic principles of Marxism, the rationality of these understandings and interpretations directly affected the legitimacy of socialist countries’ autonomous choice of their own path and model of development. It was this legitimacy that determined institutional choices and the basis of their existence. If either side lost this legitimacy, then it would lose the basis of its existence. Thus, the Sino-Soviet split was not just a general disagreement over the interpretation and understanding of Marxism. Because it was linked to the legitimacy of each state’s development model, which involved the independence of socialist states to choose their development path, and this independence also reflected the degree of national independence, this shocking global ideological battle became a rare historical instance in which cultural security is an issue of national sovereignty. This was particularly the case for China, as a new republic. The complete independence and freedom achieved by China was not just political and economic; it was also ideological and cultural. For China, the Sino-Soviet split had implications about safeguarding Chinese cultural sovereignty. China had to maintain its interpretative authority over Marxism. Maintaining the connection between their own revolution and Marxism was crucial to the success of the Chinese revolution. In this respect, the CCP already had lessons from which to draw; thus, whether China could independently interpret world culture and Marxism was an issue of whether China could achieve independent authority over its own culture. 24  Mao Zedong zhuan: 1949–1976, [Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976)] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2003), 2:1308.

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For the Communist Party, this was a sign of the independence of national ­cultural sovereignty and cultural security.

Post-Cold War International Cultural Conflicts and the Reconstruction of the Chinese Cultural Security System

International cultural conflicts are expressed in international political and economic conflicts. Although these conflicts, generally speaking, are determined primarily by conflicting global movements, since the global affairs of major powers play a disproportionate influence on the world system—that is, the existence of major powers is the result of the overall strength of the state—after a state achieves great power status, it will inevitably affect a shift in power in the international system. Conflicting movements in international politics and economics are much the same, and so are conflicting movements in international culture. Thus, the relative strength of the cultural structure between the major powers in the world changes, which marks a new shift in the international cultural security system. The end of the cold war was a period of struggle between a “multipolar” world and a “unipolar” world. The international order transitioned from the bipolar era of the cold war to a new, supposedly more stable structure of relative global strength of “one superpower and many potential superpowers.” This was not, however, an extremely stable structure. The United States sought to create a unipolar world while many other major powers proposed a multi­ polar world order. This led to many sharp conflicts over the shape of the future world order. Although ideological conflicts over international culture between the left and the right were no longer the main source of conflict, the experience of the cold war allowed culture to become a major force in the strategic global interests for the United States in the post-cold war period. On September 10, 1992, U.S. President George H. Bush wrote in his “Agenda for American Renewal,” “Our political and economic connections are supplemented by the attractiveness of American culture in the world. This is a new kind of soft power we can use.”25 Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of the New Republic, described the relationship between American culture and foreign policy more succinctly: “I find this original wording online: America’s culture has, in fact, been its foreign policy. Even if the U.S. has not always acted on its lofty rhetoric, America has always defined its culture on the basis of individual rights 25  Xinhua News Agency, Washington Bureau, September 10, 1992.

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and democracy that exerted a universal appeal—on the belief that American democracy should serve as a model for the world.”26 Hence every shift in the global strategy of the United States could be seen as the cultural embodiment of shifts in its global cultural strategic interests. At the end of the cold war, the U.S. national strategy had three main pillars: first, to maintain its position as an economic superpower; second, to spread American democracy around the world and impose American ideology; third, to develop a national ballistic missile defense system out of considerations for national security. Culture was one of the three main pillars. After September 11, fighting terrorism became the primary national security concern of the United States. This strategy was not only military; it was also cultural. On June 1, 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush outlined the “Bush Doctrine” in a speech at West Point. In his speech, President Bush proposed, “And our security will require all Americans . . . to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”27 The emergence of this doctrine of “preemptive action” was at the core of American unilateralism. The core of unilateral strategy was focused on maintaining a unipolar world led by American interests and values; and therefore, the v­alues of national sovereignty and the standards of international relations and its implications for the values inherent in the standards of international relations needed to be reconsidered; otherwise, one risked being seen by the United States as operating with an outdated mode of strategic thinking. Due to the unrivaled position of American power in the world, this attitude toward the world led to an international cultural conflict in the post-cold war period in which the United States shifted from the cultural “engagement strategy” of the [President Bill] Clinton years to the “unilateralism” in the “containment strategy” of the Bush years, in that it was a shift from “multipolar” politics and “diverse” culture to “unilateral” politics and “hegemonic” culture. These new cultural conflicts and the interweaving of cultural interests in many states led to a new characteristic in the conflicting movements of international culture since the cold war, and the national strategy of the United States was a major factor in this shift in international cultural conflicts in the post-cold war period. The Iraq War initiated by the United States and its ally, the United Kingdom, intensified the historic direction of this new international cultural conflict. Although this was a regional war, the diplomatic battle over war and 26  As cited in Wang Shaode, Meiguo wenhua yu waijiao [American Culture and Diplomacy] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2000), 13. 27  As cited in Hu Angang and Men Honghua, eds., Jiedu Meiguo da zhanlüe [Interpreting American Strategy] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2003), 14.

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peace was a global one, in which it seems that every major power took part in this diplomatic battle. In a certain sense, this was a confrontation among different political powers within the post-cold war global system. Although this confrontation was a diplomatic one, this was in fact a major confrontation over the distribution of world power in the post-cold war era. This confrontation in the early days after September 11 not only allowed the United States to build a radically different strategic relationship with Russia but it also led to a differentiation between “old Europe” and “new Europe,” which represented a shift in the strategic relationship between the United States, France, and Germany. If the former continued the U.S. containment of Russia, then the latter strengthened the struggle for a leadership position between France, Germany, and the United States in global affairs. The Iraq War was ultimately unavoidable as a result of the massive disparities of power. This was the direct role of relative power in national policy. Regardless of how international relations have changed, people see power as the “final word” in international relations. Hence, the use of unilateral policies by the U.S. government was not accidental; the hegemonic power of the United States, surpasses that of all other major powers, reflects a hegemonic attitude in its concept of the world. This reflection is cultural. As the United States changes the basic structure of the relative strength of the major powers, it also changes the cultural relations between the major powers. This made the Iraq War not only a clash of civilizations—between Christian civilization and Muslim civilization—but also an international post-cold war cultural clash. There are still conflicts between East and West, and North and South, but conflicts within the West have also bubbled to the surface. The European Union’s conflicts with the United States have gradually become a force that has set off a global cultural restructuring of power. At the end of the cold war, the massive shift in the global cultural landscape after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc led to a fundamental shift in the structure of international cultural conflicts. The cultural conflicts between socialism and capitalism no longer comprise the main conflicts in world culture. Capitalism, as a cultural system represented by the United States, became the main force in shaping global cultural trends and conflicts. What were originally international cultural conflicts in the postcold war period took on an asymmetrical structure. The characterization of these new issues and trends that emerged with these changes in international cultural conflicts in the post-cold war period, as well as their impact on Chinese cultural security, will first and foremost be based on the Chinese cultural security system in the cold war period, including theoretical policies

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and institutional structure. Responses to these changes will either be a continuation of national ideological strategies from the cold war or an entirely new national security strategy centered on national interests that regards Chinese cultural security strategy as a strategic matter addressed by Chinese national security. The Chinese cultural security apparatus formed in the cold war, or in other words, was adapted to fit the needs of the cold war; thus, ideology and social institutions have always been two major components of Chinese cultural security and the standards for handling international cultural relations. These standards are important measures for evaluating Chinese cultural security and determining cultural security policy. This system was a product of the global cold war and, at the same time, matches the overall national strategic interests of China during the cold war. Although today this security apparatus has also had many negative impacts on the construction of Chinese culture and national development, historically it was an inevitable consequence of China’s international position and security power at the time. After the cold war, with shifts in the driving structure of international security as well as a transformation in the international cultural conflicts that emerged from it, because of the reforms in the Chinese economy, China’s incorporation into the modern world system, participation in international affairs, and the restructuring of the international political economy and cultural order, China’s original cultural security apparatus, based on resisting the bipolar cold war conflicts and domestic “class conflict,” no longer fits with China’s overall national interests or with shifts in China’s security strategy. The forces that drove China’s past cultural security issues have not entirely disappeared. This makes up a special part of China’s post-cold war cultural security issues: on the one hand, new variables that emerged from external cultural security forces coincided with globalization and cold war ideology to affect structural changes in Chinese cultural security; on the other hand, globalization has led to a new internal cultural security crisis in China. Just as a collision between electrons and positrons, if left uncontrolled, can lead to nuclear fusion, which can unleash massive amounts of energy that well surpass the inherent energy of the atom, we must also effectively control this profound shift in post-cold war international cultural conflicts and cultural security trends. China’s failure to change its national cultural security apparatus can lead to an inability to achieve national cultural security in view of new international cultural security trends, so that national cultural security apparatus needs to be rebuilt. This is an inevitable strategic demand for the development of China’s cultural security in the post-cold war period.

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Works Cited Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, [A Selection of Writings by Deng Xiaoping] vol. 3. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993. Frank, André Gunder. ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. Gu Yanwu. “Zheng shi.” [Pure Beginnings] Ri zhilu, vol. 13. Guo Zhengzhao. “Daerwenzhuyi yu Zhongguo.” [Darwinism and China] In Gangtai ji haiwai xuezhe lun jindai Zhongguo wenhua, [Hong Kongese, Taiwanese, and Foreign Scholars on Modern Chinese Culture] ed. Jiang Yihua et al. Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1987. Hu Angang and Men Honghua, eds. Jiedu Meiguo da zhanlüe. [Interpreting American Strategy] Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2003. Jiang Qing. Gongyangxue yinlun. [Introductory Treaties on Gongyang Scholarship] Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995. Li Zehou. Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shi lun qimeng yu jiuwang de shuangzhong bianzou. [Modern Chinese Intellectual History on the Dual Themes of Enlightenment and Salvation] Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1987. Liang Qichao. “Lun xiaoshuo yu qunzhi zhi guanxi.” [On the Relationship between Novels and Controlling the Masses] In Zhongguo jindai wenlun xuan. [A Selection of Modern Chinese Theses] Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981. Lu Zhongwei, ed. Feichuantong anquan lun. [Theory of Unconventional Security] Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2003. Mao Zedong zhuan: 1949–1976, [Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976)] vol. 2. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2003. Marx, Karl. “Trade or Opium.” New York Daily Tribune, September 20, 1858. Pan Shuzhi. “Wenming de panghuang: wanming lishi da bianju.” [A Vacillating Civilization: The Great Transformation in Late Ming History]  Jiefang Ribao, June 28, 2004. Schwartz, Benjamin. In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. Wang Shaode. Meiguo wenhua yu waijiao. [American Culture and Diplomacy] Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2000. Yang Chunshi. “Wusi jingshen de mingyun.” [The Fate of the May Fourth Spirit] Xuexi yu tansuo 3 (1989). Yang Sixing. Wenhua minzuzhuyi yu jindai Zhongguo. [Cultural Nationalism and Modern China] Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003. Zhongyang bianyiju Liening Sidalin zhuzuo bianyishi. “Dui Liening guanyu ‘aiguozhuyi’ de yi chu lunshu yi wen de dingzheng.” [A Revision of Lenin’s Textual Discussion on “Patriotism”] Guangming ribao, October 13, 1985.

CHAPTER 16

A New Understanding of “Soft Power” Liu Xiangping Joseph S. Nye first proposed the concept of “soft power” in 1989 with the publication of his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. This concept quickly received wide usage, becoming a part of public discourse. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, this concept was particularly noted in China, as all of Nye’s publications were translated into Chinese. Not only did each academic field incorporate the core concepts of “soft power” to apply to its theories of international politics and international relations, but this concept was also extended to the research of local politics, regional economics, business management, and cultural reconstruction. At present, over 4,000 publications in Chinese in the Full-Text Chinese Academic Journal Database—an astounding number—use the concept of “soft power.” In the course of research, this author has discovered, nonetheless, that the descriptions of “soft power” in academia, on some levels, is still insufficiently in depth and complete. Many discussions by scholars have many errors; therefore, in the hopes of throwing a few ideas out there to find something of value, I outline the views of scholars on the evolution of “soft power” in China, the relationship between “soft power” and “hard power,” and the assessment and use of “soft power.”

The Meaning of “Soft Power” as Well as Its Evolution in China

Joseph S. Nye argues that international politics comprises two forces. The first comes in the form of military and economic power, which plays a dominant role as “hard power.” Hard power relies upon incentives (the carrot) or threats (the stick) to coerce people to change their position. The second is an indirect force to get people to do what you want them to do: “soft power.” This kind of power may be effective “because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness.” “Soft power” emphasizes cooperation with others and not coercing

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others to follow one’s will.1 “I may be able to persuade you to do something for me without using threats or inducements. It is possible to get many desirable outcomes without having much tangible power over others.” This has also been referred to as “the second face of power.”2 Thus, soft power is the ability to get what one wants through attraction and not through coercion or financial enticement. It is a soft assimilation. Nye points out that if a country can get other countries to see its power as legitimate, then it will meet with less resistance to its goals; if its culture and ideology are seen as attractive, then other countries will be more willing to follow it; if a country can establish international norms consistent with its society, then it will not have to force change; if a country is able to get another country to take an action or limit its actions according to the first country’s expectations, then this country will not need to use very costly coercion or hard power.3 Thus from these four “if” statements discussed by Nye, we can see that the reality of soft power relies primarily upon the legitimacy of state power, the attractiveness of a culture and ideology, conformity with international norms, and a supportive attitude toward other countries that are moving “closer” to its institutions. The reason Nye first proposed the idea of “soft power” was that: most large countries today find military force more costly to apply than in previous centuries. This has resulted from the dangers of nuclear escalation, the difficulty of ruling nationalistically awakened populations in otherwise weak states, the danger of rupturing profitable relations on other issues, and the public opposition in Western democracies to prolonged and expensive military conflicts.4 Hence: the sources of power are, in general, moving away from the emphasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier eras. In assessing international power today, factors such as technology, education, and economic 1  Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 8. 2  Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Cambridge: Public Affairs Press, 2004), 2 and 5. 3  Joseph S. Nye, Yingquanli yu ruanquanli, trans. Men Honghua (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2005), 107. 4  Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 30.

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growth are becoming more important, whereas geography, population, and raw materials are becoming less important.5 Clearly, the point of Nye’s theory of “soft power” was to maintain the hegemonic position of the United States in the world. He hoped to see the United States use hard power and soft power in concert in order to maintain and strengthen its influence in the world at a minimal cost to its strategic goals. As Liu Jie, a scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, described it: In order to offset the deficiencies in the concept of power with the traditional theory of hegemonic stability as well as to provide explanatory power to the hegemonic position of the United States . . . the common values of American institutions and culture as well as its power projection were incorporated into the international order, lending further resources to its hegemonic position.6 In response, Guo Haomin sharply pointed out that Nye’s concept of soft power was directed at understanding international relations. His strong sense of “American exceptionalism” is trying to shift toward a “softer” hegemony. So, his idea of “soft power” is more utilitarian or pragmatic. In fact, this theory has already been included in the “strategic arsenal” of many major Western countries as a major means of intervening and controlling other countries.7 In fact, the first person to really discuss soft power but without using this concept was the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. In thinking about how Western capitalist countries, particularly Italy in his case, maintained control over society, Gramsci argued that the most effective tool of capitalist state power was not the blunt force of its many armed soldiers and polices but its hegemonic position or, better yet, its cultural and ideological hegemonic position.8 Gramsci’s discussion, however, only discussed the role of 5  Nye, Yingquanli yu ruanquanli, 98–99. 6  Liu Jie, “Zhongguo ruanliliang jianshe de jige jiben wenti,” [Some Fundamental Problems in Building China’s Soft Power] in Guoji tixi yu Zhongguo de ruanliliang [The International System and Chinese Soft Power], ed. Shanghai shehui kexue yuan shijie jingji yu zhengzhi yanjiuyuan (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2006), 103. 7  Guo Haomin, “Dangqian woguo ruanliliang yanjiu zhong ruogan nandian wenti ji qi sikao,” [Several Difficult Issues and Thoughts on the Study of Our Current Soft Power] Shehui kexue 2 (2009). 8  Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi, “Guoji zhengzhi zhong de ruanliliang yiji dui Zhongguo ruanliliang de guancha,” [Soft Power in International Politics and Observations on Chinese Soft Power] Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi 7 (2007).

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soft power in domestic politics, but Nye expanded this idea into international politics. Nye admits that “Co-optive behavioral power—getting others to want what you want—and soft power resources—cultural attraction, ideology, and state institutions—are not entirely new ideas. Not long after the Second World War, the Soviet Union gained much from soft resources of Communist ideology, the myth of invincibility, and the transnational institutions of the Communist Party.”9 As soon as the theory of soft power was proposed, however, it set off many discussions in American academia, with a variety of opinions. This is highly linked to the traditional handling of international relations in the United States. America has always relied on the “carrot and stick”—chiefly economic enticements and military coercion—to handle its foreign relations because of the preeminence of its “hard power.” For a long time, “soft power” was neglected. It was at this time that Nye came up with his “new concept” and “new idea,” making controversy unavoidable. In China, the theory of soft power was widely welcomed. Although “this particular logic is based on soft power and the maintaining hegemony, this concept may only provide methodological inspiration and utilitarian value as a concepts in its usage in China.”10 In fact, Chinese scholars bestowed even more meaning to the idea of “soft power.” The Chinese-American scholar Wang Hongying gave a complete summary of discussions on soft power in Chinese academia. She found that, in this conceptual category, Chinese scholars’ use of soft power is much broader than Nye intended. Nye applied the concept of soft power to international relations, but discussions of soft power among Chinese scholars include foreign policy and domestic policy. Moreover, Nye’s focus on American soft power centered on popular culture and political models, but discussions on Chinese soft power among Chinese scholars has focused on traditional culture and economic development, and many even touch upon national unity, social justice, political reform, moral standards, and anti­corruption measures.11 Even though interest and research on soft power by Chinese scholars is abundant, this interest boils down to mainly two issues. The first is pure utilitarianism. Nye’s theory of soft power is regarded as a kind of framework and methodology. The focus is on how to apply Nye’s theories to improve and 9  Nye, Yingquanli yu ruanquanli, 107. 10  Liu, “Zhongguo ruanliliang jianshe de jige jiben wenti,” 103. 11  Hongying Wang, “Chinese Conception of Soft Power and Its Policy Implications,” in China in the New International Order, ed. Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (New York: Routledge, 2008).

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construct Chinese soft power and even the soft power of local government and private enterprises. Second, since Nye’s description of “soft power” was incomplete and, from an American perspective, it is difficult to apply this to the actual situation in China, further research on the theory of soft power by Chinese scholars greatly expanded its applicability, which has included studies reinterpreting the concept of soft power, defining elements of soft power, characterizing soft power, surveying the application of soft power, and exploring the relationship between hard power and soft power. The most unique thing about these studies is that they “sinicize” the theory of “soft power.” Clearly, Chinese discussions of “soft power” have gone far beyond what Nye originally envisaged and defined. The popularity of the theory of soft power in China has been objectionable to some scholars. Zheng Yongnian and others argue: Some Western scholars of international politics have proposed some policy-oriented concepts or theories, but because of clear faults in these theories, they have not been widely noticed or applied in Western academia. In many developing countries, however, these theories have quickly spread and have had a profound impact. China is no exception in this respect. Samuel Huntington’s notion of “a clash of civilizations” and Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power” are two clear examples of this. Zheng attributes this to “over-the-top promotional praise from academia on top of media hype.”12 In this author’s view, Zheng’s perspective is a bit biased. The “flourishing” of the concept of “soft power” is linked, first, to China’s “peaceful rise or development” in recent years. Liu Jie argues that, within the scope of building national power, the meaning of soft power in China helps the utilitarian value of “soft power” to be defined roughly as: the impact and driving force produced by powerful resources of core values, political institutions, culture, ideology, national spirit, and other significant elements as well as their internalization in national behavior. The basic characteristics of soft power are mainly embodied in its endogeneity, introspectiveness, and internal drive. Endogeneity refers to the growth of soft power from a country’s faith its own core values, innovation and perfection of its political institutions, confidence in its culture and ideology, and the effervescence of its national spirit and does not rely on the coercive force of hard power; introspectiveness refers to the basic value of soft 12  Zheng and Zhang, “Guoji zhengzhi zhong de ruanliliang yiji dui Zhongguo ruanliliang de guancha.”

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power being based on an understanding and reflection on existing power as being an intrinsic space built by developing power when it is insufficient and lacking, instead of being an evident power projected onto the outside world; internal drive refers to the interactive integration of constituent elements that elevate soft power—that the force behind soft power is derived from a demand for building an overall power that is an objectively effective source of power projection but the impact of that projection is not consciously controlled.13 Moreover, the idea of “soft power” has a wealth of inherently Eastern characteristics, making it all the easier to borrow. Wu Xiaohui and Qian Cheng believe that “soft power” fits well with Chinese cultural traditions and traditional moral values in Confucianism: empathy, righteousness, courtesy, sincerity, trustworthiness, generosity, harmony, sentimentality, and respect for others; “harmony is the most precious,” “man and nature are one,” “peace,” “benefiting the people,” “rectifying oneself before governing the people,” “there are proper ways to gain wealth for the gentleman,” “it gives them life yet claims no possession; it benefits them yet exacts no authority,” and “do not do to others what you would not want done to yourself.”14 Moreover, for long time, Chinese history had ideas like “A just cause will find support; an unjust cost will find meager support.” In The Art of War, even more of these ideas appear, such as “hence to triumph in all your battles is not supreme excellence; to defeat your enemy’s soldiers without fighting is supreme excellence.” Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem. Closest to the character of soft power is what Confucius described as “If people from afar still do not support you, then bring them around through cultivating literature and virtue.” This is the epitome of cultural strategy and foreign religions of the “kingly way” in ancient China. The “kingly way” is broken down into “the pure kingly way” as represented by Mencius and the “pragmatic kingly way” as represented by Xunzi. The former refers to foreign relations, which do not pursue the national interest as its main goal but, instead, make benevolent 13  Liu, “Zhongguo ruanliliang jianshe de jige jiben wenti,” 103–104. 14  Nye, Soft Power, 221.

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and righteous morality its greatest goal. Morality is not an approach to foreign relations, nor is it a goal in foreign relations. The latter refer to foreign relations that maintain and pursue the national interest as their main goal but balances this with moral principles, oppose military force, and prefer peaceful solutions to international conflicts. In Chinese history, the “pragmatic kingly way” has been the dominant position for a long time and the most consistent and influential of the “kingly ways” in Chinese culture. Over many centuries, this “kingly way” culture permeated Chinese traditional society and even became the main principle of individual interpersonal relationships. Thus we can see that the idea of “soft power” in China’s current growth has, unsurprisingly, grown in rich and fertile soil. Generally speaking, China has already benefited from discussions and practices of soft power. Domestically, the theory of soft power strengthened the rationality of scientific development. As Chinese economic development and material life has reached a certain point, people have come to demand spiritual, cultural, and core values. There has been a cry for complete and balanced development. The emergence of the theory of soft power echoes these demands and cries out for powerful theoretical support. Internationally, the theory of soft power not only can help China prepare for rainy days by providing a theoretical guide to guard against American soft hegemonic power, but it can also dispel pressure from the “China is a threat” theory by creating a good international (and public) environment for China’s peaceful development or rise.

The Relationship Between Soft and Hard Power

The relationship between soft and hard power has been a focus of academic research. Nye argues that the relationship between hard and soft power is complementary, because they are both capable of affecting others in order to achieve one’s own goals. The difference between them are due to their considerably different behavioral nature and substantive resources. Command behavior—the ability to change the behavior of others—relies upon coercion and inducements. Co-optive power—the ability to influence the desires of others—relies upon the attractiveness of the culture and values of a country or manipulation by a political agenda that has the ability to make people believe that their own goals are unrealistic and abandon expressions of their own individual desires. A plethora of behavioral categories are encapsulated between these two extremes of command and co-option: coercion, economic inducements, a formulated political agenda, and even pure appeal. Soft power

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resources are frequently linked to co-option while hard power is often associated with command.15 In this light, Nye believes that soft power and hard power are “two sides of the same coin.” In the interaction between these two powers, Nye believes that: A country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose not only its hard-power resources but also some of its ability to shape the international agenda and some of its attractiveness. . . . however, soft power does not depend on hard power. . . . Sometimes countries enjoy political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight would suggest because they define their national interest to include attractive causes such as economic aid or peacemaking.16 For Nye, soft power is influenced by hard power but does not rely upon it. In this regard, there certainly is no consensus in academia. As Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi believe, the examples of “soft power” cited by Nye, such as the Marshall Plan and fellowships for scholars to encourage international exchange, are all supported by “hard power” behind the scenes. If it were not for the exceedingly strong U.S. economic and military might after World War II, then it would have been difficult for any kind of Marshall Plan to be implemented. Some people might say that these national policies based on “hard power” are actually “soft power.” If this was an issue of policy alone but it was not implementable, however, then how could this power work? The implication of these policies must rely on the “soft power” defined by Nye.17 Although Yan Xuetong at Tsinghua University admits that there is a “complementary” relationship between the two, he emphasizes that “soft power” cannot be separated from hard power and “hard power remains first and foremost—it is the foundation of soft power. This is a precondition for building soft power,” because Regardless of the time, when managing international affairs, countries do not rely upon abstract composites of national strength or soft power but, instead, use specific measures of real power. That is to say that in responding to security threats, countries mainly rely on military force; when experiencing economic friction, countries tend to count on their 15  Ibid., 7. 16  Ibid., 9. 17  Zheng and Zhang, “Guoji zhengzhi zhong de ruanliliang yiji dui Zhongguo ruanliliang de guancha.”

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economic power; and in response to political pressure, states tend to rely on their political strengths.18 These ideas emphasize the leading role that hard power plays in soft power and makes soft power subordinate to hard power. The point of view of the Shanghai scholar Yu Xintian is quite distinct from this perspective. She argues that soft power and hard power are generally seen as belonging to the same category by operating in opposing and parallel ways. Actually, their particular characteristics are completely different. Soft power is distinctive. First is its dominant role. Soft power leads the development and delivery of hard power. Second is its permeation. In order to assist research, soft power and hard power are often separated, but in fact the two are often combined. Soft power permeates the economy, politics, military, society, and international relations. In this sense, soft power is a much greater, more profound, and broader power. Third is its invisibility. Since soft power is immaterial and abstract, it is not easy for people to observe but imperceptibly asserts its will. The noncoercive role of soft power is even more pervasive and lingering.19 Clearly, Yu emphasizes the leading role of soft power more than the others. Echoing this is Yu Keping, who argues: In a globalized era, the basic path to increasing a state’s overall strength is through improving one’s hard power, such as promoting economic development, improving the general strength of the national economy, improving living standards, and consolidating national defense; however, national soft power—such as national culture, education, physical and mental health, national science and technology, the superiority and progressiveness of a national culture, national human resources and strategic talent, government solidarity, social unity and stability, and the sustainability of economic and social development—has become even more important. In a globalized era, it is not enough to rely on economic and military strength to maintain national sovereignty and improve national strength. It must also have political, cultural, and moral authority.20 18  Wang Jianjun, “Ruanshili ‘shengwei,’ ” [The “Elevation” of Soft Power] Liao wang 11 (2007). 19  Yu Xintian, “Ruanshili jianshe yu Zhongguo duiwai zhanlüe,” [Building Soft Power and Chinese Diplomatic Strategy] Guoji wenti yanjiu 2 (2008). 20  Yu Keping, “ ‘Zhongguo moshi’: jinyan yu jianjie,” [“The Chinese Model”: Experience and Reflections] in Zhongguo moshi yu “Beijing gongshi”: chaoyue “huashengdun gongshi,” ed. Yu Keping (Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe, 2006), 19.

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In a theoretical analysis, the essence of power is nothing more than a kind of “relationship” in that it is an activity between related constituent parts that are mutually reliant. After a dependent relationship has been established between organizations or individuals, power emerges.21 “Soft power,” as a kind of power, can only exist or have any meaning in comparison (including transnational and historical comparisons).22 That is, one cannot discuss “soft power” in an analysis independently and statically; only when considered within its own temporal and circumstantial context can we discover the real role of soft power and hard power. This author believes that the relationship between soft power and hard power can be characterized as follows. First, neither soft power nor hard power can exist independently and are merely manifested differently in particular temporal and spatial circumstances. In actual society, it is essentially impossible to discern which resources can be categorized as soft power or hard power. Most scholars agree that military and economic power are parts of hard power, but they can also devolve into soft power. Military power in assaulting an enemy is clearly a display of hard power, but in participating in peacekeeping, rescue, and disaster relief operations is clearly soft power. Applying economic sanctions or providing financial inducements to some ruling faction or regime is clearly a display of hard power, but offering economic aid or financial crisis recovery funds has the effect of soft power. In the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the renminbi was not devalued, which gained China much respect in the world. This is a classic example. Thus, economic power can become hard power, which can also become soft power in that it uses sanctions to coerce other countries as well as using wealth to encourage other countries. Furthermore, “culture”23 is also recognized as a part of soft power. Gao Zhanxiang considers “cultural power the core of soft power.”24 Scholars who share this perception include Zhang Ji, Sang Hong, Yu Xintian, Wang Huning, and Guo Haomin. Their position has been challenged by Yan Xuetong, Jia 21  Roderick Martin, Sociology of Power (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 80–81. 22  Wu Xu, “Zhongguo ruanshili bu neng chi laoben: jian yu Yan Xuetong, Lu Gang liangwei jiaoshou shangque,” [Chinese Soft Power Cannot Rest on Its Laurels: A Discussion between Professors Yan Xuetong and Lu Gang] Huanqiu shibao, June 27, 2007. 23  There are over 200 definitions of “culture.” Here it refers to “a system of concepts based on social ideology that comprises political ideology, morality, art, religion, philosophy, and other forms of thought. It includes science, philosophy, literature, art, social customs, habits, and other aspects of spiritual culture. It also includes economic institutions, political institutions, legal systems, family structure, social structure, and other institutional cultures.” 24  Gao Zhanxiang, Wenhuali [Culture Power] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2007), 2.

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Lizheng, and others, who argue that “political power is the core of soft power.” These two positions have been battling in a nonstop debate.25 This author does not intend to enter the fray, but I support the position that “cultural power is at the core of soft power,” because Culture is humanity. . . . The essence of culture is a survival mechanism to adapt humanity to nature. At its core is values, which play a role in manmade constructions—spirituality, morality, etc.—and this is where cultural power is revealed. . . . Whether it is in popular culture and ideology or national institutions, they are both dominated by specific values, and behind these values are profound cultural roots. This is inherent in soft power.26 Even within the “cultural sphere,” however, soft and hard powers also exist at the same time. The vehicle of cultural existence and development and the path and tool to cultural dissemination cannot be separated from “hard power.” The several millennia of Chinese history have given Chinese culture unparalleled advantages in resources, but Chinese cultural soft power is rather weak. This is because “in terms of tools of cultural dissemination, China lacks the massive media organization and advanced communication technology of the West; in terms of methods of cultural dissemination, China basically relied upon the government to promote it, to the point that even though China’s economic development has made learning Chinese more popular, spreading Chinese culture has primarily been helped by government power with things like Confucius Institutes.”27 In a nutshell, this is because of a lack of hard power. With economic globalization, the culture industry has become an important force in cultural development, but it is also an important component of global 25  See Sang Hong, “Wenhua: guoji zhengzhi zhong de ‘ruanquanli,’ ” [Culture: “Soft Power” in International Politics] Shehui zhuyi yanjiu 3 (1999); Yu, “Ruanshili jianshe yu Zhongguo duiwai zhanlüe”; Wang Huning, “Zuowei guojia shili de wenhua: ruanshili,” [Culture as National Power: Soft Power] Fudan xuebao 3 (1993); Guo, “Dangqian woguo ruanliliang yanjiu zhong ruogan nandian wenti ji qi sikao”; Yan Xuetong, “Ruanshili de hexin shi zhengzhi shili,” [The Core of Soft Power Is Political Power] Huanqiu shibao, May 22, 2007; Jia Lizheng, “Cong zhengzhi ruanshili kan Zhongguo de qiangsheng,” [Seeing Chinese Strengthening in Political Soft Power] Renmin luntan: shuangzhou kan (February 2008). 26  Guo, “Dangqian woguo ruanliliang yanjiu zhong ruogan nandian wenti ji qi sikai.” 27  Hu Jian, “Ruanshili xin lun: goucheng, gongneng he fazhan guilü: jianlun zhong mei ruanshili de bijiao,” [A New Theory of Soft Power: A Comparative Discussion of Formation, Function, and Developmental Patterns of Chinese and American Soft Power] Shehui kexue 2 (2009).

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trade and the gross domestic product. Culture has an economy, but an economy also has a culture. It is hard to mechanically separate them, so one could also say that “culture” is also a combination of “soft” and “hard” power. Second, the goal of hard power is “hard control” while the goal of soft power is “soft checks and balances.” They all make others submit to oneself, but their approach is different. In this regard, Nye clearly states that “soft power is more humane than hard power.” This is not necessarily certain. Soft power is merely a description, and not a moral prescription. Like any other form of power, soft power can be used for good or evil. Hence, “although soft power can in certain circumstances provide a better way to achieve certain goals in a moral sense, if soft power falls into the hand of the wrong person, it could have dire consequences.”28 Third, building soft power is effective over the long term while hard power can be effective in the short term and can even grow exponentially in a short period through, for example, purchasing arms; moreover, the impact of soft power takes longer than that of hard power to be felt. Co-optive power generally has a proliferating effect that produces a general impact rather than a specifically quantifiable effect on behavior.29 The government often depends on skill and luck to achieve its expected outcome through the application of military deterrence and combat at the appropriate time. Economic power generally works in much the same way. The government can freeze the assets of a foreign country overnight as well as immediately provide trade deals or foreign aid. Over a much longer time frame, economic sanctions can also (if it is possible) to achieve the desired outcome. The building of soft power requires a great deal of time and is very difficult to carry it out, because “many of its crucial resources are outside the control of governments, and their effects depend heavily on acceptance by the receiving audiences. Moreover, soft power resources often work indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes take years to produce the desired outcome.”30 Fourth, soft power is relatively reliant on hard power; however, for some countries or organizations, soft power is not entirely limited to their own hard power. Soft power can be linked perceptibly or imperceptibly (alliances or non-alliances) to the hard power of more countries and organizations to improve their own overall strength and influence. Singapore is a typical example: although Singapore has a degree of hard power, it fully uses its distinct 28  Joseph S. Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power” Foreign Policy (February 23, 2006). http://foreign policy.com/2006/02/23/think-again-soft-power/. 29  Nye, Soft Power, 15. 30  Ibid., 99.

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soft power lineages, allowing it to play a role in international affairs far beyond what its hard power would imply. Fifth, soft power and hard power do not have a simple complementary relationship. If the two grow together harmoniously, then they can reinforce each another, but if the two do not grow together harmoniously, then they interfere with and harm each other. The U.S. war in Iraq is an example that proves this point. In sum, this author believes that hard power is derived primarily from material and substantive resources while soft power resources are derived mainly from ideology; hence, the relationship between hard power and soft power is basically akin to the relationship between the “material” and “ideology.” Hard power determines soft power, and soft power is relatively reliant on hard power. Soft power is not, however, some sort of squire to hard power. It has its own “agency of initiative” and can work “contrary” to hard power. It can strengthen or diminish hard power. At times, it may precede hard power to cover up some of the less appealing parts of hard power and even direct the development of hard power.

Assessment and Application of Soft Power

Some scholars argue that soft power is an imperceptible thing that is unquantifiable and even impossible to apply and operate. As Su Changhe claims, precisely quantifying Chinese soft power, as some kind of statistician would do, is no easy task, even impossible. “Soft power,” like an emotion, is impossible to measure and quantify. It can only be “felt” and described, but it is difficult to pry apart its logic for analysis. Even if it is elastic, it is still hard to measure. It is difficult to use to establish a causal relationship between soft power and its effect on state behavior.31 Jim Hoagland, a columnist at the Washington Post, once complained that soft power, like globalization, is so elastic that it is transmogrified beyond recognition to the point that it is a useless concept. In response, Joseph Nye pointed out that claiming “hard power can be measured while soft power cannot” is mistaken. His response is that “it is possible to measure soft power resources. . . . We can measure and compare possible cultural and diplomatic resources that could produce soft power. Public opinion can also be seen as a measure of change in a country’s attractiveness in the 31  Su Changhe, “Zhongguo de ruanquanli: yi guoji zhidu yu Zhongguo de guanxi wei lie,” [China’s Soft Power: The Example of Relationship between China and the International System] Guoji guancha 2 (2007).

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short term.”32 In this respect, Nye’s response emphasizes measures of “soft power resources” and not “soft power itself,” making it difficult for him to avoid accusations of “pulling off a game of intellectual bait-and-switch.” Thus, Wu Xu believes that “soft power” can be demonstrated and defined only in certain specific circumstances in which it is used and managed, because power is not a theoretical presence but a manifestation of the will of a state or organization with the real capability and resources to anticipate, prevent, and respond to crises and reconstruction. All power, regardless of whether it is soft or hard power, is and should be quantifiable.33 Despite his position, Wu Xu has not constructed a methodology to quantify soft power. Some scholars have argued that public opinion surveys can measure soft power, but critics reply that the degree to which public opinion surveys are welcome to provide measurements provides an immediacy that does not necessarily reflect reality. Nye argues that “one must be careful not to read too much into opinion polls. They are an essential but imperfect measure of softpower resources because answers vary depending on the way that the questions are formulated, and unless the same questions are asked consistently over some period, they represent snapshots rather than a continuous picture,” but, Nye emphasized, “polls are a good first approximation of both how attractive a country appears and the cost that are incurred by unpopular policies, particularly when they show consistency across polls and over time.”34 Nye has not, however, established a complete model to measure soft power. His view on the matter is scattered across his discussions on the issue. He indicated that “the soft power of a country rest primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).”35 In sum, he believes that to measure soft power, one must primarily consider the following issues: political institutions, whether there are disputes over sovereignty and territory, domestic ethnic unity, quality of life indexes, university rankings in the world, publication sales, published scientific and journal articles, quantity of Internet servers, number of patents, research and development spending, high-tech exports, transnational brands, Nobel prize winners, record sales, sports celebrities, film and television exports, public diplomacy, foreign tourism, number 32  Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power.” 33  Wu, “Zhongguo ruanshili bu neng chi laoben: jian yu Yan Xuetong, Lu Gang liangwei jiaoshou shangque.” 34  Nye, Soft Power, 18. 35  Ibid., 11.

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of ­international students, number of immigrants, number of applications for political refugee status, foreign development aid, and whether endangered species are protected. In fact, resources that provide soft power go far beyond the examples that Nye has used, which shows the incompleteness and ­arbitrariness of his discussion. This author believes that it is extremely difficult to accurately quantify soft power, because “public opinion is as variable as water.” Soft power, however, is certainly quantifiable; otherwise, we would be unable to explain the formation of “public support.” Numerous “nodes” exist, ranging from “variable public opinion” to “public support.” Theoretically, these “nodes” can be quantified with some certainty. In current practice, it is quite difficult. There are two main problems: first, quantitative methodology; second, insufficient motivation in quantification practices. This is not, nevertheless, a problem with soft power itself. In terms of quantitative practices, some scholars are conducting constructive work. There has been progress in attempts by Yan Xuetong, Xu Jin, and Hu Jian. They have come to define soft power as “a combination of the international attractiveness of a state, the mobilization of international force, and the mobilization of domestic government.” They have also built a quantitative index to calculate the elements in these things as well as equations to measure and build soft power.36 What they share in common is an emphasis on the proportion of soft power in political elements. Thus, it is not so much to say that what they have laid out is a model to quantify soft power as it is a model of “how governments can build and deploy soft power.” Nonetheless, the construction of a model and some kind of rational core is quite significant in advancing discussions. In terms of quantitative approaches, some scholars and organizations are currently undertaking exploratory research. Scholars such as Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin have conducted comparative quantitative studies comparing the soft power of China and the United States with the index they have designed and concluded that “the overall soft power of China is between 20.8% and 44% of that of the United States, with an intermediate value of about one-third or 32.4%.”37 On the eve of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and East Asia Institute released a joint survey that measured soft power in several countries, such as the United States, China, Japan, and 36  See Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin, “Zhong Mei ruanshili bijiao,” [A Comparison of Chinese and American Soft Power] Xiangdai guoji guanxi 1 (2008); Hu, “Ruanshili xin lun.” 37  Yan and Xu, “Zhong Mei ruanshili bijiao.”

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Korea, using multiple questionnaires and other methods that asked respondents to rate their feelings on a scale from 0 to 1. In China, the soft power of other countries was ranked respectively as the United States as 0.71, Japan as 0.62, and Korea as 0.65; in the eyes of these countries, however, China’s soft power ranked respectively as 0.47, 0.51, and 0.55. Hence, this report concludes that: “There is now unanimous recognition of China’s growing hard military and economic power in Asia. There has also been a great deal of attention paid to China’s attempts to foster its regional soft power and its supposed growth in this area. Importantly and somewhat surprisingly, the survey results indicate that China’s ‘charm offensive’ has thus far been ineffective.”38 Perhaps, there exist faults in any of these quantitative practices of soft power, regardless of one’s choice of perspective (attitude), methodology, and even survey population, thus affecting the credibility of results, but these attempts undoubtedly have a positive significance. If we continue with such attempts, we may bring to light some parts of the true nature of “soft power.” In fact, quantitative research on soft power has not completely begun. In comparison with electoral public opinion polls, quantitative research into soft power is certain negligible. One could say that the lack of quantitative practices may have made soft power unquantifiable. Of course, most scholars argue that, although it is difficult to quantify soft power, if one could create an approximate framework, it could be applied. For example, Yu Xintian has defined the intrinsic meaning of soft power in three parts. The first is ideology, concepts, and principles, both those upheld by national governments and those recognized and reflected among the public. The second is institutions. In international relations, particular attention is paid to participation in international institutions, but it is also linked to domestic institutions. The third is strategy and policy. This is something clearly determined and carried out by governments, but businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and the public are also linked to this. This can come to include and be understood through development models, national image, information, and mutual reliance. She indicated that “the core of soft power is culture, and it is mainly at the core of culture—values.”39 Pang Zhongying believes that soft power can be derived from the following factors: an education system that cultivates an educated and productive population; a research and development system that is capable of intellectual 38  Christopher C. Whitney and David Shambaugh, “Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs and East Asia Institute, 2009. 39  Yu, “Ruanshili jianshe yu Zhongguo duiwai zhanlüe.”

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innovation and contribution; media with international influence; a political system, economic system, model, theory, and ideology that are universally applicable; successful foreign policy and diplomacy; positive interaction between the government and society; a global appeal produced by moral authority or demands; and the ability to take on global responsibilities.40 Huang Shuofeng believes that soft power should also include political power, educational power, and diplomatic power, which comprise an imperceptible “overall national strength.” This can be further analyzed as: internal soft power such as institutional innovation, human resources, cultural radiance, solidarity and affinity, and the ability to understand high-tech research and development; and external soft power such as national image, international mechanisms of control, the capacity to create international norms, and the ability to bear international obligations. In particular, non-economic elements like political institutions, core values, national identity, and solidarity are important segments of overall national strength or national competitiveness.41 Men Honghua believes that the core elements of Chinese soft power include culture, ideology, development model, international image, and international institutions. Among these, culture, ideology, and development model comprise the “internal force” of soft power; international image comprises the “external force”; and international institutions combine and span the two as the main channel to expand and build Chinese soft power.42 None of these interpretations go beyond the model proposed by Nye. Most of these scholars refined and categorized the overall reality in China, but, in terms of their discourse, they clearly need to be much more rigorous. Like Nye, however, these perspectives, whether intentionally or unintentionally, have neglected an important and even crucial indicator: the one who constructs and applies soft power is the “people.” In Nye’s discussion, we see scattered quotes such as “civil society is the origin of much soft power,”43 “government policies

40  Pang Zhongying, “Zhongguo ruanliliang de neihan,” [The Implications of Soft Power] Liao wang, November 7, 2005. 41  Huang Renwei, Zhongguo jueqi de shijian he kongjian [The Time and Space for China’s Rise] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe, 2002), 109. 42  Men Honghua, “Zhongguo ruanshili pinggu baogao,” [An Evaluation of Chinese Soft Power] Guoji guancha 2 (2007). 43  Nye, Soft Power, 17.

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Official (Government)

Influencer

Influenced

Civil (Public)

figure 1

Civil (Public)

Interactive model of soft power.

at home and abroad are another potential source of soft power,”44 “multinational corporations are another source of co-optive power,”45 and “soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers.”46 These quotes deal with the issue of the “actors” in soft power, but it is extremely chaotic and disorganized. This author presumes that, since soft power is a kind of relationship, then there must be an influencer and the influenced. In this relationship, the influencer can be either official (government) or civil (the public, including individuals, businesses, grass-roots organizations, and public organizations). The influenced similarly can be either official (government) or civil (the public). As we can see, this is a relatively complex interactive relationship, and any actor is involved in multiple relationships. (See Figure 1.) In this figure, the influence and effect of the “official (government)” influencer on the “official (government)” influenced is much easier to observe and measure, and the influence and effect of the “official (government)” influencer on the “civil” influenced or the “civil” influencer on the “official (government)” influenced is much more difficult to manipulate and quantify, because it is easier to understand one side than the other. The influence between civil influencers and influencees is even more difficult to quantify because they are both very fluid and scattered. If an influencer clearly desires to push “soft power” to its extreme, then it must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the official and civil influencer with relatively strong “soft power” must have values that are relatively attractive to the influenced; (2) an official and civil influencer must be able to undertake a common action based on a common identity; in fact, many think tanks, 44  Ibid., 13. 45  Nye, Bound to Lead, 193. 46  New, Soft Power, 16.

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corporations, industry associations, and a host of nongovernmental organ­ izations that have exploded onto the scene recently have had increasingly larger influence.47 Even though they always appear on the surface to represent a “civil” face, they are inextricably connected to the “official.” One could say that this further confuses the boundary between “official” and “civil,” but this kind of ambiguity reflects a commonality between “official” and “civil,” which strengthens soft power. (3) The ability of official and civil influencers to project soft power simultaneously on official influenced. (4) Since soft power resources are quite diffuse, they tend to fall into the hands of the “civil.” At the same time, in actual society, “official” influence has generally been interpreted as “propaganda,” and “propaganda” is generally defined as “deceptive” and leads to a loss of influence; hence, relatively speaking, the civil (public) is the most important vehicle for soft power and the general quality of the influencer—“people”— becomes all the more crucial. We see that what is most crucial in constructing soft power is improving the general quality of the “people.” Of course, this is a topic that could be further discussed later. Since the beginning of the reforms thirty years ago, the overall national strength of China has rapidly improved. Although the world universally recognizes the success of China’s development and the continual strengthening of Chinese hard power, elevating its position internationally and improving its international influence, an emphasis on building soft power is an innovation in ideas on how to build national strength. It is an addition to and improvement on the Chinese economy, politics, and military since China undertook these reforms. As Men Honghua claims: even though Chinese leaders are clearly aware of the major significance of building soft power and the Chinese government is aware that expanding hard power is subject to soft power, which has been insufficiently supported, there is a lag in the strategic decision-making process for the national construction model, even ignoring soft power, as many have before. As many policymakers have indicated we are working on soft power, but we have not made it into a strategic consideration.48

47  Here I am referring to associations, community groups, foundations, charities, non-profit companies, and other legal entities that are not seen as part of a government and are not organized around the principle of profit within a specific legal system. 48  Men, “Zhongguo ruanshili pinggu baogao.”

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We must build soft power in China so that it is on par with the country’s status and influence as a major power, by making soft power an important part of our national development strategy. Understanding, studying, and grappling with the construction and application of soft power will be a essential component of and guide for our development strategy. Works Cited Gao Zhanxiang. Wenhuali. [Culture Power] Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2007. Guo Haomin. “Dangqian woguo ruanliliang yanjiu zhong ruogan nandian wenti ji qi sikao.” [Several Difficult Issues and Thoughts on the Study of Our Current Soft Power] Shehui kexue 2 (2009). Hu Jian. “Ruanshili xin lun: goucheng, gongneng he fazhan guilü: jianlun Zhong Mei ruanshili de bijiao.” [A New Theory of Soft Power: A Comparative Discussion of Formation, Function, and Developmental Patterns of Chinese and American Soft Power] Shehui kexue 2 (2009). Huang Renwei. Zhongguo jueqi de shijian he kongjian. [The Time and Space for China’s Rise] Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe, 2002. Jia Lizheng. “Cong zhengzhi ruanshili kan Zhongguo de qiangsheng.” [Seeing Chinese Strengthening in Political Soft Power] Renmin luntan: shuangzhou kan (February 2008). Liu Jie. “Zhongguo ruanliliang jianshe de jige jiben wenti.” [Some Fundamental Problems in Building China’s Soft Power] In Guoji tixi yu Zhongguo de ruanliliang [The International System and Chinese Soft Power], ed. Shanghai shehui kexue yuan shijie jingji yu zhengzhi yanjiuyuan. Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2006, 103–104. Martin, Roderick. Sociology of Power. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. Men Honghua. “Zhongguo ruanshili pinggu baogao.” [An Evaluation of Chinese Soft Power] Guoji guancha 2 (2007). Nye, Joseph S. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 1990. ———. The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. ———. “ ‘Ruanquanli’ zai sisu,” trans. Cai Weizhai. Guowai shehui kexue 4 (2006). ———. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Cambridge, MA: Public Affairs Press, 2004. ———. Yingquanli yu ruanquanli, trans. Men Honghua. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2005. Pang Zhongying. “Zhongguo ruanliliang de neihan.” [The Implications of Soft Power] Liao wang, November 7, 2005.

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Sang Hong. “Wenhua: guoji zhengzhi zhong de ‘ruanquanli.’ ” [Culture: “Soft Power” in International Politics] Shehui zhuyi yanjiu 3 (1999). Su Changhe. “Zhongguo de ruanquanli: yi guoji zhidu yu Zhongguo de guanxi wei lie.” [China’s Soft Power: The Example of Relationship between China and the International System] Guoji guancha 2 (2007). Wang Hongying. “Chinese Conception of Soft Power and Its Policy Implications.” In China in the New International Order, ed. Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian. New York: Routledge, 2008. Wang Huning. “Zuowei guojia shili de wenhua: ruanshili.” [Culture as National Power: Soft Power] Fudan xuebao 3 (1993). Wang Jianjun. “Ruanshili ‘shengwei.’ ” [The “Elevation” of Soft Power] Liao wang 11 (2007). Whitney, Christopher C., and David Shambaugh. “Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion.” Chicago Council on Global Affairs and The East Asia Institute, 2009, http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/dynamic_page .php?id=75/. Wu Xu. “Zhongguo ruanshili bu neng chi laoben: jian yu Yan Xuetong, Lu Gang liangwei jiaoshou shangque.” [Chinese Soft Power Cannot Rest on Its Laurels: A Discussion between Professors Yan Xuetong and Lu Gang] Huanqiu shibao, June 27, 2007. Yan Xuetong. “Ruanshili de hexin shi zhengzhi shili.” [The Core of Soft Power Is Political Power] Huanqiu shibao, May 22, 2007. Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin. “Zhong Mei ruanshili bijiao.” [A Comparison of Chinese and American Soft Power] Xiangdai guoji guanxi 1 (2008). Yu Keping. Zhongguo moshi yu “Beijing gongshi”: chaoyue “Huashengdun gongshi.” [“The Chinese Model”: Experience and Reflections] Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe, 2006. Yu Xintian. “Ruanshili jianshe yu Zhongguo duiwai zhanlüe.” [Building Soft Power and Chinese Diplomatic Strategy] Guoji wenti yanjiu 2 (2008). Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi. “Guoji zhengzhi zhong de ruanliliang yiji dui Zhongguo ruanliliang de guancha.” [Soft Power in International Politics and Observations on Chinese Soft Power] Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi 7 (2007).