New Population and Labour Force Projections and Policy Implications for Singapore 9789814376303

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES
I. INTRODUCTION
II. METHODOLOGY
III. FUTURE POPULATION TRENDS
IV. FUTURE LABOUR FORCE TRENDS
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FUTURE TRENDS
THE AUTHOR

Citation preview

I5EA5 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focused on the many-faceted problems of development and modernization, and political and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees on which are representatives from the National University of Singapore, appointees from the government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

NEW POPULATION AND LABOUR FORCE PROJECTIO NS and POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR SINGAPORE Saw Swee-Hock

Research Notes and Discussions Paper No. 61 INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

1987

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 1987 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters. Cataloguing in Publication Data Saw, Swee Hock New population and labour force projections and policy implications for Singapore. (Research notes and discussions paper/Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: no.61) I. Population forecasting -· Singapore. 2. Labour supply ·-Singapore. 3. Singapore -- Population policy. 4. Labour policy --Singapore. I. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. II. Title. Ill. Series. DS501 I596 no. 61 1987 ISBN 9971-988-55-0

ISSN 0219-8828 Printed in Singapore by General Printing & Publishing Services Pte Ltd

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

IV

INTRODUCTION 11

METHODOLOGY

3

Projection A Projection B Projection C

6

Ill

FUTURE POPULATION TRENDS

8

IV

FUTURE LABOUR FORCE TRENDS

22

V

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FUTURE TRENDS

31

5

7

LIST OF TABLES

9

1

Projected Population, 1985-2070

2

Estimated Births, 1985-2070

11

3

Projected Population by Three Age Groups According to Projection A, 1985-2070

14

4

Projected Population by Three Age Groups According to Projection B, 1985-2070

16

5

Projected Population by Three Age Groups According to Projection C, 1985-2070

18

6

Projected Labour Force, 1985-2070

24

7

Projected Labour Force by Age Group, 1985-2070

26

8

Actual Births and Estimated Births, 197 4-85

33

9

Legalized Abortions and Voluntary Sterilizations, 1970-85

36

10

Projected Total Population by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection A)

39

11

Projected Male Population by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection A)

42

12

Projected Female Population by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection A)

45

13

Projected Total Population by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection B)

48

iv

Projected Male Population by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection B)

51

Projected Female Population by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection B)

54

16

Projected Total Population by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection C)

57

17

Projected Male Population by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection C)

60

Projected Female Population by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection C)

63

Projected Total Lab.our Force by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection A)

66

Projected Male Labour Force by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection A)

69

Projected Female Labour Force by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection A)

72

Projected Total Labour Force by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection B)

75

Projected Male Labour Force by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection B)

78

Projected Female Labour Force by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection B)

81

Projected Total Labour Force by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection C)

84

Projected Male Labour Force by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection C)

87

Projected Female Labour Force by Age Group, 1985-2070 (Projection C)

90

14 15

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

V

I

INTRODUCTION

It is customary in Singapore to prepare and pub 1 ish population projections after the results of the latest decennial census of population are made available. 1980

Census

of

Population,

eventually published in 1983.

Following the completion of the three

different

projections

were

The first set by sex, age group,

and ethnic group for intervals of five years from 1980 to 2030 was prepared and published by the Department of Statistics in Singapore Census of Population 1980: Administrative Report.

The

second set by sex and age group for every five years up to 2030 was prepared and published by the then Singapore Family Planning and

Population

1980-2030.

Board as Population

Projections for Singapore,

The third set by sex and age group for every five

years up to 2070 was prepared by Saw Swee-Hock and pub 1 i shed by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies as Population Projections for Singapore, 1980-2070. The

above

population

because they are all

projections

are

somewhat

dated

now

based on population figures obtained from

the census conducted in June 1980 and fertility indices derived from

births

occurring

in

1980.

The

availability of mid-1985

population estimates by sex and age as well as fertility indices for 1985 enables us to compute a more up-to-date set of popul ation projections.

Furthermore, the availability of the relevant

1

collected in the annual labour-force survey conducted in 1985 makes it possible to proceed a stage further to compute a

data

new set of labour force projections. There are good reasons for preparing the new population and 1 abour force projections now rather than years 1ater when the figures from the next decennial census to be held in 1990 become The results of the projections have been used in

available.

conjunction

with

the

review of

current

population

trends

and

policies to ensure that the demographic goal of stabilizing the population in the future can be attained.

The new projections

will a 1 so pro vi de more up-to-date figures to users who may wish to utilize them for a variety of reasons, such as the forecasting of future demand for housing, water, electricity, and other goods and services that are dependent on the size of the population. Three separate projections have been prepared based on three different assumptions regarding the future course of ferti 1 ity trends in Singapore. based

on

the

The three projections are:

assumption

replacement level

that

fertility

will

Projection A, move

back

to

in 2000; Projection B, on the assumption that

fertility will remain constant at the 1985 level; and Projection C, on the assumption that fertility will decline further to 0.668 The results of these three projections will serve to show what would happen to the population if fertility trends in 2000.

follow certain paths

in the future.

Since the government has

agreed to introduce changes to its population control programme to raise fertility back to the rep 1a cement 1 eve 1 , readers who wish

to

use the

projected

population

and

labour force

adopt the set of figures shown under Projection A.

2

should

11

METHODOLOGY

The population projections were prepared by the component method which

consists

of separate

males and females usual

projections

of

both the number of

in each age group of the population.

It is

to project the population by time-intervals equal to the

age-intervals

into which it has

base population has

been divided.

been divided

Since the 1985

into quinary age groups, the

projections are most easily made for five-year intervals of time which implies that at the end of the five-year period all the survivors of one age group would have moved into the next higher age group.

Each cohort of the 1985 sex-age group is diminished

to account for mortality with the passage of time.

This step

requires a set of five-year survival ratios which are deemed to represent mortality in each cohort during specific periods of time subsequent to 1985. in

each

sex-age

group

A multiplication of the original number by

the

relevant

ratio

will

yield

the

estimated number of persons five years older at a date whi eh is five years later.

A repetition of the procedure will furnish the

estimated population aged ten years older than those at the base date and for the ten years later. In the second step the future number of children born in each

five-year

time-interval

subsequent

to

the

base year

is

estimated in order to fill the vacuum in the first age group 0-4 3

at periods of time every five years later. formulation

of

a

set

of

plausible

This requires the

assumptions

regarding

the

future course of fert i 1 i ty in terms of the gross reproduction rates.

Having worked

conjunction

with

out

the

these

female

rates,

they

population

are in

utilized

the

in

relevant

reproductive age to derive the estimated number of births for the various five-year periods.

The number of births surviving to the

end of a given five-year period can be estimated by multiplying the

number

of

births

during

the

period

with the

appropriate

survival ratio. This estimated number of survivors is used to fi 11 the vacuum in the first age ·group 0-4 at every five-year time-interval. In constructing the new population and projections, the four separate sets of data

1abour

computation are obtained from different sources.

The 1985 base

used

force in

the

population classified by sex and quinary age group up to 85 and over is taken from the mid-year population estimates prepared by the Department of Statistics.

The figures obtained from these

estimates terminate at 70 and over, and the figures for the four age groups from 70 to 85 and over were estimated on the basis of the percentages in these age groups as determined in the 1980 Population Census. The values of the survival

ratios, known as Px, for the

various quinary age groups for each of the two sexes are computed from the values of the Lx column of the abridged life table.

The

figures for the Lx column are obtained from the author's abridged life tables which were published in "Increasing Life Expectancy in Singapore during 1969-1981",

(1984).

Singapore Medical

Journal,

25

To reflect improving mortality, the computed Px values

are increased over time with the aid of the United Nations model life tables. 4

The age-specific fertility rates and the gross reproduction rates are based on the mid-1985 population estimates mentioned earlier, and on birth data supplied in advance by the Department of Statistics pending their publication in the Report on the Registration of Births and Deaths for the year 1985. The female population by quinary age group and the births by similar age group of mothers are used to compute the age-specific fertility rates and the gross reproduction rates. While the 1atter rates are used to formulate our fertility assumptions, the former rates are applied to the future female population in the reproductive ages to estimate the number of births in every five-year period after 1985. The "additional information" required to prepare the 1abour force projections refers to the age-specific 1abour force part i ci pat ion rates by sex for 1985. These rates are derived from data obtained in the annual labour force survey conducted bY the Ministry of Labour in mid-1985. The labour force or economi~ cally active population is defined to include those working during the reference week as well as those not working during the reference week but actively looking for work during the week. The three sets of population projections are computed on the basis of the following future course of migration, mortality, and fertility:

Projection A Migration It is assumed that the population in Singapore is a closed population not subject to international migration. 5

Mortality It is assumed that the 1985 mortality level with a life expectancy at birth of 70.2 years for the males and 75.3 years for the females will improve over time to a life expectancy of 72.6 years for the males and 75.7 years for the females.

Fertility It is 0.779 after level

assumed that the gross reproduction rate will rise from in 1985 to 0.854 in 1990, 0.936 in 1995 and 1.025 in 2000, which it will remain constant at this replacement fertility until 2070.

Projection B

Migration The assumption is similar to that used in Projection A.

Mortality The assumption is similar to that used in Projection A.

Fertility It

is

assumed that

the

gross 6

reproduction

rate will

remain

constant be 1ow the rep 1acement 1eve 1 at the 1985 rate of 0. 779 throughout the whole period of projection.

Projection C

Migration The assumption is similar to that used in Projection A.

Mortality The assumption is similar to that used in Projection A.

Fertility It is assumed that the gross reproduction rate will fall from 0.779 in 1985 to 0.740 in 1990, 0.703 in 1995, and 0.668 in 2000, after which it will remain constant at this level until 2070. In addition to the above assumptions used to prepare the population projections, it is necessary to formulate another assumption in preparing the labour force projections. It is assumed that the age-specific 1abour force part i ci pat ion rates for each sex for 1985 wi 11 remain unchanged during the who 1e period of projection. This assumption is applied to all the three labour force projections.

7

Ill

FUTURE POPULATION TRENDS

The 1ong-term demographic goa 1 of Singapore is to stabilize its population at a certain number some time in the first half of the 21st century. In order to ensure the attainment of this goal, two conditions must be fulfilled. The first condition is that fertility must be reduced to rep 1acement 1eve 1 , and the other condition is to maintain it at this level indefinitely. The first condition was accomplished in 1975 when fertility was reduced near to the replacement level with the gross reproduction rate equivalent to 1.025. However, the second condition has become elusive because fertility continued to fall below this level to reach the low of 0.779 in 1985. The continuous decline of fertility below replacement level can be attributed to Singapore's comprehensive population control programme as well as to many conducive economic, social, and cultural factors favouring a small family size among the masses in general. The above points should be borne in mind when interpreting the results of the three population projections summarized in Table 1. It can be shown from Projection A that if we succeed in moving fertility back to the rep 1acement 1eve 1 of 1.025 in the year 2000 and hold it at that point indefinitely, the total population of Singapore will reach the peak of about 3.39 million in 2030 and will remain just slightly below this figure 8

TABLE 1

ProJ-=t.d Papuhrtlon,

Projection A

Annual Growth Rate

198~2070

Projection 8

Annual Growth Rate

Projection C

Annuli I Growth Rate

Year

Population ( 1 ,000)

1985

2,558.0

1990

2,702.6

1.11

2,691.3

1.02

2,686.0

0.98

1995

2,850.0

1.07

2,809.2

0.86

2,789.2

0.76

2000

2,987.1

0.94

2,899.5

0.63

2,857.7

0.49

2005

3,101.7

0.73

2,961.3

0.42

2,895.8

0.26

2010

3,191.4

0.57

2,999.7

0.26

2,911.0

0.11

2015

3,266.1

0.46

3,018.1

0.12

2,904.9

-0.04

2020

3,328.3

0.38

3,013.8

-0.03

2,872.9

-0.22

2025

3,371.8

0.26

2,979.1

-0.23

2,807.5

-0.46

2030

3,391.2

0.11

2,912.3

-0.45

2,708.3

-0.72

2035

3,382.4

-0.05

2,814.0

-0.65

2,577.5

-0.99

2040

3,357.9

-0.15

2,698.0

-0.84

2,429.1

-1.18

2045

3,332.3

-0.15

2,576.7

-0.92

2,275.3

-1.30

2050

3,316.9

-0.09

2,459.6

-0.93

2,125.5

-1.35

2055

3,314.3

-0.02

2,350.8

-0.90

1,984.4

-1.36

2060

3,316.9

0.02

2,246.2

-0.91

1,849.4

-1.40

2065

3,320.0

0.02

2,144.9

-0.92

1,720.6

-1.43

2070

3,319.9

o.oo

2,044.9

-0.95

1,596.9

-1.48

Population (1,000)

2,558.0

9

Popullltlon (1,000)

2,558.0

indefinitely.

The

annual

rate

of

population

growth

will

be

reduced continuously from 1.11 per cent during 1985-90 to 0.11 per cent during 2025-30, after whi eh it will stay flat near the zero growth level.

We can, therefore, expect the population to

experience zero popu 1at ion growth around the year 2030, and from that time onwards the population is expected to remain almost stationary at slightly below 3.4 million. The

results

of

Projection

B reveal

that

a

completely

different scenario will emerged if fertility is not pushed back to replacement level and is allowed to continue indefinitely in the future at the 1985 1eve 1 of 0. 779.

The population will grow

from 2.56 million in 1985 to the peak of 3.02 million in 2015, after which it will start to shrink and fall back to 2.58 million in

2045.

It

will

continue

to

fall

progressively

below the

present size to touch the low of 2.04 million towards the end of the period in 2070.

The annual rate of increase will decelerate

faster from 1.02 per cent during 1985-90 to 0.12 per cent during

2010-15,

and

thereafter

we

will

witness

the

appearance

of

negative growth rate whi eh will decline over the years to reach

-0.95 per cent during 2065-70. It is clear that the decline in population will take place eventually because fertility would have

remained

below

replacement

level.

In

other

words,

not

enough children will be born to allow the population to replace itself in the next generation. The position would be worse if fertility were allowed to fall further from the 1985 level to 0.668 in the year 2000 and to remain constant thereafter.

Projection C shows that in this case

the population will only reach the maximum of 2.91 million in twenty-five years' time in 2010. After that it is expected to decline faster to reach the small size of 1. 60 million in 2070. The annual growth rate will drop from 0.98 per cent during

10

TABLE 2 Estla1'ecl Blrttls.

Year

198~2070

Projection A

Projection B

Projection C

1985*

42,484

42,484

42,484

1990

46,698

42,618

40,490

1995

47,124

39,252

35,426

2000

46,409

35,280

30,246

2005

42,784

32,478

27,824

2010

42,381

31,759

27,026

2015

44,001

31,689

26,410

2020

45,701

30,825

24,796

2025

46,043

28,914

22,338

2030

45,026

26,774

20,033

2035

43,862

25,215

18,496

2040

43,727

24,354

17,562

2045

44,514

23,704

16,699

2050

45,275

22,551

15,571

2055

45,338

20,274

14,255

2060

44,821

19,248

13,034

2065

44,353

18,476

12,080

2070

44,370

17,785

11,337

* Actual Births.

11

1985-90 to 0.11 per cent during 2005-10, and the negative growth rate will be increased from -0.04 per cent during 2010-15 to -1.48 per cent during 2065-70. Si nee the differences in the rate of popu 1at ion increase among the three projections are entirely dependent on the assumed future course of fertility, it would be instructive to look at the number of future births implied in these projections. Table 2 shows the estimated births for every five years up to 2070. According to Projection A, the number of births is expected to increase from 42,284 in 1985 to the peak of 47,124 in 1995 and to decrease after that to the low of 42,381 in 2010. These up-and-down movements will be repeated on two occasions, going up to 46,043 in 2025 and down again to 43,727 in 2040. This is followed by another upward movement to 45,338 in 2055, and thereafter going down again. This wave-like movement in the context of constant replacement fertility from the year 2000 onwards may be attributed to the distortions in the present age structure due to past fluctuations in the number of births. In studying the future changes in the age structure of the population, a summary of the age distribution expressed in terms of three functional age groups is shown in Tables 4 to 6. Figures have also been given for every ten years instead of every five years since they would be adequate enough to serve the purpose. According to figures for Projection A shown in Table 3, the number of children under 15 years of age wi 11 rise from 623,800 in 1985 to 682,300 in the year 2000, and then fluctuate by slightly below this level during the rest of the period. The working-age population from ages 15 to 59 will increase from 1,734,900 in 1985 to 2,079,200 in 2010, after which it will decrease slightly to about 1,900,000 in the 21st century. The old population aged 60 and over is expected to rise rapidly from 12

199,300 in 1985 to the peak of 829,600 in 2030, after which it will also decline slightly. By far the greatest change in the numbers is expected to occur among the old people. The above shift towards an aged population is better illustrated by the percentage figures presented in the lower section of Table 3. The proportion of persons in the youngest age group is expected to be reduced from 24.4 per cent in 1985 to 19.9 per cent in 2070, while those in the working-age group 15-59 will have their proportion reduced from 67.8 per cent to 57.9 per cent during the same period. On the other hand, the o1dest age group 60 and over will experience movement in the opposite direction, with the proportion of persons going up from 7.8 per cent at the beginning to 22.2 per cent at the end of the period. We can therefore expect to see not only an increase in the total dependency burden, but also a shift from the burden of child dependency to old dependency, which will be accompanied by certain social and economic consequences. The cost of providing for an old dependent is usually greater than a young dependent, and the increasing cost of supporting relatively more old dependents will be borne by the state and charitable institutions. Since people in different age groups have different needs, the changing consumption pattern will lead to a gradual swing from the demand for goods and services for children to that for the aged. The above scenario based on figures for Projection A assumes that fertility will move up from 0.779 in 1985 to the replacement level of 1.025 in 2000, and remain at that level. Should fertility not be raised back to replacement level, the scenario would be different as can be seen in Tables 4 and 5. Figures for Projection B show that if fertility remains constant at the 1985 level of 0.779, the number of children below age 15 will decrease 13

TABLE 3 ProjeC'ted Popu hrtfon by Three Age Groups Acccrdlng to Projection A, 1985-2070

Year

0-14

60 & Over

15-59

Number

(1 ,

Total

000)

1985

623.8

1,734.9

199.3

2,558.0

1990

620.8

1,850.9

230.9

2,702.6

2000

682.3

1,991.0

313.8

2,987.1

2010

659.7

2,079.2

452.4

3, 191.4

2020

643.4

1,982.4

702.0

3,328.3

2030

671.1

1,890. 5

829.6

3,391.2

2040

658.9

1,919.8

779.2

3,357.9

2050

654.2

1,933.1

729.7

3,316.9

2060

666.3

1,906.8

743.7

3,316.9

2070

660.2

1,921.3

738.5

3,320.0

Percentage 1985

24.4

67.8

7.8

1oo.o

1990

23.0

68.5

8.5

1oo.o

2000

22.8

66.7

10.5

1oo.o

2010

20.7

65.2

14.2

100.0

2020

19.3

59.6

21.1

1oo.o

2030

19.8

55.7

24.5

1oo.o

2040

19.6

57.2

23.2

1oo.o

2050

19.7

58.3

22.0

1oo.o

2060

20.1

57.5

22.4

1oo.o

2070

19.9

57.9

22.2

1oo.o

TABLE 4 Projectacl Popu I at ton by Three Age Groups Accanltng 1o ProJection a. 1985-2070

Year

0-14

15-59

60 & Over

Total

Number ( 1,000) 1985

623.8

1,734.9

199.3

2,558.0

1990

609.5

1,850.9

230.9

2,691.3

2000

594.7

1,991.0

313.8

2,899.5

2010

506.6

2,038.7

452.4

2,999.7

2020

468.5

1,843.3

702.0

3,013.8

2030

438.2

1,644.5

829.6

2,912.3

2040

387.2

1,531.5

779.2

2,698.0

2050

354.9

1,384. 7

720.0

2,459.6

2060

326.7

1,245.9

673.6

2,246.2

2070

293.2

1,147.3

604.4

2,044.9

Percentage 1985

24.4

67.8

7.8

100.0

1990

22.6

68.8

8.6

100.0

2000

20.5

68.7

10.8

100.0

2010

17.0

68.0

15.1

100.0

2020

15.5

61.2

23.3

100.0

2030

15.0

56.5

28.5

100.0

2040

14.4

56.8

28.9

100.0

2050

14.4

56.3

29.3

100.0

2060

14.5

55.5

30.0

100.0

2070

14.3

56.1

29.6

100.0

TABLE 5 Projected Popuhrtlon by Three Age Groups According 1o Projection c. 1985-2070

Year

0-14

60 & Over

15-59

Number

(1 ,

Total

000 >

1985

623.8

1,734.9

199.3

2,558.0

1990

604.2

I ,850.9

230.9

2,686.0

2000

553.0

1,991.0

313.8

2,857.7

2010

439.8

2,018.8

452.4

2,911.0

2020

392.8

1,778.1

702.0

2,872.9

2030

346.5

1,532.2

829.6

2,708.3

2040

288.0

1,361.9

779.2

2,429.1

2050

252.6

1,157.3

715.6

2,125.5

2060

220.1

989.1

640.2

I ,849.4

2070

186.7

867.5

542.7

1,596.9

Percentage 1985

24.4

67.8

7.8

100.0

1990

22.5

68.9

8.6

100.0

2000

19.3

69.7

11.0

100.0

2010

15.1

69.4

15.5

100.0

2020

13.7

61.9

24.4

100.0

2030

12.8

56.6

30.6

100.0

2040

11.9

56.1

32.1

100.0

2050

11.9

54.4

33.7

100.0

2060

11.9

53.5

34.6

100.0

2070

11.7

54.3

34.0

100.0

consistently from 623,800 in 1985 to 293,200 in 2070. The size of the working-age population is a 1so expected to shrink from The old 1,734,900 to 1,147,300 during the same period. population aged 60 and over will rise from 199,300 in 1985 to reach the peak of 829,600 in 2030, and after that it will drop to In fact, the figures up to 2040 are the same as those for Projection A because these o1d persons were a 1 ready born at the base period of 1985 and were subjected to the same mortality assumption.

604,400 in 2070.

The same pattern of changes is revea 1ed by the figures for Projection C in Table 5 when fertility is assumed to decline further from 0.779 in 1985 to 0.668 in 2000 and thereafter. The main difference is that the decrease in the population in the child-age group and working-age group is expected to take place at a quicker pace. Whilst the figures for the population aged 60 and over would again remain unchanged up to 2040 for the same reason, the dec 1 i ne after that year would be steeper because of the greater reduction in the number of births observed earlier. On account of the rapid fertility decline in the past, the process of the population becoming an aged one has already It was noted earlier that even if fertility is commenced. successfully pushed back to replacement level in 2000, the population will continue to become an aged one quite rapidly. The population will obviously be an aged one more rapidly if This is fertility does not go back to replacement level. reflected by the percentage figures shown in the lower section of Tables 4 and 5. The proportion of children below age 15 will fall from 24.4 per cent in 1985 to 14.3 per cent in Projection B and 11.7 per cent in Projection C towards the end of the period. At the other end of the age range, the proportion of old persons is expected to rise faster as the fertility level remains lower.

20

From the initial figure of 7.8 per cent, the proportion will rise sharply to 29.6 per cent in Projection B and 34.0 per cent in Projection C by the year 2070. The need to raise fertility back to replacement level should be viewed mainly in the light of preventing the population from declining in the 21st century. If this objective is achieved, it will also be possible to avoid an acceleratio n in the process of our population becoming largely an aged one as well as a worsening in the shortage of manpower supply. The latter aspect of population dynamics will be examined in greater detail with the aid of labour force projections in the next chapter.

21

IV

FUTURE LABOUR FORCE TRENDS

It was intimated earlier that the course of future population trends is such that the question of an adequate supply of labour in the country will be of great concern in the future. The size of the 1ab our force wi 11 depend primarily on changes in the size and age composition of the total population in the future.

To

some extent, changes in the age-specific labour force participation rates may affect the size of the population, but such changes in the future are extremely difficult to predict. Partly because of this,

it

is

assumed that the participation

rates will remain constant during the whole period of projection. What this implies is that the changes in the future labour force, to be discussed in this chapter, would be solely a reflection of the fertility trends assumed in our computation. This fits our objective well since our prime purpose is to demonstrate the impact of the different paths of fert i 1 ity trends on the growth and structure of the labour force. The total labour force at every five-year time-interval and the

increase

for

every

five-year

period

from

according to Projection A are presented in Tab 1e force is estimated to rise from 1,219,889 in 1985 1990, an increase of 80,311 or 6.6 per cent. In year period 1990-95, the labour force is expected

22

1985 onwards 6. The 1abour to 1,300,200 in the next fiveto increase by

number of 54,500 or 4.2 per cent.

a small

it amounts to only 6,400 or 0.4 per

continue to slacken until cent

2010-15.

during

attained

its

peak

The increase will

2015

By

level

of

the

labour

1,441,900,

and

force

would

thereafter

have it

is

expected to fluctuate slightly around the 1.4 million level with small negative growth rates at certain periods and small positive growth rates at others. The figures for Projection B rev ea 1 that the 1abour force will follow a somewhat different but more clear-cut path in the future.

It should be mentioned at the outset that there will be

no change in the growth rate during the first fifteen years up to

2000,

due

to

the

fact

that

the

changing

number

of

births

consequent on different fertility assumptions will only have its impact

felt

fifteen

years

entering the labour force.

later

when

the young

people start

However, the slackening in the rate

of growth is expected to continue beyond 2000 when the rate wi 11 drop to 1.7 during 2000-05 and 0.3 per cent during 2005-10.

From

the peak of 1,416,200 in 2010, the labour force is expected to decline by 1.7 per cent during 2010-15 and 3.4 per cent during

2015-20.

During the rest of the period it will dec 1 i ne by about

4-5 per cent every five years to reach the 1ow of 850,600 in 2070. will

The figures for Projection C show that the 1abour force follow

almost

the

same

path,

except

that

the

onset

of

decline will commence five years earlier soon after 2005 and the decline will be more pronounced. The results of our labour force projections suggest that if fertility were to move up to replacement level in the year 2000, the labour force will reach the maximum size of 1.44 million in

2015 and

will

million.

The stabil i zat ion of the 1ab our force at this size is

the

outcome

thereafter of

the

remain

almost

stabilization

23

of

steady the

at

about

population

1.40 under

TABLE 6 ProjeC'ted labour Force. 1985-2070 (Thousand)

Projection C

Projection B

Projection A

Increase

Increase

Increase Labour Force

Labour Force

Year

Labour Force

1985

1,219.9

-

-

1,219.9

-

-

1,219.9

1990

1,300.2

80.3

6.6

1,300.2

80.3

6.6

1,300.2

80.3

6.6

1995

1,354.7

54.5

4.2

1,354.7

54.5

4.2

1,354. 7

54.5

4.2

2000

1,388. 7

34.0

2.5

1,388.7

34.0

2.5

1,388. 7

34.0

2.5

2005

1,415.5

26.8

1.9

1,411.8

23.1

1.7

1,410.1

21.4

1.5

2010

1,435. 5

20.0

1.4

1,416.2

4.4

0.3

1,407 .o

- 3.1

-0.2

2015

1,441.9

6.4

0.4

1,392.3

-23.9

-1.7

1,368.6

-38.4

-2.7

Number

Per Cent

Number

Per Cent

Number

Per Cent

2020

1,434.6

- 7.3

-0.5

1,345.4

-46.9

-3.4

1,303.4

-65.2

-4.8

2025

1,415.9

-18.7

-1.3

1,286.9

-58.5

-4.3

1,226. 9

-76.5

-5.9

2030

1,398.3

-17.6

-1.2

1,228.8

-58.1

-4.5

1,153.8

-73.1

-6.0

2035

1,392.9

- 5.4

-0.4

1,176.8

-52.0

-4.2

1,081.6

-72.2

-6.3

2040

1,389.0

- 3.9

-0.3

1,128.3

-48.5

-4.1

1,013.3

-68.3

-6.3

2045

1,393.7

4.7

0.3

1,079.0

-49.3

-4.4

944.3

-69.0

-6.8

2050

1,395.4

1.7

o. 1

1,028.2

-50.8

-4.7

875.8

-68.5

-7.3

2055

1,392.2

- 3.2

-0.2

978.6

-49.6

-4.8

811.8

-64.0

-7.3

2060

1,388.9

- 3.3

-0.2

929.5

-49.1

-5.0

753.7

-58.1

-7.2

2065

1,387. 7

- 1.2

-0.1

890.2

-39.3

-4.2

701.1

-52.6

-7.0

2070

1,391.3

3.6

0.3

850.6

-39.6

-4.4

652.5

-48.6

-6.9

TABLE 7 Projected Labour Force by Age Group. 1985-2070

Projection A

Year

15-39

40 & Over

Projection B

Total

15-39

40 & Over

Projection C

Total

15-39

40 & Over

Total

Number (I ,000) 1985

900

320

I ,220

900

320

I ,220

900

320

I ,220

1990

905

395

1,300

905

395

1,300

905

395

1,300

2000

791

598

I ,389

791

598

I ,389

791

598

1,389

2010

731

704

1,435

712

704

1,416

703

704

1,407

2020

765

670

1,435

675

670

I ,345

633

670

I ,303

2030

760

638

I ,398

599

630

1,229

528

626

I, 154

2040

744

645

I ,389

540

588

1,128

452

561

I ,013

2050

758

637

I ,395

501

527

1,028

400

476

876

2060

757

632

I ,389

449

481

930

339

415

754

2070

750

641

1,391

410

441

851

292

360

652

Percentage 1985

73.8

26.2

100.0

73.8

26.2

100.0

73.8

26.2

100.0

1990

69.6

30.4

100.0

69.6

30.4

100.0

69.6

30.4

100.0

2000

56.9

43.1

100.0

56.9

43.1

100.0

56.9

43.1

100.0

2010

50.9

49.1

100.0

50.3

49.7

100.0

50.0

50.0

100.0

2020

53.3

46.7

100.0

50.2

49.8

100.0

48.6

51.4

100.0

2030

54.4

45.6

100.0

48.7

51.3

100.0

45.8

54.2

100.0

2040

53.4

46.6

100.0

47.9

52.1

100.0

44.6

55.4

100.0

2050

54.3

45.7

100.0

48.7

51.3

100.0

45.7

54.3

100.0

2060

54.5

45.5

100.0

48.3

51.7

100.0

45.0

55.0

100.0

2070

53.9

46.1

100.0

48.2

51.8

100.0

44.8

55.2

100.0

Projection A and the adoption of constant participation rates. If fertility were to continue to remain below replacement level, as in Projection Band C, the size of the labour force can be expected to shrink cant i nuous ly in the 21st century. The lower fertility remains below replacement, the greater will be the shrinkage in the size of the future labour force. Si nee the 1abour force projections have been computed for quinary age groups, it is possible to examine the type of changes that will happen to the age structure of the labour force. This will be accomplished in terms of two broad age groups as shown in Table 7. We will first look at the effect of the assumed rise in fertility back to replacement level as reflected by the figures for Projection A. In 1985 the young workers be 10~1 age 40 wou 1d belong to the cohort of babies born before 1960 when the annual number of births was on an upward trend. This accounts for the comparatively young labour force in 1985 with as many as 900,000 workers or 73.8 per cent below age 40. Contributing to this relatively large proportion of young workers were foreign workers. The number of young workers is expected to decline continuously towards the early 21st century as the smaller number of babies born during the 1970s and 1980s begin to enter the labour force. As births begin to stabilize at about 45,000, the proportion of young workers ~,; ll also remain at about 750,000 during the rest of the period. The number of old workers will more than double from 320,000 in 1985 to 704,000 in 2010, after which it will stay slightly below the latter level. The scenario wil1 be completely different if fertility 1~ere to remain below replacement level, as revealed by the figures for Projections B and C. However, no change in the age structure of the labour force will occur during the first fifteen years up to 2000 because the future entrants to the 1abour force in these 28

years

have already been pre-determined by the population aged under 15 as at 1985. Similarly, the number of old workers aged 40 and over wi 11 remain the same until 2020 because .they belong to the cohort of births already born prior to our base year 1985.

The difference is that there will be a continuous decline in the number of young workers from the year 2000 and old workers from 2020. If fertility were to remain at the 1985 level, a shrinkage can be expected in the number of young workers from 791,000 in 2000 to 410,000 in 2070 and in old workers from 670,000 in 2020 to 441,000 in 2070. Figures for Projection C show that the shrinkage wi 11 be more severe, v1i th the number of young workers dropping to 292,000 and the old workers to 360,000 by 2070. Apart from the above reduction in the number of workers in both the age groups, there wi 11 a 1 so be a faster ageing of the labour force when fertility remains below replacement level. According to Projection B, the proportion of old workers aged 40 and over will cent

in

increase from 26.2 per qent in 1985 to 51.8 per 2070. Th~ increase will be progressively larger

according to Projection C, v1ith the proportion reaching 55.2 per The ageing of the 1abour force is, of course, a direct result of the population getting older consequent on the rapid fertility decline in the past.

cent in 2070.

Our

discussion

of the future labour force based on the results of the three projections has underscored the two basic problems that we have to live with in the future. The first problem concerns the shortage of labour caused by a slackening in the growth rate of the 1abour force in the near future and an eventua 1 zero growth if fertility goes back to replacement 1eve 1 , or even negative growth if fertility continues below this level. Singapore cannot expect any re 1i ef to the present shortage of labour and must continue to depend heavily on foreign sources to 29

overcome the short fa 11 • As an important factor of production, the shortage of 1abour can be expected to continue to pose a serious constraint to further growth of the economy particularly in certain sectors which the local workers tend to shy away from. The other basic problem is the greying of the labour force. More o1der persons in their 1ate forties and fifties will be holding important positions in the public and private sectors compared with the present situation where relatively young persons are occupying these positions. One benefit of this trend is that qua 1it i es such as wisdom, experience, patience, breadth of views, stability, and sound judgement are found more among o1der workers than among the young ones. While benefiting from such qua 1it i es, emp 1oyers will have to incur higher 1abour costs in view of the higher wages that have to be paid to workers with longer years of service. The ageing of the labour force revealed by Projection A figures clearly demonstrates that even if fertility were to go back to replacement level, the problems associated with an older work-force cannot be avoided. Furthermore, we can expect a continuation of the present swing towards later retirement, dictated by the need to compensate for the shortage of labour, to acknowledge the increasing life expectancy due to the general improvement in the health of workers, and to a11 evi ate the increasing burden of caring for retired senior citizens.

30

V

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FUTURE TRENDS

The 1ong-term demographic go a 1 of Singapore is to stabilize the population at a certain fixed number in the first half of the 21st century.

In order to attain this go a 1 , it is necessary to

satisfy two conditions.

The first condition is that fertility

must be reduced to replacement level, and the other is to maintain it at this level. The first condition was successfully accomplished

in 1975 when the gross

reproduction

rate reached

1.006 which is slightly below the replacement level of 1.025. The completion of the demographic transition in less than two decades since fertility first commenced to fall

in 1958 can be

attributed to the comprehensive population contro1 programme as well as changing cultural, social, and economic factors favouring small families among the general population. The second condition was never realized since fertility has continued to dec 1 i ne be 1ow rep 1a cement 1eve 1 in the 1ast twe 1ve years, reaching the low point of 0.779 in 1985. This is clearly due to the continuation of the same strong population control programme even after replacement fertility was attained in 1975. The

failure to

relax

or eliminate the

anti-natalist

policies

earlier was probably due to a misunderstanding of the necessity to maintain fertility at replacement level if the population were to

be

stabilized

at

a fixed

size 31

and

to

be

prevented

from

dec 1 i ni ng in the future.

Even if the anti -nata 1 i st po 1 i ci es had

been abolished, the cultural, social, and economic factors favouring low fertility would continue to exert their influence. The recent experience of Taiwan and Hong Kong has demonstrated that replacement-level fertility can be attained even without strong government intervention in the area of childbearing. The significance of fertility below replacement level can be better appreciated if we examine the question of how many more births have to be produced in order to ensure a complete renewal of the population in the future. This question can be re so 1ved by estimating the number of births based on the assumption that the

age-specific

fertility

rates

corresponding

reproduction rate of 1.025 would prevail.

to

a

gross

The estimated births,

actua 1 births, and the short fa 11 s for the years 1974 to 1985 are presented in Table 8.

The 1974 figures have been included to

demonstrate that a gross reproduction rate of 1.135 has yielded 43,268 births, giving an excess of 4,194 over the 39,07 4 that would have been produced if fertility were at replacement level in that year. Prior to 1974, there were also enough births to ensure that the population can replace itself. In 1975 the number of births needed to reach rep 1a cement fertility amounted to 40,703, and would have needed to have been increased yearly to reach 55,900 in 1985.

The upward trend in

the absolute number despite the constant gross reproduction rate was

caused

by

the

reproductive ages. gross

reproduction

increasing

proportion

of

women

in

the

What had occurred in these years was that the rate

had

been

moving

down

below

the

replacement level and the actual births oscillated between 38,000 and 43,000. The net effect is that there has been a worsening in the short fa 11 in births during the past e 1even years. In the first two years 1975 and 1976, the deficit was quite negligible, 32

TABLE 8 Actual Births illlld Es1"1-'-1 Blrths 0 1974-85

Actual Fertility

Actual GRR

Actual Births

(2)

Replacement Fertility

Deficit Births

Assumed GRR

Estimated Births

Number (4)-(2)

Per Cent (5)/(4)

(3)

(4)

( 5)

(6)

Year

(1)

1974

1.135

43,268

1.025

39,074

+ 4,194

+10.7

1975

1.006

39,948

1.025

40,703

755

- 1.9

1976

1.019

42,783

1.025

43,035

252

- 0.6

1977

0.878

38,364

1.025

44,788

- 6,424

-14.3

1978

0.869

39,779

1.025

46,521

- 6,742

-14.5

1979

0.855

40,779

1.025

48,887

- 8,108

-16.6

1980

0.841

41,217

1.025

50,235

- 9,018

-18.0

1981

0.830

42,250

1.025

52,176

- 9,926

-19.0

1982

0.816

42,638

1.025

53,578

-11,186

-20.9

1983

0.766

40,585

1.025

54,316

-13,731

-25.3

1984

0.772

41,556

1.025

54,174

-12,618

-23.3

1985

0.779

42,484

1.025

55,900

-13,416

-24.0

33

755 and 252 respectively. But in 1977 the deficit shot up to 6,424 or 14.3 per cent, and worsened year after year unt i 1 it came to 13,416 or 24.0 per cent in 1985. The figures provide a clearer picture of the fact that not enough children are being produced to ensure that the population will not dec 1 i ne in the long run. to extrapolate the above analysis into the future, and in this connection the relevant figures have already been computed and shown earlier in Table 2. In this table the births for Projection A for the year 2000 onwards have been calculated on the assumption that fertility will remain at the replacement level of 1.025, while those for Projection B were reckoned on the basis of constant fertility at 1985 level of 0.779. The difference between these two figures gives an idea of the birth shortfall, for example, 46,409 - 35,280 = 11,119 or 24.0 per cent in the year 2000. This shortfall will continue to rise to 14,876 or 32.6 per cent in 2020; 19,373 or 44.3 per cent in 2040; and finally 26,595 or 59.9 per cent in 2070. With such persistent shortfalls in births, the population is expected to peak at only 3,018,100 in 2015 and to commence declining It would be useful

thereafter. The movement back to replacement fertility constitutes a prerequisite condition for avoiding a declining population in the An acce 1erated ageing process of the early 21st century. population and a worsening of the manpower shortage that accompany such a dec 1 i ne wi 11 have adverse consequences. Considering that fertility has remained well below replacement level for close to twelve years now, it is never too early to revise the population policies in order that the demographic goal of stabilizing the population in the future can be successfully The various components of the population control attained. 34

programme, which have served us well in the past, are no longer relevant or required nowadays and should be relaxed or even eliminated if there is to be any realistic chance of realizing the demographic goal. The most important part of the programme that deserves urgent review concerns the current practice of making abortion easily available to any woman who wishes to terminate her unwanted pregnancy. Induced abortion, first legalized in 1970 on a restrictive basis, was completely liberalized in 1975 with the result that the number of abortions shot up by 79.4 per cent from 7,175 in 1974 to 12,873 in 1975. It may be recalled that it was in 1975 that fertility first reached replacement level. As can be seen in Table 9, the annual number of abortions continued to rise steadily until it reached the record high of 23,512 in 1985, bringing the total for the whole sixteen-year period to 221,631. With annual births oscillating around 40,000, the abortion ratio was raised from 322.2 per 1,000 births in 1975 to 553.4 in 1985. What is a1so noteworthy, as Tab 1es 8 and 9 show, is that the annual number of abortions always exceeded the annual shortfall in births by a wide margin. It is time to make abortion available only on a more restrictive basis by amending the more liberal aspects of the Abortion Act and by institutionalizing counselling before and after the performance of abortion. Another area of the population control programme that requires urgent review concerns not only the provision of voluntary sterilization to women and men on an extremely liberal basis, but also the various incentives encouraging this permanent method of birth control. As in the case of abortion, sterilization was also legalized in 1970 and made easily available in 1975. Between 1970 and 1985 some 100,040 women and 5,764 men had undergone vo 1untary sterilization, and in 1982 about 23 per cent

35

TABLE 9 l.agllllzed AbortiCIIIS and Voluntllry S'hlrlllzatiCIIIS•

197()-85

Year

Abortions

Abortion Ratio

Star Ill zatlons

Sterilization Ratio

1970

1,913

41.6

2,122

46.2

1971

3,407

72.4

3,700

78.6

1972

3,806

76.6

5,889

118.5

1973

5,252

108.8

8,988

189.5

1974

7,175

165.8

9,147

211.4

1975

12,873

322.2

9,498

237.8

1976

15,496

362.2

10,218

238.8

1977

16,443

428.6

7,986

208.2

1978

17,246

433.5

7,245

182.1

1979

16,999

416.9

6,620

162.3

1980

18,219

442.0

6,266

152.0

1981

18,890

447.1

6,014

142.3

1982

19,110

448.0

5,637

132.2

1983

19,100

470.6

5,198

128.1

1984

22,190

534.0

5,786

139.2

1985

23,512

553.4

5,490

129.2

TOTAL

221,631

Ratio

= per

105,804

thousand births.

36

of the women within the reproductive ages were sterilized.

Since

sterilization has contributed to past fertility decline and is partly responsible for the current low fertility, it is necessary to amend the 1 i bera 1 aspects of the Sterilization Act and to abolish the incentives that come with it. For instance, sterilization should be restricted to spouses with at least two children instead of the current practice of even offering it to those with no children. The other major part of the programme that requires a critical examination pertains to the whole package of incentives and disincentives aimed at influencing couples to have small families. These anti-natalist measures have been effective in shaping public opinion and action toward "stopping at two", but have become redundant since fertility dropped below replacement 1eve 1 in 1975. Some of these measures have served their purpose well, but are now no longer effective in the context of the present low fertility and general affluence. As for those measures which are still effective, they should be made less severe or abolished since we are now more interested in raising fert i 1 i ty back to rep 1a cement 1eve1 than in 1oweri ng fertility further. Family planning, the fourth and oldest part of the programme, requires a thorough appraisal though not with the aim of eliminating it completely. The family planning programme should be revamped to give more emphasis to social welfare goals rather than national demographic goals. There is still scope to accomplish much in family planning from a welfare standpoint. Government and private agencies should continue to provide information, education, and clinic services with a view to improving the welfare of married couples. This could be accomplished by permitting couples to space rather than limit

37

births according to their personal circumstances by providing contraceptive methods that meet their needs and lifestyles. Moreover, they should be persuaded to use effective family p1anni ng methods instead of resorting to the common practice of Family-life abortion to terminate unplanned pregnancies. education for teenagers should be strengthened to minimize pre-maritally conceived pregnancies that lead to abortion or illegitimate births. It is important to recognize that as soon as fertility dropped below replacement level, the strong anti-natalist policies were no longer consistent with the national demographic goal of working toward a stationary population in the 21st century. When these po 1i ci es are modified or abo 1i shed, it is important to monitor closely the possible changes in the fertility trend to see whether it does in fact rise to rep 1acement 1eve 1 and stays there in the 1ong run. If fert i 1i ty still fails to move back to replacement level, there is little choice but to proceed a step further by introducing pro-nata 1i st policies aimed at influencing couples to produce more children.

38

TABLE 10 Projected Tota I Papu la'tiCIII by /oge Group. 1985-2070 (ProjectiCIII A)

Age Group

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

0-4 5-9

207,500 192,700

221,368 206,972

231,548 220,804

230,834 230,958

220,123 230,246

210,183 219,562

10-14 15-19

223,600 235,100

192,468 223,194

206,721 192,167

220,537 206,399

230,679 220,193

229,968 230,319

20-24 25-29

286,300 294,900

234,304 285,100

222,574 233,479

191,722 221,893

205,922 191,135

219,684 205,291

30-34 35-39

252,300 209,700

293,581 250,757

283,942 291,918

232,532 282,334

220,992 231,215

190,358 219,740

40-44 45-49

134,400 129,400

207,638 132,069

248,555 204,420

289,502 244,991

279,997 285,582

229,302 276,207

50-54 55-59

104,200 88,600

125,322 98,934

128,257 119,440

198,989 122,620

238,871 190,784

278,883 229,489

6Q-64 65-69

65,700 52,600

81,114 57,478

91,131 71,487

110,581 80,875

114,001 98,726

178,011 102,116

70-74 75-79

40,000 24,100

41,978 28,454

46,335 30,383

58,290 33,740

66,339 42,783

81,561 49,062

80-84 85 & Over

11,700 5,200

15,098 6,762

17,997 8,835

19,360 10,961

21,598 12,493

27,558 14,094

2,558,000

2,702,591

2,849,993

2,987,118

3,101,679

3,191,388

TOTAL

39

TABLE 10 (Continued) Projected Total Popu I at Ion by Aqe Group, 1985-2070 (Projection A)

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

0-4 5-9

213,185 209,648

221,379 212,642

226,419 220,815

224,753 225,842

219,369 224,180

216,164 218,810

10-14 15-19

219,297 229,609

209,395 218,955

212,386 209,069

220,549 212,055

225,569 220,205

223,909 225,218

20-24 25-29

229,787 219,011

229,079 229,083

218,449 228,378

208,585 217,780

211,565 207,946

219,696 210,918

30-34 35-39

204,457 189,279

218,121 203,299

228,152 216,885

227,450 226,860

216,895 226,161

207,101 215,666

40-44 45-49

217,920 226,200

187,710 214,969

201,613 185,166

215,086 198,881

224,980 212,170

224,287 221,932

50-54 55-59

270,084 268,424

221,188 260,452

210,201 213,305

181,055 202,700

194,468 174,588

207,459 187,525

60-64 65-69

214,664 159,968

251,714 193,542

244,855 227,620

201,028 222,079

191,019 182,334

164,516 173,235

70-74 75-79

84,744 60,692

133,313 63,369

161,928 100,147

191,150 122,200

187,312 144,914

154,447 142,745

80-84 85 & Over

31,819 17,276

39,613 20,456

41,334 25,109

65,279 27,866

79,589 39,129

94,287 50,014

3,266,064

3,328,279

3,371,831

3,391,198

3,382,393

3,357,929

Age Group

TOTAL

40

TABLE 10 (Continued) Projectad Total Papullltlon by Age Group. 1985-2070 (Projection Al

Age Group

2045

2050

2055

2060

2065

2070

0-4 5-9

217,774 215,613

221,594 217,219

223,627 221,029

222,507 223,057

220,076 221,940

218,963 219,515

10-14 15-19

218,546 223,560

215,353 218,205

216,956 215,017

220,763 216,618

222,788 220,419

221,672 222,440

20-24 25-29

224,698 219,023

223,043 224,009

217,701 222,360

214,520 217,035

216,117 213,863

219,910 215,456

30-34 35-39

210,062 205,927

218,133 208,872

223,099 216,897

221,461 221,835

216,154 220,206

212,994 214,930

40-44 45-49

213,879 221,248

204,220 210,981

207,141 201,454

215,100 204,335

219,997 212,186

218,382 217,017

50-54 55-59

217,008 200,047

216,340 209,261

206,300 208,617

196,984 198,936

199,801 189,952

207,479 192,669

60-64 65-69

176,711 149,183

188,505 160,248

197,196 170,934

196,590 178,829

187,467 178,280

179,001 170,006

70-74 75-79

147,280 118,302

126,814 112,776

136,227 97,086

145,300 104,300

152,028 111,235

151,561 116,402

92,821 60,643

76,908 64,420

73,286 59,324

63,074 55,625

67,767 49,771

72,265 49,252

3,332,325

3,316,901

3,314,251

3,316,869

3,320,047

3,319,914

80-84 85 & Over

TOTAL

41

TABLE 11 Projac:hld Male Popuhrtlon by llge Graap. 1985-2070 (Projection A)

1985

1990

0-4 5-9

107,700 100,300

115.319 107,431

10-14 15-19

115,600 120,600

2Q-24 25-29

2000

2005

2010

119,981 115,031

119,611 119,681

114,059 119,312

108,908 113,774

100,160 115,334

107,280 99,979

114,870 107,087

119,513 114,663

119,145 119,298

147,400 151,900

120,033 146,575

114,930 119,517

99,719 114,540

106,809 99,380

114,365 106,446

30-34 35-39

128,600 106,500

151,110 127,700

145,930 150,188

118,991 145,039

114,036 118,265

98,943 113,340

40-44 45-49

68,000 65,200

105,233 66,545

126,384 103,254

148,792 124,299

143,691 146,575

117,165 141,550

50-54 55-59

52,800 45,300

62,566 49,400

64,096 58,812

99,785 60,513

120,520 94,606

142,573 114,748

60-64 65-69

33,300 25,300

40,403 28,049

44,386 34,351

53,190 38,052

55,055 49,950

86,546 47,909

70-74 75-79

18,200 10,200

18,639 11,528

21,000 12,057

26,100 13,847

29,220 17,508

35,814 19,916

4,600 1,400

5,789 1,855

6,662 2,435

7,087 2,977

8,275 3,375

10,631 3,991

1,302,900

1,373,669

1,446,273

1,514,180

1,570,812

1,615,062

Age Group

80-84 85 & Over

TOTAL

1995

42

TABLE 11 (Continued ) ProJectad Male Popuhrtlon by Age Group. (Projectio n Al

Age Group

1~2070

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

0-4 5-9

110,463 108,636

114,710 110,187

117,322 114,423

116,459 117,029

113,669 116,168

112,007 113,385

10-14 15-19

113,615 118,930

108,484 113,410

110,033 108,289

114,263 109,835

116,865 114,057

116,005 116,655

2Q-24 25-29

118,988 113,976

118,621 118,583

113,115 118,218

108,007 112,730

109,549 107,640

113,760 109,177

30-34 35-39

105,977 98,339

113,475 105,331

118,061 112,783

117,698 117,341

112,234 116,980

107,166 111,549

40-44 45-49

112,286 115,420

97,425 110,613

104,351 95,973

111 '734 102,796

116,250 110,069

115,892 114,518

50-54 55-59

138,039 136,271

112,557 132,435

107,870 107,987

93,593 103,490

100,247 89,793

107,339 96,177

60-64 65-69

105,545 75,857

126,037 93,196

123,111 112,047

100,871 110,123

96,670 90,229

83,876 86,472

70-74 75-79

37,757 24,772

60,405 26,475

74,948 42,900

90,971 53,903

90,268 66,254

74,611 66,546

80-84 85 & Over

12,300 5,107

15,557 6,190

16,626 7,857

26,941 8,976

33,851 13,365

41,608 17,824

1,652,278

1,683,691

1,705,914

1,716,760

1,714,158

1'704,567

TOTAL

43

2040

TABLE 11 (Continued) Projected ..... Pqluhrtla. by • (Projectlan A)

en:.p. 1985-2070

2045

2050

2055

2060

2065

2070

0-4 5-9

112,841 111 '727

114,822 112,559

115,877 114,535

115,297 115,587

114,037 115,009

113,460 113,752

1Q-14 15-19

113,226 115,796

111,571 113,022

112,401 111,370

114,375 112,199

115,425 114,169

114,848 115,217

20-24 25-29

116,352 113,373

115,495 115,956

112,728 115,102

111,080 112,345

111,907 110,702

113,872 111,527

30-34 35-39

108,697 106,512

112,874 108,034

115,446 112,185

114,600 114,742

111,851 113,901

110,215 111 '169

40-44 45-49

110,512 114,165

105,521 108,865

107,029 103,949

111,142 105,434

113,675 109,486

112,842 111,981

5Q-54 55-59

111,678 102,981

111,334 107,144

106,165 106,814

101,371 101,855

102,819 97,255

106,771 98,645

60-64 65-69

89,839 75,027

96,195 80,361

100,083 86,046

99,775 89,524

95,143 89,249

90,846 85,105

70-74 75-79

72,074 55,615

62,535 53,724

66,981 46,614

71,719 49,928

74,618 53,459

74,389 55,620

80-84 85 & Over

41 '791 22,435

34,926 24,245

33,739 22,337

29,273 21,169

31,354 19,042

33,572 19,025

1,694,641

1,689,183

1,689,401

2,691,415

1,693,101

1,692,856

Age Group

TOTAL

44

TABLE 12 ProJIIC'ted F-Ie Popuhrtl- by Age Group. 1985-2070 (Projec:t"lan A)

Age Group

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

0-4 5-9

99,800 92,400

106,049 99,541

111,567 105,773

111,223 111,277

106,064 110,934

101,275 105,788

1D-14 15-19

108,000 114,500

92,308 107,860

99,441 92,188

105,667 99,312

111,166 105,530

110,823 111,021

20-24 25-29

138,900 143,000

114,271 138,525

107,644 113,962

92,003 107,353

99,113 91,755

105,319 98,845

30-34 35-39

123,700 103,200

142,471 123,057

138,012 141,730

113,541 137,295

106,956 112,950

91,415 106,400

40-44 45-49

66,400 64,200

102,405 65,524

122,171 101,166

140,710 120,692

136,306 139,007

112,137 134,657

50-54 55-59

51,400 43,300

62,756 49,534

64,161 60,628

99,204 62,107

118,351 96,178

136,310 114,741

60-64 65-69

32,400 27,300

40,711 29,429

46,745 37,136

57,391 42,823

58,946 52,776

91,465 54,207

70-74 75-79

21,800 13,900

23,339 16,926

25,335 18,326

32,190 19,893

37,119 25,275

45,747 29,146

7,100 3,800

9,309 4,907

11,335 6,400

12,273 7,984

13,323 9,118

16,927 10,103

1,255,100

1,328,922

1,403, 720

1,472,938

1,530,867

1,576,326

80-84 85 & Over

TOTAL

45

TABLE 12 opllhrtlon by Age Q-oap. I!JSS-2070 (P'rojec:t"lon 8)

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

o-4 5-9

99,800 92,400

101,199 99,541

97,356 100,936

88,629 97,103

80,576 88,399

76,387 80,367

10-14 15-19

108,000 114,500

92,308 107,860

99,441 92,188

100,835 99,312

97,006 100,704

88,311 96,880

20-24 25-29

138,900 143,000

114,271 138,525

107,644 113,962

92,003 107,353

99,113 91,755

100,503 98,845

30-34 35-39

123,700 103,200

142,471 123,057

138,012 141,730

113,541 137,295

106,956 112,950

91,415 106,400

40-44 45-49

66,400 64,200

102,405 65,524

122,171 101,166

140,710 120,692

136,306 139,007

112,137 134,657

50-54 55-59

51,400 43,300

62,756 49,534

64,161 60,628

99,204 62,107

118,351 96,178

136,310 114,741

60-64 65-69

32,400 27,300

40,711 29,429

46,745 37,136

57,391 42,823

58,946 52,776

91,465 54,207

70-74 75-79

21,800 13,900

23,339 16,926

25,335 18,326

32,190 19,893

37,119 25,275

45,747 29,146

7,100 3,800

9,309 4,907

11,335 6,400

12,273 7,984

13,323 9,118

16,927 10,103

1,255,100

1,324,072

1,384,672

1,431,338

1,463,858

1,484,548

Age Group

8Q-84 85 & Over

TOTAL

54

TABLE 15