Police Use of Force: Global Perspectives and Policy Implications 3031227042, 9783031227042

Table of contents :
Foreword
Contents
Part I: Police Use of Force in the United States and Canada
Chapter 1: Analyzing the Use of Deadly Force by Police in Canada and the United States
Canada and the United States of America: Bordering Nations
Policing in Canada
Policing in the United States of America
Policing and Violent Crime
Police Use of Deadly Force
The Risks Inherent in Policing
Theoretical Considerations: Police Use of Deadly Force
The Physiological Impact of Police Use of Deadly Force
Analysis
Conclusion
References
Chapter 2: Analyzing and Understanding Police-Involved Shootings in the United States
Introduction
The “Ferguson Effect”
A Decline in Public Trust in American Police Officers
Contemporary Police Officer Perspectives
Recent Sensational Police Incidents
Police-Involved Shootings in the United States
Race and Police-Involved Shootings
Serious Crime and Murder Spikes in the United States
Explanations for the Violent Crime and Murder Spike Since 2014
Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: Police Shootings, the Media, and the Public
Introduction
The Image of the Police in the Visual Arts and Media
Life Imitating Art or Art Imitating Life in Police Work
Policing in Democratic Society
Conclusion and Recommendations
References
Part II: Police Use of Force Globally
Chapter 4: A Comparison of the Use of Force by Police: New Zealand and England & Wales
Introduction
The Use of Force by Police
Discussion and Methodology
New Zealand and England and Wales – The Facts
Overview of the Recording of the Use of Police Force in New Zealand and England and Wales
New Zealand
England and Wales
Examination of Use of Force in New Zealand in 2017
Examination of Use of Force in England and Wales in 2017
Discussion
Conclusion
References
Chapter 5: Big Data Before Its Time: The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database
Introduction
The Establishment of a National Use of Force Database
New Zealand Police Staff Safety Project
New Zealand Police National Staff Safety Database
The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database
2009 and 2017 Review of the Tactical Options Research Report Database
Examining the New Zealand Police Tactical Options Research Report
The New Zealand Police 2017 Tactical Options Report
The United Kingdom
Conclusion
References
Part III: Police Non-lethal Use of Force Options
Chapter 6: Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters
Introduction
Stress Inoculation Training
Types and Lengths of Training and Use of Force Compared
The Toolbox
De-escalation and Pre-escalation
Pre-escalation Tactics
De-escalation Tactics
Breathing
Dynamic Simulation-Based Training
Legal Framing
Academic Framing
Introduction of Physical Skills
Simulations and Scenarios
Closed Dynamic Simulations
Open Dynamic Simulations
Officer-Induced/Officer-Created Jeopardy
Designing Training Simulations to Reduce Use of Force
Risk Matrix
Let Go of Your Ego and Depersonalise
Training Equipment
Inert Training Weapons
Helmets and Safety Glasses
Goals of Your Training
Evidence
Writing Scenarios
Simulation/Scenario Examples and Questions
Culminating Scenarios
Training and Technology
Conclusion
Apply the Skill
References
Chapter 7: Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public: A Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison
Introduction
Policing and the Importance of Transparency
CEW Use and Racial Bias
CEWs and Mission Creep
Are CEWs Reserved for Critical Incidents?
International CEW Reporting Requirements
Reporting CEW Use in the UK
Northern Ireland
England and Wales
Reporting CEW Use in the NZ
Reporting CEW Use in Australian Policing Jurisdictions
Victoria
Queensland
Northern Territory
New South Wales
Australian Capital Territory
Western Australia
Discussion and Conclusions
References
Part IV: Policing Protests, Demonstrations and Mass Violence
Chapter 8: Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses
Introduction
Public Order Law in Australia
Public Order Offences in NSW
Public Order Law in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland
Public Order Offences in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland
COVID-19: A 2021 Public Assembly Game-Changer?
Managing Crowds and Psychology of Crowds
Police Training
Police Tactics in Public Disorder Incidents
‘Kettling’
Preparation and Planning
Tactics Police Should Not Use
Legitimacy of Police
Protestor Tactics in Public Disorder Incidents
Conclusion
References
Chapter 9: An Examination of the Police Response to Riots and Violent Demonstrations in the United States
Introduction
Characteristics of Responding Agencies
Human Resources
Officer Physical Competency
Psychometric Testing
Reporting Actions and Civil Complaints
Equipment Used by a Police Civil Disorder or a Riot Squad
Firearms and Non-lethal Weapons
Training Members of Police Civil Disorder or Riot Squads
The Response Structure of a Police Civil Disorder or Riot Squad
Discussion
Conclusion
References
Chapter 10: Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United Kingdom
Introduction
Evolution of Football
Football-Related Disasters and Inquiries
Hillsborough Disaster in 1989
Football in England
Policing and Safety at Football Grounds
Football-Related Violence
Australia – History of A-League Football
Policing of Football Matches
Cost of Policing Football Matches
Crimes Committed by Football Fans in the Vicinity of Football Grounds
Policing Techniques to Deter Football Hooliganism
Police Training and Techniques
Alcohol at Sporting Events
Football Banning Orders
Football Banning Orders in Australia
Conclusion
References
Part V: Violence Directed at the Police
Chapter 11: Factors Influencing Assaults on New Zealand Police Officers
Introduction
Methodology
Discussion of the Results of the Survey
Characteristics of the Survey Respondents
Discussion
The Assailant
Officer Actions
Recording the Assault
Location of Assaults
Time of Day of Assaults
The Number of Individuals Present During an Assault
The Influence of Alcohol Consumption
Conclusion
References
Chapter 12: Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors
Introduction
An International Review of Assaults on Police Officers
Assaults on Police Officers in England and Wales
Assaults on Police Officers in the United States of America
Prior Research of Assaults on Police Officers
Types of Assaults on Police Officers
Measuring the Form and Number of Assaults
Factors and Circumstances Surrounding Assaults on Police Officers
Predictor of an Assault: Resistance by an Assailant
Predictor of an Assault: Characteristics of the Assaulted Officer
Predictor of an Assault: Characteristics of the Assailant
Predictor of an Assault: Situational Factors
Predictor of an Assault: Social Factors
Predictor of an Assault: Gender of Police Officer
Predictor on an Assault: Minority Officers
Organisational Factors
Organisational Structure
Responding to Domestic Assault Calls
Limitations of the Research
Conclusion
References
Part VI: Police Deviance and Brutality
Chapter 13: When the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa
Introduction
Explaining Police Brutality
Prominent Case Studies of Police Brutality in South Africa
Police Accountability
Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID)
Motivations for the Use of Violence by Police
Recommendations to Deal with Police Brutality
References
Chapter 14: Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality
Introduction
The Police Deviance Typology
Understanding Police Deviance
Examining Police Deviance Through Patterns and Trends
Police Deviance in the United States
Timetable of American Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct (1960s–Present)
The 1960s
The 1970s
The 1980s
The 1990s
2001 to the Present
Overview of Police Deviance Involving the NYPD
Police Corruption and Deviance: A Brief Literature Review
Theories of Crime and Police Deviance
Summary: Police Deviance
Theories of Crime and Police Corruption
Theories of Crime and Police Criminality
Theories of Crime and the Excessive Use of Force
Theories of Crime and Police Abuse of Authority
Theories of Crime and Police Misconduct
Theories of Crime and the “Blue Wall of Silence”
Theories of Crime and Courtroom Perjury
Policy Recommendations: Enhancing Organizational Integrity and Professionalism
Conclusion
References
Part VII: Holding Police Accountable
Chapter 15: The Use of Force by Police Officers in the Republic of Kosovo
Introduction
Use of Force by Police
Reviewing Use of Force by Police in Kosovo
Preliminary Actions and Use of Force Case Panel Review
The Use of Force Review Panel Report and Processes
Kosovo Police Use of Force Data
Conclusion
Chapter 16: The Effect of Police Accountability Measures on the Repeat Use of Excessive Force by Police Officers
Introduction
Literature Review
Theoretical Framework
The NYPD Data
Research Variables
Research Findings
Conclusion
References
Part VIII: Sociological and Psychological Factors Involving Police Use of Force
Chapter 17: Police-Community Relations: Policing Amidst the Black Lives Matter Movement in the United States
Introduction
The Derek Chauvin Case: What This Verdict Means for Future Police
The Many Deaths of Minorities by Law Enforcement
Botham Jean (Texas)
Daunte Wright (Minnesota)
Marvin Scott III (Texas)
Daniel Prude (New York)
Andre Hill (Ohio)
George Floyd (Minnesota)
HR 1280 George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021
The Emergence of the Active Bystander for Law Enforcement (ABLE) Project
The Use of Minority Community Members in Examining Police-Community Relations
Implications for African-American Police Officers
The Myth of Post Floyd Era Rising Crime Rates
Likely Future Trends
Conclusion
References
Chapter 18: The Negative Impact of Police Psycho-physiological Stressors
Introduction
Types of Police Stressors
Negative Outcomes Associated with Police Stressors and Possible Coping Mechanisms
New Features of the Present Study
Methodology
Participants
Research Procedures
Measurement of Police Stressors
Measurement of Possible Negative Outcomes
Measurement of Healthy and Unhealthy Coping Mechanisms
Preliminary Data Analyses
Data Analysis
Results
Preliminary Analyses of Demographic Variables Associated with Police Stressors
Negative Outcomes Associated with Police Stressors
Coping Mechanisms Most Significantly Associated with Police Stressors
Does Repressed Anger Mediate Associations Between Stressors and Negative Outcomes?
Discussion
Study Limitations
References
Chapter 19: Afterword and Final Thoughts
Introduction
Discussion
Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

James F. Albrecht Garth den Heyer   Editors

Police Use of Force Global Perspectives and Policy Implications

Police Use of Force

James F. Albrecht  •  Garth den Heyer Editors

Police Use of Force Global Perspectives and Policy Implications

Editors James F. Albrecht Pace University New York, NY, USA

Garth den Heyer Arizona State University Phoenix, AZ, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-22704-2    ISBN 978-3-031-22705-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is dedicated to police officers across the globe, who continue to make personal sacrifices to ensure that society remains safe and secure and particularly to those who have lost their lives while honorably serving their communities. “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.” Matthew 5:9—King James Bible This book is dedicated to my two children, Jimmy and Kristiana, who continue to provide me with constant motivation through their unlimited sense of curiosity and their enthusiasm for life and learning. James F. Albrecht This book is dedicated to my two grandsons, Liam and Joshua. Garth den Heyer

Foreword

When Ego Bittner posited that we need the Police when “something ought not to be happening about which something needs to be done RIGHT NOW,” he also implied that in order for that something to stop from happening, police officers who intervene to prevent this “something” from happening need to achieve compliance. Following this argument, Rubinstein postulated that “use of force be the police is not a matter of if, but rather when and how much.” Finally, this writer has stated, for decades now, that the more civilized we become as a society, and the more educated we are about our rights and privileges in the era of celebration of the importance of human rights, the more we resent the idea of being subject to a profession which carries the right to use coercive force and, ultimately, make the unfortunate call to take someone’s life. Given the three, aforementioned, complex notions, one needs to engage in an academic discourse as to how police officers in the field can actually achieve the necessary compliance to stop the “something that ought not to be happening” from actually happening. How can they achieve this end result, using the minimal amount of force, and while engaging in this dangerous and often impossible to resolve situation, do it with the necessary precautions that will lead to a successful end and a minimal amount of criticism from the public they are charged to protect? This book is an excellent, much overdue, and needed contribution to both the academe and the practitioners in the field. In the era of extreme assaults on the legitimacy of the police profession, it is a mandatory read for those who claim to understand the police profession, those who want to “reimagine” it, and those who actually put their lives on the line every day in an attempt to save the lives of others. Policing is a profession predicated upon the explicit, but also implied notion that its members have the authority to use coercive force to achieve compliance. The first step to accept this fact is to try to understand it as a true profession, from a comparative angle, in order to clarify the notion that when people engage in what they are not supposed to engage in, there needs to be a swift and certain response on the part of police officers. A recent participation in an international conference brought a relevant quote from one of the presenters, when a police officer from Iceland was asked by a vii

viii

Foreword

counterpart how he achieves compliance while not carrying a gun, as officers in Iceland are mostly unarmed. The officer, in response, pointed to his mouth. Yes, in the ideal world of policing a society that has less than a handful of shootings a year, his response sounded like the correct one. However, in the not so perfect world of hundreds of mass shootings a year, or even in environments where people are simply heavily armed and willing to point their guns at others, it may be hard, or simply impossible, to merely follow the tactical option described by this police officer from Iceland. Focus on police use of force protocols, from a comparative angle, highlights the complexity of this profession and its fundamental tool, while at the same time provides much food for thought that can, and should, be translated into training modules and a transformational change in the way officers are prepared for their daily tasks. At the same time, it also hints at another, much needed change, a thorough look at what competencies and skills police departments need to look for before they recruit individuals to discharge their duties, having the ability to use coercive force, when needed. If we agree upon the notion that policing is indeed a profession predicated upon regular use of force, be it from the mere presence standpoint and up to the deadly use of coercive force, then maybe we should rethink, in a fundamental manner, who the ideal candidate for this profession would be. I would be remiss if I had not concluded this preface with a simple notion: use of force never looks pretty, no matter how justified or restricted. This book, edited by Albrecht and den Heyer, is indeed a very important contribution to help us better understand more about the way we think about the police and the field of policing. Furthermore, it will help us improve this most noble of professions. Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice New York, NY, USA

Maria (Maki) Haberfeld

Contents

Part I Police Use of Force in the United States and Canada 1 Analyzing  the Use of Deadly Force by Police in Canada and the United States ������������������������������������������������������������������������������    3 Rick Parent and Catherine Parent Canada and the United States of America: Bordering Nations������������������    3 Policing in Canada����������������������������������������������������������������������������������    4 Policing in the United States of America������������������������������������������������    5 Policing and Violent Crime������������������������������������������������������������������������    6 Police Use of Deadly Force��������������������������������������������������������������������    8 The Risks Inherent in Policing����������������������������������������������������������������    9 Theoretical Considerations: Police Use of Deadly Force ����������������������   12 The Physiological Impact of Police Use of Deadly Force����������������������   13 Analysis������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   14 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   15 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   16 2 Analyzing  and Understanding Police-­Involved Shootings in the United States����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   19 James F. Albrecht Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   19 The “Ferguson Effect” ������������������������������������������������������������������������������   20 A Decline in Public Trust in American Police Officers ����������������������������   20 Contemporary Police Officer Perspectives������������������������������������������������   21 Recent Sensational Police Incidents����������������������������������������������������������   22 Police-Involved Shootings in the United States����������������������������������������   23 Race and Police-Involved Shootings���������������������������������������������������������   25 Serious Crime and Murder Spikes in the United States����������������������������   26 Explanations for the Violent Crime and Murder Spike Since 2014����������   27 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   29 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   30

ix

x

Contents

3 Police  Shootings, the Media, and the Public������������������������������������������   33 Hasan T. Arslan and Rainer Kroll Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   33 The Image of the Police in the Visual Arts and Media������������������������������   35 Life Imitating Art or Art Imitating Life in Police Work������������������������������    36 Policing in Democratic Society ����������������������������������������������������������������   39 Conclusion and Recommendations������������������������������������������������������������   42 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   44 Part II Police Use of Force Globally 4 A  Comparison of the Use of Force by Police: New Zealand and England & Wales������������������������������������������������������������������������������   49 Garth den Heyer Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   49 The Use of Force by Police������������������������������������������������������������������������   50 Discussion and Methodology��������������������������������������������������������������������   52 New Zealand and England and Wales – The Facts������������������������������������   52 Overview of the Recording of the Use of Police Force in New Zealand and England and Wales����������������������������������������������������   53 New Zealand ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   53 England and Wales����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   54 Examination of Use of Force in New Zealand in 2017������������������������������   54 Examination of Use of Force in England and Wales in 2017��������������������   56 Discussion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   59 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   62 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   63 5 Big  Data Before Its Time: The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database������������������������������������������������������������������������   67 Garth den Heyer Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   67 The Establishment of a National Use of Force Database��������������������������   68 New Zealand Police Staff Safety Project ��������������������������������������������������   72 New Zealand Police National Staff Safety Database��������������������������������   73 The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database ��������������������   74 2009 and 2017 Review of the Tactical Options Research Report Database ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   76 Examining the New Zealand Police Tactical Options Research Report ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   77 The New Zealand Police 2017 Tactical Options Report����������������������������   77 The United Kingdom ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   78 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   79 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   80

Contents

xi

Part III Police Non-lethal Use of Force Options 6 Police  Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   85 W. Bradley Cotton Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   85 Stress Inoculation Training������������������������������������������������������������������������   87 Types and Lengths of Training and Use of Force Compared��������������������   87 The Toolbox ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   88 De-escalation and Pre-escalation ��������������������������������������������������������������   89 Pre-escalation Tactics��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   91 De-escalation Tactics ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   91 Breathing������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   92 Dynamic Simulation-Based Training��������������������������������������������������������   93 Legal Framing ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   93 Academic Framing����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   93 Introduction of Physical Skills������������������������������������������������������������������   94 Simulations and Scenarios ������������������������������������������������������������������������   95 Closed Dynamic Simulations������������������������������������������������������������������   96 Open Dynamic Simulations��������������������������������������������������������������������   96 Officer-Induced/Officer-Created Jeopardy������������������������������������������������   98 Designing Training Simulations to Reduce Use of Force����������������������   99 Risk Matrix ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   99 Let Go of Your Ego and Depersonalise������������������������������������������������������  100 Training Equipment ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  100 Inert Training Weapons������������������������������������������������������������������������������  100 Helmets and Safety Glasses ����������������������������������������������������������������������  101 Goals of Your Training����������������������������������������������������������������������������  101 Evidence��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  102 Writing Scenarios������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  102 Simulation/Scenario Examples and Questions������������������������������������������  103 Culminating Scenarios ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  105 Training and Technology ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  106 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  106 Apply the Skill ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  107 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  107 7 Reporting  Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public: A Cross-­Jurisdictional Comparison ������������������������������  111 Emma Ryan and Laura Bedford Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  111 Policing and the Importance of Transparency ������������������������������������������  113 CEW Use and Racial Bias ������������������������������������������������������������������������  114 CEWs and Mission Creep��������������������������������������������������������������������������  117 Are CEWs Reserved for Critical Incidents?����������������������������������������������  119 International CEW Reporting Requirements ��������������������������������������������  120

xii

Contents

Reporting CEW Use in the UK������������������������������������������������������������������  120 Northern Ireland��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  120 England and Wales����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  121 Reporting CEW Use in the NZ������������������������������������������������������������������  123 Reporting CEW Use in Australian Policing Jurisdictions ������������������������  125 Victoria����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  127 Queensland����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  127 Northern Territory ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  129 New South Wales������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  129 Australian Capital Territory��������������������������������������������������������������������  130 Western Australia������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  130 Discussion and Conclusions����������������������������������������������������������������������  131 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  133 Part IV Policing Protests, Demonstrations and Mass Violence 8 Police  and Protestors: Motives and Responses��������������������������������������  139 Alan Beckley Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  139 Public Order Law in Australia ������������������������������������������������������������������  140 Public Order Offences in NSW������������������������������������������������������������������  142 Public Order Law in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland ��������������������  142 Public Order Offences in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland��������������  143 COVID-19: A 2021 Public Assembly Game-Changer?����������������������������  143 Managing Crowds and Psychology of Crowds������������������������������������������  146 Police Training ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  147 Police Tactics in Public Disorder Incidents ����������������������������������������������  149 ‘Kettling’����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  151 Preparation and Planning ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  152 Tactics Police Should Not Use������������������������������������������������������������������  153 Legitimacy of Police����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  154 Protestor Tactics in Public Disorder Incidents ������������������������������������������  156 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  159 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  161 9 An  Examination of the Police Response to Riots and Violent Demonstrations in the United States������������������������������������������������������  167 Garth den Heyer Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  167 Characteristics of Responding Agencies����������������������������������������������������  168 Human Resources��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  169 Officer Physical Competency��������������������������������������������������������������������  171 Psychometric Testing ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  172 Reporting Actions and Civil Complaints ��������������������������������������������������  173 Equipment Used by a Police Civil Disorder or a Riot Squad��������������������  173 Firearms and Non-lethal Weapons ������������������������������������������������������������  175

Contents

xiii

Training Members of Police Civil Disorder or Riot Squads����������������������  176 The Response Structure of a Police Civil Disorder or Riot Squad������������  179 Discussion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  181 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  183 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  183 10 Soccer-Related  Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United Kingdom��������������������������������������������������������������������  185 Alan Beckley Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  185 Evolution of Football ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  186 Football-Related Disasters and Inquiries ��������������������������������������������������  186 Hillsborough Disaster in 1989 ������������������������������������������������������������������  187 Football in England������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  190 Policing and Safety at Football Grounds ��������������������������������������������������  192 Football-Related Violence��������������������������������������������������������������������������  193 Australia – History of A-League Football ������������������������������������������������  195 Policing of Football Matches ��������������������������������������������������������������������  196 Cost of Policing Football Matches������������������������������������������������������������  197 Crimes Committed by Football Fans in the Vicinity of Football Grounds ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  199 Policing Techniques to Deter Football Hooliganism ��������������������������������  199 Police Training and Techniques ����������������������������������������������������������������  201 Alcohol at Sporting Events������������������������������������������������������������������������  202 Football Banning Orders����������������������������������������������������������������������������  202 Football Banning Orders in Australia��������������������������������������������������������  204 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  206 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  206 Part V Violence Directed at the Police 11 Factors  Influencing Assaults on New Zealand Police Officers������������  213 Garth den Heyer Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  213 Methodology����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  215 Discussion of the Results of the Survey����������������������������������������������������  215 Characteristics of the Survey Respondents������������������������������������������������  215 Discussion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  222 The Assailant����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  223 Officer Actions ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  224 Recording the Assault��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  226 Location of Assaults����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  226 Time of Day of Assaults����������������������������������������������������������������������������  226 The Number of Individuals Present During an Assault ����������������������������  227 The Influence of Alcohol Consumption����������������������������������������������������  228 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  228 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  229

xiv

Contents

12 Assaults  on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors����������������������  233 Garth den Heyer Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  233 An International Review of Assaults on Police Officers����������������������������  235 Assaults on Police Officers in England and Wales������������������������������������  236 Assaults on Police Officers in the United States of America��������������������  237 Prior Research of Assaults on Police Officers ������������������������������������������  239 Types of Assaults on Police Officers���������������������������������������������������������  240 Measuring the Form and Number of Assaults ������������������������������������������  242 Factors and Circumstances Surrounding Assaults on Police Officers ������  242 Predictor of an Assault: Resistance by an Assailant����������������������������������  244 Predictor of an Assault: Characteristics of the Assaulted Officer��������������  244 Predictor of an Assault: Characteristics of the Assailant ��������������������������  246 Predictor of an Assault: Situational Factors����������������������������������������������  247 Predictor of an Assault: Social Factors������������������������������������������������������  249 Predictor of an Assault: Gender of Police Officer ������������������������������������  250 Predictor on an Assault: Minority Officers������������������������������������������������  251 Organisational Factors ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  251 Organisational Structure����������������������������������������������������������������������������  252 Responding to Domestic Assault Calls������������������������������������������������������  254 Limitations of the Research ����������������������������������������������������������������������  254 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  255 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  257 Part VI Police Deviance and Brutality 13 When  the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  267 Christiaan Bezuidenhout and Annalise Kempen Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  267 Explaining Police Brutality������������������������������������������������������������������������  272 Prominent Case Studies of Police Brutality in South Africa ��������������������  275 Police Accountability ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  277 Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) ��������������������������������  278 Motivations for the Use of Violence by Police������������������������������������������  280 Recommendations to Deal with Police Brutality��������������������������������������  282 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  285 14 Criminological  Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  289 James F. Albrecht Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  289 The Police Deviance Typology������������������������������������������������������������������  289 Understanding Police Deviance ����������������������������������������������������������������  290 Examining Police Deviance Through Patterns and Trends������������������������  290 Police Deviance in the United States ��������������������������������������������������������  291

Contents

xv

Timetable of American Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct (1960s–Present)����������������������������������������������������������������������  291 The 1960s������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  292 The 1970s������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  292 The 1980s������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  293 The 1990s������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  294 2001 to the Present������������������������������������������������������������������������������  297 Overview of Police Deviance Involving the NYPD����������������������������������  298 Police Corruption and Deviance: A Brief Literature Review��������������������  299 Theories of Crime and Police Deviance����������������������������������������������������  300 Summary: Police Deviance������������������������������������������������������������������������  301 Theories of Crime and Police Corruption��������������������������������������������������  302 Theories of Crime and Police Criminality ������������������������������������������������  303 Theories of Crime and the Excessive Use of Force ����������������������������������  304 Theories of Crime and Police Abuse of Authority������������������������������������  305 Theories of Crime and Police Misconduct������������������������������������������������  306 Theories of Crime and the “Blue Wall of Silence”������������������������������������  307 Theories of Crime and Courtroom Perjury������������������������������������������������  307 Policy Recommendations: Enhancing Organizational Integrity and Professionalism ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  308 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  310 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  310 Part VII Holding Police Accountable 15 The  Use of Force by Police Officers in the Republic of Kosovo����������  315 Reshat Maliqi Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  315 Use of Force by Police ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  316 Reviewing Use of Force by Police in Kosovo�������������������������������������������  316 Preliminary Actions and Use of Force Case Panel Review ����������������������  318 The Use of Force Review Panel Report and Processes������������������������������  319 Kosovo Police Use of Force Data��������������������������������������������������������������  320 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  321 16 The  Effect of Police Accountability Measures on the Repeat Use of Excessive Force by Police Officers����������������������������������������������  323 Suat Cubukcu and Olivia Hom Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  323 Literature Review��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  324 Theoretical Framework������������������������������������������������������������������������������  325 The NYPD Data����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  328 Research Variables ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  329 Research Findings��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  331 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  335 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  336

xvi

Contents

Part VIII Sociological and Psychological Factors Involving Police Use of Force 17 Police-Community  Relations: Policing Amidst the Black Lives Matter Movement in the United States����������������������������������������  341 Robert D. Hanser and Savannah Ohara Quinn Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  341 The Derek Chauvin Case: What This Verdict Means for Future Police ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  341 The Many Deaths of Minorities by Law Enforcement ��������������������������  342 HR 1280 George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021������������������������  347 The Emergence of the Active Bystander for Law Enforcement (ABLE) Project ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  349 The Use of Minority Community Members in Examining Police-­Community Relations������������������������������������������������������������������  351 Implications for African-American Police Officers��������������������������������  352 The Myth of Post Floyd Era Rising Crime Rates ����������������������������������  353 Likely Future Trends������������������������������������������������������������������������������  354 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  356 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  357 18 The  Negative Impact of Police Psycho-­physiological Stressors ����������  361 S. Hakan Can Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  361 Types of Police Stressors ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  361 Negative Outcomes Associated with Police Stressors and Possible Coping Mechanisms ������������������������������������������������������������  362 New Features of the Present Study������������������������������������������������������������  363 Methodology����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  364 Participants����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  364 Research Procedures ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  364 Measurement of Police Stressors������������������������������������������������������������  365 Measurement of Possible Negative Outcomes����������������������������������������  365 Measurement of Healthy and Unhealthy Coping Mechanisms��������������  366 Preliminary Data Analyses����������������������������������������������������������������������  367 Data Analysis������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  367 Results��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  368 Preliminary Analyses of Demographic Variables Associated with Police Stressors ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  368 Negative Outcomes Associated with Police Stressors����������������������������  369 Coping Mechanisms Most Significantly Associated with Police Stressors ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  369 Does Repressed Anger Mediate Associations Between Stressors and Negative Outcomes?������������������������������������������������������������������������  369 Discussion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  371 Study Limitations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  372 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  373

Contents

xvii

19 Afterword and Final Thoughts ��������������������������������������������������������������  377 James F. Albrecht Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  377 Discussion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  378 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  382 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  385

Part I

Police Use of Force in the United States and Canada

Chapter 1

Analyzing the Use of Deadly Force by Police in Canada and the United States Rick Parent and Catherine Parent

Canada and the United States of America: Bordering Nations Canada and the United States are bordering nations that share similar social and economic experiences. The population of Canada in 2021 is roughly 38 million within a nation comprised of 9985 million square kilometres. Canada is the second-­ largest country in the world, located in the upper half of North America. The nation is vast and rugged. To the south, Canada shares 8890 kilometres of land border with the United States, the longest international border in the world. Canada’s largest cities and the bulk of the nations populous live within a few hundred kilometres of the US/Canadian border (Statistics Canada, 2021a, b). The nation is highly developed with an advanced economy and membership in several international institutions and groupings that include NATO, the G7, and the World Trade Organization. The nation is also a bilingual parliamentary democracy providing universal health care for all citizens. The United States is the fourth largest country in the world within a nation comprised of 9834 million square kilometres. In 2021, the population of the United States is estimated to be roughly 332 million making it the third most populated nation in the world (World Factbook, 2021). It is considered a federal republic with three separate branches of government having one of the world’s largest economies. Internationally, the United States is seen as a leader in areas that include human rights, education, economic freedom, and quality of life. It is a founding member of the United Nations with membership in several international institutions and groupings that also include NATO, the G7, and the World Trade Organization. Both Canada and the United States reflect nations founded on democratic principles and high qualities of life, enjoying a GNP that is one of the highest in the R. Parent (*) · C. Parent Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_1

3

4

R. Parent and C. Parent

world. Canada and the United States also administer national Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) programs that are based on police reported data, thus allowing for limited comparisons of crime rates.

Policing in Canada Policing is the largest component of the Canadian criminal justice system with a budget of over $14 billion (Whitelaw & Parent, 2018: 21). There are approximately 200 police agencies and 69,000 police officers in the nation reflecting a rate of police strength of 183 officers per 100,000 population (Statistics Canada, 2019). Sixty percent of all police officers are employed within five Canadian police services—the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Toronto Police Service, the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), the Sûreté du Québec (SQ), and the City of Montreal Police Service (Service de police de la Ville de Montréal, or SPVM). Stand-alone municipal police services in Canada represent the remaining 40% of the police personnel. In 2015, there were a total of 176 municipal police services of which 117 police services had fewer than 25 staff. In the far north, Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and the Yukon utilize the services of the federal RCMP for policing (Statistics Canada, 2017). Police officers carry out their tasks within several legislative frameworks that define their roles, powers, and responsibilities. Policing in Canada is carried out at four levels: municipal, provincial, federal, and First Nations (Indigenous). Most police work is performed by services operating at the municipal level. Across Canada, municipal police services range in size from three officers to more than 5000 officers (the Toronto Police Service has 5366 plus an additional 2818 civilian personnel, and the Montreal Police Service has 4583 and an additional 1364 civilian personnel), and have jurisdiction within a city’s boundaries (Statistics Canada, 2016). A unique feature of the Canadian policing landscape is the evolution of “autonomous” Indigenous police forces occurring within the context of a broader movement leading towards Indigenous self-government. Under the First Nations Policing Policy (FNPP), Indigenous policing is implemented across Canada through tripartite agreements negotiated among the federal government, provincial or territorial governments, and First Nations. In 2015, there were 186 First Nations policing program agreements in place in Canada, providing policing services to roughly 65% of First Nation and Inuit communities nationwide. A total of 1299 police officer positions receive funding under the FNPP, serving a population of approximately 422,000 in 453 communities. Officers in Indigenous police forces generally have full powers to enforce the Criminal Code and federal and provincial statutes, as well as band bylaws on reserve lands (Whitelaw & Parent, 2018: 24). In Canada, the police are responsible for the services they provide to the community as well as for their conduct within the community. There are both legislative and administrative frameworks for holding Canadian police officers accountable for their actions. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has had a significant

1  Analyzing the Use of Deadly Force by Police in Canada and the United States

5

impact on police work. Since its enactment in the early 1980s, a number of major decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada (so-called Charter cases) have further defined the role and powers of the police. Police officers can be held accountable under the Criminal Code as well as under civil and administrative law for their actions. For example, the police have been held civilly liable for negligent investigations and both negligent supervision and negligent retention of employees. Furthermore, the various provincial police acts set out mechanisms and procedures for overseeing and reviewing the actions and decisions of police officers. One of the most significant recent developments is the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. McNeil (2009), as a result of which police services must now release a police officer’s disciplinary records to defense counsel prior to a criminal prosecution. Police services and their employees are also held accountable by coroner’s inquests or fatality inquiries and by human rights boards and commissions. Freedom of information legislation has also established a heightened level of accountability in relation to police records and their management. Every Canadian province has established an office whose task is to receive and review general complaints against police officers. The role of each oversight body varies, ranging from reviewing complaint investigations and making recommendations to conducting the investigation itself. In addition, there has also been the establishment of policing oversight bodies to review specific issues related to the police use of force. For example, in Canada’s most populated province of Ontario, the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) provides external civilian review of police activities. The SIU specifically investigates cases involving serious injury, sexual assault, or death that may have been the result of criminal offenses committed by police officers. The SIU is independent of any police service and operates directly under the provincial attorney general. It has the authority to investigate municipal, regional, and provincial police officers. The director of the SIU has the authority to decide whether charges are warranted in a case, and he or she reports this decision directly to the attorney general. This model of external civilian review has also been established in other provinces. In the western province of Alberta, the Alberta Serious Incident Response Team (ASIRT) has a similar but broader mandate in that it also investigates sensitive matters involving police conduct (Whitelaw & Parent, 2018: 28).

Policing in the United States of America In the United States, there are approximately 18,000 separate police agencies and a wide variety of governmental agencies that have police powers (e.g., United States Postal Service). Together these various law enforcement agencies employ roughly 700,000 sworn law enforcement officers serving approximately 330 million people (USCB, 2021). These numbers reflect a rate of police strength of roughly 212 officers per 100,000 population. In contrast, Canada has fewer officers per capita at a rate of 183 per 100,000 population.

6

R. Parent and C. Parent

Policing in the United States is complex. Although the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution reserves police powers for the individual states, law enforcement agencies have evolved at the local, state, and federal levels, each having unique operational responsibilities. For example, the national government has police agencies such as the FBI and the Secret Service, but they are authorized to enforce only those laws prescribed under the powers granted to Congress. The FBI, part of the Department of Justice, is responsible for the investigation of all violations of federal laws. The FBI has jurisdiction over fewer than 200 criminal matters, including offenses such as kidnapping, extortion, interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles, and treason (Cole, 1987). In addition, the FBI is responsible for the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system that collects national statistics on crime, criminals, and criminal justice agencies. For the most part, law enforcement in the US is a function of state and local agencies. Within this setting, there are 52 separate criminal law jurisdictions in the United States. Of these 52 jurisdictions, one exists in each of the 50 states, one in the District of Columbia and one represents the Federal jurisdiction. Each of these jurisdictions has its own criminal law and procedure as well as its own law enforcement agencies. Although the systems of law enforcement among the 50 states are quite similar there are frequently substantial differences in the penalties for similar offenses. Furthermore, a given jurisdiction in the US may be policed by several law enforcement agencies: a city police department, a sheriff’s department, a state police organization, and several federal agencies (e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms). Along with federal police agencies, each state operates their own law enforcement agency that may include a state police or a state highway patrol agency. Historically, state police agencies were created for a variety of reasons such as the need to provide law enforcement in rural or undeveloped areas, the need to investigate criminal activities occurring outside of city or county jurisdictions, and to provide assistance to local police agencies if needed (Gaines & Kappeler, 2015). There are also local police agencies in the United States. These local police agencies include city, municipal, college, university, and county agencies. County police departments include sheriff’s departments and county police agencies. In addition, Tribal governments operate over 200 local police departments. Combined, these local police agencies employ the largest number of police officers in the United States and account for the vast majority of police services provided (Gaines & Kappeler, 2015).

Policing and Violent Crime While the societies of Canada and the United States of America are similar in many ways there are significant differences in the rates of extreme violence between the two nations. Crime rates between Canada and the United States, for the year 2020,

1  Analyzing the Use of Deadly Force by Police in Canada and the United States

7

indicate that the US has much higher rates of violent crime per capita. Despite the differences in crime rates, previous research suggests that trends in crime between the two countries have been quite similar during the 1980s and 1990s. Both countries administer national Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) programs but use different offense definitions and techniques to record and count crimes (Statistics Canada, 2001). Canada and the United States also have very different regional variations in crime and varying economic and socio-demographic characteristics. Nonetheless, it is possible to examine selected acts of community violence that include the rates for homicide, justifiable homicide, the police use of deadly force, and the murder of police officers. For example, in Canada, there were 743 homicides in 2020 resulting in a national rate of 1.95 homicides per 100,000 population. In comparison, there were 21,570 homicides in the United States in 2020, resulting in a national rate of 6.5 per 100,000 population—a figure that is more than three times higher than Canada’s. It is interesting to note that, in the United States, private citizens (non-police) “justifiably” kill roughly 350 individuals each year. Certain willful killings are considered to be justifiable or excusable. In the United States, justifiable homicide is defined as, and limited to, the killing of a felon by a law enforcement officer in the line of duty, or the killing of a felon by a private citizen during the commission of a felony (UCR, 2021). Since these killings have been determined to be justifiable by way of a law enforcement investigation they are tabulated separately and apart from murder statistics. The vast majority of these individuals are shot and killed with a handgun. In contrast, private citizens in Canada rarely, if ever, are involved in a “justifiable” shooting incident largely due to the unavailability of handguns as well as the restriction of firearms in general. In those extremely rare incidents where a member of the Canadian public has discharged a firearm to prevent a crime, the individual discharging the firearm is often charged with a firearm offense or, other Criminal Code offense, resulting in a judicial examination of the incident (Parent & Parent, 2018). Noteworthy is that the homicide rate in general has been rising in the United States with recent UCR data indicating nearly a 30% increase in homicides from the year 2019 to 2020. This is the largest single-year increase since the 1960s. The increase in homicides is believed to be based on a recent spike in gun violence highlighting that 77% of reported murders were committed with a gun (UCR, 2021). Overall, violent crime in the United States was up 5.2% in 2020 with 1,277,696 incidents reported. The 2020 statistics reflect a rate of violent crime as 398.5 offenses per 100,000 inhabitants. The estimated rate of property crime was 1958.2 offenses per 100,000 inhabitants, reflecting a decline of 8.1% (UCR, 2021). In contrast, Statistics Canada noted that the homicide rate in Canada increased 7%, from 1.83 homicides per 100,000 population in 2019 to 1.95 in 2020. Canadian police agencies reported higher rates of all three violent firearm violations: discharging a firearm with intent (+21%, 1850 incidents in 2020), pointing of a firearm (+14%, 1670 incidents), and using a firearm in the commission of an indictable offense (+3%, 617 incidents). However, robbery, and the act of violence or threat of violence during the commission of a theft, was down sharply.

8

R. Parent and C. Parent

Crimes that are more serious but not specifically related to firearms, such as homicide, robbery, assault, and sexual assault, may also involve the use or presence of a firearm. In 2020, there were 8344 victims of violent crime where a firearm was present during the commission of the offense, or a rate of 29 per 100,000 population. This rate was unchanged when compared with 2019. In sum, there were over 2 million police-reported Criminal Code incidents (excluding traffic) in 2020, about 195,000 fewer incidents than in 2019. At 5301 incidents per 100,000 population, the police-reported crime rate—which measures the volume of crime—decreased 10% in 2020 with a recorded 5301 incidents per 100,000 population (Statistics Canada, 2021a, b).

Police Use of Deadly Force When police officers in western society use firearms against individuals, it may be assumed that they are using lethal force. Generally, officers who discharge a firearm or utilize other forms of potentially deadly force are attempting to immediately incapacitate a perceived lethal threat to themselves or another individual. This decision-­making process will usually transpire at a time when the individual officer is under considerable stress and perceived danger, leaving him or her open to the influence of a variety of physiological and psychological factors. In both Canada and the USA, police shootings and the use of deadly force tend to generate the most media attention, public interest, and controversy on police misconduct. However, in terms of volume, the police use of deadly force is more of an issue in the USA than in Canada. Proportionately, and in absolute numbers, far more people die by legal intervention in the USA. One possible explanation for this difference relates to the availability and use of handguns by the public in the USA as well as the American Constitutional provision to bear arms. Possession of a handgun is both highly regulated and restricted in Canada. Furthermore, Canada has no provision within the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms enshrining the right to possess firearms (Parent & Parent, 2018). While policing within Canada and the United States of America is similar in many ways there are also differences between the two nations. For example, the Canadian province of Newfoundland remained the last bastion of “unarmed policing” on the continent of North America until as recently as 1998. This was because Canada’s most eastern province entered into a confederation with Canada in 1949, becoming the nations tenth province. Before 1949, Newfoundland was under the guidance of Great Britain and distinct from the rest of North America in many ways, including that of policing. The former British Colony created an independent police force using the Royal Irish Constabulary as a model, thus drawing upon the best features of Irish and British Policing. When joining with Canada, Newfoundland maintained their tradition of having an unarmed police force while the rest of North America had armed their police. For over 120  years, the “Royal Newfoundland Constabulary” (RNC) continued to be the only policing jurisdiction within Canada

1  Analyzing the Use of Deadly Force by Police in Canada and the United States

9

and the United States where day-to-day street level policing was conducted without police having immediate access to firearms. This was a fact that was long considered to be a source of pride by the local population of Newfoundland. While the police had access to firearms that were kept either secured in the trunk of their vehicles or at their police station, members of the RNC rarely, if ever, utilized firearms. A review of police shootings revealed that RNC personnel had been involved in only one shooting incident during the 20-year period from 1978 to 1998. This single shooting incident was non-fatal (Parent, 2004). However, owing to changes within society and the influx of visitors from the United States and the rest of Canada, members of the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary lobbied to have immediate access to firearms like their Canadian and American counterparts. In June 1998, the RNC was granted its request and shortly after being equipped with firearms the RNC became involved in two shooting incidents underscoring the complexities associated with deploying an armed police service. Other differences between the US and Canadian police exist. For example, Canadian police officers rarely, if ever, carry their issued police service firearm on their days off. Most Canadian police agencies require that police personnel secure their firearm at their place of employment when not working. In contrast, it is not uncommon for “off-duty” police personnel in the USA to be involved in a shooting incident. One study noted that, in some instances, off-duty police officers were the first to attend the scene of a crime in progress and could be the first to confront an assailant with their police issued firearm in hand (Parent, 2004: 290). Typically, these off-duty US officers were dressed in civilian attire and were somehow alerted to shots fired outside their personal residence, or at a commercial center. The attendance of off-duty and non-uniformed police personnel to the altercation further added to the dynamics of the shooting incident. Research has revealed that overall, there are relatively few differences in relation to the dynamics and circumstances of police use of deadly force in the United States and Canada. The issues pertaining to police use of deadly force are for the most part very similar. The major differences between these two nations are reflected in the frequency of incidents rather than the individual characteristics of a police shooting (Parent, 2004: 281–219).

The Risks Inherent in Policing It is within this setting that approximately 1000 individuals are shot and killed by American law enforcement personnel each year. In 2015, the Washington Post first estimated that police agencies in the United States fatally shot 987 individuals. Reporting a population of 320 million people, this number reflects a frequency rate of roughly three fatal police shootings per 1 million individuals. The Washington Post continues to monitor and document fatal police shootings within the United

10

R. Parent and C. Parent

Fatal Police Shoongs in Canada 30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Fig. 1.1  Police use of deadly force in Canada: 1990–2014 (n = 376) Frequency of Fatal Police Shootings in Relation to Relative Population in Canada 1990: 17 fatal/27,691,000 = Roughly 1 fatal shooting per 1.62 million people 2000: 11 fatal/30,685,000 = Roughly 1 fatal shooting per 2.8 million people 2005: 22 fatal/32,242,000 = Roughly 1 fatal shooting per 1.47 million people 2009: 22 fatal/33,628,000 = Roughly 1 fatal shooting per 1.53 million people 2011: 28 fatal/34,342,000 = Roughly 1 fatal shooting per 1.25 million people 2014: 19 fatal/35,543,000 = Roughly 1 fatal shooting per 1.85 million people Note: *The frequency of fatal police shootings per population in Canada has slightly increased over the past 25 years. Since 2004, there is a noticeable increase in fatal police shootings in Canada **From 2004 to 2014, a total of 214 fatal shootings occurred in Canada during the 11-year period of analysis reflecting a rate of roughly 19.5 fatal police shootings per year. (n = 214/11 = 19.45) This high average is higher than the previous decade ***In contrast, police agencies in the United States of America fatally have shot an estimated 1000 individuals in 2015, within a nation of 320 million people. This reflects a frequency rate of roughly three fatal police shootings per one million citizens. (The Washington Post media source estimates that police agencies in the USA fatally shot 987 individuals in 2015.) The frequency rate of fatal police shootings in the USA is roughly five times greater than the frequency of fatal police shootings in Canada (per capita): 2014 – Canada: Roughly 1 fatal shooting per 1.85 million 2015 – United States of America: Roughly 1 fatal shooting per 320,000 Source: Parent and Parent (2018)

States, reporting that there were 999 fatal shootings in the year 2019 and 1021 in the year 2020 (Washington Post, 2021). In stark contrast, there were 30 fatal police shootings in Canada in 2017 and 21 in 2019. Figure 1.1 indicates that that there have been 376 fatal police shootings in Canada during the 25-year period from January 01, 1990 and December 31, 2014

1  Analyzing the Use of Deadly Force by Police in Canada and the United States

11

(Parent & Parent, 2018). This number equates to approximately 15 fatal police shootings per year during this period, reflecting a rate of one fatal shooting per 1.85 million individuals (Parent & Parent, 2018). Based on population figures, the number of deaths by legal intervention within the United States is roughly five times greater than the corresponding number of legal intervention deaths within neighboring Canada (per capita). Researchers suggest that the police use of deadly force in Canada and the US typically occurs when police personnel, or a member of the public that they are protecting, are facing the immediate risk of being murdered or suffering grievous bodily harm at the hands of an assailant. The use of a police firearm is often the only means available that will immediately incapacitate the perceived lethal threat and prevent harm (Parent & Parent, 2018). Added to the circumstances surrounding police shootings are numerous documented incidents where law enforcement personnel in Canada and the United States have faced a potentially lethal threat, but the death of a suspect did not occur. This category includes those incidents in which a police officer utilized potentially deadly force by discharging his or her firearm, but death did not result. In these instances, the suspect either survived his or her wounds or, in other instances, the police missed, so the suspect was not shot. It must be emphasized that in both Canada and the United States there are also countless incidents of lethal threats to law enforcement personnel that are resolved each year without the discharge of a firearm. During these instances, the officers utilized alternate tactics or less-lethal compliance tools such as pepper spray or Taser guns to subdue the individual who was posing a lethal threat. Often, this method of resolution has occurred with an increased risk to the police officer. This increased risk to police officers has at times resulted in their deaths. Indeed, there is no other occupation in society like policing that places the risk of murder or grievous bodily harm during day-to-day duties as a condition of employment. Owing to the very nature of their day-to-day duties, operational police personnel routinely face the real possibility of being assaulted or murdered. On average, approximately 50 police officers are murdered each year within the United States (B.J.S., 2021; O.D.M.P., 2021). In Canada, during the 11-year period from 2010 to 2020, an assailant has murdered a total of 13 police officers reflecting a rate of roughly 1 police murder per year (P.P.M.R.S., 2021). In both Canada and the United States, the police death typically occurs due to gun shot. These figures illustrate that the risk of a police officer being murdered by an assailant is roughly four times greater in the United States than in Canada. Due to the precarious nature of their work police also face the risk of death due to accidental circumstances. Accidental on-duty police deaths are typically due to mishaps that include automobile and motorcycle crashes as well as being struck by a vehicle while directing traffic or standing on a highway. In this regard, it was noted that approximately 50 police officers are accidentally killed each year in the United States (B.J.S. 2021; O.D.M.P., 2021). In Canada, roughly 2 police officers will die each year, accidentally in the line of duty (P.P.M.R.S., 2021).

12

R. Parent and C. Parent

Theoretical Considerations: Police Use of Deadly Force Most empirical research surrounding the police use of deadly force is grounded in theory that police behavior is influenced by the social dynamics of police-public encounters. This line of inquiry has directed an analytical focus on the structural characteristics of situations in which the police and public interact. These structural characteristics include age, race, social class, gender, attitude, sobriety, and demeanor of suspects; the seriousness of the offense; the number of police officers present; and the characteristics of the community in which the encounter takes place. It is within this theoretical framework that these “situational factors” serve as cues to influence and direct police officers to form judgements on how to react to a given situation (Alpert & Fridell, 1992; Geller & Scott, 1992). Due to the nature of their duties, front-line police officers may react to violent encounters, often within moments of arriving at a situation. As such, research has often also focused on the related theories of violence and victimology in an attempt to understand the complex situational factors that confront police officers (Geller & Scott, 1992; MacDonald et al., 2001; White, 2001). Research literature provides theories to explain the changing patterns of extreme violence (such as homicide) among community members, across time and geography. These theories adopt an integrated approach in that it is assumed that a combination of social and psychological factors cause persons to commit violent crimes (Geller & Scott, 1992; MacDonald et al., 2001; White, 2001; Best & Quigley, 2003). To help explain the varying levels of violence against police, it is necessary to explore possible variations in the nature of police shootings. One of the most widely cited explanatory theories of violence is the “subculture of violence” concept pioneered by Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967). They posit that, within different communities, there exist “subculture(s) with a cluster of values that support and encourage the overt use of force in interpersonal relations and group interactions.” The authors further argue that this subcultural system is normative and localized within the lower social class of society (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967: 11). Wolfgang’s and Ferracuti’s hypothesis may offer some insight on police shooting frequencies. Within the subculture of violence theory, one may theorize that individuals predisposed to violent criminal activities will engage in contact with the police more frequently. Increased contact with police, combined with a disposition towards violence, may precipitate the actions of a police officer, resulting in greater frequencies of deadly force. Geller and Scott (1992) add that the “structural theory” of violence asserts the influence of “broad-scale social forces such as lack of opportunity, institutional racism, persistent poverty, demographic transitions, and population density all combining to determine homicide rates. These forces operate independently of human cognition and do not require individual learning to explain their impact.” Fyfe (1980) and other researchers have suggested that police personnel are more likely to shoot and kill individuals who are disproportionately involved in violent

1  Analyzing the Use of Deadly Force by Police in Canada and the United States

13

crimes. The police use of deadly force is best explained by the exposure of police personnel to dangerous persons and places. Jacobs and O’Brien (1998) refer to this concept as the “reactive hypothesis” while MacDonald et al. (2001) refers to this concept as the “danger-perception” theory. This suggests that the number of criminal homicides and extreme violence in a community is correlated with the police use of deadly force. The ratio-threat represents police officers’ defensive stance toward the danger of their work. Put simply, police officers are more likely to use deadly force during situations in which they encounter greater levels of violence, or when they perceive their situation to be dangerous. In this regard, Fyfe’s (1986) examination of criminal homicide in New York City revealed that an area with a high rate of criminal homicide would also experience a high rate of police use of deadly force. Fyfe noted that there exists a high correlation between the police use of deadly force and threats to police and general public safety.

The Physiological Impact of Police Use of Deadly Force Murray and Zentner (2001: 257) define stress as a physical and emotional state that is always present in people, but can be intensified when an environmental change or threat occurs to which an individual must respond. The individual’s survival depends upon constant negotiation between environmental demands and their own adaptive capacities. Experimentation and observational examination of threat, stress, and anxiety suggest that extreme elevated stress levels negatively affect any performance and that physical and social settings can heighten anxiety. This stress is intensified in relation to dark or poorly lit places, high crime and violence areas, angry or upset people, and non-supportive social structures. While these factors affect all individuals, police officers are likely to experience even higher levels of anxiety as they often have few choices on entering into a dangerous situation. Skolnick (1966) suggests that in reaction to the pressures they face, police officers develop a perceptual “shorthand” to identify certain kinds of people as “symbolic assailants.” These symbolic assailants are individuals who use specific gestures and language and wear attire that the officer has come to recognize as a possible prelude to violence. In other words, the characteristics of a person’s presentation (physical and behavioral) may be associated with individuals that engage in criminal actions. Their characteristics may be grounds for suspicion but are not necessarily conclusive of criminal activity or intent (Pate, 2012). This may also apply to symbolic settings and types of encounters, associated with communities, neighborhoods and locations that officers have come to recognize as having potential for danger. The responding officer’s arousal level may be heightened upon confronting a perceived symbolic setting. This recognition and arousal pattern may serve to “trigger” the use of force, whether it is actually required or not. An officer’s preconceived expectation may serve to alter facts, thereby creating an improper situational assessment and response. Symbolic situations may additionally provoke fear within an individual officer, including the fear of serious injury, disability, or death. These

14

R. Parent and C. Parent

noted levels of stress may serve as explanatory variables of why individual officers use force. An individual that perceives a serious threat will act on that perception. In sum, physiological and psychological changes that occur to officers under stress may also serve as important factors in an officer’s decision to deploy their firearm. Further influences of stress may also include the community environment. As a result of inadequate community resources for the mentally ill, homelessness, and increased availability/use of hallucinogenic drugs such as PCP (phencyclidine) and cocaine, there is greater potential for law enforcement officers to encounter and deal with disturbed, irrational, and perhaps violent individuals. Methamphetamine-type drugs, which are often used by this population, frequently cause the user to be aggressive and violent when confronted by law enforcement personnel. In many instances, officers must be able to assess and interpret the cues of an individual (often within seconds) to ascertain the correct procedure in dealing with them. The behavior exhibited by a person with a mental illness can easily be misinterpreted as an aggressive act, indicating the need for the use of force. A mentally distressed individual waving a knife in the air while shouting and raging may be “talked down” by one officer using verbal communication techniques; however, another officer who encounters this individual may perceive that their life is in danger and decide that resolving the situation requires the use of a firearm. Police officers are at times placed in the precarious situation of being required to assess and instantaneously confront people in various community settings, including on the street and in residences or workplaces. Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) suggest that these factors create increased stress levels for police officers. In sum, modern-day law enforcement agencies deal with both contemporary crime problems and a public that often expects immediate solutions to problems that are deeply rooted within society. These solutions need to be achieved within the parameters of legislation, constitutional guarantees, and the complexities of the criminal justice system. In addition, the public expects law enforcement personnel to maintain an exemplary level of service: professional and accountable to all individuals within society. The various theories and empirical studies surrounding the police use of deadly force and potentially deadly force provide some insight into why police shootings occur. Throughout these explanations, it is clear that no single theory serves to fully explain why the police use of deadly force occurs. In many instances, organizational, psychological, and sociological forces combine to influence and direct the individual police officer in the deployment of deadly force.

Analysis The reason for the disparity in crimes and behavior associated with violence between the two neighboring nations of Canada and the United States is varied and complex. Unique to the United States is a culture of firearms and the widespread availability of handguns. This situation suggests that the perceived threat and calculated risk for police officers in the United States is substantially higher than for police officers in

1  Analyzing the Use of Deadly Force by Police in Canada and the United States

15

Canada and in many other nations. This may partially explain why police officers in the United States utilize deadly force in greater frequency than in most western nations. Due to the nature of their duties, police in both nations are often required to confront society’s systemic failures that are manifested within community settings. On a daily basis, police may respond to domestic violence, mental illness, homelessness, drug addiction, and other complex social issues. As first responders, they are often criticized for failing to completely resolve complex situations that may be dynamic and violent. In the United States, law enforcement personnel may be quicker to respond to these issues with deadly force as a pre-emptive means in dealing with greater perceived threats of violence. Also unique to the United States is a policing structure that creates additional challenges due in part to the vast array of police agencies and national differences. As stated, there are over 18,000 different police agencies in the United States, spread over 50 states, with few national guidelines or policies to ensure consistency in the police response. In contrast, Canada has far fewer police agencies per capita, operating within national frameworks that include one national Criminal Code and one national use of force model that regulates and directs the use of force by police personnel. Furthermore, Canada has only 10 police training centers scattered across the country, sharing information and techniques, thereby providing similar training to police personnel on a national basis. Added to these features are recruiting standards and pay/benefit scales that are comparable throughout the roughly 200 police agencies in Canada (Parent & Parent, 2018). Furthermore, Canadian policing emphasizes community values incorporating problem-solving responses that involve community partnerships. High public expectations have also ensured that officers are held accountable for their actions. Canadian police agencies have responded to this demand by developing organizational policies and procedures that are reinforced by internal processes and mechanisms. Several external factors, including evolving case law and designated police oversight agencies provide checks to ensure police transparency and accountability in the use of force (Parent & Parent, 2018). In contrast, civilian oversight in the United States can vary greatly from county to county.

Conclusion In summary, community attitudes towards firearms, violence and crime appear to be closely related to the rates of justifiable homicide by the police. Social, cultural, and historical forces of a geographic area may also influence and direct the associated levels of violence. Further research of extreme violence and the risk of violence perceived by police personnel in their policing jurisdiction may assist in understanding the patterns of police shootings from both a national and international perspective.

16

R. Parent and C. Parent

References Alpert, G. P., & Fridell, L. A. (1992). Police vehicles and firearms: Instruments of deadly force. Waveland Press. Best, D., & Quigley, A. (2003). Shootings by the police: What predicts when a firearms officer in England and Wales will pull the trigger? Policing and Society, 13(4), 349–364. Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2021). Sourcebook of criminal justice statistics  – 2000. U.S. Department of Justice. Cole, G. (1987). United States of America. In H. G. Cole, S. Frankowski, & M. Gertz (Eds.), Major criminal justice systems: A comparative survey. Sage. Fyfe, J. J. (1980). Geographic correlates of police shootings: A microanalysis. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 17(1, January), 101–113. Fyfe, J.  J. (1986). The split-second syndrome and other determinants of police violence. In A. Campbell & J. Gibbs (Eds.), Violent transactions. Basil Blackwell. Reprinted in Dunham, R. G., & Alpert, G. P. (Eds.), Critical issues in policing: Contemporary readings. Waveland Press (1989). Gaines, L. K., & Kappeler, V. E. (2015). Policing in America (8th ed.). Anderson Publishing. Geller, W. A., & Scott, M. S. (1992). Deadly force: What we know – A practitioners desk reference on police-involved shootings. Police Executive Research Forum. Jacobs, D., & O’Brien, R. (1998). The determinants of deadly force: A structural analysis of police violence. American Journal of Sociology, 103(4), 837–862. MacDonald, J., Kaminski, R., Alpert, G., & Tennenbaum, A. (2001). The temporal relationship between police killings of civilians and criminal homicide: A refined version of the danger-­ perception theory. Crime & Delinquency, 47(2), 155–177. Murray, R., & Zentner, J. (2001). Health promotion strategies through the lifespan (7th ed.). Pearson. Officer Down Memorial Page. (2021). Fallen officers. Retrieved from https://www.odmp.org/ Parent, R. (2004). Aspects of police use of deadly force in North America: The phenomenon of victim-precipitated homicide. Doctoral dissertation, Simon Fraser University. Parent, R., & Parent, C. (2018). Ethics and Canadian law enforcement. Canadian Scholars’ Press. Pate, M. (2012, March 31). Seeing danger through tinted windshields. Hawaii Tribune Herald. Retrieved from http://hawaiitribune-­herald.com/sections/commentary/their-­views/ seeingdanger-­through-­tinted-­windshields.html Police and Peace Officers Memorial Ribbon Society. (2021). Honour roll. Retrieved from https:// www.memorialribbon.org/honour-­roll/ Skolnick, J. (1966). Justice without trial: Law enforcement in a democratic society. Wiley. Skolnick, J., & Fyfe, J. (1993). Above the law: Police and the excessive use of force. Maxwell MacMillan. Statistics Canada. (2001). Crime comparisons between Canada and the United States (Cat. No. 85-002 – XPE Vol. 21, No. 11). Statistics Canada. (2016). Police resources in Canada, 2015 (Cat. No. 85-002-X). Retrieved from https://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-­002-­x/2016001/article/14323-­eng.htm Statistics Canada. (2017). Police resources in Canada, 2016 (Cat. No. 85-002-X). Retrieved from http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-­002-­x/2017001/article/14777-­eng.htm Statistics Canada. (2019). Police resources in Canada, 2019. Retrieved from http://www.statcan. gc.ca/pub/85-­002-­x/2017001/article/14777-­eng.htm Statistics Canada. (2021a) Canada’s population estimates: Age and sex, July 1, 2020. Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-­quotidien/200929/dq200929b-­eng.htm Statistics Canada. (2021b). Police-reported crime statistics in 2020. Retrieved from https:// www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-­002-­x/2021001/article/00013-­eng.htm Uniform Crime Reports. (2021). FBI releases 2020 crime statistics. Retrieved from https://www. fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-­releases/fbi-­releases-­2020-­crime-­statistics

1  Analyzing the Use of Deadly Force by Police in Canada and the United States

17

United States Census Bureau. (2021). U.S. and world population clock. Retrieved from https:// www.census.gov/popclock/ Washington Post. (2021). Fatal force. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/ investigations/police-­shootings-­database/ White, M. D. (2001). Controlling police decisions to use deadly force: Reexamining the importance of administrative policy. Crime & Delinquency, 47(1), 131–151. Whitelaw, B., & Parent, R. (2018). Community-based strategic policing in Canada. Nelson. Wolfgang, M. E., & Ferracuti, F. (1967). The subculture of violence: Towards an integrated theory in criminology. Tavistock. World Factbook. (2021). The United States. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/ the-­world-­factbook/ Dr. Rick Parent  is an associate professor emeritus in the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University and a former police officer. His current research interests include community policing, police ethics, and the police use of lethal force, including the phenomena of suicide by cop. Catherine Parent,  MEd, is a registered nurse (clinician), researcher, and educator regarding complex behavior issues and mental health. Cathy also collaborates with Richard Parent in policing projects. Together they research and co-author major reports concerning police-involved shootings, police and mental health, ethics in law enforcement, and community policing practices.

Chapter 2

Analyzing and Understanding Police-­Involved Shootings in the United States James F. Albrecht

Introduction Homicide rates and gun violence have dramatically increased nationally since 2014 and there is speculation that this upsurge is the result of a phenomenon generally referred to as the “Ferguson Effect.” The “Ferguson Effect” involves “de-policing” or a decline in proactive enforcement by law enforcement personnel in cities and regions overwhelmingly impacted by over-sensationalized incidents in which police officers have been extensively criticized for their enforcement activity, and specifically events that have involved the shooting by police of non-White criminal suspects. The police departments that have come under extreme scrutiny following sensationalized police-suspect encounters since 2013, i.e., the Baltimore Police Department, the Chicago Police Department, the New York City Police Department, the Minneapolis Police Department, among many other across the nation, also align with the cities that have generally displayed discernible increases in murder and serious crime rates following those events. Other jurisdictions have exhibited, at the minimum, short term homicide and crime increases following similar incidents. From a police practitioner perspective, this transition from proactive law enforcement to mainly reactive response appears to reflect a commonsense reaction to threats to job security and both professional and personal reputation. The increase in murder and violence rates across the United States since 2013 will be closely analyzed with an effort particularly made to determine the validity of the impact of the “Ferguson Effect,” the death of George Floyd, and the calls for defunding the police on American law enforcement strategies, from both individual and organizational perspectives. J. F. Albrecht (*) Pace University, New York, NY, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_2

19

20

J. F. Albrecht

The “Ferguson Effect” The “Ferguson Effect” stems from a police-involved shooting in Ferguson in Missouri in August 2014. The encounter involved a Ferguson Police Department officer stopping two robbery suspects shortly after the crime. Unexpectedly one of the suspects attempted to violently remove the firearm from the police officer’s holster, resulting in the firearm discharging as the officer retained control of the weapon. For some unknown reason, the same suspect involved who had been fleeing, turned directly at the police officer at full speed. Fearing for his life, the police officer discharged his firearm to stop the suspect and put an end to the violent assault. The suspect quickly succumbed to his injuries. Although this sounded like a straightforward case of unfortunate, yet justified use of force by police, there was a surprising twist to the narrative, as the second robbery suspect claimed that the suspect aggressor was actually raising his hands when the officer discharged his firearm at the suspect. This misinformation quickly transitioned across social media and ultimately to traditional media. Public outcry ensued, primarily from the African American local and national communities. Ensuing demonstrations led to rioting and further violence. As a result, the Black Lives Matter movement was born. The group claimed that police officers consistently kill unarmed African Americans due to endemic racism across the police profession in the United States. Ultimately the police officer involved was determined to have legally use justified and necessary force during the encounter separately by both federal and state prosecutors. Compounding the matter was that another high-profile incident within New York City had taken place in July 2014, which involved the in-custody death of a suspect, Eric Garner, who opted to resist arrest rather than cooperate with police officers involved. In this case, the police officers involved were cleared criminally by the local prosecutor, including a Grand Jury investigation, and by federal civil rights investigators. Regardless of the findings in both cases, the group Black Lives Matter continued to promote the narrative that American police officers are all racists and that government entities should intercede to correct these injustices.

A Decline in Public Trust in American Police Officers Both incidents resulted in numerous demonstrations, not all peaceful, orderly and without criminal incident, across many large cities across the country. As a result of the continuing allegations that the actions of police officers across the United States are prolifically discriminatory and unjustified, trust and confidence in the police declined across all sectors of the public. According to the Cato Institute (Ekins, 2016), public perception research had revealed that positive attitudes about the police vary by race. While 68% of Whites have a positive impression of the police, those sentiments were only 40% for Blacks and 59% for Hispanics. This actually is

2  Analyzing and Understanding Police-Involved Shootings in the United States

21

a decline from the 67% of Whites and 43% of Blacks in 1970 who had a favorable view of the police. On a good note, the same 2016 survey did note that the vast majority of participants had sufficient confidence in the police as, regardless of race, members of the public would generally report criminal incidents to the police. While there is a common belief that public confidence in the police commenced its decline in 2014, this trend actually commenced in 2007 with a drop from the high of 64% in 2004 to 54% in 2007 (Jones, 2015). It had generally remained stable since then, but declined to 52% in 2015. Racial differences have continued to be noted across decades, but this trend first became apparent in the 1970s. As such, one might have to question the event or phenomena that has cyclically resulted in notable decreases in public trust and confidence in the police. From another perspective, when the public were surveyed regarding trust in the criminal justice system as a whole (Ekins, 2016), only 17% of African Americans believe that the criminal justice system treats all races the same (as compared to 49% of Whites and 27% of Hispanics). This lack of trust and confidence in rule of law in America appears to be a larger concern and apparently involves greater than just policing practices.

Contemporary Police Officer Perspectives While surveys are often designed to gauge public perspective, a comprehensive evaluation of active American police officers (Morin et  al., 2017) evaluated the impact of anti-police demonstrations on officer perceptions of their profession. About 86% of police personnel conveyed that fatal encounters between the police and Blacks have made policing harder and 93% have expressed concerns about their safety. A strong indicator of police reservation to take proactive action was revealed when 72% of them stated that they have become less willing to stop and question criminal suspects even who appear suspicious. In contrast to the 67% of police officers who believe that fatal police-Black encounters are isolated, about 60% of the public believe that these events are indicative of a larger problem. Further, the police view the public as holding contrasting perspectives of the law enforcement profession as 79% of police officers report being thanked by the community, while 67% report being verbally abused by the public. The vast majority (92%) of police officers believe that anti-police are the result of long-standing bias against the police. When feelings about police work were evaluated, it was indicated that the vast majority of officers conveyed pride in their work (91%), felt frustration (93%), were fulfilled (84%), felt angry (71%), and expressed satisfaction with their agency (74%). About 83% of officers expressed that their respective agency did not have sufficient personnel to handle their responsibilities, and 84% believed that there is a personal responsibility to intervene when they believe that an officer may be prepared or is using excessive force, while 66% supported the use of police body cameras. About 97% of police officers recognized the importance of knowing the community to improve effectiveness, while the majority (56%) of officers believed that they had positive relations with the Black community that they serve. Overall,

22

J. F. Albrecht

it would appear that police officers are satisfied with their jobs, and believe that the demonstrations have strained public support for the police. Many of the negative sentiments possessed by the police are likely related to the decline in proactive police encounters that have been shown to support enhanced crime control. Can one conclude that there is support for the “Ferguson Effect,” even many years after the “trigger event” that initially provided support for the anti-police sentiment advocated and supported by many in the United States?

Recent Sensational Police Incidents The most obvious incident that elicited further anti-police sentiment in the United States involved the death of George Floyd while being arrested in Minneapolis in May 2020. In this case, police officers stopped a vehicle since the occupants had reportedly just attempted to use counterfeit money to make a purchase in a store. Responding police officers saw three individuals seated inside a car, and George Floyd fit the description of the suspect involved in the earlier crime. When officers removed Floyd from the vehicle and attempted to place him under arrest he violently resisted and continued the aggression when placed in the rear of the police car. One of the police officers removed Floyd from the police car and positioned him face down on the street and placed one knee on his shoulder to control the resistance. However, even after Floyd had discontinued his resistance, the arresting officer continued to apply his weight to Floyd’s back for numerous minutes even after Floyd had apparently lost consciousness. As soon as the paramedics arrived they did not detect a pulse and moved him to the ambulance and transported him to the hospital. George Floyd subsequently was declared dead. Although the original incident was not filmed by bystanders, numerous individuals did record the police officers restraining the suspect on the street, including Floyd losing consciousness. The video was released to the press, which almost immediately reported the incident on traditional media. As a result, widespread demonstrations and eventually rioting took place in Minneapolis and other cities across the United States. Although the medical examiner did conclude that Floyd had died from a severe overdose due to his recent ingestion of Fentanyl and other illegal narcotics, prosecutors charged and eventually convicted the primary police officer involved of murder, as a result of his extended restraint of the suspect, which prosecutors contended had been reckless. After this incident, Black Lives Matter and other groups routinely held demonstrations following police-involved shootings that involved Black criminal suspects, alleging that the use of force was a sign of endemic racism, regardless of the circumstances and facts that had been revealed. Many large urban centers, particularly those with large minority communities, consequently called for the “defunding” of local police agencies and a transition of those funds to social programs in minority communities. The demand to “defund the police” continues to this day, even with the severe rise in violence, homicides and gun crimes in most of those cities.

2  Analyzing and Understanding Police-Involved Shootings in the United States

23

Police-Involved Shootings in the United States While social and traditional media have been extoling that police officers in the United States overwhelmingly and unjustifiably shoot predominantly unarmed male Blacks due to endemic organizational racism, it would be best to undertake a comprehensive analysis of available related statistics. The SHOT database (Arlsan, 2019), housed at Western Connecticut State University, includes comprehensive statistics consisting of almost 5000 officer-involved shootings (OIS) that have occurred in all 50 American states between January 2000 and December 2019. While not all-inclusive, it documents all open-source OIS and additionally examined numerous variables that should permit a clearer understanding of these tragic phenomena. Of the total OIS in the United States across two decades, 73.3% were fatal. From a gender perspective, 95.5% of the subjects being shot by police during these deadly encounters were male, and only 1.2% of the subjects were immigrants from various countries (Arlsan, 2019). Quite surprisingly, only a small percentage of the subjects (2.7%) had reported gang affiliations at the time of the OIS. Most of these police-­ suspect encounters lasted less than 3 min. Almost 20% of the incidents involved car pursuits, whereas another 18% resulted in police officers taking part in foot pursuits before the shooting. Sadly, almost 50% of either chase scenario ended up in a suspect fatality. A small number of OIS involved both a vehicle and a foot pursuit. . The distribution of OIS is almost equally distributed within all four seasons (Arlsan, 2019); however, Fall with 26% had the highest percentage, but minimally. The deadliest month for OIS is December, whereas the lowest months were revealed to be February and April. Similar to the seasons, there is not a single day of the week that strikes out significantly, which would surprise most police professionals, who likely would predict weekends as the most dangerous days for OIS. The average age of all subjects involved in OIS was almost 34 years old (Arlsan, 2019). The mode for age is 25, and over half (60%) of all subjects were between the ages of 20–39. More than 70% of the subjects had documented no mental health issues with only few reportedly exhibiting unstable behavior at the time of the incident. About 11% of the incidents fit into the category “suicide-by-cop,” a situation where the subject often acts erratically with the desired intent for the police to shoot them. Mental health concerns were present in 12% of the cases. Only 6% of the subjects had been reported to be under the influence of drugs, including many with multiple substances in their system. Race stands at the center of the controversy. More specifically, a Black man killed by a White officer routinely stirs a considerable controversy as it relates to public trust and confidence in the police. Overall, White subjects made up 41% of all OIS, Blacks 30%, Hispanics 25%, and Asians 4% (Arlsan, 2019). On age, young Black males (20–29) have a significantly higher fatality rate in OIS than any others. Whites, whether male or female, had higher rates of OIS deaths for subjects aged 40 and older.

24

J. F. Albrecht

On the officer’s assignment at the time of the OIS (Arlsan, 2019), the vast majority (82.9%) were on-duty patrol officers. The remaining OIS were divided between tactical (e.g., Emergency Response Team & SWAT) officers 5%, State Troopers 3.2%, plainclothes officers 3%, and Vice & Gang Squads 1%. The remaining complement consists of a combination of various units and agencies. About 6% of the OIS cases involved more than one law enforcement agency. Federal law enforcement officers were involved in less than 1% of all OIS. In 65% of the incidents, only one officer fired his or her weapon. In 42.4% of the cases, the shooting officer was the only officer present; two officers were present in 31.8% of the cases. It should be highlighted that, as part of their training, officers target the body center mass when they fire their firearm in an effort to quickly stop the threatening actions of the subject. As a result, in 78.6% of the cases, police struck the subject in the torso and had effectively put an end to the threat. There are 20 different call types during which most police shootings have taken place (Arlsan, 2019). Domestic disturbance cases involved 17% of OIS and were the most frequent police calls that officers responded to prior to an officer-involved shooting. This was followed by the traffic-related incidents with 12.8%, which often started merely as a simple traffic stop, but escalated quickly to involve the use of deadly force. Other dangerous calls that resulted in OIS were welfare checks (7.1%) and person-with-a-gun calls (7%). However, it was revealed that uniformed patrol officers from local police departments are the police personnel with the highest risk for becoming involved in an OIS, and particularly while responding to a family dispute or when making a vehicle stop. Further, most police officers involved in OIS had exhibited incredible restraint in firing their guns, as 50% of OIS involved the police officer firing only one bullet, with an additional 23% firing 2 rounds. In 93% of the cases, the police officer or police officers involved fired 5 or less bullets when involved in an OIS (Albrecht, 2021). When analyzing the geographical location of OIS in America (Arlsan, 2019), most shootings (42%) occurred in the Western states. California and Nevada were the states in the West that had the highest ratio of OIS. The South had 34% of the OIS, with Texas and Florida being the top two states in that region. The Midwest was third with 14% and then the Northeast region had 10%. The physical nature of the location of OIS varied widely. Most were outdoors, predominantly taking place on streets, highways, and parking lots (74.5%). Most indoor shootings took place in residential locations, such as apartment buildings and houses (40%). While there is a strong perspective across the public, and more so within members of minority groups in the United States, that police officers routinely shoot unarmed Black suspects, OIS data has proven to show otherwise. In more than 50% of the cases (Arlsan, 2019), the subject possessed a firearm and in an additional 25% of those scenarios, the suspect had both possessed and fired a firearm. In 17% of cases, the subject used or threatened a weapon other than a firearm. In 6% of the cases, the subject was physically attacking the police officer. In 11% of the cases, the subject was reportedly unarmed, but in some of those cases the suspect had used a vehicle as a weapon or as a means to injure the police officer, i.e., dragging the officer with the car. It was very rare that the subject did not threaten or use a weapon

2  Analyzing and Understanding Police-Involved Shootings in the United States

25

or physically assault the police officer prior to an OIS taking place. Overall, only 2% of OIS could be identified as involving an unarmed suspect (Albrecht, 2021).

Race and Police-Involved Shootings Research has revealed that the use of force by police officers in America is extremely rare, and the use of deadly physical force by police is remarkably exceptional. The Bureau of Justice Statistics regularly surveys the public regarding contact with the police. According to the latest data (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2020), the police made direct contact with 61.5 million individuals, or approximately 24% of the public in 2018. Whites (26%) were more likely than Blacks (21%), Hispanics (19%), or persons of other races (20%) to experience police contact. A higher percentage of Blacks (4%) and Hispanics (3%) than Whites (2%) or other races (2%) experienced threats or use of force. However, it should be noted that the definition of use of force by police included grabbing, pushing and all arrests, even if peaceful and not involving resistance. In addition, only 0.3% of all contacts involved the police officer drawing or pointing a firearm at them. Even more importantly, a police officer-involved shooting is extremely unlikely and occurred in only 0.0018% of police-public encounters (Albrecht, 2021). Overall, members of the public who engaged the police overwhelmingly conveyed that the police acted properly (90%) and respectfully (92%) during the contact (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2020). More compelling is the empirical evidence that has resulted from the evaluation of prosecutorial, judicial and federal criminal investigations involving OIS in the United States. Of the more than 20,000 officer-involved shootings over the last two decades, it was determined that only 0.63% resulted in criminal charges and 0.22% resulted in criminal conviction (Albrecht, 2021). This should provide the most credible evidence that police officers have routinely and overwhelmingly engaged in legally justified actions when involved in situations that have involved the use of deadly physical force by police in America. Yet the criticism, apparently unwarranted and unsupported, continues to be over-sensationalized by community advocates, many government officials, and most of traditional media. Latzer (2000) analyzed police-involved shooting data from 2019 and compared those statistics to arrest rates for violent crime committed by racial groups in the United States over the same time frame. Latzer’s analysis showed that 49% of individuals killed by police were White, compared to 50% of arrests for violent crimes which involved White suspects. Similarly, 31% of individuals killed by police were Black, and 31% of arrests for violent crime involved Black suspects. In addition, 17% of individuals killed by police were Hispanic, compared to 19% of arrests for violent crime committed by Hispanics. Latzer concluded that the racial/ethnic identities of those killed in police-involved shootings clearly bear a notable similarity to the identities of those involved in violent crime in America. Latzer (2000) further explained that when police-involved shootings in Chicago, renowned for its high rate of violence and criminal homicide, from 2006 to 2014

26

J. F. Albrecht

were investigated, it was revealed that in 77% of the cases, police were responding to a report of a person involved in a violent crime or a suspect armed with a firearm and in 80% of those cases, the police reported a threat involving a gun. As such, in the overwhelming majority of police-involved shootings, the police officer did not initiate the confrontation, but were responding to civilian reports of violence, and ultimately they were forced to engage the subject in response to a direct threat of attack, usually involving a firearm. Johnson et  al. (2019) analyzed police-involved shootings in the United States from 2015 and determined that subject race did not play a role in determining whether a person of a certain race was more likely to be shot by police. In fact, comprehensive statistical analysis revealed that a person fatally shot by police was 6.67 times less likely to be Black than White and 3.33 times less likely to be Hispanic than White. As a result, in the typical police-involved shooting in American, there was no evidence of anti-Black or anti-Hispanic disparity. The primary predictor of the race of the subject involved in a police-involved shooting in the Unites States was the race-specific violent crime rate for that respective jurisdiction, supporting the findings of Latzer (2000). Casselman (2015) found that fatal shootings by police tend to take place in neighborhoods that are more socioeconomically disenfranchised and have a higher percentage of Black residents than the United States as a whole. About 30% of police-involved shootings had taken place in communities that are in the bottom 20% nationally in terms of household income. Additionally, 25% of those killed by police died in neighborhoods with majority Black populations. It should be clarified that nationally, just 7% of the population live in majority Black areas. Finally, Fryer (2019) found that police officers in New  York City were more likely to use physical force against a Black suspect than a White suspect, but interestingly concluded that Blacks were 27.4% less likely than Whites to be fatally shot by police. Therefore, it should now be obvious that the race of a subject has not been found to be as critical and relevant a variable as the racial breakdown of groups involved in violent crime within a specific jurisdiction in America. Even given the robust nature of related research, there are still many who continue to decry that police-involved shootings are racially motivated.

Serious Crime and Murder Spikes in the United States American violent crime rates reached an unacceptable level in 1991 (7.58 per 100,000), but commenced a rather sharp decline in 1992 that continued until 2014 (361.6 per 100,000). In 2015, the violent crime rate suddenly reversed direction and has increased through 2021. The violent crime rate nationally has increased 16% to date in 2021, which follows a 3.3% rise in 2020 (Statistica, 2021a). Since 2014, the violent crime rate in America has risen, but not at the astronomical rate that criminal homicide and murder have. The criminal homicide and murder rate in the United States stood at 10.4 (per 100,000) in 1980, and then declined to

2  Analyzing and Understanding Police-Involved Shootings in the United States

27

9.4 in 1990 and 8.4 in 1995. From 2000 to 2008, the homicide rate remains stable at approximately 6.0, but thereafter declined to 5.1 in 2014. However, from 2015 to 2021, the criminal homicide and murder rate across America began a continuous rise back to 6.2 per 100,000 (Statistica, 2021b), thereby erasing all of the gains in enhanced safety since the turn of the millennium. The national homicide rate increased 13% from 2014 to 2019, but has since skyrocketed another 30% in 2020 and continues to spike further in 2021 (approximately 15%). It should be apparent that the effective crime prevention and control measures have been dramatically and rather negatively impacted since 2014. There exists an obvious challenge and also a dilemma in explaining this significant and disturbing change of events.

 xplanations for the Violent Crime and Murder Spike E Since 2014 A number of theories have been proposed in an attempt to explain the significant increase in criminal homicides and gun crime in the United States since 2014. Much of the speculation has revolved around the apparent decline in trust and confidence in the police due to the over-sensationalization involving police-involved shootings and the unsupported claims that police officers act in an environment fueled by endemic racism. This unwarranted criticism of the police profession seemingly commenced in 2014 following the media coverage of the Garner death while resisting police in New York City and the police-involved shooting in Ferguson, Missouri. Rosenfeld (2016) had proposed a number of theoretical explanations for this phenomenon. Rosenfeld first conveyed that the increase in gun violence was due to a decline in perceived police legitimacy. In lieu of requesting police to settle disputes between parties, many have opted not to notify the police of infractions and criminality. This was evidenced by a significant decrease in calls for service, i.e., 911 calls, in Black communities across the United States. This has thus permitted conflict to fester and criminality to continue unabated in many cases. Rosenfeld (2016) also proposed that there is support for the “Ferguson Effect,” as the unfounded claims of police brutality and institutional racism have caused police officers to reevaluate their level of commitment to proactive policing strategies. With diminishing police engagement of criminal suspects, those individuals have become empowered to engage in heightened acts of violence as they no longer fear police interdiction and arrest. Rosenfeld further speculated that this lax atmosphere has permitted criminal gangs, particularly those who deal in drugs, to increase acts of violence against competing gangs without apprehension. Rosenfeld additionally posited that there has been a noteworthy increase in the number of gangs involved in the distribution of illicit drugs and this has resulted in increased competition and gang-related acts of violence. Rosenfeld cited the increase in gang-­ related homicide as support for this postulation.

28

J. F. Albrecht

Albrecht (2018) conducted a comprehensive and multifaceted examination of the increase of criminal homicides in the United States since 2014. Albrecht posited that the negative perceptions and sentiment of police officers across the United States (Morin et al., 2017) following numerous anti-police demonstrations provided strong support for the “Ferguson Effect.” Dramatic increases in homicides were routinely reported in cities in which sensational incidents involving police actions and large demonstrations and rioting had taken place. It is only rational and indicative of human nature that police officers have become overly concerned that they might face unjustified negative consequences, including prosecution, termination or other punishment, if the “court of public opinion” determines that a police action, particularly if the criminal suspect is Black, has reportedly been the result of endemic racism across the police profession, even if these allegations are unsupported and without merit. This has been most apparent in jurisdictions where local and state politicians have openly and verbally supported anti-police sentiment and have often participated in related demonstrations. Police personnel, as a result, have therefore opted to limit engagements with criminal suspects, when possible, in an effort to reduce the likelihood that they will face allegations of criminality and brutality if the need to use physical or deadly physical force should arise. As such, career preservation has taken preference to public service. This is evidenced in the sharp decline in police stops, arrests and case clearances in cities where the criminal homicide rates have generally risen the most. Albrecht (2018), however, stated that the return to a reactive form of policing is only partially responsible for the increase in criminal homicides and gun violence in America. Albrecht opined that a number of factors have combined to create the dramatic increase in criminal homicides since 2014. These variables include the relatively new practice of classifying many opioid related deaths, which formerly were classified as accidental overdoses, as criminal homicides. With opioid-related overdose deaths up 100% since 2014 and with these cases exceeding 50,000 annually, many police departments have elected to conduct more thorough criminal investigations with the intent to charge co-conspirators and opioid dealers with criminal homicide. In addition, Albrecht (2018) further hypothesized that the legalization of marijuana has increased the likelihood of drug-induced conflict and driving while impaired vehicular fatalities. In line with this, advanced forensic technology and more thorough investigations following vehicle fatalities may have led to a slight increase in criminal homicide charges, particularly as it relates to criminally negligent and reckless driving and behavior. Many large cities in the United States have prioritized reductions in vehicle fatalities and criminal investigations have become more common place. Albrecht (2018) provided further explanation for the significant increase in criminal homicide rate in the United States by positing that the scrutiny placed on police-­ involved shootings has resulted in a small number of those cases being classified as criminal homicides in some jurisdictions, before the matter had generally resulted in acquittal within the criminal courts. In addition, since 2014, there have been between 1 to two million guns sold legally each year in the United States, which

2  Analyzing and Understanding Police-Involved Shootings in the United States

29

amounts to an almost 400% increase in firearms available across America. Couple this with a strong decline in incarceration as a general practice within State and federal governments and there are considerably more career criminals walking the streets. This has been compounded by the routine absence of pre-trial detention due to pandemic restrictions placed on grand juries and criminal trials since March 2020 and the removal of bail in most cases, even when criminal charges involve serious felony charges, in many large urban settings, as part of criminal justice reform measures. As such, the noteworthy, but undesirable, increase in criminal homicide and gun violence in the United States since 2014 is not the result of one factor, but rather a combination of variables that unfortunately and tragically has led to the death of thousands more needlessly across America, of which many are unfortunately young Black males, particularly in large urban centers.

Conclusion With criminal homicides and gun violence spiking across the United States since 2014, there clearly is the strong need for the re-evaluation of policing strategies and the development of effective criminal justice reform that will ensure that crime control is again prioritized. It is critical to note that much of the increase in criminal homicides across America, and more so in large urban areas, involve Black victims. If “Black Lives Matter,” then the effective prevention of violence must be immediately addressed to avoid needless death. Promoting the defunding of the police at a time that criminal homicides and gun violence are surging should be viewed as being clearly unacceptable and obviously irrational. The obvious response is a prompt return to the highly successful and acclaimed proactive law enforcement and policing measures that emerged in the mid-1990s that fueled the dramatic reduction in all categories of serious crime. This was coupled with longer prison sentences, particularly for gun-related crimes. Keeping career criminals off the streets would require a reversal of the ineffective bail reform measures that have been implemented over the last 2 years in many metropolitan areas, which coincidentally align with many of the jurisdictions that are faced with the largest increases in serious crime and violence. While misinformed politicians and community advocates openly condemn the police in America for endemic racism, there is little evidence to support these baseless allegations. Every noteworthy statistical analysis has revealed that race is not a major factor in police use-of-force scenarios, and more specifically in police-­ involved shootings. The fact that more than 99% of police-involved shootings in America have consistently been found to be legally justified following intensive criminal investigation by state and federal prosecutors, often independently, also provides evidence that the police officers involved acted properly and lawfully. There is, however, the need to address the diminished trust and confidence that portions of the public have for the police, and the return to enhanced community

30

J. F. Albrecht

policing measures should strongly be contemplated. Enhancing police-community engagement and organizational transparency should coincide with any proactive crime prevention initiatives. Police administrators and policy makers should take the time to review Sir Robert Peel’s principles of policing (Lee, 1901) that were developed when public policing was in its infant stages in the 1820s. These guiding tenets outlined the relevance of public input and scrutiny into law enforcement priorities and practices. Most critical is Peel’s second principle, which posits that “(t) he ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.” As the police are public servants, they must therefore strive to serve the public, regardless of socio-economic status, race, ethnicity, or other demographic characteristic.

References Albrecht, J. F. (2018). Examining the Ferguson effect: Statistically supported or ideological speculation. Presentation at the Annual Conference of the Homicide Research Working Group in Clearwater, Florida in June 2018. Albrecht, J. F. (2021). Understanding and investigating officer-involved shootings and in-custody deaths. Presentation at the Annual National Sheriffs Association Conference in Phoenix, Arizona in June 2021. Arlsan, H. (2019). The impact of police shootings in the United States on police-community relations. In Policing and minority communities: Contemporary issues and global perspectives. Springer. Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2020). Contacts between the police and the public  – 2018. U.S. Department of Justice. Casselman, B. (2015). Where police have killed Americans in 2015. In FiveThirtyEight. ABC News. Ekins, E. (2016). Policing in America: Understanding public attitudes toward the police. Results from a National survey. Cato Institute. Fryer, R. G. (2019). An empirical analysis of racial differences in police use of force. Journal of Political Economy, 117(3), 1210–1261. Johnson, D. J., Tress, T., Burkel, N., Taylor, C. & Cesario, J. (2019). Officer characteristics and racial disparities in fatal officer-involved shootings. In The Proceedings Of The National Academy Of Sciences of the United States of America (Vol. 116(32), pp.  15877–15882). National Academy of Sciences. Jones, J. M. (2015). U.S., confidence in the police lowest in 22 years. Gallup. Latzer, B. (2000). The facts on race, crime and policing in America. In Law and Order on June 18, 2000. The Liberty Fund Network. Lee, W. L. M. (1901). A history of police in England. Methuan and Company. Morin, R., Parker, K., Stepler, R., & Mercer, A. (2017). Behind the badge. Pew Research Group. Rosenfeld, R. (2016). Documenting and explaining the 2015 homicide rise: Research directions. U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. Statistica. (2021a). Reported violent crime rate in the US 1990–2020. Statistica Research Department. Statistica. (2021b). Death by homicide per 100,000 resident population in the U.S. from 1950 to 2020. Statistica Research Department.

2  Analyzing and Understanding Police-Involved Shootings in the United States

31

James F. Albrecht  is a professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Homeland Security at Pace University in New York City. Jimmy received a ­prestigious Fulbright Fellowship in 1998 and worked as a professor at the National Police College of Finland. He is also the recipient of a 2013 Embassy Policy Specialist Fellowship (USDOS/IREX) and was tasked with conducting research and making recommendations to improve law enforcement effectiveness and legitimacy in Ukraine. Police Chief Albrecht served in the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo (former Yugoslavia) as the head of the EULEX Police Executive Department, in charge of criminal investigations and coordinating international law enforcement cooperation and intelligence analysis from 2008 through 2010. He had previously served in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo Police from 2007 to 2008. Jimmy is also a 23-year veteran of the NYPD who retired as the Commanding Officer of NYPD Transit Bureau District 20, tasked with the prevention of crime and terrorism in the subway and commuter transit system in New  York City. He was a first responder and incident command manager at the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and developed the counter-terrorism strategic plan for the subway system in the borough of Queens, New York City.

Chapter 3

Police Shootings, the Media, and the Public Hasan T. Arslan and Rainer Kroll

Introduction Stories that begin with “Once upon a time …” depict fictional narratives full of fantastic creatures, beasts, heroes, and locations that are far, far away. Hollywood movies are typical examples of this creativity made for public consumption. In real life, we enjoy them by watching, reading, and listening. Other “stories affect all areas of life in terms of how people view themselves, how they live their lives, and how they see others. Some of the content that these industries distribute to the public remains the only form of representation some individuals see, and these portrayals may or may not be accurate. Media depicts stereotypical representations for people of color and women, whether through Hollywood or on the news, as violent criminals, terrorists, submissive characters, highly sexualized beings, unintelligent people, and more” (Washington, 2019, December 19). Throughout the depictions of the visual arts in the Hollywood movie industry, one might receive a depiction of police officers resembling modern-day heroes. Although these portrayals may carry some semblance of truth, visual arts and the media sometimes do not accurately the police. The media, however, always seek news-related materials in police behavior. The media is well aware that stories involving the police increase readership. Frequently, we read a media report on police officers abusing their authority or applying excessive force. “Gossip and conjecture spread faster than fact because of the uncritical behavior of the media” (Rothman, 2014). Currently, public perception of the police image relies heavily upon popular culture, which is influenced primarily by social media. One can argue that the social network sites became “the fifth estate” of our information age, where they have emerged to rival the existing acknowledged powers. This fifth estate affects the way H. T. Arslan (*) · R. Kroll Western Connecticut State University, Danbury, CT, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_3

33

34

H. T. Arslan and R. Kroll

people tell stories and judge the actions of police officers and the agencies they serve. Compounding the problem, social media serves as the forum for people to interact and form their opinions about police work. Applications such as Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, etc., have become normalized as a primary news source. They dominate public discourse and have become hardwired into our brains, and significantly influence our cognitive abilities, impacting the marginalization of gender, race, ethnicity, and religion. In recent years, this social media scrutiny has increased public awareness, which resulted in a nationwide debate about race and policing. The officer-involved shootings in Ferguson, New York City, Minnesota, Baltimore, and numerous other places led to significant destructive civil riots, harkening memories of the social turmoil in some American cities during the Civil Rights Era. In addition, rallying cries of “de-fund the police” have brought even more conflict and strain to all concerned parties. These include the public, the police, and government, particularly relevant in the densely populated inner-city communities. Each controversial and racially motivated police use of force has the potential to strain the relationship between society and law enforcement. According to research done by the NORC Center for Public Affairs Research at the University of Chicago, “55% of Americans say police use deadly force only, when necessary, while 45% say police are too quick to use deadly force” (2015). Throughout the last decade, there has been an increasing debate on the excessive use of force by the police, which has fueled the public debate on policing, race, and community relations. From a political standpoint, activists and some local politicians began to argue whether those officers use too much deadly force against unarmed individuals or not; subsequently, they pressure the public prosecutor’s office to charge those officers criminally. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Tennessee v. Garner (1985), imposed strict constitutional limits on the use of deadly force. The restrictions found it unconstitutional to use deadly physical force to apprehend an unarmed, nonviolent, fleeing felon. The ruling established the “defense of life” standard, which has become the law of the land. These changes created an atmosphere of uncertainty for both police officers and the public, creating numerous misconceptions. Few studies have analyzed officer-involved shootings from the use of a deadly force policy perspective. More specifically, scholarly research on police shootings, which focused on precursor variables, is lacking. What little has been done is the result of investigative reporting, primarily at a local level. Continuing research on police behavior should not focus exclusively on the officer and the individual. Multiple perspectives frame the narrative. However, this multi-faceted perspective may not be available in many cases; nevertheless, officer-involved shootings carry significant implications for the need to reassess the use of force policies within the agency. Therefore, it is incumbent that researchers have access to reliable data. An inherent problem complicating matters is that the public thinks the police departments do not keep separate and accurate records of officer-involved shootings that creates the potential for faulty and dangerous conclusions about police behavior. Without a rigorous scientific methodology to rely upon, this can result in sharp divisions between America’s races, ethnicities, and communities. For example, the 2016 Pew Research Center survey demonstrated this big difference. Indeed, “75%

3  Police Shootings, the Media, and the Public

35

of white-Americans believe that the police do ‘an excellent or good job’ in treating racial and ethnic minorities equally and holding officers accountable for misconduct, while only one-third of black Americans believe the same” (Morin & Steppler, 2016). Similarly, in most officer-involved shooting cases, this issue becomes provocative, creating divisions within the country. In recent years, every officer-involved shooting incident is a banner headline and the first story during the evening news. More particularly, shootings where race seems to be a factor, like a white officer shooting a person of color, creates the sense that the officer and the agency are fundamentally flawed concerning race relations and fairness. This creates an environment rife for public reactions questioning police tactics, officer accountability, racial profiling, and even civil disorder. On certain occasions, such incidents become clickbait in the name of journalism. According to French author Voltaire, “The history of human opinion is scarcely anything more than the history of human errors” (2015; p. 3782). Indeed, humans are susceptible to mistakes and errors; it increases even more during high-stress, rapidly evolving situations. Policing is one of those jobs that might produce some of those irreversible outcomes in life, and officer-involved shootings (OIS) are among them. In this chapter, the reader will read how media and films shape some of the false realities of police work in the United States. In addition, we want to contemplate some of the myths and facts surrounding the use of deadly force controversy.

The Image of the Police in the Visual Arts and Media According to Encyclopedia Britannica, the visual arts are defined as “the arts that meet the eye and evoke an emotion through an expression of skill and imagination” (Brittanica.com, n.d.). Thus, filmmaking is considered a visual art form and science, with many technicalities and procedures to be completed. Since Auguste and Louis Lumière created the cinematograph and the first motion picture in the late nineteenth century (International Photography Hall of Fame and Museum, n.d.), the movie and subsequently the television industry became a dominant powerhouse for people and their way to see the world. Notably, the magnifying effect of mainstream cinema and television series created their phenomena and subject interest for social scientists. For example, the “CSI effect” began to appear among jury members after the CSI: Crime Scene Investigation television series aired in 2000. This phenomenon raised jurors’ expectations and made some jurors reluctant to convict the defendant at trials. Indeed, in a 2001 trial, State v. Everett Black, during the deliberations, the jury foreman demanded that “investigators should have done extensive fingerprinting, DNA testing, and other forensics and that he did not think the prosecutors did enough” like in the T.V. series (Thomas, 2006). Although such evidence was not needed for a conviction, Everett Black was found innocent and released. Likewise, visual arts, media, and recently, social network sites are causing similar impacts on the image of the police work. Like many things in life, stories and

36

H. T. Arslan and R. Kroll

news are subject to prejudice and bias. It seems to be more prevalent than ever in our history. Whether controlled by major or local news outlets and T.V. stations or operated by everyday smartphone users, the cameras only show one point of view, where a police officer has contact with a citizen. Whether it is a personal bias, misunderstanding of the profession, monetary gains, or politics, these media outlets frequently exaggerate and dramatically affect police work to attract the public’s attention. Sometimes, it gives many people a perspective that is out of context with the reality of police work; the outlets also mock these exaggerations in other works. For example, a scene from the 1988 spoof, The Naked Gun: From the Files of Police Squad!, teases another movie dialogue between Inspector Harry Callahan and the Mayor of San Francisco in Dirty Harry (1971). In this movie, Clint Eastwood’s character, Henry Callaghan, says, Yeah, well, when an adult male is chasing a female with intent to commit rape, I shoot the bastard – that’s my policy.

This similar scene was reenacted and made fun of in The Naked Gun (1988): Lt. Frank Drebin: “When I see five weirdos dressed in togas stabbing a guy in the middle of the park in full view of 100 people, I shoot the bastards. That’s my policy.” The Police Chief: “That was a Shakespeare in the Park production of Julius Caesar, you moron!”

Consequently, when Oscar Wilde wrote, “life imitates art far more than art imitates life” in The Decay of Lying (1889), he would not be prouder if he witnessed our modern times. Modern films and movies have ingrained the CSI Effect in the public’s mind more than ever. The recent box office successes of Marvel and D.C. comic book universes have captivated audiences worldwide and introduced various technological crime-fighting tools. This is like Wilde’s comments on art and its effect on how we look at the world around us. In another example, one of the most common cliches in many crime dramas or action cop flicks is the “good cop, bad cop routine.” “It has become so ingrained in popular culture that the technique—in which two interrogators, one rough and aggressive, the other genial and calm, attempt to will a suspect into compliance—long ago became a metaphor applied to a multitude of situations” (Harris & Shetty, 2013, July 02). One can argue the effectiveness of the routine, and, it has been employed by detectives. The film and media industry have played a significant role in perpetuating this perception of police detectives and a general understanding of the standards in the criminal justice system.

Life Imitating Art or Art Imitating Life in Police Work Due to the intersection of movies, television, social media, human error, and body cameras, there has been created certain misperceptions, or myths, of the police. The following is a list of some of the more common types found in the discourse, with their reality.

3  Police Shootings, the Media, and the Public

37

Police Officers Throw Their Coffee Out the Window to Respond to a Call for Service  It does not happen, but it is a film cliche. For dramatic purposes, the films prepare the audience for an action scene and give actors something they can act on. Police Officers Live on Donuts  It has some truth with some logic and history. First, donuts are a quick source of calories and energy, not a substitute for nutrition. Second, a long time ago, police officers did not ride around in squad cars. They walked a beat, and some store owners in the neighborhood loved to offer free coffee and sometimes some snacks. Third, back in the day, donut stores were the only shops open all night. Police Officers Love Writing Traffic Tickets  Traffic enforcement is one of the most unpopular police duties, performed only as a matter of course. However, news stories and reports indicate the abuse of this enforcement (Safemotorist.com, n.d.). “What is the purpose behind requiring police to issue a certain number of tickets? The answer is to generate revenue for the state” (Lichtenberg, 2003). Traffic enforcement should not be a method to balance the department budget. However, based on news reports and a few court cases, few officers have been caught writing fake tickets or have come forward to say they are uncomfortable with the department’s pressure on the officers (Threewitt, n.d.). Police Officers Are Racists  Police officers are among the least racist as a group because police officers are a diverse group, dependent upon each other for survival. Joshua Correll et al. (2002) used a simple videogame to assess “the police officer’s dilemma” while examining the effect of ethnicity on shoot/don’t shoot decisions. They compared police officers with regular people from the same neighborhoods that these police officers patrolled. Both police officers and ordinary citizens shot Blacks more often than Whites under precisely the same circumstances; however, the police officers were less biased than the community sample based on shoot/ don’t shoot decisions. “In other words, police officers do show an unconscious racially discriminatory shooting tendency. But on the whole, this tendency is weaker, not stronger, than the same tendency as measured in regular U.S. citizens” (Pelham, 2020, August 31). Furthermore, within the same context, a diverse police force leading to better policing is also misleading. The race of the police officer has little effect on the quality of police service. Police Officers are Arrogant  Generally, the need for a command presence at a scene where the officer needs to maintain control is misinterpreted. Every police officer develops a particular occupational character that demands him to be blunt, brusque, and curt in a decent period while learning to call bluffs and interrupting rambling, circular explanations (Freeman, 2014, August 19). Policing does require being vigilant all the time. However, let us not forget the fact that “the uniform gives no sanctuary to people who lack the basic interpersonal skills of being polite” (Donahue, 2018, March 18).

38

H. T. Arslan and R. Kroll

Police Officers Do Not Care How the Public Perceives Them  It is not valid. Police officers are humans, susceptible to the same feeling as their civilian counterparts. A study in 2019 found that “law enforcement officers who would otherwise be ­motivated to do their job at a high level tend to become apathetic if they believe that they are perceived negatively” (Patil and Lebel, 2019). Female Police Officers Are Weak and Cannot Perform Their Duties  Female officers are a tremendous asset to the agency, providing a calming influence in the most explosive situations. A study in 1982 found that (Bell, 1982): Despite the evidence that female officers are as competent as male officers in handling traditional police duties, male police officers perpetuate myths about female officers that makes it difficult for policewomen to obtain the vocational support of their male colleagues. It is important that police supervisory personnel clear away the myths about women’s limitations and focus on their positive contributions as police officers.

Today’s Police are Overwhelmingly Militarized  This is also one of the perceptions of life imitating art concepts, seeing police officers in camouflage and Robocop-­ style costumes while carrying automatic weapons in armored vehicles. It is still being debated on many levels. First, only a small percentage of police departments are tasked and equipped to confront armed and dangerous criminals. Second, there is some explanation for this. Over several decades, as part of the war on drugs, the U.S. implemented policies intended to bring law enforcement and the military closer together. The most impactful of those, which began in 1990, is what’s now known as the 1033 Program — it allowed the military to loan its surplus equipment to law enforcement agencies. By the mid-1990s, local police departments across the U.S., including even university police, had acquired gear like armored trucks, automatic rifles, and grenade launchers (Marshall, 2020, June 25).

According to press release by Congressman Hank Johnson’s office, “through the Defense Logistics Agency’s Law Enforcement Support Office, which oversees the 1033 program, the Department of Defense has transferred $7.4 billion in surplus military equipment – often from warzones overseas – to our streets, for only the cost of shipping” (Johnson, 2021, March 09). Third, during the post-9/11 era, homeland security grants provided considerable funding to police departments to purchase battlefield equipment and other military paraphernalia (Greenwald, 2014, August 14). Why Do Police Not Shoot to Wound?  Another controversy that has come to the forefront of public debate is whether the police could have resorted to wounding the suspect using physical force. Officers are trained to use their firearms if they feel that their life or someone else’s is in danger. When one’s life is in danger, the odds of hitting a moving limb are astronomical. An incident in New York created this exact type of question, “Why did not the cops just shoot the suspect in the leg?” which became a center point of a legislative bill in 2006 (Wyllie, 2010). Dr. Bill

3  Police Shootings, the Media, and the Public

39

Lewinski, executive director of the Force Science Institute, told Force Science News in a 2006 interview centered on the proposed legislation: The argument is often brought forward. Shooting to wound is naively regarded as a reasonable means of stopping dangerous behavior. In reality, this thinking is a result of ‘training by Hollywood’, in which movie and T.V. cops are able to do anything to control the outcomes of events that serve the director’s dramatic interests. It reflects a misconception of real-life dynamics and ends up imposing unrealistic expectations of skill on real-life officers (The Force Science Institute, 2010).

While certainly possible in the movies, it is an impracticality as a matter of course in police use of deadly use of force. First, police officers are trained to stop a deadly threat against themselves or another while minimizing potential collateral damage. Officers are trained to shoot at the largest part of the target, which in the human anatomy is the torso. They are not trained to wound or shoot the weapon out of someone’s hand because this is impractical for the average police officer. Even a superior sharpshooter would be challenged with this mandate due to the immediacy, fluidity, and danger to innocent bystanders. There is no greater need for swift, split-­ second decision-making in these types of incidents, for the consequences of delay can be catastrophic. Second, the notion that police are fully engaged in crime-fighting, dispensing justice like their superhero counterparts is based mainly on fiction. Most officers spend their shifts engaged in mundane social service calls for service, punctuated by an occasional high-risk incident. During these times of high-risk incidents, police officers may become involved in a life-threatening situation. Depending on the type of neighborhood, officers encounter passive citizens, along with violent criminals. Most police officers never draw their firearm or use it, except in their firearms qualification training. It is a rare occurrence, given the millions of calls for service in the United States on any given day. There is another misconception on this issue. According to a Pew Research Center study in 2016: About three-in-ten adults estimate that police fire their weapons a few times a year while on duty, and more than eight-in-ten (83%) estimate that the typical officer has fired his or her service weapon at least once in their careers, outside of firearms training or on a gun range (Morin & Mercer, 2017).

However, the same PEW study also revealed that “only about a quarter (27%) of all officers say they have ever fired their service weapon while on the job” (Morin & Mercer, 2017).

Policing in Democratic Society The word police originates from the Greek word “polis,” used for city, state, community, and citizens (etymonline.com, n.d.). In ancient Greece, despite having citizens having equal rights in the public forums, the family structure gave enormous power to the patriarch to control the lives of members of the household. In Western

40

H. T. Arslan and R. Kroll

society, the term gained its modern roots in British monarchial history, where it was perceived as “the king’s men” (Blackstone, 1769). The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 introduced a centralized and unified police system in England loyal to the King. “The American Revolution toppled the power of the king over his people—in America, ‘the law is king,’ Thomas Paine wrote—but not the power of a man over his family. The power of the police has its origins in that kind of power. Under the rule of law, people are equals; under the rule of police, as the legal theorist Markus Dubber has written, we are not. We are more like the women, children, servants, and slaves in a household in ancient Greece, the people who were not allowed to be a part of the polis” (Lepore, 2020, July 13). Now, an argument can be made at this point: It is understood that most of the world’s police forces carry firearms, but no developed nation uses them against their citizens as often as police in the United States. How can this be explained? The policing style in the U.S. differs from other advanced democracies “in areas including organization, funding, training, relations with minority communities, use of force, and accountability” (Cheatham & Maizland, 2021). One of the crucial criticisms against American policing is the interpretation of the deadly use of force policies compared to their counterparts in other Western nations, notably the United Kingdom, the birthplace of modern-day policing. Police indeed “kill more people in the United States than in any other developed country, and there are growing calls for improved training to reduce the use of lethal force” (Horton, 2020, May 18). This phenomenon, however, cannot be explained by accusing some American police officers of being Gung-Ho, trigger-happy killers, hiding behind their shields. Unlike many European counterparts, there is no national police force in the U.S. Policing is considered a local function due to the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,1 which relegated powers to the States that were not enumerated as Federal powers. This concept of Federalism made policing fragmented and subject to local, political control. The modernization of policing in America has made significant progress since the days of Dirty Harry’s policing style. Harry Callahan was a no-nonsense, street justice dispensing, rule-bending exemplar of those defending the blue line between order and chaos, the victims from the offenders. Like anything else, historically one particular incident changed the tactics officers used in their approach to high-risk calls. On April 05, 1970, four California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers died in a shootout outside a Valencia coffee shop after a seemingly routine traffic stop. Later, this event was called the “Newhall Massacre,” which “permanently changed the CHP from a corps of highway helpers to hard-core cops” (Los Angeles Times, 2016, July 09). Many agencies changed their training programs to focus primarily on officer survival techniques, such as adopting more higher-capacity weapons, gun training with moving targets, taking cover behind their squad-car doors, or waiting for backup during high-risk traffic stops. After the Newhall, police train to assume any

 The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. 1

3  Police Shootings, the Media, and the Public

41

citizen interaction represents a potential threat of harm, requiring a hypervigilant approach (Phippen, 2016, July 15). There are approximately 18,000 law enforcement agencies serving federal, state, county, and city police departments. There are “no national standards on training, procedures and timescales vary across the country. On average, U.S. officers spend around 21 weeks training before they are qualified to go on patrol” (Horton, 2020, May 18). Indeed, the data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2018 indicated that “the average length of basic training for all state and local law enforcement academies was 833 h. Of all state and local academies, 83% reported that field training was mandatory for some or all recruits after they completed basic training.” In addition, the Institute for the Criminal Justice Reform (n.d.), found that after examining the police training rinst the police: A randomized contro0 countries, “the United States has among the lowest police training requirements by far” (Fig. 3.1 above). “There are few mandates to give officers substantive training in anti-bias, conflict resolution, and other approaches that some experts say could help mitigate violence” (Preston, 2020, June 28). Furthermore, criminal justice scholars also stated that academy training focuses less on officer communication skills that might de-escalate situations and bring peaceful resolutions (Horton, 2020, May 18). Unlike the other Western nations, the reality of existing gun violence in the U.S. might be one of the primary factors where the “officer survival movement” heavily justifies its lethal force policies. Rashawn Ray, professor of sociology at the University of Maryland, says: “In most states, people can carry guns either on their body or in their vehicles, so that escalates things for police – they instantly perceive that anyone can be a threat” (Horton, 2020, May 18). The National Fraternal Order of Police found that as of the summer of 2021, 51 law enforcement officers were shot, 13 of whom died, in 40 ambush-style attacks, a 91% jump from the same time

Fig. 3.1  Hours of police training required: average hours in selected countries

42

H. T. Arslan and R. Kroll

in 2020 (Pagones, 2021, July 01). Such an existing high-risk threat shapes particular police behavior more in the United States than the other countries. In recent times, in many communities of color where there is tension between the police agency and the communities they serve. While this makes excellent conversation for those seeking to be elected to political office, the reality is, the police will never be removed. Let us face it, who will respond to a 911 call for service when there is no longer a police presence. In fact, where this has occurred to some extent, the crime rates have increased, following the pendulum of police and crime. When there is more crime, the public wants more police intervention. When crime drops, the public wants less police. Until a viable alternative to the police is established, there will always be a need for enforcement to uphold the social contract. What form this takes remains to be seen and is worth exploring. Do we want our police to be legalistic, watchman, or service-oriented? And how much will this cost? For comparison, Fig. 3.2 below is provided that displays overall budget expenditures for various nations.

Conclusion and Recommendations It can be argued that some catastrophes such as oil spills, gas explosions, dam collapses are the consequence of human error. It is entirely plausible that human error on both sides of a police-citizen encounter culminates in a catastrophe. For example, police shootings bring a considerable strain on the relationship between the public and police agencies in the United States. “When police go beyond reasonable force to use excessive force during an arrest or in a precipitous response, citizens become victims of police, and the public’s confidence in the police force can plummet” (McEwen, 1996). One way to counter this challenge is officer retraining. This is a way to provide the officer with specific de-escalation skills and tactics to reduce tragic outcomes. One example of innovation is the nation’s largest police department, the New  York Police Department (NYPD), implementing the Active Bystandership for Law Enforcement Project, or ABLE, a nationwide program hosted by the Georgetown University Law Center. “The program teaches officers to step in when another officer—including a higher-ranking one—uses excessive force or goes against police department guidelines” (Neuhauser, 2021, January 28). This program, however, is expensive and maybe a budget challenge for smaller agencies with limited budgets. The benefit of implementation may outweigh the cost and make this program essential to foster positive police and community relationship. Additionally, body cameras were introduced as a consequence of the videos of police-citizen interactions after the fact. What was missing was the context of the encounter beginning with the approach. The use of body cameras has assisted the police in capturing the whole incident, not the consequences, which received so much media attention. The visual recording system has the desired effect of dispassionately capturing the event, providing an objective narrative from beginning to

3  Police Shootings, the Media, and the Public

43

Fig. 3.2  Among OECD, U.S. police spending ranks in middle: Spending on police as a percentage of GDP in 2017

44

H. T. Arslan and R. Kroll

end. Furthermore, such technology holds officers and citizens accountable and reduces complaints of excessive use of force. Ariel and his colleagues found that “the likelihood of force being used in control conditions were roughly twice those in experimental conditions. Similarly, a pre/ post analysis of use-of-force and complaints data also supports this result: the number of complaints filed against officers dropped from 0.7 complaints per 1,000 contacts to 0.07 per 1,000 contacts” (2014). It can be asserted that most officers would feel more comfortable having the body camera as evidence to back up their narratives. Furthermore, body cameras would also aid the external investigators during the departmental investigation of the officer. Let us not forget the power of public scrutiny, which holds the police to a higher standard. Human error, particularly on the decisions to use deadly force in some officer-­ involved shooting cases, can be reduced and controlled significantly by more firearm training, body cams, and implementing mental health divisions within law enforcement agencies. All changes must be implemented by transparent and diverse police squads serving in their respected communities. “The best people, with the best of intentions, doing their utmost, cannot fix this system from within” (Lepore, 2020, July 13). Moreover, it needs a demanding public, a willing executive branch, along with the iron velvet of the Supreme Court decision to make all law enforcement agencies amenable but not coerced participants of this change. It is also true that policing in a democratic society requires that law enforcement personnel be accountable for their actions based on the principles of legality, subsidiary, and proportionality.

References Ariel, B., Farrar, W. A., & Sutherland, A. (2014, November 19). The effect of police body-worn cameras on use of force and citizens’ complaints against the police: A randomized controlled trial. Retrieved November 03, 2018, from https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/ s10940-­014-­9236-­3 Bell, D. J. (1982). Policewomen – myths and reality. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 10(1), 112–120. Blackstone, W. (1769). Commentaries on the laws of England in four books, with notes selected from the editions (Final edition in 2008 ed.). The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. Brittanica.com. (n.d.). Visual arts. https://www.britannica.com/browse/Visual-­Arts Bureau of Justice Statistics BJS, (2018). What are the outcomes for recruits in basic training? Retrieved on August 29, 2021, from https://bjs.ojp.gov/topics/ law-­enforcement?tid=7&ty=tp#recent-­faqs-­what-­does-­a-­training-­program-­for-­state-­and-­local Cheatham, A. & Maizland, L. (2021, April 21). How police compare in different democracies. Council on foreign affairs. Retrieved on August 30, 2021, from https://www.cfr.org/ backgrounder/how-­police-­compare-­different-­democracies Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2002). The police officer’s dilemma: Using ethnicity to disambiguate potentially threatening individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1314–1329. Donahue, J. (2018, March 18). Cop arrogance. Retrieved on September 02, 2021, from https:// copblue.com/cop-­arrogance/

3  Police Shootings, the Media, and the Public

45

Etymonline.com, (n.d.). Polis (n). https://www.etymonline.com/word/polis Freeman, J. (2014, August 19). Why people see cops as ‘arrogant’? Retrieved on September 03, 2021, from https://www.police1.com/officer-­safety/articles/ why-­people-­see-­cops-­as-­arrogant-­GAF6LOGl5TjL5sHl/ Greenwald, G. (2014, August 14). The militarization of U.S. police: Finally dragged into the light by horrors of Ferguson. The Intercept. Retrieved on September 04, 2021, from https://theintercept.com/2014/08/14/militarization-­u-­s-­police-­dragged-­light-­horrors-­ferguson/ Harris, A., & Shetty, S. (2013, July 02). Is the “Good Cop, Bad Cop” routine a real thing? Slate. Retrieved on August 29, 2021, from https://slate.com/culture/2013/07/good-­cop-­bad-­cop-­ routine-­real-­life-­history-­pop-­culture-­examples-­and-­effectiveness-­as-­interrogation-­tactic.html Horton, J. (2020, May 18). How U.S. police training compares with the rest of the world. BBC News. Retrieved on August 29, 2021, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­us-­canada-­56834733 International Photography Hall of Fame and Museum. (n.d.). Auguste Lumiere & Louis Lumiere. https://iphf.org/inductees/auguste-­louis-­lumiere/ Johnson, H. (2021, March 09). Johnson reintroduces bipartisan bill to de-militarize police. Retrieved on September 03, 2021, from https://hankjohnson.house.gov/media-­center/ press-­releases/rep-­johnson-­reintroduces-­bipartisan-­bill-­de-­militarize-­police-­1 Lepore, J. (2020, July 13). The Invention of the police. The New Yorker. Retrieved on August 27, 2021, from https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/07/20/the-­invention-­of-­the-­police Lichtenberg, I. (2003). Police discretion and traffic enforcement: A government of men. Cleveland State Law Review, 50(3), 425–454. Los Angeles Times. (2016, July 09). From the archives: The ambush killings of 4 CHP officers that changed California policing in 1970. Retrieved on August 29, 2021, from https://www.latimes. com/local/lanow/la-­me-­newhall-­massacre-­20160709-­snap-­story.html Marshall, M. (2020, June 25). Why America’s police look like soldiers. Vox. Retrieved on September 02, 2021, from https://www.vox.com/2020/6/25/21303538/ american-­police-­soldiers-­1033-­program McEwen, T. (1996). National data collection on police use of force. Bureau of justice statistics (BJS). https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndcopuof.pdf Morin, R., & Mercer, A. (2017). A closer look at police officers who have fired their weapons on duty. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/ fact-­tank/2017/02/08/a-­closer-­look-­at-­police-­officers-­who-­have-­fired-­their-­weapon-­on-­duty/ Morin, R., & Steppler, R. (2016). The racial confidence gap in police performance. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/social-­trends/2016/09/29/ the-­racial-­confidence-­gap-­in-­police-­performance/ Neuhauser, A. (2021, January 28). NYPD officers to get training on speaking up against bad policing. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ nypd-­officers-­to-­get-­training-­on-­speaking-­up-­against-­bad-­policing-­11611838809 NORC Center for Public Affairs Research. (2015). Law enforcement and violence: The divide between black and white Americans. The University of Chicago. https://docplayer.net/21075421-­ Law-­enforcement-­and-­violence-­the-­divide-­between-­black-­and-­white-­americans.html Pagones, S. (2021, July 01). Ambush attacks on police officers up 91% in 2021 compared to last year, the group says. FOX news. https://www.foxnews.com/us/ ambush-­attacks-­police-­officers-­law-­enforcement Patil, S. V., & Lebel, D. (2019). “I want to serve but the public does not understand”: Prosocial motivation, image discrepancies, and proactivity in public safety. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 154, 34–48. Pelham, B. (2020, August 31). Are police officers racist? Like the nature of racism itself, the answer is complicated. Society for Personality and Social Psychology. Retrieved on September 02, 2021, from https://www.spsp.org/news-­center/blog/pelham-­police-­officers-­racist Phippen, J. (2016, July 15). One day in 1970 that changed policing in the U.S. The Atlantic. Retrieved on August 29, 2021, from https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/07/ newhall-­massacre/490526/

46

H. T. Arslan and R. Kroll

Preston, C. (2020, June 28). Police education is broken. Can it be fixed? The Hechinger Report. Retrieved on August 30, 2021, from https://hechingerreport.org/ police-­education-­is-­broken-­can-­it-­be-­fixed/ Rothman, N. (2014). Taking sides in Ferguson. Popular Culture. Retrieved on August 28, 2021, from https://www.commentary.org/articles/noah-­rothman/taking-­sides-­in-­ferguson/ Safemotorist.com, (n.d.). Do traffic ticket quotas really exist? Retrieved on September 03, 2021, from https://www.safemotorist.com/articles/traffic-­ticket-­quotas/ Siegel, D. (1971). Dirty Harry (film). Warner Bros. Tennessee, v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). The Force Science Institute –FSI. (2010, May 26). Why shooting to wound doesn’t make sense scientifically, legally, or tactically. Retrieved on August 27, 2021, from https://www.police1.com/ patrol-­issues/articles/why-­shooting-­to-­wound-­doesnt-­make-­sense-­scientifically-­legally-­or-­tact ically-­6bOdYvNUEECtIWRI/ The Institute for the Criminal Justice Reform. (n.d.). Not enough training. Retrieved on August 29, 2021, from https://www.trainingreform.org/not-­enough-­training Thomas, A.  P. (2006). The CSI effect: Fact or fiction. The Yale Law Journal, 15. https://www. yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-­csi-­effect-­fact-­or-­fiction Threewitt, C. (n.d.). Do police really write tickets to make money? Retrieved on September 02, 2021, from https://people.howstuffworks.com/do-­police-­write-­tickets-­to-­make-­money.htm Voltaire. (2015). Delphi collected works of Voltaire (Illustrated), Delphi Classics. Washington, L. (2019, December 19). The importance of representation in film and media. Retrieved on August 27, 2021, from https://medium.com/@Laurenwash/ the-­importance-­of-­representation-­in-­film-­and-­media-­2d006149cac9 Wilde, O. (1889). The decay of lying – An observation. Retrieved on August 28, 2021, from http:// web.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/phil%20of%20art/wildetext.htm Wyllie, D. (2010, May 26). So-called ‘no-kill bill’ surfaces in N.Y. Retrieved on August 27, 2021, from https://www.police1.com/officer-­shootings/articles/ so-­called-­no-­kill-­bill-­surfaces-­in-­ny-­zdIuSMYXhZLQUE50/ Zucker, D. (1988). The naked gun: From the files of police squad (Film). Paramount Pictures. Hasan T. Arslan  joined the Division of Justice and Law Administration at Western Connecticut State University in 2018 with more than 10 years of teaching experience. He received his PhD degree in criminal justice from the College of Criminal Justice at Sam Houston State University of Huntsville, Texas. His doctoral dissertation involved one of the most extensive eco-terrorism databases in the world. Dr. Arslan also holds a law degree from Marmara University in Istanbul Turkey. His primary research project, Statistics Help Officer Training (SHOT) database, involves an ongoing comprehensive data collection to define and consolidate information of police shooting incidents throughout the United States. The primary objective of the SHOT is to establish a repository of national data, which can be statistically, spatially, and temporally analyzed to understand the dynamics of deadly encounters. Professor Rainer Kroll  received his PhD and MPhil in criminal justice from the City University of New York, Graduate Center, and an MA in criminal justice from John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Professor Kroll joined the Division of Criminal Justice and Law Administration in 2018. Before joining the faculty at Western Connecticut State University, he taught at John Jay College for 15 years. While there, he specialized in instructing research methods, statistics, and geographic information systems. Professor Kroll retired as a lieutenant from the New  York City Police Department in 2018, after 35 years of service. During his career, he performed duties in investigative, patrol services, special operations, and a­ dministrative units. He also served in the United States Army and New  York Army National Guard for 17 1/2 years, leaving as a senior non-­ commissioned officer.

Part II

Police Use of Force Globally

Chapter 4

A Comparison of the Use of Force by Police: New Zealand and England & Wales Garth den Heyer

Introduction The force used by the police can be a volatile issue which affects the relationship between the police and the community, especially if its application is perceived by members of the public as being inappropriate (Ariel et al., 2015). As a number of high-profile examples attest, the inappropriate use of force by the police has had a negative impact on the relationship of the police with the public. As a result of the high-profile incidents, the force used by the police has become an area of increasing concern (Hollis, 2018). Concern has also been raised about the alleged use of militarized suppression tactics and equipment. The regular stream of media reporting that centres on the use of force by the police (Stenning et al., 2009) also highlights the public interest in and the importance of this area of policing. The use of force is a key function of the role of the police and while most interactions between the police and the public do not involve the use of force (Bittner, 1970; National Institute of Justice, 1999), police officers have the legal authority to use minimal and an appropriate level of force against members of the public in certain circumstances. The exercise of the power of a police officer to use force has significant implications on two levels. The first is at an individual level, where the use of force by the police has the potential to cause physical and mental harm (Locker, 2010). This means that when a police officer uses force, they must balance the level of harm that may be caused with seeking to resolve a situation. This balance is achieved by formal, external (legislative), and internal (training, policy, and reporting) accountability structures, which emphasizes the need for officers to use minimal, appropriate and justified force whenever such force is necessary (Locker, 2010).

G. den Heyer (*) Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_4

49

50

G. den Heyer

The second level where force, exercised by the police has implications is at the organizational level. The management of the police use of force mandate has important implications for the relationship between the police and the public (Locker, 2010). The police rely on the support and cooperation of the public to function effectively. Such cooperation is contingent on the public’s trust and confidence in the police. Any inappropriate or perceived excessive use of force by the police has the potential to erode the public’s confidence in the police, which impacts negatively on the ability of the police to function and deliver their services. This means that in addition to minimizing the harm caused to individuals, the management of the police use of force mandate has significant implications for organizational credibility, legitimacy and ultimately, the ability to fulfil its function (Locker, 2010). This chapter examines the use of force by the police in 2017  in two western democratic countries: England and Wales and New Zealand. There are similarities between the two countries. New Zealand was a former British colony and the police do not routinely carry a firearm in either country. They are different however, in the size of their populations and how the countries deliver their police services. New Zealand has one national police service and England and Wales has 43 separate geographically based police forces. While the structure of the police forces in the two countries is different, there are benefits in comparing the force used by the police as the comparison will not be influenced by the presence of officers equipped with firearms (Ariel et al., 2017).

The Use of Force by Police The right to use force is a distinctive aspect of police work (Bittner, 1970). The right for the police to use force is so basic that some researchers claim that one of the reasons why the police are called to an incident is because there is a belief that force may be necessary (Langworthy & Travis, 1999). The use of force has been defined in a general context by Kania and Mackey (1977), as the “exertion of power to compel or restrain the behavior of others” (p. 29). This definition is extended in a policing situation to also include “acts that threaten or inflict physical harm on suspects” (Terrill, 2003, p. 56). The police usually use force when suspects do not comply with the lawful request of an officer. The goal is for the suspect to comply with the request and when a suspect does comply with the request the “police will use the minimum amount of force necessary to gain and maintain control of the suspect” (Lindberg, 2012, p. 7). The National Consensus Policy on the Use of Force (2017) recommends that the use of force should only be applied when it is determined to be necessary to protect the public or police officers or to resolve an unlawful situation. When considering the amount of force to apply, “police officers should use only the amount of force necessary to control an incident, effect an arrest, or protect themselves or others from harm or death” (National Institute of Justice, 2012, p. 1).

4  A Comparison of the Use of Force by Police: New Zealand and England & Wales

51

The problem for researchers in relation to the use of force by the police is that the decision to use force by an officer occurs “in highly variable, dynamic and often dangerous situations” (Rajakaruna et al., 2017, p. 508). As result of the complexity involved in the decision-making process, researchers have examined police officers’ use of force from sociological and psychological theoretical perspectives (Bolger, 2015; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002), organizational perspectives (Mastrofski et  al., 1987), and at the community level (Smith, 1986; Terrill & Reisig, 2003). There is, however, according to Terrill et al. (2018), a number of studies that have examined the use of police force that have found that such use is determined by the situation in which an officer finds themselves in and common reasons for the use of force are because of the suspect’s demeanor, antagonistic, or aggressive behaviour or intoxication (Black, 1976; Bolger, 2015; Chevigny, 1969; Klahm & Tillyer, 2010; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002) or the presence of weapons (Boivin, 2017). Suspects that resist complying with the directions of a police officer are more likely to have force used against them and the level of force that is used by an officer relates to the level of resistance displayed by the suspect during an intervention (Boivin, 2017). It is clear from the literature that the level of resistance by the suspect is the primary cause of the police using force (Morabito et al., 2017). What is not known however, is the relationship between illegal drugs, alcohol and mental illness and their influence on the suspect’s level of resistance or their behavior (Morabito et al., 2012, 2017). Researchers have difficulty in determining what constitutes resistance and how to define it (Klahm et al., 2014). In 2000, the United States Department of Justice examined and documented the demographic characteristics of those that had had force used against them by the police. The report was the first that had examined and documented these factors and it revealed that the average age of a police use of force suspect was 28 years old and that the overwhelming majority of suspects were male. The research also found that 54% of the suspects were White, 47% were Black and 35% were Hispanic. It was claimed that the majority of suspects were agitated or erratic in their behavior during their encounters with the police and almost all suspects showed some form of resistance. Twenty-five percent of cases involved a suspect assaulting the police officer and 42% of suspects were intoxicated by drugs or alcohol prior to the use of force. According to the report, intoxicated suspects were more likely to actively resist or assault an officer rather than to flee or resist passively. Another problem in understanding the police use of use is that the approaches used to measure the use of force have been inconsistent (Hollis, 2018). This is despite the force used by the police having been extensively researched (Alpert & Dunham, 1999, 2004; Bazley Lersch et al., 2007; Garner et al., 2002; Reiss, 1971; Scharf & Binder, 1983; Sherman, 1980). Determining what force is and what it is not, or what is appropriate force, is difficult to interpret and depends on a number of situational factors and perspectives (Terrill, 2009). While the use of deadly force by the police may be fairly simple to identify, measure and define, other types of police force are not as easy to define (Alpert & Dunham, 2004). This is because a standardized definition of the various levels of force used by the police has not been agreed

52

G. den Heyer

upon and what amounts to reasonable force in a police encounter is not clear (Wolfe et al., 2009). The use of force by the police, according to a number of researchers, is a rare event (Croft, 1985; Langan et al., 2001; Reiss, 1971; Worden, 1995). This perspective was supported in a report released by the National Institute of Justice (1999, p. vii) that claimed that is “[k]nown with substantial confidence is that police use force infrequently” (p. vii). The problem, as Terrill et al. (2018) noted is that picture is more complex than what has been claimed by earlier researchers as there are variations within the occurrence of the use of force. Terrill et al. (2018) expands on this by claiming that a number of different jurisdictional studies using various research methods found that the police use force at between 1 and 22% of the events that they attend (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Friedrich, 1980; Klinger, 1995; Lundstrom & Mullan, 1987; McLaughlin, 1992; Sun et al., 2008; Terrill, 2014).

Discussion and Methodology The chapter takes a comparative case study approach to examining the use of force by the police in 2017 in England and Wales and New Zealand. The recording of the use of force by the police and the secondary data relating to the use of force have been included in the case study. This includes a comparison analyses of this data on a 100,000 population and per sworn officer basis.

New Zealand and England and Wales – The Facts Both England and Wales and New Zealand are western democratic nations. New Zealand, being a former British colony has a Westminster form of parliament and maintains similar societal and religious values as England and Wales. The values that most New Zealanders claim are important, are, for example, democracy, the rule of law, protection by the government, fairness and equality, and honesty (Levine, 2012). While the two countries are similar in respect to values and beliefs, there are a number of fundamental demographic differences. The countries have similar sized land mass, but England and Wales has a larger population and a larger proportion of White ethnicity in their population. England and Wales also has a higher police to population ratio, a lower homicide rate and more crimes per 100,000 population than New Zealand. The size, composition of population, and policing information have been presented in Table 4.1.

4  A Comparison of the Use of Force by Police: New Zealand and England & Wales

53

Table 4.1  Population, number of sworn officers, and crime ratios in 2017 for New Zealand and England and Wales Factor Land mass Total population Ethnicity – White Maori/Pacific peoples Asian Authorized sworn officers Sworn officers per 100 k Civilian support employees Homicides Homicides per 100 k Crimes Crime per 100 k

New Zealand 268,021km2 4.805 million 71.2% 21.7% 11.3% 8955 187 3067 157 3.27 414,854 8643

England and Wales 264,059km2 58.381 million 85.4% 0 7.8% 122,405 210 67,209 653 1.12 6,519,956 11,166

Source: Author

 verview of the Recording of the Use of Police Force in New O Zealand and England and Wales New Zealand The New Zealand Police implemented the Tactical Options Report database in September 2006 to provide a capability for its executive to better understand its operating environment and the inherent risks within this environment (Police Executive Meeting, 2007). The database was designed to address the organization’s need for comprehensive information, knowledge and understanding of the use of force to: • maintain the public’s trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police in the use of less lethal force; • promote the value of the use of less lethal weapons as a valid response to deal with incidences of violence and disorder; and, • raise awareness of the priority of the New Zealand Police to maintain public and staff safety during violent confrontations (Police Executive Meeting, 2007). The strength of the database was that it was able to provide electronic reports that enabled both quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the use of tactical options by police officers and the circumstances surrounding its use (Police Executive Meeting, 2007). The capability to evaluate, according to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and the United Kingdom Home Office representatives, set an international precedent in terms of police use of force data collection, analysis and research (Police Executive Meeting, 2007). It was realized by the New Zealand Police that there would be benefits from analysing the information gathered about the use of force and the use of tactical

54

G. den Heyer

options. It was proposed that an analysis of this data would provide a vital source of information and assurance that would contribute to the proposed Tactical Options Deployment Review and the ongoing routine review and development of: • • • • •

staff safety initiatives; staff use of force training; operational policies and procedures pertaining to the use of force; protective equipment; and, use of less-than-lethal weaponry (Police Executive Meeting, 2007).

The other benefit that would be gained from analysing the use of force data would be the ability to understand the application of force in the context of complaints made by the public about police actions.

England and Wales A national database for recording the police use of force was not established until 1 April 2017. Prior to the establishment of the national database, the use of force data was contained in evidence notes, rather than being part of a consistent, formal procedure across all police forces in the United Kingdom (Home Office, 2018). The database was introduced by the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) as there were concerns that the previous system was fragmented and deficient and did not provide data that was comparable across all police forces (Home Office, 2018). The new national database required all police forces in the United Kingdom to record the force used by the police (Home Office, 2018). It was intended that the collection of use of force data would hold police forces to account and would provide the public with greater information on the different types of force used and the context in which the force was used (Home Office, 2018). The use of force information recorded in the national database is published quarterly. Police officers are required to record the details of any incident where they deployed use of force tactics on a “Use of Force” report (Home Office, 2018). Where an incident involved more than one subject or officer, each officer who used force is required to complete one Use of Force report for each use of force subject. This means a single use of force event or subject may feature in multiple Use of Force reports (Home Office, 2018).

Examination of Use of Force in New Zealand in 2017 The examination of the force used by New Zealand Police Officers in 2017 is based on the data obtained from the Tactical Options Reporting (TOR) database, which records the use of force events and the tactical options used by police staff within those events (Response and Operations: Research and Evaluation, 2018). A “Tactical

4  A Comparison of the Use of Force by Police: New Zealand and England & Wales

55

Options Report event” is defined as the reportable use of one or more tactical options, by one officer, against one individual (Response and Operations: Research and Evaluation, 2018). This means that as some Tactical Options Report events involve the use of more than one tactical option and that the total number of Tactical Option Report events may be lower than the total number of tactical options used (Response and Operations: Research and Evaluation, 2018). The examination of the use of force by the New Zealand Police and the discussion that follows has been based on the New Zealand Police Annual Tactical Options Research Report #6 that was prepared by the Response and Operations Research and Evaluation Team in 2018. The New Zealand Police rarely use tactical options when engaging with the public, with only 0.01% of the 3,766,446 public face-to-face interactions requiring the use of a tactical option. Furthermore, the majority of the tactical options used by police officers were at the lower levels of force, with the three most common tactical options deployed being empty hand tactics (at 39% of the Tactical Options Report events), handcuffs and restraints (at 34%), and pepper spray (at 32%). In 2017, 7066 tactical options were used by police officers at 4536 Tactical Options Report events. The TASER™ was deployed (either shown or discharged) at 26% of the Tactical Options Report events, firearms (6%), deployment of police dogs (6%), baton (1%), and “other” tactical options (0.4%) were the least frequently used tactical options at Tactical Options Report events. The New Zealand Police record a number of different TASER™ modes. The modes are shows (presentation, laser painting, or arcing) and discharges (discharge with probes and/or contact stun). The majority of TASER™ events in 2017 did not involve a discharge of a device, “show” was the highest mode of deployment at 84% of TASER™ events. The TASER™ was discharged through contact stun mode (1.2%) or discharge with probes (14.5%) at 16% of the TASER™ events, resulting in a TASER™ “show” to “discharge” ratio of 5 to 1. The majority of Tactical Options Report events occurred at a private residence (1513), closely followed by on a street, highway, or motorway (1446). The third most common location was an outdoor public area (1236). Events also occurred on police premises (364), in a police vehicle (347), and at a clandestine laboratory (2). Injuries at Tactical Options Report events were not common. Approximately 18% of the Tactical Options Report events resulted in an injury to the subject. Of those, 9% of the injuries were minor, 8% moderate and 2% serious. The TASER™ at 2% and pepper spray at 4% had the lowest injury of the subject rates of all tactical options. The use of firearms by the police resulted in six injuries to the subject (3 fatal, 3 non-fatal). In comparison, police staff were injured at 12% of Tactical Options Report events. Injuries sustained at 9% of these events were minor and 3% were moderate.

56

G. den Heyer

Examination of Use of Force in England and Wales in 2017 The examination of the use of force by the police in England and Wales is based on data collected from the 43 Home Office funded police forces. The Home Office advised that this data is designated as “experimental statistics” and that they should be used with caution. A use of force incident in England and Wales is defined as a situation in which a police officer uses any use of force tactic ranging from applying handcuffs to using a firearm. As well as any tactics used in each use-of-force incident, officers must also record: the subject’s details (their age, gender, ethnicity, and whether disability they have); the reason for using force and any other impact factors, such as the outcome of using force, the location and any injuries sustained by the subject or the police officer. The Home Office also advised that the statistics do not give an accurate representation of the total number of incidents involving the use of force by the police, as this was the first year that there was a national requirement to record the use of force. They went on to warn that although all 43 police forces had submitted a data return, there were various discrepancies and constraints in their recording. Many police forces were unable to record data for all of the use of force variables or they had submitted this data to the Home Office in a non-standard format and not all incidents in the reporting period were recorded. The police use of force record is one “use-of-force incident” which refers to one officer’s use of force involving one subject. This means that the “number of incidents” reported in this data is equal to the number of use of force reports that were completed by police officers, not the number of unique incidents or subjects involved in an incident. For example, if one subject is restrained by two officers, two use of force reports would be completed. The limitation of the England and Wales use of police force reports, which is similar to the New Zealand reports, is that it is not possible to determine the location in which each tactic was used (where multiple tactics and locations are reported), or which tactic (or combination of tactics) caused a subject’s injuries. Although this approach to recording the use of force events limits the interpretations that can be made from the data, the information has been collected in this way to ensure that the reporting process is not excessively bureaucratic or burdensome for police officers. There were 313,000 recorded incidents where a police officer used force on an individual in England and Wales in 2017. The number of incidents recorded by each police force ranged widely, from 410 to 61,000 incidents. Across the 313,000 incidents, there were 469,000 force tactics used and of these incidents, 62% involved the use of one tactic only. Restraint tactics, which includes the use of handcuffs, ground restraint, and/or limb/body restraints were used 286,000 times. These were the most used tactics across all incidents. The use of handcuffs was the most used restraint tactic and was recorded in seven out of every ten incidents (70% or 219,000 incidents). Of the 219,000 incidents that involved the use of handcuffs, 126,000 (57%) reported that handcuffing was the only tactic used. Unarmed skills and other restraint tactics such

4  A Comparison of the Use of Force by Police: New Zealand and England & Wales

57

as ground, limb or body restraint were the next most frequently reported tactics. The category of “other/improvised” was the fourth most frequently reported and may have included tactics such as the use of a police vehicle or horse. Across all reported use-of-force incidents, the reason given for using force that was reported the most was for protection or to assist in making an arrest. Using force as a means of protection mostly involved the officer protecting themselves or other officers, but also included officers protecting the public and the subject. There were 214,000 instances of the use of force to protect the officer, 170,000 to protect other officers, 148,000 to effect an arrest, 127,000 to protect the subject and 117,000 to prevent the subject from escaping. The most common outcome across all use-of-force incidents was “arrested.” This was also the most frequently reported outcome across the use of force tactics. The outcome “other” was the second most commonly recorded outcome. “Other” includes the subject being cautioned, charged, or de-arrested following the awareness of more information. Officers must also record when a TASER™ is used in an incident, even when it is not fired. The use of the TASER™ is recorded against seven categories: drawn, aimed, arced, red-dot, drive-stun, fired, and angle drive-stun. Drawn, aimed, arced, and red-dot are non-discharge uses, as no electricity is discharged into the subject. Drive-stun, fired, and angle drive-stun are discharge uses. The method for recording the use of the TASER™ is similar to that which is recorded in New Zealand in that only the “highest” use of the TASER™ from each incident is recorded. For example, if the TASER™ is drawn, aimed, red-dotted and then fired, the incident would be recorded as “Fired” only. The recording of the use of the TASER™ was a national requirement prior to 2017, but owing to the transition to implement a new recording systems only 17 police forces provided the Home Office with summary data on the use of the TASER™ for part or all of the reporting period. Despite the change in collection methods, the total figure for the use of the TASER™ is considered to be an accurate reflection of their use by the 43 police forces in England and Wales in 2017. However, owing to the transition to a new recording system occurring at different times across police forces, only 13,000 of the 17,000 TASER™ incidents included wider incident details, such as the reason for using force, impact factors and outcomes. The TASER™ was used in 17,000 incidents in 2017 but was only discharged at 15% of these incidents. The most common reason for using the TASER™ was to protect the officer (12,000 incidents), followed by other officers (10,000 incidents) and assistance in making an arrest (7900 incidents). The Home Office did advise caution when comparing figures on the use of the TASER™ in 2017 with those of previous years, but the 2017 figures did show that the number of times the TASER™ was used had increased compared with the previous reporting year of 2016. All forms of TASER™ use increased in 2017 compared to the previous year. However, the majority of the increase in the use of the TASER™ was accounted for by a rise in the number of non-discharge uses (89%).

58

G. den Heyer

The increase in the use of the TASER™ compared to the previous reporting year is in line with the overall trend of increasing use and according to the Home Office may reflect: • the increase in recent years of the number of TASER™-trained officers and TASERs™ available in police forces; or, • officers dealing with more incidents with the potential for conflict. The increase in the use of the TASER™ may not, however, be explained entirely by an increase in the number of police using the device, but may be partially accounted for by an increase in the recording of the use of the TASER™ owing to an improved method of recording. Firearms were involved in 1% (3100 incidents) during 2017. This number includes incidents where a firearm was aimed but not fired which has a different method of counting the incidents compared to that used by the New Zealand Police. Of the 3100 incidents that involved firearms, there were 12 incidents where a firearm was discharged. The most common reasons that firearms were used was for the protection of an officer (2800 incidents) and other officers (2700 incidents). Protecting the public and preventing an offense from occurring were amongst the most frequently reported reasons for the police using a firearm. Most of the use-of-force incidents that were recorded occurred in a public location. The most common location recorded was a street or a highway, which was recorded in 44% (137,000) of incidents. Restraint tactics were the most used tactics across all location types, followed by unarmed skills. The use of less lethal weapons and firearms was recorded predominantly in dwellings and public settings, such as on a street. Injuries sustained by subjects were common during a use-of-force incident, which is similar to the number in New Zealand. Subjects sustained an injury in 20,000 (6%) of use-of-force incidents. There were 18,000 (91%) minor injuries reported and 380 (2%) severe injuries reported. Of the severe injury category, 1800 persons required hospitalization and there were 8600 incidents where hospitalization was recorded as an outcome, but the officer reported that the subject did not sustain an injury as a result of the officer’s use of force. There were also 1700 (7%) incidents that involved an injury, but the level of the injury was not recorded. The Home Office also noted that there were 12 deaths from the use of police force but cautioned that this figure should not be used to represent the number of deaths caused by police use of force. In comparison, there were 18,000 (6%) use of force reports that identified that an officer had sustained an injury as a result of the incident. Of these reports, 16,000 (86%) were for minor injuries and 270 (2%) were for severe injuries. There were also 2300 (13%) incidents that involved an injury, but the level of the injury was not recorded.

4  A Comparison of the Use of Force by Police: New Zealand and England & Wales

59

Discussion The use of police force by the New Zealand Police and the 43 police forces in England and Wales has been presented separately in the previous sections. This section will compare the information from the countries using two methodologies to standardize the use of force data. The first method is to change the data to a ratio of 100,000 population and the second is to change the data to a ratio per sworn officer. The two methods are used to ensure that the data is analyzed comprehensively and to enable the data from the two countries to be compared. The first area of comparison is that of the demographics of the use of force subject. The main ethnicity of the subject in the use of police force in England and Wales was described as being White. Force was used against this ethnicity in 73% of the recorded events. In comparison, the main ethnicity of the subject in the use of force in New Zealand was Maori at 54% of the events, while use of force was used on those subjects identified as being White at 32%. It is reasonable that the ethnicity of White is involved in the highest percent of use of force events in England and Wales as they make up the largest percentage of the population. Furthermore, England and Wales do not have an indigenous population. However, in New Zealand, Maori and Pacific peoples make up only 21.7% of the population, while those who identify themselves as White make up more than 71%. The first similarity when comparing the two countries is the range of ages of the use of force subjects. In England and Wales, more than 80% of the use of force subjects were between 18 and 64 years of age, while in New Zealand 76.2% of the use of force subjects were between this range. The difference between the countries is that more than 7% of the New Zealand Police use of force events involved subjects between the ages of 14 and 16 years, indicating that the New Zealand Police use force on younger subjects than the police in England and Wales. Table 4.2 presents a comparison of the use of force by the English and Welsh police in comparison to the New Zealand Police for 2017. The police in England and Wales recorded a total of 313,000 use of force events in 2017 or approximately 803 per 100,000 population. In comparison, the New Zealand Police only recorded Table 4.2  Use of force tactics used per 100,000 population Use of Force Tactic Tactical events Restraint tactics used Unarmed skills Other equipment useda Less-than-lethal weaponsb Firearms

England and Wales 803.34 489.89 188.42 37.68 30.83 5.31

Includes baton, police dogs, and other Includes OC Spray but not the TASER™

a

b

New Zealand 147.06 32.10 36.82 6.99 30.21 5.66

60

G. den Heyer

Table 4.3  Use of force tactics used per sworn officer Use of force tactic Tactical events Restraint tactics used Unarmed skills Other equipment useda Less-than-lethal weaponsb Firearms a

England and Wales 3.97 2.42 0.93 0.19 0.15 0.03

New Zealand 0.79 0.17 0.20 0.04 0.16 0.03

Includes baton, police dogs and other Includes OC Spray but not the TASER™

b

Table 4.4  The annual use of the TASER™ per 100,000 population Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

England and Wales 5.31 11.31 13.53 14.05 17.81 17.30 17.78 19.29 29.14

New Zealand Not recorded 17.61 6.72 19.25 22.68 21.10 20.35 25.77 23.29

147 use of force events per 100,000 population. This indicates that the English and Welsh police may be more conscientious at recording their use of force or they encounter a larger number of violent or potentially violent subjects. Another reason could be is that they may be more prepared to use force. This deduction is supported by the analysis in Table 4.3, which presents the use of force on a per officer basis. Again, there is a large difference in the police use of force between the two countries. The only two forms of force that are similar in their use in both countries is less-­ than-­lethal weapons and firearms. Both these forms of force are almost identical in both countries, which could support any of the three reasons for the differences between the police forces use of force that has been discussed above. The same difference in the use of force does not, however, apply to the use of the TASER™ in each country. For each of the years between 2010 and 2016, the New Zealand Police used the TASER™ more often per 100,000 population than did the English and Welsh police. By 2017, as presented in Table 4.4, the English and Welsh police had, however, surpassed the New Zealand Police, using the TASER™ 29 times per 100,000 population compared to the use of 23 per 100,000 population in New Zealand. The results for the use of the TASER™ by the police in the two countries are similar when the use is examined on a per officer basis. Again, the use of the

4  A Comparison of the Use of Force by Police: New Zealand and England & Wales

61

Table 4.5  The annual use of the TASER™ per sworn officer Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

England and Walesa 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.14

New Zealand Not recorded 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.13

Allen and Zayed (2019)

a

Table 4.6  Subject and officer injuries sustained per 100,000 population Type of injury sustained Total subject injuries Subject minor injuries Subject severe injuries Subject hospitalized Total number of officer injuries Officer minor injuries Officer severe injuries

England and Wales 34.26 30.83 0.65 3.08 30.83 27.41 0.46

New Zealand 16.99 8.50 1.89 Not recorded 11.33 8.50 2.77

TASER™ is higher in New Zealand when compared to the use by the English and Welsh for the period 2010 to 2016, but this then changes in 2017 when the use by the police in England and Wales is higher. Table 4.5 presents the use of the TASER™ per officer. The last section of comparable information is that of injuries sustained by the subject and the police officer. The English and Welsh police had a higher number of total subject injuries and minor subject injuries per 100,000 population, but the New Zealand Police had approximately three times the number of severely injured subjects. This information has been presented in Table 4.6. Again, the reasons for the differences between the two police forces could be because the English and Welsh police forces may be more conscientious at recording the subject’s injuries. The fact that the New Zealand Police have recorded a higher number of severe subject injuries indicates that the subject was more violent, or the use of force event is more violent than those experienced in England and Wales. Table 4.7 presents information that compares the number of subject and officer sustained injuries per sworn officer in England and Wales and the New Zealand Police. Similar to the number of injuries sustained per 100,000 population, the only categories where the data from the New Zealand Police is higher than the English and Welsh data is in the category of severe subject and severe officer injuries. This

62

G. den Heyer

Table 4.7  Subject and officer injuries sustained per sworn officer Type of injury sustained Total subject injuries Subject minor injuries Subject severe injuries Subject hospitalized Total number of officer injuries Officer minor injuries Officer severe injuries

England and Wales 0.17 0.15 Less than 1% 0.02 0.15 0.14 Less than 1%

New Zealand 0.09 0.05 0.01 Not recorded 0.06 0.05 0.02

result supports the thesis that the subject in New Zealand is more violent, or the use of force event is more violent than those experienced in England and Wales.

Conclusion This chapter has examined and compared the use of police force in England and Wales with the data in New Zealand in 2017. The examination was based on an analysis of secondary data, which has provided a high-level of understanding of the use of force by the English and Welsh police and the New Zealand Police. However, this understanding is limited because the reasons for the type of use of force chosen by the police officer and other factors involved in the event have not been examined. The examination found that in both countries their use of force options were primarily based on unarmed tactics and less-than-lethal force options and officers only resorted to firearms when confronted with armed subjects. The use of firearms by the police in both countries is minimal and occurs in 5.31 per 100,000 population in England and Wales and 5.66 per 100,000 in New Zealand. An analysis of the use of force in both countries indicates that force, other than firearms, is used more (or is recorded more consciously), in England and Wales than it is in New Zealand, when examined on a 100,000-population basis. However, when the use of force information is analyzed on a sworn officer basis, the New Zealand Police appear to use the less-than-lethal force option slightly more than the police in England and Wales. The use of the TASER™ by police in both counties indicates that the New Zealand Police use the device more often, although the 2017 data indicates that the use of the device by the police in England and Wales is similar. When both the use of police force and the injuries sustained by the subject and the officer are considered, there are indications that the English and Welsh police used force more often and sustained less serious injuries in 2017 than did New Zealand. In comparison, the New Zealand Police data indicates that they used force less often but sustained more serious injuries. These results suggest that the English and Welsh police are confronting a larger number of violent or potentially violent

4  A Comparison of the Use of Force by Police: New Zealand and England & Wales

63

subjects and that the New Zealand Police are confronting lesser numbers, but more violent subjects.

References Allen, G. & Zayed, Y. (2019, 31 July). Police service strength. Briefing paper number 00634. House of Commons Library. Alpert, G., & Dunham, R. (1999). The force factor: Measuring and assessing police use of force and suspect resistance. In National Institute of Justice (Ed.), Use of force by the police: Overview of national and local data (pp. 45–60). National Institute of Justice. Alpert, G., & Dunham, R. (2004). Understanding police use of force: Officers, suspects, and reciprocity. Cambridge University Press. Ariel, B., Farrar, W., & Sutherland, A. (2015). The effect of police body-worn cameras on use of force and citizens’ complaints against the police: A randomized controlled trial. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 31(3), 509–535. Bayley, D., & Garofalo, J. (1989). The management of violence by police patrol officers. Criminology, 27(1), 1–27. Bazley, T., Lersch, K., & Mieczkowski, T. (2007). Officer force versus suspect resistance: A gendered analysis of patrol officers in an urban police department. Journal of Criminal Justice, 35(2), 183–192. Bittner, E. (1970). The functions of the police in modern society. National Institute of Mental Health, Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency. Black, D. (1976). The behavior of law. Academic Press. Boivin, R. (2017). Correlates of subject(ive) resistance in police use of force situations. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 40(4), 719–732. Bolger, C. (2015). Just following orders: A meta-analysis of the correlates of American police officer use of force decisions. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 40(3), 466–492. Chevigny, P. (1969). Police power: Police abuses in New York city. Pantheon Books. Croft, E. (1985). Police use of force: An empirical analysis. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Friedrich, R. (1980). Police use of force: Individuals, situations, and organizations. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 452, 82–97. Garner, J., Maxwell, C., & Heraux, C. (2002). Characteristics associated with the prevalence and severity of force used by the police. Justice Quarterly, 19(4), 705–746. Hollis, M. (2018). Measurement issues in police use of force: A state-of-the-art review. Policing: An International Journal, 41(6), 844–858. Home Office. (2018, 13 December). Police use of force statistics, England and Wales: April 2017 to March 2018. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Kania, R., & Mackey, W. (1977). Police violence as a function of community characteristics. Criminology, 15(1), 27–48. Klahm, C., & Tillyer, R. (2010). Understanding police use of force: A review of the evidence. Southwest Journal of Criminal Justice, 7(2), 214–239. Klahm, C., Frank, J., & Liederbach, J. (2014). Understanding police of use of force: Rethinking the link between conceptualization and measurement. Policing: An international Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 37(3), 558–578. Klinger, D. (1995). The micro-structure of nonlethal force: Baseline data from and observational study. Criminal Justice Review, 20(2), 169–186. Langan, P., Greenfeld, L., Smith, S., Durose, M., & Levin, D. (2001). Police and the public: Findings from the 1999 national survey. US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

64

G. den Heyer

Langworthy, R., & Travis, L. (1999). Policing in America: A balance of forces (2nd ed.). Prentice-Hall. Levine, S. (2012). Story: Political values. Retrieved from: https://teara.govt.nz/en/political-­values Lindberg, D. (2012). Police use of force: A review of the literature. Criminology and Criminal Justice Senior Capstone Project. Paper 6. Retrieved from: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=ccj_capstone Locker, J. (2010). New Zealand police use of force annual report 2007. New Zealand Police. Lundstrom, R., & Mullan, C. (1987). The use of force: One department’s experience. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 56(1), 6–9. Mastrofski, S., Ritti, R., & Hoffmaster, D. (1987). Organizational determinants of police discretion: The case of drinking driving. Journal of Criminal Justice, 15(5), 387–402. McLaughlin, V. (1992). Police and the use of force: The Savannah study. Praeger. Morabito, M., Kerr, A., Watson, A., Draine, J., Ottati, V., & Angell, B. (2012). Crisis intervention teams and people with mental illness: Exploring the factors that influence the use of force. Crime and Delinquency, 58(1), 57–77. Morabito, M., Socia, K., Wik, A., & Fisher, W. (2017). The nature and extent of police use of force in encounters with people with behavioral health disorders. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 50, 31–37. National Consensus Policy on Use of Force. (2017, October). National consensus policy and discussion paper on use of force. Retrieved from: https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2018­08/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force.pdf National Institute of Justice. (1999). Use of force by police: Overview of national and local data. US Department of Justice. National Institute of Justice. (2012). Police use of force. Retrieved from http://www.nij.gov/topics/ law-­enforcement/officer-­safety/use-­of-­force/Pages/welcome.aspx Police Executive Meeting. (2007). Tactical options report database: Activity update and resource implications. New Zealand Police. Rajakaruna, N., Henry, P., Cutler, A., & Fairman, G. (2017). Ensuring the validity of police use of force training. Police Practice and Research, 18(5), 507–521. Reiss, A. (1971). The police and the public. Yale University Press. Response and Operations: Research and Evaluation. (2018). New Zealand police annual tactical options research report #6. New Zealand Police. Scharf, P., & Binder, A. (1983). The badge and the bullet: Police use of deadly force. Praeger. Sherman, L. (1980). Perspectives on police and violence. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 452, 1–12. Smith, D. (1986). The neighborhood context of police behaviour. In A. Reiss & M. Tonry (Eds.), Communities and crime (pp. 313–341). University of Chicago Press. Stenning, P., Birkbeck, C., Adang, O., Baker, D., Feltes, T., Gabaldon, G., Haberfield, M., Machado, E., & Waddington, P. (2009). Researching the use of force: The background to the international project. Crime, Law and Social Change, 52(2), 95–110. Sun, I., Payne, B., & Wu, Y. (2008). The impact of situational factors, officer characteristics, and neighbourhood context on police behaviour: A multilevel analysis. Journal of Criminal Justice, 36, 22–32. Terrill, W. (2003). Police use of force and suspect resistance: The micro process of the police-­ suspect encounter. Police Quarterly, 6(1), 51–83. Terrill, W. (2009). The elusive nature of reasonableness. Criminology and Public Policy, 8(1), 163–172. Terrill, W. (2014). Police coercion. In M. Reisig & R. Kane (Eds.), The Oxford handbook on police and policing (pp. 260–279). Oxford University Press. Terrill, W., & Mastrofski, S. (2002). Situational and officer-based determinants of police coercion. Justice Quarterly, 19(2), 215–248. Terrill, W., & Reisig, M. (2003). Neighborhood context and police use of force. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 40(3), 291–321.

4  A Comparison of the Use of Force by Police: New Zealand and England & Wales

65

Terrill, W., Ingram, J., Somers, L., & Paoline, E. (2018). Examining police use of force and citizen complaints. Policing: An International Journal, 41(4), 496–509. Wolf, R., Mesloh, C., Henych, M., & Thompson, F. (2009). Police use of force and the cumulative force factor. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 32(4), 739–757. Worden, R. (1995). The ‘causes’ of police brutality: Theory and evidence on police use of force. In W. Geller & H. Toch (Eds.), And justice for all: Understanding and controlling police abuse of force (pp. 31–60). Police Executive Research Forum. Dr. Garth den Heyer  is a professor at Arizona State University and a senior research fellow with the Police Foundation. He is also a contributing faculty member at Walden University and an associate with the Scottish Institute of Policing Research. He served with the New Zealand Police for 38 years, retiring as an inspector and manager: national security. He also spent more than 20 months as a strategic advisor to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. His main research interests are policing, militarization, service delivery efficacy, policy development, strategic thinking, and organizational reform.

Chapter 5

Big Data Before Its Time: The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database Garth den Heyer

Introduction In 2015, more than 50,000 police officers were assaulted on duty, of which more than one-quarter (28.4%) resulted in an injury to the officer (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). The problem for police practitioners, researchers and policy makers in the United States of America is that little is known about the violence used against police officers or the use of police force on the public (Alpert, 2016; Klinger et al., 2016; Gibbs et al., 2017; Terrill et al., 2018). One reason for the gap in the understanding of violence used against police officers or the use of police force on the public is that there is no national database in the United States that records the police use of deadly or less-than-lethal force. This is despite longstanding calls for its establishment (Gruber & Schmidt, 2015). The New Zealand Police established a national database in 2006 and the United Kingdom Home Office established their national use of force database in 2018. A number of observers have expressed dismay at the state of the current use of police force information systems in the United States, especially in relation to the use of police deadly force (Klinger et al., 2016). The United States does, however, have a national voluntary data collection system that uses especially designed software that has been developed by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (Dymond, 2015). The system was designed for the anonymous submission of use of force information by officers and agencies whenever force was used and stores information pertaining to the incident, the officer and offenders involved, their ages, ethnicities, education, injuries sustained and details of any complaint made (Dymond, 2015). There is also the police data initiative that was developed by the National Police Foundation that promotes the use of police force data to encourage problem G. den Heyer (*) Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_5

67

68

G. den Heyer

solving, innovation, understanding and accountability between communities and the law enforcement agencies that serve them (Police Data Initiative, 2019). The need for a national use of police deadly force data collection system was first raised in 1981 by the United States Commission on Civil Rights (White, 2015) and then again, 35  years later by the President’s Task Force on twenty-first Century Policing, who stated in their final report: 2.2.4 Action Item: Policies on use of force should also require agencies to collect, maintain, and report data to the Federal Government on all officer-involved shootings, whether fatal or nonfatal, as well as any in-custody death (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015, p. 21).

A lack of understanding as to the use of police force impedes the development of evidence-based policies and practices that minimize the use of such force (Koper, 2016). It also undermines police accountability and legitimacy, particularly in high-­ crime, minority communities where the majority of police use-of-force incidents occur (Koper, 2016). The ability to access comprehensive data relating to police use of force events is needed to help understand the factors involved in more detail and to ensure transparency and accountability in policing (Koper, 2016). This chapter examines the arguments for establishing a national use of police force database in the United States. The discussion is based on the presentation of the New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report database that provides a detailed evidential base from which to understand the deployment of tactical options by police officers and use of force situations (New Zealand Police, 2010). New Zealand is in a rather unique environment in terms of international policing policy and practice when it comes to the use of force by its officers and in relation to the armed response to critical incidents. With the exception of the United Kingdom (excluding Northern Ireland) and some Pacific Island nations, members of the New Zealand Police are not armed in the normal course of their duties, although they have immediate access to firearms (Marshall & Shuey, 2001). The first section of the chapter reviews the literature in relation to the use of force by the police and argues for the establishment of a national use of force database in the United States. The following sections introduce the Staff Safety Project, which led to the establishment of the New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report and provides an overview of the database. The concluding sections present the United Kingdom use of force data collection system and contains some final remarks.

The Establishment of a National Use of Force Database In 1999, the National Institute of Justice claimed that what is “[k]nown with substantial confidence is that police use force infrequently” (p. viii). This claim is supported by a number of scholars who assert that the police seldom use force to achieve public compliance (Croft, 1985; Langan et al., 2001; Reiss, 1971; Worden, 1995). Hickman et  al. (2015) claim that the data that is available indicates that

5  Big Data Before Its Time: The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database

69

police use of force occurs in less than 2% of police-citizen encounters and that the force most commonly used by police is minor. However, Terrill et al., (2018) suggests that a closer look at the force used by the police presents a more “muddied picture” as there is considerable variation in the use of force which is “not all pointing in the direction of force being infrequent” (p. 2). Terrill et al. (2018) states that there have been a large number of studies that have examined the use of force by police officers that have been undertaken in different jurisdictions over a number of years using different research methodologies, resulting in differing conclusions (see for example, Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Friedrich, 1977; Klinger, 1995; Lundstrom & Mullan, 1987; McLaughlin, 1992; Terrill, 2014). Federal and local police agency definitions of the use of police force provide police officers with criteria that are helpful in determining whether it is appropriate to use force and the parameters for the type of force to be used in particular situations (Portland State University, 2012). The majority of police agencies use their own definition of the use of force, but these have generally been based on the definition that was developed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Force used by the police is defined by the International Association of Chiefs of Police as the “amount of effort required by police to compel compliance by an unwilling subject” (United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2012). The accepted approach for the use of police force is that police officers should not use more force than is necessary to maintain control of an incident, to carry out an arrest, or to protect the public or themselves from the threat of injury or death (United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2012). There are a number of factors involved in deciding whether or not a police officer will use force (Taylor & Woods, 2010). These factors include the location of the encounter, the officer and offender involved, their mental capabilities, and whether drugs and alcohol are involved (Taylor & Woods, 2010). As Alpert (2016), Klinger et al. (2016), and Terrill et al. (2018) observed, there is a gap in our understanding of the factors surrounding the police use of force in the United States because there is no national use of force database. The discussion as to whether to develop a national database in the United States on the use of deadly force or officer-involved shootings is not new (Alpert, 2016). There are some sources of data available that captures police officer killings of citizens, but the limitations of this data are well known (White, 2015). In 1994, Congress passed a law that was intended to assist the Justice Department in collecting better statistics about police officer-involved shootings, but the law only established a voluntary use of force data gathering system (Dymond, 2015; Gruber & Schmidt, 2015). The International Association of Chiefs of Police received federal funding to create a national database to capture police use of force. The International Association developed software for use of force reporting and coordinated the collection through their State Associations of Chiefs of Police (White, 2015, p. 230). The database captured more than 50,000 use-of-force incidents from 1996 to 1997 from more than 1000 agencies (Henriquez, 1999), but unfortunately funding for the database ended in 2001 (White, 2015).

70

G. den Heyer

In February 2015, the problem was bought to the attention of the media by the Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James B. Comey, who highlighted the discrepancies in police lethal force reporting. There were an estimated 928 people killed by the police over an eight-year period, but police agencies only reported 383 to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Gruber & Schmidt, 2015). Director Comey acknowledged the limitations of the data available and said that “it’s ridiculous that I can’t tell you how many people are shot by police in this country right now” (McCarthy, 2015, p. 2). The history of the discussion from the perspectives of practitioners, politicians and researchers has been covered in-depth by Klinger et al. (2016). Although some police agencies have implemented databases that record their use of less-than-lethal force, there has been no movement to introduce a national database that records less-than-lethal force, despite an increase in public consciousness of the issue. Without a national use of force database, information regarding the use of force is lacking. If this information were captured in a national database, it would be useful in the development of policy and in officer training programs. The use of force data that is available, according to Klinger et al. (2016), does not enable an assessment of “the social determinants of the use of deadly force by the police, racial disparities in police shootings, or the degree to which racial disparities may reflect biased or discriminatory police behaviour” (p. 194). This means that the information on the use of force that is currently available cannot be a reliable guide for policy evaluation (Klinger et al., 2016). It also means that in the United States, there is a lot of information about the use of force event, the officer and the suspect involved and the decision to use force that is not known (Alpert, 2016). Although a number of police agencies collect and record detailed information about an officer shooting a member of the public, there is no single repository at the national level that is able “to examine patterns, trends, or even anomalies” (Alpert, 2016, p. 238). If data were captured from a use-of-force incident, police agencies would be able to know why force was used. Furthermore, analysing the patterns, trends, and reasons for the use of force would assist the police in developing force application training programs and more effective plans for the deployment of officers (Gruber & Schmidt, 2015). To date, research has shown that in the majority of cases, force used by the police on suspects is physical force, which implies the use of hands, fists or feet (see for example, Garner et al., 1995; Greenfeld et al., 1997), but why this form of force is used is unknown. In the majority of police agencies in the United States, information pertaining to the use of force by officers is collected, but this is usually in relation to criminal or administrative investigations about a specific application of the use of force. This is in contrast to other police agencies that neither collect use of force data nor undertake any investigations into its application (Alpert, 2016). This situation demonstrates how fragmented the system of policing in the United States is, and as a consequence, the ability to develop knowledge and improve the response to violent situations (Henriquez, 1999). The introduction of evidence-based policing is placing pressure on police agencies in the United States to understand their role and to develop policies based on

5  Big Data Before Its Time: The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database

71

research. This is one of the reasons that Klinger et al. (2016) placed a high level of importance on the gathering of data and its analysis. However, when reviewing the use of force information, Klinger et al. (2016) did not propose any phases or stages of a use of force event (Binder & Scharf, 1980), the tactical decision made, or the actions of the suspect in the information to be gathered. This means that an argument could be made that the behavior of the suspect is a more critical variable in the explanation as to why a specific form of force was used by an officer, rather than the racial or microspatial factors of an event (Alpert, 2016). According to Alpert (2016), police agencies and researchers of policing remain in an information vacuum concerning the realities of the force that police officers use and the circumstances of use of force events. Literature is available that investigates the violence used by members of the public on the police and the force used by the police on members of the public, but according to White (2015), the use of force has been examined in isolation and not in relation to other factors. As there is no use of a national use of force database, there is a gap in the capability to analyze the theories and questions that have been raised in studies (McEwen, 1966). The first step in understanding the application of the use of force by the police and the reasons for its application is gathering more and better data in relation to the event of its application, especially the details of the offender and the officer involved (Alpert, 2016). The gathering of use of force data would enable the reasons why officers use force to be examined, including the sociological, psychological (Bolger, 2015; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002) and organizational (Mastrofski et al., 1987) factors. If the United States were to consider developing a national use of deadly force database, the following information would be needed: (a) the number of incidents in which police officers discharge firearms at citizens; (b) the demographic characteristics of the officers and citizens involved in each incident; (c) the agency or agencies employing the officers involved and the location of each incident; (d) the weapon used by police officers and citizens; and (e) the injuries, if any, suffered by officers and citizens. This would be the minimum amount of information that would need to be recorded for a non-lethal use of force database (Klinger et al., 2016). Klinger et al. (2016) also recommended that all police agencies collect this information on behalf of a designated collection entity (for example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics), which in turn should post the information online and provide annual reports to the public. This proposal would lead to the ability to be able to improve police use of force training and practice and would enable evidence-based use of force policies to be developed (see Lum, 2009; Weisburd & Neyroud, 2011). A national database with the core elements that Klinger et al. (2016) proposed would allow for the understanding of the use of deadly force by the police and the use of force events (White, 2015). Such a database would provide information on how often police officers use deadly force, on whom and for what reasons (White, 2015). A national use of force database would be beneficial as it would provide the capability to evaluate policy proposals regarding the police use of force, which are currently difficult to evaluate and improve upon, owing to the fact that little is

72

G. den Heyer

known about how often and under what circumstances the police use force (Klinger et al., 2016). Klinger et al. (2016) also claims that it is not appropriate to evaluate the use of force policies and practices of an individual agency based on information provided by that agency alone, but that “[c]omparative information is needed to determine whether a given agency is in line with or diverges from comparable agencies and to assist agencies in revising their policies and training protocols based on best practices elsewhere” (p. 217). Another benefit, especially if a police shooting national database were to be established, is that it would give police agencies, which currently only have access to those incidents in which its own officers were involved in, access to a database that enables lessons to be learnt from the experiences of other agencies (Klinger et al., 2016). As a result of not having the data and knowledge that pertains to the use of police force, police trainers and policy makers rely “on anecdotal evidence from particular officer-involved shootings that they somehow become aware of” (Klinger et al., 2016, p. 218). Another benefit of having a national use of force database is that the information contained in the database and its analysis would be a valuable tool to inform the public and the media about any occurrence of police use of force.

New Zealand Police Staff Safety Project The New Zealand Police Staff Safety Project was the first step towards developing the Tactical Options Report Database. The project was initiated in May 1997 by the then Commissioner of the New Zealand Police in response to what appeared to be a trend of high-profile, serious assaults on police officers (den Heyer et al., 1998). In 1986, there were 1696 minor1 assaults on police officers, which increased to 1984 in 1994, 2114  in 1995, and then dropped back to 1907  in 1996. Serious assaults increased 88.6%, from 100 to 207 over the same period (den Heyer et al., 1998). The primary purpose of the project was to identify strategies that would minimize harm to police staff and maximize their safety. There was also heightened concern about staff safety issues, the deployment of staff and the allocation of safety resources. The project was part of a police executive instituted evaluation of capsicum sprays, but the project was also established to gain a clearer understanding of the patrol and deployment policies that were being used and to ensure that these policies were meeting the primary aim of officer safety (den Heyer et al., 1998). The overarching factor that influenced the project was the binding obligations of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, but the project also was developed within the strategies outlined in the Police Strategic Plan and the Direction in Australasian Policing Strategy. There were four factors that influenced the project:

 Minor assault was defined as an assault that did not require hospital treat and a serious assault was defined as an assault that required hospital treat. 1

5  Big Data Before Its Time: The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database

73

1. The overall capacity of the police and the level of service that the organization provided 2. Response policies and strategies 3. Officer use of force training 4. Safety equipment, including effective communications As a result of the increase in the number of assaults and the seriousness of some of the assaults, the project researched the assault data that was held in the police districts throughout the country. The information contained within the prosecution files that related to the charge of “Assault on a Police Officer” or “Assault of a Law Enforcement Officer” for the years 1994, 1995, and 1996 (den Heyer et al., 1998) was examined and formed the basis for the research. It was surmised that an in-­ depth analysis of the data obtained from the prosecution files would provide researchers with a thorough understanding of the circumstances in which the assaults occurred. The conclusions from this analysis provided the foundation for the development of preventative strategies, the introduction of conducted electrical weapons, OC spray, stab resistant vests and the Tactical Options Report Database. An analysis of the data revealed that most assaults on police officers occurred on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights between the hours of 9:00 PM and 3:00 AM, with a peak period between midnight and 3 am. In just under a third (28.7%), the incident that precipitated a police officer being assaulted was placing a person under arrest. Assaults most often took place on the street (46.4%), followed by in a private residence (20.3%) and in almost one-quarter (22.9%), as a result of a police officer attending a fight or disturbance. Furthermore, the majority of assailants were under the influence of alcohol (79%) at the time of committing the assault and in almost all of the cases (96%), assailants used “personal weapons,” such as their fists or feet when assaulting the police. As these results suggest, most assaults were spontaneous acts arising out of emotionally charged situations.

New Zealand Police National Staff Safety Database A review of how the New Zealand Police recorded the use of police force was undertaken by Marshall and Sheuy in 2001. This review identified that there was an absence of a coordinated and informed approach to recording the use of force. A coordinated and informed approach to recording the use of force could be used to inform training and the development of policy. The review noted that there was a proliferation of forms that needed to be completed for a range of different use of force circumstances, for example, there were different forms for the use of police dogs, presenting a firearm, injury sustained by an officer and the application of force. Another limitation that was identified was that all of the information that related to the use of force was retained at the district level and not at the national level and this did not allow for a more strategic understanding of the factors involved

74

G. den Heyer

in the use of force. This situation, according to Marshall and Sheuy (2001), did little to advance the collective understanding or knowledge on how the police used force. The report proposed that a national staff safety database would underpin and form the basis for the strategic direction in assessing and dealing with critical events and the use of force by the police. The database would give rise to the implementation of one computer generated entry, recording all instances of use of force, use of firearms, use of dogs, Occupational, Safety and Health matters and related circumstances, which would identify when police officers had used force or had force used against them during the course of their duty. This would ensure that trends, issues and training requirements could be identified nationally and in a timely manner. The database would be an intelligence system, with a feed-back loop and would be a driving force behind future training, policy direction and equipment initiatives. It was claimed by Marshall and Sheuy (2001) that without a nationally based system, the New Zealand Police would not progress in their understanding of the use of force.

The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database The Tactical Options Report database was implemented in September 2006 to provide the capability for the New Zealand Police Executive to better understand the operating environment of the organization and the inherent risks within this environment (Police Executive Meeting, 2007). The database was designed to provide the organization with the ability to access comprehensive information and understanding of the use of force and would enable them to: • maintain public trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police in the use of less lethal force; • promote the value of the use of less lethal weapons as a valid response to deal with incidences of violence and disorder; and, • raise awareness of the New Zealand Police priority to maintain public and staff safety during violent confrontations (Police Executive Meeting, 2007). The strength of the database was that it was capable of providing electronic reports that enabled both a quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the use of tactical options by police officers and the circumstances surrounding their use (Police Executive Meeting, 2007). This evaluation capability, according to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and the United Kingdom Home Office representatives, set an international precedent in terms of police use of force data collection, analysis and research (Police Executive Meeting, 2007). The New Zealand Police realized that there would be valuable benefits for the organization if the use-of-force incident information and the use of tactical options was analyzed. It was proposed that an analysis of this data would provide a vital source of information and assurance and would contribute to the proposed Tactical Options Deployment Review and the routine review and development of:

5  Big Data Before Its Time: The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database

• • • • •

75

staff safety initiatives staff use of force training operational policies and procedures pertaining to the use of force protective equipment use of less-than-lethal weaponry (Police Executive Meeting, 2007)

The second area of benefit for the organization if the use of force data were analyzed would be the ability to understand the application of force in the context of complaints made by the public about police actions. These two areas were of particular interest to the New Zealand Police and enabled them to analyze the form and the basis for the complaint: • complaints against the Police – a total of 15.2% of all complaints (1820/11,982) laid in the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2006 related to the use of force by police officers. This was the largest category of complaints made against the police. The next largest category of complaints made against the police were the attitude of officers (1607/11,982), which accounted for 13.4% of all complaints made by the public • civil litigation – excessive or inappropriate use of force by police officers represented 22% of all civil claims initiated against the police from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 2003 (Police Executive Meeting, 2007) Since the Tactical Options Report Database was introduced, it has contributed significantly to the evaluation processes associated with the operational trial of the TASER™. The database was the primary resource that was utilized for the qualitative and quantitative analysis of TASER™ incident details, including injuries to staff and offenders. Other activities that the Tactical Options Report database provided information for during the trial of TASER™ were: • immediate access, at both a district and national level, to specific incident information; • substantial reduction in costs and time necessary for analysis of information relating to police use of force; • an ability for the project team to track the use of the TASER™ and follow up with districts as further information needs were identified; • reporting to the Police Executive Meeting, the Minister of Police and the Law and Order Select Committee; and, • requests for information as the need arose, especially from the media (Police Executive Meeting, 2007). The database enables other questions to be investigated and analyzed including: • what injuries are police staff and subjects receiving as a result of the use of force tactics used • what use of force tactics are the most effective in controlling and apprehending an offender • how often are New Zealand Police going to incidents where weapons are present and used

76

G. den Heyer

• what are the behavioral and emotional factors of offenders • how often are drugs and/or alcohol a factor in violent offenders and the application of the use of force • which officers are using which tactics and for what • what types of incidents are the New Zealand Police attending where use of tactical options2 is occurring • how often are specific tactics used? (Police Executive Meeting, 2007) In summary, the database is capable of providing additional information to better understand the organizational risk in relation to the use of force, enable the identification of controls to provide a high level of assurance that the risks are managed and better enable the police executive to make informed decisions in relation to staff safety and the use of force.

2 009 and 2017 Review of the Tactical Options Research Report Database The Tactical Options Reporting Database was reviewed and updated in 2009, which resulted in the database being able to generate three reports for analysing trends in the use of force and for the development of a use of force policy: 1 . The Tactical Options Report (TOR) 2. The Tactical Options Report-Animal (TOR-Animal) 3. The Tactical Options Report-The Unintentional Discharge of a firearm by a police officer (TOR-UD) In 2017, the New Zealand Police completed a review of the database to enhance their understanding of the use of firearms in use of force events. The firearms reporting capability within the Tactical Options Report database was developed significantly to improve the comprehensiveness of the data and to enable real-time reporting. In late 2017, the Fatalities/Shooting Injury Form was introduced to ensure real-time coverage of highly significant use of force events that were subject to extensive investigative processes but had not been captured previously within the reporting data. From the 2018 reporting year forward, these changes would improve the comprehensiveness of police firearms fatality and injury data.

 Tactical options include the use of open hand tactics and less-than-lethal weapons.

2

5  Big Data Before Its Time: The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database

77

 xamining the New Zealand Police Tactical Options E Research Report The Tactical Options Report database presents a quantitative overview of the deployment of tactical options by New Zealand Police Officers. It does not, however, provide an understanding of the factors that influenced the officer’s choice of tactical option that was deployed (Response and Operations Research and Evaluation, 2018). The database comprises of records of tactical options events and their use by police staff within those events. A “Tactical Options Report event” is defined as the reportable use of one or more tactical options, by one officer, against one individual (Response and Operations Research and Evaluation, 2018). However, multiple Tactical Option Report events can occur at a single incident. Deploying one of the tactical options, that have been listed subsequently, requires the completion of, and the entering of a report on to the database: handcuffs with pain compliance, or without pain compliance when used with another reportable tactical option; other restraints; OC spray bursts; empty hand tactics; baton strikes; dog bites or other dog-related deployment injuries; weapons of opportunity and the use and discharge of sponge rounds; shows and discharges of a TASER™ and/or firearm (Response and Operations Research and Evaluation, 2018). As some Tactical Options Report events involve the use of more than one tactical option, the total number of Tactical Options Report events recorded will be lower than the total number of tactical options used (Response and Operations Research and Evaluation, 2018).

The New Zealand Police 2017 Tactical Options Report This section presents the results of an analysis of the New Zealand Police use of force data that was recorded on the Tactical Options Report database in 2017. The report notes that the use of force was an extremely rare occurrence. Of the more than 3.5 million recorded interactions with the public, for example, there were approximately 4500 Tactical Options Reporting events. This translates to the police using force in only 0.1% of contacts with the public (Response and Operations Research and Evaluation, 2018). According to the report, the use of force option most commonly used by officers were empty hand tactics (in 39% of the Tactical Option Report events), handcuffs and other forms of physical restraints (34%), and OC spray (32%). The TASER™ was used at 26% of Tactical Options Report events and in the majority of instances, that usage was presentation only (therefore presentation, laser painting, and/or arcing). In 2017, the TASER™ was discharged at 186 Tactical Option Report events and presented at a further 1003; this amounts to a 5:1 show to discharge ratio (Response and Operations Research and Evaluation, 2018). This means that the

78

G. den Heyer

TASER™ is most likely to have been used only in presentation mode at these events. However, comparing the trends of recent years, it is worth noting that this ratio has reduced each year for the past 4 years (reducing from a show to discharge ratio of 8:1 in 2014 to 5:1 in 2017). At a 5:1 show to discharge ratio, it is more likely that the TASER™ was discharged when used in an event in 2017, compared to its use in 2014. Firearms were reported to have been used by patrol and investigative officers at 6% of all Tactical Option Report events. In most instances, the use of firearms was in presentation mode only. However, in 10 instances, a firearm was discharged by the police that resulted in 4 miss events, 3 non-fatal injury events and 3 fatal injury events (Response and Operations Research and Evaluation, 2018). The report also claimed that the police use force, in the majority of cases, did not result in a reported injury to either the officer or to a member of the public. In 2017, police staff were injured in 12% of Tactical Option Report events and in 18% of the events on whom force was used (Response and Operations Research and Evaluation, 2018). These proportions are almost identical to data of earlier years.

The United Kingdom On 1 April 2017, the United Kingdom National Police Chiefs’ Council introduced a requirement for all police forces in the United Kingdom to record data on the use of force by police (Home Office, 2018). The collection of this data was intended to hold police forces to account and to provide the public with greater information on the different types of force used and the context in which this occurs (Home Office, 2018). The Home Office use-of-force incident is defined as a situation where a police officer uses any force tactic, ranging from applying handcuffs to using a firearm (Home Office, 2018). As well as the tactics used in each use-of-force-incident, officers must also record: the subject’s details; the reason for using force and other impact factors, such as the outcome from the use of force; location; and subject and staff injuries (Home Office, 2018). Prior to the introduction of the national use of force recording system, individual police forces used their own definitions of use of force and maintained their own recording processes. In 2015, 34 of the 41 United Kingdom police forces responded to a survey that examined the recording of the use of force practices by police forces (Dymond, 2015). The results showed that a substantial proportion of forces were already capturing data whenever force was used, with 27 (79%) of police forces indicating they had an in-house data collection system in place (Dymond, 2015). The problem was, however, was that many of these systems had been developed independently and the extent and nature to which the data was collected, how it was captured and to what extent it was analyzed and utilized, varied considerably between the forces (Dymond, 2015).

5  Big Data Before Its Time: The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database

79

According to Dymond (2015), the majority of forces with an in-house data collection system recorded information on the characteristics of the subject and the officer and details about the incident. However, survey results identified that there was a lack of detailed data captured on crucial issues, such as: • specific details of the force used by an officer, such as the techniques used, in what order, how many times and for how long • officer, subject and bystander injuries. More than 40% of forces with an in-house database indicated that they were not capturing whether officers and subjects were incurring injuries as a result of force used, or whilst using force. Even fewer forces recorded important details on how many subjects were injured, the severity of injuries for the officer and the subject, particularly force techniques that inflicted injury and whether bystanders were injured • whenever force was used in mental health settings (adapted from Dymond, 2015) A number of survey participants also advised that although the data they gathered was analyzed and fed back into policing practices, other survey participants acknowledged that there was a need for an improvement in using the information to inform the development of policy (Dymond, 2015). The majority of participants also recognized the benefits of reporting the use of force, with a number of respondents commenting specifically on the value that a national approach to recording and analysing the use of force data would have (Dymond, 2015).

Conclusion This chapter has examined the background to the current approach of recording the use of force in the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. The background and the development of the New Zealand Police use of force database, the Tactical Options Report was presented as a case study. Also discussed was an analysis of the 2017 Tactical Options Report data to highlight the capability that the information held in the database has. The need to collect police use of force data is becoming increasingly important for police agencies. The collection and analysis of such data at the national level is not only important for the development of evidence-based policy and practice, but also ensures that there is transparency in police practices. As Klinger et al. (2016) claimed, it is impossible to use the principles of evidence-based policing for the development of policy pertaining to the use of deadly force without a more comprehensive, national data system. The current approach of examining use of police force data through police reports has inherent limitations, including the bias of the reporting officer and that there is no set standard in the way that information is recorded (Wolfe et al., 2009). Furthermore, the analyses of these reports make it impossible for researchers to examine the specific details of the use of force event, for example, to determine the length of each confrontation.

80

G. den Heyer

Internationally, it is clear that reporting practices are very similar with the majority of agencies having mandatory recording of a range of use of force techniques— from empty hand tactics to weapons. The characteristics of the officer and the subject involved; details of the incident; and details of any injuries sustained that have been collected on a use of force form appears to be best practice. Other sound practices are the regular analysis of the use of force data and making this information available to the public (Dymond, 2015).

References Alpert, G. (2016). Toward a national database of officer-involved shootings: A long and winding road. Criminology & Public Policy, 15(1), 237–241. Bayley, D., & Garofalo, J. (1989). The management of violence by police patrol officers. Criminology, 27(1), 1–27. Binder, A., & Scharf, P. (1980). The violent police–citizen encounter. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 452, 111–121. Bolger, C. (2015). Just following orders: A meta-analysis of the correlates of American police officer use of force decisions. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 40(3), 466–492. Croft, E. (1985). Police use of force: An empirical analysis. (unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Michigan. den Heyer, G., Keay, D., & Russell, N. (1998). Assaults review: A study of assaults on New Zealand police officers. Staff Safety Project, New Zealand Police. Dymond, A. (2015). Use of force reporting practices: Findings from a survey of UK police forces. University of Exeter. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016). Law enforcement officers killed and assaulted, 2015. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Friedrich, R. (1977). The impact of organizational, individual, and situational factors on police behaviour (unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Michigan. Garner, J., Schade, T., Hepburn, J., & Buchanan, J. (1995). Measuring the continuum of force used by and against the police. Criminal Justice Review, 20(2), 146–168. Gibbs, J., Lee, J., Moloney, J., & Olsen, S. (2017). Exploring the neighbourhood context of serious assaults on police. Policing and Society, 28(8), 898–914. Greenfeld, L., Langan, P., & Smith, S. (1997). Police use of force: Collection of national data. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Gruber, C., & Schmidt, W. (2015). Mandatory nationwide use of force reporting by police and correctional agencies – And why this is an important issue. AELE Monthly Law Journal, 6, 501–509. Henriquez, M. (1999). IACP national database project on police use of force. In National Institute of Justice (Ed.), Use of force by police: Overview of national and local data. National Institute of Justice. Hickman, M. J., Atherley, L. T., Lowery, P. G., & Alpert, G. P. (2015). Reliability of the force factor method in police use-of-force research. Police Quarterly, 18(4), 368–396. Home Office. (2018). Police use of force statistics, England and Wales: April 2017 to March 2018. Home Office. Klinger, D. (1995). The micro-structure of nonlethal force: Baseline data from and observational study. Criminal Justice Review, 20(2), 169–186. Klinger, D., Rosenfeld, R., Isom, D., & Deckard. (2016). Race, crime, and the micro-ecology of deadly force. Criminology & Public Policy, 15(1), 193–222.

5  Big Data Before Its Time: The New Zealand Police Tactical Options Report Database

81

Koper, C. (2016). Advancing research and accountability on police use of deadly force. Criminology & Public Policy, 1591, 187–191. Langan, P., Greenfeld, L., Smith, S., Durose, M., & Levin, D. (2001). Police and the public: Findings from the 1999 national survey. United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Lum, C. (2009). Translating police research into practice. Police Foundation. Lundstrom, R., & Mullan, C. (1987). The use of force: One department’s experience. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 56(1), 6–9. Marshall, P., & Shuey, R. (2001). A strategic evaluation of New Zealand police position concerning the use of force when responding to potentially violent situations: A review of best practice, policy and training. New Zealand Police. Mastrofski, S., Ritti, R., & Hoffmaster, D. (1987). Organizational determinants of police discretion: The case of drinking driving. Journal of Criminal Justice, 15(5), 387–402. McCarthy, T. (2015). The uncounted: Why the US can’t keep track of people killed by police. The Guardian. Retrieved from theguardian.com/us-­news/2015/mar/18/ policekillings-­government-­data-­count McEwen, T. (1966). National data collection on police use of force. Bureau of Justice Statistics and National Institute of Justice. McLaughlin, V. (1992). Police and the use of force: The Savannah study. Praeger. New Zealand Police. (2010). The tactical options reporting database. Wellington. Police Data Initiative. (2019). Home page. Retrieved from https://www.policedatainitiative.org/ Police Executive Meeting. (2007). Tactical options report database: Activity update and resource implications. New Zealand Police. Portland State University. (2012). Police use of force: A review of the literature. Criminology and Criminal Justice Senior Capstone Project, Paper 6. Retrieved from: http://pdxscholar.library. pdx.edu/ccj_capstone/6 Reiss, A. (1971). The police and the public. Yale University Press. Response and Operations Research and Evaluation. (2018). New Zealand police annual tactical options research report 6. New Zealand Police. Taylor, B., & Woods, D. J. (2010). Injuries to officers and suspects in police use of force cases: A quasi-experimental evaluation. Police Quarterly, 13(3), 260–289. Terrill, W. (2014). Police coercion. In M. Reisig & R. Kane (Eds.), The Oxford handbook on police and policing (pp. 260–279). Oxford University Press. Terrill, W., & Mastrofski, S. (2002). Situational and officer-based determinants of police coercion. Justice Quarterly, 19(2), 215–248. Terrill, W., Ingram, J., Somers, L., & Paoline, E. (2018). Examining police use of force and citizen complaints. Policing: An International Journal, 41(4), 496–509. United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. (2012). Police use of force. Retrieved from http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-­enforcement/officer-­safety/use-­offorce/ welcome.htm Weisburd, D., & Neyroud, P. (2011). Police science: Toward a new paradigm. In New perspectives in policing. National Institute of Justice. White, M. (2015). Transactional encounters, crisis-driven reform, and the potential for a national police deadly force database. Criminology & Public Policy, 15(1), 223–235. Wolf, R., Mesloh, C., Henych, M., & Thompson, F. (2009). Police use of force and the cumulative force factor. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 32(4), 739–757. Worden, R. (1995). The ‘causes’ of police brutality: Theory and evidence on police use of force. In W. Geller & H. Toch (Eds.), A justice for all: Understanding and controlling police abuse of force (pp. 31–60). Police Executive Research Forum.

82

G. den Heyer

Dr. Garth den Heyer  is a professor at Arizona State University and a senior research fellow with the Police Foundation. He is also a contributing faculty member at Walden University and an associate with the Scottish Institute of Policing Research. He served with the New Zealand Police for 38 years, retiring as an inspector and manager: national security. He also spent more than 20 months as a strategic advisor to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. His main research interests are policing, militarization, service delivery efficacy, policy development, strategic thinking, and organizational reform.

Part III

Police Non-lethal Use of Force Options

Chapter 6

Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters W. Bradley Cotton

Introduction Training is an absolutely critical element of anyone involved in law enforcement. Not just any training will do… it must be the right type of training.Training that is unrealistic, that focuses only on use of force, defensive tactics, driving, firearms and the physical elements of policing is, without question, all necessary, but on its own without other types of training to compliment it, can have disastrous consequences. There are many books and seminars dedicated to training and officer survival. ‘The Bullet Proof Mind’ and ‘Warrior Mindset: Mental Toughness Skills for a Nation’s Peacekeepers’ are just a couple. These books and seminars by the same title have recently come under fire in the press for teaching militarised tactics to police officers (McLaughlin, 2020). We much prefer framing in a different, more positive fashion. Author and former Navy SEAL, Commander Richard Marcinko is quoted as saying ‘The more you sweat in training, the less you bleed in battle’ (Marcinko, 1992). Officers need to spend the time learning how to deal with the myriad of situations they will encounter on the street, the vast majority of which will never end in a use of force of any kind. The Washington Post maintains an online database of all persons shot by police in the United States, based on media and social media reports in addition to submitted national statistics (Tate et  al., 2021). According to their data, since January 1, 2015, 6,005 persons have been shot (Tate et al., 2021). In that 6-year time frame according to the National Emergency Number Association, approximately

W. B. Cotton (*) WB Global Partners, University of Edinburgh Business School, Edinburgh, Scotland, United Kingdom e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_6

85

86

W. B. Cotton

1.44 billion emergency calls were received (Tate et al., 2021). That translates into a tremendously small percentage of calls that ended tragically. According to other data, of the 240 million emergency calls,1 roughly 62.9 million became police/public contacts and of those an estimated 337,590 had a use of force reported (Garner et al., 2018).2 What is not addressed is the impact that those deaths had on the community. Interestingly, it is more than likely that many of those situations that do end in a use of force may not have needed to. For decades we have heard media accounts of the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War Against Gangs’. We have seen an increase in the militarisation of police in appearance, training and equipment. As a public, we seem to have been conditioned by the ‘War on Crime’ but, what we are finally coming to realise is policing is not truly like a war. That position is an outdated understanding of what and who police need to be in today’s society and for today’s community. Today, police need to be Peacemakers and Referees. Revisiting the Marcinko quote, we like the way that Norman Schwarzkopf put it even better, ‘The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war’ (Norton, 1991). Recognising it is another ‘war’ reference, we are going take some licence and propose the following as our desire for you to take away in this chapter, The more you sweat in training on peaceful solutions, the less anyone will bleed.

As we go on we will look at some of the traditional models and methods of police training. We will talk about de-escalation and pre-escalation, particularly as a response to incidents where persons are suffering the effects of mental illness or mental breakdown as they have such a significant impact on policing. We will also cover the use of Dynamic Simulation-Based Training as a tool to reduce violent encounters and briefly touch on the future of police training. As you can imagine, the proper training of police officers is absolutely critical. Gone are the days of handing someone a badge, gun, baton and a set of handcuffs and pushing them out the back door of the station with instructions, ‘Don’t get yourself killed and stay out of trouble’.3 Today, depending on your location, fully training a police officer can require a degree of up to three or four years and demand much more than just use-of-force training (Dekanoidze & Khelhvill-Kyviv, 2018; Huisjes et al., 2018). Training can (and should) include courses on mental health, de-escalation, law, culture, ethics, ethnicity, diversity and more.

 We should note that this figure does not include officer or public initiated contacts that occurred outside of the NENA system. 2  As mentioned, not all states and departments have national reporting requirements (hence, the Washington Post website creation). 3  Thiswas described to the author on his first day as an officer in 1991 by a soon to retire veteran hired in the late 1950s. 1

6  Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters

87

Stress Inoculation Training One of the most important considerations of good training is the positive effects it can have on pre-event, event and post-event outcomes. This is generally referred to as stress inoculation training. When one is inoculated or vaccinated, one receives a ‘little bit of the disease’, that your body learns to fight off. Incorporating stress inoculation training in simulations allows the student to be safely exposed to different types of situations and experience emotional arousal while learning appropriate responses without being overwhelmed (Novaco, 1977). When the human body experiences stress, many things happen physiologically. The degree of response is generally thought to be determined by how threatening the individual feels the situation is (Anderson et al., 2019). In a non-spontaneous threat situation, the threat is processed cognitively and physically, normally without difficultly. In a spontaneous, startled, fearful situation however, the amygdala, which is hardwired for survival, primes the body with adrenaline for an automatic response. The triggering of the amygdala is directly responsible for what many consider (post-incident) as irrational responses, such as panic, flight, freezing in place, aggressive actions that utilize untrained skills, repeating an action time and again (a motor skill feedback loop), or an inappropriate physical response (Ross & Murphy, 2017).

Stress inoculation improves an individual’s response to the stressors an individual may experience in a critical incident. It can have a very positive spin-off benefit of reducing the effects of the incident (post-traumatic stress disorder) (Ford, 2019). Many empirical studies have been undertaken that support the positive effects of stress inoculation training to reduce anxiety and enhance performance (Saunders et al., 1996). Designing realistic scenarios that mimic real situations ‘…provides individuals with experience with minor stressors that fosters psychological preparedness and promotes resilience’ (Meichenbaum, 2017). As a result, when designing scenarios and simulations, realism is a key factor for consideration to best prepare students for the realities of police work and training must reflect the diverse situational demands faced in the field (Arble et al., 2019).

Types and Lengths of Training and Use of Force Compared The empirical evidence suggests the more educated officers are in police matters, the less they will use force (Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Shjarback & White, 2016). There is always a need for new police officers to be hired and that need has become increasingly more pronounced over the last two decades. Police services around the world have commented on the difficulty they are having filling roles with qualified applicants that are indicative of the community (Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Shjarback & White, 2016). This has led to a number of plans to try and fill ranks. It

88

Research Findings Police less authoritarian Police less cynical Police have a more flexible value system Police have improved attitude toward minorities Police more ethical and professional with less complaints

W. B. Cotton

Research Authors Parker et al. (1976); Roberg (1978) Regoli (1976) Guller (1972) Parker et al. (1976) Roberg and Bonn (2004); Mons et al. (2008); Lersch and Kunzman (2001)

Fig. 6.1  Synthesis of early research into degree educated officers in the USA. (Source: Rogers & Smith, 2018)

has also led to programs of training that can run very short. In Canada, typical training runs from 12 to 26 weeks before officers are sworn in. However, in Europe, many programs run two to four years and actually incorporate degrees focused on the science of policing. As mentioned earlier, not only do program lengths differ, but the subjects studied also vary greatly. In North America, there is a distinct focus on operations and tactics. The training tends to be much more militaristic and technical with a focus on weapons (lethal and less lethal), defensive tactics and officer safety. There is little serious consideration paid to diversity, ethnicity, mental health and de-­escalation. Compared to the European schools which feature entire courses on police history, culture, diversity, mental health and more. There have been many studies about the length of training programs and the impact that they have on the use of force. Numerous studies over the last few years appear to confirm that there is a nexus between use of force and education. In addition to the studies by Rydberg and Terrill (2010) and Shjarback & White (2016) other studies further show positive results from officers who have degrees (Fig. 6.1). This does not mean that higher educated officers are reluctant to use force or that those that are less educated more willing, but what it does appear to reflect is critical thinking and the ability to apply knowledge and skills from other experiences and learning within the fluid dynamics of the different situations that officers face daily and the positive outcomes of better attitudes, higher levels of professionalism and lower use of force. Additionally, these longer courses serve to fill the police officer’s personal ‘toolbox’ with practical skills that they can apply in day-to-day situations.

The Toolbox When we conduct training for officers (or anyone for that matter), we frequently refer to the ‘toolbox’. What is the toolbox?It is a symbolic repository that each of us carries which contains the ‘tools’ of our training and experience that we can pull out and use as situations demand.

6  Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters

89

Students are told that when you see a colleague do something that you like and that worked, put it in your toolbox to take out and try yourself. When you read or experience or learn something, do the same thing. You fill up your toolbox with tactics and skills that you can use to resolves situations. Some of these tools are experiential, and we can only decide on their effectiveness by using them in a real experience (either reality-based simulations or real life), but many of these tools can be taught (de-escalation and techniques for mental health intervention) in a classroom. Example An experienced colleague who was an extremely skilled negotiator attended a call during a domestic dispute between a husband and wife. He and his partner separated the pair and he spoke to the husband in the family room. Within a few minutes there was laughter and conversation coming from the other room. They dealt with the issues to the best of their ability de-escalating the argument. The officers got agreements that the husband and wife would stay apart until cooler heads could prevail and police would not have to return. Outside they compared notes and his partner asked about the laughter. The experienced officer had noticed a baseball game playing on the TV and used his knowledge of the game and teams to open communications and build rapport. This created an open doorway that allowed him to speak with the husband and help resolve the issues. Will this always work? No. Another colleague attended another dispute and noted the house was in a state of renovation. He too was renovating and tried to use that as a rapport builder. The problem was the dispute was about the renovations and his attempt at rapport building actually escalated the situation which took longer to resolve! He had no idea what the argument was about, but at least he was willing to try. The key takeaway here are ask questions to divine the nature of the incident then use your toolbox to select something that might work. Had he done that, he might have been able to avoid the emotionally charged topic of the renovation and been able to create rapport using another.

De-escalation and Pre-escalation The subject of de-escalation has been receiving a lot of global press following the unjust deaths of a number of black, indigenous and people of colour in the United States and elsewhere. De-escalation is the practice of defusing potentially volatile situations, slowing things down and resolving them with minimal force. Pre-­ escalation is the use of tactics and techniques to prevent potentially violent events by recognising and removing trigger events that lead to breakdowns, particularly when dealing with mental health. Both types of training have a significant part to play in reducing police use of force. Priming is the understanding that past experience forms a lens through which we see and react to current stimuli. By example, if you were once stung on the lip by a

90

W. B. Cotton

bee that had flown into your coke can while on a patio, you might be very cautious about drinking from a can outside ever again. In fact, you might be so cautious that you insist on your drink being in a glass. Early studies in policing suggested that officers used experiential classifications to prejudge or predict future behaviour by individuals they were interacting with (Klein, 2009; Muir, 1977; Taylor, 2020; Wilson, 1978). Obviously, there were many sweeping generalities that were made. While some may have some validity in certain circumstances, as police we have to be cautious about stereotyping and developing bias upon which we base our actions. Damaging, sweeping generalisations have led to issues of systemic racism and inequality in policing practices and these practices must be avoided at all costs. Each circumstance needs to be taken based on the evidence before the officer and not inferred evidence that may or may not be true and that the officer has no way of confirming. It is when we look at the context of reducing the use of force that this concept becomes tremendously important. An officer responding to a ‘rough part of town’ and a location ‘known to them to be frequented by gang members’ for a call about a ‘subject with a gun’ paints a very vivid picture for a responding officer. Studies have shown that information like this can have a significant impact on an officer’s decision to use force having been subconsciously made before they even arrive (Luoma-aho & Canel, 2020; Taylor, 2020). It is not an example of a subject with a gun, but take an officer dispatched to assist the fire department at a call involving a house fire. The dispatcher advises that the parents do not know where the children are and are concerned, they are still in the house. The officer proceeds to the call at an exceptionally high rate of speed, approaching 180km/h in an urban environment. The officer, a new dad himself, has formed such a convincing preconceived picture in his head about what is going on that he has difficulty separating from reality. He misses the fact that the fire department was already on scene and due to the heightened arousal, misses the dispatched information that the children were located.How could dispatch have modified their information? Simply by changing call type and the order the information was broadcast.Had the call been put on as a traffic direction assistance call instead of an active fire, what do you think the result would have been? Would it have changed the level of arousal the officer felt?Most likely. The same would be true of being dispatched to a ‘person with a gun call’ versus a group of kids playing ‘cops and robbers’ in the park. The same incident, if classified differently and eliciting a different response from the officers. In the first, the officer approaches, possibly gun in hand. Any furtive or quick movement by the subject could be met with lethal force. In the second, the officer is aware, still concerned about the possibility of a gun being present, but their level of arousal is lower and their response more balanced.4

 This example is based on the 2014 shooting of 12-year old Tamir Rice by Cleveland Ohio (USA) Police officer, Timothy Loehmann (Stone & Socia, 2019). 4

6  Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters

91

The effect of dispatch priming on police use of force is only just beginning to be empirically explored and the understanding we currently possess is in its infancy. We have briefly discussed it here because we feel the effects of dispatch priming can play a significant part in situation outcome and students need to be aware of the possibility of its role.

Pre-escalation Tactics There have been many recent studies of de-escalation training and its effect on use of force. However, another method of lowering the incidence of use of force is pre-­ escalation, pre-dispute or pre-intervention (International Mediation Institute, 2016). Any practices of this nature seek to find ways to intervene before a crisis develops. Tactics could involve the design of spaces using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts to reduce the incidence of crime in a neighbourhood or space and the inclusion of teams such as the Mobile Crisis Rapid Response Team (‘MCRRT’) or Crisis Outreach and Support Team (‘COAST’) which get to know those in the community suffering mental illness. Through their knowledge of the individuals, they get to know and understand their clients and what can trigger crisis events. An example would be the date a loved one committed suicide, or a friend died. These dates can prove quick traumatic and frequently coincide with crisis events for the subject. Often a visit from the team and some additional supports near or on that date can prevent a crisis from developing. Risk mitigation tables use community teams to intervene before crisis develops for those at acute risk and part of a community safety framework (Nilson, 2018). Tactics also can include identifying and addressing the system issues and biases that could potentially create conflict, community partnerships, shared responsibility, and team building to name a few. We strongly believe that appropriate training sets the stage for excellence in pre-escalation.

De-escalation Tactics To date there are few studies that have been done to gauge the effectiveness of de-­ escalation training (Sherman, 2020; Wolfe et al., 2020). Additionally, no definition of de-escalation or de-escalation training currently exists in policing (Sherman, 2020). This does not mean that we cannot engage in training to try and defuse situations. The Oxford dictionary defines de-escalation at a ‘reduction of the intensity of a conflict or potentially violent situation’ (Oxford Dictionary, 2021). Any efforts police can take to reduce the emotional intensity of encounters would be considered de-escalating.

92

W. B. Cotton

In an emotionally charged encounter, having the assistance of a hybrid police-­ mental health team such as MCRRT or COAST (see chapter __) would be ideal for any attempt at de-escalation. However, some police services may not have this capability. The Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model and training for individual officers is only a weeklong and could afford some significant understanding and translate into de-escalation in potentially violent situations (Robinson, 2020). Time and distance are two factors that we often fail to consider that form one of the cornerstones of de-escalation. One of the easiest ways to defuse and slow down a situation is to back off and slow down. This is an emphasis ion CIT training and when possible, can greatly diffuse a volatile situation (Pollack & Humphreys, 2020). Time and distance are generally things that the police have on their side. We usually have some ability to create distance and allow an individual time to calm down. Academic evidence will come on the effectiveness of training like CIT, advanced mental health understanding, verbal communication tactics and the use of hybrid team in the process of de-escalation. Regardless, the process has value and has been seen by the author in the field to reduce use of force.

Breathing De-escalation is also a matter of keep oneself grounded. Dynamic events can wreak havoc on the psychology and physiology of officers. As the levels of stress increase, respiration and heart rate start to climb. When they do, so do the effects of physical deficits in the officer’s body. These motor and cognitive deficits alter perception, create tunnel vision, tunnel hearing and reduce fine motor skills. This is the fight or flight response we hear spoken of often. Fight, flight, posture or submit are the choices that we are faced within the face of a violent occurrence (Andersen & Gustafberg, 2016; Grossman, 2014). Specific training that teaches officers how to deal with the effects of these stressors and minimise them is available. Systems such as iPREP or focused breathing (combat breathing), have been empirically shown to reduce stress, improve cognition and help produce better critical decision making and judgment (Andersen & Gustafberg, 2016; Hourani et al., 2011). Tactical Breathing, Combat Breathing or Box Breathing are techniques taught by many instructors up to and including the US Navy SEALs to control the physiological effects of stress and calm decrease sympathetic nervous system activity. It as simple as breathing in for a count of four, hold for a count of four, out for a count of four and hold for a count of four. The technique will have a profound effect on one’s ability to function in a dynamic situation (Andersen & Gustafberg, 2016; Finn, 2021; Grossman & Christensen, 2017; Rottger et al., 2020).

6  Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters

93

Dynamic Simulation-Based Training Conducting effective training for police is not a simple task. Training has many components that need to work together to be effective for officers, especially when looking at reducing the amount of force being applied in situations.

Legal Framing Before any action is undertaken, it is vital that the action is legal. This means that the officer has a lawful authority for the actions that they are about to undertake. Lawful authority is granted through the knowledge of the various, laws and legislation that govern police actions. This includes local and departmental regulations and policies. Principle among these is the power of arrest granted by those authorities. This means that for a use of force to be legally undertaken, it needs to conform to the legislation and that means that officers must know their authorities. Failing to know their authorities can lead to unlawful actions on the part of the police which at the low end of the scale would mean that a charge might be tossed out of court. An example would be an unlawful search in which the seized property is given back to the subject and the charges lost. The next step up could create bad case law that affects all officers in the jurisdiction. At the far end of illegal action is legal action against the officer from a criminal or even civil perspective.

Academic Framing This can include legal framing, but it also goes deeper into the ‘why’ police need to undertake the actions they do. The academic framing will include academic evidence, background, and history. Academic framing can (and should) also include the culture, history, ethnicity and the subtle differences that make up the community as it is all relevant. If you think about Legal Framing as the ‘what’ and part of the ‘why’, Academic Framing supplies the other part of the ‘why’ and the classroom part of ‘how’ and ‘when’. It is also during the academic framing that we should be learning about techniques that will reduce the need for us to resort to force. This is the opportunity to introduce concepts of effective communication, first-contact approach, negotiation, pre-escalation, and de-escalation. All of these concepts are necessary to reduce the need for police to use force. See the descriptive sections earlier in this chapter. The rest of the framing is applied through physical training. Do not let the length of the legal framing and academic framing sections above lend to a belief that they are not at all important. They are absolutely vital to understand and minimise use of force.

94

W. B. Cotton

Introduction of Physical Skills During this phase of the training, officers are slowly introduced to the physical skillsets necessary to effect arrests and defend themselves and others. Instructors should walk through the skill set with officers, describing what they want done and demonstrating it with other instructors and then students. Students will then be encouraged to engage with each other and move slowly through the new skill. It is crucial that new techniques are taught slowly to allow officers a chance to absorb the training and learn to facilitate the techniques. As a young recruit, sitting in a class, we were asked if anyone had ever taken any martial arts. I had taken a few lessons as a teen, and eager to please I put my hand up and went to the front of the room. I was asked what martial art I had taken, and I said that I’d taken some judo. The instructor stood facing the room and said, ‘Defend yourself’. He turned and punched me, full speed in the face, bloodying my nose and bruising my lip.He made some derogatory comment about my skills and sent me to get cleaned up.5

Proper instruction is about moving slowly, building skill, and increasing confidence for officers. Officers need to be confident in their skills and abilities if they are to be successful on the street. It may seem pointless to learners initially but starting at 10% speed and intensity is a great way to test the mechanics of the motions, get comfortable with the techniques and build confidence. It is unwise and potentially injurious to have students go 100% on each other. As you will see, when students are given that opportunity, it is with safety officer, proper safety equipment and significant controls in place. Anything else is a recipe for disaster. Most importantly, if students do not feel comfortable and confident in using techniques in the gym, they will not feel confident on the street. A lack of confidence in their abilities leads to force multiplication and the over-reliance on intermediary weapons such as a baton, conducted energy weapon or aerosol spray (e.g., Oleoresin capsicum or mace). Taken to extremes, it can lead to an over dependency on the firearm and lethal means. For illustration, we once conducted an experiment with a group of citizens who were taking part in a ‘Citizens Police Academy’. Many comments had been made that indicated an overreliance on television and film as a source for their understanding. We set up a very scenario and issued volunteers some inert use of force options and a blank firing pistol. The scenario was a fairly straightforward one, an intoxicated and argumentative male is causing problems yelling at people. He has a beer bottle in his hand he is drinking from. It was interesting watching the half-dozen or so students interact with the instructor who was playing the part. Overwhelmingly, students drew their gun and pointed it at the male when he refused to listen. The

 The author’s experience at the hands of an ‘instructor’ when he was a young recruit. Unfortunately, this method of teaching was all too common and resulted in many injuries. The event did nothing to teach me about defensive tactics. It did teach me some critical lessons about awareness, reactionary gap and not trusting that particular instructor. This is not how training should be conducted! 5

6  Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters

95

male ended up being shot twice, once when he held his arms out and shouted, the other when he took a (simulated) drunken staggered step toward the student. Clearly this was not a fair test for the students. They had been given no instruction and had to rely on their own knowledge to react to the stimulus presented in the scenario. The scenario was specifically set up to get the students to engage verbally. The instructor was not behaving violently. He was loud and obnoxious, but not threatening. The two students that did engage more appropriately were community college students who were taking a law and security program and who worked security part time, but even their approaches were far from perfect. It may seem counter-intuitive, but confidence in physical abilities can actually reduce more serious use of force, injuries and even the use of lethal force. If you are confident in your skills, that comes through when interacting with the public. A lack of confidence and skill can lead to the overreliance on tools or improper techniques when using tools which in turn leads to injury and death. As much as students, some instructors and some administrators may want to see officers proceeding quickly through some kind of ‘officer training mill’, rushing trainees (regardless of whether they are new cadets or seasoned officers), is never a good idea. Students must be successful in the relatively stress-free environment afforded by Legal Framing, Academic Framing and the Introduction of Physical Skills before proceeding to any kind of simulation.

Simulations and Scenarios In dynamic simulations, officers wear protective gear and are outfitted with training equipment that functions identically to what they carry on the street. Typically, dynamic simulations fall into two categories, closed dynamic and open dynamic. Closed dynamic have a specific skill to be demonstrated in a specific way. Open dynamic scenarios have multiple branches that the actors will follow based on what the officer does, where they stand, their approach, what they say and how they say it. As mentioned earlier, dynamic simulation training is most effective when it is the final part of a series of training that includes: • • • • •

the academics behind the correct procedures operational policies legalities the mechanics behind accepted tactics and techniques it has been practised at a slow pace in a rigidly controlled environment (closed dynamic scenarios)

Trainers are after success for their students to reinforce the good practices and demonstrate that the tactics work. The overall goal of any use-of-force training should be teaching students to resolve the situation using as little force as necessary.

96

W. B. Cotton

Closed Dynamic Simulations The next step in training is the application of the academic, legal and practical introduction in a carefully created, highly structured, instructor supervised ‘scenario’. Trainees are given very clear direction and walked through the lesson in a manner similar to below. Instructor to group. (A second instructor demonstrates on the role-playing instructor as the lead instructor speaks). When I blow the whistle, move quickly from this line to the X on the floor. Take a defensive stance and tell the subject they are under arrest and why. From there I don’t want you to rush. Take your time and make sure you get this right. We can build on speed later. (The instructor who is playing the part of the student is proceeding slowly and deliberately). Have them hold their arms out away from their body and turn slowly in a circle. When they have turned completely, have them kneel down and cross their ankles and hold their arms out and back away from their body, palms face up. Move in on their left side on the 2 position. Before you make contact, load your handcuffs, ratchet facing out. Have them bring their hands together, back-to-back behind them. Quickly ratchet the handcuffs on, right wrist then left. Check the fit and double lock them. Once you have done that, you will instruct them to stand, make sure you maintain contact with them holding their left elbow with your left hand and the back of their left hand with your right. Once they are standing and we have checked the handcuffs and your escort position, the scenario is done.

It may seem simple, perhaps even overly detailed, but this is a representation of a closed dynamic simulation. These are simulations that are completely laid out with all the expected steps and learning outcomes forward facing for the student. If the student makes an error, they are corrected immediately and repeat the process until they get it right. This is a safe place for the student to practice their skills and gain confidence. It can be very repetitive for instructors, but most will recognise the need and allow as much practice as reasonably necessary. Closed dynamic simulations can be applied to practically anything. From the basic arrest above to use-of-force options and everything in between. These simulations do not have to be defensive tactic-based. We have used them for everything from laying a spike belt to learning how to search a house. Again, use your imagination. Training should not be boring for the students.

Open Dynamic Simulations The chapter will centre around the use of open dynamic simulations to reduce officer use of force. While there may be a temptation to believe that ‘No officer should ever encounter something on the front-line that they have not seen at least once in training’, that is likely not realistic. There are as many possible outcomes as there are individuals. It is however possible to give officers a wide, evidence-based, exposure to those scenarios that you are most likely to have occur in your community.

6  Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters

97

Example: The dispatcher advises assistance is requested at an apartment complex. A male is severe mental crisis is holed up in his apartment with a knife. He has been threatening suicide. He also threatened his wife and small child who are now outside with a neighbour. He is alone in the apartment. On your arrival, you speak to the wife outside. She explains that he was injured almost a year ago and has been off work. He has been using prescription drugs for pain and was told today that his benefits for the injury are being cut off. While talking to the wife, the man comes out on the balcony shouting. You can see the knife in his hand. Attending inside with your partner, you can see the door to the apartment is open. The man is pacing back and forth yelling. He has the knife in his hand. When he sees you in the hallway, almost 20 feet away, he stops and glares at you. Speaking very calmly, he tells you that if you come in the apartment you will have to either kill him or he will kill you. There is no one in the hallway. What will you do? This is an open dynamic scenario because it is fluid and active. Unlike closed dynamic simulations which are created to test or reinforce a specific skill, the open dynamic allows the officers the choice of making a decision and following that through to completion. These scenarios are generally played out with inert or training use-of-force equipment (blue guns) such as pepper spray cans that contain water, plastic expandable batons and Simunition6 firearms which fire paint projectiles. These are culminating exercises designed to help trainees use new and established skill sets in a highly controlled environment. Every scenario or simulation is designed with specific training goals in mind and has multiple branches of action for the subject. The branches that the subject acts out are however not chosen by them but are a reaction to the actions of the trainee. In the above scenario, some possible branches might be: 1. Trainee stays in the hallway, protected by the doorframe and begins to engage the subject with de-escalating talk. 2. Trainee stays in the hallway but stands in the doorway engaging with de-­ escalating talk. 3. Trainee stays in the hallway but does not use de-escalating talk and instead begins to yell commands to drop the knife. 4. Trainee enters the apartment but remains in the doorway. 5. Trainees enters the apartment but moves toward the subject. You can imagine the possible outcomes in each of these scenarios. Take a few moments and write out your thoughts as to what could happen in each. What do you think the goal of this scenario was? The first two outcomes will likely end with the subject putting down the knife, beginning to cry and being taken into involuntary custody for mental health review.  Simunition is the trade name of a popular firearm conversion platform that is designed for most popular pistols, rifles and shotguns used by police. The kits include different working parts, different barrels and specialised ammunition (blank and marker). They are considered significantly safer than many other options as the weapons cannot chamber or fire live ammunition. 6

98

W. B. Cotton

The last three outcomes will generally not be positive. They will generate increased aggression. From the third branch on is where you see other training, such as firearms and the communications that surround those skills taking precedence. There is a much higher likelihood in the last three branches of the scenario ending with the subject receiving a lethal force option. In each of the branches, there are mini branches that can be followed. For example, if the trainee enters the apartment, hears the subject say something like, ‘I’ll kill you if you come any closer!’, and exits to engage from the doorway with de-­ escalating talk, the trainee needs to be rewarded for recognising the error and moving to correct it. In this particular scenario, there were three goals.The first was to slow down and maintain reactionary distance. The second was to reinforce the need to verbally engage the subject and get them talking; making an attempt to build rapport. The third, equally (and arguably more) important goal was to reinforce an awareness of officer induced jeopardy.

Officer-Induced/Officer-Created Jeopardy This is a concept by which an officer actually creates a situation in which they are forced to defend themselves, often lethally (Garrison, 2018; Ijames, 2005; Jenkins, 2019).7 Some examples would be, being the sole officer to attend the drug house full of gang members to arrest one of them, entering a location that you do not need to enter (like the apartment scenario above) forcing a subject to attack, or moving carelessly within a subject’s reactionary reach. There has been little academic research done on the concept, but it is well known within training circles and most try to train to avoid it. Courts in the United States have been split over the reasonableness of the use of force if the officers create the situation. Some have held that if the police created the situation that required them to use force, it is then prima facie unreasonable. Others have held that only the facts at the time the decision to use force was made are relevant. Regardless of the U.S. Court’s dichotomy, if there is a method, we can use that will reduce the need to take a life, we are morally and ethically bound as peacekeepers to do everything we can to minimise the chance. The aftereffects of such an incident critically harm a community, hurt both families and officers, and cause immeasurable damage to trust.

 At the time of writing, there were only 16 Google scholar entries for ‘Officer Created Jeopardy’ and only two for ‘Officer Induced’. 7

6  Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters

99

Designing Training Simulations to Reduce Use of Force There can be a tendency in training circles to always be going for the big, impressive simulations. While there is nothing wrong with having larger group scenarios, we need to make sure that we do not get caught up in the ‘exotic’ at the expense of the practical. We need to base our simulations on evidence, risk and community need.

Risk Matrix A very simple risk matrix is pictured in Fig. 6.2. There are four categories of risk that we can consider when designing training. 1. High frequency/Low impact- these tasks are the activities that we undertake hundreds of times a day. Walking into the station from our car. Searching the back seat after an arrest. Sitting in the car writing a report and having a coffee. 2. High frequency/High impact- these are situations which are frequent and carry a measure of great risk to us and those around us. Emergency response driving. Conducting an arrest. Doing a traffic stop. 3. Low frequency/Low impact- these are tasks that we are asked to do occasionally that are generally very low risk. Manning a barricade at a fire scene. Helping out at a festival. Picking up an abandoned bicycle. 4. Low frequency/High impact- these tend to be either really major incident like a train derailment which involve multiple agencies, or they can be situation of exceptional danger for the police and public like an active shooter, high risk takedown or a weapons call. Risk is fluid and dynamic. As much as we want to try to manage all aspects of a situation, we cannot. So, we train for the worst, but expect the best. We need to train for the routine as hard as you train for the one-off events.

Fig. 6.2  Operational risks. (Mulyana, 2012)

100

W. B. Cotton

Let Go of Your Ego and Depersonalise We are all human and as such, we are all fallible. We will make mistakes. We will take things personally that we should not. Sometimes, it can be difficult to separate our emotions and our ego from the situation. We have to learn that most people who react negatively to us as police or law enforcement do not have a problem with us as individuals, they have an issue with the institution of policing. As such, we cannot take their words, actions and behaviour personally, but we sometimes do and that can have dangerous consequences with respect to the use of force. Our sense of self-worth, self-esteem and self-­ importance can easily get tied up in the job. Cutting remarks, blatant disregard for authority or even personal attacks can all serve to deplete the ego and increase the likelihood of a more significant use-of-force response. The effects of ego depletion can even lead to officer induced jeopardy as discussed earlier. Regardless of who you are, every individual’s ego has limits that they can be pushed to before their ego is depleted (Staller et al., 2019). You have to realise three things: 1. Recognise your limits and when it is time to tap out because you are feeling the frustration 2. Remember that it is most often not personal, but against the office you hold 3. Do not engage subjects in personal attacks, stay professional and focused on the objective. If they have a legitimate gripe, acknowledge it. If it is not legitimate, defend it, but do not get into an argument.

Training Equipment There is lots of cost-effective equipment available on the market to allow officers and students to train safely and effectively. That said, some dedicated equipment can be expensive. Padded training suits are a great addition and can allow trainees to use physical techniques with relative safety.

Inert Training Weapons While it is permissible (and has been done!) to conduct a training course with ‘finger guns’, it may not be the most realistic. Inert firearms, foam batons, water filled sprays, and similar devices are available. Like the padded suits, some can be expensive (Simunition gun conversion kits can be more expensive than the guns themselves), but they add an element of realism and feedback not possible any other way. Airsoft and paintball are other less effective options. It is ideal if these weapons fit in the standard carriers to help reinforce their use.

6  Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters

101

Helmets and Safety Glasses These are essential for all taking part. Helmets should protect the head while allowing the student to see and hear clearly. It is recommended that when scenario training that trainees and officers train in the uniform that they wear day to day with boots, vest (bullet resistant or stab/cut resistant) and their duty belt, to be as realistic as possible.

Goals of Your Training First and foremost, what are the lessons you are trying to convey? If you are an instructor, you need to be very clear about what it is you are trying to teach students. If you are the student, you need to understand the goals of the session. If you are in an administrative role, you want to ensure that the training that is being conducted meets your operational goals and is supported by evidence. If you are in a legal/ liability role, you want to ensure that the training conforms to legal requirements and is teaching students lawful methods and tactics. If you are a civilian stakeholder, you want to ensure that the training emphasises safe outcomes with minimal force whenever possible. These are just a few possible groups of people who have an interest in police training. Each viewpoint is valid and needs to be considered. It is not enough justification to train for an event because it is cool, exciting or fun. Scenarios must have clear, evidence backed goals that are being met. The second most important goal of designing training is that the scenarios are winnable. Little is learned from scenarios that are unrealistic or that always ‘kill’ the trainees. What is learned from a scenario involving aliens or a gang member in the trunk of a car that suddenly pops out in a traffic stop and starts shooting? As mentioned in the next section, evidence-based scenarios are by far the best for learning. A note on ‘killing’ trainees. We never allowed trainees to ‘die’ in scenarios. Trainees were taught that all scenarios were survivable and that they were to continue regardless of what they felt their injuries might be. Again, this point is evidence-­based on multiple cases of officers and subjects surviving being shot, stabbed or otherwise injured and continuing to fight, subdue the assailant and still go home.8

 A Google search for ‘surviving gunshot wounds’ or ‘surviving being stabbed’ will reveal many examples to support this both in the media and in academia. 8

102

W. B. Cotton

Evidence What does the academic and researched evidence show needs to be conveyed in your community? Have you had a number of injuries that occurred while handcuffing? Then you likely need scenarios that include this element. Have you had an increase in the use of intravenous drugs and lots of used syringes being found? Then you may want to incorporate sharps9 in a session on searching or have a syringe used as part of a scenario. Have you had an increase in a type of mental health calls? Then incorporate this specific type in your mental health scenarios. There are many sources of data that you can pull from. Some sources will depend on your location but, typically the best places are calls for service, your situation table (if you have one), your local mental health unit, other support units, other police services and trainers.

Writing Scenarios Following on the previous paragraph, once we know what we need to teach, we build our program around the need. Beginning with the legal and legislative frameworks, following with the academic reasoning to give a sound foundation for what must be done to affect the most desirable outcome with the least force possible. Finally, we craft the scenario. It is important that all aspects are written down and followed for each repetition. Sample teaching plan A statement of the goals of the exercise; generally (but not always) given at Learning Goals the start of the session. Safety A rigid set of instructions to be followed by all participants; safety words, Instructions/ proper practice, safety equipment. Breaching safety protocols endangers Briefing everyone and is taken very seriously. No live or real use-of-force equipment is ever allowed in the training area with few exceptions (firearms allowed on the range for shooting, batons allowed for that portion of training on heavy bags, etc.). Safety Search All members line up and are checked by at least two members (one of whom is an instructor) to verify no real equipment is present. General Given to all students, generally at the same time; explains the scenario and Statement of gives a chance to ask questions. Simulation or Scenario Individual Given to trainee before they start. Instructions

 A sharp is anything that can stab, jab or otherwise puncture the skin. The term most often refers to syringes and medical needles. 9

6  Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters

103

Sample teaching plan A statement of the goals of the exercise; generally (but not always) given at Learning Goals the start of the session. Detailed This is the part of the scenario that it is the responsibility of the instructors to Scenario follow. It is here that the branches and possible outcomes are written out. As previously mentioned, the goal is to use the appropriate (least) force necessary to successfully end the scenario. As you will see in the examples, levels of force can vary from verbal interaction to lethal force in the same situation depending on how the student reacts to the stimulus. Student Debrief It is here that the instructor, role-players and the trainees have a chance to learn from what they did. They are given an opportunity to discuss what went right, what went wrong, how they could improve. They are also asked to articulate their choice of using force to the instructional team as they would in court. This further reinforces the need to understand their options and ensure that they have exercised good judgment in their response. Depending on the outcomes, learners may be given a chance to go again and correct minor mistakes. Major mistakes will go again. Never let a student leave on failure, they must have success with the techniques you have been reinforcing or they will not use them in the field. Instructor Generally given at the end of the sessions. Like the student debrief, the good, Debrief bad and areas for improvement are discussed and any issues that need to be tweaked are. It is permissible to test your scenarios on volunteers before running them with the main group. This is a great way to share ideas and solicit feedback.

The cases at the end of the chapter will give an idea of how you can maximise your training opportunities from very elaborate scenarios to very simple scenarios that require little by way of equipment. Dynamic training scenarios with real actors and proper training equipment help to prepare officers for what they will encounter on the street. The training scenarios need to be representative of the actual situations being encountered in that locale. Training needs to be repeatable and consistent for all participants. It is also essential that the locations and actors are believable.

Simulation/Scenario Examples and Questions These scenarios are abbreviated but give an example of what can be done easily. To be conducted in a training session, much more information would be given (safety instructions, equipment, etc.) as in the teaching plan in the previous section. Citizens call about a female who appears intoxicated and is lapsing in and out of consciousness on a bench. Officers approach and interact with the female. Goals Verbal communications, de-escalation, pre-escalation, recognition of mental health crisis, knowledge of involuntary admission for mental evaluation, effective search.

104

W. B. Cotton

Citizens call about a female who appears intoxicated and is lapsing in and out of consciousness on a bench. Officers approach and interact with the female. Branches (a) Officers talk in a normal tone to female and approach – she talks to them and reveals she is despondent and suicidal over the loss of her mother. She wants to die and says she will kill herself. She has just shot up with drugs and was going to try and find more. When asked about weapons or things that could hurt her or the officers, she places the syringe on the bench. (b) Officers talk aggressively – female becomes aggressive and argumentative. Tries to walk away. Becomes increasingly uncooperative. Will not reveal syringe (c) Officers go hands on gently – female will wake slowly, then start when she realises it is the police. See branch a) and b) (d) Officers go hands on roughly – female is instantly defensive. If aggression continues will threaten with the syringe but not attack.

A male is seen on a downtown corner. He is yelling at the air and swatting his arms saying ‘Get away! Leave me alone!’. Goals Verbal communication, maintain reactionary gap, de-escalation, pre-escalation, recognition of mental health crisis - psychosis, knowledge of involuntary admission for mental evaluation, effective search. Branches (a) Officers approach, maintain reactionary gap (safe distance), engage male verbally asking what is wrong. Male keeps repeating about the giant bugs flying around him, but is cooperative (b) Officers approach and are aggressive with their approach. Male escalates and yells louder, swatting the air more aggressively (c) If officers close the distance and do not leave enough room, the male will scream and swat at a bug on one of the officers. If the officers recognise the hallucinations and back off, the male will not pursue. If they do not and continue to close, he will continue to swat the officer. (d) If the male goes hands on, he will resist only to continue swatting the bugs. He will not attack the officers. He will struggle, but only with the goal of getting away to continue swatting the bugs.

The above scenarios are simple enough to replicate and adapt. Again, we stress that the importance of the scenarios is to ensure that the officers resolve the situation with the least force necessary. One favourite type of simulation was called the ‘Bag Drill’. The trainee wears protective gear, training with use-of-force equipment and is hooded over their helmet with a bag they cannot see through. The instructor wears a full contact padded suit. The safety officer stands in front of the student and instructs them to ‘react to your environment’ when the bag is removed. The student can be moved, turned around and placed in different places. The suited instructor can engage physically, be verbal, use ‘lethal’ weapons or do nothing and sit on the floor singing. The subject has many options within this environment and can engage from any location within the defined area. This type of scenario is very effective at making a student scan and critically assess the environment before reacting. You can easily run a single student through half a dozen simulations in a few minutes.

6  Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters

105

Culminating Scenarios The following scenario is an example of a culminating scenario for trainees at the end of a weeklong session. It brought together all the elements of the weeks training. It is a more complicated scenario, but it was tremendously worthwhile for the participants. Dispatch advises that Smoke is pouring from an elementary school and shots are being fired. On arrival, police find fire and EMS taking cover behind vehicles which have been shot at. One firefighter has been hit and is being tended to by fire crews. Smoke is billowing from the windows of a classroom. Screams and shots can be heard inside the school. Police quickly get portable air systems (Scot Air Packs) from the fire department and move into the school in a ‘T’ formation. They are met with a thick wall of smoke. Visibility is almost zero. A lone student runs screaming out of the smoke between the officers. They ignore her and continue moving down the hallway on hands and knees where the smoke seems a bit thinner, trying to see. Over the fire alarm, they can still hear sporadic shots and hear the screaming of children and what sounds like an angry male, screaming that he will ‘Kill them all!’. They pass two motionless, small forms in the smoke before they pass a doorway to a classroom and suddenly can see a little better thanks to air currents. They stand up as a male adult, dressed all in camouflage and tactical gear emerges wielding an assault rifle, pointed down. The officers order him to, ‘Drop the gun!’. The subject turns toward the officers and starts shooting at them, hitting two of them. All four officers return fire, rounds hitting the wall behind and the subject. The subject drops to his knees then collapses moaning.Two officers cover the hallways as one covers the subject and the fourth moves forward and after kicking the gun away, secures the subject with handcuffs. The officer does a quick search and goes over the radio, ‘Shots fired, subject in custody. He’s hit multiple times. We’re going to need EMS at some point we but need to secure the rest of the school and get the fire out’. Another officer applies a dressing over the most serious wound while two officers scan the hallways for additional threats. There is a loud whistle followed by a shout of ‘Red!’. The officers immediately relax and holster their weapons. The ‘subject’ sits up. Post-scenario One of the officers looks somewhat shaken. ‘Everyone good? No injuries?’ The instructor asks. Each shakes their head. The shaken officer, a 25-plus year veteran, shakes his head and mutters, ‘Wow! That was intense. I couldn’t see a thing!’. These officers are sweaty, out of breath and bruised. Two are bearing the welts and paint left by Simunition marker bullets, a grim, but transient reminder of the hazards police can face. The instructor leads a second group through the scenario which has a similar outcome but ends with an exchange of gunfire in a classroom where the subject is shooting at realistic cardboard target ‘victims’. Debrief Both groups are simultaneously debriefed about what they did, what went right, what went wrong and how they feel they could improve. It is an iterative process of self-­exploration that is guided by the instructional staff. The safety officer and the subject both offer their take on the response of the teams and solicit their feedback. Most are stunned by the complexity of the scenario which was created with the assistance of local fire who donated the air masks and live actors. One comments that they never thought they would ever use the air mask training that had been provided the year prior but were glad to have had it.

106

W. B. Cotton

This type of scenario is a culminating event that brings together the training events of the week and feature multiple facets. As we have demonstrated, scenarios do not have to be this complicated to be effective. You can do a lot very simply or you can make more complicated scenarios. It depends on your resources and your imagination. The most important point is, make an effort to be realistic and tie training to evidence creating a cohesive package.

Training and Technology There will likely come a time when realistic virtual environments exist that are largely indistinguishable from the real world. Until then, Dynamic Simulation-­ Based Training is in no real danger of being replaced with video and virtual reality. The goal of training is to impart the desired lesson on all students and to be as consistent throughout. Consistency is absolutely critical as each student, no matter the number, needs to have had a similar straining experience with as few variations from the lesson goals as possible. Deviations are quite unwelcome and could lead to dire outcomes for students, the agency or the public. It is possible to impart the knowledge on any number of students in a consistent fashion. It takes dedication, patience and an understanding of the potential consequences. Virtual Reality and Video-Based Training have begun to make an appearance in the training arena. They do offer repeatability, accessibility and strict adherence to sets of guidelines but not without costs. Digital scenarios are not yet capable of responding outside of their parameters, engaging in conversation or understanding as humans do. Advances in technology with devices such as Oculus Rift VR headsets, the ‘As Real As It Gets’ (ARAIG) three-dimensional force feedback suits and 360° treadmills are making it possible to move and interact within a virtual environment, but the environments themselves and the characters within do not yet interact realistically (Laffan et al., 2020; McGregor & Bonnis, 2016). At best, these virtual training environments can supply some rudimentary branched closed dynamic simulations but play out more like a choose your own adventure book than an open dynamic simulation. Dynamic simulations remain the most realistic, cost effective and versatile training tool for police services currently available.

Conclusion This chapter has covered training and the use of force. The goal is to use the minimum force necessary to safely conclude the situation. Unfortunately, there will undoubtedly be situations that will be resolved without force being applied and, in some cases, that force may even have to be potentially lethal (as in the final example).

6  Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters

107

What has been stressed throughout and is reinforced now is that whenever possible, every effort must be made to use the least force possible before force is escalated. We need to gather as much information as time allows to make the best decision. Every use of force will have an impact on a number of people. The subject receiving the force, the officer using force, the families of both the subject and the officer, the community in which the event occurs and the police service. Following a program of training that includes legislation and legal frameworks, academic understanding of concepts and background, and the application of this learning in realistic scenarios designed to consolidate the knowledge, trainees will learn to confidently apply new understandings and reduce incidence of higher levels of force.

Apply the Skill Answer the following questions using your new knowledge of training to reduce use of force. 1 . What is a closed dynamic simulation? 2. What is an open dynamic simulation? 3. How fast should closed dynamic simulations be performed? 4. Write out a detailed plan for a simple closed dynamic simulation involving a less lethal use-of-force tool (spray, TASERTM, baton, etc.). 5. Write out a detailed plan for a simple closed dynamic simulation involving a non-use-of-force scenario (a house search, search of a person, etc.) 6. Write out a detailed plan for an open dynamic simulation 7. What things must you consider when planning your scenarios? 8. Why is local knowledge of the community important to reduce use of force?

References Andersen, J. P., & Gustafsberg, H. (2016). A training method to improve police use of force decision making: A randomized controlled trial. SAGE Open, 6(2), 2158244016638708. https://doi. org/10.1177/2158244016638708 Anderson, G. S., Di Nota, P. M., Metz, G. A. S., & Andersen, J. P. (2019). The impact of acute stress physiology on skilled motor performance: Implications for policing. Frontiers in Psychology, 10. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02501 Dekanoidze, K., & Khelashvili-Kyviv, M. (2018). Police education and training systems in the OSCE region (p.  164). National Police of Ukraine. https://www.osce.org/files/f/ documents/f/7/423401.pdf Finn, M. (2021, January 3). How to reduce stress like a navy SEAL. Gear Patrol. http://gearpatrol. com/fitness/health-­wellness/a325714/box-­breathing-­navy-­seals/

108

W. B. Cotton

Ford, R. (2019). Impact of stress inoculating training on police in aftermath of critical incidents. 120. Garner, J. H., Hickman, M. J., Malega, R. W., & Maxwell, C. D. (2018). Progress toward national estimates of police use of force. PLOS ONE, 13(2), e0192932. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal. pone.0192932 Garrison, A. H. (2018). Criminal culpability, civil liability, and police created danger: Why and how the fourth amendment provides very little protection from police use of deadly force. George Mason Civil Rights Law Journal, 28(3), 241–312. Grossman, D. (2014). On killing: The psychological cost of learning to kill in war and society. Open Road Media. Grossman, D., & Christensen, L. (2017). On combat: The psychology and physiology of deadly conflict in war and peace. Cork. Hourani, L. L., Kizakevich, P. N., Hubal, R., Spira, J., Strange, L. B., Holiday, D. B., Bryant, S., & McLean, A. N. (2011). Predeployment stress innoculation training for primary prevention of combat-related stress disorder. A Training Method to Improve Police Use of Force Decision Making: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 4(1), 101–116. Huisjes, H., Engbers, F., & Meurs, T. (2018). Higher education for police professionals. The dutch case. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 14(2), 362–373. https://doi.org/10.1093/ police/pay089 Ijames, S. (2005). Managing officer created jeopardy. Police1. https://www.police1.com/archive/ articles/managing-­officer-­created-­jeopardy-­t4w1PZChSkzfdf84/ International Mediation Institute. (2016, August 11). Pre-dispute and pre-escalation processes to prevent disputes: A brief introduction. International Mediation Institute. https://imimediation.org/2016/08/11/pre-­dispute-­and-­pre-­escalation-­processes-­to-­prevent-­disputes-­a-­brief-­ introduction/ Jenkins, B. (2019). Canadian police tactical units: The normalization of police militarization or a pragmatic response to high-risk calls? [Master of Arts, Carleton University]. https://doi. org/10.22215/etd/2019-­13738 Klein, G. A. (2009). Streetlights and shadows: Searching for the keys to adaptive decision making. The MIT Press. https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/streetlights-­and-­shadows Laffan, C. F., Coleshill, J. E., Stanfield, B., Stanfield, M., & Ferworn, A. (2020). Using the ARAIG Haptic suit to assist in navigating firefighters out of hazardous environments. 2020 11th IEEE Annual Information Technology, Electronics and Mobile Communication Conference (IEMCON) (pp. 0439–0444). https://doi.org/10.1109/IEMCON51383.2020.9284922 Luoma-aho, V., & Canel, M. J. (Eds.). (2020). The handbook of public sector communication (First ed.). Wiley. Marcinko, R. (1992). Rogue warrior. Pocket Books. McGregor, C., & Bonnis, B. (2016). Big data analytics for resilience assessment and development in tactical training serious games. 2016 IEEE 29th International Symposium on Computer-­ Based Medical Systems (CBMS) (pp. 158–162). https://doi.org/10.1109/CBMS.2016.64 McLaughlin, K. (2020, June 2). One of America’s most popular police trainers is teaching officers how to kill. Insider. https://www.insider.com/ bulletproof-­dave-­grossman-­police-­trainer-­teaching-­officers-­how-­to-­kill-­2020-­6 Meichenbaum, D. (2017). The evolution of cognitive behavior therapy: A personal and professional journey with Don Meichenbaum. Routledge. Muir, W. K. (1977). Police: Streetcorner politicians. University of Chicago Press. https://press. uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo3645755.html Mulyana, R. (2012, November 5). Operational risk. https://www.slideshare.net/abyanima/ operational-­risks Nilson, C. (2018). Community safety and well-being: Concept, practice, and alignment. 9. Norton, M. (1991). Naval academy graduates get a Schwarzkopf send-off – Baltimore Sun [News]. Baltimore Sun. https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-­xpm-­1991-­05-­30-­1991150152-­ story.html

6  Police Training Options to Reduce Violence in Police-Suspect Encounters

109

Novaco, R. W. (1977). A stress inoculation approach to anger management in the training of law enforcement officers. American Journal of Community Psychology, 5(3), 327–346. https://doi. org/10.1007/BF00884700 Oxford Dictionary. (2021). De-escalation | Definition of de-escalation by Oxford dictionary on Lexico.com also meaning of de-escalation. https://www.lexico.com/definition/de-­escalation Pollack, H. A., & Humphreys, K. (2020). Reducing violent incidents between police officers and people with psychiatric or substance use disorders. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 687(1), 166–184. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716219897057 Robinson, L. O. (2020). Five years after Ferguson: Reflecting on police reform and what’s ahead. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 687(1), 228–239. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716219887372 Rogers, C., & Smith, B. (2018). The college of policing: Police education and research in England and Wales. In C. Rogers & B. Frevel (Eds.), Higher education and police: An international view (pp. 87–106). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­319-­58386-­0_5 Ross, D. L., & Murphy, R. L. (2017). Stress, perceptual distortions, and human performance. In Guidelines for investigating officer-involved shootings, arrest-related deaths, and deaths in custody (p. 322). Routledge. Röttger, S., Theobald, D.  A., Abendroth, J., & Jacobsen, T. (2020). The effectiveness of combat tactical breathing as compared with prolonged exhalation. Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10484-­020-­09485-­w Rydberg, J., & Terrill, W. (2010). The effect of higher education on police behavior. Police Quarterly, 13(1), 92–120. https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611109357325 Saunders, T., Driskell, J. E., Johnston, J. H., & Salas, E. (1996). The effect of stress inoculation training on anxiety and performance. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 1(2), 17. Sherman, L. W. (2020). Evidence-based policing and fatal police shootings: Promise, problems, and prospects. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 687(1), 8–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716220902073 Shjarback, J. A., & White, M. D. (2016). Departmental professionalism and its impact on indicators of violence in police–citizen encounters. Police Quarterly, 19(1), 32–62. https://doi. org/10.1177/1098611115604449 Staller, M. S., Müller, M., Christiansen, P., Zaiser, B., Körner, S., & Cole, J. C. (2019). Ego depletion and the use of force: Investigating the effects of ego depletion on police officers’ intention to use force. Aggressive Behavior, 45(2), 161–168. https://doi.org/10.1002/ab.21805 Stone, R., & Socia, K. M. (2019). Boy with toy or black male with gun: An analysis of online news articles covering the shooting of tamir rice. Race and Justice, 9(3), 330–358. https://doi. org/10.1177/2153368716689594 Tate, J., Jenkins, J., & Rich, S. (2021, September). Fatal force: Police shootings database. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-­shootings-­database/ Taylor, P. L. (2020). Dispatch priming and the police decision to use deadly force. Police Quarterly, 23(3), 311–332. https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611119896653 Wilson, J. Q. (1978). Varieties of police behavior (Vol. 1). https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog. php?isbn=9780674932111 Wolfe, S., Rojek, J., McLean, K., & Alpert, G. (2020). Social interaction training to reduce police use of force. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 687(1), 124–145. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716219887366 W. Bradley Cotton  was a police officer for the Brantford Police Service in Ontario, Canada, for 28 years, retiring as a police sergeant in 2018. He went on to pursue a Master of Business Administration degree at the University of Edinburgh Business School. Brad is currently a consultancy managing member for public safety and business for WB Global Partners, serving both public and private organizations and industry in assisting in the development of effective agency strategy.

Chapter 7

Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public: A Cross-­Jurisdictional Comparison Emma Ryan and Laura Bedford

Introduction This chapter compares reporting practices around police use of conducted energy weapons (CEWs) in the United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand (NZ) and Australia. It provides a critique of reporting trends in Australia specifically, where CEWs were first introduced over two decades ago.1 CEWs, widely termed ‘Tasers’ or ‘conducted energy devices’, have been adopted by police globally, including each Australian state and territory. This comparative discussion shows that very little is known about current CEW usage patterns in Australia in relation to other jurisdictions where public reporting of police use of force is far more regular and accessible to the public. This chapter seeks to emphasise the potential benefits of transparent reporting, which can serve to increase public confidence in policing by inviting scrutiny of practice. This is especially important on use of force, which is understood to delegitimise police organisations when perceived to be excessive. Developing a clear understanding of the impacts of CEWs on community confidence in and relationships with police presents significant challenges. There is undoubtedly much more to learn in terms of developing a useful metric with which to measure this vital quality. In light of this complexity, this chapter shows that while Australia lags behind other democratic countries in the core Anglosphere in providing regular, publicly accessible data on police use of force, those who

 The ‘Air Taser’ was introduced into Western Australia’s Tactical Response Group in March 2000. See Ryan (2012) for a detailed account of the introduction of CEWs into Australia. 1

E. Ryan (*) · L. Bedford Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_7

111

112

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

experience it and the nature of CEW use, further research is needed to better understand the impacts of this lag for both police and the communities they serve. Lack of access to use-of-force data is a global problem for policing, but more acute in some jurisdictions than others. Thus, while barriers to accurate reporting remain in the UK and NZ, these jurisdictions have made significant progress towards ensuring international standards of transparency are upheld through legislated public reporting of police use of force. Such reporting arguably underscores key tenets of democratic policing. But while police in the UK and NZ currently make some details of the nature and frequency of their CEW deployments available to the public, such data remain largely closed to such public scrutiny in Australia. Yet there are no formal public reporting requirements in any Australian state or territory to allow for independent monitoring and evaluation of CEW use. Even where use-­of-­force reporting does occur in Australia, concerns have been raised that the data produced is vulnerable to inaccuracy and underreporting (see, for example Office of Police Integrity, 2009; Howie et al., 2011; Queensland Police Service, 2014; Home Office, 2020). This chapter seeks to further inform discussion that might lead to better policy and practice in the reporting of CEW use by police generally, but especially by Australian police. While comparative analysis of any use-of-force data is a fraught undertaking, relying as it does on data as recorded and presented by police, in Australia, these difficulties are compounded by the different reporting requirements in each state and territory policing organisation. This is especially the case with reporting of CEW use because there are multiple ways the weapon can be used to achieve various compliance ends that might be desired by operational police from threatening deployment, incapacitation or to administer pain. Indeed, the ‘use’ of a CEW is in itself relatively complex in comparison to traditional use of force types. ‘Use’ of a CEW can variously be defined as the weapon being: • drawn from a holster; • aimed or pointed at a person; • ‘arced’ (so that an electrical current emitting a cracking sound is seen and heard but no barb is fired); • red-dotted or used to ‘laser paint’ a person;2 • successfully deployed so that two electrified probes that resemble small fishhooks, and connected to very thin conductive wires, are fired at a person;3 and, • used in ‘drive stun mode’, where the handset is placed in direct contact with skin.4  In this mode, a red laser light is projected from the CEW handset onto a person’s body, usually the largest body mass such as the chest. This type of ‘use’ also assists with aiming the weapon’s barbs if it is then used in deployment or ‘probe’ mode. 3  This mode causes the infamous neuro-muscular incapacitation (NMI) that disables the target by distributing an electrical circuit running at a particular frequency which drops them to the ground. 4  Use in ‘drive-stun’ mode will not cause NMI. However, it can be used to complete an electrical circuit through a person’s body sufficient to produce NMI if applied to a subject’s skin in circumstances where only one barb attaches (such as after a faulty ‘probe mode’ deployment). When used without any attached probes, drive-stun mode is considered as purely a pain-compliance technique. 2

7  Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public…

113

In light of these intricacies, meaningful, comparative analysis of CEW ‘use’ is very difficult and not the intention of this study, which is focussed on a broader problem such as accountability and transparency in the frequency and form of existing CEW reporting to the public. It seeks to highlight the value of reliable, detailed, consistent and publicly accessible data, at a time when the lack of data means that evaluation of evidence-based policy and practice related to CEWs in Australia is impossible. We argue that without national guidelines or legislated requirements for such public reporting, it will remain impossible in Australia to meaningfully track or guard against the incidence of concerning trends that are becoming evident through more transparent reporting practices in other jurisdictions. Such trends include ‘CEW mission creep’ and potential for racial bias in the use of CEWs by police particularly against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australia. This chapter outlines what is currently known about CEW use in the UK, NZ and in each Australian jurisdiction. It will emphasise the importance of independent analysis and review of data on CEW use to monitor and enhance police relationships with the communities they serve. We will first discuss the reasons why transparent reporting matters in upholding the ideal of democratic policing, and why reporting of CEW use is of particular importance. We then further demonstrate this argument through a comparative analysis of reporting requirements in the UK, NZ and Australia. We conclude with some observations about the importance of transparent reporting, noting the tensions between open reporting and possible impacts of this for community perceptions of police legitimacy and highlighting the need for Australian police to note international trends and carefully consider the benefits for democratic policing of open reporting of CEW use.

Policing and the Importance of Transparency Transparency around police use of force serves a number of important functions, and, by extension, limited independent scrutiny potentially ripens the ground for a significant misalignment of public expectations and police practice, and a lack of meaningful democratic regulation. The benefits of transparency include enhancing police legitimacy by facilitating the public’s ability to track how weapons are used tactically in everyday law enforcement duties. Transparency also enables the public to determine the extent to which it has provided implicit and informed consent in the arming of police with CEWs. Police scholars have long stressed the importance of transparent and reliable police data as a cornerstone of legitimacy in democratic policing (Hickman, 2014; Hickman & Poore, 2016). Further, in the absence of transparent reporting, public knowledge about the use of particular policing tactics risks being shaped by inaccurate sources of knowledge. This is especially the case for CEWs where media reporting tends to focus on controversial or sensational incidents involving fatal outcomes or very public deployments (Clifford, 2020). In doing so, it tends to overlook examples where CEW use results in ‘successful’ deployment (perhaps de-escalating tensions in a situation where a firearm may

114

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

otherwise have been used) or where CEWs are used in relatively benign circumstances perhaps to ensure a person complies with a police direction by using the red-dotting function. How, when and why CEWs are used by police is especially important data to be open to scrutiny in light of the huge variety of ‘uses’ to which they can be put. Not only should such data be carefully collated, it must also be made readily accessible. Over a number of decades, critical policing scholarship has consistently highlighted the difficulties in accessing use-of-force data related to police interactions with the public. For example, renowned policing scholar and ex-New York City Police officer, James Fyfe, lamented in 2002 that the media is a better source of information about police use of force than government or scholarly sources. Kane (Hickman, 2014) reflected on the irony that police assiduously gather data on all manner of offenders but appear unable to ‘systematically distribut[e] comprehensive data on their own activities that produced those crime statistics’ (cited in Hickman, 2014, p. 434). However, some jurisdictions can be more readily and reliably studied than others, which could be read as reflecting strong organisational confidence in officers’ actions. When examining reporting deficiencies surrounding the use of deadly force in the United States, Fyfe (2002) notes the ability of researchers to access such data is generally driven by two major levers. The first is the willingness of an agency to ‘open up the books’ for inspection because they believe that they ‘are at or near the state of whatever art is to be studied’ (Fyfe, 2002, p. 96). The second is whether an agency has been compelled to open up to external scrutiny by either an order by government, such as an investigation by an oversight body, or an independent court. Fyfe provides a useful framework to compare data transparency in the UK, NZ and Australia, as he examines reporting of data that openly exists and ‘the data needs that are not addressed’ (Fyfe, 2002, p. 88). By examining the data that exists around CEW use and cross-referencing this evidence across jurisdictions, it is possible to show why the data gaps in Australia are so problematic. Before delving into the issues raised by current deficits in Australian reporting of CEW usage data, we briefly examine some broader challenges around CEWs that have been identified in the relatively scant existing literature and independent research, beginning with impacts on relationships between police and citizens who are vulnerable to disproportionate police attention.

CEW Use and Racial Bias We argue that detailed knowledge of CEW use is especially important where the ongoing legacies of colonisation remain so problematic. The over-representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples at all levels of the criminal justice system in Australia is well documented. The over-policing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples has led to increasingly higher rates of arrest (Parliament of Australia, 2016) and incarceration since the 1980s (Cunneen, 2017, 2018). For context, the number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in full time custody

7  Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public…

115

in Australia in the first quarter of 2007 was 6521 whilst in the final quarter of 2020 it had almost doubled to 12,344 (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS], 2020). Currently, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are imprisoned at a rate 16 times higher than non-Indigenous Australians and represent a higher per-capita rate than any other people in the world (Anthony, 2017). The criminalisation of Indigenous youth is of specific concern, with around 53% of all young people aged 10 to 17 in detention in Australia being Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, who only make up 6% of young people in Australia. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders aged 10 to 17 were 17 times more likely to be imprisoned than non-­ Indigenous youth in 2019 (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare [AIHW], 2020). Accountability is an essential element of democratic policing, and transparency is a key method of retaining public trust and shoring up a community’s acceptance and approval of police power (Hickman & Poore, 2016). Experiences of and responses to police use of force in the US provide an historic and salutary warning for other countries about the dangers of failing to address public concerns stemming from abuses of police power. Specifically, the failure of police to address racial bias in the use of force over many decades, culminating in public outrage over the murder of George Floyd in May 2020, has sparked widespread Black Lives Matter protests in the US and beyond. A key product of this malaise are limits in data reporting, documentation and the evaluation of police performance in a federated enforcement system (Zimring, 2017). These factors, and the collective backlash they can generate, demonstrates the delicate nature of the relationship between police and communities, and the potential for a perceived lack of accountability to erode these relationships. The focus in use-of-force literature is frequently the ‘characteristics of suspects, officers, and situations that make the occurrence of force more or less likely’ with race being ‘(o)ne of the most obvious suspect characteristics that may influence use of force’ (Gau et al., 2010, p. 30). As we discuss, available statistics from the US, UK and NZ indicate that CEW deployments are incontrovertibly characterised by racial bias.5 In the context of extremely high levels of over-policing and incarceration of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australia (Cunneen, 2017), the lack of detailed reporting of CEW use is a significant problem. Notably, the limited data made publicly available through ad hoc studies and reviews indicates that racial bias is an element of CEW deployments in Australia (Crime and Corruption Commission, 2010; Western Australia Police, 2010; Crime and Misconduct Commission, 2011; New South Wales Ombudsman, 2012; Ryan, 2012). For example, in 2011, the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission found that over 20% of Taser deployments were against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, who only made up 3.6% of the Queensland population Queensland at that time (CMC, 2011, p. xvii). In the context of well documented and deep historical tensions with police, and lack of publicly available data around police use  There is also a growing body of scholarly knowledge on the excessive use of CEWs on persons with a mental illness. This is outside the scope of our discussion but see for example Hallett et al. (2021). 5

116

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

of force, or, indeed, a demographic profile of use of force, this figure raises red flags around the possibility that CEWs are used disproportionately against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander persons. Further, beyond the actual recording (albeit internal) of CEW deployment as a use of force, there is evidence from other jurisdictions that a much more common occurrence is the presentation (without deployment) of a CEW in the context of mundane or relatively minor infractions to increase compliance with police directions through the threat of force. These mundane uses of the CEW, we argue, require specific attention and should be differentiated from deployments which provide an alternative to firearms in the resolution of incidents where serious injury is a risk, as stated in policy (Ryan, 2012). This data implies an embedded racial bias that provides a problematic context for CEW use. Against this backdrop, the nature of CEW use (i.e. in a ‘draw’ or ‘discharge’ mode) becomes important to know, especially within the context of all too common reports of excessive use of force and deaths in custody which adds to growing pressure on police to improve relationships with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australia. If CEWs can be shown to be used in a ‘draw mode’ (which includes drawn, ‘arced’ or ‘red-dotted’) in mundane situations and in a disproportionate manner against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the public has a right to know, and police have a responsibility to justify the way CEWs are being used by officers in the field. As suggested, detailed data must underscore broad public acceptance and informed consent to the use of CEWs in situations where firearms could not lawfully be used. This is particularly important because there is a widespread (and intentionally fostered) assumption that the purpose of CEWs is to reduce the need for firearms.6 In addition, detailed data on CEW use could provide important insights into police interactions with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples more broadly. If the figures suggest CEWs are drawn only to avoid firearms use in the context of imminent violence, it must be assumed that violent interactions involving police and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people occur disproportionately, and that CEW deployments regularly and successfully de-escalate such situations. In this instance we might have concerns about the frequency of violent interactions involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people that require police involvement, but we might also feel reassured that police had recourse to CEWs and were not called upon to use their firearms. But if the figures show that CEWs are presented to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders people disproportionately in relatively mundane circumstances (in which the subject is not presenting an immediate threat of violence) then our concern would take a different form. We might seriously question why CEWs were used routinely instead of other non-violent means or tactics. This detail is important given the recognised propensity of CEWs to be susceptible to ‘mission creep’.

 This is evident in police and public statements in the media. For a detailed discussion of the discourse surrounding the introduction of CEWs in Australia, see Ryan (2012). 6

7  Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public…

117

CEWs and Mission Creep A repeated concern about the use of CEWs relates to ‘mission’ or ‘function’ creep. These interchangeable terms refer to ‘the use of the weapon in increasingly mundane situations so that the requirement of minimal force is breached’ (Bourne, 2011, p.  44). The propensity of CEWs to be used in this way has been documented to some extent in Australia. For example, the Western Australia Corruption and Crime Commission found that: ‘[m]ission creep can cause police to rely on one weapon more than another, or at the expense of non-weapons based approaches’ (Corruption and Crime Commission, 2010, p.  24). It is argued CEWs may be used for non-­ intended or unpermitted purposes such as, for example, to promote compliance with verbal directions rather than to minimise a specific threat of physical violence (Howie et al., 2011). But in the absence of nuanced, interpretable data required to accurately understand the scope, scale and consequences of ‘mission creep’ in the use of CEWs, any argument that such use is occurring or leads to problematic outcomes must remain conjectural, because the data to support these assertions is simply not there. Given this, it is currently not possible to ensure that CEWs are being used in a manner that complies with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990). What is clearer is that the careful evaluation and scrutiny of non-lethal weapons use envisaged under the UN principles is probably being violated in Australia, namely that ‘the development and deployment of non-lethal incapacitating weapons should be carefully evaluated’. Concerns about CEWs and mission creep have been expressed by many national and international oversight bodies for over a decade (see, for example Corruption and Crime Commission, 2010, p. 62; New South Wales Ombudsman, 2012; Crime and Misconduct Commission, 2013, p. 29; Independent Office for Police Conduct, 2020). Although identifying trends in CEW use over time to promote continuous review and improvement of policy and practice, in line with the UN Principles, is widely recommended by police review bodies, the ability of independent scholars or members of the public to closely monitor data is curtailed in Australia by a ‘closed shop’ approach to use-of-force data. Although data on the use of force is collected in various forms and use-of-force incidents are internally reviewed in all states, the outcomes of such reviews are only accessible to government organisations and integrity commissions. Our research suggests that, despite continued roll-­ out of CEW devices to police around Australia for over a decade, there has been no sustained, detailed review of trends in CEW use over time in any Australian jurisdiction. The absence of this type of data limits public understanding of the complexities of CEW use and fosters the ‘technofallacy’ that CEWs have the explicit agenda of saving lives (see Corbett & Marx, 1991). Identifying mission creep requires accurate, reliable and consistent reporting by police of how CEWs are deployed. As discussed, CEWs can be used in multiple ways with a variety of intentions and outcomes, with the potential effect of eroding the principle of minimum force (see Ryan, 2012). For example, international studies have found that police use CEWs as a substitute for verbal de-escalation techniques (e.g. see Gau et al.,

118

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

2010). As Delahunty and colleagues argue (2017: p. 2), this ‘mirrors psychology’s classic “Law of the Instrument,”’ where access to a certain tool increases the probability it becomes routinely used when other tools may be more appropriate. It must be noted that reporting practices do not in and of themselves promote accountability. While all CEW use is classified as a use-of-force incident that must be reported internally by officers in most Australian jurisdictions, there has been several cases where police have been publicly criticised and, in some cases, charged as a result of over-zealous or inappropriate CEW deployments.7 Modern versions of the most widely utilised brand of CEW in Australia, the TASER®, which is produced by Axon Enterprise, Inc., formerly known as Taser International, incorporate recording mechanisms to capture the time and duration of each weapon’s deployment. While this feature is marketed by Axon as an enhancement of accountability there is no capacity to do this in the context of a use involving the mere presentation of a CEW weapon or the threat of deployment. Should a CEW be used merely to obtain compliance, outside policy and in defiance of the advertised purpose of CEWs (i.e. to reduce the use of firearms by police) then such use represents a form of mission creep that moves policing away from a consensual model and towards a coercive one. Over time, this can erode police legitimacy and procedural justice, which ultimately decreases the acceptance of police authority by communities they serve (Tyler, 2003). This concern is underscored by Ariel et al. (2020), who found the ‘visual cue’ of a CEW increases levels of aggression in police-public contacts. Under randomised controlled trial conditions, this study found a 48% higher incidence of use of force by officers equipped with CEWs (Ariel et al., 2020).8 Further research suggests ‘the key factor shaping public behaviour is the fairness of the processes legal authorities use when dealing with members of the public’ (Tyler, 2003, p. 283; Mazerolle et al., 2013). Traditional Peelian principles of policing, and the more recent body of research on ‘procedural justice’ both suggest the more police are regarded as fair and transparent in their interactions with citizens, the greater the likelihood their authority will be accepted. In this context, if CEWs are used in an overtly intimidating and coercive and/or disproportionate manner, then relationships with the community are likely to be damaged. This concern is amplified within communities with pre-existing fractures and mutual antagonisms with police.

 For example, the March 2012 death of Roberto Laudisio Curti where the coroner, Mary Jerram, found that police ‘“threw themselves” into the confrontation “like schoolboys in Lord of the Flies”’ (McNally 2014). Note: This record from the Coroner’s Court of New South Wales is no longer publicly available according to a search of the website (search conducted on 25 February 2021). 8  The use of force for non-CEW equipped officers also increased during the study, but only by 19% (Ariel et al., 2020). 7

7  Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public…

119

Are CEWs Reserved for Critical Incidents? CEWs are widely marketed as an alternative to firearms, to be used in violent confrontations and reduce the frequency of casualties and fatalities.9 Regardless, in many jurisdictions in Australia and internationally, policy recommends against using a CEW in incidents where subjects are armed with a firearm or edged weapon (see e.g. Crime and Misconduct Commission, 2013, p.  28). There are two main reasons for this policy. First, it is difficult to ensure two barbs connected to wires of various lengths can accurately connect with a subject’s skin so an electrical charge will effectively lead to their incapacitation. The possibility of ineffective deployment must always be a concern for both operational police and policy makers. Second, the electricity delivered by CEW barbs that do successfully embed the target’s skin may result in involuntary muscle movement, which could be potentially catastrophic if used against a person holding a firearm. These practicalities expose the vulnerabilities of CEWs which, unlike firearms, are a relatively unreliable weapons for defensive use against an armed person. Nevertheless, many police agencies routinely arm frontline officers with CEWs, arguably because the weapon lends itself to successfully gaining subject compliance in both mundane and very serious circumstances without ever being fired. While this feature might make CEWs seem attractive to police organisations, it also carries the potential to undermine consent for police tactics. Kleinig (2007) speaks to this point as follows: Although technology may offer clean and aseptic ways of controlling situations, its use may also impact on public perceptions in ways that should be taken into account. We are usually more comfortable about two officers wrestling a refractory person to the ground than the sight of them tasering the person. Tasering seemingly violates dignity in a way that wrestling into submission does not (Kleinig, 2007, p. 289).

Here, Kleinig refers to interactions with unarmed people, which might be contrary to many people’s expectations of how CEWs are used given their intended function as a less lethal alternative to firearms. The data we report below demonstrates that CEWs are used with far greater frequency than firearms, which suggests a misalignment between their common operational use and marketing pitches directed to the public. We now turn to our examination of reporting standards in identified comparison jurisdictions before moving on to a more detailed analysis of publicly accessible CEW data in each Australian jurisdiction.

 CEWs carry lower rates of injury when compared to batons and police dogs. However, there is no persuasive evidence to date that they reduce either fatalities or the use of firearms (see, for example Ba and Grogger, 2018). 9

120

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

International CEW Reporting Requirements Below we describe use-of-force reporting requirements and practices in relation to CEWs in the UK, New Zealand and Australia.10 We also identify relevant trends and patterns that emerge from the data capturing reported CEW use. But we note at the outset that making comparisons of this particular use of force type between jurisdictions should be treated with caution for two main reasons. First, definitions of ‘use’ differ between jurisdictions. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the rates of CEW carriage vary considerably between jurisdictions. We commence by discussing reporting requirements for policing jurisdictions in the United Kingdom which includes Britain, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Reporting CEW Use in the UK CEW usage is regularly reported by the Home Office for all jurisdictions in the UK. Reporting by police agencies is also made public every six months under the mandatory requirements of the Statistics and Registration Act UK, 2007. The UK Home Office provides a User Guide to assist with the interpretation of use-of-force statistics (Home Office, 2020), which details the Home Secretary’s power to request data from the 43 policing agencies operating in England and Wales, also known as the Annual Data Requirement (ADR). The guide notes: The collection of data through the ADR encourages greater consistency of reporting between police forces, together with an expectation of higher quality data, and is signed off by individual Chief Constables. Furthermore, collecting use of force data through the ADR underlines the importance of these data to Ministers, the Home Office and to the public (Home Office, 2020, p. 3).

Northern Ireland In Northern Ireland, regular reporting facilitates easy access to data to allow for external scrutiny. For example, the reports clearly define and report on the different CEW11 modes of use and reports against these different use modalities (Police  We exclude CEW usage rates in the United States for two reasons. First, the large number of policing agencies in the US (almost 18,000) with concomitant differences in reporting cultures, policies and processes, would make practical comparison difficult. Second, and more importantly, in the United States the right to bear arms, the rapidly escalating civil conflict in recent years and the long-standing militarisation of the police results in an entirely different operational environment form those jurisdictions which are the focus of this discussion. We focus instead on countries where firearms carriage by citizens is limited and highly regulated. 11  Note that the weapon is termed a Conducted Energy Device (CED) in the reporting. 10

7  Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public…

121

Fig. 7.1  Presentation of CEW usage data in Northern Ireland. (Source: https://www.psni.police. uk/globalassets/inside-­the-­psni/our-­statistics/statistics-­on-­police-­use-­of-­force/2020/september/ use-­of-­force-­1-­apr-­2020%2D%2D-­30-­sept-­2020-­official-­public.pdf)

Service of Northern Ireland, 2020b). The differentiation between ‘drawn’ and ‘fired’ CEW use make it clear that any use of the weapon in presentation mode, whether drawn, aimed or ‘red dotted’, is recorded in Northern Ireland (see Fig. 7.1). Further, CEWs are only issued to specialist and authorised firearms officers attached to armed response vehicles who have completed National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) approved accredited training in the use of the device (Police Service of Northern Ireland, 2020a). In Northern Ireland, CEW usage trend data (kept since the introduction of CEWs in 2008) are also provided in a user-friendly format which allows ease of public scrutiny of CEW usage trends over time and comparison of CEW use to other use-of-force options available to police (such as batons, OC spray, dogs, firearms and water cannons) (Police Service of Northern Ireland, 2020b, p. 10). While gender and ethnicity are not provided in CEW reports from Northern Ireland this may reflect the relatively homogenous population there. The figures reported reflect fairly conservative use of the weapon overall.

England and Wales Consistent use-of-force reporting has been a national requirement in England and Wales since 2017, following a Home Secretary review examining the types of police data that should be recorded and made public (Shaw, 2015). In contrast to Northern Ireland, the data relating to CEW use in England and Wales are issued by Home

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

122

CED Red-dot

17 7

CED Drawn CED Fired

3

CED Aimed

3

CED Not stated

1

CED Arced

0

CED Drive-stun

0

CED Angle-drive stun

0 0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Thousands Fig. 7.2  CEW use in England and Wales by mode year ending March 2020. (Source: Cabinet Office, Government Digital Service, 2020)

CED non-discharge

CED discharge

CED not stated 0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Thousands White

Black/Asian/Mixed

Other/Not reported

Fig. 7.3  Rate of CEW use by ethnicity (as perceived by reporting officer), England and Wales: Year ending March 2020. (Source: Cabinet Office, Government Digital Service, 2020)

Office statisticians and publicly available via the GOV.UK website (Cabinet Office, Government Digital Service, 2020). The level of detail on the way CEWs are used and the demographic details of targets is broken down in significantly more detail than Northern Ireland.12

 Since the analysis conducted for this chapter occurred, the figures have been further represented in a statistical bulletin capturing selected, summarised data. The tables we drew on to create Fig. 7.2 present the data in more specific detail. 12

7  Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public…

123

In England and Wales, the total number of CEW uses is reported for the relevant annual period and is compared to other use-of-force incidents. The comparative use-­ of-­force reporting is followed by a breakdown of the number of times CEWs are aimed, drawn, red-dotted, arced, used in drive stun mode, fired or used in ‘angled drive stun mode’. Where mode of use is not stated by reporting officers, this is also recorded. Raw use numbers and the number of incidents in which CEWs were used in any mode are provided. The detailed data breakdown provides the opportunity for independent review of the use of CEWs (including non-discharge, discharge, ‘not-­ stated’ use and perceived age, gender, ethnicity, health conditions of the CEW target). Stated reasons for using force are also captured. The data are presented here in graphic form tabulated by the authors based on the Home Office raw data (see Fig. 7.2 and Fig. 7.3). Notably, for the year ending March 2020, red-dotting or laser-­ painting accounted for around 52% of all 32,507 reported CEW uses (Home Office, 2020). An over-representation of ‘Black’, ‘Asian’ and ‘Mixed’ people is evident in all ‘non-discharge’ modes. Throughout the UK, the requirement for Chief Constables to sign off on use-of-­ force data adds a layer of formality and accountability to the reporting process. Nevertheless, the Home Office has raised concerns that data collection is incomplete and recording systems in some of the 43 police forces in the UK did not meet Home Office requirements. For example, there is no centralised system or software for recording use-of-force incidents, so wording of questions put to officers about reportable incidents differs between forces. Training and guidance of use-of-force reporting happens at force level and lacks consistency. Data validation is also challenging as there is no mechanism to ensure that officers accurately report their involvement in use-of-force incidents. Further, some use-of-force forms do not allow adequate details of incidents to be recorded, such as rationales and outcomes of multiple uses of a weapon in the same incident. All these differences within and across the 43 UK police forces potentially lead to data quality issues and underreporting. These limitations are nevertheless acknowledged within the guide to using the data tables. However incomplete or flawed, these publicly available data provide at least some opportunity to understand the manner in which CEW are utilised by police and how they compare with other use-of-force types, including the extent to which CEWs have replaced the use of firearms and how they compare to other sublethal options, such as OC spray, batons and dogs. It also allows interested parties to monitor rates of use against citizens by sex, race and age, and the circumstances of use, all of which are relevant to meaningful evaluation of CEW deployments.

Reporting CEW Use in the NZ An annual Tactical Options Report (TOR) provides extensive detail on the nature and frequency of use-of-force incidents reported by NZ Police, which includes demographic details of those subjected to the types of force reported (New Zealand, 2019). The nature and frequency of this reporting reflects an explicit recognition

124

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

Fig. 7.4  TASER Use at TOR Events by Highest Mode of Deployment (New Zealand). (Source: New Zealand Police (2019). Tactical Options Annual Report, p. 22)

Fig. 7.5  TASER usage by subject ethnicity (New Zealand). (Source: New Zealand Police (2019). Tactical Options Annual Report, p. 43)

that ‘Policing in Aotearoa is by the consent of our community – a fact that is not taken for granted’ (New Zealand Police, 2019: foreword). Data is drawn from the New Zealand Police TOR database. This database allows police to report details about use-of-force events, including details of persons involved, their behaviours and the tactical options exercised. Notably, information about the broader context and sequence of an event or incident is also required, including ‘the officer’s own thinking and decision-making leading up to and during the event’, while every

7  Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public…

125

‘TOR report is reviewed first by the officer’s immediate supervisor, and then by another District staff member at Inspector level or above’ (New Zealand Police, 2019: 11). This demonstrates the degree of oversight around incident reporting, which limits the ability of officers to provide inaccurate or incomplete reports and provides a level of quality control to increase confidence in the data produced in the TORs. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 show all modes of CEW use across each policing district are included in this public facing data. Figure 7.5 reports the ethnicity of the person subject to the CEW deployment with the mode of use broken down as ‘shows’ and ‘discharges’. Mirroring trends in the UK, NZ data demonstrate that ‘shows’ of CEWs far outnumber ‘discharges’ for all recorded ethnicities. In particular, ‘laser painting’, which is termed ‘red-dotting’ in the UK, is the predominant identifiable manner of CEW use in New Zealand comprising 66% of total deployments (New Zealand, 2019, p. 22). These figures provide significant insight into the operational uses of CEWs, and a capacity for the public to monitor trends around CEW use and for media to report on these issues (see, for example den Heyer, 2020). Figure 7.5 shows Māori people were disproportionately represented in CEW use in the relevant period. Making up 17% of the New Zealand population, Māori people were the target of a CEW almost 59% of total reported incidents in the period examined here (New Zealand, 2019, p. 43). The rate of ‘show’ to ‘discharges’ for this group is also reported in Fig. 7.5, which may under-estimate actual rates of use against Māori populations given potential inaccuracies in police use-of-force reporting more generally. If Pacific Islander peoples are included, the over-representation of people of colour becomes even more significant. Data also documents the reported ages of citizens subject to CEW, with detail on incidents involving the youngest and oldest people who experienced CEW use in response to their behaviour. No data are provided by New Zealand on the sex of CEW targets.

Reporting CEW Use in Australian Policing Jurisdictions Despite growing recognition of open and transparent data reporting by policing agencies in comparable democracies, and the significant role of judicious use of force in maintaining the careful balance of public consent, no Australian policing organisation is required by either state or federal legislation to publicly report use-­ of-­force data. This means scholars, legal and human rights advocates, and mental health campaigners in Australia do not have the same access to data as their counterparts in the UK or New Zealand which arguably prevents effective, independent oversight or review of the use of CEWs in any Australian state. In Australia, while formal requirements for external reporting are non-existent, even internal reporting practices around use of force could be described as patchy. While Use of Force Principles have been developed by the Australia and New Zealand Police Advisory Agency (ANZPAA), these guidelines do not place any

126

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

obligation on police to transparently report on use-of-force incidents or the specific use of CEWs. However, the Principles highlight the significance of the maintenance of ‘governance structures to report, record, monitor and evaluate the use of force to improve public and police safety’ (see ANZPAA, 2018). Although not binding, the spirit of this document recognises that use-of-force data requires reporting and reporting practices that are able to ensure the ongoing monitoring and evaluation of use-of-force incidents. It should also be noted that the ‘inappropriate or excessive’ use of CEWs by Australian police came to the attention of the United Nations Committee Against Torture in 2014, which recommended Australia consider abolishing these technologies altogether (United Nations, 2014 p. 4). In 2017, the Committee requested information from the Australian government about CEW training, ‘efforts made to adopt uniform national rules to ensure that a high threshold for the use of (CEWs) is established and that reporting on their use is mandatory’, along with a request for: Annual data, disaggregated by the sex and age range of the person affected and the minority group to which he or she belongs, if applicable, on the number of situations in which those weapons have been used (United Nations, 2017, p. 11).

Notably, a specific request for data disaggregated by modes of use against citizens was not issued. In any case, Australia’s 2018 response to the request in its Sixth Periodic Report under the Convention Against Torture starkly reveals the deficiencies in reporting and record keeping standards across Australian states and territories, with only five of Australia’s eight policing jurisdictions providing the requested data.13 Australia’s report to the UN also states that ‘All Taser use involving discharge is subject to a review, including analysis of video footage’ although it neglects to mention that not all states employ ‘Tasercam’ attachments or body-worn cameras (Australian Government, 2018, p. 74.) This inability to adequately respond to this request made by a key international human rights regulator is not simply a matter of scholarly concern, but also an issue for Australian policing agencies, as well as Australian state and federal governments, to reflect upon going forward. A recent desktop review of publicly available data concerning CEW use in Australian states and territories highlights the infrequent and ad hoc manner of police reporting practices compared with the UK and NZ. CEW deployment and modes of carriage differ slightly across Australia, where it has been incrementally introduced since 1999, working their way from specialist police to general issue first in Western Australia, followed by Queensland and New South Wales (Ryan, 2012). CEWs are available to general duties officers in South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. In Tasmania and Victoria, CEWs are not routinely carried by general duties police and are restricted to special response police, except in 37 police stations in Victoria, although there is no further public detail on these carriage rates in official police sources (Premier of Victoria, 2017). No publicly accessible data could be located for Tasmania or South Australia, so those jurisdictions are not included in the following 13

 Data was not provided by Victoria, Tasmania or the Northern Territory.

7  Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public…

127

section, which provides a chronological overview of the most recent publicly available data on CEW use in each of the remaining Australian jurisdictions.

Victoria No data on CEW use by police in the state of Victoria has been released to the public for over a decade. The most recent information was obtained via a Freedom of Information (FoI) application made by the Federation of Community Legal Centres to Victoria Police in 2010. The records showed that Critical Incident Response and Special Operations Group officers used CEWs 83 times (McKenzie, 2010). CEW use by specialist squads had also been reported by the Office of Police Integrity (OPI) in 2009, but none of these data provided any detail of subject characteristics or mode of use (Office of Police Integrity, 2009). The OPI was replaced by the Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission (IBAC) in 2012, but this body has never reported on or investigated CEW use in Victoria, and no information is offered via Victoria Police Annual Reports. As such, the information available to the public on CEW use in the state of Victoria is non-existent and renders independent analysis impossible. It cannot be determined, for example, whether the weapons’ deployment into mainly regional areas of Victoria has resulted in disproportionate use against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, young people or other vulnerable groups. In light of international trends, this is a legitimate and pressing concern which could easily be addressed by transparent, regular reporting.

Queensland The most recent reporting on CEW use in the state of Queensland occurred in 2014 when the Queensland Police Service (QPS) released a review of violent confrontations (see Queensland Police Service, 2014). This report provided some raw numbers for CEW use from 2012–2014, under the category ‘Taser presentation/use’ in a table designed to provide data on the contexts of CEW use under standard police reporting categories about the characteristics of citizen encounters, including possession of a weapon, self-harming, abusive/violent language, alcohol affected, exhibiting violent behaviour, apparent mental disorder, and drug affected. Quite apart from the clear difficulties in distinguishing between some of these reportable categories, there is no further detail provided in terms of gender, race or any specific health indicators of those experiencing CEW deployments. Previously, in 2013 the QPS oversight body, the Crime and Misconduct Commission14 (CMC, 2013), reported on multiple and prolonged use of CEWs between 2009 and 2012. This

14

 Since renamed the Crime and Corruption Commission.

128

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

report made several recommendations and observations about reporting practices at that time, including that the QPS: 1. amend the Taser policy to state that officers must report the reason for each Taser cycle and the effect each cycle had on the subject person, 2. ensure that Taser training emphasises that deploying officers must report the reason for, and effect of, each Taser cycle, 3. modify the Use of Force Report to capture the reason for each Taser cycle and the effect each cycle had on the subject person, 4. ensure that deficiencies in an officer’s report of an incident are identified during the review process, and that officers are provided with feedback about their report (CMC, 2013: xiv). This report also found: The majority of multiple or prolonged Taser incidents involved people from one or more ‘medically vulnerable or at-risk’ groups: • More than 80% of the people were reportedly affected by drugs and/or alcohol. • Indigenous people comprised 16% of all people who were the subject of a multiple or prolonged deployment. • Over 40% of the people were believed to have an underlying mental health condition (CMC, 2013, p. xii). Despite these findings, no specific recommendations were made on the importance of regular, ongoing public reporting of CEW deployments. Further information about CEW use in Queensland is documented in a Research and Issues paper produced by Crime and Misconduct Commission (2012). This research brief includes a breakdown of usage types for the two-year period from 2010 to 2012, and shows that 75% of CEW uses were presentations, 22.5% were ‘probe mode’ deployments and the remainder were drive stun or probe and stun applications, which can be used to complete a cycle when a CEW barb fails to make contact with a subject (Crime and Misconduct Commission, 2012, p. 3). It is also reported that Indigenous people made up 22.6% of all people subject to a CEW deployment despite comprising only 3.5% of the Queensland population (Crime and Misconduct Commission, 2012, p. 4). This information suggests that Queensland broadly follows trends around CEW use that can be seen in comparable international jurisdictions, and for a short period following the introduction of CEWs, some meaningful data was made publicly available. Regrettably, there has been no similar reporting of CEW deployments in Queensland since 2014. Thus, it is not possible to establish more recent trends in Queensland. As in the case of Victoria, the lack of transparent reporting and public accountability is a pressing concern.

7  Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public…

129

Northern Territory In 2017, the Northern Territory Ombudsman issued a report titled ‘Taser use and management of police conduct issues’. This followed an incident involving the use of a CEW against a 12-year-old boy who was running away from a police officer after being involved in a car theft (see, e.g. ABC, 2016). The Ombudsman’s report does not provide any data on frequency of CEW use in the Northern Territory, but recommendations maintaining ‘a system for regular monitoring and reporting on Taser use to a senior executive officer responsible for oversight of all instances of Taser use’ (Ombudsman Northern Territory, 2017, Recommendation 7). Before this review, Northern Territory Police commented on CEW usage rates in a media release regarding an internal review conducted in 2009 that was not released to the public in full. During the 13-month period of this review, CEWs were used 79 times, with 39 of these involving presentation only (Northern Territory Police, 2009). No further data that might reveal the manner and frequency of CEW use in the Northern Territory can be located.

New South Wales Information about CEW use in New South Wales (NSW) was obtained most recently via FoI and reported in the Sydney Morning Herald (Gladstone, 2019). The data obtained was for 2014–2018 and included the location, date/time and rationale for all reported use-of-force incidents. It shows that CEWs were used ‘almost 3000 times’ and that ‘more than 1000 incidents’ involved a ‘mental-health issue’ (Gladstone, 2019). In response to this media report, a spokeswoman for the NSW Police Force is reported as saying ‘three-quarters of the time, Taser use involved officers only drawing but not “actively using” their Tasers’ (Gladstone, 2019). No information about race, ethnicity or gender is reported and it is unclear if this information was included in the records released through FoI. Prior to the release of these figures no reporting had occurred since 2012 when the NSW Ombudsman documented CEW use based on data for a three-year period between 2008–2011. This report showed 72.3% of incidents involved ‘draw and cover’ events that did not disaggregating presentations into draw, aim and red-dot as is routinely done in the UK and New Zealand, while 16.5% involved single deployments15 (New South Wales Ombudsman, 2012). Detailed data about mode of use and age, sex or ethnicity of subjects is presented in this report, which identifies Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people as ‘significantly over-represented’, making up 29.3% of all CEW subjects and 2.5% of the population of NSW at that time (New South Wales Ombudsman, 2012, p. 99). This group was also reported to  The other 11% of deployments were either in drive-stun mode or involved multiple or continuous deployments. 15

130

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

Fig. 7.6  Use-of-force reports submitted by ACT Policing. (Source: Australian Capital Territory Police Annual Report 2019–20, p. 7)

be ‘more likely to be subjected to Taser use in probe mode, drive-stun mode or multiple/continued Taser use’ (New South Wales Ombudsman, 2012, p. 99). These figures mirror established over-representation trends facing ethnic minorities in all jurisdictions that report such demographic data. Of concern is the fact that this detailed reporting of CEW use by police in NSW has not occurred since 2012.

Australian Capital Territory Police in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) recently reported their use of CEWs through their Annual Report as an aggregate figure (Australian Federal Police, 2020). No other policing agency in Australia provides this level of transparency or uses the annual reporting process to publicly disclose use-of-force trends. While such high-level data are provided, there is no disaggregation by type of use or demographic characteristics of subject (Fig. 7.6).

Western Australia Western Australia Police (WAPol) has provided data in response to a FoI request from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). The outcome of this FOI request was a media report published on the news outlet’s website (Turner, 2019) which provided a bird’s eye view of general trends but very little in terms of specific data that could be used to measure broad trends. Nonetheless, reported figures show CEWs are used more frequently in regional areas than in Perth, the state’s capital, and are more likely to be used on subjects aged between 36 and 49 years. The ABC report also showed that physical aggression was recorded as the main reason for CEW use (on 153 occasions), followed by possession of an edged weapon (53

7  Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public…

131

occasions). Nonetheless, the report notes that one area known as the Kimberley recorded the second highest number of deployments despite having the smallest population of the regions in Western Australia (Turner, 2019). Given that 50% of the population of the Kimberley is Aboriginal compared to an average of 4% across the state, reading between the lines, the disproportionate use of CEWs against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities is clear. The lack of reporting of the use of CEW in Western Australia is of significant concern.

Discussion and Conclusions This brief and preliminary comparison of reporting practices and discernible trends around CEW use in the UK, New Zealand and Australia indicates a number of possible trends across the different jurisdictions, particularly on mission creep and the over-representation of people of colour and other groups susceptible to over-­ policing. While this discussion has sought to examine the frequency and method of public reporting of CEW use by police in various jurisdictions, rather than present a detailed comparative analysis of CEW use itself, several broad observations can be made based on the data presented. A particular trend suggests that CEWs are drawn or presented far more frequently than they are discharged. Additionally, where CEW use is reported (in the UK and NZ) laser-painting or red-dotting a person is shown to be a tactic frequently used by police. Reporting on this issue is extremely important because it could be interpreted as evidence of mission creep where CEWs are used more frequently as a low-level mode of force in relatively mundane incidents rather than as a replacement for firearms in critical incidents or when facing an armed subject. Conversely, it could also be interpreted as evidence that CEWs are extremely effective in the de-escalation of potentially violent incidents where serious injury is averted. Traditionally, police are trained never to draw their firearms unless they intend to use them. If CEWs were an equivalent option designed to prevent serious injury and were subject to strict policies reflecting this threshold for use, then the high number of shows, presentations and red-dotting events would reflect a surge in critical encounters requiring firearms use by police. Forming a better understanding of this trend requires detailed and accurate reporting of the precursors to CEW use by officers, high levels of scrutiny of available taser-cam footage where available and careful oversight of incident reporting practices. Ideally, data would allow such oversight to be conducted both in-house by police seeking to understand and improve their practices, and externally by civil society to promote accountability and seek to ensure that CEW use remains proportionate and used strictly according to established policies and procedures. Our brief survey of reporting in the UK and NZ finds that CEWs are over-used in the policing of people of colour in both jurisdictions. While we argue that this is also almost certainly the case in all jurisdictions in Australia, opaque reporting practices mean that we cannot know for sure. Dated and patchy reports undertaken by

132

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

oversight agencies and through FOI requests in Australia suggest that this is the case, but no recent or sufficiently detailed data have been made available to researchers or to the public in the last decade to allow any certainty. Given such patterns are evident and repeated in jurisdictions with more transparent reporting practices, we should see the lack of transparent reporting in Australia’s a matter of pressing concern. The well-documented history of over-zealous law enforcement against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples provides context for significant concern about the nature of CEW use in Australia, where accountability hinges on external, independent, scrutiny of policing activity, especially use of force. While we argue that openness and accountability ultimately increases police legitimacy, it may be the case that such legitimacy would be negatively impacted by the exposure of CEW data to public scrutiny. If the over-representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples becomes evident upon ‘opening the books’, police may fear an initial loss of legitimacy. This might explain the lack of transparency to date. This approach is both short-sighted and unsustainable in the context of trends towards open reporting occurring in the UK and NZ. CEW usage data must be made available to facilitate greater scrutiny of their use by police. Data may raise uncomfortable truths and even test legitimacy and strain relationships, but these are not valid or justifiable reasons to withhold them. A final conclusion is the reporting and interpretation of CEW usage data is complex. An understanding of the many modes of CEW ‘use’ is required to understand trends and make comparisons across jurisdictions. This is specialised work and appropriate metrics that could be used to compare trends internationally have arguably yet to be adequately developed. More uniform definitions and consistent thresholds for CEW use may be required if meaningful cross-jurisdictional comparisons are to be made. In the case of Australia, detailed national guidelines specific to CEW use would assist the examination of the data once it becomes available. Such guidelines should require annual public reporting of CEW use including the mode, frequency, demographic detail of targets and circumstances of use. This would facilitate far greater confidence that CEWs are used effectively and accountably, supporting a model of policing by consent. Australian policing organisations are well behind the times in comparison to their international counterparts. The consequences of this lag are not precisely known but this situation should not remain unchallenged. In terms of transparently and openly reporting on CEW use, we have shown that Australian policing organisations are well behind the UK and NZ.  The consequences of this lag are not precisely known, but there is no reason why this situation should remain unchallenged. It is our hope that this work demonstrates the importance of following in the footsteps of other policing agencies that demonstrate a far greater commitment to transparency about their use of force, and the use of a contentious technology such as CEWs, which demonstrates a greater degree of recognition of the importance of transparency than is currently evident in most Australian jurisdictions.

7  Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public…

133

References Anthony, T. (2017, June 6). Fact Check Q&A: are Indigenous Australians the most incarcerated people on Earth? The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/factcheck-­qanda-­ are-­indigenous-­australians-­the-­most-­incarcerated-­people-­on-­earth-­78528. Accessed 8 Apr 2021. Ariel, B., Lawes, D., Weinborn, C., Henry, R., Chen, K., & Brants Sabo, H. (2020). The ‘less-­ than-­lethal weapons effect’—introducing TASERs to routine police operations in England and Wales: A randomized controlled trial. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 46(2), 280–300. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). (2016, November 21). 12-year-old tasered by Northern Territory Police during arrest after alleged car theft https://www.abc.net.au/ news/2016-­11-­21/boy-­12-­tasered-­by-­northern-­territory-­police/8043970 Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] (2020, December 3). Prisoners in Australia. https:// www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/crime-­and-­justice/prisoners-­australia/latest-­release Australian Government. (2018, November 28). Australia’s sixth periodic report under the convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-­03/integrity-­human-­rightscat-­report.PDF Australian Institute of Health and Welfare [AIHW]. (2020). Youth detention population in Australia 2019. Bulletin 148. https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/c3ba6d29-­7488-­4050-­ adae-­12d96588bc37/aihw-­juv-­131.pdf.aspx?inline=true Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency [ANZPAA]. (2018). Australia New Zealand use of force principles. https://www.anzpaa.org.au/publications/general#mental_health Ba, B., & Grogger, J. (2018). The introduction of Tasers and police use of force: Evidence from the Chicago Police Department (Working Paper 24202). National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w24202 Bourne, K. (2011). Shock tactics threaten police authority. Alternative Law Journal, 36(1), 42–46. https://doi.org/10.1177/1037969X1103600109 Cabinet Office, Government Digital Service (UK). (2020, December 17). Police use of force statistics, England and Wales: April 2019 to March 2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/ statistics/police-­use-­of-­force-­statistics-­england-­and-­wales-­april-­2019-­to-­march-­2020 Corbett, R., & Marx, G. (1991). Critique: No soul in the new machine: Technofallacies in the electronic monitoring movement. Justice Quarterly, 8(3), 399–414. Corruption and Crime Commission (Western Australia). (2010). Use of Taser® Weapons by Western Australia Police: Summary Report. https://www.ccc.wa.gov.au/sites/default/ files/Summary%20of%20Report%20-­% 20Use%20of%20Taser%20Weapons%20by%20 WAPOL.pdf Crime and Misconduct Commission (Queensland). (2011). Evaluating Taser reforms: A review of Queensland Police Service policy and practice. https://www.ccc.qld.gov.au/sites/default/ files/Docs/Publications/CMC/Evaluating-­Taser-­reforms-­Report-­2011.pdf accessed 12 April 2021. Crime and Misconduct Commission (Queensland). (2012, November). An update on Taser use in Queensland. Research & Issues Paper No. 9. https://www.ccc.qld.gov.au/sites/default/ files/Docs/Publications/CMC/Bulletins%2Cseries-­a nd-­d iscussion-­p apers/Research-­a nd-­ issues-­paper-­series/Research-­and-­Issues-­An-­update-­on-­Taser-­use-­in-­Queensland-­2012.pdf Crime and Misconduct Commission (Queensland). (2013). Multiple and Prolonged Taser deployments. https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Documents/TableOffice/ TabledPapers/2013/5413T2908.pdf Cunneen, C. (2017). Police violence: The case of Indigenous Australians. In P. Sturmey (Ed.), The Wiley Handbook on Violence and Aggression. Wiley. ISBN 9781119057550. Cunneen, C. (2018). Sentencing, punishment and Indigenous people in Australia. Journal of Global Indigeneity, 3(1) https://ro.uow.edu.au/jgi/vol3/iss1/4 Fyfe, J. (2002). Too many missing cases: Holes in our knowledge about police use of force. Justice Research and Policy, 4, 87–102. https://doi.org/10.3818/JRP.4.1.2002.87

134

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

Gau, J. M., Mosher, C., & Pratt, T. (2010). An inquiry into the impact of suspect race on police use of Tasers. Police Quarterly, 13(1), 27–48. https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611109357332 Gladstone, N. (2019, September 24). NSW Police database unlocked: The where, when and why officers used force. The Sydney Morning Herald. https://www.smh.com.au/national/ nsw/nsw-­police-­database-­unlocked-­the-­where-­when-­and-­why-­officers-­used-­force-­20190917-­ p52s1p.html Hallett, N., Duxbury, J., McKee, T., Harrison, N., Haines, A., Craig, E., & O’Brien, A. (2021). Taser use on individuals experiencing mental distress: An integrative literature review. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 28(1), 56–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpm.12594 Hickman, M. (2014). Police administrative records as social science data. In M.  D. Reisig & R.  J. Kane (Eds.), Oxford handbook of police and policing (pp.  433–448). Oxford University Press. Hickman, M., & Poore, L. (2016). National data on citizen complaints about police use of force: Data quality concerns and the potential (mis)use of statistical evidence to address police agency conduct. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 27(5), 455–479. Home Office (United Kingdom). (2020). User Guide to Police use of force statistics, England and Wales. Howie, E., Brown, A., & Lynch, P. (2011). Upholding our rights: Towards best practice in police use of force: Final report. Human Rights Law Centre. https://static1.squarespace.com/ static/580025f66b8f5b2dabbe4291/t/5823b882f5e2312802b4f0de/1478736004607/HRLC-­ Police-­Use-­of-­Force-­Final-­Report-­2-­September-­2011.pdf Independent Office for Police Conduct. (2020) Independent Office for Police Conduct (United Kingdom). (2020, May 14). IOPC calls for greater scrutiny of Taser use following increasing concerns. https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/news/ iopc-­calls-­greater-­scrutiny-­taser-­use-­following-­increasing-­concerns Kleinig, J. (2007). Ethical constraints on Taser use by police. Policing, 1(3), 284–292. https://doi. org/10.1093/police/pam037 Mazerolle, L., Antrobus, E., Bennet, S., & Tyler, T. (2013). Shaping citizen perceptions of police legitimacy: A randomized field trial of procedural justice. Criminology, 51(1), 33–63. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-­9125.2012.00289.x McKenzie, N. (2010, October 12). Taser breaches by police revealed. The Age. https://www.theage. com.au/national/victoria/taser-­breaches-­by-­police-­revealed-­20101011-­16g05.html McNally, L. (2014, December 17). Roberto Laudisio Curti death: Policeman involved in arrest found guilty of assault, three other officers cleared. ABC News Online. https://www.abc.net.au/ news/2014-­12-­16/policeman-­guilty-­of-­assault-­curti-­death-­three-­others-­cleared/5971136 New Zealand Police. (2019). Tactical options: 2019 annual report. https://www.police.govt.nz/ sites/default/files/publications/annual-­tactical-­options-­research-­report-­8.pdf Northern Territory Police, Fire and Emergency Services. (2009, November 30). NT Police– More on Taser Review. [Media release]. https://www.pfes.nt.gov.au/newsroom/2009/ nt-­police-­more-­taser-­review New South Wales Ombudsman. (2012, October 23). How are Taser weapons used by the NSW Police force? A special report to Parliament under s. 31 of the Ombudsman Act 1974. https:// www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/6970/How-­are-­Taser-­weapons-­used-­by-­ NSW-­Police-­Force-­Special-­report-­to-­Parliament-­October-­2012-­.pdf Office of Police Integrity (Victoria). (2009). Review of the Use of Force by and against Victorian police. https://www.ibac.vic.gov.au/docs/default-­source/reviews/opi/review-­of-­the-­use-­of-­ force-­by-­and-­against-­victorian-­police%2D%2D-­july-­2009.pdf?sfvrsn=c4586175_8 Ombudsman (Northern Territory). (2017). Taser use and management of police conduct issues. https://www.ombudsman.nt.gov.au/sites/default/files/downloads/taser_use_and_management_ of_nt_police_conduct_issues.pdf Parliament of Australia. (2016). Report: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander experience of law enforcement and justice services. Commonwealth of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.

7  Reporting Police Use of Conducted Energy Weapons to the Public…

135

au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Finance_and_Public_Administration/ Legalassistanceservices/Report Police Service of Northern Ireland [PSNI]. (2020a). Statistics on police use of force. https://www. psni.police.uk/inside-­psni/Statistics/statistics-­on-­police-­use-­of-­force/ Police Service of Northern Ireland [PSNI]. (2020b). Use of force statistics: 1 April 2020 to 30 September 2020. https://www.psni.police.uk/globalassets/inside-­the-­psni/our-­statistics/ statistics-­o n-­p olice-­u se-­o f-­f orce/2020/september/use-­o f-­f orce-­1 -­a pr-­2 020%2D%2D-­3 0-­ sept-­2020-­official-­public.pdf Premier of Victoria. (2017). Regional police Taser rollout now complete. Media Release. 04/10/17. https://www.premier.vic.gov.au/regional-­police-­taser-­rollout-­now-­complete Queensland Police Service [QPS]. (2014). QPS violent confrontations review. https://www.police. qld.gov.au/sites/default/files/201812/QPS%20Violent%20Confrontations%20Review.pdf Ryan, E. (2012). Below the belt: Police use of conducted energy weapons in Australia [Doctoral dissertation, Monash University]. Bridges. https://bridges.monash.edu/articles/thesis/ Below_the_belt_police_use_of_conducted_energy_weapons_in_Australia/4664377/1 Shaw, D. (2015, October 23). Report to Rt Hon Theresa May M.P.: National Use of Force Data Review Project. National Police Chiefs Council. https://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/uniformed/2016/Use%20of%20Force%20Data%20Report%20to%20Home%20Sec.pdf Turner, R. (2019). WA Police taser data reveals the locations where tasers are used most in the state. ABC News. 23 October 19. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-­10-­23/ wa-­police-­taser-­data-­obtained-­under-­foi-­reveals-­state-­hotspots/11627806 Tyler, T. R. (2003). Procedural justice, legitimacy, and the effective rule of law. Crime and Justice, 30, 283–357. United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990). https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/useofforceandfirearms.aspx United Nations Committee Against Torture (53rd sess.: Geneva). (2014, December 23). Concluding observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of Australia. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/790514?ln=en United Nations Committee Against Torture (59th sess.:Geneva). (2017, January 9). List of issues prior to submission of the 6th periodic report of Australia: Committee against Torture. https:// digitallibrary.un.org/record/857779?ln=en Western Australia Police. (2010). Post implementation Taser review. Corporate Executive Team, May 2010. Zimring, F. E. (2017). When police kill. Harvard University Press. Dr. Emma Ryan  conducts research on police use of less-lethal weapons and police accountability for use of excessive force more broadly. She has worked in state-­based anti-corruption bodies in Victoria, Australia, and published book chapters on various aspects of criminological theory and the importance of accurate, detailed, and publicly accessible use of force data for maintaining police legitimacy. Emma has taught in the discipline of criminology for over 20 years in several leading Australian Universities and is currently the course director of the Bachelor of Criminology program at Deakin University. Emma is currently involved in a project aiming to map Taser use in Australia via unofficial sources considering the current paucity of available official data. Emma’s most recent publications have focused on decolonizing criminology and policing in the pandemic. Dr. Laura Bedford  is Lecturer in Criminology at Deakin University. Laura is a highly skilled, qualitative, and quantitative researcher. Laura has a PhD in criminology awarded by the University of Queensland. Her thesis, Randomised Controlled Trials in Policing: An Organisational Learning Perspective, focused on the challenge of translating rigorous criminological research into evidence-based policy and practice in police organizations. She has led and contributed to a range of collaborative research projects and programs of research and written numerous research reports and scholarly papers. She worked as an embedded criminologist at the Queensland Police Service

136

E. Ryan and L. Bedford

(QPS), where she was the lead researcher on a 2-year randomized controlled field evaluation of the role and impact of frontline mobile technology. She has also contributed to a number of systematic reviews related to interpersonal violent crime, the predictors of youth gang membership, and the prevention of youth gang violence in low- to middle-income countries.

Part IV

Policing Protests, Demonstrations and Mass Violence

Chapter 8

Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses Alan Beckley

Introduction In the years of 2020 and 2021, hosting the spectre of the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, the subject of police and protestors is of great interest, as the ‘right to protest’ is colloquially thought to be every citizen’s right in countries with liberal democracy government. Legally and factually, this common belief is not the case as this chapter explains. However, despite the complexity of this area of the law and its differences across states, let alone nations, the police are expected to understand and enforce the law effectively and fairly. Generally, the police are expected by members of the public to take some sort of action to ensure the safety and security of protestors and the rest of the community. However, it appears that Police Commissioners and Chief Constables do have some discretion over whether to act, forbid or allow protests to take place without a police presence. For example, in 1981, the Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall refused to instruct his officers to remove protestors trespassing on land owned by the Central Electricity Generating Board1 on the grounds that he had no power to interfere with a civil law matter and there was no ‘breach of the peace’. The Court of Appeal in England found that the Chief Constable did have discretion as to whether to deploy his officers and ‘police constables are no one’s lackeys’ (Walters, 1982: 121). The chapter will commence with an examination of the law in Australia (focusing on New South Wales) and the UK to identify some differences and then it will go on to discuss some police tactics and developments in recent years to cope with

 R v. The Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall ex parte The Central Electricity Generating Board. [1981] 3 All ER 826. 1

A. Beckley (*) University of Technology in Sydney, Branxton, NSW, Australia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_8

139

140

A. Beckley

public protests. Public activism has become increasingly complex in recent years, and it is now necessary to consider the immediate availability of social media and new technology when dealing with public order incidents. It is important to recognise changes in society and public order have been identified as a major issue by an influential wide-ranging independent strategic review of policing in England and Wales which found that over the next 20 years: • • • •

Social tension and public order will be more challenging Hate crime will be more likely Online disputes may result in conflict in public Militant climate activism will be more common, and the public will be sympathetic (Munro, 2020)

These factors lead to the conclusion that public order policing needs a radical overhaul and re-thinking of the tactics used by police and certainly 2020 and 2021 have changed the landscape fundamentally to the approach adopted by police commanders.

Public Order Law in Australia The reason that in Australia, this chapter will focus on the law in New South Wales (NSW) is that all states and territories in Australia have different laws and different versions of rights-based laws. Most states in Australia, except for the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Victoria, do not have specific human rights legislation in their domestic statute book (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2014a). In fact, there was a national human rights consultation in Australia in 2008 which resulted in a national human rights action plan (AG, 2012). The committee was chaired by Father Frank Brennan who said: ‘The clearest finding from our work is that Australians know little about their human rights – what they are, where they come from and how they are protected’ (Brennan, 2009). Father Brennan’s comment was corroborated when the author completed a structured on-line interview which found a low level of knowledge of NSW police officers about human rights and of general knowledge about the Australian Constitution. Police officers in aggregate scored 41.2% correct answers out of the nine questions with 22.5% ‘don’t know’ answers (Beckley, 2014). However, all states are accorded protection by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Relevant provisions of the 1948 Declaration are: Article 18, Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; Article 19, Freedom of opinion and expression; Article 20 (1), Freedom of peaceful assembly and association. Also, Australia ratified the more specific International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): Article 18, Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; Article 19, Freedom of opinion and expression; Article 21: the right of peaceful

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

141

assembly shall be recognised. A case heard in the Australian courts2 found that the international instruments are not fully integrated into Australian law; therefore, do not afford actionable rights, but the courts do operate in a climate to respect general principles of human rights (Gans et al., 2011: 19). It is important for readers to note that all the international treaties include a caveat that public assemblies must be ‘peaceful’, and they are subject to the interests of national security or public safety and the protection of public health. This point has become important when examining the situation during a pandemic such as the COVID-19 pandemic. NSW has hosted many public protests and riots, some examples being: Cronulla Riot (2005); the G20 Protest (2006); Macquarie Fields (2005) and Redfern (2004) Riots. Royal Commissions of Inquiry were held into these events (Beckley, 2013b). Subsequently police powers were extended to deal with potential public order incidents for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) conference in Sydney, in 2007; powers that were criticised as having a ‘significant lack of transparency and accountability’ (Snell, 2008: 1). In fact, the right to public assembly is recognised in Common Law in NSW which can be traced back to The Magna Carta in England in the year 1215 (Jarett & Mund, 1931) and was recognised in legislation in the year 1411 by King Henry IV (Gotsis, 2015). The scope of this common law right is that the meeting must assemble peacefully and be conducted without violence. The right has been recognised by the High Court of Australia and the NSW Supreme Court, but there is a statutory scheme relating to public assemblies in NSW under the Summary Offences Act 1988. This Act does not grant a statutory right to public assembly, nor does it abolish the common law right. Under section 23 of the Act, organisers of protests should inform the Commissioner of Police details of the proposed location and route of the protest, the number of people expected to be present and its duration. If the police do not object to the protest, it is designated as an ‘authorised public assembly’ and participants have extra legal safeguards as they will not be guilty of attending an unlawful assembly or committing wilful obstruction. Protest organisers can hold a protest without notifying the Commissioner of Police and it will not automatically be deemed an unlawful assembly except where the protest threatens or becomes violent; it is then an offence under section 545C of the Crimes Act 1900. The Commissioner of Police can object to the public assembly and using a procedure, can apply to the courts for a prohibition order; these applications have been challenged many times. In addition, although the Australian Constitution has no Bill of Rights (PEO, 2010), according to political activists (Gregoire & Nedim, 2019), there is an implied right to freedom of political expression in the Australian Constitution which should be considered alongside the apparent right to public assembly discussed above.

 Walker v. Baird [1882] AC491: 18–21, 34.

2

142

A. Beckley

Public Order Offences in NSW The most usual public order offences are similar around the states of Australia to those in the UK and they can be listed as: Breach of the Peace (Common Law); obstruction, violent disorder, offensive conduct, offensive language, (Summary Offences Act 1988); ‘move on’ powers, disperse groups, establish roadblocks, search vehicles, (Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (LEPRA), Part 6A); Affray, riot, unlawful assembly, assault during public disorder, assault on police, destroying or damaging property, intimidation or annoyance by violence or otherwise (hindering), (Crimes Act 1900). There are also offences such as interfering with a mine and trespassing on agricultural land (Ricketts, 2017).

Public Order Law in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland3 The main difference to the law in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland to that in Australia, is the Human Rights Act 1998 (the Act) which affords citizens fundamental rights in many areas of community life (Beckley, 2000). The aspects of this rights-based law relevant to this chapter are: Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 9); Freedom of expression (Article 10); and Freedom of assembly (Article 11), which are taken from the European Convention of Human Rights4 and adopted by the Act. Article 11 then gives a presumption that citizens have the right (although designated as a ‘qualified right’) to attend a public assembly such as a protest march. Indeed, there should be no interference by a ‘public authority’ (such as the police) unless it is in accordance with the law or necessary in a democratic society. Article 11 is frequently combined with the rights afforded with Articles 9 and 10. If the police decide to try to ban a protest march, they must justify the infringement of citizens’ rights by using the principle of ‘proportionality’5 and citing a ‘legitimate aim’ (of which they have evidence) from: national security; public safety; prevention of disorder or crime; protection of health or morals; protection of the rights and freedoms of other citizens. The right to protest, like that in Australia, only extends to peaceful assembly, but the right has been recognised by the European Court of Human Rights6 as a right fundamental to democratic society. In relation to freedom of speech and especially religion, there have been numerous cases decided by the courts as to what constitutes an offence; such cases include widely divergent views (Hedges, 2017).

 The criminal law in Scotland is slightly different to that in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950. 5  ‘Proportionality’ meaning: Proportionality requires public authorities to take only such measures that are strictly necessary to achieve the required objective (Beckley, 2000:47). 6  Adali v. Turkey App 38,187/97 judgement of 31 March 2005. 3 4

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

143

 ublic Order Offences7 in England, Wales, P and Northern Ireland Guidance to police forces is governed by six core principles of: policing style and tone; communication; national decision model; command; proportionate response; capacity and capability, and the command considerations (College of Policing, 2013a). Statutory powers and duties of the police in public order incidents are first governed by the Human Rights Act 1998 (above); the common law powers to deal with Breaches of the Peace; and the following Acts: Public Order Act 1986 (POA), Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJ&POA), Criminal Law Act 1967 (CLA), Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), (College of Policing, 2012). Public order offences most commonly used under the POA include: Causing fear or provocation of violence (s.4); Intentional harassment, alarm or distress (s.4A); Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour (s.5); Affray (s.3); Violent disorder (s.2); and Riot (s.1). There are sections of the POA relating to advance notice of public processions, imposing conditions on public processions and public assemblies and prohibiting trespassory assemblies. There are separate offences and legislation dealing with picketing, trespassing, road traffic (wilful obstruction), and other less common situations.

COVID-19: A 2021 Public Assembly Game-Changer? As this is written in the year 2021, globally, normal life has been changed fundamentally by the spectre of the deep-rooted and pervasive COVID-19 pandemic, which has affected all aspects of modern-day living both in the social sphere and the economy. Specifically relevant to this chapter, public precautions and regulations to lessen or mitigate the effects of COVID-19 such as ‘social distancing’ and urban ‘lock-downs’8 have affected the fundamental rights of citizens in liberal democracies to hold public assemblies. During this tightened regime, regulations have been imposed, relaxed, and re-imposed causing great confusion and angst while police in New South Wales have challenged the right to hold protests in the high court and supreme court on public health grounds, not always with success. Add to this, recent tragic events in the USA whereby individual Black African Americans have been killed in the course of policing operations and the subsequent protest meetings have been curtailed by government-imposed conditions – for example ‘safer at home’ (Garcetti, 2020)  – using public health or safety as justification. The Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests have been prevalent in the USA and Australia in support of protests about Indigenous people who died in custody, although the BLM social  Current UK legislation may be accessed via: www.legislation.gov.uk  For example: New South Wales Government Public Health (COVID-19 Restrictions on Gathering and Movement) Order (No. 4) 2020.

7 8

144

A. Beckley

movements have been in existence for several years9 and can be traced back to systematic racism over generations (Goode & Nicolazzo, 2016). As mentioned in the sections above, although citizens may have a right to protest and attend a public assembly, this is subject to police and court controls for reasons of: ‘prevention of disorder or crime’, and/or ‘protection of health or morals’ – i.e. prevention of the spread of COVID-19. Indeed, some research in the USA suggested that in areas which hosted BLM protests showed ‘an uptick’ in COVID-19 infections (Fasehun, 2020) and, for the sake of the whole community, everyone should comply with personal protective equipment (PPE) measures (Ralston, 2020). Conversely, the director of a health institute in the USA suggested that, if precautions such as wearing a face mask were taken, ‘the number of people infected is likely to be lower than you think’ while attending BLM protests; notwithstanding, the Black community faced the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic in mortality rates and economic impacts (Jha, 2020). In response to a statement by the Public Health Association of Australia that said: ‘peaceful protest is safe at this time’, seven legal and human rights group condemned the approach of several Australian state governments that had curtailed the people’s ‘right to protest’ during proposed BLM protests (Keeling, 2020). Also, people in many countries have protested about lock-down regulations that have been imposed by state government to try to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in specific locations. For example, ‘Freedom Day’ demonstrations occurred in September 2020 in Sydney which resulted in arrests and fines while on the same day there were protests in every capital city and several regional areas of Australia. The state of Victoria in Australia reportedly came down hard on people even planning protests by the use of the charge of ‘incitement’ (Crimes Act, Victoria) following an anti-lockdown gathering and arresting people for incitement for planning protests, thereby criminalising an ostensibly lawful activity. In October 2020, press reports alleged that transgender rights protesters were set to defy a court order banning a rally in the centre of Sydney after NSW police successfully obtained an order prohibiting the protest by claiming that the COVID-19 pandemic presented a risk to public health if the protest was allowed to go ahead. In fact, one woman was charged with assaulting police and 11 others were fined for attending the banned rally. A journalist from the Sydney Morning Herald said: ‘The freedom to protest should be one of the last things we give up and, coming out of lockdown, it must be one of the very first things we take back’ (Fitzsimmons, 2020, October 22: 29). During September 2020, press reports said that at least 15,000 protestors went to Trafalgar Square in London to protest against coronavirus measures in England. Also, there were a number of protests about ‘stay at home’ orders in several states in the US; protestors claiming their ‘second Amendment Rights’10 to bear arms at public assemblies where there was a low police presence. Press reports queried that

 See: http://blacklivesmatter.com  Second Amendment to the US Constitution: ‘A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed’. 9

10

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

145

it appeared protests against ‘stay at home’ orders were lawful, including the open display of firearms, whereas the Black Lives Matter protests were unlawful for not obeying the curfew (Chun, 2020). Indeed, it appears that in the USA, public protests have ‘become armed events, with protestors and counter-protestors carrying firearms’ (Zick, 2018: 223). Also, the press reported COVID-19 infections resulted from attending political rallies, supported by US President Trump, protesting against lockdowns. Although organisations such as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute suggested that enforcing COVID-19 restrictions could erode public trust in police, research indicated that trust in the police was not necessarily reduced as shown in Fig. 8.1 (Coyne, 2020). Furthermore, research indicates that, far from quelling dissension and protest, the years 2019 to 2020 actually promoted freedom of speech despite it being transmitted in different ways to those hitherto. Pleyers (2020: 8) said the evidence indicated: ‘… popular education and awareness-raising is perhaps the most potent role of movements as the pandemic is combined with an “infodemic,” a spread of false information, fake news and conspiracy theories’. For example, the press in Australia spotted that, although there were deaths from coronavirus, deaths from influenza were actually down in 2020. According to medical experts, this was because of lockdowns, border closures, and social distancing, which was described as: ‘A very convenient explanation for the ABC’s rabid health conformism and Covid mania and perpetuating myths’ (Collits, 2020). The article went on to list the many government bungles of different approaches towards mitigating the effects on both health and economics of the COVID-19 pandemic, thereby perpetuating the mythmaking. However, ‘a closer look at less visible activities developed by social movements

72% 70% 68% 66% 64% 62% 60% 58%

Sep-16

Oct-17

Sep-18

Federal police

Mar-19

Apr-20

State police

Fig. 8.1  Trust in Federal and State Police (Australia). (Chart data source: Essential Research retrieved from: https://essentialvision.com.au/trust-­in-­institutions-­13)

146

A. Beckley

shows that movements for social justice adapted to unexpected circumstances and were actually highly active in this challenging period’ (Pleyers, 2020: 13). In addition, authoritative police sources were warning that banning legitimate public protest and targeting campaign groups as ‘domestic extremists’ is dangerous and unsustainable and indeed: ‘[the] quickest way to create protests is to ban it’ (West, 2020a). The pandemic forced people to examine inequalities and question unfairness in the economic system, re-setting their world view and predicting a better future. Therefore, despite the infringements and impositions of governments trying to battle with an unprecedented societal menace, the long-term objective of progressive movements in the community was achieved; forcing political regimes to impose their regulations with empathy and making the global economy fairer to all members of society.

Managing Crowds and Psychology of Crowds Things have moved on considerably since police training late in the twentieth century in England rejected public order techniques based on fallacious crowd psychology theories such as those of Gustave Le Bon (1895) which interpreted three crowd factors: submergence, contagion, and suggestibility (Stott, 2009). These theories posited that individual members of a group are subsumed into the group mind and adopt emotionally charged behaviour of recklessness. Researchers have also found that it is good practice for police public order commanders to understand the reasons or rationale of the protestors who consider their approach ‘virtuous’ (Morell & Brammer, 2014) and that protest will influence decision makers to change public policy (Battaglini, 2016). Hoggett and Stott (2010a) examined police public order training and found that there was a lack of focus on modern crowd theory which meant that police commanders could not understand why crowds were reacting in certain ways in dynamic situations. The review also found that public order training in England and Wales did not reflect either the Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland (ACPO) Manual of Guidance11 or the EU Handbook.12 Researchers subsequently found that use of force on crowd behaviour was mostly counter-productive and that a more interactive approach between police officers and the crowd was more effective (Beckley, 2011; Drury et al., 2003). As a result, Clifford Stott (2009) was commissioned to re-write the ACPO guidelines on crowd behaviour and crowd management guidelines in the ‘Keeping the Peace’ section of police training. Research in the UK and the USA formulated the theory of ‘Elaborated Social identity Model’ (ESIM) or knowledge-based public order policing (Hoggett & Stott, 2010b; Madensen & Knuttson, 2011; Reicher et al., 2007).  Association of Chief Police Officers. (2003). Manual of Guidance for Keeping the Peace, London: Association of Chief Police Officers. 12  Better known as: Measures to Prevent and Control Violence and Disturbances in Connection with Football Matches with an International Dimension (2006). 11

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

147

The ESIM model was successfully used in the 2004 European Football Championship in Portugal with a policing good practice statement emphasising the importance of the legitimacy of the crowd’s relationship with the police, leading towards ‘self-­ policing’ of the crowd (Hoggett & Stott, 2010a). Other methods of ‘crowd watching’ or systematic observations were developed to recognise early warning of likely flashpoints and identify troublemakers within the crowd during three phases: convergence, task, and divergence and to better understand crowd psychology (Adang, 2018). Another technique of benefit to both police and protestors is that of ‘independent legal observers’ (ILOs) who were used to good effect at the 2014 G20 conference at Brisbane. The ILOs were all qualified lawyers who recorded interactions between police and members of the public with the objective of maintaining peaceful relations in public places; this was called a ‘negotiated management’ approach which resulted in few arrests and praise of the policing by lawyers and the general community (Walsh, 2016). Other researchers were observing the G20 summit at Brisbane and noted the internal flows of data, information, and intelligence in public order policing which they called ‘flow-­ based’ architectures; all this information added to the base of knowledge of evidence-­based policing upon which to advise future policing operations (Whelan & Molnar, 2019). Certainly, police commanders need to undertake a detailed assessment of crowds taking into account such factors as time of day, type of day, aggression level, season, setting, weaponry available, media, crowd organisation, attitude to authority, political motivation, crowd cohesion, crowd size, possibility of negotiation, and other features such as religious and/or gender/personal factors (Flower, 2002). How these new theories of crowd psychology translated into on-the-ground operational policing becomes clear through a discussion on police training and policing tactics in the sections that follow.

Police Training Police training, in most countries with liberal democratic principles, is under-pinned by police ethics and human rights which emphasise that where coercive force is used by police it must proportionate and necessary in a democratic society; this is a fundamental requirement of the workforce (ANZPAA, 2019). All public order police training must reflect these principles (Beckley, 2017). Understanding crowd psychology is also imperative for police commanders in both the public order situation and managing football and sporting crowds (see the chapter in this book entitled: Soccer-related violence; the response in Australia and the UK by this author). Stott (2009) quoted the pre-read material for the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) 2006 police Public Order Commanders Course as defining a crowd as: ‘a crowd is a device for indulging ourselves in a kind of temporary insanity by all going crazy together’. There had been an emphasis on segregation, control and enforcement of football fans and the rival factions, but it was found to be

148

A. Beckley

non-effective and non-productive. The ‘command and control’ function the police adopted, although relevant to a disaster or major incident scenario, did not work effectively as it exacerbated the behaviour of crowds into higher levels of disorder and violence. In the UK, all police officers are trained in the basics of public order techniques (Common Minimum Standards) and once trained, they can participate in ‘mutual aid’ to other police divisions or forces and be a part of a Police Support Unit (PSU) that is a standard number of police officers with a regulation supervisory level. PSUs will be added until supervisors and senior police managers decide they have the number of police officers required to effectively deal with a given incident. There are also courses for Tactical Advisors and Public Order Commanders (Bronze commanders). In the UK, most incidents are managed by the police in a common approach: Gold – strategic command; Silver – tactical command; Bronze – operational command. Public order training is located in the classroom for law-­ based and incident-based training and on specially designed safe areas in which to practice techniques and get used to wearing personal protective equipment. Incident-­ based training is in the form of role plays when the police officers perform specific roles in a public order scenario which is played out with paper feeds or managed using computer-based training such as the Hydra or Minerva systems. This type of training is common in the UK and Australia with the practical aspects being carried out in PSU cohorts to simulate real public order incidents. Like the UK, there is a competency framework in Australia with training packages for managing incidents and public safety.13 There is also training for evidence gathering operatives who often have a ‘minder’ to ensure their safety and security. Public order training emphasises that police officers need to be aware that they are on public display and ensure they comply with professional and ethical behaviour norms as in recent years there will be many cameras and mobile phones at the incident with immediate access to social media. Although many police officers wear body worn cameras currently, it is a command decision whether to utilise those depending on the circumstances of the incident and the safety and security of police officers (Beckley, 2019b). Finally, police training for public order incidents and sporting events should take account of developments in society such as: A more litigious society; higher expectations of professional standards; expectations of enhanced management expertise; greater public freedom yet improved public safety; expectations of a multi-­ disciplinary approach with greater collaboration between public and private sector; greater emphasis on licensing or conversely de-regulation (Beckley, 1997). Police officers need to be aware of their legal, ethical, and practical limitations and that their actions will be judged by the court of public opinion, and the different phases of the legal system: criminal courts, coroners courts, civil courts, public inquiries, and police disciplinary enquiries (Beckley, 2013a).

 There is a competency framework for managing incidents in Australia. See: Commonwealth of Australia 2007. PUA00 Public Safety Training Package Version 6. Training in Australia (PUAPOL025B – Manage Incident Scenes). 13

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

149

Police Tactics in Public Disorder Incidents Following criticism of use of police powers, policing tactics, and training, a review of protest policing was carried out by Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary in 2009 which incorporated many of the issues discussed above and was entitled Adapting to Protest (HMIC, 2009). According to an authoritative police practitioner, former Chief Superintendent Owen West, Adapting to Protest has ‘stood the test of time’, but following the Black Lives Matter (BLM) and Extinction Rebellion (XR) protests in England, HMIC is currently undertaking another review (West, 2020b). Subsequently, based on HMIC findings, police tactics in public order incidents in England are clearly set out in the core principles and legislation according to public order (College of Policing, 2013a). As was previously explained the six core principles should be read in conjunction with command and command considerations (gold, silver, bronze) and are: Policing style and tone; communication; National Decision Model (NDM); command; proportionate response; capacity and capability. Space limits the amount of detail that can be given to the six core principles, and many police forces (including those in Australia) have similar standard operating procedures (SOPs). However, the NDM is usually depicted in a self-­ explanatory diagram which is centralised on the UK police Code of Ethics (Fig. 8.2).

Fig. 8.2  UK Police National Decision Model (NDM). (Source: College of Policing, 2013b)

150

A. Beckley

The UK police code of ethics originate from the principles of public life document (Standards in Public Life, 199514) and cover the attributes of: accountability; fairness; honesty; integrity; leadership; objectivity; openness; respect; selflessness (Beckley, 2019a; Neyroud & Beckley, 2001a). Also, emanating from the authoritative House of Lords/House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Tenth Report of Session 2010–2011 is entitled Facilitating Peaceful Protest (JCHR, 2011); a complex decision-making tree, which covers ‘all of the above’, is available (with the same title) to police commanders for managing public assemblies and public processions on that peaceful basis. Despite all the guidance, all police public order commanders will tell you, because of dynamic factors and fast-changing circumstances in public order incidents, many legal, moral, and ethical dilemmas will occur while policing these incidents, all of which will be harshly judged after the event in the cold light of day with the 100% accuracy of 20/20 hindsight (Beckley, 1997; Morgan, 2018). A fundamental factor in policing public assemblies is the use of evidence-based policing to correctly inform police decision making; that is police practice should be based on scientific evidence of what works best (Hoggett & Stott, 2012: 175b). Evidence-based policing of this type can only be achieved by undertaking the research and study of empirical evidence, in an operational policing setting, which will allow positive changes to public order policing (Martin & Graham, 2016). This chapter will examine some of the scientific evidence around the tactics of policing protests, but research is still in an early stage and many situations incorporate factors that are dynamic or unusual. However, the consensus is that policing crowd events in democratic countries has moved away from reliance on overt use of force. Notwithstanding this change of approach, one of the lawful options for police commanders to consider is the use of coercive force to maintain the peace, safety, and security of the community. This gives many tactical options for the police to deploy, ranging from lethal force to less-than-lethal force and minimal force or acquiescence to the wishes of protestors. A list of possible use of force options (in order of the continuum of force) could be: Firearms, firearm-propelled bean bags/ rubber bullets, water cannon, ‘CS’15/pepper spray, CS gas canisters, police batons. As proportionality remains a consideration for the use of force, firearms are never justified against peaceful protestors and rarely justified in violent protestors, although there have been some examples of their use. The other use of force options have been used frequently in liberal democracies, except water cannon have been used sparingly in Australia and the UK. In fact, in 2011, a newspaper report suggested that the $700,000 spent on the water cannon by police in New South Wales was a waste of money as it had not been used in public in four years. Subsequently, in 2018 police use of force was questioned when the water cannon was deployed by 14  See: Chapman, R.A. (1995). The first Nolan Report on Standards in Public Life. Teaching Public Administration. Autumn 1995. Vol. XV, No. 2. 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1177/014473949501500201 15  CS spray  =  a gas causing tears, salivation, and painful breathing, used in civil disturbances; ortho-chlorobenzal malononitrile. Formula: C6H4ClCH:C(CN)2, AKA: C20: from the surname initials of its US inventors, Ben Carson and Roger Staughton

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

151

‘riot police’ in Sydney to protestors who refused to disperse when asked. The use of water cannon to quell public assemblies in liberal democracies appears to be a step too far in terms of the level of force police are authorised to use. For example, in the UK, when Boris Johnson was Mayor of London, he purchased three water cannons for such use, but, after the then Home Secretary, Theresa May banned their use in the UK, the machines were eventually scrapped with a net loss of 300,000 GBP. Another politically contentious tactic that police use to keep the peace is that of ‘kettling’.

‘Kettling’ During the early part of this century,16 police devised a tactic used to contain protestors and marchers to stop them meeting up with other crowds or opposing groups (James & Pearson, 2015); this was called ‘kettling’ and was mentioned in the authoritative document Facilitating Peaceful Protest (JCHR, 2011) that it ought to be used sparingly and with empathy. Kettling was defined by the Oxford Dictionary as: ‘Confinement by police of a group of demonstrators or protesters in a small area, as a method of crowd control’ and was utilised at the G20 summit conference in London in 2009 where it was found to be unlawful for several reasons by the High Court; damages were awarded and paid by the Metropolitan Police Service to protesters. However, the use of kettling had been challenged in 200917 through to the European Court of Human Rights18 and in that case, the containment of peaceful demonstrators within a police cordon for over seven hours was found, in the 2012 judgment, to be no violation of Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights (Right to Liberty and Security). This was because, the European Court said, the police cordon was to safeguard the crowd in dangerous and volatile conditions and the tactic was the least intrusive and most effective means of averting real risk of serious injury or damage. Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary called on police in the UK (HMIC, 2009) to adopt a more permissive approach towards political protests, thereby facilitating the right to protest (Waddington, 2011). In summary, the tactic of kettling is considered a lawful tactic within the police public order commander’s options, provided it is done within the law, and it was successfully implemented at anti-racist protests in Glasgow as recently as June 2020, but politicians questioned the police use of the process.

 Kettling was reportedly first used by police as a tactic against protesters in the anti-globalisation protests in 2001, Oxford Street, London (Dodd, 2011). 17  Austin v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] 1 A.C. 564, Austin (2012) 55 EHRR 14. 18  Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC] – 3962/09, 40,713/09 and 41,008/09. Judgment 15.3.2012 [GC]. 16

152

A. Beckley

Preparation and Planning Police should always be prepared to deal with incidents that happen where they have prior notice such as the public assemblies of which they have been notified. They also should be agile to respond to spontaneous or non-disclosed events by use of certain tactics and ‘local knowledge’ of vulnerable or usual locations of incidents and ‘the usual suspects’. Therefore, the police need to prepare and plan for foreseeable incidents of public disorder using well-known processes, practices and procedures known as contingency planning (Beckley, 2007). The police also need to incorporate contingencies into their planning to take account of unforeseen or non-­ disclosed actions that could occur organised by protesters who try to keep their objectives secret. Police are advised of possible incidents of public disorder through gathering criminal intelligence via their own systems or those of multi-agency partnerships (Beckley, 2013c). Intelligence may also be gathered through the use of ‘informants’ or covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) and police officers who work as undercover agents in subversive groups (Neyroud & Beckley, 2001b). While policing incidents of public disorder or protest, police have tried to use a tactic of dialogue and communication with protestors with some success and some failures (Baker, 2019). In the UK, following the death of a protestor at the London G20 conference (2009), many reforms were proposed to make policing of public order incidents more compliant with human rights law, not least the requirement for making police officers identifiable in such incidents (Ruiz, 2017). One of the main techniques was to use Protest Liaison Officers (PLO) or Protest Liaison Teams (PLT) or Police Liaison Teams who are trained to build links between police and protestors through facilitating dialogue and trust relationships (Stott et al., 2013). In 2011, riots swept across many major cities in the UK and police were criticised for their approach which was deemed to be ‘too soft’. Also, in 2011, the Liberal Democrat (political) conference was held in Sheffield and researchers examined the effectiveness of PLTs policing protestors and found that: ‘… dialogue and liaison were effective because they allowed for an ongoing dynamic risk assessment that improved command-level decision making and enhanced police proportionality’ (Gorringe et al., 2012: 111). Although, when researchers examined the use of such PLT tactics on protestors and ‘anti-fracking’ protest at Salford, Greater Manchester in 2013–2014, they found that police only used them to justify the use of force when they came to the conclusion from the work of the PLT that protestors were irrational and uncooperative (Gilmore et al., 2019). The advice of one senior and very experienced police commander in the Metropolitan Police Service (London) was to use the following guide: • • • • • •

Use dialogue as a tactic Operate from within the crowd Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) Enhance compliance with Articles 9, 10, 11 Reduce the necessity to revert to the use of force ‘Sensing’ (the feelings of the police officers present) (Morgan, 2018: 8)

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

153

Police agencies, subject to their ‘duty of care’ (Beckley, 1997), should also prepare for public order incidents through procuring sufficient good quality personal protective equipment (PPE) for police officers who may otherwise sustain serious injuries as a result of their duties. Regular duty police officers placed on the front line of public disorder incidents, also need to be backed up by other police resources such as dog-handlers, mounted branch, police helicopters, and drones where they are available and appropriately deployed. Drones are a comparatively recent innovation in their use at public order events which according to Sandvik: ‘… through both surveillance and its visible presence—not only maintains order but carries the promise of increased order and improved forms of order …’ (Sandvik, 2017: 2). Police should also be working with appropriate partners in the planning and execution of public order incidents such as ambulance service, hospitals, fire and rescue, transport departments, roads authorities and public authorities. Policies should be agreed on media releases and good use of the media to advise members of the public on possible danger and traffic congestion. Tactical decisions to deploy police officers, and in what type of uniform and equipment, is a crucial decision in terms of acceptance by the public and the media; there should be good reasoning behind decisions to escalate police operations. At all times, the peace and tranquillity of society and the return to normality is the overall objective along with the safety of citizens and police officers and the minimum of disruption, cost and damage to facilities and the community. Police commanders must decide the time to deploy officers in specific locations and consider the location and physical attributes of the terrain. Tightly packed streets are an easy location to predict, but police might decide to leave an ‘escape route’ for people to ease them away from danger or other massed crowds. The decision to deploy police officers in full ‘riot gear’ or full PPE may mean that protesters use force against them by throwing missiles, rocks, or petrol bombs at a static line of police officers holding interlocking long shields. Police commanders might also consider using more mobile ‘snatch squads’ of police, carrying lighter protective gear, to arrest protest ringleaders and/or offenders or break crowds into smaller groups. As is normal in the management of critical incidents, a decision log is essential and should be entered contemporaneously showing the time and decision along with the name of the decision-maker. This information could be vital evidence in any subsequent enquiry into police operations (Beckley, 1997).

Tactics Police Should Not Use Earlier in this chapter, the use of crowd psychology as a policing tactic was discussed and one of the main findings of research was that the use of force against protest crowds and football crowds was counter-productive and indeed resulted in provocation and escalation of violence rather than the pacification of violence (Madensen & Knutsson, 2011: 4). Police should be careful not to use excessive force on persons attending public assemblies, especially where their agency has a

154

A. Beckley

reputation and/or history for this in complaints against police (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2014a, b). Coupled with the use of excessive force, there has been a tendency over the last decades for police forces to turn towards ‘militarisation’ or a militaristic approach or using military weapons, clothing, and equipment (Beckley, 2014). This is a reference to the adoption by the police of military style weapons which might be necessary in a proportionate response to criminals who use such weapons but not the general public or the community (USA excepted). Also, some democratic countries (such as France) have military or quasi-military police squads to deal with public disorder incidents but in other countries, the spectre of the aggressive appearance of heavily armed police officers may add to the fear of crime in the general public (Silverman & Della-Giustina, 2001). Even in Sydney, New South Wales, the police have been accused of a ‘shift towards paramilitary policing’ with the Public Order and Riot Squad (White, 2017: 112). The over-militarisation of the police in community protest situations was illustrated earlier in the last decade at Ferguson, Missouri, USA when there were public protests following the police shooting of unarmed Black teenager Michael Brown (18  years). The militarisation of police was found to be socially and politically unacceptable to the community and indeed, caused long-running rioting in the streets (Sheptycki, 2013). Research following the shooting of Michael Brown found that trust in the police was slightly higher in the category of ‘other race’ but was significantly lowered after the incident among African American residents in the local area of St. Louis County (Kochel, 2015). When researchers interviewed older residents, they identified a breakdown in intergenerational communications and suggested enhanced dialogue could ease on-going community development (Morrow-Howell et al., 2017). In all countries, militarisation of police can happen incrementally over time due to increasingly draconian legislation to curtail offences such as terrorism but should be guarded against in democratic societies as it can affect the legitimacy of police (Marat, 2014; McCulloch, 2000). This shift of emphasis away from militarisation of police and use of force to deal with public protests is strongly recommended in a recently published document: Policing Protests to Protect Constitutional Rights and Public Safety, which will form part of the conclusions of this chapter (The Policing Project, 2020).

Legitimacy of Police The legitimacy of police is a key concept in understanding the use of coercive power by police officers in a public protest or public assembly incident (Beckley, 2019a). Legitimacy, in a policing context is defined as: ‘… the rightful exercise of authority or the rightful use of power’ (Newburn & Neyroud, 2008: 157). The ‘British policing model’ (Emsley, 2012), which is adopted in many liberal democracies including Australia, is based on the nine principles of policing which commenced in the London Metropolitan Police Service in 1829; the second principle stated that police legitimacy depended on public approval (Reith, 1956, Appendix 1). Residents’ views about the level of police legitimacy were recorded following the shooting of

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

155

Michael Brown in Ferguson and they mirrored the results for trust in the police in the description above about trust in police in St Louis County (Kochel, 2015: 9). Trust, confidence, and respect for the police is defined and described in criminological theories and relevant research as police legitimacy (Rochel, 2011). As with all responsible organisations, but especially law enforcement agencies, police legitimacy (Jackson & Gau, 2016; Tyler, 1989) and the respect of the public is something that police organisations should work towards continuously; although there will be many hurdles to overcome (Ferdik, 2016). Inevitably, police must execute coercive powers relating to use of force, arrest, search, and seizure in their investigation of crimes and offences against society; this will inevitably lead to criticism or less frequently, praise (McClelland, 2013). Ultimately, police operations must be held accountable to the public and to law in democratic societies (Bayley, 2006: 145); this concept is linked to the over-arching principle of policing by consent (Bronitt & Stenning, 2011). Trust and confidence in the police is linked to whether members of the public will willingly defer to police requests and instructions, a crucial factor when dealing with civil emergencies (Beckley, 2007), critical incidents (Beckley, 2011) and public disorder (Perry, 2020). The words trust and confidence are generally taken to mean the same thing and are used interchangeably (Jackson & Gau, 2016); however, trust in the police diminishes when the public hear about incidents of police misconduct, corruption or over-zealous use of police powers (AIC, 2007). Nevertheless, research has established that members of the public believe that some violence is acceptable and goes with police legitimacy (Jackson et al., 2013); and a study in the USA found that police use of force is supported by citizens if it is a reasonable level of force and not excessive force (Gerber & Jackson, 2016). Also, members of the public judge the actions of police rather than their words or press releases, therefore, policing operations need to be correct, legally justified, the minimum use of force possible, the least intrusive tactic and proportionate to the threat against society (Keane & Bell, 2013). Furthermore, research in England showed that members of the public think about their local police less in relation to risk of victimisation of crime, but more about social cohesion and neighbourhood stability; therefore, the public order role of police is paramount to the level of confidence that the public have in the police (Jackson & Bradford, 2009). Figure 8.3 shows a comparison of public confidence in the New South Wales criminal justice system between the police and the courts. However, Fig. 8.4 illustrates that American’s confidence in the police shows a significant lowering of the confidence in the police from 2018 to 2020. Principally, the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement has lowered confidence in the police in the USA; this could be a sign that it will happen in other liberal democracies. In fact, a detrimental effect of taking strong action against protesters was high-­ lighted in the USA, after BLM calls to defund the police and when two sheriff’s deputies were shot at a protest in Los Angeles; that these events, coupled with the issue of COVID-19 pandemic had made it much harder to recruit police officers. It should be noted that this was at a time of high unemployment due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In Australia, recruitment of police officers has not diminished, and the press has reported a high increase in young people applying to join the Armed Forces.

156

A. Beckley

Confidence in NSW police and courts, 2019 100 90

86

82

80 70 60

70 55

50

86 77

75

66 48

40

30

30 20 10 0

Bringing people to justice

Meeting needs of victims

Respecting rights of accused Police

Treats accused fairly

Deals with cases promptly

Courts

Fig. 8.3 Public confidence in the NSW criminal justice system. Update: 2019. (Source: BOCSAR – NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (Moore, 2020: 9))

Fig. 8.4  Line graph. Percentage of Americans who have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police since 1993. The latest reading of 48% is the lowest on record and down five points since 2019. (Source: Gallup Polls, USA (Brenan, 2020))

Protestor Tactics in Public Disorder Incidents Environmental activism includes diverse philosophies and inconsistencies, legal and illegal events, single events, and long-term campaigns, small- and large-scale protests, it is therefore difficult for the police to predict with accuracy how best to cope with such incidents. Added to this, from international incidents, more radical forms of protest have been witnessed targeting the resources and energy sector along with their operational sites, office headquarters, and, more importantly, critical infrastructure for energy supply and water supply. The issues related to public

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

157

protest and essential energy supply were discussed by a panel of experts and practitioners in Queensland that came up with a number of key issues that highlighted ‘wicked problems’ of dealing with such incidents (Fulcher, 2015). Although the current legal framework was available for trespass, public nuisance, and property damage, it was viewed as insufficient and unworkable by those seeking to enforce them. On the other hand, there was the view of Richard Griggs, Director of Civil Liberties Australia: ‘what is the value of free speech (and the right to assemble and protest) if it needs to be done in a way that is pre-approved and sanctioned by government?’ (Griggs, 2013). Techniques of the protestors were identified as being ‘more clandestine’ and using leaderless cell-like structures making it difficult, if not impossible, for police to identify the leaders of the protest to make arrests or deter unlawful behaviour. Also, this dispersed model can make use of social media or encrypted mobile phones for dynamic deployment of small groups of protesters to ensure the message of the protest is conveyed to the media while spreading the police resources thinly thereby rendering them less effective. Protesters in the UK rapidly found an antidote to ‘kettling’ (see earlier section) by use of a high-tech response: ‘Sukey’. Using technologically collated information from individual protesters, tweets, texts, and GPS positioning, the Sukey operators populate an online live map of the protest using data from smart phones. The Sukey operators then direct protesters away from likely kettling situations. The name Sukey is derived from a popular nursery rhyme ‘Polly put the kettle on’. Also, in more sophisticated protest or terrorist organisations and conspiracy theorists, the use of encrypted communications has become commonplace by using such programs as Telegram, Twitter substitutes Parler and Gab, and YouTube substitute, BitChute, to ensure messages are not easily accessed by police agencies. One of the tactics of climate emergency protests such as Extinction Rebellion (XR) is to protest by means of nonviolent civil disobedience but in such numbers to stretch police resources beyond their limit with their catch phrase: ‘Only rebellion will prevent an ecological apocalypse’ (Monbiot, 2019). Protests about climate change are becoming international such as the Global Mass Strike for Climate which took place in September 2019 in 150 countries. In addition, and especially during the COVID-19 lockdown periods, social and digital media has been heavily utilised by climate activists to good effect, achieving significant influence on young people and concerned citizens (Wilson, 2020). One very sensible tactic of protesters is to be briefed by legal experts before the event and ensure that all participants have the same information about their rights and possible criminal or civil law infractions that they should avoid. Potential protesters can also refer to books on how to successfully plan a protest using ‘spatial choreographies’ which advise on the best places to protest and how to move protestors deftly around cities in a ‘movement-based activity’ (Hatuka, 2018). The movement has been likened to a dance and is similar to the rapid spread of the effects of coronavirus (Kalabikhina & Panin, 2020). There is also advice on how protestors can win public support by broadcasting the heterogeneity of the protest by means of

158

A. Beckley

showing large numbers of diverse, worthy, united, numerous and committed participants (dWUNC) to attain or pursue social change (Wouters, 2019). One of the most prominent tactics of protesters is the ‘Occupy Movement’ which, according to Kinna et al. (2019), was used by over 1000 camps worldwide to protest global capitalism, corrupt local and global structures, and opposing the legacy of colonialism, patriarchy and class factions. This tactic is for protesters to converge on an iconic location, such as the first location Wall Street (OWS) New York in 2011 and then set up a camp which is fortified to make removal difficult and controversial. The location is important so that it attracts media attention, is an embarrassment to the local government and makes policing and removal of the protesters an extremely sensitive and difficult operation, even in the People’s Republic of China (Tiananmen Square Protests, 1989). This type of action has been described as ‘anarchy in our streets’ (Rippon, 1990); however, the experience of the Occupy camps in Australia were found to be highly democratic and well-organised with a ‘General Assembly’ making decisions based on consensus votes and teaching and learning about the relevant issues of the Occupy Movement. For example, the Occupy Melbourne event (October 2011) said its aims were: ‘We occupy, for peace, for equality, for our children’s future’ (Gonzalez et al., 2012: 7). Another thing to expect from this type of protest is that there will be reaction to the policing operations and local government legal actions/decision-making taken to remove the protest camp with revelations of legal and unlawful incidents involving authority figures and protesters, and there will be calls for independent enquiries and ‘accountability’ into the use of force and infringement of the right to protest and participate in public assembly. Research (Occupy protests, Israel 2012) has also found that positive evaluations of trust in the police equate with compliance with police powers and directions, but when protestors perceive police actions as negative, they are less willing to comply with directions (Perry, 2020). The camps purport to be nominally leaderless and thus it is difficult to negotiate with ‘leaders’ and participant protesters believe that democracy has not worked in current society as political and economic power has been vested in a small minority of the population. The protest is intended to transform government into a participatory democracy and safeguard the well-being of all people and the planet. This kind of direct action is not as innovative or original as modern participants apparently believe judging by the historical records of the infamous Star Chamber in England and its records pertaining to property disputes and riots; however, it does not make policing of such events any easier (McDonagh, 2009). Following from the information about ‘dWUNC’ earlier in this section, police should always be aware of the perseverance and tenacity of protestors, especially where they have an unwavering belief in their righteous cause and have a desperation or ‘fight for survival’. This occurred in Hong Kong between 2019 and 2020, despite extreme efforts of the police to curb demonstrations and thousands of arrests, the protests and demonstrations persisted for many months as they crystallised twelve pre-existing and new issues of quality of life and well-being which were triggered by the draconian Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 in Hong Kong (Extradition Bill) which

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

159

allowed alleged offenders to be extradited to China and dealt with under that country’s interminable and opaque criminal legal system (Shek, 2020). Along with protests against excessive use of force by the police, according to local observers, the ‘fire’ of protest has been intensified by ‘four strong winds’ of disinformation and misinformation, anonymity of protestors, public support for students, and support given by parties outside Hong Kong. Police should be politically aware and ensure that they do not become the operational arm of the government or an extreme political ideology to support anti-democratic actions such as happened in the Miners’ Strike in England in the 1980s, regarded as the most bitter industrial dispute in British history (Van Der Velden, 2007). Police from all round England and Wales were used by the British government to intervene in the Miners’ Strike mainly taking place in the midlands and north of England with a view to destroying the power of the trade unions and establishing good industrial relations. The violent policing operations achieved the former objective but failed in the latter. The police in England are still feared and reviled in mining towns to this day. That is not to say police should not intervene when protestors, whether union inspired or not, when they are disrupting lawfully operating businesses or when it is a public protest around environmental issues and ‘climate change’; police should use discretion as normal when deciding to intervene (see the example of CEGB case at the beginning of the chapter).

Conclusion This chapter has examined the policing of public order incidents, particularly public protests; the discussion has been mainly centred on information in Australia and the United Kingdom. The relevant law in Australia and the UK was listed with the proviso that the recent pandemic of COVID-19 has changed priorities away from the automatic right (of citizens in democratic countries) to attend public assemblies and protests. Then the theories of managing crowds and the psychology of crowds was detailed along with a description of police training. Police tactics of dealing with public protests was discussed in addition to the effects of police action and the tactics that protestors sometimes utilise. Police officers should always be aware of the democratic rights of their citizens and their primary aim should be to promulgate those rights but always ensure citizens’ safety and security. This can be achieved with a well thought out contingency plan based on a dynamic risk assessment. Contingency plans should be: necessary; workable; in-line with staff training; legally sound; monitored and evaluated (Beckley, 1997: 133). For their own protection from legal challenge and criticism, police commanders should stick to the contingency plan through a process of: • Learning the lessons of previous incidents • Planning properly for all foreseeable circumstances • Exercising and updating plans

160

• • • •

A. Beckley

Adequate training for staff Ensuring all actions/decisions are recorded Adopting a rational/logical decision-making process Above all – acting reasonably (Beckley, 1997: 133)

Finally, a major project at New  York University School of Law recently published an interesting guide to policing public protests which summarises many of the points made in this chapter (The Policing Project, 2020). It states that the right to engage in peaceful demonstration is a cornerstone of American democracy and makes fourteen main recommendations which the author has summarised as: Policy and Training • Create a written policy for how the agency responds to demonstrations • Train officers on the policy and their role as facilitators of peaceful demonstrations • Provide de-escalation training Force and Surveillance • Ensure that use of force is authorised only when there is a clear risk to personal safety • Avoid an unnecessarily militarised presence or aggressive response • Ban the mass surveillance of protestors Advance Planning • Provide all officers with crowd management plans … that clearly communicate officers’ roles and responsibilities • Develop protocols to address officer wellness during an event • Reach out to demonstration organisers … and emphasise cooperation and negotiation During the Event • Target enforcement to only those who are engaging in violence • Communicate transparently – both internally and externally After the Event • If appropriate, engage in comprehensive after-action review, including protestor feedback • Re-evaluate, update and refresh demonstration training • Provide officers with counselling and peer support (The Policing Project, 2020) Police officers should always facilitate the citizens’ rights to protest and attend public assemblies, but their major duty is to protect and ensure the safety and security of all citizens, whether protesting or merely standing nearby. It remains to be seen after the scourge of the COVID-19 pandemic is over, whether citizens’ rights to protest will become stronger or remain challenged by the police as a danger or risk to the safety and security of a peaceful society.

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

161

References Adang, O.  M. J. (2018). A method for direct systematic observation of collective violence and public order policing. Sociological Methods & Research, 47(4), 761–786. ANZPAA. (2019). Police workforce compendium. Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency. Attorney-General, Australia. (2012). National Human Rights Action Plan 2012. Commonwealth of Australia. Australian Institute of Criminology. (2007). Community satisfaction with police. (Crime Facts Info no. 161). Australian Institute of Criminology. Baker, D. (2019). Public order policing approaches to minimize crowd confrontation during disputes and protests in Australia. Policing, 14, 995. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paz071 Battaglini, M. (2016). Public protests and policy making. The Quarterly of Economics, 2017, 485–549. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw039 Bayley, D.  H. (2006). Changing the guard: Developing democratic police abroad. Oxford University Press. Beckley, A. (1997). Operational policing: liabilities & entitlements. Police Review Publishing Company Ltd. Beckley, A. (2000). Human rights: The guide for police officers and support staff. The New Police Bookshop. Beckley, A. (2007). Emergency response planning: The practicalities. In J. Schafer (Ed.), Policing 2020: Exploring the future of crime, communities and policing. Department of Justice. Beckley, A (2011). Public safety: Learning the lessons. Paper presented at the Centre for Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS) annual conference ‘Risk and Resilience: Redefining Security’, 5–7 October 2011, Hilton Brisbane Hotel, Brisbane. Beckley, A. (2013a). Fair Trial Rights & Right to silence: Fundamental human rights for all? (Paper presented at the Human Rights and Policing Conference, ARC Centre for Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS), 16–18 April 2013). The Rex Hotel. Beckley, A. (2013b). Royal commissions into policing: Australia. Salus Journal, 1(3), 33–52. Beckley, A. (2013c). Intelligence: A risk too far or ‘dignity and justice for all of us’? Salus Journal, 2(1), 52–72. Beckley, A. (2014). Human rights: The route towards ethical policing or to global domination? (Paper presented at the ANZSOC Conference, October 2, 2014, Conference Theme 14: Policing). University of Sydney. Beckley, A. (2017). Human rights and police training: Democratising policing systems. Chapter 33. In L. Weber, E. Fishwick, & M. Marmo (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of criminology and human rights (pp. 354–364). Routledge. Beckley, A. (2019a). Examining human rights and ethical practice in Australian policing: A New South Wales Case Study (PhD Thesis). Western Sydney University. Beckley, A. (2019b, July 22). Literature review: What the research reveals about the effectiveness of body worn cameras. Policing Insight. Retrieved from: https://policinginsight.com/analysis/ literature-­review-­what-­the-­research-­reveals-­about-­the-­effectiveness-­of-­body-­worn-­cameras/ Brenan, M. (2020, August 20). Record low express confidence in police. Washington DC: Gallup. Retrieved from: https://news.gallup.com/poll/317135/amid-­pandemic-­confidence-­key-­ institutions-­surges.aspx Brennan, F. (2009, October 8). Human rights: Australia has spoken. Speech at the launch of the report by the Committee of the National Human Rights Consultation at Parliament House on 8 October 2009. Retrieved from: https://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article/ human-­rights%2D%2Daustralia-­has-­spoken Bronitt, S., & Stenning, P. (2011). Understanding discretion in modern policing. Criminal Law Journal, 35, CrimLJ 319. Chun, C. (2020, September 6). Black lives matter and the right to protest? Diggit Magazine. 1–5. Retrieved from: https://www.diggitmagazine.com/column/Black-­lives-­Matters-­Protest

162

A. Beckley

College of Policing. (2012). National public order: A compendium of legislation. College of Policing. College of Policing. (2013a). Public order: Core principles and legislation. First Published 23 October 2013. Last modified 12 September 2018. Coventry: College of Policing. Retrieved from: https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-­content/public-­order/core-­principles-­and-­legislation/ College of Policing. (2013b). National decision model. First published 23 October 2013. Last modified: 15 December 2014. Coventry: College of Policing. Retrieved from: https://www.app. college.police.uk/app-­content/national-­decision-­model/the-­national-­decision-­model/ Collits, P. (2020, August 9). The Covid Reich and the epic fail of the Australian media. ABC.  Retrieved from: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-­07-­23/ coronavirus-­restrictions-­cause-­flu-­cases-­to-­drop-­australia/12480190 Coyne, J. (2020, September 18). Enforcing Covid-19 restrictions could erode public trust in police. ASPI Strategist. Retrieved from: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ enforcing-­covid-­19-­restrictions-­could-­erode-­public-­trust-­in-­police/ Drury, J., Stott, C., & Farsides, T. (2003). The role of police perceptions and practices in the development of ‘public disorder’. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33(7), 1480–1500. Emsley, C. (2012). Marketing the brand: Exporting British police models 1829–1950. Policing: A journal of policy and practice, 6(1), 43–54. Fasehun, L.-K. O. (2020). Reviewing COVID-19 modelling amidst recent United States protests. Annals of Global Health, 86(1), 76. Ferdik, F. (2016). Exploring determinants of citizen satisfaction levels with the police. The role of strain. Conference presentation at ANZSOC 29th Annual Conference 2016, HORIZONS CRIMINOLOGY, 29 November  – 2 December 2016, Hotel Grand Chancellor, Hobart, Tasmania. Fitzsimmons, C. (2020, October 22). Post-lockdown, we’ve opened up the economy and society but not restored our democratic rights. Sydney Morning Herald. p. 29. Retrieved from: http:// smh.com.au/digitaledition. Flower, J. (2002). The applied psychology of crowds: Assessment, management and control. In A presentation to Jane’s 5th Annual Less-Lethal Weapons and Police Firearms Conference. Qinetiq Ltd. Fulcher, J. (2015). Public protest and continuity of essential energy supply (A discussion paper). TC Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland. Gans, J., Henning, T., Hunter, J., & Warner, K. (2011). Criminal process and human rights. The Federation Press. Garcetti, E. (2020, March 19). Public order under city of Los Angeles emergency authority (Subject: SAFER AT HOME). City of Los Angeles. Gerber, M.M., & Jackson, J. (2016). Justifying violence: Legitimacy, ideology and public support for police use of force. Psychology, Crime and Law, Retrieved 2016, July 25 from: http://ssrn. com/abstract=2710103 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2710103 Gilmore, J., Jackson, W., & Monk, H. (2019). That is not facilitating peaceful protest. That is dismantling protest: Anti-fracking protestors experiences of dialogue policing and mass arrest. Policing and Society. An International Journal of Research and Policy, 29(1), 36–51. Gonzalez, A. S., Aconley-Jones, R., & Adam, D. (2012). Occupy policing. A report into the effects and legality of the eviction of occupy Melbourne from City Square on 21 October 2011. The Occupy Melbourne Legal Support Team. Goode, J.  R., & Nicolazzo, Z. (2016). Black lives matter, but not here: A case study. College Student Affairs Leadership, 3(1), Article 2. Goodman-Delahunty, J., Beckley, A., & Martin, M. (2014a). Complaints against the New South Wales police force: Analysis of risks and rights in reported police conduct. Australian Journal of Human Rights, 20(2), 81–105. Goodman-Delahunty, J., Beckley, A., & Martin, M. (2014b). Resolving or escalating disputes? Experiences of the NSW police force complaints process. Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal, 25, 79–90.

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

163

Gorringe, H., Stott, C., & Rosie, M. (2012). Dialogue police, decision making, and the management of public order during protest crowd events. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling., 9(2012), 111–125. Gotsis, T. (2015). Protests and the law in NSW (Briefing Paper No. 7/2015). NSW Parliamentary Research Service. Gregoire, P., & Nedim, U. (2019 July 5). Taking to the streets in protest? Know your rights beforehand. Sydney Criminal Lawyers (blog) Retrieved from: https://www.sydneycriminallawyers. com.au/blog/taking-­to-­the-­streets-­in-­protest-­know-­your-­rights-­beforehand/ Griggs, R. (2013, December 20). In defence of peaceful protest. : Civil Liberties Australia. Retrieved from: http://www.cla.asn.au/News/in-­defence-­of-­peaceful-­protest/ Hatuka, T. (2018). The design of protest. Choreographing political demonstrations in public space. University of Texas Press. Hedges, P. (2017). Religious offence, public order, and the law (RSIS Commentary. No. 101–-22 May 2017). Nanyang Technological University. HMIC. (2009). Adapting to protest  – Nurturing the British model of policing. Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary. Hoggett, J., & Stott, C. (2010a). The role of crowd theory in determining the use of force in public order policing. Policing and Society, 20(2), 223–236. Hoggett, J., & Stott, C. (2010b). Crowd psychology, public order police training and the policing of football crowds. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 33(2), 218–235. Hoggett, J., & Stott, C. (2012). Post G20: The challenge of change, implementing evidence-based public order policing. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 9, 174–183. Jackson, J., & Bradford, B. (2009). Crime, policing and social order: On the expressive nature of public confidence in policing. British Journal of Sociology, 60(3), 493–521. Jackson, J., & Gau, J. M. (2016). Carving up concepts? Differentiating between trust and legitimacy in public attitudes towards legal authority. In E. Shockley, T. M. S. Neal, L. M. PytlikZillig, & B.  H. Bornstein (Eds.), Interdisciplinary perspectives on trust (pp.  49–69). Springer International Publishing. Jackson, J., Huq, A. Z., Bradford, B., & Tyler, T. R. (2013). Monopolizing force? Police legitimacy and public attitudes toward the acceptability of violence. Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 19(4), 479–497. James, M., & Pearson, G. (2015). Public order and the rebalancing of football fans’ rights: Legal problems with pre-emptive policing strategies and banning orders. Public Law, 3, 458–475. Jarrett, J.M., & Mund, V.A. (1931). The right of assembly. New York University Law Quarterly Review. Vol. IX, September 1931. No. 1. 1–38. Jha, A. (2020, June 18). Why protests aren’t as dangerous for spreading coronavirus as you might think. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/ jun/18/anti-­racism-­protests-­coronavirus-­rise-­covid-­19-­cases Joint Committee on Human Rights. (2011). Facilitating peaceful protest. In HL Paper 123, HC 684. The Stationery Office Limited. Retrieved from: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ jt201011/jtselect/jtrights/123/123.pdf Kalabikhina, I. E., & Panin, A. N. (2020). Spatial choreography of the coronavirus. Population and Economics, 4(2), 123–153. Keane, J., & Bell, P. (2013). Confidence in the police: Balancing public image with community safety  – A comparative review of the literature. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 41, 233–246. Keeling, A. (2020, June 18). Joint statement: Australians’ right to protest. NSW Council of Civil Liberties. Retrieved from: https://www.nswccl.org.au/joint_statement_the_right_to_protest Kinna, R., Prichard, A., & Swann, T. (2019). Occupy and the constitution of anarchy. Global Constitutionalism, 8(2), 357–390.

164

A. Beckley

Kochel, T. R. (2015). Assessing the impact of the Michael Brown shooting and police and public responses to it on St. Louis County residents’ views about police (Conference Paper). Southern Illinois University. LeBon, G. (1895 trans 1926). The crowd: A study of the popular mind. Unwin Madensen, T.D., & Knutsson, J. (2011). Preventing Crowd Violence. Crime Prevention Studies: 26. USA. Lynne Reiner Publishers Inc. ISSN 1065 7029 Marat, E. (2014). Policing public protest in Central Asia. Central Asian Affairs, 1, 5–23. Martin, D., & Graham, W. (2016). Policing protest. Public order policing. Chapter 11. In M. Brunger, S. Tong, & D. Martin (Eds.), Introduction to policing research: Taking lessons from practice (pp. 149–162). Routledge. McClelland, R. (2013). Oversight of police critical incidents. Report to the Hon. Barry O’Farrell, Premier of New South Wales, 29th November 2013. NSW Government. McCulloch, J. (2000). Blue Army: Paramilitary policing in Victoria. Deakin University. McDonagh, B.  A. K. (2009). Subverting the ground: Private property and public protest in the sixteenth-century Yorkshire Wolds. Agricultural History Review, 57(2), 191–206. Monbiot, G. (2019, April 1). Only rebellion will prevent an ecological apocalypse. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/15/ rebellion-­prevent-­ecological-­apocalypse-­civil-­disobedience Moore, E. (2020). Public confidence in the New South Wales criminal justice system: 2019 update (Crime and Justice Bulletin Number 227, June 2020). NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR). Morgan, C. (2018). Moral and legal dilemmas in the policing of protest and other major public events. Medico-Legal Journal, 86(1), 4–15. Morrell, K., & Brammer, S. (2014). Governance and virtue: The case of public order policing. Journal of Business Ethics, 136, 385. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-­014-­2522-­z Morrow-Howell, N., Jackson, C., Lewis-Harris, J., Clark, R., Ekong, S. C., & Bostic, B. (2017). Experiencing civil unrest: Elder voices on Ferguson. Journal of Gerontological Social Work, 60(4), 256–269. Munro, T.O. (2020, July 29). Policing in England and Wales: A radical rethink is needed to tackle the challenges ahead. Policing insight. Retrieved from: https://policinginsight.com/news/ policing-­in-­england-­and-­wales-­a-­radical-­rethink-­is-­needed-­to-­tackle-­the-­challenges-­ahead/ Newburn, T., & Neyroud, P. (Eds.). (2008). Dictionary of policing. Willan Publishing. Neyroud, P., & Beckley, A. (2001a). Policing, ethics and human rights. Willan Publishing. Neyroud, P., & Beckley, A. (2001b). Regulating informers: The regulation of investigatory powers act, covert policing and human rights. Chapter 11. In R. Billingsley, T. Nemitz, & P. Bean (Eds.), Informers: Policing, policy, practice (pp. 164–175). Willan Publishing Ltd. Parliamentary Education Office. (2010). Australia’s constitution. With overview and notes by the Australian Government Solicitor. Commonwealth of Australia. ISBN 978-1-74229-343-1. Perry, G. (2020). Promoting protestors’ compliance: The effect of general perceptions of the police versus police actions. Policing, 15, 1245. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paaa041 Pleyers, G. (2020). The pandemic is a battlefield: Social movements in the COVID-19 lockdown. Journal of Civil Society., 16, 295. https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2020.1794398 Ralston, S. (2020). Live free and die! Medium, the controversial idea. Wright College, Woolf University. Reicher, S., Stott, C., Drury, J., Adang, O., Cronin, P., & Livingstone, A. (2007). Knowledge-based public order policing: Principle and practice. Policing, 1(4), 403–415. Reith, C. (1956). A new study of police history. Oliver and Boyd. Ricketts, A. (2017). Anti-protest laws: Lock up your nannas. Alternative Law Journal, 42(2), 107–111. Rippon, A. G. F., & The Rt Hon. Lord of Hexham QC. (1990). Constitutional anarchy. Statute Law Review, 11, 184–188. Rochel, T. R. (2011). Can police legitimacy promote collective efficacy? Justice Quarterly, 29(3), 384–419.

8  Police and Protestors: Motives and Responses

165

Ruiz, P. (2017). Power revealed: Masking police officers in the public sphere. Visual Communication, 16(3), 299–314. Sandvik, K. B. (2017). The public order drone: Proliferation and disorder in civil airspace. Chapter 5. In K. B. Sandvik & M. G. Jumbert (Eds.), The good drone (pp. 109–128). Routledge. Shek, D. T. L. (2020). Protests in Hong Kong (2019-2020): A perspective based on quality of life and well-being. Applied Research in Quality of Life, 15, 619–635. Sheptycki, J. (2013). Global policing. In Paper presented at the Human Rights and Policing Conference (ARC Centre for Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS), 16–18 April 2013). The Rex Hotel. Silverman, E. B., & Della-Giustina, J.-A. (2001). Urban policing and the fear of crime. Urban Studies, 38(5–6), 941–957. Snell, L. (2008). Protest, protection and policing. Alternative Law Journal, 33(3), 173–174. Stott, C. (2009). Crowd psychology & public order policing: An overview of scientific theory and evidence (Submission to the HMIC Policing of Public Protest Review Team). University of Liverpool. Stott, C., Scothern, M., & Gorringe, H. (2013). Advances in liaison based public order policing in England: Human rights and negotiating the management of protests? Policing, 7(2), 212–226. The Policing Project. (2020). Policing protests to protect constitutional rights and public safety. New York University School of Law. Tyler, T. R. (1989). The psychology of procedural justice: A test of the group-value model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(5), 830–838. Van Der Velden, S., Dribbusch, H., Lyddon, D., & Vandaele, K. (Eds.). (2007). Strikes around the world 1968–2005: Case-studies of 15 countries (pp. 352–354). Amsterdam University Press. Waddington, D. P. (2011). Public order policing in South Yorkshire, 1984–2011: The case for permissive approach to crowd control. Contemporary Social Science, 6(3), 309–324. Walsh, T. (2016). ‘Public Order’ policing and the value of independent legal observers. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 28(1), 33–49. Walters, T. C. (1982). A peaceful breach? Journal of Criminal Law, 46(2), 111–122. West, O. (2020a, September 7). Outlawing legitimate protest and targeting campaign groups is dangerous and unsustainable. Policing Insight. Retrieved from: https://policinginsight.com/features/opinion/ outlawing-­legitimate-­protest-­and-­targeting-­campaign-­groups-­is-­dangerous-­and-­unsustainable/ West, O. (2020b, October 8) Public order policing: Why science, not soundbites, should determine guidance. Policing Insight. Retrieved from: https://policinginsight.com/features/opinion/ public-­order-­policing-­why-­science-­not-­soundbites-­should-­determine-­guidance/ Whelan, C., & Molnar, A. (2019). Policing political mega-events through ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ tactics: Reflections on local and organisational tensions in public order policing. Policing and Society, 29(1), 85–99. White, C. (2017). An ‘absolute right to do anything’: Protest policing in NSW’s last decade of a full-time riot squad. Alternative Law Journal, 42(2), 112–117. Wilson, S. (2020). Representing climate activism through digital media before and during COVID-19 lockdowns. International Journal of Contemporary Humanities, 4(1), 1–15. Wouters, R. (2019). The persuasive power of protest. How protests wins public support. Social Forces, 98(1), 403–426. Zick, T. (2018). Arming public protests. Iowa Law Review, 104, 223–285. Alan Beckley  was a police officer in the United Kingdom, serving for 30 years in Surrey Police and West Mercia Constabulary, respectively. After retiring from the police service, Alan was operating as a management consultant, working in the public sector in the UK and with national police forces in UK and Europe. He also taught as a lecturer and visiting fellow at four UK Universities. He is a published author on many police-related subjects and edited police journals and has completed many assignments in the police service internationally. He is an expert resource in corporate governance and police ethics/human rights issues, risk and contingency planning in the police service, and comparative legal and policing studies. In 2010, he moved to Australia and was a

166

A. Beckley

senior lecturer at Charles Sturt University, Australian Graduate School of Policing, Manly. From 2012, Alan was employed by Western Sydney University in positions in the Office of Widening Participation, and he also taught several subjects and retired in 2016. In 2019, he was awarded a PhD – Doctor of Philosophy – by Western Sydney University and the subject of his dissertation was: Examining human rights and ethical practice in Australian policing: A New South Wales Case Study. He currently holds an honorary appointment as industry/professional fellow at the University of Technology in Sydney in the Criminology section of International Studies and Education within the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences.

Chapter 9

An Examination of the Police Response to Riots and Violent Demonstrations in the United States Garth den Heyer

Introduction There has been an increase in the number, size and frequency of violent protest activity across the United States, the United Kingdom and most western democracies in recent years (den Heyer, 2020). Participants in civil disorder and riots have displayed an increase in their willingness to assault innocent bystanders and to perform deliberate violent acts of vandalism. This is a new form of violent protest and riots, as they are now often unpredictable, short, or even no-notice events (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2011). The current response to violent protest and riots is similar across the western world and usually involves authorities moving quickly to control the violence and to restore order. To ensure an effective response, the police must deploy appropriately trained officers, develop deployment plans and establish a command structure to manage and control the resources deployed. This chapter presents the findings of an electronic survey of local police agencies in the United States that serve populations of more than 100,000 people. A link to the electronic survey was emailed to 273 agencies in May 2019. The survey was designed to examine how police agencies prepared and responded to violent civil disorder and riots. To elicit this information, the survey questionnaire comprised of 40 questions, which related to the response structures, the type of planning and preparation undertaken, the training given and the police response to riots and civil disorder. The survey was based on the following two research questions: What is the appropriate role of the police when responding to riots and civil disorder? What service delivery and response models are the most appropriate for policing riots and civil disorder? G. den Heyer (*) Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_9

167

168

G. den Heyer

Characteristics of Responding Agencies Of the 273 local police agencies in the United States that serve populations of more than 100,000 people that were contacted as a part of this research, only 39 agencies (approximately 14.3%) returned a completed survey questionnaire. While this sample is relatively small, the percentage of returned questionnaires is similar to that of other public order studies and is an indication of the problems that are encountered when undertaking research into this area of policing (Drury et al., 2009a, b; Drury & Stott, 2001; Stott & Reicher, 1998a, b). The return rate is to be expected considering that questions about a sensitive, core part of policing were asked. According to Davis and Dawson (2016), a survey return rate of 35% is considered to be exceptional for this type of research. The way that the police handle civil disorders and riots causes emotional debates, which emanate from participants, bystanders, media, politicians, and police oversight bodies and often culminates in commissions or Presidential inquiries, official reports, and civil legal action. A large number of responses to this survey that examined how police agencies trained, equipped and supported their staff during a riot was never expected. The response rate of 14% has provided a significant amount of information, which will allow a number of topics to be discussed. It also enables other issues to be identified and debated and provides a basis for further research to be conducted. To ensure that any differences or anomalies were considered when interpreting the results of the survey, agencies were asked to classify their agency into one of five different categories, based on geographical areas, or the jurisdictions they served. Just under half of the responding agencies served cities, and approximately one-­ third of agencies classified their agency as municipal. The remaining agencies were either regional, county or unified county/city (Table 9.1). The agencies that responded represented a reasonably sized spread, when measured by the number of sworn officers employed. Most of the agencies (17, or more than 43%) employed between 201 to 250 sworn officers. Sixteen percent of agencies employed between 101 and 200 sworn officers, with the remaining agencies being spread relatively evenly across the remaining six categories of agency size. The smallest agency that responded employed 134 sworn officers (Table 9.2). Table 9.1  Type of responding agency Type of agency City Municipal Regional County Unified County/City No answer Total

Number of agencies 19 13 1 1 3 2 39

Percentage of agencies 49.0 33.0 2.5 2.5 8.0 5.0 100.0

9  An Examination of the Police Response to Riots and Violent Demonstrations…

169

Table 9.2  Size of responding agencies Number of sworn officers Less than 150 101 to 200 201 to 250 251 to 300 301 to 500 501 to 1000 1001 to 1500 More than 1500 No answer Total

Number of responding agencies Percentage of responding agencies 1 2.5 6 16.0 17 43.5 2 5.0 3 8.0 2 5.0 2 5.0 2 5.0 4 10.0 39 100.0

Table 9.3  Number of agencies that have employed full time staff to a civil disorder or riot squad

Yes No Other No answer Total

Number of responding agencies 4 24 4 7 39

Percentage of responding agencies 10.0 62.0 10.0 18.0 100.0

Human Resources On whether an agency had staff employed in a full time capacity in a civil disorder or riot squad, only four agencies (10%) responded that they did have full-time staff employed in a civil disorder or riot squad, while 24 agencies (62%) identified that they did not. Another four agencies (10%) stated that they had a Mobile Field Force, and it was the duty of the Mobile Field Force to deploy to “every incident for their expertise and team leader abilities.” These four agencies are accounted for in the “Other” category in the survey. Seven agencies did not answer the question. The information about the form that the squads take has been presented in Table 9.3. To understand the number of police staff who were dedicated in a full-time capacity to a civil disorder or riot squad and its associated duties, the police agencies were asked whether they had a full time civil disorder or riot squad and how many staff were employed on it, on a full-time basis. Of the four agencies that stated that they had full-time squads, one agency stated that they had 599 full time, civil disorder or riot squad members, and another had 10 Field Forces of 32 officers per Field Force, making a total of 320 full time staff. The other two agencies did not know the number of staff that were employed on a full- time basis. The findings from these questions are logical, because only four agencies had full time, civil disorder or riot squads, and while only two agencies responded to the

170

G. den Heyer

question about the number of staff, one of those agencies were the largest agency that took part in the survey and the other agency that responded to the staffing question maintained that they had more than 1300 sworn officers. Both agencies are larger-sized city police agencies. Agencies were also asked whether they had full time staff dedicated to a civil disorder or riot squad and how many staff were able to be deployed to a civil disorder or riot squad or had been trained to respond to a civil disorder or riot? Twenty-­ nine agencies responded to this question. Only 16 agencies responded with the number of sworn officers that could be deployed to such a squad, while ten agencies were not able to determine the number of officers who could be deployed. One agency stated that all sworn staff receive civil disorder or riot response training, and were, therefore, able to be deployed to a civil disorder or riot squad, but the training that was referred to related to basic, academy training. Another agency stated that their agency delivered a similar level of training to their patrol officers, but members of their SWAT team received additional training. The third agency that responded to this question said that they had 15 staff members, at a minimum, who received civil disorder or riot training and that this number increases whenever there is a major event or whenever there is a need. The second area of training that was examined in the survey pertained to how many years of sworn police service was required before an officer was able to be deployed on a civil disorder or riot squad. Thirty-one agencies answered this question. However, most of the respondents, 17 agencies, did not know, or did not have access to this information. Of the 14 agencies that were able to answer the question, two agencies stated that less than one year of service was needed, two agencies answered that between one to two years were needed, five agencies replied that between two and three years were needed, and five agencies required more than four years. The length of service required has been presented in Table 9.5. Two agencies made comments about the appointment process for employing members of a civil disorder or riot squad. The first agency noted that the level of service, prior to qualifying for being able to be appointed to a squad, varies and depends on three criteria. The first criteria that was reported was that an officer must have completed probation and the second and third criteria, was the level of an officer’s experience and skills, respectively. The second agency’s response was that any vacancy on the squad was advertised. This implies that both of these agencies appoint officers to the position, based on merit, and that sworn police service is only one of the factors that are considered in the appointment process. The last question that was asked that related to the demographics of squad members was gender composition. Of the 24 agencies that answered this question, women made up less than 5% of membership of squads in nine of the agencies, between five to 10% in five agencies and more than 10% in another agency. Six agencies responded that they did not have any women in their civil disorder or riot squads and three agencies did not know whether they had women in their squads.

9  An Examination of the Police Response to Riots and Violent Demonstrations…

171

Table 9.4  Number of sworn officers able to be deployed to a civil disorder or riot squad by the number of sworn officers in the agency Number of trained officers 12 20 24 26 28 30 30 49

Number of sworn officers 188 250 190 960 407 225 184 172

Percentage of trained officers 6.4 8.0 12.6 2.7 6.8 13.3 16.3 28.4

Number of trained officers 50 50 60 80 100 100 240 800

Number of sworn officers 232 310 242 1500 160 219 240 800

Percentage of trained officers 21.5 16.1 24.7 5.3 62.5 45.6 100.0 100.0

Table 9.5  The length of police service that members of civil disorder or riot squads need to have when first deployed to a squad Number of responding agencies Less than one year 2 More than one year but less than two 2 years More than two years but less than 5 three years More than three years but less than 0 four years More than four years 5 Other 17 No answer 8 Total 39

Percentage of responding agencies 5.1 5.1 12.8 0 12.8 43.6 20.6 100.0

Officer Physical Competency The second tranche of questions related to the physical competency of members of a civil disorder or riot squad. The first question asked agencies whether members of a civil disorder or riot squad had to pass a physical competency test prior to being deployed to a civil disorder or riot squad. Only 25 agencies responded to this question. Seven agencies maintained that there was a requirement for a member to pass a physical test, while ten agencies did not require members of these squads to pass a physical competency test. Eight agencies did not know whether they had such a test. The second part of this question applied to those agencies that required members of their civil disorder or riot squad to complete a physical competency test. These agencies were asked whether the members were required to maintain a level of physical competency. All seven agencies answered that members of a civil disorder or riot squad had to maintain a level of physical competency following an initial competency test.

172

G. den Heyer

The third part of the question asked these same agencies how often the physical competency of a member of a civil disorder or riot squad was tested. Of the seven agencies that answered that their squad members were required to complete a physical competency test and maintain that level, two agencies had their members tested quarterly, two agencies tested their members between 6 and 12 months, and three agencies tested between 12 and 24 months.

Psychometric Testing The third section of the survey included three questions that related to the “state of mind” of the members who made up a civil disorder or riot squad. The first question asked whether the squad members undergo psychometric testing prior to being deployed or being appointed to a squad. Of the 30 agencies that answered this question, one agency reported that it was a requirement for members to complete psychometric testing prior to being appointed to a civil disorder or riot squad and one other agency stated that psychometric testing was a part of their processes for employing all of their sworn officers. Eighteen agencies did not require squad members to undergo psychometric testing and ten agencies did not know the answer to this question. The second question in this section was an extension of the first question and asked agencies whether members were psychometrically reassessed after their deployment to a civil disorder event that was of a life-threatening nature to the member. Of the 29 agencies that answered this question only two agencies said that they required members to be psychometrically reassessed and 16 agencies said that they did not have such a requirement. Six agencies did not know whether their agency had this requirement and four agencies required psychometric testing on a case-by-case basis or only if the event was traumatic. One agency reported that their policy stipulated that all sworn officers who had experienced a life-threatening event were to be debriefed by a peer support team and that an officer be offered additional voluntary counselling with members of the employment assistance program (EAP). The last question in this section examined whether agencies had implemented a debriefing process for squad members after the squad had been deployed to a civil disorder or a riot. More than half of the 30 agencies (17 agencies or approximately 57%) that responded to the question claimed that they did hold debrief sessions after deploying a civil disorder or riot squad. Five agencies did not hold a debrief session, and eight agencies did not know whether their agency held debriefing sessions.

9  An Examination of the Police Response to Riots and Violent Demonstrations…

173

Reporting Actions and Civil Complaints To understand how accountable squads were to their communities, the survey included three questions that related to the action of a member of a civil disorder or riot squad during and after a civil disorder or a riot. The first question asked agencies whether a member of a civil disorder or a riot squad needed to complete a report about their actions after being deployed to a civil disorder or a riot. Twenty-eight agencies answered this question. Ten agencies claimed that their members needed to complete a report, eight agencies stated that their members did not need to complete a report and seven respondents did not know. Two agencies stated that their members only complete a report when they used force and one agency answered that a report is completed, but the report relates to the deployment of the squad and not to a member of the squad. The second question in this section related to the use of force by officers during a deployment of the squad to a civil disorder or a riot. Agencies were asked who undertakes an investigation into any breaches of an agency’s use-of-force policy. Of the 28 agencies that answered this question, one agency stated that any investigation would be undertaken by the squad supervisor, 16 agencies claimed that any investigation would be undertaken by a member of their professional standards or internal affairs unit and seven agencies did not know. Four agencies responded that who would undertake this type of investigation would depend on the severity of the force used and that the investigation could be undertaken by any sworn supervisor, another senior officer, a detective or a member from professional standards or the internal affairs unit. The last question in this section was similar to the previous question asked. Agencies were asked as to who would investigate a complaint that was made by a member of public about the actions of a member, or members of a civil disorder or a riot squad. Of the 28 agencies that responded to the question, two agencies stated that such an investigation would be undertaken by an independent senior officer and 16 agencies stated that the investigation would be undertaken by a member from the professional standards or the internal affairs unit. Four agencies stated that depending on the type of complaint and the severity of the use of force, the complaint could be investigated by any sworn supervisor, another senior officer, a detective or by a member of the professional standards or internal affairs unit. There was an exception to this, however, with one agency reporting that a complaint made by a member of the public could be investigated by any sworn member of the agency.

Equipment Used by a Police Civil Disorder or a Riot Squad The next section of the survey asked a series of questions about the type of equipment used by a civil disorder or riot squad. The first question related to the uniform worn by the members of a civil disorder or riot squad and asked whether squad

174

G. den Heyer

members wore the same uniform as general patrol officers. Twenty-four agencies answered the question. Ten agencies stated that members of these squads wore the same uniform as patrol officers and in 14 agencies, squad officers did not wear the same uniform as patrol officers. The second question in this section asked agencies about the type of baton that was used by members of a civil disorder or riot squad. Of the 26 agencies that responded to this question, seven agencies answered that they equip their squad members with the ASP type baton, five agencies use the PR24 side handle baton and 11 agencies stated that they use the 36-inch straight riot baton. Four agencies did not know the type of baton that was used by the members of their civil disorder or riot squad. The last question asked in this section related to protective equipment. Agencies were asked to identify from a list of protective equipment itemized in the survey, the items that were issued to the members of their civil disorder or riot squad. Thirty agencies responded to this question. The type of protective equipment and the response of the agencies, in the order of the most frequently issued piece of equipment has been presented in Table 9.6. As can be seen from the table, the most common forms of protective equipment used by members of a civil disorder or riot squad are a helmet with a visor, shin and knee protectors and forearm or elbow protectors. Agencies were also asked as to what type of shield they issue to the members of their civil disorder or riot squads. Eighteen agencies issued their members with shields, three agencies did not issue shields to their members and five agencies stated that their agency did not use shields when responding to civil disorders or riots. The shield that is used mostly, is the large rectangular type, with 14 agencies Table 9.6  Protective equipment issued to members of civil disorder or riot squads Number of agencies in the survey that issued the item of equipment Helmet with visor 20 Shin or knee 15 protectors Forearm or elbow 14 protectors Foot protectors 11 Shoulder 11 protectors Groin protectors 10 Thigh protectors 6 Fire retardant 4 overalls/suit Helmet without 3 visor Shield 3 Gas mask 1

Percentage of agencies in the survey that issued the item of equipment 80.0 60.0 56.0 44.0 44.0 40.0 24.0 16.0 12.0 12.0 4.0

9  An Examination of the Police Response to Riots and Violent Demonstrations…

175

using this type of shield. Two agencies used the large rectangular shield that is able to be locked together and three agencies used the small rectangular shield. Only one agency used a circular shaped shield. The last question that was asked on protective equipment is related to vehicles. Only two agencies had especially identified and equipped civil disorder or riot vehicles, while 21 agencies did not have any specific vehicles for these squads to use.

Firearms and Non-lethal Weapons To examine the type of weapons that a civil disorder or riot squad used, agencies were asked a number of questions about firearms and non-lethal weapons. The first question asked whether members of the civil disorder or riot squad were issued with a sidearm, a firearm or a pistol. Twenty-four agencies responded to this question. Members of the squads of 16 agencies were issued with these types of weapons and two agencies said that their members were not issued with a weapon, individually. Two agencies stated that all officers carry a sidearm regularly and another agency said that all personnel carry their duty weapons. The next question related to weaponry of a larger gauge. Agencies were asked to identify, from a list of weapons that were itemized in the survey, those items that were issued to members of their civil disorder or riot squad. Only 14 agencies responded to this question, of which, six agencies stated that their squad members were issued with semi-automatic rifles or carbines while three agencies issued shotguns. One agency stated that they issued shotguns, rifles and 40 millimetre projectile weapons. None of the agencies affirmed the use of a single shot rifle or carbine and four agencies did not issue any of these weapons. Agencies were also asked whether they issued tasers and, or OC Spray to members of their civil disorder or riot squad. Ten agencies replied that they issued tasers to members of the squad and one agency stated that all of their staff carry a taser while on duty. Another agency stated that they issue tasers to the supervisors of their civil disorder or riot squads but not to the officers. Nine agencies did not issue tasers to squad members. On OC Spray, 19 agencies issued members with personal canisters and five agencies did not issue individual canisters. To establish whether agencies used any other form of less-lethal weaponry, agencies were asked whether their squad members were issued with any other type of non-lethal weapons that had not been mentioned in the previous questions. In response to this question, five agencies stated that they use pepper ball launchers, three agencies used bean bag shotgun rounds and three agencies said that they use chemical agents. Another agency used rubber bullets and another used stinger ball grenades. This section of the survey contained two lists of non-lethal weapons that are often used by civil disorder or riot squads. The first list related to distraction devices and the second list related to other types of non-lethal weapons. Fifteen agencies

176

G. den Heyer

responded to the list of distraction devices in the survey. Ten agencies stated that their civil disorder or riot squad uses flash-bang grenades and the squad in one other agency used stun grenades. Three agencies did not use any of these devices and one agency used both of these devices, but these were deployed by the agency’s SWAT team and not by the civil disorder or riot squad. The second list in the survey related to the use of different types of gases and sprays that may be used by a civil disorder or riot squad. Four agencies stated that they used tear gas and two agencies stated that they used both CN and CS tear gas. Two agencies used OC Spray bombs, and eight agencies dispense OC Spray from large canisters.

Training Members of Police Civil Disorder or Riot Squads The next section of the survey contained of a number of questions that related to the training of members of civil disorder or riot squads. The first question pertained to the initial training that officers received in the use of batons and the second question asked how often officers need to retrain or requalify in the use of a baton. Twenty agencies responded to the first question. Officers in three agencies received more than one hour, but less than two hours of training, officers in one agency received more than two, but less than three hours and officers in five agencies received more than three hours, but less than five hours of training. Seven agencies provided more training than this group of agencies. Three agencies provided more than five hours, but less than eight hours of training and four agencies provided more than eight hours. The number of hours of training delivered by an agency has been presented in Table  9.7. Another agency stated that all of their officers receive initial training in the use of the baton as a recruit, and then again annually, while two agencies stated that their officers attend a 3-day course (24 h) delivered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

Table 9.7  Number of hours of initial training in the use of the baton received by civil disorder or riot squad members Less than one hour More than one but less than two hours More than two but less than three hours More than three but less than five hours More than five but less than eight hours More than eight hours Other No answer Total

Number 0 3 1 5 3 4 4 19 39

Percentage 0 7.7 2.6 12.8 7.7 10.2 10.2 48.7 100.0

9  An Examination of the Police Response to Riots and Violent Demonstrations…

177

The second question in this section asked agencies how often retraining or requalification in the use of the baton was undertaken by squad members. The majority of agencies (12 agencies) stated that they require their members to be retrained or to requalify on an annual basis. Three agencies stated that they require retraining or requalification, quarterly and one agency requires retraining or requalification every six-months. One agency stated that they undertake periodic departmental training whenever training can be provided by local, outside agencies. Another agency said that they did not have a qualification for the use of batons and that all of their officers are trained when they are recruits but are given refresher baton training periodically at on-going training sessions. Agencies were also asked how many hours of initial training in the use of shields squad members received. Only 17 agencies answered this question. Of those agencies, members in four agencies received less than one hour of initial training, squad members in three agencies received more than one hour, but less than two hours, while members in three agencies received more than two, but less than three hours. Squad members in two agencies received more than three hours of training, but less than five hours. Only four agencies provided more hours of training than these agencies. One agency provided more than five hours, but less than eight hours and three agencies provided more than eight hours. One agency did not know how many hours of training in the use of shields that members of the squad received. The number of hours of initial training in the use of shields has been presented in Table 9.8. The second part of this question asked agencies how often members of civil disorder or riot squads had to retrain or requalify in the use of the shield. Squad members must retrain or requalify in the use of a shield annually, in the majority of agencies (seven agencies). Two agencies required retraining or requalification on a quarterly basis and two agencies require six-monthly retraining or requalification. Two agencies said that they did not know how often squad members needed to retrain or requalify and four agencies stated that they did not have any requirement for retraining or requalification. Agencies were then asked how many hours of initial training in riot formation and crowd dispersal tactics the members of a civil disorder or riot squad received. Approximately 50% of agencies (19 agencies) answered this question. Of these Table 9.8  Number of hours of initial training in the use of shields that members of civil disorder or riot squads receive Less than one hour More than one but less than two hours More than two but less than three hours More than three but less than five hours More than five but less than eight hours More than eight hours Other Total

Number 4 3 3 2 1 3 1 17

Percentage 23.5 17.6 17.6 11.8 5.9 17.6 11.8 100

178

G. den Heyer

Table 9.9  Number of hours of initial training in riot formations and crowd dispersal tactics that members of a civil disorder or riot squad receive

Less than one hour More than one, but less than two hours More than two, but less than three hours More than three, but less than five hours More than five, but less than eight hours More than eight hours Other No answer Total

Number 1 2

Percentage 2.6 5.1

1

2.6

4

10.2

1

2.6

7 3 20 39

17.9 7.7 51.3 100.0

agencies, members in one agency received less than one hour of initial training in riot formation and crowd dispersal, members in two agencies received more than one hour, but less than two hours, while members in one agency received more than two, but less than three hours and members in four agencies received more than three hours, but less than five hours. One agency provided more than five hours, but less than less than eight hours and another seven agencies provided more than eight hours. Another agency provided 16 h of training. One agency did not know how many hours of training squad members received and another agency said that squad members did not receive any such training. The hours of initial training received has been summarized and has been presented in Table 9.9. Agencies were then asked how often squad members were required to be retrained or to requalify in squad formations and crowd dispersal tactics. Nineteen agencies answered this question. Of these agencies, one agency required their squad members to be retrained or to requalify on a monthly basis, four agencies require their members to be retrained or to requalify every quarter, two agencies required retraining or requalification every six months and five agencies required it annually. One agency did not require retraining or requalification, four agencies were unsure of the time period, and one advised that they had no specific timeframe. Another agency retrained or required requalification of their members in advance of anticipated events. To further this discussion, agencies were asked whether they included real-life scenarios with actors and events in the formation training delivered. Thirteen agencies included these aspects in their training and three agencies did not. One agency stated that they sometimes include these aspects in their training and one agency did not know.

9  An Examination of the Police Response to Riots and Violent Demonstrations…

179

Agencies were also asked whether they included crowd control psychology in the training of their squad members. Eleven agencies included crowd control psychology while seven agencies did not. The last two questions that were asked that related to training pertained to whether squad members had been trained in self-defense tactics. Sixteen agencies said that they trained members in these tactics, while three agencies did not. One agency said that self-defense training was provided as part of basic academy training. Of the agencies that did deliver self-defense training, two agencies delivered this type of training quarterly, two agencies delivered the training every six months and ten agencies conducted it annually.

 he Response Structure of a Police Civil Disorder or T Riot Squad The last section of the survey comprised of a series of eight questions, which related to the structure, the policies and the tactics used by a civil disorder or riot squad. The first question in this section related to the composition of a civil disorder or riot squad and asked agencies whether their squads comprised of a Sergeant and five officers. Six agencies deploy their squad using this structure. Eight agencies claimed that they used a similar, but different ratio of officers to Sergeants or supervisors. One agency deployed six officers to one Sergeant, one agency used seven officers to a Sergeant, four agencies deployed eight officers to a Sergeant and one agency deployed as 11 officers to a Sergeant. One larger-sized agency stated that they deploy as a Field Force Unit comprising of a Lieutenant, four Sergeants, and 32 officers. Seventeen agencies stated that the deployment of their squad needs to be approved by a commissioned or senior officer and two agencies stated that their squads were deployed by the watch commander. The findings of this question were similar to the question that was asked of agencies – whether the deployment of the squad was overseen or commanded by a commissioned or senior officer. Fifteen agencies stated that when their squads are deployed, they are commanded or overseen by a commissioned or senior officer. One agency stated that they separated command and control by having the command undertaken by a first line supervisor with oversight being the responsibility of a senior officer. One agency did not oversee or command the deployment of the squad by a commissioned or senior officer. The second question that was asked that related to the response structures used. Agencies were asked whether they used a centralized command structure when their civil disorder or riot squad was deployed. Fifteen agencies stated that they did use a central command structure and two stated that they did not. Twenty-two agencies did not answer the question. To understand whether an agency had an identifiable process prior to deploying their civil disorder or riot squad, the survey included two questions that related to

180

G. den Heyer

pre-deployment planning. The first question asked agencies to identify whether they prepared any of the planning and assessment documents that were listed in the question in the survey, or whether they prepared any of the documents prior to deploying their civil disorder or riot squads to an incident or event. Eighteen agencies responded to this question. Agencies were asked whether they completed a deployment plan, a community assessment or a written appreciation or risk assessment. Fifteen agencies claimed that they did complete a deployment plan and one agency claimed that they prepared both a deployment plan and a community assessment. Two agencies stated that they did not undertake any pre-deployment planning or needed to have any documents prepared. The second question pertaining to pre-deployment planning related to a use-of-­ force policy. Agencies were asked to ascertain, from a list of use-of-force policy documents, the type of policy that their civil disorder or riot squad deployed and operated under. Twenty-one agencies responded to this question. The type of policy and the responses of the agencies, in the order of the most frequently issued, have been presented in Table 9.10. As can be seen from the table, the most common form of use-of-force policy that is used by members of a civil disorder or riot squad is the force continuum, with 12 agencies ascertaining this approach. One agency that ascertained the directive form of use of force, stated that this “provides the various levels of force and the appropriate response but leaves a realistic opening for use of force as is reasonably necessary.” The last two survey questions related to the tactics that a civil disorder or riot squad used when deployed to an incident or event. The first question asked whether it was a policy of the agency for squad members to issue or make requests, or to give warnings to protestors prior to taking any enforcement action. Sixteen agencies maintained that their squad members did issue or make requests or give warnings and one agency said that their members did not. Two agencies stated that they did not know what their policy was. The second question related specifically to the type of tactic used by a squad during an incident or event. Agencies were asked to ascertain, from a list of tactics that were documented in the survey, the type of tactics that their squads would use. As can be seen from Table  9.11, the most common tactic used is crowd dispersal,

Table 9.10  Different types of use-of-force policies that civil disorder or riot squads use

Continuum Framework Model Force options Directive Policy Total

Number 12 4 2 1 1 1 21

Percentage 57.1 19.0 9.5 4.8 4.8 4.8 100

9  An Examination of the Police Response to Riots and Violent Demonstrations…

181

Table 9.11  Tactics used by a civil disorder or riot squad

Controlled dispersal Contain Condon Did not know Total

Number 13 9 4 2 28

Percentage 46.4 32.1 14.3 7.1 100

followed by contain. One agency stated that they used all of the tactics listed and two agencies identified that they did not know what tactics their squads used.

Discussion The return rate of approximately 14.3% for the survey was low. However, as Nix et al. (2017) noted, surveys that are not undertaken in person have, over time, had a decreasing number of responses and “a low response rate on its own is an insufficient reason to dismiss a study’s merit” (p. 530). As discussed in the following section, the geographical spread of respondents, the types and sizes of agencies are a representative sample of the police agencies servicing jurisdictions of over 100,000 residents. The low response rate of this survey is a poor indicator of nonresponse bias (see Eck, 2006; Groves & Peytcheva, 2008; Holbrook et al., 2008), as response rates are “a poor predictor of the absolute relative response bias” (Groves & Peytcheva, 2008: 174). Furthermore, such correlations say little about the magnitude of bias (Pickett et al., 2018). The findings from the survey indicate that police agencies in the United States are well prepared for a civil disorder or rioting event. The survey found that very few agencies had a full-time civil disorder or riot squad, but they did have a high percentage of their staff who were trained in civil disorder tactics and they were well equipped. Furthermore, 10% of the respondents had Mobile Forces, whose members had been trained in not only civil disorder techniques, but also in a number of other tactics that would be used for handling violent situations. The survey also found that a number of agencies use crowd psychology in their response plans and that they use a number of different crowd control methods. There were two elements, however, that stood out in relation to the number of officers trained in civil disorder response tactics. The first is that there does not appear to be any correlation between the size of an agency and the number of sworn staff in an agency that are capable of being deployed to a civil disorder or riot squad. This was highlighted in Table  9.4, with agencies that have the same number of sworn officers having different percentages of officers that have been trained in civil disorder techniques. The second element is that the two agencies that have the largest number of deployable sworn staff have trained all of their sworn officers in civil disorder techniques.

182

G. den Heyer

Seven agencies maintained that they required new squad members to pass a physical test and two agencies required their officers to undertake and pass a psychometric test. However, 18 agencies stated that they did not require a physical test or that they did not know whether they had such a test. Furthermore, the majority of agencies did not require their squad members to maintain a specific level of physical fitness after being appointed to their civil disorder or riot squad. By not having officers undertake a physical competency test prior to them being deployed on a civil disorder or riot squad places the officer, their colleagues, members of the public and the agency at risk. Civil disorder or riot situations are violent and stressful for officers and responding to them places an officer at risk of short- and long-term health problems (den Heyer, 2021). Not knowing the fitness level of their officers can also place an agency at risk of breaching health and safety requirements or health insurance obligations. Another factor that was noted in relation to recruitment was the gender composition of civil disorder or riot squads. Men were the main gender of those who made up a civil disorder or riot squad in all of the agencies that responded to the survey. However, one agency stated that women made up 10% of the personnel in their squad and 14 agencies stated that women comprised of between five to 10% of their squads. While women generally do not have the same physical size as men, they are effective in controlling violent disturbances and should be included in the composition of a civil disorder riot squad. It is also essential to have women officers present during the arrest and search of female offenders. The survey finds that police agencies in the United States have trained and equipped their civil disorder and riot squad members to a level that will reassure the community and that the police can be held accountable for their actions (Kwong, 2018; Prenzler & den Heyer, 2016). More than one third of survey respondents stated that their agency requires their officers to complete a report if they used force during their deployment to a civil disorder incident. Ensuring that use-of-force reports are made available for public scrutiny will assist with increasing the public’s confidence in the police (Maxson et al., 2003). The confidence that the public have in the police may be increased further by knowing that more than 70% of agencies stated that all public complaints made in relation to the actions of their civil disorder and riot squads are investigated by an independent, senior officer. There are also two other findings of this survey that may increase the level of confidence in the capability of the police. The first is that the level of training that is delivered to members of civil disorder or riot squads by the agencies that responded to the survey. The majority of agencies train their officers in civil disorder and riot formations and crowd dispersal tactics, and in the use of batons and shields. A number of agencies also require their officers to retrain in these tactics annually. The second finding that may increase the confidence of the public in the police is that half of the agencies required a commissioned officer or senior officer to approve the deployment of their civil disorder or riot squad, and when they are deployed, they are led through a central command structure. The plan that they use to respond to a civil disorder or riot must also be approved by a central command.

9  An Examination of the Police Response to Riots and Violent Demonstrations…

183

Conclusion The findings of this survey pertain to medium to larger sized police agencies in the United States. However, the findings are also relevant to other police agencies around the world (see den Heyer, 2020). One of the principal changes that have influenced how the police respond to violent civil disorder and riots, and that has provided a foundation for professionalizing the police management of such events, has been the introduction of specific incident management (or command) systems (den Heyer, 2020). The police are aware that any publicity about the excessive use of force by the police will lead to crises in policing by consent and questions about their legitimacy. Such a crisis would create an opportunity for a political or public review of their actions (Wood, 2014). The findings of this survey ultimately should provide confidence to the public that the police are competent and capable of responding to civil disorders and riots, as well as revealing that they professionally respect civil rights. More than half of the agencies that responded to the survey claimed that their officers issue or make requests or warnings to protestors prior to taking any enforcement action and almost all agencies use crowd dispersal and containment tactics. According to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2011), for the police to continue to respond appropriately to the different forms of riots, they will require officers to continue to be trained appropriately in civil disorder and riot control tactics and receive further training to effectively use existing non-lethal weapons when controlling a violent crowd. This must be balanced with an assurance that the lessons learned from responding to previous civil disorder and riotous behavior will be acknowledged by the police and that what has been learned will be assimilated into the policies and practices used by the concerned law enforcement agencies (den Heyer, 2020).

References Davies, G., & Dawson, S. (2016). Spoonful of sugar or strong medicine: ‘Meet and greet’ as a strategy for policing large-scale public events. Police and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy, 28, 697. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2016.1259317 den Heyer, G. (2020). Police response to riots: Case studies from France, London. Springer. den Heyer, G. (2021). An examination of the post-traumatic stress factors among New Zealand police personnel: A cross-sectional study. Policing: An International Journal, 909. https://doi. org/10.1108/PIJPSM-­01-­2021-­0001. Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. Drury, J., & Stott, C. (2001). Bias as a research strategy in participant observation: The case of intergroup conflict. Field Methods, 13(1), 47–67. Drury, J., Cocking, C., & Reicher, S. (2009a). Everyone for themselves? A comparative study of crowd solidarity among emergency survivors. British Journal of Social Psychology, 48, 487–506. Drury, J., Cocking, C., & Reicher, S. (2009b). The nature of collective resilience: Survivor reactions to the 2005 London bombings. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 27, 66–95.

184

G. den Heyer

Eck, J. (2006). When is a bologna sandwich better than sex? A defense of small-n case study evaluations. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 2, 345–362. Groves, R., & Peytcheva, E. (2008). The impact of nonresponse rates on nonresponse bias. Public Opinion Quarterly, 72, 167–189. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. (2011). Policing public order—An overview and review of progress against the recommendations of adapting to protest and nurturing the British model of policing. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Holbrook, A., Krosnick, J., & Pfent, A. (2008). The causes and consequences of response rates in surveys by the news media and government contractor survey research firms. In J. Lepkowski, C.  Tucker, M.  Brick, E. de Leeuw, L.  Japec, P.  Lavrakas, M.  Link, & R.  Sangster (Eds.), Advances in telephone survey methodology. Wiley. Kwong, L. (2018). Increasing police accountability and improving use of force policies in the United States. Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic Science, 6(11). Maxson, C., Hennigan, K., & Sloane, D. (2003). Factors that influence public opinion of the police. National Institute of Justice. Nix, J., Pickett, J., Baek, H., & Alpert, G. (2017). Police research, officer surveys, and response rates. Policing and Society, 29(5), 530–550. Pickett, J., Chiricos, T., Bushway, S., & Alpert, G. (2018). The response rate test: Nonresponse bias and the future of survey research in criminology and criminal justice. The Criminologist, 43(1), 7–11. Prenzler, T., & den Heyer, G. (Eds.). (2016). Civilian oversight of police: Advancing accountability in law enforcement. CRC Press. Stott, C., & Reicher, S. (1998a). Crowd action as intergroup process: Introducing the police perspective. European Journal of Social Psychology, 26(4), 509–529. Stott, C., & Reicher, S. (1998b). How conflict escalates: The intergroup dynamics of collective football violence. Sociology, 32(2), 353–377. Wood, L. (2014). Crisis and control: The militarization of protest policing. Pluto Press. Dr. Garth den Heyer  is a professor at Arizona State University and a senior research fellow with the Police Foundation. He is also a contributing faculty member at Walden University and an associate with the Scottish Institute of Policing Research. He served with the New Zealand Police for 38 years, retiring as an inspector and manager: national security. He also spent more than 20 months as a strategic advisor to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. His main research interests are policing, militarization, service delivery efficacy, policy development, strategic thinking, and organizational reform.

Chapter 10

Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United Kingdom Alan Beckley

Introduction This chapter will examine football-related violence in the UK and Australia, following the developments from the inception of the game through the football hooligan era and improvements in recent years. First, it is important to state that the sport of football in Australia was called soccer to differentiate it from the three other codes of sports that are rather more popular but are also called ‘football’ or the slang derivation: ‘footie’. To confuse matters slightly, more recently, the Football Federation Australia (FFA) have reverted to calling soccer: ‘football’ (FFA, 2020). The states of Queensland and New South Wales have Rugby League as their most popular sport followed by Rugby Union, then soccer and finally, Australian Rules Football (AFL) which is a game similar to Gaelic football in Ireland that combines football and rugby with a complex scoring system. AFL is the most popular sport in the state of Victoria, but also has clubs in Western Australia, Southern Australia, Queensland, and New South Wales. Therefore, soccer appears to be the second most popular code in all states but has a national dimension (Danforth, 2001). This chapter will confine its remit to the evolution of soccer in the world, Europe and the UK and focus on England and Australia to investigate the phenomenon of soccer-related violence.

A. Beckley (*) University of Technology in Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_10

185

186

A. Beckley

Evolution of Football From a brief survey of the origin of the game of football, it appears to have over 2000  years of history, with records showing that it was played in ancient China, Greece, Rome, and Central America. However, it was transformed into the modern recognisable game in England, dating back at least 700  years. Indeed, the first example of public disorder at football matches was in the year 1314. According to Frosdick (2010:83), football was banned in England by the Royal Proclamation of King Edward II (reigned 1307–1327) because it was ‘the violent sport of soccer’. Apparently, that proclamation did not prevent football being played and developing into the internationally popular game we know today. In England, the organisation and development of football was subject to a major growth of popularity in the nineteenth century following the industrial revolution and population migration from rural to urban, industrialised locations. The weekend attendance at a football match lifted the dour life of factory workers and labourers seeking relaxation and providing (mainly) male bonding and hard drinking. The start of the twentieth century brought anecdotes of friendly football matches on the battlefields of the First World War during religious festival unofficial ‘cease-­ fires’. Throughout that century, football became highly organised and became a professional rather than an amateur sport at the top echelons, leading to Premier League players in England, and other European countries, being paid obscenely high salaries and transfer fees between football clubs. While this was occurring, football became tarnished with the spectre of football hooliganism (Dunning, 1988) the so-called ‘English disease’ (Stott & Pearson, 2007). As any Football Match Police Commander would tell you, the police in England throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s, set in place massive planning and operational orders to prevent or mitigate effects from crowd disorder both inside and outside football stadia. Although the football-related disasters started at the turn of the twentieth century, it was apparently not until late in the same century that effective measures were introduced (Fig. 10.1).

Football-Related Disasters and Inquiries Figure 10.1 lists football-related disasters which resulted in over 1600 deaths and countless thousand injuries (Beckley, 2011; Elliott & Smith, 1993). These disasters included the collapse of stadia and Ibrox Stadium in Glasgow suffered two incidents, seventy years apart, in 1902 and 1971, which was roughly the time it took for football in England to be effectively managed and organised into a safe and secure sport for players and spectators. There were many public enquiries into the disasters, such as Popplewell (1986) and Stott (2009), but the main faults that caused the disasters could be summarised as: poor design or construction of sports stadia; faulty policing operations; spectator

10  Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United… Year

187

Dead

Injured

Year

Dead

Injured

1902

Glasgow, Scotland

25

517

1989

Sheffield, England

95

n/k

1946

Bolton, England

33

500

1991

Orkney, Sth. Africa

42

n/k

1955

Santiago, Chile

6

n/k

1992

Bastia, Corsica

18

1900

1964

Lima, Peru

328

500

1996

Lusaka, Zambia

9

78

1968

B A, Argentina

74

150

1996

Tripoli, Libya

0

50

1971

Glasgow, Scotland

66

140

1996

Guatemala City

84

180

1971

Salvador, Brazil

4

1500

1997

Lagos, Nigeria

5

12

1974

Cairo, Egypt

49

n/k

2000

Monrovia, Liberia

3

n/k

1976

Yaounde, Cameroon

2

n/k

2000

Harare, Zimbabwe

13

n/k

1976

Port-au-Prince, Haiti

5

n/k

2001

Jo’burg, Sth Africa

47

155

1981

Athens, Greece

21

n/k

2001

Congo

7

n/k

Ghana

126

n/k

Place

Place

1982

Moscow, Russia

340

n/k

2001

1985

Bradford, England

56

265

2004

Togo

4

8

1985

Brussels, Belgium

39

600

2007

Zambia

12

n/k

1987

Tripoli, Libya

20

n/k

2009

Ivory Coast

19

100

1988

Kathmandu, Nepal

39

100

2012

Port Said, Egypt

79

n/k

1670

6755

TOTALS

Fig. 10.1  Football-related disasters – 1902 to 2012. (Source: Various – collected by the Author over time)

over-crowding; or football hooliganism. The author completed a short study of the recommendations from three such inquiries at: Bolton, Bradford, and Hillsborough (Sheffield) which occurred between 1946 to 1989. The table (Fig. 10.2) reveals that similar problems and issues were identified by the inquiries, but due to inaction, omission, and obfuscation, no effective action was taken until the late 1980s. Following his examination of football disasters, Johnes (2004:16) said: ‘The history of football disasters in post-war Britain illustrates how the safety of consumers has been submerged beneath wider concerns’. This is a history of prevarication, delays, and failures of a duty of care towards spectators and supporters of football world-wide. The author identified at least 12 other inquiries and information sources about football-related disasters between 1972 to 1996 (Beckley, 2011), but it was not until the devastating Hillsborough disaster that effective action was taken.

Hillsborough Disaster in 1989 The circumstances on 15 April 1989 that caused the crushing deaths of 96 and several hundreds of people injured are documented in the public record and investigated in the Taylor Report (1990). The football match held on that day was between Liverpool FC and Nottingham Forest FC, an FA Cup semi-final which was held (in Sheffield) on a neutral ground, as is usual at this stage of the competition. Over 50,000 spectators were due to watch this game of football, but many were late

188

A. Beckley

Inquiry Recommendations

Bolton Wanderers disaster – 1946

Bradford City FC disaster – 1985

Hughes, 1946

Popplewell, 1985

     

 

(overcrowding/crushed spectators)

Inquiry Report

Condition of Entrances Unauthorised entry Movement internally Calculation of capacity Licencing of Grounds Update Green Guide (Sports Ground safety manual) Police Training Additional Police Powers Steward Training Criminal offences (fans/touts) Control of Alcohol Building Regulations Supporters Membership Scheme All-seater Stadia Closed Circuit TV More safety provision Advisory Groups on Safety Subsequent Legislation

(stadium fire)

Hillsborough disaster – 1989 (overcrowding/crushed spectators, police decision-making) Taylor, 1990

 

     

   

  

  

     

None – voluntary system

Amend Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975; Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol) Act 1985

Football Spectators Act 1989; Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999; Football (Disorder) Act 2000; Violent Crime Reduction Act, 2006

Fig. 10.2  Three football disasters: Comparison of recommendations from Inquiries compiled by the Author from Hughes (1946) and Taylor (1990)

arriving at the ground, and this led to crushing in several areas, mainly the ‘Leppings Lane’ end of the ground. Police officers on duty at the ground failed to take effective action to prevent injuries and deaths at this disaster. Several observers stated that the disaster was similar to those which occurred at Bolton in 1946: ‘The crushing accident at Bolton in 1946 has a striking similarity with the Hillsborough disaster’ (Dickie, 1995:319) and in the Bolton Inquiry: ‘of serious casualties inflicted by a crowd upon itself’ (Hughes, 1946:1). The Leppings Lane stand did not comply with all safety requirements and supporters were locked into the stand, although the rest of the Hillsborough ground was well-maintained and compliant with safety requirements (Scraton, 2004:185). On 17 April 1989, the Right Honourable Lord Justice Peter Taylor was appointed by the Home Secretary: ‘To inquire into the events at Sheffield Wednesday Football Ground on 15 April 1989 and to make recommendations about the needs of crowd

10  Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United…

189

control and safety at sports events’. Taylor, a senior judge, finally reported in 1990 and the main recommendations are listed in Fig. 10.2 above. It is important to realise that the police at this time, quite wrongly, took on the sole responsibility of managing the safety and security at sporting venues such as this match, although the football ground and other organisations paid an agreed sum for policing. Police officers were appointed to be Football Match Commanders at all levels of the professional game; the commander at this game was Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield, who had no experience as a football match commander and little experience of managing major public events. Friends and relatives of those people killed at the disaster looked to establish blame for the incident on the police. Although an inquest into the deaths made a finding of unlawful killing there were no criminal charges against anyone until David Duckenfield was tried for manslaughter in 2019, thirty years after the incident. A ten-week trial commencing in January 2019 failed to reach verdicts, but the re-trial was finalised in that November when Duckenfield was acquitted of gross negligence, manslaughter. It was reported that families and friends of the deceased spectators labelled Duckenfield: ‘a coward and a disgrace’ when they learned of the outcome of the trial and accused the judge’s summing up as being ‘one-sided’. In researching a master’s degree and a book published in the late 1990s, the author interviewed several police officers connected to the Hillsborough disaster, and gave a warning that, under existing management systems, individual police officers could be held liable for disasters that occurred under their management and control (Beckley, 1997a, b). The Taylor report was presented to the English Parliament in 1990 and came to the conclusions that there was a failure of police control, and that over-crowding was the main reason for the disaster (Scraton, 2004). The report led to enhanced safety legislation and a new body to licence football grounds and monitor safety requirements: The Football Licencing Authority. Football clubs, which were all commercial enterprises, were henceforward to take responsibility for safety and security inside football grounds, and the police were responsible for public safety outside the grounds. Taylor also advocated all-seated football grounds as being one of the main safety precautions saying: ‘There is no panacea which will achieve total safety and cure all problems of behaviour and crowd control. But I am satisfied that seating does more to achieve those objectives than any other measure’ (Taylor, 1990:12). The provision of all-seated grounds is a source of contention to this day for football fans as they believe that seating changes the atmosphere and camaraderie of the football crowd. The Taylor report heralded a new standard in safety and security at football grounds (Williams & Vannucci, 2020), resulting in the building of new stadiums, new management systems for safety and stewarding, and enhanced facilities for spectators and corporate sponsors. It is certainly significant that there have been no disasters at football grounds in England from that date. In addition, to bring the subject up to date, football hooliganism (Dart, 2008; Spaaij, 2014) in England has largely been brought under control (Kavassanu, 2006) through improvements to football stadia, enhanced stewarding skills, increased powers of punishment, such

190

A. Beckley

as football exclusion orders, increased video surveillance, police intelligence and specifically appointed football intelligence officers (NPIA, 2010; Stott, 2009; Williams & Vannucci, 2020). This led journalist Owen Gibson, in 2009, to state: ‘Out of the ashes of Hillsborough modern football [in England] was born’ (Gibson, 2009). There have been very few incidents of football hooliganism noted in the twenty-first century other than individual skirmishes; a League Cup match in 2010, two matches in 2012–13 season and an FA Cup match in Birmingham in 2015 (Spaaij, 2014:147b). However, the essence of British football was fundamentally altered by the changes to safety and security by the Taylor report. Historically, football was a working class, mass attendance phenomenon, but the changes to the well-loved but less well-cherished and maintained football grounds meant that the demographic of football spectators changed over the last century. From ‘blue collar’ workers at that start, to young hooligans and trouble-makers – excluding the audience of females and young people from the mix. According to Williams and Vannucci (2020:79), post-Taylor, at least four other changes were noted: (i) Public attitudes towards football changed through the extensive legislation and the different attitude towards safety and comfort of spectators, coupled with a less confrontational policing style; (ii) New football grounds were built with powerful and accurate closed-circuit television (CCTV) facilities along with intelligence-led policing techniques; (iii) New ticketing and pricing regimes which tended to filter out hooligan groups (but also disadvantaged or working-class demographics). Marketing techniques targeted a wider audience by age, ethnicity, sex, and social class; and (iv) New legislation that sought to heavily punish spectator misconduct and the technical ability through seating and CCTV to accurately identify offenders. Although the changes certainly led to more peaceful, safe, and secure football games, many fans in England thought that the ‘atmosphere’ of the live game suffered because of the changes. This led to calls to bring back non-seated areas within stadia; an issue that is still being discussed. From the scourge of football hooliganism and the devastating impact of football disasters, this chapter will now examine football-related disorder in a comparison between Australia and England.

Football in England A simple explanation of the governance of football in England is that it is managed by two bodies: The Football Association (FA) and the Football League. The FA has remained a body steeped in tradition and somewhat old-fashioned in its mode of operation. On the other hand, the Football League, as described above, has developed in a multi-billion pound organisation recognised throughout the world for its successful promotion of individual football clubs such as Manchester United (James & Day, 2015). The FA manages international football matches for England and the annual FA Cup (officially called The FA Challenge Cup) which was first played in 1871–72 season and open to all 92 professional football league clubs and several

10  Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United…

191

hundred non-league (semi-professional or amateur teams) registered in the English National League System. The FA Cup system can involve over 700 football teams in the knock-out competition which eventually results in the FA Cup Final. Concurrently there is the FA Women’s Cup tournament with an ever-increasing number of participants. Winners of the FA Cup qualify for lucrative Europa League football matches and the FA Community Shield match. The Football League manages the English Premier League (EPL) or Premiership and the English Football League (EFL) or Championship, both highly profitable organisations with surrounding television and media income along with effective marketing, football kit, and sponsorship deals. Rules relating to promotion and relegation from these leagues involve massive financial impacts when football teams are demoted to a lower league. Below the Premiership and Championship there are League 1 and League 2 football clubs which are relatively less profitable to the extent that some clubs are not financially viable (Jennett & Sloane, 2006). The relative profitability of football clubs can be deduced from the aggregate attendances at matches in Fig. 10.3. The EPL seasonal average attendance totals illustrate the power and success of the draw for the football fans in England and show a steady increase in numbers between 2005 and 2019 (see Fig. 10.4). The trend of increase should be compared with the situation shown in Australia for the A-League average attendances in Fig. 10.7 below. As can be seen in Fig. 10.4, average attendance in the EPL for the

16.

14.5

Aggregate attendance in millions

14. 12.

11.12

10. 8. 6.

4.8

4.

2.47

2. 0.

Premier League

Championship

League 1

League 2

Fig. 10.3  Overall football attendance in the United Kingdom (UK) in 2019, by league (also see Fig. 10.4). (Source: Worldfootball.net)

192

A. Beckley

39000

38297 38168

Average aendance

38000 37000

36076

36000 35000 34000

33885

34365

35592

35273 34151

35921

36631

36176 36452

37523

35822

34601

33000 32000 31000

Season

Fig. 10.4  English Premier League Seasonal Average Attendance Totals. (Source: Worldfootball.net)

last three seasons has been 37–38,000 spectators, a result un-matched in Australia even for AFL matches.

Policing and Safety at Football Grounds Current advice given to all police forces in England and Wales reiterates the relationship between the police and football clubs as a partnership where the club is responsible for the overall safety of those present at the event and the police assist by preventing and detecting crime and disorder (College of Policing, 2013). The guidance suggests there should be a statement of intent setting out the respective roles and responsibilities and the charging agreements which have been discussed. In terms of policing, the guidance describes the role of the police commander who liaises with the club’s designated safety officer, the dedicated football officer (focal point for information and intelligence about football) and the football spotter with the role of on-the-ground intelligence and information and community engagement. All these dedicated roles should be performed by police officers with relevant experience (learning from the Hillsborough disaster). In England and Wales, police use a standardised set of categories to identify the risk of disorder of the specific football match, including police-free, minimal attention and low to high risk as appropriate. Football matches are policed through the usual management practices of public order/public safety (POPS) command. Since 2005, national football intelligence is centred on the UK Football Policing Unit with responsibility for providing intelligence within England and Wales and internationally. In terms of travel, the British Transport Police (BTP) have a role to ensure football fans travelling by rail enter and leave police force areas safely and peacefully.

10  Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United…

193

In England and Wales, the licencing authority for the operation and safety at football grounds is the Sports Ground Safety Authority (formerly Football Licencing Authority). In no uncertain terms, the Authority sets down that the football club is responsible for spectator safety and employing a safety officer, although it is responsible for providing inspections and tests of the stadium, safe capacity calculations (Perkins, 2016). The football club is also responsible for: creating a safety management structure; providing trained supervisors and stewards; formulating contingency plans and evacuation procedures with safe access and exit procedures; and searching spectators on entry. Current ‘hot topics’ relating to sports ground safety have been identified as: counter terrorism; pyrotechnics; persistent standing in seated areas; drones; and accessibility issues.

Football-Related Violence The usual way to measure football-related violence is by way of the number of arrests per season. Football related arrests are closely monitored by the UK government and are published annually by the Home Office (Fig. 10.5). As can be seen from Fig. 10.5, the number of football-related arrests in the UK has shown a downward trend from 1990 to 2018. The statistics can be broken down further into the several leagues of football in England and Wales shown in Fig. 10.6. As can be seen, the long-term trajectory of arrests is going down, from 3000 in the 2010–11 season to around 1500 in the 2017–18 season. Although in a recent research study in the UK, 80% of respondents considered youth hooliganism at

Fig. 10.5  Football-related arrests, 1985–2018. (Source: Home Office, UK)

194

A. Beckley

3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 -00

2010-11

2011-12

2012-13

2013-14

2014-15

2015-16

2016-17

2017-18

Total

Premier League

Championship

League One

League Two

Naonal League (Naonal Division)

Other

Fig. 10.6  Football-related arrests, England and Wales 2010–2018. (Source: Home Office, UK)

football matches had increased over the past five seasons and had ‘become fashionable’ again due to the lower police presence as a result of tighter financial control over the police (Hester, 2020a). However, statistics do not corroborate the research findings, which were carried out between November 2018 and May 2019, as numbers of arrests and incidents reduced again in the 2018/19 season at 1382 (from 1542); a 10% decrease from the previous year (Home Office, 2019). The prevalent offence types were public disorder (38%) and violent disorder (19%). In that season 1007 reported incidents at football matches including incidents with pyrotechnics (33%), throwing of missiles (30%) and pitch incursions (19%); this was a decrease of 4% (1050) in the number from the previous season. In that season, the football-­related arrests per 100,000 attendees were an average of 3.3 overall, but by far the highest rate (22.6) was the football league trophy (Premiership). Adair and Vamplew (1990) reviewed six earlier studies of spectator disorder at football matches in Australia and the UK. They found that typically football hooligans were male and in their early 20s, but in the UK, they were employed in manual working-class occupations. One of the studies pointed out: ‘street-fighting and village brawls at football matches were so much a part of “traditional” society that we tend to forget how relatively civilised modern social life has become’. The idea was that the socio-economic mix of football crowds had changed significantly over the twentieth century towards a less disadvantaged audience but with lower social cohesion and lower behavioural controls. At that time, there were concerns about spectator violence at football grounds in Australia, but there was no data available to establish the strength and trend of the phenomena. Several reports blamed excessive consumption of alcohol and ‘unemployment’ but, because of lack of data, remedies or solutions could not be justified.

10  Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United…

195

Australia – History of A-League Football Prior to the authoritative Crawford Report in 2003, from the recommendations of which the A-League was formed, football/soccer had been played in Australia from the time of colonisation. Its popularity peaked in the 1960s but there were several problems haunting the code. In 1961, the Australian Soccer Federation (ASF) was the governing body which formed the National Soccer League (NSL) in 1977. Average attendance at matches was three to four thousand spectators and football clubs were formed based on ethnicity from immigrants from specific countries. The League consisted of 14 teams of which 11 were based on ethnicity: four were Greek, three were Italian, two were Croatian, one Maltese, and one Macedonian (Danforth, 2001). The ethnicity of the teams caused problems when political, social, or global issues were perceived between the teams which led to rivalry, public disorder, assaults, criminal damage, and racist taunts (Skinner et al., 2008). To improve this in 1992–3 season, the ASF banned all teams with foreign or ethnic names in the National Soccer League, although the campaign to ‘de-ethnicise’ soccer in Australia was, at first, not successful; this did not occur until the late-1990s when the national soccer team was attempting to qualify for the 1998 World Cup. According to Georgakis and Molloy (2016:72) the game of football was described at this time as: ‘fractured, marginalised and ghettoised’. After the national soccer team (the ‘Socceroos’) failed to qualify for international competitions, there was a media investigation into the financial and organisational issues facing Soccer Australia that resulted in an intervention in the game by the federal government which initiated a committee inquiry which led, in 2004, to the demise of the NSL (Harper, 2019). The intervention resulted in the influential Crawford Report (2003) which investigated governance issues and problems relating to ethnicity and violence. Most of the recommendations from the report ‘were made in an attempt to “mainstream” and “broaden” football’s appeal to the wider Australian society’ (Georgakis & Molloy, 2016:73). The Crawford Report made 53 recommendations (pages 9–12) fundamentally starting the administration and operation of the game of football from scratch based on new principles of fairness, equity, non-discrimination, and good governance. The Crawford Committee acknowledged: … over the past two decades, soccer in Australia has found itself addressing a series of crises evidenced more recently by: a) severe financial problems; b) reduced staffing levels; c) political infighting; d) lack of strategic direction and planning; and e) mixed results on the field in the international arena (Crawford, 2003:1).

It concluded that it was necessary to implement changes that: 1. Ensure the governing bodies are independent and capable of acting in the best interests of the sport as a whole; 2. Separate governance from day-to-day management by implementing an effective governance and management structure; 3. Ensure that all stakeholders have the opportunity to be heard, that is, change membership and voting structures at national and state levels; and. 4. Restructure the relationship between Soccer Australia and the NSL (Crawford, 2003:3).

196

A. Beckley

The approach suggested by the Crawford report of ‘grass roots level’ development and coaching has generally worked well (Lock et al., 2009) and subsequently on an international level the Socceroos have achieved a high ranking (2010 World Cup = 14). However, according to the latest (2019) Caltex ranking, the Socceroos are 44th in FIFA country rankings. The female football team (the ‘Matildas’) have achieved an even more significant growth and their current FIFA/Coca-Cola world ranking is number 6. Following the Crawford report, the new football league, the Hyundai A-League was formed and commenced on 26 August 2005 heralded by advertising to differentiate the new league from the NSL. Initially there were eight teams: Sydney FC, Newcastle Jets, Central Coast Mariners, Melbourne Victory, Adelaide United, Perth Glory, Brisbane Roar, and the New Zealand Knights (subsequently replaced by Wellington Phoenix). In 2014/2015 this was expanded to ten teams (Melbourne City, Western Sydney Wanderers) with a home and away tournament, a top-four playoff and Grand Final. Subsequently Western United FC and Macarthur FC were added to the League and Fig.  10.7 depicts the average attendances at A-League football matches from 2005 to 2019. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, there are no comparative data in 2019–2020 season. Having started on an excellent upward trend of attendance in 2005 to 2007, attendances then took a dip. Positive gains in 2011 to 2013 were not sustained subsequently and are showing a downward trend from 2016–17. Measures to address this will be discussed later in this chapter. There has not been a significant threat to football in Australia such as the hooliganism described above in the English and European games since the 1990s described above, although, for example, in 2010 to 2020 there have been several ‘crowd disturbances’, and the ignition of flares in confined spaces causing danger. The development of individual players and football clubs in Australia has been significantly enhanced ‘post-Crawford’ by entering football competitions such as Asian Football Confederation (AFC), the Asian Nations Cup and Asian Champions League, although there has been widespread use of ‘marquee’ players. That is players from other countries with good skills and famous internationally (usually towards the end of their playing career) to enhance the popularity of the team they play in. In addition, many of the Australian male and female professional football players have transferred to higher quality football teams all around the world, but especially in Europe.

Policing of Football Matches On policing of football matches in Australia, a system of ‘command’ and ‘control’ is in use, which is different to that in the UK, but there is vast experience managing police response to major crowd events such as the Royal Easter Show and well attended sporting events; for example, in Sydney multiple venues were in use at the same time with 140,000 people in a relatively small precinct (NSWPF, 2017:8). The

10  Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United… 16000 14000 12000 10956 10000 8000

12911

14610 12347

12180 9793

13041 12511 12326 12294

10497

197

10671 10411

8429

6000 4000 2000 0

Fig. 10.7  A-league average attendance, 2005 to 2019. (Source: Ultimate A-League)

entire system of emergency management in Australia is different to that in England and, indeed, there is differing legislation and systems in each of the states and territories in this country. As an organisation, the police do not necessarily have automatic primacy in the management and resolution of major incidents and emergencies like the police in the UK, although several states1 designate the Police Commissioner as the state emergency/disaster controller or coordinator. However, the police in Australia are an essential integral part of the multi-agency response to any such incidents. On the policing of football, senior police officers liaise closely with football clubs and other relevant stakeholders to ensure the safety and security of spectators; there is a system of ‘user-pays’ for the cost of policing which is detailed below. Data relating to arrests at football matches are not centrally recorded in Australia, possibly because there has been a lower level of football hooliganism or a different approach towards ‘larrikins’ than many other countries. Press reports appear to bear this assertion out as there are few incidents of violent behaviour in this country, for example the head of the A-League stated that only 19 people were arrested at matches during the entire 2018 season (Adno, 2018). If this is truly the case, the fears of the academics (Spaaij, 2014b), and the press in 2014 and 2015 which announced that events heralded widespread outbreaks of disorder were unfounded.

Cost of Policing Football Matches Both in Australia and England, the authorities have realised that there are significant policing costs related to what, after all, is the commercial enterprise of staging football matches. This was a significantly higher problem during the football hooligan eras previously referred to. However, there are still considerable costs in relation to human resources and the removal of policing services from their normal patrol areas to areas in the immediate vicinity of the football ground. Charging football clubs for  For example, New South Wales: State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (NSW).

1

198

A. Beckley

policing services has always been a contentious issue, as there are often disagreements over specific levels of policing; frequently, the clubs believing that matches were over-policed. In England, the policing of football matches was discussed several times in Parliament, leading to the House of Commons, in 2009, to recommend ‘full cost recovery’ of policing services (House of Commons, 2009). Since the 1980s, football matches in England were placed into a specific category of risk in relation to the likelihood of public disorder and the number of spectators. This was based on previous experience and football intelligence and was usually accurate. As a result of this assessment, the number and type of police officers and supporting services, such as police dogs and horses etc. would be calculated. Following this a memorandum of understanding (MoU) would be produced between the football club and the police force concerned, setting out roles and responsibilities and costs of providing the service. Problems occurred when football clubs denied any responsibility for the behaviour of football fans outside the ground, yet those many areas needed policing. Also, the full cost recovery of policing was enormous as police forces charged for per head of police officer, depending on rank and a charge for holiday pay and sick pay was also included. In 2017 in England, the disputes over policing costs resulted in Ipswich Town Football Club successfully disputing the level of policing costs in the Court of Appeal which held that the police could only charge for officers engaged inside the football ground – not even the immediate surroundings. This matter was again discussed in Parliament, with submissions about the high level of income of the Premier League football clubs, and where various solutions were suggested but were not adopted. Assertions to the discussion, stated that the National Police Chiefs Council estimated the cost of policing football matches in England and Wales was 48  m GBP per year whereas police could only recover 5.5 m GBP from clubs; this was at a time of extreme austerity in the country relating to funding of police forces (Hollobone, 2019). The statement from the police chiefs was corroborated by the London Metropolitan Police Service in a freedom of information request which reported the cost of policing football matches in London in 2016/7 was 9.3 m GBP and costs recovered from clubs was 796,000 GBP (Information Rights Unit, 2018). In Australia, the police were never as actively involved in the hands-on organisational management of football matches as has been described earlier in England. The role of Australian police forces has always clearly been to deal with incidents of disorder in the ground and during the ingress and egress of the match. However, ‘user charges’ for policing services have been the norm for many years in (for example) New South Wales (NSW, 2010). The latest guidance on cost recovery were released in 2019 and appear to be more reasonable and open to negotiation than the English version that was rejected by the courts there (NSWPF, 2019). Indeed, the charges for football matches only apply to crowds over 20,000. As discussed earlier in this chapter, few football matches in Australia reach this benchmark. Also, the level of charges for events are set to cover only ‘avoidable costs’, and the event organiser is not charged for overhead costs (NSW, 2010). Despite the

10  Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United…

199

reasonableness of government policies, the charging for police services at football matches appears to be contentious around the world (Baxter et al., 2019).

 rimes Committed by Football Fans in the Vicinity C of Football Grounds The level and types of arrest of football-related crimes have been discussed earlier, but there have been various studies into crimes at or nearby football grounds in several countries. Research has tended to support the police case for user-pays for services, as the findings tend to show that the holding of football matches leads to an increase in crime and disorder in the vicinity that would not have occurred otherwise. For example, in Serbia, a study of 139 male participants on football fan groups found that over 75% were aged over 21, with the majority (73%) residing in urban areas; most (69%) had completed secondary education, but 56% were unemployed and 75% were single marital status. Most of the participants were from ‘families with unfavourable socio-economic status’. The total of 1142 criminal offences in which they were involved were wide-ranging and mostly not related to public disorder; from theft, robbery, and drug related crimes to illegal possession of weapons, violent behaviour, and homicides, but the majority of crimes (75%) and ‘misdemeanours’ (81%) were committed by those fans over 21 years (Baic et al., 2017). Also, Kurland et al. (2018) completed a study of five football stadia based in UK cities over a six-year time frame to establish whether football matches generate crime within football grounds and beyond them. The study found that there was a higher risk of crime and incidents in the immediate surrounding areas of the football stadia during the times when the matches occurred.

Policing Techniques to Deter Football Hooliganism The next section in this chapter will discuss some of the policing techniques to deter and detect football hooliganism and the issue of police intelligence has already been mentioned. The subjects that are relevant are police training and techniques; alcohol at football grounds; successfully dealing with football crowds and crowd psychology; finally, the contentious issue of football banning orders. Of course, one of the main things that has increased safety at sports grounds and reduced public disorder is the lessons learned from football ground design and safety techniques implemented by well-trained and deployed stewarding staff and the vast amount of technology introduced over the last 30 years. Described as the most heavily policed social groups, football supporters are routinely restricted in their freedom of movement, stopped, and searched and subject to heavyweight intelligence-gathering and surveillance techniques such as CCTV,

200

A. Beckley

intelligence-led policing, undercover police officers and police spotters. Through the troubling era of football hooliganism in the late twentieth century, football fans appeared to finally acquiesce and accept they were beaten by the plethora of measures both physical (all-seater stadia) and legislative which resulted in the number of football-related arrests going down substantially through the first twenty years of the twenty-first century. However, there are worrying signs from recent research that this trend could change with the spectre of football hooliganism raising its head again. Apart from the arsenal of cosy and benign crowd safety measures that have been introduced to calm crowds and enforce ‘social distancing’, this chapter will now examine some recent developments in policing techniques to combat the ‘English disease’. There is an element of copy-catting football hooliganism in Australia and there have been several calls for changes in the approach of police towards football-related violence, which here appears to go unchecked. Informants (or covert human intelligence sources [CHIS]) have been used by the police since the beginning of civilisation in their fight against crime and corruption. However, there has been research about police in Scotland recruiting football fans as informants to provide information and intelligence about football related violence and public disorder (Atkinson et al., 2020). The research uncovered concern among police officers that the technique of using informants for football intelligence had relegated its effectiveness as a police technique from high policing (such as terrorism and organised crime) to everyday ‘low policing’ (Atkinson et  al., 2020:8). Although it was regarded as a legitimate policing tactic, the use of informants in the sphere of risk supporters was viewed as ‘surveillance creep’ which could result in practical and ethical issues for police resulting in wrongful criminalisation of young people and distancing between police and public. In another research project, the authors, Stead and Rookwood (2007) interviewed football supporters and football intelligence [police] officers about actions taken to prevent football hooliganism. Supporters believed that the covert and intelligence-­ led approach of the UK police, was more effective than the aggressive and overt style of the police in other parts of Europe. Participants in the study agreed that the police in the UK had developed a ‘consistent, standardised and effective model of managing hooliganism’ (p. 33). Although the view of some participants was that police presence sometimes worsened situations that led to public disorder, it was ‘just as likely to aggravate a situation as relieve it’ (p. 37). Particularly where the police were wearing ‘riot gear’ (or ‘protective clothing’ according to police), it turned peaceful situations into an aggressive atmosphere. The study concluded and concurred with Stott & Pearson (2006) that a ‘low profile’ police presence rather than a highly visible presence was likely to result in prevention of disorderly conduct. Police are not helped by the official European Union definitions,2 of ‘risk

 European Union – Council Resolution OJC/322.

2

10  Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United…

201

supporters’ contained in the legislation3 which are not specific and are widely misinterpreted by police officers. Designating individuals with this label could be a self-fulfilling prophecy and result in heavier penalties in the courts if found guilty.

Police Training and Techniques When police officers in the UK were appointed as ‘Match Commanders’ there were some training courses on safety at sports grounds, crowd density, management of crowds, football intelligence and other related matters. Since the review of the laws and practice, such courses are no longer necessary and police training for management of public order in general has covered this subject. The details about police training for public order will be included in the other chapter in this book by this author. In any case, the police training for crowd psychology at football matches was considered out of date and dangerously inaccurate. Indeed, researchers pointed out that the NPIA4 2006 police Public Order Commanders Course defined a crowd as: ‘a crowd is a device for indulging ourselves in a kind of temporary insanity by all going crazy together’ (Stott, 2009). Plus, the usual police tactics of segregation of different supporters, close control, and tight supervision of fans both inside and outside stadia, was actually non-effective. Clifford Stott and James Hoggett, researchers from the University of Liverpool have spent decades researching crowd psychology, especially related to football matches. They found that dealing with football crowds required the use of crowd psychology utilising Police Liaison Teams who used dialogue-based and non-coercive techniques. Other researchers also found that police use of force against protest crowds and football crowds was counter-productive and indeed resulted in provocation and escalation of violence rather than the pacification of violence (Madensen & Knutsson, 2011:4). At that time, Stott re-wrote the ACPO5 handbook entitled Keeping the Peace in the section relating to crowd behaviour and crowd management, amending the guidelines to: 1. Crowd behaviour is ‘… the evolving interaction between the police and the crowds that are present’; 2. A more interactive strategy ‘promotes contact and trust’; 3. Which leads to crowd ‘self-policing’ and aids police enforcement activities (Stott,

 Definitions of risk and non-risk supporters. The European Union provides the following definitions for risk and non-risk supporters (see Council Resolution OJC/322): 3

• risk supporter – a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or antisocial behaviour, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event, • non-risk supporter – a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing no risk to the cause of or contribution to violence or disorder, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event. 4  NPIA = National Policing Improvement Agency in the UK. 5  ACPO = The Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

202

A. Beckley

2009). The subject of crowd psychology will be covered in greater depth in a companion chapter on policing public disorder elsewhere in this book.

Alcohol at Sporting Events Going back to the twentieth century inquiries into football disasters and hooliganism, they found that there was a ‘strong relationship exists between alcohol and violence’ (McElhone, 1977). The Taylor Report (1990) cited ‘alcohol as a possible cause for disorder’, but research by Tomsen (1997) found: ‘… no direct and obvious tie between violence and the use of alcohol, there is a complex but powerful link between many incidents of public violence and the social process of collective drinking’. Subsequently, the evidential link between alcohol and football-related violence has been observed as weaker, and, indeed, the fact that alcohol is freely available at other sports events (which do not suffer incident of public disorder) tend to corroborate that weakness. However, as a remedial solution, laws were passed in the UK6 to ban alcohol at football matches, but the mass of supporters noted that spectators seated in corporate boxes and expensive club seating were still allowed to purchase alcoholic drinks. Subsequently, research indicated that consumption of alcohol was regarded by fans as: ‘an integral part of the match experience’ and alcohol was consumed in great quantities before the match, therefore the alcohol ban inside the football ground was ineffective (Pearson & Sale, 2011). At football matches in the UK and Australia, alcohol is available, provided it is purchased on the site of the football ground. However, to confuse this issue, the most recent research on this subject was completed in Brazil. The study, which examined violence among football fans, found that alcohol can be an important trigger for violence and therefore alcohol banning orders should be considered. It found that although alcohol is not the sole cause of violence it is certainly one of the causes. The study gave examples of States in Brazil where alcohol was banned in and around football stadia, there was marked decrease in the number of incidents and arrests violent incidents (Belmont, 2020).

Football Banning Orders Football banning orders (FBOs) have been a major influence in preventing or mitigating incidents of public disorder at football grounds since their introduction in the 1990s. However, their draconian provisions and non-compliance with globally accepted legal and rights-based principles have led to controversy and allegations of

 Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol) Act 1985. Acts of Parliament in the UK can be accessed through the UK Statue Law Database, UK National Archives: http://www.legislation.gov.uk 6

10  Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United…

203

unfairness. The following section will outline some of the issues that have arisen both in the UK and Australia. In the UK, the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 introduced domestic and international Football Banning Orders (FBOs) after previous legislation had used exclusion orders; FBOs are of a statutory duration for a minimum period of three years and a maximum of five years. An FBO is defined as a civil order which may be made by a court to help prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with regulated football matches. Stead and Rookwood (2007:36) reported that Football Intelligence Officers (FIOs) they interviewed said that FBOs were: ‘largely responsible for the control and even break up of many hooligan groups. It’s helped us change the way we police fans’. From the football fans’ perspective, the threat of a ban has served as a considerable deterrent from disorderly behaviour. The graph in Fig. 10.8 below depicts the number of FBOs that were granted by the courts between the years 2010 and 2018  in the various football leagues in England and Wales. As can be observed in that figure, the total number of FBOs has fluctuated from almost 1000 in 2010 down to just over 400 in 2018. The number of new (not continuing) FBOs appears to be on downward trend from 2015–16 season. However, a government report (Home Office, 2019), reported that in 2019 there were 1771 FBOs in force which were a decrease from the previous football season and in England and Wales, there had been a ‘steady decline’ in FBOs since 2011. But the report pointed out that fans from five football clubs had retained the highest number of FBOs for consecutive football seasons which tended to indicate less of a deterrent effect (Home Office, 2019:4). Also, research from police sources indicated that football-related arrests and FBOs had declined over that period because fewer police intelligence resources (called ‘football spotters’) were available to police football matches due to 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0

2010-11

2011-12

2012-13

2013-14

2014-15

2015-16

2016-17

2017-18

Total

Premier League clubs

Championship clubs

League One clubs

League Two clubs

Naonal League (Naonal Division) clubs

Other clubs

Fig. 10.8  Football-related new banning orders, 2011–2018, England and Wales. (Source: Home Office, UK)

204

A. Beckley

government ‘austerity’ measures rather than fewer incidents of disorder (Hester, 2020a). This is so, despite that the 43 police forces in England and Wales can apply for special funding from a central government department (UKFPU7) to apply for funding for FBOs. However, the law relating to FBOs has been widely criticised as it was introduced rapidly following the disorder created by England supporters at Euro 2000 in Belgium. Critics have claimed that the law is too draconian, and the police have used the powers disproportionately and inconsistently (Hester, 2020b:3; Stott and Pearson, 2006). Also, research after ten years of the introduction of FBOs indicated that police were under pressure to deliver targets of the number of orders they obtained (Hopkins, 2014). FBOs have been criticised for criminalising the breach of the FBO rather than the original criminal behaviour, thereby under-mining the correct legal processes, particularly where the punishment for the breach is greater than that for the original crime (James & Pearson, 2015). The power of Magistrates to impose a banning order on complaint of a police officer8 has been criticised by the courts as no charge or conviction for a criminal offence is necessary and the standard of proof has not been clarified, possibly resulting in weak evidence being allowed to prove the complaint (James & Pearson, 2015). Most FBOs contain several standard conditions related to prevention of attending regulated football matches and exclusion from a zone around the football ground, railway stations or town centre. There may also be stipulations that the banned individual surrenders their passport to the local police station—these are serious restrictions on freedom which could be imposed on persons who have not been convicted of criminal offences. FBOs have also been likened to a case of punishment without a trial (James, 2010), although all such claims were rejected in the case of Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire9 which held that they were not a breach of EU law, disproportionate, retroactive or a breach of the UK Human Rights Act. The case also identified the standard of proof in FBO cases to be that of the civil standard rather than the more onerous criminal law standard of proof. Issues with FBOs other than those raised in England occurred in Australia.

Football Banning Orders in Australia In Australia, football spectator banning procedures became necessary because of behaviour ‘by a minority of spectators’ attending A-League matches and this was reviewed in 2016 where it was stated that between August 2005 and 2016 although cumulative attendance at matches was 16 million people, it had only been necessary to impose 320 bans (FFA, 2016). The bans were imposed for the following reasons:

 United Kingdom Football Policin Unit.  Football Spectators Act 1989, s.14B as amended by the Football (Disorder) Act 2000. 9  Case references: Trial: [2001] 3 CMLR 29; Appeal: [2002] 2 CMLR 11. 7 8

10  Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United…

205

Flare Ignition/ Possession (95); Spectator Violence (90); Unauthorised entry to Field of Play (44); Trespass/ Breach of Ban (34); Disorderly Conduct (24); Offensive Behaviour (16); Throw Missile (8); Possess Weapon/ Harmful Substance (4); Possess Prohibited Item (2); Intoxication/ Alcohol Related (2); Damage to Property (1). State police forces in Australia were part of the consultation process on the procedures of the banning process. The review went through historic procedures including the Football Federation Security Program carried out after the review of 2007 which recommended a comprehensive risk program using best practice globally including the UK’s ‘Green Guide’ (FLA, 2016) and FIFA Stadium and Security Regulations (2013). From a short pamphlet on safety at its inception, the Green Guide sixth edition is over 300 pages long and contains many appendices. The 2016 review of banning orders stated that: ‘the paramount interest is and must be protecting, promoting and advancing football and that to do so demands that people coming to games can be assured of a safe and enjoyable, whilst exciting and unique, experience’ (FFA, 2016:26). The main recommendations of the review were: 1. A revised banning procedure that ensures a fairer process by introducing a prior opportunity for the accused to see the allegation against them, see the evidence being used by the FFA to impose the ban and a right of appeal to an independent FFA Tribunal consisting of legally qualified members. 2. Publish a Table of Prohibited Conduct to ensure consistency in bans. 3. FFA to continue to work with the many stakeholders to the banning process and seek legislative reform to ensure its effectiveness. 4. Undertake flare awareness publicity to underline the dangers of igniting flares especially in enclosed spaces. 5. Hyundai A-league football clubs to recognise that they are vicariously liable for the behaviour of their supporters, take ownership of this issue and work proactively to comply with the Minimum Security Standards (MSS). 6. FFA to establish an effective communication strategy with relevant stakeholders. In common with football clubs around the world, the banning orders were linked to common Terms of Admission to football grounds of a generic nature. Football clubs also picked up the responsibility for condemning and punishing violent behaviour by handing out up to ten years bans to attend matches on supporters identified as offenders. Spaaij (2014b) posited that although FBOs could prove a deterrent in reducing violent behaviour, a more holistic approach, including an understanding of fan culture and group dynamics is necessary to increase successful interventions. Also, similar to the UK, FBOs are considered disproportionate; a ‘sledgehammer to crack a nut’; encroaching on basic privacy and freedom rights while cracking down on the lower end of threatening or unruly behaviour.

206

A. Beckley

Conclusion This brief review of the history and effects of soccer-related violence reveals the horrific result of inaction, complacency and uncertainty over roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders. What is clear is that the each of the partners in the game of football, whether players, managers, football clubs, spectators, private and public sector participants need to be clear about their role and responsibilities which are preferably mutually agreed and set down in writing. The above chapter has shown, from the perspective of the police, what can happen if things go wrong and the many things that relevant organisations have done to address the issues in recent years. Also revealed is that the police always need to be agile and responsive to developments in dynamic situations of crowd control and safety when dealing with spectator sport. Police need to deal with soccer-related violence and crowd control with firmness, fairness, and compassion to ensure human rights of individuals are respected while also observing the rules of natural justice for all parties. This balance of rights for individuals and the community is always a conundrum and difficult to get exactly right; the legal and organisational frameworks now in place assist the police in their job, but do not allow for individual mistakes which will be punished with highly accurate 20/20 hindsight.

References Adair, D., & Vamplew, W. (1990). Not so far from the madding crowd: spectator violence in Britain and Australia: A review article. Sporting Traditions, The Journal of Australian Society for Sports History, 7(1), 95–103. Adno, C. (2018, October 1). A-League boss Greg O’Rourke reveals just 19 arrests were made at matches last season. Fox Sports. Retrieved from: https://www.foxsports.com.au/football/aleague-­boss-­greg-­orourke-­reveals-­just-­19-­arrests-­were-­made-­at-­matches-­last-­season/ news-­story/105be8ef96d11f0bb090a325e04a0157 Atkinson, C., McBride, M., & Moore, A. (2020). Pitched! Informants and the covert policing of football fans in Scotland. Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2020.1795168. Baic, V., Ivanovic, Z., & Popovic, S. (2017). Socio-demographic characteristics of violent fan groups as football matches. Acta Kineiologica, 11(1), 37–43. Baxter, J., Carlsson-Wall, M., Chua, W. F., & Kraus, K. (2019). Accounting for the cost of sports-­ related violence. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal., 32(7), 1956–1981. Beckley, A. (1997a). Operational policing: Liabilities & entitlements. Police Review Publishing Company Ltd.. Beckley, A. (1997b). Police Liability for Public Safety in the UK and Europe. Submitted May 1997 in partial fulfilment of master’s degree in Law (LLM). Wolverhampton University, School of Legal Studies. Beckley, A. (2011). Public Safety: Learning the Lessons. Paper presented at the Centre for Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS) annual conference ‘Risk and Resilience: Redefining Security’, 5–7 October 2011, Hilton Brisbane Hotel, Brisbane. Belmont, R. (2020). Alcohol and violence: Brazilian organized football fans. Research Gate. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343655406

10  Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United…

207

College of Policing. (2013). Public order. Policing football. (First published: 23 October 2013. Last modified: 30 January 2020). Coventry: College of Policing, UK. Retrieved from: https:// www.app.college.police.uk/app-­content/public-­order/policing-­football/ Crawford, D. (2003). Report of the Independent Soccer Review Committee into the structure, governance and management of Soccer in Australia. Australian Sports Commission. Danforth, L.  M. (2001, May). Is the ‘World Game’ an ‘Ethnic Game’ or an ‘Aussie Game’? Narrating the nation in Australian soccer. American Ethnologist, 28(2), 363–387. Dart, J. (2008). Confessional tales from former football hooligans: A nostalgic, narcissistic wallow in football violence. Soccer & Society, 9(1), 42–55. Dickie, J. F. (1995). Major crowd catastrophes. Safety Science, 18(1995), 309–320. Dunning, E. (1988). The roots of football hooliganism: An historical and sociological study. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Elliott, D., & Smith, D. (1993). Football Stadia Disaster in the United Kingdom: Learning from the Tragedy. Industrial and Environmental Crisis Quarterly, 7(3). FFA. (2016). Review of football spectator banning procedure and related matters (Report). Football Federation Australia. FFA. (2020). XI principles for the future of Australian Football. Football Federation Australia. Football Licensing Authority. (2016). Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds (6th ed.). (ISBN 978-1-9164583-0-7) (“The Green Guide”). The Stationery Office (TSO). Frosdick, S. (2010). Policing, safety and security in public assembly facilities. International Journal of Police Science and Management, 12(1), 81–89. Georgakis, S., & Molloy, S. (2016). From old soccer to new football? Expert accounts of transformations on the world game in Australia post-Crawford report. Soccer & Society, 17(1), 72–89. Gibson, O. (2009, April 13). Out of the ashes of Hillsborough, modern football was born. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/football/2009/apr/13/liverpool-­ hillsborough-­disasteranniversary#:~:text=That%20English%20football%20was,April%20 1989%20is%20beyond%20dispute Harper, A. (2019). From bastard child to a place in Australia’s family: The Federal Government’s role in repositioning Australian soccer as a legitimate, mainstream sport: A qualitative study. Sport in Society, 22(11), 1816–1833. Hester, R. (2020a). Assessing the UK Football Policing Unit funding of football banning orders in times of policing austerity. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice (May 2020). Retrieved from: https://academic.oup.com/policing/advance-­article-­abstract/doi/10.1093/police/ paaa015/5827739 Hester, R. (2020b). “It’s become fashionable”: Practitioner perspectives on football hooliganism involving young people. In Social vulnerabilities conference 2020. University of Gloucestershire. 15/07/2020, Online – University of Gloucestershire. (Unpublished). Hollobone, P. (Chair). (2019). Cost of policing football. House of Commons Hansard. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/2WIISEt​. Home Office. (2019). Football-related arrests and banning order statistics, England and Wales, 2018/19 Season. Home Office UK. Hopkins, M. (2014). Ten seasons of the football banning order: Police officer narratives on the operation of banning orders on the behaviour of ‘risk supporters’. Policing and Society, 24(3), 285–301. House of Commons. (2009). The costs of policing football matches: Tenth report of session 2008–09. Accessed 17 Oct 2010. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmhaff/339/33902.htm Hughes, R.  M. (1946). Enquiry into the disaster at Bolton Wanderers Football Ground on 9th March 1946 (Cmnd 6846). HMSO. Information Rights Unit. (2018). Freedom of information request. Metropolitan Police Service. James, G., & Day, D. (2015). FA Cup success, football infrastructure and the establishment of Manchester’s footballing identity. Soccer & Society, 16(2–3), 200–216.

208

A. Beckley

James, M. (2010). The regulation of football disorder: a case of punishment without trial? Presentation to the Birkbeck Sport Business Seminar Series, Wednesday 9th December 2010, University College, London. Salford: University of Salford. James, M., & Pearson, G. (2015). Public order and the rebalancing of football fans’ rights: Legal problems with pre-emptive policing strategies and banning orders. Public Law, 2015, 3, July, 458–475. Jennett, N., & Sloane, P. J. (2006). The future of league football: A critique of the report of the Chester committee of enquiry. Leisure Studies, 4(1), 39–56. Johnes, M. (2004). Heads in the sand: Football, politics and crowd disasters in the twentieth-­ century Britain. Soccer and Society, 5(2), 134–151. Kavussanu, M. (2006). Motivational predictors of prosocial and antisocial behaviour in football. Journal of Sports Sciences, 24(6), 575–588. Kurland, J., Tilley, N., & Johnson, S. D. (2018). Football pollution: an investigation of spatial and temporal patterns of crime in and around stadia in England. Security Journal, 31, 665–684. Lock, D., Darcy, S., & Taylor, T. (2009). Starting with a clean slate: An analysis of member identification with a new sports team. Sport Management Review., 12(2009), 15–25. Madensen, T.  D., & Knutsson, J. (Eds.). (2011). Preventing crowd violence. Lynne Reinner Publishers Inc. ISSN 1065 7029. McElhone, F. (1977). Report of the working group on football crowd behaviour. HMSO. NPIA. (2010). Guidance on POLICING FOOTBALL. National Policing Improvement Agency. NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet: Community Engagement and Events Division. (2010). User charges policy: Whole-of-government policy for the application of user charges for major and special events. Accessed 29 Oct 2010. http://www.events.nsw.gov.au/event-­organising/ user-­charges-­policy NSWPF. (2017). New South Wales police force 2016–17 annual report. New South Wales Police Force. NSWPF. (2019). Cost recovery and user charges policy, October 2019. NSW Police Force. Pearson, G., & Sale, A. (2011). ‘On the Lash’ – Revisiting the effectiveness of alcohol controls at football matches. Policing and Society, 21(2), 150–166. Perkins, J. (2016). Safety at sports grounds. Presentation to the Emergency Planning Society. Sports Grounds Safety Authority. Popplewell, O. (1986). Inquiry into safety at Sports Grounds (Cmnd. 9710). HMSO. Scraton, P. (2004). Death on the terraces: The contexts and injustices of the 1989 Hillsborough disaster. Soccer and Society, 5(2), 183–200. Skinner, J., Zakus, D. H., & Edwards, A. (2008). Coming in from the margins: ethnicity, community support and the rebranding of Australian soccer. Soccer & Society, 9(3), 394–404. Spaaij, R. (2014a, January 9). Australia has no ‘soccer hooligan’ problem  – But we need a smarter policing approach. The Conversation. Retrieved from: https://theconversation.com/ australia-­has-­no-­soccer-­hooligan-­problem-­but-­we-­need-­a-­smarter-­policing-­approach-­21851 Spaaij, R. (2014b). Sports crowd violence: An interdisciplinary synthesis. Aggression and Violent Behaviour, 19(2014), 146–155. Stead, D., & Rookwood, J. (2007, December). Responding to football disorder: policing the British football fan. Journal of Qualitative Research in Sports Studies, 1(1), 33–41. Stott, C. (2009). Crowd psychology & public order policing: An overview of scientific theory and evidence. Submission to the HMIC Policing of Public Protest Review Team, School of Psychology University of Liverpool. Stott, C., & Pearson, G. (2006). Football banning orders, proportionality, and public order policing. The Howard Journal., 45(3), 241–254. Stott, C., & Pearson, G. (2007). Football ‘hooliganism’. Policing and the war on the ‘English Disease’. Pennant Books. Taylor, P. (1990). The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15 April 1989: Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Taylor (Final Report. Cmnd 962). HMSO.

10  Soccer-Related Violence: The Police Response in Australia and in the United…

209

Tomsen, S. (1997). A top night: Social protest, masculinity and the culture of drinking violence. British Journal of Criminology., 37(1), 90–102. Williams, J., & Vannucci, N. (2020). English hooligans and Italian ultras sport, culture and national policy archives. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 12(1), 73–89. Alan  was a police officer in the United Kingdom, serving for 30 years in Surrey Police and West Mercia Constabulary, respectively. After retiring from the police service, Alan was operating as a management consultant, working in the public sector in the UK and with national police forces in UK and Europe. He also taught as a lecturer and visiting fellow at four UK Universities. He is a published author on many police-related subjects and edited police journals and has completed many assignments in the police service internationally. He is an expert resource in c­ orporate governance and police ethics/human rights issues, risk and contingency planning in the police service, and comparative legal and policing studies. In 2010, he moved to Australia and was a senior lecturer at Charles Sturt University, Australian Graduate School of Policing, Manly. From 2012, Alan was employed by Western Sydney University in positions in the Office of Widening Participation, and he also taught several subjects and retired in 2016. In 2019, he was awarded a PhD – Doctor of Philosophy – by Western Sydney University and the subject of his dissertation was: Examining human rights and ethical practice in Australian policing: A New South Wales Case Study. He currently holds an honorary appointment as industry/professional fellow at the University of Technology in Sydney in the Criminology section of International Studies and Education within the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences.

Part V

Violence Directed at the Police

Chapter 11

Factors Influencing Assaults on New Zealand Police Officers Garth den Heyer

Introduction Policing is considered to be a dangerous occupation, not only from the tasks officers are asked to perform, but also from the possibility of being assaulted from someone that they are seeking to assist (Covington, 2010; Tuttle, 2019). It has been considered to be one of the most dangerous careers in any society (Biere, 2017; Brandl & Stroshine, 2003, 2012), with police officers and staff often being assaulted or injured while undertaking their duties (Johnson, 2011; Tuttle, 2019). The majority of everyday police encounters with the public however usually do not result in an officer being assaulted, but some encounters can place an officer in a situation where they are required to respond to an individual who may become violent and as a result exposing themselves to the risk of being injured or assaulted (Johnson, 2019; Redman, 2018; Wilson & Zhao, 2008). It is the potential of being violently attacked and the unpredictability of such attacks that differentiates the working environment of a police officer from that of other occupations (Johnson, 2011). Research has concluded that the number of assaults on police officers has increased in countries around the world since 2015. In England and Wales, there was a 6.3% increase in the number of assaults on police officers in 2020 compared to 2019 and more than an 18% increase in assaults over a 5-year average (McKenzie, 2021). Research conducted by Thompson (2021) defended the claim that the number of assaults had increased and stated that in 2020, there were 36,969 assaults, which was an equivalent to 101 assaults occurring every day and if annualised, would be an increase of 20%. The National Police Chiefs Council (2021) claimed that there had been a 26% increase in assaults carried out on emergency workers in 2020 compared to the number that took place in 2019. This substantiates the

G. den Heyer (*) Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_11

213

214

G. den Heyer

anecdotal evidence from media outlets and police officers that there has been an increase in aggressiveness in society, especially from criminals (Tuttle, 2019). Similarly, violence against the police, including killings and injuries sustained from assaults, represents an ongoing and serious problem in the United States. In 2012, nearly 53,000 police officers were assaulted while on duty, and 28% of those assaults resulted in injury (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013). In research that reviewed assaults that took place during the period 2003 to 2012, it was found that most officers were killed while undertaking an arrest, pursuing traffic offenders, or responding to a disturbance call (Marotta & Caplan, 2013), while only 1.3% had been assaulted (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013). An average of 58,124 officers were assaulted and 50 deaths occurred every year (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013), while the rate of assaults on police officers in 2012 only was 10.2 per 100 sworn officers (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013). When the circumstances around why an officer was assaulted was examined, it was found that they were more likely to be assaulted when an officer was responding to a disturbance call or when making an arrest, and these made up approximately half of all the assaults on officers (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013). Violence against the police is a difficult aspect of policing to research. A number of researchers have analysed the relationships between social, demographic, and economic factors and the levels of violence inflicted on the police at various levels of geographical aggregation to examine how they influence the occurrence of an assault on a police officer. This research has been undertaken at the national (Bailey & Peterson, 1994; Kaminski & Marvell, 2002; Quinet et  al., 1997; Southwick, 1998), state (Bailey, 1982; Bailey & Peterson, 1987; Chamlin, 1989; Peterson & Bailey, 1988), county (Kaminski et al., 2000) and city levels (Fridell & Pate, 1995; Kaminski, 2002; Lott, 2000; Regens et al., 1974). However, little is known about the factors that influence the occurrence of assaults on police officers, as there are few studies that exist on this topic. Most literature tended to focus on offender resistance or where police officers have been seriously assaulted (Biere, 2017). The increase in the number of recorded assaults in recent years raises a number of questions, such as, is violence against a police officer a part of their job, is an assault of a police officer an indication of the inherent, violent nature of people, or is the violence that is inflicted on police officers an indication of the diminishing notion of whether policing is consensual (Johnson, 2019)? The difficulty in studying assaults on police officers is that little is known about what causes this violence to take place, especially the structural factors that are associated with non-fatal assaults on the police (Barrick et al., 2014). Further, enduring an assault has often been viewed by some members of the police as being just a part of their job and as being an unavoidable consequence of operational policing (Johnson, 2019). This chapter presents the findings of an electronic survey examining the drivers of assaults on police officers and how police officers that have been assaulted perceived the assault reporting process. The first section of the chapter explains the methodology adopted to undertake the research, and the second section presents the results of the survey. The following section discusses the findings of the survey in the context of the literature.

11  Factors Influencing Assaults on New Zealand Police Officers

215

Methodology The research was undertaken to understand the factors influencing assaults on police officers in New Zealand, how this might be prevented and how officers and families may be best supported. The purpose of the study was to: 1 . Explore the drivers of assaults on police. 2. Understand how police staff report assaults. The research question that formed the basis of the research was: What are the drivers of assaults on police officers and how do police officers that have been assaulted perceived the assault reporting process. The study was based on a 55-question electronic survey that was approved by the Arizona State University Independent Review Board (STUDY00014191) on July 22, 2021. The link to the survey was included in the September 2021 issue of the New Zealand Police Association monthly member magazine called Police News. The association has approximately 16,500 serving and retired New Zealand Police members. By November 20, 2021, 82 participants had completed and returned the survey.

Discussion of the Results of the Survey The return rate for the survey was low. However, the survey was voluntary, and members of the association were not sent individual emails inviting them to respond to the survey invitation. Literature has also highlighted the value in reviewing surveys that have low response rates. As noted by Nix et al. (2017), surveys that are not undertaken in person have, over time, a decreasing number of responses and “a low response rate on its own is an insufficient reason to dismiss a study’s merit” (p. 530).

Characteristics of the Survey Respondents The 82 respondents included 71 serving members of the New Zealand Police and 11 retired members. Sixty-seven were males and 15 were females. Their police service was fairly evenly distributed with 27 respondents (33%) having less than 5 years service, 14 respondents (17%) had between 6 and 10 years service, 16 respondents (19.5%) between 11 and 15  years service and 25 respondents (30.5%) had more than 15 years service. The first survey question asked participants how often they had been assaulted in their role as a police officer. Very few of the respondents had only been assaulted once, with just under 50% stating that they had been assaulted on six or more

216

G. den Heyer

30

27

25

22

20 16 15

14 11

10 5 0

7.5 2.5 One

Two

Three

Four

Five

Six to Nine 10 or More

Fig. 11.1  Percentage of occasions respondents had been assaulted in their role as a police office

occasions. The percentage for the number of occasions that respondents had been assaulted is presented in Fig. 11.1. The following sections of the survey required participants to choose the occurrence of one assault as the basis for answering each of the questions. The first question asked participants whether they were carrying any of the defensive equipment identified in the question when they were assaulted. Nearly all respondents (more than 96%) were carrying a baton, 64% were carrying OC spray, 88% were carrying a TASER and 49% were carrying a firearm. At the time of the assault, 81% of the respondents were wearing a stab proof vest. The next question asked participants whether the assault was serious. Forty-nine percent of the participants claimed that their assault was serious, and 51% stated that it was not. The second question related to the injury received during the assault. Of the 49% that stated that they received an injury during the assault, the majority received either cuts or bruises (77%) or pain or a strain (57.5%). Officers also received firearms injuries, concussion and fractures. The type of injury an officer received by the percentage of respondents is presented in Fig. 11.2. Only 33% of the assaults resulted in the officer requiring hospital treatment, but 49% of the respondents needed to take time off work. Of the 49% needing to take time off work, 28% needed 5 or more days to recover. The number of days taken off work and the percentage of officers is presented in Fig. 11.3. . The next section of the survey asked questions relating to the assailant. The majority of assailants were male (80.5%), with females also being significant at 13.5%. Other genders made up the final 6%. The most prevalent age of an assailant was between 25 and 30 years old (40%), followed by 21 to 25 years old (29.3%). The percentage of assailants for each age group is presented in Fig. 11.4. Only 27% of assailants had a history of assaulting police officers, while the assault was the first offence for 56%. In relation to employment, 22% of assailants

11  Factors Influencing Assaults on New Zealand Police Officers

NO INJURY

217

13.5

CUTS/BRUISES

77

PAIN/STRAIN

57.5

FRACTURES/STITCHES

13.5

CONCUSSION/TRAUMA

26

MULTIPLE INJURIES

7.5

FIREARM INJURIES

2.5 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Fig. 11.2  Type and percentage of injury received

28

6

7.5 5

2.5 1

2

3

4

5 OR MORE

Fig. 11.3  Number of days taken off work following the assault

were employed, and 50% were not employed. Only 22% were a member of a gang, and more than 57% of assailants had consumed alcohol or had taken drugs prior to the assault. In relation to weapons, only 28% used a weapon to undertake the assault. These weapons included a rock, kitchen knife, a spanner, a brick, a bottle, steel pipe, screwdriver and a firearm. More than 56% of assailants were accompanied at the time of the assault, while only 11% of the assaults were the result of the assailant suffering a mental health issue. The final question in this section asked participants whether the assailant was arrested and charged with the assault. More than 93% of the respondents stated that the assailant was arrested and charged.

218

G. den Heyer

NOT KNOWN 2.5 MORE THAN 30 YEARS

13.5

26 TO 30 YEARS

40

21 TO 25 YEARS

29.3

17 TO 20 YEARS

11

UNDER 16 YEARS

3.7 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Fig. 11.4  Percentage of assault assailants by age group

OTHER

6

POLICE CELLS

1.3

POLICE VEHICLE

3.7

POLICE STATION

2.5

BAR

2.5

RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY

24.5

STREET

60 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Fig. 11.5  Locations where assaults occurred

The third section of the survey involved reviewing the occurrence of the assault. The first question asked what time of the day the assault took place? More than 40% of the assaults occurred between 8 pm and 3 am, while 55% of respondents stated that the assault occurred in the dark. The majority of the assaults occurred on a street (60%), followed by 24.5% occurring in a residential property. The other locations that an assault occurred and the percentage are presented in Fig. 11.5. More than 60% of the assaults occurred from an event that the officer had been dispatched to and 25.5% occurred from a self-initiated event. The majority of self-­ initiated events were traffic stops. Participants were also asked whether they thought their assessment of the incident identified a potential that they could be assaulted. More than 45% stated that they thought that they could be assaulted, and 50% stated that they thought the event would not lead to them being assaulted.

11  Factors Influencing Assaults on New Zealand Police Officers

OTHER

219

8.5

DURING SEARCH

1.2

PREVENTING ESCAPE

11

POST ARREST

12.2

DURING AN ARREST

51.2

ON ARRIVAL AT SCENE

15.9 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Fig. 11.6  When the assault took place

There were also two follow-up questions that were related to this theme. The first asked if the assailant had made verbal threats prior to the assault. Thirty percent of assaults did include prior verbal threats and 70% did not. The second question asked participants if they had an opportunity to communicate with the assailant as a means to deescalate the situation. More than 45% of respondents stated that they did communicate with the assailant to deescalate the situation and 51 did not. The next tranche of questions examined the actions of the officer that was assaulted. The first asked when did the assault take place. The majority of assaults occurred with the assailant being arrested (51%), but on arrival at the scene of the incident or event (16%), post-arrest (12%) and preventing the assailant’s escape (11%) were also stages of high risk. When the assault took place and the percentage are presented in Fig. 11.6. Survey participants were asked whether they were with another officer at the time of the assault. More than 68% of officers were accompanied, and 25% were not. They were also asked whether they thought that the assault could have been prevented. Twenty-eight percent of respondents thought that the assault could have been prevented and 67% thought that it could not have been. Similarly, 94% of respondents thought that their actions prior to the assault were necessary, and only 3% thought that they were not. The fifth section of the survey pertained to the reporting of the assault. The first question asked participants whether they had reported the assault. More than 96% of respondents did report the assault, and in 59% of the cases, this involved the completion of an individualised report. A further 14% of reports were completed using a proforma template, and 6% were completed by entering into an assault database. Participants were also asked as to whether they felt comfortable in reporting the assault. Ninety-five percent of participants said that they did feel comfortable, and 3% stated that they did not feel comfortable. To clarify the reasons as to whether an

220

G. den Heyer

OTHER

13.6

NOT COMFORTABLE

2.5

NOT KNOWN

2.5

SUPPORTED BY SUPERVISORS

51

SUPPORTED BY PEERS

36

USED FOR TRAINING

28

IMPORTANT TO REPORT

79 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Fig. 11.7  The reason for reporting the assault

officer felt comfortable in reporting the assault, participants were then asked “If you did feel comfortable in reporting the assault, what made you feel comfortable? The majority of participants (79 percent) stated that they felt comfortable in reporting the assault because they “know that it is important to report assaults”. This reason was followed by “You feel you would be supported by your supervisors” (51%). The reason for reporting the assault and the percentage is presented in Fig. 11.7. To clarify why officers may or may not feel comfortable in reporting the assault, participants were asked two follow-up questions. The first question was “Why do you think officers feel comfortable in completing a report after being assaulted? All of the participants answered this question. The answers included because reporting is mandatory, it helps with rehabilitation, it is nothing to be ashamed of, and to help improve officer safety. The second follow-up question asked “Why do you think officers may feel uncomfortable in completing a report after being assaulted?” All of the participants answered this question. The answers primarily centred on lack of management support, embarrassment, it would not make any different and no consequences for the assailant. Participants were also asked whether they felt that their direct supervisor supported them after being assaulted. Seventy-eight percent said that they were supported, and 16% said that they were not. In a follow-up question, participants were also asked if they felt that they were supported by management after the assault. Sixty percent of participants thought that they were supported by management, and 33% thought that they were not supported by management. Overall, more than 63% of participants were either very satisfied, satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the process of reporting their assault, whereas approximately 33% were somewhat dissatisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the process of reporting their assault. The percentage for whether participants were satisfied or dissatisfied in the process of reporting their assault is presented in Fig. 11.8.

11  Factors Influencing Assaults on New Zealand Police Officers

OTHER

2.5

VERY DISSATISFIED

1.2

DISSATISFIED

221

5

SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED

2.5

NEITHER

25.6

SOMEWHAT SATISFIED

8.5

SATISFIED

37.8

VERY SATISFIED

17 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Fig. 11.8  Percentage of participants who were satisfied or dissatisfied in the process of their assault Table 11.1  Eight themes for increasing the completion of assault reports 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Establish good support and welfare networks More support from supervisors Better policies to protect officers Reassurance that the report will not affect the officer’s role Amend incident reports to include compulsory capture of assaults Ensure that it is a simple and confidential process Better follow through on reported assaults Training in handling different scenarios

To clarify if there were weaknesses in how assault reports were processed, participants were asked: “If you were not satisfied with the process, why were you not satisfied?” Only 10% of participants answered this question. All of the respondents stated that the reason that they were not satisfied with the process was because they were not supported by their supervisor or that the supervisor appeared to not care. The last question in this section sought to examine what can be done to change the way that an officer feels about completing a report after being assaulted. All of the participants answered this question. The answers were grouped into eight main themes, and they have been presented in Table 11.1. The last section of the survey asked questions in relation to the organization and support following being assaulted. The first question sought to examine whether officers thought that being assaulted was “part of the job”? Sixty-one percent of the respondents stated that they thought that being assaulted was part of the job, and 38% stated that they thought that it was not. To understand why respondents thought that being assaulted was or was not part of the job, two follow-up questions were also asked. The first was “If you think that being assaulted is ‘part of the job’, why do you think this?” and the second was “If you think that being assaulted is not ‘part

222

G. den Heyer

Table 11.2  Reasons for assault being or not being part of the job Being assaulted is “part of the job” 1. People are unpredictable and often violent 2. There are risks involved in policing 3. High-risk incidents cannot be avoided 4. People often do not like being told what to do 5. Lack of respect for police.

Being assaulted is not “part of the job” 1. Officers should be able to work safely 2. People did not join the police to be assaulted 3. Being assaulted cannot be eliminated 4. Police are here to help not be assaulted 5. It is an occupational hazard but that does not mean you should be assaulted. I have the right to go home safe like everyone else. 6. I accept being assaulted, but it should not be normal 7. No one should have to consider that being a victim of assault is “part of the job”

of the job’, why do you think this?” The answers to both these questions are presented in Table 11.2. The last questions of the survey concentrated on how officers are supported following being assaulted. The questions asked whether the assault should be discussed with a staff welfare officer, a trauma counsellor or a union representative. Approximately, 60% of respondents stated that they should discuss the assault with a staff officer, and more than 7% stated that they should not. While more than 46% stated that the assault should be discussed with a trauma counsellor and just under 8% stated that they should not. In relation to discussing the assault with a union representative, 81% stated that the officer should discuss the assault with the union, and 11% said that they should not.

Discussion A number of factors have emerged from the analysis of the origins of assault on police officers (Brown, 1994). The most important being the reason for the contact between the police officer and the assailant (Brown, 1994). Other important factors used to distinguish between incidents included the extent to which an officer prepares themselves for an encounter and whether they plan their actions, whether or not the consumption of drink or drugs by the assailant was a major contributing factor and whether other officers or members of the public were present at the encounter (Brown, 1994). Injuries sustained by officers during an assault are classified in research according to the type of violence that was perpetrated by the assailant (Alpert & Dunham, 1999). According to Alpert and Dunham (1999), 44% of the injuries sustained involved striking or hitting the officer, 27% involved pushing or pulling the officer and 20% involved grabbing or holding the officer. The researchers also identified three types of injury that were sustained by officers: 10% of assaults involved serious injury, 39% involved resisting a subject and 50.4% were characterised as an

11  Factors Influencing Assaults on New Zealand Police Officers

223

occupational accident. The most common activities that led to an injury incident were controlling or arresting a suspect (43%), conducting an investigation (15.6%), pursuing a fleeing suspect (11.6%), taking a suspect into custody and processing (5.0%) (Alpert & Dunham, 1999). In earlier research that was completed in England, Brown (1994) found that 41% of injuries that were inflicted on an officer were the result of either a punch, kick or headbutt and 38% were from general scuffles. In 8% of the cases, the injury was caused by a weapon of some form, which included dog bites, stabbings and slashings, clubbing, being hit with a glass, being shot at and being rammed with a vehicle (Brown, 1994). There were 57,180 assaults against the police that were reported in the United States in 2016 (Redman, 2018). Almost three out of ten (28.9%) officers who were assaulted (N = 16,535) in the United States sustained injuries (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). In 79% of these assaults, assailants used weapons, such as hands, fists and feet, which resulted in 31.4% of the assaulted officers sustaining an injury. Approximately 11% of officers were assaulted with knives or another type of cutting instrument, and another 23.3% of officers were attacked with some other dangerous weapon that resulted in some form of injury (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). Many different types of weapons have been used to assault a police officer (Redman, 2018). A number of studies have found that the seriousness of an injury incurred by a police officer during an assault depends partially on whether the assailant used a weapon and what type of weapon was used (Brandl, 2001; Margerita, 1980; Meyer et al., 1981; Wilson, 2005). The findings from the survey support some of the previous research on assaults of police officers. The survey found that the majority of respondents had been assaulted but that most of the assaults were not serious with only one-third requiring hospital treatment. However, more than half of the officers needed to take off work to recuperate. In relation to weapons used by an assailant, the survey found that only a quarter of the assaults involved the use of a weapon and that the majority of assailants punched, kicked or head-butted the officer.

The Assailant Research has not been able to identify unique characteristics of assault assailants (Redman, 2018). However, some general features and inclinations were identified for characterising assailants who had assaulted police officers (Chapman, 1986; Meyer et  al., 1979). In early research undertaken by Meyer et  al. (1979), it was found that most of the assaults on police were committed by young, adult males (88%), who had consumed alcohol. Similar results noted that assailants tended to be young adults, who had consumed alcohol and who often had a criminal record and that alcohol and drugs were often consumed prior to an assault taking place.

224

G. den Heyer

A further characteristic of risk was people with a mental illness. MacDonald et  al. (2003) noted that mental illness may intensify the appearance of a hostile demeanour, as well as the appearance of resisting an arrest, which may result in a more proactive approach to the person by a police officer. In a 2008 study of police officers based in Chicago, Kerr et al. (2010) found, however, that encounters with those who had a mental illness rarely resulted in an officer incurring an injury. When an officer did incur an injury, the injuries were no different from what may have incurred from someone without a mental illness (Kerr et al., 2010). Similar to previous research, the survey found that the majority of assault assailants were male, aged between 21 and 30 years, not employed and had consumed alcohol. They did not necessarily have a previous assault conviction or belong to a gang.

Officer Actions According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (1997), the most serious assaults on police officers occur when an officer has initiated the contact with an offender, rather than the officer being called to the scene of an incident. When an assault does happen when responding to calls, the calls usually relate to a disturbance or because of violence (Brandl, 1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997). The assaults usually occur outdoors, either on a highway or roadway or in an alley (Covington, 2010). In research undertaken by Johnson (2019), in Lincolnshire, England, it was also found that most of the assaults on police officers occurred at the moment that an arrest was being made, while just under a third of assaults occurred after an arrest, for example, during processing at a police station. In comparison, only 22.4% of recorded assaults were committed prior to an arrest being made (Johnson, 2019). Overall, more than two-thirds of all assaults on police officers occurred after the use of force by officers in making an arrest (Johnson, 2019). According to Johnson (2019), assaults occurred more readily later in the police process once the formal decision had been made to deprive someone of their liberty. This finding related to the fact that the assailant could strike out and resist arrest or attempt to escape at the later stage of processing (Johnson, 2019). The majority of studies found that male and female offenders resist arrest at similar rates (Johnson, 1999; McClusky et al., 1999) or that females resist more than males (Mastrofski et al., 1996). These studies have focused mainly on the arrest of an offender for less serious crimes and only measured minor forms of resistance, such as not complying with the directions given by the officer (Biere, 2017). In research that examined more serious or lethal assaults on police officers, it was found that males were of a higher risk than female offenders (Bierie et al., 2013; Craun et al., 2013). Research has also been undertaken that examined the relationship between assaults on police officers and the types of calls for service (Covington, 2010).

11  Factors Influencing Assaults on New Zealand Police Officers

225

According to Wilson et  al. (1990), there is a dominance of certain crimes that increase the probability of police officers being assaulted. Detailed analysis of 100 assault incidents that involved officers from the West Midlands police revealed that over half of the assaults occurred when officers attended a call for assistance, one third while officers were on routine patrol and 10% occurred while undertaking enquiries (Phillips & Cochrane, 1991). According to Brown (1994), responding to robbery incidents was also very dangerous, resulting in a high proportion of injured officers. Other duties that led to assaults were attending to domestic disturbances, attending to “other” disturbances and investigating suspicious circumstances (Brown, 1994). In similar research that was completed by Biere (2017), it was found that the lowest risk of calls for officers to attend to was property crimes and sex crimes. The riskiest call for service was for the destruction of property and robbery. The findings of the studies that have examined the crimes with the highest risk were very similar. The majority of assaults on officers took place in public places, with approximately 20% of these occurring in or around bars or nightclubs (Brown, 1994). Assaults were most closely associated with public disorder events and the consumption of alcohol by assailants. According to Brown (1994), traffic stops, attempting to resolve domestic disputes, transporting suspects and interrupting on-­ going offences also presented many problems for officers. Other researchers have focused more on specific, departmental policies rather than the structural composition of an agency (Barrick et  al., 2018). Building on earlier work by Kaminski (2004), Fridell et al. (2009) found that policies that related to the use of force and officer safety were not significantly associated with less assaults on police officers. The research undertaken by Fridell et al. (2009) found that the use of body armour by police officers was significantly associated with more violence against the police. Only a limited number of studies have investigated the relationship between organisational practices and policies and assaults on police officers. These studies have found that certain characteristics of organisation can predict violence against police officers (Fridell et al., 2009; Lott, 2000; Wilson & Zhao, 2008). One of the characteristics is referred to as organisational control, which refers to the formalisation of rules and regulations within a police force (Willits, 2014), to typically guide or constrain the discretion of officers. Policies also enable officers to understand the expected protocol in a given situation, and it is likely that some of the rules and regulations have been introduced with the intention of increasing officer safety (Kaminski, 2004). Moxey and Mckenzie (1993), in their study of assaults on officers in a large, mainly rural force in southern England, found that officers were most likely to be assaulted when conducting a “general” arrest. Ellis et al. (1993), in their study of injuries to Canadian police officers, discovered that the most threatening situation for officers was executing an arrest and the transporting and controlling of suspects and prisoners. Other situations that could lead to an officer being assaulted included arresting suspects as part of a public order offence, assisting a colleague, self-­ defence, restraining a suspect and warning or pacifying assailants (Brown, 1994).

226

G. den Heyer

Recording the Assault Police officers’ not reporting an assault makes it very difficult to identify the actual number of assaults on police officers. This means that police forces are reliant on the subjective recording of the details of an incident by a police officer (Johnson, 2019). As Johnson (2019) noted, some officers still see assaults as “part of the job” and as a result, will often downplay the effect of an assault. There are a number of other reasons why officers do not report being assaulted, and these can include internal organisational expectations that are based on the cultural values of the force, the officer may not see the assault as being serious and view the reporting of the incident as a waste of time because there is no visible injury, that their actions may be scrutinised by senior officers, or they may have the feeling that they provoked the assault (Johnson, 2019). One of the main reasons that officers do not report an assault according to the findings of this survey is because of the perceived lack of supervisor or management support. Another reason why officers may not report a non-serious assault is that they fear being ostracised by their colleagues, for not being macho and that they should have been able to deal with the assailant themselves.

Location of Assaults Prior research suggested that incidents that take place in a residence are particularly dangerous for the police (Uchida et al., 1987), especially if it relates to a domestic violence incident (Barrick et  al., 2018). This research found that assaults mainly occur at night and either on the street or in a private residence. Earlier British research found that more than half of the assaults on police officers occur on the street, while one in five incidents occurred within the confined environment of a business or residential property and a lesser number (14%), occurred in police vehicles or within the precincts of the police station (Brown, 1994).

Time of Day of Assaults In research completed by the Hampshire Constabulary (2017), it was found that nearly 50% of assaults on police officers (47%) occurred between 9 pm and 3 am, indicating a possible relationship between assaults and the policing of the night-­ time economy. These were similar findings as to those found in this survey with the majority of the assaults occurring during the same time period. In earlier research in the United Kingdom, Brown (1994) observed that assaults on police officers occurred throughout the week, but mostly in the late afternoon or overnight (2 pm–6 am). In studies that were conducted in the United States, it was

11  Factors Influencing Assaults on New Zealand Police Officers

227

found that the most common time for an assault to occur was 12 pm–12 am, while others claimed that it was 10  pm–2  am. Other researchers claimed that it was between 4 pm and midnight (Covington, 2010). Most of the studies do, however, agree that the most common time for an officer to be assaulted was during the hours of darkness (Brandl, 1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006; Meyer et  al., 1981). According to Covington (2010), the discrepancies in the times in the United States may be owing to geographical differences, as some studies examined assaults at a national level while others focused only on one area, such as a city. In another study in the United States, it was found that between 1998 and 2012, most of the assaults on police officers occurred between 12 am and 2 am (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012). Of all the assaults that occurred from 2003 to 2012, 41.7% occurred between the hours of 8 pm and 2 am (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012). The hours of least risk for officers were in the early morning, with a gradual increase in assaults throughout the early afternoon and into the evening (Marotta & Caplan, 2013).

The Number of Individuals Present During an Assault If other individuals are present during the arrest of an offender, the risk for both the arresting officer and the offender will not be based entirely on the social or environmental factors that influenced the occurrence of an assault on a police officer. According to Toch (1969), if other people are present during the arrest of an offender, the ego of the offender plays a part in the deciding whether they will assault a police officer. There are also reasons to believe that an officer who is being watched by others might be more inclined to take stronger actions that could result in a violent response from an offender or alternatively, the officer may be more inclined to be more respectful towards the offender (Wilson et al., 1990). Not only may strong actions by an officer have an ego-supportive function (e.g. Reiser & Geiger, 1984), but such actions may be rational (Wilson et al., 1990), to take control of a situation and to ensure compliance by the offender and others in the vicinity. According to Toch (1969), if an officer is observed by many witnesses as taking strong and forceful actions against an offender, then this may reduce the officer’s need to take such actions again in the future, and the force that the officer used now may reduce the risk of an injury in the long term (Wilson et al., 1990). In contrast, the ego may have a reduced impact on the arrest when no witnesses are present. The probability of an assault by an offender is also likely to change with the number of individuals who are present at an incident (Wilson et al. 1990).

228

G. den Heyer

The Influence of Alcohol Consumption Because of the drinking culture, there is a perception among some police officers that being assaulted is an inevitable part of the job of policing (Lister et al., 2001). One of the most common locations for police officers to be assaulted is on a street, most notably outside a bar or club, on a weekend evening (Brown, 1994; Christopher & Noaks, 1990). In their study, Christopher and Noaks (1990) found that 58% of assaults occurred on a street with 13% taking place in licensed premises. Brown (1994) and Christopher and Noaks (1990) found that the majority of people who were involved in assaults had been drinking prior to the incident. The presence of the police and the expectation that they impose order places them in direct conflict with people who have consumed alcohol. Both of these factors can influence how an encounter develops and its potential outcome (Johnson, 2019).

Conclusion Some assailants may harbour hostile attitudes towards anybody in authority, and police officers make an obvious and accessible target for the release of aggression, and any form of antagonistic manner that is displayed by an officer may play a role in the officer being assaulted. As found in this research and noted by Redman (2018), the majority of assaults against the police are carried out by young males and most frequently occur when an officer attempts to make an arrest. A number of other factors that influence the occurrence of assaults on police officers can be drawn from this research, and these have been summarised and have been presented in Table 11.3. A number of studies (Noakes & Christopher, 1990; Moxey & McKenzie, 1993; Wilson, 1993) have indicated that some officers are more at risk of being assaulted than others. However, this finding cannot be explained by the demographics of officers, offenders or by social factors alone or the findings of this research. Phillips and Cochrane (1991, cited in Brown, 1994), found that assaulted officers are more likely to have been the subject of a previous complaint, while additional research found that 7% of officers in one division of a police force were involved in 50% of both assaults and complaints. Table 11.3  Factors that influence the occurrence of assaults on police officers The majority of assaults on police officers are carried out by one perpetrator Assailants are almost exclusively young males between 21 and 30 years of age Most assailants are affected by alcohol Most assaults involve hitting, punching or kicking More violent assaults occur during the course of an interaction rather than being planned Most assaults occur on a street during the hours of darkness The action of highest risk is making an arrest

11  Factors Influencing Assaults on New Zealand Police Officers

229

Previous research and the findings of this research identify that making an arrest is the most dangerous activity that a police officer can perform (Ellis et al., 1993; Hirschel et al., 1994). This is because when officers are initiating an arrest, they are more likely to be in close proximity to motivated offenders than in other types of activities. A number of environmental factors can also increase the risk of a police officer being assaulted. For example, the majority of assaults occurred during darkness, when the assault assailant was accompanied and when they had consumed alcohol. Furthermore, assaults on police officers are usually committed by assailants who are adolescent, male, of lower class and have been consuming alcohol (Johnson, 2011). However, most of the assaults on police officers do not usually result in injury and are generally unplanned (Redman, 2018). An officer’s age does not impact on the likelihood of them being assaulted, and nor does the officer’s level of professionalism, competence or experience. The findings from this research, which has examined the factors relating to assaults on police officers, are consistent with previous research. Furthermore, what this research highlights is that understanding an assault against a police officer is complex and not as straightforward as focusing solely on social or environmental factors that may influence the occurrence of an assault on an officer. As noted by Johnson (2019), to be able to understand the reasons for assaults on police comprehensively, there is a need to understand the role of the police organisation, the formal and informal culture of police officers, their attitudes and responses to assaults and the role of the police.

References Alpert, G., & Dunham, R. (1999). Use of force: Overview of national and local data. National Institute of Justice. Bailey, W. (1982). Capital punishment and lethal assaults against police. Criminology, 19, 608–625. Bailey, W., & Peterson, R. (1987). Police killings and capital punishment: The post-Furman period. Criminology, 25, 1–25. Bailey, W., & Peterson, R. (1994). Murder, capital punishment, and deterrence: A review of the evidence and an examination of police killings. Journal of Social Issues, 50, 53–73. Barrick, K., Hickman, M., & Strom, K. (2014). Representative policing and violence towards the police. Policing, 8(2), 193–204. Barrick, K., Strom, K., & Richardson, N. (2018). Individual and situational influences on injurious assaults against the police. Policing: An International Journal, 41(2), 202–214. Biere, D. (2017). Assault of police. Crime & Delinquency, 63(8), 899–925. Bierie, D., Detar, P., & Craun, S. (2013). Firearm violence directed at police. Crime & Delinquency, 62(4), 501–524. Brandl, S. (1996). In the line of duty: A descriptive analysis of police assaults and accidents. Journal of Criminal Justice, 24(3), 255–264. Brandl, S. (2001). In the line of duty: A descriptive analysis of police assaults and accidents. Journal of Criminal Justice, 24, 255–264. Brandl, S., & Stroshine, M. (2003). Toward an understanding of the physical hazards of police work. Police Quarterly, 6, 172–191.

230

G. den Heyer

Brandl, S., & Stroshine, M. (2012). The physical hazards of police work revisited. Justice Quarterly, 15, 262–282. Brown, B. (1994). Assaults on police officers: An examination of the circumstances in which such incidents occur (Police Research Group, Police Research Series, Paper 10). Home Office Police Department. Chamlin, M. (1989). Conflict theory and police killings. Deviant Behavior, 10(6), 353–368. Chapman, S. (1986). Cops, killers, and staying alive: The murder of police officers in America. Charles C Thomas Publishing Ltd.. Christopher, S., & Noaks, L. (1990). Assaults on the police: The assailant’s perspective: A research study. Police Research Awards Scheme: Home Office. Covington, M. (2010). Correlates and causes of violence against police officers: A criminal events analysis. Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of Central Florida. Craun, S., Detar, P., & Bierie, D. (2013). Shots fired: Examining lethal force used against Deputy U.S. Marshals. Victims & Offenders, 8, 56–69. Ellis, D., Choi, A., & Blaus, C. (1993). Injuries to police officers attending domestic disturbances: An empirical study. Canadian Journal of Criminology, 34, 149–168. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (1997). In the line of fire: Violence against law enforcement. National Institute of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2006). Violent encounters: A study of felonious assaults on our nation’s law enforcement officers. National Institute of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2013). Law enforcement officers killed and assaulted. http:// www.fbi.gov/ucr.htm#leoka Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016). Law enforcement officers killed and assaulted. http:// www.fbi.gov/ucr.htm#leoka. Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports. (2012). Law enforcement officers killed and assaulted. http://www.fbi.gov/about-­us/cjis/ucr/leoka/2012/officers-­assaulted/ assaults_topic_page_2012. Fridell, L., & Pate, A. (1995). Death on patrol: Felonious killings of police officers (Final report). National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. Fridell, L., Faggiani, D., Talor, B., Brito, C., & Kubu, B. (2009). The impact of agency context, policies and practices on violence against police. Journal of Criminal Justice, 37, 542–552. Hampshire Constabulary. (2017). Part of the job? Assaults against Hampshire Constabulary’s frontline staff. Hampshire Constabulary Internal Report. Hirschel, J., Dean, C., & Lumb, R. (1994). The relative contribution of domestic violence to assault and injury of police officers. Justice Quarterly, 11(1), 99–117. Johnson, R. (1999). Phoenix project: Predictors of suspect use of force (NCJRS: 187776). U.S. Department of Justice. Johnson, R. (2011). Predicting officer physical assaults at domestic assault calls. Journal of Family Violence, 26, 163–169. Johnson, L. (2019). Understanding assaults against police officers: A study of conflict escalation in police encounters with the public. Unpublished doctoral thesis. The University of Leeds. Kaminski, R. (2002). An opportunity model of police homicide victimization. Unpublished doctoral thesis. University at Albany, State University of New York. Kaminski, R. (2004). The murder of police officers. LFB Scholarly Publications LLC. Kaminski, R., & Marvell, T. (2002). A comparison of changes in police and general homicides: 1930-1998. Criminology, 40, 171–190. Kaminski, R., Jefferis, E., & Chanhatasilpa, C. (2000). A spatial analysis of American police killed in the line of duty. In L. Turnbull, E. Hendrix, & B. Dent (Eds.), Atlas of crime: Mapping the criminal landscape (pp. 212–220). Oryx Press. Kerr, A. N., Morabito, M., & Watson, A. (2010). Police encounters, mental illness, and injury: An exploratory investigation. Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 10(1–2), 116–132. Lister, S., Hadfield, P., Hobbs, D., & Winlow, S. (2001). Accounting for bouncers: Occupational licensing as a mechanism for regulation. Criminal Justice Journal, 1(4), 363–384.

11  Factors Influencing Assaults on New Zealand Police Officers

231

Lott, J. (2000). Does a helping hand put others at risk? Affirmative action, police departments, and crime. Economic Inquiry, 38(2), 239–277. MacDonald, J., Manz, P., Alpert, G., & Dunham, R. (2003). Police use of force: Examining the relationship between calls for service and the balance of police force and suspect resistance. Journal of Criminal Justice, 31(2), 119–127. Margerita, M. (1980). Killing the police: Myths and motives. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 452, 63–71. Marotta, P., & Caplan, J. (2013, December). Felonious assault and injury to law enforcement: Epidemiology and spatial risk factors. Rutgers Center on Public Security. Mastrofski, S., Snipes, J., & Supina, A. (1996). Compliance on demand: The public’s response to specific police requests. Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 33, 269–305. McClusky, J., Mastrofski, S., & Parks, R. (1999). To acquiesce or rebel: Predicting citizen compliance with police requests. Police Quarterly, 2, 389–416. McKenzie, J. (2021, May). Over 1,000 Covid-linked assaults on police recorded as attacks against officers in Scotland continue to rise. https://www.scotsman.com/news/crime/over-­1000-­ covid-­linked-­assaults-­on-­police-­recorded-­as-­attacks-­against-­officers-­in-­scotland-­continue-­to-­ rise-­3254425. Meyer, C., Magedanz, T., Kieselhorst, D., & Chapman, S. (1979). Violence and the police: The special case of the police assailant. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 7(2), 161–171. Meyer, C., Magedanz, T., Dahlin, D., & Chapman, S. (1981). A comparative assessment of assault incidents: Robbery-related, ambush, and general police assaults. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 9(1), 1–18. Moxey, M., & McKenzie, I. (1993). Assaults on police. Policing, 9, 172–186. National Police Chiefs Council. (2021, May). Demands on the police forces in England and Wales during the Covid-19 pandemic. https://cdn.prgloo.com/media/download/ e4b6eccd1ebc44e6a7c8cf970bbe9468. Nix, J., Pickett, J., Baek, H., & Alpert, G. (2017). Police research, officer surveys, and response rates. Policing and Society, 29(5), 530–550. Noakes, L., & Christopher, S. (1990). Why police are assaulted. Policing, 6(4), 625–638. Peterson, R., & Bailey, W. (1988). Structural influences on the killing of police: A comparison with general homicides. Justice Quarterly, 5, 207–233. Phillips, S., & Cochrane, R. (1991). Assaults against the police: A study in three phases. Birmingham University, School of Psychology. Research Based Management Information for West Midlands Police. Unpublished report. Quinet, K., Bordua, D., & Lassiter, W. (1997). Line of duty police deaths: Aparadoxical trend in felonious homicides in the United States. Policing and Society, 6, 283–296. Redman, V. (2018). Macro-level predictors of assaults against police in Kentucky. Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of Louisville. Regens, J., Meyer, C., Swanson, C., & Chapman, S. (1974). An analysis of assaults on municipal police officers in 46 south central cities. Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma. Reiser, M., & Geiger, S. (1984). Police Officer as a Victim. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 15, 315–323. Southwick, L. (1998). An economic analysis of murder and accident risks for police in the United States. Applied Economics, 30(5), 593–605. Thompson, T. (2021, July). More than 100 officers assaulted every day. https://www.policeprofessional.com/news/more-­than-­100-­officers-­assaulted-­every-­day/. Toch, H. (1969). Violent men: An inquiry into the psychology of violence. Penguin. Tuttle, J. (2019). Dangerous politics? An analysis of the relationship between political affiliation and assaults on police officers in American counties. Unpublished Master’s thesis. Colorado State University. Uchida, C., Brooks, L., & Kopers, C. (1987). Dangers to police during domestic encounters: Assaults on Baltimore County police, 1984–86. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 2(4), 357–371.

232

G. den Heyer

Willits, D. (2014). The organisational structure of police departments and assaults on police officers. International Journal of Police Science and Management, 16(2), 140–154. Wilson, C. (1993). Police-citizen interactions: Conflict resolution tactics and their influence upon the resistance patrol officers encounter. National Police Research Unit. Wilson, S. (2005). Determining the correlates of police victimization: An analysis of social disorganization and organizational level factors on injurious assaults. Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of Nebraska. Wilson, S., & Zhao, J. (2008). Determining the correlates of police victimization: An analysis of organizational level factors on injurious assaults. Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(5), 461–468. Wilson, L., Brunk, G., & Meyer, K. (1990). Situational effects in police officer assaults: The case of patrol unit size. Police Journal, 63, 260–271. Dr. Garth den Heyer  is a professor at Arizona State University and a senior research fellow with the Police Foundation. He is also a contributing faculty member at Walden University and an associate with the Scottish Institute of Policing Research. He served with the New Zealand Police for 38 years, retiring as an inspector and manager: national security. He also spent more than 20 months as a strategic advisor to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. His main research interests are policing, militarization, service delivery efficacy, policy development, strategic thinking, and organizational reform.

Chapter 12

Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors Garth den Heyer

Introduction Policing is considered to be a dangerous occupation, with violence commonly being inflicted on police officers and staff (Covington, 2010; Tuttle, 2019). It has been considered to be one of the most dangerous careers in any society (Biere, 2017; Brandl & Stroshine, 2003, 2012), with police officers and staff often being injured while undertaking their duties (Johnson, 2011; Tuttle, 2019). The majority of everyday, police encounters with the public will not result in an assault of an officer, but some encounters can place a member of the police in a situation where they are exposed to individuals who may become violent, thereby increasing the risk of them being injured or assaulted (Johnson, 2019; Redman, 2018; Wilson & Zhao, 2008). It is the potential of being violently attacked and the unpredictability of such attacks that differentiates the working environment of a police officer from that of other occupations (Johnson, 2011). The continual risk of potentially being assaulted could be one of the reasons why police officers often mistrust the public, which leads to officers believing that they need to keep their guard up at all times (Barker, 1999; Johnson, 2011; Skolnick, 1966; Wilson, 1968). The findings from the research that examined assaults on police officers in the United States are complex however and should be interpreted with caution. According to Tuttle (2019) and Sforza (2016), the number of assaults on police officers is declining in the United States. This is despite there being an increase in the number of police officers killed and an increase in the number of ambushes of police officers (Kaste, 2015). Sforza (2016) and MacDonald (2016) maintained,

G. den Heyer (*) Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_12

233

234

G. den Heyer

however, that the number of assaults on police officers in some states and cities had actually increased. More modern research has concluded that the number of assaults on police officers has increased in countries around the world. In England and Wales, there was a 6.3% increase in the number of assaults on police officers in 2020 compared to 2019 and more than an 18% increase in assaults over a 5-year average (McKenzie, 2021). Research conducted by Thompson (2021) defended the claim that the number of assaults had increased and stated that in 2020, there were 36,969 assaults, which was an equivalent to 101 assaults occurring every day and if annualised, would be an increase of 20%. The National Police Chiefs Council (2021) claimed that there had been a 26% increase in assaults carried out on emergency workers in 2020 compared to the number that took place in 2019. This substantiates the anecdotal evidence from media outlets and police officers that there has been an increase in aggressiveness in society, especially from criminals (Tuttle, 2019). Despite the importance of the matter of assaults against the police, there are only a few academic articles or books that have examined the topic, especially compared to the number of articles, books, and reports that have been published that examine the use of force by police officers. As a result of the lack of examination into assaults on police officers, little is known about the personal or situational factors that lead to such wrongdoing. Of the limited number of publications on the topic of assaults on police officers, the majority of publications have attempted to identify the factors that may be associated with violence against the police (Barrick et al., 2018), such as the violent crime rate (Barrick et  al., 2014; Kaminski, 2008; Kaminski et  al., 2003), economic disadvantage (Kaminski, 2008; Kaminski et  al., 2003), racial, political subordination (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Kaminski & Stucky, 2009; Kent, 2010), and departmental policies and practices (Fridell et  al., 2009; Wilson & Zhao, 2008). Other studies have examined how factors such as the characteristics of the officer and the characteristics of the offender can predict the likelihood of an assault being carried out against an officer (Bierie et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 1990). The increase in the number of recorded assaults in recent years raises a number of questions, such as, is violence against a police officer a part of their job, is an assault of a police officer an indication of the inherent, violent nature of people, or is the violence that is inflicted on police officers an indication of the diminishing notion of whether policing is consensual (Johnson, 2019)? Unfortunately, enduring an assault has often been viewed by some members of the police as being just a part of their job and as being an unavoidable consequence of operational policing (Johnson, 2019). This chapter reviews the literature on the factors that predict an assault on a police officer. The first section examines the prevalence of assaults on police officers in England and Wales, New Zealand, the state of New South Wales in Australia, and the United States. The second section reviews and discusses the factors that predict assaults, and the final section looks at the limitations of the existing research.

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

235

An International Review of Assaults on Police Officers This section discusses the increase in assaults on police officers in various countries and discusses the trends that were found in the number of assaults in three different countries. Researchers from around the world have found that the number of assaults on police officers has increased (Ellrich & Baier, 2016; Johnson, 2019; McKenzie, 2021; Metropolitan Police, 2021; National Police Chief’s Council, 2020a, b; Shjarback & Maguire, 2021). The number of assaults on police officers and staff members in England and Wales, New Zealand, and New South Wales, Australia, for the period 2014/2015 to 2019/2020 has been presented in Table 12.1. England and Wales have experienced an increase in the number of assaults on police officers during the study period, while the New Zealand Police initially experienced an increase, the number then decreased, while the New South Wales Police experienced a decrease and then an increase in assaults. An analysis of the trends and the number of assaults on police officers per 100,000 population revealed that the numbers are similar to those that have been presented in the Total Assaults of Police in Table 12.1. England and Wales police had an increase in the number of assaults during the 2014/2015 to 2019/2020 period, while New Zealand and the New South Wales police had decreases in the number of assaults (Table 12.2). Table 12.1  Total assaults on police officers annually

2014/2015 2015/2016 2016/2017 2017/2018 2018/2019 2019/2020

England and Wales injury/ non-injurya 7,844/14.180 7,903/15,491 8,973/16,531 8,181/18,114 10,399/20,578 10,410/20,269

New Zealand Policeb 1629 251/1,450 247/1,476 288/1,409 1440d 1628d

New South Wales Police Force (Australia)c 2,518 2,472 2,325 2,335 2,476 2,483

Office of National Statistics; bNew Zealand Police (2019); cNew South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (2020); dBhatia (2020)

a

Table 12.2  Assaults on police officers per year period per 100,000 population 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20

England and Wales 33.8 35.6 38.6 39.6 46.4 45.7

Source: Author

New Zealand Police 35.3 36.5 36.6 35.8 30.1 33.5

New South Wales Police Force (Australia) 66.2 63.9 59.2 58.6 61.3 61.2

236

G. den Heyer

Assaults on Police Officers in England and Wales In 2020, as a response to concerns about the rising number of assaults and the increasing amount of violence carried out against police officers, the National Police Chief’s Council and the College of Policing surveyed more than 40,000 police officers nationally, to examine the safety of officers and staff (National Police Chief’s Council, 2020a). The year 2008 was used as a base year so that the numbers could be compared with the number of assaults that were carried out in 2019. Four out of five police officers who responded to the survey (88%) said that they had been assaulted at some point during their career, and 39% of the respondents reported having been assaulted in the previous 12 months. Many officers reported that they had been repeatedly assaulted. Of those who had been assaulted in the previous 12 months, 50% of custody officers and 46% of response officers reported that they had been assaulted at least three times during the course of their career (National Police Chief’s Council (2020b). The result of the survey provides an estimate of the number of assaults that have not been recorded as a crime. About one-third of the officers (32%), who had been assaulted in the past 12 months, said that the assault that they most recently experienced had not been recorded. This number varied by the severity of the assault. Assaults that did not result in injury were less likely to be recorded than were assaults that resulted in an injury (37% unrecorded compared with 19% that were recorded) (National Police Chief’s Council, 2020b). In 2018/2019, a total of 30,885 assaults were recorded in England and Wales. Assaults that did not result in an injury increased by 13% from the previous year to 20,476, while assaults that resulted in injury increased by 26% to 10,409 (National Police Chief’s Council, 2020b). This means that in 2018/2019, there were 328 assaults per 1,000 Constables or approximately one in three Constables in England and Wales had endured an assault. This was an increase from the number recorded in 2017/2018, when 284 per 1,000 Constables had been assaulted. The trend showing the change in number, over the period 2007/2008 to 2018/2019, has been presented in Fig.  12.1. The figure shows that there was a decrease in the number of assaults over this period, but there was a steady increase from 2015/2016, and by 2018/2019, the number of assaults exceeded the number that had occurred in 2007/2008. The high rate of assaults on police officers was also noted by the Metropolitan Police (2021), who claimed that every day, at least 25 officers are assaulted by being hit, spat at, stabbed, and abused about their race, religion, gender, or sexual orientation. According to the Metropolitan Police, these attacks are crimes, that they are not “part of the job,” and that in the last 12 months, more than 5,000 charges have been laid against people for hate abuse and the assault of Metropolitan Police Officers (Metropolitan Police, 2021). The increase in the number of assaults carried out on police officers continued during the pandemic in 2020. The data that covered

237

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors 35,000

30,885

30,000

26,447

25,000

20,476

20,384 20,000

17,384

15,781 15,510 15,873

15,000

14,527 14,456 14,369

15,510

16,647

18,158

8,289

10,000

10,409

5,000 0

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 Without Injury

With Injury

Total

Fig. 12.1  Trends in recorded assaults on police officers in England and Wales from 2007/2008 to 2018/2019. (Source: National Police Chief’s Council (2020b, p. 17)

the period July–August 2020, compared with the data that covered the same period in 2019, saw a 31% increase in assaults against emergency workers (National Police Chief’s Council, 2020a).

Assaults on Police Officers in the United States of America Violence against the police, including killings and injuries sustained from assaults, represents an ongoing and serious problem in the United States. In 2012, nearly 53,000 police officers were assaulted while on duty, and 28% of those assaults resulted in injury (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013). Policing in the United States, in addition to the increase of instances of violence against the police, has been facing a number of challenges since the summer of 2014 (Shjarback & Maguire, 2021). Like the social situation that occurred following the civil disorder of the late 1960s and the fallout from the Rodney King incident in the early 1990s, American police, since the summer of 2014, have experienced an ongoing crisis of legitimacy (see Weitzer, 2015). A number of highly publicised, police shooting incidents, some captured on video and widely disseminated through conventional and social media, have resulted in significant national and international attention (Shjarback & Maguire, 2021) and have intensified the scrutiny of the actions of the police. In addition, the number of assaults against police officers has increased, from 49,725 assaults in 2014 to 60,632 in 2018. According to Duhart (2001), it has been estimated that approximately 10% of police officers are assaulted every year in the United States. The trend in the number of assaults against police officers in the United States from 2004 to 2018 has been presented in Fig. 12.2. The number of

238

G. den Heyer

Number of Assaults 70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Fig. 12.2  Trends in recorded assaults on police officers in the United States from 2004 to 2018. (Source: Statista, 2021)

assaults decreased during the period 2008 to 2014, but increased again from 2015, with a slight decrease in 2018. The difficulty in studying assaults on police officers is that little is known about what causes this violence to take place, especially the structural factors that are associated with non-fatal assaults on the police (Barrick et al., 2014). Some researchers have claimed that police officers are now reluctant to use force in situations in which it would be justified because of the fallout from the death of George Floyd in 2019, while other researchers have argued that the criticism and negative attention directed toward law enforcement have led to people feeling more emboldened, making them more likely to physically resist an officer or to assault an officer (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017; MacDonald, 2016). A suggestion that has been put forward as to why the number of assaults of police officers has increased is the “danger imperative”. Sierra-Arévalo (2016) defined the “danger imperative” as the preoccupation with violence and the demand for officer safety. Sierra-Arevalo (2016) explained that the danger imperative fosters behaviours by police officers that are in direct conflict with policies that have been designed to keep them safe. The behaviour of police officers may be fostered by the formal and informal processes of officer socialisation, which has intensified in recent years, owing to the current social and political climate and the increase in the perception of anti-police rhetoric. The Pew Research Center (2017) supports the findings of Sierra-Arevalo and found that 93% of officers have become more concerned about their safety because of the number of high-profile incidents that have involved minorities and the police over the last 3 years. The Pew Centre also stated that such beliefs may put officers more on edge and may lead them to take actions that could escalate physical confrontation when they are interacting with the public. The policing environment in the United States suggests that police interactions with the public have become more adversarial and antagonistic (Shjarback & Maguire, 2021). It has been suggested that since the events of 2014 and 2015, members of the public are more willing to resist police authority and are less likely to

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

239

comply with officer directives. Some researchers have speculated that displays of disrespect toward officers have increased (Shjarback & Maguire, 2021). However, in a study using monthly data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) report (2010–2016), Shjarback and Maguire (2021) found that neither assaults on police officers that resulted in injury or those that were of a non-injury nature had increased after Michael Brown’s death in August 2014. This research, however, only examined data on police officer assaults until 2016, and furthermore, the findings did not match the data that was supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2016) or Statista (2021). This information has been presented in Fig.  12.2 and clearly shows that since 2014, there has been an increase in the number of assaults.

Prior Research of Assaults on Police Officers The majority of research that has examined police violence has focused on the police use of force rather than on the police as victims of violence (see, e.g. Alpert & Dunham, 1997, 1999; Fyfe, 1978; Gallo et  al., 2008; Geller & Toch, 1995; Hoffman & Hickey, 2005; Kaminski et  al., 2004; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005; McCluskey et  al., 2005; McElvain & Kposowa, 2004; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Seron et al., 2004; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2008). Most research that examines the factors that relate to physical assaults against police officers focused on offender resistance, such as refusing to obey the directions of an officer (Johnson, 2011), while other studies have used broad definitions to examine minor forms of aggression (see, e.g. Kavanagh, 1997; Mastrofski et al., 1996). There is the potential for conflict to develop during any incident that involves a member of the public and a police officer, and it can occur at any stage during the interaction (Johnson, 2019). It has often been claimed that it was the officer’s behaviour that caused an assault to occur (Reiss, 1971), and that it is at the point of arrest that an officer is most likely to be assaulted (see, e.g. Brown, 1994; Moxey & McKenzie, 1993). A limited number of studies have attempted to estimate how often offenders resist arrest, but the number is not known for certain. However, it is known that offenders resist arrest on a regular basis, with Garner and Maxwell (2002), predicting that offenders use physical force during an arrest in about 1 out of 6 cases. The extent of the resistance may be of a minor or of a serious nature (Covington, 2010). Identifying the two forms of violence is important, because there appears to be a difference between the two (Biere, 2017). According to Mastrofski et  al. (1996) and McClusky et  al. (1999), female offenders are more likely to resist an officer’s directions in a minor manner than male offenders are. Similarly, Covington et al. (2014) found the same pattern with minor assaults on police, that females assault police officers more often than they do males. Studies of more serious, violent resistance found the reverse; that male offenders pose a greater risk than women (Bierie et al., 2013; Craun et al., 2013) and in minor forms of resistance, younger offenders are more of a high risk. Studies of serious or lethal

240

G. den Heyer

resistance found that the risk increases with the age of an offender (Bierie et al., 2013; Mustard, 2001). Given the limitations of the number of studies that have examined assaults on police officers, most of the studies that are available have only looked at the general factors surrounding violence against the police (Covington, 2010). Only a few of these studies have attempted to provide a theoretical explanation for an assault, and of those that provide an explanation, most have been based on weak methodological approaches (Covington, 2010). It has been suggested that one of the main reasons why a police officer is assaulted is because they are a visible representation of the state (Emsley, 1991; King & Brearley, 1996; Klein, 2012; Smelser, 1962). Another reason that was proposed is one that is based on conflict theory, and that is, that some groups that do not have access to the political process may resort to criminal behaviours, including violence, such as assaulting a police officer, to achieve their objectives (Jenkins & Schock, 1992; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002). It is also difficult to put into context the scope and the prevalence of assaults on police officers as whatever literature is available on the topic, is imprecise. It is important for our understanding to define what an assault on a police officer is, as this will have an impact on what is measured and how the action can be classified (Johnson, 2019). Some studies, for example, have suggested that annually, approximately 10% of police officers are injured from being assaulted in the United States (Henriquez, 1999; Kaminski, 2004; Kaminski et  al., 2004; Smith & Petrocelli, 2002; Smith et al., 2007a, b), while other studies have claimed that this figure is as high as 38% (Alpert & MacDonald, 2001; Kaminski & Sorensen, 1995). The real number is not known because the definition of assaults on police officers has not been standardised. The definition that is used in research is often based on the context of the assault that is being examined (Johnson, 2019). This means that definitions are subjective and are defined differently by different observers (Johnson, 2019). Because the term has not been defined, police forces do not agree on what is a recordable assault, which leads to differences in recording practices and subsequently identifying the number of assaults. This is clearly explained by Johnson (2019): For example, one person might deem a use of force as being intentional and unlawful whereas another might view the same incident and use of force as accidental, unintentional or a reasonable defence in the circumstances presented. Similarly, when considering police officers, one officer could consider a use of force as an assault and subsequently make an arrest; whereas another officer, under the same circumstances, might decide that the technical “assault” is not worthy of reporting or recording. (p. 26)

Types of Assaults on Police Officers There are numerous types or classifications of assaults on police officers. One method used to classify assaults is “the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victim” (Redman, 2018, p. 11). An assault, for example, may not result in injury, or

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

241

in injuries of a minor or serious nature, or may be life-threatening, resulting in death. Injuries may be categorised as minor non-lethal; non-lethal but requires medical attention; and lethal (Redman, 2018). Minor, non-lethal assaults can be assaults that do not result in any physical injury or can result in minor injuries that do not require professional medical attention (Redman, 2018). Lethal assaults are assaults that result in life-threatening injuries and that could cause the immediate or eventual death of an officer (Redman, 2018). Another method that could be used to review assaults on police officers is to define the composition of an assault or by grouping the different types of assaults. Some studies of assaults on police have classified assaults into two groups—descriptive and explanatory. Most of the studies are descriptive, in that they provide information on the number of officers assaulted, the circumstances surrounding the incident, the type of weapons used, and the characteristics of the officers and assailants (Alpert & Dunham, 1992, 1997, 1999; Bayley, 1989). Assaults on police officers have also been studied at the macro-level, with the research grounded in theoretical frameworks to explain violence more generally (Barrick et  al., 2018). This type of research has examined the areas of political exclusion and structural disadvantage (Barrick et al., 2014; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Kaminski & Stucky, 2009; Kent, 2010), structural disadvantage and crime rates (Kaminski et al., 2003; Kaminski, 2008), and agency policies and practices (Barrick et al., 2014; Fridell et al., 2009; Wilson & Zhao, 2008) to explain the differing levels of violence against the police. According to Barrick et al. (2018), this type of research has helped to identify the kinds of communities and police forces or services that can experience a greater risk of violence, although the research is unable to clarify whether some situations are riskier than others. Other researchers have claimed that they can predict whether an assault on a police officer has been premeditated or is spontaneous (Redman, 2018). Spontaneous assaults have been defined as emotional or reactive assaults, while planned and pre-­ planned assaults are considered to be predatory violence (Meloy, 2006; Schouten & Brennan, 2016; Siegel & Victoroff, 2009). When an assault is spontaneous or reactive, it has not generally been planned, and is impulsive (Redman, 2018). This form of assault can arise because an officer intends to arrest an offender or an offender wants to escape an arrest (Boylen & Little, 1990; Cardarelli, 1968; Margerita, 1980; Meyer et al., 1981). In contrast, a planned assault or predatory violence on police officers is strategic and is premeditated (Redman, 2018). These types of assaults are purposeful and goal directed (Meloy, 2006; Siegel & Victoroff, 2009; Schouten & Brennan, 2016). They are usually sudden and occur without any provocation from the police officer (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1975) and are committed with the intention of deliberately causing harm to the officer (Meyer et al., 1981).

242

G. den Heyer

Measuring the Form and Number of Assaults As a consequence of there not being a standardised definition of an assault on a police officer, the form and the number of assaults cannot be measured accurately. As Johnson (2019) noted, because of the varying definitions and methodologies used in collating statistics, and the subjective recording and reporting of incidents, there are a number of challenges in accurately measuring the level of violence that police officers face. This is exacerbated by the fact that police officers may choose not to report an incident, especially when the assault is of a minor nature and does not result in their injury. Police officers may not want to report an assault because they don’t want to show that they have been affected by an incident. They may not wish to be questioned informally by their colleagues or answer questions about why they chose to make an arrest for a low-level incident, where someone resisted arrest (Johnson, 2019). Officers may not show any concern or emotion after they have been assaulted and may even be dismissive of the dangers by having “an attitude creating and substantiating a perception of violence as ‘part of the job’” (Johnson, 2019, p. 38). This reaction may be because the culture of the police force puts pressure on officers to demonstrate to others that they have not been affected from emotionally challenging or violent incidents and, thereby, avoid being ostracised by their peers (Brown, 2000; Goodey, 1997; Stanko, 1990). The internalisation of a violent experience may, however, add to emotional stressors and impact on how some officers approach future incidents, potentially placing them at a greater risk of enduring an assault (Goodey, 1997; Pogrebin & Poole, 1991). Officers who have been assaulted may not file a report of the assault that they were subjected to, and there may be a number of reasons for this. When an officer is assaulted during an incident that involves the assailant’s mental health, for example, the assailant is taken to an institution or is arrested for a serious offence, an assault on an officer may be seen as being minor compared to the potential sentence for the more serious offence and, therefore, is not recorded (Johnson, 2019). Another reason that an officer may not choose to report an assault could be because the officer chooses to over-dramatise the incident to colleagues (see van Maanen’s (1973) discussion of war stories) in order to generate a shared understanding of how dangerous the job is “or to make themselves out to be a ‘strong’ officer, unaffected by the challenges of the role” (Johnson, 2019, p. 38).

 actors and Circumstances Surrounding Assaults F on Police Officers Research studies that have used qualitative and quantitative methods to identify the factors and circumstances that are associated with assaults on police officers have been conducted (MacDonald et  al., 2003; Margerita, 1980; Meyer et  al., 1979;

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

243

Uchida et al., 1987; Wilson, 2005). Sherman (1980) suggested that the factors surrounding an assault on a police officer is categorised into four groups so that the assault can be analysed. The individual characteristics of the officer that has been assaulted (e.g. length of service, training, gender, age, ethnicity) should be grouped together in the first category. The second category should focus on the situational factors that are associated with an assault (e.g. the relationship between the officer and the suspect, the number of police officers present when the incident occurred, the circumstances preceding the assault, and who initiated the contact). The third category should focus on the organisational aspects of the police force that the assaulted officer is employed by, and would include, for example, an examination of policies and the training offered. The fourth category would focus on the characteristics of the community and would include a review of the community’s economic structure, demographic composition, political ethos, and structure of government. A number of researchers from the United Kingdom have conducted similar studies, and their research identified a number of characteristics of assailants (Brown, 1994; Moxey & McKenzie, 1993; Noaks & Christopher, 1990). All three of these studies found that assailants were predominantly males who had low incomes, were unemployed, had a criminal record, and were consuming alcohol at the time of the assault (Johnson, 2011). Most of the assailants were between the ages of 17 and 25, with an average age of 22 years. Similar characteristics of assailants were found in an Australian study that was undertaken by Mayhew (2001). Australian assailants were generally found to be intoxicated, young males of lower socioeconomic status, with aboriginals being over-represented (Johnson, 2011). In research undertaken in Iceland, assailants were predominantly young, indigenous males who were unemployed, had a criminal record, and had been consuming alcohol (Bragason, 2007). Several research studies focused on the factors that would enable assaults on officers to be predicted. The characteristics of the police officer (their gender, age, ethnicity, training, years in law enforcement, and overall health) and the assailant (their gender, ethnicity, age, criminal history, and level of sobriety) were examined (Hirschel et al., 1994; MacDonald et al., 2003; Margerita, 1980; Meyer et al., 1979; Meyer et  al., 1982; Rabe-Hemp & Schuck, 2007; Stobart, 1972; Uchida et  al., 1987). Other studies examined the circumstances that led to an assault on a police officer. These studies looked at, for example, the weapons used and the injuries sustained from using a weapon being used (Redman, 2018). Other studies have examined the physical environment, the location of an assault, the time that an assault occurred, the circumstance surrounding the offence, how an assault was committed, the type of call for police assistance, and the encounter with the assailant (Brandl, 2001; Brown, 1994; Brown & Langan, 2001; Chamlin & Cochran, 1994; Chapman, 1986; Margerita, 1980; Morrison & Meyer, 1974; Yocum & Hasner, 2008). Only a limited number of studies have, however, examined the impact that the social environment has on the factors that influence an assault on a police officer occurring (e.g. Bailey, 1982; Kaminski, 2008; Kaminski et al., 2003; Kent, 2010; Morrison & Meyer, 1974; Peterson & Bailey, 1988), and only a small number of studies have explored the impact that crime rates have had on the occurrence of assaults on police officers (Fridell et al., 2009; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Kaminski et al., 2003; Rossler, 2015).

244

G. den Heyer

Predictor of an Assault: Resistance by an Assailant Studies have also examined the possibility that resistance by a suspect can be predicted (Garner & Maxwell, 2002). The factors that have been examined to predict an assault on an officer are the presence of numerous police officers at the scene of an assault, the presence of bystanders, if the assailant was alcohol impaired, if the assailant was a gang member or associate, and if the assailant had been previously arrested for a violent offence (Covington, 2010). However, the findings of this type of research were found to be ambiguous, with the majority of the predictors having no effect or an inconsistent effect on the probability of force being used (Covington, 2010). Two out of three major studies of assailants found that the ethnicity of an offender indicated a high level of resistance. In the research conducted by Belvedere et al. (2005), it was found that in the United States, black suspects were more likely to resist arrest if the arresting officer was white, black, or Hispanic and white suspects were less likely to resist when being arrested by a black or Hispanic officer. In similar research that was undertaken in Rochester, St. Louis, and Tampa -St. Petersburg, Engel (2003) found that non-white suspects were less likely to comply with white officers. The findings from the studies that have examined assailant resistance did not suggest that any characteristics of the police officer were predictors of resistance (Covington, 2010). However, the studies did find that several characteristics of offenders, such as being female (Engel, 2003), being intoxicated, disrespectful, and having been previously arrested for serious or violent crimes (Garner & Maxwell, 2002; Kavanagh, 1997) were important. In similar research, Belvedere et al. (2005) found that the seriousness of the offence the offender was being arrested for did not affect the likelihood of an offender resisting. Kavanagh’s (1997) study found that when offenders were in the presence of other offenders, they were more likely to resist, but Garner and Maxwell (2002) found that resistance was more likely when there were more police officers and bystanders present. Research has found that the situational factors may predict whether an offender will resist. The situational factors that were found to be most important for predicting resistance were when contact was initiated by an officer, attending incidents that occurred at night (Kavanagh, 1997), and those in high-crime areas (Belvedere et al., 2005).

 redictor of an Assault: Characteristics P of the Assaulted Officer Several studies have examined the factors associated with the victims and the offenders of violence (Chapman, 1986; Johnson, 2008, 2011; Little, 1984; Margerita, 1980; Rabe-Hemp & Schuck, 2007). In these articles, researchers found that there

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

245

are personal characteristics that are common among the victims and among the perpetrators of assaults, in terms of age, ethnicity, gender, and psychological state at the time of the assault (Redman, 2018). In a research that was conducted by Schmalzl (2005), it was found that negligent behaviour, mistakes in ensuring personal safety, and a lack of coordination with fellow officers on the beat or patrol could act as an accelerator for violence, making it more likely for an officer to be assaulted while on duty. Other studies reviewed the time that an assault occurred and found that an assault usually came as a surprise to an officer and that most of the assaults did not occur immediately an officer had arrived on the scene, but rather, during the course of the interaction with the individuals concerned (Ohlemacher et al., 2003; Sessar et al., 1980). The sequence of an incident has been questioned by Schmalzl (2005), and whether there might have been an indication that a sudden assault was about to take place and whether an officer could recognise that an assault might happen before it took place. Schmalzl (2005) suggested that by identifying a process, a psychological, early warning system could be developed that would provide more awareness and enable a risk assessment framework to be devised. A distinction can, however, be made between the visible and non-visible characteristics of police officers (Baier & Ellrich, 2012). Visible characteristics include factors such as gender, physical stature, and age, while non-visible characteristics are those that cannot be seen, but affect the behaviour of an officer, such as personality, attitudes, and experience (Ellrich & Baier, 2016). In a research that examined police officers in Germany, Ellrich and Baier (2016) found that male officers (52%) had a significantly higher risk of being subjected to a physical assault than their female (45%) colleagues. There was also evidence that age influences the likelihood of experiencing violence. Approximately two-thirds of all officers who were under 30 years of age (69.6%) had been victims of an assault while on duty, while just over half (52.4%) of the officers aged between 30 and 49 years had been assaulted. Just under one third of those aged over 50 (31.8%) had been assaulted. The findings of Ellrich and Baier (2016) indicated that younger officers were more frequently exposed to violence than older officers while on duty, and this finding has been supported by the findings of a number of other studies (Bosold, 2006; Bragason, 2007; Griffiths & McDaniel, 1993; Manzoni, 2003). The research from Germany also examined the type of duty that an officer was performing at the time of an assault. Officers who were undertaking beat or patrol duties were more than five times (69.6%) as likely to be physically assaulted compared to those who were performing other duties, such as criminal investigations (22.3%) (Ellrich & Baier, 2016; Falk, 2000; Griffiths & McDaniel, 1993; Manzoni, 2003). The risk was even higher for an officer who was assigned to a special unit. According to the findings, the risk was more than six times higher (73.3%) than the risk for officers who were assigned to criminal investigations units. There were also indications that an officer’s height increased their risk of being assaulted, while their weight had no effect (Ellrich & Baier, 2016). Examining officers’ height and weight implies that physical stature can influence whether an officer is assaulted. However, some empirical studies have been conducted to confirm whether the height or the weight of an officer has a bearing on whether they would

246

G. den Heyer

endure an assault, but the findings of the studies were inconsistent (Garner et al., 1996; Griffiths & McDaniel, 1993; Rabe-Hemp & Schuck, 2007). Ellrich and Baier (2016) cautioned that care needed to be taken in interpreting the results of these studies. They claimed that larger officers are more frequently assigned to attend more dangerous incidents and that they are more susceptible to being assaulted because offenders “see them as the greatest threat” (p. 148). Another explanation could be that larger officers, because they are aware of their physical strength, are less likely to shy away from a confrontation (Ellrich & Baier, 2016). Another characteristic that researchers have examined is the age of a police officer at the time that an assault took place. A number of studies have found that the age of an officer did not increase or decrease the risk of an officer being assaulted (Chapman, 1998; Yocum & Hasner, 2008). However, research that examined the experience of an officer found that officers who remained alert and cautious when dealing with members of the public were less likely to be a victim of an assault (Redman, 2018). This may be because as an officer gains experience in handling various types of calls and attending incidents, they build some insight into how to read a subject and be better prepared to react and deal with a potentially dangerous situation (Cardarelli, 1968; Yocum & Hasner, 2008).

Predictor of an Assault: Characteristics of the Assailant Unique characteristics of assailants were not found after examining the data on assaults on police officers (Redman, 2018). However, some general features and predispositions were identified for characterising assailants who had assaulted police officers (Chapman, 1986; Meyer et al., 1979). In early research undertaken by Meyer et al. (1979), it was found that most of the assaults on police were committed by young, adult males (88%), who had consumed alcohol. Noaks and Christopher (1990) obtained similar results in their study of assaults on police officers. According to their study, assailants tended to be young adults, who had consumed alcohol and who often had a criminal record. Rabe-Hemp and Schuck (2007) also found that alcohol, as well as drugs, were often consumed prior to an assault taking place. The ethnic composition of assailants has also been researched, but the findings were found to be conflicting. Research conducted by Meyer et al. (1979) indicated that most assailants were white, while Hirschel et al. (1994) and Margerita (1980) found that the majority of assailants were black. In similar research, Meyer et al. (1981) found that non-white offenders were overrepresented among those who had committed robberies and had assaulted a police officer. Other researchers have noted that assailants tended to have had previous encounters with the police (Chapman, 1986; Schouten & Brennan, 2016; Wilson & Meyer, 1991). In another study, Schouten and Brennan (2016) found that offenders were more likely to commit assaults against police officers if they had a prior record, had a history of

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

247

violence, if they had been in detention, or had a history of inflicting or being a victim of physical abuse, as well as mental illness. An opposing argument was presented by Ellrich and Baier (2016). They claimed that no conclusion could be drawn as to who poses the greatest risk to police officers. Ellrich and Baier (2016) found that one in seventeen domestic violence incidents ends with an officer being injured (6%) and that the greatest factor influencing whether an offender would assault a police officer is whether they have consumed alcohol. According to Ellrich and Baier (2016), and Rabe-Hemp and Schnuck (2007), police officers who confront inebriated offenders have a 5.5 times greater risk of being injured compared to confronting offenders who have not consumed alcohol. Assailants who have a mental illness are also a characteristic that has been included in the studies of the factors that lead to assaults on police officers. MacDonald et al. (2003) noted that mental illness may intensify the appearance of a hostile demeanour, as well as the appearance of resisting an arrest. In a 2008 study of police officers based in Chicago, Kerr et al. (2010) found, however, that encounters with those who had a mental illness rarely resulted in an officer incurring an injury. When an officer did incur an injury, the injuries were no different from what may have incurred from someone without a mental illness (Kerr et al., 2010).

Predictor of an Assault: Situational Factors Schouten and Brenan (2016) found that situational factors (a trigger or events that set in motion a violent act) influenced whether an assault would take place. The characteristics of an assailant and the situational factors that may influence an offender to resist an arrest and confront a police officer have also been studied (Redman, 2018). According to Kavanagh (1997), the most common situational factor is an assailant demonstrating disrespect towards a police officer, and it was found that this has a correlation with an assailant taking violent action. The violent action that an assailant may take includes verbal abuse (Kavanagh, 1997). Other researchers have argued that an offender’s demeanour can influence the behaviour and actions taken by a police officer. Engel et  al. (2011) found that an offender’s demeanour was linked to an officer’s behaviour and the decision to arrest, and this can cause the situation to escalate further (see also Westley, 1953). Unfortunately, there are inconsistencies in the literature that is available as to whether the risk to police officers increases with the level of seriousness of the crime committed (Biere, 2017). A number of researchers have claimed that the probability of aggression occurring rises when the crimes that officers are responding to increase in seriousness or when offenders are under the influence of alcohol (Bierie et al., 2013; Covington et al., 2014; Craun et al., 2013; Engel, 2003; Johnson, 1999; Kavanagh, 1997; McClusky et al., 1999). Numerous studies have, however,

248

G. den Heyer

found that some social and demographic factors have shown to have little or no impact on whether an offender will resist an officer’s commands (Steffensmeier et  al., 2006). To date, the research that has been conducted does not support the commonly held myth that minority offenders resist law enforcement officers any more often than Caucasians (Bierie et  al., 2013; Covington et  al., 2014; Craun et al., 2013). The most dangerous police activity, according to a number of researchers, is when an officer attempts to make an arrest (Brandl, 1996; Brandl & Stroshine, 2003; Buchannan & Perry, 1985; Ellis, 1987; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1992; Little, 1984). During an arrest, a police officer is in a particularly vulnerable situation because of their proximity to an offender (Barrick et al., 2018). This provides a greater opportunity for an offender to assault an officer and for an injury to occur. The risk of an offender assaulting a police officer heightens when an arrest is taking place late in the evening or during the night (Violanti et al., 2012). In other research, Brandl (2001) found that more officers were assaulted when they were trying to control a suspect rather than when they were making an arrest. Other researchers have claimed that officers are exposed to greater risks when they are responding to robberies and burglaries, as these pose a higher likelihood of being assaulted than when responding to other crimes that are in progress (Geller & Karales, 1982; Margerita, 1980). In contrast, Klinger (1994) found that offenders who displayed a hostile demeanour were not significantly more likely to resist arrest or be arrested any more than those who were not arrested and concluded that an involvement in a criminal act may determine how an offender reacts towards the police. In more comprehensive research, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2017) found that the ten most common situations in which an assault was likely to occur were disturbance calls, burglary in progress or pursuing a burglary suspect, attempting an arrest, attending a civil disorder, the handling, transporting, or taking into custody of a prisoner, investigating a suspicious person or event, handling a person with a mental illness, and undertaking a traffic stop. Early research has highlighted that responding to domestic incident is one of the most dangerous activities for a police officer (Uchida et al., 1987). According to Johnson (2011), offenders of domestic violence, who are unemployed, live with the abuse victim, who consume alcohol, who have damaged property, and displayed a hostile demeanour towards a police officer were more likely to assault a police officer. Other studies found, however, that responding to traffic incidents, dealing with those who had mental health issues (Hirschel et al., 1994), transporting offenders, and responding to robberies and burglaries posed a greater threat (Garner & Clemmer, 1986). As well as examining the activities that resulted in the most risk to a police officer, a number of researchers have identified a number of personal and situational factors that increase the risk of an assault on an officer taking place. One of the most prevalent predictors of an assault that leads to an injury is the age of the officer. A number of researchers emphasised that older officers were more likely to be injured than younger officers and that younger offenders were more likely to injure an

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

249

officer than older offenders (Kaminski & Edwards, 1995; Mastrofski et al., 1996). In other research, the gender of an offender was not associated with the probability of an officer being assaulted. However, ethnicity was found to be a predictor of an officer being assaulted, with non-white suspects being more likely to injure an officer than white suspects (Kaminski & Edwards, 1995). The ethnicity of the officer did not affect this finding (Barrick et al., 2018). In similar research that examined non-lethal assaults on police officers, Kaminski and Edwards (1995) found that the only predictor of an assault was the level of education of the officer. No other factors (gender, ethnicity, or age) influenced the likelihood of an assault occurring. Similarly, the researchers did not find any characteristics of an offender that would be significant in influencing the likelihood of an assault occurring (Kaminski & Edwards, 1995).

Predictor of an Assault: Social Factors In early research that was undertaken by Bailey (1982), poverty and unemployment were found to be significant predictors of lethal assaults on police officers occurring. In comparable research, Kaminski (2008) found that police officers had a greater risk of being seriously assaulted in areas that were made up of populations who had low-income levels and had elevated levels of unemployment and poverty. Other research has investigated the broader, structural characteristics of a city to assess how these factors affect the levels of violence taken against the police. These characteristics include the level of social disorganisation (Peterson & Bailey, 1988), the racial and economic structure of a city (Chamlin, 1989; Chamlin & Cochran, 1994; Southwick, 1998), and the rate of violent crime (Willlits, 2014). Most of these studies found that the social and economic make-up of a city, including the overall level of deprivation, increases the rate of non-fatal assaults on police officers (Barrick et al., 2018). However, not all studies found that poverty was a significant predictor of a police officer being assaulted. Research by Jacobs and Carmichael (2002) found that poverty was unrelated to whether a serious assault would be inflicted on a police officer. Two other social factors that influence whether an assault on a police officer is likely to take place are residential mobility and family stability. Residential mobility refers to how fluid the population is in a community (Redman, 2018). When the turnover of a population in an area was examined, the findings were not consistent. However, research by Morrison and Meyer (1974) and Kaminski et al. (2003) found that residential mobility was among the factors that explained assaults against the police, while Kaminski (2008) did not find residential stability at the county level to be related to serious assaults on police officers. The findings from studies that have examined the influence of family stability on assaults of police officers were similar to other social predictors, which were mixed. Some studies found a positive relationship between family disruption, crime, and assaults on police officers (Andreescu et al., 2011; Kaminski et al., 2003; Pratt &

250

G. den Heyer

Cullen, 2005; Sampson & Groves, 1989), while others found that there was no significant relationship between lethal assaults against police officers and the percentage of households in an area, that were headed by a female (Kaminski, 2008). Kaminski (2008), however, reported that there was a positive and significant relationship between divorce rates and police homicides.

Predictor of an Assault: Gender of Police Officer Two studies that were conducted in the United Kingdom (Brown, 1994; Noaks & Christopher, 1990) found that female officers were assaulted at a rate that was proportionate to their representation in the forces that they researched. However, a study in South Australia (Wright & Prunckun, 1990) found that male officers were assaulted more frequently than female officers and noted that there may be several explanations for this. The explanations offered were fewer females occupy operational positions or are assigned to higher-risk duties, male assailants may be less inclined to assault a female officer, and female officers may have a less confrontational manner (Wright & Prunckun, 1990). In more modern research conducted in Australia, French (2012) found that female officers were less likely to be assaulted than their male counterparts, except for female officers that had assignments that were considered to be more dangerous or those who had been reassigned to a new duty early in their careers. In a similar study, it was found that female officers were no more likely to be assaulted than their male counterparts were, but they were at a higher risk of being assaulted than male officers when they were responding to domestic violence calls (Rabe-Hemp & Schuck, 2007). It was also claimed by Bosold (2006), and Burke and Mikkelsen (2005) that female police were assaulted less often than their male counterparts. This could be because assailants, who are mostly male, are more reluctant to assault a female officer than a male officer or it could be because female officers are assigned to less violent-related tasks than their male colleagues (Ellrich & Baier, 2016). It has been suggested that female officers are more likely to be communicative, empathetic, supportive, and less aggressive in interactions with the public than their male peers (Rabe-Hemp, 2008). Female officers are also less likely to use controlling behaviours, such as threats and violence, in their interactions with the public (Garner et al., 1996; Manzoni, 2003; Rabe-Hemp, 2008). In research that was conducted in Germany, Ellrich and Baier (2016) found that if there was at least one female officer in a group of officers who were attending an incident, the risk of injury lessens compared with a group that is exclusively made up of males. Further analysis of the Ellrich and Baier (2016) data showed that the presence of a female officer at an incident reduces the risk of both male and female officers being injured (Ellrich et al., 2012). However, a study undertaken by Wilson

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

251

and Zhao (2008) found that the number of female police officers attending an incident had no bearing on whether an officer would be assaulted.

Predictor on an Assault: Minority Officers A number of studies have examined the characteristics of officers who have been a victim of an assault (Redman, 2018). These researchers found several characteristics that were prominent in most of the assaults that had occurred, the most prominent being, that most of the officers who had been assaulted were white, male officers (Boylen & Little, 1990; Brown & Langan, 2001; Chapman, 1986; Lester, 1978; Margerita, 1980). A similar conclusion to the research that examined social factors was drawn from the studies that focused on the link between the number of minority officers that made up a police force and assaults (Ozkan et al., 2016). While Wilson and Zhao (2008) and Barrick et al. (2014) found that the percentage of minority police officers that made up a police force did not have any effect on assaults of police officers, the research conducted by Barrick et  al. (2014) found that as the ratio of ethnic minorities represented in a police department increased, the number of assaults on police also increased, at the same rate. Barrick et al. (2014) observed that the size of the population of a city and the rate of aggravated assaults were strongly associated with the number of assaults on police officers. The findings of research that examined whether there was a relationship between the ethnic composition of a community and assaults on police officers were also conflicting. Several studies found that the ethnic heterogeneity in a community is related to serious assaults on police officers, while in other studies, the ethnic composition of an area was not a significant predictor of police victimisation (Kaminski, 2008; Kaminski et  al., 2003; Pratt & Cullen, 2005; Sampson & Groves, 1989). Kaminski’s (2008) study found, however, that police officers were more likely to be killed in counties that had higher black populations. Lester (1984) and Wilson (2005) also found that there was a positive relationship between racial heterogeneity and violence against police. In Wilson’s (2005) study, racial heterogeneity was found to be a non-significant predictor of lethal violence being used against a police officer.

Organisational Factors Some studies have used organisational factors, such as the size of a force, or the daily activities undertaken, such as the average number of arrests made by their officers, to examine whether these can influence the number of assaults on police officers (Grennan, 1987; Lott, 2000; Regens et al., 1974). Using this approach to

252

G. den Heyer

examine assaults on police officers implies that the use of different styles of law enforcement by police forces may affect different aspects of policing or may influence the level of confidence that the public has in the police. Some police forces may, for example, use more aggressive strategies to target crime problems than other forces (Wilson & Zhao, 2008) or they may adopt Community-Oriented Policing and partner with their communities to reduce crime (Skogan, 2003; Wilson & Kelling, 1998). Community policing strategies are designed to improve the relationship that the police has with a community (Cordner, 1995; Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994; Greene, 1999), while the use of aggressive law enforcement tactics has the opposite effect and tends to worsen the relationship between the police and the community as well as affecting the legitimacy that the public holds of the profession (Greene, 1999; Hemmens & Levin, 2000; Innes, 1999; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Stoutland, 2001). Wilson and Zhao (2008) and Barrick et al. (2018) also claimed that some of the factors used by an agency (e.g. policing strategies, organisational structure), as well as the characteristics of the community served, were associated with levels of violence toward the police. Three variables were used to examine the number of assaults on police officers that took place between 1999 and 2001. The variables were the presence of a formal community policing plan, the number of community policing programs, and the number of community groups that agencies regularly met with. Wilson and Zhao (2008) found that police forces that met with a larger number of community groups had lower rates of assaults. However, not having a community policing plan and not participating in community policing meetings were found to be associated with assaults on police officers. Of the aggressive policing variables studied, only the drug arrest rate was significantly associated with an increase in injurious assaults (Wilson & Zhao, 2008).

Organisational Structure Research that examined the role that an organisational structure has in relation to the occurrence of assaults on police officers has also been conducted. The research examined whether specific departmental policies were associated with violence against the police (Barrick et al., 2018). Most studies have, however, focused on the organisational practices of a force rather than on the structure of the force and how it influences assaults on police officers (Willits, 2014). When the relationship of an organisational structure and the occurrence of assaults of police officers has been studied, it has typically used unreliable data (Willits, 2014). A number of researchers have found that the outcomes of policing have been influenced by the organisational structure of a police force. Empirical research, for example, links an organisational structure to police behaviour, including the decision to effect an arrest and to use force on an offender (Alpert & McDonald, 2001;

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

253

Chappell et al., 2006; Mastrofski et al., 1987; Nowacki, 2011; Riksheim & Chermak, 1993; Smith, 1984; Swanson, 1978; Willits & Nowacki, 2014). Other researchers have argued that organisational structure is directly related to organisational success, noting that “organisations that incorporate societally legitimated rationalized elements in their formal structures maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival capabilities” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 352). In addition to performance, organisational context, which includes aspects of the social and cultural organisation of an environment in which police forces deliver their services, has also been researched (Willits, 2014). In terms of assaults on police officers, the argument linking organisational context to violence is that police forces that operate in riskier environments are more likely to experience assaults on their police officers (Willits, 2014). In other words, when police forces operate in areas that are characterised by higher rates of violent crime, structural disadvantage, and inequality, the officers working in these areas are more likely to be exposed to dangerous situations (Willits, 2014) In 2014, Willits (2014) examined how an organisational structure of a police force in the United States influenced the occurrence of assaults on police officers. The researcher found that measures of organisational context and complexity were significant predictors of violence against the police. More specifically, police forces working in cities that have higher levels of structural disadvantage, such as unemployment and significant levels of poverty, reported more assaults than forces in less disadvantaged cities. Measures of organisational complexity also predicted violence against the police. The more specialised the department, the fewer incidents of violence against the police (Willits, 2014). Willits (2014) also found that both organisational functional differentiation and spatial differentiation were significant statistical predictors of assaults on police officers. This finding suggests that certain organisational structures increase the risk of a police officer being assaulted. Examining spatial differentiation, for example, indicates that police forces with more substations are more likely to report fewer assaults against police officers, which may indicate that the use of substations promotes positive relationships between the police and the community. The presence of police officers in a community and a nearby substation may result in police officers becoming more familiar with the neighbourhoods that they serve. Similarly, residents in these communities may become more familiar with police officers and may be less likely to view them as an invading presence (Willits, 2014). In earlier research, Kaminski et al. (2003) examined assaults of police officers in Boston between 1993 and 1999 and found that the number of arrests, violent crime rates, and social deprivation (poverty, number of female-headed households, income, racial composition, unemployment, and divorce) were positively associated with the number of serious assaults inflicted on police officers. However, neither population mobility areas nor population demographics were associated with violence against the police (Kaminski, 2008)

254

G. den Heyer

Responding to Domestic Assault Calls The potential for an assault to occur when an officer responds to a domestic assault call has been the subject of some debate (Johnson, 2011). Research that examined the risk of the police responding to domestic assault calls has been mixed, with some studies finding that responding to a domestic assault call only contributes to a very small portion of the assaults that officers experience (Garner & Clemmer, 1986; Hirschel et  al., 1994; Konstantin, 1984), and other researchers found that officers were more likely to be assaulted when responding to other types of calls (Ellis et al., 1993; Garner & Clemmer, 1986; Hirschel et al., 1994). However, studies that have been completed in different communities have suggested that responding to a domestic assault call is one of the three most common situations where officer assaults occur (Ellis et al., 1993; Stanford & Mowry, 1990; Uchida et al., 1987). Early research by Bard (1970) concluded that responding to a domestic violence call was one of the most dangerous calls that an officer could respond to. Other early studies also concluded that officers are at a higher risk of being victimised when responding to domestic dispute calls (Auten, 1972; Muir, 1977). The risk of officers being assaulted when responding to domestic calls was indicated in the data that was recorded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with more than 224,000 officers in the United States being assaulted at these types of incidents between 1980 and 2003 (Johnson, 2008).

Limitations of the Research Despite the importance of the topic, the literature has a number of limitations (Biere, 2017). The main limitation is that most of the findings have been based on small sample sizes and have only examined a few geographical areas (Biere, 2017). Most research to date has used only one jurisdiction (Belvedere et al., 2005; Engel, 2003; Mastrofski et al., 1996) or a handful of cities (McClusky et al., 1999). A problem with the lack of geographic diversity is that the findings from one area may not be reflected in other locations or in other police forces (Biere, 2017), and not all of the factors that could influence the likelihood of an assault occurring against a police officer has been examined in-depth, and some factors have not been examined at all (Biere, 2017). While Meyer and Carroll (2011) noted that responding to domestic violence calls are events that can be of a high risk to an officer’s safety, there is little or no empirical evidence to adequately test whether this is the case. However, Uchida et  al. (1987) claimed that domestic incidents, particularly those that take place in a home, are particularly dangerous, while Bierie et al. (2013) found that incidents that occur on roads and in the home are particularly risky for police officers. Barrick et al. (2018) also stated that the research that had been conducted was limited in a number of ways. Similar to other researcher’s comments on limitations,

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

255

Barrick et al. (2018) claimed that the main limitation is that most studies rely on aggregate data, which has not established whether the characteristics of an incident impact on an officer’s safety. While data from the National Incident Based Reporting System has been used to examine the variation in police assaults at an agency level (see Fridell et al., 2009), this data has not been used to examine the individual and situational predictors of violence against the police (Barrick et al., 2018). Most of the research has been conducted at an individual level and has only examined a few of the activities that the police perform, particularly responding to domestic disturbances (Johnson, 2011; Uchida et al., 1987) and use-of-force encounters (MacDonald et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2007a, b).

Conclusion The findings from studies examining the factors relating to assaults on police officers seem remarkably consistent. Furthermore, understanding an assault against a police officer is complex and not as straightforward as focusing solely on social or environmental factors that may influence the occurrence of an assault on an officer. To be able to understand the reasons for assaults on police comprehensively, there is a need to understand the role of the police organisation, the formal and informal culture of police officers, their attitudes and responses to assaults, and the role of the police (Johnson, 2019). An assault on a police officer is statistically likely to occur late in the evening or early in the morning, usually in the weekend, and involve a young police officer or constable and a young male assailant. The officer is likely to have been sent to the scene of a dispute or public disorder incident or be carrying out a traffic stop. Assailants are often under the influence of alcohol or drugs or both and are usually unemployed, coming from a lower socio-economic background. They are likely to be accompanied or encouraged by their friends, and the assailant often blames the attitude of the officer for the assault. Only a minority of assailants use weapons, and they tend to use whatever is at hand to inflict harm, rather than having carried a weapon for the purpose of assaulting a police officer. Most victims of assaults do not receive any, or only slight, injuries and do not need to take sick leave. A summary of the findings from the literature has been presented in Table 12.3. Several inferences can be drawn from the review of the literature about assaults on police officers. A number of studies have identified that assaults can occur in any police encounter with the public, although there are certain locations and incident types where the risk of being assaulted increases. These risks include incidents where the assailant has consumed alcohol, convicted of previous violent offences, and where there is a direct challenge to the authority of an officer, either during or after the arrest of the offender. The occurrence of each assault has unique dynamics, and the interaction of these dynamics combines to increase the danger to an officer (Johnson, 2019).

256

G. den Heyer

Table 12.3  Summary of findings from the assault on police officers literature Almost one third of all assaults occurred before the officer had an opportunity to speak with the assailant Most assaults are direct attacks and often involved the use of weapons One fifth of assaults occurred when officers tried to calm or pacify individuals, particularly during a public disorder or dispute incident One quarter of all injuries that were sustained were when officers were attempting to restrain a suspect at the point of an arrest One quarter of injuries were sustained after an assailant had been initially detained (this was particularly common with drunk suspects, or suspects who were looking for opportunistic attempts to escape) More than half of all serious injuries were sustained as a result of carrying out traffic stops or dealing with disputes Only four percent of all assaults were the result of unexpected and unprovoked attacks; these incidents resulted in a higher proportion of serious injuries than for any other type of assault. Eight percent of injuries were caused by a weapon of some description Officers claimed that additional equipment would not have helped them to prevent or respond to an assault Source: Author

Approaching, arresting, transporting, and processing offenders are dangerous activities for a police officer, and they are often at risk of an assault as soon as they arrive on the scene of an incident. In Brown’s (1994) study, almost one-third of assaults occurred before the officer had spoken to the assailant, one quarter of all injuries were sustained at the point of arrest, and one-quarter were sustained after the suspect had been detained. However, the most serious assaults tend to occur when an officer interrupts an offence that is in progress and when offenders are determined to escape. Completely unexpected assaults are also particularly dangerous. Brown (1994) found that these made up only 4 percent of all assaults in his study but result in a higher proportion of serious injuries than any other type of assault situation. Assaults on police officers also appear to be higher in large, urban centres (Tuttle, 2019). The literature has also intimated that responding to domestic violence calls poses an elevated risk to officers (Biere, 2017). However, Johnson (2019) claimed that domestic assault calls do not occur very frequently, but they can pose a significant risk of assault for police officers in the United States. Other studies have suggested that there are many other types of incidents that police officers attend to, which are just as dangerous or even more so, than domestic violence calls (Biere, 2017). Certain officer characteristics or situational factors may also lead to an officer being assaulted. Similarly, the structures and the culture of a police force or service may discourage the report of an assault. These may include the deployment of officers, the activities to enforce and maintain order, and the style of policing used. Threats and assaults on police officers and staff need to be managed in a more systematic way if the occurrence of assaults is to be reduced. Police forces should also contemplate what support can be offered after an assault has taken place in order to encourage assaults to be reported and to reduce the distress that an officer may experience (Bragason, 2007).

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

257

References Alpert, G., & Dunham, R. (1992). Policing urban America. Waveland Press Inc.. Alpert, G., & Dunham, R. (1997). Understanding police use of force: Officers, suspects, and reciprocity. Cambridge University Press. Alpert, G., & Dunham, R. (1999). Use of force: Overview of national and local data. National Institute of Justice. Alpert, G., & MacDonald, J. (2001). Police use of force: an analysis of organizational characteristics. Justice Quarterly, 18(2), 393–409. Andreescu, V., Shutt, J., & Vito, G. (2011). The violent South: Culture of honor, social disorganization, and murder in Appalachia. Criminal Justice Review, 36(1), 76–103. Auten, J. (1972). The domestic disturbance: A policeman’s dilemma. Police Chief, 39(10), 16–22. Baier, D., & Ellrich, K. (2012). Welche Einsätze sind für Polizeibeamte besonders gefährlich? In T. Ohlemacher & J.-T. Werner (Eds.), Empirische Polizeiforschung XIV: Polizei und Gewalt. Interdisziplinäre Analysen zu Gewalt gegen und durch Polizeibeamte (pp. 23–46). Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft. Bailey, W. (1982). Capital punishment and lethal assaults against police. Criminology, 19, 608–625. Bard, M. (1970). Training police as specialists in family crisis intervention. U.S. Department of Justice. Barker, J. (1999). Danger, duty, and disillusion: The worldview of Los Angeles police officers. Waveland. Barrick, K., Hickman, M., & Strom, K. (2014). Representative policing and violence towards the police. Policing, 8(2), 193–204. Barrick, K., Strom, K., & Richardson, N. (2018). Individual and situational influences on injurious assaults against the police. Policing: An International Journal, 41(2), 202–214. Bayley, D. (1989). The management of violence by police patrol officers. Criminology, 27(1), 1–26. Belvedere, K., Worrall, J., & Tibbetts, S. (2005). Explaining suspect resistance in police-citizen encounters. Criminal Justice Review, 30(1), 30–44. Biere, D. (2017). Assault of police. Crime & Delinquency, 63(8), 899–925. Bierie, D., Detar, P., & Craun, S. (2013). Firearm violence directed at police. Crime & Delinquency, 62(4), 501–524. Bosold, C. (2006). Polizeiliche Übergriffe. Aspekte der Identität als Erklärungsfaktoren polizeilicher Übergriffsintentionen, Nomos. Boylen, M., & Little, R. (1990). How criminal justice theory can aid our understanding of assault on police officers. The Police Journal, 63, 208–215. Bragason, O. (2007). Assaults against police officers: A self-report study among Icelandic police officers. The Office of the National Police Commissioner. Brandl, S. (1996). In the line of duty: A descriptive analysis of police assaults and accidents. Journal of Criminal Justice, 24(3), 255–264. Brandl, S. (2001). In the line of duty: A descriptive analysis of police assaults and accidents. Journal of Criminal Justice, 24, 255–264. Brandl, S., & Stroshine, M. (2003). Toward an understanding of the physical hazards of police work. Police Quarterly, 6, 172–191. Brandl, S., & Stroshine, M. (2012). The physical hazards of police work revisited. Justice Quarterly, 15, 262–282. Brown, B. (1994). Assaults on police officers: An examination of the circumstances in which such incidents occur (Police Research Group, Police Research Series, Paper 10). Home Office Police Department. Brown, J. (2000). Occupational culture as a factor in the stress experiences of police officers. In F. Leishman, B. Loveday, & S. Savage (Eds.), Core issues in policing (2nd ed.). Pearson Longman.

258

G. den Heyer

Brown, J., & Langan, P. (2001). Policing and homicide, 1976–98: Justifiable homicide by police, police officers murdered by felons. US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Buchannan, D., & Perry, P. (1985). Attitudes of police recruits towards domestic disturbances: An evaluation of family crisis intervention training. Journal of Criminal Justice, 13(6), 561–572. Burke, R., & Mikkelsen, A. (2005). Gender differences in policing: Signs of progress? Employee Relations, 27, 425–436. Cardarelli, A. (1968). An analysis of police killed by criminal action: 1961–1963. Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 59(3), 447–453. Chamlin, M. (1989). Conflict theory and police killings. Deviant Behavior, 10(6), 353–368. Chamlin, M., & Cochran, J. (1994). Opportunity, motivation, and assaults on police: A bivariate ARIMA analysis. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 19(1), 1–19. Chapman, S. (1986). Cops, killers, and staying alive: The murder of police officers in America. Charles C Thomas Publishing Ltd.. Chapman, S. (1998). Murdered on duty: The killing of police officers in America (2nd ed.). Charles C. Thomas Publishing Ltd. Chappell, A., MacDonald, J., & Manz, P. (2006). The organizational determinants of police arrest decisions. Crime & Delinquency, 52, 287–306. Cordner, G. (1995). Community policing: Elements and effects. Police Forum, 5(3), 1–8. Covington, M. (2010). Correlates and causes of violence against police officers: A criminal events analysis. Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of Central Florida. Covington, M., Huff-Corzine, L., & Corzine, J. (2014). Battered police: Risk factors for violence against law enforcement officers. Violence and Victims, 29(1), 34–52. Craun, S., Detar, P., & Bierie, D. (2013). Shots fired: Examining lethal force used against Deputy U.S. Marshals. Victims & Offenders, 8, 56–69. Duhart, D. (2001). Violence in the workplace, 1993–99. U.S.  Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Eck, J., & Rosenbaum, D. (1994). The new police order: Effectiveness, equality and efficiency in community policing. In D. Rosenbaum (Ed.), The challenge of community policing: Testing the promises (pp. 3–23). Sage. Ellis, D. (1987). Policing wife-abuse: The contribution made by ‘domestic disturbances’ to deaths and injuries among police officers. Journal of Family Violence, 2(4), 319–333. Ellis, D., Choi, A., & Blaus, C. (1993). Injuries to police officers attending domestic disturbances: An empirical study. Canadian Journal of Criminology, 34, 149–168. Ellrich, K., & Baier, D. (2016). Police officers as victims of violence: Findings of a Germany-wide survey. In D. Baier & C. Pfeiffer (Eds.), Representative studies on victimisation: Research findings from Germany (pp. 141–162). Nomos. Ellrich, K., Baier, D., & Pfeiffer, C. (2012). Polizeibeamte als Opfer von Gewalt. Ergebnisse einer Befragung von Polizeibeamten aus zehn Bundesländern. Nomos. Emsley, C. (1991). The English police: A political and social history. Harvester Wheatsheaf. Engel, R. (2003). Explaining suspects’ resistance and disrespect toward police. Journal of Criminal Justice, 31(5), 475–492. Engel, R., Tillyer, R., Klahm, C., & Frank, J. (2011). From the officer’s perspective: A multilevel examination of citizens’ demeanor during traffic stops. Justice Quarterly, 1–34. Falk, E. (2000). Widerstand gegen Vollstreckungsbeamte. Ein praxisbezogenes Forschungsprojekt (Texte Nr. 25). Hochschule für Polizei. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (1992). Killed in the line of duty: A study of selected felonious killings of law enforcement officers. Governmental Printing Office. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2013). Law enforcement officers killed and assaulted. Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/ucr.htm#leoka Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016). Law enforcement officers killed and assaulted. Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/ucr.htm#leoka.

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

259

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2017). The assailant study—Mindsets and behaviors. Retrieved from: http://media.washtimes.com.s3.amazonaws.com/media/misc/2017/05/04/study.pdf French, N. (2012). Assessing the Hazards of Assaults on NSW Police Officers: 2005–2010. Police Association of New South Wales. Fridell, L., Faggiani, D., Talor, B., Brito, C., & Kubu, B. (2009). The impact of agency context, policies and practices on violence against police. Journal of Criminal Justice, 37, 542–552. Fyfe, J. (1978). Shots fired: An examination of New York City police firearms discharges. State University of New York. Gallo, F., Collyer, C., & Gallagher, P. (2008). Prevalence of force by police in Rhode Island jurisdictions: Implications for use-of-force training and reporting. Criminal Justice Review, 33(4), 480–501. Garner, J., & Clemmer, E. (1986). Danger to police in domestic disturbances: A new look. National Institute of Justice Research in Brief. US Department of Justice. Garner, J., & Maxwell, C. (2002). Understanding the use of force by and against police in six jurisdictions: Final report. US Department of Justice. Garner, J., Buchanan, J., Schade, T., & Hepburn, J. (1996). Understanding the use of force by and against the police. National Institute of Justice. Geller, W., & Karales, K. (1982). Shootings of and by Chicago police: Uncommon crises part ii: Shootings of police, shooting correlates and control strategies. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 73(1), 331–378. Geller, W., & Toch, H. (1995). And justice for all: Understanding and controlling police abuse of force. Police Executive Research Forum. Goodey, J. (1997). Boys don’t cry: Masculinities, fear of crime and fearlessness. British Journal of Criminology, 37(3), 401–418. Greene, J. (1999). Zero tolerance: A case study of police policies and practices in New York City. Crime & Delinquency, 45(2), 171–187. Grennan, S. (1987). Findings on the role of officer gender in violent encounters with citizens. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 15(1), 78–85. Griffiths, R., & McDaniel, Q. (1993). Predictors of police assaults. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 9, 5–9. Hemmens, C., & Levin, D. (2000). Resistance is futile: The right to resist unlawful arrest in an era of aggressive policing. Crime & Delinquency, 46(4), 472–496. Henriquez, M. (1999). The IACP national police use-of-force database project. Police Chief, 66, 154–159. Hirschel, J., Dean, C., & Lumb, R. (1994). The relative contribution of domestic violence to assault and injury of police officers. Justice Quarterly, 11(1), 99–117. Hoffman, P., & Hickey, E. (2005). Use of force by female police officers. Journal of Criminal Justice, 33, 145–151. Innes, M. (1999). ‘An Iron Fist in an Iron Glove’ The Zero Tolerance Policing Debate. The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, 38(4), 397–410. International Association of Chiefs of Police. (1975). Robbery events: A risk reduction manual for police. International Association of Chiefs of Police. Jacobs, D., & Carmichael, J. (2002). Subordination and violence against state control agents: Testing political explanations for lethal assaults against the police. Social Forces, 80(4), 1223–1251. Jenkins, J., & Schock, K. (1992). Global structures and political processes in the study of domestic political conflict. Annual Review of Sociology, 18, 161–185. Johnson, L. (2019). Understanding assaults against police officers: A study of conflict escalation in police encounters with the public. Unpublished doctoral thesis. The University of Leeds. Johnson, R. (1999). Phoenix project: Predictors of suspect use of force (NCJRS: 187776). U.S. Department of Justice. Johnson, R. (2008). Officer firearms assaults at domestic violence calls: A descriptive analysis. The Police Journal, 81, 25–45.

260

G. den Heyer

Johnson, R. (2011). Predicting officer physical assaults at domestic assault calls. Journal of Family Violence, 26, 163–169. Kaminski, R. (2004). The murder of police officers. LFB Scholarly Publications LLC.. Kaminski, R. (2008). Assessing the county-level structural covariates of police homicides. Homicide Studies, 12(4), 350–380. Kaminski, R., & Edwards, S. (1995). A multivariate analysis of individual, situational, and environmental factors associated with police assault injuries. American Journal of Police, 14(3), 3–48. Kaminski, R., & Sorensen, D. (1995). A multivariate analysis of individual, situational and environmental factors associated with police assault injuries. American Journal of Police, 14(3/4), 3–48. Kaminski, R., & Stucky, T. (2009). Reassessing political explanations for murders of police. Homicide Studies, 13(1), 3–20. Kaminski, R., DiGiovanni, C., & Downs, R. (2004). The use of force between the police and persons with impaired judgment. Police Quarterly, 7(3), 311–338. Kaminski, R., Jefferies, E., & Gu, J. (2003). Community correlates of serious assaults on police. Police Quarterly, 6(2), 119–149. Kaste, M. (2015). Is there a war on police? The statistics say no. National Public Radio: All Things Considered. Retrieved from: https://www.npr.org/2015/09/17/441196546/ is-­there-­a-­war-­onpolice-­the-­statistics-­say-­no. Kavanagh, J. (1997). The occurrence of resisting arrest in arrest encounters: A study of police-­ citizen violence. Criminal Justice Review, 22(1), 16–33. Kent, S. (2010). Killings of police in US cities since 1980: An examination of environmental and political explanations. Homicide Studies, 14(1), 3–23. Kerr, A. N., Morabito, M., & Watson, A. (2010). Police encounters, mental illness, and injury: An exploratory investigation. Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 10(1-2), 116–132. King, M., & Brearley, N (1996) Public Order policing: Crime and security shorter study series (Number 2). Perpetuity Press. Klein, A. (2012). Policing as a causal factor: A fresh view on riots and social unrest. Safer Communities, 11(1), 17–23. Klinger, D. (1994). Demeanor or crime? Why “hostile” citizens are more likely to be arrested. Criminology, 32(3), 475–493. Konstantin, D. (1984). Homicides of American law enforcement officers. Justice Lersch, K., & Mieczkowski, T. (2005). Violent police behavior: Past, present, and future research directions. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 10, 552–568. Lester, D. (1978). Predicting murder rates of police officers. Police Law Quarterly, 12(3), 20–25. Lester, D. (1984). The murder of police officers in America. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 11(1), 101–113. Little, R. (1984). Cop killing: A descriptive analysis of the problem. Police Studies, 7(2), 68–76. Lott, J. (2000). Does a helping hand put others at risk? Affirmative action, police departments, and crime. Economic Inquiry, 38(2), 239–277. MacDonald, H. (2016). The war on cops: How the new attack on law and order makes everyone less safe. Encounter Books. MacDonald, J., Kaminski, R., & Smith, M. (2009). The effect of less-lethal weapons on injuries in police use-of-force events. American Journal of Public Health, 99(12), 2268–2274. MacDonald, J., Manz, P., Alpert, G., & Dunham, R. (2003). Police use of force: Examining the relationship between calls for service and the balance of police force and suspect resistance. Journal of Criminal Justice, 31(2), 119–127. Manzoni, P. (2003). Gewalt zwischen Polizei und Bevölkerung. Einflüsse von Arbeitsbelastungen, Arbeitszufriedenheit und Burnout auf polizeiliche Gewaltausübung und Opfererfahrungen. Rüegger. Margerita, M. (1980). Killing the police: Myths and motives. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 452, 63–71.

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

261

Mastrofski, S., Ritti, R., & Hoffmaster, D. (1987). Organizational determinants of police discretion: The case of drinking-driving. Journal of Criminal Justice, 15, 387–402. Mastrofski, S., Snipes, J., & Supina, A. (1996). Compliance on demand: The public’s response to specific police requests. Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 33, 269–305. Mayhew, C. (2001). Occupational health and safety risks faced by police officers. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 196, 1–6. McClusky, J., Mastrofski, S., & Parks, R. (1999). To acquiesce or rebel: Predicting citizen compliance with police requests. Police Quarterly, 2, 389–416. McCluskey, J., Terrill, W., & Paoline, E. (2005). Peer group aggressiveness and the use of coercion in police-suspect encounters. Police Practice and Research, 6(1), 19–37. McElvain, J., & Kposowa, A. (2004). Police officer characteristics and internal affairs investigations for use of force allegations. Journal of Criminal Justice, 32, 265–279. McKenzie, J. (2021, May). Over 1,000 Covid-linked assaults on police recorded as attacks against officers in Scotland continue to rise. Retrieved from: https://www.scotsman.com/news/crime/ over-­1000-­covid-­linked-­assaults-­on-­police-­recorded-­as-­attacks-­against-­officers-­in-­scotland-­ continue-­to-­rise-­3254425. Meloy, J. (2006). Empirical basis and forensic application of affective and predatory violence. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 40(6-7), 539–547. Metropolitan Police. (2021, July). Tweeter post. 22 July. Meyer, C., Magedanz, T., Dahlin, D., & Chapman, S. (1981). A comparative assessment of assault incidents: Robbery-related, ambush, and general police assaults. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 9(1), 1–18. Meyer, C., Magedanz, T., Kieselhorst, D., & Chapman, S. (1979). Violence and the police: The special case of the police assailant. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 7(2), 161–171. Meyer, C., Magedanz, T., Chapman, S., Dahlin, D., & Swanson, C. (1982). An analysis of factors related to robbery-associated assaults on police officers—Part III. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 10(3), 249–272. Meyer, J., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340–363. Meyer, S., & Carroll, R. (2011). When officers die: Understanding deadly domestic violence calls for service. The Police Chief, 78(5), 24–27. Morrison, P., & Meyer, C. (1974). A microanalysis of assaults on police on Austin, Texas. Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma. Moxey, M., & McKenzie, I. (1993). Assaults on police. Policing, 9, 172–186. Muir, W. K. (1977). Police: Street corner politicians. University of Chicago Press. Mustard, D. (2001). The impact of gun laws on police deaths. Journal of Law & Economics, 44, 635–657. National Police Chief’s Council. (2020a, September). NPCC and College of Policing pledge to improve officer and staff safety following largest ever survey of police workforce. Retrieved from: https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/npcc-­and-­college-­of-­policing-­pledge-­to-­improve-­ officer-­and-­staff-­safety-­following-­largest-­ever-­survey-­of-­police-­workforce National Police Chief’s Council. (2020b). Officer and Staff Safety Review: A review of the arrangements to secure the safety of police officers and police staff engaged in frontline policing.. College of Policing. National Police Chiefs Council. (2021, May). Demands on the police forces in England and Wales during the Covid-19 pandemic. https://cdn.prgloo.com/media/download/ e4b6eccd1ebc44e6a7c8cf970bbe9468. New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. (2020). NSW crime tool. Retrieved from: http://crimetool.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/bocsar/. Police, N. Z. (2019). NZ Police tactical options research report #7: 1 January to 31 December 2018. New Zealand Police. Noakes, L., & Christopher, S. (1990). Why police are assaulted. Policing, 6(4), 625–638.

262

G. den Heyer

Nowacki, J. (2011). Organizational-level police discretion: An application for police use of lethal force. Crime & Delinquency, 61(5), 643–668. Ohlemacher, T., Rüger, A., Schacht, G., & Feldkötter, U. (2003). Gewalt gegen Polizeibeamtinnen und -beamte 1985–2000. Nomos. Ozkan, T., Worrall, J., & Piquero, A. (2016). Does minority representation in police agencies reduce assaults on the police? American Journal of Criminal Justice, 41, 402–423. Paoline, E., & Terrill, W. (2007). Police education, experience, and the use of force. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 34(2), 179–196. Peterson, R., & Bailey, W. (1988). Structural influences on the killing of police: A comparison with general homicides. Justice Quarterly, 5, 207–233. Pew Research Center. (2017). Behind the badge: Amid protests and calls for reform, how police view their jobs, key issues and recent fatal encounters between blacks and police. http:// www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/behind-­thebadge/?utm_content=buffer33b9f&utm_ medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer. Pobregin, M., & Poole, E. (1991). Police and tragic events: The management of emotions. Journal of Criminal Justice, 19(3), 395–403. Pratt, T., & Cullen, F. (2005). Assessing macro-level predictors and theories of crime: A meta-­ analysis. Crime and Justice, 32, 373–450. Rabe-Hemp, C. (2008). Female officers and the ethic of care: Does officer gender impact police behaviors? Journal of Criminal Justice, 36, 426–434. Rabe-Hemp, C., & Schuck, A. (2007). Violence against police officers: Are female officers at greater risk? Police Quarterly, 10(4), 411–428. Redman, V. (2018). Macro-level predictors of assaults against police in Kentucky. Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of Louisville. Regens, J., Meyer, C., Swanson, C., & Chapman, S. (1974). An analysis of assaults on municipal police officers in 46 south central cities. Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma. Reiss, A. (1971). The police and the public. Yale University Press. Riksheim, E., & Chermak, S. (1993). Causes of police behavior revisited. Journal of Criminal Justice, 21, 353–382. Rossler, M. (2015). Environment and citizen resistance of police coercive authority: Application of defiance and social disorganization theories. Unpublished doctoral thesis. Michigan State University. Sampson, R., & Bartusch, D. (1998). Legal cynicism and (subcultural?) tolerance of deviance: The neighborhood context of racial differences. Law & Society Review, 32(4), 777–804. Sampson, R., & Groves, W. (1989). Community structure and crime: Testing social disorganization theory. American Journal of Sociology, 94(4), 774–802. Schmalzl, H. (2005). Das Problem des “plötzlichen” Angriffs auf Polizeibeamte. Polizei & Wissenschaft, 3, 8–18. Schouten, R., & Brennan, D. (2016). Targeted violence against law enforcement officers. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 34(5), 608–621. Seron, C., Pereira, J., & Kovath, J. (2004). Judging police misconduct: “Street-level” versus professional policing. Law & Society Review, 38(4), 665–710. Sessar, K., Baumann, U., & Müller, J. (1980). Police officers as victims of wilful homicide. Federal Criminal Police Office. Sforza, T. (2016). Assaults on California police soar with 9 deaths so far this year. The Mercury News. Orange County, California. Sherman, L. (1980). Causes of police behavior: The current state of quantitative research. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 17(1), 69–100. Shjarback, J., & Maguire, E. (2021). Extending research on the “war on cops”: The effects of Ferguson on nonfatal assaults against U.S. police officers. Crime & Delinquency, 2021, 67(1), 3–26.

12  Assaults on Police Officers: A Review of the Predictors

263

Siegel, A., & Victoroff, J. (2009). Understanding human aggression: New insights from neuroscience. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 32(4), 209–215. Sierra-Arévalo, M. (2016). American policing and the danger imperative. https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2864104. Skogan, W. (2003). Representing the community in community policing. In W.  Skogan (Ed.), Community policing: Can it work? Wadsworth Publishing. Skolnick, J. (1966). Justice without trial: Law enforcement in a democratic society. Wiley. Smelser, N. (1962). Theory of collective behaviour. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Smith, D. (1984). The organizational context of legal control. Criminology, 22, 19–38. Smith, M., & Petrocelli, M. (2002). The effectiveness of force used by police in making arrests. Police Practice and Research, 3(3), 201–215. Smith, M., Kaminski, R., Rojek, J., Alpert, G., & Mathis, J. (2007a). The impact of conducted energy devices and other types of force and resistance on officer and suspect injuries. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 30(3), 423–446. Smith, W., Allen, W., & Danley, L. (2007b). “Assume the position... You fit the description” psychosocial experiences and racial battle fatigue among African-American male college students. American Behavioral Scientist, 51(4), 551–578. Southwick, L. (1998). An economic analysis of murder and accident risks for police in the United States. Applied Economics, 30(5), 593–605. Stanford, R., & Mowry, B. (1990). Domestic disturbance danger rate. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 17, 244–249. Stanko, E. (1990). Everyday violence. Unwin Hyman. Statista. (2021). Number of law enforcement officers assaulted in the United States from 2004 to 2018. Retrieved from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/584823/ number-­of-­law-­enforcement-­officers-­assaulted-­in-­the-­us/. Steffensmeier, D., Ulmer, J., & Kramer, J. (2006). The interaction of race, gender, and age in criminal sentencing: The punishment of being young, Black, and male. Criminology, 36, 763–798. Stobart, R. (1972). Serious assaults on police. The Police Journal, 45(2), 108–126. Stoutland, S. (2001). The multiple dimensions of trust in resident/police relations in Boston. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 38(3), 226–256. Swanson, C. (1978). The influence of organization and environment on arrest policies in major U.S. cities. Policy Studies Journal, 7, 390–398. Terrill, W., & Mastrofski, S. (2002). Reassessing situational and officer based determinants of police coercion. Justice Quarterly, 19, 215–248. Terrill, W., Leinfelt, F., & Kwak, D. (2008). Examining police use of force: A smaller agency perspective. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 31(1), 57–76. Thompson, T. (2021, July). More than 100 officers assaulted every day. Retrieved from: https:// www.policeprofessional.com/news/more-­than-­100-­officers-­assaulted-­every-­day/. Tuttle, J. (2019). Dangerous politics? An analysis of the relationship between political affiliation and assaults on police officers in American counties. Unpublished master’s thesis. Colorado State University. Uchida, C., Brooks, L., & Kopers, C. (1987). Dangers to police during domestic encounters: Assaults on Baltimore County police, 1984–86. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 2(4), 357–371. van Maanen, J. (1973). Working the street; a developmental view of police behavior (Working Paper 681–73). Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Violanti, J., Fekedulegn, D., Andrew, M., Charles, L., Hartley, T., Vila, B., & Burchfielet, C. (2012). Shift work and the incidence of injury among police officers. American Journal of Industrial Medicine, 55(3), 217–227. Weitzer, R. (2015). American policing under fire: Misconduct and reform. Society, 52(5), 475–480. Westley, W. (1953). Violence and the police. American Journal of Sociology, 59(1), 34–41. Willits, D. (2014). The organisational structure of police departments and assaults on police officers. International journal of Police Science and Management, 16(2), 140–154.

264

G. den Heyer

Willits, D., & Nowacki, J. (2014). Police organization and deadly force: An examination of variation across large and small cities. Police & Society, 24, 63–80. Wilson, J. (1968). Varieties of police behavior: The management of law and order in eight communities. Harvard University Press. Wilson, J., & Kelling, G. (1998). Broken windows: The police and neighborhood safety. In G. Cole & M. Gertz (Eds.), Criminal justice system: Politics and policies (pp. 103–115). Wadsworth. Wilson, L., & Meyer, K. (1991). Violence at the street level: Police casualties and fatalities. The Police Journal, 64(1), 28–45. Wilson, L., Brunk, G., & Meyer, K. (1990). Situational effects in police officer assaults: The case of patrol unit size. Police Journal, 63, 260–271. Wilson, S. (2005). Determining the correlates of police victimization: An analysis of social disorganization and organizational level factors on injurious assaults. Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of Nebraska. Wilson, S., & Zhao, J. (2008). Determining the correlates of police victimization: An analysis of organizational level factors on injurious assaults. Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(5), 461–468. Wright, J. & Prunkun, H. (1990). A study of assaults on South Australian police officers from 1980 to 1986.. South Australia Police. Yocum, J., & Hasner, R. (2008). Police line-of-duty deaths from 1955 through 2004 in the State of Nebraska. Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 17(3), 1–26.

Dr. Garth den Heyer  is a professor at Arizona State University and a senior research fellow with the Police Foundation. He is also a contributing faculty member at Walden University and an associate with the Scottish Institute of Policing Research. He served with the New Zealand Police for 38 years, retiring as an inspector and manager: national security. He also spent more than 20 months as a strategic advisor to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. His main research interests are policing, militarization, service delivery efficacy, policy development, strategic thinking, and organizational reform.

Part VI

Police Deviance and Brutality

Chapter 13

When the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa Christiaan Bezuidenhout and Annalise Kempen

Introduction In a democratic society police brutality is usually not tolerated, and if forceful actions are needed in the execution of police duties, it is expected that the police use force only when it is necessary for legitimate purposes. However, the police in modern societies are often criticized for their excessive violent actions towards citizens. Police aggression and the extensive powers they have to use violence and even deadly force against fellow citizens as a control apparatus in society are poorly understood. One can also question where one draws the line of what type of behavior classifies a police action in the line of duty as brutal instead of a legal necessity. Many police agencies, including the SAPS, pay large amounts from their budget (tax money) in the form of civil claims due to complaints against police officials, including those who used brutal or deadly force against citizens. During the period 1 April 2020 to 31 March 2021, a total number of 10,689 new civil claims were registered with the South African Police Service, valued at R16.782 billion. A total of 52,203 claims, valued at R59.812 billion, were still pending by 31 March 2021. (These claims emanate from previous financial years, as well as the 2021/2022 financial year. Unfortunately, the report does not specify how much was spent on civil claims relating to police brutality, i.e., assault and torture). When the police become the aggressors and not the protectors, their actions carry significant psychological, economic, and social costs and create a situation of distrust in the community. Since one of the main objectives of the police in democratic South Africa is to police communities in partnership, it is a travesty that the

C. Bezuidenhout (*) · A. Kempen Department of Social Work and Criminology, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, Republic of South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_13

267

268

C. Bezuidenhout and A. Kempen

community is losing confidence and trust in the police since some police officials themselves become the aggressors/offenders. Such use of violence by the police has implications, not only on the individual victims in terms of their pain and suffering, but also on the workings of the Criminal Justice System which eventually can cause a societal problem with a ripple effect throughout society (Hadebe & Gopal, n.d.). Amnesty International (n.d.) reminds us that police brutality, or the unlawful use of force by police officials, is a human rights issue as it can result in people being deprived of their right to life. If the use of force is unnecessary or excessive, it may also amount to torture or ill-treatment. In addition, the unlawful use of force by the police can also violate the right to liberty and security; to equal protection under the law and to be free from discrimination. The preamble of the South African Police Service (SAPS) Act 68 of 1995 states the powers and functions of the SAPS in accordance with the national policing policy and the directions of the Cabinet member responsible for policing as follows: (a) Ensure the safety and security of all persons and property in the national territory; (b) uphold and safeguard the fundamental rights of every person as guaranteed by Chapter 3 of the Constitution; (c) ensure cooperation between the Service and the communities it serves in the combating of crime; (d) reflect respect for victims of crime and the understanding of their needs; and (e) ensure effective civilian supervision over the Service.

This legislative mandate of the police makes it clear that the police are not supposed to be the aggressors, but rather the protectors of the South African society. It is thus evident that unregulated force and violence do not form part of the functions and duties of the SAPS. The initial demilitarization of the SAPS had probably been driven by the need to improve police effectiveness and efficiency and to adhere to the above functions. The former SAP was heavily criticized for their hard-­ handedness in the era prior to 1994. However, the effort to establish a police service after 1994 and replace the former notorious (SAP) police force currently seems to have been a waste of time and money as the various demilitarization efforts (ranks, uniforms, insignia, changes in training, etc.) had limited impact on the crime statistics. It also failed to ensure the safety and security of all the people and their property in South Africa. In fact, generally speaking, it is not safe to walk alone in the streets at night, and most South Africans fear becoming a victim of a serious crime. That is why the South African National Development Plan Vision 2030 states in Chap. 12, entitled Building safer communities, that “in 2030, people living in South Africa feel safe at home, at school and at work, and they enjoy a community life free of fear. Women walk freely in the streets and children play safely outside” (National Planning Commission, 2012: 387). Another key aspect that needs to be mentioned is that the demeanor of many police officials had not changed significantly as the police were still regarded as violent and uncompromising since the dawn of the new democracy in 1994 to date. Discipline in the police service has also been questioned since 1994. Egwu (2021) writes that many police officials believe that there were improvements in policing during the first 5 years or so after the dawn of the new democracy. This was because

13  When the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa

269

there was a clear focus on community policing, community relations, demilitarization, and human rights training. Yet, after 2000 a lot changed, including the training period of new police recruits that was shortened from 2  years to only one, and whereafter it was claimed that there was also corruption involved in the recruitment process of new police recruits. At this juncture it is also imminent to highlight that there are a diverse range of law enforcement agencies in South Africa, including municipal and metropolitan police services, municipal law enforcement officers, and the traffic police. However, their specific mandates differ from that of the SAPS, since the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, in section 205(3) only provides for a single police service with the object to prevent, combat, and investigate crime, maintain public order, protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and uphold and enforce the law. Although the municipal and metropolitan police services resort under the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995, their functions are, according to section 64E of this Act, the prevention of crime, traffic policing, and the policing of municipal by-laws. They are not mandated to investigate crime. There are also specialized units such as the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) (commonly referred to as the Hawks) which was established as an independent directorate within the South African Police Service in terms of section 17C of the South African Police Service Act, 1995, as amended by the South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008. The Hawks are responsible for the combating, investigation, and prevention of national priority crimes such as serious organized crime, serious commercial crime, and serious cases of corruption. In addition, an extensive private security industry exists in South Africa, while members of the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) are occasionally deployed to assist the SAPS in the combatting of crime in hotspot areas, such as where gang violence is rife. All these units, sections, and departments are broadly regarded as law enforcement agencies although any form of abuse of power unfortunately reflects negatively on the SAPS’s image. The pressure on politicians is mounting as crime is regarded as out of control while the police are having little impact on preventing crime. Not only are many police officials involved in criminal activities, but some use strong arm tactics in their day-to-day policing operations. Many use their police power, high-level contacts, police gear, and influences for their own gain. In the period from 1 April 2020 to 31 March 2021, 1592 misconduct and disciplinary hearings were concluded against SAPS employees, which resulted in the dismissal of 227 employees, suspension without payment against 19, and final written warnings against 217 others, among others. The types of misconduct addressed during the disciplinary hearings which are relevant for this discussion include that 25 SAPS employees were found guilty of robbery, 16 for assault with the intent to cause grievous bodily harm (GBH), 12 for murder, 13 for rape, 4 for malicious damage to property of a serious nature, and 15 for contravention of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 (SAPS, 2021: 322–324). To contextualize the timeframe when police brutality became very clear in the new democratic dispensation, the following incidents by political leadership need to

270

C. Bezuidenhout and A. Kempen

be highlighted. Bheki Cele, a former National Commissioner of Police (and the ­current Minister or Police at the time of writing), instructed the SAPS in 2007 to use lethal force and always “aim for the head”. In April 2008, Ms. Susan Shabangu, the then Deputy Minister for Safety and Security, made a very controversial statement when she told police during a Ministerial imbizo (a community meeting) that they must “kill the bastards who were raping our children and murdering our people.” Prior to making this statement, she said that SAPS members have the power to protect themselves within the parameters of the law (Kempen, 2008: 17). Researchers such as Berning and Masiloane (2011) argue that reasons why police brutality increased significantly during that time include that the police had a strong culture of following orders without asking questions. This is because they will typically carry out orders given to them by their commanders rather than be reprimanded if they question the commands given to them. Ms. Shabangu’s remarks, which were in contrast with the cultural transformation process that was envisaged with the democracy, might have contributed to more police brutality. In 2009, Mr. Fikile Mbalula, the then Deputy Minister of Police, indicated that he wanted the Police Service to change back to a para-military force with its accompanying military ranks and discipline. According to Mbalula, the reintroduction of remilitarized ranks would be part of the new approach to fiercely deal with criminals (Bezuidenhout & Kempen, 2021: 273 in Albrecht & Den Heyer, 2021). In 2010, under the leadership of Bheki Cele as National Commissioner of the SAPS, the decision was made to re-introduce the rank system of the old SAP (prior to 1995), among others. In the media statement that was issued on 11 March 2010 by Mr. Nathi Mthethwa, the Minister of Police at the time, he noted that it was part of the police’s transformation, not only in terms of name, but also with regard to attitude, thoughts, and operational duties. Even though he admitted that the change of ranks would not automatically lead to a decrease in crime and that it should not only be interpreted as militarization. Yet, it should be interpreted as a new approach of “being fierce towards criminals, while lenient to citizens’ safety and maintaining good discipline within the Force … For any Force to discharge its tasks effectively there needs to be a commander because wars are led by commanders” (Kempen, 2010: 2). The “remilitarization” of SAPS in 2010, which included the changing of the rank structure and the implied “permission” to use deadly force as a result of comments made by police leadership, received sharp criticism locally and internationally. That includes the comments made by Ms. Shabangu, the Deputy Minister of Police in 2008, when she also said: “You must not worry about the regulations. I want no warning shots. You have one shot and it must be a kill shot. I want to assure policemen and -women … that they have permission to kill these criminals. I will not tolerate any pathetic excuses for not being able to deal with crime. You have been given guns, now use them” (Kempen, 2013: 20). More recently in July 2022, following a mass shooting of patrons at a tavern in Pietermaritzburg in KwaZulu-Natal that left four people dead, Mr. Jomo Sibiya, the acting Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Community Safety and Liaison in that province, was quoted as having said: “I’ve been told in South Africa a criminal can shoot you, but once they turn their back, you cannot shoot that criminal

13  When the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa

271

because he is no longer a threat to you. It cannot be that way, that’s not how the law should work.” He added that the laws need to be changed to assist in the fight against crime and was angered about the fact that the police “will be arrested because he shot someone who is not a threat. That is a stupid law, I’m saying it. We cannot have laws that protect criminals – we need laws that give authority to the state and the police. The state must be respected”. Sibiya’s remarks came during the same weekend when 15 other people had also been killed during another mass shooting at another tavern in Soweto, Johannesburg, approximately 500  km away (Singh, 2022). Again, one can rightfully ask whether such statements by politicians and office-bearers contribute to police taking the law, unlawfully into their own hands, irrespective of whether or not it is due to the frustration of feeling that their hands are bound by strict laws or for other reasons. Para-militaristic police forces are regarded as an apparatus by which oppressive political regimes maintain control over rebellious citizens. Since the SAP was also regarded as a para-militaristic force, with links to the military, it simultaneously acquired a reputation for brutality. In the process it focused on upholding apartheid regulations, while service delivery to the masses (the Black population) was not a priority. Day-to-day street policing was conducted in a swift, forceful style, and confessions were sometimes extracted under duress, coercion, and torture (Bezuidenhout & Kempen, 2018). In the current context where police brutality is rife during looting incidents, chronic service delivery, and labor strikes, it appears that the SAPS have again become the pawns or aggressors that protect the interest and anxieties of the government. The change in the police structure from a “Force” to a “Service” did not necessarily result in lower crime levels and did not built trust in the community. The crime rate in South Africa has continued to be unacceptably high and it is apparent that members of the SAPS continued to be guilty of police brutality and torture. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, through sections 11, 12, 14, and 25 of the Bill of Rights provides for the right to life, freedom, and security of the person, freedom from all forms of violence, privacy, and not to be arbitrarily deprived of property. It is the responsibility of the state to provide for the safety and security of its citizens and not allow their police to brutalize the community. Hence, the public perceive the state and their police service as inadequate to provide the necessary services and to protect their citizens from violent criminals as well as unnecessary police actions and force from aggressive police officials. In 2013, the Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013 was promulgated. This Act provides for the offense of torture of persons and other offenses associated with the torture of persons; and to prevent and combat the torture of persons within and across the borders of the Republic of South Africa. One of the objects of the Act is to provide for the training of persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation, or treatment of a person subject to any form of arrest, detention, or imprisonment, on the prohibition and the combating of torture (section 2(1)(d)). These persons would in the majority of cases be members of the South African Police Service or the municipal police services who have the power to arrest people who

272

C. Bezuidenhout and A. Kempen

are suspected of having committed a crime. If found guilty of the crime of torture, the accused can face a life sentence. The SAPS Code of Conduct explicitly states that every police official must “uphold and protect the fundamental rights of every person,” and “act impartially, courteously, honestly, respectfully, transparently and in an accountable manner”.

Explaining Police Brutality Police brutality can manifest in many forms, but the most extreme forms are physical assaults and the use of deadly force. Other forms of police brutality include forms of intimidation, police corruption, unlawful arrests, verbal attacks, and other actions that are considered inappropriate police conduct (Zondi & Ukpere, 2014: 575). Police brutality can be regarded as “the use of excessive physical force or verbal assault and psychological intimidation”. Therefore, there should not be an over-emphasis on the physical violence of police brutality as status and personal degradation are included, such as verbal assault and denial of water, food, and legal or medical services. Police brutality can be affected by one or a group of police officials. In a group context one can assume that it is rooted in collectivism and the nature of humans to perform punishment as a group when they believe they have been wronged (Geldenhuys, 2020: 10). Perhaps we can explain police brutality by a process of deindividuation where the police engage in seemingly impulsive violent acts in situations in which they believe they cannot be personally identified. One even has to question whether there is a possibility that some police officials lose their self-awareness in the type of work they do. This is a debatable subject as the police in most countries have sworn to a code of conduct to serve and protect the community. In some countries such as the United States of America (USA), racism is often coined as police brutality. Reports about white police officials who assault or shoot an African American (Black) person are often highlighted. One of the more recent cases that caused international outrage is that of 46-year-old George Floyd who died on 25 May 2020 after a policeman had kept his knee on Floyd’s neck for approximately 8 min. This fatal action left Floyd unable to breath, even though he and bystanders called out for help. The tragedy happened after Floyd had bought cigarettes at a convenience store, whereafter the store employee had called 911 alleging that the customer (Floyd) had used a counterfeit $20 bill to pay for his purchases. As a result, police officials from the Minneapolis Police Department responded, which eventually led to the tragedy during which George Floyd died as a result of him not being able to breathe. At the time, George Floyd’s death sparked various protest actions across the USA against police brutality. Ironically, The New York Times (2020) reports that law enforcement’s response to these protests were further criticized as they reacted with force, including using teargas and shooting rubber bullets at protestors, and conducting mass arrests, despite these protests being mostly peaceful.

13  When the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa

273

Within days after the incident, the local county prosecutors brought serious charges against the four police officials involved in the incident (Hill et al., 2020). In April 2021, Derek Chauvin, the (White) police official who had held his knee against Floyd’s neck, was found guilty of murder and sentenced to 22 and a half years’ incarceration. In May 2022, another one of Chauvin’s colleagues, namely, Thomas Lane, pleaded guilty to second-degree manslaughter, and his sentencing date was set for September 2022. However, Lane had already been found guilty of federal crimes in February 2022, along with Tou Thao and J. Alexander Kueng for their failure to intervene while Chauvin had placed his knee against the neck of George Floyd for so long, resulting in his death (The New York Times, 2022). Racism is also still a reality in South Africa, and although Black people are the victims of a large proportion of police brutality cases, a significant number of brutality cases were due to the actions of Black police officials. One of the more recent cases that comes to mind happened on 26 August 2020 when 16-year-old Nathaniel Julies, who lived with Down Syndrome in Eldorado Park in Gauteng, was shot by police officials. This came after he had gone to a local tuck shop to buy biscuits, whereafter the police started questioning him, allegedly about vehicle theft. When he failed to respond in answering his questions, he was shot, while the true reason why he could not answer them was because he was non-verbal due to him living with Down Syndrome (Nkanjeni, 2020). As a result, three police officials, namely, Simon “Scorpion” Ndyalvane, Caylene Whiteboy, and Voster Netshionlogo, are facing charges of premeditated murder, defeating the ends of justice and illegal possession of ammunition (Naidoo, 2022). According to Bruce (2000), “police brutality occurs when members of a police service use force unlawfully. Therefore, brutality is the (unlawful) abuse of the capacity to use force. By implication, police brutality is generally deliberate unlawful violence but actions which amount to criminally negligent uses of force should also be considered as acts of police brutality.” Dr. Johan Burger, a former senior police officer (assistant commissioner/major-general) in the South African Police Service, explains police brutality as “the use of any force exceeding that which is reasonably necessary to accomplish a lawful police purpose” (Kempen, 2013: 18). When the use of force by the police is inevitable, the police officials should carry out their responsibilities, and if they have to use force in such situations, it is not regarded as unlawful (Bruce, 2002). South African police officials find the legal prescripts to the use of force in section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which describes the use of force during an arrest as follows: If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists the attempt, or flees, or resists the attempt and flees, when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him or her is being made, and the suspect cannot be arrested without the use of force, the arrestor may, in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances to overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing, but, in addition to the requirement that the force must be reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances, the arrestor may use deadly force only if –

274

C. Bezuidenhout and A. Kempen

(a) the suspect poses a threat of serious violence to the arrestor or any other person; or (b) the suspect is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm and there are no other reasonable means of effecting the arrest, whether at that time or later.

The term “deadly force” is defined in section 49(1)(c) as: “… force that is likely to cause serious bodily harm or death and includes, but is not limited to, shooting at a suspect with a firearm.” The Nathaniel Julies case, as discussed supra, is one of many examples of the use of deadly force, but in this case, it was not justifiable. Despite the legislative explanation of the use of force, the use of excessive force by the police is a vague concept, as it is evident that excessive force includes situations that went beyond the necessary force needed to achieve the police mission. A clear definition of police brutality is important for police agencies as a lack of a definition impacts on the proper recording of police brutality incidents in official statistics. In short, police brutality amounts to the violence or violent actions of law enforcement officials that use an unnecessary amount of force unlawfully and intentionally to abuse the public. Such actions may include occurrences of torture, assault in- or outside of custody, execution-type murder in custody, rape and sexual assault or deaths linked to protests, domestic arguments, disputes, and the irresponsible and/or accidental shooting of alleged criminals, suspects, or innocent bystanders (Kempen, 2013: 18). Another issue that needs to be considered is that so-called bad apples in a police agency are often blamed for police criminality and misconduct. According to Dr. Johan Burger, a report published by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police states that the so-called bad apples or the bad apple paradigm has, since the 1970s, been recognized as primarily a political or defensive explanation. This focuses the blame on individuals and allows leadership to escape responsibility for addressing the systemic factors which are at the root of the problem. These systematic factors include, among others, the pressure to conform to the police culture; rigid command and control structures which lowers ethical decision-making; and deficiencies in internal accountability mechanisms (Kempen, 2013: 20). Police brutality, corruption, and unlawful activities by police officials undermine fundamental human rights, endanger the stability and security of societies, undermine the values of democracy, and jeopardize the rule of law (Vilakazi, 2015: 32). Using aggressive techniques while making arrest is a factor which Van den Heever (2017 in Geldenhuys, 2019a: 12) highlights as a result of the stress and trauma which police officials are exposed to. This is one of the many outcomes of a stressful policing work environment, which can further contribute to burnout, insubordination, and even fatigue on the job. It poses a threat to their psychological health which can result in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) of which mood swings, aggressiveness, recklessness, and self-destructive behavior are common symptoms (Violanti et al., 2017 in Geldenhuys, 2019a, b: 13). Van den Heever (2021: 46) further points out that SAPS members are considered to be “on duty” 24 h a day even when their regular shift for the day has ended. As a result, this means that police officials take their service pistols home, not only to protect the community where they reside, but also themselves from armed and

13  When the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa

275

violent criminals. The risk is that this easy access to a firearm not only increases the likelihood of such a police official committing suicide but also a family murder. Geldenhuys (2019a: 13) explains that the stress and trauma of being a police official do not only have a direct impact on the personal lives of police officials  – both physically and psychologically – it also has an impact on those around them including their colleagues, family members, and friends. This results in vulnerable police officials taking their own lives and even those around them. The return to a military style of policing in 2010 has been compared to the pre-1994 para-militaristic policing style era during which police brutality and torture were rife. In April 2011, following the death of Andries Tatane in Ficksburg in the Free State and Jeanette Odendaal in Kempton Park, Gauteng, at the hands of police officials, the former President of South Africa, Mr. Jacob Zuma, said that: “We cannot have this culture from police … I must make it clear that we don’t want people exercising violence on protesters. We condemn it totally” (News24, 2011). Another case which happened on 16 August 2012, during which 34 mineworkers were killed during the Lonmin mine tragedy, made international headlines and was dubbed the Marikana massacre, evidently because of unrestrained police violence (SAHO, n.d.). In another incident that happened in 2013, Mido Macia, a taxi driver from Mozambican descent, died after being dragged behind a police van in Daveyton, east of Johannesburg, Gauteng. These types of incidents query the motives behind police violence. In March 2020, the current President of South Africa, Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa, declared a state of disaster, which eventually lasted (in various levels of restriction and with different regulations) for more than 2 years, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. During the initial strict level lockdown period which lasted for 3 weeks from 26 March to 17 April 2020, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), which is regarded as the police’s watchdog, informed the Parliament of South Africa that it had a total intake of 403 cases of misconduct during COVID-19 operations conducted by law enforcement. Of these, 152 were cases of assault by police officials, resulting in five deaths due to excessive force (Du Plessis, 2021: 44).

Prominent Case Studies of Police Brutality in South Africa Case Study 1: The 2012 Marikana Massacre The events of 11 to 16 August 2012 will forever be engraved in the minds of South Africans when 34 miners who were participating in an unprotected strike against their employer, Lonmin in Marikana, situated in the North West province of South Africa, were fatally wounded by police officials. Since there had been no formal application for the strike in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993, the SAPS was initially not present, but as the gathering grew to around 3000 miners, members of mine management requested the police’s presence, resulting in the deployment of the nearby Rustenburg Public Order Policing (POP) Unit to monitor the situation. Although the situation was initially peaceful, the mine management

276

C. Bezuidenhout and A. Kempen

was concerned about reports of intimidation towards non-striking miners while some were using pangas and knobkerries to do so. Since the miners were involved in a wildcat strike, security officers used rubber bullets in an attempt to disperse the crowd due to the intimidation of non-striking miners. During the following 2 days, two security officers were hacked to death by the striking mineworkers. That same night, two non-striking miners were murdered by the colleagues while three police officials were killed – leaving ten people dead at the hands of striking mineworkers (Kempen, 2015: 56). During the next few days, the strike gained momentum with more miners joining, resulting in an increased police deployment of around 400 police officials. The police tried to negotiate with the miners to disarm and disperse peacefully, while the then Deputy Provincial Commissioner of the Police in North West, Maj-Gen Mpembe, even told the management of two labor unions that the police did not want to be seen as “the police that is brutally killing people and at the same time we do not want to be seen as the police that is not complying with international standards. We are policing in a democracy where negotiation [is] its weapon, not bloodshed.” Sadly, the bloodiest day of the Marikana Massacre was on 16 August 2012 when 34 miners were shot and more than 71 injured. Some of the police reports noted that their actions were as a result of self-defense since some of the protestors were heavily armed with weapons, pangas, spears, axes, and firearms. The miners had hastily flanked the police vehicles deploying the barbed wire, but since the police could not stem their actions with stun grenades, police officials had to use force to protect themselves from the charging group. Following the Marikana Massacre, the police were heavily criticized resulting in the appointment of the Marikana Commission of Enquiry, which published a 660-page report on 31 March 2015 making various recommendations about the way in which the SAPS should deal with protests in the future in order to prevent similar tragedies. It also recommended that all killings and assaults be referred for further investigation by the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (Kempen, 2015: 57–59 and SAHO, n.d.). Case Study 2: The Andries Tatane Shooting During a service delivery protest that happened in the Free State town of Ficksburg on 13 April 2011, Andries Tatane was killed after he had been shot with a rubber bullet at close range (Bruce, 2022). Those rubber bullets were fired from police shotguns while police officials also tried to subdue him with batons (SAPA, 2013). The nation watched in horror as his final moments were broadcast on the evening news, while his hand clutched his bloodied chest where the rubber bullet had entered his body. Years after his death, residents of this town said that Tatane had died in vain as nothing had changed since that fateful day when the service delivery protest had been held during which he was fatally wounded. If nothing else, the situation had even worsened with a failing municipality not addressing basic service delivery (Shoba, 2020). One of Tatane’s close friends, as well as his nephew, even believed that he was deliberately targeted and killed for his political activism since he had earlier decided to participate in the local municipal elections as an independent candidate. His friend believes that his popularity among voters was regarded as a threat, while his nephew

13  When the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa

277

believes that if his uncle had an issue with something, he would speak up, possibly making him a target because at the time they saw that he would collapse the municipality or something. Tatane died a month before the local elections (Shoba, 2020). The police officials who stood trial for Tatane’s murder were acquitted (Knoetze, 2021) after the court found that the State could not prove its case of murder and assault with the intent to commit grievous bodily harm (GBH) beyond a reasonable doubt. The court added that the identity of the accused police officials could neither be proven, nor could the rubber bullet that killed Tatane be traced back to a specific firearm. What had allegedly happened was that Tatane had stepped in to protect the elderly who had come in harm’s way after a crowd of approximately 4000 protestors had become upset after the police had used water cannons to disperse them. His nephew also questioned why the police did not use pepper spray and then handcuff him if he were aggressive. “You are a trained policeman, but you can’t detain someone. How is that possible?” he asked (Shoba, 2020). Case Study 3: The Mido Macia Assault In 2015, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) secured convictions against eight police officials who had been accused of the murder of Mido Macia (South African Government News Agency, 2015). Following their conviction, they were each sentenced to 15  years’ incarceration by the North Gauteng High Court. This came after the police officials had been found guilty of handcuffing and then dragging Macia behind a police van on 26 February 2013. On that day, Macia had allegedly parked his vehicle illegally, and video footage that was taken by a bystander showed that police officials had overpowered Macia, whereafter they tied him to the back of a police van by his arms before driving off. He later died in police custody. During their trial, the accused claimed that the deceased had fallen out of the police van and that the handcuffs had accidentally hooked on to the back of the van. However, the trial court had found that the police officials had corroborated their actions and the court had no doubt that the accused could have foreseen that their actions would have fateful consequences to the deceased. The post-mortem report that was submitted during the murder trial indicated that the deceased had died as a result of extensive soft tissue injuries and hypoxia. The trial court found that those injuries were inflicted by the accused persons (Karrim, 2020).

Police Accountability Accountability refers to a fundamental principle of a democratic society that the police should be held accountable for their actions (Walker, 2007: 1). Accountability includes what the police do and how they perform. Agency-level accountability involves the performance of law enforcement agencies with respect to controlling crime and disorder and providing services to the public. Individual-level accountability involves the conduct of police officials with respect to lawful, respectful, and equal treatment of citizens (Walker, 2007: 1). All police officials are charged with

278

C. Bezuidenhout and A. Kempen

extensive powers of arrest and detention in order to facilitate effectiveness in the fight against crime. They are also armed by the state to enable them to deal with violent situations that may threaten citizens or themselves. These huge responsibilities also substantiate the trust bestowed on them by society. Police officials, traffic officials, and those serving as metro police officials who are mandated to enforce traffic and municipal by-laws and conduct crime prevention and all those who perform many other law enforcement duties deal in many instances with the public directly. These public engagements offer opportunities where the police can abuse their powers and get away with it which hinders accountability. The opposite is also true as these engagements with the public are actually the best platform for the police to enhance their image and dispel any negative publicity or negative attitudes of the communities they serve. Accountability in a policing context refers to answerability and responsibility. One can consider two interpretations of accountability, namely, that a person has an obligation to explain and respond to concerns or queries that may be raised relating to one’s explanation; and that those who are accountable to someone imply that they are subject to some form of authority. The latter implies that one has to be transparent in his or her communication and actions, explain things to the authority if one deviates from prescribed behavior, and that such person needs to take instructions and direction from the relevant authority. Accountability further means that individual police officials recognize that they may have to provide detailed information about any situation in which they have used force, but also that the police organization monitors the use of force by its members and reports on the use of force and its efforts to ensure that police conform to appropriate standards when using force (Bruce, 2020: 4). Sadly, torture, assault, beatings, and killings are part of the modus operandi of many police officials as they too have to risk their lives on a daily basis in a violent country where attacks on and subsequent police murders are high. To ensure that police officials adhere to prescribed rules and regulations and be held accountable for any wrongdoing, such as using excessive force in circumstances that did not justify its use, a police watchdog in the form of the Independent Police Investigative Directorate was established.

Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) The Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), initially called the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), was established in April 1997 with the initial aim of investigating complaints of brutality, criminality, and misconduct against members of the South African Police Service and municipal police services (metro police departments). The Directorate was created to function independently from the police to ensure effective and efficient investigation of police misconduct and criminality by police officials (Kempen, 2011: 8). In line with new legislation,

13  When the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa

279

namely, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate Act 1 of 2011, signed into law in 2011, the ICD changed its name in April 2012 (SAPA, 2012). In accordance with section 28(1) of the IPID Act, this Directorate is obligated to investigate the following matters: (a) any deaths in police custody; (b) deaths as a result of police actions; (c) any complaint relating to the discharge of an official firearm by any police officer; (d) rape by a police officer, whether the police officer is on or off duty; (d) rape of any person while that person is in police custody; (e) any complaint of torture or assault against a police officer in the execution of his or her duties; (f) corruption matters within the police initiated by the Executive Director on his or her own, or after the receipt of a complaint from a member of the public, or referred to the Directorate by the Minister, an MEC or the Secretary, as the case may be; and, (g) any other matter referred to it as a result of a decision by the Executive Director, or if so requested by the Minister, an MEC or the Secretary as the case may be, in the prescribed manner.

To give credence to the allegations that police brutality exists among police in South Africa, the Annual Report of IPID for the period 1 April 2020 to 31 March 2021 (the reporting period) reveals the following: A total of 6122 cases were reported to the IPID during the reporting period, of which 4228 were assault cases, 830 were cases of complaints of discharge of an official firearm(s), 353 were cases of deaths as a result of police action while 256 cases of torture were reported. The reported cases show a 9% increase in comparison to the previous reporting period (IPID, 2021: 38). IPID (2021: 45–46) further reveals the circumstances in which deaths as a result of police action occurred during the reporting period and that the majority of these deaths occurred during police operations. These include 114 deaths in response to a crime, 123 deaths during arrest, 23 deaths as a result of negligence handling of official vehicles, 10 deaths as a result of an escape from police custody, 26 suspects died during the course of investigations, while 21 deaths were associated with domestic violence. In terms of section 29 of the IPID Act, the Station Commander of a police station, or any member of the South African Police Service or Municipal Police Service (metro police) must: (a) immediately after becoming aware, notify the Directorate of any matters referred to in section 28(1)(a) to (f) (see supra); and (b) within 24 hours thereafter, submit a written report to the Directorate in the prescribed form and manner of any matter as contemplated in paragraph (a).

The Act further prescribes that such police members must provide their full cooperation to IPID with the arrangement of an identification parade within 48 hours of the request made by the Directorate; the taking of an affidavit or an affirmed declaration or to give evidence or produce any document in that member’s possession or under his or her control which has a bearing on the matter being investigated; and any other information or documentation required for investigation purposes.

280

C. Bezuidenhout and A. Kempen

Motivations for the Use of Violence by Police A study conducted by Hadebe and Gopal (n.d.) from the Department of Criminology and Forensic Studies, at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, revealed that citizens in that province of South Africa have experienced strangulation, suffocation, and tubing during police raids and interrogation. During interviews with ten IPID investigating officers, it became clear to the researchers that police officials are motivated by a variety of factors that can contribute to them using violence in the cause of their duties; these include the following factors: • Management often places pressure on police officials to meet arrest targets and to retrieve illegal weapons and drugs. In order to meet projected targets, police officials often rely on brutal and illegal methods such as aggression, assault, strangulation, and suffocating to achieve cooperation from suspects and to coerce suspects to hand over illegal weapons and drugs. • Police raids are usually conducted in high-crime areas where the police use force to enter suspects’ homes and other locations. These raids can turn volatile if the police officials inflict confusion and disorientation in the process of entering, while they might also use violent methods such as beating, suffocation, and strangling to force suspects to hand in their firearms or drugs or to provide evidence. • Members of the public are seldom aware of the rules and procedures that guide police raids and stop-and-search operations or the policing of public unrest (e.g., during strikes or public protests). The public’s lack of knowledge about police procedures is defined by the police as provocation, which in turn result in members of the public becoming uncooperative and resistant. These actions may result in some police officials reacting with force as they do not tolerate resistance. Police violence is also used in situations where civilians defy police authority. • Public protests, police raids, and stop-and-search operations lead the public to react violently towards the police by disobeying their instructions and provoking and challenging them  – sometimes even throwing them with stones. However, police also instigate acts of violence by using excessive force to create resistance from the public and extract information from suspects. This conflict and animosity between the public and the police existed since Sir Robert Peel introduced The Metropolitan Police Act 1829 to establish the Metropolitan Police of London. • Police officials are not adequately trained, especially in terms of how to approach the process of restraining and arresting a suspect in accordance with the legal prescripts. Police training often falls short in providing them with the skills needed to address the types of challenges they may encounter while executing their duties in the streets. As a result, many police officials apply illegal methods

13  When the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa

281

to restrain and arrest suspects. Police officials stationed at the specialized Public Order Policing (POP) Units of the SAPS are often under severe stress, outnumbered, and have a lack of equipment to manage crowds that may turn violent during service delivery or labor-related protests. • In his latest budget speech for the 2022/2023 financial year, the Minister of Police, Mr. Bheki Cele, announced that the POP Units will be further capacitated with an additional 4000 police officials to respond more effectively to public unrest. In addition, R150 million (around $9 million) were to be spent during this financial year for capital modernization, including procurement of armored vehicles and aircraft, with an additional R9 million (around $600000) for the procurement of protective gear for POP Unit officials (Department of Police, 2022). • Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a contributory factor to police brutality. There is a high occurrence of stress-related problems among police officials due to them being exposed to traumatic, stressful, and violent situations on a daily basis. Due to the high-crime rate in South Africa, police officials are continuously exposed to traumatic incidences such as murder, rape, gender-based violence, violent protest actions, vehicle hijackings, home invasions, child abuse, and motor vehicle crashes. This may eventually have a negatively impact on the average police official’s well-being (Boshoff & Strydom, 2015: 12–13), especially if they do not deal with such exposure regularly through debriefing. Bruce (2020: 1) adds that the weakness of the accountability structures for police in South Africa contributes to widespread brutality among law enforcement officers. For this to be strengthened, the management of the SAPS must be held directly answerable to how their members use force. The reason is that those police services that are accountable for the use of force by the members monitor, record, and accurately report on such use of force. Bruce (2020: 2) argues that the SAPS is not currently able to account for how its members use force generally. The SAPS can also not only rely on external oversight bodies, such as IPID, to ensure accountability in the SAPS or the various metro police departments. In addition, risk factors related to police officials committing acts of brutality include the following (Kempen, 2013: 21): • Personality traits: relating to a police official having a pro-violent and aggressive attitude and a lack of self-control or anger management skills. • Poor recruitment, vetting, and selection processes of the SAPS and deficient training of recruits: it is vital to instill a sense of responsibility, discipline, integrity, good morale, and accountability in all SAPS trainees before they start their operational duties; a comprehensive background check of all new recruits is vital while only those who respect the law and maintain a clean criminal record should be kept in the service. • Pressure to conform to the SAPS culture: eradicating the unwritten code of silence among officials while instilling an obligation to report and not overlook colleagues’ violent and/or illegal acts.

282

C. Bezuidenhout and A. Kempen

• The lack of discipline and professionalism: a breakdown of supervision, control, and command as well as a loss of discipline among SAPS members. • A lack of accountability as police officials are rarely held accountable for their unlawful actions. Accountability may include that police officials are held personally responsible for the actions, either financially or otherwise, to reiterate the importance of always acting within the confines of the law. • One reason for the increase in the use of more force by police officials in South Africa may be due to the increasing disinterest from the public because of the lack of service delivery by various government structures on municipal, provincial, and national level. As a result, officials are unable to control these mass protests and struggle to quell demonstrations in an ethical and legal manner. In this regard the SAPS (2021: 17) notes that it is not uncommon to have more than 14,000 labor strikes and protests annually in South Africa, of which some may be violent and disruptive. During the 2020/2021 financial year, 8050 crowdrelated incidents were responded to and successfully policed/stabilized, which included 2764 unrest-related incidents. A total number of 2688 arrests were made of which 2665 were made during crowd unrest incidents and 23 during peaceful incidents. • Another reason that we can put forward for the violent behavior of police officials may be due to the immense stress that operational police officials are facing due to the nature of their job in a violent country. A hypothesis is that they reach breaking point or that their forceful behavior is a way of “venting” their frustrations against the system (organizational politics), the public, and management. There is some food for thought in terms of those police officials who are laid off from the police due to unacceptable acts of violence in South Africa. Since the SAPS is a hierarchical centralized system, a dismissed police official cannot apply for a policing position in another province as it is centrally managed. However, in many states in the USA, so-called “gypsy” cops who are dismissed due to violent unacceptable behavior in one state often apply for a position in another state and are often appointed due to the fragmented decentralized policing system of the USA. The lack of effective record keeping and the independence between the different policing departments in the USA allow the so-called bad apple gypsy cops to move around between police departments and states if they are dismissed, but at least the federal government and many states have taken measures to put an end to this practice over the course of the last 2 years.

Recommendations to Deal with Police Brutality There are a number of recommendations that can be made: • The training of police officials needs to revisited. Hadebe and Gopal (n.d.) found that two of the main issues that the IPID investigating officers found lacking with

13  When the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa

283

police training were the fact that it does not adequately deal with aspects of interviewing skills, while it also does not deal sufficiently with the challenges which police officials face in an operational setting. The latter specifically relates to their response during police raids, stop and searches as well as with the public’s reaction to such operational aspects. • The issue of training was also raised during the Marikana Commission of Inquiry, which resulted in the appointment of a Panel of experts on policing and crowd management, established by the Minister of Police. The Panel therefore recommended an overview of training for Public Order Policing officials, and the importance of benchmarking it against global and regional practices. The Panel found that although crowd management training was quite comprehensive, the training manuals and curricula are not reviewed regularly to reflect the dynamic nature of crowds and crowd management in South Africa. This means that the techniques and tactics used do not reflect the complex nature of the current crowd management environment (Panel of experts on policing and crowd management, 2018: 387–390). • Another interesting recommendation made by this panel of experts (2018: 36) deals with the use of terminology and differentiating between the use of non-­ lethal versus less-lethal weapons used for crowd management, namely, teargas, rubber bullets, stun grenades, and water cannons. The distinction is important since all weapons, including less-lethal weapons, have the potential to cause injury and death. The Panel further reminded that vulnerable people, including the elderly and young children, are often most at risk for injury from these less-­ lethal weapons, and that calls for awareness of this risk be promoted through training. • The National Development Plan Vision 2030 calls for the professionalization of the police in South Africa, which upholds the integrity of the police service. Such police officials should be knowledgeable about the law and their roles, carry out their functions competently, and understand their responsibility to serve communities. If this happens, they are more likely to earn public respect and support resulting in citizens upholding the rule of law. The National Planning Commission (NPC) therefore recommended already in 2012 that the Code of Conduct and Code of Ethics be enforced. This is done in the sense that each member of the SAPS has to sign these codes of conduct and ethics – however, too many of these police officials fail to take the contents of these codes to heart. Another recommendation from the NPC is that highly trained and skilled personnel be appointed and that a body is established to set and regulate standards (NPC, 2012: 389). There is no doubt that the police in South Africa is not regarded by the public as professional, and the regular prevalence of police brutality serves as confirmation that South Africa needs professional police officials who are better trained, motivated, and managed. • The Civilian Secretariat for Police Service (CSPS, 2018a, b: 8–9), in its Professional Use of Force Policy and Guidelines for the South African Police Service, makes it clear that questions related to the use of force are of special

284

C. Bezuidenhout and A. Kempen

importance for a professional police service. The latter must be guided by the law, while high ethical principles must be adhered to by all its members. The professional use of force demands that police officials are conscious of the dangers involved in the use of force and specifically, lethal (deadly) force. It further demands that police officials give high value to the protection of life and that its use is limited to when it is clearly necessary to protect the safety of police and others when their lives are threatened. In order to ensure that such professionalism becomes entrenched, police officials need to be properly trained and equipped to discharge their functions in compliance with legal principles. Professionalism also relates to effective management of the organization on all levels, both administratively and operationally, while a commitment to life-long learning is another principle of professionalism. • Dr. Johan Burger, a retired senior police officer, suggested that a national inter-­ related and inter-sectoral policing board will be beneficial when recruitment is done for new members into the SAPS as it will aid in maintaining a high standard and legitimate promotions (Kempen, 2013: 20). There should be clarity in training and messages from management to police officials on how to fight crime and handle suspects. Not only is there potential suffering of the alleged perpetrator and possible bystanders due to the lack of skills and experience, but the officials may further expose themselves to harm and greater danger. The recruitment process should include more comprehensive vetting while strict and regular competency assessments should be in place. New police recruits should be trained how to handle dangerous and stressful situations in a legal and professional manner. • Publicized statements made by leaders are a salient aspect that must be acknowledged since controversial speeches by high-ranking ministers or influential political leaders may be a catalyst in encouraging police officials to use excessive brutality and violence. • The use of technology such as body-worn cameras should be actively considered in a country such as South Africa where police brutality is prevalent. Such cameras provide both visual and audio footage of what transpired during police-­ citizen encounters. Using this technology therefore has the ability to transform policing for the better due to the record it creates, of both the public and police officials’ behavior and whether that behavior resulted in a justified and legitimate reaction. It can further contribute to greater accountability to those involved in incidents, and the footage can even be used in training of police officials (Geldenhuys, 2019b: 24–25). • Curbing or even reducing incidents of police brutality is not going to happen overnight due to a police subculture where the use of violence has been entrenched for many years and even instigated by political leaders, in a country with a high-­ crime rate. Mitigating the risk of police brutality therefore starts with the stricter selection and recruitment process of new police recruits; comprehensive and continuous training of police officials about human rights, legislation and alternative methods to deal with unruly suspects/crowds, as well as the use of technology as tools to keep police officials and the public on their toes. ­

13  When the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa

285

Accountability, from both leadership and management, as well as individual police officials who perpetrate acts of police brutality, is another key recommendation to deal with police brutality. If the SAPS, and other police agencies do not deal with these issues as a matter of urgency to address police brutality, the mutual trust and respect that are required to build safer communities will never exist.

References Albrecht, J. F., & Den Heyer, G. (2021). Enhancing police service delivery (Global perspectives and policy implications). Springer. Amnesty International. (n.d.). Police violence. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-­ we-­do/police-­brutality/. Accessed 29 June 2022. Berning, J., & Masiloane, D. (2011). Police militarisation: Is South Africa disproving or failing to learn from police history? Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology, 24(3), 60–71. Bezuidenhout, C., & Kempen, A. (2018). Transforming a para-militaristic police force to a human rights-oriented police service in a violent country. The South African challenge. European Journal of Policing Studies (EJPS), 5(4), 109–128. Bezuidenhout, C., & Kempen, A. (2021). Historical and current dilemmas in South Africa that challenge proficient police service delivery. In J. F. Albrecht & G. Den Heyer (Eds.), Enhancing police service delivery (Global perspectives and policy implications). Springer. Boshoff, P.  J., & Strydom, H. (2015). An assessment of the needs of police officials regarding trauma and trauma intervention programmes: A quantitative approach. Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology, 28(1), 12–29. Bruce, D. (2000). In N. Mwanajiti, P. Mhlanga, M. Sifuniso, Y. Nachali-Kambikambi, M. Muuba, & M. Mwananyanda (Eds.), Police brutality in South Africa. From the report Police brutality in Southern Africa – A human rights perspective. Published by Inter-African Network for Human Rights and Development (Afronet), 2002. Available from: www.csvr.org.za/docs/policing/policebrutality.pdf. Accessed 10 May 2013 Bruce, D. (2002). Police brutality in South Africa. Available from: http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/ policing/policebrutality.pdf Bruce, D. (2020, November). How to reduce Police brutality in South Africa. Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Southern African Report. Available from: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/ site/uploads/sar-­40.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2022. Bruce, D. (2022, July 7). Ntumba verdict continues South Africa’s police impunity trend. ISS Today. Available from: https://issafrica.org/crimehub/iss-­today/ntumba-­verdict-­continues-­ south-­africas-­police-­impunity-­trend. Accessed 12 July 2022. Civilian Secretariat of Police Service (CSPS). (2018a). Available from: http://www.policesecretariat.gov.za/downloads/Panel_Experts_Report.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2022. Civilian Secretariat of Police Service (CSPS). (2018b). Available from: http://www.policesecretariat.gov.za/downloads/policies/Use_Force_Policy.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2022. Department of Police. (2022). Budget vote 28, 24 and 21 presentation: Department of Police, IPID and the Department of the Civilian Secretariat for Police Service delivered by the Minister of Police, General Bheki Cele (MP) on Tuesday 24 May 2022. Available from: https://www.saps. gov.za/newsroom/msspeechdetail.php?nid=39991. Accessed 1 June 2022. Du Plessis, M. (2021). Police and power in a pandemic: Reflections on the rise of police brutality during COVID-19 and its implications on social justice in South Africa. Pretoria Student Law Review, 15, 38–48. Available from: https://www.pulp.up.ac.za/edocman/journals/2021_PSLR/ mason%20du%20Plessis.pdf. Accessed 12 July 2022

286

C. Bezuidenhout and A. Kempen

Egwu, P. (2021, May 31). South African police are undertrained, uncontrolled and deadly. Foreign Policy. Available from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/31southafrica-­police-­brutality-­ julies. Accessed 22 Feb 2022. Geldenhuys, K. (2019a, September). Policing: A creator of stress. Servamus Community-Based Safety and Security, 112(9), 10–13. SARP Publishers. Geldenhuys, K. (2019b, September). Body-worn cameras. An important tool in modern policing. Servamus Community-Based Safety and Security, 112(9), 24–27. SARP Publishers. Geldenhuys, K. (2020, November). Mob justice serves no justice at all. Servamus Community-­ Based Safety and Security, 113(11), 10–15. SARP Publishers. Hadebe, P., & Gopal, N. (n.d.). Police brutality in South Africa. SaferSpaces. Available from: https://www.saferspaces.org.za/understand/entry/police-­brutality-­in-­south-­africa. Accessed 29 June 2022. Hill, E., Tiefenthäler, A., Triebert, C., Jordan, D., Willis, H., & Stein, R. (2020, May 31). How George Floyd was killed in police custody. New York Times. Available from: https://www. nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-­floyd-­investigation.html. Accessed 4 July 2022. Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID). (2021). Annual report 2020/2021. Pretoria. Karrim, A. (2020, February 21). Ex-cops who killed taxi driver Mido Macia fail in bid to overturn convictions. News24. Available from: https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/ ex-­cops-­who-­killed-­taxi-­driver-­mido-­macia-­fail-­in-­bid-­to-­overturn-­convictions-­20200221. Accessed 12 July 2022. Kempen, A. (2008, June). The community speaks – Government must listen. Ministerial imbizo in Pretoria West. Servamus Community-Based Safety and Security, 101(6), 14–17. SARP Publishers. Kempen, A. (2010, April). ‘n Nuwe rangstruktuur lui ou-bekende klokkies. (A new rank structure rings familiar bell.) Servamus Community-Based Safety and Security, 103(4), 2. SARP Publishers. Kempen, A. (2011, July). The Independent Complaints Directorate – New legislation to sharpen the ICD’s teeth. Servamus Community-Based Safety and Security, 104(7), 7. SARP Publishers. Kempen, A. (2013, June). Police brutality. Servamus Community-Based Safety and Security, 106(6), 16–21. SARP Publishers. Kempen, A, (2015, August). The Marikana tragedy  – Three years later, many questions still remain. Servamus Community-Based Safety and Security, 108(8), 56–57. SARP Publishers. Knoetze, D. (2021, April 13). Ten years after Andries Tatane was killed, police misuse of rubber bullets is still unchecked. GroundUp. Available from: https://www.groundup.org.za/article/ ten-­years-­after-­andries-­tatane-­was-­killed-­police-­misuse-­rubber-­bullets-­still-­unchecked/ Naidoo, S. (2022, June 3). Police officers accused of teenager Nathaniel Julies’ murder to plead when new trial starts. Available from: https://mg.co.za/news/2022-­06-­03-­police-­officers-­ accused-­teenager-­nathaniel-­julies-­murder-­to-­plead-­when-­new-­trial/. Accessed 30 June 2022. National Planning Commission (NPC). (2012). National Development Plan Vision 2030. Our future make it work. The Presidency: Republic of South Africa. News24. (2011, April 28). Zuma: Police brutality concerning. Available from: https://www. news24.com/News24/Zuma-­Police-­brutality-­concerning-­20110428. Accessed 12 July 2022. Nkanjeni, U. (2020, August 28). Justice for Nathaniel Julies: what you need to know about the teen’s death. Times Live. Available from: https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-­africa/2020-­08-­28-­ justice-­for-­nathaniel-­julius-­what-­you-­need-­to-­know-­about-­the-­teens-­death/. Accessed 4 July 2022. Panel of experts on policing and crowd management. (2018, May 27). Final report. Available from: http://www.policesecretariat.gov.za/downloads/Panel_Experts_Report.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2022. Shoba, S. (2020, December 16). Andries Tatane: Ten years later nothing has changed in Ficksburg. Daily Maverick. Available from: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-­12-­16-­andries-­ tatane-­ten-­years-­later-­nothing-­has-­changed-­in-­ficksburg/. Accessed 12 July 2022. Singh, K. (2022, July 11). “Tavern tragedy: We need laws that favour the police not criminals  – KwaZulu-Natal MEC.” News24. Available from: https://www.news24.com/news24/ southafrica/news/tavern-­tragedy-­we-­need-­laws-­that-­favour-­the-­police-­not-­criminals-­kwazulu-­ natal-­mec-­20220711. Accessed 12 July 2022.

13  When the Protectors Become the Aggressors: Police Brutality in South Africa

287

South African Government. (2015, August 25). Independent Police Investigative Directorate secures conviction for Mido Macia murder case. Available from: https://www.gov.za/speeches/ ipid-­secured-­conviction-­mido-­macia-­murder-­case-­25-­aug-­2015-­0000 South African History Online (SAHO). (n.d.). Marikana massacre 16 August 2012. Available from: https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/marikana-­massacre-­16-­august-­2012. Accessed 12 July 2022. South African Police Service (SAPS). (2021). South African Police service annual report 2020/2021. Pretoria. South African Press Association (SAPA). (2012, April 2). ICD changes name and extended mandate. Available from: https://www.iol.co.za/news/icd-­gets-­new-­name-­and-­extended-­ mandate-­1268929. Accessed 13 July 2022. South African Press Association (SAPA). (2013, March 28). Cops acquitted of Andriew Tatane’s murder. Mail & Guardian. Available from: https://mg.co.za/article/2013-­03-­28-­cops-­acquitted-­ of-­andries-­tatanes-­murder/. Accessed 12 July 2022. The New York Times. (2022, May 19). How George Floyd died, and what happened next. Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-­floyd.html. Accessed 4 July 2022. Van den Heever, C. W. (2017). Homicide-suicide: Common factors in South-African Police Service members who kill their spouse or consort and themselves. UniSA. Van den Heever, C. W. (2021). Homicide-suicide*: Identifying demographic, social, and cultural factors within the South African Police Service. Just Africa Journal, 6(2), 45–54. Vilakazi, M. C. (2015). The impact of police corruption on service delivery in Pretoria central. South Africa: University of South Africa (MA Dissertation). Violanti, J.  M., Charles, L.  E., McCanlies, E., Hartley, T.  A., Baughman, P., Andrew, M.  E., Fekedulegn, D., Ma, C.  C., Mnatsakanova, A., & Burchfiel, C.  M. (2017). Police stressors and health: A state-of-the-art review. Available from: www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ PMC6400077/#R38. Accessed 18 July 2019. Walker, S. (2007). Police accountability: Current issues and research needs. Available from: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/218583.pdf Zondi, Z. V., & Ukpere, W. I. (2014). Police brutality in post-apartheid South Africa reviewed. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(3), 574–579. MCSER Publishing. Christiaan Bezuidenhout  holds a BA (Criminology), BA Honors (Criminology), MA (Criminology), DPhil (Criminology), and MSc (Criminology and Criminal Justice) from the University of Oxford. He is attached to the Department of Social Work and Criminology, University of Pretoria, UP, where he teaches psychocriminology, criminal justice, and contemporary criminology at undergraduate and postgraduate level as a full professor. He has supervised several postgraduate studies. Psychocriminology, criminal justice (policing), and youth misbehavior are some of his research foci. During his academic career, Christiaan has published numerous scientific articles in peer-reviewed journals and has authored chapters in several books. He has also acted as editor-in-chief for various scholarly works. He was awarded the 2019/2020 University of Pretoria Institutional Community Engagement Award. He has assisted the South African government in the development of different crime prevention initiatives. He serves on the South African Police Service (SAPS) Tertiary Institutions Cluster for Training as well as Research. Christiaan does court work as an expert witness, and he was the president of the Criminological Society of Africa (CRIMSA) from 2015 to 2017. He is currently doing research at East Carolina University (ECU) in the United States as part of his Fulbright Research Fellowship regarding the role of females in law enforcement (LE). Annalise Kempen  obtained her BPol Science degree in 1993 from the University of Pretoria. She started working in the South African Police Service in 1994. She became the editor of SERVAMUS Policing Magazine in 2002, when the magazine was privatized and converted to a communitybased safety and security magazine. Annalise is also the assistant editor of the Just Africa journal.

Chapter 14

Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality James F. Albrecht

Introduction One of the most contentious and sensationalized issues impacting America (and actually the broader global audience) today is the misperception that police personnel in the United States have consistently acted and continue to act in an abusive and corrupt fashion, particularly as it relates to their interaction with representatives of minority and underrepresented groups. The actual data, however, does clearly indicate that incidents involving police deviance are relatively rare and have been effectively addressed through the criminal courts and organizational administrative procedures (e.g., suspension, termination). However, in many cases in which these allegations have been substantiated, law enforcement administrators often react on a case-by-case basis, without routinely acknowledging systematic or organizational trends that may warrant more comprehensive action.

The Police Deviance Typology One of the flaws in many prior studies is that many researchers have attempted to explain unacceptable police practices uniformly, while not acknowledging that there are clear distinctions across the spectrum of potential deviant police behaviors. As such, in order to better grasp the plethora of concepts and variables that are commonly referred to as police deviance, it would be beneficial to specifically define the different types of serious police misconduct. A close examination of these incidents nationally (and globally to a general extent) has revealed that police deviance can be categorized into five basic types (Albrecht, 2017): J. F. Albrecht (*) Pace University, New York, NY, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_14

289

290

J. F. Albrecht

1. Police corruption. 2. Police criminality. 3. Excessive use of force. 4. Abuse of authority. 5. Police misconduct. This typology will ultimately permit tangible analysis and theoretical discussion.

Understanding Police Deviance To be more specific, police corruption involves situations when police officers lose integrity in their professional actions and accept benefits or rewards in exchange for violating their mandated responsibilities. Examples include bribe receiving, receiving reward for official misconduct, and official misconduct. Police criminality occurs when police officials engage in direct acts of crime, such as robbery or theft, whether on or off duty. The use of excessive force involves engaging in menacing (i.e., threatening with a weapon) actions, assault, battery, and perhaps murder, when it is not legally justified while acting in the capacity of a police professional. Abuse of authority involves violating the legal mandate of the police position. Such infractions could include illegal stops, searches, and arrests. Finally, police misconduct includes acts that violate the rules and regulations of the respective law enforcement agency (Albrecht, 2017). Such agency infractions could include arriving to work late or an unprofessional appearance (which could be indicators of other serious personal issues that could negatively affect police performance). By understanding the distinctions between these misbehaviors, researchers can more easily incorporate theoretical analysis into future research endeavors. As a direct result, many sociological and criminological theories can be applied to the distinct tendencies and patterns that have been revealed.

Examining Police Deviance Through Patterns and Trends In order to better understand the patterns apparent in American policing as it relates to police deviance, historical trends in the United States over the last five decades will be evaluated, and specific incidents of serious police misbehavior occurring within the New York City Police Department, a large urban law enforcement agency often viewed as a “trend setter” (but not always for positive accomplishment), the Los Angeles Police Department, and other American police departments will be closely examined. Eventually sociological theories will be applied to apparent patterns that have been revealed in order to guide the development of policy recommendations to enhance professional standards and practices in the field.

14  Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality

291

Police Deviance in the United States The United States routinely ranks in the top 20 nations (of 182 United Nations member states) when the public perception of government corruption is ranked. However, the United States has consistently received a score that indicates that the public believes that approximately 25–30% of American government officials engage in acts of corruption (Transparency International, 2021). Clearly this is alarming, but this would be more disturbing if the agencies responsible for enforcing the law were excessively involved in these practices. Fortunately the feedback appears to point heavily in the direction of private corporations and special interest groups attempting to obtain advantages within the political arena, rather than rampant corruption within the law enforcement and criminal justice sectors. When the American law enforcement profession was most recently examined, the rate of serious police misconduct within the USA was noted to be below 0.5%, i.e., less than half of 1% of all police personnel have been the subject of allegations of criminality or serious misconduct in 2009 and 2010 (Packman, 2010). This supports the findings of the Christopher Commission that revealed that less than 0.5% of LAPD officers could be labeled as being “problematic” (Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991). Even when examining involuntary terminations from law enforcement agencies, less than 2% of police officers were found to have been separated from the organization for cause, including dismissals, terminations, and forced resignations or retirements. Of those involuntary separations, more were found to be attributable to profit-oriented corruption than to brutality or other allegations of civilian abuse and were found to likely involve male rather than female officers (Fyfe & Kane, 2006). Other studies have supported the notion that a small percentage of officers account for a disproportionate amount of agency misconduct (Harris, 2009). While ultimately the goal should be total eradication of police deviance, it should be noted that the number of reported incidents of police misconduct are relatively minimal and practically rare. In addition, most statistical analyses have based the research findings on the total amount of allegations and not the number cases that have been substantiated cases or that have led to criminal conviction, which undoubtedly would result in a much smaller value for the number of identified deviant police personnel. Regardless, any accusation of police deviance or criminality often taints the reputation of the entire agency involved, and the more sensational cases (e.g., the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles, George Floyd in Minneapolis, etc.) have often placed the credibility and legitimacy of the entire law enforcement profession into question.

 imetable of American Police Deviance and Serious T Misconduct (1960s–Present) In order to avoid making generalizations about police deviance by evaluating a small number of incidents or isolated events (unfortunately a common practice of politicians, the media, and special interest groups), the more effective approach will

292

J. F. Albrecht

be to examine the most significant and disturbing trends observed over the last five decades. National and local occurrences will be outlined, with those taking place in the New York City Police Department over that time frame given the most attention, in line with the resulting impact that those media reports and public scrutiny have placed on the policing profession across the United States. In addition, the New York City Police Department often considers itself to be a national and global trend setter, whether it is dealing with crime reduction efforts or measures to increase organizational professional standards and integrity.

The 1960s From a law enforcement perspective, the 1960s were notable for a number of critical events. The civil rights movement placed law enforcement personnel in a position to attempt to maintain the peace at demonstrations that often turned violent. When police officers countered disruptive or threatening demonstrators with force (mainly physical force or use of the police baton), many groups, including minority group advocates and the media, often alleged that the force used by police was excessive (Mara, 2009). What made matters worse was the formation of extremist groups (e.g., Black Panthers, Red Army Faction, The Weather Underground, Puerto Rican Independence Front, etc.) who engaged in planned attacks and routine assassinations of police personnel across the United States. This placed police patrol officers continually on the defensive. Likely the most significant events that impacted the law enforcement profession were United States Supreme Court cases that restricted and developed police authority. Examples include Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1 [1968]); Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]); Elkins v. United States (364 U.S. 206 [1960]); and Rios v. United States (364 U.S. 253 [1960]). Each one of these cases (among others) redefined the authority of police officers and created concrete direction to ensure that law enforcement actions were in line with constitutional guidelines. In summary, the 1960s left a notable impression on the New York City Police Department, which implemented formalized police academy training measures and distributed detailed rules, regulations, and directives, often based on policy that was based on numerous significant United States Supreme Court decisions.

The 1970s New York City and other large American municipalities were faced with dramatically increasing serious and violent crime rates throughout the 1970s, much of it revolving around a growing organized crime and street level illicit drug distribution threat. Of similar importance was federally imposed legislation that mandated that minorities and women be granted equal hiring and promotional opportunities in

14  Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality

293

private and public organizations. Federal laws prohibiting discrimination strengthened continually from the early 1960s to 1970s (Player, 2009). This drastically changed the work atmosphere within the predominantly male white New York City Police Department. Most notably, both females and blacks were granted opportunities that had previously been organizationally prohibited. Two major events radically influenced policing in New  York City during the 1970s. The first was the uncovering of a corruption scandal that essentially reached across all levels of the New York City Police Department. The agency’s corruption practices came to light when a number of officers reported their concerns to the New York Times in 1970. This action led New York City Mayor John Lindsay to form a panel, called the Knapp Commission, which would investigate corruption practices within the New York City Police Department from 1971 and 1972 (Maas, 1973). Although only a small number of NYPD officers lost their jobs or were arrested, it was strongly believed that the corruption, which routinely involved weekly payoffs to patrol officers to permit organized crime activity to continue, reached NYPD commanders and executives at the highest levels of the police department. The second half of the 1970s was defined by overwhelming budgetary challenges across public service agencies in New York City, with the Mayor coming close to publically declaring bankruptcy. As a direct result, the New  York City Police Department was forced to lay off thousands of police officers. Consequently, with the limited number of patrol officers, NYPD personnel were moved from traditional foot patrol to police vehicles equipped with new two-way radios (Kavanaugh, 2010). The belief thereafter was that this would permit law enforcement officers to respond quickly to crime calls and apprehend the majority of criminal suspects shortly after the act. This never came to fruition, and the only thing that actually resulted had been the elimination of close contact with the community, which had been common during the foot patrol era.

The 1980s With the start of the 1980s came the return of political and financial stability for the City of New York. The New York City Police Department commenced an 8-year trend of hiring a minimum of two 2000+ police candidate classes each year1 throughout the decade. While this may sound unbelievable, the NYPD was attempting to bring the complement of police personnel back to pre-1975 levels, while also addressing the escalating rates in crime and violence. With the dawn of crack cocaine, a much cheaper and more addictive form of cocaine, drug-related murders and street violence quickly became rampant. And crime committed by drug abusers to feed their addictive habits resulted in notable increases in theft, robbery, and assault complaints.  The author was hired by the NYPD in January 1984 with more than 2200 other police officers.

1

294

J. F. Albrecht

With such a quick and dramatic increase in patrol resources, the New York City Police Department implemented the Community Patrol Officer Program in 1983 that expanded to all 75 police stations throughout New York City by 1986. Each police station was tasked with deploying 10 police officers to large fixed area beats. These officers, called community policing beat cops and deployed exclusively to neighborhood foot patrol, were to evaluate crime problems, look for underlying causes, and recommend strategies for correcting them in partnership with community representatives and government and private agencies. Ultimately, this endeavor had no significant impact on public safety, as index crime and violence continued to climb, with the murder rate in New York City astonishingly and disturbingly exceeding two thousand annually during the final years of this decade (United States Department of Justice, 1989 and 1990). In 1986, the New York City Police Department was once again embarrassed by a corruption scandal that took place in one police station, the 77th Precinct, a high crime, drug-prone neighborhood within the borough of Brooklyn. In this isolated case, a small cadre of police officers had been caught engaging in thefts and robberies of drugs from small street level drug dealers and later with resale of the stolen controlled substances in those same neighborhoods. In other instances, these corrupt officers apparently accepted payoffs to “protect” drug dealers from arrest by fellow officers. The New  York City Police Department was able to enhance the thoroughness of the internal investigation by granting the two lead corrupt officers immunity from prosecution in return for their cooperation during the criminal investigation and prosecution, which ultimately led to the arrest of many of the police officers who were working the midnight shift at that police station (McAlary, 1989).

The 1990s The most significant case that negatively affected the law enforcement profession in the United States in the 1990s was the incident involving the Los Angeles Police Department and suspect Rodney King in March 1991. Following a long vehicle pursuit, suspect Rodney King allegedly failed to comply with the directions of Los Angeles Police Department personnel who were attempting to place him under arrest. To counter the suspect’s resistance, police personnel opted to repeatedly strike the suspect with their batons. The suspect was eventually arrested. The incident was videotaped by a bystander. Four LAPD officers were eventually cleared in a California state court of assault and related charges, but were later convicted of violating the suspect’s civil rights in federal court. The acquittal in state court in April 1992 led to widespread rioting across Los Angeles. This was the first major case where videotaped police behavior had led to social unrest across the United States and allegations of excessive use of force quickly became more relevant. The 1990s as it relates to the New York City Police Department must be divided into two distinct periods. From 1990 to 1993, the NYPD successfully incorporated community policing as the department’s guiding principle. In 1994, the NYPD

14  Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality

295

developed the COMPSTAT protocol, which involved crime mapping and proactive enforcement to control violence and serious crime, which continued even after the end of that decade. The NYPD implemented community policing as the agency-wide strategy from 1990 through 1993. Over these 3 years, this deployment greatly increased the visibility of uniformed police officers who were assigned to fixed foot patrol beats (ranging between 30 and 70 in every police station) and who were required to utilize long-term problem-solving approaches (New York City Police Department, 1990). The enhanced police presence had an immediate and striking result in that crime rates across all categories, including murder, began to stabilize and actually declined slightly by the end of 1993. In contrast to these positive developments, the New York City Police Department in 1992 was once more disgraced by two separate corruption scandals that involved two high-crime, drug-ridden police stations, the 73rd Precinct in eastern Brooklyn and the 30th Precinct in northern Harlem in Manhattan. In the 73rd Precinct, a team of police officers on the midnight shift were found to be stealing drugs from drug dealers for personal use and for resale. Even more embarrassing was that it was not the NYPD, but rather another police agency in Long Island (New York) that apprehended these police officers for dealing narcotics. In the 30th Precinct, numerous police officers on the midnight shift were caught by NYPD internal investigators stealing drugs and committing perjury in court as it related to facts involving drug arrests. The New  York City Mayor appointed a large panel, called the Mollen Commission, to investigate these cases and make recommendations to control corruption and criminality by police personnel within the New  York City Police Department (Mollen, 1994). As a direct result of the report by the Mollen Commission, the New York City Police Department revised the internal affairs investigation mechanism by enhancing the number of investigators and supervisors assigned to the Internal Affairs Bureau; naming a civilian commissioner to head the Internal Affairs Bureau; performing both random and target integrity tests;2 conducting random and promotional drug tests;3 increasing the hiring qualifications by raising the minimum age from 20 to 224 and the educational requirement from a high school diploma to 60 college credits; implementing mandatory routine ethical and integrity training; and selecting Internal Affairs Bureau investigators and supervisors not only from direct

 Integrity tests evaluate a police officer’s reaction to found currency or narcotics and ensure that legal and police department procedural guidelines are complied with. Most tests are randomly administered, but can also be conducted on targeted police officers when there is suspicion that they may be engaging in thefts or other criminality. 3  Drug tests can also be administered for cause when there is reasonable suspicion that the police employee has smoked or ingested illegal narcotics. 4  This would permit a potential police candidate to have served 4 years in the military or complete a bachelors’ degree. 2

296

J. F. Albrecht

applicants but from the list of all applicants seeking an investigative assignment5 (Mollen, 1994). In January 1994, New  York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani appointed former Boston Police Chief William Bratton as the NYPD Police Commissioner. The most significant strategies attributed to Police Commissioner Bratton included the implementation of the “Zero Tolerance” proactive policing model and the use of timely crime statistics to permit the strategic deployment of police resources to crime plagued locations, which were identified through detailed crime mapping (Albrecht, 2011). Since its inception in January 1994, this initiative has been highly effective and has greatly contributed to the impressive −85% decrease in FBI Index Crime levels in New York City through 2016.6 As a result, New York City was for more than two decades regarded as the safest city in the United States of America with a population exceeding one million residents (Albrecht, 2011). Two significant incidents again portrayed the New York City Police Department in a negative light. In August 1997, a police officer in the 70th Precinct was reported to have savagely attacked a prisoner, Haitian immigrant Abner Louima, in the police station bathroom. The police officer involved later pleaded guilty to the atrocious criminal charges. Another event that placed additional scrutiny on the New  York City Police Department occurred in February 1999, when four members of the NYPD’s elite plainclothes Street Crime Unit, with its reputation for arresting large numbers of violent and armed suspects throughout New York City, were deployed in the Bronx in search of a violent serial sexual predator. Upon approaching a criminal suspect, the individual entered a dimly lit building lobby and, as the officers approached, reached into his back pocket. Believing that the suspect was reaching for a firearm, all four officers opened fire killing the unarmed suspect, Amadou Diallo, a West African immigrant. Both incidents involved Black males and resulted in allegations of racially profiling and discrimination at the hands of the NYPD. In general, the accomplishments of the New York City Police Department across the 1990s have been looked upon positively due to the highly successful measures that dramatically reduced serious and violent crimes, but there are some who have said that the rather sensational incidents of police corruption and deviance, although infrequent, have taken away from the positive accomplishments of the NYPD.

 When a police officer, detective, sergeant, or lieutenant applied for a position within the NYPD’s Detective Bureau, Narcotics Division, or other criminal investigative unit, the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) received “first choice” in transferring that applicant to the IAB to ensure that the IAB had experienced investigative staff and management. 6  The author recognizes that there may be other contributing factors that have supported the dramatic drop in crime in New  York City and across the USA since 1993, which include relative economic stability and low unemployment rate; decrease in the American juvenile and adolescent populations; increased incarceration and lengthened prison terms; notable decline in crack cocaine usage and addiction; more effective treatment in the correctional and probationary environments; enhanced use of technology (e.g., DNA analysis, video surveillance, etc.) to prevent and solve crime; etc. 5

14  Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality

297

2001 to the Present Clearly the most significant event that has impacted law enforcement in the United States and internationally since the start of the new millennium involves the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. Considerable resources have been redeployed to counter terrorism-related responsibilities since that tragic day.7 This has also aligned with a significant reduction in police personnel, not only in New York City, but across the United States. Essentially the police in America had become the victims of their own success, as agency budgets declined in line with decreasing crime rates. This steep decline in police resources has not occurred without occasional negative consequences. The quest to ensure that NYPD officers maintain a certain expected level of summary activity has led to repeated allegations that police personnel have been given “quotas” for monthly police activity that they are mandated to meet. With the steep decline in personnel resources and due to supervisory pressure, a small number of police officers are alleged to have engaged in criminal misconduct by falsely arresting suspects, placing fake evidence on arrested individuals,8 and writing “phantom” traffic tickets and other summonses to individuals or vehicles that did not commit any violation of the law.9 In addition, in 2010 and 2011, a number of police officers were found to have “taken care of”10 parking and traffic tickets for relatives and friends of police officers. This practice was apparently coordinated by police union representatives (Baker & Goldstein, 2011). Even with the normally effective measures that the NYPD and its Internal Affairs Bureau have in place, there have been isolated arrests of off duty NYPD officers who have provided “protection” for illegal drug groups or who have robbed or stolen money from drug dealers in the middle of illegal narcotics transactions. Some have even participated in bank robberies (New York City Police Department, 2012). Contemporary allegations involving police abuses and brutality routinely revolve around allegations of racial bias in deployment and enforcement practices. The high profile death of Eric Garner in July 2014 while resisting his arrest by NYPD officers had shortly followed another sensationalized shooting by police in Ferguson, Missouri. These events among others across the United States have given rise to the “Black Lives Matter” movement, whose supporters have alleged racial bias and  This event and the resultant counter-terrorism responsibilities has not significantly affected police integrity, ethics, or deviance, other than concerns regarding the implementation of the Patriot Act, which does not overwhelmingly affect local law enforcement agencies like the NYPD. 8  The practice of making false arrests and of planting fake evidence on suspects is called “flaking.” 9  Some police officers were found to have used the phone book and information found on department databases to write “phantom” summonses and tickets to individuals and vehicles. The summonses and tickets were actually never issued, but individuals only found out about them when the courts notified them that they had failed to pay a fine or show up in court. 10  A police officer could “take care of” a traffic ticket by discreetly disposing of it or by providing false testimony in traffic court. 7

298

J. F. Albrecht

excessive use of force by law enforcement personnel across America, specifically as it relates to African-American criminal suspects. While these accusations continue to be made, there has been limited investigatory evidence or empirical support to substantiate these claims. However, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing has made considerable recommendations to address these claims and to enhance community perceptions and trust in the police (COPS, 2015).

Overview of Police Deviance Involving the NYPD Police corruption and other forms of police deviance are clearly unacceptable. Police officers, due to their oath of office and the amount of authority that they have been granted, are and must be held to a higher standard than the average citizen. That is why reported police deviance is so often sensationalized and why punishments tend to be more severe. However, from broader perspective, the incidents of police corruption and police deviance are notably rare and have normally involved only an isolated number of officers in one police station, generally on the midnight shift. The number of NYPD police officers arrested each year (since the early 1990s) encompasses less than 0.5% of the entire complement of uniformed police personnel. And it should be highlighted that the vast majority of these arrests involve domestic and alcohol-related incidents (New York City Police Department, 2012).11 When analyzing the larger scale corruption events that have involved the New York City Police Department since the 1980s, a number of common factors have been identified (Albrecht, 2017). The major scandals all occurred within high-­crime police stations, namely, the 77th Precinct, the 30th Precinct, the 73rd Precinct, and the 70th Precinct. These communities are plagued by widespread street level and indoor drug dealing. Since these police stations were undesirable to police personnel, they were the most common locations where troublesome police officers were transferred to after they had been identified as “problem” employees.12 The police station commander often assigned these officers to the midnight shift in an effort to limit their contact with community residents. Since these police stations had high workloads, the supervisors assigned within these precincts were normally overwhelmed with work, which  The number of NYPD police officers arrested on an annual basis is less than 0.5% of the total complement of police officials, and this has remained stable since 1990. The overwhelming number of arrests is made for domestic incidents and alcohol-related offenses such as bar altercations or drunk driving. The extreme (ab)use of excessive force, police corruption, and police criminality are exceptionally rare events and have tended to involve 1 or 2 police officers and not a large team of officers as seen during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. 12  “Problem” employees include police officers who were involved in higher level disciplinary cases. As part of the punishment process, these officers would be transferred to undesirable work locations, and those who had performed in an exemplary fashion at those same police stations were permitted to transfer to a more desirable precinct. 11

14  Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality

299

limited time to provide “problem” officers with extra supervision. In addition, some of the “problem” employees were supervisors themselves with poor or indifferent management skills. Due to the high crime rate, these police stations were not routinely visited or inspected by police managers from NYPD’s central headquarters or from the regional command office. Even those involved in NYPD internal investigation units avoided travel to these areas and opted to spend more time conducting surveillances in more desirable and safer communities. In essence, police personnel who worked in high-crime, drug-prone police stations, specifically those who worked on the midnight shift, were not tightly supervised by the police station and external police management. This eventually provided the problem officers with “free reign” to perform their duties as they wanted to (Albrecht, 2017). When closely examining the police officers who eventually turned to corruption and criminality in the identified large-scale cases, most of the officers involved actually were later identified as being “proactive” employees who routinely made arrests for drug offenses and other serious crimes. The high crime rates made it easy to take summary action (i.e., make arrests). A common trend was often observed. These officers initially engaged in proper arrest processing, but eventually, and likely due to the lack of appropriate supervision, engaged in evidence and inventory abuses, which included drug disposal to avoid paperwork, then moved on to theft of some of the drugs to reward cooperative informants, then to theft of some of the currency that was recovered, to theft of all the money retrieved from the suspects or crime scenes, and finally to the theft of the drugs seized for resale to other drug dealers. Almost all of the officers engaged in some form of perjury when preparing police reports or while testifying in court (Albrecht, 2017).

Police Corruption and Deviance: A Brief Literature Review Many researchers have attempted to define or categorize what precisely police deviance is. Unfortunately there is no one common definition of this phenomenon, and many researchers have listed different inappropriate behaviors when discussing the topic. Kappeler et al. (1998) included corruption, abuse of authority, police crime, and occupational deviance as categories of police deviance. Klockars et al. (2003) produced the seminal survey instrument to examine the perceptions of corruption. Actions which they described as involving police corruption also included working in the security profession while off duty,13 accepting free coffee and

 In New York City and other jurisdictions, police officers are permitted to work in most security positions with the specific permission of their agency, so this does not necessarily mean that police personnel who work a second job in the security field are deviant or corrupt. 13

300

J. F. Albrecht

meals,14 police officers referring victims to specific businesses, drinking alcohol while on duty, and other questionable or illegal actions by law enforcement personnel. Their research has been replicated in other countries including Poland, Slovenia, and Croatia (Haberfeld et al., 2000). Barker and Carter (1993) identified five patterns of police deviance which included corruption, courtroom perjury, police brutality, sex on duty, sleeping on duty, and drinking on duty. Punch (2000) separates the concept of police deviance into three categories, namely, corruption, misconduct, and police crime. Based upon the most significant and most commonly cited research, there has been no consensus for universally accepted definitions for police deviance and police corruption. This lack of general uniformity and agreement in defining key terms provides clear support to accept and acknowledge the five category typology created by Albrecht (2017) as the most rational typology for better understanding incidents of serious police misconduct.15

Theories of Crime and Police Deviance A number of researchers have attempted to apply theories of crime to police deviance or corruption. One interesting viewpoint promoted by Kappeler et al. (1998) and Erikson (1962) is that deviance must be measured from two separate perspectives, the perception of the actors and the other through the eyes of the observer. As such, while the public may view certain actions of the police as being inappropriate or deviant, the law enforcement officers involved, due to the sub-cultural atmosphere, may believe that their acts were appropriate or correct. Some examples could include professional courtesy at traffic stops, not reporting police misconduct involving others to supervisors or administrators, and even courtroom perjury.  Accepting free coffee has presented some discomfort to police administrators. On one hand, the police should move closer to the community and accepting a cup of coffee or a non-alcoholic beverage would be considered appropriate within the boundaries of community policing. Some businesses that operate 24 hours (e.g., 7/11 stores, Dunkin Donuts, diners, and some gas stations) have established the standard practice of providing free coffee to uniformed police personnel, more so on the night shift. On the other hand, there are businesses that provide free coffee and/or discounted meals to police personnel often with an expectation (e.g., no traffic tickets issues in front of their business or perhaps permitting illegal activity such as gambling to take place on those premises). Again, this is a sensitive situation as each instance may have to be judged on its own specific characteristics and intentions. A troubling issue for frontline police personnel is that they often see high-ranking administrators attending community, business, or inter-agency meetings where meals are served and they do not understand how that is different from them accepting coffee or discounted meals from local restaurants. The matter also has to be evaluated in relation to its perception by the public. 15  The five general classifications are (1) police corruption; (2) police criminality; (3) excessive use of force; (4) abuse of authority; and (5) police misconduct. 14

14  Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality

301

Unfortunately fidelity to other police officers at times exceeds their loyalty to their oath of office and their service to the public. The use of excessive force against criminal suspects and falsifying evidence or courtroom testimony are often justified by the “just desserts” conception, in which no true harm has been done since criminals deserve to be punished. Such acts have often been referred to as “noble cause” corruption (Crank & Caldero, 1999), since officers may have considered their efforts to ensure that criminals be properly punished, regardless of methods used, to be an acceptable practice of crime control. Many other studies on the application of criminological theory to inappropriate police behavior have been reported. One significant research publication made an attempt to apply control balance theory (Tittle, 1995) to police deviance. Hickman et al. (2001) theorized that “the amount of control to which one is subject relative to the amount of control one can exercise (the control ratio) affects both the probability of deviance as well as the specific form of deviance.” Control balance theory outlines that actual deviance is a product of complex interactions between three factors: motivation, constraint, and opportunity. Each person has a “psychic need” that draws them toward deviant action and a desire for autonomy. Their actions within a specific opportunity are therefore triggered by an imbalance within their “control ratio.” A person could then be motivated to act in a deviant fashion if they could escape a “control deficit” and extend a “control surplus.” As a result, the opportunity for some type of deviance is almost always present (Tittle, 1995). Within police work, the frequency of the opportunities and the isolated and unsupervised nature of the events add to the potential that officers may act in a deviant fashion. The findings of this limited research revealed that police personnel with control deficits were more likely to report police misconduct to supervisors and agency administrators (Hickman et al., 2001), which is counter to what is commonly observed in many police organizations. As such, officers with stronger attitudes towards ethics were more likely to engage in appropriate conduct and less likely to engage in activity that would support the “blue wall of silence” phenomenon.

Summary: Police Deviance As mentioned above, police deviance cannot be generalized to one form of inappropriate or illegal conduct. The five general classifications are (1) police corruption; (2) police criminality; (3) excessive use of force; (4) abuse of authority; and (5) police misconduct (Albrecht, 2017). In addition, the phenomena involving the “blue wall of silence” and occurrences of courtroom perjury and “ticket fixing” are also unacceptable practices that must be included within the umbrella of serious police misconduct. It should also be noted that officers involved in police misbehavior at times take part in more than one type of the outlined classifications (Albrecht, 2017).

302

J. F. Albrecht

Theories of Crime and Police Corruption Police corruption involves situations when police officers lose integrity in their professional actions and accept benefits or rewards in exchange for violating their mandated responsibilities. Examples include bribe receiving, receiving reward for official misconduct, and engaging in official misconduct. After the Knapp Commission review in 1972 involving the NYPD agency-wide payoff scheme, most incidents involving corruption payoffs were eliminated. However, with the emergence of the highly profitable illicit drug trading that developed across New York City through the 1980s, the potential for bribery attempts and offers of other benefits to law enforcement personnel in exchange for allowing local drug dealing to flourish arose. The most lucrative areas for drug dealing were in the impoverished and crime-ridden areas. In applying theories of crime to police corruption, which involves the willful acceptance of bribes and other rewards, the officer has in essence committed to engaging in official misconduct. In most cases, the incentive to engage in this deviance would involve the reception of money or other valuable item or items. One possible theory of crime that could be applied is the strain theory as it has been clarified by Merton (1968). Merton’s strain theory proposed that societal pressure to achieve unattainable material goals can coerce individuals to engage in criminality. Specifically as it applies to the New York City Police Department, whose officers are recognized as some of the most underpaid within the north-eastern American region and are one of the lowest paid among America’s largest municipal police agencies,16 one can identify the potential for NYPD officers to desire more material goods to keep up with the social pressures of the high cost of living in New York City. Many of those who were later apprehended were found to own lavish homes, sport cars, and other luxury items (McAlary, 1989). One routine recommendation by three NYC mayoral commissions that have followed the major scandals has been an increase in salary for NYPD personnel to counter the potential for temptation to engage in deviance or corruption (Mollen, 1994). In the newer generation of identified corrupt NYPD officers, some have been found to have had prior associations or contacts with criminal gangs or street level criminals. These relationships were not identified during the pre-employment screening process. These younger officers continued their involvement with some of these criminal elements, and were drawn into corrupt activities to further their commitment to their private associates.17 These officers have likely been influenced by  At one point in 2004, the New York City Mayor actually decreased the starting salary for new police officers by more than −25%. Even with tax surpluses that at times exceeded $4 billion annually over the last 15 years, no raises or cost of living increases were provided to NYPD personnel on a routine basis. The situation changed in 2007 when New York City was embarrassed that the NYPD could not fill their budgeted police academy complements. 17  This is one reason why the NYPD does not permit enforcement personnel to live in the area in which they work. However the policy does not preclude police officers from working in areas where they had previously lived, attended school, or had been employed. 16

14  Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality

303

differential association, but in this case their loyalty is stronger to outside contacts and friends, rather to their work cohort. Their socialization to the deviant elements in the community had been developed prior to their police employment. As such, in these isolated cases, this form of corruption (and associated criminality) could be attributed to Sutherland’s differential association theory (Gaylord & Galliher, 1988), which suggested that individuals learn their personal values, techniques, and motives for their illegal activities through contact with others within their respective social network. One final theoretical explanation to explain police corruption could involve Becker’s rational choice theory. Rational choice theory proposes that criminals, and all people, weigh the costs and risks and potential rewards and benefits when considering whether to engage in criminal conduct. Economic factors also play a significant role. Proper planning to avoid detection and apprehension will be devised, and criminals actually conduct a probability analysis before engaging in deviant acts (Becker, 1968). In the case of police officers, they may believe that since they are the actors charged with the enforcement of the law, the potential for detection or arrest would be relatively low. As such, some corrupt police personnel may have believed that their position has left them “above the law.”

Theories of Crime and Police Criminality Police criminality encompasses criminal actions undertaken by police personnel other than corruption and the excessive use of force. These incidents would involve theft, robbery, drug dealing, and other illegal endeavors. In the three most significant cases, New York City Police Department officers assigned to the crime-ridden, drug-prone 30th, 73rd, and 77th Precincts engaged in the routine theft of money, drugs, and other valuables, at times threatening violence. In many cases, stolen drugs were used to reward informants or were resold by the police officers themselves to increase criminal profit (McAlary, 1989; Mollen, 1994). The investigation and some of the interviews of the officers involved later revealed that many of the police officers had started their careers by engaging in productive enforcement of the laws. They expressed frustration when seeing the criminal offenders promptly returned to the street (commonly referred to as the “revolving door court system”) with little or no punishment. The detailed and tedious evidence inventory process led many to destroy some of the drugs recovered. As this went on undetected, the officers slowly progressed to removing some and eventually all of the recovered currency for their personal use. Eventually further greed developed, and the officers reverted to not making arrests and merely stealing the criminal proceeds and either delivering the recovered drugs to cooperative drug dealers or to selling the drugs either within the boundary of the police station or outside the New York City borders (McAlary, 1989Mollen, 1994). Clearly there was an evolution to the deviance that had arisen in almost all cases.

304

J. F. Albrecht

From a theoretical perspective, the most likely explanation for these developments would rely on Becker’s rational choice model (Becker, 1968). It would appear that the officers calculated the likelihood of detection and noting its unlikelihood, progressed from low level criminality to serious crime and violence. In the perspective of these criminal officers, Tittle’s proposed “control ratio” (Tittle, 1995) would have weighed in on the side of deviance. In addition, since the three scandals involved a small cadre of criminal police officers all routinely working together on the same shift, one could propose that Sutherland’s differential association theory (Gaylord & Galliher, 1988) played a role in their illicit conduct. In these scenarios, which involved groups of officers and not simply individual actors, it would appear that many officers believed that they would not be identified as a member of “the team” unless they participated in criminal activities. Limited integrity control measures and specific instances of weak supervision appear to have often resulted in unrestricted unethical actions in the scandal plagued police stations (Albrecht, 2017).

Theories of Crime and the Excessive Use of Force Police brutality involves the use of more than the minimal amount of force needed to overcome resistance or counter an attack or threat. The criminal law and police policy and procedure almost universally delineate that the use of force by law enforcement officers must involve no more than what is needed to overcome the use or threat of force directed at them or a third party. When police officers exceed the amount of force necessary, then they may be acting with criminal intent or in a reckless manner. Law enforcement personnel who utilize excessive force are therefore acting in a deviant manner.18 Regarding the excessive use of force, the phenomenon can best be explained in similar fashion to other criminal behavior in which the perpetrators inflict injury to their intended victims. The use of violence, intentionally and often without remorse, could best be elucidated through trait theory, which promotes that biological, genetic, or psychological factors influence an individual to engage in violent outbursts (Siegel, 2011). In essence, the police officers who engage in police brutality may be plagued by a biological deficit that leaves them prone to inflict guilt-free physical punishment. The use of disproportionate or unwarranted force or violence can also be explained through social learning theory (Widom, 1989), which

 This has to be contrasted with the “perceived” use of excessive force by police personnel, which is more common than the actual incidents involving force-related police deviance. The sensationalized cases often highlighted by the media have routinely resulted in prosecutorial or jurist conclusions that the police officers had acted appropriately given the known circumstances and facts at the time of the decision to deploy force. This often differs dramatically from the related allegations of racism and police brutality made by minority group and other community advocates. It is clear that the perception of police brutality has to be addressed by police administrators, but it should not be confused with the actual use of excessive force by law enforcement actors. 18

14  Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality

305

proposed that those who have had childhood exposure to violence or have been victimized by physical abuse are more likely to engage in violence against others, and as such, these aggressive behaviors had been learned earlier by these individuals as being socially acceptable. If either (or both) of these theories are accepted, then one must question the effectiveness of the psychological, background, and other screening processes that have taken place during the pre-employment period. In either case, whether trait theory or social learning theory is acknowledged as the primary explanation, it is highly likely that police officers who engage in brutal conduct have done so in the past and will do so in the future unless efforts are made to terminate these problematic individuals from the police agency, either through criminal or administrative processes (Albrecht, 2017). Another matter that will be addressed later is the practice of the blue wall of silence, in which police officer who work with these abusive colleagues fail to report the unacceptable incidents to police command staff.

Theories of Crime and Police Abuse of Authority While the use of excessive force would fall under the domain of abuse of authority, this has been addressed separately (see above). The remaining categories of police abuse of authority include discourtesy, abusive language, ethnic slurs, and verbal threats. In practice, since these matters deal more so with disrespect than ethical issues, allegations involving these incidents are routinely referred to as “civilian complaints” against the police, and are often investigated by an independent agency staffed by non-law enforcement investigators.19 In the field, it is not uncommon for patrol officers to escalate their verbal discourse when confronted with an uncooperative individual. If one considers the potential increases in the police use of force spectrum that match the threat posed by a suspect, so too do police personnel cater their verbal interactions to the amount of verbal or physical cooperation or resistance displayed by persons with which they are interacting. When a suspect or other civilian encountered continues to be uncooperative with law enforcement personnel, the verbal requests and directives presented by the police will likely get louder and possibly escalate to the use of abusive language. While clearly unprofessional, some officers perceive that the use of louder verbal direction coupled with abusive language will result in a higher likelihood for cooperation and thus negate the need to elevate the interaction to one that requires the use of physical force. As such, in many police organizations the use of abusive language (e.g., cursing) does not necessarily lead to instruction or reprimand by agency supervisors. Under these circumstances, frontline police personnel, supervisors, and even police administrators may have rationalized this type of behavior as being acceptable. This is in line with

 In New York City, allegations involving abuse of authority are investigated by an independent agency staffed by civilian employees and supervised by the Civilian Complaint Review Board. 19

306

J. F. Albrecht

Sykes and Matza’s (1957) neutralization theory (Hunt & Manning, 1993; Kappeler et al., 1998), which opined that individuals can justify specific conduct, often illegal or socially unacceptable, through a process of personal rationalization. These individuals undertake “techniques of neutralization” in which they deny the existence of personal responsibility and injury to intended victims, while condemning the criminal justice system and promoting their noble calling to ensure criminals receive “appropriate punishment.” The utilization of discourteous or abusive language is viewed in stark contrast to the use of ethnic slurs or unjustified threats that police officers may verbally convey to suspects or encountered civilians. This type of behavior is unquestionably unacceptable. One theoretical explanation for these two categories of abusive dialogue is social learning theory (Widom, 1989), in that abusive and threatening dialogue and discriminatory representations of different ethnic groups may have been learned during infancy and adolescence from family members and friends and later through peers. These officers involved have opted to disregard agency ethical and cultural awareness training and continue to engage in these forms of police abuse of authority.

Theories of Crime and Police Misconduct Police misconduct involves the failure to abide by agency policy, procedure, rules and/or regulation. While some infractions may rise to the level of criminal conduct, most are rule violations normally addressed by verbal or written reprimand and instruction, or through a formal administrative process. While issues like tardiness, unprofessional appearance, sick leave abuse, and other minor rule infractions would not normally warrant overwhelming attention, repeat violations could be signs of a more serious issue (Albrecht, 2017). Chronic tardiness, disheveled appearance, routine unplanned absences, or excessive sick leave may be signs of a more serious personal disorder or issue. Within the law enforcement profession, recurring incidents involving one or all of the above could be a sign of alcohol or substance abuse or familial instability. Without instruction or early intervention, these employees could engage in criminal conduct (e.g., theft) to support an alcohol or drug addiction or could exhibit abusive conduct (verbal or physical) in response to fatigue or abuse experienced at home (Albrecht, 2017). It is quite common for police colleagues and agency managers to overlook these infractions and the potential future problems as part of the sub-cultural custom involving the “blue wall of silence” (which will be addressed later). Unfortunately this lack of attention may lead these officers, who unquestionably require assistance, to engage in harmful behavior and possibly to later commit suicide. Early warning programs may assist in reducing the potential for police officer suicide.

14  Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality

307

Theories of Crime and the “Blue Wall of Silence” The “blue wall of silence” involves the common practice in which police officers do not take the initiative to report misconduct or other police deviance involving work colleagues, nor do they cooperate in internal or external investigations that are examining forms of corruption or police deviance. Similar practices have been noted in other dangerous professions (e.g., military personnel and firefighters). The common belief is that by reporting others who commit misconduct or deviance, one could place themselves in harm’s way since there is a likelihood that work colleagues will not come to their assistance when needed. This practice is not learned prior to employment and is initiated when first deployed to the post-training field work. This informal code is prevalent in all ranks and not only in frontline personnel. In the upper ranks, misconduct and deviance may be overlooked to spare the agency from embarrassment. As such, except in extreme cases or in instances when the incidents have been drawn to the public’s attention through another mechanism (e.g., media), it is believed that much of the misconduct and deviance that takes place within law enforcement agencies goes unaddressed or unpunished. While it had been common practice to remain silent as it has pertained to misconduct and deviance by fellow police colleagues, the move to enhanced professionalism, agency transparency, media access, and the use of technology (e.g., patrol car video cameras, body work cameras, and civilian cell phone cameras) have moved police officer actions into a “fish bowl” environment. Even in situations when officers may have opted to not cooperate in the past, they have been forced to provide supporting testimony since the evidence against their misbehaving and deviant colleagues may have been too strong. To also ensure cooperation, the New York City Police Department in 1997 implemented a policy that any employee openly covering up or lying in an internal investigation will be terminated (New York City Police Department, 2002). As a result, the “blue wall” is slowly being torn down. From a theoretical perspective, the “blue wall” phenomenon can be explained by applying Sykes and Matza’s (1957) neutralization theory (Hunt & Manning, 1993; Kappeler et al., 1998) to this custom. The same could be said of the practice of providing police officers and government officials with “professional courtesy” during traffic stops. The officers could rationalize their actions through the belief that neither of these rituals causes overwhelming harm to the public. As these practices are learned through organizational exposure, social learning theory (Widom, 1989) would provide a reasonable explanation for these actions.

Theories of Crime and Courtroom Perjury Courtroom perjury could have been included within the police criminality category; however it will be looked at separately due to its recurrence in recent NYPD scandals. In those cases closely examined by the Mollen Commission and some

308

J. F. Albrecht

subsequent incidents, NYPD officers were found to fabricate certain aspects of the events leading up to arrests in order to strengthen the likelihood of conviction.20 Syke’s and Matza’s (1957) neutralization theory (Hunt & Manning, 1993; Kappeler et  al., 1998) could be applied as a theoretical explanation as police officers may have rationalized this form of criminality by believing that their intent was simply to place “bad people behind bars.” As such, this practice has often been referred to as “noble cause” corruption. In addition, this form of deviance could be supported practically by instruction or coercion by peers, trainers, or perhaps even other criminal justice actors (e.g., prosecutors). As such, Widom’s (1989) social learning theory could provide a plausible explanation for this serious criminal misconduct.

 olicy Recommendations: Enhancing Organizational Integrity P and Professionalism Given the plethora of behaviors that could be classified as police deviance, it is recommended that law enforcement administrators take a number of measures to enhance agency professionalism, strengthen integrity, and improve supervisory leadership. Firstly, law enforcement executives should clearly define the relevance of ethical standards and professional practices by delineating them in agency mission statements, procedures, policy statements, and rules and regulations and by incorporating them into all training curricula, including continuously through in-­ service instruction (Albrecht, 2017). Pre-employment screening must include the thorough examination of the psychological and behavioral history of police department applicants. As noted, studies have shown that a record of disciplinary events in school or in prior employment, arrests for criminal conduct (even those that do not result in conviction), and repeat traffic violations are indicative of future misconduct and deviant behavior (Gips, 1998). Personality and psychological screening mechanisms can be used to effectively screen out applicants be evaluating indices and scales that have been shown to be correlated to later misconduct or termination.21 Agencies should consider employing a battery of personality screening tests (i.e., MMPI-II; NEO-PI-R; IPI and the CPI) to “weed out” potentially problematic individuals and to “screen in” likely productive candidates for police positions (Albrecht, 2017).

 The most common examples included police officers testifying that they discovered a gun or illicit narcotics on the body of the suspect, when in fact the contraband had been found on the floor nearby, in the suspect’s car, or in the suspect’s home. When questioned, the officer’s often admitted that they merely wanted to strengthen the criminal case (Mollen, 1994). 21  Prior research has indicated that specific indices or scales in the MMPI, CPI, NEO-PI-R, and IPI have been shown to be predictive of misconduct and termination. Further research is needed to validate these findings, but agency psychologists should at the minimum pay close attention to these factors when interviewing these job candidates prior to employment. 20

14  Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality

309

Disciplinary events and performance evaluations during the police academy and field training probationary periods should be thoroughly scrutinized. Chronically problematic employees should be closely supervised, and attempts should be made to terminate these individuals at the earliest opportunity, rather than waiting for a more serious or criminal event to occur (Albrecht, 2017). In addition, if they do not already do so, police agencies should strongly consider requiring 2 to 4 years of pre-employment college education, which has shown to be correlated to enhanced performance and diminished problematic behavior (Albrecht, 2017). Law enforcement supervisors should receive comprehensive leadership training that advocates strong decision-making and routine documentation of misconduct and other inappropriate activity by police personnel. In addition, agency managers should use the monthly and annual performance evaluation processes as a tool to provide mentoring, instruction, and corrective guidance to subordinate personnel. All negative incidents should be promptly addressed, and constructive instruction should be provided, but if ineffective, the agency should make an effort to commence termination proceedings for repeat offenders at the earliest stages in an officer’s career. If not already in place, an early intervention mechanism should be implemented in an effort to proactively monitor potentially problematic employees (Albrecht, 2017). On the other hand, the agency should develop a transparent reward and promotion system for personnel who perform in an exemplary fashion and for those who proactively report deviance and serious misconduct by co-workers. In addition, any actions that could result in potential criminal charges should be referred to the prosecutor’s office for guidance and formal investigation. This will likely eliminate future allegations of preferential treatment or cover-up (Albrecht, 2017). In an effort to deter deviance in police stations that have been shown to be more prone to misbehavior by law enforcement personnel,22 regular supervisory visits should be made by upper and middle management from the agency central and regional headquarters at all times of the day (i.e., on all working shifts and in particular during the night time hours) to police stations that are plagued by high crime and rampant drug dealing (Albrecht, 2017). In addition, internal affairs (professional standards) investigations must be conducted in an effective fashion in an effort to conduct inquiries into the specific misconduct alleged. Command and control could also be strengthened by decreasing the supervisor-to-officer ratio to no more than eight uniformed police officers assigned to patrol or administrative duties, or to four officers, investigators, or detectives for each supervisor tasked with managing undercover personnel or those working in civilian attire (Albrecht, 2017). Police administrators must continue to reward those who bring forward information about corrupt and abusive police officers and appropriately punish those who do not cooperate in these investigations. Police managers who have been found to have condoned unacceptable behavior or have ignored it should be held responsible

 Those police stations that are located in high-crime and drug-prone communities have been shown to be of higher risk of police deviance. 22

310

J. F. Albrecht

and face appropriate disciplinary action (e.g., administrative charges of “failure to supervise” or criminal charges of “official misconduct”). Additionally, all police agencies should implement integrity and drug testing23 on random and targeted bases to ensure compliance with criminal law and department procedure, with renewed attention placed on the potential for misuse of prescription medication (Albrecht, 2017). Ultimately, police executives should pride themselves in maintaining highly professional standards throughout their organizations and creating an atmosphere of transparency to ensure the highest levels of citizen trust and confidence.

Conclusion Police deviance unfortunately can take many forms. Criminological analyses have revealed that no one theoretical model has been found to apply to all forms of inappropriate law enforcement misbehavior; however there are clear sociological trends when each of the five specific types of police deviance is independently and more closely examined. Police executives and government leaders can take specific steps to ensure that only the highest-quality candidates are hired, deployed in the field, and are left to interact with the public. Effective pre-employment screening and accurate entry level and in-service performance evaluation may hold the key to a superior and more professional work force (Albrecht, 2017). Given that deviance is present in all aspects of life and in all fields of employment, eliminating gross misbehavior from the law enforcement profession will continue to provide a compelling challenge to those responsible for ensuring the safety and well-being of the public-at-large. Law enforcement administrators must realize that even with impressive crime reductions, the agency’s (and their personal) reputation will be questioned if citizens lack confidence and trust in the police and if the organization’s legitimacy and credibility come under scrutiny.

References Albrecht, J. F. (2011). Three decades of policing reform in the New York city police department. In Albrecht & Das (Eds.), Effective crime reduction strategies: International perspectives. CRC Press. Albrecht, J. F. (2017). Police brutality, misconduct and corruption: Criminological explanations and policy implications. Springer Publications.

 The issue of drug testing of law enforcement personnel must take into consideration the legalization of medical and recreational marijuana usage within that respective state and jurisdiction and agency policy when determining the need for testing police employees for marijuana usage. 23

14  Criminological Explanations for Police Officer Brutality and Criminality

311

Baker, A., & Goldstein, J. (2011). Unsealed indictments shed light on procedures for ticket-fixing by officers. in New  York Times on October 28, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/29/ nyregion/in-­ticket-­fixing-­scandal-­16-­officers-­to-­be-­charged.html Barker, T., & Carter, D. L. (1993). Police deviance (3rd ed.). Anderson Publishing Company. Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 196–217. COPS Office. (2015). President’s task force on 21st century policing implementation guide: Moving from recommendations to action. Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Crank, J. P., & Caldero, M. A. (1999). Police ethics: The corruption of Noble cause. Anderson Publishing Company. Erikson, K. T. (1962). Notes on the sociology of deviance. Social Problems, 9, 307–314. Fyfe, J. J., & Kane, R. (2006). Bad cops: A study of career-ending misconduct among new York City police officers. US Department of Justice. Gaylord, M.  S., & Galliher, J.  F. (1988). The criminology of Edward Sutherland. Transaction Publishers. Gips, M. (1998). A corrupt personality? Security Management, 42(9), 14. Haberfeld, M. R., Klockars, C. B., Kutnjak Ivkovich, S., & Pagon, M. (2000). Police officer perceptions of the disciplinary consequences of police corruption in Croatia, Poland, Slovenia, and the United States. Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 1(1), 41–72. Harris, D. A. (2009). How accountability-based policing can reinforce - or replace - the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 7. Hickman, M. J., Piquero, A. R., Lawton, B. A., & Greene, J. R. (2001). Applying tittle’s control balance theory to police deviance. Policing, 24(4), 497–519. Hunt, J., & Manning, P. (1993). The social context of police lying. In Delos (Ed.), Deviant behavior. St. Martin’s Press. Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department. (1991). Report of the independent commission on the Los Angeles police department. Independent Commission on the LAPD. Kappeler, V. E., Sluder, R. D., & Alpert, G. P. (1998). Forces of deviance: Understanding the dark side of policing (2nd ed.). Waveland Press. Kavanaugh, J. J. (2010). No back-up needed: How veteran new York City cops struggled through the summer of 1975, when New York City went broke. Red Anvil Press. Klockars, C. B., Kutnjak Ivkovich, S., & Haberfeld, M. R. (2003). The contours of police integrity. Sage Publications. Mara, W. (2009). Perspectives on civil unrest in the 1960s: Riots and their aftermath. Benchmark Books. Mass, P. (1973). Serpico, the cop who defied the system. The Viking Press. McAlary, M. (1989). Buddy boys: When good cops turn bad. Putnam Publishing Group. Merton, R. K. (1968). Social theory and social structure. Free Press. Mollen, M. (1994). Commission report: Commission to investigate allegations of police corruption and the anti-corruption procedures of the police department. City of New York. New York City Police Department. (1990). NYPD staffing needs plan. NYPD Printing Office. New York City Police Department. (2002). NYPD internal affairs bureau annual report 2001. NYPD Printing Office. New York City Police Department. (2012). NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau Annual Report 2011. NYPD Printing Office. Packman, D. (2010). National police misconduct reporting system. Cato Institute. Player, M. A. (2009). Federal Law of Employment Discrimination in a Nutshell (6th ed.) St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West Publishers. Punch, M. (2000). Police corruption and its prevention. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 8, 301–324. Siegel, L. J. (2011). Criminology: The Core (4th ed.). Wadsworth Publishers. Sykes, M., & Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency. American Sociological Review, 22 (6), 644–670. Tittle, C. (1995). Control balance: Toward a general theory of deviance. Westview Press.

312

J. F. Albrecht

Transparency International. (2021). Corruption perceptions index 2020. Transparency International. United States Department of Justice. (1989). Crime in the United States 1988. United States Department of Justice. United States Department of Justice. (1990). Crime in the United States 1989. United States Department of Justice. Widom, C. S. (1989). The cycle of violence. Science, 244, 160–166. James F. Albrecht  is a professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Homeland Security at Pace University in New York City. Jimmy received a prestigious Fulbright Fellowship in 1998 and worked as a professor at the National Police College of Finland. He is also the recipient of a 2013 Embassy Policy Specialist Fellowship (USDOS/IREX) and was tasked with conducting research and making recommendations to improve law enforcement effectiveness and legitimacy in Ukraine. Police Chief Albrecht served in the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo (former Yugoslavia) as the head of the EULEX Police Executive Department, in charge of criminal investigations and coordinating international law enforcement cooperation and intelligence analysis from 2008 through 2010. He had previously served in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo Police from 2007 to 2008. Jimmy is also a 23-year veteran of the NYPD who retired as the Commanding Officer of NYPD Transit Bureau District 20, tasked with the prevention of crime and terrorism in the subway and commuter transit system in New  York City. He was a first responder and incident command manager at the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and developed the counter-terrorism strategic plan for the subway system in the borough of Queens, New York City.

Part VII

Holding Police Accountable

Chapter 15

The Use of Force by Police Officers in the Republic of Kosovo Reshat Maliqi

Introduction Within the Kosovo Police, there are specific policies through which are defined the rules regarding the use of force by police officers against persons or citizens and the review of the use of that force. Establishment of standard agency rules and procedures outlining the manner for the use of physical and deadly force by police officers against persons is intended to provide officers with clear instructions on the necessary and reasonable use of force by police personnel. These policies have been drafted in full compliance with the Law of Police, which is national legislation, and aim to inform police officers about the rules that enable the realization of police objectives, defined by legal provisions, as well as the review of cases of use of force after each occurrence, in order to ascertain the legality of police action (and inaction). The training and instruction of police officers regarding these acts and the rules of use of force are expected to guide each Kosovo Police officer to make professionally impartial and reasonable decisions while engaged in their duties. The review of the use of force by Kosovo Police officials requires ongoing evaluation. The identification of patterns and irregularities in the use of physical force is aimed at preventing and raising the level of discipline and professionalism of police officers during the performance of their official police responsibilities.

R. Maliqi (*) Kosovo Police, Pristina, Republic of Kosovo e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_15

315

316

R. Maliqi

Use of Force by Police The use of physical force, deadly force, and firearms by police can become necessary and permissible in specific circumstances, such as for self-defense or protection of another individual or group. The use of force is generally used when other police measures and actions are not successful, while the use of force in cases of crowd control and cessation of the use of force against the crowd is done only with the authorization of a supervisor in Kosovo. It must be emphasized that, in any case of use of force, police officers must always take into account the specific circumstances, the nature of the criminal offense, the degree of danger to the persons present, and the physical, mental, and emotional state of the suspect against whom the force is used. In the case of the use of physical force, police officers are allowed to use the minimum force or the lowest level of use of force, through which legitimate police objectives can be achieved. The force used must be proportionate, reasonable, and used only when necessary. The use of force as a necessary and unavoidable authorization of Kosovo police officers is applied pursuant to Law 04/L-076 of Article 26-27. Article 27 of this law provides that a Kosovo police officer is authorized to possess and carry an official weapon. In addition, Kosovo Police personnel are permitted to use force in the following specific circumstances, but which are not limited to: • To protect themselves or others from imminent and imminent threat • To prevent the commission of a criminal offense • To arrest the perpetrator of the criminal offense or the person who poses a threat to public order and security • To prevent the escape of the perpetrator of the criminal offense • To protect property and material goods of special importance Of particular note, before using a firearm, a police officer in Kosovo must give a verbal remark introducing himself as a police officer, ordering the person to stop, but also warning the suspect that the officer will shoot if the subject does not stop. It is clear that there are clear legal mandates that limit the use of force by police officers in Kosovo, but the conditions are not as restrictive as those commonly observed in the United States and other nations.

Reviewing Use of Force by Police in Kosovo The Law on Police in Kosovo authorizes the development and maintenance of a Use of Force Commission within the Kosovo Police, which is responsible for reviewing all instances of the use of force by officers within the Kosovo Police. This legislation is based on the bylaws based on Article 55 of the Law on Police, paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3, which have been approved by the General Director, who is the highest ranking police official in the nation.

15  The Use of Force by Police Officers in the Republic of Kosovo

317

The review of the use of force in the Kosovo Police is done by a specifically selected complement of police managers. This Use of Force Commission will assess and evaluate all cases of use of force through the use of a panel of Kosovo Police supervisors consisting of three members. The commission for reviewing the use of force is regularly scheduled and is under the direct supervision of the office of the Kosovo Police Deputy General Director for Resources. What is highly impressive is that Kosovo Police regulation and national legislation mandate that all use of force incidents involving the Kosovo Police must be documented and this report must be forwarded to Kosovo Police headquarters and the Use for Force Commission. This practice ensures that police arrests and use of force incidents are monitored centrally in an effort to identify policy violators and identify patterns and training needs that require attention and potential correction. There are a number of options for reporting use of force by police in Kosovo. It is mandated that any use of force incident result in the preparation of a Use of Force report that must first be reviewed by the respective Kosovo Police supervisor before it is forwarded through channels to the Use of Force Commission at police headquarters. There are additional options for bringing use of force complaints and allegations to the Commission, and these include formal complaints filed by police officers, regardless of rank or position, and citizens’ complaints about use of force by police officers. In addition, a formal case will be initiated when disciplinary proceedings have been initiated by the Kosovo Police Directorate of Professional Standards or the Kosovo Police Inspectorate1 if it is alleged that a criminal offense has been committed during the use of force in a police incident. In special situations, the commission also can also be directed to handle cases at the request of the Deputy Director General for Resources, if it deems that there is a need to review a specific case of use of force, or if there is need identified to improve supervisory practices or make changes or modification to agency rules, procedures, and/or training regarding the use of force and firearms by police personnel. As it relates to the use of a firearm, in cases when the police officer uses or discharges a firearm, regardless of whether it involved a deliberate act, accident, or negligence, such cases would immediately be reported to the immediate supervisor, resulting in all Use of Force forms to be completed and the case would then be processed for review by the Use of Force commission. Special considerations can be made when reviewing cases of the use of force by police officers belonging to minority groups (e.g., Serbian, Roma, etc.) or when women are involved, as the chairperson of the Use of Force Commission shall ensure that a panel member may be appointed to include a member of that minority or gender. In addition, when necessary, an official interpreter will be provided during the hearing. The case files are often multi-faceted and involve the collection of detailed information to enhance the review process. All cases involving the use of force by  The Police Inspectorate of Kosovo is an independent government agency that investigates allegations and cases of criminal activity involving Kosovo Police personnel, which operates under the direct guidance of the local or special prosecutor. 1

318

R. Maliqi

members of the Kosovo Police are initially reported to the direct supervisor at the police station or other unit where the incident occurred. The preliminary investigation by the supervisor involves not only the basic Use of Force report, but also the statement of the person against whom the force was used, the statements of witnesses, the measures taken by police officers, the type of force used, the doctor’s report on whether medical assistance was provided to the person against whom the force was used, and copies of any video recordings, if available. Once all of the documentation and evidence has been collected, and after preparing the case file, the responsible supervisor will conduct a preliminary evaluation of the use of force and thereafter will send the case file by official mail to the Use of Force Commission at police headquarters. If the preliminary investigation reveals that there are elements of disciplinary infractions, the supervisor will also submit a complete copy of the case file to the Kosovo Police Directorate of Disciplinary Standards. If it appears that there are elements of a criminal offense, the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo will be immediately notified.

Preliminary Actions and Use of Force Case Panel Review All cases that are sent officially for review by the Use of Force Commission will be initially registered in the central register, which is located in office of the General Director of the Kosovo Police. The cases are then immediately forwarded to the Chairman of the Use of Force Commission. The Commission Chairman must undertake all actions to hold a confidential panel review of the facts of each case. It is the specific responsibility of the Chairman of the Use of Force Commission to ensure that all cases of use of force are reviewed by the designated panel as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days from the date of receipt random. If the case is not completed within this deadline, the Chairman of the Commission is obliged to justify in writing any delay and report the circumstances to the General Director of the police. The Chairman of the Commission, depending on the nature of the case and the number of cases, determines the composition of the membership of the panel and the date for the hearing. The members of the panel will thoroughly examine the case file, ascertain the factual situation, and then make a decision, respectively giving recommendations regarding the appropriateness of use of force in each specific incident. When receiving documents related to the use of physical force, weapons, or a firearm, the panel and Commission will pay special attention to the determination for the need to use force, evaluate the level of resistance and the prior options to gain control of the subject, the amount and type of force applied by the police officer, and the need to neutralize the illegal physical actions of a subject in order to best manage and control a certain situation. The panel will ensure that all aspects of the Code of Conduct for Kosovo Police Officers have been followed. It is critical that Kosovo

15  The Use of Force by Police Officers in the Republic of Kosovo

319

Police officials always act ethically and lawfully to ensure that the highest levels of democratic policing is consistently maintained.       The panel, after reviewing the specific factors in each case, will then determine whether the use of force by the police officer was, or was not, reasonable, proportionate, and in accordance with the Law on Police and all policies of the Kosovo Police. The panel will not only evaluate the use of force event, but will also analyze the need for other appropriate action(s). If during the examination of the case, it is found that the use of force by the police officer was reasonable and in accordance with the legal provisions, but there is the need for improved training, there is an option to mandate that the officer receive additional instruction in tactical techniques, policy, legal mandates, and use of force. If during the review of a case, the panel determines that there is insufficient evidence and the need for further investigation to better establish the factual circumstances, the Use of Force Commission Chairperson may adjourn the hearing of the case and direct the responsible supervisor in the field to conduct a more comprehensive investigation and collect more documentation and evidence. This interruption or postponement of the hearing will then be recorded in the official minutes of the meeting. In cases where there are reasons to suspect that any of the members of the use of force review panel appears to be biased during the examination of the case, the Chairman of the Commission may replace the respective member of the panel, but is obliged in advance to: (a) Verify if there is any possible conflict of interest (b) Take the necessary steps to avoid such a conflict (c) Decide on the appropriate replacement of the panel member In addition, the panel, during the hearing session, is obligated to maintain a written record, in which the course or progress of the actions taken in the review session of the use of force by the panel must be reported.

The Use of Force Review Panel Report and Processes After reviewing each case involving police use of force, the chairperson of the Use of Force review panel must prepare a report outlining the panel’s investigation and inquiry, the findings and recommendations of the panel, the conclusions drawn regarding the legality, and appropriateness of the use of force by the police officer. This report will then be forwarded to the Chairperson of the Use of Force Commission. Within this report, among other things, it should be specifically stipulated that: (a) The use of physical force by the police officer has been reasonable and in accordance with the legal provisions and internal acts of the Kosovo Police; or that

320

R. Maliqi

(b) The use of physical force has not been in accordance with the legal provisions and internal policies of the Kosovo Police. After receiving this report, the Chairperson of the Commission must then send a copy of the panel’s findings and recommendations to: (a) The police unit which has initiated the case in the Use of Force Commission (b) The police supervisor or senior superior of the unit where the employee works (c) The employee who was involved in the case (d) The Kosovo Police Directorate of Professional Standards to initiate disciplinary proceedings, if it is suspected that there is a disciplinary violation (e) The Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, if at that agency’s request, a disciplinary procedure has been initiated by the Commission This comprehensive process and review ensures that all actions involving the Kosovo Police in which the use of force has been used will receive adequate attention and evaluation. This procedure has been designed to improve public trust and confidence in the law enforcement and criminal justice institutions within Kosovo, and acts as another level of accountability for Kosovo Police personnel. The findings of the Use of Force Commission are also made available to the public and indicate the high level of transparency that the Kosovo Police provides to the communities being served.

Kosovo Police Use of Force Data Documented use of force incidents within the Kosovo Police includes not only cases in which a police officer used physical, non-lethal, or deadly force involving a suspect or subject of a police encounter, but also includes any incident or arrest in which a Kosovo Police officer used handcuffs to restrain a person, even when that individual did not resist. As such, police action during a broad array of police contacts is being evaluated and investigated. Table 15.1 illustrates a comparison of use of force incidents for the Kosovo Police during 2020 and 2021 that have been reviewed by the Use of Force Commission. While the data for 2021 shows a dramatic increase in every category when compared to 2020 data, it must be noted that 2020 was overwhelmingly affected by Covid pandemic restrictions that generally restricted the public to their residences. As such, police-public encounters were severely limited in 2020. Even given these annual differences, it would appear that most police encounters that involve arrest or the use of force are deemed to be justified and appropriate. Very few cases result in disciplinary punishment, criminal action, or the need for additional training.

15  The Use of Force by Police Officers in the Republic of Kosovo

321

Table 15.1  Presentation of data and comparisons for Kosovo Police Use of Force cases examined during the years 2020 and 2021 (Maliqi, 2022) Comparisons for the years Kosovo Police subjects investigated

2020 863

Use of Force panel sessions Kosovo officers involved Finding that use of force by Kosovo Police was in line with the law, by-laws, and policy Finding that the use of firearms by Kosovo Police was in accordance with the law Finding that there is the need for additional training in use of firearm Cases returned for further investigation Injured police officers

39 1772 883

2021 1037 (+73 cases carried over from the year 2020) 66 2246 1096

18

14

4

2

25 No data No data

57 7

Injured citizens

3

Conclusion Although the Republic of Kosovo is a relatively new nation and a continuously developing democracy, the Kosovo Police has taken the initiative to closely monitor use of force incidents involving the police to ensure that all personnel are held accountable for their professional actions. In addition to the Use of Force Commission, the Kosovo Police has a separate Directorate of Professional Standards which is responsible for investigating disciplinary infractions and allegations made against the Kosovo Police. To further enhance accountability, the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, under the Ministry of the Interior, is an independent agency that investigates allegations of a criminal nature made against the Kosovo Police and also conducts detailed audits and inspections of police operations, policy abidance, and procurement practices. Each entity publishes annual reports and posts investigative reports on their respective websites. These measures are an indication of clear efforts to maintain transparency and accountability within the Kosovo Police. All of these initiatives should act as examples for other nations regionally and globally. Reshat Maliqi  is currently the Chairperson of the Kosovo Police Use of Force Commission. Reshat studied at the Vushtrri Police Academy between 1975 and 1979, after which he worked for the Yugoslavian National Police, including as a security officer at the nation’s consulate in San Francisco in the United States. In 2000, he started training with the Kosovo Police Service. General Maliqi has held a variety of command positions in the Kosovo Police, including the Director General of the Kosovo Police, the Regional Commander for the Province of Gjilane, and the Chief of the Border Police in Pristina. Dr. Maliqi holds a PhD in Criminal Investigations and has published numerous articles on policing matters as it relates to Kosovo and south-eastern Europe.

Chapter 16

The Effect of Police Accountability Measures on the Repeat Use of Excessive Force by Police Officers Suat Cubukcu and Olivia Hom

Introduction Making police more accountable for their misconduct has been a concern since modern policing was created in 1829  in England. However, it was not generally among top public concerns until actual and perceived acts of police brutality were captured by cameras, and the public was exposed to video footage and visual stories of police brutality. Use of force incidents with police has become of particular interest, especially because of incidents of the use of fatal force against unarmed Black citizens. Particularly after the death of George Floyd in May 2020, the calls for police reform and demands to make police more accountable have become more vocal and stronger. Police agencies have depended primarily on police disciplinary processes to dissuade excessive use of force even though a range of organizational methods, such as personnel screening and training, may be utilized. There is a big assumption that making police officers accountable for their misconduct will dissuade them from repeating it and discourage others as well (Stephens, 2011). However, this assumption needs to be further examined in the context of police excessive use of force. While there has been an increasing body of research examining the factors that make an officer more or less likely to engage in misconduct, yet, there has been little research on police excessive use of force, adjudication processes, and their impact on police officers’ future violations. This research examines recidivism by comparing different adjudication outcomes of citizen complaints and versions used to sanction delinquent police officers.

S. Cubukcu (*) · O. Hom American University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. F. Albrecht, G. den Heyer (eds.), Police Use of Force, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22705-9_16

323

324

S. Cubukcu and O. Hom

Literature Review The existing research that examines risk factors for the likelihood of an officer receiving a complaint points out the importance of officers’ individual characteristics and demographics (e.g., gender, age, race). Male officers (Brandl et al., 2001; Harris, 2010; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996; Terrill & Ingram, 2016) and younger and inexperienced officers are more likely to engage in misconduct (Brandl et al., 2001; Gullion et al., 2021b; Harris, 2009, 2014; Harris & Worden, 2014; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996; McElvain & Kposowa, 2004; Terrill & Ingram, 2016). Having a college degree decreases an officer’s likelihood of receiving a complaint (Harris, 2010, 2014; Kane & White, 2009; Terrill & Ingram, 2016). Yet, there are inconsistent findings regarding officers’ race and military experience. Harris (2010 and 2014) and Kane and White (2009) found that Black officers are more likely to receive a complaint, while others show that race does not affect an officer’s likelihood of receiving complaints (Brandl et al., 2001; Gullion et al., 2021b; McElvain & Kposowa, 2004). Some studies found that officers with prior military experience are more likely to receive a complaint (Kane & White, 2009; Henson et al., 2010; Terrill & Ingram, 2016). Others found that officers with military experience take longer to develop (Harris, 2014) or have no effect on the likelihood of complaints (Harris, 2010). Regarding situational factors, body-worn cameras have been found to be effective in reducing citizen complaints, but have had no effect on officer use of force (Ariel et al., 2015, 2017; Peterson & Lawrence, 2021; Yokum et al., 2019). Peterson and Lawrence (2021) found that when officers had a body-worn camera, they had 29% fewer complaints compared to when they did not have a body-worn camera. They also found that with each additional month an officer was equipped with a body-worn camera, there was a 6% reduction in the number of monthly complaints against them. However, they did not find an impact on the number of use of force incidents (Peterson & Lawrence, 2021). Terrill (2005) found that in 75% of officer-citizen interactions, the officer used de-escalation techniques. The suspect’s resistance or compliance, state of being (under the influence or mental impairment), their respectfulness or lack thereof towards the officer, and the number of bystanders affect an officer’s decision to use force and, if so, the amount of force. A suspect resisting verbal direction, a suspect under the influence, and the more officers at the incident increased the likelihood that an officer would use force. Interestingly, officers were less likely to use force when a suspect acted aggressively from the beginning of the interaction (Terrill, 2005). Willits and Makin (2018) found that if force is used, it will be used early in the interaction; officers are more likely to use force against a suspect that is Black and male. As suspect resistance predicts the time and duration of force used, officers are more likely to use greater levels of force in longer interactions (Willits & Makin, 2018). There are a small number of officers responsible for citizen complaints (Chalfin & Kaplan, 2021; Harris, 2010, 2014; Terrill & Ingram, 2016). Terrill and Ingram

16  The Effect of Police Accountability Measures on the Repeat Use of Excessive…

325

(2016) found that 37% of officers across eight cities accounted for all complaints. Similarly, Harris (2010) found that 5% of officers in a police department in the northeastern United States accounted for 20% of complaints at that agency. However, Chalfin and Kaplan (2021) found that removing the top 10% of officers identified based on risk would lead to only a 4–6% decrease in the use of force complaints. In their study of a northeast police department, Harris and Worden (2014) found that half of the officers received a subsequent sustained complaint within 22.5 months after the initial complaint. More than 75% of officers received their second sustained complaint within 4 and a half years after the initial complaint. More recently, Gullion et al. (2021b) used complaint data from a police agency in the southwestern United States from 2010 through 2017 and found that more than half of the officers who received a second complaint did so within the first year after their initial complaint. Approximately 94% of officers who received a second complaint did so within the first 3 years of their initial complaint. Gullion et al. (2021a) later reported that use of force incidents from 2013 through 2017 at a police agency in the southwestern United States was used to examine the likelihood and timing of repeated officer use of force. The results show that most officers received a use of force complaint within the first 3  months to 1  year after their initial complaint. Citizen injury was also found to be significant in the subsequent use of force complaints: there was an increased time to the relapse of use of force complaints when the initial use of force incident resulted in citizen injury (Gullion et al., 2021a). A very limited number of police officers were made accountable for their misconduct against citizens. The vast majority of citizen complaints against officers were either unfounded, dismissed, or exonerated (Cubukcu et al., 2021; Michelle Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996; Terrill & Ingram, 2016). Terrill and Ingram (2016) found that 11% of complaints were sustained: complaints of force (2%) and discourtesy (9%) were the least likely to be sustained. Additionally, they found that Black and female officers are more likely to have a sustained complaint. Complaints investigated by internal investigators are 39% less likely to be sustained than when investigated by an external citizen oversight review. Headley et al. (2020) also found disproportionate sustained complaints across racial groups, where complaints from White citizens are more likely to be sustained than those from Black or Hispanic citizens.

Theoretical Framework There are multiple theoretical approaches to how different investigation outcomes and disciplinary measures affect recidivism in police misconduct. We will discuss the potential relationships between the outcome and explanatory variables by using the theoretical frameworks of deterrence, defiance, and legitimacy theories. Deterrence theory is based on the idea that individuals are rational actors and make decisions based on their calculations of perceived costs and benefits. The investigation of citizen complaints and subsequent potential disciplinary sanctions

326

S. Cubukcu and O. Hom

can deter delinquent police officers from subsequent misconduct. Yet, police officers’ perception of certainty, celerity, and severity of sanctions may affect the level of deterrence. The judgment of certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment is based partly on one’s own experience (specific deterrence) and the experience of others (general deterrence). Police disciplinary systems have significant limitations in upholding the certainty, celerity, and severity of sanctions. The certainty of sanctions relies on many factors, for example, whether a citizen files a complaint after an interaction where a citizen thinks the officer engaged in misconduct. Many citizens do not file a complaint even if they believe misconduct has taken place. Even if a citizen files a legitimate complaint and follows all the procedures, the complaint may not be sustained due to a lack of supporting evidence. Terrill and Ingram (2016) found just 10.9% of complaints over eight cities had been sustained. The odds of a complaint being sustained increased by 78% when a civilian review board, in addition to the agency’s internal affairs unit, was used to investigate the allegation. The NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) reported that only 23% of fully investigated cases were sustained in 2016. The denominator of this percentage does not take into account the number of allegations that were closed because the CCRB was “unable to investigate” (Civilian Complaint Review Board, n.d.) due to various factors. There is no guarantee of a swift investigation and penalty if it has been determined that the officer engaged in misconduct. The CCRB states that the quickest investigations take “a few months” (Civilian Complaint Review Board, n.d.). This does not include referral to the police commissioner for sanctions. In New  York City, the minimum time it takes for an officer to be sanctioned after a complaint is filed is generally 4 to 6 months. When a complaint is substantiated, the sanction(s) an officer receives can be too lenient or dismissed. Along with formal sanctions, officers often experience informal sanctions as a result of sustained misconduct. Guilt, shame, and/or embarrassment that one might feel within their group (a police department) or within the community as a result of engaging in misconduct may act more as a deterrent effect than formal lenient sanctions, such as forfeiture of 5–30 vacation days. For example, Pogarsky and Piquero (2004) found that informal sanctions and certainty of punishment had the strongest deterrent effects for officers. From the legitimacy and defiance perspective, fairness and procedural justice matter for police officers’ compliance with the rules. As citizens often view the police based on their interactions with them and how fair and respected the police officer treated them, the same goes for police officers and their agency; officers can make fairness assessments of their agency based on their rules, procedures, sanctions, and treatment of officers. The more legitimate or fair the officer perceives their agency to be, the more likely they are to act professionally. From the defiance theory perspective, experiencing punishment fairly and legitimately is necessary for acknowledging shame, which in turn conditions deterrence. When the person feels that the sanction is unfair, it might result in “unacknowledged shame” and “defiant pride,” which raises the likelihood of future delinquency. The conditions of defiance depends on whether (1) offender defines criminal sanction as

16  The Effect of Police Accountability Measures on the Repeat Use of Excessive…

327

unfair, (2) offender has little to no social bonds to the sanctioning agent or community in which the offender is part of, (3) offender defines the sanction as stigmatizing act, and (4) the offender refuses to acknowledge the shame that the sanction has caused the offender. Defiance can be more prevalent especially among police officers with a warrior mindset, which refers to a “bone-deep commitment to survive” in a challenging environment (Stoughton, 2014, p. 1). Supporting the defiance approach, Harris and Worden (2014) found that officers who were sanctioned following the initial complaint were more likely than officers who were not sanctioned to obtain a subsequent complaint. Officers who were sanctioned also received their second complaint more quickly than officers who were not sanctioned. Further, officers who received severe sanctions were significantly more likely to receive another complaint compared to officers who received a less severe sanction. There is limited research on recidivism in police misconduct complaints, especially on the use of force. In existing studies, Harris and Worden (2014) examined citizen complaints in general but did not focus on the use of force complaints. On the other hand, Gullion et  al. (2021a) examined recidivism of use of force complaints but did not evaluate the impact of citizen complaint investigation outcomes. This study builds upon Harris and Worden’s (2014) and Gullion et al. (2021a) studies and examines the effect of different investigation outcomes and disciplinary actions on the likelihood and timing of subsequent use of force complaints by using more comprehensive data from the nation’s largest police department. Testing the deterrent impact of police accountability and disciplinary system on excessive use of force remains largely unexplored, and there needs to be a further scientific inquiry with comprehensive data on citizen complaints. We examine the following research questions and hypotheses in this study: Research Question 1: How do different citizen investigation outcomes affect the likelihood and the time length of subsequent use of force complaints? Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between the outcomes of citizen use of force complaints investigations and the likelihood of recidivism. Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between the outcomes of citizen use of force complaints investigations and the frequency of recidivism. Research Question 2: How do different disciplinary sanctions following a sustained use of force complaint affect the likelihood and the time length of subsequent use of force complaints? Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship between the type of disciplinary measures for sustained complaints and the likelihood of recidivism. Hypothesis 4: There is a relationship between the type of disciplinary measures for the sustained complaints and the frequency of recidivism.

328

S. Cubukcu and O. Hom

The NYPD Data The data utilized for this study is from the New  York City’s Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB). The New York City Police Department (NYPD) established the first CCRB in 1953 consisting of three deputy police commissioners to investigate civilian complaints. For the first time, in 1965, civilians were included in investigations of complaints against police officers. The current, all-civilian, CCRB began in 1993 and has since been granted subpoena power, authority to recommend discipline in substantiated cases, had their budget increased, and improved their practices to become the largest civilian oversight agency in the country (Civilian Complaint Review Board, n.d.). Citizens can file a complaint online, by phone, by mail, and in person at the CCRB’s office, a council member’s district office, or any police station. Within 48 h of making a complaint, an investigator contacts the complainant to arrange a time to get an in-person affidavit which will serve as the foundation of the investigation. After the in-person affidavit is submitted, the investigator determines if there should be mediation or an investigation. In the case of mediation, the complainant and officer meet to resolve the incident rather than pursue a full investigation. This study focuses on complaints that went through an investigation process. In the investigation process, the investigator interviews the officer(s) involved and may use subpoena power to obtain further evidence and information about the incident to construct the case (Civilian Complaint Review Board, n.d.). The entire case is then brought to a panel with three board members (one member designated by the mayor, one by the city council, and one by the police commissioner) who review the case and the majority vote decides the outcome of the case. There are several possible outcomes that the board can rule. These findings are divided into three categories (“Findings on the Merits,” “Other Findings,” and “Unable to Investigate”) and then further divided within those categories. “Findings on the Merits” is used when there is a complete investigation and a subsequent report and the board rules on whether the officer committed any misconduct. The data we retrieved from the CCRB data portal includes 164,081 citizen complaints against all sworn NYPD officers between 2000 and 2022. The data provides information on whether the officer was active since the last reported status, the current rank of officer, officer demographics (gender, race, and days on force as of incident), incident date, the precinct of the incident, the reason for police contact, complaint type (force, abuse of authority, offensive language, or discourtesy), allegation, victim demographics (gender and age), the outcome of encounter, allegation disposition, NYPD allegation disposition, officer penalty, and whether or not there is footage of the incident from a body-worn camera. Since the data was structured at the complaint level, instead of the incident level, we were able to consider each use of force complaint separately if multiple complaints stemmed from an incident. This is a more nuanced approach than just aggregating all complaints within one incident.

16  The Effect of Police Accountability Measures on the Repeat Use of Excessive…

329

This study only includes complaints (N = 88,262) against police officers who were reported active when the data is reported. In other words, all officers included were active in duty when the data was acquired from the official webpage. In this way, we excluded officers that were fired or left the force after their first citizen complaint. By doing this we can make a more accurate identification of their recidivism and calculate the time difference between the first and second use of force complaints. Otherwise, those who quit their job shortly after their first complaint would be identified as “not recidivated,” without knowing the date of their service and this would contaminate the data. We also only included complaints against police or patrol officers and sorted out complaints against detectives and sergeants from our study sample. We excluded ranking officers from the data since their duties and responsibilities significantly differ from police officers and including these ranking officers can bring noise to the data. We also filtered to look at incidents with complaint type “Force.” The types of force identified include the following: physical force, animal, chokehold, flashlight as club, gun as club, nightstick as club, radio as club, other blunt instrument as club, gun fired, gun pointed, handcuffs too tight, nonlethal restraining device, pepper spray, restricted breathing, vehicle, and other. To examine recidivism of use of force among police officers, we transformed the unit of data from incident level to police officer level.1 12,710 use of force complaints were against 6208 New York City police officers who were active when the data was retrieved on February 4, 2022. The data do not include police officers who quit their service at NYPD by the date of February 4, 2022. Otherwise, we would not be certain if there was a fair and sufficient period to observe and identify recidivism in these police officers. For similar reasons, we only examined police officers who received use of force complaints by February 4, 2019. So, we give at least a 3-year tracking period to monitor recidivism of use of force complaints. After all these data screenings, we had 4774 NYPD police officers who received use of force complaints and were still active in the department when the data was retrieved.

Research Variables We investigated two dependent variables. The first variable was a dichotomous variable which indicated whether a police officer recidivated, in other terms, received at least two use of force complaints. The second dependent variable was a continuous variable that identified the number of days between the first and the second use of force complaints against police officers who recidivated.

 The data is structured in a way that may include multiple complaints against one officer for the same incident. We observed that the officer with the most reported use of force incidents had 15 incidents in the given time period. 1

330

S. Cubukcu and O. Hom

One of the major independent variables was the investigation outcomes of citizen complaints.2 We grouped these categories into four major categories; substantiated, exonerated, unfounded, and dismissed. We aggregated the categories of “Unsubstantiated,” “Miscellaneous,” “Unable to Investigate,” “Alleged Victim Uncooperative,” “Complaint Withdrawn,” “Victim Unidentified,” and “Closed Pending Litigation” as “Dismissed” investigation outcomes.3 The second independent variable was the type of disciplinary action as an outcome of a substantiated complaint. In most cases of a complaint being substantiated, the CCRB would recommend discipline, but the CCRB’s Administrative Prosecution Unit will prosecute the case. A formal administrative trial is used to determine an officer’s consequences after a substantiated complaint and takes place before an administrative law judge and the Deputy Commissioner for Trials or an Assistant Deputy Commissioner of Trials. However, the Police Commissioner ultimately retains the authority to decide whether discipline should be imposed, the level of discipline, and the penalty (Civilian Complaint Review Board, n.d.). Possible disciplinary actions following a substantiated complaint include the following: sanctioned (charges and command discipline), instructions and formalized

 The details of the investigation outcomes are described below:

2

• Substantiated – there is sufficient evidence to believe the officer participated in misconduct; these cases “...are sent to the police department with a disciplinary recommendation.” Disciplinary action may include charges, command discipline, instructions, or formalized training. • Unfounded – there is sufficient evidence to believe the officer did not participate in misconduct. • Exonerated – “the event did occur but was not improper by a preponderance of evidence.” • “Other Findings” is used when the board decides there is not enough evidence to determine if the officer participated in the misconduct. The rulings within this category include the following: • Unsubstantiated  – “there is not enough evidence to determine whether or not misconduct occurred.” • Miscellaneous  – this usually means “...that the subject officer is no longer a member of the NYPD.” • “Unable to Investigate” means the cases are closed for the following reasons: Alleged Victim Unavailable – “...the complaint was filed without any contact information or with inaccurate information, and the investigator is unable to locate the complainant.” • Alleged Victim Uncooperative – “...the person does not respond to repeated attempts by the investigator to set up an interview or fails to show up for two scheduled interviews.” • Complaint Withdrawn – the complainant no longer wishes to move forward with the investigation; the person must voluntarily withdraw the complaint. • Victim Unidentified – “...there isn’t enough information to locate an alleged victim.” • Closed Pending Litigation  – “the complainant/victim and/or attorney representing the complainant/victim, does not want to proceed with the CCRB’s investigation because of (potential) pending litigation” (Civilian Complaint Review Board, n.d.). 3  There are a few cases where a police officer received more than one excessive use of force complaint for the same incident. Instead of omitting these complaints, we went over all the investigation outcomes for each specific complaint and identified whether or not there is at least one substantiated complaint from multiple complaints. If there are no substantiated complaints among them, we used the first available complaint outcome.

16  The Effect of Police Accountability Measures on the Repeat Use of Excessive…

331

training, and dismissed cases (no disciplinary action or training for substantiated complaints).4 We have excluded “pending” disciplinary actions from the data.

Research Findings In the analysis of 4774 NYPD police officers and their first complaints, there were 85 (1.7%) substantiated, 1476 (30.9%) exonerated, 392 (8.2%) unfounded, and 2821 unsubstantiated or dropped (59.1%) complaints. Among these police officers, 660 (13.8%) recidivated within a year, 1412 (29.8%) recidivated within 3 years, and 2079 (45.5%) of them recidivated during the span of the data period. We tested Hypothesis 1 by using a chi-square test (χ2 = 5.746 · df = 3 · Cramer’s V = 0.035 · p = 0.125), which suggested no discernable association between citizen complaint adjudication outcomes and the likelihood of future use of force complaint (Table 16.1). We also tested the effect of recidivism within a year and 3 years, and we still did not observe a statistically significant association between investigation outcomes and recidivism. For a robustness check, we ran the logistic regression analysis to analyze the likelihood of future complaints, no statistically significant relationship (Table 16.2). Table 16.1  Investigation outcomes and recidivism Investigation outcomes Dropped Exonerated Substantiated Unfounded Total

Recidivated No 162057.4% 79653.9% 4957.6% 23058.7% 269556.5%

Yes 120142.6% 68046.1% 3642.4% 16241.3% 207943.5%

Total 2821100% 1476100% 85100% 392100% 4774100%

χ2 = 5.746 · df = 3 · Cramer’s V = 0.035 · p = 0.125

 The details of the disciplinary outcomes are described below:

4

Charges – which begins an administrative prosecution in the NYPD Trial Room and may result in officer loss of vacation days, suspension, or termination; used for the most serious allegations (The study data do not include terminated police officers.) Command discipline – there are two types, Schedule A and Schedule B, and can result in officer loss of up to ten vacation days. Instructions or Formalized Training – “results in training at the command level (Instructions) or training at the Police Academy or NYPD Legal Bureau (Formalized Training)”; the least severe discipline. The decision of severity level of the discipline is mostly given based on the officer’s disciplinary history, CCRB history, performance evaluations, and the seriousness of the misconduct. All CCRB complaints and discipline are recorded in the officer’s personnel records (Civilian Complaint Review Board, n.d.).

332

S. Cubukcu and O. Hom

Table 16.2  Logit regression analysis of recidivism Investigation outcomes (Base: substantiated) (Intercept) Dropped Exonerated Unfounded Observations R2

Recidivism Odds ratios 0.73 1.01 1.16 0.96 4774 0.001

CI 0.47–1.13 0.65–1.57 0.75–1.82 0.60–1.55

p 0.160 0.968 0.504 0.862

investigation_outcomes

Unfounded

Substantiated

Exonerated

Dropped

0

2000

4000

6000

relapse_time_in_days

Fig. 16.1  Box plot for the adjudication outcome and relapse days

In our analysis of Hypothesis 2, we have focused only on police officers who received a subsequent use of force complaint and examine whether there was an association between investigation outcomes and the time until the next use of force complaint. Among 2079 recidivism incidents, the relapse time varied between 1 day and 6293 days, with an average of 984 days and a median of 640 days. The distribution of relapse days was positively skewed. The average relapse time after substantiated complaints (854  days) was lower than dropped (941  days), exonerated (1055 days), and unfounded (1038 days) complaints (Fig. 16.1). Similar to the visual test with the box plot, the ANOVA test suggested no discernible difference between the categories of investigation outcomes in terms of the relapse time until the subsequent use of force complaint (F value: 2.253, p-value = 0.0803). In a similar vein, the linear regression revealed no relationship between the investigation outcomes and the time period. Compared to the base

16  The Effect of Police Accountability Measures on the Repeat Use of Excessive…

333

category of substantiated complaints, no other investigation outcomes were found to be statistically and significantly related to the relapse time (Table 16.3). In the following, we have focused on how different disciplinary actions have affected police officers’ likelihood of recidivism (Hypothesis 3) and the time that elapses between a sustained complaint and any other subsequent complaint (Hypothesis 4). Among the 85 substantiated complaints, only 65 complaints have information in the data about the NYPD’s disciplinary actions against police officers. Among those, only 31 police officers received disciplinary actions (Command discipline A and B) including the forfeit of vacation days from 5 days to 30 days.5 As a result of substantiated complaints, 14 police officers received instructions or formalized training at the command level, the Police Academy, or NYPD Legal Bureau. Yet, 15 of the substantiated complaints were dismissed by the NYPD, and police officers did not receive any sanctions. The disciplinary action decisions for five police officers were still pending when the data was retrieved from the website. Since the decision was not yet available, these five cases were omitted from the study sample. Among 31 disciplined police officers, 16 (51%) of them recidivated (as illustrated in Table 16.4). Six (40%) police officers with dismissed disciplinary actions recidivated. And five (36%) police officers recidivated among 14 police officers who received training. There were proportionately fewer instances of recidivism among trained police officers, but with a small sample size of 60, the chi-squared test did not suggest a statistically significant difference between the disciplinary actions and the likelihood of recidivism (Cramer’s V = 0.145 · p = 0.533). Overall, Hypothesis 3 has not been supported. Among the police officers with substantiated complaints and subsequent recidivism, the average relapse time was 877 days with a median of 752 (see Fig. 16.2.). The average relapse period for trained police officers (1127 days) was longer than for disciplined officers (936  days) and those who did not receive any sanctions Table 16.3  OLS regression analysis of relapse times Relapse time in days Predictors (Base: substantiated) (Intercept) Dropped Exonerated Unfounded Observations R2/R2 adjusted

Estimates 853.67 87.23 201.10 184.25 2079 0.003/0.002

CI 527.79–1179.54 −243.49 – 417.96 −133.30 – 535.49 −176.02 – 544.52

p