Islam and modernism : the Iranian revolution of 1906 9781850431015, 1850431019

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Islam and Modernism The Iranian Revolution of 1906

VANESSA MARTIN

I.B.TAURIS & Co Ltd Publishers

London

To my family Published by

I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd

110 Gloucester Avenue

Primrose Hill London NW1 8JA

Copyright @ 1989 by Vanessa A. Martin All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Martin, Vanessa A., 1946slam and modernism; the Iranian revolution of 1906 1. Iran. Political events 1906-1980

1. Title

955.05 ISBN 1-85043-101_9 Printed and bound in Great Britain

Univ.-Bible Bamberg

FU 8227

Contents Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

viii

ix

Introduction 1 The Relationship between the 'Ulama and the State The 'Ulama in Qajar Iran and the Coming of the Revolution

2 3 4

Tabataba'i and the Campaign for Reform The 'Ulama and the Establishment of the National Consultative Assembly

5 Constitutionalism and the Law of Islam 6 Reform and Reaction: September 1907 to June 1908 Shaikh Fazlallah and the Absolutist Cause

11 35

65 87

113 139

165

Notes

201

A Note on the Sources

223

Bibliography

229

Glossary

237

Index

241

Acknowledgements My thanks for advice and support go first and foremost to Professor Malcolm Yapp, my former supervisor at the School of Oriental

and African Studies, for his invaluable guidance in the original

planning, research and writing of this work. Much would not have

emerged without the questions he raised, and a great deal of

improvement was due to the criticisms and suggestions he made. I

am also grateful for the advice of Dr Norman Calder, who has

given much time and assistance particularly on the subiect of the relations between religion and state. Dr John Gurney of Wadham College, Oxford, has been particularly helpful in suggesting source material and allowing time for me to use the excellent collection of Persian works at Wadham College. I am also grateful to Mrs Anne Enayat for advice and references on the mercantile background, as

well as for her most helpful comments and suggestions as an

editor.

I would like to thank many friends and acquaintances for lending books, sending photocopies of references and drawing my attention to particular points. I am most especially grateful to the

British Institute of Persian Studies, without whose financial assistance and interest my research could not have been started nor the book completed. My thanks are due also to the School of Oriental and African Studies whose award of an Exhibition enabled me to

carry on with my research, originally undertaken for a thesis. I

owe a great deal to the support and encouragement of my parents,

and of my husband, who has given considerable time to reading and checking the work.

Abbreviations Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs BSOASBulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies Cambridge University Library CUL ZDMG Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesell-

BMFA

schaft

Introduction The nineteenth century saw the beginnings of a process of change

in Iran which would transform the country from a traditional

feudal society into a modernized and centralized state. This move-

ment, the product of the impact of the West, accelerated in the

early part of the twentieth century. A significant point in the

process of change was reached during the Constitutional Revolu-

tion of 1906-9, which was the turning point where the old order was finally broken and the beginnings of the new one established.

In the old order Shiite Islam was secure as the ideology of the state and as the law according to which the shah ruled, and the 'ulama (who were its interpreters and proponents) enjoyed a posi-

tion of privilege and respect. The new order would bring uncertainties as to the place of Islam and the 'ulama in a modern state, most particularly by establishing the law of parliament alongside

the law of Islam, the sharia. It was during the Constitutional

Revolution that the problems facing Islam in the conflict between the old order and the new first became apparent.

1

This work is a study of the response of Islam and the 'ulama to the emergence of Western political ideology and the creation of West-

ern institutions during the Constitutional Revolution. The work looks at this response by considering the reaction of the 'ulama both as part of society as a whole and as an individual group. It also examines the sources of conflict between Islam in its political and legal context, and constitutionalism.

In examining the reaction of the 'ulama as part of society as a whole, their contacts with other groups are considered in detail with a view to understanding how far they affected the policies of

the 'ulama. During the course of the revolution the 'ulama

appeared to be a self-motivated and largely self-sufficient group,

the prime movers in the various opposition movements of which they formed part. In fact, being beholden for much of their funds

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

INTRODUCTION

to other groups, and therefore linked to them, the 'ulama were

This study is concerned with the ideological viewpoints produced

One important aspect of the response of the 'ulama as part of

in Tehran, a subject which falls into two parts: the reformist policies advocated by Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'; and the

subject to pressure from those who seemed to be their followers.

society was their role in organization, both on the constitutionalist and the absolutist side during the revolution. They were significant

in helping to organize demonstrations in the early opposition

movement in 1905-6, and for the establishment of an assembly. They played a part in the formation of political factions in the first assembly on the one hand, and in the creation of the absolutist campaign against the assembly on the other.

Aiming to understand the 'ulama as an individual group, an introductory chapter looks at the theoretical background of the basic relationship between the 'ulama and the state. It has been argued, chiefly by Hamid Algar, that the 'ulama regarded the

state as fundamentally illegitimate, and that they saw themselves as the only legitimate authority in the land. Yet during the revolution they did not apply this doctrine, and a study of the subject has indicated that, though in theory in the field of jurisprudence the

actual ruler had no legitimate authority, in practice a number of views were held on the matter. With regard to political practice, it has been asked how far the 'ulama had an interest in reform, or understood its implications. This study looks at the attitude of the ulama to the reforms of the Constitutional assembly in the light of their interests as an élite group in the traditional system. It also considers their response to

the movement towards centralization of government, accountability and institutional change, and how they were affected by these

developments. One important question is how far the response of the 'ulama to

anti-constitutionalist theories propounded by Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri. With regard to Tabatabai, effort has been made to determine the sources of his ideas; to learn what he understood from terms drawn from Western thought; and to define his exact goals,

particularly during the period 1905-6. The campaign against con-

stitutionalism was led by Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri, who based his arguments primarily upon fundamental points of Islamic law. This study attempts to examine the bases and validity of these arguments in defence of Islam, as well as the manner in which constitutionalists, both lay and clerical, attempted to refute them.

As the subject of this book is potentially very large, certain

delineations have been set on the main body of the study. Thus the ulama referred to are those of orthodox persuasion, most particu-

larly the mujahids, their leaders, who had the largest investment in the protection of the religious body. Many of those who participated in the revolution, though ostensibly ordinary mullas, were in fact heterodox in their views. This study is not concerned with

them as they were not committed to the same theoretical and

material goals as the orthodox 'ulama. The events under consideration mainly concern Tehran, though some reference is made to major events in other parts of the country involving the 'ulama and Islam. This choice has been necessary because of the diverse and decentralized nature of the body politic in Iran during this period. Following discussion of the 'ulama on the eve of the revolution and their role during the course of events, the main body of the study

Westernization and constitutionalism was united. They had a great deal in common as members of the religious body, yet during the

ends in the summer of 1909, as after that point the 'ulama and

examination has been made of these divisions, brought about by differing positions, by varying sources of income, by family connections, by links with other groups, and by profound ideological differences. It is notable that ideologically the 'ulama ostensibly divided into two groups, pro and anti-constitutionalist. It is neces-

to dominate the political arena. Finally some consideration has been given to the nature of the revolution itself: in particular, why it arose when it did, and how far the obiectives of those who participated were really constitutionalist, and how far regressive.

sary to consider why they adopted these positions, what they understood by them, and how far they adhered to them. Two

The Constitutional Revolution formed part of a process of change 2

course of the revolution they were often bitterly divided. An

centres were important with regard to ideology: Najaf and Tehran.

The arguments advanced by the 'ulama of Najaf have been covered by Hair in his work on the constitutionalist 'ulama there.?

Islam became much less significant. With the arrival of the revolutionary armies in the capital, new and more national forces came

which began in the early nineteenth century. This process com-

prised new institutional and ideological developments which arose

primarily as a result of the influence that Europe exerted upon

4

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

Iran, politically, economically and ideologically. The shah and his governments were aware of the weakness of Iran compared to Europe and inaugurated reforms in the fiscal system, the adminis-

tration and the army - which, however, made little progress. As

McDaniel has pointed out, such attempts to centralize the govern-

ment amounted in a traditional Islamic society to a policy that

might be called unconstitutional.' It brought the government into conflict with powerful interest groups, notably the landowners, the provincial authorities, the tribal leaders and the 'ulama. The movement towards reform had tentative beginnings in the

reign of Fath 'Ali Shah (1797-1834) when the crown prince,

"Abbas Mirza, began to reform the army. Other efforts at reform followed throughout the century but, without the support of a modern, centralizing bureaucracy, the army succumbed to inefficiency and the peculation of bureaucrats.* Amir Kabir, the chief minister between 1851 and 1853, tried to reform the legal system

by establishing loose control of the sharia courts, an attempt which brought him into conflict with the 'ulama. In the 1870s, Mirza Muhsin Khan, Sipah Salar, imposed similar measures with equal lack of success. In 1872, in an attempt to develop the country's resources, the Sipah Salar advised Nasir al-Din Shah

(1848-1896) to grant a concession to construct railwavs to a British

subject, Baron de Reuter; but he was defeated by a combination

of his personal enemies, and the 'ulama who were fearful of foreign penetration. A few years later the shah attempted further administrative reforms along the lines of the Ottoman Tanzimat,

but the measures were thwarted by the provincial authorities,

INTRODUCTION foreign presence from the 1880s led them to believe the shah was

failing in his duty to protect Iran, the land of Shi'ism. The West was a source of tension in another sense. During the latter part of the century Iran was increasingly penetrated by western political thought. From the middle of the nineteenth century various reformers, including Akhundzada, Majd al-Mulk, Mustashar al-Daula, Talibov and Mirza Malkum Khan, placed emphasis on the need for a proper code of laws to which government officials would be accountable. These reformers perceived that compared to Europe Iran was poor, backward and weak, and they attacked the mismanagement of the existing system with a view to creating greater prosperity and security. One of the first reformers, Fath 'Ali Akhundzada, translated works from English and French, and contrasted the benefits of constitutional and parliamentary rule with the traditional system in Iran. He was a

rational secularist, believing it was not possible to reconcile Islam with a modern state, as Islam was too authoritarian and intolerant, and therefore not compatible with freedom and equality. In 1870 Muhammad Khan Sinaki, Majd al-Mulk, a high-ranking

bureaucrat, published the Risala-yi majdiyya, one of the earliest works to give a sustained criticism of the government of Iran on the grounds of lack of proper laws. He laid part of the blame for

this at the door of the 'ulama for their failure to withstand oppression, and for their contradictory judgements. He was also critical of government officials for their arbitrary acts and for abuse of the law. The significance of the law was emphasized too in Yak kali-

including the 'ulama. S

ma, a work by Yusif Khan Mustashar al-Daula, published 1869-

but they made little or no distinction between the interests of Islam

European progress. He especially admired the French code of

The 'ulama perceived all these proposals as a threat to Islam,

and those of the 'ulama. The movement towards centralization threatened the independent power base of the religious body.

Attempts at law reform questioned by implication the functions of

the mutahid, the highest ranking of the 'ulama, and suggested government control of an important source of revenue. In the late

1880s, the shah, partly to replenish the treasury and partly to assist the development of the country, adopted a policy of selling concessions to foreigners. As Lambton has pointed out, to the 'ulama this

seemed to be encouraging foreign intervention, threatening the

Islamic basis of the state. Thus the centralizing policy taken up by the government in response to pressures from Europe exacerbated

relations between the 'ulama and the state, while an increased

70, in which the one word, law, was held to be the secret of

laws. He critized the existing Islamic law not in principle but in its mode of practice. His remedy was in effect a separation of religious and secular affairs in law, by which the sharia was to cover religious matters such as fasting and prayer, while law codes on the French model would regulate worldly affairs for all citizens. This would allow for equality before the law. Realizing such proposals might provoke religious opposition, Mustashar al-Daula tried to show, not very convincingly, that the law created by the people's representatives in their legislative assembly could be reconciled with Islamic law. He claimed such an assembly was justified on the basis of a hadith (Muslim tradition), urging consultation.

Another reformer, 'Abd al-Rahim Talibov, in Kitab-i Ahmad,

published in 1894, a book ostensibly written to instruct a young

6

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

boy on European advancement, emphasized European achievements in science, history and geography, as well as in rules of conduct, and contrasted these with the backwardness of Iran. He noted especially Iran's dependence on imports. Like other reformers he perceived that law was the key to progress and expressed a desire for the establishment of legislative and judicial institutions.

Probably the most prolific and influential of the reformers was Mirza Malkum Khan (1833-1908), originally an Armenian and

educated in Paris. He wrote many treatises during his career, some of which was spent in Istanbul at the time of the Ottoman reforms. For a few years in the 1850s and 1860s and again in the early 1870s

he was in Iran trying to persuade the shah and leading figures of

the government to undertake reform on European lines. In his earlier works in the 1860s, believing that constitutional monarchy

INTRODUCTION expansion, and the regeneration of Islam.? He is said to have acquired a number of disciples on a visit to Iran in 1890.

Ideas such as those of Malkum Khan changed the traditional

perception of the nature and duties of government, and influenced

a few of the 'ulama, among others. Certain of the 'ulama also responded to Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's pan-Islamic message which attempted to unite all Muslims with the call of Islam in

danger. But the secularizing tendency of Western thought and the

radical institutional changes it would engender were not necessarily apparent to those of the 'ulama who gave it their attention. Virtually none of them had any experience of Western-style government. Furthermore, the reformers couched their proposals in strictly orthodox terms in the hope of not offending the 'ulama and

and other European political institutions were not suitable for Iran, he placed emphasis on reform of the administration. He believed European states were strong because they had an effi-

involving them in the protest movement.& The penetration of Western ideas was still slight, which probably explains why the body of the 'ulama made little effort to support or refute them before the revolution. It is also doubtful whether those few who

the expansion of trade and prosperity. To this end he advocated proper regulations and procedures in the Iranian administration. He also strongly emphasized the need for legal improvements in the form of codes of law, which necessarily preceded all other

responded understood fully the practical implications of the refor-

cient administration which produced good order, in turn leading to

mers' ideas and in any case their number was small. In 1902 a member of the lesser 'ulama assessed that not 80 out of 2.000 students in the madrasas (theological schools) of Tehran were

advancement. By the 1890s at the end of his career, when he was

attuned to the country's problems. Since legal change was such a fundamental issue in the Iranian

advocating changes which were considerably more radical. In his newspaper Qanun (Law), published in London, he demanded the

reform movement it may be helpful to summarize the main features of the judicial system during the Qajar period. The administration of the law was carried out in two types of court, shar' and urf. In common with practice in most Muslim countries civil law was mainly dealt with by the shar' (religious law) courts, and

in exile and out of favour, Mirza Malkum Khan had moved to

limitation of the royal power by an assembly termed the majlis-i shaura-yi kabir-i milli (the Great National Consultative Assembly), to be composed of the leading members of society. This body

would draw up and implement laws to cover all spheres of government affairs. It would also review the budget and control taxation. Ministers, though appointed by the shah would be responsible to the assembly. Malkum Khan placed strong emphasis on law as the means to prevent tyranny and oppression and make government in

Iran more efficient. At the same time, with the aim of deploying the power and influence of the 'ulama on the side of his reform movement and against the existing state, Malkum Khan identified

reform with religion, intending also to make change seem more acceptable. He presented a flattering picture of the 'ulama as leaders of a future reform movement to establish an assembly.

Another influential reformer was Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-

Afghani, who advocated Islamic unity in the face of European

criminal cases by the state authorities in the 'urf or customary law

courts. Shar' cases could be tried by a mulla, and if they were

important they were referred to a mutahid. Such trials were often

informal in character and usually took place in the house of the mulla concerned. Similarly, there were no properly constituted secular courts of law. The 'urf law was administered by any official

of rank with power to enforce the execution of his judgement,

competence depending on that factor alone. In the villages, cases

were usually referred to a gathering of elders, and then tried

before the headman or local mulla. ' In a town they went before a

local magistrate or darugha, and serious criminal cases were put to

the governor of a town or province. Authority in urf legal matters

was delegated from the shah, who was the ultimate court of appeal.

8

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

The civil law dealt with by the shar' courts mainly covered personal law, such as marriage, divorce, wills and transfer of

INTRODUCTION

property. It was also concerned with religious rights and duties,

the 1850s courts of justice were set up to try civil cases but soon disappeared without trace. In 1858 and 1862 decrees were passed establishing a Ministry of Justice with provincial branches, thus

judgement the 'ulama were independent of, and in no way re-

introducing a new authority into the existing judicial system. Further attempts at improving the judicial system through the

and crimes against religion, such as heresy and sacrilege. In giving

sponsible to, the state authorities.

The 'urf law varied in different parts of the country, and it was unwritten since no law other than the sharia could be written. 12

Little attempt was made to refer to precedent, and decisions were promptly given and executed. The principal checks on government officials were dread of their superiors and the fact that trials were

held publicly.

Although criminal law cases were usually tried in the secular courts difficult cases were referred to the mutahids, who pro-

nounced sentence according to the sharia. In cases where execution was decided upon, proof of guilt was taken according to the sharia, and sent to the shah to obtain his mandate. With murder,

however, the law of retaliation often applied, and cases were

settled by compensation.

In civil law, especially in such matters as deeds and contracts, there was a certain amount of overlap between the shar'i and 'urf systems. There was no special ruling to determine which courts had the power to deal with matters of this kind, and the plaintiff might present his case wherever he felt it was most in his interests

to do so. The confusion led to rivalry between the shari and 'urf courts, the former arguing that the latter were not legitimate. The fact that the 'ulama could not execute their own decisions, whereas the state could, gave an advantage to the secular authorities. The

actual execution of the law in all cases was carried out by state officials called farrashes. Commercial cases and civil cases concerning matters such as

titles to property were frequently not referred to either the shar' or 'urf authorities, but decided by private arbitration. A gathering of merchants heard both sides of the case, and after inspecting the documents gave a decision in the nature of a compromise. 13 The verdict might be ratified by the seal of a muitahid. The commercial

law, like commercial organization, was rudimentary compared to that which backed European capitalists. There was no insurance,

or guarantee, and little hope of reclaiming lost property, with a consequent lack of confidence. I Merchants were also subiect to the arbitrary actions of powerful officials. The government made repeated attempts at judicial reform. In

Ministry of Justice were made under the Sipah Salar in the 1870s (see chapter 3). The duties of the ministry included the hearing of

cases in the Tehran region, and the execution of judgements

delivered by the 'ulama. It also had agents in every town to take note of the local administration of the law, but since they were

nearly always subservient to the local governor, they were

ineffective. I5 The ministry also dealt with matters of commercial law, and for this reason was initially combined with the Ministry of Commerce. In the 1890s the two were separated and commercial

law cases were referred to the Ministry of Commerce. After he returned from a iourney to Europe in 1889. Muzuffar al-Din Shah ordered that the law be codified, and translations of the Code Napoleon and the Indian Muslim Code were begun but never completed. 16 One of the main problems with these reforms was finding the personnel to carry them through. The chief obstacle, however, was the opposition of the powerful interest groups, especially the 'ulama and the provincial authorities. As a result, beyond the formation of the Ministry of Justice, judicial reform

made little progress. The secular authority was also weakened by the fact that the 'urf law was unwritten and that the sharia did not exist in a form that was accessible to laymen.

The Iranian failure in legal reform may be contrasted with the

work of the Ottomans over the same period, which, though imper-

fect, was much more advanced. The reforms included the Commercial Code of 1850, translated from the French; the Penal code

of 1858, again based on the French and abolishing most of the defined punishments of the sharia (hadd); the Code of Commer-

cial Procedure of 1861; and the Maritime Code of 1868. 17 Between 1869 and 1879 most shar'i precepts relating to civil matters were

codified in the Mejelle, enabling secular courts to ascertain that law. As a result, all civil jurisdiction, excepting that of personal status, came within the competence of the secular authorities. During the 1870s the Nizamiyya, a new system of secular courts, was established to apply these codes. Provision was also made for new municipal councils and a municipal code.

The lack of any written law outside the sharia, and the lack

even of administrative regulations, meant that government in Iran

10

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

was arbitrary and unsystematic. Many of the complaints of the

merchants, for example, related to arbitrary taxation and to

maladministration of the revenues. As Malcolm noted, the whole question of collecting the revenue was so closely connected with

the administration of justice that the two subjects cannot be

separated. I One of the themes of the Constitutional Revolution, that government be regulated by law, derives from the connection

between these two issues. It is also worth noting that the cry for

justice and law, so persistent among Iranian reformers, hardly occurs in the writings of their Ottoman counterparts - illustrating once again how much less developed the Iranian system was.

1 The Relationship between the 'Ulama and the State The basis of the relationship between religion and state differs in

Sunni and in Shiite Islam. In Sunni Islam the legitimacy of the ruler is accepted, provided he is Muslim. In Shiism the ruler has no legitimate status in the sharia - a point much stressed in some

recent studies of Qajar Iran. it is, however, dangerous to assume that a theory evolved for

the world of jurisprudence is necessarily the one that applied in practical politics. The evidence on the relationship of religion and state in the Qajar period is still incomplete, but there is much to indicate that there were not one but many views. Probably the most predominant of these in the practical sphere was that religion

and state must co-operate to protect Shiite Islam and its homeland, Iran. For this reason many 'ulama sought accommodation and partnership with the shah.

1Concerning the status of the ruler in Shi'ite jurisprudence and the manner in which it evolved, the initial divergence between Shi'ism

and Sunnism may first be noted. The Shi'ites, like the Sunnis, accepted the message and authority of the Prophet, but not the authority of the Companions. They believed that men could not

avoid sin unless they had an infallible leader to stand in the place of the Prophet and carry out all his functions except revelation. None of the Prophet's Companions were infallible except his sonin-law, Ali, whose place as the rightful successor to the Prophet was usurped. 'Ali was the first Imam, or infallible leader, and his descendants, who are likewise infallible, are the only legitimate

leaders of the Shi'ite community. There are twelve Imams in all,

11

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

'ULAMA AND THE STATE

including 'Ali, but the twelfth has gone into occultation - a conclusion reached by the Shiites in the tenth century. The reasons given for his occultation have been several, but the foremost is his fear of his enemies among men. At first the Imam was represented by a

hierarchical structure. Only Shaikh Murtaza Ansari (d. 1864), and

12

series of four deputies, each a na'ib-i khass or Specific Agent. After their passing, interpretation of the law remained with its custodians, the 'ulama. The 'ulama derive their authority from a delegation from the sixth Imam, Ja'far al-Sadig, and it is conferred

on them because of their knowledge of the Imami hadith (tradi. tions). The theory of the delegation (na'ib-i'amm), which evolved first in the tenth and eleventh centuries, appears to have referred only to judicial authority;' the executive functions of the Imam were considered lapsed (sagit). In the period between the eleventh and the sixteenth centuries the 'ulama assumed most of the execu-

tive duties of the Imam. These included gaza, control of the canonical taxes, (khums and zakat), and defensive jihad (holy war).? As a result of the delegation, the Shi'ite 'ulama are in a stronger theoretical position than the Sunnis.

The guidance of the community by the 'ulama is provided not only in answers to questions, but in the example of the highest ranking and most learned of their number, the mujtahids. They may act according to their own judgement, ijtihad. Other believers must imitate their example, and are called mugallid. The theory of

iftihad was first explicitly expressed in the work of Hasan in Yusif

ibn Mutahhar al-Hilli al-Allama (d.1325). He stated that it was

both permissible and incumbent for believers (muqallid) to act on the basis of the opinions of the muitahid 3

The muitahids owe their eminence to their knowledge of the roots of law, and it is this which entitles them to exercise ijtihad,

that is: "The searching for a correct opinion (ra'y-yi savab) particu-

larly in the deducing of the specific provisions of religious law

(furu*) from principles (usul) and ordinances (ahkam)'.* This provides the believer with the logical proof without which he may not

act. The obligation of the Imamis to follow the direction of a

muitahid is also based on the duty of loyalty and obedience to the

Hidden Imam, which is transferred to his representatives, the mujahids. Apart from his learning, the mujahid is an ordinary believer.§ The mujahid is known as a marja'-i taglid, an example to be imitated, and it is to him that the mugallid personally pays his contributions of the canonical taxes. From the nineteenth century there has, on occasion, been one marja-i taglid of all the Twelver Shi'ites; but on the whole the Shi'ite system resists such

13

Mirza Hasan Shirazi, from 1891 until his death in 1895, seem to

have held the position of sole marja'-i taglid of all the Twelver Shiites.

Of the mutahids, those in the shrine cities of Ottoman Irag held pre-eminence, while within Iran the mutahids of Tehran looked upon themselves as taking precedence over their colleagues in the

provinces. The mujtahids' duties included giving judgement in legal matters, executing wills, supervising endowments, giving advice on ritual observance, distributing the canonical taxes and teaching tullab (theological students). According to Sir John Malcolm, British emissary to Iran, they were meant to be protectors of the weak against the strong, exemplary in their conduct, and free of all connections with the shah or government officials." In Mal-

colm's time there were only about five muitahids in the whole country, but by 1890 Curzon reported that numbers were much less restricted. The mujtahid Aga Naiafi Ouchani, in his autobiography written at the turn of the century, complains of the ease with which certificates or ijazas were awarded so that people might

become mujtahids.? In Tehran, at the beginning of the century, about twelve 'ulama claimed the title of mujtahid, of whom three or four tended to be more prominent at any one time. In theory a mujahid was expected to combine exemplary character with great learning. In practice many mutahids inherited their positions; thus in Tehran, in the period of the Constitutional Revolution, the influential mujahids Sayyid 'Abdallah Bihbihani, Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i, Murtaza Ashtiyani, and Sadr al- * 'Ulama, all succeeded their fathers in office. I Nevertheless they had all undergone a course of study, for which most mujahids in Iran went to the shrine cities. I1 The life of Aga Najafi Quchani reveals the immense difficulties of attaining the rank of mutahid without pecuniary assistance or family connections.

In practice a mujtahid tended to specialize in some duties and not in others. This depended in some measure upon his place of residence. Isfahan and Mashhad were known as teaching centres, although the shrine cities were the real centres of learning. All the great mujtahids there held classes, and Aga Najaf Ouchani found

the teaching of Akhund Mulla Khurasani in Najaf of a much higher standard than the level he had experienced at Mashhad and

Torahshaikh Ethlamarialad is reported as giving regular cases. The others appear to have concentrated on legal and administrative duties, as well as a role of leadership in the community.

14

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

Ideally a mutahid attained religious leadership of his particular

city by exhibiting the necessary qualifications of learning and qualities of character. In practice prominence depended on a variety of factors. One of the most important was wealth, as shown

by the example of Aga Najafi, a prominent mujtahid of Isfahan, noted neither for his learning nor his character, but immensely rich. 14 Another factor was a devoted following. Thus when the

leading mutahid of Mashhad died in 1896, the battle for his position depended upon the number and character of the adhe-

rents of each protagonist, as well as on their influence. IS In Tehran rivalry among the 'ulama became entangled with political rivalries,

and much was to be gained from good contacts in the higher

bureaucracy. The rise to prominence of both Bihbihani and Shaikh Fazlallah was much assisted by their respective connections with

Amin al-Sultan and 'Ain al-Daula, both of whom became sadr-i a'zam (Chief Minister). In addition to following a local mujahid most Twelver Shiites appear also to have been mugallid to a mujahid in the shrine cities. Thus Hajj Mirza Husain Haji Mirza Khalil was the marja'-i taglid of Tehran and its districts. I Pilgrims to the shrine cities brought alms to the mujtahid they regarded as their religious leader. I This emergence at the turn of the century of influential marja'-i taqlid in the 'Atabat (Ottoman Iraq) was in large measure due to improvements in communications which enabled the canonical taxes, formerly expended locally, to be paid direct to them, 18

and money could be sent by telegram. 19

Although there was usually no overall leader of the Twelver

Shi'ites, precedence was given to the most aged of the learned mutahids, for which reason Hajj Mirza Husain, who was around ninety years old, was sometimes referred to as the most eminent muitahid at the time of the Constitutional Revolution.2 Hindsight has created a list of marja'-i taglid,21 but the lists drawn up at the beginning of the century by the British in reference to the Oudh bequest, and based on specific questioning of the mutahids of the

'ULAMA AND THE STATE

15

could remain isolated and discredited. In addition to being in

Tehran pishnamaz (prayer leader) of the main mosque, the Masd-i Shah, he received from the shah rich vag (religious endowments), such as the wealthy Madrasa-yi Khan Marvi. Like many

other offices the title of imam jum'a was usually held by one

family, the son of each incumbent being confirmed in his position

on his father's demise.? The imam jum'a's were similar to the

al-Bakri family in Egypt in holding an office confirmed by the state

for several generations. Their relationship with the state was, however, less systemized than that of the al-Bakri. Both had administrative control of rich government religious endowments, but in the case of the imam jum'a this appears to have been limited to the supervision of funds from specific endowments under his

jurisdiction, while registration at the Diwan al-Augaf in Cairo

depended on the recommendation of the al-Bakri25 No evidence

has yet emerged that the imam jum'a had such close links with the divan-i augaf (office in charge of religious endowments) in Tehran. One of the main roles of the imam jum'a was to act as a channel of

communication, and important government announcements on matters relating to the religion were made in the Masjid-i Shah.26

2

Fundamentally, the chain of authority in Shi'ite jurisprudence leads from the divine word to the Prophet and the Imams, and thence to the 'ulama. According to this chain the only legitimate ruler is the absent Imam, and there is no place within it for the temporal ruler. In practice, however, the executive powers of the 'ulama, as defined in their theory of jurisprudence, do not cover all aspects of government, and in particular do not deal with the

keeping of good order or the means of defending the country. Like

the Sunnis, the Imami 'ulama had to contend with powers which established themselves without the benefit of religious sanction.

'Atabat, do not reveal any one individual as leader.22 After the

Their response was largely passive, following a dictate of the sixth Imam not to engage in revolutionary activity.27 The major works

Muhammad Kazim Tabatabai Yazd were both considered the

of figh (jurisprudence) up to the sixteenth century studied by

death of Hajj Mirza Husain, Akhund Mulla Khurasani and

most respected.23

A mutahid who occupied a unique position in each city was the

imam juma, the official link between the government and the

*ulama. He was powerful as long as the government was strong, but in times of instability his prestige sank considerably and he

Calder discussed the principles of government service twice, once under a just and rightful sultan, and once under an unjust sultan. The just sultan can, almost certainly, only be the Imam. However,

a treatise by Sharif al-Murtada (d. 1044), studied by Madelung, appears to conclude that a ruler who recognizes the Imams and

applies their commands, that is the sharia, could be recognized as

16

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

'ULAMA AND THE STATE

17

just. While primary and inherent legitimacy belongs to the Imam, such a ruler, in Madelung's view, acquired a 'derivative, functional legitimacy and was entitled to the support of the community.28

tude to the ruler, however, remained ambivalent. He did not

Until the sixteenth century, the Shiites lived largely under

that the 'ulama owed much of their power and prestige to the

behalf of the Imam.? Thus the essentials of Shiite doctrine

very powerful, and his task also included the stamping out of heresy. Later it was largely confined to the administration of religious affairs, most notably vagf property. In the later Safavid period, as the state weakened, the mujtahids gained in power and

It may perhaps be understood that such a ruler would also be a Shi'ite.

Sunni government, and jurists on the whole took the view that it was permissible to take office as long as it was possible to implement Shi'ite law and to protect the Shi'ite community. They consi dered they were applying the law not on behalf of the ruler but on evolved largely under Sunni rulers and accorded them no legitimate status in Shiite law. The advent of the Safavid shahs in the early sixteenth century

posed new problems of authority for the 'ulama. Before the establishment of the Safavid empire there had been no extensive longlasting Twelver Shi'ite state. The Safavids claimed descent from the Imam Musa, as well as employing the title zill allah, Shadow of God, like Sunni rulers before them. They thus asserted their right to rule on two counts: the first on behalf of the Imams by descent;

and the second by direct appointment from God, a claim which required no further validation and disposed of all intermediaries. In the early Safavid period the 'ulama tolerated the shahs' view -

kharai and its disbursement among believers was lawful. His atti-

regard the government as legitimate, yet frankly acknowledged

support of Shiite kings. 33 The Safavids appointed an official known as the sad to control the religious classes.34 Under the early Safavids this official was

dominated in religious matters. The office of sadr was replaced by that of shaikh al-islam, and was filled by powerful theologians such

as Muhammad Baqhir Majlisi. The 'ulama also gained in wealth

and influence not only from holding state offices, but also from the acquisition of endowed land.

During the Safavid period there were a variety of opinions on the relationship of religion and state. The merchant and traveller Sir John Chardin reports that on the one hand there was the commonly held view that the shah drew his authority from God: 'That the King is God's representative and the Prophet's in guiding

although it contradicted their own prerogatives as representatives of the Imam - because the establishment of Shiism as the religion of the state enhanced both the faith and their own position. 30

the people; and that the Sad and all other clerics must not inter-

Furthermore, at that time they could do little to oppose the

held to be ministers of a tyrannical power founded only on force.36

power of the state. But the fundamental Imam theory remained unaffected by these aspirations and the religious claims of the Safavid shahs were hardly even mentioned and certainly not con-

doned by Safavid works of jurisprudence.31 Nevertheless the elevation of Shiism to the religion of the state brought major changes in its relationship with the temporal power. The security of the state was regarded as bound up with the right religion so that unorthodoxy was severely dealt with. The Shi'ite 'ulama participated in the organization of the state as they had not previously done, and many of them gave tacit support to the temporal power.

Modarressi has shown that under the Sunnis the Shiite 'ulama

were rarely given government grants, most of which came from the

land tax or kharaj. 32 Under the Safavids, however, the Shiites

received large sums as pensions and grants, so that kharaj became

a main source of livelihood. This led Shaikh *Ali al-Karaki, one of

the leading mujtahids, to argue in 1510 that the imposition of

fere in the government or politics. ›35 On the other hand he states

that the 'ulama and the pious believed the royal power to have been usurped. Officials of the urf courts were correspondingly

Chardin also reports an opinion that accords to the 'ulama a greater authority than the execution of their sharia duties. It was that during the occultation true authority belongs only to a muita-

hid - a man who possesses sanctity and knowledge beyond all others.37 Since the mujtahid would be a holy and peaceful man, there must be a king who carries the sword for the exercise of justice, but he would be like a minister to the mujahid. The last of the great Safavid mujahids, Muhammad Baghir Majlisi (d.1699), recognized the necessity of co-operation with the temporal power and admitted the interdependence of religion and

de facto government; he wrote:

Know that justice (adl) of kings and amirs is one of the greatest things conducive to the well-being of man. The justice and righteousness of kings and amirs is the cause of

the righteousness of all the people ... It is related by a reliable source that the Prophet said, There are two classes

18

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

(sinf) in my community such that if they are corrupt, my community will also be corrupt. 38

These two classes were the fugaha (jurists) and the umara'

(princes). Majlisi was not concerned with the right by which kings

arrive at their position, but he saw their authority as being validated by the performance of certain functions connected to the religion. Majlisi saw subjects and rulers as having mutual rights and duties. The subjects were to show the king respect, pray for his welfare, and not oppose his authority. Kings had corresponding duties: 'Know that kings who follow the true religion have many claims upon their subjects, whom they protect and whose enemies they repel, and whose religion, lives, wealth and honour are safe through the protection of kings.' From the phrase kings who follow the true religion' it would seem this theory applied to Shi'ite rulers. It would seem also that the foremost obligation of the ruler was protection.

By the late Safavid period, therefore, a number of different theories on the relation between the religion and state had emerged. There was a fundamental jurisprudential theory that the Imam is the only legitimate ruler and all others are unjust; there was the view that a king who exercised the sword in the

service of Shiism had a qualified authority as long as he recognized the superiority of the mujtahid, as reflected in Chardin; and there was Majlis's view that jurists and princes must combine in enforcing righteousness, and that the first duty of the ruler was to

defend the Imam faith. These last two views may have derived from strands of thought that always existed alongside the fun-

damental theory; or they may represent the response to the arrival

of a powerful Shi'ite state.

3An examination of the nineteenth century reveals a diversity of opinion among the 'ulama on the nature of their relations with the state, and among ordinary Shiites on the authority of the mustahids themselves. The position of the 'ulama vis-a-vis the Qajars was stronger than

it had been under the Safavids. Shiism, of which they regarded themselves as the legitimate custodians, had become the predominant religion of the land. Also many of their number, following the instability in Iran in the eighteenth century, resided in the

ULAMA AND THE STATE

19

shrine cities in Ottoman Iraq outside the control of the Iranian government. 39 The Qajars, like the Safavids, appointed official representatives of the 'ulama in the principal towns, the shaikh al-islam and the imam jum'a, but they never had the institutional control over the 'ulama exercised by the Safavids in such appointments as the sadr.48 In addition, the mutahids were strengthened by a reformulation of their role which had taken place in the eighteenth century. 41

This emerged as a result of a dispute between the Usuli and Akhbari branches of Imami Shi'ism over the functions of the. mutahid. The Akhbari school was founded by Muhammad Amin Astarabadi (d. 1626/7), and by the beginning of the eighteenth century dominated Shiite jurisprudence to the point where there

is no mention of important mutahids in the history of Shi'i law during the middle of the eighteenth century. The Akhbaris rejected the paramount role of the mujtahid as incompatible with the

authority of the Imam, and considered the use of independent judgement (itihad) reprehensible. They rejected the division of

the community into mugallid and muitahid in favour of the idea of all believers being followers of the Imam. They preferred to rely solely on guidance through the interpretations of traditiens reporting the judgement of the infallible Imams. Bayat has pointed out

that Akhbari doctrine represented a reaction to the power acquired by the muitahids.* De Gobineau mentions that Akhbari theory enabled the adoption under the title of the opinion of the Imams, of ideas that were not strictly orthodox, and that the theory had a following among lesser officials and the bourgeoisie. 43

The Akhbari theory was refuted by the Usulis, particularly Muhammad Baqir Bihbihani (1705-1803). The Usulis derived

their name from the four principles or usul used by the mujtahids in deducing the law,44 to which they gave precedence over the traditions, and thus a more significant role to the interpretations of

the mutahids. The doctrine produced a concept of orthodoxy centred on and expounded by the mujtahids.4S The principles of

jurisprudence laid down by Bihbihani and modified by Shaikh Murtaza Ansari (1801-1864) applied throughout the Qajar period. The position of the mutahids was strengthened not only against

the temporal power, but in the elimination of dissent. The authority of the mujtahid was not accepted by all ordinary

Twelver Shiites. The end of the eighteenth century and the begin-

ning of the nineteenth century saw a resurgence of Sufism. The Ni matallahi order in particular gained a large following in Ker-

20

ISLAM AND MODERNISM man. Since a Sufi looks to the head of his order as the example to be emulated, possessed of the esoteric knowledge of the

Imams, this represented a challenge to the authority of the muita-

hids. According to Ma'sum 'Ali Shah, one of the masters of the

Ni matallahi in the late eighteenth century, the shari' a represented

only the outward path of the Imams, while the inner divine truths were found in Sufism. 46 Ma'sum "Ali Shah also questioned the validity of the fatvas of the mujtahids because of their frequent contradictions, and claimed that Islam, being perfect, stood in no

need of the 'ulama. Another master, Nur 'Ali Shah, considered

that the power of the leader of the order was greater than that of any ruler 47 The influence of the Ni matallahis seems to have reached the highest in the land. The 'ulama of Gilan complained to the shah in the early nineteenth century that the governor there and his chief

official had adopted the Nimatallahi cause, and that the sharia was being undermined.* Fath 'Ali Shah was not personally antipathetic to Sufism, but the 'ulama nevertheless persuaded him to suppress the movement, as Malcolm explained:

They have always succeeded in convincing his judgement

that the established religion was necessary to the support of the state, and that nothing could be more dangerous than the

progress of a spirit of infidelity, which, by unsettling men's

minds, was calculated to throw them into a state of doubt and ferment. 49 The persecution of the Ni matallahis provides an interesting example of the collaboration of 'ulama and the state and the manner in which they understood their interests to be intertwined. It also has implications for the position of the 'ulama on the legitimacy of the shah to be discussed shortly.

A few of the Ni matallahis found refuge in the court of the

crown prince 'Abbas Mirza, and one of their disciples, Haji Mirza

Agasi, won ascendancy over the mind of Muhammad Shah (183448). Indeed the shah seems to have looked upon him as his qutb (i.e. master), considering him 'the pole of the firmament of shar-

¡at and tarigar' and 'the source of revelation and excellence. "S® This would be consonant with the view that the authority of the ruler is second to that of the master, but Haji Mirza Agasi does not seem to have pressed the point. In a letter to the shah he refers to him as padishah-i islam panah ki vali-yi am allah ast (padishah protector of Islam who is the guardian of the command of God)S!

'ULAMA AND THE STATE

21

which, although not very clear, seems to be close to the idea of the

shah as the Shadow of God, and does not seem to denote any particular Sufi idea of kingship. Algar has maintained that the

shah's open profession of Sufism endangered the standing of the 'ulama, but as he afterwards admits, the shah's beliefs were prob-

ably no more than a mild irritant to them.S? This was probably

because Sufism as a popular force had ceased to be a serious threat

to their own authority. Moreover Muhammad Shah was a pious ruler who ordered his court to attend the mosque every Friday.$3 Haji Mirza Aqasi himself encouraged the 'ulama of the provinces

to come to Tehran so that it might develop into a centre of learning. S4 His chief enemies were not the 'ulama but other politi-

cians, and it was they who brought about his downfall. In the early part of the nineteenth century a further challenge to

the authority of the mutahids emerged from Shaikhism. The

founder of this sect, Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i (1753-1826) insisted

that the source of all his knowledge was the Imams themselves. 55

He believed that knowledge was acquired through a visionary perception of the divine, which he held much superior to the mujtahid's use of discursive reasoning. He also rejected the mujtahid's judgement as humanly fallible and denounced taglid (imitation of a mujtahid by an ordinary believer). Ahsa'i propounded the doctrine of the 'Perfect Shi'a': rare beings, specially guided by the Imam to act as authoritative examples for the faithful. Any neces-

sary change in the Holy Law comes from the Imam through the perfect Shia. Indeed the Shaikhis accorded more authority to the

Imams than the orthodox,56 using direct inspiration from them to form a chain or authority that by-passed the mujtahids.

Three leading 'ulama passed the takfir (excommunication)

against Shaikh Ahsa'i, and the Shaikhis were forced to moderate

their opinions, at least outwardly, particularly after the rise of

Babism (see below). However they remained active and Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1896-1907) was said to have Shaikhi proclivities as a young man.$? It is possible that some of those active in the cause of

reform in 1905 in Tehran were Shaikhis. One of the members of a

secret society organized by the reformist 'alim, Nazim al-Islam Kirmani, cited Shaikh Ahsa'i and other Shaikhi writers as authorities in a speech at one of the meetings, which was accepted without comment by the others present 58

The most dangerous heterodoxy to emerge in the nineteenth century was Babism, which arose from the claim of Savvid *Ali Muhammad in 1843 to be the Bab, or Gateway to the Hidden

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

'ULAMA AND THE STATE

Imam.S? The Bab issued laws and regulations like a prophet in a book called the Bayan, the decrees of which purported to explain

Malcolm explains that the sword had a particular significance as it was 'consecrated at the tomb of the holy founder of the Suffavean family; and he became, by the act, pledged to employ the sacred weapon in defense and support of the Shiah faith. '65 The shah's rule was thus based on power, but at the same time the coronation

22

the essence of the divine word. The Bab was regarded as the head

of the faith and the temporal sovereign of the world. Certain Muslim tenets were no longer held obligatory, such as formal prayer, fasting in Ramazan, and the avoidance of certain foods.

Babism appealed to all classes and seems to have meant different things in different regions. In Mazandaran in 1850 the downfall of the Qajar dynasty was decreed, and was linked to the number of Qajar princes and the money needed to support them. 'Ulama and government combined to suppress Babism in a vigorous campaign.

The followers of the Bab divided into two, Azalis and Baha'is, of which the former were to be very active in the agitation leading to

the Constitutional Revolution. One prominent preacher and member of the Qajar family, Shaikh al-Ra'is, was reportedly a Baha'i, but otherwise the Baha'is followed a quietist policy.§

The persecution of the Sufis and Babis highlights the interdependence of religion and state, for if right religion helped guarantee political stability, it also needed the coercive power of

the state to enforce it. A persistent complaint of the 'ulama against the state in the latter part of the nineteenth century was that the government was not sufficiently diligent in suppressing heterodoxy, particularly Babism. The 'ulama also did not have the means to protect the country and Shi'ism against foreign invasion,

nor at this stage the inclination to assume such a responsibility. The practical alternatives to a Shiite ruler were possibly Sunni rule, more likely anarchy, or even worse, infidel domination.

In the nineteenth century the 'ulama were not only stronger

vis-a-vis the temporal power because of the reformulation of the

role of the mutahid, but also because, unlike the Safavids, the Qajar dynasty, which established itself in 1785, did not claim legitimacy by right of descent from the Imams. The true basis of Qajar rule was power, as illustrated by the coronation ceremonies

of the Qajar shahs, in which the 'ulama played little part. Aga

Muhammad Qajar (1785-1797), the founder of the dynasty, was considered eligible to assume the title of shah when he had conquered most of the lands ruled by previous shahs. At the cere-

mony, 'he put on the royal regalia at the request of his well.

wishers, being the assembled princes (umara) and learned men (fuzala). According to another account he put on the sword of the conqueror and mounted the jewelled throne, and promised to rule 'in the manner of former kings and custom of past sultans'. 64

23

emphasized the Shi'ite character of the new dynasty, and the function of the shah as defender of the faith. The coronation of subsequent ajar shahs followed a similar pattern. Fath 'Ali Shah also donned the royal regalia, and in addition promised to rule justly.* Muhammad Shah (1834-48) and Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-96) were similarly confirmed in office

by the recognition of the powerful.®? Muzaffar al-Din Shah

mounted the throne in the presence of all the dignitaries of the state. The role of the 'ulama had grown a little more prominent as the Kayani crown, now recognised as the rightful crown of Iran, was placed upon the shah's head by the imam juma. 68 At Muham-

mad 'Ali Shah's coronation the mutahids sat while everyone else stood. When the shah ascended the throne they rose, and in the name of God hailed him as shah. He, however, placed the crown on his head himself. 69

The ajar coronation ceremonies were therefore based on the crown as the symbol of power, and the recognition of the power-

ful, including the 'ulama as notables. In 1908 Muhammad 'Ali

Shah stated quite plainly that his ancestors had conquered Iran by

the sword and he intended to keep it by the sword.? The cere-

monial at court, at least in the early Qajar period, was also deliber-

ately intended to enhance the power of the shah. As Malcolm commented:

The nature of absolute power requires that it should be

supported by a continued revival of the impression of its high

and almost sacred character. Many of the usages of Persia are calculated to produce this object: Everything connected with the royal name or authority is treated with respect that is increased by the form which attends it 71

The later shahs also used descent to stress their right to rule in such

titles as al-sultan bin al-sultan. Nevertheless, the Qajars recognized the need for a legitimizing

doctrine for their authority, and, like the Safavids before them, they claimed to be the Shadow of God upon earth, zill allah. In so doing they were asserting that they derived their authority directly from God, by-passing any intermediaries including the Imams. As

24

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

Fath 'Ali Shah (1797-1834) expressed it, God 'gave glory and adornment to our princely person of blessed attributes through the

'ULAMA AND THE STATE

25 of the shah's authority and the 'ulama's co-operation with him. The problem was how to give the shah such authority without

sultanate, and the caliphate and the rulership of the world. 72 Nasir al-Din Shah claimed: 'We consider the ru aya (subjects) to be a trust given on the part of the Almighty and the means by which we hold our sovereignty." Such a claim had no validity

weakening the fundamental juristic theory. There thus developed a number of what might be termed accommodatory theories which

according to the fundamental Imami doctrine whereby all authority must derive from the Imams. The idea of an all-powerful shah, with his authority bestowed by God, was not acceptable to most of the 'ulama. Probably for this reason the Qajars did not insist on

traditional context of figh, and study it within new parameters. One such theory is propounded in the Irshadnama addressed to Fath 'Ali Shah by Mirza Abu'l Qasim Qummi (d. 1815-16), one of the leading 'ulama of his day. Mirza Qummi addresses the shah as Shadow of God but gives careful qualification to the term. 77 He avoids any implication of divine power and attributes, and discusses it instead in the sense of exemplary emulation. Thus the shah has a duty to be just and to set a high moral example, recalling the

the title zill allah.

If some 'ulama viewed the shah from the fundamental de jure position that he was a usurper, and that the state was not legitimate, others appear to have had a more ambivalent attitude. Shaikh Murtaza Ansari, the leading Shi'ite jurist of the nineteenth century, showed a marked reluctance to comment on political affairs, even on such a matter as Babi doctrines on which he declared himself inadequately informed.? His method of deduction of principles from the sources of law was so stringent and meticulous that he would refrain from issuing injunctions in areas

which required a latitude in interpretation. 75 Ariomand has

pointed out that Ansari even questioned the vice-regency of the 'ulama as jurists because it could not be firmly deduced from the sources. With regard to the 'ulama in general, Calder has shown that the potential opposition in the idea of na'ib-i 'amm was rarely stressed. 76 He has indicated how, within the works of jurispru-

dence themselves, some kind of modus vivendi with the temporal power was recommended. Thus, for example, it was considered

permissible to work for a usurper if he be relatively just, or to

accept the proceeds of taxes collected by the officials of the 'un-

just ruler. Such notions continue to assume, however, that the ruler is fundamentally unjust.

While some ulama no doubt adhered literally to the fun-

damental juristic theory, others recognized that in this imperfect world there must be a distinction between what is ideal and what is

practical. For the nineteenth century certain treatises have come to light which suggest that many, if not most, of the 'ulama did not carry the fundamental juristic theory into practice. Realizing the advantages of being ruled by a Shi'ite power, they sought, in different ways, accommodation with the state. But the de facto power of the shah, and the de facto recognition of it by the 'ulama, was not enough. A need was evident for some theoretical recognition

helped gain acceptance for the rule of the shah. Most of these attempted to take the problem out of the restraints imposed by the

attributes of the creator. In enjoining the shah to protect his

subjects and care for the needs of the weak, Mirza Qummi says this duty is incumbent on him because God has placed this duty upon him. He adds that God has created all men equal but made

one his deputy (janishin) with special responsibilities. Thus

according to Mirza Qummi the shah's authority derives from God: 'The principle (as) of kingship is derived from the decree (tagdir)

of God.' But it does not follow that every action committed by a king was made necessary by divine decree. Kings would be rewarded and punished in the next world for the manner in which they carried out their responsibilities. Mirza Qummi's theory is interesting in that he sees rulers as having duties in the performance of which they also have Godgiven authority. They do not act as agents or intermediaries, even of the Prophet or the Imams. The argument seems to be that the possession of power itself confers certain God-given responsibilities. One of the king's primary purposes is to protect the world of men, while the purpose of the 'ulama, according to Mirza Qummi,

is to guard the religion from all forces that might weaken it.

Oummi seems to see a division of authority between the ruler and

the 'ulama. Likewise, the carrying out of duties, particularly the function of protection, is an important part of kingship.

If Mirza Qummi found validity for the shah's rule outside the shari' a chain of authority, Shaikh Ja'far Najaf (d. 1821) found a place for him within it, albeit with a strictly limited and probably temporary role." When the Russians threatened Iran in the early nineteenth century, 'Abbas Mirza approached the 'ulama for fatvas (legal rulings) sanctioning a jihad. The mujtahids responded by

26

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

making explicit their claim to be collectively the Deputy of the Imam, na'ib-i 'amm-i imam, and declared Fath 'Ali Shah their Special Agent, na'ib khass. The argument as stated by Shaikh Ja'far was that offensive jhad could only be instigated by the Imam, but defensive jihad was the responsibility of the mutahids in the absence of the Imam. If they were not present they could appoint another to lead the jihad and whoever disobeyed him,

disobeyed them, and therefore the Imam, the Prophet and God himself."" As a mujtahid, Shaikh Ja*far gave permission to Fath "Ali Shah to take such measures as were necessary, including the collection of

land tax, and the canonical tax, zakat, to repel the infidel.

The fatvas issued by the 'ulama were collected in a volume entitled

Risala-yi jhadiyya. A treatise on the Risala by Abu'l Qasim, the second Qa'im Maqam, son of the famous minister of that title who served the valiahd (the heir to the throne), 'Abbas Mirza, explains that it was put together by order of Fath 'Ali Shah so that at a time of infidel threat the opinions on the subject might be easily available for reference. The treatise acknowledges that the approval of the 'ula-

ma for jihad is essential. A sign has been revealed to the most learned 'ulama that the

blessed person of His Majesty should in this time that the

Imam is absent act as the Special Agent of the General

Agency, and in order that the commands of the government

should carry the utmost weight, he should take over the sword of jihad of the Imams.* Qa'im Magam emphasizes that the shah's functions in the service

of Islam are to act as the keeper of good order and the keeper of the religion in addition to his being the pillar of the kingdom and the shahanshah of the world. The concept of the shah as na'ib-i khass-i na'ib-i 'amm does not appear to have been pursued by either side. The mujahids gave the shah only temporary validity to act as leader in a particular jihad, and to the shah there was little advantage in seeking perma-

nent recognition of such a subordinate role. An important treatise on the relations between religion and the

'ULAMA AND THE STATE

27

power, pass to two groups who act as his deputies, the 'ulama and

the rulers: The muitahids and the rulers both hold the same office, which office is that of the Imamate, transferred to them from the Imam through the Viceregency (niyabat) and consisting of two pillars (ruk) knowledge of Prophetic matters which is

called religion; and the implementation of the same in the course of imposing order on the world, called kingship or sovereignty.*2

Both these are found in the Imam, and should coexist in his

Deputy, but the 'ulama, because of the opposition of rulers, have abandoned sovereignty and the power of the sword, and rulers

have yielded to the 'ulama understanding and interpretation in matters of religion. It is in the interests of both to maintain this consensus, for when it breaks down the 'ulama suffer from the stagnation caused by disorder, and the ruler is left with mere power. Then both groups fail to discharge their office. Using a

tradition derived from the Imam 'Ali, Kashfi asserts that the

'ulama and the rulers are each a 'Special Deputy' (naib-i khass) of the Imam, the one in the matters of knowledge ('ilm) and the other in the matter of the sword. One of the conditions of kingly rule and for the 'Special Deputyship' is justice. This theory provided religious legitimization for the ruler only in the sphere of his own functions, and was not intended to confer any religious authority upon him. Certain elements in the theory,

including the division in functions and the duty of the ruler to impose order, have been noted in earlier writers, Majlisi and

Qummi. They also stressed justice although they did not make it g precondition of office. In the earlier theories, however, the shah's

authority to carry out his duties came from God, whereas Kashfi introduced the idea that it derived from the Imam. The shahs do

not, however, seem to have taken up the idea that they were Special Deputies of the Imam, claiming, as mentioned above, that

state by Sayyid Ja'far ibn Abi Ishaq Kashfi (d. 1850), entitled

they derived their authority from God. Enough is not yet known about the views of the 'ulama in Qajar times to say how far this

far known for a division in the spheres of authority of the 'ulama and the shah. During the occultation of the Imam the two main functions of the Imamate, religious leadership and the wielding of

The idea of a separation of powers was put forward by Mulla "Ali Kani in a letter to Nasir al-Din Shah in 1873. In it he denies an accusation by the shah that the 'ulama are overstepping their

Tuhfat al-muluk, seems to argue more clearly than anyone else so

theory found acceptance among them.

authority.*3 He asserts the Imam's function of wordly rule (salta-

28

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

nat) and knowledge ('ilm) have become divided in the occultation.

During that time God appointed a na'ib for each of the Imam's functions - the 'ulama to fulfil the duties relating to knowledge, and the shah those relating to law and order and protection of the subjects. Kani differs from Kashfi in saying that the ruler derived his authority from God and not from the Imam -a more nebulous, and therefore less dangerous, justification of the royal power.

The mutual dependence of religion and state, and their close

relationship were stressed by Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri (c. 1840-1909).

In Sual va javab, first published sometime before 1892 and purporting to repeat the views of Mirza Hasan Shirazi, who led the opposition to the Tobacco Concession in 1891, Shaikh Fazlallah takes up the topic of seditious ideas, and the duty of defending the

faith against them:

'ULAMA AND THE STATE

29 Due to a series of accidents, these two principles, that is the application of the religious precepts and the wielding of power, became separated: In truth these two are supplementary and complementary to

each other, and the foundation of Islam depends on them.

Without these two Islamic precepts (ahkam-i islamiyya), that

is deputyship in the affairs of prophecy (nivabat dar umur-i

nabaviyya) and wordly rule (saltanat), the religion would collapse. Shaikh Fazlallah then defines the nature of wordly power:

Worldly rule (saltanat) is the authority to execute the com.

mands of Islam, on which justice depends. And in Islam promises and threats such as applying the prescribed penal-

During the periods when the government (daulat) and (the leadership of) the community (millat) was fixed in one per-

ties (igamat-i hudud) are both the work of the executive, although warning is more its concern.

part of the affairs of the community (umur-i 'amma) was in

He goes on to say that anyone desiring justice must support the two groups which sustain the religion, that is the 'ulama and the sultans.

son, as in the time of the Prophet, the duty of regulating this

the charge of that person. Now, through the exigencies of the divine ordinances, each of these duties is in separate hands,

so it is the responsibility of each, with the assistance of the

other, to guard and preserve the religion and the world of worshippers (din va dunya-yi 'ubbad) so that the roots of Islam may be protected in the absence of the Imam. 84

He goes on to say that if one of the responsible entities, the government, is slow to act, the other, the community (millat),

must encourage, intimidate and threaten it until it does so. By the community it is probable that Shaikh Fazlallah meant their lead. ers, the 'ulama. The theory in effect propounds an active role for the 'ulama in the political sphere, when necessary, while recognizing the authority of the shah. The main point of friction was likely to be whether the shah considered matters had reached the point

where they might interfere, or not. In a farva issued in 1908 in support of Muhammad 'Ali Shah, Shaikh Fazlallah again took up and elucidated further the question

of the division of the authority of the Prophet:

Prophecy (nubuvvat) and wordly rule (saltanat) differed in the earlier prophets. Sometimes they were united and some. times separate. But the truth of the matter was otherwise in the blessed existence of the most great messenger and Seal of the Prophets and his successors 85

Shaikh Fazlallah does not seem to have followed Kashfi in

claiming that the shah was a Special Deputy, nor does he state that

the shah derived his authority from God. Indeed he seems not to have concerned himself with the justification or lack of it whereby the ruler arrives at his position. The sultanate conferred a responsibility on its holder, to execute the commands of Islam, for which the ruler was presumably answerable to God. And because of this

responsibility the people are bound to obey him. Like Majlisi,

Shaikh Fazlallah recognized the need for coercive power to sustain the religion, and believed that the justice and righteousness of the

community depended not only on the 'ulama, but also on the powerful - the sultan and the umara'. He follows Mailisi, Oummi

and Kashfi in seeing a division in functions between the ruler and the 'ulama, the primary duty of the former being to keep order. Another 'alim who upheld the authority of the actual government and one who did not agree that all rulers were usurpers was

Muhammad Rafi 'i Tabataba', Nizam al-Islam Tabrizi. In his

treatise Huquq-i duval va milal (The rights of governments and

peoples) written in 1887. he discussed the question of not helping a

ruler who is a usurper, and a pretender to the Imamate. He said that governors who are rightful (ahl al-hagg) and whose intentions are good are not included in the precepts on the governors being

30

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

'ULAMA AND THE STATE

usurpers, and it was therefore obligatory to obey them. But he also concluded that the sultan must in any case be obeyed:

The Prophet himself said, 'Obedience to the sultan is obliga-

nineteenth century, before western ideas made a major impact, there appears to have been an approximate consensus on the practical relations between religion and state. This consensus is

tory, and whoever disobeys the sultan, disobeys God

reflected in the correspondence, rescripts and other documents of

...For power is necessary to protect the country and its people. This cannot be done except by a government. For this reason they must not delay in paying their taxes and

other dues for the well-being of the country, and the order, peace, and progress of society depend upon the pavment of

taxes (maliyat). And their payment is an act of devotion (ta'at). 86

In this way a member of the Shi'ite ulama reaches the same

conclusion as the Sunnis on the necessity for coercive power and unquestioning obedience to it, though unlike the Sunnis he does

not accord it legitimacy. Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i (1841-1918) believed that the traditional svstem of government was not adequate either for defending Se imam fine suits but since he was absent and no

one knew when he would return, Tabatabai, like others before him, was forced to consider what form of government was best for the temporal polity in default of the ideal. He was one of the first mujtahids to turn to western political thought for a solution.

He said that in order to understand the true meaning of saltanat it was necessary to study the new sciences 'ulum-i jadid. Influenced by ideas on constitutional government, he gave to saltanat a meaning closer to sovereignty than to temporal power. The shah, in his

view, was appointed by the people on condition he keep good

order and protect the country. If he failed the people would remove him and appoint someone else in his place 88

Similar ideas were put forward by Muhammad Husain Na'ini

(1860-1936). who also stated that the ideal government was that of the Imam. Of the alternatives he argued in favour of constitutional

government. He defined tyrannical rule as consisting of three kinds of injustices: injustice to God; injustice to the Imam; and injustice to the people. Constitutional rule consisted of only one kind of injustice, that which applied to the Imam 89 Thus if all government was illegitimate in the absence of the Imam, constitutionalism provided the least reprehensible alternative.

None of these theories were accepted by all the 'ulama, or had

the complete agreement of the state. But, by the end of the

31

the time. The well-being of the general community ('amma-vi millat), government (daulat), monarchy (saltanat), and country (mamlikat) were seen as interconnected. The role of the shah in ensuring this well-being is reflected in the title most frequently used for him, Protector of Islam. Thus Mirza Hasan Ashtivani addressed the shah in a letter in 1891 as shahanshah-i islamiyan panah, Shahanshah Protector of Muslims."" His contemporary in Najaf, Mirza Hasan Shirazi, referred to the shah as shahanshah-i islam panah." In a letter from various 'ulama to the shah in 1906 he is called pasban-i millat va hami-yi shariat, the Guardian of the

Community and the Protector of the sharia. 2 Shaikh Fazlallah

Nuri, writing to a colleague in the 'Atabat, calls him shahanshah-i din panah. The shah was occasionally also referred to as sultan-i islam."3 Correspondingly Iran is called mamalik-i mahrusa-yi iran,

the protected lands of Iran." Ashtivani defined the functions of the shah in his letter as: Protector of the true religion and guardian of the law of the Prophet, the foundation of the government . .. The estab-

lishment of his government and the strength of his authority perpetuates the safety and security which are the greatest

benefit from God 95

Nasir al-Din Shah put the point more bluntly: Without the state (daulat) your wives and children would be seized by Russian cossacks, Ottoman soldiery, the British army, or Afghans and wolves. 96

Elsewhere the shah is referred to as the executor of the sharia.

the protector of the religion and the preventor of sedition 97

Muzaffar al-Din Shah likewise regarded his function as primarily one of protection: God has entrusted the protection of the kingdom of Persia to us- it is also necessary for us, while making it our

duty to look after the kingdom and protect the subjects, to be

constantly careful 9 The shah referred to the 'ulama as the 'well. wishers of the government and the leaders of the community y Ashtivani called them 'the leaders of the religion and the commun-

itv' rosa-vi din va millat. I They also acted as intermediaries with the 'mardum-i 'avam', the ordinary people. The view of the division of function between the 'ulama and the

32

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

shah already noted in 'ulama theories found an echo in the opinion

of the state. Zill al-Sultan, Nasir al-Din Shah's eldest son, wrote:

'There are two sorts of influence, one of which is moral such as the Prophet enjoys, and the other consists in the possession of mater.

ial force. I It was recommended that the shah and the 'ulama

must co-operate for the good of Islam. Thus some of the 'ulama wrote in 1908 to Muhammad 'Ali Shah: 'By the firm order of the creator of the world, the protection of the foundations of Islam

throughout the centuries is in the trust of the Sultan of the age and

the exalted 'ulama.' In 1911 the 'ulama of Najaf wrote to Nasir al-Mulk, the regent, that the independence and prosperity of the

religion and the land were due to the efforts of past 'ulama and sultans. The present 'ulama and great men of the land must again unite to protect the country and ensure its progress. 102

Ashtiyani explained to Nasir al-Din Shah that when he saw a

matter was contrary to the good of the government and the com-

munity, and would weaken the country and the sultanate, he

would contest it. What destroyed the independence of the sultan-

ate would also demolish the foundations of the religion. The

problem was that shah and 'ulama did not always agree on what was good for the community and when the religion was in danger. Thus the 'ulama sometimes interfered in affairs where the shah felt they had no right. On the other hand, the 'ulama were on occasion critical of the shah, not because they regarded him as illegitimate

but because he was not performing his duties to the Shi'ite community to their satisfaction. On the whole, however, the rulers and most of the 'ulama seem to have agreed on certain points. One of these was that they had separate functions, the 'ulama being responsible for matters of religion and interpretation of the sharia, the shah for the protection of the community and the keeping of good order. The shah was also expected to uphold the Imami sharia and, in so far as he did, was not treated as illegitimate or unjust. His right to unquestioned authority and to obedience rested on the satisfactory performance of these functions. The mutual enemies of both shah and

'ulama were the seditious within and aggressors without. The vexed questions of whether or not the shah held a legitimate position according to Shiite jurisprudence, whether he was a 'just

sultan' and whether he was appointed by God. were allowed to

lapse. 103 A similar sort of accommodation was arrived at in Oudh

in India, where the rulers and mutahids co-operated to establish and organize a Shi'ite state. 104 The existence in Oaiar Iran of an

'ULAMA AND THE STATE

33

approximate agreement on the division of authority between shah and 'ulama in practice, and the mutual recognition of each other's position as valid, may explain why at the time of the Constitutional

Revolution, the 'ulama did not raise the question of the shah's legitimacy.

This view of partnership and division of authority in practice

between shah and 'ulama may be compared with ideas on religion

and state held in Iran in earlier times when the government was Sunni. Among jurists, al-Ghazzali (1058-1111) put forward the view that religion depends on kingship and that the ruler must look

after the affairs of religion by suppressing any heterodoxy and protecting the frontiers efficiently. Likewise Fakhr al-Din Razi (d. 1209) stated that good order could only be maintained by proper regulation of the affairs of religion and those of the state, and that the former was the concern of the 'ulama, while the latter

was the responsibility of the ruler.! Among laymen the famous statesman Nizam al-Mulk (1018-1092) wrote that:

The most important thing a king needs is sound faith because

kingship and religion are like two brothers; whenever disturbance breaks out in the country religious affairs suffer too; heretics and evil doers appear; and whenever religious affairs are in disorder there is confusion in the country; evil doers gain power and render the king impotent and despondent; heresy grows rife and rebels make themselves felt. 107

The notion of the mutual dependence of religion and state also appears in the Shahnama of the poet Firdausi (d. 1025-6): Nor can religion be stable without royalty, Nor can rovalty be permanent without religion: They are two foundations interlaced with one another, Which intelligence hath combined in one. I% Thus the concept of partnership of religion and state, which is

reflected in some of the accommodatory theories and correspond-

ence of Oajar times, may derive from a traditional consensus, established in the medieval period when Iran was under Sunni rule, and never quite lost.

2 The 'Ulama in Qaiar Iran and the Coming of the Revolution The 'ulama played a highly significant role in the events which culminated in the Constitutional Revolution. Some recent studies have taken the view that their participation in this process was motivated by a strongly Shiite sense of injustice and that the revolution itself was a rebellion against the oppression of the traditional Qajar regime. But a close examination of the evidence suggests a very different interpretation - namely that the revolu. tion arose from the government's immediate economic difficulties, from its need to reform and modernize and therefore raise taxes,

and that the 'ulama's response to this situation was shaped by factors more complex that questions of legitimacy alone.

1Before turning to a more detailed consideration of the causes and events of the revolution, and to help illuminate the 'ulama's role in

these, it is necessary to look briefly at certain aspects of the 'ulama's position under the traditional political system of ajar Iran. Under this system the 'ulama enioyed a position of power and influence which would hardly have been possible under a modern centralized government. This was particularly true with regard to taxation and the law. The 'ulama had financial resources

derived from the religious foundations, from shar' offices, and

from canonical taxes, which rendered them independent of the state. The most lucrative of these were the vaaf or reli. gious foundations, reckoned at the turn of the century to be

worth 4,000,000 tomans, that is approximately half of the total state revenue.! This was, of course, a rough estimate, as in the absence of government control, little was known of the real value 35

36

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

of vagf properties, and the system of accounting was obscure. There was no government control or registration of the kind that existed in Egypt. The foundations consisted of landed property and its income, left for the building and maintenance of religious schools, mosques, shrines, and tombs. The land could also be used for commercial enterprises such as shops and caravanserais. Vagf

property was, however, not equally distributed throughout the country, and the shrine at Mashhad, for example, received about

$235,000 per year,? which was proportionately greater than the income from vagf elsewhere. The 'ulama, however, did not completely control vagf property. Certain foundations were under the control of the shah, the most significant being the shrines of Mashhad and Qumm? and several important institutions in Tehran, such as the Sipah Salar mosque,

which was particularly well endowed.* Usually in the case of

appointments to these foundations, the heirs of the initial recipient

were confirmed in the same office. If, however, the holder incur-

red the royal displeasure, the shah could remove him from his office, as happened when the mutahid Mirza Murtaza Ashtivani was dispossessed of the lucrative Madrasa-vi Khan Marvi in 1905.5

Furthermore, laymen who made religious endowments sometimes did so under strict conditions which left their heirs rather than a mujtahid or other member of the 'ulama, with final authority over the bequest and the disbursement of its funds. The 'ulama control

over vaqf property was thus, to some extent qualified; nevertheless it left them with great power and wealth. There were often fierce struggles among the 'ulama for control of endowments when the office of mutavalli (administrator) fell vacant. Usually a mutahid held particular influence in the quarter where he lived and would thus have the best chance of attaining control of any vacant religious office in that area. The numerous students dependent on the muitahid formed the front line in such battles. Towards the end of 1903 a quarrel broke out in Tehran between the students of the Madrasa-vi Sadr and the Madrasa-yi

Muhammadivya over control of the Madrasa-vi Afsariyya. Behind each group of students were two rival mutahids: Sayid 'Ali

Akbar Tafrishi and the Imam Jum'a. In Mashhad, where there was a considerable amount of endowed property, battles between rival muitahids and their students were even more frequent. A certain amount of endowment income was sent to the 'ulama

of the shrine cities. For example, Akhund Mulla Khurasani received 2,000 tomans yearly from the endowed lands of Or'im

'ULAMA IN QAJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

37

Magam, which were under the supervision of Shaikh Fazlallah in Tehran.? It is not clear why he in particular received this payment, for he is not specially mentioned as a close connection of Shaikh Fazlallah. Connections between the muitahids of the 'Atabat and

those of Tehran over religious endowments are clearer in the

matter of the Oudh bequest. This money was left for distribution amongst the pious of Najaf and Karbala by the King of Oudh, who had nominated the British government as trustee. The money was given to a particular mujtahid for distribution, but in 1902 Newmarch, the political agent in Baghdad, was ordered to reorganize the distribution on more regular lines. & This produced fierce competition among the 'ulama there. The news travelled quickly to Tehran, and Hardinge, the British representative, was besieged by requests from members of the 'ulama with friends and relatives in the Atabat to have them put on the list of recipients.

A further means of financing the religious estate was by the

contributions of the faithful. The most significant of these were the canonical payments of khums, the share of the Imam, amounting

to one-fifth of the donor's yearly income, and zakat, alms. The canonical taxes were originally supposed to have been paid to the Imam, but in his absence - there being no other legitimate author-

ity - they were paid to the mujahids. Indeed, the mujahid had the right to demand zakat and it was incumbent upon the faithful to pay him. I Distribution of zakat, other than through a mujtahid, or his agent, did not carry the same spiritual credit. The canonical taxes were thus important not only as a source of income but also in that their method of payment was a recognition of the role of the mutahid. Distribution of the religious payments also gave the mujtahid great influence. On the other hand, payments were made not only for religious reasons, but also for the mutahid's ability to represent the grievances of the less powerful classes. If he failed in

this function, religious payments might be withdrawn, or given elsewhere, so the muitahid was to some extent directed by his followers. " It is noticeable that at the time of the Constitutional Revolution the 'ulama formed constellations around a leading

mujahid, each of whom had his own following of tullab

(students), sayids (descendants of the Prophet) and preachers and tended to dominate religious affairs in his own quarter. Such constellations may have reflected the movement of funds collected

and disbursed by the muitahid. The 'ulama also received a much less considerable income from government stipends and pensions. In 1895 it was reckoned that

38

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

about 500,000 tomans were disbursed by the government to mem-

bers of the 'ulama, theological students and sayids. No demands were made upon the recipients of pensions, who carried out their studies or duties independent of government control. 12 The basis

for awarding a pension was usually either personal contact or hereditary right. At the death of a pensioner a third of his pension passed to his heir, but usually the payment of a sum to the shah

ensured that the pension continued for another life. Several

attempts were made to reform this state of affairs -as in 1903 when Amin al-Sultan tried to suppress hereditary pensions descending

through daughters as well as sons - but such measures had little effect. Many 'ulama were also tuyuldars, or fiefholders, that is to

say they were in receipt of a grant from the government. Such

grants varied, being sometimes a grant on the revenue attached to a certain office; sometimes a grant of khalisa or crown lands in lieu of salary; or a grant to collect taxes in a given area which might be

crown property, or the property of a third person, or that of the person to whom the tuyul was granted. I In the last case the tuyul amounted to an immunity from taxation. As a young man, the muitahid Aga Naiafi Ouchani obtained such an immunity for his father for several ears on condition the money remitted went to

subsidize the son's religious studies. 14 In another case a mulla was permitted 264 tomans per year from taxes due on his land for his

own account, any revenue in excess being payable to the local treasury.IS Titles as well as offices carried a stipend, the title sometimes belonging with the office and sometimes not. In 1896 a mulla

named Sayyid Fakhr al-Din, who undertook religious duties

among the royal bodyguard, was awarded the title Fakhr al-Ashraf by Muzaffar al-Din Shah. 16 He was also given a grant of 7 tomans cash plus a certain amount in kind to be paid annually in addition to his salary. This sum had previously been paid to someone else. recently deceased, but it is not clear whether he had held the title as well. In this case the money came from the taxes of Khurasan,

but it was to be collected from the treasury in Tehran. The

nomination was made by Amir Bahadur Jang, the commander of the royal bodyguard, but nominations were most commonly made by the sadr-i a'zam. The money the 'ulama derived from fees from legal documents and contracts was one of their most significant sources of income. As a proportion of their total income it would have varied according to the individual mutahid or mulla, and so far no estimates for

'ULAMA IN QAJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

39 this period have come to light. One area that was particularly lucrative was the administration of government shar' business which in Tehran was usually passed to one particular mutahid 17 The ulama paid little to the state in the way of taxes: Income from khums and zakat was not taxed, and salaries and pensions had a duty imposed on them only just before the revolution. As owners of land they were, however, liable to payment of the land tax. But as the Governor General of Mashhad told the British consul there: 'None of the Mutahids who were among the chief landowners in the country paid a twentieth of the revenue that could be justly demanded of them. '18 The 'ulama were also ex-

empt from the arbitrary levies of money exacted by high

officials. 19

The 'ulama enjoyed a privileged position of virtual immunity from prosecution by the state. This was particularly true of the

mutahids, whom it was difficult for the government to curb. Thus Shaikh Fazlallah told the followers of the mutahid Sayyid 'Abdallah Bihbihani, when they came to enlist his support for the opposition to the government in November 1905, that the sadr-i a'zam could not touch Bihbihani, but he could destroy them.20 Likewise

members of the secret society to which the reformer and 'alim Nazim al-Islam belonged complained that it was all very well for him to conspire against the government as he was under the protection of the muitahid, Sayid Muhammad Tabataba'i, but they were entirely vulnerable 21 A powerful muitahid was in a position to give sanctuary to opponents of government policy in his

house, as Tabataba'i did for the reformers. Malik al-Mutakallimin and Aga Sayyid Jamal al-Din. The 'ulama as a whole, however, had a certain immunity from punishment, even when engaged in quarrels which disturbed the peace and embarrassed the government. In 1903, after a disturbance between the students of two rival schools, the sadr-i a'zam and the governor of Tehran had them punished in a manner they considered a slight to their dignity

and despatched them to prison in Ardebil. The 'ulama at once

united in indignation as, until that time, such an incident had never been punished with such severity, particularly where sayids were involved. 22 The 'ulama guarded their privileged position jealously,

as demonstrated by an incident which occurred in 1904 when

students beat the nephew of the sadr-i a zam for what they considered maltreatment of one of their number.23 Aga Naiafi Ouchani

also reports rigorous objection by sayids and students against 'maltreatment' or punishment by the state authorities.24 One pri-

40

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

vilege which was determinedly defended against all attempts by the state to abolish it was the right of sanctuary, particularly in the

house of a mujtahid. A typical dispute arose in 1876 when some servants of the imam jum'a of Tehran, who had taken sanctuary in his house, were bastinadoed in his presence, so that he suspended public prayers and withdrew from the citv. 25

The 'ulama had strong links with other groups, notably the

merchants and trades guilds. These were forged by the religious and legal services which they performed, and, where the 'ulama

were also landowners, by economic links they had in commer. Among the mutahids the connection does not seem to have extended to marriage, but it did among the lesser 'ulama.26 The 'ulama were looked upon as mediators between the ordin-

ary people and the government. In conformity with the theory

discussed in chapter 1 that the 'ulama and the shah were partners

in the good ordering of the community of Islam, they were expected to co-operate with the government by acting as guides,

helping to quell disturbances, and passing and explaining govern-

ment policy to the people.27 On the other hand the 'ulama were also one of the main channels through which popular grievances could be brought to the attention of the higher state authorities. Those who were victims of extortion and arbitrary acts by state officials looked for protection to the 'ulama. Thus, when the Vazir Makhsus tried to build a qanat (water channel) on his land without

agreeing the water rights with the local villagers, some of them took bast (sanctuary) with Bihbihani, who succeeded in putting their point of view.28 In 1896 when a drought caused a water shortage in Chala Maidan, a district of Tehran, and soldiers and water officials (mirab) took advantage of the situation, the local people made representations to Shaikh Fazlallah who brought the problem to the attention of the governor. 29 Often the best means whereby other classes, especially the mercantile groups, could press for a particular policy, or change in

policy, was by linking themselves to an influential mulla. 30 It is likely the connection took concrete form in the pavment of canonical taxes to the muitahid or to one of the mosques from which he collected these dues. To be sure not to lose these contributions to a

rival, the mutahid had to be to some extent amenable to the

wishes of his following. An ambitious muitahid needed financial

resources to exercise patronage, without which he could not attain prestige. Thus a mujtahid seeking influence needed to be attuned

to current opinion and discontent. He was also vulnerable to

ULAMA IN AJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

41 popular pressure, and at times obliged to pursue goals which at heart he might not really believe in. There are many instances where the 'ulama appeared to be

leading an agitation, but where in reality the pressure came from their following. What appeared to be a religious campaign led by the 'ulama against the Jews in Tehran in 1899 really originated in a competition between Muslim and Jewish shopkeepers over the cotton piece goods trade.31 The foreign firm of Ralli and Son in

1865 came under attack by the chief muitahid of Tabriz at the

instigation of a combination of local merchants. 32 Soon after the

establishment of the Imperial Bank in Isfahan a dispute with a local money changer led to an attack by the 'ulama on the chief

clerk. 33 In a similar protest in Yazd the Bank was accused of 'not

respecting Islam' 34 The best example of a movement which was justified in religious terms, and found legitimacy by taking a religious form under the ostensible leadership of the 'ulama, is the protest over the tobacco concession in 1890-1.35 In an attempt to increase the profits of the tobacco industry and direct some part of them to the treasury, the shah sold a monopoly of the collection, manufacture and export of tobacco to a British subject. The move triggered widespread dis-

content and agitation culminating in a fatva issued by the chief

mujahid of the 'Atabat, Mirza Hasan Shirazi, prohibiting the

smoking of tobacco until the concession was abolished. The fatva was observed even in the royal court and, as a result, the government was forced to withdraw at a cost of £500,000 in compensation

to the company. The opposition was apparently led by the 'ulama, but the pattern of protest strongly suggests that merchants were behind it 36 The first petitions, presented to the shah in February 1891, came

from merchants established in Tehran and later in the year there were petitions from the merchants of Tabriz, Shiraz, Mashhad and Isfahan. Moreover, the leading muitahid of Tabriz initiallv refused to preach against the concession much to the discontent of local merchants.39 and placards appeared in the city threatening the lives of the 'ulama if they did not protest. 38 It is interesting to note

that in Tabriz, with its powerful bazaar, the 'ulama did eventually join the agitation, whereas in Mashhad, where they were largely dependent on the shrine for a living, they remained loval to the shah and did their best to quell the disturbance 39 One of the government's responses to 'ulama-led agitation was to buy off the mujtahids. As the state weakened during the 1890s

42

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

'ULAMA IN QAJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

the government was increasingly forced to use this method, pursued particularly by the then Prime Minster Amin al-Sultan. Amin

the government was faced in the 1890s with increasing difficulties. Its deficit grew from £50,00043 at the beginning of the decade (not

al-Daula, his successor, resisted it, although he did buy off the

leading mutahid Mirza Hasan Ashtiyani during agitation in

"His general refusal to give in to the 'ulama was, however, a

major factor behind his fall from power in 1898. Amin al-Sultan managed to stave off opposition to the Russian loans of 1900 and

1902 by offering financial inducements to the mujahids of Tehran. It is unclear quite what services the mutahids could perform for government officials in return for the frequent requests they made on the part of their following. One of their main services seems to have been the negative one of simply resisting popular pressure, or helping to quell incipient disturbances. Also, by judicious adminis-

tration of government patronage in the form of gifts, pensions, shar' business, and the supervision of endowment funds, they could help to build up support for a particular minister, as Bihbihani did for Amin al-Sultan. Occasionally they might perform a special favour for a high official, as Shaikh Fazlallah did when he issued a fatva supporting Hishmat al-Mulk's claim to his father's possessions in Qa'in,4 or when he sold vagf land to the Russian Bank at the special request of 'Ain al-Daula. 42

2One of the most important questions about the origins of the Constitutional Revolution is why it took place in 1906. The government of Iran had many faults. It was corrupt, inefficient and arbitrary; provincial governorships were sold to the highest bidder; and the army existed largely on paper. Yet this ramshackle system had been accepted by the shah's subjects not merely during

43

including the debt incurred by the cancellation of the tobacco concession) to £300,000 in 1900.4 Nasir al-Din Shah to some extent made up for the short fall by auctioning off governorships

more frequently, making about £100,000 in this way;45 by vigorous demands for pishkish (gifts); by sales of khalisa or state lands; and

by allowing provincial governors to remit that portion of the land tax levied in kind at fixed rates of conversion (ta'sir). The situation

deteriorated still further under his milder successor. Muzaffar al-Din Shah tried to give up the sale of governorships as pernicious, but during his reign provincial governors frequently neglected to send the portion of the maliyat or land tax they were

obliged to remit to the central government so that by 1905 hardly

any money was coming in at all. The only other source of

revenue for the treasury was the customs dues which, until 1898, were farmed out and made about £200,000.47 Commercial conces-

sions were supposed to bring in about £100,000 but since most payments had been commuted for lump sums this source of revenue had been largely forestalled. At the time the economic difficulties of the central government, and often of the country as a whole, were blamed on the extrava-

gance of the court, corruption, and a growing list of pensioners. 48 Another factor consistently identified by contemporaries was inflation. From the later 1890s especially there were many reports of

high prices and a dearth of foodstuffs.* Gilbar's research has

shown that inflation was indeed high in the last twenty years of the

nineteenth century with prices rising most rapidly in the last

decade. He estimates that the price of a basket of basic commod.

the whole Qajar period but for long before. On the other hand, by

ities rose 5.5 times between 1880 and 1900 and that price rises were

1906 Western ideas had not penetrated Iran sufficiently to create a new perspective and a new set of values on any significant scale. A

ment the inflation of the 1880s and 1890s meant a sharp decline in

very real cause of discontent in the latter part of the nineteenth century can, however, be found in the government's attempts to

centralize, that is to introduce modernizing improvements, and its consequent need to increase its share of the country's wealth. The disagreement between the shah and his subjects over the tobacco concession in 1890-1 was the first full-scale conflict produced by

this new situation. Centralization with a consequent growth of the bureaucracy on the one hand, and economic difficulties on the other, meant that

greater in the northern than the southern cities. For the govern-

the real value of the maliyat which was based on fixed

assessments,S while in 1900 it precipitated bread riots in the urban centres. 2 After 1900 deflationary trends were at work and prices

decreased precipitating a new problem - namely a slow-down in economic activity and growing unemployment. One of the factors behind the inflationary spiral was an excessive issue of token coins in the 1890s caused by competition for control of the mint between two notables, Nasr al-Saltana and his nephew Amir Humayun, and Amin al-Sultan.53 Both paid dearly

to acquire and regain rights to farm the mint, recouping their

44

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

outlay by issuing defective silver coin and, even worse in its impact

on the economic life of ordinary people, by flooding the country with copper coins known as black money. As a result the value of the copper shahi, which was used widely in daily transactions, fell considerably from 1893-7. The rate of exchange between the shahi

and the silver kran was officially 20:1, but during this period it averaged 30:1 rising at one point to 80:1.54 The mint master, a

merchant named Amin al-Zarb who acted in co-operation with the sadr-i a'zam, Amin al-Sultan, was held responsible and eventually briefly imprisoned in December 1896 and fined 765,000 tomans.

A third factor which contributed to the economic difficulties of both the government and people was devaluation. This is sometimes attributed to an imbalance of trade. But although contemporaries were almost certainly correct in pointing to an excess of imports over exports, evidence collected and analysed recently indicates that until the early 1900s external payments were not in deficit - Iran's invisible exports were clearly, if somewhat mysteriously, sufficient to maintain a balance. The real culprit was the country's silver-based currency, the kran, which lost value on the foreign exchanges against the pound sterling owing to a rapid decline in international silver prices over the decade. But the falling price of silver was not the only external economic trend to affect Iran during this period. Over the second part of the nineteenth century the country's economy had been gradually drawn into the world economy and, by 1900, had become vulnerable to fluctuations in the fortunes of major trading partners. 56 One of these was Russia, which at the time took 59 per cent of Iran's exports and supplied 38 per cent of its imports. The RussoJapanese War, and the economic depression precipitated in Russia by the war, resulted in some dislocation of this trade between 1904

and 190657 greatly adding, especially in the north, to the difficul ties of merchants and the quite substantial element of the urban population dependent on the prosperity of their business. The abolition of the tobacco concession had revealed the weakness of the government. Not only were there financial difficulties, but the Qajars, now remote from their tribal levies, and unable to develop or afford a modern army, had not the means to suppress

protest. Among those who took advantage of the government's weakness in the 1890s were the provincial authorities. They not only increasingly failed to remit their taxes, but by 1900 the Russian, British and French representatives were agreed that their open disobedience to orders from Tehran was a major factor in the

'ULAMA IN AJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

45 breakdown of the machinery of government. 8 Another group who grew in power were the 'ulama, especially some of the muita-

hids. By playing upon popular discontent they were able to augment their own prestige while undermining the authority of state institutions, notably the Ministry of Justice,59 and the police.6 They were also able to defend their interests more rigorously both

in Tehran and in the provinces. Certain of them were increas-

ingly caught up in political intrigue, nost particularly in the power struggle between the chief ministers, Amin al-Daula and Amin al-Sultan. They tended to support Amin al-Sultan, who was willing

both to heed their protests and to buy them off, whereas Amin al-Daula resisted their interference in government. 62

3Yet the economic hardship of the 1890s did not produce revolution. The reason a revolution developed in 1905-6 in particular must be sought in the reformist ministry of Amin al-Daula, sadr-i a'zam from 1897-8. He held strong views on modernization and was determined to begin by tackling the country's financial prob-

lems. Assisted by a council of like-minded people he embarked on the first major reform programme for more than twenty years. 63

The minister of finance, Abu'l Qasim Khan, Nasir al-Mulk, put forward a plan of reform inspired by his study of the financial

organization of European states. 6 Its first item was the abolition of the customs farms. Instead Europeans were to be placed in all the main ports to control receipts and supervise individual employees. A European official was to reorganize the central administration of the finances, and control over the collection of taxes was to be removed from the provincial to the central government. Belgian officials were chosen to carry out these tasks and they

arrived in March 1898. Their representative, Gerard, was not

optimistic about their prospects: 'The customs are vital to increasing government income. Unfortunately their fruits, far from being

consecrated to works of development, are being squandered by

the court. 65 Gerard felt that the new style of administration would be at odds with the traditional one: 'How is it possible to suppress abuse by the present officials without condemning the principle of

the method of government itself?'

Gerard also foresaw opposition, firstly because the existing tariff was not levied, a present to the official in charge usually ensuring exemption; and secondly because vested interests from

46

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

the valiahd (crown prince) downwards considered they had a

right to make deductions from the customs revenues. Most espe-

cially he feared: Problems because of the retrogressive rather than progres-

sive tendency of the population and religious fanaticism ... In such difficult circumstances what possible effect

can the efforts of foreigners have on the Persian administra-

tion unless it be to bedevil the present system of government?

The ministry of Amin al-Daula did not survive for very long. His

enemies, including members of the 'ulama, used his financial

'ULAMA IN AJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

47

fixed sum per case of goods. Certain of the major merchants had acquired leases to farm the customs houses at a number of ports and Gilbar believes that these major tujjar or wholesale dealers led the agitation. 69 Opposition to the customs reforms soon made itself felt. In June

1900 Spring Rice, the British chargé 'affaires, reported disgrunt-

lement on the grounds of employment of foreign officials, but attributed the real reason to the losses incurred by the most important officials, who were unable to make favourable arrangements with the Belgians.? De Groote, the Belgian representative,

believed former farmers and sub-farmers were involved.?! The

difficulties to bring about his fall in 1898,6 and he was succeeded

opposition came into the open under the leadership of members of the 'ulama using the pretext that there must be no foreign adminis-

the government was able to find only two options to deal with it: to

tration in the country. The government replied there was no

by Amin al-Sultan. However, the financial crisis deepened, and

borrow money or to carry out far reaching reforms in the fiscal

system. The first would meet with the criticism that it rendered the country dependent on foreigners; the second, as Amin al-Sultan saw, would arouse opposition from powerful vested interests, and

might well lead to rebellion. Joseph Naus, the leader of the Belgian customs administration,

proposed a detailed programme of reform. The prevailing system had certain anomalies, the most significant of which was that trade in the hands of foreigners was subject to a 5 per cent ad valorem

duty, while that in Iranian hands paid duty at 2-4 per cent. The trade of Iranian subjects was also subject to many and various

foreign administration, only a few foreign servants of the shah During 1900 there were demonstrations against the new tariff in Shiraz, Tehran and Isfahan, and in November in most commercial

centres. In early 1901 there were riots in Tabriz, Tehran and

Kashan. Naus offered to resign in August but his resignation was

not accepted.

In March 1903 a new customs tariff on trade with Russia was introduced following a commercial treaty with the Russians. It replaced the ad valorem import and export tax of 5 per cent by a more complicated tariff based on three schedules, which elimin-

internal duties such as road tax. Naus proposed a uniform tax of 5 per cent ad valorem on all exports and imports whatever the origin

ated the Iranian export tax. The new tariff favoured Russian goods and generated a great deal of discontent. It was also considered too complicated for merchants to deal with, and for government

of the goods and nationality of the trader. He also requested

officials to administer. A further complaint was that some of the

traditional inland customs dues continued to be levied by the

suppression of transit dues in the interior. His plan was accepted and put into effect from late 1898. By September 1900 the new

provincial officials alongside the new system. 72

£200,000 per annum to £350,000-£400,000 per annum. 67

Tabriz against the new chief Belgian customs official, Priem. Naus

administration had raised the customs revenue from about

The tariff reform precipitated opposition among merchants who benefited from the former system of customs collection. This had allowed some degree of flexibility. Although a tariff was supposed to be levied on goods entering and leaving the country, a present

to the official in charge usually ensured freedom from taxation. Leading merchants came to agreements with the farmers of particular entry points, who would offer attractive reductions to draw in trade by their route. 68 On condition that a merchant guaranteed

to bring in a given number of cases he could pay a relatively low

The introduction of the new tariff brought serious agitation in

considered that the agitation was organized by the former employees of the customs with the possible complicity of those who

stood to lose by the reform, including the valiahd.?3 In July the ulama of the 'Atabat, stimulated, the Belgians believed, by financial inducements, protested to the shah over the employment of foreigners.? They sent a letter to the leading mujahid of Tabriz declaring the new tariff impious and impure as it allowed duty on wine and spirits.?S The campaign against Naus continued through

1904 and into 1905. There were protests in January in Mashhad, in

April in Tabriz, Kermanshah, and several other towns, and in

48

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

January 1905 again in Tabriz. 7 Naus, however, remained in office and by early 1904 the customs receipts had risen to £600,000.77 The customs receipts alone could not fund all domestic expenditure and in January 1900, following a series of small loans, Amin al-Sultan borrowed £2,000,000 from the Russians. Realizing that

the loan would only tide him over immediate difficulties, Amin al-Sultan considered the possibility of reform, but was pessimistic

as he foresaw serious opposition. In January 1901 he told Spring

Rice, the British representative, that a careful survey of the finances had revealed an annual deficit of £300,000, and he had considered two possible solutions; one was an increase of the maliyat, or internal taxes; the second was the reduction in un-

necessary expenditure.78 The problem with the first was that the landowners would hate him, and with the second that the pension-

ers would hate him. Naus's customs scheme had provoked the

opposition of the merchants and clergy, so that whichever way he turned he was met by irreconcilable opposition. Because of these difficulties reform could only come very slowly. In the meantime

the proceeds of the first Russian loan were exhausted and in January 1902 a second loan agreement was concluded with Russia

for £1,000,000. Discontent now affected all classes, and in 1901 a plot involving diverse elements was uncovered. In August a proclamation was posted in public places accusing the government of selling the country to Russia.? In September seventy people were arrested including two senior officials, the shah's son-in-law and some

members of the lesser 'ulama.8 One criticism of note in the leaflets circulated was that the government had failed to give

proper account of the Russian loan, and that it had misappropriated funds. Hardinge, the British representative, reported that there was general discontent at the waste of public money, with complaints coming especially from merchants and shopkeepers. Indeed the government's proclamation after the plot gave a prolonged justification of the customs reforms, which it apparently thought was the most powerful cause of opposition. The second loan brought signs of unease from the leading 'ulama, who had been largely quiescent since the return to power of

Amin al-Sultan. Although it was reported that the ulama were

voicing the misgivings of the notables and merchants, the principal source of their opposition seems to have been their own fear that the country was becoming dangerously dependent on Russia. The

government, anxious that they should not incite a populace

'ULAMA IN QAJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

49

already discontented at the dearness of provisions, attempted to buy them off and stop open opposition:$ but when the shah left

for Europe in April 1902 only the imam jum'a appeared at his departure. According to Hardinge, they were talking openly of

excommunicating the shah (presumably by issuing a takfir) unless

he changed his policy. 2 In August the opposition came into the open and achieved a brief moment of unity when the muitahids of Tehran swore almost unanimously on the Koran that they would renounce allegiance to the shah if Amin al-Sultan returned to Iran

with him as prime minister. The sincerity of some participants may be doubted as Sayyid 'Abdallah Bihbihani, who was known for his association with Amin al-Sultan, was said to have drawn up a long

indictment of him. Furthermore, the 'ulama opposition was as

usual entangled with political intrigue; one of its mainsprings was

the governor of Tehran, 'Abd al-Majid Mirza, *Ain al-Daula, who

aspired to be prime minister. The shah, however, supported Amin al-Sultan, and by November the 'ulama were once more divided into two camps, with one for and one against the prime

minister. The 'ulama of the 'Atabat, who were now being incited by the

British, as well as by numerous complaints against the authorities

from all over Iran, sent a remonstrance to the shah accusing

government officials of embezzling state money, so that money had to be borrowed from Russia and even then was not used for the general good. They also protested at the employment of Europeans in the customs administration, which they termed 'oppressive', and at the possible involvement of Europeans in the collec-

tion of taxes.84 There was agitation in Isfahan85 and in Tabriz

where it involved both 'ulama and merchants, some of whom were finally expelled from the city.86 The proceeds of the second loan had now been spent, and since a third was likely to arouse intransi-

gent opposition, Amin al-Sultan could find no more money, and was forced to resign. At the end of 1903 a takfir appeared against

him purporting to emanate from the 'ulama of the 'Atabat.

Although there was some doubt as to the validity of this document, the shrine 'ulama never seriously denied it. In the meantime the scheme for the reform of the maliyat had not been entirely forgotten. In 1902 Naus pointed out that despite the fall in the value of the toman the land tax had not been revised,

and might be increased without injury to the taxpayer. In the

centralizing spirit of Nasir al-Mulk's proposals of 1898 he added that the maliyat should be removed from the hands of the provin-

50

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

cial governors, and made the responsibility of the ministry of

finance. Amin al-Sultan agreed with him, but feared the unpopularity of the proposals. At the end of the year Naus again pressed his scheme, suggesting in addition that an assessment be made on all classes including government officials, the 'ulama and the land-

owners. But in view of the opposition, Amin al-Sultan felt the proposals were too dangerous.

On the fall of Amin al-Sultan, 'Ain al-Daula, the governor of Tehran and a Qajar prince, became prime minister. He determined to incur no further loans but pursue instead a vigorous

policy of financial reform, retrenchment and increased taxation. He began by ordering that the maliyat from the crown lands be

paid either in kind, or at its real value. In April 1904 Naus

proposed a further scheme for the reorganization of the maliyat before a meeting of provincial governors. In Hardinge's words it was intended to, 'strengthen the hold of the central government

over the provincial administration, and assist in the gradual transformation of the Provincial Governors from Achaemenian Satraps

to French Prefects.87 The scheme proposed that the provincial authorities have fixed salaries. After these had been paid the

surplus was to be sent to a central treasury in Tehran under Naus. Soon after he came to power 'Ain al-Daula had enforced econo-

mies in the royal household. In May 1904 he introduced a tax on salaries and pensions of 10 per cent. In addition arrangements were made for recipients to discount their salaries on payment of

20 per cent. This system was expected to benefit the recipients as

salaries were to be paid regularly in quarterly instalments, and a discount of 20 per cent on a government draft was in many cases

less than they would receive from the money changers in the bazaar. However, Hardinge was doubtful whether recipients would welcome the change in system:

This new tax on salaries and pensions, from the uniform and systematic character of its incidence, is most distasteful to the

Persian bureaucracy, as well as to the Princes, hereditary

governors and aristocratic classes generally, who have hitherto milked the state whilst being milked from time to time by those immediately above them, and having grown up under this corrupt and gambling system, they have so adapted their

methods to it, that any change in it confuses and alarms

them.88

Hardinge reported that the discontent against Ain al-Daula's

'ULAMA IN AJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

51

policy of retrenchment was very great. "Ain al-Daula also attemp-

ted to revive a proposal of Amin al-Daula's to impose a tax on sharia documents, but was obliged to give way in the face of 'ulama resistance. 89 His policy enabled 'Ain al-Daula briefly to balance the budget in 1904, but a fall in the customs revenues in the same year, together with the shah's insistence on a third trip to Europe, meant that there was again a large deficit in 1905. By the

end of the year the finances were still in confusion and Ain

al-Daula needed £800,000 to balance his accounts. Grant Duff commented that no prime minister could reorganize the finances

without offending the vested interests of the court, the 'ulama and

the pensioners. If he did so the shah would overthrow him, or

there would be a popular outbreak that he had neither the money

nor the troops to deal with.

4 The Constitutional Revolution began in Tehran, and indeed

throughout the period 1905-9 was little understood outside Tehran, and some, but not all, of the major towns. It is of some

importance to an understanding of how the revolution arose to consider the manner in which the different groups making up the population of Tehran were variously affected by the financial crisis

and the government's responses to it. The population, which in 1900 was about 250,000,° may be roughly divided into officials of the court and state administration, 'ulama, including tullab, merchants, members of the guilds, and servants and labourers. Perhaps 2,000 of Tehran's inhabitants held official positions. Certain of the senior officials, or notables, were landowners and their consequent wealth brought them influence additional to that

derived from their position. The proposals regarding the malivat would have affected them, but this particular attempt at reform

seems to have been greeted largely by passive resistance.91 Houtum Schindler considered that those more dependent on salar-

les saw a fall in their value because of inflation." were discontented with "Ain al-Daula's retrenchments and salaries, nearly always in arrears, were further behind than usual. But the major grievance affecting both high and low seems to have been the 10 per cent stamp tax. ?3

Within this general picture a strong division existed between the

clients of the prime minister in power, Ain al-Daula, and those of

52 ISLAM AND MODERNISM the one out of power, Amin al-Sultan, many of whom had lost their positions with his fall. Cross-cutting this division was yet another between officials who favoured westernizing liberal reforms of the kind advocated by Malkum Khan, and those who were either indifferent or opposed. Many, if not most, of the readers of foreign based Persian language newspapers were bureaucrats. Marling, a British representative, referred to employees of the customs as being of the partially or sometimes highly educated newspaper reading class, which has been most influenced by the nationalist propaganda preached therein* 94 Among the higher bureaucracy was also a group, most of them educated abroad, who had clustered around Amin al-Daula during his brief period in office, and who had been largely out of power

since his fall. They included Murtaza Quli Khan Sani' al-Daula, educated in Berlin,'S and Nasir al-Mulk who was educated in England and drew up the original plan for financial reform. Also of the group was Nasrallah Khan Mushir al-Daula. Of relatively

humble origin he had risen through the bureaucracy and sent one of his sons, Hasan Khan Mushir al-Mulk, to be educated in Russia,

and another, Husain Khan Mu'tamin al-Mulk, to France. Of all groups the merchants, who probably numbered a few were in the greatest state of discontent mainly because

of the customs reforms. In April 1905 the leading merchants of Tehran closed their shops and went to the shrine of Hazrat 'Abd al-'Azim in protest against the customs administration. 8 There was also constant communication between the 'ulama and merchants of Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz and Bushire expressing discontent over the customs administration.? The 'ulama of Isfahan held frequent meetings, but waited on events in Tehran. The shah, who was about to go to Europe, placated the merchants with promises of Naus's possible removal on his return. The merchants had also been critical of the foreign loans and the connection between the

loans and the customs reforms was not lost on them. As De Groote, the Belgian representative, reported:

The one serious reform affected in Iran - the reorganization of the customs, has only served to allow the Shah to conclude

two loans, a large part of which has been squandered in

Europe . . . The opposition points out that at least under the old system of farming the millions remained in Persia., 100

It was not simply that the government had raised the taxes, they had failed to account for what they had done with the money. A

'ULAMA IN QAJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

53

quite different, but also significant, grievance of a section of the

merchant class was that of the sarrafs (money changers), who had 70,000 tomans owing to them from the treasury. 101 During 1905

they took bast in the house of the imam jum'a, but left without making good their claim.

It is uncertain how far the merchants were interested in reforms. In the 1880s a group of them had made an attempt to reform the

commercial law. The proposal was to set up an assembly of the

representatives of the merchants of Iran to carry out a programme of economic development and to encourage foreign trade. 102 Its responsibilities were to include the establishing of commercial law

courts. The leading merchant who proposed it, Haji Muhammad Hasan Amin al-Zarb, believed that the mercantile classes should have a say in the affairs of the country, since they were its chief source of prosperity. In addition, the representatives of the merchants would co-operate with the guilds for the protection of their

rights, for which it was evident, in their opinion, that one single

law was necessary. The proposed assembly was to examine many projects later taken up by the Majlis. These included the develop-

ment of the country's resources, the setting up of factories, the opening of mines, and restrictions on foreign goods.

Amin al-Zarb was especially critical of government officials,

who in his view lacked knowledge and experience, and were not sufficiently accountable. For this reason he wished the proposed

assembly to take judicial precedence over the provincial governors

in commercial affairs. It was to give the merchants protection against arbitrary action, such as the seizure of property. Amin al-Zarb was also critical of the 'ulama for taking bribes, and for

their habit of overruling each others' decisions. Abroad, he commented, people did not have to pay taxes to mullas. 103 The coun-

cils were formed in 1884 but were soon allowed to lapse because of

combined opposition by the provincial governors and the 'ulama

who felt their own privileges threatened. 104

By the turn of the century there was no apparent organized

movement among merchants for political change, though there

were signs of their continued support for westernizing ideas. The leading merchants in Tehran on the eve of the revolution included

Hajj Mirza Muhammad Husain Amin al-Zarb, the son of the

Amin al-Zarb who had instigated the merchant councils in the 1880s. He had been educated partly in France and showed his interest in reform by supporting the Anjuman-i Marif founded in 1897-8 to promote modern education. He had inherited his

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

ULAMA IN AJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

father's business interests as one of the leading sarrafs of Tehran

porary reports from Tehran itself do not mention such a request,

54

dealing in commercial and treasury bills, and foreign exchange,

giving credit and accepting deposits. The family fortune, however,

was somewhat depleted by the fine paid over the affair of the 'black money' in December 1896 105Another merchant, Hajj

55

and stress that the demonstration was against the customs reforms.

The question of the impact of foreign goods remains unresolved

with Gilbar contending that the wholesale merchants profited from the increased trade and Floor believing it pushed them

Muhammad Ismail Maghaza'i, corresponded for many years with

into a position of dependency they resented. 17 But this was a long

Zain al- Abidin Maragha'i author of the reformist book, 'The Travels of Ibrahim Big 106 His wealth was estimated at about

term problem and does not seem to be among the immediate

30,000 tomans in 1898, about average for a leading wholesale merchant's at that time; and he carried out trade with Istanbul,

causes of discontent in 1905. Some of the merchant community were thus interested in modernizing ideas and development. Yet as Gilbar has argued, they

Mu'in al-Tujjar Bushihri, were active in the demonstrations

were also desirous that more money should not pass into the hands of the government, and without government initiative it is difficult

Baghdad and Russia. 107 Both he and a third significant merchant,

against Naus in April 1905. 108 Mu'in al-Tujiar Bushihri was reckoned one of the shrewdest merchants in the country, who while continually augmenting his wealth, was also frequently engaged in projects of development with very variable success.

Of course Iranian merchants had neither the capital nor the

legal or administrative support for such projects which is why they frequently failed. Amin al-Zarb, with greater resources, had managed some small successes including the establishment of a silk mill in Rasht in 1885, where silk was spun for export to Marseilles. 109

Other merchants of note were the Zoroastrian sarraf, Arbab

Jamshid, and the sarraf, Hajj Muhammad Husain, who in 1898 took bast in the British Legation because, for three years, the government had owed him, or rather a group of merchants for whom he was acting, 20,000 tomans. I10 One other way merchants evinced an interest in reform, was in subsidizing the establishment

of new schools, such as those of Hajj Mirza Hasan Rushdiya in

Tabriz and Tehran. I When the reformer Yahva Daulatabadi

founded the Madrasa-yi Sadat in 1899 the merchants, both of Tehran and abroad, sent donations. 112 Indeed the merchant class was among not only the wealthiest but also the most highly educated sections of the population. 113

The merchants were also reportedly unhappy over the prevalence of foreign goods, and the manner in which local industry had been destroved. At the time of the establishment of the merchant councils, one of their complaints was that foreign goods were so abundant that Iranian workshops had ceased to exist 114 Accord.

ing to the newspaper Habl al-Matin, published at the time in Calcutta, one of the aims of the demonstration of April 1905 was

to force the government to encourage home industries and to

protect them against competition from Russian goods. 115 Conter-

to see how major reforms could be undertaken. No real evidence has yet emerged that the merchants were working towards a constitutional government before 1906, so their position in 1905 was a conservative one - what they sought was the lifting of the customs dues.

If the British representative Thomson's estimates for Tehran in 1870 are correct, the guilds (asnaf) formed a substantial section (approximately 5-7,000) 118 of the total adult male population, which Thomson put at about 29,000. The proportion in 1905 was presumably about the same. Floor has defined a guild as a group of

townspeople engaged in the same trade or craft, who elect their own leaders and pay guilds tax. " There was some overlap between the guilds and the merchants in that the brokers (dallal) and the moneychangers (sarraf) paid guilds tax but were usually refer-

red to as tujjar, merchants. In addition to their corporate tax the guilds were frequently called upon to give a pishkish (present) to the governor at feasts. The guilds often looked to the 'ulama to

represent their grievances. They were also dependent on the wholesale merchants or bunakdars for their supplies, their consumer market, and their capital and credit. 120

In the period just before the revolution, Houtum Schindler

considered the guilds to be less affected by inflation than others

since they were better able to keep their incomes in line with increased prices. I21 They seem, however, to have suffered to some

extent from the government's raising dues. In mid-1902 Ain alDaula, then governor of Tehran, was said to have incurred their

hostility by his 'extortions' 122 In 1905 there were complaints that he took large sums in the name of ta'aruf (gifts) from the butchers and bakers of Tehran. 123 But they had had to contend with demar. ding governors before, as in 1899 when they repeatedly paid Na'ib al-Sultana 200.000 tomans. 124

56

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

One of the leading reformers, Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani, had

a large following among the artisans and labourers of the

bazaar. 125 His speeches were largely devoted to attacks on govern-

ment officials and foreign enterprise. 126 He would also inform his audience that they were ignorant of their rights and, spelling out

the word ganun, get them to repeat it after him. Yet reform was, to the guildsmen, a new concept and constitutionalism quite unknown. Unrest among the guilds in 1905 seems to have been incited largely by the merchants who, for example, obliged all the drapers to close their shops in April 1905,127 and later in the year

by the agitation of some of the 'ulama. Of the specific problems of the lowest class, labourers and servants, little is recorded except that they suffered greatly from the high prices, as had been the case for many years. According to

Thomson, in the 1870s large numbers came to Tehran annually

from the countryside in search of work for a season. 128 They were usually poorly housed and fed, lodging fifteen to twenty to a room

in caravanserais and stables on the outskirts of the town where they stayed for four to five months. A feature of the period is the

'ULAMA IN AJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

57

the shah's failure to stem it.

The 'ulama, however, were not united. There were rivalries

among them and differences of opinion which, among the mujta-

hids, had been accentuated by the accession to power of "Ain

al-Daula. The early years of the century had seen the passing away

of an older generation of mujahids. Mirza Hasan Ashtiyani died in 1901; his successor as senior mujahid of the capital, Sayid 'Ali

Akbar Tafrishi, died in 1905; the most, liberal minded of the

"ulama, Shaikh Hadi Najmabadi, in 1902, and Zain al-'Abidin, the

Imam Jum'a, in 1903. In Najaf the marja'-i taqlid, Mirza Hasan Shirazi, died in 1895. Sharabiyani and Mamaghani, who successively followed him as most senior mutahid, were both dead by

1905. Hajj Mirza Husain Hajj Mirza Khalil, who at over ninety

years of age, was the most venerable mujtahid, was held in the highest respect; but he was not recognised as marja'-i taglid. Neither in Tehran nor in the Atabat was there one overall leader of the 'ulama to repudiate government policies on their behalf as there had been at the time of the tobacco concession.

growth in the population of Tehran from approximately 100,000 in 1870 to 280,000 in 1908.129 The districts Of Chala Maidan on the

.

east of the city and Sang-i laj, an old mixed district in the centre, were particularly crowded, providing fertile ground for agitators and those seeking mass support for a political cause.

Turning finally to the 'ulama, Gilbar has given three main

reasons why they were particularly discontented with the govern-

ment in 1905.130 One was that they were engaged in wholesale commercial activity and thus suffered from the customs reforms like the major merchants. This may have been true of the 'ulama of Isfahan, but it was not the case with those of Tehran, who do

not seem to have had commercial interests of their own. The second was that those who owned land or administered endow-

5 In the autumn of 1905 there were four mutahids of outstanding importance in Tehran: Mirza Abu'l Qasim, the Imam Jum'a, Sayyid 'Abdallah Bihbihani, Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai and

Sheikh Fazlallah Nuri. The Imam Jum'a, a young man in his

thirties, came from a long line holding that office and had succeeded his father in 1904 having spent eighteen years in Najaf. Bihbihani, Tabataba'i and Shaikh Fazlallah, who were to play a significant role in the Constitutional Revolution, were about sixty. Bibbihani was by far the most politically active of the mujtahids.

ments feared an increase in the land tax and its possible collection by foreigners. However, while this certainly worried the 'ulama of

Through his close links with Amin al-Sultan, he had charge of

Mashhad, it does not seem to have preoccupied the 'ulama of Tehran. The third point is that salaries and pensions, on which

both materially and for the batronage it brought him 132 ye was

many of the 'ulama and tullab were dependent, were three years in

arrears. This was an unusually long delay and it added to the

general discontent, but it was not a new situation. What was new was the 10 per cent stamp tax which did create discontent. 131 In addition, as previously mentioned, the 'ulama had been unhappy

for some time at the increasing foreign presence in the country and

government business in the shar' courts, which was very profitable

also connected to the British, and charges concerning British subjects and protected persons were referred to him. 133 He preached both in his own mosque in Sar Pulak and the important mosque of

Sipah Salar, which was in the gift of the shah. Tabataba'i came from a long line of religious figures and his family, like those of Bihbihani and the two younger muitahids, Shaikh Murtaza Ashtiyani and Sad al-'Ulama, was firmly estab

58

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

lished in Tehran. From 1883 to 1885 he had studied in Samarra and

while there had corresponded with al-Afghani who urged him to lead the struggle in Iran against oppressive government. After his

'ULAMA IN AJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

59 eroded even further after he protested at the arrest and imprisonment of some brawling students. "Ain al-Daula seized the oppor-

return to Tehran he had associated with reformers, become friends with Amin al-Daula, and been involved in the foundation of a new school, the Madrasa-yi Mubarak-i Islamiyya, which was intended

tunity to make an example of him for interfering in government affairs, and replied to his protest that the government was not responsible to 'Mr Bihbihani'. 141 From then onwards Bihbihani

tionalist 'ulama that the new style of education was in conformity

of Amin al-Sultan.

to strengthen Islam and show both the modernizing and tradi-

with the Muslim religion. Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri was the most learned of the capital's mujahids. He had spent most of his life in the 'Atabat and had not returned to Tehran until 1300. 134 He does not appear to have come from an established Tehran family, his most notable relative being

a muitahid from the "Atabat. He also does not seem to have

earned much from vagf property or bazaar connections, but lived rather on the fees of his shar' duties. In 1897 it was reported that he led a secluded life and was poor but much respected,135 visitors usually found him surrounded by students. 36 He became involved

in the tobacco protest with the other 'ulama, but did not involve

himself in politics again until 1898 when he joined with Mirza Hasan Ashtiyani to oppose the loan policies of Amin al-Daula who was trying to curtail the influence of the 'ulama. 137 In 1902 Shaikh Fazlallah and Tabataba'i both opposed the loan

policies of Amin al-Sultan and actively sought to remove him. They met with others (including Sayyid *Ali Akbar Tafrishi, the old Imam Jum'a, Zain al-Abidin, and 'Ain al-Daula), and wrote letters to the 'ulama of the provinces and the 'Atabat where

Shaikh Fazlallah's cousin, Mirza Muhammad Nuri, was especially active. 3& Amin al-Sultan silenced Tafrishi and others by bribery, but Tabatabai and Shaikh Fazlallah felt strongly that his policies were detrimental to the country and continued to work with Ain al-Daula in opposition. 39 When 'Ain al-Daula came to power in 1903, Tabataba' withdrew from association with him, but Shaikh Fazlallah remained as his major supporter among the 'ulama. In this he was joined by the new Imam Jum'a.

Since Bihbihani was one of the leading partisans of Amin alSultan, 'Ain al-Daula was anxious to reduce his influence. He

therefore removed from his care the responsibility for government

business in the shar' courts and gave it to Shaikh Fazlallah. 140 Association with the government gave Shaikh Fazlallah and the

Imam Jum'a extensive patronage and their following consequently

grew while Bihbihani's influence declined. His position was

did his utmost to subvert the government and work for the return

Early in 1905 Bihbihani and his followers joined with the merchants discontented over the customs reforms. Bihbihani had made no criticism of Naus during the regime of Amin al-Sultan, but on 'Ashura, supported by students in a state of great excitement, he delivered an impassioned address against Naus, saying that the merchants' complaints about him to the shah had been ignored. 142 A photograph of Naus dressed as a mulla was circulated at religious gatherings. Naus was accused by the followers of

Bihbihani of insulting Muslims and taking over the Muslim cus-

toms and Post Office. "Ain al-Daula sent heavy bribes to Bihbihani and the 'ulama of his faction. In addition the government obtained

a telegram from the 'ulama of the 'Atabat in support of their

policies, and the agitation subsided. 143 At about the same time Tabataba'i began to preach against the government, but for much broader and more obviously ideological reasons. He complained that the appalling state of the country was

due to oppression and only regulation by proper laws could bring about improvement. At the same time he encouraged the refor-

mist 'alim, Nazim al-Islam Kirmani, to start a secret society to

work towards constitutionalism. 144 The society began meeting on

19 March 1905. A decision was taken to work on anyone with a grievance against the government, and to contact Bihbihani in particular. '4 Seeing his campaign to undermine 'Ain al-Daula was so far unsuccessful and, moreover, that he was in danger of losing yet more of his influence because he could not afford to pay

his students, Bihbihani welcomed the idea of collaboration with Tabatabai. 14 He sent a message to Tabatabai, who agreed on condition that Bihbihani gave up his limited aim of removing Ain al-Daula and worked for reform. The society founded by Nazim al-Islam was not the only one

active at the time. Since the protest against the tobacco concession there had been occasional reports of secret societies, but very little

is known about them. Malikzada records that his father helped found a secret society in 1904; but his account is suspect, especially as it enhances the role of his father, Malik al-Mutakallimin. 147 The

60

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

'ULAMA IN QAJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

latter was, however, one of a number of middle ranking 'ulama who knew each other and who favoured reform. They included Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani, the preacher Malik al-Mutakallimin, and Yahya Daulatabadi, who had been active in founding a

6 The opposition movement did not get underway until October

new school. Significantly, all these three held somewhat unorthodox religious opinions, Malik al-Mutakallimin and Yahya Daulata-

bastinado on a prominent mujahid for instigating a riot. On 26 October Bihbihani secretly visited Tabatabai's house to discuss the matter and the two mujahids made a firm agreement to

badi being almost certainly Azalis, and Sayyid Jamal al-Din, a freethinker. 148 Another Azali, Shaikh Mahdi Sharif Kashani, mentions that he founded a society with five members to struggle against oppression, but says little more about it. 149 It may be mentioned with regard to the lesser 'ulama that during the nineteenth century virtually the only form of education in Iran

was religious, and many who completed their course of study, entitling them to the name of mulla, did not perform religious duties. Indeed, as Malcolm noted, they did not even class themselves with the priesthood but followed various occupations including scholarly and literary pursuits. 150 A number of the refor-

mist 'ulama in the constitutional period belonged to this group, among them Nazim al-Islam Kirmani, who edited a newspaper before the revolution, and Majd al-Islam who was for a while in the employ of the notable, Sa'd al-Daula, and the merchant, Muin

al-Tujjar.

Nazim al-Islam's society is the only one which is reasonablv reliably documented. It seems to have had eight members all

belonging to the middle ranks of the 'ulama. IS! They apparently

held a variety of opinions from strictly religious viewpoints to

those, such as Filsuf Shiraz's, showing a fair knowledge of West-

ern political developments. Early meetings were largely spent

reading newspapers while members ascertained each others' posi-

tions. Nazim al-Islam remarks on this point that most of those present had previously not read newspapers. In discussions on ganun (law) some seem to mean the sharia, and others not. Loyalty to either the religion or the fatherland vatan was permit-

ted. These 'ulama seemed to have differentiated themselves from

61

1905 mainly because the shah was in Europe for the spring and summer. In October 1905 the governor of Kerman inflicted the

campaign against the government. Their collaboration produced a following of several hundred people which included students, mullas and artisans, and had connections with discontented bureauc-

rats, the clients of Amin al-Sultan, and the major merchants. No detailed programme was given, and, although Tabatabai and the preachers Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani and Malik al-Mutakallimin were seeking reform, the main objective was most likely, as Brown

has stated, the removal of Naus and 'Ain al-Daul 153

Messengers were sent to other members of the 'ulama to try and persuade them to join the opposition against government 'oppression'. But when Tabataba'i's emissaries approached Shaikh Fazlal-

lah, they found his policy differed from theirs. He showed a

concern for order which in the common interest took priority over the grievances of a particular group:

The governor of each province must maintain order in the area. Anybody who disturbs the peace must be punished, whether he be mulla or sayyid, or whatever. Haji Muhammad Riza (the mutahid in Kerman) has been the cause of sedition and revolt. 154

Shaikh Fazlallah also expressed a firm belief in the shah and in the existing system of government, which must not be weakened: I have said the seditious must be punished. We, the people of

Iran, need a shah; we need an Ain al-Daula; we need the bastinado and the executioner. Whether mulla or sayyid we must submit to the government of the shah.

others more senior, and possibly more orthodox, as one of their aims was 'to limit the power of both ministers and mullas'. It was not until the seventh meeting that Nazim al-Islam unveiled the true purpose of the society: to work for consitutionalism (mash-

to the existing form of government. The slogan mashruta-yi

acquired some cohesion in an agreed programme and was attemp-

Fazlallah, and he was not deceived by their attempt to make

ruta) through revolution. 152 By the end of the year the society had

ting to set up cells.

One of the reformers brought up the subject of mashruta, and

linked it with the term mashrua (according to the sharia), to persuade Shaikh Fazlallah that it provided a legitimate alternative

mashru'a was later to be turned against the reformers by Shaikh

mashruta respectable by explaining it as the enforcement of the laws of Islam. He told them: 'Your argument is the same as that in

62

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

the newspapers. Far from being in accordance with the sharia, to advocate mashruta and jumhuriyyat (republicanism), especially in the newspapers, is seditious'.

Indeed Shaikh Fazlallah showed suspicion of any ideological innovation that might undermine faith in the existing system.

'ULAMA IN AJAR IRAN AND REVOLUTION

63

'ulama gathered in the mosque were the deputies of the Imam of the Age (nuvvab-i imam-i zaman) and all were resolved to pluck out the roots of oppression and innovation. He then spoke of the duties of Muslim sultans in establishing justice and prohibiting

injustice, saying: 'If the shah were a true muslim, he would co-

Referring to recent attempts to found schools on modern lines, he said: "Are these new schools not contrary to the sharia? Will entry to them not lead to the overthrow of Islam? Will lessons in foreign languages and the study of chemistry and physics not weaken the students' faith?'

operate with the 'ulama. IS He was interrupted by the Imam Jum'a whose followers set on him and on Bihbihani. The opposition thus had their hand forced, and Tabataba'i feared disorders leading to bloodshed which he and Bihbihani were always anxious to avoid. He was also aware that the 'ulama might be charged with support-

and reforms of "in al-Daula. The telegram which came from

ing merchants who put up the price of sugar, and discredited in the eves of the common people. '57 Evidently a sizeable section of the

Ali Akbar Burujirdi, and was signed by one of his connections, Muhammad Kazim Tabataba'i Yazdi, a very learned and highly respected member of the shrine 'ulama, as well as by Akhund

population had no sympathy for the merchants, and the opposition

Shaikh Fazlallah evidently firmly supported the retrenchment

Najaf in March 1905 was sent in reply to a letter from an associate,

Mulla Khurasani, another leading mujtahid. It stated that since the appointment of 'Ain al-Daula many beneficial reforms had taken

ulama feared being overwhelmed by a mob incited by •Ain alDaula and the Imam Jum'a. On the other hand, Tabatabai could not take the alternative course of deserting the merchants as they were subsidizing the opposition. So he decided to take sanctuary

for a few days along with Bihbihani and their followers, in the Shrine of Hazrat "Abd al-'Azim.

The constitutionalist sources state that in al-Daula made

Shaikh Fazlallah privy to the affairs of state and consulted him on matters of policy. There is no record, however, of his intervening

on a single political event of any importance. Yet he clearly

believed that the 'ulama should be consulted and should make an effort to keep abreast of the times. Asked by a reformer if a mulla

of 300 years ago would be useful to the people nowadays, he replied: 'Certainly not. A mulla nowadays must be aware of the exigencies of the times and well-informed on international relations'.

7The first major outburst of popular unrest came in December 1905

8 In this way the reform programmes begun by the government in 1897-8, and especially the highly successful customs reforms, pro-

duced a steadily rising series of protests culminating in the campaign to have Naus removed during 1905, which in turn led to the revolution. The increase in customs dues was born largely by the

major merchants. The government of 'Ain al-Daula also raised other taxes particularly affecting the population of Tehran. As in the pattern of many previous protests what was really discontent by a variety of groups was led ostensibly by the 'ulama and took on

a religious form. The government reforms of the turn of the

Mashhad. The punishment was represented by the opposition as a

century may be viewed as a continuation of the attempts at centralization during the second half of the nineteenth century which had already brought the state into conflict with privileged groups. like the 'ulama. One new note, however, was the beginning of the idea that if the government increased its revenues, it must also account

great injustice on the part of 'Ala al-Daula, governor of Tehran. Merchants went in groups to the leading 'ulama to ask them to

Revolution.

when a group of merchants were bastinadoed for having raised the

price of sugar in Tehran after they had heard by telegram that prices had increased in Russia, and consequently in Rasht and

protest. The Imam Jum'a called a meeting at the Masjid-i Shah at

which Sayyid Jamal al-Din spoke. He began by saying that the

for them. This was to be one of the themes of the Constitutional

However, the 'ulama of Tehran did not respond to government policy as one. Apart from those of heterodox persuasion there were three main groups: the first, amounting to perhaps a third of

64

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

'ulama was represented chiefly by Shaikh Fazlallah and supported

government policy; the second, a small one, was led by Tabataba

and favoured reform; the third, probably the most substantial,

followed Bihbihani, and were in league with the major merchants, their main objectives being the abolition of the customs reforms and other increases in taxation.

The position of Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri, as well as the motives of Bihbihani and his group, offers evidence in refutation of Algar's view that the Constitutional Revolution was the culmination of a long period of conflict between the 'ulama and a state they considered illegitimate. Indeed the single piece of evidence to support

his argument from this period is the speech made in December 1905 by Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani, who was not a mujtahid, but a preacher of unorthodox views. The position of Shaikh Fazlallah's

and Bihbihani's groups, in other words of the majority of the

'ulama, must also lead to questioning of Lambton's view that the movement was a demand for the restoration of just and righteous

government. IS It can thus be argued that the protest of 1905 happened not because what had formerly existed had gone wrong

but because something new and alien had appeared in Iranian political life, and that was a European means of government that required higher taxation. Finally, it is worth noting that there is as yet no evidence for a constitutional movement before 1906 apart from small groups of reformers who met for discussion.

3 Tabataba'i and the Campaign for

Reform

Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai was the leading exponent of reformist ideology among the mutahids in Iran itself, and the constitutionalist writers set him apart from all the other 'ulama.' Although to all appearances the 'ulama as a group were to request reform in 1905-6, most particularly in the form of a demand for an 'adalat-

khana, or house of justice, it has been shown in the previous

chapter that they were primarily concerned with the dismissal of Naus and 'Ain al-Daula. The presence of Tabataba'i as a reformer among the 'ulama helped advance the cause of political change, which was otherwise instigated and supported largely by laymen. Tabataba'i had been influenced from his youth by the reformist movement which included such writers as Malkum Khan and Maid al-Mulk, and such practical reformers as Sipah Salar. He had read

works by modernizing thinkers, most notably Maraghai and

Kawakibi. Among his ideas was a demand for justice, which on the surface would seem to emanate from the traditional Shi'ite view of

the state as oppressive and unjust, but though the influence of Shi'ism cannot be precluded, it was from European thought that Tabataba'i derived his views. In this chapter an attempt will be made to analyse the origins of Tabataba'i's ideological viewpoint

and objectives, as well as to consider his role in the political

process. He did not leave behind any substantial written work, but his ideas are embodied in his recorded letters and speeches, dating

mainly from 1906. Tabataba'i was born in 1257 (1840-1) the son to Sayyid Sadig Tabatabai, also a well-known mujahid. His relatives were mostly

members of the 'ulama, and the family appear to have been established in one of the mosques in the bazaar. He began his studies under his father, who probably influenced him to take an

65

66

ISLAM AND MODERNISM interest in reformist ideas from an early age. Sayyid Sadig was

reputed to have belonged to Malkum Khan's Faramushkhana, the group founded in 1859 to make people familiar with modern ideas

and development.? The effort made by Malkum to recruit Sayid Sadiq derived from his tactic of identifying reform with religion. Tabataba'i himself was accused of being a Freemason," but there was no properly constituted lodge in Iran before that founded by Adib al-Mamalik in 1908. Malkum Khan's Faramushkhana was

loosely based on Freemasonry and as a result there has been confusion between the two organizations. As Algar has pointed out, the idea of Freemasonry, with its semi-secret bonds, fitted into the pattern of Iranian political life, with the difference that it provided a greater degree of organization. It is possible that, with his father's links with the Faramushkhana, Tabataba'i as a young

man entered into this milieu. Another influence on Tabataba'i in his youth was the enlightened mujtahid, Shaikh Had Najmabadi, who, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, held daily discussions attended by people

of all ranks. He had links with both Malkum Khan and Afghani,

whose associates participated at these meetings. He was at heart a free-thinker who used to inveigh against the government, meaning the shah, his family and courtiers, accusing them of oppression and

extortion - a view also held of course by secular reformers. He was conscious of Iran's weakness and misrule as compared to Europe, and believed that the corruption and self interest of government officials were leading to injustice and oppression. Similar ideas were to be voiced by Tabatabai. In Namabadi's opinion Islam had strayed from the right path and become distorted. He was critical of other 'ulama to a rare degree, saying people should not follow them if they acted from impious motives. *He noted that people were often aware of the defects of the 'ulama but nevertheless adhered to them because of mutual benefits. He also questioned the manner in which the 'ulama authenticated and

interpreted hadith to favour their own views. These were unorthodox ideas, and Tabataba'i is reported to have denounced Najmabadi as heretical, and Sayyid Sadig to have issued a takfir (excommunication) against him. It may be that whilst sharing Najmabadi's reformist opinions, Tabataba'i found his freedom of thought on religious matters abhorrent.

During his period in Samarra from 1883 to 1895 Tabataba'i

came under the influence of Afghani's campaign to encourage the 'ulama to fight for the protection of Islamic lands against infidels.?

TABATABAI AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR REFORM 67 Afghani does not seem to have urged on Tabatabai the panIslamic idea of joining other Muslim countries in the struggle against European incursions, or looking to the Ottoman Sultan as the leader of all Muslims. Whether influenced by Afghani or not,

one of Tabataba'i's major objectives was to save Shi'ism from infidel aggression. Pan-Islamic ideas were current in Iran at the turn of the century, touching even Shaikh Fazlallah.* At the time of the Russian loans there was much talk amongst the 'ulama of appealing to the Sultan against Amin al-Sultan, but it was probably more with the idea of frightening their own government, and discouraging European interference, than anything else.

Tabataba'i states in his memoir that from 1895 he worked for constitutionalism (mashruta) and for the establishment of a na-

tional consultative assembly (majlis-i shaura-vi milli) but that Nasir al-Din Shah sent messages asking him not to mention the matter in his sermons as Iran was not ready for it.' Unfortunately Tabataba'i was old and ill when he wrote this memoir in 1911 and the account it gives of events before 1906 is brief and not very coherent. The

clearest, and probably most reliable exposition of his aims and

ideas before the revolution is to be found in the record of a conversation he held with Nazim al-Islam in February 1905, before

the latter founded his secret society. *

1The conversation opened with Tabataba'i complaining to Nazim

al-Islam that he had been striving for progress in Iran for the past eight years, from 1897. He had started discussions on the subject and educational projects to awaken the people and had worked for the exile of Amin al-Sultan who had quashed these endeavours; now Amin al-Sultan had been replaced by 'Ain al-Daula whom he considered ill-informed and oppressive. At this point Nazim alIslam raised the problem of who else could govern the country.

Tabataba'i replied that: "The problem of Iran cannot be solved until it has a constitutional government (mashruta) with a fundamental law (ganun-i asasi). Despotism will (then) be overthrown and reform (islah) and good order (intizam) will be intro-

duced.

But constitutionalism could not be introduced until people were aware of their national rights (huguq-i milli). If people understood

68

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

their rights they would never again have to live under oppression (zulm) and injustice (jaur). Nazim al-Islam asked how and when Iran should have constitutional government, to which Tabataba'i replied: 'When people have knowledge and are awakened from their ignorance. Then they will comprehend not only their rights

but understand the meaning of nationhood (milliyyat) and nationality (gaumiyyat), and realize that what is to the advantage of the country affects all its citizens.' Knowledge and education

TABATABAI AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR REFORM

69

understood their meaning. Conditions in Iran were not yet ripe for

constitutionalism and it was still a long term objective. The key was education, most particularly in people's rights. It is not fully

clear from this discussion how far Tabataba'i understood the working of constitutional government or exactly what was meant by the terms mashruta and hugug-i milli. It is evident, however, that they were intended to uproot the oppression and misgovernment that

were the key to the whole problem, but unfortunately time was short and the country was in grave peril. The people must be

were weakening the country. It is also evident that, like so many other reformers of the period, Tabataba'i failed to see the contradiction between his advocacy of a more populist form of govern-

jahida) of Islam and their homeland (vatan).

ment and the associated demand for the state to take a more active role in modernizing the country, which of course assumed a strong

induced to unite and work together in the service and struggle(mu-

Tabataba'i's ideas about the link between knowledge and political

progress reflect the views of Malkum Khan and of Yusif Khan Mustashar al-Daula, the author of Yak kalima, who had both spoken of the need to make people aware of their rights and to awaken them from their ignorance." But the influence of the

secular reformists and Western notions becomes even more striking when, having completed his reply, Tabataba'i passed to Nazim

al Islam the Siyahatnama-yi Ibrahim Big (The Travels of Ibrahim

Big), written circa 1890, which he had just been reading and which he strongly recommended to his companion. 12 The author of this

book, Zain al-Abidin Maraghai, came from a merchant family, lived in Cairo and Istanbul, and was himself influenced by the ideas of Malkum Khan. Much of it is a commentary on the dis-

order prevailing in Iran at the time and the lack of laws (gavanin); it also laments the extreme weakness of the country and its consequent vulnerability to foreign interference. Maragha'i speaks of the need for people to know their rights (huguq) which, following eighteenth and nineteenth century European political theory, he

defines as the protection of life, property and honour against

oppression, both internal and external. 13 He also argues that the country's problems can only be resolved through national unity and that the people should achieve this by gathering together in a consultative assembly (mailis-i shaura) 14

The discussion between Tabatabai and Nazim al-Islam ended with Tabataba'i recommending that Nazim al-Islam begin a campaign to educate people to understand their rights, to be carried out through associations and societies at which those who were progressive (mutamiddin) could discuss the problems of the home-

land. The most immediate practical problem with his objectives

was that it would take time to achieve them because so few people

executive. When he founded the society that Tabataba'i had advocated Nazim al-Islam stressed the advantage of acting while it had the support of a mujahid such as Tabataba'i who was 'so knowledgeable and aware; he reads foreign books, understands politics, and

knows about international law. IS There is not, however, much evidence that Tabataba'i was influenced by a direct reading of

Western political thought. He had indeed studied French, and one of his vocabulary lists including the word patrie has come to light; 16

but it is doubtful that he read difficult works in that language. He requested the British legation to find out if a Persian translation of

Gustave le Bon's La civilisation arabe existed? and it is most

probable that he read other books in translation. 18 There is no evidence that he knew Ottoman, but as a mujahid he was familiar with Arabic and it is almost certain that he had read the work of an

influential Arab modernist, Kawakibi who belonged to the circle of Afghani and 'Abduh. Kawakibi's Taba'i al-istibdad (The Characteristics of Tyranny), was published in Cairo in 1904 and did not

appear in Persian translation until 1907.19 Partially based on A. Alfieri's Della Tirannide, the Taba' is an analysis of tyranny, how it grew and thrived, and how both oppressors and oppressed became the victims of fear.20

2 In his memoirs Tabataba'i states that the aim of the meeting called

in the Masid-i Shah on 14 December to protest the bastinadoing of the sugar merchants was to press for the creation of a mailis-i 'adalar (Council of Justice).21 But Tabataba'i refers here to his

own purpose - among the 'ulama only some members of his

70

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

family and a few others, mainly heterodox, thought as he did.

Bihbihani and the main body of the 'ulama joined the meeting but

despite Tabataba'i's condition that they work for reform their

purpose was still, almost certainly, the dismissal of "Ain al-Daula.

About 2,000 people participated in the bast at Hazrat 'Abd al-Azim which began after the meeting in mid December was broken up by the Imam Jum'a's followers and lasted until 12 January 1906. Among them were a number who were in some way

related to Tabatabai and Bihbihani. Thus Bihbihani was accompanied by his son-in-law Muhsin, and the latter's brother, the muitahid Sadr al-'Ulama. Another son-in-law, 'Itimad al-Islam,

was active in the movement. Tabataba brought with him his

brother, Sayyid Ahmad, with his family as well as his own sons, Abu' Qasim and Muhammad Sadiq. He was also accompanied by the mujtahid Murtaza Ashtiyani, and the latter's brother, Mustafa.

Generally Tabataba'i and Bihbihani acted as the spokesmen for their following so it is difficult to ascertain if individual members had a different standpoint. Among the other followers of Bihbi-

hani and Tabataba'i were many students as well as several mutahids.

One such was Mirza Muhammad Riza Qummi, said to have come from the 'Atabat at the same time as Tabatabai, and considered one of the most learned and respected of the 'ulama of Tehran.22

He later withdrew from even slight involvement in politics and may be considered an example of a learned but apolitical 'alim. Another was Sayid Jamal al-Din Afia'i, an elderly and respected mujahid, who scorned wordly power and spoke in a derogatory

fashion of the shah.23 Also among those who made an exodus were

well known preachers and a number of lesser mullas. They were joined by students from the theological schools including those under the control of the Imam Jum'a, as well as by Shaikh Mahdi, son of Shaikh Fazlallah, who professed support for the opposition movement and was on bad terms with his father. A limited number

of merchants accompanied them, most preferring to keep a low profile, and they also had a following from the guilds. In all the

TABATABAI AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR REFORM

71

al-Din, a descendant of Fath 'Ali Shah and "Ain al-Daula's chief

confidant among the 'ulama;25 and Sayyid Raihanallah, a mujtahid

who had been active in the movement to replace Amin al-Sultan

by 'Ain al-Daula.

An organization was set up to supply the bastis with provisions.

Funds were collected from bazaar sources by two brothers, Hajj Muhammad Tagi and Hajj Muhammad Husain Bunakdar. 26 Expenses for subsistence, such as food, tea, tanbaku (tobacco) and cigarettes were disbursed from their fund. But the highest contributions to the funding of the bast came from the notables, who may be divided into three groups. The first were aspirants to the throne,

including Salar al-Daula, who sent a large sum through Malik al-Mutakallimin; Muhammad 'Ali Mirza, the valiahd who dis-

trusted and detested 'Ain al-Daula is also said to have sent a large contribution in the belief that the bast was largely directed against the sadr-i a'zam. The second group were the family and clients of Amin al-Sultan who, according to Browne, provided the very large sum of 30,000 tomans.27 The third group consisted of reformist members of the elite who wanted a change in the form of govern-

ment. It included the foreign minister, Mushir al-Daula, and his

sons, Mushir al-Mulk and Mutamin al-Mulk, Sani' al-Daula, Mukhbir al-Saltana, Sad al-Daula and Nasir al-Mulk. Mushir al-Daula's name occurs prominently in all accounts. Nazim al-

Islam, for instance, says that he and his sons gave much assistance

to the 'ulama,28 and Shaikh Mahdi Sharif reports that he was

detailed by Mushir al-Daula to pass on 500 tomans to Bihbihani so he would persevere in the bast 29

The encouragement of these political factions was to be more

consistent than that of the bazaar. The support of the guilds flagged, and when Malik al-Mutakallimin tried to raise more

money in the latter part of the bast the merchants would give him next to nothing. By that time it was fairly clear that they were not

going to dislodge 'Ain al-Daula and Naus. On the other hand,

bastis numbered about 2,000. After the departure to the Shrine the shah removed some of the vagf property from the charge of those

according to Grant Duff in February the 'ulama were still receiving moral and pecuniary support from high officials, one of whom he

muitahids who had gone and gave it to those who remained. Of the 'ulama who remained in Tehran and continued to support 'Ain al-Daula, Shaikh Fazlallah and the Imam Jum'a were by far the most important. Others included Shaikh Mirza Abu Talib

The manner in which the money was disbursed depended on the amount and source. All small amounts and contributions from the

Zanjani, a mujtahid who was exceptionally well-informed on Western ideas and in the confidence of Ain al-Daula;24 Saif

named as Sad al-Daula.

merchants were given to the Bunakdar brothers. Large amounts from outside sources, such as the followers of Amin al-Sultan, were received directly by the leading ulama and divided among them. One of the lesser 'ulama told Nazim al-Islam that the only

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

money he received was 60 tomans from Tabataba'i for daily expenses. A certain amount of the cost was borne by the wealthier 'ulama themselves. Tabataba'i's brother complained that he had to

pay out 1,000 tomans in the first two weeks or so of the bast.

3"Ain al-Daula responded to the situation with the usual govern-

ment policy of quelling 'ulama opposition through a combination of threats and financial inducements. A week after the 'ulama left, Amir Bahadur Jang, the minister of court, was sent with a company of armed men to bring them back. A serious incident occurred when Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afja'i referred to the shah as an ass.

Fearing bloodshed, Tabataba'i agreed to return to Tehran with Amir Bahadur, but certain of those in sanctuary who feared for their lives prevented him from doing so by dragging the leading muitahids into the sanctuary and surrounding them. The sadr-i a'zam also tried to separate Tabataba'i from Bihbihani with a bribe, and even succeeded in winning over the former's brother Ahmad, who, however, did not have sufficient influence to sway the 'ulama. Contemporary accounts suggest that of all the 'ulama Bihbihani was the most determined not to emerge without some

advantage over 'Ain al-Daula. When threats and financial inducements failed a process of bargaining began. The 'ulama were asked what they wanted and submitted a list of requests to be given to the shah. Two accounts

of the content of this list remain, or are so far known: those of Nazim al-Islam and of Yahya Daulatabadi. A third, by Malikzada,

TABATABA'I AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR REFORM 73 road. 'Asghar Garichi was annoying the 'ulama of Oumm and the request was calculated to win their support. 4 Compensation for the mujahid punished in Kerman. 30

This list probably represents the wishes of a minority of the 'ulama anxious to extricate themselves from the shrine. The

second, said to be more representative, was the same, except that it included one more condition: the dismissal of the sadr-i a zam, "Air al-Daula. 31 Nazim al-Islam states this was the primary aim of

the 'ulama, and, it may be added, of most of their supporters as

well. But 'Ain al-Daula managed to prevent the fifth condition from reaching the shah and the 'ulama found it impossible to circumvent him. It is to be noted that no request for reform is included on the lists mentioned. It is fairly certain that Tabataba'i and his small circle desired reforms but they were very much in a

minority.

When the 'ulama's requests were rejected, they declined to leave

the shrine. Meanwhile, Bihbihani was trying to find a way round *Ain al-Daula, and to establish direct contact with the shah, who was less resolute and not antagonistic on account of personal opposition. He sent a book and a note explaining the position of the 'ulama to the Ottoman ambassador, Shams al-Din Beg, asking him to see the shah on their behalf. 32 The ambassador had long been resident in Tehran, had many connections among the notables and was reputed to hold the Iranian government in profound contempt. 33 Initially, he declined to intervene in the matter, but was later persuaded to change his mind through the intervention of

is largely based on Daulatabadi's. The accounts are sketchy, confused and conflicting, so an attempt will be made to analyse them

Yahya Daulatabadi and his brother, who were personal friends. Daulatabadi was a dedicated reformer deeply involved in the events of the Constitutional Revolution. He claims to have begun

in detail.

writing his memoirs as early as 1310/1892-3, and at least part of his

According to Nazim al-Islam two lists were submitted through Ahmad Tabatabai. The first, made secretly with the agreement of only a few others, included the following conditions:

1 Dismissal of 'Ala al-Daula, governor of Tehran whose punishment of merchants for raising the price of sugar had triggered the agitation. 2 Dismissal of Zafar al-Saltana, governor of Kerman whose bastinadoing of a mutahid was taken by the 'ulama as a primary example of 'oppression'.

3 Removal of Asgar Garichi, the conveyancer on the Qumm

work was known to Nazim al-Islam in 1911. Though Daulatabadi

was well-informed on the movements of political factions, his work

is marred by a tendency to exaggerate his own role in events. He

alleges he won the ambassador over on the grounds that his intervention would bring about reform. He also states in his

account that he received from the 'ulama the following demands to pass to the ambassador:

1 Dismissal of 'Ala al-Daula, governor of Tehran.

2 Dismissal of Naus from the customs and other offices. 3 Amnesty for the followers of the 'ulama on their return to the

city.

74

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

4 Return of the confiscated vagf property. 5 Removal of 'Asgar Garichi from the Qumm road. 6 Compensation for the Kerman mutahid. 7 Abolition of the 10 per cent stamp tax. 34

Though longer than the first list, this still did not include a

request for reform. Daulatabadi claims that since he had

approached the ambassador on the grounds that he was acting in

the cause of reform, he could not have presented him with a list representative only of the interests of the 'ulama. He was contem-

plating this problem in the Ottoman ambassador's office, when,

fortuitously, the ambassador left the room. Fortunately, there was a blank piece of paper left on his desk, so Daulatabadi rewrote the

list adding the deliberately ambiguous phrase: 'Qarardadi dar islah-i kullivya-yi umur ba ru'ayat-i huguq-i 'ulama.' (Agreement to reform in all affairs with consideration to the rights of the 'ulama).

Thus revised, the demands of the bastis (those in sanctuary) were passed from the Ottoman ambassador to the shah through Mushir al-Daula, and returned with agreement to all the first six

TABATABAI AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR REFORM 75 al-Islam. The list was submitted through the ambassador and included the following conditions: 1 Removal of Asgar Garichi from the Qumm road. 2 Compensation for the Kerman mutahid. 3 Return of the vagf property confiscated from some of the 'ulama who had gone into bast. 4 The establishment of an 'adalatkhana in every province which would redress the grievances of the subjects, and conduct itself

in a just and suitable manner. 5 The execution of the law of Islam for each individual regardless of anyone (in other words, impartially). 6 The dismissal of Naus from his directorship of the customs and

finance.

7 The dismissal of *Ala al-Daula, governor of Tehran. 8 Abolition of the 10 per cent stamp tax on government salaries and pensions. 35

tion a clarification was demanded. Daulatabadi and fellow reformers such as Malik al-Mutakallimin therefore held a meeting at

The demand for an 'adalatkhana was not welcome to the government but the 'ulama had dropped their goal of removing 'Ain al-Daula himself, and might also be persuaded to forego the dismissal of Naus. "Ain al-Daula, therefore, opened his own negotia-

Daulatabadi recounts):

tions with them through his nephew, Amir Khan Sardar. It was agreed that the four younger 'ulama who were involved in the

conditions except for the dismissal of Naus. For the seventh condi-

which they redrafted the seventh condition as follows (or so In order to carry out reforms in all affairs it is necessary to establish a council of justice (divan-i 'adalat) in conformity with the law of Islam as compiled in a book (kitab), and a national consultative assembly (majlis-i shaura-yi milli) to ensure that the law be executed equally in all parts of Iran so that there can be no difference between high and low, and all

may obtain redress of their grievances. The list with the newly drafted seventh condition and the shah's comments was sent to the 'ulama with the admonition that negotiations could go no further unless there was some general request

for reform. The 'ulama returned the revised list only slightly amended and it was once more passed to the Ottoman ambassa-

dor.

Nazim al-Islam gives only a condensed version of this stage

negotiations should meet 'Ain al-Daula on 9 January. The following day a rescript was issued granting the requests of the 'ulama

(except for the dismissal of Naus and 'Ain al Daula) and prom-

ising: The establishment of a state house of justice ('adalatkhana-yi

daulati) to execute the laws of the sharia and ensure the security of the subjects is our foremost objective. To carry out this sacred objective, the law of Islam, which consists of the establishment of the boundaries and the execution of the

precepts of the sharia, must be enforced immediately throughout the land. There shall be no difference in the

treatment of subjects, regardless of their status; nor shall considerations of personal interest play any part in the execution of the law. Clarification of the law will be given in a code

saying that a final list was submitted for the shah's attention after consultations involving Daulatabadi and his brother, the Ottoman

shortly to be issued, which will be in conformity with the

ambassador, and the four younger leading 'ulama - Abu' Qasim Tabatabai, Mirza Mustafa Ashtiyani, Mirza Muhsin and I'timad

The body to be set up was thus an 'adalatkhana. The description of the law as the sharia was probably convenient to most, and literally

sharia. Its provisions will be enforced in all the provinces. 36

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

TABATABAI AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR REFORM

believed by many. The 'ulama returned to Tehran on 12 January seated in honour in the royal carriages except, that is, for Sayyid

Devlet or Council of State. One of the main purposes of this

76

Jamal al-Din Afja'i, who travelled on a mule. The confusion over what exactly the 'ulama had asked for is illustrated in both the British and Belgian sources. Grant Duff reported on 28 December that the 'ulama had asked for some form of representation of the people'. But he was being fed information by secular reformers and even translated as authentic a leaflet distributed in the bazaar that purported to emanate from

the 'ulama and asked for a full constitutional government.

Although the British translation of the rescript refers to the 'adalatkhana as 'courts of justice', the accompanying memorandum reports the concession as 'a representative assembly' to be composed probably of government officials, mullas and merchants. 38 The Belgians reported that the reform was intended 'to create a

Higher Tribunal in every important town as well as a kind of

Council of the Empire which will be engaged in discussing legal projects'.39 It was also to watch over the administration.

4 To attempt to understand the significance of the term 'adalatkha-

na, and how it emerged on the 'ulama's list of requests, it is

necessary to consider briefly its previous use in the second half of

the nineteenth century.

The term occurred in attempts at legal reform in 1860 when, following a proposal in Malkum Khan's council of reform an

'adalatkhana was established. 40 It constituted part of a reorganiza-

tion of the Ministry of Justice and aimed at prohibiting provincial governors from interfering in judicial affairs. It consisted of a high court in the capital and an independent presiding judge in each

province, who was responsible only to Tehran. The reform was obstructed by provincial governors and proved fruitless. In the 1870s, under Sipah Salar, a similar reform was attempted. The Ministry of Justice was again reorganized with tribunals adalat-

khanaha) in the provinces, responsible for counteracting the illegal

acts of government officials.* These reforms were part of an overall thrust to secure centralization of government. There is strong evidence that Sipah Salar was influenced by the Ottoman reforms of the Tanzimat. In the 1860s and 1870s the Ottomans were in the process of reforming their legal system, and among the

measures they introduced was a body known as the Shura-yi

77

institution was to judge government officials accused of misconduct and to render the executive more efficient. 42 The Shura-vi

Devlet was modelled on the Conseil de l'Etat of France, the

pinnacle of a system of special courts of law whose purpose was to

investigate and adjudicate complaints against the government administration.43It was introduced after the French Revolution to complete the process of centralization in France. Sipah Salar's reorganized Ministry of Justice shows similarities with both these bodies. The most significant feature they shared was a system of

tribunals established throughout the provinces under a central body in the capital to which the government administration was accountable. The reforms of the Sipah Salar were short lived as they lapsed after his fall in 1873, but an attempt on the practical side to revive some of his measures was made by Amin al-Daula in 1893. At this time an order was given to the Ministry of Commerce and Justice to set up an 'adalatkhana to deal correctly and firmly with trials, and to protect the rights of the subject. The 'adalatkhana was also

to reorganize the government courts.44 It thus combined in a slightly confused way the functions of administering justice and watching over the executive. Meanwhile in 1890, Malkum Khan had repeated in his newspaper Oanun his earlier calls for a more

regular system of justice. He demanded government according to the law and called for security and protection from oppression by

properly regulated tribunals of justice, again using the term 'adalatkhanaha.4S In a later edition published the same year he pointed to the Ottoman law reforms and compared the progress in

the making of laws and the organizing of 'adalatkhanaha in the Ottoman Empire with the anarchic and oppressive system in

Iran. 46 Thus up to 1905 the word 'adalatkhana had two basic meanings:

the first was a system of tribunals under the Ministry of Justice with the function of watching over the provincial authorities and obtaining redress of grievances against them; the word could also

be used to refer to a single one of these tribunals. The term is really a concept dear to reformist bureaucrats. In France and in the Ottoman Empire such bodies had been instruments in the process of centralization of government. The creation of a modern centralized state was also one of the primary aims of the reformers

who put forward proposals for an 'adalatkhang in Iran in the second half of the nineteenth century.

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

5 To return to the events of 1905-6, three accounts or possibilities

remain as to where the idea of the 'adalatkhana came from. The first is that it was put forward by Tabataba'i. Nazim al-Islam says

that he repeatedly mentioned the idea of an 'adalatkhana to Taba-

taba' before the departure to the shrine. 47 Tabatabai's own

account is brief and not very clear:

I wrote down whatever anybody wanted, for example, that the Madrasa-yi Khan Marvi should be taken back from the imam juma, and 'Asgar Garichi should be removed from the Qumm road. The purpose, however, was a majlis-i adalat, to which they agreed. Then 'Ain al-Daula obstructed our re. quests, and we went to Oumm. 48

It should be noted that he used the term majlis-i 'adalat, and not

'adalatkhana. As will be discussed further below, Tabatabai's

mailis-i 'adalat was different to the term 'adalatkhana as used by previous reformers. One of its features was that all sections of the populace should participate in it, and in this respect it is distinct from the 'adalatkhana of the rescript. It therefore seems improbable that the proposal for an 'adalatkhana came from Tabataba'i and it may be assumed that his goals were initially overshadowed by the preoccupations of the main body of the bastis, namely to

remove Naus and 'Ain al-Daula.

The second possibility is that the idea came from Daulatabadi. But Daulatabadi uses the term divan-i 'adalat not 'adalatkhana. Furthermore, his account inflates the importance of his own role

and contains fortuitous, and therefore, suspect elements. It is improbable that the leaders of the 'ulama would have accepted

such a major change from a person of comparative insignificance, even on the grounds Daulatabadi gives. It must also be noted that his account was published after two of the major participants in events, Bihbihani and Mushir al-Daula were dead, and the Ottoman ambassador was no longer in Tehran.

The third account of how the 'adalatkhana was included in the

requests of the 'ulama is to be found in the memoirs of Hai Shaikh

Mahdi Sharif, who was a follower of Bihbihani and possibly an Azali. 4 According to him the idea came from members of the

higher bureaucracy who were in contact with Bihbihani and who. in the spring of 1905 during the campaign against Naus, sent him a message telling him to ask for an 'adalatkhana to reform the affairs

of the country.St

TABATABAI AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR REFORM

79

Shaikh Mahdi does not name the bureaucrats involved and provides no further specific evidence for his assertion. Neverthe-

less of the three accounts his is the most acceptable. The word

'adalatkhana was a term familiar to bureaucrats, and implicit in the wording of the rescript is the old aim of reforming bureaucrats - to

control the executive, particularly the provincial authorities.

Furthermore, as we have seen, senior bureaucrats actively sup-

ported the 'ulama while they were in the bast. Finallv the reformist bureaucrats, especially Mushir al-Daula who was the only one of

them in power at the time, were in a position to influence the

leaders of the bastis in a way that a man like Daulatabadi was not. Mushir al-Daula, according to Tabatabai, assisted him greatly in passing his requests to the shah. Others wrote to Bihbihani while

he was in bast telling him not to be tricked into submission and after the return of the 'ulama to Tehran, thanked him for what he had done. Significantly, perhaps, some months later the wellconnected mulla, Saif al-Din, told Churchill that 'other and more

far-seeking people gave the clergy the idea of asking for a code of laws and other liberal institutions. 52

With regard to Bihbihani himself, it may be noted that the

question of the 'adalatkhana was not raised until it became appa-

rent that the 'ulama were not in a strong enough position to remove 'Ain al-Daula. Shaikh Mahdi reports that Bihbihani was

determined to come out of the shrine with some advantage - even

in the face of considerable difficulties in financing the bast and controlling his following. The request for the 'adalatkhana enabled

him to maintain his prestige and it may be that he was more instrumental in putting the reform on the list than Tabatabai. For the 'ulama as a whole the rescript granting the 'adalatkhana was a means whereby they and the government could come to terms in a dangerous crisis. The government, while making concessions such as the removal of the stamp tax, had refused to give

way on the most important points - the dismissal of Naus and "Ain al-Daula. The 'ulama for their part had escaped from a difficult position with their prestige enhanced and the safety of their followers guaranteed. But in the period following the return from the bast they showed little enthusiasm for the 'adalatkhana. Rumours began to spread that, once it was established, they would

have to 'close shop'; that is to say, much of their legal business would be curtailed. Yet pressure from their following of merchants, guildsmen, theological students and reformers obliged them to pursue the matter. Contemporary events in Russia were

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

being closely watched and discussed, particularly among the tullab

who, hearing that the Russian people were trying to obtain their 'freedom', began openly to demand 'freedom' themselves.53

"Ain al-Daula, as before, played on divisions among the 'ulama and offered them financial inducements to desist. Some of the

younger ulama used the popular ferment to further their own

ambitions. Sadr al-'Ulama professed himself in sympathy with the

theological students and acquired the largest following among 54 He and like-minded colleagues formed a faction known as

the Islamic Circle (Hauza-yi Islami) to press for the execution of the shah's rescript. The Islamic Circle demanded a say in the code

of laws, a major part of which was to be a translation of the Ottoman law codes. The government recognized that judgement

in sharia affairs would have to be dealt with by the 'ulama but resisted any further participation by them in the matter. Moreover, when in the spring Ain al-Daula passed the 'ulama the section of the code dealing with the sharia he did so in the hope that it would create disagreement among them and responsibility for delay in the reform could be placed at their door.55

TABATABAI AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR REFORM 81 opportunity. They vent their anger and greed on whomsoever they

wish and beat and kill and mutilate . .. Thousands of Iranians

have fled abroad from the oppression of the governors and state

officials to become porters and labourers, and they die in an abject

state.' Elaborating on the same theme in his speech Tabataba'i called for justice, presenting it as a legitimate Shiite demand: 'The prophets and the saints have commanded justice . . . Justice is emphasized in the Koran and the message of the Prophet.' In another passage he identified the main problems of Iran as iniustice, disunity and tyranny: 'Some say the disease is injustice and its cure is justice. Some say the disease is association (shirk) and the cure is oneness (tauhid). Some say the disease is tvranny (zulm) and its cure is deliberation (shaur) and consultation (mashvarat).' Here Tabataba'i's phraseology would suggest a religious origin; but in fact his terms were borrowed from the Taba'i 'al-istibdad where Kawakibi speaks of despotism as shirk, which is the sharing of the despot in God's powers, and its remedy as tauhid, a belief in

God's oneness.® The metaphors of disease and cure may also derive from Kawakibi who used them to describe the problems of

6 During April and May 1906 the situation remained uneasy but

Eastern countries.

al-Daula to act for the same reason that he himself was acting: 'for

shah and sadr-i azam, not the Russians, the Ottomans or the British.' Iran was so weak that it faced extinction and one of the

quiet. Sometime in the spring Tabataba'i wrote to Ain al-Daula reminding him of his promise to institute reforms.§ He urged 'Ain

this is a great work and will cause my name to be written in the pages of posterity.' At about the end of May he wrote a second

letter directly to the shah. 57 Neither letter elicited any response, so

in June, when an agitator named Mahdi Gavkush was arrested for

seditious activity and seriously ill-treated, Tabataba'i took the

opportunity to deliver a long speech from the pulpit on the state of

the country and the need for reform.$8 His two letters and his speech give further expression to the ideas expounded to Nazim al-Islam at the beginning of 1905 as well as further evidence of their secular origins. A theme of all three documents was the oppression (istibdad) exercised by governors and other state officials which Tabatabai, in common with other reformers, identified as the bane of Iran. Repeating views found in the Siyahatnama-yi Ibrahim Big, in parts almost word for word,59 he described istibdad as follows: 'They

(the governors) seize people's property whenever they have the

In all three documents Tabataba'i broached the subiect of the majlis-i adalat. He pointed to the extreme weakness of the country and the danger of invasion: 'We wish to live under our own main causes was the current system of oppressive government. The remedy of the country's problems was unity which could only be achieved by means of a council (described both as a mailis and an anjuman) composed of all sections of the population (tamam-i 'asnaf-i mardum). Tabataba'i did not outline the exact role that his

majlis-i 'adalat would play in government, nor did he define the limits of its authority or specify how it was to be chosen. But he stressed that in it all would be equal, and through it the people would obtain redress for their grievances and the country would prosper. The majlis was also described as an institution in which the government (daulat) and the people (millat) - meaning the notables of the state (rijal-i daulat) and the 'ulama - would be united and work together to solve the country's problems. The unity of people and government was to become one of the main goals of the Constitutional Revolution. It had been a theme among those with reformist ideas since the 1860s and was particu-

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

larly prominent in the reformist thought of the 1890s. €2 Thus

Maragha'i proposed the unity of the millat and daulat in a majlis-i shaura and Malkum Khan referred frequently to the millat in his

newspaper Oanun. 3 Malkum Khan believed that the millat or nation would play an important part in the future of Iran and like Tabatabai he appears to have meant by the term the leading figures of the nation - the notables, the 'ulama, officials and merchants - who would provide direction to the rest of society and share in the processes of government.

At the end of his speech Tabataba further defined his council

as one in which 'shah and beggar would be equal according to the law', a phrase which may have come from Yak kalima. He defined the idea of equality according to the law, borrowed from Western constitutionalism, as equal according to the sharia, thus creating confusion on the nature of the legal codes that were to be introduced. Elsewhere Tabataba'i is equally ambiguous on the question referring both to the need for laws (gavanin) and of the necessity of executing the law of Islam. It is probable that by this he did not

mean the literal execution of the sharia and it must be remembered that at the time it was dangerous to advocate law for two reasons - because it implied another written law which was regarded with suspicion by many of the 'ulama, and because it suggested a system of government in which the monarchy was limited by laws. It is unfortunately not possible to conclude what Tabatabai's views on the law were at this stage. But from his reading of Maragha'i, from the probability that he was familiar with some of Malkam Khan's ideas, from the fact that Yak kalima

was studied in the secret society he instigated, and finally from his

TABATABAI AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR REFORM

83

that the people of Iran 'have not yet reached the necessary level of

education and are not capable of constitutionalism' - a view

which may have been at least partially derived from his reading of

Kawakibi. 6S Unfortunately Tabataba'i never elaborated on the distinction between constitutionalism and a system of government

in which a majlis-i adalat would have a role to play; but to him they were clearly rather different. By constitutionalism he seems to have meant full popular sovereignty expressed in a Western-

style parliament to which the executive would be subject. It

appears that the majlis-i 'adalat he sought would merely share in power in order to produce fairer, more efficient administration, to make the government accountable, and to remedy what he termed "oppression'. It also seems clear that, despite his denial of constitutionalism, Tabataba'i's was essentially a gradualist position, and in the long-term he favoured government by popular sovereignty. At the beginning of his, speech Tabataba'i also denied accusations of republican sympathies and expressed support for the shah. At the time, republicanism, constitutionalism and the limitation of royal power, or even legal reform by itself, were not always clearly distinguished and advocates of one of this set of ideas were very

vulnerable to such accusations.66 The idea of republicanism

(jumhuriyyat) had clung to Tabataba'i's name for some time. The shah, for instance, believed that he was working for a 'jumhuri' 67 and Nazim al-Islam recounts that he was warned by a friend to avoid his mentor since he wanted a republic and the country to be ruled by laws' 68 It was, of course, dangerous to criticize the shah,

but there is no real evidence that Tabataba'i was a republican in

policy after the constitutional régime was established, it is most likely that he envisaged a system similar to that proposed in Yak kalima - that is a code of laws partially drawn from the sharia, or at least not contrary to it, which would regulate secular affairs

the sense of one who positively seeks a government without

administration. It is unlikely that Tabatabai really understood the

shah was a Muslim and if there were reforms while he reigned further decline would be prevented. The reforms he advocated would not affect the shah's position: 'Why shouldn't there be a

already under the government sphere of authority such as the state conflict that might arise under the constitutional system between a

law based on the word of God and one based on popular will. The question of constitutionalism was raised in the speech and Tabataba'i swore that this was a goal attributed to him by others. There can be no doubt that he was thought of as a constitutional-

ist, for a long letter exists from Nasir al-Mulk trying to dissuade him from this objective.* But repeating what he had earlier said in his conversation with Nazim al-Islam, Tabataba'i told his audience

monarchy and his public rejection of the idea was almost certainly more than an act of self-protective dissimulation. Furthermore he went on in the speech to consider the role of the shah in his altered

system of government. He was less concerned, he said, with the position of the shah than with the urgent need for change. The

Council of Justice in a country that has a shah?' On the contrary,

in view of the danger from abroad, reform would strengthen the position of the monarchy, for good government would produce a prosperous country and a full treasury. He stated that the one true shah was the Imam of the Age, but in a brief analysis of human society he showed that the shah of the

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time had a valid function within the political system and must be obeyed as long as he fulfilled it. Turning to the question of the meaning of saltanat he told his listeners: 'If you had studied the

new learning, if you knew about history and law, if you were

educated, then you would understand the meaning of saltanat.'

The emphasis on the need to have studied modern learning ('ulami jadid) to comprehend the meaning of saltanat shows that his own understanding of the word was influenced by European thought.

According to the theory that Tabataba'i propounded, God has given each creature certain qualities to enable it to survive. But unlike other creatures man is not simple in the things he needs for

a livelihood. For example, he needs bread, clothing, and buildings. One person cannot supply all of these, so communities have grown up to serve the needs of individuals. But these communities are in danger of destroying themselves because of the forces of rage and greed which lead men to destroy each other. Therefore,

the wisest men decide to appoint one person to protect their

community. The appointment is made on the understanding that the members of the community devote their lives and property to one person, on the condition that he protects them from oppression both from outsiders and from each other. This one person is the shah, and he has been provided with taxes to keep soldiery to enable him to carry out his duties. If the shah does not fulfil his functions, but is idle and self-interested, his people may withdraw their allegiance, their life and property, and bestow it upon some-

one else.

Tabataba'i's ideas on this subject seem to combine the tradition-

al Muslim view of the role of the shah as the protector of his people and the keeper of good order with the notion drawn from European thought that the ruler is accountable to his people. His pessimistic view of human nature recalls Hobbes; but it is extreme-

TABATABAI AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR REFORM

85

Tabataba'i himself stressed the novelty of his ideas. Furthermore, in stating that the ruler had duties to the community which had the right to remove him if he failed it, he diverged from Muslim theory which holds that the ruler is responsible to the sharia, the law of

God, and can only be removed if he violates the law.

Tabataba'i ended his speech with an exhortation to action

couched in the traditional Shi'ite terms of a demand for justice. Using what Fischer has termed "the Karbala paradigm' he com-

pared the oppression of the present regime to that endured at the

time of Husain. Like Husain he and his followers might be martyred in the cause of justice, but his children would carry on the

struggle. Finally he reminded the shah of the tenuous basis of his

authority: Our true shah is the Imam of the Age, and we are his servants who fear no-one.' He did not, however, make any refer-

ence to the role of the 'ulama as the na'ib-i 'amm (general agent).

In this manner what was essentially a demand for a form of

government based on ideas and values derived from Europe was legitimized as a traditional Shi'ite protest against oppression and injustice. Even though the principle influences of Tabataba' in his campaign for reform derived from the West through thinkers such

as Malkum Khan, Maraghai and Kawakibi, in his ideological

viewpoint he was more concerned with Islam than they were and

he looked on Iran primarily as the homeland of Shiism. Thus he wrote: 'If Iran is thrown to the winds, Islam will become weak and Muslims humiliated . . . Iran is not only their vatan but the place where their religious goals are fulfilled.'

This strong linking of Iran with Islam is not found in more

secular reformers and it must be doubted that Tabataba'i had quite the same concept of nationality or understanding of nationalism as

they did. His aim was to protect both Iran and Islam and he

ly unlikely that he had read Hobbes whose theory hardly fits with his other political ideas. The right of people to choose a ruler and then remove him for dereliction of duty suggests the influence of contractual theories of government, particularly Locke and Rous-

considered that this could only be done by uniting the people and government in a majlis-i 'adalat with, probably, elected elements and positive power to carry out reforms, to eliminate maladministration, injustice and inefficiency. Tabataba'i's majlis- 'adalat is a slightly different concept from the adalatkhana meaning a system of tribunals to watch over the government administration. Unfortunately, either because of a need to obfuscate his aims, or be-

remove it if it failed their expectations. On the other hand it might be argued that Tabataba'i was thinking of the Muslim ba'ya, the act by which a certain number of persons, acting collectively or

cause he did not work them out fully, Tabataba'i gave no clear indication of the functioning of the majlis-i 'adalat, of its rights,

seau. The notion is more likely to have come to him through a contemporary thinker such as Kawakibi who argued that men could choose a government by their own reason and will and

individually, recognize the authority of another person.® Yet

duties and limitations. For this reason his proposal fell before the pressure of constitutionalism in 1906, for the constitutionalists could at least borrow a fully worked out model.

4 The Ulama and the Establishment of the National Consultative Assembly The events leading to the establishment of the National Consulta-

tive Assembly are surrounded by confusion. As in previous pro-

tests the agitation was justified in Islamic terms and appeared to be

led by the 'ulama. In reality the impetus did not come from Islam and the ulama were as much the guided as the guides.

he decisive event of the revolution was the great bast of July1TAugust 1906, when 14,000 people sought sanctuary in the grounds of the British legation. Bast, or sanctuary, was a peculiarly Iranian tradition dating from the early Qajar period. There had long been a custom for distressed and aggrieved subjects to take bast in such places as mosques, shrines and the houses of the mujtahids, where they might both hope for protection against arbitrary justice and draw attention to their grievances. Attempts by the government in

the mid-nineteenth century to limit this practice led increasing

numbers to seek sanctuary in the foreign legations, particularly the British and the Russian. The British were sometimes embarrassed by their uninvited and often long-term guests, but were unwilling

to break the tradition, partly because it enhanced their prestige with the populace at large, and partly because it could be useful

in bringing pressure on the Iranian government. The bast of 1906 revealed the final breakdown of the authority of the government under the old system, resulting from financial in-

solvency and unpopular policies. The bast was the means by which the opposition movement, now much swollen in numbers, compel-

87

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THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

led the government to grant not merely reform but a complete

tions took place between the government and the leading 'ulama who remained in the Masid-i Jum'a surrounded by troops. Their

change in the political system.

Towards the middle of June 1906 the pace of events began to quicken. Agitation against the government mounted with Tabata-

demands were still the dismissal of the sadr-i a'zam, and the institution of an 'adalatkhana.* Negotiations continued throughout

bai, Bihbihani, and other mullas preaching to large congregations and demanding an 'adalatkhana.' On 10 July Grant Duff received a message from Bihbihani saying that the people were prepared to overthrow the present government, and requesting pecuniary assistance.? He replied that the British government could not support opposition to the government of Iran. On 11

the 15th when the muitahids also ordered the shops to open; however, the bazaar remained closed. Sayyid 'Ali Yazdi, a mulla who had influence at court, spoke to

the shah on behalf of Shaikh Fazlallah and Bihbihani. On the

subject of the 'adalatkhana, the shah commented: 'You well know that Bihbihani and Shaikh Fazlallah do not want an 'adalatkhana,

July 'Ain al-Daula ordered the arrest of Shaikh Muhammad Va'iz, the leading preacher of Tehran, whose sermons were particularly

as it would be detrimental to their interests. In fact if an 'adalatkhana were established, they would be the first to speak against it. 'S By the term 'adalatkhana, the shah probably understood the

incendiary. When a party of students attempted to rescue the

prisoner, the officer commanding the guard shot one of them. His

institution envisaged in the rescript in January, similar to the Ottoman Shura-yi Devlet. The 'ulama asked permission of the shah to go to the Atabat. This was granted and the great majority departed from Tehran

body was taken to a nearby mosque, and messages sent to the leading mujahids. The body was carried in procession to the

Masjid-i Jum°a. The government sent troops to prevent the bazaar

closing in protest, but with no success. The muitahids tried to

contain the situation, sending criers round the bazaar asking peo-

ple not to loot, and the butchers and bakers to remain open. The Imam Jum'a was out of town, but the opposition was ioined

for the first time by Fazlallah, who was obliged by a large crowd which gathered at his house, to go to the Masid-i Jum'a.? When the Imam Jum'a returned, he also joined the opposition. In this manner the leading ulama were induced into apparent unity. After troops had been picketed throughout the bazaar, the shah issued a rescript to the 'ulama expressing disapproval of the agita-

tion, and promising to redress rightful grievances, but refusing to dismiss the sadr-i a zam which was still a major goal of the opposition movement. On Thursday 12 July the situation remained un-

changed, with the shops closed, and a large crowd filling and surrounding the Masjid-i Jum a. The next morning the agitation took on the traditional Shi'ite form of protest as a procession parading the shirt of the dead sayid formed in the bazaar with a number of people wearing kafan, winding sheets, and carrying the

names of Hasan and Husain, whom they declared themselves ready to emulate to fight oppression. Bihbikani tried in vain to calm them. When the soldiers attempted to stop the procession, the commanding officer gave the order to fire and about a dozen people were killed. That evening Bihbihani said from the pulpit that his demands for iustice had been met with bloodshed. However,

he enioined the people to maintain order. On 14 July negotia-

89

.

immediately on Sunday 15 July. The next day they changed their destination to Oumm because to go to the 'Atabat would be too costly. Shaikh Fazlallah delayed his departure by three davs. "Ain al-Daula brought pressure on him either not to go, or to go and try to persuade the others to return.® Finally, probably realizing that he would be stripped of all influence and prestige with the popu-

lace of Tehran if he remained in the city, on 18 July he left for

Qumm with a large following. 'Ain al-Daula was much weakened

by the departure of Shaikh Fazlallah, whose support had prevented his regime from being discredited by the 'ulama as a body.

With the great majority of the 'ulama absent little legal business could be carried on in the capital. As he was leaving for Qumm on 16 July, Bihbihani sent Grant Duff a second communication stating that discussions between himself and the sadr-i a'zam on the fulfilment of the shah's rescript

of January and the institution of an 'adalatkhana had only led to bloodshed. He ended with the ambiguous reauest that: "In view of the friendship that exists between us, you should on no account refrain from endeavouring to put an end to the oppression and transgression. ›7

2 There are two accounts of who instigated the bast in the British legation. The first, put forward by Malikzada, claims that it was

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

initiated by the major merchants in accordance with a preconceived plan. According to Malikzada the major merchants made preparations for the bast before the 'ulama left for Qumm.8 This was done in co-operation with leading reformers, and with the ultimate aim of using popular pressure to secure constitutional government. The merchants deliberately used their influence in the bazaar to win widespread support for the bast. Because they sold the merchandise they imported into Iran on credit they had thousands of tradesmen in their debt. By giving reductions to the

tradesmen, they were able to force the closing of the bazaars." Malikzada also mentions that the Zoroastrian, Ardishirji, acted as an intermediary between those in the Masid-i Jum'a and the British legation grounds, I and states that the legation obtained permission from London to shelter those whose lives were in danger. This account does not agree with the British documents which record that, on 18 July, two men unknown to the legation approached *Abbas Quli Khan, the second oriental secretary, and said that about 500 merchants proposed to take bast there. I Ardishirji is not mentioned. 12 The second account, given by Nazim al-Islam, is more detailed and agrees on this latter point with the British sources. According to Nazim al-Islam, before the departure for Qumm Bihbihani told

his merchant following that, if harassed by 'Ain al-Daula, they

should take refuge in the British legation. On 15 July a meeting of lesser merchants and sarrafs was held at the house of Aqa Muhammad, the agent of the Russian bank. 13 The two bunakdars, Hajj

Muhammad Taqi and Hajj Muhammad Husain, who had orga-

nized the provisioning of the Hazrat 'Abd al-'Azim bast in Decem-

ber, arrived at the meeting and explained that they and others were in danger from Ain al-Daula. A message was sent to Bihbi-

hani, then on his way to Qumm, to ask what to do. He replied that they should follow his earlier instructions and take refuge in the British legation. The merchants were worried since they had no dealings with or knowledge of the British legation. Finally a mer-

chant named Aga Mirza Mahmud Isfahani went with another

man to the legation's summer quarters at Qulhak where he spoke to an official who at first refused the request, but in the end agreed on condition that there should be no bankrupts or criminals. On 19 July some fifty merchants and mullas (probably theological stu-

dents and sayyids) took bast at the legation. I Like the British sources Nazim al-Islam makes no mention of Ardishirji, and agrees that the first contact was made by two men approaching the

THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

91

legation. Nazim al-Islam's account also agrees with Daulatabadi's

brief remarks on the subject according to which Bihbihani told

some of his following to take refuge in the legation after the 'ulama left for Qumm. IS Daulatabadi adds that this unprecedented order

had been agreed with certain notables of the government who were working secretly with Bihbihani. It seems reasonable to conclude that, of the two accounts, Nazim al-Islam's is the more reliable and that the bast was instigated by the lesser merchants prompted by Bihbihani, not by the maior merchants. The point is reinforced by two further facts. Firstly, Hajj Muhammad Tag and Hai Muhammad Husain were not merchants but guildsmen, and neither of their names appears

on lists of the major merchants of Tehran in the late 1890s and

early 1900s. 16 Secondly, when some days later the shah sent the

major merchants to talk to those in bast, the refugees at first

rejected them as not being of their number. The idea for the bast seems to have come from Bihbihani. It was primarily a means of providing protection for his following, but it also served the purpose of bringing pressure on the British to act as intermediaries between the opposition movement and the shah. It is nevertheless not impossible that, as Daulatabadi mentions, Bihbihani had discussed the matter with notables sympathetic to reform. It is possible too that once the bast had begun the major merchants used their influence in the bazaar to maintain it in the manner described

by Malikzada. According to Nazim al-Islam, the theological students and

sayyids joined the bast at the instigation of the merchants. 17 He says, however, that two of the British Indian officials (their names

are given as Quli Khan Navab and Mirza Yahya Munshi) sug-

gested to the merchants that they invite others to join them, as

there was greater safety in larger numbers. It is more probable that

the merchants themselves decided to bring the students in to

create a larger pressure group. The merchants initially invited the

students from the Madrasa-yi Sad and Dar al-Shafa, some of

whom they paid. Certain payments were organized by Aga Sayyid

Muhammad Taqi Simnani, a follower of Bihbihani, who had remained in Tehran for this purpose, and were made through Aga Mirza Mahmud Isfahani. These two were the most active in con-

tacting sayyids and students. The role of the British diplomats in the bast is not entirely clear.

The Foreign Office documents make it plain that British government policy was to discourage the demonstration by all possible

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THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

means. Grey, the foreign minister, sent telegram after telegram to

students' families.26 He also says that when the bast was over, Hajj

Grant Duff, the chargé 'affaires in Tehran, telling him to get the bastis out of the legation. Grant Duff himself had no special sympathy with the bastis and was most concerned about the condi-

tion of the garden. Certain members of the legation, particularly Walter Smart, who had been a student of the eminent Persian scholar, E. G. Browne, were friendly to what they saw as a liberal

constitutional cause that could change the old system of arbitrary government. It is probable that they privately gave encouragement to those who were organizing the bast.

3The numbers in the legation mounted rapidly. By 21 July there

were 700, representatives of the guilds having joined. The number had risen to 5,000 by 24 July, 10,000 by 27 July and 14,000 by 2

August. Altogether 80-90 guilds or groups were represented including nearly all the trade and craft guilds.19 They were so organized that each guild had its own tent, and meals were pre-

pared in a common kitchen, and served in huge cauldrons to each guild in turn. Grant Duff estimated that at the height of the bast, the cost was £350 per day.

According to one account a meeting of seventy-two people,

including merchants and leaders of the guilds, was held to discuss provisions because the students and guild workers complained that they could not subsidize themselves.? The meeting decided that a large amount would be sent by the guilds' leaders to the students. The expenses of the bast were defrayed from a fund organized by Haji Muhammad Taqi.21 Browne heard that the fund amounted to

30,000 tomans raised by subscription from merchants and

'ulama.22 Malikzada, as stated above, believed the funding came largely from the merchants.23 Daulatabadi attributed the funding

to merchants and officials working for the return of Amin al

Sultan. Sharif Kashani believed the funds came mainly from the

merchants. Vakil al-Daula, one of the main correspondents of Amin al Sultan, did not know where the money came from, and like other officials believed the British had a hand in it.24 He considered most of the bastis were there for the free

dinners. Another account reported that the merchants had contributed 100,000 tomans.25 Nazim al-Islam states that the merchants subscribed to the sum to be distributed by the heads of the guilds to the students, and that this sum was also intended to support the

93

Muhammad Taqi and his brother raised the question of expenses at a meeting of the merchants, saying that they had spent 32,000 tomans. The merchants got an account for 18,000 tomans from the brothers and pointed out to them that they had had other assist-

ance. Finally, on the insistence of Bihbihani and Tabatabai, the

major merchants divided the lesser sum between them, the most

notable contributors being Amin al-Zarb, Haji Muin al-Tujjar Bushihri, Hajj Muhammad Ismail and Arbab Jamshid.27 The evidence would suggest, therefore, that although the bastis, particularly the guilds' leaders and the lesser merchants, were to some

extent self supporting, the major part of the expenses was de-

frayed by the leading merchants. The merchants also ensured the

solidarity of the bast. When a small group, evidently bribed, left the British legation for the Russian, the merchants sent roughs, who, after enticing them out, beat them up. 28

Most accounts indicate that the demand for a national assembly evolved during the bast. Many figures were active in arousing the

multitude. Zhu'l-Riyasatain Kirmani, a member of Nazim alIslam's secret society, stood on a chair and addressed the bastis on

the subject of awakening. Fakhr al-Islam, another member, got out a book in French every day, read it, and translated it. Filsuf Shirazi and other members read out articles from the newspaper Habl al-Matin.29 According to Nazim al-Islam, the legation became like a 'school* with people sitting in circles under tents, while

those 'with a knowledge of politics' taught them. Matters which hitherto no one dared mention were brought to the attention of

the people. Daulatabadi also mentions that those of reformist

views mingled with the people and made good use of the

occasion.30 Vakil al-Daula reported that: 'The people in the legation are learning politics and law . .. for example, that the meaning of the word 'shah' is 'representative of the nation'. And when the nation no longer wants a shah he is not recognized. '31 But not all the audience were receptive. Filsuf Shirazi was chased from one

tent when he suggested the bastis should ask for a proper law (ganun). 32 As Browne's correspondent remarked, the vast major-

ity of bastis were probably quite ignorant of the principles of democratic government. 33

On 23 July Grant Duff conveyed the first demands of the bastis

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

to the shah. They included:

1 The removal of 'Ain al-Daula.

2 The establishment of 'law courts'. 3 The return of the 'ulama from Qumm. The 'law courts* - the British legation's translation of the Persian 'adalatkhana - were further defined as not having an administra-

tion in the hands of venal officers.34 The bastis refused to leave the

legation until their requests were granted, and claimed that their lives and property were no longer secure. Muhtasham al-Saltana, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was sent to deal with the bastis, but no one would see him. He was told that all com-

plaints would be submitted through the mediation of Grant Duff. 35

On 26 July eight leading merchants of Tehran, who had not gone to the legation, were summoned before the shah. They included Amin al-Zarb, Hajj Muhammad Ismail, Haji Muhammad 'Ali Shalchi (Shalfurush), Hajj 'Abd al-Razzaq Usku'°i, Hajj Muhammad Taqi Shahrudi, Hajj Sayyid Muhammad Sarraf, Mu'in al-Tujjar and Hajj Muhammad Baghir Kashani. 36 The shah

demanded to know what this rabble' was doing in the British

legation, but apart from professing loyalty to him the merchants

remained silent. He sent the merchants to mediate with the crowd.

The bastis at first refused to negotiate through them. However, when they swore they were in sympathy, the bastis relented and told the merchants that the requests made so far were for the return of the 'ulama, the establishment of an 'adalatkhana, and that the government should honour its bills of credit (a particular grievance of the sarrafs). When the merchants returned to see 'Ain

al-Daula, Mu'in al-Tujjar dissociated himself from the others

who, he said, were in collusion with those in the legation and had the same aim, the establishment of an assembly (majlis).37 Ain al-Daula said he had promised an 'adalatkhana, to which Mu'in al-Tujjar replied that the bastis wanted an elected assembly. The

bastis had not asked for an elected assembly, but for an 'adalatkhana, so this was the first time the term majlis was used.

On 27 July 'Ain al-Daula replied to Grant Duff through the

foreign minister about the list of requests. The reply stated that the

government would offer sufficient protection (this was in response to the complaint that there was no security from oppression); that there were still 'ulama in Tehran to transact business; and that an

'adalatkhana already existed. Such a body could not be in the

THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

95

hands of anyone other than government officials.? Evidently 'Ain

al-Daula interpreted the word to mean a reformed ministry of

justice rather than some sort of council to make the administration accountable to law. His response was greeted with laughter by the bastis. That same day they submitted three petitions to the shah

through Grant Duff detailing their grievances - one by the sarrafs, one by the students and one general. The content of the petitions remains obscure, but Grant Duff does not say they included a request for an assembly (majlis). On the same day the merchants were summoned to see 'Ain al-Daula who, according to Daulatabadi, agreed to the request

for the majlis, abandoning his position that an 'adalatkhana already existed and was sufficient, and saying openly that he wished to co-operate with the merchants in order to circumvent the ulama, whose growing intervention in affairs both he and the merchants mistrusted. * This was probably an attempt to separate

the 'ulama from their following and save his own position. After

the discussion between the sadr-i a'zam and the merchants it was

agreed that Mushir al-Daula was to go to Qumm to inform the 'ulama that a national consultative assembly (majlis-i shaura-yi milli) had been granted. Grant Duff also reports that Mushir al-Daula was to go with a rescript granting 'courts of justice ('adalatkhana), a consultative assembly and the return of the 'ulama. # The matter was as yet little understood outside Tehran. The crown prince telegraphed the shah in support of the 'ulama and what he believed was a movement to overthrow his enemy, the sadr-i a'zam, who was reportedly opposed to his succession. "Ain al-Daula's position was also seriously undermined when the soldiers and police made apparent their discontent over their lack of pay, and threatened to join the bast. He resigned on 29 July and Mushir al-Daula succeeded him as sadr-i a'zam. Among the bastis in the legation a movement had also begun to

induce the participants to ask not only for the exile of "Ain alDaula who, they felt, would return to office after a few months,

but to demand fundamental changes in the system of government through the creation of a national assembly. Nazim al-Islam says that the members of his secret society were particularly active in this respect from about 27 July onwards. 42 Tagizada told Browne

that a commission was formed amongst the bastis which was

advised by the better educated Iranians.'43 This last group seems to have included Sani' al-Daula** and Mukhbir al-Mulk. *S When the

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

bastis were informed of the resignation of "Ain al Daula some

prepared to leave. The commission persuaded them to remain in the legation, pointing out that his resignation was no longer the issue, and that a more fundamental change was needed. In this way the demand for an 'adalatkhand developed into the demand for a majlis-i milli. It seems, however, that the issue of the mailis was first raised by the merchants in their interview with the sadr-i azam on 26 July, and the list Mushir al-Daula was to take to Qumm, including a consultative assembly, was instigated by that meeting. The merchants were most probably also in touch with the

commission in the legation to ensure pressure in favour of their

requests from the bastis.

As sadr-i a'zam, Mushir al-Daula could not go to Qumm him-

self, so 'Azud al-Mulk, the head of the Qajar tribe, was designated to convey the list of demands to the shah and he left on 1 August.

But the government's intentions over the majlis were evidently mistrusted. The legation bastis sent word to the 'ulama in Oumm not to leave until the shah had granted all requests. They further

asked Grant Duff that the mailis should be one in which

merchants, 'ulama and other ranks of people were represented. 46

Until 'Ain al-Daula resigned the telegraph lines from Tehran to Qumm were cut, and contact with the 'ulama was maintained by messengers. Mirza Ibrahim 'Attar, whose shop and house were near that of Tabataba'i, was the bearer of packets and messages brought on foot from the 'ulama to the bastis. 47 Sharif Kashani also says he provided the 'ulama with news. The 'ulama themselves were in touch with their colleagues in Najaf and elsewhere in Iran by telegraph. Tabataba'i informed the 'ulama of Hamadan that they had received a message not to leave Qumm until the merchants in Tehran told them to. 48 Bihbihani sent Grant Duff a telegram asking him to tell the merchants and guilds in the legation

that the 'ulama would not leave until they had heard from the legation bastis. The shah telegraphed the 'ulama asking them to return to Tehran. In reply they complained of oppression by the government and of the failure to execute the sharia. 49 The promise of an assembly of justice (majlis-i'adalat), to ensure justice in all affairs,

and to counter disorder and sedition, had not been fulfilled, although it would strengthen the authority of Islam (saltanat-i islamiyya) and protect the country against foreign interference. They now asked for a majlis to include:

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97

Ministers, senior government officials who will act in a disinterested fashion; merchants who are informed on subiects of economy and trade, and may be consulted on the well-being

of the people and government (millat va daulat); representatives of the 'ulama, and learned persons who have knowledge. The assembly would, under the control of the shah, oversee all the offices of government and introduce reform in all affairs.

The constitution of the assembly would be written out in a set of articles; its character, however, would be Islamic, as it should *aim to enforce the sharia, enjoin good and prohibit evil; and act as a check on agreements with foreigners according to the sharia'. The assembly the 'ulama requested would also be the means of

reforming the affairs of Muslims according to the law of Islam,

defined as 'the customary and sovereign law of the land' (ganun-i rasmi va saltanati-yi mamlikat).$" Evidently it was to be composed

neton. is presentat not, hovered, classes constidiote not mentioned).

national assembly, but rather a development of Tabataba'i's earTier majlis-i'adalat. Its legislative functions were left vague, though

possibly the 'ulama envisaged a body that would pass laws not contrary to the sharia in the areas which at the time were largely

under the 'urflaw. The assembly was also to be subordinate to the shah, and no definition of his powers is suggested. It was, in short, unequivocably Islamic, and different from the assembly the mer-

chants and other bastis were in the process of demanding in

Tehran.

The slightly uncertain character of this proposed majlis may result from the fact that there were considerable disagreements amongst the 'ulama in Qumm, with Tabataba'i venturing to suggest constitutionalism (mashruta) and having to retreat in the face

of opposition from Shaikh Fazlallah, who said that while it was desirable to limit the powers of the shah and ministers, it was unacceptable to advocate such ideas as freedom or legislation, which were contrary to Islam. To this Tabataba'i replied hastily and oppression, pose of the proposed mallis was to end injustice

On 3 August a rescript was read to the people in the legation granting a majlis for Tehran only, with powers defined in such a way that it was clearly subject to the royal office, and the shah would not be obliged to execute the bills passed. It was to include

Univ.-Bibl Bamberg

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

representatives of the princes, landowners, 'ulama and merchants.

The merchants and guilds rejected the proposal saying they wanted ten independent majlis with authority throughout the country. The shah must ratify its laws, whether he agreed with them or not. What they were now asking for was a national assembly with a limited monarchy. As a result of these objections, on 6 August a second rescript was posted on the walls of Tehran announcing:

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99

the major bone of contention. The shah argued that he would only

ratify a law if he considered it suitable, that is he retained final authority. The merchants replied that the situation would then remain unchanged and added in a manner which startled the court

by its bluntness: The law must be what the majlis decides. We will not accept the shah's order and signature in this matter, nor that of the

sadr-i a'zam nor that of the ulama either. Nobody is to

The establishment of a majlis of elected representatives of the princes, 'ulama, notables, landowners, merchants and

interfere in the laws of the majlis. We have no business with

consultation on affairs pertaining to the government, the country and the people, to the shah's ministers. It will bring about reforms necessary for the prosperity of the country, which will be executed by the shah and enforced in accordance with the sharia.53

we preserve from the depredations of the governors, the

guilds to assemble in Tehran and give necessary assistance in

The guilds, it should be noted, were for the first time to be

included in the franchise.St The rescript, however was torn down from the walls, the bazaars remained closed and the bastis stayed

in the legation although some had wanted to accept it.S They

informed Grant Duff that they considered the wording ambiguous, and refused to accept the rescript. There were two points at issue:

the first was the exact nature of the majlis for the word milli was not included:§ the second was the limitation of the shah's powers. The 'ulama had, in the meantime, sent Muhammad Sadiq Taba-

taba'i and the two sons-in-law of Bihbihani to Tehran with their requests and they arrived on 7 August. Their main request was

"the establishment of a majlis in the correct manner' $7 The leading

conservative courtiers seem to have taken this opportunity to try to divide the merchants and guilds from the 'ulama, and the shah issued an amendment to his rescript describing the assembly as *an

Islamic consultative assembly' (majlis-i shaura-yi islami), which

would execute the laws of the sharia. On 8 August Grant Duff took a group of the leading bastis for discussion with the sadr-i azam while another, consisting of the major merchants, went to see the shah. It was probably on this occasion, though possibly a

day or so earlier, that the merchants spoke to the shah on the

drafting of the rescript. They informed him they should determine who the members of the majlis were, that is the shah should have

no say in who was chosen as a representative. In addition, they

insisted that laws passed by the majlis must be executed. This was

the sadr-i azam nor the 'ulama ... we do not want any

orders except those of a just assembly. If the 'ulama want to come back, let them; they are as bad as you are. Whatever we save each year from thieves slips into the sands. Whatever

sadr-i a zam and the shah, has to be given to the house of the

sharia. When the 'ulama return we are not going to accept any more orders from them either. 38

Following this interview, and the discussion with the sadr-i a'zam as well as consultation with the three 'ulama who had

arrived from Qumm, it was finally agreed that the assembly should be described as the majlis-i shaura-yi milli, and the shah's rescript was issued with this amendment. In the British version the major

points of difference between the final version and that of 6

August were that the majlis was described as a national assembly, and that the proposals of the assembly would be submitted by the sadr-i a'zam for the shah's signature, and thus put into force. 59 Since the shah's rescript in the Persian as reproduced by Nazim al-Islam, changes only on the point of milli the second difference may represent a verbal agreement. The law to be enforced was still described as the sharia though this probably meant that the laws passed would be in conformity with the sharia. Perhaps because

the law was defined as the sharia, the 'ulama do not appear to have commented on the change from islami to milli. Probably also

most of them did not yet understand the full implications of the difference. The assembly, though national, in other words representative of the popular will, was still not constitutional, and the exact delineation of the shah's authority was left vague. The rescript was published on 10 August, and all but 200 bastis with individual grievances - the most significant were the sarrafs - left the legation. The bazaars opened the next day. A telegram was sent to the 'ulama in Qumm telling them to disperse, and the

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THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

merchants sent money to help pay their debts in Qumm and cover

and Mushir al-Mulk, and some of the merchants; certain of the 'ulama led by the sons of Tabatabai; and representatives of the

the expenses of their return to the capital. It seems that the initial outlay of the bast in Qumm was defrayed by the 'ulama themselves, with Shaikh Fazlallah, who had to support a larger personal following, bearing the highest expenses.62

Amir Bahadur told Muhammad Sadiq Tabataba'i that the

'ulama would never accept a majlis as it was against the sharia and

their own interests. When Muhammad Sadi replied that the

Prophet had enjoined consultation, Amir Bahadur said Muslim consultation was beneficial, but asked why they had agreed to

'national consultation' (shaura-yi milli). Muhammad Sadiq replied that religion could be used as a pretext to exile the opponents of the government by designating them as irreligious, whereas the word milli would prevent such tactics." He also stated that from now on the requisition and collection of taxes, and the payment of salaries, would be the responsibility of the majlis, and that government expenditure would be controlled. ®* This, of course, had not been defined in the rescript, and was to be another major point of

conflict.

5 The 'ulama returned from Qumm on 15 August, and a meeting of leading 'ulama, government officials and members of the merchants and guilds was convened on 18 August in the old military school to make arrangements for the establishment of the Majlis. Until 27 August the gathering was engaged in drawing up the electoral rules. Dabir al-Mulk wrote to Amin al-Sultan that everybody was busy writing the regulations they wanted and ignoring everybody else. 65 Mukhbir al-Saltana wrote to him that:

A number of totally uninformed people are busy writing the

electoral rules in the Military School. About two thousand

meet there about twice a week and ask for their 'rights'. The government is trying to avoid implementing the rescript, and there is likely to be a struggle between them and the people. The members of the government suppose that they can deceive the people, and the people think that they can achieve these wonderful results free of cost. 6

According to Daulatabadi there were three main groups at work,

those whom he calls the 'liberals' or reformers, together with notables educated abroad, Sani' al-Daula, Mukhbir al-Saltana,

101

court. 67 Malikzada adds that the court group had secret supporters amongst the 'ulama. 68

A draft, based on the electoral rules in the Belgian constitu-

tion, was submitted for approval by Sani 'al-Daula's group to the gathering in the military school. The faction headed by the sons of

Tabataba'i objected to it, and withdrew to compose their own version, which gave more prominence to religion and less to the

nation. The draft was also altered by Amir Bahadur in such a way as to protect the powers of the shah.® The court urged the shah to allow representatives from Tehran only, depriving the assembly of its national character, and thus its main basis of legitimacy.™ The court camarilla led by Amir Bahadur then tried to suborn Bihbihani, who was promised a piece of land. He was invited to meet the shah and given the altered regulations to present to the people.

The merchants complained vehemently to Tabatabai, who remonstrated with Bihbihani.? His students threatened to take his life, and a large crowd gathered at his house so he was forced to

abandon the amended draft. It was a clear and prime example of a mujtahid being dictated to by his following. On 30 August two drafts, one written under the guidance of Sani

al-Daula, and the other by the younger 'ulama, led by Tabata-

ba's sons, were read to the gathering at the military school. After a few changes the former draft was accepted, again indicating that the influence of the merchants and bureaucrats was stronger than that of the 'ulama. After some demur the shah signed the electoral rules on 10 September. The regulations provided for 200 members, sixty of whom were to come from Tehran. Mukhbir al-Saltana, who was one of those responsible for drawing up the regulations, wrote that preponder-

ance was given to Tehran because it was anticipated that the provincial deputies would take time to arrive, and it was feared that unless some means was found for establishing the Majlis

immediately the court camarilla would take advantage of the de-

lay. Of the sixty Tehran deputies, thirty-two represented the

guilds, ten the merchants, ten the landowners including ayan or notables and wealthier peasants, four the 'ulama and four the

Qajar family.

The elections in Tehran took place on 29 September, the total number of electors being no more than a few hundred in each of the five classes. The electors had to be male, over twenty-five, of

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

Persian nationality, known either to possess substantial property, or to be engaged in a recognized business or trade. They also had to have no record of crime or bankruptcy. One of those elected for the 'ulama resigned and was replaced by Mushin, brother of Sadr al-'Ulama, and son-in-law of Bihbihani, without any further elections taking place.72 This indicated scant regard for the meaning of

representation, but Nazim al-Islam commented that anvway few

people in Tehran understood the meaning of assembly, deputy and elections, and that the provinces were no better. No provision was made for the religious minorities who wanted their own deputies. The members of Nazim al-Islam's secret society, realizing that this might cause a reaction among the 'ulama, induced the Armenians

to let Tabataba' represent them, and the Jews Bihbihani. The leading merchant Arbab Jamshid, however, won the right of

representation for the Zoroastrians, reportedly by bribing

Bihbihani.73 A measure of the influence of the merchants was that they declared that unless Nasir al-Mulk or Sani *al-Daula was elected on behalf of the ayan (notables), they would not co-operate.74 However, reformers of all kinds were aware of the need to keep the good will of the 'ulama, as the 'will of the people' was still a tenuous basis of legitimacy, and there was known to be powerful opposition amongst the notables. Therefore, though the deputies had general immunity from arrest, this did not apply if they said anything contrary to the laws of Islam. The formidable nature of the latent opposition was soon apparent when the vali'ahd forbade the publication of the shah's rescript on the assembly in Azarbaijan and only yielded after disturbances in Tabriz. In the provinces there was little or no understanding of events in Tehran before September of 1906. In the autumn, however, attention turned briefly from local affairs to what might be termed

national politics. The elections to the Majlis produced power

struggles between factions in which local and national issues were mixed. In these power struggles the 'ulama tended to defend their conservative interests except where they felt it to their advantage

to represent a strong popular view. This was particularly true in Isfahan where the powerful and wealthy mutahid, Aqa Najafi,

and his brother, Aga Nurallah, endeavoured to overcome the

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103

tion of justice detrimental to their wealth and influence. 75 How. ever, from the pulpit Aga Najafi represented the Majlis as a means

to strengthen Islam and the sharia." After some struggle his

nominees were selected not only for the Isfahan clergy but also for the merchants.77

In Tabriz the 'ulama were more divided, some siding with the bazaar element and supporting the 'ulama of Tehran in their campaign for the Majlis, others, especially those with landed interests, aligning with the vall'ahd in hostility. In Rasht many of the 'ulama, like those in Isfahan, feared loss of influence and author-

ity. Two leading mujtahids, Haj Khummami and Shari at Madar, sided with the governor to frustrate reforms detrimental to their interest.78 A strong party of mullas also opposed the elections to the assembly in Kermanshah, largely because they feared that the

sharia would be replaced by secular law.? The obstruction of

elections by the 'ulama of Kermanshah in particular produced a hukm (decree) from Najaf that it was obligatory to support the Majlis.$° The 'ulama of Najaf, who were at first confused by the events in Tehran, began their long campaign to sustain the Mailis in the autumn of 1906. They declared its establishment to be a beneficial action and, significantly, expressed the hope that the nizamnama-yi ganun-i islami (the Islamic book of rules of law, i.e. the Constitution) would be in accordance with the sharia. They do not appear to have absorbed the fact that a national, not an Islamic, assembly had been established.

5 In Tehran the Majlis opened as soon as the Tehran deputies were elected, on 7 October. Its debates were somewhat rambling, and though the president, San' al-Daula, maintained a certain degree of order, there was no order of the day for speakers. Bihbihani and Tabataba'i attended regularly and often interrupted the proceedings. They were not official members, but seem to have had an undisputed right to attend as mutahids and leaders of the 'nation' (millat). Their presence gave the assembly religious sanction and their role indicates how far the old order was still confused with

contradiction between their personal interests and the popularity of the assembly in Tehran by controlling elections to it. They were

the new. Of the other 'ulama, Hajj Nasrallah Akhavi, one of the representatives of the 'ulama of Tehran, spoke regularly, usually as a moderate, except in defence of religious interests, when he

rumoured to be planning reforms in taxation and the administra-

was rigorous. Mirza Muhsin, another of the Tehran 'ulama, contributed only occasionally. Of the provincial 'ulama, the Imam Jum'a

reported to have little faith in the Majlis, especially as it was

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

Khu'i from Azarbaijan was to be the only significant contributor,

again as a moderate. There is no indication that the 'ulama coalesced as a group in the Majlis, or that at this stage, they

perceived themselves as having a group interest. Nor did they initiate policies. As before the assembly was founded, their concern was to represent the views of their contacts among other

groups, and in the Majlis itself this role was chiefly carried out by Bihbihani and Tabatabai. In addition the 'ulama played an important part in keeping the popular movement together in face of the conservative opposition at court, and in mediating with the government. The sons and relatives of the mutahids found an outlet for their

ambitions in the establishment of the newspaper Mails which received, through the influence of Bihbihani, the sole right to report the proceedings of the assembly. The original concession

had been granted to Daulatabadi who first mooted the idea. 82 But

it was withdrawn from him and given to Muhsin, son-in-law of Bihbihani, and Muhammad Sadiq Tabataba'i. partly because

Daulatabadi's views were suspect (he was believed to be an Azali Babi), and partly because the younger 'ulama wanted to control

such a potentially influential paper. The paper's first editorial shows the Islamic preoccupations of its editors in stating its intention to work for knowledge and progress such as Islam had shown in the past, and in its perception of Iran less as a nation than as the

home of Shia Muslims. Shaikh Fazlallah rarely attended the Majlis, except at the very beginning, and hardly ever spoke. When the 'ulama returned from Oumm he found himself isolated and much reduced in influence,

partly as a result of the exile of Ain al-Daula, and partly because he had not taken part in the opposition movement early on. He seems to have tried to dissociate himself from his former friends, so

when Sipahdar, who was responsible for firing on the crowd in the Masjid-i Jum'a, asked Shaikh Fazlallah to intercede on his behalf,

the latter replied that this is a personal matter and does not

concern me 83 He also seems to have tried to regain recognition by establishing contact with those involved in the reform movement. He wrote in September 1906 to Zahir al-Daula, Governor of

Hamadan, saying he had hitherto been excluded from these

sacred intentions', and asking to be kept informed of the reforms Zahir al-Daula was introducing. &* In a letter to Spring Rice, the new British representative, on the occasion of his arrival in Tehran

he said: 'I am taking this opportunity to congratulate Your Excel

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105

lency on behalf of myself and the other religious leaders of the people (millat), who have always considered themselves in accord with the respected and progressive British. *85 But Shaikh Fazlallah was effectively excluded front regaining his

former influence by Bihbihani who, in mid-October, humiliated Fazlallah's son, Mahdi, in Fazlallah's presence in the Majlis, just as Mahdi was about to protest over the irregularities in the elections of the 'ulama.86 Shaikh Fazlallah felt obliged to withdraw, and thereafter hardly attended. In any case it is doubtful that he ever really sympathized with the Majlis. The frequent reports from the autumn onwards that certain of the 'ulama were unhappy over

the effect the Mailis might have on their own authority almost

certainly referred to him, and Daulatabadi thought he was closely in touch with the court conservatives. On 19 August 1906 he had a

meeting with Mushir al-Daula, Tabataba'i and 'Azud al-Mulk at

which the main subiect discussed was that the law of Islam must be executed, and more particularly, that the law on taxation (maliyat)

must be in conformity with the sharia. 87

6By the beginning of December two bodies of opinion were dis-

cernible in the Majlis, the moderates led by Sani 'al-Daula and the radicals, consisting chiefly of the merchants and guilds, led by Sad al-Daula. Ettahadieh Nezam Mafi has discussed both the first and

second Majlis in terms of political parties. Yet while her study of the second Majlis is illuminating, it is not really appropriate to analyse the first Majlis in terms of western-style political patterns. The earlier division between government and people exemolified

in court and assembly was breaking down, but conflict between

different groups in the Majlis had not yet clearly emerged and there were no party divisions. The Mailis seems to have been

composed of myriad constellations which formed and reformed as

their members co-operated over one particular immediate in.

terest, and then moved on to unite with someone else over some other issue. Observers commented that the maiority of the de. puties were ignorant, had no understanding of constitutionalism, and either put their personal interests first or fell under the influ.

ence of a few who were ambitious.88 The guilds' deputies in

particular were largely under the guidance of the merchants and mujtahids. Despite their numbers they were reported as being simple people, overawed by the proceedings, and even later only

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THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

one or two took an active part in the debates. The ministers were

weak and caught between the Malis and the shah.

The Majlis was, for a while, dominated by Sad al-Daula, a

largely opportunist politician who found a power base in repre-

senting some of the grievances of the merchants and guilds, which

he used to embarrass his personal opponent, San 'al-Daula. The latter, was in a difficult position as president because he had to find compromises with the government which were not always popular with the Majlis.* In this pattern Tabataba'i and Bihbihani seem to have oscillated between collaborating with Sad al-Daula

and the merchants and, as the need for compromise was recognized, with the court conservatives, acting as conciliators. In addition the time-honoured system by which they represented the views of the less privileged was probably one of the major impedi-

ments to the foundation of political parties.

107

Mushir al-Daula as sadr-i azam, while sympathetic to reform,

were not necessarily in agreement with full constitutional govern-

ment. Of necessity the personnel of the executive were drawn from those who had experience in government, which in effect meant the higher bureaucrats of the pre-constitutional period. Mukhbir al-Saltana, who translated the constitution from the French, felt that events were moving too fast in a country with no tradition of elective government. He believed that even the Belgian constitution contained elements that were too radical, and

preferred slow reform on the English model. Despite his part in translating the Belgian constitution, he would have preferred one closer to the sharia but found he had to give way to those with more extreme views.? The constitution made provision for a senate, but its compositon was a major subject of contention in November and Decem-

7 So far only electoral rules had been drawn up and ratified. A draft constitution, based largely on the Belgian, was ready for the shah's

signature by the end of October. The articles on the rights and duties of the assembly included the right to initiate and carry out legislation, as well as to cancel and modify it. The assembly's

approval was required in all financial matters, particularly the ratification of the budget, the sale or transfer of national

resources, and the contracting of loans. The position of ministers was not very clear, but it was implied that they were appointed by and responsible to the monarch. They had the right to attend the assembly but could only speak with the president's permission.

They were required to give any explanation of policy which the

assembly might request. The assembly was also entitled to demand the dismissal of any minister who did not act in accordance with his duties. Issues such as the powers of the shah, particularly in fiscal

matters, and the relationship of ministers and cabinet to the shah and Majlis, were left vague. The articles on the fiscal powers of the assembly were also brief and open to different interpretation. It is probable that these topics were not clarified because they were recognised as sensitive and liable to give rise to discord. On

the one hand there was a desire for a speedy ratification of the

constitution as Muzaffar al-Din Shah, known to be dying, was less vehemently opposed to it than his son and successor, Muhammad "Ali. On the other hand some members of the government, led by

ber 1906. It was proposed in the draft that the senate should have a two-thirds majority elected by the people and a third appointed by

the government. The idea met with stiff resistance from the court

camarilla, who still hoped to use the senate to check the lower

house. On 25 December the government proposed a compromise

whereby it would choose a small majority of the senate - a plan

Sani' al-Daula was inclined to accept, but Sad al-Daula, the

merchants and mujtahids vehemently opposed." Sani' al-Daula resigned but was induced to reconsider by the mujahids, and eventually on 29 December a compromise was reached whereby the government and people each selected half the members of the senate. The shah at first refused to sign, but when the mujahids, in response to popular pressure, warned him that if he did not there

would be trouble all over the country, he signed on 1 January 1907, just before he died. The new shah, Muhammad 'Ali, and the assembly soon joined battle over the issue of ministerial responsibility. The ministers

attended the assembly irregularly, which the deputies interpreted

as lack of co-operation. A letter of complaint on this point was sent to the shah by Bihbihani and Tabatabai, probably at the

instigation of Sani 'al-Daula. As a result eight ministers appeared

in the Majlis on 31 January.

8

From its inauguration the major problem facing the Majlis was that of finances. There was no prospect of revenues and salaries

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

were well in arrears. Furthermore, it was impossible to implement

al-Zarb, Muin al-Tujjar, Hajj Muhammad Ismail and Arbab

108

reforms without funds. An attempt in November to raise a joint Anglo-Russian loan met with opposition from the 'ulama, on the grounds that it threatened the country's independence, and from the mercantile deputies, who were mistrustful of what the govern-

ment would do with the money. The Mailis continued to treat all loans with suspicion, taking the view that there could be no really effective guarantee that the money would be spent for the purposes shown unless they received it themselves. The government declined to sign any loan agreement unless it received the money

directly, so the result was a deadlock. It was recognized that the state finances must be put in order and a proper budget drawn up. Following suggestions by Nasir al-Mulk, minister of finance, a committee was formed to examine the government's requirements and to discuss the degree of con-

trol of the assembly over the accounts. One aim was to abolish madakhil, the old system of unregulated gifts in the collection of

revenue, and pishkash, gifts made to the shah in return for

109

Jamshid, proposed to set up a National Bank. The plan for such a bank was first floated by Amin al-Zarb's father in the late 1870s and the project, together with others, such as the development of mines, were among the proposals put forward by the merchant

councils in 1883. It was also mentioned from time to time in

Persian newspapers in the 1890s. At this time the National Bank was concerned as a development bank and was part of nationalistic

notions which Iranian reformers had about economic progress. A novel element in the new plan was the idea that the National Bank represented an alternative to foreign loans as a means of financing the budgetary deficit. Another aim it may have served was to assist in making the government finances accountable. The whole issue

of the National Bank illustrates the powerful role played by the merchants in the Mailis at this stage. The plan was for the Bank to be financed by subscriptions, the

funds from which would then be lent to the government. During the last week in November the leading merchants circulated subscrip-

appointments. Tabataba'i spoke out against such 'bribery and corruption' and said the Majlis would be powerless until some-

tion lists, but no large contributions were forthcoming. In the

for an hour on the subject of corruption to another mutahid

security. Nazim al-Islam commented that the organizers had insufficient funds for such an enterprise and doubted their integrity. 7 Similar suspicions were voiced in the Majlis. In addi-

thing had been done about it." Spring Rice preached (as he put it)

(almost certainly Bihbihani): He answered with a story about the Prophet. A man brought his son to him asking that he would warn him against eating dates. The Prophet said, 'Bring him tomorrow. The father said, 'Why not today?' The Prophet answered, 'Because I have just breakfasted off dates', 93

The finance committee, which consisted of Sani al-Daula and the major merchants, submitted its recommendations on 19 March. They comprised the beginnings of reorganization and centralization along European lines. In effect these proposed reforms were similar to those of Naus, and in line with the centalizing proposals set in motion by the higher bureaucracy in the 1890s under Amin al-Daula. All provincial revenues were to be paid into the treasury and the governors were to receive salaries. The collection of the revenues was to be undertaken not by the governors, but by agents

of the Ministry of Finance under the supervision of local

councils. A draft law dealing with the regulations for provincial

councils was already under discussion 95 As an alternative to a foreign loan, the leading merchants, Amin

provinces the response was also unenthusiastic. In Isfahan, Shiraz and Tabriz merchants refused to contribute because of the lack of

tion the amount of coin in the country was limited and mostly in the hands of the Imperial Bank, which had the concession to issue bank notes.98 By March 1907 the National Bank had still not been

able to collect adequate funds to help the government. Sanit al Daula proposed that the bank raise a foreign loan and ther re-lend the money to the government in return for the right to exploit concessions to be granted to the bank by its Charter. Negotiations commenced for a German loan, and in return for a small advance the government confirmed the concession of the

National Bank. The chief features of the charter were that all revenues from Tehran or the provinces were to be paid into the

Bank, which would then pay the national expenses. It also had the

right to undertake loans in accordance with the sharia and to

construct roads and railwas and exploit mines. 99 With the assistance of Sa'd al-Daula, the merchants also secured the dismissal of Naus, whom they held responsible for the customs administration policy and for raising the money the government

had, in their view, misspent, before the revolution. Sad al-Daula

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

had a personal grudge against Naus who had reported him for grossly overcharging the government on the purchase of machinery for the new mint. 100

9 Beset on the one hand by a powerful court working outside it, the Mailis was also harrassed on the other by the radical and increasingly militant onlookers. Both these elements had some rep-

resentation in the Majlis, but essentially they were not absorbed

by the institution. From December 1906 there was a growing

militancy amongst the population of Tehran. Secret societies proliferated, Nazim al-Islam joining a new society where each member vowed to form an additional cell. 101 An Aniuman-i Tullab was active distributing leaflets on the subiect of the crown prince and

the Majlis. 102 Members of these societies were amongst the onlookers who were beginning not only to disrupt the Majlis but also to intimidate its members. On one occasion when the Mailis went into closed session there was very nearly a major disturbance only just quelled by Bihbihani. 103 In February 1907 a societv called the Anjuman-i Ittihadiyya, which reportedly had 4,000 members,

began drilling to form a sort of national guard against the shah's

expected attack on the assembly. 104

THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

111

time the Tabriz deputies, who were particularly radical, arrived in Tehran in early February, there was already a militant movement

afoot. As the situation polarized, Bihbihani and Tabataba'i did

their utmost, with some success, to play a conciliatory role. Bihbihani stressed the need for unity between government and people,

and attacked the authors of anonymous radical pamphlets. In March the two muitahids induced the so-called National Guard, then drilling, to disband, IS and Tabataba'i spoke against any society that was not properly constituted.

In general, Bihbihani's loyalty to reform was less noticeable

than that of Tabatabai, who commented on the shah's coronation that the shah had been crowned with a constitutional crown, and that if he turned against the constitution, he would no longer be

recognized as sovereign. The real role of the two muitahids re.

mained that of legitimizing the Majlis. The third significant muita-

hid, Shaikh Fazlallah, adopted a quietist role, almost certainly

because he did not approve of the Majlis, but was not in a position

to oppose it.

Of the notables, most seemed anxious to maintain a low profile. Not all went so far as to advocate the establishment of a national assembly, both Nasir al-Mulk and Mukhbir al-Saltana being scep-

tical. The more progressive ones, such as the sons of Mushir al-Daula and Sani al-Daula, were able to use their knowledge of

Another sign of a new kind of political activit in early 1907 was the appearance of newspapers. 'There was no proper press in Iran before the granting of the constitution in 1906. Only a few officig

European systems to give shape to the popular movement in the absence of any other clearly conceived ideology.

flattering reports of the activities of the shah and senior officials.

10 The real impetus towards establishing the Majlis appears to have

papers existed, and they contained little in the way of news beyond

There were several Persian langauge newspapers outside Iran, notably Habl al-Matin of Calcutta, Akhtar published in Constantinople, and Surayya and Parvarish established in Cairo. These did

contain genuine news articles, and, more particularly, open discussion of Iran's problems. The earliest proper newspaper in Iran was

Majlis, established in Tehran in November 1906 principally to

report the debates of the assembly. Early in 1907 it was followed rapidly by many others. They included Habl al-Matin of Tehran,

containing discursive articles of good quality, Sur-i Israfil, a radical reformist paper, Tamaddun, another such, and Musavat,

important for its detailed accounts of trials of political significance. Though most of the Tehran newspapers were moderate, a number

contained articles of an inflammatory nature. which the government was not permitted by the assembly to censor. Thus by the

come from the bazaar, especially from the merchants. They provided most of the funding for the bast the first mention of a mailis came from them. and they ensured it was a mailis-i milli (national assembly); and when the time came it was they who summoned the

'ulama for Qumm. The more simple guildsmen appear to have

followed their lead, and once the Mailis was established the leading merchants were on all the important committees. The reasons

that impelled them to struggle for a Mailis may be found in increased government taxation in preceding years; in the failure to

account for the money raised; and in government failure to repay debts to certain of their number. The exact nature of their interest in reform for its own sake must await further study.

By February the Majlis was having to contend with radical

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

societies outside it and a powerful, but largely unrepresented court

faction led by Amir Bahadur. The impression is less of the Mailis changing political habits than being overwhelmed by traditional patterns, such as diffusion of authority and shifting allegiances, now made overt by the collapse of the shah's coercive power.

5 Constitutionalism and the

Law of Islam

In the course of the struggle over the responsiblity of ministers in early 1907, Mushir al-Daula, the sadr-i azam, pointed out that an assembly had been granted, but not constitutional government. Indeed the royal rescripts had so far avoided the word mashruta. The Mailis immediately demanded a rescript from the shah confirming that the government of Iran was constitutional. He resisted and there was commotion in both Tehran and Tabriz, which had received news of the conflict from the Tabriz deputies.' In addition to the Tabriz deputies, the major merchants were also press-

ing for mashruta.? Ministers and notables debated how to respond to this new demand. Azud al-Mulk is reported to have suggested the word

'constitutional' 3 This was vetoed by the majority of other notables

present on the grounds that it implied conditions, such as freedom

of religion, which were impossible to grant but which radicals would no doubt soon proceed to demand. Mukhbir al-Saltana considered that the people were already participating in the gov-

ernment, but realized that the populace of Tabriz would not be satisfied with such a reply.* He believed initially that in an Islamic country mashruta would have no meaning and thought that if mashru'a (meaning in accordance with the sharia) were properl implemented, it could lead to mashruta. This shows some lack of understanding by Mukhbir al-Saltana of the full implications of government according to the sharia. In any event the shah was influenced by this argument and on 10 February he sent a message to the Majlis that he would not grant an assembly that was mashruta (constitutional) but that he would

grant one that was mashrua. On the following day Mukhbir 113

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

al-Saltana told the Majlis on behalf of the government that: It is not advisable for the government of Iran to be constitu. tional, for in a constitutional government all things are free,

and in this case there must also be freedom of religion. Certain persons will insist upon religious freedom, which is

contrary to the interests of Islam. This argument was resisted in both Tabriz and Tehran, where Tabataba' and Bihbihani, under strong pressure from their following, would not accept. In the meanwhile Mukhbir aLSaltana had been persuaded that the term mashru'a would give power to the 'ulama and he in turn explained this to the shah.& There was

now no real alternative to mashruta, particularly in the face of popular agitation. Mukhbir al-Saltana suggested a form of compromise whereby the government of Iran was declared to be

mashruta but the monarchy was vested perpetually in Muhammad 'Ali Shah and his descendants. On the evening of the same day a rescript was issued to this effect. It has already been noted that the term mashruta-yi mashru'a was used by reformers, and here it was again raised by someone of reformist sympathies, in this case to endorse change, but prevent it accelerating at such a pace as to become destructive. The rescript was signed not only by the shah but also by Tabata-

bai and Bihbihani, as it was felt that their endorsement was needed to authenticate its legitimacy. Tabataba'i tried hard to persuade Shaikh Fazlallah to sign as well, but the shaikh evaded this duty by saying he needed several days to read through it first."

1 In the interim Tabriz had divided into pro- and anti-Mailis factions. A local aniuman or council supported by the mercantile and

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM 115 difficulty in obtaining his share of the previous year's produce. I A similar dispute between the local anjuman dominated by the

bazaar element, and members of the 'ulama combined with landed

interests, developed in Rasht." One of the leading mujtahids, Hajj Mirza Khumami, was forced to leave the town with several other 'ulama at the end of March, and eventually took refuge in

Tehran.

In Tehran itself, 'ulama opposition to the Majlis was beginning to emerge. On 19 February, one of the better known preachers, Sayyid Akbar Shah, delivered a sermon against the assemblv in which he said that the laws of the Prophet were sufficient for Muslims, and true believers should protest against the introduction of the laws of infidels. 12 Savvid Akbar Shah had accompanied

Tabataba'i and Bihbihani to Hazrat 'Abd al-'Azim, but had latelv fallen out with them over payments due to him in the shrine and after. 13 He was joined by another preacher, Shaikh Muhammad Vaiz, who had also been in the shrine. Savvid Akbar was backed by the imam juma and another mujtahid, Sayyid Muhammad Tafrishi, who had lost control of a large amount of vaaf land to Bihbihani, as well as by Zain al-'Abidin Zanjani, and complained that his students were smitten with freedom and no longer showed

him any respect. On 23 February Sayyid Akbar and his group,

together with a following of about seventy students, took bast in

Hazrat 'Abd al-'Azim. They were said to be subsidized by the Vazir Makhsus, the governors of Tehran, acting on behalf of the shah

and while there they preached against the Majlis, but were largely

ignored by popular opinion. Eventually, through the mediation of Tabataba' and Bihbihani, they were allowed to return to Tehran. The Majlis, in the meantime, was considering how it might save

lower classes had been established there. This body was constantly in touch with the Tabriz deputies in Tehran, and agitated in favour

money, and a recommendation that tuvuls be abolished was added to the report of the finance committee. Tuyuls were a type of fief. whereby land was assigned to a holder who might collect and keep its dues in lieu of payment of salary. In practice such holdings were

of constitutionalism. Many of the 'ulama were hostile to the aniuman which was depriving them of much of their importance and of

fiefholders were in effect landowners, and as such, powerful mem-

their emoluments. They were joined by the landed proprietors who found their interests menaced by the anjuman, which was

cluded many of the notables and 'ulama, opposition soon

forcing down the prices of meat and grain. The antipathy between

the two factions came to a head in April when Hai Mirza Hasan Aga, the leading mujahid, was expelled from Tabriz by the aniuman for supporting the landlord of a local village who was having

often hereditary and treated as private property. Tuvuldars or

bers of a society still largely feudal. 14 Since the fiefholders ingathered. Nazim al-Islam, whose secret society was worried by the

effect of such radical measures, requested Tabataba'i to try and restrain the Majlis on this issue, and suggested that it could wait for another vear. IS Tabataba'i brought up the matter on 16 March,

but was not given a chance to explain his case. The opposition, led

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

by Taqizada, a Tabriz deputy, managed to carry the vote in favour

of abolition by a small minority. A decision was also taken to examine and reduce pensions, a measure Daulatabadi considered ill-advised as it not only provoked opposition, but affected people

of small means, as well as the notables. 16 Consequently a reaction began against the Majlis, and, to the

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM 117 By mid-April Amin al-Sultan was on his way home assisted by the

Russians, who provided a gunboat to bring him to the port of

Enzeli on the Caspian. His arrival there met with a demonstration of opposition, for he was suspected of wanting to restore the old

order. He was not permitted to proceed to Tehran until he had

covert opposition of the shah and the court factions, was added the discontent of other groups, who began to realize they stood to gain

sworn fidelity to the constitution. Yet, while some believed that he would use his statecraft to incapacitate the Majlis; others considered him the one person capable of reconciling the differences

The priesthood are fully conscious that their turn will come,

between the assembly and the shah. His supporters included Bihbihani as well as the President of the Majlis, Sani' al-Daula, Mukhbir al-Saltana and Amin al-Zarb.21 On his arrival Amin

more under the old system. Spring Rice reported:

and that, when the court is dealt with, the mullahs will not have long to wait before they find their masters. The Shah had little difficulty in showing them that their interests are bound up with his. Their support of the popular cause is manifestly lukewarm, but they have to seem to lead for fear that it will be plain to everyone that they will be forced to follow. 17 Spring Rice does not, however, indicate to which members of the 'ulama this statement refers.

As part of the original constitution it had been stated that an

oath of allegiance would be sworn to the shah and the 'nation' by the deputies, and the shah requested that this should be accom-

plished in early March. On 5 March, Sani' al-Daula and about

thirty deputies subscribed to an oath written in Shaikh Fazlallah's

hand. 18 But Sad al-Daula refused, saying that the constitution required further modification. The spectators, with whom he was in league, rushed into the Majlis and tore up the oath. Students and sayyids calling themselves the 'national guard' began drilling outside the town in support of the Majlis, but were persuaded by Bihbihani and Tabataba'i to disband. Two days later, on 7 March, Bihbihani and Tabataba'i administered the oath to the deputies. 19

Without assistance in men and money the shah had no means of suppressing the assembly. He had for some time been in contact with the exiled former prime minister, Amin al-Sultan, concerning

the possibility of the latter's return to office. Amin al-Sultan had

resigned in 1903 largely because of his failure to solve the govern-

ment's financial problems. He was obliged to leave the country and had spent about three and a half years travelling in Europe and Asia. In reply to the shah's note he said that, although Iran was little suited to representative institutions, the Majlis must be sustained, and, unless the shah agreed, he would not take office. O

al-Sultan concerned himself with the pressing problem of the finances, and the need to raise a loan. There were reports that the shah mistrusted him, and it was considered that any influence Amin al-Sultan had at court was largely due to his being on good terms with the Russian legation.22

2 By April 1907 many of the 'ulama were expressing disquiet over

the Majlis, and were particularly worried about the Commission on the Supplementary Law, which was completing its work. A series of meetings was arranged between deputies and leading ulama to examine the law article by article. Shaikh Fazlallah and his group attended these meetings determined to have the law drafted in conformity with the sharia. On 5 May the shaikh wrote

to his son in Najaf that: My time is so taken up with all this business that there is no

chance to read or write a letter. All the lands of Iran from Tabriz to Isfahan to Shiraz are in a state of chaos. A variety of people and societies have been stirring up events in a manner destructive to the community and the government of

Islam (daulat va millat-i islam) in a way no one could have expected.23

The most contentious point in the law was Article 8 which stated that all the people of Iran were equal before the law of the state

(ganun-i daulati) irrespective of their creed. As Mukhbir alSaltana pointed out there was no ganun-i daulati 24 but the radicals obviously intended to rectify this. Some ulama objected to Article 19 on the establishment of state schools and compulsory educa-

tion, which they insisted was contrary to the sharia. A further

ISLAM AND MODERNISM 118 point of controversy was Article 21 giving freedom of the press. Although this was qualified by a prohibition of books that might

undermine Islam the exact nature of such books was not defined. To counter the constitutionalists, Shaikh Fazlallah composed an

article to be included in the Supplementary Fundamental Law to

the effect that no bill should pass the Majlis without the consent of

the 'ulama. It was worded as follows:

The Sacred National Consultative Assembly, which has been

established through the care of the Imam of the Age, may God hasten his coming, and the favour of His Majesty the Shahanshah of Islam, may God prolong his reign, and the

diligence of the Proofs of Islam, and the whole community of Iran, may at no time pass a law that is not in accordance with the sacred precepts of Islam and the laws of His Excellency,

the best of men, may prayers and peace be upon him. It is specified that it is the responsibility of the exalted 'ulama,

may the blessings of God be upon them, to distinguish whether the laws proposed by the National Consultative

Assembly, have been and are in accordance with the sharia. Therefore it is laid down that at all times a council of muitehids and iurists of the first rank should be in session, so that before laws are passed they may be first examined and discussed in that learned council. If the proposal is contrary to

the sharia, it shall not be accorded the title of law. The

judgement of the learned council in this matter is final and must be obeyed. This article cannot ever be altered, 7 Rabia 20 April 1907.25

The article did not clarify the important point of how the council would be chosen. Copies were circulated for about a month, and

the shah, hoping to create divisions and a delay, proposed sending the whole Law to the 'ulama of Naiaf for approval. 26 On the other side of the political spectrum there were disturbances in Azarbai-

jan following messages from the Tabriz deputies. 27 In mid-May there were heated discussions in the Mailis on the Law. Sayyid

Tagi Harati, a follower of Bihbihani, propounded the view that Islam was the religion of the country, and the Fundamental Law must be in accordance with it. The law must therefore be meticulously studied by the 'ulama. The Supplementary Fundamental Law was put to the Mailis on

16 May in the presence of all the muitahids. On the subiect of

equality all the 'ulama, except Tabataba', obiected of the

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM 119 grounds that infidels and Muslims could not be subjected to equal

penalties or possess equal rights according to the sharia. The

muitahids were absent from the next debate on 19 May, and there was strong criticism of them, prompting all the 'ulama deputies to rise and leave in an unusual demonstration of unity in defence of

their interests. Shaikh Fazlallah's amendment was to be read to the Majlis on that day but Taqizada, fearing that the 'ulama's influence over some of the deputies might result in its ratification,

managed to have it deferred. When one of the deputies, Hajj

Mirza Ibrahim, attempted to cast aspersions on the motives and loyalty of the Tabriz deputies, he was repulsed by Tabatabai.28 The divisions amongst the 'ulama were widening, with Tabata-

bai and Bihbihani still firmly supporting the constitutionalist cause, and Shaikh Fazlallah becoming increasingly open in his

opposition to it. Each day he was said to summon about eighty students to his house, feed them, lecture them on the evils of constitutionalism, give them two krans each, and send them away.2° It was widely believed that these activities were assisted by

donations from members of the court. Shaikh Fazlallah also made

common cause with Hajj Mirza Hasan, the prominent muitahid expelled by the Tabriz anjuman, and with Hajj Khumami, who had likewise been compelled to leave Rasht. On 30 May students in the pay of Shaikh Fazlallah entered the Mailis and abused the members. 30 Thus mobilized the students formed a counterpart to

the radical anjumans, who had contacts with the constitutional leaders, and affrays began to develop between them.

Discussions on the Fundamental Law amendment resumed on 1 June when Sani' al-Daula, probably trying in his position as president to effect a compromise, suggested that certain clauses be sent

to the 'ulama of Najaf. On 11 June Tagizada pointed out that Article 27 of the Fundamental Law already stipulated that any laws passed must be in conformity with the sharia, so the amendment was superfluous.? Pressing the advantage of the divisions

among the 'ulama, he added that they should all watch over the laws, not just a few of them. This argument was supported by the

newspaper Habl al-Matin: 'The right of judging what is in conformity with the sharia belongs to all the 'ulama. The Council of *Ulama might well ratify a law which would be rejected by all the rest 132

The amendment was again introduced on 12 June but with a

significant alteration concerning the selection of the members of the council, defined as follows:

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There shall be at all times a council of not less than five persons who are mutahids or jurists, well versed in the

religious law, and aware of the exigencies of the age. They shall be chosen in the following manner: the leading 'ulama and those who are maraja'-i taqlid of the Shia shall submit the names of twenty persons having the aforementioned qualities to the Majlis. Five or more of those, according to the exigencies of the times, shall be appointed by agreement or ballot of the National Consultative Assembly.33

It is not clear where this compromise draft came from, but it may have been the work of Sani' al-Daula in collaboration with Bihbi-

hani and Tabataba'i. The important point was, of course, the participation of the Majlis in the selection of the members of the

Council. Given the divisions among the 'ulama this would in

effect permit the dominant faction in the Mailis to choose those

who acquiesced in their views. There is little indication that such a

faction would be in agreement with Shaikh Farlallah

On 15 June the matter was again debated, and Tabataba'i asserted angrily that the Mails would not be allowed to exist unless the Council of 'Ulama was accepted. He added that the

council must have full authority to reject any bills passed by the Majlis if they were deemed contrary to the sharia. The article was

carried by a large majority. It is likely that, as Spring Rice

observed, a number of deputies at least realized that they could not openly attack the 'ulama at present. The article also had the advantage of cutting the ground from under Shaikh Fazlallab's

feet.

The 'ulama who supported the Malis had made some attempt to

mollify Shaikh Fazlallah and induce him to compromise. On 11 June all the leading 'ulama signed a fatva which stated that the Mailis and all its laws must be in accordance with the sharia. Shaikh Fazlallah is reputed at this time to have promised not to oppose the constitution any further. But he was clearly dissatisfied

with the modified draft of his article, and he and his group continued to preach against constitutionalism in the pulpits, and sent emissaries to the provinces to incite opposition there. It is possi ble, as Kasravi suggests, that his attitude may also have hardened because of links with members of the court. On 19 June Shaikh Fazlallah's followers erected a large tent, said to have been lent to them by the shah, ostensibly to hold a rauza khan - a religious ceremony where rhapsodists performed

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM 121 on holy days, particularly on Ashura. When large numbers of roughs gathered in Fazlallah's tent, it became evident that the purpose was to rally support for the anti-constitutionalist cause. 34 Supporters of the constitution attacked the tent and succeeded in dismantling it. Next day a meeting of the anjumans was held at the

Madrasa-yi Sad, to which the leading constitutionalist 'ulama were brought. The crowd was threatening, and Tabataba'i only succeeded in pacifying them by promising that, if Shaikh Fazlallah

continued to oppose the mashruta, he would personally see him

out of the city.

Shaikh Fazlallah and his group realized that events were turning against them, and the situation was growing more dangerous. That evening they set out for the shrine of Hazrat 'Abd al-'Azim. Their number included Shaikh Fazlallah himself, Shaikh Lutfallah, Mul-

la Muhammad Amuli, Sayid Muhammad son of Muhammad Kazim Tabatabai Yazdi, Sayid Ahmad, the brother of Tabata-

bai, and Hajj Mirza Hasan, the mujtahid from Tabriz. They were joined by a crowd of about 500, consisting of tuyuldars, many theological students, and some of the poorest classes (aubash). 36

Unlike the group who had taken bast in February, Shaikh Fazlal-

lah and his following enjoyed considerable prestige. The accession

of a new shah, who was opposed to constitutionalism, had given Fazlallah a powerful ally, and it is probable that the two had been in contact since March at least. The Mailis reforms, which caused

unease among members of the court and holders of fiefs and pensions, had given him additional support while the article on equality, pressed by the Tabrizis and the religious minorities, provided him with a clear pretext on which to designate constitu-

tionalism as contrary to the sharia. On 24 June Mulla Muhammad Amuli sent a telegram to Najaf announcing the group's presence in the shrine, and explaining that

it arose from ' heretical rebellion' which was to the revulsion of all the 'ulama, excepting two - by whom he presumably meant Bihbihani and Tabatabai. Similarly, in a letter to the shah saying that they intended to go to Qumm to win over the 'ulama there, the bastis declared: 'This Mailis has nothing to do with our four principles - unity, prophecy, imamate, and resurrection." On 28 June they also sent a telegram to the 'ulama of the main cities of Iran explaining that their intention was to protect the laws of Islam. The message does not appear to have made much impress-

ion. In Kerman it was received with indifference," and in Isfahan the effect of an emissary despatched by Shaikh Fazlallah was

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counteracted by someone else sent by Bihbihani. 38 In the Majlis deputies complained of the government's failure to stop Shaikh Fazlallah, and warned that if it did not soon intervene,

the 'nation' would. Tabataba'i and Bihbihani went to Hazrat 'Abd al-'Azim to try to persuade Shaikh Fazlallah to return to Tehran. In the course of a long discussion Shaikh Fazlallah warned the two

mujtahids that they were being used by people who were not

sympathetic to the interests of Islam, and who were paying respect to them at present because their influence was needed to endorse

the constitutionalist cause, but would jettison them once their

purposes were achieved. Speaking of how he himself was reviled for his opposition to constitutionalism, Shaikh Fazlallah said: 'Today it is my turn, tomorrow yours will come. 39

Tabataba'i had considerable trouble restraining the anjumans, with whom he was in contact through Sayyid Jamal al-Din, from evicting the bastis from the shrine by force. The Majlis also urged restraint on the anjumans, fearing that any major disturbance would give the shah a pretext to ask for Russian intervention. In addition the bazaaris were urged not to close shop, which they were presumably threatening to do,* and a telegram was sent to the provinces accusing Shaikh Fazlallah of acting from motives of personal gain. It was widely believed that the bast was subsidized by the shah, and indeed it would have been impossible to sustain such an undertaking without a substantial and reliable source of income. A

sufficient amount was reportedly paid monthly to Shaikh Fazlal-

lah's supporters and their families. According to Malikzada,

Shaikh Fazlallah was financed by the notables whose pensions and

salaries were to be cut by the Majlis, and also the tuyuldars.41

Kasravi considered that he was already receiving money from the government early in June. *2 Daulatabadi was of the same opinion

and stated that the money came from the Vazir Makhsus, governor of Tehran, from funds transferred by the shah to the Russian

bank. 43 Mahdi Sharif, however, denies that the Vazir Makhsus was involved.# Spring Rice reported that Shaikh Fazlallah had received money from the Russian bank which might have come from the shah's private account, but was said to be paid with

Russian consent. 45 He estimated the cost of the bast as £100 per day and said it was universally believed that the money came from

the shah.* Amin al-Sultan also believed that the shah was subsidizing Shaikh Fazlallah. He told Spring Rice that, had he denied it when the Majlis pressed him on the subject, they would prob-

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM 123 ably have confronted him with proof.47 Shaikh Fazlallah is also claimed to have raised loans on his own account to finance the

bast, and was certainly in debt at the time he died 48

On 7 July Spring Rice brought up the subject of the dispute between Shaikh Fazlallah and the Malis in an interview with the shah, who replied that the Majlis was filled with subversive elements and meddlesome 'ulama and there was a need for new elections. According to the regulations of the Malis this was not

possible before the two year term was up. Spring Rice related the shah's comments to Shaikh Fazlallah's demand that twenty-five members be purged and observed that the Russians had put forward similar arguments before the recent dissolution of the Duma. He believed Shaikh Fazlallah and the shah were in effect arguing

for a practical restoration of the old regime. The Majlis would continue to exist because of popular support for such an institu-

tion, but it would be purged and thus become an instrument of

royal policy.

In the interim the controversy had spread to Najaf, whence the Majlis requested a telegram in its support. * Of the leading muta-

hids there, Akhund Mulla Khurasani and Shaikh *Abdallah

Mazandarani complied, but Sayyid Kazim Tabataba'; Yazdi refused, giving only a brief explanation that the matter concerned the religion of Islam and the need to safeguard the souls and qualities of Muslims, which could not be accomplished except through the sharia. Khurasani and Mazandarani's telegram asserted that the Majlis would counter tyranny and protect Islam and the sharia; Khurasani and Mazandarani saw the Majlis as the

best means of doing this, whereas Tabataba'i Yazdi did not.

Shaikh Fazlallah claimed in a leaflet that the Majlis he was seeking was precisely the one desired by Khurasani, and that the Mailis in existence was being taken over by Babis. Khurasani had supported Shaikh Fazlallah's amendment, and probably considered that measure adequate. It is difficult to escape the impression that Shaikh

Fazlallah was to some extent right, and that Khurasani did not

grasp the essence of the conflict in Tehran. Shaikh Fazlallah also felt that Khurasani was hampered in understanding by being remote from the centre of events. St

In about the middle of July the bastis in Hazrat Abd al-'Azim set about propagating their cause in printed leaflets. They are re-

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ported to have had difficulty persuading any of the printing houses

in Tehran to publish their writings, which suggests that a kind of

unofficial censorship was operating; so at first they wrote out their tracts very clearly and circulated them as photographs. Since this

was an expensive method, they purchased their own lithograph

and took it to the shrine. Browne says that they produced nineteen

leaflets in all. S But according to Kasravi there were more: a first series of more than nineteen written in nastalig script, some of them dated, and a second series of nineteen written in naskhi script.52 Altogether approximately fourteen have been published,

each about two to four pages long. Of these fourteen there are four leaflets written in nastalig bearing the legend Published in the shrine of Hazrat 'Abd al-'Azim to awaken the Brothers in Religion and remedy their errors'. Two bear dates - 12 Jamadi I1 1325 (23

Julv 1907)53 and 18 Jamadi II 1325 (29 July 1907)54 - but no numbers; and two.bear numbers - No. 95S and No. 10.56 The latter is dated 23 Jamadi II 1325 (3 August 1907). There are also

two in naskhi script bearing the numbers 18$7 and 1958 and with the

same layout but different titles - "Awakening and admonition' and 'Against doubt.' Neither are dated, but the second mentions that the bastis have been in the shrine for two months, and must therefore date from about 20 August 1907. Other examples in the

naskhi script are, however, dated 26 Jamadi II 1325 (6 August 1907), 2 Rajab (11 August) and 4 Rajab (13 August) 59 Kasravi may be right that there was an earlier series in nastalig and a later one in naskhi. Of the leaflets published so far the earliest is dated 23 July 1907 but those circulated as photographs were probably sent out in mid-July; the latest was printed about 20 August. Thus the leaflets seem to have been published over a period of about six

weeks. Of the available leaflets only two are actually signed by Shaikh Fazlallah.6 Most have no signature or are simply signed 'Written by the refugees in Hazrat Abd al-'Azim'. One gives the text of a long speech by Shaikh al-Hiii61 whose name does not occur elsewhere, and who may have been a preacher designated to publicize the bastis' arguments. Some leaflets reproduce letters and tele. grams from the 'ulama of Najaf to justify the bastis' arguments. 62

As Kasravi remarked, their purpose was propaganda, making

explicit the arguments of the bastis, rather than the circulation or discussion of news. The available evidence is not sufficient to distinguish marked differences of views between different groups in the shrine, nor

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM 125 does it demonstrate any notable shift of opinion over the approxi-

mate six weeks that the leaflets were published. Generally, the

leaflets were known as the 'Ruznama-vi Shaikh Fazlallah' ('Shaikh

Fazlallah's newspaper') and refutations of their contents were directed against him personally. They will therefore be taken as representing a body of opinion, that of the bastis, amongst whom

Shaikh Fazlallah was the leading figure. The most powerful argument the bastis brought against the constitutionalists was that they had established an institution which had no legitimate basis in shar law, and was therefore a conflicting source of legal authority. They accused the constitutionalists of working for a revolution in the sharia and of trying to change it according to the works of the parliaments of Paris and England. * In attempting to introduce the law of European parlia. ments the constitutionalists took no account of the fact that the people of Iran had the sharia of which they claimed: Its provisions cover all regulations of government, and specify all obligations and duties, so the needs of the people of Iran in matters of law are limited to the business of government which, by reason of universal events, has become sepa-

rated from the sharia . . . Now the people have thrown out the law of the Prophet and set up their own law instead.

The bastis accused the Majlis deputies of interfering in the revealed law, which they had no right to do.6s They strongly rejected the argument, put forward by many constitutionalists, that the law of Islam could be altered according to the exigencies

of the age. They explained why it was not possible to alter the revealed law: God has never left the world empty of proof (hujiat), and that proof is the Prophets. To each Prophet he sent the law in a holy book to regulate the affairs of this world and the next.

To our Prophet, he revealed the law in the Koran, which is the perfection and completion of all previous laws, and will remain until the day of reckoning. Therefore there is no need

to follow the example of the law of Europe and German. If the Law of the Seal of the Prophets were defective it would be necessary for God to send another Prophet and another law, so that his proof to the people be not defective. 6 In other words, the only legitimate source of law is the divine will made manifest from time to time in the Prophets and their holy

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

books. The bastis also questioned the basis of the Majlis's legitimacy by demanding to know from what book or prophet the constitu-

tionalists got their ideas.7 Without a true basis for its power, ie. the divine law, the Majlis did not belong to things that had to be obeyed, which were fixed in God, the Prophet, the Imams and those who derive their deputyship from them. The Mailis could not claim, therefore, to be the ultimate source of authority - ulu al-amr. 68

The second significant charge which the bastis brought against the constitutionalists was that they had perverted the original idea of the institution the 'ulama had sought, and had created instead a

European parliament: 'You must distinguish between the Great Communal Place of Consultation of the Ja'fari Shia and foreign parliaments.6 They were particularly indignant that the word 'Islami' had been dropped from the original description of the Majlis. Shaikh Fazlallah defined the majlis the 'ulama had sought as: 'The Great Islamic House of Consultation established through the efforts of the Proofs of Islam and General Agents of the Imam to serve and assist the Twelver Shia government, and to protect the rights of the followers of the Jafari faith. 70 They stressed the strictly Islamic basis of the Mailis the 'ulama had wanted. National

consultation (shaura-vi milli) and constitutionalism (mashruta),

they claimed, had not been heard of until the events of the British Legation." The 'ulama had wanted an institution based on Islam,

on the Koran, the sharia and on the principle of 'amr-i bi maruf va nahy a munkar, the command to enjoin good and prohibit evil. Instead, after the Majlis was established, Babis and other irreligious persons had come out into the open, and had turned it

into an institution based on the command to enion evil and

prohibit good.72 Heretics and infidels had introduced such con-

cepts as national consultation, freedom, equality and a fun-

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM 127 constitutionalists' stated aims before the revolution, was now used

against them. In itself it has no meaning, as 'constitutionalism according to the sharia' does not exist, and Shaikh Fazlallah

always used the term mashruta to mean constitutionalism. Indeed

he was really demanding the replacement of the word mashruta with the word mashru'a,' 75 but since the word mashruta was very

popular at that point, mashruta-vi mashru'a made a convenient

slogan to win support for what was, in effect, a constitution framed

from the sharia. In the later leaflets the slogan emphasized was 'nizamnama-yi islami', 'an Islamic book of rules', which gives a more accurate summation of the bastis' aims: 'The meaning of 'nizamnama-vi islami' is precisely that law which has been amongst us for 1,300 years or more. 7 In other words, the divine revelation

was the only legitimate basis for law.

It may indeed be asked how far the bastis really wanted an

assembly. As Spring Rice commented at that time it was virtually

useless to advocate a return to the old system. Remarks in the leaflets - such as having a Majlis for a period, the need to purge certain members, and functions being limited to helping and advis-

ing the government - suggest that any Majlis the bastis accepted would not only be based on the sharia but also be compliant with the royal wishes. This was one of the main sources of difference between the bastis and the constitutionalist muitahids who desired

a limitation of the monarch's authority. The bastis took up the point of Shaikh Fazlallah's amendment

on the Council of Ulama. They denied that the Majlis had any

right to interfere in the selection of the mutahids on the Council. 7? They demanded that there be twenty supervisors appointed by the

'ulama alone, and that the clause should be unalterable. They accused the deputies of assuming an authority to which they had no right, and of overstepping the bounds of their duties. They also demanded to know the duties of the Mails and its deputies, their

damental constitutional law, all clothes made for a foreign figure, and outside the Divine Law and the Holy Book. 73 Their influence was such that any Mailis that was now set up would have for every

rights and the limits of their authority (hugug va hudud), the

ten members four materialists, one Babi, two foreign mimics

the 'ulama, and the prerogatives of the sharia. The authoritv of

(farangi ma'ab), and three ignorant Ja'fari Shi'ites. 74 The bastis' assessment of the intentions of the more determined members of

the Mailis was probably correct but their designation of their opponents as Babis was not based on fact: rather it was the common technique of slandering the opposition.

As an alternative to the existing scheme of affairs, the bastis asked for mashruta-vi mashrua. This phrase, borrowed from the

implication being that they were infringing the rights and duties of

the 'ulama was strongly upheld: 'And the Prophet said, "An offence to an 'alim is an insult to me, and an insult to me is an

affront to God. And to contradict the 'ulama is to contradict me and to disobey God. "7& They complained of the current lack of

respect for the 'ulama and the erosion of their authority. They also complained of the denigration of the shah: 'Every few davs there is a bold attack on the exalted sultanate by groups of hired thugs. 79

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

The aim of the Babis and materialists, the bastis asserted, was to

alter the sultanate.$ They were referring, presumably, to the

attempt to make the sovereign answerable to the will of the people rather than the sharia. In asking why the existing system should be altered the bastis pointed out that: "The land is the land of Islam, the sultan is the Sultan of Islam, and the 'ulama are the 'ulama of

Islam.*81

Shaikh Fazlallah also made an interesting distinction, upon which he unfortunately did not enlarge, between the Shi'ite Muslim terms and the secular terms for oppressive government: 'The

business of government (karha-yi saltanati) . .. is called in the

language of the fugaha, unjust government (daulat-i ja'ira), and in

the language of politicians, despotic government (daulati istibdad).?82 Elsewhere the bastis examined the current terms being used and

stated: The name of arbitrary government shall henceforth be

known in the language as despotism (saltanat-i istibdad) and contractual government shall be called constitutional monarchy (saltanat-i mashruta). 83 The implication was that the constitutionalists

had introduced a new vocabulary, with new values, into the language, and that although this vocabulary had been linked to Shi'ite

concepts, in reality the new ideas and the ideas of Shiism belonged in different contexts and served different purposes; the same inferences could not be drawn from them. The impression remains that the bastis wanted the shah to continue in his role in the traditional, and in their view, Islamic system of government.

The bastis also implied that the reformist cry for justice was deceptive:

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM

129

... so why have you become so weak in resolution that for the rumour of a majlis of justice you rebel against tyranny and oppression?&5

The constitutionalist measure that had most antagonized the 'ulama and had driven Shaikh Fazlallah into open opposition to the Majlis was the article asserting the equality of all subiects regardless of their creed. It highlighted the differences between a

law based on the will of the citizens of a nation state, and one based on the Divine Will. For, in Islam, unbelievers have a position distinct from that of believers. They are allowed their own legal institutions, but are obliged to pay special taxes and are excluded from specifically Muslim privileges. Thus, as an example of the Majlis's alleged desire to prohibit good and enjoin evil, the bastis stated: 'For example it gives the Zoroastrians the freedom to propagate their faith. Now anyone who tries to stop this is labelled a despot and accused of trying to destroy the Mailis. '86

The bastis also took issue with the current call for libertv. In

their view liberty was confined by the precepts of the sharia. Most particularly they attacked freedom of the press which, they maintained, was causing sedition and permitting the spread of anarchy.

They demanded stricter control, and particularly that all articles

and books published should be in conformity with the sharia.

Since Shaikh Fazlallah had recently excommunicated Talibov, the westernizing reformer, and banned his books, this term could be susceptible to dogmatic interpretation. Another point of contention was compulsory education, which the constitutionalists were

trying to introduce. The bastis asserted it was contrary to the

The freedom seekers have deceived our brothers by the use of two enticing words, justice and consultation, into making common cause with atheists . . . Islam, the most complete, the most perfect, took the world by iustice and consultation.

sharia, and that the real intention was to create European schools and inculcate foreign habits upon immature children.

justice from Paris, and our plan of consultation from

They say that the ignorant people of Iran spend twenty crore

What has happened that we must bring our regulation of

England?84

They implied that the constitutionalist goal of justice was merely a

deceptive means to another end, a banner around which to rally support. According to them it was obvious that such a goal was unrealistic: Absolute justice is limited to the time of the appearance of

his Lordship the Proof, and you have always known this

The bastis said little on the subject of the impending financial reforms. But they took up the constitutionalist criticism of the

present use of resources:

tomans a year on obtaining the waters of Zamzam and the

ground for a tomb, and that if they were not wild and

barbaric, they would not kill cows, sheep and camels at 'Id-i

Ourban.

And again: They argue that the funds for rauza-khvans and pilgrimages to the Holy Places should instead be used for the creation of

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

factories, for the building of roads and thoroughfares and other novelties like railways, and to promote foreign-style

industries 88

Finally the bastis accused the constitutionalists of causing chaos

and anarchy. Since the appearance of the Majlis, there had been a

breakdown of security, and invasions and uprisings. This, they were careful to say, was not the result of the Majlis itself, but of the influence in it of those of seditious opinions. They fulminated particularly against the anjumans as a cause of anarchy and

pointed out that, 'In England there is only one Parliament, yet you • 389 are setting up an assembly in every corner of Tehran.

• The 4 constitutionalists set about refuting the bastis in the press, in

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM 131 The newspaper Tamaddun came up with another argument exploring the idea of essential and secondary principles, and diffe-

rent areas of legislation. It maintained that the law is divided into two parts, the roots and the branches. The roots of the law are also divided into two sections, that which pertains to politics, and that which pertains to worship. The laws of the branches are laws which merely channel and make explicit the laws of the roots, like organizing ministries and keeping account of taxes. These laws may occasionally be changed according to the exigencies of the age, but the laws of the roots which come from God may never be altered." The problem with this argument was that it presupposed a division between religion and politics that in theory does not exist

in the sharia, although in nineteenth century Iran it was to some

extent evident in practice; also it presupposed a more rigid distinc-

the Majlis, and in the publication of tracts. On the question of law they brought a variety of arguments. One of the Tabriz deputies,

tion between what is primary and what is secondary law than in

Mailis on 16 July 1907. He affirmed that the sharia would not be altered, and that the Majlis would legislate in conformity with it. This would be accomplished as follows: the laws Mailis passed would be of two kinds. The first would define particulars of ques-

Tagi, put forward the idea of the Majlis confining itself to legislation in a certain area. According to this argument the duty of the

Mirza Fazl 'Ali Aga, made a long and ingenious speech in the

tions on which the shari' a made general pronouncements, of which

Mirza Fazl 'Ali Aga gave examples including the whole area of government administration. The second would concern matters

which are permissible, that is to say not obligatory, by the sharia, but regarding which, for the preservation of order, some form of agreement must be entered, though not in the name of the sharia. These laws would be a definition of the essential meaning of the

fact exists. The newspaper Majlis, in an article signed by one Muhammad

Mailis was to pass 'political' (sivasi) laws for the country as a whole, and regulations for the ordering of government departments. The paper then went on to define a law:

A law is that which establishes the limits of the monarchy; which secures the basis of the constitution, and makes the ministers responsible. A law is that which executes the precepts of the sharia, and sets the affairs of the country in

order.?

Majlis also argued that legislation limiting of the actions of

sharia, made according to the exigencies of the age. If it were impossible because of treaties or other matters to execute the fundamental ordinances of the sharia then, on the principle that

the government and making ministers responsible should take

into effect. Thus in no case would the laws of the Mailis be

An anonymous treatise written in about mid-August 1907 in

necessity justifies avoidance, secondary regulations would be put

contrary to the sharia. Therefore a law voted by the Mailis did not

have to be referred to anybody for approval. This was an inpressive argument, but it posed practical problems. For example, there is not always agreement over what is permissible, and how a

situation is to be judged as warranting the application of the

principle that necessity justifies avoidance. Haii Sayid Nasrallah obiected that this example was correct on fixed precepts, but matters that were doubtful had to be referred to the 'ulama.

place in the area of 'urf law, and added that in this way taxes might be collected in a legal manner, without extortion or oppression.

refutation of Shaikh Fazlallah, and published by Mailis newspaper took up this same point. The writer quoted the bastis' argument that the sharia had a precept on every matter and a duty for every

situation, so the need for the enactment of laws was limited to government business, and pointed out that the argument was inconsistent, adding: 'What is meant by the enactment of laws? Is

this a compromise? Is it a recognition of existing practice? Is it

theoretically correct?'93 The writer then added that this contention

would take too long to answer.

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

In August 1907, Habl al-Matin devoted space in at least three

editions to the bastis' arguments. On the question of the limitation of law-making to the matters of government it said:

From this it is clear that Shaikh Fazlallah wants the conduct

of government officials to be limited by law, but that the

government should not have a law. But in this he is mistaken because the deputies have been elected by the people and given rights to introduce laws which will give them peace and security. They want a law that concerns the whole nation, a law that covers all government. 94

This comment ignores Shaikh Fazlallah's contention that the de-

puties had no authority to do any such thing. The paper also

examined the slogan mashruta-yi mashru a and asked what Shaikh

Fazlallah intended:

If by mashruta-yi mashru'a the shaikh means why was the word mashru'a not written alongside mashruta, the answer is because in all books of law, especially the Fundamental Law, it is repeatedly stated that legislation must be in accordance with the sharia. If the shaikh means that mashru'a should be written instead of mashruta, the answer is that the implica-

tion of the word mashruta relates to a political problem, for

when constitutionalism becomes law in our country, and after it has borne fruit, we will be known to belong to the

group of constitutionally governed countries. Then if tomorrow the ruler acts despotically, they may assist us to prevent

it.

The first point could be refuted by saying there was no guarantee that the Mailis would legislate in accordance with the sharia. The

second argument may be less naive than an attempt to justify

mashruta other than by saying the government be made respons-

ible to the people. It would have been wholly repugnant to the bastis as it could invite infidel intervention.

The more radical newspapers such as Sur-i Israfil emploved more sweeping arguments, for example, that Islam should conform to the exigencies of the age, and an Islam that was not in conformity with the exigencies of the age was counterfeit Islam, invented by a number of opportunist ulama.95

The constitutionalists were resourceful in their refutations of

Shaikh Fazlallah's argument on the sources of law and the area of legal jurisdiction, but they never really answered the fundamental

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM

133

point that there was a conflict between a law based upon the

revealed will of God and one founded on the sovereign will of the people in parliament. On the subject of equality the constitutionalist arguments were,

from the point of view of the sharia, of doubtful validity. Mailis put forward the view that God bestowed rights on everybody according to what was suitable.* Throughout the world and in every sect each person has their rights and duties. The Fundamental Law concerned public rights (huguq-i 'amma) which all

prophets had recommended. On the possible conflict between 'public rights' and 'sharia rights' the paper made no comment. More pertinently the paper queried why the shaikh had not insisted upon the application of the sharia rights under the former 'despotism'. On the question of freedom of the press, the constitutionalists were on surer ground, as Shaikh Fazlallah was not arguing that this was inherently contrary to the sharia, but rather that the press was

denigrating religion and the 'ulama. The 'Treatise in Refutation' pointed out that most of what the bastis were complaining about was in the anonymous leaflets (shabnama), which had nothing to do with the Majlis. The treatment of the 'ulama in the press bears out some of Shaikh Fazlallah's complaints. Moderate papers such as Habl al-Matin were circumspect, but the more radical ones such as Tamaddun put forward some extreme arguments - for example that the foundations of the Malis were based upon the Holy Law of the Prophet, and each of its members was therefore a protector and guardian of the sharia, 7 which in effect meant usurpation of the authority of the 'ulama. It also accused the 'ulama of deliber-

ately obscuring the principles of religion in language only they could understand in order to enhance their own authority, an argument which was also employed in Reformation Europe, and possibly comes from a European source. With regard to censorship the impression remains that much of what the bastis objected to could have been controlled by a law of libel and the judicious application of a limited censorship. Where. however, the press touched upon the conflict of authority between

the sharia and constitutional government, the problem was far more intractable. In discussing the complaint that the word islami had been deliberately dropped from the title of the Majlis, the 'Treatise in Refutation' maintained that it was only the corrupt Islam of the past that had gone."* It was stated firmiv in the Fundamental Law

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM 135

that whatever takes place in the Majlis must be in accordance with

the sharia. In reply to Shaikh Fazlallah's complaint that the

attempt to bind the shah and government by contract was a trans-

gression, the Treatise expostulated that the aim was to limit not

only the powers of the government but of all classes and all sects,

so that each individual knew his rights and duties, and no one could then be oppressed and enslaved.? The writer was also insistent on the loyalty of all Muslims to the shah. The Treatise also attempted to define the nature of the Majlis,

affirming that it was not a foreign parliament introducing an alien law. 10 In answer to Shaikh Fazlallah's demand for a definition of the rights and duties of the Majlis, and the limits of its authority,

the Treatise said it was a place of consultation which fixed the limits and established the rights of the people, and enacted the political laws of the kingdom. It was also the means of executing

the religious law. It was concerned with the affairs of the country, and not with the religion. This reflects the more moderate constitutional view, but still presents unresolved problems on the possible conflict in duties between the Majlis and the government, and the legal arrangements according to which these reforms would be

carried out.

posedly with money supplied by the court. Besides the guilds, Shaikh Fazlallah's adherents were those with an interest in the old order and those the constitutionalist writers termed aubash. It is difficult to know if the latter were mostly poorer people who profited little from constitutionalism, or roughs in the pay of the shah.

In August, the bastis' activities produced bitter debates in the

Mailis. When it was reported that Shaikh Fazlallah had been to see

the shah on 16 August, Tabataba' remarked angrily on someone

who had behaved so to the millat being received by the shah. 103 A delegation was sent to see the shah but only evasive replies were

expected. Questions were asked on 19 August as to why the

authorities did not take firmer action, and it was clear that Fazlallah's propoganda was having sufficient effect to cause unease. The

Majlis was worried about Shaikh Fazlallah's opposition on two

counts: firstly, because it created a division in the original unity of the people against the shah and court; secondly, because it cast aspersions on the legitimacy of the assembly, thereby undermining

its authority. To protect the Majlis on the latter point a telegram was elicited from the constitutionalist 'ulama of Najaf saying that the bastis should be ignored and that to oppose the Mails was to

The constitutionalist arguments against Shaikh Fazlallah and the bastis were, on the whole, weak. Because of the close dependency of religion and state, to question the authority of Islam at that time was to lay oneself open to the charge of sedition, not only against religion, but against the state. Also the constitutionalists could not afford to dispense with the influence and legitimizing presence of

oppose the Imam. 104

Therefore they had to preserve the fiction that constitutionalism is

that the government had the right to supervise the administration of vagf land and left the Majlis. 105 This reveals the ambivalence of

those ulama who, for whatever reason, still sided with them.

inspired by, and in conformity with, Islam. This meant that they had to contend with Shaikh Fazlallah on his own ground, and on that ground he was nearly irrefutable.

Shaikh Fazlallah and the bastis had some success with their

The situation had not improved over the summer of 1907. Amin

al-Sultan had tried to find the money to finance reform, but all attempts to raise a loan had failed. Proposed financial and administrative reforms had been drafted but not yet put into effect. On

20 August, when the regulations of the Ministry of the Interior were discussed, Tabataba' strongly protested at a clause stating his position in supporting a western style government while defending the privileges of the religious body. In the meantime the disorder complained of by Shaikh Fazlallah increased. At the end of May Spring Rice reported that the resistance to all authority was spreading and was strongest in Azarbaijan and Tehran. 106 By the autumn the situation had worsened, and

propaganda. Daulatabadi reports that they gained influence over the more pious members of the guilds. I How far this was due to

on 24 August, Tabataba'i made disturbances in Rasht a pretext to deliver a speech critical of the anjumans which contrasted with his

discontent with the Majlis, is difficult to assess. Whatever the case, the guilds are said to have unsuccessfully instigated closures in the bazaar as an expression of discontent with the Majlis, 102

them:

the respect in which Shaikh Fazlallah was held, and how far to

- sup-

attitude in the spring when he had had frequent contacts with We went to much trouble to establish this Mailis and make it fruitful, but these numerous anjumans and certain deputies,

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

the soundness of whose credit is not known, are creating so

much disorder that the country is nearly lost. There are

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM 137 on his body was found a paper identifying him as "Abbas Aga of Azarbaijan, forty-first member of an unnamed anjuman of fida'is,

seventy anjumans in Tehran alone. These should unite and work for the country, not interfere in its political affairs. We

resigned in the belief the deed was instigated by a court intrigue,

the anjumans. 107

and that he was next on the list; the governor of Tehran also

must work against the sedition and anarchy being caused by

During the same debate Tabatabai suggested that the Supplementary Fundamental Law be sent to the 'ulama of Najaf for approval, a proposal formerly put forward by the shah. It was reported that at this time the Russian legation was in communica-

tion with both Bihbihani and Tabataba'i, and that the latter had

paid a secret visit to the Russian minister on 15 August. 108 On 22 August, before the debate, the Russian oriental secretary was said

to have called on both Tabatabai and Bihbihani. This visit was

linked to the opinion on the anjumans expressed by Tabataba'i in the debate.

These events may, however, be connected to the activities of Amin al-Sultan, who from his return seems to have set about creating a moderate party in the Majlis as a means of reconciling that institution with the shah and the more moderate notables and

members of the court. Those won to this group included Sanit al-Daula and his brother, the leading merchants Hajj Muhammad Ismail, Amin al-Zarb and Mu'in al-Tujjar, some representatives

of the guilds, as well as Bihbihani and Tabatabai. 109 At the same time Amin al-Sultan managed to have removed from the cabinet the more hardline conservatives such as Vazir Humayun, and most particularly the shah's uncle and father-in-law, Nab al-Saltana. The strongest opposition to Amin al-Sultan came from Taqizada

and the Tabrizis, whose influence declined as that of the sadr-i a'zam grew, to the point where they sometimes had difficulties in speaking in Majlis debates. The anjumans, especially that of Azarbaijan, in which Taqizada was prominent, were deeply suspicious

of Amin al-Sultan's tactics, which they believed were aimed at

sapping the Majlis to the point where it proved ineffective and lost respect and support. Theirs was an extreme view of a policy that was probably aimed at achieving a compromise between the Majlis

and the shah over their respective powers, and a degree of collaboration in resolving the country's problems. On 31 August the situation changed completely with the assassination of Amin al-Sultan who was shot leaving the Majlis in the company of Bihbihani. His assassin afterwards shot himself, and

or dedicated fighters. Sani' al-Daula, President of the Majlis,

resigned, convinced that it was the work of a radical secret society

which would shortly attack him. 110 Many deputies were deeply disturbed, and a telegram of condolence was sent to the shah as

well as one to the provinces informing them of the loss. The anjumans, however, received the news with joy and held lamp lighting ceremonies in celebration. On 16 September Shaikh Fazlallah emerged from bast. Kasravi

links the timing to the death of Amin al Sultan, who he consi

dered was supporting him, although no evidence for this has yet come to light. Daulatabadi thought the reason was that the supply of money from the court had dried up. II He also writes that the

implication of the assassination - that the revolution had entered a

more violent phase - created fear in certain quarters, and that Shaikh Fazlallah was affected by it. Spring Rice reported on 13 September that Shaikh Fazlallah's propaganda was having little effect, and this may be the reason why he could no longer command financial support. Certainly he does not seem to have shaken the control of the anjumans over a large part of the capital's population. Another possible reason for the shaikh's emergence at

this time, although nowhere stated or implied, was that the shah had supported him not only to give ideological justification to his own position, but also to bring pressure upon Amin al-Sultan as the latter was building up a party in the Majlis and the government to induce him to co-operate.

Shaikh Fazlallah was able to end his bast with some honour

through the good offices of Tabatabai and Bihbihani. A question

he drafted was put to the Majlis by Sadr al-'Ulama asking what the limits of its authority were. In a written answer the Mails affirmed

that it would not interfere in the affairs of the sharia, and that its

responsibility lay in matters covered by the urf law, and concerned reform of the country. 112 Shaikh Fazlallah's arguments against the constitutionalists had been very powerful, especially his charge that the constitutionalists

wished to replace the sharia with a law of foreign origin which, since it did not derive from the shar' sources of authority, had no legitimate basis in Islamic law. Constitutionalists struggled to refute this argument either by dividing the sharia precepts into

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essential and non-essential, or by attempting to define an area of law which was under government administration and in which the Majlis might legislate without contravening the sharia. Both these divisions are nebulous and in effect the constitutionalists were not able to refute Shaikh Fazlallah on these points.

6 Reform and Reaction: September 1907 to June 1908 As the revolution continued its course into 1908 Shaikh Fazlallah

provided the shah with an ideology for opposition - that the

Mailis had been taken over by heretics and that the Fundamental

Law was not mashru'a - while Bihbihani and Tabataba'i sought to provide the Majlis with a measure of legitimacy through their endorsement of it. However, further cracks were beginning to appear in the original unity of the popular movement as more divergence of interests became apparent.

An important cause of contention was the resistance of the 'ulama

to reforms in the judiciary which brought them into conflict with many of their original followers and collaborators. When the Supplementary Fundamental Law came before the Mailis for debate in late September and early October 1907 the 'ulama, led by both

chief mustahids, but particularly Bihbihani, objected to many

points which threatened their privileges and authority. The most serious dispute was over judicial authority (gazavat). The 'ulama demanded that the articles relating to this matter be drafted in a way that did not impair their judicial powers. The radical constitu. tionalists, led by Tagizada, wanted all cases referred initially to the Ministry of Justice, which would then decide whether they should

go before a civil or a shar' court.! This would give the state the authority to decide what went before the shar' courts, and thus remove judicial control from the 'ulama. The problem of what categories of cases came within the respective jurisdiction of the shar' and the secular courts was for the present avoided. Bihbi-

hani, however, disputed the right of the Ministry of Justice to decide. 139

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REFORM AND REACTION

He also contended that judgement in the important areas of property, petitions and life (amval, a'raz va nufus) should be referred to the shar' courts, and matters of customary law (umur-i 'urfivva) should go before the tribunals at the Ministry of Justice. Bihbihani

sion that nothing be published detrimental to Islam (article 20), but did not mention any mechanism for determining which pub-

did not explain what he meant by umur-i 'urfiyya; but from the

beginning the 'ulama seem to have been seeking reform in the area

of government administration where they perceived a sphere of jurisprudence in which the Majlis might legislate without interfering with the sharia. They do not, however, appear to have given much thought to the practical workings of any new system. Bihbihani's speech was greeted by an uproar in the Majlis, members of the anjumans appeared, adding to the commotion, and Bihbihani

felt it unsafe to leave the building.? To achieve a compromise the article under discussion (no. 27) was drafted ambiguously: the matter of who should decide to which courts a case was to be referred was not mentioned, nor was

the question of which cases came under what jurisdiction. It was simply stated that shar' cases were to be tried in the shar' courts and 'urf cases in the government tribunals. Article 71 dealing with

the powers of the tribunals of justice was drafted with similar obfuscation. Likewise article 86, setting up a court of appeal in

every provincial capital, did not state whether it would consider an

appeal against a shar' decision, but merely defined the court as dealing with judicial matters in accordance with the regulations concerning the administration of justice (not yet drafted). A further proposal that the 'ulama be compelled to try their cases in the

courts of the Ministry of Justice, and not in informal tribunals in

their own homes or elsewhere,3 also appears to have been

dropped. The constitution vested the power of making laws in the shah, the Majlis and the Senate, with the proviso that they could onlv become operative if deemed not contrary to the laws of Islam. In article 2 the 'ulama ostensibly reserved the right to decide what constituted infraction of the sharia; but their lack of organization, the divisions among them, and the method of selecting the committee of supervision made it unlikely that this negative power could be used to much effect. On 5 October the constitutionalists

also proposed an article ending the right of bast in a mutahid's

house. The Majlis showed determination to pass the measure, but it was vehemently opposed by the 'ulama and did not become law. The 'ulama do not seem to have again contested the article on equal rights. They accepted freedom of the press, with the provi-

141

lications were contrary to Islam. The acquisition of scientific knowledge was also permitted except what was forbidden by Islam

(article 18). Again details of what scientific knowledge might be

contrary to Islam do not seem to have been discussed. Nor did the 'ulama object to article 19, which placed all primary and secondary

schools under the direction and surveillance of the Ministry of Education, and perhaps considered it as applying to secular schools only. Since there were very few of these schools, the full import of this article was possibly not yet apparent. With regard to other matters, the powers of the shah, by contrast with the law of 31 December 1906, were severely curtailed. Sovereignty was defined as a trust which is bestowed by the nation

on the sovereign (article 35). The 'ulama did not contest this, most

probably because they took the word millat (nation) to mean the community as led by themselves and not, as the radical constitu-

tionalists intended, the popular will. The monarchy was to be

constitutional and vested in the present shah and his descendants (articles 35, 36). The role of the shah was to defend the kingdom, to

rule in accordance with the Fundamental Law (traditionally the

shah was said to rule in accordance with the sharia), and to promote the Ja'fari faith (article 39). Responsibility rested not with the sovereign but with his ministers (article 44) who were

responsible to the assembly (article 58), though the shah retained

the right to appoint them (article 46). In fact this produced a

major weakness as ministers found themselves in an ambivalent position, caught between the shah and the assembly - a situation exacerbated by the fact that they tended to be the same higher bureaucrats who had served in the government before the revolution, simply because no one else had the education, experience, and to some extent prestige, necessary for office. With regard to finance, the assembly approved the budget and there was to be strict control of the state revenue by a state accounts department (article 102).

The articles of the Fundamental Law relating to the judiciary were fairly evenly balanced between the interests of a modern

nation state with a centralized administration, and the traditional Islamic legal system. Many articles were deliberately ambiguous,

and the intention, though it can be deduced, is left obscure. In view of the antagonism of the shah and many powerful wealthy notables the constitutionalists could not afford a breach with those

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of the 'ulama who supported the Majlis. Also in a country still profoundly influenced by traditional concepts, the will of the people, imperfectly understood, was still not sufficient legitimate

basis for the Majlis. The approval of the mutahids was also

needed to legitimize it. Therefore, the interests of Islam were placed on a level with those of Iran in the Fundamental Law, and the 'ulama were able to hold their ground against the encroachments of reform. After discussion and prevarication, pressure to complete the

Fundamental Law was brought on the Majlis by representatives of the anjumans, and it was signed by the shah in October 1907.

A second significant event of the autumn of 1907 was the signing of

the Anglo-Russian Agreement at the end of August. Its purpose was to end the rivalry of the two countries in three areas of Asia Iran, Afghanistan and Tibet. It was hoped that friction would be

eliminated by agreement over past problems in these areas. According to the agreement, Iran would be divided into three

zones: the first, including Tehran and the north, would be Russia's sphere of influence; the south-east would be the British zone; and the area between would remain neutral. The two countries agreed not to seek commercial and political concessions for their subjects in each other's zone and not to impede each other's subjects from obtaining concessions in the neutral zone. Britain and Russia emphasized that the integrity and independence of Iran

was to be upheld, and promised not to interfere in Iranian affairs unless some injury was perpetrated on the persons or property of their own subjects. Britain hoped by the agreement to safeguard its interests in India. Both countries felt the need to resolve problems in Asia in order to concentrate on affairs in Europe. Unfortu-

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143

The Mailis, meanwhile, remained in difficulty. Marling, the British chargé d'affaires reported on 10 October: The treasury is empty; there is no public force to maintain order and enforce it; the moral authority of the old regime has been destroyed by the local Anjumans and the Assembly is powerless to create any respect for itself; there appear to be no statesmen of constructive ability; taxes are being paid with the greatest irregularity and even the framework of such

elementary administration as once existed has well nigh disappeared.'

As McDaniel has remarked, the forces of the central government were neutralized by internal conflict and fear, with ministers hesitant to take any action unpopular with the assembly. The Mailis

was thus little more than the local government of Tehran, its power resting on the strength and support of the anjumans. Any opposition was immediately interpreted as support for the shah. The major problem facing the Majlis was finance. The National Bank was still regarded as a panacea for all ills, and about 320,000

tomans were said to have been collected, but only 12,500 was in cash, the remainder being in Treasury receipts. In an attempt to

balance the budget, cuts were made in the shah's allowance and he,

in turn, informed the royal household that salaries would be re.

duced and some members dismissed.? It was also known by mid-

October that the salaries of princes and notables were to be cut by 50 per cent and only those wholly dependent on their salaries were to receive them in full. Their dissatisfaction was therefore added to

that of the tuyuldars and the numerous dependants of the royal

nately these motives were not credited by Iranians who viewed the

household. Tensions between the Majlis and the shah began to build up

agreement with deep misgiving, believing it foreshadowed the eventual division of Iran.

of Ramazan. The shah made urgent pleas to the Russians for

From 1907-9 the agreement had the effect that the shah and his ministers found themselves in the novel position of having to cope

with Britain and Russia acting more or less in unison, instead of playing them off against each other. The result during this period was, with a brief exception in the summer of 1908, disadvantageous to the traditional system of government, which might otherwise have had the support of the Russians.

again towards the end of October in the frequently uneasy month

money so that he would be independent of the Majlis. Rumours of a movement to depose him were meanwhile gaining ground, particularly of a largish faction supporting the claims of his uncle, Zill al-Sultan.& Some anjumans were reported to have sent messages to

Zill al-Sultan asking him if he would be a 'constitutional monarch'.° The cabinet of reformist ministers led by Nasir al-Mulk

was virtually powerless. Likewise fearing an increase in the power of the constitutional-

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ists, the anti-constitutionalist 'ulama had once again become active. Shaikh Fazlallah was reported to be one of those influencing

the shah against the Majlis,' and Sayyid 'Ali Yazdi began preaching against the institution in early November, the students

of his madrasa gathering round the pulpit so that no one could interrupt him. He was believed to have support from members of the court. Another preacher, Shaikh Muhammad Vaiz, who had been a prominent member of the opposition movement in 1906, attacked Tabataba'i and Bihbihani, as well as Sayyid Jamal al-Din. His message was similar to the one propounded by Shaikh Fazlal-

lah during the summer: 'This is not the mashruta we wanted - it has been perverted by Babis and materialists.' As Kasravi remarks, Shaikh Muhammad was always one of those who understood mashruta as the literal implementation of the sharia. 11

On 19 November the anjumans, in an apparent attempt to create a legal force of their own to protect the Majlis, wrote a

letter jointly to the assembly requesting the formation of a na-

tional army. 12 The proposal was opposed by the leading merchant,

Mu'in al-Tujjar, who said such a force was needed on the frontier and not in Tehran. The matter was, however, again taken up by Bihbihani and Tabataba'i on 29 November when they put forward a plan, which they stressed was intended to strengthen the govern-

ment, for a volunteer force which would receive money and arms from the authorities. Though they were evidently worried about the lack of order, the pressure for this proposal appears to have come from the anjumans for Tabataba'i and Bihbihani stated that

the millat had a strong desire for such a force. The Majlis was

reluctant to agree, and discussion of the proposal was deferred by

putting it to a committee. In this matter the opinion of Bihbihani and Tabataba'i appears to have been largely conditioned by that of

• their following. Bihbihani in particular held his position of considerable influence by remaining constantly in touch with popular opinions and representing it in the Majlis. In view of the shah's resentment of the limitations placed on his authority, not least in matters of finance, and the Majlis's suspicions of him, it was inevitable that the situation would not remain calm for long. Matters moved towards a climax in early December with both the shah and the anjumans mustering their forces. The shah was trying to organize an armed force composed of his own bodyguard and his father's guard under Amir Bahadur, as well as tribal elements brought to Tehran from Azarbaiian.id Certain courtiers were organizing anjumans in support of the shah, like the

REFORM AND REACTION

145 Anjuman of the Family of Muhammad, which was made up of sayyids who held meetings under the slogan 'The Family of Muhammad does not want constitutionalism'.'S Shaikh Fazlallah was said to be ready with a takfir against certain members of the Majlis should the anjumans be dispersed. The radical anjumans, hearing rumours of the shah's activity, blamed him and his hardline advisors for the country's problems. They particularly castigated Sa'd al-Daula, Amir Bahadur, Shap-

shal (the Shah's former tutor), Shaikh Fazlallah and Sayyid 'Ali Yazdi. At a meeting of the anjumans on 13 December speeches were made by Sayyid Jamal al-Din and Malik al-Mutakallimin demanding the removal of Sa'd al Daula. The shah retorted by claiming liberty of person under the constitution and on 14 De-

cember summoned the cabinet, which, being unable to deal with the crisis, resigned! At sunrise on the following day, some 600-700 roughs from the Sang-i Laj and Chala Maidan quarters occupied one of the courtyards of the Sipah Salar mosque, the main meeting place of the anjumans. Bihbihani was summoned and sent a message to one of their leaders to ask what they were doing. 16 They replied that they had been sent to defend the Majlis; but shortly afterwards the mob

attacked the Majlis building itself, and shots were fired at the door. Those in the Majlis were unarmed but members of the

aniumans fired a few shots from the walls of the mosque, and the mob retreated. When the Majlis requested that the Cossacks (a brigade responsible to the shah whose officers were Russian) be

sent to maintain order, their colonel, Liakhoff, refused. 17 The brigade, indeed, played no part in the attempted coup.

The mob departed to Maidan-i Tupkhana where they were

joined by camel drivers, muleteers, canonkeepers, servants of the guard house and soldiers of Amir Bahadur's Silarkhur regiment. 18 The president of the Majlis sent his brothers to intercede with the

shah, who promptly arrested them. In the afternoon the prime

minister, Nasir al-Mulk, was also seized and had to be rescued by the British minister. On his arrest the Majlis dispersed. It seemed, briefly, that the shah had won, as the Majlis and the anjumans had been thrown off their guard and offered no resistance. The shah, however, did not press his advantage - according to some because

of his lack of resolution, but probably, as Browne suggests, be-

cause he could not rely on his 'troops'. I° Kasravi says that his main objective was to create a disturbance to show that the people did not support the constitution. This view is borne out by a telegram

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from Hartwig, the Russian representative, in which the crowd in

the Tupkhana is represented as a vast throng of different sections of the community expressing support for the shah and antipathy to the constitution and the Majlis. The following day the Majlis regained the advantage. The anjumans gathered round it with about 3,000 men armed with rifles 21 The opposition was largely organized by the Tabriz deputies, and

the Anjuman-i Azarbaijan who sent messages to the provinces.

When the shah requested that the Majlis adiourn while he restore order, meaning disperse the anjumans, his message was rejected. The crowd in the Maidan-i Tupkhana was now joined by mullas.

Among them were the preachers Sayid 'Ali Yazdi and Akbar Shah; well known opponents of constitutionalism such as 'Ali

Akbar Burujirdi and Mulla Muhammad Amuli, and the mujahids,

Abu Talib Zanjani, Muhammad Tafrishi and Shaikh Fazlallah. Kasravi maintains that Shaikh Fazlallah was party to the whole plan; but a letter from one of Fazlallah's retainers to his son in

Najaf, makes it clear that he was brought from his house reluctantly by the shah's roughs.22 The crowd, which was provided with some protection by armed Cossacks, was also joined by students and sayyids, and more armed roughs appeared from Varamin led

by a mulla. Two partisans of the Majlis who went to survey the scene were set upon and killed By 17 December the fact that the Majlis had stood firm for two

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147

that the exiled notables be allowed to return. The shah in turn

demanded the expulsion of four or five deputies. While the idea of

putting pressure on the shah to restore order by removing his myrmidons was resisted by the Russians, the demand for the expulsion of the deputies was opposed by the British. On the evening of 17 December the crowd round the Majlis was estimated

by the British at 6-7,000 and that in the Maidan-i Tupkhana at 1,500.28 Telegrams began arriving in support of the Majlis, and that from the Tabriz aniuman advocated the shah's deposition. The shah began to waver, and a compromise was reached whereby his supporters were to leave the Maidan-i Tupkhana while all but a core of the Majlis's men were to quit the mosque.29 Amir Bahadur had orders to remove Shaikh Fazlallah's tent and pulpit in order to

force him to go, and the shaikh was obliged to take refuge with a number of his followers in the Arg (citadel). Bihbihani and Tabataba'i were instrumental in persuading the forces of the Mailis to disband. The Russians considered the shah indecisive but also believed he had insufficent support to deter the aniumans 30

By 22 December the Majlis was gaining the upper hand,

largely through the efforts of the Tabriz anjuman, which sent

telegrams calling for the shah's deposition to all other cities, with

the result that telegrams poured in from the provinces. On the

evening of 23 December the shah yielded to all the Mailis's

to Daulatabadi, the Anjuman of the Guilds provided victuals for

conditions, requesting only that Amir Bahadur be retained. When on 24 December the militants seemed poised to press their advantage further, the Russians and British agreed that it was important to keep the shah on the throne to prevent the country falling into anarchy.31 As McDaniel has pointed out this attempt to maintain

sion set up for the purpose.23 Contributions came secretly from

stability meant preventing either side from overwhelming the

wealthy notables, such as Zill al-Sultan, who were against the

constitution, and the deputies in turn were to swear loyalty to him. The Majlis's conditions relating to military forces appear to have been dropped, but the arrested notables were to be released and the shah's roughs to be punished. By 26 December the situation was sufficiently secure for the bazaar to reopen. The mullas and roughs sheltering in the citadel were given five tomans each by the shah's henchmen and escorted out. The shah

davs helped to rally support. More arms appeared, as did workers

from the telegraphs, the Hazrat Abd al-'Azim railway and the

tramways who were sent back to work by the president. According

the other anjumans, and the costs were borne by a special commis-

shah. Zill al-Sultan had previously withdrawn £50,000 in consols invested in London.24 He was also said to have provided guns.25 Aniumans arrived from the outling districts such as Shimiran. 26 According to one of Browne's correspondents those around the

Mails included young men in white collars, mullas and sayids, kulah namadis (labourers) and tradesfolk,27 indicating the variety

of support for the Majlis, and the many hopes held of it. The Mailis now took the initiative and demanded the removal of Amir Bahadur and Sad al-Daula: that the Cossack Brigade and other forces should come under the Ministry of War; that a 200strong National Guard be established to protect the Mailis, and

other 32 Finally, the shah agreed to swear an oath in support Of the

tried to put off punishing them, and they took refuge in the

Madrasa-vi Khan Marvi on the east side of the palace, dislodging

the students from their quarters. Food was supplied from the court. Sayid Ali Yazdi made a speech from the pulpit demanding mashruta-yi mashru a. To secure this he proposed that articles in

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the constitution (nizamnama) which were contrary to the sharia

should be changed. Emissaries sent to the bazaar collected a

miscellaneous following under the cry of 'Islam in danger'. On 28 December Shaikh Fazlallah sent a telegram to the 'ulama of all the

provinces in the name of the sharia requesting assistance for

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governor of Tehran. The leaders of the roughs of the different quarters of Tehran, such as Sani' Hazrat from Chala Maidan, Muqtadir Nizam in Sangalaj, and Hajj Ma'sum in Sar Pulak, sold their services to whoever required them. Sani' Hazrat, who led the

himself and his following as they were oppressed (mazlum). The following day some of the ministers went to see Shaikh Fazlallah and request him to disperse his supporters. On 30 December a

mob attack on the Majlis in 1907, had only recently been working

response to one from Tabataba'i and Bihbihani. It declared Shaikh Fazlallah to be the cause of sedition and his participation in affairs was forbidden.33 The shah reportedly sent a message to Shaikh Fazlallah saying that this was not the time for further resistance and requesting that he disperse his following which, on 1 January,

punishment by the Majlis, thereby gaining prestige with certain of the residents of his own quarter. 38 Protests were also ioined by

telegram came from the three constitutional 'ulama of Najaf in

left the madrasa. In the next few davs the newspapers Habl alMatin and Majlis published telegrams from the 'ulama of the provinces accusing Shaikh Fazlallah of leading the people astrav and trying to reinstate 'despotism'. The Russians referred to

Shaikh Fazlallah's following as the 'reactionary party', and

thought it was composed of those of his adherents who were in the pay of the more hardline members of the court.34 Though Shaikh Fazlallah seems initially to have been brought to open criticism of

the Mailis on the shah's initiative to give justification for the

attempted coup, he himself apparently then took a leading part in encouraging opposition to the constitution, using a number of the arguments he had employed in the summer. The association of mullas and roughs in the service of a particular cause was not unusual. And, as happened in this case, their agita-

tion was often financed by others. In Tabriz at the time of the

tobacco protest the agitation was organized by a few influential

citizens among the teashop keepers and small tradesmen. A petition was circulated through the bazaars by one of the lesser 'ula-

ma, his method being to give it to the head of each guild and instruct him to secure the signatures of those engaged in his trade.35 In the campaign leading up to the bast of July 1906 in Tehran, the money came from major merchants and high officials but the organization was carried out by the 'ulama and bazaaris. One of the mob leaders, Mahdi Gavkush, known as the 'centurion'

(yuzbashi) for his ability to raise a crowd, worked for Bihbihani

and Tabataba'i.36 When Savvid Akbar Shah took bast in the shrine of Hazrat Abd al- Azim in February 1907, he was accompanied by

students and roughs (not always distinguishable) paid for by the

for Bihbihani.37 Hajj Ma'sum, one of the shah's mvrmidons in 1907, was resident in Bihbihani's quarter and had also been linked

to the mujtahid. For this reason Bihbihani helped him to evade strangers from the countryside, who came into town in the ex-

pectation of pillage, usually in the guise of tullab. 39 There may well

have been a connection between these gangs of the roughs in

Tehran, also known as lutis, and the zurkhanas (gymnasiums), but so far no direct evidence has emerged.

4 The problems of government were exacerbated by divisions within the Mailis itself. Ettehadieh Nezam Mafi has identified two parties in the assembly, the Azadikhvahan and Mutadil. The former may be translated variously as the Liberals, Democrats or Radicals, 40

and the latter as the Moderates. The Azadikhvahan formed a more cohesive group with an agreed programme of social and economic reform, the division of the secular and religious spheres,

strict curtailment of the powers of the shah, and such liberal-

democratic tenets as freedom of the press.41 They were dominated

by the Tabriz deputies, led by Taqizada, and had a powerful

organization outside the Majlis in the Anjuman-i Azarbaijan, of

which Taqizada was also the head. The so-called Moderates were not really a party but a body of opinion concerned to limit govern-

ment and make it legally and financially accountable. They consisted of amorphous groups which formed and reformed according to what they perceived to be their immediate interest, and whose

members at times allied themselves with the Azadikhvahan. The

Moderates included the 'ulama and some of the leading merchants who had been linked to each other from the time of the opposition

movement to "Ain al-Daula. They looked upon the Azarbaiian contingent as a group of unknowns who had played little part in

the establishment of the Mailis, and should not be allowed to take it over. 42 They included Bihbihani and Tabataba^, Amin al-Zarb,

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Hajj Muhammad Ismail, Mu'in al-Tujjar, and Hajj Muhammad Taqi Bunakdar. According to Malikzada, these men considered themselves "the pillars of the mashruta', and had great influence

among the lesser deputies. They had hoped, after the return of

Amin al-Sultan, to overwhelm the most radical deputies and, with the help of the government, purge them from the Majlis. They also

had links with the anjumans, for example the Aniuman of the

Guilds and Merchants. Although suspicious of each other, these factions within the Majlis had a common bond in their opposition

to the shah. A somewhat isolated figure was Ihtisham al-Saltana who, from

the autumn of 1907, was president of the Majlis. Like Sani

al-Daula before him, he was placed in a weak position because, by

virtue of his office, he had to struggle to achieve some form of compromise with the shah. In addition he had only recently re-

turned from abroad and had no time to build up a base of his own. Ihtisham al-Saltana sympathized with many of the reforms desired

by the Azadikhvahan, and, like many of the higher bureaucracy,

one of his chief aims was to curb the influence of the 'ulama,

particularly Bihbihani, since he considered their rigorous defence of their privileges was interfering with the reform of the administration and the regular running of government. He therefore decided for the present to ally with Tabrizis. 3 To win them over he

kept them informed on all discussions, and allowed them a say which added to their influence. Bihbihani and the leading merchants perceived that their position was being undermined and responded each in their own way. Amin al-Zarb and Muin alTujjar made a rapprochement with Ihtisham al-Saltana who, although advised by Taqizada to ignore Amin al-Zarb, had to respond since he was in charge of the Majlis accounts. The other merchants, Hajj Muhammad Ismail and Sayyid Murtazavi, disliking the influence of both the Tabrizis and the 'ulama, formed some

links with the shah, but on the whole remained in a neutral

position. In all this political manoeuvring Bihbihani behaved much as any politician bent on maintaining his power. In danger of being isolated, he knew that the shah did not trust him, and that in any case to effect a reconciliation would mean losing all the prestige he

had gained for his part in the opposition movement. His only alternative was to ally with the Tabrizis - with whom he had little in common - and detach them from Ihtisham al-Saltana. This he achieved by increasingly voicing the opinions of the anju-

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151

mans, even the most radical. At the same time the alliance between Ihtisham al-Saltana and the Tabrizis was shaken by the president's habit of arrogating a greater measure of executive powers to himself than his predecessor had done, and adopting a

peremptory tone in discussion - usually to try and see business carried through. The constellations thus reformed, with Bihbihani

and the Tabrizis allied against the president. One effect was to

increase the representation of the radical section of the anjumans

in the Majlis. Another was to exacerbate the difficulty of the

president's task of reconciling the Majlis and the shah, and to lay him open to charges of conniving with the shah whenever he tried to represent the latter's point of view.

5 It was generally recognized that the December agreement between

the shah and the Mailis was only a truce. In an effort to convert this into a more lasting peace Bihbihani asked Hartwig to use his influence with the shah to give up his more hardline advisors and to show more trust in experienced men of moderate opinions.44 Hartwig, who had considerable respect for Bihbihani 'since he is possessed of a keen mind unlike his colleague Sayyid Muhammad', promised to induce the shah to compromise; but although he made

an effort in this direction he met with no success. For a while,

however, the shah was resigned to the existing state of affairs, and

ceased to oppose the Majlis actively. Perhaps partly as a result of the shah's abstention, the divisions

within the Majlis itself were now exacerbated. While Ihtisham al-Saltana had the support of many deputies his base was not strong enough for him to resist Bihbihani and the Tabrizis. His necessary private audiences with the shah, and his efforts to placate him by such measures as restricting the freedom of the press,

led to rumours that he was betraying the popular cause. He was accused of having joined the shah's faction and of planning to drive Taqizada from the house. * In January Ihtisham al-Saltana openly attacked Bihbihani and accused him of taking bribes and trampling on the people's rights.4 Although a number of deputies agreed with him there was a furore in the Majlis. Marling consi dered that Ihtisham al-Saltana's action was generally interpreted as a sign of treason to the popular cause. It had long been known that Bihbihani's motives were suspect, but this was not an opportune moment for a breach. Ihtisham's attack was a serious tactical

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error, which laid him open to the accusation of trying to divide the supporters of the constitution. 47 The legitimizing presence of a compliant mujtahid with multifarious connections and influence over the pious was, at this time, of much greater value to the constitutionalist cause than a reformist notable. The constitutionalists also recognized that, as long as the

reformers, particularly members of the higher bureaucracy such as

shah distrusted Bihbihani, the latter had no alternative but to support the Majlis, whatever his real views and interests. They believed that if they could be assured of the shah's support for the

Majlis, they could dislodge Bihbihani and the other 'ulama.

However, as long as the shah offered formidable opposition, sus-

tained by the Russians, it was necessary to keep the popular movement together and not bring out the latent difficulties be-

tween the reformers and the 'ulama. Ihtisham al-Saltana was obliged to apologize publicly to Bihbihani. At the end of March he openly criticized the leader of one of the more radical anjumans over a disagreement he had had with

the merchant, Mu'in al-Tujjar. 48 This gave the aniumans an

opportunity to bring about his resignation, which he had in any case been seriously contemplating. In his place the Majlis elected Mumtaz al-Daula, who was compliant to the wishes of the Tabriz deputies, once again the dominant faction. Most of February 1908 passed without disturbance. The British

found it difficult to renew the mining contract of the Imperial Bank, which should have been automatic, because of the opposi-

tion of the Finance Committee of the Majlis, of which Amin al-Zarb was a member.* He and Muin al-Tuiiar were the most

active in blocking renewal of the contract which they sought to

control. On 26 February two bombs were thrown at the shah's car,

but the shah, who was travelling in a carriage behind was un-

harmed. The apathy shown by the Majlis in finding the culprit, and the manner in which the anjumans obtained the release of those

ultimately arrested in April, caused bitterness to the shah. The Majlis itself was becoming increasingly ineffective, powerless to. have its orders carried through, yet impeding the government.

153

Mukhbir al-Saltana, with their centralizing objectives, aimed for state administration of the judiciary, as well as for greater consistency and efficiency. The officials of the Ministry of Justice complained of the constant interference of the 'ulama, and also that their contradictory judgements (ahkam-i naskh va mansukh) were causing chaos in the administration of justice. The 'ulama still exerted the greater influence and authority, and this enabled them to ignore the regulations issued by the Ministry of Justice when they chose. From October 1907 to February 1908, Mukhbir

al-Saltana, an assertive minister, had attempted to ignore the shari' a ahkam (ordinances) when these were incompatible with the

workings of the ministry, and to curtail Bihbihani's influence in judicial matters. He had also reorganized the ministry, creating

new courts and attempting to make the judiciary more

independent. However, with little support for ministers, either from the shah or in the Majlis, where Bihbihani had strong influence, the 'ulama once more gained the upper hand, and the reforms had little impact. The result was paralysis in the work of the ministry, which consequently made no improvement in the administration of justice. The primary aim of the first stage of the movement for reform had been judicial reform, and the Anjuman of the Guilds began to complain that all their efforts to confirm their rights and set up a proper Ministry of Justice (ihgaq-i hagg va dashtan-i 'adliyya) had come to nothing. A meeting of 'ulama, officials and representatives of the aniumans was called on 11 March 1908 to discuss the affairs of the Ministry of Justice. An indictment by the Anjuman of the Guilds was read complaining of the ministry officials and of the lack of reform. The officials, after pointing out that the ministry still had no suitable location, insufficient educated personnel, no civil law in accordance with the necessities of the times and no money, took the opportunity to launch an attack against the 'ulama for creating anarchy in the legal system by their contradictory

pronouncements. Mukhbir al-Saltana who, although no longer minister, had attended the meeting, suggested that the 'ulama should collaborate to examine all ordinances (ahkam), distinguish

In March 1908 the struggle over the authority of the 'ulama and

the Ministry of Justice in the administration of judicial affairs came to a head again. The 'ulama, led as usual by Bihbihani, considered the Ministry of Justice to be 'the servant of the sharia,SO while the

between what was valid and what was void, and burn the latter. Everyone agreed to this suggestion except the 'ulama, who included Bihbihani, Sadr al-'Ulama, and Muhammad Riza Qummi. They demanded to know what sort of meeting would suggest burning the ordinances of the sharia, and left in high dudgeon.

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Later Sadr al-'Ulama, who had influence in the bazaar, summoned

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155

some of the leaders of the guilds, and said that as Mukhbir al-

ordinances. The more radical anjumans also tried to bring pressure on the 'ulama by threatening to occupy their houses unless they at

for his exile.

once began discussing the regulations. In the end, Bihbihani, as previously, held his ground against any curtailment of the influ-

Saltana had spoken heresy, they should close the bazaar and ask The members of the guilds were distressed because, according to Daulatabadi, they were pious and simple people, and perhaps because the 'ulama represented their grievances in powerful quarters, and there was still no other means of obtaining a hearing or

redress. The reformers Malik al-Mutakallimin and Sayyid Jamal al-Din perceived that a dangerous rift was developing among the

supporters of the Majlis, and decided that it was unwise to antagonize the 'ulama. They therefore arranged a reconciliation between

the guilds and the leading 'ulama. The situation remained, however, that there could be no judicial reform without encroaching on the authority of the sharia. There was still an inherent clash of

interests between the 'ulama and their following among the guilds,

which was for the time being buried because of the need to maintain a united front against the shah. According to Daulatabad there was also a division within the

guilds themselves between the more important members or elders (rish sifidan), and the lesser and younger ones who were particu-

larly active in the Anjuman of the Guilds.54 The former had links with certain government officials to whom they.made representa-

tions on behalf of lesser members, which brought them both influence and pecuniary advantage. They were suspicious of change, of the younger members of the guilds, and of the influence

exerted among them by reformers such as Daulatabadi. The 'ulama continued to stall on the regulations of the Ministry

of Justice. When, on 30 April, the president of the Mailis

announced that the bill was ready for completion, Bihbihani complained because it had not been given to a committee of 'ulama to examine and expurgate. S Mustashar al-Daula (a Tabriz deputy) tried to persuade him that the regulations were in two parts, one of

which was purely concerned with administration, and the other with the sharia. It was not necessary for the 'ulama to occupy themselves with administrative arrangements. Bihbihani retorted that all the regulations concerned the sharia, especially since it was rumoured that the Majlis wanted to limit the power of the shar' courts, which in effect meant limiting the shari'a itself. Aga Shaikh Husain, representing the guilds of Tehran, complained that the purpose of the Majlis was to give equal rights to rich and poor, and this was impossible as long as the 'ulama issued contradictory

ence of the 'ulama in the judiciary. A decision was taken to form a committee to include other deputies as well as the 'ulama, but to examine the regulations article by article, whether they concerned

the sharia or administrative regulations. By the time of the coup against the Majlis in June 1908, the committee had still reached no

agreement. The struggle over the judiciary highlights the divergence be-

tween the interests of the 'ulama and the interests of many of their

following and collaborators in the initial opposition movement.

Resistance to the judicial reforms brought them into conflict with

westernizing modernizers such as Tagizada and the Azadikh-

vahan, and reformist bureaucrats wanting centralized government, such as Mukhbir al-Saltana. The chief impediment to the efficient

and impartial Ministry of Justice desired by the merchants and guilds was that such an institution would encroach upon the authority of the 'ulama over the administration of the sharia. The 'ulama were ostensibly leading a movement for reform, yet it is questionable whether, with a few exceptions, they really understood or desired change. Under the traditional system, after all, they had a position of power and prestige, most particularly in financial and judicial matters. These factors were obstacles in the

creation of a uniform national administrative and legal system. With regard to Bihbihani in particular, most sources agree that he was indifferent to constitutionalism, but for the present it brought him a position of power and influence. In fact the perpetuation of the constitutional cause had become for the time being a major

political interest for him.

7The Majlis was becoming increasingly dominated by the radical and somewhat lawless element in the anjumans which, from

the autumn of 1906, had been playing an important role in polit-

ical life and were by now very numerous. The events of 1907 had shown that the Majlis depended on the anjumans to act as its 'strong arm' against the shah. On the other hand many members were worried by the growth ot lawlessness, for while some anjumans had a serious political aim, others had no

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

purpose but agitation. Malikzada commented that:

many members belonged to the oppressed poor. They had little understanding of the rights and duties of members of a constitutional government, and constantly interfered in the work of government. Thus, if a telegram arrived from the provinces complaining of the government officials, they at once organized a meeting, contacted other aniumans and

went to the Majlis to lay a charge of transgression of rights or oppression, and also sent messengers to badger the relevant ministry. The shah complained that he was the protector of the rights of the people, not this collection of roughs. 56

A good many members had few political convictions of any depth.

They came from the rootless poor who had always joined such organizations created by the political and social climate as would give them daily sustenance. Mukhbir al-Saltana says that when he tried to speak out against their interference in the Majlis, members of the anjumans surrounded him demanding an explanation. They included Muqtadar-i Nizam, one of the leading roughs of Tehran 37

Yet while many anjumans formed pressure groups with radical aims and interests of their own, a number took their leadership

from deputies, notables or members of the 'ulama. The most

powerful and best organized of the anjumans was the Aniuman-i Azarbaijan which had 2,962 members, headed by Tagizada, 58 It was used to bring pressure to uphold the policies of the Azadikhvahan, giving them influence out of proportion to their numbers in the Mailis. Another radical anjuman was that of the Baradaran-i Darvaza-vi Oazvin (the Brothers of the Oazvin Gate) led by Mirza Sulaiman Khan Maikada, the Quartermaster General. 5° This aniu-

man appears to have been in the nature of a gang of retainers, since it collansed at Sulaiman Khan's arrest in June 1908. Also militant was the Anjuman-i Muzaffari, led by the Tabriz deputy,

Hajj Mirza Ibrahim Aga, and including amongst its members

officers from Muzaffar al-Din Shah's regiment of riflemen. They may have ioined through discontent at being unemployed, for, as was customary, on his accession to the throne Muhammad tAli Shah had created his own bodyguard of Azarbaijanis, dismissing

his father's. Particularly radical was the Anjuman-i Mujahidin, which included among its members Abd al-Husain Taimurtash, who had studied military science in Russia and was later minister of court under Riza Shah. 61 The anjuman was led largely by Makli

al-Mutakallimin, and its rank and file seems to have consisted of

lesser tradesfolk and poorer people. 2 There is no sign of the

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157

merchants being involved in these activities, though they had their own anjuman, and were occasionally present at meetings between

leaders of the anjumans and the 'ulama.

About seventy anjumans were formed among the guilds of

Tehran, 3 but with various purposes. Some reportedly held discus-

sions reflecting modernist views, while others called for the reinstatement of Islam and many considered that the purpose of the Majlis was to lower or fix prices. Unfortunately not very much is

known about them, but the police reports on the activities of Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani reveal that they were numerous. Sayyid Jamal had for several years had a following among the artisans, and in 1907 he incited them to press for a 'national militia'

and to attack the bastis in Hazrat 'Abd al-'Azim. His contacts included the anjumans of the grocers, potters, bricklayers, cob-

blers, goldsmiths, patchers and secondhand dealers.®* Sayid Jamal was the link between these organisations and their leaders in the

Majlis, Bihbihani and Tabataba'1.65 The two mujtahids, while using their following, as did the Tabrizis, to enhance their influence in the Majlis, also took pains to dampen its more extreme manifestations, a policy which required finely balanced manoeuvres. Tabataba'i did not actively express disapproval of the militia, but his remarks in the Mailis at this time reveal his anxiety over the extremist activities of the anjumans. They may also reflect the views of his other constituents', the leading merchants. Bihbihani similarly calmed a meeting which proposed to send a militia force to fight Ottoman encroachment on the frontier, and when a member of the audience objected, those

present told him to be silent and obey Sayyid Abdallah. 6 On the other hand Bihbihani took up the demands for a militia in order to win popularity and prestige when his position in the Mailis was slipping in the autumn of 1907. The guilds also organized their own central anjuman, largely at the instigation of the reformer, Yahya Daulatabadi, who wrote its regulations, and ran its newspaper. Each guild elected one member, from whom twelve were chosen to form a central committee with Daulatabadi. Members of the guilds from the provinces also assisted in forming anjumans which looked to the Tehran anjuman as their head. It might be thought that this organization had links with guild members in the Majlis, but evidence of connections has

vet to emerge. The true representatives of most of the guild

interests in the Mailis remained the muitahids.

As a group the theological students (tullab) are rarelv men-

tioned in 1908. There was reportedly an Anjuman-i Tullab headed

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by Bihbihani, and having slight conservative tendencies. In June 1907, Bihbihani's students tried to persuade him to stop Sayyid Jamal preaching. 68 Shaikh Fazlallah retained a following of students and some are mentioned as being with the conservative opposition. If it is remembered how few could claim to be serious

plied money to arm supporters of the popular cause in December. Another source was said to be Zill al-Sultan. But although there

students of theology, it may be surmised that many donned secular garb, and became mujahidin or members of the anjumans.

The conservative opposition also established anjumans. For ex-

ample, an Anjuman-i 'Ilmiyya was reportedly set up at the instigation of Na'ib al-Saltana through the mulla Sayid Husain Shushtari. It included sayyids, mullas, pishnamaz, rauza khans, and others dependent on religious offices. 69 Each member was given a subsistence and encouraged to attack the 'ulama who supported the Majlis. When a special aniuman for Isfahani members of the guilds who were residents of Tehran was established, certain merchants with connections with the conservative courtiers

got control of it.70 According to Daulatabadi, the shah and his uncles had infiltrated a number of the anjumans with their own followers, and were much better informed on the activities of the anjumans and their strengths and weaknesses than in December. 71

An Anjuman-i Futuvvat, led by Zafar al-Saltana, met in the house of the Imam Jum'a Khu'i, its purpose being reportedly to under-

mine the Anjuman-i Azarbaijan by organizing demonstrations

against cuts in salaries.?2 Arshad al-Daula organized an Aniuman-i Markazi with the purpose of discrediting the Majlis and the shah. 73

Members were encouraged to come to the Mailis and demand deposition of the shah. According to Malikzada, 180 anjumans in all declared them-

159

was talk of thousands of armed men, when the Mails actually came under threat in June Malik al-Mutakallimin tried in vain to get arms from a supplier named Ziya al-Mulk. 7 He finally gave Malik al-Mutakallimin and his companion 'two guns and some

bullets, for which they were grateful'. In the provinces anjumans only emerged on a notable scale in the few cities where there was a strong interest in constitutionalism

and where they seem to have been organized, largely by bazaar elements, to challenge the authorities of the traditional order. The activities of the aniumans in Tabriz and Rasht have already been briefly mentioned. In Isfahan, Aga Najafi, who had initially seen

in the popular movement a means to unseat his long standing opponent, the governor, Zill al-Sultan, now found himself beleaguered by the same forces. The various aniumans of Isfahan demanded proper courts of justice, the abolition of bast in mosques and the houses of mutahids and the custom of 'mediation' by

the 'ulama in judicial affairs.? Aga Najafi's brother, politically

ambitious like many of the brothers and sons of the leading 'ulama, saw in the anjumans the chance of a power base independent of his brother and sided with them. After declaring that members of the anjumans were not true Muslims, Aga Najafi was eventually forced to give grudging consent to measures they demanded. No doubt he hoped that these could soon be rescinded.

selves ready to support the Mailis in 1908.74 Bevond the fact that some of the guilds' anjumans seem to have paid for themselves, and other anjumans were, as mentioned above, funded by particular notables, little is known of their financing. Malikzada says that many of their members were unemployed, and so poor that they

By the end of April mutual suspicion between the shah and the radical anjumans had grown again. The authority of the Majlis,

ate dried bread and slept on a mattress out of doors. Accounts vary as to how many of the aniuman members were armed, but it was probably no more than 2-300, and most of these lacked ammunition. Some members took out loans and bought guns themselves,? others were provided with guns by the anjumanny which they belonged. Thus Mirza Sulaiman Khan was accused of supplying arms to his own and other aniumans from both the

Sayyid Muhammad Yazdi, a relative of Sayyid *Ali Yazdi, was implicated in posting leaflets in the bazaar in the name of the

arsenal and the tribes near Tehran with whom he had contact. The Zoroastrian merchant, Arbab Jamshid, was also said to have sup-

financially indigent and increasingly intimidated by the anjumans,

was at a minimum. At this point, reportedly at the behest of the shah, the anti-constitutionalist religious party became active again.

mujahidin of Tabriz, implying they were self-confessed Babis. 78 When Sayyid Muhammad was caught and sentenced to long imprisonment even the 'ulama who supported the constitution objected because he was a sayyid, but to no avail.? The Oaiar family were now anxious about the situation and for several davs a series of meetings were held at the house of Azud

al-Mulk. These were organized by three of the Oajar princes.

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

REFORM AND REACTION

among them Jalal al-Daula, son of Zill al-Sultan, and included

Bagh-i Shah and the telegraph lines were cut. Hartwig considered conditions now favoured the shah more than in December because many in the Majlis were alienated from the anjumans.85 The Majlis looked on the arrest of the princes as contravention of the Fundamental Law. On 8 June Bihbihani and Tabataba'i sent a note to all the provinces saying that an attack on the Mailis was

160

ulama, notables, deputies and representatives of the anjumans. 80

The Russians thought they were part of a plot to bring Zill al-

Sultan to the throne, and reported that a telegram had been sent requesting him to act as regent. Hartwig believed Zill al-Sultan had been co-operating with the anjumans since December 1907, and that the ministers and Mails were now totally intimidated by the revolutionaries.81 He also feared that with no army, no police

and no money, it would be difficult for the shah to combat the aniumans. 2 Deeply involved in Iranian affairs, Hartwig was anxious to protect the shah and trenchant in his opposition to the

Majlis. The foreign minister, Izvolsky, was preoccupied with

affairs in Europe, and in preserving the Anglo-Russian agreement.

He was therefore unwilling to act against the Mailis for fear of

jeopardizing the agreement. At the same time he realized that the overthrow of the shah and his replacement by Zill al-Sultan, who was known to be pro-British, would threaten the standing of the agreement in Russia itself. In these circumstances he was obliged

to wait on events. As a result of the meetings of the Qajar family, the shah was told that unless he co-operated with the Majlis, the Qajar family would depose him. He was to prove his sincerity by removing his more hardline advisers, particularly Amir Bahadur. The shah felt obliged to agree and on 3 June Amir Bahadur took bast in the Russian legation. Hartwig considered the shah had thus been

deprived of his most trustworthy support and protection, and that the revolutionary anjumans would take advantage of the general disorder to make an attack on his life. 83 The ministers and Mailis he believed too intimidated to defend the shah. In Hartwig's view, if the shah, regarded as pro-Russian, were removed, Zill al-Sultan

would take advantage of the anarchy to seize the throne. The

threat gave Hartwig and the shah the pretext they had long been

waiting for to disperse the anjumans and purge the Mailis. It is probable that Hartwig was also influenced by the fact that the

British had a policy of strict non-interference in internal affairs. It was supposed of course that Russia would do the same in line with the 1907 Agreement.

On 4 June the shah, with a strong escort, left his palace for Bagh-i Shah, a residence just outside the city, where Hartwig

considered he would be safe under the protection of the Cossack Brigade.** On Saturday 6 June Jalal al-Daula and two other Qajar princes were arrested and exiled. Amir Bahadur joined the shah in

161

feared. The anjumans had meanwhile rallied in the Sipah Salar Mosque and the shah demanded their dispersal. The Mailis real-

ized that whereas the Russians would support the shah, the British would not support them. Further, there was not the same enthu-

siasm for the Majlis in the provinces as there had been in

December.&7 It was decided to disperse the anjumans, though the move was resisted by Bihbihani as a sign of weakness. The leading

merchants were meanwhile active. At the instigation of Hajj

Muhammad Ismail and several others, Malik al-Mutakallimin and Sayyid Jamal were ordered not to speak. Amin al-Zarb and three other leading merchants seized what arms they could find and hid them. 88 This evident lack of enthusiasm for the Majlis on the part

of the leading merchants was probably due to the growth of lawlessness and of radical anjumans over which they had no influence. The majority of lesser merchants and guilds appear to have either continued in their support, or else to have remained neutral

in the battle with the shah.

The shah, who had been moving arms and ammunition to Baghi Shah, demanded that eight men be either exiled or handed over to him. Nearly all of them were either militant preachers or members of the radical press. Some deputies were anxious to comply,

but Bihbihani resisted the move on the grounds that the shah

would then demand something else. The British and Russian ministers meanwhile fell into disagree-

ment over what their joint policy should be. While the British continued to pursue a policy of non-interference, the Russians argued that this would enable Zill al-Sultan to seize the throne. Hartwig represented this as a grave danger to Izvolsky, who, while anxious to maintain the Anglo-Russian Agreement, knew that the agreement would be jeopardized in Russia itself if it resulted in a shah known for his British sympathies. On 14 June the shah's soldiers were given guns and ammunition. The bazaars closed, partly because of intimidation by the revolu-

tionary anjumans. & The Majlis petitioned the shah on 15 June

complaining of his failure to enforce the constitution. In return the shah demanded more authority than granted in the Fundamental

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REFORM AND REACTION

Law, sole control over the army, and the right to suppress any 'national' forces. The Majlis and the anjumans realized that an attack was imminent. The radicals slept in the Majlis for safety, but the organization of their provisions, mainly from the anjumans of the guilds

Russian decision to give the shah firmer support in June was that

163

popular enthusiasm for the Majlis was ebbing away, a point not

lost on the Russians. Already in December there had been signs of disillusionment and Tabataba'i complained that:

and merchants, was haphazard because of lack of funds. * Bihbihani proposed that the people and the 'ulama should congregate in the Masjid-i Shah, and present themselves as the oppressed seek-

We heard much praise of a constitutional form of government. If this is the result there is no advantage in it. Is it not the duty of the sovereign to prevent disorders? Under present conditions, life in this city is impossible.»

mullas, and members of the guilds, put on winding sheets and went

twenty Cossacks were sent to arrest them. Being fired on from the •Sipah Salar mosque, they withdrew. Reinforcements were brought

By January 1908 accusations of corruption were being made. Marling reported that about £50,000 extorted from certain notables (presumably for the National Bank) had been lodged with one of the vice-presidents (probably Amin al-Zarb, who kept the Mailis books). No accounts had been given and the money was said to have been quietly absorbed by the assembly and the anju-

in under Russian officers. Bihbihani and Tabataba'i arrived with their following, but when the firing started again they fled to a nearby house where they were later arrested. Only the Anjuman-i

interest."3 The Mailis was reported weaker than before and to be

ing their rights. In the event, on 23 June Sad al-'Ulama, other

to the mosque but were unable to gather popular support." On 22 June a demand from the shah that the eight radicals be handed over had been rejected. At 6 am the following morning

Azarbaiian and some members of the Anjuman-i Muzaffari put up a fight. The mosque was forcibly cleared, and the Majlis building bombarded. Bihbihani and Tabatabai, seized in the garden where they had taken refuge, were seriously manhandled by the shah's

soldiers and servants, but later rescued by an Iranian Cossack officer and taken to Bagh-i Shah. Shortly afterwards Bihbihani was exiled to Iraq, and Tabataba'i to Mashhad. The firm defence

of the Majlis by the two mujtahids shows a greater dedication to it

than that manifested by many of their original following. On

Tabataba'i's part this was mainly ideological; whatever the faults

of the Majlis he never ceased to prefer it to the shah. Bihbihani had probably gone too far along the path of opposition to be reconciled with the shah, and to desert the Majlis would have meant the loss of his power and prestige. The Mails had become for him, politically, a vested interest.

mans. In late January there was a violent disagreement in the Majlis with deputies accusing each other of peculation and self-

unpopular because of the prevalence of the committee system.?* It also incurred odium by paying its own members arrears of salary,

which were denied to others. In March the Malis continued to lose ground in popular esteem on account of its inefficiency and the committee system.? Marling commented that the shah was doing nothing against the assembly, possibly because he thought that it was becoming 'so disordered and unpopular that it would

die a natural death. Daulatabadi, in enumerating the reasons why the Majlis failed to defend itself in June 1908, gives lack of support as a major

factor. He says that in December financial support came in for the Majlis and the anjumans, whereas in June it was seriously short of

money.% A major factor was a loss of enthusiasm on the part of the wealthy merchants. When in mid-June Bihbihani sought funds to instigate a demonstration in the bazaar in support of the Majlis,

Brigade, which as a fighting force was much superior to the

both Amin al-Zarb and Mu'in al-Tujjar refused.?? The merchants were critical of the militants and the radical anjumans and were inclining towards the shah. Arbab Jamshid, who may have provided money for guns in December, was worried by the murder of a Zoroastrian merchant, and, seeing that the Majlis was too weak to provide proper protection, was secretly in touch with members of the court. Amin al-Zarb had disapproved of the militants, but

bled in December. But probably of greater significance than the

of the provincial deputies sent telegrams home to the effect that

9 The circumstances and participants in the events of December

1907 and June 1908 were outwardly similar, yet the outcome was entirely different. One reason was the deployment of the Cossack cohorts of muleteers, roughs and tribal levies the shah had assem-

for unspecified reasons was not on good terms with the shah. Some

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the shah was wronged and the anjumans and the extremists were the oppressors. 8 Many resented the interference of the 'ulama in affairs, while others opposed the dominance of the Tabrizis. Also some of the Qajar clan, who had been able to influence the Majlis through Ihtisham al-Saltana as long as he was president, were less enthusiastic when he was replaced by Mumtaz al Daula, who was

known to be close to the Tabrizis. As a result, the Majlis lost their patronage.

7 Shaikh Fazlallah and the Absolutist

Cause

In the period after the coup of June 1908 Shaikh Fazlallah came

out in full and open support of the shah. He worked for the absolutist cause not because he believed in absolutism as such, but

because he considered it, in practical terms, the best means of

protecting Islam against the most formidable enemy of the sharia,

constitutionalism.

1

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, with the attitude of the British and the situation in the country in general still uncertain, the shah and Shaikh Fazlallah felt it expedient to express themselves with caution on the subject of constitutionalism.' Shaikh Fazlallah confined himself to saying that constitutionalism must be

in conformity with the sharia, and the Majlis limited. By mid-

August, however, he was feeling sufficiently confident to excommunicate the constitutionalist 'ulama of Najaf, and to say openly that constitutionalism was contrary to Islam. Nazim al-Islam's account reveals that many people in Tehran, most particularly his associates among the lesser 'ulama who, like himself, had formerly been warm supporters of constitutionalism, were now disillusioned with it. They felt it had become the tool of seditious elements who created anarchy and undermined Islam.

They considered it corrupt, ineffective in solving the country's

problems, and unsuited to a land where most people were uneducated. On some points Nazim al-Islam had moved closer to Shaikh

Fazlallah's view, saying that constitutionalism had not been in conformity with the sharia, that freedom of the press had been abused, and that if the shah had not acted against the seditious, 165

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

nothing would be left of Iran and Islam. He also opined that the

three mutahids of Najaf, who continued to favour the Majlis,

were ignorant of the conditions constitutionalism had created, and

would not have supported it otherwise.

Nazim al-Islam's view contrasts with that of Tabataba'i who

retained his faith in constitutionalism, commenting that:

In the next few months the people will be busy thinking of their own affairs, but then they will wake up and realize what a blessing they have lost. They they will once again seek their rights and be pulling at our skirts.

4 Among other sections of the population constitutionalism had

become unpopular because their financial lot had deteriorated still further under its regime. Many existed on salaries and emoluments

provided by the government, and blamed the Majlis for their

employer's lack of funds. According to Nazim al-Islam many merchants and guildsmen felt that matters had worked better under despotism (istibdad - a word which suddenly acquired quite positive connotations).$ Constitutionalism retained only a minority of

fervent supporters in Tehran, including some bureaucrats like Sanit al-Daula and a few members of the 'ulama, such as Sadr al-'Ulama and Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afja'l. However, in the presence of the Cossack Brigade, and in the absence of a large

popular following, they remained quiescent. The shah seems to have had a fair amount of support among the people of Tehran, and for a few months he retained the initiative. Marling observed that if he gave any proof of a capacity to govern, for a time' the bulk of the population would accept absolutism. For many it was, in reality, a question of choosing the lesser of two evils. Marling's view of the alternatives was not optimistic:

If the Shah is able to secure the return of subservient Deputies, the new Parliament will only serve to sanction the restoration of the old state of affairs which originally led to the constitutional movement: while. on the other hand, if the

elections are free, they are likely to result in the return of a House as hostile to His Maiesty as the last. but without the support of the Anjumans to make its opposition effective. In neither case would the cause of reform be forwarded 6

To this may be added that a Mailis supported by the aniumans would onlv produce the disorder and paralysis of government evident in early 1908.

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 167 The main impetus for the restoration of constitutionalism came from Tabriz, which rose in revolt as soon as the news of the June 1908 coup was received. The constitutionalist forces there soon gained the upper hand and gradually expanded their grip on the town. The shah was unable to suppress the rebellion because he lacked the money to pay the necessary troops. That there should be serious unrest in a city so close to Russia created a sensitive problem, for Russia disliked disturbances on her border. Following the coup the British had protested at the actions of the Cossack Brigade, but adhered to their policy of non-intervention - largely in the interests of preserving the Anglo-Russian agreement. In the meantime they had adopted a position of wait and see. The situa-

tion in Tabriz now led both powers to fear that Russia might

become embroiled there, thus endangering the agreement. The British also believed that a Majlis of some sort would be the best prospect for introducing a proper system of financial accountability and control, a view to some extent endorsed by the Russians. On 8 September therefore, the British and Russians made representations to the shah to restore the Mailis and thus placate the

rebels in Tabriz. In his reply the shah stated that it was his intention to form a Mailis which would 'suit the nature of the country, be in conformity with the religious laws, and not again

cause anarchy? It could not, however, be established before the

restoration of order in Azarbaijan, which condition really meant that the shah would be able to summon the Majlis he wanted, or indeed no Mailis at all. Throughout September and October a struggle took place between the shah and the court camarilla on the one hand, and the British and Russians on the other, over the summoning of some sort of assembly. At about the end of October the shah was openly joined by the anti-constitutionalist 'ulama led by Shaikh Fazlallah, who sent messages to the 'ulama of the provinces requesting the despatch of telegrams signed by themselves, merchants, guilds, and other supporters, stating that constitutionalism had been tried

in Iran and had failed. The present order of affairs was quite

adequate and there was no need to alter it.& In another missive

Shaikh Fazlallah announced that he was despatching an emissary

to the 'ulama of every district to explain his policies. The 'ulama of Najaf also took up the propaganda battle and sent

the shah a telegram implying he was a tyrant and saying his conduct in failing to grant representative government was an offence against the Absent Imam.* These events caused commotion

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

in Mashhad where Tabataba'i was accused of inciting agitation and had to write protesting his innocence to the sadr-i azam. I° The 'ulama of Mashhad wavered between the two parties until a telegram from Shaikh Fazlallah recalled them to their anti-consti-

tutionalist duties. 11 Shaikh Fazlallah's vigorous propaganda campaign produced a flurry of telegrams from the provinces. On 7 November a demonstration against the reintroduction of constitutionalism organized

by the shah's entourage took place in Bagh-i Shah. Several hurdred people attended including lesser merchants and guilds.en, notables and princes, and Shaikh Fazlallah and his 'ulama following. Court officials read out telegrams from the provinces request-

ing the abandonment of constitutionalism, and those present signed a petition to this effect. The British and Russian representatives, for whose benefit this

demonstration had largely been staged, were not taken in. Informed by one minister that he had only signed for fear of the consequences, the British minister, Sir George Barclay, consi-

dered that most of those present had done the same. 12 Accused of staging the demonstration the shah denied that it was artificial and claimed that a large section of the population regarded constitutionalism as contrary to their religion. Barclay countered that most

people supported constitutionalism. In fact most people at this stage were probably either undecided or indifferent, but the shah

was using the objections of the 'ulama to justify his own opposition

to the Majlis, and Barclay was using the chimera of popular

support to press for a Majlis which the British hoped would bring order to the finances. At about this time the constitutionalists of Tehran began to take

heart, probably because the shah was proving ineffective and losing popularity. A petition signed by Sani' al-Daula, Sad al*Ulama, and the merchants, numbering thirty-two in all, was presented to the legations on 15 November. 13 There was also a note by a mutahid (possibly Sadr al-'Ulama) stating that constitutionalism was in conformity with Islam. At about the same time a group

of 'ulama led by Sayid 'Ali Yazdi, who had switched sides,

reportedly because the shah had failed to compensate him ade-

quately for previous services, held meetings at which the shah was

enjoined to open a Mailis 14 On 19 November, in response to the protests of the legations

and to constitutionalist activity, a further demonstration was orga-

nized in Bagh-i Shah in which Shaikh Fazlallah was more openly

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 169 active. A petition prepared under his auspices was presented to

the shah. I5 It stated that a meeting of all classes had agreed that a

national consultative assembly was inconsistent with the precepts

of Islam, but that no rescript had been issued confirming this. Therefore: 'Since by the firm order of the Creator of the World, the foundation of Islam throughout the centuries has been in the trust of the Sultan of the Age and the 'ulama, the issue of a rescript

is requested. '16 In addition, a petition was read on behalf of the merchants and guilds stating that they did not want constitutional-

ism as it created disorder. According to Malikzada, considerable pressure had been brought to bear on most of them by Mufakhkhar al-Mulk, vice-governor of Tehran. 17 In response to 'the request of the 'ulama' the Shah granted a rescript banning constitu-

tionalism and an elected assembly. In it he stated that he had always been ready to protect Islam, and now that the ordinances of

the 'ulama of the capital and the provinces had expressly stated

that the institution of a Majlis was contrary to Islam, he would

abandon the idea. 18 In this way the shah used Shaikh Fazlallah's arguments against the remonstrations of the British and Russians.

Indeed he seems to have preferred them to his other defence: namely that constitutionalism did not suit the conditions of the

country.

The British and Russians responded immediately on 22 Novem-

ber, with a strongly worded joint note. The rescript, which had

been printed and promulgated to the 'ulama of the provinces, but

not yet posted in Tehran, was withdrawn on 23 November. The next day Barclay saw the foreign minister, "Ala al-Saltana, to demand a properly constituted Majlis, which would ensure the restoration of order in Azarbaiian. "Ala al-Saltana replied, with some truth, that the trouble in Azarbaijan had nothing to do with constitutionalism, that Iran was not ready for constitutionalism,

and that the majority of people were against it. Barclay responded that the 'educated classes' of the capital were in favour of it as a way of subiecting the shah's advisers to some control. The foreign minister then produced an Egyptian newspaper, and asked Barclay why, if Britain thought constitutional government was such a

benefit, she did not confer it upon Egypt. To this Barclay had no adequate response. On 1 December the rescript banning a constitutional assembly was posted all over Tehran. Its publication was followed by an urgent message from the shah to the British and Russian ministers

denying responsibility. An explanation of the incident may be

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

provided by a letter from Shaikh Fazlallah to the sadr-i a'zam

saying that, since the printing of the notice had been delayed, he himself had had it printed and distributed.! In an attempt to placate the two powers, the shah appointed a

new body called the majlis-i shaura-yi kubra-yi daulati or high

consultative council of state. The members of this assembly were

all of absolutist sympathies and measures were initiated by the government and ratified by the shah. The two powers protested that this was not an elected assembly. Tabataba'i wrote from

Mashhad to his son Abu' Qasim, who was a member of the council, saying constitutionalism and a correct Malis were needed, not this counterfeit assembly attended by false persons.?" By December 1908 there appears to have been a shift in popular

opinion in Tehran. Nazim al-Islam reported that members of the anjuman were despairing of the shah and repented of supporting him as there was no improvement in the country's condition. The shah had been no more able to solve the country's problems than

the Mailis. He had lost most of the better educated and more experienced members of the higher bureaucracy after the events of December 1907 and the coup of June 1908. As a result ministerial

posts were filled by the court camarilla which surrounded Amir Bahadur. The effect of their influence was chiefly felt in matters financial. An adviser named Bizot had arrived from France in April 1908 charged with the task of reforming the finances. His ideas resembled those of Naus in that he wanted to organize the tax-collecting bureaucracy along centralized lines and make it accountable. If these reforms could be generally endorsed, the British and Russians were willing to grant a loan to initiate the programme. The shah and his conservative minded courtiers, however, would not give up their vested interests and allow control in financial matters to pass from their control. The British and Russians declined to lend money when there was no guarantee that it would be accounted for. The shah's government therefore remained paralysed and ineffective. As in the summer, salaries were unpaid, trade could not function because of disorders, and there was a shortage of money. The merchants were also, according to one report, discontented because they had once again no protection from extortion at the hands of the shah's advisers.21

On 20 December forty people took bast in the Ottoman legation. Among their leaders was Sadr al-'Ulama, who had evidently assumed the mantle of Tabataba' and Bihbihani as the leading mutahid of the constitutionalist cause. By 22 December the num-

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 171

bers in the Ottoman legation had risen to 270, and a petition signed by 650 people, including San' al-Daula, demanding the

restoration of the constitution and stating that it was in accordance

with the laws of Islam, was presented to the Austrian legation.22 The British and Russians, fearing that the Germans and Austrians would capitalize on popular discontent, again pressed the shah to issue an electoral law.

At this point Shaikh Fazlallah resumed the pressure from the other

side. He and Sayyid Ahmad Tabataba'i organized meetings of several hundred people which sent the shah a request to the effect that constitutionalism was contrary to Islam and forbidden.24 They were encouraged by the conservative notables, such as Na'ib alSaltana. Thus when the British and Russians saw the sadr-i a zam

on 24 December, he proved unexpectedly stubborn, and argued that elections by the people were contrary to Islam,25 a point no doubt taken from Shaikh Fazlallah.

On 28 December the bazaars closed, but were forcibly

reopened. The bast in the Ottoman legation now included merchants, guildsmen, and officials who, having received no salary,

saw no point in supporting the existing regime.26 On 29 December Sayyid 'Ali Yazdi, acting from a sense of grievance over payments, and Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afja'i, who had always supported consti-

tutionalism, took bast in Hazrat 'Abd al-'Azim together with their students. They were later joined by Mirza Mustafa Ashtiyani, who had been quiescent since the early days of the opposition movement.

Shortly afterwards, on 8 January, an attempt was made on

Shaikh Fazlallah's life and he was slightly wounded. His assailant, Karim Davatsaz, who had a shop in the tinsmiths' bazaar, refused to divulge the identity of his associates; but according to Malikza-

da he had been put up to it by a secret organization called the

Jahangir Committee, set up by some of the constitutionalists resi-

dent in Qulhak, which had links with Tabriz and Gilan. 27 The committee was not the only group hostile to Shaikh Fazlallah. Barclay, who had been advocating the removal of the sadr-i a'zam and Amir Bahadur for some time, now added Shaikh Fazlallah to his list. On 21 February he telegrammed to Grey that the shaikh should be removed from Tehran, for although he was not a minister he had a most baneful influence.28 The Russians, how-

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ever, considered the measure imprudent on the grounds that: This Mujtahid enjoys great influence not only in conservative circles but also among moderate elements with whom it is indispensable to collaborate for the success of the reform project. Any steps which the two governments undertake against this Shaikh could provoke the discontent of the mas-

ses, especially in Tehran, where he has many adherents

amongst the theological students. 29

That Shaikh Fazlallah had influence among conservatives such as court notables, fief and pension holders, and a large section of the 'ulama, is almost certainly true; but it is difficult to find evidence of support for him among the 'moderates', presumably meaning those who would support a parliament with a limited franchise. He does seem to have been held in respect amongst theological stu-

dents as a teacher, and he may have had a following among

them. Of course, this influence could have been augmented by provision for their stipends even though Shaikh Fazlallah does not

appear to have controlled vagf property of any substance. With regard to the poorer classes, he was identified in December 1907

with those of them who derived their income ultimatelv from the shah, what Abrahamian calls "the palace economy', and

demonstrations by such people were probably due less to Shaikh Fazlallah's own influence than the organization and inducements provided by the shah's roughs. Nevertheless, the Russians were probably correct in estimating that it would be unwise to interfere with such an eminent religious figure. In addition to propagating the shah's cause in the capital Shaikh

Fazlallah continued to exhort the 'ulama of the provinces to de-

fend absolutism. In January 1909 Isfahan was taken over by a force of Bakhtivari tribesmen led by Samsam al-Saltana who had recentIv been deposed as il-khan by the shah in favour of a relative, Amir

Mufakham. He therefore made common cause with the constitutionalists of Isfahan, and together they took possession of the city. Shaikh Fazlallah sent a telegram to Aga Najafi telling him either to get rid of the Bakhtiyari influence, or if this was impossible, to

leave the town or suffer the shah's vengeance.30 Aga Najafi, however, was more inclined to bend to the wind from the other direction. For the first time he gave sanctions to the 'ulama of Naiaf's order for the restoration of the constitution on the grounds that it would prevent the ascendancy of foreigners.31 He did not,

however, pass over the matter without using it as an opportunity to

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 173 assert the authority of the 'ulama and the sharia. The constitution, he said, would also prevent oppressive governors from acting on

the orders of illegal courts to seize the property of Muslims. From Najaf, Akhund Mulla Khurasani maintained his campaign against the absolutist regime. In February 1909 he sent a long telegram to the shah in which he complained of the negligence and oppressive conduct of government officials, and of the influence of foreigners, which was detrimental to home industry and trade. 32 To remedy these ills he suggested unity of government and people whereby the shah gave power to the people who continued to live

under his protection 'as under the just shadow of a kind father'. The government should strive to put the country in order and to make the people understand the importance of this obiective so

that they willingly paid their taxes. Home industry should be

encouraged and schools started which taught industrial skills with-

out teaching 'seditious ideas. He did not enlarge upon the latter point but this is probably an early example of a member of the 'ulama of Iran advocating Western technical skills while trying to suppress other aspects of Western culture. Khurasani went on to say that he had these obiectives in view when the events of the Constitutional Revolution took place, and after deliberation: We considered that the roots of this matter derived from the

sharia and, by ensuring that the Fundamental Law was in accordance with the sharia and based on the sharia, and by

the existence in the mailis-i shura-yi milli of a group of

muitahids to make sure that its proceedings would be without doubt in accordance with the sharia, it was hoped to achieve

the aim of many years of protecting and strengthening reli-

gion and state. From these words it is evident that, though known as a 'constitutional' mutahid, Khurasani's prime preoccupation was the protection and assertion of Islam. Like other mutahids to follow, he saw in the Council of Guardians a means to enforce the sharia, but he

did not perceive the weaknesses in the authority of the council revealed in the events of 1907-8. Nor does he appear to have taken

account of the significance of the word milli, or of the potential conflict identified by Shaikh Fazlallah between the laws passed by

the Mailis and the sharia.

During January and February 1909 a struggle was taking place over whether to support the bast in the Ottoman legation, with

both constitutionalists and the shah using coercive tactics. The bast

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

was evidently funded from the bazaar33 with support from discon-

tented notables such as Farman Farma. Possibly each group or individual funded themselves, with the lesser merchants contributing more than others. Of the merchants who supported the bast, at least two were money lenders who were no doubt still owed large sums by the government. One notable feature is the absence of the

influence of the major merchants. Amin al-Zarb was bankrupt at this point. Hajj Muhammad Ismail had joined the absolutists, and

was making a profit from the mint, where he was twice repri-

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 175

1,000. They were joined in mid-March by the aged mutahid, Raihanallah, who had co-operated with Shaikh Fazlallah in the autumn, but now seemed to have changed with the wind. 42 Support was elicited from the 'ulama of Najaf who sent a telegram saying that

assistance to those in bast was in accordance with the wishes of the

Imam of the Age.43 The shah had earlier been urged by Shaikh Fazlallah to take firm action against the bastis in Hazrat "Abd al"Azim in particular, 44 and soldiers were sent on 14 March to stop

manded for issuing false coin. 34 Arbab Jamshid had grown cool

Sayyid *Ali Yazdi from preaching. On 23 March Mustafa Ashtiyani

about the idea of constitutionalism since the murder of the Zoroas-

and three others were assassinated in a house near the shrine by the shah's roughs led by Sanit Hazrat. It was widely believed that Mufakhkhar al-Mulk was involved, though the incident seems to have beer set up by Mujallal al-Sultan, the shah's chamberlain and henchman. 45 According to Sani' Hazrat at his trial some months later, the original orders were to assassinate Sayyid 'Ali Yazdi, but since they could not find him and did not want to go back empty-handed, they entered a

trian merchant. Mu'in al-Tujjar continued to prosper, but

although he did go with Sani* al-Daula to see the shah in December 1908, he is not reported as actively sustaining the bast. It appears that some guilds supported the bast and some did not. The cobblers' guild declared that they had no business with either mashruta or istibdad 35 When the bazaars finally closed in midFebruary, the tobacco sellers, hat makers, shoe makers and sellers of second-hand items, no doubt influenced by the fact that their businesses were hard hit, tried on several occasions to reopen.36 In addition, pro-constitutionalists used coercive tactics to induce the bazaar to close. When some of the guilds tried to stay open they were threatened with a bomb, and on 20 February a bomb actually exploded in the quarters of the second-hand dealers, who promptly closed.37 A leaflet was posted through the door of an ammunition seller who was told that his duty was to stay closed. 38 A similar leaflet was delivered to the house of a leading member of

the 'ulama who had not gone to the bast at Hazrat "Abd al-

house by the shrine and shot the inhabitants, who happened to be Mustafa Ashtiyani and his associates. Evidently the purpose of the attack was to frighten the bastis into leaving the shrine. From March to May 1909 the shah came under pressure from all sides. On the one hand he was short of money. "Ain al-Daula had

been appointed governor of Tabriz in August, with orders to suppress the rebellion there, but his campaign of seige was an especial drain on the treasury. On the other hand the opposition at

Isfahan, led by the Bakhtiyari khans, was becoming more orga-

nized. In Rasht the local governor was killed and Sinahdar-i A'zam, an enemy of the shah, was appointed governor by the local

Azim. Messages were passed around the bazaar that the guilds should stay closed and references made to an order of the Naiaf

revolutionary anjuman. In April starvation and the threat of dis-

Various measures were also taken to force the bazaars to open. Haji Muhammad Ismail managed to prevent some of the guilds closing in January.40 The Russian legation prompted the Russian bank to immediately reclaim debts owed to them by the merchants in the Ottoman legation. The government sent Cossacks, soldiers

have expected the Russians to hand it over to him if they did

'ulama. 39

and gendarmes to oblige the bazaars to open, but without success.

Government ministers eventually tried to persuade some of the

merchants, whom they seem to have regarded as the prime movers in the closures, to reopen the bazaar with promises that constitutional government would be reinstated, but to no avail. 41

The numbers in Hazrat Abd al-'Azim had grown by March to

order in the north led to the long anticipated Russian intervention. The shah had refused to allow food into the beseiged city and may

capture it. But he underestimated the force of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, for although the Russians might intervene to impose order, they could no longer act to reinforce the traditional system. The Russian intervention in turn promoted the revolutionaries of Rasht, many of whom were Caucasian Russian subjects, to evade the Russians by moving towards Tehran with Sipahdar-i A'zam at

their head. The Bakhtiyaris and their allies in Isfahan, who had been planning an invasion of Tehran, set out soon afterwards. In

March, with the situation in the provinces looking more and more ominous, the shah began to reconsider the idea of reintroducing a constitutional assembly. He hoped, by this means. to strengthen

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

his position both politically and militarily, and to induce the pow-

ers to agree to a loan. At the end of March Sa'd al-Daula, probably at the instigation of the Russians, proposed a meeting of all classes to give their view

on the restoration of constitutional government. A letter from

Shaikh Fazlallah published by Malikzada may be a response to an invitation to attend the meeting. The letter was probably written not long after the attempt on his life, as he refers to his joy at being

able to stand up and walk.46 In it Shaikh Fazlallah was most scornful about a gathering to which he had been invited. There was no need for it especially as there had recently been large

gatherings participated in by people of all kinds in support of the shah: 'Last time the ambassadors complained we nevertheless got rid of the idea of an assembly, and things worked out well.' A second letter from Shaikh Fazlallah to the sadr-i a zam probably dates from this time as well. 47 It mentions that Sad al-Daula is in contact with the ambassadors who are also making representations. It also says that Tabriz is nearly taken, so must date

from the time when Ain al-Daula was besieging the city, but

before the Russians entered on 20 April. He exhorts the government not to weaken as the disorders will grow worse. He shows only a limited understanding of British and Russian policies and

power. In his view the European powers are pressing the shah now because they fear that if Tabriz falls there will be no further chance

of constitutionalism. He goes on to say:

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 177 that the subjects were the means of the independence and strength

of the 'Twelver Sultanate' 50

On the other hand, the wordly centre of the community of

Twelver Shi'ites was the Sultanate, and the padishahs were the 'shadows of the King of Truth'. This would appear to recognize the shahs as exercising a rightful office as long as they protected Islam. On the subject of the laws, he defined constitutionalism as mean-

ing participation by the people in the ordering of 'urf affairs and consultation between them and the government in this area. He

emphasized that the Mailis was not set up to abrogate the precepts of the shari' a or to interfere in such matters as khums and zakat. In this respect he was in accordance with the constitutionalist 'ulama

of Tehran. Like Khurasani he placed great weight on the role of the Council of Guardians in protecting the sharia, and added that

all the good intentions of the mashrutiyyat had been destroyed by persons with self-interested motives. Sikhat al-Islam received a cordial reply to his message and was invited to meet Ain al-Daula, but the mission proved a disappointment.

In Tehran Sad al-Daula continued to press for his meeting,

which eventually took place on 26 March and to which notables and 'ulama were invited. When constitutionalism was brought up, Abu'l-Qasim Tabataba'i, who envisaged a division between religious affairs and affairs of state, propounded the view that where there was no law the wise men of the land had to enact laws. $1 In

Iran there was the law of Islam, which had to be followed.

I am an old worshipper with one foot in the grave. I have no

However, the law of Islam did not cover certain matters not in

desire for life, and that which I had to see of this world I have

existence in the early years of Islam, such as administration of the

seen; but as long as I live I will never cease to struggle for Islam, and what life I have left I will sacrifice for it.

In Tabriz, by April 1909, most of the mutahids who had made common cause with the landowners, had been obliged by the anjuman to flee the city. The only one remaining, Sikhat al-Islam, sent a long telegram to the shah begging him to consider the

sufferings of the people and grant a constitution 48 Much of what he said was similar to that of the 'ulama of Najaf, for instance that the first duty of the shah was to protect Iran and Islam. The best means of carrying out this duty was to restore the constitution and the Majlis, and order new elections. However, he put forward new views on the co-operation of the shah and subiects whom, he said, were linked to the advantage of Iran so that no Muslim or Iranian should permit the rights of either to be destroyed. 49 He argued

army or the running of a ministry of foreign affairs. For these

matters, which concerned state affairs, the people had to collect laws in a code which would be in conformity with the sharia. His

opponents, led by 'Ali Akbar Burujirdi representing Shaikh Fazlallah, retorted that the laws of Islam covered all affairs, and the Prophet had dictated what was permitted and what was forbidden.

Evidently, in the face of this new attack, Shaikh Fazlallah was being at his most fundamental. The meeting appears to have

ended inconclusively. The shah, still under pressure from the two powers, summoned another meeting to discuss the matter, and Shaikh Fazlallah again organized agitation against it. Large gatherings were held under the banner, We do not want constitutionalism, we are subject to the Koran' 52 At the second meeting the debate grew acrimonious.

"Ali Akbar Buruirdi voiced Shaikh Fazlallah's view that elections

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

were against the sharia and that any majlis must be endorsed and

participated in by the 'ulama, while Sad al-Daula presented the usual view of the higher bureaucracy that the 'ulama should not intervene in government. The anti-constitutionalist 'ulama lost, and the gathering agreed to petition the shah to grant a parliament in accordance with the wishes of the two representatives.

The 'ulama of Najaf had in the meantime kept up their cam-

paign in support of the constitution sending successive telegrams

saying that to oppose the shah was obligatory and to pay taxes to his agents absolutely forbidden; that opposition to the constitution was opposition to the Imam of the Age; that the constitution was necessary to eradicate oppression, and that it was the only way to protect Islam and save Iran from foreign domination. $3

On 5 May the shah issued a rescript restoring constitutional government, and on 9 May another ordering learned constitutionalists' to draft a new electoral law. The second rescript also

explained that it had been the shah's intention to grant a Majlis in November, but that 'learned men' (agala) had beseeched him not to do so as it would be a cause of sedition. The shah thus laid the blame for the failure to restore the constitution on the anti-constitutionalist 'ulama, whom he was now evidently jettisoning as being of no further use to him. Possibly he held the meetings on restoring constitutionalism partly to disembarrass himself of their arguments. The shah finally signed the new electoral law in mid-June.

According to the Russian newspaper Rossiya of 1 June, towards the end of May 1909 Shaikh Fazlallah published a pamphlet which set forth all his arguments against constitutional government and was freely distributed amongst the people.54 This pamphlet may be either of two works by Shaikh Fazlallah; the first is a treatise entitled Tadhkirat al-ghafil wa irshad al-jahil, dated 1306 but written after the fall of the Majlis, that is between February 1908 and January 1909;55 the second is a fatva written after the fall of the Majlis, but otherwise undated, and published by Malikzada in his Mashrutiyyat. $6 As the arguments expressed in the treatise and the

fatva are similar, the two will be treated together, and any difference of development from 1907 indicated. The most fundamental new concept that Shaikh Fazlallah introduced into his arguments against constitutionalism was that it interfered not only with the workings of the sharia, but with its

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 179 basic purposes. First he emphaiszed that the two systems, Islam

and what he called infidelity (kufr) were different and each possessed of a logic complete in itself. Thus he said: 'They (the constitu-

tionalists) maintain that the law can be changed. Does this mean

change from Islam to infidelity, or from infidelity to Islam?

Obviously either of these is false. 5? He goes on to say:

If such a change would be from Islam to Islam it is conceivable. But it is an error (ghalat) to make a law (which by its nature must be enforced) concerning an action which the Founder of Islam has designated as permissible (mubah, i.e. that need not be obeyed or enforced, and as a consequence to punish (a Muslim) for non-compliance with a law which according to the sharia) he need not obey. The argument devolves on the significance of the words mubah

and vajib. These terms are two of the five qualifications (al-ahkam

al-khamsa), namely: vajib, obligatory; mandub, recommended; mubah, permissible; makruh, reprehensible; and haram, forbidden. Every act of a Muslim is subsumed in Islamic law under one of these five qualifications. They provide a scale of moral evalua-

tion by which all acts and relationships are measured. & The sharia thus comprises an infallible doctrine of ethics covering the whole religious, political, social and domestic lives of those who profess Islam.S? In Islam problems which in other legal systems belong to the moral or religious sphere only, come within the competence of the shari' a jurist, and he is obliged to give a value judgment on all

human actions 6 Certain actions are neither recommended nor condemned, but regarded with indifference (mubah). But in reality the fugaha still retain ultimate authority over these actions because only they are empowered by their knowledge of figh to designate whether an action is permissible. The ultimate purpose of categorizing every action by one of the five qualifications is to

secure divine favour both on earth and in the hereafter. The Muslim community is intended to be so ordered by the shari'a that

its individual members may secure favourable judgement on the

day of resurrection. Thus, when Shaikh Fazlallah accused his

opponents of interfering with the sharia and the five qualifications by, for example, declaring obligatory what was permissible, he was

in effect saying that they were obstructing the basic purpose of

Islam.

A process which particularly undermined the sharia was the

drafting of a constitutional law. In Shaikh Fazlallah's eyes this was

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contrary to Islam because it involved legislation, which he designated an innovation. Islam has no shortcomings so that it needs someone to complete it. Shaikh Fazlallah was clearer and more emphatic on this point than he had been in 1907. He also reiterated that the emergence of new situations was no justification for legislation. In the case of such situations reference must be made to the Gates of the Provisions, that is the Deputies of the Imam. 62 This was a further clarification of his arguments of the previous

year.

The Shaikh's fundamentalist arguments were disputed by Mirza

Muhammad Husain Na'ini in his Tanbih al-umma wa tanzih almilla (The admonition and refinement of the people) written in

Najaf in the spring of 1909.63 Na'ini claimed that where there were

already specified Islamic provisions covering existing judicial and political problems, then there was no need for legislation.64 But a number of problems had arisen which were not predicted by the sharia, and in this matter it was the duty of the authorized ruler to make an appropriate law. This argument was employed by some of

Tabatabai's followers and expressly stated by his son Abu'l Qasim. On the matter of objection to change in the law, Na'ini claimed that, as the law emerged from expediency, it was logically

bound to alter to suit new circumstances. As Hair has pointed out, 65 Shaikh Fazlallah's argument on this point stands; there can

be no legislation in Islam, only logical deduction by a muitahid of new provisions from the sharia. With regard to Shaikh Fazlallah's argument that a constitutional law might enforce what was not compulsory, Na'ini gave an example of the same process taking place after a contract or on the basis of a vow. 6 Thus the perform-

ance of certain non-compulsory actions may become obligatory because they may be part of the performance of a compulsory action. This argument did not grapple with Shaikh Fazlallah's real point that interference with the five qualifications governing every

action, by a power having no true knowledge of the sharia,

constituted interference with the fulfilment of the moral and religious purpose of Islam.

Another theme taken up by Shaikh Fazlallah was that of areas of authority in law. The matter is deeply confused and no one at this period ever really clarified it. This failure is perhaps because the shari'a covers every aspect of a Muslim's existence. But in reality such a rigid doctrine is not feasible and the concept had long existed of umur-i 'urfiyya with which in practice the 'ulama did not concern themselves, leaving such matters to state officials.

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 181 Shaikh Fazlallah's position on this subject was ambivalent. At one

point he stated: 'All matters, including the political (siyasat) fall within the scope of the sharia.67 To the constitutionalist's argu-

ment that they were working in the area of government law

(ganun-i daulati), which was outside the sharia, Shaikh Fazlallah contended that no government could consider itself outside the divine law, and make and execute laws. At another point, however, he admits that in practice: There have always been govern-

ment affairs and regulations (dasturat) to cover them, but it is certain that these stipulations were outside the religion (kharij az din). 68 Thus they had a de facto existence but were not legitimate

according to the sharia. From the phrase kharij az din it would

seem they are not permissible, simply extraneous.

Fazlallah does, however, appear to see a division between the affairs of the government (umur-i daulati) and those of the religious community (umur-i 'amma): 'If their intention was to draw up a law, especially to control the actions of government officials,

then it has no connection with the affairs of the community, on which the sharia alone may speak. 69 In effect there are two spheres of authority in the state - one ordered by the government, in which the 'ulama play little part, and the other under the authority of the 'ulama, in which no one else may intervene. The problem with constitutional government seems to be that, unlike the existing regime, it fails to recognize this division and attempts to enforce legislation in the umur-i 'amma, which it has no legitimate right by the sharia to do. Thus he states that, by contrast with the past when government regulations were generally recognized as outside religion, under the Mailis adherence to the regulations of the assembly was considered an obligatory duty. 7°

The Majlis had claimed to be acting in accordance with the sharia, and Shaikh Fazlallah refuted this claim on a number of points. But first he asked whether, if the constitutionalists' intention really was to conform to the sharia, how they were to judge

that their actions were consistent with it.?1 In other words, he

considered the Mailis had attempted to subsume the authority of the 'ulama and interfere in the affairs of the community in a way that previous governments had not.

In 1908-9 Shaikh Fazlallah also took up another argument

against the constitutionalists' supposed source of authoritv - that

is representation of the will of the people followed by decision

according to the wishes of the majority. In his challenge the shaikh

discussed representation in the sense it is used in figh - of one

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

person appointing another to perform certain duties on his behalf

Hairi has pointed out that this arrangement involves individual matters and is not a communal concern. 72 The term used then and

now for a representative at the assembly is vakil and his function is

vikalat; but Shaikh Fazlallah did not acknowledge this secular usage. Asking what was meant by vikalat, he said: 'What is the

meaning of representation, who is represented and for what is the

representative elected? . . . If the matter concerns urf affairs,

then this religious practice (tartibat-i dini) is not necessary. 73 Thus

maintaining the idea of a division between the affairs of the community and those of the government, he said there was no need to introduce a concept drawn from sharia jurisprudence into customary administration. He continued: 'If it is intended (to introduce

representation into) the sharia affairs of the community, then what is meant is not representation (vikalat) but deputyship (vilayat).' The basis for this point is that the representative of the people has no authority in shari' a affairs, responsiblity for which devolves on the deputies of the Imam, as Shaikh Fazlallah explains: 'Vilayat in the time of the absence of the Imam devolves on the fugaha and the mutahids, not just on any grocer or draper depending (for his authority) on the will of the majority. Such a concept is erroneous

in the Imami religion.' In other words the will of the majority is not a basis for any claim to authority in Imami Shiite law, and hence has no role in the affairs of the community. Further: Participation in the affairs of the community by anyone other

than the Imam amounts to denigrating the authority of the

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 183 timacy than any theory the shah could produce, and threatened

the Shi'ite chain of Divine Will, Prophet, Imam and 'ulama in a way the shah could not. In addition the will of the people meant the will of the individual members of the nation regardless of creed. Such a notion was in conflict with the sharia which legislated for the Islamic community not the nation, and gave precedence to Muslims. The constitutionalist 'ulama had declared that support for the Mailis was part of the Islamic duty of amr-i bi ma'ruf va nahy az munkar (the command to enjoin good and prohibit evil). In refut-

ing this point Shaikh Fazlallah was obliged to admit that the

judgment of a mujahid may be fallible. Having shown that support of the constitution was contrary to the sharia and the Koran he declared the duty of taqlid (following the practice of a chosen muitahid to be null in this matter if the mujtahid supported the constitution. If a thousand muitahids write that this Mailis is founded on the command to do good and prohibit evil . . . then you are a witness that this is not the case and they have erred . . . ex-

actly as if they were to say this animal is a sheep, and you know it is a dog, you have to say 'You are mistaken, it is unclean'.75

Shaikh Fazlallah did not attempt to reconcile this appeal to individual judgement with the argument that a defective intelligence could not gauge what was in conformity with the sharia.

Prophet and the Imam . .. If anyone else sits in his (the

Imam's) place it is obligatory to oppose such an attempt and

forbidden to support it. Do you not know that this work is outside the General Agency and usurpation of the right of

Muhammad and his descendants? 74

There is no more place for the representatives of the people in the

chain of authority derived from the revealed will of God, than

there is for a monarch, and if they lay claim to such a place then

they, like him, are usurpers. Shaikh Fazlallah was at pains to attack representation and the will of the people because they were elements in the legitimizing doctrine of constitutionalism as a political theory. He recognized

that the enactment of the will of the people by their elected representatives in parliament had a much stronger claim to legi-

4 Na'ini took up Shaikh Fazlallah's contention that only the Deputies of the Imam could have authority in the umur-i 'amma. He stated that it was not necessary, or even possible, that a mujahid should handle all problems in the affairs of the community, and so he might authorize another person to do so on his behalf. Further, if the agents of the Imam could not perform all necessary func-

tions, then responsibility for them devolved on the just faithful ('udul-i mu'minin).? In his view, if the 'ulama themselves could not take power, the best alternative was the creation of a constitutional regime, which was much preferable to tyranny. Any aberration in legislation would be rectified by the mutahids under article

Il of the constitution. This was a pragmatic point of view, but in practice it raised

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problems for the authority of the 'ulama and the religious estate.

To begin with a member of the assembly was a representative

(vakil) of the people and not a deputy (na'ib) of the 'ulama.

According to Fazlallah's understanding and experience, this con-

tention created a new authority which threatened that of the 'ulama. He also realized that Article II might sound promising in

theory but in practice it left the 'ulama with very weak control over the legislation of the assembly.

Na'ini also argued that vikalat does not have to be religious

representation to be rightful, in which he was correct; but Shaikh Fazlallah was arguing that, if the representation was not religious representation, then it belonged in 'urf affairs, and had no rightful place in the sphere of the sharia. On the subject of the majority

Naini contended that the payment of taxes by the people in the public interest gave them a right to a voice, which is not a principle recognized by the sharia. He also believed Islamic rul-

ership was based on consultation (mashvarat), implying the super-

iority of the majority of the wise men over the minority. In this he was confusing a general principle with a precise element in a chain

of authority.

To Shaikh Fazlallah the best alternative, in the absence of the Imam, was absolutism - that is government by the shah in the

traditional manner - and for this reason the shah had to be supported. At this point he produced the argument mentioned in chapter 1 that Islam is based upon two supplementary authorities - deputyship in the affairs of the prophesy and kingship, defined

as the power that executes Islamic provisions. If justice is to

spread, it is necessary to strengthen these two groups - that is those who know the provisions and those who possess power among Muslims. The shah maintained that he derived his authority from God. Shakh Fazlallah, as already mentioned, does not raise the question, but maintains that the shah's authority is justi-

fied by the exercise of power in the interests of Islam. In the Tadhkirat Shaikh Fazlallah attacked the constitutionalists for undermining, he four ento final , Cher posed a, kingship was usurped authority and liable to become tyrannical, for which

reason constitutionalism, for all its shortcomings, was preferable.

To Shaikh Fazlallah, kingship fell short of the original ideal government where power and knowledge were vested in one person, the Imam; but provided the ruler acknowledged the superior authority of the sharia, kingship was preferable to constitutionalism

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 185 because it reinforced Islam, instead of standing over and against the sharia and thereby weakening the faith. This traditional division in authority is paralleled in the concept of the umur-i 'amma, the affairs of the religious community covered by the sharia, and the umur-i daulati, government affairs, of

which the umur-i 'urfiyya, customary affairs, formed a part. As mentioned in chapter 1, these two spheres of authority were

recognized in practice by both the shah and the 'ulama. The problem of constitutionalism, in Shaikh Fazlallah's view, was that it did not acknowledge this division, but legislated in both spheres. In his fatva, Shaikh Fazlallah went into greater detail about his objections to the notion of equality. The most serious differences he mentioned were undoubtedly those between Muslims and nonMuslims, especially apostates, into which category Babis fell. He reminded his readers that if equality were introduced, Muslims would lose their special status under the sharia. 8 Using his argument that only the 'ulama have the authority in the umur-i 'amma he asked why different sects should have a voice in its affairs?79 Na'ini, in his attempted refutation, reveals himself, as Hair comments, to be confused by a vague interpretation of the constitu-

tional notion of equality.8 He took the view that all should be equally summoned to court for an offence, but should be tried

respectively according to the precepts which governed Muslims and non-Muslims. He did not appreciate, as Shaikh Fazlallah did, that in a modern nation state all citizens are equal before the law,

and all law can only be valid if it is passed or condoned by

parliament. This was quite distinct from the system of communities (millets) regulating their own affairs under a distant or minimal government, as happened in Ottoman Iraq, where Na'ini resided. Shaikh Fazlallah perceived that constitutionalism would mean greater government control, and greater taxation, with a consequent diversion of funds from the religious estate. He enlarged upon this point in his Tadhkirat, though with some exaggeration: Under constitutionalism the people of this country will pay taxes at the rate of 90 per cent. Money will be extracted little by little on a thousand different pretexts. For example the municipality will take money from you every year by a hundred means. And every governor will have the right to take two contributions each year under the Fundamental Law. Also the new Ministry of Justice will exact more money from

you.§I

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

A new sort of oppression was about to exert itself: In brief the subjects must toil so the coffers of the National Bank will fill up,

and they can organize the affairs of commerce.' In his assessment of the economy under constitutionalism, he seemed only able to conceive of wealth as a fixed sum, and had no understanding of the idea of economic development.

Interestingly, Shaikh Fazlallah was rare among contemporary commentators in identifying some of the problems, other than lack

of education, of establishing a nation state in Iran, in particular: 'Parliament is not possible in Iran because of three characteristics:

lack of an army; religious differences; and large tribal groups.

These do not exist in other countries. *82 Shaikh Fazlallah gives an account in the fatva of how he became

involved in the early stages of the constitutional movement. He states that, like many people, he was beguiled by the constitu-

tionalists' presentation of their cause, particularly the offer of justice. 83 This is not strictly true as he onlv ioined the movement at

the last possible moment, and then most likely because he would have been isolated if he had not. As he himself admits, he initially

acquiesced in the notion of representation, but tried to make it conform to Islam (he does not say how).

In July 1909, after an attempted compromise with the shah had broken down, the Sipahdar's forces from the north and the Bakhtiyaris from Isfahan entered Tehran. Following their arrival, the shah, who had taken refuge in the Russian legation, was deposed by an Extraordinary General Council', consisting of notables, deputies, 'ulama, merchants and guildsmen. They nominated the shah's son Sultan Ahmad to succeed him and elected Azad al-

Mulk, head of the Qajar tribe, as regent. Cabinet posts were

allotted to the constitutionalist notables - Sipahdar-i À'zam was made prime minister and Sardar-i 'Asad Bakhtiyari, minister of

the interior.

Once it became clear that the 'nationalist' forces were reasonably well disciplined, the return of constitutionalism was largely welcomed by the people of Tehran. The news was likewise wecomed in Tabriz, but in many parts of the country, such as Kerman, it was received without enthusiasm.® In Isfahan, the Baktiyari governor, Samsam al-Saltana, took pleasure in depriving

Aga Najafi of his preponderant influence and in obliging Aga

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 187 Nurallah to resign from his presidency of the anjumans. 85 The shah was joined in the Russian legation by the conservative

notables and by his henchmen, such as Mujallal al-Sultan. Sad al-Daula, who was in the British legation, is said to have warned Shaikh Fazlallah that he was in danger of his life, to which the shaikh is said to have replied that his religious calling made it impossible to take refuge in a foreign legation. In a letter written

just before the nationalists entered Tehran, he told Na'ib alSaltana that his friends had sent messages advising him to go to the

north, but his own inclination was to stay in town, as it was quiet and the people would be agitated if he left. 86 He was determined to maintain the struggle and encouraged Sani* Hazrat, with a large

group of roughs armed by the shah, to resist the advance of the

nationalist forces into the Sang-i Laj district where Fazlallah lived.87 On 25 July their defences were broken. A few days later, Shaikh Fazlallah was arrested.

6 Shaikh Fazlallah was brought before a special tribunal called the High Court of Justice, which was set up on 26 July 1909. It had ten members drawn from the occupying forces, the former assembly,

the press and others, mostly of a radical persuasion. Two other people were tried by this court - Sani* Hazrat, the organizer of the shah's roughs, and Mufakhkhar al-Mulk, deputy governor of Tehran. Both were found guilty of instigating and carrying out the assassination of the four constitutionalists in Hazrat 'Abd al-'Azim

in March 1909. Shaikh Fazlallah's trial, which took place on 31 July 1909, was conducted largely by Shaikh Ibrahim Zanjani, a mulla who had been a deputy in the first Majlis, and who claimed the status of mujtahid. The newspaper accounts of the trial give only the long

indictment against him. * They do not give any record of an

interrogation, or say if there was one. Both Malikzada and Kasravi

searched for a transcript of the trial or any written account, but without success. Malikzada, who knew some members of the mixed tribunal, obtained verbal accounts but these, as he himself

says, must be treated with caution. Nazim al-Islam alleges that Shaikh Fazlallah denied he was against constitutionalism." Shaikh Fazlallah's grandson claims to have been present at the trial. There

must be some doubt about this, but his assertion that the case against Shaikh Fazlallah was based mainly on his activities in

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 189

Hazrat Abd al-'Azim in the summer of 1907 may well be

Shaikh Fazlallah was also bitterly criticized for his part in the

correct. 91

In a letter to the new regent, 'Azud al-Mulk. Shaikh Fazlallah

expressed his sense of injustice at the idea of a trial, and hoped the

judges chosen would be fair." In another letter to the regent he attempted to defend himself, pointing out that he had not run away because he believed only in protection from God. 93 He also disclaimed any fault, mentioning that as one of the founders of the Mailis he had spent 4,000 tomans on it. If he had felt compelled to criticize the assembly, it was because strangers had gained control of it and it needed purging. He also mentioned that he was 35,000

tomans in debt, as the local money lenders would testify. His

indebtedness is confirmed by correspondence between the Imperial Bank of Persia - which at the time of his arrest tried to recoup

events of December 1907 and for his support of the shah's unconstitutional policies after June 1908. It was a cause of some bitterness to the constitutionalists that in December 1907 he had orga-

nized demonstrations by poor people shouting, 'We don't want constitutionalism, we want tea and rice'.

The Shaikh was also charged with involvement in certain violent incidents. These included fortifying his house in June 1908, and surrounding it with armed roughs who fired against the 'nation'. Shaikh Fazlallah is reported to have answered this charge at his trial by saying: 'According to the basic rules of Islam any Muslim is

bound to defend himself. I took steps to protect myself and my adherents'. In addition he was said to have planned the murders in

some 22,561 krans he owed them - and the Iranian foreign

Hazrat 'Abd al-'Azim in March 1909. As mentioned earlier, Fazlallah encouraged the shah to take action against the bastis, but

denied being against constitutionalism is correct; but in view of his

there is no clear evidence that he actually instigated their murder. San' Hazarat and Mufakhkhar al-Mulk were condemned at the

ministry.? It would seem that Nazim al-Islam's assertion that he

policy after June 1908, hardly true. The mention of his debts is

interesting as it suggests that, as well as receiving money from the

shah and the notables, he personally spent large sums on the

demonstrations against constitutionalism. The indictment against

Fazlallah was largely based on the assumption that to wage a

sustained campaign against constitutionalism was tantamount to a

crime. That he had consistently opposed constitutionalism is, as Malikzada remarks, not much in doubt. It is the accusations concerning the methods he used that are disputable.

The first point raised against him was that, after the initial establishment of constitutionalism, he first supported it ther turned against it.? He was also accused of first accepting the Fundamental Law and then rejecting it. This ignores the fact that his original wording of Article Il was changed.

He was, in addition, castigated for declaring mashruta forbidden. when the 'ulama of the Atabat had enjoined it as obligatory. He was, however, legally entitled to give his opinion as a mitchi of eminence and, moreover, he had the support of one leading mujtahid in the 'Atabat, Tabataba'i Yazdi. One charge that is amply substantiated by Shaikh Fazlallah's leaflets is that he accused his opponents of being Babis and atheists. The accusation amounts to the calumny with which he frequently charged his enemies, as there is no evidence that the majority of the constitutionalists were other than ordinary Mus-

lims.

same time. The shah's courtiers and leading supporters had all either fled the country or taken refuge in the Russian legation.

Shaikh Fazlallah was thus the only person of standing to be

arrested, tried and executed. There was probably an element of revenge in his execution, for Tehran was filled with partisans of the occupying forces seeking a scapegoat for the shah's policies. These included Caucasian revolutionaries and Bakhtivari tribes-

men, neither of which groups were noted for their respect for mullas. Shaikh Fazlallah's arguments had also threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the constitutional assembly and it may

have been felt necessary to make an example of him because he was dangerous. Contrary to expectation Shaikh Fazlallah was reported not to have defended himself at the trial. But concerning his propaganda campaign, the treatise, leaflets, fatva, letters and telegrams that he

wrote, he is said to have commented: 'I am a mujahid and in conformity with what was revealed to me through my power of

iftihad, and in the light of my knowledge of jurisprudence, I

distinguished the way that was consistent with the sharia and

followed it. 9

The existing accounts of Shaikh Fazlallah's execution, which

took place immediately after his trial, vary, but an important point

is raised in Browne's version. 7 According to this he said on the scaffold: 'Neither was I a reactionary, nor were Sayid 'Abdallah and Savvid Muhammad constitutionalists. It is merely that they

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

wished to exceed me and I them, and there was no question of reactionary or constitutional principles.' Browne mentions two

other points. His son Shaikh Mahdi is said to have stood under the scaffold and cursed him and Fazlallah to have quoted the verse: 'If

we were a heavy burden we are gone. If we were unkind we are gone.' After telling the executioner to do his work he was hanged in his turban and cloak. According to Malikzada, the square was very full and noisy. No mention is made of his speaking but Malikzada says the story about Shaikh Mahdi is quite unfounded.° An account pulished recently in a magazine in Qumm in which Shaikh Fazlallah discarded his stick, his turban and his cloak as he proceeded up the scaffold, and waited till his servant had swallowed his seals, may be discounted." In Nazim al-Islam's version, which he took shortthe invadind forces merchand we a vert, present revonnerbers he

had a chance to say was: 'What good, what ill, I am gone.' A

picture of the occasion shows an excited crowd, and Shaikh Fazlallah with his cloak, but without his turban. 101 The account in Nazim

al-Islam, therefore, probably comes closest to the truth, and the speech recorded in Browne, which has been taken as fact, was almost certainly apocryphal, and belongs to the constitutionalist historiographical tradition which sought to attribute the Shaikh's political stance to personal motives alone. The execution caused consternation among the other 'ulama, Khurasani sending a telegram to try and save his life. 102

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 191

feudalism, equality for all irrespective of creed, separation of

religion and politics, state control of religious endowments, and industrialization and construction along western lines. They were

opposed by the so-called moderates who were chiefly made up of the landed classes, bazaar merchants, guildsmen and 'ulama who desired modest reform of the old system and wanted to safeguard

religion and restore order.

Both Tabataba'i and Bihbihani were back in Tehran by the

beginning of November, when the oath to the constitution was

administered in their presence. Bihbihani had been released from his prison near Kirmanshah in the spring and had gone to Kerbala where he had forged stronger connections with the ulama of the "Atabat. Tabataba', on hearing of the overthrow of the absolutist regime, had sent a telegram offering congratulations on this moment which is one of the most blessed celebrations of Muslims' 103

On his return, however, he withdrew from politics. He became

unhappy with the course events were to take, writing in his notes: "The mashruta and majlis have once more been set up, but not in

the way I wanted. I It is not clear what he meant by this, but

perhaps he was referring to his original wish to establish a majlis-i

'adalat. Bihbihani tried to regain his old position, but now that the shah

had been overcome he was no longer useful to the constitutionalists, who told him that since he was not an elected member of the Majlis, he had no right to participate. 105 However, he retained a following amongst the guilds, who were told that the ideas of the

radicals, especially on the division of religion and state, were

7

Elections for the second Malis were held in Tehran on 17 August

1909 and throughout the country in the following weeks. The second Mailis was opened by the new shah on 15 November. At first it was apparently united, and successfully set about restoring

order, negotiating the withdrawal of the Russian troops and obtaining a loan of £1,250,000 to finance the recruitment of a group of Swedish officers to organize the police, and of Americans

led by Morgan Shuster, to reorganize the tax administration. But divisions soon appeared in the Majlis and two camps emerged. The first, calling themselves the Democrats, were led by radical

members of the former Majlis, mostly from Azarbaijan, among whom the leading figure was Tagizada. They had a programme of reform on the most advanced lines including measures to weaken

contrary to Islam. Members of the guilds still brought their grievances to him in the traditional way. By means of this following,

by his links with the 'Atabat, and by joining up with the more conservative faction led by Sipahdar, he was able to intervene in politics to some extent. At the end of June 1910, Khurasani telegraphed to the govern-

ment urging the removal of Tagizada from the Majlis on the

grounds that he was irreligious and his activities were harmful to the country's interests. 'O The 'ulama of Najaf were said to have received information from various sources on Taqizada's line of conduct, of which they disapproved. 17 Tagizada asked for, and obtained, three months leave, which was granted with practically

the unanimous approval of the Majlis. The expulsion was also sought of the foreign fida'is on whom Taqizada and the militants mainly relied to maintain their influence. Bihbihani was believed

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to be implicated in the denunciation of Tagizada by the 'ulama of Najaf, and on 16 July he was shot by four fida'is. * The bazaars closed and a demonstration of merchants and 'ulama demanded the arrest of the murderers, the expulsion of foreign fida'is, and the dissolution of the existing Majlis. They also protested at the chaos brought about by the militants and their following.

8 The assassination of Bihbihani ended the main role of the 'ulama in the revolution. They had played various parts and been impor-

tant from different points of view. In the earlier years Bihbihani and Tabataba' were needed by the constitutionalists to legitimize their cause. Constitutionalism itself does not of course need religious sanction to legitimize it; but in Iran at that time representation of the will of the people was little recognized and imperfectly understood. The authority of Bihbihani and Tabataba'i was needed

as proof of the legitimacy of the Majlis in a still very traditional

society, particularly in the face of the attacks of Shaikh Fazlallah. Of the two mutahids only Tabataba'i contributed to the ideolo-

gical debate. It would appear, however, that he was not really aiming for full constitutional government since he believed that

conditions in Iran were not yet suitable, especially with the lack of

education. Instead he advocated a majlis-i 'adalat which would render the government accountable and remedy the ills of an arbitrary administration. He did not, however, work out in detail how his majlis would be organized, and the idea was thus overtaken by constitutionalism, which could call on a fully worked out system. Tabataba'i's views on legal reform are not entirely clear, but most probably, like many of the pro-constitutional 'ulama, he hoped for reform in the area of government administration, but in conformity with the sharia. It is unlikely that he fully understood the inherent conflict between Islamic and parliamentary law. Nevertheless, as he showed in his defence of the principle of equality, Tabataba'i went further than most mujahids, either at that time or since, in his effort to understand a constitutional form of government and the advantages it might have to offer.

Tabataba'i's relatively enlightened position may be contrasted with that of the three so-called 'constitutional' ulama of Najaf Hajj Mirza Husain, Khurasani and Mazandarani. An examination

of their telegrams reveals that constitutionalism as such was not of

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 193 interest to them in the positive sense; it was regarded merely as a

bulwark for the protection and enhancement of Islam. They

claimed in fact that constitutionalism was based on the sharia and must put its precepts into effect. If they supported Shaikh Fazlallah's article Il, they did not appreciate, as he did, its weakness as a curb on secularizing forces.

The role of the mujtahids in organization on the constitutional side was perhaps most important. Bihbihani in particular had connections with the leading roughs of Tehran including Sani 'Haz-

rat, Muqtadir-i Nizam, Hajj Ma'sum and Midi Gavkush. His links

with the lesser merchants and his long standing relations with the British enabled him to instigate the bast of 1906. His connections with members of the higher bureaucracy were possibly an important factor in bringing the bast of December 1905 to a successful

conclusion. The two mutahids were the point of connection between the rank and file of the opposition movement in 1906, the merchants who financed it, and the bureacrats who gave it ideological direction. Through lesser 'ulama such as Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani they had contacts among the anjumans, though these did not appear to have been anything like as close or well organized as

those of Taqizada and the Azadikhvahan with the Anjuman-i Azarbaiian.

Shaikh Fazlallah acted as the ideoloque of the absolutist cause. He perceived that constitutionalism threatened the sharia more than absolutism because it had a dangerously attractive legitimizing doctrine, which absolutism lacked. That is why he was at pains to attack representation and to make the point that vikalat used in the constitutionalist sense is different to vikalat as used in figh. The constitutionalists were employing vikalat where the fugaha would use vilayat; that is for authority over the affairs of the community.

Shaikh Fazlallah based his case essentially on the legal conflict between constitutionalism and the sharia emphasizing that they have different sources of law. The one derives its authority ulti-

mately from the revealed will of God; the other is based on the will of the people in parliament. The Majlis, therefore, did not belong

to the category of things that had to be obeyed, and could not claim to be the ultimate source of authority. The constitutionalist

mujtahids believed that the Majlis would only legislate in the

umur-i 'urfiyya, by which they appear to have meant matters dealt with by the state. Shaikh Fazlallah, with his clearer understanding of the sources of authority in law, realized that in practice constitutionalism would make no such distinction, and that sooner or later

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

constitutional government would impinge on the sharia and

undermine the position of the 'ulama.

Shaikh Fazlallah sought to disqualify anyone who was not a mutahid from legislation, maintaining that even a mutahid can only elicit the provisions of the sharia from the sacred texts. To

the constitutionalist argument that laws may be changed according

to the exigencies of the age, he responded that the sharia being

complete, perfect and appropriate to all ages, may never be changed. He further argued that legislation would undermine the

fundamental purpose of the sharia by interfering with the five

qualifications which define every action of a Muslim. The constitu-

tionalists never really answered Shaikh Fazlallah's points on the potential conflict between the sharia and the Majlis. Not even an 'alim as gifted and eminent as Na'ini was able to refute them. One weakness on the constitutionalist side was that points of potential incompatability between parliamentary law and the shar-

la were not clear to the constitutionalist 'ulama - partly because the lay constitutionalists tended deliberately to obscure them be-

cause of their need for the 'ulama's support. Shaikh Fazlallah identified the interests of the religious body, and examined in detail the implications for Shi'ism of introducing constitutionalism

into Iran, in a way that his contemporaries among the 'ulama did not. Many of them gradually came round to producing arguments similar to his and, indeed, found themselves in a position he had held, although they were on the whole reluctant to take the final step back towards positive endorsement of royal authority. As

Richard has pointed out, the division from this point was no longer between constitutionalist and absolutist ulama, but between the Islamic body and new ideas. 109 In addition to providing ideological arguments in support of the absolutist cause Shaikh Fazlallah, especially from 1908-9, played

an important role in legitimizing it. On the one hand he attacked the roots of authority of constitutionalism, showing them to be contrary to Islam, and on the other he set about confirming the

shah as one of the executive authorities of the religion. On

this last point it may be noted that Shaikh Fazlallah, the most

powerful exponent of Islam, and the one who argued most closely

from the essentials of Shi'ite doctrine, highlighted the position of the 'ulama as Deputies of the Imam only against the encroach.

ments of constitutionalism. On the other side Bihbihani and Tabatabai, although recognizing that they had the authority to accord validity to the political institution, never referred to

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 195 themselves as na'ib-i 'amm acting against a usurped power.

Shaikh Fazlallah played an important role in organization for the absolutist cause, though not as great as that of Bihbihani for the constitutionalists. He was certainly involved in arranging demonstrations such as those of the autumn of 1908 and spring of 1909, and the fact that he was in debt at the time he died suggests that he spent much of his own money on his cause. However, his role in that respect was equalled, if not surpassed, by that of the conservative courtiers. They are reported to have funded his activities at nearly every point, as well as funding anti-constitutionalist anjumans. Most important, however, was the shah himself. The

trial of his roughs reveals that the major demonstrations were organized from the palace through his henchman, the chamberlain, Mujallal al-Sultan. The shah needed Shaikh Fazlallah to provide him with ideological backing until the spring of 1909 when the bankruptcy of the government, the opposition forming at Isfahan and Rasht, and the continued pressure from the British and the Russians led him to seek a compromise with the constitutionalists. From this point an estrangement grew between him and the anti-constitutionalist 'ula-

ma. Their complete defeat in the summer of 1909 indicates how closely their cause had been identified with his.

9 The 'ulama did not play a united role in the revolution. Ostensibly

they divided into pro- and anti-constitutionalists, but as Arjomand

has pointed out, the division was in fact superficial, and many 'ulama did not maintain a consistent position throughout the revolution. There were deeper divisions within the 'ulama as a body,

the most notable being financial in origin. Their chief sources of funds were vagf foundations, contributions from the faithful, fees for judicial services, salaries and pensions. There were numerous

ulama, and competition for these funds was fierce. In addition, individual members of the 'ulama tended to depend more on one source of funds than on others so that one muitahid might derive his income largely from endowments, another from sharia duties

and possibly court connections. Some of the financial sources of the 'ulama, including control of endowments, salaries and pensions, as well as outright contribu-

tions of the faithful, were not under their control, being in the

hands of the shah, the sadr-i a'zam or wealthy laymen. In order to

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ISLAM AND MODERNISM

maintain their income, the 'ulama, including the mujahids, had to defer to or act in accordance with the opinion of such people. In addition to being dependent on the financial contributions, cano-

nical or otherwise, of his following, a mujahid derived prestige and influence from their number and membership. In this case he was vulnerable to pressure from his following as they were fully entitled to take their donations elsewhere. It was this dependence

on the community at large, for both income and prestige, which was the main cause of divisions among the 'ulama. Thus Tabata-

ba' and Bihbihani, coming from families long established in

Tehran, had links with the merchants and guilds of the bazaar, and

came to represent their opinions. Indeed it may be said that if Bihbihani, and to some extent Tabataba^i, appeared to lead the constitutional movement, they were quite as much pushed from

behind

A number of 'ulama who were ostensibly pro- or anti-constitutional were really governed by a variety of motives. This was true for a brief period of Shaikh Fazlallah himself, for he is known as one of the three mutahids who founded the Malis. His recorded actions show that he was a firm supporter of 'Ain al-Daula until that minister proved powerless. Subsequently he supported the Majlis largely out of expediency, since to do otherwise would have left him isolated. The accession of a new shah and the emergence

of a full-blown constitutional doctrine impelled him in 1907 to come out against constitutionalism, a position which he subsequently maintained. Other 'ulama also changed their position for

ideological reasons. Shaikh Murtaza Ashtiyani and Mirza Muhammad Riza Oummi withdrew from political activity as the implications of constitutionalism became clearer. Pecuniary motives influ-

enced a few, such as Sayyid Akbar Shah and Sayyid 'Ali Yazdi, while others, such as the Imam Jum'a, who changed sides three times, like the vicar of Bray simply preferred to be on the winning

side.

Other factors causing division were kinship, especially in the initial stages when there were strong family ties between those who took bast in 1905-6; and age - the younger sons of the mujahids in particular perceiving a chance to acquire status. Rivalry, particularly that of Shaikh Fazlallah and Bihbihani, has been over-estimated as a factor, since the two mutahids were committed to different groups in the community, and had totally different ideological viewpoints. It would seem, therefore, that Arjomand is correct in assuming

SHAIKH FAZLALLAII AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 197 that the attitude of the 'ulama towards constitutionalism was not

the defining feature in their behaviour. But Aromand has taken

the matter further and argued that: 'The divergent attitudes within the clerical estate are best looked at as relatively superficial differentia resting on a common outlook. '110 It cannot be denied that the mujahids and the lesser ulama had a great deal in common as members of the religious body. This is reflected in the manner in which they defended their privileges over the punishment of the sayyid and in Bihbihani's defence of the sharia in the debates on

the supplementary Fundamental Law in 1907. After 1909 Bihbihani and Khurasani found themselves at odds with the radicals, especially Taqizada, as Shaikh Fazlallah had been previously.

Yet the fact the 'ulama did not work together suggests the

differences between them were more than superficial, and much stronger than the fabric of their common outlook. Of course one reason they did not work as a group was that most did not understand the threat constitutionalism presented to the religious body, even Tabataba'i not comprehending that it would create a centralized state which would seek to impose taxation on vaqf land and

severely curtail the authority of the sharia - points also not evident to the 'ulama of Najaf. Shaikh Fazlallah was alone in

thinking through the implications of constitutionalism for Islam and the 'ulama. More significant in the 'ulama's lack of unity, however, were the divisions caused by the differences in their financial position and their links with other groups within the community. Bihbihani and Tabataba'i had a different kind of following from Shaikh Fazlallah's. The pressures imposed by his following led Bihbihani in particular to pursue a course that was not in his interests as a sharia jurist. His immediate concern was to retain his position of power and influence and this was best achieved for the present by identifying with constitutionalism. In fact the perpetuation of the

constitutionalist cause had in itself become a major political interest for him. A mulla such as Sayyid 'Ali Yazdi, who depended for his income on the court, had perhaps less in common with a mulla who subsisted on contributions from his bazaari congrega-

tion, than with another dependant of the court. Members of the 'ulama whose salaries and pensions were cut were likely to identify

with notables in the same situation. Higher taxes on bazaar merchants no doubt made themselves felt in lower canonical contributions. Further, many of the lesser 'ulama were linked to, or dependent on, a particular mujtahid and their interests would, to a great

198

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

extent, be identified with his, so they would most likely follow his

lead.

There was also an important ideological point which divided the pro- and anti-constitutional 'ulama, and this concerned the role of the shah. The anti-constitutionalists considered that in the absence

of the Imam, the absolutist system best served the interests of Islam, as long as the shah respected the sharia and defended the religion. In the absolutist system the shah was dependent on his

service to Islam to justify his rule. The pro-constitutionalist 'ulama, or at least a few of them led by Tabataba'i, believed that Shi'ite Islam would best be strengthened by the inauguration of an elected assembly, which would regenerate Iran, its homeland.

From 1908 society at large was divided into pro- and anti-

constitutionalists with equal lack of conviction. After the spring of 1908 in particular public opinion seems to have been either lukewarm or indifferent to either side. Nazim al-Islam's account shows there was a certain amount of support for the shah but, as he was unable to solve the country's economic difficulties, public opinion

swung back to constitutionalism. The constitutionalist cause in Tehran was maintained by some of the reformist bureaucrats and by the lesser bazaar merchants, partly because of the shah's failure to pay his debts and partly because the government was resorting

to its old tactics of extracting money from the populace and deploying it without account.

The merchants were an important group on the constitutionalist

side throughout the period. Their initial opposition to those who imposed higher taxes, "Ain al-Daula and Naus, impelled them to be among the prime movers in the campaign for an elected assembly and major financers of the bast of July 1906. A desire to render the government accountable seems to have been one of their main

goals. They were also active in the Majlis and sat on important

committees. By 1908 the major merchants seem to have become

disillusioned because of the breakdown in law and order. The sarrafs remained active on the reformist side largely because of

government failure to pay debts. The guilds' support for constitutionalism also seems to have begun with opposition to higher taxes. Opinion on constitutionalism varied among them from those who made some attempt to understand it and work for a new order, to those, especially the elders, who felt the old system worked for them well enough as long as taxes were not altered. On the whole they appear to have taken their leadership from the 'ulama and merchants, making few

SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE 199 significant contributions to the debates in the Mails. It is a paradox of the Constitutional Revolution that what began largely as a revolt against a policy of centralization of government

turned into an important stage in that very process. The chief

reason is perhaps that the bureaucrats who had revived the policy in the 1890s took a leading part in the Majlis and the first constitutional cabinets. They were joined in 1907 by militant westernizing

reformers like Taqizada. In 1905-6, when there were so many

groups with different goals and understanding of what was hap-

pening, members of the higher bureaucracy, such as Sani' al-

Daula, with their study and experience of the West, were alone in having clear objectives and the organization to carry them out. In the confused situation of those years they were able to implement some of their policies, assisted by those, like the merchants, who

saw advantages in them for their own reasons. These policies included the reorganization of local government in a way that

would render the provincial governors accountable, the reordering of the finances with the introduction of the notion of a budget, of departmental accountability, and of something approaching a civil

list for the shah. At the Ministry of Justice, Mukhbir al-Saltana had worked for legal reforms which gave greater power to the state. In all departments the notion of accountability desired by reformist bureaucrats, leading merchants and others before the revolution was introduced. Because of the financial crisis and the disordered state of the country, these reforms, though ratified by

the Majlis, remained in abeyance. However, they were not re-

moved from the statute books, and were taken up and im-

plemented under the Pahlavi regime. Commenting on the implications the policy of westernization and centralization would have in the 'ulama, Smart wrote in 1906:

One remarkable feature of this revolution here - for it is surely worthy to be called a revolution - is that the priesthood have found themselves on the side of progress and freedom. This, I should think, is almost unexampled in the world's history. If the reforms which the people. with their

help, have fought for become a reality, all their power will be gone. 111

This is precisely what happened. The 'ulama assisted in a pro-

cess they had so long resisted. Under the Pahlavi regime, this process was to create a new social, political and economic order which reduced proportionally the numbers and influence of the

200

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

religious estate; subjected them to taxation and control by state bodies (e.g. the Ministry of Endowments); took over many of their legal functions; and curtailed the jurisdiction of the sharia. It is not, however, uncommon that the initial leaders of a revolution,

Notes

cautious reformers, lose out to those who hold a more radical position.

Introduction 1 H. Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906 (Berkeley, 1969). 2 A. H. Hairi, Shiism and Constitutionalism in Iran (Leiden, 1977). 3 R. A. McDaniel, The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revolution, Biblioteca Islamica (Minneapolis, 1974), p. 20.

4 Ibid., p. 22.

5 For an example see Abbott to Rosebery, no. 6, 6 April 1875, incl. 2, FO 60/374

6 A. K. S. Lambton, 'The Persian 'ulama and the constitutional revolution', in Le shi'isme imamite, Colloque de Strasbourg, 1968 (Paris, 1970), pp. 245-69.

7 For a discussion of Afghani see N. R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'al-

Afghani', (University of California Press, 1972). 8 A. K. S. Lambton, 'Secret societies and the Persian revolution of 1905-6', St. Antony's Papers, no. 11, London, 1956, p. 55; N. R. Keddie, 'The origins of the religious radical alliance', Past and Present XXXIV (1966), p. 77. 9 De Graz to Lansdowne, no. 107, 21 July 1902, FO 60/651. 10 M. Durand, 'Memorandum on the situation in Persia, 27 September 1895, part I, section 7, FO 60/566 (henceforward 'Durand Memorandum'). 11 G. N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London, 1892), p. 454. 12 Sir John Malcolm, A History of Persia (London, 1815), II, p. 439. 13 Curzon, Persian Question, I, p. 455. 14 Wood to Hardinge, incl. I in Hardinge to Salisbury, no. 82, 23 June 1897, FO

539/77. 15 Durand Memorandum, part I, section 7. 16 Encyclopedia Britannica, 1902, Persia.

Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh, 1964), p. 151; B. Lewis, 17 See The Emergence of Modern Turkey (OUP, 1961), pp. 107-8, 116-21.

18 Malcolm, History of Persia, p. 470. Chapter 1 The Relationship between the 'Ulama and the State

1 N. Calder, The Structures of Authority in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence, unpublished PhD, London University 1980, pp. 72, 77.

2 Ibid., pp. 77, 78, 121-130.

3 Ibid., p. 240.

Algar, Religion and State, p. 6. 4 5 J. E. Eliash, 'The Ithna 'ashara-shi'i juristic theory of political and legal authority', Studia Islamica XXIX (1969), p. 26.

201

202

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

6 Hardinge to Salisbury, no. 58, 7 May 1897, FO 539/76, no. 74. 7 Malcolm, History of Persia, p. 443. 8 Curzon, Persian Question, p. 452. 9 Najafi Quchani, Aga Hasan, Siyahatnama-yi sharq. (Mashhad, 1351/1972-3), pp. 212-3. 10 I. Safa'i, Rahbaran-i mashruta (Tehran, 1344/1965-6), pp. 173, 207; M. Bamdad, Sharh-i hal-i rijal-i Iran dar garn 12, 13, 14 hijri (Tehran, 1347/1968-9), I,

p. 241.

11 Curzon, Persian Question, I, p. 452. The leading mutahids of Tehran at the period under study had all spent some years in the Atabat. 12 Najafi Ouchani, Siyahatnama, p. 294. 13 See I'°timad al-Saltana, Mirza Muhammad Hasan Khan, Ruznama-yi khatirat, ed. I. Afshar (Tehran, 1345/1966-7), p. 1046; and Nazim al-Islam Kirmani, Mirza Muhammad, Tarikh-i bidari-yi Iranian (Tehran, 1357/1978-9), p. 321. 14 Biographical Notes of 1906, Papers of 4th Earl of Minto, National Library of Scotland, p. 61. 15 Elias to Durand, Mashhad Diary for 31 July and 4 September 1896, in FO 248/632.

16 Najafi Quchani, Siyahatnama, p. 366.

17 Ibid., p. 434.

18 A. K. S. Lambton, 'A reconsideration of the position of the Marja' al-taglid and the religious institution', Studia Islamica XX (1964) p. 132.

19 I. Yaghmal, Shahid-i rah-i azadi, Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani (Tehran, 2537/1978), р. 240.

20 M. Malikzada, Tarikh-i inqilab-i mashrutiyyat-i Iran (Tehran, 2536/1977-8),

II, p. 47.

21 M. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Harvard, 1980), p.

252.

22 Newmarch to Hardinge, no. 63, 4 February, 1903, FO 248/801, no. 31.

23 Ramsay to the Government of India Foreign Dept., no. 153, 13 February 1909, quoted in J. Macherson, 'Summary of events in Turkish Arabia', 5 December 1910, no. 1084, p. 10, L/P & S/10/77, India Office Records. 24 Dus, 'Ali Khan, Mua 'yyir al-Mamalik, 'Zain al-'Abidin Imam Jum'a', Yaghma, year 12, no. 12, 1338/1959-60, pp. 565-576. 25 F. de Jong, Turug and Turug Linked Institutions in Nineteenth Century Egypt (Leiden, 1979), p. 32. 26 G. W. Brasswell, A Mosaic of Mullahs and Mosques: Religion and Politics in Iranian Shiah Islam, PhD thesis, University of North Carolina 1975, p. 209. 27 W. Madelung, A treatise of the Sharif al-Murtada on the legality of working for the government', BSOAS XLIII 1 (1980), p. 18.

28 Ibid., p. 30. 29 L. Binder, 'The proofs of Islam: religion and politics in Iran', Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honour of H. A. R. Gibb (Leiden, 1965). 30 R. Savory, Iran under the Safavids (OUP, 1980) p. 93. 31 Calder, Structures, p. 90.

32 H. Modarressi, Kharaj in Shi'i Law from the Beginnings to the 10th/16th Century, unpublished D.Phil., Oxford, 1982, p. 144.

33 Ibid., p. 157.

NOTES TO PAGES 11-23

203

34 For discussion of the 'ulama in the Safavid period, see Savory, Safavids, pp. 30, 93, 185, 234. 35 J. Chardin, Voyages en Perse et autres lieux de l'Orient (Paris, 1811), VI, p. 48.

36 Ibid., VI, p. 47. 37 Ibid., VI, p. 216.

38 Quoted in A. K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam (OUP, 1981), p. 283. 39 A. K. S. Lambton, "Quis custodiet custodes? Some reflections on the Persian theory of government', Studia Islamica VI (1956), p. 143.

40 Ibid., pp. 142-4. 41 Algar, Religion and State, pp. 33-6. 42 M. Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent (New York, 1982), pp. 21-2.

43 De Gobineau, Les religions et les philosophies dans l'Asie centrale (Paris 1866),

p. 30.

44 Bayat, Mysticism, pp. 21-2. 45 Algar, Religion and State, pp. 33-6.

46 Ibid., p. 37.

47 Nur Ali Shah, Hidayat-nama, an unpublished letter quoted in N. Pouriavady and P. Lamborn Wilson, Kings of Love: the Poetry and History of the Nimatullahi Sufi Order (Tehran, 1978), p. 117.

48 Mirza Muhammad Taqi Sipihr, Lisan al-Mulk, Nasikh al-tavarikh, ed. J. Qa'im Magami, I, p. 44. 49 Malcolm, History of Persia, II, p. 414. SO Lisan al-Mulk, Nasikh al-lavarikh (Tehran, 1337/1958-9), II, p. 40.

51 H. Sa'adat Nuri, 'Hajj Mirza Agasi', pt. 4, Yaghma 184 (1342/1963-4), pp. 357-8 52 Algar, Religion and State, p. 107. 53 Lisan al-Mulk, Nasikhal-tavarikh, Il, p. 211. 54 Sa'adat Nuri, 'Haji Mirza Agasi', pt. 9, Yaghma 190 (1343/1964-5), pp. 65-7.

55 M. Bayat, Mysticism, p. 38. 56 A. L. M. Nicholas, 'Le Cheikhisme', Revue du monde musulman X (1910), p.

513.

57 H. Sa'adat Nuri, 'Muzaffar al-Din Mirza va shaikhigari', Vahid V.3 (1346/ 1967-8), pp. 290. 58 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I (Tehran, 1357/1978-9), p. 296. 59 For a discussion of Babism see Sheil to Palmerston, no. 20, 12 February 1850,

FO 60/150 and no. 72, 21 June 1850; M. Momen, The Babi and Baha'i Religions 1844-1944 (Oxford 1981); W. McElwee Miller, The Baha'i Faith (California, 1974). It is not entirely clear whether the Bab was claiming to be the Gate to the Imam, or the Imam himself, in other words a major manifesta-

tion of the Deity; see ibid., pp. 15-16. 60 N. R. Keddie, 'Religion and irreligion in early Iranian nationalism', Comparative Studies in Society and History IV, pt. 3 (April 1962), 267-74. 61 Momen, Babi and Baha'i Religions, p. 364. 62 In Safavid times belief in religion was also equated with loyalty to the state, and religion and state combined to suppress heresy. See Savory, Safavids, p.

30.

63 Riza Quli Khan Hidayat, Rauzat al-safa-yi Nasiri (Tehran, 1270-4 /1853-7),

204

NOTES TO PAGES 23_39

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

1, p. 291.

64 Lisan al-Mulk, Nasikh al-tararikh, I, p. 44. 65 Malcolm, History of Persia, II, pp. 287-8. 66 Lisan al-Mulk, Nasikh al-tararikh, I, p. 52 67 Ibid., pp. 14, 29; Hidayat, Rauzat al-safa, X, pp. 457, 461. 68 Zahir al-Daula Mirza 'Ali Khan Qajar, Khatirat va asnad-i Zahir al-Daula, ed. I. Afshar (Tehran, 1348/1969-70), p. 41. 69 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 22, 30 January 1907, FO 371/303, no. 5274. 70 Marling to Grey, no. 146, 17 June 1908, FO 416/37, no. 53. 71 Malcolm, History of Persia, II, p. 564. 72 Lambton, 'Quis Custodiet', p. 143. 73 Thomson to Derby, no. 56, 20 April 1875, FO 60/371. 74 Algar, Religion and State, p. 164. 75 S. A. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam (Chicago, 1984), pp. 236-7. Calder, 'Accommodation and revolution in Imami Shi'i jurisprudence: Khumayni and the classical tradition', Middle Eastern Studies XVIII. 1, p. 5. 77 A. K. S. Lambton, 'Some new trends in Islamic political thought in late 18th

76 N.

century and early 19th century Persia', Studia Islamica XXXIX (1974), pp. 114-18.

18 A. K. S. Lambton, 'A nineteenth century view of jihad', Studia Islamica

205

101 Lascelles to Rosebery, no. 12, 19 January 1893, FO 60/542. 102 From a collection of telegrams to and from Nasir al-Mulk in the possession of M. Gulbun, pp. 100-2. I am grateful to Mrs Anne Enayat for allowing me to see a copy of these telegrams. 103 The term sultan-i adil was used on rare occasions of the actual ruler; see for example Shirazi to Nasir al Din Shah in Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 37. Nasir al-Din Shah on the sample of coins I have examined, seems most

frequently to have employed the title 'al-sultan bin al-sultan'; see H. L. Rabino, Album of Coins, Medals and Seals of the Shahs of Iran 1500-1941 (Hertford, 1945), and R. S. Poole, Catalogue of Coins of the Shahs of Persia in the British Museum (London, 1887).

104 S. A. Ahmad, Two Kings of Awadh (Aligarh, 1971), p. 129. There is some

evidence that the ruler of Oudh regarded himself as the Deputy of the Imam, but it is not clear whether this was acceptable to the 'ulama there; see J. N. Hollister, The Shi'a of India (London 1953), pp. 97 and 130. 105 A. K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam (OUP, 1981), p.

123.

106 Ibid. p. 136. 107 Nizam al-Mulk, The Book of Government or Rules for Kings, trans. H. Darke (London, 1978), pp. 59 60. 108 S. Robinson, Persian Poetry for English Readers (Tehran, 1976), p. 89.

XXXII (1970), pp. 180-92. E. Kohlberg, 'The development of the Imami Shii doctrine of jihad', ZDMG CXXVI (1976), pp. 64-86.

79 Lambton, 'Jihad', p. 189.

80 Abu'1 Qasim Qa'im Maqam, Munsha 'at-i Qa'im Magam (Tehran, 1337/19589), p. 294

81 Ibid., p. 294.

82 Arjomand, Shadow of God, p. 226.

83 Ibid., p. 56.

84 Shaikh Fazlallah, Sual va Javab (Bombay, 1893), pp. 61-2.

85 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, p. 217.

86 Nizam al-'Ulama Tabrizi, 'Huquq-i duval va milal', in Afkar-i ¡jtima'i va sivasi va igtisadi dar asar-i muntashir nashuda-yi daura-yi Qajar, ed. F. Adamiyyat and H. Natiq (Tehran, 1356/1977-8), pp. 68-70. 87 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 453. 88 See chapter 3 for further discussion 89 Hairi, Shi'ism and Constitutionalism, p. 103. 90 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 24.

91 Ibid., I, p. 36.

92 Ibid., I, p. 364. 93 Ibid., I, p. 40. 94 Ibid., I, p. 36. 95 Ibid., I, p. 24. 96 Ibid., I, p. 23.

Chapter 2 The 'Ulama in Qajar Iran and the Coming of the Revolution

1 Durand Memorandum, part I, section 6. 2 D. M. Donaldson, The Shi'ite Religion (London, 1933), p. 183. 3 Ringler Thomson to Durand, Mashhad Diary, 25 January 1895, FO 248/611; Lascelles to Salisbury, no. 117, 15 July 1892, FO 60/532. 4 A. K. S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia (OUP, 1953), p. 234 5 Y. Daulatabadi, Tarikh-i mu asir ya hayat-i Yahya (Tehran, 1335/1958-9), II,

pp. 15-16. 6 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, pp. 211-12.

7 Ibid., I, p. 637.

8 Newmarch to Hardinge, no. 63, 4 February 1903, FO 248/801, no. 31. 9 A. Hardinge, A Diplomatist in the East (London, 1928), p. 373.

10 Calder, 'Jurisprudence', p. 121.

11 See Fischer, From Religious Dispute to Rebellion, p. 95, for illustration of the influence of the mugallid on the mujtahid in present day Iran. 12 Durand Memorandum, part I, section 6. 13 A. K. S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia (OUP, 1953), p. 139.

14 Najafi Quchani, Siyahatnama, p. 199. 15 M. A. Karimzada-Tabrizi, 'Chand sanad-i tarikhi' (Some historical documents), Barrysiha-yi tarikhi, year 8, no. 4, 1352/1973, p. 8.

97 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, pp. 229, 235. 98 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 119, 7 August 1903, FO 60/666.

16 I am grateful to Dr Mehrdad Shokoohy for giving me a photograph of this

99 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 366. 100 Ibid., I, p. 24.

17 See Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, 1, p. 210, for the example of Shaikh

farman, which is in his possession.

Fazlallah and 'Ain al-Daula.

206

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

18 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 26, 3 March 1903, FO 60/665, incl. I, quoting the son of the Governor General of Mashhad.

19 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 254.

20 Ibid., I, p. 272. 21 Ibid., I, p. 280. 22 Ibid., I, p. 213.

23 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 150, 16 August 1904, FO 60/682. 24 Najafi Quchani, Siyahatnama, p. 61. 25 Thomson to Derby, no. 113, 5 August 1876, FO 60/380.

26 W. M. Floor, 'The merchants (tujjar) in Qajar Iran', ZDMG CXXVI (1976), p. 104. 27 See Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 28; Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 69, 24 March 1905, FO 60/698; Barclay to Grey, no. 202, 25 November 1908, FO 371/507, for examples of the shah assigning this role to the 'ulama. 28 Sharif Kashani, Hajj Shaikh Mahdi, 'Tarikh-i mashrutiyyat-i Iran', Vahid, nos. 206-9, 215-16, 218-20 (1356/1977-8). This has recently been published as a book entitled, Vag'at intifaqiyya dar ruzgar (Tehran, 1362/1983). This reference, Vahid no. 206, p. 59. A. A. Jalilvand, 'Chiqunigi-yi ab-i paytakht dar dauran-i Qajariyya' Vahid,

29

nos. 219-20 (1356/1977-8), pp. 28-40.

30 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, Il, p. 27.

31 Durand to Salisbury, no. 74, 26 July 1899, FO 60/609. 32 Alison to Russell, no. 71, 30 June 1865, FO 60/290. 33 Conyngham Greene to Kimberley, no. 170, 14 August 1894, FO 60/559. 34 Conyngham Greene to Kimberley, no. 142, 21 June 1894, FO 60/558.

35 For a full account of the tobacco protest see N. R. Keddie, Religion and

Rebellion in Iran (London, 1966). 36 G. Gilbar, "The big merchants and the Iranian constitutional revolution of 1906*, Asian and African Studies Il. 3 (1977) 37 Kennedy to Salisbury, no. 128, 20 May 1891, FO 60/553. 38 Kennedy to Salisbury, no. 180, 27 July 1891, FO 60/553. 39 Kennedy to Salisbury, no. 203, 6 October 1891, FO 60/553. 40 Hardinge to Salisbury, no. 5, 7 May 1897, FO 539/76, no. 74. 41 Marling to Grey, no. 224, 9 October 1907, FO 371/312, no. 35492.

42 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, pp. 324-8. 43 Lascelles to Russell, no. 106, 20 June 1893, FO 60/543. 44 Hardinge to Lansdowne, 16 April 1902, FO 60/650. 45 Durand Memorandum, subsection 14. 46 I. Safai. 'Asnad-i mashruta (Tehran, 1348/1969-70), pp. 11-16. 47 Durand Memorandum, subsection 14. 48 S. Bakhash, Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars: 1858-1896

(London, 1978), p. 270. 49 Durand to Salisbury, no. 76, 25 July 1899, FO 60/609. The exact period of years is not given. 50 G. Gilbar, 'Trends in the development of prices in late Qajar Iran 1870-1906', Iranian Studies 16 (1978) 177, 198. 51 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1902, Persia. 52 Spring Rice to Salisbury, no. 72, 28 June 1900, FO 60/617.

NOTES TO PAGES 40-52

207

53 A. Enayat, 'Amin al Zarb I, Haj Muhammad Hasan' Encyclopedia Iranica I (London, 1985), pp. 952-3.

54 Ibid.

55 V. F. Nushirvani, "The beginnings of commercialized agriculture in Iran', The Islamic Middle East, ed. A. L. Udovitch (Princeton, 1981), pp. 547-91.

56 Ibid.

57 M. Enter, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, 1828-1914 (Gainesville, Florida, 1965) p. 63. 58 Spring Rice to Salisbury, no. 91, 19 September 1900, FO 60/618.

59 Amin al-Daula, Mirza 'Ali Khan, Khatirat-i siyasi, ed. I. Afshar (Tehran, 1341/1962-3), pp. 225-6.

60 Ibid., p. 156. 61 Beyens to Favereau, 22 September 1897, no. 152/46, folio 2981, I to III,

BMFA.

62 Amin al-Daula, Khatirat, pp. 225-6.

63 Ibid., p. 218.

64 Beyens to Favereau, 13 February 1897, no. 64/17, folio 2981, I to III, BMFA. 65 Gerard to Favereau, 3 December 1898, no. 296/94, folio 2981, I to III, BMFA. 66 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 152, 17 November 1897, FO 539/77. 67 Spring Rice to Salisbury, no. 89, 18 September 1900, FO 60/618; Gerard to Favereau, 3 December 1898, no. 246/94, folio 2981, I to III, BMFA 68 Independence, § October 1904, in folio 10.640, BMFA. 69 Gilbar, 'Merchants', pp. 293-4 70 Spring Rice to Salisbury, no. 65, 26 June 1900, FO 60/617. 71 De Groote to Favereau, 9 September 1900, no. 114/78, folio 2981, IV to VII,

BMFA.

72 W. M. Floor, The customs in Qajar Iran', ZDMG 126 (1976) 281-311. 73 De Villegas to Favereau, 5 June 1903, no. 136/58, folio 2981, IV to VII,

BMFA.

74 De Villegas to Favereau, 19 August 1903, no. 195/87, folio 2981, IV to VII,

BMFA.

75 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 126, 17 August 1903, FO 60/666.

76 Gilbar, 'Merchants', p. 295

77 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 19, 30 January 1904, FO 60/681. 78 Spring Rice to Salisbury, no. 7, 9 January 1901, FO 60/636. 79 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 124, 18 August 1901, FO 60/637. 80 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 136, 6 September 1901, FO 60/637. 81 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 23, 14 February 1902, FO 416/8, no. 125. 82 Hardinge to Lansdowne, 27 August 1902, FO 800/177, p. 155. 83 Newmarch to Hardinge, no. 412, 18 July 1903, FO 248/802; see also Hardinge, Diplomatist, p. 323. 84 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 18, 4 February 1902, FO 60/650. 85 Aganoor to Hardinge, no. 5, 24 February 1903, FO 248/788. 86 Stevens to Hardinge, no. 10, 18 July 1903, FO 248/792. 87 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 69, 22 April 1904, FO 60/681. 88 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 87, 19 May 1904, FO 60/682. 89 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 10, 6 January 1905, FO 60/698. 90 Encyclopedia Britannica, 1902, Persia.

208

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

91 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 69, 22 April 1904, FO 60/681. 92 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1902, Persia. 93 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 10, 6 January 1905, FO 416/22, no. 49. 94 Marling to Grey, no. 176, 14 July 1908, FO 371/506, no. 26812, incl. Cox to the government of India 95 Biographical Notes of 1906, p. 77 (National Library of Scotland).

96 Ibid., p. 58, p. 60. 97 Strictly speaking, the word tujar (merchants) means the major wholesale

merchants who dealt in the import-export trade. Persian sources, however, use

tujjar to mean merchants generally, including bunakdars (retail dealers), dallals (agents) and sarrafs (money changers) - see for example Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, p. 71, referring to bunakdars as tujjar of the "'third rank'. Their functions were also not rigidly divided as tujjar might also be sarrafs. Picot in

the Biographical Notes of 1897, FO 60/592, lists 28 important merchants, mainly wholesale dealers and money changers. Thomson in 1870 reckoned that

there were about 250 'influential merchants' whom he distinguished from shopkeepers and artisans (Thomson to Clarendon, no. 2, Comm., 20 January 1870, FO 60/327). The possible estimate of 'a few hundred' is based on the definition used in the Persian sources. 98 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 121, 12 May 1905, FO 60/699. Aganoor to Hardinge, no. 26, 20 May 1905, FO 248/845. 100 De Groote to Favereau, no. 172/81, 29 July 1902, folio 2748, BMFA. 101 Hajj Shaikh Mahdi Sharif, 'Tarikh-i mashrutiyyat', Vahid 208 (1355/1977) 63.

99

102 F. Adamiyyat and H. Natiq, Afkar-i ijuima'i va siyasi va igtisadi (Tehran, 1356/1977-8), p. 299.

103 Ibid., p. 302. 104 Ibid. p. 356. 105 A. Enayat, 'Amin al-Zarb II, Haj Muhammad Husain', Encyclopaedia Iranica (London, 1985), p. 953. 106 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 298. 107 Biographical Notes 1897, p. 210, FO 60/592. 108 A. Kasravi, Tarikh-i mashruta-yi Iran (Tehran, 2536/1977), p. 51; Hardinge to Lansdowne no. 69, 24 March 1905, FO 60/698.

109 Enayat, 'Amin al-Zarb I', p. 952. 110 Durand to Salisbury, no. 118, 11 November 1898, FO 60/595. 111 F. R. C. Bagley, 'Religion and state in Iran', Islamic Studies X (1971) 10. 112 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, I, pp. 249-50; Surayya no. 46, p. 6, 3 January I,

1317.

113 Rossiya, 19 May 1909, Browne papers.

114 Adamiyyat and Natiq, Afkar, p. 318.

115 Habl al-Matin, Calcutta, 19 June 1905, quoted in Gilbar, 'Merchants* p. 301.

116 Gilbar 'Merchants' p. 301. 117 Floor, 'Merchants', pp. 124-5. 118 Thomson to Clarendon, no. 2, Comm., 20 January 1870, FO 60/327. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1910, Persia.

119 W. M. Floor, The Guilds in Qajar Persia, unpublished PhD thesis, University

of Leiden, 1971, pp. 16-17.

120 Ibid., p. 51.

121 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1902, Persia.

NOTES TO PAGES 52-67

209

122 Erskine to Lansdowne, no. 155, 8 November 1902, FO 60/651. 123 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 254.

124 Floor, Guilds, p. 56. 125 Browne, The Persian Constitutional Revolution 1905-9 (London, 1966), p.

116.

126 Yaghma'i, Shahid, pp. 16-20. 127 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 101, 12 May 1905, FO 60/699. 128 Thomsom to Clarendon, no. 2, Comm., 20 January 1870, FO 60/327. 129 Thomson to Clarendon, no. 2, Comm., 20 January 1870, FO 60/327. 130 Gilbar, 'Merchants' p. 302. 131 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 10, 6 June 1905, FO 60/698. 132 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, pp. 210-11. 133 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 23, 14 February 1902, FO 60/650. 134 A. H. Amini Najafi, Shahidan rah-i fasilat (Tehran, n.d.), p. 516. 135 Biographical Notes 1897, p. 219, FO 60/592. 136 I'°timad al-Saltana, Ruznama-yi khatirat-i l'timad al-Saltana, ed. I. Afshar (Tehran, 1345/1966-7), p. 1046; Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 321. 137 Majd al-Islam Kirmani, Tarikh-i ingilab-i mashrutiyyat-i Iran (Tehran, 1351/ 1972-3), pp. 171-2 138 Newmarch to Hardinge, no. 387, 15 July 1903, FO 248/802. 139 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, pp. 210-11.

140 Ibid., p. 210. 141 Ibid., p. 213.

142 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 69, 24 March 1905, FO 60/698. 143 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 76, 1 April 1905, FO 60/699. 144 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 243.

145 Ibid., p. 269. 146 Ibid., p. 271.

147 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, , pp. 10-11. 148 E. G. Browne, Materials for the Study of the Babi Religion (Cambridge, 1918), p. 221; Keddie, 'Religion and irreligion', p. 274. 149 Sharif Kashani, 'Tarikh-i mashrutiyyat', Vahid 208, p. 42. 150 Malcolm, History of Persia, p. 575. 151 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, II, p. 328. 152 Ibid., I, p. 28; see also pp. 289-90 for a discussion on constitutionalism. 153 Browne, Revolution, pp. 111, 113. 154 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, pp. 321-4. 155 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 76, 1 April 1905, FO 60/699. 156 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, Il, p. 42; Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 333. 157 Ibid., I, p. 339; S. H. Taqizada, Magalat-i Tagizada (Tehran 1349/1960-1), p 324. 158 A. K. S. Lambton, "The Persian 'ulama and the constitutional revolution', Le shüsme imamite, Colloque de Strasbourg 1968 (Paris, 1970), pp. 268-9.

Chapter 3 Tabataba°i and the Campaign for the Council of Justice

1 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, II, p. 20. 2 F. Adamiyyat, Andisha-yi taraggi va hukumat-i ganun, 'asr-i Sipah Salar (Tehran, 1352/1973-4), p. 67.

210

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

3 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, I, p. 27. 4 I. Rain, Faramushkhana va framasunari dar Iran (Tehran, 1347/1968-9), II, pp. 27, 57. 5 H. Algar, 'An introduction to the history of freemasonry in Iran', Middle Eastern Studies VI (1970), pp. 276-96.

6 Hairi, Shi'ism, pp. 73-7; see also Browne, Revolution, p. 40, and Rabino to Browne 20 March 1911, Browne papers, University of Cambridge Library. 7 For discussion of this campaign see Keddie, Afghani, pp. 142, 336. 8 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 239, 31 December 1904, FO 60/683. 9 I. Kazimiyya, 'Yaddashtha-yi Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i', Rahnama-yi Kitab, nos 8-9, 1350/1971-2, p. 474.

10 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, pp. 243-5. 11 Mirza Yusif Khan, Mustashar al-Daula, Yak kalima, edition published Tabriz 1327/1907-9, p. 4. The book was read by Nazim al-Islam's secret society, see

his book, vol. 1, p. 267. 12 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 245. 13 Zain al-'Abidin Maragha'i, Siyahatnama-yi Ibrahim Big (Tehran 1353/1974-

5), p. 81.

14 Ibid., p. 213.

15 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 247.

16 H. Ardakani, 'Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i*, Rahnama-yi Kitab, no. 21 parts 1-2 1357/1978, p. 28. 17 Marling to Tabataba'i, 30 December 1907, FO 248/920, no. 527.

18 A number of translations of foreign books were made at the turn of the century, for example Fenelon's Telemaque, presumably for its criticism of absolutist government; see F. Adamiyyat, Idi uluzhi-yi nahzat-i mashrutiyyat-i Iran (Tehran, 2535/1976), pp. 55-85.

19 G. Sadiqi, 'Dah risala-yi tablighati-yi digar', Rahnama-yi Kitab, no. 13 (1349/

1970), р. 18. 20 S. Haim, 'Alfieri and al-Kawakibi', Oriente Moderno XXXIV (1954) 321-34. 21 Kazimiyya, 'Yaddashtha', p. 476. 22 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 345.

23 Ibid., p. 353.

24 Hardinge to Lansdowne, no. 40, 28 February 1905, FO 60/698.

25 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 101, 22 April 1906, FO 371/109, no. 16412. 26 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 344 27 Browne, Revolution, p. 113. 28 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 345. 29 Sharif Kashani, 'Tarikh-i mashrutiyyat', Vahid, 219-20, p. 47. 30 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 353.

31 Ibid., p. 357.

32 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 19.

33 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 289, 4 December 1906, FO 416/29, no. 301.

34 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 22. 35 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 358. 36 Ibid., p. 366. 37 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 277, 28 December 1905, FO 416/26, no. 98. 38 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 23, 30 January 1906, FO 416/26, no. 155. 39 Sanservens, 15 June 1906, no. 23/13, in Doc. 1281, BMFA.

NOTES TO PAGES 67-90

211

40 Adamiyyat, Taragqi, p. 81.

41 Ibid., p. 181.

42 See B. Lewis, op. cit., p. 179; S. K. and E. J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (CUP, 1977), pp. 80-1; E. Engelhardt, La Turquie et le tanzimat (Paris, 1882), II, p. 19. 43 See L. Freedman, The Conseil de l'Etat in Modern France (New York 1961),

pp. 1-8. 44 Amin al-Daula, Khatirat, p. 156. 45 Qanun, no. 3, p. 4. 46 Qanun, no. 16, p. 3. 47 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 359. 48 Kazimiyya, 'Yaddashtha', p. 477.

49 Sharif Kashani, 'Tarikh-i mashrutiyyat', Vahid 208 (May 1977), p. 62.

50 Ibid., p. 62.

51 Ibid., Vahid, 219-20, p. 47 and no. 238, p. 42. 52 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 101, 22 April 1906, FO 371/109, no. 16412 53 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 277, 28 December 1905, FO 416/26, no. 98. 54 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 381.

55 Ibid., p. 408. 56 Ibid., pp. 390-1. 57 Ibid., pp. 403-5. 58 Ibid., pp. 444-53. 59 Maraghai, Ibrahim Big, p. 24, p. 67. 60 K. S. al-Husry, Three Reformers (Beirut, 1966), p. 63; see also pp. 26-9 of the Persian translation by 'Abd al-Husain Qajar, printed 1325/1907-8. Tabataba' must have read the Arabic, unless he saw a draft of this translation.

61*Abd al-Husain Qajar, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

62 Bakhash, Monarchy, p. 314, p. 339. 63 Maragha'i, Ibrahim Big, p. 213. 64 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, pp. 454-62. 65 For Kawakibi's views see Husry, Three Reformers, pp. 67-9; Haim, op. cit., p.

331.

66 H. Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan, (California, 1973), p. 48. 67 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 497.

68 Ibid., p. 63.

69 Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition, Ba'ya.

Chapter 4 The 'Ulama and the Establishment of the National Consultative Assembly

1 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 167, 21 June 1906, FO 371/112, no. 23147. 2 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 178, Tel., 10 July 1906, FO 371/112, no. 23516. 3 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 70. 4 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 193, 19 July 1906, FO 371/112, no. 26753. 5 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 496

6 Ibid., p. 503.

7 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 194, 19 July 1906, FO 371/112, no. 26754. 8 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, Il, p. 168.

212

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

9 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, II, p. 28.

10 Ibid., p. 168.

11 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 193, 19 July 1906, FO 371/112, no. 26753. 12 Ardishirji is almost certainly the same as Ardershir Reporter, a Parsee from Bombay who sometimes acted as an intermediary between the Iranian govern-

ment and the British Legation. It may be he intervened in this case, and that his intervention is not mentioned as he was a confidential agent. However, his account given to Malikzada does not tally with the British correspondence or

with Nazim al-Islam and must therefore be regarded as unreliable. (I am indebted for the information on Ardershir Reporter to Sir Denis Wright). 13 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 510. 14 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 203, 13 August 1906, FO 371/112, no. 29707; Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 511. 15 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 71. 16 I am indebted to Anne Enayat for this information. 17 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 511. 18 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 192 Tel., 21 July, no. 197 Tel., 24 July, no. 200 Tel., 26 July, 1906, FO 371/112, nos 25173, 25310, 25684

19 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 211, 15 August 1906, FO 371/112, no. 29712. 20 I. Safai, Panjah nama-yi tarikhi (Tehran, 1350/1971-2), p. 159.

21 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 512. 22 Browne, Revolution, p. 120. 23 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, II, p. 170. 24 Safa'i, Asnad-i Mashruta, pp. 42-4. Tafrishi Husaini, Haji Mirza Sayyid Ahmad, Ruznama-yi akhbar-i mashru-

25tiyyat va inqilab-i Iran 1321-1328, ed. I. Afshar (Tehran, 1351/1972-3), p. 29. 26 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 539.

27 Ibid., p. 590.

28 Smart to Browne, July 1906, Browne Papers, Cambridge University Library. 29 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, pp. 512, 514. 30 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 74. 31 Safa'i, Asnad-i Mashruta, p. 78.

NOTES TO PAGES 90-105 47 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 536.

48 Zahir al-Daula, Khatirat va asnad-i Zahir al-Daula (Tehran, 1348/1969-70), p.

130.

49 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, pp. 546-8.

50 The exact meaning of this phrase is uncertain but it may have originated with

one of the 'ulama who had some familiarity with western thought, such as Muhammad Sadiq Tabataba'i. 51 This suggests the links of the leaders of the 'ulama were closer to the merchants than the guilds. It may reflect the fact that they were largely funded by

the merchants. 52 M. Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, II, (Tehran, 1363/1984), p. 173-5.

53 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 551.

54 None of the sources report a struggle to include the guilds in the franchise, but

there must have been a specific request, or else they would not have been included in the rescript of 3 August.

55 Tafrishi Husaini, Ruznama, p. 40. 56 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 120. 57 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 558. 58 Malika-yi Iran to Zahir al Daula, in Zahir al-Daula, Khatirat, op. cit., p. 136. Malika-yi Iran was his wife and a Qajar princess. She was educated, wellinformed and close to the court. It is therefore unlikely that she would have invented this speech. 59 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 210 Tel., 10 August 1906, FO 371/112, no. 27347.

60 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 562.

61 Ibid., p. 566.

62 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, II, p. 170. 63 Such tactics were in fact to be employed by Shaikh Fazlallah. 64 Vakil al-Daula to Qavam al-Saltana, Safa'i, Asnad-i Mashruta, p. 68. 65 I. Safa'i, Asnad-i siyasi-yi daura-yi Qajariyya (Tehran, 1346/1967-8), p. 381.

66 Ibid., p. 384.

32 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 512. 33 Browne, Revolution, p. 122.

67 Daulatabada'i, Hayat-i Yahya, II, pp. 87-8. 68 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, II, p. 188. 69 Safa'i, Qajariyya, p. 381. 70 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 226, 11 September 1906, FO 416/29. 71 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 636.

35 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 74.

72 Ibid., p. 644. 73 Ibid., p. 584.

34 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 206, 13 August 1906, FO 371/112, no. 29797. See also no. 193 Tel. of the 27 July 1906.

36 Ibid., p. 75.

37 This may have been a ruse as Mu'in al Tujjar paid the main costs of the bast along with the other leading merchants. 38 Gilbar, 'Merchants', p. 299. 39 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 206, 13 August 1906, FO 371/112, no. 29707. 40 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 76. 41 Grant Duff to Grey, no. 201 Tel., 30 July 1906, FO 371/112, no. 25830. 42 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 534.

43 Browne, Revolution, p. 122. 44 Biographical Notes of 1906. 45 Majlis, 17 February 1907. 46 Grant Duff to Mutamin al-Mulk, no. 381, 3rd August 1906, FO 248/889.

213

74 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Mahdi Quli Hidayat, Khatirat va khatarat (Tehran, 1361/ 1982), p. 142. 75 Barnham to Grant Duff, no. 40, 10 September 1906, FO 248/877. 76 Barnham to Spring Rice, no. 63, 31 October 1906, FO 248/877 77 Barnham to Spring Rice, no. 78, 5 December 1906, and no. 81, 28 December 1906, FO 248/877. 78 Rabino to Spring Rice, no. 32, 3 November 1906, FO 248/879. 79 Haworth to Spring Rice, no. 77, 5 December 1906, FO 248/879.

80 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, II, pp. 71-2.

81 Ibid., II, p. 66.

82 Ibid., I, p. 650; Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 91. 83 Safa'i, Mashruta, pp. 141-2.

214

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

84 Zahir al-Daula, Khatirat, p. 157. 85 Shaikh Fazlallah to Spring Rice, received 6 October 1906, FO 248/887, no. 363. The letter is written in the fair hand of a scribe and is not signed but it bears on the back a square seal with the legend, Dhalika fadlu Allah yu'tih man yasha' (Such is the grace of God which He giveth unto whom He will (Koran Surah 5, no. 59). This was well-known as the seal of Shaikh Fazlallah (see H. A. Burhan, 'Shaikh Fazlallah va dar kashidan-i u', Vahid 203 (1335/ 1976-7) 876. The letter is therefore most probably genuine. 86 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 640.

87 Ibid., p. 577.

88 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Khatirat, p. 148; I. Zinov'ev, Inqilab-i mashrutiyyat-i Iran, trans. A. I'tishami, (Tehran, 1362). 89 McDaniel, The Shuster Mission, p. 63. 90 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Khatirat, p. 144. 91 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 5, 3 January 1907, FO 371/301, no. 2204. 92 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 38, 27 February 1907, FO 371/301, no. 7801. 93 Spring Rice to Grey, 30 January 1907, FO 800/70: 94 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 65, 28 March 1907, FO 371/301, no. 11863. Spring Rice to Grey, no. 38, 27 February 1907, FO 371/301, no. 11863. 96 Barnham to Spring Rice, no. 78, 5 December 1906, FO 248/877; Grahame to Grant Duff, no. 276, 28 November 1906, FO 248/882. 97 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, II, p. 20; see also Majlis, 31 January 1907. 98 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 290, 4 December 1907, FO 416/29, no. 302 99 Serstevens to Favereau, no. 112/53, 9 March 1907, folio nos IV to VI, BMFA. 100 H. Rabino to Browne, 31 January 1911, Browne Papers, Cambridge Universi-

95

ty Library.

101 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i Bidari II, pp. 73-4. 102 Ibid., p. 32. 103 Ibid., p. 81. 104 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 43 Tel. 5 March 1907, FO 371/308, no. 7334. 105 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 47, Tel. 8 March 1907, FO 416/31, no. 166.

Chapter 5 Constitutionalism and the Law of Islam 1 Tagizada, Sayid Hasan, Khitaba, tarikh-i ava'il-i inqilab-i mashruta dar Iran (Tehran, 1338/1959.60), p. 46. 2 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Khatirat, p. 147. 3 Sharif Kashani, Vagi'at, I, p. 109. 4 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Khatirat, D. 147. 5 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 38, 27 February 1907, FO 371/301, no. 8664.

6 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 222. 7 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i Bidari, II, pp. 84-5.

8 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Khatirat, p. 148.

9 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, II, p. 288. 10 Wratislaw to Spring Rice, no. 19, 15 April 1907, FO 248/913. 11 Rabino to Grant Duff, no. 23, 10 April 1907, FO 248/906. 12 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 38, 27 February 1907, FO 371/301, no. 8664. 13 Kasravi, Tarikh. II, pp. 88-9.

NOTES TO PAGES 105-124

215

14 Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, pp. 109ff., 178-9.

15 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, II, p. 118. 16 Daulatabadi, Hayar-i Yahya, II, p. 113. 17 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 81, 24 April 1907, FO 416/32, no. 130. 18 I. Safai, Asnad-i nau yafta (Tehran, 1349/1970-1), p. 217. 19 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 43, 5 March and no. 47, 8 March 1907, FO 416/31. 20 Goschen to Grey, no. 35, 5 April 1907, FO 416/36, no. 27. 21 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 127. 22 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 110, 21 May 1907, FO 371/312, no. 18869. 23 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 293. 24 From Mukhbir al-Saltana, Guzarish-i Iran quoted in M. I. Rizvani, Inqilah-i mashrutiyyat-i Iran (Tehran, 1344/1965 6). p. 145.

25 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 316-17 26 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 113, 23 May 1907, FO 371/301, no. 18872. 27 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 294.

28 Ibid., p. 324. 29 Ibid., p. 361.

30 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 137, 21 June 1907, FO 371/301, no. 22402.

31 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 370. 32 Habl al-Matin, no. 30, 15 June 1907, p. 4. 33 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 372

34 Sayyid Akbar Shah had also used a rauza khan in his campaign of opposition to the constitution. On another occasion a rauza khan was held to celebrate an alliance between two groups of roughs in Tehran (Muhakamat, 15 Muharram 1326)

35 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 350.

36 Ibid., p. 376. The shah had signed the bill for the abolition of tuyul on 16 May, not, it was reported, without a certain satisfaction at the disagreements it would cause. 37 Ducat to Spring Rice, no. 54, 11 July 1907, FO 248/906. 38 Barnham to Spring Rice, no. 106, 23 July 1907, FO 248/905.

39 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, Il, pp. 173 4. 40 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 379. 41 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, III, p. 30. Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 373. 42 43 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 129. 44 Sharif Kashani, Vagi'at, I, p. 128. 45 Spring Rice to Grey, 18 July 1907, FO 800/70. 46 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 143, 10 July 1907, FO 416/34, no. 136. 47 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 164, 19 July 1907, FO 371/304, no. 26051. 48 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, II, pp. 292, 400-0. 49 Kasravi, Tarikh, pp. 379-85. 50 Turkaman. Shaikh-i shahid, II, D. 332. 51 E. G. Browne. The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia (Cambridge, 1914), p.

94

52 Kasravi, Tarikh. p. 411. Kasravi published three of the leaflets in his history, pp. 410, 414-23, and 432-8. Rizvani has the largest collection of them, which he has published as 'Ruznama-yi Shaikh Fazlallah', Tarikh (Appendix to the

Journal of the Faculty of Humanities, Tehran University), Il, Part I, pp.

216

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

159-209, 2536 Shahanshahi/1977. The leaflets have all been published in M. Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, Fazlallah Nuri (Tehran, 1363/1983), pp. 231-368. They are given not only in the handwritten version, but also in printer's type. As Shaikh-i shahid comprises a most useful collection of Shaikh Fazlallah's

known writings, and is more readily available than Tarikh, reference will

henceforth be made to Shaikh Fazlallah's documents as they appear in this

work and in Kasravi. 53 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, p. 249. 54 Ibid., I, pp. 260, 270. 55 Ibid., I, pp. 277, 282. 56 Ibid., I, pp. 285, 290.

57 Ibid., I, pp. 351-2. 58 Ibid., I, pp. 344-6.

59 Ibid., I, pp. 294, 301 (this leaflet also bears the number 2); p. 316 (bearing numbers 3 and 4); pp. 317, 324 (numbered as 5).

60 Ibid., I, pp. 238-9, 242, 244. 61 Ibid., I, pp. 328-37; Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 431. 62 E.g. Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 240, 243, 254, 259. 63 Browne, Press, p. 94. 64 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 241-2, 244. 65 Ibid., I, pp. 360.362.

66 Ibid., I, p. 335; Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 437. 67 Rizvani, 'Ruznama', p. 198.

68 Ibid., p. 204.

69 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 280, 284.

70 Ibid., I, pp. 241-2, 244. 71 Ibid., I, pp. 322, 326. 72 Ibid., I, pp. 287, 291. 73 Ibid., I, pp. 320, 325. 74 Ibid., I, p. 331; Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 434.

75 Ibid., p. 414.

76 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 356, 358. 77 Ibid., I, pp. 267-8, 275: Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 422. 78 Ibid., p. 437; Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, p. 335.

79 Ibid., I, pp. 288, 292. 80 Ibid., I, pp. 266, 274; Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 421. 81 Ibid.. p. 438; Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, 1, p. 336.

82 Ibid., I, pp. 267, 275. Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 422. 83 Ibid., p. 416; Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 261, 270. 84 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 410.

85 Ibid., p. 433.

86 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 287-8, 291-2. 87 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 434; Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, p. 331. 88 Kasravi, Tarikh, pp. 416-17; Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 262-3, 271-2. 89 Kassavi, Tarikh, p. 438; Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, p. 336. 90 Habl al-Matin, 15 June 1907. Spring Rice to Grey, no. 147, 16 July 1907, FO 371/301, по. 26034.

91 Tamaddun, no. 4, p. 4.

NOTES TO PAGES 124-147

217

92 Majlis, no. 159, 18 August 1907, pp. 2-3. 93 Published by Majlis press, c. mid-August 1907. 94 Habl al-Matin, no. 86, 10 August 1907, p. 2; and no. 106, 2 September 1907,

pp. 1-2. 95 Sur-i Israfil, no. 5, p. 4. 96 Majlis, no. 162, 21 August 1907, p. 3. 97 Tamaddun, no. 5, p. 4. 98 Treatise in Refutation, p. 12.

99 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 100 Ibid., p. 27.

101 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 131. 102 Habl al-Matin, 27 August 1907. 103 Majlis, 18 August 1907, p. 2. 104 Ibid.

105 Majlis, no. 161, 20 August 1907, p. 2. 106 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 113, 23 May 1907, FO 371/301, no. 18872. 107 Majlis, 24 August 1907. 108 Spring Rice to Grey, no. 205, 13 September 1907, FO 371/304, no. 32480. 109 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 125. 110 There may, as Ettehadich Nezam Mafi suggests, have been two plots to assassinate Amin al-Sultan; see her thesis, The Origin and Development of Political Parties in Persia 1906-1911, unpublished, p. 219. 111 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 146. 112 Rizvani, 'Ruznama', p. 208

Chapter 6 Reform and Reaction: September 1907 to June 1908

1 Marling to Grey, no. 231, 10 October 1907, FO 416/34, no. 116. 2 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 150. 3 Marling to Grey, no. 242, 7 November 1907, FO 371/313, no. 38673. 4 Marling to Grey, no. 231, 10 October 1907, FO 371/303, no. 35499. 5 Marling to Grey, no. 230, 10 October 1907, FO 416/34, no. 119. 6 McDaniel, The Shuster Mission, p. 74.

7 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 488.

8 Marling to Grey, no. 326 Tel., 4 November 1907, FO 371/313, no. 36529. 9 Marling to Grey, no. 248, 8 November 1907, FO 371/313, no. 38679.

10 Daulatabadi, Hayar-i Yahya, II, p. 161. 11 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 482.

12 Majlis, no. 212, 20 November 1907, p. 2. 13 Marling to Grey, no. 263, 5 December 1907, FO 416/34, no. 441. 14 Hartwig to Izvolsky, 7 Dek/20 December 1907, Sbornik, p. 57. 15 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 160. 16 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 506. 17 Marling to Grey, no. 380 Tel., 15 December 1907, FO 416/34, no. 378. 18 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 505. 19 Browne, Revolution, p. 163. 20 Hartwig to Izvolsky, 11 Dek/24 December 1907, Sbornik, pp. 61-2.

218

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

21 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, Il, pp. 167, 170. 22 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 511. 23 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 168. 24 Marling to Grey, no. 391 Tel., 18 December 1907, FO 416/34, no. 399. 25 Mustashar al Daula Mirza Sadiq Khan, Yaddashtha-yi tarikhi-yi Mustashar al-Daula, ed. I. Afshar (Tehran, 1361/1982-3), p. 47. 26 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 515. 27 Browne, Revolution, p. 165. 28 Marling to Grey, no. 283, 31 December 1907, FO 416/35, no. 75. 29 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Khatirat, p. 163. 30 Hartwig to Izvolsky, 7 Dek/20 December 1907, Sbornik, p. 58. See also Zinov'ev, Ingilab, p. 64. 31 Marling to Grey, no. 283, 31 December 1907, FO 416/35, no. 75. 32 McDaniel, The Shuster Mission, p. 75. 33 Majlis, 31 December 1907. 34 Hartwig to Izvolsky, 14 Dek/27 December 1907, Sbornik, pp. 72-3. 35 Kennedy to Salisbury, no. 202, 3 September 1891, FO 60/553 36 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, I, p. 442.

37 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 506. 38 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 189.

39 Kennedy to Salisbury, no. 207, 12 September 1891, FO 60/553.

40 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, Il, p. 180. 41 M. Ettehadich Nezam Mafi, Political Parties, pp. 234-7. 42 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, III, p. 68. 43 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, pp. 181, 193. 44 Hartwig to Izvolsky, 5-18 January 1908, Sbornik, pp. 82-3.

NOTES TO PAGES 147-169 66 Yaghma'i, Shahid, p. 286. 67 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, pp. 116-17. 68 Yaghma'i, Shahid, p. 250. 69 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 271.

70 Ibid., p. 217. 71 Ibid., pp. 271-2. 72 Ibid., p. 161.

73 Mustashar al Daula, Yak kalima, p. 31. 74 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IlI, p. 271. 75 Yaghma'i, Shahid, p. 284. 76 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, p. 66. 77 Aganoor to Barclay, no. 34, 30 May 1908, FO 248/937. 78 Kasravi, Tarikh, pp. 559 60. 79 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 232. 80 Zahir al-Daula, Khatirat, p. 324. 81 Hartwig to Izvolsky, 21 Maia/3 June and 25 Maia/7 June 1908, Sbornik, pp.

174, 180. 82 Zinov'ev, Inqilab, p. 75.

83 Hartwig to Izvolsky, 21 Maia/3 June 1908, Sbornik, p. 174. 84 Hartwig to Izvolsky, 22 Maia/4 June 1908, Sbornik, p. 176. 85 Hartwig to Izvolsky, 26 Maia/8 June 1908, Sbornik, p. 181.

86 Kasravi, Tarikh, p. 587.

87 Hartwig to Izvolsky, 7 liun/20 June 1908, Sbornik, p. 191. 88 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, p. 25. 89 Hartwig to Izvolsky, 17 liun/30 June 1908, Sbornik, p. 216. 90 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 308.

45 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 194. 46 Ibid., pp. 192-3.

91 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, p. 84.

48 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 218. 49 Marling to Grey, no. 24, 14 February 1908, FO 371/497, no. 6677. 50 Majlis, 2 May 1908, p. 2. 51 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 205. 52 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Khatirat, p. 164. 53 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 213.

96 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, II, p. 271.

47 Marling to Grey, no. 18, 30 January 1908, FO 416/35, no. 206.

54 Ibid., p. 216.

55 Majlis, 2 May 1908, p. 2. 56 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, III, p. 82. 57 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Khatirat, p. 159. 58 Marling to Grey, no. 39, 28 February 1908, FO 416/35, no. 356. 59 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, III, p. 277.

92 Marling to Grey, no. 261, 4 December 1907, FO 416/34, no. 439. 93 Marling to Grey, no. 14, 29 January 1908, FO 416/35, no. 204. 94 Marling to Grey, no. 41, 26 February 1908, FO 416/35, no. 357. 95 Marling to Grey, no. 77, 27 March 1908, FO 416/36, no. 65.

97 Ibid., p. 303. 98 Ibid., p. 275. 99 Ibid., p. 273.

Chapter 7 Shaikh Fazlallah and the Absolutist Cause

1 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, II, p. 169.

60 Ibid., IV, p. 58.

2 Ibid., p. 183.

63 Floor, Guilds, p. 71.

5 Ibid., p. 364.

64 Yaghma'i, Shahid, pp. 281-3. 65 This point was first made by Charles Davis in a talk on Sayyid Jamal al-Din given at St Antony's, Oxford, May 1982.

8 Zahir al-Daula, Khatirat, p. 401.

61 Ibid., p. 57. 62 Ibid., p. 271.

219

3 Ibid., pp. 236-7. 4 Ibid., pp. 363-4.

6 Marling to Grey, no. 213, 13 August 1908, FO 416/37, no. 404. 7 Marling to Grey, no. 309 Tel., 19 September 1908, FO 416/37, no. 540. 9 Barclay to Grey, no. 287, 4 November 1908, FO 414/38, no. 231.

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

NOTES TO PAGES 169-190

10 Franklin to Barclay, nos 48 and 49, 28 November 1908, FO 248/939, nos 232,

53 Ibid., pp. 353, 363, 367, 372. 54 Rossiya, 19 May - 1 June 1909, Browne Papers. 55 The work bears no author's name, and Hair originally believed it to be by Shaikh Abd al Nabi Nuri (see Hairi, Shi'ism, pp. 209, 260). Hairi has since referred me to M. A. Mudarrisi, Raihana al-adab (Tehran, n.d.), VI, p. 264,

220 236.

11 Franklin to Barclay, no. 47, 21 November 1908, FO 248/939, no. 225. 12 Barclay to Grey, no. 366 Tel., 8 November 1908, FO 416/38, no. 162. 13 FO 248/947, no. 322, received 15 November 1908. 14 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, V, p. 67. 15 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, II, p. 234. 16 The wording of the request reflects the theory of a partnership between shah and 'ulama mentioned in chapter 1. 17 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, p. 200; see also Tafrishi Husaini, Ruznama, p.

279.

18 Barclay to Grey, no. 302, 25 November 1908, FO 416/38, no. 386.

19 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, V, p. 270. 20 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, Il, p. 273. 21 Barclay to Grey, no. 297, 15 November 1908, FO 416/38, no. 329. 22 PLP II, no. 375/139, 22 December 1908, BMFA. 23 Barclay to Grey, no. 446 Tel., 22 December 1908, FO 416/38, no. 417. 24 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, II, p. 270. 25 Barclay to Grey, no. 451 Tel., 25 December 1908, FO 416/38, no. 423. 26 Zahir al-Daula, Khatirat, p. 414. 27 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, V, p. 109. 28 Barclay to Grey, no. 111 Tel., 21 February 1909, FO 416/39, no. 327. 29 Nicholson to Grey, no. 172, 18 March 1909, FO 426/39, no. 470. 30 Grahame to Barclay, no. 61, 13 February 1909, FO 248/965. 31 Grahame to Barclay, no. 69, 26 February 1909, FO 248/965. 32 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, II, pp. 287-91.

33 Ibid., Il, p. 268.

34 Marling to Grey, no. 239, 3 September 1908, FO 416/37, no. 575. 35 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, Il, p. 270.

36 Ibid., p. 314. 37 Ibid., p. 314. 38 Ibid., p. 335. 39 Ibid., p. 295. 40 Ibid., p. 272.

41 Ibid., p. 311. 42 Ibid., p. 326.

43 Ibid., p. 351.

44 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, V, p. 279. 45 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, II, p. 530. 46 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, V, p. 279.

47 Ibid., pp. 261-4. 48 M. Gulbun, 'Asnadi dar barih-yi mashruta-yi Iran', Barrisiha-yi tarikhi III (1349/1970) 141; see also Wratslaw to Barclay, no. 16, 2 May 1909, FO 248/974

49 Gulbun, Ibid., p. 14. 50 Ibid., p. 159.

51 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, II, p. 339.

52 Ibid., p. 543.

221

who lists the Tadhkirat as one of the works of Shaikh Fazlallah. The arguments are similar to those in the fatva (see below) and on p. 36 is found the legend inscribed on Shaikh Fazlallah's seal (Dhalika fadlu Allahi, see chapter 4, note

85)

56 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, pp. 211-21.

57 Ibid., p. 215.

58 N. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh, 1974), p. 83. 59 Encyclopedia of Islam, first edition, Sharia'.

60 Y. Linant de Bellefonds, Traité de droit musulman comparé (Paris, 1965), I, p.

78.

61 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, p. 219.

62 Ibid., p. 219. 63 Hairi, Shiism, p. 210. 64 Ibid., p. 210. 65 Ibid., p. 211.

66 Hairi, Shi'ism, p. 200.

67 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 57, 78. Turkaman has published the Tadhkirat in full, and reference will henceforth be made to his text.

68 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, p. 214. 69 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 59, 81. 70 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, p. 215. 71 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 58-9, 81. 72 Hairi, Shi'ism, pp. 204-5. 73 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, p. 211. 74 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 67, 89-90. 75 Ibid., I, pp. 65-6, 89-90. 76 Hairi, Shi'ism, pp. 205-7. 77 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 68, 92. 78 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, p. 215. 19 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 59, 81. 80 Hairi, Shi'ism, pp. 223-4, 234. 81 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, I, pp. 68, 92.

82 Ibid., I, pp.72, 96-7.

83 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, IV, p. 211.

84 Ducat to Marling, no. 70, 22 July 1909, FO 248/968. 85 Grahame to Barclay, no. 109, 3 April 1909, and no. 254, 24 July 1909, FO 248/965.

86 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, V, p. 265.

87 Ibid., VI, p. 50.

88 See Majlis, 7 August 1909.

89 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, VI, p. 128; A. Kasravi, Tarikh-i hijdah sala-yi Azarbaijan (Tehran, 2537/1978), I, p. 661.

90 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, II, p. 536.

222

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

91 Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, II, pp. 292-3. 92 Maid al- 'Ali, Majmu 'a-yi khatiratz (1359/1978-9), p. 89. 93 Ibid., p. 90. His refusal to flee although he realized his life was in danger is borne out by other accounts, see Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, II, pp. 288 and 262-3.

94 Ibid., Il, pp. 400-1.

95 Malkizada, Mashrutiyyat, VI, pp. 128-31.

A Note on the Sources

Ibid., p. 129. 96 97 Browne, Revolution, p. 444.

98 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, VI, p. 132.

99 Majalla-yi kausar 3 (1359/1978-9). This version appears to be taken from an article by Shaikh Fazlallah's grandson, T. Kia, in Shahin, 1334/1955-6, pp. 210-319. Part of it is cited in Turkaman, Shaikh-i shahid, II, pp. 285-317. 100 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, Il, p. 535. 101 "Aksha-yi Tarikhi', Vahid 200 (2535/1976-7), p. 240.

102 Hairi, Shiism, p. 114. 103 Nazim al-Islam, Tarikh-i bidari, II, p. 521. 104 Tabatabai, 'Yaddashtha', p. 473. 105 Daulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, III, p. 126. 106 Marling to Grey, no. 129, 15 July 1910, FO 416/45, no. 181; see also Aurag-i taza yab-i mashrutiyyat marbut bi salha-yi 1325-1330 gamari, ed. I. Afshar (Tehran, 1359/1980-1), p. 207 and 209, for Khurasani's telegram and Mazare darani's letter of explanation published in Habl al-Matin, Ramazan, 1328.

107 Marling to Grey, no. 297 Tel., 22 July 1910, FO 416/45, no. 125. 108 Marling to Grey, no. 292 Tel., 18 July 1910, FO 416/45, no. 102. 109 Y. Richard, 'Le radicalisme islamique du Sheykh Fazlollah Nuri et son impact dans l'histoire de l'Iran contemporain', Les integrismes: la pensée el les hon. mes, 29-2 (Brussels, 1986), p. 77. 110 S.A. Arjomand, 'The 'ulama's traditionalist opposition to parliamentarianism: 1907-1909, Middle Eastern Studies XVII 2 (1981), p. 184. 111 Browne, Revolution, p. 123. Original letter in Browne Collection of Letters, Cambridge University Library.

For the study, a variety of Persian sources have been used. Of the primary sources,

the richest in material is still probably Nazim al-Islam Kirmani's Tarikh-i bidari-vi Iranian. The book chronicles in detail the political events of the period, reproducing such documents as rescripts and propaganda leaflets. The author had a variety of contacts among 'ulama, bazaaris and bureaucrats, and of the Persian accounts his work has usually proved the most accurate. Though Nazim al-Islam was a client of Tabatabai, and the work is biased in favour of the constitutional cause, it has the immense advantage for the historian of not carefully selecting the events described and of not being moulded by hindsight. Another contemporary account is the Hayat-i Yahya, the autobiography of Mirza Yahya Daulatabadi. The work is slightly marred by Daulatabadi's desire to inflate

his own role in events. a feat which is sometimes achieved at the expense of accuracy. Nevertheless it is a useful source because Daulatabadi had a close acquaintance with some of the Qajar notables.

Two more contemporary accounts are the diaries of Mirza 'Ali Khan, Zahir

al-Daula, and Haji Mirza Sayyid Ahmad Tafrishi Husaini, both edited by I. Afshar. From the point of view of the historian, Zahir al-Daula's diary and papers are useful because of his many well-placed correspondents. Khatirat va khatarat, the memoirs of Mukhbir al-Saltana, are particularly valuable as this highly educated notable was involved in the creation of the new régime. For the period just before

the revolution, Mirza 'Ali Khan, Amin al-Daula's Khatirat-i siyasi reveals the factional struggles within the government and the impediments placed in the path of reform, particularly by the 'ulama.

A further source on the revolution, particularly for the period 1907-8 is the

Persian newspapers. For the years prior to the revolution there are such papers as the Habl al-matin of Calcutta and the Akhtar of Cairo, published abroad, which are

useful for the study of the development of reformist and modernizing opinion. Their lists of contributors to various projects are especially interesting as many were merchants. As chronicles of events in Tehran their reliability cannot be compared with the accounts of those on the spot. The vast body of newspapers published in the capital during the revolution were pro-constitutional. From the

point of view of this study the most useful has been the accounts in Mailis, published on average three or four times a week, of the debates in the Assembly. These accounts are undoubtedly flawed, partly because the debates themselves were often rambling and disorderly, but mainly because the accounts were précised, reflecting the interests and prejudices of the writer. The result can often make very frustrating reading. There is a further difficulty in that the Majlis was owned and run by relatives of the leading 'ulama, so that material detrimental to the prestige of the 'ulama is edited out. Thus for the period of the crucial debate

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over the Supplementary Fundamental Law in 1907, during which the 'ulama

illuminating comment so far has been made by E. Abrahamian in his article on 'The crowd in the Persian revolution'.

224

vehemently opposed certain articles, the debate contents appear in the briefest précis. Other papers are of value for particular reasons: Muhakarat, for example,

225

Another weighty work in Persian is the seven volumes of M. Malikzada's

published the records of the trials of the shah's roughs, giving insight into the organization of a mob. The absolutists did not publish a newspaper of their own, probably because of

Tarikh-i inqilab-i mashrutiyyal-i Iran. The study suffers primarily from the author's desire to give prominence to the part played in the revolution by his father, Malik

intimidation. The only anti-constitutionalist press set up at this time, undoubtedly

nowledged, is Daulatabadi's Hayat-i Yahya, which at times Malikzada repeats word for word. Malikzada has, however, probably been most seriously misleading on the

with money provided by the shah and the conservatives, was that of Shaikh

Fazlallah in the Shrine of Hazrat 'Abd al-'Azim. Its productions were propaganda leaflets rather than newspapers: with no editorial, no comments on current events and no letters, their purpose was simply to convey, usually in a single article, the anti-constitutional message. Their leaflets have been collected and published with an introduction by M. I. Rizvani. In addition to his newspaper, Shaikh Fazlallah also published a treatise entitled Tadhkirat al-ghafil wa irshad al-jahil. In it he sets out in some detail his arguments against constitutionalism. A treatise in refutation of Shaikh Fazlallah's arguments was published anonymously by Majlis press. Shaikh Fazlallah had earlier published a work entitled Su'al va javab, which is important for its comments on the relations of religion and state. In recent years a number of invaluable collections of documents and memoirs, including many from the period under study, have been edited and published, most notably through the efforts of I. Afshar and I Safa'i (see bibliography). These papers include correspondence sent to Amin al-Sultan, Sadr-i a'zam, during his period of exile, by his adherents in Tehran. Though comparatively scant, some of these letters provide an insight into the views of those who were sceptical of or opposed the constitutional movement. Another important source of published documents is the various Persian journals particularly Barrisiha-yi Tarikhi, Rahnama-yi Kitab, Yaghma and Vahid. Material from these journals has included letters from various members of the 'ulama, the memoirs of Hajj Shaikh Mahdi Sharif,

and the reports of the government spies which have also been published by Yaghma'i in his book on Sayid Jamal al-Din Isfahani, Shahid-i rah-i azadi. A significant collection of documents relating to Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri has recently been edited and published by M. Turkaman under the title Shaikh-i Shahid Farlal.

lah Nuri. The first volume of this work contains the writings of Shaikh Fazlallah himself, most of which have already been published elsewhere. The second volume

contains mostly contemporary accounts of Shaikh Fazlallah and his activities, and includes much interesting hitherto unpublished material. Perhaps the best-known secondary source in Persian on the Constitutional Re-

volution is A. Kasravi's Tarikh-i mashruta-yi Iran. The work is a comprehensive study of the events of the revolution in Tehran and Tabriz (with particular emphasis on Tabriz), and is dedicated to the constitutionalist cause. Kasravi scrutinized the role of the 'ulama in particular and was at pains to show they understood little of the term 'constitutionalism'. It has been said of Kasravi's work that he was the first to stress the role of the poor and unknown in the revolution. However, this effect is achieved largely by employing the unhelpful term 'the people' (mardum). On closer examination Kasravi's mardum usually indicates merchants or guildsmen who were not specially poor or unknown. Of the viewpoint of the mass of the very poor, constituting over half the population, little is recorded. Probably the most

al-Mutakallimin. The major source for the early part of the book. largely unack-

subject of the secret society or anjuman, which he claims his father belonged to before the revolution. Close examination of this anjuman strongly suggests that it

did not exist in the form he describes it. In spite of these considerable flaws Malikzada's account cannot be ignored; most important he has published in full original documents which are as yet not otherwise available. Among the most outstanding recent works in Persian on the revolution are those of F. Adamiyyat. These include Afkar-i ¡jtima'i va sivasi va iqtisadi, a compendium of treatises and other documents edited in collaboration with H. Natiq and providing much valuable original material; Andisha-yi taraqqi va hukumat-i ganun, on the

reforms of Sipah Salar, showing the influence of the Ottoman reforms of the Tanzimat and tracing the development of new ideas on government and administra-

tion; Idiuluzhi-yi Nahzat-i mashrutiyyat-i Iran, on the influence of Western ideology and concepts on the constitutional movement up to and including the revolution; and Fikr-i dimukrasi-yi ¡tima'i dar nahzat-i mashrutiyyat-i Iran, which deals with social democratic thought during the constitutional movement. Of the non-Persian primary sources, the British diplomatic Archives at the Public Records Office are the most extensive. These include the FO 60 series of diplomatic correspondence up till 1906. From 1906 onwards it is superseded by the FO 371

series in which she classification of correspondence is somewhat confusing. In addition there are FO 539 and FO 416 confidential print series. In this study reference has been made to the original papers in the FO 60 and FO 371 series, but

sometimes the originals listed in the Legation ledgers are missing, in which case reference has been made to the confidential print. Unlike the Persian sources which tend to see the ills of the country in terms of those who desired reform from below. the British sources show the difficulties confronting the government as it struggled

to effect reform from above. On the other hand, the British officials necessarily viewed events primarily with the furtherance and protection of British interests in mind. During the Constitutional Revolution a number of the Legation staff became devotees of the constitutional cause without always considering its full implications for Iran. These prejudices and preferences must be taken into account when using the British diolomatic archives. In addition to the diplomatic correspondence there

is the FO 248 series containing consular papers, correspondence to and from Iranians, and miscellaneous correspondence. The miscellaneous correspondence contains the despatches from the British representatives in Turkish Arabia, and provides comments on the ulama of Najaf. Although they cannot provide the same insight into the interrelations of the 'ulama of the Atabat as some Persian sources can, they possess a degree of objectivity not always found in the uncritical and often

life-long devotion of a member of the 'ulama to his particular maître. One other useful series is the FO 800, Private Collections of Ministers and Officials. Other private papers and memoirs include The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring

226

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A NOTE ON THE SOURCES

Rice, edited by Gwynn, and Hardinge's memoirs, A Diplomatist in the East, written

has drawn attention to the role of the major merchants in organizing and funding

in his old age. Cambridge University Library has two important collections of private papers, those of E. G. Browne, and Sir Charles Hardinge.

Since the involvement of a number of the 'ulama in the reform movement began

with the campaign against Joseph Naus, the Belgian Minister of Customs, the Belgian archival material in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels has also been examined. This highlights more clearly than the British sources the reform programme begun in 1897, of which the customs reforms formed a part. Further, although the campaign against Naus was led by the 'ulama, the Belgians significantly identified the merchants and certain of the notables as their real opponents. The

telegrams and despatches from Hartwig to Izvolsky published by the Russian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1911 as a collection in a book entitled Sbornik

diplomaticheskikh dokumentov kasaiushchikhsia sobytii v. Persis kontsa 1906 g. poliul. 1909 g constitute an important primary source, particularly on the events of the Maidan Tupkhana in 1907 and the coup of 1908. Of course one of the problems with this correspondence is that Hartwig's policy differed from Izvolsky's and his presentation of events cannot always be relied on.

Of secondary sources on the revolution the earliest is E. G. Browne's The

Persian Constitutional Revolution 1905-6. Although written with a strong liberal bias, the book contains useful primary material and some enlightening observations by the author. In more recent years the Constitutional Revolution and the ajar period in Iran have attracted a good deal of attention and a number of studies have appeared. In his work, Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars: 1858-1896, S. Bakhash examines attempts at reform from above and analyses why they failed. McDaniel in his study The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revoluton introduced the new and important argument that much of the dissatisfaction at the time of the revolution arose from the government's centralizing policy, and not,

as had previously been argued, from decline and growing oppression. On the subject of foreign relations, Kazemzadeh's work, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914, a broad outline of Russian and British policy towards Iran, touches on

the constitutional period. Among useful articles on the relations of religion and state are A. K. S. Lambton's comments on the arguments of Mirza Qummi in 'Some new trends in Islamic political thought in late 18th century and early 19th century Persia', and on Shaikh

Ja'far Najafi's proposals on jihad in 'A nineteenth century view of Jihad'. S. A. Arjomand has highlighted the attempts to find a concordance between religion and state in 'The "ulama's traditionalist opposition to parliamentarianism'. The sources

of authority of the Iranian ulama have been identified by Binder and compared with those of the Sunnis in The proofs of Islam: religion and politics in Iran'. N. Keddie has shown the influence of the heterodox and radicals on Iranian reformism

and nationalism in 'Religion and irreligion in early Iranian nationalism'. She has also shown that reformers made westernizing ideas acceptable to the 'ulama by presenting them in Islamic guise in 'The origins of the religious radical alliance. A

H. Hairi has given an introductory translation of the fatva issued by Shaikh Fazlallah after June 1908 in 'Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri's refutation of the idea of constitutionalism'.

The involvement of other groups has also been brought out recently. G. Gilbar

227

the bast in 1906 in 'The big merchants and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906°. The organization and the social and economic links of the guilds, including

the fact that the 'ulama acted as brokers for them with the state, have been discussed by W. M. Floor in The guilds in Iran: an overview from the earliest

beginnings to 1972*. Of recent theses, N. Calder's work on The Structure of Authority in Imami Shii Jurisprudence traces the development of the fundamental doctrine of the delega-

tion of authority from the Sixth Imam to the 'ulama, and their assumption of the Imam's executive powers in his absence. M. Ettehadieh Nezam Mafi's PhD thesis. The Origin and Development of Political Parties in Persian 1906-1911, is based on much fresh material. H. Modaressi's work on Kharaj in Shi'i Law from the Beginning to the 10th/l6th Century concentrates on the lawfulness or otherwise of the 'ulama in accepting the proceeds of the kharaj tax, touching on the relationship between religion and state.

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Crick, B. R., Basic Forms of Government: a Sketch and Model (London and Basingstoke, 1973).

Curzon, G. N., Persia and the Persian Question (London, 1892). Destree, A., Les fonctionnaires belges au service de la Perse 1898-1915 (Tehran, Liège, 1976). Donaldson, D. M., The Shi'ite Religion (London, 1933). Eliash, J. E., 'The Ithna *ashara-Shi'i juristic theory of political and legal authority', Studia Islamica XXIX (1969), pp. 2-30.

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Glossary 'adalat justice

'adil just

ahkam ordinances

ahkam al-khamsa the five precepts ahkam-i naskh va mansukh contradictory judgements on religious matters

ahl al-haqq the rightful 'alim learned person

amr-i bi ma'ruf va nahy a munkar the command to enjoin good and prohibit evil

aniuman council or society 'Ashura 10th Muharram, which is the day of mourning for Imam Husain

asl principle

asnaf pl. of sinf, guilds, classes

aubash roughs

'Atabat the threshholds, refers to the holy cities of Iraqi Najaf, Karbala, Samara and Kazimain

bast sanctuary bastis those in sanctuary bunakdar retail dealer darugha local magistrate daular government, state

daulat-i ja' ira unjust government

din religion

divan government council

dunya world

faqih jurist

farrash executive servant fatva a legal ruling by a mujahid giving an opinion on a point of law fida'i one devoted to a cause

figh jurisprudence

furu' specific provisions of the sharia ghalat error in the religious sense hadd penalty prescribed by Islamic law hadith traditions concerning the Prophet which form the basic evidence of Islamic

law

237

238

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

hami protector

hagg right

haram forbidden (one of the five precepts of Islam) hudud pl. of hadd, penalty; also the boundaries or limits of authority hujjat proof (of the validity of the religious message) hukumat government huqm order, decree. judgement, precept

huguq pl. of hagg, rights huquq-i milli national rights ihgaq-i huquq the confirmation of rights ijaza permission; certificate of knowledge and character required by those seeking the rank of mutahid ijthad independent judgement (of a mutahid in pronouncing a legal ruling) 'ilm knowledge, meaning religious knowledge Imam one of the succession of infallible leaders of the Twelver Shia community imam jum'a one appointed by the shah to lead the prayers at the main mosque of

each town inqilab revolution

igamat-i hudud the application of the prescribed penalties istibdad despotism

janishin deputy, successor

jaur injustice jihad holy war

jumhurriyat republicanism

kafir infidel

khilafat the rightly guided succession

khalisa crown land khana house kharaj tax, land tax khums one fifth of a peron's income levied as a canonical tax

kitab book madrasa theological school

mahrusa protected

majlis assembly, council, meeting majlis- shaura-yi milli National Consultative Assembly makruh reprehensible (one of the five precepts of Islam) maliyat tax, especially the land tax

mamlikat country

mandub recommended (one of the five precepts of Islam)

mardum people

mardum-i 'avam the ordinary people marja'-i taglid example to be imitated, may refer to any mujahid or to one mujtahid acknowledged as the most prominent of his time

mashru'a in accordance with the sharia

GLOSSARY

239

mashruta constitutionalism mashvarat consultation

mazlum oppressed millar community, nation

milli national

mirab official in charge of the distribution of water

mu'minin the faithful mubah permitted

mujahid warriors in a holy cause mujtahid one who may use his own judgement (itihad) in interpreting the religious law, therefore one of the highest ranking of the religious body

mugallid ordinary believer, follower of a mutahid

nabi prophet

na'ib-i 'amm general agent na'ib-i khass specific agent niyabat deputyship, agency

nizamnana book of rules, used to mean code of laws, and also constitution

nubuvvar prophecy

panah protector pasban guardian pir master (of a Sufi order) pishkash gift, often extracted as a kind of tax, or expected as an inducement pishnamaz mulla who leads the prayers at a mosque

qanat water channel ganun pl. gavanin, law, usually used of non-religious law gaza office and function of applying Islamic law qutb lit. pole, master of a Sufi order rauza khan religious rhapsodist; ceremony on religious occasions where rhapsodists perform

ra'is leader, director rajul pl. rajal, notable

ra'y-yi savab correct opinion

rish sifidan elders ru'asa pl. of ra'is, leaders ruaya subjects

rukn pillar

sadr government official in charge of the religious body in Safavid times

sadr-i a'zam chief minister saltanat power, worldly rule, authority, sovereignty, monarchy sarraf changer of money and bills of exchange, banker

sagit lapsed

sayyid one claiming descendance from the Prophet

240

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

shabnama anonymous leaflet

shahid martyr

shaikh al-Islam official representative of the 'ulama presiding over the religious

Index

courts in one town shar', sharia the sacred law of Islam

shaur deliberation

shirk association, meaning also the association of the Divinity with another, which is heresy in Islam sinf class, group, guild

siyasi political taaruf gifts, also used to refer to payments extracted as a form of tax

ta'at act of devotion takfir excommunication tanbaku tobacco, specially processed for the hookah

tagdir decree

taqiyya dissimulation for religious reasons taglid imitation (of a mutahid by an ordinary believer) tarigat the way or path, term especially used by Sufis tujjar major wholesale merchants, but also used to mean merchants in general tullab theological students

tuvul fief

tuyuldar fiefholder 'ugala the learned ones, usually meaning 'ulama

'ulama the religious scholars of Islam ulu al-amr the ultimate source of authority 'ulum-i jadid the new sciences umara princes, commanders, the powerful

umur affairs, matters 'urf customary law

usul principles, roots, essentials

va'iz preacher

vajib obligatory (one of the five precepts of Islam) vakil representative, agent vagf religious endowment

vatan homeland

vikalar agency, representation vilayat deputyship, guardianship

zakat alms, canonical tax rill allah Shadow of God, title sometimes assumed by the shahs

zulm oppression

zurkhana lit. house of strength, traditional gymnasium

Amir Mufakhkham, 172 Amuli, Mulla Muhammad, 121, 146 Anglo-Russian Agreement, 142, 160-1,

*Abbas Aga, 137

"Abbas Mirza, 4, 20, 25, 26

*Abbas Quli Khan, 90 "Abduh, 69

167

Accommodatory theories of authority,

anjumans

formation of 1906-7, 110-11 in December 1907, 143-7 different types 1908, 155-9

24-30

'adalatkhana, 76-9, 86, 88, 89, 94, 95,

96

and the coup of 1908, 159-63

Adib al-Mamalik, 66 Afghani, Sayyid Jamal al-Din, 6-7, 58, 66, 69 Afia'l, Sayyid Jamal al-Din, 70, 72,

Ansari, Shaikh Murtaza, 13, 19, 24 Aqa Muhammad Qajar, 22 Agasi, Hajj Mirza, 20-1 Arbab Jamshid, 54, 93, 102, 158, 163,

166.171

ahkam al-khamsa, 179

174

Ahsa'i, Shaikh Ahmad, 21 'Ain al-Daula, 'Abd al-Majid Mirza,

14, 42, 49-51, 55, 58-9, 61-4, 67, 70-3, 75, 78-80, 88-90, 94-6, 104, 149, 176-7, 196, 198, 205 Akbar Shan, Sayyid, 115, 146, 148, 196,

215

Akbaris, 19 Akhavi, Haji Mirza Nasrullah, 103, 130 Akhtar, 110 Akhundzada, Fath 'Ali, 5 Ala al-Daula, 62, 72-3, 75 *Ala al-Saltana, Ahmad Khan, 169

Alfieri, V., 69 "Ali, first Imam, 11

58

Ashtiyani, Mirza Murtaza, 13, 36, 57,

70, 74, 197

Ashtivani, Mirza Mustafa, 70, 171, 175 "Asgar Garichi, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78 Astarabadi, Muhammad Amin, 19 "Attar Mirza Ibrahim, 96 "Azud al-Mulk, 'Ali Riza Khan, 96, 105, 113, 159, 186, 188 Azalis, 22, 60

Babism, 21-2, 24 Baha'is, 22 al-Bakri family, of Egypt, 14 Bakhtiyaris, opposition to Muhammad 'Ali Shah, 172, 186-7

"Ali Muhammad, Sayyid (the Bab), 21 Amin al-Daula, Mirza 'Ali Khan, 42, 45-6, 51-2,58, 77, 108 Amin al-Sultan, 'Ali 'Asghar, 14, 38. 42-6, 48-50, 57-9, 67, 71, 92, 1167, 122, 135-7, 150, 217

bast, origins of in foreign legations, 87

bast in British Legation 1906, 87, 89

Amin al-Zarb I. Haii Muhammad Hasan, 44,53, 109 Amin al-Zarb II, Hajj Muhammad

Husain, 53, 93-4, 109, 117, 136, 149, 150, 152, 161, 163, 174

Ardishirji, 90, 211 Arshad al Daula, 'Ali Khan, 158 Ashtiyani, Mirza Hasan, 31-2, 42, 57,

100

bast in Ottoman Legation 1980-9, 170-

1.173-4

bast in Shah Abd al-'Azim 1905-6, 70-

Amir Humayun, 43 Amir Kabir, Mirza Tagi Khan, 4 Amir Bahadur Jang, Husain Pasha Khan, 38, 72, 100-1, 112, 144-7, 160.170 Amir Khan Sardar. Nasratallah Mirza,

bast in Shah 'Abd al-'Azim 1907, 121

bayan, 22 Bihbihani, Sayyid 'Abdallah, 13, 14,

75

241

39 40, 49,51, 58-9, 61, 63-4, 70. 89-90, 93, 96, 101, 104-8, 110-11, 114-122, 136-7, 139 40, 144, 1479. 153-5. 157-8. 161-3. 170, 189.

242

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

193-7

before bast 1906, 88-89

and Amin al-Sultan, 42, 49, 57-8 campaign against Naus, 59 in bast 1905-6, 71-3, 78-9

in Majlis, 105, 111

instigates bast 1906, 89, 91

in bast 1907, 121-3, 137

and establishment of the Majlis, 102-

3

and political groups in the Majlis,

150-2

after the coup of 1908, 162 assassination of, 191-2

Bihbihani, Sayyid Muhammad Baqir,

19 Bizot, M., 170

Bunakdar, Hajj Muhammad Husain, 54, 71, 90-3

Bunakdar, Hajj Muhammad Taqi, 71, 90-1, 93, 150

Burujirdi, 'Ali Akbar, 62, 146, 177 Constitutionalism as a goal in 1906, 67-9, 97

conflict over, 1907, 113-4 attempts to restore 1908-9, 167-78 after 1909, 190-2 Cossack Brigade, 162 Coup of 1908, 159 62

Dabir al-Mulk, 100 Daulatabadi, Yahya, 54, 60, 73, 74, 78,

79, 104, 157

Davatsaz, Karim, 171 Della Tirannade, 69 Elections to the First Majlis, 101-3 Electoral rules 1906, 100-1 Equality before the law, 117, 118, 129,

185

Fakhr al-Din Fakhr al-'Ashraf, 38 Fakhr al-Islam, 93 Faramushkhana. 66 Farman Farma. "Abd al-Husain Mirza,

174 Fath 'Ali Shah Qajar, 4, 20, 23, 24, 26, Fazl71 Ali Aga, 130

Fazlallah Nuri, Shaikh, 3, 13, 14, 28-9, 31, 37, 39-40, 42, 57, 64, 67, 70, 97, 100, 114-7, 131-5, 139, 144-5. 158, 196-7, 205, 213, 215, 220 and 'Ain al-Daula 58, 61-2, 89, 104 position 1905. 61-2

draft of Article II of the Fundamental

Law, 118-20, 127

arguments against constitutionalism 1907, 124-30 in the demonstrations of December

1907, 146-8

support for the absolutist cause, 165,

167-73, 175-8, 193-5

arguments against constitutionalism

1908-9, 178-86 arrest and trial, 187-9 execution, 189-90 Filsuf Shirazi, Shaikh Muhammad, 60,

INDEX Ihtisham al-Saltana, Mirza Mahmud

Khan, 150-2, 164 itihad, 12

imam jum'a, functions of, 14-15 Imam Jum'a, Abu'l Qasim, 36, 57, 58, 62-3, 70, 88, 196

Imam Jum'a, Zain al-'Abidin, 57, 58 Imam Jum'a Khu', 103, 158 Irshadnama of Mirza Abu'l Oasim Oummi. 25 Isfahani, Jamal al-Din, 39, 56, 60-4,

122, 144-5

Isfahani, Haji Mirza Mahmud, 90-1 I'timad al-Islam, Sayyid 'Ala al-Din, 74, 98-9

Finances, problems of, 43-5, 48-51, 107-9. 175-6

Ja'far al-Sadig, 12 Jahangir committee, 171 Jala al-Daula, Sultan Husain Mirza, 160

Freedom of the press, 110-11, 117, 133 Freemasonry, 66

Justice Ministry of, reform of, 9, 76-7, 139 40, 152-5

Gavkush, Mahdi, 80, 148, 193 al-Ghazzali, 33

Kani, Mulla 'Ali, 27-8

93

Firdausi, 33

Guilds

organization of, 55-6 participation in revolution, 92-3, 98

in Majlis, 105 6 anjuman of, 154-7

and bast in Ottoman Legation 1908-

9, 174

Habl al-Matin of Calcutta, 54, 93, 110 Habl al-Matin of Tehran, 110, 119, 132,

133, 148 Harati, Sayyid Taqi, 118

Hartwig N.H. de, role in coup of 1908.

160-1

Hasan, Hajj Mirza Aga, 114, 119, 121 Hauza-vi Islami. 80 Heterdoxies. 18-22 al-Hilli, Hasan ibn Mutahhar al. "Alama, 12 Hishmat al-Mulk, 42 Hobbes, Thomas, 84 Huaug-i duval va milal. 29

Husain, Aga Shaikh, 154 Husain, Imam, 85

Husain-i Hai Mirza Khalil. Hai Mirza Husain, 14, 57, 192 Ibrahim Aga, Hajj Mirza, 119, 156

jihad. 26

al-Karaki, Shaikh Ali, 16 Kashani, Muhammad Bagir, 94

Kashfi, Ja'far ibn Abi Ishaq, 26-7, 28,

29

Kawakibi, 'Abd al-Rahman, 65, 69, 81,

83.85

Khumami, Haji, 103, 115, 119

khums, 12, 37 Khurasani, Akhund Mulla Muhammad Kazim, 14, 36, 62, 123, 173 Kitab-i Ahmad, S

Le Bon, G., 69 Liakhoff, Col. Vladimir, 145 Locke. John. 84

Lutfallah, Shaikh, 121

243

Majority, rule by, 184 Malik al-Mutakallimin, Hajj Mirza Nasrallah, 39, 59, 60-1, 71, 74,

145, 154, 156, 159, 161 Malika-yi Iran, 213 Malkum Khan, 5, 6, 7, 52, 65, 66, 68, 76, 77, 82, 85 Mamaghani, 57 Maragha'i, Zain al-'Abidin, 54, 65, 68,

82,85

marja'-i taglid, 12-14

mashruta-yi mashru'a, 61-2, 114, 126-

7,132, 147

Ma sum, Hajj, 149, 193 Ma'sum, 'Ali Shah, 20

Mazandarani, Shaikh 'Abdallah, 123,

192

Merchants in 1905, 53-4

and bast of 1905-6, 71 and bast of 1906, 90-4, 96, 98-100

role in Majlis, 108-9 and bombardment of Majlis, 1908,

161

Mob, organization of, 148-9 Mufakhkhar al-Mulk, 169, 175, 187,

189

Muhammad, Hajj Sayyid, 121 Muhammad Shah Qajar, 20-1, 23, 28 Muhammad 'Ali Shah Oaiar (also vali'ahd), 23, 32, 71, 95, 106, 107, 113-4, 116-8, 122-3, 135, 137, 143-8, 152, 156, 158-9, 160-1, 165-70,175, 186-7, 195 Muhammad Ismail, Haji. 54, 93, 94, 109, 136, 150, 161, 174 Muhammad Riza, Haii. 61 Muhammad Sarraf. Haii Savvid, 94 Muhammad Va'iz. Shaikh, 88. 115, 144 Muhsin, Mirza, 74, 98-9, 102-4 Muhtasham al-Saltana, 94

Maid al-Islam, 60 Maid al-Mulk, Muhammad Khan, 5, 65

Mu'in al-Twiiar Bushihri. 54,60.93, 94,

Mailis establishment of, 94-100

Mujallal al-Sultan, 175, 187, 195 muitahid, authority of, 12-14, 17-22

regulations of, 100-1 elections to, 101-3 attack on. December 1907. 145-8

parties in, 105-6, 149-51, 156 bombardment of, 1908, 161-2 Majlis, 104, 110, 131, 133, 148, 149

Mailisi, Muhammad Bagir, 17, 18, 27,

29

109, 136, 144, 150, 152, 163, 174

Mukhbir al-Mulk, 95 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Mahdi Quli

Hidayat, 100-1, 107, 111, 113 4, 117,153-5, 199

Mumtaz al-Daula, 152, 164

mugallid, 12

Mugtadir Nizam, 149, 156, 193 al-Murtaza, Sharif, 15

.244

ISLAM AND MODERNISM

Murtazavi, Sayyid, 150

Musa, Imam, 16 Musavat, 110

Mushir al-Daula, Mirza Nasrallah Khan, 52, 71, 74, 78-9, 95-6, 98-9,

105, 107, 111, 113 Mushir al-Mulk, Mirza Hasan Khan,

52, 71, 101

Mustashar al-Daula, Mirza Sadig

Khan, 5, 68

Qanun, 6, 77, 81 Qummi, Mirza Abu'l Qasim, 25, 27, 29 Qummi, Mirza Muhammad Riza, 70, 153, 196

Sipahdar-i A zam, Muhammad Vali Khan, 104, 175, 186, 192

Raihanallah, Sayyid, 71, 175 Razi, Fakhr al-Din, 33 Representation, 181-4 Reuter, Baron de, 4 Risala-yi jihadiyya, 26 Risala-yi majdiyya, 5

Sulaiman Khan, Maikada, 156, 158 Sultan Ahmad Shah, 186 Supplementary Fundamental Law, 117, 139_42 Article II 118-20, 127, 173, 177

Mustashar al Daula, Yusif Khan, 154 Mu'tamin al-Mulk, Hasan Khan, 52, 71 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 84 Muzaffar al-Din Shah Qajar, 9, 21, 23, Rushdiyya, Hajj Mirza Hasan, 54 31, 38, 43, 89, 94, 96, 98, 99, 106

na'ib-i'amm, 12,24, 26

na'ib-i khass, 12, 26, 27 Na 'ib al-Saltana, Kamran Mirza, 56,

136, 158, 171, 187 Na'ini, Mirza Muhammad Husain, 30, 180, 183-5, 194 Najafi, Aga of Isfahan, 25-6 Najafi, Shaikh Ja'far, 14, 102-3, 159, 172, 186 Najmabadi, Shaikh Hadi, 57, 66 Nasr al-Din Shah Qajar, 4, 23-4, 28, 31-2, 43, 67, 204 Nasir al-Mulk, Abu'1 Qasim Khan, 32, 45, 49, 52, 71, 82, 102, 108, 111,

143, 145

Nasr al-Saltana, 43

National Bank, 109, 143, 163, 186 Naus, Joseph, 46-50, 52, 59, 61, 63, 64, 71, 73, 75, 78-80, 108, 110, 198

Nazim al-Islam Kirmani, Mirza Muhammad, 21, 39, 59, 60, 67-9, 78, 80, 82, 115, 165 Newspapers, 110-11 Ni matallahi order of Sufis, 19-20 Nizam al-Mulk, 33 Nur' Ali Shah, 20 Nurallah, Aqa, 102, 187 Nuri, Mirza Muhammad, 58 Nuri, Shaikh Fazlallah, see Fazlallah,

Shaikh

Sad al-Daula, Mirza Javad Khan, 60, 71, 105-7, 109, 116, 145-6, 176-8.

Sadr al Ulama, Mirza Muhammad, 13, 57,80, 137, 153-4, 162. 166, 168,

170

Saif al-Din, 70, 79 Salar al-Daula, 71 Samsam al-Saltana, Najaf Quli Khan,

172, 186

Sani' al-Daula, Murtaza Quli Khan, 52, 71, 95, 100-3, 105-9, 111, 116-7, 119-20, 136-7, 150, 166, 168, 171.

199

Sani' Hazrat, 149, 175, 187, 189, 193

Sardar-i 'Asad, 'Ali Quli Khan, 186 Shahrudi, Hajj Muhammad Taqi, 45 Shaikh al-Ra'is, 22 Shaikhism, 21 Shalfurush, Hajj Muhammad 'Ali, 94 Shams al-Din Beg, 73, 74, 78

Shapshal Khan, 145 Sharabiyani, 57 Shari at Madar of Tabriz, 103

sharia

Shaikh Fazlallah's views on, 118-20, 125-30, 165, 178-85

and the urf law, 7-9, 17

and judicial reform, 139-40, 152-5

Sharif Kashani, Haji Shaikh Mahdi, 60, Shirazi, Mirza Hasan, 13, 28, 31, 41, 57,

Pan-Islam, 67 Parvarish, 110

Shushtari, Sayyid Husain, 158

Qa'im Magam, Abu'1 Qasim, 26

Siyahatnama-yi Ibrahim Big, 68, 80

Sual va javab, 28 Sufism, 19-21, 22

Sir-i Israfil, 110, 132 Surraya, 110

245

Tammadun, 110, 131, 133 Tanbih al-umma wa tanzih al-milla, 180 Taqi Harati, Sayyid, 118 Tagizada, Sayyid Hasan, 116, 119, 136, 149-50, 155-6, 190-1, 193, 197,

199

Tobacco Concession, opposition to, 41-

2,58,59

Tuhfat al-muluk, 26 Tupkhana, Maidan, demonstration in,

145-7

tuyul, 38, 115-6

Taba'i al-istibdad, 69, 81 Tabataba'i, Sayyid Abu'l Qasim, 70,

74, 101, 170, 177, 180

'urf law, 7-8, 17 Uskui, 'Abd al-Razzaq, 94 Usulis, 19

Tabataba'i, Sayyid Muhammad, 3, 13, 30, 39, 57-9, 61, 63-4, 70-2, 88, 93, Vakil al-Daula, Mirza Muhammad 96-7, 101-8, 114-6, 118, 120-2, Khan, 92 124, 135-7, 139, 144, 147-8, 151, vali' ahd, see Muhammad 'Ali Shah 189, 192, 196-8 vaqf, income from, 35-6 influences on 65-9 Vazir Humayun, Mahdi Khan, 136 ideological viewpoint 1905, 67-9, 83 Vazir Makhsus, 40, 115, 122, 137 and the adalatkhana, 78 and the majlis-i adalat, 78, 81-2, 86

in the Majlis, 111, 119, 149, 157, 163 and the anjumans, 157 in the coup of 1908, 161-2 in Mashhad, 166, 168, 170 returns to Tehran, 191 Tabatabai, Sayyid Muhammad Rafti,

Yak kalima, 5, 81

Yazdi, Sayyid 'Ali, 89, 144-7, 159, 168,

171, 175, 196-7

Yazdi, Sayyid Muhammad, 159 Zafar al-Saltana, 72, 158

29

Zahir al-Daula, Mirza 'Ali Khan, 104,

70, 98-101, 104

zakat, 12, 26, 37

Tabataba'i, Sayyid Muhammad Sadiq, Tabataba'i, Sayyid Sadiq, 65-6 Tabataba'i Yazdi, Sayyid Muhammad

Kazim, 14, 62, 121, 123, 188 Tadhkirat al-ghafil wa irshad al-jahil,

178

Tafrishi, Sayyid 'Ali Akbar, 115, 146

Tafrishi, Sayyid Muhammad, 36, 57-8 Taimurtash, 'Abd al-Hasan, 156 Talibov, 'Abd al-Rahman, 5-6, 129

213

Zanjani, 'Abu Talib, 146 Zanjani, Shaikh Ibrahim, 187 Zanjani, Zain al-'Abidin, 70, 115 Zhu'l Riyasatain, Mirza Ahmad Kirmani, 93

zill allah, 16, 23-24 Zill al-Sultan, Masu'd Mirza, 32, 143, 146, 159-61 Ziya al-Mulk, 159

78-9,96

Nuri, Shaikh Mahdi, 70, 105, 190

Political parties, development of, 1056, 149-51, 156, 190-1

INDEX

204

Shuster, Morgan, 190 Sikhat al-Islam, 176-7 Simnani, Muhammad Tagi, 91 Sipah Salar, Mirza Muhsin Khan, 4, 9,

65.76-7

Univ.-Bibl,

Bamberg