Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics: From the Tributary System to the Belt and Road Initiative 2020048158, 2020048159, 9780367751074, 9780367751067, 9781003161004

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Information
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of abbreviations
1 Hegemony and Theories
1.1 “hegemony” in Western and Chinese Definitions
1.2 The West and the Rest
References
2 The Tributary System and Hegemony
2.1 The Philosophical Sources of the Tributary System
2.1.1 Chinese Folk Religion (民间信仰)
2.1.2 Confucianism (儒家)
2.1.3 Taoism (道家)
2.1.4 Legalism (法家)
2.1.5 Mohism (墨家)
2.2 The World Order of Imperial China
2.2.1 Tianxia (天下)
2.2.2 Hua–yi Distinction (华夷之辨)
2.3 Definition and Structure of the Tributary System
2.4 Hegemonic Dynamics of the Tributary System
2.4.1 Power
2.4.2 Consent
2.4.3 Legitimacy and Prestige
2.4.4 Hierarchy
2.4.5 Wuwei
2.5 Conclusion
References
3 The Belt and Road Initiative and Hegemony
3.1 The Road to Belt and Road
3.1.1 Century of Humiliation (百年国耻)
3.1.2 Maoism (毛泽东思想)
3.1.3 Nationalism (爱国主义)
3.1.4 Rejuvenation (复兴)
3.2 The Belt and Road Initiative
3.2.1 Framework
3.2.2 Motives
3.2.3 Routes
3.2.4 Implementation
3.2.5 Risks
3.3 Hegemonic Dynamics of the Belt and Road Initiative
3.3.1 Power
3.3.2 Consent
3.3.3 Legitimacy
3.3.4 Ideology
3.3.5 Institutions
3.4 Conclusion
References
4 Toward a New Tributary System
4.1 The Neo-Tributary System
References
Index

Citation preview

Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics

Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics compares the historical relationship of China with its neighbors to the developing trajectory of the Belt and Road Initiative, and asks what this tells us about the kind of hegemon China is likely to become. China is going to play a more active and decisive role in the international community and there is much uncertainty about how China will handle its responsibilities and interests. The ambiguous and assertive Belt and Road Initiative is a matter of special concern in this aspect. The Tributary System, which provides concrete evidence of how Chinese dynasties handled relations with foreigners, is a useful reference point in trying to understand its twenty-​first century developments. This is particularly true, because after the turbulence of the “Century of Humiliation” and the Maoist Era, China seems to be explicitly re-​embracing its history and its pre-​revolutionary identity. Confucius, one of the biggest targets of the Cultural Revolution, is being rehabilitated alongside Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism and other ideologies and philosophies suppressed in the Mao era. Doğan analyzes the extent to which China’s current approach to foreign relations resembles its earlier models. Grounded in “hegemony” as an analytic lens, this book provides an innovative study of the power generated by the global rise in China. It will be a valuable resource for scholars and students of Chinese foreign policy and international relations and serve as a benchmark for further studies. Asım Doğan lived and engaged in business with his own company in Hong Kong and Mainland China for 18 years, and has an MA in Public Management from The Chinese University of Hong Kong and a PhD in Political Science and International Relations.

Routledge Contemporary China Series

Doing Labor Activism in South China The Complicity of Uncertainty Darcy Pan Chinese Energy Companies in Africa Implications for the Foreign Policy of an Authoritarian State Kasandra Behrndt-​Eriksen China’s International Socialization of Political Elites in the Belt and Road Initiative Theodor Tudoroiu Regional Inequality in Transitional China Haifeng Liao, Dennis Wei and Li Huang Modern Art for a Modern China Yiyan Wang Ethnic Minorities, Media and Participation in Hong Kong Creative and Tactical Belonging Lisa Y.M. Leung The Politics of Waste Management in Greater China Environmental Governance and Public Participation in Transition Natalie Wai Man Wong Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics From the Tributary System to the Belt and Road Initiative Asım Doğan

For more information about this series, please visit: https://​www.routledge. com/​Routledge-​Contemporary-​China-​Series/​book-​series/​SE0768

Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics From the Tributary System to the Belt and Road Initiative Asım Doğan

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Asım Doğan The right of Asım Doğan to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data Names: Doğan, Asım, author. Title: Hegemony with Chinese characteristics: from the tributary system to the Belt and Road Initiative/Asım Doğan. Description: London; New York: Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge contemporary China series | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020048158 (print) | LCCN 2020048159 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367751074 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367751067 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003161004 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Hegemony–China–History. | China–Foreign relations. | Tributary system (China) | Yi dai yi lu (Initiative: China) Classification: LCC DS740.4 D64 2021 (print) | LCC DS740.4 (ebook) | DDC 327.51–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020048158 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020048159 ISBN: 978-​0-​367-​75107-​4  (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-75106-7 (pbk) ISBN: 978-​1-​003-​16100-​4  (ebk) Typeset in Galliard by Newgen Publishing UK

Contents

List of abbreviations 

vi

1 Hegemony and theories 

1

2 The Tributary System and hegemony 

9

1.1  “Hegemony” in Western and Chinese definitions  1 1.2  The West and the rest  4 References  7

2.1  The philosophical sources of the Tributary System  9 2.2  The world order of Imperial China  39 2.3  Definition and structure of the Tributary System  52 2.4  Hegemonic dynamics of the Tributary System  61 2.5  Conclusion  69 References  72

3 The Belt and Road Initiative and hegemony 

79

3.1  The road to Belt and Road  79 3.2  The Belt and Road Initiative  94 3.3  Hegemonic dynamics of the Belt and Road Initiative  110 3.4  Conclusion  123 References  126

4 Toward a new Tributary System 

130

4.1  The Neo-​Tributary System  130 References  146

Index 

147

newgenprepdf

List of abbreviations

ABC AIIB ASEAN BOC BRI BRICS CCB CCP CDB EIBC EU HSBC ICBC IMF NDB SRF WTO

Agricultural Bank of China Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank Association of South East Asian Nations Bank of China Belt and Road Initiative Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, China, South Africa China Construction Bank Chinese Communist Party China Development Bank Export-​Import Bank of China European Union Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Industrial and Commercial Bank of China International Monetary Fund New Development Bank Silk Road Fund World Trade Organization

1  Hegemony and theories

1.1  “Hegemony” in Western and Chinese definitions In social sciences some specific terms can evoke different meanings or imply different nuances in different societies from specific cultural backgrounds and historical experiences. “Hegemony” is such a term. The exact meaning of “hegemony” in the modern international academic community and in Chinese language and culture has differences in nuances. Before examining the Tributary System and Belt and Road Initiative, the nuances in definitions of “hegemony” must be clarified to comprehend its exact meaning and differences according to the international actors. “Hegemony”, “hēgemonia” and “hēgemōn” initially originated from the Greek word “hēgeisthai”, which means “to lead”. “Hēgemonia” literally means “leadership”, and it is derived from the word “hēgemōn”, which means “leader”. “Hēgemonia” was first used in the English language in the mid-​16th century and finally evolved into today’s final form we use: “Hegemony” (Kaymak, 2016: 66; Agnew, 2005: 20; Scruton, 1996: 219; McLean, 1996: 218). “Hēgemonia” is compared with two more words in the Greek language by Triepel, a prominent scholar in the related field. According to Triepel (1938: 343), all three have similar outcomes in terms of meaning, but with different intonations. One is “arche”, which carries the meaning of a stronger power relation compared with “hēgemonia”. It is interpreted as “sovereignty”. The other one is “dynamis”, which is used in quite close meaning with “arche”. The two words stress stronger power relations, while “hēgemonia” has a relatively loose meaning, interpreted as “supremacy”. Hegemony, as a term in the social sciences, is often explained with the word “domination” as well, in most of the sources. Rosamond (2016) describes it as “the dominance of one group over another, by legitimating norms and ideas”. In political sciences it is defined as domination of a state or a group (Bealey, 1999: 153) or simply “domination of one state over another” (Safire, 1978: 324), respectively, in different sources. Since “domination” is about the capability of the dominant actor, it is a result of power relations between weak and strong (Evans and Newnham, 1990: 153), though it does not give any clues about the nature of that relation, like how the domination is set up by the strong over the weak.

2  Hegemony and theories In contemporary usage, hegemony refers to a softer form of “domination”. Domination may include coercion by use of material power (Shafritz, 1993: 333). When the United States started the Marshall Plan in 1947, the aim was to help war-​torn Western Europe to recover and prevent possible further advancement of Soviet invasion. Yet, this was not the only result and aim of the plan. Through the Marshall Plan, the US established a matured supremacy over Western Europe. At this initial stage of the US supremacy, the Western European countries cherished the plan, as they needed the provided funds to recover from war destruction. In the later stages, the main incentive for Western Europe to accept the continuation of supremacy was their dependency on the US currency, leadership and power. US possession of nuclear weapons, for instance, was never a reason for Western Europe to accept US supremacy in the Cold War era. That is because US supremacy in Western Europe did not depend on exercising power but mostly on “leadership”. In the same period, on the other hand, the Soviet regime was establishing its supremacy over a different region: Eastern Europe. In Hungary, Soviets sent troops to stop the economic and political liberal reforms in 1956. When it invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, by troops formed by neighboring communist states, the supremacy was again set up by coercion, and it was called “the fraternal invasion” (Robertson, 2002: 78). Therefore, supremacy in the two camps had different characteristics. The US supremacy was in the form of “leadership”, built on “consent”, which can be named “hegemony”, while the Soviet supremacy was differing with its characteristics of “coercion”, as can be described best by the term “domination”. In the disciplines of politics and international relations, “hegemony” is a fundamental term, and has become the subject of many theories. One of the foremost theories of hegemony in this context is the Neo-​Gramscian theory. Neo-​Gramscian theory is attributed to the father of the critical school, Robert Cox (Moolakkatu, 2009: 439). Cox defines the term “hegemony” in the tradition of the Frankfurt School. He borrows Gramscian ideas and terminology of “hegemony” from the disciplines of politics and sociology, to create a comprehensive theory of “hegemony” in the discipline of international relations. Cox (1992:  140) describes hegemony in international relations not just as rough supremacy of a stronger power over a weak one, but functioning in a more complicated way as using coercive power together with international institutions and ideological principles. The principles are meant to influence the whole international system, to bind the members in the system with the hegemonic rules and obtain their “consent”. In Cox’s definition of hegemony, the domination which solely depends on material power is not enough to set up a hegemonic system. Besides, the hegemon must get “consent” of the dominated states as well. Thus, material power, consent, international institutions and ideology are key factors in the Neo-​Gramscian definition of hegemony. In the Neo-​Gramscian definition, hegemony is not just a type of power relation between the states, but also a system of global economy working with a dominant mode of production and influencing other countries, getting connected

Hegemony and theories  3 with the sub-​production levels. It is at the same time a special kind of international socializing network that connects the classes from different countries. That is why international hegemony is a structure arising on a social, economic and political trivet. Hegemony cannot endure in the absence of any of them. All social, economic and political components must be working together to create an ideal structure of hegemonic system. Besides, there must be civil structures that operate beyond the nation-​states, supporting the hegemonic system as a whole, by imposing its values on the member states. This can be done by universal sets of norms, institutions and mechanisms. Setting up such a huge and complex structure is a difficult undertaking and can only be done by the countries that have had extensive social and economic revolutions, which have changed domestic economic and political dynamics, carrying huge potential to influence the outside world as well (Cox and Sinclair, 2016: 137). Ideology in a hegemonic system is a crucial factor that functions not only to manufacture consent, but also to prevent counter-​hegemonic movements. Formation of these movements is prevented by hegemonic educational institutions, like universities and international organizations. They create local elites with domesticated minds, eliminate counter movements and ideas, as well as help the hegemon to convert all these into eliciting consent, if not targeting further steps like assimilation (Cox, 1983: 173). International institutions, ideologies, intellectuals, media, universities, international non-​ governmental organizations (NGOs), international corporations and many other means of hegemonic tools are all created and designed to generate the consent of the dominated societies and governments. However, this peaceful framework does not mean that hard power does not have a function in the system, or it will never be used. Neo-​Gramscian hegemony does not deny the role and importance of material power. On the contrary, coercion and consent are considered to be the two main pillars of the hegemonic system; they are mutually needed in creating the hegemonic system. The idea of using coercion and consent to create hegemony originates from the Italian medieval political advisor Machiavelli. Machiavelli advised the “Prince” to be furnished by two managerial instruments, coercion and consent. He resembled the political power of the “Centaur”, a half-​human, half-​animal creature. The Centaur represented how coercion and consent would work together. The prince was advised to not hesitate to use either of them, whenever needed. Coercion is always innate in the system, but it is only utilized if there is a challenge to the system (Cox and Sinclair, 2016: 127). Most terms have different interpretations and nuances in different cultural and historical backgrounds, and likewise the term “hegemony” in the Chinese language also carries some connotations added by Chinese historical experiences. The Chinese ancient Warring States Period and early modern history are often described as the arena of brutal repression by tyrants. The ruthless, repressive, tyrannical rule and endless power struggle between the war lords in these periods is often associated with the term “hegemony”. Further, it has strong psychological connections with unjust treatment; China also faced in the “Century of

4  Hegemony and theories Humiliation” by Western powers. The common characteristics of these periods are injustice and tyranny, demonstrated by the powerful states. “Hegemony” in the Chinese language and in daily usage does not overlap with the Western definition. The Chinese definition contains “immoral” nuances. This is the reason Chinese leadership, including Mao, has particularly stressed the point that they are not going to be a hegemon and they will always stand against hegemonic rules and aims (Nordin, 2016: 207). The modern scholarly definition of hegemony is widely accepted to be associated with “leadership” and “consent” and it is presented in the Chinese language with the two characters 霸权 (bà quán) which literally mean “domination and influence” (Denisowski, 1997). However, when the character 霸 (bà) is taken alone, it does not have that simple and neutral meaning. In the Chinese language 霸(bà) alone means “tyrant, lord, feudal chief, to rule by force, to usurp”. Thus, in Chinese understanding, being a “hegemon” is simply being an “immoral, brutal tyrant” and setting hegemony is “setting domination in a ruthless tyrannical way” (Cunningham-​Cross and Callahan, 2011: 367). On the other hand, while the Chinese government and scholars defend that China will never be a hegemon, this should not lead the reader to think that China will not seek supremacy and domination in its relations with other countries. This approach can be interpreted as Chinese authorities claiming that they do not have the intention to be “immoral tyrants”, but that does not mean they will not be seeking “hegemony” in the Western meaning, which is in the form of “leadership” depending on “consent”. The objection of Chinese authorities is to its moral implications, not to itself. In this book the term “hegemony” is used in the Neo-​Gramscian meaning of leadership, depending on consent of the dominated parties, while the material power is essential but kept aside to assure the system is running.

1.2  The West and the rest Understanding Chinese hegemony does not only require examining the verbal meanings and nuances, and its differences to the modern Western definition, but also the interpretation of historical events, application of terms and theories of hegemony to Chinese society should be carried out prudently. Like all modern disciplines of social sciences, the discipline of international relations originated from the West, deeply contributed to by the scholars from the USA (Biltekin, 2015: 570). It is important for this fact to be boldly underlined if the topic is not about Western countries or societies, just like this book’s subject country. Most of the theories that have originated from Western countries cannot effectively explain the phenomenon which took place in the rest of the world (Ibid.: 517). Since the ancient Greek city-​ states and the records of Thucydides (460–​ 400BC), “power” and “power relations” determine the major matters of international relations (IR). Thucydides, in his records of the Peloponnesian Wars (431–​404BC), he explains the conflict between Athens and Sparta as the result

Hegemony and theories  5 of power competition: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta” (1998: 49). Thucydides’ observations more than two millenia earlier are supposed to provide modern scholars with some universal principles, valid for all times. This is the essential approach of positivism in social sciences. The Western world experienced a big intellectual clash between conservatism and modern philosophers in the “Enlightenment Era”. The denial of most of the traditional, religious and cultural values in social life and especially in education and intellectual fields was the result of that big struggle. The Europeans suffered too much during the centuries of feudal darkness. The harsh attitude of modernists could be understood in this aspect. However, this big struggle may have led them to overreact against everything old and overemphasize everything new. Positivism and Empiricism developed in the Enlightenment period as the new guiding principles to lead humankind, replacing old values, especially religious ones. The founder of sociology, Comte, suggested that the methodology of physical sciences must be used in sociology (Bostanoğlu, 2008:  44). In this trend, social sciences separated first from religion and then from philosophy to create their own independent field. Social scientists have been trying to detect the universal scientific principles of the social phenomenon, which is valid in all times and conditions. Positivism is a method to find the universally valid principles. Nevertheless, analyzing social events in the methodology of natural sciences received some objections later. According to the alternative methodology, the social sciences examine special phenomena that have exclusive relations with its aims and meanings, and therefore they must be analyzed by exclusive methods, rather than positivist methods (Ibid.: 42). The discussion between these two methodologies has not yet ended, but the second one, in the definitions of hermeneutics or historicism, has gained wide acceptance. Kuhnian approach to the issue suggests that scientifically all results have historical dimensions, which means that a specific result may be correct today, while tomorrow it may not. In science, subjectivity is inevitable. Science examines the phenomenon or objects of “now and here” and both of them are built in historical processes, which means they do not carry the characteristics of timelessness, predictability and accuracy, as positivism suggests or looks for. Humans’ social actions are loaded with values and therefore cannot be examined like an object. The loaded values and meanings are affected by time and conditions. Similarly, the social and political values of different societies, which have developed in different times and conditions, may not create universally applicable rules. The rules derived from one phenomenon may not be suitable to be applied to all. In the light of quantum physics, it is revealed that Newtonian sharpness and predictability is questioned even in natural sciences (Ibid.: 58–​77). Thus, social sciences should not be approached as natural sciences and vice versa. Gramsci strictly refused the applications of pure positivism in the social sciences. He claims that the application of pure positivism to social sciences means

6  Hegemony and theories excluding humans from the historical context, which will lead to delusions (Okur, 2010: 38). In this way he is in contradiction with Marx. A generation of US international relations researchers has grown up with Kuhnian ideas as well (Cox and Sinclair, 2016: 13). Critical theory and the neo-​ Gramscian perspective advocate hermeneutics and historicism. Cox and Sinclair state that ontology and values are changing in each country’s historical journey (Ibid.: 29). No social discipline can be independent of the environment it is born in. In his famous statement, Cox (1981: 128) argues that theories are for somebody and some aims, which means that theories are not free from the social, intellectual and political conditions of the place where they were born. Cox and Sinclair (Ibid.: 57) describe historicism and positivism as the two main methods of interpreting history, and they choose to use historicism. Generally speaking, critical theories and Cox’s approach of hegemony are built on historicism (Cox, 1981: 129). Cox’s definition of hegemony can briefly be described as taking the interaction between a particular process into consideration, focusing on changes in the production domain and abusive nature of the social relations and interpreting the whole as “continuing creation of new forms”, rather than an unchangeable and explicit approach (Bieler and Morton, 2003: 86). Historicism is a theoretical approach emerging from a Marxist-​ Hegelian tradition. It is the most significant methodological characteristic of the Neo-​ Gramscian theory of hegemony, in general for all approaches of critical schools as well (Devetak, 2013: 220). Historicism is a way of interpretation and it is commonly attributed to German philosophers such as Wilhelm Diltley (1833–​1911), Ernst Troeltsch (1865–​ 1923) and Friedrich Meinecke (1862–​ 1954) (Rand, 1964:  503). It suggests that all social phenomena that are related to humans, like culture, language, history, politics and so on, are fundamentally history-​ oriented (Troeltsch, 1923: 107). That means the human mind is not the product of a permanent, fixed, intangible nature. On the contrary, it is built by changeable historical social relations, and therefore it is also changeable itself (Maurice, 1988: 134). According to Cox and Sinclair (2016:  7), the positivist approach cannot explain the changing dynamics of the events as it relies on observations, rather than history. It is observing a dynamic incident in constant and persistent change, which means it is also going to be changed in the future. Thus, what positivism is going to observe is a small part of the whole incident, an incident which has not yet been completed and which will not be completed as long as the social relations exist. Positivism can be useful only when it is defined between certain times and within historical boundaries. Historicism, in Cox’s understanding, is useful when it comes to discovering the regularities in certain periods of history, which are meaningful in the context of that period. However, Cox is unique in the methodology of using the positivist approach in the cases of persistency, and historicism in the cases of divergence (Ibid.: 8). All these facts prove that while a society is examined, especially a very different society like that of China, it is crucial to remember the fact that Western methodology and theories may not fully overlap to explain or to understand the

Hegemony and theories  7 actual dynamics of the phenomenon in that different society. The efforts to create local international relations theories in various countries as well as in China are partially related to this reason. Chinese society did not have the same historical, social, political and intellectual experience as Western societies had. Hence, while applying the terms, definitions and theories of hegemony to Chinese society, an analist must be very cautious to analyze the case exclusively. In the next chapters, these facts are going to guide and be the basis of the analysis of this book. While Chinese society and political events are being evaluated, special attributions will be given to its unique historical, social and political experience. Each hegemonic system will be covered with its own historical context and the philosophical developments behind it. Besides, while analyzing the features of Chinese hegemony in the past and the present, the differences that do not match with the modern hegemony theories and definitions will be emphasized separately.

References Agnew, J. A. (2005). Hegemony:  The New Shape of Global Power. Philadelphia:  Temple University Press. Bealey, F. (1999). The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science. Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers. Bieler, A. and Morton, A. D. (2003). Theoretical and Methodological Challenges of Neo-​ Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy. Retrieved from International Gramsci Society:  www.internationalgramscisociety.org/​resources/​online_​articles/​ artickles/​bieler_​morton.shtml (accessed October 5, 2018). Biltekin, G. (2015). Özgün Teori İnşası ve Batı-​Dışı Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri. In R. Gözen, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri (2nd Ed.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 517–​564. Bostanoğlu, B. (2008). Türkiye-​ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası. İstanbul: İmge Yayınevi. Cox, R. W. (1981). Social Forces, States and World Orders:  Beyond the International Relations Theory. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10(2): 126–​155. —​—​—​. (1983). Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method. Millennium Journal of International Studies, 12(2): 162–​175. —​—​—​. (1992). Towards a Post-​Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldoun. In J. N. Rosenau, E.-​O. Czempiel and S. Smith (Eds.), Governance Without Government:  Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 132–​159. Cox, R. W. and Sinclair, T. J. (2016). Dünya Düzenine Yaklaşımlar (E. Çınar and S. Çelik, Trans.). İstanbul: Röle Akademik Yayıncılık. Cunningham-​Cross, L. and Callahan, W. A. (2011). Ancient Chinese Power, Modern Chinese Thought. Chinese Journal of International Politics, 4(4): 349–​374. Denisowski, P. A. (1997). CC Cedict Wiki (MDBG, Producer). Retrieved from https://​ cdict.net (accessed October 15, 2018). Devetak, R. (2013). Eleştirel Teori. In S. Burchill, A. Linklater, R. Devetak, T. Nardin, M. Paterson, C. Reus-​Smit, J. True and K. Povey (Eds.), Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri (M. Ağcan and A. Aslan, Trans., 4th ed.). İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 217–​246. Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1990). The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions. London: Simon and Schuster.

8  Hegemony and theories Kaymak, M. (2016). Hegemonya Tartışmaları Işığında İngiliz ve Amerikan Hegemonyaları: Yönlendirici Hegemonyadan Kural Koyucu Hegemonyaya. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 34(1): 63–​92. Maurice, F. A. (1988). Gramsci and History of Dialectical Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press. McLean, I. (1996). The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. New  York:  Oxford University Press. Moolakkatu, J. S. (2009). Robert W. Cox and Critical Theory of International Relations. International Studies, 46(4): 439–​456. Nordin, A. (2016). Hegemony in Chinese: Ba in Chinese international relations. In L. König and B. Chaudhuri, In Politics of the “Other” in India and China. London: Routledge, 205–​213. Okur, M. A. (2010). Emperyalizm, Hegemonya, İmparatorluk: Tarihsel Dünya Düzenleri ve Irak’ın İşgali. Ankara: Binyıl Yayınevi. Rand, C. G. (1964). Two Meanings of Historicism in the Writings of Dilthey, Troeltsch and Meinecke. Journal of History of Ideas, 25(4): 503–​518. Robertson, D. (2002). A Dictionary of Modern Politics (3rd ed.). London and New York: Europa Publications. Rosamond, B. (2016). Hegemony (E.  B. Inv, Producer). Retrieved from Encyclopedia Britannica: www.britannica.com/​topic/​hegemony (accessed October 8, 2018). Safire, W. (1978). Safire’s New Political Dictionary. New York: Random House Inc. Scruton, R. (1996). A Dictionary of Political Thought (2nd ed.). London:  MacMillian Publishers Ltd. Shafritz, J. M. (1993). A Dictionary of 20th Century World Politics (1st ed.). Ontario: Fitzhenry & Whiteside Ltd. Thucydides. (1998). The Peloponnesian War (S. Lattimore, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. Triepel, H. (1938). The Hegemony:  A Book of Leading States. Stuttgart and Berlin: W. Kohlhammer Verlag. Troeltsch, E. (1923). Christian Thought (F. Kugael, Trans.). London:  University of London Press.

2  The Tributary System and hegemony

The Chinese imperial era formally ended with the proclamation of the Republic of China (中华民国) “Zhōnghuá Mínguó” (1912–​1949). However, Western political thought had started to influence China earlier. The First Opium War (1839) (第一次鸦片战争) “Dìyīcì Yāpiàn Zhànzhēng” and the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) (南京条约) “Nánjīng Tiáoyuē”, which ended the war, are considered to be the beginning of the modern age in China. In this book references to “Imperial China” will refer to the long period before these events. The Tributary System is a name given to Imperial China’s specific conduct of foreign relations, based on and developed in its imperial political experience and exclusive cultural values. Hegemony is an aspect of a country’s foreign relations and it has deep connections with political philosophy, especially with how that particular society has been defining “self” and “others”. In order to comprehend the Tributary System, the sources of Chinese political tradition and the perception of world order in Imperial China must be well understood. Only in this way can the exclusiveness of the imperial foreign policies and the system be revealed. Analyzing the historical and philosophical roots of the Tributary System is a method of historicism that advocates evaluating each social phenomenon in its own special conditions.

2.1  The philosophical sources of the Tributary System Institutional and philosophical evolutions in a society are customarily too complicated to explain with apparent reasons and results. The complete and exact sources of a certain phenomenon are ideationally hard to fully reveal. Political tradition or philosophy gets its meaning, structure and shape in a continuous evolution in time. During this evolution there will be myriads of factors affecting it. Chinese imperial political tradition is not an exception. It is not possible to fully describe and define the causes behind the several thousand years of political tradition in a few elements. However, analyzing its main dynamics will provide valuable insight into how the political philosophy evolved over time and how it created the Chinese manner of foreign relations, in particular the Tributary System.

10  The Tributary System and hegemony Cultures, religions and political philosophies do not develop separately in the course of history. Political philosophies and religions are part of the culture. The sources that create them all emerge in the historical experience of society. Cultures, religions and political philosophies influence and are influenced by each other. This interaction creates an endless evolutionary path. Chinese political philosophy emerged and developed gradually, along with the Chinese culture and religions. Thus, Chinese political philosophy, which is the philosophical source of the Tributary System, can be explained extensively if the historical experience, the main beliefs and the main philosophical schools are analyzed. Chinese folk religion, from which the Chinese political tradition and philosophy have emerged and developed, is especially a major contributor to the path leading to the imperial Chinese Tributary System. 2.1.1  Chinese folk religion (民间信仰) The emergence of Chinese civilization can be traced back to the third millennium BC, though settlement had begun and simple communities had formed much earlier in the Yellow River (黄河) “Huáng Hé” basin, which has been contemplated to be the cradle of Chinese civilization (中华文明) “Zhōnghuá Wénmíng”. Oracle Bones Scripts (甲骨文) “Jiǎ Gū Wén”, the oldest written evidence of Chinese scripts found until now, date back to the middle of Shang Dynasty (商朝) “Shāng Cháo” (1600–​1046BC). However, the emergence of the writing system likely occurred much earlier, maybe in the Xia Dynasty (夏朝) “Xià Cháo” period (2070–​1600BC), or even earlier, as the oracle bones scripts show that the writing system had already attained a degree of maturity at that time (Hei, Zhao and Ma, 2016: 62). The beginning of Chinese political order is quite interwoven with the primitive religious system of the Chinese folk religion (民間宗教) “Mínjiān Zōngjiào”. Chinese folk religion is further considered to be the main source and base of the entire Chinese culture and political system (Clart, 2014: 407). Chinese political and cultural identity is intertwined with the principles and development of folk religion. The deities and semi-​deities of this primitive religion are believed to be the old prehistoric tribal leaders, military or cultural heroes or a deified respected person who turned into part of this religion in time (Overmyer, 2009: 36–​37). Chinese folk religion, having no common accepted name in history, is a quite complicated primitive religion. Being far from a mature belief system, it presents a combination of a variety of sects or indigenous cults (Clart, 2014:  393). It has many branches with complicated, unsystematized backgrounds and philosophies (Fan and Chen, 2013: 5–​6). However, there are several theological, cosmological and moral common concepts binding them together and displaying the essence of the beliefs. These are the Heaven (上帝), “Shàngdì”, or (天) “Tiān” as source of morality and creation; Qi (气) “Qì” as the energy that enlivens the cosmos; ancestor worship (敬祖) “Jìngzǔ”; ethical justice (报应) “Bàoyìng”; fate (命运) “Mìngyùn”; fateful coincidence (缘分) “Yuánfèn” (Ibid.:  21–​23) and

The Tributary System and hegemony  11 the foundation of order in the universe in polarity, Yin-​Yang (阴阳) “Yīnyáng” (Adler, 2011: 13). The oldest known Chinese historical political leaders and religious deities are the same figures. Therefore, it would be more comprehensive to trace the historical development of Chinese political thought back to the emergence of Chinese political philosophy and inter-​tribal relations. This will also enlighten the background of the concepts and beliefs of philosophers, which will emerge later, like Confucius, Laozi and so on. The beginning of the political order in the Yellow River basin is assumed to have started with legendary, semi-​deity figures:  the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors (三皇五帝) “Sān Huáng Wǔ Dì” date back to circa 2852–​2070BC (Hucker, 1995: 22). This is even earlier than the first known Chinese state, the Xia Dynasty. The Three Sovereigns were believed to be gods and semi-​god kings or deified kings that created humankind and initiated life on Earth, introducing some basic skills to improve life on Earth. Alternatively called the “Sage Kings”, the five kings are listed as the Yellow Emperor (皇帝) “Huáng Dì”, Zhuānxū (顓頊), Emperor Kù (嚳), Emperor Yáo (堯) and Emperor Shùn (舜) in the “Records of the Grand Historian” (史記) “Shǐjì”, written by the famous ancient Chinese historian, Sima Qian (司马迁) “Sīmǎ Qiān” (145–​85BC). According to Chinese legend, these figures were the ancient rulers that made great contributions to the emergence and development of Chinese identity, society and political philosophy. They are believed to be the initiators of farming, writing, using fire, medicine, calendars, building houses, producing silk and so on (Morton and Lewis, 2005: 14). Sage Kings later were presented to Chinese society as the ideal rulers, furnished with great morality, legendary wisdom, benevolence and power and were supposed to be the ideal model of sovereignty over their people. Among these rulers the most famous and, according to Chinese legends, their first ancestor, the first king and at the same time the first person who started to use Chinese scripts, is the legendary Yellow Emperor (皇帝) “Huáng Dì” (Hei, Zhao and Ma, 2016: 255). The Yellow Emperor had great influence at the beginning of Chinese political tradition. According to Sima Qian (1993a: 9), in the “Records of the Grand Historian”, the Yellow Emperor was a tribal leader at the heart of the cradle of Chinese civilization, the Yellow River basin. According to some legends he was of nomadic origin, that is, from northwest of present-​day China, and had eliminated his rival, the Red Emperor (炎帝) “Yán Dì” who led a settled clan. The Yellow Emperor was the first person to unite the divided small clans under his flag. His administration was so favorable to the public that he could transcend the differences between the nomadic and settled tribes, creating a common identity by strengthening the sense of belonging within his administration. Both the Yellow and Red Emperors are considered to be common ancestors of all of the tribes formed from that common identity, even today. He marks the starting point of the formation of Chinese identity (Dillon, 2017: 7). This common identity in later dynasties was to be strengthened, transformed and developed until the present day.

12  The Tributary System and hegemony Following the legendary Five Emperors, another ancient ruler who had a great impact on the formation of Chinese political thought was to take the stage, the legendary tribal leader, Yu the Great (大禹) “Dà Yū”. Yu the Great was the last archetype of the semi-​deity kings. According to uncertain information, Great Yu was the founder of Xia Dynasty (夏朝) “Xià Cháo” (2070–​1600BC), the first known semi-​legendary dynasty of China (Mittag and Mutschler, 2010: 532). Great Yu’s biggest success was to control the water flow of the Yellow River. The Yellow River’s floods were causing huge damage for Chinese people who were mainly peasant farmers. During the long history of China, floods have been one of the major natural calamities that an emperor and the citizens worry about. Great Yu’s successful struggle with the Yellow River’s floods gave him a unique reputation. His great morality, spirit of public service, benevolent and dedicated character, together with his success in ruling the country, made him one of the ideal Sage Kings in this later period. Great Yu and his predecessors would choose, train and prepare their successors and summarily they would leave their thrones voluntarily. This system is called the Abdication System (Dillon, 2017: 9). The Abdication System did not survive for long. Nevertheless, it existed long enough to put a much-praised permanent mark on Chinese political history, commemorated even today. The Xia Dynasty, about which we do not have sufficient scientific evidence, was followed by the Shang Dynasty (上朝) “Shàng Cháo” (1600–​1046BC). The Shang enjoyed great prosperity for most of its approximately 500 years of sovereignty. However, during the late Shang period, the aristocrats became increasingly corrupt and decadent. The dynasty shrunk in power gradually and endless internal struggles weakened it further. It was around this time that the hereditary father-​to-​son power transition system was initiated in the hope of ending the struggles for the throne (Ibid.: 14). Finally, when the last king, Zhòu Xīn’s (紂辛) reign became unbearable due to his brutal and corrupt personality in addition to other internal problems, the Shang Dynasty was ended by a revolt led by King Wu of Zhou (周武王) “Zhōu Wū Wáng” (Shaughnessy, 1999: 301). King Wu was the first king and founder of the Zhou Dynasty (周朝) “Zhōu Cháo” (1046–​221BC). The Zhou Dynasty was to rule in one of the most important periods of Chinese civilization. During this period most of the elements of Chinese political ideology emerged, and Chinese political philosophy attained its main characteristics. Zhou society presented a different attitude to spirituality compared to the Shang. The Zhou was not as spiritual as the Shang. Shang society and rulers were highly spiritual, giving extraordinary importance to beliefs and divinations, asking guidance of the spirits for most of the things they would do. Sacrificing animals or even humans were important aspects of life which could be seen on the divinations, written on turtle shells, Oracle Bones (甲骨) “Jiǎgū”, the precious historical evidence of very early Chinese history. The Zhou, on the other hand, was much worldlier and materialist, respecting beliefs but preferring to focus more on earthly matters and social affairs (Dillon, 2017: 43). Therefore, the political system that matured from the Shang Dynasty was more systematic and more

The Tributary System and hegemony  13 realistic. This earthly characteristic of Chinese society and cultural values initiated with Zhou Dynasty basically continues to today. The dynastic transition from Shang to Zhou, as well, was not an ordinary transition for Chinese political tradition. To legitimate his sovereignty, King Wu of Zhou claimed that his power was legitimate because the Heaven, “The Supreme God” (上帝) “Shàngdì” or (天) “Tiān”, granted a “mandate” (命令) “Mìnglìng” to his father, King Wen (文王) “Wén Wáng” to govern the country. Further he claimed that Shang rulers lost the mandate because they were morally corrupt and were not capable of ruling the country well (Mittag and Mutschler, 2010:  530). The doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, which has traces from the Shamanic perception of the king regarding them as the axis of earth and sky (Feuchtwang, 2016a:  146–​147), had been used by the Shang Dynasty in religious terms. Therefore, King Wu did not invent the term but applied it to politics, and it gradually became the key criterion for all power transitions. He had to use this concept because Shangdi, the supreme God, was worshipped and claimed to be their ancestral origin by Shang Dynasty rulers (Didier, 2009: 145). This rhetoric was the source of Shang legitimacy (Hinton, 1998: 23). Revolting against and bringing down the Shang Dynasty needs to be explained by such an extensive religious and political concept. When doubts were raised about Zhou Dynasty kings, whether they still held the Mandate of Heaven or not, it was further evaluated that the Mandate of Heaven could be taken from the Zhou Dynasty as well, just as it had been taken from both the Xia and Shang dynasties earlier (Ibid.: 531). Newly formulated, this ideology would be the core of the Chinese imperial political system. The Mandate of Heaven (天命) “Tiān Mìng”, in another sense “The Consent of God”, was the central ideology to legitimate any power ruling the country from this time (Adler, 2011: 5). Religion and politics have been intertwined in Chinese history from the very beginning, similar to many other societies. Chinese society was a polytheist society worshipping plentiful deities of Chinese folk religion. The spirits of both nature and humans were worshipped to gain protection. Besides rivers, mountains, clouds and winds and so on, the semi-​mythical ancestors, pre-​dynastic kings and dynastic kings and their families, even cultural heroes and other subjects from myths and legends, were worshipped (Eno, 1984:  53). People believed that spirits and ancestors had somehow the power to protect their living family members from any kind of possible menace. Therefore, sacrifices to them could bring about the satisfaction of those spirits, for good luck and security (Eno, 1990:  20). However, Shangdi, later called the “Tian” in the Zhou Dynasty (Chang, R. H., 2000: 47), was the highest deity, “Lord on High”, over all others (Yao, 1996: 31). In the Shang Dynasty, though Shamans were the religious clergy specialized in religious activities and divinations, they were still considered to be of lower status to the royal family. The right and power of sacrificial ceremonies to the highest deity Shangdi belonged only to the kings, as they were believed to be the direct descendants of Shangdi. This is the origin of the belief that worship of Shangdi should be performed by the emperor, and Shangdi is only accessible to ordinary people through the ancestors’ souls. Shangdi worship could be done

14  The Tributary System and hegemony through ancestor worship, and is the core of Chinese folk religion and a determining element of Chinese identity. The kings were the chief mediators between the realms of spirits and the material earth (Ching, 1997:  20). Chinese kings were the highest authorities and figures in both political and religious domains. Morality and authority were intertwined in Chinese political tradition since the very beginning of Chinese civilization (Konior, 2009:  62). The religious authority and rituals legitimized the earthly authority of the kings. As Son of Heaven (天子) “Tiānzǐ”, the king was a semi-​deity ruler approved by Heaven (Dull, 1990: 59). He was supposed to be an ideal human being, and a ruler who performed ceremonies with right conduct, who avoided any managerial and personal mistakes, so that the Mandate of Heaven could continue (Kissinger, 2015: 38). If the Mandate of Heaven was lost, floods, droughts, earthquakes or other kinds of calamities would strike the kingdom. When any of these devastating natural events happened, they would be interpreted as signs of this loss. Simply put, it was believed that the disasters were taking place just because the king was not favored by Heaven any longer. When the loss of a mandate was widely assumed, people morally (not legally) could revolt (Dillon, 2017: 63). The doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven unofficially granted to the people the right to revolt, in cases when Heaven was believed to be dissatisfied with the ruler. If the revolt was not successful, the revolting people would pay for it with their lives. However, if it was successful, the new ruler, without consideration of his origins, whether he was from a royal family or was a peasant, would be undoubtedly regarded as the new Son of Heaven, bearing the Mandate of Heaven (Kissinger, 2015:  39). Success in revolt was testimony of Heaven’s approval. So, any de facto power grab would be self-​evident. This is an important Chinese political value generated at the beginning of the formation of its civilization, and continues even today. The resultant success justified the method and morality had nothing to do with it. The sovereignty of the Zhou Dynasty was divided into two periods: the first circa three centuries, called the Western Zhou, and the second period the Eastern Zhou. In the Western Zhou Dynasty (西周朝) “Xī Zhōu Cháo” (1045–​771BC), the Duke of Zhou built the city of Luoyi (today’s Luoyang) and named it the Central Plain (中原) “Zhōng Yuán”, which referred to its political centrality compared to the old capital. The tribes who dwelt in the Central Plain were named as Glorious or Splendid Xia (华夏) “Huáxià” (Ibid.: 7). The Huaxia people, later known as the ancestors of the Han people (汉人) “Hàn Rén”, by integration of various tribes, were the first united community in the Yellow River basin. At the same time, the name had the intention of separating the settled and more civilized, that is, the Central Plain (Han) people from the “nomadic barbarians” at the periphery. This discrimination tendency basically arose from the different lifestyles and etiquettes of the two sides (Shi and Chen, 2014: 57). The Central Plain people, otherwise known as Han (Hua) people, were sedentary people with a relatively more civilized lifestyle, etiquette and societal order. On the other hand, the tribes beyond the frontiers led a nomadic life, depending on animal breeding

The Tributary System and hegemony  15 and migration, with not much need for a societal order and etiquette that was inevitably needed in the sedentary lifestyle. Nomads were looked down on by Huaxia people, just the same as ancient Greeks had looked down on foreigners from beyond the borders. Contrary to their own “civilized identity”, Huaxia people tended to name and regard others as “uncivilized”. That is why they used the word Yi (夷) “Yí”, to name the others as barbarians (Pulleyblank, 1983: 411). This division is termed as Hua–​Yi (civilized–​barbarian) Distinction (华夷之辨) “Huá–​Yí Zhībiàn”. Although some historians draw attention to the many similarities between the two sides, and deny this distinction (Shelach, 1999: 222), it is widely accepted that the Hua–​Yi Distinction existed from the very early stages of Chinese civilization, and became more visible in the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (东周朝) “Dōng Zhōu Cháo” (771–​ 221BC) (Ibid.: 223). The Hua–​Yi Distinction would be the main characteristic of Chinese universalism and its approach to other societies, and also the main source of its obsession with cultural superiority, which continues even today. Further, it would produce systemized sets of strategies in later stages of Chinese history in how to deal with “others”, which was also the gage of Chinese imperial foreign policy and the Tributary System. The name Middle Kingdom (中国) “Zhōng Guó”, though which time period is hard to clarify, was exactly that (Wang, E. Q., 1999: 286), today it is still used by Chinese people as “China”. The name was used in the Zhou Dynasty to refer to the lands of the main duke, the Zhou King, to make a distinction from the other kingdoms. Later in the Qing Dynasty (清朝) “Qīng Cháo” (1644–​1911) the term was utilized to refer to all Manchu Qing lands (Wilkinson, 2000: 132), where the societies culturally shared the same values. Therefore, Chinese imperial identity was shaped by the perception of superiority, on the basis of culture and lifestyle, starting from its very beginning. All of the earliest three big dynasties of China, the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties, were feudal and confederational in structure. The system consisted of autonomous states, supervised by the king of the central state, the Son of Heaven. Each of the autonomous states was managed by its own Lord (诸侯) “Zhūhóu”. The lords answered to the central king, who provided unity and legitimacy in exchange for revenue and defense from the lords (Chung, 2017: 37). The Western Zhou Dynasty had successfully carried the leadership of the confederation for a long time. The small kingdoms were enlarging their territories and revenue capacities, especially toward the north and north-​west, eventually strengthening the Zhou Kings. For better transportation and efficiency in military campaigns, Zhou built a road from the capital city Louyang (洛阳) “Luòyáng” to the deep south, named from the dynasty Road of Zhou (周道) “Zhōu Dào” or King Road (王道) “Wáng Dào”. Using the King Road, the dynasty’s famous King Zhao (昭王) “Zhāo Wáng” (reign 977–​957BC), who had a remarkable impact on Chinese political thought, decided to conquer the southern neighbors of the confederation, south of the Yangtze River (长江) “Cháng Jiāng”, for their valuable copper resources and land. However, the military campaign for this colonization project did not

16  The Tributary System and hegemony work as planned as the king was drowned and his army destroyed. After this catastrophic event the Western Zhou Dynasty never recovered and came to an end in the year 771BC (Shaughnessy, 1999: 322). Nevertheless, the disastrous event found a positive place in Chinese minds and political thought. The campaign of King Zhao, later commemorated as King Wen’s Way (文王之道) “Wén Wáng Zhī Dào”, was supposedly the campaign that brought the southern barbarians to King Wen’s Transforming Influence (文王之化) “Wén Wáng Zhī Huà”. The combined meanings of the Zhou Road and Transforming Influence was symbolized as the King Road (王道) “Wáng Dào” or “Kingly Way”, and it meant ideal ruler and civilizing mission for the great cause of the Moral Transformation (德) “Dé”, of the barbarians into civilization (Mittag and Mutschler, 2010: 531). In this way the Western Zhou Dynasty had set up a state ideology of “Civilizing Mission” and the term Kingly Way referred to this mission, rather than the original connotation of the road built to the south. Chinese political thought was reflected in the ruling class and in every segment of society, leading to a highly idealist lifestyle. Morality was at the center of these relations. The emperor was, first, a supreme moral model and, second, a ruler. The officials were first regarded as teachers and then as magistrates. People were ashamed if they had done anything wrong, and punishment was for those who were not ashamed (Martin, 1944: 20). This format of the morality-​based society and politics later would be idealized by philosophers, when the society suffered deep moral erosion, especially in the second period of the Zhou Dynasty. The great sage Confucius (孔子) “Kǒngzı ”̌ (551–​479BC) idealized The Way (道) “Dào” following the moral concept of the “Proper Way”; the founder of Taoism, Laozi (老子) “Lǎozǐ” (6th century BC), used it with a more philosophical meaning, Dao (way), as “the principle of universe”; and others used it for different meanings (Mittag and Mutschler, 2010: 531). Zhou political and social values would be inspirational sources later. The Eastern Zhou Dynasty (东周朝) “Dōng Zhōu Cháo” (771–​ 221BC) was set up after the collapse of the Western Zhou. The Eastern Zhou survived for about five hundred years, approximately the first half of what was called the Spring and Autumn Era (春秋时代) “Chūn-​qiū Shídài” (771–​ 476BC). The other half was called the Warring State Era (战国时代) “Zhànguó Shídài” (476–​ 256BC). The Spring and Autumn Era is characterized by the weakening power of Eastern Zhou kings, causing excessive autonomy of the subordinated lords. In this period, the bureaucratic class, the formation of which matured in the Western Zhou Era (Li, 2008: 3), reached its heyday. The weakening of the central power resulted in strengthening not only the lords but also the bureaucratic class in the whole system. The ministers claimed that they were not subjects of the rulers, but were shareholders in the state administration. Their loyalties claimed to be not to the rulers, but to the “Altars of the Soil and Grain” (社稷) “Shèjì” (Pines, 2009:  164). Unusually, the Chinese rulers had to accept the status of sharing power with their subordinates, to be “primus inter pares”, or the first among equals until the Warring States Era. In the Warring States Era, the bureaucratic

The Tributary System and hegemony  17 class stepped down to its magistrate position and the rulers deployed them to enforce their power, rather than sharing power with them. Early formation of bureaucratic management of the country would mature in due course. Namely, the “bureaucratic autocracy” set up in this period (Pines, 2009:  164) would mostly remain in effect during the rest of Chinese history, and it continues in a different form today. Bureaucratic uprisings in the Spring and Autumn Era created further chaos in the system. A deterioration of hierarchy in the political structure gradually caused the collapse of the system, creating rivalry and wars between the lords for further enlargement of their territories and revenues. This led to fierce struggles between the small states, causing turmoil, insecurity, chaos and instability in a long period of the Warring States Era. During the Eastern Zhou period of five centuries, the Autumn and Spring Era and Warring States Era, the instability, moral erosion, wars and chaos initiated a wide consensus for the need for “Great Unity” (大一統) “Dàyītǒng” (Mittag and Mutschler, 2010:  532) of the “Huaxia”. Whenever China was politically divided, the power holders, no matter how strong or weak, would have this ideal in mind: to be the one, the country found its Great Unity under his authority. Achieving Great Unity of the country has been one of the major political goals and values throughout Chinese history. This explains why, after every upheaval, the country somehow finally entered a long, peaceful and prosperous period as a unified strong state, under a single ruler, whether foreign or domestic. Unification ideals helped to create a strong sense of belonging to the land and its values. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Eras, from roughly 600BC to 221BC, the political instability, wars and social chaos somehow created a fertile environment for ideas to be produced, and these were freely discussed in the different schools of thought. Endless wars and chaos in this period paved the way for the emergence of scholars and philosophers to produce remedies (Wen, 2017: 19). This era is specifically named the Hundred Schools of Thought (諸子百家) “Zhūzǐ Bǎijiā”. Addressing the clash of ideas in this era, the period is known as the “Contention of a Hundred Schools of Thought” (百家爭鳴) “Bǎijiā Zhēngmíng” (Cao and Sun, 2016: 39). Although there had been considerable development of ideas and institutions in political, social and cultural domains in the previous stage of Chinese history, this era is regarded as the era of construction of the foundation of Chinese civilization (Dillon, 2017: 77). In this era, famous Chinese philosophers emerged, almost simultaneously with the emergence of Buddhism in India and Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greece. These were the great sage Confucius (孔夫子) “Kǒng Fū Zǐ” (551–​479BC), the founder of Taoism, Laozi (老子) “Lǎozǐ” (6th century BC), the second sage of Confucianism, Mencius (孟子) “Mèngzǐ” (372–​289BC), the founder of the Mohist school, Mozi (墨子) “Mòzǐ” (470–​391BC), Confucian sage Xunzi (荀況) “Xún Kuàng” (310–​235BC), the founder of legalism, Shang Yang (商鞅) “Shāng Yāng” (390–​338BC), the sage of legalism, Hanfeizi (韩非子) “Hán Fēi Zǐ” (280–​ 233BC), and others, like Zhuangzi (庄子) “Zhuāngzǐ” (369–​286BC), Li Si (李斯) “Lǐ Sī” (280–​208BC), Sun Tze (孙子) “Sūnzǐ”

18  The Tributary System and hegemony (544–​496BC) and so on. This period with its amazing philosophical productivity not only put a permanent mark on Chinese identity, history, political thought and culture, but also had great influence on most of the East Asian societies, and the formation of relations between them as well. During the reign of the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (Spring and Autumn Era and Warring States Era), Chinese political philosophy attained its classical maturity. Before this happened, the Western Zhou Period had been considered to be formative of the Chinese state (Mittag and Mutschler, 2010: 533). The concepts and institutions of political order were mainly created, but had not yet found their mature forms when compared with the later stages in the imperial era. Chinese philosophy has different characteristics compared with Western philosophy. It is usually described as a photographic way of comprehension, through pictures and symbols referring to the Chinese characters, rather than through logical and metaphysical ideas (Ko, 2003:  116). The Chinese are described as talking about what they see, while Westerners are described as talking about what they think (Konior, 2009: 63). Therefore, Western philosophy and concepts had been relatively difficult for the Chinese to grasp. Western thought is regarded as too notional, while Westerners find the Chinese philosophy not mature enough due to its structure, which is composed of expressions in the form of practical abstracts, mostly as guidance for living in harmony with others and nature, rather than as comprehensive, all-inclusive, systematic thought. This argument is concluded by some as the Chinese producing a political culture over its long history which cannot be called political philosophy (McLean, 1996: 63). There are differences in structure and methodology between the two traditions of philosophies. These differences produce very different societies and political understandings, as can be observed today. Chinese folk religion served as the basis for most of the developments in Chinese philosophy, culture and politics. It is the mainstream that created and shaped Chinese political philosophy and the perception of “self” and “others”. It was the source of inspiration and guidance for the philosophical age of the Hundred Schools of Thought as well. All the schools that emerged in this era also depended on Chinese folk religion as an initial basic source of their ideas (De Groot, 1892: 1912). Chinese folk religion is intensely rooted in the family and public life of Chinese people, rather than being represented by an institution, like the “Church” in the West (Fan and Chen, 2013: 4). The basic criterion for participation in Chinese folk religion was not belief in religious dogmas, but about being part of communities in local units of the religion, such as community institutions, village or kinship with their gods and rituals (Ibid.: 5). This was not a universalist attitude until Confucianism took cultural ties as the main reference point, instead of civic and ancestral ties. Chinese folk religion and the initial historical period were the basic sources of the most important political concepts of Chinese civilization. The Mandate of Heaven (天命) “Tiān Mìng”, Son of Heaven (天子) “Tiānzǐ”, Hua–​Yi Distinction (华夷之辨) “Huá–Yí Zhībiàn”, the name Middle Kingdom (中国) “Zhōng Guó”, the concept of King Road (王道) “Wáng Dào”, the ideal of “Great Unity”

The Tributary System and hegemony  19 (大一統) “Dàyītǒng” and the justification approach of “the success in the result, justifies the method” were some of the concepts that composed the pillars of Chinese imperial system, and further developments would occur around these basic terms. Having summarized the initial foundation and development of Chinese imperial political thought and its close relation with folk religion, it is necessary to have an insight into the main philosophical schools, to comprehend its further development. Though there were a lot of philosophical currents that had a certain degree of influence on Chinese imperial political practice, it was predominantly affected by Confucianism (儒家) “Rú Jiā”. Taoism (道家) “Dào Jiā”, Legalism (法家) “Fǎ Jiā”, Mohism (墨家) “Mò Jiā”, the School of Yin-​Yang (阴阳家) “Yīnyáng Jiā” and the School of Names (名家) “Míng Jiā” are the other main philosophical approaches that had varying roles in shaping political practice, as Sima Qian (1993a) also listed them in his Shiji. In this book four of them will be covered. 2.1.2  Confucianism (儒家) The Confucian “School of Scholars” (儒家) “Rú Jiā” was the most effective school of thought in ancient and Imperial China. Anything written or reported about the Chinese, their society, philosophy, culture, history, ethics or politics is not regarded as “complete” if the role of the Great Sage, Confucius (孔夫子) “Kǒng Fū Zǐ” (551–​479BC), is not mentioned. He put a deep and permanent mark on the Chinese, almost “everything” (Wen, 2017: 25). He had considerable influence on Pacific Asian societies as well. Confucius was born and grew up in the Spring and Autumn Era of chaos, moral corruption, and social and political disorder. He was aware of the problems of the society and politics of his time, and produced his remedies from the old values (Kissinger, 2015: 27). Confucius was one of many thinkers of his time who thought of these problems and tried to find solutions. He had a strong sense of mission to serve the values he believed in. He affirmed that a human being is essentially good and able to learn and improve (Tay, 2010: 102). He was apparently a conservative, teaching classical texts to his students to protect the tradition, however he was a revolutionary in interpreting them (Bai, 2012: 29). He was an expert in the ancient ritual system and the classics. He did not create a new philosophy depending on his own formulation, but tried to restore the previous order (Wen, 2017: 23). Therefore, he actually reinterpreted the values of Chinese folk religion, those related to the earthly life. He focussed attention on the times of the Sage Kings, referring to the legendary kings such as the Yellow Emperor, Zhuanxu, Emperor Ku, Emperor Ya and Emperor Shun, as well as some other figures like Yu the Great, and especially his hero, the Zhou Dynasty’s king Zhou Wu. He devoted himself to reminding people about the righteous conduct of the Chinese legendary kings, their virtues and the old “glorious values” of the society and the ruling class, especially of the Western Zhou Dynasty (Ibid.: 30). In Confucius’ mind, the sage rulers’ ideal administration methods and their

20  The Tributary System and hegemony pure values were the way to create a coherent and prosperous community. As a “melioristic” philosopher, Confucius combined ethics with politics (Chang, C., 2012: 42), commonly called “virtue politics” (Zhao, D., 2007: 162). Confucius was aware of the fact that his ideas could only be effective enough if implemented by a ruler. He was appointed as Minister of Justice in the State of Lu (魯國) “Lǔ Guó” after doing a series of minor works, but was not successful in finding an opportunity to apply his ideas (Dubs, 1946: 275). He decided to leave his home state, and struggled for most of his life to find a ruler in the divided Zhou system who understood him and adopted his thoughts (Ibid.: 276). However, he could not find any support and sometimes he was even laughed at. After a long period of interstate journeys to seek support, he returned to his own kingdom at the age of 69, and decided to continue teaching his students in his hometown of Qufu (曲阜) “Qūfù” (Ibid.: 277). Confucius’ main remedy for the social disintegration and political chaos of his time was to create a society and politics depending on virtues. In the Confucian approach, virtue is essential for personal self-​esteem, social solidarity and political order, contrary to wealth and power, which were the most respected currencies in his time. The essence of Confucian values occurs together in one paragraph: Zixia said, “if a man withdraws his mind from the love of beauty and applies it to the love of the virtues; if in serving his parents, he can exert his utmost strength; if in serving his prince, he can devote his life; if in his interaction with friends, his words are sincere; although men say that, he has not learned, I will certainly say that he has”. (Confucius, 2005: I/​8/​20) Confucius depicted an Ideal Ruler (君子) “Jūnzı ”̌ , who was furnished with all the virtues, while expressing his thoughts. Junzi literally means “Son of the Ruler”, so it refers to a member of the aristocracy or a “prince” or is sometimes interpreted as “gentleman”, but usually interpreted as “man of honor” (Lin, 2017:  145). The ruler was a role model for society (Ibid.: 33). He merely suggests that the ruler must be an ideal person first, and if the ruler is an ideal person, the society will take him as an example and follow him; thus, all of society would rid themselves of their problems in this way (Okay, 2017: 30). In other words, the virtues of rulers create the order (Ford, 2010: 33). The rule of virtue was preferred to a rule of punishment (Lin, 2017: 131). Upholding benevolence and virtues in government conduct and approaching subjects compassionately is the Kingly Way of Confucius (Kim, 2014: 426), particularly when referring to the legacy of the Zhou Dynasty’s King Wen. To be a Junzi, a person needs to cultivate virtues and become a “Virtuous Person” (道德) “Dào Dé” (Ibid.: 47). Virtues can be fostered by the self-​cultivation of certain sets of moral values. The most important one is love of humans: benevolence, humanness (仁) “Rén”. The other important values are: obedience to parents and being of good descent; filial piety (孝) “Xiào”; obedience of ritual

The Tributary System and hegemony  21 rules, rites (礼) “Lı ”̌ ; keeping away from loudness, being modest (中庸) “Zhōng Yōng”; behaving in a proper manner according to status, propriety (正名) “Zhèng Míng”; being honest and fair, righteousness (义) “Yì”; harmony (和) “Hé”; loyalty (忠) “Zhōng”; forbearance, forgiveness (恕) “Shù”; trust (信) “Xìn”; wisdom (智) “Zhì”; aspiration (志) “Zhì”; bravery (勇) “Yǒng” (Ibid.: 1–​77). Confucius regarded all humans as being very similar in nature, but their environment and upbringing make them different. Therefore, he strongly advocated that all people need education and moral cultivation and the government must be responsible for educating people (Ibid.: 101). For this reason, he is still considered to be the first teacher in China today, and his statues are still erected in school gardens to commemorate him (Okay, 2017: 20). Personal cultivation of morality is at the center of the Confucian ethical system and this is supported by social, religious and political principles as well. The crucial political and religious concept of the Mandate of Heaven emerged in the Zhou Dynasty and it is an essential concept in Confucian thought as well. The fundamental duty that Confucius was performing, restoring the order of Zhou, is obvious in this issue. In the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Eras, Zhou’s legitimacy was highly eroded, together with the concept of the Mandate of Heaven. Each of the states, struggling for power, needed to legitimate its claims over the others. This need led each state to organize ceremonies of communication with Heaven, which had been the monopoly of the Zhou Dynasty kings (Didier, 2009: 36). Any power strong enough to conquer some land could claim the right to the rites, to legitimize its own political ambitions. Breaking with the divine rights of Zhou caused a political chaos of legitimacy and mistrust by the public toward the political system (Ibid.: 37). Confucius’ effort was to fill this morality gap in society with the self-​cultivation of virtues. Benevolence and propriety in rites would restore the previous ritual order. The principle of rituals, Rite (礼) “Lı ”̌ , was so important for Confucius that he claimed it to be a way of proving benevolence (Wen, 2017: 26). Rituals, or correct conduct of rituals, were regarded as fundamental to reestablish the old harmonious society, depending on hierarchy. Rituals are the source of social order and mutual understanding in Confucian thought (Lin, 2017: 23). It is the most effective way to clearly define the eroded responsibilities of superiors and​ inferiors, and the ideal conducts of ancestors could be materialized only in this way (Wasserstrom, 2011: 27). Confucianism is regarded as the continuation of Chinese folk culture, which had been evolving over thousands of years, and depended on the spiritual worship of numerous gods, at the top the cult of the “Supreme God”, Shangdi, later named Tian (Chen, 2012: 105). What Confucius was trying to do was to restore the previous moral, religious and political system, and every time whenever the Chinese civilization experienced trouble, they would repeat the same habit of returning to the old order and values (Kissinger, 2015: 27), corresponding to the Chinese understanding of the cyclical conception of time flow (Wen, 2017: 38). Confucius’ portrayal of the ideal ruler “Junzi”, “the man of honor”, stressed the moral values with which he was equipped, and it was the duty of the state

22  The Tributary System and hegemony to educate individuals, and furnish them with moral values (Lin, 2017:  121). Combining this with the proposal of education for all people, and giving everybody the opportunity to play a part in the ruling class without discrimination (Confucius, 2005: XV/​39/​313), the meritocratic bureaucracy system was created later, forming the Mandarin “官” (guān) bureaucratic class. Enrollments were accepted through an Imperial Examination (科举) “Kējū”, and almost completely depended on measuring candidates’ knowledge of Confucianism (Kracke, 1967:  251). The system survived for a long time, from its initial setup in the Han Dynasty (汉朝) “Hàn Cháo” (202BC–​220AD), later developed in the year 605AD, in the Sui Dynasty (隋朝) “Suí Cháo” (581–​618AD) and fully implemented in the Tang Dynasty (唐朝) “Táng Cháo” (618–​907AD), until its abolition in 1905 (Paludan, 1998: 79). The system created scholar bureaucrats (Mandarin), replacing the military generals. For centuries, the Imperial Examination system had the function of releasing a certain amount of the social and political tension against the rulers, which would potentially arise from the unsatisfied regions or classes. The system also provided rulers with a highly educated loyal bureaucracy, serving the integrity of the country directly (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006:  105). Further, the examination built a sense of belonging and fair opportunities, providing a certain level of participation in the government, offering equal opportunity to people of talent and uniting them in the single aim of serving the country (Ibid.: 106). Confucius placed family at the center of the social and political order, if not at the center of the universe. Filial piety (孝) “Xiào”, the principle that described the duties of a virtuous son to his parents and ancestors, was regarded as one of the most crucial values a person should have. Filial piety was considered to be so important a virtue that the physical body of a person should be kept in good condition and not be damaged, just as it comes biologically from father and mother (Israeli, 1977: 299). Family members were supposed to apply the morality of family relations to the whole society. Family respect is accepted to be the root of all humane feelings (Wen, 2017: 24). It is quite interesting that the Chinese character for “home” (家) “Jiā” means “everybody” (大家) “Dà Jiā” if you added the word “big” in front of it. Everybody equaling the big family is closely matched with Confucian understanding of family–​community and family–​state relations. Family was viewed as the smallest unit of society but was considered to be a prototype for the whole state. In fact, an ideal state was thought to be a big family. Among Confucius’ Five Fundamental Relationships (五倫) “Wū Lún”, three of them are related to family, emphasizing the importance of hierarchic family relations, for an orderly community and state. The five are, namely, Ruler and Subject (君臣) “Jūnchén”, Father and Son (父子) “Fùzǐ”, Elder and Younger Brothers (兄弟) “Xiōngdì”, Husband and Wife (夫婦) “Fūfù”, and Friend and Friend (朋友) “Péngyǒu” (Feuchtwang, 2016a: 146). Each of the five basic relationships places obligations on both sides. From the elders toward the young, protection and blessings were suggested, and from the young to their elders, the attitude suggested was obedience (Wasserstrom, 2011: 27). Only friend-​to-​friend

The Tributary System and hegemony  23 relations depend on equality, while all others were hierarchic in which respect and obedience were essential. The Five Basic Relations are actually the expansion of the principle of filial piety (孝) “Xiào”, beyond family borders, covering the whole society until the rulers establish order (Ibid.: 147). The final aim is to put society back on track by restoring the correct forms of relations, duties and responsibilities. This proposal is clearly formulated by Confucius: Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about government. Confucius said, “let the ruler be ruler, the minister be minister, the father be father, the son be son”. “True indeed!” said the Duke, “If the ruler is not ruler, the minister not minister, the father not father, the son not son, although the abundant grain was there, could I get enough to eat?” (Confucius, 2005: XII/​11/​233) In this dialog Confucius connects the establishment of state and social order with clearly defined duties and responsibilities of individuals (Kissinger, 2015: 37), as well as their commitments to play their roles inside every hierarchical order to which they belong (Lin, 2017: 123). It is connected with justice as well. In his rationale, in a society where responsibilities are not undertaken, and relations are not based on virtues, it is not realistic to expect fairness and justice. The moral and religious connection of subjects to the state and ruler puts the ruler in a unique position, acting on behalf of Heaven and Earth. Chinese rulers did not have any counterparts in Europe, or anywhere else in this respect, as the ruler was considered to be the highest person of all human beings (Kissinger, 2015: 38). It was a radically monist system of governance that the ruler at the center was furnished with the power of Heaven, ruling over the Earth and Mankind together (Ford, 2010: 35). In the imperial political system, the authority to define the borders of morality was an attribution given to rulers, stemming from the religious position of the ruler, the Son of Heaven. This unrivalled position acquired absolute loyalty as well, endorsed by Confucianism. It can be argued that what made Confucianism for the rulers of China so attractive was its morality, endorsing the loyalty of subjects to whoever was superior or elder, especially to the ruler. Therefore, it was government protection rather than human devotion which kept it so effective until modern times (Tarling, 1967:  26). Perhaps as a historical instinct, even today, just as a law defines a pet as the owner’s personal belonging in China, some Chinese people will not consider killing their pet as questionable, as the law indirectly allows it. This is an example of loyalty to the rulers that, interwoven with moral values, Chinese rulers have enjoyed for centuries. However, this loyalty often reached its limits when there was a common conviction that the ruler had lost the Mandate of Heaven (Kissinger, 2015: 39). The Chinese defined themselves as closely related with the values of Confucius, which stemmed from historical experience and the beliefs of folk religion. Chinese identity and “self”-​consciousness reflects clear signs of Confucian values.

24  The Tributary System and hegemony In Confucian political mentality, the approach to foreigners, constantly described as barbarians, was identical to the previous Chinese approach. The Chinese developed a sense of belonging common to their political, social and cultural identity during the chaos of the Zhou Dynasty. However, they were not quite willing to accept that there could be other societies on Earth that have the same status as their own society. Confucius had the same mindset. In Confucian terminology there was only one country on Earth and that was China. There was the “self” and “others” division, however there was not a concept of “international relations” in the Confucian world. Indeed, there were no other nations at all. The whole world was considered to be one community (Ford, 2010: 36). The name of that country on Earth under the rule of the Son of Heaven was Tianxia (天下) “Tiān Xià”, “All Under Heaven”, which was used to mean both “China” and “Earth” (Pines, 2002: 134). In that single political jurisdiction there were tribes which did not live in the same geographical area but on the periphery, in addition to not sharing the same cultural and political identity with “civilized” Huaxia people, the Han Chinese. However, they were still considered to be the responsibility of the Chinese ruler, who was in fact responsible for all humanity on Earth. Zhaoguang Ge (2018: 11) argues that “expansion of ancient ‘China’ was an endless process of conquering, immigration and merging”. The Chinese carried out a “civilizing” mission in the vicinity of their mainland, the Yellow River basin. The Kingly Way required them to capture the barbarian lands and “civilize” them. This expansion was carried out to the south, today’s Vietnam, and to the West, Tibet and the Tarim Basin. Chineseness and non-​Chineseness were identities defined by cultural stance, rather than blood kinship. Between inner and outer identities there could be transitions (Ibid.: 11). The interiors could be exteriors, and exteriors could be interiors, if their cultural identity changed accordingly. Barbarians could become civilized and the civilized could become barbarians. The Confucian approach to dealing with the non-​ Chinese has two methods: pacifist and militarist (Yang, L.S., 1968: 24). The pacifist method considers the non-​Chinese as the “others” of the same community, who needed to be civilized by the virtuous rulers of China. So, the attractiveness of the virtuous ruler was the first power to civilize the barbarians. This method did not propose the use of power. The attractiveness of benevolence and the virtue of the rulers were supposed to be enough to attract and transform the others. The ideal ruler was described as a truly universal ruler (Ibid.: 26) through the benevolence and virtues he offered to all people. The Master Said, He who rules the country by virtue can be compared to the Polestar, which holds its own with a multitude of stars revolving around it. (Confucius, 2005: II/​1/​14) The governor of She asked about government. The Master answered, make those near you happy and those far away will flock to you. (Confucius, 1861a: XIII/​16/​133)

The Tributary System and hegemony  25 For the states in the Chinese feudal Zhou system, Confucius suggested: “It is by good faith that a small state serves a big one, and benevolence is seen in a great State’s protecting a small one” (Confucius, 1872: 814). This suggestion intended building relations based on hierarchy, to achieve harmony. The Confucian ideal of harmony has strong relations with hierarchy, and observance of one’s proper place in relations, unlike modern international relations based on equality. In the Confucian approach, hierarchy is the way of nature (Wang, Y. K., 2013: 211). The principle of hierarchy was applied to relations with the other societies as well. Confucius applied hierarchic relations to family, to the nation, and finally to the world to achieve peace and harmony, none of which could be achieved without the individual cultivation of virtues in the first place. If there be righteousness in the heart, there will be beauty in the character. If there be beauty in the character, there will be harmony in the home. If there be harmony in the home, there will be order in the nation. If there be order in the nation, there will be peace in the world. (Confucius, 1861b: 263–​264) The pacifist approach was the mainstream method to deal with the non-​Chinese in Confucian political thought. Moral politics would later prove that it did not work in every condition or was not effective for every tribe and community who were supposed to be attracted. The militarist method was in effect when the barbarians were not attracted by the virtues of the Chinese civilization, or were not willing to be civilized. In this case, coercion was proposed in various conditions. Those distant people have nothing to do with our great land; those wild tribes must not be permitted to create disorder among our flowery States. (Confucius, 1872: 777) The Jung and Ti know nothing of affection or friendship and are full of greed. The best plan is to attack them. (Ibid.: 424) To advance when you see advance is possible and withdraw in face of difficulties, is a good way of moving the army; to absorb weak states and attack those, that are willfully blind, is a good rule of war. (Ibid.: 317) The Confucian approach to foreigners tended to be more pacifist and idealistic. However, coercion and persuasion were generally equivalent methods to be used in practice (Yang, L. S., 1968: 27). Confucius advised that the peaceful stance must be backed up by a military power (Dillon, 2017: 61). The militarist method of “civilizing the barbarians” was not the suggested mainstream method for relations with foreign communities. However, it was utilized more than

26  The Tributary System and hegemony the suggested pacifist “virtue politics”, attracting others by virtue. During the long history of Chinese dynasties, use of force was essential to deal with neighboring countries, especially the nomadic northern and western ones. Peaceful negotiations or peaceful coexistence were only merely possible when Chinese rulers had no other choice or when the barbarians totally submitted and became “civilized”. Confucius had a strong cultural pride while trying to produce remedies for societal maladies. This pride was not generated by him, but he contributed to it. The rude tribes of the east and north have their princes and are not like the states of our great land, which are without them [China is better even without a prince, in anarchy]. (Confucius, 1861a: III/​5/​20) China’s relations with neighboring tribes and societies were driven by the assumption of superiority in culture during all of its long history. This assumption was somehow effective to pacific societies, but not much to the northern and western tribes. Northern and western tribes were mostly not at ease with the notion of Chinese cultural superiority. On the contrary, they occasionally tried to impose their own values on China when they could, and if they could not, a long and fierce struggle ensued (Suzuki, 1968: 180). The Confucian model of Chinese political tradition did not end with Confucius. After Confucius came the second sage of Confucianism, Mencius (孟子) “Mèngzǐ” (372–​289BC), and the other important sage, Xunzi (荀況) “Xún Kuàng” (310–​ 235BC); the Neo-​ Confucianists (理学) “Lǐxué”, Zhou Dunyi (周敦颐) “Zhōu Dūnyí” (1017–​1073AD) and Zhu Xi (朱熹) “Zhū Xī” (1130–​1200AD), have reshaped it with new interpretations. Mencius (孟子) “Mèngzǐ” (372–​289BC), named “The Second Sage”, is one of the most important philosophers in Chinese history (Dillon, 2017: 64). Living a century after Confucius and being educated by Confucius’ grandson Zisi (子思) “Zǐsī” (483–​402), Mencius was the person who systemized Confucianism (Chan, 1963a:  49). He had a similar life story to Confucius:  born to a poor family; lost his father at a very young age and brought up by his mother; traveled a long time to find a sponsor for his teachings; returned home disappointed; died in his hometown Zoucheng (邹城) “Zōuchéng”, 20 km south of Confucius’ hometown, Qufu (曲阜) “Qūfù”; and finally his teachings were compiled by his students (Ibid.:  50). Mencius was so influential that one of the four books of famous Confucian classics “Four Books and Five Classics” (四書五經), “Sìshū Wūjīng”, was later renamed Mencius (孟子). However, he did not enjoy this reputation when he was alive. He was discovered and valued in the Tang Dynasty (唐朝) “Táng Cháo” (618–​907AD) (Dillon, 2017: 64). Mencius was a great proponent of Confucian teachings. Nonetheless, he had some approaches that differed from Confucius. Mencius clearly defined human nature, which was not so much stressed by Confucius, as “good” (Kim, 2014: 432). According to him, people are naturally born good, but bad habits are

The Tributary System and hegemony  27 inherited from the environment. That is why all people need education (Dillon, 2017: 64). Mencius’ political ideas were mostly oriented to the common people, while Confucius was focused on the elite and the ruling class. Mencius expressed it clearly in his conversations: The people are the most important elements in a nation; the spirits of lands and grain are the next; the sovereign is the lightest. Therefore, to gain the peasantry is the way to become the sovereign; to gain sovereign is the way to become a prince of a state; to gain prince of a state is the way to become a great officer. When a prince endangers altars of spirits of land and grain, he is changed and another is appointed in his place. (Mencius, 1895: VII/​2/​14/​483–​484) Mencius in this discourse points to the importance of the common people, their ideas and welfare as the base of the political system. The transition requirement, the Mandate of Heaven, was supposed to be granted to a new ruler first by the consent of the people. Heaven watches the ruler through people’s eyes and ears, which means the wellbeing of people should be observed, and for the ruler to keep the right of governance the people must be well treated. Heaven does not speak. It simply indicated his will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs…heaven sees with the eyes of its people; heaven hears with the ears of its people. (Ibid.: V/​1/​5/​356–​357) Mencius was a step ahead of Confucius, describing the ruler–​subject relationship in the form of father-​son relation, and acknowledged the right of common people to change the rulers, provided that the rulers have lost the Mandate of Heaven (Wasserstrom, 2011: 44). The common people were supposed to hold the right to observe the ruler, to see if he rules the country with the right conduct, the conduct which is closely intertwined with the interests of the common people. If the people were not content with the ruler, for any sensible reason, and tried to change him, the Heaven would not protect the ruler and would allow the change. Mencius legitimized a revolt in cases when the ruler and subjects were not content. King Xuan of Qi asked, “Is it the case that Tang banished Jie, and that Wu struck down Zhou?” Mengzi responded saying, “There are such accounts in the historical records.” The king said, “Is it acceptable for subjects to kill their rulers?” Mengzi said, “One who violates benevolence [ren] should be called a thief. One who violates righteousness [yi] is called a mutilator. A mutilator and thief are called a mere fellow. I have heard of the execution of a mere fellow called Zhou, but I have not heard of the killing of one’s ruler”. (Mencius, 1895: I/​2/​8/​167)

28  The Tributary System and hegemony In this context, Mencius is regarded to be populist and a promoter of democratic notions by some writers, although what he describes is not a completely democratic stance in modern understanding (Wasserstrom, 2011: 45). Mencius puts common people at the center of the administration, which had been occupied by the rulers until this time, but nonetheless he defends the notion that “the people who work with mind, should govern the people working with the body” (Wen, 2017: 31). In this approach he is in contradiction with common people’s advocacy. Mencius strictly defended benevolence, morality and rites in administration, observing people’s approval and aiming to win their hearts (Cao and Sun, 2016: 369). This ideal ruling is generally described by him as the Kingly Way, which was used by Confucius as well. Mencius’ description of Benevolent Rule is opposed to the Hegemonic Rule (霸道) “Bà Dào”. Hegemonic rule is characterized as interest-​oriented and serving the personal interests of the ruler. Mencius does not propose that personal interests are evil and must be eliminated, which were not tolerated at all by strongly anti-​individualist Confucian moral codes (Kim, 2014: 429–​430). Rather, he combines the personal interests of the ruler with public interest. Put another way, if the benevolent ruler wanted to have property and material power, he needed to share it with the people, which would make it acceptable according to Mencius (Mencius, 1895: I/​2/​4, 157–​158). On the other hand, while defending that the role of the government must be limited in people’s lives, Mencius showed quite a liberal stance (Peta, 2016). He based his restricted government definition on Confucius’ sentence: “The requisites of government are that, there should be sufficient of food, sufficient of military equipment and the confidence of people to their ruler” (Confucius, 1861a: XII/​7/​118). He further evaluated that “The root of kingdom is in the state. The root of state is in the family. The root of family is in the person of its head” (Mencius, 1895: IV/​1/​295). In another sentence he defends tax exemption: “there were inspections but no levy at border stations and market places” (Ibid.: I/​2/​154). Mencius advocated the limited intervention of the state as he thought people are rational, good in nature and able to learn, constituting the foundation of the state system. Mencius’ response to the Mohists in a famous argument was quite an expected one, as a Confucian, believing in the importance of family ties and hierarchic community structure. Mohists’ advocacy of human love for all people without observation of personal ties and social status was rejected by Mencius. He claimed that treating a stranger the same as one’s own father meant treating one’s own father as a stranger (Ibid.: III/​I/​257). Xunzi had great influence on the Han Dynasty (汉朝) “Hàn Cháo” (202BC–​ 220AD) politics, but in later history his importance waned (Knoblock, 1982: 29). What makes Xunzi famous is his thesis about man’s nature. Xunzi believed that man has an evil nature: Mencius states that man’s nature is good, but I say that this view is wrong. All men in the world, past and present, agree in defining goodness as that

The Tributary System and hegemony  29 which is upright, reasonable, and orderly and evil as that which is prejudiced, irresponsible, and chaotic. This is the distinction between good and evil. Now suppose that, man’s nature was in fact intrinsically upright, reasonable and orderly –​then what need would there be for sage kings and ritual principles? The existence of sage kings and ritual principles could certainly add nothing to the situation. But because man’s nature is in fact evil, this is not so. Therefore, in ancient times the sages, realizing that man’s nature is evil, that is prejudiced and not upright, irresponsible and lacking in order, for this reason established the authority of the ruler to control it, elucidated ritual principles to transform it, set up laws and standards to correct it, and meted out strict punishments to restrain it. (Xunzi, 2003: 162) Xunzi described human nature as bad, evil and selfish, and he proposed education, rituals, laws and study of classics to curb and improve it. Otherwise, he anticipated that constant chaos awaited society (Wen, 2017: 56). Xunzi argued that Heaven and the Earth have their own rules. So, a human would act according to human nature. Xunzi represented a materialistic approach of Confucianism (Dillon, 2017:  64) and he has been named the “Chinese Hobbes” (Wen, 2017: 56). Convincing himself that it is difficult to apply Confucianism to state management, Xunzi returned to his hometown and wrote books in his old age. He proposed that all personalities are set up by society, even family reverence is thought up by family and society, and it is not innate (Ibid.: 55). The ideal government should rule through “Kingly Governance” combined with the rule of law and strictly followed by rites, conquest of territories by force and maintenance of order by corporal punishment. However, people were still regarded as important and all these actions were meant to be done to take care of people (Dillon, 2017: 65). Xunzi thought that “great national unity”, which was a popular concern in his time, would be established by the Qin Dynasty (秦朝) “Qín Cháo” (221–​206BC) as they were ruled through the legalist (法家) “Fǎ Jiā” approach (Ibid.: 65). The unification ideal was a natural result of the chaos in the long-​lasting Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods. During these long periods succeeding each other, Chinese society suffered so much from the states fighting for power and land, endless political conflicts, countless bloody wars, social chaos, moral decay, that the unification of the country became a natural goal for all the states, whenever there was a similar condition of fragmentation. The divided land was always considered to be the main reason for all problems, and unification was regarded to be the most important agenda. Unification under a sole ruler was first achieved by the legendary “First Emperor” of China, Qin Shi Huang (秦始皇) “Qín Shı ̌ Huáng” (259–​210BC), the founder of the Qin Dynasty in 221BC (Dillon, 2017:  82). He succeeded in uniting all the fragmented Chinese feudal kingdoms under his flag, set up the first Chinese empire with a multi-​ethnic society, a highly centralized political

30  The Tributary System and hegemony system and ended the feudal system which had been ongoing since the beginning of known Chinese history until his time. The feudal system was never going to return to Chinese political life again following him. Xunzi had an indirect relation with this unification as Li Si (李斯) “Lǐ Sī” (280–​208BC), the prime minister and the political advisor of Qin Shi Huang, was his student. Also, the other important sage of the Legalist School, Hanfeizi (韩非子) “Hán Fēi Zǐ” (280–​233BC), was Xunzi’s student as well. Xunzi’s belief in the evil of human nature allowed him to develop a notion suggesting that a ruler should appear to conduct rituals outside and follow laws inside (Wen, 2017: 56). These ideas were compounded and turned into an administration philosophy by Lisi and Hanfeizi. Qin Shi Huang was the first ruler to implement this philosophy. Confucianism became the state ideology in the Han Dynasty, which was succeeded by the first dynasty of united China, the Qin Dynasty. The seventh emperor of the Han Dynasty, Emperor Wudi (汉武帝) “Hàn Wūdì” (140–​ 86BC), accepted Confucianism as a state ideology (Dillon, 2017: 63). From then on, Confucian values dominated Chinese society and became the main political philosophy until its abolition in 1905 (Paludan, 1998: 79). Confucian thought had stayed mostly intact during all that long history, except for the Neo-​Confucian (理學) “Lǐxué” influence during the Song Dynasty (宋朝) “Sòng Cháo” (960–​1127AD). The main figures were Zhou Dunyi (周敦颐) “Zhōu Dūnyí” (1017–​1073) and Zhuxi (朱熹) “Zhū Xī” (1130–​1200). Neo-​ Confucianism was a philosophical movement, expanded during the time from the Tang Dynasty to the Song Dynasty. As their main argument was the “heavenly principle” (天理) “Tiān Lǐ”, which they described as the soul of the whole universe, the name of the school literally meant “The School of Li” (Dillon, 2017: 414). Zhou Dunyi, the prominent Neo-​Confucian scholar, combined the ethical system of Confucianism with the cosmology of Taoism (道家) “Dào Jiā”, and tried to add a metaphysical dimension to Confucianism. Although some scholars argue that Neo-​Confucianism was the result of introversion, which took place after the tragedies the Song Dynasty suffered from the northern nomadic Jurchen (女真) “Nǚzhēn” Later Jin Dynasty (后金) “Hòujīn” (1115–​1234), who were the ancestors of today’s Manchus (滿洲) “Mǎn Zhōu” (Liu, 1988: 24), the main motivation behind the Neo-​Confucian movement was to counter the challenges emerging from the comprehensive systems of Taoism and Buddhism (佛家) “Fó Jiā” (Dillon, 2017: 415). Zhuxi was one of the most influential Confucians. He created a coherent synthesis of all Neo-​Confucian thought and added it to the classical Confucianism, creating a concrete vision of Confucianism influenced by Taoism and Buddhism (Berthrong, 1998: 110). Zhuxi was the person who created a Confucian canon of nine books, categorizing them into “Four Books and Five Classics” (四書五經) “Sìshū Wūjīng”. The Four Books (Analects of Confucius (论语) “Lún Yū”, The Mencius (孟子) “Mèng Zǐ”, The Great Learning (大学) “Dà Xué”, and The Doctrine of The Mean (中庸) “Zhōng Yōng”) and the Five Classics (The Classic of Poetry (诗经) “Shī Jīng”, The Classic of History (书经) “Shū Jīng”, The

The Tributary System and hegemony  31 Book of Changes (易經) “Yì Jīng”, The Classic of Rites (礼记) “Lǐ Jì”, and The Spring and Autumn Annals (春秋) “Chūn Qiū”) are the main books representing Confucianism in a comprehensive set, from Zhuxi’s edition until today (Chan, 1963b: 589). In the Ming Era, the Confucian set of “Four Books and Five Classics” was accepted to be the canon of Official Examination (Cao and Sun, 2016: 378). In this respect, Zhuxi has unmeasurable influence on Chinese political thought as, from roughly the 14th century until the end of the Imperial Era, all of the official bureaucrats’ minds were shaped by his perspective (Berthrong, 1998: 110). Confucianism was the state ideology for China for around two thousand years. The concepts of the Mandate of Heaven, Son of Heaven, Kingly Way, benevolent ruler, education for all, rights and duties in five relations, description of the ideal person (junzi), adherence to the middle way, the importance of rites and rituals, harmony in relations, filial piety, bureaucratic selection on merits, civilized culture, importance of fairness in laws, propriety, good intention, describing human beings as good in nature, the right to change the ruler, separating tyranny from the ideal rule, explaining the relations and universe in the principle (li), and so on, are the important concepts that Confucianism did not invent particularly, but it put them into coherent conceptual frameworks and kept them on China’s agenda for nearly two millennia of imperial political life. Confucianists did not invent most of the arguments they advocated. Most of them, like the concepts of the Son of Heaven, the Mandate of Heaven, the Kingly Way and so on, were invented and were part of Chinese social, religious and political life much earlier than Confucius. However, Confucius was so successful in formulating them and drawing attention to them, and the time was so chaotic and society was in such dire need of social order that the Confucian reinterpretation become effective, though some time after his death. Confucianism is actually a new interpretation of Chinese folk religion in an earthlier way, or only dealing with the earthly side of it. Confucius was not interested in metaphysical issues; he preferred to focus on earthly matters. Though the Neo-​ Confucianists added the cosmological connections of this earthly philosophical school and made it more like a religion, the debate over whether Confucianism is a religion or not still holds great weight in discussions today. Discussions range from describing it as a “bureaucratic religion” to “a set of non-​religious moral values” (Yang, C., 1961: 26), and from “a religion of good citizens” to “not a religion at all” (Ming, K. H., 2013: 31). In fact, Confucius was not promising paradise, nor aiming to illuminate others for the sake of God. Confucianism did not have or did not focus on most of the concepts that the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) and other popular religions (Buddhism, Hinduism etc.) have, such as the afterlife, sins, holy books, angels, and so on. Due to this fact, most intellectuals label Confucianism as “non-​religious” and they argue that Chinese people were never religious. This notion is defended by Chinese scholars as well (Chung, 2017: 60). However, the Chinese political system and society were indeed quite religious. It was a political system where the ruler obtains authority from Heaven, and people obey him as a

32  The Tributary System and hegemony semi-​deity figure, just because they believe his authority is endorsed by Heaven. The ruler was believed to have authority to rule all of humanity –​not only China –​on behalf of Heaven. Chinese people have constantly joined and organized various religious activities throughout history. The notion that describing Chinese society and the state as non-​religious perhaps refers to its differences from the Abrahamic religions. Confucianism has played an incomparable role in creating a distinct and coherent Chinese social and political identity and Chinese political philosophy. This fact is confirmed through the term “Confucian Society”, used to describe Chinese and some other Asian societies that have been vastly shaped by Confucianism. Confucian imperial political ideology and the codes of social interactions determined the nature of Imperial China’s relations with other communities and states. Chinese relations with “others” were Confucian as much as its “self”-​definition was. Therefore, Imperial China’s foreign relations, which include the Tributary System, vastly reflected Confucian characteristics. 2.1.3  Taoism (道家) The Taois “School of Dao” (道家) “Dào Jiā” is a belief system or a religion that was formulated around the ideas of Lao Tzu (The Old Master) (老子) “Lǎozı ”̌ (6th century BC), in the book of Tao Te Ching (道德经) “Dào Dé Jīng”. Taoism includes many concepts reinterpreted from folk religion. Laozi was one of the prominent philosophers and even a worshipped deity. He had a huge influence on Chinese and Asian cultures, politics and beliefs, though there is not much information about him. The most reliable source about him is Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand Historian (史記) “Shǐjì”. Lao Tzu was a state bureaucrat of the Zhou Dynasty, responsible for sacred books. When he lost hope of order in the Zhou system, he decided to leave China for India, traveling westward on the back of an ox. At the gate he gave the guard a book which is known as Tao Te Ching, the sacred book of Taoism. While researchers dispute over it, most sources admit that he lived at the same time with Confucius. Laozi was older than him and there are stories about their meetings (Robinet, 1997: 26). “The Way”, Dao (道) “Dào” and Yin-​Yang (阴阳) “Yīn-​Yáng” concepts are the essence of Taoism (or Daoism). Dao is the “invisible, indescribable, immaterial force or energy that is the source of all things, exists or happens” (Dillon, 2017: 66). Dao was described as having created the cosmos, including humans, and all creation shall return back to it (Ebrey, 2010: 47). Yin-​Yang is the positive and negative material energy, seemingly opposite forces, but in fact harmonizing each other, materializing all things in the forms of objects, by cycling around each other (Feuchtwang, 2016b: 150). Taoism suggests that actions and principles should be in harmony with nature, otherwise the natural way of Dao will be interrupted and create problems. All things have relations with each other, and they are interdependent at the same time. Human inaction, wuwei (无为) “Wú Wéi”, will let all things work in its correct way, the way Dao works (Dillon, 2017: 66).

The Tributary System and hegemony  33 The Yin-​Yang concept supports the cyclical concept of time, contrary to the Western linear concept. It brings the understanding that the only essential motion is returning. Everything is returning to itself, or its original form (Zhen, 2016a:  38). This fact explains why the Chinese return to their old values and traditions (Kissinger, 2015: 27) whenever they have trouble with contemporary developments. Contrary to Confucianism, which advocates vigorous and positive interaction between ruler and subjects to create a harmonious and coherent society principally built on benevolence and other virtues, Taoism strongly advocates private life, separation of private and public affairs and freeing public life from the ruler’s interference (Ebrey, 2010: 46). It is idealized as: The highest good is what that of water. The goodness of water is that, it benefits the ten thousand creatures; yet itself does not scramble, but is content with the places that all man disdain. It is this that making water so near to the Way (Dao). (Tzu, 1997: Chapter 8/​8) Advances in human relations and material usage takes people away from the original way Dao worked. So, the best reform or policies are to return to the remote past and catch the pureness of the beginning (Yitik, 2014: 217). The principle of wuwei is applied to management too: Act by means of inaction; deal with matters by means of not being meddlesome; taste by means of tastelessness. The big stems from the small; the many is based on the few. To overcome the difficulty should begin with the easy; to accomplish what is big should begin with the small. The difficult things in the world must originate in the easy; The big things in the world must take root in the small. That is why the sage can accomplish what is great by never attempting to be great. Light promise-​giving, light promise-​breaking; the easier one considers things, the more difficult things become. That is why the sage never meets with difficulty because he always considers things difficult. (Tzu, 1997: Chapter 63/​66) Laozi suggests wuwei, “non-​interference”, to the rulers to achieve the best type of governance. Wuwei does not mean simply doing nothing or non-​action. It means this: not acting in a forceful way to change the ideas or will of the people; to respect people’s natural wish of doing things; to let them fulfill their desires (Zhen, 2016a: 118). The best ruling is also based on not overly informing the public; that is, not letting the public know much but making sure they are healthy (Wen, 2017: 42). In this aspect Taoism advocates a liberal environment for people in a hierarchic ruling and ruled classes structure, and not much democracy. In Confucianism, wuwei works differently. The rulers guide without coercion or they are supposed to demonstrate the right way. (Zhen, 2016a: 118).

34  The Tributary System and hegemony Laozi suggests the governors should be like “water”. Water does not compete with and confront others, but rather it acts “accordingly” (Leyton-​Brown, 2016:  79). It follows its course as it flows, stills if the landscape requires so, adapting to the conditions given by nature. This principle corresponds with one of the most obvious characteristics of Chinese society and state mentality: what can be called “water ethics”, which suggests a decent and humble stance, but a strong inner commitment to the aims. Laozi does not suggest presenting firm values or declaring the aims the ruler has, but suggests following the conditions and requirements of the statuesque to get the desired result. Laozi’s “water ethics” is vulnerable to arbitrary interpretations as well. Interpretation can lead to legitimization of adopting opportunist and deceptive methods, and using all possible means to achieve the target, without presenting a stance of some values or disclosing the real aims. The other prominent Taoist sage is Zhuangzi (庄子) “Zhuāngzǐ” (369–​ 286BC). Being the second sage of Taoism, his ideas are collected in the book carrying his name, Zhuangzi, and it became the second fundamental source of Taoism. Zhuangzi praised the harmoniously, anarchic social orders in pre-​society times, and blamed the kings as destroyers of that ideal society of nature. He argued: “in the age of perfect virtue”, the communities of different states knew each other but did not have any relations. However, after the Sage Kings started to rule them, they were fragmented and clashes began (Ford, 2010: 41). Zhuangzi blamed the Sage Kings for all the problems of society, whereas Confucius described them as “ideal rulers” in the formulation of the Kingly Way, as role models for all kings. Zhuangzi was a typical individualist, defending personal freedom from state interference, and even societal bonds, while pursuing his personal desires that went along with nature and Dao (Wen, 2017:  45). The famous story of the butterfly and his refusal of a prestigious position in the kingdom were well-​known personal experiences in line with his ideas. Zhuangzi gives the example of two swords to symbolize two different ruling methods. The first is “the sword of a feudal lord”, referring to a government in a feudal state. In a feudal state, he argued, the use of the sword would bring power struggles and fragmentation. The second sword is “the sword of Son of Heaven”, and it can bring unity and submission of all on Earth (China), if it is used properly (Zhuangzi, 2017: Chapter 30/​315–​319). Though there are conceptual conflicts between the two sides causing tension sometimes, Taoists and Confucians agree on hierarchy and ultimate unification. Zhuangzi advised further that the rulers who will govern the Middle Kingdom must be obeyed by all people (Ford, 2010: 42). Taoism was not officially implemented as the state ideology for a long time. It can be argued that it was more religious and not realistic enough to encounter the emerging problems of society compared to Confucianism. Taoism was implemented during the first years of the Han Dynasty, until Confucianism was accepted as the state ideology. Though Taoist approaches have sometimes been

The Tributary System and hegemony  35 criticized as non-​progressive (Dillon, 2017: 66), they have had significant influence on Chinese culture, society and politics. The foremost Taoist influential notions were wuwei, the water ethics, the support of a unification ideal, hierarchy, unification under the Son of Heaven, keeping people uninformed about public work and letting them fulfil their desires without interference. 2.1.4  Legalism (法家) Legalism “The School of Law” (法家) “Fǎ Jiā” was one of the most influential philosophical schools in the “Era of Hundred Schools of Thought”. Legalism was set up by Li Si (李斯) “Lǐ Sī” (280–​208BC) and Hanfeizi (韩非子) “Hán Fēi Zǐ” (280–​233BC), both of whom were students of Xunzi. Hanfeizi is known to be the person who formulated legalism in a systematic way. However, both were influenced by the ideas of the Qin Dynasty’s famous statement by Shang Yang (商鞅) “Shāng Yāng”, whose military reforms paved the way for Qin armies to conquer the rest of China, and unite it for the first time (Ebrey, 2010: 51). Shang Yang (or Lord Shang) argued that strong personal desires are the obstacle to creating order in society. “If people live in humiliation, they value ranking; if they are weak, they honor the office; if they are poor, they price rewards” (Yang, S., 1928:  154). Based on the belief that “orderly state brings strength, disorder brings weakness” (Ibid.: 155), legalism basically advocates an authoritarian system of ruling by laws, which does not leave any space for individualism (Ebrey, 2010: 52). Legalists reject the Confucian concepts of “Virtuous Sage Ruler” and Taoist “Non-​Interfering Sage Ruler” as they think that neither provides enough strength to keep order in society. Instead there should be a pure punishment and reward system, based on clearly defined rules, keeping all people in line and properly doing their jobs according to their positions (Droit, 2014: 155). They also suggest the ruler must be a “Sage King”; however, their sage king should not be involved in daily political issues or deal with order in the palace, which all should be handled by the ministers, but instead he should be busy discovering the “regulatory principles” of Dao, arranging the worlds of both nature and human (Wang and Chang, 1986:  9). When the right laws in harmony with the cosmic principles are proclaimed, then what remains is everybody’s obedience to those laws, which reminds us of Max Weber’s model of “rule bound bureaucracy” under a charismatic head (Black, A., 2016: 111). Ministers are chosen by merit-​based laws, and the king has to just supervise them to make sure they do their jobs correctly, and not let them control the ruler, but the ruler must “take hold of the handles of government (minister) carefully, and grip them tightly” (Han, 1967: 18). If they do not do their jobs correctly, they must be strictly punished. Indeed, legalism requires the ruler to be in Taoist non-​action mode (wuwei) and if so, the world achieves complete order. Hanfeizi also named the laws and regulations as “The Way”, Dao (Pines, 2009: 101). These similarities attest legalism’s connection with Taoism.

36  The Tributary System and hegemony Lisi argued that there is no practice ethically wrong or right, as long as state authority is consolidated. The consolidation can be by any means, and the ruler should not think about the ethical side, which corresponds with the principle that the “successful result justifies the means” (Dillon, 2017: 69). In this aspect he resembled Machiavelli (Mosher, 2000: 20). Xunzi’s notion, suggesting that the ruler must govern with rituals outside, laws inside (Wen, 2017: 56), was a method adopted by legalists in the form of ritualist outside, legalist inside. The best and the only truly legalist administration was an extremely autocratic Qin administration, under the rule of Qin Shi Huang: the legendary emperor united China and was the first emperor of a highly centralized administration system. The Qin administration was known for its brutality as well. The concept of a single monist rule and a single unified state that corresponds with the notion of Tianxia (Ford, 2010:  51) created an ideal structure of the political system for the Chinese people. The ideal of Great Unity was the earlier formulation of what legalists have achieved. Qin Shi Huang was under the direct influence of the legalists, Shang Yang, Hanfeizi and especially Lisi, his minister (Dillon, 2017: 69). One of the most important legalist achievements is replacing the aristocratic feudal system with a centralized, merit-​based bureaucracy (Mosher, 2000: 26). However, the brutal reign of the first emperor created such a haunting memory in Chinese society that the same measure of legalism has never been implemented again. Nevertheless, Xunzi’s notion, from outside Confucian while inside legalist, had been applied for two thousand years during the imperial era, from the Han Dynasty to the Qing. People were apparently treated in a Confucian way, but the emperors were ruthless in punishing them when they did “wrong”. Legalism seemingly was applied in the short Qin Dynasty only, but actually it was the hidden face of the Chinese imperial political mechanism, entered Chinese DNA with the Qin Dynasty (Ibid.: 28) and continues under the current regime today. The current CCP regime is defined as legalist, and it is not hidden at all. 2.1.5  Mohism (墨家) Mohism, the “School of Mo” (墨家) “Mò Jiā”, got its name from its founder Mozi (墨子) “Mòzı ”̌ (470–​391BC). Mohism can be described as a religious group with a political nature (Dillon, 2017: 68). Mozi challenged Confucianism as well as legalism and Daoism did. Some of Mozi’s basic ideas were in contradiction with Confucianism. He criticized the basic Confucian value of Benevolence (Ren) to be wrongly defined, as Confucians defend the idea that love should be given to the parents first, then to others, by the order of inner to outer affinity. However, Mozi extends benevolence impartially to the level of “Universal Love” (兼愛) “Jiānài”. For Mozi, discrimination in love does not hail from Heaven. Heaven loves all humans the same, and humans must follow Heaven’s way (Mozi, 1967: 50). Mozi criticized the Confucian emphasis on rituals, like that of mourning for deaths, arguing that it is a waste of time. In this aspect, Mohism approaches things from their consequences (Ebrey, 2010: 55).

The Tributary System and hegemony  37 One of the major principles of Mozi was “Just War”, supported by nona​ ggression, social solidarity and communal help (Dillon, 2017: 68). Mozi personally tried his best to stop many wars (Okay, 2017: 21). He was firmly against aggression. He walked barefoot between the fighting states until he was exhausted and couldn’t walk anymore, and he lost his hair in this struggle. When he could not stop a war, he chose to fight on behalf of the weaker or non-​aggressive side with his students. Mozi argued that “heaven desires, powerful state; family or individuals should not attack or oppress the weak ones; the strong should help the weak; those who understood ‘the way’, should teach to the others; and the wealthy ones should share it” (Black, A., 2016: 101). These moral values in Mohism resemble the Abrahamic religions. Mozi defended the notion of “confirming upright” (商同) “Shāng Tóng”. He argued that in the absence of a state or political power, people cannot know right from wrong. This would cause conflicts and struggle. Therefore, the rulers must be talented, so they can set the norms and people can follow them, as benevolence alone is not enough (Zhen, 2016a: 97). Mozi used rational methods. He used rational calculations rather than empathy as a way of moral judgment. In this aspect, he is the founder of systematic debate in China (Graham, 1989: 36). He can be considered to be “the most modern-​ Western minded ancient Chinese” (Black, A., 2016: 101). Other schools of thought appeared in the same time period, less popular but worth mentioning here. They included:  the School of Yin-​Yang (阴阳家) “Yīnyáng Jiā”, the School of Names (Logician) (名家) “Míngjiā”, the School of Agriculture (农家) “Nóng Jiā”, the School of Diplomacy (纵横家) “Zòng Héng Jiā”, Za School (杂家) “Zájiā” and the School of Small Talks (小说家) “Xiǎo Shuō Jiā”. Further, we have to mention the imported religions that reached certain numbers of followers, like Islam (伊斯兰教) “Yī Sī Lán Jiào”, Christianity (基督教) “Jī Dū Jiào” and Buddhism (佛教) “Fó Jiào”. They have not been hugely influential on Chinese imperial political thought, though they had a certain number of followers and considerable influence on various aspects of culture. Buddhism especially had a reputable place in Chinese culture and society, yet it had little effect on Chinese imperial political thought (Ford, 2010: 49), perhaps mostly because of its antisocial ascetic characteristics. Christianity and especially Islam had followers and a long history in China, but they have mostly been excluded by predominantly Confucian Chinese political thought. Chinese identity, culture and political thought have deep roots in its historical experience and its exclusive folk religion. Changes and developments influenced by outsiders are not really a factor in Chinese imperial political thought, compared with Europe or the Middle East. Local roots are the main dynamics of political philosophy. Chinese characteristics are the main feature of Chinese political thought. In Chinese cosmology, even the creator of the universe is Chinese (Kissinger, 2015: 36). Thus, the strong Chinese characteristics of imperial political thought are a sign of how the Chinese situate themselves in the universe. Confucianism and Confucian values have been at the heart of imperial political philosophy. Taoism followed, and legalism came next.

38  The Tributary System and hegemony The Chinese imperial political mentality of an ideal administration was based on the dual tenets of coercion and benevolence. The ruler was believed to be an ideal human, the highest virtuous person on Earth, who could attract the compassion of Heaven for the sake of his subjects. He was supposed to rule the subjects with benevolence and passion, like a father, and his virtuous ruling style was supposed to create consent among the subjects. On the other hand, the laws and state power were held in reserve against the subjects, and they were used brutally in case of any disorder or disobedience. Thus, the general structure of political philosophy was based on Confucian, legalist and Taoist values. The discussions among the different schools in the era of the Hundred Schools of Thought were amazingly good in quality and diversity. This gives an impression of a highly confident society that enjoys generous freedom. The discussion topics and the ideas are highly mature for their time. It is because of that maturity, when Chinese imperial political thought needed to be examined, the era of the Hundred Schools of Thought is the first on the list. This era put a permanent mark on the next two thousand years. The Chinese state demolished its feudal system at the end of the era of the Hundred Schools of Thought, and adopted a highly centralized, absolute monarchic rule, which Europe also did after the Age of Enlightenment, roughly two thousand years later. Chinese society, being quite confident about the advancement of its culture, mostly struggled for political unity in times of disunity, but they rarely questioned the political, social and moral system and alternative systems did not find a place in Chinese society until modern times. This was partially because China was closed off from external influences for the most of history (Shi and Chen, 2014: 62). China did not have the experiences that Europe had during its history, having intense interactions with other societies with more sophisticated cultures. The Renaissance, geographic discoveries, the Enlightenment, the industrial revolution, reform and secularism, the emergence of capitalism, the French Revolution, notions of equality and freedom, human rights, and so on, did not overly influence China. In fact, Chinese society and the bureaucratic class did not have a comprehensive awareness of these events and concepts. The Chinese had little reason to question their political and cultural values and develop alternatives. Obedience, non-​interference and strict observance of hierarchy as the main characteristics of the culture seem to be the factors behind this quiescence. In the Middle East and Europe, the kings or emperors were morally questionable, whether their decisions and acts were compatible with moral and religious values or not. The rulers were followers of religions, not the God or Son of the God. The laws they enacted were administrative, observing the lines of the religious values. The laws could not define the borders of morality, rather they would be within the borders of morality. Morality was defined by the Church, Holy Books and God, so laws enacted by rulers could be right or wrong according to these moral values. Those laws and the ruling systems that were made by people could be changed or abolished. They might not be very well structured or could be inadequate to cope with the changes that time and different conditions brought.

The Tributary System and hegemony  39 However, in China the emperor was the source of morality because the political system and notions were part of the folk religion, endorsed by Confucianism. Morality and politics were so well combined that fairness and ethics went together with obedience to public and social norms (Zhen, 2016b: 45). People were at the same time performing a religious duty while obeying the emperors, officials, community, family and the elderly in a strict religious collectivist manner. The whole of Earth had the duty to submit to the emperor, as he was believed to be the sole ruler of All Under the Heaven. As Son of Heaven, he could act on behalf of God, that had to be obeyed unquestionably by the whole Earth. The hidden legalist face actually ensured obedience in physical ways as well. Besides other reasons, like geographic isolation, lack of interaction, and so on, these were the main reasons why Chinese society could not develop a revolutionary tradition, and could not evolve to a new stage after a centralized absolute monarchy, to a democratic system or any other in a two-​thousand-​year time period, while Europe moved on to democracy and declared human rights within a few centuries, after the era of intense philosophical discussions and absolute monarchy. The philosophical branches and political tradition examined until now do not have clear and comprehensive ideas or strategies on the relations with “others”, the foreigners. Foreign relations developed over the course of time, mostly on practical realities, when Chinese states faced strong adversaries from the north, or submission from Confucian societies. Chinese imperial foreign relations developed gradually. Nevertheless, it was not in the form of an international order, but a Chinese world order.

2.2  The world order of Imperial China After examining Chinese imperial political thought and tradition and before starting to analyze the Tributary System, it is necessary to assess the mentality towards foreign relations in Imperial China. Imperial China did not have the concept of international or interstate relations, as the culture and state mentality did not have concepts of nation, foreign sovereignty and equality on which the contemporary international system is based (Fairbank, 1968: 5). Chinese foreign relations had the same hierarchical structure as domestic society (Ibid.: 2). For the Chinese there was actually one genuine sovereign political entity in the world, which was China. That is why, when referring to Imperial China’s foreign relations, it is more correct to use the term Chinese imperial world order. Chinese imperial world order can be effectively explained in two theoretically contradicting main concepts. These are Tianxia “All Under Heaven” (天下) “Tiān Xià” and Hua–​Yi Distinction (华夷之辨) “Huá–Yí Zhībiàn”. The concept of Tianxia defines the peaceful, inclusive and universalist side of Chinese imperial world order, while Hua–​Yi Distinction describes the xenophobic, intolerant and unpeaceful side of it. Furthermore, how the conceptual terms are actually applied in practice will receive special attention in this section.

40  The Tributary System and hegemony The Chinese imperial world order is defined in many formulations nowadays. Chinese scholars especially have tried their best to produce a comprehensive ideology that it can convince the world to adopt, digging down into the deep historical, traditional and philosophical principles and practices to find some universal principles which will legitimize Chinese policies and boost national pride. This can be broadly viewed as the result of reaction to the Western hegemony in “discourse power”. The concepts of Tianxia and Hua–​Yi Distinction, as the Yin and Yang of Chinese imperial world order, can explain most of its practical historical experience. Therefore, in this book these two terms will be covered to basically define the perception of world order in Imperial China. 2.2.1  Tianxia (天下) Tianxia (天下) “Tiān Xià” means “All Under Heaven”. It is a special Chinese religious, political, cultural and geographical concept that practically refers to China but literally, theoretically, and theologically refers to the whole world (Liang, 1899: 76). Shun had five ministers, and the empire (Tianxia) was well-​governed. King Wu said, “I have ten able minister” ’. Confucius said, “Is not the saying that talents are difficult to find, true? only when the dynasties of Tang and Yu met, were they more abundant than in this of Chau, yet there was a woman among them. The able ministers were no more than nine men. King Wan possessed two of the three parts of the Tianxia, and with those he served the dynasty of Yin. The virtue of the house of Chau may be said to have reached the highest point indeed.” (Confucius, 1861a: VIII/​20/​78) If the Chinese imperial world order is assumed to have good and bad sides, Tianxia conceptually was the good side, though its practical application did not always correspond to this. The owner of the famed Tianxia theory, Zhao Tingyang (2012:  59), gives three definitions of Tianxia. The first, as an ordinary meaning, refers to the whole land under the sky which is the physical Earth. The second refers to the Confucian interpretation of a “common or public choice made by all people”, reflecting their common ideal will. The third represents the Zhou Dynasty and also Confucius’ wish, the political system of the world, that is responsible for managing all people. In Zhao’s definition, the term represents the physical, psychological and political world. Interestingly, Chinese scholars skip the religious meaning, but actually it is a term which emerged from the religious concept of the division of the cosmos into earthly and heavenly realms. It directly referred to the realm left to the emperor to govern on behalf of Heaven, while the other realm is governed by Heaven itself, so it is a religious term as well, referring to the “ecumenical claim” (Wang, E. Q., 1999: 287) of Chinese rulers.

The Tributary System and hegemony  41 The term Tianxia emerged in the Shang Dynasty, but became common in the Western Zhou period (Mosher, 2000:  16). Shang kings ruled absolutely with religious authority, as they were believed to be the direct descendants of Shangdi, the Supreme God. Zhou kings did not come from the lineage of Shang kings, so they changed it to Mandate of Heaven. But the concept of ruling the Earth on behalf of the Shangdi, now Tian, did not change. It resembled the claim of the Catholic Church, to manage the Earth on behalf of God, but with the difference of passing earthly matters to the kings to be handled. According to Han Zhen (2016b: 112), when the term Tianxia first emerged it referred to “monarch, state power or the nation”, while later it evolved to mean the whole world. The concept of Tianxia is crucial for understanding Imperial China’s perception of foreign relations and world order. The concept reflects the theoretical inclusiveness of the Chinese perception of world order. It is the expression of Chinese universalism or cosmopolitanism. A  semi-​deity emperor, furnished with sagely virtues and fatherly concerns for the whole of humanity, who was afraid of losing the Mandate of Heaven if he did not treat people well, was thought to rule the universe, including foreigners. The idealistic frame is perfect and promises a lot to the neighboring nations and tribes as it sounds peaceful and inclusive. The impression of Tianxia recalled a peaceful approach of Chinese universalism, as all humans were treated equally on behalf of Heaven. However, the practical application did not correspond. First, it brought hierarchy into the international domain, just as in domestic relations. In Fairbank’s (1968:  315) description, in the first circle around the emperor there were the Han people, considered to be the civilized and essential circle. In the second circle there were minorities, under Chinese administration but who did not yet fully embrace Chinese culture, and were regarded as “semi-​civilized”. In the last circle there were the barbarians, beyond Chinese borders, not yet civilized. The determining factor of civilization level was the adoption level of Chinese culture, to such an extent that, in the Qing Dynasty (清朝) “Qīng Cháo” (1644–​1911), the British King George was a king of barbarians (Kissinger, 2015:  65), as the British had nothing to do with Chinese culture. Second, the centrality of China and its culture was actually announced in its name, China “Middle Kingdom” (中国) “Zhōng Guó”. This term acquired its final meaning in the Qing Dynasty, and by this name the Chinese were referring to their country as the center of civilization or the only land worth being counted by Heaven, compared to the barbarians beyond the borders (Wilkinson, 2000: 132). The ancient Chinese did not have convincing reasons to have little doubt about their centrality. On the contrary, they had strong cause to believe that they were the center or the only civilized part of the Earth, and Chinese culture was superior to all others, just by comparing themselves with any of their neighbors. The cradle of Chinese civilization, the Yellow River basin (黃河流域) “Huánghé Liúyù”, used to host a highly advanced lifestyle and political tradition

42  The Tributary System and hegemony compared to the surrounding areas. A sedentary culture brought a more prosperous life, organized community, regulated management, and advanced moral and political systems. On the other hand, the surrounding communities were mostly living primitive, nomadic or semi-​sedentary lives, divided in tribal units, with a lack of civic advancement, and did not have much improvement in culture to compete with the Chinese Huaxia community. This was the major factor supporting the perception of centrality and self-​supremacy of the Chinese people (Fairbank, 1968: 37). Geographical determinism is a respectable way of explaining the different perceptions and lifestyles that emerged in different societies. Lattimore (1940: 25) suggests that the environment has effects on the development of society, while climate has effects on communal activities. Similarly, Ibn Khaldun’s theory claims that physical environment determines the non-​physical factors (Gates, 1967:  415). Montesquieu was also believed to be influenced by Ibn Khaldun, on account of his theory of environmental effects on human nature and societies (Ibid.:  422). Chinese statesman Guang Zhong (管仲) “Guǎn Zhòng” (720–​ 645BC), who lived a century before Confucius, connected the physical features of the rivers with people’s character, arguing that the harsh and twisting rivers made the people of frontiers greedy, rude and warlike (Guanzi, 1998: 106). The geographical position of China was one of the biggest determinants of its perception of centrality (Kissinger, 2015: 36) and the supremacy of its culture. The flat and fertile geography with its mild climate provided the finest conditions to develop a sedentary lifestyle and a refined community. When the ancient Chinese encountered their surroundings, what they saw was a huge ocean in the east; enormous high mountain ranges, large deserts and barren lands with nomadic, unfriendly people in the north and west; and endless hills, forests and primitive cultures in the south (Shi and Chen, 2014: 6). Thus, its geography confirmed that they were the center of civilization and their culture was superior. They had some interactions with and information about the Roman and Indian civilizations during the Han and Tang Dynasties, and later in the medieval period they had direct contact and trading with advanced Islamic civilizations as well (Kissinger, 2015: 29). In fact, when the Chinese Shang Dynasty started to use scripts, the ancient Egyptians (Ibid.: 26) and Mesopotamians were at the peak of their civilizations. However, all these were limited interactions and did not bring much change to the Chinese perception of the world, especially that of the ordinary Chinese. Contrary to the Chinese rhetoric, which underlines the peacefulness of the Tianxia concept, it is not much different from the other universalisms, basically because of the strong dose of Sinocentrism. Abrahamic universalism depends on conversion in a salvationist approach. Salvation for the “infidel others” comes from their conversion to the beliefs that Abrahamic religions offer. Conversion is the only principle to abolish barbarian status. It is measured by adherence to the Abrahamic values. Modern European universalism was provided by the “white man’s burden”, bringing freedom and “civilization” to the Earth (Shafer, 1988: 46). Salvation from barbarianism came by adherence to the “white man’s” values.

The Tributary System and hegemony  43 Third, Chinese universalism was said to be peaceful and did not have salvationist instincts (Zhao, T., 2012). However, history does not confirm this. In fact, Imperial China was not much different than any other imperial power in history. They also fought for land and expansion, as well as imposed their values on barbarians with the self-​appointed mission of civilizing them. The Chinese expanded their lands in any direction possible and they stopped when expansion was not possible anymore, or when the country reached natural borders (Shi and Chen, 2014: 6). Natural borders were defined by geography: ocean to the east; Himalayas to the west; deserts to the north and mountains and forests in the south. The north was further closed by the Chinese themselves, with the Great Wall (长城) “Chángchéng” (Ibid.: 7). Managing a country between these borders brought a self-​sufficient economy, prosperity and a reasonable ability to manage it due to its convenient size. Beyond these natural borders was difficult to manage, and more importantly, there wasn’t much need for those areas, neither economically nor politically. Non-​aggression and peacefulness of those areas, or if possible, their obedience, was enough for Chinese emperors. The salvationist instinct of Chinese universalism rested in the mission to spread Chinese culture. When Chinese culture is considered, one should not forget that its values mostly stemmed from the Chinese folk religion. Confucianism was just a revitalization of earthly chapters of those religious values. Spreading the Chinese culture, “bringing civilization” to the conquered lands, Wang Dao, which actually means spreading Chinese folk religion as well, was one of the basic duties to carry out in the conquered lands. This explains how the Huaxia culture, initially covering the Yellow River basin (Ge, 2018: 6), in a very short time expanded to a much bigger area, to Vietnam in the south, Tibet in the east and Mongolia in the north. Ge (2018: 5) recognized that the “periphery” of China was always changing and it was because the old periphery later became part of China through continuous conquests. At the beginning of Chinese civilization, the Yangtze River (长江) “Cháng Jiāng” formed a border. To the south were barbarian lands and King Wu of Zhou died on an expedition trying to civilize them. Later, from the Qin Dynasty onwards, the same border river between civilized and barbarians found itself in the middle of the civilized country due to continued land annexations to the south. Chinese Salvationism required civilizing the barbarians by converting them to embrace Chinese cultural values (Ibid.: 11). This is how all those ethnic minorities gradually blended culturally with the Han people, after conquest. Chinese Salvationism was visible in the eras of initial conquests, in the Qin and Han Dynasties, until it reached its natural borders. After that the Chinese generally lost interest in advancing further, and kept that attitude until the rule of the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty in the 13th century. Jared Diamond (1997: 352) expressed this fact in his famous book Guns, Gems and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies as “Environment molds history”. Chinese expansionism, the mission of civilizing and Salvationism were no longer seen after its natural borders were reached. After this stage, with the effects of strong and hostile neighbors, China gradually became introverted.

44  The Tributary System and hegemony Geography has contributed to the introverted and conservative characteristics of Chinese culture and society. This view is shared by Shi and Chen (2014: 7), expressed thus: There are two obvious characteristics of the Chinese mainland, the land is huge, and neighboring conditions are severe … which makes Chinese culture an introverted culture in a strict sense. China’s agricultural and natural economy and Confucian culture have strong features of closed development. Tianxia theory is presented as a peaceful solution for the problems of the world. Chinese history is almost constantly presented by Chinese scholars as peaceful. Peacefulness is a very firm assertion for a culture that has a strong sense of superiority and humiliates others. During the Spring and Autumn Era over two and half centuries, 483 wars broke out in China between the rival states (Mosher, 2000:  17). History does not bear out the theory of Imperial China’s peacefulness, as Callahan (2008: 15) also suggests. Chinese dynasties had countless wars with northern and eastern Turkic, Manchu, Mongolian, and Tibetan tribes, occasional wars with the Vietnamese and even with the Confucian societies of Korea and Japan, along with Ceylon, the Roman Empire and Arabic empires, despite being far apart from each other. The endless domestic struggles for power and uprisings over the course of two millennia are not able to be included in this evaluation. As a very special exception, Tianxia universalism, adopted in the era of the Tang Dynasty (唐朝) “Táng Cháo” (618–​907AD) and in the two fragmented periods before and after it, was the closest to the ideal definition. The founder of the Tang Dynasty, Gaozu (唐高祖) “Táng Gāozǔ”, was of foreign blood (Chung, 2017: 121). The first and only Empress in Chinese history, Wu Zetian (武则天) “Wǔ Zétiān” (624–​705), also ruled in the Tang era. Chinese culture had never been open to interaction that much until Tang’s time and would never be that much after Tang. Tang was not xenophobic, but a xenophile, with nearly no sign of Sinocentrism (Ibid.: 122). The Tang era was the formation period of the Confucian international system (Hei, Zhao and Ma, 2016: 584). Chinese culture gained numerous elements from steppe cultures. Foreigners could enter China, settle, trade and practice their religions and cultures freely. They could even take part in government by passing the Civil Servant Examination, and there were some foreign generals in the army as well (Dillon, 2017: 230). The Tang was a true superpower with cosmopolitan cities, and friendly approaches to neighboring societies and China had a thriving economy by with international trade, especially along the Silk Road (丝绸之路) “Sīchóuzhīlù”. Moreover, it had relations with 300 countries (Ibid.: 225). Cultural interaction was at its peak and religious tolerance paved the way for the introduction and spread of Manichaeism, Islam, Zoroastrianism, Nestorianism and widespread Buddhism in China (Ibid.:  231). Confucianism was spreading to neighboring Asian countries as well in this peaceful and tolerant environment of interaction (Hei, Zhao and Ma, 2016: 584). Chinese emperors were using coercion and consent together to manage the relations with

The Tributary System and hegemony  45 their aggressive neighbors (Ibid.: 581). Prosperity and peace not only benefited China, but also the neighbors in this ideal application of Tianxia universalism. Antony Black (2015: 12) suggests that the Confucian principles of humanness and harmonious international relations should be the world ideology, if one were needed. Nevertheless, in the practice of most of history, Tianxia universalism presented features of convert-​Salvationism, similar to the universalisms in other cultures such as Rome (Ibid.: 6). In both systems outsiders could become insiders by adopting the “culture”, otherwise they were simply labeled barbarians and perished (Feuchtwang and Steinmüller, 2017:  18). Having different characteristics of jurisdiction, geography, different moral sets and cosmology did not make them different in attitude to the others. It would be unrealistic to contend, as Zhao Tingyang does (2012), that China has never been a religious state, Chinese society has never been a religious society, Chinese culture and state have never been expansionist and salvationist, and it has been peaceful all the time. Most contemporary Chinese scholars are heavily influenced by Chinese official ideology (Ge, 2018: 11), which imposes excessive antipathy against religion and a large dose of Chinese nationalism, with signs of cultural chauvinism. Their analyses and opinions are mostly along the extreme lines of “self”-​admiration and the biases of false “others”, “civilized” collectivist Chinese heritage and “aggressive” selfish individualist others. This negative instinct and attitude have a relation with the never forgotten Century of Humiliation (百年国耻) “Bǎinián Guóchǐ” (1839–​1949) (Adcock, 2010: 1). Whatever the reasons, these are the obstacles Chinese narrative has to overcome to analyze the notions and history on a realistic basis. In sum, Tianxia was a special term that defined and contained the peaceful and exclusive characteristics of Chinese imperial foreign relations, Chinese universalism and Chinese world order. Theoretically, it is inclusive, universalist and peaceful, promising a lot to the world, which struggles with various discriminations and inequalities. However, in practice it did not work in correspondence with its definition. Tianxia has a highly Sinocentric mentality. Despite the controversial claims, it was salvationist and expansionist, placing Chinese cultural values, which were mostly derived from Chinese folk religion, at the center. These features gradually diminished until the time when the natural geographical borders were reached. From then on, the salvationist and expansionist instincts of Tianxia transformed into introverted but highly self-​confident, contemptuous and xenophobic characteristics, with little tolerance of differences. Chinese folk religion inherently existed and performed its rules in Chinese society in the actions of the ruling class in the form of an earthly culture, without strong references to the metaphysical concepts, and it is observable in the concept of Tianxia. The culture’s conservativeness came from its religious nature, though its religion does not resemble other popular faiths such as the Abrahamic religions. As a primitive religion, the dogmas of Chinese folk religion were the main commanding sources of Chinese culture and philosophy. Tianxia is one of the concepts rooted in Chinese folk religion and got its Confucian re-​touching later. Thus, the Chinese political system was a religious one, and the principles that guided its foreign

46  The Tributary System and hegemony relations and world order were all religious, because they were all defined by its exclusive religion, Chinese folk religion, from which Taoism and Confucianism sprang. The differences between theory and practice make the claimed peacefulness of Tianxia universalism highly debatable. Peace between China and the other Confucian cultures –​Vietnam, Korea, Japan, Ryukyu –​after their submission was mostly established, though occasionally there were clashes for different reasons. Nevertheless, with non-​Confucian societies such as the nomads in the north and west, China was almost constantly at war during most of its history. Peacefulness in Tianxia depended first on how much the counterparts were converted to Chinese culture, and second, if there were no clashes in political and economic interests. Consequently, Tianxia offered a world order under the patronage of Chinese political, religious and cultural values, with limited or no tolerance to any other alternatives. This makes the Tianxia world order quite similar to others, such as the Roman and Middle Eastern (Abrahamic) ones, in terms of their universalism, peacefulness and inclusiveness. 2.2.2  Hua–​Yi Distinction (华夷之辨) Hua–​ Yi (civilized–​ barbarian) Distinction (华夷之辨) “Huá–​ Yí Zhībiàn” is another decisive historical concept, to help gain an insight into how the Chinese saw foreigners and to comprehend the characteristics of Chinese imperial foreign relations. Hua–​Yi Distinction as a concept represents the negative and xenophobic side of the Chinese imperial world order, in contrast with the theoretically cosmopolitan, peaceful and inclusive Tianxia concept. The Chinese attitude to foreign communities varied on the basis of their affinity with Chinese culture. If foreign communities such as the Vietnamese, Japanese and Koreans embraced Chinese cultural values, the relations were mostly peaceful and regulated by the Confucian values of hierarchy, respect, rites, and so on. However, if the foreign community had no affinity with the Chinese cultural (religious) values, relations were established but the people were generally discriminated against, excluded and labeled as “barbarians”. The relations were set up and carried out in the form of a “civilized–​barbarians” relationship. Hua (华) “cultured-​civilized” referred to China, Yi (夷) “barbarian-​uncivilized” (Pines, 2005:  59) in practical usage referred to the northern, southern and western nomadic tribes, but in theory it applied to all foreign communities. Therefore, the Chinese basically divided foreigners into Confucian and Non-​ Confucian societies. Hua–​Yi Distinction was the practical formulation through which the Chinese handled practical relations with “non-​Confucian” societies. The civilization level was not measured by blood relationship or tribal affinity, but was a matter of adhering to Chinese cultural values. In the imperial Chinese world order there was no foreign state or society of equal status with China. The equality was between the foreigners, but China was above them all. There was impartiality between foreigners in the Chinese approach. All foreigners in theory were considered to be equal to each other (Wang, G., 1968: 61). China

The Tributary System and hegemony  47 was believed to be always unequaled, among all. Besides, a tribe or state could be civilized if it adopted Chinese culture, or could turn back to barbarian status if converted to another culture: two ways to transition between civilized and barbarian status. So, Hua–​Yi Distinction emphasized the superiority of Chinese culture, but also implied that others could join (Arrighi, 1996: 20). Though in Sima Qian’s Shiji many known Chinese ancestors were of nomadic origin, like the Yellow Emperor, Yu The Great, Qin Shi Huang and so on (Xu, 2016:  36), and the nomadic communities contributed to Chinese civilization as much as Han people (Hei, Zhao and Ma, 2016:  442), the distinction of Chinese and barbarian started very early, in the second millennium BC (Fiskesjo, 2012: 61). The clear distinction of Hua–​Yi started in the Zhou Dynasty (Li and Zheng, 2001: 116). Though Qiang (羌) “Qiāng” people were the first people to use proto-​Chinese scripts, they were also labeled barbarians (Fiskesjo, 2012: 62). In theory, Tianxia and the Mandate of Heaven concepts did not exclude foreigners from Chinese culture and its political system (Mittag and Mutschler, 2010: 18). It was formulated simply: the emperor was the head of the Tianxia while the barbarians were the feet, but still a part of Tianxia (Ibid.: 545). However, in practice there was a sharp discrimination. The Chinese have approached the “others” with a very xenophobic attitude throughout history. For the Chinese, there were only three kinds of living beings on Earth: Chinese, barbarians and beasts (Ford, 2010: 88). Barbarians were often named using Chinese characters associated with animals, like dog, beast, ape, bug, worm, and so on (Fiskesjo, 2012: 57). In southern China the slang word “ghost” (鬼老) “Guı ľ ǎo” was used for British people on first meeting, and it is now applied to all foreigners. Some barbarians were called “cooked barbarians” (熟) “Shú”, if they had a certain degree of affinity with Chinese culture and submitted to the Chinese authorities, while those who did not live in Chinese jurisdictions, sometimes doing corvee labor and not subject to Chinese laws, were called “raw” (生) “Shēng” barbarians (Fiskesjo, 1999: 143). All those who did not look Chinese, physically, culturally or ethnically, were looked down on by Chinese people as inferior beings and were humiliated (Pulleyblank, 1983: 411). In Confucian definitions, having virtues was not enough to merit being called human. Besides, the person must participate in a Confucian society, after all it was the only meaningful one on Earth. Those people outside the borders were barely human, but beasts, as, in the Confucian approach, they did not have “rites” (礼) “Lı ”̌ (Ford, 2010:  87). These rites referred to those in the context of Confucian definition. Hailing from outside of a Confucian society inevitably made anybody barbarian in this aspect. Among all of the barbarians, the most troublesome were the northerners. They were in constant conflict with China throughout most of known history. They established states and empires in the steppes, attacked Chinese border towns, sometimes plundering the inner cities, sometimes conquering parts of or the whole of China, like the Northern Wei (北魏) “Běiwèi” (386–​534AD), the Yuan Dynasty (元朝) “Yuán Cháo” (1279–​1368), the Qing Dynasty (清朝) “Qīng Cháo” (1644–​1911) and so on. They have influenced China in many

48  The Tributary System and hegemony aspects as well (Kang, 2007: 25). Tan Chung (2017: 99) suggests that China has been governed by foreigners as much as by locals. The nomadic people in the steppes neither had the sense of belonging to the Chinese world order nor did they accept its superiority in most cases. They had their own cultural, religious and political systems, compatible with their nomadic lifestyle (Kang, 2007: 25), but mostly different from those of the Chinese. At the beginning of Chinese civilization, or in the pre-​Confucian era, a philosopher did not know what advanced civilization actually was, but they knew Chinese civilization was better than being barbarian (Wang, G., 1968: 36). The latter were not civilized and not friendly, posing a threat to China’s public order (Mittag and Mutschler, 2010: 20). There were convincing reasons for the Chinese to find a permanent strategy to solve the threats coming from barbarians. As Sima Qian commented, exhibiting power and virtue in central Asia was too costly, and the land did not deserve to be conquered (Ibid.: 39). Besides, the expensive military campaigns caused financial and social instability. Thus, the methods to deal with barbarians varied considerably over time and depended on the community encountered. Conquest and assimilation by force, attracting them by virtue, pushing out those who resisted, lord-​vasal relationships with those who accepted it or totally ignoring them were the methods the Chinese adopted occasionally (Ibid.:  37). Initially, the most adhered method was to attack and destroy, or assimilate, if possible. However, this policy was later found to be insufficient in solving the problems permanently. In the Zhou, Qin and Han Dynasty eras, the Turkic Hun (匈奴) “Xiōngnú” (4th century BC–​late 1st century AD) was a strong state of northern barbarians, nearly always in constant hostility with China, who did not accept Chinese cultural superiority, even posing their own superiority over China (Ford, 2010: 85). In Sima Qian’s (1993b: 129–​163) Shiji, they were described as a tribe with a long history, strong traditions and fighting skills. The Chinese did not have a united coherent strategy to deal with foreigners until the big conflict between Han and Xiongnu (Wang, G., 1968: 40). Xiongnu was the first neighboring barbarian that forced China to formulate its strategies of foreign relations. In this period three important ideas shaped imperial foreign policy towards the barbarians. When Xiongnu forces surrounded the Han Emperor Gaozu (汉高祖) “Hàn Gāozǔ” (247–​195BC) in 200BC, in the Battle of Baideng, the Chinese were convinced that barbarians were not that easily destroyed by military attacks. The seriousness of the threat pushed them to develop more comprehensive strategies. Finally, “five strategies” were developed to deal with barbarians (Yu, Y., 1986: 450): 1. Harmonious kinship strategy (和親) “Héqīn”; inter-​dynasty marriages for establishing peaceful relations with “brotherly states”, supported by the tradition of annual “gifts”, which was actually paying tribute to Xiongnu and many other cases. Marriage alliances were established to set up blood relations to secure the country against the threats, though the acceptance of this was thought to be humiliation for Chinese emperors.

The Tributary System and hegemony  49 2. The coercion policy of attacking the enemy with a strong army in order to destroy it had totally collapsed. It was removed from the options. 3. A defensive policy was developed which would be the major characteristic of Chinese engagement with the barbarians after that. Standing armies, wall building, establishment of military colonies (屯田) “Túntián”, and the concept of “Punitive Expeditions” (征伐) “Zhēngfá” were introduced. 4. The concept of “loose reigns” (羈縻) “Jimí”, referring to non-​interference and free trade with nomads, was developed. 5. The strategy of “controlling barbarians through barbarians” (以夷制夷) “Y ı y̌ í Zhìyí” was developed. When Britain obtained trading rights after the Opium wars, the Chinese easily granted the same rights to the other powers such as the French, Russians and Americans as well. It was the strategy of controlling barbarians through the other barbarians, by creating conditions for rivalry and conflict among them. In a more deceptive approach, the famous Han statesman Jia Yi (贾谊) “Jiǎ Yì” (200–​169 BC) formulated “the three standard and five baits” (三表五饵) “sānbiǎo wǔěr” to engage with them. This strategy highlighted the hierarchy between a civilized and a barbarian community as the reaction to the relatively equal relations in Heqin policies. While giving the honor of a “benevolent” position to the Chinese emperor, he suggested approaching the barbarians in a deceptive Confucian manner by attracting them to make them civilized. The three standards for the Chinese emperors were to keep faith in a friendly manner, to make them believe the “Son of Heaven” likes their appearance, and to make them believe they were loved for their war techniques. The five bits of bait were about indulging them. For their eye service, giving nice clothes and carriers; to close their mouths, giving nice foods; to close their ears, giving music and women; to fill their stomach, giving grain stocks and slaves. And finally, when they came to surrender, indulge them with food and wine feasts in the emperor’s presence (Yu, Y., 1967: 37). As time has proved that a peaceful approach does not solve problems, in search of solutions to create a framework which would work all the time, Ban Gu (班固) “Bān Gù” (32–​92AD), the Han Dynasty historian and politician, was the first to set up a theory of imperial foreign relations, after the relaxation that came with the collapse of the Xiongnu. He formulated this relationship structure, inspired by history. He assumed that neither peace nor aggression were permanent solutions in dealing with barbarians. He suggested an engagement strategy called “five submissions” (五賦) “wǔfu”, which consisted of five degrees of hierarchical relationship, which he defended as being defined by nature and geography. In an approach of “inner” and “outer” division, China was the inner division, and the barbarians were the neglected outer divisions, with no formal relations and no wars. They would be controlled when they were close to the borders and carefully watched even when they were far from the borders (Ibid.: 41). These last two strategies were relatively arrogant, tactical and deceptive strategies and they were selectively adopted whenever the Chinese faced a foreign

50  The Tributary System and hegemony force which seemed stronger than themselves. Even in the Qing Dynasty, when the British and Portuguese forces came, the Chinese applied the strategy of indulging them to make sure they did not pose a threat. Zhaoguang Ge (2018:  13) describes the wars between China and Xiongnu as “international war”, while others defined it as “civil war”. China–​Xiongnu relations followed the characteristics of a Balance of Power system, though the Chinese never accepted the Xiongnu to as a peer. The collapse of Xiongnu, being a strong state with the ability to dictate to China, changed the balance in favor of China. For the Chinese an important obstacle had disappeared in the journey to consolidate their belief in their superiority (Wang, G., 1968: 41). The strategies to deal with other neighbors developed before the Confucian era and mostly were used in the Confucian era as well. However, those strategies did not have complete Confucian characteristics. The basic characteristic of a Confucian approach to the barbarians was to attract them with virtues and benevolence, but not neglecting the necessity to keep power in reserve. An indulgent strategy was very compatible with Confucian values, but calling a barbarian a “brother” was not compatible with hierarchy, the backbone of Confucian values. The most comprehensive form of relationship with the barbarians was formulated with motives of superiority, well-​suited to Confucian values. That comprehensive form of relationships, enriched in the long history of Confucian characteristics, later would be called the “Tributary System” (朝贡体制) “Cháogòng Tǐzhì”. Sinification (汉化) “Hànhuà”, the name for the process of spreading Chinese values to non-​Chinese ethnicities within and outside Chinese borders, was an important aspect of the Hua–​Yi Distinction. Spreading cultural and religious values to others was not observed only in Imperial China. By a more common name, “assimilation”, it can be seen in many cultures and geographies in the past and present. Sinification was another way of handling the barbarians. It was an acculturation process of non-​Chinese people. When the Chinese failed to defeat foreign invaders, they chose Sinification. This was considered to be the final method of fighting and protection as well (Wang, E. Q., 1999: 288). Chinese success in Sinification explains why every time that China was conquered by a neighboring barbarian, it ended up with assimilation and integration of their new rulers. As Kissinger (2015: 26) points out, the new conqueror had to adopt the established Chinese values and their way of government to legitimize himself; otherwise it was impossible to manage such a conservative country, with his own values and methods. Chinese values that needed to be adopted first were the “Confucian ideology, Chinese scripts, Civil Servant Examination, sedentary lifestyle (after the Tang Dynasty) and agricultural economy” (Wang, E. Q., 1999:  289). In this sense, every conqueror did not actually add China to his empire, but added his own empire to China. China got the biggest land annexations from the Mongolian Yuan Empire and Manchu Qing Empire. They made the biggest land contribution, including their own countries, to create what we call “China” today. Sinification is approached in different ways by various scholars. Evelyn Rawski (1996:  835) argues that Sinification was much more complicated than simply

The Tributary System and hegemony  51 naming it “assimilation”. She draws attentions to the Chinese effort to protect their culture. On the other hand, Ping-​Ti Ho (1998: 133), in a counter argument, argues that the Chinese Sinification process in many cases was too barbarian in practice. Sinification was one of the strongest attitudes to the “others” in Chinese culture. However, it is hard to evaluated it as a purely one-​sided transition. It is commonly accepted that both Chinese and non-​Chinese have contributed to the development of Chinese civilization (Wang, E. Q., 1999: 289), especially the Qing, the multi-​ethnic Manchu empire, who adopted assimilation policies in all of the conquered areas including China. In this case, Sinification did not merely result from the proud culture or rhetoric of “superiority”, but it also paved the way for smooth governance, creating a unified culture (Ge, 2018: 18). The Sinification process reveals an important difference between theory and practice in Chinese imperial foreign relations. In theory, the Tianxia concept suggests the whole world be ruled in harmony and attract the barbarians by virtues, rather than force, and in practice, non-​Chinese were excluded, bullied and humiliated as long as they were not converted. Likewise, when Chinese lands were conquered, Sinification took a passive form, but on the other hand when they were the conquerors, usually hardline assimilation policies were practiced. Zhaoguang Ge (2018: 11) summarizes the whole process of assimilation policies in three steps. In the first step, the new land was conquered. In the second step a mass immigration of ethnic Chinese to the new land was organized in order to dominate the population. When this colonialization process ended, the new land’s annexation to “China” would be complete. Last, the locals were pushed to change their culture and beliefs by some policies, until they became completely “Chinese”. The Chinese soldiers in the armies of conquest also inhabited the new areas in the Qin, Han, Tang, Yuan, Ming and Qing Empires. In the Sinification process, they also played an important role by being pushed to marry the locals and their descendants mostly converted to the Chinese way of life, as happened in many places, especially in the southern regions (Wang et  al., 2011:  319). The final imperial dynasty, the Qing Dynasty, undertook mass conquest and turned China into an empire of five ethnic nations: Manchu, Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan and Hans. However, they were not as successful in their assimilation policies as the Hans had been. So, the five nations could not be successfully integrated into a single society, and religious, ethnical and institutional differences largely remained. That is why today China’s political and cultural borders do not overlap (Ge, 2018: 11). Mongolians, Uyghurs and Tibetans, besides many other smaller minorities inside Chinese borders, mostly keep their distinct characteristics. Hua–​Yi Distinction can be regarded as the practical implementation of Tianxia universalism in the field. Tianxia’s theoretical Confucian peacefulness, in practice, turned into a bitter “civilized–​barbarian division”, triggered by an arrogant cultural pride. The proud and discriminatory stance against non-​Chinese communities further evolved into practical policies as a means to handle the barbarians. Historical experience reveals that the policies implemented to deal with barbarians changed over time and according to the situation. The initial attack-and-destroy strategy evolved into the Tributary System over time. However, Sinification has

52  The Tributary System and hegemony always been a persistent element of Chinese strategy against foreigners or different ethnics, which persists even today.

2.3  Definition and structure of the Tributary System The Tributary System (中華朝贡体制) “Zhōnghuá Cháogòng Tǐzhì” is a Western name given to the specific relationship type that imperial Chinese states developed with their neighbors, based on Confucian values and historical experience. The term was coined by the famed American Sinologist John King Fairbank in 1960. Since the term was invented later, there wasn’t such a concept in history, neither in Chinese nor in Western terminology. In Chinese language and history there was no equivalent term. In Fairbank’s (1968: 1) short definition, it “was a set of ideas and practices developed and perpetuated by the rulers of China over many centuries”. The Tributary System is not a definition explaining all relations that China developed with all foreign states at all times (Wang, Y., 2013: 213). In theory, it covers a period of more than two thousand years of the history of relationships. However, its ideal structure is reached in the historical period of the Ming and Qing Dynasties, specifically matured between the years 1425 and 1550 (Wills, 2009: 2325). Fairbank and Teng (1941: 137) named the relationship type they observed as a system of values and rules that China developed in East Asia, which “deserve attention as one historical solution to problems of world-​organization”. Fairbank’s definitions and comments created a large literature, with some critics and add-​ons, but mostly recognized by scholars of related fields. Fairbank (1968:  1) draws attention to the Sinocentric and hierarchic, non-​ egalitarian characteristics of the system. The region, which Europeans called the “Far East”, was a Sinocentric world for China. China was able to set up a Confucian world order among the East Asian states, which were geographically isolated from the rest of the world, and shared some basic common social and political values with China. China, being the center of cultural influence in the region, has intensely influenced Korea, Vietnam, Japan and the small island kingdom of Ryukyu by its relatively advanced culture. Among these communities, the shared common values which developed over time were mainly the “Chinese ideographic writing system, the Confucian classical teachings about ethics and social order, the official examination system”, and the monarchic and bureaucratic administration systems. Fairbank and Teng (1941: 137) further explain: the tributary system was a natural outgrowth of the cultural pre-​eminence of the early Chinese, came to be used by the rulers of China, for political ends of self-​defense, in practice it had a very fundamental and important commercial basis and served as a medium for Chinese international relations and diplomacy. Fairbank and Teng (1941: 138) argue that the basic features of the system were the hierarchic, non-​egalitarian structure of Chinese domestic politics, which was

The Tributary System and hegemony  53 applied outward, and the Chinese perception of cultural superiority over barbarians. The assumption of superiority basically “embodied in Confucian codes of conducts and the use of Chinese scripts”. If those barbarians want to come and be transformed (来-​华) “Lái-​Huá”, and then benefit from the outcomes of Chinese civilization, they had to recognize the unique, highest position of the Chinese Emperor, who was the Son of Heaven and responsible for all people, Chinese and barbarians. Devotion to the Chinese way of life was a natural acknowledgment of accepting the Emperor’s political and religious status, as an intermediary between the human and the rest of the cosmos (Ibid.: 139). Since there was no clearly defined effective way of dealing with barbarians, the method of interaction with them was also unclear from the beginning of confrontation in ancient times. Therefore, the Chinese Emperors accepted foreign envoys in the same procedures as the ceremonies for domestic feudal lords, submitting tributes (Wang, G., 1968:  37). This was the mentality of ancient Chinese foreign relations, reflecting the domestic submission structure outward, due to the Tianxia concept of unity, whose jurisdiction covered the entire Earth. The non-​Chinese rulers or envoys on their behalf, if they wanted to join the Chinese world order of the Tributary System, had to follow some symbolic rules and rituals with the domestic local rulers. The performance of rituals was very important, signifying the Confucian principle of Rites (礼) “Lı ”̌ in meeting with the Son of Heaven. The symbolic ritual was three kneelings and nine prostrations, “kow-​tow” (磕头) “Kē-​Tóu” (Ibid.: 138). The practical outcome of submission would be as follows: the tributary ruler would be granted a patent of appointment and an official stamp for use in correspondence; he would be granted a noble rank in the Chinese state hierarchy; he would start to use the Chinese calendar and the dynasty’s reign title; he had to “present a symbolic tribute memorial of various sorts on appropriate statutory occasions”; he was required to present a symbolic tribute of local products from their country; his convoys would be accompanied by the imperial posts to the imperial court; after the kowtow, he would receive imperial gifts in return; and he was granted some rights of trade, at the borders and in the capital city (Fairbank, 1968: 10). Any ruler who followed these procedures could take his place in the Chinese world order. The Tributary System in the late Ming and early Qing periods structurally was a matured system of foreign policy, compared to the previous Chinese experience. The earlier Chinese methods of dealing with the barbarians, as defined in the section on Hua–​Yi Distinction, varied during the long history of their confrontation. Attacking and destroying them, attracting with virtues, indulging them, using one against another, ignoring them but being cautious, loose reign and finally assimilation, were the most common methods used (Yu, 1986: 450). The Tributary System gained its mature form in the latest two dynasties, based on experience over a long time. When the Han–​Xiongnu conflict finished with the collapse and submission of Xiongnu, the Han benefited from a period of being unrivalled, and the perception of superiority was further consolidated. After the Han’s demise in 220AD, the Chinese world divided between the rival states again. This division was concluded by the Tang Dynasty in the year 618AD, which had

54  The Tributary System and hegemony strong rivals as well. The Tributary System with Confucian states initially emerged in a simple form in the Tang Dynasty, when the cosmopolitan Tang mentality allowed various neighbors to be in free contact with China, though some relations started even earlier, dating back to the Zhou Dynasty (Yang, Z., 2011: 292). The Tang Empire managed barbarian relations with a “loose reign” policy (Wills, 2009: 2326). Tang culture was not ignorant of the northern neighboring cultures, unlike the later Chinese dynasties (Ibid.: 2325). Their envoys were received and given feasts, their presents were displayed in front of the emperor. For the specific political condition of the Tang period, if the envoy was from strong rival states like Tibet, Mongolia and Turkeyc, the ceremonies added “extra splendor”. In the powerful circle of the neighborhood, Tang China used the tributary ceremonies in service of its own survival actually (Ibid.:  2326). The Tang’s success in managing foreign relations would not be continued by its successors after its demise in 907AD. After the Tang Empire, there was one more fragmented period. In this period the “barbarian” Later Jin Dynasty (后金) “Hòujīn” (1115–​1234), founded by the nomadic Jurchen (女真) “Nǚzhēn”, were so powerful that they destroyed the Northern Song Dynasty (北宋朝) “Běi Sòng Cháo” (960–​1127AD), which had united China after long struggles. Jin troops captured the capital of Bianliang (Kaifeng) (开封) “Kāi Fēng” in 1126AD, looted, destroyed and took away the palace residents, including the royal family, together with 14,000 people and left their capital, selling and using them in prostitution and in their harems. This was a huge humiliation for the Chinese, something that they had never seen before. Called the “Humiliation of Jingkang” (靖康之恥) “Jìngkāng Zhī Chǐ”, it had a deep effect on the Chinese attitude toward the barbarians. The capital was moved to Lin’an (Hangzou) (杭州) “Hángzhōu” and the Southern Song Dynasty (南宋朝) “Nán Sòng Cháo” (1127–​1279) was founded. It was the first time that the cradle of Chinese civilization was not in Chinese political jurisdiction (Wang, Y. K., 2013: 223). In this period, the Song, Jin and Khitan (辽朝) “Liáo Cháo” (907–​1125) possessed similar strength, and there was a balance of power strategies in a multi-​polar system. The agreements between the Song and Khitan did not give any superiority to the Song, rather they were formally equal. The agreements of the Song and Jin were even worse, with clear humiliating terms against the Song. The Song paid tribute to the Jin (Dillon, 2017: 284). The Chinese were pragmatic in leaving the claim of superiority when it came to the matter of political survival. In this period the Chinese realized that power was the determinant in relations, not Confucian values (Ibid.: 216). Finally, the Song and Jin were united against the Khitan and defeated them, but later the Jin attacked and destroyed the Song as well (Ibid.: 217). The Song’s Song’s attitude to foreigners was truly Confucian. The treatment of foreigners was generous, without calculating their value, granting them honor without demand. If they came there was no rejection, if not, there was no persuasion. After the Jin destroyed the capital Kaifeng, the Song cut relations with the north and developed relations with the South Asian countries, but those countries were not eagerly obedient as before, as the Song was not of the same

The Tributary System and hegemony  55 strength (Wang, G., 1968: 47). They constructed a strong navy, but did not use it for conquest. The Southern Song did not survive long before the Mongolian Yuan Empire overran all China in 1279. The Mongolians applied conquest policies and they set their rules by wars, and if they were not useful, then they applied traditional Chinese methods, but did not have any coherent foreign policy (Wang, G., 1968:  49). They attacked neighbors of China such as Korea, Vietnam, Japan and others (Dillon, 2017:  301–​311), which the Han Chinese rarely did. Finally, they reached an extent of territories that China had never reached until that time. They treated the Chinese as the lowest class in the empire but they also could not survive long with oppressive policies. Around a century later the Mongolian Yuan Empire suffered its demise in 1368. The Song focused on virtues but neglected the military and this resulted in disaster. The Yuan’s case was just the opposite: it had a strong military but no virtues, and also did not survive long. The later dynasties learned a lesson from this ironic equation. The Chinese perception of superiority, which was in the sense of both Han ­ethnicity and culture, lost its unity in the Song’s tragedies (Wang, E. Q., 1999: 302). The Chinese came to the point where the central lands of their civilization could be managed by non-​Han ethnics, and they could represent Hans as well. Thus, bearing the Mandate of Heaven, their sense of superiority evolved to be limited to the superiority of culture, excluding ethnicity. This new conviction became a new normal, after the Yuan Mongolians ruled China. The Chinese would refer to the cultural superiority in their superiority rhetoric after that, not to the ethnocentrism of Han anymore. Under the rule of Mongolian Yuan and Manchu Qing, the name Han became a cultural name (Ibid.: 303). Founding the Ming Dynasty (明朝) “Míng Cháo” (1368–​ 1644), the Chinese began reconstructing what they had lost in the Song and Yuan eras with the invasion of the northern barbarians. From Song rule onward, the Chinese tended to an introvert acceptance that it was difficult to deal with aggressive barbarians (Wang, E. Q., 1999: 301) without an effective formula for a permanent solution. Chinese culture and political thought had the remedy of “Sinification”, in case the Chinese state became weak in physical power. Indeed, it was mostly working, but assimilation of others into Chinese culture did not bring independence. This fact, proven with the tragedies of the Song and Yuan, brought Ming rulers to the point of formulating foreign affairs in a softer, more introvert framework, while keeping military power strong and strengthening fortresses for deterrence at the same time. A softer strategy was preferable due to its low cost as well (Ibid.: 297). Physical power was not inappropriate to Chinese traditions within the framework of virtuous ruling (Wang, G., 1968: 49). This new synthesis was to re-​create a solid model of Confucian order which would be named the “Tributary System” by Fairbank later. Within the framework of the Tributary System was a Confucian cultural-​based system, supported by economic and military powers. This was a model of soft conduct of foreign relations, recalling the “loose reign” principle, formulated in the Han Dynasty (Wang, E. Q., 1999: 296). It was not a totally

56  The Tributary System and hegemony new strategy, but it had matured (Wills, 2009: 2325), and was at the practical center of relations. The over-​emphasis of culture by the Chinese, in international relations, was named “Culturalism” by Alastair Johnston (1995:  66), which he describes as depending on three basic components: “war is inauspicious and to be avoided, the enemy is not necessarily demonized, it can be acculturated and pacified, though not exterminated or annihilated; violence is a last resort”. For Johnston, the alternative to culturalism is the concept of realpolitik and the Chinese used it skillfully. Ming put military power at the center of relations, as the former Mongolian Yuan rule did. This was realpolitik and indirectly legitimized Mongolians in their power-​centered policies (Wang, E. Q., 1999: 297). The Ming Dynasty created a rich, powerful and centralized state. Upon its foundation, most of the neighboring Asian states sent envoys for to establish formal relations with the new powerful Chinese Dynasty. The third Ming Emperor, Yongle (永乐) “Yǒnglè” (1360–​1424), played a significant role in solidifying the Tributary System. He assigned his Muslim eunuch Zhenghe (鄭和) “Zhènghé” (1371–​1433) with a mission to visit all known coastal South Asian, Middle Eastern and even North East African countries, later these would be termed the “Zhenghe Voyages”. Nobody knew the actual reason for those voyages. Fletcher (1968: 207) suggests that Yongle wanted to set up tributary relations with all the known world, which is the most reasonable explanation. The main aim of the voyages was not commercial, but rather political. There are four other possible reasons for the Zhenghe voyages that are worth considering: to show the power and superiority of Ming China, promote friendly exchanges between those countries and China, being attracted by ivory, spices and jewels, and possibly to find the rival to the throne, Zhu Yunwen, who was believed to have died fighting in China, but rumors were that he had escaped south (Dillon, 2017: 336). Zhenghe set up an enormous fleet of 315 ships, a size the world hadn’t seen until that time, with 28,000 men, the aim not being conquest (Kissinger, 2015: 30). With that size of armada, he could have conquered any place or could have discovered sea routes or new continents way before Columbus. Around 70  years later Columbus made more significant discoveries with much more modest and less powerful fleet of smaller ships. These facts, together with the fact that Zhenge’s voyage records were all destroyed by the next emperor, makes the voyages mysterious (Kang, 2007:  30). Zhenghe made seven voyages, collected and delivered gifts on every voyage, and brought many envoys to present a tribute to the Emperor. They were welcomed in China and given even more gifts on their return. Zhenghe died on the last voyage and these voyages were never repeated afterwards. However, the voyages had important results: (1) China started to influence South Asia more effectively by revival of relations, (2) the Chinese started to carry their goods to the neighboring Asian countries by themselves, hindering the activities of Arabic merchants in China and South Asia (Fairbank, 1942: 142), (3) this was the period when the overseas Chinese increased their population in many neighboring countries.

The Tributary System and hegemony  57 The period of the Zhenghe voyages was the highest stage of tributary relations (Fairbank and Teng, 1941:  136). Most of the East Asian countries established tributary relations with China. After the Zhenghe voyages, Ming China returned to dealing with domestic issues, due to security concerns from the north and the high cost of the trips. The Ming’s well-​known self-​isolation first started in the political field, then moved into the cultural field (Mungello, 2013: 3). This would strengthen the introverted characteristics of the Chinese, which had started with the Song tragedies and would mostly continue till the end of the imperial era, leaving them isolated from the rest of the world, as well as keeping them unaware of the philosophical, political, social and industrial developments of the modern ages. Abandoning Zhenghe’s legacy would cost China even more over time, gradually losing the tributes to England, Holland, France and Japan (Tarling, 1967: 3). The Manchu Qing Empire, the last imperial dynasty, ruled between 1644 and 1911, with important differences compared with the Ming. First, they were not Han, but they had adopted Chinese values as their state ideology to unite the vast empire (Kang, 2007: 40). This was a common attitude of all nomadic conquerors. The Qing, having essentially three different approaches to the three different spheres of relations, was expansionist in Central Asia, relatively peaceful with East Asians, and pursued a type of diplomatic relations with the Russians (Perdue, 2010: 38). Therefore, they inherited the Ming Tributary System, but adjusted it to better serve their interests (Fairbank and Teng, 1941: 135). Second, they did not arrange their relations merely in accordance with Confucian values, though they used them as a means of ideology. Instead, they pursued a nomadic expansionism, especially in the reign of the emperor Qianglong (乾隆帝) “Qiánlóngdì” (1711–​1799) (Chung, 2017: 207). Most of Mongolia, Central Asia and Tibet were added to the empire with brutal massacres (Zhao, S., 2015: 967). Due to this policy, the Qing was described as “colonialist” (Perdue, 2015: 968). The policy change from Ming to Qing presented itself through changes in government institutions too. They set up a “barbarian control office” (理藩院) “lǐfànyuàn”, to manage relations with steppe communities, which were all previously under the jurisdiction of the “Ministry of Board of Rites” (礼部) “lǐbù” (Mancall, 1968: 72). As a reaction to the former Yuan Empire, the Ming divided the world into Chinese and non-​Chinese, while the Qing’s approach was on the basis of division between sedentary and nomadic (Ibid.:  73). Nomadic people were different in the aspect of their relations with China. They mostly did not accept the superiority of Chinese culture (Suzuki, 1968: 180). The Qing used the name Middle Kingdom (中国) “Zhōng Guó” for the country, including all ethnicities, referring to the cultural values as the ties binding all to each other (Ang, 2015: 399). The Manchus always kept their steppe heartland strong, as it would be their location of refuge in any crisis (Tarling, 1967: 22). To serve this aim, they strengthened the Eight Banner System (八旗) “bāqí” to further consolidate Manchu and Mongolian relations. The Qing was actually first to take the whole of Mongolia under control, so the steppes experienced a peaceful period (Farquhar, 1968: 199).

58  The Tributary System and hegemony Third, the Qing was a multi-​ethnic empire since the rulers had dual roots. The first Qing emperors were not even counted as “Chinese” (Fletcher, 1968: 224). Thus, Qing China wasn’t solely ruled by Chinese elites (Mungello, 2013: 5). Fourth, the Qing preferred private trade to tributary. Trade activities were carried out in two ways, by state to state and by the domestic institutions to states (Kang, 2007: 33). Toward the end of the Ming and the beginning of the Qing, traders gained more value than the scholars, as earning money gained more preference in society. However, the Qing still believed that they did not need the products of the barbarians, so they closed their borders to all foreign activities, except with Guangzhou. The Qing and Ming emperors generally had not much knowledge about developments in Europe or elsewhere because of these isolation policies (Hei, Zhao and Ma, 2016: 179). In the 1990s a big discussion on Qing history started upon the emergence of a brand-​new school called the “New Qing”. New Qing scholars Evelyn Rawski, Mark Elliott and Pamela Kyle Crossley challenged the widely accepted idea that the Chinese always assimilated (Sinification) their conquerors, so the Manchu Qing was also assimilated and adapted into Chinese culture. Upon the newly opened Qing official documents in Chinese and Manchu languages, they discovered that Manchus were actually very pragmatic on this issue. They had developed a sense of Manchu identity, by managing the country in Central Asian style as much as the Confucian style (Lee, 2016: 29). It was a kind of Manchu-​centric system in which Han China was a very important part, but still a part of the vast country (Elliott, 2000:  603), among the others, Mongolia, Manchuria, Central Asia and Tibet (Rawski, 1996). The new Qing interpretation has challenged Fairbank’s theory of the Sinocentric Tributary System, which he claimed was built on the hierarchic and non-​ egalitarian Confucian base. The new Qing challenged Fairbank further by suggesting different ideas on important points. First, the name “China” not only referred to Chinese Confucian culture or identity, but to the “others” included in it as well. Second, there is not a single form of Tributary relations which can explain the complex structure of relations, changing on the basis of time and region (Lee, 2016: 29). The Qing emperors did not mold themselves on the typical Confucian “Son of Heaven” model. They were “Cakravartin” to the Buddhists, and “Khan” to the nomadic Mongolians, also Son of Heaven to Hans. They hold multiple identities, using each identity in the relevant region, to make the ruling of those societies possible (Lee, 2016: 30). Fairbank (1968: 2) describes the structure of the Tributary System as three circular zones from inner to outer: 1. In the center there was the Sinic Zone, “consisting of mostly nearby and culturally similar tributaries” like Korea, Japan, Vietnam and the Ryukyu islands. 2. In the second circle there was Inner Asian Zone, consisting of the barbarian nomadic or semi-​nomadic people of inner Asia on the periphery, such as the Manchus, Mongols, Uighur Turks and Tibetans, who were “not only ethnically but also culturally non-​Chinese”, on the fringe of the Chinese cultural zone, though sometimes ruling over the whole.

The Tributary System and hegemony  59 3. In the last circle, there was the Outer Zone, consisting of “other barbarians”, further away from China, like the South East Asian states, Europeans and the rest of the world, eventually including Japan as it was not quite an obedient tributary. China was at the core with its values and imperial institutions, creating the center of the system. The political entities, inner or outer, all completed the whole structure of Chinese world order, depending on hierarchic ranking. In another holistic perspective, however, as the Tributary world is a unity in its own terms, a member on the periphery can sometimes take control of the center or the whole. That was another way to legitimize the rule of Manchu, Mongol and Turkic states over China (Ibid.: 9), besides the criterion of losing or gaining the Mandate of Heaven. The Tributary System was a large “framework within which all sorts of interests, personal and imperial, economic and social” (Fairbank and Teng, 1941: 13) could find a way to express themselves. Though in general it was a Sinocentric order, emphasizing China’s special place and the superiority of its culture, in practice there were other concerns for different members. It could carry different meanings and benefits for each of the members (Mancall, 1968: 65). First, for the Chinese emperor, it was a way of cultivating further prestige (Fairbank, 1942: 9). In another way, it enlarged the cultivation field for the Mandate of Heaven to extend beyond the borders (Zhao, S., 2015:  965). Being respected and obeyed by other kings was a way of confirmation of a Chinese emperor’s legitimacy for domestic society, as the Chinese emperor was supposed to be responsible for all people. On the other hand, barbarian attacks could bring the legitimacy of an emperor into question, as he clearly could not prevent chaos, believed to be a sign of losing the favor of Heaven (Mancall, 1968: 70). Chinese domestic politics have been always hard to separate from foreign politics. They have been always intertwined, as the concept of Tianxia approached the Earth and its matters in unity. The emperor used the principles of Rites (礼) “Lı ”̌ and Law (法) “Fǎ” in the domestic administration, while in the Tributary framework he used only the principle of Rites. Therefore, the emperor theoretically did not use power in his self-​claimed jurisdiction area beyond the borders (Fairbank, 1968: 8). Another benefit of the Tributary System for China was to secure the borders at minimal cost (Zhao, S., 2015: 964). The Chinese had learned that encountering security threats on all the borders of its vast territories was very costly. Deploying the military to all corners of empire was not a practical way of improving the security of borders. Constructing a peaceful environment was both an economical and practical way. Fairbank (1942: 137) upholds that the Tributary System was used by China for “spying out the enemy, seeking allies and all manners of negotiations, including the threat by force”. This strategy was especially beneficial for the northern and western borders. Engaging with nomadic barbarians and even following them to the steppe heartlands was expensive and exhausting to the extent that the construction of the Great Wall (长城) “Cháng Chéng” was for reducing this difficulty (Yang, L., 1968: 29).

60  The Tributary System and hegemony The Tributary System was beneficial for China in trading as well (Fletcher, 1968:  207). Though in theory trade was not a crucial incentive for China to set up the Tributary System, in practice it was clear that China benefited from the trading activities in the created safe framework. Generally, the perception of superiority did not allow frankly admitting that, but China actually benefited from trading in the Tributary System. It reflects the attitude of Confucianism against trading as well (Mancall, 1968: 87). Confucianism does not favor trading and merchants, as they are chasing personal profit (Mungello, 2013: 6). Being one of the few exceptions, the Qing Emperor Kangxi (康熙帝) “Kāngxīdì” (1654–​1722) encouraged trading, and admitted that it was beneficial to China (Mancall, 1968: 89). In confirmation of his non-​Confucian policy in this matter, Kangxi was regarded to be in favor of Buddhist values more than Confucian ones, so he was regarded as a reincarnation of Buddhist deities, rather than a Confucian master (Perdue, 2015: 1007). Trading was not the main focus, especially as the domestic market was large enough to provide a stable economic environment. However, the richness of China depended not only on its domestic market. History tells us that when the Chinese could engage in international trade intensively, like the times when the Silk Road was busy, they could get more prosperous, as in the Han, Tang, Song and Ming dynasties. Though not the first intention of Chinese emperors, trade was part of the Tributary System, and it not only provided economic benefits but also supported the system itself to continue (Fairbank and Teng, 1941: 12). Each of the benefits of the Tributary System was claimed by different scholars to be the main incentive for China to set up the system. Nevertheless, there is a different approach as well. According to Lee Ji-​Young (2016: 62), besides legitimization of domestic politics, it was a natural social process not created by one actor but socially created. Therefore, it emerged as a result of Confucian political interactions. In this case, the Tributary System is a sum of the unplanned social behavior of East Asian states, just being themselves in relations, which requires being in a Confucian way of interaction, shared by all. However, this explains the relations of the first circle, the Sinic Zone, not the later zones. The Tributary System was in fact a concept of the relationship accepted by all parts. So, any of the other states, if it found an opportunity to set up its own hegemony, would use the same framework. That means it could be copied by any member (Mancall, 1968: 68). The Vietnamese king called the Cambodian king a barbarian, although he was also addressing himself as a barbarian in a letter he sent to the Chinese emperor (Fletcher, 1968: 207). Siamese (Thailand) kings set up their own Tributary System on Buddhist values when they could, but if they couldn’t, they joined the Chinese system (Mancall, 1968: 68). Java could collect tributes from Brunei, while both of them were Chinese tributaries as well (Wang, G., 1968: 53). As mentioned earlier, the Chinese also paid tribute on many occasions to the northern barbarians. The tributary relations can be seen among the nomadic tribes throughout history as well. However, the Tributary System that China developed with East Asia was different compared to others, as it depended on Confucian values, claimed to be peaceful and lasted much longer.

The Tributary System and hegemony  61 Being at the center of the system, none of the other states could take China’s place. All barbarians, that is, Japan, Vietnam and even Korea, called themselves barbarians when it came to comparing themselves to “civilized” China. They were formally admitting the superiority of China. However, this still does not prove that it was simply because they admired Chinese culture that they came to obey the emperor, as Chinese popular narrative points out. The other members of the Chinese Tributary System had their own reasons to adopt the system. Those reasons were usually about economic and security concerns. For some it was not a sole economic activity, but also a symbolic ritual to formally accept Chinese superiority, in exchange for the title of king, accepted from the Chinese emperor as a means of legitimization of that ruler, his autonomy and confirmed status for his domestic politics (Lee, 2016: 49). Koreans were the most successfully Sinicized community. Confirmation of their king’s authority by the Chinese emperor played an important role in legitimizing his domestic authority. The approval had political and religious meanings for Korean society (Ibid.:  170). That is why the Korean attitude toward the Ming and Qing was different because, while the Ming was representing Confucian values, the Qing was not. They did not recognize the Qing’s rule, as they viewed it a barbarian rule, and continued to use the Ming calendar (Perdue, 2015:  1009). Thus, the domestic politics of China and other member states played an important role in setting up and maintaining the Tributary System (Ibid.: 34), not merely the attractiveness of the Chinese culture. The Tributary System ideologically included Tianxia universalism and Hua–​ Yi separation at the same time. Tianxia’s strongest ideological components, Sinocentrim, hierarchy and rites-​ centered relations, are clearly seen in the system, especially with those of the Confucian societies of Korea, Japan, Vietnam and Ryukyu. On the other hand, relations with the other neighbors, especially Mongolians, Manchus, Turkic and Tibetan states, clearly showed the characteristics of Hua–​Yi Distinction. The relations were dominated by attack-and-destroy, wars, invasion, disrespect, cultural chauvinist policies, assimilation and occasionally detente and peace, only when the situation offered no other choices. The dual-​faced Chinese political ideology, which was legalist inside but Confucian in appearance, proved itself in foreign relations as Confucian with Confucian societies, and legalist with non-​Confucian societies. Thus, Tianxia universalism appeared peaceful only in the relations with the societies that assimilated or embraced Chinese cultural values, and submitted to Chinese authority. The relations with those who had different cultural values and refused the assimilation policies were driven by enmity and humiliation. The Tributary System is the name of these dual-​faced relations.

2.4  Hegemonic dynamics of the Tributary System The Tributary System is a hegemonic Sinocentric world order that had an exclusive structure depending on distinct values, operation scope and mentality. Therefore, analyzing it using Western theories of international relations may not

62  The Tributary System and hegemony give the accurate and complete picture of it, due to conceptual incompatibilities. To make a correct analysis, Chinese political thought and its sources, Chinese perception of world and world order, perception of foreignness and foreign relations and their historical applications in different eras must be examined as done in the previous chapters. This is a methodological requirement of an historicist approach as well. The Tributary System and its mentality do not overlap with the definition of Neo-​Gramscian theory. Besides power, consent ideology and institutions, the other exclusive characteristics of Imperial China’s perception and application of hegemony will be analyzed to reveal the complete picture, “with Chinese characteristics”. It would give misleading results if Chinese tributary relations were to be evaluated as a whole. The relations in different zones, as Fairbank divided them –​Sinic, Inner Asian and Outer Zones –​have fundamentally different characteristics. That is why each of the zones will be paid special attention in analysis. 2.4.1  Power Power, if possible in all its forms, is essential to set up hegemony in any definitions of hegemony. It is indeed the first condition of setting up and perpetuating a hegemonic system. Military and economic power play a crucial role in the imperial Chinese Tributary System. The clearest evidence is that when the Chinese state was weak it lost most of the tributaries, and when it was strong the tributaries got more in number and better in obedience, the best example of which were the Song and Ming Dynasties. Military power was the most functional power and its usage in the Tributary System differs according to the zones. In the Sinic zone, military power and coercion were not often used, but they were important factors in setting up and perpetuating the system. If the first conquest waves to neighboring areas, the Qin and Han dynasties are regarded as exceptions; not only during the mature period of the Tributary System in the Ming and Qing eras, but during most of Chinese history, relations with the East Asian Sinic countries contained relatively less aggression. This fact can be explained in three ways. First, it was because of the introverted characteristics of Chinese policies, especially in the Ming and Qing dynasties, with almost no interest in overseas expeditions. Tan Chung (2017: 53) explains it as “turning the back to ocean, being one of the Chinese national characteristics”. When Koxinga (國姓爺) “Guóxìngyé” (1624–​1662), the famous conqueror of Taiwan island, talked to the Dutch colonials, he told them that China had not needed Taiwan until then (Campbell, 1903: 423). Even the closest strategic island Taiwan was not worthy of conquest until 1683. The introvert and ocean-​averse characteristics of China was seen in the costly and challenging canal construction between the rivers, while the sea routes from north to south were never thought to be an alternative. Also, during its history, China did not have a big city, let alone a capital city, on its long ocean coast. With this tradition, China was not expected to have power-​centered aggressive conquest policies against the East Asian countries. Military power was a

The Tributary System and hegemony  63 means of deterrence against pirates, and a means of keeping Tributary relations on track in East Asian Sinic zone. Second, in the Sinic zone there wasn’t a threat to China, due to the fact that none of these countries had that much power to challenge China. Japan was the exception in some instances; they had withdrawn from the system when they were strong enough (Lee, 2016:  170), claiming equality with Imperial China, and even occupied China in the Second World War, when they had enough power. Thus, military power was the factor ensuring the stability of the Tributary System. History reveals that theory and practice always show contradictions on this matter, when values and interests clash. Third, the nature of relations with the Sinic zone countries was compatible with the ideal Confucian characteristics of an inter-​state relationship. Confucius suggested a benevolent approach backed with military power in reserve. The reason behind the relatively peaceful Sinic zone was the deterrence of military power. Military power was the factor in setting up and maintaining the system, not Confucian values, though it cannot be denied the latter had an important role. Yang Zewei’s (2011:  293) argument, which suggests that the reason for the peacefulness was due to the lack of use of force, can turn into an illusion if the right question is asked: “Would there be peace if there wasn’t a military power imbalance in favor of China?”, or “Would there be peace if all the East Asian states including China were similar in military power?” In the Confucian Sinic Zone, it can be observed in many cases that Imperial China did not refrain from invading them, when needed. Even in the golden period of the Tributary System, in the Ming Dynasty, Java and Ceylon were attacked, the Ceylon prince was captured, and Korea and Annam (Vietnam), which were in the Sinic Zone, were invaded by China (Mosher, 2000: 33–​34). Military power, in the context of the Inner Asian Zone, which was the second zone of the Tributary System, had much more currency and function. Nomadic neighbors seldom accepted the superiority of Chinese values and emperors, unless forced to do so. While some accepted it and were assimilated when they conquered China, in the case of the Manchu Qing, however, it was discovered by New Qing historians that they actually had their own superiority claim. For China, the Confucian values had nearly no use in dealing with the nomadic neighbors, as Confucianism was not a shared ideology among them. Military power was essential for the security of the borders, against the threat of invasions, also for penalizing them with punitive expeditions when needed. China used military power in the second zone as a proven fact for safety and stability. When China was weak and the nomadic neighbors were strong, it was almost expected they would be invaded by nomads, being subjugated or paying tribute to them. When China was strong and the nomads weak, China invaded their lands. China sometimes used balancing strategies, by supporting one against another, which was also required by the structure of power distribution. Thus, the relations in the Inner Asian Zone almost merely depended on power distribution, leaving no room for other determinants. In other words, between China and the Inner Asia Zone, relations were based on power politics, in which military power played a decisive role.

64  The Tributary System and hegemony In the third circle, the Outer Zone of the Tributary System, military power played a similar role as in the second circle. With the arrival of Europeans in the late Qing period, China found itself in a bitter power clash. The Qing rulers finally understood that they did not have enough technology and military power to fight the British after the Opium Wars. Imperial China implemented a balance of power strategy to deal with the powerful European states, first with the UK and then with France, the USA, Russia and Germany. The strategy was to make similar agreements with each party and hope they would fight each other in rivalry. This was a strategy the Chinese had applied against barbarians since the Han Dynasty. When needed, China had supported one nomadic tribe against another, letting them weaken each other. Nevertheless, this strategy did not work in the third circle of the Tributary System and China entered a historical period called the Century of Humiliation, which would end with Mao’s proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国) “Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó” in 1949. Economic power was another determining power parameter in Tributary relations. In the Sinic Zone the economic charm of China was one of the major incentives for the other states to establish relations (Lee, 2016:  30). It was a determining factor for the stability of relations. China was gaining from Sinic Zone trading as well, but it was claimed not to be the incentive, mostly because Confucian ethics was not in favor of trade activities, so the Chinese tended to cover that benefit of the relations. In the Inner Asian Zone, economic incentives were valid to some extent. Some tribes were selling horses to Chinese states (Zhao, S., 2015: 964). Chinese armies needed this trading. And the Silk Road was an important trading route for China. China was often concerned with the security of the road. The Chinese mostly chose to occupy the entire road all the way to Central Asia and fortify it as much as possible. These strategies sometimes pushed China to cooperate with the small states in Central Asia and sometimes make peaceful agreements with the nomadic tribes in the region. In the Outer Zone, in the late Qing period, economic factors caused aggression against China from the industrial European powers. China, having a weak military defense, could not take a stand against them. Power was the biggest determinant in the establishment and stability of the Tributary System. In the Sinic Zone, it was an important factor of stabilization, providing obedience and deterrence against aggression. Military power was the deterring factor keeping stability in the Sinic Zone, helped by being a community of shared values of Confucianism, while in the Inner Asian Zone and Outer Zone, it was a crucial factor of survival for all sides. In terms of power use in the system, it is safe to say that power was a decisive dynamic in all relations, though the Chinese were still mostly appearing Confucian in the Sinic Zone but legalist in the Inner Asian and Outer Zones. 2.4.2  Consent Consent is a critical dynamic in the modern definition of hegemony. According to the Neo-​Gramscian theory, consent is the factor that differentiates hegemony

The Tributary System and hegemony  65 from other kinds of supremacy, especially those depending on coercion. Chinese imperial Tributary hegemony depended on consent only in the Sinic Zone. There are contradictory arguments regarding the concept of consent. The main Chinese narrative argues that Confucian values were the factor that attracted consent, along with “civilizing”, but in practice they thought Confucianism created attraction to some extent, as the economic and political public goods provided by China were the major incentives generating consent. In the Sinic Zone, the shared values facilitated interaction, promoting peacefulness and unity; however, commercial and political reasons were the driving factors impelling them to China. In some cases, perpetuation of the system and China’s leadership had more meaning than economic and political benefits. In the case of Korea, the approval of the Chinese emperor and the establishment of tributary relations with China at the same time promoted the domestic legitimacy of the Korean king. In this case Chinese culture and Confucian values were the factors creating a moral base for the consent of other Sinic states. As Lee (2016: 35) argues, Confucian culture was used by China for strategic purposes. If the values were the actual factor in creating consent, the coherence of the system would not change; at the times when China was weak, China and other Sinic countries would not invade each other, as had happened many times in history. Consent for Chinese hegemony was rarely achieved in the other zones. Chinese hegemony in the Inner Asian Zone did not depend on consent, but mostly on coercion. In some cases, mostly for some economic and military benefits, nomadic neighbors apparently consented to Chinese hegemony, but cultural attraction was not a decisive factor to be counted in these cases. Some of the nomadic tribes which invaded China and were assimilated seem more comprehensible when looking at cultural attraction; however, for most cases this was not the case. Nomads were not actually attracted by culture, but by wealth. The rules of dealing with Chinese society and managing China, together with cultural interaction and adoption of a sedentary lifestyle, assimilated them later after the conquests. Given that they also contributed a lot to Chinese culture, it was not simply because they were attracted by the advanced culture and after the conquest they embraced it, as the main Chinese narrative claims. The role of Chinese culture can best fit into the framework of imperial soft power (Ibid.:  62). Soft power is a kind of “power”, but does not have clear boundaries of its usage and function, and it is hard to assess its actual impacts on any particular occasion. It is also highly changeable according to the situations and to the related countries. A country’s soft power can be high in one society but low in another. It can be worsened while being good, but it could also get better while it was bad. It is not a solid power parameter, like military and economic power. It can facilitate interactions and pave the way for smooth relations, but cannot be depended on in times of interest clashes and other serious conflicts. It has not enough influence to be successful in the case of crisis. Chinese culture functioned as a means of soft power. It had dignity and currency in the Confucian Sinic Zone, but had low value in the nomadic world of the

66  The Tributary System and hegemony second zone, and almost no value in the Outer Zone. Chinese culture facilitated smooth relations, but it is hard to access the actual solid effects on any certain occasion. It could create a sincere environment of diplomacy, but did not have that much influence to suppress political and economic interests in the case of clashes. Chinese culture’s role, as a means of soft power for Imperial China, cannot be denied but should not be exaggerated, just as in detecting the function of soft power in international relations. Confucian culture can also be regarded as an ideology in the Tributary System. In the Neo-​Gramscian concept of hegemony, ideology is a fabricated system of values that mostly serve the interests of the dominant side, with a little to the dominated side as well, in order to create consent and obedience. The ideology in a Neo-​Gramscian context is supposed to be universal in applicability, like Liberalism, Marxism, and so on. It is supposed to create consensus on the model of distribution of resources, and define the rights and obligations of each party to best serve common interests. Confucian culture has similarities and differences with an ideology in this case. It is not applicable universally because it simply imposes a Chinese system of values. Except in the Sinic zone, most communities did not accept and adopt the values, rather they chose to fight them, as in the case of the Inner Asian Zone. A  divinely appointed Chinese emperor, ancestral worship, Chinese scripts, the superiority perception of Hans, a sedentary agricultural life, and the humiliation of their values by the Hans Chinese mostly did not gain the acceptance of the nomadic tribes. Chinese culture, if taken as the ideology of the Tributary System, was not aiming to distribute resources fairly and didn’t define the rights and obligations of all the parties efficiently, which was crucial in serving common interests properly. It was a call for being part of the culture, but not around interests, rather around the way of living and Chinese old religious values. Therefore, Chinese culture functioning as ideology in Chinese imperial hegemony did not have supposedly the same functions as hegemony theories expected from the ideology. Another important difference is that the ideology of the Chinese system is not spread and supported by international institutions. Zhenghe voyages were the only serious and organized attempt by China to further develop and consolidate the tributary relations. But it did not function in the same way as institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and so on function in American hegemony. However, Chinese culture, in terms of ideology, has similarities in creating a common agenda between the parties, creating a base for diplomacy and facilitating stability. Consequently, in terms of consent, the Tributary System was a hegemonic system depending on consent in the Sinic Zone, but in other zones was not. Confucian values facilitated the relations and interactions, but the economic and political public goods the system provided were the main incentive in generating consent of the Sinic Zone. In the Inner Asian and Outer Zones, the nature of hegemony changed dramatically when China could establish hegemony. In these zones, hegemony did not rest on consent, but it was rather set up by coercion,

The Tributary System and hegemony  67 though there were certain degrees of incentives through public goods, such as horse trading and the benefits of the Silk Road. 2.4.3  Legitimacy and​Prestige The Tributary System was a special hegemonic system, as Ji-​ Young Lee (2016:  62) suggests, in terms of providing legitimacy and prestige. Giving the examples of Korea and Japan, he argues that weak countries and rulers may have internal reasons, like legitimacy, to join the system. Reliance on the powerful side would provide legitimacy in domestic politics, and strengthen their hand in dealing with rivals. Using the Tributary System as a mean of gaining legitimacy in domestic politics was not in fact new. Examples can be seen in the Mughal, Ottoman, Russian and Qing empires, and even today in France (Perdue, 2015: 13–​14). In the Neo-​Gramscian definition of hegemony, the interaction would be among the established powers, while legitimacy or prestige do not play much of a role in the international hegemonic system. However, in the Chinese imperial hegemonic system, the Tributary System, they are important dynamics. Legitimacy was not only an incentive for the weak states in the Tributary System. The strongest participant and the leader, the Chinese emperor, also benefited from the system in the context of legitimacy and prestige. The Tributary relations and obedience of the neighboring kings further consolidated the legitimacy of the Chinese emperor and gave him considerable prestige as well. The Son of Heaven, responsible for the whole Tianxia, could prove this claim practically from the obedience of foreign authorities. Though it was not the sole source of their legitimacy, Chinese emperors needed to consolidate their legitimacy through the Tributary System as they had the worry of maintaining domestic legitimacy. Any natural disaster or calamity could undermine their legitimacy, and let the public could easily be manipulated by any rebellious movement. For consolidating legitimacy and boosting prestige, the tributaries submitted from Confucian states had an important function. Chinese international relations have specifically served the domestic political agenda during history, as they do to this day. It is ironic that foreign relations in the past served to further consolidate the legitimacy and prestige of the emperors, while today they serves the legitimacy of the communist party. 2.4.4  Hierarchy The Chinese imperial hegemonic system does not define the international environment as “anarchic”, as the modern approaches do. Ideally, the whole Earth was under the sole jurisdiction of the Chinese emperor, as the sole ruler. The other kings and rulers were lesser leaders and were required to submit to him, but the emperor in theory allows them the freedom to join the system. In practice, joining depended on Chinese interests and the importance of that kingdom. There was no single authority that could claim equality with the emperor in the Chinese

68  The Tributary System and hegemony world order. The Chinese emperor was the sole highest point of authority over a hierarchic order of “all under Heaven”. The other states theoretically could be treated equally (Wang, G., 1968: 61) but the hierarchy between China and them could not be questioned. Equality with the Xiongnu, Khitan, Jin and others was tactically and temporarily accepted (Zhang and Buzan, 2012: 17), indeed making agreements as equal peers, which was thought to be humiliating. James C. Hsiung (2010: 10–​17) argues that the Chinese world order was formally hierarchic but informally equal, while the modern Western one is formally equal but informally hierarchic. This is too pessimistic a view of the Western world order while occasionally true, and too optimistic of the Chinese world order while true pragmatically and temporarily, as can be seen in various examples from history. Chinese imperial rulers admitted there could be equal power between them, and were able to establish equal relations only after the disastrous Opium Wars in the late 19th century. The conceptual absence of “anarchy” in the international environment was introduced by English School representatives, especially Hedley Bull. Bull’s (1977:  13) definition of “international society” rested on the assumption of an international order that consists of equal members, which bind themselves with some common rules in their relations, and work together in common institutions for a common destiny. The Chinese Tributary System resembled an “East Asian International Society” according to some scholars (Zhang and Buzan, 2012:  34). Bull’s definition stresses the mutual respect of sovereignty and cooperation through international institutions, in the framework of common interests. In this milieu, the Tributary System is mostly respectful to sovereignties in the Sinic zone. Confucianism is a common value, but the system lacks international institutions. However, it is totally irrelevant considering the other zones, especially the relations with barbarians. Yuan-​Kang Wang (2013: 208) explains it more realistically. He connects the structure with power symmetry and asymmetry. He argues that asymmetry in power causes hierarchic structures, and symmetry in power creates diplomacy, bringing the opportunity of solving the problems peacefully. Lee (2016:  62), on the other hand, suggests that the whole system was just the casual outcome of social interaction of Confucian states. In this case, a Tributary community, as Zhang and Buzan (2012: 26) and Lee (2016:  62) suggest, can hardly be named an “International Society” in the Sinic Zone because of China’s position hierarchically above all states in the system. Hierarchy has established itself in the DNA of Chinese culture and political values. Hence, the Tributary System was also a strictly hierarchic system. Foreign kings were regarded as equal to domestic lords and equal to each other, but never equal to Chinese emperors. This hierarchic structure, communicated by kowtows, made Chinese imperial hegemony in the Tributary System an officially declared hierarchic system. The brotherly treatment, which gives the impression of equality, came only after the foreigners had formally accepted Chinese superiority.

The Tributary System and hegemony  69 2.4.5  Wuwei Wuwei is a Taoist principle of non-​interference in the things occurring in natural flow. It was applied in politics as respecting and not interfering in people’s natural wishes, let them do the things they wish to do. In short, to let them fulfill their desires. In Confucianism, wuwei works differently. The rulers guide without coercing or asking, they just show the right way (Zhen, 2016a: 118). The principle of wuwei is usually explained as suzerainty in the Western lexicon. However, Zhang and Buzan (2012) oppose it, because the concept of suzerainty requires independence in domestic affairs but dependence in international affairs. The case in the Tributary System is not the same. China mostly did not interfere in the domestic and foreign affairs of the tributaries (Zhao, S., 2015: 973). Even when there was a conflict between the tributaries or between a tributary and a foreign force, China mostly did not interfere. For example, in 1471 the Vietnamese made war on Champa, China opted not to interfere and Vietnam occupied Champa (Kang, 2007: 44). In some cases, China interfered in the conflicts between the members, as in conflicts between Japan and Korea. Wuwei non-​interference was a principle which worked in the Tributary System selectively. China did not take on the burden maintaining of peace and security in the system. Chinese hegemony did not provide protection and respect of sovereignties, nor deterrence against aggression among the participant states. The red line was Chinese interests. The tributary states could annex each other. Wuwei in this case was functioning in an inactive way, meaning it ignored conflicts between the members, as long as Chinese interests were not damaged, and they kept loyal to Chinese emperors. Wuwei characteristics in the Tributary System denoted the self-​centeredness of China, rather than providing protection and sovereign rights in the system it led.

2.5  Conclusion China, with its long history, is a challenging task to be analyzed and defined in a single term of political mindset. Each of the dynasties or empires have specific characteristics defined by their composition, policies, neighboring composition, power structure and so on. As an example, from the beginning, the Shang and Zhou dynasties were very different in mentality. The last two empires of Imperial China, the Ming and Qing, in the mature period of the Tributary System, were different in characteristics as well. That is why scholars usually contradict each other, trying to define the system, referring to its hegemonic characteristic. However, the discussions around the characteristics of Chinese imperial foreign affairs suggest considerable similarities between the dynasties. One of the key questions related to the characteristics of imperial foreign relations is whether Chinese dynasties were empires or not. Christopher Ford (2010: 81) states that China concluded the warring state period as a unified country, but with the characteristics of an empire. “Empires have no interest in operating

70  The Tributary System and hegemony within an international system, they aspire to be an international system themselves. Empires have no need for a balance of power.” Ford names the centralized system of the Qin as an “empire”, while inevitably all of the dynasties that emerged after the Qin could be named “empire” as well, because they were quite similar in terms of system. For Fairbank (1968: 7), China was always imperial in structure before the Qin and Han feudal empires, after that they were bureaucratic empires. Mark Mancall (1968: 63) states that it is difficult to define in a Western context; it was an empire without neighbors. Zhao Tingyang (2006: 39) approaches it in a Chinese manner, defining it in terms of Tianxia, more like “globalization” compared to the “empires”. Peter Perdue (2015:  15) suggests that the Ming and Qing were just usual empires, though Chinese empires had some differences from other empires, which is normal. Perdue likens some of the practices of the Qing to colonialism, like the colonial characteristics of the administrations they set up in Taiwan, Mongolia, Southwest China, Xinjiang and Java (Ibid.:  16). Yang Zewei (2011:  1) defines China as a “celestial empire”. Zhaoguang Ge (2018:  22) evaluates China as a changing entity throughout history, that has never been homogenous. Some of the dynasties did not show the characteristics of an empire, but all of the others were empires with imperialist inclinations. Particularly, the Qing was a multi-​ethnic empire with assimilation policies, not only in the conquered areas but inside China as well. Sinification in a Sinocentric empire was not only because of the rhetoric of “superiority”, but also because it was useful for governance (Ibid.:  18). In an environmentalist approach, James Blaut (1999:  402) states that because of its geography, China became a single state, imperial and despotic. The definition of empire as “supreme rule, absolute power and dominion” (Agnew, 2005:  21) fits all Chinese dynasties, while the definition “colonial rule based on oppression and exploitation” (Zielonka, 2011:  770) may not fit well with all, but matches with the policies of the Qin, Han, Yuan, Ming and Qing. Overall, however, the Chinese had divided foreigners into Confucian and non-​ Confucian societies and treated them accordingly during its long imperial history. Tianxia universalism explained well the relations with Confucian societies, while Hua–​Yi Distinction described the characteristics of relations with the non-​ Confucian societies, with the Chinese calling them all barbarians. In conclusion, Chinese imperial hegemony in the Tributary System displayed some characteristics of a modern definition of hegemony in the Sinic Zone, while in the Inner Asian Zone it took on the characteristics of domination, which can be defined as “power politics”. In the Outer Zone, especially against the European powers, China did not have the chance to set up hegemony or domination. The relations were characterized by “balance of power”. Chinese hegemony in the Sinic Zone had some special “Chinese characteristics” which are not compatible with the modern definition of hegemony. They were the characteristics of providing legitimacy for all parties, the non-​ interference or wuwei, the official hierarchic structure, Sinocentrism, culture as

The Tributary System and hegemony  71 ideology, and soft power and lack of institutions to implement the hegemony. These were the elements of Chinese hegemony in the Sinic Zone of the Tributary System, making it different from modern definitions. Peacefulness was one of the most controversial issues about the Tributary System. The main Chinese rhetoric usually stressed the peacefulness of Chinese values that were reflected in East Asian politics, specifically in the Sinic Zone of the Tributary System. However, it is hard to evaluate any long-​term social and political event in such a holistic approach. The system was peaceful as long as it referred to the Sinic Zone, and defined as the period of late Ming and Early Qing. For the other zones and periods of time, peacefulness was temporary and conditional, as can be seen in any part of the world, in any period. The argument of “peaceful imperial China due to its peaceful values” was not observed as quite that perfect in practice. The theories and practices do not usually correspond with each other in Chinese history. Imperial China in its initial formation in the Yellow River basin was a multi-​state entity. From that point until the modern age, the struggle between China and those states who had not submitted and been assimilated has continued, and today the process has not been concluded yet. This endless struggle was no different from the power and sovereignty struggles in Europe and the Middle East, which have continued for centuries. China had already conquered most of the accessible geography and reached its natural borders a long time ago. The reasons for the relative peacefulness of the Sinic Zone in the period mentioned were the geographical conditions of the Sinic states, the legitimacy concerns of all parties, economic and political benefits, and finally Confucian values. Therefore, the relative peacefulness of the Sinic Zone cannot be explained only by Confucian values and China’s peacefulness: it has a lot to do with realpolitik, economy and geography as well. Chinese hegemony in the imperial Tributary System was not a peaceful paradise or an ideal example for humanity in the 21st century. It had its own settings, values, advantages and disadvantages. Overall, it was a hegemonic system and being composed of “Chinese characteristics” did not change the whole picture. It served Imperial China considerably, and to some extent served the member states as well. However, limiting Chinese imperial foreign policy and the Tributary System to the Sinic Zone, and only to the relatively peaceful late Ming and early Qing periods, is just illusion. The Sinic Zone is only one aspect of the Tributary System, and a very narrow portion of Chinese imperial foreign relations. It gives a vision of only a part of the whole picture. When the other zones and aspects of foreign relations are included, and the political values analyzed, the picture revealed is not very different to those in other parts of the world, just with different values. Chinese imperial hegemony was based on actual material power, and its culture was the system’s ideology, functioning as soft power. As long as the members did not violate Chinese interests and authority, they were treated well. Military power and coercion were always options, especially in relations with non-​Confucian states. In the scope of the Tributary System, China portrayed

72  The Tributary System and hegemony salvationist, hierarchic, Sinocentric and self-​centered characteristics, which makes it quite similar to, if not worse than, the other hegemonic systems, especially the modern liberal hegemony which the Chinese often tend to criticize.

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3  The Belt and Road Initiative and hegemony

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (一带一路) “Yídài Yílù” is an umbrella term to describe a large range of international infrastructure projects, initiated, sponsored and constructed by China, as part of the international strategy in Chinese contemporary foreign policy. Foreign relations have deep connections with domestic politics, culture, ideologies, identities and history. China is one of the best examples for the strengthening of foreign policies and connection with its domestic political agenda and historical accounts. During the Tributary System, covered in the previous chapter, Chinese domestic equilibrium was supported by its policies in foreign relations. The relation between domestic and foreign agenda functions the same way today, even perhaps more strongly than in the past. Today, Chinese foreign policy is an instrument of domestic politics for legitimacy, perhaps more than at any time.

3.1  The road to Belt and Road The BRI has strong relations with Chinese modern history and its current domestic political structure and agenda. Carrying strong traditional connections and with a modern influence, China’s current politics and international relations have strong ties specifically with the Century of Humiliation. Besides, to gain insight into the BRI with its incentives, characteristics, dynamics and possible results, the ongoing influence of historical values and strategies, the outcome of the devastating Maoist experience, the strength and capacity of nationalism and the argument of rejuvenation must be closely analyzed. These major components are decisive to figure out the incentives behind the strategies of contemporary Chinese political elites, and their moves in foreign affairs, specifically to comprehend the BRI. Analyzing the BRI through its historical roots will be the best method to comprehend it, as suggested by the historicist approach as well. 3.1.1  Century of Humiliation (百年国耻) The role of historical experience, culture and ancient philosophy in contemporary Chinese politics and social mindset have attracted special attention and have become the topic for much research. China has been portrayed as a highly

80  BRI and hegemony traditional state with a highly traditional society. This statement may cause confusion because of the image of the Maoist experience and the current authoritarian regime’s socialist rhetoric. However, the Maoist experience did not dramatically change the way the Chinese have handled social and political issues. Chineseness is in every domain such a dominant instinct that even Marxist theory evolved into something “with Chinese characteristics”, which the Chinese feel more comfortable with, though it actually means nothing more than a complex mixture of socialist, authoritarian and capitalist principles. The strong traditional tendency, cultural pride and conservative approach are demonstrated in the definition of universal human rights as well as in the formulation of “Human Rights with Chinese characteristics”. Chinese politics have carried many contradictions between reality and image, the theories and the practices. Most importantly, the long historical narrative starts researchers at the very beginning of this civilization each time, pretty much regardless of topic. Historical roots and connections perhaps cannot be more helpful to understand the social and political mindset in any other society than they are in China. To analyze the Tributary System, we had to go back to the Warring States period, BC, and now to analyze the motives that took China to the path of the BRI, and to figure out the mindset of the political leaders who planned and implemented it, we have to rewind the story back to the beginning of China’s modernization period. The Century of Humiliation (百年国耻) “Bǎinián Guóchǐ” (1839–​1949), as the Chinese call it, is one of the critical periods in Chinese history in terms of social and political unrest, chaos and interaction with foreigners. It would not be wrong to compare it with the Warring State period in the context of its significance. It had deep effects on contemporary Chinese politics, culture, and society, and as a whole on the Chinese mindset. The Century of Humiliation started with the First Opium War in 1839 (第一次鸦片战争) “Dìyīcì Yāpiàn Zhànzhēng” and ended with the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国) “Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó” in 1949 by Mao Zedong (毛泽东) “Máo Zé Dōng”. In his famous proclamation speech announced that: Chinese have always been a great, courageous and industrious nation; it is only in modern times that they have fallen behind. And that was entirely due to oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments… Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up. (Mosher, 2000: 37) The Century of Humiliation that Mao declared at an end was a chaotic period that started with Western imperialist intervention, continued with social, economic and political chaos, invasions, suppressions, poverty, endless civil wars, moral disappointment, ideological confusions, rivalries, loss of self-​confidence and incalculable loss of life.

BRI and hegemony  81 China was ruled by the Manchu Qing Empire when the British envoy Lord Macartney came to Beijing (北京) “Běijīng” in 1793, carrying a letter from King George III. There had been envoys from Holland in 1656 and 1667, from Russia in 1692 and 1720, from the Vatican in 1720 and from Portugal in 1753, before Macartney. Yet, his diplomatic visit is accepted as the turning point in China’s relations with the world, especially with the West (Dillon, 2010: 49). All of the Western envoys including Macartney came to China to set up diplomatic relations between China and their countries, on the basis of equality, and obtaining permission to trade in Chinese territories. Portugal got permission for trade in Macau; Russians had some trading privileges in the capital Beijing. Nevertheless, none of them was successful in setting up equal diplomatic relations. China, with the strong perception of its superiority over the rest of the world (barbarians), even treated King George III of England the same as the steppe barbarians who came to benefit from the prosperity of China. The emperor’s humiliating letter was not delivered to King George III: living far beyond the big seas, but still sending letters with your envoys to benefit from the benediction of our civilization … to prove your loyalty, you have sent gifts from your country … while I  am ruling the whole world, I have only the aim of ruling in a perfect way … the magnificent benefits of our country has effected everything under the sky and kings of all nations sent their gifts through land and sea routes. As your envoy can see with his own eyes, we have all things … we do not need the things produced in your country. (MacNair, 1927: 3–​4) The stance in this letter from the Chinese emperor dramatically conveyed how the Chinese viewed themselves and the world. China’s isolation and unfamiliarity with the developments in the rest of the world would delay its modernization and perhaps the chance for peaceful industrialization and early peaceful integration with the world. The British response to this attitude was to spread the trade of opium in China. This is known to be the reason for the Opium War. However, the main reason for the war, even beyond the sale of opium in China, was the silver deficit that Great Britain build up over its porcelain, silk and tea trade with China. Against these products they had to pay in silver, and could sell almost nothing to China in exchange (Dillon, 2010: 47). To balance the deficit, opium was a good instrument. Therefore, as long as China continued the isolationist attitude, war was inevitable and the reason could be for anything, not only the opium trade. The Century of Humiliation is the cornerstone of contemporary China, because for the first time in history the superiority perception of Chinese values and political philosophy began to be questioned. The First Opium War in 1839 was the beginning of a new era for China. It was not the first time China had been invaded and defeated. For centuries China had faced fierce attacks and invasion from their nomad (Mongol, Turkic, Tibetan, Manchu, etc.) neighbors in the

82  BRI and hegemony steppes. The Chinese had intermingled so much with the steppe nomads through these endless invasions that the nomads ruled China as much as the Han Chinese did (Chung, 2017: 34). Nevertheless, Chinese confidence in its superiority had never been challenged in any of these invasions. What made the Opium Wars different was the fact that, for the first time in history, the Chinese gradually started to understand that something was wrong with their narrative of superiority. The Manchus did not question the Confucian cultural setting, because they needed it to manage China, so they kept it and supported it. Therefore, the Manchus were not a threat to Chinese values. However, Westerners posed a fundamental threat to Chinese identity and perception of superiority, and pushed the Chinese elites to question it as well (Meissner, 2006: 43). The questioning did not start immediately. It was a process that increased during the Century of Humiliation. The beginning of this process was marked by a mix of feelings of anger, confusion and humiliation. As Meissner (2006: 44) describes it, it was also the beginning of China’s identity crisis. He divides this crisis into three stages, covering the whole Century of Humiliation. The first stage took place from the First Opium War in 1839, and lasted until the First Sino-​Japanese War in 1895. The anger and blame targeted the Manchu Qing administration as much as “arrogant” foreigners. The main reason for China’s defeat was believed to be the weakness of the Chinese government and the cruelty of Western imperialism. The first books written about foreigners suggested they had to “learn from barbarians to defeat them” (Dillon, 2010: 122). This strategy would never be forgotten, and even today it is still viable in Chinese minds. This idea reduced the superiority of the Westerners to technology, weaponry and economic power, but brought legitimacy to learn from them, which was inconceivable till that time because of the firm self-​superiority perception. Cultural superiority was still believed to belong to China at this stage. Chinese values were essential, but Western knowledge and values were functional. Named “half modernization”, this method did not work (Meissner, 2006: 44). It proved not to be effective in many areas, and even the first factories built in this era did not work well. In the second stage, there was the proclamation of the Republic of China (中华民国) “Zhōnghuá Mínguó”, which Meissner (2006: 44) claims took place between 1895 and 1911. With the effect of the Japanese defeat, the Chinese elite acknowledged that just technical learning from the West was not adequate, but political changes were needed as well. At this stage famous reformers such as Kang Youwei (1858–​1927), Liang Qichao (1873–​1929) and Tan Sitong (1865–​1898) emerged. Especially with the works of Kang Youwei, Confucius was presented as a reformer himself, and the political reforms legitimized. However, he still followed the Confucian methods of legitimizing the new with the old values. The developments continued with setting up universities, while advocacy of constitutional monarchy was spreading and the notion of equality with foreigners was emerging. In this stage, the elites started to accept Chinese and Western equality.

BRI and hegemony  83 The third stage covered the time period from 1911 to the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (中华人民共和国) “Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó” in 1949. In the republic era the interaction with foreign ideas and lifestyles intensified. In the Colonial Divisions of the major cities, especially in Shanghai, the Chinese directly interacted with Western ideologies, cultures, lifestyles, and political and financial institutions. They sent students abroad and opened foreign language schools, for example (Dillon, 2010: 123). Chinese elites in the middle of a values crisis were the ones who questioned Chinese values more intensely, which had been upheld since the beginning of Chinese civilization. They were bitterly divided into ideological camps, but nearly all agreed on the necessity for change and to update Chinese state mentality and cultural values. Some had radical solutions, some more compromising solutions, and the Chinese elite produced solutions for the backwardness and chaos, reminiscent of the Warring States period. At this highly productive stage there were three main intellectual groups. First were the Nationalists grouped around Sun Yat-​Sen (孙中山) “Sūn Zhōngshān” (1866–​1925) and his Nationalist Party (国民党) “Guómíndǎng” (KMT). His famous Three People’s Principles (三民主义) “Sānmín Zhǔyì” combined democratic Western values with traditional Chinese values (Meissner, 2006: 45). Giving prime position to Chinese values but updated with Western values, the KMT line was the official ideology in the Republic of China (ROC). Liberalism was another main school, represented by Hu Shi (1891–​1962), who suggested “total Westernization” (全盘西化) “Quánpán Xīhuà”, including political liberalization, capitalist economy, federal divisions and democratization of Chinese culture as a whole. This was thought to be the only way to get China to the place where it deserved to be (Ibid.: 45). The third largest group were Marxists. Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Mao Zedong were the leading figures in this group. Following the Soviet model, the Marxists were determined to destroy the “feudal” structure of the culture, especially Confucianism, and set up a Marxist-​Leninist socialist identity in China (Ibid.: 45). The famous May Fourth Movement in 1919 (五四运动) “Wūsì Yùndòng” was a nationalist movement, mainly against Japanese claims related to Shandong province, and brought a significant change to the diversity of intellectual paths. It increased nationalism and created a fertile environment for mass movements, from which both the Marxists and Nationalists benefited greatly (Dillon, 2010:  197). More importantly, Chinese culture became a national identity. It was widely accepted that only by revisioning Chinese culture could China catch up with the West (Meissner, 2006: 45). This was one of the ideas in the Century of Humiliation, but became the main path after the May Fourth Movement. Marxists, benefitting the most from the nationalist wave, would be the winners of the war with the KMT and set up their ideal China later in 1949, helped favorable conditions and incompetence of the KMT government.

84  BRI and hegemony Dramatic changes in politics, society and culture in this era transformed the perceptions, institutions and strategies in Chinese foreign affairs irrevocably. First, China accepted the Westphalian system of equal relations among sovereign states, but only by force, from the defeats of the Opium Wars ending with the treaty of 1860. Before that, led by Confucian values, Manchu China had contacted Vietnam, Korea and other Sinic Zone Countries through the Ministry of Rituals, while managing their relations with the northern barbarians by the Ministry of Conquests (Chung, 2017: 41). This structure was fully abandoned after 1861 by setting up the Foreign Office (总理衙门) “Zǒnglǐ Yámén”, which later, in 1901, would be upgraded to ministry level to become China’s first Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Second, the Century of Humiliation left China with a strong sense of victimization, insecurity and righteousness in foreign affairs (Shambaugh, 2013: 23). The feelings of victimization created by the Century of Humiliation shaped the Chinese mindset and became an important part of it (Meissner, 2006: 44). This rhetoric is still used by Chinese politicians fairly regularly. It is an old wound, occasionally reopening. When the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was mistakenly bombed by the USA during the Bosnian War, the reaction of the Chinese government and public reflected a clear sense of this victimization (Harris, 2014: 68). China does not accept foreign influence on country matters, it strongly opposes the status of the Century of Humiliation, and puts this sensitivity at the center of its foreign policy (Dillon, 2010: 445). This sense of victimization keeps the sense of insecurity and distrust alive. China strongly follows the realist or social Darwinist principles of cultivating strength or dying in international relations. The Chinese found it hard to trust the West and could hardly believe that the 19th-​century imperialism was over (Kaufman, 2010: 1). This cautiousness has created over-​sensitivity and suspicion about falling into a “trap”, in case of any Western, especially US, statements related to China, directly or indirectly. It also creates an exaggerated false image of Western values, the Chinese firmly believing Westerners to be deceitful and ill-disposed to others, their policies only created and designed to serve Western interests. Even in academic and top-level ​government circles, Chinese scholars and politicians often openly criticize or imply that notions like individualism, human rights, freedom, equality, democracy, and so on are empty principles, only serving Western interests and creating selfish individuals. Besides, Western civilization is portrayed as inhumane and uncivilized compared to their own. In addition the Chinese developed a habit of finding a scapegoat for every disaster they faced. Accusations of traitor, betrayer, Japanese collaborator, and so on were often used, especially during the Maoist period. This habit of scapegoating has often been utilized by the regime to distract attention or anger to foreign countries. Sense of insecurity sometimes brings sense of cruelty as well. Most of contemporary Chinese blame their ancestors for following benevolence too blindly, not exploiting their neighboring weak states, while now they are “betraying” China, cooperating with the USA. The Chinese would blame a soft but unsuccessful stroke, compared to a hard but successful one (Dillon 2010: 30). The successful

BRI and hegemony  85 result legitimizes unethical methods. A  sense of humiliation, victimization and betrayal mostly puts successful outcomes ahead of morality, justice, righteousness and fairness. This habit is not alien to the Chinese, as the traditional values include it too. Third, the Century of Humiliation is one of the main factors motivating China to stick to the principles of Westphalian sovereignty and advocacy of non-​ interference in domestic affairs (Harris, 2014: 71). China’s hyper-​sensitivity for sovereignty and non-​interference in domestic affairs causes strong reactions to any minor comments from outside about China, let alone to a real threat. Issues about Taiwan, Hongkong, Tibet or the Uyghurs directly create a sense of threat to national security and sovereignty, no matter whether the topic is minor, or indeed has the aim of interference. China does not hesitate overtly or covertly in using economic and diplomatic means to deter and silence any foreign power, institutions, or even individuals involved in any issues that they define as related to Chinese sovereignty and intending interference in domestic affairs. The issue can be related to the Dalai Lama or a map illustrating Taiwan out of Chinese jurisdiction printed on a T-​shirt. Similar issues immediately create an avalanche of reaction, mostly due to the sense of victimization derived from memories of the Century of Humiliation. Fourth, the dramatization of the Century of Humiliation is one of the most convenient ways of legitimizing the Chinese regime today (Shambaugh, 2013:  23). The Chinese government often reminds the rest of the world how China has suffered under the merciless Western imperialists and Japanese invasion. Community Party elites often emphasize the role of the Chinese Communist Party (中国共产党) “Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng” (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (人民解放军) “Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn” (PLA) in ending the Century of Humiliation, when the conditions were terrible and the members of the Nationalist Government (KMT) mostly pursued personal interests, in negligence and treason. The Chinese government often uses this argument to consolidate public support. Leaders often defend the view that sticking to the CCP regime is the only way to ensure that humiliation will not happen again and it is the only way to reach the bright future China deserves. Finally, whether the sense of victimization created a wish for revenge or not is a serious question, and has not been asked seriously or examined closely. Chinese officials often like to emphasize the cruelty they suffered from Western imperialism in the past. Frequently they have stated that the West must understand how China suffered in the past (Callahan, 2004: 214). These statements are not enough to elicit the conclusion that China wants to get revenge in the same way. However, it is worth thinking that if one day China has enough power to do so, would it be the case? In summary, the Century of Humiliation was over a long time ago. Nevertheless, it has left such profound effects on Chinese society and political life that its spirit still haunts and still plays an important role in the Chinese domestic and foreign decision-​making process, perfectly utilized and exploited by the Chinese regime.

86  BRI and hegemony The BRI has direct connections with the Century of Humiliation, presented as an important stage to reverse its effects and bring China to its “rightful” place once again. 3.1.2  Maoism (毛泽东思想) Maoism (毛泽东思想) “Máo Zédōng Sīxiǎng” had a significant influence on three decades of the PRC. Though not as much as then, it still has considerable effects on Chinese thought and international relations today. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (中国共产党) “Zhōngguó Gòngchǎn Dǎng” and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (中国人民解放军) “Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn” have achieved great things for the nation, from the beginning in 1921 until 1949, the proclamation of the PRC. The successful organization and guerrilla fighting in Jiangxi (江西), the legendary Long March (长征) “Cháng Zhēng” in 1934–​ 1935, the synergy and spirit of the years in Yan’an (延安) between 1936 and 1947, the heroic wars against the Nationalist (KMT) (國民黨) “Guómíndǎng” government and Japanese armies in spite of an imbalance in the power equation, attracted many others from all around the country to communist ranks. All these factors, together with the unsuccessful defense by the KMT against the Japanese invasion, the corruption, difficult situations created in rural and urban areas by the long wars and instability, the promising motivation of the leader Mao Zedong and the confidence of Red Army (PLA), were the factors that paved the way to victory for the Chinese communists. Mao Zedong dreamt about a China in the red dress of Marxism. However, just like any other conqueror in the past, Mao was also aware of the fact that a highly conservative society like the Chinese cannot be turned into another society in a short time. Mao was a revolutionary, but his ideas and strategies had deep connections with Chinese culture and history. Mao was an isolationist, ideological, pragmatist and traditional (Harris, 2014: 36). He adopted both the conservative nationalist thoughts advocating that China should keep limited contact with the outside world to avoid cultural damage, and also that it should defend cosmopolitanism and modernity, to learn and benefit from necessary technology and development against aggression (Ibid.: 27). The contradiction of isolation and cosmopolitanism in Mao’s strategy highlights the pragmatism that the Chinese are experts in. In fact, his own ideology was also of Western origin, and in practice, he adopted Western ideas to serve his country. The father of the communist world, the USSR (苏联) “Sūlián”, helped and guided the CCP from the beginning. However, despite lacking support from the USSR in the Yan’an years, Mao was able to win the civil war. After the proclamation of the PRC, Mao was aware of the weakness of the regime and knew it would not be possible to survive without support from a powerful ally, especially while they were still at war with the KMT nationalist government in Taiwan and its supporter the USA (Dillon, 2010:  293). Mao’s “lean to one side” strategy made the USSR the only reasonable choice (Ibid.: 310) of partner to solve the problems related to governmental organization, financing of the infrastructure,

BRI and hegemony  87 technology transfer, technical support and a protective shield against capitalist adversaries. Mao was traditional in foreign relations, ideologically leaning to the Soviet side but pragmatically not forgetting that one day China might need to set up relations with the West. However, the Korean war and the Taiwan issue delayed this rapprochement (Harris, 2014: 33). Mao was not a faithful comrade in fighting for Koreans, but was responding to a request from Stalin; more importantly, Mao suspected that NATO would target him next after Korea. Mao lost his own son in this war, with Chinese casualties outstripping North Korean losses. The PLA were victorious because they had war experience. However, Mao used all these successes to consolidate domestic public opinion around the party. This caused the United Nations (UN) to reject the claim of the CCP over all Chinese territories, and delayed China’s joining the international community as a legitimate member (Dillon, 2010: 305). Mao’s foreign policy was strongly anti-​imperialist, not just because of his ideology, but mostly due to the memories of the Century of Humiliation. Just the same as the USA was a rebel colony at the beginning, and they did not set up a UK-​style hegemony based on military invasion and colonialism, China also adopted anti-​imperialist policies because of the country’s experience in the past. However, colonialist and imperialist policies were not restricted to capitalist countries alone. The Soviet Union treated the other communist countries in the communist international as satellite or colonial countries. Mao gave signals in his Moscow visit that he would not be happy to accept that treatment. Stalin was a cruel dictator and Mao was his admirer, but the Chinese imperial sense of superiority persisted in the communist leader’s attitudes, behaving at least as a partner rather than a colony or satellite. Mao was aware of the Soviet’s potential imperial policies, though annexation of Tibet and Xinjiang were the clear evidence that Mao himself was also adopting Qing China’s imperialist policies. Mao’s Three Worlds Theory (三个世界的理论) “Sāngè Shìjiè de Lǐlùn” and his claim to be the revolutionary leader of the third world revealed traces of the historical Tributary mentality (Tarling, 1967: 9) in a different form. Mao and Deng developed the theory but did not join the Non-​Alignment Countries (Harris, 2014: 34). China as a respectful country, with historical significance and cultural pride, claimed its former respected place in this way, pushing the boundaries of the day’s conjecture. China continues this policy with the BRI today. Although the old Sinic Zone countries are not in China’s sphere of influence as before, China has replaced them with weaker African, Central Asian, Latin American countries. The Bandung conference in 1955 was a turning point in this aspect. Maoist China defined the principles of its foreign policy with “The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”. The principles were: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-​aggression, mutual non-​interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. China strongly stressed sovereignty, non-​interference and common interests, reminding all of the suffering of the Century of Humiliation. By this policy China managed to solve its border problems with India (Ibid.: 36). These principles have been the core of Chinese foreign policy since then and are

88  BRI and hegemony still in effect today. Based on these principles, China has been able to set up stable relations with underdeveloped countries, especially in Africa. China repeated historical habits and traditions even in the Maoist period. The five principles set up a new sphere of influence, equivalent to the former Sinic Zone in the Tributary System. The targeted countries were relatively peaceful, weak states, beneficial to China, tied to China politically and economically, but not burdened to, and not protected by China. The Chinese hierarchic order showed itself in its post-​imperial era foreign relations and developed around the five principles with the underdeveloped countries. The violent face of the Tributary System, which was a constant type of relationship with the steppe barbarians of the Inner Asian Zone, emerged in Mao’s time as well. The Korean War was the first example. Wars with India and Vietnam, border clashes with Russia, the annexation of Tibet and Xinjiang were typical Chinese behaviors that can be seen during the long history of the Tributary System in the Inner Asian Zone countries. China did not tolerate disobedience to the Son of the Heaven under the sky (Tianxia). Any community, domestic or foreign, creating disorder and posing a threat to the legitimacy and interests of China, or the Chinese hierarchical celestial system, was punished hard. In the Maoist period international relations did not carry the same international and moral values. However, the relations were still deeply affected by past values and practices. China did not tolerate any actions infringing on its own perceived interests, questioning its legitimacy or threatening its order. In this context, the Vietnamese did not pose a serious threat to China, but it was a matter of prestige to “teach a lesson” to Vietnam in 1982. The 1950 Korean War was a threat to Chinese interests, to the regime and to its domestic and international prestige. Border clashes with India and Russia and the territorial annexation of Tibet and Xinjiang were cases related to Chinese imperialist intentions, self-​defined interests and order. Breaking up with the Soviets after Stalin’s death seemed an ideological issue. Revisionist Khrushchev was a betrayer in Stalinist Mao’s opinion. However, the break-up had solid links to China’s domestic politics. When there were demonstrations against communist policies in the Eastern European satellites, of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1956, Mao was afraid that this wave of protests would spread to China and strike his regime too. When the Soviets crushed the demonstrations, Mao was alarmed. Thus, developing independent relations and even creating his own communist ideology was a good way to escape Soviet influence (Dillon, 2010: 324). The escalation of tension with the Soviets turned into small-​scale border clashes, and the final breakdown came in 1960 (Ibid.: 341). It was a period of developing more independent policies, and criticizing both large camps, capitalists and communists. During the 1960s Mao did not feel safe; the devastating Cultural Revolution (文化大革命) “Wénhuà Dàgémìng” (1966–​ 1976) in this period, was initiated against the revisionist party cadres like Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) “Dèng Xiǎopíng” (1904–​1997). In 1968, when Czechoslovakia was invaded by the Soviets, Mao was terrified by such a ruthless, reckless action inviting potential backlash from the

BRI and hegemony  89 international community. This event caused deep insecurity in China, and in 1971 relations with the USA were established, and the USSR became an endorsed “enemy” from then on. It was a surprising political and ideological twist, hard to believe. Nevertheless, Chinese pragmatism was brilliantly demonstrating itself. The Chinese are highly pragmatic when needed, and forgetting this fact would always surprise people. In 1971, China was admitted to the UN. This was a turning point for the PRC. From then on, the revolutionary rhetoric and helping revolutions in the third world were set aside, and normal diplomatic relations were set up with all countries (Harris, 2014:  37). Maoist ideology was stepping down from foreign policy priorities. China’s accession to the UN ended the crucial problem of legitimacy with the international community. The PRC was not the legitimate representative of China, rather, until that time it was the ROC government in Taiwan. The PRC gained legitimacy in the international community; however, the legitimacy distress in domestic politics would continue. After Mao’s death in 1976, with the presidency of Deng Xiaoping the highly ideological Cultural Revolution policies were replaced by policies related to the economy, national unity and sovereignty (Ibid.: 36). The Reform and Opening Up (改革开放) “Gǎigé Kāifàng” policies started in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping diverted attention away from Mao’s controversial and devastating policies. When the Soviet Union collapsed unexpectedly in 1989, however, the Chinese regime was haunted by a possible similar result in China. The Tiananmen Massacre (六四事件) “Liùsì Shìjiàn” in the same year reduced China’s prestige in the outside world and brought sanctions. The massacre saved the CCP regime, but caused deep disappointment among Chinese society with this leader, Deng Xiaoping, after the big disappointment with Mao. Deng’s strategy for foreign relations was a new and highly pragmatic path for the CCP to follow even today. He formulated his foreign policy strategy inspired by the Chinese traditional proverb, “hide your strength, wait your time” (韬光养晦) “tāo guāng yǎng huì”. It was a highly pragmatic and deceptive strategy to avoid confrontation with the incomparably powerful USA (Zhao, S., 2013b:  32). Called the “low profile strategy”, Deng’s formulation carried China and the CCP regime through a crucial period of economic development (Ibid.:  33). China’s current foreign policy still bears heavily the influence of Deng’s low profile strategy. Chinese society has mostly turned its back on politics today, busy with a vibrant economy that very few countries on Earth could have. However, the legitimacy distress still haunts the CCP leadership. Capitalist economic and social development was anticipated to accelerate the demand for democratic rights under a strict authoritarian regime. This has not taken place until now, but it is the biggest source of misery for the Chinese regime. Being questioned over its legitimacy, this is such a vulnerable point of the regime that almost all strategies and plans, domestic or international, somehow serve to keep the CCP in power. It would not be an exaggeration if Chinese foreign affairs were described as knitted strategies, which directly or indirectly are meant to serve the party’s legitimacy

90  BRI and hegemony and finally keep it in power. Missing this point when examining any strategies in Chinese foreign affairs makes it difficult to draw the correct conclusions. 3.1.3  Nationalism (爱国主义) In contemporary China, the strongest political currency is nationalism (爱国主义) “Aiguó Zhǔyì”. For a nation like China, traditionally with a strong perception of superiority, pride and memories of the Century of Humiliation, nationalism is not surprisingly the strongest political ideology. At the end of the Manchu’s imperial multicultural and multi-​ethnic cosmopolitanism, the Chinese perception of self-​superiority, which reflected itself in the Sinocentric order of the Tributary System, and referred to cultural values without ethnic reference, was influenced by modern nationalism and reincarnated itself into a strong Han (汉) “Hàn” nationalism, if not chauvinism. Western imperialism that showed its ruthless face in the Century of Humiliation was one of the crucial factors in this transformation. It is as Callahan (2004: 200) describes, the essence of Chinese nationalism. The Han Chinese developed a sense of nationalism during the Mongolian Yuan Empire and Manchu Qin Empire. The discrimination, humiliation, and sometimes large-​scale massacres against Han Chinese by both of these empires took Han nationalism to a level of maturity before imperialism struck China in the mid-​19th century. The Opium Wars and the unfair treaties in the mid-​19th century ended the Sinocentric Tributary System. For the Chinese, with the perception of self-​superiority and a strong national and cultural pride, this was a huge insult. In the age of imperialist expansion, many nations suffered from Western imperialist and colonialist policies. However, none of them deemed them as “shame” or “humiliation” as the Chinese did. What was the reason for naming the military defeats and unfair treaties as “humiliation”? This was due to the strong sense of superiority, Sinocentric pride and chauvinism that the Chinese accommodated in their identity, and drew sharp lines between “self” and “others”. The nationalism that developed during this period against Manchu and Western imperialists found its meaning in protecting the race from the “white invaders” (Meissner, 2006: 51). Sun Yat-​Sen, the leader of the Chinese revolutionaries that overthrew the Qing rule and set up the ROC in 1911, is known as the father of modern Chinese nationalism. As the first (provisional) president of the ROC, Sun coined his famous Three Principles (三民主义) “Sānmín Zhūyì”:  nationalism (民族) “Mínzú”, Democracy (民權) “Mínquán” and Welfare (民生) “Mínshēng” (Ibid.: 45). Today these principles are still the main ideology of the ROC, ruling Taiwan island. Nationalism in the modern sense entered Chinese political life with Sun Yat-​Sen and the ROC. Sun Yat-​Sen was content with Western values, but still believed in Chinese cultural superiority, so he combined both in his doctrine. Therefore, the strong sense of superiority developed during the long Chinese history gradually turned into a strong nationalism with the Century of Humiliation, the ROC and especially with mass demonstrations starting on May 4, 1919 against Japan’s territorial claim to Shandong province (Dillon, 2010: 196).

BRI and hegemony  91 Meissner (2006: 51) differentiates Western and Eastern nationalism. He describes Western nationalism depending on liberal values and being “civic”, but with deep arrogance and an imperialist past and aims. In contrast Eastern nationalism, especially Chinese nationalism, depends on cultural and ethnic values and is pointedly against Western arrogance and imperialism. Rather than freeing the nation from their own autocratic governments Eastern nationalism means keeping the nation free from the West. Therefore, it has strong tendencies to cultural, ethnic and even racist reactions, unlike Western nationalism, sensitive to protecting liberal and individual rights. Chinese nationalism has shaped Chinese domestic and international politics since the beginning of its modernization. This includes the tough ideological Maoist period as well. Maoists did not consider that traditional Chinese culture is part of Chinese identity; instead they gave place to a class division of Marxism: peasants, proletariat, petit and national bourgeoisie. Nationalism was a form of party patriotism. However, after the Cultural Revolution the ancient culture quietly and slowly was returned to its place (Ibid.:  52). National pride was promoted with the rhetoric of exporting the communist revolution to other parts of the world, defeating the imperialist powers in China, and being the leader of the third world against imperialist aims. After the Tiananmen Protests (六四事件) “Liùsì Shìjiàn” in 1989, patriotism combined with socialism. In the panic of the Soviet collapse, for the party’s legitimacy and for providing social stability, the Chinese regime turned to cultural values to re-​write Chinese history, and strengthen nationalist feelings to the limits of racism (Ibid.:  52). According to Meissner (2006:  53), racism was never foreign to Chinese politics and society. He suggests that during the period of the ROC, Chiang Kai-​Shek himself described China not as a “nation”, but as a “race”. He further evaluates that Chinese identity combined cultural superiority with Darwinism and racism before the proclamation of the PRC. Therefore, Chinese racial nationalism was created in modern times. Racial sentiments in Chinese nationalism can be hardly seen in the daily life and interaction with foreigners. However, it exists and it is promoted by the victimization narrative of the Century of Humiliation, and foreign arrogance against Chinese food, script, cultural values, traditions and, in some cases, even physical features. The Chinese, in case of defending any values, intentionally or not, actually talk on behalf of the Chinese civilization or race, rather than a nation-​state or a culture. In Martin Jacques’ (2009: 247) definition, China is a civilization-​state rather than a nation-​state. This is well in line with Meissner’s (2006: 52) argument of Chinese racial nationalism. The Chinese Central Propaganda Department is now busy promoting nationalism (Callahan, 2004: 214) rather than Marxism. The misleading memories and exaggerated narrative of advancement and peacefulness of Chinese civilization before the West arrived, and amplified victimization storyline of the Century of Humiliation, has increased populist nationalism in China. The Chinese regime is under pressure to restore its historical glory (Yu, H., 2016: 72). According to Bhattacharya (2007: 235), Chinese nationalism is motivated by the elements of nation building and motives of gaining its “rightful” place in

92  BRI and hegemony the superpower league. Chinese nationalism aims to achieve national salvation and regain its great position in the world order by removing the disgrace of the Century of Humiliation. Bhattacharya further claims that China uses nationalism not only to achieve domestic aims, but also to create international order for its own interests. This has led China to be more assertive, especially in recent years. The cleansing of national humiliation is the essence of nationalism in China. Nevertheless, there is an important detail here in that the Chinese have not only commemorated the “humiliation” they experienced with the arrival of the imperialists, but have also drawn attention to their weakness at that time (Callahan, 2004:  202). Therefore, getting stronger and regaining their rightful place is a direct pressure for the current regime. However, the Chinese regime is skilled in using nationalist feelings for political purposes, especially against Japan and the USA. In the Sankaku and South China Sea islands issues, the issues of Taiwan and Tibet, the regime easily consolidates public support by stirring up nationalist feelings. Chinese public opinion is consolidated in supporting the regime by the sense of nationalism. By remembering this national humiliation, and the wars and destruction that the CCP helped the country to escape, the regime keeps nationalism as an important instrument in its hands, available to use whenever needed. Nevertheless, the regime is also conscious that nationalism is a two-​sided blade, and can cause self-​damage when used. The Chinese masses could easily blame the regime for any of its shortcomings, if national interest is being violated by a foreign power. Nationalism is fostered and effectively used by the regime, but it can constrain and endanger the regime itself as well. Chinese society in the main does not buy into the rhetoric of hardcore Maoism anymore. Disappointment with the leaders and the devastating policies in the past have left the ideology enfeebled in society. Noticing this, the Chinese communist elite replaced the rhetoric of saving the country from Japan and the merits of Maoism with the propaganda of successful economic development. This propaganda is also losing its effect, because the economy is not looking positive anymore. Nationalism is especially promoted to take the place of the waning Maoism and the rhetoric of miraculous economic development as the new cement of social coherence and the source of legitimacy behind the communist party. Strong Chinese nationalism, carrying elements of racism, is the strongest integral factor in Chinese domestic and foreign policy today. The Chinese government benefits from the strong nationalism, but at the same time can also be a victim of it. Keeping the nationalist pressure in mind would facilitate comprehending China’s over-​reaction to international issues, especially those about the regime’s legitimacy, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and any issue that has something to do with or reminds it of the Century of Humiliation. 3.1.4  Rejuvenation (复兴) Rejuvenation (复兴) “fù xīng” means “reviving” in the Chinese language. It is used to refer to “renaissance” as well. The term is reminiscent of the European Renaissance, yet is quite different in meaning and practice.

BRI and hegemony  93 Chinese society, with its strong sense of pride and superiority, could never accept the Century of Humiliation and its legacy. Accepting their own backwardness at that time, the Chinese have always aimed to get back to the strong and glorious times that they had experienced throughout history. Chinese rejuvenation is roughly about getting China back to its “rightful” place in the international arena. The Chinese, being a highly traditional society, whenever they faced social or political chaos in history, would restore the old values in order to solve the problems and bring back stability (Kissinger, 2015:  27). Even Confucius himself restored the “glorious past”, especially the Zhou Dynasty values, to end the social, moral, and political problems in the Autumn and Spring periods, prior to the utter chaos of the Warring States period. This habit has repeated itself over the long period of Chinese history, and it continues even today. What rejuvenation means is to bring back the glorious days through advanced technology, back to a developed, powerful, and rich country. However, in practice it includes the restoration of the old cultural values and even imposing them on the world this time. Chinese society, being disappointed by its communist leaders, first Mao in the Cultural Revolution and then Deng after the Tiananmen Massacre, lost interest and faith in political and ideological values. Today, people are preoccupied with earning money. Marxist ideology has not much to give to Chinese society anymore. In such a period of “moral crisis”, rejuvenation rhetoric and associated policies have paved the way for the restoration of the old values. Currently, Chinese society is enormously curious and is pinning its attention on Chinese history, religions and especially Confucian values. Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist temples are hosting visitors in crowds they have not seen for nearly a century. Books and movies related to Chinese history and religions are in high demand. There are many newly opened Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist schools or training centers and private education all around the country. Chinese people are rediscovering the old values after the Marxist storm. The Chinese government that once destroyed most of the historical and cultural heritage, and tried to erase all traditional values, especially the Confucian ideals in the Cultural Revolution, is now actively promoting its revival. Callahan (2016: 24) explains this as a patriotic discomfort with the “money worshipping” society. Moral crisis is an important reason for this attitude of the government. However, Confucian values advising obedience to the elderly and state authorities, and endorsing the hierarchical order, are quite useful for consolidating and legitimizing CCP rule, while the same values were criticized in the Cultural Revolution and blamed as being responsible for inertia and a stagnating society. The biggest reasons for the persistence of CCP rule, after communist regimes collapsed in the Soviet bloc, are the static, obedient, and collectivist structure of Chinese cultural values. Confucian values, which advocate the unequal, hierarchic rule, and unconditional obedience, are well matched with the mentality of CCP rule. Reading it in reverse, CCP mentality quite overlaps with the old Confucian mentality that Chinese society did not actually feel a difference between an authoritarian government with Marxist values and the authoritarian imperial rule

94  BRI and hegemony with Confucian values. Collectivism in Chinese culture consolidated by the concept of deified ancestors, semi-​deified family and state, also matches well with communal society and the collectivist government mentality of the CCP. This argument is strengthened if it is remembered that Chinese society has never had had the experience of democratic rule and values, so they cannot compare and know what they have lost and must fight for. Knowing these facts, CCP leadership must have appreciated the Confucian values for their functionality in legitimizing their rule and providing social stability. In this process the promoted ideology is not only Confucianism:  Taoism, Buddhism and especially legalism are also promoted. If the Chinese regime is thought to exploit Confucian values for their own power, that would be a correct comment, but not complete without mentioning its ancient brother, legalism. Similar to Imperial China, the CCP regime displays a two-​ faced characteristic:  Confucian in appearance, legalist inside. Therefore, the revival of the old values includes legalism as well, perhaps as the most favored one for the regime, for its usefulness in contemporary Chinese society. The ideal of rejuvenation has gained in popularity recently, associated with the new term “China Dream” (中国梦) “Zhōngguó mèng”. China’s amazing economic growth after the Reform and Opening Up, started by Deng Xiaoping, has continued for around 40 years, when the current Chinese president Xi Jinping (习近平) “Xí Jìnpíng” took office in 2013. This amazing uninterrupted growth created a miracle country with the second largest economy in the world. However, the growth rate is slowing down and the Chinese economy is facing the threat of recession, the middle-​income trap, unemployment and other profound economic problems. Xi, facing these serious problems, has adopted more assertive domestic and foreign policies. He consolidated his power internally, lifted the term limit for presidency, and at the same time he came up with the inspiring terms “China Dream” and “Rejuvenation”. After the economic crisis of 2008, the relative recession of the USA economy gave China a sense of confidence that it could be more assertive (Zhao, S., 2013a: 119). Rejuvenation and the China Dream pathway changed Chinese foreign policy from following a soft-​passive line to a confident-​assertive line. While Deng’s low profile strategy is still a major path, Xi has brought assertiveness and confidence to Chinese foreign policy with the Rejuvenation dream. Rejuvenation currently is one of the main objectives of the Chinese state, more than it was at any time in the past.

3.2  The Belt and Road Initiative The BRI indicated a paradigm shift in Chinese foreign policy. It is not just an ordinary strategy to enhance economic and political benefits, but also has deep historical roots and meaning for China. It is a game-​changing move in international relations. While China denies having a “Grand Strategy” (Pillsbury, 2015: 198), the BRI is a series of plans that can be deemed a grand strategy for the coming decades if not the century.

BRI and hegemony  95 3.2.1  Framework The Silk Road (丝绸之路) “Sīchóu Zhīlù” is the nostalgic name for the historical trade routes that connected China to the Middle East, Anatolia and Europe. As the famous Silk Road scholar Peter Frankopan (2018: 3) explains, the routes were “the world’s central nerve system”, due to their significance in transmitting goods and ideas, and finally shaping the culture, religion, philosophy, languages and even food and clothing and so on. The name “Silk Road” was invented by German geographer Ferdinand F. von Richthofen, who used it in his book China published in 1877 (Hei, Zhao and Ma, 2016: 530). The emergence of trade routes in the region dates back to the Han dynasty, from its capital Chang’an (长安) “Cháng ān”, today’s Xi’an (西安) “Xī ān”. The Silk Road has helped East and West to interact for centuries. Western music, painting, dancing, sculptures, architecture, science and technology, astronomy, the calendric system, medicine and religions like Zoroastrianism, Manicheism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam spread via the Silk Road, and had considerable effects on China. Vice versa, Chinese technologies of textile, paper, printing, gunpowder, compass and porcelain making, Chinese painting, Confucianism and Taoism were introduced to the West via the Silk Road. The Maritime Silk Road was even older than the land Silk Road and it has also contributed to the interaction as much as the land one (Ibid.: 531). The BRI, also called “The New Silk Road”, is claimed by Chinese officials to fulfill the same function as its historical peer, serving not only commercial purposes, but also cultural rapprochements and people-​to-​people interactions, and going beyond all historical Silk Road routes (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). China is the actor that defines the framework of the initiative along the limits of which the cooperation will take place and the results will be obtained. The framework will define the rules of the game, and the goals of the initiative as well. In the declaration of such a colossal initiative, naturally the framework will be highly idealistic, as there will be hopes and optimistic calculations for the outcome. The BRI is an ambitious and ambiguous proposal of infrastructure projects announced first by Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan on September 7, 2013. In his speech entitled “Promote People to People Friendship and Create a Better Future”, Xi proposed to “Jointly Build a Silk Road Economic Belt”. A month later, on October 3, 2019, he proposed to “Jointly Build 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, during his speech entitled “Building China-​ASEAN Community of Common Destiny” in the Indonesian Parliament (Wang, L., 2017: 1). Since then, the two proposals were shortened, first as “One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR)” (一带一路) “Yídài Yílù” and later to the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) corresponding with the official name, “The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路), “Sīchóu Zhīlù Jīngjìdài hé èrshíyī Shìjì Hǎishàng Sīchóu Zhīlù”. The first official comprehensive document released by the Chinese government about the BRI was the announcement of the National Development

96  BRI and hegemony and Reform Commission in March 2015. The document, “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-​Century Maritime Silk Road”, outlined the initiative. The document stated that the basic principles the initiative is based on are the main principles of the UN Charter, China’s most referred to principles in international relations: The Belt and Road Initiative is in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. It upholds the five principles of peaceful coexistence: mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-​aggression, mutual non-​interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015) These principles are “The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” of China, declared at the Bandung conference in 1955, and referred to continuously in international relations since then. On the “Vision and Actions” document, the aim of the initiative was described as follows: The Belt and Road Initiative aims to promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along The Belt and Road, set up all-​dimensional, multi-​tiered and composite connectivity networks, and realize diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development in these countries. The connectivity projects of the initiative will help align and coordinate the development strategies of the countries along the belt and road, tap market potential in this region, promote investment and consumption, create demands and job opportunities, enhance people-​to-​people and cultural exchanges and mutual learning among the peoples of the relevant countries, and enable them to understand, trust and respect each other and live in harmony, peace and prosperity. (Ibid.) The BRI is officially defined to have five main objectives:  policy coordination, facilitating connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and finally people-​ to-​people bonding (Ibid.). Beijing refers to these principles as “the new model of international cooperation” (Kulintsev, 2018: 197). The first objective, policy coordination, is described as mutually generating leading policies in a cooperative manner and on an equal basis. The trust, consensus, cooperation and win-​win outcomes are addressed to be the guarantee of the initiative’s success. The second objective, facilitating connectivity, is portrayed as the primary goal of the initiative. It strongly stresses on respect for national sovereignties and security concerns, while implementing policies of building infrastructure projects in each country, with a final aim of reaching a smooth network of infrastructure

BRI and hegemony  97 through the routes of the historical Silk Road and other areas, step by step (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). The third objective, unimpeded trade, is one of the pillars of the initiative. The aim is to construct a trade network, free from any barriers and facilitated as much as possible. Cooperation in trade agreements, custom tariffs, custom procedures, constructing free trade zones, by any means that require bilateral or multilateral cooperation, discussion, and coordination. At one end of this huge trade network there will be one of the biggest and most advanced economic zones in the world, Europe. At the other end there will be the new dynamic economic giant, the world’s second largest economy, China (The Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the BRI, 2019: 2). The fourth objective, financial integration, is the inevitable result of the third objective. Settling unimpeded trade networks will require financial integration to a certain degree. Implementing policies that facilitate financial integration in “building a currency stability system, investment and financing system and credit information system in Asia” (Ibid.) are the steps to be taken to reach financial integration in BR countries. The final objective, people-​to-​people bonding, is a byproduct of the whole infrastructure project of economic and financial cooperation. It is more related to social and cultural interactions, and can be the result of those interactions. It is a supportive objective for the other objectives. Cultural, academic, personal exchanges, and cooperation will create a suitable environment and support for the initiative. Finally, people-​to-​people links are supposed to create better mutual understanding, reducing the possibility of prejudice and conflicts. The Chinese official rhetoric often mentions the construction of “The Community of Common Destiny” via BRI projects. According to the argument, the common interests (“Community of Shared Interests”) will bring common responsibilities (“Community of Shared Responsibility”) and will evolve into a shared destiny (“Community of Common Destiny”) (Zeng, 2016: 517). Highly idealist, this goal was endorsed by the Chinese government putting it to the PRC Constitution (Rolland, 2019), and it became one of the challenging claims associated with BRI. Su Ge (2017: 372) describes the concept of Community of Common Destiny as “China’s new Tao”. A highly vague term, Community of Common Destiny is planned to be constructed on four main principles. The first one is that all countries should respect each other on an equal footing. Second, win-​win cooperation will be the standard for mutual benefits. Third, collaboration and sustainable security will be an important aim of cooperation. Finally, it promises inclusiveness and mutual learning among the civilizations (Wang, L., 2017: 2). The Community of Common Destiny recalls the utopic final stage of Marxism, which is communism. Chinese academics, while trying to explain the meaning, scope, and methods of creating the Community of Common Destiny, sometimes even end up with a more hazy image of it; mostly because of following the official statements, which do not give much detail about or explanation of the terms. Nevertheless, it can

98  BRI and hegemony briefly be described as the international community that has some common interests, common understandings, and common future prospects, and finally developed some sense of belonging to the same larger community, which will be all developed by the BRI projects and activities. The BRI is not a spontaneously emerging plan. It has deep historical roots dating back to the Century of Humiliation. When Chinese public opinion was frustrated with the aggressiveness of Western imperialism, in the Century of Humiliation they were aware of their weaknesses as well. Therefore, throughout all the modern period of China, the Chinese government and people were united to rebuild those glorious days. This ambition became so inherent in the social and political agenda from the Opium Wars that today the regime’s survival also depends on the realization of this historical national goal. Rejuvenation and the China Dream are exactly what this national goal is about. When Xi declared the ambitious plan of the BRI, he was well aware of this national thirst and knew very well that serving this goal will unite public opinion behind him. The most striking fact about the BRI is that China has not been this assertive and confident in foreign affairs since the beginning of the modernization period. Since the economic crisis in 2008, Deng Xiaoping’s low profile policy has faded gradually to a certain degree. The BRI is clear evidence that China is initiating a new phase in foreign affairs. This new phase cannot be accommodated inside the Opening Up and Reform Period. It is a new era on its own account that can be called the “Rearing Era”. 3.2.2  Motives The BRI is supposed to be a compact, all-​in-​one solution for China’s many problems, goals, and even dreams. China has major economic, financial, political, strategic, and military motives to start such a large-​scale international strategy. Those motives mostly arise from domestic economic and political conditions. Foreign affairs are mostly interwoven with domestic conditions in every country. However, in China this relation is much stronger and more complicated. Economic motives are the primary force behind the BRI. Due to its strong connections with all aspects of the relations, economic relations create bases for all other interactions and motives. The post-​Mao Chinese economy in the Reform Era started to integrate with the world economy, under the guidance of Deng Xioaping’s policies. Since the 1980s, the Chinese economy has continually grown with amazing annual growth rates, until recent years. It roughly means that a person at the age of 40 has never seen any economic downturn or chaos in his or her life, and have grown up witnessing amazing economic development. China has now finally come to experience some of the economic realities that most other countries have encountered: the reality that not all economies enjoy high development rates, rather there are often recessions and downsizing as well; the reality that people sometimes have to sell their property to pay their debts; the reality that they have to reach a certain level of product quality, create marketing

BRI and hegemony  99 strategies, spend on R&D, support innovation, and set up an innovation-​based economy, and so on. The Chinese economy has been slowing down since 2012. According to Wang Yong (2016: 457), the new development rates are becoming the “new normal”, and the BRI was a kind of remedy for this slowdown. Chinese development strategy in domestic economy has highly depended on the infrastructure projects, carried out by the government, and today it is presented as a model to other countries (Yang, J., 2019: 13). The infrastructure-​driven economic development strategy had its first difficulty in 2012. China domestically had constructed giant airports, ports, highway networks, high-​speed train networks, metro networks in the main cities, electrical grids, cyber infrastructure networks, gas and oil pipelines, mega industrial zones, heavy industrial plants, gigantic estate projects, new residential and business areas sometimes the size of a city, and so on. The infrastructure projects were carried out on the scale that settled nearly all domestic needs. The economic slowdown, if it continues to be deteriorate further with the decline in infrastructure projects, due to satisfaction of domestic needs, will result in an economic recession, if not chaos. To stop this foreseen destiny, the Chinese government thought to create new markets for infrastructure production surplus, and move the low profit and polluting production bases to those BR states. By doing this, the infrastructure production facilities would not be closed down. On the other hand, Chinese industrial production, after decades of rapid development, has reached a middle-​income trap level that needs to be supported by progressing to the level of a high-​tech and innovation-​driven economy. In the slowing economic environment this would be a difficult task. Opening up to new markets and moving production bases to the peripheral poor countries would help China protect the dynamism of industrial production and pass to the new value-​added stage of production in the domestic market. The BRI would be just a tailor-​made solution for these economic problems. Economic inequality between the regions and provinces is another problem China suffers from, even after becoming the second largest economy after the USA. Chinese coastal and neighboring provinces, like Guangdong, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Jiangsu, Hebei, Guangxi, Anhui, Jiangxi and Liaoning, and the regions like the Pearl River Delta and Tianjin, Dalian and Shanghai, have developed considerably. On the other hand the provinces and regions in the inner areas, like Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Guizhou, Yunnan, Heilongjiang, Ningxia, and so on, still remain underdeveloped, poor regions. The big inequality gap between the provinces and regions potentially carries risks for social and political stability. In the rapid growth period while the economy was dynamic, the inequalities could balance out over time. However, when the economy is slowing down, the gap may get bigger and become unsustainable. The BRI is supposed to be the solution for this economic inequality as well. The new Silk Road will mostly start from the inner provinces that did not receive much investment during the reform period. Especially Xinjiang, Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan and Guangxi are supposed to be fostered by the new trade routes that start from or pass through

100  BRI and hegemony them. These regions are planned to be the feeder regions for the demands from the connected economies in Asia, Europe, and Africa. The success of the BRI is crucial for the disadvantaged regions suffering from economic inequality. One of the most important economic motives for China in the scope of the BRI is to close the development gap between regions and provinces in the country. China trades with Europe, Africa and West Asia, mostly through the narrow Malacca Strait in South East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the man-​made Suez Canal. The Strait of Malacca comes after the disputed area of the South China Sea islands. The region is prone to crisis or military conflicts, in case of which the busy sea lanes can be disrupted severely. The Malacca Strait is narrow and one of the busiest sea routes in the world. China depends so heavily on this super-busy strait that its dependency is described as a weak point. The “Malacca Trap” rhetoric addresses the possible disadvantages of this dependency (Harris, 2014: 186). The Indian Ocean is another dilemma for China, which is described as the back garden of China’s biggest rival in the region, India. Besides, cases of piracy are seen increasingly commonly in the Indian Ocean, especially near the Horn of Africa more recently. In the case of any serious conflicts with India, it is unclear how China will manage to secure the flow of logistics through this region. Finally, the man-​made Suez Canal is the route that may look less risky than the other parts of the route, but being in the Middle East there are potential security risks caused by instability in the region. China depends on this route not only for trade, but also for its raw material and energy supply. China heavily depends on this route to carry Middle Eastern oil, raw materials and other important import products from the source countries to China. Considering all these factors, China has to develop alternative routes for the safe flow of these goods. The historical Silk Road routes suggest good land alternatives. Therefore, diversifying the supply routes for raw materials and energy is another decisive motive for China to develop BRI projects. China has accumulated considerable financial power over the last decades of miraculous economic development. Though, it has not yet joined the “Paris Club” (Hurley, Morris and Portelance, 2018: 19), but it has become one of the most powerful financial actors on Earth. China wants to use its financial power in support of its economic and political interests, which is another strong motive for China to create the BRI. By this method, China is supposed to use its financial power to generate capital flow, internationalize the RMB (Ren Min Bi, or Yuan), and reap other economic and political benefits. The BRI not only serves China economically. It is assumed to be of benefit to domestic politics as well. Being a dictatorial-​authoritarian regime, the Chinese government does not enjoy domestic legitimacy in a democratic sense. The problem of legitimacy is the soft belly of the Chinese regime. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chinese regime has been haunted by the possibility of the same fate in any minor or major related domestic and international cases. The regime’s obsession about being questioned by the mass public and being challenged on the issue of legitimacy forces it to be more aggressive and stricter on

BRI and hegemony  101 domestic and foreign issues, which has the possibility of creating public awareness of their democratic rights or creating social unrest. Legitimacy is always the top concern of the Chinese regime. Nearly all actions taken and plans made are somehow neatly arranged to support the regime’s power and political control. Through this perspective, if the BRI was examined, it would reveal that one of the major motives that pushed the Chinese government to take on such a colossal action plan is its concerns about political stability, the regime’s safety and its legitimacy. It is well known that economic slowdown will result into the government being questioned by the masses as the PRC’s current legitimacy depends on its economic performance. The BRI is thought to be a remedy that, if it works well, will create alternative markets and production bases, and create a new dynamism for the cooling down economy. The BRI’s expected economic success will finally turn the regime around into credit as well as providing a brand-​ new rhetoric for legitimacy and for further consolidation of its power. Finding a solution to domestic political problems, such as regional discontent and separatist activities, is the other domestic political motive for the Chinese government to invent the BRI. The initiative is specially designed to eliminate, or at least diminish, regional development inequalities and the tension they create in those regions. In particular, Xinjiang Autonomous Region is a typical case for this concern. The separatist movement is supposedly setting roots in the Uyghur minority mostly because of the economic inequalities aside from the political ones caused by regime’s policies. Xinjiang is going to be an important transport route, production base, and logistic hub for Pakistan, the West Asia Economic Corridor and the Kazakhstan–​Europe routes. This economic vibrancy is thought to be a remedy for blocking the separatist movements and potential terrorist activities. Xinjiang is the best example of this case, but similar tendencies that may emerge from other regions could also be eliminated by the development the BRI will bring. Among those regions, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Yunnan and Tibet can be counted. Besides economic and domestic political motives, there are also international motives for China to formulate the BRI. China has not been this advantaged, strong, assertive, and confident perhaps since the beginning of the Century of Humiliation. Strong economic power backed by confident political decision making, and the relative declining power of the USA under the clumsy policies of Donald Trump, have made China dare to air its dreams manifestly, contradicting the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s low profile policy. China has become the organizer, leader, and financier of an independent and highly ambitious international strategy, the first on this scale in its modern history. Inherently, it has not frankly been declared, but the BRI is expected to target the US presence in South East Asia. It is supposed to diminish US influence in South East Asia and in Central Asia, if not the whole world as Michael Pillsbury (2015: 183) vigorously asserts. In the Chinese regime’s perceptions, American hegemony in Asia is the biggest threat to territorial integrity and the social and political stability of China. Ideological differences and historical experience cause deep distrust and suspicion

102  BRI and hegemony of the US presence in the region. China has been challenged by the US in the South China Sea islands dispute, in the Taiwan dilemma, in exerting influence over the South East Asian countries, and in disputes with Japan and India. The US is also a potential rival in Central Asia, though not as influential as Russia in the region. As the founder of the historical Tributary System, being accustomed to being the leader in its periphery, China could never get accustomed to US hegemony in its perceived back garden, especially the disputes over the South China Sea islands and Taiwan. China sees the US presence as posing a threat not only to its territorial integrity, but also to the regime’s survival. In the case of any conflict with the US, highly nationalist Chinese public opinion could easily question the regime for not being able to save the core interests of the country, its sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Therefore, the BRI is a move against US hegemony in the region, to increase Chinese influence in the periphery and consequently to secure the regime in power. Close affiliation set up via the BRI with the intended countries will give China various opportunities to improve relations to a better level. In this context China can easily set up military bases or security alliances with weaker countries in the future. Military and strategic motives are not voiced, though they are quite obvious. China has one more important motive for the BRI and tha is the quest for soft power. Soft power constitutes an important agenda in Chinese policy making since the term was first used by Hu Jintao in 2012 (Shambaugh, 2015:  12). China has put in huge effort and resources to improve the country’s poor soft power. For example, public diplomacy means Confucius institutes, Chinese language centers, and so on, are all operated in many countries for this purpose. However, it is hard to say whether all these efforts are fruitful. Joseph Nye is perhaps the foremost scholar criticizing the Chinese way of creating soft power. Nye (2015: 14) thinks that the way the Chinese regime tries to boost its soft power is not successful, because creating soft power is actually a job which should be done by civil society, rather than the bureaucracy of the government institutions. Bureaucratic strategy has not gained attraction and is mostly misunderstood by the targeted societies. Bureaucratic strategies, combined with Chinese oppressive measures to prevent unfavorable content about the regime, makes soft power in the Chinese case better renamed “sharp power”, as defined by Walker and Ludwig (2017: 5). Facing this criticism, the Chinese government is now taking an even bigger step with even bigger capital backup to create better soft power, first in the periphery, then hopefully in the rest of the world. The BRI is perhaps the biggest soft power project China has carried out to date. In the “Vision and Action” declaration (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015), the aim to create a “people-​to-​people bond” is assumed to enhance Chinese soft power in BRI countries and beyond. Each of the BRI projects is planned and agreed mutually by the BR countries and China. Therefore, each of the countries has incentives and motives to cooperate with China, in the context of the BRI projects. For each contractor

BRI and hegemony  103 country, or in the case of each project, there can be various different incentives and motives. For each country and each project this must be analyzed separately. Here it is important to remember that China is not the only decision maker, and each country has their own reasonings, plans, and calculations as well. 3.2.3  Routes The BRI was designed to connect China with the geographies of Central Asia, Russia and Europe, the Persian Gulf, Mediterranean Sea, West Asia, South East Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean. The Maritime Silk Road connects China with Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean (Qin, Zhou and Luo, 2017: 74). The “belt” is the combined name of the “New Silk Road” land routes, the “road” comes from the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, the Indian Ocean Route. There is also a special route passing through the North Pole, along the north coasts of Siberia to Europe, called the “Ice Silk Road” (Ibold, 2018). The BRI is assigned to create six specific main economic corridors that will be the veins of planned economic webs. The first is the “New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor”; the second is the “China–​ Mongolia–​ Russia Economic Corridor”; the third is the “China–​Central Asia–​West Asia Economic Corridor”; the fourth is the “China–​Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor”; the fifth is the “China–​Pakistan Economic Corridor”; and the sixth is the “China–​Myanmar-​ Bangladesh–​India Economic Corridor” (Ibid.: 75). The New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor is the most critical route of land connectivity by railway. Construction of this corridor depends on the coordination of modern international logistics, of which the China–​ Europe railway logistics is the main facility. It is planned with emphasis on economic and trade improvement and production capability collaboration, setting up cooperation in energy and other resources, and organizing a comprehensive regional market  along the route (The Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the BRI, 2018). The rail connection starts from the city of Lianyungang (连云港) “Liányúngǎng” in Jiangsu Province, on the Pacific Coast of China, passes through Gansu Province, the important traditional passage of the historical Silk Road. After Gansu it follows the routes that pass from Xinjiang and arrive at Kazakhstan. The route further passes through Russia, Poland and Germany and is planned to end in Madrid, Spain. This route shortens the transportation period. While it takes 25 days from China to Rotterdam by sea, it takes 15 days by rail, though it is relatively expensive. Along this main economic corridor, development will be inevitable. Besides, transportation is not only available for Chinese goods to be carried to Europe, but the trains also bring European and Asian goods to China in return. European countries mostly were doubtful about the BRI at the beginning. However, this reality pushed them to reevaluate their attitude toward the BRI, and specifically to the New Eurasian Land Bridge. Italy signed a partnership agreement with China in 2018, and Italy’s embrace of the BRI was a strong signal for Europeans to change their attitude.

104  BRI and hegemony The China–​Mongolia–​Russia Economic Corridor is an alternative arm of the New Eurasian Land Bridge. The rail connection starts from the north east of China, Beijing, and Dalian regions, through Hohhot in Inner Mongolia, and from there it passes to Mongolia and Russia, connects with the Trans-Siberian Railway, and finally joins the New Eurasian Land Bridge (The Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the BRI, 2018). The China–​Mongolia–​Russia Economic Corridor predominantly focuses on logistics and trading activities. The China–​Central Asia–​West Asia Economic Corridor connects China with Europe through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Turkey, and the Balkans, while other alternative sub-​roads are planned through the Caspian Sea and Black Sea. This corridor is longer and requires more custom procedures, which is why it has not yet developed much. Cooperation on energy is the main focus in this route. Infrastructure, trading, investment, the high-​tech areas for nuclear energy, aerospace satellites, and new energy are the other areas of cooperation (The Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the BRI, 2018). The China-​ Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor connects China and South Asian countries. It specializes in land infrastructure, the border economy, and the railway connection of the countries in the region (The Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the BRI, 2018). Cross-​border trading functions well in internationalizing RMB. The Indochina Peninsula corridor combines with the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road as well, as the route passes through the region. It is intended to facilitate cooperation between China and ASEAN (Xinhua, 2015). The Economic Corridor includes the construction of the China–​ Laos and China–Thailand railroads, the backbone of regional integration. The China–​Pakistan Economic Corridor is one of the most popular corridors. It starts from Kashgar in Xinjiang and ends in Gwadar Port on the Pakistan coast of the Indian Ocean. It is an economic corridor, being the “pilot zone” of the BRI. The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs described it as the “First Movement” of the Belt and Road symphony. It is a compact combination of projects, including highways, railways, oil and gas pipelines and an optical fiber channel (Qin, Zhou and Luo, 2017:  76). The route is crucial for bypassing the Malacca Strait and connecting West China to the Indian Ocean directly. Utilizing the transportation facilities and Gwadar Port, constructed by China, it will facilitate Middle East energy and raw material transportation to China over a much shorter distance, and it will be a safe alternative to the Malacca route. China–​Pakistan relations have strategic importance as well. By supporting Pakistan, China is containing its strong rival (India) in the region. The China–​Pakistan Economic Corridor is assumed to benefit more than three billion people (Ibid.: 77). The China–​Myanmar–​Bangladesh–​India Economic Corridor connects China’s relatively less developed south west provinces, especially Yunnan, to Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India. The proposed backbone project is a highway, connecting the four countries besides the China–​Myanmar pipeline (Prateek, 2016: 3). The facilitated transportation is expected to integrate the region better, in the fields of border trade, energy, resources, industrial materials, and raw materials, as well as developing the economies of the region (The Office of the Leading Group for

BRI and hegemony  105 Promoting the BRI, 2018). China’s Yunnan province will have direct access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the Malacca Strait. The Ice Silk Road is one of the most interesting and ambitious routes. It passes from the north of Siberia via sea routes in the Arctic Sea. Although the route includes extremely harsh natural conditions of cold and ice, the Ice Silk Road shortens the conventional sea route time considerably (Ibold, 2018). Though not attracting much attention nowadays, with ice melting at the poles, in the future it is a potential candidate for handling transportation between China and Europe, avoiding the Malacca Strait and Suez Canal. Besides these main routes, there are plans to create an infrastructure network in Africa. Transportation projects in Kenya, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Djibouti are the first steps of a large BRI network project in the African continent. For other regions such as South America and Australia, time will shortly reveal what projects will be carried out. 3.2.4  Implementation The BRI is not a single project planned to address one area. It is a collection of projects, and for now some are finished, some are pending, some are in planning mode, and some may come onto the agenda later. The projects are multilateral, but processed bilaterally throughout. The BRI is officially managed by the Chinese government and Chinese official institutions. The “constitution” of the initiative “Action and Vision” document was issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) with contributions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization, the main executive body in the PRC system. In practice, multinational and foreign institutions are funding parts of the projects. However, BRI projects are mostly funded by Chinese companies, Chinese-​led international institutions or directly by Chinese banks. In 2016, only 2 percent of funding was from foreign banks or institutions. Chinese state institutions and banks fund 98  percent of the projects. Among these institutions, the Silk Road Fund (SRF) was set up in 2014, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was set up in 2015,  the China Development Bank (CDB) and Export-​Import Bank of China (EIBC) are the leading financiers. The four institutions fund more than half of the BRI projects, according to 2016 data. The other institutions are called the “Big Four”, and the four big banks of China are the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), together funding 45 percent of the BRI projects. Besides these Chinese institutions, the New Development Bank (NDB) set up by BRICS countries, which includes China, is also a financier of the projects. Furthermore, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) finances or is involved as an advisor for around 100 projects. The UK government has pledged $1 billion to support the BRI.

106  BRI and hegemony China aims to finish the BRI plans in the centennial year of the foundation of the PRC in 2049. In the first five years after its announcement in 2013, China has taken considerable leaps forward in implementation. Although the Chinese government and institutions are not accountable and transparent in sharing information about the projects and the deals, the reports and news present the amazing scale of the projects and investments. Chinese state-​owned enterprises usually deal with the investment projects, while Chinese private companies usually run the trading activities. By the end of 2018, investment in the scope of BRI in all countries reached $6 trillion, more than 30 percent of the world GDP, and in 2019 more than 150 countries had signed a contract with China, which exceeds 30 percent of the world population (Lam, 2020). China has taken the first step in many projects already. Some are finished, some will finish soon and some have just started. In the New Eurasian Land Bridge route, China has finished the railway connection between China and Europe, connecting 108 cities and 16 countries. On this route, by the end of 2018, 13,000 trains have carried more than 1.1 million TEUs (Twenty-​foot Equivalent Units). Among the trains that departed from China 94 percent were fully loaded, and among those departing from Europe 71 percent were full (Office of Leading Group for Development of BRI, 2019: 15). After the “Vision and Actions” document, the first large-​scale BRI event was the first Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing in May 2017. The participants included 29 countries at leader level, representatives from 130 countries, and 70 international organizations, who discussed the opportunities and contributions of the BRI in two-​day roundtable meetings (The State Council PRC, 2017). The second forum took place in Beijing, April 25–​27, 2019. The forum hosted 70 leaders, 5,000 participants from more than 150 countries, and 90 international organizations (Portal, 2019). The numbers prove a great and growing interest in the initiative. The second forum started in the shadow of some doubts about BRI loans, procedures and aims. The issue of the “Debt Trap” especially raised a big question mark in participant countries’ agendas. Likewise, there were doubts about China’s intentions, albeit the projects are described to be peaceful, depending on win-​win cooperation and having mutual respect, without any political and military expectations. The Debt Trap issue was a fear which became reality with the H ​ ambantota Port project in Sri Lanka. China provided around $1 billion in loans to Sri Lanka, and leased the strategic Hambantota Port for 99 years in exchange, because the Sri Lankan government did not have the resources to pay the bill (Shattuck, 2018: 8). A similar scenario took place in Djibouti, where China leased the port for military purposes for 99  years, and set up its first military base abroad, in exchange for the debit the Djibouti government could not pay. China is likely to set up more military bases in this way (Economy, 2019: 2). Laos, Pakistan, Greece, the Maldives and more countries are in the queue, likely to be the next victims of the Debt Trap (Shattuck, 2018:  8). Debt Trap accusations caused concern in many countries, and public opinion alerted against cooperation with

BRI and hegemony  107 China. In Malaysia, the newly elected president Mahathir suspended all Chinese projects for not being honest in their intentions (Balding, 2018: 1). Besides the Debt Trap, BRI projects are targeted as not being transparent in their terms and of not much benefit to local economies, especially during their construction. China was criticized for making deliberately large loans at high interest rates especially to poor countries that do not have the ability to repay. The loans do not have preconditions as Western countries’ loans have, against human rights violations and so on, so the client countries could easily access the money, paving the way for bribery and corruption (Balding, 2018: 1). Also, the contract terms are claimed to be more beneficial to China, with some confidential terms that local officials cannot disclose to the public. The project contractors are usually Chinese companies and the materials, workers, equipment and so on are mostly supplied by China. Locals have little chance to get involved in the construction and local companies cannot join the process (Shattuck, 2018: 8). In response to these criticisms Xi has assured the client countries that China will uphold “the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits … open, green and clean approaches, as well as goals of high-​standard, livelihood-​improving and sustainable development” (Portal, 2019). Recently, one of the most significant developments was Italy’s surprising decision to participate in the initiative. Since European countries have generally kept their distance from the BRI, this was not anticipated. The chairman of the China–​ Italy Chamber of Commerce, Davide Cucino, anticipates “sooner or later, all countries will embrace the initiative” (Portal, 2019). Considering the recession in European economies, it seems likely that none of the European countries can keep on neglecting the initiative, and Italy’s embrace of it is just the start for the rest of Europe. 3.2.5  Risks The BRI, as a gigantic set of projects, naturally is not risk free. There are considerable risks; however, they are not anticipated to derail the initiative in the long run. First, the development style is highly criticized as being not feasible in the long term. China has depended heavily on an infrastructure-​based economic development model. Chinese central and local governments have invested heavily in infrastructure projects such as the high-​speed rail network, highways, ports, airports, industrial zones, production facilities, subway networks, power plants, cyber networks and so on. Through these projects the government has injected large sums of capital into the market, through the large numbers of subsidiaries and suppliers. This development strategy has supported the Chinese market for decades and constituted the driving force for the economy. However, the infrastructure needs of a country have their limits. When the need is met, as it is now in China, the huge production capacity would be left idle, with potentially grave results for the economy. China is having this problem now. The infrastructure necessities of the country are mostly supplied and the excessive production needs new markets. China aims to export its own story to the BRI countries, and plans to apply the

108  BRI and hegemony same strategy in BRI countries as well (Harris, 2014: 147). Nevertheless, it is assumed by some that will not bring the same results in other countries. Infrastructure is supporting the economy, but without economic strength the infrastructure projects will not take place. Infrastructure is the outcome of a successful economic development, and at the same time supporting it. Both are interrelated and need each other. So, in BRI countries if the infrastructure development is going to support the economy, then the economy must have enough dynamics to support infrastructure development. For China, this was possible as the amazing 40 years of development created a sound background for nearly every sector. Thus, in such a vibrant and profitable economy, investments in infrastructure will be higher and most profitable. However, in countries like Sri Lanka, the economy cannot carry and support investment in infrastructure, and it has ended up leasing the port for 99 years, against the loans given. Besides this risk, it is also well known that the Chinese state-​owned companies are in big deficit and regularly supported by the government to survive; their collapse would have severe consequences for the Chinese economy. Therefore, the success of investment in infrastructure in China needs to be analyzed again, reconsidering the dynamics that brought success to China, but which were not shared by the BRI countries. As China could not solve its own problems, the infrastructure-​ based development model may not be successful in other countries (Tsui, Wong, Chi and Wen, 2017: 44). From this perspective, it seems China’s experience has been quite unique, due to its economic power of supporting the state-owned enterprises in loss. Thus, the likelihood of an infrastructure-​based development strategy repeating itself in another country does not seem promising. Another risk for the BRI may arise from the domestic sphere via Chinese public opinion. Chinese society generally does not have sufficient knowledge or interest in the issues related to the BRI. The informed portion of society is divided into two camps. The optimistic majority believes that the BRI is beneficial to China and they support it. The pessimist minority, who are on the increase, thinks that the BRI is not necessary for China right now. They think China still has a lot of problems to solve and spend money on rather than spending funds in some poor, risky countries. If this opinion, which is sometimes backed by academics as well, gains more support in Chinese public opinion, it will bring a risk in implementing future projects, as public discontent is the soft belly of Chinese party-​government. Another China-​related risk is that it does not have sufficient experience for such kinds of large-​scale international projects and engagements with various countries. Wang Yiwei (2018: 80), in his highly official role as the writer of one of the best-​selling books in China, admits this point and has proposed further necessary reforms to facilitate implementation of the BRI. The risks that are not related to China itself, but related to the client BRI countries, are numerous. They also vary from country to country. Wang (2018: 81) suggests that the main risks may be political risks, security risks, economic risks, legal risks and moral risks. Political risks are likely to be the most common. The Debt Trap argument has already alerted the public and governments of many countries. In some

BRI and hegemony  109 countries, such as Malaysia, concern and reaction has turned into political campaigns against China, the outcome being projects suspended, though later an agreement was reached. This example could be repeated in many countries. Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sierra Leone are the countries that have already reevaluated the agreements they have made with China, as the debts are difficult to pay back, and other issues like environment, labor and governance have mostly been ignored in any agreements (Economy, 2019: 4). The political risks consist of the unstable domestic or regional political environments of the BRI countries and the new international conditions that the initiative will create. The BRI can damage the political and economic balance between neighboring countries, and may eventually pave the way for conflict. It also can destabilize low-​risk countries like Pakistan (Clarke, 2017: 78). Most of the BRI countries are weak in respect of domestic political stability, and they are mostly in regional or international environments that are subject to harsh competition between big powers. Central Asian countries can be described as under the pressure of three big powers: Russia, China and the USA. South East Asian countries are in a region that attracts the interest of the USA, China, India and Japan. In the Middle East and Africa the fully-​fledged competition started long ago. In this tense rivalry, the possibility of conflicts of interest among the big powers is highly possible. These risks may bring further competition, tension, hostility and realignments, eventually halting the BRI projects. Therefore, in reality the BRI is not being implemented in a safe and coherent domestic and international environment, but is actually taking place in the shadow of growing domestic and international tension in opposition to it (Balding, 2018: 1). Economic reasons can be the main factors triggering all other risks. The biggest problem is related to the unstable economies of the BRI countries, which are mostly poor. For small economies it is difficult to pay back the large loans for huge infrastructure projects. A recent survey has indicated that among the BRI countries there are 23 with a risk of debt distress, namely, Cambodia, Mongolia, Laos, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Ukraine, not to mention countries like Syria and Yemen (Hurley, Morris and Portelance, 2018: 8). Among these countries Pakistan, for example, is applying to the IMF to pay its large sum of Chinese debts (Balding, 2018: 1). Most of these countries are major partners in the BRI, some have already completed some of the projects, while in some others construction is still ongoing. China and the contractor BRI countries carry big-​risk, unprofitable projects, with the extra concern that the host country is not able to pay the loans back. Besides, China does not have risk-​response mechanisms or the experience to deal with diverse issues (Wang, Y., 2018: 110). Security risks, closely related to political risks, are also the most possible risks that could be commonly witnessed in BRI countries; though in most of the countries or regions “the traditional security threats like military, politics and diplomacy” do not seem to be matters of concern, except in regions like the Middle

110  BRI and hegemony East, but “the non-​traditional security threats like terrorism, ecological pollution, information security, resource security etc.” can be threats that risk the projects (Wang, Y., 2018: 88). A legal framework is the only way to implement projects safely in every country. However, due to differences in legal systems, there are various risks that can be encountered in each country. The BRI covers a large area, nearly every continents and many different countries, some of which have very different laws and legal systems. Some countries use common law, some civic law, some religious law, some customary laws and others have a mixture of a few of them. During the agreement and implementation stages, many risks of conflict need to be considered. The legal risks may arise due to the investments, labor issues, trade issues, environmental issues, or poor management, and may also be due to deficiencies in the related laws of BRI countries (Ibid.: 112–​120). Moral risks cannot be denied in the healthy implementation environment of the BRI. The biggest moral risks are bribery and corruption. Chinese companies are blamed for paying bribes to local officials to get approval of high-​cost loans and sign infrastructure projects, specifically in Kenya, Zambia and Uganda (Balding, 2018: 2). This is a reasonable explanation of loans provided by China to poor countries with the highest interest rates, compared to other loan sources. Further, moral defiance in handling investments and trade, the ideological, historical, religious and cultural tensions that the local communities have with China and Chinese workers, companies and officials, cause risks in anticipation of successful implementation. After counting the major general risks that may arise in any country and project, it is necessary to remember that each country or project can have its own specific conditions and risks. According to recent research, “Critical Risk Identification in One Belt One Road Highway Project in Serbia”, there are ten risks for a highway constructed in Serbia, as a BRI project: cultural differences, language barriers, safety measures on site, inflation and currency exchange rates, water and soil pollution caused by construction work, force majeure, poor quality of materials, unforeseeable ground conditions, noise pollution and different religious backgrounds (Andric et al., 2017: 1). Inevitably, China is going to be challenged by regional geopolitical issues between the countries, and differences in mentality (Kulintsev, 2018: 199), and as Chinese experts warn, it will be challenged by countries’ complex social and political structures, local conflicts, terrorist attacks and jealous great powers as well (Rolland, 2019: 2).

3.3  Hegemonic dynamics of the Belt and Road Initiative It has been a fairly long time since the BRI was initiated by China. The Action and Vision document, forums, first projects and the seven-​year history give an adequate idea about what it is and what it is to bring when finalized. Examining it through the Neo-​Gramscian theory of hegemony and trying to figure out what modern Chinese hegemony looks like has its own difficulties. The historical

BRI and hegemony  111 background, the ideological fit, the direction of Chinese foreign policy evolution, domestic and international conditions all provide enough materials so as to draw a complete image of Chinese hegemony in the modern age, and an insight into the modern mentality of China’s foreign policy. 3.3.1  Power Military and economic power or material power are the major determinant factors in the setting up and perpetuation of the hegemonic system, and perhaps have been so for all time. Modern Chinese official and academic rhetoric strongly opposes the argument that China is going to set up its own hegemonic system when it has the power to do so. The denial could be read as a strategic tactic. Yet, the other reason for this strong reaction is that in Chinese literature “hegemony” is associated with “immorality”. However, in modern definitions, especially in the Neo-​Gramscian definition, morality is not a factor in the description of “hegemony”. Hegemony depends on the twin pillars of material power and consent. Therefore supremacy, whether immoral or not, can still be hegemony. China, even in the weakest of times, had hegemonic relations with its neighbors, including in the modern period after the Tributary Era. China–​North Korea relations cannot be explained by the solidarity of comrades in this context. It was a typical hegemonic relation, formulated in a polite way as “brotherhood”, but solely depended on Chinese military power. The Chinese have acknowledged the importance of material power in the very painful Century of Humiliation. It was not the first time China was weak and was invaded. The previous thousands of years had many examples of what happened when China was not strong enough materially. Their nomadic neighbors have been reminding of the importance of material power. If the Xiongnu, Liao, Wei, Jin, Mongolians and Manchus knew they could invade China, they almost certainly would do so. The Century of Humiliation was the latest lesson the Chinese experienced in this aspect. China once more has painfully experienced that military, political and economic powers are essential in protecting itself. Since then, China has dreamed of being a leading country in the category of the first prerequisite of hegemony, material power. During the Maoist period, the “lean to one side” strategy was a temporary remedy for weakness. It was unthinkable for the Chinese to have to depend on another country for self-​defense. That is why getting stronger was an ambitious goal for the Chinese. Weakness was considered a temporary condition, and this would have to be changed soon. In the Reform Era, China accumulated a considerable military and enormous economic power. Militarily, China is a peer neither of the USA nor of Russia. However, it has an important military power with “nuclear deterrence”. According to Michael Pillsbury (2015: 45) in his famous book The Hundred Year Marathon, the Chinese believe that the Soviets collapsed because the Americans tricked them into an arms race, and that is the reason the Chinese are not racing to build a mighty military power today. This argument can be supported by the fact that for decades, and even today, China has followed Deng’s low profile

112  BRI and hegemony strategy of “hide your strength, bide your time”. China could build mighty military power with its enormous economic resources, but strategically it does not choose that way, because it would provoke the superpowers and alarm the weaker nations, especially the South East Asian countries. For a great leap forward in military strength, China is waiting for the right time, but the current military power serves the country’s basic security needs more than enough. China is undeniably an economic superpower today, solving most of its international problems through its economic power (Rolland, 2019: 2). Its economy is its biggest instrument of power in international relations. The BRI sums this up: it is for transforming economic power into domestic political power, besides international political, military and soft power. China depends on its economic power in the BRI, rather than military or political power. The projects are mostly carried out in countries that are not able to finance and build such large projects. BRI projects and loans will inevitably cause the economic dependency of weaker countries on China for the coming decades, and for some countries maybe even longer. This is an inevitable result of infrastructure investments. Perpetuating economic dependency gradually increases political influence of the stronger countries over the weak, which may easily turn into military and strategic alignments, setting up military blocks, air and sea bases. Finally, the weaker partner can easily end up being a satellite country, part of a hegemonic system. The BRI resembles the American “Marshall Plan”, although Chinese rhetoric strongly opposes this notion. The Marshall Plan had important aims: first, it aimed to support war-​torn European countries, so that they could stand up against further invasions, especially the potential attack that could come from the USSR. Second, the plan was to find a new market for the US economy in order to recover from the ongoing effects of the 1930’s “Great Depression” and the Second World War. After aid was delivered by the plan, most of the countries became economically and militarily dependent on the US. The US recovered from the Depression partially because of these dependencies created, and reached the status of superpower, which it enjoyed using its strong political, military and economic influence over the Marshall Plan countries for a long time. Further, using the rhetoric of a “Soviet Threat”, the US set up and consolidated a “Western Bloc”, to prevent the Soviets growing further and creating satellite economies and states. Since the first time the BRI was tagged as the “Marshall Plan for Beijing” in the New York Times on January 5, 2009, Chinese official rhetoric has strongly rejected it on every platform (Wang, Y., 2018: 39). The main reason for the strong objection is because the Chinese have described Western hegemony as “selfish and immoral” with intention to exploit through imperialist methods. Western economic and political relations are often described as a “zero sum game” by Chinese authorities. On the other hand, China claims to be a peaceful country, not having had such a culture or intentions at any time (The Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the BRI, 2019:  2). These arguments supposedly keep China innocent of such “selfish and immoral” intentions and plans. According to Wang Yiwei (2018: 27), the BRI has three reasons: first, to find a way out of the

BRI and hegemony  113 crisis for the post-​crisis world economies; second, to rebalance the global distribution of wealth; and third, to create a new model of regional cooperation in the 21st century and “transcend” the Marshall Plan. While explaining why the BRI is different from the Marshall Plan, Wang Yiwei skips the obvious resemblance but focuses on the differences in detail (Ibid.: 40). China is on a similar path as the Marshall Plan by working on setting up political alliances and dependencies through economic means, which could easily turn into hegemonic relations and military alliances later. However, since China claims it is not being “immoral and selfish”, this process is considered to be legitimate, or consciously covered by Chinese rhetoric. Indeed, China needs the BRI to solve its deteriorating domestic economic conditions, just as the US was trying to reverse the effects of the Great Depression. Chinese economic power is beneficial for the BRI countries as well, but finally the process will end up with more political and military influence and more economic benefits for China, the same as happened with the US and the Marshall Plan. China is trying to reduce the influence of the US in Asia, especially in its neighboring countries, by stronger economic ties which will finally create more integrated communities and economies by excluding the US, in the same way that the US and the Marshall Plan consolidated the Western Bloc and excluded the Soviets from it, creating its own backyard. Chinese rhetoric, tactically or not, has a false vision about an obvious fact that Western hegemonic systems do not always comprise a “zero sum game”, as implied in the Chinese government’s official documents (The Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the BRI, 2019:  2). In reality, the target countries also benefit from Western hegemonic systems, as China itself has done, just not as much as the hegemon itself. Michael Pillsbury (2015:  24) is even more sketchy when elaborating that China aims to set up an authoritarian-​hierarchic international system, in which human rights and democratic values will not be respected. He claims that China is following a low profile just as Deng Xiaoping frankly suggested as a remedy for weakness and will disclose its real intentions more assertively as it grows stronger with a social Darwinist instinct. He further evaluates that Chinese hawks in the official ranks and their influence should not be underestimated. The mentality of “hiding strength, biding for time” has strong cultural and historical roots, like the ancient war stratagems that depended on “deceptions” rather than confrontations. According to him, China is in a “Long Marathon” of seizing power from the US, following the strategy they learned from their history; they are not building military power so as to provoke the USA, but they will do so as soon as they have the right conditions (Ibid.: 23–​ 220). Pillsbury builds his arguments on strong bases from Chinese history and culture:  though there is not much reason to expect such a pessimistic scenario, it is worth noting his perspective. It is doubtful whether China has such a longlasting hatred and deceptive strategy against the Western world since the Century of Humiliation, but it is obvious that the BRI has the potential of the Marshall Plan to transform China’s immense economic power into international political and military power.

114  BRI and hegemony China has set up its first overseas military base in Djibouti. Likewise, the port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka is expected to be partly used for military purposes. There is almost no doubt that China is going to add more overseas military bases soon (Economy, 2019:  2). China has a lengthy non-​intervention tradition in foreign affairs, at least in rhetoric. However, the first military bases have raised a few questions whether it is the end of the pillar policy or not. Theo Neethling (2017: 4) argues that the Chinese military bases will not be used for the purpose of intervention because China knows it does not lead to favorable results. For the Chinese regime’s stability and territorial integrity, non-​interference is an important principle for China to further implement. It is not anticipated that China will ditch the principle of non-​interference in the short to medium term. Nonetheless, the reality is that this principle does not satisfy the needs of China anymore, as the protection of nationals abroad has become a priority since 2004, due to the new principle of “diplomacy serving the people” (Duchatel, Brauner and Zhou, 2014: 57). During civil wars in the Sudan, China hesitated to intervene, worried about risking its interests. However, as the influential scholar Yan Xuetong first signaled, criticizing the non-​interference principle and suggesting that China build its own security alliance (Godement, 2013:  12) In the near future China will likely abandon the non-interference principle, especially for the protection of BRI projects in high-risk countries. Enhancing the country’s poor soft power is another power-​related quest for China, among the aims of the BRI. Coined by Joseph Nye, soft power has been discussed among scholars, and yet there is not a consensus reached on its reflections in the practical world. How can soft power be measured and how can actors use it? There are not any convincing enough answers for these important questions as yet. However, soft power is taken seriously by most countries, yet it is not easily transferable to material power, instead it increases prestige. China has spent a large amount of money and has put in a lot of effort in the last decade since the soft power concerns were first raised by Hu Jintao in 2007. Further, public diplomacy endeavors, Confucian institutes, Chinese language classes in many countries, student exchanges, and media and social activities are leading attempts to foster China’s soft power abroad. The BRI will be even a bigger attempt. Through the story of successful economic development by successful implementation of infrastructure projects and public diplomacy in BRI countries, China aims to impress the underdeveloped countries. It is not expected to have a great impact on democratic countries, as they have a low interest in authoritarian regimes. In sum, material power is an essential base for the foundation of Chinese modern hegemony through the BRI, in conformity with the Neo-​Gramscian definition of hegemony. Through the BRI, China currently uses its strong economic power, which is expected to turn into increasing political, military and soft power and influence in the international arena. In other words, China is buying political, military and soft power through the BRI by economic and financial means. Material power will play an irreplaceable role in the foundation and maintenance of Chinese hegemony in the future, just as it has for all hegemons. While material

BRI and hegemony  115 power is the main requirement in setting up hegemony, it will also be increased during the hegemonic period. Consequently, the BRI has been initiated based on Chinese economic and financial power, but it will boost all power parameters, economic, military, political and soft power too. 3.3.2  Consent Hegemonic systems do not always depend on the “consent” of the dominated parties. In modern international relations history, hegemony, specifically US liberal hegemony, is commonly associated with “consent”. Neo-​Gramscian theory puts consent at the heart of the hegemonic system, while explaining the settings of the current American liberal hegemony. Liberal ideology, institutions, academics, media, international trade, universities and so on are the means of creating, spreading and supporting “consent” worldwide. At the core, however, the biggest source that generates consent in international relations is the “public good” the system provides. Ideology, institutions, media and so on support and regenerate consent, predominantly created by the “public good” the hegemon and its system offers. That means the more the hegemon can create “public good”, the more it can harvest “consent”, and consolidate its power. China pays attention to this point, and it seems that it has noticed the importance of consent. In almost all documents related to the BRI, China declares that it is creating “public good” for all of the participating countries and beyond (The Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the BRI, 2019: 46). Besides, to consolidate this point, Beijing repeats and underlines that cooperation in the BRI will be in the form of mutual benefit, win-​win cooperation, respect for territorial integrity, dignity, sovereignty, development path, social system, core interests and major concerns (Ibid.: 50). China has actually declared all these principles before. At the Bandung conference in 1955, it declared the five principles of peaceful coexistence: “mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-​ aggression, mutual non-​interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence” (Dillon, 2010: 443). Peacefulness and non-​aggression have been the main themes of Chinese foreign policy rhetoric since then. China has also strong concern regarding consent because of its own historical experience, just the same as the US was sensitive to colonial policies because it was fighting against colonialism in its independence struggle. The Century of Humiliation has still strong impacts on Chinese ideas and its evaluation of the Western world. Western civilization is still labeled “selfish” due to its individualist settings; international relations are still portrayed as based on a “zero sum game” due to an imperialist past. Chinese rhetoric still claims that the West is not reliable in its aims; China represents a wise, peace-​loving, ancient civilization, despite being humiliated by the West in the Century of Humiliation. That is why, when the BRI is compared to the Marshall Plan, Chinese authorities strongly reject it. The Marshall Plan was not solely for the benefit of the war-​torn countries; the US

116  BRI and hegemony had a lot of benefits as well. However, it cannot be denied that the war-​ravaged countries were able to stand up and defend themselves against Soviet aggression; they could set up their economies again and their armies by that plan and its implications. Perhaps the most important factor that Chinese officials never want to talk about is that the Marshall Plan was an aid plan, though it brought dependency. There were no predatory loans at high interest, no profitable investment projects with secret terms, no unfair agreements signed through bribery and no tricky traps. Mostly the plan had the characteristics of cooperation against a common enemy. Chinese scholars and officials are so obsessed with the imperialist experience they suffered that they cannot appreciate the benefits of the Western international system, even though its recent biggest beneficiary is China itself. China developed because it reformed itself to conform with the liberal international system under US hegemony, not because of socialist values and Maoism. As much as China gave up socialism and Maoism, it could benefit more from the system, and all was dependent on the consent of China. The BRI, and the international system it will create, is claimed to be different from the US-​led liberal system, because it will basically respect the sovereignty of others, and will not impose any social or political value; it is not a military or strategic alliance, and not a “China Club” (The Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the BRI, 2019:  2). China implies that it will be a different hegemon on every platform, especially denying “hegemony” and employing the term “friendship cooperation” instead. Despite this situation, however, the world has enough reasons to suspect this perfect peaceful rhetoric. First, Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy principle of low profile and the expression “hide your strength, bide your time” (韬光养晦) “tāo guāng yǎng huì” (Zhao, S., 2013b: 32) has guided Chinese foreign policy for decades: it does not promise trust. A fully pragmatic and deceptive principle, it implies that Chinese foreign policy will change and show its real intentions when it has enough confidence and a suitable international and domestic environment. In fact, between 2008 and 2013 it changed toward a more assertive and demanding approach. Even nowadays, the non-​intervention principle is questioned by Chinese scholars themselves (Godement, 2013: 12). Therefore, it is not too realistic to expect that the Chinese hegemonic system that emerges with the BRI will be a fully non-​ interventionist and completely peaceful cooperation of “equal friends”. Second, it is very common in politics that the rhetoric, official declarations and plans are quite different in reality once implemented, and the BRI is no exception. In the first five years of the proposed 30 years, implementation of the BRI has already escalated serious concerns about the fairness and the transparency of the contracts, China’s military aims, secret terms, Debt Traps and so on in Djibouti and Sri Lanka, and many other likely cases may erupt soon. China is now highly suspected as a deceitful partner, not complying with “cooperation of friends, mutual respect, win-​win cooperation”. The largest volume of loans were very loosely termed loans, seemingly intentionally given to the poorest countries, which mostly do not have the capacity to repay them. In African countries

BRI and hegemony  117 officials were bribed by Chinese firms to give their “consent” and to take on the heavy burdens of loans and projects. Similar other cases are raising other concerns about China’s intentions and sincerity in observing the “consent” of BRI countries. Third, the Chinese way of boosting soft power, which is assumed to be one of the ways to elicit “consent”, has raised concerns. As David Shambaugh (2015: 107) puts it, despite China spending billions of dollars to boost its soft power, the country’s image is getting worse, even in Africa and Latin America. The reason is that China is trying to foster soft power in the same way as it approaches constructing infrastructure projects. In its soft power quest, China invests money and coordinates the official bureaucracy, expecting success. As long as China does not understand that soft power is not a matter of official bureaucracy and investment of capital, but a matter of free human effort and attractive values, it will continue wasting resources and time. Despite its world class cuisine, a distinct culture, a tale of miraculous economic rise, China’s unsuccessful attempts are proving that soft power cannot be bought. China is infamous for trying to curb the free expression of opinion about China and its regime in many Western countries. As described by Walker and Ludwig (2017: 5), China uses various methods to censor academics and officials, suppressing unfavorable media content, which does not comply with the definition of soft power, but is called “sharp power”. As the BRI is the best way to formulate soft power, China is expected to show the same false attitude in BRI countries, using its economic power and political influence to stop any unfavorable content produced in those countries. BRI countries are more vulnerable to censorship compared to Western countries. Though soft power is a sort of “power”, it does not mechanically generate “consent”, but it can be used as an effective way to create it. Throughout the BRI rhetoric, China has underlined its values and cares about the BRI countries consenting to Chinese leadership, stressing the mutual benefits, respect for differences and friendly cooperation. However, the inconsistent principles of foreign relations, like the deceptive low profile strategy and the attitudes in some countries that cause discontent about “debt trap” and “sharp power” methods China has used in many countries, are the important factors that indicate the characteristics of the hegemony China will set up. These factors do not suggest that Chinese BRI hegemony will enjoy a high level of consent from BRI societies, but consent may come from authoritarian and corrupt governments. In this case it seems that China will give an impression of unwelcomed hegemon to the BRI societies, though it may somehow perpetuate relations with their governments. 3.3.3  Legitimacy Legitimacy is not an issue directly related to definition of hegemony. However, it can be a matter of discussion in hegemonic systems in two ways. First is the legitimacy of leadership of hegemon in the system, which can be called “international legitimacy”. Second is the relation of the hegemonic system to the political

118  BRI and hegemony legitimacy of hegemon, or the dominated country’s “domestic legitimacy”. The first depends on the hegemon’s values, political system and partially on the conditions of international relations. If the hegemon’s values promote fairness, equality, solidarity and friendship and provides public goods, the leadership of hegemon will probably be deemed legitimate. If the political system is democratic, the hegemon will probably try to act within the boundaries of democratic norms, institutional decision making and lawfulness. If the international order is more stable, and the system consists of legitimate governments of democratic countries, the hegemon will be more bound to act within the limits of democratic norms. However, if the values, political system and international order do not exert pressure on the hegemon to act lawfully and legitimately, the hegemon may not care to act legitimately in its hegemonic system. These examples can be applied to the US-​led liberal hegemony. Just because the cultural and political values of the US demand rule of law, fairness, respect for human rights and democratic norms, and also because the government complies with these norms, the international hegemonic system that the USA set up is also based on these norms. Therefore, legitimacy of any action in this system is sought by the hegemon itself and the hegemon acquires this power from its own domestic political values. Besides, as the international order contains democratic and non-​democratic actors, all are more or less participants of the liberal hegemonic system. The US policies toward European countries and North Korea are different, mostly due to the different nature of their domestic political systems and values. However, this does not mean that the hegemon will always uphold the legitimacy of its encounter. While supporting democratic changes globally is supposed to be the default policy of the US administration, complying with its domestic and political values as well, it did not support the democratic transition in Egypt for example. It even supported a military coup against a democratically elected president. This situation is not an exception, rather it repeats itself when the hegemon comes to the crossroads of values and interests. In the case of a crossover of interests and values, interests will win over values. The US hegemony mostly depends on international norms and regulations and institutional policies, just because the political values and system upholds them. However, it can and often does act beyond these boundaries when the practical benefits are in question. Therefore, the international legitimacy of the liberal hegemonic system is relatively high if the selfish unilateral policies are not mentioned. Second, the hegemon’s policies in the international hegemonic system can have close relations with its domestic powerholders’ political legitimacy. In the US case this does not matter as the governments are domestically legitimate, being elected by the people and bound by laws. However, countries like China do not share the same situation. The Chinese government is characterized by the dictatorship of a communist party, rather than democratic values. Thus, it does not enjoy domestic legitimacy in the democratic sense but enjoys legitimacy on its performance. The Chinese regime, being well aware of this, is obsessed with erosion of its domestic power and the ability to control public opinion. The Chinese regime solved the problem of international legitimacy a long time ago, when

BRI and hegemony  119 Mao met Nixon in 1972. However, domestic legitimacy still represents a soft belly, basically depending on its economic performance or skills of propaganda. For this purpose, foreign relations are usually used as the way to boost legitimacy. The Chinese government uses foreign policies to secure its legitimacy in public opinion, by pumping up nationalist feelings through state-​owned media, for example over an issue related to Taiwan, Tibet or disputed islands, in order to divert public attention to an international matter and to cover up a domestic issue which carries the risk of public reaction. The BRI, examined in the scope of the first criterion, complies with international legitimacy. China discusses the matters and signs lawful contracts with counterparts in BRI countries while observing international standard rules and regulations. Nevertheless, the policies of initiative have strong relations with the domestic legitimacy concern of the Chinese regime. The Chinese regime is trying to find a remedy for the slowing down of the economy, which is a big threat to its possession of power. The regime’s obsession with being questioned by the mass public and being challenged over the issue of legitimacy has forced it to create more assertive remedies for the problems, including any potential ones. What has persuaded the communist leaders, like Xi, to use a term like the “China Dream”, recalling liberal appeals, is the urgent need to consolidate public opinion behind a high ideal, which will divert attention from the upcoming bitter realities. The BRI is portrayed as a new grand strategy of China by various scholars. For the regime, it functions for legitimacy, the same as it derives legitimacy from the argument being the savior of the country from Japanese invasion. The regime looks to be the savior of the country from a major economic depression, and presents itself as a hero, providing guidance to the country to realize its dreams. Thus, the BRI has direct relations with the domestic legitimacy concerns of the PRC regime, though in hegemonic systems it is not a matter for concern. 3.3.4  Ideology Ideology is one of the key concepts in Neo-​Gramscian theory. In the Neo-​ Gramscian definition the powerful hegemon sets up its hegemony basically with the consent of the dominated countries, backed up by hegemon’s power in reserve. The consent is elicited through ideology that the hegemon produces. The ideology will be institutionalized and propagated by means of international laws, institutions, media, education, universities, elites, and so on. The ideology is the key instrument in consolidating the control and strengthening the system of hegemony, by way of convincing the dominated parties to acknowledge that their interest depends on the continuation of the system. Thus, ideology has a crucial role in convincing the masses to embrace the hegemonic system with its principles and provide its survival. As Zbigniew Brzezinski (2000: 21) describes it, China is no longer a Middle Kingdom, a celestial empire, a humiliation victim or a Maoist revolution exporter; nevertheless, it is a key player in the future of Eurasia and the global system, at least as the Chinese elites see it. Yet, there are deep effects of the legacy of the

120  BRI and hegemony “Middle Kingdom” and celestial empire mentality, Maoism and the Century of Humiliation on Chinese political culture and foreign affairs. However, none of them solely can explain today’s Chinese political mentality and foreign affairs. From the Reform Era onward, China integrated with the world, perhaps to a greater extent than ever before. With the presidency of Xi, China entered a new era in international relations, this time as a more assertive and rule-​making China. What is more, since the beginning of the Trump administration, China has presented itself as the defender of free trade and multilateralism, as the US has been ignoring it (Johnson, 2019: 3). China sees itself as the vanguard of the “second way” or an alternative to liberal, capitalist democracy (Liao, 2017: 3). Ideologically, China accommodates itself between socialism and capitalism, finding its meaning in the Chinese expression “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. And now under Xi it is in a “new era”. Johnson (2019: 2) argues that the narrative of the “new era” implies a new period of confidence to claim its “rightful” place on the world stage. The Chinese have proved many times in history that they are pragmatic and more loyal to their material interests than to ideologies or moral values. Xi, by declaring his “new era”, suggested he is going to follow a new line and he has proven it until now in his seven years of presidency. China has become more confident and assertive than at any time in its modern history. However, the “new era” has brought a new period of personality cult and an overdose of authoritarianism. Xi has become the new “red emperor”, the resurrection of Mao, by concentrating all the power in his hands, abolishing collective decision-​making processes, eliminating time limits of holding power and rules of accession of power, all of which had stabilized since Deng complied with the party’s leanings. China is the inventor of the biggest public surveillance system on Earth with 200 million cameras, a social credit system, as well as internet censorship using artificial intelligence (AI) (Economy, 2019: 2). Authoritarianism, supported by technological systems, has been exported to Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda to control media and contain political dissent. The CCP is involved in business and using companies, which has led to international Chinese companies such as Huawei being suspected of being a tool of the CCP (Ibid.: 3). Through the BRI, China does not present a brand-​new form of ideological behavior. The promotion of free trade, respect for sovereignty and non-​interference are the most common and underlined principles in its BRI narrative. Another commonly expressed term is creating the Community of Common Destiny. It is the vaguest term but at the same time a term that directly recalls creation of a community of a hegemon, which is now in the constitution of China (Rolland, 2019: 1). This community will be formed, first, around economically shared interests and supported by people-​to-​people activities, which is the first level of being a community:  Community of Common Interests. Then the Community of Common Interests is supposed to be turned into the Community of Common Destiny, the highest level of familiarity and connectiveness of a social group. It can be described as a group of people bundled together by common interests and

BRI and hegemony  121 fate, like a political community, international community, moral community and so on (Zhang, D., 2018: 197). Creating the Community of Common Destiny is one of the main concepts of Xi, as voiced very often. Zhang Denghua (2018:  204) states that the motive behind the term is to ease the tensions of neighbors in territorial disputes for the short term. In the long term it will serve to sustain a favorable external environment for economic development in the first few decades of the 21st century, something China needs for any further development. Creating the Community of Common Destiny and assertiveness together shows the two faces of the coin. While assertive in its core interests, it is ready for cooperation in secondary (non-​core) interest areas. However, Zhang is still not sure about the exact meaning, as it is rather vague. Creating the Community of Common Destiny, besides all its vagueness, shows that the BRI is not just an economic cooperation, but has strategic and political meanings and aims, and military aims, as Yang Xuetong honestly proposes (Ibid.: 198). Economically semi-​capitalist, politically highly authoritarian and nationalist, China presents its ideological settings to the world as a model through the BRI; though the liberal values of free trade and non-​interference are on display, the coercive and authoritarian principles are not visible. It is not an exciting model for the democratic countries, but for some underdeveloped countries with poor democratic culture it is. Elizabeth Economy (2019: 4) argues that China is losing on all sides under Xi and she shows poll results on this, asking people which country they would prefer to lead the world. The results indicate that 63 percent prefer the USA to lead the world, while only 19 percent favor China. The Community of Common Destiny is a key term in creating a united ideology, and it will create the framework of the ideology of Chinese hegemony in the BRI. Chinese hegemony in the reach of the BRI will find its legitimacy through the idealized motto of the Community of Common Destiny, just as the motto of “Brotherhood of Working Classes of the World” was the idealist showcase of the Soviet hegemony serving to legitimate it. In the future, it will reveal itself more in terms of how the Community of Common Destiny will be formed. Why is there such a need? For what purpose and who will it mostly serve? What values will they share? Until that time the vagueness will present as one of the mysteries of the BRI promising positive outcomes in the narrative, but raising the suspicion of the realists. In sum, the BRI is currently running on the US setup of liberal international order. However, the concept of the Community of Common Destiny implies that China is planning to set up its own hegemonic ideology, when the conditions are mature enough. 3.3.5  Institutions International institutions are the physical evidence of a hegemonic system, generating consent, order, stability, legitimacy and endurance, commonly set up and led by the hegemon. Institutions are so important in upholding the system that institutionalist theoreticians, like Keohane (1984: 31) in his famous book After

122  BRI and hegemony Hegemony, suggests that hegemonic rule is necessary only at the beginning of the system setup. In later stages, cooperation does not require a hegemonic power, because international institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Union (EU), World Trade Organization (WTO) and so on they can continue to do the job they were created for. They even can warn and put sanctions on states, in case of any infringement of the international rules in the absence of a hegemon. American hegemony has endured and been maintained, stabilized and legitimized by economic, financial, political, military and social institutions. Among these institutions, the IMF, World Bank, NATO and WTO are well-​known. Further, educational institutions, media companies, the film industry, large international corporations and so on contribute a considerable coverage of influence. China is not a power unfamiliar with hegemony. From its historical experience of the Tributary System, China has hegemonic instincts in its political tradition. Most Chinese believe that the period which started with the Century of Humiliation as an unfortunate period of time, caused by both the ruthless imperial powers and the weakness of China, will finish soon. Finally, China will return as a great power on the world stage again. Returning to the big power status, the “China Dream” cannot be realized without having political, economic, financial, military and social power. The institutions China set up during the BRI process are the clear evidence of an approaching complex hegemonic system, though Chinese officials and the public strongly reject the fact that economic and political engagements with poor countries will bring complex political, economic, financial, military and social networks and dependency, hierarchically managed by the hegemon itself. All these networks will naturally need certain institutions to be regulated, stabilized, legitimized and maintained. The institutions, which are set up to regulate each of these relations are and will be the solid proof of that hegemonic system. The BRI is no exception. It is a new system of relations of interests, which is set up, financed, regulated, maintained and managed by China. This complex network of relations and interests will be managed by institutions set up or led by China. The institutionalization of the system has already started in financial relations. The SRF, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China Development Bank (CDB) and Export-​Import Bank of China (EIBC) are the leading financiers. The other financiers are the institutions known as the “Big Four” which are the four giant banks of China: the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), already established to regulate the financial pillar of the hegemony. Politically the biggest institution set up in the scheme of the BRI until now is the Belt and Road Forum (BRF). Two BRF gatherings have been held since the start of the BRI. China currently coordinates relations with each country on a bilateral basis. This is the strategy that was defined at the beginning. The projects in each country and region will come to a level of connecting, feeding into and completing each other. At that stage multilateral institutions

BRI and hegemony  123 will be required as well. However, having a look at the agreements and institutions set up and signed in the first five years of implementation, it is more likely that the structure will be completed with some over-​arching institutions later on, when they are needed the most and when international conditions are suitable. The important dialogs, declarations, cooperation mechanisms, forums, meetings and agreements completed in the first five years, which are going to be the basis of certain multilateral, regional or global institutions, are already numerous (The Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the BRI, 2019: 1–​48). According to Michael Pillsbury (2015: 183), the challenger will delegitimize the hegemon for not obeying the rules of the current system, to legitimize itself and gain support. China will try to delegitimize institutions like the IMF and WTO, to delegitimize the US hegemony. Then it will replace those institutions with its own when it is in a position to do so. In the scheme of the BRI, China is setting up a system of complex relations that cover nearly every aspect of relations. These meetings, forums, agreements and initiatives are creating solid documents, regulating the related fields. When these relations become more complex and the volume increases, setting up large umbrella institutions to handle them efficiently will be inevitable. The Chinese hegemonic system through the BRI, which nowadays is developing via forums and initiatives, will become more institutionalized, which will legitimize its hegemony and create more consent.

3.4  Conclusion China is an authoritarian socialist country, with one-​party rule enabling strict control on society, and a semi-​capitalist economy. Since the days of imperial rule, the Chinese state and society have changed considerably. However, the process that brought about these changes was not very peaceful or smooth, and left a strong impact in Chinese minds. China’s modern age started with the arrival of imperialist powers in the 19th century. With the Opium Wars, the Chinese were forced to open their economy and society, which had been closed to the world for a long time, in order to have formal relations with the “barbarians” (foreigners). The political chaos afterwards brought about the demise of the imperial Qing Dynasty in 1911, and the Chinese soon witnessed enormous political, social and economic chaos, caused by civil war between warlords, unfair treaties and invasions, the Japanese invasion, the Second World War, and the ideological civil war between nationalists and communists. The devastation did not end with the victory of the communists and proclamation of the PRC in 1949. In the new period, Chinese society suffered further by being a laboratory for ideological experiments by Mao and his comrades for nearly three decades, leaving a society exhausted by the memory of all they had suffered since the arrival of the barbarians, the beginning of the time period which they have named the Century of Humiliation (百年国耻) “Bǎinián Guóchǐ” (1839–​1949). Many countries have suffered from similar oppressions and defeats during their history, even in the same period as China. They all usually recall that bad

124  BRI and hegemony experience with anger. However, the Chinese sense of superiority and cultural pride shows itself again in this case, by describing the military defeats and colonization as “humiliation”. The French, for example, do not formally call their occupation by Germany “humiliation”. China’s strong perception of superiority was gradually being questioned first, after their defeat by the Western powers and Japan, and further by realizing that many countries had actually developed far more than China, especially the Japanese with their successful Meiji Restoration. The Chinese had been defeated many times by the steppe nomads, Mongols, Turkic, Tibetans and Manchus, yet none of those defeats had so much effect on the Chinese state and society. The Chinese were in search of restoring the glory they had been familiar with from past history. For the “humiliation”, the Chinese not only blamed the Western powers and the Japanese for their imperial aims on China, but were also aware of their own weaknesses and backwardness. From this self-​criticism, combined with erosion of the perception of superiority, and the chaos they had suffered, the Chinese developed a strong nationalism, a modern replacement for the historical Sinocentric pride. This nationalist social tension put pressure on successive governments to raise China to its “rightful place” once again on the international stage. Chinese state mentality on foreign relations also has changed drastically since the beginning of the Century of Humiliation. China first had to forcefully accept the equality of all states and set formal and equal relations, which formally ended  the superiority claim and the Tributary System. Until the foundation of the PRC in 1949, China was formally under occupation with no unity and strength to develop a coherent foreign policy. With the proclamation of the PRC, a new age started for Chinese foreign relations. The imperial cultural perception of “self” and “others” was changed into a “class” division, referring to both domestic and international realms together. China has been pragmatic, shifting between values and bitter realities. In the imperial period when the Xiongnu defeated the Han army, China realized that it was not possible to defeat the Xiongnu militarily. Han officials developed a “heqin” policy to set up marriage alliances with the Xiongnu, though it did not fit in with the framework of the superiority claim, even considered as “humiliation”. Similar instances often occurred in history, especially in the Song Dynasty. Mao was no different. When he felt the Soviets had an imperialist attitude and might interfere with Chinese domestic politics and he felt the threat of revisionism, he quickly cut relations with the Soviets and “leaned” toward the USA, surprising the whole world, though the ideological restraints were strong. Establishing formal relations with the USA in 1972 allowed China to be recognized in the international arena and to join the UN Security Council. Mao’s regime gained legitimacy in international relations, relieved from the huge pressure of a “hostile capitalist world” and “evil Soviet Union”, thanks to pragmatism. Deng’s strategy retained its major role in Chinese foreign policy until the 2008 economic crisis that put most of the big economies into recession. China emerged stronger and more confident from the crisis, and it could voice its priorities in a more assertive manner. That is why the Dengist era in foreign policy

BRI and hegemony  125 was thought by some to be over. However, Deng’s low profile strategy is still the backbone of China’s foreign policy. The BRI emerged in a time when the Chinese economy started to show clear signs of recession and decline, while the society awakened to their past values and history. It is a paradigm change in Chinese foreign policy. Rather than a profitable strategy to develop economic and political interests, it has deep historical roots and meaning for China. It is a game changer move in international relations which will give leverage to China to change the international system in its own interests. China’s investments and activities in the chosen BR countries, poor countries usually, almost certainly will create a hegemonic system in favor of China. Investments and loans will create a wide range dependency of the invested countries on China, and this will intensify the relations. Intensified relations will bring the concerns of protecting the investments and properties in the BR countries, which gradually will make China a de facto actor in their domestic politics. Chinese hegemony in the BRI basically depends on Chinese economic power and consent of the related countries’ governments, which is compatible with the definition of the Neo-​Gramscian theory of hegemony, though consent may be limited to governments, not shared by the public in most of the countries. Chinese economic power is prevailing over all the other power parameters in the system. Military, political and soft power do not play decisive roles in it. The investments creating public goods are the main reason for the consent of the BR countries. Consent in this case is owed to economic power as well. Therefore, the two tenets of hegemony are inherent in Chinese BRI, and both are related to Chinese economic power. Its other specifications, which actually define its Chinese characteristics, are its relation with the CCP’s domestic prestige and legitimacy, its pragmatism of using the liberal institutional system and ideology of free trade and capital flow, though the Chinese are not content with the system’s values. Among them, prestige or legitimacy are interesting factors that are unknown to the definition of hegemony, but play important roles in the Chinese hegemonic system in the BRI. The CCP’s dictatorial characteristics require economic, military or political success to generate legitimacy and prestige and to stay in power. The BRI is a new remedy for this perpetual problem of the CCP, after the rhetoric of victories in the Second World War and the narrative of economic miracle have fallen away one by one. The BRI success was planned to be the new legitimacy source for the CCP regime. Chinese pragmatism appears in the BRI hegemonic system as well. While Chinese official rhetoric openly opposes liberal values, on some occasions showing the intention to undermine the liberal international system, recently the biggest beneficiary of the system has been China itself. A distinct and coherent ideology that binds the sides together in the BRI hegemonic system has not yet been created by China. The system basically runs on the liberal ideology for now. However, the narrative of Community of Common Destiny signals an ideological

126  BRI and hegemony transformation which will be attempted in the future, though its current definition is extremely vague. Chinese current ideology, an authoritarian semi-​socialist political system and a semi-​capitalist economy are also presented as a model to the world by China. Nevertheless, they are far from creating a vacuum for the international community, especially for the Western democratic countries. Besides ideology, the institutional requirement of a hegemonic system is also not yet matured by China. Likewise, in this aspect China currently depends on institutions set up by the US-​led liberal international system. However, the institutionalization process has started already in the financial sector. The banks were the first steps of the institutionalization of the BRI. With the intensified relations, it is anticipated that there will be regulatory and binding institutions being set up in all facets of the relations. These institutions will be political, military and economical umbrella institutions, and will probably run in rivalry with the current liberal international institutions. Consequently, it is safe to argue that Chinese hegemony has already been set up in the BRI with basic tenets, and it will turn into a fully-​fledged system with its own ideology and institutions as soon as it is possible, considering the development speed of the BRI.

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4  Toward a new Tributary System

The previous chapters covered a wide range of sub-​topics to dig out the roots and philosophies behind each hegemonic system that China set up. The Tributary System and the Belt and Road Initiative were chosen to represent the historical and contemporary examples of Chinese style hegemony. Analyzing each system against its own historical and philosophical background is the requirement of an historicist approach. In this way, social phenomenon can be interpreted more accurately. In this chapter, the analysis will bring the results of previous chapters together, to find out what those chapters actually propose. This analysis aimed to find its own answers to many questions. The main question is, in the BRI context, what is the Chinese perception of hegemony, and how has it evolved since the imperial Tributary System? In other words, what are the diverging and persisting dynamics between the two hegemonic systems, Tributary and BRI? How much does the BRI carry the characteristics of the Tributary System and to what extent does it differ? And finally, what kind of hegemon is China going to be? What values will underlie its hegemonic system? To what extent will Chinese history and its traditions lead its hegemony? The other important questions this book intended to answer are: what were the ideological sources of the Chinese perception of “others” and “self”, and how have they evolved to today? After much turbulence in the modern era and restoring its former powerful status, what kind of dynamics dictate China’s foreign policy today? And what it is likely to be in the future? Does China tend to solve its problems with the old Chinese strategies and values in foreign policy? In this context, is China actually a “threat” to the international community or is it just “a peaceful stakeholder”?

4.1  The Neo-​Tributary System China is not a “Tianxia Empire” anymore. The centrality of the “Middle Kingdom” is now a nostalgic expression of historical Sinocentric pride. China is not a Marxist-​Maoist revolution exporter country either, just as much as it is not a “Confucian State”, dividing human beings into three categories of “Chinese, barbarians and beasts”. It is not a mighty hegemon of the imperial Tributary System. China is a state governed with an old-fashioned Western ideology, a

Toward a new Tributary System  131 semi-​capitalist economy, and a dynamic society, pursuing international relations in its own fashion. This book claims that despite dramatic changes in its cultural, social and political spheres since the imperial period, China still has strong connections with its long history and exclusive political culture and philosophy, and it is gradually embracing the past by becoming more affiliated with its historical values, just the same as has happened each time it lost its way in historical periods of chaos. Chinese society and its statesmen have always been traditional, perhaps more than many countries in the world. Even in the devastating Maoist era, hidden behind Marxist terminology, China was highly traditional in international policies, political strategies, social and cultural moves. Therefore, it is naïve to think that China has completely changed in modern times. China still often looks to the past to find remedies for its modern problems and to find examples to guide it in strategic moves. The reference points for the Chinese political elite are still those from its history and ancient philosophy, far more than any modern values and references. China is still explicitly proud, Sinocentric, and sometimes even behaves like a racial state. Chinese history can shed light on today and the future, perhaps more than any other country in the world. We would not attempt to comprehend contemporary France or Japan by studying the 5th century BC, but to understand contemporary Chinese moves, scholars have to examine China’s history starting from the Zhou Dynasty, or at least from the Century of Humiliation for more recent references. After the turbulence of the Century of Humiliation and then Maoism, China once more turned to face its rich history to find its guiding values. Most observers would be deceived on this point. They would use the effects of modernity on China as evidence that Chinese society and politics are now different or have limited relations with the past. Communism itself is a modern ideology that emerged from the West and China embraced it. It seems this is enough to be convinced, however, that communism or any other ideology and values set can survive in China only if they are compatible with Chinese culture and its traditional mindset. Communism is highly compatible with the Chinese hierarchic, authoritarian, suppressive, and collectivist culture, which is why it is rooted in Chinese society and did not collapse even after the 1990s. The traditional mindset is so strong in China that even when Sun Yat-​Sen tried to modernize the nation, he could not create a brand-​new modern system, and only combined some modern principles with traditional Chinese values. Mainland China did a very similar thing when it embraced communism. China embraced communism because this was quite in harmony with traditional values. Similarly, today, while China reformulates its stance, it combines modern values with historical percepts, but the historical values are still more effective than the modern. Modern values are despised as empty and political tools of the West to be used for their own interests. The Chinese have tried to create the most useful solutions for solving their problems, using their cultural settings with a contemporary makeup, which makes things not brand new but combined “with Chinese characteristics”.

132  Toward a new Tributary System This research suggests that because of the shared main dynamics and philosophical tenets, the mentality and cultural elements persisting from the Tributary System, the current hegemonic system China is setting up through the BRI can be called the “Neo-​Tributary System”. “Neo” refers to both persisting and diverging dynamics from the Tributary System to the Neo-​Tributary System. The BRI is a system which inherited its main characteristics from the historical imperial Chinese Tributary System. That is why “neo” refers to this point, its “revival”. At the same time, its meaning of “new” refers to the diverging dynamics from the Tributary System, inevitably brought by modern times and the demise of the imperial era. In other words, “neo” represents both the old dynamics of Neo-​Tributary System, revived from the Tributary System, and the new dynamics that are observable in BRI policies. As this formulation describes the mentality of Chinese foreign policy in general, the Neo-​Tributary System cannot be merely equated to the BRI. The BRI is the current implementation of the Neo-​Tributary System. In the future, the Neo-​ Tributary System may perpetuate itself in other moves or initiatives, as it represents the mindset of Chinese policy makers, rather than a temporary strategy. However, the BRI will be taken as the Neo-​Tributary System in this analysis, because the BRI is the only available example representing the Neo-​Tributary System. Comparing the Tributary System and Neo-​Tributary System (BRI) in the context of their perception of hegemony requires a cautious process of evaluation of each system in its own framework and time period, as has been explored in each related chapter. Obtaining the correct image of each structure is a prerequisite to detecting the full picture of Chinese hegemony, and its reflections in the components of power, consent, ideology, institutions and so on. The Neo-​Tributary System, the mentality of which is staged by China in the context of the BRI, has persisting and diverging dynamics from the historical Tributary System onward. The persisting points, derived from the comparison of the Tributary System and the Neo-​Tributary System (BRI), are basically as follows: the Neo-​Tributary System is based on the underlying tenets of power and consent, just as the Tributary System was. It is still hierarchic, chauvinist (nationalist), authoritarian, pragmatist, domestic legitimacy and prestige-​oriented, wuwei in characteristic and structured into divided zone, the same as the Tributary System. The first dynamic of the Neo-​Tributary System is “power”. Power is essential to set up a hegemony, in any definition of hegemony. As examined in each respective chapter, power plays an essential role in both the Tributary System and the BRI. In the Tributary System “power” appears in different characteristics in different zones. In the Sinic Zone, China’s military, economic and political power kept the system stable and enduring. Economic power was essential for attraction and military power was for deterrence. Confucian values or Confucianism were not the only dynamic the system depended on, as Chinese rhetoric mostly advocates that Confucian values, especially the principle of benevolence, attracted other societies and created the foundation of the system. They were shared

Toward a new Tributary System  133 values, creating a smooth socializing environment for the Confucian Sinic countries. Nevertheless, it was not an essential factor in the creation of the relations. This fact can be shown in the situation when all of the Sinic countries were at the same level of power, or when China was not as strong as it usually had been. When China was not strong enough, as in the case of the Song Dynasty and other fragmented periods, the tributary states were not willing to send tributary gifts and offer their obedience. Especially in the case of Japan, when it was stronger than China it claimed its own superiority, occasionally attacked Korea and even attacked and occupied China. On some occasions, tributary countries set up their own tributary systems, members of which were Chinese tributaries as well. China did not utilize military power to annex or to exploit the Sinic Zone peoples in a colonialist mindset, yet it had wars with all of them and sometimes occupied them under different dynastic reigns. Chinese economic and political power played the role of insurance for the system in this zone. The Confucian principle of “attract them with virtues but keep the power in the reserve” was applied most successfully in this zone. In this regard, the attractiveness of the values and culture, “soft power”, was seen most obviously in this zone as well, but as a facilitator and not an essential dynamic. In the Inner Asia Zone and the Outer Zone, however, the Confucian values had almost no function at all. The relations mostly depended on tough military power. When China was stronger, it could dominate the steppes, and when the steppes or Outer Zone countries were powerful, they occupied China. When they were comparable in power, balance of power strategies operated. Thus, solid material power was essential in setting up and perpetuating the Tributary System in all zones, with differences in the details. Similarly, the Belt and Road Initiative depends almost solely on Chinese economic power, while military power and soft power (Chinese cultural and political values) do not play much of a role. It was not “virtues and peacefulness of Confucian Chinese culture” setting up and keeping the historical Tributary System on track. Likewise, what makes the Neo-​Tributary System possible today is not the attractiveness of “peaceful, sharing and benevolent China”, or the rhetoric of “China, the advocate of the developing countries” it is solely Chinese economic power, infrastructure investments and the loans provided to BR countries that make the Neo-​Tributary System possible. The second dynamic of Neo-​ Tributary Chinese hegemony is “consent”. Consent was generated in the Tributary Sinic Zone by economic and political incentives and Confucian values, which played the role of legitimizing Chinese ideology but without any international institutions or means of supporting it; whereas in other zones, consent, ideology and institutions were not matters of concern and were irrelevant because of the nature of the relations. In the Neo-​Tributary System, consent of the other states was obtained by China basically through its economic power, rather than by its political ideology or cultural values, except in some poor and authoritarian underdeveloped countries, attracted by the Chinese economic development experience. Chinese economic power generates consent by its production of “public goods”. In other words,

134  Toward a new Tributary System economic concerns play a major role in the consent of BR countries, although this consent is not from the mass public of the BR countries, but from the mostly authoritarian governments that do not represent public opinion on the projects. Hierarchy is an important dynamic and characteristic of the Neo-​Tributary hegemonic system, contradicting modern international values. It was the essence of the Tributary System. Basically, the Tributary System depended on submitting to the Chinese emperor, accepting his and Chinese culture’s superiority and bowing in front of him. It was clearly and officially based on declaration of this hierarchic structure, in which Chinese interests certainly enjoyed priority. The tributaries formally shared equal status, but China was indisputably accepted to be above all. In modern hegemonic systems, however, including the Neo-​ Gramscian definition, the states in the system are officially equal and sovereign in their territories, whereas hierarchy actually may exist unofficially. The BRI is such a system. In all the rhetoric, equality and respect for sovereignty are expressed, but naturally the loan provider and the loan taker are not equal in practice. The money taker will soon be vulnerable to influence. The BRI countries are part of an undeclared, unofficial hierarchic order. China’s stress on “matters to be handled on mutual basis” actually underlines that hierarchy will be decisive in the relations. This is a relational hierarchic approach, in which the rules and values will be applied according to the status of each state compared to China, contrary to law-​based relations valid in the current international system. The hierarchic Chinese tradition and historical practices are the strongest evidence for this. Chinese culture still defines every aspect of the life in a hierarchic order. The Chinese state still looks through its hierarchic binoculars to matters of international relations, though the rhetoric and statements are quite Westphalian. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Neo-​Tributary System is based on an unofficial hierarchy. Chinese “core interests” will always trump all other interests and the Neo-​Tributary hierarchic relations will continue unofficially, in a manner compatible with Chinese traditional values. The next important dynamic of the Neo-​Tributary System is the Sinocentric pride and cultural arrogance which persists from the Tributary System, but has evolved into the modern term, nationalism. Chinese nationalism is a very exceptional one which needs to be construed as hyper-​nationalism. In its contemporary political meaning, “China” is a nation-​ state with 55 minority groups living alongside the majority Han Chinese. The Chinese official rhetoric tries to equate China and Chineseness with Han ethnicity. However, its historical dimensions have gone far beyond this twisted description. When “China” in its historical context is under discussion, one should not forget that China is not comprehensible through the context of a nation-​state and one ethnic community, but a much larger entity, containing diverse communities, with different cultures and lifestyles, some of which are conscious of a distinct identity, others not. The Han ethnicity is just one such of these communities, though sometimes the richest and culturally more developed than others. Rather like the case of Europe, China historically was not equivalent to a nation-​state, like France or Germany, but equivalent to “Europe” as a whole continent. The

Toward a new Tributary System  135 main factor creating its “European” identity was basically Christianity in the past, shared democratic, cultural and historical values and, again, Christian heritage today, but disregarding the language and geographical location of each community member. In the past, “Chineseness” was associated with each community’s affinity with Chinese culture. Chinese cultural values mainly refer to Confucian moral sets, its political conduct and the Chinese scripts (Fairbank and Teng, 1941: 138). Any community that embraced Chinese cultural values was regarded as “Chinese” or “civilized” (Hua) (华), though they were sometimes of Mongolian, Manchu, Turkic or Tibetan origin and disregarded their contribution to the common culture. All the other communities outside of Chinese cultural boundaries were, as a whole, called barbarians (Yi) (夷). This point is critical to understanding why the Chinese accepted their occupiers, such as the Mongolian Yuan, Manchu Qing, Turkic Northern Wei, as “Chinese”. They were invaders from outside, but some had embraced Chinese culture after occupation. Being on the same continent as the Chinese sphere of influence, they were named Chinese. That is why in contemporary Chinese understanding, all the lands conquered by the Manchu Qing, which Mainland China was part of, were accepted to be the legitimate part of China today, even after the demise of the Qing. It is like France claiming Belgium as part of France, addressing the common religious, political and cultural values and, most importantly, because in the Second World War they were both part of the same political entity, Germany. So basically, it is like France could claim rights over another country, just because they both were part of Germany for some period of time. This example demonstrates the Chinese mentality on the identity of the other societies in the Chinese continent. In Imperial China identity was defined not by kinship but by culture. However, the Hans always viewed themselves as in the center, the self-​claimed sole representative, owner and sole beneficiary of all material and cultural outcomes, created by whole communities of the Chinese continent. This mentality is still the driving force of Chinese foreign policy today, and BRI is no exception. The Chinese do not treat minorities and neighbors as equal partners and societies but as the outsiders who “benefited from the benevolence and wisdom of China (Han)” or as the inferior barbarians not yet civilized. In this way, the cultural values and historical narratives enormously boost nationalist feelings today. The Century of Humiliation is an important factor strengthening Chinese nationalism. The Chinese education system and media still pump out hardline nationalist content to society, boosting feelings of anger and desire for revenge over the imperialist invasions in the 19th century, and what happened after that. The anger arises from the past, and merges with the anger over conflicts arising from contemporary political and cultural issues such as the attitude of foreigners against Chinese culture, food, script, national ideology and so on. With all these mixed feelings and anger, the Chinese have mostly developed an attitude of strong nationalism that divides people into two camps, Chinese and foreigners. Foreigners become an indivisible block though including many cultures and nationalities. With such a mindset, Chinese nationalists mostly pass beyond the

136  Toward a new Tributary System limits of patriotic feelings, unquestioningly defending the complete elements of Chineseness. Consequently, it becomes a hard task to comprehend whether what we call Chinese nationalism is a nation-​state patriotism or actually a racism. Chinese official rhetoric contributes the most to this dilemma. Chinese officials and most academics have almost an obsession in claiming “jealous foreign powers aim to stop China’s rise”. This paranoia of “all (beasts) are against (benevolent and civilized) us” is mostly used by the CCP as a tool to cover up and divert attention away from domestic problems and. This vicious cycle has created an obsessive society, most of whom don’t know what they are exactly against, whether political plots or all things to do with foreigners. Perhaps this issue is going to be one of the main topics about China, and it is definitely one of the most important dynamics of the Neo-​Tributary System, enduring throughout the Sinocentrism of the Tributary System. Authoritarianism has been a persistent characteristic of China since the very beginning of Chinese civilization, rooted deep in its culture. The authoritarian characteristics of Imperial China do not need to be mentioned, but China’s modern history is also strictly associated with authoritarianism. In fact, the structure and mentality of policy making seems not to have changed much from Imperial China to the PRC, as somehow the traditional values survive under any conditions. Confucian principles of fatherly imperial rule with benevolence but unquestionable authority, Taoist principles, letting people go free in the fulfilment of their desires while keeping them minimally informed about government affairs, and legalism suggesting strict, authoritarian rulers and severe punishment of any infringements, are the most widely shared traditional principles of Tributary and Neo-​Tributary China, and somehow have survived throughout. In the Maoist Era, the only difference was lack of historical memory, though Mao himself was highly traditional. The priorities and characteristics of Chinese foreign relations also have been defined by highly authoritarian regimes. In this aspect, both the Tributary and Neo-​ Tributary Systems have similar decision-​making mentality behind them. In the past these decision makers were the authoritarian unquestionable emperors, while today they are the authoritarian unquestionable CCP regime, the red emperors with ties. Nowadays the Chinese are recovering and restoring the historical memory. However, modern universal values such as human rights, freedom, equality, and democracy are still far from being embraced by the elites, let alone the masses. Pragmatism is perhaps one of the most important characteristics of Chinese society, politics and foreign policy. China is still very pragmatist as it was in the past. Pragmatism is one of the primary dynamics of the Neo-​Tributary System persisting from the Tributary System, deeply rooted in Chinese cultural and religious values. The Taoist principle of adjusting and adapting “self” to “nature”, rather than trying to change it, is well reflected in Chinese pragmatism throughout its history and it persists today. “Water” in Taoism is presented as a model for Chinese people to take lessons from. It follows the patterns of its course, takes the shape and direction it requires as dictated by the landscape, but always proceeds to its destination. Chinese moral values are not against deceit and pragmatism in any

Toward a new Tributary System  137 field of life. As long as the result is successful, the way it is reached is legitimate. This was how the power transition occurred in dynasties as well. The ancient Chinese war philosophy always depended on deceptive methods of reaching the target without a battle or confrontation and without presenting a firm stance of some moral value. China was like Taoist water in history. It made agreements, gave princesses and even tributes to the barbarians when it needed to do so, and adjusted its policies accordingly when the conditions required it. In the modern age, Mao’s twists between the superpowers, the USSR and the US, and Deng’s deceptive low profile strategy are examples of these ethics. Pragmatism can be observed in the actions of many politicians and many societies, and historical cases. The difference with Chinese pragmatism is that it has a place in the cultural and religious values of Chinese society. Machiavellian ethics is strongly criticized bitterly all around the world for its result-​oriented and unscrupulous nature; however, perhaps the least criticism of the Machiavellian mindset can be expected from the Chinese. Machiavellian ethics and Social Darwinism overlap best with Chinese cultural and political ethics. Therefore, it would be naïve if it is assumed that the Neo-​Tributary System will run on some universal values all the time, and pragmatism will not be observed. Pragmatism will be a common tool utilized by China in the Neo-​Tributary System whenever Chinese interests require it. Legitimacy and prestige are persisting dynamics of Chinese hegemony, from the Tributary to the Neo-​Tributary System, though these dynamics have no place in the definition of modern hegemony theories. In other words, hegemons are not expected to set up of costly hegemonic systems with the aim of boosting domestic legitimacy and prestige. This is one of the factors comprising hegemony “with Chinese characteristics”. Legitimacy and prestige of domestic politics play important roles in both the Tributary and Neo-​Tributary Systems. Legitimacy and prestige were the primary motives and gains for Imperial China in the Tributary System. It was a way of legitimizing the power of the emperor and of the other kings in their domestic societies. Similarly, in the contemporary context, the BRI primarily serves the CCP regime by creating a convincing legitimacy narrative and prestige, by fulfillment of the “China Dream” through solving the emerging serious economic problems. Chinese emperors were legitimate as long as there was rice for everybody and no natural calamities. Today’s CCP regime will be legitimate as long as there are jobs and stable incomes for everybody. This perpetuating situation puts the concerns of domestic legitimacy and prestige at the heart of Chinese foreign policy today. Legitimacy and prestige of the regime will be important dynamics of the Neo-​Tributary System, as they were in the Tributary System because they both depend on performance. Wuwei is another unusual but persisting dynamic of the Neo-​ Tributary Chinese hegemony, worthy of being addressed. In this book, wuwei, the Taoist principle of “negligence, non-​interference”, is utilized to refer to the similar attitude observable in Chinese foreign affairs. In the Tributary System, China mostly did not interfere in the domestic and international politics of any tributaries.

138  Toward a new Tributary System Besides, China did not interfere in the conflicts between the tributary states. As in the examples of the Vietnam–​Champa and Japan–​Korean wars, China did not interfere or try to ensure peace in the system, as long as the conflict did not disturb Chinese interests. Yet, such an “egocentrism” did not affect its status. In the modern sense, the hegemon will be the guardian of the system and sometimes will exercise tough power against any sabotage that poses a threat to its authority and the system’s peacefulness and stability. In the BRI context, China is not likely to use its power to interfere in any conflicts between the BR countries. From the rhetoric of official declarations, non-​interference is repeatedly assured. Nevertheless, if the conflicts are going to damage its “core interests” and if the international environment is suitable, China may not be that respectful of the principle of non-​interference, as seen in history, for example in the Korean war in 1950. The principle of non-​interference is directly criticized by Chinese academics nowadays, giving serious signals of change in the near future. However, this change would address Chinese action in protecting its own interests, not to solve the participants’ problems. The principle of wuwei idleness, with its self-​centric nature, persists in the Neo-​Tributary System, and was once an important feature of the Tributary System. China skillfully continues to ignore the problems of our planet, as long as they do not pose a real threat to China or Chinese interests. China follows active policies all around the world, but it is still very home-​centric, self-​centric and localized in mind. In comparing the two hegemonic systems, the Tributary and Neo-​Tributary Systems, the similarities between the structures attract attention immediately. China has been paying more attention and involving itself mostly with its direct neighborhood and immediate vicinity. In the Tributary System the Sinic Zone was the inner zone and the intense relations were seen in this zone. It was a sort of back garden for Imperial China. Any outside interference in this zone would catch China’s attention, though it seldom did anything to protect zone members or the order. The Outer Zone and more distant areas were not much in the scope of Chinese attention, even usually entirely ignored as long as there was no threat to China. Zone division is a practice of hierarchic mentality. Chinese relations presented different patterns in different zones, according to the affinity and power. The most intense relations were in closest circle. The more remote circles were virtually neglected; thus, China was a big East Asian power, but never truly a global superpower. In the Belt and Road Initiative the structure shows quite similar patterns. The closest circles receive most of the attention and investments from China. China considers Pacific Asia, South East Asia and Central Asia historically in its sphere of influence, and it is jealous of any other superpower’s interference in these regions. Africa is an exception in this context, as it is not on China’s periphery, but China surprisingly treats them the same as those in its neighborhood. Structurally, the common point between the Tributary and Neo-​Tributary hegemonic systems is that China has not set up a world-​scale hegemony. In the Tributary System, China was more focused on the neighboring periphery but mostly neglected

Toward a new Tributary System  139 anything beyond it. The Neo-​Tributary System in the BRI context looks like a worldwide endeavor, but the focal point is regional, or selectively the poorer and weaker countries. Though the scope is the whole world, in reality it is regionally concentrated. In this case the World System Theory is applicable to both the Tributary System and the BRI. China always had stronger ties with the neighboring periphery countries, however, economic relations were not intense as the World System Theory suggests. There wasn’t a systemized and planned wealth flow or labor division in the Tributary System. Economic relations were based on unorganized regional scale trading. With the BRI, besides the former peripheries with intense and systemized economic relations, China aims to create more distant periphery circles that in the Tributary System were never aimed for or set up, such as in Africa, creating core–​periphery relations with China. Nevertheless, it is assumed that China cares more about relations in the vicinity than with more distant nations. This care makes China more proactive and more jealous of interference by the other big powers in the closer circles. The definition of “core interests” will cover the neighboring periphery circles first and then the more distant ones after that, with intense investments and political rapprochements. China is indisputably creating a system of complex interdependency in the BRI web. It has started with economic relations but will end with the creation of the “Community of Common Destiny”. This community will have complex social, economic and political relations, so that they can share commonalities from material interests to their destinies. Interdependency was applicable to the Tributary System countries as well, but it was not that “complex”, as the relations were not that intense, compared to today’s relations under the influene of globalization. Bearing in mind an approaching multi-​polar world in the near future, the Neo-​Tributary System in the context of the BRI proposes that China is likely to set up a comprehensive hegemonic system in its backyard and in the distant periphery circles, similarly to the Inner and Outer Zones of the Tributary System, rather than a real, comprehensive global hegemony like the one the US has set up. Both the Tributary System and the BRI have covered all the known world in their time, but both focus on neighboring regions. The diverging dynamics between the Tributary and Neo-​Tributary Systems, resulting from the comparison of the Tributary System and the BRI, are mainly as follows: formal and informal equality, the role of Chinese soft power, ideology, extrovert and assertive foreign policies, institutionalization and military use. The formal equality of countries is one of the biggest diverging dynamics between the Tributary and Neo-​Tributary System. The Tributary System was formally based on overt acknowledgment of the superiority of the Chinese emperor and Chinese culture. This formal acceptance was further supported by the physical kowtowing rituals. Equality was possible between the tributaries, while China was regarded as superior to all. This historical practice was further supported by cultural arrogance and introvert characteristics for centuries. The Chinese finally accepted formal equality of the states in international relations, through treaties

140  Toward a new Tributary System signed after the defeats in the Opium Wars. China accepted the equality of others only by force. The formal equal relations established by the Qing authorities with other countries was by a gradual process of setting up a ministry of foreign relations. Relations with foreign countries were regarded as domestic matters until that time. The pillars of the modern international system are equality between the states and respect for the right of sovereignty within borders. The established formal equality in contemporary formal international relations and China’s repeated assurance of respect for sovereignty and non-​interference are the official stance of China today, due to the fact that Westphalian values are the base and driving forces of today’s international relations, and following its main values which are highly useful for Chinese strategies. Contrary to this official rhetoric, the Chinese unofficial view supported by its culture would hardly accept this. Today Chinese society and policy makers traditionally do not equate any society or country with their own. Hierarchic relations are so deeply embedded in the Chinese mentality that in the BRI context Chinese authorities are still emphasizing that relations with BRI countries will be carried out on a mutual basis, which indirectly highlights the hierarchic type of relations rather than the rule-​based equal notion. Nevertheless, despite this unofficial stance, China has formally established relationships with foreign countries, which was impossible to imagine in the Tributary System. Soft power is another important diverging dynamic between the Tributary and Neo-​Tributary Systems. China has enjoyed great soft power during most of its imperial history. Confucian values were the basic soft power source for China. Socialization in the Tributary System was smoothed by Chinese imperial soft power. However, mostly due to its authoritarian regime’s bad reputation in the international community, China has very low soft power today and the BRI is aimed at boosting it. The Neo-​Tributary System differs from the Tributary System in the role of soft power. Whereas Imperial China’s soft power facilitated interaction in the Tributary System, in the BRI strengthening contemporary China’s poor soft power is an objective. Ideology is another diverging dynamic between the historical and current Chinese hegemonic systems. Ideology is defined to be the common values that are generated by the hegemon to convince others join the system and to obtain their consent. In this aspect ideology is crucial in the formation of the hegemonic system. Historically, Chinese cultural and political values, specifically Confucianism, constituted the basic ideology. In the Neo-​Tributary System, however, China is far from formulating a coherent ideology which will attract others, until now. Chinese state ideology and cultural values do not play a decisive role as much as the “liberal” values of free trade, non-​interference and interdependency play in its miraculous recent economic development. China started to develop economically when it gave up implementing Maoist ideas and policies. Those ideas and policies are not attractive to most countries, except some authoritarian regimes in some undeveloped countries. China has experienced amazing economic

Toward a new Tributary System  141 development and pragmatically constructed the BRI by exploiting international liberal values, while its political ideology is not consistent with those principles. China overtly presents its dictatorial system and authoritarian-​hierarchic cultural principles as alternatives to the liberal, democratic systems and universal values like human rights, freedom, equality and so on. The Chinese are expected to undermine the system that they owe their development to, as soon as they have enough power to do so. In this case a more attractive ideology needs to be formulated to cement the Neo-​Tributary System. The rhetoric takes place around the vague concept of the Community of Common Destiny, and is seen to be the efforts of formulation of such an ideology. The institutional structure of the Tributary and Neo-​Tributary Systems is another important diverging dynamic. Institutions are the tools of the hegemon to maintain its supremacy, implement the rules derived from the ideology and regulate the relations in the hegemonic system. In the Tributary System China did not set up such institutions to maintain its role, though regular official visits and rituals took place instead. In the modern international environment, maintaining a hegemonic system without institutions is not possible, since the institutions are the most convincing apparatus of the hegemony supported by ideology. International institutions being set up by the hegemon are the practical evidence of the hegemony, and find their value with ideology. It seems China is aware of this fact and initially started institutionalization of the Neo-​Tributary System by setting up financial institutions. The AIIB and SRF are the first examples of this effort. This process will likely continue with more comprehensive institutions that are aimed to replace the liberal institutions, not only in the financial field, but social, political and military as well. The intensified relations inevitably require this process. China is going to set up a tighter grid of institutions in all fields of relations to secure its interests which have materialized by investments in many countries. Another divergence between the Tributary and Neo-​Tributary Systems is that China is not an introvert country anymore. China has learned the consequences of isolation very well in the Century of Humiliation and Maoist period. Compared to the imperial era, China has changed this attitude entirely. China was not even interested in Taiwan island for a long part of its history, until it was finally conquered in the 19th century. It was unimaginable for any dynasty to have intense relations with African countries as China does today. China was mostly an introvert country, with almost no presence in Tributary countries, whereas by actively interacting with foreign countries today and with the BRI, China is becoming a globally active and more assertive country. Its military presence is a diverging issue as well. China did not use military power in distant areas in the Tributary System. The military was actively used in the case that “core interests” were threatened. Today, however, the definition of “core interests” will cover the neighboring periphery circles first, and then distant ones soon in the BRI context, with intense investments and political rapprochements. China has become a strong actor, and the stability of the periphery circles in its vicinity and at a distance will force China to create a comprehensive security

142  Toward a new Tributary System climate, with overseas bases and alliances, covering all “core interests”; and perhaps soon it will develop facilities with operational and coercive options as well, and this is something China seldom did before. Imperial China was a typical empire and occasionally an imperialist and colonial power in the Ming and Qing dynasties, but only limited to the Inner Asia Zone, but empires, imperialism and colonialism are not applicable to the BRI in today’s context. The BRI is carried out in the climate of globalization, which is described to be the new version of imperialism. However, the system has not yet matured in all relational dimensions to enable comprehensive evaluation and determination of its final nature, in this context. Gramsci (1971: 180–​195) divides “hegemony” into three levels of consciousness. The first level is the consciousness of cooperation, limited to the economy and to certain group interests. The second is class consciousness, which extends the scope to all classes, but is still limited to the economy. The third is the matured hegemony which unites the interests of the ruling class with all other class interests and formulates it in a universal ideological frame. Within the context of this definition, the Tributary Sinic Zone matches well with the third level of consciousness, the mature hegemonic system. The interests of the hegemon were seen in compliance with their own interests by the Sinic countries, in the frame of Confucian ideology. The other zones match with first level consciousness, as they pursue their own economic aims and do not have a sense of shared common interests. The Belt and Road Initiative, however, sits at the second level, the class consciousness of economic cooperation. The class refers to the related BRI countries because they complete each other by connectivity. For instance, the success of BRI projects in Kazakhstan is important for Turkey, as both are going to be part of the same economic corridor. So, Turkish actions in the BRI context cannot be in the scope of the self-​centered first consciousness level. Nevertheless, the third level of mature hegemony has not yet been achieved in the BRI. China’s official rhetoric, the “Community of Common Destiny”, refers to the last level of mature hegemony. In that level the hegemon and the other countries in the system share the perception that they have a common identity, shaped by common interests and threats. The shared ideology is not yet formed among all Belt and Road countries, but the Community of Common Destiny is addressing that need. The Community of Common Destiny is meaningful in the Gramscian definition of the “historical bloc” as well. The historical bloc, which means “binding and cohering” different interest groups (Morton, 2003:  159) for the formation of hegemonic order, corresponds with the creation of the Community of Common Destiny. Formation of the community will be achieved by persuading each of the parts that they have common interests in the BRI. Thus, the “binding and cohering” process, formed by ideology, will end up with the “matured level of hegemony”, the Community of Common Destiny. In sum, the Neo-​Tributary System suggests a modern Chinese hegemony with Chinese characteristics, the first of its implementations to be seen in the context

Toward a new Tributary System  143 of the BRI. Some aspects of the Tributary System will disappear, namely diverging dynamics, like the formal equality, the role of soft power, ideological differences, China’s changed introvert foreign policy into an assertive one today, institutionalization, and the changes in its military deployment. The Neo-​Tributary System basically depends on Chinese economic power and the consent of the BR countries, due to the public goods China offers. Nevertheless, there will be persisting factors from the Tributary System, namely, hierarchy, Sinocentric pride and cultural chauvinism transformed into strong nationalism, authoritarianism, the decisive role of pragmatism and deceptive policies, the role of domestic legitimacy and prestige in foreign affairs, the principle of wuwei with its self-​centric nature and structural resemblance of arranging the relations in zones. Finding these basic similarities between the two systems, it would not be wrong to call the new hegemonic system the Neo-​Tributary System. The analysis gives enough evidence that Chinese cultural values and historical experience will have a strong impact on future policies, as it does today. Being one of the most conservative countries on Earth, with very strong nationalism and cultural pride, China is not expected to change this characteristic in the near future. The memories of the Century of Humiliation, especially, which are quite usefully employed for the regime’s survival, are the leading factors in the Chinese mindset, which they take into account for making their strategic moves in implementing international policies and their relations with other countries. The sense of humiliation in the 19th century quite possibly created a need for revenge, which is biding its time. In this case, the mentality of imperial Tributary System was never completely abandoned in the modern period. The endurance of cultural and historical memory reminds us that it was strong even in the Maoist period. Mao’s Three World Theory was a kind of new formulation of the Tributary System. China’s proposed leadership in the revolutionary path of the third world was a formulation of the Tributary System in Maoist characteristics. This trend is supported by the nationalist surge in contemporary China. The memories of the Century of Humiliation and the strong nationalism are two sides of the coin. Memories strengthen nationalism, and nationalism keeps the memories alive. Besides this, the historical and cultural definitions of “self” and “others” plays significant role in today’s Chinese foreign policy and individual and social attitudes against foreigners. The division of Chineseness and foreignness is deepened by Sinocentric, highly xenophobic and chauvinist traditional values, and these values currently are gradually getting stronger, along with increasing Chinese confidence. Chinese culture is attracting the spotlights nowadays. As it is going to be decisive in Chinese behavior, the culture’s characteristics gain importance. Chinese culture, as analyzed in previous chapters, is more than just a lifestyle. It contains strong elements and influences of a primitive religion as well. The culture is strongly influenced by Chinese folk religion, from which Confucianism and Taoism emerged. Therefore, the culture itself bears the characteristics of a religion. Chinese folk religion does not have strong metaphysical connections,

144  Toward a new Tributary System and it is not a belief system that explains the heavenly and earthly lives, the relations between the universe, human beings, the hereafter and so on in a compact, coherent philosophical formulation, as most major religions do. It mostly encompasses materialist and earthly characteristics and is poor in structure and coherency. Besides, this does not make Chinese society a dogma-​free society, as the official and academic Chinese rhetoric proudly presents. Chinese society and values are still guided by a strong conservative culture, the elements of which are connected with dogmatic, earthly, primitive Chinese folk religion. In this aspect, Chinese society is highly religious, if the definition of religion is not limited to the other major religions such as the Abrahamic religions. Chinese folk religion is not just limited to ancestor worship, a pagan practice limited to a daily moment of spirituality. It is just the visible tip of the iceberg. It is the true source of the hierarchy, communal life, collectivism, paternal social structure, authoritarianism, inertia around old values, characteristics of obedience and anti-​individualism and so on. The strong conservativeness of the culture, and its inflexible opposition to change, can only be comprehended if its religious characteristics are discovered. Thus, while evaluating Chinese social and political principles, we are actually talking about principles affected deeply by a primitive religion, the Chinese folk religion, which is known as “Chinese culture”. Therefore, the attitude of Chinese culture to changes and differences should not be expected to be flexible, which in fact is hard to be expected from any religion. The peacefulness of a culture or society cannot be evaluated by observing how they treat similar societies sharing the same values. On the contrary, the observation should be focused on how they treat different societies with different characteristics and values. In this aspect, Chinese social and political culture does not promise a lot. It is peaceful towards societies that it resembles or that it could assimilate, but intolerant and xenophobic towards societies that have different values and settings. The world today is roughly divided into two camps on China and its future aims. The pessimistic “China Threat” camp is warning the world to be aware of China’s deceptive policies and implying that the Chinese will actually show their real intentions when it is too late to stop them. This camp believes that the deceptive characteristics of Chinese values and history, plus the current authoritarian antidemocratic regime’s characteristics, deem it mostly unreliable. The optimistic “Peaceful China” camp, which is mostly formed by the Chinese themselves, is trying to convince the world that, just like any other country, China is trying to get stronger and protect its interests in the best way possible (Ming X, 2013) and it will be a “responsible stakeholder”; its peaceful traditional values and historical practice bear that out. This book suggests its own answer to this discussion. As covered in the previous chapters, China cannot be described as always peaceful, with a peaceful culture and political tradition. China has had expansionist policies during most of its history. It also had a hierarchic, xenophobic, chauvinist cultural attitude with limited tolerance for different cultures and societies, and these mostly endure

Toward a new Tributary System  145 today. The Chinese were peaceful as long as others embraced their values and did not violate their interests. Chinese society still looks down on other cultures and is highly egocentrist, with no interest in world problems if they do not directly affect them. Chinese policies are still highly pragmatic and deceptive, and can hardly be trusted or depended on. Pragmatism and deceptive nature are the main characteristics of the Neo-​Tributary System as well, as they have been throughout most of China’s history. It seems that the traditional characteristics of Chinese politics will endure in the future, as previously described as “apparently Confucian, inherently Legalist”. This was how Chinese pragmatism and deception worked in politics. This characteristic will not be limited to domestic politics only. It will be a decisive feature of the Neo-​Tributary System as well. A compact description of Chinese pragmatism and deceptiveness can be best explained through the mighty Yellow River. China will be tender and promising when the conditions require it to do so, the same as the Yellow River does, gently flowing from the sources to the lower plateau. China will follow the conditions, with a low profile, even if it leads in odd directions, just like the Yellow River makes odd turns to the north, east and south. Finally, when there are no obstacles anymore, it will be as it likes, being destructive toward the threats against its interests, or accommodating to the cooperators, just the same as the Yellow River, which floods and destroys everything when it arrives at the Central Plain without any obstacles, but becomes rewarding by watering the fertile lands when it is content with the conditions. And during this whole journey China is expected to remain vague in its actions and rhetoric, just the same as the Yellow River flows in a vague muddy color until it reaches its destination. These are the major factors making the hegemony as well “with Chinese characteristics”. In this vague future of the Neo-​Tributary System, the Confucian principle of “benevolence” and a peaceful interpretation of Tianxia universalism are the dynamics that promise peaceful international relations, first to the periphery and then to the world. However, the authoritarianism, hierarchic values, cultural chauvinism, strong nationalism, the memories of the Century of Humiliation, Chinese pragmatism, Chinese self-​centrism, wuwei “idleness” against the global problems, are all potential threats to peace and stability. Which path will be dominant and whether China is going to make a successful synthesis between these dynamics to become a responsible and respectable power will be seen only when China becomes its real self, without the limitation of any conditions in international relations, the same as the Yellow River frees itself from the dictatorship of its course after arriving at the Central Plain. However, what we have seen so far does not suggest optimism and there are not enough reasons to expect that the Neo-​Tributary System will create a peaceful, respectful, or fair international environment, any more than the “liberal” system has done up to now.

146  Toward a new Tributary System

References Fairbank, J. K. and Teng, S. (1941). On the Ching Tributary System. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 6(2): 135–​246. Gramsci, A. (1971). Selection from The Prison Notebooks (Q. Hoare and G.  N. Smith, Trans.). New York: International Publishers. Ming, X. (2013). “China Threat” or a “Peaceful Rise of China?”, Defense Forum India. Retrieved from https://​defenceforumindia.com/​forum/​threads/​china-​threat-​or-​a-​ peaceful-​rise-​of-​china.46428/​ (accessed 25 September 2018). Morton, A. D. (2003). Social Forces in the Struggle Over Hegemony:  Neo-​Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy. Rethinking Marxism-​ProQuest Central, April 15(2): 153–​179.

Index

Abdication System 12 Abrahamic religions 31–​2, 37, 42, 45, 144 Abrahamic universalism 42 absolute monarchic rule 38 absolute monarchy 39 acculturation process 50 Africa 56, 87–​8, 96, 100, 103, 105, 109, 116–​17, 138–​9, 141 African continent 96, 105 After Hegemony 122 Afterlife 31 Aggressiveness 98 Agricultural Bank of China 105, 122 agricultural economy 50 Albania 109 All Under the Heaven 39 Altars of the Soil and Grain 16 American hegemony 66, 101, 122 Anarchic 34, 67; social orders 34 Anatolia 95 ancient Egyptians 42 ancient Greece 17 angels 31 Angola 105 Anhui 99 Annam 63 Arabic empires 44 Arabic merchants 56 arche 1 Arctic Sea 105 aristocrats 12 Aristotle 17 Armenia 109 Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 105, 122 Asian countries 44, 56 aspiration 21

assimilation 3, 48, 50–​1, 53, 55, 61; policies 51, 61, 70 Athens 4 Australia 105 balance of power 70; strategies 54, 133; system 50 Balkans 104 Ban Gu 49 Bandung conference 87, 96, 115 Bangladesh 103–​4, 109 Bank of China 105, 122 barbarian control office 57 barbarians 14–​16, 24–​6, 41, 43–​51, 53–​5, 58–​9, 60–​1, 64, 68, 70, 81–​2, 84, 88, 123, 130, 135, 137; cooked 47 battle of Baideng 48 Beijing 81, 96, 104, 106, 112, 115 Belarus 109 Belgrade 84 Belt and Road Forum 122 Belt and Road Initiative 79, 95 benevolence 11, 20–​1, 24–​5, 27–​8, 33, 36–​8, 50, 84, 132, 135–​6, 145 Bhattacharya 91, 92 Bhutan 109 Bianliang 54 Big Four 105, 122 binding and cohering 142 Black Sea 104 Blaut, J. 70 Bosnia and Herzegovina 109 Bosnian war 84 BR countries 97, 102, 125, 133–​4, 138, 143 Bribery 107, 110, 116 BRICS countries 105 British people 47

148 Index brotherly states 48 Brunei 60 Brzezinski, Z. 119 Buddhism 17, 30–​1, 37, 44, 94–​5 Bull, H. 68 bureaucratic: administration 52; autocracy 17; class 16, 22, 38; empires 70; management 17; religion 31; selection 31; strategy 102; uprisings 17 butterfly 34 Cakravartin 58 Callahan 4, 90, 93 Cambodia 109 Cambodian king 60 capitalist economy 83, 123, 126, 131 Caspian Sea 104 CCP 36, 85–​7, 89, 92–​4, 120, 125, 136–​7 celestial empire 70, 119–​120 Centaur 3 Central Asia 48, 57–​8, 64, 87, 101–​4, 109, 138 central propaganda department 91 Century of Humiliation 3, 45, 64, 79–​85 Ceylon 44, 63 Champa 69, 138 Chang’an 95 chaos 17, 19–​21, 24, 29, 59, 80 chauvinism 90, 146; cultural 45, 143 Chen, D. 83 Chiang, K.S. 91 China: Club 116; Construction Bank 105, 122; Development Bank 105, 122; Dream 94, 98, 119, 122, 137; Threat 144; Central Asia-​West Asia Economic Corridor 103–​4, Europe railway 104; Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor 103–​4; Mongolia-​Russia Economic Corridor 103–​4; Myanmar-​Bangladesh-​India Economic Corridor 103–​4; North Korean relations 111; Pakistan Economic Corridor 103–​4 China’s modernization 80–​1 Chinese: authorities 4, 47, 112, 115, 140; borders 41, 50–​51; characteristics 37, 62, 70–​1, 80, 120, 125, 131, 137, 142, 145; civilization 10–​12, 14–​15, 17–​18, 21, 25, 41,

43, 47–​8, 51, 53–​4, 83, 91, 136; Communist Party 85–​6; Communists 86; cosmology 38; foreign policy 79, 87, 94, 111, 115–​16, 124–​5, 132, 135, 137, 143; cultural superiority 26, 48, 91; debts 109; dynasties 26, 44, 54, 69–​70, economy 94, 98–​9, 108, 125; elite 58, 82–​3, 119; embassy 84; expansionism 43; Folk Religion 10, 13–​14, 18–​19, 31, 43; foreign affairs 84, 89–​90, 137; government 4, 82, 84–​5, 92–​3, 95, 97–​102, 105–​6, 113, 118–​19; history 12–​13, 15, 17, 26, 30, 44, 62, 71, 80, 91, 93, 113, 130–​1; identity 11, 14, 18, 23, 37, 82, 91; imperial era 11; kings 14; emperor 43–​4, 48–​9, 53, 59–​61, 65–​9, 81, 134, 137, 139; language 1, 3–​4, 52, 92, 102, 114; Minister of Foreign Affairs 104; nationalism 45, 90–​2, 134–​6; painting 95; party-​ government 108; philosophers 17; philosophy 18; political philosophy 10–​12, 18, 32; political tradition 10–​11, 13–​14, 26; pragmatism 89, 125, 136–​7, 145; public opinion 92, 98, 102, 108; revolutionaries 90; rhetoric 42, 112–​13, 115, 132, 144; Salvationism 43; scholars 31, 40, 44–​5, 84, 116; scripts 10–​11, 47, 50, 53, 66, 135; society 4, 7, 11, 13, 29–​30, 32, 34, 36, 38–​9, 45, 65, 85, 89, 92–​4, 108, 123, 131, 136–​7, 140, 144–​5; soldiers 51; state hierarchy 53; State-​Owned Enterprises 106; style hegemony 130; Universalism 15, 41, 43, 45; values 50, 57, 63, 71, 131, 144; world order 39, 45, 47–​48, 53, 59, 67–​8 Chineseness 24, 80, 134–​6, 143 Chongqing 99 Christianity 31, 37, 95, 135 city-​states 4 civic advancements 42 Civil Servant Exam 44, 51 civil war 50, 80, 86, 123, 124 civilization-​state 91 civilized lifestyle 14 Civilized-​Barbarian 15, 46, 51; division 51 Civilizing Mission 16, 24 coercion policy 49 Cold War era 2

Index  149 Collectivist 39, 45, 93–​4, 131 colonial countries 87 Colonial Divisions 83 Colonialism 70, 87, 115, 142 Colonialization 51 Columbus 56 common law 110 communal help 37 communist: international 87; party 67, 118; states 2; World 86 The Community of Common Destiny 97, 120–1​, 141–​2 community: of Common Destiny 95, 97, 120–​1, 125, 139, 141–​2; of Shared Interests 97; of Shared Responsibility 97 complex interdependency 139 Comte 5 Confucian: classics 26; codes of conducts 53; era 48, 50; international system 44; peacefulness 51; State 67–​8, 71, 130; world 24, 52 Confucianism 17–​19, 21–​3, 26, 29–​37, 39, 43–​5, 60, 63–​5, 68–​9, 83, 93–​5, 132, 140, 143 Confucius 11, 16–​17, 19–​28, 30–​2, 34, 40, 42, 63, 82, 93, 102; Analects of 30 conquest policies 55, 62 consent 2–​4, 13, 27, 38, 44, 62, 64–​6, 111, 115–​17, 119, 121, 123, 125, 132–​4, 140, 143 conservatism 5 Contention of a Hundred Schools of Thought 17 controlling barbarians through barbarians 49 corruption 19, 86, 107, 110 corvee labor 47 cosmology 45; of Taoism 30 cosmopolitanism 41, 86, 90 cosmos 11, 32, 40, 53 counter movements 3 Cox, R. 2, 6 Critical theory 6 Crossley, P.K. 58 cultural: chauvinism 46, 143, 145; heroes 10, 13; identity 10, 24; proud 52; Revolution 88–​9, 91, 93; superiority 15, 26, 38, 53, 55, 82, 90–​1 culturalism 56

currency stability system 97 Czechoslovakia 2, 88 Dalai Lama 85 dao 16, 32–​5, 43 Debt Trap 106–​8, 116–​17 Democracy 33, 39, 84, 90, 120, 136 Deng, X. 87–​9, 94, 98, 101, 111, 113, 116, 120–​1, 124–​5, 137 Diamond, J. 43 Diltley, W. 6 diverging dynamics 132, 139, 143 divine rights 21 Djibouti 105–​6, 109, 114, 117 domestic legitimacy 65, 67, 100, 118–​19, 137, 143 domination 1–​2, 4, 70 Duke of Zhou 14 Dutch colonials 62 East Asian International Society 68 Eastern Zhou 14, 16–​17; Dynasty 15–​16, 18 Economy, E. 121 ecumenical claim 41 Egypt 109, 118 Eight Banner System 57 Elliott, M. 58 England 57, 81 English School 68 Enlightenment Era 5 ethical justice 10 Ethiopia 105, 109, 120 Etiquette 14–​15 European Union 122 Export-​Import Bank of China 105, 122 facilitating connectivity 96 Fairbank, J.K. 41, 52, 55, 58–​9, 62, 70 fateful coincidence 10 feudal kingdoms 29 filial piety 22 Five Fundamental Relationships 22 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 87, 96 formal equality 139–​140, 143 Four Books and Five Classics 26, 30–​1 fraternal invasion 2 Frankfurt School 2 Frankopan, P. 95 French Revolution 38

150 Index Ge, Z. 24, 50–​1, 70 geographic isolation 39 Geographical determinism 42 Globalization 70, 138, 142 Gramsci 5, 142 Gramscian 2, 6, 111, 119, 134; neo​ 2, 4, 62, 64, 66–​7, 110, 114–​15, 119, 125 Grand Strategy 94, 119 Great Depression 112–​13 The Great Learning 30 Great Unity 17, 19, 36 Great Wall 43, 59 Guns, Gems and Steel 43 Guomindang 83, 86 Gwadar Port 104 Hambantota Port 106 Han: dynasty 22, 28, 30, 34, 36, 48, 49, 55, 64, 95; Emperor Gaozu 48; ethnicity 55, 134; nationalism 90; people 14, 41, 43, 47; Xiongnu conflict 53 Hanfeizi 17, 30, 35–​6 Harmonious kinship strategy 49 Harmony 21, 25, 31–​2, 35, 51, 96, 131 Heaven and Earth 23 heavenly principle 30 hegemonic: educational institutions 3; rule 2, 4, 28, 122; system 3, 7, 62, 66–​7, 71–​2, 111–​13, 115–​16, 119, 122–​3, 125–​6, 130, 132, 134, 137–​8, 140–​3; tools 3 Héqīn/​Heqin 49, 124; Hermeneutics 5–​6 hide your strength, wait your time 89, 112, 116 hierarchical order 23, 93 Himalayas 43 Hinduism 32 Historical Bloc 142 historical boundaries 6 historicism 5–​6, 9 Ho, P. T. 51 Hu, J. 102, 114 Hua-​Yi Distinction 15, 18, 39–​40, 46–​7, 50–​1, 53, 61, 70 Huaxia people 14–​15, 24 human rights 38–​9, 80, 84, 107, 113, 118, 136, 141 humane feelings 22 Humiliation of Jingkang 54

Hundred Schools of Thought 17, 35 Ice Silk Road 103, 105 ideal ruler 11, 16, 20–​1, 24, 34 ideographic writing system 52 IMF (The International Monetary Fund) 66, 109, 122–​3 Imperial: China 9, 19, 32, 39–​41, 43, 44, 50, 62–​4, 66, 69, 71, 94, 135–​8, 140, 142; examination 22 inactiveness 32 Indian Ocean 100, 103–​4, 106 individual rights 91 individualism 35, 84, 144 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 105, 122 Industrial Revolution 38 inequality gap 99 information security 110 infrastructure projects 79, 95–​6, 99, 107–​10, 114, 117 Inner Asian Zone 58, 63–​6, 69, 88 Inner Mongolia 99, 101, 104 International: community 87, 89, 98, 121, 126, 130, 140; corporations 3, 122; infrastructure projects 79; institutions 2–​3, 66, 68, 105, 121–​2, 126, 133, 141; legitimacy 117–​19; Monetary Fund 122; non-​ Governmental Organizations 3; order 39, 68, 92, 118, 121; organizations 3, 106; politics 91, 138; society 68; strategy 79, 98, 101; system 3, 39, 44, 70, 113, 116, 125–​6, 134, 140 introvert 55, 62, 139, 141, 143 Islam 31, 37, 41, 44, 95 Islamic civilization 42 Jacques, M. 91 Japanese invasion 85–​6, 119, 123 Judaism 32 Jung and Ti 25 Junzi 20–​1, 31 Jurchen 30, 54 Just War 37 Kang, Y. 82 Kangxi 60 Kashgar 104 Kazakhstan 95, 101, 103–​4, 142 Keohane 121 Khaldun, I. 42 Khitan 54, 68

Index  151 Khrushchev 88 King George III 81 King Road 15–​16, 18 King Wen 13, 16, 20; Wen’s Transforming Influence 16; Wen’s Way 16; Wu of Zhou 12–​13, 43; Zhao 15–​16 kingly: governance 29; Way 16, 20, 24, 28, 31, 34 Kissinger 50 Korean war 87–​8, 138 kow-​tow 53 Koxinga 62 Laozi 11, 16–​17, 32–​4 Later Jin Dynasty 30, 54 Lattimore 42 “lean to one side” strategy 86, 111 learn from barbarians to defeat them 82 Legalism 17, 19, 35–​7, 94 legitimacy and prestige 67, 125, 137, 143 liberalism 66, 83 Long March 86 loose reigns 49 Louyang 15 Low Profile Strategy 89, 94, 98, 101, 111, 125 Macartney, Lord 81 Machiavelli 3, 36, 137 Malacca Strait 100, 104–​5 Malacca Trap 100 Mancall, M. 70 Manchu: identity 58; Qing 15, 50, 55, 57–​8, 63, 81–​2, 135; centric system 58; Manchuria 58 Mandarin 22 Mandate of Heaven 13–​14, 18, 21, 23, 27, 31, 41, 47, 55, 59 Manichaeism 44 Mao, Z. 80, 83, 86 Maoism 86, 92, 116, 120, 131 The Maritime Silk Road 95, 103 Marriage alliances 48, 124 Marshall Plan 2, 112–​13, 115–​16 Marxism 66, 86, 91, 97 Marxist ideology 93 massacre 57, 89, 90; Tiananmen 93 May Fourth Movement 83 Meiji Restoration 124 Meissner 82, 91 melioristic 20

Mencius 17, 26–​8, 30 meritocratic bureaucracy 22 Middle Kingdom 15, 18, 34, 41, 57, 119–​20, 130 middle way 31 middle-​income trap 94, 99 military colonies 49 Ming Dynasty 55–​6, 63 Ming Tributary System 57 Ministry of Board of Rites 57 Ministry of Conquests 84 Ministry of Rituals 84 Mohism 19, 36–​7 money worshipping society 93 Mongolian Yuan Dynasty 44 Mongolians 51–​5, 58, 61, 111 moral crisis 93 moral risks 108, 110 moral transformation 16 morality-​based society 16 Mozi 17, 36–​7 nation-​state 3, 91, 134, 136 Nationalism 45, 79, 83, 90–​2, 124, 134–​6, 143, 145 Nationalist Party 83 NATO 87, 122 natural: borders 43, 71; calamities 12, 137; sciences 5 Neo-​Confucianists 31 Neo-​Gramscian 2–​4, 6, 62, 64, 66–​7, 110–​11, 114, 119, 125, 134; concept of hegemony 66 Neo-​Tributary System 130, 132–​4 New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor 103 The New Silk Road 95, 99 New Qing 58, 63; historians 63; scholars 58 non-​action 34, 36 non-​Alignment Camp 87 non-​Confucian societies 46, 61, 70 non-​egalitarian 52, 58 non-​interference 33, 38, 49, 69–​70, 85, 87, 96, 114–​15, 120–​1, 137–​8, 140 Northern Song Dynasty 54 Northern Wei 47, 135 Nye, J. 102, 114 One Belt One Road Initiative 95 Opium War 9, 49, 64, 68, 80–​2, 84, 90, 98, 123, 140 Oracle Bones Scripts 10

152 Index Outer Zone 60, 62, 64, 66, 70, 133, 138–​9 overseas expeditions 62 Paris Club 100 Patriotism 91, 136 Peaceful China 144 peaceful coexistence 26, 87, 96, 115 peaceful stakeholder 131 people-​to-​people bond 92, 102 People’s Liberation Army 85–​6 Peoples Republic of China 64 perception of superiority 15, 53, 55, 60, 81–​2, 90, 124 Perdue, P. 70 Persian Gulf 103 persisting dynamics 130, 137 Pillsbury, M. 101, 111, 113, 123 policy coordination 96 post-Mao economy 98 power transition 12–​13, 137 pragmatism 86, 89, 124–​5, 136–​7, 143, 145 primitive religion 10, 45, 143–​4 propriety 21, 31 public goods 65–​7, 115, 125, 133, 143 Punitive Expeditions 49, 63 Qianglong 57 Qin Dynasty 29–​30, 35–​6, 43 Qin, S.H. 29–​30, 36, 47 Qufu 20, 26 raw barbarians 47 Rawski, E. 50, 58 Records of the Grand Historian 11, 32 Red Emperor 11, 120, 136 Reform and Opening Up 89, 94 Reform Era 98, 111, 120 Rejuvenation 79, 92–​4, 98 religion of good citizens 31 religious authority 14, 41 religious dogmas 18 Renaissance 38, 92–​3 Republic of China 9, 64, 80, 82–​3, 105 revolutionary tradition 39 rites 21, 28–​31, 46–​7, 53, 57, 59, 61 Rule of Law 29, 118 rule of punishment 20 Ryukyu 46, 52, 58, 60 Sage Kings 11–​12, 19, 29, 34 The Second World War 112, 123, 125, 135

security risks 100 sedentary culture 42 self-​isolation 57 semi deity 11–​12, 14, 31, 41 semi-​capitalist economy 123, 126, 131 Shamans 13 Shambaugh, D. 117 Shang Dynasty 10, 12–​13, 41–​2 Shang, Y. 17, 35–​6 Shangdi 13, 20, 41 Sharp Power 102, 117 Shiji 19, 47–​8 Siamese King 60 Silk Road 44, 60, 64, 67, 95–​7, 99–​100, 103–​5 Silk Road Fund 105 Sima Qian 11, 19, 32, 47–​8 Sinic States 65, 71 Sinic Zone 58, 60, 62–​6, 68, 70–​1, 84, 87–​8, 132–​3, 138, 142 sinocentric: mentality 45; empire 70; order 59, 90; pride 90, 124, 130, 134, 143; Tributary System 58, 90 Sinocentrism 42, 44, 70 Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 120 Socrates 17 Soft Power 65–​6, 71, 102, 112, 114–​15, 117, 125, 133, 139–​40, 143 Son of Heaven 14–​15, 18, 23–​4, 31, 34–​5, 39, 49, 53, 58, 67 South China Sea islands 92, 100, 102 Southern Song Dynasty 54 Soviet: bloc 93; invasion 2; model 83; supremacy 2; threat 112; Union 87, 89, 100, 124 Splendid Xia 14 Spring and Autumn Era 16–​19, 44 Sri Lanka 106, 108, 109, 114, 116 State Council 105 steppe cultures 44 Suez Canal 100, 105 Sui Dynasty 22 Sun, Y.S. 83, 90, 131 Taiwan 62, 70, 85–​7, 89, 92, 102, 119, 141 Tang Dynasty 22, 26, 30, 44, 50, 53–​4 Tao Te Ching 32 Taoism 32–​5, 37, 46, 94, 95, 136, 143 Tarim Basin 24 Terrorism 110 Three People’s Principles 83 Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors 11

Index  153 Three Worlds Theory 87 Tianxia 24, 36, 39–​42, 44–​7, 51, 53, 59, 61, 67, 70, 88, 130, 145; Empire 130; theory 40, 44; universalism 44–​5, 51, 61, 70, 145 Tibet 24, 43, 54, 57, 58, 81, 87–​8, 99, 101, 119, 124, 135 Trans-Siberian Railway 104 Treaty of Nanjing 9 Tributary: Era 111; framework 59 Turkic 44, 48, 59, 61, 81, 124, 135; rule 3 Tze, S. 17 Tzu, L. 32–​3 unimpeded trade 96–​7 Underdeveloped Countries 88, 114, 121, 133 Uyghurs 51, 85, 101 Victimization 84–​5, 91 Vietnam 24, 43, 46, 52, 55, 58, 61, 69, 84, 88, 138

virtue politics 20, 26 virtuous person 20, 38 Water ethics 34–​5 Western Bloc 112–​13 Wuwei 32–​3, 35, 69–​70, 132, 137–​8, 143, 145 Xi, J. 94–​5 Xia Dynasty 10–​12 Xinjiang 70, 87–​8, 99, 101, 103–​4 Xiongnu 48–​50, 53, 68, 111, 124 Yan’an 86–​7 Yellow Emperor 11, 19, 47 Yellow River 10–​12, 14, 24, 41, 43, 71, 145 zero sum game 112–​13, 115 Zhenghe 56–​7, 66 Zisi 26 Zone division 138