Greater Eurasia Partnership and Belt and Road Initiative: The Cooperation or Containment of Atlanticism in the International System 9819930456, 9789819930456

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
1 The Greater Eurasian Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative: Cooperation and Competition in the International System
1.1 The Background and Goals of the Greater Eurasian Partnership: Russia’s Eastward Transformation
1.2 The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Plan for International Cooperation
1.3 The Greater Eurasian Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative: Challenges for Sino–Russian Development Cooperation
1.4 The Impact and Prospects of the Alignment of the Two Initiatives
References
2 China and the Atlantic Countries in the Context of the Belt and Road Initiative
2.1 China–Europe Competition Over the Belt and Road Initiative: Differences and Conflicts
2.2 Sino–US Strategic Games: Challenges and Countermeasures to the Belt and Road Initiative
References
3 Russia and the Atlantic Countries in the Context of the Greater Eurasian Partnership
3.1 European and Russian Sanctions and Countersanctions: The Shattering of Russia’s “European Dream”?
3.2 The Development of US–Russia Relations: Variability, Contingency, and Uncertainty
References
4 China, Russia, the United States, and Europe in International Organizations: Quadrilateral Relations
4.1 Political, Economic, and Military Relations Between the United States and Europe
4.2 The Quadrilateral Relationship Under the Ideologies of Atlanticism and Neo-Eurasianism
4.2.1 The Historical Development of Neo-Eurasianism
4.2.2 Challenges in the Quadrilateral Relationship Between China, Russia, the European Union, and the United States
References
5 Differing Values and Perceptions of International Leaders
5.1 Vladimir Putin: An Intelligent Leader with a Soviet Complex
5.2 Xi Jinping: A Farsighted Leader with Unique Courage
5.3 Joseph R. Biden: A Career Politician with Fluctuating Opinions
5.4 Angela Merkel: A Unifying Leader of the EU
5.5 Who Leads Matters: Explaining Foreign Policy Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders
References
Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

Greater Eurasia Partnership and Belt and Road Initiative The Cooperation or Containment of Atlanticism in the International System e dm u n d l i sh e ng

Greater Eurasia Partnership and Belt and Road Initiative

Edmund Li Sheng

Greater Eurasia Partnership and Belt and Road Initiative The Cooperation or Containment of Atlanticism in the International System

Edmund Li Sheng School of Political Science and Public Administration Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Research Institute Shandong University Tsingtao, China

ISBN 978-981-99-3045-6 ISBN 978-981-99-3046-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3046-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Dedication for my beloved wife Elizabeth Yanming Tsui who always backs me up and whom I trust whole heartedly

Preface

Russian foreign policy after the Second World War has been challenged by the competing interests of Atlanticism and Eurasianism. The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into countries bordering Russia is considered to be one of the major reasons why Russia has shifted its focus from integration into a Greater Europe and Russia–US relations to the development of pan-Eurasian partnerships. The term “Eurasia” refers in this book to the countries that are members of or have joined the Commonwealth of Independent States. Its main geographical areas are East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Asia–Europe border, Russia, the five Central Asian countries, three countries in the South Caucasus, and Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova in Eastern Europe. These regions are closely linked to the Greater Eurasian Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative. Eurasia is bordered to the east, west, north, and south by the Arctic, Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Since the end of the Cold War, the Eurasian order has undergone major restructuring. First, the region has moved rapidly from the deconstruction of alliances to regional cooperation. The disintegration of the Soviet Union was followed by the establishment of several quite fragile regional cooperation organizations in the Eurasian inland. After the end of the Cold War, neither the United States nor EU member states changed their Cold War confrontational thinking. They squeezed Russia’s strategic space by the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union, which have absorbed countries that had been within the Soviet Union’s sphere of control. Russia was

vii

viii

PREFACE

therefore led to change its strategic approach, as seen in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union and, after China proposed the Belt and Road initiative, its proposal for a Greater Eurasian Partnership. On the global geopolitical map, Eurasia is a region of considerable complexity and importance. In modern international relations, the Eurasian region has become an arena in which various geopolitical ideas and actors collide, from the Cold War thinking of the United States to the multipolar thinking and notion of a “community with a shared future” promoted by China. Eurasia’s geopolitical situation is closely intertwined with that of the great powers. The game played in the Eurasian region between the great powers has generated two diametrically opposed development trends in the region: integration and fragmentation. Integration is embodied by the successive establishment of regional organizations, such as the European Union, NATO, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Meanwhile, fragmentation results from the forceful intervention of the major powers when they regard the strategic orientation of individual countries as a threat to their own interests. The Russia–Ukraine crisis that erupted in 2021 has shaken the post-Second World War international order and has had a particularly profound impact on the world’s geopolitical landscape. In addition to being a regional conflict, this is also a continuation of the East–West confrontation that was prevalent during the Cold War. The conflict in Ukraine shows that the end of the Cold War did not free Eurasia from the cloud of war. The reorganization of the world order through war might be the normal state of history, but it does not meet the needs of human society in the contemporary world, and it disrupts the process of reorganizing the Eurasian order by the peaceful means of economic and market integration. The conflict has not only accelerated the evolution of the world’s geopolitical landscape but also pushed Europe toward re-atlanticization. Through the lens of the Greater Eurasian Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative, this book explores the cooperation and competition between Eurasianism and Atlanticism in the international system. Alignment of the development strategies of the Russian Federation and China plays a crucial role in the establishment of a Eurasian Economic Union. The primary focus of this book is on the feasibility and uncertainty of cooperation between Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as Russia’s Neo-Eurasionist eastward shift. The book also explores Eurasia in the context of Russia–China

PREFACE

ix

cooperation and describes the relationship between Europe and China in terms of both cooperation and conflict. Further, as China’s Eurasian integration strategy demonstrated in the Belt and Road Initiative offers a new alternative to the long-standing dominance of Atlanticism in Europe, the book also provides an overview of the prospects of the Belt and Road Initiative and of Eurasian political and economic integration, as well as the many difficulties and challenges that are expected to be encountered in implementing the strategy. Additionally, the interactions between Russia, the European Union, the United States, and China as four of the most influential players in international politics and economics have significant effects on the political and economic security situations in the world today. A discussion of the prospects for developing quadrilateral strategic ties between China, Russia, the United States, and Europe is therefore presented in chapter four along with observations on the differences between these parties regarding regional and international cooperation, such as the positions of Atlanticism and Neo-Eurasianism and support for United Nations mechanisms. Finally, the book examines the personalities and characteristics of key leaders from these four major powers: Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, US President Joseph R. Biden, and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The impact of the personalities and personal experiences of these leaders on their various bilateral relations is discussed from a neoclassical realist perspective. As the Ukraine crisis continues to simmer, it is necessary to call on countries in the Eurasian region, especially Russia, China, India, and other emerging economies, to reshape and rebuild partnerships in the region. The relatively large security threats in the Eurasian continent mean that the focus of building global partnerships should first be on the construction of partnerships in the Eurasian region. Tsingtao, China

Edmund Li Sheng

Contents

1

2

The Greater Eurasian Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative: Cooperation and Competition in the International System 1.1 The Background and Goals of the Greater Eurasian Partnership: Russia’s Eastward Transformation 1.2 The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Plan for International Cooperation 1.3 The Greater Eurasian Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative: Challenges for Sino–Russian Development Cooperation 1.4 The Impact and Prospects of the Alignment of the Two Initiatives References China and the Atlantic Countries in the Context of the Belt and Road Initiative 2.1 China–Europe Competition Over the Belt and Road Initiative: Differences and Conflicts 2.2 Sino–US Strategic Games: Challenges and Countermeasures to the Belt and Road Initiative References

1 1 7

15 26 36 43 43

51 63

xi

xii

3

4

5

CONTENTS

Russia and the Atlantic Countries in the Context of the Greater Eurasian Partnership 3.1 European and Russian Sanctions and Countersanctions: The Shattering of Russia’s “European Dream”? 3.2 The Development of US–Russia Relations: Variability, Contingency, and Uncertainty References China, Russia, the United States, and Europe in International Organizations: Quadrilateral Relations 4.1 Political, Economic, and Military Relations Between the United States and Europe 4.2 The Quadrilateral Relationship Under the Ideologies of Atlanticism and Neo-Eurasianism 4.2.1 The Historical Development of Neo-Eurasianism 4.2.2 Challenges in the Quadrilateral Relationship Between China, Russia, the European Union, and the United States References Differing Values and Perceptions of International Leaders 5.1 Vladimir Putin: An Intelligent Leader with a Soviet Complex 5.2 Xi Jinping: A Farsighted Leader with Unique Courage 5.3 Joseph R. Biden: A Career Politician with Fluctuating Opinions 5.4 Angela Merkel: A Unifying Leader of the EU 5.5 Who Leads Matters: Explaining Foreign Policy Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders References

67

67 74 79 81 81 84 84

86 93 97 97 101 105 112 117 122

Conclusion

127

Index

129

CHAPTER 1

The Greater Eurasian Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative: Cooperation and Competition in the International System

1.1 The Background and Goals of the Greater Eurasian Partnership: Russia’s Eastward Transformation The great continent of Eurasia stretches from East Asia to Western Europe and spans over one-third of the planet. It is the world’s most populous region, home to over two-thirds of the global population. Eurasia has tremendous natural resources, from oil and gas to fresh water and fertile lands. Russia once dominated the region because of its central position, and if geography is destiny, then Russia is fated to be the world’s great Eurasian power. Russia is the largest country in the world, stretching across a vast swath of land from the Pacific to the Arctic Ocean, and two-thirds of its territory is in Asia and one-third in Europe. This continent-sized nation is endowed with rich natural resources, a worldleading nuclear arsenal, and one of the strongest armed forces of any nation, giving the Russian state authority and geopolitical muscle and providing it with the opportunity to play a more important and influential global role than the size of its economy might imply. The Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) emerged as an extended and upgraded version of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The EAEU first emerged as a customs union in 2011 and then as an economic union © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. L. Sheng, Greater Eurasia Partnership and Belt and Road Initiative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3046-3_1

1

2

E. L. SHENG

in 2015, and includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan alongside Russia. The primary objective of the EAEU is to create a single market for goods, services, capital, and labor as a first step toward deeper integration of the post-Soviet space. The idea of Greater Eurasia was first manifested in 2015 when China and Russia signed the Joint Statement on Cooperation on the Construction of the Joint Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Projects, in which both sides expressed their intention to open a common economic space in the Eurasian region on the platform of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).1 At the end of 2015, during his annual state of the nation address, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin further developed the Eurasian common economic space into an economic partnership consisting of the member states of the EAEU, SCO, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations, marking a further step in the formation of the GEP initiative. In May 2016, at the Russia–ASEAN Summit, President Putin again stated that collaboration between the EAEU, ASEAN, SCO, and China’s BRI would provide the most promising direction for regional economic integration, and he called for the establishment of a broad transnational partnership on this basis.2 In June 2016, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Putin explicitly proposed building a GEP that would include the member states of the EEU, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, China, India, Pakistan, and Iran.3 In November of the same year, the Greater Eurasia strategy was written into The Foreign Policy Concept of The Russian Federation, marking it as the priority of Russia’s foreign policy.4 At the 2019 Belt and Road Initiative meeting, President Putin stated that “the PRC president’s Belt and Road initiative echoes the Russian idea of creating a ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership,’ which would involve an ‘integration of integrations’ or ‘a close linking of various ongoing bilateral and multilateral integration processes in Eurasia.’”5 As these events have unfolded, the concept of Greater Eurasia has gradually replaced that of Greater Europe in Russia’s official documents, which represents an essential step in Russia’s gradual transformation since the collapse of the Soviet 1 Hong Kong Trade Development Council (2015). 2 ASEAN–Russia Summit (2016). 3 President of Russia (2016b). 4 President of Russia (2016a). 5 President of Russia (2019).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

3

Union and reflects a shift in Russia’s diplomatic focus from the West to the East.6 The extension of the new partnership’s geographic scope to a greater Eurasian region beyond the post-Soviet space reflects the Russian objective to bring economic prosperity to the region. The launch of the GEP is also intended to create the impression that Russia is still the leading force in the region’s integration process. The GEP has become synonymous with Russia’s turn to the East. The EAEU and GEP are intended to move Russia’s foreign policy away from its traditional Western-centrism and toward a much closer engagement with Asia. Both of these initiatives challenge the primacy of a liberal world order and both are centered on the Sino–Russian partnership. This is a shift from Russia’s historical vision of its foreign policy, which has always held Europe as its priority diplomatic concern and been guided by the ultimate strategic goal of achieving integration into Europe. When the bipolar global system centered on the Soviet Union and the United States that prevailed after the Second World War collapsed immediately after the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s initial foreign policy orientation leaned greatly toward the West in the expectation of major support for Russia’s economic transformation. Prominent Moscow reformers viewed Western liberal democracy as a worthy economic model for reform and a source of financial support.7 After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow’s principal foreign policy objective was to join the West as an integral player in a Greater Europe and a major ally of the United States. Russian leaders achieved accession to the Council of Europe (1996), the G7 (1997), and the World Trade Organization (2012). They sought membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and even considered joining the European Union. Essentially, Moscow was seeking higher status within the West that would allow its full participation in all decision-making alongside Washington. However, this aspiration has not become a reality. Russia was offered partnership but no special privileges and no role in Western decision-making. Integration into a Euro-Atlantic entity as a subordinate element is not acceptable to Russia. Although the concept of Greater Europe geographically encompasses all of the countries in Europe and some of the countries in northern Eurasia, including

6 Krickovic and Pellicciari (2021). 7 Desai (2006).

4

E. L. SHENG

Russia,8 it contains an inherent cultural conflict in that Western Europe does not consider Russia as a purely European civilization, and Russia acknowledges this divergence.9 In the view of Western European politicians, Greater Europe is an ambitious project of integrating the former Soviet Union region with European civilization at its core to attract and induce Russia to discard the legacy of the Soviet Union and gain independent sovereignty.10 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian elites initially believed that they would receive help from the West through the plan for a Greater Europe, including increased international influence and access to technology and support in the financial system.11 However, despite struggles and compromises, Russia never received the expected assistance and support. The Russo–Georgian War in 2008 finally clarified that further pursuit of Greater Europe would run counter to Russia’s national interests.12 The aftermath of this war demonstrated that the seemingly irreconcilable conflicts and continued confrontation between Russia on one side and the United States and Europe on the other ultimately makes cooperation impossible. Russia, the United States, and Europe have all abandoned the illusion of a Greater Europe, and NATO has accordingly re-established Russia as a potential threat.13 Following its rupture with the West in 2014 as a result of the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s position in the international system has changed dramatically. These changes in the internal and external environment led President Putin to propose the GEP initiative to replace the original strategy of Greater Europe and European integration, reflecting a major adjustment to Russia’s diplomatic strategy and a geopolitical pivot to Asia. The implementation of the GEP from Lisbon to Vladivostok has the potential to contribute to the peaceful development of this strategically important yet underdeveloped region. The GEP is intended to connect Europe to Asia and to link integration initiatives in Eurasia with key economies in East and South Asia, including China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN states. It is no secret that the economic and 8 Tsvyk (2018). 9 Liotta (2005). 10 Krickovic and Pellicciari (2021). 11 Sakwa (2016). 12 Larsen (2012). 13 Sokolsky (2017).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

5

political center of gravity in the world order is shifting from the West to Asia. As the Indo-Pacific region becomes the global hub of economic growth, cooperation and harmonization of the economic projects of the European Union, EEU, BRI, India, and ASEAN will bring socioeconomic and political benefits to all of the states on the greater Eurasian continent even if geopolitical disruptions result. Russia’s turn to the East has inevitably affected its geopolitical game with the United States and Europe and on the overall international political and economic development trends. For Russia, turning eastward means greater interaction with China, stronger relations with India and ASEAN, and opportunities for cooperation with Japan and South Korea.14 This new policy orientation promises new initiatives in three key directions: more economic development in Russia’s Far Eastern regions, revived ties with former Soviet republics through Eurasian integration, and the forging of closer political alignments with China and other East Asian countries. On its periphery, Greater Eurasia is characterized by a network of sea trade routes, which are likely to become the most profitable for transporting goods produced in Asia in the long run because of travel time reductions. Meanwhile, strengthening the inland production base in the continent center will lead to gradual saturation and land corridors. The Greater Eurasia project is related to the development of two international transport and logistics corridors: from east to west (the Russian TransSiberian railway) and from north to south. The main proponents of this project are considered to be India and Iran. China is responsible for the Silk Road Economic Belt, which is a project within the BRI framework to create a land route connecting China with Europe. Under these circumstances, Russia has an opportunity to make rational use of its resource potential because the size of its territory allows for the optimization of logistics and infrastructure inside Russia, and Russia can potentially transform it into the most extensive global transportation hub. From the geopolitical and geo-economical point of view, the economically powerful China, militarily powerful Russia, hugely populous India, and a large group of significant medium-sized countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Korea can feel more powerful together in a GEP. The uniqueness of cooperation within the Eurasian space is that the international environment that is being formed there excludes the possibility

14 E. L. Sheng (2022a).

6

E. L. SHENG

and necessity of the emergence of an undisputed hegemon. This can be beneficial for the mega-regional international community emerging in Eurasia in terms of democracy and sustainability. The main engines and poles of the integration of the huge Eurasian area are the EAEU and China. On the Russian interpretation, Greater Eurasian cooperation can lead to the formation of a vast space of overlapping interests in the international economy and international politics. Mega-regional trade associations can set new standards for trade and thereby influence the development of the rules of world economic processes, which is vital for Russia. On the somewhat more abstract Chinese interpretation, Greater Eurasian cooperation can construct a “community of common destiny”: an international community based on shared values and existing within the wider international society. Greater Eurasia is a regional, extra-regional, and global project: it is regional in that it is a vehicle for promoting Russian interests and influence throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union; it is extraregional in that it looks beyond these boundaries toward the Asia–Pacific, South Asia, and Europe; and it is global in that it envisages a recasting of the world order from one dominated by the United States to one in which Russia is a pivotal player, as a Greater Eurasia–centered world would turn on the Russian axis. Sergei Karaganov, chairman of Russia’s Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and the key architect of the GEP initiative, asserts that the Greater Eurasia strategy intends to transform Eurasia into a new economic, political, and cultural center of the world, replacing the West.15 Its anticipated participants include countries in East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Eurasia, and even some on the European continent, with the ultimate goal of establishing a new geostrategic community in the form of a Eurasian space of joint development, cooperation, peace, and security. Given its inherently geopolitical nature and the threat presented by a rising China, the Greater Eurasia strategy most importantly aims to integrate China into relations, cooperation, balance, and agreement, thus preventing it from becoming a potential hegemon.16 However, President Putin has stated that Greater Eurasia is not an abstract geopolitical blueprint but has specific economic content, including promoting Eurasian trade and the efficient flow of

15 Starr (2020). 16 Karaganov (2018b).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

7

goods and constructing mutual means for accessing services and capital markets. As indicated by Alexander Lukin, Russia can only integrate into the Asia–Pacific region’s political, economic, and cultural life through its own map of Asia.17 The plan is to transform Russia into a more essential and independent builder of and participant in the Eurasian space, strengthening its cooperation with the East and the West. Therefore, Russia’s GEP initiative is not simply a policy shift from East to West but a strategic upgrade that necessitates the search for new partnerships in the wake of its changing foreign policy objectives.

1.2

The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Plan for International Cooperation

The concept of the New Silk Road was inspired by the ancient Silk Road, a trade network linking East and West Eurasia. The New Silk Road, presented for the first time by China’s President Xi Jinping in the autumn of 2013, provides for the construction of infrastructural connections between China and Europe, mainly in China’s neighborhood. The New Silk Road has two main parts: the Silk Road Economic Belt stretching from China to Western Europe and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road extending from China through the Indian Ocean toward the Mediterranean Sea. Emerging from the New Silk Road proposals, the BRI includes transit countries and regions on the way from China to Europe: Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the South Caucasus, Turkey, and the Middle East. More than 60 states have announced their participation in the project. The BRI is generally perceived as a cross-border infrastructure development project. The five main links promoted by the BRI—policy coordination, infrastructure construction, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people exchanges—serve the ultimate objective of building a “community of shared destiny for mankind,” a phrase that carries a clear revisionist subtext. The BRI’s main appeal is the amount of money Beijing is willing to inject into various projects. China presents the BRI as inclusive, and the majority of China’s closest neighbors have enthusiastically joined the initiative. The BRI aims to facilitate China’s economic expansion and to maintain the openness of external markets to Chinese

17 Lukin and Yakunin (2018).

8

E. L. SHENG

trade and investments. It also aims to pursue win–win outcomes and promote regional economic development by strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries and regions along the route in infrastructure development, production capacity, and trade facilitation, thus creating development opportunities and conditions for China and its partner countries. The basic principle of cooperation is to produce mutual benefit, joint development, and prosperity by implementing projects with the approach of negotiating, building together, and sharing. Its ultimate commitment is to build a harmonious and inclusive international society. In short, involvement in the BRI will mean that countries along the route no longer need to develop independently, as they can benefit from the BRI’s new measures to promote economic and social development. It will increase the construction of an economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological civilization, promote the orderly and free flow of economic factors, and facilitate macro-policy coordination between China and other countries along the route. The BRI sits at the center of China’s foreign strategy as it fundamentally aims to create a new global and regional economic framework and a community of world interests that can enhance China’s influence on the global economy, expand the influence of Chinese propaganda, open new space for Chinese economic development, and thus enhance the vitality and creativity of the Chinese economy.18 In addition, the construction of the Belt and Road has implications for China’s national security in reducing the influence of those whom China regards as terrorists, ethnic separatists, and religious extremists. From the perspective of the development of the world economy, the BRI actively integrates the global economy and regional economies, strengthens policy communication between governments and close exchanges between people, aligns with the world economy, synchronizes with regional economic development, and develops in a synergistic manner. The basic starting point is to promote the regional economy and advance balanced and sustainable global development by strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries and regions in infrastructure construction, production capacity cooperation, and trade facilitation. The basic approach to implementing cooperation projects is to discuss, build,

18 Johnston (2019), Ly (2020).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

9

and share together while taking full account of the interests of partners, seeking mutual benefits and win–win outcomes.19 China states in its official documents that it looks forward to relying on the established bilateral and multilateral mechanisms between itself and the countries concerned, using the established regional cooperation platforms in the name of the historical symbols of the ancient Silk Road, actively developing economic partnerships with countries along the route, and jointly building a community of interests, destiny, and responsibility with mutual political trust, economic integration, and cultural tolerance.20 Sheng and do Nascimento argue that the developing countries that make up the BRI corridors will benefit from financial support from China with investments in infrastructure and transportation when China can create shared values and balance its interests with those of its partners.21 China has carried out several foreign investment projects, mainly in the fields of transport infrastructure (railways in Central Asian states, seaports in Southeast Asia) and energy infrastructure (power plants in Pakistan). One reason for this strategy is that China’s domestic market is becoming increasingly saturated, and Chinese companies need new markets to grow. However, domestic inequality in China may also be a factor. As the wealth gap in China continues to widen, there is a risk that the government will face increasing pressure from the country’s wealthy elite to invest abroad and find new markets for their goods and services.22 Over the past few years, most of the loans granted by Chinese state-controlled banks have been allocated to participants in the New Silk Road project. Chinese banks, including the China Development Bank and the Export–Import Bank of China, provide funding for BRI projects, such as infrastructure development, energy projects, and other large-scale initiatives. These banks have also established overseas branches and subsidiaries to facilitate financing and provide banking services for BRI-related projects. As BRI projects often involve significant risks, such as political instability or regulatory uncertainty, Chinese banks provide risk mitigation services, such as project insurance or credit guarantees, to help mitigate the risks faced by Chinese companies investing in BRI

19 Dunford and Liu (2019). 20 Clarke (2017), Huang (2016). 21 Sheng and do Nascimento (2021). 22 Sheng and Gao (2018).

10

E. L. SHENG

projects.23 According to a 2019 Refinitiv report,24 China’s BRI has been one of the main driving forces of global projects. There are plans to build roads, railways, ports, and other infrastructure to connect 126 countries and 29 international organizations in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The report points out that the 2631 completed projects were worth USD 3.7 trillion and the contracted projects involve nearly 2600 enterprises, of which more than 55% are non-Chinese enterprises. Overall, China has carried out 170 transactions related to 163 main projects or independent projects. From 2013 to 2018, the trade volume between China and countries along the BRI exceeded USD 6 trillion, with an average annual growth rate of 4%. In addition, according to the information office of the Chinese government, more than 80 overseas economic and trade cooperation zones have been established, creating more than 244,000 jobs.25 Because of the severe blows of the US–China trade war and the COVID19 epidemic, China has dramatically reduced its BRI-related investments in international infrastructure. Boston University’s database of China’s overseas development finance tracks lending commitments by China’s two major banks: the China Development Bank and Export–Import Bank of China. From 2008 to 2019, China’s overseas development finance was USD 462 billion, which was barely exceeded by that of the World Bank at USD 467 billion.26 However, China’s development lending has varied more over time than the World Banks’ sovereign lending. According to the database, the total loans of the China Development Bank and Export– Import Bank of China reached USD 4 billion in 2019, far lower than the record of USD 75 billion in 2016.27 There are many reasons behind China’s reduction of its BRI investment in infrastructure. Externally, the BRI has been widely criticized by other countries for its various shortcomings, such as placing emerging countries that are short of funds heavily in debt and a lack of transparency and environmental impact research in investment projects.28 The Chinese government will need to carefully manage these factors to ensure that its economy remains competitive and 23 Sheng (2006). 24 Refinitiv (2019). 25 State Council Information Office (2019). 26 Yang et al. (2021), Ray and Simmons (2020). 27 Boston University Global Policy Development Center (2022). 28 Russel and Berger (2019).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

11

sustainable in the long term.29 As the world recovers from the current economic crisis brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic, it remains to be seen how active China’s lending will be in the future. Although the trade war against China launched by former US President Donald Trump has caused much uncertainty and the development of the BRI was halted by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, China is gradually turning its attention to sustainable and inclusive growth, international public health, telecommunications, and digital infrastructure through the Green Silk Road, Healthy Silk Road, and Digital Silk Road initiatives.30 For example, the interconnection project between China and Myanmar and China–Russia cooperation on the Amur gas processing plant were launched successfully in 2020.31 The Sino–US trade war and COVID-19 have further encouraged China to adopt a more cooperative mode in the construction of the BRI, with the pandemic highlighting the importance of supply chain diversification and leading governments along the BRI to realize that they cannot rely too heavily on a single country, especially during a recession. According to data from the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, China has made the most significant investment in green energy of any country in the world for nine of the past ten years. The energy industry is the primary source of global carbon emissions,32 and 42% of global carbon emissions are from electricity and thermal energy production. Energy is the most crucial cooperation area of the BRI, as the green and low-carbon development of electric power is essential not only to realize the green, low-carbon, and sustainable development pursued by the BRI but also to promote the green and low-carbon transformation of the global economy. Although the international community wonders whether China is merely exporting its carbon emissions to countries along the route through the BRI to fulfill its commitment to carbon neutrality, the statistical data indicate that this is not the case. Investment in green infrastructure projects supports sustainable long-term growth and mitigates climate change. From 2013 to 2020, the cumulative controllable installed capacity of overseas investment of Chinese-funded enterprises

29 Li and Sheng (2018). 30 L. Sheng (2022b). 31 China Daily (2020). 32 Nobletz (2022).

12

E. L. SHENG

in photovoltaic and wind power plants exceeded 9 GW.33 The installed capacity of overseas investment in photovoltaic power plants by Chinesefunded enterprises was less than 500 MW in 2015, but in 2019, it reached 4500 MW—an eightfold increase in just four years. Comparing the investment in renewable energy and fossil energy projects, China’s investment in renewable energy projects in the BRI accounted for 35% of the total energy investment in 2017 and rose rapidly to 56% by 2020, surpassing fossil energy projects. Furthermore, investment in coal projects (including coal power and coal mines) has declined since reaching its peak in 2015, dropping to zero in the first half of 2021. China is also rapidly becoming a leader in digital technology construction in developing countries. The global pandemic has accelerated the construction of the Digital Silk Road, providing new scenarios and meaningful testing opportunities for breakthroughs in the spheres of digital technology and artificial intelligence.34 Trends in digital consumption during the COVID-19 pandemic have opened new space for digital industry integration and development. The digital economy, 5G, and other new industries and infrastructures are receiving greater attention, and development opportunities have arisen for high-end services, such as e-commerce platforms, cloud communications, telecommuting, video games, and video streaming. These trends provide essential opportunities for the readjustment, transformation, and upgrading of the industrial chains, supply chains, and value chains in countries along the BRI. Partner countries along the BRI have strengthened cooperation with China in the fields of big data, online technology, the Internet of Things, 5G, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, smart cities, and the digital economy.35 The development of Silk Road e-commerce has enabled the construction of digital transportation corridors and cross-border fiber-optic cable information channels to promote international cooperation and the joint development of new ideas in countries along the BRI. For example, the Chinese enterprises Huawei and ZTE are closely involved in developing 5G network technology in Third World countries and have 5G construction contracts in 28 European countries. In the past two years, Huawei has signed smart city and data center contracts with Kenya and cloud data

33 UK–China Offshore Wind Industry Advisory Group (2021). 34 L. Sheng (2022a). 35 Shen (2018).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

13

center construction contracts with Pakistan, and has launched the first 5G test platform in Southeast Asia in Thailand. Alibaba, another Chinese digital giant, has 22 overseas data centers outside China. China provides countries along the BRI route in Africa and Asia that have underdeveloped infrastructure with the opportunity to join the high-speed digital world. The capacity of Chinese companies to provide high-quality products at lower prices, occupy market share, and thus have more funds available for research and development affects the competitiveness of Western technology companies. With digital connectivity and mobile services playing a fundamental role since the outbreak of the pandemic, China is devoted to expanding its construction and investment in 5G networks, maintaining its leading position, and exporting its technology to BRI countries.36 There has been widespread skepticism in the West regarding the BRI, and most Western countries have analyzed its underlying national intentions from the perspective of China’s geostrategic goals. For some scholars adopting a realist perspective, the promotion of the BRI confidently signals China’s rise and will lead to a future with an increased potential for war as China gradually becomes a sole hegemon.37 Offensive realist John Mearsheimer believes that the ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share among the world’s great powers and to eventually dominate the entire international system38 because achieving dominance is the best way to ensure survival. On this account, China is likely to try to establish a Chinese-centric order in Asia, and the BRI is one of the important strategies to achieve this goal. Mearsheimer points out that the Belt and Road Initiative will greatly increase China’s influence in Asia, which is likely to produce a fierce security competition with the United States and its allies.39 Alternatively, some institutionalist scholars, who focus on the rules and procedures of the international system, predict that although the international cooperation between states will continue, China’s rise with the implementation of the BRI will affect the international liberal order and cause a series of changes in rules and norms.40 Moreover, 36 GSMA (2022). 37 Allison (2017). 38 Mearsheimer (2005). 39 Ibid. 40 Braga and Hall (2019).

14

E. L. SHENG

some scholars compare the BRI with the Marshall Plan, which revived Western Europe after World War II, arguing that China is trying to use its economic power to achieve geopolitical dominance.41 For example, Antonina Habova asserts that the BRI focuses on national interests and geopolitical strategy under the guise of an international cooperation initiative to provide public goods.42 Scholars who emphasize the political and security implications of China’s BRI are often pessimistic about the inevitability of future Sino–US competition and conflict. There are also controversies regarding the openness, transparency, and fairness of the BRI operational mechanisms, with attention brought to topics such as debt traps, economic plunder, and environmental pollution.43 Dependency theorists accuse China of using the BRI to form a new type of neo-colonial relationship that forces many developing countries to rely on China. On this account, the BRI leaves host countries economically dependent on Chinese loans and trade and, although the Chinese government claims minimal interference in the political and economic systems of other countries, the economic dependence of developing countries is undiminished. Despite this skepticism, the BRI has achieved remarkable results. China has signed more than 200 cooperation documents with 148 countries and 32 international organizations, with the total trade volume of goods with participating countries reaching USD 10.4 trillion and the non-financial direct investment in these countries exceeding USD 130 billion.44 In 2021, the development of the China Railway Express surged, as the number of trains operating increased to 15,000 and 1.46 million twentyfoot equivalent units of cargo were sent via this railroad throughout the year, representing year-on-year increases of 22% and 29%, respectively.45 The BRI covers both developing and developed countries, realizing the unification of “South–South” and “North–South” cooperation. Moreover, the BRI is actively cooperating with a number of national and regional initiatives, such as the EAEU in Russia, Global Maritime Axis in Indonesia, Bright Path in Kazakhstan, Steppe Road Plan in Mongolia, 41 Shen (2016), Shen and Chan (2018). 42 Habova (2015). 43 Hillman (2018). 44 Wang (2022). 45 Global Times (2022).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

15

European Commission Investment Plan in the European Union, and Suez Canal Corridor Development Project in Egypt.46 At a time when the integration of different national plans has become an important element of bilateral and multilateral international cooperation, the BRI and its core concepts have been included in relevant documents of the United Nations, G20, Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, and other international and regional organizations, covering the areas of interconnection, investment, trade, finance, science and technology, society, humanities, people’s livelihood, and the sea, and consensus has been reached on a number of issues.47 The backdrop of China’s expanding BRI has been a highly turbulent few years in the international political arena marked by a series of unexpected events, such as the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, the presidency of Donald Trump in the United States, the US–China trade war, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Build Back Better World (B3W) program newly proposed and led by the United States, all of which have created uncertainty about the future of the BRI.48

1.3 The Greater Eurasian Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative: Challenges for Sino–Russian Development Cooperation Russia and China are indispensable strategic partners. Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed satisfaction with the high level of bilateral political dialogue and cooperation in all spheres between the two countries when he sent a congratulatory message in October 2019 to Chinese President Xi Jinping on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Reminding his Chinese counterpart that the Soviet Union was the first foreign country to establish diplomatic ties with China in 1949, Putin expressed his feeling that the Russia– China relationship had successfully stood the test of time.49 Both leaders officially upgraded their bilateral ties to a new era of coordination in a comprehensive strategic partnership. It has become commonplace to 46 Hong (2019), Chubarov (2019), Pieper (2021), Kamel (2018), Gruebler (2021). 47 Wang (2022). 48 Sheng and Felix do Nascimento (2021). 49 Xinhua (2019).

16

E. L. SHENG

see Russian and Chinese leaders billing their partnership as a unique phenomenon in international relations, and there is ample evidence that relations between Moscow and Beijing are closer than they have been since the Sino–Soviet split. After the collapse of the USSR, the major non-Western countries began to work together to create a counterweight to the rising influence of the Western world led by the United States. The growing bonhomie between Moscow and Beijing stems from the keenness of the political leadership in both Russia and China to project an image of allies sharing the same views on the current fluid geopolitical situation and favorable prospects for the emergence of a multipolar world. Nonetheless, the argument that a crisis in Russia–China relations is unavoidable has been repeatedly raised by analysts since the 1990s. The reason for such a crisis would be geopolitical competition between the two powers in Central Asia. In 2013, Xi Jinping announced the concept of the New Silk Road, and Moscow announced its efforts to build its own integration project in the form of the EAEU. These two developments seemed to confirm that the initial argument was correct, with the two projects apparently fated to compete. In May 2015, however, during Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow, a joint declaration was issued calling for a formal mechanism for the coordination of the two projects in the form of a joint task force. The vision of “a great Eurasian partnership” announced by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin during the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg on 16–17 June 2016—which he also referred to as the Greater Eurasia project—was a signal that Moscow had ultimately opted for the strategy of joining a stronger partner rather than of trying to counterbalance the rising power of China. At the same time, Moscow is trying to conceal the growing asymmetry in Russia–China relations. The GEP proposed by Russia and BRI proposed by China represent the two countries’ respective national interests in the context of intensifying competition in the international system. Although the two countries share the concordant primary target of broadening Eurasian economic cooperation, differences remain in the principles, means, and paths of the two projects, which may lead to a series of challenges. From the geopolitical perspective, the US strategy of containing China and Russia will not change. China and Russia share substantial common diplomatic, military, and economic interests that aim to counterbalance US hegemony through institutional cooperation. In this era of a shifting world order, Russia and China have deepened their ties based on a range of shared interests and are certainly looking with equal yearning toward Eurasia.

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

17

Both powers perceive the Western presence on opposite sides of the Eurasian landmass—US alliances and presence in East Asia for China and NATO presence and the European Union’s normative power for Russia—as threatening to contain and ultimately undermine them. Both powers consider Eurasia their strategic backyard, and both have launched ambitious initiatives to strengthen their influence over the region: the EAEU and GEP for Russia and the Silk Road Economic Belt (the land component of the BRI) for China. Their common focus does not mean that China and Russia are necessarily competing against each other in this vast continental space, however; rather, they share similar concerns about Eurasia’s political stability and security and similar overall objectives regarding the future regional order. Chinese strategists are clear-eyed about Russia’s regional ambitions and pursuit of prestige, its concerns about China’s strategic intent, and its uneasiness with the growing power imbalance. At the same time, they are aware that China cannot achieve regional supremacy if Russia is antagonized and stands in the way. Chinese strategists thus advocate a low-friction path, prudently working on ways to assuage Moscow’s fears while taking advantage of its current isolation and lack of alternatives. They hope that a concerted effort might enable the two strategic partners to avoid the rise of bilateral tensions and discord while helping both to achieve their regional objectives. China sees Russia’s attempt to promote regional economic integration via the EAEU as part of a geo-economic strategy that ultimately aims at restoring the unified economic, political, and security space of the former Soviet Union, albeit in a modern form. Russia’s decision to look to the East is attributed to a series of disappointments with the West that have accumulated since the end of the Cold War, with the post-Ukraine sanctions being only the latest iteration. Likewise, according to Chinese officials and analysts, the US post-Cold War charm offensive toward the CIS was a “squeeze strategy” designed to weaken Russia, while the European Union’s Eastern Partnership program constituted European encroachment into the post-Soviet space and did not even involve consultation with Russia. The eastward expansions of the European Union and NATO represent a mortal danger to Russia, especially as they attempt to “lure, threaten or even interfere in internal affairs (such as inciting and planning color revolutions).”50 The 2014 Ukrainian

50 Rolland (2019).

18

E. L. SHENG

crisis pushed Moscow to shift its focus from Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia, but Russia’s turn to the East is not only the “inevitable result of the US and EU geopolitical game,” it is also the logical consequence of the gravity shift toward an increasingly politically and economically powerful Asia–Pacific, which provides Russia with tremendous cooperation and development opportunities. Western hostility and the rise of Asia have prompted Russia to pivot to Asia. Russia intends to use the GEP and BRI as a way to shift its development focus from the European part of Russia to Siberia and the Far East. China is a key ally for Russia in the development of a new greater Eurasian community. China needs energy and natural resources from Russia, and it has invested in two major LNG plants in the Russian Arctic and the Siberian pipeline to deliver gas from Russia to China.51 China also wants access to Russia’s military technology and modern weaponry. As the countries share a long border, Russia plays the role of a stable bulwark in the north of China. Russia needs China as a primary market for its energy and commodity exports, a buyer of high-tech weaponry, and a strategic partner to provide a counterweight to the United States and promote a multipolar world as an alternative to the US-dominated liberal rules-based international order.52 Russia faces both internal and external difficulties. Internally, Russia has long-lasting domestic economic problems. Externally, sanctions and boycotts imposed by the United States and European Union over the Ukraine crisis have caused difficulties for Russia in terms of energy, national security, and financing. As China and Russia have their own unique objectives that may bring about potential conflicts, an institutional framework is required for harmonizing their relations. China and Russia show both the intention to respond to US suppression in the international system through institutional cooperation and the desire to coordinate their relations at the regional level.53 For the foreseeable future, Russia’s relationship with China will be of the greatest importance and of considerable concern, given China’s huge and growing economic, demographic, and military weight and its steadily expanding geopolitical horizon.

51 Sheng (2023). 52 E. L. Sheng (2022b). 53 Shakhanova and Garlick (2020).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

19

There are diverse opinions on the alignment of the two initiatives promoted by China and Russia in Eurasia. At the strategic level, Russia has always maintained a relatively positive attitude toward trade and economic cooperation with China. The two sides strive to create a favorable environment for collaboration, which they maintain through the exchange of high-level visits, dialogue, and the signing of a series of cooperation documents. In practice, however, Russia tends to be coldly cooperative or even uncooperative and intentionally confrontational to contain China’s so-called expansion. The GEP can thus be described as an evolution from a traditional harrowing confrontation to a soft confrontation. Although Russia and China have long talked about dovetailing the GEP with the BRI, members of the Russian elite are still greatly concerned that China is using its huge investments in the BRI to expand its geopolitical influence and encroach on Russia’s sphere of influence. When Russia and China talk about dovetailing, the Russian government stresses that Russia does not seek to take the lead in cooperation; in exchange, the Russian government asks China not to seek dominance either. On the face of it, this may seem like a move to equality, but it is difficult for China as an investor to effectively control its Russian investments without seeking dominance. Despite Russia’s commitment not to take the lead in the cooperation, it has an inherent advantage that gives it significant room to maneuver and a geographical advantage once the alliance is in full swing. Even if the Chinese government threatens to divest, the losses suffered by Chinese investors will be far more significant than those sustained by Russia. In practice, therefore, Sino–Russian cooperations fraught with uncertainty. In its international collaborations, Russia pays attention not only to its economic benefits but also to the position that Russia occupies in the cooperation. The attitude of the Russian government is that if it is bound to fall into a position of subordination in the collaboration, then it should simply abandon it.54 Russia continues to struggle to find a workable framework within which it can manage China’s rise. Despite Russia’s close relationship with China, it has been cautious about China’s multilateral initiatives and nervous about China’s expansion into its sphere of influence. As China continues to rise, Russia’s international role remains limited by its underwhelming economic growth, and it risks ending up in a difficult position as China’s junior partner. Russia will continue to

54 Lukin (2019).

20

E. L. SHENG

contend any and all initiatives in what it considers to be its sphere of influence. Some scholars argue that Russia aims to take advantage of changes in the international order that arise from the implementation of the Chinaled BRI but that in so doing, it regards partnership with China only as a temporary solution to maintain its status as a great power in world politics and to avoid further international political marginalization. Conversely, Chinese officials remain wary of Russia’s GEP because they see its motives as vague; accordingly, they have recently referred to the GEP as the “Eurasian Economic Partnership Agreement” rather than the “Eurasian Comprehensive Partnership,” which may reflect China’s preference for economic cooperation between Eurasia members and partnership diplomacy based on the liberal order, and wariness of the potential risks of becoming too close to Russia.55 In the long term, Russia has reason to see China’s growing power in Central Asia and the former Soviet sphere of influence as a challenge to the Russian vision of the GEP,56 particularly in Belarus and Uzbekistan.57 Russia fundamentally sees China as a long-term competitor and the GEP as a counterbalance to the BRI. The Economic Commission for Europe and Asia has tried to limit the impact of the BRI to a particular technical sphere, viewing it as complementary to the GEP and even attempting to integrate it within the GEP framework. As both countries seek to lead the reshaping of the international economic system and world order, this similarity of goals could create intense competition.58 Other scholars comparing the concepts, goals, principles, and paths of the two countries have taken the more positive view that Russia and China are making efforts to maintain order in the Eurasian region rather than falling into an uncontrolled competition over spheres of influence.59 From some perspectives, Russia and China’s common goals and values in relation to the international order and the blueprint for the near future have converged out of a mutual desire to counterbalance the global influence of the United States, which necessitates further cooperation and 55 Braga and Hall (2019). 56 Schubert and Savkin (2016). 57 Hallgren and Ghiasy (2017). 58 Shakhanova and Garlick (2020). 59 Christoffersen (2021).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

21

the reduction of competition in China–Russia relations.60 The two countries also have a convergence in their international institutional strategy, as both are latecomers to the current international system and share common interests in its underlying values and development models. The diplomacy of the two countries is rooted in strategic collaboration on basic principles and norms, which provides advantageous conditions for Sino–Russian institutional cooperation.61 Nonetheless, the similarity in institutional scope and functions of the two major initiatives can easily give rise to competitive relations and institutional overlap. Chinese experts caution that Moscow could perceive the BRI as potentially damaging to Russia’s interests in its near neighbors. They are also aware that the growing Sino–Russian asymmetry of power and influence, which is especially visible in Central Asia, may cause some problems for a Russia that clings jealously to its big brother status. Jiao Yiqiang, a Central Asia specialist, underlines Russia’s possible concerns that the BRI could be used as a tool to help turn China’s economic clout into political influence, thereby weakening Russia’s position and ultimately subordinating it in its own traditional sphere of influence: “Russia is worried that China will surpass its influence and thus hinder its status and role as great power.”62 Nevertheless, Jiao insists that Chinese and Russian interests are fundamentally similar. Likewise, Yang Lei, the director of the Zhou Enlai School of Government’s Eurasian Research Center, notes that the consistencies between the BRI and the GEP are greater than the differences: economically, both aim at promoting the development of a Eurasian transportation corridor, leading to integration via infrastructure and trade; geopolitically, although some potential conflicts do exist, they are not serious enough to affect the overall bilateral cooperation in the foreseeable future.63 In the long term, however, “when the integration process has reached a certain stage,” Yang cautions, “Russia’s hegemonic ambitions will have to be considered.”64

60 Kendall-Taylor and Shullman (2021). 61 Stronski and Ng (2018). 62 Jiao (2018). 63 Yang (2016). 64 Ibid.

22

E. L. SHENG

In the end, Chinese analysts argue, the immediate danger for Russia is not China but the old international order dominated by Western countries. Notwithstanding recent shifts in US policy, which some Western observers see as weakening the existing Western-led order, Chinese analysts believe that the Western-dominated international order continues to constitute a common challenge to both countries and is “undoubtedly the biggest obstacle to the rejuvenation of China and Russia.”65 In Eurasia, Moscow and Beijing are keen on expanding their economic cooperation, which is seen as a prerequisite for social and political stability; ultimately, a “safe and stable Central Asia is a common interest.”66 In the security domain, both countries can multiply their advantages against a common adversary if they work together and carry out security cooperation under the GEP framework. Working together would enable them to “jointly safeguard peace and stability” and “curb the United States’ new interventionism.”67 Two powers competing for the same space with two different projects might seem like a formula for growing friction and even conflict, but the opposite is actually taking place. Aware of the high risk of geopolitical rivalry, both China and Russia have demonstrated remarkable consistency in trying to avoid competition and to instead develop a cooperative framework that allows for an alignment of their respective flagship Eurasian initiatives. The first sign of Russia and China’s shared willingness to work hand in hand came during the Putin–Xi summit in Moscow in May 2015. The two leaders signed a joint declaration on “cooperation in coordinating the development of the Eurasian Economic Union project and the Silk Road Economic Belt,” which pledged to strengthen regional economic integration and “safeguard peace and stability on the Eurasian landmass.”68 Investments in transportation and infrastructure development and an eventual free-trade agreement between the EAEU and China are envisioned as ways to enhance the region’s economic development. With the two countries agreeing to merge the BRI and EAEU projects, Central Asia is considered a crucial region for promoting the harmonization of the GEP and BRI.

65 Jiao (2018). 66 Ibid. 67 Wang (2017). 68 Xinhua (2015).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

23

During the Russian leader’s visit to Beijing on June 25, 2016, Xi and Putin reiterated their commitment to aligning their interests in Eurasia and promoted the idea of building a “comprehensive Eurasian partnership on the basis of openness, transparency and the consideration of other’s benefits.”69 In July 2017, the same day Putin and Xi formally agreed to deepen their bilateral “Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation Relationship,” the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development set up a task force to study the feasibility of a joint Eurasian Economic Partnership.70 During the ensuing bilateral consultations, Russian and Chinese experts reached a consensus on observing the principles of “sovereign equality and noninterference in internal affairs” and respecting each other’s “chosen path of development.”71 Some experts believe that the BRI might prove to be a useful instrument for serving Moscow’s objectives. At a time when Russia faces serious economic difficulties and lacks the financial power to pursue some of its own priorities, the BRI may be able to provide support for the development of regional infrastructure, accelerate Eurasia’s regional integration at a lower economic cost for Russia, strengthen the EAEU’s position as an intermediary between Asia and Europe, and counterbalance the negative geopolitical implications of economic mega-blocs such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.72 In addition to presidential meetings and formal joint declarations, both countries have developed an “outstanding mechanism” for regular consultations that functions at every level, “from meetings between heads of state and government ministers downward.” The high-level Sino–Russian political commitment to cooperate in Eurasia seeps down to both countries’ intellectual elites, which have been mobilized to provide recommendations on the feasibility of BRI–GEP integration. For example, the Russian International Affairs Council is promoting research focused on the GEP while the Chinese government funds a national grant for the project “Study of the Docking Path and the Growing Trends of Belt and Road and Greater Eurasian Partnership Initiatives.” Russian and Chinese analysts tend to see the

69 Ministry of Commerce (2017). 70 Ibid. 71 Li (2018). 72 Timofeev et al. (2017).

24

E. L. SHENG

two projects’ differences not as irremediable obstacles but as mutually complementary and strengthening factors. These statements suggest that China’s external propaganda campaign, which portrays the BRI as a generous gift to promote regional economic prosperity and places the emphasis on benefits for participating countries, has thus far been effective in shaping Russian perceptions. In this sense, Russia is no different from Western countries that tend to be oblivious to the geostrategic nature of the BRI and prefer to focus on the possible avenues of cooperation with China. Given that Russian experts claim that there is no well-calculated and informed strategy behind the BRI, it is unsurprising that Russia has decided to coordinate its Eurasian efforts with China. Chinese thinkers believe that even if Russia is uncomfortable with the power gap, it does not really have any other viable options but to consolidate its relationship with China, especially after Western sanctions have amplified its economic difficulties and reduced its diplomatic space.73 As the BRI connects Asia with Western Europe, Russia risks being isolated if it does not cooperate with China on jointly integrating Eurasia. Without China, Russia’s “Look East” policy would be inconsequential, as given that no concrete progress has been made with any Asia–Pacific countries other than China, the deepening of Russia’s cooperation with China is the only real achievement of its Asia–Pacific diplomacy. Moreover, because it is naturally impossible for Russia to rely on its own strength to promote the country’s economic revitalization, deepening bilateral cooperation has become an “inevitable choice.” Whatever the case, Russia seems inclined to play along. Aware of Moscow’s sensitivities, China treads carefully. Chinese experts interpret the GEP as Russia’s struggle to maintain its image as a key strategic actor in Eurasia, playing the leading role in the region’s integration process. China nurtures similar ambitions with the BRI but does not express them as straightforwardly. Like Russia, China hopes to see a new Eurasian order emerge, free of Western influence and integrated to a degree, but with China, not Russia, at its center. To preclude a Sino– Russian rivalry, the Chinese elite are willing to exercise self-restraint, show deference to Russia’s vision for the region, and even let Russia don the cloak of Eurasian leadership. What really matters is not the appearance of leadership but the reality of power. Letting Russia take the lead could

73 Li (2017).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

25

actually work to China’s advantage, especially in areas where it is still weak compared with Russia. The issue of power asymmetry, a critical element feeding Russia’s insecurity toward China, could be turned into something that both countries accept, provided they make good use of their respective strengths. Asymmetry does not necessarily play to China’s favor in all domains. China may indeed be stronger than Russia economically and financially, but it is also in a much weaker position from a regional diplomatic and security perspective. In Central Asia, Russia’s overall influence is still greater than that of China.74 China cannot rely solely on its own strength to confront all the problems that the BRI faces in the region, including “complex cultural differences” and local security challenges. In this regard, Sino–Russian asymmetry does not constitute a problem but rather creates opportunities, first for complementarity and eventually for rebalancing. For example, a deeper BRI–GEP alignment would allow China to benefit from Moscow’s entrenched influence in Russianspeaking countries, thus improving its own image. Central Asian countries’ remaining concerns could be dispelled, causing them to engage more willingly with China as they realize that the BRI and the GEP are effectively interchangeable. The EAEU customs union de facto facilitates customs procedures and eliminates trade barriers for the BRI. Russia’s military presence can provide a security umbrella and reduce the risks faced by the BRI in Eurasia.75 Closer BRI–GEP coordination could also mean an increased role for China in the region’s security, without raising local alarm. It could even allow China to burnish its “responsible big power” image. In addition, growing Sino–Russian security cooperation would address shared challenges such as opposing the “three evil forces” (terrorism, separatism, and extremism) and external interference, and preventing color revolutions.76 As one top Chinese diplomat puts it, Eurasia is the main region where China must work hand in hand with Russia to “seek convergence and a balance of interests” and align both countries’ Eurasian grand strategies.77

74 Jiao (2018). 75 Ibid. 76 Li (2017). 77 Fu (2016).

26

E. L. SHENG

Meanwhile, China’s BRI can provide investments that neither Russia nor Central Asian economies can afford. Russia’s cooperation with China will help Russia not only regain some of its diplomatic space but also overcome the economic difficulties caused by Western sanctions. Finally, to alleviate Russia’s possible remaining concerns about China’s economic dominance, China could ensure that Chinese banks are not the exclusive lenders for BRI projects by working with multilateral financing platforms such as the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Ultimately, both countries will benefit as China engages more with Russia on Eurasian political and strategic issues and Russia improves its economic situation thanks to China’s BRI.

1.4 The Impact and Prospects of the Alignment of the Two Initiatives Russia’s self-perception as a great power has prepared the context that makes its pivot to China possible. For Russia’s ruling elite, Greater Eurasia is more significant than a project of increased connectivity, trade, and investment. It is impossible to fully understand Russia’s purposes for creating a Greater Eurasia without considering Russia’s vision of its international identity. Similar to the EAEU, this new project strengthens Russia’s self-conception as a great power. Russia’s GEP is an economic project undertaken mainly in pursuit of Russia’s great power aspirations. Russian officials and academics have presented Greater Eurasia as a zone of peace, cooperation, and development across the Eurasian continent. In this self-conception, Russia is a promoter of openness, integration, and connectivity. Since the global financial crisis in 2008, Western-led globalization has taken a step backward. The United States has become less willing to fulfill its international responsibilities and has sought to remove the international framework and cease to be the sole provider of public goods. Meanwhile, COVID-19 exposed the flaws in global governance under the Western institutional system and set back the era of Western-led globalization considerably. With the recent retreat of the West from globalization, China and Russia have the will to promote the publicization of the international system and actively provide public goods to the international community. This means that China and Russia, as latecomers to the international system of institutions, are no longer merely obedient participants in the rules of the international procedure but have also become the

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

27

initiators and actors of new regulations and solutions. In this context, China and Russia have promoted different combinations of globalization activities through the BRI and the GEP, respectively. This has resulted in cross-border linkages with substantial regional and local outcomes. The current objective of the GEP to promote cooperation in the Eurasian region is consistent with that of China’s BRI, which provides a basis for the alignment of the two initiatives. The collaboration of the EAEU with the Silk Road Economic Belt sits at the center of successfully aligning the BRI and GEP. The coordination of these two initiatives would help stabilize the strategic partnership between Russia and China, resolve possible frictions between the two countries, and promote regional cooperation in Eurasia.78 A successful alignment would advance the Eurasian integration process and increase China and Russia’s influence on the international order. At the most concrete level, the GEP is intended to assist the diversification of Russia’s external trade. This entails tapping into Asian markets in areas where Russia possesses comparative advantages: arms, energy supply and infrastructure, nuclear technology, and food and water security. Russia’s logic is straightforward: most of the Asian economies are still developing, and Russia has goods and services they need. However, such complementarities are not only mutually advantageous but also potentially short-lived, given the fast rate of growth of many Asian economies. There are knock-on benefits as well: if Russia can open up new markets, it will be less dependent on its traditional European trading partners and therefore in a stronger negotiating position with them on a whole range of political and economic issues.79 Among other benefits, this would reinforce the message that Western sanctions are no longer fit for their purpose.80 The concept of Greater Eurasia objectively separates Russia politically more and more from the European Union, but a pivot to the East, according to Russia, is not a disconnection from Western Europe. Russia is a European country, and the European Union is a neighbor and an important trade and economic partner. Greater Eurasia, as a developing geo-economic and

78 Makarov and Sokolova (2016). 79 Karaganov and Bordachev (2018). 80 Karaganov and Bordachev (2017).

28

E. L. SHENG

geostrategic community, opens opportunities for Russia and the European project to reset their relationship by creating new zones of mutual development. Russia is open to constructive cooperation with all partners. Russia sees the GEP as a means of positioning Russia at the center of expanding trade routes between Europe and Asia.81 Given how rapidly the BRI is unfolding, it makes sense for Russia to hitch itself to the BRI bandwagon to improve its chances of attracting substantial volumes of direct investment for major projects such as Yamal LNG, in which China’s Silk Road Fund has bought a 9.9% stake. Russia is also keen to ensure that the main Eurasian transport routes go through its territory so that it will not be marginalized as the BRI proliferates.82 The GEP has two broad economic goals. First, it aims to connect Russia and the EAEU to China’s BRI. Second, it has the lesser goal of moving beyond China to connect the EAEU with Iran, India, and Southeast Asia. In other words, the GEP is Russia’s strategy to keep China in check. The United States is not a Eurasian power, but its influence across the region is strong. The United States is likely to use its own partnerships across the region to thwart the implementation of the GEP in the same way that it has been critical of the BRI and sought to offer alternatives, such as the Quad’s infrastructure development program and the G7’s B3W initiative. In Eurasia, Turkey, a NATO member, could play key role in counterbalancing Russian and Chinese initiatives. With Turkey’s help, the United States may try to edge Russia and China out of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The United States and some of its allies and partners are casting the struggle to strengthen the world order as a contest between democracies and autocracies, and there are many of both on the Eurasian continent. The key to preventing conflict and promoting prosperity, peace, and stability is to focus on trade and investment that would be mutually beneficial to all stakeholder countries. The US’ adjustment of the international system hurts the interests of both Russia and China. The United States has used the international system to strengthen its policy of containment of Russia by expanding NATO to Russia’s borders despite Russian opposition. Meanwhile, the United States has engaged in a series of public crackdowns on China’s

81 Karaganov (2018a), Russian International Affairs Council, & Fudan University (2018). 82 Luzyanin (2018).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

29

efforts to enhance the influence of its discourse in the international system. To improve their unfavorable position and safeguard their interests in the international system, and to enhance the legitimacy and recognition of the system, both China and Russia want to reform the US-dominated global order. The alignment of the GEP and BRI is an essential step for China and Russia to build a regional cooperation system, and its success would change the operation of the international system in the Eurasian region, with China and Russia advocating a more diverse and stable multilateral pattern and attracting the participation of emerging countries. This new structure would challenge the traditional rules dominated by the United States and intensify the competition between China and Russia and the United States for dominance of the international system.83 The dovetailing of the two initiatives would stabilize the strategic partnership between China and Russia, resolve possible conflicts of interest between the two countries, and promote the process of regional cooperation in Eurasia, which would help coordinate their interests in Eurasia and promote the development of a bilateral strategic partnership. Russia and China can thereby combine their efforts to respond to US pressure and compete with the United States for international rule-making power. This will contribute to the expansion of the power of both sides within the international system and to improving the system of regional cooperation in Europe and Asia. To successfully realize this shared strategy of reforming the international system, the two sides need to coordinate their policies on the participation in and promotion of global governance and effectively promote the transformation of the international order, ultimately achieving the goal of multilateralism as a counterweight to US hegemony. It may also be beneficial for China and Russia to increase their levels of economic cooperation, particularly in relation to natural resources and civilian industries. However, a challenge to cooperation is that the GEP and BRI are highly similar in terms of regime scope and functions. This has led scholars to raise concerns over institutional overlap, which arises when the functional scope of one international regime is extended to the functional capacity of another. The similarities in the institutional functions of the two projects tend to create a competitive relationship between the two countries, thus undermining the basis for cooperation. The BRI aspires

83 Krickovic (2017).

30

E. L. SHENG

to run through Eurasia, connecting the Asia–Pacific economic sphere to the east and entering the European economic sphere to the west. The institutional design of the BRI is largely similar to the GEP’s objective of advancing the free flow of resources in the Eurasian region, emphasizing cross-regional economic and transport infrastructure development. The focus of both initiatives is on avoiding the likelihood that Eurasia will create intra-regional competition and reduced efficiency, or even institutional destruction. Overlapping regimes allow participating countries to choose between different regime providers on merit. Competition between Russia and China in promoting regional economic cooperation is inevitable, especially as China’s activities in Russia’s traditional strategic priority regions are likely to affect Russia’s geopolitical interests. It is therefore indispensable for China and Russia to keep the competition within certain limits through inter-regime cooperation. Inter-regime cooperation between the two sides, conducted in an inclusive manner, has become a fundamental driving force for China and Russia to promote the dovetailing of the two major initiatives. Its promotion of the existence of pluralistic rules makes emerging countries significant in driving the evolution of the international institutional system. In contrast, if Russia and China fail to align their two major initiatives, it could trigger and expand conflicts of interests, undermine the basis of bilateral cooperative relations between the two countries, and strengthen the US dominance of the international system.84 The idea of Greater Eurasia as a Sino–Russian challenge to US hegemony is also viewed as dangerously confrontational by some mainstream foreign policy thinkers in Russia. Dmitri Trenin, the Director of the Carnegie Center in Moscow, has argued that “Russia’s mission is not to change the world order, or overthrow the U.S. from the position of leading global power.” Above all, Greater Eurasia should not be a platform to form “a kind of anti-American alliance with China.” Instead, Russia should maintain a balanced foreign policy, avoiding dependence either on China or on Europe and maintaining an equidistant position between East and West. Such a policy, Trenin believes, will lead to a kind of “geopolitical loneliness” for Russia, but this need not be wholly negative. Without the entanglements of alliances and even alignments,

84 Mastanduno (2019).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

31

Russia would be free to exercise its sovereignty and achieve a rare status in international politics: the capacity to be free. Russia’s proposal for the GEP is constructive, but it remains a concept, with many steps required to make it a reality. All sides should create a cooperative institution or platform for dialogue that will allow Eurasian powers to meet and discuss disagreements and to find ways to settle problems peacefully. A key objective should be to plot roadmaps for creating economic, transportation, and other cooperative networks and links to connect and integrate the Eurasian continent. The building blocks for GEP projects are in place, but it is not clear which states or institutions should finance them. A “Greater Eurasian Partnership Bank” is needed to address this challenge, with strengthening infrastructure interconnections and providing the financial resources for developing Eurasian economies as its top priorities. Interested parties should explore ways to harmonize the digital projects of the EAEU, European Union, China, India, ASEAN, and other players in Eurasia, especially given that the pandemic has served as a powerful catalyst for digitalization. The globalization of Greater Eurasia must continue; indeed, it cannot be stopped, even by the disruptions and disputes that are the hallmark of today’s great power geopolitics. The BRI aims to build the logistic and economic framework for Greater Eurasia. Part of this framework will involve Indian Ocean ports, and another part will use the Arctic Sea Route, but a growing segment will pass through continental Eurasia, including Russia. The New Silk Road will stretch all the way to the Mediterranean. Work is also underway to build meridional logistic corridors to interconnect Eurasia from North to South. Faced with growing American protectionism and seeing rapidly rising new markets, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN countries are most likely to pay more attention to the Eurasian vector of their development. Russia’s pivot to the East, which began as its relations with the United States and Europe kept deteriorating and worsened dramatically in 2014, is giving a strong boost to the creation of the Eurasian geopolitical, geo-economic, and cultural community. A widely read policy report published in 2017 stated that Russia had made a political turn to the East and its economic pivot had started gaining momentum.85 Greater Eurasia is an emerging geo-economic community brought into existence by the

85 Karaganov and Bordachev (2017).

32

E. L. SHENG

“Asia for Asia” trend, China’s pivot to the West, its integration with the EAEU, and Russia’s turn to the East. Russia may be the architect of the GEP, but China will decide its fate. So far, Beijing has chosen to accommodate Moscow’s great power ambitions. For example, Russia and China have avoided clashing over Central Asia, a region within the traditional Russian sphere of influence.86 Gabuev even believes that the strategic partnership between Russia and China is already transforming into a “soft alliance.”87 For China, closer cooperation with Russia provides insurance for strategic stability in Eurasia. More importantly, as noted by a Chinese scholar, “Greater Eurasia is an important area for the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt.”88 China needs Russia to access European markets, as unimpeded trade and infrastructure connectivity are two of Xi Jinping’s goals in Eurasia.89 Three of the four economic corridors that are part of the Silk Road Economic Belt go through the EAEU: The New Eurasian Land Bridge through Kazakhstan and Russia, the China–Mongolia–Russia corridor, and the China–Central Asia–West Asia corridor. The most efficient of these is the first: it takes a train 14 days to reach Europe from China through Kazakhstan and Russia.90 The Eurasian Development Bank reports that railway container traffic between China and Europe almost doubled from 2017 to 2020, which makes the EAEU’s unified customs mechanism highly significant for China. However, improvements in railway transportation in Eurasia are unlikely to challenge the primacy of maritime and air trade, which account for more than 90% of the volume of trade between China and the European Union. Russia is vital as an energy supplier to meet China’s ever-increasing demand, and the Yamal LNG plant will deliver an increasing amount of Russian natural gas to the Chinese market through the Northern Sea Route over the decade to come. China currently has a 29.9% stake in the Yamal LNG project, with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation and the Silk Road Fund owning 20% and 9.9% of the shares,

86 Stronski and Ng (2018). 87 Gabuev (2015). 88 Zhao (2018). 89 Nadege (2017). 90 Daly and Rojansky (2018).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

33

respectively.91 Chinese participation in Russian energy projects is crucial at a time when Russia’s leading role in gas production is challenged and Russian energy firms are under Western sanctions. China’s growing presence in the Yamal LNG project has strengthened Moscow’s rationale for its acceptance of China’s Polar Silk Road.92 In 2016, China’s Silk Road Fund, which invests in Belt and Road projects, purchased a 10% stake in Russia’s largest petrochemicals company, SIBUR, in which China’s Sinopec also holds a 10% stake. Beyond these two projects, Russia has not benefited from the BRI as much as it had hoped. For example, construction of the much-awaited Moscow–Kazan high-speed railway has not started. Because of Russia’s financial problems, there has been slow progress in the construction of the Amur railway bridge that will connect Nizhneleninskoye in Russia with Tongjiang in China. China was not an important economic actor in Central Asia at the turn of the millennium but has recently become a top trading partner. In 2017, China’s trade with Central Asia reached USD 30 billion and Russia’s trade with the region stood at USD 18 billion. Moscow can do little to balance Chinese growing economic influence in Central Asia. The two countries need each other for their joint effort to adjust the rules of the Western-led international order to their advantage, but China does not need Russia’s intermediary role to intensify its trade and investment with post-Soviet states. The long-term political and economic prospects for Russia in Central Asia are not good, as the BRI and China’s economic power could push Russia out of the economic competition in that region. However, as Russian scholar Artyom Lukin points out, amid increasing Chinese economic influence in the region, Central Asian leaders might eventually need Russia to balance China’s regional aspirations.93 Russia no longer fears isolation from the West, at least for the moment, thanks to China’s support. However, it is unclear how much longer Russia will tolerate China’s rising capabilities and influence in its own perceived sphere of influence. In addition, Russia is unlikely to be satisfied with a merely symbolic accommodation of its GEP and will instead ask for a more substantial role in China’s connectivity projects. Whereas

91 Filimonova and Krivokhizh (2018). 92 Kaczmarski (2018). 93 Lukin (2018).

34

E. L. SHENG

the EAEU is an economic integration mechanism that aims to protect Russian-led Eurasia from outside competition, the BRI is designed to benefit from economic globalization through connectivity.94 In the age of global connectivity, other members of the EAEU will find little economic benefit from a Russia that is in search of import substitutions. The alignment of Russia’s GEP and China’s BRI has implications beyond a mere tactical division of labor of the sort that can currently be observed in the post-Soviet space, in which Russia dominates the political and security sphere and China the economic sphere. China is eager to partner with Russia in establishing a Sino–Russian condominium over an economically prosperous and politically stable Eurasia because Chinese strategists see this as the “starting point of shaping the future world order.”95 Many Chinese experts draw a direct connection between acquiring a dominant position over Eurasia and the reshaping of the world order—a vision that emanates directly from the works of Mackinder and Spykman on geopolitics. Variants of Mackinder’s well-known observation that “whoever controls the world island rules the world” can, for example, be found in the writings of Wang Xiaoquan, the Secretary-General of the Belt and Road Research Centre at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He advocates a closer Sino–Russian partnership over Eurasia because “whoever can guide the Eurasian process can lead the construction of a new world order.” Lei Jianfeng, a professor at the Renmin University School of International Studies, describes the classic theories of geopolitics and draws on the history of the rise of the British Empire to conclude that maintaining a divided Eurasia is “the essence of the geopolitical strategy” of the United Kingdom, Europe, and the United States. A consolidated China–Russia strategic partnership would make it more difficult for the United States to divide and rule in Eurasia and prevent Washington from simply “doing whatever it wants” in the region. Lei also considers the domination of Eurasia as crucially important in the context of China’s long-term competition with the US hegemon: “The pre-World War Two power competition model that relied on military strength to seek hegemony gradually gave way to a contest of comprehensive national power based on economic strength. The world is increasingly divided into

94 Kaczmarski (2017). 95 Li (2017).

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

35

competitions between the European, the East Asian, and the North American economic zones. Only by being able to lead the region’s economic prosperity can we gain the advantage.” Unspoken here is the idea that as Russia’s power recedes, China will come to dominate the entire region. Chinese thinkers also speculate about the potential effects of a Sino– Russian condominium over Eurasia on the reconfiguration of the main regional actors’ positions. For example, Li Ziguo, a Russia expert at a think tank affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believes that if the GEP and the BRI combine their strengths, Eurasia could not only become a regional bloc that competes with developed economies but also increase the rising powers’ “economic discursive rights” in constructing a new international order. Yang Lei further contends that the alignment of the two initiatives will have a “profound impact on the international relations pattern” as a deeper Eurasian integration under Sino–Russian co-leadership will eventually persuade the other three major players in the region—the European Union, Japan, and India—to shift their focus of cooperation.96 In particular, the European Union’s cooperation with Russia and China will expand, as its “sense of independence from the U.S. is constantly on the rise.” EU member-state governments are reluctant to cooperate with Russia’s EAEU because they do not want to accord it legitimacy and thus strengthen Russia’s position, but they generally hold favorable views of the BRI and wish to cooperate with China to “exert an effective influence on the rule-making process.” As the GEP and the BRI overlap further, the argument runs, the European Union will have no choice but to cooperate with both countries. Similarly, as China and Russia become the main driving forces behind regional integration, Eurasia will become further separated from the United States, and Washington will have no choice but to “seek coexistence” with the two Eurasian powers to protect its interests in the region. As both China and Russia have turned their attention to Eurasia and launched elaborate initiatives to expand their influence and reaffirm their primacy in the region, international observers see the continent emerging once again as a contested zone. They observe that previous competition between the two countries ended up in a conflict that took three decades to overcome and assess that the new-found appetite of each for

96 Yang (2016).

36

E. L. SHENG

regional leadership could test the solidity of their partnership and eventually cause a collision. In this view, the West simply needs to sit back patiently and observe the Eurasian chessboard as it becomes the stage for a contest that inexorably embroils and eventually hobbles the two rivals. However, such a scenario is not preordained. If the analysis of Chinese and Russian experts is any indication, China and Russia might be able to transform Eurasia into a joint playground instead of a battlefield. The Chinese leadership is well aware of the possibility that a sensitive and insecure Russia could overreact to China’s rising influence in what Russia regards as its own sphere of influence. To preclude conflict, China’s inclination is to play the cooperative card, convincing Russia that China’s thrust into Eurasia actually supports Russia’s goals, focusing on common political, economic, and security interests, and letting Russia claim the role of “Greater Eurasia leader” if it pleases. As time passes, problems might emerge in the Sino–Russian relationship. Russia may eventually realize that China poses a profound threat to its interests and ambitions and decide to get serious about competition, but it took the United States nearly a quarter of a century to come to a similar conclusion. Over the medium term, a Sino–Russian condominium over Eurasia will probably continue to take shape.

References Allison, G. (2017). Destined for war: Can America and China escape Thucydides’s Trap? Scribe Publications. ASEAN–Russia Summit. (2016). Russia and ASEAN . http://en.russia-asean20. ru/russia_asean/ Boston University Global Policy Development Center. (2022). China’s Overseas Development Finance. https://www.bu.edu/gdp/chinas-overseas-develo pment-finance/ Braga, P., & Hall, S. G. F. (2019). China’s emerging liberal partnership order and Russian and US responses: Evidence from the Belt and Road Initiative in Eurasia. In P. J. S. Duncan & E. Schimpfössl (Eds.), Socialism, capitalism and alternatives: Area studies and global theories (pp. 131–158). UCL Press. China Daily. (2020, August). Construction kicks off on Sino-Russian gas chemical plant. https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202008/28/WS5f48528 ca310675eafc56012.html Christoffersen, G. (2021). Sino-Russian accommodation and adaptation in Eurasian regional order formation. In G. Christofferson (Ed.), Russia in the Indo-Pacific (pp. 179–197). Routledge.

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

37

Chubarov, I. (2019). Challenges and opportunities for the spatial development of Eurasia under the BRI: The case of the Eurasian Economic Union. Area Development and Policy, 4(1), 81–97. Clarke, M. (2017). The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s new grand strategy? Asia Policy, 24(1), 71–79. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2017.0023 Daly, R., & Rojansky, M. (2018, March 12). China’s global dreams give its neighbors nightmares. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/ 12/chinas-global-dreams-are-giving-its-neighbors-nightmares/ Desai, P. (2006). Conversations on Russia. Oxford University Press. Dunford, M., & Liu, W. (2019). Chinese perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 12(1), 145– 167. Filimonova, N., & Krivokhizh, S. (2018, January 18). China’s stakes in the Russian Arctic. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/chinas-sta kes-in-the-russian-arctic/ Fu, Y. (2016). Are China and Russia partnering to create an axis? Valdai Discussion Club. https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/are-china-and-russia-partne ring-to-create-an-axis/ Gabuev, A. (2015). A “Soft Alliance?” Russia–China relations after the Ukraine crisis. European Council on Foreign Relations. Global Times. (2022, January 5). China–Europe freight train service bolsters continental supply chain stability: Foreign Ministry says. https://www.global times.cn/page/202201/1245139.shtml Gruebler, J. (2021). China connecting Europe? Asia Europe Journal, 19(1), 77– 101. GSMA. (2022). The Mobile Economy China 2020. https://www.gsma.com/mob ileeconomy/china/ Habova, A. (2015). Silk Road economic belt: China’s Marshall Plan, pivot to Eurasia or China’s way of foreign policy. KSI Transactions on Knowledge Society, 8(1), 64–70. Hallgren, H., & Ghiasy, R. (2017, December). Security and economy on the Belt and Road: Three country case studies. SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, 2017 (4). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24480 Hillman, J. (2018, January 25). China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five years later. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Hong, Z. (2019). China’s Belt and Road Initiative and ASEAN. China: An International Journal, 17 (2), 127–147. Hong Kong Trade Development Council. (2015, May 8). Joint statement on cooperation on the construction of joint Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road projects. https://beltandroad.hktdc.com/en/official-documents/jointstatement-cooperation-construction-joint-eurasian-economic-union-and-silk

38

E. L. SHENG

Huang, Y. (2016). Understanding China’s belt & road initiative: Motivation, framework and assessment. China Economic Review, 40, 314–321. Jiao, Y. (2018). From perceptual differences to cooperative consensus: Research on “One Belt-One Union” cooperation, and asymmetric mutual interdependence. Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, 4, 51–85, 157–158. https://caod.oriprobe.com/articles/54862730/From_Perceptual_ Differences_to_Cooperative_Consens.htm Johnston, L. A. (2019). The Belt and Road Initiative: What is in it for China? Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 6(1), 40–58. Kaczmarski, M. (2017). Non-Western visions of regionalism: China’s New Silk Road and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union. International Affairs, 93(6), 1357–1376. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix182 Kaczmarski, M. (2018). Russian–Chinese relations in Eurasia: Harmonization or subordination? Briefing Paper 238, Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Kamel, M. S. (2018). China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Middle East. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 31(1), 76–95. Karaganov, S. (2018a). From East to West, or Greater Eurasia. Valdai Discussion Club. https://valdaiclub.com/ Karaganov, S. (2018b). The new Cold War and the emerging Greater Eurasia. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 9(2), 85–93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras. 2018.07.002 Karaganov, S., & Bordachev, T. (2017). Toward the great ocean—5: From the turn to the East to Greater Eurasia. Report, Valdai Discussion Club. https:// valdaiclub.com/ Karaganov, S., & Bordachev, T. (2018). Toward the great ocean—6: People, history, ideology, education. Rediscovering the identity. Report, Valdai Discussion Club. https://valdaiclub.com/ Kendall-Taylor, A., & Shullman, D. (2021). The future of Russia–China relations. In Navigating the Deepening Russia–China Partnership (pp. 4–22). Center for a New American Security. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep286 53.5 Krickovic, A. (2017). The symbiotic China-Russia partnership: Cautious riser and desperate challenger. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 10(3), 299–329. Krickovic, A., & Pellicciari, I. (2021). From “Greater Europe” to “Greater Eurasia”: Status concerns and the evolution of Russia’s approach to alignment and regional integration. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 12(1), 86–99. Larsen, H. B. L. (2012). The Russo-Georgian war and beyond: Towards a European great power concert. European Security, 21(1), 102–121. Li, T., & Sheng, L. (2018). Corruption and travel: Effects of China’s anti-graft campaign on Macao. DIE ERDE, 149(1), 44–51.

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

39

Li, Y. (2018). The greater Eurasian partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative: Can the two be linked? Journal of Eurasian Studies, 9(2), 94–99. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2018.07.004 Li, Z. (2017). Greater Eurasian Partnership: Remodeling the Eurasian order? China International Studies, 63, 46. Liotta, P. H. (2005). Imagining Europe: Symbolic geography and the future. Mediterranean Quarterly, 16(3), 67–85. Lukin, A. (2018, February 8). Putin’s Silk Road gamble. Washington Post. Lukin, A. (2019). Russian-Chinese cooperation in central Asia and the idea of greater Eurasia. India Quarterly, 75(1), 1–14. Lukin, A., & Yakunin, V. (2018). Eurasian integration and the development of Asiatic Russia. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 9(2), 100–113. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.euras.2018.07.003 Luzyanin, S. (2018). Greater Eurasia: The common challenges for China and Russia. Valdai Discussion Club. https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/gre ater-eurasia-the-common-challenges/ Ly, B. (2020). China and global governance: Leadership through BRI. Cogent Social Sciences, 6(1), 1801371. Makarov, I., & Sokolova, A. (2016). Coordination of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt: Opportunities for Russia. International Organizations Research Journal, 11(2), 29–42. Mastanduno, M. (2019). Partner politics: Russia, China, and the challenge of extending US hegemony after the Cold War. Security Studies, 28(3), 479–504. Mearsheimer, J. (2005, November 18). The rise of China will not be peaceful at all. The Australian. https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/ 2019/06/The-Australian-November-18-2005.pdf Ministry of Commerce. (2017, July). China and Russia Sign the Joint Declaration of Feasible Study on Eurasian Economic Partnership Agreement. http:/ /english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201707/201 70702605903.shtml Nadege, R. (2017, June 5). Eurasian integration “a la Chinese”: Deciphering Beijing’s vision for the region as a “community of common destiny.” The Asan Forum. http://www.theasanforum.org/eurasian-integration-a-la-chinese-dec iphering-beijings-vision-for-the-region-as-a-community-of-common-destiny/ Nobletz, C. (2022). Green energy indices & financial markets: An in-depth look. International Economics, 171, 80–109. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.int eco.2022.05.004 Pieper, M. (2021). The New Silk Road heads north: Implications of the China– Mongolia–Russia economic corridor for Mongolian agency within Eurasian power shifts. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 62(5–6), 745–768. President of Russia. (2016a). Executive Order approving the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/53384

40

E. L. SHENG

President of Russia. (2016b, June 17). Plenary session of St Petersburg International Economic Forum. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/ 52178 President of Russia. (2019, April 26). Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60378. Ray, R., & Simmons, B. A. (2020). Tracking China’s overseas development finance. BU Global Development Policy Center. https://www.bu.edu/gdp/ 2020/12/07/tracking-chinas-overseas-development-finance/ Refinitiv. (2019). BRI connect: An initiative in numbers. New York: Refinitiv. Rolland, N. (2019). A China-Russia Condominium over Eurasia. Survival, 61(1), 7–22. Russel, D. R., & Berger, B. (2019). Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative. Report, Asia Society Policy Institute. Russian International Affairs Council, & Fudan University. (2018). Russian– Chinese dialogue: The 2018 model. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/ Sakwa, R. (2016). How the Eurasian elites envisage the role of the EEU in global perspective. European Politics and Society, 17 (Suppl. 1), 4–22. Schubert, J., & Savkin, D. (2016). Dubious economic partnership: Why a ChinaRussia free trade agreement is hard to reach. China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, 2(4), 529–547. Shakhanova, G., & Garlick, J. (2020). The Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union: Exploring the “Greater Eurasian Partnership.” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 49(1), 33–57. Shen, H. (2018). Building a Digital Silk Road? Situating the internet in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. International Journal of Communication, 12, 2683– 2701. Shen, S. (2016, February 7). How China’s “Belt and Road” compares to the Marshall Plan. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/how-chi nas-belt-and-road-compares-to-the-marshall-plan/ Shen, S., & Chan, W. (2018). A comparative study of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Marshall Plan. Palgrave Communications, 4, 32. https://doi.org/10. 1057/s41599-018-0077-9 Sheng, E. L. (2022a). Extra-regional players in the Arctic: EU, China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea. Arctic opportunities and challenges: China, Russia and the US cooperation and competition (pp. 115–140). Springer. Sheng, E. L. (2022b). Sino-Russian cooperation on the Polar Silk Road: Vision, divergence, and challenges. Arctic opportunities and challenges: China, Russia and the US cooperation and competition (pp. 51–67). Springer. Sheng, L. (2006). Der Einsatz von Asset Management Companies zur Lösung notleidender Kredite im chinesischen Bankensystem. Rombach Verlag.

1

THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE BELT …

41

Sheng, L. (2022a). Big tech and the nation-state. Big tech firms and international relations: The role of the nation-state in new forms of power (pp. 1–41). Springer. Sheng, L. (2022b). The acceleration of the global power transition: From west to east. In How COVID-19 reshapes new world order: Political economy perspective (pp. 25–46). Springer. Sheng, L. (2023). Chancen und Herausfordedrungen der Arktis: China. Springer. Sheng, L., & Felix do Nascimento, D. (2021). On Sino-US trade wars: A dialectical consideration. In Love and Trade War: China and the US in Historical Context (pp. 47–98). Palgrave Macmillan. Sheng, L., & Gao, J. (2018). Foreign investors versus host communities: An urban political economy model for tourist cities. Argumenta Oeconomica, 41(2), 257–275. Sheng, L., & Nascimento, D. (2021). The Belt and Road Initiative in SouthSouth cooperation: The impact on world trade and geopolitics. Palgrave Macmillan. Sokolsky, R. D. (2017). The New NATO–Russia military balance: Implications for European security. White paper, Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Starr, S. F. (2020). Greater Eurasia: Russia’s Asian Fantasy. Kennan Cable No. 46, Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cableno-46-greater-eurasia-russias-asian-fantasy State Council Information Office. (2019). Key takeaways on Belt and Road Initiative development. http://english.scio.gov.cn/beltandroad/201904/03/content_74641730.htm Stronski, P., & Ng, N. (2018, February 28). Cooperation and competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic. Paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Timofeev, I., Lissovolik, Y., & Filippova, L. (2017). Russia’s vision of the Belt and Road Initiative: From the rivalry of the Great Powers to forging a new cooperation model in Eurasia. China & World Economy, 25(5), 62–77. Tsvyk, A. V. (2018). ‘Greater Europe’ or ‘Greater Eurasia’? In search of new ideas for the Eurasian integration. Bulletin of Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (Bectnik Pocciuckogo ynivepciteta dpymcby napodov). Series: Sociology (Cepir: Cociologir), 18(2), 262–270. UK–China Offshore Wind Industry Advisory Group. (2021, May). IAG Newsletter No. 201. https://www.cbbc.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/ IAG%20Newsletter%20No.%201.pdf Wang, C. N. (2022). China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2021. Green BRI Center, International Institute of Green Finance. https:// greenfdc.org/brief-china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2021

42

E. L. SHENG

Wang, X. (2017). Ouya Quanmian Huoban Guanxi Dailai de Lishixing Jiyu yu Tiaozhan’ [Historic Opportunities and Challenges Generated by the Eurasian Comprehensive Partnership]. Eluosi Xuekan [Russia Journal], 20, 172. http:/ /www.cssn.cn/gjgxx/201710/t20171023_3676627.shtml Xinhua. (2015, May). China, Russia agree to integrate Belt initiative with EAEU construction. http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/201505/09/content_35527698.htm Xinhua. (2019, October). Xi, Putin exchange congratulations on 70th anniversary of diplomatic ties. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/02/c_1384 44539.htm Yang, H., Alexander, S. B., Ray, R., Nolte, C., Gopal, S., Ma, Y., Ma, X., & Gallagher, K. P. (2021). Risks to global biodiversity and indigenous lands from China’s overseas development finance. Nature Ecology & Evolution, 5(11), 1520–1529. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-021-01541-w Yang, L. (2016, January 28). Russia’s Greater Eurasia vs China’s Belt and Road. Ifeng. http://inews.ifeng.com/55485952/news.shtml?&back Zhao, H. (2018). Greater Eurasian Partnership: China’s perspective. China International Studies, 68, 68–84.

CHAPTER 2

China and the Atlantic Countries in the Context of the Belt and Road Initiative

2.1 China–Europe Competition Over the Belt and Road Initiative: Differences and Conflicts Since its launch in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been expanded to Africa, Latin America, and the South Pacific, including countries such as Russia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Australia, Myanmar, and Japan. With the BRI covering a wide area of Eurasia, from China’s east coast to the Atlantic Ocean, Europe has become an important region for China to promote the BRI. Whereas most of the countries along the Belt and Road are developing countries, Europe, a developed market, has been China’s largest trading partner for many years and holds an important and special position in the construction of the BRI. The European Union’s attitude toward the BRI has undergone a series of changes from wait-and-see to participation and from defensiveness to competition. Since the Chinese government first proposed the BRI, the European Union has deepened its understanding of the initiative and has set out a specific response at each stage. Initially, it took a cautious wait-and-see approach, with no explicit support for or hostility toward the initiative. It was only in 2015 that the European Union began to respond formally to the BRI. In May 2015, European Commission (EC) President Jean-Claude Juncker stated that there were no significant obstacles to integrating Europe’s investment plans (the “Juncker Plan”) with China’s BRI. In June of the same year, China and Europe proposed a © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. L. Sheng, Greater Eurasia Partnership and Belt and Road Initiative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3046-3_2

43

44

E. L. SHENG

series of initiatives, such as the dovetailing of the BRI with the Juncker Plan at the macro and technical levels and the establishment of an interconnection platform between China and Europe. The two sides had an in-depth exchange on promoting bilateral investment and trade from a strategic perspective. A broad consensus was also reached on docking the BRI with the Juncker Plan for cooperation on the digital economy. The two sides agreed to set up a working group to study concrete proposals for establishing a China–EU common investment fund, and in September 2015, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding on establishing a China–EU connectivity platform. This series of initiatives marked a shift in the European Union’s attitude toward the BRI from an initial wait-andsee approach to an attempt to participate. Meanwhile, as an important vehicle and platform for the BRI, the China Railway Express has effectively promoted trade between China and Europe and played a pivotal role in promoting and constructing the BRI.1 It was not until 2016 that a clear shift in the attitude of the European Union and some of its member states toward the BRI began to emerge. Although China continues to be seen as a promising export market and investment destination, its image as a fierce and unfair competitor has become more entrenched in the European Union. As the European Union’s understanding of the BRI has gradually deepened, it has become greatly concerned about the risks that the project might pose for Europe. Two main factors have led to a weakening of the initial European enthusiasm for the BRI. First, key EU member states have become more skeptical about China and the potential impact of the BRI on Europe’s economy, politics, and overall strategy.2 The BRI has come to be considered as an action plan for China to consolidate its current position and enhance its overall power to establish a network of relations with China at its core.3 Some EU scholars have likened the BRI to the Marshall Plan, stating that China is using a stimulus package to expand its global investment.4 The Chinese government’s investment behavior is seen as a form of creditor imperialism, and the BRI as a China-centered strategic plan

1 Men (2020). 2 Sheng (2023). 3 Li (2020). 4 Shen and Chan (2018).

2

CHINA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

45

for the future economic and political order with a dual nature of political control and economic expansion. These scholars regard the BRI as a challenge to the US-dominated unipolar world and believe that the BRI is fraught with uncertainties, such as opaque financing rules and unclear political motivations. In particular, at the 17 + 1 summit between China and Central and Eastern European countries, China seized the opportunity presented by the euro crisis to make large-scale acquisitions in Southern Europe, ignoring international investment regulations and weakening intra-European economic and trade solidarity. This has led to growing concerns in Western Europe that the BRI may increase competition between member states to attract Chinese investment and thus weaken the European Union’s economic and trade integration.5 Second, with the rise of Chinese companies in Western Europe, an increasing number of European businesspeople are dissatisfied with China’s trade barriers, industrial policies, and weak enforcement of intellectual property rights.6 There are risks that the BRI could lead to trade imbalances and increase pressure on other countries to take measures to protect their own industries. By investing in infrastructure and industry in other countries, China could create new opportunities for exports, which could help to further boost China’s current account surplus.7 However, most European entrepreneurs believe that China should take its share of responsibility in addressing bilateral trade imbalances and supporting the sustainable development of the global economy. Nevertheless, the European Union maintains a long-term partnership with China. Europe cannot completely abandon the considerable development opportunities offered by the BRI and must participate in the BRI and cooperate with China to a certain extent. The implementation of the BRI could also alleviate some of the financing problems faced by EU member states, given the high levels of public debt and a lack of capital in Europe. The BRI provides opportunities for the banks to expand their operations and increase their influence in the global financial system. Chinese banks are also working to promote the use of the renminbi (RMB) in BRI-related transactions, in order to reduce the dependence on the US dollar and increase the internationalization of the RMB. This

5 Pavli´cevi´c (2019). 6 Sheng (2011). 7 Yin and Sheng (2021).

46

E. L. SHENG

involves providing RMB-denominated financing and settlement services, as well as promoting the use of the RMB in cross-border trade.8 As a result, the relationship between China and Europe has become one of “coopetition.” In September 2018, the European Union published Connecting Europe & Asia: The EU Strategy, in which it emphasizes sustainable, broad-based, and rule-based interoperability across Eurasia. European powers and EU institutions will use their own rules and practices as a protective wall, increase the protection of EU common markets and common interests, and selectively cooperate with the BRI to prevent China from using an open, consultative approach. In addition, the huge market opportunities in Asia and Eurasia’s connectivity, the achievements of the BRI and its wide influence have led the European Union to seek concrete and in-depth cooperation with China while ensuring that its own priorities and specific interests are safeguarded. At the beginning of 2019, Europe’s cautious stance toward China, especially in the areas of trade, economy, and security, has become more pronounced. In March 2019, the EC released a report EU–China— A Strategic Outlook,9 which defines China as a systemic and strategic competitor. The document makes clear that the balance of opportunities and challenges brought by China to the European Union has shifted over the past decade, with China’s economic power and political influence growing at an unprecedented scale and speed, reflecting China’s ambition to become a leading global power, a partner of the European Union in many policy areas, and a negotiating partner. The EC also points out that China is an economic competitor of the European Union in terms of technological leadership and an institutional competitor in promoting alternative governance models. Although Russia is also seen by the European Union as a historical competitor, the European Union believes that Russia is using its confrontation with the West more as a tool for domestic legitimacy and regime survival, seeking to regain its sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union republics and operating in a relatively homogeneous manner, relying mainly on military strength while ignoring economic power, normative power, and the mutual transformation of power; in contrast, China is a major economic, political, technological, and even military power, and its rise is making the dominant power,

8 Sheng (2006). 9 European Commission (2019).

2

CHINA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

47

the United States, anxious. Simultaneously, as the BRI progresses, the European Union has proposed several connectivity policy initiatives across Europe. By interfacing with the BRI, the European Union hopes to enable the seamless, safe, and sustainable movement of people and goods across its territory to ensure accessibility and connectivity while improving transport services between Europe and Asia. Ntousas and Minas developed an argument from this report that the European Union’s attitude toward China and the BRI varies for different policies.10 For example, China is an important partner in climate change and a strategic competitor in telecommunications and other industries. In 2015, China released a 10-year economic plan called Made in China 2025 to promote state-led industrial development. This plan outlines China’s goal to rapidly develop ten high-technology industries, including telecommunications, green vehicles, and electrical engineering, to operate with new forms of energy. As these are industries in which Germany currently has a commercial advantage, the plan will increase economic competition between Germany and China. It is clear that China will become the main competitor and defensive object of European geopolitics, and the uncertainty of Sino–European relations will increase. However, this does not mean that the European Union will give up on cooperation with China or that the relationship between China and Europe will move to a state of full confrontation.11 The competitiveness and uncertainty of China–Europe relations mainly lies in the European Union’s interpretation of China’s policies and behavior from a geopolitical perspective and its consequent adoption of targeted measures.12 Behavior following this logic can easily lead to strategic misjudgment, aggravate the trust crisis, and bring about a vicious level of competition and even conflict. The European Union believes that the BRI follows a geopolitical and economic logic. Through the BRI and its debt trap policy, China can expand its military footprint globally at a relatively low cost in a short time. This will affect the global distribution of power and freedom of navigation. President Trump also expressed skepticism about the BRI, criticizing it as a “debt trap” and accusing China of using it to expand

10 Ntousas and Minas (2021). 11 Anthony et al. (2021). 12 Sheng (2022).

48

E. L. SHENG

its influence in other countries.13 Meanwhile, given that the eastern and southern parts of Europe and most NATO member states are along the Belt and Road pathway, China’s political influence is growing rapidly as economic cooperation strengthens, thus weakening cohesion within NATO and the European Union as a community of shared values and interests, the consequences of which are already evident in the voting behavior of some member states. For example, in July 2016, Hungary and Greece strove to avoid direct references to China in an EU statement on the ruling overturning China’s legal claims in the South China Sea; in March 2017, Hungary refused to sign a joint letter condemning China’s “mistreatment” of detained lawyers; and in June 2017, Greece rejected the European Union’s decision to issue a statement to the UN Human Rights Council criticizing China’s human rights record, which was the first time the European Union had failed to issue a joint statement to the Human Rights Council. Economic stagnation in Europe has led to a decline in its military power. Although China is not the source of these economic problems, its strategy of economic expansion is invisibly driving the process. Economically fragile EU countries such as Italy, Greece, and Spain would benefit from more exports, but one of the consequences of China’s aggressive export promotion is that European exports to Belt and Road countries have dropped while China’s continue to grow.14 China’s economic statecraft and initiatives like the BRI have reshaped the regional balance of power, exacerbated divisions inside the European Union, and lured both weak European countries and large, influential companies into economic dependency. Most European countries remain reluctant to face the reality of China’s offensive economic statecraft.15 China is playing a more assertive role in world affairs through the BRI by translating commercial inroads in Europe into political influence, investing in strategically important sectors, and achieving major breakthroughs in advanced digital technologies. China’s trade policies have also widened the rift between Europe and the United States. Heisbourg indicates his concern that the European allies in NATO will have to choose to side with or against the United States in disputes with China, much as they did during the Cold War.

13 Sheng and Felix do Nascimento (2021a). 14 Holslag (2019). 15 Ibid.

2

CHINA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

49

The dispute between the United States and China concerning the acquisition of 5G networks is the first major test of this proposition, as handling the precedent-setting 5G confrontation is a first-order political issue.16 With the rapid expansion of the BRI, including subprojects such as the Polar Silk Road and Cyber Silk Road, many NATO allies believe that the infrastructure coming along the BRI will affect communications and interoperability in Europe.17 In October 2019, the EC and the European Cybersecurity Agency released a cyber risk assessment that sets limits for 5G providers in EU countries. Although the report does not mention China, it echoes US policy toward China, with a clear intention of containment. Since 2003, Huawei has been involved in the construction of the United Kingdom’s communications network and was set to play a role in upgrading the network to 5G. Although former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson at one point decided to limit rather than prohibit Huawei from involvement in the 5G network rollout, the United Kingdom was put under pressure by the US government and the situation in Hong Kong, among other factors, to take a tougher stance. Since January 2020, the UK government has gradually banned Huawei from providing services in the country and has phased out Huawei products and facilities, which is seen as a sign of a shift in the United Kingdom’s policy toward China as a representative US ally. The British government announced in July 2020 that it would stop purchasing Huawei equipment at the end of the year and would gradually replace Huawei equipment in the country’s information network infrastructure. Many other countries remain hesitant to take this step. Although the BRI has geopolitical significance and aims to promote China’s interests, it is first and foremost an economic cooperation program involving the construction of infrastructure. The aim is to promote regional economic integration, freedom of trade, and modernization. Countries can simultaneously pursue their interests and cooperate with other countries to promote common interests. China brings Eurasia closer through integrated transport and infrastructure ties, deepening trade, and human links. By participating in this initiative, the European Union can make itself a player in constructing a multipolar world order and act as a counterweight to the coopetitive relationship between the

16 Heisbourg (2020). 17 Sheng (2022).

50

E. L. SHENG

United States and China. In the economic field, the BRI poses serious challenges but also offers several opportunities for the European Union. The interconnection within the BRI framework means more competition but also new markets for European companies. The planned infrastructure and related services will be beneficial for Europe, as is well illustrated by the Euro-Asian rail transport infrastructure, which is described as the symbolic realization of the BRI and which reduces transport costs and provides more market opportunities, thus benefiting EU trade. In many cases, BRI projects can provide excellent investment opportunities for the European financial sector. The BRI also offers geopolitical opportunities for the European Union. There is no doubt that the BRI can effectively mitigate some of the challenges facing the European Union, as it can stabilize its environment through joint economic development and potentially reduce migration pressures or terrorism. In fact, the most exciting question is whether, with the support of the BRI, Europe can change its century-old Atlantic focus and leave more room for a Eurasian orientation. Such a new positioning would imply a decline in US influence and international status in Europe, offering Europe the opportunity to break away from its subordinate status and to become fully empowered in the international order. Of course, this new geopolitical orientation requires a more coherent defense and foreign policy, which is essential for the European Union to be more successful in defending its interests. Many European elites believe that the achievements of the BRI in Europe are still relatively limited, there is still extensive work to be done in terms of policy communication between China and Europe, and the public opinion base of the BRI in Europe is relatively weak. According to European elites, the risks of Sino–European cooperation around the BRI are mainly focused on trade and trade structure imbalances, transparency of infrastructure construction in China, and a lack of reciprocity in market access between China and Europe. The BRI faces six major risks in Europe: economic and trade frictions between China and Europe, a rise of protectionism, the uncertainty of European integration, geopolitical changes in Europe, the continued poor public opinion environment, and misperceptions of the Chinese model.18 Therefore, European elites suggest that China should improve reciprocity and market openness, that

18 Liu (2019).

2

CHINA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

51

the initiatives of both sides could be fully aligned, and that the localization of investments and better cooperation between Chinese and European companies should be encouraged.

2.2 Sino–US Strategic Games: Challenges and Countermeasures to the Belt and Road Initiative Rather than leading the United States to see China as a potential partner, the rapid development of China’s economy has made the United States increasingly worried about its rise as a peer and competitor. US politicians and strategic thinkers increasingly see China as a threat to US interests. Many Chinese scholars have pointed out that the United States launched a trade war against China because the irresistible rise of China’s comprehensive national power is threatening US hegemony.19 The Biden–Harris Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy 20 states that China is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so. The document claims that China has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power, and that it is using its technological capacity and increasing influence over international institutions to create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model and to mold global technology use and norms to privilege its interests and values. China is described as making frequent use of its economic power to coerce countries and of benefiting from the openness of the international economy while limiting access to its domestic market; in brief, it seeks to make the world more dependent on China while reducing its own dependence on the world. The BRI involves large-scale investment and infrastructure projects aimed at promoting cooperation and connectivity between China and the rest of the world. As the Chinese government expands its BRI roadmap, countries around the world have interpreted it differently based on their national situation. Some countries have responded positively to the BRI, others have adopted a skeptical, wait-and-see attitude, and some have 19 Liu and Woo (2018), Sheng and Felix do Nascimento (2021d). 20 White House (2022).

52

E. L. SHENG

openly opposed the BRI. In the current context of increasing competition between major powers, the rise of the Chinese economy, and the US pivot to Asia, the attitude of the United States toward the BRI is particularly important. Some Western analysts with a Cold War or power politics mindset see China as a challenger to the existing international system and order and a possible future world hegemon; they also believe that the rise of emerging powers represented by China has affected the hegemonic position of the United States. Sino–US relations are undergoing a “paradigm shift” characterized by “great power competition,” and in the foreseeable future, the BRI will become the focus of strategic competition between China and the United States. As a result, US–China relations will have a decisive impact on the future course of international dynamics. According to the Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China released in 2019 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States,21 the rise of China over the past decade has led to great concern in the United States, with policymakers especially concerned about the security issues involved. According to the report, China and its leaders greatly benefited in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, which is regarded by China as “the period of strategic opportunities.” During this period, China was allowed to focus on its domestic development, enhancing its comprehensive national power to secure its status as a great power and emerging as a preeminent power in the Indo-Pacific region. The report also highlights the danger of the BRI, pointing out that “China’s advancement of projects such as the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) will probably drive military overseas basing through a perceived need to provide security for OBOR projects.” For the Department of Defense, the “OBOR is intended to develop strong economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to sensitive issues.” At the same time, the DoD criticizes the security concepts about the Indo-Pacific region advocated by China’s President Xi Jinping. The DoD argues that “China also seeks to secure these goals without jeopardizing the regional stability that remains critical to economic development; this stability has helped the CCP maintain the legitimacy that has kept it in power.” In other words, to suppress the development of China, the United States

21 Office of the Secretary of Defense (2019).

2

CHINA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

53

is willing to destabilize this region, if necessary. Another concern raised in the report is international finance, especially regarding the issue of China’s Yuan expansion. The DoD believes that countries that participate in the BRI will have greater economic dependence on Chinese capital, which China will leverage to achieve its interests in target countries and regions. Furthermore, the report directly links finance to military capacity, stressing that “some OBOR investments could create potential military advantages for China, should China require access to selected foreign ports to preposition the necessary logistics support to sustain naval deployments in waters as distant as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean to protect its growing interests.” The report also discusses the international image of China against the background of the BRI, claiming that the “CCP [Chinese Communist Party] seeks to condition foreign and multilateral political establishments and public opinion to accept China’s narrative surrounding its priorities like OBOR and the South China Sea territorial and maritime claims.” In contrast, the exorbitant privileges that the United States obtained from the US dollar’s reserve currency status are accompanied by increasing difficulties, as posed by the Triffin dilemma.22 According to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, given that the rise of Athens in the fifth century B.C. caused the land hegemon Sparta to be wary and war was a common historical pattern, the challenge of the established hegemon to an emerging power often leads to war. This concept is cited in Harvard professor Graham Allison’s, 2017 book Destined for War in his exploration of the future of China and the United States. He argues that China’s rise and the countermeasures from the United States are leading the two countries into confrontation and that whether the two powers can ultimately avoid a war mainly depends on whether they can escape the “Thucydides Trap.”23 The Thucydides Trap seems to be the accepted thesis of many scholars of Sino–US relations. Especially with the escalating trade dispute between China and the United States and the outbreak of COVID-19, many scholars fear that China and

22 The Triffin dilemma suggests that a country that has a dominant international currency, like the US dollar, will face conflicts between its domestic monetary policy objectives and the global need for a stable reserve currency, which could ultimately lead to a crisis of confidence in the currency. 23 Allison (2017).

54

E. L. SHENG

the United States will fall into the aforementioned Thucydides Trap and start a new Cold War. John Mearsheimer, an international relations scholar and professor at the University of Chicago, argues that the ultimate goal of competition between great powers is to gain dominant power over others, as this is the best way to ensure one’s own survival. As each competitor wants to gain a competitive advantage over the others, states are destined to clash.24 Some international analysts have pointed out the geopolitical nature of the BRI, implying that China’s expansionism is a challenge to the USled global order.25 Western analysts tend to view the BRI as China’s grand and well-thought-out strategy to regain geopolitical dominance in Asia and establish a China-centric world order.26 The BRI is thus often compared to the US Marshall Plan that revived Western Europe after World War II to promote the argument that China is trying to use its economic power to achieve geopolitical dominance.27 Conversely, some scholars express support for the BRI by arguing that China simply wants to integrate itself into the global economy,28 with the BRI guided by the goal of strengthening relations between China and developing countries. The United States understands the BRI as primarily a geo-economic and geopolitical strategy and a competitive move from China. Officially, the United States looks on with indifference and a predominantly negative view, believing that the BRI will weaken US influence and even hegemony in Asia, Europe, the Asia–Pacific region, and the world, and that it will affect the international economic and financial system created under US leadership after the Second World War. The United States has openly opposed and threatened its allies and Third World countries over cooperation with China. As early in 2015, the Obama administration was highly unsatisfied with the interest shown by some US allies, including the United Kingdom, South Korea, and Australia, in joining the Chinasponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and he repeatedly urged these countries to think carefully before making a decision. The United

24 Mearsheimer and Alterman (2001). 25 Hamilton and Ohlberg (2020), Martinico and Wu (2020), Miskimmon et al. (2021). 26 Callahan (2016), Fallon (2015), Leverett and Bingbing (2017), Staníˇcková and

Fojtíková (2021). 27 Shen and Chan (2018). 28 Summers (2016).

2

CHINA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

55

Kingdom’s application to become a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was even met with a public censure from the United States. Despite suspicions over China’s BRI, the Obama administration did not make a clear challenge to it.29 It was not until the Trump years that the outbreak of the US–China trade war brought bilateral relations to a freezing point. Washington described the BRI as an inherently flawed vehicle for risky investments and predatory economic and debt sovereignty deals, arguing that China had military-strategic intentions under the guise of these investment projects. Of particular concern was that China sought to expand its so-called “digital authoritarianism” through the Digital Silk Road.30 From a review of a 2020 Congress of the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission report, Sheng and do Nascimento conclude several key points about US politicians’ attitudes toward China’s intentions and the scale of these intentions with the BRI. (i) China wants to create “a parallel order of alternative China-centric organizations, including the BRI, and China is creating an integrated economic and geopolitical order under China’s leadership. Beijing seeks to use its central role in this new parallel order to exploit globalization, using the networks and resources of other countries while limiting access to its own market.” (ii) The US Department of Commerce tightened restrictions on Huawei and added over 100 China-based entries to the Entity List for a range of activities, including illicitly providing US technology to China’s military, aiding in the repression of China’s ethnic Uyghur minority, and constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea. (iii) The Chinese government views technical standards as a policy tool to advance its economic and geopolitical interests. It has systematically tried to expand its influence in international standards-setting organizations by installing Chinese nationals in key leadership and functionary positions, and pushing standards backed by its industrial policies. (iv) China’s commitments to provide greater market access for some foreign financial services may present commercial opportunities for US firms but could also expose US financial institutions and investors to substantial risks. (v) The recent iteration of China’s industrial policies is predicated on the assumption that a “cluster of revolutionary new technologies” will reshape “the global competitive landscape and [change] the

29 Shah (2021). 30 Zhao (2021).

56

E. L. SHENG

relative strength of nations.” This cluster incorporates high-speed Internet and 5G telecommunications networks, artificial intelligence and robotics, and interconnected sensors, with applications spanning the economic and military realms. Beijing views mastery of this integrated suite of technologies as a chance for Chinese companies to overtake the United States and other market incumbents in the global hierarchy, whereas failure to do so would represent a major setback. (vi) China’s comprehensive approach to technological growth and infrastructure can ultimately be exported through channels such as the BRI’s Digital Silk Road, for which loan signatories may be required to adopt Chinese technical standards as part of the terms of agreement. (vii) The BRI subverts the global order by influencing existing multilateral organizations. The BRI’s amorphous setup allows it the flexibility to fit these diverse projects within organizations like the UN or frameworks like the World Trade Organization when it serves China’s interests. The report mentions the presence of China in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean, and refers to the issues of Taiwan and Hong Kong. It also repeats the rhetoric of the Trump administration on the COVID-19 pandemic, blaming China for its spread and for using the fight against the pandemic to promote itself: “Beijing has tried to use the COVID-19 pandemic to promote itself as a responsible and benevolent global leader and to prove that its model of governance is superior to liberal democracy.”31 The US government aims to dissuade other countries from joining the BRI and to propose alternative infrastructure, investment, and aid programs to strengthen cooperation with its allies and Third World countries. The United States has adopted a comprehensive “containment” strategy against China, attacking and suppressing China in the political, economic, cultural, social, and information fields. Trade wars, technology wars, information wars, and financial wars have intensified, leading to a competition between the United States and China that is no longer a simple economic and trade friction but a confrontation between the two countries in all fields. The US–China technology war undermines the global technology ecology and hinders technological cooperation between countries, which will affect the technological progress of other countries and lead to a slowdown in global technological progress. Under the impact of the trade war, bilateral trade between the United States and

31 Sheng and Felix do Nascimento (2021b).

2

CHINA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

57

China declined sharply in 2019. Sheng and do Nascimento summarize the main elements of Phase One of the U.S.–China Economic and Trade Agreement, signed in early 2020, as follows. The United States and China agreed to the following. (i) Enforceable obligations on trade secrets, patents, trademarks, geographic indications, pharmaceutical-related intellectual property, and enforcement against pirated and counterfeit goods will be included. (ii) China is prohibited from forcing or pressuring US companies to turn over their technology as a condition for market access, to gain administrative or licensing approvals, or to receive advantages from the Chinese government. Any transfer of technology must be voluntary and take place in market terms. (iii) The agriculture chapter of the agreement addresses a number of structural barriers to US exports. China must implement a fair, predictable, science-based, and risk-based regulatory process that will facilitate exports of US meat, poultry, seafood, rice, dairy, infant formula, horticultural products, animal feed, and pet food, among other items. Importantly, this agreement includes requirements to approve certain US biotech products more promptly. (iv) The agreement removes a wide range of discriminatory regulatory requirements and limitations that have stifled US companies seeking to operate in China’s financial services market. In addition, the agreement requires China to increase purchases of US exports by no less than $200 billion over the next two years in four major areas: manufactured goods, agriculture, energy, and services.32 The Biden administration has largely continued Trump’s approach to China, which is explicitly seen as the most serious competitor of the United States. At the G7 Summit in June 2021, under the auspices of the Biden administration, the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom launched the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative for global infrastructure,33 which aims to support low- and medium-income countries’ infrastructure construction to hedge the impact of China’s BRI. The G7 countries agreed to cooperate on the specific details of the program. The content of the B3W is closely linked to competing issues, such as ideology, trade, and security; it is not only politically charged but

32 Sheng and Felix do Nascimento (2021c). 33 EU Council (2021).

58

E. L. SHENG

also constantly hints at the dominant position of the United States in promoting the initiative.34 As China’s BRI expands into Europe, it will include an increasing number of NATO members. China will need to deal simultaneously with the strategic game between the major powers and the relationship between the major powers and the countries along the BRI. Although the United States is not located along the BRI, its role cannot be ignored. As things stand, the United States has a generally negative attitude toward the BRI. China needs to pay attention to promoting BRI cooperation while strengthening ties with the United States and finding entry points on issues of US concern. Furthermore, the BRI has scope for a variety of collaborations with US companies, with many US companies such as General Electric, Caterpillar, and Honeywell having been involved in and benefited from China’s One Belt One Road project in Africa.35 Therefore, offering business opportunities to US companies, strengthening cooperation with these companies, and then extending this to the US government could play a role in easing US–China tensions. Moreover, the United States and China can cooperate effectively in providing international public goods and build new partnerships in international development. European and Asia–Pacific countries do not want the relationship between B3W and BRI to become a zero-sum game and thus face the dilemma of choosing sides. Jones believes that viewing the BRI as a Chinese geopolitical strategy overestimates the ability of the Chinese central government to formulate and implement a clear, coherent, and well-defined grand strategy.36 Zeng similarly suggests that the Belt and Road is an evolving, vague, Chinese concept that often exceeds Beijing’s expectations, rather than a well-designed, clearly defined grand strategy.37 In a direct response to the geopolitical narrative, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi commented that “The Belt and Road Initiative is a product of inclusive cooperation, not a tool of geopolitics, and the war mentality must not be viewed with an outdated cold eye.”38 The mainstream analysis of the BRI tends to view 34 Khan and Khan (2022). 35 Wang and Huo (2019). 36 Jones and Zou (2017). 37 Zeng (2019). 38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015).

2

CHINA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

59

it as China’s master plan to achieve its geopolitical goals, exaggerating both China’s capabilities and the BRI’s geopolitical threats. China states that the BRI is about meeting global infrastructure development needs and promoting economic growth in developing countries. The achievements that China has made over the past 40 years of reform and opening up are based on the country’s integration into the existing international system. China hopes that the system will become more complete, rational, and orderly, but it does not intend to break up the international order to establish a new one. In June 2021, G7 leaders released a summit communiqué entitled Our Shared Agenda for Global Action to Build Back Better, which includes the B3W global initiative: a values-based, high-standard, transparent infrastructure partnership led by leading democracies to catalyze hundreds of billions of dollars of infrastructure investment in low- and middle-income countries.39 In the current international context and in the context of increased competition between the United States and China, analysts tend to view B3W as targeting China and Russia. In the section on “Global Responsibility and International Action,” the communiqué highlights a collective approach to China’s non-market policies and practices that undermine the fair and transparent functioning of the global economy. In the context of US–China competition, B3W can be seen as a countermeasure to China’s BRI. If B3W and BRI are competitors, both will face a series of challenges. Despite the rapid development of the BRI and its many notable achievements, the COVID-19 pandemic has raised concerns about its sustainability. B3W is a collective initiative, and as such, it inevitably involves divergent internal interests. Its private capital nature may also limit its ability to compete with the state-backed BRI.40 B3W seeks to move beyond the regional nature of the various overseas infrastructure cooperation programs launched by the United States and its allies in recent years to a “global” focus that would include the entire developing world. Geographically, it would include all low- and middle-income countries around the world, including in Latin America, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific region. According to the communiqué, the global initiative has six main goals: (i) vaccinate the world and end the COVID-19 pandemic; (ii) revitalize economies by creating jobs, investing

39 EU Council (2021). 40 Miller (2021).

60

E. L. SHENG

in infrastructure, and promoting innovation; (iii) secure existing global trade, taxation, technological transformation, cyberspace, and outer space systems; (iv) protect the environment by supporting green development, reducing emissions and seeking to limit global warming to protect the environment; (v) strengthen partnerships around the world, particularly in Africa; and (vi) support the values of democracy, freedom, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. A White House fact sheet describes B3W as a proactive initiative to meet the enormous infrastructure needs of low- and middle-income countries and a transparent infrastructure partnership based on values, high standards, and leadership from leading democracies with the goal of helping developing countries. The goal is to help developing countries build more than USD 40 trillion in infrastructure by mobilizing bilateral and multilateral and private sector capital investments in four areas: climate, health and health security, digital technology, and gender equality and equity.41 Moreover, to achieve the goal of green and sustainable development, B3W claims to be strict in project selection and financing methods, fully integrating the requirements of different stakeholders. It also seeks to achieve transparent competition in project construction and to prevent corruption and ecological impacts by increasing the participation of host countries, local governments, labor organizations, and civil society groups and by effectively leveraging the effectiveness of public financing platforms and the enthusiasm of private capital.42 Howard W. French asserts that despite the Biden administration’s denial of the political nature of the initiative, it is clearly intended to raise the West’s profile in competition with China.43 The B3W proposal sends a message that the United States under President Biden is planning to reinvigorate its role as a key driver of multilateral cooperation in support of sustainable economic development. As a leader of the initiative, Washington has committed to mobilizing funds from sources such as the Development Finance Corporation, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Export–Import Bank. Some scholars argue that B3W will be unable to compete with China’s lower costs, more lenient standards, and faster timelines. If the G7 intends to outbid China as a major provider of traditional infrastructure, the

41 White House (2021). 42 Zhao (2021). 43 French and Dollar (2021).

2

CHINA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

61

money will be spent on social spending and human capital development, which is not feasible. The biggest difference between the B3W and BRI is the B3W’s focus on good governance. The White House has dedicated entire paragraphs to the values-driven nature of the program, emphasizing its commitment to transparency and financial, environmental, and social sustainability. The G7 specifically commits to anti-corruption, social inclusion, high levels of labor security, and combating climate change.44 There are significant differences in scope, funding, and governance between the B3W and BRI programs. The B3W program places human infrastructure at the core of global development rather than physical infrastructure. The White House and G7 emphasize the goals of promoting health security, digital technology, and gender equality, which are consistent with other G7 initiatives, from global vaccine distribution to decarbonization to expanding female education. B3W also faces funding challenges. The G7 communiqué calls on each of its members to mobilize the needed funds from their respective development agencies, bilateral partnerships, multilateral development banks, and other international financial institutions. B3W is also eager to mobilize significant private capital for its infrastructure investments, which is often challenging because of the perceived risks in developing and emerging markets, including weaknesses in the rule of law, macroeconomic instability, and environmental, social, health, and security risks. The BRI’s main advantage is that China has strong infrastructure construction ability and can provide a one-stop service for project financing, insurance, and construction for developing countries. Developing countries are less attracted by ambitious monologues about democracy, freedom, and openness; they are more concerned with building usable roads, bridges, and airports. Many low- and middle-income countries prefer China’s state-backed loans to the more expensive, shorter-term private funding offered by Western financiers. The United States and other G7 countries often impose conditions that developing countries feel are onerous and that delay project implementation and increase costs. Most importantly, B3W relies on unreliable private funding. It is difficult to convince private companies in developed G7 countries to invest in developing countries because they see such investment as high risk and low return.

44 Crystal (2021).

62

E. L. SHENG

In infrastructure, the United States is significantly behind China in terms of funding, institutional mechanisms, and experience. Although the Biden administration continues to push for B3W, especially given the high standards it promotes, it is also time to face a hard truth: B3W may not be as effective as the BRI. Instead, the Biden administration should turn to other areas of economic and diplomatic engagement, such as digital trade agreements to set regional rules for cross-border data flows, privacy protections, and artificial intelligence. Therefore, some scholars argue that the Biden administration’s B3W initiative is more suitable as a complement to China’s BRI than as an alternative to it. Similar to the BRI, B3W aims to promote transnational and regional cooperation between relevant countries while facilitating large-scale projects in developing countries. However, B3W has not evolved from a vision to a concrete plan: no specific funding commitments have been made, and no multilateral project management coordination mechanism has been announced. In addition, there is no indication of which G7 companies will be able to engage in international contracting work. Assuming that B3W does materialize as envisioned and agreed, it might complement the BRI in four ways. First, whereas B3W aims to be a market-led bilateral and multilateral approach, the BRI relies heavily on bilateral state-backed concessional and commercial loans to leverage private sector capital and on state-owned enterprises. Second, whereas the BRI primarily focuses on project construction, digital technologies, and physical infrastructure (such as ports, roads, dams, railways, power plants, and telecommunications facilities), B3W focuses on climate, health, health security, and gender equality and equality. Third, a common goal of B3W and BRI is to develop green and sustainable infrastructure to minimize ecological impact, reduce pollution, and improve energy efficiency to address global climate change challenges. Fourth, developing countries’ rational choice is to use the resources of both the B3W initiative and the BRI rather than choose between the two. Therefore, they will expect the host country to direct them to different sectors to meet their various needs. At the same time, there are signs of an increase in the number of countries participating in the BRI. Over the past two decades, Chinese companies have accumulated rich experience in building infrastructure overseas, whether through contracted project construction or foreign aid. This gives them a comparative advantage in cost and project turnaround time.

2

CHINA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

63

For many investors and G7 companies, the B3W initiative’s reliance on and mobilization of private sector capital to improve infrastructure in low- and middle-income countries is deemed too risky. In general, wealth and fund managers who own pension funds, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds are looking for reliable long-term returns. That the private sector has been reluctant to participate in or invest in some Belt and Road projects in the Middle East suggests that G7 companies may also balk at similarly risky development projects. In contrast, Chinese companies are more willing to invest in larger, riskier projects, offer flexible financing arrangements, and coordinate project paperwork and seller credit. Finally, among the terms and conditions proposed for joining the B3W initiative are upholding human rights and the rule of law and preventing corruption. In reality, however, low-income countries are often plagued by these problems. Given their predicaments and priorities, it seems unlikely that local governments will place themselves in the conditions required by B3W to continue seeking its benefits. The stability and prosperity of the world will be best served if the B3W initiative and the BRI work together.

References Allison, G. (2017). Destined for war: Can America and China escape Thucydides’s Trap? Scribe Publications. Anthony, I., Yuan, J., & Xia, S. (2021). Promoting China–European Union cooperation on green and sustainable finance. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Callahan, W. A. (2016). China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the new Eurasian order. Norwegian Institute for International Affairs. Crystal, C. (2021). The G7’s B3W infrastructure plan can’t compete with China. That’s not the point. Council on Foreign Relations. EU Council. (2021, June 13). 2021 G7 Leaders’ communiqué: Our shared agenda for global action to build back better. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ press/press-releases/2021/06/13/2021-g7-leaders-communique/ European Commission. (2019). EU–China – A strategic outlook. https://ec.eur opa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook. pdf Fallon, T. (2015). The new Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s grand strategy for Eurasia. American Foreign Policy Interests, 37 (3), 140–147. https://doi.org/10. 1080/10803920.2015.1056682

64

E. L. SHENG

French, H. W., & Dollar, D. (2021, July 6). How should the G-7 respond to China’s BRI? Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/howshould-the-g-7-respond-to-chinas-bri/ Hamilton, C., & Ohlberg, M. (2020). Hidden hand: Exposing how the Chinese Communist Party is reshaping the world. Simon and Schuster. Heisbourg, F. (2020). NATO 4.0: The Atlantic alliance and the rise of China. Survival, 62(2), 83–102. Holslag, J. (2019). China, NATO, and the pitfall of empty engagement. The Washington Quarterly, 42(3), 137–150. Jones, L., & Zou, Y. (2017). Rethinking the role of state-owned enterprises in China’s rise. New Political Economy, 22(6), 743–760. https://doi.org/10. 1080/13563467.2017.1321625 Khan, A., & Khan, S. N. (2022). BRI vs. B3W: A rivalry for economic hegemony: An archival research. Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 61(1), 31–44. Leverett, F., & Bingbing, W. (2017). The New Silk Road and China’s evolving grand strategy. The China Journal, 77 (4), 110–132. https://doi.org/10. 1086/689684 Li, M. (2020). The Belt and Road Initiative: Geo-economics and Indo-Pacific security competition. International Affairs, 96(1), 169–187. Liu, T., & Woo, W. T. (2018). Understanding the US–China trade war. China Economic Journal, 11(3), 319–340. Liu, Z. (2019, September). Europe and the Belt and Road Initiative: Response and risks. HKTDC Research. https://research.hktdc.com/en/article/MzY yOTgyMDg5 Martinico, G., & Wu, X. (2020). A legal analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative: Towards a new Silk Road? Palgrave Macmillan. Mearsheimer, J. J., & Alterman, G. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. WW Norton & Company. Men, J. (2020). China-Europe railway connectivity: Opportunities and challenges. In A. Lukin (Ed.), The “Roads” and “Belts” of Eurasia (pp. 129–146). Palgrave Macmillan. Miller, N. W. (2021). Who will win the strategic long game? The G7’s Build Back Better World or China’s Belt and Road Initiative? Sochin Research Institute. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2015). Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets the press. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1243662.shtml Miskimmon, A., O’Loughlin, B., & Zeng, J. (2021). One Belt, One Road, One story? Towards an EU–China strategic narrative. Palgrave Macmillan. Ntousas, V., & Minas, S. (2021). The European Union and China’s Belt and Road. Routledge. Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2019, May 2). Annual report to congress: Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic

2

CHINA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

65

of China. https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/ 1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf Pavli´cevi´c, D. (2019). A power shift underway in Europe? China’s relationship with Central and Eastern Europe under the Belt and Road Initiative. In Li. Xing (Ed.), Mapping China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative (pp. 249–278). Palgrave Macmillan. Shah, A. R. (2021). Revisiting China threat: The US’ securitization of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. Chinese Political Science Review, 8, 84–104 (2023). Shen, S., & Chan, W. (2018). A comparative study of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Marshall Plan. Palgrave Communications, 4(1). https://doi.org/10. 1057/s41599-018-0077-9 Sheng, E. L. (2022). The Polar Silk Road and the Belt and Road Initiative: Integration and optimization. In Arctic opportunities and challenges: China, Russia and the US Cooperation and Competition (pp. 141–164). Springer Singapore. Sheng, E. L. (2023). Case studies. In S. J. Clarke (Ed.), Contemporary strategic Chinese American business negotiations and market entry (pp. 517–541). Palgrave Macmillan. Sheng, L. (2006). Der Einsatz von Asset Management Corporations zur Loesung des Problems der notleidenden Kredite im chinesischen Bankensystem. Rombach Verlag. Sheng, L. (2011). Theorising free capital mobility: The perspective of developing countries. Review of International Studies, 37 (5), 2519–2534. Sheng, L. (2022). Big tech containment policies of the European Union. In Big tech firms and international relations: The role of the nation-state in new forms of power (pp. 71–92). Springer Nature Singapore. Sheng, L., & Felix do Nascimento, D. (2021a). Geopolitics in the trade war. In Love and Trade War: China and the US in Historical Context, (pp. 99–128). Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. Sheng, L., & Felix do Nascimento, D. (2021b) The Belt and Road Initiative in South–South cooperation: The Impact on world trade and geopolitics. Palgrave Macmillan. Sheng, L., & Felix do Nascimento, D. (2021c). On Sino-US trade wars: A dialectical consideration. In Love and trade war: China and the US in historical context (pp. 47–98). Palgrave Macmillan. Sheng, L., & Felix do Nascimento, D. (2021d). A brief history of trade wars. In Love and trade war: China and the US in historical context (pp. 1–46). Palgrave Macmillan. Staníˇcková, M., & Fojtíková, L. (2021). Belt and Road Initiative alias Chinese Dream: How are the cards dealt for this game? China and the World, 4(3), 2150014. https://doi.org/10.1142/s2591729321500140

66

E. L. SHENG

Summers, T. (2016). China’s “New Silk Roads”: Sub-national regions and networks of global political economy. Third World Quarterly, 37 (9), 1628– 1643. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1153415 Wang, W., & Huo, S. (2019). One Belt One Road—New game, established rules. Open Journal of Political Science, 9(3), 582. White House. (2021). Fact sheet: President Biden and G7 leaders launch Build Back Better World (B3W) partnership. https://www.whitehouse.gov/bri efing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-bidenand-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/ White House. (2022). National security strategy. https://www.whitehouse.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload. pdf Yin, Y., & Sheng, L. (2021). Theorizing about global imbalances: An inequality perspective. Argumenta Oeconomica, 46(1), 169–181. Zeng, J. (2019). Narrating China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Global Policy, 10(2), 207–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12662 Zhao, M. (2021). The Belt and Road Initiative and China–US strategic competition. China International Strategy Review, 3(2), 248–260.

CHAPTER 3

Russia and the Atlantic Countries in the Context of the Greater Eurasian Partnership

3.1 European and Russian Sanctions and Countersanctions: The Shattering of Russia’s “European Dream”? The concept of a Greater Europe originated with former French President de Gaulle, who referred to Europe as the area from Lisbon to the Urals. During a visit to Germany in September 1962, de Gaulle suggested that Germany would someday build Europe together with the Soviet Union. The purpose of this statement was to demonstrate the independence and openness of French diplomacy and to eliminate the dominating influence of the United States in European affairs.1 Later, in 1987, then General Secretary of the Soviet Union Gorbachev expanded on this idea in his “New Thinking” by putting forward the concept of a “Common European Home” stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok.2 Based on this idea, the Soviet Union agreed to reunite East and West Germany in the context of Gorbachev’s reforms and new ways of thinking, which would eventually lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Today, the concept of a Greater Europe encompasses politically and geographically the countries of northern Eurasia, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific coasts 1 Jackson (1989), Snyder (2011). 2 Casier (2018).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. L. Sheng, Greater Eurasia Partnership and Belt and Road Initiative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3046-3_3

67

68

E. L. SHENG

and including all of the nations of Europe and several Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, such as Russia and Kazakhstan. In Russia’s early foreign policy vision, a European orientation was always a priority. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia made the “European choice” of a “return to Europe.” For a long time afterward, Russian diplomacy had as its strategic objective the achievement of European integration and its diplomats repeatedly stressed that Russia was an integral part of European civilization. Since the late 1990s, Russia has joined the Council of Europe and initiated a series of positive bilateral contacts at summit meetings with the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It was hoped that a Greater Europe program could be launched to integrate into Europe’s financial markets and give Russia its rightful place in the continent. However, the idea of directly absorbing Russia was immediately rejected by the European Union, which stated only that it wanted to deepen its strategic partnership with Russia. In the eyes of the Russian political elite, only by uniting European and Russian potential could a strong and genuinely independent Europe emerge as a genuine pole of the world order. Russian leaders have thus pursued the idea of building a Greater Europe and Russia has shown unprecedented activity in the European direction. However, the pictures of a Greater Europe envisaged by Russia and the European Union differ. Russia wants to be part of and on par with the West,3 but Western European politicians view Greater Europe as an ambitious project with European civilization at its heart. Europe wants Russia to be a friendly neighboring country that is free of political ambitions, to which end they seek to prevent Russia from reverting to a Soviet attitude toward them.4 These divergent pictures of a Greater Europe generate a sharp contradiction in the geopolitical dimension of Russia’s European choice. Russia’s position can be seen in the eight basic principles underlying its Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) project and setting it apart from other plans for Eurasian unification, as listed by Andrey Kortunov (2020)5 : First, the GEP is not viewed as a potential competitor of regional integration structures (the Association of Southeast Asian

3 Hello et al. (2002), Krickovic and Pellicciari (2021). 4 Sakwa (2021). 5 Kortunov (2020).

3

RUSSIA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

69

Nations, Eurasian Economic Union [EAEU], or Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) or of trans-border economic projects (the Belt and Road Initiative [BRI]) and organizations (the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, or Asia–Europe Meeting). On the contrary, all of those structures, projects, and organizations are seen as nodes and individual parts of a future single Eurasian economic mechanism. The objective of the GEP is to assemble these parts and nodes together without detriment to those elements that have already demonstrated their efficiency. Second, the GEP is not a union of the Eurasian East against the European West; as a large peninsula in the north-west of the Eurasian continent, Europe should not be opposed to Eurasia but rather should become an integral part of it. Therefore, the GEP remains open to the European Union, which could join its activities in the forms and to the extent that it deems appropriate. Third, when building the GEP, the parties need to proceed from the understanding that significant differences will remain in the models of their social, political, and even economic development. Eurasia is home to socialist states and liberal democracies and to market and planned economies, and the GEP does not set itself the task of eliminating political plurality and imposing some common denominator or single set of values. The activities of the GEP should be based on universally recognized norms of international law and offer the greatest level of comfort for all participants. Equally, and unlike many integration projects, the GEP should not have leaders and outsiders, “pilots” and “wingmen,” or a “central nucleus” and a “periphery.” Fourth, unlike the European Union with its rigid integration structures, the GEP envisages highly flexible forms for the involvement of individual states or regional groups in its activities. Countries may join individual dimensions of the GEP (trade, finance, infrastructure, visas, etc.) when they are ready and with due account of their current needs and capabilities. Fifth, although the GEP is focused on the economic unification of the Eurasian continent, the expansion of economic interactions will inevitably influence other areas of cooperation, such as science and education, culture, and humanitarian contacts. Eurasian integration will fail if it is reduced to increasing trade and investment, and social interaction between the peoples of Eurasia and economic cooperation between Eurasian states should supplement and stimulate each other. Sixth, it is impossible to develop economic integration projects in Eurasia without simultaneously creating a parallel process of bolstering

70

E. L. SHENG

continental security and resolving problems inherited from the twentieth century and earlier. These problems include territorial disputes, separatism, the “divided peoples” phenomenon, the arms race, and the dangers of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, and religious extremism. Consequently, the building of the GEP should go hand in hand with developing mechanisms for military and political cooperation on the continent, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia. Seventh, implementing the GEP should never involve “Eurasian isolationism”— the closing off of Eurasian states from partners in other regions, such as Africa or North and South America. On the contrary, migration to and within Eurasia should serve as a powerful incentive for further developing economic ties in the basins of the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans and for achieving progress in resolving such universal human problems as climate change, combating pandemics, ensuring food and energy security, and managing migration. Eighth, the building of the GEP should proceed from the bottom up and not from the top down; that is, it should be based on specific, even if very modest, agreements between regional integration unions and individual states. Concluding the work on connecting the EAEU and BRI should constitute the crucial first stage in building the GEP. Creating independent Eurasian payment systems and rating agencies, decreasing dependence on the US dollar, and establishing a Eurasian economic information center similar to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development are among the other promising areas of activity. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the geopolitical environment between Russia and Europe has changed fundamentally with the emergence of new regions, including Ukraine and Belarus. Whereas the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European countries were once aligned against Western Europe, most Central and Eastern European countries have now joined NATO and the European Union and become closely linked to what was traditionally considered Western Europe. Since the outbreak of the Russo–Georgian war in 2008, the Russian government has realized that Greater Europe is against Russia’s national interests and probably cannot be pursued further. The divide between Russia and Europe has reached deep into the heart of the former Soviet Union, and the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union has become

3

RUSSIA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

71

a massive concern for Russia.6 From Russia’s perspective, the proximity of the NATO integration zone to Russia’s borders is a severe threat to national security.7 At the end of 2013, the pro-Russian president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, refused to sign a free-trade agreement with the European Union, which led to pro-Western opposition protest marches against him. The resulting crisis in Ukraine was followed early the next year by the annexation of Crimea by Russia. This dealt a devastating blow to Russia–Europe relations, as a result of which Russia was subjected to comprehensive sanctions in 2014 by both the United States and Europe, which isolated Russia’s financial institutions and key economic sectors, such as the energy and military industries. Among other measures, the sanctions included a ban on companies from EU countries supplying equipment and services to Russian oil companies.8 In response, Russia introduced a series of countersanctions, including a ban on imports of agricultural products, raw materials, and foodstuffs from Western countries, a call for wealthy Russians to “de-offshore” their assets, and the creation of a national payment system to protect the country’s financial stability. Years of sanctions and countersanctions between Russia and Europe have taken a heavy economic toll on both sides.9 Despite his criticisms of NATO and the EU, President Trump approved the provision of military aid to Ukraine to support its fight against Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas region. However, the aid was temporarily withheld in 2019, which raised concerns about whether the United States was fully committed to supporting Ukraine.10 The continuous enlargement of NATO and continued installation of US and NATO military infrastructure and missile defense systems reinforced Russia’s perception of encirclement. NATO enlargement also strengthened the perception in Russia that the European Union and NATO were working together to push the Euro-Atlantic space to the East, to the detriment of Russia’s security and economic interests.11 As a result of NATO’s continued eastward expansion, the Russo–Ukrainian 6 Dias (2013). 7 Akchurina and Della Sala (2018). 8 Romanova (2016). 9 Bˇelín and Hanousek (2021). 10 Sheng and Felix do Nascimento (2021a). 11 Sheng (2022b).

72

E. L. SHENG

war officially began in February 2022 when Russian President Vladimir Putin declared war on Ukraine. What was expected by Russia to be a quick takeover of Ukraine evolved into a prolonged war of attrition that seems to have no end in sight. There is currently no political engagement or negotiation between the two countries and no sign of a cease-fire. The European Union has progressively imposed a number of sanctions on Russia in response to Russia’s military attack on Ukraine and the annexation of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. These sanctions include targeted restrictive measures, economic sanctions, and diplomatic measures. The European Union has added a significant number of persons and entities to the sanction list, and its economic sanctions include a number of import and export restrictions on Russia and the prohibition of the purchase, import, or transfer of crude oil and certain petroleum products from Russia to EU member states. These measures were intended to weaken Russia’s economic base by depriving it of critical technologies and markets and to significantly curtail its ability to wage war. The European Commission not only agreed to impose an embargo on oil imports from Russia but also pledged to reduce Russian gas purchases by two-thirds by the end of 2022. As most Russian oil is delivered to the European Union by sea, the sanctions on the transfer of crude oil covered nearly 90% of Russian oil imports to Europe, which has significantly reduced Russia’s profits from trade. However, these sanctions have also had negative effects in Europe. Some EU member states have a specific dependence on Russian supplies and no viable alternatives. Energy and raw materials are becoming increasingly scarce as EU sanctions increase, and many European factories that have long relied on Russian energy have been shut down. On September 2, 2022, Gazprom announced an indefinite closure of the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline to Europe on the grounds of a “leakage of the main turbine,” and soon after, on September 26, the North Stream 1 and North Stream 2 natural gas pipelines developed four leaks due to explosions in the Baltic Sea. With gas supplies falling and gas prices in the European Union at an all-time high, EU states faced challenges to meet their energy needs for winter heating.12 In October 2022, the European Council adopted an eighth package of economic and individual sanctions against Russia, which

12 Sziklai et al. (2020).

3

RUSSIA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

73

included a series of biting measures to reinforce pressure on the Russian government and economy and weaken Russia’s military capabilities. As the European Union and others have continued to impose sanctions on Russia, Russia has responded with countersanctions. A significant number of the Russian countermeasures are directly related to the sanctions imposed against Russia by other countries. The Russian government adopted a list of such “unfriendly states,” which currently includes the United States, all EU member states, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Ukraine, Albania, Andorra, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Micronesia, Monaco, San Marino, North Macedonia, and Montenegro. A number of measures have been adopted by Russia against these so-called unfriendly states, broadly aimed at mitigating the effects of international sanctions on the Russian economy. Europe’s policy toward Russia has also undergone significant adjustments following the lead of the United States. However, Russia has always been a neighbor that Europe cannot move away from. From a longerterm perspective, Europe does not want its relations with Russia to be completely deadlocked and is unwilling to continue to bear the impact of the deterioration of its relations with Russia. On the issue of sanctions against Russia, Europe and the United States have maintained the same pace in the same general direction, but there are major differences over specific measures, especially in the field of energy. Some European countries, such as Germany, have always maintained relatively close energy cooperation with Russia.13 These countries cannot diversify their energy sources in a short period and are unwilling to sacrifice their people’s living standards to support Ukraine. Nonetheless, the flexibility of Europe’s Russia policy will be greatly weakened by these events. Although the crisis in Ukraine will not dispel Europe’s idea of seeking strategic autonomy, it can only further bind Europe to the United States in the field of security. As the rigid US policy toward Russia continues, Europe will be tied to the US chariot to suppress Russia, and the deterioration of US–Russia relations will make it difficult to restore Europe–Russia relations. The Ukraine crisis, coming 6 years after the Russo–Georgian war and the birth of the sanctions policy, and coupled with an acceleration of the Eastern partnership toward Ukraine, led to a belief in Russia that it could never acquire an

13 Sheng (2022c).

74

E. L. SHENG

equal status within an EU/NATO-centric Greater Europe because such a project was primarily a sub-geopolitical element of Western and unipolar hegemony aimed at reducing Russia’s power and influence. Therefore, Russia has come to consider the new EU partnership in Asia and Eurasia through the prism of the export of Western norms and democracy. There are many problems with the Eurasian cooperation agenda, concerning the substantive content of Eurasian integration, possible formats of cooperation, and the problems of ensuring security and the development of institutions. The stability of supply and demand in the energy market is vital for both unions, but the idea of creating a common economic space between the European Union and EAEU is still very far from implementation. Several known contradictions prevent the leaders of the two integration associations to open official discussions toward an “integration of integrations.” Russia needs Europe as a responsible and predictable partner in resolving economic and political issues; meanwhile, it is in the European Union’s best interests to become an independent and competent player in economic and political affairs.

3.2 The Development of US–Russia Relations: Variability, Contingency, and Uncertainty The Cold War ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the United States maintained a Cold War mentality and continued to regard Russia as a critical opponent in its foreign affairs strategy. In the current international climate, US–Russia relations have also deteriorated with confrontations provoked by both sides. During the Ukraine crisisin 2014, the United States viewed the Ukraine issue as a way to maintain a check on Russia.14 As a result, the United States increased its financial and military assistance to the country, providing Ukraine with weapons, equipment, and relevant military training and holding regular joint military exercises. The aim of the United States in this period has been to push Ukraine step by step to the forefront of US–Russia confrontation while tying European countries to the chariot of US hegemony. On its part, the United States blames the deterioration of US–Russia relations on Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, which it describes as undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity and violating the basic norms

14 Charap and Shapiro (2016).

3

RUSSIA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

75

of international relations. With the United States having condemned Russia politically, imposed economic sanctions, and made military threats, Moscow believes that it is clinging to a Cold War mentality of viewing Russia as a thorn in its side. The United States has also interfered with Ukraine, which is Russia’s most prominent neighbor to the west, by instigating “color revolutions,” and has mobilized NATO to accelerate its eastward expansion. This series of actions has stalled Russia’s economic development and worsened Russia’s external environment. Following the outbreak of the Crimean crisis, Western countries, led by the United States, imposed severe economic sanctions on Russia. During his presidential campaign and early in his administration, Donald Trump promised to improve US–Russia relations, repeatedly hinting that he was prepared to ease sanctions if the two countries resumed a mutually beneficial dialogue in certain areas.15 On this front, however, his policy agenda was constrained by “Russiagate.” Ultimately, the US Congress intervened to ensure that the US sanctions against Russia would be permanent and comprehensive, and the Trump administration imposed eight rounds of sanctions over Russia’s activities in Crimea.16 In 2017, Washington introduced the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which targeted Russia with a systematic sanctions program based on the existing sanctions over Crimea and cybersecurity. Under the CAATSA, Congress froze the overseas bank accounts of many Russian banks, defense companies, energy companies, entrepreneurs, and officials, in what is regarded as an all-out embargo war by the United States against the Russian government.17 The sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and European Union since 2014 have taken a heavy toll on the Russian economy, and the ruble has suffered a significant devaluation against the US dollar.18 The Russian Federation’s proposal for a GEP has been formed in the context of the twin crises of economic sanctions and NATO’s eastward expansion. Through its GEP strategy, Russia is seeking to shift its strategic vision out of the Soviet space and into the Asia–Pacific and Indian Ocean. Under the Biden administration, strategic rivalry has continued to dominate US–Russia relations and the

15 Sheng and Felix do Nascimento (2021b). 16 Klinova and Sidorova (2019). 17 U.S. Department of the Treasury (2017). 18 Gould-Davies (2020).

76

E. L. SHENG

game between the United States and Russia has developed into a more mature form of conflict. In their strategic competition, the two sides have not shown the slightest hint of compromise or concession over a range of geostrategic issues, while rivalry also continues in the ideological sphere.19 The struggle between the United States and Russia can therefore be expected to continue in at least the short term. In response to Russia’s violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including the occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, the United States has suspended its bilateral engagement with the Russian government on most economic issues. Sanctions imposed on the finance, energy, and defense sectors have reduced Russia’s ability to access finance and limited its access to certain technologies in these sectors. Through administrative action and legislation, the United States has also imposed a number of unilateral sanctions on Russia and Russian entities. The United States investigates allegations of mistreatment of or discrimination against US investors in Russia and urges Russia to improve its investment climate, adherence to the rule of law, and transparency. In Russia, the Political/Economic Section of the US Embassy works on behalf of the US Commercial Service to assist US firms interested in developing market opportunities that do not violate sanctions. A combination of low oil prices, structural limitations, and sanctions pushed Russia into a deep recession in 2015, with the economy contracting by 4% that year and by a further 1% in 2016. Russia’s economy returned to modest growth in 2017, owing to a global rebound in oil prices. The economic slowdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with a drop in oil prices resulting from the Russian– Saudi oil price war of early 2020 and a decrease in global demand, pushed the Russian economy into another recession, before an OPEC+ agreement in April 2020 and returning global demand caused oil prices to rebound. Economics plays a much smaller role in US–Russia relations than geopolitics. There is limited trade and investment between the two countries, and this has been further constrained by sanctions since 2014. Although US economic superiority gives it a certain amount of leverage over Russia, the Russian economy has proved more resilient to US restrictions than might have been expected. In geopolitics, no issue is more toxic

19 Sheng (2022a).

3

RUSSIA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

77

to US–Russia relations than the broken promises over the encroachment of NATO. The presence of NATO military infrastructure close to Russia’s borders is at the top of the list of risks set out in Russia’s military doctrine, and the eastward expansion of NATO has inflamed Russia and resulted in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. US and NATO leaders proceeded with several rounds of expansion, including the provocative step of adding the three Baltic republics, which not only had been part of the Soviet Union but also part of Russia’s empire during the Czarist era. With this wave of expansion, NATO was perched on the border of the Russian Federation. With Moscow’s patience with NATO’s ever more intrusive behavior wearing thin, the last reasonably friendly warning from Russia that the alliance needed to back off came with Putin’s address to the annual Munich Security Conference in March 2007: “NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders,” Putin complained, and NATO expansion “represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?” In his Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, Robert M. Gates, who served as Secretary of Defense in the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, states his belief that “the relationship with Russia had been badly mismanaged after Bush left office in 1993.”20 Among other missteps, “US agreements with the Romanian and Bulgarian governments to rotate troops through bases in those countries was a needless provocation,” and, in an implicit rebuke to the younger Bush, “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching.” The latter move, Gates contends, was a case of “recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests.” In 2008, the year after Putin issued his warning, Russia demonstrated that its discontent with NATO’s continuing incursions into Russia’s security zone had moved beyond verbal objections. Exploiting a foolish provocation by Georgia’s proWestern government, Russia launched a military offensive that brought its troops to the outskirts of Tbilisi. Russia then permanently detached two secession-minded regions from Georgia and placed them under effective Russian control.

20 Gates (2015).

78

E. L. SHENG

The Biden administration’s policy toward Russia has differed from that pursued by Trump, with Biden choosing to abandon the established diplomatic approach of rapprochement with Russia and place repeated emphasis on a renewed US mission to advance human rights and democracy in the world. Biden’s policy has focused on curbing the expansion of Russia’s global influence by, for example, developing measures to counter Russian disinformation, cyber-attacks, human rights abuses, military interventions, and other malicious activities.21 The key to the success of Biden’s policy toward Russia lies in securing NATO support. Biden’s appointments of White House officials also point toward a tougher stance on Russia than that adopted by the Trump administration. Claiming that the rapid expansion of Russian ambitions can be blamed on past inaction by the US and its allies, Biden nominated Victoria Nuland, who is fiercely anti-Russia and has advocated for tougher sanctions, as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs at the US Department of State. After the Russia–Ukraine conflict broke out, the United States increased its pressure on Russia on multiple fronts. On the economic front, the United States, along with its allies and partners, imposed devastating and wide-ranging sanctions on Russia. For example, some Russian banks were blocked from using SWIFT and the assets of Russian entities were frozen, an administrative order was issued to prohibit the import and investment of Russian energy, and export controls were implemented. On the military front, although the United States has repeatedly stressed that it will not directly intervene in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, it took the opportunity to activate NATO and strengthen its deterrence capability against Russia by expanding its troop numbers on the eastern flank. In March 2022, Biden visited Europe for the third time during his term of office to attend the NATO summit and re-emphasized the US commitment to NATO. In response to changes in the situation in Russia and Ukraine, NATO also announced that it would establish four new multinational battle groups, in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. That the United States has adjusted its policy toward Russia so quickly and decisively and has not hesitated to push the relationship between the two countries into dangerous and uncharted waters is not only because of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine itself but also because of the long-term accumulation of structural problems between the United States

21 Ohanyan (2021).

3

RUSSIA AND THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT …

79

and Russia. This experience of escalation has also afflicted the US–Russia relationship in the past and explains why several rounds of “reboots” have never actually resulted in any substantial improvement in the relationship.

References Akchurina, V., & Della Sala, V. (2018). The European Union, Russia and the post-Soviet space: Shared neighbourhood, battleground or transit zone on the New Silk Road? Europe-Asia Studies, 70(10), 1543–1551. Bˇelín, M., & Hanousek, J. (2021). Imposing sanctions versus posing in sanctioners’ clothes: The EU sanctions against Russia and the Russian countersanctions. In P. A. G. van Bergeijk (Ed.), Research handbook on economic sanctions. Edward Elgar Publishing. Casier, T. (2018). Gorbachev’s ‘Common European Home’ and its relevance for Russian foreign policy today. Debater a Europa, 18, 17–34. Charap, S., & Shapiro, J. (2016). US–Russian relations: The middle cannot hold. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72(3), 150–155. Dias, V. A. (2013). The EU and Russia: Competing discourses, practices and interests in the shared neighbourhood. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 14(2), 256–271. Gates, R. M. (2015). Duty: Memoirs of a secretary at war. Vintage Books. Gould-Davies, N. (2020). Russia, the West and sanctions. Survival, 62(1), 7–28. Hello, E., Scheepers, P., & Gijsberts, M. (2002). Education and ethnic prejudice in Europe: Explanations for cross-national variances in the educational effect on ethnic prejudice. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 46(1), 5–24. Jackson, W. D. (1989). Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and reform: The great challenge. The Journal of Politics, 51(4), 1056–1058. Klinova, M. V., & Sidorova, E. A. (2019). Economic sanctions of the West against Russia: Development of the situation. Studies on Russian Economic Development, 30(3), 355–364. Kortunov, A. (2020, September 28). Eight principles of the “Greater Eurasian Partnership.” Russian International Affairs Council. https://russiancouncil. ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/eight-principles-of-the-greater-eur asian-partnership/ Krickovic, A., & Pellicciari, I. (2021). From “Greater Europe” to “Greater Eurasia”: Status concerns and the evolution of Russia’s approach to alignment and regional integration. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 12(1), 86–99. Ohanyan, A. (2021). The road not yet taken: Regionalizing US policy toward Russia. The Washington Quarterly, 44(4), 29–47. Romanova, T. (2016). Sanctions and the future of EU–Russian economic relations. Europe-Asia Studies, 68(4), 774–796.

80

E. L. SHENG

Sakwa, R. (2021). Greater Russia: Is Moscow out to subvert the West? International Politics, 58(3), 334–362. Sheng, E. L. (2022a). Participation in and strategic arrangements for arctic affairs by the United States: Seeking collective security in a new era. Arctic Opportunities and Challenges: China, Russia and the US Cooperation and Competition (pp. 69–91). Springer. Sheng, E. L. (2022b). The new strategic triangle in the arctic: China, Russia, and the United States. In Arctic opportunities and challenges: China, Russia and the US Cooperation and Competition (pp. 27–50). Springer. Sheng, E. L. (2022c). Who will win in the climate crisis? A reinterpretation of the interaction between climate change and security issues in the arctic. In Arctic opportunities and challenges: China, Russia and the US Cooperation and Competition (pp. 93–113). Springer. Sheng, L., & Felix do Nascimento, D. (2021a). Geopolitics in the trade war. In Love and trade war: China and the US in historical context (pp. 99–128). Palgrave Macmillan. Sheng, L., & Felix do Nascimento, D. (2021b). On Sino-US trade wars: A dialectical consideration. In Love and trade war: China and the US in historical context (pp. 47–98). Palgrave Macmillan. Snyder, S. B. (2011). Human rights activism and the end of the Cold War: A transnational history of the Helsinki network. Cambridge University Press. Sziklai, B. R., Kóczy, L. Á., & Csercsik, D. (2020). The impact of Nord Stream 2 on the European gas market bargaining positions. Energy Policy, 144, 111692. U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2017). Countering America’s adversaries through sanctions act –related sanctions. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-iss ues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/counte ring-americas-adversaries-through-sanctions-act-related-sanctions White House (2022, October). National security strategy. https://www.whiteh ouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-forUpload.pdf

CHAPTER 4

China, Russia, the United States, and Europe in International Organizations: Quadrilateral Relations

4.1

Political, Economic, and Military Relations Between the United States and Europe

Europe has long been and will continue to be the foundational partner of the United States in addressing the full range of global challenges. Diplomatic relations between the European Union and United States date back to 1953, and the EU–US bilateral relationship is now one of the world’s most important. As the biggest economic and military powers in the world, the European Union and United States dominate global trade and play the leading roles in international political relations. According to the EU diplomatic service, “the EU–US partnership has prospered for more than six decades, constructed on a foundation of shared common values, including a commitment to the rule of law, the democratic process, free enterprise, human rights, and alleviating poverty. These values, combined with deep economic ties and high levels of trust built over more than half a century, make the EU and the United States natural partners for tackling today’s global challenges.”1 Nonetheless, there is a complex relationship between the United States and European Union in the areas of culture, economics, politics, and social interactions. In a global context, they are both partners and 1 European Union External Action (2021).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. L. Sheng, Greater Eurasia Partnership and Belt and Road Initiative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3046-3_4

81

82

E. L. SHENG

competitors. The United States has always supported European integration for strategic and economic reasons, or at least has done so since the end of the Second World War. Starting in the early days of the Cold War, the US government advocated the idea of a United Europe. In Washington’s view, this was a means not only of promoting peace and stability in Western Europe but also of countering the Soviet Union by strengthening the unity of the Atlantic region. European unity made a significant contribution to the Cold War by improving the resistance to Soviet subversion by its member states. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established after the Second World War as the main defense tool of the West, led by the United States, Great Britain, and France, and as the European defense system. Despite Europe’s potential as a partner in the 1940s, the United States regarded it as an adversary.2 On the basis of its economic strength and military capability in the early post-Cold War period, the United States was considered a major player in the international system and was able to prevent Europe from challenging its position. The United States supported European integration as a method for increasing productivity and promoting economic growth. In addition to being a partner in the economic development of the United States, a prosperous Europe would also bear the fruits of peace and stability in the region. Meanwhile, European countries sought to unite with a focus on Germany rather than the Soviet Union. Originally, unification was designed to create a common market for coal and steel, to settle the problem brought by the Ruhr occupation, and to bring peace between the European nations that had triumphed and those that had been defeated.3 US–Europe relations have evolved as a result of the launch of the single market initiative and the ending of the Cold War. The heads of government of the member states of the European Community (EC) signed the Single European Act in 1986 with the intention of creating an internal market by the end of December 1992. Although the European single market initiative can be seen as a response by the EC to meet the global economic challenges triggered by the United States, the United States fundamentally supports the initiative and strongly supports its expansion

2 Alcaro et al. (2016). 3 Riddervold and Newsome (2018).

4

CHINA, RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND EUROPE …

83

toward Central and Eastern Europe. From the US perspective, expanding the single market would help to increase trade and investment between Europe and the United States and provide opportunities for US companies doing business in Europe to reap the benefits.4 Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War, the ideology and values of the Eastern European countries began to shift in the direction of Western Europe. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe began to gradually reduce their political, military, and economic ties with the Soviet Union—and, eventually, with the newly founded Russian Federation—and worked to expand their ties with the West in an attempt to eventually return to Europe. Meanwhile, the EC, with its political objective of creating a harmonious Europe, demonstrated a strong capacity for financial assistance and convinced the United States of its importance on the political stage.5 Since then, the United States has increasingly recognized the European Union and established cooperation in various fields. The two powers formally adopted the Transatlantic Declaration in 1990, which set out the principles for their cooperation and consultation. In 1995, the New Transatlantic Agenda and the EU–US Joint Action Plan were formally adopted. The Joint Action Plan provides a framework for developing the capacity of the European Union and United States for promoting peace, stability, democracy, and development in the world. Since the adoption of this plan, significant progress has been made in EU–US cooperation, and the two powers now work closely together, mainly within the framework of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership and under the multilateral umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The US and the EU cooperate effectively as two important international actors in the areas of digital finance, digital trade, and international security. Despite a number of disagreements on international matters, the nature of the EU–US partnership has not changed.6

4 Anderson et al. (2016). 5 Shapiro and Witney (2009). 6 Nguyen (2016).

84

E. L. SHENG

4.2 The Quadrilateral Relationship Under the Ideologies of Atlanticism and Neo-Eurasianism 4.2.1

The Historical Development of Neo-Eurasianism

The development of Eurasianism has gone through three stages: Classical Eurasianism, Gumilyovian Eurasianism, and Neo-Eurasianism. Classical Eurasianism is marked by the collection of essays Exodus to the East. Forebodings and events: An affirmation of the Eurasians (Icxod k Boctoky. Ppedqyvctvir i cvepxenir. Utvepidenie evpazi˘icev in Russian) written by four of the most prominent Eurasianists of the time: N. S. Trubetskoy,7 ,8 P. N. Savitsky,9 G. V. Vernadsky,10 and N. N. Alekseev.11 Classical Eurasians reconceptualize Russia in geographical and historical terms. They follow the belief that Russia belongs to a unique Eurasian culture and that its civilization is not a copy of either European or Asian civilization. As a country straddling both sides of the Eurasian continent, Russia is neither a European nor an Asian country, but a bridge between these continents.12 During the Cold War, the Eurasianism advocated by the Soviet Union was confronted by the Atlanticism advocated by the United States and Western Europe. By the late 1930s, the Eurasianist movement had fallen out of favor. The doctrine of Eurasianism had long been rejected as heretical at that time. Lev Gumilyov, a Soviet historian who met Savitsky in prison, was profoundly affected by Eurasianism. He played a key role in the return of the new Eurasianism at the end of the nineteenth century. He believed that Eurasianism could awaken the Russian national consciousness and help the Russian nation to find and develop itself. At that moment, the relative balance of Soviet nuclear power added a military dimension to the struggle for spheres of influence between the two sides, guided by Atlanticism and Eurasianism, respectively. As a matter of fact, both classical Eurasianism and Gumilyovian Eurasianism played a 7 Trubetskoy (1995a) 8 Trubetskoy (1995b). 9 Savitsky (1997). 10 Vernadsky (1997). 11 Alekseev (1998). 12 Laruelle (2008).

4

CHINA, RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND EUROPE …

85

very limited role in the society of the time and they were found to be of greater popularity among the diaspora. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eurasianism was revived and redeveloped into what might be called Neo-Eurasianism, which gradually gained a greater level of visibility and had a profound effect on Russian politics and society as a whole. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was gradually marginalized by the Western-dominated political and economic system. Russia’s socioeconomic situation deteriorated sharply, its international standing declined significantly, and Russian national pride was dealt a severe blow. Throughout its history, Russia has attempted to answer the question of who we are by integrating with the West. The West, however, saw the end of the Cold War as a victory for capitalism and a defeat for socialism, and the divided former Soviet Union did not possess the qualifications or capabilities to compete with the West on the world stage. It was in this context that the idea of a return to Eurasianism emerged. Eurasianism, as a socio-political trend, had a considerable impact on Russian politics, academia, and all social strata. As leading Russian politicians such as Vladimir Putin began to emphasize the geopolitics of Eurasianism,13 the idea of Neo-Eurasianism was proposed in the Russian political philosopher Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin’s magnum opus Foundations of Geopolitics.14 Dugin calls for the United States and Atlanticism to lose their influence in Eurasia and for Russia to rebuild its influence through annexations and alliances. As opposed to classical Eurasianism, which is only concerned with adhering to the culture and values of Russia, Neo-Eurasianism implies that Russia is not just a country but rather an entire Eurasian civilization with continental characteristics that imply a geopolitical significance. In particular, it considers Russia to be culturally closer to Asia than to Western Europe. This advocacy of Neo-Eurasianism for a Eurasian civilization and the importance of its geopolitical interests makes it able to provide a better theoretical basis for Russia’s national strategic planning.15 Dugin, who went on to found the Eurasia Party in Russia, was once called “Putin’s brain” by the Western media, especially after Russia started to promote the Eurasian Economic Union in 2011

13 White (2016). 14 Dugin (1997). 15 Shekhovtsov (2009).

86

E. L. SHENG

and on the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014. In Foundations of Geopolitics, Dugin calls for a new Eurasian empire to be constructed on the fundamental principle of the common enemy: the rejection of Atlanticism and of the strategic control of the United States and a refusal to allow liberal values to dominate Russia. This common civilizational impulse is considered the potential basis of a political and strategic union. Political scientist Anton Shekhovtsov defines this vision as “a form of a fascist ideology centered on the idea of revolutionizing the Russian society and building a totalitarian, Russia-dominated Eurasian Empire that would challenge and eventually defeat its eternal adversary represented by the United States and its Atlanticist allies, thus bringing about a new ‘golden age’ of global political and cultural illiberalism.”16 4.2.2

Challenges in the Quadrilateral Relationship Between China, Russia, the European Union, and the United States

The quadrilateral relationship between China, Russia, the European Union, and the United States defines the prospects and direction of the global order, including free trade, technical cooperation, and market order. In an increasingly complex and pluralistic world, the international order is subject to constant change and development and the demand for global governance is strengthened. As the United States, the European Union, Russia, and China gradually but clearly emerge as the four major centers of power in global politics, the interaction between these four powers is increasing day by day and their development prospects have an increasingly significant impact on the world situation. As the world’s challenges continue to deepen and develop, the international community urgently needs to promote and strengthen effective coordination and actively build an inclusive, open, and broadly participatory multilateral framework and order. However, the future development of Sino–Russia–US–EU relations is highly uncertain, harboring both the risk of joint US–Europe confrontations with Russia and China and the opportunity to win cooperation out of competition. The development of quadrilateral relations is no longer a simple zero-sum game but instead a non-zero-sum game with many complex elements. Competition and cooperation have become the

16 Shekhovtsov (2018).

4

CHINA, RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND EUROPE …

87

norm in the relationship between Russia, China, the United States, and Europe. In the process of maintaining national security and pursuing national development, the relationship between the four powers should no longer simply emphasize contradiction and conflict but rather make use of coordination and cooperation to regulate and resolve contradiction and conflict.17 Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union are the most important economies in the world and their interactions are crucial to global trade, investment, technology, and other fields. The breadth and density of the international system have reached new historical peaks but the structural imbalance of the global economy is also arriving at a critical point.18 The “iron law” of the global market is to move in the direction of greater unity, but how to share the cost of the market order and formulate market rules has become the focus of debate among Russia, China, the United States, and Europe.19 These arguments are reflected in actions taken in response to the new round of global technological innovation, such as 5G technology, and an undercurrent of anti-globalization.20 Russia, China, the United States, and Europe have had frequent and intense interactions over the rollout of 5G technology. The United States has spared no effort to promote its Clean Network Initiative, acting to block and suppress Chinese high-tech enterprises with technology decoupling.21 The United States has also activated hegemonic tools in multiple areas and at multiple levels to strengthen its strategy against China; one of the most essential of these is the accelerated deployment of “technological alliances,” which has received a positive response from the European Union.22 On March 22, 2021, the Atlantic Council, a US think tank, published the report The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic Competition,23 which proposed a clear line of strategic competition and countermeasures against China. The content of the report includes the de-Sinicization of the supply chain to remove 17 Zongze (2007). 18 E. L. Sheng (2022). 19 Schwartz (2018). 20 L. Sheng (2022). 21 Wei (2019). 22 Sheng and Nascimento (2021a). 23 Binnendijk and Kirchberger (2021).

88

E. L. SHENG

Huawei’s 5G technology and the provision of financial and technical assistance to address what it describes as “predatory economic behavior” in areas such as climate and health. The United States and European Union are re-examining their value to each other in the context of the landscape of US–China strategic competition and the positioning of bilateral relations within the trilateral framework of the US–China–EU relationship. In 2019, the European Union defined China as a full-fledged competitor with four identities: partner, negotiating partner, economic competitor, and systemic adversary.24 After the outbreak of COVID-19, the United States and Europe pushed for a return to industrial strength and the construction of industrial fortresses. On the issue of Hong Kong, the United States and Europe have adopted a more consistent position and approach of refusing to recognize and maintain Hong Kong’s special status.25 In recent years, European countries have shown increased interest in the Indo-Pacific region, with the French Ministry of Defense releasing its Indo-Pacific Defense Strategy Report in June 2019 and the German Foreign Ministry releasing its policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region—Germany– Europe–Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together—in September 2020. In the security field, NATO released NATO 2030: United for a New Era at the end of 2020, stating that the alliance must devote more time, political resources, and action to the security challenges posed by China. The NATO assessment was based on China’s national capabilities, economic heft, and the stated ideological goals of its leaders, and, for the very first time, included China in a joint summit statement. NATO 2030 maintains the European determination that China is best understood as a systemic adversary across the spectrum, not simply an economic player or a security actor in Asia.26 Heisbourg states that the priority in the current situation should be the creation of “NATO 4.0,” a strategic change intended to contain the rise of China, which is portrayed as the real danger to the “free world.”27 He points out that NATO should have as its main objective to make the Atlantic alliance safe from the consequences of China’s rise without prejudice to NATO’s ongoing policy of

24 Garcia Herrero (2019). 25 Sheng (2018). 26 Moller and Rynning (2021). 27 Heisbourg (2020).

4

CHINA, RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND EUROPE …

89

defending against and deterring Russia.28 Hence, in the contemporary era, the strategic transformation of NATO needs to be understood in relation to the shifting geopolitical dynamics of regional players and global powers such as China and Russia. Sino–European relations seem to be characterized by a combination of economic rivalry, cooperation in global governance, and political and ideological confrontation. In terms of the strategic quadrilateral relations between Russia, China, the United States, and Europe, China has increasingly become an issue in US–Europe relations, especially as a driving force in NATO’s strategic transformation and as a link in the restructuring of transatlantic relations. The European powers’ concern with and involvement in the IndoPacific region might have two prominent and interrelated consequences. First, as the China–US–Europe strategic triangle extends from the global economy to geopolitics, the European Union may become more involved in geopolitical issues, which will complicate the triangular relations.29 Second, it might encourage the globalization trend of NATO.30 The extension and expansion of NATO’s focus to the Indo-Pacific region is likely to involve the European Union in Indo-Pacific affairs and increase the uncertainty of China–EU relations. As maintaining a flexible triangular relationship between China, the United States, and Europe is crucial to the global political and economic order, its degeneration into a confrontation should be avoided. Establishing a trilateral negotiation mechanism between these three parties will allow them to seek consensus in areas of common interest. Through in-depth conversation, the three parties can enhance mutual understanding, increase trust, and clear doubts. This will not only help to control the differences and competition between China, the United States, and Europe but also produce positive spillover effects, helping to maintain the stability of the international system.31 As far as the picture of globalization is concerned, the best geopolitical combination is for the United States to provide military support and technology, China to provide infrastructure and export markets, Europe to provide rescue and governance consultants, and enterprise supply chains to straighten out the connection process.

28 Ibid. 29 Heberer and Taube (2002). 30 Nazemroaya (2012). 31 Sheng (2023).

90

E. L. SHENG

Holslag cautions that European allies are reluctant to endorse a role for NATO toward China, and the failure of NATO to formulate a proper answer to China’s ascent could undermine its relevance in the new world order and increase frustration on both sides of the Atlantic.32 He recommends that the North Atlantic community avoid economic dependency on strategic challengers to reestablish the strength of its economy, restore social cohesion, grow its power overall, and ready itself for a turbulent period of adjustment.33 Against the background of the escalating conflict between Russia and Ukraine, cooperation between the United States and Europe under the NATO framework to address regional security challenges has become the primary goal of both sides; Kwon, Jeh, and Lee conclude that “from the perspective of its European members, such a repurposed NATO would ideally be compatible with the pursuit of strategic autonomy without compromising the continued presence of US forces in Europe. From the US standpoint, it should ensure maximum overlap between US and European policies towards China, and the reduction to manageable proportions of the areas of disagreement between the US and Europe, in an ‘agreeing to disagree’ mode.”34 The world’s political and economic security situation has undergone and continues to undergo profound changes in the twenty-first century. As the four major forces in the world today, the United States, Russia, Europe, and China, and the interactions between them, have a great deal of influence on the geopolitical and economic future of the globe. The quadrilateral strategic relationship between these four powers has been relatively stable since the end of the Cold War but can be adjusted at any time with changes in the external environment. In the new situation, some of the difficulties and sticking points between China, Russia, the United States, and Europe can be further divided into multiple pairs of bilateral relations. In terms of the political environment and foreign policy strategies following the Cold War, China and Russia share more similarities because their political systems differ from those of the West and because they are both under pressure from the United States, which has identified them as major strategic competitors. In light of China and Russia’s national recovery strategies, the United States is unlikely to

32 Holslag (2019). 33 Ibid. 34 Kwon et al. (2022).

4

CHINA, RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND EUROPE …

91

change its repressive posture toward them as it seeks to maintain and consolidate its global leadership position. The core conflict between the United States and China lies in their differing perceptions of the international landscape, with the former aspiring to a multipolar world and the latter trying to maintain the current international order under its leadership despite its own weakening relative power. The United States makes great efforts to create obstacles to China’s progress, change its course of development, and contain its expanding influence abroad out of fear that an independent and strong China will eventually undermine US security interests. Meanwhile, the US–Russia conflict arises partly from the former confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and partly from ongoing competition between their military and security forces. It has long been a centerpiece of US foreign policy to regard Russia as the “enemy” and despite periods of cooperation, attempts to relaunch relations, and brief honeymoons, bilateral relations have been dominated by competition. In this regard, it is unlikely that the comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation between Russia and China to counter American containment and hegemony will be broken anytime soon.35 To obtain a clear view of US–Europe relations, it is essential to notice that the two sides across the Atlantic still have the most solid foundations for close ties. They not only have the same political systems, common values, and deep-rooted cultural connections but, more importantly, their common security and economic interests since the end of the Second World War have cemented an enduring coalition between the two sides in the form of NATO and other cooperative mechanisms, which will most probably continue to be valid and useful to meet the security and economic concerns of both. Coping with Soviet military pressure was of course the dominant factor for the alliance relationship in the long period of the Cold War. However, despite the fact that the United States and Europe have been allies for many years, their basic positions toward China and Russia are very different. The geopolitical deterioration of Russia caused by the eastward expansion of the European Union has exacerbated the conflicts between the two continents. Increasingly, the European powers also believe that closer China–Russia relations have contributed to the deterioration of both China–Europe and

35 Wenzhao and Shengwei (2020).

92

E. L. SHENG

Russia–Europe relations. Human rights and ideological issues become the central issues impacting China–Europe relations at times of competition and confrontation.36 China, Russia, the United States, and Europe have united to address global issues such as international terrorism, climate change, the global financial crisis, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, since the Biden administration explicitly perceived China and Russia as adversaries, both the United States and Europe have increased their strategic vigilance and pressure on these countries. In a bid to reassert US global dominance, Washington is pursuing a “dual containment” strategy to counter the challenges posed by China in economics and technology and Russia in military affairs and foreign policy. This strategy will expand the US alliance in both Asia and Europe and increase the effectiveness of economic and technological sanctions against China and Russia. Consequently, the current state of international relations makes it difficult for China, Russia, the United States, and Europe to come to an agreement on major issues and to respond effectively together. Taking the global health crisis response as an example, the US and Chinese governments have a long history of cooperation, having worked together on AIDS, SARS, H1N1 influenza, H7N9 influenza, and Ebola, among others.37 The outbreak of COVID-19 has been an exception to this rule, with both China and the United States shirking their responsibilities and promoting conspiracy theories in the process. Rather than encouraging US–China cooperation, this major non-traditional security threat has further deteriorated bilateral relations.38 The future China–Russia relationship depends largely on the relations these two countries have with the West, especially the United States. If Washington pushes too hard on oil prices, Ukraine, and NATO expansion toward Russia, and rebalances too far against China in the Pacific, China and Russia may indeed move toward a formal alliance, even if that may not have been what they originally wanted. Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Putin are strong leaders with aspirations to recapture past glories. Xi’s new foreign policy features strong positions over the East China Sea disputes with Japan and the South China

36 Riddervold and Rosén (2020). 37 Li and McElveen (2021). 38 Feigenbaum (2022).

4

CHINA, RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND EUROPE …

93

Sea disputes with Southeast Asian countries, while Putin has exhibited aggression over Crimea and eastern Ukraine.39 Both Xi and Putin believe that their respective countries have been unfairly treated in the past and are uncomfortable with the current international order. This quadrilateral relationship may be the most important factor in the development of the future world structure. Its importance lies not only in the fact that each of the four powers is either in a position of supremacy or on a fast and sustained rise but also in the situation of these four powers in the most important geostrategic areas, such that good or bad relations among them will largely determine the peace and stability of Eurasia—the world’s future center of gravity. Furthermore, as each of these four powers has its unique strengths, the quality of quadrilateral relations between them implicates the relations between developed countries and between developed and developing countries, thus having a significant impact on the future international order.

References Alcaro, R., Peterson, J., & Greco, E. (Eds.). (2016). The West and the global power shift: Transatlantic relations and global governance. Palgrave Macmillan. Alekseev, N. N. (1998). Russian people and the state. Agraf. Anderson, J. J., Ikenberry, G. J., & Risse, T. (Eds.). (2016). The end of the West? Crisis and change in the Atlantic order. Cornell University Press. Binnendijk, H., & Kirchberger, S. (2021, March 22). The China plan: A transatlantic blueprint for strategic competition. Atlantic Council. https:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/The-China-Plan-ATransatlantic-Blueprint.pdf Dugin, A. (1993). Konspirologiia. Arkotegia (republished in 2005). Dugin, A. (1997). Foundations of geopolitics. Arkotegia. European Union External Action. (2021, July 22). The European Union and the United States. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/united-states-america/europeanunion-and-united-states_en?s=253 Feigenbaum, E. A. (2022, April 28). Why the United States and China forgot how to cooperate. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/28/why-united-sta tes-and-china-forgot-how-to-cooperate-pub-81673

39 Sheng and Nascimento (2021b).

94

E. L. SHENG

Garcia Herrero, A. (2019). Europe in the midst of China–US strategic economic competition: What are the European Union’s options? Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 17 (4), 403–423. Heberer, T., & Taube, M. (2002). China, the European Union and the United States of America: Partners or competitors? (Duisburg Working Papers on East Asian Studies, 45). Universität Duisburg. Heisbourg, F. (2020). NATO 4.0: The Atlantic alliance and the rise of China, Survival, 62(2), 83–102. Holslag, J. (2019). China, NATO, and the pitfall of empty engagement. The Washington Quarterly, 42(3), 137–150. Kwon, J., Jeh, S. H., & Lee, K. (2022). Dragon and bear dancing a waltz under the sharp-clawed eagle: Three critical junctures, aggravating threat perceptions, and evolving strategic ties between China and Russia. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 23(2), 146–166. Laruelle, M. (2008). Russian Eurasianism: An ideology of empire. Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Li, C., & McElveen, R. (2021, March 2). 10 reasons the US and China should cooperate now to stop the pandemic. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/02/10-reasons-the-us-and-china-shouldcooperate-now-to-stop-the-pandemic/ Moller, S. B., & Rynning, S. (2021). Revitalizing transatlantic relations: NATO 2030 and beyond. The Washington Quarterly, 44(1), 177–197. Nazemroaya, M. D. (2012). The globalization of NATO. SCB Distributors. Nguyen, H. T. T. (2016). The US–EU partnership: More necessary than ever. Global Change, Peace & Security, 28(2), 225–235. Riddervold, M., & Newsome, A. (2018). Transatlantic relations in times of uncertainty: Crises and EU–US relations. Journal of European Integration, 40(5), 505–521. Riddervold, M., & Rosén, G. (2020). Unified in response to rising powers? China, Russia and EU–US relations. In M. Riddervold & A. Newsome (Eds.), Transatlantic relations in times of uncertainty (pp. 49–64). Routledge. Savitsky, P. N. (1997). Continent Eurasia. Agraf. Schwartz, H. M. (2018). States versus markets: Understanding the global economy. Bloomsbury. Shapiro, J., & Witney, N. (2009). Towards a post-American Europe: A power audit of EU–US relations. European Council on Foreign Relations. Shekhovtsov, A. (2009). Aleksandr Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism: The New Right à la Russe 1. Religion Compass, 3(4), 697–716. Shekhovtsov, A. (2018). Russia and the Western far right: Tango noir. Routledge. Sheng, E. L. (2022). Introduction: The game in the Arctic—A historical review. In Arctic opportunities and challenges: China, Russia and the US cooperation and competition (pp. 1–5). Springer Singapore.

4

CHINA, RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND EUROPE …

95

Sheng, E. L. (2023). American and Chinese ethics and their influence on multinational business. In S. J. Clarke (Ed.), Contemporary strategic Chinese American business negotiations and market entry (pp. 311–334). Palgrave Macmillan. Sheng, L. (2018). Hong Kong and Shanghai: A tale of two cities in China. Tempo Social, 30, 171–190. Sheng, L. (2022). Cyber-politics in US–China relations: Big tech and the trade war. Big tech firms and international relations: The role of the nation-state in new forms of power (pp. 43–70). Springer. Sheng, L., & Nascimento, D. (2021a). The Belt and Road Initiative in SouthSouth Cooperation: The impact on world trade and geopolitics. Palgrave Macmillan. Sheng, L., & Nascimento, D. (2021b). Love and trade war–China and the U.S. in historical context. Palgrave Macmillan. Trubetskoy, N. S. (1995a). Europe and humanity. Progress. Trubetskoy, N. S. (1995b). On true and false nationalism. Progress. Vernadsky, G. V. (1997). History of Russia. Mongolia and Russia. Agraf. Wei, L. (2019). Towards economic decoupling? Mapping Chinese discourse on the China–US trade war. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 12(4), 519–556. Wenzhao, T., & Shengwei, X. (2020). The US factor in post-Cold War China– Russia relations. International Politics. White, D. (2016). Russian Eurasianism, an ideology of empire. National Identities, 18(4), 425–427. Zongze, R. (2007). China–EU–US relations: Shaping a constructive future. In D. Shambaugh, E. Sandschneider, & Z. Hong (Eds.), China-Europe relations (pp. 301–314). Routledge.

CHAPTER 5

Differing Values and Perceptions of International Leaders

5.1

Vladimir Putin: An Intelligent Leader with a Soviet Complex

Putin studied law at Saint Petersburg State University (formerly known as the Leningrad State University), at which he was tutored by Anatoly Sobchak, later one of the leading reform politicians of the perestroika period. Putin served 15 years as a foreign intelligence officer for the Committee for State Security (KGB), the Soviet Union’s primary intelligence organization, and worked in the Leningrad district of Russia after the dissolution of the USSR. Through his years of experience in the KGB, Putin developed an indomitable character and a distinctive ability to analyze and reason about information that was beyond the ordinary. In 1985, Putin was sent to East Germany to gather economic intelligence on West Germany, and this secret service experience gave him a keen interest in intelligence and national security. On August 9, 1999, Putin was appointed acting Prime Minister of the Government of the Russian Federation by Boris Yeltsin. Having officially become President of the Russian Federation on January 1, 2000, Putin has been in power in Russia for more than 20 years. Putin initially served as President of the Russian Federation from 2000 to 2008, but due to constitutional limits on re-election, he was unable to stand for election as the President of Russia in 2008. In December 2007, the United Russia party and other parties elected Dimitri Medvedev as the next President of Russia. After © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. L. Sheng, Greater Eurasia Partnership and Belt and Road Initiative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3046-3_5

97

98

E. L. SHENG

being named by Putin as his successor, Medvedev offered to nominate Putin as Prime Minister, a position he held from 2008 to 2012. During his tenure as Prime Minister, President Dmitry Medvedev amended the Constitution to extend the presidential term from 4 to 6 years. In 2012, Putin ran for a third term as President of the Russian Federation and won, serving as President to this day.1 The early years of his presidency were difficult for Putin due to insufficient political popularity and a lack of a suitable image of a leader for the Russian public. His public image has gradually changed due to actions and statements promoting Putin as a strongman with an iron fist. Putin’s public approval ratings soared when he launched a well-organized military operation against secessionist rebels in Chechnya. He faced a difficult situation in Chechnya, particularly from rebels who staged terrorist attacks in Moscow and guerilla attacks on Russian troops from the region’s mountains. With various tough public speeches regarding how to respond to the accusations of war in the Western media, Putin managed to establish his image as a strong and domineering individual, a hero to the Russian citizen.2 However, Putin has a different image in the eyes of some Western scholars. In one persistent school of analysis, Putin is painted as a rogue leader who sits outside the mainstream of thought and action. Former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates believes that Putin has a very different world view compared to European and US leaders: on this account, Putin insists that the world should adopt a zero-sum worldview whereas Western leaders consider conflict as a source of mutual benefit for all parties. There are other Western scholars who consider Putin to be a pragmatic leader,3 and two former US presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, referred to Putin as an organized, dynamic, and trustworthy leader.4 In 2000, during the early presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russia faced several internal and external problems and a difficult domestic and international environment. Among the number of issues affecting Russian society were ideological problems, slow economic growth, social unrest, and extremely low standards of living. Meanwhile, Western powers

1 Hill and Gaddy (2015). 2 White and McAllister (2008). 3 Dyson and Parent (2018). 4 Kramer (2015).

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

99

were actively pursuing the expansion of NATO to the east, which further constrained Russia’s strategic options. Consequently, rebuilding the ideology of social cohesion and development in Russia is of utmost importance to President Putin. As part of his efforts to make Russia prosperous and strong, Putin has proposed the “New Russian Idea” which holds social disunity to be the root cause of social unrest. As a result, he has set out a strategy for the development of the country as a strong nation, which aims to restore traditional Russian values, strengthen its national self-confidence, and restore Russia’s status as a great power. In December 2007, Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party won the election on a platform called the “Putin Plan.” Besides laying the foundations for the party’s victory in the national elections, the Putin Plan strengthened the Russian public’s understanding of Putin’s overall political philosophy and further strengthened the position and influence of United Russia in the Russian political system. The Putin Plan has now become Russia’s official philosophy of governance and strategic planning. In 2008, Russian military action against South Ossetia was swiftly followed by military action against Georgia. A strong style of governance can be seen in Putin’s presidential campaign platform and in Russia’s response to the Ukrainian crisis of 2014. In February of that year, when the government of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was overthrown after months of sustained protests, Yanukovych fled to Russia. Refusing to recognize the interim government in Kyiv as legitimate, Putin requested parliamentary approval to dispatch troops to Ukraine to safeguard Russian interests. By early March 2014, Russian troops and pro-Russian paramilitary groups had effectively taken control of Crimea, a Ukrainian autonomous republic with a predominantly ethnic Russian population. In a popular referendum held on March 16, residents of Crimea voted to join Russia, and Western governments introduced a series of travel bans and asset freezes against members of Putin’s inner circle. On March 18, Putin, stating that the Crimean Peninsula had always been part of Russia, signed a treaty incorporating the peninsula into the Russian Federation. Over subsequent days still more of Putin’s political allies were targeted with economic sanctions by the United States and European Union. After ratification of the treaty by both houses of the Russian parliament, on March 21, Putin signed legislation that formalized the Russian annexation of Crimea. In April 2014, groups of unidentified gunmen outfitted with Russian equipment seized government buildings throughout southeastern

100

E. L. SHENG

Ukraine, sparking an armed conflict with the government in Kyiv. Putin referred to the region as Novorossiya (“New Russia”), evoking claims from the imperial era and, although all signs pointed to direct Russian involvement in the insurgency, Putin steadfastly denied having a hand in the fighting. On July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, carrying 298 people, crashed in eastern Ukraine, with overwhelming evidence that it had been shot down by a Russian-made surface-to-air missile fired from rebel-controlled territory. Western countries responded by tightening sanctions, and those measures, combined with plummeting oil prices, sent the Russian economy into a tailspin. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) estimated that more than 1000 Russian troops were actively fighting inside Ukraine when Russian and Ukrainian leaders met for cease-fire talks in Minsk, Belarus, on September 5. The cease-fire slowed, but did not stop, the violence, and pro-Russian rebels spent the next several months pushing back Ukrainian government forces. On February 12, 2015, Putin met with other world leaders in Minsk to approve a 12-point peace plan aimed at ending the fighting in Ukraine. Although fighting slowed for a period, the conflict picked up again in the spring, and by September 2015, the United Nations estimated that some 8000 people had been killed and 1.5 million had been displaced as a result of the fighting. On September 28, 2015, in an address before the UN General Assembly, Putin presented his vision of Russia as a world power capable of projecting its influence abroad, while painting the United States and NATO as threats to global security. As Putin’s government has raised the banner of nationalism in the face of a complex international situation, it continues to emphasize the notion of a strong Russian state while promoting traditional Russian values. Putin also pays close attention to secure Russia’s interests in the Arctic region, which is believed to contain vast reserves of natural resources and has become increasingly important due to climate change and the melting of Arctic ice.5 One of the key aspects of Putin’s Arctic strategy is to promote cooperation with other countries, including China. Moreover, several important reforms have been implemented under Putin’s leadership, including economic reforms, political restrictions, and historical recognition. Under Putin’s administration, Russia’s political and economic

5 E. L. Sheng (2022).

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

101

development has stabilized, the public’s identification with the country has increased, and the country’s economic situation and the standard of living of its people have improved.

5.2 Xi Jinping: A Farsighted Leader with Unique Courage Xi Jinping was born in June 1953, in Fuping county, Shaanxi province, China. He joined the Communist Party of China (CCP) on January 10, 1974, and graduated from Tsinghua University in 1979 with a degree in basic organic synthesis from the Department of Chemical Engineering. Xi Jinping has been President since 2013. Before his formal appointment as President, Xi was appointed a party committee member and vice mayor of Xiamen (Amoy) in Fujian province, managing the city’s then population of approximately 550,000. Although Xi’s career as a provincial administrator was unimpressive, he accumulated power more rapidly than his predecessor. He was appointed First Secretary of the Party Committee of the Ningde Military Sub-district in Fujian province on June 26, 1988, and while holding this position he punished more than 400 corrupt officials. Xi’s anti-corruption and rectification campaign deterred his opponents and upended the Party and state hierarchy.6 These experiences laid the foundation for his subsequent career in power. Corruption has long been seen as a drag on China’s economy, with officials taking bribes and engaging in other forms of illicit activity to enrich themselves. The anti-corruption campaign has helped to curb some of this behavior, reducing economic costs associated with corruption.7 The anticorruption campaign has been popular with the Chinese public, who have long been frustrated with the perceived corruption and abuse of power by officials. The campaign has helped to restore public confidence in the government and the Party. Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun, was a comrade in arms with Chairman Mao and a first-generation leader of the Communist Party. When Xi Jinping was 9 years old, his family was raided when his father was sensationally cast down as a traitor of communist ideals. In 1966, Chairman Mao launched the Cultural Revolution. When his father, Xi Zhongxun, was cast down, Xi Jinping was classified as a 6 Li and Sheng (2018). 7 Sheng et al. (2021).

102

E. L. SHENG

“gangster’s son” and repeatedly imprisoned and censored by the authorities because of his father’s involvement. Eventually, Xi Jinping was exiled to settle and work in rural Shaanxi and began a hard life in the countryside. This experience of the Cultural Revolution sharpened Xi’s willpower and reinvented him. It also allowed him to witness abject poverty, which helped him to realize what the Chinese government needed to do to address the enormous problems posed by poverty. Having experienced both privilege and suffering, he developed a strong belief that a strong Communist Party was essential to Chinese governance, a dislike for chaos and social instability, a desire for China’s economic growth through a recognition of the role of markets, and a strong demand for international respect for China.8 Xi later became governor and party secretary of neighboring Zhejiang from 2002 to 2007, and he has served as the president of the People’s Republic of China since 2013. Among Xi’s first initiatives was a nationwide anti-corruption campaign that soon saw the removal of thousands of high and low officials (both “tigers” and “flies”).9 His anti-corruption campaign led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including a former member of the Politburo. During the 9 years he has led the party, Xi has successfully reduced poverty and curbed corruption. Xi has also emphasized the importance of the “rule of law,” calling for adherence to the Chinese constitution and greater professionalization of the judiciary as a means of developing “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Under Xi’s leadership, China has been increasingly assertive in international affairs, particularly with regard to relations with the United States, the “ninedash line” in the South China Sea, the Sino–Indian border dispute, and the political status of Taiwan. He has sought to expand China’s influence in Africa and Eurasia through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and to promote joint trade, infrastructure, and development projects with East Asian, Central Asian, and European countries. Xi has expanded support for state-owned enterprises, advanced military-civil fusion, overseen targeted poverty alleviation programs, and attempted to reform the property sector. He has also promoted “common prosperity,” a series of policies designed with the stated goal of increasing equality, and used

8 Lam (2015). 9 Sheng, Yin, Zhang, and Wu (2022).

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

103

the term in 2021 to justify a broad crackdown against and a slew of regulations on the technology and tutoring sectors. During his tenure, Xi Jinping has been concerned about the uneven development situation in the country and has been a strong advocate of reform. Over the past few decades, China has experienced phenomenal economic growth, but this growth has been uneven, which has created a number of daunting domestic challenges. For instance, there are problems associated with providing employment, housing, transportation, and medical services to new workers moving to the cities each year, increasing levels of inequality and corruption, an aging population, and peace and stability in areas populated by people of minority ethnicities. Domestic inequality can have a significant impact on China’s export industry. As the income gap between rich and poor widens, the domestic market for consumer goods and services may become increasingly concentrated among a small group of wealthy individuals, limiting the growth potential for domestic firms.10 As a way of addressing these challenges, President Xi Jinping introduced the concept of the “Chinese Dream” during his first term as president.11 According to Xi, the Chinese Dream is the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, manifested in national prosperity, national revitalization, international influence, and a sense of happiness among the Chinese people. Several initiatives have been promoted by Xi Jinping under this concept, covering poverty alleviation, sport, environmental protection, and reforms of the national and local tax systems.12 In 2013, the Third Communist Party Plenum of China proposed to make the market the “decisive” factor in economic operation, to rebalance domestic demand and consumption-driven growth, and to address the problem of overcapacity and excess capacity. Furthermore, Xi launched a campaign against corruption and strengthened the fight against it by introducing a number of anti-corruption measures.13 The BRI, along with the concept of “a community with a shared future,” has been proposed by Xi as an international and regional project.14 The BRI,

10 Yin and Sheng (2021). 11 Economy (2018b). 12 Economy (2018a). 13 Sheng, Yin, and Zhang (2022). 14 Ferdinand (2016).

104

E. L. SHENG

which has been called Xi’s “signature project,” involves numerous infrastructure development and investment projects throughout Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas.15 Its importance was elevated on October 24, 2017, when it was added to the CCP Constitution at the closing session of the 19th Party Congress. Xi has also promoted the establishment of international financial institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which are aimed at enhancing China’s global influence.16 Under the administration of Xi Jinping, China also remains firmly integrated into major international institutions, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and World Bank.17 Xi has cultivated stronger relations with Russia, particularly in the wake of the Ukraine crisis of 2014, and he seems to have developed a strong personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Both are viewed as strong leaders with a nationalist orientation who are not afraid to assert themselves against Western interests.18 Under Xi, China signed a $400 billion gas deal with Russia and China has become Russia’s largest trading partner. Xi and Putin met on February 4, 2022, during the run-up to the 2022 Beijing Olympics and during a massive buildup of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border, with the two expressing that the two countries are nearly united in their anti-US alignment and that both nations shared “no limits” to their commitments.19 In April 2022, Xi Jinping expressed opposition to sanctions against Russia,20 and on June 15, 2022, Xi reasserted China’s support for Russia on issues of sovereignty and security.21 However, Xi also said China is committed to respecting “the territorial integrity of all countries”22 and that China was “pained to see the flames of war reignited in Europe.”23 In general, China has kept a distance from Russia’s actions, painting itself as a neutral party. 15 Time (2019). 16 Tan (2017). 17 Bader (2016). 18 Baker (2014). 19 Deng et al. (2022) and Buckley and Myers (2022). 20 Ng (2022). 21 Lau (2022). 22 Voice of America (2022). 23 Al Jazeera (2022).

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

105

Russia is the first country that China sees when considering Eurasia. China’s President Xi Jinping describes Russia as the “most important, most valuable” strategic partner. The significance of Sino–Russian relations goes far beyond the Eurasian region and has a global impact. A friendly and cooperative relationship between China and Russia not only guarantees mutual security between these two neighbors but also contributes to China and Russia’s regional and international positions. Central Asia also has much significance for China as a neighboring region rich with energy and minerals that is closely connected to China’s Xinjiang region and seated on the axis of continental communications between China and Europe. China values Central Asia as a friendly neighbor, an irreplaceable partner in combating “East Turkistan” terrorists, an important energy provider, and a promising economic partner, particularly for Xinjiang.

5.3 Joseph R. Biden: A Career Politician with Fluctuating Opinions Joseph Robinette Biden Jr. was born on November 20, 1942, in Scranton, Pennsylvania. In 1953, the Biden family moved from Pennsylvania to Claymont, Delaware. Joseph Biden, who graduated from the University of Delaware and Syracuse Law School, served on the New Castle County Council. Influenced by his idol John F. Kennedy, Biden developed a strong interest in politics in his youth. Joining politics early after graduating from college, he became one of the youngest senators in history when he was elected to the US Senate at the age of 29. Just a few weeks after the Senate election, his first wife, Neilia and their 1-year-old daughter died in a car accident that also left his sons Beau and Hunter with serious injuries. Biden was filled with anger and doubts about his religious beliefs, but instead of being overwhelmed by grief, he focused his attention on caring for his son and working hard. He was sworn in to the US Senate at his sons’ hospital bedside and began commuting to Washington every day by train, a practice he maintained throughout his career in the Senate. In 1977, Biden married Jill Jacobs. Jill Biden, who holds a Ph.D. in Education, is a life-long educator and currently teaches at a community college in Northern Virginia. Biden’s eldest son, Beau, was Delaware’s Attorney General from 2007 to 2015 and a Major in the 261st Signal Brigade of the Delaware National Guard. He was deployed to Iraq in

106

E. L. SHENG

2008–2009. In 2015, Beau Biden passed away at the age of 46 due to brain cancer, which was another huge blow to Biden. Nonetheless, he chose to run for the 2020 presidential election on the back of his belief in seeing the positives in life through suffering. His previous ordeals have shaped Biden’s firm will, allowing him to keep trying in the process of pursuing his goals, and to never give up easily. He has stated that he failed to run for President twice, in 1988 and 2007, but did not allow himself to give up despite these failures. A key characteristic of Biden’s personality is his approachability. Biden demonstrates a high level of empathy in interpersonal communication and his humble style of dealing with people gives him a high degree of affinity. His compassion for the underprivileged has driven him to make improving the situation of this demographic a key motivation for his political career. During his childhood, Biden was regularly teased by his classmates for his stammer, which led him to realize the importance of respecting others and in turn to demonstrate a high degree of empathy as he progressed in his future career. Whether operating as the state’s legislative negotiator with the Republican Party or as a broker in foreign affairs, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan, Biden was always able to adapt to seeing things from the other side of the table and effectively achieving better results than the other side.24 Early in his career, Biden worked for the senior partner of a construction company. In the following years, Biden gave up the job and decided to be a public defender, defending the underprivileged in Wilmington and helping them to get back on their feet. According to Biden, the government needs to take care of those who do not receive an adequate education because external factors are at the root of backwardness and poverty. When he served on the New Castle County Council, Biden worked to limit the harm caused to the public interest by large corporations. While serving as a senator from Delaware for 36 years, Biden established himself as a leader in facing some of the most complex domestic and international challenges. As Chairman or Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee for 16 years, Biden became widely recognized for his work writing and spearheading the Violence Against Women Act —a landmark piece of legislation that strengthens penalties for violence against women, creates unprecedented resources for survivors of assault, and changes the national dialogue on domestic and sexual

24 Griebie and Immelman (2021).

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

107

assault. As Chairman or Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 12 years, Biden played a pivotal role in shaping US foreign policy. He was at the forefront of issues and legislation related to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, post-Cold War Europe, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and ending apartheid. Among Americans, he is known as one of the most influential politicians in the battle against terrorism, drugs, and crime. Biden served as the 47th Vice President of the United States from 2009 to 2017. In his capacity as vice president, Biden had a relatively good relationship with then-President Barack Obama, who described him as a man of integrity, honesty, and loyalty.25 As vice president, Biden continued his leadership on important issues facing the United States and represented the country abroad. Vice President Biden convened sessions of the President’s Cabinet, led interagency efforts, and worked with Congress in his fight to raise the living standards of middle-class Americans, reduce gun violence, address violence against women, and end cancer as we know it. During his time as vice president, Biden built a strong record for his leadership in foreign affairs, defense, environmental issues, and economic issues, and took on important leadership roles on key issues facing the United States. Throughout his career, Biden has played an active role in politics, arguing for a reduction in the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia, for Mexico’s membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and for the strengthening of financial regulation in the United States. In his role as vice president, Biden contributed massively to the passing and subsequent implementation of President Obama’s Recovery Act —the most extensive economic stimulus package in the history of the United States and one of the largest commitments to advancing renewable energy technology. Obama’s plan prevented another Great Depression, created and saved millions of jobs, and led to 75 uninterrupted months of job growth by the end of his administration. This was achieved with less than 1% lost in waste, abuse, or fraud, making it the most efficient government program in the country’s history. During the administration of President Obama and Vice President Biden, the Affordable Care Act was also passed and by the time they left office, the number of uninsured Americans had been reduced by 20 million and insurance companies were banned from denying coverage due

25 Adichie (2020).

108

E. L. SHENG

to pre-existing conditions. Biden also served as the point person for US diplomacy throughout the Western Hemisphere, strengthened relationships with allies in Europe and the Asia–Pacific, and led the effort to bring 150,000 troops home from Iraq. In a ceremony at the White House, President Obama awarded Biden the Presidential Medal of Freedom with Distinction, which is the nation’s highest civilian honor. Joseph Biden has been a leading architect of the US strategic vision of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. During his time in the Senate, Biden led the effort to enlarge NATO to include the former Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern and Central Europe after the collapse of the Iron Curtain. His speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2015 laid out a vision for how to revitalize NATO, strengthen democratic institutions in Europe, prioritize investments to bolster energy security, and grow trade and investment ties across the Atlantic. Biden led the Obama administration’s efforts to support a sovereign, democratic Ukraine, visiting the country three times in 2014, and took a leading role in reassuring NATO allies of the US commitment to their security after Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine, including convening a summit with the leaders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in August 2016. On the first day of Biden’s presidency in 2021, he signed 17 executive orders, including the return of the United States to the Paris climate agreement, in an attempt to repair relations with international organizations, reshape US global leadership, and set climate change as the core of national security and foreign policy. In February 2021, the United States decided to return to the United Nations Human Rights Council. The Biden administration still believes that the WTO needs major reforms. Policy shifts and changes constitute the main line of the Biden administration’s policy toward Europe. The Biden administration has made obvious policy adjustments on a series of global issues, narrowing the policy gap between the United States and Europe to a large extent and creating the conditions to repair their bilateral relationship, of which Biden declared at his inauguration ceremony, “We will repair our alliance and engage with the world again, not only to meet the challenges of yesterday, but also to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.” Biden’s election generated high hopes for US–Europe relations. After Biden took office, he quickly spoke with EU leaders and the NATO secretary general to reiterate the importance of transatlantic relations and

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

109

NATO. In terms of economic and trade relations, the Biden administration announced that the United States would no longer impose retaliatory tariffs on France’s digital tax. Although the Biden administration still opposes the Nord Stream 2 project, it exempted relevant entities and individuals from US sanctions on May 19, 2021, in what was obviously a major compromise to Europe, and especially to Germany. In terms of strategic relations, Biden participated in the Munich Security Video Conference on February 19, 2021, at which he sent an important policy signal that “America is back.” Biden chose Europe as the destination for his first overseas visit, and he attended the G7 summit, NATO summit, US–Europe summit, and US–Russia summit successively. Biden and then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson signed The New Atlantic Charter, demonstrating a strategic intent to revive Western alliances and Western values. At the G7 summit, the United States mobilized all member states to issue a joint statement expounding a common vision for the world, in which the G7 policy toward China was explained in considerable length. In addition, the Biden administration announced that it would hold a global “democracy summit” in December 2021. The Biden administration has emphasized the need for a more nuanced and collaborative approach, while seeking to create alternatives to China’s BRI that promote sustainable development and align with US values. He has expressed interest in working with US allies to create a counterweight to China’s BRI, through initiatives like the B3W. Meanwhile, in response to COVID-19, Biden has mandated the wearing of masks on federal government agencies and federal lands. In the face of border issues, Biden stopped building a border wall and ended Trump’s travel ban on several countries with large Muslim majorities.26 The Biden administration stopped the process of withdrawing from the World Health Organization that had been initiated by the Trump administration and instead actively intervened in the organization and used it to put pressure on China on issues such as the traceability of the new coronavirus. The Biden administration’s stance on the United Nations also represents a change from that of Trump. He also revoked the license for the fourth phase of the Keystone XL project.

26 L. Sheng (2022).

110

E. L. SHENG

However, US policy toward major global competing powers under Biden has largely continued the policy framework of the Trump administration.27 In response to regional challenges, the Biden administration has attempted to adjust its policies but has failed to devote sufficient resources and efforts. In terms of policy framework, the Biden administration has continued the core concept of competition adopted by the Trump administration. On February 4, 2021, in his first foreign policy speech, Biden called China the most serious competitor of the United States. Since then, he has repeatedly used terms such as “extreme competition” and “long-term continuum competition” to describe the US–China relationship. In the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategy Guidance, China is positioned as the only country with the potential to integrate its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological capabilities to pose a significant and enduring challenge to a stable and open international system. This guidance is the most important national security strategy document released by the Biden administration to date, indicating that the Biden administration has already established a strategic position on China.28 It clearly states that the United States recognizes China as its most consequential geopolitical challenge, and that although the Indo-Pacific is where its outcomes will be most acutely shaped, there are significant global dimensions to this challenge. Meanwhile, Russia is described as posing an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe and as a source of disruption and instability globally. The United States will therefore effectively compete with the People’s Republic of China, which is the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the capability to reshape the international order, while constraining a dangerous Russia.29 The PRC and Russia are increasingly aligned with each other but the challenges they pose are, in important ways, distinct. The US strategy is to prioritize maintaining an enduring competitive edge over China while constraining a still profoundly dangerous Russia. The document presents Russia as an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting

27 Tan (2021), Sheng and Felix do Nascimento (2021), Fischer (2022), and McBride (2021). 28 Biden (2021). 29 The White House (2022b).

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

111

the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown. China, by contrast, is described as the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective. President Joe Biden has put forward the “Five No’s” in regard to China, stating that the United States does not seek a new Cold War with China, does not aim to change China’s system, is not targeting China with the revitalization of its alliances, does not support “Taiwan independence,” and is not looking for conflict with China. The Biden administration has diverged from Trump’s unilateralism in seeking to unite allies to jointly put pressure on China.30 Since the Biden administration came to power, it has paid more attention to uniting allies with common values and democratic consciousness, building a new alliance to contain China, and finally achieving the goal of jointly checking and balancing China with collective influence. In the Biden era, the US government has sought to counterbalance China through quadrilateral security cooperation to maintain US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region and further implement its Indo-Pacific strategy. In a statement issued in September 2020, Biden condemns what he describes as Russia’s fraudulent attempt to annex sovereign Ukrainian territory. He states that the United States will always honor Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders and will continue to support Ukraine’s efforts to regain control of its territory by strengthening its hand militarily and diplomatically, including through $12 billion in additional security assistance to support Ukraine.31 Biden’s statement describes the United States and its allies as responding to Russia’s phony claims of annexation by imposing sanctions on individuals and entities, inside and outside of Russia, that provide political or economic support to illegal attempts to change the status of Ukrainian territory. It insists that the United States will rally the international community to both denounce these moves and to hold Russia accountable and will continue to provide Ukraine with the equipment it needs to defend itself, undeterred by Russia’s brazen effort to redraw the borders of its neighbor.

30 Yang (2021), Zarrow (2022), Zhang (2022), and Zhao (2021). 31 The White House (2022a).

112

5.4

E. L. SHENG

Angela Merkel: A Unifying Leader of the EU

The former German Chancellor Angela Merkel was born in Hamburg in West Germany in 1954. Merkel’s family moved from West Germany to East Germany after she was born. She obtained a doctorate in quantum chemistry in 1986 and entered politics in the wake of the revolutions of 1989. She served as Chancellor of Germany from 2005 to 2021. Merkel was the first female chancellor of Germany, and the first Chancellor since reunification to have been raised in the former East Germany. During her tenure as Chancellor, Merkel was frequently referred to as the de facto leader of the European Union, the most powerful woman in the world, and after 2016 the leader of the free world. As the first female Chancellor of a reunited Germany, she became the most popular Chancellor for more than two decades and at the age of 51, she was also the youngest person to hold the position to date. Merkel completed high school in Templin in 1973 and began studying physics at the University of Leipzig (formerly known as Karl Marx University) a year later. In 1978, she graduated and became a member of the academic faculty at an East Berlin state-owned institute involved in physical chemistry. Merkel’s thesis on quantum chemistry resulted in her being awarded a doctorate in 1986. Because of her background as a scientist, the Chancellor is uniquely positioned to think ahead and make decisions, setting her apart from her peers and enabling her to be more flexible and forward-looking than other politicians. During Merkel’s childhood, she was involved in several national youth organizations. She became a member of the Young Pioneers in 1962 and the Free German Youth in 1968. Merkel joined the newly formed Movement for Democratic Awakening in 1989, shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was then in February 1990, that she became that party’s press spokesperson.32 It was in that same month that the party joined the conservative alliance for Germany, a coalition that included the German Social Union and the Christian Democratic Union. It was at this point that Merkel began to develop herself as a leader who was extraordinary and authentic.33 Merkel’s nickname while in office was “Mutti Merkel” (“Mutti” meaning mother in German). This nickname was warmly pronounced and reflects a sense that Germans were taken care of by Merkel during 32 Clemens (2006). 33 Janes (2006).

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

113

her more than 10 years in office. Merkel’s administration was dedicated to growing the economy and reducing unemployment in Germany. Nonetheless, during her time as Chancellor, she experienced several crises that were closely linked to the fate of Europe. For example, in 2008, Merkel served as President of the European Council and played a central role in the negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon and the Berlin Declaration. Merkel played a crucial role in managing the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, negotiating the 2008 European Union stimulus plan with a focus on infrastructure spending and public investment to counteract the Great Recession. She was also a prominent figure in managing the European debt crisis, which began in 2010; the refugee crisis and ensuing home-grown counter-terrorism problems in 2015; the “Trump cycle” from 2016 to 2020; Brexit, which began in 2016; the crises in Georgia and Ukraine, with strong ties to Russia; and the COVID-19 pandemic. At a time when Europe was facing a serious debt crisis, Merkel, together with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, advocated contractionary fiscal policy as a way for Europe to recover from its damaged economy. Germany was able to emerge strongly from the global financial crisis, and the country managed to successfully weather the European debt crisis, largely thanks to reforms led by Merkel. During the refugee crisis, under Merkel’s leadership, Germany took in more than 1.2 million refugees and asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016. Furthermore, to provide protection for refugees, Merkel contributed to Germany’s collective efforts to take in refugees and integrate them into society through education and training programs, employment schemes, and labor market integration. In the face of Brexit, Merkel took a strong stance in defending the interests of the European Union and refusing to make unprincipled concessions. Merkel also had to guide Germany through the period of Trump’s presidency, when the United States was at odds with Germany over defense spending, trade between the United States and Europe, the Iran nuclear deal, and many other issues.34 Since Biden came to power in the United States, the US–Germany relationship has regained its former strength to some degree. Finally, Merkel’s decision to impose sanctions on Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis came amid possible divisions over the issue within the European Union.35

34 Sheng (2021). 35 Mushaben (2016).

114

E. L. SHENG

In foreign policy, Merkel emphasized international cooperation, in both the EU and NATO context, and strengthening transatlantic economic relations. In domestic policy, Merkel’s Energiewende program focused on future energy development, seeking to phase out nuclear power in Germany, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and increase renewable energy sources. Reforms to the Bundeswehr, which abolished conscription, health care reform, and her government’s response to the 2010s European migrant crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany were major issues during her chancellorship. She served as the senior G7 leader from 2011 to 2012 and again from 2014 to 2021. In 2014, she became the longest-serving incumbent head of government in the European Union. Merkel is a fluent Russian speaker. Germany’s relationship with Russia has historically been one of the most crucial in shaping Europe’s fate. According to Larres and Eltsov,36 there are three reasons for Merkel’s more sober and, on the whole, more constructive approach to dealing with Putin. First, Merkel is a very cautious and unemotional person. At least in public, she is not prone to excited outbursts and the flaunting of her ego. She detested, for instance, the male-chauvinistic behavior of both former Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, with his high-testosterone style, and former French President Sarkozy who never was happy if he could not be regarded as the most important person in any room he happened to be in. By contrast, Merkel’s leadership style is characterized by a rejection of pomp and circumstance and knee-jerk decisions. Not least, it seems, the “ego” factor is almost totally absent in her way of leading. She tended to resort to a frequently somewhat slow and contemplative approach to decision-making, relying largely on a small circle of trusted advisers and gatekeepers in the Chancellery in Berlin. This made her come across as enigmatic at times, but also gave the appearance of a superior leadership style, one that was not unduly influenced by the drama of the moment or by self-importance, and was instead characterized by long-term considerations and careful reflection. Second, the historical reference points of Merkel and her Foreign Minister Steinmeier were not the appeasement of Hitler, the Suez crisis, the Kosovo war, or the US invasion of Iraq; instead, their point of reference goes back to the era of détente and West German Ostpolitik of the 1970s pursued by Social Democratic chancellor Willy

36 Larres and Eltsov (2014).

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

115

Brandt. The “policy of small steps” and “change through rapprochement,” as Brandt’s confidante Egon Bahr called it, did indeed lead to a wholesale change of West Germany’s (and the West’s) policy toward the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. More importantly, it profoundly changed Moscow’s way of dealing with the West. Third, Merkel is one of the few Western politicians who attempted quite genuinely to see the world through the eyes of the Russian president; putting yourself into the shoes of your opponent is a crucial but much neglected foreign policy skill. Again, her upbringing in Soviet-dominated East Germany and her deep immersion in Russian culture was a benefit, and informed Merkel that Putin still views the world and Russian history through a Cold War prism. On the issue of the Ukraine war, Merkel condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, saying that it “was not just unacceptable but also a major mistake by Russia.”37 Merkel said she lacked the power to influence Putin; she had tried to convene European talks with the Russian president and French President Emmanuel Macron in the summer of 2021 but did not have the power to get her way as everyone knew that after four terms as Chancellor she was to leave office in December 2021. She had opposed NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 as she had wanted to prevent escalation with Russia. At that time, NATO pledged that the two countries would join at some point but declined to trigger the “membership action plan” to let them join the alliance within 5 to 10 years. Merkel said that if NATO had granted them membership, Russian President Vladimir Putin could have caused “enormous damage in Ukraine.” As it was, Russia invaded Georgia less than 6 months after this declaration in Bucharest, instigating Europe’s first war of the twentyfirst century. Believing that Ukraine was not a stable democracy, Merkel pointed to the systemic corruption issues in Ukraine as a reason to block their membership. Given Russia’s proximity to Europe, trade with Russia was a political necessity. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline to carry Russian natural gas directly to Germany was built while Merkel was chancellor and only suspended by her successor, Chancellor Olaf Scholz, shortly before Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Under pressure to impose stringent new

37 BBC (2022).

116

E. L. SHENG

sanctions over the invasion, Germany has struggled to reduce its dependence on Russian energy without damaging its own economy. Merkel said that Europe and Russia were neighbors that could not ignore each other, and that the two countries have to find a way to co-exist despite their differences. She defended the sanctions imposed on Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea and Germany’s role in maintaining the Minsk peace process, which was meant to end the fighting in eastern Ukraine in 2014–2015. The peace process, she argued, gave Ukraine time to develop as a nation and strengthen its military forces. Merkel and Putin both had direct experience of life in communist East Germany—Merkel grew up there and Putin served there as a Soviet KGB officer. Putin speaks fluent German and Merkel speaks fluent Russian. During Merkel’s time in power, Germany’s national image and strategic role also underwent significant changes. Under her leadership, the German government maintained a healthy financial status while the economy grew steadily, improving the lives of its population. Germany’s unemployment rate fell by around 5% at one point and its GDP per capita rose by more than 40%. Merkel demonstrated a remarkable capacity to adapt to crises and maintain a positive relationship with the European Union and the world. As a result, she successfully integrated Germany’s interests, role, and responsibilities, quietly permitting Germany to assume the leadership role in the European Union. Furthermore, of all European leaders, Merkel visited China the most often. During her tenure, Sino– German relations reached their most positive level ever, with the establishment of a governmental consultation mechanism and the upgrading of bilateral relations to an all-round strategic partnership. At the same time, Merkel’s government accepted a new perception of China as a so-called systemic rival of the European Union, a position which was extended throughout the European Union. This led to a marked increase in the confrontational dimension of Sino–German and Sino–European relations.38 Merkel’s calm approach to Russia is greatly influenced by both her East German background and her understanding of Russia’s

38 Heiduk (2014).

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

117

culture. Although she was born during the Cold War, she was not influenced by the bitter confrontational ideology that dominated the Cold War mentality, but rather tried to take a rational and balanced approach to international affairs.39

5.5 Who Leads Matters: Explaining Foreign Policy Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders We live in the era of storytelling and of leaders who are storytellers. —Kerry Brown.40

Individual leaders play a central role in world politics. Recent international relations work on foreign policy analysis focuses on how the personal characteristics of political leaders affect their governments’ foreign policy behavior.41 A leader’s life experience plays a fundamental role in shaping the leader’s personality traits, ideal preferences, and value attitudes. The formation of leaders’ personality traits is based on the interaction of key life events and comprehensive experiences of leaders. The interaction of leaders’ personality characteristics and historical situations have a substantial impact on the foreign policy of a country.42 For example, Horowitz and Stam suggest that the prior military background of a leader is an important life experience with direct relevance to how leaders evaluate the utility of using military force.43 The leaders most likely to initiate militarized disputes and wars are those with prior military service but no combat experience, as well as former rebels.44 Scholarship on elites and foreign policy also has made important advances in identifying how elites influence foreign policy.45 Leaders’ preferences, personal beliefs, attitudes, and character naturally play a significant role in determining their foreign 39 Yoder (2011). 40 Brown (2018). 41 Hu (2019), Koops and Tercovich (2020), and Carati and Locatelli (2022). 42 Hermann (1980) and Preston (2001). 43 Horowitz and Stam (2014). 44 Ibid. 45 Guisinger and Saunders (2017), Choi (2022), and Saunders (2022).

118

E. L. SHENG

policy, as leaders tend to explain and predict events through the lens of their formative experiences. Therefore, the above sections in this chapter focus the analytical lens on leaders and their personal backgrounds to facilitate the analysis of foreign policy dynamics with reference to the role of leaders’ personal traits. In this section, drawing on recent advances in the international relations and political psychology literature, it is assumed that political executives’ life experiences affect their policy choices once in office. This section focuses on how political institutions and leaders’ personal attributes influence policy choices, with the cases of the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) led by Putin and the BRI proposed by Xi Jinping. A remarkable commonality between the GEP and the BRI is that each bears the deep imprint of its country’s leader. Through the GEP, Moscow and Beijing contest the Western liberal order, present a challenge in the competition over the shifting balance of power amid new international tensions, and try to realize opportunities that are presented by this shift. According to Macikenaite, China’s exercise of economic statecraft has changed with the growth of its economic power.46 Chinese foreign policy and the conduct of China’s diplomacy have undergone tremendous transformation under Xi Jinping’s leadership since 2012.47 According to Xi, all of the endeavors that the Party has led the nation in pursuing over the past century have been directed at turning China into a great modern country and realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.48 Bringing about milestone transformations and ushering in a “new era” for socialism with Chinese characteristics, Xi is regarded as a helmsman capable of leading the country in overcoming difficulties and pursuing full modernization.49 Xi’s career, which has spanned the grassroots and various levels of administration, has given him a unique perspective on the problems in the Chinese economy.50 Alongside his rich experience in economic governance, this background led Xi to the BRI as an effective solution to the gaps in China’s economic achievements and the upgrading of its industry. 46 Macikenaite (2020). 47 Hu (2019). 48 Xinhua (2022). 49 Ibid. 50 Chan (2022).

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

119

The BRI is one of the ambitious economic policies issued during the reign of Xi Jinping. As Ferdinand suggests, since Xi Jinping became leader, China’s foreign policy has moved from risk-averse caution to optimistic “dreaming” about a better world in which China will have recovered its rightful place.51 Proposed in 2013, the BRI has two pillars: the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road.” The first was put forward by Xi Jinping in a speech during his visit to Astana, Kazakhstan, in March 2013 and the second was proposed in November 2013 during a speech in Jakarta, Indonesia. These two speeches marked the birth of Xi’s grand BRI strategy. In 2015, the BRI was incorporated into the constitution of the CCP in a passage reading “following the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration, and pursuing the Belt and Road Initiative,” which indicates that the Chinese government attaches great importance to the BRI and deems it a key element of its national strategy.52 The BRI now underpins “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” and “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy”; in its international dimension, the project is also closely related to Xi’s image of “the building of a community with a shared future for humanity.” The vision of building a community with a shared future for humanity, which proposes building an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity, has been enshrined in the constitutions of the Party and the country and incorporated into important documents of the United Nations and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms. Given its five pillars—policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people exchange—the BRI is a grand strategy not only connecting different geographic regions but also involving diverse disciplines. China’s BRI has thus become the organizing foreign policy concept of the Xi Jinping era. Russia’s foreign policy is also deeply influenced by the personality of its president, and this has become especially evident during Putin’s presidency. As a variety of scholars have pointed out, Putin’s leadership style rests on a cult of personality.53 The main theme of the Putin era is Russia’s

51 Ferdinand (2016). 52 Xinhua (2017). 53 Cassiday and Johnson (2010) and Sperling (2016).

120

E. L. SHENG

power strategy, in which Russian elites, including Putin, agree that the principles and goals of foreign policy are to maintain Russia’s status as a country that cannot be ignored in the world. Putin joined the KGB while at university and became a Soviet intelligence officer. Although the Soviet Union has disintegrated, Putin has a strong “Soviet complex.” He believes that the disintegration of the Soviet Union was a tragedy and holds in his heart the goal of a strong Soviet Union. In particular, Putin’s experience in the KGB strengthened his concept of national sovereignty and gave him a strong will to safeguard national interests.54 Likewise, the remnants of the KGB may be influencing the directions of Putin’s actions as president. As Sergei Uvarov, the minister of culture under Nicolas I, famously said, “The founding pillars of the Russian state are orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality—which is a thesis very similar to Putin’s.”55 These experiences have led Putin to cherish the idea of Eurasian integration. At the same time, changes in the external environment are also subtly shaping Putin’s personal temperament. At the end of 2013, Russia was under high pressure from the West due to the Ukraine crisis. With the collapse of the pro-Russia party in Ukraine, Russia became further exposed to the threat presented by NATO and was driven to act in the east of Ukraine, which led to the Crimean crisis. Subsequently, Russia was sanctioned by the west and became the victim of economic repression. Russia was thereby forced to shift its strategic orientation toward the East and decided to rearrange its traditional sphere of influence. As part of this shift, Russia actively strengthened its relations with China. Diesen describes Russia’s integration initiatives with Europe as having been through three major stages: first, Yeltsin seeking to integrate into the West on the West’s terms; second, Putin seeking to integrate with Europe as equals; and third, Moscow seeking to integrate Europe either into or with Greater Eurasia.56 Putin has openly endorsed the idea of a Greater Eurasia, arguing for a Sino–Russian partnership to integrate

54 Marten (2017). 55 Larres and Eltsov (2014). 56 Diesen (2021).

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

121

the continent, and personalist rule has amplified his leadership on this issue.57 According to Gomza, the nature of Putin’s regime has significantly contributed to the outbreak and course of the Russia–Ukraine conflict.58 Russia seeks to shape Ukrainian politics and foreign policy by applying a variety of tactics, including coercive threats over energy supplies, seizing control of maritime approaches to Ukraine, extending Russian passports and citizenship to Ukrainian citizens, influencing elections, promoting the pro-Russian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, and deploying the Russian Orthodox Church to promote Russian–Ukrainian unity.59 Russia has advanced a notion of soft power and seeks to wield influence in Ukraine with a much broader repertoire of policies.60 In November 2016, Vladimir Putin approved the current Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, which advocates the deployment of soft power: “In addition to traditional methods of diplomacy, ‘soft power’ has become an integral part of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives. This primarily includes the tools offered by civil society, as well as various methods and technologies—from information and communication, to humanitarian and other types.”61 As the foreign policy leaders of Russia and China, Putin and Xi Jinping consider long-term diplomatic goals in their decision-making and are undoubtedly the central foreign policy figures in their respective countries. Therefore, when interpreting the foreign policy decisions made in these two countries, it is important to strongly consider the ideas and decisions of their political leaders. Presidential personality traits are an important element in interpreting the past and future of Russia’s GEP and China’s BRI.

57 Rolland (2017) and Kuzio (2022). 58 Gomza (2022). 59 Hurak and D’Anieri (2022). 60 Ibid. 61 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2016).

122

E. L. SHENG

References Adichie, C. N. (2020, November 12). Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie on Barack Obama’s ‘A promised land’. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2020/11/12/books/review/barack-obama-a-promised-land.html Al Jazeera. (2022). China’s Xi: Beijing supports peace talks between Russia, Ukraine. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/9/chinas-xi-beijing-sup ports-peace-talks-between-russia-ukraine Bader, J. A. (2016). How Xi Jinping sees the world and why. Brookings Institution. Baker, P. (2014, November 8). As Russia draws closer to China, U.S. faces a new challenge. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/ 09/world/vladimir-putin-xi-jinping-form-closer-ties.html BBC. (2022, June 7). Ukraine war: Angela Merkel defends her record on Putin. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61727450 Biden, J. R., Jr. (2021). Interim national security strategic guidance. Executive Office of the President. Brown, K. (2018). The Belt and Road: Security dimensions. Asia Europe Journal, 16(3), 213–222. Buckley, C., & Myers, S. L. (2022, March 7). “No wavering”: After turning to Putin, Xi faces hard wartime choices for China. The New York Times. https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/world/asia/putin-ukraine-china-xi.html Carati, A., & Locatelli, A. (2022). All the President’s men. Leadership style, advisory system and Donald Trump’s mixed record in foreign policy. Global Policy. Cassiday, J. A., & Johnson, E. D. (2010). Putin, Putiniana and the question of a post-Soviet cult of personality. Slavonic and East European Review, 88(4), 681–707. Chan, A. L. (2022). Xi Jinping: Political career, governance, and leadership, 1953–2018. Oxford University Press. Choi, S. W. (2022). When does liberal peace fail? Trade and nationalism. Review of International Political Economy. Clemens, C. (2006). From the outside in: Angela Merkel as opposition leader, 2000–2005. German Politics and Society, 24(3), 41–81. Deng, C., Simmons, A. M., Gershkovich, E., & Mauldin, W. (2022, February 4). Putin, Xi aim Russia–China partnership against U.S. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-vladimir-putin-meets-with-chi nese-leader-xi-jinping-in-beijing-11643966743 Diesen, G. (2021). Europe as the western peninsula of Greater Eurasia. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 12(1), 19–27. Dyson, S. B., & Parent, M. J. (2018). The operational code approach to profiling political leaders: Understanding Vladimir Putin. Intelligence and National Security, 33(1), 84–100.

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

123

Economy, E. (2018a). The third revolution: Xi Jinping and the new Chinese state. Oxford University Press. Economy, E. (2018b). China’s new revolution: The reign of Xi Jinping. Foreign Affairs, 97 (3), 60–74. Ferdinand, P. (2016). Westward ho—The China dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping. International Affairs, 92(4), 941–957. Fischer, F. (2022). Post-truth populism and scientific expertise: Climate and Covid policies from Trump to Biden. International Review of Public Policy, 4(4). Gomza, I. (2022). The war in Ukraine: Putin’s inevitable invasion. Journal of Democracy, 33(3), 23–30. Griebie, A. M., & Immelman, A. (2021). The personality profile and leadership style of U.S. President Joe Biden. Paper presented at the 44th Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, July 11–13, 2021. https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/psychology_pubs/132 Guisinger, A., & Saunders, E. N. (2017). Mapping the boundaries of elite cues: How elites shape mass opinion across international issues. International Studies Quarterly, 61(2), 425–441. Heiduk, F. (2014). Conflicting images? Germany and the rise of China. German Politics, 23(1–2), 118–133. Hermann, M. G. (1980). Explaining foreign policy behavior using the personal characteristics of political leaders. International Studies Quarterly, 24(1), 7– 46. Hill, F., & Gaddy, C. G. (2015). Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin. Brookings Institution Press. Horowitz, M. C., & Stam, A. C. (2014). How prior military experience influences the future militarized behavior of leaders. International Organization, 68(3), 527–559. Hu, W. (2019). Xi Jinping’s ‘major country diplomacy’: The role of leadership in foreign policy transformation. Journal of Contemporary China, 28(115), 1–14. Hurak, I., & D’Anieri, P. (2022). The evolution of Russian political tactics in Ukraine. Problems of Post-Communism, 69(2), 121–132. Janes, J. (2006). The change in government and transatlantic relations. German Politics and Society, 24(1), 119–133. Koops, J. A., & Tercovich, G. (2020). Shaping the European external action service and its post-Lisbon crisis management structures: An assessment of the EU High Representatives’ political leadership. European Security, 29(3), 275–300. Kramer, A. E. (2015, May 28). Putin declares soldiers’ deaths and wounds a secret, in war and peace. New York Times.

124

E. L. SHENG

Kuzio, T. (2022). Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nations and Nationalism. Lam, W. W. L. (2015). Chinese politics in the era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, reform, or retrogression? Routledge. Larres, K., & Eltsov, P. (2014). Merkel, Putin and the lessons of history. The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/mer kel-putin-the-lessons-history-10116 Lau, S. (2022, June 15). China’s Xi gives most direct backing to Putin since invasion. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-give-most-dir ect-backing-putin-invasion-ukraine/ Li, T., & Sheng, L. (2018). Corruption and travel: Effects of China’s anti-graft campaign on Macao. Die Erde, 149(1), 44–51. Macikenaite, V. (2020). China’s economic statecraft: The use of economic power in an interdependent world. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 9(2), 108–126. Marten, K. (2017). The ‘KGB state’ and Russian political and foreign policy culture. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 30(2), 131–151. McBride, J. (2021, January 13). After Trump: What will Biden do on trade? Council on Foreign Relations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2016, December 1). Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. https://www.mid.ru/en/ foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/con tent/id/2542248. Mushaben, J. M. (2016). The best of times, the worst of times: Angela Merkel, the Grand Coalition, and “majority rule” in Germany. German Politics and Society, 34(1), 1–25. Ng, T. (2022, April 2). Chinese leader warns it may take decades to fix damage from Ukraine crisis. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/ news/china/diplomacy/article/3172860/chinese-president-xi-jinping-warnsit-could-take-decades Preston, T. (2001). The president and his inner circle: Leadership style and the advisory process in foreign policy making. Columbia University Press. Rolland, N. (2017). China’s Eurasian century? Political and strategic implications of the Belt and Road Initiative. National Bureau of Asian Research. Saunders, E. N. (2022). Elites in the making and breaking of foreign policy. Annual Review of Political Science, 25, 219–240. Sheng, E. L. (2022). A panorama of the Arctic: Geopolitics and International Law. In Arctic opportunities and challenges: China, Russia and the US cooperation and competition (pp. 7–26). Springer Singapore. Sheng, L. (2021). How Covid-19 reshapes new world order: Political economy perspective. Springer.

5

DIFFERING VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS …

125

Sheng, L. (2022). Comparison between authoritarian and democratic countries in the pandemic era. In How COVID-19 reshapes new world order: Political economy perspective (pp. 47–82). Springer. Sheng, L., & Felix do Nascimento, D. (2021). On Sino-US trade wars: A dialectical consideration. In Love and trade war: China and the US in historical context (pp. 47–98). Palgrave MacMillan. Sheng, L., Gu, X., & Guo, H. (2021). Business cycles of casino cities: Theoretical model, empirical evidence and policy implications. Journal of Urban Affairs, 1–20. Sheng, L., Yin, Y., & Zhang, A. (2022). Theorising on tourist flows and business cycles in casino cities. Argumenta Oeconomica, 48(1), 187–199. Sheng, L., Yin, Y., Zhang, A., & Wu, J. (2022). Modelling economic structure: The perspective of tourist cities. Argumenta Oeconomica, 49(2), 135–150. Sperling, V. (2016). Putin’s macho personality cult. Communist and PostCommunist Studies, 49(1), 13–23. Tan, H. (2017). China wrote Belt and Road Initiative into the party constitution. That makes it riskier than ever. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/ 31/china-wrote-belt-and-road-initiative-into-the-party-constitution.html Tan, S. S. (2021). (Still) supporting the indispensable power: Singapore’s relations with the United States from Trump to Biden. Asia Policy, 28(4), 77–85. Time. (2019, April 25). Xi Jinping defends China’s Belt and Road project. https://time.com/5578514/china-xi-jinping-belt-road-corruption-debt/ Voice of America. (2022). China’s Xi says international disputes should be resolved via dialogue, not sanctions. https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-xi-says-int ernational-disputes-should-be-resolved-via-dialogue-not-sanctions/6538799. html White House. (2022a, September 30). Statement from President Biden on Russia’s attempts to annex Ukrainian territory. https://www.whitehouse. gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022b/09/30/statement-from-pre sident-biden-on-russias-attempts-to-annex-ukrainian-territory/ White House. (2022b, October). National security strategy. https://www.whi tehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022a/11/8-November-Combined-PDFfor-Upload.pdf White, S., & McAllister, I. (2008). The Putin phenomenon. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 24(4), 604–628. Xinhua. (2017, October 24). “Belt and Road” incorporated into CPC Constitution. Xinhua. (2022, October 25). Profile: Xi Jinping leads China on new journey. https://english.news.cn/20221025/97bce6c7614242f5a6e0c3ecf5e 837ee/c.html

126

E. L. SHENG

Yang, X. (2021). US–China crossroads ahead: Perils and opportunities for Biden. The Washington Quarterly, 44(1), 129–153. Yin, Y., & Sheng, L. (2021). Theorizing about global imbalances: An inequality perspective. Argumenta Oeconomica, 46(1), 169–181. Yoder, J. A. (2011). An intersectional approach to Angela Merkel’s foreign policy. German Politics, 20(3), 360–375. Zarrow, P. (2022). Prospects for a chilly war: China advice at the dawn of the Biden era. Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 29(1), 82–112. Zhang, B. (2022). From defensive toward offensive realism: Strategic competition and continuities in the United States’ China policy. Journal of Contemporary China, 31(137), 793–809. Zhao, M. (2021). The Belt and Road Initiative and China–US strategic competition. China International Strategy Review, 3(2), 248–260.

Conclusion

As the cornerstone of Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP), the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is both a point of departure and a starting point. Russia’s desire to consolidate and enhance its influence in the EEU through the GEP has undoubtedly increased the vigilance of the European Union and the United States. With the development of the GEP and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—and their increasingly converging possibilities—Russia, China, the EU, and the United States all face unique challenges and opportunities. To realize the idea of a GEP in the areas of security, economics, and human development, cooperation between the EEU and other countries is essential. Despite the uncertainty about the prospects of the development of the GEP, China actively supports this initiative. Both economically and strategically, the GEP can contribute to the integration of regional economies and the maintenance of regional stability. Furthermore, this initiative is in the interests of China, Russia, and other countries in the region and can play a significant role in strengthening Russia–China relations. The history of more than two decades after the Cold War has shown that the stability of Sino–Russian bilateral relations and the development of Sino–Russian cooperation not only conform to the respective national interests of the two countries but also have an important impact on the stability of the Eurasian situation. China and Russia jointly build and connect the BRI and the EEU and take the lead in carrying out joint research and formulating relevant measures, which not only shows the © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. L. Sheng, Greater Eurasia Partnership and Belt and Road Initiative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3046-3

127

128

CONCLUSION

positive intentions of China and Russia but also makes China–Russia cooperation an important part of building Eurasian partners. Cooperation between China and Russia, as the two most important countries in the Eurasian region, can not only effectively promote regional stability by reducing the possibility of small and medium-sized countries in the region choosing sides but also play a dual-leadership role, provide a continuous impetus for regional cooperation, and attract more countries to participate in the construction of the GEP. However, Sino–Russian cooperation will make the United States and Europe more nervous and the tone of provocations and short-selling of Sino–Russian relations will escalate. The West is aware of the potential strategic motivations of the GEP and the BRI and their ability to change the geopolitical landscape and global governance standards. China and the West share many common interests regarding economic globalization, trade liberalization, and multilateral trade, but the geopolitical considerations involved in the GEP and BRI mean that they remain contentious. Relations between Russia and NATO continue to deteriorate as the Russia–Ukraine conflict develops. European and NATO countries, led by the United States, have generally demonstrated a strong sense of unity and solidarity. The world’s four major powers, the United States, Europe, China, and Russia, have had varying degrees and types of involvement in the conflict. A highly complex interaction pattern has emerged in these relations between the great powers as a result, which has destabilized the global order. During this conflict, the relations between China and Europe are also going to be put to a severe test. In today’s international situation, the Sino–Russian partnership is steadily improving, the pattern of Sino–American competition has not yet changed, American–Russian confrontation is intensifying, Europe and Russia seem to be moving toward confrontation, and US–Europe cooperation is becoming stronger. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the relationship between these four major economic players will not continue to change or evolve. In light of this, a dynamic approach is needed to judge the future direction of relations between Russia, China, the United States, and Europe.

Index

A anti-corruption, 101 Arctic Sea Route, 31 artificial intelligence, 12, 56, 62 ASEAN, 2, 4, 31 Atlanticism, vii, 84–86

B big data, 12 Build Back Better World (B3W), 15, 57

C carbon neutrality, 11 current account surplus, 45

D debt trap, 14, 47 digital finance, 83 digital technology, 12, 60, 61

F financial system, 4, 45, 54

G G20, 15 geopolitical competition, 16 Green Silk Road, 11

H harmonization, 5, 8, 22 Healthy Silk Road, 11 Hong Kong, 49, 56, 88 Huawei, 12, 49, 55, 88

L Lisbon, 4, 67, 113 localization, 51

M marginalization, 20 Maritime Silk Road, 7, 119

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 E. L. Sheng, Greater Eurasia Partnership and Belt and Road Initiative, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3046-3

129

130

INDEX

Marshall Plan, 14, 44, 54 Mediterranean Sea, 7, 53 Merkel, Angela, vii, 112–116 N Neo-Eurasianism, vii, 84, 85 New Silk Road, 7, 9, 16, 31 non-zero-sum game, 86 O Obama, Barack, 77, 107 overseas investment, 12 P Paris climate agreement, 108 pivot to Asia, 4, 18, 52 Polar Silk Road, 33, 49 S Sino–Russian cooperation, 19, 127 soft power, 121 stakeholder, 28, 60 strategic partnership, 15, 27, 29, 32, 34, 68, 91, 116

supply chain, 11, 12, 87, 89

T Taiwan, 31, 56, 73, 102, 111 Transatlantic Declaration, 83 Trans-Pacific Partnership, 23, 107 transparency, 10, 14, 23, 50, 61, 76 triangular relations, 89 Triffin dilemma, 53

U Ukraine crisis, vii, 4, 18, 73, 74, 104, 113, 120 unilateralism, 111 United Nations, vii, 15, 100, 104, 108, 109, 119

V Vietnam, 5, 43

W World Trade Organization (WTO), 3, 56, 83, 104