The Impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: From Asia to Europe 9780815396109, 9781351182768

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Acknowledgements
1. The role of the Belt and Road Initiative in China’s international relations
1.1 The complex and multifaceted rise of China
1.2 The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s ‘new silk roads’
1.3 Reactions to the BRI as frames of interpretation
1.4 Developing a theoretical-methodological approach to the Belt
and Road
1.5 Organisation and contribution of the book
References
2. Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative
2.1 Introduction: how to theorise the BRI’s complexity?
2.2 China’s flexible, syncretic approach to policymaking in
a complex world: implications for the BRI
2.3 Theory 1: Tang Shiping’s social evolution paradigm (SEP)
2.4 Theory 2: neo-Gramscian hegemony
2.5 Theory 3: offensive mercantilism
2.6 Complex eclecticism: a theoretical-methodological framework
for analysing the BRI below the macro-level
2.7 Conclusion
References
3. Complex eclecticism
3.1 Introduction: why complex eclecticism?
3.2 Sil and Katzenstein’s analytic eclecticism: strengths and
weaknesses
3.3 International relations (IR) theoretical schools: mainstream,
non-mainstream and non-Western
3.4 Moving from inter-paradigm debates to conceptual toolkits
3.5 Complexity theory/complexity thinking (CT)
3.6 Incompleteness and difficulty: an impasse or a way forward for
IR theory?
3.7 The problem of complex systems in IR
3.8 An outline of CT’s conceptual toolkit
3.8.1 Nonlinearity/sensitivity to initial parameters
3.8.2 Feedback loops
3.8.3 Emergence/self-organisation
3.8.4 Tipping points/edge of chaos
3.8.5 Black swans
3.8.6 Path dependence
3.9 Conclusion: combining complexity and eclecticism to analyse
the BRI
References
4. Applying complex eclecticism to the Belt and Road Initiative
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Interdependence, institutions and non-state actors
4.3 Power, states and anarchy
4.4 Norms, ideas and intersubjectivity
4.5 Non-mainstream concepts: harmony of interests/world society/
relationalism/patriarchal authoritarianism/economic inequality/
natural environment
4.6 Complexity theory/complexity thinking (CT)
4.7 Conclusion
References
5. The characteristics of the Belt and Road Initiative
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The emerging characteristics of the Belt and Road Initiative
5.2.1 The Belt and Road is supposed to encompass over 60 countries in Asia
and Europe
5.2.2 The Belt and Road is intended to improve connectivity across Eurasia,
primarily by focusing on improving transport and energy infrastructure, with
the other stated goals probably being subsidiary
5.2.3 The Belt and Road contains two main routes, the Silk Road Economic
Belt (SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR)
5.2.4 The Belt and Road contains sub-projects
5.2.5 The Belt and Road is a continuation of previous official Chinese
government policies
5.2.6 The BRI is Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy initiative, and thus
closely associated with his leadership
5.2.7 The BRI involves the use of institutions such as the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund and regional
forums
5.2.8 The Belt and Road is intended to have appeal for foreign audiences as
well as the domestic Chinese one, thus boosting China’s soft power abroad
and legitimacy at home
5.2.9 The Belt and Road is ambitious, large-scale, loose, and vague
5.2.10 The BRI is intended to achieve win-win cooperation among
participating nations
5.3 Conclusion: unpacking the implications
References
6. The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Central Asia
6.2.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to Central Asia
6.3 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
6.3.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to CEE
6.4 Southeast Asia
6.4.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to Southeast Asia
6.5 South Asia
6.5.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to South Asia
6.6 The Middle East
6.6.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to the Middle East
6.7 Conclusions
References
7. Assessing the impacts of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Summary of the findings in Chapters 4–6
7.3 Assessing complex eclecticism
7.4 Assessing the macro-level theories
7.5 The Belt and Road’s global implications
7.6 Conclusion: the Belt and Road Initiative into the future
References
Index

Citation preview

“Jeremy Garlick’s book presents a comprehensive and unique theoretic approach based on rich and solid empirical studies to understand the BRI, China’s flagship foreign policy under President Xi Jinping. The theoretical-methodological framework, or what he calls ‘complex eclecticism’ in this book, creatively utilizes a set of conceptual stepping stones to bridge the gap between the confusing, multi-regional empirical reality of the BRI and existing grand theories from the IR literature. The result is a remarkable book that both foreign policy observers and international relations scholars cannot afford to miss.” Suisheng Zhao, Professor of International Studies, University of Denver, and Editor, Journal of Contemporary China “A tightly researched, lucid account that should stand out amidst the growing literature on this subject. The book dissects BRI’s diverse, often loosely connected, multi-country projects, making the central story accessible to both international affairs specialists and the general reader.” Kishan S. Rana, Honorary Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi; Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington DC; former ambassador and diplomat with service in China; served as a joint secretary on the staff of PM Indira Gandhi (1981–82); author of eleven books on diplomacy “Within the mushrooming academic literature on the Belt and Road Initiative, this ambitious book stands out as it achieves something remarkable: it offers a truly original perspective on its sources, mechanisms and implications. Embedding a meticulously systematic and analytically rigorous assessment of BRI in the critically important debates and scholarship in the discipline of international relations, Jeremy Garlick provides intellectually impressive and as comprehensive as possible evaluation of what is certainly one of the great puzzles of global politics today. This book is an important contribution to the understanding of China’s foreign policy and China’s evolving relationship with the world.“ Dragan Pavlićević, Department of China Studies, Xi’an Jiaotong – Liverpool University “Jeremy Garlick’s book offers a unique theoretical understanding of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. The complex eclectic framework serves as a vehicle for deeper discussions on Xi Jinping’s proposal. The book uses three types of theoretical understanding: Tang Shiping with the social evolution paradigm, through Robert Cox with neo-Gramscianism, and Jonathan Holstag’s offensive mercantilism. Thus, the book explains the Chinese proposal from very different perspectives. Going into more detailed scope of understanding Jeremy Garlick presents an eclectic approach of combination of almost all IR schools and discusses BRI from very different angles. The presented approach is very Chinese in the sense that the Chinese culture is all about finding middle ground, based on everlasting processes and not-fixed principles, being always flexible. And, in fact, this understanding also refers to the Chinese theory of Chinese (ethical) knowledge as the foundation, Western knowledge (and technology) for practical

application of zhong wei ti, xi wei yong (中为体，西为用). This in fact shows the Chinese flexible and pragmatic approaches, as does the book. The complex eclectic framework shows that BRI is a multidimensional, multilevel and multidirectional proposal that serves China’s global aspirations and Xi Jinping’s desire for China’s future role in the world. Going beyond the eclectic framework, the book presents a necessary theoretical toolbox from which each of us can take the most suitable approach towards understanding the Belt and Road Initiative.” Dominik Mierzejewski, Associate Professor, Department of Asian Studies, Faculty of International and Political Studies, Chair at Center for Asian Affairs (university-based think-tank), University of Lodz, Poland “Garlick provides a deep and refined understanding of China’s Belt and Road Initiative that is often over-simplified by media pundits as well as the mainstream IR theorists. He shows the complexity of China’s rise and the fluidity of its theoretical implications. He makes the case that eclecticism and interdisciplinarity is the future of IR studies.” Jessica C. Liao, Assistant Professor of Political Science, North Carolina State University “This book provides a stimulating discussion on the relationship between two complex and difficult subjects: international relations theory and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The book challenges conventional thinking on these subjects and deserves to be read by both scholars of international relations and of China’s changing role in the world.” Duncan Freeman, Research Fellow, College of Europe, EU-China Research Centre, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies

The Impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative

This book merges macro- and micro-level analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to dissect China’s aim in creating an integrated Eurasian continent through this single mega-project. BRI has been the source of much interest and confusion, as established frameworks of analysis seek to understand China’s intentions behind the policy. China’s international activity in the early 21st century has not yet been successfully theorised by IR scholars because of a failure to satisfactorily encompass its complexity. In addition, the mix-and-match syncretism of the Chinese approach to foreign policy has been under-emphasised or omitted in many analyses. Bringing together complexity thinking and analytic eclecticism to assess the degree to which this scheme can transform international relations, Garlick critically examines this large-scale interconnectivity project and its potential impacts. The book will be of interest to scholars and practitioners in the field of international relations and China studies including academics, policy-makers and diplomats around the world. Jeremy Garlick is an Assistant Professor at the Jan Masaryk Institute of International Studies, University of Economics in Prague, specialising in China’s international relations. He lived in China between 2008 and 2010, and again between 2013 and 2015, working at the University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. He also lived in South Korea for five years, teaching at several universities and institutes. He first arrived in the Czech Republic in 1994, where he taught at Masaryk University of Brno for three years, and speaks fluent Czech. In 2014 he obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science from Palacký University in Olomouc, Czech Republic. He has published papers in peer-reviewed impact journals and more than a hundred articles in major English-language newspapers in China, the UK and South Korea.

Rethinking Asia and International Relations Series Editor: Emilian Kavalski, Li Dak Sum Chair Professor in China-Eurasia Relations and International Studies, University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China

This series seeks to provide thoughtful consideration both of the growing prominence of Asian actors on the global stage and the changes in the study and practice of world affairs that they provoke. It intends to offer a comprehensive parallel assessment of the full spectrum of Asian states, organisations, and regions and their impact on the dynamics of global politics. The series seeks to encourage conversation on: • • • •

what rules, norms, and strategic cultures are likely to dominate international life in the ‘Asian Century’; how will global problems be reframed and addressed by a ‘rising Asia’; which institutions, actors, and states are likely to provide leadership during such ‘shifts to the East’; whether there is something distinctly ‘Asian’ about the emerging patterns of global politics.

Such comprehensive engagement not only aims to offer a critical assessment of the actual and prospective roles of Asian actors, but also seeks to rethink the concepts, practices, and frameworks of analysis of world politics. This series invites proposals for interdisciplinary research monographs undertaking comparative studies of Asian actors and their impact on the current patterns and likely future trajectories of international relations. Furthermore, it offers a platform for pioneering explorations of the ongoing transformations in global politics as a result of Asia’s increasing centrality to the patterns and practices of world affairs. Recent titles China, the UN and Human Rights Implications for World Politics Christopher B. Primiano The Impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative From Asia to Europe Jeremy Garlick For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/RethinkingAsia-and-International-Relations/book-series/ASHSER1384

The Impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative From Asia to Europe Jeremy Garlick

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Jeremy Garlick The right of Jeremy Garlick to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with Sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-815-39610-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-18276-8 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd.

Contents

List of figures List of tables Acknowledgements 1

The role of the Belt and Road Initiative in China’s international relations

xi xii xiii

1

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4

The complex and multifaceted rise of China 1 The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s ‘new silk roads’ 7 Reactions to the BRI as frames of interpretation 13 Developing a theoretical-methodological approach to the Belt and Road 20 1.5 Organisation and contribution of the book 22 References 25

2

Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative 2.1 Introduction: how to theorise the BRI’s complexity? 33 2.2 China’s flexible, syncretic approach to policymaking in a complex world: implications for the BRI 35 2.3 Theory 1: Tang Shiping’s social evolution paradigm (SEP) 40 2.4 Theory 2: neo-Gramscian hegemony 44 2.5 Theory 3: offensive mercantilism 48 2.6 Complex eclecticism: a theoretical-methodological framework for analysing the BRI below the macro-level 51 2.7 Conclusion 55 References 56

33

viii 3

Contents Complex eclecticism

62

3.1 Introduction: why complex eclecticism? 62 3.2 Sil and Katzenstein’s analytic eclecticism: strengths and weaknesses 63 3.3 International relations (IR) theoretical schools: mainstream, non-mainstream and non-Western 68 3.4 Moving from inter-paradigm debates to conceptual toolkits 72 3.5 Complexity theory/complexity thinking (CT) 76 3.6 Incompleteness and difficulty: an impasse or a way forward for IR theory? 78 3.7 The problem of complex systems in IR 81 3.8 An outline of CT’s conceptual toolkit 84 3.8.1 Nonlinearity/sensitivity to initial parameters 87 3.8.2 Feedback loops 87 3.8.3 Emergence/self-organisation 88 3.8.4 Tipping points/edge of chaos 89 3.8.5 Black swans 89 3.8.6 Path dependence 90 3.9 Conclusion: combining complexity and eclecticism to analyse the BRI 90 References 95 4

Applying complex eclecticism to the Belt and Road Initiative

101

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

Introduction 101 Interdependence, institutions and non-state actors 102 Power, states and anarchy 109 Norms, ideas and intersubjectivity 115 Non-mainstream concepts: harmony of interests/world society/ relationalism/patriarchal authoritarianism/economic inequality/ natural environment 123 4.6 Complexity theory/complexity thinking (CT) 130 4.7 Conclusion 133 References 134 5

The characteristics of the Belt and Road Initiative

141

5.1 Introduction 141 5.2 The emerging characteristics of the Belt and Road Initiative 141 5.2.1 The Belt and Road is supposed to encompass over 60 countries in Asia and Europe 143

Contents

ix

5.2.2 The Belt and Road is intended to improve connectivity across Eurasia, primarily by focusing on improving transport and energy infrastructure, with the other stated goals probably being subsidiary 146 5.2.3 The Belt and Road contains two main routes, the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) 152 5.2.4 The Belt and Road contains sub-projects 153 5.2.5 The Belt and Road is a continuation of previous official Chinese government policies 155 5.2.6 The BRI is Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy initiative, and thus closely associated with his leadership 156 5.2.7 The BRI involves the use of institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund and regional forums 157 5.2.8 The Belt and Road is intended to have appeal for foreign audiences as well as the domestic Chinese one, thus boosting China’s soft power abroad and legitimacy at home 160 5.2.9 The Belt and Road is ambitious, large-scale, loose, and vague 160 5.2.10 The BRI is intended to achieve win-win cooperation among participating nations 161 5.3 Conclusion: unpacking the implications 162 References 164 6

The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts 170 6.1 Introduction 170 6.2 Central Asia 172 6.2.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to Central Asia 177 6.3 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 178 6.3.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to CEE 183 6.4 Southeast Asia 184 6.4.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to Southeast Asia 189 6.5 South Asia 190 6.5.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to South Asia 197 6.6 The Middle East 198 6.6.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to the Middle East 202 6.7 Conclusions 203 References 205

x

Contents

7

Assessing the impacts of China’s Belt and Road Initiative 7.1 Introduction 216 7.2 Summary of the findings in Chapters 4–6 216 7.3 Assessing complex eclecticism 218 7.4 Assessing the macro-level theories 221 7.5 The Belt and Road’s global implications 227 7.6 Conclusion: the Belt and Road Initiative into the future 229 References 232

Index

216

235

Figures

1.1 3.1 4.1 5.1

Map of the Belt and Road Initiative The complex eclecticism toolkits The revised complex eclecticism toolkits China’s BRI investments, 2015–2018

10 93 133 148

Tables

2.1 3.1 3.2 4.1 5.1

Three macro-level theories for analysing the Belt and Road Initiative International relations (IR) theory conceptual toolkit Complexity thinking (CT) conceptual toolkit Four forms of ideational power BRI countries according to the State Information Center’s ‘Belt and Road’ Country Cooperation Evaluation Report (2016) 5.2 Number of times conceptual tools were applied

52 76 86 123 144 162

Acknowledgements

The book you have in your hand emerges from the premise that making sense of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – also known as ‘One Belt, One Road’ – is extremely difficult. This truth was brought home to the author by his attendance at a conference on the topic organised by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung political foundation at Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan in April 2018. In the very place where Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced the BRI to the world in September 2013, it became clear from conversations with conference participants that all (including the author of this book) were struggling to find a way to grasp the implications of Xi’s flagship foreign policy initiative. There was also a lack of clarity about how to frame the initiative analytically and theoretically. One participant even went so far as to suggest provocatively that the BRI was nothing more than a slogan used to generate overseas support for Chinese expansion.1 This book is an attempt to analyse the empirical detail of China’s BRI using the tools of international relations (IR) theory and complexity theory (CT). To those who dislike theoretical debates, I can only repeat a similar mantra to ones articulated by others before me, albeit it here in a simpler formulation: without theoretical framing of a problem, we cannot hope to understand it properly. As the Astana conference – and other conferences subsequent to it – brought home to me, a mass of empirical detail without theory to frame it is confusing and affords no possibility of developing clear interpretative insight. At the same time, I have no desire to do theory for theory’s sake alone. My aim is to move towards a better understanding the practicalities of China’s international relations, not to obscure them. To those who find themselves bewildered by the theoretical considerations which make up large parts of this book, I can only restate the idea that without them it is not possible to make sense of the empirical detail in the chapters in between. However, I anticipate that for some the theory may prove to be too tough to chew through and point to the possibility of reading the empirical chapters in isolation. I have endeavoured to make the individual chapters self-explicatory (as far as possible) and therefore readable in isolation from the others. I believe I had a fairly good idea of the difficulty of completing this project at the outset. Yet I was not aware of the extent to which the project would

xiv Acknowledgements develop and transform as I worked on it, requiring study of an ever-wider range of materials and developments. In part this was because interest in the BRI has blossomed since I began work in 2017, and the literature on the topic has mushroomed. In addition, it was because the suggestions of colleagues, such as those at the Astana conference, changed my conception of the book in important ways. But most of all it was because the BRI itself, and perceptions of it, have evolved over the course of the last two years. In 2020 the BRI is different in important ways from the previous decade’s incarnation from which it emerged. It has been tarnished in the international media by perceptions of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ and ‘neo-colonialism’; yet still retains its underlying sheen as a visionary foreign policy initiative with the economic strength and energy of the world’s most rapidly growing nation of the last four decades behind it. As such, I believe China’s initiative is now, as it was before, the main game in town in terms of a coordinated strategy to transform global affairs. This is particularly the case since the other main contenders in the global ‘great game’ of the 21st century – the US, the EU, Russia, Japan and India – have not yet managed to present coherent visions of how the international order should develop in the face of the pressing problems – economic, political, environmental and cultural – which face humanity. Thus, the need to examine the Chinese initiative’s conception, characteristics and emerging development – as well as reactions to these – remains unchanged, and perhaps, given the initiative’s apparent resilience, even more urgent. I also need to make clear that I am not by any means claiming to have all the answers to the BRI. One fact which has become evident to me during the writing of this book is that nobody has a monopoly on interpretation(s) of the BRI, including Xi Jinping and the Chinese government. As I hope the book demonstrates, the BRI, despite its material real-world impacts such as investments and infrastructure projects, is wide open to a range of possible understandings. In fact, in a very important sense, the BRI is not one thing, but is a matter of perception. Like beauty, the ‘truth’ of China’s initiative lies in the eye of the beholder. It is my hope that at the very least this book will present an outline of some of the various ways in which China’s approach to global affairs can be understood and analysed – including the need to combine and synthesise ideas for interpretation taken from a range of different theoretical traditions. Completing this book would not have been possible without a whole host of people, many of whom I have probably forgotten to include in the following list. First and foremost, I need to acknowledge the enduring support given me by my head of department, Štěpánka Zemanová, without which I would not have had a platform from which to launch this project. At the Faculty of International Relations of the University of Economics, Prague, numerous others have been constantly helpful and inspiring in a wide variety of ways. These include, in purely alphabetical order: Tereza de Castro, Tomáš Doležal, Radka Drulaková, Zbyněk Dubsky, Eva Grebe, Radka Havlová, Aneta Hlavsová, Petr Kratochvil, Karel Müller, Jan Němec, Jan Rolenc, Gaziza Shakhanova, Pamir Halimzai Sahill, Ondřej Sankot, Zuzana Stuchliková, Zuzana Trávníčková, and

Acknowledgements

xv

Ayaz Zeynalov. Not least, Karla Hůjová, our department secretary, has worked tirelessly to fill in all the gaps in my knowledge of the administrative nuances of the Czech education system. Next there are the countless conversations with colleagues in both the Czech Republic and elsewhere, many of which have produced insights of which I did not become aware until later. Among those who have helped, often perhaps without knowing it, and not least through their support and friendship, include (again, in strictly alphabetical order): Kerry Brown, Duncan Freeman, Alfred Gerstl, Marcin Grabowski, Richard Griffiths, Heidi Hobbs, Malgorzata Jakimow, Jakub Jakóbowski, Tomasz Kaminski, Ivana Karásková, Bartosz Kowalski, Vendulka Kubálková, Li Xing, Tamas Matura, Dominik Mierzejewski, Jeremy Paltiel, Dragan Pavlićević, Runya Qiaoan, Kishan S. Rana, Mária Strašáková, Richard Turcsányi, Anastas Vangeli, and Suisheng Zhao. Apologies to any I have neglected to mention. A debt of thanks must also go to my editor at Routledge, Robert Sorsby, for encouraging and committing to this project from its inception. An expression of gratitude must also go to editorial assistant Claire Maloney for her tireless efforts to coordinate the project and to shape this text into its finished form. Above all, the support and contribution of Emilian Kavalski, the series editor, has been invaluable, not least in terms of Emilian’s own body of work on theories of complexity theory, normative power and other aspects of IR theory provided part of the initial impetus for the framework of the book and certainly constitute an intellectual precursor. Emilian has pointed to the need to explain Chinese approaches to international relations using a language which transcends paradigms by eclectically combining insights concerning material and ideational factors from disparate theoretical traditions (2009: 12). He has also consistently emphasised how vital it is for IR theory to be developed within a framework which fully accounts for complexity (Kavalski 2007, 2015). In addition, he has indicated (Kavalski 2009: 3), in common with others (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004, Acharya and Buzan 2007, Hobson 2012), the Eurocentric biases intrinsic to mainstream IR theory and its consequent inability to describe non-Western experiences of the international. All these elements are present in this book. Finally, it needs to be pointed out that in a book as broad in scope as this one – for which I offer no apologies, since the subject matter, the Belt and Road Initiative, is, at least in its conception, one of the most ambitious and large-scale projects the world has ever seen – there are likely to be numerous approximations, generalisations, and inevitably also, despite the author’s best efforts, errors and gaps in the research. It is my belief, however, that this book is timely and, given the confusing public and scholarly debate swirling around the Belt and Road, much-needed. Even through the inherent limitations, it is to be hoped that it will present a stimulating and reasonably thorough overview of the impacts of President Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy in Asia and Europe within a theoretical framework whose pragmatism is of some use to both IR scholars and practitioners. Hopefully the book you hold in your hands will contribute at least a little to the ongoing debate on the fate of China’s New Silk Road.

xvi Acknowledgements

Funding details This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation (Grantová Agentura České Republiky, GAČR), as part of the research project ‘China’s multifaceted economic diplomacy in the era of the Belt and Road Initiative’ (project no. 19-01809S).

Note 1 This participant was Dominik Mierzejewski; to whom many thanks for this insightful comment.

References Acharya, Amitav, and Barry Buzan (2007) ‘Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An introduction’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 287–312. Hobson, John M. (2012) The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inayatullah, Naeem, and David L. Blaney (2004) International Relations and the Problem of Difference, New York and London: Routledge. Kavalski, Emilian (2007) ‘The fifth debate and the emergence of complex international relations theory’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 435– 454. Kavalski, Emilian (2009) ‘“Do as I do”: The global politics of China’s regionalization’, in Emilian Kavalski (ed.) China and the Global Politics of Regionalization, Farnham, UK: Ashgate, pp. 1–16. Kavalski, Emilian (ed.) (2015) World Politics at the Edge of Chaos: Reflections on Complexity and Global Life, Albany: State University of New York Press.

1

The role of the Belt and Road Initiative in China’s international relations

1.1 The complex and multifaceted rise of China As the third decade of the 21st century approaches, there must be few in the world who are not aware of the story of China’s dazzling rise to global preeminence since the late 1970s. Based in pragmatic economic development under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China has transformed itself by becoming the workshop of the world. By utilising a combination of foreign investment, experimental entrepreneurship and state-led stimulus (for instance in the highly successful Shenzhen special economic zone next to Hong Kong), an export industry has emerged more massive in scale than any seen before. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty by migrating from the countryside to jobs in the swelling cities. State coffers are full to overflowing with cash in the form of foreign exchange reserves (Wang 2016: 457). China’s economy has become enmeshed with the world’s, via a complex process of interdependent globalised trade. China produces goods which are sold in the US, Europe and almost every other corner of our planet. Many of these goods are manufactured for Western companies, meaning that the fortunes of China’s economy are now dependent on foreign consumers. The negative downturn in China’s economy as a result of the trade war with the US which began in mid-2018 is clear evidence of this (Inman and Kuo 2019). The increasing amounts of raw materials and energy needed to keep the manufacturing process running are mostly imported: increasing amounts of oil and natural gas from the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa to keep the Chinese juggernaut running; iron from Australia to produce steel; copper from Zambia; gold from Central Asia; and other metals and minerals from all over the world for computer and mobile phone components and all manner of other products (Zweig and Jianhai 2005). China has raised itself out of poverty on the back of a combination of its own cheap labour, overseas markets and imported commodities, meaning that its economy can no longer be separated from those of other countries, a fact of which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which runs the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is keenly aware. Simultaneously, China’s increasing involvement in the world means political impacts abroad as well, as much as the nation’s leaders might wish this not to

2

BRI’s role in China’s IR

be the case. Examples of China’s growing political entanglements are becoming ever more evident. Across Asia and Africa, the engagement of Chinese companies in trade and investment activity has an impact on the political scene and civil society within individual countries. For instance, the official policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states conflicts with the bilateral trade and investment deals which need to be struck in order to do business. In states with authoritarian regimes, the mere fact of striking deals can serve to endorse a government which Western power regard as morally reprehensible or illegitimate. This affects the internal political climate within the country, even if the CCP would argue otherwise (Large 2008, Aidoo and Hess 2015, GonzalezVicente 2015). In addition, China expects states with which it does business to respect the ‘One China’ policy of recognising Taiwan as part of the PRC rather than a sovereign country and also to acknowledge that Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory. Economics can never be entirely free of political content: in fact, as the pioneering international political economist Susan Strange demonstrated in her book States and Markets more than three decades ago, the two are inextricably interlinked (Strange 1988). As far as China’s emerging international relations are concerned, the connections between economic and political factors are clear even if the Chinese may seek to downplay the latter. As Duncan Freeman (2017: 189) puts it, ‘while economics is fundamental to the relationship with China, the political dimension is key to the distribution of its benefits.’ In other words, economic forces have been driving the rising China’s engagement with the rest of the world; however, as the US-China trade war of 2018–2019 has incontrovertibly demonstrated, these cannot be separated from the influence of political factors relating to China’s internal structures and its relations with states and other international actors. There is also a weight of evidence, including President Xi Jinping’s almost hour-long speech about economic globalisation at Davos in January 2017, that the Chinese government and its President Xi Jinping are very well-informed about the extent to which their country’s intertwined economic and political fortunes depend on the world beyond China’s borders (Xi 2017). Indeed, as Timothy Heath (2016) demonstrates in a detailed examination of Chinese scholarly and government texts, there is a strong weight of evidence that the interdependence of international and domestic political and economic factors has been recognised by Chinese experts and government officials since the early 1990s. Heath shows that the development and substantial prioritisation within Chinese scholarly and policy circles of the concepts of ‘national economic security’ (guojia jingji anquan, 国家经济安全) and ‘economic diplomacy’ (jingji waijiao, 经济外交) acknowledges the fact that economic and political factors impact upon each other in both the domestic and international spheres, and furthermore, that domestic and international affairs are interdependent as well. In her book on Chinese economy diplomacy, Shuxiu Zhang (2016) confirms the importance of economic diplomacy as ‘an instrument for protecting China’s international interests’ (Zhang 2016: 10), as well as observing interlinkages between political, economic and

BRI’s role in China’s IR 3 cultural factors (p. 11), connections between the domestic and the international in Chinese foreign policy (pp. 8, 19), the dynamic nature of Chinese foreign policy (pp. 11–12) and the complexity of all these influences on Chinese decisionmaking processes and their implementation (pp. 26–27). In short, a mindset which perceives security, diplomacy and economics as intertwined fields of activity is one which is inherently working within the theoretical assumption of politics and economics as inherently interconnected and mutually dependent. The interdependence of political and economic spheres of activity results in a complex international political economy which needs to be understood for what it is, rather than what those who advocate utilising parsimonious theories to simplify reality would wish it to be (Cox 1981: 126–127). Although labelling China’s international relations complex may seem obvious, it is necessary to emphasise this characterisation to counter assertions in the academic discipline of International Relations (IR) that it is necessary to seek theoretical parsimony focusing on ‘thin’ and ‘unidimensionally political’ conceptions of international affairs (Buzan and Little 2002: 200). From relations with Japan and North Korea, from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean, from Russia to the USA, nothing is straightforward when it comes to understanding China’s emerging global role. Each facet of China’s interactions with other nations is difficult to analyse and hard to untangle. The devil, it is said, is often in the detail, much as one would wish it not to be. The neorealist scholar Kenneth Waltz argued in his influential 1979 work Theory of International Politics (Waltz 1979) that international politics consists of a complex system of interacting units. On the other hand, although acknowledging that there are multiple factors and actors, he identifies the principal units within the system as states, regarding other actors as having no significant impact on the working of the system. He also claims that states’ behaviour can be attributed to a single cause or independent variable. This is the fact (according to Waltz) that the international system is anarchic, which in the sense used in the academic field of IR means that there is no ultimate authority such as a world government to police states. In support of his monocausal argument, Waltz argues that a good theory ‘naturally and rightly makes some simplifying assumptions’ (p. 50) and that ‘[t]o construct a theory we have to abstract from reality, that is, to leave aside most of what we see and experience’ (p. 68). In short, Waltz argues that it is necessary ‘to simplify the material we deal with’ (p. 68). The central argument of the book you hold in your hand takes a position directly opposed to Waltz’s use of theoretical parsimony as a justification of linear monocausality in academic IR. Instead, the theoretical starting point for this book is the emerging field of complexity theory (hereafter CT; reformulated as complexity thinking by Kavalski 2015a: 2), which has been influential in the natural sciences but less so in the social sciences (so far). Nevertheless, and whether one would wish it to be so or not, CT cuts across research fields and, as the Chinese sustainability scholar Jack Liu demonstrates, implies multiple linkages between them which demand solutions which transcend academic disciplines (Liu et al. 2007). As far as academic IR and international politics are

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concerned, Neta Crawford (2016: 266) points out, in agreement with Alker (1996), Booth (2007) and Ling (2013), that it is only by ‘interdisciplinarity, a relaxation of the insistence on parsimony, and openness to the pluralism and complexity of human experience’ that one can attempt to understand, as far as possible, ‘world politics as an emergent system of multiple interacting systems’. Thus, this book presents the argument that attempts to boil Chinese involvement with other nations down to straightforward causal relationships with identifiable dependent and independent variables within the framework of a single theory within a single discipline are not likely to succeed, much as one might, quite understandably, prefer that to be the case. Under these circumstances, conceiving of China’s international activity in linear terms, in the form of causal relationships in which one specific factor brings another specific one about in an identifiable chain of events (cf. King et al. 1994), loses meaning. Robert Jervis, the author of a seminal work on complexity in IR, explains the point like this: ‘as actions combine to constitute the environment in which the actors are situated and actors in turn change as the environment alters, the language of dependent and independent variables becomes problematic’ (Jervis 1997: 58). With regard to China’s rising international impacts, very little is simple and almost everything is in flux amid what Maximilian Mayer (2018: 6) calls ‘the flexible dynamics on the ground’. Contemporary China’s emerging impacts on the world are evolving in all manner of messy and complex ways which make analysis difficult. They also render inadequate the conventional analytical tools of the mainstream Western traditions of IR theory, which rely on linear causeand-effect and an outdated view of the world as adhering to the laws of Newtonian mechanics (Kavalski 2007, 2015b, Ling 2013, Garlick 2016, Pan 2018). Further, the conventional notion of an IR in which theoretical traditions such as realism, liberalism and constructivism are perceived as mutually exclusive research ‘paradigms’ is, as numerous scholars have pointed out, nomothetically flawed: attempting to use the insights of an individual ‘paradigm’ to explain the state of the world in general and China’s impact on it in particular gives one only a partial, incomplete understanding of events (Jackson and Nexon 2009, Sil and Katzenstein 2010b, Regilme 2018, Zhou and Esteban 2018). At this point it is important to recall that contemporary China, although still under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is a very different entity to the one that existed when Mao Zedong died in 1976. Maoist China was almost entirely cut off from the world, separated from global currents, much as North Korea is nowadays. In an important sense, things were more straightforward back then (although certainly not simple): more-or-less unlinked to the global economy, operating in a distinct political realm without significant input from outside, China’s domestic sphere was largely self-contained and separate from world currents. It existed, to use a hackneyed but pertinent phrase, in a bubble. Today, to reiterate the point made at the beginning of this chapter, China’s slowing but still expanding economy, whose gross domestic product (GDP) is still growing at an annual rate of around 6.5 per cent, is integrated with the rest of the world in a process which the neoliberal theorists Keohane

BRI’s role in China’s IR 5 and Nye (1977) have called ‘complex interdependence’ and President Xi Jinping calls ‘economic globalisation’ (Xi 2017). Such interconnection with world economic affairs means that what Robert Jervis (1997) has called ‘system effects’ (such as positive and negative feedback effects, for instance relating to the effects of changes in commodity prices, exchange rates, or economic growth) flow back and forth across China’s borders, altering and being altered by events in China (Lairson 2018). One example of complex interdependence is the fact that 19 per cent of Chinese exports are sold to the United States, but only 10 per cent of its imports come from the US. This created a trade surplus of $329 billion in 2015: good for China’s bank balance, not so good for the massive US national debt.1 The resulting cash surplus for China and red ink for the Americans has meant that China has been forced to become one of the two largest purchasers (alongside Japan) of US national debt in the form of treasury bonds, of which China now holds approximately $1 trillion (Wang 2016: 457). It is precisely these interlinkages between the two Pacific giants which make Donald Trump’s victory speech promise of ‘America first’ (at the expense of China, by implication) so difficult to fulfil. It also means that the trade war Trump initiated in mid-2018 is likely to be damaging to both China and the US. Evidence for this came in January 2019 in the form of a fall in technology giant Apple’s revenue forecast (and share price) which was, in large part, caused by a slowdown in the Chinese economy: it is expected that this downturn will affect other US companies as well (Nicas and Bradsher 2019). In short, in China, as elsewhere, globalisation means the intertwining of domestic and international factors in an interconnected network of complex and interlocking system effects. Rises and falls in the prices of imported raw materials affect razor-thin profit margins in China’s export industry, in turn affecting jobs, migration to cities, house prices, and so on. Foreign firms build factories to take advantage of low-cost labour, only to find that wages are rapidly rising, thus undercutting the competitive advantage of the ‘China price’ (Harney 2008). The rural poor relocate to cities to find work in factories but return home to their farms when factories close due to slumps or shocks in the global economy. The distinction between domestic and international influences on the economy becomes blurred amidst a swirl of feedback effects and nonlinearities (Cudworth and Hobden 2011: 75). Beneath the surface of China’s apparently miraculous rise is a range of messy, evolving problems in the domestic sphere which go on to have impacts on international affairs. Among them are the following: massive industrial overcapacity and inefficiencies, for instance in steel and cement production (Chin 2015: 220) so-called ‘zombie’ companies, most of which are inefficient state-owned enterprises (Kroeber 2016: 229, Tan et al. 2016); excessive debt levels resulting from banks propping up the aforementioned zombie companies; steadily slowing GDP growth as China’s economy matures; severe air pollution caused (in large part) by the industrial burning of coal (Shirk 2007: 33); the emerging problem of demographic imbalance caused by a high birth rate under Mao and the one-child

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policy introduced by Deng in order to control population growth (Shirk 2007: 20–21); high house prices in cities as increasing numbers of Chinese join the urban middle classes (Kroeber 2016: 80); and steadily increasing wage levels making Chinese goods less competitive globally (Kroeber 2016: 176). All of these (and many other) issues demand the attention of the government, even if solutions are elusive. All of them also contribute to the emerging complexity of China’s domestic economy as well as its engagement with the world, creating a set of interlocking and dynamically evolving phenomena. Out of this complex set of domestic factors emerge multiple interlinkages between China’s domestic political economy and its external relations. These occur, as some of the examples already outlined in this chapter reveal, on a number of different levels and in a number of different areas, including economic fields of activity such as business, finance and the stock market, but also impacting political, social and technological areas such as human rights, terrorism, the internet, scientific research, the military and the environment. One example of a complex, evolving phenomenon which bridges across from China’s domestic political economy and into the realm of China’s international relations and the subject matter of this book is the relationship between the legitimacy of the CCP in the eyes of the Chinese people and China’s foreign affairs. In the wake of the pro-democracy demonstrations on Tiananmen Square in June 1989, the CCP made an implicit pact with the Chinese people in return for holding onto power. The Faustian deal goes something like this: we (the Party) will provide you (the citizens) with the opportunity to make money and build better lives; we will make China strong and respected again in the world, but in return for delivering on these promises you are not supposed to challenge our right to rule (Callahan 2015, Brown 2016: 214–215). The appeal to nationalism is the justification, among other things, for maintaining tight control of the internet, the arrests of troublesome human rights lawyers and the ‘re-education’ of Uighur separatists in Xinjiang: the CCP believes that it has so far held up its side of the bargain as well as it can, so it feels it has sufficient legitimacy to knock back all challenges to its authority as it sees fit. At the same time, that sense of legitimacy is not sufficiently resilient for those in charge to feel that they can loosen the reins of power more than they already have done. Indeed, under Xi Jinping there has been a significant degree of tightening compared to the preceding Hu Jintao presidency (Economy 2014). However, the CCP realises that in the age of the internet it is not possible (or even wise) to suppress literally all expression of dissent, so it allows the public to voice its dissatisfaction to a certain extent, and in certain areas. For instance, given the obvious severity of air pollution in many of China’s cities, including Beijing, it would make no sense to try to prevent people from talking about it. Similarly, since the middle classes are buying up homes at a fantastic rate and real estate constitutes one of their prime investment opportunities, it would not be advisable to restrict Chinese people from debating issues related to house prices. The resulting online discussions provide a limited public sphere to Chinese ‘netizens’, but at the same time exert a degree of pressure on the government. Allowing a degree of free

BRI’s role in China’s IR 7 expression in certain areas means that the CCP must maintain legitimacy by sustaining economic growth and giving the Chinese people a sense that their lives are improving while China’s global standing and respect in the eyes of the world is also enhanced. Persuading its citizenry that it is able to deliver the mostly materialistic ‘China dream’ (zhongguo meng, 中国梦) of a prosperous, powerful China has become, under Xi Jinping, an intrinsic aspect of Chinese governance (Callahan 2013, M. Liu 2015, Ferdinand 2016, Dickson 2018). For three decades, GDP growth averaged approximately 10 per cent per year. Between about 2012 and 2016, growth steadily slowed and reached a level of around 6.6 per cent in 2018 according to official government projections (J. Zhang 2018). Chinese officials and economists refer to this changed situation as the ‘new normal’ (Wang 2016: 457). Confronted by the evidence of a gradually slowing economy, the Party needs to find new ways to stimulate growth in order to sustain its ‘China dream’ legitimacy and export excess industrial capacity at the same time. One way to do this is to encourage Chinese companies to look for opportunities outside China as part of a coordinated overseas investment strategy (Kenderdine and Ling 2018). The reasoning is that if growth in the domestic economy is fading, then there is only one other direction to go in order to generate revenues: outwards, into the world. This is what the Chinese call ‘going out’ (zou chuqu, 走出去) or ‘going global’ (zouxiang shijie, 走向世界): a long-term strategy since the 1990s of expanding the activity of Chinese companies beyond China’s borders (Shambaugh 2013b: 174–175).

1.2 The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s ‘new silk roads’ The latest manifestation of the ‘going global’ strategy, a deepening and extension of it, is President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Although presented as an entirely new foreign policy gambit, the BRI in fact builds on the policies of Xi’s predecessors (Summers 2016, Small 2018a: 192, Tekdal 2018: 374). However, the initiative, launched in a pair of speeches given in Kazakhstan and Indonesia in the autumn of 2013 (Xi 2014: 315–324), is far more ambitious than its antecedents. In these two speeches Xi presented the BRI – also frequently called ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR; a literal translation of the Chinese yidai yilu, 一带一路) – as a grand scheme to improve connectivity, trade and infrastructure from Asia to Europe. The conception of the initiative ostensibly derives from the ancient ‘Silk Roads’ via which exchange of Chinese and European goods took place through Central Asia. However, it should be noted that the notion of overland ‘Silk Roads’ connecting China with Europe via Central Asia is a European invention originating with the German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen in the 19th century (Frankopan 2018: 2). The point here is that the metaphorical and symbolic (i.e. ideational or normative) content of the ‘Silk Roads’ concept, with its relatively recent origins in modern European (rather than Chinese) thought, is more significant than the physical contingencies of the ancient trade route. Some Chinese analysts (e.g. Ge 2018, Zou 2018) clearly see China’s ‘New Silk Roads’

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as closely connected to the ancient ones and devote a great deal of space and effort to outlining the supposed historical links between the ancient Silk Roads and the BRI in order to emphasise the frankly mythical idea of a Eurasian tradition of harmonious cooperation and connectivity. However, the argument of this book will not take this somewhat apocryphal line literally but will instead treat the BRI as a Chinese state-led strategy of international expansion across Asia towards Europe which stems from the consequences of China’s economic rise since 1978. On the other hand, it is certainly worth bearing in mind the symbolism of the ‘Silk Roads’ for both Asian and European audiences, as we delve into the ideational aspects of the Chinese initiative which stand alongside the material ones. As we move deeper into this analysis, it is worth bearing in mind the Chinese government’s ongoing search for legitimacy both at home and abroad and the role which the BRI plays in this elusive quest both domestically and abroad. Rather than being motivated by the idea of reviving ancient trade routes, there is evidence, as Nadège Rolland (2017b: 116–119) points out, that the ‘Belt and Road’ is, in large part, a reaction to the US Obama administration’s ‘pivot to Asia’. Erstwhile Secretary of State Hilary Clinton called in July 2011 for the US, India, and India’s neighbours to … work together to create a new Silk Road. That means building more rail lines, highways, energy infrastructure, like the proposed pipeline to run from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan, through Pakistan into India. It means upgrading the facilities at border crossings, such as India and Pakistan are now doing at Waga. And it certainly means removing the bureaucratic barriers and other impediments to the free flow of goods and people. It means casting aside the outdated trade policies that we all still are living with and adopting new rules for the 21st century. (Clinton 2011b) Alongside Clinton’s pitch for a ‘pivot’ – in a Foreign Policy article provocatively entitled ‘America’s Pacific Century’ (Clinton 2011a) – the Chinese government seems to have taken very seriously the possibility of a major US push into the Asia-Pacific and what it interpreted as an attempt to form an anti-Chinese alliance with arch-rival India. Beijing reacted with alarm to the ‘pivot’, seeing it as an attempt to ‘contain’ China (Shambaugh 2013a). The irony of the Chinese response to the US ‘pivot’ is that it was a reaction to a ‘strategy that never existed’ (Kolmaš and Kolmašová 2019: 15). However, it is highly likely that the prospect of US activity in China’s immediate neighbourhood prompted the politburo of the CCP, including incoming president Xi Jinping (who assumed office in November 2012), to think in terms of developing a Chinese initiative to counter the Obama administration’s apparent foreign policy realignment. The BRI, in this interpretation, attempts to achieve this goal by ‘pushing back against perceived U.S. attempts to pressure and contain China’s strategic space … in ways that minimize the risk of military conflict’ (Rolland 2017b: 118).

BRI’s role in China’s IR 9 Be this as it may, the BRI, as officially presented, consists of two strands. The first is the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), which is in fact envisaged as several overland routes passing through Central Asia, Russia, Mongolia, Iran and Turkey to Europe; while the second is the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), identified as a sea route through South and Southeast Asia via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean to the Middle East and Southern Europe. Revealingly, in terms of being suggestive of China’s focus on and acute sensitivity to geographical factors in its attempts to ‘go global’, the SREB was unveiled when Xi spoke at Nazarbayev University in Astana in September 2013, while the MSR was presented in a speech to the Indonesian parliament in October of that year. Soon afterwards, in November, the Central Committee of the CCP declared that it would ‘set up development-oriented financial institutions, accelerate the construction of infrastructure connecting China with neighbouring countries and regions, and work hard to build a Silk Road Economic Belt and a Maritime Silk Road, so as to form a new pattern of all-round opening’.2 The official BRI action plan, called Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (henceforth Visions and Actions), was published more than a year later (National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 2015), suggesting that the details of how to apply Xi’s initiative (in both the material and ideational aspects) were still very much a work in progress – as they probably still are in 2019. The Vision and Actions document presents five dimensions to the BRI. These are as follows: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people contacts. The ‘belt’ and ‘road’ are thus presented primarily as large-scale, inherently complex means by which to generate improved relations and mutual opportunities for economic growth between China and the developing countries in both its neighbourhood and beyond by enhancing trade, investment and connectivity (Yu 2017), which is to be done by building infrastructure such as railways, ports, dams and power plants. However, the BRI is also intended to maintain the momentum of the ‘go global’ push to maintain growth in China’s economy by promoting and expanding the activity of Chinese commercial actors beyond China’s borders, since it is they who are set the task of building the new infrastructure (Kenderdine and Ling 2018). It can also be interpreted as an attempt to establish a flexible, macro-scale ‘container’ to deal with complex interdependence within which various mid- and micro-level projects can be coordinated (Lairson 2018). The ‘container’ consists of a vast, evolving framework for large numbers of emerging trade and investment relationships, from international- to national- to provincial- to city-level, reaching from within China to Belt and Road countries (Gong et al. 2015). As an example of the possibilities, Tomasz Kaminski’s research demonstrates the already strong political, economic and academic interlinkages between the Lodzkie region of Poland with Sichuan province in China within the framework of BRI cooperation and paradiplomacy (Kaminski 2019). Figure 1.1 shows, very roughly, the six land ‘corridors’ and one maritime ‘road’ through which the BRI is intended to connect China with Asian regions

10 BRI’s role in China’s IR and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The land ‘corridors’ are identified in the Vision and Actions document as follows: the New Eurasian Land Bridge from Asia to Europe, whose most significant route passes through Kazakhstan; the China-Mongolia-Russia route which connects China with Russia’s Far East and from there continues to Europe; the China-Central Asia-West Asia route which is supposed to reach Europe through Iran and Turkey; the ChinaIndochina Peninsula corridor which links southern China to Southeast Asia; the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor; and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In the Vision and Actions publication, the last two corridors, BCIM and CPEC, are claimed to be ‘closely related’ to the BRI rather than integral to it. However, they have since been increasingly incorporated into the BRI based on publications in People’s Daily and other official Chinese media (Aoyama 2016: 5–6, n1). Observers now routinely discuss the six economic ‘corridors’ as being key to the BRI, especially its overland routes, while the MSR complements them by ‘bolstering economic interconnectivity between China and the maritime states of South East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East’ (Clarke 2018: 91). The use of the word ‘corridor’ needs to be unpacked, since it is not as selfevident as some (e.g. Griffiths 2017) believe that the use of the term automatically indicates that the BRI’s primary goal is transport and trade connectivity. Since for

Figure 1.1 Map of the Belt and Road Initiative Source: Wikimedia Commons. See https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:One-beltone-road.svg

BRI’s role in China’s IR

11

instance in CPEC investments in transport infrastructure have taken second place to energy infrastructure investments,3 the use of the word ‘corridor’ alongside the rhetoric about re-establishing ancient Silk Roads should not be taken as automatically demonstrating that the BRI is chiefly about enhancing transport connections through the construction of ports, airports, railways and highways. Of course, this is a possibility, but there is a need to probe beneath the surface of the official rhetoric about ‘corridors’, ‘belts’ and ‘roads’ in an exhaustive search for other goals and motivations. As Liu and Dunford (2016: 326) point out, the use of the ‘Silk Road’ concept is ‘a metaphor for “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit” ’; similarly, the term ‘corridors’ may also have primarily metaphorical and symbolic (i.e. ideational) content. The official discourse presenting the BRI is intended, as later chapters will show, to generate support for China’s expansion and thus to promote China’s normative as well as material power. At any rate, as already stated, the Visions and Actions document presents a set of five goals among which transportation would seem to figure in only two categories, ‘facilities connectivity’ and ‘unimpeded trade’. Thus, it seems that there is intended, even in the official published version, to be a larger agenda than transport connectivity alone. By means of the regional ‘corridors’ within the overall initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative is, according to official texts and some Chinese scholarly interpretations of them (e.g. Zeng 2016, D. Zhang 2018), intended to create what China calls a ‘community of shared destiny’ (mingyun gongtongti, 命运共同体) and a ‘community of shared interests’ (liyi gongtongti, 利益共同体) by improving connectivity, infrastructure, transport and cultural exchange. Synergies emerging from ‘win-win cooperation’ will be generated for all states which participate in a new trade and investment network (Hu 2018). China, it is implied, of course aims to benefit from the enhanced trade, but according to the implications of the Chinese rhetoric and its interpretation through the lens of neoliberal theory, it is possible for all boats to float on the rising tide of emerging interdependence and feedback effects by finding ways to make profits (Zhou and Esteban 2018: 489). Of course, this does not mean that all the boats will reach the same level: critics point out that the theory of relative gains means that some boats will float higher than others, meaning that the power of the highest-floating boat – in this case, presumably, China – will increase relative to other participants (Miller 2017). Nonetheless, talk of interdependence and economic globalisation are central to Xi Jinping’s rhetoric, notably in his keynote address at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017 (Xi 2017). Less clear in Beijing’s rhetoric are the political aspects of the BRI. The initiative is frequently presented by Chinese government officials as being free of political content. However, as already mentioned, in the international arena economic and political factors go hand in hand. For instance, the policy of non-interference, a cornerstone of the PRC’s foreign policy since the 1950s, is obviously consistent with Beijing’s insistence that other nations respect China’s sovereignty by keeping their noses out of issues which Beijing considers domestic ones, such as Tibet, Xinjiang and other human rights issues within the PRC. This means that the policy of

12 BRI’s role in China’s IR non-interference, although presented by the Chinese government as devoid of political actorness, is inherently politicised. It also has impacts on the affairs of states in which the PRC is involved. Furthermore, increasing involvement in the domestic problems of states in which China is investing under the BRI umbrella means that China’s grand scheme for Euro-Asian integration is itself becoming politicised whether Beijing likes it or not. China’s support for the governments of unstable countries which are prone to internal violence – such as Myanmar and Pakistan – means that Beijing is taking a stance on political issues as well as economic ones, despite the CCP’s insistence that it does not aim to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries. As Ritika Passi (2019: 168) puts it, ‘desires notwithstanding, the political and strategic consequences of OBOR are functionally pegged onto the economics.’ As China becomes more and more entangled in the affairs of other countries, particularly its neighbours, there are signs that the nation’s rulers have come to the realisation that they can no longer stick to Deng Xiaoping’s advice to ‘keep a low profile and bide your time’, and to ‘never take the lead’ in international affairs (taoguang yanghui, 韬光养晦).4 Under Xi Jinping’s rule, as Camilla Sørensen (2015) points out, Deng’s safety-first policy has been replaced by ‘striving for achievement’ (fenfa youwei, 奋发有为). Xi’s BRI is itself a manifestation of the shift to a more assertive foreign policy. China’s expansion is also driven by the quest for the ‘Chinese dream’, an important part of which, as presented in a well-known book written by a retired People’s Liberation Army (PLA) colonel, consists of a vision presented to the Chinese people of a revitalised, powerful, wealthy China which is respected in the world (M. Liu 2015). Figure 1.1 demonstrates that, even given a detour into East Africa, the regions of Asia and Europe stand out in the conception of the BRI. The initiative’s central focus on linking Asia and Europe means that it manifests as ‘a Eurasia-centred project that, distinct from twentieth-century Eurasianism, aims to introduce a new comprehensive communication agenda to the Eurasian strategic landscape’ (Yilmaz and Changming 2018: 253). Carla Freeman (2017: 92) calls the BRI a ‘regionalism foreign policy’ which interprets the initiative as a ‘comprehensive approach to regional security whereby it seeks to engage [a] region through multiple vectors … as part of an overarching security strategy to advance China’s power and influence’. Similarly, Zhou and Esteban (2018: 488) use the term ‘regional multilateral cooperation’ to explain the BRI as ‘a multifaceted grand strategy … promoting China’s soft power and building its role as a normative power through the promotion of alternative ideas and norms, and reshaping global governance in a way that reflects China’s values, interests and status’. All these interpretations emphasise the BRI’s (trans-)regionalism, and also stress the multifaceted nature of the initiative, with the conjoined goals of enhancing China’s national security and expanding its overseas influence at its core. These assertions that the BRI is intended to increase China’s material and ideational power across Asia in the direction of Europe are important ones which the remainder of this book will examine. However, the identity of the BRI (if it has one) remains elusive and ‘hazily defined’ (Ang 2019), with official accounts differing from scholarly

BRI’s role in China’s IR 13 interpretations. Western and Chinese notions of the initiative also vary. This suggests that at this stage instead of trying to pin the BRI down as a thing-initself it may be at least as profitable to examine reactions to it. Although the ‘belt’ and ‘road’ certainly have material manifestations in the regions at which the initiative is aimed, it is also the case that it can be interpreted ideationally, in terms of its normative impacts on global public spheres. One of the dominant characteristics of the BRI, as this book will demonstrate, is that its very vagueness and lack of definition allow it to be used flexibly and pragmatically as both a ‘meme’ and ‘an empty vessel in need of being filled with actual values and meaning’ (Mayer 2018: 28) through which to transmit whatever the needs of the moment require. The initiative should be understood, like all other phenomena in the international sphere, an evolving organic process rather than ‘a single fixed and internally consistent end state’ (Whitehead 2011: 292). The BRI’s impact thus depends, to a great extent, on how it is interpreted by targeted audiences – which include IR scholars – both outside and within China. Let us therefore turn to an examination of scholarly and other reactions to, and interpretations of, the Belt and Road concept in order to understand, through the eyes of expert observers, what it has thus far been taken to mean.

1.3 Reactions to the BRI as frames of interpretation Just as there is policy continuity from the Chinese ‘going global’ policy to the Belt and Road era, so it is not possible to divide scholarly (and other) interpretations of the BRI neatly into a pre- and post-2013 taxonomy. Since the 1990s, Western perceptions of China’s rise have existed, in accordance with the primal motivations of business interests in advanced capitalist economies, on a spectrum between fear and greed – or, alternatively configured, opportunity and threat (Pavlićević 2018). Despite some qualitative differences, there has been a similar threat/opportunity duality in the developing countries of the global South. At the fear end of the spectrum, there is the ‘China threat’ hypothesis. This originated in the US in the 1990s and is still prevalent in Washington at the present time. As Suisheng Zhao (2019: 1) points out, a growing number of foreign policy and business commentators in the US support the view that ‘China remains an authoritarian, mercantilist and aggressive state whose growing power increasingly challenges the US’. Since the turn of the century, suspicion of China’s aims in the US has led to a slew of books with titles such as The China Threat (Gertz 2000), The Coming China Wars (Navarro 2008) and, in the era of the BRI, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (Pillsbury 2015), and Bully of Asia: Why China’s Dream is the New Threat to World Order (Mosher 2017). The influence of this literature is evident in President Donald Trump’s appointment to the office of Director of Trade and Manufacturing Policy of Peter Navarro, whose books call for measures against China (Navarro 2008, 2015, Navarro and Autry 2011). The Trump-initiated US-China trade war which began in mid-

14 BRI’s role in China’s IR 2018 emanates, in large part, from the influence of Navarro’s books on the president’s view of China (Lowrey 2018). In China, the Hu Jintao administration’s supposedly reassuring ‘peaceful rise’ slogan was, as Glaser and Medeiros (2007) demonstrate, a direct reaction to the ‘China threat’ hypothesis. There are also scholarly variants on the ‘China threat’ hypothesis based in the realist school of academic IR theory. The most prominent scholars interpreting China’s rise as a threat to the US and to world peace are John Mearsheimer (2001, 2010) and Graham Allison (2017). As evidence for his theory of ‘offensive realism’, which posits that a rising power will inevitably clash with the global superpower, Mearsheimer cites the historical record of wars between hegemons and challengers. On this basis he predicts that it will be difficult to avert military and other confrontations between China and the US. Deriving his insights from the oldest school of realism originating in ancient Greece, Allison draws the same conclusion based on his depiction of US-China rivalry as a ‘Thucydides’ trap’ into which the two dominant global powers, one hegemonic and one rising, most probably cannot help but fall into war. Hence, Mearsheimer and Allison present essentially the same monocausal pessimistic hypothesis with different labels: China and the US will go to war with each other because of the challenge the rising power presents to the global hegemon. In the BRI era, realist security threat perceptions have mutated, often in the direction of defensive rather than offensive realism. Mastro (2019) sees China’s hegemonic goals as more modest than global domination, involving ‘displacing’ rather than ‘replacing’ the US. Displacement is to be achieved by forcing the US out of the Indo-Pacific region while China gains the capability to defend its interests elsewhere as needs arise. Supporting this assertion, the foremost Chinese scholar of realism, Yan Xuetong (2019: 40) claims that Rather than unseating the United States as the world’s premier superpower, Chinese foreign policy in the coming decade will largely focus on maintaining the conditions necessary for the country’s continued economic growth – a focus that will likely push leaders in Beijing to steer clear of open confrontation with the United States or its primary allies … Both countries will build up their militaries but remain careful to manage tensions before they boil over into outright conflict. Further support for Yan’s position – which is both more nuanced and better grounded in the reality of contemporary China than the Thucydides’ trap hypothesis – comes from Tang Shiping (2008), who demonstrates that there was a switch from offensive to defensive realism in Chinese foreign policy under Deng Xiaoping. Accordingly, he argues that ‘China is unlikely to revert to the offensive realism mindset in its past’ (Tang 2008: 141). Tang (2013) sees the same change globally in states’ foreign policy, mainly due to increased understandings of the potentially dire consequences of military aggression in the wake of the Second World War, as well as the advent of nuclear weapons.

BRI’s role in China’s IR 15 Taking a geo-economic rather than geopolitical approach, Jonathan Holslag (2017) extends offensive realism into the sphere of economic statecraft and applies it directly to the BRI. Holslag calls China’s Belt and Road economic diplomacy ‘offensive mercantilism’, which he interprets as an aggressive type of economic strategy designed to benefit China at the expense of partners by promoting Chinese interests through ‘national champions’ – Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) such as construction and oil companies. Loans from Chinese state banks such as the Export-Import (Exim) Bank of China for infrastructure projects in BRI countries end up in the pockets of the Chinese companies which carry out the projects, thus ensuring that, instead of ‘win-win synergies’, China wins twice: its companies are put to work, thus exporting excess industrial capacity in the Chinese company, and the loaned money ends up back in Chinese hands. China can even win thrice if it can gain control of territorial assets in exchange for debt forgiveness: this is what happened in 2017 when China Merchants Port, a state-controlled shipping company, acquired a 99-year lease to control the port which another Chinese company had built at Hambantota in Sri Lanka (Abi-Habib 2018). Support for the state- and economics-led hypothesis comes from William Norris (2016). He points out the shortcomings of mainstream IR economic statecraft theory, which tends to over-emphasise coercive measures such as sanctions and fails to fully account for the Chinese state’s use of commercial actors in the service of comprehensive national security goals (Norris 2016: 5). The question then is whether the BRI has primarily political goals pursued via economic means (Brown 2017: 143, Turcsányi 2017) or whether, as scholars of international political economy such as Robert Cox (1981) and Susan Strange (1988) claim, political and economic goals are linked inseparably together so that neither takes precedence. Norris’ research, based on his in-depth examination of Chinese literature on the Chinese use of the term ‘economic diplomacy’, points to ‘the instrumental use of economic means to achieve national strategic objectives’ (p. 20), where – although Norris does not stress the point – those objectives have both political and economic content. This is a conclusion with which Heath (2016) concurs. Economic diplomacy/statecraft, in the Chinese interpretation, is a comprehensive and multifaceted state-led strategy of advancing national security interests conceived as depending on both political and economic factors. Since mid-2017, the alleged deliberate leveraging of debt by the Chinese to gain geopolitical and geo-economic influence as well as territorial assets has meant that perceptions of the BRI in the developed world have turned sour (Smith 2018). The use of Chinese state-backed loans to fund Chinese-built infrastructure projects in developing countries in Asia, Africa and CEE was christened ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ during 2017 and increasingly reported in global media in 2018. In Malaysia, the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – which have been the recipients of Chinese state-backed loan-for-infrastructure deals – controversy intensified during 2018. The resulting backlash began, as Andrew Small points out, to damage the image of the BRI in South Asia (Small 2018b). Accusations that Beijing is pursuing neo-colonialism through debt-trap diplomacy began to dominate global public awareness when the

16 BRI’s role in China’s IR incoming Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, expressed his reservations about Chinese state-backed investments in his country during a visit to Beijing in August 2018 (Hornby 2018). By early 2019 there was clear evidence that the downturn in the BRI’s image had only intensified (Sum 2018, Mastro 2019). However, the debt-trap debate has received relatively limited scholarly attention thus far, perhaps due to time delays resulting from editorial processes in peer-reviewed publications, with only a smattering of articles addressing the issue head-on up to the time of writing (e.g. Balding 2018, Sum 2018). Internationally, on the other side of the Belt and Road perception fence, there are scholars influenced by the neoliberal theory of globalisation and complex interdependence who argue that the Chinese economic miracle and its growing global impacts as a historic shift of potentially game-changing proportions. Richard Griffiths (2017), for instance, interprets the BRI above all in terms of its potential to massively enhance Eurasian transport connectivity through massive Chinese investment in railway, road and port infrastructure. Nadège Rolland (2017a: 137), while recognising the obstacles to the implementation of the Belt and Road and the ‘possible strategic implications’ for the US of ‘a new regional order with its own political and economic institutions, whose rules and norms reflect China’s values and serve its interests’, believes, with Griffiths, that Beijing’s goal of ‘an integrated and interconnected Eurasian continent’ is achievable and urges the US not to underestimate or ignore the BRI. Some Western scholars, usually co-authoring with colleagues based in China, go further in drawing on the official version of the BRI as presented in the Visions and Actions action plan and other official pronouncements. The British economic geography scholar Michael Dunford, alongside his co-author Liu Weidong, concludes that China’s BRI … is a proposal for an open and inclusive model of cooperative economic and cultural exchange that draws on the deep-seated meanings of the ancient Silk Roads. Communication and exchange require channels of communication and nodal infrastructures (roads, railways, ports, airports, telecommunications networks, pipelines, development zones and cities) that require massive infrastructural investment, and so this project does indeed envisage specific projects and new mainly multilateral financial instruments. The BRI is, however, conceived as open and inclusive and potentially global. It is underpinned by a desire to strengthen an open global trading system in which the hand of the market is accompanied by the hand of government, as it rests on the aim of promoting catch-up development and poverty alleviation, which themselves can expand markets for capital and intermediate goods, create opportunities and increase growth. (Liu and Dunford 2016: 337) The conclusion of Dunford and his co-authors in this and a second paper (Liu et al. 2018) is that the BRI should be theorised as ‘inclusive globalization’: the

BRI’s role in China’s IR 17 authors see the Chinese geo-economic model as an improvement on the established neo-liberal international order in that the former, unlike the latter, is ‘open and inclusive to all’ (p. 1212). In this interpretation, the BRI is an effort to supplant Western-style ‘free market’ economics with an alternative system of globalisation, or at least to push it in that direction. Another who takes the line of steering close to the prevailing wind issuing from Beijing, apparently assuming that the picture portrayed in the official literature can be taken at face value, is the economist Alicia Garcia Herrero. In conjunction with the Chinese scholar Jianwei Xu, Herrero concludes that ‘Xi Jinping’s current vision for the Belt and Road, centred on improving transport infrastructure, is very good news for Europe as far as trade creation is concerned’ (Herrero and Xu 2016: 11). Herrero and Xu, like Griffiths, thus focus on transport infrastructure and enhanced trade connections with Europe, but largely omit analysis of the possible geopolitical and geoeconomic motivations for – and implications of – Beijing’s promotion of its vision for its ‘belt’ and ‘road’. It should also be pointed out that these rather over-optimistic accounts of the BRI as a transformational infrastructurebased connectivity project echo those of many Chinese scholars, who tend to recycle the Chinese government line as formulated in the Visions and Actions document (e.g. W. Liu 2015, Huang 2016, Ge 2018, Hu 2018, Lin 2018, Qiao 2018). It also needs to be stated that prominent Sino-sceptic European scholars such as François Godement have explicitly warned, both before and after the advent of the BRI, against taking Chinese rhetoric as corresponding to real motivations and intentions (Godement et al. 2011, Godement and Vasselier 2017). In the simplest parsing, then, the reactions of foreign observers to the BRI can frequently be taxonomised according to their position closer to one end or the other of the threat/opportunity spectrum. However, an important qualification to such interpretations is the extent to which the author believes that Beijing’s vision of pan-Eurasian connectivity is achievable. For instance, as we have seen, while some – for instance Liu and Dunford (2016), Herrero and Xu (2016), Griffiths (2017) and Rolland (2017a, 2017b) – buy into the vision of a super-continent connected by Chinese-built infrastructure, other scholars see the BRI as lacking clarity, being over-ambitious or vague in the formulation of goals, and therefore likely to fail (e.g. Brown 2015, Kuhrt 2015, SzczudlikTatar 2015). A few even designate the BRI ‘a strategic blunder’ (e.g. Greer 2018). On the other hand, perceptions of hubris, over-stretch and nebulousness can be explained away as errors of interpretation by the notion – discussed in the previous section – of the Belt and Road as a flexible, large-scale container for evolving projects which change as circumstances and needs demand. Nevertheless, accusations of over-aggressive and unclear strategic planning sowing the seeds of the initiative’s failure are ones that need to be examined seriously, not least because they tie in to criticisms that have been levelled against the BRI from within China itself.

18 BRI’s role in China’s IR Within China, responses can be categorised somewhat differently, although again along a spectrum from broadly in favour to vehemently against. In the first group there are those who view the BRI as a vehicle for expanding China’s global power and influence, albeit one that needs refining; while in the second group are those who see it as a waste of money and resources which could be better utilised to address China’s domestic problems. The first group, consisting of the backers of the government line, is, for obvious reasons, much larger than the second. In an autocratic country such as the PRC with its mix of hierarchical, patriarchal Confucian culture and a centralised Marxist-Leninist state under the CCP – in both of which challenging authority is not encouraged (to say the least) – it would be foolish to expect that many scholars would stick their necks out and criticise the President’s flagship foreign policy initiative. Thus, it is not surprising that the majority of Chinese scholars who have published on the BRI tend to support and even recycle the Visions and Actions rhetoric about ‘win-win cooperation’ and ‘a community of shared destiny/interest’.5 Nevertheless, there are Chinese scholars who, either feeling secure or perhaps sensing that they personally have little to lose, have expressed dissent. Most notably, in July 2018 a Tsinghua University law professor named Xu Zhangrun (who was probably in Japan at the time) published an online essay entitled ‘Imminent fears, immediate hopes’. In the essay, Xu called for an end to ‘empty grand gestures and wasteful international largesse’, implicitly criticising the BRI and the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. Despite attempts to censor it, the essay spread rapidly through social media (Buckley 2018). The principal focus of the BRI-related part of Xu’s critique was on Chinese investments in the Middle East: At the recent China-Arab States Cooperation Forum [on 10 July 2018] the Chinese Leadership [that is, Xi Jinping] announced that twenty billion US dollars would be made available for ‘Dedicated Reconstruction Projects’ in the Arab world. On top of that, [Xi Jinping declared that] ‘a further one billion yuan will be offered to support social stability efforts in the region’. Everyone knows full well that the Gulf States are literally oozing with wealth. Why is China, a country with over one hundred million people who are still living below the poverty line, playing at being the flashy big-spender? How can the Chinese not comment in astonishment: just what is the Supreme Bureaucratic Authority thinking? Don’t They care about our own people? Furthermore, the people who indulge in such grand and expensive gestures evince no respect for existing budgetary procedures or institutional formalities; in the process They shunt aside a National People’s Congress that is constitutionally empowered to maintain budgetary oversight. In the process, existing institutionalised bureaucratic mechanisms are for all intents and purposes paralysed. It is akin to a declaration of war on the authority of the Constitution and the Rule of Law.6

BRI’s role in China’s IR 19 Sentiments expressed in private conversations by expatriate Chinese scholars based in the US and Europe confirm that the perception that the BRI is a waste of money which would be better spent at home is quite general among Chinese academics.7 It is possible that such mutterings have pressured the Chinese leadership into cutting foreign direct investments, although these might have been on a downturn anyway: in 2018 investments in North America and Europe dipped sharply from 2017 levels (Johnson and Groll 2019). On the other hand, some experts cast doubt on the notion that the BRI is primarily about material matters such as investments, infrastructure and physical assets. It has been claimed by scholars influenced by constructivism that the ‘Belt and Road’ is principally a slogan designed, like previous (and markedly less successful) catchphrases used during the Hu Jintao presidency – most notably, ‘peaceful development’ and ‘harmonious world’ (Shambaugh 2013b: 218) – to bend an international audience to China’s will and to shape a new international order according to Xi Jinping’s ‘China dream’ (Callahan 2016, Mierzejewski and Kowalski 2019: 211). Notions of soft power (Nye 1990), normative power (Manners 2002, Kavalski 2013) and symbolic power (Bourdieu 1991) enter the picture, the idea being that the BRI is mainly a means for Beijing to set the agenda and persuade global publics to accept Chinese approaches to international order. One scholar even posits that generating such influence involves the formation of institutions such as the ‘16+1’ forum in Central and Eastern Europe to garner support and shape the ideational landscape according to the CCP’s aims (Vangeli 2018). In constructivist ideational interpretations such as those briefly outlined here (and covered in more depth in Chapter 3), the ‘belt’ and the ‘road’ being ‘built’ by China exist chiefly as normative concepts designed to develop mechanisms of, if not exactly control, then certainly increased influence and agenda-setting. Thus, as stated earlier, the question of whether the BRI is primarily material or ideational in character is, as even the scholarly disputes outlined in this section indicate, one that is central to understanding the initiative, and which will be returned to at intervals in subsequent chapters. By now it should be evident that when it comes to the BRI and its interpretations by scholars, complexity, disagreement and a degree of confusion reign at both the theoretical and empirical level. Is the initiative primarily economic or political, or both combined? To what extent are a ‘belt’ and a ‘road’ really under construction? How do the normative (ideational) and material aspects of the initiative interact, if at all? The task of developing an approach or framework to understand the BRI is clearly a highly demanding one, and one that has so far mostly eluded theorists, or not even been attempted. Despite the difficulties of theorising China’s flagship foreign policy under Xi Jinping, the remainder of this book is an attempt to understand the BRI through theoretical framing which attempts to account for the full complexity of its impacts.

20 BRI’s role in China’s IR

1.4 Developing a theoretical-methodological approach to the Belt and Road In order to establish a suitable theoretical framework, the evidence laid out in this chapter suggests that the indistinct nature of the BRI renders it difficult to theorise through only one branch of IR theory such as realism, liberalism or constructivism. An approach is therefore needed which takes account of the complexity of the initiative by combining theoretical approaches. Indeed, several scholars (Zhou and Esteban 2018, Li 2018, Mayer 2018) have independently come to exactly this conclusion. Zhou and Esteban (2018: 488) argue that ‘China’s embrace of regional multilateralism in Eurasia is not only driven by neorealist thought, but also shaped by constructivist and neoliberal logics that are respectively linked to power balancing, normative influence and institutional transformation’. Their explanation of the BRI as a ‘multifaceted grand strategy’ is suggestive of the theoretical and empirical possibilities, and they utilise insights from the three theoretical schools of academic IR named in their analysis of China’s use of soft balancing and soft power to attempt to reshape global governance. However, they do not attempt to develop these insights into a fully satisfying and integrated theoretical picture of how the BRI works at the level of grand theory, perhaps due to lack of space in a standard-length journal article. Similarly, Li (2018: 31) clearly sees that the ‘multifaceted aspects’ of the BRI need to be theorised by combining theories. Interestingly, he elects to use Cox’s (1983) neo-Gramscian IR theory and Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) world system theory of capitalism to frame his approach. In addition, he also includes elements taken from Kautsky’s ultracapitalism theory and Lenin’s theory of imperialism (Li 2018: 32), as well as referencing the BRI’s ‘ideational and normative constituents (soft power) in terms of order-shaping, norm-negotiating, agenda-setting and policy-institutionalizing’ (Li 2018: 42). Ultimately, however (and understandably given that he refers to concepts which probably need booklength unpacking in a chapter which is only a little over twenty pages long), he does not manage to explain exactly how these complex and disparate theoretical elements relate to each other in terms of an over-arching framework. Maximilian Mayer (2018: 26–27) also understands the Belt and Road as a complex interplay of power politics and normative elements. He points to the fact that ‘[s]ocio-economic and techno-spatial transformations as well as the evolution of China’s great power identity offer significant insights into the contingent dynamics and processes behind the BR’ (Mayer 2018: 26). Nevertheless, he does not attempt to develop a theoretical approach to the initiative based on the complex conceptual elements he identifies, instead apologising for the limitations of the multi-authored volume for which his chapter provides an introduction: Given the comprehensive nature of the BR, this volume cannot address all crucial aspects. The chapters instead throw a conceptual spotlight on key elements of the BR to inspire further theory-driven studies. (Mayer 2018: 27–28)

BRI’s role in China’s IR 21 As will be explained in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3, this book takes Mayer’s words – and the other theoretical and empirical insights outlined in this chapter – as a prompt to try to develop an ambitious theoretical-methodological approach to the BRI which incorporates concepts taken from both complexity theory and what Sil and Katzenstein (2010a, 2010b) term ‘analytic eclecticism’. Complexity theory is used in an (admittedly ambitious) attempt to fully account for the complex nature of the initiative, while analytic eclecticism sets out to utilise the insights of a range of IR theories instead of attempting the forlorn task of attempting to narrow analysis down to one theoretical ‘paradigm’. The task of combining complex and eclectic theorisation in one framework is a difficult one, and one almost certainly doomed to approximation and probable failure in one aspect or another, but it is one, as the analysis in this chapter demonstrates, that it is necessary to attempt if one is to come to a clearer understanding of the comprehensive character of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Even if one accepts the truth of the observation that, to paraphrase Box et al. (2005: 440), all theories (models) are approximations, the most salient question is not whether the theoretical approach is rough, imprecise and inaccurate in one way or another, but whether it is useful. Sil and Katzenstein (2010b: 45) refer to the same idea when they point to the need to develop a ‘spirit of fallibilism’ in line with the idea of a scientific research project. It is important to understand that the theoretical-methodological approach at the heart of this book – which I call complex eclecticism – does not constitute a grand theory of the BRI. Instead, it aims to present and utilise a set of conceptual stepping stones – akin, as Deng Xiaoping put it, to ‘crossing the river by feeling for the stones’ – which can bridge the gap between the confusing, multi-regional empirical reality of the Belt and Road and some existing grand theories from the IR literature. Complex eclecticism is designed to be abductive (rather than inductive or deductive), in that the aim is to search for patterns in data, develop a suitable explanation, then return to the data to check to see if the explanation is supported (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009). After that, the idea is to return to macro-level theoretical explanations to reformulate or re-evaluate both them and the theoreticalmethodological approach as necessary. The expectation is that no one theory or approach can provide all the answers and that it is likely to be necessary to combine insights from a range of theoretical approaches in order to understand a given international phenomenon such as the BRI. The methodological approach is thus based on eclectically using theoretical approaches in combination to explore possibilities rather than excluding alternatives due to perceptions of incommensurability (the idea that theories logically contradict each other). The science writer Philip Ball (2012: xii) points out that It is not unusual for one model or theory to appear to be supported by experience in one situation, but others in other circumstances … This situation does not necessarily imply that the theories are inadequate or ambiguous, but may be simply a reflection of what the social world is like. Not only do outcomes often depend on a host of different contingencies, but

22 BRI’s role in China’s IR sometimes there may be too much variability in the system – too sensitive a dependence on random factors – for outcomes to be repeatable. The converse is also true: a particular social phenomenon might be equally well ‘explained’ by two different models based on quite divergent assumptions. In such cases, we need not despair of the value of models or theories. Rather, it might be necessary to accept that a particular phenomenon has no unique explanation, no ‘best’ model that accounts for it. In such cases, there might instead be a need for several complementary and overlapping models, some of which work well sometimes or for some aspects of a problem and others in other cases. Based on these considerations, the approach which will be taken in this book contains four steps. The first step is to outline some possible grand (macrolevel) theories which can potentially be useful for framing the BRI. The next stage is to create a theoretical-methodological conceptual ‘toolkit’ through which to analyse the empirical data of the initiative. The third step consists of an evaluation of the real-world impacts of the BRI in the Asian and European regions to which it is primarily being applied using the complex eclecticism toolkit. And finally, we will return to the macro-level grand theories to assess the degree to which they are a good ‘fit’ with the data, and the extent to which they need to be adapted, improved or combined. The chapters therefore proceed with a structural logic which is based on this process of abductive reasoning through complex eclecticism in order to identify the extent to which a set of macro-level theories can explain the BRI.

1.5 Organisation and contribution of the book The book contains seven chapters. The first, this one, frames the rest of the book by outlining the inherent complexity of the BRI and explaining the need for theoretical and methodological framing which takes account of that complexity. Chapter 2 then examines three macro-level theoretical approaches which may be able to account for the complexity of the BRI: the neoGramscian hegemony of Robert Cox (1981, 1983); Jonathan Holslag’s (2017) offensive mercantilism; and Tang Shiping’s (2013) social evolution paradigm (SEP). These are all candidates for ‘grand’ theories which may be able to explain the BRI. Applying neo-Gramscianism to the BRI frames it as an attempt to create a Chinese-led challenge to the current liberal international order based on enhanced cooperation between the emerging economies of the global South. Offensive mercantilism explains the BRI as a neo-colonialist attempt at domination and exploitation of economically emerging countries through economic tools such as so-called ‘debt trap diplomacy’. Tang’s SEP presents a picture of an evolving system-like phenomenon based on the dynamic interaction of institutional, ideational and material factors in a ‘defensive realism’ world. These three theories provide possible frames for analysing the BRI which need to be evaluated by studying the initiative’s impacts and implementation.

BRI’s role in China’s IR 23 The final section of Chapter 2 introduces the complex eclecticism theoreticalmethodological approach. This is applied to the BRI in order to examine the extent to which each of the ‘grand theories’ outlined in Chapter 2 can explain the initiative. The aim is to bridge between macro-level considerations and the mid- and micro-level real-world implementation and impacts of the BRI by combining concepts taken from a range of IR theories to flexibly evaluate evidence in an abductive manner. The approach creates a basis for evaluation of the macro-level theories in the final chapter, Chapter 7. Chapter 3 outlines complex eclecticism in detail, explaining the need to develop a ‘conceptual toolkit’ which goes beyond the standard paradigmatic frameworks – realism, liberalism and constructivism – which tend to dominate IR theory. The aims and implementation of the BRI are to be examined through conceptual tools which are extracted from individual theoretical perspectives. Concepts can be used in combination as necessary, without the need to worry about the supposed incommensurability (logical incompatibility) of paradigms. Conceptual tools taken from complexity theory (CT) are also incorporated in order to take account of the BRI’s inherent complexity. Thus, Chapter 3 presents two conceptual toolkits – one drawn from IR theory, the other from CT – for the abductive empirical analysis of the BRI to be conducted in Chapters 4–6. Chapter 4 moves on to the application of complex eclecticism to the BRI at a broad level, applying and reconfiguring the theoretical concepts extracted from IR theory and CT in an abductive manner. The aim of this chapter is to examine and deconstruct the overall conception of the BRI as it has been outlined by the Chinese government, state media and scholars, most notably in the Vision and Actions official BRI manifesto (NDRC 2015). The chapter will evaluate the extent to which Beijing’s rhetoric matches the implementation of the BRI. It will also assess which of the conceptual tools outlined at the end of Chapter 3 can be successfully applied to the BRI and which need to be discarded. Most centrally, the analysis reveals the extent to which the contested concept of power contains material and ideational aspects and transcends conventional paradigmatic boundaries in IR theory and informs analysis of the goals of the BRI. Chapter 4 also demonstrates the need to deploy concepts extracted from theoretical traditions beyond the mainstream and confirms that eclectically using concepts rather than paradigms provides analytical flexibility. Chapter 5 evaluates ten supposedly key characteristics of the BRI using the complex eclecticism conceptual toolkit. The analysis confirms that a key aspect of the BRI is its focus on transport and energy infrastructure, with the proviso that the division of the BRI into land and maritime routes is revealed to be mainly an ideational construct rather than a material reality. Ideational factors relating to regime legitimacy and normative power are evident in the presentation of the BRI, with its oft-repeated slogans about ‘win-win cooperation’ and a ‘community of shared destiny’. Nevertheless, material factors are also present, especially in terms of the attempt to enhance development in the global South by increasing connectivity and economic interdependence. The BRI is thus an

24 BRI’s role in China’s IR ideational as well as material construct within which an increasingly complex network of institutional practices takes shape and intersects. Chapter 6 consists of in-depth empirical studies of the progress and impact of the BRI in the five Eurasian regions through which the ‘belt’ and ‘road’ from Asia to Europe are intended to pass: Central Asia and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. In each region, the complex eclecticism toolkit draws out the key factors and their impacts. Central Asia is supposed to be a zone of connectivity between China and Europe, but the region’s natural resources, particularly energy, are likely to be of greater importance. Trade and investment ties in Southeast Asia are increasing, but China’s ideational charm offensive has been negatively impacted by perceptions of aggression in the South China Sea and accusations of debt-trap diplomacy. The situation is similar in South Asia, where Chinese involvement in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and other nations is a source of tension with respect to India. In the Middle East energy imports are prioritised; however, so far regional conflicts and geographical distance deter the Chinese from any serious attempt to project power. CEE, purportedly a gateway to Western Europe, is less significant for the implementation of the BRI than other regions geographically closer to China. Overall, material and ideational factors are found to be stronger in the three regions in China’s neighbourhood, as are interdependence and institutions; these factors are weaker in CEE and the Middle East. The analysis suggests that the regions in China’s neighbourhood – namely, Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia – are the most important for the fulfilment of the BRI’s goals, while the other two – CEE and the Middle East – are of less significance (although the Middle East has the key role of oil supplier). Finally, Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, will assess the relative degree of success achieved in the application of complex eclecticism and the macro-level theoretical approaches outlined in Chapter 2. The global impacts of the potentially transformational BRI and implications for the future will also be discussed. A main conclusion is that there is an ‘opportunity/threat’ bifurcation in perceptions of the BRI which affects the global implementation of the initiative. This bifurcation translates into two contrasting theoretical explanations of the BRI: either as a neo-Gramscian counterhegemony based on South-South cooperation or an offensive mercantilist form of ‘debt trap diplomacy’. In either case, Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy initiative represents a challenge to the US and the existing liberal international order based on the hegemony of the West. At the same time, the third option for framing the BRI, Tang’s SEP, provides the ‘most macro’ theoretical framework in that it analyses change in the international system in the longue durée, over thousands of years of human history. It posits that change in the international system is evolutionary rather than revolutionary and is enacted through the ‘genes’ and ‘phenotypes’ of ideas and institutions. The SEP also acknowledges the ontological priority of the material aspects of existence in a system-based analysis which cleaves to the demands of complexity theory and complexity thinking (CT).

BRI’s role in China’s IR 25 Overall, the book does not provide a single neat answer to questions about the impacts of the BRI but presents a nuanced approach to China’s expansion which takes account of the complexity of the impacts and implementation of Chinese foreign policy. The findings suggest that, depending on how the BRI is implemented, it can be transformative for emerging economies in Asia and Europe as well as in other parts of the world. At the same time, if the BRI is to achieve at least some of the goals promoted by the Chinese government’s official propaganda, it needs to be held to higher standards of transparency and accountability than have been implemented so far. It is only by examining the apparent contradictions and bifurcated perceptions of the BRI – often polarised into a ‘threat/opportunity’ dichotomy – that we can hope to understand it and react appropriately, whether as IR scholars, policymakers or global citizens.

Notes 1 Data obtained from the Observatory of Economic Complexity at the MIT Media Lab Macro Connections Group. Available at: http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/chn/. 2 ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on some major issues concerning comprehensively deepening the reform’, 12 November 2013 (published 16 January 2014). Available at: www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/ 2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm. 3 See the record of investments and projects on the official CPEC website (cpec.gov.pk). 4 Taoguang yanghui has a complicated provenance, and interpretations of it are varied, hence the lengthy translation used here. For a discussion of the phrase, see David Wolf (2014) ‘Understanding “Tao Guang Yang Hui”’, The Peking Review, 2nd September, available at: https://pekingreview.com/2014/09/02/understanding-tao-guangyang-hui/. 5 See previous page for citations. 6 An English translation of Xu Zhangrun’s ‘Imminent fears, immediate hopes’ (by Geremie Barmé) is available at http://chinaheritage.net/journal/imminent-fears-immediatehopes-a-beijing-jeremiad/. The English translation here quoted includes explanations by the translator in square brackets. The Chinese original is available at: https://theini tium.com/article/20180724-opinion-xuzhangrun-fear-hope/. 7 Private communication with the author.

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BRI’s role in China’s IR 31 Small, Andrew (2018a) ‘Choosing not to choose: the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle East’, in James Reardon-Anderson (ed.) The Red Star and the Crescent: China and the Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 189–203. Small, Andrew (2018b) ‘The backlash to Belt and Road: a South Asian battle over Chinese economic power’, Foreign Affairs, 16 February. Available at: www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/china/2018-02-16/backlash-belt-and-road. Smith, Jeff (2018) China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Implications and International Opposition (Backgrounder No. 3331), 9 August, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation. Sørensen, Camilla T.N. (2015) ‘The significance of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream” for Chinese foreign policy: from “tao guang yang hui” to “fen fa you wei”’, Journal of China and International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 53–73. Strange, Susan (1988) States and Markets, London: Bloomsbury. Sum, Ngai-Ling (2018) ‘The intertwined geopolitics and geoeconomics of hopes/fears: China’s triple economic bubbles and the “One Belt One Road” imaginary’, Territory, Politics, Governance, online. 5 October. Available at: https://rsa.tandfonline.com/doi/ full/10.1080/21622671.2018.1523746#.XEWzJ1xKiM8. Summers, Tim (2016) ‘China’s “New Silk Roads”: Sub-national regions and networks of global political economy’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 9, pp. 1628–1643. Szczudlik-Tatar, Justyna (2015) ‘“One Belt, One Road”: mapping China’s new diplomatic strategy’, PISM Bulletin, Vol. 67, No. 799, 2 July. Available at: www.pism.pl/files/? id_plik=20062. Tan, Yuyan, Yiping Huang, and Wing Thye Woo (2016) ‘‘Zombie firms and the crowding out of private investment in China’, Asian Economic Papers, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 32–55. Tang, Shiping (2008) ‘From offensive to defensive realism: a social evolutionary interpretation of China’s security strategy’, in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds.) China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 141–162. Tang, Shiping (2013) The Social Evolution of International Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tekdal, Veysel (2018) ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: at the crossroads of challenges and ambitions’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 373–390. Turcsányi, Richard Q. (2017) ‘OBOR’s older brother: lessons learned from the China-CEE 16+1 platform’, Asia Dialogue, 19 July. Available at: http://theasiadialogue.com/2017/ 07/19/obors-elder-brother-lessons-learned-from-the-china-cee-161-platform/. Vangeli, Anastas (2018) ‘Global China and symbolic power: the case of 16+1 cooperation’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 27, No. 113, pp. 674–687. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974) ‘The rise and future demise of the world-capitalist system: concepts for comparative analysis’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 387–415. Waltz, Kenneth (1979) Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Wang, Yong (2016) ‘Offensive for defensive: the belt and road initiative and China’s new grand strategy’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 455–463. Whitehead, Laurence (2011) ‘Enlivening the concept of democratization: the biological metaphor’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 291–299. Wolf, David (2014) ‘Understanding “Tao Guang Yang Hui”’, The Peking Review, 2nd September, available at: https://pekingreview.com/2014/09/02/understanding-tao-guangyang-hui/. Xi, Jinping (2014) The Governance of China, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

32 BRI’s role in China’s IR Xi, Jinping (2017) ‘Full text: Xi Jinping’s keynote speech at the World Economic Forum’, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 6 April. Available at: www.china.org.cn/node_7247529/content_40569136.htm. Yan, Xuetong (2019) ‘The age of uneasy peace: Chinese power in a divided world’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 1, p. 40. Yilmaz, Serafettin, and Liu Changming (2018) ‘China’s “Belt and Road” Strategy in Eurasia and Euro-atlanticism’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 252–276. Yu, Hong (2017) ‘Motivation behind China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiatives and establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 26, No. 105, pp. 353–368. Zeng, Lingliang (2016) ‘Conceptual analysis of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: a road towards a regional community of common destiny’, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 517–541. Zhang, Denghua (2018) ‘The concept of “community of shared destiny” in China’s diplomacy: meanings, motives and implications’, Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 196–207. Zhang, Jie (2018) ‘China projected to post 6.6% GDP growth in 2018’, China Daily, 26 October. Available at: www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201810/26/WS5bd2ab2aa310eff303284c15. html. Zhang, Shuxiu (2016) Chinese Economic Diplomacy: Decision-making Actors and Processes, London and New York: Routledge. Zhao, Suisheng (2019) ‘Engagement on the defensive: from the mismatched grand bargain to the emerging US-China rivalry’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 28, Issue 118, pp. 501–518. Zhou, Weifeng, and Mario Esteban (2018) ‘Beyond balancing: China’s approach towards the Belt and Road Initiative’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 27, No. 112, pp. 487–501. Zou, Lei (2018) The Political Economy of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Singapore: World Scientific. Zweig, David, and Bi Jianhai (2005) ‘China’s global hunt for energy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, pp. 25–38.

2

Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative

2.1 Introduction: how to theorise the BRI’s complexity? Chapter 1 demonstrated that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an inherently complex phenomenon whose impacts and implications are difficult to unpack. Material and ideational elements intersect, and the theorist is presented with a bewildering mix of factors usually associated with a range of theoretical traditions (i.e. realism, liberalism and constructivism) within academic international relations (IR) rather than one paradigm. It is therefore clear that understanding Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy strategy demands a theoretical approach which takes account of complexity and the full breadth of IR scholarship rather than attempting to shoehorn it into a narrow and procrustean theoretical bed. An important aspect of the argument presented in this book is that this difficult task of analysis demands making a self-conscious effort not to simplify, on the grounds that the effort to simplify always results in the omission of crucial elements from the analysis, and thus makes it inaccurate (Mayer 2018b: 5). There is also a need to incorporate insights from IR theoretical traditions such as realism, liberalism and constructivism wherever appropriate, since to disregard the work of generations of scholars would be negligent. Of course, at the same time there is a danger that, if too many elements are included in a theoretical analysis, it becomes confusing and useless. Yet it seems incumbent on the theorist who wishes to encompass complexity to attempt this task. The goal, perhaps unreachable, is to synthesise insights from different paradigmatic approaches into one overall theory of the BRI. This chapter therefore begins by considering China’s foreign policy as conducted through the BRI as a phenomenon which contains a range of seemingly contradictory or confusing elements: material and ideational, political and economic, realist and liberal, Marxist and capitalist, domestic and international. Yet, as the next section will demonstrate, it is important to acknowledge that the multifaceted conception of the BRI, as articulated by the PRC’s leadership and its factotums, emerges from conceptions of the nature of reality and approaches to establishing order arising from a fertile, complex and organically-evolving synthesis of Chinese and Western elements rather than a confusion of aims. This syncretic tendency in China’s approach to developing and implementing policy in the

34 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative contemporary era, which incorporates theoretical strands taken from the Western tradition as well as the Chinese tradition, has, apart from a few notable exceptions (e.g. Bickford 2007, Diamant 2007), for the most part been underemphasised by scholars working in IR and other social sciences. Another key point in this chapter’s argument is that the apparent vagueness of the BRI identified by many observers (e.g. Hillman 2017, Stec 2018, Ang 2019) is intentional on the part of the Chinese government. The deliberate lack of precision evident in the Visions and Actions document (NDRC 2015) and other official discourse is characteristic of the Chinese rhetorical tradition (Callahan 2016: 228). It can also be understood as constituting a strength rather than a weakness (Rippa 2017). The BRI is, as mentioned in Chapter 1, deliberately formulated as a container or “empty vessel” (Mayer 2018b: 28) whose grand, all-encompassing language and lack of specifics mean that policy can be pragmatically and flexibly adapted according to the demands of circumstance. The BRI becomes an allencompassing envelope for Chinese foreign policy which can contain whatever is needed at a certain point in time without undermining the foundations laid down at the initiative’s launch in 2013. It is, in the words of one observer, ‘open-ended, borderless, both literally and figuratively … flexible enough to evolve with the times, blow in the direction of contrasting political winds, and ride out the inevitable cycles of the global economy’ (Shepard 2017). Nevertheless, in opposition to the claims of some commentators (Hillman 2017, Stec 2018, Jones and Zeng 2019), it should not be inferred from the vagueness of the presentation that there is not an overarching macro-level strategy behind the initiative. The principal aim underlying the BRI is to create an expanding zone of international influence which will promote and protect Chinese interests through both material and ideational means while gradually reconfiguring the Western-based international order, as far as necessary, according to Chinese norms. However, it may be the case that the implementation of the initiative at the mid- and micro-levels – i.e. in terms of what is being done at the regional, state and sub-state levels – is likely to be open to negotiation by the actors involved. This may lead, according to recent research, to loss of coordination, contradiction of aims and the undermining of official policy goals (Hameiri et al. 2018, Jones and Zeng 2019). At the same time, a lack of ability to perfectly coordinate commercial and other actors also does not logically entail an absence of overarching strategic intent and planning (Norris 2016, Zhang 2016). Thus, the argument presented in the first part of this chapter posits that the Belt and Road Initiative has the following three characteristics at the broadest macro-level. First, it is open-ended and evolving, an organic process which is capable of shifting as needs demand rather than a fixed entity (Stec 2018). Second, it is syncretic in that it combines theoretical and practical elements taken from both the Chinese and Western traditions. Third, as already argued in Chapter 1, it is inherently complex in its conceptualisation and execution. Thus, in order to theorise the BRI effectively, a theoretical-methodological framework is needed which is capable of accounting for these three aspects of the initiative as one studies the initiative’s conception and execution.

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The next section frames the Chinese approach to foreign policy as a syncretic, evolving process and analyses the implications of this approach for the BRI. Then the following three sections introduce macro-scale theoretical approaches with the potential to encompass the open-ended, evolving complexity of the BRI. The first approach examined is that of a Chinese scholar, Tang Shiping(2013), although it is crucial to note that the main criterion for selecting the framework is its potential explanatory power rather than the author’s supposed ‘Chineseness’. In fact, it should be carefully noted that Tang’s approach is based on the analytically eclectic use of elements taken from Western IR theory and Darwinian evolutionary theory rather than the Chinese tradition. As will be demonstrated, it is the focused analytical fusion of these elements which gives Tang’s social evolution paradigm (SEP) explanatory potential with regard to the evolving complexity of the BRI. The other two theoretical frameworks are Robert W. Cox’s (1981, 1983, 1987) neo-Gramscianism and Jonathan Holslag’s (2017) offensive mercantilism. Again, these are selected because of their potential for macro-level theoretical insight regarding the material, ideational and institutional development of the BRI. The strengths and weaknesses of each of these theoretical approaches will be outlined and their relevance to the BRI explained. The final part of the chapter introduces the complex eclecticism theoretical-methodological approach which will be used in the remainder of the book to approach the empirical reality of the BRI at the mid- and microlevels of analysis. The aim when using the complex eclecticism approach is to try to establish which of the macro-level theories appears to explain the initiative best or whether an explanation incorporating elements of each needs to be used. This comparative analysis will be conducted in the final chapter of the book, after all the empirical evidence examined in the intervening chapters has been outlined.

2.2 China’s flexible, syncretic approach to policymaking in a complex world: implications for the BRI China’s leaders, following the success of neighbouring countries such as Japan, Singapore and South Korea in developing their economies by syncretically combining the best of Western and Eastern approaches, consciously develop policy based on utilising a range of theories and approaches in a selective manner. There is, for instance, substantial evidence that the CCP encourages senior cadres to read widely in a variety of political, economic and other texts and even listen to presentations by academics during the process of hammering out long-term policy (Brown 2016: 24–25). In a 2009 interview, Li Yuanchao, who served in the 25-strong Politburo from 2007 to 2017 and was the Vice President of the PRC from 2013 to 2018, describes the process thus: To construct a learning-oriented Party … we need to learn both theoretical knowledge, such as Marxist classics and the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and all the advanced human scientific knowledge and

36 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative advanced experience … We ask our officials to cultivate a reading habit and encourage them to read more books, and more importantly, good books … Every year all ministerial-level officials in the Organization Department will take time out for intensive study and discussions together … This year’s topic was how to expand democracy in our work. We read books by Marxist classic writers, expositions on democracy by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, even The Theory of Democracy Revisited by Giovanni Sartori. All of us read together. After we finished, we had comparative discussions, taking into account China’s special reality. We believe that a ruling party only remains viable and vibrant when it masters state-of-the-art knowledge. (Robert Lawrence Kuhn 2011: xix–xx) The result of the Politburo’s in-depth discussions is a seeming mishmash of elements inherited from Chinese philosophies such as Confucianism and Daoism, combined with aspects taken from European theories – particularly Marxism – and mainstream Western IR concepts such as multi-polarity and balance of power: an apparent dog’s dinner of theoretical approaches which nevertheless facilitates pragmatism and flexibility. Even Mao Zedong, publicly the arch-enemy of Confucianism, utilised his extensive reading of traditional Chinese philosophy when deliberating upon strategy (Kissinger 2011: 94–95). In his youth Mao also read texts by a range of Western thinkers including Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith, absorbing these influences long before he stumbled upon Marxism in his twenties (Spence 2000). There is thus ample evidence that the Chinese approach to strategy uses an eclectic range of theories, making it elastic enough to evolve and to react to changing circumstances. This approach can lead to bewilderment and misinterpretation among Western IR theorists, who tend to fixate on formal logic in the European tradition and notions of incommensurability (which means roughly the same as logical incompatibility between theoretical approaches, implying that they cannot be combined). For East Asians such perceived contradictions have less importance. For instance, in Chinese Daoism the notion of yin and yang denotes the idea of seemingly contradictory opposites complementing each other rather than clashing. In other words, what can seem chaotic and confused has an underlying logic and order, even if it does not look this way from the Western viewpoint. The use of ideas from multiple, seemingly incompatible sources can be termed syncretism, which in its basic meaning signifies forging together disparate elements from different cultural traditions in a pragmatic manner to form an innovative synthesis (Galvan and Sil 2007). In East Asia the tendency to cultural and religious syncretism based on the fusing of European and local norms since the 19th century has been a contentious topic, at least as far as Western scholars are concerned, since for Westerners it has pejorative overtones of inauthenticity and colonialism (Shaw and Stewart 2003). The controversy is unnecessary since it flies in the face of clear evidence that the West has absorbed elements of Eastern philosophy and science down the centuries (Ronan and Needham 1978). In East

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Asia, such syncretism is tacitly accepted and has also tended, once the lessons of European hegemony in the region had been learnt, to result in unexpected social and economic transformations such as Japan’s Meiji Restoration (which emerged from the combination of elements of European industrialisation and education with underlying Japanese cultural norms) and the South Korean economic miracle of the 1970s and 1980s. Syncretism could also be called eclecticism: essentially, cherry-picking and combining the most suitable parts of existing philosophies and schools of thought to find suitable approaches. These may appear to be theoretically incommensurable according to standard interpretations yet can be successfully applied in practice. This eclectic, pragmatic approach to policy has enabled China, in Deng Xiaoping words, to ‘cross the river by feeling the stones’ (Brown 2018: 46), and is today, this book argues, being utilised by China’s leaders in developing the emerging BRI. In the contemporary era, it is important to take note of Chinese syncretism because by combining approaches in a pick-and-mix fashion from Western and Eastern political and economic theory Chinese decision-makers have created an innovative framework for forging policy which, at the same time, since it contains Western (European) elements, cannot be dismissed as purely ‘Chinese’. Observers such as Zhao Tingyang (2006) and Martin Jacques (2009) who point out the distinctive character of the Chinese approach are thus both right and wrong: right because they demonstrate that the Chinese approach is different from the Western one, but wrong in the sense that they characterise it as emanating purely from Chinese culture and philosophy. A more accurate conception of Chinese strategising has to account for the ways in which Chinese leaders synthesise – syncretise – Chinese and Western theoretical and practical approaches to strategy and policy (Brown 2018: 109). Chinese syncretism also lends itself to the idea of envisaging strategic longterm policymaking as an ongoing, ever-evolving process rather than a static teleological design which is to be understood as a ‘final product’ (Marks 2018: 95). Envisaging strategic decision-making as processual enables Chinese leaders to react to complex developments in the international arena: process and complexity go hand-in-hand. Since the evolving BRI is certainly complex and, in one possible interpretation, presents as an emerging complex adaptive system (CAS), the attempt to employ a decision-making process which is capable of flexible and pragmatic reaction to circumstances is rational and entailed by the character of the initiative. Part of the role of the BRI, as China’s flagship foreign policy, is intended to be its capacity to absorb jolts and shocks in the international environment which may affect China’s development and role in the world. Thus, when President Xi Jinping and official Chinese state media refer to ‘black swans’ and ‘grey rhinos’ (Leng 2017, Munro 2019), it is a clear indication of the awareness at high levels of the Chinese government of the need to be prepared for unexpected events such as financial crises and to be in a position to react quickly to them. Furthermore, it is a reaction to scholarly interpretation, emanating first

38 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative from the West and then being taken up in China, of uncertainty and risk management in financial markets (Taleb 2007, Wucker 2016, Lu 2018). As China has emerged onto the world stage in the early 21st century, there has been an ongoing debate in the Anglophone IR literature about whether China is a ‘revisionist’ or ‘status quo’ power with respect to the existing ‘liberal international order’ (see for instance Buzan 2010, Ikenberry 2011, Stephen and Skidmore 2019). In essence, the debate revolves around whether China’s strategy is to sustain the existing international order in its current arrangement or challenge it and attempt to change it according to a ‘Chinese model’. However, Tang (2010: 23–26) perceptively argues that this debate is sterile, outmoded and analytically impoverished because it depicts international affairs as an either/or, zero-sum game in which there is space only for a single international order selected from (usually) two possibilities according to the logic of the Cold War or the struggle against Nazism. Such thinking, as Tang (2013: 43–147) demonstrates in copious empirical and theoretical detail, belongs to the historical era which ended in the 20th century rather than the present-day. According to Tang (2010: 26), an analytically richer approach is to replace discussion of ‘status quo’ and ‘revisionist’ powers with an examination of ‘the differences between an offensive realist state and a defensive realist state’. He suggests that while for much of human history the security dilemma was perceived in terms of aggressive elimination and absorption of rival states (the ‘offensive realism world’) in the contemporary era states perceive such aggression as unnecessarily risky. Thus, today, since ‘theories of international politics are not timeless’ (Tang 2013: 183), we live in a ‘defensive realism world’ in which the logic of security has evolved to encompass the understanding ‘that conquest is no longer a viable option in both the material and ideational sense [since] states can and will resort more and more to cooperation for gaining security’ (Tang 2013: 146). As a result, instead of identifying a binary pair of contrasted closed systems, characterised in contrast to each other as ‘liberal’/‘non-liberal’ and ‘free market’/‘state-led’, it is better to understand today’s world as a contestation between alternative normative visions of how the realm of the international should develop based on the material factors which influence each nation’s position vis-à-vis the evolving international order. For example, the US, Russian, European, Chinese and Indian versions differ in important, substantive aspects and are clearly influenced by history and culture as well as political, economic and regional factors (which there is no space or need to examine in detail here). Therefore, I suggest that instead of using scientifically outdated metaphors of linear mechanics and Cartesian either/or duality, it is better, through an adaption of Martin Jacques’ (2009) notion of ‘contested modernity’, to envisage the contemporary international arena as a zone of contested complexity. Ours is a world in which contrasting interpretations – particularly those coming from East and West – of cross-border intersectionality and interdependence tend to collide, leading to misinterpretations and misunderstandings. In other words, while the complexity of the international is not in dispute, there are differing views of how to address it and a subsequent lack of consensus concerning the best way to react to

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it. Actors differ in both the demands that the increasing complexity of the international order places upon them and their development of policy in response. For instance, at the time of writing the US and the UK were attempting to control complexity by taking active measures to re-impose their authority on processes of globalisation and complex interdependence: the Trump administration through the imposition of trade tariffs on China and its attempts to build a wall to keep Latin Americans out of the US, and the UK government by seeking to remove the nation from the European Union (EU). Both administrations were seeking to re-establish lost influence by placing barriers between themselves and the rest of the world: an enterprise which, in a globalised world of complex interdependence, is arguably doomed to failure. In the case of the US, it is remarkable that Donald Trump’s two chief advisors on China, Peter Navarro and Michael Pillsbury, have both published influential books which argue that China is a threat to US hegemony and so represents a challenge needs to be beaten back by any means available (Navarro 2008, Pillsbury 2015, Rappeport 2018). Meanwhile, the EU was struggling, under the pressure of dealing with the competing actors within it and other intractable problems such as Brexit and migration from Africa and Asia, to develop its own coherent set of responses to globalisation and China’s rise. From this perspective, China is in the process of re-imagining the future in ways that the West cannot. Where Western theorists tend to picture the ‘liberal international order’ as a fixed state to be preserved and protected in the present, China takes a long view, accepting the ongoing evolution and increasing complexity of international affairs. In this the Chinese are influenced by the Hegelian dialectics employed by Marx as well as traditional Chinese thought (such as Confucianism and Daoism) and even Darwinism. The historical record supplies evidence that Mao Zedong was aware of all of these (Spence 2000) and, as discussed above, that the present generation of Chinese leaders and thinkers is too. Thus, rather than mistakenly seeking to control complexity like some of their Western counterparts, Chinese leaders accept it as an integral characteristic of the international order and look for ways to adapt, react and shape it as far as possible. Their vision is one which understands the international as a set of organic systems or nonlinear processes rather than Newtonian mechanisms with fixed, static characteristics (Whitehead 2011, Kavalski 2012, Marks 2018: 94). Thus, the BRI needs to be understood as an evolving, organic, adaptive process rather than a closed, linear system. What Westerners tend to perceive as vagueness and lack of a coherent strategy needs to be re-interpreted as a deliberately pragmatic and flexible approach to the international order which is capable of withstanding shocks by adapting to complex interdependences in the global economy by building greater transnational connectivity and generating comprehensive national power (zonghe guoli, 综合国力) and national security (guojia anquan, 国家安全) for China. Here it should be noted that as far as the Chinese are concerned elements of non-traditional security and power (such as economic, energy and food security as well as soft or ideational power) are taken to be at least as important as traditional (i.e. military) security and hard

40 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative power (Ong 2007: 12, Klimeš 2017: 134). In this way, elements commonly associated with the realist, liberal and constructivist strands of mainstream IR theory lock together to form a pragmatic and holistic approach to China’s role in international affairs of which the BRI is the current, and thus far most significant, manifestation. Understanding the BRI, with its plans to connect more than 60 countries in Asia and Europe (and beyond them Africa, Latin America, and perhaps eventually the whole world), as a reaction to complexity and an attempt to shape it thus provides a starting point for the theoretical and empirical analysis conducted in the remainder of this book. If the BRI is inherently a highly complex phenomenon (possibly akin to a complex system, although this idea needs to be carefully examined) containing nonlinear, systemic elements whose outcomes are difficult or impossible to predict (of which Section 1.1 in Chapter 1 represents only a teaser trailer: there is plenty more to be explained in the remainder of this book), then this also means that the BRI is very difficult to explain theoretically and that any attempt to do so is going to be as ambitious and prone to failure as the initiative itself. Nonetheless, the implications of the preceding chapter and the first part of this one imply that it is necessary to consider some overarching theoretical frameworks which can potentially encompass the multifaceted, evolving nature of Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy initiative. As Kerry Brown (2016: xvi) notes, in trying to understand Chinese policymaking ‘hybrid approaches work best, taking methods and insights from diverse areas and trying to link them to what one observes in China’. To this end, the following three sections will examine some candidates for a macro-level theoretical approach which can account for the BRI by combining insights from a range of theoretical traditions.

2.3 Theory 1: Tang Shiping’s social evolution paradigm (SEP) A theory which synthesises disparate elements from a range of IR theories – specifically, realism, neoliberalism and constructivism – in an eclectic fashion is Tang Shiping’s (2013) social evolution paradigm (SEP). The theory posits that international relations between states are made up of a complex system of interlocking ideas, institutions and power relations which evolves according to changing circumstances in a Darwinian process of ‘artificial selection’. Tang derives this concept from Darwin’s notion of ‘natural selection’ and claims that it is through this ‘artificial selection’, which is mostly ‘non-random and directed’ (Tang 2013: 22), that ideas shape and are shaped by material factors (Tang 2013: 23–24). As a human social system dependent on both material and ideational factors, the realm of the international is not static but dynamic, constantly evolving over time according to shifting forces, which include culture, learning processes and socialisation. Institutional arrangements, which Tang (2011) claims as an example of social ‘phenotypes’,1 are defined as formal rules such as laws and informal rules such as norms and conventions, but not organisations or practices (Tang 2011: 3–4, 2013: 8). They constitute the structure that exists within the

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international system, being ‘the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (North 1990: 3, cited in Tang 2013: 8). Ideas (an example of ‘genes’) are in competition with institutions for ascendancy, and together they act as forces in the evolution of the system. Ideas and institutions are linked to power and material forces in the sense that they are inevitably ontologically shaped by and dependent on them rather than being, as the constructivist theoretical tradition often assumes or implies, separate from and independent of material factors (Tang 2013: 37). At the same time, Tang rejects realism’s implied conclusion that ideational factors are not as important as material ones: he suggests that realists’ overriding emphasis on power, anarchy, states and structure, while useful, is not sufficient on its own to explain present-day international politics in their entirety and complexity (Tang 2013: 173, 177). On the other hand, realist analyses of power play a key role in Tang’s SEP. As mentioned in the previous section, Tang claims that the international system has shifted in the last century from an ‘offensive realism world’, in which nations saw benefits in attacking and absorbing other nations, to a ‘defensive realism world’, in which nations have learnt (for instance from the failures of imperial Japan and Nazi Germany) that defence rather than aggression is key to survival in the international system. He demonstrates through theoretical analysis and historical examples going back millennia that this is a neat solution to the debate between offensive and defensive realists (Tang 2013: 43–147). At the same time, since Tang’s SEP is based on Darwinism and is therefore not teleological, it allows for the possibility that an ‘offensive realism world’ or even a ‘neoliberalism world’ (Tang 2013: 182) might evolve out of the existing order and become nations’ prevailing approach to international affairs at some point in the future, dependent on changing circumstances. Nevertheless, he argues (see also Jervis 1999, Tang 2010) that in the present-day defensive realism, through which nations seek to defend their territories and interests rather than seeking to attack and absorb other states, dominates and tends to exclude the aggression inherent in offensive realist interpretations of international relations such as Mearsheimer (2001) and Allison (2017). In an earlier work, Tang demonstrates that China shifted from an offensive realist approach to international relations under Mao Zedong (for instance promoting global socialist insurgencies) to a defensive realist approach to international relations under Deng Xiaoping (Tang 2008). Tang explains that China seeks to ensure its national security but understands that cooperation within the existing international system rather than aggression and trying to revise or overturn the status quo is the best approach to achieve its goal. The Chinese conception of national security encompasses a complex set of problems involving both traditional (military) and non-traditional (e.g. economic, energy, food) security (Ong 2007: 12, Heath 2016: 158) and is linked to the notion of ‘comprehensive national power’, which is defined as ‘the sum of a country’s political, economic, military, and ideational strength’ (Klimeš 2017: 134). The understanding that aggression would be certain to damage rather than promote China’s comprehensive national security, as outlined in Chinese defence white papers published in

42 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative the last two decades (e.g. State Council, 2006, 2013), has led its leaders to emphasise slogans such as ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘win-win cooperation’, in direct opposition to the ‘China threat’ theory proposed by some US scholars (e.g. Gertz 2000, Navarro 2008, Pillsbury 2015). By its consistent emphasis on ‘active defence’, Chinese national security policy can thus be classified as defensive realist rather than offensive realist, which effectively counters Mearsheimer’s (2010) and Allison’s (2017) assertions that China’s rise will inevitably lead to a confrontation between China and the existing hegemon, the US. Tang’s theory thus incorporates elements of realism (power relations connected to material factors), neoliberal institutionalism (the importance of institutions and economic interdependence) and constructivism (ideational factors) without being hobbled by unnecessary concerns about the supposed incommensurability of the theories from which the concepts for his framework are derived. He achieves this by consciously extracting and redefining key theoretical concepts from IR theory, in particular society, culture, institutions and structure, to support his framework. At the same time, Tang critiques and adapts the elements he takes from the IR perspectives, rejecting the idea that any one of the main IR theories on its own is sufficient to explain international politics, and pointing out that his theory incorporates the elements of time and change to the international system better than the existing mainstream IR theories. He also (though mainly implicitly and without detailed elaboration) draws in concepts from complexity theory (particularly via Robert Jervis’ 1997 book System Effects), in particular the notion of emergence, to explain the mechanics of how the ever-evolving international system works and changes (Tang 2013: 152). Tang’s theory constitutes a clear candidate of a theory through which to understand the complexity of the BRI using an eclectic approach which synthesises elements from a range of IR approaches. Tang points out that institutional arrangements can consist of informal as well as formal institutional structures: this connects to the regionalising aspect of the BRI (Kavalski 2009), within which the Chinese insist that arrangements such as the ‘16+1’ platform in Central and Eastern Europe and the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in the Middle East are informal, evolving arrangements rather than formal institutions (Shi 2013). These institutional arrangements also, according to Tang’s logic, cannot exist without some form of material power to back them up: this observation correlates with China’s increasing economic clout and, to a lesser extent, with its expanding military presence along the route of the Maritime Silk Road, for instance in the South China Sea and the new base at Djibouti. Within the framework of the SEP, Tang also discusses his ‘social evolutionary interpretation of the transformation of international systems via institutionalizing peace after the coming of a defensive realism world (within a particular region)’ (Tang 2013: 114), which, again, may represent a valid description of the BRI. Thus, Tang’s SEP provides a possible macro-level theoretical explanation for the BRI as a system-like phenomenon with emerging, potentially transformative characteristics relating to the dynamic interaction of the institutional, ideational

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and material aspects of Chinese foreign policy in Eurasian regions. On the other hand, Tang’s framework has four possible weaknesses which need to be acknowledged. The first possible weakness is the SEP’s evolutionary aspect, which is not fully explained and is therefore in need of further development: Tang is apparently addressing this issue in a future work.2 Nevertheless, based on the work presented so far, there is a problem insofar as it appears that Tang intends that his framing of institutional arrangements as ‘phenotypes’ and ideas for institutional arrangements as ‘genes’ within a system of ‘artificial selection’ should be taken literally. As Michael P. Marks (2018: 154) points out, it would surely be more advisable to self-consciously identify the metaphorical or analogical nature of the use of the Darwinian framing of the SEP. Although Tang recognises that the ‘genes’ and ‘phenotypes’ of international politics are institutions (formal and informal rules) and ideas, he does not acknowledge that his language is metaphorical. This lack of acknowledgement represents a potential area of weakness in the theory which needs to be addressed, since it is difficult to see how anything in IR could be seriously be said to constitute a ‘gene’ or ‘phenotype’ in anything other than a metaphorical sense. A second point is that the mechanism by which Tang’s ‘genes’ and ‘phenotypes’ – institutional arrangements and ideas – engender evolutionary change in the international system is not sufficiently explained. Although, as already mentioned, Tang refers to system and complexity effects briefly (Tang 2013: 152); he does not integrate these fully into his theory. For this reason, it is not entirely clear exactly how evolutionary change occurs. This is a crucial point for the BRI, which, insofar as it can be classified as an emerging complex system, requires detailed explanation of precisely how it is changing and evolving over time and impacting the regions in which it is being implemented. A possible solution to this issue would be to integrate an analysis of complex systems effects into the SEP framework, something which Tang has not thus far attempted. A third problem for the BRI is Tang’s definition of institutions, which he explicitly states is to exclude organisations (Tang 2013: 8) and practices (Tang 2011: 3). For Tang, ‘institutions’ are purely ideational sets of rules and thus must exclude entities which he regards as having physical form such as organisational entities. He also excludes behaviours (i.e. practices), regarding them as ‘not equivalent to institutions’ because in his view they do not contribute to the structure of the system of institutions (Tang 2011: 3). The exclusion of organisations and practices is surprising, since it seems to unnecessarily narrow the range and diminish the power of the term ‘institution’. Since Kavalski (2009), Jakóbowski (2018) and Vangeli(2018) have outlined China’s attempt to regionalise its foreign relations through the establishment of practices and emerging institutional organisations such as 16+1 and Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), it would seem appropriate to include practices and organisations in analysis of the BRI’s institutionalisation of foreign policy in specific regions. This point is important because practices and organisations appear to constitute the institutional framing of the emerging BRI.

44 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative A final area of possible criticism as regards the application of the SEP to the BRI is that it may not be sufficiently critical to evaluate the possible downsides and negative attributes of the initiative. This applies to both the intended and unintended consequences of the initiative. For instance, in evaluating today’s international affairs as a ‘defensive realism world’, albeit one which is capable of transforming back into an ‘offensive realism world’ through unforeseeable future circumstances, the theory may, in its assessment of present-day international politics, lack the capacity to evaluate possible counter-hegemonic or offensive mercantilist (Holslag 2017) outcomes, be these intentional or unintentional. This leaves space for other theories such as neo-Gramscian hegemony and offensive realism to take up the task of critiquing the BRI’s possible negative outcomes which the SEP does not, at least at a first long glance, seem capable of addressing. Nevertheless, despite these points of weakness, there is enough apparent correlation between Tang’s SEP and the BRI – at least in its officially-endorsed version – to make the former worth considering as a candidate for macro-level theoretical framing of China’s New Silk Road initiative. The theory will thus be referred to at points in the book, and aspects of the theory will be applied at appropriate junctures as the detail of the BRI is examined at the mid- and micro-levels. The concluding chapter will then attempt to draw together the evidence of the empirical chapters and to analyse the extent to which the SEP is suitable as a theoretical framing for the BRI.

2.4 Theory 2: neo-Gramscian hegemony An alternative theory with potential for macro-level analysis of the BRI is neoGramscian hegemony. The theory, which is based on two publications by Robert W. Cox (1981, 1987), derives from the work of the Italian scholar Antonio Gramsci, who addressed the problem of how to generate consent for a Marxist alternative to the existing capitalist-based political structure in his country (Gramsci 1971). Cox’s ideas about dynamic, historical processes of change in the world order based on a critical analysis of the neoliberal political economy established by the USA in the period after the end of the Second World War have been subsequently developed by other scholars, most notably Stephen Gill (1993). Hegemony in the Gramscian sense contains the notion that the power to affect and shape the global order resides not simply in the military and political power of states as realists suggest, but rather in the complex interaction of institutions, ideas and economic factors such as industrial production and global capitalism (Cox 1981: 138, 1987). The complementary idea of a counter-hegemony based on consensus-building which challenges the existing order is also interesting because it supplies an alternative to the offensive realist interpretation of global power transitions (Li 2018: 39). Since Cox is also cited as the inspiration behind the field of International Political Economy (IPE), in which political and economic factors are perceived as inextricably interwoven instead of separated, neo-

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Gramscianism presents a potentially fruitful framework within which to analyse the interconnected elements of both China’s rise and the role that the BRI now plays in the global expansion of Chinese influence. It offers a possible interpretation of China’s alleged challenge to the Western liberal international order which is worth consideration in the context of this book. Neo-Gramscian hegemony contains the idea that in order to establish and legitimise their dominance, ‘the dominant class must gain the active consent of subordinate classes on the basis of shared values, ideas, and material interests’ (Cohn 2012: 112). Elsewhere this process of consensus-building through official propaganda, the media and other legitimation channels has been called the ‘manufacture of consent’ (Lippmann 1922: 135, Herman and Chomsky 1988); however, the neo-Gramscians surprisingly tend not to reference this literature and unlike Gramsci (1971) do not examine the means by which legitimacy may be achieved in any detail. In the contemporary world, US hegemony in the neo-Gramscian sense has also been achieved through global capitalism and consumerism: Applying Gramsci’s ideas to IPE, Cox writes that postwar institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and GATT upheld liberal norms and legitimized U.S. hegemony with a minimal amount of force. Cox also sees a transnational historic bloc composed of the largest MNCs, international banks, business groups, and economic organizations as extending class relations to the global level. (Cohn 2012: 113) Thus, a strength of neo-Gramscian hegemony is that it incorporates non-state actors and economic and cultural elements as well as states and political factors. Another is that, like Tang’s SEP, it attempts to account for dynamic processes of change in the international system through the complex interaction of material, ideational and institutional factors. Possible change to the international order itself is incorporated through the notion of a counter-hegemonic historic bloc which challenges the existing order by establishing an alternative consensus ‘at the state level, through international organisation and mobilisation, and in the production structure’ (Strange 1996: 24). Neo-Gramscian hegemony thus provides a lens to understand the BRI as an attempt to establish either a parallel global order to the existing Western liberal one, or to challenge and supplant it. Using the idea of a ‘counter-hegemonic historic bloc’, Li (2018: 40) suggests that Beijing is developing alternative “multilateralism” (China-led international financial institutions) as an institutional tool to realize the OBOR initiative … China’s pursuit of the OBOR initiative through multilateralism will consolidate its position as a new player in the game of norm-setting and norm diffusion. However, applying neo-Gramscian hegemony to the BRI in this way means that it is not clear whether China is seeking to replace or provide an alternative to

46 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative the US-led global order. Counter-hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, suggests a revolutionary overturning of the existing order through political and economic means, but it is not certain that China is aiming to supplant the US, at least not in the immediate future. So the question of whether the BRI is counterhegemonic is open to debate. Unfortunately, in the neo-Gramscian literature, the mechanism or process by which the transformation of the international order through ‘counter-hegemonic historic blocs’ is supposed to occur is under-theorised, most notably by Robert Cox in his 1987 book Production, Power and World Order (Kaufman 2005). Whereas for Gramsci (1971), it is about the intellectual class re-educating the proletariat to support the ‘philosophy of praxis’ (i.e. Marxism), the neoGramscian theorists tend to focus on the means by which a transnational capitalist elite generated hegemony in the period after the Second World War by generating public consent for the system, and how this engineered consent was supposedly in a state of legitimation crisis (e.g. Gill 1993, Bieler and Morton 2004; cf. Habermas 1988). Thus, their work is, in the main, a critique of the existing Western neoliberal order rather than an examination of how the order might transform or be transformed through ‘the exercise of “intellectual and moral leadership”’ (Burnham 1991: 76). A connected point is that in Cox’s work, as Susan Strange (1996: 24–25) noted, despite discussion of the impact of transnational capitalist elites, the role of states in generating power is also strongly emphasised. As a result, one critic goes so far as to claim that ‘the neo-Gramscian approach is barely distinguishable from a sophisticated neorealist account’ (Burnham 1991: 76). The lack of clarity about how a counter-hegemonic historic bloc could transform the international order somewhat diminishes the theory’s power to analyse China’s challenge to the US-led contemporary global order. On the other hand, as already noted, this lacuna in the literature leaves the question of whether China’s ideational, material and institutional shaping of regional orders via the BRI is ‘counter-hegemonic’ in a Gramscian sense open to further debate and research. This means that, as Li (2018) points out, it remains possible to consider neo-Gramscian hegemony in relation to China’s global impacts. Since the CCP has portrayed itself since the Mao era as a developing nation seeking to lead other states in the global South (especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America) towards the goal of economic development, there is a degree of correspondence with the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and historic blocs – even when they are imprecisely conceptualised – which makes the framework suggestive for analysis of the BRI. The open question then is whether the CCP with Xi Jinping at its head can be classified as the intellectual leadership of a PRC-led counter-hegemonic historic bloc in the original Gramscian sense. Notwithstanding the notion that Marxism supposedly underpins the CCP’s approach to domestic and global governance, the facts demonstrate that the PRC has taken, as Chapter 1 explained, a capitalist-based route rather than a Marxist-based route to economic development since 1978. Alternative classifications of the PRC’s expansive economic

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and political foreign policy such as neo-colonialism, neo-mercantilism and ‘offensive mercantilism’ (Holslag 2017), all of which make the BRI look less like a counter-hegemony and more like an attempt at state-led capitalist domination based on a model of European imperialism mixed with some aspects of Leninism (Li 2018: 47–50), will be considered in the following section. There are other weaknesses in the neo-Gramscian version of hegemony. The first is that it is easily confused with conventional hegemony, which is taken to mean domination through the wielding of military, political and economic power by a single state or empire. It is this type of hegemony that China tends to strongly deny that it is pursuing. Since neo-Gramscian hegemony emphasises ideational consensus-building in support of an established or establishing order, one needs to be careful in using it and in making clear that this is what one is referring to in the use of the term, particularly in relation to China. For this reason, throughout the remainder of this book when the term is used, the descriptor ‘neo-Gramscian’ will be attached to it. Another weakness relates to the aforementioned imprecision in the use of the concept of hegemony by neo-Gramscians such as Cox. When class, production, culture and other factors are brought in, it can be difficult to discern where the central focus of the analysis lies. This leads to criticism from those who would rather emphasise one of these factors over the others. For instance, Cohn (2012: 113) points out that while Marxists criticise neo-Gramscians for overemphasising culture at the expense of economics and leaving their Marxist roots behind, liberals and critical theorists charge neo-Gramscians with an alleged excessive focus on capitalism. In neo-Gramscianism, the consistent focus in Gramsci’s work on the means by which public support for the counterhegemonic historic bloc can be generated seems to fade into the background. Overall, the main neo-Gramscian concepts of hegemony and historic bloc are in need of further development than the existing literature provides. Nevertheless, neo-Gramscianism’s broad conceptual range and ability to bring in non-state actors as well as states can also be seen as a strength which may be informative in the case of contemporary China and the BRI. As Norris (2016) demonstrates, the Beijing government uses Chinese commercial actors in the service of comprehensive national security goals which include military, economic and political aspects. The BRI, in accordance with Cox’s (1981) analysis, also contains a blend of material, ideational and institutional elements which the Chinese government deploys in a drive to implement foreign policy. Above all, if the BRI is understood as an attempt to create a Chinese-led international order through both economic and political means in the face of the existing US-led order, it may be possible to characterise it as a counterhegemonic historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian sense. Beijing’s attempt to win support for the BRI through a soft power charm offensive (Kurlantzick 2007) is an important aspect of the initiative which should not be omitted from the analysis, and ties in to Gramsci’s (1971) extended discussion both of the need for leaders to generate support for their policies and of the means by which they should do so. Thus, the open question of whether the BRI can be considered an

48 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative attempt at forming a counter-hegemonic historic bloc needs to be considered as a possible macro-level theoretical framing for the initiative, as does the extent to which neo-Gramscianism connects with or supplements Tang’s (2013) SEP.

2.5 Theory 3: offensive mercantilism3 Through 2017 and 2018, as global awareness of the BRI increased, critical interpretations began to emerge in the international media and even the IR literature (e.g. Holslag 2017, Small 2018). These reports and analyses painted a picture of Chinese economic statecraft which was diametrically opposed to that presented by Beijing. Instead of accepting the Chinese government’s rhetoric about ‘winwin cooperation’ and ‘communities of shared destiny’ at face value, there was growing criticism of China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ (Lindberg and Lahiri 2018), ‘neo-colonialism’ (Blanchard 2018), and ‘neo-mercantilism’ (Yu 2017). Even the newly-elected prime minister of Malaysia, the sprightly 93-year-old Mahathir Mohamad, got in on the act during a visit to Beijing, calling China’s involvement in his and other Asian countries ‘a new version of colonialism’ implemented through ‘unequal treaties’ (Hornby 2018). The appearance of this wave of negative depictions of the BRI necessitates the examination here of a theory or theories capable of framing Chinese economic statecraft in terms of deliberate exploitation of developing countries’ vulnerability to economic predation. There can be little doubt, given the appearance of so much criticism, that it is important to consider a critical interpretation (or interpretations) as a counter-balance to possible over-optimism concerning the aims of the BRI. One set of critical positions which analyse imperialist exploitation of developing countries is based on Marxist thought and are generally grouped together under the label of dependency theory. This approach emerged in Latin America in the work of Raúl Prebisch (1950) and was subsequently taken up by others, most notably Baran (1957) and Frank (1969). It is also closely linked to the world system theory of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), as well as other associated theories of (neo-)colonialism and (neo-)imperialism. What these Marxistbased theories have in common is that they seek to explain, in one way or another, the asymmetric, historically unequal economic relations between ‘core’ states – also referred to as the global ‘North’ – and the ‘periphery’ or global ‘South’ in terms of the history and impacts of European colonialism and exploitation of the poor by the rich. In these perspectives, broadly speaking, a relationship of domination and subordination emerges: the countries of the North get their raw materials as cheaply as possible from the weaker nations of the South, transform them into finished industrial products, and then sell them at a profit, including to the same countries from whence the raw materials for the industrial process came. In this way, ‘the core appropriates the surplus produced by the periphery’ (Larrain 1989: 122). There are, however, several problems with the dependency approach as far as its possible use as a framework for analysing the BRI is concerned. First, as Larrain (1989: 178–179, 201) points out, it can be claimed that the dependency

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approach does not in fact constitute a fully-formed theory separate from theories of capitalism (such as Marxism) at all, since all it does is to point out inequalities in economic relations in selected underdeveloped regions. The dependency approach should instead be regarded as ‘a generalization or model stemming from the concrete analysis of cases’ (Larrain 1989: 200). As such, it presents a static model which does not account for the possibility that economic relations may be transformed through market-based trade and investment transactions, including actions taken by the subordinate (periphery) nations themselves (Warren 1980: 163–164). In addition, the dependency approach has an inbuilt assumption that market-based economics is inherently a zero-sum game in which one partner’s gain means the other’s loss (Warren 1980: 141–142, Kitching 1982). It also fails to acknowledge that a degree of inequality and some loss of sovereignty are an inevitable part of economic development in today’s globalised world (Mandle 1980: 874). Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this book, the attempt to apply such theories to China’s BRI economic statecraft in the developing world requires giving them a perspectival twist. China was not among the imperial powers which colonised large parts of the world and since a large proportion of its population still earns low incomes, China is usually categorised as belonging to the global South. Indeed, China was itself a victim of European predation during the 19th century, for instance as a result of the Opium Wars through which Britain acquired Hong Kong and enforced its right to sell narcotics to Chinese citizens (Spence 1990: 152–164). If China is henceforth to be categorised as an exploiter of the developing world, a reworking of colonialism, dependency theory and mercantilism to fit the changing regional orders which the rising China is shaping through the BRI is required. The above reasoning explains why labels such as neo-mercantilism and neocolonialism are increasingly being applied to China’s economic statecraft in the era of the BRI (e.g. Gueldry and Liang 2016, Belesky and Lawrence 2018). Although not generally specified, the use of the prefix ‘neo’ is presumably intended to indicate an exploitative relationship which is resembles that examined by scholars of dependency, but which emerges from the international activity of a power which was not previously colonial, such as China. At the same time, the use of such labels for China’s BRI-era economic statecraft is generally under-theorised in the literature and so lacks systematic foundations. An approach which attempts to develop a systematic theory of economic exploitation using political means via the BRI is therefore needed. One attempt to theoretically frame China’s economic statecraft via the BRI as a deliberate attempt to establish relations of exploitation is Jonathan Holslag’s (2017) offensive mercantilism. Despite some shortcomings, not least in the rather unsystematic presentation of the theory, it is at least an attempt to develop a fully-worked-out framework through which to analyse the BRI in terms of assertive profit-seeking which benefits China at the expense of its partners. Although Holslag is not explicit about the reasons for his choice of terminology, the selection of the word ‘offensive’ is clearly influenced by John

50 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative Mearsheimer’s (2001) offensive realism theory of international politics,4 while ‘mercantilism’ suggests economic policy which intends to generate wealth in what is conceived as a zero-sum game – in other words, at the expense of other actors. Holslag frames the theory primarily as an assertive Chinese geoeconomic strategy which contains a range of interconnected goals and tools, but at the same time claims that there is an inbuilt political aspect. In Holslag’s interpretation, the BRI can thus be understood, in addition to economic aims, as a strategy of deliberate power projection and influence building (Holslag 2017: 52). Offensive mercantilism, like the SEP and neo-Gramscianism, thus contains political and economic aspects as well as accounting for material and ideational goals in Chinese foreign policy. However, in contrast to the SEP, Holslag claims that, under Xi Jinping, China has transitioned from a ‘defensive’ strategy of protecting China’s domestic economy to an ‘offensive’ one which aims to sustain flagging economic growth by supporting the expansion of Chinese companies globally (Holslag 2017: 47). According to this logic, Xi has decided that Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of lying low and biding one’s time (韬光养晦, taoguang yanghui) is no longer suitable and that there is both an opportunity and a need for China to be more assertive on the world stage (Turcsányi 2018: 173). Holslag posits that the primary goal of the BRI, according to his reading of Chinese official documents,5 is to support Chinese industries’ penetration of foreign markets. The aim is to exploit economic globalization and open markets for the benefit of Chinese companies and the Chinese domestic economy. A set of interconnected sub-strategies is used in the service of this overall goal. These include: enhancing coordination between Chinese stakeholders involved in overseas trade and investment activity; increasing access to energy and raw materials; boosting service exports, for instance in construction, engineering, dredging and transportation; acquiring strategic assets; supporting Chinese contractors who secure overseas projects; externalising the overcapacity problem in the domestic Chinese economy by promoting the export of manufactured goods; and increasing political influence via economic means (Holslag 2017: 48–52). Further, Holslag identifies four ‘tools’ which China uses to unlock foreign markets. First, there is the promotion of ‘national champions’, defined as a few large companies which are controlled, partially-controlled, or influenced by the Chinese state. Second, large credit lines are supplied. Third, China aims to promote global connectivity which benefits Chinese interests by building transportation and communications infrastructure. And finally, China uses free trade agreements in the service of its economic foreign policy (Holslag 2017, pp. 53–56). Holslag’s offensive mercantilism thus interprets the BRI as an exploitative, neo-mercantilist strategy for promoting Chinese companies’ penetration of foreign markets in the service of China’s national interests. As evidence for his assertion, Holslag uses a combination of published official Chinese documents and UN Comtrade data which analyses imports by forty countries along the BRI route (Holslag 2017: 57). The latter suggest that Chinese exports along the New Silk Road are increasing exponentially while European exports are in

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steady decline. Holslag interprets this as meaning that China is now setting out to win (and is indeed winning) a zero-sum-game of geo-economic domination which contrasts with its oft-stated goal of ‘win-win cooperation’. There are two main provisos to Holslag’s theory which should be addressed here. The first is that Holslag claims – without clearly connecting this part to his overall theory – that China is pursuing a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy through the BRI. This assertion is, as Garlick (2019, forthcoming) demonstrates, not proven because of a lack of evidence that China is trying to split regions into state-level units through bilateral agreements. Rather, there is evidence that the BRI has regionalisation at its heart. By setting up institutional-type arrangements such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Central Asia, the ‘16+1’ forum in Central and Eastern Europe, and the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in the Middle East, there is considerable evidence of the BRI’s ‘regionness’ (Kavalski 2009): a regionalising conception which is (at least ostensibly) designed to enhance economic integration and cooperation along the BRI by taking each region as a distinct unit or arena within which Chinese foreign policy can be enacted. The second – and more serious for the purposes of theorising the BRI at the macro-level – is that Holslag applies his framework specifically to China’s alleged attempt to dominate Europe and does not mention other BRI regions. Nor, in addition, does he address the question of whether offensive mercantilism might be applied to other powers, such as (to give some historical examples) imperial Britain or Spain. This relatively narrow focus and lack of an attempt to generalise implies that Holslag’s framework can be interpreted as what Merton (1968: 51) calls a theory ‘of the middle range’ rather than a macro-level theory. On the other hand, Holslag’s surprising inattention to these important matters does not necessarily negate the potential insight to be obtained from his theory, if it were to be given a wider framing. The fact that it is operationalised by him at the mid-level does not mean that its scope cannot be expanded to include other powers which have attempted – or are attempting – to promote their national interests through economic activity. Offensive mercantilism would thus become a theory of economic imperialism or so-called ‘neo-colonialism’ with considerable explanatory power. Expanding offensive mercantilism’s scope in this way, which is not at all difficult to do, would enable it to be used as a macro-level theory which could be applied to the BRI. It would also supply a theoretical framework capable of encompassing the concerns of those who frame the Chinese initiative in negative terms, i.e. as an attempt at global economic (and political) domination and exploitation, and would provide a potentially productive analytical counterpoint to the first two theories outlined in this chapter.

2.6 Complex eclecticism: a theoretical-methodological framework for analysing the BRI below the macro-level The three theories outlined in the preceding sections provide possible frameworks for understanding the BRI at the macro-level. The three theories and

52 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative their main characteristics are summarised in Table 2.1. However, without examining the empirical evidence of what is happening in BRI regions at the mid- to micro-level it is difficult to establish which of the three theories is best able to frame China’s economic statecraft along the New Silk Road. There is thus a need for a theoretical-methodological approach through which to assess whether the macro-level theories are a good fit for the BRI. The approach used needs to provide a methodology through which to examine the BRI, but at the same time to be based on some solid theoretical foundations. It needs to account for the complexity of the initiative, but at the same time, since the goal is to understand the international impacts of China’s BRI economic statecraft, also to utilise concepts taken from IR theory. As we have seen, because of its complexity, the BRI is difficult to analyse using just one theoretical perspective, so there is a need to eclectically combine the insights of a range of IR theories with some concepts which can analyse complexity. The innovative theoreticalmethodological framework presented in this book, which is intended to be subsidiary to grand or macro-level theory by analysing the BRI at the mid- and micro-levels, is one which I call complex eclecticism.6 Complex eclecticism takes as its basis two strands of theory. The first is the complexity theory (CT) pioneered by the Santa Fe Institute in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Waldrop 1992), and thereafter taken up by scholars in many fields, including some in academic international relations (Jervis 1997, Kavalski 2007, Bousquet and Curtis 2011, Garlick 2016). In the form in which it is interpreted in this book, CT – also understood as complexity thinking (Kavalski 2015: 2) – attempts to analyse phenomena in terms of a ‘conceptual toolkit’: this toolkit includes elements of complex systems such as emergence, interdependence, selforganisation, feedback effects and nonlinearity. Some examples of these ‘system effects’ have already been outlined in Chapter 1 with direct reference to China; more detailed analysis will be provided in Chapter 3. By using such a toolkit,

Table 2.1 Three macro-level theories for analysing the Belt and Road Initiative Theory

Author(s)

Key concepts

Theory 1: Social Evolution Paradigm (SEP)

Tang Shiping (2013)

Theory 2: NeoGramscian hegemony

Robert W. Cox (1981, 1983, 1987) and others

Evolving system formed by the interplay of material, ideational and institutional factors; ‘defensive realist world’ Counter-hegemonic historic bloc challenges the existing order; importance of ideas, institutions and material factors Aggressive expansion into overseas markets, zero-sum game economic exploitation, influence building (neomercantilism/neo-imperialism)

Theory 3: Offen- Jonathan Holslag (2017) and sive mercantilism others (dependency theorists, neo-mercantilists)

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dynamic networks of interactions can be interpreted, rather than attempting the impossible by seeking to understand them via the linear causality of isolated dependent and independent variables (Bousquet and Curtis 2011: 45). The use of CT includes the idea that attempts to be parsimonious when theorising in the social sciences are doomed to failure because they over-simplify and therefore fail to take account of the interrelated web of factors which make up complex phenomena (Kavalski 2007, Garlick 2016). Many theoretical attempts to simplify, as they have been developed in academic IR over the last half-century, have also often tended to reach conclusions which are abstruse (because they refer mainly to concepts and debates understood only by IR scholars) and lacking in detail about how they should be applied to the real world. Such supposedly ‘parsimonious’ frameworks can thus be surprisingly difficult for practitioners (who understand intuitively the complexity of the real world through their interactions with it, and seek to problem-solve within that setting) to see the point of, let alone understand and use (Sil and Katzenstein 2010a: 418). It is thus the contention of this book that theoretical attempts to de-complexify reality move us further away from reality, not closer to it. Put simply, trying to simplify complexity does not work because it leaves out too much that is important (Garlick 2016). The second strand, and equally important to the theoretical-methodological approach to be used, is the analytic eclecticism developed by Sil and Katzenstein (2010a, 2010b). Analytic eclecticism is a bold and well-supported attempt to refute the assumption, based (incorrectly, the authors argue) on Thomas S. Kuhn’s work on theoretical incommensurability (Kuhn 1962), that the worldviews underlying the main IR theories (usually taken to be realism, liberalism and constructivism) represent mutually exclusive ‘paradigms’ presented in incompatible and mutually unintelligible conceptual language. Rather than paradigms with ‘shared incommensurable content’, IR theories should instead be seen, in Jackson and Nexon’s (2009) helpful analysis, as constituting Weberian ‘ideal types’: conceptual envelopes for encapsulating general principles about how to understand social phenomena. There can be considerable overlap between the analytical content of IR ‘paradigms’ at what Sil and Katzenstein call, after Robert Merton, the ‘mid-range’ level of theorising (Sil and Katzenstein 2010a: 414). In addition, theoretical concepts (such as anarchy or interdependence) can be shared between different IR theories. This is important because it suggests, according to Sil and Katzenstein (2010b) and other theorists (Snyder 2002, Jackson and Nexon 2009, Samuel Barkin 2010), that it is perfectly possible to combine insights from different IR theories in an eclectic manner without having to worry about the question of logical contradiction. It is also, according to their argument, not necessary to attempt the difficult (or impossible) task of theoretical synthesis while juxtaposing insights from various theoretical positions (Sil and Katzenstein 2010a: 415, 2010b: 17). Sil and Katzenstein develop their idea further. They claim that in order to understand complex international phenomena and to theorise about them in a way which gives useful input to both scholars and practitioners, one needs to

54 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative utilise the insights of different theories in a pragmatic, syncretic manner, with a problem-solving approach (Sil and Katzenstein 2010b: 45). This is not only possible, according to them, but essential if one wants to understand the complexity of international politics. It is also what practitioners such as policymakers and diplomats (who understandably prioritise real-world problems over scholarly concerns) frequently do (consciously or unconsciously) when attempting to find practical solutions to problems on the ground. Practitioners also, as anyone who has listened to diplomats attending IR conferences dominated by academics can attest, seek theoretical insights from any available source which they can readily understand and apply to the difficult and complex real-world problems which face them daily. They have no objection to eclectic, pick-andmix solutions if these can be shown to be workable. Both complexity theory and analytic eclecticism will be outlined in depth in Chapter 3, and the rationale for utilising them both will be explained in more detail. However, it needs to be said here in brief that although Sil and Katzenstein provide an extended justification, based on the complexity of international phenomena, for utilising the ‘mid-level’ insights of IR theories in an eclectic manner to analyse real-world problems, they do not explicitly incorporate the insights of complexity theory into their approach. Instead, and understandably, they regard analytic eclecticism as a broad methodological church which can be used for problem-solving purposes in a limitless variety of ways (Sil and Katzenstein 2010a, 2010b). The theoretical-methodological approach used builds on their work – but differs from and adds value to it – by attempting to add insights from complexity theory to analytic eclecticism’s use of IR theories in an explicit manner. Methodologically, the question is how to use both complexity theory and analytic eclecticism to analyse the BRI in a way which produces fruitful conclusions. Since a pragmatic, ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ methodology is needed, the approach taken for the application of complex eclecticism is the style of abductive reasoning suggested by Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009). Where deductive logic attempts to build theory out of empirical data, and inductive reasoning posits a theory and then attempts to find supporting evidence for it, abductive reasoning looks for patterns in data, tries to develop a suitable explanation, then returns to the data to check to see if the explanation is supported, then goes back to the explanation to reformulate it and try to produce a full-fledged theory. As Friedrichs and Kratochwil point out, abductive reasoning is pragmatic and more closely resembles the reasoning processes humans use in everyday life than deductive or inductive logic. It is also more intellectually honest, because it allows the reader to see the reasoning process as it develops. Abductive reasoning rejects dead-ends and puts together patterns in data cumulatively and without worrying about theoretical incommensurability. Since complex eclecticism is a rough theoretical-methodological approach in need of refining since it contains a relatively large, even unwieldy number of theoretical possibilities and concepts, abductive reasoning seems a good fit. It

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allows concepts and theories to be tested against the data and rejected or refined as necessary. Since it is pragmatic and open to multiple explanations used singly or in combination, it is also a good fit for Sil and Katzenstein’s analytic eclecticism. There also does not appear to be any logical problem applying it methodologically to the use of complexity theory’s conceptual tools. In this way, it is possible to go back and forth between the empirical data and the theoretical concepts to try to find ways to theorise the BRI at the mid-level, while holding the grand theories examined in this chapter in the background. The suitability of these theories for framing the BRI at the macro-level needs to be checked at the end of the book once the complex eclectic analysis has been completed.

2.7 Conclusion This chapter has outlined three macro-level theories – namely, Tang’s SEP, neoGramscian hegemony, and offensive mercantilism – which appear to have the potential to explain the BRI. It has also introduced a theoretical-methodological framework – complex eclecticism – which is designed to supply a ‘conceptual toolkit’ through which to examine China’s BRI activity at the mid- and microlevel. The overall aim is to use complex eclecticism to assess the extent to which the macro-level theories outlined in this chapter are suitable explanations for China’s flagship foreign policy initiative. To begin this analytical process, we first need, in Chapter 3, to explain complex eclecticism in more depth and to define the conceptual tools which will be used to examine the BRI in Chapters 4–6.

Notes 1 Apparently, Tang changed his mind about the definition of ‘genes’ and ‘phenotypes’ between 2011 and 2013: in his 2013 work he explains that ‘it may be unfeasible, unnecessary, and even undesirable to have a single pair of gene and phenotype in social evolution’ (2013: 21). 2 Personal communication with Prof. Tang via one of his doctoral students. 3 Parts of this section are based on my (2019) article in Europe-Asia Studies. 4 For evidence of this influence upon Holslag, see his 2015 book China’s Coming War with Asia (Holslag 2015). In the preface to the book, Holslag echoes Mearsheimer’s (2001) book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics with his discussion of the ‘great power war as an inevitable tragedy’ (p. viii). 5 The reader is referred to Holslag (2017) for a detailed listing of the Chinese documents utilised in the creation of the offensive mercantilism framework. 6 The choice of terminology is based primarily on Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein’s ‘analytic eclecticism’, to which, as the following paragraphs attempt to make clear, the theoretical framework here presented owes the greatest debt. I have, however, replaced the word ‘analytic’ with ‘complex’ in order to convey the central aim of the theoretical part of the book, which is to combine Sil and Katzenstein’s approach to the study of international phenomena with the ‘conceptual toolkit’ of complexity theory. Sil and Katzenstein themselves explain the need to recognise complexity when analysing international phenomena, but do not directly incorporate CT’s ‘conceptual toolkit’ into their framework, because they wish to leave the use of analytic eclecticism open to a wider range

56 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative of approaches. Sil and Katzenstein’s two key works on analytic eclecticism, in which the approach is explained in detail, are: (2010a) ‘Analytic eclecticism in the study of world politics: reconfiguring problems and mechanisms across research traditions’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 411–431; and (2010b) Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Lippmann, Walter (1922) Public Opinion, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. Lu, Lerong (2018) ‘Black swans and grey rhinos: demystifying China’s financial risks and the financial regulatory reform’, Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, Vol. 33, No. 9, pp. 594–597. Mandle, Jay R. (1980) ‘Marxist analyses of capitalist development in the Third World’, Theory and Society, Vol. 9, No. 6, pp. 865–876. Marks, Michael P. (2018) Revisiting Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Mayer, Maximilian (ed.) (2018a) Rethinking the Silk Road: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Emerging Eurasian Relations, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Mayer, Maximilian (2018b) ‘China’s rise as Eurasian power: the revival of the Silk Road and its consequences’, in Maximilian Mayer (ed.) Rethinking the Silk Road: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Emerging Eurasian Relations, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–42. Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton. Mearsheimer, John J. (2010) ‘The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US power in Asia’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 381–396. Merton, Robert K. (1968) Social Theory and Social Structure, New York: The Free Press. Munro, Kelsey (2019) ‘China cabinet: black swans, grey rhinos, an elephant in the room’, The Interpreter (Lowy Institute), 24 January. Available at: www.lowyinstitute.org/theinterpreter/china-cabinet-black-swans-grey-rhinos-elephant-room. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (2015) Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 28 March, issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization. Available at: http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/ t20150330_669367.html. Navarro, Peter (2008) The Coming China Wars: Where They Will Be Fought and How They Can Be Won (revised and expanded edition), Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press. Norris, William J. (2016) Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. North, Douglass C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ong, Russell (2007) China’s Security Interests in the 21st Century, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Pillsbury, Michael (2015) The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, New York: Henry Holt & Co. Prebisch, Raúl (1950) The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems, New York: United Nations. Rappeport, Alan (2018) ‘A China hawk gains prominence as Trump confronts Xi on trade’, The New York Times, 30 November. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2018/11/30/ us/politics/trump-china-trade-xi-michael-pillsbury.html. Rippa, Alessandro (2017) ‘Centralising peripheries: The Belt and Road Initiative and its role in the development of the Chinese borderlands’, International Journal of Business Anthropology, Vol. 7, No. 1, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 1–21. Ronan, Colin A., and Joseph Needham (1978) The Shorter Science & Civilisation in China: Volume 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Samuel Barkin, J. (2010) Realist Constructivism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

60 Theorising the Belt and Road Initiative Shaw, Rosalind, and Charles Stewart (2003) Syncretism / Anti-Syncretism: the Politics of Religious Synthesis, London: Routledge. Shepard, Wade (2017) ‘Why the ambiguity of China’s Belt and Road Initiative is perhaps its biggest strength’, Forbes, 19 October, available at: www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshe pard/2017/10/19/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-is-really-all-about/#1dbce3e7e4de. Shi, Mingtao (2013) ‘China and international institutions: international order beyond formal rules?’, International Journal of China Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Supplement), pp. 439–467. Sil, Rudra, and Peter J. Katzenstein (2010a) ‘Analytic eclecticism in the study of world politics: reconfiguring problems and mechanisms across research traditions’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 411–431. Sil, Rudra, and Peter J. Katzenstein (2010b) Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Small, Andrew (2018) ‘The Backlash to Belt and Road’, Foreign Affairs, 16 February. Available at: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-16/backlash-belt-and-road. Snyder, Jack (2002) ‘Anarchy and culture: insights from the anthropology of war’, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 7–45. Spence, Jonathan D. (1990) The Search for Modern China, New York: W.W. Norton. Spence, Jonathan D. (2000) Mao, London: Phoenix. State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2006), Government White Paper: China’s National Defense in 2006. Official English text (as published on the website of the Information Office of the State Council) available in Chinese Journal of International Law (2007), Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 195–235. State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2013) The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces. Official English translation available at: www.china.org.cn/gov ernment/whitepaper/node_7181425.htm. Stec, Grzegorz (2018) ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative is neither a strategy nor a vision. It is a process’, European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS), February, available at: www. eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/EU_Asia_at_a_Glance_Stec_BRI_2018-1.pdf. Stephen, Matthew D., and David Skidmore (2019) ‘The AIIB in the liberal international order’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 61–91. Strange, Susan (1996) The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas (2007) The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, London: Allen Lane. Tang, Shiping (2008) ‘From offensive to defensive realism: a social evolutionary interpretation of China’s security strategy’, in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds.) China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 141–162. Tang, Shiping (2010) A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Tang, Shiping (2011) A General Theory of Institutional Change, London: Routledge. Tang, Shiping (2013) The Social Evolution of International Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Turcsányi, Richard Q. (2018) Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Power Sources, Domestic Politics, and Reactive Foreign Policy, Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Vangeli, Anastas (2018) ‘Global China and symbolic power: the case of 16+1 cooperation’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 27, No. 113, pp. 674–687.

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Waldrop, M. Mitchell (1992) Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, New York: Touchstone. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974) The Modern World System, New York: Academic Press. Warren, Bill (1980) Imperalism, Pioneer of Capitalism, London: Verso. Whitehead, Laurence (2011) ‘Enlivening the concept of democratization: the biological metaphor’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 291–299. Wucker, Michele (2016) The Gray Rhino: How to Recognize and Act on the Obvious Dangers We Ignore, New York: St Martin’s Press. Yu, Fu-Lai Tony (2017) ‘Neo-mercantilist policy and China’s rise as a global power’, Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 1043–1073. Zhang, Shuxiu (2016) Chinese Economic Diplomacy: Decision-making Actors and Processes, London and New York: Routledge. Zhao, Tingyang (2006) ‘Rethinking empire from a Chinese concept “All-under-heaven” (tian-xia, 天下)’, Social Identities, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 29–41.

3

Complex eclecticism

3.1 Introduction: why complex eclecticism? Chapter 1 set out to demonstrate that, as a preliminary setting out of the themes of this book, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is (a) complex, and thus not easy to theorise, and (b) only capable of being theorised by using concepts derived from multiple theoretical approaches rather than just one. Chapter 2 then outlined three macro-level theoretical approaches – Tang Shiping’s (2013) social evolution paradigm (SEP), neo-Gramscian hegemony, and offensive mercantilism – which appear capable of being used to frame the BRI analytically. At the same time, it is not immediately clear how to apply these theories to the BRI, which, despite its vast scale and ambition, contains a range of mid- and microlevel issues in terms of its real-world application. Theoretically and methodologically, it is therefore best to begin the task of analysis with a meso- rather than macro-level approach (Merton 1968). In essence, it is necessary to develop an exploratory theoretical-methodological approach to the BRI which operates at a level below the macro-level before one can attempt to assess whether the conclusions obtained through this exploratory approach are compatible with large-scale theories. The abductive theoretical-methodological approach here developed to explore the BRI at the meso-level is called complex eclecticism. Complex eclecticism, as already stated in Chapter 1, is intended to draw on two theoretical approaches to international relations. The first is the analytic eclecticism of Sil and Katzenstein (2010a, 2010b), while the second is the complexity theory/ thinking (CT) developed by a range of theorists from both outside the academic field of IR (e.g. Waldrop 1992, Mitchell 2003, Liu et al. 2007) and within it (e.g. Jervis 1997, Harrison 2006a, Kavalski 2007, 2015a, Bousquet and Curtis 2011, Gunitsky 2013, Crawford 2016), mainly since the 1980s. CT has so far been left on the margins of IR theory debates, while scholars are in the main still working out on how to employ analytic eclecticism (two recent attempts are Zhou and Esteban 2018 and Regilme 2018). The rationale for using an innovative complex eclectic framework as a theoretical-methodological basis for the examination of the BRI needs a good deal of unpacking, but is based on the following five precepts:

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IR theory’s ‘paradigms’ or ‘perspectives’ are not incommensurable (meaning mutually exclusive and based on incompatible theoretical premises), and insights from them can be eclectically combined without necessitating contradiction or the loss of analytical strength (Jones 2014: 180). Addressing complex global problems demands a pragmatic, syncretic approach which integrates theory and practice, takes full account of the complexity of phenomena, and is useful for scholars and practitioners (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009). Accordingly, the approach of China’s leaders to policy formation in the domestic and international spheres constitutes an eclectic approach to a world which is perceived as inherently containing elements of systemic complexity, and thus their policy and strategy need to be theorised in a way which takes account of this fact. The framework is (and should be) rough, loose and flexible in the same way as the Belt and Road Initiative: it mirrors the Chinese approach to China’s emerging, evolving foreign policy and economic diplomacy. It allows an exploratory analysis to take place at a level subsidiary to the three macro-level IR theories outlined in Chapter 2: the conclusions derived from this abductive analytical process can later feed back into an assessment of the extent to which the macro-level theories are suitable frameworks for understanding the BRI.

Working through the theoretical-methodological complex eclecticism framework demands first of all building on the opening statements made in Chapter 1 and closely examining two theoretical threads, analytic eclecticism and complexity theory, in turn. This chapter will therefore begin by critically assessing analytic eclecticism in order to establish its strengths and weaknesses, as well as explaining which elements appear useful in developing the complex eclecticism framework for analysing the BRI. The same assessment will then be conducted in relation to CT. The final part of the chapter will then explain how analytic eclecticism and CT can be combined and present the completed framework for use in analysing the BRI. Those who are more interested in the BRI itself rather than the development of the theoretical-methodological framework used in this book have the option of skipping ahead to the end of the chapter, where the framework to be used is summarised. As will be seen, the framework is not as difficult to understand or use as it may initially seem to be. In particular, the use of the idea of ‘conceptual toolkits’, while admittedly a metaphorical usage (Marks 2011, 2018), is intended to be an effective and manageable qualitative method through which to address the complexity of the BRI, albeit one which may at first sight appear disconcerting.

3.2 Sil and Katzenstein’s analytic eclecticism: strengths and weaknesses Sil and Katzenstein’s (2010a, 2010b) analytic eclecticism provides the foundation for the methodological-theoretical framework developed in this book.

64 Complex eclecticism However, it is not without flaws and provides a starting point rather than an end product. It emphasises complexity and pragmatism while seeking to combine insights from IR theory’s main paradigms without attempting the difficult task of synthesis. In this the approach adheres to Philip Ball’s (2012: xii) position that in order to explain social complexity one needs to adopt a ‘position of “pluralistic modelling”.’ Clearly, there are both advantages and drawbacks to this approach. On the one hand, what might be termed analytic eclecticism’s ‘pick-and-mix’ mentality allows a degree of freedom and flexibility which rigidly-delineated theories do not possess. On the other hand, there is an air of ‘anything goes’ to the enterprise which suggests a lack of rigour. Nevertheless, Sil and Katzenstein’s approach contains the important principle, unknown to so-called ‘parsimonious’ theoretical frameworks in academic IR but acknowledged by an increasing number of researchers in the natural sciences and other fields, that ‘[p]luralism reflects complexity’ (Mitchell 2003: 208). Analytic eclecticism, as Sil and Katzenstein develop the framework, is an IRspecific approach which channels Sandra D. Mitchell’s call for an ‘integrative pluralism’ which can encompass ‘both the ontology and the representation of complex systems’ (Mitchell 2003: xiii). By combining approaches taken from supposedly incommensurable paradigms, Sil and Katzenstein’s analytic eclecticism ‘trains its sights on the connections and interactions among a wide range of causal forces normally analyzed in isolation from one another’ (Sil and Katzenstein 2010b: 12). It does this by using a theoretical-methodological process akin to what Mitchell terms ‘piecemeal integration’. Since it is difficult in the face of complexity to achieve a satisfying theoretical synthesis at the macrolevel, one is best advised to address specific problems as they arise and find explanations and solutions to them by putting them together ad hoc to suit the needs of the specific case being examined (Mitchell 2003: 207). Later, when some cases have been analysed, it becomes possible to put the information gathered together to form a more complete picture of patterns in the phenomena under study. This style of reasoning has been called abductive by Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009) to contrast it with inductive and deductive reasoning. To address the demands of this approach, analytic eclecticism utilises Robert K. Merton’s (1968: 56, 60) concept of theorising at the ‘middle level’, in order to build a bridge between macro-level unified theory and micro-level empirically-based theorising. The goal of mid-level theorising is to enable the researcher to encompass theoretical and empirical concerns in one approach (rather than emphasising one over the other, as much work in academic IR undoubtedly does) by generating ‘an empirically grounded theory of delimited scope’ (Merton 1968: 63). Macro-level theories can be characterised as ‘looseknit, internally diversified, and mutually overlapping’ (Merton 1968: 43), meaning that the conception of them as mutually incommensurable and contradictory is not helpful. On the other hand, micro-level theories deal only with specific areas of empirical study and do not allow the theorist to understand the broader picture which stands behind the subject of study. Mid-level

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theories which have ‘a measure of empirical confirmation’ (Merton 1968: 43) can therefore be used productively to avoid ‘the balkanization of sociology, with each principality governed by its own theoretical system’ (p. 51), whereby each group of scholars ‘begins to respond largely to stereotyped versions of what the other is saying’ (p. 53). Research into China’s economic diplomacy by Shuxiu Zhang (2016: 30) supports Merton’s idea that it is a good idea to analyse Chinese foreign policy using mid-level theorising in an eclectic fashion, explaining that what is needed is a middle range analytical framework that is eclectic and built from the assumption of bounded rationality … this is not a polemic for or against any of the grand ‘isms’ of IR or IPE. Decades of empirical research have shown conclusively that none of these grand approaches is adequate by itself. (Zhang 2016: 30) Extending and elaborating on Merton’s foundation, analytic eclecticism also refers to the philosophical tradition of pragmatism, founded by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce in the late 19th century, which prioritises practical results over theoretical ‘purity’.1 More recently, the pragmatism baton has been picked up for use in IR research and methodology by Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009). The pragmatic approach also correlates with the Chinese approach to policy formation, which according to Joshua Cooper Ramo (2004: 4) ‘is pragmatic and ideological at the same time, a reflection of an ancient Chinese philosophical outlook that makes little distinction between theory and practice.’ The emphasis of both Western and Chinese pragmatism is on effective problem-solving in the real world rather than focusing on the nearimpossible task of developing an all-encompassing large-scale theory which may not actually be useful for analysing what is happening on the ground. In taking this stance, both pragmatism and analytic eclecticism thus lean towards the ‘problem-solving’ side of Robert Cox’s distinction between ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ theory (Cox 1981: 128–130). Furthermore, what Colin Wight (1996: 319) rightly identifies as IR’s obsession with the supposed incommensurability of paradigms (i.e. the idea that they are logically incompatible and cannot be compared or measured against each other) prevents the development of ‘a multi-perspectival approach to IR inquiry’ which would be able to productively utilise insights from a range of theoretical traditions. According to Wight, the idea that communication across and between paradigms is impossible is erroneous: if theorists can understand and accept points being made by those on the other side of the theoretical divide, then this renders the notion of incommensurability – the idea that paradigmatic theories do not have any common ground and therefore are engaged in entirely different discussions – invalid. Jackson and Nexon (2009) extend Wight’s point by arguing that there are no such things as ‘paradigms’ per se in IR theory, only Weberian ‘ideal-types’

66 Complex eclecticism (Weber 1978). Emphasising the logic and implications of theoretical arguments rather than their formal appearance ‘allows for genuine “analytic eclecticism” insofar as scholars are free to interrogate and combine particular mechanisms, processes, variables, and methodologies – subject to the constraints of logical and analytical consistency rather than concerns about the coherence of particular “paradigms”’ (Jackson and Nexon 2009: 926). Incommensurability drops away as one looks at the content of theories rather than their ‘inherent architecture’ (ibid.). This allows one to focus on theoretical concepts and the ‘interrelationships between multiple approaches’ (Wight 1996: 318) rather than being preoccupied with ‘monolithic, impermeable, and imperialistic paradigms’ (Wight 1996: 319). Ole Wæver (1996: 149–150) supports and extends this point when he comments that ‘the image of “incommensurable” paradigms is a block to scientific progress as well as to earnest, painful criticism, and its “theory of science” basis is at least contestable’. Cambridge University scholar Charles Jones puts the main argument against paradigmatic theorising in IR more straightforwardly when he points out that … the various theories are not mutually exclusive. It is perfectly possible to be Marxist, realist, constructivist, and feminist all at once. (Jones 2014: 180) All the above considerations provide support for Sil and Katzenstein’s overall presentation of analytic eclecticism, which emphasises the following points: the need to address complexity; theoretical pragmatism and problem-solving rather than an over-emphasis on the supposed incommensurability of different theories; and eclectically combining ‘mid-level’ insights from IR’s main ‘paradigms’, which are taken to be realism, liberalism and constructivism. It is therefore essential to outline what distinguishes IR’s main schools of thought in order to draw out the mid-level insights which can bridge the theoreticalempirical divide. It also, however, seems advisable to take Sil and Katzenstein’s framework an important step further by going further ‘beyond paradigms’ than they do: this means, first, including a wider range of theories than just the three standard ‘paradigms’; and second, leaving the three-way ‘interparadigm debate’ behind once and for all. This is necessary because a major weakness of Sil and Katzenstein’s analytic eclecticism is that it does not fully justify the focus on the utilisation of insights from only the three main theoretical traditions within academic IR. Although the authors explain that the majority of work in IR is based on these three perspectives, this would not logically appear to rule out the eclectic use of other theoretical and methodological approaches. Yet Sil and Katzenstein do not include any others from outside the dominant group of three. It seems that, despite their attempt to move ‘beyond paradigms’, their thinking is still rooted in exploring the intersection of traditional paradigmatic boundaries rather than leaving them behind. Sil and Katzenstein’s use of triangle-shaped diagrams which denote the intersections between realism, liberalism and constructivism support the

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assertion that analytic eclecticism, for all its emphasis on real-world pragmatism, is still heavily based in the abstract ‘paradigmatic’ thinking of mainstream IR theory which their approach in part seeks to critique. This problem also has another aspect, and that is the fact that Sil and Katzenstein fail to acknowledge not only IR theories located outside the mainstream such as Marxism, post-structuralism, the English School or feminist theory, but also do not mention any non-Western theories. Importantly for this book, nonWestern IR theory includes Chinese theories such as Tang’s SEP and Zhao Tingyang’s (2006, 2019) tianxia (all-under-heaven) theory, which although clearly utopian has become quite influential in China by proposing an alternative to the current Western-derived international system based on precepts of traditional Confucian philosophy. Another emerging Chinese variant is Qin Yaqing’s (2016) relational theory, which he places in direct opposition to what he calls the ‘rational’ theories emanating from the West. Sil and Katzenstein’s failure to incorporate a wider range of theories into their framework undermines their claim to be ‘beyond paradigms’ and suggests, instead, that they remain fixed in conventional (and, according to Colin Wight (1996) and Jackson and Nexon (2009), conceptually erroneous) paradigmatic thinking rather than moving beyond it. It is also necessary to mention that by choosing to base their eclecticism on only the three standard theoretical strands, all of which come from the West, Sil and Katzenstein’s approach is redolent of what John M. Hobson (2012) terms ‘eurocentric’ IR theory. Hobson’s deep analysis distinguishes the explicit Eurocentrism of pre-Second World War generations of theorists with the implicit (or unconscious) eurocentrism of current Western IR scholars and their immediate predecessors. Sil and Katzenstein’s failure to include (or even to mention) nonWestern IR theories is indicative of an implicit (as opposed to conscious) eurocentrism, which this book on Chinese approaches to international relations will seek to remedy by incorporating Chinese thinking on IR theory into the analysis. Connected to this problem is Sil and Katzenstein’s distinctly underdeveloped approach to complexity. They repeatedly emphasise that their approach is designed to take full account of complexity; yet beyond combining insights from different theoretical perspectives, they do not propose specific tools for analysing it. For this reason, this book makes the attempt to include the ‘conceptual toolkit’ (Walby 2007, Bousquet and Curtis 2011) of CT to the analysis, complementing the eclectic use of IR theory by pointing out complex ‘system effects’ (Jervis 1997) generated by real-world events and interactions between actors. Complex eclecticism thus aims to utilise two ‘toolkits’: concepts taken from IR theories and perspectives, alongside CT’s system effects. This is intended to provide a rich and informative analytical framework designed to reconfigure the use of IR theory in conjunction with CT in order to intersect with real-world decision-making by leaders and the messy world they have to work within. Logically, in order to move ‘beyond paradigms’ as Sil and Katzenstein suggest, it is necessary to discard the notion of paradigms altogether and reconceptualise the use of IR theory. In relation to the first point, non-mainstream and

68 Complex eclecticism non-Western theories will be presented and included in the complex eclecticism framework; and in relation to the second, an innovative theoreticalmethodological approach will be introduced which reconfigures theories as metaphorical tools in a conceptual toolkit which can be used eclectically, pragmatically and abductively at the mid-level to analyse real-world phenomena. These tools will then be tested in subsequent chapters to assess their utility with regard to analysis of the BRI, and those that prove not to be of value discarded so that the tools in the admittedly unwieldy toolkit can be whittled down so that the approach ultimately becomes more streamlined as the most useful tools are identified. The following section therefore presents the three main theoretical schools utilised by Sil and Katzenstein’s analytic eclecticism, as well as non-mainstream Western theories and some non-Western approaches. Only a brief summary of each school is provided, with particular points emerging from each perspective in relation to aspects of the BRI being left for deeper analysis at appropriate points in subsequent chapters. It is hoped that the summaries here presented are sufficient for readers who are unfamiliar with the perspectives to gain a basic understanding; the curious reader is referred to the literature referenced for more in-depth analysis.

3.3 International relations (IR) theoretical schools: mainstream, non-mainstream and non-Western At the outset of this section, it is necessary, before discussing theoretical schools in the academic field of IR, to remind the reader that the usage of the terms ‘paradigm’ and ‘theory’ in the discipline is contested and often unclear. Although the term ‘paradigm’ derives from the work of Thomas Kuhn (1970), Kuhn himself intended the concept for use in the natural rather than the social sciences. As already discussed, prominent IR scholars such as Wæver (1996), Wight (1996) and Jackson and Nexon (2009) doubt that the term is even suitable for use to describe schools of thought in academic IR. Similarly, as the Cambridge University IR scholar Charles Jones points out, the term ‘theory’ is not well-defined in IR and does not adhere to Popperian notions of falsifiability (Jones 2014: 180–181). These considerations make it appear likely that the frequent use in the literature of the term ‘paradigm’ to describe IR’s main perspectives is intended to acknowledge that on the whole, in their broader manifestation, they are more akin to schools of thought than falsifiable theories with clear hypotheses which can be proven or disproven. This assumption provides another reason for discarding the term ‘paradigm’ and replacing it, in the case of IR’s theoretical perspectives, with the more appropriate term ‘school of thought’. Within each school of thought, there may reside some actual theories (such as, within the school of realism, offensive and defensive realism, which as Tang (2008, 2013) demonstrates are theories which contain falsifiable hypotheses), but the working supposition in the rest of this book is that the schools themselves constitute theoretically-based ontological perspectives or

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collections of conceptual thought rather than being fully-fledged bona fide theories as such with hypotheses or positions which are falsifiable (in a Popperian sense) in terms of empirical data. For instance, scholars (Moravscik 1999, Smith 1999) have pointed out that constructivism is a meta-theory rather than a theory as such, since it presents an ontological perspective rather than a hypothesis which can be tested ‘in any meaningful sense’ (Risse and Wiener 1999: 778). Much the same can be argued about realism and liberalism, both of which are approaches or perspectives (rather than theories in the strict sense) within which there can be a range of theoretical positions: some positions within a ‘paradigm’ – such as ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ realism – are in fact logically contradictory (Tang 2008, 2013). Realism is the oldest IR school of thought, going back as far as Thucydides. It addresses questions of power and realpolitik. In its classical form, it takes a pessimistic view of human nature (Morgenthau 1948, Kaufman 2006) and regards international politics as consisting of states fighting a Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’; while in its contemporary neorealist incarnation (based on Waltz 1979), it focuses on the behaviour of states within an anarchic international system, which means that there is no world government which would check states’ behaviour. Offensive realism predicts that rising powers will challenge existing hegemons, leading to major conflicts (Mearsheimer 2001, Allison 2017), while defensive realism predicts that states will seek to protect their interests against other states rather than seeking to decrease other states’ security (Glaser 1994–95: 60–72, Jervis 1999: 49, Tang 2013: 97–98). Realism tends to emphasise material factors and the inevitability of power struggles and conflict, and, while not denying their presence, downplays the influence of non-state actors, economic forces and identity. Organski’s (1958) power transition theory, which like offensive realism posits that a rising power will militarily challenge a hegemonic state, can be situated within the realist framework (DiCicco and Levy 2003: 110). Liberalism is generally agreed to stem from the work of Immanuel Kant (in political philosophy) and Adam Smith (in free market economics) in the 18th century. Particularly in its neoliberal institutionalist form, it emphasises the importance of economic interdependence, international institutions and non-state actors in addition to states (Keohane and Nye 1977). It generally takes the view that wars are not inevitable if the right international institutions are in place to act as a check on the behaviour of states. In the main, liberalism is more optimistic about the possibility of peaceful outcomes, although, like realism, it stresses that people are selfish profit-seekers. It sees such self-interest as a positive factor, driving actors away from conflict because war is not good for business and leading ultimately to ‘an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism’ (Fukuyama 1989: 3). Liberal-inspired democratic peace theory also claims that the intrinsic ideological commitment in liberalism to individual freedom and material well-being means that democratic states are unlikely to go to war with each other (Ray 1988, Owen 1994). However, since China is not a democracy in the Western liberal sense, there is no need to apply this disputed (e.g. Layne 1994) theory to China’s international statecraft.

70 Complex eclecticism Constructivism is a more recent addition to the stable of mainstream IR perspectives, originating in social theory and emerging as a ‘paradigm’ in IR in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It focuses on what is perceived to be the socially constructed nature of human reality, leading to an emphasis on intersubjectivity, i.e. actors’ perceptions and understandings of themselves and others in international society (Jackson and Sorensen 2006: 165). Constructivism stresses questions of identity, mentally constructed self/other dichotomies, and threat perceptions, which lead in the international arena to securitisation (Buzan et al. 1998). It also addresses ideational factors, norms, social processes and interactions between actors. In this way, it tends to downplay the material factors emphasised by realism and liberalism, seeing political power and international institutions as human-created phenomena based on mutually reinforcing perceptions and ideas (Onuf 1989, Wendt 1992, Kubálková et al. 1998). There are of course two other groups of theories which are omitted by Sil and Katzenstein. These are non-mainstream Western and non-Western IR schools of thought. In developing an analytic eclecticism which goes ‘beyond paradigms’, it logically makes no sense to include only the three mainstream theoretical perspectives and exclude all others. This book will therefore endeavour to correct this omission by Sil and Katzenstein by seeking to expand the analytic eclecticism framework to include other theories within the complex eclecticism framework. There is a wide range of non-mainstream Western IR theoretical perspectives. Some notable ones among these are Marxism, the English school, critical theory, post-structuralism, feminism, world system theory, democratic peace theory (which has already been mentioned under liberalism), power transition theory (mentioned in the realism paragraph) and political ecologism or ‘green’ theory. Rather than outline all of them here in detail, the intention is, as with the mainstream theories, to utilise concepts taken from these perspectives in relation to specific aspects of the BRI as they arise during the empirical part of the book. However, the following paragraphs will outline those theories which seem most relevant to the analysis of the BRI (Marxistderived theories, the English School, feminism and political ecologism) briefly to draw out the key analytical aspects they contain. Developed from the writings of Karl Marx in the 19th century but passing through a number of other hands since then, Marxism’s main focus is on class conflict caused by economic inequality resulting from the capitalist or free market system of rich factory owners allegedly exploiting the industrial working class. Historically, revolutionary Marxism inspired Stalinism, Maoism, the Russian and Cuban revolutions, and the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In academic IR, Marxist thought has exerted influence on theories which stand in opposition to the mainstream. For instance, as discussed in the previous chapter, Robert W. Cox’s version of critical theory derives some of its most important conclusions from the Marxist scholar Antonio Gramsci’s writings concerning counter-hegemonic blocs which form in order to oppose the existing order (Gramsci 1971, Cox 1981, 1983, 1987). Theories of dependency,

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imperialism and neo-colonialism also have their roots in Marxist thought (Larrain 1989). Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) world system theory, with its conception of the unequal relationship between the global core and periphery, is derived from Marxist notions of economic inequality and class, transferred to the international level. Johan Galtung’s (1969) concept of structural violence, in which social structures inflict harm and disadvantage upon people, also derives from Marxist thought. The English school of IR theory views international relations in terms of an international society of states which may one day be transformed into a world society (Bull 1977, Buzan 2004). It accepts some premises of realism (e.g. anarchy in the international system), but attempts to add social elements to the analysis, as well as normative concerns. It shares with constructivism an emphasis on ideas shaping international affairs as well as material capabilities, but includes more analysis of world history, law and political science. It is an ongoing research project whose outcome is still unknown, and which has many points of connection with other theories, particularly realism, liberalism and constructivism. Feminism looks at gender inequality emerging from male-dominated social structures. It also posits that IR theory and international politics need to be reevaluated as the products of a history of predominantly male thought processes and practices. Feminism has emerged from the West, and mostly critiques Western IR and political structures, but has an obvious application to China, whose social structures, influenced by a historical, social and philosophical tradition of patriarchal Confucianism, tend to be authoritarian and dominated by men (Fincher 2018). Political ecologism is (surprisingly) at present a rather marginal school of thought. However, given the impacts of human beings on the planet and the urgency of finding solutions to environmental degradation, there is no doubt that it needs to be more emphasised, as Cudworth and Hobden (2011) point out. In addition, Tang (2013) demonstrates that international political and economic activity is always dependent on exploitation of the physical environment (e.g. food, water, livestock, industrial production, technological advances, territory, etc.), and so analysis cannot be based on ideational factors alone. This makes it imperative to include the natural environment as a crucial factor to be incorporated in the examination of complex international relations, since the impact and dependence of inter-state activity on the physical environment has been astonishingly underemphasised by mainstream theory (Cudworth and Hobden 2011: 111). Moving on to non-Western theories, Hobson (2012) demonstrates that IR has been dominated since its inception by European theories, meaning that nonWestern IR theory is an important and emerging area of the field which is, at present, being hotly debated, without, as yet, a clear resolution. For this reason, as well as for reasons of space and effective, concise analysis, it is proposed in this book to limit the number of non-Western theoretical approaches included. Since the subject matter of the book is China’s international relations, the most pertinent theories are Chinese ones. Among these, apart from Tang’s (2013)

72 Complex eclecticism SEP (which was analysed in the previous chapter), the most pertinent for the analysis of the BRI are tianxia theory and relational theory. The tianxia theory developed by Zhao Tingyang (2006) views the current international system based on Western political and economic precepts, like its predecessors such as imperialism, as dysfunctional because of the inter-state rivalries and tensions built into it. Zhao suggests replacing the Westphalian system of nation-states with a system based on mutual respect, tolerance and harmonious coexistence derived from elements of Chinese Confucianism. Zhao (2019) depicts the tianxia system as transcending the nation-states system since it arises from the internal structure and logic of the Chinese civilisation-state: Jacques (2009) suggests that this is a qualitatively distinct entity from the Westphalian nation-state. Although tianxia theory has been criticised by Feng Zhang (2010) as utopian and William Callahan (2008) as legitimising a possible drive to future global hegemony by the PRC, it has been quite influential in Chinese policy circles as providing a potentially legitimising normative basis for Chinese global expansion (Carlson 2011). Tianxia will be dissected in more depth in Chapter 4 as part of the discussion of how complex eclecticism can be used to analyse the BRI. Qin Yaqing’s relational theory – which is influenced by the work of nonChinese theorists such as Mustafa Emirbayer (1997) and Jackson and Nexon (1999)) – distinguishes itself from what Qin regards as the rationalist theories of Western IR theory, which he claims are based on ‘individualistic rationality’ (Qin 2016, see also Zhang 2015: Chapter 2). Despite its Western intellectual precursors, Qin’s relational theory is based in Chinese traditions of thought, primarily Confucianism, which tends to prioritise interpersonal relationships over abstract theorising and individuality over relatedness and context (Qin 2016: 36). He sees Western rationalist-based theorising as disconnected from considerations of human interactions on a cultural, contextual level. Qin’s relational theory of IR is based on three precepts: interrelatedness, identities shaped by social relations, and relations in motion (process) (Qin 2016: 35–37). In this it connects to constructivism and the English School but is distinguished from them by being based on Chinese culture, in particular what he calls ‘Confucian cultural communities’ (Qin 2016: 33). An expanded account of Qin’s relational theory and how it can be applied to the BRI will be presented in Chapter 4. To sum up the discussion in this section, the theoretical perspectives or schools of thought which can be eclectically employed to analyse international phenomena clearly extend beyond the three mainstream paradigms used by Sil and Katzenstein. The question to be answered is how exactly to use them in developing a complex eclecticism approach which can be applied to the BRI: this is the subject of the following section.

3.4 Moving from inter-paradigm debates to conceptual toolkits As discussed in section 3.2, IR’s theoretical ‘paradigms’ are highly contested, and it is not the aim of this book to expand on those debates. Indeed, in seeking, in line with Sil and Katzenstein’s (2010a, 2010b) analytic eclecticism,

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a more pragmatic approach which can be understood and utilised by scholars and practitioners alike, I here intend to take a more radical step than Sil and Katzenstein and abandon discussion of ‘paradigms’ altogether. Instead, inspired by Jackson and Nexon’s (2009) call to substitute talk of ‘paradigms’ with a return to the Weberian notion of ‘ideal-types’, I concur with Barkin’s (2010) suggestion that it is better to focus on the concepts at the heart of IR’s theoretical approaches rather than becoming enmeshed in ‘inter-paradigm debates’: these are, as Sil and Katzenstein (2010b: 8–9) point out, unproductive in terms of solving real-world problems or communicating with practitioners. Concurring with Barkin, this book will therefore focus on the concepts which are situated at the heart of each approach rather than picking at the somewhat ossified paradigmatic carcass of each ‘-ism’: there is already plenty of literature (e.g. Smith et al. 1996, Wæver 1996) which analyses ‘inter-paradigm debates’, and thus inquisitive readers are referred to that. The aim of this book is to develop an approach which can be used to analyse complex real-world phenomena such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative in a pragmatic fashion rather than to discuss IR theory per se. The justification for this seemingly radical step is fourfold. First, it seems clear that the three so-called ‘paradigms’ addressed by Sil and Katzenstein (realism, liberalism and constructivism) have become ossified and reified through overuse, somewhat obscuring the contents of the perspectives and making their application uncertain. In contrast, the concepts which form the core of each school’s perception of international relations (such as power, interdependence and intersubjectivity) can be matched quite closely to mid- and micro-level real-world phenomena such as conflicts, trade networks, normative impacts, and so on. My argument is that it is therefore better in a pragmatic sense to identify and utilise concepts rather than ‘paradigms’, and to utilise them at the mid-level, rather than to become embroiled in sterile ‘paradigm debates’. This is also why I claim that it is better to leave the ‘paradigm debate’ and the term ‘paradigm’ on the theoretical shelf rather than become distracted by all the associated academic baggage which accompanies these contested abstractions. Using concepts rather than ‘paradigms’ will allow, I contend, a more productive analysis of China’s BRI. The second reason for leaving the ‘inter-paradigm debates’ out of the analysis relates to the problem of defining what exactly the terms ‘realism’, ‘liberalism’ and ‘constructivism’ mean. Within each term is a mass of contentious and unresolved debate which has divided scholars into rival camps. For instance, any IR scholar worth their salt can count off at once four distinct types of ‘realism’ without having to wrack their brains much: classical realism, neorealism, neoclassical realism and offensive realism are all variants with different theoretical precepts and competing claims to be the ‘true form’ of ‘realism’. Similarly, it is not clear between ‘neoliberalism’, ‘liberal institutionalism’ and other variants what exactly ‘liberalism’ is. Constructivism is similarly contested, with Wendtians coming up against critical constructivists, ‘practice turn’ theorists and others (Smith 1999).

74 Complex eclecticism The third justification for leaving out the ‘inter-paradigm debates’ is probably the most important in analytical and theoretical terms, and also theoretically the clearest. It is based on analytic eclecticism’s emphasis on pragmatism and midlevel theorising. The notion of ‘theories of the middle level’ comes from the work of Robert K. Merton (1968), who explains that it is likely to be at least as difficult to establish grand theories in the social sciences, as it has proved to be in the natural sciences (famously, even Einstein did not manage to produce an overall, integrated theory of everything in physics). He suggests that it is better not to be over-ambitious by making ‘extravagant claims to total systems of theory, adequate to the entire range of problems encompassed by the discipline’ (Merton 1968: 49). Instead he suggests ‘engag[ing] in theoretically oriented empirical research’ in order to create ‘an empirically grounded theory of delimited scope’ (Merton 1968: 56, 63). This emphasis on theorising at the mid-level means that attempts to build a ‘theory of everything’ in international relations such as those by Waltz (1979) and Wendt (1999) should be abandoned (at least for the time being, until the evidence has been worked through) in favour of utilising theoretical insights which can potentially bridge between ‘allembracing, unified theory’ and ‘descriptive empirical work’ (Merton 1968: 56). Merton’s view is that it is in fact neither necessary nor advisable to attempt large-scale theorising before working on some more modest, but still useful, mid-level theories. In terms of IR theory, it is this book’s argument (in broad agreement with Sil and Katzenstein) that such mid-level theoretical insights can arguably be obtained through the eclectic use of empirically grounded theoretical concepts which occur within, between and across the ‘paradigms.’ Dropping the ‘paradigms’ and using theoretical concepts instead allows a greater flexibility of theoretical and empirical analysis. The final reason for omitting the ‘paradigms’ relates to the ‘complex’ aspect of complex eclecticism. I contend, in agreement with others (most notably Jervis (1997), Kavalski (2007) and Cudworth and Hobden (2011)), that it is necessary to prioritise complexity thinking (CT) rather than ‘paradigmatic’ considerations when analysing and theorising about international phenomena such as the BRI. This, allied with the justification established in the previous paragraph, means that it is necessary to examine international affairs through a complexity lens rather than one based on conventional IR theoretical debates. The detailed justification for doing this will be explained in a dedicated section below. Reasoning in this way means that instead of discussing realism, I will, in line with Barkin (2010), take the analysis of power, states and anarchy as the central focus of realist scholars and attempt to apply these to the examination of the BRI. Turning to liberalism, I assume interdependence, non-state actors and institutions to be the central concepts and move on from there. The central concepts derived from constructivist approaches I take to be norms, ideas and intersubjectivity, and so I examine insights based on these rather than becoming distracted by arcane academic debates about distinctions between different varieties of constructivism.

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Concerning the non-mainstream theories, it is possible to consider only a few selected perspectives from which key concepts may be drawn and applied to an analysis of the BRI. The selected perspectives are the ones which have already been outlined in this chapter, and so the concepts are drawn from these. Marxism’s central concern is with class conflict caused by economic inequality resulting from the capitalist (free market) system: since economic inequality is a key aspect of contemporary processes of globalisation (e.g. the North/South divide, wealth gaps, development issues in economically impoverished countries, etc.), while it is not obvious how class conflict would be relevant, it is economic inequality which will be used. Feminism looks at inequalities caused by patriarchal authoritarianism (Fincher 2018), so this is the key selected concept. The English school views international relations as a world society of states (Bull 1977). Political ecologism studies the ‘environment as implicated in human systems and as fundamentally altered by them’ (Cudworth and Hobden 2011: 110), and hence the natural environment is the key focus. All of these, as the next chapter will demonstrate, can be applied to the BRI. On the other hand, the central idea of democratic peace theory that democratisation brings peace may safely be discarded from the set of conceptual tools at this point on the grounds that China is obviously not promoting Western liberal democracy via the BRI. The two emerging Chinese theories also have their key concepts. Tianxia theory views the Western international system as broken and in need of replacement by a system based on a Confucian universal harmony of interests based on mutual respect and tolerance (Zhao 2006). Relational theory views relations between actors as key (Zhang 2015, Qin 2016). Thus, in the application of each theoretical perspective within the ‘conceptual toolkit’ of IR theories available (see Table 3.1), some central concepts can be extracted which can be utilised as analytical tools without the need to constantly refer to the ‘paradigm’ or theoretical school within which they are traditionally located, according to conventional conceptions of the field. Nevertheless, it is not necessary entirely to exclude the use of the terms ‘realism’, ‘constructivism’, ‘Marxism’ and so on where referring to them may be productive. The goal here is to create a set of analytical tools which can be utilised productively alongside and in conjunction with the ‘conceptual toolkit’ of CT to create a rich picture of the international sphere, and in particular China’s BRI. Chapter 4 will attempt to apply these conceptual tools to the BRI at a broad level and will subsequently, at the end of that chapter, assess whether in the light of the analysis the tools need to be reconfigured, combined or discarded for use in examining the BRI at the level of empirical detail. The aim, then, is genuinely move ‘beyond paradigms’ towards the eclectic, pragmatic use of concepts as analytical tools within the complex eclecticism framework. Two further questions then remain: first, how to integrate or combine the revised version of analytic eclecticism with CT? And second, how to justify the need to do this theoretically and methodologically? First, however, we need to look at CT in more detail.

76 Complex eclecticism Table 3.1 International relations (IR) theory conceptual toolkit IR theory

Concepts

Realism

Power, anarchy and states

Liberalism

Interdependence, institutions and non-state actors

Constructivism

Norms, ideas and intersubjectivity

Marxism

Economic inequality

Feminism

Patriarchal authoritarianism

English School

World society

Tianxia

Harmony of interests

Relational theory

Relations between actors

Political ecologism

Natural environment

3.5 Complexity theory/complexity thinking (CT) Complexity theory (also called complexity thinking, or CT), as Ben Ramalingam (2013: 143) has pointed out, is a work-in-progress rather than a complete and fully-worked-out science. Confirming the impression of an emerging field rather than a finished product, Sylvia Walby (2007: 449) has called CT ‘a loose collection of work that addresses fundamental questions on the nature of systems and their changes’. There is ongoing debate about how to approach complexity, what tools and methods to use, and even what complexity itself is. In an important sense, the term CT encompasses a bundle of different approaches to complexity rather than ‘a unified body of theory’ (Walby 2007: 456). On the other hand, its influence has spread deep into branches of the hard sciences in areas as diverse as the environment, meteorology and theoretical physics. A prominent group of scientists led by the influential Chinese environmental researcher Jianguo (Jack) Liu has called for an integrated, interdisciplinary approach to complex systems which would include social as well as natural scientists (Liu et al. 2007). Using mixed methods from both the environmental and social sciences, the Liu group has researched feedback effects within coupled human and natural systems. These produce a phenomenon which Liu calls telecoupling: this is defined as long-distance nonlinear (i.e. lacking a simple or obvious cause-and-effect between a dependent and independent variable) impacts due to hard-to-discern interlinkages between apparently unrelated phenomena, even at far-apart locations. The Liu group’s results strongly suggest that accusations by some IR scholars (e.g. Gunitsky 2013: 57) that CT constitutes a metaphorical or partly-metaphorical approach are wide of the

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mark. The concept of telecoupling also implies that feedback effects could occur within and between complex systems in the international realm, including within the BRI and the projects included in it. The Liu group’s findings also tie in to Cudworth and Hobden’s definition of the international: What we call the international is a complex interweave of numerous systems nested, intersected and embedded in each other, all undergoing processes of co-evolution and linked by innumerable feedback loops. (Cudworth and Hobden 2011: 75) Looking at the problem in this way provides a possibility of how to utilise CT in the analysis of large-scale complex international phenomena such as the BRI: to view it as an emerging and evolving mega-system with smaller but still complex systems built into it. On the other hand, viewing the BRI in this way reveals a methodological and theoretical problem: how is one to approach the examination of a complex international realm consisting of subsystems embedded within a larger system? Cudworth and Hobden (2011: 75) continue their analysis as follows: Which leads to the downside: how can it be possible to analyse this? The simple answer is that it isn’t. All that we can do is attempt to capture snapshots of a constantly developing situation in the hope that it can reveal answers to the questions that we have, and illuminate the central features and interconnections in international relations. The study of complexity may provide an answer to the question of why international relations as a discipline has found it so hard to make progress, as this is a complex system with many subsystems interacting in multiple ways, and the developments in one can have impacts right across the system. Thus, it can be readily understood that there are serious difficulties inherent in attempting to use CT for the study of IR. At the same time, since complexity rather than parsimony characterises the realm of the international, it is necessary to make the effort to apply a CT analysis in order to push IR further along a trajectory to clearer understandings of international relations. Nevertheless, other problems related to the use of CT are evident. Apart from those already mentioned, problems with the use of CT include the following: • • •

CT’s incompleteness as a science CT is inherently difficult to grasp, particularly for those without a background in the hard sciences (after all, it is complex!) The difficulty of establishing with clarity and methodological rigour the extent to which phenomena which are studied in academic IR constitute complex, self-organising systems (often called complex adaptive systems, or CAS)

78 Complex eclecticism •

Complexity science includes a range (or ‘conceptual toolkit’) of ‘system effects’ whose definition is not always agreed upon even by complexity theorists themselves

For the sake of IR theory and practice, as well as this book, these difficulties – incompleteness, difficulty, the range of effects and the question of system – need to be addressed in a relatively compact way which allows the analysis of real-world phenomena such as China’s BRI to advance in a meaningful fashion capable of producing analytical results. The following sections will set about this task, tackling first the questions of incompleteness and difficulty together, then exploring the question of systems in IR, and finally examining CT’s toolkit of system effects and conceptual tools.

3.6 Incompleteness and difficulty: an impasse or a way forward for IR theory? There have been a number of serious attempts to incorporate CT into IR, the earliest of which is Robert Jervis’s (1997). However, Jervis’s attempt, while incorporating elements of CT such as feedback effects, remains firmly rooted in the systems thinking of traditional IR. Perceiving both the need for a more radical step in the direction of moving on from mainstream paradigmatic thinking and the integration of CT into IR theorising, Emilian Kavalski (2007) has called for a genuine complex international relations theory. Others have attempted to apply CT to a new type of ‘posthuman’ IR which takes into account the biosphere (Cudworth and Hobden 2011) and to the study of international aid (Ramalingam 2013). However, none of these attempts has taken root to the extent that CT would be allowed to enter the mainstream of IR theorising. Probably there are several factors contributing to the relative lack of serious interest and paucity of attempts to apply CT. Foremost among them are questions of the incompleteness and difficulty of CT. Other off-putting elements include the perception, despite acknowledgement of Jervis’s efforts, that CT is incompatible with the traditional schools of thought in IR. The effort required to incorporate CT with IR theory is also time- and attention-demanding in terms of reevaluating existing conceptions of what IR can be. On the other hand, there is considerable encouragement for CT in the nearuniversal agreement among IR scholars (including Kenneth Waltz (1979)) that the field is concerned with the study of phenomena which are inherently complex. This in itself, I argue, necessitates an approach which directly confronts the complexity of the real world and attempts to account for it within an abductive theoretical-methodological framework, rather than calling, as Waltz and others do, for a ‘parsimonious’ approach which simplifies the interactions of international actors and phenomena into a more easily understandable framework. As Ray Cooksey (2001: 86) puts it, it is necessary to ‘complexify the problem before simplifying it’. It is the difficult task of complexifying before simplifying that this book aims to lay a groundwork for.

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To illustrate the shortcomings of parsimonious approaches to theory in terms of accounting for the complexity of the real world they purport to encompass, and the subsequent need to address CT’s incompleteness and difficulty in a constructive manner, it is instructive to look briefly at Waltz’s influential theory of neorealism. Waltz posits that the self-interested behaviour of the primary international actors (nation-states) is directly caused by the structure of the international system, which he identifies as anarchic (i.e. lacking a world government or other organization of control which would inhibit the self-help actions of states). In other words, he sees the causal relationship between anarchy and states as the single explanatory cause of international phenomena. Thus, although he recognises that international relations are complex, he attempts to account for them through an explanatory mechanism which posits a linear causal chain between an independent variable (the anarchy of the international system) and a dependent variable (the self-help behaviour of states). It is not necessary here to go into all the criticisms that have been levelled at Waltz in the four decades since his book Theory of International Politics was published, but merely to point out the deficiencies of neorealism in relation to complexity. There are three. First, Waltz’s framework boils international relations down to interactions between states in an anarchic system. He downplays the influence of other actors such as MNCs, IGOs and NGOs, claiming that international institutions operate under the control of the strongest states for as long as they are useful (Waltz 2000). He also does not sufficiently acknowledge that there are aspects of the system which do not conform to the anarchy principle, such as hierarchic elements (which may be as significant, or more significant, than the anarchic ones: see Kang 2007, Lake 2009). Waltz also does not account for important normative elements of international power relationships such as legitimacy and soft power. He thus leaves out other actors and factors which have significant effects on outcomes in the international environment. Second, his theory is overly reliant on a perception of international politics as operating through a straightforward linear cause-andeffect process based on dependent and independent variables rather than taking account of nonlinear complexity which includes a wider range of factors. Third, due to the first two points, neorealism is incapable of describing and predicting international interactions with any precision due to its failure to account for the complexity and interplay of a large number of factors. Thus, as has been noted by Richard Ned Lebow (1994), neorealist theorists, with their narrow focus on international anarchy and the self-help behaviour of states, were among those who failed to foresee or satisfactorily account for the popular revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe which led to the internal disintegration of the Soviet bloc in 1989. The end of communism in CEE was due to interrelated factors such as economic stagnation, lack of regime legitimacy and the rapid spread of mass demonstrations which do not generally feature in neorealist thinking. In short, as far as accounting for complexity is concerned, Waltz’s neorealism is guilty of sins of omission and over-simplification, as well as descriptive and predictive inadequacy and error due to its failure to account for a sufficient range of interacting factors in a complex world.

80 Complex eclecticism Without going into the same detail of analysis regarding the other mainstream IR theories, similar conclusions can be reached in regard to their representations of reality failing to account for the full range of complex phenomena in the international arena. Liberalism and its offshoots (such as neoliberalism) emphasise economic interdependence and peace-building through international institutions but fail to fully account for other factors such as power politics and intersubjective perceptions. The constructivist school focuses on socialization, identity and intersubjectivity, but arguably neglects physical reality in favour of ideational aspects of human interactions. In short, the other two mainstream schools also limit their descriptive and predictive range by focusing on particular aspects of reality rather than attempting to account for all of it. Spreading the theoretical net wider than just the three main theoretical schools identified by Sil and Katzenstein (2010a, 2010b), one can also look to the English school for a more complete account of complex international affairs. The English school certainly attempts to include a wider range of elements (international society, historical contextualization, the international system) which make it appear to be a rigorous account of complexity. However, its theoretical framework and methodological tools are arguably not defined with sufficient precision to give more than a generalised, holistic picture of IR lacking adequate sharpness of focus and empirical support. For instance, Barry Buzan’s 2004 book examining the English school attempts to resolve ‘areas of weakness’ (Buzan 2004: 15) such as questions about whether it really constitutes a theory (Buzan 2004: 24–26) and a lack of precision in the usage of the concept of ‘world society’. Buzan decides the latter concept is ‘both incoherent and underdeveloped’ (Buzan 2004: 62), concluding that the ‘present usage of world society covers so many meanings as to sow more confusion than clarity, and this weakens the structural potential of English school theory’ (Buzan 2004: 269–270). Given that ‘world society’ has been at the heart of English school thinking since it was founded by Hedley Bull (1977), this lack of definition seems a serious flaw which means that the otherwise promising theory lacks a clear analytical lens through which to understand complex phenomena – which is likely also to reduce its utility for analysing the BRI (which will be discussed in due course). In the light of the deficiencies and omissions of the IR theories briefly examined here, it is the argument of this book that CT, while in many ways a frustratingly incomplete and difficult project, has at least the considerable virtue of making an attempt to overcome linear thinking and the human theoretical tendency to view the world through prisms which prioritise one perspectival angle over others. CT has the potential to be more inclusive of the messy phenomena inherent in the international sphere. It has met with considerable success in terms of theoretical prediction in the natural sciences, and thus it can be expected that in the course of time, as understandings and technologies improve, it will also become capable of being applied to the social sciences. In an important sense, then, the incompleteness and difficulty inherent in CT can be seen not as impediments to its application, but rather as assets. CT’s

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incompleteness means that it is still in a state of development and can therefore be flexibly applied, elements being dropped, added or adapted as needs demand. Similarly, difficulty is to be expected of any approach which aims to encompass the extreme messiness of interrelated real-world phenomena: it could not be otherwise. It also needs to be pointed out at this juncture that CT’s incompleteness and difficulty are a good match for the BRI as it has thus far taken shape. The BRI is an emerging, loose framework for enhanced IR that, like much Chinese foreign and domestic policy in the modern era, adapts to changing circumstances, dropping, adding and altering policies, as they are seen to be successful or otherwise. This on-the-hoof, gradualist, ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ aspect of Chinese policy-making has already been noted, appearing in the Deng Xiaoping era of economic reform from 1978 onwards (Zhang 2016: 73). It was also already noted in Chapter 1 that the task facing Chinese leaders in forming policy is a massively difficult one involving the evaluation of many interconnected and complex elements. It is hard to see how to apply any single IR theory to an analysis of Chinese foreign policy, and it is also therefore appropriate to take an incomplete, evolving and even difficult-to-understand framework (CT) and to attempt to apply it, in conjunction with the eclectic use of existing IR theories, to the incomplete, evolving and difficult-to-understand BRI.

3.7 The problem of complex systems in IR The third difficulty of CT pointed out above is the question of the extent to which complex systems and self-organization can be said to exist in IR. This part will therefore examine the problem of what are often referred to as complex adaptive systems (CAS) as far as the field of IR is concerned. Probably the most important aspect of CT is that, as Warren Weaver explained as long ago as 1948, it emphasises organised complexity rather than organised simplicity or disorganised complexity (Ramalingam 2013: 135). In other words, CT tries to study the way that patterns emerge in seemingly chaotic and unpredictable phenomena. It attempts to identify the systemic elements in what seems to be the mess of reality, but with the emphasis being on complex interactions, dynamic change (rather than entropy or reversion to equilibrium as in classical physics), self-organization, emergence and nonlinearity. Thus, CT posits the existence of complex systems in which, as Robert Jervis (1997: 57–58) has pointed out, linear analysis using dependent and independent variables is inadequate and misleading. For these reasons, the use of a conceptual toolkit can provide better explanations than the straightforward linear cause-and-effect (organised simplicity) or statistical probability analysis (disorganised complexity) usually favoured by conventional scientific theory (Bousquet and Curtis 2011: 45). What we might term the ‘systems problem’ is a serious one in IR as in other social sciences. There is often disagreement about what constitutes a system, whether there are any systems, and if it is accepted that there are systems, the

82 Complex eclecticism agents and structures they comprise. In IR, disagreements over what was once termed the ‘agency/structure debate’ led in the 1990s to a theoretical impasse classed by Tang Shiping (2014: 484) as ‘disastrous for IR’. This meant that the aim of generating fertile theoretical debate seemed to point away from systems thinking. However, Tang (2014) points out that the standard conception of the agency/structure debate is an error in that structure is subsumed by system, and that there is therefore a need to elaborate a system-based general theory of international relations, such as the one developed by Tang (2013) which was outlined in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, despite Tang’s innovative and sophisticated argumentation concerning the difference between system and structure (Tang 2014), thinking about systems in academic IR has been heavily influenced by theories which do not recognise this distinction, and which also do not account for the possibility of change to the system theorised. Most notably, Kenneth Waltz’s view of the international system as a fixed, anarchic structure containing states as ‘like units’ which are forced by anarchy into self-help behaviours held sway over the field of IR for approximately two decades and is still influential today (Waltz 1979). Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) notion of a ‘world system’ consisting of a rich core and an impoverished periphery is another notable example of systems theorising in IR. Waltz and Wallerstein’s theories constitute two influential examples of the type of thinking about systems which has traditionally been prevalent in IR and which is essentially static in that it does not account for the possibility of change to the system or its elements (Tang 2011). It is this inflexible view of systems as closed, linear and static ‘structures’ which led John Ruggie to remark that theories of world politics are ‘reposed in deep Newtonian slumber’ (cited in Harrison 2006b: 6): mainstream IR theories of systems, based on a mechanistic image of the universe, fail to account for the nonlinear, complex dynamism which can be seen in international affairs. The conception of systems in CT is rather different, as Cudworth and Hobden (2015: 173) have pointed out, to the one commonly employed by social scientists such as Talcott Parsons and IR theorists such as Waltz and Wallerstein. Rather than viewing the system as some kind of a fixed ‘structure’2, for CT the system is an evolving set of a large quantity of interacting elements whose exact dimensions are hard to ascertain, precisely because at any given moment both they and the processes which bind them to other elements are in flux (Cudworth and Hobden 2011: 7). CT sees systemic complexity as dynamic, ever-changing and adapting, hard to pin down, existing on the ‘edge of chaos’ (Kauffmann 1995, Ramalingam 2013), or at the ‘tipping point’ where, in the old adage, the straw breaks the camel’s back (Scheffran 2015: 234). The conclusion that small changes to the system can produce large and unexpected results is an important one for CT and is one that has no clear parallel in the mechanistic Newtonian theorising of conventional systems theorists such as Waltz and Wallerstein. For instance, the tipping point/edge of chaos hypothesis can account for the nonlinear process leading up to unexpected, apparently improbable ‘black swan’ events such as the outbreak of the First World War in

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1914 and the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 (Taleb 2007). In these cases, apparently minor trigger events (an assassination, small-scale protests) led to unexpectedly large outcomes (war, revolution), but the trigger events were in fact a manifestation of underlying tension, a reaching of critical mass, which was subsequently released in overwhelming and unanticipated fashion. In this and other ways, CT is much better at accounting for radical change than traditional IR systems theories, although it still has difficult predicting it. On the other hand, it appears difficult to pin down exactly what a specific complex system might be and of what elements it consists in the field of IR. The nature of the system, in other words, is elusive. It is this that leads some analysts to describe CT as metaphorical: the precise workings of the ‘system’ are difficult to identify, even using the latest computer models and artificial intelligence (AI).3 In addition, the extent to which phenomena in IR are self-organising and adaptive is unclear. For instance, the workings of the interdependent global economy might fit the picture of a complex adaptive system or CAS, in line with Adam Smith’s conception of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, but even here the lack of precision in the analysis leads to uncertainty and dispute rather than clarity: witness the ongoing argument over the extent to which the free market should be regulated or left to its own devices.4 If one builds in political elements, as in the international political economy (IPE) analysis championed by Robert Cox (1987), Susan Strange (1988) and others,5 then the precise workings of the ‘system’ become even more hazy. For instance, any top-down intervention by state actors in the ‘system’ – such as the imposition of tariffs or sanctions, or a decision to intervene militarily – alters the components of the ‘system’ and interferes with any emergent qualities of self-organisation which might be developing. It is also possible that, as Cudworth and Hobden (2011: 75) put it, international phenomena consist of sets of interlocking complex systems, but even if this is the case there is as yet no capacity, even if one were to use computers, to model such a network of systems in IR. This is not to say that complex systems, whether adaptive, self-organising or otherwise, do not exist. It is rather to conclude that they remain difficult to comprehend, unknowable by human brains or current technology. Fully understanding them, to the extent that this should prove possible, awaits improvements to our ability to comprehend and encompass their extreme complexity. As far as academic IR – and the analysis of the BRI – is concerned, this presents some problems. If the system itself is hard to define, then what use is it as analytical tool? Indeed, if it cannot be defined clearly, then is it really a system at all? What are CT and CAS worth if they cannot provide any precision and clarity? To address this problem, what I propose to do in this book is to take, as Sil and Katzenstein (2010b) and Robert Merton (1968) suggest, a pragmatic line: pragmatism, in this case, means leaving the question of identifying the ontology and characteristics of the international system – or interlocking, nested set of systems – on

84 Complex eclecticism one side for the time being. The problem of identifying the deep structures and dynamic mechanisms of the ‘international system(s)’, should they prove to be real, is, given present limits on knowledge, currently not achievable. The use of computers, modelling and AI may one day offer solutions, but such technological assistance, even if it is eventually developed, is obviously not yet available as an analytical tool which could be used for the purposes of this book. Thus, the logic of this book suggests leaving questions about systems on one side for the time being and continuing the same approach as that used in the eclectic framework developed in the first part of this chapter for IR theories and to focus pragmatically and abductively on the mid- and micro-levels of CT’s system effects rather than attempting to scale the heights of macro-level grand theory at this point. This task can be left until we return in Chapter 8, following the logic of abductive analysis – to the three theories outlined in Chapter 2. Instead of attempting to prove from the get-go that the BRI is a self-organising CAS, it seems more prudent and productive to concentrate on applying CT’s conceptual tools to understanding various empirical aspects of China’s emerging global impacts and finding ways to establish how this analysis can assist practitioners in assessing and reacting to the BRI. The question of whether systemic elements which may be manifested in the BRI constitute a self-organising system will be left for discussion in the analysis – incorporating the macro-level theories outlined in the previous chapter – to be conducted in Chapter 8, but even then, no definitive answers are to be expected. Instead, let us leave questions of the ontological status of system(s) in IR on one side and examine CT’s conceptual tools in order to develop a toolkit for use in pragmatic empirical analysis in the following chapters. The set of CT conceptual tools to be utilised is outlined in the next section.

3.8 An outline of CT’s conceptual toolkit The fourth and final difficulty associated with CT is its use of a range of conceptual tools to analyse complex phenomena. Not all of these are agreed upon by all theorists, and some of them may appear obscure or lacking utility for the study of IR. Nevertheless, certain of them appear repeatedly in key texts on CT and so it is necessary to understand them and establish some kind of clarity about what they are and are not. Probably the most influential text for understanding CT’s ‘system effects’ is Robert Jervis’ 1997 book of the same title. Jervis gives a wide range of IR examples to illustrate how CT’s conceptual toolkit can be applied to IR. His book is therefore a handy starting point for the use of CT in IR. However, since it reverts in its second half to conventional IR categories rather than pursuing the ‘system effects’ within a complexity framework, his application of CT is incomplete and rather unsatisfactory in terms of the state in which he leaves it. Indeed, Jervis’ approach resembles Sil and Katzenstein’s in the sense that it titillates with a novel, potentially game-changing framework in its early pages but then reverts to conventional IR type in its second half. Fortunately, subsequent theorists of CT in IR, such as Kavalski (2007,

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2015b), Ramalingam (2013) and Cudworth and Hobden (2011, 2015), have taken up the gauntlet of examining CT’s analytical possibilities and showing how they can be applied to international problems in a deeper and more theoretically radical fashion. This section will outline what I take to be, drawing on a close reading of the complexity literature, the most significant among CT’s set of conceptual tools as far as analysis of IR and the BRI are concerned. These are the ones which will be used in the analysis of the BRI in this book. For the sake of clarity, the CT conceptual tools and their most important characteristics are summarised in Table 3.2. It is important to note here, before examining the tools in the CT toolkit, as presented in Table 3.2, one by one, that as conceived in this book, prioritising rough analytically eclectic pragmatism rather than exact quantifiable results, the tools possess both analytical strengths and weaknesses. The first of these is that the CT tools should be seen as being less like a surgeon’s precision instruments and more like a builder’s rough tools. These are not scalpels, lasers and needles, but hammers, wrenches and spanners. In this spirit, they should not be perceived as capable of pinpointing exact quantifiable outcomes but rather of qualitatively establishing general principles concerning ongoing processes that occur in the realm of international relations and specifically concerning the BRI. This leads to the potential criticism that using the metaphor of a builder’s tools to understand the CT toolkit implies that CT is itself metaphorical. The solid counter-argument here is that the metaphor is to be conceived as an aide to understanding difficult-to-grasp real-world phenomena rather than a thing-initself. Thanks to research into the conjunction of linguistics and human psychology, it is well-known that the human brain uses narratives and metaphors to grasp reality, and this is as true, whether IR scholars like it or not, of the study of IR as in other fields (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Bousquet and Curtis 2011: 56, Marks 2011, 2018). This should not be seen as invalidating or undermining the use of the CT ‘toolkit’ as a metaphor to assist understanding, nor of the utility of the tools for qualitative analysis of the characteristics of the BRI. Extending this point and connecting it to the brief discussion in the preceding section of the analytical and methodological limitations inherent in the use of CT, it needs to be repeated that precise quantitative analysis of complex processes in the social sciences is not possible given the current state of knowledge and technology. This leaves qualitative analysis as the only sensible option. By acknowledging that complex processes occur with regards to international phenomena, but also acknowledging that the results cannot be quantified, the researcher can at least avoid falling into the trap, as many IR theorists have done, of over-simplifying and leaning on Newtonian linear causal mechanics where no such processes exist. That the task of evaluation has to be done qualitatively may be perceived by some critics as a failing, but here it is taken to be an advantage, in that it allows one to survey mid- and micro-level complex phenomena with a degree of insight not yet available to the researcher using any other methods. Bearing these limitations in mind, the

Cause-and-effect forms a loop or circuit. Circular system develops, ‘feeding back’ into itself. Positive feedback amplifies; negative feedback dampens.

Large-scale patterns and regularities arise spontaneously from interactions among smaller entities in a previously disordered situation, amplified by positive feedback. Outcomes are more than ‘the sum of the parts’ but difficult to predict using standard scientific methods.

• • •

•

Feedback loops

Emergence/self-organisation

Difficult to predict, rare events that nevertheless have a dramatic effect on the course of subsequent events (e.g. fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe).

The situation existing in the present time is the result of circumstances which arose in the past. Positive feedback effects reinforce patterns, producing outcomes dependent on past events and decisions.

•

• •

Black swans

Path dependence

Tipping points/edge of chaos •

A dynamic region between order and disorder where small changes can cause the system to ‘tip over’ the edge into chaos.

Changes in outputs are not proportional to changes in inputs. Simple cause-and-effect chains via dependent and independent variables do not apply. Outcomes are difficult to predict.

• • •

Nonlinearity/sensitivity to initial parameters

•

Attributes

Conceptual tool

Table 3.2 Complexity thinking (CT) conceptual toolkit

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following sections outline the qualitative characteristics of the conceptual tools in the complexity toolkit. 3.8.1 Nonlinearity/sensitivity to initial parameters Nonlinear phenomena are ones which do not contain a direct causal line containing dependent and independent variables. Relationships between variables ‘do not display proportionality between input and output, and … small influences can result in large effects’ (Bousquet and Curtis 2011: 46). This means that the outcomes are determined by interactions and nature of the set of variables: altering the arrangement of variables, even slightly, results in completely different outcomes, although not ones which are random (Orrell 2007: 110–115). Popularly, this phenomenon has been referred to as the ‘butterfly effect’ whereby the image of a butterfly flapping its wings and affecting weather systems is used as a way of understanding how small alterations to the causal landscape result in large-scale changes, sometimes at a great distance. These impacts are difficult to predict due to the problem of establishing the precise pattern of causal variables, whose characteristics, behaviour and interactions are constantly changing as time elapses. Interwoven into the concept of nonlinearity is the notion of sensitivity to initial parameters, which essentially means that it is difficult to analyse and predict outcomes due to shifting patterns in the causal landscape. It is difficult or impossible to quantify these initial conditions in order to calculate their results and predict how complex phenomena will emerge, but the end results are at the same time dependent on the exact mix of parameters present when the phenomena began to coalesce. Sensitivity to initial parameters is also closely linked to path dependence. 3.8.2 Feedback loops Feedback can be of two types: positive or amplifying feedback, and negative or dampening feedback (Jervis 1997: 125). The positive version of feedback loops involves an accumulation effect, for instance, when a rise in a party’s popularity encourages more media coverage of that party, which in turn increases its popularity further, leading to more coverage and more popularity, and so on. In the negative version, there is a tendency to move towards a state of equilibrium: an example of a negative feedback loop is balance of power theory, in which rival powers cancel out each other’s advantage through alliances (Jervis 1997: 97, 134–135). However, the relationship between positive and negative feedback is often not clear-cut, as Jervis points out through the following example: an arms race appears to constitute a positive feedback loop, but the balance of power it may produce resembles a negative feedback loop (Jervis 1997: 126–130). In practice, many feedback loops contain elements of both positive and negative feedback at different points in time, sometimes overlapping. Telecoupling, as pointed out earlier, depends on feedback loops for its hypothesis, borne out by scientific evidence, of interactive influences circulating between apparently unconnected phenomena even at considerable geographical distance (Liu et al. 2007).

88 Complex eclecticism 3.8.3 Emergence/self-organisation Emergence refers to the way hard-to-predict characteristics and outcomes are produced by the interactions of disparate, numerous elements in a system-like phenomenon (Jervis 1997: 12–13). For instance, Jones-Rooy and Page (2012: 316) classify climate change as a case of an emergent property that coalesces out of a number of ‘micro-level actions’ which produce ‘macro-level behaviors that in turn influence the system’. The interaction of micro-level events produces the emergent property of climate change, not the individual events themselves. Kavalski (2007: 439) points out that ‘the emergent properties of complex systems are often surprising, because it is difficult to anticipate the full consequences of even simple forms of interaction’. According to Maren Wagner (2016), an example of emergence in IR is the development of regional institutions in East Asia, which are not reducible to the sum of their parts. Like the BRI, the concept of emergence is open to criticisms of being ‘vague and imprecise’ (Mitchell 2009: xii). However, it attempts to describe an important property of complexity, namely that the interactions of numerous smallscale elements produce unexpected and hard-to-predict large-scale system-level outcomes which do not appear to be directly related to the discrete characteristics of the individual components. Steven Johnson (2001: 19) describes emergent complex behaviour as occurring within ‘a system with multiple agents dynamically interacting in multiple ways, following local rules and oblivious to any higher-level instructions.’ The concept of self-organisation is closely connected with the ideas of both emergence and complex adaptive systems. Like emergence, it refers to interacting elements finding order spontaneously. It does not involve conscious organization, for instance via human intervention, but depends instead on bottom-up, dynamic, fluctuating processes. As Sheehan and Wahrman (2015) point out, an example of the concept is Adam Smith’s idea of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, whereby (for instance) forces of supply and demand supposedly lead to appropriate pricing levels without top-down government controls such as tariffs. Another oft-cited example is that of ‘a school of fish, which behaves as a superorganism whose movements are unintended by any individual fish’ (Sheehan and Wahrman 2015: xi). Of course, since top-down decision-making often affects international events, the implication for any use of the linked concepts of self-organisation and emergence is that they should be used with care and restraint, not least when it comes to the impacts of Chinese foreign policy, in which top-down direction and decision-making clearly play a key role. However, such reservations are mitigated to a degree by the ‘fragmentation of authority’ (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 23) and ‘principal-agent problem’ (Laffont and Martimort 2002: 2, Gill and Reilly 2007: 38–39) inherent in Chinese decision-making processes, for which a recent study of the BRI by Jones and Zeng (2019) finds evidence. If Beijing lacks the ability to exert total control over its agents both domestically and in overseas settings (Garlick 2019) then there is still a need to consider

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the possibility of self-organising and emerging system-type effects resulting from the various impacts and evolving developments along the route of the BRI. 3.8.4 Tipping points/edge of chaos The old idea of the ‘straw breaking the camel’s back’ illustrates the idea of tipping points and the edge of chaos. In the analogy, an overloaded camel can sustain a load of straw up to the point at which one extra straw is added, whereupon it collapses. The concept of a tipping point (being on the ‘edge of chaos’) thus refers to ‘a state that is both optimal and fragile’ (Miller and Page 2007: 104) at the ‘boundary between stable order and unstable chaos’ (Miller and Page 2007: 129). A real-world example is the financial crisis of 2007–2008, in which the apparently stable global financial system rapidly began to unravel due to an overarching accumulation of underlying weaknesses which had previously been sustained without apparent difficulty until they reached critical mass wherein the accumulation of problems became too much for the system to sustain. It is this critical mass which constitutes the ‘tipping point’, while the closely-associated notion of the ‘edge of chaos’ is the moment at which a situation may seem stable and uneventful but is in fact close to collapse. It is this ostensible but very fragile stability which makes the subsequent drastic shift in the dynamics of the system or phenomenon seem as if it could not be predicted, and in fact makes radical change difficult to foresee. 3.8.5 Black swans Most famously expounded by the risk analyst Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007) in his book of the same name, the idea of ‘black swans’ is that of rare, sudden, and hard-to-predict events disrupting existing patterns and having major impacts on subsequent historical developments. Examples from the field of insurance and risk assessment, within which Taleb began his career, include natural disasters such as earthquakes or floods. Moving on to international affairs, an obvious example is the widely-unanticipated overthrow of communism in Central and Eastern Europe during the last few months of 1989.6 An example from international economics is the Wall Street Crash of 1929, which had repercussions beyond US borders. Still another is the rise of Hitler, which came about through an unexpected alignment of factors including economic depression and an election victory. Through numerous examples such as those mentioned here, Taleb hammers home the valid point that more attention should be paid across numerous fields of inquiry to calculating the risk of rare events occurring due to the extreme impacts that they have on human affairs. This conclusion applies at least as much to the field of international relations as elsewhere, given that straight-line extrapolation into the future has been demonstrated by numerous analysts to be an ineffective way of anticipating and planning for future outcomes (Rescher

90 Complex eclecticism 1998, Sherden 1998, Orrell 2007). It should also be mentioned here that, as discussed in Chapter 2, Chinese policy-makers are well aware of the implications of the black swan concept, as well as the connected (but less thoroughly theorised) one of ‘grey rhinos’ (Wucker 2016): consequently, they are clearly intent on developing dynamic, flexible policy approaches which allow for risks and uncertainties in the international arena (Zhang 2016: 12). 3.8.6 Path dependence Although not included among CT’s conceptual tools by all scholars, path dependence connects to complexity theory in that it traces the route by which present and future outcomes emerge from past decisions and processes. Among these processes may be positive feedback loops, which cause an accumulation of effects emerging from specific historical events. The concept of path dependence developed from economics, where it was theorised that market dominance by certain technological products depended mainly on the historical process by which those products were adopted. An oft-cited example is that of the market dominance of VHS video cassettes at the expense of Betamax: this was caused by a series of fortuitous developments which meant that one format ousted the other without any possibility of returning to a level playing field (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995). The concept of path dependence has also been applied to political science and the social sciences, albeit with the proviso that the concept needs to be carefully elaborated, as Paul Pierson (2000: 251) points out: Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced, can be almost impossible to reverse; and consequently, political development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life. As far as path dependence in IR is concerned, cultural and historical factors create conditions which lead actors and events in a particular direction which then tends to lead to a ‘locked-in’ path (or potential paths) into the future. While not exactly the same as determinism, and not implying that there is only one possible pre-set outcome, path dependence suggests that it is difficult to depart from possible routes into the future which have been determined by aspects of the past. Consequently, the choices that can be made are limited to a specific set emerging from the circumstances pertaining to the path that has been laid out.

3.9 Conclusion: combining complexity and eclecticism to analyse the BRI Having outlined all the components of the CT conceptual toolkit, it is now necessary to explain how it will be applied to the BRI, and how to combine

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it with the conceptual toolkit derived from the range of IR theories examined in the first half of this chapter. Since, as already explained, conducting rigorous quantitative analysis is out of the question, it seems advisable to stick to a qualitative, interpretative approach in the use of the conceptual tools without worrying excessively in the early stages of the analysis about finding a ‘larger picture’. The emphasis should be on achieving some results at the mid- and micro-levels of empirical analysis before returning to macro-level theoretical considerations in the final chapter. Thus, the approach taken is to consider the BRI as a whole in the next two chapters before dropping down to the regional and national levels in Chapters 6 and 7. Only then, in Chapter 8, will it be possible to relate any tendencies and patterns identified to the macro-level theories. In his 2007 article, ‘The fifth debate and the emergence of complex international relations theory’, Emilian Kavalski called for work to be done towards building a ‘complex international relations theory’ (CIR). The fact that this project has not progressed as far as it might have and has not impacted much on mainstream IR theory is indicative of not only the difficulty of the task, but also of the very understandable unwillingness or inability of most IR scholars to grapple with CT (Cudworth and Hobden 2011: 26). The complex eclecticism framework presented in this chapter, incomplete as it may be, is intended to be a step towards a CIR. However, just as CT is considered even by one of its founders to be an incomplete science (Kauffmann 1995), so complex eclecticism is to be seen as a rough, flexible, loose framework for approaching the confusing complexity of the real world while making use of the full array of IR theories available without the need for hang-ups about ‘incommensurability’ or contradiction. That the framework is in need of further development and refinement is undeniable; however, at this stage it is hoped that its roughness gives it (like the Chinese approach to foreign and domestic policy) a flexibility and adaptability which mean that it is useful. A difficulty of CT is that the human brain is limited in its capacity to compute highly complex interactions involving hundreds or thousands of individual phenomena. This is why computers are such powerful tools: they can beat humans at chess or go (weiqi in Chinese), compute flightpaths, find individual items in among billions of pieces of information on the internet, and even predict what we want to see using algorithms and artificial intelligence. It therefore seems likely that in the long run they are going to assist us (or, more likely, surpass us) in understanding the complex social world we have inadvertently created over hundreds of generations. Creating a CIR is thus likely going to depend on improvements in artificial intelligence which have not yet arrived, but on which computer programmers, mathematicians and scientists – including those in China – are already working (Lee 2018). However, in the meantime, the argument of this book is that we need to make the effort to approach complexity with as much theoretical rigour as possible, even if this results in imperfect and approximate results. There is little point restricting oneself to so-called ‘paradigm debates’ or insights drawn from

92 Complex eclecticism just one or two theoretical perspectives when real-world decision-making demands more flexibility and eclectic pragmatism. After all, as Neta Crawford (2016: 265–266) points out, examining global affairs today demands that we recognise and adapt to the fact that that the international is ‘a complex adaptive system composed of various actors reflexively interacting within and changing a dynamic social and natural environment … an emergent system of multiple interacting systems.’ This analysis in the preceding sections has been suggestive of synergies between the two sets of conceptual tools. Concepts taken from the theoretical perspectives of IR can be applied eclectically to aspects of the BRI, while complex system effects are identified alongside. CT and IR theory can therefore be seen, in this book’s framework, as a pair of complementary toolkits (see Figure 3.1) from which analytical tools can be selected and applied as the need arises, without the need to worry about contradiction. As Sandra Mitchell (2003) explains, it is entirely possible to achieve a pluralism that views rival theoretical interpretations as compatible rather than competitive. Putting it very simply, the conceptual tools can be used singly or in combination to analyse aspects of the BRI and other international phenomena in an experimental, trial-and-error fashion. Tools which do not seem to be useful for addressing a particular problem can be put back in the toolkit and others tried out instead. In this way, a range of concepts can be applied to analysing the complexity of the BRI without having to worry about theoretical incommensurability, and without having to limit the analysis to a narrow range of tools within one theoretical paradigm. The theoretical framework developed in this chapter means that, while concerns about a loss of theoretical rigour cannot be eliminated, they can be minimised. The complex eclecticism approach developed in this chapter could thus also be termed ‘toolkit theory’. Although the idea of taking conceptual tools out of a toolkit as necessary and using them to address specific issues as need arises is a metaphor, it is an apt one. As already stated, tools can be selected, either one at a time or in combination, and tried out on specific issues to see if they are a good fit for the problem at hand. It may be that certain tools turn out to be more useful than others or that certain combinations of tools work well together or do not. It may also be that tools have to be put back in the toolkit and exchanged for other ones because they are not a good fit for the situation at hand. Complex eclecticism can thus be used as a loose framework (Walby 2007) which matches the loose, dynamic flexibility of Chinese foreign policy and the BRI itself (Zhang 2016: 11–12, Griffiths 2017: 219). The different theoretical elements identified in this chapter can be applied eclectically and qualitatively, as they seem to fit different areas of the BRI, and common themes can be identified. At the same time, if a concept is seen to be of little analytical use in practice, the possibility of removing it from the toolkit can be kept in reserve. Chapter 4 will attempt to apply the tools in both the CT and IR toolkits to the BRI at a fairly broad conceptual level, with a view to assessing which of them

Complex eclecticism

POWER, ANARCHY AND STATES

FEEDBACK LOOPS

INTERDEPENDENCE, INSTITUTIONS AND NON-STATE ACTORS

EMERGENCE/SELFORGANISATION

TIPPING POINTS/EDGE OF CHAOS

COMPLEX ECLECTICISM

NONLINEARITY/ SENSITIVITY TO INITIAL PARAMETERS

93

PATH DEPENDENCE

BLACK SWANS

NORMS, IDEAS AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY WORLD SOCIETY HARMONY OF INTERESTS RELATIONS BETWEEN ACTORS PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITARIANISM NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

Figure 3.1 The complex eclecticism toolkits

are most useful, which are of little or no use, and also whether the use of any of them needs to be re-evaluated. The idea in Chapter 4 is thus to examine the extent to which the tools can be applied to the BRI in order to refine the use of the toolkits and prepare for analysis of specific aspects of the BRI in more detail throughout the rest of the book. As the theoretical sections of this chapter have attempted to demonstrate, there is no need to see the tools available as incapable of being used eclectically and even in combination. Instead, the approach to be taken here is to use the tools as needs demand in a pragmatic manner. This approach involves neither unnecessary separation of theoretical concepts into reified ‘paradigms’ which cannot be combined, nor does it involve an attempt to synthesise the concepts into one over-arching grand theory. The approach outlined in this chapter should be seen as a pragmatic middle way between separation and synthesis. At the same time, the complex eclecticism or toolkit theory approach should be seen as a theoretical-methodological approach building a foundation for a general theory such as Tang’s SEP. It is not a finished product, but a foundation for further theoretical discussion (including that conducted in Chapter 7). It is hoped that the framework provides not only a useful way to approach complex international phenomena such as the BRI, but also a further step along the road towards solving the problem of IR’s seemingly everlasting preoccupation with supposedly distinct, incommensurable paradigms and Lakatosian research programmes and linear, mechanistic Newtonian thinking.

94 Complex eclecticism Complex eclecticism and its toolkits are intended to answer Sandra Mitchell’s (2003) call for an integrative pluralism which encourages the use of a range of theories and concepts rather than unnecessarily restricting the analysis to only one. In this interpretation, theorising is not to be seen as conducting conversations in mutually incompatible, incomprehensible languages which cannot be cross-translated. Up to now, pluralism in IR has been seen as a means for tolerating different theoretical perspectives without attempting to establish dialogue between them. As both Colin Wight (1996) and Sandra Mitchell (2003) point out, taking the attitude that pluralism involves incommensurability and strict separation of theories into distinct theoretical traditions which cannot talk to each other prevents theoretical progress. It also prevents the use of valid and valuable insights from different theoretical perspectives to analyse complex international phenomena which often in practice require multi-conceptual framing. The framework presented in this chapter allows theories and concepts to be used eclectically and interchangeably without having to worry, at least for the time being, about synthesis. Complex eclecticism, as presented in this book, constitutes an admittedly somewhat makeshift framework for analysing highly complex real-world phenomena such as China’s emerging BRI. It, like analytic eclecticism, is not intended to synthesise existing theoretical frameworks, but to develop an analytical approach which can be used for finding pragmatic solutions to complex questions. The author of course hopes that the start made here will inspire much more complete theoretical frameworks, perhaps utilising computer as well as human intelligence, in the future. However, for the moment, despite its obvious shortcomings, the approach presented in this chapter (and this book) will have to suffice as a necessary beginning to what is likely to turn out to be a project which, like all complex social phenomena, has no clear end in sight.

Notes 1 In addition to Peirce, pragmatism owes its origins to the American philosophers William James and John Dewey. Probably the best-known account of it is James (1907/ 1922) book Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 2 Tang Shiping (2014: 490) points out that ‘structure’ is anyway a ‘contested concept’ in the social sciences, and that ‘there is no consensus on what exactly structure (of international politics) is.’ He therefore recommends, for greater clarity of analysis, a focus on systems, with their emergent properties, rather than ‘structures’. 3 One notable analysis which seeks to explain complexity in terms of metaphor is James D. Proctor and Brendon M.H. Larson (2005) ‘Ecology, complexity, and metaphor’, BioScience, Vol. 55, No. 12, pp. 1065–1068. 4 For instance, in opposition to the conventional wisdom of laissez faire economics inspired by Adam Smith and Milton Friedman, the Cambridge University institutional economist Ha-Joon Chang calls for greater market regulation in the interests of greater economic efficiency in his (2010) 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism, London: Penguin.

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5 For an examination of the development of international political economy see Benjamin J. Cohen (2008) International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 6 It is interesting to note that among major US analysts only Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor in the Jimmy Carter administration, is credited with having predicted the fall of communism. See his book The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the 20th Century (Brzezinski 1989), which was published shortly before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

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4

Applying complex eclecticism to the Belt and Road Initiative

4.1 Introduction The task addressed in this chapter is to begin to apply the complex eclecticism framework to China’s Belt and Road Initiative via the use of the IR and CT conceptual toolkits developed in Chapter 3 and summarised in Figure 3.1. The aim of this chapter is therefore to examine the overall conception of the BRI, as it has been outlined by the Chinese government, state media and scholars, applying conceptual tools from the toolkits in an attempt to understand the initiative theoretically, and make its conceptualisation and potential impacts clearer than they have generally been formulated up to now. It will also aim to assess the utility of individual conceptual tools in the light of the analysis conducted in this chapter and to decide (in the conclusion) whether some of the tools need to be reconfigured, recombined, re-evaluated or discarded. The chapter will thus provide a groundwork for moving on in the next chapter, Chapter 5, to a more detailed exploration of specific characteristics of the BRI, and then in Chapter 6 to analysis of the impacts and implementation of the BRI in individual regions and countries. The overall aim of this chapter, then, is to sift through the conceptual tools in an abductive manner and try to apply them to decide whether they have utility for the analysis of the BRI at the overall ‘systemic’ level as well as at the level of specific regional sub-systems within the larger ‘system’ (with the word ‘system’ being used cautiously, in line with the theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter 3). It is to be expected, in anticipation of the next two chapters, that certain tools will be more applicable to different aspects of the BRI than others and that it will not necessarily be possible to apply the same tools across the board. For instance, it might be expected that different conceptual tools can be applied to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) than to China’s relations with Central Asia. In other words, there is likely to be a ‘horses for courses’ aspect to analysing the BRI through this framework, just as there is in the pragmatic Chinese ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ approach to foreign policy. This ‘horses for courses’/‘crossing the river’ factor is in itself an important part of the complex eclecticism framework, although it may intuitively or at first sight seem unsatisfactory theoretically. As previously stated, the

102 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI framework is a theoretical-methodological one whose aim is to build foundations for a fully-formed general theory of the BRI. Discussion of the extent to which the analysis and conclusions of this chapter and the following ones fit the three macro-level theories outlined in Chapter 3 will be left for the final chapter of the book. The following sections will deconstruct the overall conceptualisation of the BRI at the broad level by selecting conceptual tools from the IR and CT toolkits to analyse specific aspects of the initiative, as it has been framed and promoted by the Chinese government and media. Thus, the analysis begins by working through the tools in the IR conceptual toolkit (with some use of CT conceptual tools), before moving on to the CT conceptual toolkit in the latter part of the chapter. The ‘big picture’ of how the two toolkits fit together will be discussed in the chapter’s conclusion.

4.2 Interdependence, institutions and non-state actors In formulating and presenting the BRI to audiences both domestic and international, Chinese leaders, diplomats and scholars have been first and foremost at pains to emphasise that the initiative is intended to produce ‘win-win’ outcomes for all concerned, in line with the Vision and Actions official BRI manifesto (NDRC 2015). In other words, the BRI is framed in terms of continued Chinese economic growth producing economic benefits for partner countries, particularly developing countries (Zheng and Zhang 2016: 52). The main idea presented, whether implicitly or explicitly as the occasion demands, is that as China’s economy grows, the interaction of Chinese companies with BRI countries will produce knock-on economic growth in those countries. The dominant ideas being offered to the world in the framing of the BRI thus pertain to economic globalisation and complex interdependence between nations. Indeed, President Xi Jinping made the concept of economic globalisation (经济全球化, jingji quanqiu hua) the keynote of his fifty-minute address to the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017, stressing that it should be seen as a force for good rather than a problematic development (State Council 2017). Although the focus of this speech was on economic globalisation rather than the BRI per se, Chinese rhetoric relating to the initiative frequently and repeatedly references economic globalisation and win-win cooperation. These considerations imply that the first set of concepts from the IR theory conceptual toolkit in Figure 3.1 that can be applied to the BRI is the trio derived from the liberal tradition: interdependence, institutions and non-state actors. Interdependence is, in its basic conception at least, the notion that the fortunes of international actors rise and fall together in a complex, interconnected world of economic transactions. In a capitalist (or free market) world economy such as the one that has developed since the industrial revolution and which dominates global affairs since the collapse of the Soviet Union, non-state actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs) and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) such as the United Nations play a major role. Institutions,

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conceived in both the narrow sense of international organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and in the more important broader sense which includes rules, practices and norms (Tang 2011), are also key to the maintenance of the system. In interdependence theory, particularly in the form in which it is propagated within the official Chinese discourse about the BRI, economic globalisation encourages knock-on economic growth effects across borders. For instance, ‘infrastructure investment … creates employment and income through renewing the infrastructures of developed countries and creating infrastructures for growth and market expansion in emerging economies’ (Liu and Dunford 2016: 336). Indeed, infrastructure investment, as will be shown in subsequent chapters of this book, is one of the key tools used by China in the service of the BRI. Chinese companies, whether directly linked to the state as ‘national champions’ (Gallagher and Irwin 2014) or not, and whether perceived as ‘non-state actors’ or not, are thus vital elements in the Chinese vision of interdependence because they are very often involved in building infrastructure such as railways, dams and power plants. Of course, the difficulty of assessing the extent that supposedly private companies such as Huawei, Lenovo, ZTE and CEFC are linked to the Chinese state blurs the distinction between state and non-state actors. It also introduces the issue of the principal-agent problem (Laffont and Martimort 2002: 2), which focuses on conflicts of interest between principals (such as the Chinese state) and agents, such as Chinese commercial actors (Gill and Reilly 2007: 38–39). Still, the main point here is that as China increasingly becomes a normative power (Kavalski 2007, 2010, 2013), creating and establishing practices and norms within and around its interactions with BRI countries, it is also creating institutions (in the sense of Tang’s 2011 definition, which does not restrict the use of the term to organisations only) which oil the wheels of increasing interdependence. Interdependence is also connected to a concept from the CT toolbox: feedback loops, which, as we have seen, include the idea of telecoupling, i.e. feedback effects at great geographical distance (Liu et al. 2007). As economic interactions occur and create interdependent systems, for instance through trade and investment activity, feedback effects and telecoupling can occur which intensify and build transnational economic effects. When feedback is positive, effects can be cumulative and lead to mutual growth across borders in a ‘winwin’ fashion. However, feedback, as discussed in the previous chapter, can be negative as well as positive, so logically outcomes could also be ‘lose-lose’ as well. The question of relative gains also needs to be considered, whereby even within a feedback loop some actors gain more than others, even in cases where all actors gain: this will be discussed in more detail below. An example of a transnational positive feedback loop is when a certain product manufactured in one country becomes popular internationally and sales grow. The increasing demand for the product means increased production, more factory jobs, and a booming local economy at the site of production. Subsequently, increased production means that the product’s international availability

104 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI in stores grows, increasing brand recognition and sales of the product. The popularity of the product internationally may then lead to the need for factories to be set up outside the home country, which in turn creates jobs in the target market as well as at home. Thus, in the Chinese government’s conception of the BRI, ‘win-win’ outcomes will result from an increasingly globalised and interdependent economy in which increased production, investment and sales result in economic growth for both producer and consumer countries. On the other hand, there is plenty of space for critics to point out that this conception does not take sufficient account of the realities of global trade, which often involves tariffs, dumping and other economic mechanisms. Complaints about Chinese dumping practices, protectionism and government subsidies frequently occur in Western critiques of China’s global trade and investment activity, casting doubt upon China’s commitment to true economic globalisation and thus on the ‘win-win’ rhetoric which typifies Chinese government and media output. Even in the optimistic scenario of Chinese commitment to a level playing field, outcomes in the international political economy are likely to be more complex than the simplistic ‘win-win’ scenario suggests. For instance, David Rapkin and William Thompson (2013: 132) point out that Technological competition makes … economic interdependence complicated in transitional settings. At best, it means economic interdependence is likely to have mixed effects. While there may well be conflict-pacifying processes that are operative at the dyadic level, there are also likely to be increased competition and tensions both at the dyadic level and systemically. It is difficult to say which set of effects is more likely to be predominant. In other words, economic interdependence is more of a mixed bag than the image portrayed in the official Chinese ‘win-win’, ‘mutual benefit’ discourse (e.g. Xi 2014: 361, Guo 2017: 52). This means that it has the potential, like any other phenomenon, to produce both positive and negative outcomes for the actors involved, including the possibility of some actors benefitting at others’ expense (Keohane and Nye 1977: 9). Indeed, Susan Strange (1996: xii–xiii) goes further and suggests persuasively that the ‘vague and woolly … term “interdependence” … hides the truth behind a persuasive euphemism for asymmetric dependence’. Asymmetry theory (Womack 2010) and using language to hide the truth via ‘symbolic power’ (Bourdieu 1991, Vangeli 2018) are rival interpretations of China’s power projection which will be examined in the next two sections. Moving on, discussion of ‘win-win’ economic outcomes seems to have an obvious connection with the notion of non-zero-sum games stemming from the game theory developed by the RAND Corporation and others in the 1950s. A zero-sum game is one in which, in a two-player game, victory for one ‘player’ means defeat for the other: any gain, for instance of money or an asset, means a loss of the same for the other player. In contrast, in a non-zero-sum game, partners can gain or lose together. Complex interdependence in a globalised economy,

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according to the official Chinese government line at least, can therefore be equated with a non-zero-sum game in which the destinies of all human societies are interconnected. For instance, as Robert Wright (2000) points out, advanced electronic communications allow more efficient trade and benefit people in countries around the world by giving them rapid, easier access to new products. Clearly, conceiving the BRI as a non-zero-sum game of complex interdependence begs the question of whether the other side of the game theory coin cannot also be applied. If the BRI can be conceptualised as a non-zero-sum game in which everybody wins, it can also be theorised as a zero-sum game in which China wins at everybody else’s expense (in the oft-repeated joke, China wins twice). It is important to note that there does not have to be intentionality for this to be the case: Chinese policy-makers and business people could sincerely believe that their actions are benefitting all nations involved, and yet China would still ultimately emerge as the biggest winner of its global economic expansion through the BRI and other activity. There is also the question of relative gains: it is possible to envisage a nonzero-sum game in which everybody benefits, but in which one actor benefits at a higher level than the others, thus gaining more in terms of its position vis-àvis the other actors. Assuming that gains are always relative as well as absolute blurs the distinction between zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. In addition, the idea of assessing relative rather than absolute gains connects to realist debates concerning power relations between nation-states in international relations (Grieco 1988). This shifts the analysis away from the neoliberal institutionalists who focus on cooperation and interdependence achieved through increased formation of non-state actor relations, for instance through intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) such as the United Nations. On the other hand, Stein (2008: 210) points out that a debate in the IR literature in the 1990s between realists and neoliberals about the effect of the relative gains problem on cooperation between nations (see Stein 1990: Chapter 5, Powell 1991, Snidal 1991a, 1991b, Busch and Reinhardt 1993) was inconclusive and has been left unresolved since. This leaves the issue open to further interpretation and in need of further analysis, since ‘relative gains notwithstanding, there is a great deal of institutionalized cooperation and much of it having quite differential payoffs’ (Stein 2008: 210). On the other hand, Tang (2008: 465, n35) labels the debate about relative gains from cooperation ‘unproductive’, at least as far as the Waltzian logic of anarchy is concerned, ‘because states can never feel completely secure under anarchy’: this implies that ‘all states must always be concerned with relative gains’, regardless of whether they are attempting to cooperate or not. For the BRI, with its rhetoric of win-win interdependence and mutual benefits via economic globalisation, the recognition of the importance of the idea of relative gains for shares of global economic and political power presents a logical difficulty. If the BRI floats all boats, but some boats float higher than others – in this case the Chinese boat – then, logically, there is inevitably a power aspect to interdependence. When all gain, but one or a few actors gain more than others,

106 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI then in relative terms gains are not equal but create a growing asymmetry and inequality between actors even if all participants experience absolute gains. This occurs in the same way as a wealth gap emerges in a capitalist economy when the rich get richer faster than the poor – even when the poor are also better off materially in absolute terms than they were before. In addition to the possible relative gains problem for the BRI, there is also the issue of whether the Chinese understanding of interdependence, economic globalisation and ‘win-win’ cooperation matches the Western one. One paper by a Chinese scholar (Wu 2016) suggests, for instance, that Asian and European conceptions of economic cooperation differ in terms of the degree of integration sought: according to this account, while the construction of the European Union followed the functionalist logic of increased economic integration blurring the boundaries between states, Asians prioritise enhanced connectivity between nations states conceived primarily in terms of bilateral relations and joint ‘docking’ (duijie, 对接). This emphasis on bilateral connections leads, Peter Ferdinand points out, ‘to weaker cross border integration than was intended in Europe, since it focuses upon creating shared transport links, while leaving the production structure in each country untouched’ (Ferdinand 2016: 950). It also means that in the Chinese conception of BRI there is no question of giving up any degree of state sovereignty to regional institutions per the EU model. In the BRI’s official framework, instead of multilateral regional integration and cooperation, a model of ‘unimpeded’ trade which emphasises bilateral links with the retention of full state sovereignty is promoted. In other words, ‘winwin’ cooperation can be taken as referring literally to the ties between two partners via bilateral economic deals, but does not necessarily cover more complex interaction within a larger group of states – even when this is what rhetoric about building a ‘beneficial community of shared interests’ (NDRC 2015, also Guo 2017: 18) would seem to imply. Taking these ideas about Chinese interpretations of economic globalisation and interdependence further, it becomes possible to infer that the Chinese conception of economic globalisation is not the same as the standard Western neoliberal economic theory in which free trade across borders and the ‘invisible hand’ of the market are supposedly desirable. The Chinese vision is less about unfettered neoliberal free trade, and more about ‘soft protectionism’ (Umarov 2014: 127). Thus, it is necessary to understand the Chinese official line on the BRI about ‘unimpeded trade’ and ‘the promotion of trade and investment, and the infrastructure connectivity to deal with the accessible but obstructed Eurasia market’ (Liu 2018: 40) in a different sense than the one that would be assumed from a Western neoliberal standpoint on complex interdependence: as the enhancement of transport links, financial services and connectivity infrastructure between nations in order to ensure a smoother and unhindered passage of goods and services between them, but without relinquishing state control over transactions. Turning from questions about economic interdependence to institutions, it is important to define whether the term refers strictly to organisations only or has a broader connotation. Taking his cue from North, Tang understands

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institutions as ‘the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (North 1990: 3, cited in Tang 2013: 8). He explicitly rejects the use of the term to denote organisations only or even patterns of behaviour. Defining the term in this way gives it a greater flexibility as an analytical concept than restricting it only to the examination of regional organisations and platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) or 16+1 forum for meetings between the heads of states of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and their Chinese counterparts. While these are important institutions which have an impact on the implementation of the BRI, using the term in its wider Tangian sense allows more breadth and insight in the analysis of Chinese economic diplomacy. Defined in this way, i.e. as formal and informal social rules (Tang 2011: 3–4, 2013: 8), institutional arrangements have a clear role within the BRI. As China establishes ties with partners, institutions steadily emerge, formulated either consciously or by ‘feeling the stones’, to govern transactions between the states. Ranging from the trade and investment deals that are drawn up when Chinese leaders visit partner countries, to formal arrangements such as CPEC and 16+1, the introduction of institutions (in the Northian/Tangian sense) enables economic relations to grow. The implementation of institutions includes establishing informal rules such as norms and conventions for cooperation, as well as being based on formal rule-based institutions such as contracts. In these cases, the rules are set by the Chinese side: the Chinese provide the financial wherewithal, usually in the form of state-backed loans, to back up cooperation deals, which often include infrastructure construction. Agenda-setting in the formation of institutions and norm-based practices is invariably Chinese-led and follows certain patterns. These can be described as emerging rule-based institutional interactions under the framework of the BRI. This implies that Tang’s conception of institutions may be a productive one deserving of further analysis. Accordingly, the empirical detail of this aspect of China’s economic statecraft will be analysed in more depth in Chapter 5. The question of non-state actors, as already mentioned, is a trickier one. Most notably, it seems inappropriate to classify Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as non-state actors since their heads are often appointed by the Chinese state (Norris 2016: 72). Private corporations such as Huawei, Lenovo and ZTE also cannot necessarily be entirely separated from the state, in that they are answerable to it and more closely affiliated with it than would be the case in Europe or North America. Often there is a mixed corporate structure in both state and non-state enterprises which makes it hard to produce precise definitions. Generally, the role of the state is more intrusive than is perceived as normal in the West, yet the degree of oversight is not necessarily clear. In short, the line between state and non-state actors is considerably more blurred than in Western countries (Li and Cheong 2019). An interesting case in this regard is the supposedly private company CEFC, which established a virtual monopoly on Chinese investment in the Czech Republic during and after President Xi’s visit in March 2016. Sino-Czech trade

108 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI agreements involved CEFC in a leading role as the company invested in a brewery, financial company, a football club, real estate, media and travel agencies in the Czech Republic. This demonstrated that the company’s activity was closely linked to the agreements signed under the auspices of the Chinese and Czech presidents (Fürst 2018: 127–8). In late 2017 and early 2018, however, cracks appeared in CEFC’s image: first the firm’s financial chief, Patrick Ho, was arrested in New York on charges of bribing African politicians; and then CEFC’s CEO, Ye Jianming, disappeared from sight, apparently detained, in early 2018 amid a welter of unpaid investments and the implication that CEFC did not possess the financial wherewithal to cover its investment commitments. By mid-2018, CEFC’s investments in the Czech Republic had been taken over by the Chinese state-owned investment firm CITIC. Although the activity of the supposedly private company had clearly been enmeshed with the economic foreign policy of the Chinese state, it had clearly not behaved as Chinese leaders and diplomats had expected, necessitating an intervention to protect China’s national image and interests (Barboza et al. 2018, Garlick 2019). In an important sense, then, the state/non-state dichotomy is problematic in China’s international relations except at the level of medium and small enterprises with relatively small workforces. Of course, these have a role to play in interactions with other nations at a sub-state level, as evidenced by the proliferation of Chinese restaurateurs and other entrepreneurs in many countries. However, in terms of the BRI, there is no doubt that the most significant transactions are conducted by large companies and state-backed institutions such as banks which are always subject to a degree of state oversight, or at least are ultimately answerable to the state (for more on this, see Kenderdine and Ling 2018). Other non-state actors which one might think of in Western countries, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in the Chinese case either do not exist or lack much influence. In the end, the analysis conducted in this section reveals that issues relating to interdependence, institutions and non-state actors within the framework of the BRI and China’s foreign policy have a quite different character to what observers coming from a Western background might expect. Above all, for China unimpeded trade and economic cooperation do not mean the same as opening up to free markets in the conventional neoliberal sense. Interdependence comes with strings attached and with aspects of power relations interwoven into it, as realists, neoliberals and students of international political economy would in fact predict. However, the strings and power relations in the BRI differ in important respects from the standard neoliberal model. The interlinkages between power and interdependence reveal that a naïve application of neoliberal interdependence theory alone to the BRI cannot tell the whole story: there is a need to examine Chinese official interpretations of the initiative in relation to China’s foreign policy and economic diplomacy within the framework of the BRI, as well as the reactions of those who are supposed to be a part of it. As Tang (2013) and Cox (1981) point out, ultimately it becomes necessary to look at ideational factors as well as material factors related to questions of power and interdependence.

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4.3 Power, states and anarchy The previous section has already referred to the need to consider issues of power when assessing the hypothesis that the BRI might be based on the promotion of non-zero-sum outcomes amid interdependence in a globalised economy. However, there is a need to probe deeper into the topic of power, which of course is a key and contested concept in IR, and clearly not the domain only of realists. This analytical task is especially pressing because, as Richard Turcsányi (2017: 474) perceptively points out, … even though (or perhaps exactly because) power is the central concept of international relations, there is a lack of consensus about what it stands for and how it can be applied in research practice. Enrico Fels, in his in-depth study of power in IR, agrees that ‘the current state of research and theory development is disappointing’ (Fels 2017: 154). For this reason, there is a need in this section to unpack the concept of power with reference not only to its use in mainstream IR theory (in particular by realists), but also by enriching the analysis conducted in this section with explanations taken from other fields such as international political economy and sociology: these will be introduced in this section but examined in more depth in the following section. In mainstream IR, variants on Robert Dahl’s well-known definition of power as the ‘ability of an actor A to make an actor B do something it would otherwise not do’ (Dahl 1957) tend to prevail, especially among realists. The Dahlian definition is a relatively narrow one which takes account primarily of material factors, with insufficient attention devoted to ideational factors. Nevertheless, given the historical predominance of realism in IR, it is probably wise to begin with a discussion of realist objections to the official Chinese discourse on BRI, before widening the scope of the debate to include other theories of power which are relevant to the current analysis and take account of ideational factors, such as soft power (Nye 1990a, 1990b), structural power (Strange 1988), normative power (Kavalski 2007) and symbolic power (Bourdieu 1991). It is at this point that the power, states and anarchy tool in the IR conceptual toolkit can be examined. In international relations, in the realist conception, the potential winners and losers are conceived as being nation states which compete with each other for power, dominance or survival in a Hobbesian setting of international anarchy (Waltz 1979). Anarchy here refers to the absence of a world government or similar overarching authority to check the behaviour of states, which in Waltz’s neorealist conception are the units of the international system. Thus, where the interdependence, institutions and non-state actors tool, at least as it is promoted by the Chinese state, is supposed to equate to non-zero-sum game thinking, the power, states and anarchy conceptual tool, in its realist incarnation, tends to equate to zero-sum game thinking, which is not part of the official BRI rhetoric. There is, however, no need to add game theory to the IR

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conceptual toolkit: zero-sum and non-zero-sum games are already included by being subsumed into the interdependence- and power-led conceptual tools. Essentially what one means by a zero-sum game is a realist-style contest over some type of power in which there are winners and losers (in terms of either relative or absolute gains), imbalances of power, as well as a tendency to search for alliances, create deterrence strategies, and aim for other solutions to overcome those imbalances. At any rate, if one foregrounds the role of power, states and anarchy, this means a flat-out rejection of the idea that a Chinese-led initiative such as the BRI can lead to anything except increased Chinese dominance of the sphere in which the initiative exerts influence. When states are seen as the dominant actors, and there is no world government to restrain them (anarchy), the end result can only be attempts to establish or maintain as much power as possible. The result is a bid for hegemony, in the conventional sense of military and political dominance: this differs from the more nuanced neo-Gramscian use of the term which was discussed in Chapter 2. Here there is a divide between offensive realists, who believe that states will aggressively try to seize power from other states, and defensive realists (such as Van Evera 1999, Jervis 1999), who believe that states will seek to defend their interests rather than pursue policies of aggressive territorial expansion. Offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer (2001, 2010) understand the rise of China as a challenge to US hegemony. The BRI, in this conception, thus becomes a major part of China’s challenge, whether it is conceived as such by the Chinese or not. The BRI, whether by design or by accident, will contribute to China falling into the ‘Thucydides Trap’ of a rising power challenging a hegemon and the two inevitably clashing over power (Allison 2017). It will do this by establishing a Chinese zone of influence across Eurasia which aims to exclude the US and thus boost Chinese hard power. In this conception, offensive realism, as it interprets the westward Eurasian sweep of the BRI, continues an American tradition of focusing on map-based geopolitical and geostrategic thinking. This ‘cartohypnosis’ (Steil 2018: 43) goes back to Halford Mackinder’s (1919: 106) portrayal of the Eurasian landmass as the global ‘Heartland’. Stemming from Mackinder’s geopolitics, the idea of needing to prevent the Soviet Union from controlling this ‘Heartland’ or ‘grand chessboard’ (Brzezinski 1997) governed much of American strategy during the Cold War, for instance in Korea and Vietnam. Thus, it is understandable that the BRI could easily be seen by Americans thinking in this tradition as a Chinese ‘great game’ intended to extend its geopolitical influence westwards. On the other hand, defensive realists deny that the states/anarchy/power framework automatically implies aggressive expansion. They claim that states, rather than pursuing to eliminate rivals, are instead primarily interested in preserving their own existence. Defensive realists thus infer that military build-up occurs as a strategy of self-protection rather than territorial expansion. Interestingly, as discussed in Chapter 2, Tang (2013) has posited that contemporary

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international relations can be classified as a ‘defensive realist world’ in which states understand, after the failures of Hitler and Imperial Japan, that territorial expansion, rather than enhancing their interests, is highly likely instead to damage them. Tang contrasts this with the ‘offensive realist world’ (which existed for most of human history), in which military expansion was seen as the only way to survive in a dog-eat-dog state of anarchy with few or no regulatory institutions to temper aggression. Analysis of Chinese power projection via the BRI thus comes down, at least as far as realists are concerned, to the dichotomy between the offensive realist vision of the BRI as a cover for a Chinese territorial power grab and the defensive realist claim that the rational strategy for states to pursue is self-defence rather than aggressive expansion. However, through either realist lens, the BRI comes to be viewed primarily in terms of hard (i.e. military) power strategy. If the defensive realists are to be believed, China’s overt claim in its 2015 defence white paper that it is pursuing a strategy of ‘active defence’ in order to protect its national interests (Gady 2015) can be taken at face value: any military use for bases and ports acquired under the BRI umbrella such as the base at Djibouti and supposedly commercial ports in Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka is merely to defend China’s vital interests, for instance to protect its shipping or oil and gas supplies from piracy or blockades. Nevertheless, offensive realists would argue that any form of military expansion, whether packaged as ‘active defence’ or not, proves their contention that China is expanding its zone of influence and, whether intentionally or unintentionally, challenging existing powers in the regions into which it is expanding, most notably the US. As evidence for this interpretation, they can offer the observation that ‘ “active defense” was a favorite tactic of Mao Zedong’ (Holmes 2015). On the other hand, as far as the claims of offensive realists are concerned, the simple fact is that China does not yet have anything like the military capabilities to exert direct control over the vast Eurasian terrain that the BRI encompasses, not to mention swathes of Africa as well. Of course, there is a possibility that China is aiming to dominate Eurasia militarily in the long term, but since there are many obvious geopolitical limitations on what it can hope to achieve – the presence of India in the south and Russia in the north, for instance – the strong likelihood is that total hard power domination is not China’s intention and not even achievable, in the medium term at least. Drawing this conclusion, allied with the overt focus of the BRI on economic interdependence and the aforementioned rhetoric of ‘active defence’, would tend to favour – at least as far as the intra-realism debate is concerned – a defensive realist interpretation. As Tang (2013) reasons, we are now living in a ‘defensive realism world’ in which, as already mentioned, it is well-known that aggression usually causes the downfall of states and damages the economy to boot. Here it is necessary to consider the last two parts of the power/anarchy/states conceptual tool: states portrayed as the principal actors in an international system in which anarchy prevails. Although today’s world is one in which large corporations exert increasing amounts of influence, the power of state principals

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such as presidents and government officials to take executive decisions which affect international business ultimately means that companies cannot operate independently of state authority. A straightforward example of the ability of states to intervene in the international operations of large corporations is the US-Chinese trade war of 2018–2019 in which the Trump administration placed tariffs on imports from China and the Chinese state attempted to retaliate in kind. Amidst these actions, there was also coordinated action by the US to curtail the activities, investments and trade practices of the massive Chinese electronics conglomerate Huawei, which the US and other Western states suspected of being an agent of the Chinese state. In May 2019 the US government intervened further, issuing an order preventing Chinese corporations from getting access to US technology. This resulted in the US internet firm Google restricting the use of its mobile phone software platform Android by Huawei, an action which, given the dominant global market position of the two firms in mobile phone software and hardware respectively, had potentially wide-ranging implications in a global business which offers services to billions of consumers (Li 2019). The incident confirms that supposed ‘multinationals’, whether American, Chinese or based in another country, still need to operate within the framework set them by the national government of the country to which they are tied. As discussed in the preceding section, in the context of China’s economic statecraft, the boundaries between state and non-state corporations and other entities is blurred, with the strong suspicion being that every actor of a certain size is linked to the Chinese state. In this regard, the example of CEFC presented in the previous section is a telling one, although one which is subject to the vagaries of principal-agent dynamics and asymmetries of information (Garlick 2019), as well as ‘fragmentation of authority’ in Chinese decision-making structures (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 23). Essentially, there is evidence to show that the Chinese state is not as monolithic as some observers would suggest, with provincial governments and commercial actors also having a great deal of power to establish international business relationships at the sub-state level without the state necessarily being involved (Kamiński 2019). Evidence analysed by Jones and Zeng (2019: 1) suggests that the ‘struggle for power and resources’ between ‘competing domestic interests’ within China is ‘already shaping BRI’s design and implementation’, meaning that ‘outcomes … often diverge from top leaders’ intentions and may even undermine key foreign policy goals.’ In fact, this is what happened in the CEFC case (Garlick 2019). Nevertheless, if no Chinese actors can be considered entirely ‘non-state’ (except at the small enterprise level, where they tend to be resilient), the focus shifts to the relationship between the state and its agents, whether classified as ‘non-state’ or not. As far as the BRI is concerned, bilateral negotiation between states has been the prevailing method for advancing economic and political ties. Where companies step in, they are most often state-owned enterprises (SOEs) such as shipping, energy and construction companies with direct financing from Chinese state banks such as the Export-Import (Exim) Bank of China, which is, according to its own website, ‘directly under the leadership of the State Council’.1

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Despite the undoubted existence of a degree of ‘fragmentation of authority’ in Chinese decision-making structures (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 23) and ‘an increasing set of tensions and contradictions between the interests and aims of government principals … and the aims and interests of ostensible agents – the companies and businesses operating on the ground’ (Gill and Reilly 2007: 38–39), there can be little doubt that China’s economic statecraft in the BRI is state-led. As such, it is often conducted at the level of heads of states and other senior officials, using commercial actors as agents of the state to one extent or another (Norris 2016). One thing common to all realist analyses is the focus on anarchy and states as principal actors. Yet the Waltzian (1979) focus on anarchy as the guiding force (or independent variable) which causes states to behave as they do in international relations excludes other possibilities which deserve analysis. For instance, Kang (2007) claims that relations between East Asian states have historically taken the form of hierarchical relationships. Most crucially for the purposes of the current analysis, this took the form of the tributary state system with China at the geographical and ideational centre, and other states in a subservient role (Jacques 2009). If this claim is assumed to be true – and it is not difficult to argue that while anarchy is an important factor, even in historical East Asia, hierarchical elements should not be ignored – it refutes Waltz’s contention that anarchy is always the sole factor shaping inter-state relations. Further support for the argument that hierarchical relationships are at least as important as anarchic ones comes in the form of Brantly Womack’s asymmetry theory (Womack 2010, 2016). Using the example of China’s relations with its regional neighbours such as Vietnam, which he analyses as ‘an indigenous model of successful foreign relations’ (Womack 2010: 3), Womack focuses on the inherent and inevitable imbalance involved in relations between larger and smaller state actors. He argues that asymmetric bilateral relations, despite the power element inherent in them which is at first sight suggestive of Waltzian anarchy, can be established through ‘negotiation rather than coercion’ and can be resilient over the long-term. By encompassing the different perspectives of the two actors involved and ensuring that the autonomy of each is maintained, a normal working relationship based on mutual respect can be developed which takes account of the differences in size and power between the actors (Womack 2010: 3–5). Womack demonstrates that his theory can be applied also to other powers such as the US, but for the purposes of this book the fact that it is based on a detailed study of China’s international relations gives it considerable weight in terms of analysing the emerging BRI. Susan Strange’s assertion that the term ‘interdependence’ is generally used as a ‘persuasive synonym for asymmetric dependence’ (Strange 1996: xiii) lends support to Womack’s analysis and casts China’s official discourse regarding the BRI in a new light. The shift in emphasis from anarchic to hierarchic or asymmetrical relations is significant. Since the BRI is China-led, it is arguably inherently hierarchical in its conception and can be analysed as being an extension of the long Chinese tradition of asymmetric, tributary relations in East Asia (Kang 2007, Jacques

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2009, Womack 2010, 2016). If the BRI was to come to fruition as an interconnected network of trading states, as the official discourse claims, then one could envisage relations being established along the lines of the East Asian tributary system, with China at the centre and other nations in orbit around it. The degree of hierarchy/anarchy involved is of course unclear, but it is possible that, as discussed in the previous section, China would continue to focus on developing bilateral ties with individual states, with the asymmetry between China and each partner, in economic terms at least, being in every case inherent in the relationship. In terms of the overall picture of the BRI, China would of course be the most significant actor, and relations with other states would likely be prioritised according to the extent of each nation’s economic size, geographical position and other factors. Indeed, this may well be what the Chinese have in mind. Zhao Tingyang’s tianxia theory (to which we will return later in this chapter) posits a new world order – replacing what Zhao sees as the broken Western system – based on Chinese Confucian philosophy (Zhao 2005, 2006). Confucianism is inherently hierarchical in its emphasis on establishing social ‘harmony’ through patriarchy and top-down social relations. Confucian thinking has been steadily absorbed into the Chinese government discourse over the last two decades. For instance, a major slogan of the Hu Jintao regime (2002–2012) was ‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui, 和谐社会), which derives directly from Confucianism rather than Marxism. Despite the Chinese state’s continued official espousal of communism, renewed pride in the teachings and influence of Confucius in the history of Chinese culture is demonstrated by the official programme of establishing Confucius Institutes across the globe to teach Chinese and increase Chinese influence and soft power. If the Chinese state’s increased prioritisation of Confucianism in political theory and education were to be extended to the BRI through tianxia and its ostensible focus on an international harmony of interests, in the long term it would logically imply an attempt to establish a Chinese-led hierarchical order covering the cooperating states. Traditionally, relations were depicted as a set of concentric circles with tributary states radiating outwards from the Chinese centre. Of course, there is no certainty or even probability that a tianxia system is workable in China’s foreign relations. Offensive realists would object that it is simply rhetoric and a cover for standard power-grabbing tactics, thus negating the argument for hierarchy and re-establishing the guiding principle of anarchy in the international system. Nevertheless, the fact that hierarchical thinking appears to be present to an extent in Chinese strategic theorising suggests that it is also of significance for the conceptualisation of the BRI and should not be ignored. The need to account for hierarchy and asymmetry tempers but does not necessarily eliminate the realist focus on anarchy as the shaping force in international relations. The tension built into the anarchy/hierarchy question thus necessitates further analysis with reference to the empirical detail of the BRI in subsequent chapters.

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In view of the discussion so far, it is reasonable to continue exploring the possibility that China is looking to extend its influence, and thus its power – but shifting the focus to power conceived in a different sense (or senses) than just the military or material ones foregrounded by realists. To extend the analysis of power so far conducted, one therefore has to move beyond the standard realist focus on hard power and look at explanations of power from other theoretical traditions. It is necessary to consider a range of options including more ideationally-based notions of power, such as soft power, structural power, normative power and symbolic power. These overlap to a great extent conceptually, and yet there are important distinctions between them. It is also important, as Tang (2011, 2013: 137–9) points out, to consider the contribution of Michel Foucault (1980) concerning the intimate connections between power, knowledge, practices, ideas and institutions: in other words, how the ideational and material elements of power interact. These interconnections, also noted in connection with the BRI by Zhou and Esteban (2018), necessitate a shift from theorising based solely on relatively narrow materialist-based realist notions of anarchy and states into wider fields of inquiry. Since the analysis now moves into non-realist territory, the examination of ideational elements will be conducted in the following section. Overall, it is possible to wrap up the discussion of this section by stating that, in view of the analysis conducted, it is not possible to leave the concept of power solely to the realists. Power permeates international relations, no matter from what perspective one views it. For the Chinese-dominated BRI in which, as we have seen, even apparently non-state actors are answerable to the state, anarchy is important – but so are hierarchy and asymmetry. Above all, one has to acknowledge that ideational factors as well as material ones have to be taken into account, requiring us to apply the third set of tools in the IR conceptual toolkit.

4.4 Norms, ideas and intersubjectivity For constructivists, analysing power relations and economic interdependence is not enough. They insist that international relations need to be seen as socially constructed, containing ideational and normative elements as well as material ones (Wendt 1992, 1999, Kubálková et al. 1998). Meanings and relationships in the international arena are not givens which have popped into existence without input from Homo sapiens, but instead develop through shared interactions and mutual understandings between human beings (intersubjectivity) over extended periods of time. This means that, to put it in simpler terms, one must take into account the fact that people communicate and influence each other, establishing practices by which international affairs are conducted. Crucially, at the international level, norms are socialised through evolving relationships (Kavalski 2010, Qin 2011, Yan 2011; an idea to which we will return in Section 4.5). One must therefore examine the processes through which such interactions occur in order to understand them fully. There is also, in contradiction of the assertion that the European Union ‘is more normative than most other actors in world politics’

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(Manners 2006: 171), no logical reason to believe that it is not both possible and necessary to conduct comparisons of norm socialisation emerging from nonWestern traditions like the Chinese one (Hobson 2012, Kavalski 2013). The fact that the BRI has been initiated and theoretically framed by China as a ‘win-win’, mutually beneficial transformation of interconnectivity amid increased prosperity across the Eurasian landmass points to the notion that China is now promoting its own version of how international relations should take shape. Since the international system as it exists today was historically shaped by the West (meaning primarily Europe and the US), China’s new-found confidence under President Xi Jinping and subsequent move to reshape the world in its image comes as a challenge to the existing order – and, indeed, that is how it is being perceived by many in the US and Europe (e.g. Pillsbury 2015, Godement and Vasselier 2017). The other side of this coin is that there is a growing recognition in China too that along with China’s growing global influence comes the need to parse that influence theoretically and normatively as a reconfiguration of the Western-dominated global system (Zhao 2019). Thus, as far as the BRI is concerned, focusing on the conceptual tool of norms, ideas and intersubjectivity means that one has to account for not only Chinese discourse about the initiative and practices related to it, but others’ reactions to it. Since the BRI is a Chinese-created initiative, the starting point for analysis has to be the way that the initiative is framed in Chinese official and media discourse. This returns us to the ‘win-win’ economic interdependence conceptualisation of the BRI examined earlier in this chapter. However, it also raises more complex questions related to Chinese norms and Confucian culture (e.g. Zhao Tingyang’s tianxia theory (Zhao 2005, 2019)), as well as the long-touted principles of non-interference in a nation’s internal affairs (sovereignty) and peaceful rise. The question then is whether China genuinely aims to implement the ideational aspects of the BRI, as officially presented – if one takes the notion of China promoting norms and practices at face value – or whether these ideas are being used for the purposes of propaganda while cloaking Chinese hegemonic intentions. Of course, it is difficult to answer such questions conclusively without information about the discussions going on inside Zhongnanhai, the Beijing headquarters of the CCP. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions based on a close understanding of Chinese economic statecraft. Already the analysis conducted in Section 4.2 reveals that the Chinese interpretation of interdependence and economic globalisation takes a form which is tangential to Western free market models and that the norms promoted by the Chinese depend more on an understanding of ‘unimpeded’ trade as being based on bilateral deals between sovereign nation states than on laissez-faire economics. As far as the BRI is concerned, attempting to analyse ideational factors also points to a need to interpret the character of China’s statecraft in terms of soft power, normative power and Bourdieu(s)ian symbolic power. First, however, it is essential to understand Foucault’s analysis of power and its connections with institutions and practices.

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Foucault explains that it is necessary to take a critical stance when examining the role of practices, discourses and institutions in human society. Power relations are inherent in all social institutions (Foucault 1980: 90), even when the participants – including those maintaining and exerting power – may not be conscious of them (1980: 97). Thus, it is necessary to approach the emerging institutions, discourses and practices of the BRI critically in order to analyse the ways in which these are ‘made and backed by power’ (Tang 2013: 137). In other words, since the institutions of the BRI, such as the 16+1 and CPEC as well as its practices and discourses, are primarily Chinese-led and Chinesecreated, it is essential to analyse the purposes and power interests they serve in order to avoid what Tang (2013: 137) calls ‘normative pitfalls’. Neoliberals in particular tend to slip into these pitfalls because they take an over-optimistic view of the transformative effects of international institutions in terms of cooperation and interdependence. Foucault advises four methodological precautions when examining political power which are relevant to the examination of power relations within the emerging, extended network that is supposed to be introduced within the BRI framework. First, the analysis should not address only centres of power such as governments, but also ‘power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions’ (Foucault 1980: 96). Second, rather than examining power ‘at the level of conscious intention or decision’, the analyst should examine power ‘at the point where its intention, if it has one, is completely invested in its real and effective practices’ (Foucault 1980: 97). Third, power should be studied as a phenomenon ‘which is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation’ which uses ‘individuals as vehicles of power’, rather than as the domination of ‘one group or class over others’ (Foucault 1980: 98). And fourth, one should study the mechanisms by which power permeates through human society (1980: 99). In this there are some similarities between Foucauldian power and the Gramscian notion of hegemonic domination by one class over another since Gramscian hegemony contains ideational elements in terms of the dominant class acquiring legitimacy through persuasion and the subjugated class consenting to be governed (Gramsci 1971). As far as the BRI is concerned, taking a Foucauldian approach in a methodological-theoretical sense to the exercise of power means that one should not necessarily focus on trying to analyse the Chinese government’s overall macro-level strategy (if a clearly-formulated one even exists, which is doubtful). Rather, one needs to concentrate on critically understanding the detail of the mechanisms, institutions, practices and organisational attributes by which China conducts its economic diplomacy in connection with the initiative. In this way, by addressing the forms in which the BRI is being implemented instead of attempting the nearimpossible task of assessing government strategy as it is created at the seat of power in CCP headquarters at Zhongnanhai in Beijing (which is inaccessible for the analyst), one can attempt to establish a better understanding of how emerging

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power relations are being established in practice. Methodologically, this interpretation of the Foucauldian approach to power appears to be a good fit for examining the BRI, as it manifests in various regions and countries and can therefore be utilised for the analysis in subsequent chapters. Of course, Foucault was also concerned with analysing power relations in terms of dominance, suppression and subjugation. In this, he was at pains to make clear that although the principles he establishes could in fact be applied to ‘any society’ (1980: 93), he was mainly discussing the situation in the developed world, or, in other words, the West (Foucault 1980: 94–96). It is therefore not at first sight clear how his analysis of repression through power would apply to China and the BRI. Since the BRI is an emerging phenomenon, and China an emerging power, any potential dominance by China through the BRI presumably resides mainly in the future. However, there is the proviso that, due to China’s economic size and clout, it is already able to exert a degree of power through its economic foreign policy, as subsequent chapters will demonstrate in more depth. Nevertheless, in a methodological-theoretical sense, one can still use the Foucauldian critical approach to power, institutions, practices and discourse to examine China’s emerging power relations with smaller nations in the process of formation. Thus, using the Foucauldian approach can yield theoretical and practical insights into the means by which China is establishing powerbase relationships via its practices, discourse and institutions at the level of regions and individual nation-states. Another theorist who has considered power from an alternative perspective to the usual realist one is the pioneering international political economist Susan Strange. In her 1988 book States and Markets, she claims that there are two types of power: structural power and relational power. Relational power refers to the standard realist conception of power, defined, as previously discussed, as the ability of an actor to get another actor ‘to do something they otherwise would not do’ (Strange 1988: 24). Structural power, on the other hand, refers to ‘the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises’ (Strange 1988: 25). Structural power thus broadens the concept of power to include influence, relationships, agenda-setting and economic issues as well as military power, in a way that complements the Foucauldian analytical framework. Strange further sub-divides structural power into four sources of power: control of security; control of production; control of credit; and control of knowledge, beliefs and ideas (Strange 1988: 26). By doing this, she brings in economic and ideational factors as well as military and political ones. The fourth source of power also broadens the analysis beyond the material realm while recognising the importance of material factors through the other three. This ties in with Tang’s emphasis on the importance of including both material and ideational factors when theorising international relations rather than emphasising one and downplaying the other, as both realists (preferring material factors) and constructivists (preferring ideational factors) tend to do (Tang 2013: 128). Adding Strange’s analysis of structural power in IPE to the Foucauldian

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approach thus sets the stage for analyses of soft power, symbolic power and normative power, since these can be included as interpretations of the fourth source of power. Soft power is a concept first developed by Joseph Nye (1990b) as a deliberate contrast to hard (i.e. military-based) power. According to Nye’s conception, among the soft power tools of attraction are culture and economics. Selfconsciously taking up the soft power concept, since the turn of the century the Chinese state has attempted to attract other countries through a ‘charm offensive’ (Kurlantzick 2007) which involves such diverse means as Confucius Institutes and television stations in foreign languages. The idea of attracting others through increased soft power is also clearly part of the BRI narrative, although one that has arguably had a limited impact thus far due to China’s patchy record on selling its message effectively. Despite the shortcomings of the Chinese global propaganda drive, soft power is regarded by Chinese strategists as … an important indicator of a state’s international status and influence, and a tool for maintaining advantageous positions in international competition … soft power is inseparable from China’s rise. It is instrumental in helping China achieve the goals of a peaceful and stable international environment, a neighborly and friendly environment in surrounding regions, a cooperative environment based on equality and mutual benefit, an objective and friendly media … and a reduction of the impact of the China threat theory and its challenges on national security. (Sanguanbun 2015: 22) In China’s case, its foremost attractor is its remarkable economic growth since 1978 and the methods it used to achieve it, which other nations may wish to emulate or profit from. Other sources of soft power which the Chinese government has tried to promote relate to Chinese culture, both traditional and modern. However, China’s soft power drive has so far produced mixed results internationally. The Pew Research Center’s Spring 2017 Global Attitudes survey, conducted in 38 countries, indicates a slight dip in favourable attitudes towards China from the figure in 2014–2016 (Wike et al. 2017). However, the decline in the US’s favourability rating was sharper, so that perceptions of the two rivals were in fact similar, at 49 per cent favourability for the US and 47 per cent for China, down from 64 and 50 per cent, respectively. The survey data also demonstrate that perceptions of China, led by attitudes towards its growing economic power, tend to be more favourable in Africa than in other parts of the world, with the deepest mistrust of the Xi administration occurring in the US and Western Europe: this reveals an apparent divergence in views of China in the global North and South. On the other hand, moving beyond survey data to theoretical considerations, the most serious problem with Nye’s presentation of soft power is, as Womack (2010: 65) demonstrates, that it is poorly defined in analytical terms. It is not clear ‘whether or not it is really a separate phenomenon from hard power’

120 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI (Womack 2010: 65), nor how it relates to the generation and exercise of power. Womack (2010: 64) notes that although initially Nye presented a nuanced view of soft power combining agenda-setting and attraction (Nye 1990a: 33), in a more recent work the agenda-setting aspect has been dropped and the concept is defined solely as the ability to build influence by attraction (Nye 2004: x). Womack (2010: 64–65) points out that Nye’s odd reduction of the concept from a two- to a one-stringed bow undoubtedly weakens its ability to provide analytical insight. Merely being attractive to others may produce a degree of influence or it may not. For instance, Japanese and Korean cultures are increasingly attractive internationally, for instance through popular music, food and films, but to what extent this attractiveness translates into the generation of real power is not clear. Indeed, in Enrico Fels’ analysis, both Japan and South Korea rank below China, Russia and Pakistan in terms of overall power, despite apparently generating more soft power (Fels 2017: 327). Such considerations generate an unclear overall picture in terms of Nye’s soft power concept. US culture in the form of movies, food, music, television and so on has remained globally dominant – just like American military clout – while the nation’s global image declined sharply between 2014 and 2017 according to the Pew Global Attitudes data (Wike et al. 2017). In the case of China, the charm offensive of recent years has produced inconclusive results in terms of attracting global publics to China’s cause; yet China’s power to set or alter agendas and frame cooperation with other nations – for instance in effectively neutering Western governments’ attention to issues such as Tibet, Taiwan and human rights and generating substantial support for its policies in Africa – has been steadily advancing nevertheless. These shortcomings of soft power theory mean that it is necessary to look elsewhere than Nye’s rather unsatisfactory conceptualisation for a more persuasive, rigorous analysis of China’s ideational sources of power. Beyond soft power lies the analytically richer concept of normative power. This is defined as the ability to shape ideas, norms and institutions, with institutions conceived as both organisations and in the broader sense of ‘a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals’ (Bull 1977: 71). Here, rather than with soft power, is where the BRI’s ability to generate influence and hence power may reside: as a framing and agenda-setting device which attempts to remake Eurasia ideationally and intersubjectively according to Chinese norms. However, the concept of normative power is a theoretically contested one. Ian Manners (2002, 2006) asserts that the EU is ‘more normative’ than other powers, and somehow therefore more deserving of being labelled a ‘normative power’, principally on the grounds that, unlike other major powers such as the US, it does not enforce its will through military means. However, Diez (2005, 2013) and Kavalski (2013) dispute Manners’ claim: why, they ask, should it be the case that the EU would be the only major actor which would be capable of setting norms for others to follow? Diez (2005) shows that the US is capable of being a normative power, while Kavalski achieves the same goal with China.

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With regard to this dispute, confusion over the implications of the term ‘normative’ appears to have obfuscated the issue. For Manners, the ethical component of the term implies that the EU is a unique actor which promotes standards of behaviour by promoting standards, whereas other actors enforce their will at gunpoint. Diez and Kavalski counter this by pointing out that promoting norms entails only establishing practices regarding what is ‘normal’, without any value judgement. Be this as it may, Manners’ position is clearly undermined by its implication that only Europe can be judged to be a source of standards by which international relations can be conducted. Kavalski (2013) suggests that China’s normative power has a different character to the EU’s, being founded in relations rather than rules. Where the European conception of the term ‘normative’ contains the sense of promoting practices which are viewed as right and proper, China’s normative power consists in building relationships based on (for instance) bilateral relations, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Whether one accepts this distinction or not, it is quite clear that by conducting its international affairs according to its own norms and trying to establish these as the basis for interactions at the inter-state level, China is acting normatively. Hence, China may, as Kavalski shows, quite reasonably be classed as just as much of a normative power as the EU. On the other hand, as with soft power, there is also an inherent problem in terms of explaining how normative power is exercised. Why do major powers such as the EU, the US and China have normative power while smaller powers do not? Is it a question of military strength or economic size backing up the normative element? Or is normative power exercised purely ideationally, for instance through institutions and practices? For Tang (2013), the answer is clear: ideational factors cannot exist without the backing of material ones. Humans cannot subsist on ideas alone, and international relations are not conducted merely through the exchange of mental constructs. Equally, by inference, normative power cannot exist without some kind of material support. Thus, normative power logically has to be connected to military and/or economic power. This neatly demonstrates why only large powers can qualify as ‘normative’ powers with the ability to persuade others that their standards and practices are ‘normal’ ones. Quite closely related to normative power is the Bourdieu(s)ian concept of symbolic power. In Bourdieu’s conception, symbolic power operates through language and subterfuge (Vangeli 2018). In this way, as Bourdieu explains, it is ‘capable of producing real effects without any apparent expenditure of energy’, and ‘it is defined in and through a given relation between those who exercise power and those who submit to it, i.e. in the very structure of the field in which belief is produced and reproduced’. Symbolic power’s effects are achieved through ‘the power of words and slogans’, but dependent on ‘belief in the legitimacy of words and those who utter them’. It ‘enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic) by virtue

122 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI of the specific effect of mobilization’. It also operates in support of ‘the other forms of power’ as a ‘subordinate power’ (Bourdieu 1991: 170). In essence, then, symbolic power works through language to generate legitimacy and support for those exercising power. In this sense it is difficult to distinguish symbolic power from normative power. The main difference is that symbolic power focuses on speech acts intended to mobilise publics and also on concealment of underlying agendas, whereas with normative power that which is to be legitimised is in the open and is obtained through the establishment of shared norms and practices. Thus, for both normative and symbolic power, every state that negotiates terms with China under the BRI framework is, to one extent or another, agreeing to the agenda set by the Chinese. However, with symbolic power, those being mobilised legitimise those exercising power without being aware of the power wielder’s underlying agenda. In this interpretation, the deliberate use of ‘vague and woolly words’ (Strange 1996: xii) such as ‘win-win cooperation’ and ‘economic globalisation’ to promote the BRI may be interpreted – depending on one’s perspective – as a Chinese exercise of symbolic power. For the BRI, the debate between symbolic and Foucauldian power on the one hand, and normative and soft power on the other hand, is thus a question of the interpretation of China’s strategic goals. The dichotomy is between subterfuge/ subjugation and intersubjectivity/shared purpose. The question is: is China trying to achieve concealed goals or are the aims declared in official pronouncements genuine? Boiling it down further, are China’s statements to be taken at face value? Interpreting China’s charm offensive in terms of symbolic power suggests that they are not and that China is trying to achieve long-term goals which suit its own interests by bending others to its will through slogans designed to generate legitimacy and mobilise publics in BRI countries to participate willingly in Chinese domination.2 In the end, it seems advisable for the sake of analytical clarity to develop a concept of ideational power which incorporates the various elements contained in soft, normative, symbolic and Foucauldian power. Soft power mainly refers to attraction through culture and other non-hard power tools. Normative power refers to the ability to persuade partners to adopt the dominant actor’s practices and norms of behaviour. Symbolic power examines the use of language in support of hidden agendas. Foucauldian power analysis links power, practices and institutions used for the purposes of subjugation. Linking these complementary elements produces the analysis of ideational power presented in Table 4.1 and sets the scene for a more detailed analysis of China’s use of ideational power in support of the BRI in the next chapter. Since the concept of ideational power proposed here synthesises elements from a range of theories, it represents a theoretical innovation which builds upon Strange’s (1988: 26) incomplete but seminal analysis of the fourth source of structural power. It also needs to be distinguished from the version of ideational power presented by Carstensen and Schmidt (2016). Although valuable in that it points to the need for a development of the concept, Carstensen and

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Table 4.1 Four forms of ideational power

Key aspect Means

Soft power

Normative power

Symbolic power

Attraction

Norm setting

Subterfuge

Culture, economy, media, public diplomacy Character Public (mostly)

Institutions Public, intersubjective

Foucauldian power

Subjugation/ domination Language Institutions, practices, discourse Concealed, Concealed covert

Schmidt’s analysis is more restricted in scope in that it mainly focuses on institutions, structural power and Foucauldian analysis and does not engage with soft power or normative power. The version of ideational power presented here synthesises the use of tools of attraction, persuasion, language, practices and institutions in support of power projection. As far as China’s BRI is concerned, this synthesis allows us to examine various aspects of China’s ideational power projection with a clearer focus than would be obtained by using the subsidiary theories of soft power, normative power, symbolic power and Foucauldian power separately. In summary, Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 reveal the extent to which the contested concept of power transcends traditional paradigmatic boundaries in IR and has impacts across all of them. The analysis also reveals the need to move beyond IR theory’s main three paradigms by introducing elements derived from other theoretical traditions. Material, institutional and ideational factors also do not fit neatly into one paradigm or another, much as one might wish this to be the case. These considerations confirm that eclectically using IR’s concepts rather than its paradigms provides analytical flexibility as well as a theoretical breadth and depth suitable for examining the BRI. Moving on, the next section will continue complex eclecticism’s theoretical-methodological project by looking at the concepts derived from non-mainstream theories and how they can be applied to the BRI.

4.5 Non-mainstream concepts: harmony of interests/world society/ relationalism/patriarchal authoritarianism/economic inequality/ natural environment This section will examine the six remaining concepts in the IR conceptual toolkit in terms of how they might be applied to the BRI. The six concepts are as follows: the Marxist theory of economic inequality being applied to relations between states; the English school concept of the international society of states eventually becoming a world society (Bull 1977, Buzan 2004); tianxia theory’s espousal of a Confucian-based harmony of interests in the international sphere ousting the imperfect Western-based order of the present-day (Zhao 2006); Qin

124 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI Yaqing’s (2016) relationalism, which emphasises interrelatedness, identities shaped by social relations, and relations in motion (process); the feminist notion of patriarchal authoritarianism in international affairs; and last, the natural environment, i.e. the overall physical and material context in which human inter-state relations take place. The first concept to address is the Marxist theory of economic inequality. Obviously, the official ideology of the CCP is based on Marxism: historically the aim of the Party has been to raise the level of the mass of Chinese peasants at the expense of the landed classes. Maoist movements such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were based upon the principle of righting economic wrongs via class warfare and redistribution of wealth. In the international arena, this translated into Mao’s ‘Three Worlds Theory’: superpowers belonged to the ‘first world’, developing powers to the ‘second world’ and exploited nations in Africa, Latin America and Asia to the ‘third world’. Drawing on this theory, Mao proposed South-South cooperation between China and other developing nations in the face of perceived exploitation by the global ‘North’. Cooperation translated into extensive Chinese aid programmes focused on infrastructure such as the Tanzania-Zambia (Tanzam) railway, which was completed in 1976 thanks to an interest-free Chinese loan of US$500 million (Davies 2008: 147) and the Karakoram Highway from Xinjiang in China into Pakistan. In contrast to these two marquee infrastructure projects, most Chinese loan-based programmes prior to the advent of the BRI were small or medium sized (Brautigam 2008: 199). Thus, the BRI’s focus on developing infrastructure and connectivity across Asia, the Middle East and East Africa to Central and Eastern Europe is, to an extent, a continuation of Maoist policy towards economically disadvantaged nations. The approximately 60–70 countries officially included in the BRI are mostly developing nations.3 The geographical zone depicted in standard maps of the initiative largely corresponds to the Maoist ‘third world’, although Latin America and parts of Africa were not initially included. Thus, within the BRI the concept of economic inequality is principally deployed with reference to the economies of the developing nations in the global South, of which China perceives itself as both a member and a leader. Ostensibly at least, this is the reasoning behind the setting up of regional forums such as the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation (FOCAC) and the ‘16+1’ forum for cooperation between China and 16 nations in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). This analysis of course returns us to questions of non-zero-sum games, interdependence theory and the asymmetrical relationship between China and its individual partners. If the BRI is really to be an interconnected zone of unimpeded trade benefitting all participants, then one would expect extensive multilateral discussions promoting transnational integration and cooperation. However, in the era of the BRI such discussions have thus far not materialised in any meaningful sense, even despite the now annual Belt and Road Forum meetings. In spite of the appearance of multilateral forums for regional cooperation such as FOCAC and 16+1, the reality is that China tends to prefer

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bilateral deals which focus on the national interest of each side first, with regional integration a distant second (see Jakóbowski 2018 for a detailed analysis). The result is that asymmetry, Chinese agenda-setting and Chinese dominance are automatically incorporated into cooperation, which undermines the Maoist discourse of South-South cooperation and the Marxist notion of challenging economic inequality. In fact, China emphasises its economic relations with developing countries such as Pakistan in order to ensure that it is a dominant influence in those countries ahead of, for instance, other powerful regional actors such as the United States, the EU, Japan and India (Zhang 2016: 12). Even if one accepts that developing countries’ interests are placed ahead of those of developed countries – which is doubtful given the extensive data concerning, for instance, China’s far larger investments and trade volumes in Western Europe (particularly in the ‘Big Three’, France, Germany and the UK) than CEE countries (Hanemann et al. 2019) – it is doubtful that China would put developing countries’ interests ahead of its own. Indeed, there is plentiful evidence to suggest that the Chinese state uses economic diplomacy conducted via commercial actors such as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies to build economic and political relations with partner countries in order to first and foremost promote the PRC’s national objectives (Heath 2016, Norris 2016, Zhang 2016: 14). Employing the economic inequality concept to analyse the BRI thus comes, as with other concepts, the built-in limitation that it is a double-edged sword. China’s initiative aims to lift developing countries out of poverty in the same way as hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens have benefitted from economic development since 1978. Indeed, it is wholly possible that the BRI may contribute in the long-term to achieving this goal in some cases. However, as previously discussed, relative gains, asymmetry and the law of economic gravity are also likely to come into play as China’s economic might increases and small and medium-sized countries are drawn inexorably into their senior partner’s orbit. Despite official Chinese denials, the long-term outcome of the BRI’s implementation may well be Chinese economic (and even geopolitical) hegemony in the global South. This may indeed be the intention of China’s leaders, although it is difficult to state this with certainty. The attempt to address NorthSouth economic inequality through the BRI is therefore also capable in the long-term of producing greater economic and political asymmetry between China and its partners – and hence, logically, even new inequality, even if this is not the intention. Moving on to world society and harmony of interests, there are logical reasons to address these two concepts, the first derived from English school theory and the second taken from Zhao Tingyang’s tianxia theory (Zhao 2005, 2006), as a pair. Both are transformative theories of how the world should be; both are based on the idea of creating a new global order which can supposedly transcend anarchic competition between nation-states. For this reason, both can be examined and criticised on similar grounds.

126 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI World society is a concept which, as Barry Buzan (2004) points out, was left relatively undeveloped by the English School founder, Hedley Bull (1977). Unfortunately, in a book length re-evaluation of the concept Buzan is unable to define the concept any more clearly than Bull, going so far as to conclude that ‘present usage of world society covers so many meanings as to sow more confusion than clarity, and this weakens the structural potential of English School theory’ (Buzan 2004: 269–70). His solution is to marginalise the concept and replace it with ‘interplay amongst the interstate, interhuman and transnational domains’ (Buzan 2004: 269). However, Buzan’s solution seems no more analytically precise than Bull’s – indeed, possibly even more vague and unsatisfactory. Thus, the world society concept is left, at the end of Buzan’s extensive investigations into Bull’s English School framework, not only in an undeniably utopian state, but also in an analytically unclear one. Tang (2013: 140) points out that English School theorists tend to talk about ‘big things’ such as ‘world society’ without ever getting ‘their hands dirty with the empirical task of understanding the dirty business of making institutions and order’. In addition, for Tang, the English School divides into those who propose ‘a truncated form of neoliberalism’ (pluralists) and those who advocate ‘a truncated form of normative Kantian social constructivism’ (solidarists). Either way, English School theory and the ‘world society’ concept lack theoretical distinctness, substance and empirical support, and moreover can be viewed as falling into the trap of promoting a vision of an ‘impossible and dangerous’ utopia (Tang 2013: 141–5). Similar criticisms can be made concerning the tianxia notion of harmony of interests, which is no less utopian than world society. Indeed, Tang (2011: Chapters 1 and 2) demonstrates that all theories of harmony tend to be excessively optimistic about human behaviour and cooperation and take insufficient account of conflict in international society. This point leads the analysis back to E.H. Carr’s classic 1939 deconstruction of the failure of the League of Nations to prevent the rise of Hitler and the Second World War due to a lack of realism concerning the degree to which nations will surrender their national interests to an idealistic spirit of cooperation. Carr’s damning deconstruction of inter-war Kantian idealism contributed to the rise of realism in both IR theory and US approaches to international politics in the wake of the Second World War and remains a convincing critique of harmony-based theorising today. An additional criticism, as William Callahan (2008) has pointed out (and as already discussed in Section 4.3), stems from the fact that the Confucian basis of tianxia theory can be interpreted as a cover for the promotion of the hegemonic agendas of the Chinese state on an international stage. The CCP’s ‘powerfully effective techniques of mass mobilization … and genuine skill at the manipulation of belief through well-conceptualized propaganda’ were developed during the long years spent resisting the Japanese and the Kuomindang Nationalists under Mao Zedong’s leadership during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s (Spence 2000: 107). For this reason, it is

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essential not to underestimate the ideational power of tianxia theory’s Confucian-based harmony of interests reasoning being used in support of Chinese foreign policy and the BRI. Callahan concludes that: Indeed, while the Westphalian system is rightly criticized for being statecentric, the Tianxia example shows how non-Western alternatives can be even more state-centric. Moreover, proposals for a ‘‘post-hegemonic’’ system often contain the seeds of a new (and often violent) system of inclusion and exclusion: Tianxia presents a popular example of a new hegemony where imperial China’s hierarchical governance is up-dated for the twentyfirst century. (Callahan 2008: 759) Thus, even if one takes Callahan’s conclusion to be excessively harsh, tianxia and harmony of interests ultimately feed back into the analyses of Chinese ideational power and hierarchy/asymmetry begun in the preceding sections. This makes them a useful tool for the analysis of the BRI in a subsidiary rather than a primary role, but still worth retaining for this purpose. Meanwhile, it is probably better to drop world society from the IR conceptual toolkit since it seems to have no real analytical power and has no clear relevance to the BRI. The fourth non-mainstream concept in the toolkit is Qin Yaqing’s (2011, 2016, 2018) relationalism. Qin presents what he claims is a new approach to IR theory based on Chinese (Confucian) ideas of interrelatedness and complex relational processes as being the guiding principles governing relations between humans. He contrasts this Chinese relationalist approach with what he sees as the standard rationalist approach used by the majority of Western IR theorists. Where Western theory focuses on the individual actor as a unit, Qin’s Confucian-based relationalism emphasises ‘relations between actors and their context’ (Qin 2016: 5). Qin also stresses the importance of processes as being a better way to account for change in international society than focusing on actors as stable, static entities with fixed attributes, for instance according to the standard neorealist model outlined by Waltz (1979). In Qin’s conception, the ‘maintenance and management of relations among international villagers are of ultimate importance for a stable world’ (2016: 13). Thus, relationalism also has a normative, transformative aspect in terms of seeking to optimise relations between nations. The guiding principle here is the Confucian idea of harmony as opposed to conflict, which Qin claims is emphasised in the Western (Hegelian) tradition (Qin 2018: 193–4). As far as the BRI is concerned, building effective relations between the partners in the initiative would therefore be the primary focus, rather than the relative attributes of individual states. The processes involved in establishing and improving relations come to the fore since the Confucian concept of harmony involves blending the different attributes of various actors into an inclusive relationship in which the actors’ strengths (and weaknesses) are complementary rather than conflicting

128 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI (Qin 2018: 194). So, in theory at least, asymmetry between actors would not be an impediment to establishing harmony through enhanced relations. On the other hand, there are two significant problems with Qin’s version of relationalism. The first is that, like tianxia, world society and inter-war idealism, it is based on a self-evidently utopian ideal of establishing harmony between nations, except this time based on Confucianism. The second is that it is difficult to distinguish it from the ideational elements analysed in Section 4.4. What Qin calls relations and processes seem similar to the notions of norms, ideas and intersubjectivity, as well as institutions in the broader sense pointed to by Tang Shiping and Douglass North. There is a vagueness to his conception of relationalism which means that it lacks the characteristics or precision of the version earlier established by Emirbayer (1997) and Jackson and Nexon (1999), whose works Qin cites, and which seem at first sight to be the foundation of his theory. These two problems detract, at least to an extent, from the analytical power of the relationalist concept as it is expounded by Qin. Nevertheless, since Qin is a leading Chinese IR theorist, and the BRI is also Chinese, it is worth retaining the core of the relational concept in the analysis in terms of its ability to explain aspects of the Chinese approach to its relations with other states. As with tianxia theory, Qin’s relationalism is based on Confucian philosophy and culture, which undoubtedly has a strong hold on the Chinese imagination and self-image. It is therefore possible to use the concept to understand the approach of the Chinese government to the BRI, although this approach still needs to be carefully scrutinised. Combining the overlapping Confucian-based elements of tianxia (all-under-heaven), harmony of interests and Qin’s relationalism into a single concept (which for greater ease of reference can simply be called Confucian harmony) produces a sharper conceptual tool which can be used to understand the discourse and ontological approach to the BRI as it is being developed by the Chinese government and those who speak on its behalf (such as academics in state institutions and journalists). However, as Peter Ferdinand points out, Confucian-based rhetoric such as Hu Jintao’s slogan of ‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui, 和谐社会), which was mocked and satirised online by sceptical sections of Chinese society, needs to be treated with caution: in the international arena the Confucian influence has ‘overflowed into rather vacuous foreign policy statements that urged international harmony as well’ (Ferdinand 2016: 941). Understanding this necessitates critical examination of the employment of Confucian thinking by Chinese officials and media as a culturally based concept designed to boost ideational power. Nadège Rolland (2017: 135) neatly compresses the issues involved with the use of Confucian-based thinking in Chinese foreign policy to provide us with the following definition of the Confucian harmony concept: This revamped Confucian concept is framed as a principle according to which countries should conduct harmonious relations with one another while maintaining their distinctive viewpoints and, above all, avoiding criticism or interference in one another’s internal affairs. China’s leaders

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promise that the BRI will knit together a ‘community of common destiny.’ As in the past, when China was Asia’s ‘Middle Kingdom,’ the interconnected area created by the Belt and Road will bask in its cultural and civilizational glow. Examining Chinese Confucianism brings us to the fifth concept in the nonmainstream IR toolkit, patriarchal authoritarianism. In terms of China and the BRI, and without going over Western feminist theory in unnecessary detail, the main point to emphasise is the Confucian tradition’s focus on paternalism and patriarchy in both the family and the leadership of the state (Dawson 1978: 90–92, Jacques 2009: 134). In communist China, the end result of this has been the fact that since the foundation of the PRC in 1949 no woman has ever served on the seven-member standing committee of the CCP’s politburo; in 2017, out of 25 members of the politburo, only 2 were women; and the percentage of women in the party’s Central Committee dropped from 6.4 per cent in 2012 to 4.9 per cent in 2017 (Tatlow 2017). This state of affairs persists in spite of Mao Zedong’s championing of women’s rights in the face of ‘masculine authority’ (Spence 1990: 375–6) and successful efforts to stamp out some traditional practices damaging to women, such as foot-binding. Mao also improved women’s ability to divorce their husbands, but this was likely motivated by his own proclivity for sex outside marriage (Spence 1990: 376). In spite of the steps towards gender equality made under Mao, the Confucian emphasis on patriarchal leadership elites obviously means that women are still effectively excluded from positions of power in Chinese society (Fincher 2018). As far as the BRI is concerned, exclusion means a lack of female involvement in decision-making processes and also a lack of emphasis on developing roles for women in the initiative, including in the partner countries. In fact, even though developing people-to-people contacts is listed as one of the key principles of the BRI, creating roles for women is not mentioned. Like other aspects of Chinese domestic and foreign policy, the BRI is therefore inherently a patriarchal top-down initiative which does little to promote gender equality in terms of explicit policy in either China or its partner countries. The final concept in the non-mainstream toolkit is the natural environment. It is clear, as Tang (2013: 23–24) points out, that material resources and the physical environment both permit and constrain human social activities, including international ones. Humans cannot live without food and water; transportation does not work without fuel dug from the earth or collected from the sea, wind or sun; wars cannot be waged without weapons made from materials harvested from the planet; and so on. Human activity also impacts and modifies the natural environment in the form of global warming, climate change, desertification and other phenomena which have the capacity to threaten our survival, transcend borders, and cause conflict within and between nations (Cudworth and Hobden 2011: 111). Importantly also for the central thrust of this book, Cudworth and Hobden (2011) persuasively argue that human impacts on the natural

130 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI environment form a large part of the overall setting in which international relations are situated and contribute to their complexity. As an initiative which aims to connect a large number of countries in Asia, Europe, Africa and beyond, the BRI has environmental impacts and is dependent and contingent on the natural environment. For instance, energy in the form of fossil fuels has to be extracted and obtained from somewhere, and China is not self-sufficient in oil or natural gas. This means that relations between supplier nations (such as those in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia) and China form a highly significant part of the BRI mix. Concomitant environmental effects include air pollution and global warming, especially since BRI projects include ‘a high proportion of coal-fired power plants and other projects requiring high-polluting resources and construction materials’ (Lelyveld 2019). Another point is that China has a large population and a relatively small percentage of its territory is suitable for agriculture. This implies that imports or acquisitions of land for agricultural exploitation may also be incorporated into BRI projects. Infrastructure projects such as dams, ports and power plants may also have local environmental impacts, as can the construction of transport infrastructure (Losos et al. 2019). Some experts fear that increased trade and transport links along the BRI’s six land corridors and the MSR will encourage invasive species to destroy fragile local habitats and ecosystems (Liu et al. 2019). Environmental degradation within China itself is clearly also a significant factor in China’s foreign as well as domestic policy. Chinese renewable energy companies, seeking both solutions and business opportunities, are expanding their activity overseas, acquiring solar and wind power assets in Europe and elsewhere. Environmental problems within China spill over into neighbouring countries in the form of pollution or problems with water flowing through the major rivers which originate in Tibet. Then there is the question of nuclear energy, which may be cleaner than fossil fuels in terms of immediate effects but still has the potential to cause serious environmental damage. The issues listed in the previous paragraph are just a sample of the potential environmental impacts of Chinese BRI projects. These are extraordinarily complex and intrinsically intertwined with the social, political and economic aspects of China’s initiative. It is thus essential to incorporate them into the analysis of the BRI in the remaining chapters of this book, despite the self-evident difficulty of integrating the examination of environmental impacts with that of inter-state relations. At the end of this section, and after excluding concepts which do not seem to possess significant analytical power, we are left with four non-mainstream concepts which seem useful for analysing the BRI: economic inequality, Confucian harmony, patriarchal authoritarianism, and the natural environment. These will be carried forward into the next chapter and the remainder of the book.

4.6 Complexity theory/complexity thinking (CT) At the beginning of this section, it is important to state that complexity is not just about applying individual concepts. It is also important to hold complexity

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thinking in mind when addressing the BRI at all levels, including the macrolevel, because of the intrinsic complexity of the initiative. Thus, when we move on to examine the effects of specific concepts in the CT toolkit, we must also make sure to bear in mind their relation to each other and to overall complexity, including the key IR theory concepts outlined in this chapter. It is not necessary to go over the individual CT concepts again from scratch, because an explanation of each was given in the second half of the previous chapter. Here it is only necessary to explain how they might be applied to the BRI. So, the possible impacts of each on the BRI will be briefly outlined, leaving the expansion into specific empirical detail for subsequent chapters. Some effects of feedback loops have already been explained earlier in this chapter, in Section 4.2. Suffice it to say here that there are likely to be a multitude of feedback effects within the BRI zones as links are created between China and partner countries politically, economically and socially. These can be positive or negative or a mixture of the two, depending on the results of particular projects. For instance, a failed project in a particular country may bring with it a dampening of enthusiasm for further ventures, while initial successes may lead to a spiralling increase in further cooperation. Effects resulting from trade and investment will be felt both in China and the partner country, but, as Womack (2016: xiii) points out, with different characteristics and outcomes due to asymmetries of size. Nevertheless, it is probable that the precise results of feedback loops are likely to be difficult to quantify in precise terms and their effects will need to be evaluated qualitatively instead: it is important to understand that the difficulty or impossibility of quantification does not invalidate the use of the concept. Equally, other interlinked complexity concepts such as nonlinearity/sensitivity to initial parameters, emergence/self-organisation and path dependence are likely to be seen within individual BRI projects and relations on the bilateral level with BRI countries. Given the practical impossibility of establishing linear cause-and-effect in relations between China and its partners, the precise trajectory of developing relations can be difficult to predict. Yet, like weather patterns, those relations emerge from a specific set of conditions in each bilateral relationship and coalesce into certain emerging patterns. These patterns or tendencies in relations can be difficult to change, leading to the possibility of path dependence. For instance, the present-day character of China-India relations is strongly influenced by the brief Sino-Indian War of 1962 (for which each side blames the other) and the ongoing unresolved border disputes. These historically-based tensions have soured relations between the two countries ever since and affected cooperation, meaning that India today is suspicious of the BRI and reluctant to participate in it for fear of being dominated by China (Menon 2017: 196–7). Similarly, the long history of interaction between China and Vietnam has a strong impact on mutual perceptions and misunderstandings in SinoVietnamese relations today which is not easily shaken off (Womack 2016: xi–xii). Yet new elements such as trade deals, tariffs or investments introduced into relations can also affect their development, even when constrained by historical factors and perceptions, in a nonlinear fashion. Thus, it

132 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI is necessary when evaluating the impact of the BRI in specific regions and countries to evaluate flexibly and pragmatically the effects of nonlinearity, emergence and path dependence effects even when these are, as with feedback loops, difficult or impossible to precisely quantify. As for tipping points/the edge of chaos, this concept is less obvious in the context of China’s foreign policy and the BRI, but no less important due to its potential for disruption or rapid alteration of circumstances. Brinkmanship, for instance, is a strategic tactic of pushing events towards a point at which they teeter on the edge of all-out conflict without quite passing the tipping point. This quite accurately describes events during the Cuban Missile Crisis, where events almost fell over the edge of chaos into full-blown nuclear warfare between the US and the Soviet Union. It is also a possible interpretation of China’s island-building strategy in the South China Sea, in which China seems to push towards the limits of what its maritime neighbours (and the US) are likely to find unacceptable behaviour (Hayton 2014). The South China Sea, of course, is a key shipping route for energy to China from the Middle East and also for Chinese goods to Europe, so it is de facto a vital component in the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) section of the BRI. This means that if China builds airstrips on artificial islands for the purpose of protecting its trade routes or claims features occupied by other countries, these actions may result in the building of tensions towards the point at which armed conflict would become a possible outcome. China’s tactical skill at maintaining the situation before or at the tipping point into chaos therefore comes into play in its relations with its maritime neighbours along the South China Sea portion of the MSR. Edge of chaos analysis may also affect China’s port-building activity in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, which is liable to create tensions if India comes to see it as a threat to its security. Lastly, black swans are unexpected events with sufficient force to cause drastic alterations in the development of a situation. Thus, these are not necessarily evident in the BRI at a given moment in time, but still given their potential game-changing impact allowance has to be made for them. Black swan events for the BRI could be natural disasters, the outbreak of local wars, the onset of a financial crisis, or sudden shifts in policy by major powers such as the US. For instance, an unexpected policy decision by the US president – such as the Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs on Chinese goods in 2018 and 2019 – is capable of causing repercussions within China and across the BRI regions in a nonlinear, emergent, hard-to-analyse manner which can also incorporate feedback effects. Similarly, a breakdown of governance or a civil war in a key BRI partner would be a black swan event which would affect relations between that country and China in an unanticipated way, and might also have knock-on effects for China’s relations with other countries in the affected region. Other possible black swans could be the meltdown of a nuclear reactor, a stock market collapse, or sanctions imposed on a key BRI partner (such as those imposed on Iran by the Trump administration in early 2019). All of these represent contingencies which could radically affect the progress and outcomes of the BRI in various ways which are not necessarily easy to predict.

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Overall, there are good reasons to suggest that all the complexity effects outlined in Chapter 3 need to be accommodated in the analysis of the BRI. At the same time, as already stated, the overall complexity of the BRI demands that the use of the individual CT concepts should be somehow connected to, and integrated with, the IR concepts outlined above. Deploying individual concepts piecemeal, without fitting them together, clearly would not provide much assistance. Thus, the conclusion to this chapter will explain how this is to be done.

4.7 Conclusion This chapter has discussed how to apply the IR and CT conceptual toolkits to the BRI. In doing so, it has become evident that some concepts are more relevant to the BRI than others, and that some of them need to be reconfigured. Altering and adapting the set of conceptual tools in the IR toolkit is in line with the abductive approach to complex eclecticism’s theoretical-methodological framework and with the ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ pragmatism of the BRI. Thus, since the Chinese state exercises a greater degree of influence over corporations than is customary in the West – although President Donald Trump’s 2018–2019 trade war with China demonstrates that the differences may not be as large as one might expect – distinctions between ‘state’ and ‘nonstate’ actors can be difficult to define with regard to Chinese foreign policy and the BRI. For this reason, analysis of the ‘state/non-state’ dichotomy is presented as one conceptual tool (see Figure 4.1) and will be applied strictly in relation to cases where the division between the two is unclear or in dispute. The anarchy tool is also not adequate on its own for examining the BRI since, as we have

ANARCHY/HIERARCHY/ ASYMMETRY

FEEDBACK LOOPS

STATE/NON-STATE ACTORS

EMERGENCE/SELFORGANISATION

TIPPING POINTS/EDGE OF CHAOS

COMPLEX ECLECTICISM

NONLINEARITY/ SENSITIVITY TO INITIAL PARAMETERS

INTERDEPENDENCE

PATH DEPENDENCE

BLACK SWANS

Figure 4.1 The revised complex eclecticism toolkits

INSTITUTIONS INTERSUBJECTIVITY MATERIAL POWER IDEATIONAL POWER ECONOMIC INEQUALITY CONFUCIAN HARMONY PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITARIANISM NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

134 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI seen, elements of hierarchy and asymmetry apply to China’s economic statecraft, so this results in a tripartite anarchy/hierarchy/asymmetry conceptual tool. These considerations produce a revised and altered set of tools in the IR conceptual toolkit. These are listed in Figure 4.1 (which is a revised version of Figure 3.1) alongside the CT conceptual toolkit. As can be seen, the concepts have been fully separated from the IR paradigms within which they are customarily placed. They have been reconfigured according to the discussion in this chapter according to the demands of their application to the BRI. They can now be applied to a closer analysis of the BRI in the following chapters without having to frame that analysis in terms of paradigmatic thinking. As far as the integration of the IR and CT conceptual toolkits is concerned, the approach to be taken is to utilise the CT toolkit in support of the IR one. Since complexity concepts in effect describe ‘system effects’ (Jervis 1997), they are both complementary and subsidiary to the over-arching IR concepts. At the same time, retaining the notion of complexity thinking at the holistic level permits the use of IR and CT conceptual tools in a qualitative, integrated fashion. This means that CT can be used at both the macro-level, as an overall framing device, and at the mesoand micro-levels, through individual concepts, to explain and elucidate specific phenomena within the BRI.

Notes 1 The Export-Import Bank of China website, ‘Brief Introduction’, available at: http:// english.eximbank.gov.cn/tm/en-TCN/index_617.html. 2 Thanks also go to Dominik Mierzejewski for pointing out to me the necessity to analyse the BRI and China’s international relations in terms of slogans and mobilisation. 3 See HKTDC Research’s website, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: Country profiles’, for a semi-official list of BRI countries. Available at: http://china-trade-research.hktdc. com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-InitiativeCountry-Profiles/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36I0.htm. For more discussion of the inclusion of countries in the BRI see Chapter 5.

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Kavalski, Emilian (2013) ‘The struggle for recognition of normative powers: normative power Europe and normative power China in context’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 247–267. Kenderdine, Tristan, and Han Ling (2018) ‘International capacity cooperation – financing China’s export of industrial overcapacity’, Global Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 41–52. Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Kubálková, Vendulka, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (eds.) (1998) International Relations in a Constructed World, Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe. Kurlantzick, Joshua (2007) Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and David Martimort (2002) The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Lelyveld, Michael (2019) ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative blackened by coal – analysis’, Radio Free Asia, 31 January. Available at: www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_ watch/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-blackened-by-coal-01312019115712.html. Li, Ran, and Kee Cheok Cheong (2019) China’s State Enterprises: Changing Role in a Rapidly Transforming Economy, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Li, Yuan (2019) ‘As Huawei loses Google, the U.S.-China tech cold war gets its iron curtain’, New York Times, 20 May. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2019/05/20/business/huaweitrump-china-trade.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage. Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg (1988) Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Liu, Jianguo, Thomas Dietz, Stephen R. Carpenter, Marina Alberti, Carl Folke, Emilio Moran, Alice N. Pell, Peter Deadman, Timothy Kratz, Jane Lubchenco, Elinor Ostrom, Zhiyun Ouyang, William Provencher, Charles L. Redman, Stephen H. Schneider, and William W. Taylor (2007) ‘Complexity of coupled human and natural systems’, Science, Vol. 317, No. 5844, pp. 1513–1516. Liu, Weidong, and Michael Dunford (2016) ‘Inclusive globalization: unpacking China’s Belt and Road Initiative’, Area Development and Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 323–340. Liu, Xuan, Tim M. Blackburn, Tianjian Song, Li Xianping, Cong Huang, and Yiming Li (2019) ‘Risks of biological invasion on the belt and road’, Current Biology, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 499–505. Liu, Zuokui (2018) ‘The “16+1 cooperation” under the “Belt and Road” initiative’, in Weiqing Song (ed.) China’s Relations with Central and Eastern Europe: From “Old Comrades” to New Partners, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, pp. 29–47. Losos, Elizabeth, Alexander Pfaff, Lydia Olander, Sara Mason, and Seth Morgan (2019) Reducing Environmental Risks from Belt and Road Investments in Transport Infrastructure, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8718, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Mackinder, Halford (1919) Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, London: Constable. Manners, Ian (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 235–258. Manners, Ian (2006) ‘The European Union as a normative power: a response to Thomas Diez’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 167–180. Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton.

138 Applying complex eclecticism to the BRI Mearsheimer, John J. (2010) ‘The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US power in Asia’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 381–396. Menon, Shivshankar (2017) ‘Some thoughts on India, China and Asia-Pacific regional security’, China Report, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 188–213. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (2015) Vision and actions on jointly building silk road economic belt and 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, 28 March, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization. Available at: http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/ t20150330_669367.html. Norris, William J. (2016) Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. North, Douglass C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nye, Joseph S. (1990a) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York: Basic Books. Nye, Joseph S. (1990b) ‘Soft power’, Foreign Policy, Vol. 80, No. Autumn, pp. 153–171. Nye, Joseph S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs. Pillsbury, Michael (2015) The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, New York: Henry Holt and Co. Powell, Robert L. (1991) ‘Absolute and relative gains in international relations theory’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, pp. 1303–1320. Qin, Yaqing (2011) ‘Rule, rules, and relations: towards a synthetic approach to governance’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 117–145. Qin, Yaqing (2016) ‘A relational theory of world politics’, International Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 33–47. Qin, Yaqing (2018) A Relational Theory of World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rapkin, David P., and William R. Thompson (2013) Transition Scenarios: China and the United States in the Twenty-First Century, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Rolland, Nadège (2017) ‘China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: underwhelming or gamechanger?’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 127–142. Sanguanbun, Sompong (2015) ‘China’s soft power policy: lessons and implications’, Rangsit Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 19–26. Snidal, Duncan (1991a) ‘International cooperation among relative gains maximizers’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 387–402. Snidal, Duncan (1991b) ‘Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 701–726. Spence, Jonathan (1990) The Search for Modern China, New York: Norton. Spence, Jonathan (2000) Mao, London: Phoenix. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2017) ‘Full text: Xi Jinping’s keynote speech at the World Economic Forum’, 6 April. Available at: www. china.org.cn/node_7247529/content_40569136.htm. Steil, Ben (2018) The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War, New York: Simon & Schuster. Stein, Arthur A. (1990) Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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5

The characteristics of the Belt and Road Initiative

5.1 Introduction Having established the IR and CT toolkits in relation to the Belt and Road in the previous chapter, the next step is to apply the selected conceptual tools to the initiative in more depth and detail, albeit still in an abductive, ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ manner. In order to achieve this, it is necessary first to examine what are proposed or supposed to be the characteristics of the emerging BRI in more detail than Chapter 1’s brief introductory outline permitted. The chapter therefore consists of a discursive assessment of the ten most frequently mentioned aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative which purportedly constitute its key characteristics. The analysis draws on extensive reading of official publications such as the Vision and Actions document (NDRC 2015), scholarly works and media publications. Tools will be selected from the complex eclecticism toolkit which seem well-suited to analysis of the item under consideration and applied according to the theoretical-methodological considerations outlined and analysed in Chapters 3 and 4. The tools used are noted within the text as well as at the end of each section. The justification for taking this approach is to build up a picture of what the Belt and Road is – and is not – from an exploration of frequently-made statements concerning its characteristics, attempting to assess the extent to which they are accurate representations of the initiative to the extent this is possible. Methodologically, the approach needs to be qualitative because of the absence of an obvious quantitative method that can be applied to the disparate and uncertain material surveyed. The analysis in this chapter will prepare the ground for the application of the complex eclecticism approach to detailed case studies of the BRI, as it is emerging in regions and countries along the route, which will be conducted in Chapter 6.

5.2 The emerging characteristics of the Belt and Road Initiative Although the BRI was formally launched in a pair of speeches given by Xi Jinping in autumn 2013, it only took shape and gathered momentum after the publication of the official white paper in March 2015 entitled Vision and

142 The characteristics of the BRI Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (NDRC 2015). The eighteen-month gap between the announcement of the initiative and the publication of an official policy document describing its supposed characteristics suggests that, when launched by Xi, what the BRI was intended to be and how it was to be implemented had not been fully decided and was still being debated. Summers (2016: 1629) points out that the lack of detail in Xi’s original proposal and the need for further elaboration during the next two years are not an unusual approach to policy formation and decision-making at the leadership level. The gap between announcement and proposed implementation also strongly suggests that the five-year-old BRI is still a project in development, with an emerging and uncertain character. This is especially true when one considers the problems of applying the initiative’s goals of trade and transport connectivity and enhanced infrastructure across the various regions and immense geographical scope of the initiative. Further policy documents, for instance Chinese State Council decrees such as Guiding Opinions on Promoting International Capacity Cooperation and Equipment Manufacturing (State Council 2015), flesh out how Beijing intends the Belt and Road to be applied. However, the consequences of these pronouncements remain unclear, which necessitates ongoing research into their impacts even several years after their publication (see for instance Kenderdine and Ling 2018). Other difficulties of understanding the BRI have already been discussed in previous chapters. Importantly, these include the key problem of understanding what the BRI is and is not due to its apparent vagueness and breadth of scope. There is also the question of establishing the extent to which the official discourse of ‘win-win cooperation’, ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘community of common destiny’ truly represents the Chinese leadership’s underlying aims, as some commentators believe (e.g. Zeng 2016, Griffiths 2017), or whether instead the initiative is part of a long-term strategy through which China is seeking to displace the US as the global hegemon (Pillsbury 2015, Allison 2017). Although numerous research articles in a rapidly expanding literature have explored a broad range of economic and political implications of the initiative (see for instance: Liu et al. 2017, Qian and Fulton 2017, Cai 2018, Chung 2018, Reeves 2018, Tekdal 2018, Zhou and Esteban 2018), the lack of a genuinely authoritative and comprehensive full-length study of the BRI thus far is indicative of the elusiveness and emerging nature of the initiative. As Jonathan Fulton (2018: 343) points out, researching the BRI is inherently problematic for scholars due to the initiative’s rapidly evolving nature, and trying to pinpoint what does or does not belong to the Belt and Road is ‘like trying to hit a moving target’. For instance, criticisms of the BRI’s supposed ‘debt diplomacy’ and ‘neocolonialism’ from late 2017 onwards appear to have caught the CCP leadership off-guard and necessitated a rethink; there was even a reduction in BRI spending in 2018 as the Chinese economy slowed (Bradsher 2019). Given these difficulties, the approach taken in this chapter is to examine some key characteristics of the BRI upon which government officials, journalists, scholars and other observers appear mostly to agree, or which are

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frequently mentioned. Close reading of a wide range of official publications, media reports and scholarly texts allows one to condense some key propositions concerning the initiative into a set of statements. Accordingly, the material reveals that the Belt and Road, as it has taken shape so far, is generally assumed to have the following ten characteristics: 1 It is supposed to encompass over 60 countries in Asia and Europe (SIC 2016). 2 It is intended to improve connectivity across Eurasia, primarily by focusing on improving transport and energy infrastructure, with the other stated goals (such as increased people-to-people contacts, financial integration, etc.) probably being subsidiary to this main one. 3 It contains two main strands, the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), which is intended to connect Asia with Europe by land, and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR), which connects China with Europe by sea. 4 Within the SREB and the MSR there are various, somewhat exploratory, sub-projects in various stages of development, such as ‘economic corridors’ like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the BangladeshChina-India-Myanmar corridor (BCIM), as well as cooperation platforms such as the 16+1 forum in Central and Eastern Europe. 5 The Belt and Road is a continuation of previous official Chinese government policy such as the ‘Go West’ and ‘go out’ campaigns of the early 2000s rather than a clean break with previous Chinese policy. 6 The BRI is Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy initiative and thus closely associated with his leadership. 7 The BRI involves the use of institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund and regional forums. 8 The Belt and Road is intended to have appeal for foreign audiences as well as the domestic Chinese one, thus boosting China’s soft power abroad and legitimacy at home. 9 It is ambitious, large-scale, loose, and vague (Zeng 2017: 1167). 10 The Chinese government repeatedly stresses via official and media publications that the BRI is intended to achieve ‘win-win cooperation’, ‘mutual benefit’ and a ‘community of common destiny’ among participating nations. The following sections will therefore analyse each of these points in turn using tools from the complex eclecticism toolkits. At the end of each section, these tools will be listed. It will thus be possible to see which tools were most frequently applied in the chapter by conducting a simple count and presenting the results in a table (see Table 5.2). 5.2.1 The Belt and Road is supposed to encompass over 60 countries in Asia and Europe In 2016, a publication entitled ‘Belt and Road’ Country Cooperation Evaluation Report issued by the State Information Center (Administration Center of China

144 The characteristics of the BRI E-government Network) – which is, according to information on the body’s website, ‘a public institution directly affiliated to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)’1 – identified a specific set of countries which were to be included in the Belt and Road Initiative. The list includes 64 countries in Asia, the Middle East and Central and Eastern Europe which together have a population of 3.35 billion people (see Table 5.1). Although this listing should not be assumed to be definitive given the dynamic, shifting nature of Chinese foreign policy noted in Chapter 1, geographically the official identification of these 64 countries suggests a westwards orientation in the direction of Europe via land and sea. There is no one official map of the BRI, but most maps published have a Eurasian emphasis. Similarly, the six ‘corridors’ included in official conceptions are all Eurasian, with some East African countries (Kenya, Djibouti, Tanzania) sometimes included as part of the MSR. The Americas and the most highly developed countries (most notably Japan, the US, Australia and the advanced economies of Western Europe) are also usually not included in standard listings of BRI countries, at least up to 2016. Since then, the Chinese government has to widen the scope of the BRI to include almost every region on earth, possibly even the Arctic (Liu 2018), bringing on board,

Table 5.1 BRI countries according to the State Information Center’s ‘Belt and Road’ Country Cooperation Evaluation Report (2016) Region

Countries

Southeast Asia (11) Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Brunei Central Asia (7) Russia*, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Mongolia* South Asia (8) India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives Middle East (16) Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain Central and Eastern Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Europe (22) Azerbaijan, Hungary, Belarus, Serbia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, Moldova, Georgia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Albania, Armenia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, Montenegro

Total population 662 million

220 million 1,831 million 443 million

194 million

NB: Countries in each region are listed in order of population size. Population data were obtained from www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/, which is an elaboration of data obtained from the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. *Russia and Mongolia, although apparently defined as ‘Northeast Asia’ in the SIC (2016) report, are included in the Central Asian region for compactness of analysis and because the label ‘Northeast Asia’ is confusing due to omission: the region is generally taken to include Japan, South Korea and North Korea, which are not included among BRI countries in SIC (2016).

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at the most recent count, as many as 150 countries (García-Herrero 2019). However, in the face of such broadening the fact remains that the original conception of the BRI was as an initiative primarily involving routes from Asia to Europe and that the original conception of the initiative had connectivity across the Eurasian landmass at its heart. It is for these reasons – plus the not insignificant concern that the subject matter of the book is large enough already – that the scope of this book is restricted to the progress of the Belt and Road from Asia to Europe. Most of the nations included in the SIC report are economically developing ones belonging to what is often referred to as the global ‘South’. Thus, the Belt and Road seems to be a continuation of previous Chinese policy concerning so-called ‘South-South’ cooperation, with China self-identifying as the leader of a large group of far smaller, economically developing nations (tools: anarchy/hierarchy/asymmetry). The BRI could therefore be interpreted as a continuation of Maoist foreign policy developed during the first few decades of CCP governance regarding the levelling of the economic playing field in the face of Western capitalist exploitation. The intention, in this reading, is to create a loosely connected network of developing states in order to boost their economic growth (tools: economic inequality, interdependence). However, despite Xi Jinping’s commitment to Marxism and stated respect for Mao (Saich 2017: 6), there is certainly a case for saying that in a China which since Deng’s reforms has pursued a form of state capitalism (Bremmer 2008) the Party is only paying lip service to Marxist thought. Nevertheless, being seen to continue Maoist South-South cooperation is advantageous in terms of creating an ideological bridge from the early days of the CCP in order to maintain the appearance of continuity as far as the Chinese public is concerned. Dropping the Maoist focus on global economic inequality might, in the eyes of the people, threaten its legitimacy by making it seem that the Party had broken with its ideological roots. In this sense the Belt and Road is a continuation of Maoist ideology (tool: path dependence). However, it needs to be pointed out that the notion of a specific set of ‘developing’ countries being central to OBOR has been undermined since 2015 by Beijing’s insistence that other countries are welcome to join the initiative. By extending the reach of the BRI essentially to the whole world, Beijing has confused the initiative’s original conception. However, it is also not yet clear what an ‘invitation’ to join the Belt and Road means exactly, nor what ‘membership’ of the initiative entails. Since the BRI lacks a formal institutional structure and remains at core an initiative or strategy rather than an institutionalised arrangement, being a ‘BRI country’, included whether the nation concerned has agreed or – as in the case of India – has not, is a label without clear significance. For the purposes of the analysis in the next chapter, the original conception of the BRI as including between 60 and 70 countries, almost all of which (apart

146 The characteristics of the BRI from Egypt) are located in Asia and Europe, is going to be retained, and the Eurasian focus emphasised. At any rate, since the ‘Belt’ passes overland through Central Asia and Russia and the ‘Road’ goes through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean towards the Mediterranean, the idea of including (for instance) the Americas makes no geographical sense, even if the notion of creating some kind of broader globalised community appears attractive. The vision of a wider Belt and Road potentially including every country on earth will therefore be left on the shelf for the purposes of the analysis. In regard to the question of which countries are included in the BRI, there is one more point to be made. This concerns the status of Africa. East Africa is sometimes mentioned as being part of the Belt and Road, which, given the geography of the maritime route from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, has some logic. China has invested heavily in strategic Djibouti, where a military base was acquired in 2017 (Blanchard and Perry 2017) and a commercial port under Chinese control is also under development at Doraleh (Kuo 2019). In addition, China is involved in developing Egypt’s Suez Canal Corridor (Fouly 2017). China is building infrastructure such as railways in Kenya and Ethiopia, and has interests in many other African countries, either because of oil (Angola, Nigeria) or other resources such as copper (Zambia), diamonds (Democratic Republic of Congo), and gold (South Africa). Between 1998 and 2012, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia received the largest number of Chinese investment deals (Dollar 2016: 41). So, should some or all African countries be included in the Belt and Road? For the sake of keeping this book’s analysis as compact as possible, and because the majority of the African continent does not lie on the route to Europe via the Suez Canal, most African countries are omitted from the analysis. The exceptions are two key countries which are on the maritime route to Europe: Djibouti and Egypt. These will be included, in Chapter 6, in the analysis of the BRI in the Middle East. Conceptual tools used: economic inequality, anarchy/hierarchy/asymmetry, path dependence, interdependence. 5.2.2 The Belt and Road is intended to improve connectivity across Eurasia, primarily by focusing on improving transport and energy infrastructure, with the other stated goals probably being subsidiary The goal of enhanced connectivity via improved infrastructure – particularly energy infrastructure such as power plants and hydroelectric dams and transportation infrastructure such as railways and ports – is one that appears central to the Belt and Road’s overall aims (tool: interdependence). Some observers (e.g. Griffiths 2017, Rolland 2017, Xu 2018) focus on improved transportation networks, in particular new railways and port networks, as the main goal of the BRI in China’s drive to improve international trade and investment infrastructure. However, according to research conducted by the ChinaPower team at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.,

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Chinese investment in global energy infrastructure is on a larger scale than that in transportation, with these two areas of investment being far larger than any other (ChinaPower 2018). Analysing the specific case of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Andrew Small (2018: 199) concurs that although the Chinese are building roads and ports in Pakistan, ‘the initiative is mostly composed of energy projects in an assortment of locations around Pakistan, many of them far removed from the “corridor” routes’. This conclusion is supported by analysis of the official CPEC website, which in May 2019 listed 21 energy projects but only 8 transport infrastructure projects.2 In fact, the Chinese focus on energy in Pakistan is logical. Like many other BRI countries, Pakistan desperately needs to improve its energy supply: many parts of the country, both urban and rural, face disruptions to electricity supply of up to 18 hours per day (Valasai et al. 2017). According to the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT, authored by Derek Scissors 2019), Chinese investment in energy (US$680.3 billion) and transportation (US$352.5 billion) constituted 55.2 per cent of China’s total FDI between 2005 and 2018. Between 2015 and 2018 (i.e. roughly since the publication of the Vision and Actions BRI white paper), spending on energy (US$49.5 billion) and transport (US$33.22 billion) made up 72 per cent of total Chinese FDI in in Central Asia, South Asia, Russia and Turkey (Scissors 2019). In the Arab Middle East and North Africa, another key region, out of a total Chinese investment of US$71.11 billion from 2015 to 2018, energy investment made up over half (US$37.41 billion), while spending on transport was US$9.32 billion. The totals for all BRI countries taken together – and including, in the CGIT dataset, some African and Latin American countries – were US$182.11 billion for energy and US$132.65 billion for transport out of a total of US$473.44 billion for all sectors. As Figure 5.1 demonstrates, energy and transportation dominate Chinese BRI investment data, with energy clearly in first place. Although between 2005 and 2017 the majority (65.6 per cent) of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) went to developed countries, especially those in Europe and North America, 83.9 per cent of the US$734 billion spent on construction projects was invested in low- and middle-income countries (ChinaPower 2018). This demonstrates a clear distinction between Chinese investment strategies in developed and emerging economies: FDI in richer countries has been overwhelmingly allocated to acquisitions of existing assets, while the Chinese focus in so-called ‘developing’ nations is on creating new infrastructure (tool: economic inequality). Since the stated goal of the Belt and Road Initiative is to enhance connectivity from Asia to Europe, and the countries on this route are almost all emerging economies, the data show that it is safe to conclude that infrastructure construction is indeed, at present, the main geo-economic focus of the BRI. In terms of energy infrastructure, in March 2016, Liu Zhenya, the chairman of China’s national electricity generator State Grid Corporation of China (the world’s seventh largest company on the Forbes 500 list) and a former alternate member of the CCP’s Central Committee, launched an ambitious project for transforming power supply called global energy interconnection

148 The characteristics of the BRI Energy

182.11

Transport

132.65

Real estate

47.18

Metals

26.45

Other

16.68

Utilities

12.9

Logistics

11.99

Agriculture

9.52

Chemicals

8.01

Technology

7.56

Entertainment

7.37

Finance

5.73

Tourism

4.24

Health

1.05 0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Investments in $US billion

Figure 5.1 China’s BRI investments, 2015–2018

(GEI). The aim of GEI is to create a global ultra-high voltage (UHV) network based on the one already in operation in China which is cleaner and more efficient than existing power supplies (tool: natural environment). This would potentially deliver electricity from distant production sites to where it is most needed: for instance, electricity generated by hydroelectric dams in Africa could be delivered to Europe with a minimum of energy lost in transit. According to Liu (2015: x), global energy interconnection transmits primarily clean large clean energy bases with various distributed power ities, and delivers clean energy to different types of a widespread, highly deployable, safe, reliable, green, global energy distribution platform.

energy, connects generation facilend-users. It is and low-carbon

GEI has now been absorbed into the BRI with Xi Jinping’s approval, beginning with a direct reference to the project given at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015 (Zhang et al. 2018: 149). With Liu now at the head of the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization (GEIDCO), and China investing heavily in energy corporations and infrastructure around the world, GEI is now supposed to be an integral part of the Belt and Road, as Zhang et al. (2018: 150) point out: On the one hand, it is expected to be an integral and constructive part of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative. On the other hand, the construction of Global Energy Interconnection can provide infrastructure facilities for ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative.

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Thus, the investment data and the rhetoric surrounding GEI give the impression that Beijing is deadly serious about energy infrastructure investment being seen as the core of the BRI, including a proposed long-term drive towards greener and more efficient forms and use of energy, albeit one which is beset with major challenges (Finamore 2018). However, in marked contrast to what some would regard as Liu’s rose-tinted visions of a green energy future, studies by Andrews-Speed and Yao (2019) and Lelyveld (2019) reveal that a high proportion of plants being constructed in BRI countries by Chinese companies are in fact coal-powered. Thus, there is a danger of China’s domestic problem of over-reliance on relatively cheap and plentiful but heavily polluting coal being passed on to Belt and Road partner countries. Losos et al. (2019) also outline a wide range of environmental risks emanating from BRI transport infrastructure projects. In most cases the degree of risk is difficult to assess and predict with precision due to complex interacting factors (tool: nonlinearity/sensitivity to initial parameters). According to this study, risks include shifts in human populations to previously wild areas, air and water pollution, soil erosion, habitat destruction, barriers to wildlife migration, deforestation, and damage to sensitive ecosystems. The conclusion to be drawn here is that the official Chinese discourse about the supposedly environmentally friendly BRI needs to be tempered by further data-driven studies of the complex knock-on impacts of energy and transportation infrastructure projects on the natural environment in partner countries, which, given the complexity of the implementation of the BRI, are still evolving (tool: emergence/ self-organisation). As far as transportation infrastructure is concerned, it is clearly the case that connections within and between many Asian countries and between Asia and Europe need major improvements. As anybody who has travelled widely in Asia will know, the Belt and Road regions are generally poorly connected across land borders, and often – for instance in Mongolia or Cambodia – also have inadequate internal transportation infrastructure. The lack of quality roads and railways means that trade is impeded and inefficient, a point which is well understood by the Chinese but not always by Western observers who lack local experience in BRI countries and may take well-developed transportation infrastructure for granted. Emphasising lack of transportation infrastructure across much of Asia (and also Africa) leads to another point that seems to be missed by some critics of the BRI: as Richard Griffiths (2017) points out, the goal of improving transport connections is a logical one which could lead to enhanced economic growth, but which requires massive, coordinated long-term investment – which thus far has not been on offer from the US or the EU in any sustained way. The fact that the Chinese are proposing investment in the vital area of transport infrastructure is therefore a valid vision for the long-term development and greater integration of Europe and Asia, even if the logistical details remain, in most cases, unclear. In short, the other stated goals of the BRI thus would seem to be subsidiary to the overarching aim of improved connectivity and infrastructure in the

150 The characteristics of the BRI areas of transportation and energy. As Figure 5.1 shows, the majority of proposed Chinese investment relates to infrastructure of one kind or another, be it transport-related (such as ports and railways) or resource- and energyrelated (such as dams and power plants). The mooted idea of financial integration appears to be further down the list of priorities. It seems that rather than full-scale internationalisation of the Renminbi (RMB), Beijing is instead aiming to establish a ‘closed currency bloc’ in selected regions such as Central Asia in order to ensure a greater degree of top-down control and to exclude free-floating international currency markets (Blank 2018: 183). The same can be said of enhanced people-to-people contacts: the introduction of the ‘Eight-point regulation’ in December 2012, a drive to eliminate official corruption in the CCP, has led to increased supervision of expenditure by officials and academics, including on overseas travel (Doyon 2017). Restricted budgets and limits to foreign travel are likely to impede progress on genuine cooperation with institutions outside China: this is a problem with which anybody who has tried to build contacts and cooperation with Chinese universities will be familiar. The evidence thus suggests that enhancing people-topeople relations is effectively regarded as a much lower priority than investing in infrastructure. In relation to infrastructure construction, the issue of purported domestic over-capacity in industries such as steelmaking, building and oil refining is often raised by the PRC government and Chinese scholars (see for instance State Council, 2015, Pan et al. 2017, Shen and Chen 2017). Firms, it is said, need to go overseas to relieve the over-supply in the Chinese domestic economy. However, Kenderdine and Ling’s (2018) also point out that underlying the question of industrial over-capacity lies fiscal over-stimulus in the form of state-backed loans. This has caused the over-supply of debt-laden, inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Reforms and closures were supposed to have solved the problem, but whenever the economy shows signs of slowing, the government injects new loans to get growth going again (tool: feedback effects). Thus, according to Kenderdine and Ling’s analysis, it is likely that sending Chinese firms overseas to construct and invest is a method for exporting debt and postponing the restructuring process from state to free market capitalism, in the process maintaining the status quo in the Chinese domestic economy. In this way, the CCP’s targeted GDP growth level of 6 per cent can be sustained and China’s share of global power continues to rise (tools: material power). Probably just as significant is the strategy of establishing Chinese interests and positions in as many countries as possible via construction projects carried out by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies, often funded by state-backed loans to the partner state (tool: states/non-state actors). Thus, infrastructure construction, while ostensibly an enabler of increased connectivity and economic growth, also has a political aspect in terms of being a gateway to greater Chinese influence in the countries where it takes place (tool: anarchy/ hierarchy/asymmetry). Projects create financial indebtedness to Chinese state

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banks, most notably the Export-Import (Exim) Bank of China, giving China leverage over the partner state. While generating debt in the partner country, the finance provided never truly leaves Chinese hands, passing from Chinese banks into the pockets of Chinese construction companies. Construction projects also require a Chinese presence in the relevant countries for extended periods of time, usually including large numbers of Chinese construction workers. Frequently, projects involve the construction of new assets which are likely to be useful to China in the long-term, such as ports. Thus, there remains some doubt whether the Belt and Road’s primary objective is really to improve connectivity between BRI nations, or whether this is in fact secondary to the promotion of Chinese national interests, including comprehensive national security goals conceived in terms of military, energy and economic security. Infrastructure construction is certainly being prioritised over other stated goals such as financial integration and people-to-people ties, but the practical outcomes of such projects remain unknown, with some observers fearing a ‘march of white elephants’ – useless unused infrastructure (Assef 2018, Toktomushev 2019). Policy coordination and unimpeded trade, the other two goals pointed to in the 2015 white paper (NDRC 2015), are vague and open to interpretation (for instance, the meaning of ‘unimpeded’ is unclear, as pointed out in Chapter 4). However, it may be that the Belt and Road has other goals which are not mentioned in the government publications and that the official discourse about win-win cooperation and large-scale Chinese investment conceals these other, perhaps more significant, goals. Logically, there are at least three other strong possibilities concerning Beijing’s aims. One is that the BRI has the geostrategic aim of enhancing Chinese national security both geopolitically and geo-economically by extending China’s zone of influence and general material power at the expense of other powers such as the US, Russia and India. The second is that the initiative is needed, as discussed in this section, as a release valve to release pent-up pressure in the domestic economy caused by over-capacity and excessive debt by exporting them overseas. And the third is that the aims of the Belt and Road are closely linked to Xi’s ‘China dream’ discourse and that it is a tool for increasing the CCP’s and the president’s legitimacy in the eyes of both global audiences and the Chinese people (tool: ideational power). Of course, it is also entirely possible that all three aims are wrapped up in the ambitious package that is the BRI, and that they can, with the ‘combinatorial logic of analytic eclecticism’ (Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 18), be absorbed into a complex overall picture of the BRI which also includes connectivity, integration and economic growth which benefits partner countries as well as China. Conceptual tools used: anarchy/hierarchy/asymmetry, interdependence, material power, ideational power, natural environment, economic inequality, states/ non-state actors, feedback effects, nonlinearity/sensitivity to initial parameters, emergence/self-organisation.

152 The characteristics of the BRI 5.2.3 The Belt and Road contains two main routes, the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) There can be no doubt that the Belt and Road is intended to push in a westwards direction towards Europe via both land and sea. In this broad sense there are two routes. However, the notion that there is only one belt and one road is a misreading of the Chinese name of the initiative (yidai yilu, 一带一 路): according to a professor of geography at the Chinese Academy of Sciences with close links to President Xi, the initiative should be seen as ‘abstract and metaphorical’ rather than relating to fixed routes (Liu 2014).3 In fact, it is now generally understood that there are a number of alternative proposed routes beginning in China and extending into the various regions of the BRI. Using the ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ method pioneered by Deng Xiaoping, there is clear evidence that the Chinese are still working out which routes are more viable than others, with scholars personally appointed by Xi Jinping working on the details (Sidaway and Woon 2017: 600). This is probably why the initiative was (re-)christened the Belt and Road (rather than ‘one belt, one road’) in the March 2015 official Vision and Actions document. In another important sense, the idea of a ‘belt’ and a ‘road’ is exactly that: an idea or mental journey rather than a fixed physical reality. Standard maps of the BRI, the most totemic of which was first published by the Chinese state news media outlet Xinhua in 2014 (Summers 2016: 1630–1631), often depict two lines with somewhat illogical, fixed routes connecting China with Europe by land and sea. For instance, on some maps the land route from China passes through Istanbul before taking a turn up through Ukraine to Moscow and then swinging drastically westwards and ending up in Rotterdam. This obviously makes little sense in terms of physical geography but makes a good deal of sense in terms of the type of metaphorical discourse often deployed by Chinese leaders to mobilise support for their policies (tools: ideational power, intersubjectivity). Unfortunately, however, the end result of the publication of such maps is that the terms ‘belt’, ‘road’ and ‘corridors’ have been interpreted by some observers as literal descriptions of fixed routes and realities, with frequent confusion about what has already been built, what is under construction, and what still remains on the drawing board. For instance, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been generally understood as describing an effort to establish an ambitious new trans-Himalayan connection which would give China an overland link to the Pakistani port of Gwadar on the Indian Ocean (tool: material power). There is a perception (which has been disseminated so widely by Chinese and Pakistani media and academics that it has become something of a truism) that Beijing is planning a railway and pipelines in addition to the existing road, which was built in the 1970s with great difficulty and loss of life (Small 2015: 99). New infrastructure would purportedly connect Xinjiang in China with north-eastern Pakistan across the Karakoram mountains. However, rigorous study of the extremely challenging local geography (including high

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altitudes, frequent earthquakes, and extremely challenging mountainous terrain) and problems such as the ongoing border dispute with India and Pakistan’s internal instability cast doubt on the possibility of adding complex new overland connections (see Erickson and Collins 2010, Small 2015, Marshall 2015: Chapter 7, Garlick 2018). In fact, as Chapter 6 will demonstrate, it is logistically improbable that these trans-Himalayan connections can be built, and there is evidence that it is also doubtful, in the face of such difficulties and probably astronomical expense, that it is even the Chinese government’s intention to build them (Duchâtel 2011: 557, Li 2016). To sum up this section’s argument, three points need to be made. The first is that the land and sea ‘routes’ are interconnected at many points (e.g. in the Indian Ocean littoral, in the Mediterranean seaboard) rather than totally separate. It therefore does not make sense to see the ‘belt’ and ‘road’ as separate entities when countries such as Vietnam, Pakistan and India are impacted by China’s expansion both on land and at sea. The second point is that although critical geography’s analysis of the use of space for oppression and domination (Ó Tuathail 1996) is important (and might also be used as an analytical framework for interpreting the BRI), the on-the-ground reality of physical geography must also be taken into account in accounts of China’s global expansion and the BRI (see Grygiel 2006, Cohen 2015, Brewster 2017, Garlick 2018). The third point is that there is a strong metaphorical or ideational aspect to Chinese discourse about ‘one belt’ and ‘one road’ which does not translate well into English and therefore tends to confuse non-Chinese observers. Awareness of the cultural and ideational as well as the material aspects of the BRI therefore needs to be raised amongst scholars, politicians, journalists and the public. Conceptual tools used: ideational power, material power, intersubjectivity. 5.2.4 The Belt and Road contains sub-projects At first sight, the notion that the Belt and Road is an over-arching framework (or system) containing a number of sub-projects or sub-systems (such as the six ‘corridors’) seems to make sense. This, as has been discussed in earlier chapters, points one in the direction of complex systems theory or complex adaptive systems and their focus on analysing the emergence, nonlinearity and feedback effects produced when multiple systems interact (tools: emergence/selforganisation, nonlinearity/sensitivity to initial parameters, feedback effects). However, the extent to which the purported sub-projects really can be linked together to form an overall whole – the BRI – is not clear at this stage in the initiative’s development. There is also the additional problem that many of the individual ‘sub-projects’ pre-date the BRI or are not clearly positioned within it. For instance, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the ‘16+1’ forum for meetings between Chinese leaders and the leaders of Central and Eastern European (CEE) nations might be considered sub-projects within the overarching BRI and, indeed, now seem to have been absorbed into it (tool: institutions). However, CPEC and the 16+1 already existed even before the BRI

154 The characteristics of the BRI was introduced to the world in autumn 2013, and due to their characteristics, both material and ideational, it is not entirely clear precisely how each is intended to function within the overall framework of the initiative. CPEC is complicated because China-Pakistan cooperation predates the Belt and Road by decades. The construction of the Karakoram Highway took place in the 1970s, and the involvement of Chinese companies in Gwadar port has been ongoing since the 1990s. CPEC itself was not originally included as a BRI sub-project but was mentioned in the Vision and Actions document as being ‘closely related’ to the BRI (NDRC 2015). CPEC’s precise role, however, was not defined in Visions and Actions beyond a vague statement about ‘closer cooperation and greater progress’. Since many construction projects now included in CPEC were initiated earlier – not least Gwadar port – and the extent to which CPEC is intended to be situated intrinsically within BRI is not entirely clear, the relationship between CPEC and the Belt and Road is also unclear. Crucially, due to considerations of geography (a land border disputed with India, difficult mountainous terrain, and earthquake fault lines) and security (the prevalence of terrorism and separatism in Pakistan and the subsequent need for armed guards to protect infrastructure and personnel), the extent to which a land corridor can be constructed overland between China and Pakistan which will link to other corridors and connections to form a larger network is debatable (see Garlick 2018). Similarly, the 16+1 forum slightly pre-dates the Belt and Road, since it was set up in 2011 and the first forum meeting took place in 2012. However, since the 16 CEE countries included in 16+1 are all also included by China in the Belt and Road, it seems that the 16+1 is intended to be a BRI sub-project. Also, the intended ‘end point’ of both the ‘belt’ and ‘road’ is Europe, with CEE apparently seen as a ‘gateway’ to the important markets of Western Europe. However, since Duisburg in Germany is de facto the central dry port for overland train connections, and Western European ports such as Rotterdam receive far larger quantities of Chinese goods by sea than any CEE locations (many of which, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, are landlocked), CEE’s role in Sino-European trade is rather unclear. The same goes for Chinese investments, since Chinese investments in CEE have thus far been relatively unimpressive (Eder and Mardell 2018). In fact, Western European countries – in particular, Germany, France and the UK – which together accounted for 75 per cent of Chinese investment in the EU in 2017 – have been absorbing the lion’s share of investment capital from Chinese firms (Zeneli 2019). Additionally, the Chinese attempt to fashion the 16 CEE countries selected into a bloc of some kind has so far not produced much in the way of tangible outcomes in terms of cooperation and integration between the nations on the basis set by the Chinese. China-CEE relations remain in an unclear, emerging state, and the relation of the 16+1 to the overall BRI has not been well explained by either the Chinese or CEE partners in terms of its strategic goals and potential benefits for each side.

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In the case of both CPEC and 16+1, both the sub-projects themselves and their connection to the overall Belt and Road connectivity project remain unclearly defined. The upside to this lack of clarity is that the BRI and its ‘subprojects’ are malleable and can easily be redefined as need requires. However, this again pushes the analysis in the direction of ideational power concepts and constructivist conceptions of international relations rather than being related to specific material aims or gains (tool: ideational power). Conceptual tools used: institutions, ideational power, emergence/selforganisation, nonlinearity/sensitivity to initial parameters, feedback effects. 5.2.5 The Belt and Road is a continuation of previous official Chinese government policies Although the BRI seems to be a new initiative launched as a cornerstone of Xi Jinping’s presidency, it is in fact a continuation of previous official Chinese policies from the Jiang Zemin era, namely ‘going out/going global’ (zou chuqu, 走 出去) and ‘develop the west’ (xibu dakaifa, 西部大开发). This means that it is very far from being a clean break from previous policy and is instead dependent on long-term developments such as the economic expansion initiated at the domestic level under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and extended by Jiang into the international arena in 1999 (tool: path dependence). Thus, the Belt and Road needs to be seen as an elaboration and extension of previous policy, building on the base constructed by Xi’s predecessors (Summers 2016, Small 2018: 192, Tekdal 2018: 374). Deng’s strategy for economic growth involved a mixture of special economic zones (SEZs), investment from foreign companies, expansion into global markets via industrial production, and experiments with entrepreneurship replacing Maoist communal enterprise. Putting economics ahead of ideology meant opening China up to the world. Deng saw the risk to China’s national integrity this entailed as being more than offset by the potential gains. In fact, Deng’s reforms produced spectacular results in terms of an average increase in gross domestic product (GDP) of around 10 per cent per year and effectively mobilised large sections of the Chinese population to seek factory work in SEZs and fuel an explosion in export-led growth. Rather than seeking to become active overseas (in the 1980s and early 1990s China was not sufficiently developed to take the step), the primary focus was on building up the domestic economy, which had been left in an undeveloped state during the chaotic years (1966–1976) of Mao’s Cultural Revolution.4 During the Jiang Zemin era, the ‘going out/going global’ campaign was initiated to encourage Chinese companies to look overseas for business opportunities and to expand China’s global influence (tool: material power). It contains an inherent linkage between economic and political goals through a focus on enhancing China’s national security via economic statecraft, which began to be developed as a deliberate strategy during the 1990s (Heath 2016). Thus, there is an obvious connection with the Belt and Road

156 The characteristics of the BRI Initiative, which seems to build on ‘going out’ by transforming it into an ambitious programme of network construction and economic integration across the Eurasian landmass (tool: interdependence). The ‘develop the west’ initiative, launched in the same year, is intended to develop China’s impoverished western regions such as Xinjiang, Gansu and Qinghai. These provinces, being far from China’s rich, densely populated areas on the eastern seaboard, generally receive fewer economic opportunities due to geographical distance and their landlocked status. ‘Develop the West’ is being incorporated into the Belt and Road, as individual provinces are assigned a role in establishing contacts with specific regions in the BRI which may be at a similarly relatively low level of economic development, for instance in Central or South Asia (tool: economic inequality). For this reason, Tim Summers sees the Belt and Road as an evolution of ‘ideas and practices developed mainly at the sub-national level since the 1980s’ (Summers 2016: 1634). In a sense, then, Belt and Road could be perceived as simply a relabelling or expansion of ‘going out’ and ‘going west’, repackaging them for a global audience as well as the domestic one which was targeted by Jiang (tool: ideational power). It can therefore be seen as an evolution of previous policy rather than a genuinely new policy direction. Nevertheless, it contains a vastly more complex strategy than the previous initiatives in the sense that it not only synthesises domestic growth with ‘going out’ and ‘going west’, but also apparently aims to enmesh them with the economies of the BRI countries via industrial development and infrastructure construction. Although the 2015 Vision and Actions publication states that the initiative ‘is open to all countries’ (NDRC 2015, Section II: Principles), the main focus of the Belt and Road at the level of detail is on promoting international cooperation with emerging economies rather than developed ones (see State Council 2015). It also links to issues of China’s long-term rise and power, both in the material and ideational senses, and points to institution-building in the Northian/Tangian sense (tool: institutions). Conceptual tools used: material power, ideational power, institutions, interdependence, economic inequality, path dependence. 5.2.6 The BRI is Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy initiative, and thus closely associated with his leadership Since the Belt and Road was launched personally by Xi in a pair of speeches in autumn 2013, it has been clear that it is closely linked with his presidency as ‘his signature foreign policy idea’ (Summers 2016: 1629). Traditionally, the style of Chinese leadership is that individual presidents are associated with specific slogans and mobilization campaigns: in Xi’s case, his two trademark initiatives are the BRI and the ‘China dream’ of national rejuvenation and enhanced prosperity and global status (tool: ideational power). This has led observers to point out that the Xi era is one of greater assertiveness on the global stage

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and thus represents a clean break from the Dengian policy of taoguang yanghui (韬光养晦, often translated as ‘hiding one’s light and biding one’s time’; Ferdinand 2016, Zhou and Esteban 2018: 488, Hu 2019, Wang 2019). On the other hand, the Chinese dream of national revival has a history of more than a century, since it can be traced back to Sun Yat-Sen, the toppling of the Qing dynasty, and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 (Jin 2017, Mierzejewski and Kowalski 2019: 40). It has also been noted that Xi is the first General Secretary of the CCP since Mao to have something resembling a cult of personality begin to grow up around him. Discussion of ‘Xi Jinping thought’ begins to resemble Maoism and Mao’s ‘little red book’: unlike his immediate predecessors, during his presidency Xi has published two books of his speeches, which have even been translated into English and widely distributed in Western bookstores (Xi 2014, 2018). Two of these speeches (Xi 2014: 315–324) launched the Belt and Road, which, as his flagship foreign policy, is thus more than just a Chinese initiative: it is Xi’s initiative. Consequently, Xi’s image and presence constitutes an ideational aspect of the BRI which cannot be ignored. In the sense that Xi Jinping is the latest in a line of older male leaders of the CCP, the fact that the BRI is his hallmark initiative means that it is possible to interpret it as an international extension of Confucian ethics, including patriarchy (tool: patriarchal authoritarianism). Decision-making power in the CCP – as well as throughout much of Chinese society – rests almost entirely in the hands of patriarchal males such as Xi (Fincher 2018). With women largely excluded from positions of power, Xi’s leadership, of which the Belt and Road is a manifestation, implicitly extends Confucian patriarchy into foreign affairs and the international sphere. Conceptual tools used: ideational power, patriarchal authoritarianism. 5.2.7 The BRI involves the use of institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund and regional forums Although the official discourse associated with the Belt and Road Initiative tends to give the impression that the BRI is not institutional in character, various features of it bely the official account. Most obviously, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund are financial institutions which are specifically designed to support China’s expansion through the BRI (tools: institutions, states/non-state actors). The AIIB was founded in 2016 and the Silk Road Fund in 2014. In addition, as we have seen, CPEC has been incorporated into the BRI and, although not necessarily planned as such, has some institutional characteristics such as an official set of funded projects and an official website. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), although created prior to Xi’s presidency, also plays a support role to the BRI in terms of generating favourable conditions for Chinese expansion into Central Asia by

158 The characteristics of the BRI smoothing relations with Russia and its former Soviet satellites and is undoubtedly institutional in nature. An important aspect of the BRI is the use of a foreign policy which aims to shape cooperation between states in terms by a process of regionalisation via institutional arrangements. Former diplomat Kishan Rana (2008: 300) points out that China is an ‘astute practitioner’ of regional diplomacy, as evidenced by its active participation in regional forums such as the SCO and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. To shape regional cooperation according to its needs, Beijing uses institutions, practices and language to normatively reconfigure interactions between actors at the inter-state level in order to enhance its ideational power (Kavalski 2009, 2013, Vangeli 2018). Ideational power is generated through newly-formed, Chinese-led institutional structures and used in the service of material goals such as economic interests and political influence. China’s regionalising foreign policy thus aligns with Robert W. Cox’s (1981) and Tang Shiping’s (2013) assertion that the interaction of material, ideational and institutional factors shapes the international environment. For instance, the SCO has allowed Beijing to gradually increase its political and economic influence by cultivating the support of local leaders in Central Asia (Reeves 2018). Similarly, in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), China has attempted since 2012 to realign regional relations using the ‘16+1’ framework for cooperation between itself and 16 CEE countries, in a comparable way to the way it uses the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as a facilitator of reconfigured inter-state dynamics in Africa (Jakóbowski 2018). Beijing also uses the China Arab Cooperation Forum (CACF), launched in 2004, to smooth relations and steadily generate Chinese normative power in Arab states (Yao 2014). It may be objected (most notably by Chinese officials and academics) that arrangements such as CACF, SCO, 16+1 and FOCAC are platforms or forums for meetings of heads of state rather than fully-fledged institutions or ‘non-state actors’. Nevertheless, the fact that they bring together actors for repeated consultation over a period of years means, as Tang (2011) and Kenderdine and Lan (2019: 6) demonstrate, that they are de facto institutional in nature even if the Chinese define them using different terminology. Indeed, the logic of the BRI’s focus on integrating regions necessitates the development of region-specific institutional frameworks and practices. As well as benefitting partner countries, China’s promotion of region-based connectivity aims to enhance China’s ‘comprehensive national power’ (Ong 2007: 12) and to increase the PRC’s political and economic influence. On the other hand, in terms of the overtly formal institutions within the BRI such as financial institutions, the role of the AIIB and Silk Road Fund as providing finance for the Belt and Road may be overstated. There is evidence that vastly more funds for BRI infrastructure projects are being channelled through Chinese state banks and other state-backed financing sources than through the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund (Small 2018: 195). It is likely that these two institutions created specifically in support of the Belt and Road mainly serve the

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purpose of promoting China’s efforts to gradually transform the international system to suit Chinese interests (tools: material power, ideational power). In the case of the AIIB, simply the fact that China has managed to attract a large number of nations to invest and participate in the institution, including European powers such as Germany and the UK, also serves a legitimising function: the AIIB to an extent validates Chinese economic diplomacy by adding, even in the fact of US resistance, a Chinese financial institution to the mainly Western pantheon of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). In addition, it provides a channel for China to disburse some of its foreign exchange reserves into the international sphere in a transparent way which is acceptable for Westerners. Meanwhile, the Silk Road Fund performs a legitimising role in terms of promoting Chinese ideational (i.e. soft, normative, symbolic) power merely by means of its name, which generates positive connotations among international audiences and Chinese alike. However, the precise role that these two institutions are to play in the propagation of the BRI is not clear. An explanation of aims which goes beyond vague discussion of mutual benefit is missing in much of the official discourse and scholarly literature. However, Kenderdine and Ling (2018) helpfully note the links between China’s efforts to export excess industrial capacity in order to maintain economic growth in the Chinese economy and the funding of this process by Chinese financial institutions. According to the authors, this process of leveraging offshore infrastructure projects is linked to the Belt and Road but not intrinsic to it. They claim that the BRI’s geopolitical goals distinguish the initiative from the geo-economic goal of ‘dumping factories into external geographies’ (p. 43) via what is termed ‘international capacity cooperation’. On the other hand, Kenderdine and Ling’s claim that the BRI is solely ‘a long-term structural geopolitical strategy’ (p. 43) without geo-economic content is an odd one which does not stand up to scrutiny. Nevertheless, their analysis (p. 44) of the complex matrix through which government departments, financial institutions, statebacked funds, provincial governments and SOEs link together to fund overseas transportation and energy infrastructure building projects is a valuable one which assists in understanding how the Belt and Road is being implemented through institutions. Overall, in contradiction of a purely geopolitical interpretation, the Belt and Road can be seen as an overarching envelope for a large set of evolving institutions and practices in the foreign policy sphere which enables the formation of connections between geo-economic and geopolitical goals in a regionalising foreign policy of influence formation. At the same time, since it is difficult to pin down exactly what the BRI is and is not, and interpretations differ, it seems wise to return to the idea of the initiative as an ideational as well as material construct within which an increasingly complex network of institutional practices take shape and intersect. Conceptual tools used: institutions, material power, ideational power, states/ non-state actors.

160 The characteristics of the BRI 5.2.8 The Belt and Road is intended to have appeal for foreign audiences as well as the domestic Chinese one, thus boosting China’s soft power abroad and legitimacy at home While Xi’s ‘China dream’ rhetoric seeks legitimation in the domestic sphere via promotion of nationalistic sentiments and visions of increasing Chinese wealth and power, the Belt and Road explicitly seeks to convince foreign audiences of China’s positive intentions and ability to radically transform a broken international order (Zhao 2006, Ferdinand 2016; tool: ideational power). Paulo Duarte (2019: 159) notes that the New Silk Road is made not only of infrastructures and investments, connectivity and “thirst” for resources but also of a narrative that the government is constructing for “internal consumption” and in order to allay the fears of the international community regarding China’s real intentions in this century. The weight of evidence already examined in this book points to a very strong ideational aspect to the BRI, with China self-consciously pursuing a global soft power drive since before the Belt and Road was even conceived (Kurlantzick 2007) and continuing it by means of Xi’s flagship foreign policy initiative. One point to add to this analysis is one that is not always addressed. Boosting China’s overseas image (to the extent that this is indeed achieved) impacts the Chinese public’s perception of their nation’s status in the world and assists in legitimising Xi and the CCP’s administration. This results in a positive feedback loop, since the perceived boost to China’s overseas image feeds into nationalistic sentiment and pride, which then leads to an increase in support for Xi and his Belt and Road projects, which then receive more media focus and funding, and so on (tool: feedback effects). In short, ideational factors play a huge role in OBOR and its impact both overseas and at home in China, and thus they are undoubtedly at the forefront of Beijing’s Belt and Road strategising. Possible conceptual tools: ideational power, feedback effects. 5.2.9 The Belt and Road is ambitious, large-scale, loose, and vague It is, as this chapter is demonstrating, very difficult to state clearly what is BRI and what is not: the initiative, as many have pointed out, is vague, amorphous, hugely ambitious, and lacking in detail (e.g. Chen 2016, Shapiro 2017, Brown 2017: 143). As Yuen Yuen Ang (2019) points out, ‘nobody, including in Beijing, knows what BRI really is.’ However, it is likely that from Beijing’s perspective this is exactly the point: by developing the initiative as a broad, loose and potentially all-inclusive framework, it remains a flexible instrument which is open to alteration as needs require (Small 2018: 194). Liu Weidong, a professor of geography appointed by Xi Jinping to lead a ‘core group of scholars’ in researching the Belt and Road, refers to the initiative as ‘an

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ongoing and creative open project’ (Liu 2014, Sidaway and Woon 2017: 600). This keeps it in line with the approach often employed by CCP leaders of making policy proclamations which are deliberately broad in order to leave the door open for shifts of emphasis in future policy as needs demand. Such a design means that changes to aspects of the international or domestic environment will not undermine the overall goals of the initiative. In other words, the BRI is an elastic framework which can absorb change and be easily reshaped, rather than a rigid structure incapable of adjustment. Given its very loose structure, it should be able to absorb shocks generated by black swan events such as stock market crashes, natural disasters or sudden economic downturns and emerge reshaped but intact, maintaining its balance at the edge of chaos (tools: black swans, tipping points/edge of chaos). On the other hand, the looseness of conception in inherent in the BRI makes it difficult to assess the degree of success or failure of the initiative, at least in the short- to medium-term. Again, however, this may well be the point: if the Belt and Road cannot be judged a failure any time soon, Xi’s legitimacy as the ruler of China and the initiator of the initiative is inherently protected from critique by either domestic or global publics (tools: ideational power, intersubjectivity). At the same time, it is likely to be difficult to say what would be the criteria by which to judge the initiative a success, particularly if the large-scale connectivity goals outlined in section 5.2.2 prove to be difficult to realise. Possible conceptual tools: ideational power, intersubjectivity, black swans, tipping points/edge of chaos. 5.2.10 The BRI is intended to achieve win-win cooperation among participating nations The oft-repeated mantra of ‘win-win cooperation’ was discussed extensively in Chapter 4, so the reader is referred to those pages (tool: ideational power). However, it is important to repeat that the slogan’s goals are poorly defined (probably deliberately). From the Western perspective, there are connotations of complex interdependence, economic integration, and free market capitalism (tool: interdependence). However, as previously stated, there may be different implications and expectations from the Chinese side, for instance bilateral agreements between sovereign governments and the assumption that cooperation will be based on investment and financing via what Kenderdine and Ling (2018) refer to as China’s state capitalism model (tool: material power). Another possibility is that the notion of ‘win-win cooperation’ and other associated Chinese rhetoric such as the ‘peaceful rise’ trope used during the Hu Jintao presidency can be linked to the Confucian concept of harmony (tool: Confucian harmony). Zhao Tingyang’s tianxia theory takes harmony to include the idea of a new global order to replace the existing Western-derived one (Zhao 2006), with distinct tones of neo-Gramscian counter-hegemony. Harmony in the Confucian sense is also supposed to be based on the inclusion and utilisation of diverse talents and abilities rather than, as is sometimes thought,

162 The characteristics of the BRI homogenisation (Li 2006: 584–587). So theoretically this would allow for diversity of ethnicity, culture and religion across the Belt and Road nations. On the other hand, the experience of ethnic Han Chinese colonisation and suppression of Tibetan and Uighur areas within China’s borders does not seem to augur well for future tolerance of difference in countries in which China is beginning to exert economic and political influence, such as Pakistan and Myanmar. Possible conceptual tools: interdependence, Confucian harmony, ideational power, material power

5.3 Conclusion: unpacking the implications Completing the examination of the presumed characteristics of the BRI in sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.10 reveals that while some qualification is needed in most cases, it makes sense to take the ten statements in this chapter as the bedrock of the initiative and a good starting point for analysis of the BRI using the conceptual tools from the IR and CT toolkits. Certain tools were applied more frequently in the analysis than others, but all were applied at some point (see Table 5.2). However, it should be noted there is no intention here to pretend that the listings of concepts in sections above constitutes data which can be precisely evaluated using quantitative methods. The prevalence of certain concepts in the

Table 5.2 Number of times conceptual tools were applied Conceptual tool

Number of uses

Ideational power Material power Interdependence Institutions Economic inequality Feedback effects States/non-state actors Anarchy/hierarchy/asymmetry Intersubjectivity Path dependence Nonlinearity/sensitivity to initial parameters Emergence/self-organisation Confucian harmony Patriarchal authoritarianism Natural environment Black swans Tipping points/edge of chaos

9 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1

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analysis can be no more than suggestive of the core aims and emerging characteristics of the Belt and Road. This chapter – as well as Table 5.2 – is intended to be a stimulus to further research rather than a definitive result of any kind. It is also important to note that simply because a concept was used less than others it does not imply that it is not significant. For instance, the fact that the patriarchal authoritarianism and natural environment tools occurred only once in the analysis does not in any way imply that they are less important than the others. Nonetheless, the most striking point to be derived from Table 5.2 is the prevalence of ideational power in the analysis. This suggests that the soft/normative/symbolic power nexus outlined in Chapter 4 is indeed key to understanding many aspects of the Belt and Road. While quantification of the use of concepts in this chapter does not by any means constitute incontrovertible proof, it is strongly suggestive that a key aspect of the initiative is an effort to employ the BRI itself to attract and rally global publics to China’s cause, with domestic legitimacy and the ‘China dream’ also in the frame. The relatively lower count of other concepts in the analysis implies that other policy goals of the Chinese government, even when given more emphasis in official publications and speeches, are in fact likely to be further down the list of priorities. As already discussed, the concept of ideational power contains within it both positive and negative connotations, in that it is necessary to parse whether one is talking about building consensus for action which will benefit all parties or manipulating opinion to suit the geostrategic ends of the dominant actor. Unfortunately, in international politics, motivations are difficult to discern, and soft, normative and symbolic power analyses are consequently difficult to separate. For this reason, as stated in Chapter 4, they are bundled here into one concept. Nevertheless, the different strands within the concept can be examined and applied where necessary, and the analysis of this chapter at least strongly points to the conclusion that ideational power and the Belt and Road go hand in hand and that it will be important to bear this in mind when probing deeper into the initiative as it is being applied in various BRI countries and regions. Unsurprisingly, also prevalent in the concept listings are material power, interdependence and institutions. The Belt and Road includes the notion of creating a network of interlinked countries, so interdependence and institutions are obviously going to be involved. China’s increasing material power, mainly in the economic sense, also clearly needs to be accounted for. As for anarchy/hierarchy/asymmetry, the ‘anarchy’ element, as explained in Chapter 4, seems to be less analytically useful with regard to the BRI’s core characteristics than hierarchy and asymmetry, although it may be said to have some bearing on Chinese attempts to build a base for increased global influence in the existing international system of Westphalian states. The prevalence of material, institutional and ideational aspects in the analysis is suggestive of the utility of the neo-Gramscian framework of counter-hegemony outlined in Chapter 2, but also provides support for Tang’s SEP. Deeper analysis of the extent to which the complex eclecticism toolkit analysis supports or

164 The characteristics of the BRI undermines the three macro-level theories outlined in Chapter 2 will be conducted in Chapter 7. Among CT concepts, feedback effects lead the way, with the other five all being used at least once. Thus, there seems to be a good case for claiming that the CT tools have utility in explaining system effects along the Belt and Road. Table 5.2 shows that IR concepts generally take up more space in the analysis, but this does not mean that the presence of complexity effects is not also significant. As far as the complex eclecticism toolkit is concerned, the analysis conducted in this chapter suggests that it can be helpful for understanding the Belt and Road, even if the application of the tools does not always produce conclusive results. The chapter has also demonstrated that it is not necessary to stick within existing paradigmatic boundaries to analyse global phenomena. Using the tools without constantly referencing IR theory ‘-isms’ enables a more flexible analysis than would be possible when discussing standard paradigmatic tropes. Thus, the next step is to probe deeper into the empirical detail of the Belt and Road, retaining the conceptual toolkits as analytical devices. Chapter 6 will therefore examine the progress of the BRI in the major regions of Asia and Europe to which it has been addressed. Chapter 7 will then draw the threads of the book together to assess the extent to which complex eclecticism’s abductive approach has cast fresh light on the Belt and Road Initiative and can be used as the basis for macro-level theorising concerning Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy.

Notes 1 See ‘Brief Introduction’ on the State Information Center’s website, available at: www. sic.gov.cn/Column/595/0.htm. The NDRC is an agency under the Chinese State Council which conducts and coordinates Chinese macroeconomic management and planning. 2 The official CPEC website, which receives regular updates, is at cpec.gov.pk. 3 See Sidaway and Woon (2017: 592–593) for an explanation in English of Liu’s article. 4 For more on the story of China’s development under Deng, see Kroeber (2016: 1–66).

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Kenderdine, Tristan, and Han Ling (2018) ‘International capacity cooperation – financing China’s export of industrial overcapacity’, Global Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 41–52. Kroeber, Arthur R. (2016) China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York: Oxford University Press. Kuo, Mercy A. (2019) ‘China in Djibouti: the power of ports’, The Diplomat, 25 March. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/china-in-djibouti-the-power-of-ports/. Kurlantzick, Joshua (2007) Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Lelyveld, Michael (2019) China’s Belt and Road Initiative blackened by coal – analysis, Radio Free Asia, 31 January. Available at: www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_ watch/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-blackened-by-coal-01312019115712.html. Li, Chenyang (2006) ‘The confucian ideal of harmony’, Philosophy East and West, Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 583–603. Li, Xuanmin (2016) ‘Gwadar Port benefits to China limited’, Global Times, 23 November, available at: www.globaltimes.cn/content/1019840.shtml. Liu, Hai Yue, Ying Kai Tang, Xiao Lan Chen, and Joanna Poznanska (2017) ‘The determinants of Chinese outward FDI in countries along “One Belt One Road”’, Emerging Markets Finance & Trade, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 1374–1387. Liu, Weidong (2014) ‘“Yidai yilu zhanluede renshi wuqu” [The misconceptions of One Belt, One Road]’, Guojia Xingzheng Xueyuan Xuebao, Vol. 2016, No. 1, pp. 3–6. Liu, Zhen (2018) ‘China reveals ‘Polar Silk Road’ ambition in Arctic policy white paper’, South China Morning Post, 26 January. Available at: www.scmp.com/news/china/diplo macy-defence/article/2130785/china-reveals-polar-silk-road-ambition-arctic-policy. Liu, Zhengya (2015) Global Energy Interconnection, London: Academic Press. Losos, Elizabeth, Alexander Pfaff, Lydia Olander, Sara Mason, and Seth Morgan (2019) Reducing Environmental Risks from Belt and Road Investments in Transport Infrastructure, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8718. Marshall, Tim (2015) Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps that Tell You Everything You Need to Know about Global Politics, London: Elliott and Thompson. Mierzejewski, Dominik, and Bartosz Kowalski (2019) China’s Selective Identities: State, Ideology and Culture, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (2015) Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 28 March, issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization. Available at: http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/ t20150330_669367.html. Ong, Russell (2007) China’s Security Interests in the 21st Century, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Ó’Tuathail, Gearóid (1996) Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Pan, Lingying, Pei Liu, and Zheng Li (2017) ‘A system dynamic analysis of China’s oil supply chain: over-capacity and energy security issues’, Applied Energy, Vol. 188, pp. 508–520. Pillsbury, Michael (2015) The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, New York: Henry Holt & Co. Qian, Xuming, and Jonathan Fulton (2017) ‘China-Gulf economic relationship under the “Belt and Road” Initiative’, Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 12–21.

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6

The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts

6.1 Introduction This chapter will examine the emerging impacts of the Belt and Road Initiative in the five major regions to which it is primarily addressed (see Table 5.1). For the purposes of the empirical analysis conducted below, these regions are defined as Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Other regions, such as Africa and Latin America are not included because, as explained in the previous chapter, they are not central to the core aims of the Belt and Road of connecting Asia with Europe as outlined in the 2015 Vision and Actions policy document (NDRC 2015). They are also not included in the State Information Center listing of BRI countries (SIC 2016). In addition, as Kenderdine and Ling (2018) point out, the specific goals of the complementary Industrial Capacity Cooperation (ICC) initiative are addressed primarily to Belt and Road regions such as Central Asia and the Middle East. Thus, the five regions analysed in this chapter are taken to be key to understanding the BRI’s emerging impacts in Asia and Europe. At any rate, China’s involvement in Africa and Latin America are sufficiently complex to demand their own separate full-length studies, of which there are already numerous excellent examples (e.g. Brautigam 2009, Ellis 2009, Taylor 2009, French 2015, Myers and Wise 2017). Although Gearóid Ó Tuathail’s (1996: 55) exploration of interlinked narratives of geography and politics as ‘a form of epistemological imperialism’ emanating from the West is valuable, it is important to remember that physical geography continues to impose restraints on what is possible (Cohen 2015, Brewster 2017, Garlick 2018). The shape of the Eurasian landmass or ‘supercontinent’ (Maçães 2018) is undoubtedly a key constituent of the Chinese government’s approach to developing the Belt and Road and its accompanying narratives, as it has been for previous Chinese leaders such as Mao (Kissinger 2011). For analysts of the BRI, however, Sternberg et al. (2017: 2) note that ‘[w]hilst the emergent discussion of OBOR presents a policy, economic, and international relations perspective on the programme … the lack of engagement with landscapes for the world’s largest infrastructure programme is striking.’ They therefore point to the necessity to ‘identify geographical factors that constrain infrastructure, recognise geopolitical

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contestation between Russia and China, address historical and cultural factors, and consider issues of institutional capacity and marginality that may be impediments to China’s OBOR.’ This chapter’s analysis of the emerging impacts of the BRI in its core regions thus begins with physical geography before moving on to economic and political issues. First, although obvious, it is important to understand that the land routes of the ‘belt’ and sea routes of the ‘road’ to Europe pass through the five regions identified above and do not involve the Americas, most of Africa, or the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Central Asia is of vital importance to the overland route to Europe, whether it be through Kazakhstan and Russia to CEE or via an alternative route reaching Iran and Turkey and passing on into south-eastern Europe. Western Europe is the logical endpoint of budding overland Belt and Road trade but, as explained in previous chapters, the BRI and the accompanying attempt at enhancing connectivity and exporting industrial capacity to emerging economies are more applicable to the eastern half of Europe. Meanwhile, the maritime route to Europe passes through the South China Sea in Southeast Asia before transiting the critical chokepoint of the Straits of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. From there, ships skirt the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa before entering the Red Sea, reaching the Mediterranean via Egypt’s Suez Canal. Central Asia and CEE are thus central to plans for the land ‘belt’, but potentially other countries such as Iran and Turkey could become significant, depending on the success of attempts to build transport connections through their territory (Erdbrink 2017, Guo and Fidan 2018). Meanwhile, South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East are key to the maritime ‘road’ but are also included in ‘corridors’ which are supposed to enhance connectivity with China by land. If ports – such as Piraeus in Greece and Gwadar in Pakistan – and inland transport links are developed, then CEE and even Central Asia could also be connected to the sea by Chinese-constructed transport and trade routes. Thus, although geographically the ‘belt’ and ‘road’ are separate, they are potentially interconnected strands of one overarching project, as the following sections will demonstrate: we will first look at the two regions mainly involved in the Silk Road Economic Belt and then at the three regions through which the Maritime Silk Road passes. While the analyses of each region cannot, due to constraints of space and the research capabilities of an individual researcher, be exhaustive in terms of the examination of China’s activity in all the individual nations, effort has been taken to account for the impacts of the BRI in as many countries as possible while exploring the specific characteristics of each region. For the sake of clarity, there is a listing of the countries included in each region at the beginning of each section. The countries included, with the exception of two additions which are taken to be vital to the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) route (Greece and Djibouti), match the 64 nations included in the article published in 2016 by the State Information Center (SIC 2016). The SIC self-identifies as ‘a public institution directly affiliated to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).’1 In other words, the countries included as part of the BRI in this

172 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts chapter are the ones identified in a document endorsed by the Chinese government in 2016 and thereafter updated in 2017. Greece and Djibouti are added to the 64 because they constitute key strategic nodes: Djibouti is situated at the entrance to the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean and contains, since 2017, a Chinese military base and other key Chinese infrastructure investments, including the commercial port of Doraleh, which is being developed; while Greece has the container port of Piraeus, now largely owned and controlled by the Chinese and an obvious endpoint for the MSR’s route to CEE. Greece was also added to the CEE ‘16+1’ platform in April 2019 (Elmer 2019). While conducting the following region-by-region analysis, within the overarching structure of this book, we should not forget to apply the complex eclecticism toolkits. These will be deployed in a dedicated section after the empirical study of each region. Qualitatively applying the conceptual tools identified in Figure 4.1 forms the framework for the study of the BRI’s impacts in the five regions included in the initiative at the mid- and micro-levels of analysis.

6.2 Central Asia Countries: • Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Mongolia2 The fact that Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road during a speech in 2013 at Nazarbayev University, in Astana, Kazakhstan, suggests that landlocked Central Asia is perceived to be key to the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). This implies that rail transportation of goods from China to Europe is supposed to be central to the development of the BRI (Griffiths 2017). Building or improving rail infrastructure might therefore be assumed to be a primary aim of the Belt and Road in Central Asia. However, this assumption needs to be evaluated by studying the empirical evidence and other motivations for China’s westwards expansion into Central Asia considered. The shortest and most obvious overland route from China to Europe runs from Xinjiang in northwest China through Kazakhstan and then Russia. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘New Eurasian Land Bridge’. The route already includes a freight railway connection to Duisburg in Germany which involves a switch between gauges at the Chinese border with Kazakhstan (Putz 2016) and the Polish-Belarusian border. New gauge-change technologies are shortening the transit time (O’Dowd 2016). There is also another possible route through Mongolia and Russia, which is included in the BRI as the ChinaMongolia-Russia economic corridor (NDRC 2015). The number of journeys completed has increased exponentially since the advent of the initiative, with 1470 direct freight services from China to Europe in 2017. Journey times have also been shortened from 36 to 16 days since the first trial service in 2008. On the other hand, during 2017 there were only half as many trains travelling back to China (Hillman 2018). Transporting cargo by train is faster than the standard maritime shipping route, but it remains far more expensive and heavily

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subsidised – up to US$7000 per container – by the provincial governments in China from whence the trains begin their journeys (Besharati et al. 2017: 28). Other problems include the following: the inability to transport many types of products due to seasonal temperature variations; the much lower capacity of rail transport compared to ships (Hillman 2018); the possibility of goods being stolen in transit; the lack of impact of railways on the economies of transit countries such as Kazakhstan, since trains simply pass through and do not generate service industries (Hillman 2018); and delays resulting from border crossings as a result of the need for trains to switch gauge (Barrow 2018). However, the biggest problem is the fact that trains depart from China full but return empty or half-empty (Barrow 2018). There is thus a need to identify more European products that can be transported overland and sold in China and probably to open Chinese markets up to these goods. Be that as it may, it is not likely that rail freight volumes will soon challenge the dominance of maritime routes, which implies that the Central Asian rail transit route may not be as important as is often suggested. As Jonathan Hillman (2018) puts it: ‘[t]he railways have found speed, but their scale remains limited’. A more obvious attraction of Central Asia for the Chinese is that it is rich in natural resources such as oil and natural gas. Chinese-funded pipelines built by state corporations already transport fuel from Turkmenistan (natural gas) and Kazakhstan (oil) to China. Other resources include gold (Uzbekistan) and uranium, chromium, lead, zinc, manganese and copper (Kazakhstan). Agriculture may also be an attraction for Chinese agribusinesses seeking new sources of food to sell to the massive Chinese population. Thus, opportunities relating to the exploitation of Central Asia’s natural environment are likely to be a more significant motivation for the Chinese than railway freight transportation to Europe. The problem for Beijing, however, is that Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian states – Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – have long been part of the Russian sphere of influence (Godehardt 2014: 113). Until 1991, apart from Mongolia, they were part of the Soviet Union. Mongolia, while not officially part of the Soviet Union (nor, it should be noted, geographically part of Central Asia), operated as a Soviet satellite state until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have also, since 2014 and 2015, respectively, been part of Russia’s new Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which is, in part, itself a reaction to the BRI and an attempt to reassert Russian dominance in its former Soviet territories (Wilson 2016: 123). There are significant Russian populations in Central Asia: they settled there during the Soviet era (Sternberg et al. 2017: 9). Russian is commonly spoken. Although the Central Asian states sought independence from Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and consequently may be suspicious of Russian intentions, there are many business connections and interdependencies. There are also Russian military bases in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In contrast, there have traditionally been only limited connections with China and there is general distrust in Central Asia of the ethnic Han Chinese (Pantucci 2015) who constitute 90 per cent of the PRC’s population. Xinjiang, the closest

174 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts province of China, is home to a Muslim minority, the Uighurs, who are a Turkic people related to the peoples of Central Asia. Many Uighurs seek independence from China. The East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM) and other separatist groups – which have been successfully suppressed since a major riot in Xinjiang’s capital Ürümqi in July 2009 – are labelled terrorist organisations by the Chinese. However, it is unlikely that that the situation is perceived in exactly the same way by inhabitants of the neighbouring Central Asian states. For instance, anger about ‘political re-education camps’ in Xinjiang boiled over in mid-2018 during a case involving a Chinese citizen of Kazakh ethnicity seeking to remain in Kazakhstan (Fernández 2018). The Uighur issue thus constitutes a complicating factor in China’s relations with Central Asia and means that Beijing will have to tread carefully to prevent tensions with locals as Chinese business interests expand westwards. The ethnic Han Chinese originate in the centre and east of China far away from Xinjiang and there is no linguistic or cultural affinity with the peoples of Central Asia (Sternberg et al. 2017: 9). Indeed, historically the Central Asians were perceived as barbarians who needed to be kept out of China by defensive measures such as the Great Wall. Now the shoe is on the other foot and there are fears in Kazakhstan ‘of Chinese rushing into their underpopulated nation of just 18 million people spread over a territory comparable in size to India’ (Le Corre 2018).3 Sternberg et al. (2017: 8) report ‘distrust of Chinese intentions and perceived economic hegemony and land grabs by China’ and that ‘Sinophobia pervades the region’, a claim which is supported by Wilson (2016: 121), Kassenova (2017), Fernández (2018) and Vakulchuk and Overland 2019: 118). In a detailed study of attitudes among market traders in Kyrgyzstan, Alff (2016: 450) confirms the presence of ‘widespread Sinophobia’ based on the ‘exaggerated perception’ of a Chinese attempt to turn Kyrgyzstan into ‘an economic quasi-protectorate that survives mainly on the re-export of Chinese products’ (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2012: 7). These two factors – pervasive Sinophobia and traditional Russian hegemony in the region, bolstered in recent years by the advent of the EAEU – represent two serious obstacles to the long-term progress of the Belt and Road in Central Asia. Another is the mutual mistrust and resulting reluctance to cooperate of the five Central Asian neighbours (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) which were part of the Soviet Union (Godehardt 2014: 108, Song 2016: 35, Griffiths 2017: 103–104).4 Understanding the issues, China has since 1996 worked to improve relations within the format of first the Shanghai Five grouping and then, from 2001, after the admittance of Uzbekistan, using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Turkmenistan is not a member of the SCO but attends meetings as a guest. In 2017, Pakistan and India were admitted to the format, expanding its reach into South Asia but also potentially complicating the running of the organisation. The consensus of most analysts is that the SCO ‘is largely a Chinese initiative and that China plays a “leading role” in its process’ (Song 2016: 31). The framework for the SCO is based on ‘an elitedriven model of regional cooperation’ (Song 2016: 36): this has certainly

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contributed to the ‘significant difference in the perception of China by the ruling elites and by the broader public’ (Vakulchuk and Overland 2019: 117). The importance of the SCO in calming Sino-Russian and Sino-Central Asian relations at the diplomatic level and achieving enhanced and mutually beneficial cooperation at the geo-economic level should not be underestimated. With China’s rapid economic rise in the 1990s and the simultaneous near-collapse of Russia’s economy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union came a severe risk of increased tensions between the two powers concerning influence in Central Asia. The SCO, with its behind-closed-doors meeting style, has managed to smooth political relations between the six nations involved to the extent that suspicions have been minimised and Sino-Russian relations are as cordial as they have ever been since the low point of the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 (Charap et al. 2017, Wilson 2016: 113). Of course, in recent years, part of the reason for this has been the fact of US and European sanctions on Russia over Russian involvement in the Ukraine conflict and Moscow’s subsequent need to maintain a good relationship with Beijing (Charap et al. 2017: 26–27, Marshall 2015: 43). Russia is also heavily dependent on exports of oil, natural gas and other natural resources, and China is quickly becoming its largest export market. This means that the Chinese and Russian economies are increasingly joined at the hip: China is resource hungry and Russia is short of foreign currency (Marshall 2015: 30). The resultant economic interdependence has undoubtedly also done a great deal in smoothing over issues relating to China’s increasing involvement in Central Asia. As already stated, Chinese state fossil fuel companies are heavily invested in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline, which started operating in 2006, pumps 11–12 million tons of oil to China each year via the north-western province of Xinjiang (Katona 2017). In addition, in 2017 Kazakhstan started supplying some natural gas through a newly opened pipeline (Daly 2017). Turkmenistan has the world’s sixth largest reserves of natural gas, and pipelines financed by Chinese loans channel fuel to Xinjiang and on towards the east. China is now the single largest and only major importer of Turkmen gas, receiving 94 per cent of all gas exports since Russia and Iran stopped buying Turkmen gas in 2016 and 2017, respectively (Bhutia 2019). This amount also constitutes around 90 per cent of Turkmenistan’s total exports which, since ‘Turkmenistan lives by natural gas and dies by natural gas’ (Bhutia 2019) means that the pipeline exports to China are vital for Turkmenistan’s economy. In addition, Turkmenistan is repaying the Chinese loans at a rate of around US$1 billion per year (Jakóbowski and Marszewski 2018: 2). Thus, Turkmenistan’s economy, unlike relatively wealthy Kazakhstan’s, is heavily (and unhealthily) dependent on China. Although energy and other resource imports are the most significant reason behind China’s involvement in Central Asia, Tristan Kenderdine (2017a, 2017b) suggests that there are two additional motivations. First, China sees an opportunity to export excess industrial capacity via the ‘international capacity cooperation’ programme explained in Chapter 5, for instance by setting up aluminium

176 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts production in Kazakhstan (Kenderdine 2017b). According to Kenderdine’s analysis, this will chiefly benefit the Chinese since ‘China establishes a parallel trade and investment system, intrinsically tied to Chinese state-owned enterprises and the institutions of Chinese state capital’ (Kenderdine 2017b). He advises that International capacity cooperation is a genuine attempt to bring entire industrial clusters to China’s external geographies in order to develop the industrial bases of its trading partners, while offshoring its current cyclical overcapacity problem. Moreover, China’s fixed-capital investment in the region’s traditional industrial bases is a gift that the Central Asian republics cannot afford not to ignore. However, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian partners should be aware that this capital has state-strings attached, and that there will be no reciprocal opening of China’s consumer, production or capital markets. (Kenderdine 2017b) The second and more long-term motivation for China in Central Asia, according to Kenderdine (2017a), is to develop agricultural production for the production of foodstuffs for import into China. His view is that this is part of Beijing’s long-term strategy, with the assumption that China will become a net importer in due course. He concludes that The development of finance mechanisms to take some of China’s agroindustrial investment into Central Asia and Russia is already a reality … This means the doors to the largest consumer market in the world are opening for Central Asia’s agricultural exporters. While Chinese capital is always linked to state-owned enterprises, the chance to develop agroindustrial production bases is a huge opportunity for Central Asian states. (Kenderdine 2017a) Hofman’s (2016) detailed study of the expansion of Chinese agribusiness into Tajikistan under the ‘going out’ and Belt and Road initiatives confirms Kenderdine’s thesis to an extent. Hofman asserts that commercial motivations and profit rather than macro-level strategy and geopolitics dominate Chinese largeand small-scale farming enterprises. The presence of ‘dragon-head enterprises’, which ‘represent a kind of state-private nexus that challenges strict state/private binaries’ (Schneider 2017: 10), confirms rather than refutes the assertion that ‘the Chinese state has an important role’ (Hofman 2016: 18). Nevertheless, despite some evidence supporting Kenderdine’s hypothesis of a state-led export of Chinese agroindustrial investment into Central Asia, whether things ultimately result in the involvement of Chinese producers in Central Asian agriculture on the scale he envisages remains to be seen. Sternberg et al.’s 2017 study of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also reveals that there are important differences between the two countries’ relations with China. While Kazakhstan has a higher per capita GDP than China due to diversified

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exports of fossil fuels and therefore does not need Chinese investment capital, Kyrgyzstan is resource-poor and has thus, like Turkmenistan (Jakóbowski and Marszewski 2018: 2), built up a reliance on Chinese loans that points towards over-indebtedness and unhealthy dependence. The dynamics in each case are therefore quite distinct. This suggests that China needs to tailor its approach to individual countries in the region rather than adopting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ strategy. Similarly, analysts studying China’s involvement in Central Asia had better taken a country-specific approach if they wish to come to clear understandings of the implications of Chinese regional economic diplomacy. In terms of the Belt and Road, although Central Asia is generally touted as a key region because of its geographical position on the route from China and Europe (particularly through China and Kazakhstan, but also possibly via the southern route that continues through Iran and Turkey), it is the region’s natural resources, particularly energy, which are likely to be of greater importance. Longterm, the possibility of finding an access route to the Indian Ocean through Iran may also be a motivation, although this is not clear at this stage. Ultimately, therefore, it is probable that the land route to Europe will be of less significance than access to natural resources and the strategic goal of increasing China’s geoeconomic and geopolitical influence, with the latter presumably being accompanied by efforts to boost China’s ideational (‘soft’) power in the region. 6.2.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to Central Asia Overall, the picture that emerges from an examination of China’s activity in Central Asia within the Belt and Road framework is one of increasing economic interdependence and feedback effects stemming from the ‘regional embeddedness of intertwined actors’ (Godehardt 2014: 72). On the other hand, despite successful networking at the leadership level (Reeves 2018), it is unlikely that any Chinese soft/symbolic/ideational power drive will bear fruit among the general population in the face of regional Sinophobia. There are also issues relating to balance of power competition between China and Russia through their supposedly complementary but probably also competing initiatives, the BRI and the EAEU. All these factors could be interpreted as implying that neo-Gramscian counterhegemony might be thought to offer an interesting perspective on China’s activity in the region. However, the fact that China’s soft power drive seems unlikely to gain significant traction amid Russia’s traditional dominance in the region and pervasive Sinophobia places limits on the utility of the approach. Other IR tools which obviously apply are as follows: institutions (the SCO, ICC, the Belt and Road itself); hierarchy or asymmetry between China and its Central Asian partners; intersubjectivity (i.e. varying perceptions of China’s role in the region and of Central Asia’s role in China’s westwards expansion); economic inequality, with all the states in the region except Kazakhstan (which has a higher per capita GDP than China) being relatively poor (and thus liable to be pulled into China’s geo-economic orbit by infrastructure loans and indebtedness); patriarchal authoritarianism (all the Central Asian states have male

178 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts presidents, as does Russia); the natural environment, where there may be a need to assess the possible damage resulting from Chinese infrastructure projects and exploitation of natural resources, including through agricultural production; and even Confucian harmony, given that it is China’s stated aim to create a coprosperity zone of win-win cooperation with benefits for all (Zhao 2009: 15), even if this may not be convincing to many in Central Asia. In other words, all the tools in the IR toolkit can be applied in one way or another. In terms of the CT toolkit, the fact that Central Asia contains five recentlycreated states which appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and whose relations are often in flux, in which Chinese economic diplomacy has become a challenge to traditional Russian dominance, makes for a highly complex and evolving situation. Regional inter-state relations have an obviously emerging, self-organising, nonlinear character which is beyond any of the actors’ abilities to shape unilaterally. As China moves into the region, its progress is blocked by path dependence resulting from Soviet era history. Feedback may result from the increase in Chinese activity, with newcomers’ and locals’ reactions to each other causing intensifying or dampening effects, encouraging or discouraging further investment. Black swans in the region could include revolutions or economic collapse (both of which, according to Jakóbowski and Marszewski’s (2018) analysis, are highly possible in Turkmenistan), as well as the death or removal of a president or a sudden change of policy or allegiance, any of which might push the situation towards the edge of chaos, particularly if Sino-Russian tensions increased for some reason (Freeman 2017). The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is that ideationally and counter-hegemonically Central Asia is unlikely to be plain sailing for China due to local suspicions of Beijing’s motives. However, it is probable that China’s material power and influence in the region will only grow, with hierarchic and asymmetric factors in China’s favour gradually but steadily taking hold. The long-term consequences of the impact in Central Asia of a growing Chinese presence are difficult to foresee: Russia’s influence may be reduced, but that does not mean that it will willingly cede its continuing hegemonic influence in the region to its erstwhile ally.

6.3 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Countries: • 16+1/17+1 countries: 11 EU states: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Croatia + Greece; 5 non-EU states: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Albania • Others: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan The fact that a total of 22 CEE countries – here stretching the definition of CEE to include the Caucasus states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – had been semi-officially included in the Belt and Road framework by 2016 suggests

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that the region is viewed as an integral part of the initiative (SIC 2016). However, the creation of the ‘16+1’ format in 2011, a platform for meetings between heads of state in 16 CEE countries and Chinese leaders, predates the announcement of the BRI and excludes six Eastern European countries in the Russian sphere of influence, so somewhat complicates analysis. The first meeting of the 16+1 was held in Warsaw in 2012, when a US$10 billion Chinese credit line was announced (Mitrovic 2018: 30–31). In April 2019 ‘16+1’ became ‘17+1’ as Greece was added (Elmer 2019). China’s aims and motivations in the region are far from clear and in 2018 were being hotly debated by scholars in CEE (e.g. Jakóbowski 2018, Turcsányi 2018, Vangeli 2018) and China (e.g. Hu 2018, Liu 2018, Song and Zhao 2018), often with utterly different conclusions. Interpretations vary dramatically, ranging from Anastas Vangeli’s (2018) critical but insightful symbolic power analysis to Song and Zhao’s optimistic spin about ‘promoting peace, development, and cooperation and adopting a win–win strategy for all’ (Song and Zhao 2018: 55–56). Even within individual CEE countries, interpretations of China’s aims in the region are often contested, controversial and divisive, being generally polarised along a spectrum from ‘China threat’ to ‘China opportunity’ (Pavlićević 2018). In terms of analytical framing, it is not entirely clear whether China-CEE relations are to be evaluated as a sub-system of the Belt and Road or a preexisting entity of nebulous character which has been stapled on to it ad hoc. Another problem is that six Eastern European countries which were previously part of the Soviet Union – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – have not been included by China in the 17+1 arrangement, presumably as a nod to Russian sensitivities. Still another is the status of Greece, which, while not generally classified as a CEE country due to not being part of the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War, shares borders with three CEE countries: Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria. Analytical uncertainty amid attempts to interpret Chinese intentions in CEE therefore characterise scholarly and media publications concerning China-CEE relations. It is probable that contemporary Chinese perceptions of CEE are shaped to a great extent by the region’s Cold War identity as a zone of Soviet hegemony under the terms of the Warsaw Pact. Although the 16+1 nations (here excluding Greece, which was not part of the communist bloc) have largely escaped Russian influence by orienting more towards Western Europe, the other six nations remain in the Russian orbit. Belarus and Armenia are part of Russia’s EAEU, while Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan are still dominated by interaction with Russia, whether willingly or unwillingly. Thus, Belarus’ enthusiasm for Chinese investments under the BRI umbrella, including the signing of a $US15.7 billion ‘cooperation package’ in 2013 during a visit to Minsk by Xi Jinping, is tempered by the need not to antagonise Belarus’ next-door-neighbour Russia (Wilson 2016: 122). The CEE countries in the 16+1/17+1 are either recent or aspiring entrants to the EU. As such, they are perceived by the Chinese as the poorer cousins of the wealthy Western European nations, and therefore as belonging (at least in

180 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts a technical sense) among developing or ‘Third World’ countries (see for instance Mitrovic 2018: 31). The region, for the Chinese, is seen as a politically post-Soviet, post-Communist bloc of nations, and economically as in need of further development to ‘catch up’ with Western Europe. This triggers Maoistinspired thinking about economic inequality and South-South cooperation (Kowalski 2017). CEE is also seen as an area through which overland transport and trade connections from Central Asia, Turkey and the southern Mediterranean to Western Europe need to pass. One major problem with the Chinese approach to CEE has been the lack of understanding of the differences between the individual nations in the 16+1/17+1 format. By taking CEE as a bloc, it often seems as if the Chinese have assumed that the countries in the region are more homogeneous and unified than they are in reality. For instance, despite briefly recognising the need to communicate China’s message in an assortment of local languages, Song and Zhao (2018) still consistently refer to ‘the CEE public’ throughout their book chapter, with the implication that there is one audience with one set of characteristics, historical experience, and attitudes towards China rather than many. Linguistic, historical and cultural differences are brushed over or not mentioned at all, as are the rather limited economic and political connections between some of the CEE countries. For instance, in reality there are fewer links and commonalities between the Visegrad (V4) nations (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia), the Balkan countries, and the Baltic states with their large Russian populations than the Chinese acknowledge. Even within the V4, the fact that Hungary is linguistically (and also culturally) distinct from the other three members of the grouping does not seem to be very well understood or even acknowledged by Chinese analysts. Questions abound about what exactly China might want in the region, and what form cooperation is supposed to take. For instance, when Xi Jinping visited the Czech Republic in March 2016 as a quid pro quo for President Miloš Zeman’s attendance at a military parade in Beijing in September 2015, a package of investments was announced (Fürst 2018: 127). However, the most tangible outcomes of this exchange of visits were the controversial acquisitions by Chinese companies of existing assets such as a finance company, a football club, a brewery, a travel agent, a media group, and some real estate in central Prague (Turcsányi 2019). By 2018, Chinese investment in the Czech Republic still made up only about half of one per cent of total foreign direct investment (FDI), with many acquisitions, whose economic purpose was not explained, being channelled through one company, CEFC China Energy (Fürst 2018: 128). In contrast, investments by Japan and South Korea were much higher and included factories rather than only acquisitions of existing assets; this was also the case in Poland and Slovenia (Franková 2018: 4). When the head of CEFC, Ye Jianming, was detained in early 2018, apparently due to an internal Chinese investigation into alleged corruption, it became clear that something had gone wrong. There followed an undignified dispute about the non-payment of instalments on CEFC’s Czech acquisitions which was finally settled in late May

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(Reuters 2018). Up to that time, Ye had worked closely with President Zeman as his personal advisor, making some Czech observers suspicious of the circumstances surrounding CEFC’s investments even before Ye’s detention (e.g. Menzelová 2016, Hála 2017). After further media controversy in early 2018, CEFC’s Czech investments were formally taken over by CITIC Group, a Chinese state-owned investment company (Xie 2018). The CEFC episode casts doubt on the nature and value of Chinese investment in the Czech Republic, with the impression being of a lack of economic logic amid suspicions of corruption. The CEFC story in the Czech Republic has also been something of a public relations disaster internationally (see for instance Barboza et al. 2018) as well as domestically, meaning that China’s soft power goals have, to say the least, not been achieved. Indeed, ‘China threat’ discourse has been prevalent in the Czech media and some sections of academia since Xi’s 2016 visit (Fürst 2018: 129–131). In the background is also the question of a battle for influence between the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC), otherwise known as Taiwan. The island which Beijing sees as a rogue province conducted its own charm offensive in Prague in the 1990s and 2000s, culminating in the Czech Republic becoming ‘Taiwan’s favourite European investment destination, accounting for 41 per cent of the ROC’s cumulative investments in Europe in 2004’ (Tubilewicz 2007: 69–70). The prevailing Taiwanese influence, not least in media and academic circles, explains why, in early 2019, the Chinese ambassador demanded that the director of the Taiwanese trade and culture office in Prague be expelled from a meeting with the Czech foreign minister (Lidové noviny 2019). There is thus some circumstantial evidence that Beijing’s bid to increase its clout in Prague is motivated, at least in part, by the zero-sum aim of reducing Taiwanese influence in Central Europe rather than by the positive-sum goal of economic ‘win-win cooperation’ (Garlick 2019b). In other parts of CEE such as the states of former Yugoslavia or Belarus, the story has seemed different. To a great extent, this is because, as Liu (2018: 43) points out, Chinese loans do not meet the conditions set by the EU for such financing, and therefore are more easily accepted in CEE’s non-EU members. For instance, Belarus accepted $US5.5 billion in loans from China in 2013 (Wilson 2016: 122), while Serbia received almost $US10 billion in large-scale Chinese investments between 2013 and 2018, a massive increase on the $US600 million invested in the period preceding the advent of the BRI between 2005 and 2012 (Scissors 2019). However, when it comes to Chinese proclamations concerning investments appearances can often be deceptive, with declared amounts proving difficult to match to funds actually disbursed. Discussions between CEE scholars, journalists and NGO practitioners at an event organised by the Association for International Affairs (AMO) in June 2018 revealed that Chinese investments in Poland, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Albania were at lower levels than had been promised (Franková 2018: 4). Official figures for China’s accumulated outward investment stock in individual countries up to 2017 confirm

182 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts that Chinese holdings in CEE countries are vastly lower than those in Western European countries. Indeed, Chinese investment stock in each of Germany, the UK and Luxembourg is several times higher than in the whole of the CEE region (Statistical Bulletin of China’s OFDI 2017: 143–144). On the other hand, in Belgrade the Chinese did fund and build a bridge over the Danube, unveiled in 2014 (Jian 2018: 201). There was much talk of upgrades to Serbia’s aging railway network, with a new high-speed link to Budapest being mentioned in the media. Nevertheless, in late 2017 this link remained on the drawing board (Zalan 2017), with the Hungarian section in doubt due to an EU investigation into the tendering process through which the contract was awarded to the Chinese (Kynge et al. 2017). In Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro highway construction projects have been initiated (Jian 2018: 201), but doubts have been raised in some quarters concerning the wisdom of countries with relatively small economies taking on a large debt load (Barkin and Vasovic 2018). Overall, the picture remained mixed and inconclusive, as, for instance, a June 2018 Vice News report on the progress of the Chinese-built highway in Montenegro tellingly reveals through interviews with Chinese and Montenegrin interlocutors.5 The question of CEE as a transit or endpoint for both the overland ‘belt’ and the maritime ‘road’ seems, from a geostrategic point of view, to be one of the main motivations for subsuming 17+1 into the Belt and Road (Liu 2018: 39–40). The railway route from China through Central Asia reaches Western Europe via Belarus and Poland. In addition, in 2017 the Chinese shipping company COSCO acquired a controlling stake in the Greek container port at Piraeus (Hosken and Kasapi 2017), with the aim of using it to offload container ships arriving through the Suez Canal and then transport the goods by rail northwards through North Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary and beyond. Business has increased exponentially since COSCO leased half the port in 2010, transforming it into ‘the Mediterranean’s busiest port’ (Horowitz and Alderman 2017). Such sharply increasing commercial activity has made Greece a key transport node for the Maritime Silk Road to Central and Western Europe, explaining why the country was added to the 16+1 to make 17+1. Nevertheless, the same reservations concerning the transit of goods apply in CEE as in Central Asia: when goods pass through a region, there are limited commercial opportunities to benefit from trade, and this certainly applies to the overland rail route. The shipping route up through the Mediterranean to Piraeus could present more opportunities, particularly for Greece and the Balkan states, but thus far the jury is out concerning the possible long-term economic benefits for the region (Zalan 2017). Economically, Europe in general suffers from a massive trade imbalance with China, with imports far exceeding exports, and this is very much the case in CEE (Garlick 2015). The inclusion of CEE in the BRI framework since 2015 has produced no signs of any reduction in the deficit; in fact, it continues to increase (Turcsányi and Šimalčík 2018). In terms of Chinese investments, data reveals that the bulk (around 90 per cent) of Chinese FDI continues to go to

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Western Europe rather than CEE, with Germany, France and the UK the favourite destinations (Scissors 2019, Statistical Bulletin of China’s OFDI, 2017: 138–139). Chinese investment still ‘constitutes less than 1 per cent of overall foreign direct investment (FDI) in the CEE region’ (Turcsányi 2018), meaning that despite the publicity surrounding it, Chinese investment is still relatively insignificant in comparison to that coming from other countries such as Germany and Japan. In the end, the fact that Europe and China have always been ‘distant neighbours’ (Kapur 1990) tends to count against CEE assuming a major role in Chinese foreign policy. The EU is China’s biggest market but geographically is not part of China’s immediate surroundings: some observers believe, with considerable justification, that the BRI is primarily aimed at nations in China’s immediate vicinity rather than distant Europe (e.g. Brown 2017: Chapter 4). The ‘Belt and Road’ Country Cooperation Evaluation Report published by the State Information Center (2016: 3–4) confirms that cooperation with countries in the CEE region is judged to be at lower levels than in the three regions which border China (although at a roughly similar level to that in the Middle East). In addition, as already stated, China’s most significant customers by trade and investment volume are the rich nations of Western Europe rather than the second-tier economies of CEE (Turcsányi 2018). All in all, there are good reasons to assume that the region is actually of limited importance for the overall geostrategic aims of the BRI. 6.3.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to CEE In terms of the complex eclecticism toolkits, the search for ideational rather than significant material power may ultimately be the most significant outcome for China’s Belt and Road economic diplomacy in CEE in conjunction with the 16+1/17+1 format (Vangeli 2018). China is aware that it is in need of friends internationally, for instance to gain a support base for votes in the United Nations or the EU. Some therefore see the BRI as ‘partly a pretext to lure smaller countries into Beijing’s orbit’ (Phillips 2018), with undertones of neoGramscian counter-hegemonic consensus building in relation to the current hegemonic influence of Western Europe and EU institutions. Obtaining allies in CEE via a charm offensive surrounding the promise of investment may therefore primarily be a way to achieve political goals via economic means (Turcsányi 2017, Beeson 2018, Maçães 2018: 141), with evidence strongly suggesting that ‘the 16+1 agenda has been used to further a Chinese normative agenda’ (Auer and Stiegler 2018: 93). However, historical memories in CEE of an oppressive communist past mean that the increasing Chinese activity in the region is generally perceived in an unfavourable light (Turcsányi and Qiaoan 2019). As usual, the extent to which China’s ideational power and investment drives in CEE – with their accompanying promises of ‘win-win cooperation’ and ‘mutual benefit’ – can be taken at face value is disputed by commentators in the region (Franková 2018).

184 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts As far as other tools are concerned, economic inequality and path dependence (based on entrenched Maoist era perceptions) can be applied with regard to China’s perceptions of CEE, while complexity tools such as emergence, feedback effects and nonlinearity can obviously be used in a qualitative manner to analyse the fluctuating nature of relations. Analysis of the 17+1 as an institutional tool for furthering cooperation is also relevant, as are questions connected to hierarchy and asymmetry: indeed, the formulation ‘17+1’ is suggestive of the asymmetry between the colossus China and the small CEE nations. Confucian harmony, as in Central Asia, colours the background of China’s intended charm offensive in the region (even when this produces mixed results), as does the stated goal of economic interdependence, even if the assertion that ‘China’s economic engagement is a win-win program, and all actors in this region can benefit’ (Jian 2018: 213) is, as ever, open to debate and in need of further analysis. As in other regions, interdependence with Chinese characteristics seems to imply being drawn into China’s geopolitical orbit through loans, dependency on Chinese investments, and similar forms of economic leverage (Beeson 2018). These considerations suggest a need to look closely at the extent to which Holslag’s (2017) offensive mercantilism applies to the case of China in CEE (Garlick 2019a). Overall, it is probable that the CEE is less significant for the progress of the Belt and Road than other regions which are either closer to China’s borders or more geo-economically significant. The rail route from China through Central Asia to CEE is probably less important than much of the publicity surrounding the BRI seems to assume: trade by sea is still cheaper and easier to do in high volumes, and Chinese companies can use Western European ports in which they have facilities and part-ownership such as Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg (Huang 2018). This means that finding ways to develop ideational power and political influence in the CEE region via an economically-based charm offensive which is possibly counter-hegemonic or offensive mercantilist in character seems ultimately to be the most important motivation for Beijing’s continued development of a strategy of state-led economic statecraft (Norris 2016) within the framework of the BRI and the sub-framework of the 17+1.

6.4 Southeast Asia Countries: • Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei, Singapore, Timor-Leste Apart from Timor-Leste – which has the status of an observer – all the Southeast Asian countries included in the BRI are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China deals with the ASEAN countries at the multilateral level under the ‘ASEAN+1’ label. In principle, they should therefore be coordinating China policy in a united front, but as elsewhere in the world in practice bilateral relations overrule unified action. As a consequence,

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decisions on BRI projects are inevitably made at the national level rather than the regional level. This means that coordinating transport infrastructure projects (such as high-speed rail links) which aim to connect several countries with China can be difficult. Projects progress slowly or altogether fail to make headway due to logistical problems and local resistance to taking Chinese loans (Griffiths 2017: 163–187). There are plenty of good reasons to see the Maritime Silk Road as, on balance, more significant in the BRI than the Silk Road Economic Belt’s land route through Central Asia. Foremost among these reasons are the importance of the sea route through the Indian Ocean, the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea (SCS) for China’s trade with Europe and energy and resource imports from the Middle East and Africa. More than 80 per cent of China’s oil imports come through the SCS, and most of China’s exports reach the rest of the world through its shipping lanes (Miller 2017: 210). Approximately 60 per cent of China’s exports to Europe reach their destination through the SCS, the Indian Ocean and then the Suez Canal (Dorsey 2019: 201). The SCS is therefore central to China’s relations with Southeast Asia as Beijing seeks to establish a position of ‘active defence’ (State Council 2015). China is seeking to obtain as much control as possible through a well-documented artificial island-building programme in the southern Spratly Islands mainly designed, in all probability, to safeguard its economic security – in the form of vital imports and lucrative exports – using newly-created military bases (Miller 2017: 201). In particular, imports of oil and other natural resources from the Middle East and Africa would be at risk if another country (such as the US) attempted to set up a blockade at the Malacca chokepoint or to dominate the SCS with its navy. The SCS dispute, in which China claims virtually the entirety of the SCS based on the historically-debatable grounds of a ‘nine-dash line’ or ‘U-shaped line’ (which first appeared in a map published by the Geography Department of the Chinese Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1948 (Hayton 2014: 58–59)), colours China’s relations with the five countries in the Southeast Asian region which have SCS coastline. Among these the Philippines and Vietnam are the most affected, but Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei also have conflicting claims to maritime territory. In the Spratly Islands of the southern SCS, China has constructed runways and military bases on previously uninhabitable rocks and reefs by terraforming islands out of material extracted from the sea bed. Beijing is using these new bases to project its power southwards and ensure control of the vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) which are key to China’s national security. Thus, the steadily increasing Chinese military presence in the SCS since before the advent of the BRI has had a major impact on the progress of the initiative in both material and ideational terms. Materially, the dispute has affected the progress of Chinese attempts to invest in infrastructure in Southeast Asia, where, as elsewhere along the routes of the BRI, building transport infrastructure funded mainly by Chinese state-backed loans is supposed to be central to the initiative. However, progress in many countries has been slow and controversial. For instance, in August 2018 Malaysia surprisingly cancelled several

186 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts previously-agreed BRI infrastructure projects, including a railway, with the Malaysian prime minister accusing China of ‘neo-colonialism’ due to the generation of political and financial leverage through debt (McGregor 2018). Vietnam seems to be wary of accepting Chinese infrastructure investment for the same reason (Jennings 2018). Progress on the much-touted Singapore-Kunming rail link, approved as long ago as 1995 (Griffiths 2017: 169) and now reclassified as a Belt and Road project, has also been slow. If completed, this link – the central line of which is slated to include Laos, Thailand and Malaysia – would transform overland connectivity in Southeast Asia and potentially create multiple new economic opportunities and synergies. However, controversy surrounds Chinese loans, procedures and influence. This has been mainly due to lingering suspicions of China’s intentions and the use of loans to fund infrastructure investments, in Thailand and Malaysia in particular.6 In the Thai case, there was a decision not to take up Chinese offers of loans in 2016 because of perceived high interest rates, which caused the project to be delayed. However, in April 2019 there were signs that the project was going to be ‘re-energised’ by three-way talks between China, Thailand and Laos (Tanakasempipat and Wongcha-um 2019). In Indonesia, despite the fact that Xi Jinping launched the Maritime Silk Road there in a 2013 speech, there was heated competition between Chinese and Japanese companies to be awarded a contract to build a 142-kilometre high-speed rail link (Griffiths 2017: 183–184). Although this was resolved in favour of China in 2015, work on the link did not begin until mid-2018 (Spiess 2018). Ideationally, China’s role in the SCS dispute has had a negative impact on Beijing’s attempts to generate soft power and support for Chinese policies in the region via a ‘charm offensive’ initiated in the 1990s (Storey 2011: 64–98). The rational suspicion of geographically proximate nations that their gigantic neighbour to the north has hegemonic ambitions tends to undermine the Chinese ideational power drive in the region. Despite obvious economic interdependencies, historical memories of China’s so-called tributary system, in which China dominated the region, remain (Jacques 2009). The inherent asymmetry in relations with China leads neighbours to assume that Martin Jacques’s (2009) hypothesis of a Sinocentric and ineluctably hierarchic ‘Middle Kingdom Mentality’ which automatically seeks Chinese hegemony is valid. As a result, the Southeast Asian countries with SCS coastlines – especially Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines – tend to be reluctant to welcome BRI infrastructure projects backed by Chinese funding with open arms. In the ongoing disputes over China’s increasing military presence in the SCS, it is Vietnam and the Philippines which have historically been the most affected and eager to point out China’s infractions. Historically, Vietnam has tended to suffer at the hands of its much larger northern neighbour, and Vietnamese therefore tend to be wary of China – with some justification. Apart from the 1979 Chinese incursion into northern Vietnam, other incidents have included the Chinese seizing of the Paracel Islands in 1974 (Hayton 2014: 72–77) and Johnson Reef in 1988, when 64 Vietnamese

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marines were mown down by Chinese machine guns (Hayton 2014: 83), as well as an incident in 2014 in which an oil rig was set up in waters claimed by Vietnam, stirring up protests (Miller 2017: 209). However, in the first two decades of the 21st century, economic interdependence between the asymmetricallysized neighbours has caused a reduction in antagonism as business interests take precedence over nationalist feeling (Jennings 2018). As Womack (2006) points out, the asymmetry between China and Vietnam has generally, over the centuries, resulted in peace rather than conflict due mainly to the delicate balance inherent in the observation that ‘the weak have more reason to resist than the strong have interest to dominate’ (Womack 2016: 5). This asymmetrical dynamic received a paradoxical twist in 2018 due to the US imposition of tariffs on imports of Chinese goods: Chinese firms rushed to set up factories in Vietnam to avoid paying tariffs, putting China, according to a business consultant based in Ho Chi Minh City, ‘in a position of weakness coming in’ (quoted in Jennings 2018). Nevertheless, economic interdependence is growing as Chinese companies set up factories in Vietnam to exploit low-cost labour and Vietnamese cross the border in search of higher wages and profits on goods.7 There have been striking ups and downs in relations with the Philippines, depending mainly on a combination of the extent of Chinese activity in the SCS and who is president in Manila. The Philippines even took their case to an international tribunal in the Hague: in 2016 the court decided in Manila’s favour (Vitug 2018). However, since there is no world police force to enforce international adjudications, and disputes concerning interpretations of maritime law abound, the ruling in favour of the Philippines had no impact on China’s continuing expansion in the SCS. Arguably, the unenforceability of the ruling produced the sense that China’s domination of the area was inevitable. The sense of anti-climax in the wake of the tribunal’s ruling was compounded by the incoming president Rodrigo Duterte’s decision to improve business relations with Beijing rather than seek reparations. The lack of impact resulting from the Hague tribunal’s ruling means that the SCS can now be viewed as de facto a Chinese lake (Zhao 2018). Meanwhile, the Philippines’ relations with China remain in flux between tensions over the SCS and the need to do business with China to generate much-needed income for this relatively impoverished nation. However, Southeast Asia also contains five other nations which are not directly affected by the SCS dispute: Thailand, Singapore, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. China’s relations with these countries have tended, on the whole, to be better than with the five whose maritime borders include the SCS. Nevertheless, even in these cases there have been significant ups and downs in relations, notably in government U-turns concerning proposed Chinese investments. Efforts by Chinese companies to push for energy and transport infrastructure contracts have in several cases been frustrated. Often this is because countries are reluctant to incur debt which would give Beijing leverage over their internal affairs, and potentially also hand over control of key state assets such as ports, railways, dams and power plants.

188 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts China’s warmest relations are probably with Laos and Cambodia, on whose behalf it fought a brief, supposedly punitive war with Vietnam in 1979 (Storey 2011: 29). Chinese companies are active in both countries building roads, railways, housing developments and also casinos to service an increasing influx of Chinese tourists. In Cambodia a highway connecting the capital Phnom Penh with its main port Sihanoukville is under construction (Onishi 2019). However, the proliferation of casinos, condominiums and Chinese tourists in the port city has led to negative feelings about China and the BRI. Sihanoukville locals feel that Chinese tourist money mainly ends up in the hands of Chinese-run businesses which cater to Chinese tourists and ‘the trickle-down effect is minimal’ (Ellis-Petersen 2018). In impoverished Laos, whose gross government debt was 70 per cent of GDP in 2018, Chinese companies are building railways and roads connecting Laos to China (Albert 2019). A US$6 billion China-Laos railway project is going ahead despite warnings from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that the debt incurred is equivalent to half the country’s GDP and will be difficult to pay off. Laos is also borrowing US$600 million from the state-backed China Exim Bank for a hydropower project which will only exacerbate the nation’s indebtedness to China, increasing Beijing’s influence in its landlocked southern neighbour (Hurley et al. 2018: 13, 17). China has had close dealings with successive governments in Myanmar, most notably surrounding the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines to transport energy resources from the Indian Ocean port of Kyaukpyu (Maday) to Kunming in southwest China. However, in August 2018, Myanmar reportedly expressed a wish to scale back the size of the port investment from US$7.3 billion to US$1.3 billion to avoid generating excessive debt to China (Emont and Myo 2018). In 2011 Myanmar cancelled the US$3.6 billion Myitsone hydroelectric dam project after protests from locals who would have been displaced by the construction (Lanteigne 2019: 42). Ninety per cent of the dam’s hydroelectric power was slated to be delivered to China (Lee and Myint 2017). However, in November 2018 Beijing attempted to repackage the project as part of the BRI: in April 2019 there were further protests by locals against the project (Fang 2019). Political issues related to the Rohingya crisis, Aung San Suu Kyi’s role in the government and China’s tendency to back the current regime no matter what its human rights record might have also affected the progress of the Chinese ideational charm offensive. The same can be said of the perception among locals that Chinese projects – such as Kyaukpyu port – are not benefitting them economically and may be damaging to the environment (Lee and Lone 2017). Perhaps surprisingly, then, eight of the ten ASEAN nations are listed in the top 15 among 64 BRI countries in an official ‘Belt and Road’ Country Cooperation Evaluation Report published by the government-endorsed State Information Center of China’s National Development and Reform Commission (SIC 2016: 1–2, in Chinese). Thailand is surprisingly listed as having the third most successful BRI cooperation with China, while Indonesia is fifth, Vietnam sixth, Malaysia seventh, Singapore eighth, Laos tenth, Myanmar thirteenth and

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Cambodia fifteenth. The Philippines is in 29th position and Brunei is 42nd. However, since the report appears to be based on a qualitative evaluation of the fulfilment of the goals outlined in the Vision and Actions document (NDRC 2015), the data present more of an impressionistic than a scientific analysis. On the other hand, the placement of the Southeast Asian region among the leading BRI nations in terms of successful cooperation (SIC 2016: 4) implies that boosting cooperation with China’s neighbours in Southeast Asia is perceived by Chinese leaders as a priority goal of the BRI. By mid-2019, progress under the BRI label in Southeast Asia could be seen as mixed at best. Momentum previously generated had been lost as countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar sought to scale back or cancel some previously-agreed Belt and Road investments due to fears concerning excessive debt and Chinese influence. Vietnam and the Philippines, both of which clearly felt threatened by China’s encroaching presence in the SCS, were not wholehearted participants in the BRI in the first place. This left heavilyindebted Laos and Cambodia as China’s two closest allies in the region, with previously-compliant Myanmar apparently beginning to waver. Any interpretation of Chinese activity in Southeast Asia as hegemonic (or counter-hegemonic with reference to the US) in the neo-Gramscian sense therefore needs to include the proviso that there is evidence of limited success in terms of consensusbuilding and the establishing of influence. These considerations lend some support to the notion that the offensive mercantilism hypothesis might be an alternative explanation of China’s activity in the region. 6.4.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to Southeast Asia As far as the complex eclecticism toolkit is concerned, as in the previous sections, there is ample evidence to support the applicability of most concepts. Salvador Regilme Jr (2018: 215) insightfully points out that the complexity of the situation in the SCS demands a ‘multifactorial explanation’ rather than the ‘simplistic generalisations generated by paradigm-oriented debates’. The presence of a complex interweave of material and ideational factors in Beijing’s promotion of the BRI alongside the desire to defend what it sees as vital maritime routes through its near neighbourhood inevitably leads to system effects such as feedback, nonlinearity and emergence. This is particularly true of the SCS dispute, where incidents such as Chinese island-building, oil rig placement and naval blockades have sometimes produced nonlinear, escalating outcomes. Path dependence (due to historical factors), black swans (the potential for unexpected developments in the SCS), interdependence, asymmetry and hierarchy (via the attempt to build a regional hegemony) are all also clearly present. From the Chinese side, the concepts of Confucian harmony and economic inequality underlie the customary discourse about ‘win-win cooperation’, although negative local perceptions of China’s infrastructure- and loan-based economic diplomacy and assertiveness in the SCS often contradict the picture presented in Beijing’s Southeast Asian charm offensive. In the absence of any female leaders

190 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts apart from Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi (the extent of whose control over political processes is anyway unclear), the fact of male-dominated (hence patriarchal and authoritarian) diplomatic processes surrounding BRI projects is also self-evident, with the lack of minority representation in government in countries such as Myanmar also an issue of concern.

6.5 South Asia Countries: • India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives As the route of the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) passes from the South China Sea out through the Straits of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal, it enters the Indian Ocean. Precise definitions of the geographical extent of the Indian Ocean region (IOR) and South Asia vary, but the growing strategic importance of these overlapping regions is not in doubt – as indicated by the increasing use of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ since 2012 to denote the interconnectedness of the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Cordner 2018: 60). Given the geopolitical reality of Sino-Indian rivalry, with the added complication of the presence of the US in Afghanistan and the US Indian Ocean naval base at Diego Garcia in the British-occupied Chagos Islands, it is essential to recognise that South Asia, the Arabian peninsula, the Persian Gulf, East Africa and the Indian Ocean region (IOR) have merged to become a highly complex zone of contention in which China is increasingly involved (Pant 2012, Brewster 2017). However, there are many obstructions to what at first sight may resemble a Chinese push for hegemony in the region. Foremost among these is the fact that it is not easy for China to project its power effectively at such great distance (thousands of kilometres by sea) from its home bases. The reality, wellknown to Chinese analysts, is that it is difficult to consider the Chinese navy a serious challenger to the US and India in the IOR at the present time due to the vast superiority of US technology such as its fleet of advanced aircraft carriers. The lack of maritime support bases, intended for both military and merchant purposes, is likely to be one of the main reasons underlying China’s acquisition of long-term leases on ports such as Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Doraleh in Djibouti. Although distinguished in this chapter, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia are, in reality, overlapping zones whose development is in many ways interdependent and interlocked. It is for this reason that some analysts, including some prominent Chinese scholars (e.g. An 2004, Li 2004, Liu 2012), examine these three regions as one geographically-integrated unit, the ‘greater Middle East’. Nevertheless, for the sake of analytical clarity the three regions are examined in separate sections in this chapter, albeit with unavoidable overlaps. South Asia is dominated by the second most populous country in the world, soon surely to overtake China as the most populous: India. Examining China’s expanding involvement in South Asia in the era of the BRI thus necessitates

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first and foremost understanding its relations with its politically and culturally distinct neighbour on the other side of the Himalayas, as well as with its regional rival, Pakistan. Carla Freeman (2018: 84–85) points out that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in the 1980s, has failed either to mitigate Sino-Indian tensions or to significantly enhance intra-regional trade among SAARC members (the others are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives): intra-regional trade in South Asia stands at only 5 per cent of total trade, contrasted with a figure of 35 per cent in East Asia and 60 per cent in Europe. This explains why India and Pakistan were admitted to the Chinese-led SCO in 2017, with China perhaps reasoning that, despite potential complications, the ever-present tensions between the nuclear neighbours can be reduced via the behind-closeddoors negotiations typical of the platform (Song 2016: 161). Bilateral relations between China and India have been more-or-less continually strained since the 1959 flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet to India (where he has lived ever since) and the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. Mistrust and geopolitical tensions, resurfacing periodically in border skirmishes such as the one at Doklam in 2017 (which also involved Bhutan), affect interactions at the diplomatic level (Myers et al. 2017, Rana 2018: 22). On the Indian side, suspicions are also aroused by China’s port-building activities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, as well as investments and territorial acquisitions in the Maldives. India, with some justification, looks at maps and fears the ever-increasing Chinese presence and influence in its vicinity: China’s acquisition of territorial assets in the region has been called a ‘string of pearls’ strategy, an image which is suggestive for Indians of an attempt to create a linked chain of ports with the intention of expanding Chinese influence while reducing Indian power. It is thus primarily for this reason that India has been reluctant to participate in the BRI, which it sees as a Chinese power-grab (Mishra 2018, Sachdeva 2018). Yet there are other possible explanations for Chinese expansion connected to the expansive geostrategic aims of the BRI. The first is that China’s primary goal is to protect its national economic interests in the form of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), vital for imports (especially energy from the Middle East and Africa) and exports, especially goods being transported to Europe on container ships. China has for instance been active since 2009 in deploying People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels near the Horn of Africa against Somali pirates (Dorsey 2019: 208). This justification is also used for the 2017 establishment of a military base in Djibouti, China’s first such military outpost overseas. Continuing growth in the Chinese domestic economy means that the amount of energy supplies and exports passing through the Indian Ocean SLOCs is ever-expanding and that such increase necessitates ever-greater security measures (Freeman 2018: 82). Such measures include maritime bases which can potentially be used by both commercial vessels and the PLAN (Dorsey 2019: 209–210). Another motivation is that China is hedging against future contingencies such as military tensions or conflict (e.g. with India or the USA) by acquiring assets

192 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts in the region in a policy of ‘active defence’, as officially stated in a 2015 defence white paper (State Council 2015). This strategy has been likened by Henry Kissinger (2011) to the type of tactics used in the ancient Chinese game of weiqi (called ‘go’ in Japan). In weiqi two players attempt to surround their opponent with white or black stones to attempt or prevent encirclement, gradually building a strategic position or blocking an opponent’s progress. The game is well-known in East Asia and is certainly familiar to Chinese leaders. Extrapolating from Kissinger’s point, I have called the strategy of putting down territorial ‘stones’ in the form of ports and other assets ‘geo-positional balancing’ (Garlick 2018): the concept refers to the way that China ensures a physical presence in the IOR as a long-term insurance policy against as-yet-unforeseen security threats, rather than the activity being an aggressive power-play per se. In the long-term, ports may serve to protect commercial interests such as merchant shipping and energy supplies as well as being used as military bases. Even prior to the advent of the BRI, China had already become more active in the region, most notably in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, but with Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives most certainly also on the Chinese radar. At the forefront of China’s geo-economic activities in the region is the US$62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC was initiated in 2012, before the advent of the BRI, but has now been absorbed into Xi Jinping’s New Silk Road project as something of a flagship project. Although the ‘economic corridor’ name suggests that the transport link from China through Pakistan to the port of Gwadar is key to CPEC, the official CPEC website shows that energy investments dominate the initiative, with transport infrastructure projects in second place.8 Given the logistical problems of constructing the oft-mentioned but still hypothetical oil pipeline and railway line connections between Gwadar port and China’s Xinjiang province across the length of Pakistan and then over the 4,500-metre-high Karakoram mountains – a border area prone to earthquakes and disputed with India (Small 2015: 99) – it is unlikely that such links are the primary motivation for China’s undoubtedly high level of commitment to Pakistan. Instead, geostrategic (meaning both geopolitical and geo-economic) considerations surely dominate China’s thinking, including hedging against India and the US in the IOR. China aims to achieve this goal by gaining political and economic influence in Pakistan as well as by acquiring territorial assets such as, most notably, Gwadar port (Garlick 2018). Chinese companies began construction of the port of Gwadar in Pakistan as long ago as 2002, with initial funding provided by China’s Export-Import (Exim) Bank (Dreher et al. 2017). Administration of the port was handed over to the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) in 2007. However, PSA withdrew in 2013, whereupon the Chinese company China Overseas Ports Holding Company Limited (COPHC) took over PSA’s 40-year lease on the port, giving China a foothold on the IOR littoral until 2047 (Garlick 2018: 524). Although the financial arrangements concerning Gwadar have not been made public, given Pakistan’s well-known liquidity problems and lack of foreign currency, it is

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reasonable to assume that the debt owed to China for funding the construction of Gwadar has been restructured in return for Chinese control of the port, from which COPHC now gains 91 per cent of revenues (Khan 2017). COPHC itself is a corporate entity based in Hong Kong about which little is known, although, according to investigative research conducted by Pakistan’s Business Recorder website, it is safe to assume that it is under the control of the Chinese government (Business Recorder 2018). Gwadar is also linked overland to China via the Karakoram Highway, which since the 1970s has connected northern Pakistan with Xinjiang province in northwest China. However, the route, which claimed the lives of more than one thousand Chinese and Pakistani labourers as they carved it into the sides of steep mountains, is a difficult one subject to frequent rockslides and landslides (Garlick 2018: 524). In addition, Gwadar port appears to have limited commercial potential due to its relatively remote location in the restive province of Baluchistan, as well as the relatively low draft and capacity of the port (Garlick 2018: 524–525). James Dorsey (2019: 134–135) reports that the number of ships docking and departing from Gwadar is far lower than originally anticipated, with only one commercial ship per month docking on average in 2017. The ever-present danger of terrorist attacks by Baluchi separatists, who have killed Chinese citizens, also affects the security of the port (Dorsey 2019: 137–138). It is therefore highly likely that Gwadar is of interest to the Chinese primarily for geostrategic reasons relating to geo-positional balancing and longterm national security (conceived as protecting China’s political economy from external threats (Heath 2016: 164)) rather than purely economic ones relating to increased Sino-Pakistani commercial transactions. Indeed, an anonymous Chinese source interviewed by Mathieu Duchâtel in 2009 admitted that The energy-and-trade corridor has only little importance and security costs are high. Pakistan has no resources, no gas, no oil, only a geographical position. (Duchâtel 2011: 557) In addition, the frequently-mentioned but purely hypothetical goal of transporting oil and natural gas through Pakistan to China overland to avoid the Malacca chokepoint is impractical and expensive, as even Chinese logistics experts have acknowledged (Garlick 2018: 524–525). Logic also suggests that China is not expecting to recoup all the money loaned to Pakistan for infrastructure projects. Indeed, although for obvious reasons there are no public pronouncements on the topic, in private Chinese government officials have admitted that they expect that 80 per cent of Chinese investments in Pakistan will never be repaid, with further calculations of a 50 per cent write-off of debt in Myanmar and 30 per cent in Central Asia (Miller 2017: 176–177). The evidential narrative, while lacking a conclusive corpus delicti (such as a government document) which would demonstrate clear intent, is thus suggestive of Chinese motivations relating to geostrategy, leverage and influence rather than pure economic calculation.

194 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts In the circumstances it is not surprising that Dorsey (2019: 182–191) reports a rising tide of Pakistani criticism of Chinese investments since 2017. For instance, in September 2018 Abdul Razak Dawood, the minister responsible for industry and investment in the newly-elected Imran Khan-led government, told the Financial Times that the preceding government ‘did a bad job negotiating with China on CPEC – they didn’t do their homework correctly and didn’t negotiate correctly so they gave away a lot … Chinese companies received tax breaks, many breaks and have an undue advantage in Pakistan; this is one of the things we’re looking at because it’s not fair that Pakistan companies should be disadvantaged’ (Anderlini et al. 2018). However, despite the apparent decline in perceptions of Chinese investments and influence, in 2019 Pakistan was not likely to switch its allegiance to the US. Indeed, Donald Trump’s insistence in November 2018 that the Pakistanis ‘don’t do a damn thing for us’ led to angry rebukes from current and former government ministers in Pakistan concerning the US ‘relationship of betrayals and sanctions’ (Masood 2018). Instead, the Imran Khan government intended to try to renegotiate the terms of Chinese investment in CPEC. In response, China has demonstrated a willingness to revise the CPEC trade agreements signed with previous regimes. Nevertheless, by the end of 2018 over ten rounds of talks spread over three months had not produced any major concessions from the Chinese side apart from an agreement to allow Pakistan to export an extra US$1 billion of goods to China, leaving the question of Pakistan’s inability to make debt repayments unresolved (M.Z. Khan 2018). In May 2019, with Pakistan desperately short of cash reserves and with debts stacking up, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stepped in with a $US6 billion bailout (Masood 2019). This was despite the fact that fears had been expressed in the US about the money being used to pay off debts to China (Aamir 2019). There were also concerns about the lack of transparency from both China and Pakistan about the details of Chinese loans (Gulf Times 2019). A similar story emerges in Sri Lanka, where China has been involved in the construction of Hambantota port since 2009, shortly after the conclusion of the Sri Lankan civil war. China became involved in the project after India declined to be involved. The Indian government and business interests judged the port to be unnecessary and commercially unviable given the existing port at Colombo (Brewster 2017: 139). Hambantota is the hometown of Sri Lanka’s president until 2015, Mahinda Rajapaksa, who, according to investigative reporting by Maria Abi-Habib (2018) of The New York Times, received significant campaign contributions from China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE). Since its construction, the port has not been profitable, with only a small number of ships docking there in comparison to those visiting the port of Colombo. CHEC carried out the construction of Hambantota port, for which Sri Lanka received loans from China’s Exim Bank of just over US$1 billion. An initial interest rate of between 1 and 2 per cent was raised to 6.3 per cent in 2012 as Sri Lankan debts to China began to accumulate (AbiHabib 2018).

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The Hong Kong-based private company China Merchants Port gained a 99year lease on Hambantota port in December 2017 when it became clear, amid escalating debt obligations (including other external debt) and the lack of profitable business at the port, that Sri Lanka could not pay back the money owed to Exim Bank (Amir 2017). China Merchants Port, in which the Chinese SOE China Merchants Group has a 55.4 per cent stake, gained 85 per cent of the port in return for US$1.1 billion, a sum conveniently equivalent to the debt Sri Lanka owed to Exim Bank (Abi-Habib 2018). Despite handing over control of Hambantota, Sri Lanka remains heavily indebted to China due to loans taken out to fund other projects, most notably the US$1.4 billion Colombo port city and the US$1.35 billion Norochcholai Coal Power Plant (Ramachandran 2018). Sri Lanka was forced to take out a fresh loan of US$1 billion from the China Development Bank (CDB) in May 2018 in order to repay its other maturing loans (Aneez 2018). Hambantota is therefore now de facto a Chinese port: according to an eyewitness report, Chinese companies, workers and businessmen are prevalent in the Hambantota area, including the port’s sole five-star hotel.9 Consequently, suspicions concerning Chinese motivations in Sri Lanka have escalated, particularly in India. The former Indian foreign secretary and national security advisor Shivshankar Menon claims that China’s investment in Hambantota can only be justified ‘from a national security standpoint – that they will bring the People’s Liberation Army in’ (Abi-Habib 2018). Such fears are not unjustified given that China docked a submarine and a warship in Colombo in 2014 and attempted to dock a submarine in Colombo in 2017 (Aneez and Sirilal 2014, 2017). The Hambantota case has also bolstered the arguments of those, both in Sri Lanka and elsewhere, who claim that China is pursuing a deliberate policy of ‘debt trap diplomacy’ and neo-colonialism along the route of the BRI, using economic leverage to achieve geostrategic goals. There is evidence that China has had been aware of the geostrategic advantages of Hambantota from the start: Hu Shisheng, the director of South Asia studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a Beijing think tank affiliated with the Ministry of State Security and overseen by the Central Committee of the CCP, admitted as much to Maria Abi-Habib of The New York Times (AbiHabib 2018). Nihal Rodrigo, Sri Lankan foreign secretary at the time the Hambantota deal was struck, also claims that ‘discussions with Chinese officials at the time made it clear that intelligence sharing was an integral, if not public, part of the deal’. This implies that ‘China saw strategic value in the Hambantota port from the beginning’ (Abi-Habib 2018). Whatever the ins and outs of these arguments, the result is that the commercially unsuccessful port of Hambantota is in Chinese hands until 2116 while Sri Lanka’s struggles to service the remaining debt to China (as well as its other external debts) continue: in fact, Sri Lanka’s debt to China constitutes only about 10 per cent of Sri Lanka’s total foreign debt (Weerakoon and Jayasuriya 2019). All the same, the negative publicity generated in Sri Lanka and in regional and global media has seriously damaged China’s BRI soft power drive in South Asia.

196 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts In the Maldives there is a similar story of an allegedly corrupt president, Abdulla Yameen, signing deals for construction projects built by Chinese SOEs and backed by loans from Chinese state-backed financial institutions such as Exim Bank (Hurley et al. 2018). The most significant projects were a US$830 million upgrade to the airport and a bridge (Maldives Independent 2018). Yameen also signed a free-trade agreement with China in 2017 and handed over leases to as many as 17 Maldivian islands (Chatterji 2018). There is evidence to suggest that Yameen, who was responsible for ordering the arrest of opposition politicians, welcomed the deals in return for ‘political cover from China, which called on the international community to refrain from actions that may “further complicate the situation” ’ (Bhandari and Jindal 2018). By 2017, according to a paper published by the Indian Council on Global Relations (Bhandari and Jindal 2018), the debt to China had reached US$1.5 billion out of a total national debt of US$3 billion – a big deal for a country with a population of less than half a million and a GDP of just over US$7 billion.10 After Yameen was removed from office in September 2018, the new president, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, warned that ‘the state’s financial situation is precarious … due to projects conducted only for political reasons’, pointing to ‘embezzlement and corruption conducted at different levels of the government’ (Miglani 2018). Bangladesh presents another interesting case study of a regional power tussle between China and India, with China enjoying considerable influence due to its long-term support of Bangladesh’s military (Mushtaq 2018). In 2008, a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in India noted the ‘extremely uneven’ nature of Bangladeshi-Indian relations and China’s success in building up ‘robust and very comprehensive’ relations with Bangladesh despite obvious asymmetries (Datta 2008: 755). The situation remained much the same in 2018, although there were signs that Bangladesh was playing China and India off against each other in order to gain preferential terms for loans and investments. Most notably, China and India have been competing to build infrastructure such as a deep-sea port, railways and power plants (Cookson and Joehnk 2018). However, the rivalry has produced poor outcomes for Bangladesh, with India apparently blocking Chinese efforts to construct a port at Sonadia in 2014 and Bangladesh suspicious of Indian intentions. China has long been Bangladesh’s main arms supplier, with two Chinese submarines supplied to the Bangladeshi navy in 2017. On the other hand, India retains massive cultural influence, with signs of improving bilateral relations since the visit of the Indian chief of naval staff and defence minister in 2017 (Mushtaq 2018). The Rohingya refugee crisis, in which China has sided with the Myanmar government at the UN, has also cost Beijing in Bangladeshi eyes, although since India also backs Myanmar it has gained no advantage (Cookson and Joehnk 2018). In addition, the Sino-Indian rivalry for influence in Bangladesh has negatively impacted on the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor (BCIM), which is supposed, according to China, to be a BRI project (Sachdeva 2018). Landlocked and impoverished Nepal, situated as it is between its two giant neighbours, represents another case study of Sino-Indian rivalry. Since the dominant

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religion in Nepal is Hinduism, one might expect India to be influential; yet in recent years, with Indian investment lacking, the government of Nepal has increasingly aligned with China. Lintner (2018) points out that ‘China’s mix of soft diplomacy, generous aid and getting on the right side of local politics has won over a South Asian nation that was previously firmly in India’s sphere of influence.’ Chinese investments include hydropower projects, energy, mines and roads, with a rail link across the border from Tibet to Nepal also planned. However, China’s investment, as usual and despite its proclamations of non-interference, comes with strings attached: China seeks diplomatic leverage, natural resources and greater surveillance of ethnically-Tibetan border regions of Nepal (Murton et al. 2016). The remaining South Asian nations are Bhutan and Afghanistan, with both of which China shares a border. The above-mentioned 2017 Doklam border incident soured relations between China and Bhutan, but in 2018 China launched a charm offensive intended to woo Bhutan into its orbit. Time will tell whether this reclusive Buddhist nation which is traditionally reliant on India for its security will reorient towards Beijing (Lintner 2018). As for Afghanistan, after demonstrating reluctance to be involved in the post-9/11 US invasion of the country, China has increased its aid since 2014. However, although China is now Afghanistan’s second biggest investor, investment still remains at relatively modest levels. Chinese scholar Zhu Yongbiao stresses that, due to its deteriorated security situation and unfavourable geographical position away from the SREB routes, Afghanistan is not central to the BRI ( Zhu 2018: 286, 291–2, 300). Theoretically, China’s activity in South Asia, based on an ideational charm offensive but beset by accusations of debt-trap diplomacy and neo-colonialism, lends itself readily to suggestions of offensive mercantilism and attempts to generate a regional counter-hegemonic historic bloc to counter US and Indian influence. However, such claims need to be evaluated carefully: they will be examined, along with the more difficult issue of whether there is any evidence for Tang’s social evolution paradigm (SEP) in China’s involvement in the regions of the BRI, in Chapter 7. 6.5.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to South Asia Applying the IR part of the complex eclecticism toolkit to South Asia reveals China’s increasing attempts to generate material and ideational power in the region under the framework of the BRI. However, China’s charm offensive in the region began to break down from 2017 onwards, with criticisms of its ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ emanating from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and the Maldives as well as India: these criticisms have rendered China’s ‘win-win cooperation’ rhetoric ineffective. Noticeable asymmetries are present in China’s relations with all countries except India, its chief rival for regional hegemony. The resulting strongly asymmetrical interactions impact intersubjective perceptions of each partner’s role in bilateral relations, sometimes for the worse. Economic inequality, which China seems to exploit through leveraging loans and investments for political and economic influence, is also clearly present. On the other

198 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts hand, the application of the interdependence and institutions tools demonstrates that these are relatively weak in South Asia (compared to other BRI regions), with a low level of intraregional trade and the failure of the SAARC to generate stronger ties. This may be why India and Pakistan have been allowed to join the SCO. Unfortunately, in the presence of a new geopolitical ‘great game’ in the region, the natural environment does not seem to be high on anybody’s list of priorities, and regional politics remains largely male dominated (patriarchal authoritarianism). In terms of complexity effects, path dependence dominates China’s relations with India, with the 1962 border conflict apparently still uppermost in both sides’ perceptions of the other. Positive and negative feedback effects can occur when there is a build-up or dampening of pro- or anti-Chinese sentiment: from 2017 to 2018 there was an increase in discussion of China’s alleged ‘debt-trap diplomacy’, generating a swell in negative public perceptions and impacting elections and future investments. Uncertainty and tension over borders means that black swans and tipping points also cannot be discounted. Although it is difficult to develop a clear picture relating to the other complexity effects, China’s growing influence in the region can certainly be described as nonlinear and emergent, with the course of future events consequently difficult to predict.

6.6 The Middle East Countries: • Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Yemen, Palestine (+ Djibouti) During the era of Deng Xiaoping’s taoguang yanghui (‘lie low and bide your time’) strategy, the Middle East was not a priority for China. As a zone of conflict far away from China’s immediate neighbourhood, the Beijing government saw no reason to entangle itself in the Middle Eastern mayhem. The struggles of many countries in the Middle East to shake off the vestiges of European colonialism and tribalism amid wars, sectarian violence and religious schisms (Hlavsová 2018) meant that there was no motivation for China to become involved while it was still resolving issues in its own neighbourhood. Meanwhile, US influence in countries such as Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia dissuaded China from paying more than cursory attention to the region. However, the situation began to change beginning in the 1990s, when China’s energy demands first outstripped domestic consumption. Almost keeping pace with annual GDP growth, China’s demand for oil grew at an average rate of 7 per cent between 1990 and 2009 (Leung 2011: 1330). When combined with gradually increasing use of liquid natural gas (LNG) and the need to reduce excessive reliance on cheap, domestically available, but heavily polluting coal while diversifying supplies as much as possible (Garlick 2017: 14), it is obvious that fossil fuel imports became a major motivation for growing Chinese involvement. In 2014 China obtained approximately 17 per cent of its oil

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imports from Saudi Arabia and 10 per cent from Oman, with Iraq and Iran supplying 9 per cent each. In addition, Kuwait and the UAE each contributed 4 per cent of the total, meaning that approximately half of China’s oil imports originate in the Persian Gulf region (Garlick 2017: 4). Most of these supplies pass by sea through the ‘chokepoints’ of the Strait of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca on their way to the SCS and China. China also imports significant amounts of LNG from Qatar by the same route (Garlick 2017: 5). It is for this reason that Xi Jinping’s speech at the League of Arab States in January 2016 emphasised energy cooperation as the ‘principal axis’ of China’s involvement in the Middle East (cited in Small 2018: 201). Thus, China’s increasing involvement in the region must be viewed, at least in large part, as an attempt to ensure the nation’s energy security in the face of potential threats to fuel supplies. Possible disruptions include Somali pirates operating off the Horn of Africa and ‘black swans’ in the form of unexpected regional or global conflicts. An Iranian threat to blockade the Strait of Hormuz in July 2018 in response to the imposition by the US of oil sanctions provoked a critical response from the Assistant Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong, which is suggestive of the rationale behind Chinese foreign policy in the region (Blanchard 2018, Frankopan 2018: 227). In this context, the setting up in 2017 of China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti and subsequent development of port facilities in the East African country is not at all surprising (Becker and Downs 2018). As the previous section explained, in the IOR (which includes Middle Eastern countries such as Oman, Yemen and Iran) rivalries and tensions abound. However, geostrategic competition occurs not only between China, India and Pakistan, but also among the oil- and natural gas-rich states around the Persian Gulf. The latter, where Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman all have coastline, is connected to the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Hormuz, which lies between Oman and Iran. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran stand not only on opposite sides of the Gulf physically but are also at loggerheads politically and religiously (M.S.R. Khan 2018). In 2017, Qatar restored diplomatic links with Iran, angering Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain (Dudley 2017). The Yemeni civil war, in which Saudi Arabia and Iran are involved in supporting opposing factions as proxies, is also a major source of disruption to regional relations (Hlavsová 2018), as are the Syrian conflict and the issue of Palestine’s relations with Israel. In short, there is no end to the political issues which China must navigate if it wishes to become a significant actor in the Middle East. Inevitably, it will be difficult for China to avoid political entanglements, as its companies increase their investments in the region. As a result, China’s approach to the Middle East ‘is still likely to be defined by caution’ (Small 2018: 203). In particular, the Iran-Saudi Arabia regional rivalry presents the Chinese government with a near-impossible conundrum: how to balance its interests in each country without angering the other? Beijing acted as a behind-the-scenes broker in the Iran nuclear deal (Garver 2018). One of the routes of the SREB is supposed to pass through Iran on its way to Turkey and then Europe (Miller 2017:

200 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts 31). Chinese companies are pursuing infrastructure projects in Iran including oil and gas extraction, roads, dams, bridges, and even a high-speed rail link from Xinjiang province through Central Asia to Tehran (Calabrese 2018). China imports more than 25 per cent of Iran’s oil (Frankopan 2018: 247). A thinktank report cited by Dorsey (2019: 43–44) concludes that Iran is far more key for the development of the BRI than Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries, which is certainly logical in terms of the geography of the initiative’s overland route. Yet at the same time Beijing needs to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia, its largest supplier of oil, while also not antagonising the US, whose president since 2017, Donald Trump, has scuppered the nuclear deal so painstakingly negotiated under Barack Obama’s watch. Thus, Xi Jinping’s trip to the Middle East in January 2016 featured ‘a careful balancing act between the trips to Iran and Saudi Arabia’ (Small 2018: 201). China perceives Iran’s involvement in proxy wars in Syria and Yemen as a destabilising factor in the region. Yet in response to Iran’s threat to block the Strait of Hormuz in July 2018 Beijing felt unable to issue Iran with more than a carefully-phrased mild rebuke through a relatively junior diplomat (Blanchard 2018). In the circumstances, both China and Iran remain cautious about taking trade and investment ties to the next level (Small 2018: 202). Meanwhile, Chinese companies have very substantial commercial interests in Saudi Arabia. These include: a US$1.8 billion contract won in 2009 by China Railway Engineering to build a high-speed railway between Mecca and Medina; a Chinese mega-mall; and one of the largest mineral-processing projects in the world (Foley 2018: 70). In part to allay fears that China is assisting Iran with its nuclear programme, US$65 billion of agreements were signed during a visit by the Saudi King to Beijing in 2017, including the development of nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia (Dorsey 2019: 95). In short, China is attempting to generate as much soft power and geo-economic influence in the region as possible while not taking sides in the Saudi-Iranian stand-off. China is also investing in other Middle Eastern countries. Projects include the construction by Chinese companies of commercial ports at Duqm in Oman (Shepard 2017), Kumport in Turkey (Knowler 2015) and Ashdod in Israel (Eran 2016: 56). China is also developing port facilities at Djibouti which connect to its military base acquired in 2017 (Bhat 2018). These projects give China control of ports stretching from the Bay of Bengal to the Mediterranean and lend credence to the geo-positional balancing and ‘string of pearls’ hypotheses. China is also a major investor in Egypt, due most obviously to the fact that the North African country possesses the Suez Canal, a vital link in the Maritime Silk Road. China is currently the largest investor in the waterway, and the Chinese corporation TEDA is also building a special economic zone in the Suez area. Other Chinese investments include billions for a new administrative capital outside Cairo as well as a new light rail system. In return, Egypt has rounded up hundreds of Uighurs who were studying at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University and deported them back to China, where they have presumably ended up in one of the ‘re-education camps’ in Xinjiang province (Wood 2018).

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Turkey, on the other hand, has incurred China’s displeasure due to its acceptance of Uighur migrants, ‘a number of whom have gone on to join various militant groups in Syria’ (Small 2018: 203). The Turkish government’s apparent sympathy for the ethnically and culturally Turkic Uighur people has seemingly tempered Beijing’s interest in developing Turkey as a Belt and Road transportation hub. The problems in eastern Turkey due to the Syrian conflict also obviously dampen expectations concerning infrastructure projects passing through the territory. Reservations about Turkey, alongside the aforementioned caution concerning investments in Iran, mean that the intended overland route of the SREB from Xinjiang to Europe through Central Asia and Turkey is not progressing as rapidly as anticipated. In the circumstances, it is understandable that Beijing is, at the time of writing, more cautious about committing its efforts to the southern route than the northern route through Russia and Belarus. However, the maritime route, as already emphasised, is being developed as a priority of the first order. China is pouring billions into developing port facilities in Djibouti, Egypt, Israel and Turkey. Chinese investments in Doraleh, Suez, Ashdod and Kumport may receive less media attention than Gwadar and Hambantota, but still they constitute important stepping-stones on the way to European ports such as Piraeus, Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg; it should be recalled that Chinese shipping companies have substantial stakes in all four ports (Huang 2018). The Chinese have also built a railway from Djibouti to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. The principal motivation seems to be to connect new Chinese-built industrial zones in Ethiopia producing ‘Chinese’ goods to the Djiboutian port of Doraleh, from whence the goods can be exported to Europe and America (Worku and Shoubao 2018). Whether one wishes to extend the ‘string of pearls’ and weiqi analogies to the Middle East and Europe or not, there is no doubt that port building to extend and secure China’s shipping routes and commercial interests is a highly significant development emerging under the banner of the Maritime Silk Road. Overall, due to political uncertainties, logistical difficulties, geographical overstretch, and China’s difficulties in developing a clear strategy to the region, the Middle East can be expected to be less emphasised in the BRI than the three regions which are closer to China. Indeed, cooperation with countries in the region is perceived by the Chinese to be at a lower level than with Central Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia (SIC 2016: 1–2, 4). Andrew Small (2018: 203) confirms that while China will remain cautiously engaged, ‘OBOR is likely to take a more modest form there than in several of the regions on China’s periphery’. He predicts that China will mainly focus on maintaining its energy supplies while gradually developing transportation routes via Iran and Turkey and investing in industry, finance, infrastructure and ports across the region. Understandably, Chinese investments will focus primarily on the most stable states. At the same time, Beijing seeks to generate as much influence as possible in conflict-ridden countries such as Yemen, Syria, Palestine and Iraq in case they re-stabilise and opportunities for economic statecraft appear, while being careful not to take unnecessary risks with either financial or political capital.

202 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts 6.6.1 Applying the complex eclecticism toolkits to the Middle East Applying the IR theory part of the complex eclecticism toolkit to China’s relations with the Middle East is less than straightforward. As in other regions, Beijing’s search for material and ideational influence in the region is clear, even if its achievement in these areas thus far is less so. On the other hand, it is difficult to apply the other tools. Interdependence seems to relate mainly to the issue of China’s energy imports, but the extent to which Middle Eastern nations are reliant on China’s purchasing power is debatable. In this case, there appears to be an asymmetry of needs which favours the oil suppliers rather than the importer. Despite protestations that the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CACF) ‘has become a forum of significance for multilateral cooperation’ (Yao 2014: 27), effective regional institutions involving China are lacking, as are pan-Middle Eastern alliances: the most powerful institution in the region, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), includes only the Arabic oil-producing states. This is also the obvious problem with the CACF. Analysis of intersubjective perceptions is elusive, with more research needing to be done in this area: Pew Research Center’s latest data on global public opinion about China includes only Israel among its 25 countries (Wike et al. 2018). The question of China’s heavy-handed approach to its Muslim minority in Xinjiang surely weighs large, especially in Turkey. Even the economic inequality tool is hard to apply, since the members of the GCC – Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain – are among the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita measurements, while the neighbouring war-torn state of Yemen, to which China is reluctant to commit resources due to the risks and instability, is among the poorest.11 In the circumstances, Beijing’s standard ‘win-win cooperation’ and soft power Confucian harmony tropes create little leverage. As in other regions, patriarchal authoritarianism is evident in the overwhelming prevalence of male-dominated leadership structures and the lack of roles for women, while concerns about the natural environment take a backseat to resource extraction and conflict resolution. Overall, a picture emerges of China as being in a weaker position in the Middle East than in Central, South and Southeast Asia since questions of influence and asymmetry do no favours to Beijing’s negotiating position, which is also undermined by the US commitment to Saudi Arabia and Israel and antagonism towards Iran. On the other hand, in a region with as complex interstate relations as the Middle East, the CT toolkit comes to the fore. Black swans translate into potential disruptions to energy supplies which could affect oil prices and thus China’s economy. Rising or falling oil prices create feedback effects in terms of energy costs, prices and profitability for China’s domestic export-dependent industries. These factors, allied to the unpredictability of unfolding events across the conflict-prone region, produce outcomes which appear to take place at the edge of chaos but may have underlying emergent properties, for instance in the strategic balancing behaviours of Iran and Saudi Arabia, some of which relate to their relations with China. Path dependence reveals itself in the aftermath of

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European colonialism, entrenched enmities between Saudi Arabia and Iran and between Israel and its Arabic neighbours, as well as in the consequences of the US invasion of Iraq, the civil wars in Yemen and Syria, and the long-term US commitment to Saudi Arabia and its oil (Jones 2010, Auzanneau 2018). All the above create almost-impenetrable nonlinearities which make sensible analysts, including those in China, reluctant to commit to hard-and-fast forecasts concerning the future progress of the Belt and Road in the Middle East.

6.7 Conclusions Analysing the development of the Belt and Road (such as it is) through the five main regions in which it is primarily being applied allows an inter-regional comparison of its progress. The analysis allows one to see that the three regions geographically closest to China – Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia – are the most important for the success of the initiative, while the remaining two – CEE and the Middle East – are of less significance (although the Middle East has the crucial role of oil supplier). Indeed, an official Chinese report confirms that cooperation with the three neighbouring regions is perceived as more successful than with the two more distant ones (SIC 2016: 3–4). Such considerations are suggestive, as outlined at the beginning of this chapter, of the significance of geographical, geopolitical, geo-economic, historical and cultural factors as either facilitating or limiting for the BRI’s goals of developing connectivity and infrastructure (Sternberg et al. 2017). Analysing region by region also permits one to see the distinct but interlinked characteristics of the land (Belt) and sea (Road) routes of the BRI, with China’s port building programme along the route of the MSR being particularly noticeable. Digging down below the regional level to specific countries demonstrates other effects which transcend intra-regional analysis. Close inspection of the countries in which China has developed the most influence (such as Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Laos, Cambodia, Djibouti and Montenegro) reveals that these are relatively impoverished, developing states which have struggled to attract external investment in sufficient quantities to improve their economic situation; hence the success in those countries of China’s offers of loans and infrastructure building both prior to and since the advent of the BRI. China’s initiative clearly has far less traction in nations which either have plenty of cash (such as the GCC countries) or which have access to alternative sources of funding (such as the 11 CEE countries which are EU members). Much of the potential success of the Belt and Road therefore can be seen to reside in the extent to which China is able to fill the long-term infrastructure investment vacuum left in poor countries by the developed nations of the global North. This demonstrates the importance of the economic inequality and asymmetry tools for understanding China’s BRI strategy. The ‘win-win cooperation’ discourse derived from interdependence theory may be derided in some quarters as ‘China wins twice’ (Brown 2017: 143), but it has enough resonance to persuade

204 The Belt and Road Initiative’s regional impacts countries which are sufficiently desperate for investment that they have nothing to lose from cooperation with China. Access to natural resources and the security of supply chains clearly plays a huge role in China’s interest in investing in countries within the Belt and Road framework. However, efforts at influence building – in other words, developing material and ideational power – are also highly significant, although mixed in terms of outcomes. Institutions and interdependence play key roles in developing Chinese influence through trade and investment, and where they are relatively weak (for instance in CEE and the Middle East) China’s ability to achieve its goals is negatively affected. Patriarchal authoritarianism is also unfortunately a factor across most of the BRI regions, while concern for the natural environment disappears into the background as geo-economic and geopolitical concerns take precedence amidst the ongoing exploitation of natural resources for export to China. Also unfortunately, the tianxia-derived concept of Confucian harmony as a means to promote ideational power and cross-cultural intersubjective understandings is damaged by perceptions in many countries that China is pursuing ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ via the BRI. It is also negatively impacted by Beijing’s evident lack of tolerance for difference in its use of ‘reeducation camps’ in which it has, by its own admission, interned up to a million Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang province (Kuo 2018). Apart from the elements of complex eclecticism used in this chapter which derive from IR theory, the CT toolkit has also been helpful in analysing the progress of the Belt and Road. All six elements – path dependence, feedback effects, black swans, nonlinearity, emergence and tipping points – are present to one degree or another in China’s relations with the Belt and Road regions. It is clear that even if Western countries are not thinking in these terms, China is preparing for the possibility of black swans, tipping points and other nonlinear, emergent complexity effects through its geostrategic port building along the route of the Maritime Silk Road, as well as in its attempts to establish and extend zones of influence in Central and Southeast Asia. Complexity and dynamic changes clearly characterise the BRI and need to be accommodated in any analysis of the initiative’s impact on Asia and Europe. At the end of this chapter, it should be noted that the complex eclecticism analytical framework has facilitated a clearer understanding of the ways in which the Chinese government’s use of the BRI as economic statecraft has varied characteristics across the regions. For instance, its material and ideational power are stronger in the three regions in China’s neighbourhood, as are interdependence and institutions; while all four conceptual tools are weakest amid the complexities of the Middle East, in which China struggles to apply any geopolitical or geo-economic leverage. Complex eclecticism can therefore be regarded as providing an analytical framework which, while admittedly unwieldy in that it contains numerous theoretical elements which need to be manipulated, at the same time presents a far richer and more comprehensive means to understand the various elements of the Belt and Road than would be on offer if one chose to stick unnecessarily to narrow paradigmatic boundaries while ignoring the need to acknowledge the empirical complexity of the development of Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy initiative. However,

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complex eclecticism does not provide a macro-level theory of the BRI: taking the conclusions generated by applying complex eclecticism’s conceptual toolkits and using them to examine the macro-level theoretical options outlined in Chapter 2 is the task to which we turn in the final chapter.

Notes 1 According to an official description of the organisation on the SIC’s website, available at: www.sic.gov.cn/Column/595/0.htm. 2 Although not part of the Central Asian region as it is usually conceived, Russia and Mongolia are included, for compactness of analysis, in the Central Asian region. 3 The impression that Sinophobia is prevalent in Kazakhstan was also confirmed in an interview with a Kazakh scholar working in Europe, March 2019. 4 The intensity of mistrust depends on various historical and other factors specific to the relations between specific pairs of states and does not need unpacking in detail here. 5 ‘China’s One Belt One Road could make or break this poor European country (HBO)’, Vice News, 13 June 2018, available at: www.youtube.com/watch? v=d0gk_m0gZ0A. 6 Channel News Asia, ‘How will China’s New Silk Road change Thailand and Cambodia?’, 26 September 2018. Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CeYy5G9bDg. 7 Channel News Asia, ‘How is China’s New Silk Road transforming Vietnam and Laos?’, 30 September 2018. Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=D2mUa8VavDc&t=778s. 8 The official CPEC website run by the Pakistani government (cpec.gov.pk) highlights energy and transport infrastructure. As of December 2018 it lists 21 energyrelated projects and eight transport infrastructure projects in various stages of completion. 9 Personal communication with Professor Jakub Zajączkowski of the University of Warsaw, December 2018. 10 International Monetary Fund, ‘Maldives’. Available at: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ weo/2018/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2016&ey=2020&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=coun try&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=35&pr1.y=9&c=556&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDPD% 2CPPPGDP%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC&grp=0&a=. 11 CIA World Factbook, ‘Country comparison: GDP per capita (PPP)’, available at: www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.

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7

Assessing the impacts of China’s Belt and Road Initiative

7.1 Introduction This final chapter first presents a summary and analysis of the main findings presented in Chapters 4–6 regarding the impacts of the BRI in Asia and Europe. This is followed by an assessment of the utility of the complex eclecticism theoretical-methodological framework developed in Chapter 3 and refined in Chapter 4. After that, the aim is to refer back to the macro-level theories outlined in Chapter 2 to decide which – if any – of them is a good fit for the BRI. The final section consists of a discussion of the implications of the analysis for the progress and impacts of the BRI in Asia, Europe and globally.

7.2 Summary of the findings in Chapters 4–6 Chapters 4 and 5 looked at the general characteristics of the BRI at the broad level, while Chapter 6 analysed the impacts on BRI countries region by region. Based on the analysis conducted, the following five broad conclusions can be stated. •

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The empirical analysis conducted in Chapter 6 reveals that the three regions which are geographically closer to China – Central Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia – are more significant for the BRI. Cooperation with countries in these regions is judged by the Chinese to be the most successful. The two regions analysed in the chapter – Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Middle East – are revealed to be less crucial to the implementation of the BRI, although of course the Middle East plays a key role in China’s national security goals as a foremost supplier of energy, chiefly in the form of oil. In short: all five regions are important for the BRI’s developmental goals to one degree or another, but geographical, logistical, economic and other material factors play key roles in the regional implementation of the initiative. In its official conception, the BRI is intended to boost globalisation, interdependence and interconnectivity through Chinese-led infrastructure projects, investment, enhanced trade, ‘win-win cooperation’ and a ‘community

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of shared interests’. This conception is suggestive of a basis in the positivesum games of a naïve form of Western neoliberal economics, but also of the tianxia-based notion, derived from Chinese Confucianism, of a harmony of collective interests rather than a focus on the self-interest of the individual. The BRI is thus set up, in the official discourse, in opposition to realist notions of anarchy and state-centred international relations. On the other hand, the assumption that the official discourse is representative of the Chinese leadership’s true intentions for the initiative is disputed by many observers. In terms of its material implementation, the BRI involves Chinese investment and infrastructure-building on a grand scale from Asia to Europe (as well as in other parts of the world, notably Africa and Latin America). There is no doubt that much infrastructure – including ports, railways, roads and hydro-electric plants – has been built and that other projects are in progress. At the same time, it is an open question whether the constructed infrastructure benefits China more than the partner countries in which it is being built. Some projects – such as pipelines and ports – seem intended to serve China’s ‘comprehensive national security’ goals more than the needs of partner countries. The fact that projects are generally funded by loans from Chinese state financial institutions and built by Chinese construction companies while generating a debt for the partner country adds to the impression that ‘win-win cooperation’ should be understood as ‘China wins twice’. Since detailed information about the funding of BRI projects is generally not published, it is also difficult to know whether the promised levels of investment are delivered. China’s ideational or soft power drive to legitimise and gain acceptance for the BRI in the global public sphere has produced mixed results. In the initiative’s early years, there was a mixture of enthusiasm and confusion, with some observers expressing support for the BRI’s potential to transform connectivity from Asia to Europe (e.g. Liu and Dunford 2016, Griffiths 2017). However, there was an increasing wave of criticism from 2017 onwards. Foremost among such critiques were perceptions of ‘debt trap diplomacy’ and ‘neo-colonialism’ due to the use of state-backed loans to fund infrastructure building in developing countries. The lack of transparency on China’s part concerning the details of financing and contracts added fuel to this particular fire. There were also fears (for instance in the US and India) that the BRI is an attempt by the PRC to build a new illiberal international order using Chinese-led institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which challenges US global hegemony. Concerns about negative environmental impacts (coal plants, destruction of natural environments, etc.) also began to be expressed. The BRI contains material, ideational and institutional aspects. Material aspects occur in the form of infrastructure building, transport connectivity, trade, investment, and so on. The ideational part is the promotion of China’s normative/soft/symbolic power in terms of the initiative’s ‘win-win’, ‘shared

218 Assessing the impacts of China’s BRI interests’ discourse and intended appeal for developing countries looking to build up their economies. The BRI’s institutions – even if they are not defined as such by Beijing – consist of the various regional corridors and forums intended to facilitate the initiative’s implementation and cooperation with partners. The interaction of material, ideational and institutional aspects in the BRI generates emerging, evolving, nonlinear impacts which are complex and difficult to analyse using conventional analytical methods involving dependent and independent variables or a single theoretical approach. From these considerations it can be concluded that there is an ‘opportunity/ threat’ bifurcation in perceptions of the BRI which affects interpretations of the impacts and implementation of the initiative (cf. Pavlićević 2018). Material, ideational and institutional factors interact in a complex web of interlinked factors, which undermines ‘parsimonious’ interpretations and necessitates the use of an analytical framework or frameworks capable of incorporating complexity and nuance rather than resorting to dualistic Cartesian thinking. The conclusions reached here also suggest that re-examining the three macrolevel theories outlined in Chapter 2 in the light of the analysis conducted in Chapters 4–6 is a worthwhile exercise. The impacts of the BRI appear to lend themselves to counter-hegemonic (neo-Gramscian) and offensive mercantilist (or neo-colonialist) interpretations. At the same time, the interactions of material, ideational and institutional elements in the evolving BRI also need to be assessed with reference to Tang’s (2013) social evolution paradigm (SEP).

7.3 Assessing complex eclecticism Complex eclecticism’s theoretical-methodological approach provides a set of conceptual tools for mid-level analysis without the inherent limitations of examining empirical data through paradigmatic lenses. In complex eclecticism, conceptual tools can be applied with a ‘combinatorial logic’ (Sil and Katzenstein 2010b: 18) which can transcend artificial paradigmatic boundaries and interpret complex system effects without needing to resort to the linear language of dependent and independent variables (Jervis 1997). The analysis of the BRI conducted in Chapters 4–6 confirms that the complex eclecticism approach allows one to go further ‘beyond paradigms’ than is possible using Sil and Katzenstein’s (2010a, 2010b) analytic eclecticism, which limits its theoretical range to mainstream IR theories such as realism and liberalism. Even though exploratory rather than in any sense definitive, the examination of the BRI’s implementation and impacts in Chapters 4–6 supports Colin Wight’s (1996) assertion – supported by Jackson and Nexon (2009) – that there is no need to limit the range and breadth of analysis because of supposed theoretical incommensurability. The complex eclecticism framework used in this book builds on Sil and Katzenstein’s work in four ways. First, it fully integrates a complexity thinking (CT) approach into the analysis. This, despite repeatedly noting what Peter Hall

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(2003: 387) calls ‘the ubiquity of complex interaction effects’, is something which Sil and Katzenstein (2010a, 2010b) do not build into their approach. Second, in addition to CT – and unlike Sil and Katzenstein’s analytic eclecticism – complex eclecticism includes concepts taken from nonmainstream and non-Western IR theories. Doing this is important because it builds a basis from which to overcome what John M. Hobson (2012) calls ‘manifest’ and ‘subliminal’ Eurocentrism in IR’s theoretical debates. Third, complex eclecticism transcends paradigmatic boundaries within IR theory debates by extracting concepts from their paradigmatic baggage and incorporating them into a ‘conceptual toolkit’. In the ‘toolkit’, concepts become ‘tools’ used to analyse aspects of the BRI in an eclectic but reasonably rigorous fashion without being unnecessarily encumbered by the weight of the accumulated history of mainstream IR’s so-called ‘great debates’. Fourth, complex eclecticism attempts to mirror the pragmatic, syncretic, ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ approach of the Chinese leadership to the formulation and implementation of the BRI. It does this through abductive reasoning which applies, tests and – if necessary – discards or adapts concepts, moving back and forth between the theoretical-methodological framework and empirical data as necessary (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009). In this way, ‘the connections and interactions among a wide range of causal forces normally analyzed in isolation from one another’ (Sil and Katzenstein 2010b: 12) can be evaluated and a picture of the phenomenon under examination – in this case the BRI – can be shaped which fully accounts for its complexity. Among specific findings and recommendations – many of which are here stated for the first time – regarding the BRI emerging from the application of the complex eclecticism conceptual toolkit in Chapters 4–6 are the following: •

•

Feedback effects – with some nonlinear and difficult-to-predict tendencies – can be seen in accusations of debt-trap diplomacy with regard to Chinese loan-backed infrastructure building. Perceptions of debt-trap diplomacy (rather than a drive to correct global economic imbalances between the North and South) have negatively impacted the international reputation of the BRI and necessitated soul-searching in Beijing concerning the initiative’s implementation. Whether Chinese leaders can repair the damage to their ideational charm offensive and restore the image of the BRI (in the global South at least) remains to be seen; however, since (for instance) in 2019 Mahathir Mohamad, the Malaysian prime minister who was previously critical of China’s ‘neo-colonialism’, has reportedly done a U-turn and become an enthusiastic supporter of the initiative, it seems that there appears to be a decent chance of rebuilding the BRI’s reputation in emerging economies (Nambiar 2019). As the BRI evolves and impacts partner countries, it has the appearance, to a hard-to-define extent, of an emergent system containing sub-systems. Divergences in expectations between Chinese leaders and their agents in overseas settings (such as commercial actors) create hard-to-predict

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•

•

•

•

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outcomes due to bottom-up system effects. However, attempts at top-down control from Beijing reduce the potential for self-organisation within the BRI ‘system’ since ‘complex systems can’t usually be forced to behave in a certain way by top-down measures’ (Ball 2012: xi). Since Chinese leaders and those in BRI partner countries tend to be men, an unfortunate consequence of the implementation of the initiative is the propagation of patriarchal authoritarianism. The maleness of the BRI is something which is not being addressed by the Beijing leadership or other Chinese agents in their implementation of the initiative. Although the BRI ostensibly is a vehicle for environmentally-friendly energy technology, much Chinese-built infrastructure in other countries – such as dams and coal-fired power plants – is in fact harmful to the environment (Ullman 2019). Transparent auditing of the environmental impacts of the BRI is lacking and urgently needs to be implemented. The BRI has huge potential to facilitate the greening of the developing world’s energy resources – in the face, it has to be said, of Western inaction in this vital area – but so far it is not entirely clear that the initiative is promoting this goal effectively, and it may even be producing greater environmental damage. Possible tipping points and black swans relating to future environmental catastrophe could be averted by coordinated implementation of a massive programme of renewable energy-based infrastructure in the global South, but it is far from clear that such a programme yet exists. On the other hand, China appears to represent the world’s best hope for a coordinated strategy for developing renewable energy which could ‘save the planet’ (Finamore 2018). The concept of Confucian harmony is apparent in rhetoric about the BRI being a ‘community of shared interests’; however, the extent to which such rhetoric represents the reality of Chinese foreign policy implementation is open to debate. Greater transparency and communication with partners in the global South is needed. Path dependence is evident in institutional-type arrangements such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the 16+1/17+1, and the BRI as a whole: having committed to certain institutions, platforms or programmes of investment, the Xi administration cannot easily back out of them without losing face and risking regime legitimacy and public image taking a hit, even if, in some cases, policy U-turns might be desirable. Once established, BRI institutions are likely to persist in some form until Xi leaves office. Thus, Beijing needs to work at making BRI institutions more transparent and effective, as well as communicating their purpose more clearly, in order to forestall criticisms and encourage active participation by the partner countries included. If the BRI is to achieve its stated goals, Beijing needs to emphasise its role in overcoming intersubjective perceptions of anarchy in an ‘offensive realism’ world. Instead, Tang’s (2013) idea of a ‘defensive realism’ world in which large states seek to protect their interests through geo-economics

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rather than aggressive territorial expansion should be stressed. If one assumes, in contradiction of the Trump administration in the US, that the economic interdependence of multiple actors (both state and non-state) is the decisive aspect of the 21st century’s globalised economy, then the implementation of the BRI needs to demonstrate that the initiative serves the goal of enhancing connectivity for the benefit of all participants, not just China. The application in Chapters 5 and 6 of complex eclecticism via the ‘conceptual toolkit’ developed in Chapter 3 and refined in Chapter 4 thus demonstrates the analytical possibilities of the approach. In Chapter 5 a set of presumed characteristics of the BRI were evaluated using the conceptual tools. In Chapter 6 the conceptual toolkit was used to analyse empirical data emerging from the regional implementation of the BRI in five Asian and European regions. In terms of the complex eclecticism approach, in Chapter 5 the conclusion was that all tools can be applied to the BRI in at least one of its aspects, but that some – particularly ideational power, material power and interdependence – were more prevalent than others (see Table 5.2). At the same time, even the conceptual tools which were less used – such as the natural environment or patriarchal authoritarianism concepts – can have a level of importance which goes far beyond any naïve numerical head-counting. Additionally, the notion of a ‘conceptual toolkit’ – which, it must be remembered, is itself a metaphorical construct (Marks 2011, 2018) – needs to be understood as an experimental qualitative theoretical-methodological framework which can serve as a starting point for further research into the eclectic use of theoretical tools to analyse empirical, ‘real-world’ data. Complex eclecticism and its conceptual toolkit do not – and cannot – in themselves constitute a macro-level theoretical framework for explaining the BRI. Nevertheless, the analysis conducted in Chapters 5 and 6 adds value in a theoretical sense because it supplies clues which point, to one degree or another, and in one aspect or another, towards the three theories outlined in Chapter 2. The final step in the analysis therefore is an assessment – necessarily qualitative – of the extent to which the three ‘macro-level’ theories fit the analysis conducted in Chapters 4–6.

7.4 Assessing the macro-level theories The examination of the BRI conducted in Chapters 5 and 6 has been suggestive of the potential for Chinese economic foreign policy to be framed in terms of either neo-Gramscianism or offensive mercantilism, while Tang’s social evolution paradigm (SEP) has remained mainly in the background of the analysis. In essence, the relevance of the former two theories has been more obvious, while it takes more effort to make out presence of the latter in the impacts and implementation of the BRI. At the same time, simply being less obvious is not a refutation. In addition, if it could be shown that Tang’s SEP is the ‘most macro’ of the three theories under consideration – meaning that it is a grand

222 Assessing the impacts of China’s BRI theory in the sense of being an attempt to explain everything in IR, rather than just certain aspects – then it might be the case that the other two can be subsumed into it. In other words, if it could be shown that neo-Gramscianism and offensive mercantilism are ‘less macro’ than Tang’s SEP, then it may be the case that the latter is the best explanation at the ‘grand’ level of analysis. Summarising the three theories’ relevance to the BRI, as examined in Chapters 4–6, presents the following characteristics. As far as neo-Gramscianism is concerned, understanding the BRI as a drive to establish a South-South counterhegemony to the US-led liberal international order based on intersecting material, ideational and institutional factors would seem to be a distinct possibility. On the other hand, accusations in the international media and in the BRI regions that Chinese investments in developing countries constitute neo-colonialism and ‘debt trap diplomacy’ have cast doubt on Chinese claims of ‘win-win cooperation’ and a ‘community of shared interests’: such claims seem to point in the direction of offensive mercantilism. Meanwhile, elements related to the SEP are more difficult to discern in the shifting contours of the BRI: clear indicators that the ideational and institutional aspects of the BRI constitute the ‘genes’ and ‘phenotypes’ of an evolving system do not immediately present themselves and remain an open question. Be all that as it may, the status of these three theories in relation to one another – and in relation to the idea of ‘macro-level theorising’ or ‘grand theory’ – remains to be explained. Taking neo-Gramscianism first, we have seen that the BRI appears to have counter-hegemonic characteristics. Financial institutions such as the AIIB and the New Silk Road Fund, regional platforms such as the SCO and the 16/17+1, and economic ‘corridors’ such as the CPEC and the New Eurasian Land Bridge seem intended to support a push for a new Chinese-led order across Asia and beyond. A normative or soft power charm offensive (Kurlantzick 2007) involving the supposedly inclusive and mutually beneficial aims of the BRI itself supports material goals of economic expansion, political influence, and securing energy supplies. Thus, institutions, ideas and material capabilities create a neoGramscian triangle of interacting factors (Cox 1981: 136). From this perspective, the BRI’s role is to boost what is called ‘comprehensive national power’ (zonghe guoli, 综合国力), defined as ‘the sum of a country’s political, economic, military, and ideational strength’ (Klimeš 2017: 134). Interpreted in this way, the BRI represents a challenge to US and Western global hegemony: a counter-hegemony based on South-South cooperation; a movement of those who are materially weaker (developing countries) against those who dominate (the West); the whole movement led by China. On the other hand, one observer’s counter-hegemony is another observer’s offensive realism (Mearsheimer 2001, 2010) or Thucydides trap (Allison 2017). China’s challenge, from this perspective, can be understood in terms of the anarchic structure of the international system in which states strive to obliterate each other and the second-strongest state is obliged to oust the hegemon by force. Offensive realism points to the inevitability of a military confrontation no matter what either the existing hegemon – the USA – or the challenger –

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China – assert to be their aims. If correct, this analysis would undermine the ideational, institutional and economic elements built into neo-Gramscianism by refuting its Marxist-based interpretation of dialectical historical processes. On the other hand, as Tang (2010, 2013) points out, the same structural factors analysed in offensive realism can be interpreted in a totally different way: as defensive realism, in which anarchy drives states to defend their interests against competing states rather than seeking to conquer them. The offensive/ defensive realist conundrum is difficult to resolve until one absorbs Tang’s historical analysis. Tang (2013: 103–108) demonstrates a shift during the 20th century from offensive to defensive realism as the military aggression of states such as Nazi Germany and imperial Japan caused their downfall rather than ascent. It has become clear that outright conquest of other states has become more difficult and the associated costs too great. This historical shift means that we are now living in a ‘defensive realism world’ in which states understand that military conflict results in mutually assured destruction and economic collapse rather than potential benefit for the aggressor (Tang 2013: 96). Thus, in Tang’s persuasive empirical analysis, an ‘offensive realism world’ has given way to a ‘defensive realism world’. While defensive realism logically contradicts offensive realism, it is not logically incompatible with offensive mercantilism. In a defensive realism world, a state might seek to defend its interests by economic expansion and exploitation rather than the method of military conquest associated with offensive realism. From the perspective of offensive mercantilism, as Chapters 4–6 have demonstrated, the BRI appears to use an aggressive type of economic statecraft – which has been labelled ‘debt trap diplomacy’ by some commentators – to achieve a form of neo-colonialist domination of economically weaker states. In this analysis, China exploits the asymmetries between itself and partner states to extract resources and build up its economic strength at the expense of other states. Offensive mercantilism thus interprets the BRI as being based upon zero-sum rather than positive-sum economics: ‘win-win cooperation’ means ‘China wins twice’ (Brown 2017: 143). However, China’s expansionist economic statecraft can still be interpreted as being defensively motivated in terms of comprehensive national security: for instance, in order to secure and protect energy supplies from the Middle East and Africa China seeks to increase its influence and build up its territorial assets in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean (Garlick 2018). In this sense, offensive mercantilism does not necessarily contradict Tang’s (2013) conception of a defensive realism world. The examination of the BRI through complex eclecticism conducted in Chapters 4–6 revealed that, based on appearances, an offensive mercantilism interpretation is quite easy to support. There are many examples in the developing world, from Sri Lanka to Kenya to Montenegro, of infrastructure being built by Chinese companies and funded by loans from Chinese state financial institutions such as Exim Bank. The accumulated debts, which also incur interest, undoubtedly create obligations which give the Chinese state some leverage in the debtor country. In some cases, this appears to have been exploited to gain control of

224 Assessing the impacts of China’s BRI territorial assets such as, in the most well-known instance, the port at Hambantota in Sri Lanka. In others, it seems to have been exploited to gain political influence in the asymmetrically weaker partner country. For instance, the evidence suggests that China has gained a high degree of political leverage in Pakistan, Myanmar and Djibouti which it has exploited in each case to gain and maintain control of ports which are likely to have long-term geopolitical value for China’s ability to establish influence in the Indian Ocean region (Brewster 2017, Garlick 2018). On the other hand, offensive mercantilism tends to assume that the state is monolithic and that commercial actors are merely channels through which the state enacts policy, whereas there is evidence concerning China’s economic statecraft that Chinese principals are not always able to control their agents in overseas settings (Gill and Reilly 2007, Norris 2016, Garlick 2019). If implementation of the BRI is affected by a ‘fragmentation of authority’ (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 23) which involves provincial administrations and companies supposedly acting on the Chinese state’s behalf but in many cases acting in their own perceived interests, then the notion of Chinese geo-economic statecraft as a unified set of policies begins to erode. Given at least a degree of diffusion in Chinese decision-making structures, the idea of a focused campaign of neo-colonialist ‘debt trap diplomacy’ seems less convincing, particularly since detailed documentary or other empirical evidence that such a campaign exists is lacking. Another weakness is that offensive mercantilism does not fully account for the ideational or institutional aspects of the BRI since it focuses mainly on material factors, particularly economic ones. In an important sense, then, despite its explanatory power, offensive mercantilism may be less than totally convincing as a macro-level grand theory ‘of everything’. It explains how imperialist or neo-imperialist powers may try to dominate other states and exploit them (even when there is fragmentation of authority between principals (the government) and agents (commercial actors)), but it is limited to an interpretation of asymmetrical inter-state relations based chiefly on economics. Ideational, institutional and non-economic (e.g. political) material factors are included, to the extent that they are included, only in supportive roles (Holslag 2017). Neo-Gramscianism has different limitations in relation to the analysis conducted in this book. One of the most important of these relates to the role of the Chinese leadership in the putative counter-hegemony. According to Gramsci (1971), it is necessary for a highly-educated group of leaders to guide the activity of the less informed masses. Gramsci’s primary focus was on Italy’s internal politics: thus, his counter-hegemony was based on an attempt to forge an ideological movement based on Marxism and the manufacture of consent among the Italian people as an alternative to the existing political order in Italy. In neoGramscianism, the extent to which the neo-Gramscians support the idea of a leadership elite in one or more countries acting to mobilise the support of populations in the global South is also unclear. Applying neo-Gramscianism to the BRI means proposing that China – in the form of the Chinese governing

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elites – would de facto be the leader of the global counter-hegemony. From this point of view, the BRI would, as we have seen, serve the role of legitimising Chinese expansion and mobilising global public opinion in support of it. However, since neo-Gramscian theory does not satisfactorily address the issue of whether there is to be a mobilising elite group and how the counter-hegemony is to be realised, the connections between the BRI and neo-Gramscianism are left as an open question. In addition, there is also an important limitation in neo-Gramscianism’s capacity to explain long-term, macro-level developments in international relations. Since neo-Gramscianism focuses primarily on hegemony and counterhegemony, the theory does not seem to have the analytical breadth to generate a picture of the international system which transcends its current (late-twentieth /early 21st century) manifestation. Its ability to explain is primarily restricted to potential power shifts from an incumbent hegemon to a challenger within the setting of the current globalising capitalist-based, Western liberal-type economic order. Despite its attention to the interaction of material, ideational and institutional factors, it does not give a totally satisfying account of the overall system within which a potential counter-hegemony is situated: Cox’s (1987) explanation connects primarily to power relations based on capitalism and the possibility of a shift to an order which is opposed to that. Its weakness is that, despite Cox’s stated support for ‘critical’ rather than ‘problem-solving’ theory, neoGramscianism considers only the current international order rather than the evolving international system in longue durée. Nor is this limitation satisfactorily addressed by other scholars working on the theory (Gill 1993). In the breadth of its analysis, Tang’s SEP is thus ‘more macro’ than the other two theories. Taking a long historical view which spans ten thousand years of human history, Tang (2013) demonstrates that in the current era the international system has transitioned – at least temporarily – from an offensive to a defensive realism world. Within this system, change is evolutionary rather than revolutionary and is enacted through the ‘genes’ and ‘phenotypes’ of ideas and institutions. However, Tang (2013: 54) is at pains to stress that ‘material forces hold ontological priority over ideational forces’: in other words, satisfying existential needs such as food, water, and so on is fundamental to human survival and thus underlies the ideational sphere. Tang’s theory also sees the international realm as having the appearance of a system with evolving characteristics. In this the theory cleaves to the demands of complexity theory and complexity thinking. Applying Tang’s approach also reveals that, in addition to its material impacts, the BRI is itself an ideational and institutional ‘gene’ or ‘phenotype’ which has a transformational role within the ever-evolving international system. The fact that Belt and Road Summits are now held annually and that the BRI contains ‘economic corridors’ and regional cooperation platforms is indicative of the initiative’s institutional nature, in the sense in which Tang (2013) and North (1990) interpret the term. Understood as a component of the complex, evolving international system which Tang describes, the BRI itself becomes

226 Assessing the impacts of China’s BRI a conduit for change, shaping material forces through ideational and institutional means. On the other hand, Tang’s SEP is not suited to explaining the detail of the implementation of the BRI. The theory does not make clear the specifics of how precisely ideas and institutions affect change in the sphere of international affairs, concluding only that … in our social evolutionary framework, states change their ideas and practices without having to heed exogenous teaching: the transformation of ideas and practices is endogenously driven. (Tang 2013: 109) The lack of detail concerning the relationship between states and their ideas and practices suggests that the theory, which is potentially grander in scope than any before it in terms of being able to explain long-term historical processes in social systems, is in need of some ‘less macro’ assistance in terms of explaining the BRI and other mid-level international phenomena. In this circumstance, neo-Gramscianism and offensive mercantilism offer themselves as explanatory frameworks which can fold inside Tang’s SEP, albeit with very contrasting accounts of the BRI. The end point of this analysis thus has to be that Tang’s SEP offers a container – albeit one which still needs more work, particularly on the detail of the relationship between ideational and institutional ‘genes’ and ‘phenotypes’ and change in the international system – for two contrasting alternative explanations of the BRI: neo-Gramscian counter-hegemonic forces and offensive mercantilist or neo-colonialist ‘debt trap diplomacy’. At this point, it may be objected that it is not very informative to conclude that none of the three theories can explain the BRI on its own and that two contrasting explanations need to be subsumed inside the envelope of the other one. Yet there appears to be no alternative to drawing such a conclusion. One needs to remember, as science writer and complexity theorist Philip Ball (2012: xi) points out, that it is difficult to pin down precise explanations regarding complex social phenomena because of the large number of variables involved – far larger than in physical systems. This means that it might be necessary to accept that a particular phenomenon has no unique explanation, no ‘best’ model that accounts for it. In such cases, there might instead be a need for several complementary and overlapping models, some of which work well sometimes or for some aspects of a problem and others in other cases. (Ball 2012: xii) Thus, it is inevitable that one should draw the ostensibly unsatisfying conclusion that each of the three macro-level theories used in this book has something to say about the BRI, from different perspectives, while none of them provides a complete explanation in isolation from the others. At the same time, of the

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three it is Tang’s SEP which is the ‘most macro’ in that it provides the largest, most long-range breadth of explanation and is capable of subsuming the other theories inside it. For this reason, the conclusion reached here is that Tang’s SEP, while remaining in need of further development and at this stage not offering a complete explanation of dynamic processes of change occurring via the BRI and other international phenomena, is the best-suited of the three to explaining the complex interactions of interlocking factors in the international arena. The contrasting explanations of offensive mercantilism and neoGramscian counter-hegemony offer alternative perspectives on the impacts and implementation of the BRI, neither of which can be definitively confirmed or refuted by the evidence. Thus, the latter two theories can be folded inside the overall envelope of Tang’s SEP as a pair of bifurcating explanations which depend on the perspective adopted. In conclusion to the book’s theoretical considerations, it should be stated that the need to combine theories in order to explain the BRI demonstrates the difficulty of producing Popperian falsifiable theories in the social sciences. This in itself points to the consequent inevitability of generating pairs or groups of apparently opposed (but in fact complementary) theoretical perspectives with an interpretivist rather than a positivist logic. The ‘combinatorial logic’ (Sil and Katzenstein 2010b: 12) of doing this, while it may seem ontologically unsatisfactory to some, adheres to the eclectic approach taken in this book and the demands of complexity theory and complexity thinking (CT). In sum, amidst the complexity of international relations and the additional complexity of China’s attempt to introduce the BRI as a transformational expansionist drive to connect Asia with Europe and beyond, one is left with no alternative but to produce theoretical explanations which combine aspects of a range of theories.

7.5 The Belt and Road’s global implications The implications of the theoretical analysis conducted in the previous section are these. First, there is no doubt that the BRI is an expansionist initiative which aims to promote Chinese interests from Asia to Europe and beyond. Through the BRI, Beijing seeks to develop new markets for its companies and secure resources to sustain China’s economy while supporting its economic diplomacy with an ideational charm offensive. Whether one views this as a neoGramscian counter-hegemonic movement designed to address global economic and political inequalities by developing China’s relations with the global South or as a drive to exploit vulnerable countries through debt trap diplomacy, there is no doubt that the BRI is expansionist in its aims. The idea that China is spreading its influence throughout the developing world is alarming to many observers in the West, who see this as an attempt to overturn the US-led supposedly liberal international order and replace it with ‘a hybrid model of state capitalism’ (Norris 2016: 226). American scholars and officials tend to see the BRI as a challenge to US hegemony, applying offensive realist conceptions of global politics (Mearsheimer 2001, 2010, Allison 2017) to

228 Assessing the impacts of China’s BRI China’s ‘New Silk Road’. In these conceptions, exemplified in Michael Pillsbury’s (2015) book The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, China is a threat to the US-led international order because it is using the BRI to gain influence in Asia, Europe, Africa and even Latin America with the aim of steadily undermining US power. This reasoning, reportedly partly inspired by Pillsbury’s book, underlies Donald Trump’s trade war with China which was begun in 2018 and intensified in 2019: in 2018 Trump described Pillsbury as ‘the leading authority on China’ (Tweed 2018). For US hawks – who tend to dominate debates about China – whether the BRI is to be interpreted as offensive mercantilism or neoGramscian counter-hegemony is a moot point: in both cases, China’s BRI-based expansion is a threat to US national interests and the dominant role of the USA in the global political economy. On the other hand, there is good reason to think that the American zero-sumgame approach under Trump may be a mistake, at least as far as US geostrategy is concerned. By seeking to punish China for perceived infractions against free trade and to force it to reform its behaviour, the USA is in fact driving Beijing to intensify its efforts to open up new markets through the Belt and Road Initiative. By making trade more expensive through tariffs, Washington indeed inflicts damage on Chinese industry, but in doing so it persuades the Chinese that it is not a partner with whom they can do business and pushes them to turn away from the US in search of trade partners who perceive them in a more favourable light. In attempting to deny China access to US markets by banning major Chinese companies such as Huawei, Washington creates an incentive for these national champions to increase investment in markets which the US has not penetrated deeply, such as those in Central Asia or Africa: indeed, with a new cooperation agreement signed in May 2019 Huawei cemented its ‘position as Africa’s top supplier of information and communications technology’ (Wilson 2019). Indeed, Huawei in 2016 the world leader in the field of telecoms manufacturing, which may explain the entrenched American resistance to its rise (Wolf 2019). Driving a major power to seek other partners by means of punitive economic measures has a precedent in recent history. In 2014, the US and the European Union imposed sanctions on Russia for its military interventions in Ukraine. The result was not only that Russia’s economy suffered, but that, suddenly lacking reliable trade partners, Russia turned towards China. In the Russian case, the result of Western economic coercion was to intensify cooperation between two powers which many observers in the West perceive as opposed to the Western-led liberal international order (Grigorenko et al. 2016). The safest forecast is that Trump’s tariffs and restrictions are likely to be similarly counterproductive, as far as the hegemonic West is concerned, with respect to China’s global role. Indeed, framing relations with China as conflictual and zero-sum is likely to be counter-productive for the whole world in the long-term, in that it creates conditions for a new cold war (Wolf 2019). Overall, global perceptions of the BRI are undoubtedly mixed. There has been a generally positive reception in some parts of the world, most notably in

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Africa and some parts of Asia (García-Herrero and Xu 2019). However, the initiative’s reception in Europe and the US has been less favourable. There is no doubt that China has a good deal of work to do to persuade BRI-sceptics of its ‘harmonious’ intentions. In this respect, one message which can be taken away by readers of this book is that the ‘threat/opportunity’ bifurcation in perceptions of China and the BRI is one which is replicated in theoretical interpretations. In other words, there is simply uncertainty about China’s aims and intentions, and there is no obvious way to resolve this impasse in the absence of a crystal ball with which to gaze into the future and observe how things turn out over the course of the 21st century. Nevertheless, one observation can be made about China’s expansionism: in its economic aspects it is not so different to that of the many of the global powers which preceded it. Imperialist and colonialist powers such as Spain and Britain used variants on capitalism and mercantilism to dominate large areas of the world. In the case of Spain, the ideational aspect was religion and the institutional aspect was the Catholic Church: the decimation of native populations through slaughter, disease and debilitating labour was the shameful downside to Spain’s colonial past. Britain used state-backed corporations such as the East India Company to further its colonial interests while backing them up with a civilising discourse of societal transformation which, in reality, was implemented with varying degrees of conviction and undermined by institutions such as slavery. Unlike China, both of these powers also used military force to back up their state-led economic drives. In each case, interpreting the record is not easy: debates about the positive and negative aspects of Europe’s colonial past are ongoing and often controversial. Thus, in view of the contested history of colonial Europe, the fact that it is difficult to move beyond the ‘threat/opportunity’ bifurcation in perceptions of the BRI either theoretically or in terms of public opinion is not at all surprising. The question therefore needs to be asked whether China’s expansion through the BRI is going to be worse than the centuries of colonial exploitation by Western powers which came before. Given that arguably neither Europe nor the US has left the non-Western world in better shape than they found it, certainly in terms of relative wealth, the chances that China can do a better job of investing and developing it are quite high. Since no coordinated Western-led initiative on the scale of the BRI has been outlined, the Chinese initiative remains the only game in town in terms of ambitious infrastructure development, economic transformation and enhanced connectivity from Asia to Europe and beyond (Griffiths 2017).

7.6 Conclusion: the Belt and Road Initiative into the future This book has explored the impacts and implementation of the BRI from Asia to Europe. Before concluding, it needs to be pointed out that, despite the necessary limitations on the scope of this book, the regions of Asia and Europe covered may not necessarily be the whole story of the BRI as the 21st century unfolds. For instance, many Africans are enthusiastic supporters

230 Assessing the impacts of China’s BRI of the Chinese initiative and have been included, since 2016, among BRI countries: billions of dollars in deals with five African countries were signed at the Second Belt and Road Summit in April 2019 (Kede 2019). Latin America is also increasingly becoming a zone of Chinese influence and investment (Liu and Dunford 2016: 331). Western Europe should also be mentioned: in March 2019 Italy formally joined the BRI, with the development of the ports of Venice, Trieste and Ravenna being included in a flagship BRI project (Zeneli 2019). China has even published a ‘Polar Silk Road’ policy white paper which outlines how ‘Beijing will encourage companies to build infrastructure and conduct commercial trial voyages that will “bring opportunities” to the region’ (Liu 2018). It remains to be seen whether such globe-spanning ambitions can be realised or whether – as seems probable – Beijing will have to rein in the scope of the BRI and channel finite resources into a more realistic implementation of the initiative in selected countries and regions. It is important to point out here that the expansion of the concept of the BRI since 2015 or 2016 to include Africa, Latin America and other parts of the world does not undermine this book’s thesis that the initiative’s core focus is on the Eurasian continental landmass. The geographical, logistical, and economic basis for China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ conception has always been connectivity from Asia to Europe. It is probable, as political and economic realities begin to bite, that China will, while maintaining an all-inclusive vision regarding partner countries, channel its resources into the areas which can produce the most favourable results for China’s comprehensive national power. Enhancing trade, interdependence and connectivity with Asian regions and Europe – albeit with parts of Africa also in the picture for their natural resources, manufacturing potential and, in some cases, geostrategically favourable position – are likely to remain the key goals for the BRI, particularly in the face of steadily intensifying US resistance to China’s rise. In 2017 BRI investment declined according to official figures published by the PRC’s Ministry of Commerce and National Bureau of Statistics (Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 2017). This suggests a rationalisation of investment in comparison to preceding years. The reduction in spending is likely to have come as much from growing negative public perceptions of the BRI among the Chinese themselves as from a review of policy. In 2018, for the first time, reports began to come out of China concerning public criticisms by some prominent Chinese intellectuals concerning BRI investments overseas. The central point was that China should not waste vast sums of its money abroad while there still remained many pressing issues to resolve at home (Schrader 2018). ‘Why invest in the resource-rich Middle East?’ asked Xu Zhangrun, a professor at the elite Tsinghua University in Beijing, in an essay published online (Xu 2018), when the Gulf States’ pockets are full of oil money. The same could be said of investment in Africa and elsewhere, commented Sun Wenguang, a retired professor physics (Schrader 2018).

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The significance of these complaints is twofold. First, they demonstrate that there is not necessarily wholehearted support within China for the goals of the Belt and Road. This suggests that Beijing’s campaign of persuasion and mobilisation may not have been as successful domestically as it previously seemed to be and that Xi Jinping’s hold over Chinese public opinion is not absolute (Lam 2018). Second, the intellectuals’ criticisms suggest that the purpose of the BRI investments has not been communicated effectively to the Chinese public. If the investments are interpreted as ‘wasting money’, then it means that the potential goals analysed in this chapter – such as increased connectivity enhancing trade, ‘win-win’ cooperation with Belt and Road countries, greater Chinese power and influence, and more overseas opportunities for Chinese firms to export overcapacity and produce benefits for the domestic economy – have either not been understood or have not been accepted. The summer 2018 mini-wave of criticism may or may not be important in terms of domestic support for ‘One Belt, One Road’. Only time will tell. However, it does certainly cast doubt on the effectiveness of the legitimation and mobilisation campaign in support of the BRI. If domestic support is undermined, it may also impact support for the initiative abroad, where thus far it has, as this book has demonstrated, received a mixed reception. It also reveals that the goals of the Belt and Road have not been articulated any better to the Chinese public than they have to global audiences. A much better public relations campaign is needed, both domestically and internationally, than that which has been conducted so far if the BRI is to be welcomed by the majority of the world’s population. A highly complex mix of challenges remains in the areas of (geo-)politics, (geo-)economics, security, logistics and culture. They will not be easily overcome if China’s vision for the Belt and Road – whether one regards it as offensive mercantilist or counter-hegemonic in character, and to the extent that it is an evolving phenomenon with the characteristics of a complex system – is to be realised. Above all, China needs to be held to the BRI’s high rhetoric of ‘win-win cooperation’, ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘community of shared interests’. The implementation of the initiative’s ambitious aims must be evaluated carefully by scholars and public servants globally, with the voices of observers in the global South – on whichever side of the ‘threat/opportunity’ divide they stand – also being heard over the ‘China threat’ noise generated by many in the global North, since ‘framing competition with China in civilizational or ideological terms risks backfiring by turning China into what many in Washington fear it already is’ (Weiss 2019). On the Chinese side, there should be far greater transparency about BRI loans and investments if accusations of ‘debt trap diplomacy’ are to be overcome and the initiative is to be seen in a more positive light. Partner countries should continue to press the Xi administration to make itself fully accountable for the impacts and implementation of the BRI and to communicate outcomes and problems clearly and objectively. In short, there is still a great deal of material and ideational distance to be covered along the ‘route’ of the Belt and Road before it will be possible to evaluate in full precisely how its impacts should be interpreted.

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Index

Page number in italics denote tables, those in bold denote figures ‘16+1’ (‘17+1’), platform for China-CEE cooperation 19, 42, 43, 51, 107, 117, 124, 143, 153–155, 158, 172, 178–184, 220, 222 abductive reasoning 21, 22, 23, 54–55, 62–64, 78, 84, 101, 141, 164, 219 Abi-Habib, Maria 194–195 absolute gains 105–106 ‘active defence’ 42, 111, 185, 192 Addis Ababa 201 Afghanistan 8, 144, 190–191, 197 Africa 1, 2, 15, 39, 40, 46, 108, 111, 119, 120, 124, 130, 146–148, 158, 170, 171, 185, 191, 217, 223, 228–230 agency/structure debate 82 agenda-setting 120, 122, 125 agribusiness 173, 176 agriculture 130, 148, 173, 176, 178 aid programmes 124, 197 aircraft carriers 190 airports 11, 16, 196 air pollution 5, 130, 149 Al-Azhar University 200 Albania 144, 178, 179, 181–182 alliances 87, 110, 202 Allison, Graham 14, 41–42, 69, 110 Aluminium 175–176 Americas 171 analytic eclecticism 21, 53–56, 62–68, 70, 72, 74, 75, 85, 94, 151, 218, 227 anarchy, Hobbesian 3, 41, 53, 69, 71, 74, 76, 79, 82, 93, 105, 109–115, 125, 133, 134, 145, 146, 150, 151, 162, 163, 220, 222–223 Android 112 Angola 146

Antwerp 184, 201 Apple 5 Arabian peninsula 171, 190 Arctic 144 Armenia 144, 178, 179 artificial intelligence (AI) 83–84, 91 ‘artificial selection’ 40, 43 Ashdod 200 Asia 2, 7, 10, 12, 15, 24, 36–37, 39, 40, 46, 48, 106, 124, 129, 130, 143–144, 146, 147, 149, 164, 170, 204, 216, 217, 221, 222, 227–230 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 143, 157–159, 217, 220, 222 Asia-Pacific 8 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum 158 Association for International Affairs (AMO) 181 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 184, 188 Astana (Nur-Sultan) 9, 172 asymmetry 104, 106, 112–115, 124–125, 127–128, 131, 133, 134, 145, 146, 150, 151, 162, 163, 177–178, 184, 186–187, 189, 196, 202, 203, 223–224 Atlantic Ocean 171 Aung San Suu Kyi 188, 189–190 Australia 1, 144 authoritarianism 2, 13, 71 Azerbaijan 144, 178, 179 Bahrain 144, 198, 199, 202 balance of power 87, 110, 177, 202 Ball, Philip 64, 226 Balkan states 180, 182

236 Index Baltic states 180 Baluchistan 193 Bangladesh 10, 143, 144, 190–192, 196 Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor 10, 143, 196 banks 108, 150–151, 158 Barkin, Samuel 73, 74 Bay of Bengal 190, 200 Beijing 6, 14, 16, 17, 48, 116, 117, 160, 180, 195, 200, 219–220, 230 Belarus 144, 172, 178–179, 181–182, 201 Belgrade 182 Belt and Road Forum 124 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): alleged ‘divide and conquer’ strategy 51; complexity of 21, 33–35, 37, 40, 42–43, 92; conceptions of 7–8, 11, 12–13, 34, 42–43, 101–102, 106, 110, 116, 141–164, 231; comparison of ideational and material factors 8, 19; image of 16, 102, 141–164, 217, 219, 228–229; institutional practices of 24, 35, 46–47, 51, 117, 119, 145, 157, 224–225; launch of 7; legitimacy of 217, 219, 230; metaphorical aspects 152–153; official discourse 103, 106, 109, 113, 116–119, 142, 157, 159, 217–218, 220, 231; political factors 11; summits 225 Bhutan 144, 190–191, 197 bilateral ties 2, 51, 106, 114, 116, 121, 125, 131, 161, 184, 191 biosphere 78 black swans 37, 82–83, 86, 89–90, 93, 132, 133, 161, 162, 178, 198, 199, 202, 204, 220 border disputes 131, 154, 175, 192, 197, 198 Bosnia & Herzegovina 144, 178 bounded rationality 65 Bourdieu, Pierre 116, 121 Brexit 39 bridges 6, 182, 196, 200 brinkmanship 132 Britain 39, 49, 51, 125, 154, 159, 182–183, 229 Brown, Kerry 40 Brunei 144, 184–185, 189 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 95n6 Budapest 182 Buddhism 197 Bulgaria 144, 178, 179, 181 Bull, Hedley 80, 126 butterfly effect 87 Buzan, Barry 80, 126

Cairo 200 Callahan, William 72, 126 Cambodia 144, 149, 184, 187–189, 203 Cambridge University 68, 94n4 capitalism 20, 33, 46–47, 49, 70, 75, 102, 106, 145, 150, 161, 225, 229; see also free market economics; state capitalism Carr, E.H. 126 Carstensen, Martin B. 122–123; see also Schmidt, Vivien A. Carter, Jimmy 95n6 Cartesian dualism 38, 218 casinos 188 Catholic Church 229 Caucasus 178 causality 4–5, 79, 86, 87; see also linear causality; nonlinearity CEFC China Energy 103, 107–108, 112, 180–181 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 9–10, 15, 19, 24, 42, 51, 79, 83, 86, 89, 107, 124, 125, 143–144, 153, 154, 158, 170, 178–184, 203, 216 Central Asia 1, 7, 9, 10, 24, 51, 101, 130, 144, 146, 147, 150, 156, 157, 158, 170, 171, 172–178, 180, 182, 184, 185, 190, 193, 200, 201, 203, 205n2, 216, 228 Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 146 Chagos Islands 190 Chang, Ha-Joon 94n4 charm offensive 24, 47, 119–120, 123, 181, 183, 184, 186, 188, 189, 197, 219, 222, 227; see also soft power Chen, Xiaodong 199 China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CACF) 18, 42, 51, 158, 202 China-Central Asia-West Asia economic corridor 10 China Development Bank (CDB) 195 ‘China dream’ (zhongguo meng, 中国梦) 7, 12, 19, 151, 156, 160, 163 China Global Investment Tracker (American Enterprise Institute) 147 China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) 194 China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridor 10 China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) 195 China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline 175 China Merchants Port 15, 195

Index China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor 10, 172 China Overseas Ports Holding Company (COPHC) 192–193 ‘China price’, the 5 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 10, 25n3, 101, 107, 117, 143, 147, 152–155, 157, 164n2, 192, 194, 205n8, 220, 222 China Railway Engineering 200 ‘China threat’ hypothesis 13–14, 17, 39, 42, 119, 181, 228, 231 Chinese Academy of Sciences 152 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 1, 2, 4, 6–7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 18, 19, 35, 70, 117, 126, 145, 150, 160, 195; Central Committee 129, 147, 195; decisionmaking processes 3, 63, 65, 81, 88–90, 117, 129, 142, 157, 161, 219; governance style 7, 19, 88, 129, 145; ideology 124, 145; legitimacy of 6–7, 8, 23, 151, 225, 230; use of propaganda for mass mobilisation 126, 225; politburo 35, 36, 129; pragmatism of 34, 36, 37, 90, 92, 101; rhetoric of 48; State Council 112, 164n1 Chinese foreign policy 101 chromium 173 CITIC 108, 181 class conflict 70–71, 75, 124 classical realism 73 climate change 88, 129 Clinton, Hilary 8 coal 5, 149, 195, 198, 217 coal-fired power plants 130, 149, 217, 220 Cold War 38, 110, 179 Colombo 194–195 colonialism 36, 48–49, 198, 203, 229; see also neo-colonialism communications infrastructure 50 communism 79, 83, 86, 89, 95n6, 114, 183 ‘community of shared destiny’ (mingyun gongtongti, 命运共同体) 11, 18, 23, 48, 129, 142–143 ‘community of shared interests’ (liyi gongtongti, 利益共同体) 11, 18, 106, 216–218, 220, 222, 231 complex adaptive systems (CAS) 37, 43, 76–77, 81–84, 88, 92, 101, 153, 220, 231 complex eclecticism 21–24, 35, 51–55, 62–64, 67–68, 72, 74, 91–94, 101, 133, 141, 143, 163–164, 172, 177, 183, 189,

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197, 201, 204–205, 216, 218–219, 221, 223, 227; ‘combinatorial logic’ of 151, 218, 227 complex interdependence; see interdependence complex international relations theory (CIR) 91 complexity theory (CT) 3–4, 21, 23, 24, 40, 42, 43, 52, 55, 62–63, 67, 74–92, 130–133, 178, 202, 204, 218–219, 225, 227 complexity thinking (CT); see complexity theory (CT) complex systems; see complex adaptive systems (CAS) comprehensive national power (zonghe guoli, 综合国力) 39, 41, 158, 222, 230 comprehensive national security 12, 15, 41–42, 47, 151, 155, 217, 223; see also national economic security computer modelling 83–84, 91 conceptual toolkits 22–24, 52, 55, 63, 67–68, 72, 75–76, 78, 81, 84–85, 91–94, 101–102, 109–110, 127, 128, 131, 133–134, 141, 143, 162, 163–164, 172, 177–178, 183–184, 189, 197, 201, 202, 204–205, 218–219, 221 Confucian harmony 128, 130, 133, 161–162, 178, 184, 189, 202, 204, 220 Confucianism 18, 36, 39, 67, 71, 72, 75, 114, 116, 123, 126, 127–129, 157, 161 Confucius Institutes 114, 119 connections between domestic and foreign policy 2–3 connectivity 7, 9, 10–11, 16, 106, 124, 142–144, 146, 149–153, 155, 158, 160, 161, 171, 186, 203, 217, 221, 229–231 constructivism 19, 20, 23, 33, 40–42, 53, 66, 69–75, 76, 80, 115, 118, 126, 155 Cooksey, Ray 78 copper 1, 146, 173 ‘corridors’; see economic ‘corridors’ corruption 150, 180–181, 196 COSCO 182 counter-hegemony; see neo-Gramscianism Cox, Robert W. 3, 15, 20, 22, 35, 44, 46–47, 52, 65, 70, 83, 108, 158 Crawford, Neta 4, 92 credit lines 50, 179 ‘critical’ theory 47, 65, 70, 225; see also Cox, Robert W.; ‘problem-solving’ theory

238 Index Croatia 144, 178, 181 ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ 21, 37, 54, 81, 101, 107, 133, 141, 152, 219; see also pragmatism Cuba 70 Cuban Missile Crisis 132 Cudworth, Erika 74, 77, 82, 84, 129–130; see also Hobden, Stephen cult of personality 157 Cultural Revolution 124, 155 culture 47, 90, 119–120, 122, 123, 128–129, 162, 171, 180, 203, 231 Czech Republic xiii, 107–108, 144, 154, 178, 180–181 Dahl, Robert 109 Dalai Lama 191 dams 9, 103, 130, 146, 148, 150, 187, 200, 220 Danube 182 Daoism 36, 39 Darwinism 35, 39, 40–41, 43 Davos 2, 11, 102 Dawood, Abdul Razak 194 ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ xii, 15–16, 22, 24, 48, 142, 195, 197, 198, 204, 217, 219, 222–224, 226–227, 231 defence white papers 41–42, 111, 192 defensive realism 14, 22, 38, 41–42, 44, 52, 69, 110–111, 220, 223, 225; see also realism ‘defensive realism world’; see defensive realism deforestation 149 democracy 69, 75 democratic peace theory 69, 70, 75 Democratic Republic of Congo 146 demographics 5–6 Deng, Xiaoping 1, 5–6, 12, 14, 21, 36, 37, 41, 50, 81, 145, 152, 155, 157, 164n4, 198 dependency theory 48–49, 52, 70 dependent variables 4, 53, 76, 79, 81, 86, 87, 218, 227; see also independent variables desertification 129 determinism 90 developed countries 125, 144, 147, 203; see also global North developing countries 9, 13, 15, 46, 48–49, 102–103, 124–125, 145, 147,

156, 180, 217–220, 222, 223, 227; see also global South ‘develop the west’ (xibu dakaifa, 西部大开 发) campaign 143, 155–156 Dewey, John 94n1 diamonds 146 Diego Garcia 190 Diez, Thomas 120–121 diplomacy 175, 190–191, 197 dissent 6 divorce 129 Djibouti 42, 111, 144, 146, 171–172, 190, 191, 198–201, 203, 224 Doklam 191, 197 Doraleh 146, 172, 190, 201 Dorsey, James 193, 194, 200 Duchâtel, Mathieu 193 Duisberg 154, 172 dumping 104, 159 Dunford, Michael 16, 17 Duqm 200 Duterte, Rodrigo 187 East Africa 12, 124, 144, 146, 171, 190, 199 East Asia 113–114, 191, 192 East India Company 229 East Turkestan Interdependence Movement (ETIM) 174 economic ‘corridors’ 9–11, 143–144, 147, 152–154, 171, 192, 218, 220, 222, 225 economic development 46, 75, 125, 150–151, 156; of China 1, 5, 8, 16, 39, 125, 151, 155, 156, 159, 164n4, 175, 230 economic diplomacy (jingji waijiao, 经济 外交) 2, 15, 107–108, 125, 159, 177–178, 183, 189; see also economic statecraft economic inequality 49, 70–71, 75, 76, 93, 105–106, 123–125, 130, 133, 145–147, 151, 156, 162, 177, 180, 184, 189, 197, 202, 203, 219, 227 economic integration 51, 156, 161 economic leverage 184, 186, 187, 195, 204, 223 economic stagnation 79 economic statecraft 14–15, 48–49, 52, 107–108, 112–113, 116, 134, 155, 184, 201, 204, 223–224; see also economic diplomacy ecosystems 130, 149 ‘edge of chaos’ 82, 86, 89, 93, 132, 133, 161, 162, 178, 202; see also tipping points

Index Egypt 144, 146, 171, 198, 200, 201 Einstein, Albert 74 electricity 148 emergence 42, 52, 81, 86, 88–89, 92, 93, 94n2, 131–132, 133, 142, 149, 151, 153, 155, 162, 163, 178, 184, 189, 202, 204, 219; see also self-organisation emerging economies; see developing countries Emirbayer, Mustafa 72, 128 energy imports 1, 11, 24, 50, 111, 130, 177, 188, 191, 192, 198, 201, 202, 216, 222 energy infrastructure 23, 143, 146–150, 159, 187, 192, 220 energy security 199 English School 67, 70–72, 75, 76, 80, 123, 125–126 environment; see natural environment environmental catastrophe 220 Esteban, Mario 20, 115 Estonia 144, 178 Ethiopia 146, 201 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) 173, 174, 177, 179 Eurasian integration (Euro-Asian integration) 8, 12, 16–17, 20, 106, 110, 111, 116, 120, 143–144, 146, 156, 170, 230 Eurocentrism 67, 219 Europe xiii, 1, 7–10, 12, 17, 19, 22, 24, 25, 36–37, 38, 40, 47–51, 106, 107, 116, 119, 121, 125, 130, 132, 143–149, 152, 154, 159, 164, 170–173, 175, 177, 179–185, 191, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 205n3, 216, 217, 221, 227–230 European colonialism; see colonialism European Union (EU) xii 39, 106, 115, 120–121, 125, 179, 181, 183, 228 expansionism (China’s) xi 8, 11–12, 25, 45, 50, 52, 72, 103, 105, 110–111, 153, 155–157, 172, 176, 177, 187, 191, 221–223, 225, 228–230 Export-Import (Exim) Bank of China 15, 112, 150, 188, 192, 194–196, 223 exports 5, 7, 50, 175, 177, 182, 185, 191 factories 5, 104, 159, 180, 187 falsifiability, Popperian 68–69, 227 feedback effects 5, 11, 52, 76–78, 86, 87, 90, 93, 103, 131–132, 133, 150, 151, 153, 155, 160, 162, 164, 177, 178, 184, 189, 198, 202, 204, 219 feedback loops; see feedback effects

239

Fels, Enrico 109, 120 feminism 67, 70, 71, 75, 76, 124, 129 Ferdinand, Peter 106, 128 financial crisis 89, 132 financial instruments and institutions 9, 16, 45, 157, 158–159, 176, 196, 223 financial integration 143, 150, 151 financial markets 38 financial services 106 Financial Times 194 First World War 82–83 foot-binding 129 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 43, 124, 158 foreign direct investments (FDI); see investments foreign exchange reserves 159, 175, 192–194 fossil fuels 130, 175, 177, 198 Foucault, Michel 115–119, 122–123 fragmentation of authority 88, 112–113, 224 France 125, 154, 182 Freeman, Carla 191 Freeman, Duncan 2 free market economics 17, 70, 75, 83, 102, 106, 116, 150, 161, 228 free-trade agreements 50, 196 Friedman, Milton 94n4 Friedrichs, Jörg 54, 64–65 functionalism 106 Galtung, Johan 71 game theory 104–105, 109; see also non-zero-sum games; zero-sum games Gansu 156 gas; see natural gas gender inequality 71, 129 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 45 ‘genes’ (social) 41, 43, 55n1, 222, 225–226; see also ‘phenotypes’ (social); social evolution paradigm (SEP); Tang, Shiping geo-economics 14–15, 17, 50–51, 147, 151, 159, 175, 177, 184, 192, 200, 203–204, 220–221, 224, 231 geography, physical versus critical 153–154, 170–171 geopolitical influence; see political influence geopolitics 14–15, 17, 110, 151, 159, 170–171, 176, 177, 184, 190–192, 198, 203–204, 224, 231

240 Index geo-positional balancing 192–193, 200 geostrategy 110, 151, 163, 182, 183, 191–193, 195, 199, 204, 228, 230 Georgia 144, 178, 179 Germany 41, 125, 154, 159, 172, 182, 183, 223 Gill, Stephen 44 global energy interconnection (GEI) 147–149 global governance 20 globalisation (economic) 1, 5, 11, 16–17, 39, 49–50, 75, 102–106, 109, 116, 122, 216 global North 48, 119, 124, 203, 219, 231; see also developed countries global South 22, 23, 46, 48–49, 119, 124, 145, 219–220, 224, 227, 231; see also developing countries global warming 129–130; see also climate change Godement, François 17 go (game); see weiqi ‘going global’ (zouxiang shijie, 走向世界); see ‘going out’ (zou chuqu, 走出去) ‘going out’ (zou chuqu, 走出去) 7, 9, 13, 143, 155–156 gold 1, 146, 173 Google 112 Gramsci, Antonio 44, 46–47, 70, 224 grand theory; see macro-level theory Great Leap Forward 124 Greece 14, 171–172, 178–179, 182 ‘grey rhinos’ 37, 90 Griffiths, Richard 16, 17, 149 gross domestic product (GDP) 4, 5, 7, 150, 155, 176, 177, 188, 196, 198, 202 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 202–203 Gulf states 18, 230 Gwadar 152, 154, 171, 190, 192–193, 201 Hague 187 Hall, Peter 218–219 Hambantota 15, 190, 194–195, 201, 224 Hamburg 184, 201 Han Chinese 7, 162, 173–174 hard power 39–40, 110–111, 115, 119 ‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui, 和谐社 会) 114, 128 ‘harmonious world’ 19, 128

harmony (of interests) 75, 76, 93, 114, 123, 125–128, 161 Heath, Timothy 2, 15 hedging 191–192 Hegelianism 39, 127 hegemony, realist concept of 110, 116, 125–127, 142, 174, 178, 186, 190, 197, 217, 222, 227–228 hegemony, neo-Gramscian concept of; see neo-Gramscianism Herrero, Alicia Garcia 17 hierarchy 79, 113–115, 127, 133, 134, 145, 146, 150, 151, 162, 163, 177–178, 184, 186, 189 high-speed railways 182, 185, 186, 200 highways 124, 154, 182, 188, 193 Hillman, Jonathan 173 Himalayas 152–153, 191 Hinduism 197 historic bloc; see neo-Gramscianism Hitler, Adolf 89, 111, 126 Hobden, Stephen 74, 77, 82, 84, 129–130; see also Cudworth, Erika Hobson, John M. 67, 71, 219 Ho Chi Minh City 187 Holslag, Jonathan 14–15, 22, 35, 49–51, 52, 55n4 Hong Kong 1, 49, 193 Ho, Patrick 108 Horn of Africa 191, 199 house prices 6 Huawei 103, 107, 112, 228 Hu, Jintao 6, 14, 19, 36, 114, 128, 161 human rights 6, 11, 120, 188 Hungary 144, 154, 178, 180, 182 Hu, Shisheng 195 hydroelectric dams 148, 188, 197, 217 idealism 126, 128; see also utopianism ‘ideal types’, Weberian 53, 65–66, 73 ideas; see ideational factors ideational factors 8, 11, 12–13, 19, 20, 22–24, 33–35, 40–42, 44, 45–47, 52, 70–71, 74, 76, 80, 93, 108, 109, 115–123, 128, 154, 157–160, 163, 178, 185, 188–189, 197, 217–218, 222–226, 229, 231; see also ideational power ideational power 12, 19, 23, 39, 41, 44, 115, 120, 122–123, 127–128, 133, 151–153, 155–163, 177, 183, 184, 186, 197, 202, 204, 217, 221; see also ideational factors; power; material

Index power; normative power; soft power; structural power; symbolic power identity 69–70, 72, 80, 124 imperialism 20, 47–49, 51, 71, 72, 224, 229 imports 1, 5, 24, 50, 112, 130, 175, 182, 185, 187, 191, 198–200, 202 incommensurability (of theories) 21, 23, 36, 37, 42, 53–54, 63–66, 91–94, 218 incompleteness 78–81, 91 independent variables 3, 4, 53, 76, 79, 81, 86, 87, 113, 218, 227 India xii 8, 24, 38, 111, 125, 131–132, 144, 151, 153, 154, 174, 190–192, 194–199, 217 Indian Council on Global Relations 196 Indian Ocean 3, 9, 132, 146, 152, 153, 171, 172, 177, 185, 188, 190–191, 199, 223–224 Indonesia 7, 9, 144, 184–186, 188–189 Indo-Pacific 14, 190 Industrial Capacity Cooperation (ICC) 159, 170, 175–177 industrial overcapacity 50, 150–151, 159, 176, 231 industrial production 1, 5, 15, 48, 103, 106, 150 industrial revolution 102 industrial zones 201 information and communications technology 228 infrastructure 7, 9, 10–11, 15, 16, 17, 23, 50, 103, 106–107, 124, 130, 146, 150–151, 156, 158, 159, 160, 170, 172, 177–178, 185–186, 189, 196, 200, 201, 203, 216–217, 219–220, 223, 229–230 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 196 institutions 9, 16, 19, 22, 24, 40–43, 45, 46, 51, 52, 69, 70, 74, 76, 79, 80, 93, 102–108, 109, 117, 118, 120–123, 128, 133, 153, 155–159, 162, 163, 171, 177, 184, 197, 202, 204, 217–218, 220, 222–223, 225, 226, 229 interdependence 2, 5–6, 9, 11, 16, 24, 38, 39, 52, 53, 69, 73, 74, 76, 80, 83, 93, 102–108, 109, 110, 113, 115, 116, 117, 124, 133, 145, 146, 151, 156, 161–162, 163, 173, 175, 177, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 198, 202, 203–204, 216, 221, 230 interdisciplinarity 4, 76 inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) 79, 102, 105, 159

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international aid 78 international capacity cooperation; see Industrial Capacity Cooperation (ICC) International Monetary Fund (IMF) 45, 103, 188, 194 International Political Economy (IPE) 44–45, 83, 95n5, 108, 118 International Relations (IR), field of 3, 13, 20, 33–34, 36 International Relations (IR) theory 3, 20, 21, 33–35, 40, 42, 52, 53–54, 62–63, 65–76, 78, 80, 82, 84, 91, 92, 94, 109, 126–127, 131, 164, 227; Chinese theories 67, 71, 116, 128; ‘great debates’ 219; mainstream theories xiii 4, 15, 23, 36, 40, 42, 67, 68, 70–72, 78, 80, 82, 91, 109, 219, 227; non-mainstream theories 67–68, 70, 75, 123, 127, 129–130, 219; non-Western theories 67–68, 70–71, 116, 127, 219; ‘structure’ in IR theory 82; Western theories 4, 37, 67, 70–72, 127 international system 41–42, 67, 69, 72, 75, 79, 80, 83–84, 89, 103, 109, 116, 123, 160, 161, 163, 222, 225; see also liberal international order internet 6 inter-paradigm debates 73–74, 91; see also paradigms (IR theory) interpretivism 227 intersubjectivity 70, 73, 74, 76, 80, 93, 115–123, 128, 133, 152, 153, 161, 162, 177, 197, 202, 204, 220 invasive species 130 investments 2, 9, 11, 18, 19, 24, 50, 103–104, 106–107, 131, 147–150, 154, 160, 161, 180–183, 185–187, 191, 194, 196, 197, 200, 201, 203–204, 216–217, 220, 228, 230–231 ‘invisible hand’ of the market 83, 88, 106; see also Smith, Adam Iran 9, 10, 132, 144, 171, 175, 177, 198–203 Iran nuclear deal 199–200 Iraq 144, 198, 199, 201, 203 Israel 144, 198–203 Istanbul 152 Italy 224 Jackson, Patrick T. 65–68, 72, 73, 128, 218 Jacques, Martin 37, 38, 72, 186 Jakóbowski, Jakub 43 James, William 94n1

242 Index Japan xii, 3, 5, 18, 35, 37, 41, 111, 120, 125, 126, 144, 180, 183, 186, 192, 223 Jervis, Robert 4, 5, 42, 74, 78, 81, 84, 87, 134 Jiang, Zemin 36, 155–156 Johnson Reef 186–187 Jones, Charles 66, 68 Jordan 144, 198 Kaminski, Tomasz 9 Kang, David 113 Kant, Immanuel 69, 126 Karakoram Highway 124, 152, 154, 193 Karakoram mountains 192 Katzenstein, Peter 21, 53–56, 62–64, 66–68, 70, 72–74, 80, 83, 84, 151, 218–219, 227 Kautsky, Karl Johann 20 Kavalski, Emilian xiii, 43, 74, 78, 84–85, 91, 120–121 Kazakhstan xi, 7, 9, 10, 144, 171, 172–177, 205n3 Kenderdine, Tristan 150, 158, 159, 161, 170, 175–176 Kenya 144, 146 Keohane, Robert O. 4–5 Khan, Imran 194 Kissinger, Henry 192 Korea 110, 120; see also North Korea; South Korea Kratochwil, Friedrich 54, 64–65 Kuhn, Thomas S. 53, 68 Kumport 200–201 Kunming 186, 188 Kuomindang 126 Kuwait 144, 198, 199, 202 Kyaukpyu port 188 Kyrgyzstan 144, 172–174, 176–177 Lakatosian research programmes 93 Lan, Peiyuan 158 Laos 144, 184, 186–189, 203 Latin America 39, 40, 46, 48, 124, 147, 170, 217, 228, 230 Latvia 144, 178 lead 173 League of Arab States 199 League of Nations 126 Lebanon 144, 198 Lebow, Richard Ned 79 legitimacy 6–7, 45–46, 72, 79, 117, 121–122, 143, 159–161, 163, 217, 220, 225 Leninism 18, 47; see also Marxism

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 20 Lenovo 103, 107 liberal international order 22, 24, 38, 39, 45–46, 160, 217, 222, 225, 227–228; see also international system liberalism 20, 23, 33, 40, 47, 53, 66, 69–71, 73–75, 76, 80, 218, 227 linear causality 4, 39, 79–82, 85, 93, 131, 218, 227; see also causality, nonlinearity Ling, Han 150, 159, 161, 170 linguistics 85 liquid natural gas (LNG); see natural gas Lithuania 144, 178 Liu, Jianguo (Jack) 3, 76–77 Liu, Weidong 16, 17, 160 Liu, Zhenya 147–149 Li, Xing 20, 46 Li, Yuanchao 35 loans 15, 107, 124, 150, 175, 177, 181, 184–186, 189, 194–197, 203, 217, 219, 223, 231 logistics 148, 192, 201, 216, 230–231 Luxembourg 182 Mackinder, Halford 110; concept of global ‘Heartland’ 110 macro-level theory 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 35, 40, 42, 44, 48, 51–52, 55, 62–64, 74, 84, 88, 91, 93, 101, 117, 131, 134, 164, 176, 205, 216, 218, 221–227 Malacca Straits 171, 185, 190, 193, 199 Malaysia 15, 16, 48, 144, 184–186, 188–189, 219 Maldives 15, 144, 190–192, 196, 197 manganese 173 Manila 187 Manners, Ian 120–121 ‘manufacture of consent’ 45–46, 224 Maoism 70, 124–125, 145, 155, 157, 180, 184 Mao, Zedong 4, 5, 36, 39, 41, 46, 111, 126, 129, 145, 157, 170 maritime bases; see naval bases maritime law 187 Maritime Silk Road (MSR) 9, 10, 23, 42, 130, 132, 143–144, 152, 171–172, 182, 185–186, 190, 200–201, 203–204 Marks, Michael P. 43, 63 Marxism 18, 33, 35–36, 39, 44, 46–49, 67, 70–71, 75, 76, 114, 123–125, 145, 223, 224; see also Leninism

Index material factors 8, 11, 12–13, 19, 22–24, 33–35, 38, 40–42, 45–47, 52, 69–71, 108, 109, 118, 121, 123, 129, 154, 158, 159, 163, 185, 189, 216–218, 223–226, 231 material power 11, 12, 23, 41, 44, 121, 133, 150–153, 155, 156, 159, 161–162, 163, 178, 183, 197, 204, 221, 222; see also power; ideational power; normative power; soft power; structural power; symbolic power Mayer, Maximilian 4, 20–21 Mearsheimer, John J. 14, 41–42, 49–50, 55n4, 69, 110 Mecca 200 media 37, 102, 119, 123, 143, 152, 160, 181, 182, 222 Medina 200 Mediterranean Sea 146, 153, 171, 180, 182, 200 Meiji Restoration 37 Menon, Shivshankar 195 mercantilism 49–50, 229; see also offensive mercantilism Merton, Robert K. 51, 53, 62, 64–65, 74, 83 metaphors, Chinese use of 152–153 metaphors, in IR and other theories 43, 63, 68, 76–77, 85, 94n3, 221 methodology 52, 54–55, 62–66, 68, 75, 77–78, 80, 85, 117, 118, 123, 133, 141, 216, 218–219, 221 micro-level theory 52, 55, 62, 64, 84–85, 88, 91, 134, 172 middle classes 6 Middle East 1, 9, 10, 18, 24, 42, 51, 124, 132, 144, 146, 170, 171, 183, 185, 190, 191, 198–203, 204, 216, 223, 230 Middle East and North Africa (MENA region) 147 ‘Middle Kingdom’ 129, 186 mid-level theory 51–55, 62, 64–66, 73–74, 84–85, 91, 134, 172, 218, 226 Mierzejewski, Dominik xiv, 134n2 migration 39, 201 military bases 146, 172, 173, 185, 186, 191, 192, 199, 200 Mill, John Stuart 36 Ministry of Commerce 230 Ministry of State Security 195 Minsk 179 Mitchell, Sandra D. 64, 92, 94 mobilisation 122, 126, 134n2, 155, 156, 224–225, 231

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Mohamad, Mahathir 16, 48, 219 Moldova 144, 178, 179 Mongolia 9, 10, 144, 149, 172–173, 205n2 Montenegro 144, 178, 182, 203, 223 Moscow 152 multilateralism 45 multinational corporations (MNCs) 45, 79, 102, 112 Muslim minorities 174, 202 ‘mutual benefit’; see ‘win-win cooperation’ Myanmar 10, 12, 111, 132, 143, 144, 162, 184, 187–190, 191, 193, 196, 203, 224 Myitsone electric dam 188 narcotics 49 narratives 85 National Bureau of Statistics 230 ‘national champions’ 15, 50, 103, 228 national debt (of China) 5 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 9, 144, 164n1, 188 national economic security (guojia jingji anquan, 国家经济安全) 2, 12, 15, 151, 185, 191, 193; see also comprehensive national security national interests 51, 111, 125, 151, 191 nationalism 6, 12, 160, 187 National People’s Congress 18 national security 2, 12, 15, 39, 155, 185, 193, 195, 216 nation-states 3, 41, 46, 47, 69, 72, 74, 76, 79, 82, 93, 105, 109–115, 118, 121–123, 125, 133, 150, 151, 157, 159, 162, 217 natural disasters 89, 132, 161, 192–193, 220 natural environment 71, 75, 76, 92, 93, 124, 129–130, 133, 148, 151, 162, 163, 178, 188, 198, 202, 204, 217, 220, 221 natural gas 1, 111, 130, 173, 175, 188, 193, 198–200 natural resources 24, 150, 160, 173, 175, 177–178, 185, 193, 197, 202, 204, 223 natural sciences 74, 76, 80 naval bases 190–191 naval blockades 189 Navarro, Peter 13, 39, 42 Nazarbayev University 9, 172 Nazi Germany 38, 41, 223 negative feedback; see feedback effects neoclassical realism 73 neo-colonialism xii 15–16, 22, 47–49, 51, 71, 142, 186, 195, 197, 217–219, 222–224, 226

244 Index (neo-)Gramscianism 20, 22, 24, 35, 44–48, 50, 52, 55, 62, 110, 221–228; counterhegemony 44–47, 52, 70, 161, 163, 177–178, 183, 184, 189, 197, 218, 222, 224–228, 231; hegemony 44–47, 55, 62, 110, 117, 183, 189, 225; historic blocs 45–47, 52, 70, 197 neo-imperialism; see neo-mercantilism neo-colonialism neoliberal institutionalism; see neoliberalism neoliberalism 11, 16, 20, 41–42, 46, 69, 73, 80, 105–106, 108, 117, 126, 217; see also liberalism; liberal international order neo-mercantilism 47–50, 52; see also neo-colonialism; offensive mercantilism neorealism 3, 46, 69, 73, 79, 109, 127 Nepal 144, 190–192, 196–197 netizens 6 New Eurasian Land Bridge 10, 172, 222 ‘new normal’ 7 New Silk Road Fund; see Silk Road Fund Newtonianism 39, 82, 85, 93 New York 108 New York Times 194 Nexon, Daniel H. 65–68, 72, 73, 128, 218 Nigeria 146 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 79, 108, 181 non-interference policy 2, 11–12, 116, 121, 128, 197 nonlinearity 5, 39, 40, 52, 76, 79, 81–83, 86, 87, 93, 131–132, 133, 149, 151, 153, 155, 162, 178, 184, 189, 204; see also causality; linear causality non-state actors 47, 69, 74, 76, 93, 102–108, 109, 112, 115, 133, 150, 151, 157, 158, 159, 162 non-traditional security 39, 41 non-zero-sum games 104–105, 109–110, 124, 181, 217, 223 normative factors; see norms normative power xiii, 11, 12, 19, 20, 23, 38, 79, 103, 109, 115, 116, 119–123, 158, 159, 163, 217, 222; see also power; ideational power; material power; soft power; structural power; symbolic power norm diffusion; see norm-setting norms 71, 74, 76, 93, 103, 107, 115–123, 128, 183 norm-setting 45, 107, 123

Norochcholai Coal Power Plant 195 Norris, William 15, 47 North Africa 200 North America 19, 107, 147 North, Douglass 106–107, 128, 156, 225 Northeast Asia 144 North Korea 3, 4, 144 North Macedonia 144, 178, 179, 181–182 North-South divide 75, 125, 219 nuclear energy 130, 132, 200 nuclear war 132 nuclear weapons 14, 191, 199–200 Nye, Joseph S. 4–5, 119–120 Obama, Barack 8, 200 offensive mercantilism 15, 22, 24, 35, 44, 47, 48–51, 52, 55, 62, 184, 189, 197, 218, 221–224, 226–228 offensive realism 14–15, 38, 41–42, 44, 50, 69, 73, 110–111, 220, 223, 225, 227–228; see also realism ‘offensive realism world’; see offensive realism oil 1, 15, 24, 103, 111, 130, 146, 150, 173, 175, 185, 187–189, 192–193, 198–200, 202–203, 216, 230; oil prices 202; oil sanctions 199 Oman 144, 198–200, 202 ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) 7 ‘One China’ policy 2 ontology 24, 41, 64, 68–69, 83–84, 128, 227 Opium Wars 49 ‘opportunity/threat’ dichotomy 13–14, 17, 24, 25, 218, 229, 231; see also ‘China threat’ hypothesis organisations 43 Organski, A.F.K. 69 Ó Tuathail, Gearóid 170 Pacific Ocean 171, 190 Pakistan 8, 12, 15, 24, 111, 120, 124–125, 132, 144, 147, 152–154, 162, 171, 174, 190–194, 197–198, 199, 203, 224 Palestine 144, 198, 199, 201 Paracel Islands 186 paradigms (IR theory) 4, 21, 23, 33, 53, 63–70, 72–75, 78, 91–93, 123, 134, 164, 204, 218–219, 227 paradiplomacy 9 parsimony 3–4, 53, 64, 77–79, 218 Parsons, Talcott 82

Index path dependence 86, 87, 90, 93, 131–132, 133, 145, 146, 155–156, 162, 178, 184, 189, 198, 202, 204, 220 patriarchy 18, 71, 114, 129, 157 patriarchal authoritarianism 71, 75, 76, 93, 123–124, 129, 130, 133, 157, 162, 163, 177, 190, 198, 202, 204, 220, 221 ‘peaceful development’/‘peaceful rise’ 19, 42, 116, 161 Peirce, Charles Sanders 65, 94n1 People’s Daily (renmin zhibao, 人民日报) 10 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 12, 195 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 191 people-to-people contacts 143, 150, 151 Persian Gulf 18, 130, 190, 199–200 perspectives; see paradigms Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes surveys 119–120, 202 ‘phenotypes’ (social) 40, 43, 55n1, 222, 225–226; see also ‘genes’ (social); social evolution paradigm (SEP); Tang, Shiping Philippines 144, 184–187, 189 Phnom Penh 188 Pillsbury, Michael 39, 42, 228 pipelines 8, 16, 152, 173, 175, 188, 192, 217 Piraeus 171–172, 182, 201 pluralism (integrative) 4, 64, 92, 94, 126 Poland 9, 144, 172, 178, 180–182 ‘Polar Silk Road’ 230 political ecologism 70, 71, 75, 76 political influence 50, 110, 158, 162, 177, 184, 222, 224 political science 90 politics and economics as interlinked spheres of activity 2–3, 12, 15, 19, 44, 47, 50, 155 Popper, Karl; see falsifiability, Popperian popular revolutions 79 Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) 192 ports 9, 11, 15, 16, 111, 130, 132, 146, 150, 151, 154, 171–172, 182, 184, 187, 188, 190–196, 199–201, 203–204, 217, 224, 230 positive feedback; see feedback effects

245

positive-sum games; see non-zero-sum games positivism 227 ‘posthuman’ IR 78 post-structuralism 67, 70 power 40–41, 44, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 93, 105, 108, 109–123, 160; see also ideational power; material power; normative power; soft power; structural power; symbolic power power plants 9, 103, 130, 146, 150, 187, 196, 200, 220 power transition theory 69, 70 practices 24, 40, 43, 73, 103, 115–118, 120–123, 158, 159, 226 pragmatism 54, 63–67, 73–75, 83–85, 92, 93, 132, 133 Prague 180–181 Prebisch, Raúl 48 principal-agent problem 88, 103, 111–113, 219–220, 224 private companies 103, 125, 150 ‘problem-solving’ theory 65–66, 225; see also ‘critical’ theory; Cox, Robert W. pro-democracy demonstrations 6 protectionism 104, 106 proxy wars 200 psychology 85 public diplomacy 123 Qatar 144, 198, 199, 202 Qing dynasty 157 Qinghai 156 Qin, Yaqing 67, 72, 123–124, 127–128 qualitative analysis 13, 63, 72, 85, 87, 91, 92, 131, 134, 141, 172, 184, 189, 221 quantitative analysis 85, 91, 131–132, 141, 162–163 railways 9, 11, 16, 103, 124, 146, 150, 152, 154, 172–173, 182, 184–186, 187–188, 192, 196, 200–201, 217 Rajapaksa, Mahinda 194 Ramalingam, Ben 76, 84 Ramo, Joshua Cooper 65 Rana, Kishan 158 Rapkin, David 104 rationalism 127 Ravenna 230 raw materials 1, 5, 48, 50 realism, IR theory of 14, 20, 23, 33, 40–42, 44, 53, 66, 69–71, 73–75, 76, 105, 108–111, 113, 115, 118, 126, 217, 218,

246 Index 227; see also defensive realism; offensive realism realpolitik 69 Red Sea 171, 172 re-education camps 6, 174, 200, 204 Regilme Jr, Salvador 189 regional diplomacy 158, 177 regional forums 157–158, 225 regionalisation 11, 12, 16, 20, 42, 43, 51, 106, 125, 158–159, 171 regionalism; see regionalisation relationalism 67, 72, 75, 76, 93, 115, 121, 124, 127–128 relationality; see relationalism relational power 118 relative gains, theory of 11, 103, 105–106, 125 religion 229 renewable energy 130, 148–149, 220 Renminbi (RMB), internationalisation of 150 Republic of China (ROC) 157, 181 revisionism 38; see also status quo power risk assessment 89 risk management 38, 89 Rodrigo, Nihal 195 Rohingya refugee crisis 188, 196 Rolland, Nadè ège 8, 16, 17, 128 Romania 144, 178 Rotterdam 152, 154, 184, 201 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 36 rural migrants 5 Russia xii, 3, 9, 10, 38, 111, 120, 144, 146, 147, 151, 158, 171, 172–180, 201, 205n2, 228 Russian revolution 70 sanctions 15, 83, 132, 175, 194, 199, 228 Santa Fe Institute 52 Sartori, Giovanni 36 Saudi Arabia 144, 198–200, 202–203 Schmidt, Vivien A. 122–123; see also Carstensen, Martin B. sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 185, 191 Second World War 14, 44, 46, 67, 126 security 38, 39, 41–42, 154, 191, 193, 197, 231 securitisation 70 self-help behaviours 79, 82 self-interest 69, 217 self-organisation 52, 81, 83–84, 86, 88–89, 131, 133, 149, 151, 153, 155, 162, 178, 220; see also emergence

sensitivity to initial parameters 86, 87, 93, 131, 133, 149, 151, 153, 155, 162; see also nonlinearity Serbia 144, 178, 181, 182 service industries 173 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 51, 107, 157, 158, 174–175, 177, 191, 198, 222 Shenzhen special economic zone 1 shipping routes 201 Sihanoukville 188 Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) 9, 23, 142, 143, 152, 171–172, 182, 185, 197, 199, 201 Silk Road Fund 143, 157, 158–159, 222 silk roads: historical concept of 7–8, 11, 16; symbolism of 8, 11, 16; as a metaphor 11 Sil, Rudra 21, 53–56, 62–64, 66–68, 70, 72–74, 80, 83, 84, 151, 218–219, 227 Singapore 35, 144, 184, 186–188, 192 Singapore-Kunming rail link 186 Sinocentrism 186 Sino-Indian rivalry 190–191, 196 Sino-Indian War 131, 191, 198 Sinophobia 174, 177, 205n3 Sino-Russian relations 175, 178 Sino-Soviet border war 175 slavery 229 Slovakia 144, 154, 178, 180 Slovenia 144, 178, 180, 181 Small, Andrew 15, 147, 201 Smith, Adam 36, 69, 83, 88, 94n4 social evolution paradigm (SEP) 22, 24, 35, 40–44, 45, 48, 50, 52, 55, 62, 67, 72, 93, 163, 197, 221, 225–227 social ‘genes’; see ‘genes’ (social) social ‘phenotypes’; see ‘phenotypes’ (social) social sciences 74, 80, 81, 90, 227 soft balancing 20 soft power 12, 19, 20, 39, 47, 79, 109, 114–116, 119–120, 122–123, 143, 159, 160, 163, 177, 181, 186, 195, 200, 202, 217, 222; see also power; ideational power; material power; normative power; structural power; symbolic power soil erosion 149 solidarists 126 Solih, Ibrahim Mohamed 196 Somali pirates 191, 199 Sonadia 196 Song, Lilei 179–180

Index South Africa 146 South Asia 9, 10, 15, 24, 144, 147, 156, 170, 174, 190–198, 201, 203, 216 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 191 South China Sea 3, 9, 24, 42, 132, 146, 171, 185–187, 189–190, 199, 223 Southeast Asia 9, 10, 24, 144, 170, 171, 184–190, 201, 202, 203, 204, 216 Southern Europe 9 South Korea 35, 37, 120, 144, 180 South-South cooperation 24, 124–125, 145, 180, 222 sovereignty 11, 49, 106, 116, 121 Soviet bloc 79, 158, 173, 179 Soviet Union 102, 110, 132, 173–175, 178–179 Spain 51, 229 special economic zones (SEZs) 1, 155 speech acts 122 Spratly Islands 185 Sri Lanka 15, 24, 111, 132, 144, 190–192, 194–195, 197, 203, 223–224 Sri Lankan civil war 194 Stalinism 70 state capitalism 145, 150, 161, 176, 227, 229 State Council 142 State Grid Corporation 147 State Information Center (SIC) 143–145, 170, 171, 178–179, 183, 188 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 5, 15, 107, 108, 112, 125, 150, 159, 176, 181, 194–196 states; see nation-states States and Markets (book by Susan Strange) 118 statistical probability 81 status quo power 38; see also revisionism stock market crashes 161 Strait of Hormuz 199–200 Straits of Malacca; see Malacca Straits Strange, Susan 2, 15, 45, 46, 83, 104, 109, 113, 118, 122 ‘string of pearls’ 191, 200–201 structural power 109, 115, 118, 122 structural violence 71 subsidies 104 Suez Canal 146, 171, 182, 185, 200, 201 Summers, Tim 142, 156 Sun, Wenguang 230 Sun Yat-Sen 157 superorganisms 88

247

supply and demand 88 supply chains 204 symbolic power 7, 11, 19, 104, 109, 115–116, 119, 121–123, 159, 163, 177, 179, 217; see also power; ideational power; material power; normative power; soft power; structural power syncretism 33–37, 54, 63, 219 Syria 144, 198, 200–202 system effects 52, 67, 84, 134, 164, 218, 220, 227 Taiwan 2, 120, 181 Tajikistan 144, 172–174, 176 Taleb, Nassim Nicholas 89 Tang, Shiping 14, 22, 24, 35, 38, 40–44, 45, 48, 52, 55, 62, 67, 71, 82, 93, 94n2, 103, 105, 106–108, 110–111, 115, 117, 121, 126, 128, 129, 156, 158, 163, 197, 220–221, 223 Tanzania 144 Tanzania-Zambia (Tanzam) railway 124 taoguang yanghui (韬光养晦) strategy 50, 157, 198 tariffs 39, 83, 88, 104, 112, 131, 132, 187, 228 Tehran 200 telecoms 228 telecoupling 76–77, 87, 103 teleology 41 territorial expansion 110–111 terrorism 6, 154, 174, 193 Thailand 144, 184, 186–189 ‘theory of everything’; see macro-level theory Theory of International Politics 3, 79 Thompson, William 104 ‘threat/opportunity’ dichotomy; see ‘opportunity/threat’ dichotomy ‘Three Worlds Theory’ 124 Thucydides 69 ‘Thucydides trap’ 14, 110, 222 Tiananmen Square 6 tianxia (天下, ‘all-under-heaven’) 67, 72, 75, 76, 114, 116, 123, 125–128, 161, 204, 217 Tibet 2, 11, 120, 130, 162, 191, 197 Timor-Leste 144, 184 tipping points 82, 86, 89, 93, 132, 133, 161, 162, 198, 204, 220; see also ‘edge of chaos’ trade 1, 2, 5, 7–11, 17, 24, 49, 50, 73, 104–108, 112, 116, 124, 125, 130–132,

248 Index 142, 146, 149, 151, 154, 171, 176, 180, 182–185, 191, 193, 194, 198, 200, 204, 216, 217, 228, 230, 231 transport infrastructure 11, 15, 16, 17, 23, 50, 106, 130, 142–143, 146–147, 148, 149–150, 159, 171–172, 185, 187, 192, 201, 217 tributary system 113–114, 186 Trieste 230 Trump, Donald 5, 13, 39, 112, 132, 133, 194, 200, 221, 228 Tsinghua University 18, 230 Turcsányi, Richard 109 Turkey 9, 10, 144, 147, 171, 177, 180, 198–202 Turkmenistan 8, 144, 172–175, 177–178 Uighurs 6, 162, 174, 201, 204 Ukraine 144, 152, 175, 178, 179, 228 ultra-high voltage (UHV) network 148 UN Comtrade 50 United Arab Emirates 144, 198–199, 202 United Kingdom; see Britain United Nations (UN) 102, 105, 183 United States of America xii, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 14, 16, 19, 24, 38, 39, 42, 44, 45, 46, 89, 95n6, 110–113, 116, 119, 120, 125, 132, 142, 144, 151, 159, 175, 185, 190, 192, 194, 197, 199–203, 217, 221, 222, 227–230; alleged ‘containment’ policy towards China 8; global image 120; hegemony 39, 45, 110; ‘pivot to Asia’ 8; reactions to BRI 110; normative/soft power 120–121; treasury bonds 5 University of Warsaw 205n9 UN Sustainable Development Summit 148 uranium 173 Ürümqi 174 US-China trade war 1, 2, 5, 13, 112, 132–133, 228 utopianism 126, 128 Uzbekistan 144, 172–174 Vangeli, Anastas 43, 179 Venice 230 Vice News 182 Vietnam 110, 113, 131, 144, 153, 184–189 Visegrad (V4) nations 180 Vision and Actions (official BRI policy document) 9–11, 16, 17, 18, 23, 34, 102, 141–142, 147, 152, 154, 156, 170, 189 von Richtofen, Ferdinand 7

Wæver, Ole 66, 68 wages 5, 6, 187 Walby, Sylvia 76 Wallerstein, Immanuel 20, 48, 71, 82 Wall Street Crash 89 Waltz, Kenneth 3, 69, 74, 78–79, 82, 105, 109, 113, 127 Warsaw 179 Warsaw Pact 179 Washington, D.C. 146 water pollution 149 Weaver, Warren 81 weiqi (game) 91, 192, 201 Wendt, Alexander 73, 74 Western Europe 24, 119, 125, 144, 154, 171, 179–180, 182–184, 230 Westphalian system of nation-states 72, 127, 163; see also international system Wight, Colin 65, 67–68, 94, 218 ‘win-win cooperation’ 11, 15, 18, 23, 42, 48, 51, 102–106, 116, 122, 142, 143, 151, 161, 178, 181, 183, 184, 189, 197, 202, 203, 216, 217, 222, 223, 231 Womack, Brantly 113, 119–120, 131 working class 70 World Bank 45, 103 World Economic Forum 2, 11, 102 world society 71, 75, 76, 80, 93, 123, 125–128 World system theory 20, 48, 70–71, 82 Wright, Robert 105 Xi, Jinping xi–xiii, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 24, 37, 40, 50, 107, 116, 119, 141–143, 145, 148, 151, 152, 155–157, 160, 161, 164, 172, 179–181, 186, 192, 199, 200, 204, 220, 231 Xinhua 152 Xinjiang 6, 11, 124, 152, 156, 172–175, 192–193, 200–202, 204 Xu, Jianwei 17 Xu, Zhangrun 18, 230 Yameen, Abdulla 196 Yan, Xuetong 14 Ye, Jianming 108, 180 Yemen 144, 198–203 Yugoslavia 181 Zajączkowski, Jakub 205n9 Zambia 1, 146 Zeman, Miloš 180–181

Index zero-sum games 38, 50–51, 52, 104–105, 109–110, 181, 223, 228 Zhang, Feng 72 Zhang, Shuxiu 2, 65 Zhao, Qiqi 179–180 Zhao, Suisheng 13 Zhao, Tingyang 37, 67, 72, 114, 125, 161

249

Zhou, Weifeng 20, 115; see also Esteban, Mario Zhongnanhai 116, 117 Zhu, Yongbiao 197 zinc 173 ‘zombie’ companies 5 ZTE 103, 107