Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe: The Western Journey of a Turkish Muslim Movement (Dieux, Hommes et Religions / Gods, Humans and Religions) [New ed.] 9782875742759, 9783035265460, 2875742752

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Preface
Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists. A Bibliographical Essay (Karel Steenbrink)
Part I. A Multidimensional Approach to the Hizmet Movement
The Intellectual Format of the Hizmet Movement. A Discourse Analysis (Pim Valkenberg)
Theological Keywords of M. Fethullah Gülen (Thomas Michel)
Ethical Priorities of Gülen. The True Middle Road ([Gürkan Çelİk] [Karel Steenbrink])
Financial Dimension of the Gülen-Inspired Projects (Helen Rose Ebaugh)
The Socio-Political Dimension of the Gülen Movement ([Doğu Ergİl] [Gürkan Çelİk])
Diasporic Faith, Faith in Diaspora. Turkish Women’s Public Spheres Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow (Maria F. Curtis)
Part II. National and Regional Surveys
Belgium’s Gülen Hizmet Movement. History, Structures and Initiatives (Johan Leman)
The Hizmet Movement and the Integration of Muslims in Germany ([Ercan Karakoyun] [Karel Steenbrink])
Gülen in the Netherlands between Pious Circles and Social Emancipation (Karel Steenbrink)
Hizmet in France. Negotiation of Multiple Identities in a Secular Context (Erkan Toguslu)
The Gülen Movement in the United Kingdom (Paul Weller)
Turkish Schools and More. Hizmet Networks in the Balkans (Bekir Çıinar)
Concluding Reflections ([Gürkan Çelİk] [Johan Leman] [Karel Steenbrink])
Bibliography
List of contributors
Index

Citation preview

Gürkan Çelik, Professor of Cross-Cultural Entrepreneurship at Inholland University of Applied Sciences, The Netherlands. Johan Leman, Emeritus Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Social Sciences at KU Leuven University, Belgium. Karel Steenbrink, Emeritus Professor of Intercultural Theology at Utrecht University, The Netherlands.

ISBN 978-2-87574-275-9

P.I.E. Peter Lang Brussels

www.peterlang.com

Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

22 Gods, Hu man s an d R eligions

This book provides a broad presentation of Gülen’s thought and practice. These issues are discussed in the first part of this book. The second part presents six case studies from countries where the name of Gülen has been attached to a great variety of social activities in the field of education, media, business, dialogue, and the support of integration and defence of human rights. These countries are Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Albania as the centre of Muslims in the Balkans. Although the participants of Hizmet are quite small in number and work in an extremely decentralised way, they are among the best educated and most socially active of the Turkishspeaking communities in their countries. This is therefore an important study of a group of Muslims who cannot simply be categorized as ‘conservative’ or progressive’, ‘pietistic’ or ‘political’.

G. Çelik, J. Leman & K. Steenbrink (eds.)

The Hizmet Movement initiated by Fethullah Gülen in Turkey in the 1960s is today active in more than 160 countries. The participants of Hizmet are often less visible among the Muslim minorities in Western societies. They do not build mosques or hold regular prayer meetings like institutional Muslims or Sufi masters, but establish emancipatory schools without religious instruction, cherish networks of business people, publish the newspaper Zaman in various national editions, and run dialogue charities for intercultural and interreligious encounters. Small groups come together in private houses to hold sohbets, that is spiritual talks on faith, religion and society, and to discuss Hizmet-related projects in the light of teachings articulated by Gülen in his books and talks.

Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe The Western Journey of a Turkish Muslim Movement

Gürkan Çelik, Johan Leman & Karel Steenbrink (eds.)

Gürkan Çelik, Professor of Cross-Cultural Entrepreneurship at Inholland University of Applied Sciences, The Netherlands. Johan Leman, Emeritus Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Social Sciences at KU Leuven University, Belgium. Karel Steenbrink, Emeritus Professor of Intercultural Theology at Utrecht University, The Netherlands.

P.I.E. Peter Lang Brussels

www.peterlang.com

Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

22 Gods, Hu man s an d R eligions

This book provides a broad presentation of Gülen’s thought and practice. These issues are discussed in the first part of this book. The second part presents six case studies from countries where the name of Gülen has been attached to a great variety of social activities in the field of education, media, business, dialogue, and the support of integration and defence of human rights. These countries are Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Albania as the centre of Muslims in the Balkans. Although the participants of Hizmet are quite small in number and work in an extremely decentralised way, they are among the best educated and most socially active of the Turkishspeaking communities in their countries. This is therefore an important study of a group of Muslims who cannot simply be categorized as ‘conservative’ or progressive’, ‘pietistic’ or ‘political’.

G. Çelik, J. Leman & K. Steenbrink (eds.)

The Hizmet Movement initiated by Fethullah Gülen in Turkey in the 1960s is today active in more than 160 countries. The participants of Hizmet are often less visible among the Muslim minorities in Western societies. They do not build mosques or hold regular prayer meetings like institutional Muslims or Sufi masters, but establish emancipatory schools without religious instruction, cherish networks of business people, publish the newspaper Zaman in various national editions, and run dialogue charities for intercultural and interreligious encounters. Small groups come together in private houses to hold sohbets, that is spiritual talks on faith, religion and society, and to discuss Hizmet-related projects in the light of teachings articulated by Gülen in his books and talks.

Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe The Western Journey of a Turkish Muslim Movement

Gürkan Çelik, Johan Leman & Karel Steenbrink (eds.)

Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe The Western Journey of a Turkish Muslim Movement

P.I.E. Peter Lang Bruxelles · Bern · Berlin · Frankfurt am Main · New York · Oxford · Wien

Gürkan Çelİk, Johan Leman & Karel Steenbrink (eds.)

Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe The Western Journey of a Turkish Muslim Movement

Gods, Humans and Religions No. 22

This publication has been co-funded by Stichting Zonneweelde and Stichting Sormani Fonds.

This publication has been peer-reviewed. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photocopy, microfilm or any other means, without prior written permission from the publisher. All rights reserved.

© P.I.E. PETER LANG s.a.

Éditions scientifiques internationales

Brussels, 2015 1 avenue Maurice, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium [email protected]; www.peterlang.com ISSN 1377-8323 ISBN 978-2-87574-275-9 eISBN 978-3-0352-6546-0 D/2015/5678/39 Printed in Germany

Cip available from the British Library, UK and from the Library of Congress, USA. “Die Deutsche National Bibliothek” lists this publication in the “Deutsche Nationalbibliografie”; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at http://dnb.de.

Contents Preface...................................................................................................... 9 Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists. A Bibliographical Essay........................................................................ 13 Karel Steenbrink Part I A Multidimensional Approach to the Hizmet Movement The Intellectual Format of the Hizmet Movement. A Discourse Analysis............................................................................. 49 Pim Valkenberg Theological Keywords of M. Fethullah Gülen................................... 67 Thomas Michel Ethical Priorities of Gülen. The True Middle Road.......................... 85 Gürkan Çelik and Karel Steenbrink Financial Dimension of the Gülen-Inspired Projects....................... 101 Helen Rose Ebaugh The Socio-Political Dimension of the Gülen Movement.................. 113 Doğu Ergil and Gürkan Çelik Diasporic Faith, Faith in Diaspora. Turkish Women’s Public Spheres Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow............................ 137 Maria F. Curtis

7

Part II National and Regional Surveys Belgium’s Gülen Hizmet Movement. History, Structures and Initiatives...................................................................................... 159 Johan Leman The Hizmet Movement and the Integration of Muslims in Germany...................................................................... 179 Ercan Karakoyun and Karel Steenbrink Gülen in the Netherlands between Pious Circles and Social Emancipation.................................................................... 197 Karel Steenbrink Hizmet in France. Negotiation of Multiple Identities in a Secular Context........................................................... 225 Erkan Toguslu The Gülen Movement in the United Kingdom................................. 239 Paul Weller Turkish Schools and More. Hizmet Networks in the Balkans........ 253 Bekir Çınar Concluding Reflections....................................................................... 267 Gürkan Çelik, Johan Leman and Karel Steenbrink Bibliography........................................................................................ 279 List of contributors............................................................................. 303 Index..................................................................................................... 307

8

Preface This book discusses the western journey of a modern Muslim movement. It is a worldwide movement organised by a group of Turkish people inspired by M. Fethullah Gülen (Turkey, 1941), a contemporary Turkish Muslim scholar of the Sunni tradition. The movement he inspired originated in Turkey in the 1960s and expanded throughout the world from the mid-1980s. Today the movement – often referred to as “The Gülen Movement” or “Hizmet” in the media and academia – coordinates thousands of educational institutions in more than 160 countries, mobilises numerous volunteers and professionals for educational, cultural and media enterprises, and employs new networks for the ongoing realignment of public, private and civil society groups. The followers of Gülen are a small and often less visible group among Muslim minorities in Western countries. They do not build mosques or hold regular prayer meetings like institutional Muslims or Sufi shaikhs, but establish emancipatory educational institutions, cherish networks of business people, publish the newspaper Zaman in various national editions, and start dialogue centres for intercultural and interreligious meetings. Small groups come together in private houses to hold sohbets, meals and spiritual talks on faith, religion and society and to discuss Hizmet-related projects, often while listening to speeches or watching podcasts of Gülen’s speeches from his home in Pennsylvania where he has resided since 1999. This book provides a broad presentation of Gülen’s thinking and practice, as it was gladly received by some Muslims (mainly Turkish) in Western countries, but also neglected or even suspected by others. The activities of the movement also found support from Western governments, churches, and social groups. Some individuals even became active sympathizers, without embracing formal Islam. Other observers in the West, both Muslims and non-Muslims, continued to have reservations about some practices and fear of a ‘hidden agenda’. The major themes of Gülen’s thinking are discussed in detail in the first part of this book. The second part presents case studies from European countries where the name Gülen has been attached to a great variety of social activities in the field of education, business, media, dialogue, and the support of integration and defence of human rights. These countries are Belgium, the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Albania as the centre of Muslims in the Balkan region. Although ‘participants’ of the loosely organised ‘Gülen Movement’ are relatively few in number and 9

Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

work in an extremely decentralised way, they are among the best educated and socially most active of the Turkish community in their countries. They are very active in social life and have a range of people from all walks of society. This is therefore an important study of a group of Muslims who cannot be placed in simple categories such as ‘conservative’ or ‘progressive’, ‘pietistic’ or ‘political’. The present volume was first planned in 2010 on the occasion of a conference in Amsterdam about the recent developments of the Gülen Movement. This conference was held on October 7th 2010, entitled “Mapping the Gülen Movement: a multidimensional approach”, in the classical Felix Meritis (‘Happy By Doing Good Deeds’), a civil society building for science and the arts, first used in 1788. A ‘multidimensional’ approach to the Gülen phenomenon was presented by most of the scholars, who also contributed the chapters for the first part of this volume. Professor Johan Leman from Louvain gave an introduction to the Gülen presence in his country, Belgium, and for the further elaboration of the theme in a book we decided that we should also concentrate on collecting more European presentations. We are proud to see here, in the second part of the book, six national or regional studies, once the first part has presented the more general dimensions of the Gülen Movement. The introductory and concluding chapters comment on the character and the current situation of the Gülen Movement inside and outside Turkey – the cradle of the movement – which we can find in the various case studies throughout. We thank the presenters of the 2010 academic meeting for being willing to adapt their original papers to the more specific focus of this book. We realised during this long process that we wanted to write about a movement that is still ongoing, and that we have to write with caution, however, we are also conscious that these observations of the ongoing process are valuable in their own right. We give thanks to readers who provided detailed, critical and insightful comments on the original proposal for this book. We owe a special debt of gratitude to Thomas Goldberg and Simon Rae for their correction of our English without pushing us into uniformity. In this book, any reference to Gülen schools, institutions, organisations is actually a shorthand reference to Gülen-inspired schools, institutions or organisations. Gülen does not formally own or run these initiatives; rather they are the work of Hizmet, the movement he inspires. Furthermore, the terms “Gülen Movement” and “Hizmet Movement” are used interchangeably in this book.

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Preface

Note on spelling and transliteration In this book many Turkish names and words are used, as well as Muslim terminology that has it origin in Arabic. The Turkish alphabet has 29 letters with a number of differences from the common Latin alphabet as used for English. To give some examples: C and Ç, i and ı both indicate two different pronunciations. In European and American publications, as well as in private correspondence, especially in modern media such as Twitter, Facebook and e-mail, a simplified spelling is used. Sometimes we follow this easy use, as our sources do. There is an established practice of the transliteration of Arabic Muslim terminology into Turkish, but here we also find many inconsistencies with authors who write for the Western market. In this book we do not try to invent a purist practice, but we follow the spelling as used by our sources. In this way we join the hybrid practices of the Gülen people in Europe.

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Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists A Bibliographical Essay Karel Steenbrink Fethullah Gülen does not dominate the picture of Islam in European countries. It is quite the opposite: someone like the flamboyant sociologist Nilüfer Göle never mentioned the movement in her 2011 book Islam in Europe, although she received the first award accorded by the Gülen inspired Journalists and Writers Association (initiated in 1994) in 1995. In many other recent books on Muslims in Europe, there are no references to the movement. A recent book on Muslims in Germany of 591 pages, only has a half sentence about the ‘conservative, religious’ Gülen newspaper Zaman (with 22,000 subscriptions far below the more than 100,000 for Kemalist Hürriyet).1 Another comprehensive book on ‘Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in Europe’ totally neglects the Gülen Movement.2 In a recent work on Muslim youth in Norway there is only one short reference to Gülen, in combination with another ‘emotional preacher’, for whom ‘feelings prevail over law in order to achieve repentance and return to a true faith’.3 Should these omissions be interpreted as caused by the absence of Gülen people in the more strictly religious field, because of their concentration on social and educational affairs?4 Is it caused by its closed character? Or is it just a warning that despite the abundant concentration on expressions of the Gülen Movement in this book, we should never forget that it is just a ‘Gülen corner’ amidst a vast number of other groups, representing the immensely diverse Islam and the Muslim community? Still, during the last fifteen years a large number of books, academic articles, reports in newspapers, besides much debate on the internet and elsewhere in the media have shown a quite intense discussion about the character of this Islamic movement. Not only among European citizens 1

3 4 2

Al-Hamarneh and Thielmann 2008: 449-50. Allievi and Nielsen 2003. Jacobsen 2011: 66, with a reference to Roy 2004: 191. So Yükleyen 2012: 78, “the Gülen community does not run a mosque or the services traditionally attached to mosques, but they provide educational services through their tutoring centres and student dorms.”

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Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

of Turkish offspring, but also among non-Muslim citizens of European countries supporters and opponents can be found. There are few Muslim movements or individuals, so warmly praised, but at the same time heavily criticized or suspected. This bibliographical essay wants to picture this debate in English, Dutch and also some French and German publications. The first issue in this debate is about the name. The oldest references talk about one or even several Neo-Nur or Neo-Nursi/Nurcu movements. After the death of Said Nursi in 1960 his network of admirers, based on the readership of his Risale-i Nur, produced several groups of followers and new institutes also in the western world (Berkeley, Cologne), but there was no true successor for this inspiring thinker. The doctoral dissertation by Nico Landman of 1992, perhaps the first discussion of Fethullah Gülen in a European publication, mentions a group of Nurcu people who supported the political party of Erbakan. There was also a different group: Another rearrangement took place under the preacher Fethullah Gülen who estimated that these yeni asyalılar had estranged themselves from the truth of their faith by political engagement. The organisation that rose around him, commonly called fethullahcılar keeps away from party politics and is mostly active in education. In publications of fethullahcılar like the monthly Sızıntı the polemics with Western atheists is a central issue. They do not like to show their group in public, because Fethullah is very keen on preventing problems with the government. They will never make a reference to Said Nursi in publications and public speeches. Fethullah even repeatedly condemned public demonstrations of Islamic groups and justified harsh government measures against them.5

Some other observers follow this label of the Gülen Movement as a neo-Nur movement.6 One may be surprised to see this connection between two quite different persons: Said Nursi wrote in very sophisticated and quite philosophical discourse, while Gülen has a very easy and accessible style, much closer to pastoral psychology than his learned predecessor. Nursi also constructs and preaches in detail the harmony between theology and modern science, while Gülen presents only the general doctrine of the harmony between the two and promotes modern schooling in physics, medicine and science, without too detailed religious reasoning. But apparently the two have a similar style of involved and emotional preaching. From the 1990s on the comparison of Gülen with Nursi has more and more disappeared from the discourse about Gülen. Still, a comprehensive connection has been given in the account of an interview with Gülen, as published in the German newspaper Frankfurter 5



6

Landman 1992: 136, our translation. Valkenberg 2006: 309-321. Balcı 2002: 1 restricts the label Neo-Nurcu to the Gülen Movement. See also Hendrick 2009: 103-13.

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Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists

Allgemeine, 9 November 2012. ‘What has been formulated in a theoretical framework by Said Nursi, has now been put in action by Fethullah Gülen.’7 From the first name of Gülen, Fethullah, the word fethullahcılar is formed, that is often taken as an outsider’s label with a negative connotation.8 The word ‘Gülenist’ is even more often a defamatory qualification and only used by ‘outsiders’.9 Internally quite often the word Hizmet is used, in English translated as ‘the Volunteers Movement’. The authors of a book that was published in the USA in 2012 introduced the neologism ‘the Gülen Hizmet Movement’ or GHM “which incorporates not only the two best known labels for the organisation but also allows focus on both the ideas behind it, drawn largely from Gülen, but also the action that results from those ideas.”10 There exists no formal or official institution or body such as a Gülen or Hizmet Movement, Society, Institute or Organisation. There are hundreds perhaps even thousands of foundations, schools, societies and institutes that work ‘in his spirit’ or ‘are inspired by Gülen’, but no formal single body for these activities exists. Many books on Gülen and the Gülen Movement are collective books.11 In Western languages also a good number of monographs are published: Carroll 2007 is a philosophical dialogue with Gülen; Ebaugh 2010 is a comprehensive social analysis of origins, activities and membership; Harrington 2011 is a warm defence for Gülen related to his trial in Turkey during the previous decade; Koç 2012 is a quite uncompromising polemic in his analysis of the negative publicity in Turkey and abroad. Yavuz 2013 is an overall presentation by a social scientist who has been a long time observer of the movement. There are at least five doctoral dissertations devoted to this religious leader: Kim 2008, Çelik 2008, Hendrick 2009, Toguslu 2009, Çetin 2010. As can be expected from a modern movement, there is ample material available on the internet. 7



‘Was Nursi theoretisch formuliert hat, setzt Gülen heute in die Praxis um.’ Hermann: 2012. 8 Hermansen in Yılmaz 2007a: 61 ‘a somewhat depreciatory ring.’ 9 So in Sharon-Krespin 2009. 10 Balcı and Miller 2012: 2. 11 The collective books are often edited by several people. In chronological order the most important ten books are Esposito and Yavuz 2003; Yılmaz 2007a; Yılmaz 2007b; Esposito & Yılmaz 2010; Homolka, Hafner, Kosman & Karakoyun 2010; BoosNünning, Bultmann and Ucar 2011; Balcı and Miller 2012; Pandya and Gallagher 2012; Toguslu 2012; Weller and Yılmaz 2012. After this list was composed we received another important book: Yavus 2013. There is one special issue of the international journal The Muslim World (July 2005, Volume 95-3). The new journal Sociology of Islam (Leiden: Brill) had in its first year, volume I: 2013, a special issue (No. 3-4) on the Gülen Movement, edited by Joshua Hendrick. It actually was published in early 2014.

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As may be seen from these lists and even more clearly from the inventory of internet sites, there is a forum for strong supporters as well as strong opponents. Turkish authors are roughly two third of those who wrote about the movement in Western languages, but nearly one third are Western and non-Muslim authors. Quite a few of these outsider-observers at the conferences that were held since 2005 as what may be seen as a global presentation of the movement, may have felt it difficult to make a distinction between etic and emic, between the questions of the outside observer and the convictions and perspectives of the insiders. Was it a clear strategy of the volunteers of the movement to involve unbiased but also somewhat ignorant westerners in their policy? Or was it an honest effort to start the dialogue between religions and civilizations as promoted by Fethullah Gülen himself, and in this case along the social conventions of the Turkish community in combination with a Western culture of academic conferences?

Biography There is no critical, well documented biography of Fethullah Gülen. About the first fifty years of his life and work, we have to rely mostly on information that is included as an introduction to a presentation of his movement. It is often plucked from fragments of interviews with Gülen himself or with followers.12 1941-1959 Youth and Education. – Gülen was born in 1941 in Korucuk, a small village of farmers in the district of Hasankale, some 40 km from Erzurum, East Turkey.13 His father was imam in the local mosque. Fethullah followed the three years of primary school. After he had finished this quite simple basic education his father, Ramiz Effendi, was moved to another place, Alvar, to work as an imam. In this place no further education was available and the young Fethullah learned Arabic and Persian here from his father who was fond of books. Gülen told later 12

So Ebaugh 2010: 51 with a reference to a biographical interview with Latif Erdogan in Zaman, with the title Kücük Dünyam (My Life). See Erdogan 1995. Bruinessen 2010: 15 mentions that this book was some kind of ‘required reading’ for members in the movement. Ünal and Williams 2000: 9-10 has also a selection from this interview. This booklet has been quite influential in the movement, but is restricted to the period leading to the detention of Gülen in 1971. Marcia Hermansen in Yılmaz 2007a: 60-76 is a more theoretical study of the ‘Cultivation of Memory in the Gülen Movement.’ Hermansen 2007: 61 also has ‘ca 1938’ for the date of his birth. 13 Ünal and Willams 2000: 1 and 8 mention November 1938 as the date of his birth. The Official Website has 27 April 1941 as the date of birth. On this difference also Çelik 2008: 29; Hendrick 2013: 69-72 about a practice of alternation or ‘reimagining the past for the purposes of the present,’ in this case the impossibility of an important political influence of Gülen.

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Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists

that he learned Qur’ān recitation from Haci Sidki Efendi of Hasankale, 7 km from Alvar.14 In the house of his parents many learned visitors were welcomed and in his own memory the young Fethullah was not so often playing with other children, but he rather joined the learned discussions between his father and the guests who visited their house. Besides lessons from his father, he learned basic elements of Islamic doctrine from his mother Refia Hanim who in a clandestine way taught the children of the village, as well as from his grandfather Samil Aga. It is suggested that his family could claim a direct lineage from the prophet Muhammad.15 Outside his family one mystic teacher, Shaykh Muhammad Lütfi Efendi, is mentioned as an important spiritual teacher. He introduced Fethullah Gülen to the writings of Said Nursi (1876-1960), the famous author of the Risale-i-nur that try to create a harmony between traditional Islamic doctrine and modern science. Lütfi Efendi died in 1956, when Gülen was still a teenager.16 After the death of Lütfi Efendi, Gülen moved for some time from one teacher to another, staying in mosques. He first was in Kemhan, then in Tasmescid. Then he moved to Edirne, studying with Osman Bektas. In this period he also became known as a gifted young preacher, especially also for the month of Ramadan. 1959-1970 Early Career within the Diyanet Structure. – On 6 August 1959 Gülen became assistant imam in the Üçşerefeli mosque in Edirne, moving from East Turkey to the utmost north-western town, close to the border with Greece. He worked here as an official within the bureaucracy of Diyanet, the religious administration of the Turkish state. Koç mentions a state exam to be passed for this nomination. This was a position he held for more than two years, until he had to enter military service on 10 November 1961.17 After military service he returned to Edirne and opened a Qur’ān reading course in Edirne, in mid-1964. Edirne and Izmir were the two most important places for Gülen in the 1960s. Both towns were majority Greek until 1923 when the end of the Ottoman Empire and the transition to the Kemalist rule caused the religious/ethnic cleansing of the towns. The towns were re-populated with Muslim/Turkish refugees from Greece and migrants from East Turkey. There is not much reflection on this painful history in the writings of the movement. This region was 14

Ünal and Williams 2000: 14. Ünal and Williams 2000: 9. 16 The Official Website has 1956, but Ünal and Williams 2000: 10 take 1954 as date of his death. 17 Koç 2012: 4. 15

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Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

quite different from the closed and conservative region around Erzurum. Hakan Yavuz writes about Gülen in Edirne: He interpreted the liberal lifestyle of young women there in terms of their being ‘free and easy’ an outcome of lack of Islamic beliefs. The young Gülen tended to be uncomfortable around women and his conservative religious worldview conflicted with the emerging secular-modern lifestyle of Edirne and Western Turkey in general and this in turn seemed to encourage a more ascetic personal lifestyle.18

On 31 July 1965 he was transferred to Kirklareli, a smaller town in the same border region as Edirne. On 11 March 1966 he moved to Izmir “holding on to a managerial position there close to five years at Kestanepazarı, staying at a small shack and not accepting any wages for his services.”19 Gülen would stay for five years in Izmir. These years in Izmir are seen as ‘the founding years of his community’. From the mid1960s on Gülen’s duty in Izmir was not as an imam to a mosque but as a teacher and director in the Qur’ānic school, training youngsters to learn religion and eventually to become an imam. He travelled quite often to nearby places, creating a network of friends and sympathizers.20 1970-1982 Light Houses, Dormitories. Educating a ‘golden generation’ in a secular environment with a touch of spirituality. – In the aftermath of the military coup of 12 March 1971, Gülen was arrested, accused of an attempt “to change social, political, and economic base of society in Turkey”, but he was released without conviction after six months and could return to his position in Izmir. Not much is known about the effects of this period of detention for his religious and social-political ideas. Van Bruinessen observes three periods in the movement: in the 1970s and 1980s it was mostly the education of a ‘golden generation’ as an alternative elite for the Kemalists who still ruled Turkey at the time. From the mid-1990s tolerance and dialogue with non-Muslims became a major issue, while after 2000 the focus changed more towards charity and social assistance.21 These shifts should not be seen as alternating but rather as cumulative. It is told in the movement that Gülen already in the 1970s observed that Turkey had enough mosques and places to educate preachers and imams, but was short of places for secular education.22 He started dormitories for students where he also initiated discussion in small groups on religious 18

20 21 22 19

Yavuz 2013: 40. According to the Official Website. Koç 2012: 4. Bruinessen 2010: 49. Hermansen 2007: 69.

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Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists

and social issues. He labelled these ‘light houses’ or Işık evleri, referring to the chapter of light Qur’ān 24: 36. This verse follows the famous ‘verse of the light’ Qur’ān 24: 35, where God is praised as “the light of heaven and earth […] God guides to light whom He wills.” The following verse talks about “[Divine Light] in some houses for which God has provided a way for them to be built and appreciated, and for His Name to be mentioned and invoked therein; they glorify Him in the morning and evening.”23 These are dormitories under the direction of an ağabey or older brother, “flats rented by the cemaat or purchased by cemaat businessmen where students, usually from poor families, are allowed to stay during their studies.”24 Not married and living the simple life of a bachelor, Gülen had no special house or apartment for himself, but was happy with one room for himself in the dormitory, joining staff and students in their daily life. On 12 September 1980 Gülen quit from his work in Izmir, but only one year later he officially left Diyanet, at the age of 40 years. In the comparative study of religion, one would expect a small circle of important pupils, more or less ‘apostles’ or sahabāt, around the great master. It is not easy to identify such a group, if there exists or existed something that can be labelled as such. Agai talks about a group of ağabeyler or ‘older brothers’ and mentions Abdullah Aymaz as one of the oldest and most important pupils of Gülen.25 Van Bruinessen mentions that there is ‘a natural hierarchy of authority in the movement, defined by the proximity to the central figure’. They are called abi a shorter version of ağabey. The title can be used at different levels. In student dormitories or in the small reading and discussion group of the ‘light houses’ a leading ‘older brother’ may be given the title of abi.26 In various countries some kind of leadership is executed by these ‘older brothers’.27 1980-1993 Gülen Schools. The first decade of an independent religious ‘entrepreneur’, ‘Turkey’s answer to Billy Graham’.28 – The 1980s were a period of the ‘explosion of private religious education’ because of the mild, even positive attitude towards religion by General Evren who orchestrated the 1980 coup.29 The ideology of the military leaders of 23

I follow here the translation by Ali Ünal, The Qur’ān, New Jersey: The Light, 2006. Marcia Hermansen 2007: 69, following an observation by Bayram Balcı on Central Asia. 25 Agai 2010: 25, 30. 26 Hermansen 2007: 69. 27 Bruinessen 2010: 29. 28 The terminology of ‘entrepreneur’ has been taken from the current sociological discourse on evangelical Christian independent preachers. The reference to Billy Graham is from Eickelman 1998. 29 Hermansen 2007: 66. 24

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these years has been labelled as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, where nationalist sentiments could combine Kemalism with Islam.30 This was continued by the new Prime minister Turgut Özal, 1983-1989. In 1982 the first two Gülen schools were opened in Izmir and Istanbul. They were followed by many more: hundreds in Turkey, followed after the collapse of Communism after 1990 by a new wave of schools in former Soviet Republics in Central Asia. In 1986 the daily newspaper Zaman was begun, later to be followed by a television channel, Samanyolu Televizyonu. This was a great step forward to be present in the public media, after the more strictly religious monthly Sızıntı (‘Raindrop’, published since the 1970s, also later in an English version as The Fountain). Many books by Gülen are in fact a compilation of articles or columns authored him for this journal.31 About these initiatives it is always questioned whether we can speak of one more or less coordinated Gülen Movement or a series of loosely interconnected initiatives. Different from Said Nursi who is more the intellectual, writing in quite difficult Turkish, Fethullah Gülen showed a mixture of attractive, clear sermons with relevant instructions, besides organisational ability.32 One may ask whether Gülen really masterminded and controlled the many aspects of the movement after 1980, or whether we should accept this mild movement towards ‘Islamization of society’ as the wish of the period? Not the abrupt and drastic change of Khomeini in Iran, but a new model and inspiration for a changing Turkey that allowed more space for religious discourse and practice. Anyway, the TurkishIslamic synthesis is not an undisputed ideal for modern Turkey. Berna Turam formulated a challenging opposition under the title: ‘Secular State and Pious Muslims: neither eternal rivals nor allies for life.’33 1993 and beyond: from small local initiatives to the national media, the interreligious dialogue, social programs in and outside Turkey In the 1980s, Fethullah Gülen continued to be active as a writer in the magazine Sızıntı and as a free preacher and inspiring person, but for other activities it is often not clear whether he himself (and a circle of close trusted assistants?) was the central figure behind the boarding houses and the schools, as an able organizer, or merely the distant person with the big ideas. Gülen never lived in a house or even mansion of his own, but just in room(s) in a mosque or like an abi in a school or boarding house. Hendrick did research in Istanbul in 2006-7 and saw the modest building 30

32 33 31

Kurt 2010. Ebaugh 2012: 63-4; Hermansen 2007: 74. Bruinessen 2010: 13. The title of the introduction she wrote for Turam (ed.), 2012.

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Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists

of Sızıntı as the central office of the movement, called Akademi: “an allin-one publishing house, think tank, library, theological training centre, meeting centre, school, and mosque.”34 In the 1990s the activities of the movement expanded quickly to a greater variety, and increased in scale. Below we will sketch the start of schools in Central Asia. In 1994 the Writers and Journalists Foundation was established with Gülen as an Honorary President. This was only one step in the direction of a series of different activities, all for the common good, personal development and harmony in society.35 Starting in the first decade of the 21st century, Gülen organisations in Western countries offered visits to Istanbul, sometimes extended to other places in Turkey. Highlights in such visits were: 1° The modest office of the Writers and Journalists Foundation; 2° The modern, white and prestigious building of the Newspaper Zaman; 3° some excellent secondary schools in Istanbul; 4° Fatih University; 5° a dinner in the house of a young family of Gülen sympathizers; 6° visits to Aya Sophia, dinner on a boat in the Bosporus together with some local businessmen who sponsor this special event. 7° A visit to the office of Kimse Yok Mu, the organisation for humanitarian aid. 8° A hospital or orphanage also may be included in this series of visits. The participants in such trips are often a mixture of academics and activists from social groups.36 The programme of these visits also represents the growing national and even international scale as well as the variety of the main activities Fethullah Gülen himself and people inspired by him of the movement since the 1990s. The activities that began after 1994 are often seen as the responsibility of ‘the movement’ rather than the individual creation of one person. Here Gülen has no direct responsibility, but functions a ‘honorary president’ at most. So, we see a switch from the person of Fethullah Gülen to the development of the movement in general in the short and rather dispersed biographical notes. Further research on the Gülen Movement surely will have to pay more attention to a detailed and precise biography of its founder. Since March 1999 he has continued living in Pennsylvania in a small resort.

34

Hendrick 2009: 52. Also Hendrick 2013: 93-95. Hermansen 2007: 65, discussing the ‘public memory’ takes 1994 as the year for the expansion to Central Asia and 1997 as the beginning of interreligious dialogue. 36 Scheel 2007: 348 for an eleven day tour in 2005; Ebaugh 2012: 28-31, three visits between 2007-2009; Carroll 2007: 1-2 on three trips between 2004-2005; Jonathan Lacey on Irish visitors in Yılmaz 2007a: 613; I made a similar trip in April 2008. 35

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Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe Date 29 June 1994

Activity Gülen attended the opening of the Foundation of Writers and Journalists, where he was nominated Honorary President. 4 April 1996 Gülen met Patriarch Bartholomeos November 1996 Fatih University in Istanbul 19 September 1997 Gülen met Cardinal O’Connor in the United States, where he was for medical treatment. 9 February 1998 Gülen had a meeting with Pope John Paul II in the Vatican.

Meaning Media; social impact

16-19 July 1998

Social impact

First Abant Conference on Islam and the Secular State. 21 March 1999 Gülen went to the United States for medical treatment, to stay there since then. 16 October 2000 A case against Gülen started in an Ankara court. 21 September 2001 Gülen condemns attacks of 9/11 2002 Relief organisation Kimse Yok Mu, started after earthquake in October 1999, becomes a global institution. 2005 TUSKON as a federation of business unions August 2008 The journal Foreign Policy mentions that some 5 million people opted for Fethullah Gülen as the World’s Top Public Intellectual. 13 January 2015 Gülen’s statement on Paris attacks 9 April 2015 Martin Luther King Jr. International Chapel at Morehouse College awarded Gandhi King Ikeda Peace Award to Gülen

Interreligious dialogue Education Interreligious dialogue; personal Interreligious dialogue

Personal Personal Interreligious dialogue Social power Social and Economic Influence Social impact

Social impact Social impact; personal

Comparisons In quite a few comments the Gülen Movement is compared to traditional turuq, often translated as ‘brotherhoods’. Olivier Roy uses the word ‘neo-brotherhoods’ for the Gülenists as well as for groups that are similar to modern sects and cults, like New Age Spirituality.37 He stresses that there is a development: the terminology of cam’at and cemiyet or cemaat was used in Turkish and also birlik or ‘union’. A similarity with traditional turuq is the central figure of the sheikh, but there are in all these movements, including the Gülenists as few deputies (khalifa) as possible: ‘the use of email and the internet bestows on the sheikh an ubiquity that 37

Roy 2004: 220-8.

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Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists

could only have come about as a miracle in earlier times’. As in the world of turuq the newer movements have roots in older ones: Roy describes the Gülenian people as having its roots in the Naqshbandiyya as an offshoot of the Nurcu. Its most specific quality is the public-relations system, the secondary schools, the newspaper Zaman. Roy makes a comparison with evangelical Christianity: Gülen is famous for his recorded sermons in which he begins weeping and prays to God, in the manner of certain US televangelists.38 This comparison with Protestant denominations is also used by the German scholar Michael Blume. He goes back to the pietistic origins of Evangelical Christianity and August Hermann Francke (1663-1727) who preached a type of religion in critical dialogue with the state religion: a spiritual movement without distinctive creed, church organisations or church buildings, but concentrating on small and informal circles for reading and discussion, the Stund, to be compared to the sohbet or cemaat of the Gülen people. In sociological perspective both movements rose among people from small villages, mostly poor farmers, who moved to the larger towns and had to find a new balance in life, networks of people and a new, more individual style of spirituality.39 This comparison perhaps can be extended to the modern situation in Latin America, where the Pentecostal movement has often taken care for the poor people who live in the slums of the great cities, helping them to refrain from alcoholism, drugs, prostitution and gambling by a disciplined life and a sober spirituality. In an often quoted short statement, not more than a small paragraph in a broad international overview of the modern Muslim world, expecting a ‘new Islamic Reformation’ that probably could become as important as the 16th century Reformation for Christianity, Dale Eickelman said Fethullah Gülen, Turkey’s answer to media-savvy American evangelist Billy Graham, appeals to a mass audience. In televised chat shows, interviews, and occasional sermons, Gülen speaks about Islam and science, democracy, modernity, religious and ideological tolerance, the importance of education, and current events. Because he regards Turkish nationalism as compatible with Islam, Gülen is said to have the ear of Turkey’s senior military officers.40

More comparisons are found in the official presentation for the Dutch parliament by Martin van Bruinessen. Like Roy (‘secretive about its

38

Roy 2004: 228. Blume 2010: 133-6. 40 Eickelman 1998. 39

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Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

internal working’)41, he also emphasises the reticent42 way of sharing information about the internal organisation. The internal discipline and the focus on elite education lead here to a comparison with the Jesuit order43 and Opus Dei.44 Van Bruinessen highlights similarities but also fundamental differences with the Muslim Brotherhood of Hassan al Banna. “The Brotherhood is primarily a political movement. It wants to Islamize the public space, while the Gülen Movement recognizes the secular character of public activities (besides the strict spiritual discipline and social control within the movement).”45 Rainer Hermann has formulated a very sharp distinction between the Gülen Movement and the Milli Görüş, established by Necmettin Erbakan as a nationalist and Islamic political movement. Milli Görüş is centrally organised and originally concentrated on the internal politics in Turkey. The Milli Görüş members in Germany are mostly migrants from the lower working class. According to Hermann the Gülen people recruit their members from the newer middle class, both in Turkey and in Germany. Academic people joined the movement and they are not involved in the internal politics of Turkey, but in Germany are mostly involved in local programmes where they do volunteer work.46 Pim Valkenberg has proposed a quite curious but interesting comparison: we should consider the couple Said Nursi and Fethullah Gülen like the prophetic and charismatic Hindu cleric Ramakrishna (1836-1866) and his student Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902). The latter translated many sermons by Ramakrishna into English, and travelled to Europe and America, where he played a major role at the first Parliament of the World’s Religions in Chicago, 1893. “In a similar way Fethullah Gülen addressed the same Parliament at Cape Town in 1999.”47 Valkenberg is known for his thorough knowledge of Catholic mediaeval theology, especially the intellectual discourse of Thomas Aquinas and he sees many similarities with the elaborate philosophical background of religious thinking in Said Nursi. He admits that Nursi is not easy reading for most people and that Fethullah Gülen preaches and writes in a much more accessible way. In the couple Ramakrishna-Vivekananda the latter 41

Roy 2004: 227. Bruinessen 2010: 61, ‘ondoorzichtig’. 43 Bruinessen 2010: 32-5, with a denial by Jesuit Thomas Michel. On the Jesuit connection and participation also Graskemper 2007. 44 Similarity with Opus Dei is also mentioned in an article in the German magazine Der Spiegel, 8 August 2012. 45 Van Bruinessen 2010: 33. 46 Hermann: 101. 47 Valkenberg 2006: 309. 42

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Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists

was the most intellectual and while comparing Nursi with Gülen we should, in my opinion, see Nursi as the more philosophical and abstract, while Gülen has a more simple and direct style of writing.

Carroll: Fethullah Gülen as a representative of a philosophical and humanist version of Islam Doğan Koç has given a quite illuminating picture of the contrasting images of Gülen in a Turkish and in a Western context, as will be summarized below. To this conflicting series of images we may add one more. In many Turkish descriptions Gülen is seen as the ‘weeping’ and very emotional preacher, while in Western studies he is more often put in the intellectual lineage of philosophical ethics as formulated by Ibn Miskawayh and al-Ghazali where ethical autonomy is placed side by side or even as superior to the external ethical code as formulated by the shari’a.48 One of the most elaborate comparisons with Fethullah Gülen is made by the American philosopher of religion Jill Carroll. She separates Gülen from his Islamic background and places him in an arena with Western and Greek philosophers: Kant, Stuart Mill, Plato, Sartre and the Chinese thinker Confucius. She follows a programme that is quite common with many Western observers of the Gülen Movement. In December 2004 she joined for the first time a group of some twenty people for a ten days trip to Istanbul. They visited schools, a hospital, shared meals with local families. She was already interested in interreligious meetings and besides two more trips to Turkey in the following years, she also joined conferences by the Gülen Movement in the United States. She started reading English translations of texts by Gülen and compared these with the material of her own courses at the Religious Studies department of Rice University in Houston. From these comparisons a small book of some 110 pages grew that was published in 2007 under the title: A Dialogue of Civilizations. Gülen’s Islamic Ideals and Humanistic Discourse. Quite surprisingly she starts with Kant and his position of the human autonomy in ethics and the stress on the priority of humans as rational agents, who determine from within themselves the goal of their lives and the method to develop virtues and good purposes in life. Although he uses a more religious language, Gülen is placed in the same style of discourse, through the following quotation: Humans, the greatest mirror of the names, attributes and deeds of God, are a shining mirror, a marvellous fruit of life, a source for the whole universe, a sea that appears to be a tiny drop, a sun formed as a humble seed, a great 48

Çelik 2010; Çelik and Steenbrink 2011; also their contribution in this volume.

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Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

melody in spite of their insignificant physical positions, and the source for existence all contained within a small body. Humans carry a holy secret that makes them equal to the entire universe with all their wealth of character; a wealth than can be developed to excellence.49

In theological terms we see here some kind of happiness, and that Muslims or at least Gülen knows no original sin and supports an optimistic and positive image of the human nature. Words like shari’a or Islamic Law are not found in Carroll’s reading of Gülen. This is not an absolute autonomy because humans are a mirror of the divine reality, but this is not an external, but an internal quality. In her construction of a dialogue between John Stuart Mill and Gülen, the concept of freedom is leading. In this respect Carroll recognizes with Gülen that traditional Islamic teaching has given much value to boundaries for freedom that are found in the basic documents of Islam, the Qur’ān and the many sayings of the prophet. These sources, however, “gave way to narrowness and rote memorization of approved works.”50 Therefore Gülen calls for a renewal of Islamic thinking: We have to be more free-thinking and free-willed. We need those vast hearts who can embrace impartial free-thinking, who are open to knowledge, sciences, and scientific research, and who can perceive the accord between the Qur’ān and the Sunnatullah in the vast spectrum from the universe to life.51

Confucius and Plato are put in relation to Gülen in the chapter on the human ideal. At first reading this section looks somewhat aristocratic and even anti-democratic. The Platonic philosopher or the Confucian superior man is contrasted to the commoner like the ‘inheritors of the earth’ in Gülen’s Islamic discourse who are contrasted to this-worldly people who are “so shallow in their thoughts and so superficial in their views that they imitate everything they hear or see, like children, drifting along behind the masses.”52 The ideal people or the ‘golden generation’ who raised themselves spiritually, morally, and intellectual, must lead humanity. Like Confucius, Gülen likes to refer to examples from the past. These examples are the great Companions of the Prophet from the early generations of Muslims (‘the righteous caliphs’), but he relates even more to the glorious past of the Ottoman empire: “In every corner of our country, the spirit and essence of such people as Alparslan, Melikşah, Osman Gazi, Fatih and many others, waft like the scent of incense, and 49

Carroll 2007: 15, quoting from Gülen 2004: 112. Carroll 2007: 28. 51 Carroll 2007: 29, quoting Gülen 2005: 40. Sunnatullah is here defined as ‘the unchanging patterns of God’s action in the universe’. 52 Carroll 2007: 42; quote from Gülen 2005: 135-6. 50

26

Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists

hopes and glad tidings flow into our spirits from their vision.”53 There is a guarantee against loss of democracy and individual freedom and against tyranny by the dedication of these great figures to ‘the way of truth’. Carroll stresses that this is not a blueprint for an ideal society, but more a philosophical exercise: “Gülen is a Muslim preacher and theologian, not a political scientist or activist. He does not call his listeners specifically to run for office or take over commands of governance.”54 For all three sages it is education that will shape the future of mankind. It is quite peculiar that Gülen in his writings and also in the schools of the movement gives more attention to secular sciences than to very specialised religious knowledge: Especially today, as life has become more intricate and complicated, as the world has globalized, and every problem has become an all-encompassing, planetary problem, it is vital that those competent in natural sciences, engineering and technology, which are most of the time considered to be good and proper by Muslims, should participate alongside those men of high calibre who know Islamic essence, reality and spirit, and sciences. Consultation can be carried out with qualified people from the different worldly sciences, knowledge, and other required fields, insofar as decisions taken are supervised by the religious authorities for the compatibility or accord of what they suggest with Islam.55

In her last chapter Carroll quite surprisingly compares Gülen with Jean Paul Sartre, the leftist and definitely not religiously minded French philosopher. Gülen has in various writings denounced Sartre, together with Communism, Freudian psychology and existentialism of other writers like Camus.56 Still, in one aspect Carroll notes a fundamental agreement between Sartre and Gülen. This is in the autonomy of the human individual, responsibility for one’s own deeds. This is explained by Carroll as being in line with the Turkish Hanafi/Maturidi tradition in Islam, where something like divine predestination is not accepted as absolute but priority is given to the human free will and responsibility. In Qur’ānic terms this is reflected in the human position as a khalīfa or representative, vicegerent of God on earth (cf. Qur’ān 2: 30).57 This, in fact, can be related to the comparison with Kant from the first chapter, where also human autonomy is accepted.

53

55 56 57 54

Carroll 2007: 51, quote from Gülen 2005: 124. Carroll 2007: 57. Carroll 2007: 76, quote from Gülen 2005: 54-5. Carroll 2007: 81. Carroll 2007: 79-100, chapter 5 ‘Gülen and Sartre on Responsibility’.

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Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

The media war on Gülen: allegations, the sharp contrast between critical observers in Turkey and the Western World On 19 November 2009 the Turkish journalist A. Türker, published an article in the newspaper Today’s Zaman on the very different perceptions of Fethullah Gülen. He constructed a ‘Gülen-1’ who according to Türker is pictured as “a CIA/Zionist agent, a US puppet, a secret cardinal of the Pope and a Western Trojan horse in the Muslim world who is trying to either Christianize Muslims or making it easy for Western powers to exploit the Muslim world through his moderate Islamic teachings.” This is the caricature for Gülen that is rather common in the Turkish media. On the other side there is a ‘Gülen-2’ in the Western world. Here we find just the opposite: “he is portrayed as anti-Semitic, anti-Western and trying to Islamize Christians, and as a second Khomeini who is trying to establish an Islamic caliphate in the world.”58 In other words, some of Gülen’s staunchest critics alternate their depiction of Gülen depending on the target audience they address. Where Turkish society is addressed, Gülen is portrayed as an agent of the West aiming to Christianize the Turks. Where the English-speaking world is addressed, Gülen is portrayed as a dangerous “Islamist” aiming to Islamize. This article was later elaborated by Dogan Koç in a full article, and a book, based on the analysis of 436 very negative, defamatory judgments about Fethullah Gülen. Koç divided his polemic harvest from 44 Turkish books and 302 articles (in print or only on the internet) that picture ‘Gülen-1’, as a very dangerous Westernizing and Christianizing factor for present Turkish Muslim society. One Hikmet Çetinkaya is the most active author to promote this ‘anti-Muslim’ and pro-Western image of Gülen. The opposite image of Gülen as a dangerous Muslim fundamentalist is presented by 10 printed articles in English and 78 articles on the internet.59 To give just one quotation from Paul Williams, who wanted to ‘warn the Obama government’ that in the mountains of Pennsylvania an intruder is preparing for the rule of a global Islamic Caliphate: The most dangerous Islamist in the world is neither Afghani nor Arab. He comes from neither Sudan nor Somalia. And he resides in neither the mountains of Pakistan nor the deserts of the Palestinian territories. This individual has toppled the secular government of Turkey and established madrassahs throughout the world. His schools indoctrinate children in the tenets of radical Islam and prepare adolescents for the Islamization of the world […] Dozens 58

Türker 2009. The most active author is one Paul Williams who claims to be a former FBI agent. One blog is www.gülenwatch.blogspot.org, another www.thelastcrusade.org.

59

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Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists

of his universities, including the Fatih University in Istanbul, train young men to become lawyers, accountants, and political leaders so that they can take an active part in the restoration of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamization of the Western World.60

After Paul Williams other names in this circuit of defamating authors are Michael Rubin and Rachel Sharon-Kreapin, Director of Turkish Media at MEMRI, the Middle East Media Research Institute in Washington DC. The latter included in her criticism a respected scholar of modern Islam, John Esposito for supporting a permanent residence permit to be given to Gülen: John Esposito, founding director of the Saudi-financed Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding, who, after receiving donations from the Gülen Movement sponsored a conference in his honor, also supplied a reference. Two former CIA officials, George Fidas and Graham Fuller, and former U.S. ambassador to Turkey Morton Abramowitz also supplied references.61

A balanced picture of the often very sharp and aggressive criticism is given by Helen Rose Ebaugh in an appendix to her book on the Gülen Movement. Against the ‘fear for an Islamic state’ she estimates the following of Fethullah Gülen in Turkey as some 8-10% of the population or 5.6 up to 7 million people. But this must be seen as a quite loose definition because there is no formal membership, besides the engagement in local activities.62 There is the rather wild accusation that Gülen would be supported by the CIA and received much in foreign subsidies. Notwithstanding long trials in Turkish courts against Gülen, nothing of these accusations could be proved.63 Other reproaches that circulate among outspoken opponents of the movement claim that poor and uneducated people are manipulated and more or less obliged to give large donations, that the movement is like a closed sect with different discourse to the outside world than to its own community. This is also specified in the accusation that the talk of openness, integration in Western societies and interreligious harmony in fact is a cover-up of authoritarian control of the movement and a call to a strong Turkish and Islamic identity that must be guarded against amalgamation in society. Even the non-violence of Gülen and his condemnation of terrorism, especially the 9/11 attacks, 60

Taken from Koç 2009: 129; originally from www.thelastcrusade.org, but on 1 April 2013 the direct link was not effective, while other quoting sites were still working. 61 Sharon-Krespin 2009. The best known article by Michael Rubin is his ‘Turkey’s Turning Point: Could there be an Islamic Revolution in Turkey?’ from 2008. 62 Ebaugh 2012: 211. 63 Ebaugh 2012: 213; also Harrington 2011: 31-6.

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are in this discourse only seen as strategic statements, valid as long as the movement has no political power.64 Besides the speculations about a political revolution in Turkey, there are unproven allegations of psychological crimes in the boarding houses, dershane. Some talked about brainwashing and involuntary lodging of students in boarding houses where they had to recite the Qur’ān, pray and listen to religious instructions. In 2006-7 Joshua Hendrick was in a Gülen community in Istanbul and heard some life stories that contradict these allegations but also some accounts of suggestive insinuations.65 In the Netherlands a quite sudden change in public opinion through the media took place between 2004 and 2008. In 2002 the Dutch government gave a one-time subsidy to 20 boarding houses, most of them serving Turkish pupils. This was supported by all major political parties. In 2004 an official investigation was very positive about the effect of boarding houses for the progress of the students in secondary education and their integration in Dutch society, because of better command of the Dutch language. The government report stressed that for Turkish youngsters acceptance in boarding houses is considered as a privilege, while it is not appreciated in the Moroccan or other Muslim communities in the country.66 Four years later a television programme showed two boys who declared that they were in a Gülen related boarding house where they were compelled to join religious practices. This caused a debate in parliament and another government report, this time more specifically on the Gülen Movement. The public debate in 2008 concentrated not on the higher quality of school results, but on the segregation of the teenagers in ethnic Turkish boarding houses.67 In April 2013 it became known that Gülen sympathiser Köksal Gör, a member of the provincial parliament in North Holland for the liberal party VVD, was the manager of four small boarding houses in Amsterdam (totalling 25 pupils). After a debate in the media he was compelled to withdraw from his political function.68 A third and quite different cluster of allegations is that about the ‘infiltration’ of Gülen sympathizers in the Turkish army and public 64

Ebaugh 2012: 208-232, Appendix to chapter VII. A shorter summary of criticism in Harrington 2011: 15-6. 65 Hendrick 2009: 215-222, the stories of Ferhat and Selçuk. On Ferhat also Hendrick 2013: 111-115; on Selçuk ibid. 141-142. 66 See the Report Evaluatie Internaatachtige voorzieningen, Report to the Dutch government, 10-04-2004, . 67 Steenbrink 2012. The political debate that started in mid-2008 finally resulted in the report of Van Bruinessen 2010. 68 The turmoil with Köksal Gör as the central figure started in a programme of the public broadcast Nieuwsuur, on 5 April 2013.

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administration, besides numerous stories of corruption and nepotism, mostly related to Bank Asya. The strongest and often repeated statement is by Michael Rubin in an article that appeared only on the internet: “In 1998, according to Turkish court transcripts cited in the Turkish Daily News, Gülen urged followers in the judiciary and state bureaucracy to ‘work patiently to take control of the state’.”69 A recording of the debate about this ‘infiltration’ is a book by Hanefi Avcı.70 On the allegations of corruption and nepotism Joshua Hendrick has a lively story concentrating on the Çalık Group, owned by Turkmenistan businessman and politician Ahmet Çalık using Berat Albayrak, son-in-law of AK Prime Minister Erdoğan for Turkish projects. Çalık promoted and supported the edition of the Turkmenistan version of Zaman. It is questionable here whether one may place all this under the label of the Gülen Movement as such.71

Business Networks: Pious Gatherings with a Double Economic Agenda Although Gülen started his career as a religious preacher in the bureaucracy of Diyanet, he was from the 1970s on quite active in small groups of emerging middle class entrepreneurs. He gave clear, not too complicated sermons with practical ethical guidelines. This is a modern ethical inspiration that is by some compared to the Protestant Ethic of Max Weber. The Turkish-American social scientist Tuğrul Keskin coined the typology of a ‘Weberian Islamist’, at the same time identifying the Gülenist business people: A Muslim who works in a regular industrial or service-oriented job or who is a small- or middle-scale business owner, is educated, lives in a city, and holds conservative and religious political tendencies is considered to be a Weberian Islamist and will tend to be domesticated in the process of secularization.72

Gülen could formulate a new perspective for this type of business people. There seems to be no urge for technical study of religion among the Gülen communities and even no high esteem for the religious specialists. There are even observers who notice some religious indifference or strong secularism within the movement.73 69

Rubin 2008. See Van Bruinessen 2010: 8, where the book is qualified as ‘the most authoritative and plausible observation of this process’. Van Bruinessen 2013: 169 is more cautious. 71 Hendrick 2009: 272-280; Hendrick 2013: 171-172. 72 Keskin 2012: 137. 73 Özdalga 2003. Thomas Michel delivered a paper on Kimse Yok Mu at the 2008 Washington Conference, available through . A French translation in Toguslu (ed.) 2012: 47-56. 70

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Another important aspect of the relation between the Gülen Movement and the business community is the financial basis of various activities, especially the schools, the publications and the dialogue institutions. Gülen not only provides a new spirituality for small traders up to big businessmen, many activities of the movement are also built upon their donations for the great variety of dialogue centres, schools, publications, big celebrations. The Kimse Yok Mu foundation for relief work and development projects is in this field a somewhat atypical, more centralized body. It was set up by Samanyolu Television after the disastrous earthquake of 19 October 1999 in the Marmara region. This ‘Gülen channel’ immediately paid much attention to the collection of money for first help. This was in 2002 institutionalized in a national and soon later also global series of aid projects, working from a central office in Istanbul.74

2005-2011: a Dense Cluster of Global Conferences Starting in 2005 a series of conferences in the United States, Europe, Australia and Indonesia has begun with many papers (several had nearly 50 presentations in two days!), sometimes quite heavy conference books and audiences up to 500 people. For some participants these events were more a public manifestation of the Gülen Movement in unknown territory: all outside Turkey, most often in big halls of secular universities, nearly all held in English and with international scholars. We will give first a (incomplete) list. After 9/11 there was a need for ‘good Muslims’ or personalities who could represent the moderate or even liberal Muslims. Already since the 1990s Mohamed Arkoun has played this role in Europe, joined by Fatima Mernissi and Rifaat Hassan for more specific female issues. Akbar S. Ahmed and Bassam Tibi also fulfilled this role, besides Tariq Ramadan. In the United States it was Abdelaziz Sachedina, besides Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im. The case of the Gülen conferences is different again: they were much more concentrated on the personality of Gülen himself. Only through his personal writings and also the activities of the movement more general themes of developments within Islam and its relation with the West were discussed. A rough count of the authors of the 286 papers at these thirteen conferences, shows that in the six USA conferences about 25% of the papers had authors of Turkish origin. This was at the European conferences slightly under 50%. This makes clear that non-Turkish scholars and especially non-Muslims were invited to deliver papers. The conferences

74

Ebaugh 2012: 186-189.

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Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists Date

Place

Number of Published/availability papers/speakers 12-13 Nov. 2005 Houston, Rice 15 On the internet: University

4-5 March 2006 Dallas, Southern 9

25-27 Oct. 2007 SOAS and LSE, 48 Book: Yılmaz (ed.) London 2007a and 3 November 2007 University of Texas at 13 Not found San Antonio 4-5 November 2007 University of 15

Religious Studies 22-23 Nov. 2007 Rotterdam, Erasmus 34 Book: Yılmaz (ed.) University 2007b and 14-15 November Washington, 35

University 6-7 March 2009 Baton Rouge, 13 Not found Louisiana State University 27-29 May 2009 Berlin/Potsdam 31 Book: Homolka and University others 2010 (11 articles) 15-16 July 2009 Melbourne, Australian 8

7 October 2010 Amsterdam, Cultural 7 Conference booklet: Centre Felix Meritis Mapping the Gülen Movement, a Multidimensional Approach 19-21 October 2010 Jakarta, State Islamic 23

25-26 March 2011 Tirana, Sheraton 35 Only summaries in Hotel Symposium booklet

in this way had the character of the dialogue between civilizations as wanted by Gülen. They were also some kind of a demonstration of the broad interest in the ideas of Gülen outside Turkey. Through the massive audience where the local Gülen/Turkish communities by far outnumbered the local sympathizers or interested people, they also had the character 33

Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

of a celebration of the importance of Gülen rather than a strict academic debate. There were no real critical voices, and the extremely negative voices, as described above, were not part of these events. Due to the large number of papers at many of the conferences there was little space for discussion, not even during lunches and at dinner. It is not appropriate to label these meetings as ‘applause machines’ as was done by an outside observer who wanted to remain anonymous, but one may understand the atmosphere that created this qualification.75 The inward looking atmosphere of the conferences with their concentration not on global Islam in all its varieties, but on the Gülen Movement itself, could easily lead to an exaggeration of its influence. Notwithstanding the large number of papers and participants, we should never forget, that the Gülen Movement is only a small segment of Turkish and, less even, of global Islam. In Turkey itself the official religious administration of Diyanet has many more people on the payroll and in their mosques, although its intellectual creativity may be less apparent. By lack of a formal organisation, the Gülen Movement remains a modest segment of Islam as a whole. Researcher Jenny White interviewed some Turkish respondents in the later 1990s about the Gülen cemaat: “The impression I received from their description was of a pale, superficial association of ‘just anyone’ in a cemaat, contrasted with the organic kinship and moral power of a tarikat.”76 This quite harsh judgment is made by comparison with traditional and strictly religious movements. For many followers the Gülen activities are more or less secular, social, and sometimes principally emancipating activities that cannot so easily be compared to the great mystical movements. Religious authorities had a quite prominent role in the Tirana conference, where Sunni Muslim dignitaries, besides Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic clergy and leaders from the Bektashi tradition in their distinguished dress opened the session. At all other conferences the religious leadership had no distinct function. Still, some prominent academic clergy played a role. The Jesuit Dr. Thomas Michel was present in Washington, Berlin, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Melbourne, Jakarta, and so he was probably the busiest conference goer.77 Paul Weller was an ordained Baptist minister before he took up an academic role at the University of Derby, first as Head of its Religious Resource and Research 75

See also Hendrick 2009: 5 on the Houston 2005 conference, “a two-day promotion of Fethullah Gülen and the schools and social network that associate with his teachings.” Further Hendrick 2013: 214-216. 76 White 2002: 111. 77 In the selected papers as published in Michel 2010a there is no reference to Gülen. Michel 2012 is a short autobiography of Thomas Michel, but he does not pay attention to his connection to the Gülen movement in these eleven pages.

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Centre and later as Professor of Inter-Religious Relations. He was in London, Rotterdam, Washington, Berlin-Potsdam, Amsterdam. From the Turkish side Dr. Ihsan Yılmaz has been quite significant. He was one of the editors for the 530 + 754 pages that contain the papers of the conferences in London and Rotterdam. He was also in Washington and Tirana. Further the lists of participants at the conferences show a fast circulation as to presenters of papers. The list of five American conferences above shows where we may find the most important Gülen centres in the continent. This is first of all in Houston, with a dialogue centre that was guided by prominent Gülenists like Muhammed Çetin (who took his PhD with Paul Weller in Derby) and Doğan Koç. A second centre of attention may be sought in the Centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University in Washington DC, where its founding director John L. Esposito not only welcomed the major conference of 2008, but also edited important books about the movement.78 There are some striking differences between the themes that received emphasis in the American and the European meetings. During the American conferences and in the related publications the major concern was more the global image of Islam. Questions were put like: Is Islam compatible with democracy? Do you think that the Caliphate could be re-established? Many writers in the United States and the West relate the development of the West to the Renaissance. Is it possible for there to be a renaissance in the Islamic world? Is a renaissance necessary? For centuries, the Muslim world has not produced many great intellectuals. What might be the reason for this? Is it possible to have an intellectual rebirth?79

In the USA it was more the ideals of non-violence, harmony of religions and congruency between Islam and modern science. In Europe these questions were also on the agenda, but more attention was given to the concrete Muslim communities of the European countries who live as a somewhat backward minority, not really integrated in the mainstream developments of these countries. In Europe the first concern is the emancipation of Muslims in a new society. While in most places in Europe the first beginnings of the Gülen Movement was through homework support for pupils of primary and secondary schools, organised by better educated Turkish students at college 78

Esposito (ed.; with Hakan Yavuz) 2003 and 2010 (ed.; with Ihsan Yılmaz). These were some of the questions put to Fethullah Gülen in the special issue devoted to him by The Muslim World, Vol. 95/3, 2005: 447-467. Questions were put and translated by Prof. Zeki Saritoprak, teaching at John Carroll University, Cleveland. Similar issues dominate the conference papers from Houston 2005 up to Baton Rouge 2009.

79

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Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

level, in the United States it was the Rumi Institute of Washington (1999) and the Institute of Interfaith Dialog for World Peace Inc., established in 2002 in Austin that was the first solid Gülen activity. The latter moved in 2003 to Houston, where it continued until now. Important activities were the annual Ramadan Interfaith Dinner, workshops throughout the year, an annual retreat, and interfaith trips to Turkey (like the trip made by Jill Carroll, mentioned above). A large part of the budget of the institute was collected from donations by over 500 Turkish and Turkish-American students who donated often between US $ 100-150 per month. This was roughly 10% of their monthly income. Big donors were not many. One single engineer who had made bigger profits in real estate investments donated yearly US $ 50,000 up to $ 70,000.80 While students, university staff, and Turkish Americans are the main groups to be met in the American representation of the movement, it is rather an emancipating ideal that was the beginning for the early commencement of Gülen groups in countries like Germany and France: The first generation of immigrants who are poor-educated and non-speakers of the host country language (German, French etc.) commonly live in suburbs, sought to rebuild an authority on their family. They consider the Islamic associations as an alternative to ‘vices of the street’ such as prostitution, drug consumption and urban delinquency and so on. Owing to the ‘legitimacy’ of these associations, the young generation could meet out of the family enclosure, without concerning their parents. Moreover, the women branches of these associations promote inter-individual relations between women immigrants which constitute the most excluded group of the immigrant population. The existence of such common platforms of meeting relieves the members from social exclusion, isolation and loneliness. In short, Islam is a tool for integration which refuses assimilation.81

In Europe the Gülen Movement was a relative late-comer, because already since the 1970s Milli Görüş, Süleymanlı, the service of Diyanetimams of the Turkish government, and some other movements had settled in northern European countries.82

The Notion of Taqiya or ‘Denying to be a Part/Member of the Movement’ A frequent subject of debate between critical outsiders and ‘members’ of the Gülen Movement is the question of formal or effective ‘membership’. In mid-2008 there were in the Netherlands rumours and witnesses about 80

Helen Rose Ebaugh and Doğan Koç in Yılmaz (ed.) 2007a: 547. Emre Demir in Yılmaz (ed.) 2007a: 216. 82 Diyanet as a formal institution has established in Europe since 1983. 81

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Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists

harsh measures against young students living in the boarding schools. Some people who were known as spokesmen or leaders of the movement in the Netherlands were interviewed on television. Three in a row denied that they could speak for the Gülen Movement, besides the fact that they were never involved in the boarding houses. One was a director of the dialogue centre, another was the former director of Zaman, at that moment a politician for the Christian Democratic Party.83 They were right in their statements that they were not formal ‘members’ of the Movement (because there are no lists of members, no initiation rituals, no such thing as a subscription procedure). But outsiders are not happy with this silence. Some critical observers even suggest that the movement might use the Shi’ite practice of taqiya: when necessary one is allowed to hide one religious identity. There is no formal lie involved in such a case. It is also stated that during the last decades repeatedly Islamic movements like Süleymancı, Nurculuk were banned in Turkey. Fethullah Gülen was also jailed in 1971 by Turkey’s then junta government, although he was later released without charge or conviction. The practice not to have a unified and centralized movement, but many and even frequently shifting foundations, unions, institutes, courses and centres, could prevent an easy ban of the movement as a whole. In his presentation of the movement in Germany, Bekim Agai gave a series of arguments to defend this practice of secrecy. He stressed that the small cells or cemaat of the movement were copied from the followers of Said Nursi who was preaching Islam in an extremely repressive society. In order to prevent oppression there should be no direct organisational lines between the segments of the movement, although there was always a very frequent travelling between local groups.84 Hendrick talks even about ‘ambiguity as a strategy’.85 Interviewing a senior member of the Gülen Movement in Istanbul, he noted about the schools of the early 1980s: In order to prevent its takeover, [Gülen] changed the legal condition of the dorm and turned it into a school and registered it as private property. He gathered a board of directors consisting of businessmen. So that school wasn’t taken by the military government because it was the property of a corporation. This school became a model for future schools. Anybody who wanted to open a [Gülen] school started a company and owned a school in the name of that company. It then spread abroad.86

83

85 86 84

4 July 2008, the Dutch national television broadcast NOS in its programme Nova. ‘In der cemaat wird viel gereist,’ Agai 2010: 25. Hendrick 2009: 208. See also Hendrick 2013, chapter 8. Hendrick 2009: 167.

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Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

The long series of court cases against Gülen in Turkey between 1999-2008 also increased the fear for continuity of the initiatives, besides the growing ‘Islamophobia’ after 11 September 2001. In 2008 the OIC, Organisation of Islamic Conference took over this theme of Islamophobia, continued by Zaman and several dialogue initiatives of the Gülen Movement. The loose organisation of the movement is also seen as a danger or weakness. The American Mark Webb, an expert on Buddhist studies, sees a vulnerability in the international spread and variety of the network since the early 1990s, especially to Christian, Hindu and Buddhist countries: Muslims believe that failure to believe in the one God is a serious sin, while Theravada Buddhists think that to believe in a creator God is to fall under a serious delusion. This disagreement will typically not interfere with joint projects, but it could. They may also disagree about the implications of their values. Even though a Muslim and a Buddhist will agree that unnecessary suffering is an evil, the Buddhist thinks that it follows that one should not kill animals, while the Muslim will not draw that conclusion.87

The anti-Gülen American website ‘turkishinvitations.weebly.com’ suggests a strategy behind the weak or loose organisations. It published a comment under the name of CASILIPS, ‘Citizens against special interest lobbying in public schools’ under the title of ‘Fantastically disorganised or fantastically organised?’ suggesting that the loose organisation is a clear defence strategy.88

From Azerbaijan to Jakarta, Melbourne and Houston: Global Spread of a Turkish Movement Since the early 1980s some small kernels of Gülen sympathizers have been active in the migrant communities of Western Europe. A more planned expansion started in 1991 after the collapse of Communism. This first organised spread was directed to four Turkish speaking countries, former Soviet territories in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. It was not the Turkish government itself (although President Turgut Özal was very active in his support), but businessmen who entered the countries immediately after the fall of the Soviet regime. In mid 1991 the first (partly) English speaking ‘Turkish’ schools opened. In Uzbekistan they had to close in 2000 because of political problems, but at that time there were already 73 schools in Central Asia (about half primary schools, half secondary, most for boys only), served by 1451 87

Mark Webb in Balcı and Miller (eds.) 2012: 160. See .

88

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Fethullah Gülen, Hizmet, and Gülenists

teachers who were hired from Turkey for some 15,000 pupils. In the capitals of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan a university was established and the newspaper Zaman circulated already in 1993 in these countries.89 Initially the enrolment in the schools was free, but later school fees of US$ 1,000 per year or even higher were asked, although about 20% of the pupils were free from payments. There were some problems with the new nationalism in these countries. Students were expected to sing the Turkish national anthem besides their own. Also the Turkish flag was often raised side by side with the national flag.90 In the western studies on the Gülen Movement the expansion outside Turkey starting with Central Asia received much attention, but the next phase, to the former Ottoman countries in the Balkans, is rather poorly documented. This is the European region of the former Ottoman empire, mostly lost in the 19th century. People in these countries do not speak Turkish and developments were rather slow since the mid-1990s. Elsewhere in this book more attention will be given to this quite solid start of Gülen schools and the Epoka University of Tirana.91 A quite peculiar single picture of the presence of the movement in Bosnia is given in the movie Selam (2013, directed by Levent Demirkale) where three Turkish teachers leave Istanbul for duties in Kabul, Bosnia and Senegal. The male teacher who is sent to Bosnia has to leave his pregnant wife, promising that he will return when she gives birth to her baby who will be given the name of Gül (= Turkish for ‘tulip’. There is no direct reference to Fethullah Gülen in this movie, although the general public knew exactly the background of the movie). In the school in Bosnia one of the local teachers is a Christian woman who suffers from cancer, undergoes a chemical treatment, and dies at the moment when the delivery of the baby of the Turkish teacher is about to come. The teacher decides to attend the Christian funeral in Bosnia rather than taking the plane to see his first child in Istanbul. Almost at the same moment there is a furious fight among two of his students. A Muslim student wants to kill his Christian classmate because the Christian father did not defend his Muslim father during the atrocities of the interreligious wars of the mid-1990s. During this fight the two students fall into the water of the river and the teacher dives in after them, rescues both of them, but then dies from exhaustion. The movie ends with a very emotional ‘Olympic Musical Performance’

89

Balcı 2002: 1 and passim. See also Bill Park in Yılmaz 2007a: 51-6. Park is less absolute about the use of English: ‘Instruction is chiefly in English, but Turkish is also extensively used. Victoria Clement (in Yılmaz 2007a: 575-82) pays special attention to Turkmenistan. 91 See Chapter 13. 90

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in Istanbul where the two Bosnian students, Muslim and Christian, sing a song in honour of their teacher, as a sign of interreligious reconciliation. The next phase in the spread of the movement can be seen in the various countries of Western Europe, especially those where a fast growing community of Turkish migrants was living, with the Germans as the largest group and the Dutch and Belgians following. Like in Central Asia it was not the religious but the educational side of the Gülen tradition that was first developed. Initially it was here not the complete and full schools, but rather simple additional courses to help pupils with homework and with language lessons. This started in the 1990s. Only in the first years of the 21st century were full and complete schools added, after the model of the Gülen schools in Central Asia and the Balkans. The use of Turkish language, however, was not only limited but even banned in these European schools. These were not ‘Turkish schools’ but rather emancipatory schools, to help their integration in these new societies. Also in the 1990s small circles of readers of the texts by Gülen had started, sohbet, modelled after the circles which were reading the much more difficult and more theoretical texts by Said Nursi. After 2000 in most countries also national organisations of business people started: not as branches of the Turkish TUSKON, the Turkish federation of 124 local chapters of entrepreneurs, but all different and independent networks of national interest groups in European countries.92 In the first years of the 21st century in all European countries centres for intercultural dialogues were established. In many different countries we see therefore a quite similar group of activities that still are organised along local bottom up lines and not through top-down international organisational and institutional help. There are moreover great differences between these countries: due to the smaller number of Turkish citizens in France and Britain and the absence of government subsidies for private schools there, there are only very few Gülen schools in these two countries. As will be illustrated in various chapters below, these national Gülen communities developed along different lines, although a similar pattern can be discerned.93 Elisabeth Özdalga divided the concerns in the Gülen inspiration into four sections: economic enterprises; educational institutions; publications 92

For the Construction of TUSKON see Hendrick 2005: 269. In contradiction to the poor documentation about the movement in the Balkans, there is abundant published material about Western European countries. For Ireland see Lacey 2003, 2007a, 2007b; for Britain see Weller 2007a, 2007b, 2012, also Williams 2007, Tedik 2007, Cetin 2010; for Germany the best information is in Homolka and others (eds.) 2010, and Boos-Nüning, Bultmann & Ucar (eds.), but further information in Irvine 2006, Thies 2013, Demir 2007a and 2007b, Pashayan 2007; for the Netherlands see Landman 1992: 135-9, Kirk 2007a, Peppinck 2007, Van Bruinessen 2010. For France Toguslu 2007 and 2012 (ed.).

93

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and broadcasting; and religious gatherings (sohbet toplantıları).94 It is not by accident that she puts the more strict religious meetings in the last place. She even suggests a ‘secularizing trend’ in the movement, related to the cooperation with non-Muslim people. Instead of using the label of interreligious connections, in some countries the dialogue centres promote and consider themselves as intercultural networks.95 This can be seen more clearly in Europe, the most secularized continent, than in America or elsewhere. In the United States the Gülen people started with interreligious centres that had more emphasis on the religious traditions of mystical Islam than in Europe. The first dialogue centre was established in Washington in 1999. It was given the name of ‘Rumi Forum’ after the 13th century mystic from present-day Afghanistan who lived in Konya and whose grave is still visited there. In 2002 a similar centre was opened in Austin (soon moved to Houston), with the name of Institute for Interfaith Dialog.96 In some other places similar institutes followed. There are fewer courses for homework in America because the Turkish community is not found among the unskilled labourers, but rather among quite well established business people and university students. But in the field of primary and secondary education the Gülen people were very successful because of the American system of ‘charter schools’ where private schools are funded by public funds.97 For charter schools no tuition fees may be taken from pupils and students, quite different from the € 4500 tuition per year that is asked from students at the Collège EduActive in Paris, Villeneuve-SaintGeorges. In Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands students only pay a small amount for tuition, because of government support of the schools. Apart from the schools, most public attention for the movement is in the USA attracted by dinners, lunches, conferences and publications of the Dialogue Centres. The low key presence of Fethullah Gülen himself in the ‘Golden Generation Worship and Retreat Centre’ in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania, is not really known in the media, because of his rather secluded life style. Some Americans have visited him there (Thomas 94

96 97 95

Özdalga 2005: 435. Özdalga 2003. Scheel 2007: 346; Carroll 2007: 1. See the website , for a list of 135 Gülen Charter schools, consulted on 24 April 2013. The site has also polemic articles against Falun Gong, Hispanic, Black and other kind of charter schools. The site concentrates on “tampering with admissions, grades, attendance and testing; misuse of funds and embezzlement; engaging in nepotism and conflicts of interest; engaging in complicated and shady real estate deals; and/or have been engaging in other questionable, unethical, borderline-legal, or illegal activities. This is also a record of charter school instability and other unsavory tidbits.” Another polemic site, already mentioned above is .

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Michel, Jill Carroll, James Harrington), but only for exceptional talks and not on a regular basis. Outside the regions, discussed above, there is a large variation of countries where the Gülen Movement has started a basis, mostly one or more schools, during the first decade of the 21st  century. It is quite surprising that this is a more or less complete global list of countries with the exception of the central Muslim countries of Iran and the Arab countries. Iran is no surprise. There was after 2000 a Gülen presence with 12 schools and a university in Northern Iraq, but this was more an initiative in Kurdish regions than a beginning in an Arab region.98 Quite striking is also the fact that Gülen schools worldwide promote the use of English, sometimes also teach Turkish, but abstain from special religious classes and do not give any attention to the use of Arabic, the Islamic language par excellence and often seen as equivalent to the study of Islam. In the movie Selam of 2013 there is a quite interesting series of stereotypes. In the beginning a tragic situation of a girl in a poor desert village of Senegal is shown. She fell from a rock and must be brought to a hospital. The father rejects the idea because the hospital is owned by ‘white’ unbelievers who charge high fees. A car with white tourists is asked by the mother to bring the girl to the hospital, but these foreigners do not stop and the girl dies. Later the father finds work in the ‘Turkish school’ and his son also enters the school, although he has in the beginning much prejudices against the ‘white teachers’ in that school. The theme of Turkish being white but good people, is a quite prominent theme in this movie. Not the Muslim identity but the goodness and self-sacrifice of the Turkish teachers overcomes the ethnic and economic difference between the black and poor people of Senegal and the white and rather rich Turkish Gülen affiliated missionaries, teachers. Notwithstanding the common promotion of English by people of the movement in other places, according to this movie students in Senegal and also in Kabul learn Turkish quite seriously. At the Gülen conference in Jakarta, 19-21 October 2010, only one speaker out of the 23 was Indonesian, Dr. Amin Abdullah, while some other speakers had a background of work in Indonesia like the Japanese couple Mitsuo and Hisako Nakamura, and the Jesuit priest Thomas Michel. Together with Dr. Komaryuddin Hidayat, Abdullah was one of the few Indonesians who took a PhD degree in Ankara. He uttered a quite open criticism of the Turkish people who lead the Gülen schools in Indonesia:

98

Akyol 2010.

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Many Gülen schools have been built in Indonesia. They attracted critical responses from the community. As William Park mentioned in “The Fethullah Gülen Movement as a Transnational phenomenon,” there have been indications of Turkish chauvinism toward the Indonesian people whether intentional or not. Students in the Gülen schools are expected to sing the Turkish national anthem as well as their own, and raise the Turkish as well as their national flag. Instruction is chiefly in English, but Turkish is also extensively used in addition to the Indonesian language. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the teachers and administrators in the Gülen school are Turks from Turkey rather than Indonesia.99

Indonesia is the largest Muslim majority country of the world as to the number of faithful. It has two large modernizing and reforming Muslim organisations: Muhammadiyah (1912) and Nahdlatul Ulama (1926). These two organisations count millions of members, thousands of schools, hospitals and smaller clinics, development projects and universities. They also control many mosques. Since the 1980s they see a fast growing influence of Wahhabism from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Middle East. In 2009 they published an angry book against what they call ‘The Infiltration of Wahhabi, Muslim Brotherhood Ideology into Indonesia’ and ‘The Infiltration of Extremist Agents into Indonesian Islam’.100 The book, written under supervision of Abdurrahman Wahid, Nahdlatul Ulama leader and former President of Indonesia (1999-2001), shows the concern of modernizing, democratic and liberal Muslims for the fast growing influence of Wahhabi Muslims who established madrasahs that concentrate on the study of Arabic and the writings of Ibnu Taimiyya and his followers. Besides the fear for Wahhabi doctrine there were also clear nationalistic Indonesian feelings in this sometimes panicky fear of outsiders. In the doctrinal struggle the Indonesians see support in the Gülen doctrines, but they will continue to have their national pride. Prof. Dr. Komaruddin Hidayat holds a PhD from the Middle East Technical University of Ankara (1990) and was between 2006-2013 Rector of the prominent Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN, State Islamic University) of Jakarta. He facilitated a small ‘Gülen corner’ in his vast university where a small group translated works by Gülen into Indonesian and promoted the thinking of this leader in Indonesia.101

99

From the Conference Papers of the Jakarta meeting, , paper No. 20 by Dr. Amin Abdullah. See also Park 2007: 48-51 (from the 2007 London Conference). 100 Titles of chapter 2 and 4 of Wahid (ed.) 2009, English translation. 101 Interview with UIN-Jakarta lecturer Dr. Rumadi Ahmad in The Hague, 24 April 2013.

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There are Gülen activities in Kenya, Uganda,102 Cambodia,103 Japan,104 Australia,105 and many other countries. There is some speculation about this rather rapid spread. Some think about some kind of Turkish nationalistic and missionary feelings. From the late 13th century until 1923 Turkey was the most prominent world leader of Islam through the caliphate that ruled the Ottoman empire. The 20th century has seen many great movements that wanted to reconcile Islam and modernity, as well as to revive the Muslim cultures: from the Muslim Brothers of Egypt to the Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan. These great movements are considered as a failure by the leaders of the Gülen Movement, because of their efforts to start with politics, not with education and culture. They have always led to isolation and a return to a past orthodoxy. Should we see in the quite different approach of the Gülen Movement a renewed effort to regain the leadership in the renewal of global Islam? In a recent book Hakan Yavuz notices the rise of a global ‘Islamic Enlightenment’ in the Gülen Movement, as not only liberal, but also ‘communitarian’: concentrated on the identity of Islam and with much emphasis on the growth and strength of its own movement. This may lead to some kind of isolation in many countries where the ideas, methods and financial resources of the Turkish movement are very welcome, but sentiments of own identity also strong.106

A ‘Hidden Imam’ and the Ambiguity of an Overall Judgment From the later 1990s on initiatives of Gülen have continued and became even stronger and with more variations than before, despite the self-chosen absence of the leader from Turkey. An initiative like the Abant Conferences started in 1998 in the mountain resort Abant and has developed into a series of yearly conferences in many places: in 2004 in Washington, in 2006 also with conferences in Paris and Cairo. But there was no presence of Fethullah Gülen himself, other than written messages.107 In his discussion of Bank Asya, Hendrick calls this bank the most ambiguous undertaking of the Gülen Movement. There are indications of corruption and nepotism in the financial transactions of this vast enterprise. Although it must be added that to date, and despite the current 102

104 105 106 107 103

Kalyoncu 2008, speech at the Washington conference. Bruckmayr 2010. Mitsuo Nakamura at the Jakarta 2010 conference. See the papers of the Melbourne 2009 conference. Yavuz 2013: 56-59. On the Abant Conferences: Niyazi Öktem in Yılmaz 2007b: 485-6; a list in Toguslu 2012: 231-2.

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government attempts to prove otherwise, the Bank has not been found guilty of any wrongdoing by a court of law. He does not feel justified to state how much this is directly related to the person of Fethullah Gülen, since 1999 living in a mountain resort in Pennsylvania. Moreover, there is need for a positive view with Western observers: Throughout the US, Europe, and Australia, the GM now publicly promotes itself to leaders in business, religion, politics, media, and academia in a calculated marketing campaign to “sell moderate Islam” to eager Western consumers. Indeed, the demand is there. ‘Moderate Islam’ ala Fethullah Gülen has become an eagerly sought after commodity in the intellectual and cultural marketplace, and is now second to none in receiving support and praise from influential opinion makers in European and American journalism, academia, and political circles.108

We may doubt whether this can be the full story. When asked about the person(s) who could become the successor to Gülen, informants remain silent. Gülen is an exception. He had his specific life story and is now living in a remote place from where he can still send his messages and where he can still receive guests. But within the structure of the many activities which he started and the movement as a whole, he can no longer be held responsible for many further developments. In a time of internet and other ways of social media, a hidden imam still may have his influence, but it will be no longer as it was in the 1970s or 1980s when the movement was still quite small. Turkey has no strong membership of the Muslim Brothers of Hassan al Banna. The country was not really influenced by the movement started by the Pakistani Abu’l A’la Maududi, but in the last two decades the Gülen Movement has become a big player in the social and spiritual market. It even has spread to many other Muslim countries and to the West, although until now only in modest numbers. In April 2013 the American magazine Time published its yearly list of the ‘100 most influential people in the world’. Fethullah Gülen was for the first time on this list as a ‘leader’. Stephen Kinzer wrote about him in the special issue of the magazine, applying an often used ambiguous style: Fethullah Gulen is among the world’s most intriguing religious leaders. From a secluded retreat in Pennsylvania, he preaches a message of tolerance that has won him admirers around the world. Schools founded by Gulen’s followers thrive in an estimated 140 countries. Doctors who respond to his wishes, work without pay in disaster-afflicted countries. Gulen, however, is also a man of mystery. His influence in his native Turkey is immense, exercised by graduates of his schools who have reached key posts in the government, 108

Hendrick 2009: 282.

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judiciary and police. This makes him seem like a shadowy puppeteer, and he is scorned by almost as many Turks as love him.109

In more classical Islamic language the ‘shadowy puppeteer’ also may be translated as a ‘hidden imam’. Perhaps we should also say: hidden behind the enormous diversity of activities that all claim his patronage. It is still premature to formulate a final judgment about this vibrant Muslim leader, his formulation of a modernised Islam and the many initiatives that sometimes claim his leadership, sometimes overtly declare themselves not to be part of ‘his organisation’ but are so labelled by outsiders. There is no doubt that Fethullah Gülen is among the important contemporary leaders of that complex religion, culture, community and social structure that is the modern Muslim World. What will happen to the movement when Gülen passes away? Only a few people have formulated their ideas about this future. The most outspoken may be Hakan Yavuz who sees a similarity with the heritage of Said Nursi who continues to be a charismatic example although his influence was not continued by a strong institutional group. When Gülen is gone, the faithful are likely to form a new ‘tent’ around a new charismatic leader, however, given the lack of formal institutionalization, it is not clear whether the cohesion of the movement will be sustained in the future. Gülen’s powerful legacy in shaping modern Turkish state and society, however, will likely endure for some time. His death will not mean the end of the project of Islamic enlightenment he has sought to foster, but the new Turkish religiosocial movements that will arise will be heavily marked by the current one.110

For this moment, however, we only can notice a growth of many institutions inspired by this unique Muslim leader, Fethullah Gülen, called Hocaefendi by his followers. This growth is a bottom-up process rather than directed from one centre, national rather than inter- or transnational, as will be shown in the other chapters of this book.

109

See . Under the group of ‘leaders’ the other Turkish influential person was Kurdish PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, also in seclusion, this time in a prison in Turkey. 110 Yavuz 2003: 388-9.

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Part I A Multidimensional Approach to the Hizmet Movement

The Intellectual Format of the Hizmet Movement A Discourse Analysis Pim Valkenberg This chapter will present a survey of the intellectual dimension of the hizmet movement inspired by Fethullah Gülen. After having distinguished between an internal or “esoteric” and an external or “exoteric” strand in Gülen’s discourse, I concentrate on three types of intellectual inspiration that members find in Gülen’s discourse. First, the oral tradition of the sermons and the religious conversations that originate in the first years of the movement; second, Gülen’s contributions to journals such as Sızıntı and The Fountain, and finally Gülen’s published books. An analysis of the most important books translated into English shows different strands of discourse and a different public addressed. Finally, some of the different types of discourse in Turkish books, not translated into English, are considered. This contribution to the map of the Gülen Movement, or – as I prefer – to say the hizmet (service) movement, will relate to the intellectual dimension of the movement. So my main question will be: what is the type of discourse that motivates members of the movement to do what they do? Obviously, we will concentrate on Fethullah Gülen’s discourse, since he is the person who still inspires the people in the movement. Therefore we start with a discourse analysis that will distinguish the esoteric and the exoteric strand of discourse in Gülen’s works.

A Discourse Analysis In his book on the educational network inspired by Fethullah Gülen, Bekim Agai shows how this network extends to four different groups of people that coincide with some levels of Gülen’s discourse and activities. If one depicts this network as a series of concentric circles, one may represent the different partial networks within this major network by ellipses with different ranges.1 The central circle represents the person of Fethullah Gülen who took the initiative for a number of different activities that aim at different levels in the community of his followers. The first 1



Agai 2004: 361.

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level (smallest circle around Gülen) is what Agai calls the cemaat, a specific network that is ruled by a specific discourse determined by its founder.2 The cemaat originated when Gülen in Izmir in 1966 started his teaching activities with forms such as sohbet (a group discussion on a religious subject) and new forms of education in dormitories (called lighthouses or ιşιk evleri), summer camps and later schools. The language of these discussions and lessons is typical of a cemaat: the network of Gülen’s closest supporters and his first students. The second level of the network around Gülen consists of members of the movement who are religiously inspired and who can therefore be addressed by using specific religious language, although this discourse is broader than the discourse that is typical for the cemaat. Agai mentions the readers of the theological magazine Yeni Ümit as an example. To this level of the network belong those whose religious motivations are in line with Fethullah Gülen, but they are not in the cemaat or community in the strict sense of the word. The third level of the network functions mainly in Turkey since it appeals to the larger Turkish public by using positive references to national (Ottoman or Turkish) history and culture. There seems to be no religious motivation for the activities of the hizmet network at this level because of the strong laicist tendencies in Turkey. At this level, many students and teachers may want to enrol in the schools founded by the service communities, simply because they are among the best schools in Turkey, and they form a bridge between traditional society and modern sciences. If they know about Gülen, their knowledge might include a presumed notion of him serving the country as much as serving God. Finally, the fourth and widest form of network is the global network that has begun to develop during the last twenty years. Agai mentions examples of teachers who may often teach at schools in Central Asia founded by the service network without knowing about Gülen at all. For them, good education is simply the motivation to teach, but they have no idea where the inspiration came from.3 While most scholars who write about Fethullah Gülen and the people inspired by him do so from a social-scientific point of view, my approach is theological in nature, and therefore my analysis will concentrate on the works that most strongly appeal to Islam as common ground between the author and his public. When I started studying Fethullah Gülen’s works, I thought that it would be possible – following Agai – to talk about a development in Gülen’s thought from the smallest to the widest 2



3

Agai 2004: 53; Bulaç 2007. Agai 2004: 363.

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concentric circle. According to this hypothesis, Gülen’s discourse would have started as an explicitly Islamic discourse aimed at the members of the cemaat or the wider community of Muslims, but would gradually have widened to include the entire Turkish community in the 1980s, and the whole of humankind in the 1990s. While much of this analysis is true, it suggests a development that does not do justice to the complexity of Gülen’s discourse. On the one hand, interviews that I conducted in Izmir clearly suggest that the wellbeing of the whole of humankind – and not only of the members of the cemaat or of the Muslims – has been one of the distinguishing characteristics of Gülen’s thoughts from the very beginning. On the other hand, an analysis of his most recent writings shows that some of these writings still presuppose an explicit knowledge of and engagement with the Islamic tradition. So I do not think that we can distinguish an older, more explicitly religious, form of discourse from a younger, less religious discourse. Yet I think that it is important to pay attention to the form of discourse that was predominant during the origins of the hizmet movement in order to do justice to the full range of Gülen’s intellectual inspiration.

The Oral Tradition: Sermons and Religious Conversations I have often noticed how my Muslim friends who may be considered as members of the inner circle, the cemaat, read Gülen’s texts, but they often find more nourishment in his sermons. This oral rather than written discourse is typical for the Gülen Movement between 1970 and 1983.4 In his book Tradition Witnessing the Modern Age, Mehmet Enes Ergene remarks: Gülen first attracted the attention of the public with his oratory power, which contributed greatly to shaping the movement. His speeches activated mechanisms of knowledge as much as they stimulated people’s emotions. That is to say, he was an orator who spoke not just from the intellect, but also from the heart. For this reason, Gülen has to be considered within the legacy of oratory tradition, in addition to his writings and social activities.5

Gülen continues this oratory tradition in three forms. First, the vaaz (‘admonition’) which is a ‘free’ sermon that is often preached before the Friday afternoon prayer; next the hutbe which is more ceremonial and prayerful and is more strongly connected to the Friday afternoon prayer. Third, the sohbet or a religious conversation in the form of questionsand-answers. These three forms go back to the beginnings of Gülen’s intellectual career, and they represent an internal or “esoteric” form of 4



5

Çelik 2010: 28. Ergene 2008: x.

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discourse in which the traditional language of Islam is presupposed as a means of communication between speaker and listeners; sometimes this is made explicit in quotations from Qur’ān, hadīth or fiqh, or Sufi poems, but it is even there when no explicit references are given, since the speaker assumes that the average listener is able to grasp the basic references to the Muslim tradition. I think that it is useful to give a list of the most important of these oral sources in order to show how they are still part of the written sources attributed to Gülen. Moreover, a list of the books published by Gülen in Turkish will show that many of them find their origin in these oral sources, and that only a minority of them has been translated into English. In other words: even though I do not know sufficient Turkish to prove my case convincingly, I am quite sure that the person who only reads Gülen’s books in English will not get an adequate picture of the nature of his discourse. The coherence between books and audio cassettes – or CDs and DVDs as contemporary equivalents – appears from the fact that in Turkish there is a close connection between Nil Yayιnlarι, the firm that publishes Gülen’s books in Turkish, and Nil Production that publishes his audiovisual materials.6 For someone who wants to know more about Gülen’s sermons, the edition of the collected sermons (Vaaz Külliyatι) is probably the most important source. This collection contains a set of 11 DVDs and two sets of 11 CDs each with sermons by Gülen. An analysis of the table of contents of this collection shows that Gülen often preaches in a very systematic way, and that he often discusses a specific theme in a long series of sermons. Gürkan Çelik affirms the importance of the sermons – and the same holds true for the sohbetler that are included in the Vaaz Külliyatι as well – as basis of many books: “Because most of his speeches were wellstructured, most of his series of sermons, talks, conversations, and public speeches were recorded and transliterated into text format and with minor revisions published as books.”7 We will see some examples beneath, but first I want to give an impression of the titles and the subjects of some of the sermons represented in this Vaaz Külliyatι collection.8 Some of these titles are fairly poetical (just like the Turkish titles of Gülen’s books) such as “The rising voice from the pulpit”, or “From the world of our heart.” Others have more clearly doctrinal subject matter, such as sermons on the 6

I consulted 2009-2010 Yayιn Kataloğu, the catalogue with works by Gülen that I received from Hüseyin Bingül when I interviewed him at Kaynak Kültür Yayιn Grubu (Kaynak Cultural Publishing Group) in Üsküdar/İstanbul on August 11, 2009. 7 Çelik 2010: 28. 8 Translations of the Turkish titles are based on my conversations with Alper Alasağ in İzmir between August 4 and August 10, 2009. Once again, the titles in Turkish are often very poetic and my attempt at translating cannot do them justice.

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Afterlife, Pilgrimage, Fasting, Prophethood, Destiny, Angels, and Prayer. Almost all sermons and a lesser number of religious conversations on the CDs date from the years between 1975 and 1980, mostly given in the Bornova mosque in Izmir, but a few date from the years before in Edremit and Manisa. The set of 11 DVDs mainly contains sermons preached by Gülen on the Prophet Muhammad and his companions during his last tour of the most important mosques in Turkey on behalf of the government between 1989 and 1991. Some of the titles of these series of sermons are: “Compositions from the heart”, “Holy persons on their ways of life”; “The enlightened climate of the future”, “Waiting in hope”, “Endless light” and “Engagement for renewal.” Some DVDs contain sohbetler as well, for instance sohbet-i Canan (“Conversation on the Beloved”) that contains materials from 1992-1994. A series on “The last bringer of news concerning the unknown” even contains older materials (for instance Berlin 1977) and newer materials (from Yeni Ümit magazine, 2003). While the CDs in the Vaaz Külliyatι collection give a decent impression of the oral tradition of Gülen’s works, they are probably far from exhaustive. The collection contains no sermons from his first years in Edirne (1964-66) and İzmir (1966-70). There must be many audio cassettes with older recordings but these have not been published professionally.9 The DVDs in the Vaaz Külliyatι collection give a fair impression of a second important period in Gülen’s preaching, namely the years between 1989 and 1991 when he was approached by Diyanet to resume preaching after eight years of silence because of the political situation. His license was reinstated to enable him to serve as an Emeritus Preacher with the right to preach in any mosque in Turkey. Between 1989 and 1991 he preached in Istanbul on Fridays and on alternate Sundays in Istanbul and Izmir in the largest mosques in the cities. His sermons drew crowds in the tens of thousands, numbers unprecedented in Turkish history. These sermons were videotaped and also broadcast.10

According to Mustafa Gökçek, Gülen’s sermons in this period show the use of Sufi concepts more often than in his previous sermons. In these sermons which lasted until 1992, rather than the basic concepts of faith, Gülen focused on the spiritual characteristics that an ideal Muslim community should carry. Beside portraying the heroic instances from the lives of Prophet Muhammad and his companions, he presented even more examples from the lives of early Sufis. The themes were more spiritual.11 9



Çetin 2010: 71 refers to “thousands of audio and video cassettes.” Çetin 2010: 43. 11 Gokcek 2009: 308. 10

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While Gülen, to my knowledge, did not preach anymore after 1991, he still gives sohbetler that are recorded on DVDs and CDs. For instance, the Nil catalogue contains a number of cassettes entitled Gurbet Soluklarι (“Breathings from a foreign place”) or Bamteli (“Keynotes”) with the subtitle Amerika Notlarι. They have been recorded at Gülen’s present residence in Pennsylvania, and some are as recent as 2006.12 This shows that the oral transmission of Gülen’s conversations is not only limited to the formative period of the hizmet movement, but that it is a type of source that still has its significance for supporters of this movement. As some of Gülen’s supporters in İzmir indicated, they liked to listen to newer conversations by Gülen that are transmitted through www.herkul.org, a site based in the US that still updates people in the hizmet movement about Gülen’s newest audio recordings.

Between the Oral Tradition and the Books: Periodicals Before we discuss the books written by Gülen, we do best to look first at some of the journals published by the hizmet movement, since they form, together with the vaazlar and sohbetler, the main sources of Gülen’s books.13 Most of Gülen’s books have not been written directly as books, but have been edited by some of the older members of the hizmet movement at Gülen’s suggestion. Again, no scholarly study of this aspect of Gülen’s work has been made as yet, so much of what I write here is based on impressions and a number of interviews that would require deeper research. This research is especially needed since the several editions of Gülen’s works usually do not include a preface in which the editors explain the method they followed in compiling the materials, nor do they give the date of the first edition.14 Therefore, it is almost impossible to establish when exactly a certain text published by Gülen has been written. One can be quite sure, though, that many of these texts go back either to oral materials such as the sermons and conversations that we discussed above, or to written materials such as Gülen’s columns and essays in the journals that we will discuss now. The oldest and the most popular of these magazines is Sιzιntι. This Turkish title literally means “Seepage” or “Trickling down”, which relates to the purpose of the magazine: to let knowledge concerning the relation between religion and culture on the one hand and the natural sciences on the other hand trickle down on a wider public. Therefore, the subtitle in Turkish 12

See the Nil catalogue, pages 47-50. Çelik 2010: 29. 14 A recent entry on Gülen’s works on the website of the Gülen Institute, however, gives a chronological list for some of the English books: (accessed on August 31, 2010). 13

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is: Aylιk İlim – Kültür Dergisi (Monthly Scientific-Cultural Magazine). Although this subtitle suggests a secular approach with culture and science as its main focus, the theologian in me also associates the notion of “trickling down” with the tradition of revelation. The word that is used in the Qur’ān to describe the process of revelation, nazala, means “to send down”, and the same word is used for rain. So while God sends down His revelation like rain, human beings try to pass on some of it to others, which is the basic meaning of the word “tradition.”15 While the majority of the contributions to Sιzιntι discuss matters of science, education, and culture, Gülen’s regular contributions include the notion of religion as well. In each issue Gülen writes two or three editorials, usually without an author’s name. Usually it is a meditation that functions as the lead article, and an article in the series “Emerald Hills of the Heart” about Sufi concepts. Sιzιntι was first published in 1979 as a popular magazine for students interested in the relation between religion and science; it was followed a little later by a few other, more specialized magazines, such as Yeni Ümit (“New Hope”) on religious sciences and culture, Yağmur (“Rain”) for language, culture and literature, and Gonca, a children’s magazine.16 Sιzιntι, though, is the only magazine that is translated into other languages, such as English (The Fountain), German (die Fontäne), Russian (Noviye Grani) and Arabic (Hira). The English magazine, The Fountain, was first published in 1993, and its articles form a fair reflection of its Turkish older sister. It is not a literal translation of the Turkish magazine, but it has a similar lay-out and it serves a similar purpose for members of the hizmet movement outside Turkey. Again, Gülen usually contributes the lead article and an article on Sufi concepts. Very often, these contributions are published in book form as well. This process can best be followed in the series of key concepts of Sufism. Contrary to what one would expect, in this case the entries collected in book form precede the publication of these articles in the magazine. The reason for this is probably that Emerald Hills of the Heart is a carefully planned long-term project. Gürkan Çelik writes that Gülen in 1990 started a project to ‘simplify’ Said Nursi’s texts in order to make them accessible for the younger generation.17 15

My inspiration here is Thomas Aquinas and his idea of revelata aliis tradere, to hand down what is revealed to others as basic task of the Master of theology, but also of the Dominican friar. 16 See: , the Turkish website of Kaynak publishers (accessed August 31, 2010). 17 This goes back to Gülen’s interview with Nuriye Akman that can be found on Gülen’s website. See “Necip Fazil wanted to simplify the Risale-i Nur Collection”, at: (accessed August 28, 2010).

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Periodically, the simplified text would be published in the Sιzιntι and Yeni Ümit magazines, aiming thereby to eventually complete the whole Risale-i Nur collection. However, this initiative attracted much criticism from the Nursi groups in Turkey. They held that simplifying the text would result in losing its inner meaning and spirit. While disagreeing with them on this point, but seeking to avoid discord, Gülen abandoned this project […] Thereafter, Gülen decided on a different intellectual project, tracing the methodology of the concepts of Sufism (tasawuf) and establishing its place within the foundations of Islam.18

This might explain why the entries on Sufi terminology are often published in book form before they are printed in the magazines. In the case of most other recent writings by Gülen, the situation is the other way around: some of his lead articles for Sιzιntι are translated into English for The Fountain, and later published in book form as well.19 During my stay in Turkey in 2009 I was able to interview Hüseyin Bingül, one of the main translators and editors of Gülen’s works for Tughra books, an English imprint of Kaynak publishers. The interview took place at the Akademi, the intellectual centre of the Hizmet Movement in Istanbul, and the location of its central publishing house. Bingül told me that the lead articles of Sιzιntι and The Fountain are often reprinted as book publications in series such as Fasιldan Fasιla (“From Episode to Episode”, 5 volumes) and Çağ ve Nesil (“Era and Generation”, 8 volumes). He explained that Fethullah Gülen in some cases takes the initiative to publish a book, for instance the books on Sufism. In other cases, some of the people who know his works very well compile a number of chapters and edit the materials into a book which is then presented to hocaefendi. If he agrees, it is usually published under a somewhat poetic title suggested by Gülen himself, while the editors give the more prosaic subtitles. Sometimes Gülen wants to see and approve the final product, sometimes not. The English books generally go back to Turkish books that contain materials that had their original form in articles in one of the magazines, conversations with questions and answers (sohbetler), or sermons. Sometimes Gülen makes the selection himself because he thinks that this is what people need, sometimes it is suggested by editors who are among the older students of hocaefendi, for instance Reşit Haylamaz who is the editor-in-chief of Kaynak publishing company. Publishing Gülen’s books started with Nil Publishing in İzmir between twenty and ten years ago; since that time many books have been published, also in English. 18

Çelik 2010: 33-34. Many of these articles can be found on Gülen’s website in English under “recent articles”: (last accessed August 13, 2010).

19

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The first publishing company was Fountain, later it changed to Light, and now we have Tughra and Blue Dome books.20

Gülen’s Books: The Most Important English Translations This brings us to the book publications as the most important form in which the works of M. Fethullah Gülen are made accessible to the larger public. I will first discuss the books that have been translated into English, since the editors and translators consider them to be the most important works for the general public that is not able to read Turkish. After that, I will discuss some of the non-translated works in Turkish very briefly. If possible, I will indicate the source of these books. The International Edition of the Publication Catalogue 2009-10 by Kaynak Publishing Group gives a fair idea of the numbers of translations of Gülen’s works in other languages.21 In its English section, under the imprint Tughra books, the catalogue mentions two forthcoming books by Gülen (Speech and Power of Expression: On Language, Esthetics, and Belief – this book has been published in 2010 – and the fourth volume of Emerald Hills of the Heart) and one recently released book (the third volume of Emerald Hills of the Heart). The backlist mentions ten more books and two booklets by Gülen. This brings the number of books written by Gülen and translated into English to 13, but this does not include books published by others, for instance the Journalists and Writers Foundation22 or older books that are no longer in the list of available books.23 So it is safe to assume that about one quarter to one third (namely 15 to 20) of Gülen’s books in Turkish (which can be estimated at 50 to 70) has been translated into English in recent years. In order to get a sense of the international distribution of Gülen’s books, it may be useful to mention that Kaynak’s catalogue has separate sections for its Spanish, French, German, Russian and Arabic imprints. These lists contain 12 books by or about Gülen in Spanish, the same number in French, 16 in German, 8 in Russian, and 10 in Arabic (here with the author’s full name: Muhammad Fath Ullah Gülen). Finally, the catalogue mentions works in 29 other European, Asian and African languages. 20

Interview with Hüseyin Bingül, Akademi, Üsküdar/İstanbul, August 11, 2009. My source is Kaynak Publication Group, Publication Catalogue 09-10 which I obtained during my interview with Hüseyin Bingül in İstanbul, August 11, 2009. This interview took place in a room in which all international editions of Gülen’s work were collected, including a number of editions that were published by others, so that the total number of translations will be higher than the translations mentioned in this catalogue. 22 Gülen 2004. 23 Gülen 1998; Gülen 2000. 21

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Again, as an indication that this is not the full list of translations, the catalogue does not mention any Dutch translations, while I know of at least two translations published by the Islam en Dialoog foundation in the Netherlands.24 It must be said that the quality of these translations is rather diverse; while the English translations are thoroughly supervised and of good quality, I remember that my first experiences with the Dutch translations was not very good. The most important of Gülen’s books in English are the following: * Most scholars agree that the four books about basic concepts in Sufism probably contain Gülen’s most original contributions. The three volumes on Sufism published in English (Gülen 2004b orig. 1998; 2004c; 2008) under the title Emerald Hills of the Heart: Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism, are translated from the Turkish Kalbin Zümrüt Tepeleri. The fourth volume in English will be published soon.25 This book in four volumes is probably the most elaborate scholarly work by Gülen. According to Çelik, it is “the only book he systematically authored, though the writing expanded to years and it was fragmentally published in the Turkish magazine, Sιzιntι, and its English version, The Fountain.”26 The book contains a large number of references and footnotes, mainly to the Qur’ān and the authoritative collections of hadiths. The books try to explain the basic concepts of the Sufi way in such a way that the average reader with some knowledge of Islam and some experience in mysticism may apply them with some fruit in her or his daily life. Gokcek says that Gülen began to write about these themes in 1990, which would coincide with the period in which Sufism was most important in his sermons.27 * The volume on the Prophet Muhammad was first published in Turkish as Sonsuz Nur: İnsanlιğın İftihar Tablosu in 1993; it was translated into English (by Ali Ünal who translated many of Gülen’s works) as Prophet Muhammad: 24

M. Fethullah Gülen, De smaragden van het hart: basisconcepten van het Sufisme, Rotterdam 2002; Profeet Mohammed: Aspecten uit zijn leven, Rotterdam 2004. These are partial translations of Gülen’s books on Sufism and Prophet Muhammad. 25 The bibliography at the back of this chapter contains Gülen’s works in the editions that I used while writing it. However, subsequent editions have been published by different publishing houses and do not contain indications about the first year in which the books were published. For instance, my copy of the first volume of Emerald Hills of the Heart was published by The Light in Rutherford, New Jersey, 2004; the second volume by the same publisher, but now based in Somerset, New Jersey, also in 2004. The third volume was published by Tughra books, in Somerset, New Jersey in 2008 and the fourth volume by the same publisher in 2012. Yet the original edition of the first volume of Emerald Hills of the Heart was, as far as I know, published in 1998. Tughra Books’ Publication Catalogue 2014 shows the four volumes together on page 17 (). 26 Çelik 2010: 29-30. 27 Gokcek 2009: 307-08.

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Aspects of His Life in two volumes and later in a revised version (Gülen 2005). The book contains a large number of references to Muslim sources. It finds its origin in what Agai calls the cemaat discourse of Gülen: it has been transcribed from a number of sermons and conversations on Prophet Muhammad.28 * Gülen has published a number of books in which he discusses the basic tenets of Islam. The book Essentials of the Islamic Faith (Gülen 2000a) was translated from the Turkish İnancın Gölgesinde. It is a book in the style of Said Nursi, trying to demonstrate the existence of God from nature, and referring to a number of scientific observations. Gülen refers to the Qur’ān and sometimes to the hadiths, but to a number of Western scientists and philosophers as well. The two volumes of Questions and Answers about Islam were translated from the Turkish (Asrιn Getirdiği Teredütler) by Muhammad Çetin and published in 2000 (revised ed. Gülen 2005a; 2006). The Turkish editions of these books, in 1983 and 1989/90, are among Gülen’s oldest publications. The questionsand-answers style seems to suggest that these books find their origin in the sohbet discourses of Gülen and his students. Again, the style is reminiscent of Said Nursi, and there are quite a few references to Muslim sources. If Gokcek’s theory is correct that Gülen first concentrated on the essentials of faith in his sermons and religious conversations and only later included more Sufi materials in his sermons, the books about the essentials of Islamic faith would have their origins in the period 1982-1990, before the books on Sufism that began to be published from 1990 onwards.

The book about the Prophet Muhammad and the books about Islam seem to be directed primarily to Gülen’s students who are well-acquainted with the Muslim tradition. The titles and the styles employed clearly fit in with traditional Islamic discourses. This type of discourse focuses on the members of the hizmet movement and presupposes an Islamic worldview. One of the consequences is that Islam is naturally brought forward as the best religion in these books. Agai explains that there is a clear difference between books written with a view to an Islamic audience in which traditional religious arguments are used, and books written with a view to a larger audience in which this type of argumentation is lacking.29 One of the consequences is that outsiders, for instance Christians, might be offended by some of the portrayals of Christianity and Jesus Christ that Gülen would certainly not have repeated in later texts.30 For instance, 28

Çelik 2010: 29. Agai 2004: 257. 30 Some examples: the remarks on the distorted nature of Torah and Gospels in Gülen 2000a: 191; 2006: 66. 81; 2005: 14. 350; the negative remarks about Christians in Gülen 2005: 70-71 and 193; the defence of the Qur’ānic view of Jesus in Gülen 2000a: 215; 2006: 120; 2005: 128; the defence of the Qur’ānic view on Job (Gülen 2005: 155); his apologetic remarks about the marriages of the Prophet (Gülen 2000a: 246; 2006: 29

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twice Gülen seems to suggest that we can only have a right opinion about Jesus thanks to the Qur’ān; an observation that is in line with the Islamic tradition but of course unacceptable to Christians.31 I do not hold this against Gülen; quite the contrary, I think that it is a normal phenomenon in what I describe as “esoteric discourse”, a form of discourse that is mainly directed to insiders and that does not reckon with the possibility that outsiders will read these books as well.32 The form of discourse is different in most of the other books that have recently been published in English translations since their style is more general, and references to Muslim sources are less frequent. These other books belong to what I describe as “external discourse”, in which Gülen aims at a broader public, without using the specific references to sources and terminology that are characteristic of the “internal discourse” of the cemaat. Sometimes, these books have been translated directly from the Turkish originals, but often they are compiled by editors using Gülen’s columns and articles in periodicals such as Sιzιntι. As we described before, the stage between the Turkish column and the English book is the English column in The Fountain. One of the oldest books in English is Towards the Lost Paradise (Gülen 1998; original edition 1996).33 In their foreword “about the author”, the anonymous editors say that “[t]he present book is composed of Fethullah Gülen’s selected articles which have so far been published in different magazines.” (Gülen 1998: iv) The articles in this book often concentrate on the ideals of a “new generation” and on the harmony of faith and sciences. There are no explicit references to Muslim sources in this volume. This English book has been published by Kaynak publishers in İzmir, but it is not included in the actual publisher’s list. Pearls of Wisdom is among Gülen’s most often quoted books because it contains a number of short essays and aphorisms. Some of these aphorisms or 130); his idea about Judaism and Christianity as non-natural religions (Gülen 2006: 47-48); the idea that “most of humanity will embrace Islam soon” (Gülen 2005: 186); his observation that only Muslims know real tolerance (Gülen 2006: 242); that every religion except Islam has suffered distortions (Gülen 2006: 246) and the identification of Jews and Christians as the people referred to in surah al-fātiha 1: 7 (Gülen 2005: 320-21). Furthermore, Gülen 2000a: 194 states that Christians identify the Holy Spirit with Archangel Gabriel, while this is part of the Islamic – not the Christian – tradition. 31 Gülen 2005: 128; 2006: 120. 32 According to Agai, the transition from a discourse with sometimes negative implications for non-Muslim religions to a discourse without these implications, forms the transition between the second and the third concentric circles. 33 For the first editions of Gülen’s Turkish books and some of his English books, see the list under “Fethullah Gülen in Short”: , last accessed on June 18, 2014.

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wise suggestions are often quoted by members of the hizmet movement and their institutions. A recent promotional video by Rumi Forum, for instance, begins with the well-known words: “Be so tolerant that your heart becomes wide like the ocean. Become inspired with faith and love for others. Offer a hand to those in trouble, and be concerned about everyone” (Gülen 2000b: 61). These aphorisms often contain references to the Qur’ān, Prophet Muhammad, or Sufi spirituality, but these references are of a general nature, and no specific sources are quoted. The essays compiled in this book, together with Towards the Lost Paradise, seem to represent a kind of discourse that lies between the internal discourse of the sermons and the religious conversations and the external discourse of the essays for a more general public, since quite a few of these essays have a nationalist tone.34 Just like in Said Nursi’s works, the West is mainly seen as in opposition to the Muslim world, and western philosophy and forms of scholarship are often sketched in a negative light. In contrast, the values of the Turkish nation are seen in a positive light. For instance, “Journalists and writers who do not write according to national sentiment and thought represent Babylonian enslavement” (Gülen 2000b: 60). This observation should be seen in its context: I do not mean to suggest that Gülen is a chauvinist, but I try to distinguish shades of differences in his discourse that go together with the changing political context. Texts such as these would fit very well in the period between 1986 and 1996 when Gülen became a nationally acclaimed spiritual leader. Because of its popularity, Pearls of Wisdom, originally published in 1997, is still available with the publisher. The external discourse that is aimed at humanity in general, and that is characteristic of Gülen’s discourse from the second half of the 1990s onwards, is clear in titles of books such as Fethullah Gülen: Advocate of Dialogue (Gülen 2000), Love and the Essence of Being Human (Gülen 2004) and Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance (Gülen 2004a). The first of these three books has been compiled by Ali Ünal and Alphonse Williams, and it contains a broad selection of contributions from different sources, not only by Gülen but also including introductions and reactions to his work. The Turkish sources in this book have been indicated in footnotes, and Ali Ünal has translated most of the sources directly for this book. The second book has been published by the Journalists and Writers Foundation, and prepared for publication by Faruk Tuncer. The “Author’s Biography” at the front of the book ends with a paragraph that says: “Some of Fethullah Gülen’s books have been compiled from his articles, sermons, and the answers to the questions he has been asked over the years. The one in your hand is one of these.” (Gülen 2004: 12). M. Enes Ergene, the editor of the third volume, Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance, gives a similar general indication of the sources in his introduction: “The articles in this book are a collection from various writings of Gülen and speeches he has given at different times and on different occasions. Nevertheless, all the articles give a general picture of the 34

In his early works about Fethullah Gülen, M. Hakan Yavuz stresses the fact that Gülen is first of all a nationalist.

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world of his thought” (Gülen 2004a: x). As far as I can see, this is the only one of the three books that is still in print. Although it has a much more general title, the book Essays, Perspectives, Opinions (Gülen 2002) has a similar structure. It is a compilation of articles from different sources, some in Turkish, some in English. This time, the sources are indicated in footnotes at the beginning of the articles themselves. It is a somewhat older book and no longer in print. The final book with general essays by Gülen is, as far as I can see, the only book of this kind that has been translated directly from the Turkish: The Statue of our Souls (Gülen 2005b) is a direct translation by Muhammed Çetin of Ruhumuzun Heykelini Dikerken published in 1998. The central theme of the book echoes one of the central themes in Towards the Lost Paradise: the necessity for the younger generation to improve themselves and to become a “generation of hope.” At the same time, it seems to be more optimistic of the chances for renewal than Gülen’s earlier writings. The book contains a limited number of footnotes with references to Qur’ān and hadīth collections, but also explanatory footnotes for persons who do not know the meaning of some of the Arabic terms used in the book. In this respect, the book contains a mixed discourse since it is addressed to younger people in hope of their renewing their souls. In principle it addresses those who are sufficiently acquainted with the Islamic tradition to understand the notions discussed in the book: in this respect, it is not far away from the books on Sufi terminology – but at the same time it tries to attract younger people without such a religious background, but willing to renew their souls for the service of humankind.

These are the most important of Gülen’s books translated or compiled in English. They give a fairly good impression of the two strands of his discourse: on the one hand, it is directed to insiders and presupposes a basic knowledge of the Islamic tradition; on the other, it is aimed at a wider public and tries to involve them in the movement for a renewal of faith-based service initiatives. The last book mentioned, The Statue of Our Souls, might be the book in which the transitions between the two strands of discourse are most clearly visible.

A Final Note on What has not been translated into English One final remark: this survey of Gülen’s books in English gives a reasonable perspective on his writing and thus on the intellectual inspiration that he gives to the hizmet movement, but it cannot be comprehensive, since Gülen has written at least fifty books in Turkish, and only one quarter to one third of them have been translated into English. The first, internal or insider-oriented type of books on Sufi terminology, on the Prophet Muhammad, and on Islam is fairly well represented by direct translations. The second, external or outsider-oriented type of books 62

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with more general encouragements to renew oneself and to become a part of a future generation of service-oriented faithful and moral “golden generation” is much less represented in direct translations; but many of Gülen’s columns and articles in Sιzιntι and other periodicals have been compiled in anthologies, either directly translated from the Turkish, or through publications in The Fountain. Nevertheless, some of Gülen’s books in Turkish are not represented in the English translations. To conclude this chapter, I will give a few examples. Gülen has written a few books with detailed commentaries on surat from the Qur’ān, for instance a book on the first chapter, Fatiha Üzerine Mülâhazalar (Gülen 2007) or a book on places in the Qur’ān that frequently give occasion for questions (Gülen 2009a) that clearly goes back to some of his sohbetler.35 He also has written more specialized books of a theological nature, for instance a book about the intricate problem of God’s power and human destiny, Kitap ve Sünnet Perspektifinde Kader (Gülen 2009). The first part of this book has its origin in sermons, the second part in religious conversations. Gülen has preached on a number of different subjects, for instance on economics. A number of these sermons from the 1970s has recently been published as Enginliğiyle Bizim Dünyamız (Gülen 2009c). Kιrιk Testi (“Cracked Pitcher” or “Broken Jug”) is a series of books published not by Nil publishers, but by the Journalists and Writers Foundation. The metaphor behind the title is the idea that knowledge is transmitted slowly just like drops from a cracked water bottle. The series contains soh­betler, some of them quite recent. The title of the eighth volume in this series of publications, Vuslat Muştusu (Gülen 2008a) refers to the person who brings good news concerning coming home with God.36 The Journey to Noble Ideals (Mefkûre Yolculuğu) is the only in English published volume of The Broken Jug series (Gülen, 2014).37 It is a tradition among Sufi masters to collect prayers and to publish them as a special guidance to prayer. Even though he is not a Sufi in the strict sense of the word, Gülen has followed this custom and collected several such prayer 35

After the composition of this essay, this book has been translated into English as Reflections on the Qur’ān: commentaries on selected verses (Clifton N.J.: Tughra Books, 2012). 36 My translations of Turkish titles are based on conversations with Alper Alasağ in Izmir, August 2009. My dictionary gives “union” or “reunion” for vuslat but this would be problematic for orthodox Muslims. Alper suggested “arriving”, but my translation is based on the Christian idea that people are on their way to God; while we are wayfarers (viatores in Latin), we hope once to come home with God just like Christ and the saints who – Christians believe – are at home with God (comprehensores in Latin) already. 37 Journey to Noble Ideals (Vol.  13, Kırık Testi) is a compilation of speeches Gülen delivered in Pennsylvania, USA, between 2012 and 2013.

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books, the first in 1988 (Dua mecmuasι). The most recent (2014) catalogue of Tughra Books shows three books with prayers selected, compiled and edited by Fethullah Gülen.38 Finally, Çelik points to a book that is very important for some of Gülen’s admirers in the hizmet movement, since it contains a collection of his poetry.39 This book, Kιrιk Mιzrap (“Broken Plectrum”), published in 2000, is important because it shows not only Gülen’s creativity, but also the role of poetry in traditional Sufi teaching. Poems were important in the passing on of knowledge from master to student, but in many of his sermons Gülen quotes poems as well, and in an oral culture the importance of learning poetry by heart cannot be overestimated. Maybe Gülen will shed some light on this aspect of his work in his new book in English on Speech and Power of Expression. As far as I know, Broken Plectrum has not been published in English as of yet, but a number of the poems can be found in English translation on Gülen’s website.40

Bibliography of writings by Fethullah Gülen as mentioned in this chapter Gülen, M. Fethullah. 1998 Towards the Lost Paradise. Izmir: Kaynak. 2000  Fethullah Gülen: Advocate of Dialogue. Compiled by Ali Ünal (translator) and Alphonse Williams. Fairfax, VA: Fountain Publications. 2000a Essentials of the Islamic Faith. Translated by Ali Ünal. Fairfax VA: The Fountain. 2000b Pearls of Wisdom. Translated by Ali Ünal. Fairfax VA: The Fountain. 2002  Essays, Perspectives, Opinions. Compiled by the Fountain. Rutherford N.J.: The Light, Inc. 2004  Love and the Essence of Being Human. Prepared for publication by Faruk Tuncer. Translated by Mehmet Ünal, Nilüfer Korkmaz. Istanbul: Journalist and Writers Foundation Publication. 2004a Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance. Foreword by Thomas Michel. Somerset N.J.: The Light, Inc. 2004b Emerald Hills of the Heart: Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism. Translated by Ali Ünal. Vol. 1. Rutherford N.J.: The Light, Inc. 2004c Emerald Hills of the Heart: Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism. Translated by Ali Ünal. Vol. 2. Somerset N.J.: The Light, Inc. 38

See (accessed June 18, 2014). 39 Çelik 2010: 29. 40 See (last accessed on August 17, 2010). The website contains another work in English that I did not find among the printed books: Religious Education of the Child ().

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2004d The Necessity of Interfaith Dialog. A Muslim Perspective. Somerset N.J.: The Light. 2005  Muhammad, the Messenger of God: Aspects of His Life. Translated by Ali Ünal. Somerset N.J.; The Light, Inc. 2005a  Questions and Answers about Islam. Vol. 2. Somerset. N.J.: The Light. 2005b The Statue of Our Souls. Revival in Islamic Thought and Activism. Translated from Turkish by Muhammed Çetin. Somerset, N.J.: The Light. 2006 Questions and Answers about Islam. Vol. 1. Somerset, N.J.: The Light. 2007 Fatiha Üzerine Mülâhazalar. İstanbul: Nil Yayιnlarι. 2008  Emerald Hills of the Heart: Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism. Vol. 3. Somerset, N.J.: Tughra Books. 2008a  Vuslat Muştusu (Kırık Testi, 8). İstanbul: Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfι Yayιnlarι. 2009 Kitap ve sünnet perspektifinde Kader. İstanbul: Nil Yayιnlarι. 2009a Kur’ân’dan İdrake Yansιyanlar, İstanbul: Nil Yayιnlarι. 2009b Hitap Çiçekleri. İstanbul: Nesil Yayιnlarι. 2009c Enginliğiyle Bizim Dünyamız. İstanbul: Nil Yayιnlarι.

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Theological Keywords of M. Fethullah Gülen Thomas Michel In recent years, much has been written, from diverse perspectives, about the thought of Fethullah Gülen and the activities of the ‘Gülen community’.1 Some have focused on his pedagogical principles and methods in an effort to understand the success of the schools and other educational ventures founded and administered by those in the community associated with Gülen’s name. Others have analysed the social programs and institutions inspired by his ideas. Still others have focused on Gülen’s vision as the philosophical motor behind a social movement that is working to produce social change and renewal, in Turkey, in the worldwide Islamic umma, or in the modern societies in general. Still others have underlined Gülen’s call for universal love, fellowship, and tolerance and consequently his encouragement of interreligious dialogue as an essentially Islamic obligation. In this chapter, I will concentrate on the theological dimension of Gülen’s thought that underlies his role as spiritual director and teacher of internalized Islamic virtue. I will attempt to look at the specific understanding of Islamic faith that Gülen communicates to the young scholars and teachers, the businessmen, and the householders who make up the community formed by his vision. It is this theological perspective that guides Gülen’s role as spiritual master whose counsel has guided individual Muslims and formed a coherent and workable community life among his disciples. It may well prove in the long run to be the area of his deepest and most enduring influence.

Roots in Qur’ān and Sunna Islam, like other religious traditions, provides a wealth of doctrinal teaching, theological reflection, and spiritual experience so vast that it goes beyond what any individual believer is able to integrate personally and hand on to others. Even the greatest scholar or mystic is able to assimilate, 1



Fethullah Gülen and those Muslims inspired by his thought dislike the terms “Gülen movement” and “Gülen community,” which imply that Gülen dictates and directs everything done by the community (cemaat in Turkish). They prefer to refer to the community’s activities as the Hizmet, “the Service.” However, since the former terms have entered both scholarly and popular usage, I will employ them in this paper.

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build upon and communicate only a relatively small part of the whole tradition. This means that every religious teacher is constantly making choices, selecting some elements of the Scriptural and communitarian tradition upon which to comment, elaborate, and emphasize, while passing over other elements in silence. Since no one can communicate the whole of tradition, an individual thinker’s choices reveal much about that person’s own theology and spirituality. In the case of Fethullah Gülen, it is not surprising that his most important model and teacher is the Prophet himself. His teaching is not so much natural philosophy as it is commentary on the Qur’ān and hadith. Gülen’s ‘prophetology’ holds that although it is possible to arrive at a certain limited knowledge of God by reason, particularly by means of reflection on nature, much of human existence can only be known through prophetic revelation. Although we can find God by reflecting upon natural phenomena, we need a Prophet to learn why we were created, where we came from, where we are going, and how to worship our Creator properly. God sent Prophets to teach their people the meaning of creation and the truth of things, to unveil the mysteries behind historical and natural events, and to inform us of our relationship, and that of Divine Scriptures, with the universe.2

On this basis, it is not surprising that the vast majority of Gülen’s references are to the teaching of the Qur’ān and his practical examples taken from the sunna of the Prophet. Gülen holds that the sunna was God’s gift to Muslims so that they would know how to live according to God’s will in a way pleasing to the Creator. “The sunna, the unique example set by the Messenger of God for all Muslims to follow, shows us how to bring our lives into agreement with God’s commands and obtain His good pleasure.”3 Moreover, the sunna is the source for the humane qualities that Gülen as a spiritual guide wants to instil. Character traits such as tolerance, piety, forgiveness, peacemaking, etc., are rooted in the divine teaching proclaimed by and exemplified in the life of the prophets, particularly Muhammad. For example, in speaking of tolerance, Gülen notes that the quality is not of human origin, but is derived from prophetic teaching. “Tolerance is not something that was invented by us. Tolerance was first introduced on this earth by the prophets whose teacher was God.”4

2

4 3

Gülen 2005b: 189. Gülen 2010: 327. M. Fethullah Gülen, Speech to visiting scholars, 13 January 1996. Reprinted in Gülen 2004: 82.

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Forbearers in the Islamic Tradition The emphasis that Gülen places on Qur’ān and sunna underlines the ‘orthodox’ nature of Gülen’s teaching and the community’s practice. Some observers of the movement have asked whether Gülen’s theology is to be located within the mainstream of Islamic doctrine. Conversely, if it is true, as many scholars hold, that there is more than a single mainstream of Islamic theology and practice, into which current does Fethullah Gülen fit? This question can perhaps best be answered by looking at those Muslim scholars and pious forbearers with whom Gülen can be seen to identify himself. Gülen’s writings are replete with references to the words of earlier Muslim scholars and mystics. He frequently cites those whom he calls “the lovers,”5 that is, predecessors such as Jalal al-Din Rumi, Yunus Emre, Ahmad Yasawi, and Said Nursi. All of these figures are more or less associated with the Sufi tradition. Rumi6 and Yasawi were poets and founders of tariqas, and Yunus Emre was a wandering folk poet not associated with any tariqa. The ulama to whom Gülen refers, such as Ghazali, Junayd, and Shah Waliullah, are scholars who have close connections to the broader Sufi tradition. Even among those modern figures whom Gülen holds up as “heroes of thought and action” he includes Sufis and Sufi-oriented writers like Ahmet Hilmi, Ferid Kam, and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek.7 Gülen’s theology can be located best in this broad ‘humanistic current’ of Muslims who stress the interior dispositions to be fostered in the believer in response to the revealed Qur’ānic message and in imitation of the prophetic example found in the sunna. In this interpretation of Islam, faith is ‘virtue-oriented’; these Muslims stress internal qualities such as sincerity, patience, peace, tolerance, forgiveness, compassion, respect for others, and acceptance of differences, and encourage humble lives characterized by deeds of goodness, love, and service. This current, while closely related to the Sufi tradition, antedates Sufism as such and finds its origins in the pious, ascetic community of early Muslims centred in the Madina Mosque who came to be called the ahl al-suffa. These early scholars eschewed commercial and military pursuits and devoted their lives to studying and teaching the religious 5



6



7



Gülen 2004: 163. Cf. my analysis of Gülen’s appropriation of these figures in “Fethullah Gülen: Following in the Footsteps of Rumi,” Michel 2007. More than any other individual, Rumi seems to epitomize for Gülen the characteristics he seeks to form in modern Muslims. “They call everyone to their embrace and to the truth, like Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi, and they tolerate every improper behavior toward themselves,” Gülen, 1999-III: 270. Gülen, 2005a: 68-72.

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usul (sources). Rıfat Atay8 sees Gülen as reviving the ancient tradition of the suffa in two ways, firstly by embodying in his own life four of the typical characteristics of the early phenomenon (single, simple, humble, and pious), and secondly, by carrying on a consistent pattern of spiritual and theological formation for a select number of dedicated students.

Gülen’s Relationship to the Sufi Tradition The suffa movement can be seen as a “pre-Sufi phenomenon, a precursor of tendencies that later developed into Sufism. While the similarities of the modern ‘Gülen Movement’ with the early ahl al-suffa are undeniably strong, the question remains of Gülen’s relation to historical Sufism. Zeki Saritoprak has called Gülen ‘a Sufi in his own way.’9 Employing a term coined by Fazlur Rahman, I have referred to Gülen, and to Said Nursi before him, as ‘neo-Sufis’.10 Mustafa Gökçek notes that Gülen did not begin to write about Sufism until the 1990s, when he was over 50 years old.11 His earlier sermons and writings focused mainly on basic elements of Islamic faith and moral prescriptions, although he often included examples from the lives of earlier Muslim mystics and ascetics. However, in 1990, Gülen began to include a brief insert in the magazine Sızıntı that in each monthly issue elaborated a different concept of Sufi terminology. These articles became the basis for Gülen’s masterwork, Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism: Emerald Hills of the Heart, of which four volumes in English have now been published.12 The Twentieth Century scholar Said Nursi would seem to provide the closest model for Gülen’s personal relationship to Sufism. Nursi, while showing respect for the Sufi tradition and affirming many of their insights, always distinguished himself from the Sufis. Nursi distinguished his theological method from that of the Sufis by means of his praxis-oriented approach, what he called the ‘way of reality’, in which he abstained from contemplative speculation in favour of practical guidance for his disciples’ individual and communitarian lives. He states: “However, since our way is not the Sufi path but the way of reality, we are not compelled to perform this contemplation [of death] in an imaginary and hypothetical form like the Sufis.”13 8



9

10

12 11

13



Atay 2007. Saritoprak 2003. Michel 2005 and b. Gökçek 2007. M. Fethullah Gülen, Key concepts in the Practice of Sufism: Emerald Hills of the Heart, Vols. I-IV, Somerset, NJ: 1999 and later editions. Said Nursi, Risale-i Nur, Twenty-first Flash, p. 217.

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Like Said Nursi, Gülen belongs to no tariqa and follows no pir. He rejects the idea that he is trying to found a new type of Sufi Order and describes his complex relationship to the Sufi tradition as follows: I have stated innumerable times that I’m not a member of a religious order. As a religion, Islam naturally emphasizes the spiritual realm. It takes the training of the ego as a basic principle. Asceticism, piety, kindness and sincerity are essential to it. In the history of Islam, the discipline that dwelt most on these matters was Sufism. Opposing this would be opposing the essence of Islam. But I repeat, just as I never joined a Sufi order, I have never had any relationship to one.14

Common Concerns with the Sufi Masters On the other hand, Gülen shares many concerns with the Sufi masters and praises Said Nursi for “pouring down on us all the wealth of our schools and Sufi lodges (takka, zaviya, maktab, madrasa).”15 Like the Sufis, and like Said Nursi before him, he places the primacy in Islam on love, which he regards not only as a gift of the Creator God, but as the bond that unites humanity and can overcome disunity. “God Almighty has not created a stronger relation than love, this chain that binds humans one to another.”16 Gülen’s theological vision focuses on many of the same themes found in the writings of the Sufis. He elaborates, in the context of the demands of the Islamic community today, such typical Sufi concepts as ikhlas (sincerity or purity of intention), ma’rifat (knowledge), sabr (patience), and taqwa (piety). Where Gülen’s theological vision departs from that of the Sufis is his emphasis on communitarian dimension of selfless service. While he affirms the importance of solitude and retreat (halwat, itikaf) to purify one’s spirit,17 he rejects any spirituality that smacks of an individualistic mystical flight to union with God that characterizes much Sufi theory and practice. He is similarly disinterested in the kind of metaphysical speculation that preoccupied so many of the Sufis. For Gülen, spirituality must always be oriented towards service of God and of others. He states: “Individual projects of enlightenment that are not planned to aid the community are doomed to fruitlessness… Just as plans and projects for individual salvation that are independent of the salvation of others are nothing more than an illusion, so too, the thought 14

M. Fethullah Gülen, cited in Webb no date: 80. Gülen 2005a: 77. 16 M. Fethullah Gülen, The Horizon, Istanbul: Nil, 2000, p. 34. Reprinted in Gülen 2004: 37. 17 Gülen 1999-III: 27. 15

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of achieving success as a whole by paralyzing the individual awakening is a fantasy.”18 The emphasis that he places on communitarian service of humanity is a quality that distinguishes the community inspired by the thought of Fethullah Gülen both from that of the Sufi practitioners and from that of the Nur cemaat who follow more strictly the teaching of Said Nursi. For Nursi, transformation of Islamic society, and eventually civil society, will come about through the personal transformation of the individual Muslim achieved through the study of the Risale-i Nur, Nursi’s 6,000page commentary on the Qur’ān. While members of Gülen’s community also study the Risale-i Nur, Gülen hopes to bring about societal transformation through the establishment of institutions (e.g., schools, media instruments, dialogue centres) designed to promote the desired transformation. For Gülen, the way to God is by serving others. He states: “This path passes through the inescapable dimension of servanthood to God by means of serving first of all our families, relatives, and neighbours, then our country and nation, and finally humanity and creation.”19 The community commonly refers to its activities simply as ‘The Service’ (Hizmet). Among the common concerns that Gülen shares with proponents of the Sufi tradition like Mevlana Jalal al-Din Rumi is the importance of concepts that describe the ‘interiorisation’ of religious practice. In particular, he focuses on two of these Qur’ānic elements, which can be said to form the conceptual basis of Gülen’s theology. These are the notion of ikhlas, which may be translated ‘purity of intention’ or ‘sincerity’, and that of ‘ibada (worship), with its related concepts of ‘ubudiyya (servanthood) and ‘ubuda (devotion). Because of their centrality to the thought of Fethullah Gülen and the extent to which they shape and characterize the motivation and attitudes of the community inspired by his ideas, ikhlas and ‘ibada can be said to be the two cornerstones or pillars of Gülen’s theology. I have written about the topic of ikhlas elsewhere,20 but because the concept is so basic to Gülen’s theological perspective and so essential for the unity of Hizmet cemaat, I will take up once again key points of the topic here.

18

M. Fethullah Gülen, The Horizon, Istanbul: Nil, 2000, p. 192. Reprinted in Gülen 2004: 62. 19 Gülen 2002: 90. 20 I delivered a paper entitled “The Wing of the Bird: Gülen on Sincerity” at an academic congress on the thought of M.F. Gülen held in Potsdam, Germany, in May, 2009, and a revised version of the paper at a similar congress held in Munich, Germany in February, 2010. The paper has been published as Michel 2010b.

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Sincerity: at the Heart of Gülen’s Theology Ikhlas is a Qur’ānic concept that is variously translated as ‘sincerity’ or ‘purity of intention’, and Gülen’s understanding of the term covers both aspects of the Qur’ānic concept. In ordinary parlance, ‘sincerity’ indicates the notion of honesty or freedom from dissimulation and hypocrisy. A sincere person is one whose external words or deeds are in accord with their interior thoughts or feelings. A sincere person does not pretend to be expressing one thought or emotion while in reality his interior dispositions are to the contrary. Thus, a sincere person is not self-promoting, hypocritical, pretentious, two-faced, or devious. The sincere person neither flatters nor manipulates others. This straightforward transparency of speech and motivation is one aspect of ikhlas. The second aspect of the Qur’ānic notion of ikhlas, which brings together the notion of ‘purity’ with that of ‘dedicating, devoting or consecrating oneself’ to some activity, is a key virtue in Islamic practice,21 and is the aspect of ikhlas most often stressed by Gülen. Ikhlas refers to an interior disposition by which the faithful Muslim performs all external actions in a spirit of service and directed solely toward pleasing the Divine Lord. In fact, in Islam the perfection of one’s witness to faith can be gauged by the double standard of ikhlas (purity of intention) and ihsan (goodness). It is noteworthy that the brief expression of the Islamic creed found in the Qur’ānic Sura 112, “Say: He, Allah, is One. Allah is He on Whom all depend. He begets not, nor is He begotten. And there is none like Him,” has been the known in Islamic tradition as the ‘Surat al-Ikhlas’, that is, ‘The Chapter of Sincerity’ or ‘The Chapter of Pure Religion’. The importance of ikhlas has been commented upon down through the centuries by Muslim scholars, exegetes, and spiritual guides in every generation. The Sufi masters have been particularly fond of elaborating on this virtue, to the extent that in the minds of many Muslims, ikhlas is considered a ‘Sufi concept’. In commenting on ikhlas, Said Nursi distinguishes his own advice from that of the teaching of the Sufi tradition. While praising the insights of the Sufi masters, Nursi notes that “I am not a Sufi, but these principles of theirs make a good rule for our path.”22 Because of its roots in the Qur’ān and in the tradition of Islamic spiritual writing, this aspect of ikhlas can perhaps be more adequately conveyed in English by ‘purity of intention’ or ‘pure religion’ than simply by ‘sincerity’. Ikhlas indicates the interior disposition in which one practices all the acts of religion solely for God’s pleasure rather 21

L. Gardet in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden: 2006, III: 1059. Said Nursi, Risale-i Nur, The Twenty-first Flash, p. 216.

22

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than for any personal benefit that may accrue to them, whether that be prestige, pride, or the admiration of others. When one ‘worships God with sincerity’ one’s intention is pure and undefiled by base or irrelevant motives. The Qur’ān commends those who devote their lives to seeking God’s pleasure: “And there is the type of man who gives his life to earn the pleasure of Allah: And Allah is full of kindness to (His) devotees” (Qur’ān 2: 207).

Ikhlas in Gülen’s Theology In his treatment of ikhlas, Gülen builds upon what was elaborated in the tradition and applies these insights to the contemporary needs of communitarian life and the broader society. While interpreting the basic meaning of the term to be ‘upright, sincere, and pure’, Gülen indicates that ikhlas means “pursuing nothing worldly while worshiping and obeying God.”23 At the deepest level, sincerity can only be understood in the mystery of the relationship between God and God’s faithful servant. Purity of intention is a grace or divine gift that God places in the heart of those He loves24 in order to increase, deepen and give eternal value to the servant’s ordinary good acts. Gülen considers purity of intention to be “the wing of the bird” of a person’s life before God. The other wing is faithfulness, and together these virtues make up the two wings of grace that God implants in the soul that enable a person to approach God without hindrance. He quotes Mevlana, Jalal al-din Rumi, to the effect that if good deeds were a body, purity of intention (ikhlas) would be their soul. That is, it is sincerity that makes good deeds live, be effective, and have everlasting value. Without sincerity to animate deeds spiritually, all human endeavours would remain lifeless, ephemeral, and ultimately worthless. But those who fly with the two wings of sincerity and faithfulness will fly with God’s protection and will unfailingly reach their destination, that is, ‘God’s approval and pleasure’. Faithfulness, the other wing of the bird, enables God’s servant to stick to his intention to serve God even when it is inconvenient or seemingly fruitless. This kind of loyalty to God is one of the most evident qualities of God’s servants, an outstanding characteristic of all the prophets, and the source of wisdom in the believer. In the loyal, faithful servant, God will plant the seeds of wisdom that will then spring from that person’s heart and tongue. Gülen quotes Bayazid to say that it is through sincerity, not through human deeds, that a person goes to God. It is on the basis of a person’s 23

Gülen 1999-I: 60. Gülen 1999-I: 62.

24

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sincerity that God judges acts, not on the magnitude or notoriety of the deed. The size and quantity of good deeds is unimportant. Even a small deed or one that is unknown to others, if it is done with sincerity, is judged pleasing by God. This intentionality, the conviction that a person’s intention determines the value of a deed, is in keeping with the Islamic tradition. Gülen notes that God rewards a small act done with purity of intention more highly than many more ostentatious deeds done without the sincere desire to serve God alone. For Gülen, Muslims must learn purity of intention from the prophets, particularly from the Prophet Muhammad. He states: “God’s Messenger had one intention: to please God and worship Him sincerely, as he stated in a famous hadith: “Perfect goodness or virtue is to worship God as if you were seeing Him, and although you do not see Him, yet truly He sees you.”25 Just as the prophets could not take a step without sincerity, so also those who follow in the footsteps of the prophets will not be able to do anything without a pure intention. Gülen describes this purity of intention as “the pursuit of no worldly purpose in one’s relationship with God.”26 In other words, worshiping and obeying God are the only legitimate reasons that a person should have for performing any good action.

Living with Purity of Intention Like Said Nursi before him, Fethullah Gülen is not interested so much in being a theoretician of the spiritual life as in offering concrete, practical advice to those who come to him for spiritual counsel. In this, Gülen, following Nursi, distinguishes himself from the great Sufi theoreticians like Al-Muhasibi, Al-Ghazali, and Hujwiri. Gülen is interested in continuing in the line of Nursi’s ‘path of reality’ and cites Nursi to insist on purity of intention as the basic motivation for the disciple’s personal and communitarian actions: “We worship God only because we are His servants and He has told us to do so. Said Nursi said: ‘Do what you do only for God’s sake; start for God’s sake, work for God’s sake, and act within the sphere of God’s good approval.’”27 Gülen advises his disciples to maintain spiritual discretion. If purity of intention means that the servant does everything for no worldly motive whatsoever, but solely to seek God’s pleasure, it follows that sincere believers should not be ostentatious in their good deeds. One seeking God’s pleasure should hide supererogatory acts from the view of others and remain silent about edifying personal experiences, special treatment 25

Gülen 2010: 39. Gülen 1999-I: 60. 27 Gülen 2010: 38. Gülen’s citation of the Risale-i Nur is taken from “The First Word,” p. 5. 26

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received from superiors, or special gifts with which one has been endowed by God. There is a universal human tendency to perform good deeds in order to be seen by others and gain their approval. Moreover, human motivation is often complex, with the desire to serve God mixed with a craving for human admiration and approval. The sincere servant recognizes that it is only God’s approval, not that of other persons, that matters; thus it is unimportant whether or not one is seen in serving God. A person who has purity of intention worries neither about being praised for his accomplishments nor censured for his failures. He does not care if others are aware of his achievements, nor is he preoccupied about receiving a reward. Such a person behaves with consistency, whether in public or private. According to Gülen, sincerity teaches us that the true goal of acts of piety and goodness is God’s pleasure, not human recognition or respect. Moreover, in sincere worship the believer discovers that even the longing for Paradise is not sufficient motivation for doing what is right. Gülen explains: “Those performing [acts of worship] can be categorized by their intention, resolution, determination, and sincerity as follows: those who desire to enter Paradise, those who hope to be rescued from Hellfire, those who love and stand in awe of God, and those who feel that they must do so as a requirement of their relationship between God as the Creator and human beings.”28 The sincere worshiper does not care whether his deeds will form the basis for attaining Paradise. In fact, sincerity should become second nature to God’s servants, not a virtue after which a person consciously needs to strive. Gülen advises disciples to be “so involved in worship or religious deeds in seeking God’s pleasure that one does not even remember whether one should be sincere or not.”29 In other words, even the virtue of sincerity itself must not be allowed to become the final goal of religious observance. The only true objective in the performance of any good act is to serve and obey God and to thereby give God the pleasure and satisfaction that is due Him. Only a humble person can act with true sincerity. As Gülen explains: “Humble people do not attribute fruits of work and efforts to themselves, nor do they regard their successes or efforts for God as making them superior to others. They do not care how others regard them; they do not demand a return for their services for God. They regard their being loved by others as a test of their sincerity, and do not exploit God’s favors to them by boasting.”30 28

Gülen 2004: 54. Gülen 1999-I: 62. 30 Gülen 2004: 80. 29

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To arrive at a state of mind where one does not care whether one receives recognition for one’s good deeds, the disciple must engage in self-examination and self-supervision. Only the person who has learned interior honesty will know whether his motivation is solely to worship God or whether the true incentive pursued is some worldly gain, such as self-satisfaction, human respect, or personal ambition. Thus, developing a habit of honest evaluation and reflection will enable a person to grow in purity of intention. Gülen calls this muraqaba (self-supervision), by which God’s servants are led “to maintain the purity of thoughts, actions, and intentions even when they are alone, in the consciousness of His continual observation.”31

Communitarian Dimensions of Ikhlas It is not only for the purposes of an individual’s spiritual growth that purity of intention is a key virtue among those who seek to do God’s will. Purity of intention also has communitarian effects. There is nothing that can more quickly disrupt the proper bonds of friendship among disciples than personal ambition, competition, and rivalry. When a disciple is in the habit of calling attention to his superior abilities or achievements in one or another area, or to boast about his relationship to his superiors, resentment and jealousy will inevitably arise among his confreres. In his emphasis on sincerity as a key element in preserving the unity of the community, Gülen’s approach is very similar to that of Said Nursi, who repeatedly wrote of the necessity for sincerity to prevent disunity among the students of the Risale-i Nur. The history of many religious groups in various religions has shown repeatedly that jealousy and a sense of competition among members has been the cause of factionalism, resentment, and divisions into rival groups. It has produced a loss of dynamism and resulted in the break-up of many groups. It is only by the members carrying out their tasks with sincerity that this unhealthy rivalry can be avoided. In his long discursus on sincerity, Nursi envisioned a community in which “Each of the members completes the deficiencies of the others, veils their faults, assists their needs, and helps them out in their duties.”32 If this type of relationship among fellow disciples is to be possible and the unity of the community is to be maintained, everyone must be sincerely striving solely to please God. By contrast, the unity of heart and intention among those involved in the Hizmet cemaat can be traced in a large part to this emphasis on sincerity and purity of intention. It means that humble tasks – meeting 31

Gülen 1999-I: 57. Said Nursi, Risale-i Nur, The Twenty-first Flash, p. 214.

32

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guests at the airport, serving tea or coffee, feeding the poor in soup kitchens – have eternal value and ennoble the one performing them, if they are done wholly for the pleasure of God. A similar understanding underlies the readiness of intelligent, well-prepared university graduates to renounce prestigious and well-paying positions in academics or business to devote their lives to teaching students in distant and often impoverished regions. The emphasis on purity of intention has convinced industrialists, businessmen, and entrepreneurs to contribute generously to projects whose completion they will never see. Since it is sincerity that enables God’s servants to keep focused on serving God alone, thus making their actions, great or small, acceptable to God, if Gülen has been able to instil a sense of harmony and united service (hizmet) among his followers, it is largely because of the emphasis he has put on ikhlas. He cites Mevlana to this effect: “You should be sincere in all your deeds, So that the Majestic Lord may accept them. Sincerity is the wing of the bird of the acts of obedience; without a wing, how can you fly to the abode of prosperity?”33

Worship: The Motivation of the Cemaat The terms translated in English as ‘worship’, ‘servanthood’, and ‘devotion’ are taken from Arabic and possess a long history in the Islamic tradition. Like ikhlas, these concepts have been commented upon by Sufi teachers and theoreticians down through the ages. Gülen has appropriated this traditional language and applied it to the practice of Islam in modern society. The term ‘ibada is derived from the Arabic root meaning slave or servant and carries the idea of enslaving oneself to God or of acting as God’s servant, with the consequent connotations of obedience, submission, devotion, faithfulness, service etc. The concept is not an innovation within the Abrahamic tradition, and is well known in both the Hebrew Scriptures and the Christian New Testament. Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad were all known as God’s “servant,” and Gülen cites Muhammad as referring to himself in a hadith as being “a thankful servant of God.”34

Fulfilling God’s Commands in Daily Life In many treatments of Islamic belief and practice, and in the minds of many Muslim believers, ‘ibada is simply equated with ritual acts, 33

Jalal al-Din Rumi, cited by Gülen 1998-I: 62. Gülen 2010: 89.

34

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specifically the ritual practices such as the daily salat prayers, the Ramadan fast, the pilgrimage to Mecca etc., that are obligatory for all Muslims. Particularly in works of fiqh (jurisprudence), ‘ibada as ritual activity is treated as a separate chapter distinct from mu’amalat (business affairs and contracts), munakahat (marriage regulations), jinaya (expiation), hudud (punishment), faraid (inheritance) etc. Gülen expands upon the traditional view of ‘ibada to define it very broadly as “fulfilling God’s commands in one’s daily life, and fulfilling the obligations of being God’s servant.”35 It is interesting to note that there is no specific reference to ritual performance in this definition. In Gülen’s view, ritual obligations are included in the concept of ‘ibada, but the notion goes far beyond ritual performance to include everything that one does to live and act according to God’s will. When a member of the cemaat teaches physics in Kirghizstan, he is performing ‘ibada; he is worshiping God. When a businessman in Izmir donates funds so that schools, dialogue centres, well-digging projects, and publishing houses can be founded and maintained, he is doing ‘ibada. His donations are a form of divine worship. Worship in this broad sense is the primary task of man and woman as God’s khalifa, or vice-regent on earth. Gülen holds that “Humanity’s vice-regency for the Creator takes place in an unusually broad sphere that encompasses acts ranging from believing in Him and worshiping Him to understanding the mysteries within things and the cause of natural phenomena.”36 This insight has concrete application in the strong emphasis given to the natural sciences in the schools established and operated by the Gülen Movement. The teachers and students are worshiping God when they undertake a scientific study of the earth. Gülen’s comprehensive understanding of worship has resulted almost in a kind of sacralisation of education and helps to account for the emphasis the movement has given to opening and operating schools. For example, in one of his writings on education, Gülen states: “A school is a place of learning, where everything related to this life and the next is taught. It can shed light on vital ideas and events, and enable students to understand their natural and human environment. A school can also open the way to unveiling the meaning of things and events, thereby leading a student to wholeness of thought and contemplation. In essence, a school is a kind of place of worship; the ‘holy leaders’ are the teachers.”37

35

Gülen 1999-I: 53. Gülen 2004: 208. 37 Gülen 2004: 329. 36

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Worship as Integrative and Liberative The broad compass that Gülen gives to ‘ibada is meant to have an integrating effect in the lives of his followers. The far-reaching notion of worship enables the members of the movement to bring together and maintain in equilibrium their devotional life, vocational commitment, and communitarian responsibilities. According to Gülen, worship enables believers to “arrange their feelings and thoughts, regulate their individual and social life, and balance familial and social relationships.” In bringing together these aspects of a responsible life, the worshiper is simply acting as a genuine regent (khalifa) of God on earth. To play this integrative role in the life of a believer, ‘worship’ must embrace the totality of attitudes and actions of service. As Gülen notes: “Worship is not simply the performance of a set of particular movements, as some believe. It is what we call complete submission and the acceptance of a broad responsibility. Along with the title of vice-regent, it is the clearest expression of the relationship amongst humans, the universe, and God.”38 Worship is seen to have not only an integrative but also a liberative role in the believer’s life. An attitude of worship enables the believer to arrive at true freedom by becoming free from the obstacles to freedom, escape from the self-imposed dungeon people have created for themselves39 and the multifarious forms of slavery to which humans subject themselves. Gülen puts it as follows: “If worship is the placing of a consciousness of being bound to God into one’s heart, if it is the liberation of one’s self from all types of slavery, if it is the title of seeing, hearing, and feeling the beauty, order, and harmony that belong to Him in every molecule of existence – and there is no doubt that it is this and nothing else – then worship is the most immediate way to turn our face to God.”40

Servanthood (‘ubudiyya) Gülen distinguishes between ‘ibada and ‘ubudiyya, which can be translated as ‘servanthood’. For Gülen, the concept of ‘ubudiyya bears the connotation of “living in the consciousness of being God’s servant,” whereas ‘ibada means “fulfilling God’s commands in one’s daily life.”41 In other words, ‘ibada refers to what the devout believer must do to serve and obey God in daily life, and ‘ubudiyya indicates the attitude which the believer must take towards God, the object of worship. 38

40 41 39

Gülen 2004: 329. Gülen 2004: 322. Gülen 2004: 208-209. Gülen 199-I: 53.

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There is another, more subtle difference between the two concepts. Acts of worship consist of all physical and economic duties, which may include teaching school, financing dialogue projects, or delivering meat to the poor at the Id al-Adha, as well as such ritual obligations as the daily salat prayers or Ramadan fast. Servanthood (‘ubudiyya) recognizes that there is a deeper, inner dimension to all these activities that requires a degree of reflective awareness in the believer. The consciousness of the “internal congruity” that acts of obedience and service play in responding faithfully to God is what Gülen terms “servanthood”; it indicates an attitude whereby one is constantly standing before God in readiness to seek the Divine Master’s pleasure by carrying out active service in accord with His will.

Devotion (‘ubuda) Gülen reaches back into the Sufi tradition to note a still further stage of worshipful involvement, that of ‘devotion’, or ‘ubuda. Gülen acknowledges his indebtedness to the Sufi tradition for having promoted a comprehensive understanding of worship as service of God, as well as its constant encouragement to those on the Path to worship God always and in every way. As with the case of ikhlas, Gülen affirms his appreciation for the insights of the Sufis to the Islamic meaning of worship. He states: “Sufism enables individuals, through the constant worship of God, to deepen their awareness of themselves as devotees of God… Sufism allows individuals to develop the moral dimension of their existence, and enables the acquisition of a strong, heartfelt, and personally experienced conviction of the articles of faith that before they had only accepted superficially.”42 Harkening back to al-Ghazali, Gülen views worship as a way to obtain experiential knowledge of the truths of faith that otherwise would remain only postulates. As the believer progresses to deeper levels of worship, new perceptions of the realities of faith present themselves. He offers the following advice to his disciples: “Worship is the safest way to reach the most unshakable certainty in one’s conscience about the greatest truth, which is known only theoretically at the outset. In each station on this way, along which consciousness seeks certainty on the wings of reverence and respect, a person experiences a different taste of glimpsing the Beloved.”43 The Sufi theoreticians spoke of three levels or stages of worship: ‘ibada as the service performed by ordinary believers striving to advance 42

Gülen 2004: 267-268. M. Fethullah Gülen, “Understanding and Respect,” 14 June 2006, .

43

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on the path to God; ‘ubudiyya as the servanthood of those advanced souls whose mental and spiritual attitudes permit them to overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles; and ‘ubuda as the deep devotion of “those whose mental and spiritual states cause them to turn to God wholeheartedly with a profound feeling of being in His company.”44 What characterizes the level of true devotion is an enthusiastic eagerness to serve God. It occurs when the worshiper moves beyond reluctance, objections, and grumbling and performs one’s duties with joyful spontaneity. Gülen cites Ibn al-Farid to affirm the superiority of this final stage of devotion: “The acts of worship and duties of servanthood required by every station or rank that I have reached during my spiritual journey have been fulfilled by my devotion.” For the Sufis, ‘ubuda (devotion) was a rare state of soul (hal) achieved by advanced practitioners on the Sufi path. Gülen characteristically holds up even the stage of ‘ubuda to those engaged in what he sees to be the mission of Islam in the world, that is, service of God by serving others. Members of the cemaat are called to nothing less than ‘ubuda. He writes: “This vital mission can only be realized by the devout and godly, who never think of themselves, except insofar as they see their own salvation through the salvation of others.”45 The stage of devotion is, in the view of Gülen, not so much a spiritual achievement of the select few who have devoted their lives to the mystical path, but an attitude that can be achieved by any pious Muslim who strives to overcome his or her selfish passions to serve God and others. Gülen has presented countless young Muslims with the challenge to live as one of the “devout” and has thereby inspired many to devote their lives to the service of others. Gülen himself puts much hope in this “new generation” of idealistic young Muslims. “The future will be the work of these devout people who can represent such a significant mission, showing their responsibility and exhibiting their accomplishments. The existence and continuance of our nation and the nations related to us will be permeated with the thoughts, inspirations and outcomes of a new civilization and with the vast, reviving dynamism of a rich culture, carried aloft into the future on the shoulders of these devout people. They are the trustees of the sublime truths and the heirs of our historical riches.”46 44

Gülen 1999-I: 54. M. Fethullah Gülen, “The Devout: the Architect of Our Souls,” in Gülen 2005b: 91. In his biography of Muhammad, Gülen describes the prophet in similar terms: “A Prophet is totally dedicated to his mission, and thus is an altruist who lives for the happiness and good of others.” Gülen 2010: 77. 46 Gülen 2010: 95-96. 45

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Finally, it must be noted that by giving the priority to worship as a comprehensive life of service to God, Gülen is not implying that ritual performance is unimportant or optional. ‘Ibada in the sense of ritual arises from “a deeply embedded need to acknowledge the Divine” and to be in submissive contact with the “Mysterious power that controls everything.”47 He stresses that our worship can add nothing to God’s glory, which is infinite, but ritual worship benefits the believer in this world and the next. “It is we who need to worship God; not God who needs to be worshiped. He is free of all need.”48 Upon the twin pillars sincerity and worship, Gülen has built a practical theology oriented towards a life of worship and service. It is what might be called “spiritual theology,” oriented as it is to helping Muslims to live their Islamic commitment before God. Gülen has not written a systematic theology textbook, but has proposed spiritual advice to those engaged in worldly tasks, showing them how to sanctify the most basic deeds to God by offering them to God with purity of intention, and to worship the Lord in their daily lives by “fulfilling the obligations of being God’s servant.”

47

Gülen 2000: 33. Gülen 2000: 35.

48

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Ethical Priorities of Gülen The True Middle Road Gürkan Çelİk and Karel Steenbrink In this chapter, we will discuss Fethullah Gülen against the background of mainstream Muslim philosophical writers of the classical period of Islam. Intellectual leaders like Ibn Miskawayh and al-Ghazali incorporated Greek ethical thinking into the pure monotheistic ideals of Islam and made a synthesis between revelation and rational discourse. They were guides on the road of dialogue between civilizations and found many successors in later times. We will describe how Fethullah Gülen, during the last decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, reformulated their ethical messages with an even more open spirit – a universal call for human development, which may be understood in both a liberal humanistic context or a stricter monotheistic sense. In the history of Islamic ethics, from the very beginnings of the Muslim faith, the Qur’ān has remained an unsurpassed source of inspiration. It was supplemented by an astonishing number of detailed prescriptions from the large collection of prophetic traditions, hadīth. From the early beginnings of the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, the young Arab empire felt the need for translations from the older Greek civilization. Caliph Al-Mansur (754-775) hired his medical doctor Georgius Bokhtishu of the Christian Nestorian town of Gunde-Shapur, about 150 kilometres northeast of present-day Basra. The medical doctor brought Greek philosophy to the Palace of Baghdad, and this tradition quickly developed. Caliph Al-Ma’mun (813-833) established the House of Wisdom or Bayt al-hikmah as a library, a centre for translation and publishing in order to duplicate the translations. Arabic-speaking Muslims, alongside Persian Nestorians, produced new translations in all fields of science. The best known translator is Hunayn ibn Ishaq (808873) who was the first to translate the Ethica Nicomachea, the great classical work of Aristotle. The medical connection continued with the later great philosophers Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes), who also worked as medical doctors.

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Ibn Miskawayh, the ‘Father of the Islamic Humanistic Tradition’ A prominent scholar in this tradition is Ibn Miskawayh (932-1030), born in Ray, close to present-day Teheran. He had a successful career as a clerk at the court of Baghdad and in several smaller localities. Ibn Miskawayh wrote a great historical work, but he is better known for his substantial work in the field of ethics. Modern scholars like Arkoun (1982) and Goodman (2003) accept him as a great example of Islamic humanism. His great work in the field of ethics is Tahdhīb al-akhlāq [The Refinement of Character]. It is a comprehensive summary of the major themes in the ethical ideas of Plato and Aristotle, presented in the context of the Muslim world view. It emphasizes ethics as an autonomous guideline for the development of human nature, focusing upon balanced happiness in this world as its goal, while the deity is only a meeting point for the future after death.1 The origins of harmony and cooperation among religions are quite striking in the intellectual heritage of Ibn Miskawayh. His most direct teacher was the Muslim Ibn al-Khammār, a student of the Jacobite Christian Yahya ibn ‘Adi, himself a pupil of the Muslim al-Farabi and the Nestorian Christian Abu Bishr Mattā.2 In his description of a human being, Ibn Miskawayh places man among living beings, making a sharp distinction between the body and the soul (nafs).3 The human soul is divided in three parts or aspects. The rational faculty is located in the brain, the emotions of the irascible faculty is in the liver, and the passion for food, sexual intercourse and various sensual enjoyments is in the heart. Ibn Miskawayh is not clear if these should be considered as three distinct souls or rather three aspects or activities of one soul. The three qualities of the soul are related to four cardinal virtues: first, the central virtue of knowledge and wisdom; second, the virtues of temperance and liberality; and third, the virtue of magnanimity connected to courage. Once these three virtues are accomplished fully and properly, the fourth cardinal virtue of justice will result in human development. In the beginning of his major work, Ibn Miskawayh describes a strict theoretical model, which is later defined by virtues with specific and concrete examples. In the following table we show a quite general schedule of each section describing the major virtues.

1



2 3



Walzer 1962: 236, 240. See Goodman 2003: 105 for this network of intellectual relations between Muslim and Christian scholars. Ibn Miskawayh 2002: 15.

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Table 1. Four Cardinal Virtues Knowledge-Wisdom

TemperanceLiberality Modesty Seriousness Self-control

MagnanimityCourage Intelligence Greatness of spirit Memory/Retention Intrepidity Rationality Composure/ Endurance Quickness of understanding Liberality Fortitude Soundness of understanding Integrity/honesty Magnanimity Clarity of mind Sobriety Self-possession/ Calmness Capacity for learning easily Benignity Manliness Mildness Staidness Piety

Justice Friendship Concord Family fellowship Recompense Amiability Obedience to God

This is just a small part of the quite complex overview of the virtues. It is important to note that a virtue holds the middle between two vices, which are extreme attitudes, while it is virtuous to attain a position in the middle. For the cardinal virtue of wisdom, Ibn Miskawayh gives a long list of vices that are related to this virtue. Wisdom holds the middle between slyness (a person who is clever but uses false tricks) and stupidity. Retention is a “mean between forgetfulness, which is neglecting what should be remembered, and attentiveness, to what should not be remembered.”4 The idea of virtue as the middle between two extremes is connected to geographical ideas of this period: just as the earth is at equal distance from several bodies of the universe (sun, moon, planets) and is, therefore, located in the centre, virtues must also be sought in the centre. However, it is much easier to miss this central point than to achieve it, and in actual life, it is quite difficult to attain the ideal of living according to all virtues. Hence, according to the general wisdom proclaimed by the philosophers, we all need the help of other people since the human being is a social animal. From the foregoing it will be clear that Ibn Miskawayh does not proclaim an absolute division between good and evil. Life is a long process of learning. He wrote his ethical handbook at the age of eighty, and expresses his struggle to refrain from various vices. He criticizes preIslamic poets like Imru’l Qays and Al-Nabighah for their warrior ideals and pride of their own tribe, love for food, ornaments, good horses, and handsome slaves: “I have only gradually succeeded in weaning myself from these vices.”5 4



5

Ibn Miskawayh 2002: 23. Ibn Miskawayh 2002: 45.

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The goal of reaching the right midpoint is at the heart of his ethics. There is no focus at all on other discourses for rules of proper behaviour in Islamic thinking, the detailed prescriptions of the shari’a. In the opening lines of his book there is a quote from the Qur’ān, and the common praise to God and the Prophet Muhammad, but we do not find specific Islamic legal thinking in the rest of the otherwise secular ethics. We recognize the Shi’a background of Ibn Miskawayh, when he mentions Ali ibn Abi Talib as a major example of courage. In a commentary on the Battle of Kerbela, he states that “a thousand strokes of the sword on one’s head are indeed preferable to a death in bed.”6 This seems to contradict his ideal of courage that should be a midpoint between cowardice and recklessness. One could argue that it is thoughtless to fight against an enemy who is too strong to hope for a victory. In a somewhat pious mood, Ibn Miskawayh adds that we always have to remember that life is short and has an end – and that religion, women, and a town always need to be defended. When we know that the end of our life is near, running away from danger may give the wrong signal to an enemy. It is not necessary to postpone death as long as possible. The ethical system of Ibn Miskawayh is deeply embedded in a sound and realistic psychology, which is still distantly connected to the medical origin of the Islamic tradition of philosophy, as can be found in the following quote: Recklessness and cowardice are the two extremes of courage, itself a virtue of the soul and a constituent of its health. So we say: Their cause and origin is the irascible soul. Thus, all three of them [recklessness, courage, and cowardice] are related to anger. Anger is, in reality, an agitation of the soul as a result of which the blood of the heart boils in a passion for vengeance. If this agitation is violent, it kindles and inflames the fire of anger, the heart’s blood boils more intensively, and the arteries and the brain become filled with a dark and turbulent smoke which impairs the state of mind and weakens its activity.7

At the end of his great work, Ibn Miskawayh discusses the problem of how to prepare for the death of the body. In this section, he turns much more theological than in the rest of his study. Here we meet the one and only personal God, the judge on the last day who is also the merciful and forgiving deity. The general theme here is that grief may lead us to the right decisions. This section ends with one of the very few quotes from the Qur’ān in Ibn Miskawayh’s book: “Verily, God’s friends, no fear shall be on them, nor shall they be put to grief” (Qur’ān 10: 62).

6



7

Ibn Miskawayh 2002: 97. Ibn Miskawayh 2002: 172.

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The Middle Way of al-Ghazali Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali was, like Ibn Miskawayh, born in 1058 in a small provincial town, Tus, in the north of Iran. After a period of thorough classical studies, in 1085, he moved to the capital Baghdad, the court of the actual ruler of the caliphate, Nizam al Mulk. At the great university, the Nizamiyah, he became familiar with the mostly secular philosophical tradition, and he began his first writings by summarizing the philosophical thinking of his time. His teaching career soon blossomed, but came to an abrupt end in 1095 due to the climate of killings and violence related to the radical Shiites (Assassins of Al-Alamut who killed Nizam and many prominent politicians and people of culture. During this time, he lived in small, remote towns, removed from the purity of rationalism in philosophical society. This is best seen is his great work, the Tahafut al Falasifa (Incoherence of the Philosophers). In the field of ethics, however, al-Ghazali had already published a handbook. Written in the style of Ibn Miskawayh and the Greek doctrine of virtues, he created a long list categorized by the four cardinal virtues, with happiness being the ultimate goal for human beings. In this early work, Mizān al-amal [The Scales of Deeds], he refers to God more frequently as creator, lawgiver, and final judge. More so than Ibn Miskawayh, he accepts that not only the soul but also the body will be part of the final resurrection of man.8 In his later years, al-Ghazali wrote a colossal work, which has been preserved in shorter and longer versions (totalling about ten thousand pages), and is known as the best handbook on Islam for mature students. The title of this work, Ihyā ulūm al-Dīn, can be translated as ‘Revival of the Religious Sciences’. Its forty volumes start with an extensive summary of shari’a rulings – beginning with ritual obligations (ibādāt), followed by social duties including sexual ethics, economy, food, music and entertainment, and relations to non-Muslims, (mu’amalāt). The third section is an overview of vices; the section is not in the strict order of the four cardinal virtues and vices but in a looser format. Quite surprisingly, there are many sayings attributed to the Prophet Isa/Jesus that are not found in Christian sources.9 Volumes thirty-one to forty of the Ihyā discuss the virtues of repentance, patience, fear and hope, trust in God, love and attachment, truthfulness, and introspection. It concludes, like the work of Ibn Miskawayh with a long meditation on death, the fear of death, and the hope for eternal life. Al-Ghazali places emphasis on the dynamics of human life. He popularized a structure of four degrees: beginning with, the implementation of divine law, shari’a, then deeper consciousness and personal growth 8



9

Al-Ghazali 2006. See Khalidi 2001.

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through mystical initiation or tarīqa. The third degree is a phase of intellectual and emotional knowledge of God, haqīqa, while the fourth and final stage is direct awareness of the divinity as ma’rifa or true knowledge. The virtue of trust in God, tawakkul, is part of the last phase in the spiritual journey of man. This is virtue at its highest level. It is unlike a businessman who entrusts his company to a manager after an intense scrutiny of his integrity. Trust in God must be even deeper than the reliance of a baby on its mother. Al-Ghazali uses the following strong analogy for this sacred and absolute trust: ‘as a dead man is kept before one who washes him’. This is, however, only one perspective. Al-Ghazali remains a practical spiritual advisor. He discusses at length the question of whether people should take medicine or trust that God will cure disease. “To take medicine is not opposed to reliance on God. This appears in the teachings and practices of the Prophet He said: ‘O servants of God, take medicine as God created disease and also spells its cure’.”10 Al-Ghazali defines the ultimate goal of human life as does Ibn Miskawayh, as sa’adah, happiness – however, in more religious terminology, also as (re)unification with God, seeing no difference between the two. In the same vein, we find a mostly secular ethical reasoning, concentrating on virtues along with the often modest and rational discussion of the rules of shari’a. The great masters of Islamic mysticism do not use one-liners or easy solutions; they do not propagate the blind implementation of a fixed prescription but in the end leave a lot of room for personal interpretation to individuals – while describing a more general global pattern of right purposes, virtues, and ideals.

Gülen’s Islamic Ethic of the Middle Road In 1941, Fethullah Gülen was born as the second child in a family of eight in Korucuk, a small village in the province or Erzurum, Eastern Turkey. In his youth, Gülen was taught by local Islamic scholars. After completing his training as an imam and state preacher, he moved to Edirne, a city in the European part of Turkey’s historic Thrace, to work as an imam; after four years, he was appointed as a preacher at the Diyanet (Turkish State Office for Islamic Affairs) in the cosmopolitan city of Izmir. From this time on, Gülen gradually grew to become one of Turkey’s most popular preachers and writers. One of the most powerful aspects of his presentation is that he not only discusses Islamic principles within the context of actualities, but he also makes connections with society and science. Altruism, tolerance, dialogue, acceptance, and respect for others are frequent themes in his sermons, conversations, and publications. What demarcates him from 10

Al-Ghazali 1982: iv, 284.

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other Muslim scholars is his regular references to non-Islamic thinkers, philosophers, and literary figures such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza. He is not an academic who writes for other scholars. Rather, he preaches and holds lectures for interested laymen; both are based on a profound knowledge of the entire intellectual history of Islam. His texts, usually not more than five to seven pages long, have been collected in a series of books in Turkish, while the most important texts have been or are now being translated into English. In addition, his series of sermons, talks, conversations, and public speeches were recorded and transliterated into text format and with minor revisions published as books.11 Gülen frequently stresses the importance of ethics in education, the media, business, and in public and personal life. Encouraged by the influence of sociopolitical factors on Islamic issues, Gülen shifts his attention from the private rules of Islam to public ethics and from identity to education, with the ideal of a disciplined, well-ordered society as a coherent consequence. He regards education and media as key instruments in the formation of ethics and consciousness. In education, the teachers embody ethical values and are role models for their pupils and students. They are the main representatives for the practice of moral values. Sevindi regards Gülen as an Islamic intellectual, who puts human development at the centre of everything.12 Gülen considers the human person as a sample or a model of the universe. In his teaching, he states that among the living creatures in the cosmos, the human being is the most valuable.13 He symbolizes human beings as mirrors for God’s names and attributes, and he confidently argues that human beings are distinguished from the rest of creation with the honour of being responsible for making the earth prosperous in God’s name. He explains that individual and collective happiness lies in disciplining three innate faculties (reason, anger, and lust) to produce a young “golden generation”, which will learn theoretical aspects of the middle way – between materialism and metaphysics, between modernity and tradition – and will put it into practice. This generation is supposed to absorb and represent both modern realities and Muslim morality – and to constitute its identities through its mind, its behaviour, and its spirituality. The middle way is an important concept in Gülen’s understanding. It is to a great extent similar to Aristotle’s conceptualization.14 Aristotle criticized the Platonic ‘virtue-versus-vice’ categorization and classified phenomena in three groups: two of which are vices (excess and deficiency) 11

13 14 12

Çelik 2010: 28-34. Sevindi 2002: 9. Gülen 2000b: 7-8. Kuru 2003: 117.

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and one of which is virtue (the mean or the middle way). Gülen interprets and repeats the important Islamic concept of sırat-ı müstakim (the middle way), which is recited in a Muslim’s prayers forty times a day, as the middle way between ifrat (excess) and tefrit (deficiency).15 From this perspective, and since the time of Ibn Miskawayh, human faculties or drives have been dealt with in three categories – intellect, zeal, and lust.16 The first category of intellect or reason enables the human person to make the right decision and encompasses all human powers such as conception, imagination, calculation, memory, learning, and so on. The second category of zeal or anger covers the power of self-defence that according to Islamic jurisprudence is defined as that needed to defend the faith and religion, sanity, possessions, life and family, and other sacred values. Thirdly, each man and woman desires or lusts after the opposite sex and loves their children and worldly possessions. In other words, lust or desire is the name for the driving force of one’s animal appetites. These three drives or faculties of a human being, and the virtues of each along with its two extremes (levels) are visualized in the following figure:17

Drives of a human person LEVELS / LIMITS

Demagogy

Excess Middle way Deficiency

Wisdom

Stupidity

Intellect

Rage

Courage

Zeal

Cowardice Licentiousness

Lust

Chastity

Frigidity

15

Gülen 2009: 73-102. Gülen 2008: 69-80; Ünal 2006b: 30; Nursi 1994: 22-23. 17 After Çelik 2010: 107. 16

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Islamic Ethic and a ‘Golden’ Generation Islamic ethics (akhlāq) is defined as proper moral conduct. It implies positive traits of character, especially those noble qualities, which were perfected and modelled by Muhammad, the prophet of Islam.18 Akhlāq, the plural form of khuluq, refers to the virtues that comprise good character in Islamic moral teachings. It was generally shaped as an amalgamation of the teachings of the Qur’ān and the sunnah (the prophetic tradition), and the fiqh (the reasoning of Islamic jurists) embedded in an Islamic tradition of the Sunnis and Shites – two major denominations of Islam. Islamic ethics are based on the following general principle of the Qur’ān: ‘commanding good and forbidding evil (amr bi al-ma’ruf wa nahiy ‘an al-munkar)’.19 For many Muslims, the ethical values – such as justice, modesty, equality, patience, humility, magnanimity, respect for rights, truthfulness, and responsibility – are derived from the Qur’ān and developed in the sunnah. Gülen expresses that in the Qur’ān, besides verses related to human relationship with God, there are many other verses regulating the relationship of human beings with one another. To him, these verses are reminding people of their responsibilities and principles concerning their social, economic, political, and cultural life. In this regard, he stated in an interview: Although one cannot ignore the effects of ruling and administration in regulating communal relationships between individuals, families and societies, yet these, within the framework of Qur’ānic values, are considered secondary issues. That is because the values that we call major principles (ümmühat), such as faith (iman), submission (Islam), doing what is beautiful (ihsan), and the acceptance of divine morals by the community, are references that form the essence of administrative, economic, and political issues.20

The worldwide movement following his thoughts has set out to produce, what Gülen calls “the golden generation” (altın nesil), a virtuous generation, which can integrate modern realities with Islamic values. Gülen seeks to demonstrate that it is possible to be modern by practicing Islamic values. To this end, he has developed a model for human life in which social principles and ethical values have been brought to the fore. According to the movement’s philosophy, it is impossible for someone 18

Helminski 2006: 36; Çelik and Steenbrink 2015: 210. We follow the translation by Ünal 2006a. The “call to command the good and forbid evil” is a phrase found at several places in the Qur’ān: 3: 104, 110, 114; 7: 157; 9: 71, 112; 22: 41 and 31: 17. 20 Gülen, in Saritoprak (ed.) 2005: 455. 19

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who has not acquired an independent character to make a positive contribution to the social sphere.21 Morality is the knowledge, behaviour, and feelings that comprises what, where, how, and why a person does something. A human’s personality and his inborn properties are neutral; this personality and qualities can be diverted to good or bad. What causes this to happen is morality. Character training and education about morals are important ways to discover ethical values. In general, there are two types of morality: morality that is inborn from birth and morality that is acquired afterwards by an individual. These two types of morality are interrelated and illuminate each other. While the first one is more idiosyncratic and is a part of a person’s natural constitution, the second type of morality reflects a person’s personality qualities acquired after birth. Gülen’s firm opinion is that the initial step of every action and every kind of work is ethics and self-knowledge. Self-knowledge and being aware of one’s own helplessness, deficiency, and poorness are considered as necessary in order to be a mature human with appropriate morals. Self-knowledge is closely related to obtaining one’s inner and outer completeness. According to Gülen: Self-knowledge of mankind never means getting to know his anatomy, his sexual desire, angers, devaluation and wrath. Nor does it mean to know the mechanism of conscience, God given beauties (soul, heart, conscious, arcane etc.) within the soul system, consciousness, sense and willpower. Alongside all of these, self-knowledge of mankind means undertaking a different observation every other day by rereading himself, getting to know himself again, because the human being is not a creature that could be captured by a single shot, like a photograph. It is like a growing tree, every moment produces a new shape. Therefore, from the context of his soul, willpower and conscious horizon, it is necessary for man to observe and comment on the occurrences that are related to his own self. “I have seen such an incident today, its reason was probably my mistake, I guess. Or because of my behaviour, I was rewarded with divine generosity of God today. Even though I don’t deserve it, probably God Almighty is pleased with me.22

Gülen emphasizes that inner control is very important for a human being. He explains that the most difficult things a man will discover are deviations and constant changes that occur in his inner world. When a person’s inner world changes, the direction in which he or she will go, changes as well. Gülen states:

21

Çelik 2010: 59. Gülen 2004a: 167.

22

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[T]he reality is the reading of both the inner and the outer, and this means self-knowledge – which is a path to know God – and this comes to opening up to multi-dimensions, as said in the oracle of Einstein. The ones who can open themselves to multi-dimensions in other words go beyond the narrow frames with their images and construct according to their moral personality. Moral personality is human’s manners, behaviours, persuasions, evaluations, comments, views and interpretations. In this case every man has an image according to his moral personality.23

Gülen argues that the harmony of the inner and outer makes a human balanced and whole. These are parts of a whole structure, and in order for this wholeness to be useful at all, the existence of both parts is essential. His position is that when both parts come together, then the human’s spirituality, thinking, and behaviour is completely functional and balanced. He maintains that if inner and outer harmony does not exist, it is not possible to speak of a human who is really mature and moral.

Autonomous Personal Growth and Role Models versus Strict Obedience Towards a Teacher In an audio cassette series of his sermons dating back to 1980, Gülen introduced several principles about ethical values. His firm opinion is that the initial step of every action and work is ethics and self-knowledge. Based on a Qur’ānic verse, Gülen explains that “Everyone acts according to his or her own disposition” (Qur’ān 17: 84) and, thus, displays his or her own character. It is an important step in acquiring good moral values when a person knows, feels, and perceives his or her own mistakes. Without seeing one’s fallacies and faults, it is not possible for a person to get rid of all these and to find the right path. Therefore, everyone is in need of binoculars that will allow them to know their own shame and their bad character traits. In this regard, Gülen posits the following four suggestions: 1. The first principle is to find a guide; an educator, a teacher who will enlighten and inspire the individual to organize his or her life, who will redirect him or her to right path. 2. The second suggestion is to select a good friend or a coach, a magnanimously brave ally, who reminds one of ethical values and points out one’s fallacies and mistakes. 3. The third suggestion is to get rid of fallacies and faults and to adopt a good moral point of view; this will allow a person to value what has been said, negatively or positively, about oneself and to question oneself effectively. In this respect, a critically reflective attitude always offers a learning opportunity. 23

Gülen 2004a: 169-70.

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4. The fourth suggestion for gaining good moral values and eliminating bad habits and immorality is to be among people and to be involved in human society. This interaction enables each person to learn human values and to discover feelings and emotions about him- or herself.24 Here, Gülen follows the tradition of turūq, Muslim mystical orders that gave sometimes an extreme high authority to spiritual leadership. In his writings that appeared in a period of more than thirty years since the late 1970s, Gülen has incorporated many elements of the long tradition of Islamic ethical teaching. He sometimes quotes masters of the past without critically evaluating these elements in the modern time. The Gülen Movement itself has no elements of the classical turūq, and the followers have no direct or organised personal contact with a teacher or with Gülen himself – but receive his ideas through publications and since 1999 in his residence in Pennsylvania through his weekly talks that can be listened on www.herkul.org. These talks have been published in a series entitled Broken Pitcher [Kırık Testi], which already includes twelve volumes. The members of the movement have a strong individual motivation to bring these ideas into practice.25 Still, for some individuals also these opportunities of spiritual leadership are sufficient. In his teaching, Gülen lays out a broad vision for a society and a world led by individuals of spiritual, moral, and intellectual excellence.26 He calls these people ‘ideal humans’ and considers them as representatives of the golden generation. They exemplify eight character traits and attributes: faith; love; a balanced view of science; a re-evaluated view of humans, life, and the universe; free thinking and respect for freedom of thought; a habit to counsel and collective consciousness (a set of shared beliefs, ideas and ethical values); mathematical thinking; and appreciation for art or artistic sensitivity.27 Gülen’s entire endeavour is to emphasize that, by virtue of drawing attention to the relationship between God and humankind; humanity’s greatest achievement will be the attainment of a station of the ideal human (al-insan al-kamil).28 In his teaching, this is a prelude to one’s “superlative person,” who sacrifices his or her own life’s pleasures and who lives for others (altruism). He claims that such a person will only take positive action in a social arena.29 24

26 27 28 29 25

Gülen 1980. Çelik 2013. Gülen 2005a: 5-10, 31-42. Carroll 2007: 53. Gülen 2009: 289-302. Hermansen 2007: 75.

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Examples of such persons include Hacı Kemal Erimez (d. 1997), or Hacı Ata as he was known by those closest to him. He was Gülen’s dearest friend until he died while working to establish schools in Tajikistan. Another example is Adem Tatlı, a teacher and the general director of Gülen schools in Mongolia, who died in a car accident on his way to visit family in Turkey; he was just thirty-nine when he died. One respondent said that his last request, which was respected, was to be buried near his school in Mongolia. In honour of Adem Tatlı, a book entitled Riders who Go Ahead has been written by Tokak, with a preface by Fethullah Gülen. The book also eulogized various Turkish teachers, who had gone to farflung reaches of the world to work in Gülen schools.30 Also, a special DVD has been developed about Adem Tatlı and his altruism and activism in the movement. Gülen and the followers of his movement attach importance to the principle of “living for others.” According to Gülen: Sacrifice is one of the important characteristics of a person who teaches others. Those who do not, or cannot, risk sacrifice from the start can never be a person of cause. People who do not have a cause cannot be successful. Yes, those who are ready to leave at one stretch whenever necessary, their wealth, life, family, position, fame, etc., things which many people desire and put as the purpose of life – that their cause eventually reaches the peaks is certain and inevitable.31

The Turkish films Selam [Greeting] (2013) and Selam: Bahara Yolculuk [Journey to Spring] (2015) initiated by the Gülen Movement, are used as examples that tell of the self-sacrificing teachers working at Turkish schools all around the world. The movies were respectively directed by Levent Demirkale and Hamdi Alkan. The manuscript of the films, also advised and redacted by Gülen, adapts the movement’s educational and ethical activism for the screen. The films endeavour to relay humanistic values and discuss ethically inspiring real-life stories of altruistic teachers who are idealists working at schools opened by entrepreneurs from Turkey on different continents and in four different countries: Afghanistan, Senegal, Kyrgyzstan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sufism as a Method for a Virtuous Life In his series of books Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism, Gülen sketches the road towards a ‘perfect man’. This is a four-part series and is already considered one of the classics on Sufism (tasawwuf). In this series, Gülen discusses the methodology of the concepts of Sufism and shows its 30 31

Tokak 2007. Gülen 2002b: 4.

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place in the foundations of Islam. According to him, Islam without Sufism is a cold, didactic, and cumbersome set of rules. He, therefore, explores the mystical side of Islam and, in his essays, elucidates his findings about the inner values and meanings of Islam in modern time.32 Sufism is defined in different ways. Some see it as a destruction of the ego, will, and selfishness of the individual in order to let him or her spiritually become transformed in God’s being. Such a transformation results in God directing the will of the individual according to his will. Others see Sufism as an ongoing effort to purify oneself of all that is bad and evil and learn virtues instead. Junayd al-Baghdadi, a famous Sufi master (d. 910), describes Sufism as the ‘self-annihilation in God’ and ‘the dwelling or endurance with God’. Shibli (d. 946), a disciple of al-Baghdadi, sums it up as always being with God, as living in his presence so as not to strive for any worldly or otherworldly objectives. Mohammed Abu Jarir al-Tabari (d. 923) describes it as resisting the temptations of bad characteristics and the sensual self and of obtaining commendable moral qualities. Still others describe Sufism as seeing behind outer dimensions or appearances of things and events and as interpreting happenings in the world as related to God. This means that someone perceives every occurrence as an act of God, a window through which God can be ‘seen’. He or she lives life as an ongoing effort to realize this ‘seeing’, indescribable in physical terms, and is aware that God always sees him or her. Gülen summarizes these definitions of Sufism as follows: Sufism is the path which allows one to free him or herself from human weaknesses and faults in order to acquire the angelic characteristics and behaviours pleasing to God. By living in accordance with these requirements for the knowledge and the love of God, one experiences the spiritual joy that flows from it. Sufism is based on following the detailed rules of the shari’a in order to come to understand their deeper meaning. An initiate or traveller on the road (salik), makes no distinction between the outward observance of the shari’a and its inner significance and, therefore, adheres to all requirements of both the outer and inner dimensions of Islam. He or she travels in compliance, utter humility, and devotion to the goal. Sufism, according to Gülen, implies a strict observance of all religious obligations, a sober lifestyle, and the renunciation of carnal desires. Through this method of spiritual self-discipline, the hearts of men are purified, and their senses and gifts used in a way God wants, which means that travellers can start to live a spiritual existence. 32

Gülen 1998, Vol. 1, xiii-xxvi.

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As a demanding path leading to knowledge of God, Sufism does not allow for thoughtlessness and frivolity. It requires that the initiate sustain efforts to acquire knowledge, like a bee flies back and forth between hive and flower. The initiate is to purify his heart of all attachments, to resist all carnal inclinations and desires, and is to live in a manner that reflects the knowledge with which God has lit and revived his heart. Because he is convinced that the connectedness with and loyalty to God is the greatest honour and achievement; the initiate has to abandon his own desires in favour of the demands of God, the truth.33 For Gülen, Sufism enables man to develop the moral dimension of his life. It enables a strong, deep conviction, and personal experiencing of religious elements, which were hitherto only superficially accepted. As in the case of the necessity of strict spirituality, we also find here various elements of the Islamic tradition standing side by side in the person and teachings of Fethullah Gülen. First he does not opt between the more transcendent and the immanent image of God. In some of his writings, there appears a rather outward and external divinity who sends his revelation and his commands to mankind. In the more mystic writings, it is the more immanent God. The bond between humans and the divine can even be expressed in the theological schedule of emanation from and return to the divinity.34 Second, the final goal of mankind can be described as the balance between the various opposite emotions and as an intra-mundane final destination. But it may also be described, as above, in terms of a unification with the deity. It is in all respects more the individual than the Muslim community or humanity as a whole that is the focus of Gülen’s ethical writings.

Conclusion Fethullah Gülen is an example of the classical school of medieval giants like Ibn Miskawayh and al-Ghazali. He strongly supports the primacy of the development of the self, personal choice, and freedom – which makes him, as a leader of a large transnational movement with an estimate of several million followers, a key figure in the contemporary debate on ethical issues in the Islamic world. Today, the international movement he inspired coordinates thousands of educational and cultural institutions in about 160 countries, mobilizes participants for educational, cultural, and media enterprises, and employs new networks for the ongoing realignment of public, private, and civil society groups.

33

Gülen 1998-Vol. 1: xiv. Gülen 1998-Vol. 3.

34

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It is noteworthy that the more theoretical and philosophical discourse of Ibn Miskawayh and al-Ghazali is absent in Gülen’s Sufism. Instead, we see a strong psychological drive to discuss various human experiences such as grief (huzn), hope (raja), dislike of crowds (wara’), sincerity (ikhlas), and determination (istiqama). His realistic and down-to-earth reflection on tawakkul (the virtue of trust in God), is similar to alGhazali’s approach – first secure your camel, then trust God that it will work out just fine with the thieves. He focuses more on the development of the individual and adaption to our modern era, for Gülen explicitly seeks harmony with non-Muslims and to contribute to a universal morality, which transcends Islam. Recognizing the paradox in our daily lives as Europeans, we continue to be confronted with debates about the shari’a and hard-line, conservative Islam. Yet, in Gülen’s teachings, we recognize a form of Islam that demonstrates a rigorous ethical compass in the context of our European culture and social life.

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Financial Dimension of the Gülen-Inspired Projects Helen Rose Ebaugh The number and scope of projects inspired by the ideas of Gülen and made operational by his supporters is vast and continuously growing. In addition to the 1,000 or so schools in Turkey and around the world;1 the projects include: top-notch private hospitals; at least two major universities; hundreds of student dormitories and preparatory courses for the national university exam in Turkey; an international relief organisation; the Journalist and Writers Foundation; a media conglomerate that includes Zaman newspaper with the largest readership of any newspaper in Turkey, the English version, Today’s Zaman, Aksiyon, a widely read news magazine and Samanyolu television station; Kaynak Holding Group, Turkey’s largest producer, distributor and exporter of education products; TUSKON, a regional NGO that represents over 10,000 businessmen; Bank Asya; a travel agency; and hundreds of local organisations around the world that sponsor conferences, lectures and interfaith/intercultural trips to Turkey. The question of how these many endeavours are financed is repeatedly raised, both by those who are simply curious about the movement and also by the movement’s critics. The critics point to the fact that such vast amounts of money must be backed by some government and speculate that it must be Iran, Saudi Arabia or perhaps the American CIA. In order to understand the financial structure of the Gülen Movement and its many affiliated institutions, in April 2008, I spent two weeks in Istanbul, Bursa and Mudanya conducting formal interviews with top administrators in Gülen-related institutions with the goal of documenting the financial history and structure of the organisations. I focused on how the organisation or service project was begun, costs associated with the original project, sources of financing, the history of financially sustaining the project over time as well as its current financial status, including 1



Due to the non-hierarchical, locally based network structure of the movement, as well as varied terms for the schools, it is impossible to give an exact figure for the number of Gülen-inspired schools worldwide. However, based on best estimates from those who study the schools, I maintain that there are over 1,000 schools in over 100 countries on 5 continents.

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expenses and sources of income. I inquired specifically about any government financing, including not only money but also land, buildings and tax breaks. I interviewed the CEO or another top administrator at the following organisations: Bank Asya, Samanyolu Television, Zaman newspaper, The Journalists and Writers Foundation, Fatih University, Sema Hospital, Istanbul and Bakar Hospital, Bursa, three Gülen schools and Kimse Yok Mu, the relief organisation. In addition, I interviewed a cross section of people who are supporters of the movement, some in one to one interviews and others in focus groups. I interviewed two groups of businessmen who are major supporters of movement projects, one in Istanbul and one in Bursa. Each of the businessmen contributes a minimum of $ l million per year to service projects, either in cash or in-kind donations. I also interviewed a group of engineers and another of doctors, as well as two groups of blue collar workers. These interviews helped me determine amounts of money contributed by people in various occupational and income groups as well as motivations for giving. While my book describes the data I gathered for each specific institution, in this chapter I will focus on general patterns, using examples from various enterprises to demonstrate what I found. In the second part of the chapter, I will try to address the question of why people contribute to the movement as they do.

Financing Gülen-Inspired Enterprises Gülen himself has never had personal wealth to allow him to sponsor projects that he saw as important to the future of Turkey. He chose to live an ascetic life dedicated to worship, reading, writing and preaching. The story is told that he prayed that his relatives would also remain poor so as not to raise any suspicions of gaining monetarily from his influence Apart from encouraging people to donate money, Gülen remained distanced from all financial involvements. Beginning in the 1970s and escalating in the 1980s when President Özal initiated economic policies that promoted entrepreneurship and global investment on the part of Turkish businesses, Gülen encouraged the businessmen who were attracted to his ideas to grow their businesses and donate a portion of their wealth to the projects sponsored by the movement. In large part, it was the wealthy businessmen who financed the first dormitories and preparatory schools where Turkish youth could come to attend high school and university and to prepare for the mandatory university entrance exams. Again, in the early 1980s, when President Özal’s policies allowed the first private schools in Turkey, the businessmen first in Izmir and then in 102

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Istanbul, bought the land, built the schools and hired the teachers to open the first Gülen-inspired schools in Turkey. In order to protect the schools from takeover by the military government, the early schools were owned and administered by a corporation or foundation and run by a board of businessmen, a model that is followed today both in Turkey and wherever Gülen-inspired schools have been established. These businessmen and others in the locale whom they solicit and inspire provide the initial funding for a school. While each school in Turkey is private, it follows the curriculum specified by the state and teaches comparative religion only one hour per week. Each student pays tuition fee, amounting to an average of between $ 6,000-9,000 per year. Eventually, usually between two to three years, tuition fee allows a school to become self-sufficient and no longer dependent on businessmen for support. At that point, the businessmen use their resources to build a new school, finance a new project or support needy students in the school. Approximately 20-40% of the student body in each school who cannot afford the tuition fee receives need-based scholarships, provided by local supporters of the movement. In addition to monetary contributions to build and support the schools, local businessmen often contribute in-kind donations, especially business owners in the construction and furniture business. Zaman and the English version, Today’s Zaman, is a good example of how the Gülen inspired enterprises began and now operate in Turkey. In the late 1980s Gülen began talking about the importance of having a newspaper that would be inclusive in terms of reporting various ideological perspectives and opinions, would report the most current fashion in an objective way, would emphasize dialog and tolerance rather than hatred among groups and that would deemphasize alcohol and nudity in its advertising. In 1986 a group of businessmen who were inspired by Gülen and who thought such a newspaper was a good business venture bought shares in the paper and Zaman was launched. From the very beginning, it was businessmen who were interested and involved in the media who owned and controlled the paper. Gülen had no financial or administrative involvement except that he wrote a column periodically, and still does. After 25 years, today Zaman has the largest circulation of any newspaper in Turkey. In addition to the newspaper, there is a larger media group which also owns not only the newspaper but also a weekly magazine and a news agency. In 2007 the annual income for the Media Group was approximately $ 250 million, with over half of that coming from subscriptions. For the newspapers, over 50% of income comes from advertising. Zaman is not only self supporting today but is a profitable business venture for its shareholders. 103

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Dumanlı, current Editor-in-Chief of Zaman, whom I interviewed, commented that some, but not all, of the original shareholders were supporters of the movement. He was unsure how many of the current board support the movement since board members are selected from the leaders in the media and business community of Turkey with no stipulation of ties to the movement. While some critics have accused the paper of financial irregularities, financial transparency is one of the requisites of Zaman’s staying in business. Every year the government investigates the finances of every newspaper in Turkey and if there are any infringements in regard to finances, the paper can be shut down or fined. In its entire history, Zaman has not had infringements despite the rigorous review by the public auditors. Bank Asya has a history very like that of Zaman. In the early 1990s, Gülen agreed with some businessmen that opening an interest-free bank was a good idea. 346 businessmen, some, but not all of them supporters of the Gülen Movement, bought shares in the bank. Gülen attended the opening ceremonies and was photographed with some of the original shareholders which suggested to the media that the bank was associated with the movement. However, Gülen never sat on the board or had any direct dealings with the bank. While some media sources continue to present the bank as the official bank for the Gülen Movement, Kabaca, current president of the bank, reported that, while some of the Gülen inspired schools and hospitals do use Bank Asya for some of their banking needs, their choice is based upon competitive bidding among banks in Turkey. He said that the bank has no competitive edge with Gülen-inspired projects and he has to work as hard to get their business as he does with other businesses in Turkey. For example, he said, Fatih University, a Gülen inspired institution, worked for many years with a government bank until Bank Asya won their business by developing a system of collecting tuition fees that university board of directors liked. He said that some of the Gülen inspired schools use his bank but others deal with other banks in Turkey. Since its inception fifteen years ago, Bank Asya has performed very well financially, increasing its capital 7-8 times since its origins. In 2007, Bank Asya reported current deposits of $ 5 billion. As a result of its financial success, the bank has attracted global investors, both individuals and companies. Fatih University opened on the outskirts of Istanbul in 1994, one of the newly approved “foundation universities.” In Turkey only charitable foundations can establish private universities, not individuals or businesses for the purpose of profit. The foundation that founded Fatih was initially financed by supporters of the Gülen Movement in Ankara and Istanbul. One 104

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wealthy businessman from Istanbul donated the scenic property appraised at $ 5 million and today worth about $ 100 million. Other businessmen contributed to constructing the buildings and opening the university. Currently, tuition fees are sufficient to cover operating expenses such as faculty salaries and maintenance of buildings. However, Turkish law requires that foundations associated with private universities raise the money to build new buildings and labs. Many people, mainly Gülen supporters, make contributions to the foundation. If a university in Turkey, either public or private, meets certain criteria, the government gives it 15% of its budget every year. In 2006 and 2007 Fatih qualified and received its portion of government money. However, in 2008 it failed on one of the criteria and was denied government assistance. A characteristic of all Gülen inspired institutions, whether they be schools, hospitals, media organisations or universities is that they are usually initiated, constructed and financed by local businessmen, politicians and ordinary people inspired by the movement. For that reason, the movement is very non-hierarchical and non-bureaucratic. The one exception to this pattern is Kimse Yok Mu Solidarity and Aid Association, referred to simply as Kimse Yok Mu. This organisation is dedicated to relief efforts both in Turkey and wherever in the world there is a disaster or drastic humanitarian need. This Gülen-inspired agency does have formal, hierarchical structure and organised mechanisms for fundraising. The agency began in the aftermath of a massive earthquake in the Marmara region in Turkey. In 2002 it was established as a non-profit foundation to assist with human relief efforts. It raises about $ 16 million annually, some through very creative fundraising techniques such as placement of a “bank” in schools and shopping malls and sending text messages to an advertised cell phone number from any of the three major phone companies that add the donation amount to the customer’s monthly telephone bill. To summarize what I learned from studying Gülen-inspired institutions in terms of their financial structures: with the exception of Bank Asya which was a business venture from the beginning, the remaining Gülen-inspired projects were originally financed by groups of local supporters who wanted to make Gülen’s ideas reality by creating organisations that would express these ideals. In every case I studied, the initiation, planning and financing of the schools, dormitories, prep courses, hospitals and media conglomerates began when a group of Gülen supporters, usually including local businessmen, came together and saw a need in their community that required a specific institution. They then pledged their own money and in-kind donations, and offered 105

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to solicit help from their business acquaintances and friends. Usually they established a foundation to collect for and administer the project. Within a few years the projects become self supporting. The sponsors then look around for another project that needs their assistance and put their resources to help it get off the ground, sometimes in Turkey and sometimes in other countries. Often the recipients in the service projects, such as schools, dormitories, prep schools, hospitals and media consumers, appreciate the values and opportunities that their experiences in the institutions afford them and they want to become sponsors and contributors so that others will also benefit. As a result, the cadre of benefactors and supporters is growing not only in Turkey but also around the world.

Structure and Benefits of the Local Circles (sohbets) In the course of my interviews, I discovered that giving financially is a characteristic, not only of the wealthy businessmen, but of everyone in the movement. My data show that most people give between 5-20% of their annual income, with 10% being the average. In the two groups of wealthy businessmen, it was not uncommon for them to give $ 3-4 million annually to various projects. Many of them divide their income into thirds, with onethird put back into the business, one-third used to support one’s family and the remaining third given to movement projects. While it is impossible, due to lack of membership rolls and financial records, to specify exactly how many such wealthy businessmen contribute, I discovered that the number is not insignificant. Repeatedly, I either interviewed or had interviewees mention supporters who owned some of the biggest and most profitable companies in Turkey. Many of these wealthy supporters also had family who were involved in their businesses who also contribute. What was astounding, however, was that it was not only businessmen who supported the movement financially but people in all professions and occupations and at all economic levels. And, regardless of the amount of money contributed, I found that people I interviewed estimated that most supporters give at least 10% of their annual income to movement projects. Again, even though it is impossible to determine how many people either in Turkey or worldwide are supporters of the movement, there are certainly millions of them, probably at least 8-10 million worldwide. Gülen was once asked by a reporter, “where the water for this mill comes from.” My interviews revealed that it is the people in the movement who are supplying the water for the mill. The question remains: why? What motivates people to give to the many service projects that are built and maintained by supporters in the Gülen Movement? How is the movement structured in such a way that giving is embedded into the heart of the movement? 106

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The answer to these questions lies in two sources: first, deeply engrained Islamic and Turkish cultural/religious roots and, secondly, the organisation of sohbets or local circles. The movement is inherently tied to Turkish culture and to a Turkish understanding of Islam. The values of giving and showing hospitality have deep historical roots in Turkish culture. Traditions related to generosity, hospitality and charity can be traced back to the central Asian civilizations from which Turks hail. Among the various reasons given for why the nomadic Turks living in the ninth and tenth centuries were so ready to accept Islam is the existence of many similarities between their pre-Islamic lifestyles, values and ethics and those that Islam teaches. The Dede Korkut, an important source of early Turkish history, provides many examples of Turkish hospitality. When a clan member died, relatives slaughtered his horses and gave a funeral feast. Some stories condemn or belittle the houses or tents that do not receive guests or help the stranger in need. Certain acts of giving prescribed by the Qur’ān and encouraged by the Prophet Muhammad have found almost continuous cultural translation in pre-Ottoman, Ottoman and modern Turkish society. These include notions of sadaka, zekat, kurban, vakıf, ahilik, bereket, komşuluk and karz-ı-hasen. I cannot describe each of these in detail; however, I choose three of them to demonstrate how they are deeply embedded in modern Turks as motivation for charitable giving. While zakat is the obligatory payment of a certain portion of one’s total wealth to the poor once a year, sadaka is a voluntary contribution that is given with the sole intention of pleasing God and in expectation of a reward in the Hereafter. The recipients of sadaka are not necessarily only Muslims but anyone who needs charity. Sadaka is not only monetary or material, but can also be any favour given, even a smile. The most common ways to give sadaka today are contributions via the collection box in one’s mosque, the sacrifice (kurban) of a ram or cow and the distribution of its meat to the poor or the giving of funds to a charitable organisation. Sadaka is given by people who are still alive as well as in the name of those who are deceased. A prophetic tradition encourages the offspring of a deceased person to give sadaka to a charitable trust in the name of the deceased. Vakıfs are charitable trusts set up by individuals who declare all or part of his or her property to be a vakıf, that is, dedicated to religious or charitable purposes. Beneficiaries are named and a trustee or board of directors is established to manage the vakıf according to the original purpose for which it was established. Vakıfs were widespread under Ottoman rule not only among Muslims but also Jews and Christians. These charitable trusts provided many services that modern state and local governments provide, such as provision of health care and education, 107

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road maintenance and clean water. In addition to serving the needy, vakıfs also increased public respect for the rich who established them. Today in Turkey, many types of charitable trusts still exit. Some provide funds for restoration and preservation of historical sites but others provide financial, educational and health services to the public. Bereket is another important Turkish-Islamic notion embedded in the culture whereby people believe that when something is done with the intent of pleasing God and without expectation of worldly reward, it will create abundance. This idea of abundance resulting from generosity is applied not only to money but also to time, life and other intangibles. Twice during the year, Muslims celebrate special festivals that call forth their obligation to share with the needy. During the month of Ramadan when every practicing Muslim fasts from sunrise to sunset there is also the requirement to share with those less fortunate. Muslims around the world make special contributions during Ramadan to help those in need. Eid-ul-Adha, the Day of Sacrifice, occurs right after hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and, on that day, Muslims sacrifice animals in remembrance of the sacrifice that Abraham made to God. In addition to eating the meat themselves and sharing with family and friends, one third is given to the poor and hungry. Today many Muslims give money for the purchase of meat and food that is distributed to those who are hungry and there exists electronic services that coordinate these exchanges. As the above examples indicate, there is a long and rich TurkishIslamic tradition of giving in Turkey. The Gülen Movement, therefore, is able to gain people’s trust by tapping into the network of philanthropic motivations already present in Turkish society. Gülen, when he challenged Turkish people to set up dormitories and schools for the young people in Turkey was calling upon a long Turkish tradition to help those in need. He expressed his call to action in terms of fundamental Turkish-Islamic values: hospitality, giving, charity and the obligation to help the needy in society, known as himmet. Gülen simply provided ways that Turkish people who believed in what he was envisioning could express himmet, the generosity and giving that they were used to in the tenets of their culture and religion. Another practice that was familiar to Turks was that of cemaats and sohbets. The cemaat was a type of social group that evolved in Turkey after the formation of the Republic and the outlawing of the Sufi orders and the abolishing of madrasas. Practicing Muslims who wanted to preserve the Islamic heritage while adapting to modernity formed circles around scholars who blended religious devotion with a mild form of nationalism or spiritual practices. These groups of people around pioneering figures were called cemaats, a grassroots movement of practicing faithful Turkish 108

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people who did not want to abandon their faith tradition while embracing the modern age. Within the cemaats were sohbets or small groups that have no formal membership, no initiation rites, require no building to meet and have no public recognition of membership. Rather they are people who meet regularly to read interpretations of the Qur’ān, to share ideas and needs of people in the group and to decide what service projects the groups want to support financially. Gülen had been an active member of a cemaat around Said Nursi’s teachings and had experienced the fellowship and worthwhileness of this form of organisation. As his ideas caught hold in Turkey in the late 1960s and early 1970s, he encouraged the sohbet as a way for those inspired by his ideas to get together and discuss how to operationalize the ideas in terms of building a better Turkey. People were familiar with sohbets so it was natural for them to organize around this inspiring preacher. Sohbets or local circles are typically organised according to location and neighbourhoods or according to education and jobs. For example, doctors in an area might meet together as will dentists, lawyers, teachers and housewives. While members of a local circle share readings and ideas, they also share their lives in terms of what is important to them at the time. An important part of every social circle in which I interviewed is supporting some needy project, either in Turkey or in some other country. When I asked how people in the circles learned about such needs, I was told that the Gülen-inspired community is a very tight knit one and people know which projects need help. Alternatively, supporters working in a service project sometimes approach a circle and make known needs connected to that endeavour. Word circulates throughout the local circles which projects are especially in need at a given time and people in these circles get together to decide what they can do to help. The large contributions made by business owners are important not only in the projects that can be supported by the size of their donations but also in terms of giving legitimacy and visibility to the movement. Frequently I heard supporters mention the “businessmen” who are major donors that make the building of new schools, the opening of private hospitals and the starting of universities possible. In a local circle of young engineers I learned that there are about 1,000 engineers who are part of many local circles in Istanbul and that the group donates about $ 2 million a year to Gülen-related projects. About half of that comes from members themselves and the rest solicited from family and business associates of the members. The blue collar workers are not able to make large contributions but, again, most give 10% of their income which usually supports scholarships for needy students in the schools or dormitories. They also help one another 109

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when one might be in financial need at a given time. Often children of circle members can stay in local dormitories free of charge and such living arrangement is often favoured by parents because such dorm living is more conducive for study and for meeting friends that are preferred by their parents. Since financial giving is an expectation in every local circle, I asked whether members publicly announce their yearly pledge. While great emphasis was placed on the voluntariness of contributions and that money is given without expectation of gaining approval and status from fellow members, interviewees acknowledged that there is competition among circle members regarding how much one can donate. This was especially noteworthy among the wealthier businessmen who often challenge one another to increase their pledge. Also hearing publicly what a colleague is donating is often motivation to do the same. Most giving is made to a foundation rather than directly to a school or individual. This keeps the giving from being too personal and from contaminating motivations in a self-serving direction. Rather, donations are given to a pool that helps needy people without anybody knowing who is supporting which ones. Giving is done in a spirit of serving the Creator by serving his people. In addition to financial contributions, it is important to recognize the many and varied volunteer services that members provide to the movement. I interviewed supporters who work or go to school 40 hours per week and still contribute 15-20 hours to working with projects in the movement. Women often cook and serve meals to groups that gather for activities; men organize activities, create ads for events, manage video and audio taping of events; participants attend events sponsored by the movement. Volunteerism is one major characteristic of people who support the movement. When asked why supporters give to the movement, the main responses I received were: to make better human beings as Gülen encourages; to educate youth; to please God; to earn a reward in the next life; to be part of a movement to better the world; to provide hope to the people of Turkey and around the world. While personal monetary success is not an overt motivation for giving, a number of interviewees at all socio-economic levels commented that giving to worthwhile movement projects often brings material rewards to the giver. These successes are seen as God’s blessings on those who give. It is also the case that being a supporter of the movement opens up a wide network of business opportunities. Even though the construction of schools and hospitals, for example, involves competitive bidding, often preference is given to a business run by a movement supporter if his/her bid is fair and competitive. Often supporters who own companies donate 110

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some materials and expertise, along with their bids. Business owners in the movement have also created a large, worldwide association of businessmen, TUSKON, that provides a network of contacts and training for its 10,000 members. A major unanticipated consequence of being part of a local circle as well as the movement as a whole is the sense of belonging and sociability that such close interaction and friendship provides for the supporters. Many of my interviewees said that the sohbet was the most important part of their week and that nothing was allowed to interfere with that time. It is here that they are renewed in terms of their faith, where they meet friends and establish social networks, where they network in terms of business opportunities, where they are motivated to make himmet, where they learn how their contributions are helping to remake Turkey’s society and where they are imbued with enthusiasm for the Gülen Movement. As I argue in my book,2 offering himmet or financial contributions to the projects supported by the movement provides both demonstration of their commitment but also generates commitment in so far as it makes the goals and services of the movement a personal investment.

2



Ebaugh 2009.

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The Socio-Political Dimension of the Gülen Movement Doğu Ergİl and Gürkan Çelİk All mass movements, be they religious, social or nationalist movements, generate in their adherents a readiness to be active in the public domain and a proclivity for collective actions. There is no doubt that the movements do not operate in a vacuum. Their members must adhere to the laws of the sovereign state in which they are active. Movements operate within the hierarchical political and administrative structure of the country in which they take place, and therefore, it is assumed that there is a socio-political dimension to the Gülen Movement. Although the movement has presented itself as an apolitical group, its institutions and representatives, including the leading figure Fethullah Gülen, regularly talk about the debasing, corrupting and polarising influence of politics on people. They discuss politically-sensitive issues, organise meetings or meet with politicians, and also with civil society leaders and business people in Turkey and abroad. The controversies swirling around the movement are based on the fact that Gülen’s actions, and the activities of the movement frequently attract attention in the media and political arena. Two of Gülen’s recent reactions that resonated worldwide are the stances he took after the Gezi Park protests in May 2013 and after the corruption probes in December 2013. He publicly criticised the AKP government about these issues. Given the December 17th events in 2013 and their aftermath, the movement seems to be a political actor that addresses corruption and its implications regarding the political motivations for police operations and their covert connections with bureaucracy and the judicial system. Gülen shares his opinions on events and subjects related to Turkey, the region and the events around the world through media and publications. Although Gülen repeatedly claims that the movement will not be politically active, the movement’s activism in many spheres of social life inevitably has direct or indirect implications for politics. The stance of Gülen and the movement on political issues is the most frequently asked question. The claim that a movement has no political ambition does not mean that it is a neutral actor in the public sphere. Issues such as education, economic policy, democracy and organisation of the religious realm 113

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are not neutral, they all require political choices. Organised movements influence political parties, public opinion and social life through public relations, economic activities, media outlets, and the educational institutions and other civil society organisations they create and run. In one way or another, they compete with other official and unofficial groups or organisations as to the relevance of their thoughts, activities and moral choices. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann argue that the relationship between human thought and the context within which it arises are inseparable.1 Social phenomena are products of human construction and, thus, subject to multiple, contextual, social and political influences. This chapter includes five typical cases: the International Turkish Language Olympiad, the Turkish constitutional referendum, Kurdish issues, the Taksim Gezi Park protests, and the project for bringing the Cami and Cemevi together. These examples are used to examine the movement’s activism and weight in diverse socio-political arenas. The cases may be viewed as involving the growth of Turkish civil society and its gaining ground in formerly state-dominated socio-political domains. Needless to say, the growth of civil society leads to power struggles, shifts and political adjustments that are followed by change in a mentality that was conditioned by the omnipotence of the state, so any political force that still relies on the state apparatus will come into contact and possible conflict with civil societal organisations. This is how popular democracies have been nourished. This chapter provides the necessary background from which to understand the movement’s socio-political dimension and its theoretical and practical implications, and attempts to analyse the historical and socio-political context from which the movement emerged and evolved. We discuss it from the perspective of Gülen’s biography, but particularly against the background of the role of religion, the relationship with political parties, Diyanet, the army and other political forces in Turkey. This is necessary in order to understand the socio-political context of Gülen’s ideas and the movement’s activism in the socio-political arena. What is the movement’s position on politics, and what is the nature of its activism in the political force field? Why did the movement emerge and what did it stand for? What does Gülen think about the democratisation of Turkey and its participation in the European Union (EU)? What is the role of the movement in the Kurdish issue, the movement’s relationship with the opposition parties and with the ruling AKP, particularly before and after the Gezi Park protests, the corruption scandals in 2013, and the struggle between Gülen and Erdoğan afterwards? These are some of the questions which are briefly discussed in this study. 1



Berger and Luckmann 1967.

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Historical and Socio-Political Context Since the Ottoman Reformation period (Tanzimat, which started in 1839), Turkey had been and is still plagued by many unsolved political, economic, and social problems. During the early 1920s, when the empire gave way to the republic as a part of the efforts to create a nation-state, enormous structural changes took place in Turkey. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) was the leader of the founding cadre and the first president of the Republic of Turkey created on October 29, 1923. The guiding ideology of the new regime, later called “Kemalism”, was the expectation of an elitist revolution from above to change a backward, traditional society to a modern, contemporary one. Democracy was not one of its attributes. Republicanism was delegated to the vanguard ruling elite; Westernism and secularism were the foremost ideological instruments of the new regime. The instrument of hastened change was the state. So statism, rather than popular organisation and “development from below”, was on the agenda of the republican elite which controlled the government and the regime in Turkey. This hampered the growth and effectiveness of Turkish civil society as often happens in secularising and developing countries.2 Secularism was not considered to be a sociological process through which belief and politics would occupy their independent places in the public realm but rather a state initiative through which religion would be kept under state surveillance. Nilüfer Göle views Turkish republicanism as a nation-state ideology, founded on two pillars: authoritative secularism and assimilative nationalism.3 The republican government during the 1920s and 1930s merged all powers as a measure of revolutionary change in order to modernise society, allowing little civic initiative to support the official agenda. The revolutionary zest of the government barely allowed opposition, whether in the form of multi-party politics or popular movements. That is why the ruling Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), single-handedly ruled the country from 1923 to 1950. Focussed on repressing opposition in the name of a glorified republican revolution and secularism a la Europe, all independent religious organisations and institutions were terminated, and a central administrative body was created to oversee religious education and affairs. The Administration of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) is a potent institution that owns all existing mosques in the country, and manages the body of preachers serving in these mosques as government 2



3

Çelik 2013. Göle 2005, 2006a.

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officials who are paid out of the state budget. Not only its centralized character, but Diyanet’s exclusivity as being a Sunni organisation, reflects the bias of the republican state towards religious standardisation centring on the Sunni creed. The authoritarian politics of single-party rule and the method of nation-building by denying the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic variety of the people not only led to a rift between the state and society but also galvanized society itself. Those who were favoured by the state as the “good citizens” (ethnically Turkish, secular, Muslim – of Sunni conviction – modern, western, and obedient to the state and the regime) and those who were not favoured, were cast against each other. The seeds of the contention and conflict of today were sown by the very state that aimed for union and solidarity with the wrong instruments. Turkish politics lacked the quality of pluralism and deliberation from the onset. The popular discontent among the excluded and repressed majority increased the tension between the state (and whatever political group wielded it temporarily) and was choked with coups or military threats that recurred every ten years from 1960. Şerif Mardin discusses many of the concepts – centre versus periphery, elite versus the mass, military versus civilian, and so on – that in this process of the construction of the modern state overlap with the official policy of creating a standardised society, a creature of the state elite.4 Even its religion was to be shaped and managed centrally. However, Turkey grew in size and wealth. Civil society grew as well, reflecting the rich cultural diversity it possessed. In the meantime the omnipotent state began to lose its power and grip on society because it could not meet its promise of being an internationally competitive power, providing wealth, justice and freedom for its people. The easiest context in which such organisations could burgeon was that of religion, rather than politics, which was under the direct control of the central authority. Religion was a universally legitimate institution which no political authority could deny. Later, initial civic organisations emerged under the protection of religion to expand into the other fields or activities of social life. In 1950, for the first time in republican history, democratic elections were held. Between 1950 and 1960, the Democratic Party (DP) that came to power was systematically supported by various religious groups, liberal urbanites and the emerging business class.5 Gradually, a more liberal political atmosphere emerged in Turkey. 4



5

Mardin 1998. A new breed of traditional businessmen who were raised in the religious atmosphere of rural Turkey have emerged, a new entrepreneurial class with little support from

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By virtue of the support of the majority who wanted less government control of their private life, the DP managed to remove several bans on religious life – for example, freedom of religious education was instituted, and the Arabic call to prayer (ezan) was made optional. Such moves were perceived as dangerous for the regime and their control of society as the guiding elite, leading the first military coup of 1960. The leader of the DP, and the then Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, were executed, together with two other cabinet ministers, based on an arbitrary verdict by a special (political) court. In 1962, the constitution brought back the Kemalist bureaucracy, at the core of which was the military, as the tutelary power of the regime until the 2000s. Even the following coups of 1971 and 1980 could not keep society on a leash. Civil society began to exert itself first in the form of right-wing and left-wing organisations, as well as a variety of other socio-political formations that had no tradition of reconciliation and partnership.6 As a result, contention and conflict between the right and left groups were intensified in society. Society was dramatically fragmented. It is in this context that Fethullah Gülen and his initiatives grew up and matured.7 As a state preacher, he set out to make a difference by example in his own person and later in the lives of his fellow countrymen by way of promoting a morality based on selflessness and reaching out to others.8 The instruments of this spiritual quest were quite worldly, namely the promotion of education and economic entrepreneurship. Both were the means of empowerment of the individual and solidarity groups created by likeminded followers. Unlike Necmettin Erbakan, the most renowned leader of political Islam9 in Turkey, Prime Minister from June 1996 to June 1997, from the

6

8 7

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the state. They have recently been the driving force of Turkish economic growth and the internalization of her economy. This new class, which is commonly referred to as the “Anatolian Tigers,” has greatly contributed to Turkey’s rapid economic growth and the inclusion of a large number of its peripheral population groups. The political dynamism they have contributed has brought the AKP to power and kept it there, with three consecutive electoral victories in the last eleven years (since the foundation of AKP in 2002). Çelik 2013: 252. See also Mercan 2008; Ergene 2008; Yavuz and Esposito 2003. Altruism and living for others (baskası için yaşama) are two central principles of Gülen, which enable one to live a life dedicated to an ultimate goal (a gaye-i hayal). A sense of personal responsibility (mes’uliyet duygusu) and a spirit of devotion (adanmışlık ruhu) are two other important mobilising factors, which enable one to make it one’s grand purpose to serve others. The Milli Görüş (National View) is an effort to revive the Ottoman “millet system” where nations were defined as religious communities. It positioned itself against the secular republicanism of the nation-state. Its founder, Necmettin Erbakan, may

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beginning of the movement in the late 1960s, Gülen frequently articulated his opposition of the idea of an Islamic political party.10 To Gülen, such Islamic activism created social and political disputes, and therefore, he offered new readings of religious texts which catalysed voluntarism, an appreciation for worldly ascetics, and a type of universalism that articulated with current local-national values and practices. Gülen developed a religious discourse and style of piety that has attracted a network of sympathizers inside and outside Turkey. He inspired a transnational civic faith-based and human-oriented movement in tune with the contemporary international standards of democracy and civil liberties – including educational institutions ranging from primary schools to universities, many media outlets, business networks, interfaith dialogue forums, and opportunities for multicultural encounters. He is considered by many to be a social reformer, who has developed a new sense of religiosity in touch with modern realities.11 His thoughts, although originating in Islam, may be easily placed within the more general definition of contemporary spirituality that is an amalgam of the shared values and practices of “good conduct” in most religions. Since the 1980s, the movement’s participants12 have attempted to embody his interpretation of Islam through their educational and dialoguebased initiatives in secular Western societies. Hakan Yavuz explains the movement’s activism as the “coming out” of the private Muslim identity be labelled the initiator of the movement that is called today “political Islam” in the Turkish context. The Milli Görüş movement was recently suppressed by the secular elite and governments, changing names and reappearing on the political stage. Its banner was recently picked up, but the AKP has publicly announced that it has dropped its claim of “political Islam” and reveres Islam only as a source of morality and social cohesion, convincing only a portion of the populace. 10 Foreign Policy 2008. www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4408, Retrieved on 21 October 2013. 11 Çelik and Alan 2013. 12 In this chapter, movement participants refers to people who are inspired and influenced by Gülen’s teaching. We prefer to use the term participant or sympathiser, rather than member, because the term member may imply a kind of formal organisation, which does not exist as regards the Gülen movement. There are, however, a number of “elder brothers” (büyük abiler) who offer a certain amount of knowledge about Gülen’s teaching and practices. Most are his students and have known him personally for a long time. They speak informally to people in the movement about their projects and activities. People who participate in consultation (istişare) meetings and local small circles (sohbets) can be viewed as the active participants of the movement. The international Hizmet Movement is not a formal organisation that is traceable on paper. It is a network that is built on the principles and disciplines of Gülen. The media, education and business organisations founded by people who are inspired by him, have a division of labour organised as independent foundations and associations with common goals and moral principles.

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into the public arena.13 Bülent Aras and Ömer Laçiner suggest that Gülen appeared on the socio-political scene at a time when the Turkish government was desperately seeking to balance more radical Islamist movements.14 In its various discourses, the movement communicated respect for the state, while the state in turn tried to use the movement as a potential counterweight to the ever-present communist threat – although the relationship between the state and the movement was frequently disrupted, especially when the shadow of the military fell onto the government. In summary, the Gülen Movement may be defined as an area of associational life with various social, economic, educational, cultural and political functions. Civil society organisations generally do not pursue political goals, but their activities can overlap with political institutions, and the result of their activities may have political consequences.15 The Gülen Movement is no exemption to this state of affairs.

The Socio-Political Transitions As a result of social and political changes and the new legal frameworks in Turkey, the Gülen Movement has undergone several transitions. It has evolved from a faith-based community (cemaat) into a faith-inspired social movement. In other words, its focus has changed from a religious to the formation of a global social network.16 These transitions and changes can be generally categorised into four successive development stages, since the inception of the Gülen Movement in the 1960s. This categorisation is based on a combination of Gülen’s ideas and the movement’s transformation in the face of major turning points at the national and international levels, such as military coups in Turkey and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The first stage encompasses the period spanning from the late 1960s up to the 1980-1983 period when the weight of military rule was heavily felt in Turkey. In these nurturing and planning years, Gülen gave numerous talks, sermons, and a series of conference speeches at gatherings organised by his followers and sympathisers in Turkey and abroad. The formation of reading groups and summer camps in Izmir and other Anatolian cities also marks the formative stage of the movement. These activities enabled him to reach a wider audience and a more diverse cross section of the population. 13

Yavuz 2004: 223. Aras 1998; Laçiner 2012; see also the interview of Taha Akyol and Cengiz Çandar with Fethullah Gülen. NTV. 1998, 27 February. “Fethullah Gülen, NTV’ de Taha Akyol ve Cengiz Çandar’ın konuğu.” and , retrieved on 21 October 2013. 15 Çelik 2013. 16 Ebaugh 2010: 27-8; Çelik 2010: 49-53; Yavuz 2003: 19-47. 14

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In this embryonic period, Gülen advised the founding of student hostels for the needy and the establishment of Işık Evler (Light Houses) as enlightenment centres in various provinces of Anatolia, the Turkish heartland. Light Houses, which still exist, are to provide students with a home, a network of friends, and a daily routine that makes it easier for them to abstain from irreligiously immoral acts, and maintain a spiritual lifestyle. The Light Houses are rented to students and have, on average, between five to seven inhabitants. Some suggest that these houses play a crucial role in recruiting new participants to the movement because there are so many poor male and female students who do not have access to education without support.17 Some parents fear that their children may be misled in the modern atmosphere of the cities and such houses are safe havens for culturally conservative and pious youth. For the secular, modernist elite, however, such initiatives were aimed at raising a radical religious army of youth to challenge the secular nature of the regime. Gülen was arrested for his activities amidst the general military crackdown on politically motivated Islamists and leftists following the coup of March 1971. He was accused of indoctrinating his students in Islamist propaganda, antithetical to the secular state, the ultimate definition of “national security.” He was acquitted and charges were dropped after six months of prosecution, regaining his post as a preacher (government employee) in Izmir, where he remained until 1980. The second stage of the movement began in 1981 when Gülen retired as an official preacher (vaiz). After the termination of the military government in 1983, the movement gradually enlarged its goals and evolved as an education movement. Throughout the 1980s, Gülen and his followers among the new Anatolian bourgeoisie began to invest in education by establishing schools and learning institutions across Anatolia.18 Hakan Yavuz argues that, owing to the very difficult political conditions in the 1980s, the Gülen Movement put its vision of producing a golden generation into practice by utilising new political, legal and economic opportunities.19 After a relatively more relaxed period of the post-coup years (1983 and afterward), the movement developed close ties with state institutions and became involved in economic, cultural, and media activities. Gülen supported the liberalisation efforts of Turgut Özal, first as Prime Minister, and later President of Turkey. Gülen believed in free and fair trade and thus defended entrepreneurship and the acquisition of wealth provided it 17

Toguslu 2009. In his dissertation, Toguslu studied the Light Houses and their role in the construction of a Muslim habitus. 18 Hendrick 2006: 23. 19 Yavuz 2003: 35.

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was done honestly and its benefits were shared with others, raising the living standards of all. The third phase commenced in the 1990s and extends to Gülen’s permanent residence in the United States of America (USA) from 2001. By this time he had concluded that the system in Turkey was not fit to empower the individual and to bring peace to different ethnic and confessional groups. National education in every society was an introverted process through which nationalists were raised, rather than universalists equipped with humanitarian ideas and ideals. This assessment led Gülen to place more emphasis on international educational encounters and dialogue activities among the adherents of different religions. To this end, Gülen visited and received leading figures, not only from Turkey but from all over the world. Dialogue and mutual understanding became the cornerstone of the Gülen Movement. On February 28, 1997, the army mounted a “soft coup” bringing down the incumbent coalition government. Branded as a religious reactionary and a liability for the secular state, the main partner of the government (Erbakan’s Refah Party) was forced down and soon annulled. The February 28 military intervention was not limited to the removal of the Refah Party but also served as a process of monitoring, controlling, and criminalising all Islamic activism as a security threat. The February 28 intervention process in 1997 is described as a “post-modern coup” because the military mobilised other sections of society in its support. Business associations, media cartels, university staff, members of the judiciary and the bureaucracy were organised as a putschist network. Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Refah Party and the Prime Minister, was forced to resign, and Fethullah Gülen also became a target of wrath. A warrant was issued for Gülen’s arrest. At the time, he was in the United States receiving treatment for a heart condition. He has remained in the US since then. The fourth phase of the Gülen Movement began in the new millennium and extends to the present. Hakan Yavuz identifies Gülen’s exile in Pennsylvania as a significant stepping-stone in Gülen’s intellectual evolution.20 Indeed, Gülen developed a more global perspective of things which has also reflected on the mentality of the movement. The movement’s concerns expanded to cover not only countries, but continents. Local and national issues were not abandoned but global issues began to shape the movement’s activities and philosophy. The existence of a cultural pluralism that began to act in the international theatre made the movement more pluralist and liberal. Jeremy Walton sees liberalism as a 20

Yavuz 2003: 43.

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disciplining power within the Gülen Movement.21 The movement seems to be embedded between liberal political projects and secular societies. Gülen associates try to build new networks in the societies in which they operate. They show interest in bringing different national, ethnic and religious groups around mutual humanitarian causes and attempt to generate synergy for common causes. They respect diversity and aim to find out and build on the common good and contacts for the ongoing realignment of public, private and civil society groups. Today, the participants of the movement carry out voluntary and professional work in more than 170 countries.22 In fact what the Gülen followers do is to increase the capacity of civil society by empowering individuals through education, economic efficacy and access to knowledge.

An Influential Socio-Political Force Field Actor Although Gülen does not discourage his followers from being politically active as individuals, he believes that the movement’s involvement in a political group would lead to divisions between participants and make the movement a party to the sundry conflicts in society. It is because of this that the movement has reportedly stayed away from politics, however, the movement has not kept its distance from political parties and strongly supported the AKP from 2002 until 2011. Since 2011, the Gülen Movement has been the AKP’s biggest enemy in the national and international arena. This has become more visible in public sphere after the corruption scandals in December 2013. The movement related politicians within the AKP, such as former footballer Hakan Şükür, resigned from Erdogan’s AKP. The tensions between the AKP and the Gülen Movement became tangible and sensitive when both groups attempt to survive. For example, in February 2015, the Turkish governmental banking watchdog – the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK) – seized control of Bank Asya, which is affiliated with the Gülen Movement. This exemplifies the power struggle between the AKP and the movement. The movement does not publicly adhere to a particular political ideology, but criticises government policy or encourages governments in their quest for democratization, good governance and economic development. The movement does not have a policy of supporting a particular political leader or party as a whole, but it is generally known that the movement’s participants supported the Islamic AKP rather the 21

Jeremy F. Walton (2013). “Is Hizmet Liberal?” Mediations and Disciplines of Islam and Liberalism among Gülen Organisations in Istanbul, Sociology of Islam, 1: 145164. DOI 10.1163/22131418-00104003. 22 ‘Heyecan, Cesaret, Ortak Akıl ve Zafer,’ 357. Nağme. 11 September 2013; ‘Yolumuz ve Üslubumuz,’ Bamteli, 353. Nağme. 2 September 2013; derived from www.herkul.org.

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MHP and CHP between 2002 and 2011. The situation since then has drastically changed and seems to be very turbulent. Being active in the public realm and dealing with issues that concern large segments of the society requires capacity and power, not necessarily political power but the power of persuasion and enough public support for the projects carried out and to generate the necessary economic means to make social movements formidable social actors. They are taken seriously by political groups or parties, and governments heed them. This may be though of as indirect political power with the ability to exert influence rather than challenge the authorities, especially governments. It also has a downside. The government can use state power to oppress a people or group which does not support the ruling political power. For example, the AKP has changed the law on the tutorial study centres for university exams in Turkey to minimise the influence of Gülen in Turkish society and attempt to close Gülen schools throughout the world. Gülen has shared his views on social issues with a number of administrators and political leaders in Turkey. He stated in a conversation that: We are in equal proximity to all parties. I am not saying equal distance, we are in equal proximity. Because all the followers and sympathizers of every party are our people. People’s parties and people’s political ideas are not barriers to our being friends with them.23

This quotation from Fethullah Gülen sounds like political rhetoric, because it is known that the distance between the Gülen Movement and AKP and BDP (The Peace and Democracy Party, Turkish: Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi) is not equal. Basically, the movement supports progress and democratisation. Any party that is perceived as capable of this is favoured by the adherents of the movement. The main aim of the Gülen Movement, however, is building civic capacity from the bottom up through education, dialogue, economic enterprise and the dissemination of information. The general consensus is that the movement, in the person of Fethullah Gülen, is above party politics in a principled way. This is evident from the relationships he has developed with the heads of political parties ranging from right to left. As the movement grew in strength and followership, especially with Turgut Özal’s government, the Gülen Movement became a more powerful actor in the Turkish context. In the 1990s, Gülen had close relations with Turgut Özal, the then Prime Minister and later President. With Özal’s assistance, Gülen presented himself as an advocate for a modern, forward-looking, and state-sympathetic Islam. The symbiosis of the Gülen Movement and the state remained intact for a 23

Gülen 2004: 125.

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long time. In the mid-1990s, Gülen was still generally seen by the political establishment as the “acceptable face of moderate Islam,”24 and politicians across the spectrum, from the right to the left, praised him and did not refrain from meeting him publicly. The political scene changed drastically in 2001. Parties of “old Turkey” were washed away and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), won the 2002 elections to hold the majority in the Turkish Parliament. Due to its successive electoral victories (repeated in 2007 and 2011), the AKP has not lost its superior position in the political arena. Both the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic are elected from among its ranks. Although the AKP comes from an Islamic tradition, represented by the Refah Party and its predecessors, that kept its distance from the Gülen Movement for being too urban, modern and state-friendly, most participants in the movement voted for the AKP, believing that it was the closest political party to its cultural values and progressive character. The chief editor of the movement’s newspaper Zaman, Ekrem Dumanlı, explained the move to support the AKP as a way to protect democracy against authoritarian assaults.25 This stance once again reveals the truth, that although the movement publicly distances itself from party politics, it exerts an influence on political parties, elected politicians and governments as a powerful civic organisation with activities in many walks of life. It could not be otherwise given the nature of politics. The novelty of this study is the inclusion of five typical cases which give evidence to explain the intertwining of the movement’s activism and its socio-political implications.

1.  International Turkish Language Olympiad The International Turkish Olympiad (Uluslararası Türkçe Olimpiyatları), which is organised by the International Turkish Education Association (TURKCEDER),26 is one of the transnational manifestations of the Gülen Movement. It is an annual competition in the Turkish language that has taken place since 2003. Every year, the movement brings together thousands of foreign students, especially from Turkish schools 24

Aras and Çaha 2000. Dumanlı 2000. 26 www.turkceder.org. Lately, the movement has changed the vision of this festival to unite all nations of the world with universal human values. Since 2012, it has been organized under the name of International Festival of Language & Culture (iflc). It is their mission “to rise on the wings of art and music and promote peace, love, and cultural encounters throught the world.” See www.intflc.org. 25

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and cultural centres established by the movement, throughout the world.27 Students from over 160 countries compete in singing and poetry recitation contests, fascinating audiences with their outstanding performances of popular Turkish songs and well-known Turkish poems. The formal mission of this transnational activity is to contribute to the linguistic and cultural diversity of Turkey, by encouraging and motivating students of all ages to showcase their knowledge and skills in Turkish language and culture. The Olympiads were criticised for not including the linguistic diversity of the country, because they do not include Kurdish, Laz, Armenian, Greek or Zazaki languages, for example. In response to this criticism, Kurdish and Arabic songs were also performed during the Olympiads in 2011 and 2012. The years following many languages – it depends on where it is organized – local languages are integrated as well as Turkish. The frequently asked question is whether this international event in Turkish is a socio-political or socio-cultural activity. Based on his longstanding studies, Michael Byram argues that if it is not directly language teaching than it is indirectly a political action.28 Language teaching abroad is a useful way to spread a national culture outside its own borders. It is a direct acculturation process through which other forms of influence may be transferred. For example, relationships that develop between the teachers and administrators of schools with local and central authorities ease the acceptance of different cultures in those countries. Turkish businessmen find local partners and markets easily. More than anything else, however, students who graduate from international Gülen inspired schools become natural emissaries of Turkey in their countries. As they become more entrenched in the power structure of their respective countries they become voluntary bridges between Turkey and their countries. The development of human capital and cultural ambassadors in other countries is a wise and profitable investment in the future on Turkey’s part. The movement’s Turkish language teaching is therefore not altogether a cultural endeavour. In the movement’s mission, the education of the human being is at the centre of its every project and activity.

2.  Turkish Constitutional Referendum Another example of the movement’s political engagement is the Turkish Constitutional Referendum held in 2010. After the military coup of 12 September 1980, a new constitution was drafted, designed by the military junta in power. This constitution was a document that 27

Each year, about 15,000 students around the world prepare for the Olympiads, but only the finalists who win at national competitions are invited to attend the huge international competition in Turkey. 28 Byram 2001.

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guaranteed the tutelage of the bureaucracy and military guardianship of the system. Thirty years later, a referendum on a number of amendments to that constitution was held in Turkey, on 12 September 2010. The referendum results showed that the majority supported the constitutional amendments, with 58% in favour and 42% against. The changes were aimed at bringing the constitution into compliance with European Union (EU) standards. Supporters of Turkey’s EU membership hoped that the impending constitutional reform would facilitate the membership process. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the movement publicly gave full support to the efforts of the ruling AKP in the referendum process. It was the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist People’s Party (MHP) that opposed the process. Gülen came out to declare his full support for the referendum in the name of democracy and deliverance of the state from the tutelage of the military and bureaucracy.29 Gülen’s desire for a “yes” vote was strongly criticised in media and political quarters, and was interpreted as the politicisation of the movement.30 It was obvious, however, that this was not an election that necessitated the support of a particular political party. This was a critical process in Turkey’s retarded democratisation and dissociation of the state and civil society.

3.  Kurdish Issue Sharing the ideal of democracy and the same religious faith are two goals that the Hizmet movement has in common with the Kurds, whose cultural identities have been denied and manifestations prohibited in the public sphere. While supporting Kurdish claims of cultural and civic rights, the movement stood steadfast against any form of political violence. Being a pacific himself, Gülen and the movement seem to endorse Kurdish claims of basic rights and freedoms because they were human beings and citizens. Conversely some argue that in many fields there is cooperation between the Gülen Movement and BBB (Büyük Birlik Partisi, Turkish: Grand Unity Party), the extreme nationalist rights party in Turkey. The armed political organisation PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdish: Kurdistan Workers’ Party) saw this stance as a form of co-optation, however, and subsuming Kurdish identity in the pool of Islamic communalism or fraternity. The Gülen Movement’s stance concerning the Kurds was not different from its position concerning other minorities. The movement believed in cultural pluralism and equal citizenship. Differences can be 29

Günter Seufert 2014. Fethullah Gülen, ‘Kuvvetin Çılgınlığı ve Referandum Fırsatı. Bamteli.’ 2 August 2013; derived from www.herkul.org.

30

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mitigated and managed through dialogue and good governance. As long as the government thought the same way, the Gülen Movement supported government initiatives, but it has also carried out its own activities and services in the Kurdish provinces. Hostels, schools, and training courses all helped to empower and to integrate the Kurdish youth. Gülen and the movement supported the AKP government’s policy of reconciling with the Kurds and ending the 30 year armed conflict. All these efforts were looked upon as suspicious by the PKK; as Trojan Horse tactics and a threat to its monopolistic grip on Turkey’s Kurds. The PKK attempts to control the Kurdish population rather than leading and managing them by consent and competence. Given this information it can be said that the Gülen Movement attempted to contribute to the normalisation of Turkish-Kurdish relations in Turkey and the region, which is a breeding ground of ethnic and sectarian tensions. Despite differences in method, and the government’s ability to utilise all state institutions in the peace process with the Kurds, the movement has been acted as a player to normalise relationships. The biggest difference is that the latter uses “soft instruments” that ease the process.31 Almost every town in south-eastern Turkey now has a Gülen school, and the students from these schools win many prizes in academic and sporting activities. The Gülen Movement has also been active in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) section of Iraq for more than two decades, building bridges between Turkey’s and Iraq’s Kurds, to bring them together. The movement opened its first school over fifteen years ago, and there are now more than fifteen. In November 2008, the Gülen Movement founded its first university in Erbil, the capital of the KRG. The movement has also established the first private Kurdish television channel (Dunya TV). Critics find the movement’s perspective on Turkey’s Kurdish question assimilationist. The content of some TV movies in Hizmet-affiliated media draw much criticism in this regard. By pro-actively supporting Kurdish reforms in the region, however, the movement has developed a progressive attitude. The movement’s recent scepticism about the peace process is largely due to the methods: The AKP government’s negotiations with the PKK should be restrained to disarmament issues, not socio-cultural rights. Thus, the movement asked the government to consult other civil actors including the Hizmet organizations in the region, instead of recognizing the PKK as “the” legitimate advocate of all Kurds.32 31

Ergil 2009. Gurbuz 2015a, 2015b, forthcoming.

32

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4.  Taksim Gezi Park Protests The incipient friction between the movement and the AKP government due to the latter’s perception of intrusion in government affairs developed further with the spontaneous Gezi Park protests that erupted in Istanbul on 28 May, 2013. Since then there has been a distance between the participants of the movement and the AKP rank and file, although the souring sentiments are not publicised. The initial public outburst in Istanbul was led by environmentalists, opposing the replacement of a rare green zone in the congested city, the Taksim Gezi Park, with a replica of the historic Ottoman Military Barracks (demolished in 1940) that would house a huge shopping mall, and luxury residences on its upper floors. Cutting down the trees was opposed by environmentally sensitive townspeople who were soon joined by a crowd of mainly young people who sociologists call the “y generation.”33 These were urban, modern, highly educated young professionals who got together thorough the social media and shared the same concerns and civic values. What was not properly grasped by the government was that these people were the product of the ten years of economic and social development achieved during AKP rule. They differed from the AKP youth only in lacking allegiance to a party, and rather than believing in collective existence they were adamant in defending their individual rights and keen on respect for privacy. They therefore did not like being told what to do in their private lives, something the AKP leadership had not been sensitive about. The initial protestors had no leadership or organisation. They were a group of mainly young people who harboured universal values and wanted these values to burgeon in their city and country. They felt that they had the right to demand this as citizens, and that the source of their legitimacy was ingrained in the Constitution. The violent political reaction led to such resentment that the government’s popularity fell by almost seven percentage points.34 Soon after, all the opposition groups who had no real influence in the political arena entered Taksim square and the nature of the demonstrations changed to destructive protests and clashes with the police, not only in the square, but in many cities of the country. The Taksim protests were the creation of an unsuccessful opposition (an amalgam of different organisations) that could not find enough popular support and were acting out violently. The government (especially the Prime Minister) used this expediently to evoke the fear of chaos, at a time “when everything was 33

Tulgan 2009. Monthly public opinion poll conducted by MetroPOOL. See Today’s Zaman 16 June 2013: ‘Survey reveals growing public apprehension over democratic process.’

34

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going well in the country.” The conspiracy theory claimed that the Gezi incident was not a home grown protest movement but the plot of the foreign forces and their local accomplices to destabilize Turkey. This rather simplistic rhetoric was accepted by the AKP grassroots and their supporters and the 7% lost support returned to carry the popularity level of the party to nearly 50% at the end of July 2013. Instead of cooling down what was an originally peaceful civic protest, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan kindled the issue through a number of inflammatory speeches, widening the gap between his party supporters and those who opposed it/him. This was a calculated political move to solidify the AKP support base and to differentiate it from the “others.” Gülen made remarks concerning the birth of a new Turkey and that the Gezi incident reflected its spirit. He criticised the government’s harsh action and intolerant rhetoric. He recommended reducing the separations before they escalated and spread further. He called on the government to try to understand why the incident took place. He advised against exaggerating civic demands as wide-scale uprisings, and not to react to them as harshly as the government had done. Instead, he suggested wisdom in order to understand what happened, and a moderate reaction. Gülen argued that the government failed to admit that some of the protesters were seeking their rights; these were “innocent demands of innocent people.”35 The Gezi Park protest and Gülen’s reaction to it attracted great attention in the international media and across the political spectrum in Turkey and abroad. Given the inaptitude of institutional opposition (political parties) and the hegemonic role of the AKP, few people expected such a potent and spontaneous criticism of the government and its practices. Used as a model for the Arab awakening, protests in this manner came as a surprise to many within and without the country. There is no doubt that the government was seriously disturbed, and its perception of threat from the Gülen Movement was further reinforced. This incident is a vivid example of the movement’s indirect involvement in politics, as a major civic actor.

5.  Bringing the Cami and Cemevi Together Another clear example is the project born out of Gülen’s personal initiative of building a cami (mosque) and a cemevi (Alevi place of worship) together as a single complex. So far, the AKP government has been reluctant to acknowledging the cemevi as a place of worship for the Alevis, although this has been the main wish of millions of Alevi citizens

35

Gülen, ‘Taksim Gezi Parki Hadiseleri ve Problemlerin Temeli,’ 323. Nağme, 6 June 2013; derived from www.herkul.org.

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of the country. The AKP government’s emphasis on the Sunni creed, like that of the previous secular governments, has inhibited them from accepting any shrine other than the mosque. The mosque-cemevi cohabitation is the first multi-cultural complex of its kind in Turkey. The opening ceremony was held in Ankara on 8 September 2013 with the participation of many public figures from a variety of political and confessional affiliations. Gülen, who is a Sunni himself, launched this project to cultivate a culture of coexistence and reconciliation. The initiative came at a time when Sunni-Alevi grievances were growing in Turkey, partly because of Turkey’s intervention in Syrian affairs (civil-war), ruled by an Alevi minority. Alevis, a large religious minority, have been both oppressed by the state since Ottoman times and seen as a deviant group by the Sunnis who have constituted the bulk of the Turkish population. The AKP, with its Sunni emphasis, has adopted both prejudicial stances, making the Alevis feel excluded and discriminated against. Gülen believes that an unhappy part of the population will erode social solidarity and political unity, so he and his followers have initiated a trend of reconciliation so far neglected by the state. There have been reactions to the project, especially among some of the Alevis. These are groups who believe that Alevism is a separate creed to that of Islam, and that the project will only encourage Alevis assimilation into Sunnism. In fact, with this project Gülen wants to contribute to the process of “normalisation” that can only be realised with the acknowledgement of the cultural and ethnic diversity of the country. The repression and denial of cultural richness has led to a fabrication of unity and uniformity that never was. Repression and exclusion have created an imaginary homogeneous society, the politics of which were based on assumptions and social engineering. Gülen felt that it was time to go back to the normal – what is, rather than what ought to be. The aforementioned project was one of his ideas to this effect. In sum, all five examples given here support the argument that the Gülen Movement is considerably involved with major issues that have political consequences because they are all related to public life. From time to time the movement’s views and deeds contradict those of other political actors and the government alike. This is only normal because the Gülen Movement is a civic social body with a mind and projects of its own. At this point it is proper to ask whether the movement has a spokesman or a kind of “ideas/news outlet” to inform the public of its ideas, projects and stance on a number of relevant issues. It is generally Gülen himself who expresses his views on issues directly, especially through www.herkul. org. This is rare and only takes place at critical moments. Otherwise, the 130

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Zaman daily newspaper, with the biggest readership in Turkey, sets the tone of the movement’s inclinations.36 Some of its columnists function as opinion-makers and pace setters. Samanyolu TV is another venue.37 Institutionally, the Journalist and Writers Foundation38 is the closest body to the definition of an “information bureau” of the movement that reflects the views and variety of activities that the Gülen Movement sets in motion.

Claims about Political Engagement Despite his seemingly innocuous teachings and constructive activities since its inception in the 1960s, Gülen’s thoughts and practices are contested and criticised in Turkey for several reasons. The movement’s interreligious activities are viewed by opponents as a “fifth column” endeavour of foreign actors. The secularists are seeking for signs of efforts to bring in sharia law and to undermine the secular state. Nationalists find the movement too global and pluralist. Incumbent governments (of all sorts) suspect that the movement will eventually appear as a formidable competitor.39 Such criticisms have not inhibited the growth and popularity of the movement, however, because its activities have touched the life of a variety of groups positively, including non-Turks and non-Muslims. Another line of criticism is the movement’s vague position on the equal status of women within the movement. Whatever the men may prefer in this respect, the drive of the movement’s women for access to higher education and to take part in social and professional life has not been inhibited. The conservative bias concerning women’s place in society is the residue of the traditional values of a rural society carried into the cities with the migration that many of the participants of the movement have undergone in their lifetimes or those of their parents. In this respect, it is also important to note that Turkey is still a male-dominated society compared to its European countries.40 The movement is often described as carrying a hidden agenda of secretly infiltrating the state apparatus and one day seizing power, to which opinion leaders have several answers. Yes, the movement is religiously inspired but it drives a moral philosophy and values, is supportive of solidarity 36

Zaman is a leading daily newspaper with more than ten different language editions, sometimes in a bilingual format. Today’s Zaman appears in English and is the largest English-language newspaper in Turkey. 37 Samanyolu Yayın Grubu (Samanyolu Broadcasting Group) located in Istanbul is the umbrella organisation of the TV channels and the radio stations, including their internet services. See for more information: www.samanyolu.tv and www.kure.tv. 38 www.gyv.org.tr. 39 Yavuz 2013; Harrington 2011; Çelik 2010: 179-180. 40 Hofstede 1994.

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among believers and cooperation between other religious groups. For Gülen and his followers, Islam is not a recipe for political action but rather for moral conduct that is expressed not in words but through exemplary deeds. With respect to its political activism, the movement is inclusive and reconciliatory. If politics fail and go awry, people may blame the movement. That is why the movement as a whole shuns taking direct part in politics or lending full support to any single party. The two major acts of the movement, personally headed by Gülen, were publicly announcing its supportive position in the constitutional amendment referendum of 2010 and the current “peace process” set in motion to address the long-standing Kurdish problem. Are these two moves political acts? Indirectly yes, but which citizen or social group can remain indifferent to major developments that affect the lives of all? The overall position of the Gülen Movement has been in the direction of expanding fundamental rights and freedoms, promoting the rule of law and good governance. All of these positions generate political results and this is inevitable. In relation to this, it could be said that the views and criticisms of the Gülen Movement are shaped by the national and local context in which the movement operates. Its emergence has been derived from the specific historical and social context in Turkey, but in due course, the ideas have transcended the specific local context and have assumed a global pretention and manifestation. Global phenomena manifest themselves in specific ways in local situations.41 This provides the Gülen Movement with a degree of diversity and flexibility and allows for various practices to develop that can manifest differences in terms of nuances and points of emphasis. Historical conditions, disparate settings, socio-cultural characteristics, language, and so forth are all factors that can help develop and produce particular idiosyncratic practices unique to a particular country.

‘With Accession, Europe Would Know Us Better’ The above statement was made by Gülen. He has been an ardent supporter of Turkey’s EU accession for the very reasons that the movement indirectly affects the political process in Turkey: EU’s legal, political and economic standards would yield a more developed, more peaceful and democratic country. Watching the old Communist countries of Eastern Europe become EU members while Turkey has been stuck in the waiting list is shameful for Gülen. It was not that the last comers were prepared to be members, but that they did not quarrel

41

Geertz 1971.

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with Brussels about adopting the laws and procedures ingrained in the Union’s charters as Ankara did. Indeed, successive governments of Turkey have perceived the major changes to be brought by membership as handing the key of the castle to a foreign party. They resisted many of the reforms to be made, and raising the standards of governance. While politicians tried to hide this aspect of the encounter with the EU, they sold the issue as the resistance of Europe to Turkey’s accession because it was a member of a different religion and culture. Believing firmly in the reconciliation of cultures, Gülen encouraged his followers to support Turkey’s accession to the EU. In this sense, Gülen has been more honest and forthcoming in favour of Turkey’s membership. He believes this liaison will advance Turkey and break the bureaucratic shackles that have held Turkey back in the name of preserving the virtues of the nation state. For him, the Turkish nation will increase its credibility in a part of the world where people have risen up to claim their democratic rights and to demand responsible, accountable government with EU membership. He is on record as saying: I have been in favour of EU membership for a long time. That is, even when some people said that it is a ‘Christian Club’, I have replied, ‘Let those who have suspicions about their own creed and religiosity be concerned’, I would rather be on familiar terms with Europe. As a member nation I could better explain myself and acquaint them [Europeans] with my culture. Then perhaps, they would know us better. But if some of us have doubts about their own conviction, with the belief that, ‘If we get involved [with Europe], we will become Christians’ [it is because they suspect the strength of their own conviction]. I have never had that fear and from the onset said “yes” to the EU. Since the declaration of the Republic, being in line with Europe and European standards has been the dream of generations. This dream, to a certain degree, seems to have come true and in my mind Turkey is on the track of membership. Many government leaders – regardless of the parties they belonged to – have supported this bid and have brought it to a certain point. Who knows, perhaps putting down the final point will rest with this civil initiative [Hizmet]. They will wind it up and this job will be completed. […] In my opinion, the EU membership is something that the Turkish people long for. I hope it comes true [through] negotiations, as soon as possible. [I have no doubt that] at a certain period, they [the EU] will accept us as a member, and this issue will [be history] with all the gossips surrounding it.42

It is evident that Gülen – and the Hizmet movement – supports Turkish efforts towards joining the EU and maintains that this relationship will benefit both parties. Turkey’s democratization efforts and peaceful relations with its neighbourhood in the Balkans, the Middle East and the 42

Gülen in Bilici 2001.

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Caucasus will lend credibility to her bid for membership. This is why Gülen wants Turkey to come out via “soft power” instruments, including culture and economy, rather than “hard power” practices that may cause problems, as they have done recently. Fethullah Gülen has personally pointed out to Doğu Ergil the resemblance of Turkey to the birth of the Hellenistic period after Alexander the Great’s advance in Asia, bringing the European (Greek and Asiatic) cultures together and leading to a new amalgamation. Similarly, Turkey’s membership in the EU may yield a new civilizational mix rather than leading to a clash of civilisations. He sincerely believes in this project, as attested by his incessant encouragement of Turkish academics, businessmen and professionals to go to distant corners of the world and to carry their culture there, while bringing other cultures back to their country in order to create a hybrid world where nothing is alien or hostile.43

Conclusion and Discussion This chapter has attempted to provide an outline of the socio-political implications of Gülen and the movement he initiated. The socio-political dimensions of the movement remain open for discussion and analysis. Some people believe that modernity is dulled by religion. In contrast, Gülen holds the conviction that modernity is inevitable but it needs a soul. Islam, as a chest of values, may provide valuable input into contemporary civilisation. Gülen disagrees with claims that Islam is incompatible with democracy and contemporary civilisation. However he agrees with the argument that political Islam (as with any politicized religion) is incompatible with democracy and peaceful coexistence that uphold civilisation. The claim to rule in the name of the people is replaced by ruling in the name of a deity, and this is a deviation from the very essence of religion. We can argue that religious activism in the public and political arenas whether religion binds or breaks modern society is questionable. In addition, political parties and their affiliated civil society organizations tend to use public symbolism of Islam. The Gülen Movement and the ruling AKP demonstrate “cultural battles in Turkey.”44 Initially, there was an understanding between the movement and the AKP, in keeping religion out of daily politics and accepting it as a supra-identity that would facilitate cohesion among Muslims. Over time, however, the AKP moved away from this stance and made Islam the core of its political agenda. Acquiring an ideological quality, religion became a partisan instrument of solidarity at the AKP grassroots and a 43

Ergil 2010, 2012; Çelik 2010. Also Ergil 2012. Hermann 2014.

44

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means of exclusion of the “others.” The galvanisation of society as AKP supporters and “others” led to a fragmented social reality. A step further is the distinction between “good Muslims” and those who are not. Gülen was opposed to such an outcome from the very onset. He is increasingly disappointed with the politicisation of Islam in Turkey and in other Islamic countries, because he sees it as polarising and harmful for religion as a belief system and as a depository of high moral values. Gülen also argues that the Qur’ān contains only a few principles pertaining to governance and that it is about justice and responsibility rather than the form of government and who should rule. So far, the Gülen Movement has neither challenged political authority nor openly supported it. It has tried to remain goal-oriented related to the topics of democratisation, expanding the basis of the rule of law and human rights. It has supported governments and political initiatives to this effect but otherwise it has tried to remain aloof from political parties and organisations. The movement is a civic and voluntary phenomenon. None of its participants are denied the right to be politically active, however open preferences for political choices and organisations are eschewed. This does not mean that followers of Gülen have no political opinions, however. They do, but such preferences are not allowed to be a collective stance and do not affect the movement’s activities and its projects. This gives leverage to the movement to act independently and to be respected in diverse social and political circles. Having created its own workforce and economic resources, the Gülen Movement has acquired an independent character that allows it to generate its own decisions and activities, independent of the state or local authorities. This independent character and freedom of action has the potential to differ and disagree with the incumbent government. In the light of this information we can say that the movement is not an anti-political group; it is a faith-inspired civil network that is active in many departments of daily life. This richness of activities unavoidably brings it into contact, sometimes in a contentious way, with public and local authorities that are keen to preserve their monopoly on decision making and permitting other actors into the public zone. One often hears that the movement’s activities are not always politically neutral; in fact it pursues an independent agenda. This was the main argument of the previous governments that characterised themselves as “secular.” Currently, the AKP government is using the same argument and accusing the movement of encroaching onto its own political turf. The movement is neither trying to create its own political party, train its future politicians or sympathize with any political group, however, civic bodies, such as the Gülen Movement, with a variety of activities at the national and international levels, operate in a socio-political space 135

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where there are many other official and unofficial actors. Cooperation and contention between them are both inevitable; this is the general reality, so accusations concerning the movement of being a political body are unwarranted, although activities at the public level to some degree require policies, political decisions and positions. Like all civic or social movements, the Gülen Movement desires a free public space to operate in, so it demands higher democratic standards and expansion of fundamental rights and freedoms, ensuring transparency and accountability in government. This means eliminating all tutelary practices and restrictions on popular will. If this is not direct involvement in politics as a political body, as a representative of a large group of the people, the Gülen Movement remains an indirect political actor, voicing what democratic politics and good governance should be. It is interesting to note here that this role of the movement is not only particular to Turkey, by way of education and business enterprises, the same ideals and practices are exported to other countries. In essence, with these exclusive qualities, the Gülen Movement seems to be the most important “export item” of Turkey, unmatched by anything that the state has or does in projecting its influence abroad. The “unofficial” power of the Gülen Movement emanates from its voluntary character and the dedicated labour of its participants who have spread across the world carrying the same humanitarian ideals that cannot be realised without freedom and rule of law. Turkey is at a crossroads. The direction of the modern Turkey will be depend both on civil society participating in the rule of the country and on a fully democratic, social and constitutional state involving EU standards, and those of the government, through the supremacy and rule of law.

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Diasporic Faith, Faith in Diaspora Turkish Women’s Public Spheres Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow Maria F. Curtis In this chapter I aim to examine the notion of how the Gülen Movement opens Muslim public spheres to women, from taking part in local interfaith dialogue initiatives and neighbourhood volunteering to crafting new media discourses. Often questions arise as to the role of women in the Gülen Movement, with assumptions that because they do not seem to be among the most public spokespersons that their participation must be limited. This essay focuses on the Gülen Movement and women’s participation in different diasporic locations and I examine notions of leadership through a diffuse network of women rather than attempt to locate a central hierarchy. Experiences of women in the Gülen Movement are so varied, that there can really be no generalizations made that succinctly spell out what a “Gülen woman” is. In a given city or locale, they can be doing any number of things while at the same time aspiring to do still more. My research offers insight into how women become interested in the Gülen Movement and follows their pathways to leadership roles and organisational responsibilities. Here I offer examples of women who have travelled between Turkey, the U.S., and in some cases a third or fourth country where they might have lived for a period of time and taken part in the movement. When put together, their narratives do not offer a single profile of what women’s participation looks like, but rather their stories offer snapshots from the very different individuals in this movement, or Hizmet, an “altruistic collective action and voluntary philanthropic service.”1 My research has been multi-sited and has been on-going since 1998, while encountering different communities with very different goals and objectives, yet all contributing to activities that do have multiple impacts in the public sphere. My data is drawn from both formal interviewing and long-term ethnographic participant observation with both Turkish women and women of many other nationalities in cities in Turkey and in the U.S. Some women see themselves as formal adherents while 1



Çetin 2010: 153.

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others take part more informally as participants or audience members in Gülen related events or activities. My first contacts were in Austin, Texas in 1998 when I met Turkish graduate students. Believing their role in taking part in dialogue about contemporary Muslims was different from that offered by the campus Muslim Student Association, they organised campus activities and academic talks that focused less on Islam and more on interfaith dialogue, aspiring to demonstrate Islam’s capacity to moderate important public discussions on the role of religion in society. These initiatives predated 9/11, and thereafter the volume of activities and the sense of committed interfaith dialogue only continued to intensify. Turkish women in Austin were very active and often organised cultural events that drew many non-Turks interested in Turkish or Middle Eastern culture. This group was one of the first to establish a city wide “Interfaith Dialogue Day” that drew participants from many faith communities from across the city. I later resided in San Antonio, Texas (2005-2007) and got to know Turkish women there who were graduate students or who were married to graduate students. There they interacted with a growing number of families from Central Asia coming to the U.S. as asylum seekers. Though their cultural experiences were very different, as were their educational aspirations, they built a community out of a shared sense of a common Central Asian heritage. There was already a longstanding interfaith community in San Antonio, perhaps in part due to the private universities with religious affiliations. The Gülen community’s interfaith efforts resonated strongly with these groups. In Pennsylvania (in 2000) women with whom I spoke accompanied their husbands who were living and studying with Fethullah Gülen. Gülen receives a number of international guests and these women provided hospitality for visitors as well as taking part in interfaith efforts and in rigorous sohbet groups, while some formally studied in area universities. One of the women I met in Pennsylvania had grown up in the Netherlands, and her parents had been among some of Gülen’s earliest supporters. Her husband was one of Gülen’s closest consultants, and her daughters were growing up in the U.S. In this one family one could see the Gülen Movement through the prism of multiple diasporas; all were Turkish and were practicing Muslims yet their experiential and generational perspectives cast a different light on their worldviews. When visiting San Francisco (in 1999 and 2006), I met a very interesting group of women that was largely Kurdish working class immigrants who had come to the U.S. seeking political asylum alongside highly educated Turks working in Silicon Valley in very high paying positions. In Turkey, these two groups might have been unlikely cultural partners, but in the U.S. context of the Turkish-Turkic diaspora they have created together some of the most elaborate Turkish festivals that included large scale Ottoman and 138

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Anatolian displays of architecture and culinary cultures. In Atlanta (in 2005) I met a group of women who helped run a Turkish market and cultural centre that held cooking classes and folk dance demonstrations. At that time they had members from the Balkans who organised their own programs as well. During a trip to Washington D.C., I met with women who helped support programs run by the Rumi Forum, which hosts lectures and programs by renowned religious and political leaders. Here the community is tuned into political events as one would expect from a centre not far from the White House. Their community was striking in that not only did they hope to make contact with politicians and host them for dinners, but they also took strong positions on political issues and made their voices heard in the political arena. I have visited a number of smaller cities and in each place there were efforts to run Turkish Cultural centres and to invite non-Turks in and offer opportunities for interfaith dialogue. In the U.S., the three largest groups of American Muslims are African Americans, Southeast Asians, and Arabs, and often their mosques are organised around the needs of these diverse groups. Turkish Americans on the other hand seem to have set interfaith dialogue among their foremost goals and in doing so they may very well spend as much time with non-Muslims as they do with other Turkish American Muslims. There are a number of larger cities like Chicago and New York where important communities exist, as well as on the East Coast where Turks have had a history of settling since the end of the Ottoman Empire.2 America’s fourth largest city, and its most ethnically diverse, Houston has become an important site for the Gülen Movement, hosting internationally recognized figures such as Kofi Annan among others, and regularly sponsoring largescale Turkish and Turkic festivals around the city.3 I have taken part in numerous events (from 2007 to 2013), at the Turkish Raindrop House and the Istanbul Conference Centre. Here, women taking part in Gülen circles organize programs for their own children, social programs for greater Houston residents that include a heavy emphasis on volunteering, and they have organised events celebrating Turkish and Central Asian culture in smaller programs and in large scale festivals that extend over periods of days. Although all of the communities I have visited and spent time with differ in their efforts or in their programming in different cities in the U.S., it must be noted that what is apparent in each city is the considerable energy spent on events placed squarely in the public sphere. Turam has described what she calls “window sites” (vitrin, 57-60) in Turkey where Gülen adherents invite people in to get to know them and carefully craft their image in anticipation of media attention. The same is 2

Balgamis and Karpat 2008. Emerson et al., 2012.

3

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true in the U.S., but one must also take into account the weight of the post 9/11 discourse in this instance. Gülen communities organize numerous public events, but this has also become the norm for nearly every other ethnic group of Muslims in the U.S., and prominent civic groups within Muslim American communities have stated that every mosque should have a significant outreach and interfaith component built into its overall operations.4 Turam describes “front stage” events that are organised for a secular Turkish public and “back stage” events where Gülen adherents gather to discuss matters of faith and take part in study circles in Turkey. Because the notion of secularism in the American context is so strikingly different and because interfaith events have increased after 9/11, Gülen communities are perhaps more “front stage” or “front window” than they might ever be in Turkey. The imagined Turkish-Turkic cultural heritage that ignites the imagination in Turkey is actually lived out in the American context where immigrant Turks and Central Asians negotiate a mutually constructed common cultural heritage that presents historical continuity on festival stages in numerous American cities. While both the U.S. and Turkish contexts present front stage sites where the Gülen Movement is seen, they do so in response to two very different political and historical realities. The Turkish secular-religious divide has been the borderline upon which Gülen communities have sought to build social solidarity. In Turkey where there were no opportunities to build connections between secular and religious realms, the Gülen Movement has launched its own powerful counter public sphere through private hospitals and schools and media outlets. In the U.S., Turkish Americans follow in the footsteps of earlier Muslim communities who hoped for positive recognition in the public sphere,5 following what has been called the “third wave”6 of Muslim immigration and community building in the U.S. that borrows from the logic of the American Civil Rights movement in asserting that each community has rights and has a claim to space in the public sphere. The American Gülen community also follows the logic of the hyphenated American identity politics7 where every ethnic group is conceivably entitled to their space on the yearly calendar of ethnic celebrations and heritage month consciousness raising initiatives. In both Turkey and in the U.S., conservative Muslim dress readily identifies women as members of particular faith communities, and in this sense they represent the first line of contact between different communities. This may make women easy targets for discrimination, and at the same time they 4

6 7 5

Turan 2007: 59. Abdullah 2009. See Abdo 2006. Sirin and Fine 2008.

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occupy a position of great power as they may have a social impact both in formal interfaith settings as well as in everyday informal encounters.

Women in Gülen Communities and the Will towards Social Engagement I have had many exchanges and experiences with women in Turkey, and with Turkish American women from almost every region in Turkey now living in the U.S. who self identify as taking part in Hizmet, or what we might call the “service” or “volunteer” movement. I did research in Izmir (2001, 2003, 2007) and Ankara (2008, 2009). I conducted approximately sixty interviews in Istanbul (2008, 2009) and roughly the same number in Houston, Texas (between 2007-2013). In 2010 I attended a conference on Gülen in Amsterdam and spent a week with Dutch Turks, and later corresponded with Turkish women living in France, Austria, and Belgium who were interested in conducting formal academic research on women in the movement. A shared characteristic that stands out overwhelmingly is their desire to engage in civic life and to participate beyond the boundaries of their own faith circles. Leadership is understood as building contacts horizontally across communities of belief (whether interfaith in an American understanding, or across secular-religious divides in a Turkish sense) rather than ascending vertically among only likeminded Gülen adherents. This feature of the movement has won praise from those who applaud radical and nonconventional interfaith solidarity building, where Gülen adherents are seen as flexible and cosmopolitan in their ability to be at ease with nearly any faith community. Their nonconventional boundary crossing, on the other hand, has drawn criticism from others who doubt the ultimate sincerity of the movement and who instead suspect that less altruistic intentions may exist beneath the surface. Much ink has been used to either support or discredit the Gülen Movement. My aim here is neither, and instead I hope to carve out a sense of what women experience as they enter the movement and develop increasingly pious identities over time. Once we accept the notion that to identify as a pious Muslim woman brings with it at times harsh social responses, whether in the post 9/11 U.S., or amid contentious secular-religious debates in Turkey, or among Muslim immigrant communities in Europe, one has to wonder what it is about the Gülen message that compels women to want to change the tenor of public understanding and acceptance of Muslims? The answer to this question can only be offered by women in their own terms, in their own voices. In nearly every country where Hizmet has travelled, women take part in the movement, some by either marrying into Hizmet, or by participating in the many events that Hizmet volunteers organize. 141

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In addition to Turks and Americans, many other ethnicities and nationalities can be found among women in the Gülen Movement, they are Armenian, Kurdish, Alevi, African American, European American, Mexican and Mexican American, Guatemalan American, Native American, Columbian, Irish, British, Australian, Turkmen, Russian, Azeri, Afghan, Uzbek, Albanian, Spanish, Ahiska, Tajik, Bosnian, Albanian, Macedonian, and Kyrgyz women who have considered themselves adherents to the movement in some way. Added to this list are the many American women who have attended various Gülen affiliated group dinners and events and who now consider themselves lifelong friends, perhaps with women who might have first invited them for a Ramadan iftar, or tea, or a henna party at a Ladies Coffee Night. Though they might not be formal participants in Hizmet as organizers, some do attend events regularly and their presence should also be thought of as a women’s sphere where meaningful social interaction takes place, namely interaction across religious backgrounds. As this long list of ethnicities and nationalities implies, the Gülen Movement is a truly global movement that resonates well beyond Turkish borders, and well beyond Turkish discussions of the limits of religion and state. The question of who are “Gülen women” is one that is not easily answered. We have seen numerous works created on the movement from other perspectives (finance, education, and religious instruction), and we should expect and encourage multiple perspectives on women and gender as well. One then will certainly see a great variety of women who express their attachment to the Gülen Movement differently, and who take part in it in their own unique ways greatly depending on where they live and local interest levels and resources. One may find women entrepreneurs, teachers, opera singers, TV personalities, newspaper and magazine journalists, engineers of all persuasions, stay-at-home mothers, doctors, pharmacists, nurses, AIDS and cancer researchers, forensic psychologists, and medical personnel trained to help trauma victims during times of international natural disasters, daycare administrators, Qur’ān school teachers, dormitory managers and university professors. In Turkey alone there is a wide cadre of highly successful professional women who take part in Gülen communities. So well established and developed are Gülen women’s circles in Turkey that one could say that for every level of education, for every region, for every economic group, for every level of spiritual attachment, ranging from the decidedly secular to those who spend a great portion of their time as practicing Muslims, one will find institutions and activities that appeal to clusters of women with similar educational and career backgrounds. In short, there is no one role that women in the Gülen Movement play, rather, there are many. 142

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In Turkey where the issue of wearing the headscarf has been so decisive and controversial, within the Gülen Movement one will find women with a very wide range of understandings of Islamic modesty and how it is evidenced in dress. With regard to Turkey where the movement has had the longest time to develop across multiple generations, one will find the greatest diversity in institutions and groups of women who volunteer and work in those institutions. In Turkey one can see the many private hospitals and health related institutions as sites where women may not only work, but also rise to the top of administrative positions. More than that, as the rules regarding wearing the headscarf become less important, one finds groups of individuals from across the religious spectrum that become accustomed to working together as professionals. Outside of Turkey, namely in the U.S., the situation is quite different, as women in Hizmet are newly landing in places where they are involved in establishing common support networks and building the most basic infrastructures again from the ground up, often while in their childbearing years and while they are also in some cases improving their second language abilities. Childcare cooperatives between women, informal community based childcare that is offered to women so that they might attend community events, as well as more formalized state regulated paid day-care which allows women to work while removing the worry about who will take care of children in a mother’s absence. Rather than ask what is the role of women in the Gülen Movement, a more interesting question is “what will the role of women be in the years to come?”8 While the Gülen Movement is certainly a movement that lives in the here and now, it is also one that is constantly forward facing, anticipating the next generation and contemplating what the world might look like with more well educated and spiritually developed children in it. Nilüfer Göle,9 a French-Turkish sociologist wrote what is considered to have been the first serious book, The Forbidden Modern, on the newly emerging pious Turkish women who were seeking both a modern education and the choice to dress modestly in the wider Turkish public sphere. Similar modern piety movements have occurred in other parts of 8



9



Some of Gülen’s writings on women include: ‘Women Confined and Mistreated,’ //www.fethullahGülen.org/recent-articles/2897-womenconfined-and-mistreated.html and . There is an increasing amount of research focusing on women in the Gülen movement. Some of these include Özdalga 2003 and 2005; Turam 2004; Saritoprak 2005; Curtis 2005, 2012, 2013; Andrea 2006; Stephenson 2006; Kimmel 2007; Kirk 2007; Küçüksarı 2008; Rausch, 2008; Yavuz 2008; Hällzon 2008; Rausch 2009; Ebaugh 2010. Göle 1997.

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the Muslim world10 and they have articulated some of the same themes around women reclaiming the rights afforded to them in the Qur’ān and the Hadith. Since the 1970s and 1980s when these piety movements11 began to emerge, their members have been labelled in many ways, Islamic feminists and “believing women” in Islam (as opposed to Muslim feminists),12 progressive Muslims,13 “born-again” or “veiled again”14 Muslims. Negative critiques of modern women’s piety movements have considered the visibly Muslim appearance of women seeking a more public, practice-based approach to Islam in the daily lives of women with suspicion. Studies on women in diasporic contexts who do take great care to demonstrate their Islamic identity through clothing underscore the intense diversity of thought and practice that comes to life in sartorial practices, even within groups that seem to share an overarching worldview.15

Women and Conceptions of Leadership in the Gülen Movement With regard to women’s participation in the Gülen Movement, it should first be acknowledged that it is one that offers multiple forms of support beginning with young people, in this case girls, and it continues that support well into adulthood. For every stage of life, from daycares, to elementary schools, to universities, dormitories, study centres, hospitals, mental rehabilitation institutions, nursing homes, television and media outlets, there is perhaps not a moment in one’s life or a life problem for which one would not be able to find some form of assistance. In Turkey, the backbone of these institutions is educational. One characteristic shared by nearly every woman I have spoken with who identify with the Gülen Movement is their encountering it early in life while in school, and then maturing in the movement spiritually, personally, and professionally. They also mention having Ablalar, or mentors called ‘elder sisters’, who served as personal role models who supported them through exams, marriage proposals, early motherhood, and while navigating careers. As girls become women, they feel a sense of wanting to help other girls as a way of honouring the women who helped them, and thus the cycle of 10

Some remarkable work has been published on this subject. The following proved very helpful references in this research: Abu-Lughod, Lila, ed. 1998; Cooke and Lawrence 2005; Deeb 2006; Göle and Ammann, eds. 2006; Mahmoud 2005; Saktanber 2002; van Wichelen 2010. 11 Ahmed 1982. 12 Barlas 2002; Moghadem 2002; Read and Bartkowski 2000. Winter 2001. 13 Badran 2005; Petito and Hatzopoulos eds. 2003; Othman 2006. 14 Haddad 1997; Rozario 1988. Van der Veer 2004. 15 Curtis 2012.

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what one informant called “adoptive motherhood” continues from one age set to the next. While some who see women’s activities from the outside may assume there is enforced gender segregation and that separation is an indication of lack of inclusion for women, instead women elaborate on a dense network of women’s support circles that are all created and organised by women volunteers. One woman described women-run day cares, womenrun schools for Qur’ān and women-run dormitories for college girls. She explained that Hizmet embraces girls to ensure they would feel “protected” from a patriarchal society. Women-run institutions may appear to be forms of gender segregation, but from the insider’s perspective, they are havens from which women can find the necessary support to learn to assert themselves in historically male dominated professions. There is also a rewriting of women’s social expectations as well, and when traditional families cannot provide incentives or perspectives for successful women strong in their education and careers, Hizmet steps in and offers that. During my conversation with a ‘Büyük Abla’ (great big sister) in Istanbul who gave counsel to many other women who served as Ablalar to still other women, I tried to articulate with her some notion of liderlik, or leadership, as it pertains to all women in Hizmet. She explained that her husband was a close companion of Fethullah Gülen and visited him in the U.S. He proudly shared his wife’s efforts with Gülen, and she in turn communicated news from Gülen to other Ablalar. In other instances, some Ablalar did meet Gülen directly, some received letters from him, and others watched his weekly sermons as soon as they were released via the Internet. In the past I had met women who travelled to the U.S. from Turkey to meet with Gülen, who then gave private talks to Turkish women living in different cities, almost filling the role of travelling ministers. In short, women are in touch with Gülen in much the same way that men are. They also read Gülen’s work along with that of Said Nursi. They receive a consistent theological education and discuss important themes and objectives; however, the forms that this education takes largely depend on individual contexts in the very wide diaspora where people interact in varying locales. This particular Büyük Abla in Istanbul stressed the use of the term Hizmet over “Gülen Movement” and warned me that this was an Americanized understanding and that any use of movement (hareket in Turkish) lost the essence of serving others. The term “Hizmet” comes from the Arabic word that means ‘service’. She objected to the term movement or hareket as she thought it implied selective membership, which she considered to be against the spirit of Hizmet. She also reminded me of the period of time when it was virtually illegal for a group to gather for religious 145

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purposes in Turkey. To self identify as a member of a “movement” would put undue harm on those I interviewed. She preferred Hizmet as it implies a wider level of open participation and service to humanity, not just those formally in Hizmet. For this reason, I employ her usage where it seems to best resonate with those I interviewed. Critical of nearly any western term I might use as an approximation, she emphatically insisted on the use of Hizmet in our conversation, and women who are “mütevazı and gayretli” or humble and powerful. She went on to describe how leading in this way was her idea of trying to live as a practicing Muslim, by applying religious ideals in everyday contexts and interactions. When women behaved according to these principles, they were giving other girls positive role models, role models they too might want to emulate as adults. This attention to intention produces a community of likeminded women who share a sense of comfort and trust with each other. This comfort is what makes working in a Hizmet institution attractive and explains why girls and women share a continued connection over many years. This long-term association with the Gülen Movement is the best testament to the positive experiences women have in it and helps explain their continued participation. She went on to say that one need not be a practicing Muslim to care for others, that women were not formally attending regular Hizmet activities but also had a natural interest in supporting girls in school. Again, the patriarchal nature of Turkish society could bring women from across the political spectrum together for activities to support education for girls.

Women and Faith in the Gülen Movement I listed earlier many ethnic groups in many cities and many different professions where women who identify with the Gülen Movement can be found. I have visited sohbet and ders groups, or study circles, and have seen many different styles of participation. There are some women who get a great sense of satisfaction for example from cooking for large groups and events, and who live fairly traditional lifestyles and who spend most of their time with other women with similar life experiences.16 These women lead richly meaningful spiritual lives that include taking part in 16

Turam has pointed out that women in Turkey, whether educated, urban, secular or not, may likely be ‘ev hanimlar,’ or stay-at-home wives and mothers. She astutely points out the many examples of modernizing projects in the greater Muslim world that seek to raise women’s educational status so that they may stay at home and provide education to their children. In this sense, terms like modern and traditional tend to bleed into one another. Turam’s assertion cites Abu-Lughod’s edited volume, Remaking Women, in which case studies in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey reveal in each country’s women’s movements, men writers who outlined what modern women’s education and place in the public and private spheres would mean for “modernity” at given moments in times.

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group prayer for different problems or causes, and potentially travelling to different spiritual retreats where they will be able to hear sermons by other women. Their practices mirror those we might associate with followers of a Sufi path, practicing the tenets of the faith while engaging in collective forms of worship that are more rigorous than the required daily prayers. Although they may not be in the most publicly visible spaces of the movement, they are asked by both groups of men and of women to pray for important problems, issues, or upcoming projects. Indeed, they are the torchbearers of the movement, passing the flame of commitment and faith on to others, the core group to whom others turn when prayer is needed for resolving critical issues. In other cases, some women have dedicated themselves so fully to Hizmet that they chose not to marry at all and literally work from dawn to dusk in some capacity to further the cause of Hizmet, either directly or indirectly. One such woman who worked at Samanyolu TV in Istanbul gave me a bag full of CDs of programs she had produced on well-known Sufi scholars that had aired in previous years. My conversation with her had been more like speaking with a wise sage than interviewing a television producer. I asked her if she attended weekly sohbet groups because she spoke like some of the more charismatic sohbet leaders I had heard in the past. I was surprised when she replied that her job was her faith and her family. So devoted was she to her work, that she had time for little else and she attended far fewer sohbet discussions than she had in the past. After reflecting on our conversation and viewing some of her work, I began to understand the earlier comment on working diligently in whatever capacity one finds oneself as a form of Hizmet. This Samanyolu TV producer did not identify herself as a “leader” among other Ablalar; her sense of modesty would not have allowed her to do so. However, her degree of dedication and the admiration and respect of her co-workers, and above all her hard work, made her an Abla by default, a recognized leader who had earned her stripes. If we imagine that this woman’s work was potentially viewed by millions in Turkey, Central Asia, Europe, and the U.S., and her work presented a coherent history of Sufism, can we not call her a religious leader? Perhaps we can think of her work and influence like that of a charismatic female sohbet leader with an audience of potentially millions of listeners.

Turkish Women, Fundraising, and Hizmet Jenny White’s work has focused on women and their participation in vernacular politics.17 She describes the women of Ümraniye, a 17

White 2003.

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neighbourhood on the Asian side of Istanbul, and their collective sharing in building a political consensus in the same way they had pooled resources together in rural village settings during harvest periods. She cites the term imece to describe the collective will and effort of rural women who settled in Istanbul and who made their rural social order work for a greater political cause in the contemporary, urban suburb of Istanbul while taking part in female friendship support networks. These loose, interconnected, and interwoven women’s collectives offer those who participate a sense of security, and serve to buffer them from what might be otherwise harsh experiences from life’s ups and downs. Women’s groups offer a sort of safety net when one’s own personal, financial, or familial resources wear thin. In diasporic settings, the importance of social networks only increases. Women in Houston, Texas apply these same principles of imece annually during the organisation of the Turkic Festival. Since 2007, the Houston Turkish-American community has put on an ever expanding festival that celebrates not only Turkish culture, but also Turkey’s close Central Asian neighbours. In 2009 more that 20,000 people attended the festival. Houston-area Turkish women prepared traditional and labour intensive foods (börek, mantı, döner kebap, dolma, baklava, kadayıf, kısır, humus, gözleme, içli köfte, to name but a few). During the festival and during other kermesler, or traditional arts and crafts fairs, the homemade food that women prepare is often the biggest selling component, and knowledge of its availability is what draws many from the general public. Turkish women in the U.S. come from all regions of Turkey and are able to represent nearly every sort of regional cuisine speciality. Such variety of Turkish cuisine may not likely appear in similar events in Turkey. For the three days of the Turkic Festival in Houston, the entire grounds of the City Hall complex are transformed into a Turkish public space complete with traditional food taking centre stage. Though one might discount such participation as “just food preparation”, it should in fact be seen as a powerful form of solidarity building18 and fund raising as well. Women’s collectives in Turkey and in the U.S. organize fundraising for various causes. In 2009 I met with a group of retired teachers living in an affluent neighbourhood on the European side of Istanbul. They had regular sohbetler, or spiritual study groups, that also featured a significant fundraising component. One afternoon there were approximately thirty women present and the meeting began with the group singing of Salavat, or a short prayer honouring the Prophet Mohammed, his family, and companions. Women passed around a bundle of emerald green satin 18

For more on food and women’s solidarity, see: Counihan, and Van Esterik 1997; Counihan and Kaplan 2004; Inness 2001.

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napkins, and as the bundle travelled from person to person, each person unwrapped a napkin. There were forty19 napkins in all. This continued until a small glass container was revealed inside that contained the beard clippings of the Prophet Muhammad. The small container was passed around and each person confirmed that after 1,400 years, the beard clippings resembled a freshly cut rose. When the more spiritual aspect of the gathering concluded, the meeting shifted to fundraising. Later two young women from Central Asian countries gave testimonials describing how scholarships they had received had changed their lives and afforded them opportunities they would never have had without attending Gülen schools. The hostess of the gathering along with the Abla presiding over the event reminded the group of women how successful they had been at fundraising, and how their group was among the most successful groups of fundraisers in all of Istanbul, raising millions of liras the previous year. The Abla asked that the group of retired teachers remember their teaching days and asked them to contribute again to make more scholarships available for girls. And that they did, they got out their wallets and check books and contributed, and later enjoyed speaking individually with the two young Central Asian girls. They were also very curious about what activities women in the U.S. were doing. I explained that many were involved in dialogue events and in dispelling stereotypes about Muslims that were pervasive after 9/11. They wondered why Turkish women new to the U.S. would feel the need to explain how the events of 9/11 had nothing to do with mainstream Muslims. “Isn’t this already obvious?” one woman asked while others nodded in agreement, “don’t Americans know that the maniacs who carried out 9/11 are not really Muslims?” This statement and the collective reaction indicated that Gülen women initiatives vary widely, and what a woman in Istanbul might do to participate in the movement might be very different from what they do elsewhere. In a fundraising event in 2010 in Houston on Kadir Gecesi, considered to be the most holy day of Ramadan and of the Islamic calendar, women assembled for a himmet meeting to raise funds for various building projects around Houston such as the building of a mosque, a large children’s park set to be the largest in town, a dinlenme parkı, or a park for strolling and relaxation. The park has since become known as the Peace Garden. The himmet gathering is important for women who attend in their finest clothes ready to contribute in the names of their families. Such fundraising events are numerous in Hizmet; not necessarily new, but rather a function of charity that is required of all Muslims. As women may 19

The number forty is an auspicious number in the Islamic tradition.

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miss days of fasting during Ramadan due to menstruation, pregnancy and childbirth, and nursing their children, they look for extra opportunities to give to charitable causes to make up for the days they were not able to fast. In the Ottoman Empire, women commissioned many important civic sites such as mosques, public fountains, parks and resting places.20

Women and Their Rights Though Gülen personally has not dedicated himself specifically to women’s issues, his emphasis on education and the cultivation of a life of the mind through higher education21 and in developing a manevi, or spiritual, life opens new doors for women’s participation in society. Gülen has said the following about the choice between the headscarf and education in Turkey: “if these women face a dilemma between getting an education and uncovering their hair, he would say that education is important and that although covering the hair is still obligatory, it is not one of the essential pillars of Islam such as believing in one God.”22 From this we see Gülen’s commitment to women’s education. Access to higher education and the social rewards that come along with it, as well as a sense of commitment and resolve in one’s spiritual well-being, are very powerful tools that women have at their disposal as they decide how to serve humanity and take part in Hizmet. Institutions related to the Gülen Movement offer important employment opportunities to women who wear the scarf who may not be able to work elsewhere. Perhaps more important is the fact that such institutions are also experienced as an oasis by other women who lead more secular lives, and who may not necessarily consider themselves formal adherents. This perspective came cross on a visit to Zaman newspaper in Istanbul in 2007. A contact that works there had been trying to set up interviews for me with various women writers. He was not sure of one woman’s knowledge of the Gülen Movement and suggested that she might not be able to comment since she was “just working at the paper.” This woman wrote and edited material that was meant to appeal specifically to women readers. When I asked her about her knowledge of the Gülen Movement, it became apparent immediately that she did in fact consider herself “in the movement.” When asked if the Gülen Movement indirectly served the goals of women’s advancement, she argued that it absolutely did because it made jobs available to all kinds of women. On visits to other Gülen related institutions I also noticed the presence of women who seemed not to consider themselves formally in the movement, 20

Pierce 1993. Albayrak 2010. 22 Yılmaz 2009. 21

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or who wanted to make firm distinctions between their professional lives and their spiritual lives. They believed the Gülen Movement does offer real career opportunities to women of all backgrounds precisely because of its Islamic principles of equal and fair treatment. The religious values that frame the movement, though not articulated as such in workplace settings, did serve to create safe zones where women of all religious persuasions felt a sense of security in their jobs. There have been several academic studies that have focused on women’s participation in the Gülen Movement to date. Most of them note the deep sense of personal satisfaction and very profound sense of attachment that all adherents, including women, feel as members of this movement. Gülen has compared male and female participation in Hizmet as the two sides of a coin; one without the other leaves the coin with no value at all.23 Men and women with whom I have spoken have acknowledged that some inequalities exist, but claim that it is not because of the inequalities in gender that are seen in Turkish culture, and indeed everywhere in the world. In 2005 while speaking with a Turkish woman journalist who resides in the U.S., she commented, “those who are inspired by Gülen are sometimes not emotionally mature enough to live up to his broad mindedness.” While speaking with another woman at a conference held for women to encourage them to write for The Fountain Magazine, one participant stated, “sometimes the men do not know what to do with us. We’ve received all the education and spiritual training the movement has to offer; now Turkish society and Turkish men will be required to catch up with our progress and us. They’ll need to read Gülen again more closely.” Another young woman who immigrated with her family to the U.S. when she was nine years old who calls herself a Turkish-American says, “I anticipate great things for women. This place is my country and great things are going to happen here, I know it. It will happen when Turks and Americans start to build the next generation of Hizmet right here in America.” In many instances women seemed to anticipate new gender dynamics within families, both as a result of spiritual progression as well as Turkish norms changing when couples lived on their own outside Turkey. Others seemed to think that the change in gender relations has already happened. In my travels and conversations over the years, I have met many women who do occupy leadership roles and are often very surprised to be characterized in the academic literature and popular discourse as otherwise. They willingly acknowledge that the movement cannot completely eradicate gender inequalities, just as other previous social movements have not done so either. Many women feel the writings of Gülen have 23

Özkök (n.d.).

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the potential to make men and women the best people they can be, to be a person mature in one’s spirituality so as to act on the choices that are the most just. Gülen’s writings have been directed towards just marriage, and he criticized abusive husbands going so far as to say that if women are abused they should feel supported in defending themselves.24 He has also written against the idea that marriage and family are institutions that are like a “baby-making factory,”25 saying it is more important to raise children well than in great number. He has even questioned the Turkish ideal that everyone marries, by asking the question in an article entitled “Should everyone really marry?” While finding support in Gülen’s writings, women claim that Gülen cannot offer a “magic bullet” to ensure gender equality and that individuals are ultimately responsible for their spiritual development and in their treatment of the opposite gender. While many of Hizmet’s values are built on traditional Turkish values, Hizmet itself often goes against the grain of the traditional Turkish family, asserting that working for the good of society, rather than just one’s own nuclear family, is the cause that is most important to aspire to.

Locating of Women’s Leadership I was encouraged by all women I interviewed, particularly the most high profile and publically well known who occupied what would typically be thought of as leadership positions in a western sense, to look for those women who donated their time to other girls. While western notions of leadership often give priority to visibility, the Turkish understanding of Hizmet looks for leadership in one’s sense of commitment and integrity, not in a woman’s ability to share the same roles and demeanour as her male counterparts. One very successful journalist, Fatma Dişli Zibak, who writes for Today’s Zaman told me, “without the support of those women who helped pay for my scholarships, who came to visit me on the bayrams [holidays] when I could not see my parents, or who brought me food while I was preparing for exams, I have to thank them. They are the most important women in this movement. Without their hard work, I would not be where I am today. They are the real heroes, the real leaders in this movement.” I interviewed women writers, journalists, and TV scriptwriters and producers in Turkey who are inspired by the teachings of Gülen and they integrate his perspectives in their work. While most do not write about Gülen per se, they are inspired by his writings and ideas and what they called “social reconciliation.” In their work in the media, they want to send out positive messages that help in building a sense of social solidarity and 24

Kurucan 2008. Gülen 1-16-2009.

25

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also offer television programs that offer education and integrity. I asked one Samanyolu editor if 9/11 had impacted the way she saw her work. She commented that 9/11 was a wound that had to heal on American soil, and that the divide between secularism, or laicism and the public display of one’s religious life was the Turkish problem she most wanted to help solve. She said, “I want to engage in work that builds solidarity, that emphasizes our human similarities rather than our differences.” Women’s programming on Samanyolu, and its American equivalent Ebru TV, is widely available and feature all manner of programs from cooking shows, to discussions about current politics to shows that discuss family life and reproductive health, to children’s programming. Also, there are very rich female characters in serials such as “Mavi Rüya” or Blue Dream, which featured a dedicated schoolteacher, Zeynep Öğretmen, who endured all manner of hardships in the effort to save her family members from a group out to damage the image of Islam. In short she was a Turkish Muslim version of Charlie’s Angels, jumping off hydroelectric dams, and landing neatly at the bottom, every hair in place, stiletto heels intact. Another interesting female character named Zeynep appears in the wildly popular Tek Türkiye. She is a woman of Kurdish descent who stands up to her own male relatives and puts her life in harm’s way in order to open a school. In another long running show “Büyük Buluşma”, or “Big Meeting”, essentially a show about who goes to heaven and who goes to hell, we regularly see women encouraged to seek education, and we see many an unredeemed male family members fall through the big white door that leads one to the eternal flames of hell. They scream “No!” as their fate is sealed forever.

Conclusion In the summer of 2013, which will forever be associated with the now infamous Gezi Park protests, I had conversations with women and their daughters about this important moment in Turkish history. Just as there is no monolithic experience for all women inspired by Gülen, similarly there is no one consistent interpretation of recent historical events in Turkey. One woman living on the Asian side of Istanbul asserted that she felt less safe in Turkey today than before, and that she feared she would be wrongly associated with ‘the wrong side’. “I’m afraid people will see me with my scarf and blame me somehow.” When I asked her what she meant, she said simply that if Turkey were politically unstable, she would feel insecure. She had deliberately missed a dentist’s appointment in Taksim Square because she had wanted to avoid the area. Her teenage daughter had gone and not been bothered, even finding the atmosphere festive and politically interesting. 153

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Together they told the story of a neighbour girl who wears a scarf and who had gone to take part in the protests. When I asked them what they meant by “take part”, they had radically different answers. The mother said that the girl had gone to Taksim Square to pray with her friends, “they saw their prayer as a kind of protest; it was to make a statement. Maybe their prayer was to mark the space with prayer and to diminish politics.” The daughter disagreed, “No, they just went to be a part of the protests, to be a part of everything, they just prayed because it was time to pray and it was easier to do in the street than to get to a mosque because it was crowded. They can pray with people there, we do not have the same political separations as existed in my mother’s youth, things are different now. To be ‘religious’ is not to take a side now.” Women in Houston responded differently to the Gezi Park incident as well. Some said that the protestors needed to enact democratic political processes and that protests could undermine all the recent progress that Turkey had made. Others felt that Erdoğan had gone too far in responding to the protestors, and that he had undone the social and political progress that had been made in Turkey and in terms of public perception of what Turkey could be capable of as a moderate Islamic republic. They believed that the world needed Turkey more than ever as unrest has been growing in the countries where the Arab Spring had occurred. They believed that Turkey needed to take every measure to ensure stability for the entire region. While I was in the city of Eskisehir during the regular nightly protests in May and June of 2013, one elderly woman who had reached the ripe age of 106 and had witnessed both the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Turkish Republic issued a statement through her daughter to all the residents of the apartment building. “There are plenty of politics from 9: 00 am to 5: 00 pm. At night, put down your pots and pans and go to sleep, just go to sleep, politics will be there when you wake up.” It is my sense that we are going to see very surprising forms of participation in Hizmet from young women in the future. More often the trend seems to be for women to have careers and to pursue graduate degrees. A number of them who I have known since they were small children are now adolescents on their way to university. It will be very interesting to see where they take this movement in the future as they take the mantle into their hands. The various layers of women’s participation that I have outlined here are loosely configured, but effective in the powerful impact they have over public perception of pious, and practicing Muslim women. Piety and power are no longer mutually exclusive terms. The multiple public spheres that are opened up by women taking part in the Gülen Movement offer incoming women and girls unique opportunities to participate in public life. My thinking is 154

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very much indebted to Göle’s discussion of women and Turkish notions of modernity and national identity, as well as to White’s emphasis on the often-overlooked forms of women’s participation at what she calls the “vernacular” level. Whereas Göle’s work dealt with “the new veiling movement” of the 1980s and 1990s, and White’s work focused on lower middle class neighbourhoods in Istanbul, my research has followed the development of the Gülen Movement as it has moved squarely into a very large, publically recognized mainstream transnational movement that operates at every socio-economic level. At the final completion of this research project, it is my hope that in book form it will offer many portraits of women who have benefited from participation in the Gülen Movement, and that non-Turks who are less familiar with Middle Eastern societies may come to replace such dichotomies as “public vs. private” and “male vs. female”, with more nuanced understandings of dynamic Muslim public spheres that Muslims themselves experience as fulfilling, and rewarding. In conclusion, to ask “where are the women in the Gülen Movement?” is a question that yields some important answers and dispels many incorrect assumptions about women in cosmopolitan “socially active observant Muslim” spheres.26 However, we should also be asking a more general question, “how does the Gülen Movement improve the lives of women?”, and conducting broader research that examines the multiple public spheres that Hizmet opens to a wide array of women, both those who self-identify with Hizmet, as well as those that benefit directly and indirectly from its existence.

26

Yılmaz 2009.

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Part II National and Regional Surveys

Belgium’s Gülen Hizmet Movement History, Structures and Initiatives Johan Leman This chapter explores the history, profile and place of the Hizmet Movement in Belgium from 1992 till 2015. How was the movement started? When were the different initiatives created? And the platforms? Is there a logic to the process? What are the priorities? What does membership mean? What is its relationship to society in general? I apply a no-nonsense approach. I entered into contact involuntarily with the Hizmet movement in 2009, volunteering among minorities in Brussels, not as a member of Hizmet. It brought me into contact with one of their schools (Lucerna), after which I met also Turkish students at KU Leuven University in my class who asked me my opinion and advice about the movement. As I understood that the movement was the object of some controversy in Turkey, I wanted to be very careful in my contacts and decisions. As an anthropologist I really wanted to ‘see’ and to judge only after observation. I have a professional career behind me, as former Director of a Royal Commission on Migrant Policy, and as former Director of a Federal Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Fight Against Racism in my country, that doesn’t permit me to make big mistakes at the end of my career, surely when one proposes me to become chair holder of a Gülen Chair for Intercultural Studies (GCIS) at my university. And yes, between 2009 and today I gathered information and slowly formed an opinion, not a definitive one – I guess – but based on facts and encounters that I personally could control, and not on literature or on gossip. I also only want to speak about Belgium, since I am not informed about other countries. So, do I formulate an opinion about the whole movement? Not at all. Do I feel sure about what I am writing about Belgium? Yes, as far as any professional anthropologist who enters a field as a participant observer (with the focus on ‘observer’) can feel sure. The chapter comprises two sections. The first reconstructs the chronology of the appearance of Hizmet in Belgium’s public realm. The second proposes a theoretical understanding. The methodology involved interviewing people, mostly young ones in the movement and, as explained in the former paragraph, my own experience as an anthropologist and as a chair holder being involved in the GCIS at KU Leuven. In this function I discussed the objectives of the chair with some members of the 159

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Intercultural Dialogue Platform (IDP). I also had some experience with the movement as president of the Brussels NGO Foyer in the co-organisation of two interreligious concerts with Beltud, the Belgium-Turkish Friendship Association, and being a member of the advisory group in Lucerna College. Finally I followed a weekly course of initiation in the Turkish language at Beltud in the building of Fedactio, the office of the Gülen-inspired federation of organisations. From an anthropological perspective, this may be called a form of participant observation.

Chronology of the Hizmet Initiatives There were three important phases in the first twenty years of Hizmetinspired initiatives in Belgium. A first, non-institutional period can be situated between 1990 and 1997. A second period began in 1997, with the creation of Betiad Business Association in 1997, the IDP (Intercultural Dialogue Platform) in 2000, Lucerna school in 2003, Ecole des Etoiles in 2005, and some extra-curricular supportive school initiatives such as Prisma in Brussels. I will also discuss here the place of the Turkish newspaper Zaman in the first two periods. Many local initiatives in the socio-cultural sector were initiated between 2006 and 2009. A third phase began in 2009 when Betiad became a federation of local business branches, and when in 2010 Fedactio, a federation of many of the existing initiatives in Belgium, had been created. Fedactio again proved to be the motor of new local initiatives. I will look at the dynamics and at the impact of the business branch on these three periods and analyse the character of the various initiatives.

A Pre-Institutional Period (1992-1996) Around 1992, about a decade later than in the Netherlands, some Hizmet-inspired persons left Turkey for Belgium. They wanted to speak to the Belgian Turkish communities about Hizmet. They did this principally using the Turkish language, and addressed teachers of the religion of Islam. At that time Milli Görüş held a very strong position in most of the provincial cities in Flanders, the Dutch speaking part of Belgium. During holidays, Milli Görüş organised summer camps for children and ‘Qur’ān courses’. The Hizmet promoters had a similar strategy, something that was already done in Turkey in the late 1960s and 1970s by the Gülen Movement, on its own initiative. They organised summer camps and after-class support for the youth in the Belgian Turkish communities. For many parents, there was no difference between Milli Görüş and Hizmet summer camps. In the mid-1990s Milli Görüş started to split into various tendencies, remaining however in the same federation. A younger generation no longer followed the very dogmatic anti-Western doctrine of 160

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the older generation. Some 80 per cent of the first Hizmet adherents were younger, less dogmatic and more pro-Western people, growing away from Milli Görüş. In that pre-institutional period some entrepreneurs had already started supporting the local Hizmet initiatives. In 1997 they founded the business union Betiad in Brussels. In 1995, Zaman, a Turkish newspaper that had been established in 1986 in Istanbul by Hizmet sympathisers, began publishing from Frankfurt (Germany) and found a readership in Belgium. Today, this readership numbers several thousands, and it is greater in the province of Limburg (in the Flemish part of Belgium) than in Brussels.

The First Institutional Initiatives (1997-2008) Betiad is a business association that was founded and became ‘institutional’ in 1997, located in Brussels, on the initiative of a group of Belgian-Turkish business people. Some supported, morally and financially, the initiatives that I will discuss now. In 2000, in Hasselt (a province of Limburg) a group of people of second generation Belgian Turkish Muslim origin created the Intercultural Dialogue Platform (IDP) as a non-profit organisation. One of the people who took the initiative had studied as a second generation Flemish student of Turkish provenance at an Imam Hatip secondary school in Turkey. In 2008, IDP moved to Brussels. IDP is a directly Hizmet-inspired organisation because Gülen is the honorary president. In England the Dialogue Society in London seems to play a similar role and this is the case for the INS Platform in the Netherlands. There are similar institutions in Germany. IDP’s philosophy of dialogue and Islamic understanding are based on Gülen’s teaching. People who relate to the IDP are people who have a deep understanding of the preachings of Gülen and follow them closely. IDP is active at the national Belgian level and also in the EU Parliament, where Turkey’s GYV (Journalist and Writers Foundation) is also quite active. The relationship between the Green fraction in the European Parliament and Turkey’s GYV c.q. Belgian IDP particularly seems to be a very good one. This is at least what I conclude when I see IDP or Zaman contacting political fractions when they ask them to host conferences organised by IDP or Zaman in a Parliamentary conference room. At national or Flemish level, however, there doesn’t seem to be a preference for one political fraction, and most of the time the local Hizmet initiatives (e.g. Beltud, Lucerna) contact the whole palette of political fractions, from nationalists to liberals to socialists, when they organise something where outsiders are also invited. Having good contacts with people from different political fractions seems to be judged by them as quite important. 161

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The aim of the IDP is to work at better mutual understanding between different faiths, beliefs and cultures, and to facilitate social and community cohesion. They organise different activities such as conferences, workshops, training, visits and meetings. Their motto is ‘a contribution to weaving a culture of harmony’. IDP accepts diversity in a pluralistic vision of society and within the existing democratic framework: the dialogue should be founded on accepting the ‘other’ in their otherness, acknowledging the cultural exchanges between people, emphasising shared values. In 2007, at the EU parliament, IDP organised a conference entitled “What if Mawlana Lived in Today’s Europe?”, hosted by MEPs (i.e. Members of the European Parliament) in Brussels, at the Model European Parliament, a simulation of the ‘real parliament’ for students of the highest grades of secondary schools. Another significant conference was on Turkey-EU relations in 2004 at the EU parliament, co-organised with the Journalists and Writers Foundation in Istanbul. In 2010, a panel discussion, “Do Muslims have anything to say about green politics?”, was realised in order to tackle the issue of the global environment crisis and to determine and analyse what Muslims think of it. A second level of activities were community events which were more down-to-earth, such as Ramadan iftars, dialogue dinners, exhibitions, intercultural trips, meetings with local ethnic-religious communities, visiting places of worship and of ashoura, and a celebration of Alevi Muslims. The objective of these community events was to bring together different cultures and religions at the same table to discuss relevant socioreligious issues. They were not only for Muslims; IDP also applies to non-Muslims, non-believers, to give a clear message about sharing (food, happiness, celebrations). Through the mediation of the IDP, Belgian Turkish sponsors at KU Leuven decided to finance a Gülen Chair for Intercultural Studies (GCIS) from 2011. In the meantime, the newspaper Zaman became more visible among Belgian Turks. The European redaction of Zaman remained concentrated in Germany from where it also served the neighbouring countries as Zaman Avrupa (European Zaman). This would change in 2009, as I will discuss below.

The Flemish Lucerna School and Francophone Ecole des Etoiles In 2003, I assisted at the creation of a school in Brussels, under the name of Lucerna College. The first meetings for the project dated from 2000-2001. By 2013, Belgium had two ‘Gülen-inspired’ schools, Lucerna 162

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College in the Flemish area (with Limburg as its strongest anchorage) and the Ecole des Etoiles in the French speaking area (with Brussels as its strongest site). Lucerna soon opened new branches in Ghent, Antwerp and the province of Limburg. The school building of each section is sponsored by local Turkish entrepreneurs. In 2013, Lucerna had a total of 1152 pupils, most in the secondary school. The Brussels Lucerna site had 346 students. Lucerna had not yet become a member of Fedactio – the Belgian Umbrella Federation, created in 2010. In the Francophone part of the country, the Ecole des Etoiles primary school was founded in 2005 in Schaerbeek (Brussels) on the ground floor of a building which since 2010 has been property of Fedactio, of which the Ecole des Etoiles became a member in 2010. The Ecole des Etoiles is nowadays situated in Haren (Brussels). In 2007 another primary school was founded in Charleroi. In 2012, the Ecole des Etoiles opened a secondary school in Brussels. In 2013, the site in Charleroi had 200 students, and the site in Haren counted 380 students in the primary school. The secondary school in Haren had 115 students. There are plans to build a secondary school in Charleroi. Contact between Brussels’ Ecole des Etoiles and Lucerna are very rare. In both schools, teachers come from several backgrounds. In the Ecole des Etoiles, there are Belgian teachers of Swedish, Spanish, Haitian, Portuguese, Moroccan and Turkish origin. In Lucerna, more or less one third of the personnel is of Turkish-Belgian provenance. The others are a mix of Spanish, Italian, Romanian, Moroccan and Flemish background. In both schools, the direction is given to Belgian Turks. Lucerna has four dormitory (yatılı) schools, two in Antwerp and two in Ghent. There are three more yatılı schools with pupils going to Lucerna, but they were not established on the initiative of the Lucerna management and belong to other foundations. In the yatılı schools there is a separation between boys and girls from 15 years and older. Both Hizmet-inspired schools are ‘free’ non-confessional schools. This means that the “schooling (is) organised by private individuals, associations, etc.”, but the school programmes are subsidised by the Flemish or French Community. In Belgium, the other schools which are ‘free’ are confessional, and almost all are Catholic schools. For the Hizmet-inspired schools, it means that there may be Catholic, Protestant and Islamic courses starting from primary class, while for those who do not follow a religious doctrine, a class based on laïcité values may be given. In both schools, the boards are populated with highly schooled young people, and with Belgian-Turkish people from the field of free professions and entrepreneurs. The profile of the parents who send their children to these schools is socially very diverse, most being second 163

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generation migrants, but some already third generation (i.e. the children in kindergarten). Inner-Turkish diversity (e.g. being Kurdish or Alevite) is no problem. In the last two years, at Lucerna, it has become an important point of interest to attract Belgo-Belgian pupils, but this is less easy than it seems at first sight. The school is still often seen by outsiders as a ‘Turkish’ or ‘Islamic’ school. The interest in the school by converts and parents from mixed marriages is increasing. According to the data provided by the secretariat of Ecole des Etoiles in Haren in 2013, 8% of the students were Belgian, 58% Turkish-Belgian, 32% Moroccan-Belgian and 2% originated from several other countries. Clearly, the schools were opened by Gülen-inspired people, who follow the educational-ethical teachings of Gülen, but in some cases, there are also people on the board of the school, who are not Gülen-inspired, for example in the financial administration. Is the concept ‘Gülen-inspired school’ an appropriate term, which can be used in the same way as, for example, ‘Jesuit schools’? I do not think so, since there is no lineage, established tradition, nor a historical cumulative experience to express ‘Gülen pedagogy’. When asked about the Gülen inspiration, the school directors explained that parents, entrepreneurs and teachers collaborate closely, and that there is a Gülen saying for that, but they could not say much more about what Gülen thought as regards educational methodological matters. I could analyse the internal school structure of Lucerna very well. I noted that the Gülen writings and DVD’s are quite well known by people on the management board and by the Belgian-Turkish part of the direction. The entrepreneurs on the board place financial capital and private property at the disposal of the school. Young second generation BelgianTurkish intellectuals have invested their human capital abundantly for the successful development of the school. Some of the teachers adhere to the Movement and others do not. Some former students or pupils at universities or secondary schools who sympathise are helpful, by acting as tutors or simply taking a room at ayatılı school at night. With regards to the parents, the motivation for opting for a Lucerna school may or, in most cases, may not be inspired by Gülen’s ideas. Finally, the directors recruited an advisory committee, composed of people with a Flemish academic or political background, in a very pluralistic way, and also with people who have notoriously an agnostic and very laic philosophy of life. From an interview with one of the school directors at the Ecole des Etoiles, I learned that not more than 30% of all parents are Hizmet people. Moroccan-Belgian parents in Ecole des Etoiles do not even know who Gülen is. There are also Turkish-Belgians (around 10%) who oppose the ideas of Gülen, but who still believe that the educational quality of the school is very good. Parents are mainly attracted by the ethical and pedagogical attitude of the teachers towards their children and to parents. 164

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Although the majority of teachers in the school are Belgian, the directors are careful about their choice and also try to explain their philosophy to the teachers. The leadership said that they did not choose every teacher who applied but especially those who showed religious and cultural sensitivities and who were possibly more likely to understand their students. When asked why Ecole des Etoiles did not chose to be an Islamic school, taking into consideration the fact that almost 90% of the students are Muslims, the director of the primary school, a lady, answered that there was no need for an Islamic school in Belgian society. Another consideration was that she was not sure that Islamic schools would provide the children with a sufficient degree of tolerance and understanding of other faiths and cultures. For the moment, it is a matter of debate as to what extent the schools can be successful in creating the multicultural atmosphere they hope for. The percentage of students from the ethnic backgrounds other than Turkish and Moroccan is quite low. This is not due to the politics of the Ecole des Etoiles or of Lucerna, but to environmental circumstances, and circumstances related to the image of the schools. Until now, in 2013, the management had been unable to change this impression, but it does not mean it won’t change in the future. When it comes to charity work, and especially funding schools, the director of the secondary school of Ecole des Etoiles drew attention to the cultural dimension of the Turkish-Belgians. Only when he was asked about this aspect, did he explain that he was inspired by the ideas of Gülen, but he immediately added that this should not mean that it would have any effect on the way the school was run. Indeed, one will not find books or pictures of Gülen in the school, but one cannot deny the existence of a particular ethical and caring ethos. To conclude this section, an interesting anecdote may be told as follows. An Ecole des Etoiles director explained that a few Moroccan-Belgian parents contested the celebration of holidays such as Christmas and Easter in her school. Her answer to these parents was that they are important symbols of the country and that they represent a cultural image rather than a religious one. She saw it as best serving the goal of creating a more pluralistic and harmonious society, and a mosaic of cultures and symbols bringing together different non-conflicting aspects of several cultures.

A Second Series of Institutional Initiatives (from around 2009) By 2009, Betiad (first initiated in 1997) had become a federation of five major local business associations. The Betiad federation was established at the national level in Brussels, with local branches in Antwerp, Ghent, 165

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Limburg, Hainaut and Liege. In late 2009, Betiad was the first federation of migrant-rooted business organisations to sign an inter-professional association partnership with UNIZO, the Flemish Union of Self-Employed Entrepreneurs. In 2010, Betiad set up another significant membership with Fedactio in which it occupied one of the five platforms. By 2013 this Betiad platform for Entrepreneurs and Professionals inside Fedactio had brought together around a thousand Belgian Turkish entrepreneurs and free professionals. Some members come from the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. A special feature of this business platform is that its founders have indicated in their charter that in addition to wanting to contribute to the economy of the country by encouraging the entrepreneurial spirit in the business world, they also want to encourage their members to apply social responsibility fully in their professional life by contributing to various cultural, educational and social projects. This is clearly inspired by the Hizmet Movement,1 however, it is my strong feeling that not all members are really Hizmet-inspired people. For some, it is the networking opportunities which attract them. Informed people distinguish quite clearly between very motivated and less motivated sponsors. Even if Betiad does not present itself as a federation explicitly inspired by the Hizmet Movement, many entrepreneurs who join do feel connected to the ideas of Fethullah Gülen. As well as the usual objectives of a business association, such as providing support for entrepreneurs in developing their business and increasing competitiveness at national and international level, Betiad is trying to set up a strong profile at the academic and international level for its members by financing market research, surveys and conferences. Betiad also organises various workshops, seminars and panels by which knowledge is efficiently transferred to its members. Betiad International supports its members in the search for international contacts, new markets and financial resources. There is a dual anchor for this: UNITEE, the European-Turkish Business Confederation (an extensive network of 15,000 companies in 23 European countries), and TUSKON: Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (an extensive network of 45,000 members). The other European founders of UNITEE are Business Network (UK), BUV (Germany), Datifed (Denmark), Fedif (France), and Hogiaf (the Netherlands).2 One year after the creation of Betiad as a national federation, Fedactio was also founded, as a Brussels umbrella organisation. Its official creation was May 30, 2010.3 There were 25 founding member 1

3 2

Leman, 2010. See their website www.unitee.eu, accessed 6 August 2013. See their website www.fedactio.be, accessed 6 August 2013.

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associations, of which some had already been working for 2 or 3 years at local level. In 2013, there were 50 member associations. Fedactio is composed of five platforms: ‘Businessmen and Professionals’, ‘Social Cohesion and Dialogue’, ‘Women & Society’, ‘Education & Youth’, and ‘Culture, Ethics and Values’. Fedactio serves as an advocate and mouthpiece providing services to its member associations. It is also the initiator of new projects and activities. The platforms have no members and the organisations are not placed below any others. Prisma (an educational initiative outside the school) and Ecole des Etoiles, for example, are members of Fedactio but are not part of the Education & Youth Platform. Golden Rose, Inspiration and Koza are associations that were founded by women and while they are members of Fedactio, they are not members of the Women & Society Platform as such. While it is true that the Women & Society Platform develops projects and activities with those associations, they also organise events together with Betiad and the European Professional Network (EPN). The various platforms can also set up projects together with either member associations or non-member associations. In Brussels, for example, Beltud collaborated in 2012 with Integration Centre Foyer (which is completely independent of Fedactio and even of the Gülen Movement) in organising an impressive interfaith concert at the Catholic Church of St John Baptist in Molenbeek. For a more detailed discussion of the kind of initiatives that are related to Fedactio, I present two examples: Golden Rose, and Beltud. Golden Rose was founded by Belgian-Turkish women in 2009 and immediately became a member of Fedactio. It does not describe itself as a “women’s association” exactly, but rather as a platform for “women and society.” There are three other women’s associations under the ceiling of Fedactio. Golden Rose is based in Brussels, and the other associations are dispersed in different cities of the country. Although these women’s associations are part of a larger body, in this case Fedactio, they function completely independently from each other. Golden Rose has approximately 200 members. The profile of the members is not uniform. Most women are second-generation TurkishBelgians, meaning they were born and raised in Belgium and have legal citizenship. There are also some Belgo-Belgian Flemish and Walloon members, although not many, and there are some other members of different nationalities. The educational and professional backgrounds of the members variesto a great degree, as there are very highly educated women, working in different lines of the labour market, and also housewives who do not have a university degree. There are two options for becoming a member of Golden Rose: one can become either an active 167

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member and pay an annual fee, or be a half-member and be informed of all events and able to attend them. The events are open to the general public, meaning that anyone who subscribes beforehand can attend them. In 2013, the president of Golden Rose lived in Brussels and was a PhD student at KU Leuven. The president of the Women and Society Platform of Fedactio was actively concerned with Golden Rose’s internal and external affairs. The association organised interactive meetings with their members, where they discussed ideas about how to reach a wider range of people. In order to meet new members, the association organised brunches every Monday morning, and each brunch was followed by a seminar on a selected topic. For breakfast organisations, each participant had a weekly goal of reaching at least one or two people to introduce this kind of meetings to them. The objective was to increase the number of participants and also to increase the income from the provision of breakfast. All members were volunteers; they were not employed by the association. Volunteering is an important concept for all socio-cultural initiatives in the Movement. Presidency is also a voluntary position. Only the two secretaries are paid salaries. When asked about salaries, the founders of Golden Rose said that they were inspired by Fethullah Gülen. His ideas, revolving around piety, shaped their idea of what it means to be a responsible citizen who takes the initiative. The association itself however, was very careful not to use a faith inspired discourse, and was especially diligent to being open to people from different faith groups. Although the founders of Golden Rose were inspired by Gülen, they rejected any direct link between Gülen and the association, and the levels of attachment to Gülen’s ideas differed among the members. While some were very closely attached to Gülen’s teaching many others were sympathetic with the movement, however to some extent also very critical. An asset of Golden Rose’s secular discourse is that they are able to reach different levels of the state. They try to work with ministries and municipalities when they organise events, to be more effective in bringing about change concerning social cohesion. They want to reach everyone, men and women, not only Turkish Muslim women. It is safe to assume that this encompassing philosophy stems from the importance that Gülen places on dialogue and that it corresponds at the same time to the way these modern women want to live life. BELTUD is a Belgium-Turkish Friendship Association that was founded in 2010 in Brussels to encourage dialogue and friendship between Belgian and Turkish societies without focusing on politics, philosophy or religion. A typical initiative is the yearly competition called “The Colours of Belgium” which encourages children from different cultures to sing 168

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and read poems in different languages so that they can be familiar with the cultures of their friends. Different civil society organisations, started autonomously, changed their name to Beltud in 2011, and new local organisations with the same name have been founded. In 2013 there are Beltud associations in Limburg, Antwerp, Ghent, and West Flanders, and Beltud has also an office in Wallonia. Much investment has been made in the celebration of 50 years Turkish immigration to Belgium.4 There is still a huge variety of other socio-cultural initiatives, but to end this overview, we return to the newspaper Zaman, since its evolution is quite instructive for an understanding of the character of the process of the Movement. From 2009 until March 2013 Zaman remained a newspaper for the three Benelux countries reporting mostly on Turkey, but from the 1st of March 2013, it became a weekly journal published in Brussels and Rotterdam, and reporting on actual developments in the Benelux countries. The 2013 redaction called it a ‘community paper’. The Turkish edition had 13,000 subscribers (6,000 in Belgium and 7,000 in the Netherlands). On 5th April 2013, Zaman also initiated a Dutch language weekly edition called Zaman Vandaag (Today’s Zaman). This weekly addresses new Belgians (mostly 2nd and 3rd generation people of Turkish and Moroccan provenance) but also Flemish and Dutch people (mostly decision makers). At the end of March 2013 there were already 5,500 subscribers for this Dutch language edition.

A Theoretical Approach: A Loosely Knit Social Network What do I learn from my “grassroots” findings? The whole process began in an informal way, when the first contact was initiated by religiously motivated people from Turkey in the early 1990s. At the beginning of the institutionalisation phase, around 1997, we see Betiad at work. This happens again in 2009. After a short time, we see emblematic initiatives realised. The creation of the dialogue centre IDP in 2000 was central and prestigious. Soon afterwards, schools were created. In 2009, Betiad became a national federation. In 2010 Fedactio also became a national institution. IDP began to reflect on whether it should leave its national activities to Fedactio and opt for better developed contacts with the EU. Zaman (the media) followed the logic of the developments. Is this a pre-programmed process? What I see is that local initiatives were taken first. Business, interreligious contacts and educational initiatives were central here. Once the initiatives were initiated and functioned well, some local initiatives looked for a federation model to strengthen their position. Some initiatives, which did not need this national federation, remained autonomous. 4



See the sites www.50ansenbelgique.be and www.50jaarinbelgie.be.

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The federations stimulated new initiatives, where local ones remained absent. The business branch always remained an important ‘supporter’ in the Movement. Mutual local support between partners could become very strong. There was indeed always strong local social networking, but moral credibility also remained very important. Was all this hierarchically organised and ordered? I do not see indications of that. Were the initiatives ideologically homogeneous? There is more internal diversity than there may seem to be in the eyes of an outsider, but yes, the involvement of parents, business people and information and moral glue based on Islamic Gülen-inspired ethics, was always present. One may call such a structure a ‘loosely knit social network’. It is absolutely not a formal hierarchical, vertically interconnected system, but there is from time to time some very strong local social networking, and sometimes also a transnational dimension. Support may be given by Hizmet people in Brussels to new initiatives, for example in Luxembourg. There may be contacts between similar initiatives in neighbouring countries. Within the same country, I have the impression that there is, however, something functioning as a self-determining, not outwardly imposed moral hierarchy; related to the acceptance that someone may be closer to Gülen’s spirituality than someone else, and that this may be a source of credibility, but this does not mean that one should obey someone because they give an order, or that there is a strategy of action that is imposed on the different actors. When I treated with IDP people for the creation of a chair at KU Leuven university, I could see throughout the whole period of discussion how the people of the Fedactio associations that I met or Lucerna school direction were clearly not informed about it nor involved in it. In the minds of the IDP, the initiative with the KU Leuven GCIS chair concerned education and sciences, and at the same time also dialogue among religions, cultures and civilisations (another important item in Gülen’s writings and preaching), but, there is indeed something like a ‘moral’ glue that is present in most of the initiatives, albeit clearly with different biases and structures.

… of “Loosely Coupled Organisations” It is interesting to see how the philosophy and organisational culture of the Movement works on a practical level in some of their singularly important initiatives, when studied as a “loosely coupled organisation.”5 A good example is offered by Lucerna school. Conforming to the spirit of the Movement, Brussels entrepreneurs helped finance the Brussels site, Antwerp entrepreneurs sponsored the Antwerp site, and so on, but everywhere the 5



Weick 1982.

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result is an educational initiative inspired by Hizmet Islamic thinking and ethics that explicitly mean to be non-confessional, and secular.6 It gives these schools a pluralistic, secular format in an Islamic body. As far as I could see, the profile of the parents in the school is socially and religiously very diverse. The direction explicitly wants to see more non-Turkish and non-Muslim people participate. The levels between the board and the participants at grassroots are a mix of Hizmet-inspired people and others, who may belong to different philosophies, but most show some empathy with Hizmet ethics. One may call such an institute: a “loosely coupled organisation.” As a result, from an outsider perspective, I may describe the Movement in Belgium as a ‘loosely knit social network’ of ‘loosely coupled institutes’. A glue of diverse people, mostly with empathy for Hizmet ethics, holds it together. When volunteers support the dynamics morally and financially, they enter into a process of empowering themselves and the Movement. This is what happens with many volunteers in the Movement. It is a process where spiritual, social, human and financial capital support one another, but spiritually the Movement is also supported by an older Islamic tradition, strongly anchored as far back as the Ottoman period. I will develop this in the next section, when discussing the meaning of ‘Hareket’ and ‘Sohbet’.

Hareket, Sohbets and Işık Evler A good understanding of the Movement asks more than about an ‘etic’, outside observer, approach. A complementary ‘emic’, inside perspective, is needed. To envision this more clearly, I propose reflection on three concepts: hareket (meaning: Movement) in Islamic philosophical tradition, sohbet (meaning: a friendly environment of gathering, also in Islamic tradition) and işık evler (meaning: lighthouses). The idea of a hareket, goes back to philosophical insights that have been developed in works such as Ibn Rushd’s Kitab fi-Harakat al-Falak (i.e., on the Motion of the Sphere). Hareket explains the centrality of stimulating ideas (c.q. Gülen’s preaching and teachings) which have a strong or a less strong impact on people and organisations that all together belong to the same sphere. Such a Hareket explains the dynamics through which a cluster of entities pushes away from its place of rest. Some institutions feel attracted by a higher idea and become moved by it. Aristotle applied the concept of such a movement to his interpretation of the circular movements of the planets at different distances from a centre in the middle. Some entities bring themselves in movement in the direction of a first cause, an idea of beauty at the centre. The impact of the 6



Çelik and Steenbrink, 2011a.

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central idea on people and institutions may be different. Some may circle at closer or at less close distance from the first cause. They know it from one another and accept it, but they all remain attracted. The expressions, the concrete messages, the ethics, of the central and stimulating idea are cultivated in sohbets, which may be described from an outsider perspective as semi-private spaces. From an insider’s perspective they are seen as having a religious connotation, referring to the Sahabe, the companions of the Prophet. These are places concerned not with ‘physical’, but with ‘spiritual’ brotherhood. In the Hizmet Movement, there are weekly gatherings where for those members who want them, the preachings of Fetullah Gülen are the objects of reflection. Every week, some members take the last bamteli from the internet where the hocaefendi (‘reverend teacher’, as members like to call him) speaks about fedakarlik (altruism), uhuvvet and kardeşlik (Arabic and Turkish for brotherly love). A bamteli, literally the most important string of a saz instrument, is the setting where Gülen presents his mızrap, a broken string. Each time he also stimulates listeners to müspet hareket, constructive action, to act proactively in such a way that they may avoid re-action, co-operating with others instead of causing antagonism. Participation, however, is not compulsory. I know people who have followed this path for some time and then for reasons of time, do not follow it for an indeterminate period. Is this sohbet structure something ‘hidden’ or ‘secret’? No more than in a Christian Church culture where some families meet from time to time for prayer and reflection on Christian values. It is a process of socialising and personal empowerment inside the Movement. It is also for mutual support, and not only in religious affairs, but also, for example, in practical affairs for business people. The weekly bamtali of Fethullah Gülen may easily be found at Herkul.org. Martin Taylor rightly wrote: The Movement’s participants network among themselves and others through regular meetings called ‘sohbets’. A ‘sohbet’ (literally, “religious circle”) is usually held weekly and attendants number between 7 and 15 people. The circles last a few hours and consist of discussions on faith, religion, society and new and ongoing projects. The main function of these gatherings is to inform and invigorate belief, to develop social responsibility and to move awareness towards activism. The ‘sohbet’ therefore serves as an information-hub: it is where new acquaintances are made and new ideas aired. These meetings enable the Movement’s participants to network and exchange information about Hizmet-related projects that they know about or are involved in.” Participants feel friendship, mutual support, religious empowerment, support in concrete life (studies, business).7 7

See , accessed 8 August 2013.

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Another important institution are the lighthouses. In Belgium Hizmet people call the Hizmet-inspired apartments where students who left home to start their university studies to live together with some colleagues, a dershane. In Turkey this concept is only used for schools that prepare for the entrance exam at the universities. In Turkey one calls such apartments lighthouses (ışık evler). In Flanders and Brussels there are some 15 lighthouses, apartments with many rooms, where 4 to 5 students, of the same gender, live together, coached by an abi (an older, more experienced student in this case). Boys remaining with boys and girls with girls is not a Hizmet, but a typically Turkish migrant preoccupation. Living alone outside home, in the absence of social control, is also avoided. In the lighthouses, students do their work for university but participate at the organisation of concrete needs inside the apartment. There is also a daily, mostly common prayer time, and Gülen’s texts are read, individually, as material for reflection. People learn to live with different characters and to support one another. They also know people from other lighthouses and it can happen, on the occasion, for example, of an iftar, that there is a meeting between members of various lighthouses. People do not know everyone in the lighthouses, mostly people know the others through the sohbets in secondary school. Is having lived in a lighthouse an indication of later functions in Hizmet? Yes, but it is not a decisive criterion. People who have never stayed in a lighthouse may also take up such responsibilities in later life, and some people who lived in a lighthouse will never take up responsibilities in Hizmet. The decisive criterion is commitment after study of the social objectives of the movement. So, yes, the lighthouses in Brussels and Flanders are an important place of socialisation in the movement, but they are not a decisive institution for later responsibilities.

Businessmen and intellectuals doing Hizmet The key concept in the Movement is Hizmet, service to humanity as an expression of service to God.8 This is the originality of Fethullah Gülen vis-à-vis the position of Bediüzzaman Saïd Nursi (1876-1960). As Yavuz writes: Nursi emphasised the ‘inside out’, Gülen the ‘outside in’ dimension in Islam.9 In this interpretation of Islam, an entrepreneurship that is adequately oriented, directly or indirectly in Hizmet terms, becomes a religious act. A business framed by Hizmet may become religious as well as include the inside dimension, the spirituality, which of course will also necessarily be present for those who act in a spirit of religious Hizmet. 8



9

Çelik 2008, 2010. Yavuz 2003: 188.

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The sadaqa jariya, the financial support of initiatives of public, common interest (strongly anchored in the Turkish mind, since it guarantees salvation as long as the initiative exists), has been a fundamental pillar in the development of Gülen’s educational and media network. In 2003 Agai wrote that, “the movement governs about a thousand schools all around the world, supported by local entrepreneurs, altruistic educators, and dedicated parents,” “a tripartite relationship.”10 One may understand that the theological ideas of Fethullah Gülen on entrepreneurship, transmitted in a charismatic way in his preaching (and in Gülen’s bamteli), and wishing social cohesion and social peace, may have resulted in many businessmen being attracted by his ideas. But what about the intellectuals? When discussing it with Gülen-inspired, also former leftist, intellectuals in Turkey, one may see how for some the impasse created by former extreme left-extreme right struggles, and for others the nuanced approach of the secular, in the midst between official ‘third French republic’ laicism and Islamist secularism, or both arguments together, have been a stimulus to following Gülen’s way of thinking. The place given to science and the recognition of its autonomy as a complementary partner for religion, and its being positively accepted as part of God’s revelation through Creation, is a stimulating idea for young intellectuals in Turkey (and also abroad). When speaking with young intellectuals in Flanders (Belgium) who sympathise with Gülen’s ideas, one may see how they have found some pride again in being a Muslim. To quote one of them: More than once I felt ashamed about the low quality of the ideas of our preachers when I visited the mosques in former years. It simply was backward talk for someone who was a university student. However, one day, a friend invited me to participate at some meetings in a quite marginal small mosque in my city where a young imam presented the ideas of Gülen. A heavy weight fell from my shoulders. I felt I could be an intellectual, a modern person and a Muslim believer. That is the reason why today I do for the Movement what I do.

In the eyes of some of the young second generation Belgian-Turkish intellectuals, Gülen’s ideas present an Islam that has the right to claim an adequate and credible place in modern Western society, not in opposition to the West, and valorising science. One may expect that if young adult second generation BelgianTurkish intellectuals can find a common platform with Belgian-Turkish entrepreneurs, first as well as second generation, it may be the beginning of

10

Agai 2003a; Agai 2003b; also Çelik 2008: 44.

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an interesting and dynamic process of upward social mobility initiatives in the Belgian immigrant community.11 This again makes Hizmet attractive.

Hizmet, Education, and Social Engineering “Education functions as the social engineering of the movement.”12 It is well known by all people who have been inspired by Gülen that he declared very openly that Turkey did not need more mosques or imam hatip schools, but was in need of a highly qualified secular education system. It is through education and school that the new generation, the ‘golden generation’, will lead society in an ethical way. This new generation will focus on secular science, but in correspondence with Islamic ethics. Business and science have become pillars in Gülen’s society, with education, school and Islamic ethics as the motor and the glue. Of course, Gülen also emphasises an interiorisation – that is his Sufi ‘Sitz im Leben’ – of personal qualities such as self-discipline, open tolerance and a spirit of mission.13 That the school should keep its distance from politics, is due to insights from the mid-1980s, when Gülen’s school initiatives spread over the whole of Turkey. That the school should be secular, and non-confessional, is an idea that has become more important from the 1990s on, when the initiatives have become transnational and schools have been built outside Turkey. In Gülen-inspired initiatives, the creation of a secular high quality education system (as high as possible in its societal context) with profound loyalty to the general ideas of Fethullah Gülen’s teachings is a basic value. The means of implementation of education initiatives is revealing. The Gülen Movement avoids religious facilities to promote its educational programme. The Movement uses the regular school system and only on rare occasions does it offer religious education, but then outside the mosques. Part of the fundamental Hizmet philosophy is the “tripartite relationship” in Gülen initiatives between parents and teachers who are educators, and sponsors. This approach is clearly present in Belgium’s Hizmet. From the perspective of social integration, the Gülen Movement emphasises that youngsters are citizens not of Turkey, but of Belgium. I quote the director of Prisma, a Hizmet-inspired educational centre in Brussels: “The image of the Turkish community as a closed community that lives in diasporas must change. (…) Belgian Turks must know at first 11

See also Leman 2010. Çelik 2008: 41. 13 Michel 2003: 78. For a discussion of the Movement’s approach to education, see Agai 2003 (who speaks of an ‘educational Islamism’ as opposed to a ‘political Islamism’), Michel 2003, Aslandogan & Cetin 2006, and Vicini 2007. 12

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Belgium very well.” In the classrooms there are no Turkish flags, nor the Turkish national anthem, or any pictures of Atatürk.

Representativity of Hizmet among Belgian-Turks In 2013, the total number of Belgian Turks who benefit from mosque services was estimated at between 40,000 and 50,000. Milli Görüş had approximately 10,000 members. Between 20 to 25% of Turkish Belgians may be regarded as Milli Görüş followers. Diyanet had 19,000 members in Belgium. It had more or less twice as many followers and mosques as Milli Görüş, representing some 40 to 50% of Turkish Belgians. We cannot use the same criterion to estimate Hizmet followers, since the Movement doesn’t use religious facilities for education and has no mosques either. Many Hizmet followers are youngsters whose parents originally came from the more open sections of their group in the 1990s. Today they visit mostly Diyanet mosques for their prayers. In a certain sense, one may say that the impact of the arrival of Hizmet in Belgium has been that ummaoriented Milli Görüş has lost influence over the Belgian Turks. Currently in Brussels, Milli Görüş provides its mosque educational activities to approximately to 400 children and youth. For the whole of Belgium, Diyanet has 4,500 students at elementary school level. If I take the four locations of the Flemish Lucerna school (Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, and Limburg) and the two locations of French speaking Ecole des Etoiles (Brussels and Charleroi), and add its after-school centres in Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent and Limburg, the Hizmet Movement has a few less pupils than Diyanet, but has a greater impact. It could be argued that Diyanet and Hizmet are equally present in educational initiatives, and Milli Görüş at a minor level. The differences are structural and qualitative: the Gülen school initiatives are anchored inside the regular school system and stay under the control of the Hizmet volunteers. This anchored society approach is absent in Milli Görüş and Diyanet. The facilities used in Gülen schools are ‘laic’, content is secular. One may protest that it is also secular in Diyanet, but outside Turkey, this is offered very often in religious facilities, and education is orientated to Turkey. Milli Görüş offers principally religious-biased education. Does this create tensions inside the Belgian-Turkish neighbourhoods? I do not think so, at least not at grassroots level. From time to time e-mail messages and gossip are sent to non-Turkish people who have contacts with Hizmet to create confusion about the Hizmet movement, speaking about hidden agendas, hidden Islamisation and so on. These e-mails are clearly of Turkish provenance or when they come from Belgians, these persons have clearly been brainwashed by Kemalist militants. Their intention is to weaken the Hizmet position in Belgian society. 176

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Gülen-inspired education and school initiatives appear clearly as the most promising and future-oriented initiatives emanating from the Belgian Turkish communities in Belgium. As long as Belgian authorities fail to take the necessary initiatives in schooling, Diyanet will however remain strong in some sectors of the education system, namely where it concerns schooling in theology. Diyanet established an ‘imam hatip’ school or an FSIB (Faculté des sciences islamiques de Bruxelles, opened in 2007) presenting it as a university programme, resulting in an MA or PhD degree. Until today, Hizmet remains absent from this kind of theology-related initiative.

Concluding Remarks Conforming to the ideas of Kearns and Forrest (2000), one may find the following criteria important for an understanding of an explicit social cohesion-oriented programme: a sense of responsibility, social order, social solidarity, social capital, and identification with the place where one lives. Care for education and school, participation in the labour market, nationality acquisition, knowledge of the language of the region and a non-oppositional attitude in religious affairs can be seen as adequate concretizations by Hizmet in the direction of social integration. Upward social mobility is also continuously promoted within the Movement. I do not claim that the Movement outside Belgium always acts in the same way. In Turkey’s neighbouring countries the Turkish language is present inside the Gülen schools, usually as a second language. In Turkey itself, in many Gülen-inspired schools there is already much huge attention paid to multilingualism in the first years of elementary schooling. In Flanders, the Dutch language and assimilation, form the dominant norms in the social-cultural Flemish environment, as the mantra in 2010, but, I see that in Flanders they create some distance from the ‘Leitkultur’ of the public schools, in accepting a positive “Anglo-Saxon” approach to religious emblems at school, inside the classes, and for teachers. Finally, a question to which we frequently return: do my findings reveal a centrally organised system? Whoever looks for a centrally organised and hierarchical structure for Hizmet in Belgium, will not find it. Not because it remains hidden, but because it simply is not there. What one will discover are informal local initiatives that become formalised, decide to network together, sometimes create new initiatives; and where people find their moral and religious support locally, reflecting on some bamteli of the hocaefendi. Maybe what one will find is amoral hierarchy, but not formalised, and there is quite frequent internal debate and search for consensus. It is a movement dynamically created from the bottom up in the practical initiatives and from the top down in its ethics and 177

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spirituality. The semi-private spaces of the sohbets and the dynamics of the federation are the places where concrete local initiatives and spiritual top down glue meet and compromise inside the cultural space of a particular country. This means that the initiatives may be different from one country to another, but is all this hidden, vertical, authoritarian? One cannot hide something for so many years, in so many countries, involving so many different people. It is simply a modernity based on a traditional Islamic spirituality and ethics and this may makes an understanding of the process a bit more complex for modern Western and even TurkishKemalist eyes.14

14

The author thanks Fatma Zehra Çolak, Merve Kayikci, Aysegul Kayaoglu, Seval Kayman, Erkan Toguslu, Esma Yıldırım, Saliha Özdemir, Mete Öztürk, Şerafettin Pektaş for the answers they gave to the many questions he asked them. The paper itself, however, is his own interpretive construction.

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The Hizmet Movement and the Integration of Muslims in Germany Ercan Karakoyun and Karel Steenbrink Since the arrival of large groups of Turkish labourers to Germany in the 1960s, their group has grown to 2.8 million people who defined themselves as ‘of Turkish origin’ in 2005.1 They have given a great visibility to a new Muslim presence in the country. In all overviews the Diyanet organisation, Süleymanlı and Milli Görüş are given much attention. Followers of Said Nursi also are mentioned, but Fethullah Gülen was for a long time a rather invisible figure. In 1981 a ‘History of Islam in Germany’ (a book of 220 pages) did not mention Gülen and his followers at all.2 An encyclopaedic overview of Muslim groups and activities published in 2002, mentions Fethullah Gülen and the group of Gülenists twice as close to the teaching of Said Nursi and the ‘KadiriDerwische’. As their special activities their after-school tutoring to students from elementary school to high school is mentioned, besides the publication of the German-Turkish edition of the newspaper Zaman, the weekly Aksiyon and the quarterly Die Fontäne.3 In a book of nearly 600 pages, published in 2008, only one short note refers to Gülen in the list of publications, where Zaman is mentioned as a ‘centre-right, religious publication, close to Fethullah Gülen’.4 There are several reasons for this negligence. Gülen had suggested since the 1960s that his sympathizers should not build mosques, but open schools, and the focus of observers of Islam in Germany during the last decades was concentrated on mosques and activities related to these buildings. Gülen people, however, did not build mosques, they even did not stress Islam and showed in public openness to other cultures. Another reason was that Gülen-related leaders and activities were not openly known or labelled by the name of the leader. There was even an 1

Karakoyun 2010: 58-60 for this figure. Abdullah 1981. Also Amiraux 1996 does no mention Gülen in her study of Turkish Islam in Germany. 3 Şen and Aydın 2002: 25, 79-80 and 86-87. In 2012 Zaman had 30,000 subscribers in Germany alone, according to editor-in-chief Mahmut Çebi, Der Spiegel, 8 August 2012. 4 Al-Hamarneh & Thielmann 2008: 450. 2

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atmosphere of renouncing direct relation to Fethullah Gülen.5 Their relatively late arrival in the public arena compared to other Turkish Muslim groups can also be connected to the fact that in the 1960s and 1970s the Gülen Movement was still a small religious community in Izmir. The first greater manifestations where the name of Fethullah Gülen was explained to the public by sympathizers were two conferences, one in 2009 at the University of Potsdam, and another in 2010 at Bochum University.6 Since then there has been a quick rise of attention for Fethullah Gülen. The public debate on the position of Islam in Germany since then often concentrated on the image and activities of the Gülen sympathisers. Both insiders and outsiders have put the character and degree of influence of its leader as one of the many issues on the agenda of the increasingly heated and hardened debate on the place of Islam in Germany. Gülen visited Germany for the first time in August-September 1977, in his function as a Diyanet imam, to preach during the month of Ramadan. It was a shocking experience for Gülen himself, to see how the workers who visited the meetings in the mosques were thinking that they were not intending to take up a permanent residence in Germany, but only to earn money and to return back to their families in Turkey. Gülen preached that they should open themselves to German culture and society and seek their future in Europe. The next year Necdet Başaran, an independent preacher and someone close to Gülen, came for a longer period to Germany. However, he moved in 1980 to the Netherlands.7 Gülen was once again in Germany during the 1980s and once in the 1990s, but there are no detailed records of these visits available.8 In 1995 he gave a strong opinion about his advice of orientation towards a permanent life in Germany for his followers: Our people who live in Europe must come off from their old situation and become a part of European society. Their children must be oriented to universities more than artisanal secondary schools. Also, they must transmit our cultural and religious richness to European society. In the future they will constitute our lobbies which we highly need today. In the past, only two percent of the Turkish immigrant population was fulfilling their religious requirements. But today, 40 or maybe 60 percent of the young population regularly pray in the mosques. Obviously, our people didn’t undergo an assimilation process, contrary, they impressed the host societies by their conviction and culture.9 5



Agai 2011: 30-31. See Homolka and others (eds.) 2010 for the Berlin meeting, Boos-Nünning et al. (eds.) 2011 for the Bochum conference. 7 See also chapter 10 for this early history. 8 Agai 2011: 33. 9 From an interview in the Turkish newspaper Sabah, 28 Jan. 1995, with the title; ‘Hoca’nın hedefi Amerika ve Almanya,’ quoted in translation in Demir 2007a: 227. 6

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It is clear from this quotation that social emancipation and integration were not the only goals of Gülen. He also kept in mind the continuation of a solid religious and cultural identity. The process of integration of migrants in German society is also not a one-way assimilation of migrants into an existing society, but an active choice of creating a new way of living in a changing Germany, also to be seen as a contribution to this country. In the last two decades the Gülen activists or Hizmet sympathizers have developed a set of activities that is in most aspects quite different from the central focus of all other Muslim groups. They leave the strict religious facilities like mosques, Qur’ān courses, education for imam, organisation of the pilgrimage, to other organisations and so it is understandable that they had a low profile in general studies on Islam in Germany. They do not participate in national organisations of Muslims like the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland), the German Islamic Council (IRD, Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland), the Coordinating Council of Muslims (KRM Koordinationsrat der Muslime) or similar institutions.10 The label Hizmet (meaning service, dedication) is pushed as a distinctive marker and even as some kind of a new title for the movement in order to avoid the name of the central figure, Fethullah Gülen. It is this concentration on substantial social action that we may see as the special contribution of Gülen sympathizers to modern German society.

Since the Mid-1990s: the After-School Educational Training Preceding the German ‘coming-out’ in 2009-2010, there have been several studies that record the first decade of the Gülen institutions since the mid-1990s.11 After 1990 Fethullah Gülen and his Turkish followers gave priority to the expansion of his activities in Central Asia. The first initiatives by sympathizers in Germany were modest and directly related to the local need for emancipation through better schooling. They were not steered from any ‘headquarter’ in Turkey, but originated from migrants who took initiatives at a local level. The first Bildungshaus or afterschool training of pupils is recorded for Berlin in 1994 and for Stuttgart in 1995.12 A decade later sources already talked about ‘more than 100 learning centres in Germany’.13 The Gülen activists, however, were not the only Muslim group to start these initiatives. Most other Muslim groups and also many secular activists provided this kind of facilities. 10

Seufert 2014: 25. For the papers at conferences in Oklahoma (2006), Leeds and Rotterdam (both 2007) see Irvine 2006, Demir 2007a and 2007b, Pashayan 2007. 12 For Berlin Agai 2010: 41; for Stuttgart Demir 2007a: 219-220. 13 Demir 2007a: 221. 11

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Education is one of the most pressing social issues of the 21st century. It is not limited to general school education and formal vocational training but covers also further professional training and continuous autodidactic learning. As holds true for most other modern European societies, the social significance of education for Germany can be measured by the concurrence of an expansion of education and the social inequality of educational opportunities.14 Thus, the educational expansion that started in Germany already in the 1950s took up speed in the 1960s and has continued to this day. In its wake all social strata have increasingly participated in education. However, the first generation of guest workers did not receive a chance to move socially upward through education. From among the various alternatives they had decided to migrate. Yet the aim of this so-called first generation was to enable their children to enjoy a better future. These children at first missed out on the educational expansion in Germany. Although the situation has somewhat improved since the 1980s, foreign children still have particularly bleak educational prospects. At the same time the educational level of German pupils has risen. As a consequence, the gap in educational opportunities has widened between German and foreign pupils attending the general school system. The IGLU 2006 and PISA III study already confirmed in December 2007 that in no other country was the connection between a family’s social position and background so closely tied to the children’s school attainments as in Germany.15 Ever more migrant families try to catch up on the missed expansion of education, but are unable to do so. In Turkey likewise the last few years have witnessed an educational expansion within the lower and middle strata of Turkish society. The schools and facilities run by Hizmet volunteers in Germany are an effort to counter this situation. Gülen’s ideas and the successes achieved by the movement’s facilities in Turkey and Central Asia are also motivating people in Germany to establish educational associations in order to have equal access to education. The positive examples and their worldwide success have led to school help centres, private secondary schools and other educational training institutions being set up also in Germany. As already mentioned above, the first activities for after-school help started in the mid-1990s. Here, the Gülen sympathizers did not rely on a network through local mosques, as could be done by Diyanet, Süleymançı and Milli Görüş faithful. The background from which Gülen 14

Blossfeld & Shavit 1993, Müller 1998 and Becker 2006. IGLU stands for Internationale Grundschul-Lese-Untersuchung or Progress in International Reading Literacy Study, a research under supervision of OECD. PISA stands for Programme for International Student Assessment. It is also under supervision of OECD.

15

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related initiatives were started, in most cases, showed a peculiar pattern. Some families with a Turkish migration background decided to foster the education of their children. During their search they came across Gülen’s teachings and his followers. This was followed by the establishment of a parental initiative starting with extra-curricular school coaching lessons. Many of these initiatives sprang up in a local context seeking to address local educational problems. Over the years they turned into associations and education facilities. They grew and discovered additional sponsors for their educational activities. Today these associations are running educational centres for after-school training, kindergarten day-care units, elementary, junior and senior secondary schools. As they are all independent associations, each organised separately, it is impossible to provide an exact figure for the number of such institutions. It is roughly estimated that in 2009 there were some 150 centres and supporting groups who serve about 150 children each.16 However, not all of the founding members, teachers, colleagues and parents of pupils are volunteers of the movement. Gülen’s call for more education merely served as the source of motivation and inspiration. Of central importance for the parents is the educational and socialisation aspects for their children and the experiences made by the Hizmet movement in this sphere. Thus, not everyone who is supporting these institutions or is sending their children there, is also a ‘follower of Gülen’. Essential for these people is the education and the call to dialogue and tolerance. This is also the field in which the Hizmet movement has made a name for itself, in Turkey as well as in many other countries. At this point a closer look shall be taken at the individual facilities and institutions. Our interest lies in showing the activities that could be observed in many such institutions. Our list is not complete. The school help centres also offer integration courses for migrants. As language is a key for successful integration, Germany created a minimum framework of state-sponsored integration programmes in 2005, when the Immigration Act became law. At the heart of these government offerings is the integration course. These integration courses contain a total of 645 teaching units. The first part is made up of the language course which consists of 600 teaching units. The second part is called the orientation course and covers the remaining 45 teaching units. This phase of the course focuses on topics such as “Politics in a Democracy”, “History and Responsibility” and “Individuals and society.” The objective of these courses is for migrants to communicate in everyday situations and 16

Agai 2010: 37 for the year 2009. Agai added that two secular organisations Schülerhilfe and Studienkreis, had at that time 750 resp. 1,000 similar centres in order to put the Gülen contribution in perspective. Agai 2011: 30 adds that there is ‘virtually no mosque without educational activities,’ acknowledging also the initiatives of other Muslim groups.

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participate in German society. These courses are offered by almost all school help centres. Education and integration must begin already during pre-school. This is also the reason why many initiatives and educational institutions run day-care centres for small children. As language is a key component for successful integration, the day-care centres provide bilingual, German and Turkish, education and teaching. The teachers employed are native German and Turkish speakers as they are best suited to apply and develop this approach. Each group is therefore attended by a native German and Turkish tutor. In addition, the children can also attend speech tuition with a speech therapist, trained for their respective age. Pre-school children furthermore receive an additional introduction to English.

Since 2004: Formal and Full School Institutions The first secondary schools opened by Gülen volunteers, with good subsidies from the local government, were established in 2004, in Berlin, Dortmund, and again Stuttgart.17 They have grown quickly to 24 schools in 2009 and this number was stable since then, at least until 2014.18 As in other countries secondary schools were followed somewhat later by the first primary schools. Private schools are only a small portion of education in Germany: only 6% against 67% for the Netherlands. In this respect Germany can be compared to France. However, there is a good chance for generous support from the government (depending on the regulations for the individual German states), while this is not the case in France. In 1995 a Muslim private primary school was recognised in Berlin-Kreuzberg (not related to the Gülen network). It remained an exception and the only Muslim school, because in fact the Gülen-inspired schools are not Muslim schools and they also do not provide religious classes, but only courses in ethics.19 The education and teaching at the primary and secondary schools is geared toward the syllabus and guidelines of the specific state in which the school is located. Based on the approaches of, for example, Maria Montessori and J. Reichen, among others, the pedagogic work is focused on the individual pupil’s personality, self-responsibility and independence. Once again the promotion of language is a deliberate aim. Lessons are 17

Demir 2007a: 221. Agai 2011: 33. Most of these are secondary schools of the highest level, Gymnasium, Thies 2013: 179-182. To put this in perspective one may compare it to the 686 Roman Catholic private schools, of which 216 are a gymnasium. , accessed 1 June 2014. 19 Şen and Aydın 2002: 82-83 for the Berlin Muslim school. Thies 2013: 130-133 for the classes in ethics. 18

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taught in German with Turkish and English offered as important foreign languages. The schools have state-of-the-art technology in the computer rooms. The equipment of the schools is above average with libraries, social rooms and relaxation zones also made available for the pupils. Given the small class sizes, the committed teachers can address the pupils’ concerns more intensively and communicate with them. In the event that pupils encounter difficulties with the curriculum and fail to cope with it during class, they can opt to consult specially recruited student employees, who can provide support with additional coaching lessons. None of the educational activities was an exclusive business of GermanTurkish followers of Fethullah Gülen. The Bildungshäuser or after-school educational centres were staffed by young students of Turkish origin, but nearly as many Germans without Turkish roots. The proper schools had a vast majority of non-Muslim German teaching staff. This is a great difference from the first major development outside Turkey for the Gülen Movement since the early 1990s. In the Central Asian countries where the first transnational expansion of Gülen related activities took place, it was dedicated Turkish teachers who were sent from the central country to set up a series of schools where Turkish-Muslim culture (besides high quality and modern education) was a central value. In Germany religious education was neglected absolutely (although the German system has ample facilities for religious education within it overall structure) and Turkish was added as an optional third language (after German and English and in rivalry with French or Latin). The Turkish Olympiad that is one of the highlights of the Gülen schools in Central Asia and many other countries is preceded in Germany by participation of students in a mathematics Olympiad as a big manifestation at the end of the year.20 Instead, not teachers sent from Turkey, but a majority of local German staff are teaching in their secondary and primary schools in Germany. Also from the side of the pupils there is a great difference: it is not the elite of the majority population (Mehrheitsgesellschaft), but in their first decade these schools had mostly pupils from the migrant, minority groups who were in a process of integration and emancipation.21 In the early years some schools counted 80% of Turkish Germans among the pupils, 10% from other migrants and only 10% Germans without a migration background. It is therefore not surprising that there were a few cases where non-Turkish pupils were teased, and that in few cases crude words like ‘pork-eaters’ were used. There were a few cases where non-Turkish pupils even left the school, but these were rare exceptions.22 20

Agai 2011: 36. Agai 2011: 42. 22 Thies 166 and 124. 21

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Until 2009 there was not much of a general debate or even public information about the Gülen Movement in general or the educational activities in particular, but this has changed drastically since then.23 When the Berlin secondary school was opened in 2004, its director even denied any formal relation with Fethullah Gülen. This was done in some sense rightly, because there was no legal or institutional tie, but later he revoked this statement and acknowledged the influence of the spiritual leader in his strategies and activities.24 In line with the greater openness of sympathisers to acknowledge their association with the ideas, person and network of Fethullah Gülen, there was also a sharp increase in criticism. The best known examples of these criticisms are an article in the renowned weekly Der Spiegel, 8 August 2012, and a detailed programme on the leader Fethullah Gülen on ARD Television, 22 October 2013. Both media paid much attention to the boarding houses where some of pupils of the secondary schools were living together under supervision of a tutor, most often a student in one of the German colleges or universities. These houses are called Lichthäuser or ‘houses of light’ and its residents sometimes labelled ‘soldiers of light.’25 According to Der Spiegel, residents are often not allowed to watch television, listen to music and their book reading should be under control. The magazine even used a terminology of ‘a sect like scientology’, after an interview with one student who had left the residence and the movement altogether.26 Another debate, related to the practice of the schools, is about their strategy: is it wise for the sake of integration and emancipation that these schools attract a great majority from only one group, second or third generation migrants from Turkey? In theory the Gülen-related schools seek pupils from all layers of the population, as they did in Turkey itself, in Central Asia and Albania, but would it be wise in Western Europe? Jochen Thies, a senior journalist, once speech writer for the Socialist Prime Minister Helmut Schmidt, and long time working at the state owned public ARD Television, carried out research about the schools in 2012 and wrote a book where he gives a detailed and factual account of many aspects of the three institutions he visited. One of his conclusions is about the difference between the three places. In Stuttgart and Köln (Cologne) the German-Turkish students had a good command of German, while this was 23

See Bruinessen 2013: 166-169 for a simultaneous change of public opinion in the Netherlands. 24 Quotes in Der Spiegel, 8 August 2012. 25 For the Işık evleri and the reference to Qur’ān 24: 35-36 see also chapter 1. 26 Der Spiegel, 8 August 2012, article by Maximilian Popp, ‘The shadowy world of the Islamic Gülen Movement,’ here quoted after the English translation, , accessed 1 June 2014.

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much less so in Berlin. In some districts of Berlin the population of Turkish origin has reached a stark majority and some pessimists consider it already ‘part of Anatolia’. He quoted the book by Doug Saunders on The Myth of the Muslim Tide, where three groups of Turkish migrants are compared. The first group left for Istanbul and survived, but remained lower middle class. The second group moved to London. The first generation was poor. They owned small shops but their children had entered university. The third group were those in Berlin who did not learn German, had no good education, and were more religious than those in Turkey.27 Thies himself is quite pessimistic about the public schools that are chosen by a majority of the second and third generation of migrants from Turkey. As the best choice he estimates the initiatives from the Turkish community themselves, like the Hizmet schools. The high quality private schools must become the ideal for a better future for this community.28 He has also advice: due to the fragmented structure of the Gülen activists they have a lack of cooperation and do not even know each other.29 This seems to be a lack inherent in the chosen ‘invisibility’ of the Gülen network and still awaits a further repair.

The Gülen Press: Activities with the Strongest Turkish and Muslim Identity The German Gülen sympathizers read and spread the publications that had already been initiated in Istanbul in 1979 with the magazine Sızıntı, later also in an English edition, The Fountain. In 1998 a German edition followed, Die Fontäne. At the same time the Gülen related newspaper Zaman was printed in Germany in a Turkish-language edition that gave on its famous ‘page 17’ special news of interest to Turkish migrants in Europe. In 2006 the European version of the Newspaper Zaman became more independent from the Turkish original. Since then it has been published by the World Media Group and much less of its content was copied from the original from Istanbul. It had become a Turkish-language German newspaper with a focus on the developments in Germany and Western Europe, but with still a special interest for Turkish affairs. The editors hope to have left the so called ‘Ghetto journalism’ behind them and to serve a distinct group, citizens of Western Europe who like to read their newspaper in Turkish.30 In the group around Zaman and the leadership of the World Media Group, we meet the central ideological 27

29 30 28

Thies 2013: 169. Cf. Saunders 2012: 73-81. Thies 2013: 170. Thies 2013: 176. Demir 2007a: 221-222. Müller 2011. Agai 2010: 30.

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kernel of the Gülen activists with Abdullah Aymaz as the most prominent connection between Gülen himself and his German followers.31 In Offenbach, close to Frankfurt am Main, Die Fontäne and Zaman are produced and printed. Also a quite substantial number of the basic writings of Fethullah Gülen were published here in German translations. Among these are the biography of Muhammad, other books like Statue of our Souls, Pearls of Wisdom, Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance, Essays, Perspectives, Opinions. The first volume of the Sufism book is also available. The Qur’ān translation and commentary by Ali Ünal is also made available by the publisher in Offenbach.32 The list of translations shows that the market for books by Gülen is much larger in Germany than in other European countries like France, Belgium, the Netherlands or even Sweden.33 Among the various activities of the Gülen sympathizers the Offenbach publications are more for the inner circle and for consumption by those already familiar with and fond of the writings of Fethullah Gülen. For publications directed to outsiders not the World Media Group of Offenbach is used, but the more prestigious Herder (for Homolka and others 2010, Ebaugh 2012, Thies 2013) or Aschendorff (for Boos-Nünning and others 2011).

Dialogue Centres In 2001 a first ‘Intercultural Dialogue Centre’ was established in Munich. In 2014 the Stiftung Dialog und Bildung (Foundation for Dialogue and Education) in Berlin, which was more a facility for internal contacts between activists than a formal national umbrella organisation, counted 14 dialogue centres and unions. Most notable are those in Munich, Düsseldorf, Tübingen, Cologne, Dortmund and Berlin.34 Dialogue centres offer facilities for social and political debates, seminars, language courses (English and Turkish), courses to play the nay, the Turkish reed flute, as well as trips to Gülen related activities in Turkey, especially in Istanbul. These institutions are quite atypical for any global Muslim inspired movement. They started around 2000 in various countries of Western Europe and North America. They can be seen as a combination of three initiatives of Fethullah Gülen in the 1990s: the Writers and Journalists Association of 1994, interreligious meetings beginning with an encounter with Patriarch Bartholomeos in 1996, and the first Abant Conference 31

Agai 2010: 30. See also for his speech in Berlin, 9 May 2014. 32 The books are free available through . 33 Willeke 2010. 34 , approached on 29 May 2014. Agai 2010: 48.

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on Islam and the Secular State of 1998. Social and political issues were no longer discussed from the age-old perspective and framework of the classical shari’a terminologies, or from the unproductive concept of an Islamic State, but within the framework of social and political sciences with a sober non-ideological evaluation of modern society as starting point. Besides, it was an open investigation of solutions for modern society in dialogue with representatives of other religions, while also a variety of political parties were invited. As happened with the schools, also the 14 dialogue centres in Germany do not have intense contacts with each other. They all work according to local opportunities rather than in a national united strategy. This has been so since the first began in Munich in 2001.35 Because of the large German-Turkish population in Berlin, we will concentrate here on the variety of activities in the capital for the period 2010-2014. The Berlin centre organised trips to Istanbul and other places in Turkey to confront Germans with Gülen-inspired activities in Turkey itself. There were also regular courses in the thinking and writings of Fethullah Gülen under the title: ‘From a village imam to a global intellectual’. In early 2012 an interreligious choir of Muslims, Christians and Jews from Antakya, Syria, gave concerts in Berlin (as part of a larger European tour). There were monthly lectures and debates on social themes like ‘Religion and Human Rights’. There were also regular meetings on the recent social and political developments in Turkey. A national dimension was present in the ceremony for the Dialogue Awards given to five Germans in November 2013 by the Berlin Dialogue Forum. Among the winners were the theologian Professor Karl-Josef Kuschel from Tübingen University, Liberal Party politician Cornelia Pieper, and poet Feridun Zaimoğlu, born in 1964 in Bolu, Turkey, but educated and living in Germany and a creative writer about the situation of migrants. A quite ambitious programme is the cooperation of the Berlin Dialogue Centre in the inter-religious project Bet- und Lehr­haus Petriplatz, or the Inter-religious ‘House of Prayer and Learning’, to be build at Petri Platz in Berlin (with planned costs of € 40 million). By far the most spectacular activity of the Berlin Dialogue Centre since 2012 is the Istanbul Festival which is held in May or June at Potzdamer Platz with a flamboyant presentation of many aspects of modern Turkish culture, theatre, dance, music, eating, books and movies.36 35

The best known American centre, Rumi Forum in Washington D.C., opened in 1999, Hendrick 2013. Notwithstanding the local independence of Gülen activities there seems to be some kind of global synchronization in the establishment of new initiatives. 36 The name of the Berlin Centre is Forum für interkulturellen Dialog e.V. Data here are from participation. See also the site .

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The Gülen Inspiration in Germany: From Social to Real Capital Besides the initiatives in the area of education, press and intercultural dialogue, there are two more fields where Gülen-inspired activists have started institutions: business and welfare organisations. The first are connected to TUSKON, the Turkish Federation of Business People. As with many other activities, it began in the first decade of the 21st century with local unions of (nearly all ethnic Turkish) business people. Only in autumn 2010 was a national union of employers settled in Berlin, BUV, Bundesverband der Deutschen Unternehmervereinigungen e.V. Fifteen regional unions have established centres in major towns. They are better represented in industrial areas of the West (Düsseldorf, Köln, Mainz, Mannheim) and the south (Stuttgart, Ulm, München, Nürnberg) than in agricultural regions of the former East Germany: none in Thüringen. Quite a few of them have in their name the word Arbeitgeber or Existenz­ gründer (for ‘provider of a working place’ or ‘giving a living’) to show their position as creating jobs and prosperity. Kimse Yok Mu, the organisation for humanitarian aid, has its European headquarter in Germany under the name of Time to Help. It coordinates seven national branches: Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. The business and the charitable institutions represent two sides of the social relevance of the Gülen Movement. They will be taken here as the starting point for an analysis of the Gülen inspiration as experienced by members in Germany. This functions here to combine the spiritual with the practical sides of the movement. It is also included here to present a German local wording of the traditional ethical values as read in the writings of Fethullah Gülen. The organisations set up by the migrants themselves can make a vital contribution towards integration. They establish social networks, whose self-help approach can support the integration process, and they can also influence the social orientation of the immigrants. In the words of a prominent politician: “Within the ethnic groups they can significantly strengthen the acceptance of the integration policy and raise interest in the integration measures.”37 Given such background, in the near future much will depend on the ability to use both things more: the potential of the self-help organisations and the migrants’ willingness to make a societal commitment, in the promotion of integration process. This section will 37

Prof. Dr. Rita Süssmuth as chair of the Sachverständigenrat für Zuwanderung und Integration [Experts’ Committee for Immigration and Integration], a national institution in Germany, in its first yearly report to the central government of 2004: 324.

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therefore take a closer look at the social capital theory in the context of the Gülen Movement. As the concept of social capital has been redefined a number of times in its history, and for various reasons, more recent writings have come to develop common features that allow the respective strands to be bundled together.38 In this context social capital is seen as a network phenomenon. It arises and passes away again within social connections. Thus it can be seen as a resource that enables a participant to generate positive results for one self as well as for the members of the group. The Hizmet movement’s activities seek to generate above all a profit for the entire society. The movement does not pursue political objectives. “It does not strive to create a ‘better society’ through political power, but wants to serve people in society by working from below through education and tolerance.”39 Membership in associations and contacts at work create important relationships in order to acquire for example new knowledge, which might have been foreign to one’s own network so far, or to take up new perspectives and much more. Alongside the association in networks and groups, trust plays a key role in a group. According to the original social capital theory, the individual uses the opportunity to offer help, because he can trust that in the future he will benefit from his assistance given even if this takes only the form of recognition. As ikhlas – meaning purity of intention – ranks as one of the key concepts of the Gülen Movement, its volunteers are solely striving for God’s recognition. “A servant of God may exclusively strive to gain His recognition and His pleasure. The servant’s heart shall be occupied only with Him.”40 Trust is therefore a principal condition for the functioning of social capital.41 People’s trust in the Hizmet movement and their sincerity in their activities is the key reason why such diverse sympathizers donate capital to the movement and commit themselves. One of the movement’s key principles is therefore that of acting or applying oneself. Someone who spends the whole day in bed and does not engage in any activity, is therefore less happy than the one who is constantly busy and always eager to do something for society. The Hizmet movement activates people and motivates them to serve other human beings. The social commitment and the donations are important factors for the Hizmet movement’s success. Next to the normal membership contributions made by the individual associations there are other specific forms of donation. 38

40 41 39

Putnam (ed.) 2001; Lin 2001. R. Hermann, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 October 2008. Gülen 1995c, Vol. I: 60. Putnam (ed.) 2001.

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In this context the zakah (a kind of charity tax), one of the five pillars of Islam, has a very special place. It is often mentioned in the Qur’an in connection with the regular prayer (salah), which is an indication of its importance. Zakah also means purification. It is a purification of the believer and his possessions. To this end s/he donates 2.5% of his or her possessions. Every Muslim whose financial funds surpass a fixed minimum, is obliged to donate from one’s assets to a fellow citizen in need of support or to an institution that serves people. This is the minimum. The more one donates the bigger will be the reward God bestows on the believer in the next world. If zakah is donated we do not give it because God needs or receives the money. He is above all need and every kind of want. Yet in His loving mercy He promises manifold rewards to those who help other human beings in this way. An indispensable precondition for such a reward, however, is that the givers do not expect or demand any worldly advantages for their charity, as they make the payment of zakah in the name of God. The movement’s sympathizers, who want to pay this charity tax to the poor, make these payments to the movement. This is a sign of their trust. Besides this charity tax to the poor, the sadaqa is also worthy of mention. This denotes a charitable and voluntary levy. The meaning of the word says that Allah examines the sincerity and honesty the believers show to Him. In order for the recipient of the sadaqa not to feel embarrassed, one should make these donations to the needy in secret. Public donation of these alms is only positive if one aims to instigate others through one’s own behaviour. The movement terms these financial contributions and donations himmet. They enable the movement to finance schools, dialogue activities and projects and thereby make a contribution towards peace in the world. The focal point of these donations is not their quantity but the fact that donations serve a good cause. The amount of the donation has therefore no influence on one’s right to a say in the movement. All are equal, who commit themselves and make donations. The donations are received in a public himmet gathering. These meetings are held by the associations with their members. Entrepreneurs and business people are invited and compete for donations. The purpose is to pursue the interests and well-being of others or of the common wealth. Gülen considers this altruism to be one of the most important principles.42 With these principles Gülen motivates the volunteers and honorary members to commit themselves for the society in which they live and to seek solutions to their problems. He motivates them to love the country in which they live and also its population. This participation in the society as a whole, and recognition and love for the national mainstream society are key prerequisites for integration. 42

Fethullah Gülen, in Sızıntı, March 1987, Cilt 9, Sayı 98 (Vol. 9: 98).

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The Gülen Inspiration in Germany: Questions, Criticism and Adjustments From the beginning of the public participation in the debate about Islam in Germany, at the 2009 Conference of Potsdam, there has been a hesitation among Gülen sympathizers about whether they should pay the Islamic card or not. Since the arrival of the migrant workers after the first contracts with the Turkish government in 1961, there has been a constant change in the debate and the position of these people in German society. In 1973 there had already been a first stop in the arrival of temporary workers from South-Eastern Europe as it was called at the time. But the ‘temporary workers’ stayed, increased and the ‘temporary guest workers’ then became labelled as ethnically different, as migrants and new citizens, and finally, after 1990, more and more as Muslims. This is called the ‘Islamization’ of the migration debate. For Gülen activists, however, the status of religion is not the most important issue. They want to be seen as ‘volunteers’, people of Hizmet or dedication, and hope that also many people from the original German society will join their activities, enter their schools, and also participate in the dialogue meetings and support their voluntary work. But then, why first start a different organisation?43 There is among Gülen sympathizers in Germany a deep affection for his concrete teachings on spirituality in a modern society, but there are also voices within the Gülen network that consider the old cleric as somewhat conservative, especially as to the position of women in society and more concretely within the movement itself. At the Potsdam 2009 conference it was therefore stated: The public representation of women in the movement is especially in Germany a very important issue. They are underrepresented in civic events, but we can notice here a clear development and openness. In the union they are more and more active and visible. This is also a result of their education: young women with a good ability in foreign languages and appropriate education are more confident to act in a German speaking society than their mothers. We only may hope that they are accepted in society when they wear the veil. The clear domination of men in the movement does not only grow from the Muslim roots and the ideals about gender in the movement, but is also caused by the prejudices of the majority society towards women who wear the veil.44

Many of the more theological writings of Fethullah Gülen are imbedded in the thinking of Said Nursi and his debates with late 19th and early 20th century science. At the Münster Conference of 2010 a critical reader of the magazine Die Fontäne attacked the apologetic style of 43

Agai 2010: 51-52 + 54. Agai 2010: 53.

44

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some of its articles, especially those related to Said Nursi on evolution and creation. Also the idea that West-European society still is a religious society (and that inter-religious dialogue will bring integration in society) is no longer valid, because these societies are very secular and atheists should also be taken as partners in dialogue.45 Süleyman Bağ, editorin-chief of the German edition of Zaman is therefore quoted as stating that one should not only read and repeat the writings of Said Nursi and Fethullah Gülen and be content with this, but members should further develop their ideas in the contemporary German context. This means that good translations are not enough, but also a fundamental adjustment to modern culture must be found.46 This overview of the development of the Gülen Movement in Germany and the debate that takes place here must be seen therefore as a temporary inventory of the origin and early developments. More and different aspects may be expected.

Conclusion Germany is the European country with by far the largest group of people of Turkish origin. Therefore one would expect the Gülen sympathizers to take the lead in a network of activities in this part of the world. However, the fragmented nature of the movement did not facilitate such a major influence for a larger region. Still, we can see a pattern of development that is simultaneous with comparable developments in various European countries: the learning centres in the mid-1990s, the dialogue centres after 2000, a modest number of fully equipped and nationally acknowledged schools, starting with secondary schools and a smaller number of primary schools. Besides, there were publishing activities since the later 1990s, business unions and in a last phase also more specifically organised charity institutions. More than in other countries the central idea from within the German society has been the pressure on migrants and especially Muslims to adapt themselves to the majority society with what is called integration. The Gülen sympathizers have embraced this idea partially. Where followers of Fethullah Gülen created schools and boarding houses in Izmir and other towns of Western Turkey, as places of refuge for migrants from villages in Eastern Anatolia, his movement created similar safe places for personal development and integration in German society. A keen observer, Rainer Hermann, has rejected the identification of the objectives of the Gülen Movement with Milli Görüş. The latter is, according to Hermann, an instrument, created by Necmettin Erbakan for political Islam in Turkey, 45

Müller 2011: 80; see also the contribution by Marc Hieronimus in Boos-Nünning and others (eds.) 2011: 166-172 about the theory of evolution. 46 Quoted in Agai 2009: 53.

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to be compared to the Muslim Brothers of Egypt. In Germany Milli Görüş is most often supported by Turkish migrants from the working class. The Gülen Movement is in all respects different from Milli Görüş. Its members mostly are found in the new middle class, in Turkey as well as in Germany. Academic people join the movement, because they identify themselves with the three major concerns of Gülen: Education, Dialogue and the Media. They are less involved with the struggle for power in Turkey but concentrate on local projects in Germany and work for these as volunteer. They cherish only ‘the hope to receive the acceptance by God’ and enter paradise, although there is never a secure warrant. Before God they must prove their concrete good acts. Here we hear again what I have earlier defined as ‘Muslim Calvinism’.47

The German sympathizers of Gülen have found in the ideas, activities and network of the movement a good answer for the problems of their ambiguous position: migrants in a country that asks for integration without full assimilation.48 They found not only the practical support and facilities, but also the spirituality that is needed to tackle this complicated task.

47

Hermann 2010: 101. On the many applications of the concept of ambiguity to Fethullah Gülen and his movement see Hendrick 2013 passim.

48

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Gülen in the Netherlands between Pious Circles and Social Emancipation Karel Steenbrink In a book by Ahmet Yükleyen the initial Gülen presence in Europe was credited to the Netherlands: The first recorded Gülen follower who went to Europe was an imam. This imam first tried to get control of a mosque at a time when people were fighting to get in control of mosques in Germany. He failed and went to Rotterdam, where he established the Akyazılı Foundation, which had its own prayer hall open to the public. Here, students were taught Islam and supported in their school homework. Within a year, the Akyazılı Foundation stopped running mosques and focused only on education. They began using the whole building as a student dorm and tutoring centre.1

The imam, Necdet Başaran, was not working in the service of the official Turkish religious institution Diyanet, but as an independent imam. In Ramadan (5 August-3 September) 1977 Fethullah Gülen had been sent by Diyanet to Germany to give sermons for the Turkish workers. It was a revealing experience for Gülen himself, as well as for his audience. Gülen perceived that the Turkish workers did not consider Germany as their new homeland, did not learn the language, did not improve their education and did not understand that they would become settlers in a new land. The following year, 1978, Başaran came to Germany. In 1980 he moved to the Netherlands, first for some months in Schiedam, but then moved to Rotterdam, where he found a house in the poor district of Charlois, where many Turkish workers lived. In the basement of his house at Wolphaertsbocht, he established a facility for prayers and a course for children who could learn Qur’ān recitation. In 1982 he moved to a larger building, a former municipal library in the district of Delfshaven, Rosier Faassenstraat. It was called Akyazılı after a late friend of Gülen who had supported him in his beginning years by opening a foundation which promoted education out of which the initiative came for the first schools in Izmir. Also Necdet Başaran knew this person well.2 The Rotterdam 1

So Yükleyen 2012: 69, mentioning Landman 1992: 138 as his source. Interviews with Alper Alasag, Rotterdam, 22 May 2013 and with Alaattin Erdal, Rotterdam 16 July 2013.

2

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Akyazılı Foundation was from 1981 registered with the Chamber of Commerce in Rotterdam. In 1986 Başaran and his foundation was able to acquire the building Diergaardesingel 56-8 in Rotterdam. This is close to the central station and in the midst of prestigious offices. It functioned not as a mosque but became a boarding house for Turkish boys who had problems with the level of the Dutch schools. Its financing came from the so-called mutevelli who were shopkeepers, tradesmen and craftsmen in and around Rotterdam. Like Fethullah Gülen he could give long moving sermons where he often started weeping and bringing his audience to a similar emotional condition. Also for the Qur’ān courses, he did not follow the method of hard drilling, but could tell moving stories about the life of the Prophet Muhammad and the situations where verses of the Qur’ān or inspirations for hadith originated. Former students recall that his favourite book for edifying stories was the collection of animal stories or fables, Kalila wa Dimna. In the later 1980s Başaran applied for Dutch citizenship and this caused much upheaval because it was seen by most Turkish migrants as an act of leaving Turkish identity and even somewhat like treason. He did this in order to show the new condition of Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands who had to live as permanent settlers, building a future in their new country. Başaran was basically a preacher and social activist in the field of education and rights of migrants. The daily management of the boarding house was from 1986 on given to Alaattin Erdal as director and to other Turkish youngsters in Rotterdam who had received a good Dutch education and could assist in the education of fellow Turkish youngsters. The Dutch government at that time gave a double allowance for children who for educational reasons lived in a boarding house. This was a considerable financial help for the boarding houses. Since the mid-1980s Başaran became more and more a travelling preacher for Muslims in Europe. He was also often for longer periods in Turkey and later in the United States. However, he had brought his wife and four children to Rotterdam and has continued to consider this place to be his residence. It is quite striking for the organisational culture in the movement that this important founding father of the movement in the 1980s lived nearly in oblivion in the first decade of the 21st century. As reason for the declining popularity of Başaran it is mentioned that his style of long emotional preaching may have been somewhat outdated after 2000 when younger businessmen liked more of a column style of writing, or even short tweets. It has been seen as a privilege of Gülen that he could express meaningful evaluations of modern problems in very succinct formulas.3 In fact, the Gülen people of the first generation, who were born between 1940 3



Interviews with Alasag and Erdal as quoted above.

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and 1960 (and not educated in the Netherlands) had in 2010 already given up their position to people who had partly grown up in the European country. In 1990 the Dutch Akyazılı Foundation was the label of a network of European groups: four Dutch locations (besides Rotterdam, also in Amsterdam, Dordrecht, Eindhoven), two Belgian branches, eight German, two Danish, one French (Strasbourg) and one Swiss branch (Bern) were registered in Rotterdam.4 This, however, must only be seen as a formal and administrative measure. The local activities are the real heart of the movement. Başaran became quite famous also outside the smaller circle of Turkish migrants through his cooperation with the Protestant minister Hans Visser of Saint Paul’s Church, for the inter-religious talks that were attended by many people from Rotterdam.5

Examples of Leading Personalities Gülen people are action oriented and a presentation of their movement usually concentrates on the many variants of the educational and social activities, while only the personality of Fethullah Gülen receives ample attention. Still, in order to show the origin and early growth of the movement it is a valuable methodology to pay attention also to life stories. Here we will go into somewhat more detail about four men who had a prominent position in the Gülen community in the Netherlands in the first decade of the 21st century (no women are as yet in such a situation).6 Our first personality here is Alaattin Erdal, born in Konya in 1969, the year his father migrated to the Netherlands. Only in 1980 were his wife and four children brought to Rotterdam. One year later the young boy was sent by his father for a Qur’ānic reading course at the Kocatepe Mosque, a Diyanet institution. But he discovered that nearby Necdet Başaran also gave these courses in the basement of his house, and his style of teaching proved to be very entertaining, even exciting. Erdal remained close to this teacher. He was the founder of a group of young people who facilitated educational activities after school in the Akyazılı boarding house, and became responsible for discipline and maintenance. In 1992, after secondary school and a teachers’ training college, Erdal became director of the boarding house in Rotterdam, at that time called Internaat Het Centrum. From the beginning of the newspaper Zaman he wrote weekly columns, ‘Letters from Rotterdam’, and in 2005 he became the founding representative of Zaman in Rotterdam, under the name of 4

6 5

Landman 1992: 138. Interview with Alaattin Erdal, 16 July 2013, Rotterdam. Also Thies 2013 pays much attention to the small biographies of his major figures for the educational field in Germany. The biographies are based on interviews as indicated in other notes.

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Time Media Group. An office building was bought in Rotterdam with a Dutch mortgage. He began the Time Media Group with a special Dutch edition of the Turkish language daily Zaman for the Turkish community in the Netherlands. It reached at most 7,000 sold copies. Besides that there was a Dutch language monthly edition that was distributed free in 50,000 copies. From January 2009 until December that year Erdal became the first full-time reporter at the Dutch parliament in The Hague, for the Turkish as well as the Dutch editions of Zaman. In 2010 he became fulltime alderman for the administrative district of Charlois (66,000 people, part of Rotterdam), as representative for the Christian Democratic Party. In his choice of this political party (member since 1994) Erdal was not following a fixed choice of the Gülen people: some are siding with the conservative party VVD, others with the socialists of PVDA, but the Christian Democrats are also open for politically active Muslims who want to realize some of their ideals in these social institutions. Erdal had earlier been a member of the city council between 1998 and 2006. This political position brought him to a situation where he was no longer in charge of one of the prominent institutions of the Gülen Movement, but this seems to be a quite normal moment in one’s career: the Gülen people are not busy in a church where one may start a life-long career and end up as bishop or deacon. Sympathy with the ideals of Gülen is also not exclusive: they may be warm supporters of non-Muslim political leaders and be loyal to such a party as well. As a recognition for his excellent work for the town of Rotterdam, Alaattin Erdal was given the award of Rotterdammer van het jaar, or most excellent citizen of Rotterdam, for the year 1995. A second personality here is Alper Alasağ, born in 1969 in Oldenzaal, one of the old centres of the textile industry where many Turkish migrants found a job in the 1960s. He was born in an absolutely secular family, which means in the Turkish tradition not atheist, but not religiously active. His father, first working in Germany, had a German girl-friend between 1962-4, before he married in Turkey. Alasağ’s grandfather was even a militant atheist. Following the general trend in Turkish society they left their strong secular tradition somewhat later than their children and joined some religious activities in the 1990s, but remained strongly attached to the Kemalist politics. In 1975 Alper was sent to Turkey for his education. He was in the country during the 1980 coup. In 1984, shortly after he had started praying as well as reading the Gülen monthly Sızıntı, he was with a friend on the beach and they performed their prayers. A shepherd saw them praying and contacted the police. The bungalow was inspected, and besides some copies of the Qur’ān, some texts by Said Nursi and a sermon by Fethullah Gülen were found. They were arrested and detained four days by the local police. A court case was started, but they were acquitted. They were only 200

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14 to 16 years old at the time. Alasağ’s brother knew an imam who had some writings of Said Nursi and also had some recordings of sermons by Fethullah Gülen. He found this imam a quite curious person: he did not say much, but only answered briefly the questions that were put to him. After secondary school Alasağ entered Bosporus University in Istanbul where the courses were given in English. His major study there was mathematics. In 1989 he returned to the Netherlands where he enrolled at the technical university of Delft. In 1992 he ceased this study, but moved to Nijmegen where he worked as a volunteer social worker for refugees, in his case mostly Bosnian and Somalian citizens who had asked asylum in the Netherlands. Here he started finally, in 2001, a new course, religious studies at the Catholic University (currently known as Radboud University in Nijmegen), concentrating on comparative religion. Through this study he became really familiar with the Dutch Christian (even more precisely Catholic) tradition of approaching religion as an academy discipline. On one occasion at Friday prayer in the Diyanet Mosque in Nij­megen, one parent asked him for advice about his children who performed badly at their Dutch school. Alasağ started to give additional courses for these children, especially teaching mathematics, chemistry and English (that he had taken as his second language in Turkey). Gradually more children were given help because of the risen request of their parents. From this single case a formal organisation has grown: SEMA, Stichting Educatief Maasland or Foundation for Educational Initiatives in the Maas Region. For the development of this initiative Alasağ uses the Turkish proverb: “A caravan is completed while moving on its way”, meaning that while in Dutch culture an initiative should be well defined, have a clear structure and administration before it starts, in Turkish culture quite simple activities may grow step by step until a full organisational unity is established. In this way a simple request in a mosque to help one specific child for a limited problem, may result in a formal institution a couple of years later. Alasağ started teaching himself, but also attracted other students who followed higher education to come and teach for primary and secondary school children. Alasağ is one of the few interreligious specialists among the Gülen people in the Netherlands, but he received no traditional training as an imam, does not have the easy memorising of great sections of the Qur’ān and hadīth, because he has specialised in comparative religion. Therefore he became the leading figure when in 1998 in Amsterdam an institute was established, “Islam and Dialogue” by Ümit Taş. Alasağ started his work there in 2000. He gave specific courses for Muslim youth on how to deal with other religions, but started also a series of encounters with local and national Christian leaders. In 2012 Islam and Dialogue merged with Dialogue Academy and became a more social, cultural and academic 201

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initiative under the new name of Platform INS (after the Turkish word for ‘human’, ins). In the 1990s Alasağ was asked by some Turkish friends in Nij­megen to lead a regular, weekly session of selected readings from the Qur’ān, some works by Fethullah Gülen and other authors. When asked whether this is a sohbet as depicted in literature about the Gülen Movement, Alasağ agreed. Besides the sohbets Islam and Dialogue Foundation organised also courses. This was due to the events of 11 September 2001 which created much interest in Islam from the side of non-Muslims but also from Muslims themselves. After these more general courses, some nonMuslim attendants were interested in more depth. Therefore Alper started interactive gatherings with these people. They read selected works, such as chapters of the Qur’ān and the Bible with some commentaries, or had conversations on other topics. Depending on the groups, some of these gatherings lasted for three years, others even up to seven years. Even though these emerging new forms of gatherings were not meant to end up as sohbets, for Alasağ these latter gatherings also did feel as sohbets. The third to be mentioned here is Ahmet Taşkan, born in 1967 in Trabzon, northeast Turkey. The family moved shortly afterwards to the industrial town of Izmit, some 130 km east of Istanbul. In 1969 his father moved to the Netherlands. Ahmet followed only in 1988. Ahmet Taşkan had already followed his secondary school education (teknik lise) in Istanbul with emphasis on technical work. Between the ages of 17 and 21 he formed a group of some six students (out of more than one thousand in his school), who were close followers of the preaching of Fethullah Gülen. They had tapes and magazines and loved the intense personal conviction of the great preacher and the truly relevant content of his preaching. They also read some writings by Said Nursi. Taşkan owns the full edition of his writings, nearly one metre of his book shelves, but confesses that little is read of this material. The Gülen message is more concrete, easy to understand and to apply.7 After a language course in the Netherlands, Taşkan followed an education programme for police officers. He worked for over three years in the police force, while at the same time following a course to obtain the Bachelor Degree of Social Work and Social Services. In the mid-1990s he worked for two years as a consultant at Forum, the large Dutch research institute that formulated advice for the national and local administrations as to their strategy in the fast growing multicultural society. While working at the police force Taşkan and a few of his friends also started SECU, Stichting Educatief Centrum Utrecht, a centre for additional education. Initially, with the help of volunteering university students, SECU provided 7



Interview with Ahmet Taşkan, Utrecht, 19 July 2013.

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extra courses to support migrant children in primary and secondary education. Taşkan started as an unpaid volunteer. With financial support of the children’s parents and subsidies of the central and local administrations for this kind of education, Taşkan became a salaried director with 18 (part-time) co-workers. Moreover, in the late 1990s the government started programs for inburgering (‘en-civilisation’, required assimilation courses for new migrants) and SECU was the first organisation of former migrants to obtain a contract with a local administration for this kind of courses. SECU also had the supervision of a dormitory house for pupils in secondary education. In 2002 they received € 200,000 as a one-off subsidy for this work (that after 2008 was the focus of much criticism in the broad spectrum of Gülen activities: the political and social climate changed quickly). During the economic crisis of 2008 and the participation of rightwing and anti-Muslim politician Geert Wilders in the national government for the period 2010-2012, all these subsidies were stopped and SECU only survived as a modest after-school facility for pupils who needed extra support. Between 2000 and 2010 Taşkan was a member of the Utrecht City Council for the Christian-Democrats (one out of four delegates in this city that is dominated by the socialists and the green party). Looking back at the social career of Ahmet Taşkan during more than twenty years in the Netherlands, we see a shift from education and politics towards business. According to Taşkan, people who are supportive of the ideas of Fethullah Gülen consider education and entrepreneurship to be of great importance. Taşkan was the national initiator of HOGIAF, uniting seven local branches for Turkish business people into a national office for lobbying, consultation, training and mediation. On 30 May 2006 Prime Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende opened the first national meeting of HOGIAF in the World Trade Centre of Rotterdam. Taşkan was the first general secretary of this union of business people, until 2010. For the great meetings of HOGIAF he received sponsoring from Atilay Uslu, founder and owner of Corendon Airways, the largest and most successful Turkish-Dutch company in the Netherlands. Uslu, however, has no special affinity to the spirituality of the Gülen Movement. Since 2011 Taşkan has been active as a consultant, especially to support entrepreneurs with business to Turkey and vice versa. He has also done projects in the medical sector. He cooperated with Aysel Erbudak, a Turkish businesswoman. She was part-owner of the first privatised, the Slotervaart Hospital in Amsterdam. Erbudak is of the Alevi tradition and has no affinity to the Gülen Movement. Taşkan, Erbudak and a few other Turkish entrepreneurs cooperated in medical projects servicing patients from Libya who sought healthcare in the Netherlands. 203

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Chairperson of the board of HOGIAF in its first period, from 20062011, was Mehmet Kabakyer, owner of the largest scaffolding company in the country. In this period Kabakyer was also the most generous supporter for the Dialogue Academy of Rotterdam. There were rumours about his not so strict life style, but he may be seen as an example for the variety of interpretations of Islamic rules in these circles. Taşkan stresses that Turkish businessmen do not write elaborated business plans before they start with their activities, but often work along a ‘trial and error’ system and work in several fields at the same time: active in an organisation for the well-being of a larger group, but also involved in private business. In October 2013 Ahmet Taşkan was asked by the board of HOGIAF if he could return as vice-president and general director and reorganize the organization and make it more decisive and make it serve the community needs. Taşkan refocused their activities from lobby and networking to the support of HOGIAF members in areas like professionalization, internationalization and integration. The fourth personality in this short series is Mustafa Şentürk, born in 1980 in Lelystad, the second town in the newly reclaimed land not far from Amsterdam. In Lelystad he had been the initiator of a local Muslim youth organisation. He had also political ambitions, but was not successful enough at the elections to obtain a seat at the municipal council, and therefore he joined one of the larger national parties. Şentürk is a member of the socialist party PvdA. In various other fields, like the idea to start a football club, FC Anatolia, he had been active in Lelystad. The Turkish community in this town concentrated on a Diyanet mosque that gradually was taken over by Milli Görüş people and eventually was closed down. Through a younger brother, a student in Amsterdam, Şentürk first made acquaintance with sermons (on CDROM) of Fethullah Gülen. He also read some magazines. He had to read these texts with a Turkish dictionary because of his poor command of literary Turkish. After secondary school he enrolled in a Teacher’s Training College in Amsterdam to become a teacher of economics. His brother was serving as a volunteer teaching at the educational centre Witte Tulp.8 When his brother once was sick, Şentürk took over his job at the educational centre and so he became involved in this work, which ended with his job general director of the five centres in Amsterdam that served some 200 pupils in small groups of not more than 8. He was for a few years a teacher of economics at a vocational school, but in late 2011 he 8



White Tulip: Turkish people like the use of the name tulip because this flower originated from Turkey and became very popular from the 16th century on in the Netherlands; besides, the Turkish word for tulip or lale contains the same letters as the word for God, Allah, when written with Arabic characters.

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was hired as general secretary of HOGIAF, the national union of business people, based in their office in The Hague, close to the political centre of the country.9 With these four we have only given a small selection of some 2030 personalities that could be characterised as key persons in the Gülen Movement in the Netherlands, but we have already sketched the major fields of action like education, critical press, information about Islam to Dutch citizens and deepening the faith for members of the Turkish community in the Netherlands. Some more names will be mentioned in what follows. It is clear that Necdet Başaran is the only one from the generation born before 1960, and the only religious specialist in a traditional sense. His role declined after the mid-1990s. Since then the leading has been in the hands of young professionals who are active in various fields: always with some basis in the educational centres, but then moving towards various other fields. These sectors will be described in some more detail below.

Educational Activities from After-school Assistance with Homework to Full Primary and Secondary Schools The first social initiatives of the Gülen followers in the Netherlands were in the field of education. It started in the 1980s in Rotterdam with small informal classes for homework assistance, soon followed by a dormitory facility for boys. In various places small initiatives followed. In 1995 the Stichting Cosmicus was established as a legally registered foundation by students and young graduates of Turkish origin in the Netherlands. Its purpose was to support (mostly Turkish and Moroccan) students from elementary schools up to colleges and universities in their study and personal development, and to help them start a thriving career. Although not explicitly labelled as a ‘Gülen activity’, its founders and leaders show much affection for Gülen. His name was sometimes even not mentioned at all. The first activity of Cosmicus was a lecture on education in Amsterdam and many meetings and lectures followed. Members of Stichting Cosmicus were active in classes for pupils of primary and secondary schools who were able to do their homework under strict control, educational help and inspiring supervision. The successful older students of Turkish descent should serve as role models of success in the new country. The same model was also started by other Turkish and some Moroccan people. They did so at home or in community centres.10 9



Interview with Mustafa Şentürk in The Hague, 3 June 2013. This paragraph and the following are based on personal visits to Cosmicus Schools in 2009 and 2010 and interviews with Cosmicus Director Mehmet Cerit in April 2009. Aspects of this development are also discussed in Steenbrink 2012.

10

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For the name of the organisation the first chairman of Cosmicus, Ümit Taş, searched in a Latin-Dutch dictionary of 1910, and found the word Cosmicus with the meaning of the universe, worldly, but also as world citizen. Latin words were loved by these Gülen people in the Netherlands. Ahmet Taşkan called the boarding house in Utrecht Beatitas, ‘happiness’. The second chairman of Cosmicus was Turan Yazir who was succeeded in 2002 by Gürkan Çelik. Universities, municipalities and private funds donated subsidies for these activities, especially for the mentor project, individual coaching of weak pupils by fellow citizens of a similar ethnic and cultural origin. From the early years on some ethnic Dutch people also joined the leadership of the organisation.11 The assistance concentrated on the last year of primary school, focussing on good results at the final test, decisive for a good place in secondary schools. Besides that, various groups of secondary school students came once a week to this practice of tutoring in small groups.12 Cosmicus branches were established in all major university towns of the Netherlands. Initially the centre was in Amsterdam, between 2000 and 2002 in Utrecht, while since then the headquarters have been in Rotterdam. Cosmicus is known for its academic network, training for leadership, conferences for job career planning, and also for sports and social events like lectures and meals at the occasion of iftar (breaking the fast in a festive manner at the end of a day in Ramadan) and even Christmas. One of its means of communication is the magazine De.Cascade (since 2005) with articles by Dutch and Turkish authors on a variety of academic and social subjects, with education as the major field of interest. A special activity, aiming at very young children was the publication of a Dutch translation of six Turkish books for children in the age 6-12. Stichting Cosmicus is quite keen and well experienced in seeking Dutch funds for its activities. For the package of six children books it received funding from well-known cultural funds, the VSB Fonds (related to Fortis Bank) and Oranje Fonds (related to the Dutch royal family). The main goal of the activities was to break through the ceiling that prevented gifted young people of Turkish descent and other children of migrants from starting a good professional career in their (new) homeland. In short, Stichting Cosmicus wants to create an elite group that 11

They were not converts, but showed sympathy and supported the emancipatory ideals of the movement in their country. They were members of the advisory board of the dialogue centre and other activities. The majority of the teachers in the schools are also not ethnic Turkish and not Muslim. The best known convert in the Gülen Movement is Marianne Vorthoren, wife of Ümit Taş. 12 Yusuf Alan, ‘Avontuur en Elan,’ in De.Cascade, Spring 2004; a vivid description of the tutoring work in community centres for youth of elementary and secondary schools in Crul 2001.

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could match young native Dutch professionals. In this sense it is not much different from the emancipation initiated by the Dutch Protestant minister and politician Abraham Kuyper for the orthodox and lower middle class Protestants in the 1880s. In that period of well-directed segregation it was always the elite from the various ‘pillars’ of Dutch society who sought contact and cooperation in order to keep the country running and to secure a good place for their own group.13 Cosmicus has some 1,000 individual members. They are not formally linked to a Gülen organisation or network, but many of them cherish the person and ideas of Fethullah Gülen as a main inspiration for their social activities. Many of them are involved in local activities like extra lessons and educational assistance for children in buurthuizen, community centres in districts with many migrants. In Amsterdam in 2009 some 700 pupils followed these classes organised by an organisation with the name ‘White Tulip’ (i.e. the Turkish tulip active in the white Netherlands) and their score at the national CITO test for children finishing primary school was at 535 considerably higher than the average 520 of the town of Amsterdam.14 An even more intensive method of assistance for education is the dormitory, mostly for students of secondary schools. In Rotterdam, as in all major towns of the Netherlands, there are dormitories established by people of varying denominational background: Milli Görüş, Süleymanlı, and Nurcu. Most dormitories have about 30 boys. Cosmicus itself never managed a boarding house, but there were in 2002 six dormitories related to the Gülen movement among the twenty (nearly all Turkish) dormitories that received in total a subsidy of € 2 million from the Dutch government.15 More than 100 members of Cosmicus are professional teachers in primary and secondary schools, and some in higher education. They gather twice a year for brain storming sessions about strategy. During one of these sessions in 2003 there was a proposal not only to assist pupils of other schools, but also to start Cosmicus schools. Mehmet Cerit, a graduate in social work from Hogeschool Rotterdam and well versed in the Dutch bureaucratic traditions, was nominated as the project leader. In 2005 Cosmicus applied at the national Ministry of Education for a permit and funding for three secondary schools, in Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Nijmegen. The application was not successful, because the three municipalities gave negative advice about the plans.16 13

Van Eijnatten and Van Lieburg 2006: 258-266. Member of the Amsterdam City council Derya Kaplan in a statement of 5 March 2009, see Zaman Benelux 4 October 2009. 15 Rigter and Krooneman 2003, submitted to parliament on 28 April 2004. 16 Tweede Kamer vergaderjaar 2004-5, report of parliamentary debate of 6-9-2005. 14

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Cerit and other members of Cosmicus continued their efforts after this negative decision of the minister. They sought help with VBS, Vereniging Bijzondere Scholen, the union of non-denominational private schools, and were able to obtain the support of the Rotterdam cooperative of private schools, the LMC Foundation. This foundation is an administrative cooperative between some 27 semi-independent, mostly denominational, schools in Rotterdam. The name means Linker Maasoe­ver Combinatie (left or south bank of the river Maas combination). This cluster of schools could find another way of obtaining the local and national permits for the commencement of the school. Cosmicus College had only to become formally a subsidiary of LMC. Already in August 2006 Cosmicus College was able to open its doors as a secondary school. The Minister of Education reported to Parliament about this development on 2 June 2006, and at the debate with the parliamentary commission on education, 12 October 2006 there were only positive remarks about this move. For LMC with its predominantly denominational Christian background in a city with more than 50% adolescents of non-Dutch ethnic origin and among them a majority of Muslims, this initiative was quite advantageous. Now it could not only accept individual Muslim students in its schools, but also add an organisation with a different ethnic and ideological background to its cooperative. In 2003 LMC had tried to start by itself an ‘Islamic Junior Secondary School’, but after protests from the existing Ibn Ghaldoun secondary school it had to cancel the project.17 In 2007 LMC tried to open another ‘migrant’ secondary school, Spectrum College, with the help of people with Milli Görüs background, but this ‘colourful’ endeavour was not successful because there were not enough pupils who registered for the school.18 In its efforts to broaden its institutional basis the cooperation with Stichting Cosmicus was very convenient for LMC. In order to prevent bureaucratic problems, Cosmicus College was legally established as a new branch of an already existing school, Rotterdams Lyceum. All responsibility rests with LMC while Stichting Cosmicus in the legal formulation has only the status of an advisory board to the school. In the Netherlands private schools are often run by religious communities or by foundations based on their worldview or educational concepts. Cosmicus chose to rely on a new educational concept, on an identity as 17

In the Netherlands there were in 2008 43 Islamic primary schools, but only two Islamic secondary schools: Ibn Ghaldoun in Rotterdam and the Islamitisch College Amsterdam, established in 2001, but stopped in 2010 because of poor quality. Steenbrink 2012: 152. 18 The Dutch name of the school was Islamitische School voor Basisvorming, where basisvorming stands for the first two or three years of secondary education. Willemsz 2008: 20. See also the interview with members of the LMC Board Rald Visser and Tineke Drenthe in De.Cascade online, 14 March 2007.

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a school to educate wereldburgers or ‘world citizens’. Cosmicus did not rely on an Islamic identity and was very outspoken not to do this. Other arguments for its innovative character are its stress on the participation of parents, and the interaction between students of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The emphasis on language training by native speakers and on natural sciences are elements that were used later in the debate as positive factors that made the school an innovation in the educational arena of Rotterdam. World Citizenship as a branch of learning is still under development in the Cosmicus Schools. In its framework many ideas are close to the values as formulated by NCDO, the Netherlands Commission for Durable/Sustainable Development. In May 2006 the specific goals of the school were formulated as: High quality education in small classes with special attention for the development of skills, active and participatory citizenship, support and involvements of parents in a stimulating and intercultural environment where students and their parents are educated to become world citizens.19

On 1 August 2006 Cosmicus College Rotterdam started in a former office building in Rotterdam Delfshaven (Westzeedijk 507) with 86 pupils, 84 of them of Turkish origin. The location is in the centre of one of the most ethnically diverse sections of Rotterdam and definitely not a prestigious location for a school that set high criteria for entrance and wants to be an elite school. Soon, however, the school could move to a much better location, Witte Hertstraat 1. Notwithstanding the publicity for the new school in the press and through primary schools, apparently a vast majority entered through the network of Turkish mentors for homework and from some boarding houses. Cosmicus activists also visited mosques where primarily other ethnic faithful came than Turkish, and spread flyers there. In this way they tried to attract more diverse students and become an intercultural school. It was not really successful. Until the third year of its existence this had not changed much in Rotterdam. In early 2009, there were some 180 pupils, but no more than five were of non-Turkish origin. In 2013 there were some 300 pupils, but ethnic origin only slowly became more diverse. One of the first criticisms of the initiative was therefore that world citizenship and integration of students of different ethnic origin in Dutch society is not really promoted by this school. This is until now a difficulty in Rotterdam where critical right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn 19

In the brochure of Educatief Programma inzake Cosmicus College 19 May 2006: “het bieden van hoogkwalitatief en kleinschalig leerling-gericht onderwijs waarin aandacht is voor competentieontwikkeling, actief en gedeeld burgerschap, ouderondersteuning en -betrokkenheid in een stimulerende en interculturele omgeving waar scholieren en hun ouders worden opgeleid tot verantwoordelijke wereldburgers.”

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lived until he was murdered on 6 May 2002. His party was (after the murder) very critical about the Cosmicus initiative and labelled it as an effort towards segregation of Muslims.20 On 25 January 2007, at the occasion of the official and ceremonial opening of Cosmicus College in Rotterdam by Christian Democrat Minister of Education Maria van der Hoeven, € 300,000 were publicly promised as an extra stimulus for a successful commencement of this school, but there were many critical voices. Willem Vonk, rector of the Catholic City College Franciscus, used strong words. Volstrekt belachelijk or ‘absolutely ridiculous’ was his comment according to a serious newspaper. Jan Kweekel of the Protestant Melanchthon College is quoted to have said that the school did not aim for integration but for segregation: ‘this school is fully orientated towards Turkish culture’.21 They regretted that Cosmicus College attracts students with a high score in the national test at the end of primary school and argued that ‘this is a group that we want to keep in our schools in the centre of the old city’. The rectors of the two schools quoted above are also working within the cooperative LMC, but between the various LMC schools there is sometimes a keen rivalry. Mr Rasit Bal, an experienced manager of Islamic primary schools and former director of the cooperative office of the Boards of Islamic Schools in the Netherlands declared: ‘I have been involved in the start of many schools, but never thought that things could be organised in such a smooth way. Apparently there must be first a strong will for something. The law is then no problem.’22 In the later reports about the school there remained some doubts, but generally the actual situation was more positively interpreted. In 2008 and early 2009, Cosmicus College of Rotterdam organised a science fair, in cooperation with staff and students of Delft Technical University and the University of Leiden. There was an overwhelming public interest for these meetings that were supported by large sponsors like the Rotterdam Harbour and Royal Shell Oil Company. These projects 20

City Council member Anita Fahmel in an intervention of 11 April 2007. See ; accessed 30 July 2013. 21 NRC Handelsblad, 27 January 2007. 22 Quotes from a quite malicious article in NRC Handelsblad, 27 January 2007. The article showed a picture of a few girls in the school. Out of the five girls visible, four or 80% wore a headscarf. From my own observation in the school the percentage of girls with headscarf is about 10-20%. The title of the article is in translation: ‘Controversy about new ‘Turkish’ elite school’ (Controverse rond nieuwe ‘Turkse’ eliteschool). The judgement by Bal is a reference to the Dutch proverb: Waar een wil is, is een weg. Where there is a will, there is a way. In this case the way is substituted with law (wet­ instead of weg).

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stressed the interest of the school in sciences. For 16 May 2009 INESPO (International Environment & Scientific Project Olympiad, a new initiative, in line with the love of Gülen people for Olympiads) planned a first national contest for students of Dutch secondary schools in the field of knowledge about the environment. It was held at the Free University of Amsterdam, sponsored by the national programme in this field and Cosmicus College as the central actor for secondary education. Minister of Education Plasterk was present here as well. Since then this has been a yearly initiative as preparation for an international project on youth working for the study of environment.23 Besides, Cosmicus College has become known for its quality of education in modern languages. Native speakers have been hired to teach French and German. There are no problems in sports: classes of physical education are mixed, boys and girls without problems as experienced at some other schools with Muslim students. There was a Christmas tree and some social events like a grand Christmas dinner during the Christmas period, while in Ramadan classes went on as usual. Only on the first day after the end of Ramadan and at Idul Adha did Muslim students have a day off, but there were no iftar meals in the school and these Muslim celebrations were left to private homes alone. This led to some complaint by Muslim parents who judged that the school was too much accommodating to Dutch public culture and not to the majority of students and parents. In August 2008 Cosmicus opened another secondary school in Amsterdam, in cooperation with MSA, a cooperative of secondary schools on the basis of the Montessori educational system. The opening of the school in Amsterdam did not cause as much debate as the school in Rotterdam. The Amsterdam school also has a somewhat lower percentage of students of Turkish origin: only about 70% with for the rest a greater ethnic variety. In 2008 a Cosmicus primary school with four classes started in the Rotterdam district of Charlois. Here also most of the pupils initially came from the network of Turkish ethnic families with sympathy for the ideals of Cosmicus. In 2011 another primary school was established in Arnhem and in 2012 in The Hague. In both latter cases in fact a weak Catholic primary school was taken over. The reality of the Dutch system of education is that many Protestant and Catholic primary schools in the centre of the major towns have a majority of Muslim pupils. There has been a debate about ‘change of colour’ or the wish of turning these schools into Islamic schools. This has not happened, because the Protestant and Catholics boards are opposed to such a move. But in the case of Cosmicus there were no problems. 23

See . Accessed 4 August 2013. Cosmicus was still one of the main sponsors for the event that had its fifth occasion in Middelburg, 7 June 2013.

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Comparisons In the international debate about Fethullah Gülen it is quite fashionable to compare him with other great men and women. In the Netherlands he has been compared to Erasmus, the broadminded and realistic scholar, born in Rotterdam, who wanted to minimize the power of religious institutions and promoted the ideals of humanism.24 Carroll made a picture of Gülen by comparison and contrast to six western philosophers, from Plato to Sartre.25 Others have placed him in the path of mystical teachers like alGhazali and Rumi.26 In the Netherlands, initiatives of Gülen have been related to the Dutch process of social segregation and emancipation, also called ‘pillarization’, understood as a process where groups are organised according to their religious denomination in education, medical care, politics, the media, sports and many other aspects of society. Protestant minister Abraham Kuyper propagated from the 1870s a social strategy of this kind of segregation in order to establish more pure orthodox Protestant communities who could define their own style of life in many fields. It was, however, not only a movement looking backward to orthodox ideals. It was also a struggle to modernize and to gain influence in society. He was soon followed by the Catholics of the country and this has dominated Dutch society between 1880 and 1960. This strategy was basically a struggle for emancipation. The Free University of Amsterdam educated many of these Protestant lower middle class people in law and the same was done after the Catholics established a Catholic University in Nijmegen (1923). This kind of social segregation and the pampering through quality education in own circles has lead to upward social mobility. Since the 1980s scholars have debated about the possibility for the new and growing Muslim communities to use this model of ‘pillarization’ also for their emancipation. The Christian Democrats have considered Islam as a major tool for the emancipation of Muslims. Some even welcomed Islam as a help for the weakened position of religion in Dutch society. Others however, especially the liberal politicians, deemed that the time of segregation in Dutch society, due to the strong position of the religion, was over and that the new Dutch citizens had to adjust to this situation of a secular society with a strong separation of religion and the state.27 There is no place here to go deeply into this debate that finally is a quite theoretical one, because all social scientists agree that the situation 24

Çelik (ed.) 2005: 89-91; Okuyucu et al. 2008. Carroll 2007. 26 Y. Alp Aslandogan in Yılmaz (ed.) 2007a: 663-682 and Thomas Michel in Yılmaz (eds.) 2007b: 183-202. 27 Rath et al., 1996: 30-32. 25

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has changed very much. In the case of new arrivals in the Netherlands, the Muslims are ethnically and ideologically divided and the common religion of Islam can only in part unite the various communities. This can be seen in several activities of Gülen inspired people in the Netherlands: in their starting period the newspaper Zaman was very much concentrated on the Turkish-speaking community in the Netherlands. While the Cosmicus College at its start aimed to reach a diverse student population, the reality was that due to negative media attention non-Turks were hesitant to subscribe their children to this school. Because of this Cosmicus also started with a strong concentration of ethnic Turks. Gradually their students did become more diverse. This was not the case for the Dialogue Academy/Platform INS which had much broader connections.

The Debate about the Gülen Movement in Dutch Society, focussing on the Dormitories On 4 July 2008 the Dutch Public Television broadcasted a documentary on Gülen related activities, concentrating on the boarding houses. Two teenage boys were in the programme in a quite sensational way, their faces made unrecognizable and their voices also transformed so as not to be identified. They complained about discipline, physical punishment, compulsion in religious matters. The programme in general stated that Fethullah Gülen had a double agenda and sought influence under the mask of dialogue, but in fact wanted to introduce shari’a law in Turkey and is seen as a threat to a pluralist and secular society. Here the debate of Kemalist versus religionist parties of Turkey entered Dutch television (in this case in the programme NOVA). Besides some unidentified boarding houses also the newly established Dialoog Academie, the Dutch office of the newspaper Zaman and the Cosmicus School, all three in Rotterdam, were here associated with the Gülen Movement and discredited.28 Soon afterwards members of parliament put questions to the government that initially spoke quite soothing (because the intelligence officials saw no negative aspects of these initiatives), but finally the government decided to make a further inquiry. As to the Cosmicus Foundation that started the school in Rotterdam, religion did not play any role in this secondary education. There is no religious instruction in the school, and only the ideal to be a global citizen, wereldburger, is quite strongly promoted. There is no dogmatic secularism either. Some students and some staff wear the headscarf, but many others do not. The school emphasises excellence in modern 28

The 25 minutes programme was made by Selli Altunterim and Jan Eikelboom. It has been put on the internet: , accessed 24 July 2013.

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languages and hired native speakers for German and French. A substantial portion of the classes are given in English. There are no Arabic classes in the school. There is no sign of Turkish nationalism, instead, it is forbidden to speak Turkish in the school. Among themselves, however, students still quite often use Turkish. The school has offered courses in education and Dutch to the parents but these were not successful. Instead, at a meeting of staff and parents some parents asked the staff to use ‘our own’ (= Turkish) language. This was denied by staff of the school. Observers acknowledged the secular character of the school and openly questioned what is the truth: did Gülen himself or (part of) his movement change from a pure religious towards the more secular goal of global harmony and world citizenship, or is there a hidden agenda?29 In 2002 the Dutch parliament by a great majority supported a grant of more than € 2 million for 20 boarding houses in the Netherlands, nearly all of ethnic Turkish origin, as already mentioned above. An official inquiry, submitted to parliament in 2004, was positive about the results. In 2008, however, public opinion at once switched to a negative image of the boarding houses as places of indoctrination, secret complots, and bad for integration. This has remained so since then. In early 2013 a renewed public debate was held about the Gülen boarding houses. In an aggressive interview that was broadcast on national television, a journalist mentioned that a member of the parliament of the Province of North Holland, Köksal Gör, was also the acting manager of a foundation that owned four apartments where students were living as in a boarding house.30 At the chamber of commerce these four apartments were registered as the office of a consultancy. Gör denied that it was a ‘hidden’ location of the Gülen Movement. Later it turned out that the public charter of the foundation Het Witboek clearly expressed that these apartments were for the housing of students. Because there is no formal ‘Gülen organisation’ in the Netherlands, Gör was right in stating that is was not an official Gülen activity. Nevertheless Gör had to leave his political position as a member of the conservative VVD party.31 In the report for the Dutch Government after the Television criticisms of July 2008, written by Prof. Van Bruinessen in 2010, special attention was given to the status of the boarding houses. A PhD student of Van Bruinessen, Mehmet Şahin, provided some case studies about internal conflicts in these facilities (sometimes also called dersane). It is here estimated that there 29

For the previous paragraphs I relied on Steenbrink 2012. The Nieuwsuur programme was on 5 April 2012, see , accessed 31 July 2013. 31 For the foundation Witboek see also , accessed on 31 July 2013. Its main purposes are described as ‘offering safe housing for students’ besides ‘tutoring/mentoring’ pupils. 30

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were somewhere between twenty to seventy dersane in the Netherlands, all run by private persons or local organisations and their status is therefore not that of a branch of a larger body.32 Special attention was given to the question of whether it is possible to leave the ‘Gülen Movement’ and its network. Three cases were presented in the report. The first is of a man of 28 years who as a student discovered his homosexual nature, and lived for 2 ½ years in a Gülen related dersane on the advice of a senior Gülen follower (abi). In this house he concealed his inclination. Later he had a relationship with a Dutch man, but then he sought his friends only among ethnic Dutch people. He is now critical about the way the abi gave his instructions in a quite authoritarian way. About negative attitudes towards homosexuality, he recognizes that this is not something specific for Gülen people, but is also found among secular Turkish nationalists.33 There were more difficult issues in the boarding houses. Van Bruinessen also quotes a case about a Kurdish boy who felt that his ethnic origin was a cause for negative sentiments and therefore he finally left the movement. Another case is about a modest love affair: even writing romantic letters or private meetings with girls is usually not permitted in the dersane and may be the cause for a student finally leaving such an institution. But the researchers concluded that “there is little real coercion in the boarding houses, rather strong social control and some pressure towards uniformity. … The doors are also not shut forever: the people who left the movement, can always return.”34 Whatever their conclusion: after a broad public and political support in the period 1995-2005, since then there is mostly a strong criticism in the Dutch media. In 2013 a new research on Turkish movements and organisations was commissioned by the The House of Representatives. The results were very positive.35 However, the minister of integration, Lodewijk Asscher, was initially sceptical about the Turkish community in the Netherlands. He declared his wish to monitor closely four religious Turkish communities, for a period of at least five years. His proposal received much criticism from members of parliament, because they had commissioned the research themselves. Later the minister elaborated on this monitoring-issue and said that by monitoring he actually meant to say that ‘he wished to improve the contacts and collaboration with the four religious movements’. Since the end of 2014 there is no negative news on the movement. Minister Asscher even attented as the keynote speaker at an activity of HOGIAF in March 2015. 32

34 35 33

Van Bruinessen 2010: 47. Van Bruinessen 2010: 55-6. Van Bruinessen 2010: 58. Sunier and Landman 2014.

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From Dialogue Academy to Platform INS In late 1998 Islam en Dialoog, [Foundation Islam and Dialogue] was established, first in Amsterdam, by leaders of Cosmicus with Ümit Taş, a student of medicine, as its first chairman. In 1998 the goal of Islam en Dialoog was formulated in a very optimistic mood: To emphasize that Islam is based on principles such as affection, compassion, mercy, and tolerance and certainly not on violence, hostility and terror; that all religions are based on these principles and therefore all conflicts of the past should be abandoned in order to initiate a warm dialogue and to free our world from the agony of war and conflict, carrying her into a peaceful and fortunate future.36

Islam en Dialoog accepted invitations for presentations of the modern, moderate and peaceful image of Islam in social and religious meetings. It was mostly active in the university towns where they held iftar meals during Ramadan and also joined some Christmas celebrations together with Christian fellow students. In 2007 Islam en Dialoog moved to a prestigious building in the centre of Rotterdam, Rochussenstraat 221, where at the same place Dialoog Academie also found office space, from 2008 under the full time direction of Alper Alasağ. There is an auditorium in this building, enough for some 150 visitors, a restaurant and ample office space. Dialoog Academie concentrated more on social, political and artistic aspects, while Islam en Dialoog had its focus on the religious communities with more strictly religious themes. In October 2012 it was decided to merge the two bodies, working in the same building, under the new name of Platform INS, where INS can be seen as the equivalent of ‘human’, from a Turkish word with this meaning (cf. Arabic al-nās). We will first give some examples of the focus of the more social and political orientation of the Dialoog Academie. Besides a Turkish-Dutch director Gürkan Çelik, it had social scientist Iris Creemers as programme manager. It could not present great events like the Istanbul Festival of its colleagues in Berlin, but it organised programmes for some 10-200 participants. It gave some courses of introduction to typical Turkish Islamic art like the ebru-style of paintings, playing the ney or Turkish flute, with its many connotations of mystical emotions. A special event in 2008 was a performance of the St Matthew Passion of J.S. Bach, together with Turkish flutes, singing and some dancing: a cross-cultural performance of this famous work. It organised the ‘Ramadan-mix’, bringing together Muslim and non-Muslim families for meetings, meals. There were many iftar meals during Ramadan, quite 36

First announcement in Begrip, Moslims, Christenen, January 1999: 35, according to a translation produced by the new organization itself.

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often focussing on special groups like police, politicians, and academics. In 2010 there were national elections and for a broad selection of political parties meetings with politicians were organised. Top politicians liked to come to Rotterdam because this was a rare opportunity to meet young people of migrant families and to introduce to them the basic ideology and strategy of their parties. Much of the work of the Dialoog Academie concentrated on the big harbour town of Rotterdam with its varied population. There was a programme to stimulate the participation of parents in primary schools because these parents are not used in their homeland to democracy in schools and to active involvement in the study of their children. There was also a concert by the Indonesian mystic and pop-singer Emha Ainun Nadjib, at the invitation of the organization Islam en Dialoog. For its finances it had one major sponsor, the scaffolding firm, already mentioned above, which gave € 80,000 in its first years, alongside many smaller sponsors. About half the expenses of the Dialoog Academie were covered by subsidies by the local administration of Rotterdam and national subsidies in the Netherlands. From 2007, when it moved to the building in Rotterdam, the more strictly religious programme Islam en Dialoog was directed by Alper Alasağ who between 2001-2007 had followed courses at the theological faculty of the Catholic Radboud University in Nijmegen, as introduced above. Alasağ gave many talks to Muslims in the Netherlands to describe what must be seen as the purpose and strategy of inter-religious dialogue. He established a cooperation with some Protestant congregations in Rotterdam/Delfshaven, especially with ministers who worked as a missionary team in districts that counted many Muslim inhabitants. They started a regular discussion on the biblical figures like Adam, Abraham, Moses, David and Jesus who are also mentioned in the Qur’ān. This method was continued also for a large audience because it proved to be a good start for an inter-religious encounter. Alasağ became (as successor to Marianne Vorthoren) a member of the editorial team of a magazine on Muslim-Christian relations, Begrip, that initially was only published by a Christian team. As we described above, Alasağ is not a traditional religious specialist like Necdet Başaran, that is seldom found among the Gülen people. Alasağ became the secretary of the new Platform INS in October 2012. After Iris Creemer left the merging organisation for another job, her successor was Nynke van der Veldt who had studied philosophy of religion at the Protestant Free University of Amsterdam. The new Platform INS formulated its goals in a less rosy style than its predecessor: Platform INS wants to promote the encounter and cooperation of people who want to contribute to a more peaceful Netherlands. … It is truly an art of living together in a free environment like the Netherlands with so many different individual and social settings. That is not an easy duty. But we believe that the 217

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art of living together can be learned. Those people who master this art are the ones who can contribute to a society where values like freedom, democracy, justice, equality and peace can be shared. A holistic vision on dialogue is according to INS necessary.37

This looks at first glance a more secular phrasing of the goal of dialogue, but Platform INS has also a special paragraph on Fethullah Gülen in its formulation of mission and background: Platform INS receives its inspiration among others from the insights of M. Fethullah Gülen, a prominent Muslim thinker and philanthropist. Gülen tries to reconcile modernity and authenticity, spirituality and science. As such he is one of the most influential leaders, with a peaceful message that calls for social and spiritual renewal.38

Islam en Dialoog and the Dialoog Academie in total published two books in Dutch about the Gülen Movement.39 The former published a book on inter-religious theology, concentrating on the common personality of Abraham, and the latter published a book on the great examples of humanistic interpretation of religion by Mevlana Rumi and Desiderius Erasmus.40 A selection from international articles on the movement was published in Dutch translation in 2010.41 The most remarkable publications about its own philosophy are two publications on the important role of religionbased persons and organizations for the cohesion and effectiveness of civil society. One was the result of a conference in 2010.42 Another publication was the report of four lunch meetings where young professionals from various disciplines (education, health care, business and politics) talked about the role of religious or spiritual values in their daily work. This last publication especially shows the philosophy that interreligious dialogue is not a peace talk between representatives of established global religions, but rather an encounter of individual people from different background (conservative Muslims, orthodox Christians in this case) who talk from their personal background and conviction. It is not an encounter between people of the mosque and people of the church, but creating a common concern for a social world that is their meeting place.43 As a conclusion to this section we may state that in the field of education the Gülen Movement concentrated on the emancipation of the 37

See , accessed 31 July 2013. Our translation from the Dutch original. 38 . Our translation from the Dutch original. 39 Carroll 2007 (Dutch translation in 2013) and Harrington 2011 (translation in 2012). 40 Valkenberg and others 2004; Okuyucu and others 2007. 41 Çelik and Valkenberg (eds.) 2010. 42 Dekker, Çelik and Creemers (eds.) 2011. 43 Van der Veldt and Van Nes 2013.

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Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. The educational activities were not directed towards religious and Turkish traditions, but rather concentrated on an access to modern Dutch society. The dialogue centre provides an original analysis of the Dutch multicultural society and from its new strategy also a fresh renewing method of dialogue and cooperation.

Zaman and Other Publications The international steering for activities of the Gülen Movement has been most intense in the publication of the newspaper Zaman and related activities. Zaman was first published as a daily newspaper in Ankara in 1986 and reached already 100,000 subscribers in 1990, developing to some 800,000 in 2010. In 1992 its first and most important European branch was established in Germany as Zaman Avrupa, a Turkish-language newspaper for Turkish people in Germany. This media offer was extended in 2001 when Samanyolu TV, the popular TV channel that from 1993 also showed much information about Fethullah Gülen, became available in Europe by means of satellite receivers. Although the Netherlands and Germany are in geographical and cultural respects truly neighbours, there proved to be many local differences as well. As we mentioned already above, since the mid-1990s Alaattin Erdal wrote columns in Zaman under the title of ‘Letters from Rotterdam’. In 2005 he became the representative of this media concern in the Netherlands. The Dutch branch was formally independent under the name of Time Media Group or TMG. Erdal worked directly in cooperation with the leadership in Istanbul, not with the related World Media Group from Germany. The first publication was a Dutch edition of the newspaper Zaman. It had most items from the Istanbul edition of Zaman but also special reports for Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. The newspaper had to compete with other popular Turkish newspapers that were daily available at railway stations and retailers in the major towns of the country. This edition quickly rose to 6-7,000 copies per day, but that remained the maximum (its German counterpart Zaman Avrupa sold about 2010 some 28,000 copies). The second product was a Turkishlanguage weekly Zaman Hollanda, that was included in the newspaper for subscribers who paid extra for this service, but it was also separately sold in some 50 Turkish shops in the country. For the development of this weekly TMG received a one-off subsidy of € 160,513 from the innovation section of the cooperating Dutch Press.44 A third publication from its early years was the Dutch-language enclosure Zaman Nederland. This was distributed free, at some time even up to 50,000 copies. 44

Interview with Allaattin Erdal, Rotterdam 16 July 2013; , accessed 2 August 2013.

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TMG rented an office building in Rotterdam for a staff of some eight journalists, with additional facilities for the recording of television programmes that sometimes were made for the international market of Samanyolu TV, but also for Dutch local television.45 From January until December 2009 Alaattin Erdal was the first fulltime parliamentary reporter for Zaman in The Hague. This ended when he was called to become alderman for the Christian Democrat Party in the district Charlois of Rotterdam and he also had to leave the Time Media Group. The media activities of the Zaman related TMG were first directed towards the Turkish migrants in the Netherlands and Belgium. It was the result of the fact that this group had gained a new identity: no longer interested in details of many Turkish developments, but also following politics and social development in their new homeland, although Turkish as a language has remained important for the older generation. The various editions of TMG regularly pay attention to ideas and statements of Fethullah Gülen, always in a positive way. But it is impossible to deduce from the number of subscribers any conclusion about a ‘Gülen congregation’ or something like it in the Netherlands.

Turkish Business People in the Netherlands united in HOGIAF For nearly all activities of the Gülen people it is uncertain and disputed whether it is really Gülen related or not. The broadest membership definitely is with the Federation of Business People, established as HOGIAF, only one year after the same circle saw the rise of a Gülen related cooperation in Turkey, TUSKON. The latter itself was the merger of quite a few Gülen related business unions that already cooperated during the last decades. HOGIAF is a federation of seven smaller local branches in the four largest cities of the Netherlands and some regions. It was established in a grand meeting in the World Trade Centre of Rotterdam on 30 May 2006. Although the first generation of Turkish migrants were mostly employed as labourers, soon after some became independent business people. Starting a supermarket, a grocery, was a quite common business. But there has been impressive growth, in variety and in scale. Above we have already mentioned the scaffolding firm of Metin Kabakyer and Corendon Airlines of Atilay Uslu. In 2013 HOGIAF counted 500 members who pay € 600 per year (besides fees for trainings, business trips to foreign countries). It claims to have built in this way a network of some 4,500 people working in

45

Interview with Allaattin Erdal, Rotterdam 16 July 2013.

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the business world. It wants to be an open network, first for all migrant or not-Dutch-born business people, eventually for all people in the Netherlands. But in reality it is a vibrant organisation of mostly young business people who seek a role in the emancipation of Turkish citizens in the Netherlands and also in the growing trade between the Netherlands and Turkey as well as other countries of the Middle East. Its biggest yearly ceremony and public manifestation are the HOGIAF business dinners, which are organised in the Kurhaus Hotel The Hague or the World Trade Centre in Rotterdam every year during autumn, since HOGIAF has started. The second biggest event were the HOGIAF Awards, in April 2012 and 2013 held in one of the largest auditoriums of The Hague, the World Forum. During the selection process of the HOGIAF Awards semifinals 6,000 people responded to the nomination of the awards through the internet. This also is an indication of the popularity and spread of HOGIAF. HOGIAF per se has no special relations with the Gülen Movement. But the founder Ahmet Taşkan and his temporary replacement as general secretary, Mustafa Sentürk, declared in private and in public that they are moved by the ideas and inspiration of the great leader, although not in an exclusive way. HOGIAF supported the Cosmicus Foundation once with a grant of € 5,000 for the start of the INESPO Olympiad. Taşkan was the founder of the Utrecht boarding house and educational centre SECU. At the HOGIAF awards TUSKON’s president was invited as well as Adem Kumcu, an important personality in the Dutch Gülen Movement until he moved to the head-office of the Turkish business people UNITEE in Brussels. There are quite a few Gülen people active in the medical business: organising the quite complicated application of administrative rules in the medical care. Their organisation has become a member of HOGIAF. For some time they were also included in UMNED that will be discussed below. During the visit of Turkish President Abdullah Gül to the Netherlands, 17-19 April 2012, HOGIAF was the official convenor and organiser of his meeting with Dutch and Turkish business people, on the first day of that visit. This alone may indicate already the strong position that has been acquired by HOGIAF in the first decade of its existence.46

46

Based on interviews with Ahmet Taşkan, Utrecht, 19 July 2013 and Mustafa Şentürk, The Hague, 3 June 2013, the ceremony of HOGIAF Awards, 27 May 2013 in The Hague and informal talks with members.

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High Spirit, Many Organisations but Low Degree of Institutional Unity The Gülen Movement is not a religious mass movement. It is rather a collection of initiatives taken by quite self-confident people of Turkish descent who concentrate on activities that are very important for them and their friends, even for Dutch society as a whole. The perspective is never directed towards the ‘Gülen Movement’ as a whole, but rather to the small and restricted initiative they have taken and developed. As in Germany, Belgium and France, there has been an effort to unite or coordinate the many organisations that are active in various fields. In the Flanders part of Belgium a federation was established with the name of Fedactio, as is discussed in the contribution on Belgium in chapter eight. In Germany it was Ercan Karakoyun of the Berlin Dialogue Centre who took the initiative. In early 2013 it was Mehmet Cerit of the Cosmicus Foundation who was at the base of a national Dutch coordination under the name of UMNED (Unie van Maatschappelijke Organisaties in Nederland, Union of Social Organisations in the Netherlands). The business union HOGIAF, six local education centres, an organisation Sanitas for the medical sector, ZijN for women, a new initiative for students were united in UMNED. But after mid-2013 this initiative was stopped. The Cosmicus schools and the Dialogue Academy (now known as Platform INS) had remained outside UMNED, like the media business of Zaman. Kimse Yok Mu as the major Gülen related charity has no office in the Netherlands, but the German branch also is active in the neighbouring region.47 At the initiative or request of the Dutch government major Muslim organisations in the Netherlands established in 2001 CMO, Contact Moslims en Overheid, a representative body for contact between Muslims and the national government. Gülen initiatives are not (yet) members of CMO, because they have no mosques, no imams. Most CMO members are directly or indirectly (through national organisations of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinam mosques) based in a mosque. Still, CMO director Ebubekir Öztüre (himself a leader in the Turkish Süleymanlı movement) has done efforts to involve Gülen people also in CMO. In the 1990s they were active in a local initiative, SPIOR, a cooperation programme for Muslims in Rotterdam, where the local administration was active for the improvement of mosque buildings, but also to set up safe and cheap circumcision. There are two problems for Gülen people to become members of CMO: there is no representative body or council for the whole Gülen movement in the Netherlands, and many of its activities are social rather than religious. 47

Under the name of “Time to Help” a Dutch (and Belgian) branch is planned but was not yet really active in mid-2013. See www.timetohelp.nl and a Belgian equivalent.

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This case illustrates the character of the movement. It is made up of small circles of engaged volunteers who have taken initiatives and are developing new social networks continuously, rather than a big and powerful organisation that is deploying a master plan from distant offices. It is the social engagement and incentives for emancipation rather than a spectacular or impressive reformulation of the religious background that forms the contribution of the Gülen people to Dutch society.

223

Hizmet in France Negotiation of Multiple Identities in a Secular Context Erkan Toguslu This chapter aims to examine the Gülen Movement’s socio-educational activities in France during the last five years, in order to understand how religiously motivated and Gülen-inspired people activate non-religious discourse in the public sphere. The crucial area of this study is linked to public areas such as businessmen’s associations, educational institutions and humanitarian associations run by Hizmet people. Specific attention will be given to two important areas, to distinguish the negotiation of plural belonging in faith neutral activities. Having multiple identities such as secular-religious, Muslim-Turkish-French-European forms a challenge to the people in the movement trying to accommodate these multiple belongings within French society. The first topic of this study is educational institutions in which Gülen-inspired people operate a moral memory to enhance social work by opening learning centres and schools. The second area examines the charity organisations that are also run by people of French-Turkish origin. The purpose is to frame the religiousethnic aspects of the identity structure of the Hizmet socio-educational organisations in France.

From Local Informal Networks to the Institutionalisation of the Hizmet in France: Businessmen’s Associations The Gülen Movement has become more visible in the European public sphere in the last decade and has attracted the interest of scholars.1 The movement has the capacity to mobilize people around some values and principles that inspire them to invest in education, dialogue and charity activities in Europe (see the first part of this book for different dimensions of the movement). The movement was established late in France in comparison with other Turkish communities such as Milli Görüş and Süleymancı.2 The emergence of the movement started around 1



2

Weller and Yilmaz 2012. Aydın 2003.

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the sohbets (spiritual conversations) in informal gatherings. The local sohbet organisations have spread out and multiplied in different cities. The Turkish immigrants developed these circles to foster their Islamic faith and religious feelings. Sohbets are one of the main informal means to create and expand the movement’s activities. The movement was enlarged through these informal networks as a ‘Muslim community’. The start of the movement was marked by this strong religious identity that also shapes the nature of the activities. The people in the movement who gathered in these semi-religious circles developed a religious consciousness and some notions of the movement such as devotion, and the altruistic self.3 These local sohbets were developed in an informal way to consolidate the religiousness of the people in the movement. In these sohbets, people discuss socio-religious issues; topics can include discussions about faith, society, education, youth, family and some Hizmet projects. One of the attendees, who know the literature of the movement, moderates the discussion and reading circle. He reads some passages from the Qur’ān, Risale-i Nur of Said Nursi and the books by Fethullah Gülen. They listen also to Gülen’s sermons, recorded on videotapes. The people in these circles meet regularly once a week. Some of these local circles of small groups have continued regularly and become istishare (literally means consultation) groups. The people in the istishare groups commit themselves to discuss and to follow closely the on-going projects. The people involved in these istishare groups are known as the mütevelli (board of trustees) of different Hizmet projects and institutions. The development of the movement apparently was based on these sohbet and istishare groups. In these first mütevelli groups, the small- and mediumscale companies, artisans, and workers started to support the activities in their cities. The informal networks remained as small religious circles. The role of the Gülen message is important in giving an impetus to the mobilization of the people. Gülen’s sermons and talks provide a guide and a repertory of action and principles for these sohbet and mütevelli groups. Gülen also visited Berlin, Köln, Paris, and Strasbourg in the early 1990s. During these visits, Gülen preached in mosques and expressed his views in Paris and Strasbourg.4 In the beginning of the 1990s, the Turkish community was organised around the cultural associations and mosques. The foundation of cultural associations allowed the institutionalisation and the visibility of the migrants in France.5 During this period, the movement also organised some activities in the space offered by these associations. 3

5 4

Toguslu 2009; Çetin 2010; Ebaugh 2010. Demir 2006. Kastoryano 1992, Rigoni 2003, Rolland and Sourou 2006.

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The first informal networks were businessmen’s meetings held in their homes. These meetings became become the associations of Franco-Turkish entrepreneurs. The first of these associations of entrepreneurs, FATIAD, was founded in 2004 in Paris. They have around 1,200 members. Their primary objective is to gather and to represent the interest of Franco-Turkish entrepreneurs, ameliorate the level of presence of the Turkish entrepreneurs, so that they may improve their position in the leading regional trade rankings for their members. FATIAD brings together Turkish-French entrepreneurs who meet regularly and share their experiences. They organize meetings of various committees in which they exchange ideas around themes related to their areas of activity. The working committees are formed by business sectors. These entrepreneurs are from the Paris region. FATIAD has members in many different sectors. The main economic activities of the entrepreneurs are building and public works, textile and food processing. In France, other business associations were set up between 2005 and 2009: Mouvement des entepreneurs et des Industriels de France (MEDIF), Union des Entepreneurs du Centre (UDEC), Union des Entrepreneurs du Sud-Est de la France (UDESEF), Union des Entrepreneurs de la region PACA et France Rhone-Alpes (UDEF PACA, UDEF Rhone Alpes), Union des Entrepreneurs de Normandie (UDEN), Union des Entrepreneurs de Bretagne (UDEB) and Syner’J.6 These eight regional business associations show also where the movement develops its networks. The local business associations have joined together to found a federation, Federation d’Entrepreneurs et de Dirigeants de France (FEDIF). All founders have Turkish background and these businessmen associations meet the needs of people with a Turkish background by offering them international business trips, searching for partnerships, organizing fairs and international sectorial exhibitions. The programmes, conferences and activities organised by FEDIF give the impression of an ethnic enclave.7 Its activities specifically reveal their ethnic identity and culture; leaders speak their native language and French. They also adopt most aspects of the host culture. As Pecoud stated ‘ethnic entrepreneurship is connected with their ethnic-religious origin’.8 The narratives and discourses developed in the context of the economic contribution made by the Turkish community to the French economy are outlined by the members and associations. They organised a FrancoTurkish friendship dinner in the French parliament in 2012. Fatiad set up a France-Turkey economic forum in 2009 with a Turkish partner, Tuskon. 6



7



8

This is no mistake: Syner’J is the name for the association of businessmen in the region Rhône, Alps, Auvergne. Aldrich and Waldinger 1990. Pecoud 2004.

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They participated in the Turkey-World Trade Bridge meeting organised by Tuskon in Turkey.9 Fedif, and in particular Fatiad (now Fedif Ile de France), launches dynamic economic exchanges between Turkey and France and develops solidarity among its members by promoting an entrepreneurial culture. This entrepreneurial culture is intermingled with the business ethics codes addressed by Gülen.10 Many of the entrepreneurs I met know Gülen. They support the schools and educational centres. They are active in Hizmet-related projects and they engage with the movement in various ways. For this reason, a ‘Hizmet entrepreneur’ can be defined in a way that encompasses Islamic ethical codes with rational economical strategies.11 Uygur defined these entrepreneurs as Muslim Puritans. Yavuz also suggested the same terminology by using “Muslim preacher of capitalism” to depict Gülen’s sermons Fatiad’s members also endeavour to develop an ethical life style that is suitable to emergent globalisation.12 According to Özdalga, this ethical life style is very close to Weber’s worldly asceticism.13 Göle noted that these technicalbureaucratic businessmen represent new elites and a way of modernity in contemporary Turkey.14 They simultaneously embrace a spiritual Islamic tradition and a modern rational economic investment model. Toguslu remarked that there are some parallels between the Gülen Movement and the Ahi guilds and craftsmen that also indicate this worldly ascetic way of life in Islam. They develop a spirit of trade called as futuwwa.15 During the first decade of the 21st century, the movement provided support particularly to the educational associations respectively in Strasbourg, Paris and Lyon.

Educational Institutions: Openness and Closure The impact and the degree of the influence of sohbets and mütevelli groups vary from city to city. It also depends on the city’s proportion of the population with a Turkish background. Paris, Strasbourg, Lyon are the cities with a substantial Turkish community which supports and follows the movement. The primary target is not only the Turkish community. The 9



10

12 13 14 15 11

Tuskon is a confederation of businessmen and industrialists of Turkey, which is present in 7 regions; 202 business associations are member of the confederation. www.tuskon. org. Uygur 2007. Özdemir 2012; Uygur 2007. Yavuz 2003a, 2003b. Özdalga 2003: 61. Göle 1997. Toguslu 2008, 2009.

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first educational institutions started with local Turkish people for financial reasons and due to some difficulties according to Çetin, who is director of the Etude Plus federation. The first learning centres were opened in the suburbs of Paris, Pantin, Sarcelles, Clichy-sous-Bois, Villeneuve St Georges, Schiltigeim (Strasbourg), Villeurbanne (Lyon). These first centres have changed their name since then and become members of the Etude Plus federation. The Fédération Etude Plus is an umbrella organisation that brings together learning and support centres in different cities of France.16 They have 20 founder members. Some of them have been in existence for ten years already. Approximately 2,500 students, from elementary to secondary school, attend these learning centres. The students follow classes especially in French and Maths. The director of the centre in Paris said that most of the students have problem with mathematics. The migrant descendants have problems with and need support with their French studies, and for this reason the learning centres offer Maths, French and some other disciplines. Another course provided by Etude Plus is éducation civique, which is the generic name for courses providing basic knowledge on citizenship, values and morality. Thus, one of the aims of the education defined in these centres is character education based on the instruction of morality, elimination of selfishness, establishment of human values.17 This character education and instruction of morality is a central term in the movement. It shows how the Gülen Movement applies its principles in all aspects of life. It seems that the directors of the Etude Plus who are open-minded to cultural and ethnic diversity in their institutions, find themselves operating somewhere between republican ideals and multi-culturalist policies. Jennings called this contrast “multiculturalist republicanism”, which emphasizes cultural traditional values and recognition of the pluralist concept of a civic identity.18 The ambiguity between culturalist approaches and a pluralist recognition of citizenship also results in the vagueness of the moral values formulated in the movement by the directors of the centres. To conform to French social mores and values they are in favour of a broader and open concept of morality that includes diverse values that are not contrary to Islam. In line with these apparent divisions, one of the first learning support centres, named Association Souverain, was opened in Paris, which first took the name of Acacia and then Etude Plus before joining the federation. This centre has been active in the last decade in supporting and responding to the educational needs of the Turkish-origin people in 16

See the member associations of the federation in EtudePlus. . 17 Aslandoğan and Çetin 2007: 35, Çelik 2010. 18 Jennings 2000: 575.

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quartiers difficiles or urban sections with many problems.19 When they started this institution, most of the students attending it were Turkish people. After a number of years, the centre began to attract non-Turkish and non-Muslim people as well. This change is particularly suitable for studying the transformation and negotiation of the multiple identities of the movement in recent years. These changes and negotiations are the result of the twofold dynamics: social interactions with the wider society and the diffuse meaning of the Hizmet principles. This initiative in the education field was continued with the foundation of private schools in Paris and Strasbourg. The people in the movement founded two schools in France. The first one, Collège EducActif, was opened in 2006 in a suburban area, in Villeneuve St-Georges in the south of Paris.20 The Selman Asan school was opened in 2012 in Strasbourg. EducActif had, in early 2013, 140 students from primary to secondary level. The Selman Asan school had 40 students. Both school buildings were renovated and fully refurbished by local businessmen. The schools offer classes for small groups of students and there is free tutoring for all students after school time. The teachers and volunteer university students provide tuition; they also make home visits to all families. The university students and teachers spend their time with students in extracurricular activities to ensure that they are kept occupied and in a safe environment. These two schools are not publicly funded; they are hors contrat schools. The financial support comes from local businessmen. As the name of the second school indicates, the family of Selman Asan, a businessman, who died in 2011, financed the cost of buildings in Strasbourg. The following characteristics apply to the educational learning centres and the two schools in France. There is an emphasis on French and language skills. The two schools try to provide their students with more laboratory facilities. Collège EducActif, for instance, has modern updated physics, chemical and language laboratories. In recent years, the schools have organised science fairs and most students of the learning centres do participate in these fairs. The schools do not offer Turkish classes. Some of the teachers are of Turkish origin. This aspect also reveals the fragmented nature of the schools in respect of their identity, which illustrates the ambivalence of choosing to be French-Turkish-Muslim. The teachers and directors are encouraged in principle to engage with Hizmet notions of educational philosophy, but some of them, especially non-Turkish students and teachers, do not know Fethullah Gülen and Hizmet very well. They are not exclusively in this sense “Gülenist.” 19

Toguslu 2012. Ibid.

20

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Pluralisation of Identity: Dialogue Activities and Organisations Our third area of study consists of the intercultural and interfaith activities of the movement in France in order to discover the new negotiation spaces and domains of identity. Analogous with the educational institutions, one of the main activities undertaken by the participants is formed by the intercultural and interfaith programmes. The informal intercultural programmes were institutionalized by the foundation of the Plateforme de Paris, Maison des Dialogues in Lyon, Association du Dialogue de Strasbourg. In Strasbourg there is a new association named Plateforme de développement social et économique, which was founded in 2009. Intercultural dialogue associations promote cultural exchanges between different ethnicities and faiths. Plateforme de Paris was founded by young researchers and journalists.21 Its objective is defined as the provision of solutions to the social problems of the society. These dialogue organisations aim to contribute to social cohesion and learning to live together in society. To this end, their efforts are focused on two main points: reflection on social-cultural issues and working in the field. These centres stimulate intellectual debates on the issues of living together through the organisations of seminars and conferences. There is apparently is a strong link between the identity of the organisation and its members who are young highly skilled professionals, researchers, and journalists. The socio-economic status of the members and their educational background determine the nature of the activities. These focus on the following areas: identity and integration, human rights and civil liberties, interreligious dialogue, conflict resolution, cultural diversity, migration and cultural change. These themes indicate the strategic adaptation of the young French-Muslims of Turkish origin in the secular French context.22 The members are active in interfaith groups. They encourage their Muslim and non-Muslim associates to contribute to social issues. Nihat Sarier, president of the Plateforme de Paris, initiated the visits and meetings in order to mobilize the Turkish community to take initiatives on dialogue. He stated that, in recent years, many Turkish associations affiliated with the movement started to organize shared dinners around the idea of living together in their own city. Local public authorities support these dinners. They found it very relevant to the solution of certain socio-religious tensions in their cities. In one respect, it has become an opportunity for Muslims to free themselves from their ethnic-religious ‘ghetto’ which is considered ‘la maladie des immigrants 21

www.plateformedeparis.fr. Toguslu 2007.

22

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et des musulmans’ in France. On the other hand, as Anne Sophie Lamine assessed, these gatherings and dinners around the idea of living together have an impact on French laïcité [secularity].23 There are over 20 dialogue and cultural centres in France, which include community centres. They want to play an essential role in highlighting the challenges that face Turkish Muslim community. Their work is similar from one centre to another, because the main notions and concepts used in these centres are the same, such as tolerance, dialogue, living together, co-existence and diversity. They are sharing best practices among them. There is a loose coordination between the dialogue associations. The development of the mass media and the internet has made it possible to easily and rapidly connect people. In contrast with the learning centres, the dialogue institutions put more emphasis on their religious identity. “We hold these events first of all because we are all human beings and secondly because we are Muslims in France,” said M. Sarier. This statement summarizes the way in which they express their identity and religion. Being Muslim and showing the visibility of their religious faith in dialogue can be seen as problematic in a republican understanding of citizenship, which assigns religious denominationalism to the private sphere.24 According to Sarier, the root problem of this non-involvement in the republican public sphere is the refusal or inability to incorporate modern values and plural co-existence as a legitimate form of existence. Hence, the false dichotomy between Muslims and Europe, Muslims and France, Islam and Europe as well as the false assumption that Islam is not compatible with European values are somehow inherently linked with this denial of shared values. For this reason, they encourage living together programs. In the case of dialogue and community centres and associations, the development of the structural identity of the movement depends on the normative framework of the Muslim identity based on dialogue and religious pluralism. The degree of identity with the Islamic faith in dialogue associations is noticeable in their activities and we can verify how they use autonomously Islamic notions and legitimization as a symbolic capital.

Religious Humanitarian Identity Together with the Turkish partners of Kimse Yok mu in Turkey and the Gülen-inspired schools, Hizmet people in France initiated humanitarian

23

Lamine 2004. Kuru 2009; Bauberot 2006.

24

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aid in many countries especially in Africa. They supply food, medicines and other facilities for needy people.25 Motif is a humanitarian aid association created in Lyon in 2008.26 As we have observed with other educational and business associations, the informal aid organisations were first realized in an incidental way, but after 2008, local businessmen founded Motif to help needy people. In a short description, it is defined as a secular international organisation. Yüksel has been part of it for many years. Before becoming active in Lyon, he had been living in Strasbourg. He has a consulting business. He has worked with Turkish associations and Turkish firms. He is also in the mütevelli group in Lyon and created Motif with other Hizmet businessmen. The primary destination of the aid is Senegal, Mauritania, Pakistan, Kirghizstan, Morocco, and Chad. Most of the countries where they distribute food and medicine are Muslim-dominated countries. They organize information sessions about their charitable activities in various locations, in which they operate in France, working with cultural centres run by Hizmet people. “l’espoir, dialogue interculturel” and “Entraide du Centre” is another humanitarian aid organisation in the central region of France. Motif can offer us an important insight into what charity associations in France do. Motif’s humanitarian missions have evolved over recent years to meet the different needs in African countries that are politically and economically unstable. The aid mainly comes from the Hizmet movement in France, but in the last few years, a number of people who are not in the movement have been giving donations and working as volunteers in Motif. The members and supporters are not specialized in humanitarian aid. However their personal dedication, self-commitment and sacrifice for the battle against poverty make up for this lack of specialization. Additionally, the local contacts and engagement with schools, humanitarian aid organisations in African environments, minimize the lack of specialist activists who are working and living in the field. The Gülen schools in Chad and Mauritania already have experience of working with local people. This know-how has been gained through their local connections. This link with schools and people who have already been there for many years, facilitates the distribution and helps find needy people. Each welfare network is more or less formalized – institutionalized. The charitable ethic and social responsibility are the main ideas derived from general Islamic notions. These networks could be regarded as a result of their implementation in civil society and the realization of (de)centralized institutions, which are working with different groups of nodes, people, and centres. The ambivalent coexistence of secular 25

Michel 2008. .

26

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social work and religion-based social activities permits them to be interchangeable, the one replacing the other as society needs or demands. This replacement surprisingly creates opportunity for religio-secular coexistence.27 The directors of Motif prefer to refer to themselves as ‘laïque’ [secular] because they want to be open to everyone, not only towards and for Muslim people. Studies into Muslim NGOs, give some insights into the complexity of being both Islamic and humanitarian.28 They work with and are open to collaboration with, other non-Muslim NGOs, including Western development agencies. The collaboration and cooperation with other Western NGOs drives Islamic NGOs to modify their engagement in the Islamic context in the battle against poverty and developing humanitarian aid to needy people. The historical studies on Islamic charity and aid systems give some indicators with regard to the continuity and new interpretations of Islamic notions on almsgiving (zakat and sadaqa). Studying the charity from a historical point of view permits us some valuable insights.29 In these transnational complexities and multiple localities, the work of NGOs exemplifies the blurred zone between belonging and participating, especially when they work with other non-Muslim NGOs. Such Islamic NGOs use an Islamic notion and discourse in their practices and motivations. The discourses used by Muslim actors are nurtured by a sense of being Islamic and Islamic values. The new orientation as an opening to humanitarian discourse and sensibility reduces the Islamic tone of the mission. Diverting from Islamic political ideology to moderate humanitarian discourse is not necessarily a break with Islamic piety and religious devotion. Motif as a humanitarian faith-inspired association is working for a variety of causes: delivering hot meals, medical treatments, waterwheels projects, vocational training. In these projects, a kind of hybridization occurs, between Islamic devotional practice and the global development approach.30 Gülen-inspired humanitarian associations are providing aid, food, materials, buildings, hospitals and schools in various countries. At the grass root level, their efforts are appreciated and very welcomed in France. They open schools that offer non-religious courses, English classes. According to Yüksel, supporting the achievement of the educational projects, tutoring the schoolchildren (boys and girls) during their education by opening learning centres and private schools is meeting the target of combining religious duty with humanitarian responsibility. He added that their organisations give priority to some 27

29 30 28

Marty 2003. Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, Clark 2004, Harmsen 2008. Singer 2008. Harmsen 2007.

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values such as hard work, doing good deeds, being useful to persons who need help. The examples and various programmes in Motif illustrate how an empowerment process is operating in their welfare programmes.

Hizmet Network Definition in France One general aspect of the transnational movements and organisations is their categorisation according to the structure used for resource distribution and mobilization, their coordination mechanism and hierarchical organisation. Some of the transnational movements have strong mechanisms of coordination, but the weakness of their resource distribution is noticeable. Organisations with centralised resources and weak coordination are another type of structure that one can discover among multinational firms. In this framework, Hizmet is characterised by its decentralised resources and human mobilization, at the same time there is a powerful horizontal network among its members. The main patterns of the transnational Hizmet movement involve following different ideas, metaphors, and symbols. Therefore, it can be understood as being highly localized and decentralised, while at the same time the lack of a central hierarchy in terms of organisation intentionally provides for the establishment of new variable structures in Hizmet. The intense degree of coordination does not require a centralised framework and increasingly complex patterns. Less or more explicit goals and intentions attract many people without membership rules being required. It is a challenge to describe Hizmet. On the one hand, flexible and decentralised adaptation to local conditions is mostly applied, and on the other hand, coordination at transnational and national level needs to be appropriately present. Being a non-profit organisation, such as Attac or Greenpeace means, at the same time, struggling with the question of coordination and organisation at different levels, whilst retaining a cohesive identity. In this sense, the dynamics of the imitative activism in the movement are enhanced to include a common sense of belonging and values.

Communitas and Mimetic Activism Giving money, listening to Gülen’s message, supporting and becoming involved in a project may be seen as a daily ritual for the participants in the movement. During their participation and active engagement, these activities can be considered as a liminal stage, which may be a permanent threshold or turning point for the participants in the movement. Social and religious status have disappeared, it has been deemed that there is no conflict between them. Following Victor Turner in his description of ritual processes, one may see communitas as communal form based on common shared values rather than a kind of hierarchy and status. Communitas is 235

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a specific notion used by Turner to explain how rituals play a role in the construction of identity of a community. He does not use the word community to differentiate from the existing sociological term (used by Tonnies and Simmel and others).31 The values such as friendship, spontaneity, heart-toheart contact, immediate, direct relationship and experiences fundamentally constitute the form of the structural community relations in the movement. As Turner suggested, communitas may strengthen undifferentiated social relations without hierarchy. In the movement, such a kind of liminality is fostered to enhance a “community identity” that also enables the social mobilization and mimetic activities. This sense of communitas identity is created to structure their social identities and to homogenize their status in the movement. This is not a dismissal of the structure nor does it mean a rejection of hierarchy, furthermore strong coordination and cooperation is required to have such mimetic behaviour, structure and identity in the movement. The details, experiences, methods, models are shared by the participants in the movement. One can recognize that the idioms, symbols and narratives that circulate in the movement are the same as far as the social milieu has an impact on it.32 Considered as daily rituals, communitas helps to “distance themselves from mundane structures and their social identities, leading to a homogenization of status”, to create a kind of mimetic identity, symbols.33 The idea is that the organic relationship between an idea, a population, a territory, a form, and a movement fosters the individual’s identity by means of the social networks and activities in which they are embedded.34 Being in a network of organisations and activities shapes the identities of the individuals and vice versa. According to this idea, the individual’s identity becomes a set of membership relations in different social ethnic circles. Studying Hizmet affiliated institutions in France is a complex endeavour that requires practicing multi-sited ethnography: fieldwork is often done at different sites among transient individuals who are passing through, such as experts from international institutions in local settings or representatives of civil society or indigenous groups in the headquarters of the institution. During the institutionalization period, the lack of transparency is also expressed as a criticism of the movement because in the informal networks it was too hard to explain how these informal gatherings set up new institutions. Although these formal networks and organisations operate in transnational and re-territorialized contexts, they constitute 31

33 34 32

Turner 1967. Hermansen 2007; Toguslu 2009. Thomassen 2006: 322. Breiger 1990.

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their own specific repertory of action in France. They are the result of the first informal networks. In these formal organisational structures, we tend to study also in-formalized relationships and complex social processes in which religious notions play a distinctive role. The religious repertoire offers a unique perspective from which to study the collective memory of the participants. In recent years, these informal networks, as circuits of mobilization, where normative frameworks are produced and spread in France, proliferate this repertory through the experts, known as abi-abla (elder brother and sister). The term is used in the movement to denote a person who deserves a degree of respect.35 Being a good speaker, holding a sufficient high managerial position, self-commitment to the Hizmet projects are some of the internal key factors to deserving this title. These experts are considered as a moral authority in the movement and also specialists who are working in the field as educators, directors.36 These informal structures have also become the loci of our socio-anthropological enquiry for determining how participants put their multiple identities into practice and manage them. This high level of connectivity between people in the movement can be analysed with socio-anthropological methodologies. Studying these local networks and also transnational institutions and establishments enables us to look carefully at the dense social interactions, which have social impacts on their environment.

Conclusion The transnational movements create different socio-geographic territories and locations where social practices, symbols, artefacts, and organisations can be extended. In this sense of creating new social spaces and orders, Hizmet operates in networks and, alongside these networks, the people in the movement keep in touch in domains such as media outlets, educational institutions, local cultural-religious gatherings. Apart from these multiple domains, an insight into transnational areas requires a knowledge of what kind of relations there are between different structures, organisations that produce a kind of identity and sense of belonging. How is a movement without borders influenced by local boundaries and national-regional cultures, values and symbols? Under some circumstances, the movement applies its transnational symbolic capital, as enshrined in various formulations on socio-religious issues by Gülen. There is a need to examine both agents and structures to see their relation and the dynamics that affect Hizmet as a structure, which implies an identity for its supporters and participants. The analysis of the internal relation between the structure or identity of Hizmet units and the 35

Toguslu 2009. Leman 2010.

36

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networks, and their relations with other types of social units in the wider society, illustrate the dynamics of the movement in terms of resources and symbolic mobilization, transmission of values, notions and idioms. The circulation of narratives, produced in daily life in the movement, is integrated in the multiple sites of various local activities and spaces. George Marcus indicated the need for an adequate method for understanding anthropological research in new circumstances where there is a shift from a single site location to multiple sites of observation, in order to observe the dichotomies between what is local and global, system and living world. He claimed that a multi-sited ethnographical approach is not a holistic representation, but it is a portrayal of the world system and an exercise in mapping out the different terrains.37 The setting in which these terrains are mapped out is produced in several domains and local situations and becomes a global one in the sense of a connection among sites. The movement also uses various connections among various sites, domains and networks.

37

Marcus 1995: 95.

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The Gülen Movement in the United Kingdom Paul Weller To write about ‘the Gülen Movement’1 in the United Kingdom (UK) is itself already a challenging task. This is not least because the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is what this author has elsewhere called a ‘four nations state’.2 Thus it is governed overall by the UK Government with the Westminster Parliament. However, Scotland now has a restored Scottish Parliament, with the Scottish government having powers in many domestic matters and with a referendum coming in 2014 on full independence.3 Wales has an elected Assembly and some devolved powers of government, while following the Good Friday peace agreement an Assembly has also been restored in Northern Ireland together with a power sharing Northern Ireland Executive. By contrast England does not itself have any devolved governance, while being both the most populous part of the UK and also the most diverse with regard both to ethnicity and religion or belief. This chapter focuses mainly on England. This is partly because it is in England that most of the initiatives and activities of the movement have been concentrated, even though for some years the Hizmet has also made specific contributions to confidence-building following the formal conclusion of armed paramilitary and army conflict in Northern Ireland.4 This stands in contrast to the position with regard to Wales and Scotland, where nothing substantial has so far been published concerning Hizmet activities. To some extent the English focus also reflects the geographical concentration in England of the Turkish diaspora who have generally

1



As discussed later in this chapter, Hizmet (the Turkish word which can be translated into English as ‘service’) is the more generally preferred self-description as compared with the often used (including sometimes by the present author) descriptor the “Gülen Movement” which, for many, appears to highlight too much the individual person of Fethullah Gülen. 2 Weller 2005: 73. 3 The referendum of 18th September 2014 resulted in a decision to remain within the United Kingdom. 4 See Lacey 2012.

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provided the core impetus for Hizmet initiatives.5 Nevertheless, in relation to Hizmet activities in England, the only substantial publication so far has been Sanaa El-Banna’s book discussing the Hizmet as a new type of social movement, with special reference to London.6 This chapter will make a specific contribution to the general literature on Hizmet and to this book on Hizmet initiatives in Europe, by describing and discussing the historical development and current landscape of a range of Hizmet-linked organisations including: the Anatolian Muslims Society; the Axis Educational Trust; the Dialogue Society; the Koza Educational Society; the Lighthouse Educational Society; the Mevlana Mosque; the Weekly Zaman newspaper; and the Wisdom School. Another challenge in writing about ‘the Gülen Movement in the UK’ is a terminological one. To some extent this is an issue common to all of the chapters in this book. Nevertheless it will also be explored in relation to the particular context discussed in this chapter because there are specific inflections and issues involved in the articulation of this in the context of the UK. In general, the terminological issues involved relate to the complex and well-known interplay the study of religion between socalled ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ perceptions and descriptions.7 Of course, this is not in itself unique to the specific phenomenon that is the subject of this chapter, but in approaching an understanding of the movement, as well as seeking to understand it in its own terms, it can be helpful to set it in the context of a wider framework of understanding of both religious and social movements. Thus, for example, those within the Christian tradition from which the present author personally comes and are now known as ‘Baptists’ did not originally call themselves this. Rather they understood themselves to be Christians engaged in a project to recover and restore a more authentic Christianity. It was ‘outsiders’ who externally applied this descriptor to them because of their distinctive practice of reserving Christian baptism to those who were consciously able to profess Christian faith rather than administering it to children or babies. Similarly, it is ‘outsiders’ who generally use the terminology of ‘the Gülen Movement’, while ‘Hizmet’ is the more preferred terminology for those who are engaged in that project.8 5



6

8 7

In Glasgow, in Scotland, an initiative called the Nurture Educational and Multicultural Society has recently acquired a substantial former listed church building together with a sports hall, offices, manse and grounds. However, the building needs substantial refurbishment before it will be possible to run within it activities consistent with the organisation’s educational, dialogue, cultural and engagement aims. Sanaa El-Banna 2013: 35-50. See Russell McCutcheon 1999. For a discussion of this similarity and comparison, see Weller 2008a.

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In fact, setting the movement within a wider comparative theoretical framework for understanding movements in general, and religiouslyinspired initiatives in particular, can arguably help to illuminate also aspects of this movement’s particular developmental trajectory.9 For now, it is sufficient to note that a theme running throughout this chapter is concerned with what might be called ‘the politics of naming’, as will become apparent when discussing the emergence of various Hizmet initiatives in England, starting with those concerned with education.

Educational Initiatives A commitment to education is one of the key characteristics of the ‘Gülen Movement’ globally10 and, in the UK, in 1994, the Axis Educational Trust was the first organised Hizmet-related initiative to be founded in the UK. The Trust was set up by parents and teachers inspired by Fethullah Gülen’s teachings that emphasise the importance of providing comprehensive and inclusive education for all children in order to help them achieve their full potential and take part in society. It was founded as a registered charity which aimed to provide high quality education to primary and secondary school pupils, primarily through supplementary school education. By improving pupils’ literacy and numeracy levels at an early age, the Trust aims to strengthen ‘overall academic ability, broaden life-time opportunities, and encourage social cohesion’.11 More broadly, it is also committed to developing dynamic and productive new ideas about the future of education through frequent seminars, panel discussions, and workshops. According to its current Directors, in taking the name of Axis, the then founders and directors were making an allusion to the notion of an axis or meridian which it is thought may also have intentionally contained a reference to the Greenwich Meridian mean time. Thus the ‘politics’ of its naming was one that involved the intention of signalling an intention fully to ‘belong’ to the local environment;12 that it would in principle take a generic and inclusive approach to education rather than one that would be focused in terms of the needs of any specific ethnic or religious group, even if in practice it would initially predominantly serve such needs in the Turkish diaspora; and also that it would not, in the name adopted, itself directly signal or promote its founding inspiration in the way that 9



For a critique of the adequacy of social movement theories and of the paradigm of New Religious Movements in relation to the Hizmet, see Çetin 2010. 10 Bekim Agai 2003a. 11 . 12 This is a concrete example of what Sanaa El-Banna 2013: 66, calls the Hizmet’s ‘strategic adaptavism’.

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many other educational initiatives often do in the name by which they are known. However, in contrast to the majority, if not all, of other Hizmetrelated educational initiatives, on its website Axis does clearly state an inspiration from the teachings of Fethullah Gülen.13 In 1996, Axis opened its first college, the London Meridian College (LMC), in North London. This provided English courses, tuition courses and IT classes. It was followed, in 1998, by the London Meridian College Primary and Secondary School, for access to which a relatively low fee was charged in order to maintain accessibility for children whose families were struggling financially. However, in the end this did not prove sustainable in terms of its effects on Trust’s overall finances and this initiative was therefore ‘paused’. However, in 2006, the Trust founded the Wisdom School as an independent and nondenominational mixed sex school in Tottenham, north London. Having brought this initiative to birth, in 2010, Axis set up an independent and specific charity for running the school and transferred all responsibility for the school to a new Wisdom School body which is both a company limited by guarantee and a registered charity.14 The school has almost 100 students and, as a sign of both its current growth and of the scope of its vision for the future, the charity recently purchased a new school building in Hendon, North London, which can accommodate up to as many as 300 pupils. Following renovation work, the new school building was opened in September 2014. An Axis informant adds that: It is important to mention that from 2010, Axis has revised its strategies on running supplementary schools to achieve the objectives stated in its memorandum and articles of association. To this end, unlike the other 5000 supplementary schools operating in the UK, Axis has created a brand new supplementary schooling programme which has been highly popular with parents at 16 centres in the country. The success of the programme is evidenced by the attendance of pupils from over 50 ethnicities.

Overall, the Trust has successfully managed and sustained its brand through additional programmes. They include Axis Saturday Schools,15

13

Although not proclaimed by its name, the Trust’s connection with the Hizmet is not hidden as its current website makes clear that it was: ‘set up by parents and teachers inspired by Fethullah Gülen’s teachings that emphasise the importance of providing comprehensive and inclusive education for all children to help them achieve their full potential and take part in society.’ 14 See . Unlike the Axis Trust website, the Wisdom School website does not refer to any inspiration from the life and teachings of Fethullah Gülen. 15 See .

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Axis Supplementary Schools,16 and Axis Tuition Centres.17 In addition to the supplementary schools run by Axis, the Trust has also successfully provided in-school tuition services to state secondary schools. Another educational initiative is the Koza Educational Society. The word koza, in Turkish, means chrysalis. The operative image is therefore that, just like a butterfly breaking free from its protective cocoon, with appropriate encouragement every individual can flourish and broaden their life opportunities. In this instance, therefore, it can be seen that the Society was a variation from the general trend in the politics of naming of Hizmetrelated initiatives in the UK, in that the name is not from the local language. The Society was established as a charity in 2004, with its website stating that it was founded ‘by a group of parents and professionals who were inspired by the teachings of Fethullah Gülen’.18 In relation to crediting of its inspiration the Society was relatively unusual among Hizmet-related organisations in the UK, as can be seen from the examples of the Wisdom School, and the Axis Saturday Schools, the Axis Supplementary Schools, and the Axis Tuition Centres, none of whose individual websites state an inspiration from Fethullah Gülen, although all the Axis organisation websites contain a weblink to the main website of the overall Axis Trust which does state that inspiration. With what Koza’s website calls a ‘human-centric focus’, the Society aims to run programmes that will assist personal and social educational development, again in principle regardless of age, race, religion or culture. The Society states that education is inherently valuable because it empowers individuals to think and critique for themselves, but it also argues for its instrumental value on the grounds that, through well-rounded education, it is possible to overcome prejudice and misconception. Koza’s core activities include education, tutoring and mentoring for children and teenagers, seminars, language and IT support for adults, cultural activities and an annual summer fete. It also runs Supplementary Schools in Enfield and Edmonton, North London, and it runs English courses for adults. Among the projects it is planning for the future are a guidance and counselling service for parents; educational and learning trips for teenagers; a Family Learning Centre; English as a Second Language (ESOL); Internet and Computing Technology (ICT); and Skills for Life courses for women. A further educational initiative, also based in London, is the Lighthouse Educational Society. This is a South London-based charity that works to 16

See . See . 18 See . 17

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enable and empower young people through education. It aims to raise confidence and ability and to help young people achieve their full potential; to broaden life opportunity and their ability to take initiatives; to encourage the development of talent; to provide a positive environment with an emphasis on enjoyment through innovative teaching; and to instil a sense of care, co-operation and respect towards others. Like the other educational initiatives already discussed, the Lighthouse Educational Society derives its source of inspiration and motivation for its work from the teachings of Fethullah Gülen, emphasising particularly how Gülen’s approach is based on (what its website describes as) a ‘triad of non-denominational education, dialogue and peaceful coexistence, whilst encouraging individuals to be proactive citizens within their communities.’19 The Society therefore sponsors supplementary schools, mentor training, parenting school, and educational consultancy through four branches based in the Welling, Croydon, Peckham and Tooting areas of south London.

Dialogue Initiatives Reflecting one of the global Hizmet’s other key characteristics alongside a commitment to, and engagement in, education, the Dialogue Society was founded in 1999.20 On its website its states its inspiration is from Fethullah Gülen.21 The Society is based in London and acts as what might be called an ‘umbrella’ for Dialogue Society branches throughout England, including in Birmingham, Bristol, Durham, Hull, Leeds, Leicester, Manchester, Northampton, Oxford and Southampton. Dialogue groups had been organised in the south of England by Mahmut Gunay. Between 2010 and 2011 various local groups, including those from Leeds and Southampton began meeting with the London Society and each other in order to share ideas and good practice. They were also joined by the Midlands Dialogue Forum, founded by Sadik Cinar, who became the Executive Director of the Dialogue Society in September 2015. The groups ultimately came together on the basis that many of their activities in any case thematically overlapped and that resource efficiencies could be gained. As with other initiatives of the Hizmet in the UK, it should be noted that the name of the Dialogue Society also signals a broadly inclusive intent, both regard to the nature of the organisation (it does not portray 19

. See . 21 This has been the case since 2009. Earlier this was not explicitly stated because of concerns that the nature of such inspiration could either be misunderstood, or any reference to it misused, by those who wish to assert a ‘conspiratorial’ view of the Hizmet. 20

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itself as a Muslim organisation) and the focus of its activity (it is not interreligious, or even inter-cultural dialogue that are the focus, though these activities are also not excluded). One of the Society’s previous Executive Co-Directors, Ozcan Keles (a non-practising barrister of Turkish extraction who was born and brought up in the UK), says of the period when the Society was being set up that: I remember meetings we had in 1999 where we discussed the corporate identity of the soon-to-be Dialogue Society. We wanted it to be as inclusive as possible: to accommodate different types and forms of dialogue as well as dialogue about various themes and topics. Most importantly we wanted to allow room for the evolving and dynamic nature of dialogue and dialogue activities. We knew our work would involve inter-faith dialogue, but that in time it might also include other forms of dialogue. Our thinking on this was swayed by the dynamic nature of Hizmet’s practice (not aims or values) and the unsettled nature of dialogue: hence the name and logo.22

Between 1999 and 2007, the majority of the Society’s work focused on community dialogue and a significant part of that community dialogue was related to inter-faith activity. Events included both organising interfaith gatherings and also participating in, and supporting, inter-faith meetings organised by others. For example, over a period of three years, it organised an annual ‘Essential of Peace Conference’ which focused on the exploration of common themes and characteristics among the Prophets of the Abrahamic religions of Islam, Judaism and Christianity. Between 2004 and 2007, it also sponsored a large number of Whirling Dervishes events as well as fast-breaking dinners. The dinners took place in two modes: on the one hand hall-based events by invitation, and on the other, marquee events in city centres that were open to the public. Noah’s Pudding events were also organised, consisting on the one hand of formal events, and on the other of encouraging people to visit and give out Noah’s puddings to their neighbours. Inter-faith picnics were organised, along with various other forms of large and small community based projects, outreach and events. In the earlier period, detailed records were not kept of all of these events. However, more detailed information about many of them can now be found on the Dialogue Society website, by scrolling between 1999 and 2006-2007.23 Therefore the early phase of the Dialogue Society’s development was characterised by a lot of ‘grounded’ initiatives which could be highly evaluated in terms of local engagement, but were more limited in terms of broader impact. Thus Ozcan Keles says that ‘By 2008 we came to the realization that although we were doing a lot of community 22

These and other quotes from Keles are taken from interviews with him in JanuaryFebruary 2014. 23 See .

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work we needed to diversify our work to achieve greater impact.’ He also stated that: ‘we needed to focus on smaller events to prioritise their outcomes; we needed to build up organisational structure to become sustainable; and we needed to find forms of measuring outcomes.’ The international academic conference organised in 2007 on the movement24 was pivotal to these developments, with Keles explaining that ‘it enabled us for the first time to work together in one space as a team for an extended period of time.’ Keles goes on to explain that, since 2008, the Society has been focused on addressing the following questions: ‘What do we mean by dialogue? What are we trying to achieve? What is the best way and most meaningful way to achieve this? Who are our target audience? What are our dialogue principles, values and ethics? What is the next logical and incremental step of our work?’ The Society now organizes its work around three main fields: the academic field; the community field; and the policy outreach field. Keles comments on this that ‘In the next stage of its evolution there are plans for these foci of activity to become more identifiable ‘centres’ within the Dialogue Society. The intention of this development is to make the work of the Society both clearer to itself as well as to outsiders. In working to develop its activities, the Society has had the benefit of consistency in its leadership, with Ilknur Kahraman as co-Executive Director and Cem Erbil as Academic Director.’ As Keles says, ‘Because ‘dialogue’ is so elastic a term, defining and clarifying the work of a dialogue organisation is all the more important for establishing corporate identity and achieving targets.’ Indeed, the Society is concerned to do this not only for itself, but it also has the aim of clarifying (and perhaps also making more measurable) the wider field of dialogue. As a contribution to this it has initiated a number of projects aimed at establishing dialogue studies as a distinctive field. These include the initiation of a Dialogue School and the establishment of an MA in Dialogue Studies with the University of Keele;25 the publication of a book on Dialogue Theories;26 the 2013 foundation of a Journal of Dialogue Studies;27 the organisation of a Dialogue Theories 2 workshop in June 2014;28 and the planned establishment of an Institute for Dialogue Studies to give overall focus to all of these activities. 24

For papers from the conference, see Yılmaz (ed.) 2007a. See . 26 Weller (eds.) 2013. 27 See . 28 See . It will be produced as a second volume on Dialogue Theories. 25

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Engagements with Muslim Organisations and with Public Policy September 11th 2001 profoundly impacted upon on the work of many organisations involved in dialogue and on many Muslim or Musliminspired organisations. Therefore perhaps surprisingly, of 9/11 Keles says it did ‘not really impact’ on the Dialogue Society’s work. However, by contrast, the 7/7 London Transport bombings were different. At that time policy makers had experienced what the present author elsewhere calls the ‘social policy shock’ of suicide bombings being carried out by young Muslim men who had been brought up in British society and to all intents and purposes appeared to be well integrated members of it.29 Therefore in this period, Government and policy-makers were looking for partners from within the Muslim community who would clearly reject not only the bombings themselves but would also offer an alternative to the Jihadist ideology that had inspired them which the Government and policy-makers often constructed in terms of the notion of ‘radicalisation’. In this environment, the Society asked itself what it was doing in relation to these issues and whether it was doing enough. Of this period, Keles comments that: ‘since no policy maker really knew we existed, it made us think that in addition to doing all the grassroots work we were at the time, we needed to communicate that to the people responsible for shaping social policy.’ In starting to do so, however, the Society maintained its independence from government and, partly as a consequence, has only limited capacity to attempt such work which really only began from 2009 onwards. One important initiative that gave expression to this development was the publication of the booklet Deradicalization by Default.30 As its name suggests, this was an attempt to engage with policy concerns about radicalization by arguing that rather than attempting to tackle Jihadist and similar ideologies by arguing on grounds external to the Islamic tradition, it was important to do so by reference to an alternative logic and grammar from within Islam. This also relates to another strand of the Dialogue Society’s work – one which others who see it as sign of hope have often urged it to engage in more: namely its engagement with the wider Muslim community and with Muslim organisations. This is a matter on which a number of its Board of Advisors have challenged the Society at various points. But there is a complexity in 29

Weller 2008b. The Dialogue Society (2006), Deradicalization by Default: The Dialogue Approach to Rooting out Extremism, The Dialogue Society, London. Accessible free by download at: .

30

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the Society’s position in relation to this. In particular, to undertake collaboration with one or more Muslim organisations would raise the question for others of its alignment in relation to some of the tensions and fissures within the “Muslim world”, both globally and in the UK. It is also thought that it might reinforce an impression of the Society as an organisation defined by having a Muslim membership and ethos, which is something it has been at pains to try to avoid giving the impression of being. At the same time, another of the Hizmet-related organisations active in the UK is the ‘Anatolian Muslims Society’,31 which was founded in 2004 as a registered charity. In contrast to the other educational and dialogical initiatives outlined above, the name of this Hizmet-related organisation clearly locates both its ‘Turkishness’ and its ‘Muslimness’. Indeed, its charitable aims include those of supporting the British Muslim community through cultural and religious works and wider society through intercultural events and projects. It organises various activities and provides public seminars, vacation camps, trips, weekend schools and relief work. In 2009 – and perhaps unusually for a Hizmet-related organisation given the general injunction of Fethullah Gülen to build schools rather than more mosques – the Anatolian Muslims Society founded what was originally called the Mevlana Rumi Mosque and Community Centre, named in honour of the 13th  century Anatolian Sufi master, Mevlana Rumi. However, in due course it changed its name to the Mevlana Rumi Mosque (contemplation and learning centre for community), and by doing so it placed the focus more on its attempts to reinvigorate and facilitate the implementation of Rumi’s Islamic teachings of love, empathy, and engagement than on Rumi as an historic individual personality. In functioning as a mosque, the building aims to address the urgent need for quality services and education of the British Muslim community in London. However, distinctively, it simultaneously works as a centre for dialogue, proactively seeking to facilitate community cohesion at the grassroots of society and welcoming all, and approximately a thousand people use the Centre’s facilities each week. So, there are ways in which, via a division of labour among various Hizmet-related organisations, both the more distinctively Turkish and more specifically Muslim needs are addressed. But this is also always done in a way that opens out more broadly than a narrow communalist focus, while the Dialogue Society and its branches position themselves more broadly still. Nevertheless, the Dialogue Society has very importantly published

31

.

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a book Dialogue in Islam.32 On the one hand, this sets out what aspires to be an Islamic and Qur’ānic rationale for engaging in dialogue, including inter-religious dialogue; and on the other hand, it attempts a serious exegetical and hermeneutical engagement with texts in the Qur’ān which, through either aspects of their traditional or more recent interpretation, have presented difficulties and stumbling blocks to dialogue, both for Muslims and for other than Muslims. In addition, three of the ten “community manuals”33 also specifically addressed Muslims in relation to dialogue. Beyond publications, in 2012, the Dialogue Society convened a quite significant “roundtable” discussion between the Royal Air Force Marshall and Muslim communities,34 while in 2013, all the Society’s Connecting Communities Circle activities were with non-Turkish Muslim community groups (from the Somali, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Arab communities). Finally, another Hizmet-related initiative of a different kind than that of the more specifically educationally and dialogically focused initiatives discussed above is that of Weekly Zaman newspaper.35 Launched in 2011, it aims to bring quality news stories and analysis to its readers and to encourage debate and reflection through high-quality journalism. In doing this it covers UK national news, and also reports on important developments in the world of business, culture and international affairs. At the same time, it seeks to provide some coverage for local stories and items that are otherwise often overlooked by other national papers. Translated literally from Turkish, zaman means “time” or “era.” Weekly Zaman is the sister publication of Today’s Zaman, which is Turkey’s highest-circulating English-language daily. Based in London, Weekly Zaman aims to emulate the success of its Turkish sister newspaper, itself only launched in 2007, and it is currently distributed across the country to a growing number of subscribers and has recently gone in sale in newsagents across the country. Like the Daily Zaman, the Weekly Zaman is available not only through a print edition, but has an on-line edition on its website while embracing advances in digital and social media through which it currently has plans further to engage with its readership.

32

Kurucan and Kasim Erol 2012. See for further details on, and also downloadable access to these manuals. 34 See . 35 See . 33

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Initiatives, Identity and Inspiration An issue running throughout this chapter’s description and discussion of Hizmet-related initiatives in the UK has been the question of how best to articulate, both for themselves and for others, the nature of relationship between these initiatives and the person and/or example and teaching of Fethullah Gülen without such articulations leading to potential misunderstandings about the nature of these. In relation to this, a number of scholars have attempted to use terminology other than that of the ‘Gülen Movement’ which may imply a centralised and directed organisation rather than a more dynamic and organic set of initiatives having relationship with each other in terms of mutual learning and stimulation, but also independence of developmental emphases. The present author has therefore, for example, written about ‘Gülen-inspired initiatives’. However in Keles’ view, this can also be a misleading term in that ‘it can give the impression that a person reads a book by Gülen and becomes inspired.’ Rather than providing an answer to this conundrum that would itself also likely be simplistic, Keles points to a number of dimensions of how inspiration can work, as follows: ‘as impetus: in other words that one should get up and do something, being responsible as a human being; as a general framework – that what one does should be of value to the society in which one lives; in terms of general principles – that work that one does should be based on certain inclusive positive and proactive principles’. Keles further explains, While there is no single way of being inspired, example and practice is key; whether it is the teachings infused with the example of commitment and emotion as demonstrated in Gülen’s sermons or the example and practice demonstrated by Hizmet collectively or a Hizmet participant individually. While many people may first have come in touch with Gülen’s ‘practice infused teachings’, many others may have come in touch with the example and practice before recognising the source of the teaching behind it.

In relation to the history and development of the Hizmet in the UK this chapter can make only a preliminary contribution to a story that remains to be told in a fuller and more detailed way, especially with regard to those parts of the UK beyond England. Nevertheless, what is clear from what has been outlined and discussed in this chapter is that the varied manifestations of Hizmet have formed part of what could be called both a patterned but also a differentiated picture: patterned because of the typical focus of these organisations on matters of either education or dialogue, but differentiated because from the descriptions and discussions of each of the organisations it is clear that there is no single absolute organisational blueprint that exists to 250

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be rolled out. Given the relationship of Hizmet initiatives to the values that underlie and inspire them, but also the commitment to engage with local contexts, in relation to the descriptions and discussions of Hizmetrelated initiatives in other chapters of this book, it is likely that one can expect also similar patterns and differentiations, but specifically inflected according to each national context.

Postscript A significant development occurred just before going to print, and on which it has seemed important to report here. This is in the form of the launch of a consortium network bringing together a range of Hizmetrelated organisations and which, on its website36 is described as being ‘founded by Hizmet-inspired people… in Britain.’ The consortium is called ‘VOICES in Britain’, with VOICES being an acronym for Voluntary Organisations to Inspire, Connect, Empower and Serve. The network’s motto is ‘inspiring individuals, connecting communities and serving society’. In many ways this aptly describes its (and indeed even Hizmet’s) work through use of a number of key terms already used in this chapter such as ‘inspire’, ‘connect’ (dialogue) and ‘serve’ which is the Turkish translation for ‘hizmet’. According to its website, the aim of VOICES is to ‘…assist its members by (i) streamlining output through the sharing of best practice and ideas, and (ii) building capacity through specialist support and training’ in order to ‘…serve society in Britain.’ Currently it includes seven member organisations, although it is the author's understanding is that more are expected to join. This is the first time that Hizmet-inspired organisations with different areas of focus have publicly come together around the common denominator of Hizmet. What is more, although in some other countries there are a number of Hizmet-related networks, to my knowledge, VOICES in Britain is the first national network that specifically identifies itself as being ‘Hizmetinspired’.

36



See http://www.voicesinbritain.net/. 251

Turkish Schools and More Hizmet Networks in the Balkans Bekir Çınar In the beginning of the 20th Century most of the Balkan countries wanted to establish their political, economic, cultural and educational system independently. However, World War I and World War II as well as the Cold War did not allow them to achieve their goal. After the Cold War, these Balkan countries tried to re-establish their political, economic, cultural and educational system once more. Since then, they have been trying to do so. This period is called transition, which is “a relatively new term in the area of social sciences and includes the processes of pluralisation and democratization in former socialist countries.”1 During this period they have met with Hizmet networks. This chapter is about Hizmet networks in some Balkan countries; namely, Romania, Kosovo, Bosnia, and (mostly) Albania. The other countries in the Balkans are not included in this study in detail, because the required data on these countries have not been collected, but if it is necessary, the study will include some information when and where appropriate. Because of the working place of the author we will write more extensively about Albania.

Hizmet in Four Countries of the Balkans Hizmet network and the Balkan countries have met during the transitional period, because in this period these countries have introduced a politics of openness. As a result of these policies, people from each of the countries began visiting their neighbours in order to search for possible economic and other opportunities. These visits gave them an opportunity to find out what each country needs from each of them and what kind of investments and trade is carried out. People from the Hizmet network saw that there was a need to establish schools and educational institutions in these countries.

1

Lorena, 2010: 244. An interesting critical website is, , after Transitions Online or TOL.

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In 1991, a small mission from Turkey, some of whom had closer links with the Hizmet network, came to Albania to search for possible investment and trade opportunities, and to identify the social, economic and politic conditions of the country. It is clear that “Albania started the transition process long after other centrally planned economies … it had a more problematic and difficult transition period compared to other former communist countries.”2 In other words, the economic, social and political conditions of Albania were not good and not favourable. Therefore, people who came to Albania for business returned without much hope. However, people who came for establishing educational institutions returned to Turkey with a lot of hope and courage. After their return to Turkey, they visited various businessmen in order to find enough capital to establish a school in Tirana. When they, to some extent, had secured the required capital, they came back to Tirana. Then they visited the officials, in order to receive permission to start an institution. After that they tried to find a place to open a school. These people established a company, called “Educational Foundation Gülistan” which signed a protocol with the Ministry of Education and Science of Albania in August 1992.3 The first school was opened by the President, Turgut Özal, on 19 February 1993. The school was named Kolegji Mehmet Akif.4 Since then, similar types of schools including nurseries and boys’ and girls’ schools have continued opening in Tirana and other cities of Albania. Currently, there are two organisations, namely Gülistan and Turgut Özal Education Company that own 15 educational institutions including Epoka University and have approximately 4,000 students from kindergarten to 12th grade.5 Below we will elaborate more on these Albanian schools. After the collapse of the communist regime in Romania, many Turkish entrepreneurs had come to Romania; nearly all of them had opened bakery shops. In 1993, a group of teachers visited people from the educational authority in Constanta, a city closer to Turkey where there are ethnic Turks, and informed them that they wanted to open a school. Initially, it was confusing and surprising. After a lengthy discussion and negotiation, the teachers set up an educational company, Lumina Educational Institutions Foundation, which has opened the first 2



Çaro & Wissen, 2007: 89. Gülistan has no connection with the name or person of Fethullah Gülen. It means in Persian ‘Rose Garden’ and is from a poem of the famous Persian poet Muslah adDīn Sa’dī from Shirazi (1184-1292). It is well known also in the Turkish Muslim community. 4 , retrieved July 13, 2013. 5 : , retrieved July 13, 2013. 3

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private high school in Romania, namely The International Computer High School of Constanta in 1994. This school was different from the schools usually opened by the Hizmet network in other places. It was a computer high school. Due to the success of this school, the foundation has opened another International Computer High School in 1995 and International School in 1996 in Bucharest. Since then, other secondary and primary schools and nurseries have been opened in the same and other cities. The foundation has opened a university, namely the University of South-East Europe Lumina in 2010. It aims to provide ‘in a necessary continuity, the excellence standards needed to assure quality in higher education, and aiming to create an institutional model that promotes excellence, its authors and its beneficiaries’.6 There are three important developments in Romania where the Hizmet network carries out quite successfully activities that are different from those in other places. One of them is the ‘Lumina Math’ national contest. Each year around fifty thousand students participate in this contest. The successful students are given opportunity to spend some time in Turkey. The second is the international project competition ‘InfoMatrix’. The third is the ‘international exhibition’ with participation from all embassies to Romania. Each year the International School that has students from 46 different national countries organises this activity and nearly all embassies to Romania take part in it. To some extent, Romanian ‘united nations’ gather at this event and share their cultures and hospitalities which help toward having a better, peaceful world. Therefore, all these activities are well recognised by national and international institutions, some of them sponsor the event and some use the event as a medium to communicate with others.7 The Bosnian case is slightly different from these two countries, because the transition period began with a civil war and ethnic cleansing. In 1994, there were seven people in Turkey who wanted to open schools and help youth who had difficulties in continuing their education in Bosnia due to the war. They went first to Zagreb, the capital city of Croatia, where it was much safer than Sarajevo at that time. They stayed there about three months. During this time they learned the language. Then they moved to Sarajevo. There was war and it was difficult to open a school. These people stayed in Sarajevo and convinced many students (families) to going to Turkey and continue their education in Turkey. The Hizmet network in Turkey helped these students and allocated them into appropriate schools. 6

. Retrieved October 2, 2013. 7 .

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After the war ended in November 1995, these people tried to convince the Bosnian authority to open schools. But it was difficult at that time. Then the Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF), founded in 1994, intervened in the dialogue between the Bosnian educational authority and these teachers. On 19 September 1995 the Foundation organised a football match in Istanbul between the Turkish National Football team and a ‘World Team’ (combining well known players from around the world) in order to collect money for the school and for Bosnian children. Fethullah Gülen and Diego Maradona, the Argentine football player, watched this match together. After this event, the Bosnian authority signed a bilateral protocol with the Foundation and the first school was opened in 1997 in one of the buildings which Serbians had used as headquarters during the war. There was another interesting development in the Bosnian case. Students who had enrolled to study at this school had to spent their first year in Turkey where they were educated at various private schools, due to the refurbishment of the school buildings in Sarajevo. When the school was opened in 1997, the second year and the first year students started together. There were about 150 students at that moment. In 1998, the governor of Bihac invited Turkish people to open a school in his city and gave two buildings to them. After the refurbishment of these buildings, two schools, one for boys; the other for girls, opened in this city. In 1999, Bosna Sema, an institution which has a character between a company and a charity, was established and the Journalists and Writers Foundation handed over all its interests and ownership to this institution. Since then the Hizmet network operates under this name in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Sema became owner of its first property in 2004. Until this time all the school buildings were rented. According to Sema’s home page, its identity is formulated as follows: BosnaSema educational institutions are privately owned institutions covering the area of upbringing and education, based in Sarajevo. It was established in 1998, with the main aim to assist and support the educational system of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within the work of their institutions, BosnaSema has been giving special attention to extra curriculum activities and all with the purpose of preserving the historic and cultural heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has been defined by the Contract of Establishment of BosnaSema that the founders would establish the institutions which would furthermore continue to open pre-school institutions, elementary schools, high schools, colleges and universities and which would coordinate their activities. During its work, BosnaSema has founded 15 educational institutions.8 8

From Bosna Sema Educational Institutions: , retrieved July 13, 2013.

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These educational institutions include a university too. The number of students is not higher than the Albanian number. In Bosnia there is more emphasis on a mix of Muslim and Christian students and a climate of interreligious reconciliation in the schools, because of the violent history of the 1990s. The case of Kosovo has some kind of similarity with Bosnia, because the transition in Kosovo began with a civil war and years of unrest. When the country became somewhat stable in the year 2000, Gülistan Educational Company established the first school. On their homepage, this information is given: Mehmet Akif College is founded on February 2000 by a group of parents and educators to contribute to the education of Kosovo. Mehmet Akif College offers a challenging education to students focusing both on academic achievement and personal growth, regardless of religion, race, nationality or sex. More than 90% of the graduating seniors enter universities and institutions of higher learning worldwide. Mehmet Akif College seeks to foster an atmosphere conducive to personal growth which it pursues with vigour not only within, but also outside the classroom through a variety of other activities, clubs, sports, and field trips. Mehmet Akif College is committed to a quality of education which fosters international understanding and friendship, and which provides students with a clear sense and understanding of humane and democratic values. A strong academic program, centred on the traditional core disciplines, prepares students for entrance into universities, or other institutions providing tertiary education.9

The information mentioned above shows that people from the Hizmet network came to these countries initially not to open a school, but to find out what people in these countries desperately needed. After their careful assessment, they concluded that people in these countries need educational institutions, because these were lacking. Then they learned how to open a school in these countries. Then they established an educational company which owns the schools and other educational institutions. There is a demand in the education sector of these countries and the Hizmet network supplies new schools when they find enough sponsors. After this brief historical background of three new countries, the next section will provide more detailed information on the Hizmet network in Albania.

Educational Institutions in Albania Since 19th of February 1993, the Hizmet network has run schools in Albania. If one accepts that a single 20 years is enough to identify 9

.

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a generation, there is enough time to estimate that one generation of the schools has been completed. In other words, the first generation of students in these schools, not only sends their children to these schools, but also some of the graduates of these schools work at these schools as teachers, administrators or in other roles. Here, there is no need to talk about the number of schools and the number of graduates, because these are not so important. The important thing here is what kind of changes these institutions have effectuated in their students in particular and for the people of Albania in general. Therefore, this study focuses on this main point. In February 1993, Kolegji Mehmet Akif opened in Tirana with only a few students, combining boys and girls. Before the end of the year, the boys were moved to another building and the girls stayed at the original school building. Both schools have boarding facilities which welcome students from other cities apart from Tirana. The schools were new in terms of many features. First, they were opened by Turkish volunteers and sponsors. Secondly, they were free for all. Thirdly, they had new technologies and facilities such as tables, desks, chairs, boards and teachers. English was introduced as one of the main mediums for teaching alongside Albanian. The Turkish language was not introduced as one of compulsory subjects, but it was an elective. Characteristics of directors, teachers and mentors of the schools were completely different from the traditional characteristics of these professionals. They went to find students for these schools from all over Albania. Then all these students took an exam in order to win free schooling. With the condition that they passed the exams, they would have four years’ free schooling and boarding. From among the students who spent four years in these schools, some went to Turkey for further education and some went to other countries for the same purpose. The rest of them went to universities in Albania. It seems that none of them cut their links with these schools. After completing their university education, some of these students came back to these schools for work. In other words, within eight years, former students began working at these schools as teachers and administrators. Some have married other graduates from these schools. Now, some of them have children who are about 10 years old. Others may have married other girls or boys from Turkey and Albania, introducing their schools to their husbands, wives and extended families. All this helps the schools to become a phenomenon in education. Now, there is a huge demand for these schools and the companies have difficulties in meeting these demands. Not only is the size of the schools is getting larger but also the number of students is increasing every year. 258

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In Albania, the Hizmet network runs educational institutions from kindergarten to university, not because they want to establish these institutions but the demands force them to do so. In future, the Hizmet network would open more schools in other cities in order to meet these demands. The quality of education has always been maintained throughout the years. If one looks at the curricula of these schools, there is not much difference from the other public school curricula in Albania. It is a fact that there are some changes and some additions to the national curricula of Albania. However, the quality of this education does not come from the curricula, but it depends from the way the curricula are implemented. This includes the building, the class size in terms of students and physical size, equipment, technology and teachers. All these are important and the schools do not compromise on any of them. Further, the schools encourage the family to be involved in the education of their children. The schools give regular verbal and written reports to the families and, from time to time, provide updated information on their child’s progress. Another feature of these schools is that they encourage students to take part in extra curricula activities including annual scientific fairs, trips and summer break activities. A final feature of these schools is discipline. The discipline in these schools is very important. All staff members of the schools work to achieve a desired level of discipline. None use any physical restraints or verbal abuse. However, they all use love and compassion in order to discipline the students. Rewards and punishments are part of the discipline in every school, but in these schools, the punishment is not physical. For further clarification, I have asked ten questions of graduates of these schools. Their responses are explanatory as well as giving important information on the schools. These are the questions: 1. When did you start at the Turkish Colleges, and where? 2. Why did you choose to go to the Turkish Colleges? What was your expectation? 3. What kind of information did you have before going into the selection examination? 4. How were your parents’ reactions to Turkish Colleges? 5. If you have stayed at the students’ dormitory, what was your fist reaction? 6. What is the main difference between these schools from the other private and public schools? 7. What is discipline? How were you disciplined during your study at these schools, and dormitories? 8. What is your the best memory and the worst memory about these schools? 9. How much did these schools influence you? 10. What kind of role did these schools have in your countries future?

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The respondents attended these schools in different periods. One of them started in 1994, another one started in 2006. Therefore, all of them have either graduated from university or are at university. It is important to note that they were from different schools, namely, Tirana, Pristina, Shkoder and Macedonia. Their responses to the questions were not very much different. Nearly all of the statements show great similarities. For example, Question 2 was responded by the students as follows: * The first private school in Albania at that time and the impression was that these would be the best schools, the education was in English. I had good expectations even though there was no data since no one had graduated yet. * I had a lot of relatives in Turkish college, and they all flattered the system of teaching and discipline of the school. My expectations were closer to the words I heard; I was very pleased to be a student of Turkish college. * I went there because of my father’s desire for better education also the staff was kind and good friendship. * The Turkish College was considered the best high school in my city. I expected an environment of high competition among students and international education with high focus on science and foreign languages. * It was the best known school at the time. * No special reason. I found it quite interesting studying in English. * Because of high education, and to learn English language. * My parents thought that Turkish schools in Albania were the only schools who offered the best education to the students. My expectations as a student of course were high. I expected to find a prepared staff of teachers and good conditions of the school. * Compared to the other schools Turkish Colleges were the best ones. All the students coming out from the colleges were well prepared and could enter in very good universities. So I hoped to be one of them.

Responses to the other questions were to some extent similar. For example, Question 3: * That it was a private school that had one year elementary school in English and Turkish and that all lectures were conducted in English. * My parents had some information about the examination, the way that it was made and what should I have been studying. In other words, I knew the subjects that were involved at the exam. * I knew that there was like 90 schools in different countries. * I didn’t have much information apart from what my Dad told about the difficulty of that school. * I don’t remember properly, but after the civil war in Albania it looked safer than the others. 260

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* I had seen previous examinations earlier. * Just that they are successful in the entire world. * My parents thought that Turkish schools in Albania were the only schools who offered the best education to the students. My expectations as a student of course were high. I expected to find a prepared staff of teachers and good conditions of the school. * I did not have much information indeed. I participated in a competition organised by the college. When I went in there I liked it, and for this reason I applied for the exam.

The mission of the schools has been formulated as follows: “To provide education that implements the principles of dialogue and tolerance in every aspect of life in order to create a human being that both practices and becomes a representative of these principles, respecting other human beings as well as helping the world to evolve into a place where people live in happiness.” Besides a ‘mission’ also a long term goal or ‘vision’ has been formulated: Nurturing ‘idealist youths’ that have a proper education and training in the schools. These students should respect everyone who has different beliefs and views on any matter. The students should be good citizens of Albania who respect the law and order and accept contemporary democratic norms. They love their country and represent Albania on every level of the society and international community. The schools nurture an intellectual future generation. Further, the schools enhance the historical relationship between Albanian and Turkish communities.10

The schools in Albania teach four and use three languages in their teaching; these are English, Turkish and Albanian. Every student spends the first year at these schools learning Turkish and English. After they have completed successfully, they spend the next three years at these school for completing their high school (lysee) education. Initially these schools were free of charge. Over time, due to the economic developments of Albania, the schools ask some kind of financial contributions from students in order to meet their expenses. Currently, at least 30% of the students are given an education bursary, which cover the school and dormitory fees. Nearly all of the students who come from other cities, towns and villages stay at the dormitories free of charge.11 10

. Krauthamer 2012 mentions the strong difference between madrasas that are free and the tuition for the Memorial International school of Tirana from € 3,000 up to € 5,750 for grades 10 to 12.

11

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These schools are very successful when compared with other private and public schools in Albania. In addition, these schools participate in various national and international scientific Olympiads. They have been taking part in theses Olympiads since 1996 and every year since their students have been awarded gold, silver and bronze medals. The individual graduates of these schools are successful too. By 2013 Mehmet Akif Colleges held 21 graduation ceremonies; Hasan Riza Pasha College held 10 graduation ceremonies; Turgut Özal College held 13 graduation ceremonies; Turgut Özal College in Durres and Memorial International School in Tiran held 5 graduation ceremonies. So far more than 3,000 students have graduated from these schools and have gone on to study at universities across 26 different countries. The top destinations for these students are Turkey, around 500 students; Italy, 350 students; the USA, 220 students; Britain, 120 students and Germany, 100 students. These results clearly indicate that these schools not only provide education at international standards but they also recruit students who have been offered places at many western universities.

The Sema Foundation of Albania and Madrasa In the last decades the Albanian government has reassumed the Ottoman system of recognising chiefs of the various religious communities. Religious education has also been made possible, but the infrastructure is still very weak, because Albania was probably the most strongly atheist country in the second half of the 20th century. It is divided along the four major denominations of the country: Sunni and Bektashi Muslims, Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christians. Religious education seems to be still rather modest, but there is a special system for the Sunni Muslims in secondary schools, resembling the Imam Khatib Lysee of Turkey where training for Imams (with much attention to Muslim rituals, chanting of the Qur’an, study of Arabic, Islamic law and history) is given besides secular education. The supervision for this type of school was initially set up by Middle East Salafi Muslims, but after 11 September 2001 it has been given to the Gülen community of Albania. The Gülen people consider this as temporary, because they like to consider secular education as the norm for Fethullah Gülen, but the special condition of Albania and the lack of a proper alternative has made this now also a temporary duty of the Hizmet dedication.12 After the collapse of the communist regime in Albania, various Muslim group who came to Albania from a number of Muslim countries 12

Gülen is quoted as having said that “building a school is more virtuous than building a mosque and building a normal (secular) school is more virtuous than building an Imam Hatip School”, Özdalga 2000: 89. See for this section also Krauthamer 2012.

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reopened Albanian madrasas, mosques and other centres because there were not enough local Islamic educational facilities. There was a concern and demand for Islamic education of the growing number of young people in Albania. These young people were convinced by the newcomers to travel abroad to receive higher Islamic education.13 It is not very clear whether these youths have got that ‘higher Islamic education’ yet. This new development caused many problems among Albanian Muslims. In March 2004, the Albanian Islamic Community elected a new leader, Mufti Selim Muca.14 After his election, the AIC name has been changed to that of Albanian Muslim Community (AMC). There was a very important debate within the AMC about which Islamic school system would be adopted. The Salafi members in the community insisted that their tradition would be adopted and they were the majority in the AMC. However, Article 2 of the Constitution of the Muslim Community clearly stipulates that the Hanafi line is leading in the Albanian tradition. Consequently, the AMC decided to follow their constitution. After the events of 9/11, some of the sponsors of these madrasas were linked with international terrorist organisations. They were then forced to leave the country and these institutions were abandoned due to the lack of resources and other means. It was apparent that the AMC had difficulty to run these schools. Consequently, the developments lead the AMC to make an official request to the Sema Foundation, the Albanian education organisation backed by Turkish investors, to operate the madrasa in 2005.15 The Foundation has an official agreement with the government’s agency in order to run the madrasas. This Foundation is not exactly a part of the Hizmet network, but it is not really separated from the Hizmet network either. The Foundation is sponsored by many businessmen, educators and managers who might have been influenced by Gülen’s teaching, who are Turkish and Albanian investors. After the Sema Foundation became a partner of the AMC, this Foundation has changed the curriculum and physical setting of the madrasas, refurbished the buildings and brought many teachers who have a nationally and internationally recognised teacher certificate (diploma).16 For example, some people even state that ‘Tirana’s madrasa – coeducational, with a curriculum heavy on English, science, and computer skills, and with a few Christian students among the Muslim majority – does not fit the 13

Vickers 2008: 10. Vickers 2008: 6. The Albanian Muslim Community has been established as a formal institution, recognised by the government, on 13 January 2003. 15 Krauthamer 2012. 16 Further information can be obtained from: [accessed on 4 October 2013]. 14

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standard image of a Muslim school. But then Islam in Albania, like the country itself, stands apart in many ways.’17 It is important to note that Albanian madrasas do not fit the standard image of any kind of religious school. They are to some extend a contemporary school providing Islamic subjects in addition. The Muslim Community of Albania and the Sema Foundation operate six madrasas and one university in Albania. In 2005, at the opening ceremony, the head of Albania’s Muslim community, Haxhi Selim Muca, said that Islam is not a religion of violence and destruction, but a religion of faith and knowledge. Albania’s then Premier Fatos Nano said at the 2005 announcement for approving the university’s budget, We have to put an end to the import-export of theological students with the Arab countries, and instead create a university that prepares leaders who will guide our local communities in the Albanian cultural tradition of tolerance and respect for other faiths.18

Conclusion It is clear that the Hizmet network has provided great amount of service, including economic, social and cultural gains for these countries. Initially, Hizmet network opened a school and later on this school became a kind of central power station for people and educators in order to provide education which is aimed to nurture a better human being who loves peace, tolerance, harmony and help. Educational levels of these countries are getting higher and higher because of Hizmet network’s institutions. More students went/go abroad for further studies and come back to their countries to help their countries’ economic, social, cultural and political developments. These people have not only have better personality, but also they have better education and vision in order to help their countries. Nearly all students are happier having education and training from Hizmet network’s schools. They are in contact with these institutions and some of them are working for them. They are now running these institutions. Each year a new institution starts serving the public. The number of students is increasing. There is a huge competition among the students for a place in these schools. Most of the public are aware of these schools and they want to send their children to them. The last twenty years of the Hizmet network has proved that they are in these countries for the public benefit and they do not promote “Turkishness” or any other “ideologies.” They are blind to all religions, 17

Krauthamer 2012. .

18

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ideologies and other kinds of political movement. They are Muslim to be sure, because they are sincerely living in Islam. However they are not promoting Islam. They promote humanity, trustworthiness, love, peace, tolerance, ethical and moral codes and help. All these would generate islands of peace in these countries. It seems that Hizmet network will continue to serve in these countries for the public for many years to come. There is a demand and Hizmet network would meet this demand with peace and prosperity.

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Concluding Reflections Gürkan Çelİk, Johan Leman and Karel Steenbrink In this final chapter we collect conclusions and reflections about the general character of the Gülen Movement (first section) and more specifically about its priorities and organisational model in various European countries (second section). Like the movement itself, these reflections are still disparate and fragmented. They also reveal many uncertainties and quite often end in questions. It is necessary to formulate provisional conclusions, but also to identify the important fields for further research, especially in this study of contemporary developments. The title of this book suggests that an existing Gülen Movement had made some kind of expansion or extension into European countries since the 1980s. This book explores the different contexts of the European branches of the Turkish initiative and the changing focus and activities of European sympathisers of the movement. In the final analysis, however, we also have to take into account the European character of Turkish Islam as different from the two other heartland cultures, the Arab countries and Iran. The Ottoman Empire and its successor since 1923, the Kemalist Republic in Turkey, participated in European culture in various ways. Although the Arabs and Persians had their periods of less fervent Muslim enthusiasm (the dreams of the preIslamic empire of the Shah, the socialism of Nasser and Bourguiba), Kemalist secularism had a more outspoken European inspiration. When reflecting on the Gülen Movement, in comparison with developments in the Arab and Iranian world, we should take this European influence into account. In the German weekly Der Spiegel, Fethullah Gülen was compared to Mahatma Gandhi. The weekly reports that ‘Fethullah Gülen likes to present himself as the Gandhi of Islam.’1 No references are given and until now we could not find such a reference in the writings of the leader himself. Non-violence, and the power of truth is indicated sometimes as the basis for this comparison.2 There may be more grounds for this 1



2

Der Spiegel, 8 August 2012. There is a paper on Gülen and Gandhi, presented at the Washington DC Conference (Georgetown University, 14-15 November 2008) by Mustafa Gurbuz, and Bandana

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comparison. One issue is that Gandhi did not establish a solid organisation, but launched important ideas about the independence of his nation, emancipation from colonialism, peaceful strategies for achieving these goals, and the equality of all people, notwithstanding race, social class or even religion. After his death there was no true successor to Gandhi and the same may be expected for the follow-up after Gülen. The scattered pattern of the many Gülen-related or inspired organisations and activities only confirms this image and perspective. While working on the European expansion of the Gülen community, we saw that in various countries some kind of national central organisation has begun: Fedactio in Belgium, for a short period Umned in the Netherlands, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Hizmet in Germany. These federations began with the business people (Belgium), the educational centres (Netherlands) or the dialogue centres (Germany). In Turkey itself the Writers and Journalists Foundation, the Akademi in Istanbul, Zaman, Samanyolu Broadcasting Group, Kaynak Culture Publishing Group, Kimse Yok Mu Association or FEM Dershaneleri seem to be central institutions. We may question whether the movement will be fragmented into sub-communities or if there will there be a continuing and founding body after the loss of Fethullah Gülen? What will be the leading activity in this? From Chapter Nine, on the (lack of) integration of Muslims in Germany, one may doubt whether the (self-)image of Muslims in the countries of Western Europe is indeed often so negative, dominated by conflict and mutual prejudice? Actually, this chapter is describing in more detail the experience that Fethullah Gülen must have had in Germany in 1977, when he did not have a pure religious solution for the migrant Turkish Muslims, but insisted on a realisation of their concrete situation as first generation migrants who had to establish a better future in their new homeland. This resembles the mission of Tariq Ramadan for the Muslim youth in France. Born in a well-to-do family with a great pride in their ancestry (exiles from Egypt where his grandfather Hassan al-Banna had been killed by the instruments of the colonial government) Ramadan saw the spiritual, cultural and economic poverty of the youths of Arab origin in France. Integration or assimilation and the prospect of a better economic future are not enough: migrants should also have a cultural and spiritual home. Ramadan called these youths not only illiterate, but also people without a knowledge of their own or any culture and spirituality. Ramadan sees Purkayastha. See: , accessed 2 August 2013. The similarities are here described as a faith in truth as a transforming power, in non-violence, in moral performance as the way to fight ‘the enemy’. In Gülen’s terminology ‘the enemy’ is the trio of ‘ignorance, poverty, and disunity’ and not a well defined group of people.

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his preaching of the basic elements of Islam as his mission. He wants to give this group a stronger spiritual and cultural background, something to be proud of. What we notice about Gülen-inspired activities in European countries is that the Muslim and Turkish heritage plays a less important role, although the organisation always starts with a coherent group of people of Turkish and Muslim descent. This seems to be some kind of an inborn contradiction in these activities: based on a positive reappraisal of Muslim and Turkish legacy, but also with an openness to Westerners who do not immediately share this cultural and spiritual tradition. A frequent debate in all publications about the Gülen Movement is the lack of a formal organisational structure. There are no membership cards, because of the lack of a real membership structure. The estimate of the number of ‘sympathisers’ or ‘affiliates’ is therefore also closely related to the definition of the various terminologies. Criticism of the movement states that the ‘leader’ has ‘followers’ who more or less blindly obey the commands or even suggestions of their inspirer. Terminology is quite important in this discussion. In the last decade the word hizmet has been more and more used for the dedication of the ‘volunteer movement’. Volunteers are working in non-profit activities in favour of their ‘clients’, people who benefit from the activities. This dichotomy or rather delicate relationship between giver and receiver, can be important for the description of the character of the movement. In European countries the Gülen volunteers are givers, they offer schooling, courses, housing and boarding, advice, publications. As a ‘byproduct’ they also preach the high ethics and Islamic imbedding of their ideals. The receivers may have a different outlook for their philosophy of life and way of living. In this respect, it is interesting to note that in Europe the Hizmet movement operates alongside the civil society structures and using the Turkish population immigrated from Turkey to different European countries. Today, several millions of Turks from all walks of life and outlooks are living in Western Europe. It is not only simple volunteer work that we see in the movement. Much of what is done by the Gülen people is professional work: teaching, journalism, the organisation of assistance for children’s homework, the integration of courses. Much more than in Turkey, the volunteers in Western Europe have found access to government funds for these activities. In the United States the facility of the Charter Schools (public funding but operated privately) proved to be a very suitable concept for the Gülen people. In the USA this practice started in general society only in the late 1980s and has since spread to most, but not all, states. The Gülen people joined here in the late 1990s. In some European countries a much older system of church-related private schools had already existed for more than a century. In Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, the 269

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movement could profit from these regulations, but here it was religiously neutral schools that could fit within this system. In France this possibility was not present and the schools there depend greatly on high fees and donations. In fact the schools are quite important institutions and much money, and also many salaries, is involved. While mosque imams usually receive very low salaries in Europe, professionals in the Gülen schools, working on courses for integration and giving assistance with homework can make a good living. The Netherlands has already had a long and turbulent history of Islamic Broadcasting, financed by public funds. Between 1993 and 2009 a small series of Muslim Broadcasting Companies suffered from corruption and animosity between the various sections of the Muslim communities, partly because it was one of the largest Muslim institutions in the country with about twenty well paid jobs. As mentioned in Chapter Ten, the state financed Muslim schools also suffered from the tension between idealism and the large sums of money that are available for good education. Personal observations and interviews with teachers of Gülen schools in Turkey taught us that low salaries for staff, in combination with expensive prestigious buildings and high school fees, may cause conflict and make it necessary for good willing teachers to look for better paid jobs elsewhere. One may expect that such conflicts of interest might also arise in the larger institutions in Europe, notwithstanding the high ideals preached within the movement. “Golden generation” is an important concept in the movement’s educational activities. It is therefore interesting to note to what extent the schools of the Gülen Movement have been successful in educating and nurturing such a “golden generation.” Further research is needed to answer this question. In the debate about the Fethullah Gülen’s style of Islam, the terminology of ‘the Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ has been used for a Sunni style of Islam with some mystical inclinations, using classical Turkish sources like Yunus Emre and Maulana Rumi of Koina, conferring pride and praise to the Turkish Islamic past. This terminology, however, suggests more unity than there is in reality. Alevi Muslims are excluded from this ‘Turkish legacy’ and even denied a Muslim identity, although they also cherish the memory of Emre and Rumi. The more secular branch of Turkish society, where the heritage of the modernising Kemalist stream has stronger influence, also thinks differently about this kind of a glorious inheritance and sometimes has quite negative feelings about the Ottoman period.3 3



A quite polemical presentation of this debate has been written by Ahmed Akgündüz, working since 2003 as rector of IUR, the Islamic University of Rotterdam. He is a sympathiser of Said Nursi, but not really of Fethullah Gülen. See Akgündüz, and Öztürk 2011.

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In this respect it is quite interesting to note that public distrust about the Gülen Movement in European countries always has its source among Turkish migrants who oppose his influence. They formulate an ‘X-factor’ or the ‘unknown agenda’ of Gülen for the future of Turkey and the political role of Islam. It would be interesting to undertake more research on the image of Turkey’s past and present among Turkish migrants and the children of this group in Europe. It would also be useful to investigate whether the widespread fear of the influence of Gülen is related only to some kind of revolution or drastic change in Turkey itself, or if it would also have consequences for European countries. The words ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ can be seen as a delicate terminology. Europeans easily identify Islam and Muslim with religious persons or ideas, with a religious affiliation, something that a person can accept, acquire or reject. In Muslim cultures, such as traditional Turkish Ottoman society, people were designated by religious-cum-ethnic identities. Georgians, Armenians, Greek, French citizens were automatically also Christian, and as such subject to specific rules for marriages, taxes, burials, property regulations. These Ottoman citizens could not change their ethnic identity. One was born a Georgian, Armenian, Turk, or Frenchman, and this could not be denied or really changed. The same is true in the case of religious identities in contemporary Muslim cultures. The question of the ‘secularization’ of Gülen people in Europe must therefore be discussed from this perspective. People in Muslim cultures may act irreligiously, in the sense that they do not stick to ‘official’ Muslim rules, do not pray, do not bother about religious identities, but most often without openly leaving their religion: that would be apostasy which has a very negative meaning, more or less the equivalent of desertion from an army. In formal shari’a jurisprudence punishment is the same as for desertion: the death penalty. As long as there is no formal apostasy, however, there is a very long and general practice in most Muslim countries of tolerance towards people who do not really practice the formal Muslim rules. This makes the debate about the ‘secular’ character of Gülen activities and groups in Europe even more complicated. In this light, the open character of Hizmet activities, where non-Muslims are welcome, must be seen as quite exceptional and revolutionary. The movement is increasingly formed by a combination of volunteers and professionals. They have founded thousands of schools worldwide. Numerous volunteers and professionals, who are mainly products of Gülen educational institutions, coordinate many business concerns, civil society organisations, and cultural and media enterprises in and outside Turkey. The movement employs and mobilises a great number of people wherever they are active. It is now Turkey’s largest and most influential civil society initiative. It operates locally, nationally, internationally and 271

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transnationally. It may be said that the Gülen Movement is the most interesting export from Turkey to European, Asian, American, Australian, African and Arabian countries. This is a remarkable achievement for an independent civic initiative. One of the difficult issues is the movement’s activism in the public and political arena. The movement has no political party nor does it take sides with any, except in supporting one or another on specific issues or policies that concern the common good and promotion of democracy. Staying away from organised politics is a deliberate choice by Gülen because politics is interest-based and contentious. It makes distinctions between people and social groups. Although Gülen frequently mentions and advises his followers to “seek refuge in God from Satan and politics”,4 this does not mean that such a mass movement and a social and cultural group is altogether a neutral actor in the political arena. For example, issues of education, fundamental freedoms, human rights, democracy, and justice are vital issues that the movement wants to support, and all have political implications. The controversies swirling around the movement and the ongoing frictions between the AKP and Hizmet ground this argument. Related to this topic, Chapter Six discussed some typical cases: the International Turkish Language Olympiad, the Turkish constitutional referendum, Kurdish issues, the Taksim Gezi Park protests, and a project for bringing the Cami and Cemevi together. These examples are an update of the movement’s socio-political activism. A follow-up research can provide more evidence to explain and describe the ways and strategies on the intertwining of the movement’s activism and its socio-political implications.

Hizmet in Europe: Organisation and Priorities In all European countries, West and East, education is a central activity. When possible and useful, the movement will establish its own schools, but there are striking differences between Eastern and Western Europe. In Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Belgium we see local business people, of Turkish origin but well integrated in their new homeland, who take the initiative and also contribute substantially to the initial financing. In Albania, Rumania, Bosnia and Kosovo it was the Turkish entrepreneurs who were interested in investing in these foreign countries and gathered funds. We note that those who take the initiative for new schools always seek contact with the local authorities in charge of education. They formulate an agreement (Eastern Europe) or act in full transparency 4



Fethullah Gülen, ‘Girdili-Çıktılı Aktarmalar ve Suizan Virüsü,’ Retrieved on 20 October 2013 from .

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with the government and look among the existing procedures for the best fitting formula (Western Europe). In a country like France where the école publique is the dominating model, this solution may be very different from the Netherlands, Belgium or Germany, where subsidised private schools (like the USA’s ‘charter schools’) are very common. In all cases a secular and principled pluralistic model is chosen, although the facts show that the schools mostly and more or less out of necessity recruit their pupils from the ethnic minorities and the majority from the Turkish-European population. This is the consequence of a sociological reality and is not based upon a deliberate and free choice. Within the schools there is no fixed preference for a specific didactic format. In this sense there is no specific Hizmet philosophy which could determine the strategy in teaching something like languages. Everywhere the language of the guest country is given absolute priority, but another language, particularly Turkish, may or may not be given some or even much attention as a ‘homeland language’. In some cases in Germany the schools use this ‘homeland language’, but this is not the case in Flanders, the Netherlands and France. In Eastern European countries, however, this ‘homeland language’ is more common. Turkish can be an optional choice or the subject of teaching in these countries. English is an important subject everywhere, and much time is dedicated to a good and proper, even fluent use of that language. Science and mathematics are also held in high esteem in the schools. Some more general ideas and aspirations found in the writings of Fethullah Gülen himself relate to the fact that successful education is always based upon excellent cooperation between teachers (who must act as devoted educators), parents and the entrepreneurs who support the school. Another element based upon the ideas of Gülen is the importance of a subject like ‘civil education’ with a strong emphasis on dialogue, openness, tolerance. There can be different options about the strategies for language education, from an emphasis on early multi-lingual education (as early as kindergarten) up to a strong focus on the language of the guest country. Gülen people here want to honour the feelings of an official, local tradition of education. In all societies education is an important issue. Does this mean that Hizmet initiatives have always begun with educational programmes? In Western Europe there is indeed the impression that Hizmet began after a visit from Fethullah Gülen in 1977, under the responsibility of Diyanet, to preach in Germany (in cities like Berlin and Cologne) where he concluded that first generation Turkish migrants showed very little interest in contemporary German society. On his return to Turkey he sent one of his close associates to begin initiatives that would cure this disinterest, but this man was not successful and came to Rotterdam in the Netherlands to make a new attempt there. We thus see that Hizmet 273

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started in Western Europe in a Rotterdam prayer room centred around a Hizmet activist who simultaneously gave introduction to Islam and after school support to youngsters. In 1982 this resulted in a Foundation which borrowed the name of a famous business supporter of Gülen’s in Izmir, and also of a school named after him. Activities in Germany also took this line. In the early 1990s an informal network had been established between some Dutch initiatives that were set up in an independent way, and eight existing German groups, as well as two Belgian and two Danish activities. In the late 1980s Gülen also came to France, to Paris and Strasbourg, from where some groups in France and Switzerland were started. These groups know each other, but act in an independent way. Everywhere we see concern and investment to overcome the backward position in the field of education, but in the Netherlands interreligious dialogue also began very early. The first beginning, the stimulus that activated further processes, came from Hizmetians who arrived from Turkey, but the concrete reactions which resulted in the first projects, came from local people who were interested in the style of Islam preached by Fethullah Gülen, in cooperation with local business people. Initiatives to improve the educational situation for children and youngsters from minority groups, and to begin initiatives in the field of interreligious dialogue, must be seen as a logical follow-up to this. In Belgium the movement started at the beginning of the 1990s, stimulated by followers coming directly from Turkey and/or from the Netherlands. In Italy it started in 1994, stimulated by volunteers coming from Turkey and with interreligious dialogue as the focus of their interest. Central institutions today are the Istituto Tevere, Alba and Milad. One has no more moral authority than the other. In all institutions there are women who are active.5 In the Dutch organisations we see nowadays mostly second generation Hizmetians in leading positions. The same can be said for Germany, while in Belgium there is a mix of first and second generations, although also here the second generation is prominent in communication and the first generation is stronger in financial sponsoring. If we compare these developments to Eastern Europe it is evident that the direct influence of people from Turkey is much stronger. This is an evident consequence of the limited economic resources of the Eastern European Hizmetians. They lean on gifts and support from Turkey. The direct steering of the local official administration is much more limited than that seen in Western Europe. 5



Based on information given to the authors by Dr Mustapha Cenap Aydin, Rome.

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Do we only see education and interreligious and intercultural dialogue? Certainly not. The European initiatives are in a transnational way inspired by the activities of Hizmet in Turkey, but are adjusted to local accents. To give just one example: the Turkish relief and development organisation Kimse Yok Mu has been an inspiration for the French Motif that gives help to peoples of the former French colonies. The boarding houses that were strongly developed in Turkey inspired local initiatives in some countries, but not in all. In the Netherlands there have been quite a number of these houses, but only a very few in Belgium. We must here add some comments on the boarding houses, as well as on sohbet, spiritual discussion groups. One may hear the criticism of indoctrination in relation to these activities. The Hizmet movement has consequently been called a sect. In judging these comments one must realise that these are all local initiatives. General statements, both in a positive as well as in a negative direction, must be treated very carefully. Like the schools, these additional educational activities must also all be determined in their own particular contexts. In addition to the initiatives mentioned above, some big ‘Turkish Festivals’ have been organised, first in Germany and the Netherlands, and only very recently in Belgium. Investment in the press and other communication media depends on the possibilities of the market. The biggest market is in Germany and Zaman Avrupa was established in 1992. In the Netherlands people have joined this German initiative and only later was an independent activity started, in cooperation with Zaman in Turkey. This was not prompted by ideological, but by pragmatic reasoning. The direct information from the Turkish Zaman was more useful than the help from the German Zaman Avrupa and could be adjusted and extended with Dutch information. In a later stage Flanders, the Dutch speaking region of Belgium, was considered to be part of the same market. Pragmatism is a constant characteristic of all these projects, together with horizontal networking, first on an informal and later a more formal basis. Only at a later stage there arose some centralising federations in West European countries. This happened only when local initiatives received concrete profit from federations. Projects that found an advantage in this federation, made the choice to join, while others remained outside the federation. In Eastern Europe support from Turkey is much more important and therefore a centralising federation model is dominant. In this comparison we must also discuss gender. What is the position of women in the network of the various countries? We must also look at the situation of the individual countries and not rely too simply on the universal principles. It is often accidental developments and national structures that are important here. Belgium has a women’s movement with quite strong organisation, not as an ideological feminist movement 275

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but fully dominated by women. In all kinds of civic organisations women are found in leadership. Does this mean that it is the same in other countries? Definitely not. This has no direct relationship with the thinking of Fethullah Gülen, but with local adaptation of this thinking. In a country like Belgium, in a city like Brussels, where in the education of the Turkish minority women is at least as successful as that of men, where there is a strong representation of Turkish and other business women, where we find many women who have a job of their own, where the universities have many Turkish male and female students, it is not surprising that at many levels of Hizmet organisations an important representation of women is also found. Does Hizmet also experience opposition and resistance? Definitely, yes! We find this in the Netherlands (perhaps in a quite strong way), in Germany and Belgium. In the Netherlands its source may be found in some Kurdish circles, but also with Dutch politicians who are close to some very orthodox Kemalist groups. The same is true of the media. There are also opponents in France. The PKK and some Kurdish militants have directly targeted the movement in France. They attacked Zaman’s French office three times and the women’s association centre. They damaged furniture, and broke the windows of the office. This is related to the situation in Turkey. The movement is very popular among Kurds and many Kurds support the movement, they send their children to the schools in the region where a Kurdish population is dominant. The movement provides free tutorial centres to the students and distributes scholarships according to the student’s social status (not according to educational success). For example in Urfa, there are many tutorial centres in the poorest districts and areas to offer an education, giving seminars to the families. All of these activities bother the PKK and their offshoot organisations such as KCK. They show a direct hostility to Gülen and the movement, even though Gülen supports bilingual education in Turkey and education in the mother tongue, and welcomes the reforms targeting resolution of the Kurdish question. In Belgium we find academics who, in their professions, have a close relationship with undisclosed Turkish sources. They spread rumours and gossip among their colleagues who have no affinity with the country. The most common stereotypes involve homophobia, creationism, Islamism (‘the hidden agenda’), and extreme conservatism. We find also many politicians, from very diverse backgrounds, however, who try to show a positive attitude to the Hizmetians, sometimes in line with their effort to evade the conflict models, with their wish for assimilation. Because of the relatively large number of Turkish people in these countries there is also the wish to find votes for elections. A student also recently complained in a student evaluation report after a lectures series organised by the Gülen 276

Concluding Reflections

chair at Leuven University that the guest lectures were all inspired by an extreme leftist ideology. Yes, gossip and opinions against the movement are not lacking, however, when the movement organises meetings, politicians of all parties try to be present. They are aware that, electorally speaking, it represents an important community. The impression that remains at the end, however, is that the movement also suffers under the general Western diffidence to Islam. The basis for the spread and further development of Gülen-related activities remains the ethnic Turkish communities in Europe. Recently we have also found some closer contacts between Gülen’s followers of Turkish background and non-Turkish migrants, especially from among Moroccan religious scholars, but these new sympathisers from nonTurkish Muslim communities are still very few. Until now the Gülen people have been much more successful in winning the minds and hearts of a modest but stable number of Western citizens who consider this movement as an enrichment of their own society and a bridge towards both a new modernity and the traditional Muslim world. It is for future observers to see how this will develop.

277

Bibliography Works by Fethullah Gülen in English translation 1998  Key Concept in the Practice of Sufism. Emerald Hills of the Heart, Somerset, NJ: The Light, four volumes, many reprints. 2000a Questions and Answers about Faith, Fairfax VI: The Fountain. 2000b “At the threshold of a new millennium,” The Fountain, 3 (29): 7-8. 2002a  Essays – Perspectives – Opinions, Somerset NJ: The Light. 2004a Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance, Somerset, NJ: The Light. 2005a  The Statue of our Souls: Revival in Islamic Thought and Activism, Somerset, NJ: The Light. 2005b Essentials of the Islamic Faith, Fairfax VI: The Fountain. (Originally published as İnancın Gölgesınde, Nil Yayınları, 1961.). 2005c Pearls of Wisdom, Somerset NJ: The Light. 2005d “Fethullah Gülen’s message to the International Conference on Islam. Theme: Islam and Dialogue,” April 29-30, University of WisconsinMadison, Madison, WI. 2010 Muhammad the Messenger of God, Clifton, NJ: Tughra Books. 2014  Journey to Noble Ideals: Droplets of Wisdom from the Heart, The Broken Jug Series Vol. 13, Clifton, NJ: Tughra Books.

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302

List of contributors Gürkan Çelik was born in Trabzon (Turkey). He received both his Bachelor’s and Master’s Degrees in Policy and Organisation Studies, from the Faculty of Social Sciences of Tilburg University, in the Netherlands. He completed his Ph.D. on the Gülen Movement, at the same University in 2008. He worked at several institutions, amongst them the KPC Group (Institute for Educational Innovation), CINOP (Centre for Research, Developments and Consultancy in Innovations in Vocational and Adult Education), Utrecht University, and the Windesheim University of Applied Sciences. Currently, he is Professor of Cross-Cultural Entrepreneurship at the Inholland University of Applied Sciences (The Netherlands). Maria F. Curtis is an Assistant Professor of Anthropology and CrossCultural Studies at the University of Houston-Clear Lake, teaching courses in Cultural Anthropology, Middle Eastern studies, women and gender studies, and cultural diversity. She has spent time with members of the Gülen community since 1998, when she met them as a graduate student at the University of Texas at Austin. She has conducted research into women, spirituality and globalization in Morocco. Her dissertation research examined the Fez Festival of World Sacred Music which was founded as a project to bring together musicians from various world traditions. Her current research focuses on the transnational participation of women adherents of the Gülen Movement as they move between Turkey and the USA.  Bekir Çinar completed his Ph.D. on Terrorism, Countering Terrorism, and the Security Services in Liberal Democratic Countries, at the University of Hull in 2007. He received his MPhil from the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystswyth, 1995; and his MSc in Public Administration from the Institute of Social Sciences, at Gazi University, Turkey 1995. He was a lecturer at the Police Academy, Ankara, Turkey and at the Vistula University, Warsaw, Poland. Currently, he is a lecturer at Epoka University, Tirana, Albania, and Director of the Epoka University Centre for European Studies (EUCES). Helen Rose Ebaugh received her Ph.D. in Sociology from Columbia University in 1975 with specialties in organisational sociology and the sociology of religion. She is Professor in Sociology at the University of Houston. She served as president of the national Association for the Sociology of Religion, helped organise, and served as the first chair of the American Sociological Association’s Section on the Sociology of 303

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Religion, and is past president of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion. Ebaugh received two consecutive research grants from the Pew Charitable Trusts to study religion and new immigrants in the United States. Doğu Ergil is Emeritus Professor of Political Sciences at Ankara University in Turkey. He completed his dissertation, From Empire to Dependence: The Evolution of Turkish Underdevelopment, at the State University of New York, Binghamton in 1975. In the following years, Dr Ergil became an Associate Professor of Political Science at Ankara University (1980) and a Professor of Social Sciences (1989) and Chairman of the Political Behaviour Department at the same university. In 2013, he was elected to the “Wise People Commission”, aiming to formulate solutions for the long-term Kurdish problem in Turkey. Ercan Karakoyun (born 1980 in Schwerte, Germany) studied urban planning in Dortmund under a Friedrich Ebert Foundation scholarship and continues his study in Frankfurt with a dissertation on Transnationalism as a Challenge for Social Integration. He has written articles for learned journals about young Muslims in Germany and the role of the Gülen Movement in Turkey’s EU integration process. He is president of the Dialogue and Education Foundation in Berlin and President of the Pray and Teaching House (Bet- und Lehrhaus) in Berlin. He is a columnist on the German Turkish Journal (DTJ).  Johan Leman (born Kortrijk, Belgium 1946) is former Chief of Cabinet of the Royal Commissioner for Migrant Policy and the former Director of the Federal Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Fight Against Racism. He is an anthropologist and Emeritus Professor at the KU Leuven University. He is president of Foyer, an integration NGO in Brussels. He is the first incumbent of the Fethullah Gülen Chair for Intercultural Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, KU Leuven University. Thomas Michel was born St Louis, USA, in 1941. He was ordained a Catholic priest of the Archdiocese of St Louis in 1967. In 1969, he entered the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. After studying Arabic and Islamic studies in Egypt and Lebanon, he received a doctorate in Islamic theology at the University of Chicago in the USA. His doctoral thesis was directed by Professor Fazlur Rahman and was entitled Ibn Taymiyya’s Al-Jawab al-Sahih: A Muslim Theologian’s Critique of Christianity. He has taught in Yogyakarta, Rome, Bangkok, Washington, and Ankara where he is now residing. He is a visiting professor in Theology at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Karel Steenbrink (born 1942 in Breda, the Netherlands) studied Christian and Muslim theology at the Radboud University in Nijmegen, 304

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the Netherlands, and at the Darussalam College of Gontor, Indonesia. He wrote his Ph.D. (1974) about Islamic Education in contemporary Indonesia. Between 1981 and 1988 he taught at the Indonesian State Academy of Islamic Studies in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. He was a visiting professor at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1992-3. At present he is Emeritus Professor of Intercultural Theology at Utrecht University. Erkan Toguslu (also written as Toğuşlu, born in 1979 in Turkey) received his MA and Ph.D. in sociology from the School for Advanced Studies in Social Studies (EHESS) in Paris. His research focuses on transnational Muslim networks in Europe, the emergence of Islamic intellectuals, interfaith dialogue, the debate on public-private Islam, nexus immigration and religion. He is author/editor of: New Multicultural Identities in Europe, Leuven University Press, 2014 (co-edited with J. Leman and I. M. Sezgin); and Société Civile, Démocratie et Islam: Perspectives du Mouvement Gülen, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2013. Currently, he is a post-doctoral researcher at the Gülen Chair for Intercultural Studies and Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre at KU Leuven University. Pim Valkenberg was born in 1954 in the Netherlands where he studied theology at Utrecht State University and the Catholic Theological University of Utrecht. He taught dogmatic theology and the theology of religions at the Catholic University of Nijmegen (1987-2007), where he also studied Arabic and Islam. He was a visiting scholar in Leuven (Belgium), Johannesburg (South Africa), Notre Dame (Indiana, USA) and Baltimore (Maryland, USA). In 2007 he started teaching in the USA, and is currently at the Catholic University of Washington D.C. as Ordinary Professor of Religion and Culture. Paul Weller (1956) is Professor of Inter-Religious Relations at the University of Derby and University Research Excellence and Research Student Academic Manager in the University’s Research, Innovation and Academic Enterprise Division.

305

Index A Abant Conferences  22, 43-44, 188 Abla 144-145, 147, 149, 237 Abi, ağabey  19, 118 Agai, Bekim  19, 37, 49 Akademi  21, 56, 268 AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Party for Justice and Development) 113114, 117n, 122-130, 134-135, 272 Aksiyon  101, 179 Albania  9, 142, 186, 253-265, 272 Alevi 129-130, 142, 162, 164, 203, 270 Ali ibn Abi Talib  88 Amsterdam  10, 30, 33, 34, 141, 199, 201, 203-208, 211-212, 215, 217 Anatolian Muslims Society  240, 248 Ankara 22, 42-43, 104, 130, 133, 141, 219 Aquinas, Thomas  24, 55n Arab/Arabic 16, 28, 42-43, 55, 57, 62, 78, 85, 101, 117, 129, 139, 145, 154, 172, 204n, 213, 216, 249, 262, 264, 267-268 Aristotle  85-86, 91, 171 Armenia(n)  125, 142, 271 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal  115, 176 Australia  32, 44-45, 142 Avcı, Hanefi  30 Axis Educational Trust  240-243 Aymaz, Abdullah  19, 188

Bamteli  54, 172, 174, 177 Bank Asya  30, 44, 101-102, 104-105, 122 Bektashi  34, 262 Belgium  9-10, 41, 141, 159-178, 188, 190, 220, 222, 268-269, 272-276 Beltud  160-161, 167-169 Betiad  160-161, 165-167, 169 Bingül, Hüseyin  52n, 56, 57n Blue Dome Books  57 Bosnia 39-40, 97, 142, 201, 253, 255-257, 272 Bruinessen, Martin van 16, 18-19, 24, 30n-31n, 186n, 214-215 BUV, Bundesverband der Deutschen Unternehmersvereinigungen 166, 190 C Caliphate  28, 35, 44, 85, 89 Carroll, Jill 15, 21n, 25-27, 35-36, 42, 212 Çelik, Gürkan 52, 55, 58, 64, 85, 113, 206, 216, 267 Cemaat  19, 23, 34, 37, 50, 51, 59, 60, 67n, 72, 77-79, 82, 108-109, 119 Central Asia 19n, 20-21, 38-39, 49, 107, 138-140, 147-149, 181-182, 185-186 Çetin, Muhammed  35, 53n, 59, 62 Çetinkaya, Hikmet  28 Charter Schools  40, 41n, 269, 273 CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party)  115, 123, 126

B Balkan  9, 39-40, 133, 139, 253-265 307

Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

Christianity/Christian  19n, 23, 28-29, 35, 37-38, 39, 59-60, 63n, 78, 85-86, 89, 107, 133, 172, 189, 200, 201, 203, 208, 210, 212, 216218, 220, 240, 245, 257, 262-263, 269, 271

Football  122, 204, 256 France  9, 36, 40, 141, 166, 184, 188, 222, 225-238, 268, 270, 272-274, 276 G Gandhi, Mahatma  22, 267-268 GCIS, Gülen Chair for Intercultural Studies  159, 162, 170 Germany  13, 24, 36-37, 40n, 41, 72n, 161-162, 219, 166,179-196, 222, 262, 268-269, 272-276 Gezi Park Protest  113-114, 128-129, 153-154, 272 al-Ghazali  25, 69, 75, 81, 85, 89-90, 100, 212 Gökçek, Mustafa  52, 58-59, 70 Golden generation  18, 26, 41, 63, 82, 91, 93, 96, 120, 175, 270 Göle, Nilüfer  13, 115, 143, 155, 228 Gör, Köksal  30, 214 Greece/Greek  17, 25, 34, 85, 89, 125, 134, 262, 271

D Dershane  30, 146, 173, 214-215, 268 Dialogue Society (London)  161, 240, 244-249 Dialoog Academie (Rotterdam)  213, 216-218 Diyanet 17, 19, 31, 34, 36, 53, 90, 114-116, 176-177, 179, 180, 182, 197, 199, 201, 204, 273 Dormitory  18-19, 50, 101-102, 105110, 142, 144-145, 163, 203, 205, 207, 213, 259, 261 DP Democratic Party  116-117 E Ebru TV  153 Eickelman, Dale  19n, 23 Edirne  17-18, 53, 90 Emre, Yunus  69, 270 Erasmus  212, 218 Erbakan, Necmettin  14, 24, 117, 121, 194 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip  31, 114, 122, 129, 154 Erimez, Hacı Kemal  97 Erzurum  16, 18, 90 Esposito, John  15n, 29, 35 EU Membership  126, 133-134 Evren, Kenan  19

H Hadith  52, 58-59, 62, 68, 75, 78, 85, 144, 198, 201 Hanafi  27, 263 Hareket  145, 171-172 Hendrick, Joshua  15, 16n, 20, 30-31, 34n, 37, 44, 195n Hermann, Rainer  24, 191n, 194 ‘hidden agenda’ (Gülen accused of using..) 9, 131, 176-178, 213-214, 271, 276 Hizmet 15, 48-50, 67n, 72, 77-78, 118n, 133, 137, 141-143, 145147, 152, 159, 179-195, 225-230, 233, 235-237, 239-251, 253-259, 263-265, 268-269, 271-276 Hocaefendi  46, 56, 172, 177

F Fedactio  160, 163, 166-170, 222, 268 FEDIF  166, 227-228

308

Index

HOGIAF  166, 203-204, 215, 220-222 Houston  25, 33-35, 38, 41, 139, 141, 148-149, 154 Hürriyet 13

Kazakhstan 39 Kemalism  20, 115 Kemalist  13, 17, 18, 117, 176, 178, 200, 213, 267, 270, 276 Khalifa  22, 27, 79-80 Khomeini  20, 28 Kimse Yok Mu  21-22, 31n, 32, 102, 105, 190, 222, 232, 268, 275 Koç, Doğan  15, 17, 25, 28, 35 Kosovo  253, 257, 272 KOZA Educational Society  167, 240, 243 Kumcu, Adem,  221 Kurd  42, 46n, 114, 125-127, 132, 138, 142, 153, 164, 215, 272, 276

I ‘Ibada  72, 78-81, 83, 89 Ibn Miskawayh  25, 85-90, 92, 99 Ibn Rushd/Averroes  85, 171 Ibn Sina/Avicenna  85 Iftar  142, 162, 173, 206, 211, 216, 245 Ikhlas  71-74, 77-78, 81, 100, 191 Indonesia  32, 42-43, 217 Integration of Muslims in Europe  9, 29-30, 36, 40, 167, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183-186, 190-192, 194195, 204, 209-210, 214-215, 231, 268-270 Istanbul  20-22, 25, 29-30, 32, 37, 3940, 52-53, 56, 101-109, 128, 139, 141, 145, 147-150, 153, 155, 161162, 187-189, 201-202, 216, 219, 256, 268 Internet  9, 13, 15-16, 22, 28, 31, 33, 45, 131n, 145, 172, 213n, 221, 232, 243 Izmir 17-20, 50-54, 56, 60, 79, 90, 102, 119-120, 141, 180, 194, 197, 274

L Landman, Nico  14, 40n, 197n, 215 Light Houses, Işık evleri 18-19, 50, 120, 171, 173, 186, 240, 243 London  33, 35, 43n, 161, 187, 240, 242-244, 247-249 Lumina Educational Institutions  254255

J Jesuit  24, 34, 164 Jesus/’Isa  59, 60, 78, 89, 217 Jews/Jewish  60n, 107, 189, 245 Journalists and Writers Association  13, 21-22, 57, 61, 63, 101, 102, 131, 142, 152, 162, 188, 256, 268 K Kaynak Publishing Group  52n, 55n, 57, 60, 101, 268 309

M Madrasa  43, 71, 108, 261n, 262-264 Marriage  59n, 79, 141, 144, 147, 152, 164, 271 MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist People’s Party)  123, 126 Michel, Thomas 31n, 34, 41-42, 67, 175n Milli Görüş  24, 36, 117n, 160-161, 176, 179, 182, 194, 195, 204, 207208, 225 Morocco  30, 163-165, 169, 205, 222, 233, 277 Muslim Brotherhood  24, 42, 44 Mütevelli  198, 226, 228, 233

Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe

N Nakamura, Mitsuo and Hisako 42, 44n Naqshbandiyya  23 Nestorian 85-86 Netherlands 9, 30, 36, 40n, 41, 58, 138, 160-161, 166, 169, 180, 184, 186n, 188, 190, 197-223, 268-270, 272-276 Ney 216 Norway 13 Nurcu / Nurculuk  23, 37, 207 Nursi, Said  14-15, 17, 20, 24-25, 37, 40, 46, 55-56, 59, 61, 69-73, 75, 77, 109, 127, 145, 173, 179, 193-194, 200, 202, 226, 270n

17:84; 95 24:35-36; 19, 186n 112:1-4; 73 R Ramadan 17, 36, 79, 81, 108, 142, 149-150, 162, 180, 197, 206, 211, 216 Ramadan, Tariq  32, 268 Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)  121, 124 Romania  163, 253-255 Rumi Forum  36, 41, 61, 139, 189n Rumi, Mevlana  69, 72, 74, 162, 212, 218, 248, 270 S Sadaka/Sadaqa  107, 174, 192, 234 Samanyolu Televizyonu  20, 32, 101102, 131, 147, 153, 219, 220, 268 Sartre, Jean-Paul  25, 27, 212 Selam  39, 42, 97 Shari’a 25-26, 88-90, 98, 100, 189, 213, 271 Sızıntı  14, 20-21, 49, 70, 187, 200 Sohbet  9, 23, 30-40, 50-54, 59, 106109, 111, 118n, 138, 146-147, 171-173, 177, 202, 226, 275 Sufi/Sufism  9, 52-53, 55-56, 58-64, 69-73, 75, 78, 81-82, 97-100, 108, 147, 175, 188, 248 Şükür, Hakan  122 Süleymanlı  36, 179, 182, 207, 222, 225 Sunna  26, 67-69, 93

O Ottoman Empire 17, 29, 39, 44, 50, 107, 115, 117n, 128, 130, 138-139, 150, 154, 171, 262, 267, 270-271 Özal, Turgut 20, 38, 102, 120, 123, 254, 262 Öztüre, Ebubekir  222 P Pennsylvania (residence of Gülen since 1999)  9, 21, 28, 41, 45, 54, 96, 121, 138 PKK Partiye Karkeran Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) 46n, 126-127, 276 Plato  25-26, 86, 91, 212 Q Qur’ān  30, 52, 55, 58-63, 67-69, 7274, 85, 88, 93, 95, 107, 109, 135, 142, 144-145, 160, 181, 188, 192, 197-202, 217, 226, 249, 262 2:207; 74 2:30; 28 10:62; 88

T Tajikistan 97 Taqiya  36 Tasawwuf see Sufi/Sufism Time Magazine  45 310

Index

Time Media Group (Rotterdam)  199, 219-220 Tirana  33-34, 39, 254, 258, 260, 263 Turkmenistan  31, 39, Turuq/Tariqa  22-23, 69, 71, 90, 96 TUSKON  22, 40, 101, 111, 166, 190, 220-221, 228

Weller, Paul  36, 40n, 239 Women 18, 36, 88, 110, 131, 137155, 167-168, 193, 199, 212, 222, 243, 274-276 World Media Group (Germany)  187188, 219 Y Yasawi, Ahmad  69 Yavuz, Hakan 15, 18, 44, 46, 61n, 118, 120-121, 173, 228 Yeni Ümit  50, 53, 55-56

U Ünal, Ali 16n, 17n, 58, 61, 64-65, 93n, 188 United Kingdom  9, 190, 239-251, 272 United States of America  22, 25, 32, 35, 41, 121, 198, 269 UMNED  221-222, 268 UNITEE  166, 221 Uzbekistan 38

Z Zakat  107, 192, 234 Zaman  9, 13, 20-21, 23, 28, 31, 37-38, 101-104, 124, 131, 150, 152, 160162, 169, 179, 187-188, 194, 199, 200, 213, 219-220, 222, 240, 249, 268, 275-276

W Weber, Max  31, 228

311

“Gods, Humans and Religions” While most traditional world religions seem to face a fundamental identity and cultural crisis, signs are indicating that there is a universal need for new spiritual demands and revival, new awakenings of religious practices and feelings. What are the facts beyond these movements? Is there a new human religiosity in the making? This series brings together witnesses, thinkers, believers and nonbelievers, historians, scientists of religion, theologians, psychologists, sociologists, philosophers and general writers, from different cultures and languages, to offer a broader perspective on one of the key issues of our new world civilisation in the making. Series Editor: Gabriel Fragnière, Former Rector of the College of Europe (Bruges), President of the Europe of Cultures Forum

Published Books N° 21– Dibudi Way-Way, Mission en retour, réciproque et interculturelle. Étude sur la présence chrétienne africaine en Belgique, 2014, ISBN 978-2-87574-188-2 N° 20– Alexis B. Tengan (ed.), Christianity and Cultural History in Northern Ghana. A Portrait of Cardinal Peter Poreku Dery (1918-2008), 2013, ISBN 978-2-87574-114-1 N° 19– Rik Pinxten, The Creation of God, 2010, ISBN 978-90-5201-644-3 N° 18– Christiane Timmerman, Johan Leman, Hannelore Roos & Barbara Segaert (eds.), In-Between Spaces. Christian and Muslim Minorities in Transition in Europe and the Middle East, 2009, ISBN 978-90-5201-565-1 N° 17– Hans Geybels, Sara Mels & Michel Walrave (eds.), Faith and Media. Analysis of Faith and Media: Representation and Communica­tion, 2009, ISBN 978-90-5201-534-7 N° 16– André Gerrits, The Myth of Jewish Communism. A Historical Interpretation, 2009, ISBN 978-90-5201-465-4 N° 15– Semih Vaner, Daniel Heradstveit & Ali K azancigil (dir.), Séculari­sa­ tion et démocratisation dans les sociétés musulmanes, 2008, ISBN 978-905201-451-7 N° 14– Dinorah B. Méndez, Evangelicals in Mexico. Their Hymnody and Its Theology, 2008, ISBN 978-90-5201-433-3

N°  13­– Édouard Flory K abongo, Le rite zaïrois. Son impact sur l’incul­tura­tion du catholicisme en Afrique, 2008, ISBN 978-90-5201-385-5 N°  12­– Astrid de Hontheim, Chasseurs de diable et collecteurs d’art. Tentatives de conversion des Asmat par les missionnaires pionniers protestants et catholiques, 2008, ISBN 978-90-5201-380-0 N°  11­– Alice Dermience, La « Question féminine » et l’Église catholique. Approches biblique, historique et théologique, 2008, ISBN 978-90-5201-378-7 N° 10– Christiane Timmerman, Dirk Hutsebaut, Sara Mels, Walter Nonneman & Walter Van Herck (eds.), Faith-based Radicalism. Christianity, Islam and Judaism between Constructive Activism and Destructive Fanaticism, 2007, ISBN 978-90-5201-050-2 N° 9– Pauline Côté & T. Jeremy Gunn (eds.), La nouvelle question religieuse. Régulation ou ingérence de l’État ? / The New Religious Question. State Regulation or State Interference?, 2006, ISBN 978-90-5201-034-2 N°  8– Wilhelm Dupré, Experience and Religion. Configurations and Perspectives, 2005, ISBN 978-90-5201-279-7 N° 7– Adam Possamai, Religion and Popular Culture. A Hyper-Real Testament, 2005 (2nd printing 2007), ISBN 978-90-5201-272-8 N° 6– Gabriel Fragnière, La religion et le pouvoir. La chrétienté, l’Occident et la démocratie, 2005 (2nd printing 2006), ISBN 978-90-5201-268-1 N°  5– Christiane Timmerman & Barbara Segaert (eds.), How to Conquer the Barriers to Intercultural Dialogue. Christianity, Islam and Judaism, 2005 (3rd printing 2007), ISBN 978-90-5201-373-2 N° 4– Elizabeth Chalier-Visuvalingam, Bhairava: terreur et protection. Mythes, rites et fêtes à Bénarès et à Katmandou, 2003, ISBN 978-90-5201-173-8 N° 3– John Bosco Ekanem, Clashing Cultures. Annang Not(with)stand­ ing Christianity – An Ethnography, 2002, ISBN 978-90-5201-983-3 N° 2– Peter Chidi Okuma, Towards an African Theology. The Igbo Context in Nigeria, 2002, ISBN 978-90-5201-975-8 N°  1– Karel Dobbelaere, Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels, 2002 (2nd printing 2004), ISBN 978-90-5201-985-7

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