English Existentials in Functional Grammar 9067651052, 9789067651059

Table of contents :
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
List of abbreviations and symbols
Introduction
1. Existentials: a survey of general characteristics
2. Relevant aspects of Functional Grammar
3. The argument of the existential predicate
4. In support of the embedded predication analysis
5. Definite terms in existentials
6. The predicate restriction
7. Representations and expression rules
Conclusion
Notes
References
Author index
Subject index

Citation preview

English Existentials in Functional Grammar

FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR SERIES This series comprises monographs and collections written in the framework of Functional Grammar. The aim is tt> seek explanations for a wide variety of linguistic phenomena, both language specific and cross-linguistic, in terms of the conditions under which and the purposes for which language is used. Editors:

A. Machtelt Bolkestein Simon C. Dik Casper de Groot J. Lachlan Mackenzie General address: Institute for General Linguistics Functional Grammar Spuistraat210 N L-1012 VT Amsterdam The Netherlands

Other books in this series: A.M. Bolkestein, C. de Groot and J. L. Mackenzie (eds.) 1. Syntax and Pragmatics in Functional Grammar. From the same editors: 2. Predicates and Terms in Functional Grammar

Other studies on Functional Grammar include S.C. Dik, Functional Grammar (1978), T. Hoekstraetal. (eds.), Perspectives on Functional Grammar (1981), S.C. Dik (ed.), Advances in Functional Grammar (1983). All published by FORIS PUBLICATIONS.

English Existentials in Functional Grammar

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1985 FORIS PUBLICATIONS Dordrecht - Holland/Cinnaminson - U.S.A.

Published by: Foris Publications Holland P.O.Box 509 3300 AM Dordrecht, The Netherlands Sole distributor for the U.S.A. and Canada: Foris Publications U.S.A. P.O. Box C-50 Cinnaminson N.J. 08077 U.S.A. CIP-DATA Hannay, Michael English Existentials in Functional Grammar/ Michael Hannay. - Dordrecht [etc.]: Foris.(Functional Grammar Series ; 3) With ref. ISBN 90-6765-105-2 SISO enge 837 UDC 802.0-5 Subject headings: English language; functional grammar.

ISBN 90 6765 105 2 (Paper) © 1985 Foris Publications - Dordrecht. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the copyright owner. Printed in the Netherlands by ICG Printing, Dordrecht.

To my parents

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

xi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1 1.1

1.2

1 EXISTENTIALS: A SURVEY OF GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

6

1.1.1

A brief definition

6

1.1.2

Non-existential counterparts

7

1.1.3

Presentative constructions

Basic characteristics of the existential construction

1.2.2

There

9 11 12

1.2.1.1

The presentative/demonstrative distinction

12

1.2.1.2

The syntactic status of there

14

1.2.2.1

The position of the NP with respect to be

16

1.2.2.2

The definiteness restriction

The NP

1.2.3

16 18

The Extension

21

1.2.3.1

21

The predicate restriction

1.3 Accounting for there

23

1.3.1

The strong locative account

23

1.3.2

The weak locative account

24

1.3.3

The non-locative account

25

1.3.4

An integrated view

27

Summary

CHAPTER 2 2.1

5

The status of existentials

1.2.1

1.4

xiii

28 RELEVANT ASPECTS OF FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR

31

Outline of the organisation of FG

32

2.1.1

Predicate frames and semantic functions

33

2.1.2

Terms and term insertion

34

2.1.3

Syntactic function assignment

35

viii

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.1.4

Pragmatic functions

2.1.5

Expression rules and constituent ordering

The treatment of existentials in FG

36 38 40

2.2.1

The representation of there

40

2.2.2

Existentials and the functional patterns of English

45

2.2.3

Term predicate formation and the representation of copula be

49

Pragmatic functions

51

2.3.1

Topic

51

2.3.2

Focus

Summary

CHAPTER 3

54 56

THE ARGUMENT OF THE EXISTENTIAL PREDICATE

59

3.1

Milsark and existential commitment

59

3.2

Predicate frames

66

3.3

A comparison with the small clause analysis

68

3.4

Summary

70

CHAPTER 4 4.1

IN SUPPORT OF THE EMBEDDED PREDICATION ANALYSIS

73

Reduced clefts

74

4.2

The complex NP analysis

81

4.3

The semi-modal restriction

85

4.3.1

Be going to

85

4.3.2

Be to

4.4

4.5

88

Contact clauses

89

4.4.1

Tensed forms

90

4.4.2

Untensed forms

95

Summary

CHAPTER 5

99 DEFINITE TERMS IN EXISTENTIALS

101

5.1

The quantification/cardinality distinction

102

5.2

Exceptions to the definiteness restriction

108

5.3

A reanalysis of the definiteness restriction

114

5.3.1

Syntactic and intonational features of lists

114

5.3.2

The discourse environment of list existentials

116

5.3.3

The discourse environment of non-list existentials

123

5.3.4

All-new predications

126

5.3.5

The Topic restriction

128

5.3.6

The embedded Subject constituent as sub-Topic

131

ix 5.4

The status of the embedded Subject term 5.4.1

the main predication

138

Interpreting the Focality Condition

141

5.4.2 5.5

Summary

CHAPTER 6

137

The status of the embedded Subject term with regard to

142 THE PREDICATE RESTRICTION

145

6.1

Milsark's analysis

6.2

Against a predicate restriction

149

6.2.1

149

Adjectival predicates 6.2.1.1 6.2.1.2

6.2.2 6.3

6.4

14G

Adjectival predicates with partitive and definite terms

149

Complex adjectival predicates

152

Nominal predicates

156

Three constraints

160

6.3.1

160

The Focality Condition

6.3.2

Non-identifying environments

160

6.3.3

The identificatory force of the Subject

163

Summary

CHAPTER 7

166 REPRESENTATIONS AND EXPRESSION RULES

169

7.1

The Presentative function

169

7.2

The functional pattern issue

175

7.3

Eight examples

179

7.4

Summary

191

CONCLUSION

193

NOTES

197

REFERENCES

211

AUTHOR INDEX

221

SUBJECT INDEX

223

Acknowledgements

This study, my doctoral dissertation, is the result of a number of years of involvement with the notion of existence. What started off as a naive fascination with the complexities of the existential construction in German, then in English, coupled with a basic attraction to Prague School linguistics, has developed into the presentation of a Functional Grammar analysis of the there be construction. A number of people are responsible for having guided me in this direction and I would like to take this opportunity of expressing my indebtedness to them. My thanks go in the first instance to Simon Dik and Lachlan Mackenzie, who have supervised my work over the last 2h years and have offered valuable critical comments on the whole text. In earlier stages I was given valuable support and advice by Gunilla Anderman and Grev Corbett, who also gave detailed comments on drafts of two chapters. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Harry Kirkwood, who aroused my interest in linguistics when I was still an undergraduate and is to a great extent responsible for the spirit in which this study has been written. The text has benefited from discussions with a number of people, in particular Machtelt Bolkestein, Casper de Groot, Heather Holmback, Bob Kirsner and Yael Ziv. The text itself was expertly typed by Adri Brugman, who added the final touches and always knew when there was a comma missing. Finally I wish to thank my parents, who have always supported me in every possible way and will now get some idea of what my work actually involves; and my wife, Mieneke, without whose warning glances — suggesting that I should turn the TV off or else — I would still be a long way from completing these acknowledgements.

Amsterdam February 1985

Mike Hannay

List of abbreviations and symbols

Semantic functions: Ag Go Ree Ben Instr Loc Temp Proc Po 0

= = =

= = = = = = =

Agent Goal Recipient Beneficiary Instrument Location Temporal Processed Positioner Zero function

Syntactic functions: Subj Subjg

= Subject = embedded Subject

Obj Comp

= Object = Complement

Pragmatic functions: Top subTop Foe Pr

= = = =

Topic sub-Topic Focus Presentative

Illocutionary operators: DECL INT ILL

= Declarative = Interrogative = arbitrary illocutionary operator

Categories: A N V Vf Vi V pap Vprp

= = = = = =

Adjectival Nominal Verbal finite verb non-finite verb past participle

= present participle

NP S LOC VP AUX TEMP ADJ X

= = = = = = = =

Noun Phrase Sentence Locative Phrase Verb Phrase Auxiliary Temporal Adjectival Phrase arbitrary category

Term operators: d i 1 m 0 / A Q L)

= = = = = = = = =

definite indefinite singular plural zero number partitive anaphoric question arbitrary term operator

Predicate operators: Inf Pass Past Près Perf Prog Prd

= = = = = = =

infinitive passive past present perfect progressive prediction

IT

= arbitrary predicate operator

Positions : S 0 V Pi P2 P3 X

= = = = = =

Subject position Object position Verb position Clause-initial position Theme position Tail position Clause-final position

General: argument variable open predication in x^

e, - v 6, t anim Co Dy E-existentials SOA-existentials P-term Sub

LIPOC R e S

arbitrary predicate non-verbal predicate arbitrary term animate Control Dynamism Entity existentlals State-of-affairs existentials predicate term subordinate predication marker Language-Independent Preferred Order of Constituents relation of inference empty node cardinality expression

Introduction

In the last ten years a number of in-depth studies of the English existential have appeared (cf. Walters, 1974, 1975; Jenkins, 1975; Milsark, 1976; Erdmann, 1976; Nathan, 1978; Lumsden, 1983). While various references are made in these works to the communicative status of particular constituents (see especially Nathan (1978: Ch.7) and Lumsden (1983: Ch.6)), the communicative function of the existential has never been granted an important position in the description of the formal properties of the construction. In contrast with this situation, one may note a growing recognition elsewhere in the literature of the basic communicative force of the construction, as well as of the significance of the communicative setting in which the construction is used for the analysis of its formal properties. Thus Breivik (1981: 22), while admitting that existential constructions take many forms in the languages of the world, states that 'there can be no doubt (....) that the various manifestations are strategies for accomplishing the same communicative goal: the introduction of new information' In a similar vein. Brown (1983) treats the existential as a topic marking device in that it serves to introduce a new discourse topic. Further, Sheintuch (1980) looks at existentials and what I will call their non-existential counterparts, concluding that it is pragmatic factors which determine the speaker's choice as to which construction to use; moreover, she claims, pragmatic factors may be appealed to in order to account for certain cases of non-acceptability. Finally, the insights which may be gained by considering the properties of existentials and other theve-constructions in the light of their communicative function are demonstrated in a most illuminating and convincing fashion by Bolinger (1977: Ch.5). In the light of this growing recognition, the aim of this study will be to present a detailed account of the English existential construction which affords a more central place in the linguistic description to the relation between form and use. To this end the analysis to be developed here is presented in the framework of Functional Grammar, as first laid out in Dik (1978) and since elaborated in a number of further studies. Functional Grammar

2

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN PG

offers an appropriate framework for such an analysis since it proceeds from a functional view of language, which 'attempts to describe the system determining the construction of linguistic expressions in the light of the uses made of such expressions in social interaction' (Dik, 1980a: 1). The implications of this for the relationship between syntax, semantics and pragmatics are summarised by Dik as follows: The functional approach to language regards pragmatics as the all-encompassing framework within which semantics and syntax must be studied. It regards semantics as subservient to pragmatics, and syntax as subservient to semantics. Syntax is there to allow for the construction of formal structures by means of which complex meanings can be expressed; and complex meanings are there for people to be able to communicate with each other in subtle and differentiated ways. (1980a: 2) Accordingly, Functional Grammar sets out to offer a theory of grammatical organisation which, wherever possible, seeks to explain syntactic and semantic principles in functional terms. This view of language imposes various constraints on the descriptive apparatus allowed in the model of Functional Grammar. In general, an attempt is made to restrict the degree of abstractness in linguistic analyses. Consequently, transformations of a structure-changing nature are avoided, as are filtering devices; moreover, abstract lexical decomposition is not applied. How this is reflected in the actual organisation of the grammar can be seen in Chapter 2 of this study. The continued interest in the English existential over the last ten years has centred essentially on two major issues. First of all, there are still, particularly within a transformational framework, strongly competing claims concerning the constituent structure to be assumed for the there be construction (cf. Jenkins, 1975; Milsark, 1976; Stowell, 1978; Safir, 1982; Williams, 1984). Seen in functional terms the problem here concerns determining 'what it is that is asserted to exist' (from a semantic point of view) and at the same time 'what information is introduced' (from the pragmatic point of view), to speak in Breivik's terms. In the present study two chapters will be devoted to this issue. The embedded predication analysis which is proposed in Chapter 3 is compared in Chapter 4 with a number of other proposals and shown to provide a more accurate representation of the meaning of existentials. As far as the small clause analysis is concerned, which makes similar claims to the one to be presented here, it is further shown that this is in fact incapable of handling

INTRODUCTION

3

a series of existential structures common in colloquial British English without being enriched by a full clausal analysis, while the embedded predication analysis can cope quite neatly with all the structures one finds without further complication. The second major issue in the literature concerns the occurrence of definite NPs in existentials. It is generally held that the post-copular NP should in some sense be indefinite, and a number of solutions have been offered in the literature to problems raised by a series of apparent exceptions to this so-called definiteness restriction (cf. Rando & Napoli, 1978; Nathan, 1978b; Ziv, 1982a; Woisetschlager, 1983; Holmback, 1984). Given a functional analysis, this issue might be defined as relating to the question 'in what sense must information be new in order to qualify for being introduced?' Accordingly Chapter 5 of this study is devoted to a detailed functional analysis of definite NPs in existentials. The conclusion is reached that only by giving full consideration to the type of communicative setting in which an existential may be appropriate can a satisfactory and unified account of the restriction on the post-copular NP be provided. Most crucially, I will argue that the definiteness restriction is in fact a misnomer. A third issue, which has received rather less attention in the literature, is the so-called predicate restriction, which relates to the predicate types which may occur following the post-copular NP. In Chapter 6 it will be argued that once one recognises the acceptability, under specific contextual conditions, of definite post-copular NPs then one finds that the predicate types blocked by the predicate restriction may also be acceptable. Unacceptable cases may be accounted for, it is further claimed, by appealing to independently observable constraints on use. All in all, I propose that by considering constraints on the form of existentials in the light of how they may be used it may be possible to gain insights into the formal properties of the English existential construction. With as starting point the idea that the existential construction represents a specific discourse device, it is important that Functional Grammar should be found capable of providing an accurate account of the construction in functional terms. What is more, the desire for a fuller understanding of both the use and formal properties of existentials demands such an approach. In order, therefore, to set the scene for the analysis to be developed in the course of this study, two introductory chapters are provided. In Chapter 1 existentials are defined syntactically and pragmatically and an overview is given of their basic

4

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

properties; Chapter 2 presents a summary of the organisation of Functional Grammar and discusses various formal problems facing an analysis of the construction which are particular to the framework adopted. Finally, Chapter 7 considers two refinements to the underlying representations for existentials developed in the previous chapters; these refinements allow one to capture representationally the relation between the presentative nature of the construction and the order of constituents. The chapter ends by showing how the expression rules of Functional Grammar operate on fully specified predications to produce a range of existentials with a variety of different formal properties. In short, the coming pages are to be seen not only as a study of the English existential but also as an exercise in Functional Grammar.

Chapter 1

Existentials: a survey of general characteristics This first chapter has three sections. In 1.1 existentials are defined syntactically, and a brief sketch of their central semantic and pragmatic characteristics is given which will be made more precise in the course of subsequent chapters. Some consideration will also be given to other constructions which at one time or another in the literature have been labelled existential; there is indeed a clear lack of consensus concerning the range of constructions to which the term 'existential' can and should be applied, and hence what 'existential' actually means. Most treatments of existentials in English make reference to the unstressed introductory there,

but in the present

study X will be working with an even narrower syntactic definition. Functionally speaking existentials will be regarded as a particular type of so-called presentative constructions, which will also be introduced and defined in this section. In 1.2 a survey will be given of the basic characteristics of the construction under investigation: as a result of in-depth studies of the English existential in recent years much insight has been gained into a variety of restrictions governing well-formedness. Any attempt to offer a comprehensive analysis of the existential construction must seek to adequately describe and account for such restrictions, whatever theoretical framework may be adopted. In particular, the syntactic status of be,

as well as the nature of the so-

called definiteness and predicate restrictions, will be the subject of more detailed consideration in later chapters, since, while it is true that much insight into these matters has been gained, there are reasons to doubt whether the descriptions that have been offered in the literature can be seen as presenting uncontroversial solutions. Finally, in 1.3 a number of differing views will be presented concerning the particularly controversial issue of the status of there. there

To what extent can

be said to have any specific semantic content, and how should its

contribution to sentence meaning be represented in any formal account of existentials? It is particularly the widely diverging views concerning this last

6

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

issue which reflect the various competing proposals for a derivational analysis of existentials. 1.1 The status of existentials 1.1.1 A brief definition What throughout this study I will call existentials are constructions involving the unstressed introductory there together with some form of the verb to be. In 1.2 a brief general description will be given by' treating in turn the basic elements of structure. The surface structure of existentials can be represented as follows: (1)

There +

be

+

NP

+

X

where X stands for a whole range of possible structures that can occur to the right of the NP. I will call this material the Extension. The sentences in (2-5) are thus, according to this syntactic definition, examples of existential sentences: (2)

There were no problems.

(3)

There were a number of drunks standing on the corner.

(4)

There haven't been many planes hi-jacked lately, have there?

(5)

There wasn't anyone smart enough to realise what had actually happened.

Various constructions which have had the term 'existential' conferred upon them in the literature are of course not existentials by the above definition. It is a further assumption of the present study that from both a semantic and pragmatic point of view these other constructions may be excluded. Semantically, the existential predicate will be analysed within the framework of Functional Grammar as a non-verbal predicate involving an unspecified locative term. This feature is specific to existentials, and is an attempt to capture the notion that 'what exists exists somewhere'; in broader terras it may be regarded as an instantiative predicate. Other there constructions, however, have verbal predicates which may be involved in predications designating actions and processes, for example, while the existential predication designates a state. From a pragmatic point of view existentials will be regarded as a particular type of presentative construction. It will be argued in 1.1.3 that presentstive constructions have specific characteristics not shared by other constructions

7

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS which are often labelled existentials. As far as other there constructions are concerned, these do indeed belong to the class of presentative constructions, but as pointed out above they do not share the same semantic features as existentials. 1.1.2

Non-existential

counterparts

Given the syntactic definition of existentials I am adopting, (6) is an example of an existential, whereas (7-9) are definitely not, since they do not contain introductory there. (6)

There was a yellow carpet in the bedroom.

(7)

A yellow carpet was in the bedroom.

(8)

In the bedroom was a yellow carpet.

(9)

The bedroom had a yellow carpet (in it).

Sentences like (7-9) have, however, not infrequently been referred to in the literature as existential sentences. Thus Breivik (1981: 9) would accept both (7) and (8) as instances of existential sentences: they express the same cognitive content but the message is shaped differently. (7) represents a marked order, strange in English, with the indefinite focus NP in initial position; Breivik further sees (6) and (8) as distinguished with regard to what he calls 'visual impact' (see further 1.3.3). Further, Kuno (1971: 349) also sees (7) as an existential, with a sentence of the form of (8), i.e. LOC + V + NP, representing the underlying source for all existentials. A slightly different view is taken by Lyons (1967: 390), who sees (6) as primarily a 'locative' sentence, but points out that it can also be seen as an existential. Moreover, he distinguishes sentences of the form of (6) from sentences like (10) and (11), to which he assigns the status of 'absolute existentials1: (10)

Yellow carpets exist.

(11)

There are yellow carpets.

Finally, Quirk et al. (1972: 961) regard a sentence such as (9) as 'an existential sentence with have'. Here the subject of have refers, as Quirk et al. put it, to a 'person, thing etc. indirectly involved in the existential proposition'. The existential proposition in this case is the corresponding sentence with there.

8

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG Common to all these approaches is in the first instance that sentences with

the forms exemplified in (6-9) are implicitly claimed to be 1

interrelated in some way. Since 'existentiality

(transformationally)

can be argued to be an aspect

of sentence meaning, then (7-9) are existentials if (6) is one. What is slightly worrying about these claims is that no reasonably specific interpretation of the notion existential is provided, and if something is said it is not much more than 'existential sentences assert the existence of something' (cf. Jespersen, 1924: 155; Kirkwood, 1969: 230; Quirk et al., 1972: 956). This provides but a weak test for establishing the status of a sentence type. Consider in this light (12), potentially an existential sentence and claimed in most transformational treatments to be the source for (13):

(12)

Two soldiers were shot dead in Belfast last night.

(13)

There were two soldiers shot dead in Belfast last night.

Whatever the pragmatic status of the constituents in (12) may be, it is surely going too far to suggest that this sentence in any way asserts the existence of two soldiers. Obviously, as Milsark (1976: 99) points out, there is then not much stopping any sentence with an indefinite (subject) NP being seen as involving an assertion of existence. In the present study, on the other hand, it will be shown that the states of affairs involved in (7-9), as well as (12), are different from those involved in (6) and (13), and that none of the former sentence types have underlying predications which contain the unspecified locative predicate which is the essential feature of existential predications. There is another side to the coin. To what extent is it reasonable to claim that all sentences involving there + be will inevitably be interpreted as asserting (or denying) existence? Erdmann (1976: 15), for instance, suggests that the fact that sentences involving there + be have been so often regarded from a logical and philosophical point of view,1 with there being interpreted as analogous to the existential quantifier a in predicate calculus and be having a clear existential value (e.g. Kahn, 1966: 257), has pushed many people to misleading generalisations. If one analyses the whole range of constructions in English which involve introductory there, he argues, it becomes clear that the notion of existence is not always present. Such a claim might lead one to reconsider (12) and (13). It is indeed difficult to interpret (12) as involving an existential predication, but one might also claim that this is open to doubt with respect to (13) as well. The

9

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS point is best brought out by comparing (13) with (14): (14)

There were two soldiers who were shot dead in Belfast last night.

Whereas in (14) the existence of two soldiers appears to be highlighted, (13) by contrast appears to have more in common with the description of an event. If we nevertheless stick by at least the syntactic definition of existentials given in 1.1.1 then this contrast between (13) and (14) in fact raises a very important question: if there be sentences involve an existential predication, what is it that is asserted to exist? Or, in Functional Grammar terms, what is the argument of the existential predicate? This issue will be the subject of discussion in Chapter 3.

1.1.3

Presentative constructions

Another construction more regularly labelled existential is that which involves introductory there and a verb other than be. Milsark, for instance, while treating them separately from there be constructions, labels them verbal existentials. Examples are given in (15-20): (15)

In a dark towering castle there once lived a beautiful princess.

(16)

There exists some doubt about the future of the Labour Party.

(17)

There emerged the frightening possibility that she would leave him.

(18)

There were exhumed at least a dozen corpses.

(19)

And there followed him a certain man...

(20)

There entered the hall a procession of dancing girls.

(Bolinger, 1977: 97)

(Mark, 14.151)

The construction may involve a state predicate, as in (16); a process predicate, as in (17); or an action predicate, as in (18). Moreover, in some cases a 2

transitive verb with a direct object may be involved, as in (19) and (20). Both this construction and the existential construction I take to be members of the class of presentative constructions, and one may thus talk of 'presentative* rather than introductory there. However, I will follow Aissen (1975) in distinguishing the type exemplified in (15-20) from the existential construction. First of all only the there be construction has the specific type of locative predicate which I will argue in Chapter 2 is the essential characteristic of the existential construction (cf. Lyons, 1973: 34n). Secondly there is evidence that the two constructions differ in their distributional

10

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

behaviour. For instance, existentials freely allow subject-AUX inversion, but tftere-presentatives do not: (21) (22)

Were there any serious problems involved? ?Did there live in that castle anyone important?

Moreover, tfterg-presentatives do not all occur with raising verbs: (23) There happened to be a stranger sitting next to me. (24) ??There happened to sit a stranger next to me. Finally, Gueron (1980: 671) notes that ttere-presentatives do not allow 'VPpreposing': (25)

John said there would be a man on the lawn, and a man on the lawn there was.

(26) ??John said there would sit a man on the lawn, and a man on the lawn there sat. For further discussion of syntactic differences between the two constructions see Aissen (1975),3 Rochemont (1978: 35-40),4 and Ross (1974). What are presentative constructions? I assume two central features. Syntactically I take presentatives to be characterised by a special position of the subject, in some cases even positioned after the object, as in (19) and (20) above. This position is to be distinguished from the position subjects have as a result of what is known as Subj-Aux inversion. The problems concerning how this positional feature is to be described within a Functional Grammar framework will be discussed in 2.2.2 below. Functionally speaking, presentative constructions serve to introduce the subject entity involved in a particular state of affairs into the world of the discourse. This view of presentatives differs significantly from that offered by Gueron (1980: 653), who distinguishes between two types of logical form. Predications and Presentation S, the semantic interpretation of which is as follows: (27)

PREDICATION:

The subject refers to an individual or object (or set of these) whose existence in the world of discourse is presupposed: thematic subject. The vp describes a

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

11

property of the thematic subject. PRESENTATION S: The VP denotes, essentially, the appearance of the subject in the world of discourse. She makes a further informal distinction between presentatives which have 'the Presentation S configuration' present in surface structure and those which do not. Thus for Gueron, both (28) and (29) are presentatives but only (29) has the associated configuration. (28)

A problem arose.

(29)

There arose a problem.

Only (29) is a presentative construction in the sense adopted here. While Presentation S for GuSron are characterised by a particular focus assignment — in the sense that the subject is the most stressed constituent even without a contrastive interpretation being involved — and by the type of predicate,^ I am assuming that presentatives are in syntactic terms a discrete construction type, reflecting a particular communicative intention on the part of the speaker. Finally it may be noted that there are other presentative constructions in addition to there constructions. The sentences in (30-35) are all presentatives, the subject being italicised in each case: (30)

There has been a problem detected.

(31)

There has arisen a problem.

(32)

On the bridge stood/was an old man.

(33)

Up popped a sparkling marionette.

(34)

Also involved in the campaign are a number of Jewish sympathisers.

(35)

A problem in this respect are the members of the Tribune group.

Existentials might thus be more precisely labelled existential presentatives, and they are to be understood as such in the present context; other presentatives with there I will simply label there-presentatives. 1.2 Basic characteristics of the existential construction In this section some major characteristics of the existential construction will be described. The emphasis is on (a) the status of presentative there, and (b)

12

ENGLISH EXISTENT!ALS IN FG

various restrictions on the construction which have been noted in the literature. Any analysis of the construction will be required to offer a clear account of the peculiarities of there , and will have to offer adequate explanations for the various restrictions involved, as much as possible in the spirit of the framework adopted. 1.2.1

'There'

1.2.1.1

The presentative/demonstrative distinction

The there in existentials is to be understood as the typically unstressed introductory there, rather than the morphologically identical but phonologically 7 and syntactically distinct demonstrative adverbial. The introductory there is in fact often referred to as existential there, although presumably this is because of the nature of the construction in which it occurs rather than on account of any specific inherent features it may have. In accordance with the assumptions made in 1.1 about there constructions I will use the term presentative rather than existential. This basic distinction between the demonstrative locative adverb and presentative there has been assumed in most studies on existential sentences; the former is exemplified by (36), the latter by (37) : (36) (37)

A

Did you like Pilsen?

B

Actually I ended up not going there.

There are many fine breweries in Pilsen.

Whereas the demonstrative adverb can be stressed, for instance for purposes of contrast, this is not the case with presentative there. In existentials the accompanying form of be may however be emphatically stressed, as in (38) (capitals denote emphatic stress): (38)

A

You said there was a train at four in the morning but I don't believe you.

B

But there IS one I tell you.

Such sentences as (38B) may be interpreted as emphatic confirmations (or denials) of the truth of the existential predication. The broad degree of consensus on the distinction between the two theres has

13

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

not prevented a number of misunderstandings in the literature. For instance Gary (1974, quoted in Givón, 1979: 73) suggests that constructions like that in (39) constitute a variant of existential sentences: there

in such constructions

typically appears with a definite NP and the force of the communication lies in the presenting of surprise information: (39)

I walked into the room, and there, in front of me, stood John.

It would seem that Gary is confusing the presentative there

with a preposed

locative adverb, even though the second clause in (39) is still to be regarded as a presentative construction (cf. (33) above). Note, by the way, that in existentials there

and be cannot be separated, except in the case of sentence

adverbials like definitely,

surely,

never,

possibly

etc.:

(40)

There, for me at least, was nothing left over.

(41)

There outside on the street has just been a little girl run over.

Conversely, Erdmann (1976: 77,78) in his corpus study of there ascribes to a number of instances of there

constructions

the status of 'pro-form for a

locative phrase1 (by which he means the demonstrative adverb), whereas there can be little doubt that it is presentative there

that is involved:

(42)

In his letter to me he said he was going to Leiden to get in touch with the University — there were books he wanted, scholars he wished to consult.

(43)

We went into a café. There was the usual young man, pale and dissipated, playing the piano.

In addition to the two theres

already mentioned it has also been suggested by

Erdmann that a third type be distinguished. This concerns what Erdmann calls predicative there,

which he sees as the locative adverbial with some of its

locative force lost, and which occurs in the sense of 'be present', 'be available'.

g

Examples are (44) and (45):

(44)

The chance was there for the taking, but we made a hash of it.

(45)

I really encouraged them but the will just wasn't there.

Actually it might be tempting, in the light of the paraphrase Erdmann gives, to

14

ENGLISH EXISTENT IALS IN FG

regard be there not as a weakened locative predicate but rather related to the existential, instantiative predicate. It is striking in this respect that there is very little difference in meaning between sentences such as the following: (46)

We hung on and hung on, but the opportunity was simply not there.

(47)

We hung on and hung on, but there simply wasn't the opportunity.

I will return to this point briefly in 7.1. 1.2.1.2 The syntactic status of 'there' It is generally recognised that presentative there exhibits a wide range of properties characteristic of a NP. It is a peculiar NP, however, in that it exhibits only subject-like behaviour. This is not the case with the demonstrative adverb there, which can occupy a number of syntactic positions in the sentence, including that of subject: (48)

Over there looks quite nice.

(as an adverbial subject)

(49)

No, I'd prefer over there.

(as an adverbial object)

(50)

Pilsen? No, there I've never been.

(51)

There are many excellent breweries there.

(co-occurring with presentative there)

The subject-like behaviour of presentative there becomes clear from the following. In the first place, there can undergo subject-ADX inversion, as in: (52)

Never had there been so many damp squibs on bonfire night.

(53)

Had there been an entrance fee then we probably wouldn't have gone.

Like pronominal subject NPs there can turn up in tags: (54) (55)

There isn't going to be a rocket let off, is there? There can't possibly be a mistake, can there?

Further, presentative there can occur as the subject of verbs like seem, appear, be certain, be rumoured, be believed etc., which allow subject raising: (56)

There seemed to be nothing we could do about the fire.

15

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS (57)

There was rumoured to be a sparkling blonde coining to the party.

Finally, it can function as subject in infinitive and -ing clauses: (58)

I don't want there to be any mucking about in the barn.

(59)

There not being much time to spare, John decided to eat on the train.

These points all relate to positional characteristics of there.

However, verb

agreement, another feature associated with subjects, presents a different picture: agreement is usually controlled by the NP following be, which in most 9 accounts is seen as the underlying (logical) subject. This is shown in (60) and (61): (60)

There was much work left undone.

(61)

Are there any more problems still to be mentioned?

How these competing claims to subjecthood are to be assessed from the point of view of Functional Grammar will be discussed in 2.2 below. The situation with regard to agreement is in fact complicated by the fact that be often appears in the singular even with plural NPs, particularly in spoken English. Usually is

and has (in the case of has been)

are contracted to

's in such cases. (62)

There's hundreds of shells on the beach.

(63)

There's six pints waiting for the first man home.

(64)

There's been no houses built in this town in the last five years.

Breivik (1981: 15f) suggests that there

and be would appear to have developed

into a 'single presentative formula' there's,

this being particularly clear with

such sentences as (65), where a plural form of be would be ungrammatical: (65)

A

Was there anyone interesting at the party last night?

B

Well, there was ( were) Anne and Mary.

The idea that there's

*

is developing as a kind of presentative signal, or

existential particle, will be picked up again in Chapter 7. Where plurality is the result of two singular conjoined NPs it should.

16

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

however, be noted that be tends to be singular anyway, irrespective of whether the NP is definite or indefinite. Thus while (66) is acceptable, (67) is felt by most native speakers of English to be somewhat strange; on the other hand, (68) and (70) are acceptable, whereas (69) is not and (71) is doubtful: (66)

There was a pen and a piece of paper on the table.

(67)

?There were a pen and a piece of paper on the table.

(68)

#A pen and piece of paper were on the table.

(69) (70) (71)

A pen and a piece of paper was on the table. On the table were a pen and a piece of paper. ?On the table was a pen and a piece of paper.

Finally, it will be noted that with theve-presentatives concord is invariably with the NP, hence: *

(72)

There exist ( exists) so many different kinds of green that it is difficult to see the wood for the trees.

One might conclude from the data presented here that since there is a general rule that agreement is controlled by the 'real1 subject, this ought to have a bearing on the analysis of the syntax of existentials. But the data show that to a certain extent different agreement rules operate in existentials than in other sentence types, which has led Milsark (1976: 16) for instance to observe that there is probably not much evidence in these agreement phenomena to suggest the value of one analysis over another. Nevertheless, any analysis of existentials should seek to offer some kind of explanation for the regularities and variations in agreement.

1.3.2

The NP

1.2.2.1

The position of the NP with resyeot to 'be'

A significant fact about existential sentences is that the NP in most cases occurs after the first instance of be. This is termed by Milsark (1976: 10) the 'leftmost be condition'. Hence (73) and (75) are acceptable, but (74) and (76) are not: (73) (74)

*

There was nothing being done to allay his fears. There was being nothing done to allay his fears.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS (75)

There were 100 children killed in the disaster.

(76)

There were killed 100 children in the disaster.

17

There are two well-documented exceptions to the leftmost be condition, involving the semi-modal verbs to be to and to be going to. Consider the following examples: (77)

There is to be a concert this afternoon.

(78)

*There is a concert to be this afternoon.

(79)

There is going to be a concert this afternoon.

(80)

*There is a concert going to be this afternoon.

Note that it is not only a matter of the NP occurring after the second instance of be, but of it necessarily occurring in that position in these examples. Any analysis of existentials must seek to explain these facts, and I will return to the problems involved here in 4.Z. It is at any rate the case that be to and be going to may under certain circumstances occur in the Extension: the following pairs are perfectly acceptable in English, so what is it that blocks (78) and (80) but not (82) and (84). (81)

Don't worry. There's going to be no-one hurt.

(82)

Don't worry. There's no-one going to be hurt.

(83)

There's to be no homework done until the TV's been turned off.

(84)

There's no homework to be done until the TV's been turned off.

Note also, by the way, that other apparent exceptions to the condition involving raising verbs are not in fact considered as exceptions. Within a transformational analysis of existentials for instance (see Chapter 3), cases like (85) and (86): (85)

There are at least 15 members certain to be absent.

(86)

There are certain to be at least 15 members absent.

are distinguished by postulating t^ere-insertion as a cyclic rule. Thus the position taken up by the NP at least IS members in (85) and (86) depends on whether the existence reading is assigned inside or outside the scope of be certain (cf. Milsark, 1976: 105).

18

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

1.2.2.2 The definitenees restriction There has been a tendency, particularly in modern linguistic writings, to speak of a rule that states that only (grammatically) indefinite NPs are acceptable as subjects of existentials. Thus (87) is OK, but (88) is ruled out because the referent of the fly is supposedly given in the context: it is not considered meaningful to assert the existence of something which is already known to exist. (87)

There's a fly in my soup.

(88)

There's the fly in my soup.

Similarly, personal pronouns are held not to occur in existentials: (89)

*There's it/they/them in my soup.

Again, of course, there are clear exceptions to this so-called definiteness restriction. The most frequently documented exception concerns what Milsark (1976: 116) and Rando and Napoli (1978: 301) call listing. Thus in a setting where an annoyed restaurant goer is giving the waiter a list of grievances, (90) is indeed perfectly acceptable. Further examples are (91) and (92). (90)

For a start, there's the fly in my soup.

(91)

If you have any trouble at least there's John and Fred to fall back on.

(92)

If you don't know what to do with yourself there's always my sister you can talk to.

There are also a number of other exceptions to the restriction. First of all there is a group which Bolinger (1977: 119) calls 'reminders', exemplified by (93) : (93)

Don't go yet. There's still the football coupons to be filled in.

Here, something that is known in the previous context is recalled onto the scene. Since that something is being presented again in a new context, the 10

existential is possible. Secondly, consider (94-96), which Lumsden (1983: 132) groups under the 'type' interpretation:

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS (94)

There was the most beautiful sunset this evening.

(95)

There were the same standard fittings in every room.

(96)

There wasn't that problem in America.

19

Note that these sentences can be paraphrased with an indefinite NP: (97)

There was a sunset of the most beautiful kind this evening.

(98)

There were standard fittings of the same type in every room.

(99)

There wasn't a problem of that type in America.

Lumsden (1983: 148) also discusses a similar set of exceptions to which he assigns an 'amount' reading. Examples are (100), (102) and (104), with the appropriate paraphrases added: (100)

We had hoped to continue with our magazine, but there just wasn't the demand.

(101)

There just wasn't a sufficient level of demand.

(102)

I did in fact want to go to the lecture, but there wasn't the time.

(103)

There wasn't a sufficient amount of time.

(104)

There simply aren't the people to make our plan work.

(105)

There simply isn't a sufficient number of people.

In recent studies more insight has been won into the precise nature of the definiteness restriction. Briefly, a distinction has been drawn between weak and strong determiner expressions in the NP according to which a given NP may or may not occur in existentials. Milsark (1976: 117ff), for instance, claims that expressions like most, each, all, every, both, five of the etc. cannot occur in existentials:^' * (106)

There were all authors present at the meeting.

(107)

There was each group represented.

(108) *There were five of the guests dancing in the garden. (109) *There were most (of the) guests not in a fit state to drive home. Moreover, quantified NPs with some and many, in the sense of some of the and many of the respectively, are also ruled out by Milsark: * (110)

There's some of the students in the class who don't know what a verb is.

20

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

(111)

There are many of the problems solvable if you adopt a there-insertion analysis.

whereas when some and many occur as determiners of a NP denoting a hitherto unmentioned class of objects they are simply interpreted as 'a small number', 12

'a large number' rather than 'a small proportion', 'a large proportion';

in

such cases, as well as with the cardinal expressions one, two, etc., existentials are acceptable: (112)

There are many candidates who really have no chance of election.

(113)

There are five crucial questions to be answered.

Milsark interprets the determiner expressions in all the starred examples (106111), along with the definite article, as quantifiers over a given class, and it is this, he argues, that lies behind the definiteness restriction. On the other hand, Rando and Napoli (1978) claim that it is not the quantifier/cardinal, or strong/weak, distinction which is at the root of the problem but one of anaphoric/non-anaphoric, or semantically definite/indefinite, but these terms are not precisely enough defined; moreover, McCawley (1981: 425ff) presents data which appear to contradict the intuitions of Milsark. Definitely a sentence like (114) seems totally acceptable, although Milsark's analysis does not predict this: (114)

There was more than half the class who couldn't spell diarrhoea.

Just as troublesome are the existentials in (115) and (116), which are acceptable in specific contexts but which do not clearly belong to any of the groups of exceptions just mentioned. (115)

Everytime I go round to see him there's his sister there.

(116)

I looked out of the window and noticed that there was John standing at the door.

In the light of such exceptions a detailed reappraisal of the definiteness restriction will be given in Chapter 5 from a functional point of view. It will be shown that a more precise formulation of the restriction can be given in terms of pragmatic function assignment.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 1.2.3

21

The Extension

The Extension can take various forms: (117)

a. b.

0 LOC

c.

TEMP

d.

V-ing (NP) (NP)

e.

V-en (by NP)

f.

ADJ

Examples of the various forms are given in (118): (118)

a.

There was absolutely no doubt.

b.

There's a hair in the gate.

c.

There was yet another riot last night.

d.

There was a crowd of people shouting obscenities outside 10 Downing Street.

e.

There were quite a number of people shocked by the programme.

f.

There were a number of senior politicians doubtful about the outcome.

As far as restrictions are concerned the most interesting category in (117) is the adjectival predicate, but it will also be noted that NPs are excluded from the list, as well as tensed verbal predicates. The latter will be discussed in 4.4.1. As far as adjectival and nominal predicates are concerned a restriction applies which has been referred to as the predicate restriction. 1.2.3.1

The predicate restriction

Note first of all that nominal predicates in the Extension yield unacceptable existentials: (119) *There was a man a fool. (120)

There was John a labourer.

Moreover, as has been observed in various studies on existentials certain adjectival predicates do not occur either. Thus while (121-123) are acceptable, (124-126) are not:

22

ENGLISH EX ISTENTIALS IN FG

(121)

There was a first year student sick yesterday.

(122)

There must be someone crazy enough to undertake such a venture.

(123) *Is there anyone hungry yet? (124) *There is a first year student intelligent. (125) •There was someone crazy. There are a lot of flags white.

(126)

The difference between the first three and the last three cases has been described as one concerning state and property-assigning adjectival predicates (cf. Milsark, 1976: 128, as well as the detailed analysis of the restriction in Lumsden, 1983: Ch.4). In this light one can look again at the restriction on nominal predicates. In most cases nominal predicates are property-assigning,^ suggesting that (119) is out for the same reason as (124-126). Milsark argues that the reason for precisely this class of predicate being blocked has in fact to do with the weak/strong distinction mentioned in 1.2.2.2 above. He notes that state-denoting predicates can have subjects with weak determiners but not property-denoting predicates, as (127-128) show:

(127) *A teacher was ill. (128) A teacher was intelligent. It is then possible to conclude that property-denoting predicates are blocked quite simply because strong determiner NPs are blocked. However, if it is the case that the definiteness restriction must in fact be reviewed in the light of the acceptability of strong determiner NPs in certain contexts, then such an account of the predicate restriction will also need to be reviewed. What is more, in cases where strong determiner NPs appear quite natural in existentials — independent of context — property-denoting adjectival predicates will also occur, as shown in (129) and (130): (129)

If you ask me there's a lot of it untrue.

(130)

I have a class of remedial students this year, but surprisingly there's some of them quite good.

Accordingly, another look will be taken at this restriction in Chapter 6. It will transpire that the predicate restriction is much more difficult than the definiteness restriction to pin down in precise terms, and that what we may be dealing with is in fact a tendency for certain predicates not to occur rather

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

23

than a hard-line restriction. 1.3 Accounting for 'there' Much has been written on the source and meaning of there, and the views put forward differ considerably. A basic distinction can be made between locative and non-locative accounts of its synchronic derivation. In an attempt to offer a brief survey of the arguments advanced I will also apply a further rough distinction between strong and weak locative accounts. 1.3.1 The strong locative account The strong locative account involves an explicit proposal that presentative there is derived directly from a locative constituent. Such a proposal is made in one form or another by a number of linguists who attempt to analyse existentials like (131) as being derived from sources like (132) by various movements of the locative constituent: (131)

There was a needle in the haystack.

(132)

A needle was in the haystack.

Fillmore (1968: 46), for instance, argues that there is a pro-form replacement for a locative constituent which has been copied into subject position. In a similar vein, Kuno (1971: 349) says of (133) (133)

There are two books on the table.

that 'the mere fact that there is there .... suggests that the locative on the table used to be in sentence-initial position before it was postposed to the end of the sentence*. There is thus seen as what Kuno calls a 'trace' of locative postposing. Anderson (1971: 107-9) adopts a derivational approach essentially the same as that of Fillmore, with a locative element being subjectivized (thematized in Fillmore's terminology), then copied back into the neutral locative position and the first locative being 'expletivized*. Anderson thus sees there as containing little more semantic specification than locativity, with the full lexical content represented in the copy. This view is in turn similar to that taken by Lyons, who in a number of publications (1967, 1968, 1973) has postulated that presentative there is

24

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

derived from a locative constituent, but adds that it does not have all the features of the locative phrase; rather, only the "deictically neutral locative component1 (1973: 32, n. 14) of the locative phrase is extracted and copied in there. There is thus seen as a 'syntactic device of English for "anticipating" the locative phrase in surface structure1 (1968: 393). 1.3.2 The weak locative aeeoimt A weak locative account of there is presented by those writers who, while proposing that there does involve some degree of locativity, do not make any specific claim for direct derivation from an underlying locative constituent (which may or may not find itself realised in surface structure), but rather argue that this is in fact impossible on the basis of the many distinctions between presentative and demonstrative there. In this context Allan (1971) proposes that there plus a form of be is to be seen as expressing one functiona1 unit, 'the existential operator in the noun phrase, as one might anticipate from the use of the existential operator in logic' (1971: 15). The assertion of existence of an object is equated with the assertion of a spatio-temporal location for that object, this being encapsulated in the classical dictum 'whatever is is somewhere; whatever is nowhere is nothing' (cf. Kahn, 1966: 258); within the one functional element, there is claimed to indicate spatial location and the tense of be will indicate temporal location. Although Allan rejects what he calls the Fillmore-Lyons argument concerning derivation, Allan and Lyons do seem to be making similar claims as to the meaning, or force, of there: an indicator of unspecified spatial location on the one hand; a deictically neutral, weak locative demonstrative on the other. Bolinger (1977: 91-4) arrives at a similar conclusion about the meaning of there, though again without particularly concerning himself with exactly how there gets into sentences. However, rather than seeing things in terms of simple spatio-temporal location, Bolinger seeks to show that both existentialpresentatives and tftere-presentatives are constructions that bring something into awareness, where awareness is to be seen as 'abstract location', and is the meaning of there itself. The 'bringing into' is provided by the position of there in the presentative construction. Bolinger attempts to narrow down what precisely is meant by the notion of abstract location by first of all contrasting sentences with and without there. He concludes that presentative constructions with fronted locative phrases but

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

25

without there present something vividly 'on the immediate stage', whereas with there the object is being presented to our mind, is being 'brought into consciousness'. Consider in this respect (134-138) below, borrowed from Bolinger: * (134) As I recall, across the street is a grocery. (135)

As I recall, across the street there's a grocery.

(136) *As you can see, across the street is a grocery. (137) I can see that across the street is a grocery. (138)

I can see that across the street there's a grocery.

Examples (135) and (138) involve the giving of information, whereas (136) is deictic and the utterance could well be accompanied by pointing one's finger. The distinction can be reinforced by (139), where the vivid force of the preposed locative puts an abstract locative out of place: (139)

The children were wondering what was going to happen when up popped a sparkling marionette.

(140)

Up there popped a sparkling marionette.

Moreover, when the existence of something is asserted which is not in the listener's view, there is more likely. Thus, as Bolinger points out, if someone has a pencil in their open palm, extended forward, and an eraser in the other hand, clenched shut behind their back, they will tend to say: (141)

In my right hand is a pencil, and in my left there's an eraser.

The data considered here allow another interpretation however. Breivik (1981: llf), for instance, describes the use of sentences like those in (134-141) in a similar way to Bolinger, introducing the 'visual impact constraint', whereby lack of visual impact leads to the obligatory use of there; however, Breivik nevertheless rejects the argument that there has any semantic content and assigns it instead an essentially pragmatic function as a presentative signal. 1.3.3 The non-locative account Equally as popular as the locative account has been the argument that there itself does not contribute anything in its own right to the meaning of the

26

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

construction of which it is part. Such an argument is prevalent in transformational analyses of existential sentences involving there-insertion. Basically, the traditional transformational analysis seeks to derive (143) from (142) by a process of rightward movement of the subject NP with insertion of there into the vacated subject slot: (142)

Someone was lying ill in the corner.

(143)

There was someone lying ill in the corner.

Since there is inserted transformationally it is assumed to have no semantic content of its own. This view is in keeping with the claim that there functions as a dummy subject (cf. Quirk et al., 1972: 961). However, this does not mean to say that (142) and (143) do not differ in meaning: Milsark (1976) for instance, argues that the existential reading of (143) is an interpretation of the whole derived structure, with the existential contribution coming from there, although there itself remains essentially meaningless. It is not only in the traditional transformational analyses that one comes across such an interpretation of there. Bach (1980), for instance, suggests that there can be directly generated but still does not want to assign it any separate interpretation. In this case direct generation is required since the approach adopted — within a Montague Grammar framework — will not permit grammatical sentences with ungrammatical sources, and it is a well-documented fact about the there-insertion analysis that it has to cope with a 1

sourcelessness1 problem: (144) and (146) are unacceptable even though the

allegedly related existentials are perfectly OK (cf. Kimball, 1973). (144)

A pain is in my arm.

(145)

There's a pain in my arm.

(146) *Doubts are about his health. (147)

There are doubts about his health.

Finally, Breivik (1981) criticises Lyons' analysis of presentative there as a weak demonstrative adverb. The criticism is predominantly based on the syntactic features of there mentioned in 1.2.1.2, but also on semantic intuitions: the subject NP there does not appear to function as a referring expression, whereas the demonstrative adverb definitely does. Breivik goes on to suggest that any synchronic analysis of presentative there would be wrong to postulate any

27

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

relation at all with the locative adverbial, rather that there should be seen as a 'compensatory device, filling the position usually occupied by the logical subject' (1981: 7). As mentioned briefly above, he proposes not only a syntactic function for there but also a pragmatic one: the insertion of there into the vacant subject slot allows the 'communicative core' to be shifted away from the beginning of the sentence, in accordance with the principle of the basic distribution of communicative dynamism (cf. Firbas, 1966), whereby in the unmarked case thematic elements precede rhematic (new in the situational context) elements, or in other words topic precedes focus. Thus (148) is said 14 to represent a (stylistic) (148)

deviation from the basic order:

A man was at the door.

Breivik concludes that there can best be seen as a presentative signal, in existentials constituting a presentative unit together with be, and any identification on the synchronic level between the two theres should not be entertained, although it may be that they are ultimately derived from one and the same source. 1.Z.4

An integrated

view

Another way of interpreting the meaning and use of existentials can be offered by on the one hand acknowledging the characterisation of existence as a kind of assertion of generalised spatio-temporal location while also acknowledging the syntactic behaviour of there as a nominal — as far as its positional behaviour is concerned — rather than as an adverbial element. As far as the distinction made by Bolinger and Breivik in respect of visual impact is concerned it is also possible to talk in terms not of the actual locative force of there, as Bolinger suggests, but of two different kinds of presentation, with there being seen as a particular kind of presentative signal. In Chapter 2 a first sketch is given of a means of approaching the analysis of existentials in this way: by assuming an existential predicate in the underlying representation of existential sentences which has a general locative characteristic, but assuming at the same time that there is not present in the underlying representation and is inserted into a particular position in the surface linear order by a specific rule. Thus although there be may be seen as an indirect realisation of this existential predicate, there itself will not be viewed as the direct realisation of any underlying locative element and,

28

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

moreover, be will not be viewed as an existential verb but rather as a copula. Such an approach may also be advantageous from a typological point of view. One of the main aims of Functional Grammar is a maximum degree of typological adequacy, and it is well known that existential constructions in many languages do not have an overt locative element (cf. Clark, 1978). By adopting the abovementioned approach the underlying locative character of the existential predicate may be retained without the additional assumption that existentials will be characterised by the presence of an element with a locative force. However, the fact that a number of languages do have existential constructions characterised by a locative element may be understood in the light of the locative nature of the existential predicate.

1.4

Summary

What has emerged in this chapter as relevant for the rest of the study can be briefly summarised as follows. Existential sentences in English have been defined syntactically as those sentences which involve presentative there in combination with some form of the verb be. From a semantic and pragmatic point of view they can be distinguished from other related sentence types. This will be further substantiated in the coming chapters. In Chapter 2 there is, in addition to an outline of the organisation of Functional Grammar, a preliminary sketch of how existentials can be represented in a Functional Grammar framework, including a brief discussion of the problems relating to the surface position of the NP, which is a characteristic feature of presentative constructions, as well as a note on how a Functional Grammar analysis will treat the syntactic status of there. A number of specific problems in the syntax and semantics of existentials have been mentioned. With regard to the existential predicate itself one may ask what the argument of such a predicate is: what is asserted to exist? In fact, this question will be shown in Chapters 3 and 4 to be related to the issue of the syntactic status of be. As regards the NP it has been hinted that a reappraisal of the definiteness restriction is required in the light of a number of unexplained exceptions to this restriction, and that the pragmatic status of the NP may be relevant in this respect. The occurrence of definite NPs is the subject of Chapter 5. In the light of this, consideration will also be given to discourse-sensitive aspects of the existential predicate. A similar problem has arisen concerning the predicate restriction. Here too

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS it has been suggested that there are unexplained exceptions, as a result of which it becomes difficult to explain the restriction in terms of the restriction on NPs. The predicate restriction is looked at in Chapter 6. All in all, I am suggesting that there is reason to believe that an understanding of the function of existentials in discourse can contribute to a more precise account of the nature of the various restrictions which apply.

Chapter 2

Relevant aspects of Functional Grammar

I will not go into great detail here concerning the overall aims and organisation of Functional Grammar (henceforth FG). The basic model is presented in Dik (1978) and developed further in particular by Dik (1980a; forthcoming) and Bolkestein et al. (1981) . Furthermore, a number of surveys of the model have appeared in Dik (1980a, 1980b, 1983a, 1983b) and Hoekstra (1981). I will thus restrict myself in the first instance to a general outline of the organisation of the model (section 2.1). In addition, however, some consideration of specific aspects of the model is required as a preliminary to the analysis of the existential construction, in particular with regard to: (a) providing an adequate account of the predicate frame associated with existentials which reflects their essential semantic characteristics; (b) formulating specific expression rules required for translating fully specified predications into actual linguistic expressions; (c) describing the nature of the various restrictions on existentials, in particular the so-called definiteness restriction. Accordingly a further section of this chapter will be devoted to a consideration of how existentials have been treated in previous work within FG. Specifically, attention will be paid to the problems raised by there, both with respect to the question of its representation in the underlying predication and with respect to its syntactic status. I will also briefly consider various views on the representation of be as a copula in FG. Finally, in 2.3 a sketch will be given of the pragmatic functions Topic and Focus, to be mentioned in only general terms in the outline in 2.1. Since both these pragmatic notions tend to be interpreted in various ways by linguists and also seeing that they are given broad definitions in FG, it will be necessary to specify how they will be used in the present study. Topic and Focus are generally relevant within FG for triggering placement rules, and will turn out to be particularly relevant with regard to existentials for reanalysing in pragmatic terms the nature of the definiteness restriction.

32 2.1

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG Outline

of the organisation

of FG

In FG all content elements are conceived as predicates, which in turn are seen as elements of structures called predicate frames. These form the basis for the construction of predications, which after syntactic and pragmatic function assignment yield fully specified predications. Expression rules then apply to give linguistic expressions. This chain of production can be traced in Fig. 1 (from Dik, 1983: 11).

Fig. l: The organisation

of a functional

gvcmrnar

ASPECTS OF FG 2.1.1

33

Predicate frames and semantic functions

The structures in (1-3) are examples of basic predicate frames: (1)

problem^ (Xj)

(2)

difficulty (x^ l'y

(3)

'xi :

an:i n

- i(x

(x : anim(x )) '3 Rec

Predicate frames may also be derived by predicate formation rules, as shown in Fig. 1. One such rule, that of term-predicate formation, will be relevant in the analysis of existentials to be given in later chapters, and a separate note on this type of predicate formation is provided in 2.2.3 below. As summarised in Dik (1983: 10), predicate frames give the following information: (a) the predicate and its category — nominal, adjectival or verbal; (b) the number of argument positions that the predicate has, together with the semantic functions and selection restrictions associated with these argument positions. Predicate frames designate states of affairs, in the broad sense of 'what can be the case in some world' (Dik, 1978: 32). These states of affairs are assumed to be of four kinds, depending on the parameters of control and dynamism: actions (+Co, +Dy) , processes (.-Co, +Dy) , positions (+Co, -Dy) and states (-Co, -Dy). The semantic functions associated with the argument positions are related to these four types. Thus for instance the first argument of an action predication will always have the semantic function Agent. The first argument of a process designates either the entity affected or effected by the process, or the non-controlling cause of it. In the first instance the semantic function Processed is involved, in the second Force. As far as states are concerned the first argument is assigned the zero semantic function 0, no specific semantic relation between the argument and the whole predication being detectable. The various roles that semantic functions have in FG are listed by Dik (1983: 13) as: (a) they characterise the fundamental semantic relations within the predication; (b) they co-define the typology of states of affairs; (c) they co-determine Subject and Object assignment possibilities; (d) they co-determine the formal expression of terms; (e) they indirectly play a role in patterns of constituent ordering; (f) they make take part in cross-reference and agreement relations; (g) they serve to differentiate Subjects and Objects

34

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

in terms of their underlying semantic functions. An often mentioned problem relating to semantic functions, deep cases etc. is how many should actually be differentiated. This is of no concern in the present study, and the only semantic functions to be employed will be among those listed in Dik (1978).1 Finally it should be noted that basic and derived predicate frames together constitute what are called 'nuclear' predicate frames. These may become 'extended1 predicate frames by the further optional introduction of satellites, which specify additional features of the state of affairs; they are thus related to the whole nuclear predication rather than just the predicate, which is the case with arguments. Satellites have in common with arguments that they consist of variables marked for a semantic function. Thus in (4) (4)

John., . cut the bread.. . with a pen-knife._ ^ . (Ag) (Go) (Instr)

John and the bread are the Agent and Goal terms of the nuclear predication, which is extended with the satellite instrument term with a pen-knife. For a discussion of satellite introduction see Dik (1978: 49-53). 2.1.2 Terms and term-insertion Predicate frames are further developed into predications as a result of the argument positions being filled by terms, which are expressions with referential potential. Most terms are arrived at by an operation of term formation which produces structures based on the format given in (5) : (5)

tox.^jix.)

:2(x1) :....:^(x^)

In (5) the x^ term variable stands for the intended referent of the term; 01 stands for term operators for such features as definiteness and number; further, j (x^) indicates an 'open predication in x^', that is to say a predicate frame all of whose term positions have been filled with the exception of the variable x^; finally, the colon is to be interpreted as 'such that', so that the structure for the term phrase 'a difficult problem' given in (6) will be interpreted as in (7): (6)

(ilxi: problem^x^ : difficul^(x±) )

ASPECTS OF FG (7)

35

indefinite single entity x^ such that 'problem' of x^ such that •difficult' of x. 1

When all the argument and satellite slots have been filled, the result is a closed predication. An example of such a closed predication is given below for the sentence in (8): (8)

A major problem has arisen in the analysis.

(9)

Pres Perf arise,, (ilx. : problemlx.): major(x.)) (dlx.: analysis (x.)) „ 1 V l i I Proc ] j L


Rec >

Ben

Instr

Loc

+

>

+

>

+

> + >

+

>

+

>

+

> +

Time + > +

Thus the primary Subject candidate is the Agent term and the primary Object candidate is the Goal term. Each language has its own 'cutoff points' on the hierarchy. Subject and Object assignment have obvious consequences for the formal expression of the predication. The most relevant for this study concern Subject assignment: expression rules will ensure (a) agreement between the verb and the Subject term and (b) the specific positioning of the Subject term in the surface linear order. One problem concerning the first of these points was already mentioned in 1.2.1.2 with regard to the apparent lack of agreement between verb and Subject in some existentials, and both issues will be further discussed in the course of the following chapters. Yet another matter to be raised later on is the possibility of assigning more than one syntactic function to the same constituent. 2.1.4 Pragmatic function assignment A further basic assumption in FG is that different Subject and Object assignments are not enough to account for all the different forms in which a given underlying predication can be realised. To account for specific differences in constituent ordering as well as stress and intonation, pragmatic functions may be assigned to the individual constituents of the underlying predication. Differences in pragmatic function assignment correspond to differences in the communicative status of constituents within the wider pragmatic setting in which the predication is used. Four pragmatic functions are distinguished. Theme and Tail are relevant to expressions outside the predication proper, and the other two — Topic and Focus — to constituents within the predication. Theme and Tail are defined as follows:

37

ASPECTS OF FG (16)

THEME:

The Theme specifies the universe of discourse with respect to which the subsequent predication is presented as relevant.

TAIL:

The Tail presents, as an 'afterthought' to the predication, information meant to specify, clarify or modify it in various ways.

An example of each is given in (17) and (18), with the Theme and Tail expressions italicised: (17)

As for linguistics, you probably won't like it until the third year.

(18)

If you ask me he means trouble, that one.

More relevant in the present context however are the Topic and Focus functions, defined as follows: (19)

TOPIC:

A constituent with Topic function presents the entity 'about' which the Predication predicates something in the given setting.

FOCUS:

A constituent with Focus function presents the relatively most important or salient information with respect to the pragmatic information of the Speaker and the Addressee.

These functions are discussed in greater detail in 2.3; in general terms the following remarks may be made: (A)

It is important to note that Topic function is restricted to terms, while

Focus function may be assigned to both terms and predicates. This is illustrated in (20) and (21): (20) (21)

A

Who was sleeping?

B

John was sleeping.

A

What was John doing?

B

He was sleeping.

In (20B) John presents the most salient information, and since the predicate involved cannot be assigned Topic function, there is no Topic present at all. (20B) is hence represented as in (22). In the case of (21B) on the other hand, the predication is about the entity referred to by he, and the sleeping represents the most important information in the given setting. Here then both

38

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

Topic and Focus are present, as the representation in (25) shows: (22)

Past Prog sleep,, (dlx. : John(x.))„ _ V l l PoSub]Foc

(23)

Past Prog sleep,„, (dlx.: he(x.)) „ , VFoc l l PoSub]Top

(B) A second point relates to the different representations for the answers to the questions in (24) and (25): (24) (25)

A

What did John do?

B

He broke the window.

A

What happened?

B

John broke the window.

In (24B) Focus will be assigned to more than one constituent (broke and the window). (25B) on the other hand is regarded as being a plain assertion of a fact and the whole predication contains new information in the setting. Such a predication is according to Dik et al. (1981: 44) Focus neutral, and one may hence choose to assign no pragmatic function at all, or alternatively assign Focus to each constituent, since all information presented by the predication is new in the given setting. Accordingly (24B) and (25B) would receive the representations in (26) and (27): (26)

Past break (dlx.: he(x.))„ „ . . (dlx.: window(x.))„ „ Woe l l AgSub]Top ] ] GoObjFoc

(27)

Past break (dlx.: John(x.))„ „ , (dlx.: window(x.))^, VFoc l l AgSub]Foc 3 ] GoObjFoc

2.2.5 Express-ion rules and constituent ordering The representations in (26) and (27) are examples of fully specified predications which contain all information needed for triggering the expression rules. The expression rules translate the predication into an ordered linguistic expression, determining (a) the form of terms and predicates, (b) the order of constituents and (c) stress and intonation. In the present context I will be primarily concerned with rules governing constituent ordering. For a detailed discussion of other expression rules see Dik (1980b). The ordering patterns found in a language are held to emerge from three interacting and partly counteracting forces, which Dik (1983b: 25) summarises

39

ASPECTS OF FG as follows: (28)

(a)

Place constituents with the same syntactic function in the same position.

(b)

Place constituents with a pragmatic function in a 'special' position.

(c)

Order constituents in such a way that they get more and more complex toward the end of the linguistic expression.

The tendencies referred to in (28a-b) suggest that ordering patterns are strongly determined by functional factors, and they are accounted for in FG by assuming that all languages have one or more 'functional patterns' derived from the general format in (29): (29)

P2, Pi

(V)

S

(V)

0

(V), P3

P2 and P3 are extra-predication positions associated with Theme and Tail respectively. Pi is a special clause-initial position filled by designated constituents such as question words, relative pronouns and subordinators, or by constituents with a pragmatic function. Finally V, S and 0 mark the possible positions for Verb, Subject and Object. To account for the tendency in (28c) a 'language-independent preferred order of constituents', or LIPOC, is assumed (cf. Dik, 1978: Ch.9). This principle states that constituents will tend to be ordered from left to right according to the increasing degree of categorial complexity, defined by the hierarchy of relative complexity in (30): (30)

2

LIPOC Clitic - Pronoun - Adpositional Phrase - Subordinate Clause

The application of LIPOC may effect adaptations of the basic functional pattern. For instance, if the Subject term is itself a subordinate predication, there is a rule in English which may send that term to the X position in the functional pattern (see (31-2) below) and inserts it into the pattern position. As far as the functional patterns of English are concerned, the following two patterns are distinguished, (31) being relevant for declarative main clauses and all subordinate clauses and (32) covering mainly interrogative main clauses.

40

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

(31)

PI

S

(32)

PI

Vf

Vf

Vi

O

X

S

Vi

O

X

The placement rules are ordered in such a way that PI is filled first, and then all other constituents are placed in pattern position. Finally, note that the patterns given in (31) and (32) cannot account for all clause types in English, notably existentials and other presentative constructions as described in 1.1.Z. This problem will be described in some detail separately below in 2.2.2, and a solution offered in Chapter 7, where the expression rules for a series of existential sentences are discussed. 2.2

The treatment of existentials in FG

Little work has been done in Functional Grammar concerning the treatment of existentials, either cross-linguistically or in specific languages. The only — brief — discussion concerning English (apart from the discussion of specific aspects in Hannay (1982) which forms the basis for various more detailed discussions in the rest of this study) is to be found in Dik (1980a: 109f). However, the proposals there are of a rather speculative nature, and in this section I want to consider the various options a little more closely. There are two main problems: firstly, what kind of predication underlies the existential construction; and secondly, how do there constructions in general and the there be construction in particular fit in with the functional word order patterns postulated for English (Dik, 1978: 184; 1980a: 220). 2.2.1 The representation of 'there' The kind of predication that underlies the there be construction will be determined partly by how one chooses to account for the occurrence of there, and I will concentrate on this here as a preliminary to considering further semantic characteristics of existentials in the following two chapters. In this respect the problems broached in 1.3 return here in a more concrete form. One may either represent there more or less directly in the underlying predication and regard it as the output expression of some kind of locative term, or else it may be seen as representing nothing more than a formal element, in which case its occurrence is purely the product of the expression rules, which would require some other form of specific trigger in the underlying predication in order to produce there.^ Thus common to both options is the need for some feature in the underlying predication to feed the expression rules. This must

41

ASPECTS OF FG

be so since it is a stipulation in FG that fully specified predications contain all the information required for determining the semantic content of the expression as well as everything needed for the expression rules to produce an appropriate linguistic form (Dik, 1983b: 23). Dik (1980a: 108), in discussing various existential structures in Dutch and English, assumes that Dutch ev and English there are dummy elements and are each introduced by an expression rule. He starts off by considering the underlying representations to be assigned to structures in Dutch like (33-36):

(33)

De

hond loopt in de

The dog

runs

tuin.

in the garden

'The dog is running in the garden' (34)

Er

loopt een hond in de

There runs

a

dog

tuin.

in the garden

'There is a dog running in the garden' (35)

De

hond is in de

The dog

tuin.

is in the garden

'The dog is in the garden' (36)

Er

is een hond in de

There is a

dog

tuin.

in the garden

'There is a dog in the garden' For (33) and (34) , as well as for (35) and (36) , underlying representations are assigned which differ only in the nature of the term operators on the Subject term: (33) and (35) involve a definite Subject term and (34) and (36) have an indefinite Subject term. The representations for (33-36) are given in (37-40), with (39) and (40) involving a term predicate (cf. 2.2.3).

(37)

(=33)

Pres lopen r

(38)

(=34)

Pres lopen, (ilx. : hond(x.)), „ . . (dlx.: tuin(x.)l c V l 1 AgSubj j j Loc

(39)

(=35)

Pres {(dlx.: tuin(x.)) } (dlx.: hond(x.))„„ . . -j ] Loc l l 0Sub]

(40)

(=36)

Pres {(dlx.: tuin(x.)) } (dlx.: hond(x.))„„ , . 3 ] Loc l l 0Sub]

V

(dlx.: hond(x.))„ „ , . (dlx.: tuin(x.)l 1 1 AgSubj 3 j Loc

The semantic relation of existence/location claimed for (36) (Dik, 1980a: 111) is held to emerge from the application of a locative predicate to an indefinite

42

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

term. This constitutes a trigger for a kind of er insertion: er is not present in any form in the underlying predication, but rather is inserted into the Pi slot, the indefinite subject constituent being placed in the S pattern position, which in Dutch main clauses is immediately following the finite verb form. An important consideration in adopting this approach to er is the desire for an optimally adequate account from a typological point of view, as noted in 1.3.4 above. If one looks for instance at Clark's (1978:93) data for existential-locative constructions in 30 different languages it is striking how rarely such pro-forms as er occur, whether they have a locative character, as do er and there,

or not, as in German es.

Where they do occur, the languages

involved will tend to have a Pl-V basic order (cf. Haiman's (1974) V/2 constraint) or, as in English, a Pl-S-V order,- whereas they will not appear in strictly V-initial languages, where a verb form fills the PI slot. On the basis of the structural similarity between (36) and its English translation equivalent in (41), one may assume a similar underlying predication in English, given in (42): (41)

There's a dog in the garden.

(42)

Pres {(dlx.: garden(x.))T } (ilx.: dog(x.))„„ . . = I 0Sub] j D Loc I

This will not work for all existentials, however. Later in the same section Dik (1980: 109) goes on to discuss sentences like (43): (43)

There is beer without alcohol.

Here beev without alcohol

is a complex term, and no specified locative element

is present. In order to retain the idea of the existential reading arising from the combination of a locative predicate and an indefinite term, Dik proposes a representation involving an unspecified locative term predicate, so that (43) would be represented as in (44): (44)

Pres {(0). } (ix.: beer(x.): without alcohol(x.))_„ Loc i i 1 PSub]

Thus (42) and (44) have in common that they allow there

to be accounted for by

the same rules. It must again be stressed, by the way, that the unspecified locative predicate in (44) is not meant to directly account for there

in the

surface, but rather remains unspecified in the linguistic expression. This is

43

ASPECTS OF PG in accordance with the view offered in 1.2.4.

A major problem with Dik's analysis is that the postulated semantic relation of existence cannot be defined as only residing in the combination of an indefinite term with a locative predicate, since it is going to be necessary to accept the possibility of definite terms in existentials (cf. 1.2.1.2). Thus if we were to accept the proposed representations of (33-36) above, the existential and non-existential counterpart constructions in (45) and (46) respectively would receive the same underlying representation, namely that in (47): (45)

I have to hurry because there's the vicar at the door.

(46)

I have to hurry because the vicar is at the door.

(47)

Pres {(dlx.: door(x.)) } (dlx.: vicar (x.)) „„ , . 3 ] Loc I x 0Sub]

But since I am assuming that the existential reading must be triggered by some feature of the fully specified predication, (47) is clearly not sufficient for 4 producing (45).

Indeed, the same actually goes for (48-50) as well, where an

indefinite subject term is involved, although again Dik's analysis would predict that (50) underlies both (48) and (49): (48)

There's a vicar at the door.

(49)

A vicar is at the door.

(50)

Pres {(dlx.: door(x.))T } (ilx.: vicar(x.))„„ . . 3 ] Loc l i 0Sub]

In the light of the formal similarity of (43), (45) and (48) and their — related — existential reading, it seems worth while to investigate the appropriateness of adopting similar underlying representations for these cases based on the representation in (44) for the bare existential, thus rejecting the approach outlined in (33-40) above (although retaining the idea that there should be handled by an expression rule). In order to assess the appropriateness of such a representation Chapters 3 and 4 will be devoted to a detailed analysis of the semantic properties of existentials, with particular attention being paid to more complex there be constructions like (51): (51)

Be careful! There may have been someone hurt.

Evidence will be presented which suggests that these cases too may be amenable to a representational analysis based on that in (44). In short, then, the claim

44

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

to be investigated is that all existentials may be seen as involving a state predication with a one-place, unspecified locative term predicate in their underlying representation. I will also refer to this subsequently as the existential predicate. One consequence of an approach which assumes an existential predicate in the underlying representations of sentences like (43), (45) and (48) is that therepresentatives like (52) will clearly not be able to be represented in the same way, despite there-. (52)

There ensued a riot.

Such constructions are likely to have representations similar to their nonpresentative counterparts. Thus (54) underlies both (52) and (53): (53)

A riot ensued.

(54)

Past ensue,, (ilx, : riot(x.))„ „ V i i ProcSub]

The fact that (52) may receive a representation similar to its non-presentative counterpart, while existentials and their non-existential counterparts do have different representations (in terms of the structure of the predicate frame), does not really constitute a problem. In fact, this follows from the initial claim that there be constructions have a unique semantic characteristic. The only feature that the representations for t/ie^e-presentatives and existentials may be expected to have in common is a trigger which will allow the Subject term to be assigned to the particular position associated with presentatives, as noted in 1.1.3, and which will allow there to be inserted. The nature of this trigger will be discussed in Chapter 7. To summarise, the main differences between the approach offered by Dik and the one being sketched here can be seen by comparing the various assumptions concerning the sentences in (55): (55)

(a) There was a vicar at the door. (b)

A vicar was at the door.

(c)

The vicar was at the door.

(d)

There was the vicar at the door.

(e)

There arose a problem.

(f) There was a vicar standing at the door.

ASPECTS OF FG (g)

45

There was a problem.

Dik's analysis involves the following: (i)

(55a-d) all involve specified locative term predicates, (55d) clearly constituting a problem for his analysis;

(ii)

(55e-f) both involve verbal predicates;

(iii)

only (55g) involves an unspecified locative term predicate.

In contrast, I will seek to motivate an analysis whereby: (i)

(55a,d,f,g) all involve the unspecified locative term predicate;

(ii)

only (55b-c) involve specified locative term predicates;

(iii)

only (55e) involves a verbal predicate.

2.2.2

Existentials and the functional patterns of English

In accordance with the nature of Subject assignment in FG, as outlined in 2.1.3, the post-copular term, at least in existentials without an Extension, is seen as the Subject term (for complex existentials, cf. 3.2 and 5.4.1). Thus in the representation of (56) the Zero argument is assigned Subject function. (56)

There was a problem.

(57)

Past { (0) } (ilx.: problem(x. ) ) Loc i l 0Subj

It is now necessary to consider how existentials, which as presentative constructions are characterised syntactically by a particular position of the Subject, fit into the functional patterns assumed for English. Related to this issue is how a FG analysis will handle the syntactic status of there. The following two functional patterns are proposed by Dik (1978: 184) for English: (58)

Pi

S

(59)

PI

Vf

Vf

Vi

0

X

S

Vi

0

X

The pattern in (58) is the major pattern for declarative main clauses, as well as for subordinate clauses, and is exemplified in (60); the pattern in (59) is reserved mainly for interrogatives and cases of inversion, as in (61-63) , although other minor clause types may belong here too, such as the conditional clause in (64):

46

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

(60)

Tomorrow night I am throwing a big party.

(61)

What did he buy?

(62)

Have you seen the new Bond film?

(63)

Never have I seen such rubbish.

Pi PI Pi

Pi (64)

S Vf

Vf

S

S

O

Vi

Vi

Vf

Vi

O

S Vi

O

Had I known the answer Pi

S Vi

O

In Dik (1980a: 220) a third pattern is proposed with the following form: (65)

Pi

Vf

Vi

S

X

Evidence for adopting this third pattern comes from sentences like those in (66-72): (66)

At the bar stood three old women.

(67)

In the corner was John.

(68)

Sitting in the corner was the girl with the green hat.

(69)

A major problem in this respect have been the examples from English.

(70)

Of considerable interest has been the introduction of the 30-hour week.

(71)

Equally important is that you get your serve going.

(72)

Up went the red flag.

All these sentences are typical examples of presentative constructions. Since in fact it seems that it is especially constructions of this type that fit readily into the pattern in (65) I will call this pattern the presentative pattern. This extension of the functional patterns points up the importance of establishing different patterns, since it is clear that the presentative pattern is exploited in English for constructions with a particular discourse function. Existentials, as a particular kind of presentative construction, might also be expected to fit into the presentative pattern, and at first glance a sentence like (73) does indeed appear to do so: (73)

There have been a few problems. Pi

Vf

Vi

S

47

ASPECTS OF FG

However, as Dik (1980: 220) points out, a problem arises here when one considers sentences like (74), where it appears that there has assumed the Subject position, which suggests we are dealing with a different functional pattern. (74)

In the last few days there have been a few problems. Pi

??S

Vf

Vi

??

If one accepts the positional properties of there it might be possible to fit existentials like (73) and (74) into the declarative pattern, as Dik points out (1978: 187). However, the consequence of this is that the post-copular Subject term would be placed in the O slot reserved for Object terms. In short, it appears that it is difficult to fit existentials into either the declarative or presentative pattern, although the construction shares features with both — it has the sequence Pl-S in common with the declarative pattern and the sequence V-S in common with the presentative pattern. I will reserve further discussion of this particular problem for Chapter 7, where a solution will be presented which, while acknowledging the functionally relevant position of the Subject term in presentatives, requires a certain reassessment of the claim that the presentative pattern actually constitutes a basic functional pattern of English. The discussion so far in this section has also brought up again the question of the syntactic status of there. How can this situation be analysed given the FG view of Subject? Recall that the Subject function has a semantically oriented definition in FG: it is assigned to the term referring to the entity which provides the primary vantage point from which a state of affairs is presented. As a result it is impossible to imagine one clause having more than one Subject term. Moreover, it is assigned to a constituent in the underlying predication, and thus may not be assigned to a constituent like there if this is inserted by means of an expression rule; hence if there does fill a Subject slot in the functional word order pattern it would be more correct to label it a 'place-holder' rather than 'the Subject', despite other Subject-like properties which it may have. The most salient feature of the Subject notion in FG is indeed its dual nature: it has a semantically oriented definition but counts as a syntactic function, its assignment having consequences for the formal expression of the predication, specifically with respect to constituent ordering and agreement. It is therefore important to keep in mind the distinction between what Connolly

48

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

(1984) calls the 'perspectival' features of Subject and its purely syntactic features. Even if there were to be present in the underlying representation in some form, it would on this view of Subject be difficult to assign it that function, since it is not at all clear in what way it defines a perspective for presenting a state of affairs, nor in what way it refers to an entity. As a result I will for the rest of the study assume the slot-filler function of

there,

and refer to the post-copular term as the Subject term."'

The final problem arising from the comparison of the constituent order of existentials with the various functional patterns concerns the pattern position filled by the material in the Extension, as in (75-77): (75)

There had been a secret meeting held.

(76)

There might be someone coming to pick me up.

(77)

Is there a window open?

Leaving aside for the time being the problems concerning the position filled by

there,

it appears that none of the functional patterns discussed so far has two

Vi. positions separated by say a S or 0 position, which would be required to accommodate existentials like (75) and (76). Moreover, there is to my knowledge no other construction in English where two Vi forms belonging to the same clause 7 8 are split by a Subject or Object constituent. ' One way of actually solving the problem created by these sentences is to assume that a uniclausal sequence is in fact not involved at all, but rather that the material in the Extension is part of another clause. Thus (75) might be represented as (78) (again leaving on one side the problem of what position is taken up by there,

and what the exact nature of the appropriate functional

pattern is): (78)

There had been a secret meeting held. ?

Vf

Vi

S (

S

Main clause Vi

)

Embedded clause

Under this analysis the S position in the main clause is filled by some kind of embedded clause, and held

fills the Vi slot within the embedded clause.

This analysis has one major implication. If the verbal elements preceding and following the Subject term must belong to different clauses in order for the constituent ordering to be appropriately accounted for, then the be of (79) is

ASPECTS OF FG not the same as the be of

(80).

(79)

There has to be a vote taken.

(80)

A vote has to be taken.

If this is the case then (79) and

(80) obviously involve different predicate

frames. A proposal for the representation of sentences like

(79) is given in

Chapter 3.

2.2.3 Term predicate formation and the representation of copula 'be' Dik's proposal for accounting for both

(81) and

(82) involves representations

which include predicates derived from terms by term predicate formation.

(81)

There was a demonstration in London.

(82)

There was a demonstration.

(83)

Past {(London)

(84)

Past {(0)

Loc

Loc

} (ilx,: d e m o n s t r a t i o n ( x . ) ) , . i l 0Sub3

} (ilx.: demonstration(x.))_ , . l l 0Sub]

Term predicates serve as one of the possible inputs to the further rule of Copula Support in English, which is a rule for introducing copula be as a supportive device rather than it being regarded as a deep predicate, the view originally presented in Dik and

(1978: 39). According to the latter analysis

(86) would be seen as involving be as a two-place predicate, as in

(85)

(87) a]

(88) :

(85)

The captain was John.

(86)

John is in the garden.

(87)

Past be

(88)

Pres be

V

(dlx.: c arp t a i n ( x . ) ) ( d l x . : l i 0 :

V

(dlx.: John(x.))„ l l 0

John(x.))^ j 0

(dlx.: garden(x.)) T j ] Loc

The alternative view of copula support was proposed in Dik further worked out in Dik

(1980a: Ch.4) and

(1983c), where a general rule is developed for

accounting for all kinds of be

(thus including the progressive and passive

auxiliary forms), the main stimulus for the new analysis being the desire to obtain a higher degree of typological adequacy in underlying representations

50

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

for copula constructions. Since there are languages where sentences like he is a carpenter, he is in London etc. are formed without any copula at all, and since deletion of specified items is not allowed in FG, it seemed profitable to seek a unified approach which regarded the copula as a supportive device for expressing predicate operators. The rule of Copula Support for English is given in (89) : (89)

COPULA SUPPORT IN ENGLISH input:

If predicate^ (xj (x.,)

(x^) ;

conditions: IT = any specified predicate operator 3 * V; output:

IT bey predicate^ (xj (x2)

(x^).

However, a major theoretical problem arises when we consider Copula Support being applied to term predicates as in (83) and (84). It will be noted that the terms here are marked with a semantic function. This semantic function is held to be present even before term predicate formation takes place, as the rule clearly shows (cf. Dik, 1980a: 105): (90)

TERM PREDICATE FORMATION input:

any term (t)^ where s = some semantic function

output:

(t) s

(x.)„ l0

This has been criticised in Mackenzie 8, Hannay (1982) and De Groot (1983) , the main point being that semantic functions in fact express a relation between a term and a predicate, and thus cannot be regarded as intrinsic to the term to which they are assigned. This together with other arguments lead Mackenzie & Hannay to propose a return to the analysis where be is regarded as a deep predicate. Under this approach, one possible way of representing say (82) above would be as in (91); alternatively, an unspecified locative term might additionally be assumed, as in (92). (91)

Past be„ (ilx. : demonstration (x.).) „„ V i l 0Sub]

(92)

Past be„ (ilx.: demonstration(x.))_„ . . (0)T V i I flSub] Loc

ASPECTS OF FG

51

This alternative approach obviously has to be balanced against the considerable advantages which Dik (1983c: 128) lists for a theory of copula support, and if the major objection mentioned above could in some way be obviated then copula support should clearly be maintained, particularly in view of its contribution to typological adequacy. In the present study I have chosen to retain the term predicate/copula support analysis of such sentences as (85) and (86) despite earlier criticism of the theoretical consequences. 2.3 Pragmatic functions Pragmatic functions assume an important position in FG analyses since they 'specify the structuring of the information contained in a predication with respect to the pragmatic setting in which it is used* (Dik, 1983b: 22). This is of obvious relevance in a functional analysis of existentials, which in the linguistic literature are often viewed as constructions which speakers employ to introduce new referents into the discourse. 2. 3.1 Topic Topic and Focus are the two predication-internal pragmatic functions recognised in FG. They will turn out to be crucially involved in formulating a detailed analysis of the definiteness restriction in existentials, and it is therefore necessary to say something now about how these terms will be used. The more complex of the two is the Topic function, and I will start with that. The Topic function is defined as in (93): (93)

A constituent with Topic function presents the entity 'about' which the Predication predicates something in the given setting. (Dik, 1978: 138)

This is a discourse-oriented definition of a sentence-level function; in other words while discourse-oriented it should not be confused with the notion of discourse Topic, either in the sense of 'what a discourse is about' or in the sense of discourse referent (for comments on the distinction and relation between the two, see Brown & Yule (1983: Ch.3)). There are obvious problems with any non-formal definition of such a pragmatic concept as sentence Topic if it is to be required of that definition that it allow the Topic in a given sentence to be identifiable, and from a Functional Grammar point of view it is necessary to at least specify what is meant by the given setting. Firstly, this suggests that a Topic entity must in some sense present given information, and

52

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN PG

secondly that it must in some sense be presupposed in the local setting defined by the immediately preceding context. The first point I take to represent a necessary but not sufficient condition for Topichood, while the second point provides the sufficient condition required. This remains vague so a couple of examples are necessary. If the entity referred to by the expression the baker can be said to be established in the previous discourse, let's say if it is 'discourse-bound', then it can be seen as a candidate for Topic status. In a setting like (94) it also fulfils the conditions for Topic status, but not in the setting defined by (95), where in the B sentence something is predicated about 'the nicest one by far1. (94)

A B

Do you know the baker very well? Yes, the baker is one of the few people I stop to chat with when I'm out shopping.

(95)

A

Who do you like best of the local shopkeepers?

B

The nicest one by far is the baker.

I will not go into detail concerning the various ways one might go about formalising these necessary and sufficient conditions both with respect to work in and outside FG.^" What I do want to do, however, is briefly indicate the types of entity which may be said to fulfil the necessary condition for Topic status, since a distinction between Topic types can be made which has specific relevance for an analysis of the definiteness restriction in Chapter 5. The statement that givenness is a necessary condition for Topichood, implied by the Topic definition in (93), has of course little substance unless one is clear about what givenness involves. In Hannay (1985) this necessary condition is discussed in terms of discourse-boundness, and on the basis of Prince's (1981) taxonomy of given/new information three types of discourse-bound entity are distinguished, relating to Prince's categories of inferrable, situationally evoked and textually evoked entities. While Prince draws no conclusion as to whether inferrable entities should be classed under new entities or evoked entities, I propose that they can best be regarded as a particular type of discourse-bound entity, and as such they may be seen as candidates for Topic status. In consequence a distinction is made between full Topics and sub-Topics. The former are Topic entities which are directly bound to the discourse, either textually or situationally. The latter are those which have a relation of inference, and

53

ASPECTS OP FG

are bound on the basis of bridging assumptions (cf. Clark & Haviland, 1977). The rule of sub-Topic formation is given in Hannay (1985) as in (96): (96)

Sub-Topic formation If an entity X has been activated in the given setting, then the speaker may present an entity Y as a sub-Topic entity, if Y F X, where J is a relationship of inference.

In (97) a list of R relations is given on the basis of which the referents of terms may be assumed to be discourse-bound on first mention. (97)

A specification of the R relation (i)

part of

(ii)

member of

(iii)

subset of

(iv)

instance of

(v)

copy of

(vi)

aspect of

(vii)

opposite of

(viii)

projection of

(ix)

associated with

Examples of these different kinds of sub-Topic are given in (98-106), with the sub-Topic constituent being italicised in each case. (98)

It's a nice house but the kitchen is small,

(99)

The team played quite well I suppose, but Wilkins is obviously still a

('part of') bit unfit. ('member of') (100)

I had arranged to meet five students to organise a campaign against the exam requirements but three didn't turn up. ('subset of')

(101)

A

I've been troubled a lot by sleeplessness recently.

B

That's funny, sleeplessness/that has been getting me down too.

('instance of')

54

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

(102)

A

Look, I've just spent all my pocket money on this fantastic Bardot poster!

B

Oh dear. The same one is going for 50p down the market.

('copy of1) (103)

I was hoping for a swinging party but the atmosphere was very tense. ('aspect of1)

(104)

Being over-careful has its disadvantages, but carelessness can be fatal,

(105)

I bought Harry a record for his birthday, but they are so expensive I

('opposite of') nearly had second thoughts. ('projection of1) (106)

John and Bill came to see me yesterday. Fred's just acquired a new car. ('associated with')

One of the consequences of this distinction can be seen by considering a case like (107): (107) A B

What are your friends doing in the weekend? One of them is going down to London.

In the B sentence going down to London is regarded as salient information in the given setting and the relevant constituents will be assigned Focus function. However, the predication is not regarded as predicating all new information in the given setting, and hence Topicless, since one of them, despite the lack of prior mention and its — strictly speaking — indefinite nature, will be assigned sub-Topic status on account of the 'subset of' inferential relation with your friends in the A sentence. This in turn has the consequence that indefinite terms with sub-Topic status must be considered a theoretical possibility, although sub-Topic entities may also be realised by definite terms. 2.3.2 Focus The Focus function is defined as follows: (108) A constituent with Focus function presents the relatively most important or salient information with respect to the pragmatic information of the Speaker and the Addressee.

ASPECTS OF FG

55

In work on FG so far Focus has been seen as relevant with respect to information that is asserted in the given setting as well as with respect to information that is salient on the basis of contrast or emphasis (cf. Dik et al., 1981; De Jong, 1981). In Hannay (1983) I accordingly distinguish between assertive and emphatic Focus, noting that Topic constituents may well be assigned emphatic Focus function but obviously not assertive Focus function, since that which is asserted is asserted of the Topic entity (if present).** To this extent Topic and assertive Focus may be seen as presenting a kind of dichotomy, although it must be added that predications may be Topicless if (a) all information is asserted as new in the given setting or (b) if all terms in a predication are assigned (assertive) Focus function, as noted in 2.1.4. Finally it should be noted that in the course of this study I will primarily be concerned with assertive rather than emphatic Focus; hence any reference to Focus should be understood as a reference to assertive Focus unless otherwise stated. In the literature on existentials it is often remarked upon in passing that the post-copular NP is a Focus NP, but this is not regarded as crucial to an analysis of the syntax of existentials. From a FG point of view the post-copular NP will indeed tend to be assigned Focus function — at least in existentials without an Extension, where there is an equivalence between what is the most salient information, what is asserted to exist, and what is presented as relevant in the discourse world. Thus to give a straight-forward example, the Subject term in (109B) will be assigned Focus function given the setting in (109A) :

(109)

A

What prevented the programme from being broadcast at the scheduled time?

B (110)

There was a technical hitch.

Past {(0)} (ilx.: hitch(x.): technical(x.))„„ 1 1 l 0Sub]Foc

However, it is not always so clearly the case that in all settings the existential can be seen as a Focus construction. Firstly in cases like (111) it is obvious that the post-copular term may not be specified, and since Focus information is the most salient in the given setting it clearly cannot be omitted.

(111)

A

Was there a problem?

B

Yes, there was (one).

56

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

Note that the copula receives a strong emphatic accent in such cases. What (11 IB) actually involves is what Dik et al. (1981: 53) call Predication Focus, where the whole predication is in fact in the scope of Focus. This is so because what is emphatically asserted in (11 IB) is the truth value of the whole predication. This context-specific instance of Focus assignment is not problematic for the general view that the post-copular term is a Focus term. What is problematic is the following:

(112)

A

Where can I find some sugar?

B

There's some in the cupboard on the left.

It is usually the case that in existential-locative sentences the locative element is assigned some kind of Topic function, but this is clearly not the case here, since in the cupboard on the left provides the information sought in the A sentence and hence will be assigned Focus function. One is left with the question of ascertaining the pragmatic status of some, which on the basis of the discussion of Topic in the previous section would appear to meet the requirements for being assigned sub-Topic function. The problem then arises of how to square the standard view that the postcopular term presents the new, salient information with cases like this, which as Ziv (1982a) notes for not dissimilar sentences in Modern Hebrew appear to have more in common with locational constructions like (113) than existentials.

(113)

A

Where can I find the sugar?

B

It's in the cupboard on the left.

I will return to this problem in greater detail in 5,3.6 below, considering it in the light of the conclusions arrived at in Chapters 3 and 4 concerning what constitutes the argument of the existential predicate.

2.4

Summary

A number of points have been made in this chapter concerning the FG representation of existential sentences and their relation to other constructions. What distinguishes existentials from iter's-presentatives is a semantic feature: they involve different predicate frames. What the two constructions have in common is a pragmatic feature, and how this can be

ASPECTS OF FG

57

captured representationally will be discussed in Chapter 7. On the other hand, what distinguishes existentials from their non-existential counterparts is a semantic feature and a pragmatic feature. It has been claimed that the combination of indefinite term and locative predicate is not sufficient to capture the existential reading which I associate with the there be construction. A more attractive basis is provided by the analysis suggested by Dik (1980a) for bare existentials, which involves an unspecified locative term predicate. Such a predicate captures the insight that the assertion of existence involves predicating generalised location of an entity in some world. At the same time this predicate is not held to represent a direct trigger for the occurrence of there; rather, this is inserted into a particular position in the surface linear order by an expression rule. This may be a position associated with Subject constituents but there is not regarded as a Subject term. The locative form of there can be understood on the basis that languages which make use of a dummy element in the existential construction may well, though need not, employ a locative element. Rather than suggesting, as Bolinger (1977) and Lumsden (1983) do, that there has a particular kind of locative force, I would say that if anything this is a characteristic of the whole existential construction: if instead of there English had developed the phrase mindet, or chop suey (or whatever), the same locative force would be present. As far as the constituent order is concerned, existentials display features partially in accordance with the declarative pattern and partially in accordance with what I have labelled the presentative pattern. The question of the most appropriate functional pattern needs to be resolved, and an attempt to resolve it is made in chapter 7. Another problem is the position filled by the constituents in the Extension. A suggestion has been made to the effect that this may be resolved if one assumes that such constituents do not belong to the main predication but rather to an embedded predication. Semantic evidence to support this initial suggestion will be offered in Chapters 3 and 4. Finally, as far as pragmatic functions are concerned the post-copular term will typically be assigned Focus function. However, a problem arises with cases where the most salient information in the given setting is provided by the constituents in the Extension. This problem is tied up with two issues which are central to this study: firstly, what is the argument of the existential predicate; and secondly, what is the nature of the restriction on the postcopular term. These matters will be clarified in the course of the following chapters.

Chapter 3

The argument of the existential predicate

The aim of this chapter is to arrive at a clear understanding of what it is that is asserted to exist in an existential predication. Translated into predicate frame terms the aim may be seen as ascertaining the nature of the argument of the existential predicate, to be interpreted along the lines suggested in 2.2.1. To go about this, consideration will be given in 3.3 to a specific claim contained in the comprehensive analysis of existentials carried out by Milsark (1976). Milsark attempts to show that it is indeed meaningful to characterise all there be constructions as involving an assertion of existence, ^ and accordingly develops a rule of semantic interpretation which captures this in terms of a class membership predication on the entity referred to by the postcopular NP. However, I will show that Milsark's claim that existential sentences involve a particular form of existential commitment does not represent a valid judgment about the meaning of a range of existentials, and that this has implications for his analysis of constituent structure. On the basis of the judgments made in 3.1 about the nature of the state of affairs actually designated by existentials involving Extensions, a predicate frame is proposed in 3.2 which is similar to the frame adopted in Chapter 2 for bare existentials, the difference being that in the case of existentials with Extensions the argument slot of the existential predication is filled by a term whose head is not a predicate but a predication. Finally, a brief comparison will be made between the embedded predication analysis which I propose in 3.2 and the small clause analysis of existentials, which has become the standard analysis in a Government and Binding framework but which retains the kind of semantic interpretation rule originally proposed by Milsark. 3.1 Milsark and existential aormitment Milsark (1976) proposes a transformational there-insertion analysis of existential sentences. The core of the there-insertion analysis is that sentences like (1) and (2) are related by a transformation involving rightward

60

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

movement of the subject NP in (1) and the insertion of there into the vacated subject slot, thus producing a structure as in (2): (1)

An elephant was at the door.

(2)

There was an elephant at the door.

The most relevant implication of this analysis in the present context is that the subject NP can be moved around any form of be — that associated with (a) the passive, as in (3); (b) the locative, as in (4); (c) the progressive, as in (5) ; and (d) the copula, as in (6):

(3)

There was an old man killed on this very spot yesterday.

(4)

There was nobody there.

(5)

There was a nightingale singing in Berkeley Square.

(6)

There are ten pupils absent today.

In the course of this section I will argue against this view of the syntactic status of be. Milsark (1976: 90) distinguishes three structural classes of theve be construction: ontologicals, locationals and periphrastics. Ontologicals correspond to existentials without an Extension, while locationals have an Extension consisting of a locative element and periphrastics have an Extension with a verbal or adjectival predicate. Some existentials are structurally ambiguous and will tend to be interpreted as either ontological or periphrastic depending on the context. Consider (7) in this respect, which may be a reply to either (8) or (9) :

(7)

There'll be a lot of people studying Gothic.

(8)

What kind of people are there going to be at this party tonight?

(9)

What are people going to be doing at this work-in this afternoon?

In response to (8), (7) is to be seen as an ontological, with the expression studying Gothic being part of a complex term which refers to a group of people with a particular property. On the other hand, (7) will be analysed as a periphrastic in the context of (9), with studying Gothic constituting the Extension. Milsark notes that syntactically not much is going on in ontologicals and locationals, and concentrates on periphrastics in order to establish that

ARGUMENT OF EXISTENTIAL PREDICATE

61

'existential' is a meaningful characterisation of the there be construction. The main result of his analysis is a semantic interpretation rule of derived structure called the E-rule, which is given below in (10): (10)

E-RULE •there

AUX

(have-en)

be

Q

NP

X

is interpreted:

the class C denoted by NP has at least one member c such that P(c) is true, where P is a predicate and P is the reading of X and the set of such members c is of cardinality Q. As an example of how the rule works, consider (12) , which would be the interpretation of (11): (11) (12)

There's been a mistake detected. The class of mistakes has at least one member m such that m has been detected, and the cardinality of the set of such members m is one.

The positing of the E-rule reflects Milsark's decision to introduce a rule of semantic interpretation rather than complicating the syntactic rule with various constraints. Thus ungrammatical structures are allowed to be generated which will then be ruled out by the semantic interpretation rule. The rule accounts for the definiteness restriction, the predicate restriction and the leftmost be condition. However, in this chapter I will concentrate on Milsark's interpretation of the existential predication as relating to the entity denoted by the post-copular NP. I will return to the E-rule in later chapters when discussing the definiteness and predicate restrictions in greater detail. The main feature of the existential predication is that it is valid with respect to the entity denoted by the NP. Thus with regard to the example in (11) it is clear from the interpretation in (12) that the primary predication involves instantiation of a member of a class, and that the predication involving a mistake having been detected is secondary. This formulation of the existence predication is the outcome of an attempt to show that an assertion of existence is indeed a semantic feature of there be sentences but not of their non-existential counterparts. For Milsark (13) is a clear case of the existence of doubt being asserted: (13)

There will always be doubt.

62

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

However, the situation is less clear with periphrastics. As I pointed out in 1.1.2 for example, a crucial question here concerns how one can meaningfully assert the existence of say the referent of a ship in (14) when the sentence receives an event reading: (14)

A

What on earth has happened?

B

There1s just been a ship sunk outside the exclusion zone.

Milsark attempts to show that it is indeed meaningful to do so by probing the possible differences in truth value conditions between sentences such as (15-17): (15)

Someone was believed to be hiding in the bushes.

(16)

There was someone believed to be hiding in the bushes.

(17)

There was believed to be someone hiding in the bushes.

These sentences all involve the predicate believe, which takes a non-factive complement. Thus in (18) it is not necessarily true that something important had happened, only that John believed this to be true; likewise, in (19) it is not necessary that a problem exists for the sentence to be true: (18)

John believed that something important had happened.

(19)

John believed there to be a problem.

In this light Milsark claims that for (16) to be true one is committed to the existence of someone (although it is net necessarily true that someone is hiding in the bushes), whereas in (15) and (17) one is in no way committed to the existence of a person for the sentences to be true. These differences are then explained as follows: (17) is the result of tfere-insertion applying to the structure someone be hiding inside the scope of be believed, whereas (16) emerges from theve-insertion operating on a structure as in (15) , where subject raising has already applied. This latter operation of t^ere-insertion takes place outside the scope of believe. The point is then that commitment is involved precisely in those cases where

insertion does not apply within

the scope of believe. However, if one considers a range of data with denial clauses it appears that Milsark's judgments about the commitment reading of (16) are not correct.

ARGUMENT OF EXISTENTIAL PREDICATE

63

Consider first of all (20): (20)

There was supposed to be a local MP called Smith coming to dinner, but in fact there wasn't.

Here the force of the denial is that it is not the case that a local MP called Smith was coming to dinner, but this was not asserted to be true in the first half of the sentence anyway. Likewise, (21) is also acceptable: the existence of a local MP called Smith is denied, but his existence was never asserted in the first place, only the belief that such a person existed. (21)

There was supposed to be a local MP called Smith coming to dinner, but there isn't a local MP called Smith.

The problem for Milsark's argument comes when the second type of existential with verbs like believe is considered. First of all, (22) is perfectly acceptable: (22)

There was a local MP called Smith supposed to be coming to dinner, but there isn't a local MP called Smith.

The fact that existence can be denied and the sentence still be acceptable shows that it is presumably not necessarily the existence of a local MP called Smith that is asserted in the first half of the sentence (otherwise, of course, the sentence would be out). The fact that (22) is acceptable also means that the first part of the sentence — that, in Milsark's terms, a local MP called Smith existed such that he was supposed to be coming to dinner — is still true. With the other type of denial the situation is a little less clear, yet I take a sentence like (23) to be acceptable if the denial is interpreted as being an assertion that the event believed to have taken place actually did not. (23)

There was a Dutch frigate believed to have been sunk, but there hadn't been.

This again does not affect the truth of the first statement, nor does it reveal with any certainty that a specific frigate did exist which one believed had been

64

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

sunk, unlike for instance (24), from which it can be deduced that such a frigate did exist. (24)

There was a Dutch frigate believed to have been sunk, but it hadn't been.

What is not possible is (25) , which appears to deny the truth of the state of affairs designated by a Dutch frigate believed to have been sunk. Note the difference with hadn't been in the denial clause in (23). (25)

There was a Dutch frigate believed to have been sunk, but there wasn't.

These judgments force one to reconsider what it is that existence is predicated of. The first part of (22) might be paraphrased as follows: (26)

A state of affairs is said to exist, the content of which is that a local MP called Smith was supposed to be coming to dinner.

The speaker of (22) goes on, not to deny the truth of the content of the state of affairs, but to deny the existence of the person in question. This then allows the conclusion to be drawn that it is not the entity denoted by the NP whose existence is asserted but rather the whole state of affairs designated by the NP + Extension. I will call this the state-of-affairs reading of existentials. Given (26) one might then represent the difference between (16) and (17) as follows: (27)

A state of affairs is said to exist, the content of which is that someone is believed to be hiding in the bushes.

(28)

It is believed that a state of affairs exists, the content of which is that someone is hiding in the bushes.

(27) and (28) bring out the difference in scope relations between believe and the existential predication pointed out by Milsark without forcing a commitment 2

reading on the referent of the post-copular NP. Existentials like those in (22) also have another reading of course, in that they may also be viewed structurally as not involving an Extension at all but rather a complex NP. Thus on this interpretation (22) could be also paraphrased as (29) :

ARGUMENT OF EXISTENTIAL PREDICATE (29)

65

There was a local MP called Smith who was supposed to be coming to dinner.

On this reading, addition of a denial clause yields an unacceptable sentence since the existence is being denied of the only entity that could possibly be the argument of the first existential predication in (30): # (30)

There was a local MP called Smith who was supposed to be coming to dinner, but there wasn't.

The only denial that now makes sense is (31): (31)

There was a local MP called Smith who was supposed to be coming to dinner, but he didn't.

Note finally that in this light the example in (24), which is similar to (31), will also tend to be interpreted as involving an existential without an Extension. This second reading of existentials I will call the entity reading. Given this reanalysis of the nature of the argument of the existential predicate with complex existentials, one may now ask what the difference is between existentials and their non-existential counterparts. I claim that it is simply as follows: in existentials with a state-of-affairs reading a state of affairs S is conceived of as an entity, and this entity is asserted to exist; in the non-existential counterparts, on the other hand, the same state of affairs S is simply described. We thus end up with different states of affairs, one involving an existential predication — with existential commitment applying to the argument of the existential predicate — and the other one not. How this is reflected in the underlying representations of existentials will be seen in the next section. In the light of this reanalysis the problems mentioned above concerning the event reading of certain existentials and the appropriate functional pattern position for the constituents of the Extension are neatly resolved. Firstly, the fact that what is asserted to exist is a state of affairs does justice to the event reading of existentials like There 's just been a man killed, while this is not the case with the statement of semantic interpretation encapsulated in the E-ruleSecondly, if the argument term of the existential predicate is accordingly analysed as consisting of an embedded predication, then it is clear that the sequence was

.held in There was a series of meetings held, for

66

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG

instance, is not a uniclausal sequence; consequently the pattern position of held can be handled as suggested in 2.2.2 above. Finally it should be noted that one further consequence of this analysis is that doubt must be cast on the validity of the movement analysis proposed by Milsark: if NP + Extension constitutes an embedded predication then be must be analysed as the copula in all cases, irrespective of the structure of the Extension. In Chapter 4 further evidence will be offered to support this conclusion. 3.2 Predicate frames On the basis of the distinct readings assigned to existentials in the previous section one may distinguish two predicate frames. These are given in (32) and (33) : (32)

E-EXISTENTIALS {(0)T } (x.: PREDICATE (x.))-, , . Loc i i 0Subj

(33)

SOA-EXISTENTIALS { W i L o c } (x .)„_..)„„. k K Foe ] V i Ag ] GoSub] 0Sub]Top

In many cases, however, the Extension in existentials does not present Topical information at all, and consequently the post-copular term does not serve to provide the identity of a specific variable, since there may well be no variable present in the setting in need of identification. In other words, if a speaker uses a cleft like (39) at the beginning of an exchange it will not be surprising — if he has misjudged the extent of the addressee's assumed knowledge — for him to receive a response like (40), while this would be a strange response indeed to an existential like that in (41): (39)

It was a frigate that was sunk last night.

(40)

Oh, there was a ship sunk was there?

(41)

Have you heard? There was a frigate sunk last night.

The one area where there might nevertheless be something to say for some kind of functional parallel concerns existentials like the following: (42)

A

Where on earth am I going to find somewhere to sleep in a town like this?

B

Well, there's a hotel around the corner worth trying.

(42B) might be paraphrased by (43): (43)

One of the places/One place worth trying is a hotel around the corner.

It will be noted that "it and that clefts may be paraphrased in a similar way: (44)

It's London you should avoid, not Paris.

EMBEDDED PREDICATION ANALYSIS (45)

81

The place you should avoid is London, not Paris.

(46)

It's/That's John standing there.

(47)

The/That person standing there is John.

(48)

There's a man standing there.

(49)

One of the people standing there is a man.

The main difference between these paraphrases relates to 'the X that* as against 'one of the X's that', which may lead one to consider sentences like (42B) as indefinite clefts (cf. Halliday, 1967: 238). However, it would clearly be wrong to take this relation too far, since it is for instance only in specific contexts (cf. the discussion of list existentials and clefts in 5.2 below) that (48) can be paraphrased by (49). In an exchange-initial setting like (50), the sentence in (51) forms an unacceptable paraphrase for the existential: (50)

Have you heard the news? There's been a soldier killed in the grounds of Buckingham Palace.

(51) ??One of the people killed in the grounds of Buckingham Palace is a soldier. It may therefore be concluded that the notion of cleft reduction is in general incompatible with the meaning of SOA-existentials. Clefts always function to highlight in one way or another a particular constituent in a state of affairs, whereas the information presented by the embedded predication in a SOA-existential will often be in Focus in its entirety. This disparity will be reflected in Functional Grammar terms in the different underlying representations assigned to the two constructions. 4.2

The complex NP analysis

Nothing but a very brief mention was made in the last section of the proposal whereby all material to the right of be is considered as a NP. This is the central feature not only of Jenkins' original formulation of his phrase structure analysis (1972), but also of a recent proposal concerning existentials by Williams (1984). Williams proposes a 'minimal analysis' of existentials which includes the strong claim that all existentials indeed involve complex NPs; given that this has been proposed again so recently, despite the arguments amassed against it by Milsark and Jenkins himself, separate attention should perhaps be briefly given to it at this stage.

82

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG I will not go into detail concerning all parts of Williams' complete

analysis, which differs in various respects (particularly regarding the status of be) from Jenkins', but will restrict myself to a number of comments concerning the specific claims about complex NPs. Here too I think that detail can be spared, since the arguments presented in Chapter 3, as well as the evidence in other sections of the present chapter designed to underpin the embedded predication analysis, effectively invalidate any analysis which assumes that all existentials of the type there be 1VP X in fact involve complex NPs. Williams gives a number of arguments in favour of a complex NP analysis and against the analyses of Milsark and Stowell. I will discuss three of these points which are relevant in the context of the present study. A.

Given the full set of NPs in English, there is nothing to stop existentials

being generated with the structure there be NP. Williams (1984: 132) gives (52-54) as examples: (52)

(a)

There is someone sick.

(b)

Someone sick is in the next room.

(53)

(a)

There is someone believed to be a liar.

(b)

Someone believed to be a liar is in the next room.

(54)

(a)

There is someone running.

(b)

Someone running is in the next room.

However, let me refer, to begin with, to 4.3 and 4.4, where I discuss structures that may occur in existentials but definitely do not occur as NPs. What is more, Williams argues (1984: 144) against Milsark's claim that a bare NP analysis for a live pig roasted in (55) is contradictory. (55)

There was a live pig roasted.

He claims that since the Subject of (56) is unambiguously a NP, the structure a IiVe pig roasted simply cannot be contradictory, and hence the structure assignment in (57) is perfectly acceptable. (56)

A live pig roasted last Saturday was delicious.

(57)

There was (a live pig roasted)

As I pointed out in 4.1, however, it is semantic inconsistency at sentence level

83

EMBEDDED PREDICATION ANALYSIS

which is surely decisive here. There is indeed nothing the matter with assigning NP status to a live pig roasted in (58) , but what sense does it make in the case of (59)? (58)

For dinner they had enjoyed a live pig roasted on a spit.

(59)

What happened next was that there was a live pig roasted.

Admittedly NPs may occur even in the environment of what happened was that there 2

Was a X, but they are event-denoting NPs.

If a live pig roasted is seen as a NP

in (59) it cannot possibly be event-denoting, since roasted will function as a restrictor to further specify the referent of the head of the term phrase, pig, and pig is not event-denoting. Semantic factors must be considered crucial in determining constituent structure, but Williams appears to disregard this in this particular case. B.

Another point made by Williams concerns the NP restriction, which I treat in

Chapter 6 as part of the predicate restriction. Williams suggests that neither a small clause analysis nor the standard there-insertion analysis can predict the ungrammaticality of (60): (60)

*There was a friend of mine an impostor.

The complex NP analysis can, however, since 'NPs, apart from appositive structures, do not terminate with NPs' (Williams, 1984: 132), which is why (61) is out: (61)

*A friend of mine an impostor is in the next room.

The only comment I have at this stage is that the situation with respect to nominal predicates in the Extension is by no means as clear as Williams suggests. The main problem is the actual acceptability of certain existentials like (60). Nathan (1979) observes for instance that the restriction should be regarded as semantic rather than syntactic in nature and that sentences like (60) are acceptable in specific circumstances. Moreover, the construction still exists in various British English dialects, and the restrictions on it are probably of a more general pragmatic nature. I will return to this in greater detail in Chapter 6. For the moment it will suffice to say that in this light the point made by Williams cannot be seen as particularly strong evidence in favour of a complex NP analysis and against others.

84 C.

ENGLISH EXISTENTIALS IN FG One final point worth mentioning here has to do with 'heavy NP shift', which

is the transformation that accounts for the relation between (62) and (63): (62)

I consider several of George's recent acquaintances sick.

(63)

I consider sick several of George's recent acquaintances.

Williams claims that the small clause analysis cannot predict that heavy NP shift cannot occur in existentials, which is shown by (64) and (65), since it does occur in small clause contexts. Sentence (63) is cited as an example. (64)

There are several of George's recent acquaintances sick.

(65)

*There are sick several of George's recent acquaintances.

However, Williams argues further that if (64) is assigned a complex NP structure, heavy NP shift will not be able to apply. Again I do not think the situation is clear cut. To start with there are other kinds of small clauses than in (62) where the predicate of the clause cannot appear before the subject constituent. Examples are (66-69) : (66)

With so many of our closest friends sick I don't think there's any sense going to the party.

(67)

*With sick so many of our closest friends, I don't think there's any sense going to the party.

(68)

The episode I remember was one of JR'S fancy girls from the office sick

(69)

*The episode I remember was sick in bed one of JR's fancy girls from the

in bed. office. Furthermore it will be noted that in FG a predicate like consider' may possibly not be analysed as having a two-place argument structure with an embedded predication as its second argument, but rather as a three-placed predicate on a line with perception verbs (cf. Dik, 1979; Bolkestein, 1981). Thus the underlying representation of (70) will be something like (71). (71)

Pres consider, (dix.: John(x.)) „ . . (dix.: she(x.))„ V l l PoSub] 3 j GoObj