The puzzle of ethics

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THE PUZZLE OF ETHICS Dr Peter Vardy is lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion at London UDiversity's Heythrop College, and is the author of the highly acclaimed The Puzzle of God, The Puzzle of the Gospels and The Puzzle of Evil. Dr Paul Grosch lectures in Ethics and Philosophy at the College of St Mark and St John, Plymouth. '... the philosopher of religion and gifted communicator Peter Vardy ... and Paul Grosch ... provide an accessible, bal­ anced and up to date introduction to moral philosophy.'

The Way

Praise for other titles in the series:

THE PUZZLE OF GOD 'This is about the best elementary textbook on the philosophy of God that I have come across: Professor Hugo Meynell, Calgary Univmity

'This is a masterpiece of coherence ... an invaluble resource.' Linda Smith, Head

of Department of Religious Eduaition,

King's College, London

•An accomplished guide round the battlefield of ideas about God.' Don Cupitt

THE PUZZLE OF THE GOSPELS 'Peter Vardy is a gifted communicator. He is the best popular­ izer of philosophy of religion currently working in religion.' Theology

'It is a rare gift to be able to communicate complex theological and philosophical issues concisely, comprehensibly and intelli­ gibly. This series of books does just that and they are a welcome gift to teachers, students and all interested enquirers.' Elizabeth Stuart, Senior Lecturer, University

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THE PUZZLE OF EVIL • A refreshing book which teachers and students of religion and philosophy, plus many lay people, will find clear and readable.' Catholic Herald

'Peter Vardy . . . is a compassionate communicator; one who teaches with a great deal of conviction and authority ... this book is an excellent "A" Level or undergraduate textbook and should be read by those Christians who are prepared to grapple with a grim reality in God's world.' Baptist nmes

The Puzzle of Ethics PETER VARDY AND PAUL GROSCH

Fount

An Imprint of HarperCollinsP,J,lishen

Fount Paperbacks is an Imprint of HarperCollinsReligious Pan of HarperCollinsPublishtr! First published in Great Britain in 1994 by Fount Paperbacks 5791086 0 1994 Peter Vardy and Paul Grosch Peter Vardy and Paul Grosch assen the moral right to be identified as the authors of this work A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN O 00 6277012 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Caledonian International Book Manufacturing Ltd, Glasgow CONDITIONS OF SALE This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold. hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a simibr condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. All rights reserved. No pan of this publication may be reproduced, stored ina retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying. recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishen.

TO LINDSAY GROSCH AND CHRISTIAN VARDY

'

CONTENTS Acknowledgements

9

PART ONE - THEORETICAL ETHICS

2

3 4 5 6

7 8 9

Truth in Ethics Plato - Virtue and Knowledge Aristotle and Virtue Theory Aquinas and Natural Law Kant and the Moral Law Bentham and Mill - Utilitarianism Post-utilitarian Perspectives: Intuitionism Emotivism MacIntyre - Virtue Theory Revisited Buddhist Ethics

13

22 JS 52 65 74 84 -92

105

119

PART TWO - APPLIED ETHICS 10 I I

12 IJ

14

I5

16 17 18

Situation Ethics Justice and Morality - Rawls and Nozick Abortion and Personhood · Euthanasia and Medical Ethics Just War Human Rights Animal Rights Environmental Ethics Conclusion

133 143 I SJ 165 175

Further Reading Index

231 2JS

187 201

213 227

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Both authors owe a great debt to their students past and present. Responsibility for the errors and omissions in this book rests entirely with the authors, however there would have been more of them were it not for the help of those who read individual chapters and offered their advice. Peter Vardy wishes to acknowledge help given by Michael Barnes SJ, Alan Carter, Bernard Hoose, Gerry Hughes SJ, Janice Thomas and Anne Vardy. Paul Grosch wishes to thank Adrian Mills and Alan Gorman for the many discussions on the nature ofjustice. He has also benefited from discussions with his colleagu�: Dilys Wadman, Liz Stuart, Rachael Quinlan, Adrian Thatcher, Jim Little, Jon Goulding, Gordon Bartlett and Alan Cousins. He wishes to record his special thanks to Anne Littlejohn and David Benzie for their help in taming recalcitrant word-processors when time was fast running out.

...:

PART I

THEORETICAL ETHICS

ONE

Truth in Ethics 'Sex before marriage is wrong'; 'Those who perform abortions are murderers'; 'Homosexuality is unnatural'; 'There is no real difference between killing a baby and killing a dolphin'; 'Multinational companies that exploit tropical rain fo�ests are evil'; 'Women and men should always be treated equally'; 'Capital punishment is right for those who rape or murder' - we are all familiar with the bewildering variety of moral judgements which individuals and groups of people make. Often these positions are held with passion, conviction and great sincerity, yet many of those who have strong views on moral issues have not really stopped to think why they take a particular stance and, if they were challenged, they might find it difficult to justify their position. All of us have to make moral decisions in life - from the smallest ones (whether to pay for a bus ticket if we can get away with not paying; whether to pay for using the firm or the college's photocopier for our private purposes; whether to declare all our income to the tax authorities) to the much larger issues that sometimes dominate the headlines. This book examines the background to these issues and also looks at some suggested solutions as well as their difficulties. It may seem as though examining the approaches of Aristotle, Plato and their successors has litde to do with life in the last few years of the twentieth century, yet this is not the case - in many ways the issues that the great philosophers have addressed over the last two and a half thousand years are the same as those that face us today, only their practical application has altered. Most people do not like to think for themselves - they prefer to take the easy way and to follow the crowd or the dictates of their group. Thinking philosophically is not easy - it involves challenging 13

The Puzzle of Ethics our own preconceptions and this can be uncomfortable. Sometimes those things which we feel most certain about may be questioned and this can shake the very roots of our most basic beliefs. Plato recognized this would happen - he thought that philosophers would be rejected, mocked, misunderstood and despised and instead people would admire those politicians and other leaders who were skilled in rhetoric and who could flatter and persuade. The philosopher would challenge the status quo and the accepted wisdom of his society and would be considered dangerous. Plato's teacher, Socrates, suff'ered exactly this fate and was condemned to death on a charge of 'corrupting the young' - as he got young people to think for themselves and not simply to accept the values of their parents. The situation has not changed much in two and a half thousand years. Today philosophers are more likely to be ignored than put to death, although in many countries imprisonment is often their fate. This book, therefore, deals with dangerous ideas. The terms 'Ethics' and 'Morality' have come to be treated as almost identical in meaning, but they have different derivations. 'Ethics' comes from the Greek word ethikos which relates to 'ethos' or character. It is sometimes translated 'custom' or 'usage' so it refers to the customary way to behave in society. Ethical behaviour, therefore, is behaviour which is in accordance with a virtuous character. Aristotle used the word in this way - Aristotle maintained that virtue is happiness and he claims that the pursuit of virtue is the highest and noblest aim for a human being. In his book The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle maintains that a human being's highest happiness comes from philosophic speculation but that this must be combined with a life of prudence and the search for virtue. Becoming virtuous involves the individual establishing a habit of virtuous behaviour and this is directly related to a virtuous character. 'Morality' comes from the Latin word moralis - particularly as used in Cicero's commentaries on and translations of Aristotle. Morality is more concerned with which actions are right or wrong rather than with the character of the penon who performs these actions. Today 14

Truth in Ethia the two terms, ethics and morality, are often interchanged with panicular philosophers wishing to emphasise one or another aspect. In this book the field of ethics will be taken to cover not just those actions which are right or wrong but will also explore the fundamental principles which lie behind these actions as well as, at least at times, the issue of virtue that so preoccupied Aristotle and many of his successors. We shall see, however, that Aristotle's approach has been subject to considerable -criticism. Before questions about morality and ethics can be addressed, there are prior issues of the nature of truth to be considered. Truth is important - in October 1993 the Vatican produced a document dealing with - a wide range of moral issues entitled 'The splendour of truth' (' Veritatis Splendor'). This document took a strong line on many key moral issues and did so i_n the name of truth. However it is not always clear what it means to talk of truth - it is a big word and, perhaps in ethics more than in any other field, it needs to be approached with considerable caution. Take a statement like 'Sex outside marriage is wrong' - one can ask whether such a statement is true or false and what makes the statement true or false (if anything). In the rest of this chapter we will be looking at the question of truth - if you wish, you could go straight to chapter two if you do not feel this issue would be of immediate interest to you.

Truth There are two main approaches to questions of truth - those taken by realists and constructivists. a) Realism Realists operate with a Correspondenc� theory of truth which maintains that a statement is true if it corresponds to a state of affairs independent of the statement. Thus 'Crows are black' is true if and

only

if (this is expressed philosophically by writing 15

•lff) crows are, in fact,

The Puzzle of Ethics black. The blackness of the crows does not depend on those who

look at them or on human language - it is held to be a matter of fact to which the statement 'Crows are black' accurately corresponds. Supporters of the correspondence theory of truth affirm bivalence. This means that they will hold that a statement is either true or false even though we may not know whether it is true or false. If we take a statement like 'There is no intelligent life in the universe other than on earth', a supporter of the correspondence theory of truth will maintain that either this is true or it is false, it is simply the case that we do not know whether it is true or false at present. If one maintains a correspondence theory of truth in the sphere of morality one will be a moral realist and will hold that discussion of morality involves a search for absolute moral truths. Moral realists will also maintain that there is only one set of moral truths and that moral philosophy should be concerned with a search for what these are. It is a feature of realism that one can make a claim to truth even though this claim may not be provable. The realist urill always have to admit that he or she could be wrong - this is because truth is based on correspondence and however certain someone may be that a statement corresponds, the possibility is always open that it does not. As an example, every test to verify ·the claim that • All swans are white' would have confirmed this statement as true - until the discovery of black swans in Australia. Realists should, therefore, be suitably modest in making claims to truth - modesty is necessary as although they may feel very sure that they have established that a statement is true, the possibility of error always exists. This is because, as we have seen, the final arbiter of truth for a realist is not what we human beings regard as true or false but what is true or false independent of human behaviour or ideas. The Vatican in its pronouncement effectively claims a realist understanding of truth - it claims that, through the magisterium of the Catholic Church, the co"ect understanding of morality is to be found (the chapter on Aquinas and Natural Law examines the background to the Catholic position). There is only one absolute standard of moral truth and the magisterium of the Catholic Church 16

Tmtli ;,, Li1J11't-s

has access to this (although obviously others may have as well). Sud1 a claim may be right, but it can be challenged, particularly if a different understanding of truth is taken.

- b) Constructivism Constructivists maintain that truth is dependent on the evidence for moral statements or the verification conditions which would establish their truth. Constructivists operate with the Coherence theory of truth

which maintains that a statement is true if it coheres or fits in with other true statements. There is no search for correspondence with some independent 'fact', instead truth is determined entirely on 'good fit' with other true statements. This sounds complicated, but it is not as bad as it appears! Constructivists will reject any search for some possibly unknowable ultimate lying beyond human language and human practice and will instead see truth emerging from human society or the human c�mmunity. Truth, they will claim, is constructed by human bein� within the 59cieties in which they live. In morality, therefore, there is no search for any reality beyond the moral rules human beings create and live by. l Constructivists wil often have a strong sense of history, seeing claims to truth as being relative to particular times and circumstances in history. There can be two main types of ethical constructivist:

Constructivist Relativists maintain that truth is relative. Relativists will hold either that there can be a variety of frameworks within which truth claims can be judged and/or that, within a particular framework, moral truths may vary over time. Thus, within the Christian framework, it was true a thousand years ago that lending money at interest was wrong, yet today this is considered unexceptional. To take another example, within the Muslim world today a man may be allowed up to four wives whereas within Judaism only one is permitted. Relativists would maintain that there are no absolute moral truths and that truth is relative to the society or form of life in which one lives. 1

17

The Puzzle of Ethics As an example, a constructivist who is a relativist would claim that for a Muslim to ask whether • Adultery is wrong' is true is to ask whether this statement is consistent or fits in with other true moral statements within the Islamic form of life. If a coherence theory of truth is adopted as a final test of truth, then it should be obvious that there is no way of getting back to any ultimate true moral statements - any moral statement can be te-sted against other statements that are known to be true but one has to hav_e these other statements that are accepted as true as a starting point. Those who adhere to the coherence theory and who are relativists are sometimes referred to as non-realists or anti-realists (cf. The Puzzle

of God

by Peter Vardy p. 15). Philosophers who support this

understanding of truth will maintain that different m�ral systems may be radically different from each other and may, indeed, contradict each other but that the issue of truth should be determined within a particular system. There is no neutral place from which to validate a

whole ethical scheme - no place that is not some place. 2 Constructivists need not be relativists - they would then maintain that although the truth of moral statements is dependent on the evidence for these statements (i.e. on coherence), this evidence should not be confined within the views held within a particular time or a particular society - instead there is or should be a single set of true moral statements but these statements would only be true if they fitted into a perfect set of coherent moral statements embracing all human societies. This perfect state of moral knowledge may be one to which philosophers aspire but any particular claim, no matter how well supponed and tested, may still be false because it would not cohere with all other true moral statements in the perfect set of such statements once (if ever!) these become known. It may be worth summarizing these positions as they can be confusing: 1 Moral realists maintain that moral statements are true if and only if thl·y correspond to a state of affairs that is independent of human 18

Truth in Ethics language, the human psyche or the human community. They maintain bivalence and consider that morality is objective. Since truth depends on correspondence, the possibility of error is always, at least in principle, possible as no matter how thorough the tests we may apply to detennine whether a moral statement is true, the possibility always exists that the statement fails to correspond and is therefore false. 2 Constructivist relativists maintain that moral statements are true if they cohere with other true moral statements made within a particular society or a particular form of life. Different societies may have different moral truths or there may be different moral truths at different times in the same society. Such people may consider moral statements to be subjective because they depend on the views of a particular group of people. 3 Constructivist non-relativists maintain -that moral statements are true if they cohere with other true moral statements. However they consider moral statements to be objective because they maintain that there is a single set of true moral statements which can only be arrived at when perfect coherence has been reached. Any moral statement we make now may be held to be wrong as perfect coherence amongst such statements will only be achieved in the future and until this point is reached error is always possible. It is important to note that both the moral realist and the constructivist non-relativist maintain that moral truths are objective. The term 'objective' is, therefore, not a very precise or helpful way of describing moral truth claims and is best avoided. Moral realists are likely to be concerned with some form of metaphysics as they will be anxious to establish a transcendent ground of some form for moral statements. Constructivists reject such metaphysical enquiry as they consider that moral truth depends on human language and how it is used. At this stage it is important to differentiate between coherence as a test for truth and as an arbiter of truth. A moral realist (who works with a correspondence theory of truth) may well maintain that coherence or 'good fit' with other true statements is a good test as 19

The Puzzle of Ethics to whether a statement corresponds and is therefore true. However this is not the same as saying that coherence detmnines truth which is the position of\the constructivist. For instance, it may be a good test as to whether murder is wrong that all the best text books and prominent authorities agree that this is the case, but realists will say that whether the statement 'murder is wrong' is true depends on whether this statement corresponds to some absolute moral ideal. Naturalist theories

of truth treat truth claims in ethics in just the same way as truth claims in other areas - in particular they maintain that it is possible to arrive at true moral statements from premises which are not about morality. If, for the sake of argument, we assume that what is morally good is what makes people happy, then 'adultery is wrong' would be false if it can be shown that adultery makes people happy. The same would apply if what is good is defined, to take another example, as what the Fuhrer wants. In this case 'Killing Jews is good' is true provided the Fuhrer can be shown to want this. As a contrast to naturalism, philosophers after G. E. Moore argued for non-cognitivism . This holds that there are moral truths that can be known but they cannot be analysed any further nor can they be tested against any external standard. Goodness is goodneu and there is no need or possibility of referring to anything beyond this. On this basis, truth is based on meaning and there is no issue of truth to be addressed independent of meaning. We will have to return to address these issues in due course, but for the present it is enough to have established some broad definitions. In the history of moral thought, a relationship has often been claimed between what is right or wrong and the will of God or the gods. It is still common for many people to claim that many moral truths depend on the dictates of God. The Ten Commandments arc the classic example - these are held to represent the foundations of morality by many Christians, Muslims and Jews. However once this position is examined it becomes a good deal more complicated n who has done this and who can see reality as it is.

iii) Justice and goodness Socrates took a practical attitude to ethics - he was concerned with the question of how an individual should live in order to achieve happiness (happiness is perhaps the best translation for the Greek word Socrates used which was eudaimonia but it is still inadequate as the Greek word has more to do with an individual having that which is desirable in the form of behaviour rather than simply living what he or she considers is a fulfilled life. Warm toes in front of the television screen is not an adequate understanding of eudaimonia! I ndeed Plato and Socrates specifically reject the idea that 'The Good' can be defined in terms of pleasure . It is worth remembering that Socrates died for what he believed in which would scarcely fit with the conventional understanding of happiness. For Plato, for a person to act justly means having the three parts of their personality in proper balance: • wisdom which comes from reason; • coura�e which comes from the spirited pan of man and • st·!f-c,mtrol which rules the passions. JO

Plato

-

Virtue and Kn owledge

So a penon cannot be just without being wise, brave and self­ controlled - and only if this balance is maintained will a penon be happy. Plato's argument in favour of this last point rests on the claim that happiness depends on internal mental states. This seems an odd definition of justice (even from the individual's point of view) as it defines justice in terms of a person's mental states and not in terms of how we treat other people - although Plato would maintain that if the proper balance is maintained within each individual, then they would treat other people correctly. Plato held that justice in the state mirrored justice in an individual (or, to put it another way, justice writ large in the state is analogous to justice writ small in the individual). In a just state the various parts cO:.Operate harmoniously in their proper roles, just as, in an individual, the various faculties should also work together. The individual must rule himself, but state government is needed by properly trained philosopher-guardians, who are carefully educated and are not motivated by self-interest, to, ensure that the proper balance essential to justice is maintained. If the majority of people live in the cave in the shadows of ign orance, they would not be in the best position to govern the state in the way it should be governed. Plato was strongly opposed to democracy, as this gives power to the greatest number of people, because what the greatest number think may well not be correct. The mass of people are also easily swayed by rhetoric - as Socrates found to his cost when rhetoric persuad�d the Athenian population to condemn him to death. Given the case with which politicians and advertising can sway large groups of people today, Plato's suspicion of democracy should, perhaps, be given more weight than it often is, although the dangers of those who think they know best and who decide to impose their will on othen are probably greater than the dangers of democracy. However, Plato still provides a challenge to our accepted Western li�eral assumptions about government which is worthy of more consideration. Plato's approach is elitist - most people arc in the shadows of JI

The Puzzle of Ethics ignorance and it is the philosopher who, after much study, can pierce through these shadows to see the world 'righdy'.

On Plato's view, virtue is knowledge - Plato did not think anyone willingly acted immorally. People acted wrongly due to ignorance and he effectively denies weakness of the will. If, therefore, people could be brought to understand their error and to appreciate what was right, they would then act accordingly. This approach is based on the Socratic idea that no one would voluntarily choose what was not good for him or herself. Once one comes out of the cave of ign orance and sees the truth or what is morally right, Plato assumes

that one will act accordingly. This, however, rests on a considerable error. It is perfectly possible for a person to say: 1 I know that action X is wrong, yet 2 I choose to do action X. There could be any number of examples of this. Smokers know that smoking will seriously damage their health - yet they go on smoking. St Paul put this point very well when he said:

For the good that I would I do not , but the evil which I would not, that I do . (Romans, 7 : 1 9) Knowledge does not lead to virtue - and the whole of Plato's moral philosophy rests on the claim that it does. For Plato and Socrates behaving morally or justly is always better for the individual even though this may lead to suffering and even to death. This was based on their view that the soul is a prisoner of the body and survives death and that if one does a bad act then one harms one's soul (which is one's very self) most of all. This leads to Socrates' view that it is better to suffer harm rather than to inflict it because if you inflict harm on others the person you are really ham1ing most of all is yourself as you are adversely affecting your soul. In Plato 's Gorgias, Socrates is portrayed as confronting Polus who holds that immoral acts can often bring an individual the greatest 32

Plato - Virtue and Knowledge

amount of pleasure or be in some way better for the person performing the action. Polus measures actions in terms of their material consequences for the person who performs them, Socrates measures actions by the effect they have on the soul of the individual. Effectively Socrates can be seen as saying: Think hard enough and you will always find that doing the right thing is best for you (Quoted in Peter Singer's

A Companion to Ethics,

Blackwell, p. 125)

However, this will be easier to accept if one first agrees with the presuppositions of Socrates and Plato - particularly those governing the immortality of the soul. One of the gravest problems in Plato's approach is that individuals can_ never be sure that they have arrived at a correct understanding of virtue and the nature of the good - how does one know that one has emerged from the cave and is not still in shadow? In his own authorship Plato may have moved from seeing this process as involving the individual thinking by himself to the idea of arriving at these values by looking at the good for the community. However, no clear criteria are provided. The second major problem is that Plato's approach is far from practical and gives no guidance as to how to act in the day-to-day situations which individuals face. However Plato's realist understanding of the nature of moral claims is particularly important and still remains an important alternative to moral relativism that merits further consideration and development. As we shall see in a later chapter, an Aristotelian approach to virtue may once again be coming into vogue, but Plato's understanding remains an alternative which needs to be taken seriously.

Questions for discussion What do you consider to be the most satisfactory solution to the Euthyphro dilemma? 1

33

The Puzzle of Ethics 2 Socrates considered that he was ignorant and yet he was wise. How

should this be understood? 3 What are the strengths and weaknesses of Plato 's understanding of morality? 4 If I hold that the grass is green and you believe the same thing, how can Plato's approach help to explain that we are both correctly seeing the same thing?

5 What point does Plato want to make in his parable of the Cave? 6 Why did Plato reject democracy? Do you think he was right to do so and why?

34

T H REE

Aristotle and Virtue Theory It would be difficult to begin an account ofAristotle's moral theory without first saying something about where he stands in relation to Socrates and Plato. Socrates (470-400 e.c.), as has already been suggested, is generally regarded as the founding father of Westem philosophy. Although Socrates never wrote anything, or at least there is almost no evidence to point to his having done so, we know of his existence chiefly through the works of the comic dramatist Aristophanes (448-:380 e.c.), the writer and historian Xenophon (43er355 e.c.) and . particularly through the philosophical dialogues of Plato (427-347 e.c.). Plato was Socrates' pupil for approximately ten years prior to Socrates' death, and Aristotle became Plato's pupil for roughly twenty years, studying under him at the famous Academy which Plato had established in Athens. These three, then, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, may be referred to as the Three Greek Wise Men as, arguably, they laid the foundations for all philosophical inquiry. Although Westem philosophy has been described by A. N. Whitehead as merely footnotes to Plato, it is Aristotle to whom, perhaps, the greater debt must be paid, for in Aristotle's writings we find the rigorous and systematic treatment of philosophical questions in continuous prose argument, unlike the dramatic and often poetically beautiful dialogues of Plato. And Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is, effectively, the first major piece of sustained moral argument from a secular point of view.

Biography Born in 384 B.c .. in Stagyra, Macedonia, Aristotle was the son of Nicomachus, a wealthy and highly influential court physician to the

35

Tht Puzzle of Ethics

king of Macedonia. At the age of eighteen Aristotle entered Plato's Academy where he stayed for almost twenty years. Disappointed at not being given the leadership of the Academy upon Plato's death, and becoming concerned for his own safety as a result of some racial hatred being whipped up against Macedonians, Aristotle left Athens and moved East. He found relative peace and security in the kingdom of Atameus, in the Eastern Aegean. Here he married the king's niece. In 343 he became tutor to Alexander, later Alexander the Great. According to Bertrand Russell it is inconceivable that Alexander thought anything of Aristotle other than that he was a 'prosy old pedant'. None the less, enjoying some political and financial support from the king, Aristotle returned to Athens in about 33.5 and founded his own school of philosophy, the Lyceum. However, upon Alexander's early death in a far-flung Eastern campaign Aristotle went into voluntary exile 'lest Athens should sin twice against philosophy', that is, execute him as it had done Socrates. He died in Chalcis in 322 at the age of sixty-two, and his will, which survives relatively intact , suggests that he had led a happy and fulfilled life. His influence has been enormous for he began sorting human knowledge and inqui ry into the various categories and disciplines that we know and use today. He compiled the first 'dictionary of philosophical terms' and produced major works in logic (the Organon or Instrument) , in the physical sciences (the Physics, On the Heavens), in the biological sciences (The History of Animals, On the Parts of A nimals) , in psychology (On the Sou� . in politics (Politics, The Gmstitution of Athens) and in ethics (Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics) .

Ethics The Nic,,machean Ethics, generally regarded as the most detailed and coherent of Aristotle's works on moral philosophy, is a collection of lectures compiled and edited by his son, also called Nicomachus afi:l·r his grandfather. Consisting of ten books in all it describes the 36

Aristotle and Virtue Theory

purpose of life, the divisions of the soul, and the various qualities of mind and character that are supposed to be necessary for moral conduct. _ It continues with a detailed description of friendship before concluding with the view that contemplation of the Good (that is, the life of philosophic reflection) is the highest form of happiness. For those not fully committed or suited to the life of pure contemplation then friendship becomes the ideal forum in which to exercise all of the virtues; the virtues being those moral and intellectual characteristics which have been fashioned by habit and education. Morality finds part of its true expression in friendship.The purpose of life In Book I of the Ethics, Aristotle makes a number of points concerning the true object or purpose of life. Firstly, he makes the seemingly obvious point that everything a person or a group does is directed towards some kind of an aim. Every art and every investigation and similarly every action and pursuit is considered to aim at some good (all references arc to Nicomachean Ethics translated by J. A. K. Thomson and revised by H. Tredennick , 1976, Penguin, p. 63) . This, of course, _ makes complete �ense. Whatever we do there is a purpose in doing it although sometimes, of course, the purpose may not seem immediately clear nor apparent. Alternatively , there may be a purpose to what we do, but we may want to object to that purpose. There is even a purpose in having no purpose! We might just want to sit and relax without having any particular aim in mind. But our purpose here is simply to enjoy doing nothing. Secondly, there are, according to Aristotle, 'superior' and 'subordinate' aims. So, for example, writing the first philosophy esgy is subordinate to obtaining the final A level or degree qualification; and sharpening the pencil or filling the ink cartridge are yet further subordinate aims to writing the essay. The point is that we do one thing in ordl·r to accomplish the aim of another more important 37

The Puzzle of Ethics thing, and so on, almost ad infinitum. We say 'almost ad infinitum' because there must be one overall or final aim towards which everything else is aimed. For Aristotle, that final aim is the Good; not only the Good for oneself but the Good for all humanity. If then, our activities have some end which we want for its own sake, and for the sake of which we want all the other ends . . . it is clear that this must be the Good, that is the supreme Good . . . (and) . . . Does it not follow then that a knowledge of the Good is of great importance to us for the conduc� of our lives? (Moreover) . . . while it is desirable to secure what is good in the case of an individual, to do so in the case of a people or a state is something finer and more sublime (pp. 6tt). Thirdly, that Supreme Good, for Aristotle, is defined as 'Happiness': . . . what is the highest of all practical goods? Well, so far as the name goes, there is pretty general agreement. 'It is happiness' say both ordinary and cultured people (p. 66). This, however, presents us with a problem. The problem is that because people differ from each other, there are therefore differing conceptions or versions of happiness. At root, according to Aristotle, there are three broad categories of people: • those who love pleasure; • those who love honour; • those who love contemplation. There arc, then, lives given over to wine, women and song; lives ,:xpressed in constant service to the community; and lives devoted to thinking. Aristotle places the life of the politician in the second category (as someone who is always trying to find practical solutions to larbrc- and small-scale problems); the life of a philosopher inevitably

38

A ristotle and Virtue Theory

falls in the third category whereas mo�t people, it seems, would prefer to live a life of pleasure: the utter servility of the · masses comes out in their preference for a bovine existence (p. 68). Aristotle was nothing if not blunt! His three-part classification leads on to two further points. Firstly, the one thing that distinguishes human beings from the rest of creation is the faculty of reason. We share the basic function of life with both plants and animals, and we share sentience or some form of conscious life along with animals. But only humans have the capacity to use reason in order to think about the quality of their lives. Therefore, if reason is the distinguishing mark of humanity, then happiness, logically, must consist in using chat reason in order to work out what a good life is, and then to live it. The second and final point is equally important. For Aristotle, and for the Greeks in general, a person is primarily a member of a group, be it a family, a household, a village or a city state. There is no such thing as a purely free-thinking individual. Our individuality is already partly decided for us by the group or groups of which we are a part. Hence, the overall wellbeing of a group is far more imponant than the wellbeing of any single member within it. For even if the good of the community coincides with that of the individual, it is clearly a greater and more perfect thing to achieve and preserve that of a community; for while it is desirable to secure what is good in the case of an individual, to do so in the case of a people or a state is something finer and more sublime (p. 64) . And that, for Aristotle, is the major reason why politicians ought to study ethics, because they have the responsibility of ensuring that the good life is lived by all members of society, and not just by some of them. 39

The Puzzle of Ethics The soul: Before any description of a truly ethical person can be given, an account of the soul needs to be offered, for by human goodness is meant goodness not of the body but of the soul, and happiness also we define as an activity of the soul.

(p. 88) .

The accompanying wordy

account.

diagram is an attempt to simplify Aristotle's rather As

can

be

seen ,

the

soul

is

divided

ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF THE SOUL IRRATIONAL

RATIONAL

SCIENTIFIC

PART

(logic, facts & truths)

I

I

I

/

I

CALCULA TI VE PART (weighing-up & choosing)

DESIDERA TIVE

PART

(wants & desires)

I

I

I

I

I

VEGETA TIVE PAR T (needs & instincts)

I NTEL LECTUAL VIRTUES

MORAL V I RTUES

Cultivated through ' I nstruction•

Cultivatcd th�ough 'Habif

A ristotle and Virtue Theory

into two major parts: the rational and the irrational . Whether these are actual divisions in the soul, or whether they are just helpful definitional differences is irrelevant for Aristotle. We cannot split open the person in order to examine the soul like we can a leg or an ann. Each of these two major divisions is also separated into two. The irrational part is divided into the vegetative and the desiderative. The vegetative part is the cause of nutrition and growth; that is, those basic instincts necessary for individual and collective survival, such as eating, drinking, resting and procreating. The desiderative or appetitive part is associated with those many and varied desires and wants which can be channelled, controlled or made submissive. These are the desires not just for food (that is a need or a vegetative impulse), but for a particular kind of food - cheeseburger with all the relish plus chips and onions. The wants and desires will, of course, include all of those luxury goods and activities which are not strictly necessary for survival. The distinction is clearly between 'needs' and 'wants'; and of�en what we want is not what we need. I might want another pint of beer after having already drunk three, bu� physiologically it is clearly not what I need. Next, the rational part of the soul is also divided into two: the scientific and the calculative. The scientific part is the bit of the mind which can grasp invariable first principles, that is, knowledge of physics, of mathematics, of geography and so on. It is the section which houses all of the facts of the world which are not up for debate or dispute. Whereas the calculative part is the bit of the mind which deliberates, considers, weighs up or thinks about thin� in order to make a decision about what to do, what to choose, what to make, what to buy and so on. Instead of knowing facts, it is concerned with knowing how to choose or how to come to a decision. It allows us to weigh up the pros and cons of an argument or a situation.

The fruit cake example: It must be stressed at the outset that this is not an example used by Aristotle. However, let us suppose that the vegetative part of me 41

The Puzzle of Ethics needs sustenance or nutrition and growth. Now, the desiderarive part of me desires cake rather than fruit. However, the scientific part of me knows the fact that, given my current waist size, fruit will do me more good than cake will. So, finally, the calculative part of my mind thinks about the advisability of cake over fruit or vice versa, and comes to a decision: How about 'fruit cake'? The scientific part of my mind will then be able to follow the precise· instructions on how to make a reasonably respectable fruit cake of the health-food variety. Thus the vegetative, desiderative, calculative and scientific parts of my 'soul' have all come into play.

The virtues: The reason why Aristotelian ethics is called Virtue Theory is because the virtues, those 'excellences' (Greek: arete) or qualities of mind and character, are at the heart of his argument. There are two sorts of virtues: • moral virtues or qualities of character (such as courage, liberality, temperance, modesty and so on). These virtues are connected to the desiderative and hence, the irrational part of our soul. They can only be cultivated through h:Jbit. • i11tellectual virtues or qualities of mind (such as wisdom, understanding and judgement) . These virtues are connected to the rational half of the soul, and are to be cultivated through i11structio11. 1 Moral virtues In Aristotle's account there are twelve moral virtues which fall bt·twecn two vices: the vice of excess or the vice of deficiency. So, for example, the moral virtue of coura� would fall between its excess which is foolhardiness or rashness and its deficiency which is, of course , n>wardice. 42

Aristotle and Virtue Theory Excess

rashness licentiousness prodigality vulgarity vanity ambition irascibility boostfulness buffoonery obsequiousness shyness envy

Deficiency

Virtue

courage temperance liberality magn ificence magnanimity proper ambition patience truthfulness wittiness friendliness modesty righteousindignation

cowardice insensibility illiberality pettiness pusillanimity unambitiousness lack of spirit understatement boorishness cantankerousness shamelessness maliciousenjoyment

(p.

104)

2 Intellectual virtues

There are nine intellectual virtues comprising five main or primary virtues, and four secondary virtues: • A rt or Tech nical Skill (techne) : the practical skill of knowing how to bring something into existence. For example , knowing how to build a house or construct a bridge as well as knowing how to write a poem, paint a picture or sculpt a statue. For the Greeks all things had to meet two criteria: they had to be functional and they had to be aesthetically pleasing or decorative. Plays, poems and statues had a symbolic political, social or . religious function as well as possessing what we might call 'artistic or dramatic beauty'. Similarly, houses and bridges had not only to fulfil their obvious function, but they also had to be pleasing to the eye. • Scientific Knowledge (episteme) : This comprises the so-called 'facts' of the universe, that is, knowledge of all the objects in the universe as well as all the laws which govern them. Knowledge of biology, astronomy, geography and so on are all covered by this virtue. • Pmdence or Practical Wisdom (phronesis) : This is one of the most 43

The Puzzle of Ethics important virtues which helps us to balance our interests with the interests of others. This is the virtue, for example, which helps us to make the decision whether or not to purchase the colour television with stereo sound, or whether to buy the small black and white portable and give the rest of the money to Oxfam. Arguably, without phronesis the remainder of the virtues revert to being mere skills. • Intelligence or Intuition (nous): This is perhaps the basic intellecmal virtue in the sense that without it probably few other intellectual virtues could get going. Arguably, without intelligence or intuition nothing else can happen in the mind! • Wisdom (sophia): This is the finished hrm of all the virtues. Generally speaking, one must have lived to a good age, experienced many thin� and learned a numbe:.· oflessons before wisdom is finally cultivated. The four secondary intellectual virtues are: • Resourcefulness or Good Deliberation (euboulia) : This is a form of practical wisdom, and involves knowing where and how to enquire about something so that the best decision can be made. For example, suppose I need a new refrigerator. At the outset this seems to be a perfecdy innocuous issue almost completely unconnected with moral concerns. Its relevance, however, will soon be made clear. Resourcefulness will prompt me to examine Mich ?, the popular consumer guide. This will help me to make a more informed decision about the best fridge to buy. • Understanding (sunesis) : This goes beyond the ability to know external facts about the world. To understand something is to recognize all the difficulties and perplexities associated with decision­ making. I might choose the best fridge recommended by Mich ?, but when I get it home it may not fit into my kitchen! In order to understand thi� I am obliged to deliberate over many interrelated issues. • Judiement (gnome): For a judgement to be a good one it has to take account of what is right and just for all concerned. Suppose, 44

Aristotle and Virtut Theory

after examining all of the fridges on offer, after measuring my kitchen and so on, I find that my chosen fridge is called 'The Philippino Special Exploiter'. Its high quality and low price depend upon the poverty and squalid conditions of the Third World workers who help manufacture it. My sympathetic judgement will be not to purchase the fridge and perhaps to begin campaigning on behalf of the exploited workforce. • Cleverness (deinotts) : the last of the secondary intellectual virtues. On its own, however, it can hardly be said to be a virtue in the true sense of the word. Cleverness unconnected with judgement can be unscrupulous. A shady second-hand car dealer may be said to be clever, but we would hardly say that he was in possession of a vinue.

Doctrine of the mean According to the Aristotelian argument we all have the potential to develop these moral and intellectual virtues. However, it is likely that only a few people will be able to cultivate the potential virtues into actual virtues. Similarly, all acorns have the potential to become actual oak trees, but only some of them will become so. Moreover, if we are to cultivate our virtues, particularly our moral virtues, we must be aware of the doctrine of the mean. Put simply, we must regulate our emotions and responses to people and situations so that we are eventually able to conduct ourselves with dignity. We must try to ensure that we veer away from either the excess or deficiency, and so hit the 'mean' or midway point, although Aristotle is quick to mention that the midway point is not just a numerical halfway house. For example, I have the clear capacity to feel intense anger at my word processor when it fails to work. I accept my anger for what it is - a natural feeling or emotional response. However, it is my attitude towards that feeling which is crucial. I could, for example, set about my computer with a hammer in order to release my feelin�. 45

The Puzzle of Ethics But this would be to exhibit a poorly developed virtue. On the other hand, I could simply not bother about the failure of my computer, do nothing about it and give up on writing altogether. This would be an equally poor response. The right response would be to control the anger, take the computer to a repair shop, and then hire or borrow another one for the intervening period. My feelings, no matter how overwhelming they are, should not drown my reason. Feeli� are clearly important, but our virtues - our attitudes towards our fee� - are more important. What matters is what we do with our feelings so that eventually they can conform naturally to that which reason would advocate. Aristotle makes the point that children have to learn the virtues through habit. They must learn that they cannot simply give vent to all their fee� in whatever way they wish and whenever they want. Although the six-year-old may initially give vent to her

emotions in the supermarket by screaming that she wants the chocolate bar, she must gradually learn that the feelings of anger and resentment at being denied it are perfectly natural. However, she must control that anger and resentment and develop a sense of patience instead. Arguably, adulthood is about learning to control and direct one's emotions. In other words, it is about developing the moral virtues. By constantly learning through habit to control our feelings we · should, according to Aristotle, begin to: have these feelings at the right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way . . . (this is) . . . to feel them to an intermediate, that is, to the best degree ; and this is the mark of virtue (p. 101). There is the obvious criticism that this approach to moral reasoning leads to a kind of blind uniformity of belief, desire and behaviour. The intention, it would seem, is to produce an automatic response in people to other people and to situations. This would perhaps be so, if Aristotle had not emphasized the imponance of the intellectual virtues along with the moral virtues. Not only is it necessary for

46

Aristotle and Virtue Theory

us to feel and behave in the right or appropriate manner, but we should also understand and know why it is important that we feel and act in these ways.

Friendship as the main aim of a moral life Finally, without friendship none of the virtues - either moral or intellectual - would be of any value. For Aristotle, friendship is essential. We are social and political beings. Nobody would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other good things (p. 258) . A community, a society, a state, any gathering of two or more people presupposes a notion of friendship, and depends upon it. Households, marriages, partnerships, clubs, societies, etc. , all depend upon sustaining a forum within which friendships can be fostered and maintained. Again, Aristotle makes the point that: Friendship also seems to be th e bond that holds communities together . . . (p. 258) . Indeed, friendship is of such primary importance that it comes before justice itself. In fact without friendship there could be no sense of justice. The lawmaker, the lawgiver and the law-enforcer all derive their rationale from acting as the supposed legally-appointed 'friend' of everyone in the community, and of ensuring that the community fosters the right conditions under which friendship may flourish. . . . lawgivers seem to attach more importance to it than tojustice; because concord seems to be something like friendship, and concord is their primary object - that and eliminating faction, which is enmity . . . indeed friendliness is considered to be justice in the fullest sense (p. 258-9) . 47

The Puzzle of Ethics Briefly, there are three kinds of freindship, according to Aristotle: based on utility, pleasure and goodness. • Utilityfriendships are those which are, as the name suggests, simply useful to us. Utility friends are those with whom we find ourselves in company at work, those next to us on the factory assembly line. It is convenient for both parties to engage in pleasant and friendly conversation in order to while away the time whilst doing something tedious and dissatisfying. The friendship is useful in that it is an aid to comfort. Moreover, there may be more than just pleasant mutual gain in the friendship; it may be useful for the completion of a game or a project. For example, it clearly helps if team members do actually get on with each other when a cricket or netball tour is arranged. Or . the friendship may be formed deliberately to cater for plain personal need. Here Aristotle cites the elderly as a group who form utility friendships. For example, someone is needed to push the wheelchair or fetch the shopping. Or again, friendship may be sought in order to further one's own personal advantage. Here it is the middle-aged who actively cultivate utility friendships - perhaps the businessman who purposefully cultivates a friendship with a local bank manager in order to secure a business loan. According to Aristotle, most friendships in the worlds of industry, business and commerce are utility friendships. • Pleasurable or Erotic.friendships are slightly better than the first type. Here, friends give _us pleasure, and the friendship evolves through_ feelings and emotions. The relationship is governed more by the heart than by the head. Friends are pleasurable to be with because they may be witty, amusing or attractive. Friendships between the young arc generally of this kind. They tend to be impermanent, and arc often based on sexual attraction. • Perfect frie,idships are based on goodness and are obviously the most valuable. Here friends care more about the other person than about themselves. Moreover, it means liking or loving the other person for what she/he is, not for any incidental quality that they might 48

Aristotle and Virtue Theory possess, such as beauty. Such friends have similar attributes, and such friendships only occur after a long while. The relationship needs time to develop. According to Aristotle, 'You cannot get to know each other until you haved eaten the proverbial quantity of salt together. ' This apparently is a medimnos or one and a half bushels. In other words, the friends need to share many meals together; mealtimes traditionally being times of social chatting, anecdote-telling and story-swapping. Finally, there are few truly good friendships for there are few truly good people.

Criticisms: According to some scholars (e.g. Ackrill 1981; Lloyd 1968; Taylor 1955), Aristotle's account of ethics is, in fact, simply a detailed elaboration of a very orthodox Greek view of aristocratic living. It is easy to cultivate the virtues when the mortgage is fully paid up, the children are looked after by the nanny, and one's inheritance pays for the daily needs and wants. Life for the Athenian (or Macedonian) aristocrat was relatively easy, being purchased with the help of a slave population and an underclass of women. An