The End of European Security Institutions?: The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and NATO After Brexit (SpringerBriefs in Political Science) 3030421597, 9783030421595

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
List of Tables
1 Introduction
Aims, Objectives, and Research Questions
Why This Book?
Argument
Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context, and for Who?
Roadmap for the Book
Part I Historical Evolutions of the U.K.—NATO and U.K.—E.U. Relationship
2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship
The End of World War II
The Treaty of Dunkirk, the Treaty of Brussels, and NATO
Korean War
The Suez Crisis and Fallout
French Withdrawal
Détente
The Fall of the U.S.S.R
Gulf War
Partnership for Peace
NATO Enlargement
Bosnia
Kosovo
9/11
Afghanistan
Iraq
Libya
Brexit
Conclusion
3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship
End of World War II
Schuman Plan
Western European Union (WE.U.)
Petitions to Join the EEC
Joining the EEC
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Schengen Agreement
Single European Act
The Treaty of Maastricht and the End of the Cold War
The Treaty of Amsterdam
Nice Treaty
Treaty of Lisbon
Eurozone Crisis
Migrant Crisis and the Brexit
Conclusion
Part II Contemporary Contexts and Impacts of the Brexit
4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit
5 The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security
Losing a Capable E.U. Member
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Future of Defence Integration
European Intervention Initiative (E2I) and the U.K.
U.K. Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)
6 Conclusion

Citation preview

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Benjamin Zyla

The End of European Security Institutions? The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and NATO After Brexit 123

SpringerBriefs in Political Science

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8871

Benjamin Zyla

The End of European Security Institutions? The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and NATO After Brexit

123

Benjamin Zyla Department of Government Harvard University Cambridge, MA, USA School of International Development and Global Studies University of Ottawa Ottawa, Canada

ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Political Science ISBN 978-3-030-42159-5 ISBN 978-3-030-42160-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Writing a book on a contemporary security issue such as the Brexit is undoubtedly exciting and rewarding in many regards. One gets to discuss and possibly contribute to solving contemporary policy issues, and thus help shape future discussions and debates. On the other hand, one always runs the risk that current events related to that particular issue one focusses upon might change rather quickly, which, in turn, most likely would require a re-write of certain passages or even a chapter. The latter was and most certainly continues to be the case with writing on the Brexit as at least two British governments initially did not manage to clearly articulate how they would want the U.K. to separate from the mainland in Europe. In the meantime, and with winning the general election in December 2019 the new government of Prime Minister Johnson has used its comfortable majority in Parliament to secure its approval for the Brexit. Yet, the political hurdle to strike a deal with the EU and negotiating the details and conditions of Britain’s departure remain nebulous. If the UK does not manage to reach a deal with the EU at the end of the grace period in December 2020, a hard-Brexit would follow. Unclear also remain questions about the role of Scotland, as well as Northern Ireland, in the Union (see detailed discussion below). While students of European security affairs perhaps watch this process with a certain degree of amusement as the British “undecidedness”, “bickering”, “infighting”, “revolting”, “contestation”, and political despair have often been attributes that seemed to have been reserved for describing the outcomes of exhaustive meetings of the European Heads of States and Governments in Brussels or those of the Council of Ministers that often ends way past midnight. Oxymoronically, at the time of writing they adequately describe and capture the state of British politics and its government. Having observed the Brexit process unfolding since 2016, the debates surrounding it appear to be narrowed down discussing its various implications for the economy, as well as Britain’s immigration and social policy, to only name a few

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Preface

policy issues. However, not many policy analysts1 have devoted their time to extensively discussing the implications of the Brexit for the two most important security institutions in Europe, namely the E.U.’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This book addresses this lacuna. We are confident that its shelf life will be longer than some would suggest, because even if the U.K. at the end of this Brexit process decides to remain in the E.U. (which at the time of writing still is a possibility), it will remain a grumpy spouse in this marriage. At the same time, the E.U. will not only know that the U.K. will most likely be grumpy and thus most likely torpedo the EU’s initiatives for further integration in the area of security and defence; it will also consider the U.K. as an unreliable and untrustworthy (security) partner moving forward. In short, both scenarios are not really positive, ideal, or beneficial for any partner. However, in putting aside the politics of the Brexit discussions, this book offers possible and for both sides practicable policy scenarios where each side benefits and would maintain their “face”. This book would not have been possible without the generous support of the Institute for Advanced Study at the University of Konstanz where I had the great fortune to spend two academic years (2017–19) as Fellow, as well as the Department of Government at Harvard University where he currently is a Visiting Scholar (while being on leave from the University of Ottawa) and where the book manuscript was completed. I am also grateful for the generous financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for this project through their Insight Grant programme. The University of Ottawa and in particular my colleagues in the department, as well as the Faculty of Social Sciences also need to be thanked for allowing me to spend so much time away for doing research. It is one of the very rare occasions in somebody’s career that one could spend three years abroad at two of the world’s best research institutions! And for that I cam deeply grateful. Arnold Kammel, who is the co-author of chapters four and five, and I also thank the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES) for their support of this project and the institutional affiliation that we have enjoyed with them for the past several years. Lorraine Klimowich was a superb editor and supported this project from the beginnings. Together with her editorial team at Springer she made the publishing process a very enjoyable and smooth ride.

A notable and excellent exception are Benjamin Kienzle and Ellen Hallams. “FORUM: European security and defence in the shadow of Brexit”, Global Affairs vol. 2, no. 5, 2016, pp. 465–469. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1280376. Whitman even charged that “security and defence is an area in which the impact of a vote to leave the EU would be relatively marginal”. See Whitman, Richard G. (2016b). “The UK and EU foreign and security policy: An optional extra.” The Political Quarterly, 87(2), p. 254. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12249; Bakker, A., Drent, M., & Zandee, D. (2016, July). European Defence: How to Engage the UK After Brexit. Clingendael Report.

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Preface

vii

I also gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Forest Poff-Smith, Tomke Blotevogel, Paul Heinrich, Francesco Iorianni, Juliane Kuhn, and especially Alexander Pöschl for helping me to collect some of the data and trace some of the literature on the Brexit. Moreover, I thank Thomas Roberts at ELF Translations LTD for his assistance, as well as my family for their support, love, comfort, and understanding. Without them, this book would not have seen the light of the day! All errors, of course, remain ours. Boston, USA December 2019

Benjamin Zyla

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aims, Objectives, and Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Why This Book? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context, and for Who? Roadmap for the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part I

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

1 2 6 7 9 15

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19 20 20 24 26 27 27 29 32 33 33 35 40 43 43 44 47 48 49

Historical Evolutions of the U.K.—NATO and U.K.—E.U. Relationship

2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship . . . . . The End of World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Treaty of Dunkirk, the Treaty of Brussels, and NATO . Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Suez Crisis and Fallout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . French Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Détente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Fall of the U.S.S.R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Partnership for Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NATO Enlargement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9/11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Brexit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

x

Contents

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51 51 53 55 55 56 57 57 58 58 62 63 64 65 66 68

4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit (With Arnold Kammel) . . .

73

5 The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security (With Arnold Kammel) Losing a Capable E.U. Member . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Future of Defence Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . European Intervention Initiative (E2I) and the U.K. . . . . . . . . . . . U.K. Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.... ....

85 86

.... .... ....

90 94 96

6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship . . . . End of World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Schuman Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Western European Union (WE.U.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Petitions to Join the EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joining the EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe . . . Schengen Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Single European Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Treaty of Maastricht and the End of the Cold War The Treaty of Amsterdam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nice Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Treaty of Lisbon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eurozone Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Migrant Crisis and the Brexit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part II

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Contemporary Contexts and Impacts of the Brexit

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 1.4 Table 1.5 Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 2.5 Table 4.1 Table 4.2

Market Exchange Rates (MER), 2017 at current prices and exchange rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Purchasing Power Parity Rates (PPP). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Military operations undertaken by U.K. under CDSP (Jan. 2013–Jan. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Civilian Operations and associated costs for U.K. under CSDP (2012–2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . World U.K. regular force deployments, 2015. . . . . . . . . . . . . Force deployments of NATO members to UNPROFOR . . . . Force deployments of NATO members to IFOR 1996–1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Force contributions to SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, 1997–2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Force deployments of NATO members to KFOR, 2002–2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Force deployments of NATO members to ISAF in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NATO Countries’ defence expenditure, 2011–2017 . . . . . . . . NATO Countries’ Defence Expenditure as a % of GDP, 2011–2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.. ..

4 5

..

10

.. .. ..

12 13 36

..

37

..

38

..

41

.. ..

45 76

..

81

xi

Chapter 1

Introduction

The outcome of the so-called Brexit, which is an abbreviation of “British exit” from the European Union (E.U.) that Britons had voted for in a nation-wide referendum on 23 June, 2016 surprised many, not only in the United Kingdom (U.K.).1 Other members of the E.U. were also astonished to learn that the U.K. decided to be the first country in the history of the E.U. to leave the mostly intergovernmental Union.2 This would mean that the U.K. would no longer be a member of the E.U. and its institutions, including the European Council, Council of the E.U., Commission, and European Parliament, and several E.U. agencies.3 Indeed, the U.K. would be without a formal voice or even veto for that matter in these institutions, including Europe’s

1 When we use the term U.K. we refer to the entire British nation—that is Northern Ireland, England,

Scotland, and Wales. Geographically speaking, Britain normally excludes Northern Ireland. For an excellent discussion of the Brexit and its deeper roots in British society see Geoffrey Evans and Anand Menon. 2017. Brexit and British Politics. Polity Press and Anand Menon and Brigid Fowler. 2016. “Hard or Soft? The Politics of Brexit”. National Institute Economic Review 238, pp. R4–R12. 2 The obvious exceptional cases where the E.U.’s size was diminished are with the cases of Greenland and Algeria. See Kiran Klaus Patel, Kiran Klaus. “Something new under the sun? The lessons of Algeria and Greenland”, in Martill, Benjamin and Uta Staiger (eds.) Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London: University College London Press; Tim Oliver, “Goodbye Britannia? The International Implications of Britain’s Vote to leave the E.U.”, Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 8(2) 2016, p. 218. 3 Niklas Helwig and Isabelle Tannous. “Gemeinsame Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik”, in Werner Weidefeld and Wolfgang Wessels, Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2016, p. 343. To be sure, the E.U. currently has The E.U. has 42 agencies, or which 6 can be considered executive and 36 regulative agencies. Each is designed to carry out specific legal, technical or scientific tasks that are central to the overall functioning of the E.U. For a discussion see European Union, “The E.U. agencies working for you”. 2006. https://doi.org/10.2814/522644; Keleman, D.R., “The Politics of ‘Eurocratic’ Structure and the New European Agencies”, in West European Politics 25, no. 4. 2011. https://doi.org/10.1080/713601644. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Zyla, The End of European Security Institutions?, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_1

1

2

1 Introduction

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).4 However, the mechanics of how to actually leave the E.U. even after the British government invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union with their letter to the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, on 29 March 20175 are still unknown until this day. With more than two years past the referendum, in the spring of 2019 former Prime Minister Theresa May’s initial proposal for an orderly Brexit did not find the support in the British House of Commons that would allow the U.K. to officially ‘divorce’ from the E.U. This is somewhat surprising, given that she had made unbendingly clear immediately after the referendum that Britain has all intentions to leave the E.U. after 43 years of marriage. Indeed, May’s inability to introduce a Brexit plan to the House of Commons that would find the support of the majority of parliamentarians (from all parties) ultimately cost her the job. She resigned as Prime Minister at the end of July 2019, and was replaced by Boris Johnson, the U.K.’s former Foreign Minister in May’s cabinet. After months of intense political contestations inside the House of Commons (as well as among the Tories themselves), Johnson called for an election in December 2019, which he won with a landslide majority of 43.6% of the votes, which translates to 365 of the 650 seats in the House of Commons.

Aims, Objectives, and Research Questions While the Brexit process is still unfolding at the time of writing,6 this book discusses what the Brexit would mean for the future of Europe’s security institutions, especially CFSP and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). More precisely, we examine what the Brexit would mean for the U.K.’s relationship with these two major security institutions that the U.K. has been an integral member of for decades.7 4 We

hasten to add that in case the Brexit materializes the U.K. would also be placed outside the E.U. single market; the E.U.’s 32 specialized agencies (e.g. the European Medicines Agency, the European Banking Authority, the European Aviation Safety Agency) as well as the more than 40 trade agreements that the E.U. currently has signed with over 65 countries; other key E.U. programs and initiatives (e.g. in the area of research the successor to Horizon 2020 programme), the Galileo programme and its commercial and security aspects (e.g. satellite navigation), the Erasmus programme facilitating student and research mobility for circa 678000 individuals and with a budget of more than Euro 2.1 billion (European Commission, 2017) http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/ erasmus-plus/about_en#tab-1-5; and Eurojust, and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Moreover, the U.K. will no longer be a formal participant in the E.U.’s sanctions process (e.g. against Russia). 5 See HM Government. 2017. ‘Prime Minister’s Letter to Donald Tusk Triggering Article 50.’ 29 March (available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-todonald-tusk-triggering-article-50). 6 We follow Tim Oliver here with this term to consider Brexit as a process rather than an event. It thus signals multidimensionality, complexity, and actorness. See Oliver, Tim. 2016. “The world after Brexit: From British referendum to global agenda.” International Politics 53 (6): 689–707. 7 To be sure, the Brexit referendum simply decided that the U.K. would leave the E.U., not NATO.

Aims, Objectives, and Research Questions

3

Moreover and in pure policy terms, we ask how the Brexit will most likely affect the inner mechanics of the transatlantic alliance (NATO) and CFSP/CSDP in particular moving forward? These are important questions to consider for at least two reasons. First, as noted the U.K. has been an integral part of the transatlantic as well as the European security architecture since their foundations. In 1973 it joined the E.U., and on 4 April 1949 NATO. Second, the E.U. is currently exposed to a variety of external security and foreign policy challenges, and thus a situation of ‘internal insecurity’ with one of its core members leaving the CFSP institution is not only undesirable; it arrives at the wrong time and is most likely going to destabilize the E.U. even further in light of the contemporary security environment. In turn, we charge, it also harms British security interests. The most serious threat facing both NATO and CFSP over the short term clearly is Russia, along with the instability permeating the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.8 The E.U.’s ability to adequately react to these threats and pockets of insecurity could seriously be undermined by the Brexit unless a way could be found to incorporate or at least affiliate the U.K. with the CSDP architecture and its bureaucratic apparatus that would allow, above all, access to critical information. In addition, the U.K. leaving CFSP and its security architecture are exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the future of NATO that primarily stems from the U.S. and Turkey having called into question the reliability of the alliance and their country’s commitments to it.9 Moreover, it is unclear to what extent the E.U. is still able to rely on NATO in support of its operations, especially when it comes to planning and commanding these operations based on the “Berlin-Plus” agreement. Even if the U.S. under President Trump would clearly and unequivocally commit to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the reliability of Turkey having the second largest NATO military cannot necessarily be taken for granted due to its severe problems with civilmilitary relations, as well as its political proximity with Russia. Turkey has recently bought Russia’s S-400 missile defense system at a cost of circa $2 billion. That system was precisely designed to down NATO warplanes. A further rapprochement with Russia could also complicate decision-making processes within NATO and risk the procurement of the F-35 fighter jets. At the same time, there appears to be a serious gap between rhetoric and reality with regards to the E.U.’s efforts of achieving strategic autonomy, which is something that especially the Americans have long called for. For example, Table 1.1 shows the top ten worldwide military spenders in 2017, as produced by the Stockholm

8 See e.g. MacGillivray, Iain (2016). Four effects of Brexit on the Middle East. Global Risk Insights,

14. July 2016. Available at http://globalriskinsights.com/2016/07/four-effects-brexit-middle-east; see also E.U. Global Strategy. (2016, June). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy; Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary (eds.) The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, and Partnerships (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 2–3. 9 See e.g. Trump, Donald J. (2016) Foreign policy speech to the Centre for the National Interest in Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trumpforeign-policy-speech.

4

1 Introduction

Table 1.1 Market Exchange Rates (MER), 2017 at current prices and exchange rates Rank

Country

1

U.S.A.

609.8

1,879.3

35.1

2

China

228.2

161.9

13.1

3

Saudi Arabia

69.4

2,107.4

4.0

4

Russia

66.3

460.7

3.8

5

India

63.9

47.7

Sub-total top 5

Spending U.S.$ billions (MER)

Spending per capita U.S.$

1,037.7

World share (%)

3.7 59.7

6

France

57.8

889.1

3.3

7

U.K.

47.2

713.1

2.7

8

Japan

45.4

356.0

2.6

9

Germany

44.3

539.8

2.5

10

South Korea

39.2

768.0

2.3

Sub-total top 10

1,271.5

–

73.1

World total

1,738.6

–

100.0

Source SIPRI milex database 2018

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).10 While the U.S. clearly is the world’s foremost military paymaster with more than $600 billion spent on defence, China is catching up ranked second with a world share of more than 13% (compared to U.S. at 35.1%).11 Moreover, Europe’s largest military forces, especially the French forces, are widely deployed at the moment, both at home and abroad (more than 10,000 French forces are currently deployed to Mali, Iraq, Lebanon, Central African Republic, Sahel). The German forces, currently holding the second largest E.U. military, are seriously underfunded. Moreover, their overall operational readiness continues to be considered very low due to a lack of investments into the forces for more than a decade. The point here is that Brexit will undoubtedly exacerbate these internal E.U. problems following the U.K.’s withdrawal from CFSP (Table 1.2 ). Meanwhile, as we are trying to show in this monograph, there are signs that the U.K. is willing to participate in the CFSP architecture post-Brexit, although the details are still very vague and under negotiation. We argue that three very specific forms of cooperation are most likely to induce a structural change for the E.U. after Brexit, namely for its Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); the European

10 Figures are expressed in Constant (2017) Prices and Exchange Rates (US$ Billion). Countries are ranked using Market Exchange Rates (MER) and figures are also shown calculated using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates. If a different base year were used, the rankings could change due to fluctuations in exchange rates. 11 However, it is also true given these numbers that Europeans spend more than twice as much on defence as Russia (namely just short of $150 billion).

Aims, Objectives, and Research Questions

5

Table 1.2 Purchasing Power Parity Rates (PPP)3 Rank

Country

Spending U.S.$ billions

1

U.S.A

609.8

2

China

440.4

3

India

234.6

4

Saudi Arabia

180.0

5

Russia

Sub-total top 5

168.4 1,633.2

6

France

63.8

7

Iran

53.5

8

U.K.

52.6

9

South Korea

51.9

10

Japan

50.5

Sub-total top 10

1,905.5

World total

–

Source SIPRI milex database 2018

Intervention Initiative (E2I); and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) approach.12 However, as a quick preview to the more detailed discussions below, all three forms of cooperation are plagued with problems and difficulties. To start with, at the moment the PESCO arrangement appears to place relatively little focus on cooperation, and it is not clear to what extent it could improve the operational capabilities of the E.U. after Brexit. Moreover, it will cast into sharper relief the strategic differences between the different E.U. Member States. Secondly, France has proposed E2I, which seeks to achieve the level of strategic and cultural concentration that is required for fast multinational deployments within dangerous theatres of operation. While this initiative operates outside of the E.U.’s Military Committee and its staff, it is open for the U.K. to actively participate in it (a first commitment by the U.K. has already been made in this regard). Having said that, E2I appears to be focused on interventions in Northern Africa and especially French-speaking Africa. Thus, it remains unclear whether E2I might actually be a viable solution for the U.K. seeking cooperation with the E.U. down the road in case the Brexit materializes. Thirdly, the U.K.—headed JEF falls under the NATO Framework Nations Concept, although is detached from NATO decision making processes. It brings together 12 For a quick discussion see Dijkstra, H. (2016). “U.K. and E.U. foreign policy cooperation after Brexit.” RUSI Newsbrief, 36(5), 1–3. Retrieved from https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/dijkstra_ newsbrief_sept_vol.36_no.5.pdf as well as Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary (eds.) The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, and Partnerships (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). On the JEF specifically see Tormod Heier, “Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force: A Force of Friends?”, in Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary (eds.) The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, and Partnerships (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, pp. 189–214.

6

1 Introduction

eight European countries (including non-E.U. and non-NATO states) and focuses primarily on countering Russian threats. It solely is a NATO concept/approach, and thus cannot easily be transferred to the E.U. without affecting E.U.—NATO relations.

Why This Book? This monograph is very timely and highly relevant politically, given that both sides (the U.K. as well as E.U. members) are unsure how to maintain their security cooperation. As noted, while research on the Brexit has been under way for years, especially in terms of analyzing its economic dimensions13 as well as social implications (e.g. labour market, immigration etc.), the NATO—CFSP dimension of the Brexit has largely been overlooked in that debate. This is mainly due to the silence of the British government on explaining clearly how it intends to organize the U.K.— NATO/U.K.—CFSP relationship in the future should the Brexit indeed fully materialize at the end of 2020. This is in spite of the fact that a post of Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union has been created in the British Cabinet whose responsibility in part at least, one would assume, is to implement the Brexit. The result is leaving both the E.U. and NATO in suspense. Moreover, the U.K. government let pass a major opportunity at NATO’s most recent Summit in Brussels in 2018 to explain to its allies how it intends to manage, in an orderly and coordinated fashion, its exit from the E.U. and what that would mean for both the British commitment to NATO and the future of CFSP. Quite to the contrary, some observers had the impression at the Summit that the U.K. really does not want to play a critical role in transatlantica anymore. Indeed, a cold shivering of a looming isolationist British foreign policy made the rounds on NATO floors, again one must say, leaving many to speculate about the U.K.’s future in the entire transatlantic security architecture—that is both NATO and CFSP. The aim of this monograph is to help fill these obvious gaps and to provide answers as to how the U.K.—CFSP/NATO security relationship could be organized and structured now that the British Parliament has voted for the Brexit. This book thus helps us to answer one of the most pertinent security questions in the transatlantic relationship today, which are undoubtedly changing European security affairs. In other words, readjusting U.K.—CFSP/NATO relations is more than simply an internal management exercise where British commitments (financial and 13 The OECD, for example, has estimated in 2016 that the U.K.’s GDP would be more than 3% smaller by 2020 (in comparison to continued E.U. membership), and 5% lower by 2030 – the equivalent of £3200 per household (estimates are calculated on 2016 prices). It is also commonly expected that Brexit would have long term structural impacts on the U.K. economy in terms of reduced capital inflows, lower immigration, lower technical progress, stagnant labour productivity due to less foreign direct investments. For a scholarly discussion (with the exception of security) see da Costa Cabral, Nazaré, José Renato Gonçalves, Nuno Cunha Rodrigues (Eds.). After Brexit: Consequences for the European Union. London: Palgrave Macmillan. In 2016, for example, roughly 1.2 million British citizens lived in the E.U., while 3 million E.U. citizens lived in the U.K.; see McBridge, “What Brexit Means”; special issue of National Institute Economic Review vol. 238, no. 1, November 2016.

Why This Book?

7

human resources etc.14 ) to the E.U. would be simply going to be sort of ‘switched around’ from one organization to the other (from the E.U. to NATO)—or where human resources (civilian and military) are being rotated out of the respective E.U. institutions in Brussels and posted elsewhere under the NATO umbrella.15 It is very evident that the Brexit is much more fundamental than that, touching upon the very basic foundations of European security affairs and the transatlantic relationship in particular. It is, we contend, fair to state that the Brexit indeed poses a very critical moment for the alliance to re-adjust its inter-institutional relationship with the E.U., as well as what has been appreciated in the literature as the ‘transatlantic link’ that has bound Europe with its two north American partners (the U.S. and Canada) together since the end of World War II.16 Against this backdrop, it is evident that the Brexit will undoubtedly have significant policy implications for all transatlantic security actors and institutions involved in the management of European security, in Britain, in NATO, and in the E.U.17 In a word, the overall objective of this book is to unpack these issues and to provide much needed clarity and guidance on them for policy makers in the U.K., as well as the E.U. and NATO member states, on what the Brexit would mean for both CFSP and NATO.

Argument We put forward three arguments in this monograph. First, we charge that pragmatism should win out against ideology in the Brexit process in order to ensure the continuing participation of the U.K. in the wider European security architecture. Should the European Commission continue to insist on excluding the U.K. from precisely that architecture, this could result in the emergence of bilateral and multilateral ad hoc alliances, such as the E2I and the U.K.—JEF, which could also represent a possible means of incorporating the U.K. into the European security architecture post Brexit. 14 Undoubtedly, the U.K. must increase their foreign and security (human) resources significantly. See Chalmers, Malcolm. “U.K. Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit”, Briefing Paper, January 2017; Alicia von Voss and Torben Schütz. “The U.K.’s potential role in enabling E.U.–NATO cooperation after Brexit“, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and German Council on Foreign Relations, June 2018. 15 Some commentators suggest that the Brexit might actually require more resources that staying within the E.U. See Richard Whitman: Brexit or Bremain: what future for the U.K.’s European diplomatic strategy?, in: International Affairs 3/2016, S. 509–529. 16 Some analysts have suggested that the Brexit would make it incredibly difficult for the U.K. to continue to cooperate with the E.U. in the areas of foreign-, security-, and defence policy. See Bond, i. (2015). Cameron’s security gamble: is Brexit a strategic risk? Centre for European reform. London, 21 December. http://www.cer.eu/insights/camerons-security-gamble-brexit-strategic-risk; and Kerr, John (2016). Brexit would shake the four pillars of British foreign policy. Centre for European Reform. London, 31 May; https://www.cer.eu/insights/brexit-would-shake-four-pillarsbritish-foreign-policy. 17 See also Stephanie Hofmann, “Brexit will weigh heavily on European security. Here’s Why.” The Washington Post Monkey Cage Analysis, October 18, 2018.

8

1 Introduction

Whilst NATO as a whole might no longer be as reliable as it once was, the alliance can and must continue to offer a useful framework for such arrangements. Specifically, arrangements such as the E2I and U.K.—JEF would undermine the E.U.’s control over the European security architecture and enhance the role of national defence actors. They also underscore the ineffectiveness of the E.U.’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Second, in case the U.K. indeed leaves the E.U. in terms of European security policy we are likely to see that the U.K. will push for taking Europe’s most important military and security decisions inside NATO rather than the E.U. Its foremost strategic interest thereby is to discourage the E.U.’s efforts to advance its ‘strategic autonomy’ vis-à-vis NATO. Meanwhile, France as Europe’s second largest military power and a significant source of (E.U.) force projection as well as permanent member of the UN Security Council (and thus a veto power) will be enhanced and upgraded.18 Third, we are likely to expect that the U.K. will consider, indeed use, NATO as an essential source of international legitimacy and influence over European security affairs and policy, and step up its commitment in the alliance for precisely that reason, especially in terms of increasing their postings of additional military and political officials that would support NATO’s military and civilian missions. This is a logical consequence of a report published by the British House of Commons warning that the Brexit will lead to a significantly reduced British influence in CFSP.19 Given that the U.K. currently is one of seven NATO countries20 that meets the 2% defence spending as a share of national GDP target, we are likely to see the U.K. joining American voices calling upon the Europeans to significantly increase their defence spending. It would also be difficult to remove the U.K. from occupying the position of NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), which traditionally is reserved for a member of the U.K. military.21 Meanwhile, the benefit for the alliance undoubtedly is that the U.K. shifting its priorities to NATO will strengthen the Euro-Atlantic security pillar.

18 Tim Oliver, “Goodbye Britannia? The International Implications of Britain’s Vote to leave the E.U.”, Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 8(2) 2016, p. 225. 19 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee: Implications of the referendum on E.U. membership for the U.K.’s role in the world, 26.4.2016, available at https://publications.parliament.uk/ pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmfaff/545/545.pdf (last access 01.7.2017). 20 Out of the 29 NATO members in total, these 6 include Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the U.K., and the USA. 21 Chalmers, Malcolm. “U.K. Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit”, Briefing Paper, January 2017, p. 2.

Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context, and for Who?

9

Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context, and for Who? To start with, the U.K. is Europe’s second largest economy.22 It currently transfers approximately £11 billion to the E.U. each year, which roughly equals e12.85 billion.23 If one subtracts the roughly £4.4 billion of subsidies etc. that Britain receives yearly from the E.U., the British ‘net gain’ upon leaving the E.U. would roughly be in the neighborhood of £8.6 billion (or e9.86 billion).24 Moreover, in 2018 the E.U. accounted for 45% of U.K. exports and 54% imports.25 However, the U.K. recorded an overall trade deficit with the E.U. of -£64 billion. A surplus of £29 billion on trade in services was outweighed by a deficit of -£93 billion on trade in goods.26 As the third largest net contributor to the E.U. in financial terms,27 it thus appears to be evident that the Brexit will not only weaken the E.U.’s clout in terms of its foreign and security policy; it will also significantly affect its role and impact as a reliable international security actor, for example, in other international (security) organizations such as the United Nations.28 Moreover, the possibility that bilateral defence and security cooperation may be pursued between the U.K. and individual E.U. member states, whilst treating the U.K. as a third country for the purposes of E.U. foreign and security policy, clearly is a policy option at the time of writing that cannot be excluded from the planning of future policy scenarios. Indeed, in this respect, the smaller E.U. member states could play a positive role in promoting cooperation with 22 The U.K. has a GDP of e2.569 billion, France e2.184 billion, and Germany e3,026 billion. See Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. Dossier: Der Brexit und die britische Sonderrolle in der E.U.. 26.02.2019. p. 5. 23 This is based on calculations by the U.K. Office for National Statistics. See detailed calculations here: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/ publicsectorfinance/articles/theukcontributiontotheeubudget/2017-10-31. Specifically, in 2018 the U.K. government spent £864.9 billion on all aspects of public spending, of which initially £20.0 billion was transferred to the E.U. However, this amount is not the net-amount of transfers as it does not include U.K. rebates and abatements, which for 2018 amounts to £4.5 billion. From the remaining £15.5 billion, the U.K. received additional £4.5 billion from the E.U. from the so-called ‘shared management’ programmes (e.g. the agricultural guarantee fund etc.). This brings the net transfer amount of the U.K. to the E.U. to £11 billion (or roughly e12.85 billion). 24 James McBridge, “What Brexit Means”, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, March 29, 2017. See also Der Brexit und das E.U.—Machtgefüge—Wie wirkt sich das britische Votum auf die E.U. und ihr Gewicht in der Welt aus? Hrsg.: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V. Abrufbar unter: https://dgap.org/de/thinktank/publi-kationen/fuenffragen/ derbrexitunddaseumachtgefuege. 25 McBridge, “What Brexit Means”. 26 Ward, M. (2019). “Statistics on U.K.—E.U. trade”, House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper No. 7851, 3. 27 Ibid. This includes the so-called “Britain rebate” by which the U.K. is reimbursed about 66% of its net payments to the E.U.. See Weinmann, G. “Britenrabatt”, in Martin Große Hüttmann u. Hans-Georg Wehling (Hg.): Das Europalexikon, 2., aktual. Aufl. Bonn: Dietz 2013. 28 Uta Staiger and Benjamin Martill. 2018. “Rethinking the futures of Europe”, in Benjamin Martill and Uta Staiger. Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London, U.K.: UCL Press, pp. 260–265.

10

1 Introduction

Table 1.3 Military operations undertaken by U.K. under CDSP (Jan. 2013–Jan. 2014) Operation

Common costs (Million Euros)

U.K. Costs (Million Euros)

Percentages of U.K. shares (%)

Total personnel

U.K. Personnel contribution

Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina peacekeeping)

15.3

2.3

15.03

1081

4 in theatre + an “over the horizon” reserve force of up to 120 troops

Atalanta (counterpiracy off the coast of Somalia)

7.5

1.2

16

1,421

Operations commander and 60 HQ staff, 1 frigate for 3 months every 2 years

E.U. Training mission somalia

7.8

1.2

15.38

91

3 military, 2 civilians

E.U. Training mission mali

21.6

3.3

15.27

524

37 military

Total

52.1

U.K. Share

8

Source Government of the United Kingdom. (2013). Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/227437/2901086_Foreign_Policy_acc. pdf as well as calculations by authors

the U.K. under the auspices of the E.U., in particular during periods of them holding the rotating presidencies of the European Council (although this is subject to the proviso that it does not undermine European cooperation in the area of security and defence policy) (Table 1.3). With that in mind and as evidenced in table three, as an example, it is most likely that the U.K. leaving the E.U. would definitely have significant implications for future CSDP missions (as well as the E.U. more generally of course) and indeed NATO’s civilian and military crisis management operations. Moreover, it is likely to have significant implications in terms of human resources,29 especially the U.K.’s civilian staff (career diplomats) that are currently serving on or are seconded to the E.U.’s External Action Service, the further development of the E.U.’s security strategy,30 as well as the U.K.’s security expertise, intelligence resources, and equipment that 29 Richard Whitman. “Brexit or Bremain: what future for the U.K.’s European diplomatic strategy?”, International Affairs 3/2016, S. 509–529. 30 See Niklas Helwig and Isabelle Tannous. “Gemeinsame Aussen-und Sicherheitspolitik”, in: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration, 2016, p. 341.

Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context, and for Who?

11

it currently shares widely with both the E.U. and NATO.31 Could one expect, for example, that Britain’s military and civilian resources that are currently committed to CSDP be simply redirected to NATO? And if so, how might this work practically? Or will this external engagement be ‘absorbed’ by a new isolationist British foreign policy, as some British commentators have suggested32 ? These are not inconsequential questions to ask, as table four highlighting the civilian operations as well as the associated costs for U.K. under the CSDP banner for the years 2012–2013 shows. To be fair, it is a snapshot for the years 2012–2013; yet, it offers an indication if not trend of what compensations the rest of the E.U. most likely will have to compensate for should the U.K. indeed leave the E.U. (Table 1.4). The table is also significant because it demonstrates that the U.K. currently is the E.U.’s country with the largest military capabilities and defence budget, which in turn carries a significant weight with regards to Europe’s international credibility as a reliable and capable security actor,33 also because the U.K. is a significant nuclear power. In any case, as Faleg reminds us, “[f]irst and foremost, Brexit means that the CSDP will lose one of its majority shareholders, and a veto player. The U.K. and France alone make up more than 40% of public defence investments in the E.U.”34 Moreover, there is a looming question as to whether the U.K. leaving the E.U. could mean an end to what some have called a ‘special relationship’ with the U.S.35 and thus significantly reduce the U.K.’s role and status in transatlantic (security) affairs. It is most likely to even weaken the entire transatlantic relationship, including the inner governance of NATO.36 If one believes the recent foreign policy statements made by U.S. officials at the Munich Security Conference in February 2019, such a development would not necessarily appear to be inconvenient for the Americans (Table 1.5).

31 Jolyon Howorth (2017). “E.U. defence cooperation after Brexit: what role for the U.K. in the future E.U. defence arrangements?”, European View 16:191–200 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290017-0455-5. 32 See for example Anand Menon. “Littler England: The United Kingdom’s Retreat From Global Leadership”. Foreign Affairs, November/December 2015, pp. 93–100. 33 For example, the U.K. is a leader in reconnaissance in Europe: it owns 44% of the airborne earlywarning and control aircraft, and nearly half of the E.U.’s heavy transport aircraft. Both are only to be replaced by the E.U. and its member states at significant costs. 34 Faleg, G. (July 26, 2016). The Implications of Brexit For the E.U.’s Common Security and Defence Policy. CEPS. Retrieved March 5, 2017, from https://www.ceps.eu/publications/implicationsbrexit-eu%E2%80%99s-common-security-and-defence-policy#_ftnref3. 35 Niklas Helwig and Isabelle Tannous. “Gemeinsame Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik”, in Werner Weidefeld and Wolfgang Wessels, Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2016, p. 343. To be sure, this “special relationship” has never been that of equals, and was one “of choice” for the Americans. See James K. Wither. “Brexit and the Anglo-American Security and Defense Partnership”, Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018, pp. 73–84. 36 As Stephanie Hofmann shows, the E.U. and NATO are deeply intertwined. See Stephanie C. Hofmann (2019) The politics of overlapping organizations: hostage-taking, forum-shopping and brokering, Journal of European Public Policy, 26:6, 883-905, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763. 2018.1512644.

12

1 Introduction

Table 1.4 Civilian Operations and associated costs for U.K. under CSDP (2012–2013). (Costs for each mission are for a year from the month in which the mission first started. Costs listed for EUAVSEC South Sudan are for 19 months) Operation

Common costs (Million Euros)

U.K. Costs (Million Euros)

Total personnel

U.K. Personnel contribution

U.K. Share in (%)

E.U.BAM Lbya (border management assistance)

30.3

4.6

165

4 civilians, incl. deputy head of mission

15.18

E.U.CAP Sahel (capacity building for security forces)

8.7

1.3

32

1 civilian

14.94

E.U.AVSEC South Sudan (capacity building for aviation security)

12.5

1.9

8

1 civilian

15.2

E.U.CAP Nestor (capacity building for maritime security forces in the Horn of Africa)

22.9

3.5

29

4 civilians

15.28

E.U.JU.S.T LEX (capacity building for Iraqi judicial sector)

27.2

4.2

26

5 civilians

15.44

E.U.S.EC Democratic Republic of Congo (security sector reform)

11

1.7

46

0

15.45

E.U.BAM Rafah (border management assistance in the occupied Palestinian territories)

1

0.2

3

0

20

E.U.POL COPPS (police capacity building in the occupied Palestinian territories)

9.3

1.4

49

4 civilians

15.05

E.U.POL Afghanistan (police capacity building)

57

8.7

258

18 civilians

15.26

E.U.POL Democratic Republic of Congo (police capacity building)

6.8

1

28

0

14.7

E.U.LEX Kosovo (executive and capacity building mission in rule of law)

111

17

819

37 civilians

15.32

E.U.MM Georgia (ceasefire monitoring)

20.9

3.2

238

12 civilians

15.31

Total

318.4

U.K. Share

48.8

Source Government of the United Kingdom. (2013). Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/227437/2901086_Foreign_Policy_acc.pdf as well as calculations by authors

Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context, and for Who?

13

Table 1.5 World U.K. regular force deployments, 2015 Location

Number of troops

In (%)

Total

153,270

100

U.K.

134,930

88.03

13,970

9.11

790

0,52

Europe, excluding the U.K. Asia, excluding the Middle East North Africa/Middle East

1,170

0.76

Sub-Saharan Africa

560

0.37

North America

910

0.59

10

0.007

Central America/Caribbean South Atlantic Oceania Unallocated

1,030

0.67

50

0.03

300

0.12

Source British Armed Forces. (2015) U.K. Defence in Numbers. https://www.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/467482/20151013-U.K._Defence_in_Numbers_ screen.pdf as well as calculations by authors

Moreover, with the Brexit currently under way, there remain significant questions about Britain’s financial, personnel, and indeed political commitments to NATO. What will happen, for example, to NATO installations on British soil, including its naval ports in Scotland37 that are vitally important for the British Navy (especially Faslane naval base and the warhead storeplace at Coulport)?38 In turn, would leaving the E.U. also have consequences for the British armed forces, given the fact that Scotland has already indicated that it would secede from the U.K.? This could mean that the U.K. would lose Scottish members of the British Armed Forces and the closure of its nuclear deterrent submarine force (SSBN).39 As noted, these questions and issues are not only interesting and stimulating to discuss from an intellectual point of view; policy officials on both sides of the Brexit debate also need answers to them in order to effectively govern the transatlantic (security) relationship after Brexit. This book attempts to help finding these 37 Scotland roughly represents about five percent of Britain’s population, yet more than a third of the U.K.’s territory. It is especially the latter point that makes it vitally important as a strategic location for NATO’s northern defence. 38 According to RUSI’s calculations, a relocation of British forces based in Scotland, including the logistics thereof back to Britain is extremely expensive, politically sensitive, and complicated. See Hugh Chalmers and Malcolm Chalmers, Relocation, Relocation, Relocation: Could the U.K.’s Nuclear Force be Moved after Scottish Independence? (London: RUSI, 2014). 39 For a discussion see David Blagden. “Britain and the World After Brexit”. International Politics 54(1), 2017, pp. 1–25. Military bases in Scotland are also used as a part of the critical defence perimeter and the maritime defence zone, aside from a number of weapons manufacturers there. For a more detailed discussion see HM Government. 2014. Scotland analysis: Defence. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 285961/Scotland_infographics_26022014.pdf.

14

1 Introduction

answers, and to better contextualize the U.K.’s security relationship with NATO and CFSP in order to have an enhanced understanding of the potential implications of the Brexit for both the E.U. and NATO. Consider just one specific security policy issue as an example. The U.K. is a member of the so-called 5-eyes intelligence community. After the Brexit it remains doubtful whether the U.K. will indeed maintain its close intelligence sharing network across the English Channel40 —that is with the E.U.—or whether London can continue to rely on the E.U.’s intelligence data and information and those of its member states and share it with the U.K.’s MI5 and MI6. Up until the Brexit referendum in 2016, these intelligence exchanges were important institutional, cross-border networks the U.K. could always rely and count on to support, for example, their fight against radical extremism in the U.K. and abroad, as well as terrorism and organized crime. In other words, whether these intelligence networks will remain ‘live, active, and accessible’ after the Brexit remains very unclear at the time of writing. However, the consequences of Britain restricting or even cutting access to intelligence information would be significant for all parties involved, for example for policing purposes (e.g. Europol). On the NATO side, a recent call by the former President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and the former President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, to create a European army41 in response to Britain leaving the E.U. should be frightening for the alliance (especially the Americans) as it remains very unclear, for example, what role and objectives such an army would have in addition to NATO. Moreover, would it not question or even violate what Madeleine Albright once called the 3-D paradigm—that is no duplication, no decoupling, and no discrimination of NATO/E.U. assets? While frightening perhaps for NATO, one could suppose that the French might be delighted about this idea of a European army as it would come closer to their long-term foreign policy goal of creating an active and effective counterweight to the United States in transatlantic security affairs. It would also mean a general rebalancing of power and influence in NATO. On the other side of the Atlantic, this might pose yet another opportunity for the United States to further disengage itself from the alliance, with severe consequences, for example, for NATO’s ongoing burden sharing debates, strategy, partnerships etc. In case the U.K. also engages in a more isolationist foreign policy42 as a result of the Brexit, it might indeed contribute to forming what former Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, has called a two-tier alliance—that is an alliance of states that share collective burdens and are engaged in the alliance and those states that do not. Thus, it is close to being certain that what NATO needs after the Brexit is a new political commitment among the allies to re-vitalize Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, namely to “[…] consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 40 “Joint Fact Sheet: U.S. and U.K. Defense Cooperation,” White House, March 14, 2012, https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-ofce/2012/03/14/joint-fact-sheet-us-and-uk-defensecooperation. 41 Deutsche Welle. (2015, March 8). Juncker Calls for Collective E.U. Army. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/juncker-calls-for-collective-eu-army/a-18302459. 42 For a discussion see for example Sven Biscop, Brexit, Strategy, and the E.U.: Britain Takes Leave. Egomont Paper 100. Brussels: Egmont Institute.

Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context, and for Who?

15

integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” This will foster the political relationships among the NATO allies, as well as underline the multidimensionality of transatlantic security and defence cooperation. At the same time, re-committing to Article 4 will most likely improve NATO’s resilience against external shocks and insecurities. In brief, a new political commitment to NATO and its allies is desperately needed to assure NATO members, especially those in central and south-eastern Europe, that the organization is robust and healthy. Moreover, they need to be reassured that there is no need to leave the alliance, or that in case the Brexit materializes they are going to be forced to decide whether they side with the U.K. to keep NATO as the foremost institution governing European security affairs, or with France and Germany who continue to push for a more integrated E.U. defence policy.43

Roadmap for the Book The book starts in Part I with a quick historical overview of U.K.—E.U. as well as U.K.—NATO relations since Britain jones these institutions in 1973 and 1949 respectively. Our aim in these two chapters (chapter two and three) is neither to provide a historiography of these two relationships, nor do we claim comprehensiveness of the literature.44 Rather, our aim simply is to provide readers with a short and quick overview of the key and most important historical events that shaped these two relations in the past—perhaps even a primer for new scholars studying the complex embedment of the U.K. in —ropean security institutions. In Part II starting with chapter four we turn to the discussions of the Brexit and especially how it is embedded in the larger geopolitical context of today. In other words, when discussing the Brexit from a security point of view one must also consider the contemporary security environment that undoubtedly shapes security thoughts and practices. In chapter five we zoom in on discussing what options the E.U., and particular its CSDP arm, has in case the Brexit materializes, and what most likely scenario we could expect once the U.K. has made the last step in divorcing from the E.U.

43 For an extensive debate and elaboration see Zyla, Benjamin, and Arnold Kammel, A. Peacebuild-

ing At Home: NATO in Eastern Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018). wonderful overview can be found in Kienzle, B. (2016). The Foreign, Security and Defence Implications of Brexit: A Guide to the Academic Literature. Regional Security Research Centre. 44 A

Part I

Historical Evolutions of the U.K.—NATO and U.K.—E.U. Relationship

Chapter 2

A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

The United Kingdom (U.K.) has been at the center of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the organization’s creation in 1949. And even before that the U.K. was a member to the Treaty of Brussels, which is widely considered the precursor to NATO. The aim of this chapter is to briefly trace the development of the U.K.—NATO relationship. Our aim is not to provide a comprehensive historiography; this would need way more space than is available here to do justice to the vast literature available. Rather, by highlighting some of the main historical essentials, we examine how particular events, key ideas, and issues have shaped that relationship up to present day. It will not have remained unnoticed to careful readers and analysts of the transatlantic relationship that U.K.—NATO relations and even more so U.K.—E.U. relations have at times been (very) contentious. In part, this has to do with the importance of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ in the discourse of British security.1 This ‘special relationship dates back to Victorian times, and has truly solidified itself with America’s entry into World War I.2 It is thus important to note that throughout the discussion of Britain’s relationship with NATO, certainly in its early days, has to a large extent been driven by that special relationship between the British and the Americans.3

1 Tim Oliver. “Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the U.S.—E.U. and U.S.—U.K.

relationships”, in: International Affairs 3/2016, S. 547–567. 2 Campbell, D.A. (2007). Unlikely Allies: Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special

Relationship. New York: Hambledon Continuum, p. 1. 3 For a reaffirmation of this special relationship in the context of Brexit see Missy Ryan, “U.S. Military Ties with Britain Are Sheltered from Brexit Storm, Officials Say,” Washington Post, June 28, 2016; and Spencer Ackerman, “U.S.—U.K. Security Officials Cement Intelligence Partnership after Leave Vote,” Guardian, June 24, 2016. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Zyla, The End of European Security Institutions?, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_2

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The End of World War II World War II saw an alliance between the U.K., France, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R to combat militant nationalism in Germany. With the end of World War II in 1945, the threat of nationalist militarism was reduced, but not entirely eliminated. Further, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a military and economic superpower, while being diametrically opposed to capitalism, posed a new ideological and existential threat to European states. The end of World War II set the stage for the development of NATO to accomplish a trio of goals: “deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration”.4 It was therefore no surprise that the credo of European security affairs after WWII became, to quote Lord Ismay, “to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in.”5

The Treaty of Dunkirk, the Treaty of Brussels, and NATO As part of a necessity to prevent another World War, the idea of a new collective security arrangement surfaced. Employed during the creation of the League of Nations, the concept of collective security went beyond the pure idea of defence and included, according to Inis Claude, arrangements for facilitating peaceful settlement of disputes. It assumed that the mechanisms of preventing war and defending states under armed attack would “supplement and reinforce each other.”6 The philosophy behind a new collective security concept was to create a system for the maintenance of international peace (like the League of Nations) where a collectivity of states functioned as a deterrent to potential aggressors that were trying to offset the existing balance of power. To this end, the United Nations (UN) was founded on 24 October, 1945 as an international institution to “maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, achieve international co-operation and be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.” At that point, the British government and its foreign policy elites saw the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R) and post-war Germany as the two largest threats to European security.7 Especially the rearmament of Germany was considered with deep suspicions, and was to be prevented at all costs. Shortly after the end of combat in Europe, Winston Churchill warned the international community in a speech given in Fulton, Missouri on 12 May 1945 that an iron curtain had come down “from Stettin to the Baltic to Trieste,” and separated 4 NATO (2012). A Short History of NATO. Retrieved from, http://eu-nato.gov.ge/sites/default/files/ 20120412_ShortHistory_en.pdf, p. 1. 5 Lord Ismay was the first Secretary General of NATO from 1949–1957. 6 Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), 245. 7 Baylis, John (1982) Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The origins of NATO. Journal of Strategic Studies, 5(2), 236–247, p. 237.

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Western and Eastern Germany.8 The Soviet Union had gained control and influence over regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and East Germany. It also actively supported the communist insurrection in Greece. The gravity of the situation in Greece and Turkey, where communist ideology threatened to take control of the state institutions, pushed President Truman on 12 March 1947 in a Joint Session of Congress to announce what has become known as the Truman Doctrine.9 Truman’s speech was attached to a request of $400 million for the assistance of Greece and Turkey to remain democratic states. On 24 June 1948, the Soviet Union retaliated and launched a full blockade of surface routes to West Berlin, and threatened to starve the population of food supplies and other goods.10 The Western allies reacted to this Berlin blockade with an airlift on 26 June to feed the population of West Berlin. This was the moment when the British government realized that in spite of being a permanent member of the UN Security Council and thus holding a veto power over all of its decisions, it could not rely on the collective security system of the UN to guarantee Britain’s security during a time when the Soviet Union engaged in expansionist foreign policies that could again threaten the fragile political and economic conditions in Europe.11 When the fathers of the UN Charter developed Article 2(4), which described the general prohibition of the use of force in that “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,” they had not anticipated the possibility of two superpowers (the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R) rivaling for influence in world politics. Indeed, the idealism of the UN’s collective security system was quickly overshadowed by precisely these two rivaling as well as veto powers. In brief, when it came to questions of national security and national defence the British government did not trust the UN’s collective security system; instead it concentrated its efforts on creating a collective security institution in and for Europe.12 This view of tying Britain to a permanent European security institution, however, was not uncontested among British politicians. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 8 See

for example Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 809–813. 9 Urwin, Derek W. (1991). The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945, Longman: London and New York. 10 There still is debate in the literature if the blockade was an overreaction of the Soviet Union trying to gain a hegemonic position in Central Europe of it is was a reaction to the London Agreement of June 1948 in which the allies decided to create a West German state, which was opposed by the Soviet Union. At the end of the month the allies had also introduced a new currency into Germany, which threatened to undermine economic policies in Eastern Germany. For the latest research on this period see the excellent volume of Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 145–146. 11 The negotiations for the creation of a North Atlantic Alliance took place in light of George F. Kennan’s long telegram sent from the American Embassy in Moscow on 22 February 1946. For an excellent discussion about the time period see John W. Young and John Kent, International Relations since 1945: A Global History (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 68–93. 12 Baylis, 1982, p. 237.

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amongst others, reminded his colleagues that in terms of security European powers should be considered as “liabilities rather than assets.”13 The U.K. should, so his recommendation, wait until such a time as the other European states have recovered from the ravages of World War II before tying U.K. security interests permanently to them, perhaps even through a collective defence system.14 In that sense, the British differed significantly from other WWII allies, such as Canada, who not only asked what role Canada might play in a post-war international order but also what policies were conducive for establishing a global community of states. Canada believed in the collective security system in which international organizations were an integral component to ensure peace and security.15 Further, there was the British concern that any movement towards a defence union within Europe may contribute to a security dilemma scenario with the Soviet Union whereby military investments on one side would even more threaten the existence of the other side, and thus trigger calls for even more military investments. This, so the assessment of the British government, would even more threaten British security interests.16 Despite detractors, the foundations of a Western European Union (W.E.U.) and subsequently NATO were laid down with the signing of the Treaty of Dunkirk in March of 1947, with France and the United Kingdom agreeing to cooperate on defence issues.17 It is important to note that the Treaty of Dunkirk was framed as a pact to “prevent Germany from becoming a menace again.”18 This is important as the treaty was framed as defence against the threat of Germany, so as to ensure that 13 Ibid.,

p. 20. p. 238. 15 John Holms clearly shows that the primary objective of Canadian foreign policy immediately following WWII was to create a collective security system. As Holmes argues, “there was, however, no particularly Canadian territorial or economic interest at stake. Canadians were more concerned with general questions of collective security.” See Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943–1957, 106. Eventually, this policy became known as a middlepowermanship that gave Canada international status and a feeling of moral superiority—they were the ones that constrained the great powers “and acted as the world’s conscience when things got out of hand.” See Chapnick, “Canadian Foreign Policy: The Middle Power Muddle,” 4. 16 Park, W. (1986). Defending the West: A History of NATO. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, p. 7. 17 (Baylis, 1982, p. 244. Examples of EU military cooperation has occurred, among others, include the German-French brigade created on 13. November 1987; Bundeswehr support for the French army in Mali in response to the terror attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015; deployment of the Bundeswehr in support of France, Iraq, and the international coalition against ISIS; French-German defence industry cooperation (e.g. (Krauss-Maffai Wegmann on the German side, and Nexter on the French side; as well as joint French-German diplomatic missions to solve the civil wars in Syria and the Ukraine (Minsk agreement of 12. February 2015). Notably is also the French-German defence- and security council (DFVSR), which is also known as the Elysée Treaty and was singed on 22. January 1988; available online at https://www.france-allemagne.fr/Deutsch-Franzosischer,0582. html. 18 Escott Reid, “The Birth of the North Atlantic Alliance,” International Journal 22, no. 3 (1967), p. 427. See also Treaty of Dunkirk, 1947, Article 1. Treaty of Dunkirk (1947). Retrieved from http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/026961fe-0d57-4314-a40a-a4ac066a1801/ 5d5a64ab-9c7c-4e19-b528-9e53f9ce937b/Resources#1fb9f4b5-64e2-4337-bc78-db7e1978de09_ en&overlay. 14 Ibid.,

The Treaty of Dunkirk, the Treaty of Brussels, and NATO

23

the Treaty would not be seen as a threat to the Soviets. The Treaty was also signed signaling to the Americans that Europe was serious about its own security. At the same time the British believed that involving the U.S.A. in European security affairs was crucial, as this would offer Europe a credible deterrent against Soviet encroachment and invasion.19 In that sense, the Treaty of Dunkirk was a way of increasing the chances that the Americans would view European states as serious allies in the protection of Europe. Indeed, it laid the groundwork for the Brussels Pact that included the U.K., France, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The creation of NATO in 1949 was the first treaty to include the U.S.A., and was thus integral, in the minds of many, to British security as well as that of the other European states. The geopolitical superpower rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the late 1940s clearly displayed that the U.N. could not “provide its members with the security which would enable them to put it to full force for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.”20 Thus, Britain had to consider alternatives to ensure its national security, and it found one in NATO. Its closest allies, including the U.S., Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg thought along the same lines. In 1948, they negotiated a collective defence system, the Brussels Treaty, which later became the Western European Union (W.E.U.).21 The W.E.U. was a precursor to NATO and included a collective Article 5 defence clause that would ensure mutual defence. In the meantime, Britain was also a part of a group of states that negotiated the Washington Treaty, the treaty that created NATO.22 To some, it was an idealist treaty that would provide the “basis for the building of a federation of North Atlantic countries, a real North Atlantic Community”.23 Such a community would be comprised of states sharing the norms and values of liberal western democracies that would serve—besides mutual defence in the time of war—additional purposes during peacetime. Canada, for example, expected economic benefits from such treaty. Moreover, in looking back, the Treaty clearly increased the influence of middle and small powers and that “the people of the Western world might consider creating a regional security organization, open to any Western country, in which each member state would pool the whole of its economic and military resources with those of other members if any power should be found to have committed aggression against any one of the members”.24 However, the U.K.’s intention from the beginning was to keep the Alliance small and strong, avoiding commitments to peripheral countries. 19 Baylis,

1982, p. 244. of Canada. Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations 1948, Report of the United Nations (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1949), 23. 21 According to Reid, Canada’s Prime Minister Mackenzie-King was informed about such developments by a top-secret telegram from the British Prime Minister in mid January 1948, in which the British PM spoke about an urgent necessity of a Western Alliance against the evolving Soviet threat. 22 For a great historical analysis of this negotiation process see Adam Chapnik, The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005. 23 Reid, 1967, p. 430. 24 Reid, 1967, p. 426. 20 Government

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The Washington Treaty that founded NATO was officially signed in Washington D.C. on 4 April 1949.25 Ever since it has been a landmark of European defence and the transatlantic relationship, and eventually became the personification of a Western community of states that shared more than simple security interests, but also common norms, values, and objectives. As one of the founding members of the alliance, Britain has a deep historical understanding of the organization and its role in it.

Korean War NATO was of little importance during the year of its creation in 1949, except for being a deterrent against a Soviet attack on Europe. This changed with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which started with Kim IL Sung gaining support from Stalin for an armed attack on South Korea. The West assumed that Stalin had ordered the invasion of South Korea and that he might use this proxy war to distract the West from a larger invasion into Western Europe.26 Britain shared the assessment of its allies that the U.S.S.R. was not afraid of using force to achieve their desired ends,27 and decided to participate with 14,198 armed forces in the United Nations Command (UNC), a multinational military force that was authorized by the UN Security Council to drive the invader (North Korea) out of the Republic of Korea. As per the UN Security Council resolution, the United States was listed as executive agent to implement the resolution, and command UN military operations in Korea. While the Korean War did not offer an immediate or direct threat to the territorial integrity of the U.K. (or to any NATO member state for that matter), it did signal to the Alliance that their de facto enemy was willing to use extra-diplomatic and indeed coercive techniques. The reasoning logically followed that the enemy may be willing to do so again in the future, this time perhaps at the expense of Europe. In that sense, the Korean War altered the relationship between the East and the West and deepened the hostilities between the two, making reconciliation nearly impossible for the decades to come. The war in Korea also sped up the institutionalization of the Western collective defence system, and transformed NATO from a more political to a genuine military organization. Before Korea, there was no significant political and military coordination and cooperation taking place among the allies. Evidence for the institutionalization of this relationship can be found in the creation of a Supreme Allied Command Europe (S.A.C.E.U.R.), which gave NATO its first unified and coherent military command. The first S.A.C.E.U.R. was General Dwight Eisenhower, who was dual hated: above all, he was the Alliance’s chief military commander and at the same 25 The following states were signatories to the Treaty: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and the United States. 26 See for example John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005). 27 See Park, 1986, p. 21.

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time the highest military authority for the American Forces stationed in Europe.28 In 1952, the naval equivalent of the S.A.C.E.U.R., the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (S.A.C.L.A.N.T.), was created and headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia. S.A.C.L.A.N.T. However, it was different from S.A.C.E.U.R. in the sense that no standing forces were associated with this command post. Nonetheless, member states’ troops were earmarked for (naval) emergencies. The Korean War was the true beginning of the Cold War arms race, both in terms of conventional and nuclear weapons. Indeed, it marked the beginning of a transition period shifting NATO’s emphasis from conventional armed forces towards nuclear armament, also on European soil. To be sure, at that time virtually all European members of NATO were heavily reliant on the Americans for both conventional as well as nuclear forces.29 This was largely due to the slow economic recovery of Western Europe from World War II as compared to the United States and Canada. A brief statistic quickly illustrates this imbalance. In 1953, eight years after the end of WWII, 173 million North Americans roughly tripled the economic output of 208 million citizens in NATO’s European member states.30 Bearing this in mind, U.S. President Truman’s government made strides to ensure that the European NATO members provided the bulk of conventional NATO forces in Europe as a deterrent and trip-wire against a potential invasion of the U.S.S.R.31 In 1953, NATO was certain that the Alliance would lose a conventional arms race with the U.S.S.R.,32 and therefore expedited the development of a nuclear deterrent. Once again, European NATO members became heavily reliant on the United States in order to develop NATO’s nuclear capabilities. Britain, however, was one of the two exceptions (France being the other), and had begun developing its own nuclear weapons in 1946 due to America’s reluctance to share nuclear materials with the U.K. As Carl Hodge33 charges, this was evidence of Britain’s importance to European security writ large. With this in mind, Britain’s pursuit of an alliance with the United States is clear evidence of a feeling of inferiority as compared to the U.S.S.R. Until the end of the 1950s, the United States essentially had a monopoly on NATO’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.34 However, the 1958 ‘Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes

28 See for example David J. Rothkopf, Running the World: The inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, 1st ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 63. 29 See Park, 1986, p. 28. To be clear, American nuclear forces were only stationed in several European countries (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands); they were never “handed over” to those states’ armed forces and thus at all times were under the control of the United States government. 30 Ismay, L. (1954). NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954. Bosch: Utrecht, p. 33. 31 See Park, 1986, p. 27. This small, yet important fact is often forgotten in contemporary burden sharing debates that the Trump has put on the agenda since 2016. See Benjamin Zyla. 2015. Sharing the Burden? NATO and its Second-Tier Powers (New York, Toronto: University of Toronto Press). 32 Park, 1986, p. 29. 33 Hodge, C.C. (2005). Atlanticism For a New Century: The Rise, Triumph and Decline of NATO. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, p. 4. 34 Park, 1986, p. 31.

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between the U.K. and the U.S.A. allowed for sharing nuclear materials and information between the governments of the two countries. This solidified the U.K.’s importance in European security affairs even more.

The Suez Crisis and Fallout The Suez Canal crisis occurred when France and the U.K. unilaterally cooperated with Israel to invade Egypt in order to re-open the Suez Canal to British and French shipping after Egyptian President, Gamal Nasser, had nationalized the canal and closed it for international shipping altogether. The Suez Canal is the shortest link between the east and the west as compared with the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa linking the Mediterranean and the Red sea. Following the invasion of Egypt, America strongly condemned the action.35 While this condemnation did not damage the Anglo-American relationship over the long-term, it did however reaffirm the U.K.’s growing reliance on the U.S.A. in matters of war and security.36 With the 1956 Suez Crisis in mind, NATO solicited a report on the importance of non-military coordination in NATO, which was entitled Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO. Colloquially, this is known as The Report of the Three Wise Men, with the Wise Men being Halvard Lange (Foreign Minister of Norway), Lester B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada), and Gaetano Martino (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy).37 The Report called for greater levels of non-military cooperation amongst NATO members, as the “two aspects of security—civil and military—[could] no longer safely be considered in watertight compartments, either within or between nations”.38 As such, the Three Wise Men advocated the pursuit of a deeper integration of the Alliance on many civilian issues, inter alia, science and politics.39 Specifically, in the context of the Suez Crisis, they felt that the security role of NATO could only be attained through cooperation between members on a multitude of levels, as “an Alliance in which the members ignore each other’s interests or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence. Recent experience makes this clearer than ever before.”40 As a result of their work, the NATO Science Programme was created in 1957. For Britain, the Suez Canal Crisis was an awakening to the inability of the country to unilaterally exert influence abroad. However, rather than seeing this experience as 35 Peden, G.C. (2012). Suez and Britain’s Decline as a World Power. The Historical Journal, vol. 55, p. 1073. 36 Frankel J. (1975). British foreign policy, 1945–1973. London: Oxford University Press, p. 162. 37 Kaplan, L. (2006) Report of the Three Wise Men: 50 years on. NATO Review. 38 NATO. (1956). Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17481.htm#top, parag. 16. 39 Kaplan, L. (2006) Report of the Three Wise Men: 50 years on. NATO Review. 40 NATO, 1956, par. 9.

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a reason to seek deeper security integration with its European NATO allies or even with the evolving European Coal and Steel community, which at the time was being developed and ultimately advanced to be one of the forerunners of the European Union (E.U.) that we know today, Britain instead interpreted its Suez Canal crisis experience as a way to turn towards the U.S.A. for security matters,41 and ultimately seek a ‘special relationship’ with the Americans.

French Withdrawal In 1966, following NATO’s turn towards nuclear weapons as well as a growing American influence in NATO and Europe in general, President De Gaulle withdrew French troops from NATO’s command structure. This unilateral withdrawal of some 750,000 troops from NATO’s conventional military forces placed greater importance on the nuclear capabilities of both the U.S.A. and the U.K., which in turn upgraded their importance and role in the alliance as the sole nuclear powers and thus providing the foremost military deterrent of the Alliance. Nonetheless, even though French military forces were withdrawn from NATO’s command structure, France remained an integral part of the Alliance.42 In 2009 France decided to re-join NATO’s military command structure yet remains outside of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.43

Détente When the Americans began the process of détente in the late 1960s, this policy change took place in the context of Britain already having re-established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and with China post-Mao.44 Similarly, with the cooling of the bipolar tensions between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. due to détente, as well as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the subsequent 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, the context of Anglo-Soviet relations must be carefully considered, as the United Kingdom was a major player in NATO both politically and militarily to reach these agreements. For example, the U.K. helped to negotiate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) between the five recognized nuclear possessors at the time (China, France, U.K., U.S., and the U.S.S.R.). The NPT aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and eventually eliminate them altogether. With this diplomatic success at hand, the U.K. regained great power status in the alliance, displayed what had become a special and tight relationship with the U.S.A., and ensured Britain’s ability to protect its nuclear status in Europe (White 1992, p. 119). 41 Hodge,

2005, p. 8. 2005, p. 10. 43 Fabius, L. (2012) France and NATO. Diplomatic Insight. 44 White, B. (1992). Britain, Détente, and Changing East-West Relations. London: Routledge. p. 39. 42 Hodge,

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Further, the Harmel45 Report of 1967, called for the “maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression,”46 as well as for a more political Alliance “in which the underlying political issues can be solved.”47 In short, the Harmel report advocated “defence and détente”, and made suggestions for how to best reduce East-West tensions in the future. At the NATO level, the alliance changed its strategy to “flexible response”48 at the 13–14 December 1967 NATO ministerial meeting. With the French withdrawing from NATO’s integrated command structure in 1966, the main opponent to a more flexible NATO strategy was no longer present.49 As a result, the process of drafting a new strategy went ahead quickly. On 7 October 1966, an informal meeting of the NATO Military Committee revisited the threats facing NATO and re-examined allied responses to it. Little surprising, it concluded by calling for flexible responses to meet various contingencies. Those recommendations were then taken to NATO’s Defence Ministers on 11 May 1967 who agreed that “the overall strategic concept for NATO should be revised to allow NATO greater flexibility and to provide for the employment as appropriate of one or more of direct defence, deliberate escalation and general nuclear response, thus confronting the enemy with a credible threat of escalation in response to an aggression below the level of a major nuclear attack.”50 In other words, not only the element of flexibility was reiterated in NATO’s strategy, but also the idea of escalation, a thought that was developed in greater detail in MC 14/3.51 This NATO document then spelled out three types of military responses to aggression in case NATO was attacked externally: first, to escalate NATO’s responses to the level the enemy chose to fight on. Second, the concept of deliberate escalation added various steps “to defeat aggression by raising but where possible controlling, the scope and intensity of combat.”52 This included retaining a first strike nuclear capability or selective nuclear strikes on interdiction targets. Finally, the ultimate military response was the massive use of nuclear weapons against military and urban-industrial targets, which was seen as the ultimate deterrent. However, MC 14/3 was supplemented and 45 This

report was named after Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel. Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communiqué, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance—Report of the Council,” Brussels, 13–14 December 1967. 47 Ibid. 48 Following the Harmel Report on NATO doctrine, the North Atlantic Council formally adopted the strategy of flexible response. The flexible response strategy allows the Alliance to engage in some degree of conventional warfare before and escalation into nuclear exchange is being pursued. Flexible response, before it became an official NATO strategy, was a new doctrine developed by US Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1961 in a report for the Kennedy administration entitled “A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future.” 49 For an excellent discussion about the withdrawal of France from NATO’s integrated command structure see Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 50 Defence Planning Committee DPD/D(67)23, “Decisions of the Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session 11 May 1967. 51 Military Committee 14/3, “Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area.” 52 Ibid. 46 North

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29

specified by MC 48/3, which listed “measures to implement the strategic concept for the defence of the NATO area.”53 It described the military requirements for defending NATO, including improved intelligence capabilities and early warning, increased readiness and flexibility, improved air defence, reinforcement forces, mobilization and better logistics. Britain played an active role in drafting this new strategy and developing these two NATO documents. Flexible Response was tested shortly after it was adopted as NATO’s new strategy. On 20 August 1968 Warsaw Pact forces overthrew a moderate Czech government, and Soviet tanks moved through the streets of Prague. NATO closely monitored the events in Czechoslovakia, but did not put its forces on high alert, in spite of the fact that NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (S.A.C.E.U.R) had asked for additional conventional forces in Europe for protection.54

The Fall of the U.S.S.R When Mikhail Gorbachev took power in the Soviet Union, he introduced policies of glasnost (transparency) and perestroika (economic opening), which put the Soviet Union on a less confrontational course with the West. However, while this significant policy change was noticed among Western allies, they were reluctant to show triumphalism over their former enemy. In the late 1980s, it was visible that Soviet imperialism had slowly come to an end: the U.S.S.R. had withdrawn from Afghanistan by 1989, and the cohesion of the U.S.S.R. and its satellite states in Eastern Europe was crumbling. International disarmament agreements were an important milestone in achieving these ends. In 1987, Gorbachev had responded favorably to an arms reduction treaty proposed by the United States55 and offered to reduce Soviet short range SS-12 and SS-23 missiles. In June that same year, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries approved the Intermediate–range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated all intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe and thus contributed to the reduction of (military) tensions in Europe.56 In total, the Soviet Union destroyed 1,750 nuclear missiles; the U.S. eliminated 850.57

53 Ibid. 54 See for example Tony Judt, Post War: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 441–447. 55 It needs to be noted that the INF issue has been around since the NATO 1979 ‘dual-track’ decision to deploy Cruise Missiles and Pershing II missiles in Europe. After they arrived in Europe in 1983, the Soviets left the INF talks. They were finally revived in March 1985 almost simultaneously with Gorbachev taking power in the Kremlin. 56 The INF treaty was officially signed on 8 December 1987 in Washington by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. The treaty eliminated all INF systems of missiles with a range of 500–5,500 km. The agreement also provided verification mechanisms. It is precisely this treaty that the Trump administration declared to withdraw from on 20 October 2018. 57 Young and Kent, International Relations since 1945: A Global History, 585.

30

2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, East and West Germany were united into the Federal Republic of Germany. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and more particularly with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, European states had received promising assurances against full-scale armed conflict in Europe in over a century.58 The two main threats to European security, namely a divided Germany and the existential and security threat posed by the U.S.S.R., had both dissipated59 and thus questioned the raison d’être of NATO. NATO was believed to have three options, namely to dissolve, to shift emphasis on becoming an increasing global political actor, or to continue as a robust military alliance. Robert Kaplan, a strong supporter of the realist foreign policy tradition in international affairs, had a clear preference by recommending that “[w]ithout the Soviet menace to serve as a unifying glue, there seemed to be ample reason to recommend its dissolution.”60 NATO’s Secretary General Manfred Wörner, however, had a different view: I am experiencing the fortieth anniversary of NATO rather like the manager of a successful football team which has just won the league title. His initial instinct is to celebrate the season’s glories. But instead his mind is inevitably on the team’s promotion to the higher division. How will the team cope with the new, more demanding environment where not only the rewards, but also the challenges, are so much greater? Such is life. The more successful we are, the more new tasks we find ourselves taking on.61

In the end, NATO opted for a mix of two of the three options: on the one hand and in light of fiscal deficits in many European member states (including Britain) that equaled calls for increasing defence spending with suicide, allies decided to cash in the so-called peace-dividend. In other words, they decided to reduce their defence spending and thus the amount of NATO forces.62 On the other hand they agreed to maintain their nuclear deterrent and upkeep their conventional forces. They were also supposed to be modernized for being deployed in crisis management operations, particularly those designed to assist fragile and conflict-affected states. In spite of the fact that the Berlin Wall had crumbled, the Soviet Union still maintained sufficient residual military power to pose a conventional threat to Europe.63 Moreover, following the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1989, the security situation in 58 Hodge,

2005, p. 27.

59 McCalla, R.B. (1996). NATO’s Persistence After the Cold War. International Organization, 50(3),

p. 448. 60 Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance. Similar arguments were offered by Maersheimer. 61 “The future Tasks of the Alliance,” Speech by NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to the Quadrangular Forum, Brussels, 1 April 1989. 62 What is often forgotten in this discussion is that according to a NATO Parliamentary Report, by 1999 the United States had also reduced its forwardly deployed forces in Europe from 325,000 to about 100,000 troops while European members of the Alliance reduced them by more than 500,000 in total (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Report NATO Enlargement, International Secretariat, October 2001, Article 4). This accounted for 30–40% reductions of troops of all three services in the NATO Alliance. 63 McCalla, 1996, p. 451.

The Fall of the U.S.S.R

31

much of Eastern Europe was still in flux and uncertain. Ultimately, NATO extended a ‘hand of friendship’ to those states and aspired to eventually bring them into the alliance as new members.64 At the same time, this ‘new’ Europe also held some economic prospects for British businesses in central and eastern Europe. Thus, the greatest danger to Britain was a re-nationalization of European societies, which then had the potential of renewing tensions and conflicts all over Europe. A further shift in NATO’s policy following the collapse of the Soviet Union was the creation of Rapid Response Forces (RRF) at the London Summit in 1990. These were relatively small contingents of forces designed to be deployed to help manage intra- rather than inter state conflicts.65 Of the initial four of such units, two of them were comprised solely of British forces, with two additional units supplied by Italy, Turkey and Greece, along an assortment of European countries, including Britain. The United States would provide the tactical airlift capabilities for the troops, which is something that the Europeans had not acquired for historical reasons as the Cold War played out in Europe and thus largely negated the necessity for tactical airlift capabilities. As part of the RRF, NATO envisioned to have 5,000 troops more or less on standby to be able to respond to a crisis situation within 72 h notice. A Rapid Reaction Corp for Allied Command Europe was established under the leadership of the United Kingdom and supported by a multinational headquarter66 to coordinate the efficient deployment of the forces.67 This was an obvious signaling of the importance of the British to NATO (and vice versa), as they were contributing significant resources to the development of the NRF and the alliance in general.68 The London Summit also gave NATO a new conventional force posture, moving away from forward defence towards a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. About 80% of NATO’s stockpile of sub-strategic nuclear weapons were slated to be destroyed. Also, NATO planned to reduce the overall size of its forces as well as their level of readiness and instead increase the flexibility, adaptability and mobility of its forces.

64 Ibid. 65 London Declaration on A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London 5–6 July 1990, Article 14. 66 Kaplan, L. (2004). NATO Divided. NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance. Connecticut: Praeger, p. 112. 67 This concept of NATO’s new force structure was institutionalized in the Combined Joint Task Force Concept (CJTF). 68 For a detailed discussion of NATO burden sharing at the time see Benjamin Zyla, Sharing the Burden? NATO and its Second-Tier powers. Toronto, New York: University of Toronto Press, 2015.

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2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

Gulf War On 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. That same day, the UN Security Council discussed the matter and passed Resolution 660 demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops.69 Four days later, the Council passed another, more forceful resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and imposed economic sanctions against Iraq.70 The ground invasion to liberate Kuwait started on 16 January 1991 after Iraq had failed to comply with UN demands to withdraw its troops from the country. The coalition of the willing, comprised inter alia of 12 of the then 16 members of NATO (including Britain),71 successfully halted Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Even though the liberation of Kuwait was a UN mission, the Gulf War also had a significant impact on the NATO Alliance and Britain’s foreign and defence policy in particular. It reminded the U.K. that despite the absence of a threat from the Soviet Union, the world was still an unstable place where violent conflicts were likely to occur. Indeed, it underlined a demand for military capabilities. The U.K. answered the call for coalition forces mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 661 with Operation Granby. A total of 53,462 members of the British Armed Forces were deployed during the conflict at a total cost of £2.434 billion. At least £2.049 billion of that amount was paid for by Iraq’s neighbouring countries, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.72 The Gulf War demonstrated what comparative advantages NATO possessed in international security affairs. Even though NATO as an international defence Alliance was not formally involved in liberating Kuwait from Iraqi forces, NATO military assets and planning capabilities were used by the coalition of the willing to plan and execute the operation in the Gulf. During the liberation of Kuwait, and particularly during the sea and air operations around Kuwait and Iraq, the allies depended heavily on NATO and its common operational procedures, habits, techniques, and practices of cooperation—all of which facilitated interoperability amongst the various coalition partners, and indeed made a rapid build-up in and deployment to the Gulf possible. This would not have been achieved without making use of NATO’s infrastructure in Europe. While NATO territory was not directly invaded, it was nonetheless threatened, because Turkey, as a NATO ally, shares a border with Iraq. The Turkish government officially requested military assistance from its NATO allies for the defence of its territory, which NATO members delivered.73

69 S/RES/660,

2 August 1990. 6 August 1990. 71 To be sure, this was not a NATO mission. 72 £200 million of British equipment was lost or written off. 73 Turkey shared a border with Iraq and its government was anxious that the conflict would spread into Turkey. 70 S/RES/660,

Partnership for Peace

33

Partnership for Peace In order to quell Russian fears that the NATO enlargement process would intervene or even threaten Russia’s territorial sovereignty, the alliance developed the so-called ‘Partnership for Peace’ programme (PfP). PfP became available to former members of the Warsaw pact in 1994, and aimed to ensure that all countries were equal partners in pursuit of European peace, and to affirm the Alliance’s desire to work cooperatively.74 Britain played a very active role in PfP, in part because it had significant benefits for the U.K.: it provided (1) transparency of and democratic control for the armed forces of central and eastern European states; (2) a network of military and defence related issues; (3) cooperation between central and eastern European states and NATO; and (4) it specific confidence-building measures to reduce (military) tensions in Europe. Specifically, the PfP program was announced by U.S. Secretary of Defence Les Aspin in Travemünde, Germany, in October 1993 and formally accepted on 10 January 1994 during the NATO Brussels Summit. It was a comprehensive cooperative security program in which NATO provided detailed advise of how to run an effective civil administration and how to organize and structure the armed forces.75 To this end, a Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC)76 was established at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium. Representatives of PfP countries met with NATO allies on a regular basis and fully participated in discussions and deliberations of the NAC and NATO’s military bodies. The PfP program stressed transparency as the highest objective, as a confidence building measure, and dialogue and cooperation for joint actions. It was designed as a reach out program seeking cooperation, mutual understanding, and transparency in defence planning among all of its member states. It intended to create a real, personalized partnership between NATO allies and aspiring member states.77

NATO Enlargement In the fall of 1990 Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic voiced their intentions to establish closer ties with NATO. To achieve this goal, they formed an informal Alliance at their meeting in Visegrad, Hungary in September 1990 to seek greater of 74 Asmus,

R.D. (2002) Opening NATO’s Door. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 54. White House, National Security Directive 23, September 22 1989. The Bush Library, F 89–191. 76 For a greater discussion about the role of the PCC see G. Lange, “The PCC—a New Player in the Development of Relations between NATO and Partner Nations,” NATO Review 3 (May 1995). 77 Member of the PfP program as of 2007 are the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 75 The

34

2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

cooperation amongst themselves and vis-a-vis NATO.78 Allies, including the U.K. quickly realized that the process of NATO enlargement is a useful political tool for helping central and eastern European states to establish liberal principles of democratic governance (e.g. democracy, rule of law, freedom etc.). But Britain was not blind and clearly driven by functionalist calculations. It quickly understood that helping new and emerging democracies in central and eastern Europe was not only good for promoting peace and security in these countries; it was also lucrative for the British economy. Moreover, it induced and rewarded economic change, fostered private sector relationships and had a number of multiplier effects (e.g. stimulation of direct trade with the U.K.). On the other side of the table, states from central and eastern Europe essentially had two options: they could either form a new buffer zone between the West and Russia, or they could become an integral part of the NATO alliance. NATO enlargement was initially met with disdain by the Americans because they felt that NATO was already well placed and equipped to protect Europe. Due to the poor state of their armed forces, adding Eastern European countries to the alliance would most likely add an unnecessary burden.79 On top, it was expected to be expensive. The fear of weakening NATO was complimented by the fear that adding any additional members may signal an open-ended expansionism to Russia, and thereby reignite Cold War tensions.80 By 1993 the British position became to maintain a ‘grey area’ East of Europe rather than incorporating Eastern European countries into the Alliance, which would essentially mean extending NATO’s Article 5 provisions to them.81 However, throughout negotiating the enlargement process NATO allies, including Britain, quickly realized that only the U.S. was able to push its allies towards extending the invitation to selected countries from Central and Eastern Europe. In Washington, the issue of enlargement did not gain momentum until Richard Holbrooke, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs in the State Department, took office in 1994.82 When the United States made the political decision later in 1995/1996 to expand the Alliance,83 Britain effectively had no other chance than endorsing that decision. At the same time, the enlargement decision helped to keep the Americans engaged in the alliance, which was also in Britain’s (security) interest. In addition to NATO, a number of other security organizations were part of this process of promoting peace and security in Europe. In addition to the E.U. (see

78 See Asmus, 2002. As a result, these three countries are often referred to as the Visegrad countries. 79 Bilinsky, Y. (1999). Endgame in NATO’s Enlargement: The Baltic States and Ukraine. Connecticut: Praeger, p. 1. 80 Ibid., p. 3. 81 Solomon, G.B. (1998). The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990–1997: Blessings of Liberty. Connecticut: Praeger, p. 31. 82 He held this position until 1996. 83 Brent Scowcroft, “Whither the Atlantic Community” Issue Brief, (01–02), (Washington, DC: The Forum for International Policy, March 21, 2001).

NATO Enlargement

35

further below),84 it was hoped that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would provide a wide, inclusive framework for looser forms of cooperation. The advantage of ‘using’ the OSCE over NATO or the E.U. was that Russia is a member of it, and thus political consultations and exchanges were easily possible and could be dealt with ‘in-house’ so to speak. In 1999 the first set of states, including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, acceded to the Washington Treaty and thus became official members of NATO. Since then, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have joined (all in 2004), as well as Albania and Croatia (in 2009) (NATO 2016).

Bosnia The conflict that began in the former Republic of Yugoslavia in 1994 would prove to be the impetus to the first significant explicitly NATO mission beyond the borders of NATO country. While the conflict particularly in Bosnia had started to evolve since 1992, NATO’s intervention was largely halted by American trepidation, which was based on Washington’s view of the conflict being a purely European issue.85 Moreover, there was a significant danger that the evolving crisis in the Balkans had the potential to seriously undermine European security and revive Cold War-like East-West tensions.86 The transatlantic relationship was also put under strain.87 For these reasons, the only resource available to the Europeans was to join the UN-led peacekeeping mission UNPROFOR (Table 2.1). The U.K. sent a total of 3424 forces, which represented slightly more than 8% of the total UN force contingent that initially deployed in a traditional peacekeeping role.88 The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) came into existence in March 1992 in three UN protected areas in Croatia, particularly in eastern and western Slavonia, and the Krajina. It was authorized by the UN Security Council to demilitarize the UNPAs and to provide protection for the population living in these zones. It had three main objectives: first, to facilitate and provide security for the delivery of humanitarian aid; second, contain the conflict through safe-zones and

84 Although the E.U. at the time was primarily a political and economic entity, it also makes an important contribution to European security. See Richard Holbrooke, “America: European Power,” Foreign Affairs 74 (March/April 1995): 46. 85 See Kaplan, 2004, p. 117; see also Lenard J. Cohen, Alexander Moens, and Allen G. Sens, NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, Humanistic Perspectives on International Relations (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003). 86 See for example Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” or Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability after the Cold War.” 87 A good discussion can be found in Sophie Vanhoonacker, The Bush Administration (1989–1993) and the Development of a European Security Identity (Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001), 147–204. 88 Source: Department of Public Information, United Nations, September 1996.

36

2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

Table 2.1 Force deployments of NATO members to UNPROFOR NATO states contributions to UNPROFOR Country

Police

Troops

Observers

Total

%

Rank

France

41

4493

11

4545

24.23

1

U.K.

0

3405

19

3424

18.25

2

Canada

45

2091

15

2151

11.47

3

Netherlands

10

1803

48

1861

9.92

4

Turkey

0

0

1,464

1464

7.80

5

Spain

0

1267

19

1286

6.86

6

Belgium

0

1038

6

1044

5.57

7

Norway

31

826

39

896

4.78

8

U.S.

0

0

748

748

3.99

9

Denmark

45

1230

14

1289

6.87

10

Portugal

39

0

12

51

0.27

11

Total

211

16153

2395

18759

100

11

Source Military Balance 1991–1995

a no-fly zone; and third, to negotiate cease-fires with the belligerents.89 It failed miserably on all accounts.90 With UNPROFOR failing to stop the mass atrocities and even genocide (e.g. in the city of Srebrenica in 1995), NATO had to step in. NATO’s robust diplomatic and peace enforcement operations in Yugoslavia heralded a more interventionist doctrine of international affairs that was fully supported by Britain. Indeed, it set a precedent of a justification of intervening into the domestic affairs of a sovereign state based on humanitarian grounds.91 In reaction to Bosnian Serb’s shelling of the city of Sarajevo the alliance finally intervened militarily in 1994, and launched a 21day air and artillery strike campaign known as Operation Deliberate Force.92 NATO once again intervened in 1995 in reaction to the massacre off Muslim Bosniaks at the UN safe-zone in Srebrenica,93 once again reacting with a 22 day campaign of shelling and mortar attacks against the Bosnian Serb force, effectively ending the war in Bosnia.94 For the alliance, this was a crucial moment for two reasons. First, it underlined its raison d’être; and second, it underlined the effectiveness of its new 89 See for example “Fighting escalates, UN role in question,” United Nations Chronicle vol. 32, no. 3 (September 1995). 90 Kaplan, 2004, p. 118. 91 Later, this became known as the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P). 92 Behnke, A. (2013). NATO’s Security Discourse After the Cold War: Representing the West. New York: Routledge, p. 137. 93 Bono, G. (2003). NATO’s ‘Peace-Enforcement’ Tasks and ‘Policy Communities’: 1990–1999. Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 114. 94 Kaplan, 2004, p. 120.

Bosnia Table 2.2 Force deployments of NATO members to IFOR 1996–1997

37 NATO troop contributions to IFOR Country

# of troops

% of total

Rank

Belgium

420

0.8

14

Canada

1024

2.0

9

Denmark

807

1.5

12

France

7500

14.4

3

Germany

4000

7.7

4

Greece

1000

1.9

10

Iceland

0

0.0

16

Italy

2200

4.2

5

Luxembourg

0

0.0

15

Netherlands

2000

3.8

6

Norway

750

1.4

13

Portugal

900

1.7

11

Spain

1400

2.7

7

Turkey

1300

2.5

8

U.K.

10500

20.1

2

U.S.A.

18,400

35.2

1

Total

52201

100

15

Source Military Balance 1996/1997

crisis management doctrine and thus justified the restructuring of its armed forces to make them more agile and effective to operate in these missions.95 The Dayton Peace Accords reached on Nov. 21, 1995 finally brought about a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. It also replaced UNPROFOR with NATO’s more robust Implementation Force (IFOR) (Tables 2.2 and 2.3). The IFOR mission was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995. It authorized to use force under chapter VII of the UN charter. All NATO as well as some non-NATO countries contributed to the mission and by early 1996 some 50,000 troops from 15 NATO nations, as well as 10,000 troops from sixteen non-NATO, had deployed their forces to Bosnia to take part in Operation Joint Endeavor.96 Specifically, IFOR was tasked to monitor the border between Croatia and Bosnia and their four-kilometer wide zones of separation. IFOR troops literally interpositioned themselves in between the belligerents and thus physically separated 95 Behnke,

2013, p. 138. AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, 1 March 1996. The list of non-NATO countries participating in the IFOR mission include countries from the NATO PfP countries such as Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, and the Ukraine. It was the first time that Russian forces served in a NATO operation and were under the tactical control of the United States led multinational division. NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force concept allowed for a smooth integration of the forces. 96 IFOR

1,059

662

593

135

320

N/A

218

N/A

N/A

22

Netherlands

Denmark

Norway

Belgium

Portugal

Poland**

Greece

Czech Republic**

Hungary**

Luxembourg

961

25

N/A

N/A

250

N/A

351

550

743

600

1,220

1,300

2,382

23

314

561

250

450

355

550

700

630

1,220

1,300

23

639

720

680

1,053

675

1,450

1,425

1,325

2,717

2,250

2,110

2,500

23

314

491

250

302

331

660

126

346

1,180

1,201

1,201

1,200

1,500

1,900

23

159

7

250

287

330

450

125

365

1,000

1,200

1,600

1,200

1,600

1,700

23

159

8

250

287

330

4

125

365

1,070

1,200

1,600

1,200

1,500

1,000

1,500

1,400

1,800

2003

23

154

7

250

287

330

4

125

4

1,000

1,200

400

935

979

1,000

1,500

1,100

839

2004

97

1,522

Turkey

1,600

8,040

7,669

2,200

1,700

2,000

2002

Lithuania*

990

Canada

1,600

2,313

2,738

2,200

2,950

7,100

2001

106

1,555

Spain

2,500

2,600

8,280

6,200

4,600

2000

158

1,825

Italy

3,000

4,500

8,510

1999

Romania*

2,603

Germany

3,300

4,900

8,050

1998

Slovenia*

5,403

3,646

France

9,128

U.S.A.

U.K.

1997

Country/Year

Table 2.3 Force contributions to SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, 1997–2004

97

106

158

185

1,739

1,794

2,398

2,666

3,022

3,803

3,962

4,297

10,466

11,173

11,244

11,790

20,257

21,210

25,626

28,153

42,027

Total 1997–2004

0.0

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.8

0.9

1.2

1.3

1.5

1.8

1.9

2.1

5.1

5.4

5.5

5.7

9.8

10.3

12.4

13.7

20.4

(continued)

% of total force

38 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

0

2002

0

2003

2004

23,275

16,196

13,821

10,531

206,206

0

1

1

2

29

Total 1997–2004

100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

% of total force

Source Military Balance 1997–2004; N/A1 = these specific numbers could not be provided as not all NATO states broke them down according to individual missions, i.e. Bosnia + Croatia etc *This state joined NATO on 29 March 2004 **This state joined the alliance on 12 March 1999

52,356

Total

31,396

29,681

Iceland

28,950

1 0

0

Latvia*

2

0

2001

1 0

2000

Bulgaria* 0

1999

Estonia*

0

1998 29

1997

Slovakia*

Country/Year

Table 2.3 (continued)

Bosnia 39

40

2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

them.97 In short, NATO forces were tasked, as Douglas MacGregor noted, “to prevent a resumption of ethnic cleansing and fighting, and to formalize the creation of a Muslim-dominated multiethnic Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.”98 Authorized by Security Council Resolution 1088 (12 Dec. 1996) IFOR was replaced with a Stabilization Force (SFOR). The U.K. initially contributed 5,403 forces to this stabilization mission, and after the U.S. was the second largest force contributor. It also shared a rotational divisional headquarter with the Canadians and the Dutch. As table 2.3 shows, the U.K. was the second largest force provider, which indicates how important it considered this mission. SFOR troops were tasked to implement the Dayton Peace agreement, as well as ensuring the civilian elements therein, such as supporting the international police task force, providing humanitarian assistance, ensuring the safe returns of refugees and displaced people, and catching war criminals.

Kosovo Slobodan Miloševi´c came to power in 1987 while campaigning on the promise to reintegrate the Albanian dominated province of Kosovo back into Serbia. He President of Serbia from 1989 to 1997 and subsequently President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000. Kosovo’s Serb minorities had raised concerns that they were discriminated against by the ethnically Albanian government and thus sought the help of the Serbian leadership. Miloševi´c responded and introduced martial law in Kosovo while replacing ethnic-Albanian officials with Serbs. It was in this environment that the conflict in Kosovo was evolving. Following the end of hostilities in Bosnia, the militant Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fought for Kosovo to gain independence from Serbia. In reaction, President Miloševi´c began to systematically cleanse ethnic Kosovars, which with more than 90% of the population were predominantly Muslims.99 In total, the conflict between the KLA and Serb forces resulted in more than 400,000 refugees and killed more than 2,500 people.100 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in the 78-day air campaign was carried out without the approval of the UN Security Council,101 and therefore marked a watershed in the history of the alliance, because it was the first time that NATO had used force without international legal approval (Table 2.4).

97 Important 98 Douglas

to note here is that a 2,200-strong Russian contingent was deployed as part of IFOR. A. Macgregor, “The Balkan Limits to Power and Principle,” Orbis 45, no. 1 (Winter

2001): 95. 99 Kaplan, 2004, p. 125. 100 Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, Kosovo and US Policy, 4 December 2001, RL31053, 2. 101 Indeed, NATO intervened without an approval of the UN Security Council. It was thus considered illegal. However, the Council later retroactively endorsed the intervention.

800

980

6

221

Slovenia

Romania

800

Belgium

Norway

400

Czech Republic

Canada

574

Poland

313

1,300

Spain

Portugal

2,200

U.K.

325

940

Turkey

540

1,700

Greece

Denmark

5,100

U.S.A.

Hungary

4,200

5,200

France

4,600

Germany

Italy

2002

Country/Year

226

2

980

800

313

540

325

500

409

574

1,300

1,400

940

1,700

2,250

3,800

3,780

3,100

2003

226

2

60

800

313

370

294

500

408

574

800

1,400

940

1,700

1,800

2,900

2,530

3,900

2004

226

2

60

3

313

371

294

500

410

574

800

1,400

940

1,700

1,800

2,400

2,471

3,900

2005

150

92

6

3

308

364

484

420

500

312

749

400

940

1,262

1,801

2,455

2,280

3,150

2006

146

158

6

9

308

320

268

420

501

312

749

200

467

1,429

1,745

2,455

2,280

3,000

2007

Table 2.4 Force deployments of NATO members to KFOR, 2002–2013

153

92

86

8

296

363

484

420

500

312

627

150

940

742

1,640

1,830

2,280

2,279

2008

150

360

25

8

253

311

317

195

400

271

620

164

544

744

1,492

1,830

2,192

2,249

2009

145

387

6

5

279

188

241

99

321

227

3

5

465

366

1,480

807

1,409

1,507

2010

58

318

3

5

160

35

245

0

107

295

3

1

357

207

783

303

583

1,451

2011

59

308

3

9

150

35

195

0

7

117

0

2

393

118

760

337

574

1,249

2012

67

314

3

5

182

35

219

0

8

235

0

1

394

119

669

320

580

685

2013

1,827

2,041

2,218

2,455

3,188

3,472

3,691

3,854

3,971

4,377

6,951

7,323

8,260

11,787

21,320

24,637

25,159

31,070

1.17

1.31

1.42

1.57

2.04

2.23

2.37

2.47

2.55

2.81

4.46

4.69

5.29

7.56

13.67

15.79

16.13

19.92

% of total force

(continued)

Total 2002–2013

Kosovo 41

20,339

0 17,927

0 17,055

0 15,490

0

18

Sources 2010–2013: NATO’s placemats. 2002–2009: IISS The Military Balance

21,801

0

9

28

46 19

30

51

14,496

0

25,109

0

10

26

46

34

33,761

12

25

46

30

23

196

9

2009

0

30

2

0

32

23

134

1

2008

Total

11

98

0

30

26

132

4

2007

Iceland

15

Latvia

0

0

30

23

111

0

2006

0

0

Estonia

26

26

100

0

2005

Albania

0

Bulgaria

30

26

100

0

2004

0

29

Lithuania

26

100

0

2003

Croatia

40

26

Luxembourg

1,450

Netherlands

Slovakia

2002

Country/Year

Table 2.4 (continued)

8,194

0

2

20

0

1

10

36

29

146

10

2010

5,119

0

4

20

0

1

10

0

22

141

7

2011

4,391

0

9

26

0

1

10

0

22

0

7

2012

3,916

0

14

23

0

2

11

0

23

0

7

2013

187,598

0

29

89

124

214

230

277

295

1,200

1,495

Total 2002–2013

100

0.00

0.02

0.06

0.08

0.14

0.15

0.18

0.19

0.77

0.96

% of total force

42 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

Kosovo

43

Subsequently, a UN approved Kosovo Force (KFOR) peace enforcement mission was set up to monitor and control the compliance of the Serbian regime with the international peace agreement, as well as help demining the country and ensuring the safe return of refugees and internally displaced people of all ethnicities—that is—Serbs, Bosniacs, Roma, Turks, and Albanians (the latter accounted for nearly 90% of the total population of Kosovo).102 The British Prime Minister at the time, Tony Blair, had openly campaigned amongst his NATO colleagues for the use of ground troops, in spite of an absence of a clear UN endorsement.”103

9/11 The attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 changed the nature of transatlantic affairs forever. It marked the first time in its history that NATO invoked the collective defence clause in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.104 Britain was particularly fervent in their support of the U.S.A. in the aftermath of 9/11. It also strongly endorsed invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (the collective defence clause), and took part in what became a full-blown counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (see next paragraph) that was known to have harboured, trained, and aided some of the al-Qaeda members that helped carrying out the attacks.105 Moving into Afghanistan and eventually acquiring responsibility for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) underscored NATO’s increasingly global role and presence beyond traditional NATO territory.106 This fitted nicely with the U.K.’s as well as America’s own role perception as a global actor.107

Afghanistan Invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty led to the military invasion of Iraq in the fall of 2001. In this invasion, over 50 countries made contributions to the Americanlead counterinsurgengy Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) that ousted the Taliban regime. This was a US-led coalition of the willing that mostly consisted of special 102 Congressional

Research Service, Issue Brief for Congress, “Kosovo and Macedonia: US and Allied Military Operations,” July 8, 2003, 1. 103 Nossal and Roussel, “Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower,” 183. 104 Kaplan, 2004, p. 134. 105 Kaplan, 2004, p. 136. 106 Behnke, 2013, p. 146. 107 See Claudia Major and Nicolai von Ondarza. “Kein «Global Britain» nach dem Brexit: Der Brexit schwächt die britische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik—eine bilaterale Einbindung ist dennoch im deutschen Interesse,” SWP Aktuell No. 29, May 2019, p. 1.

44

2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

forces. It saw widespread support from NATO allies, as it was in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter.108 However, NATO was not officially involved in the conflict until 2003 with transferring the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from the UN to NATO.109 As shown in Table 2.5, from the beginning of the American led coalition in Afghanistan, the British were at the forefront, second only to America in terms of their troop contributions, having at the peak close to 10,000 troops in Afghanistan.110 British Prime Minister at the time, Tony Blair, has since justified Britain’s involvement noting that “we [the British] had to be there at the outset with a clear and unequivocal demonstration of support. I believed in the alliance with America. I thought its maintenance and enhancement a core objective of British policy”.111 This demonstrates the perceived importance of British involvement for the special relationship with America.112 It also undoubtedly strengthened the perceptions of NATO as a key to collective defence in the Euro-Atlantic area and strengthened the Anglo-American special relationship. With NATO taking over the responsibilities for ISAF, the mission transformed from purely focusing on reconstruction after the ousting of the Taliban regime towards one concentrating on stabilizing and state-building113 —that is to help the Afghan government to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its institutions and thus to increase their legitimacy.114

Iraq NATO did not have, nor did it approve, any role in the American-led (and British supported) invasion of Iraq in 2003. Instead, the Alliance evoked Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, and offered some preventative and protective measures to Turkey (also a NATO member) in the event that the conflict in Iraq would spill over into Turkey.115 This lack of NATO support for the American led intervention in Iraq that was widely considered illegal demonstrates that dissenting voices inside the 108 Ballard, J.R., Lamm, D.W., & Wood, J.K. (2012). From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The U.S. at War in Afghanistan and Iraq. Maryland: Naval Institute Press, p. 2. 109 Behnke, 2013, p. 166. 110 Joshi, S. (2015). Assessing Britain’s Role in Afghanistan. Asian Survey, vol. 55, p. 420. 111 Blair, T. (2011). A Journey. London: Arrow, p. 352. 112 Cyr, Arthur I. “Special Relationships: Brexit and Transatlantic Security,” Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018, pp. 85–93. 113 Behnke, 2013, p. 167. 114 OECD DAC. (2007, April). Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. Paris: OECD; OECD DAC. (2008). Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile States (Discussion Paper). Paris: OECD. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/development/incaf/ 41100930.pdf. 115 NATO (2015). NATO and the 2003 campaign against Iraq (Archived). Retrieved from http:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51977.htm.

N/A**

133

0

N/A**

Bulgaria

Czech Republic

Hungary

Lithuania

30

Norway

N/A**

Romania

50

350

Spain

165

610

Netherlands

Belgium

1400

Turkey

Denmark

0

Poland

650

Italy

1900

2300

Germany

500

300

U.K.

France

67

U.S.A.

Canada

2003

Country/Year

9

130

19

0

147

250

50

32

125

153

161

22

565

1576

491

1909

315

67

2004

6

130

56

34

147

250

185

32

125

153

315

22

565

1576

990

1909

315

67

2005

120

187

17

37

433

301

106

550

572

1200

825

3

742

2300

1860

2800

4300

89

2006

158

211

196

270

472

320

457

624

655

1754

1093

808

1020

2363

2239

3031

6539

15150

2007

217

229

361

440

486

388

723

653

776

1.747

776

1.111

2.225

2536

2.427

3.400

8.326

19.406

2008

Table 2.5 Force deployments of NATO members to ISAF in Afghanistan

207

326

443

524

504

456

700

903

811

1.826

733

1.769

2.891

2.826

2.477

3.664

8.587

27.830

2009

230

404

483

524

435

541

746

1431

1432

917

1773

2441

3770

2867

3370

4401

9500

77490

2010

216

434

532

604

416

519

750

1848

1513

190

1814

2544

3962

2115

3871

4930

9500

90000

2011

237

430

491

580

376

439

654

1773

1520

407

1340

2226

2653

811

3959

4187

9500

90000

2012

1.401

2.481

2.732

3.013

3.446

3.630

4.420

7.846

7.879

8.957

10.230

10.947

18.894

20.869

22.335

32.530

57.182

320.166

Total 2003–2012

0.3

0.5

0.5

0.6

0.6

0.7

0.8

1.4

1.4

1.6

1.9

2.0

3.5

3.8

4.1

5.9

10.4

58.5

% of total

5

49.5

103.7

149.9

(continued)

18

17

16

15

14 114.8

13 −20.5

12

11 37.2

43.1

184.2

10

9 132.2

8 −76.8

7 22.6

175.5

6

−65.7 160.0

4

3

2

1

Rank

76.8

38.1

45.3

494.1

% of change 2007–10

Iraq 45

Total

6209

0

9

2

7

N/A**

8

18

127

N/A**

17

2004

7073

0

9

10

7

N/A**

8

18

127

N/A**

17

2005

17418

20

9

28

7

N/A**

166

572

157

N/A**

17

2006

37985

8.3

9.6

60

114

N/A**

158

53

155

N/A**

65

2007

46860

8.9

9

79

124

N/A**

106

70

136

N/A**

100

2008

58711

8

8.9

149

136

156

61

73

139

319

184

2009

114199

4

9

171

148

262

149

73

65

289

274

2010

127317

4

10

149

160

266

126

79

149

309

304

2011

123019

4

10

129

153

255

138

81

70

281

318

2012

**Those countries joined the alliance at a later stage and thus cannot be included in alliance calculations at this time

0

8505

Iceland

N/A**

Albania

0

20

Portugal

Luxembourg

N/A**

Slovenia

N/A**

30

Greece

N/A**

N/A**

Croatia

Latvia

N/A**

Slovak Republic

Estonia

2003

Country/Year

Table 2.5 (continued)

547.296

57

84

777

857

939

940

1.037

1.155

1.198

1.297

Total 2003–2012

100.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

% of total

33.9

28

28

−51.7 2144.4

27

26

25 6.2

116.0

24

23 N/A

22

51.1 −13.1

20 21

N/A

19

Rank

−54.7

393.0

% of change 2007–10

46 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

Iraq

47

alliance did exist (e.g. Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium). Such disagreement, at times hotly exchanged between the allies, in some way provided a corrective to American unilateralism in international security affairs. Meanwhile the Americans themselves have acknowledged that their unilateral invasion in Iraq clearly damaged their international reputation. Equally important to NATO’s inaction was the U.K.’s active involvement in Iraq, as they, much like in Afghanistan, unilaterally came to the aid of the U.S. despite significant detractors in NATO.116 This is especially compelling evidence for the eagerness of Britain to appease the Americans and to reaffirm their ‘special relationship’ in that there was significant doubt about the legality of the invasion of Iraq and using the believed existence of weapons of mass destruction as justification for the invasion.117 However, the inability of Britain to effectively sustain war in both Afghanistan and Iraq put strain on the relations between Britain and the U.S.A. It also clearly showed the inferiority of Britain to the U.S. in terms of military capabilities and strength, and the need to work closely with allies in the conduct of military operations.118

Libya NATO evoked the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in 2011 shortly before the Alliance commenced a campaign against the Libyan’s dictator Muammar Qaddafi in order to stop his regime from targeting innocent civilians in Benghazi.119 It thus answered a call by the UN and Security Council Resolution 1973 to protect the Libyan people against the systematic violation of their human rights (including arbitrary detentions, disappearances, torture, and summary executions). NATO’s operation Unified Protector had the mandate to enforce an arms embargo, maintaining a no-fly zone, and protect civilians from attacks of their government.120 It has since been hailed as a ‘model intervention’,121 and as such, can be regarded as a bright spot on the record of successful NATO’s interventions. The intervention, however, was not without critics. BRIC states (which include Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in particular have seen the actions as akin to imperialism feeling that NATO exceeded 116 Barry,

B. (2016). Britain’s Difficult War in Iraq. London: The Stationary Office, p. 168; NATO, 2015. 117 Murphy, S.D. (2004). Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq. Georgetown Law Journal. 92(2), p. 174. 118 Barry, 2016, p. 172. 119 Kuperman, A. (2013). A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign. International Security, 38(1), p. 108. 120 Only six European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, and the U.K.) as well as Canada contributed to strike missions in Libya. See Tim Haesenbrouck. 2016. “NATO Burden Sharing in Libya: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61 (10): 2235–2261. 121 Ibid., p. 105.

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2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

the UN Resolution 1973 mandate of protection of civilians, and instead pursued regime change in Libya, which was not mandated by that resolution.122

Brexit The scholarly literature on the Brexit as well as how it might affect U.K.—NATO relations, as noted in the introduction, is sparse at best, and most definitely uncertain. Having said that, some analysts suggest that the Brexit will not directly effect Britain’s role in NATO but decrease its reputation as a reliable major power in world politics.123 Others have speculated that the special relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. is strong enough that the U.K.’s role in NATO will likely be largely unaffected by the Brexit.124 Indeed, to some, the U.K. should seek a renewal of its “special relationship” with the U.S.125 Others have speculated whether the U.K. might lose its post as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACE.U.R), a post that was traditionally held by a British general since the creation of the post in 1951. Since the post was traditionally held by the Europeans, they might reclaim it back. Indeed, the French have lobbied for the post on the grounds that it to the French would allow NATO to retain a stronger connection with the E.U. in light of Brexit.126 We will elaborate on and discuss these arguments in greater detail in the next chapters.

122 Ralph,

J. & Gallagher, A. (2015). “Legitimacy Faultlines in International Society: The Responsibility to Protect and Prosecute after Libya.” Review of International Studies, 41(3). p. 555. 123 Oliver, T. & Williams, M. (2016). Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the U.S.—E.U. and U.S.—U.K. relationships. International Affairs, 92(3), 557. 124 O’Sullivan, J. (2017). A Very Special Relationship. National Review, 69(3), 38–40. 125 Chalmers, Malcolm. “U.K. Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit,” Briefing Paper, January 2017. 126 Dearden, L. (January 10, 2017). Brexit: U.K. could lose its most senior military position in Nato to France after departure from E.U. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-latest-news-uk-lose-most-seniornato-military-position-eu-european-union-deputy-supreme-a7519196.html. For a more positive perspective that Brexit indeed would not impact the U.K.’s ability and effectiveness to continue to work with the EU in the area of foreign and security policy see Menon, a. (2016). Britain’s military standing would not suffer after Brexit. Financial Times, 24 April. https://www.ft.com/content/ a6f95c18-087d-11e6-a623-b84d06a39ec2; Godement, F. (2016). China and Brexit: What’s in it for us? European Council on Foreign relations. China analysis. http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/ summary/china_and_brexit_whats_in_it_for_us7112.

Conclusion

49

Conclusion To sum up this brief historical synoposis of the U.K.-NATO relationship it is evident that the U.K. has been an integral member of NATO since 1949. Indeed, in light of its rather ambiguous relationship with the E.U. in terms of polling its security resources with Brussels (see next chapter), NATO has always been the ‘more important’ and preferred primary security institution for the U.K. to work with. But in spite of the fact that Brexit supporters will point out that leaving the E.U. is not a ‘real problem’ for British security interests as there will always be the ‘real’ safety net provided by NATO where the U.K. feels more comfortable in any case, we will show in chapters four and five that NATO will have its own challenges to deal with should Britain indeed leave the E.U. at the end of 2020 as it was decided in the British House of Commons on 20 December 2019.

Chapter 3

A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship

The History of British and European relations is long and storied, filled with conflicts, bickering, rejections, but also cooperation.1 It is thus inaccurate to characterize the relationship as solely rejecting; indeed, it has always oscillated between one of integration and distancing.2 Moreover, the historical baggage of hundreds of years prior to the 20th century cannot be discounted when considering the current relationships between Britain and continental Europe. Even though we don’t have the time to discuss this is greater detail here, it is fair to note that the relationship between Britain and Europe has been a constant point of contention throughout British history. The British Empire was on a decline, even leading into the Second World War, and the UK started to shift from a global superpower to a regional power in Europe. It has often been suggested that a level of dissonance may have been an ideological roadblock to European integration (until this day),3 as the British were unwilling to accept their diminished place in international politics.

End of World War II The Second World War II destroyed much of the economies, financial markets, and physical infrastructure of European countries. Europe had been saved from the brink of disaster by the U.S. who entered the war in 1941 after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. After the war countries were driven by a desire to rebuild the continent, especially their shattered economies to help recover socially and politically

1 For a superb historical analysis, especially since the 1990s, see Nicholas Wright. The EU’s Common

Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK: Co-Operation, Co-Optation and Competition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). 2 For an excellent and short discussion of this see Anand Menon and John-Paul Salter. “Brexit: initial reflections”. International Affairs 92: 6 (2016) pp. 1297–1318. 3 Greenwood, S. (1992). Britain and European Cooperation since 1945. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 2. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Zyla, The End of European Security Institutions?, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_3

51

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3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship

and, above all, ensure that such a tragedy would never happen again. This process of rebuilding European societies was stimulated externally by the Marshall Plan that presented European countries with the financial means to successfully start this process. The primary goal, however, was to prevent a renewed antagonism between Germany and France, and to create institutions that would help ensure peaceful relations between the two enemies. Many politicians in both France and Germany supported the idea of a politically unified Europe and proposed a European federation or some form of European government. For example, on 19 September, 1946, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave a speech at the University of Zurich in which he outlined his vision of a “United States of Europe”, similar to the United States of America. Churchill called for the formation of a union of European countries, which would work towards strengthening the security of the world. He suggested that any union amongst European countries must be centered on an alliance between France and Germany.4 As a result of this, it was assumed that they would abstain from mutual antagonism or even renewed conflict with one another.5 It is important to note, however, that, while Churchill called for such union, he did not explicitly mention that Britain would join this union. Indeed, he mentioned the Commonwealth in such a way that Britain would not be a part of any European organization, which he coined ‘The European Council’.6 The idea behind this was to ensure that the fates of all European states would be tied to one another. The need for a European security organization was largely mitigated by the formation of NATO in 1949, which established a framework for cooperation in the area of defence, putting Britain in a position of relative power within the organization, and tying American security interests permanently to those of Britain and continental Europeans alike. As such, much of the discourse surrounding the importance of an alliance between European countries was abandoned.7 In turn, for Britain the creation of NATO allowed them to turn away from Europe, and instead nurture their ‘special relations’ with the Americans, also at the economic level.8

4 See Council on Foreign Relations. (2017). Churchill’s “United States of Europe” Speech, in Zurich.

Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/europe/churchills-united-states-europe-speech-zurich/p32536. William. (1959). The Schuman Plan: a study in economic cooperation 1950–1959, New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Praeger; European Union (2017). The Schuman Declaration—9 May 1950. Retrieved from https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/ symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en. 6 See Council on Foreign Relations (2017). 7 Greenwood (1992), p. 18. 8 Greenwood (1992), p. 26. 5 Diebold,

Schuman Plan

53

Schuman Plan The E.U. that we know today grew out of three separate communities, which continuously shared the same membership. Those were the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); the European Economic Community (EEC); and a European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). Each of these communities had its own Commission (in the case of the ECSC a High Authority), as well as its own council. In May of 1950, France began negotiating with Germany the formation of what would become known as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a supranational administrative and regulatory organization that would oversee the production of coal and steel across the continent. On May 9, 1950 French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman publicly presented his plan of pooling the coal and steel resources of the member states to create a unified market for their coal and steel products. This became known as the “Schuman Declaration”, which was drafted by the French Civil Servant Jean Monnet. Initially, the United Kingdom was invited to join the Community as well but refused citing sovereignty reasons. Thus the ECSC was formed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951 for a period of 50 years.9 By 1954 the ECSC managed to lift restrictions on imports and exports, creating a unified labour market as well as a common set of rules. Between 1952 and 1960 the steel production rose by about 75%. A supranational High Authority would administrate the new Community. At that time, coal and steel were the primary resources for the industrialization of Western Europe. The Treaty of Paris from 1952 formally established the ECSC. Specifically, the United Kingdom rejected the Schuman plan by and large due its supranational nature. They believed that it would erode some of their territorial sovereignty,10 and therefore it ran contrary to what can be considered the first rule of European integration, namely that integration should only take place when benefitting all of the members of the agreement.11 Further, it has been posited that the French sought to outline terms which they knew would prevent the British from joining the ECSC so that in turn it would strengthen their own position of power. Additionally, by essentially keeping Britain out of the ECSC, France could use the burgeoning European community to mitigate some of the growing influence of the United States on the continent.12 A few years later, ECSCs attempted to further integrate its members politically and militarily. The goal was to create a European Political Community and a European Defence Community (EDC) having in mind a European military service under joint control, as well as a federation of European States that would allow them to better 9 European

Parliament (2017). The First Treaties. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.1.pdf, p. 1. 10 Julie Smith, “Europa und das Vereinigte Königreich-Kleine Geschichte der Beziehungen seit 1945”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 49–50/2016, p. 11–16; Greenwood (1992), p. 35. 11 Greenwood (1992), p. 38. 12 Lindley-French, J. (2007). A Chronology of European Security & Defence: 1945–2007. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 26.

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coordinate their policies. In 1950, Winston Churchill first circulated such idea of a community, perhaps even creating a supranational European military, which he viewed as an opportunity to counteract the rearmament of West Germany13 and thus providing security to Europe against the threat of a rearmed Germany. Similar to his ‘United States of Europe’ speech, Churchill did not explicitly state that Britain would be a part of any such alliance.14 This idea was transformed into the Pleven plan, proposed by the French, who saw this as a step towards eventually establishing the European Defence Community (EDC). However, this was a short-lived aspiration, as the French feared German rearmament through the EDC.15 Moreover, the question of pooling sovereignty in the area of security and defence policy did not seem to be adequate tools for them to achieve an EDC. It is important to note that the United Kingdom was on the outside looking in on the EDC, much as they were on the ECSC.16 In the end the French National Assembly failed to ratify the EDC treaty and thus the idea quickly dissolved. In 1955 the Western European Union (W.E.U.) took up this space. Soon after this ratification failure ECSC members, however, reiterated their desire for further integration and founded the European Economic Community (EEC) as well as the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom or EAEC). The former was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and formed a customs union among the six founding countries in 1958. The political strategy behind such decision was that a deeper economic integration would ultimately lead to a political union. Specifically, the EEC started to liberalize the flow of goods, services, capital, and people; to abolish economic cartels; and to develop joint and reciprocal policies on labour, social welfare, agriculture, transport, and foreign trade. Indeed, the EEC was the most important of the three communities. The United Kingdom decided not to become a signatory,17 although it was invited to join. This was important, because the treaty sought to “lay the foundation of an even closer union among the peoples of Europe”,18 and thus signaled Britain’s unwillingness to seek a deeper integration with the European community. Euratom arose as the third treaty organization and was also created by the Treaty of Rome in 1958. Euratom’s aim was to foster collaboration with other member states in terms of peaceful nuclear research, as well as to ensure the free movement of nuclear raw materials, equipment, investment capital, and specialists among its members. Ultimately, its goal was to promote European nuclear research and to help avoid national competitions in this area. Euratom’s authority was exclusively restricted to the civilian use of atomic energy.

13 Ibid.,

p. 27.

14 Lindley-French

(2007), p. 33. D. (2014). Europe Recast: A History of the European Union. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 6. 16 Greenwood (1992), p. 50. 17 Dinan (2014), p. 76. 18 Lindley-French (2007), p. 56. 15 Dinan,

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Since the United Kingdom did not participate in any of the three Communities noted above, it proposed instead that the Common Market to be expanded to North America, which would thus include the United States and Canada. To this end, London initiated European Free Trade Association (EFTA) negotiations, which were finalized in 1960. Other European countries that were not member of any of the three Communities noted above joined in as well. The idea of negotiating free trade agreements started to become popular. A bit later, in the 1970s EFTA and EEC negotiated various free trade agreements that ultimately reduced trade barriers (e.g. tariffs on goods and services etc.). It also introduced the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 which helped to stabilize the currencies after two major oil crisis in 1973 and 1979.

Western European Union (WE.U.) A British led solution to the problems of rearming Germany (as it was being pressured by the U.S.A. and to a lesser extent, Britain through NATO) was found in 1955 through the founding of the Western European Union (W.E.U.). This was essentially the expansion of the Brussels Treaty (a precursor to NATO), and included the former Axis powers of Italy and Germany. It thus offered the opportunity for the two nations to join NATO. In turn, it gave the alliance a tool to incorporate their military capabilities and thus to exert control over them.19 This was a moment in what could be seen as a power dialectic between NATO and emerging other European (security) institutions, with NATO gaining the upper hand.

Petitions to Join the EEC French President Charles De Gaulle, who came to power in 1958, saw the EEC as a potential avenue for ensuring the freedom of Europe and to reduce its overall reliance on the United States.20 As such, and in light of the ‘special’ Anglo-American relationship noted above that he obviously knew of, De Gaulle used France’s veto in the EEC twice to block Britain’s ascension into the European community (in 1963 and 1967).21 Part of his calculation was to prevent further American influence in Europe (beyond of what it had already exerted through NATO), as well as to ensure that France retained its position as the most important member of the EEC. In justifying France’s veto on British Membership in the EEC of 14 January 1963 De Gaulle stated that

19 See

Greenwood (1992), p. 54; Lindley-French (2007), p. 55; Dinan (2014), p. 70. (2014), p. 88. 21 Dinan (2014), p. 88; Lindley-French (2007), p. 19. 20 Dinan

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3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her interactions, her markets and her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones. She has, in all her doings, very marked and very original habits and traditions. In short, the nature, the structure, the very situation (conjuncture) that are England’s differ profoundly from those of the continentals.22

Joining the EEC With the Treaty of Brussels in 1965 Euratom, EEC, and ECSC merged into the European Community. The Treaty also amalgamated the three Commissions and Councils to a single European Commission of the European Communities, as well as single Council of Ministers of the European Communities. Due to the failed attempts by the British to establish an organization that would rival or even replace the EEC, while reducing the level to which British sovereignty would be effected, and due to the slow development of the country economically (compared to other members of the EEC23 ) Britain once again petitioned for ascension to the EEC in 1969.24 French President Charles de Gaulle once again vetoed Britain’s request, which it previously had applied for the first time in 1963. It was only after de Gaulle left office that Britain could join the EC in 1973, at the same time that Ireland and Denmark joined.25 This was especially due to the good personal relationship between British Prime Minister Edward Heath and French President George Pompidou who stated after a joint meeting: Many people believed that Great Britain was not and did not wish to become European, and that Britain wanted to enter the Community only so as to destroy it or divert it from its objectives. Many people also thought that France was ready to use every pretext to place, in the end, a fresh veto on Britain’s entry. Well, ladies and gentlemen, you see before you tonight two men who are convinced of the contrary.26

The Single European Act of 1987 created a single internal European market. Together with the Schengen Convention it abolished all trade barriers that might hinder the free flow of goods, services, and people. The Community also integrated further in political and social affairs.27 Yet, even after Britain had formally acceded to the EEC, there remained sufficient opposition (if not resentment) amongst the British population against the E.U. to 22 https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125401/1168_DeGaulleVeto.pdf. 23 See

e.g. O’Neill (2000), p. 355. (2014), p. 135. 25 Lindley-French (2007), p. 112. 26 Hannay, D. (2000). Britain’s Entry into the European Community. Portland: Whitehall History Publishing. 27 Almost ten years later, Greece joined the EC in 1981; Spain and Portugal joined in 1986. When Germany reunited in 1990 former East Germany was automatically absorbed into the Community when it annexed with Western Germany. 24 Dinan

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the extent that the government decided to hold a referendum on that question. Contrary 2016, the 1975 referendum saw an overwhelming support amongst the British population to remain in the EEC.28

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe In 1973 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was held in Helsinki. It produced an agreement, called the Helsinki Final Act, that was signed in 1975.29 The CSCE took place in the context of détente, and provided European countries with an opportunity of reprise to work together and seek cooperation on the area of security (amongst other policy areas). While the Helsinki Final Act was a step towards a greater level of European cooperation by providing institutional avenues for cooperation, and normative codes of action,30 seeing the CSCE as a step towards total Europeanization of European security would be a mistake, as significant factions at this time within Britain believed that it was crucial to keep any European organization from managing European security affairs, which London clearly considered to be the purview of NATO.31 Moreover, the U.S. government under President Richard Nixon as well as his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, did not consider the CSCE as being of particular importance32 in international politics. Quite contrary, they reminded allies that a deepening European cooperation in the domain of security affairs would automatically impede, if not duplicate, the security functions of NATO, and thus should be avoided.

Schengen Agreement The Schengen Agreement is a treaty that established a free-travel area amongst European countries and essentially eliminated Europe’s internal borders. Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands were its first signatories in 1985.33 Meanwhile, the United Kingdom decided intentionally not sign the Schengen agreement, citing concerns regarding security and migration.34 Such reluctance to sign onto the

28 Gliddon,

P.M. (2017). The Labour government and the battle for public opinion in. (2007), pp. 113−120. 30 Lindley-French (2007), p. 120; Bickerton, C. (2011). Towards a Social Theory of E.U. Foreign and Security Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(1), p. 176. 31 Peters, D. (2010). Constrained Balancing: The E.U.’s Security Policy. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 101. 32 Bickerton, 2011, p. 177. 33 Lindley-French (2007), p. 155; Dinan (2014), p. 208. 34 Dinan (2014), p. 209; Dinan et al. (2017). 29 Lindley-French

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Schengen agreement clearly signaled the U.K.’s reluctance to fully buy into the European project, foreshadowing the potential issues for Britain in an integrated Europe, which came to fruition in the Brexit vote of 23 June, 2016. In short, Britain’s reluctance to sign the Schengen agreement in many ways can be considered a milestone to better understand its hesitations with the European Union (E.U.) of today.

Single European Act The Single European Act (SEA), which was passed in 1987, was an act signed and ratified by members of the EEC,35 which set the goal of creating a truly single market in Europe by 1992, as well as deepening political cooperation among its members in areas of security (not in the area of defence). The United Kingdom under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher championed this program as it was broadly seen as an opportunity for neo-liberal reform.36 It also signaled, if not a desire for European integration, at least a desire for the removal of barriers between the United Kingdom and continental Europe. Jacques Delores, who served as the 8th President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995 and is widely considered one of the continent’s most cautious leaders, praised this advancement in the European integration process by noting that “[Europe] is almost at the threshold of the irreversible”.37 The British support for the SEA, however, was also partially based on the acceptance of extra-treaty provisions covering foreign and security policy issues,38 as well as a grudging acceptance of some integrationist policies (changes in voting systems within the EEC).39 Once again this underlined the U.K.’s trepidation towards European integration and its security institutions.

The Treaty of Maastricht and the End of the Cold War NATO’s move in 1990 to find a new role for itself in international security affairs40 in addition to being concentrated on providing collective defence guarantees for its members was consistent with the broader developments within the European

35 The United Kingdom, France, German, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain (Lindley-French, 2007). 36 Dinan (2014), p. 209. 37 Cited in Dinan (2014), p. 208. 38 Parsons (2010), p. 717. 39 Parsons (2010), p. 718. 40 See Benjamin Zyla (2015). Sharing the Burden? NATO and its Second-Tier Powers (New York, Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

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Union.41 More specifically, until the end of the Cold War there was a division of labour between the E.U. and NATO whereby the European Community (EC) would foster member’s economic and cultural integration while NATO would solely be responsible for providing security for the continent. In that sense, NATO reduced the (financial) burdens for especially its E.U. members by allowing them to invest less in their territorial defence capabilities. This division of labour, however, ended with the end of the Cold War and called for proposals to rethink this division of labor and how to better integrate the E.U. members’ efforts in the areas of security and defence. The Treaty of the European Union (T.E.U.), signed in Maastricht in the Netherlands in 1992 and ratified by the member states in 1993, created the European Union (E.U.). It thus replaced the Treaty of Rome of 1957. The creation of the E.U. with now 15 member states was subject to many and significant objections from the U.K.42 Nonetheless, among the most important achievements was that the T.E.U. laid the foundations for a single European currency (the Euro), a central banking system, and gave the E.U. a legal personality which allowed it to be represented internationally (e.g. in the OSCE, the UN).43 Specifically, with the T.E.U. the newly created E.U. absorbed the functions of the W.E.U. in 1999, and thus automatically provided the E.U. with military capabilities that traditionally had been outside of the E.U.’s purview. These decisions were taken in light of the slow response of the E.U. during the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s and the ensuing civil wars there. Specifically, in June 1992, the W.E.U. was tasked by the E.U. to develop a new concept for future European forces, stressing that the sole responsibility for defence would remain with NATO. In turn, the W.E.U. developed the so-called Petersberg Tasks that marked the 41 When speaking of the European Union reference is made to the political-institutional setting as opposed to a geographical union. 42 Christiansen, T., Duke, S. & Kirchner, E. (2013). Understanding and Assessing the Maastricht Treaty. In T. Christiansen & S. Duke, The Maastricht Treaty: Second Thoughts after 20 Years (1– 14). New York: Routledge, p. 3; Cini, Michelle and Amy Verdun. “The implications of Brexit for the future of Europe”, in Martill, Benjamin and Uta Staiger (eds.) Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London: University College London Press, p. 63. 43 It is being recognized that the EU does not formally possess a seat at the United Nations as an international organization. Common diplomatic practice, however, is that most EU member states try to find a common position on a specific policy issue before it is being brought before the committees. See for example Heliskorski, J., The “Duty of Cooperation’ Between the European Community and Its Member States Within the World Trade Organization,” Finnish Yearbook if International Law 7 (1996), 59; Kuijper, P.J., “The European Communities and Arbitration,” in: A.H.A. Soons (ed.), International Arbitration: Past and Prospects, 1989, 181; Marchiso, S., “EU‘s Membership in International Organizations,” in: E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations, 2002, 231; Rosas, A., “The European Union and International Dispute Settlement,” in: Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Cesare P.R. Romano, Ruth Mackenzie (eds.), International Organizations and International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects, 2002, 49; Sack, J., “The European Community‘s Membership of International Organizations,” Common Market Law Review 32 (1995), 1227; Schermers, H.G., “International Organizations as Members of Other International Organizations,” in: R. Bernhardt et al. (eds.), Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Hermann Mosler, 1983, p. 823.

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first recognition of a new strategic environment in Europe after the end of the Cold War and became the core of European Security and Defence Policy (E.S.D.P.).44 The Petersberg Tasks include conflict prevention mechanisms, humanitarian and rescue tasks, crisis management missions, peacekeeping tasks as well as active combat tasks such as peacemaking.45 To be sure, the provision of collective defence for Europe solely remained the responsibility of NATO. In short, the Petersberg Tasks were an attempt to define what, when, and how Europe’s forces should be used for, and how they are different from NATO. In some countries, this step towards more autonomous European forces was not very well received, particularly in the U.K. and the U.S.46 Especially Washington very much objected to more autonomous European capabilities and laid down some general principles under which the U.S. was willing to allow greater E.U. autonomy. In 1998 then Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, defined the conditions for European autonomy inside NATO more closely by demanding three things: (1) no duplication of already existing NATO forces; (2) no discrimination against non-E.U. but NATO members; (3) no decoupling from NATO.47 With this proposal, the U.S. offered a solution that was centered on a compromise creating separable but not separate forces. Moreover, this arrangement allowed the W.E.U. to act independently from NATO while using the latter’s military assets and planning capabilities. This solution was later formalized in the Berlin-Plus agreement between NATO and the E.U. Meanwhile and contrary to Albright’s proposal, former NATO Secretary General Lloyd Robertson pushed for greater autonomy inside NATO. Specifically, Robertson, a British citizen, responded to Albright’s “3Ds” by outlining his own principles under which NATO should co-operate with the E.U. He called them the three “I’s”— indivisibility, inclusiveness, and improvement.48 Transatlantic security, he charged, is paramount for both continents (indivisibility) while all those NATO states that concurrently were not members of the E.U. should be invited to the E.U.’s military operations (inclusiveness). Also, additional capabilities were to be provided by the 44 Currently, the European Union receives its authority to deploy forces abroad from the Treaty of the European Union, Article 17.2, which says: “Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” The terms peacemaking and humanitarian are taken from the WEU Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. See Petersberg Declaration, Western European Union, Western European Union Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992. 45 However, the Europeans misleadingly use the term peacemaking instead of peace-enforcement, a term that the UN, NATO, and other countries commonly use. See for example Martin Ortega, Petersberg Tasks, and missions for the EU military forces (Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, 2005), available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/esdp/04-mo.pdf. 46 Madeleine Korbel Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure Nato’s Future,” Financial Times 07.12.1998. For a greater discussion of the ‘3D’s’ see for example Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, p. 191. 47 Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure Nato’s Future”. 48 George Robertson, “Die NATO Und Die EU: Partner Oder Rivalen?” in Europäische SicherheitsUnd Verteidigungspolitik. Der Weg Zu Integrierten Europäischen Streitkräften, ed. Werner Hoyer and Gerd F. L. Kaldrack (Badan-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002).

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E.U. member states for such operations (improvement). Robertson argued that if these three principles were lived up to, NATO would have no reason to fear ESDP; indeed, it should encourage it.49 In the Joint Declaration of the French-British Summit of St. Malo in December 1998, both President Jacques Chirac as well as Prime Minister Tony Blair made clear that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”50 This paved the way for the implementation of a common security and defence policy as part of CFSP of the E.U. Moreover, title V of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty also established a common foreign and security policy (C.F.S.P.) for the E.U., which became the second pillar of the European Union.51 This was made possible through C.F.S.P. The objective of the C.F.S.P. was that member states were to “inform and consult with one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively (…)”.52 In a sense, C.F.S.P. was meant to provide the answer to Henry Kissinger’s famous question of “Whom should I call when I want to talk to Europe?” Now the E.U. believed to have an answer. Most importantly, C.F.S.P. was based on principles of intergovernmentalism, meaning that decisions regarding Europe’s foreign and security policy needed to be taken unanimously by the Council of Ministers, and were exposed to little influence by the other institutions (e.g. the Commission).53 Meanwhile, the Maastricht Treaty reiterated the importance of NATO for ensuring the security of Europe.54 This was significant for Britain as its role in NATO automatically elevated its importance in the E.U. due to being a major (nuclear) security guarantor for the continent.55 Moreover, in recognizing NATO as the foremost organization responsible for managing European security affairs establishes a clear division of labour between the two institutions, if not a hierarchy. Britain saw the W.E.U. as an intermediary between NATO and the E.U., and as an opportunity for the U.K. to exert its influence in both institutions, while battling to keep the W.E.U. relatively autonomous.56 The U.K. vocally objected the idea of conducting military operations outside of NATO.57 However, in spite of these advancements and the political commitments to C.F.S.P., 49 Ibid.,

p. 189.

50 https://www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-

fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html. 51 The first pillar creates an internal EU market, a joint agricultural policy, environmental policy, economic and monetary union, and a customs union. The third pillar includes cooperation in the field of home and justice affairs (e.g. Europol, Eurojust). 52 Title V, Article J.2 of the Treaty on the European Union, Maastricht 7 February 1992. 53 Peters (2010), p. 116. 54 Ibid. 55 Karl-Heinz Kamp (2017). “Eine nukleare Neuausrichtung der NATO”. SIRIUS, 1(4): 359–366, https://doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2017-0086. 56 Peters (2010), pp. 154–155. 57 Rees, G.W. (1996). Constructing a European Defence Identity: The Perspective of Britain, France and Germany. European Foreign Affairs Review, 1(2). 238.

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the E.U. lacked real military capabilities to carry out any significant autonomous military or civilian operation for that matter.58

The Treaty of Amsterdam While the Maastricht Treaty outlined the need for the E.U. to work together collectively in terms of its foreign and security policy, the Treaty of Amsterdam signed on 2 October 1997 went a step further and emphasized the necessity for the E.U. to project its influence internationally, as well as to work more autonomously of NATO. By creating the position of an EU High Representative with Javier Solana being the first incumbent, C.F.S.P. also became a leading personality responsible for further developing Europe’s international responsibilities and role abroad. Again, the British acceptance of the Treaty’s provisions need to be considered in light of the role of the E.U.’s powerlessness during the civil wars ramping through the Balkans at the time, the United States’ mounting reluctance to ensure the security of Europe, as well as the deepening military cooperation between the British and the French.59 At the same time, France accepted that NATO should remain the primary institution in Europe that is solely responsible for ensuring collective defence.60 Nonetheless, the U.K. was unwilling to turn over its military control to the E.U. and insisted on the maintenance of the status quo with the W.E.U. acting as the arms-length military body of the E.U.61 Further, it was decided that the E.U.’s defence capabilities would

58 Howorth, J. (2013). European Security Institutions 1945–2010: The Weaknesses and Strengths of ‘Brusselisization’. In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security (5–17). New York: Routledge. 59 Peters (2010), p. 164. For example, in the “Lancaster House” agreement of 2010 between the U.K. and France of 2010, both states pledged to cooperate closely on nuclear as well as defence industry issues. Both praise the importance of this co-operation, their leadership role on managing global security and defense issues, point to their role as permanent UN Security Council members and nuclear powers, their high national defense expenditures, and experienced armies. In January 2018, both France and the U.K. have further deepened their cooperation, especially in maritime affairs and the fight against terrorism and political and social instability, especially in the Sahel region. Great Britain also committed to participating in France’s new prestige project, the European Intervention Initiative (EII), and to create a flexible intervention force outside of existing EU structures (to which politically willing and militarily capable EU member states such as Denmark, Estonia and Italy have agreed to). Germany, on the other hand, considers the EII project critically, primarily because it bypasses the EU structures. From a French point of view, however, it is a pragmatic approach to ensure Europe’s operational capability and to permanently anchor the U.K. in Europe’s security cooperation. 60 Ware, R. & Wright, J. (2004). Second Pillar Challenges: Foreign Security and Defence Policies. In P. Giddings & G. Drewry, Britain in the European Union: Law, Policy and Parliament (175–198). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 177. 61 Griller, S., Droutas, D.P., Falkner, G., Forgo, K. & Nentwich, M. (2000). The Treaty of Amsterdam: Facts, Analysis, Prospect. New York: Springer, 2000, p. 422.

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remain optional for the member states, leaving the option for ‘constructive abstention’ of military operations,62 which would not halt the operation, but maintained the inter, rather than supra governmental nature of the E.U.’s military power. This is key to understanding the U.K.’s position in the E.U., as the U.K. has almost always favoured organizations that ensure their military sovereignty over those that seek deeper integration.

Nice Treaty In Britain a political shift occurred during the second half of Tony Blair’s Prime Ministership.63 The U.K. became a signatory to the Nice Treaty that all European leaders signed in 2001. The treaty officially incorporated the Petersberg tasks into Europe’s Security and Defence Policy (E.S.D.P.).64 To wit, ESDP aims “to carry out the full range of the Petersburg tasks as defined in the Treaty on European Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks on combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”.65 The fact that the U.K. accepted these provisions speaks to the shifting opinion towards the necessity for a more robust E.U. defence capability, and indeed a shift away from the W.E.U. and towards the E.U. Indeed, this was a large shift in practice, especially when one considers that the E.U. does not have autonomous armed forces or military capabilities, and thus virtually no military strategy. It is important to note, however, that the provisions of the Nice Treaty did neither anticipate nor lead to the creation of a standing European army. Rather, with the Treaty of Nice E.U. forces would be deployed as a ‘coalition of the willing’.66 Further, the newly created E.S.D.P. visions still saw NATO as the most fundamental pillar of the collective defence of Europe.67 Even with these two caveats in mind, the shift towards a more robust E.U. security policy is indicative of the U.K. having warmed up slowly to the idea of giving the E.U. more international weight and role to play in the management of international crisis.68

62 Griller

et al. (2000), p. 410. & Wright (2004), p. 178. 64 These tasks were set out in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the WEU in June 1992 were member countries declared their readiness to make available to the WEU, as well as NATO and the EU, military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for the purpose of humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; combat forces for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations; and post-conflict stabilisation tasks. 65 Rynning, S. (2006). European Security and Defence Policy: Coming of Age? In F. Laursen, The Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences, Bargaining and Institutional Choice (479–502). Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 480. 66 Rynning (2006), p. 481. 67 Rynning (2006), p. 481. 68 Ware & Wright (2004), p. 184. 63 Ware

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Treaty of Lisbon The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon saw yet another change in name for Europe’s common foreign and security policy. Specifically, E.S.D.P. was renamed to Common Security and Defence Policy (C.S.D.P.), emphasizing the commonality of the security question amongst all members of the E.U.69 The Treaty of Lisbon reaffirmed the intergovernmental nature of C.S.D.P.,70 as well as the necessity for cooperation among all E.U. members, especially on issues such as research and development, crisis management, and enlargement.71 The Treaty of Lisbon further created institutions that are designed to work towards security and military cooperation for the E.U., including the high level political European Defence Agency (E.D.A.), which works on matters such as capability development, and armaments cooperation.72 While the U.K. for a long time has had reservations about increasing the size and scope of the E.D.A., which is designed to support the E.U. member states in improving their overall defence capabilities, the Brexit might be a relief for the other E.U. members that this idea might now push forward without facing the U.K.’s resistance that has been in place since at least 2012. At the same time, from the current Brexit negotiations it appears that the U.K. wants to maintain influence in the decision-making of the EDA, which is rejected by the Europeans. The civilian side of C.S.D.P. was based on the outcomes of the Summit in Santa Maria de Feira in 2000 and the E.U.’s first Security Strategy of 2003, and focuses on civilian crisis management through the exportation of democracy, the rule of law, and freedom.73 The C.S.D.P. has been called upon many times by the E.U. to engage in peace keeping and peace making abroad, both in civilian and military capacities,74 which illustrates the ability of the E.U. to project its normative ideological footprint outside of its territory.75 At the same time, failings in Bosnia, Yugoslavia, and Iraq to act as a unified front have revealed some of the complications with intergovernmental

69 Craig, P. (2010). The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform. New York: Oxford University Press. 70 Howorth (2013), p. 7. 71 Teixeira, N. S. (2012). European Defence: Challenges After the Treaty of Lisbon. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Policy Paper. (Report), pp. 3–4. 72 Biscop, S. & Coelmont, J. (2013). Military CSDP: The Quest for Capability. In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security (78–90). New York: Routledge, p. 81; Craig, 2010, p. 424. 73 Gourlay, C. (2013). Civilian CSDP: A Tool for State-Building? In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security (91–104). New York: Routledge, p. 92. 74 European Union External Action (2017). Security and Defence. Retrieved from https://eeas. europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/area/security-and-defence_en. 75 Merlingen, M. (2013) The CSDP in the Western Balkans: From Experimental Pilot to Security Governance. In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security (145–158). New York: Routledge. p. 146.

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politics and its implementations.76 However, to date more than 30 civilian and military missions and operations have been deployed in the context of C.S.D.P. on four continents with the focus on the E.U.’s immediate neighborhood, i.e. the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe as well as Africa.

Eurozone Crisis In 1999, eleven European countries decided to abandon their national currencies and to start using the Euro as a common currency. While being invited to also adopt the Euro, Britain was one of the European countries that decided to opt out of the so-called Eurozone, which some observers interpreted as the U.K.’s unwillingness to accept full E.U. integration and to maintain a certain level of autonomy.77 In 2009, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, Greece was unable to meet its financial obligations and to pay back the loans it had borrowed from international markets. As a result, the Greek government defected on their debt, leading to what would become the Eurozone Crisis wherein the Euro as a currency became volatile and exposed to significant threats by international speculates.78 In turn, the U.K. used this Eurozone crisis as evidence to prevent deeper European integration.79 76 Dinan

(2014), p. 299. (2007). 78 Samarakoon, L. (2017). Contagion of the Eurozone Debt Crisis. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money. 79 Gamble, A. (2012). Better Off Out? Britain and Europe. The Political Quarterly, 83(3). 468–477, p. 471. In recent discussions about the Brexit commentators often seemed to suggest that Britain has always been the ‘difficult’ child in the EU, as someone with special needs and always asking for exceptions (see e.g. Biscop, S. (2012), “The U.K. and European Defence: Leading or Leaving?” International Affairs 88(6): 1297–1313). While this characterization undoubtedly is partially true, we should also highlight some of influence that Britain has had throughout its EU membership. Among other things, Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, member of the European parliament, helped to create the Passenger Name Records (PNR) Directive (see European Parliament. 2016. Parliament Backs EU Directive on Use of Passenger Name Records. European Parliament News, 14 April. Available from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20160407IPR21775/ parlia-ment-backs-eu-directive-on-use-of-passenger-name-records-pnr); the EU Policy Cycle4; the European Criminal Intelligence Model (see Gruszczak, A. 2017. The EU Criminal Intelligence Model: Problems and Issues. In EU Criminal Law and Policy: Values, Principles and Methods, ed. J. Banach-Gutierrez and C. Harding. London and New York: Routledge); while holding the presidency of the EU Council, the U.K. helped to create the Data Retention Directive (Ripoll Servent, A. 2015. Institutional and Policy Change in the European Parliament: Deciding on Freedom, Security and Justice. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan); and the EU counter-terrorism strategy (see MacKenzie, Alex, “The U.K., EU, and Counter-Terrorism”, in Carrapico, Helena and Antonia Niehuss, Chloé Berthélémy, Brexit and Internal Security Political and Legal Concerns on the Future U.K.–EU Relationship. London: Palgrave Pivot, 2019, pp. 100–102). Moreover, the U.K. currently holds the world’s third largest forensic DNA database, after China and the USA (U.K. Government Statistics. 2018. National DNA Database Statistics. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/ statistics/national-dna-database-statistics; BBC. 2017a. Privacy Concerns as China Expands DNA Database, 17 May. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-39945220; BI. 77 Lindley-French

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Migrant Crisis and the Brexit In March 2011, three months after the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya,80 fifteen Syrian schoolchildren were arrested and tortured for writing on a wall the anti-regime slogan: “The people want the overthrow of the regime”.81 This event sparked massive outrage across the country, notably in Homs and Damascus, protests and uprisings against President Bashar al-Assad began,82 eventually leading to a civil war that has been called by some as “the worst humanitarian crisis of our time”.83 In the years leading up to the uprising, Assad’s opposition was fragmented and struggled to form a united front. The opposition was made up of Islamist, liberal, leftist and nationalist figures and factions that initially had difficulties maintaining a conspicuous profile and were largely disconnected by their varying grievances.84 Meanwhile, President Assad assembled a strong, militarized front comprised mainly of the Syrian Armed Forces (Syria’s national army), the National Defence Force (a unit made up exclusively of Alawites), a pro-government militia led by members of Assad’s extended family, and Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guards.85 In response to this military build-up, rebel forces rallied together to form the Free Syrian Army (F.S.A.) in July 2011 to support the protesting civilians. The government responded to regime critics with high levels of brutality in hopes of subjugating those who protested The President’s rule.86 The F.S.A. gradually seized control of various towns and villages and surprised the government with their military capacity and resilience. In June 2011, the civil war reached a military impasse while Syrians started to flee their country to neighboring states in light of the escalation of violence and worsening living conditions. It is estimated that more than 13.5 million Syrians needed 2018. CODIS-NDIS Statistics. Available from: https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometricanalysis/codis/ndis-statistics). 80 Henry, C., & Jang, J.-H. (2012). Syria, The Arab Uprisings, and the Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience. In The Arab Spring: Will It Lead to Democratic Transitions (pp. 212–226). New York: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 16. 81 Danahar, P. (2013). The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing. 82 See CBC News. (2014, April 3). Syria’s civil war: key facts, important players. Retrieved May 22, 2016, from http://www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/syria-dashboard/index.html; Danahar, 2013; Henry & Jang, 2012: 214. 83 Amnesty International. (2015, April 7). Syria: The worst humanitarian crisis of our time. Retrieved May 23, 2016, from https://www.amnesty.org.nz/syria-worst-humanitarian-crisis-our-time; Ban, K. (2015, March). Secretary-General’s opening remarks at Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria. Statement presented at the Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria, Kuwait City. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8505. 84 Hokayem, E. (2013). Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 74. 85 Malantowicz, A. (2013). Civil War in Syria and the ‘New Wars’ Debate. Amsterdam Law Forum, 5(3), 57. 86 Adams, 2015, p. 6.

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humanitarian assistance, 4.8 million were seeking refuge in other countries, 6.5 million were internally displaced, and the death toll grew to more than half a million people.87 The majority of Syrian refugees have fled to neighbouring countries like Jordan and Lebanon whereby Lebanon’s Eastern Bekaa valley as well as Turkey’s Domiz refugee camp in the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq became the major destination for refugees. In addition, more than two million Syrians have attempted to travel across the Mediterranean Sea to seek refuge in Europe—marking extensive, transnational spillovers to countries that either lacked the capacity or will to assume responsibility for them. With the increased fighting in Aleppo in July 2012, about 200,000 Syrians fled to Turkey while Greece started to control its borders with Turkey. Meanwhile, fighting in and around Damascus (at times using the nerve gas Sarin) caused an exodus of Syrians to Lebanon, and the UNHCR opened the Za’atari camp in northern Jordan. In 2013, most notably Germany and Sweden agreed to re-settle Syrian refugees (roughly 5000 each, temporarily in the case of the former, permanent in the case of the latter). At the same time, there appeared first reports in December 2013 that ISIS fighters seized parts of Ramadi, not far from the capital Baghdad in Iraq. A month later (Jan. 2014) Syrian rebels and the Islamic Front launched an offensive against ISIS. In mid 2014, ISIS intensified its military campaigns in both Syria and Iraq announcing a Caliphate stretching from Aleppo in northwest Syria to eastern Iraq. As a result, 500,000 people fled the city of Mosul, and the United States commenced an air-campaign to contain ISIS. While also resourcing them, the stream of refugees started to take a significant burden on the refugee camps. In December, the World Food Program (WFP) announced a suspension of food vouchers in refugee camps due to a lack of funding, which aggravated the humanitarian crisis. Six months later (June 2015), the UN was forced to announce a funding shortage for its agencies as well as NGOs providing immediate assistance on the ground, with only 23% of funding requirements met at that point. Against this backdrop, and in light of suffering refugees being televised on TV, the German government announced in August 2015 that it would temporarily accept roughly 800,000 refugees, which have come through the so-called Balkan route passing through countries like Macedonia, Serbia, Austria, etc. Months of what seem somewhat uncontrolled flows of refugees arrived in the E.U., resulting in temporary border closures among several E.U. member states. For example, Hungary closed its border with Serbia and subsequently Croatia. Sweden also started border controls in November 2015 after roughly 10,000 migrants arrived per week. Part of the challenge was that among this large number of refugees were

87 Barnard,

A. (2016, February 11). Death Toll from War in Syria Now 470,000, Group finds. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/world/middleeast/ death-toll-from-war-in-syria-now-470000-group-finds.html?_r=0; MercyCorps. (2016, February 5). Quick facts: What you need to know about the Syria crisis. Retrieved May 21, 2016, from https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-what-youneed-know-about-syria-crisis; World Vision. (2016, May 11). Syria refugee crisis FAQ: How the war is affecting children. Retrieved May 22, 2016, from https://www.worldvision.org/wv/news/ Syria-war-refugee-crisis-FAQ.

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not only Syrians but also refugees from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia. While the E.U. had significant difficulties with finding a solution to the refugee challenge, it was finally able in March 2016 to reach a complex agreement with Turkey that would host those refugees in Turkey rather than in the E.U. Furthermore, it is obvious that as the crisis in Syria dragged on and as European countries were restricting their family reunification programs, the percentage of women and children among the refugees increased. In fact, 75% of those fleeing Syria were women and children.88 The extent of the migration crisis is important and significant insofar as various E.U. member states, including Britain, have used it as an example to indicate that they do not have sufficient control over international migration and immigration, and as a consequence should leave the E.U. in order to regain control over the country’s borders. As additional reasons for leaving the E.U. portions of the population cite over-population and security concerns posed by migrants.89 In short, especially conservative politicians have voiced a significant discontent with immigration in the wake of the migrant crisis with approximately 300,000–400,000 new migrants per year arriving in the U.K. 90 At the time of writing the refugee crisis appears to be contained after the E.U. negotiated an agreement with Turkey to host the large majority of the refugees in Turkey; but the crisis is not solved indefinitely and the stream of refugees could resume at any time.

Conclusion In sum, it will not have gone unnoticed by reading this very brief historical synopsis of U.K.—E.U. relations that the partnership at times has been (very) contentious and was plagued with mutual distrust and disagreements about fundamental policy questions.91 In part, this has to do with the importance of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ in the discourse of British security that always preferred NATO over the E.U. when it came to pursue British security interests.92 Yet, as we will discuss 88 Lifeline

Syria. B. & Rotherham, L. (2015). Hard Bargains or Weak Compromises? Reforming Britain’s Relationship With the E.U. London: Civitas, p. 24–25. 90 Giestel-Basten, S. (2016). Why Brexit? The Toxic Mix of Immigration and Austerity. Population and Development Review, 42(4). 673–680. 91 See for example Simon Duke. Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence? The Impact on the UK and EU (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); for a more historical analysis of the U.K. being an “awkward partner” see George, S. (1997). An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Important to note, for example is that the U.K. opted out of the Schengen Agreement, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the area of freedom, security and justice. 92 Tim Oliver. “Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the US—EU and US—U.K. relationships”, in: International Affairs 3/2016, S. 547–567. 89 Binley,

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in the next two chapters, with President Trump in office the British reliance on this so-called ‘special relationship’ card is like overplaying ones hand in a poker game, as the American (national) security establishment does not consider that relationship with the British as so special any more.

Part II

Contemporary Contexts and Impacts of the Brexit

Chapter 4

The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit With Arnold Kammel

Brexit is taking place at a time of growing security challenges and insecurities facing Europe’s strategic and economic position. Included in these challenges and insecurities are threats to its internal cohesion from the rise of nationalism and political extremism in several E.U. member states (e.g. in France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland). These voices mainly reject the governance system of the European Union and are calling for a return of competences back to the national level that are currently held by the European Commission. Furthermore, some Eastern and especially Southern European states currently experience fragile state institutions (e.g. Albania, Montenegro, Serbia); indeed, some of them even are at the brink of collapse.1 This cocktail of fragility, as we know from the literature, can quickly result into full state failure.2 Last but not least, especially Europe’s eastern frontiers currently witness a relatively high number of frozen conflicts (e.g. Ukraine, Georgia). The increased assertiveness of Russia there, coupled with the impact of fake news and hybrid warfare, along with multiple spill-overs from political turmoil and conflicts in the Arab 1 Valentin Naumescu, Agnes Nicolescu. 2018. “The Impact of Brexit on Central and Eastern European Security”, Romanian Journal of European Affairs (18)1, pp. 93–112. 2 See, for example, Rotberg, Robert, ed. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004; Ayoob, Mohammed. “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure.” In Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, 127–142. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2001; Zartman, I. William. “Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse.” In Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Edited by I. William Zartman, 1–14. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995; Levy, Jack S. “International Sources of Interstate and Intrastate War.” In Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, 17–38. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2007; Marshall, Monty G.; Ted Robert Gurr, and Barbara Harff. Political Instability (State Failure) Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955–2004. Political Instability Task Force; Milliken, Jennifer, ed. State Failure, Collapse, and Reconstruction. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003.

At the time of writing, Arnold Kammel serves as Chief of Staff in the Office of the Minister of National Defence, Austria. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Zyla, The End of European Security Institutions?, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_4

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world and Africa (ranging from Mali via Chad to Sudan and South Sudan as well as the developments in Ethiopia) mean that the security challenges to Europe are more significant than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The demographic developments in these regions, coupled with conflicts over resources and political influence and overall state fragility, trigger strong migratory movements to the E.U. The refugee crisis since 2015 and subsequently the continuous flow of migrants from northern Africa until this day underline this point.3 The ability of the E.U. to adequately react to these external security and foreign policy challenges could be further undermined by Brexit, unless a way can be found, as noted, to incorporate the United Kingdom into the European security architecture. Moreover, the problems are exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the future of NATO, as the reliability and commitment of its largest and second largest militaries (U.S.A. and Turkey4 ) have been called into question. Our objective in this chapter is to briefly analyze these challenges. We charge that pragmatism should win out against ideology on both sides (the U.K. as well as E.U.) of the deadlocked Brexit negotiations to ensure the continuing participation of Britain in the entire European security architecture, which as we will see below, goes beyond simply participating in the deployment on European crisis management missions. Specifically, the security and foreign policy challenges described above that could call into question the continuing cohesion of the E.U. include the following: (1) the Trump administration questioning the E.U.’s foreign and security policy altogether, as well as the viability of the transatlantic alliance through NATO by the U.S. President doubting American commitment to Article V, as well as the U.S. pestering the Europeans (especially Germany) with burden sharing arguments that are highly

3 See for

example Alvaro de Vasconcelos (ed.), The Arab Democratic Wave: How the EU can Seize the Moment Paris, EU-ISS, Report#9, March 2011; Nicole Koenig, The EU and the Libyan Crisis: In Quest of Coherence? Rome, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Working Paper 11/19, July 2011; Federica Bicchi, “The Impact of the ENP on EU-North African Relations: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”, in Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact, London, Palgrave, 2012, pp. 206–222; Nick Witney & Anthony Dworkin, A Power Audit of EU-North Africa Relations, London, ECFR, 2012; Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, Continent by Default: The European Union and the Demise of Regional Order, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2017, Chap. 5 “A Crisis in the Making? The Refugee Crisis”; Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia, “Xenophobia, Racism, and the Securitization of Migration”, in Philippe Bourbeau (ed.), Handbook of Migration and Security London, Edward Elgar, 2017; Angelos Athanasopoulos, “Fortress Europe? The Aegean Sea Frontier and the Strengthening of EU’s External Borders” in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Borders, International Report, April 2017, pp.14–25; El˙zbieta Kaca, “Schengen’s Future in Light of the Refugee Crisis”, PISM Strategic Files, 2016; Francois Heisbourg, “The Strategic Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis”, Survival, 57:6, 7–20 (2015); F. Trauner, “Asylum Policy: The EU “crisis” and the looming policy regime failure”, Journal of European Integration, 2016, 38:8, 311–325. 4 Chalmers, Malcolm. “U.K. Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit”, Briefing Paper, January 2017.

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debated in the literature5 ; (2) the Russian government trying to destabilize the E.U.6 ; (3) serious troubles with regards to civil-military relations in Turkey; (4) the political and economic instability of African countries, especially in Northern Africa; and (5) China’s growing influence especially in southern and south-eastern Europe. Let’s consider each of these challenges in turn. 1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the cornerstone in European security affairs since its creation in 1949. However, doubts are increasingly been voiced regarding the future of trans-Atlantic cohesion,7 along with doubts about the reliability of certain NATO members in the E.U. Above all, President Trump has proved to be hesitant in stressing the U.S. commitment to Article V of the Washington Treaty (the principle of collective defence), whilst also criticizing European NATO members for supposedly not pulling their weight in the alliance. To be sure, NATO has experienced burden-sharing debates since its creation in 1949.8 Burden sharing is commonly defined as the “actual contribution of each nation to collective defence and the fairness of each state’s contribution”,9 which makes its measuring politically and analytically quite difficult. At the heart of the burden sharing debate are considering either the input or the output side of burden sharing. The input side considers, for example, how many troops a member state contributes to the alliance as perhaps the most important burden sharing variable; the output side of the argument favours to consider the number of troops that actually have been deployed in missions.10 As Table 4.1 indicates, the U.K. is among the European NATO members with one of the highest defence budgets, and ranks slightly before France and

5 Heisbourg,

F. (2016). Brexit and European security. Survival, 58(3), 13–22. For a discussion of Trump undermining the general cohesion of the Alliance see Strobe Talbott, “Brexit’s Threat to the Special Relationship,” New York Times, April 21, 2016. For burden sharing debates see Zyla, B. 2020. “Analytic Eclecticism and Atlantic Burden Sharing: A new Research Agenda.” International Political Science Review; online first https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512119863132. 6 See for example Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, “NATO after Brexit: Will Security Cooperation Work?”, Foreign Affairs, 4 July 2016. 7 Sophia Besch, “EU Defence, Brexit and Trump: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”, London, Centre for European Reform, December 2016; Constanze Stelzenmuller, “Normal is Over: Europeans hope that the Trump Era is an Anomaly. But the transatlantic Divide has never been so stark”, Washington DC Brookings, February 2018; Philip Stephens, “How Europe should react to Donald Trump”, Financial Times, 10 May 2018; Steven Erlanger, “Europe, again Humiliated by Trump, Struggles to Defend its Interests”, New York Times, 9 May 2018. 8 Wallace Thies. (2003). Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 9 Hartley, K., & Sandler, T. (1999). “NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future.” Journal of Peace Research, 36(6), 665–680. 10 For a more detailed discussion of this input versus output perspective see Benjamin Zyla, “Eclecticism and The Future of the Burden Sharing Research Programme: Why Trump is wrong”. International Political Science Review (forthcoming), and Zyla, B., 2015. Sharing the burden? NATO and its second-tier powers. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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Table 4.1 NATO Countries’ defence expenditure, 2011–2017 Country

In constant 2015 prices and exchange rates (U.S.$ billion) 2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

NATO Europe

245.7

240.3

234.8

231.3

232.1

240.9

250.3

Albania

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.1

Belgium

4.7

4.7

4.7

4.6

4.4

4.5

4.5

Bulgaria

0.6

0.6

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.7

Croatia

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.6

0.7

Czech Republic

1.9

1.8

1.9

1.8

2.1

2.0

2.3

Denmark

3.8

3.9

3.7

3.5

3.5

3.7

3.8

Estonia

0.3

0.4

0.4

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

France

44.2

44.5

45.5

45.0

44.6

45.3

46.0

Germany

41.3

42.5

41.7

41.1

41.6

43.0

45.6

Greece

5.2

4.6

4.4

4.4

4.6

4.7

4.7

Hungary

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.1

1.2

1.4

1.5

Italy

26.0

24.3

24.1

21.7

20.5

22.9

23.9

Latvia

0.3

0.3

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.4

0.5

Lithuania

0.3

0.3

0.1

0.1

0.2

0.7

0.8

Luxembourg

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.3

0.2

0.3

Montenegro

N/A

N/A

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

Netherlands

9.4

9.2

9.0

9.0

9.0

9.4

9.8

Norway

5.6

5.6

5.8

6.0

5.9

6.3

6.5

Poland

7.4

7.6

7.8

8.7

10.8

10.0

9.9

Portugal

3.1

2.8

2.9

2.7

2.8

2.7

2.7

Romania

2.1

2.0

2.3

2.5

2.7

2.8

3.6

Slovak Republic

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.9

1.0

1.0

1.1

Slovenia

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.5

0.5

Spain

11.2

12.1

10.9

10.9

11.4

10.3

11.9

Turkey

11.1

11.3

10.5

10.5

10.7

11.6

13.0

United Kingdom

63.4

58.2

54.5

53.6

52.1

55.4

55.3

NATO North America

801.8

757.4

731.1

694.4

678.3

688.2

708.4

Canada

17.7

16.1

15.1

15.8

19.0

18.5

22.5

United States

784.1

741.3

716.1

678.6

659.4

669.7

686.0

NATO total

1047.5

997.7

965.9

925.8

910.4

929.1

958.7

Source Defence Economics derived estimates from NATO data (Iceland is a member of the Alliance but has no armed forces. Defence expenditure does not include pensions. In 2014, Latvia joined the Euro and therefore the figures for 2011–2013; which were measured in its national currency, have been converted by Defence Economics using the inferred Exchange Rate for Latvia in 2013. This was done to ensure that constant exchange rates were used wherever possible. In 2015, Lithuania joined the Euro and therefore the figures for 2011–2014; which were measured in its national currency, have been converted by Defence Economics using the inferred Exchange Rate for Lithuania in 2014. This was done to ensure that constant exchange rates were used wherever possible.)

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Germany.11 This not only gives the U.K. a prominent but also an important role in E.S.D.P. In July 201812 President Trump challenged the 24 Europeans countries that had not yet reached the 2% GDP benchmark of defence spending that was agreed upon at NATO’s Wales Summit in 2014. This confrontation included letters sent by the then new U.S. administration to the concerned states and threatening them of losing U.S. protection if their defence expenses did not increase immediately. Trump also took to Twitter to reinforce his position: “[M]any countries in NATO, which we are expected to defend, are not only short of their current commitment of 2% (which is low), but are also delinquent for many years in payments that have not been made. Will they reimburse the U.S.?”13 At the Brussels NATO Summit, Trump specifically singled out Germany when addressing reporters. He accused Berlin of being “a captive of Russia”, and that “[i]t certainly doesn’t seem to make sense that they paid billions of dollars to Russia and we have to defend them against Russia”.14 On the second day of the Summit, Trump renewed his threats and targeted the 24 free-riding countries with an ultimatum demanding a raise in defence spending by January 2019, “or the United States would go it alone”.15 This caused a significant political storm inside the alliance and was widely considered a disrespect for the alliance itself and the transatlantic friendship in particular, also because American defence companies currently are the biggest beneficiaries of European defence investments (e.g. companies such as Lockheed Martin etc.). This is also one of the reasons why the U.K. is interested in a strong cooperation with E.S.D.P. so that it maintains its access to E.U. defence industry.16 As noted, this threat by the U.S. to depart from NATO did not go unnoticed by the allies. Trump’s statements not only caused surprise and commotion because the U.S. has always considered NATO an important pillar of its military strategy

11 See also Giegerich, B., Mölling, C., “The United Kingdom’s contribution to European security and defence”. 2018. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, the German Council on Foreign Relations. Yet, one should not underestimate the that the U.K.’s conventional defence budget is likely to fall in real terms, which since 2010 for the first time has been included in the defence budget. 12 The remainder of this paragraph is taken with permission from Benjamin Zyla. 2018. “Analytic Eclecticism and Atlantic Burden Sharing: A new Research Agenda.” International Political Science Review. 13 Similar accusations were made by Trump on the campaign trail (see, e.g. New York Times, 2016 or Trump, 2016). To be fair, this 2% benchmark was agreed by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Wales Summit in 2014. 14 CNN. (2018). “Trump opens NATO summit with blistering criticism of Germany, labels allies ‘delinquent’”. Accessed on 11 July. 15 (Ibid.). 16 Claudia Major and Nicolai von Ondarza. “Kein » Global Britain « nach dem Brexit: Der Brexit schwächt die britische Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik–eine bilaterale Einbindung ist dennoch im deutschen Interesse”, SWP Aktuell No. 29, May 2019, p. 2.

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since 1949; it also shook the somewhat fragile unity17 that NATO wanted to portray after Russia started to practice a more aggressive foreign and security policy since the crisis in Crimea, which especially frightened NATO’s youngest members in Eastern Europe.18 All this considered, Trump was neither the first President nor the first U.S. politician to voice dissatisfaction with the seemingly insufficient contributions of some European NATO members.19 He is yet the latest who continued to use the input side of the burden sharing debate as the key index to measure Atlantic burden sharing practices,20 which is highly debated in the literature.21 Chancellor Angela Merkel pushed back swiftly by pointing to other types of contributions to Germany’s NATO contributions, namely those that consider the output side. Specifically, she noted that “Germany also does a lot for NATO. We are the second largest donor of troops, we put most of our military abilities into the service of NATO and we are strongly committed in Afghanistan, where we also defend the interests of the United States of America”.22 Merkel was joined by Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau who also supported the Chancellor’s point of view. He added that “[y]ou can try and be a beancounter and look at exactly how-much-this and how-much-money-that. The fundamental question is: Is what you’re doing actually making a difference?”23 For Trudeau, NATO is about shared values and beliefs: “We are training together, learning together and developing a level of interoperability that goes beyond military tactics and abilities. It goes to how we understand each other, how we learn from each other and how we grow together. That as a demonstration of our shared values and convictions as an alliance is as strong as any other indication we can show with the amount of tanks or the amount of firepower.”24 He further reminded his colleagues that “[w]hen it comes to NATO, Canada has always pulled its weight. Our engagement in NATO has only expanded over the years, and with 17 Ivo

H. Daalder, “America Must Move To Save the European Project,” Financial Times, June 27, 2016. 18 See Zyla, B., and Kammel, A. (eds.). (2018). Peacebuilding at Home: NATO and its ‘New’ Member States. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 19 For an elaborate discussion see Zyla, 2015. 20 For a similar argument see Gates (2011). 21 See Benjamin Zyla, Sharing the Burden?: NATO and its Second-tier powers. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015; Zyla, B. 2019. “Analytic Eclecticism and Atlantic Burden Sharing: A new Research Agenda.” International Political Science Review; online first https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ 019251211986313; Zyla, B. 2018. “Transatlantic Burden Sharing: Suggesting A New Research Agenda.” European Security 27(4): 3–24. 22 The Guardian. (2018). “Angela Merkel hits back at Donald Trump at Nato summit”, accessed online 13 July online at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/11/nato-summitdonald-trump-says-germany-is-captive-of-russians. 23 CBC. (2018a). “At the NATO Summit Truedeau won the argument. Did it matter?”. Accessed 18 July online at https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nato-brussels-trudeau-trump-1.4746424. 24 CBC. (2018b). “‘No plans to double our defence budget,’ Trudeau says”’. Accessed online 18 July online at https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-latvia-visit-nato-1.4740098.

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good reason: it reflects Canadian values, and is essential in preserving the rulesbased international order. We will continue to step up and work together with our Allies to build a safer, more peaceful world for our citizens and people around the world.”25 Other leaders supported Merkel and Trudeau as well, even those who have already met—the 2% benchmark, such as former Latvian Prime Minister Maris Kuncinskis. For him, NATO’s capacity as an alliance is more important than the 2% benchmark.26 In short, the United States under President Donald Trump poses new challenges to the maintenance of global order as the U.S. does not appear to any longer interested in an international order that is based on shared values, alliances and institutions. Indeed, it appears to call into question the added value of international organizations, such as NATO and the WTO or international agreements like the INF Treaty and the Iran Nuclear Deal.27 Moreover, as recent events have demonstrated, the United States has become more and more active again in the Near- and Middle East and pursues a strong policy against the regime in Tehran leading to a potential conflict in the region. To add on to this, the relations with Turkey have significantly deteriorated over the last couple of months, questioning the country’s ability to join the European Union at any foreseeable date, and significantly undermining civil-military relations in the alliance. More specifically, it is well known that the current U.S. administration not only questions their degree of support for NATO; it has also repeatedly stated its aversion of the entire E.U. integration project. Indeed, President Trump has asserted that the E.U. is detrimental for U.S. interests, and has congratulated the United Kingdom for the Brexit decision, whilst encouraging France to follow suit. He has even criticized former Prime Minister Theresa May for failing to pursue an even harder line in the Brexit negotiations with the E.U. One consequence has been the imposition of customs duties on European steel and aluminum exports to the U.S.A, which was coupled with the threat to escalate the dispute into a fullblown trade war (although this is currently on the back burner as the U.S.A. has directed its sights against China, the unpredictable nature of the U.S. President suggests that the danger has not yet passed). Equally problematic are President Trump calling into question the viability of NATO because the European members of the alliance, according to him, are

25 Prime

Minister’s Office. (2018). “Prime Minister announces increased support for NATO”. Accessed July 12 online at https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/07/12/prime-minister-announcesincreased-support-nato. 26 Ibid. 27 Former Prime Minister David Cameron has argued that the U.K. needs the E.U. to help deter Iran and its desire to acquire nuclear weapons. See David Cameron’s speech at Chatham House, London, 10.11.2015, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speechon-europe (last accessed: 01.05. 2017).

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not shouldering a fair share of the transatlantic burden.28 This argument is also rooted in simple financial (and thus political) power calculations: if the U.K. were to leave the E.U., as Table 4.2 shows, the total NATO budget of $958,7 billion (2017) would only be carried by a minority of European countries with a value of $195 billion (based on 2017 numbers). In consequence and in part as a counterbalance to the U.S., it is likely that France and Germany will increase their push for a more integrated E.U. security and defence policy with the rest of the E.U., also with the aim to reinforce the European pillar of NATO, and thus to make it more autonomous from the U.S.29 2. There currently is a political elite in the Russian Government who seeks not only to destabilize the E.U. as a whole, but also individual European countries, especially in southern and south-eastern Europe (e.g. Serbia, Estonia). Moreover, Vladimir Putin’s Government has demonstrated its willingness to use force against Ukraine and Georgia, also deploying a nerve agent in the United Kingdom (the Skripal case). Furthermore, Russia interfered indirectly in the Brexit referendum by using various cyber attacks to exert influence through social media, and has attempted to do the same in French and German elections.30 It also has a track-record of financing predominantly extreme right, anti-European parties throughout Europe. So-called Russian “troll farms” use social media in order to undermine political and social discourse, to disseminate “fake news” and to promote the fragmentation of western societies. The Baltic states have experienced this first hand in 2007 when Russian hackers attacked parts of its infrastructure (e.g. the Estonian parliament, several banks, ministries, newspapers and broadcasters) that paralyzed affected institutions for days. Moreover, we know that in recent years Russia has modernized its armed forces and has been using its forces’ new capabilities in order to test the readiness of the European military, in a manner reminiscent of the final years of the Cold War (e.g. the Zapad military exercises in 2017 and 2018). These activities are known to be part of the Gerasimov Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare,31 which calls for responses to European attempts that supposedly undermine Russian influence in the “near abroad”. 28 This argument is further elaborated in Benjamin Zyla (2018) “Transatlantic burden sharing: suggesting a new research agenda”, European Security, 27:4, 515–535, https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/ 09662839.2018.1552142. 29 For a more detailed discussion see Stephanie C. Hofmann (2019) The politics of overlapping organizations: hostage-taking, forum-shopping and brokering, Journal of European Public Policy, 26:6, 883–905, https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1512644; Kempin, R., and J. Mawdsley (2013), “The U.K., the EU and European Security: A German Perspective,” RUSI Journal 158(4): 32–36. 30 Fiodor Lukyanov, “Putin’s Foreign Policy—The Quest to restore Russia’s Rightful Place”, Foreign Affairs 2016, Volume 95, No3, May/June 2016 pp. 30–37; M. Orenstein and D. Kelemen, “Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 55, No1, pp. 87–102; Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, rev. ed. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Olga Oliker et al., Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications (RAND, 2009). 31 Margarete Klein. Russia’s Military Policy in the Post-Soviet Space: Aims, Instruments and Perspectives. SWP Research Paper, no.1. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

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Table 4.2 NATO Countries’ Defence Expenditure as a % of GDP, 2011–2017 (This table shows defence expenditure by NATO member states within the fiscal years 2011–2017 as a percentage of GDP. The figures have been extracted from the NATO press release, and are based on the NATO definition of defence expenditure and are stated at Constant 2017 prices, where the effects of inflation have been removed) Country

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

NATO Europea

1.6

1.5

1.5

1.4

1.4

1.4

2017 1.5

Albania

1.5

1.5

1.4

1.3

1.2

1.1

1.1

Belgium

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.9

Bulgariab

1.3

1.3

1.5

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.3

Croatia

1.6

1.5

1.5

1.4

1.4

1.2

1.3

Czech Republic

1.1

1.1

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

Denmark

1.3

1.3

1.2

1.1

1.1

1.2

1.2

Estonia

1.7

1.9

1.9

2.0

2.1

2.1

2.1

France

1.9

1.9

1.9

1.8

1.8

1.8

1.8

Germany

1.3

1.3

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

Greece

2.4

2.3

2.2

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.4

Hungary

1.1

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.9

1.0

1.1

Italy

1.3

1.2

1.2

1.1

1.0

1.1

1.1

Latvia

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.9

1.0

1.5

1.7

Lithuania

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.9

1.1

1.5

1.7

Luxembourg

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.5

Montenegro

N/A

N/A

1.5

1.5

1.4

1.4

1.4

Netherlands

1.3

1.2

1.2

1.1

1.1

1.1

1.2

Norway

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5 1.9

Poland

1.7

1.7

1.7

1.9

2.2

2.0

Portugal

1.5

1.4

1.4

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.2

Romania

1.3

1.2

1.3

1.3

1.5

1.4

1.7

Slovak Republic

1.1

1.1

1.0

1.0

1.1

1.1

1.1

Slovenia

1.3

1.2

1.1

1.0

0.9

1.0

1.0

Spain

0.9

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.9

Turkey

1.8

1.8

1.5

1.5

1.4

1.5

1.5

United Kingdom

2.4

2.2

2.3

2.2

2.1

2.1

2.1

NATO North America

4.4

4.1

3.8

3.5

3.3

3.3

3.4

Canada

1.2

1.1

1.0

1.0

1.2

1.2

1.4

United States

4.8

4.4

4.1

3.8

3.6

3.6

3.6

NATO Total a

3.0

2.8

2.6

2.5

2.4

2.4

2.4

a Iceland

is a member of the Alliance but has no armed forces expenditure does not include pensions

b Defence

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3. Relations between the E.U. and Turkey have deteriorated significantly over the last few years. This is partly due to the broken promise of E.U. membership, but also President Erdogan’s reaction to the attempted coup d’état in 2016. The slow response and tepid support from leading European politicians during the coup, along with their criticism of subsequent events, heightened Erdogan’s mistrust towards them and towards E.U. institutions. Whilst an agreement has been struck to reduce migration through Turkey into the E.U., this has however resulted in significant financial costs for Europe (6 billion Euro), along with an awareness that this grants President Erdogan significant influence over the E.U. Turkey needs strategic partners in the Middle/Near East, above all due to the instability in Syria and Iraq, although President Erdogan appears to take the view that neither the E.U. nor the U.S.A is able to perform this role. This has been a factor behind the current rapprochement with Russia. Although it is impossible to predict how solid or lasting this new partnership with Russia will be, it would be unwise for Europe to assume that it will break down any time soon under the pressure of regional strains (e.g. shooting down of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey in 2015). The current confrontation between Turkey and the U.S.A. is more likely to strengthen links with Moscow than to facilitate the normalization of relations with Europe. Moreover, on the NATO side, at the time of writing, its second-largest army (the Turkish) is embroiled in a public confrontation with the U.S.A, which has imposed import tariffs on Turkish products, and is becoming increasingly close to Russia. Furthermore, Turkey has purchased and received the Russian S400 missile defence system,32 and has started to install it on Turkish soil. This will, inevitably, call into question its reliability as a NATO partner as the system undermines the defense of NATO’s newly procured F-35 fighter aircraft, which is still being developed. For the Turks, it has strengthened their political relations with Moscow. 4. Instability in the Middle/Near East and North Africa is being heightened by the evident withdrawal of the U.S.A. from the region, in parallel with Russia’s growing influence there. The conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen are increasingly turning into proxy wars for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the future of the Vienna Iran Deal is pending due to President Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement whereas E.U. member states prefer a continuation of said agreement. Whilst the migration agreement concluded with Turkey has stemmed the flow of refugees from Iraq and Syria, the increase in migration from North Africa, fueled by an unstable Libya, is becoming an increasing problem for both Italy and Spain. Europe has little or no influence on events in the Middle/Near East, though the continuing instability is increasing the risk of infiltration by Islamist terrorists or renewed mass migration. In principle, Europe should have more influence in Libya; yet the capacity for coherent action is undermined by the 32 Meier-Walser,

Reinhard. Die NATO im Funktions-und Bedeutungswandel: Veränderungen und Perspektiven transatlantischer Sicherheitspolitik. Springer/Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2018, p. 25.

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competing economic interests of individual E.U. member states (e.g. conflicting interests of France and Italy there). Migration is an issue of existential significance for the E.U., with populist and Eurosceptic parties exploiting the issue in order to undermine the influence of Brussels, whilst giving rise to growing disagreement between European countries. 5. China’s political and economic influence in southern and eastern Europe is growing at an increasing rate. The country has levered Europe’s economic crisis since 2008 in order to expand its presence in countries such as Greece and Spain. Although larger European states such as France and Germany remain skeptical, smaller eastern European states appear to be more willing to grasp the economic benefits of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), without any concern as to the geopolitical implications. China’s increasingly strong alliance with Russia (“Dragonbear”), in conjunction with the increasingly isolationist U.S.A. has increased the pressure on Europe to develop a coherent approach to Beijing—however, this has proved to be difficult to achieve in practice. The presence of Renminbi trading in London will help shield the city from the effects of Brexit, whilst at the same time China’s financial influence in the region is consolidated and expanded. In short, from an economic perspective, the rapid growth of emerging economies, such as China, suggest that Europe faces the prospect of long-term decline in its relative power and abilities. In sum, the Brexit arrived on the E.U.’s agenda at a very critical moment in the process of European (dis-)integration,33 especially considering the recent destabilization in both the Eastern and Southern European neighborhoods (especially the Balkan region), uncontrolled migratory pressures across the Mediterranean, the war against ISIS,34 the rising threat of terrorism (partly induced through migration), and America’s ambivalence about the viability of NATO.35

33 Uta Staiger and Benjamin Martill. 2018. “Rethinking the futures of Europe”, in Benjamin Martill and Uta Staiger. Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London, U.K.: UCL Press, p. 261. 34 See Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2016–2017, HC 21 (London: HM Government, 2017), 24. 35 For a discussion see Ian Bond, “NATO, the EU and Brexit: Joining forces?”, Insight, Brussels: Centre for European Reform, 5. July 2016; Meier-Walser, Reinhard. Die NATO im Funktionsund Bedeutungswandel: Veränderungen und Perspektiven transatlantischer Sicherheitspolitik. Springer/Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2018, p. 25.

Chapter 5

The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security With Arnold Kammel

As noted, the Brexit is taking place at a time when the E.U. is confronted with a variety of internal and external challenges related to its very own foundation as well as the security environment it is embedded in. Nonetheless, a set of shared values and geographical proximity suggest that both the U.K. and the remaining 27 E.U. members (that is the current twenty eight member states minus Britain) will have powerful reasons to continue cooperating on security issues after Brexit, and to limit the collateral damage to shared security interests. Thus, despite the possibility of the U.K. leaving the European Union as a consequence of the Brexit vote, we charge that it is not likely that the United Kingdom will leave European security per se, in spite of the strong political framing during the negotiations. Indeed, it is in its own (security) interest to keep and maintain a healthy relationship with the E.U.’s security institutions. Interestingly, as noted, security relations have not been a major subject of debates in the Brexit negotiations. In fact and to the surprise of many informed analysts, in 2017 the British government had issued proposals for a future security partnership with the European Union,1 in which it clearly states that the U.K. remains unconditionally committed to maintaining European security in general. Specifically, it noted that the British goal was to work as closely as possible together with the E.U. protecting its citizens, promoting its values and ensuring the future security of the European continent.2 However, as the political debates in London about Brexit have not been settled at the time of writing, there still are, according to Olivier de France, four main scenarios on the table about the future of the E.U.—U.K. (security) relationship. The first is that the United Kingdom chooses to remain being a member of the European Union. The second is that the U.K. exits the E.U. on the terms agreed 1 See Department for Exiting the European Union, Foreign policy, defence and development—a future partnership paper, September 2017. 2 Ibid, 22.

At the time of writing, Arnold Kammel serves as Chief of Staff in the Office of the Minister of National Defence, Austria. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Zyla, The End of European Security Institutions?, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_5

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between Brussels and London— or very similar ones (which is what Prime Minister Johnson has promised to do at the time of writing). The third is that the U.K. exits the E.U. on different terms than those already negotiated. The fourth is that it exits the E.U. without negotiating any terms, which still remains a possibility given that the time to reach a comprehensive deal with the E.U. until the end of the year is rather short. All four of these scenarios have an impact on European security—either in political, strategic, capability, operational, financial, or legal terms. Most importantly (for the U.K.) all four scenarios have significant downsides as well.3 Let’s consider each of these options in turn.

Losing a Capable E.U. Member As soon as the Brexit materializes, the E.U. is losing one of its “big three” (i.e. Germany, France and the U.K.), as well as one of the world’s leading financial centres in the fifth largest economy of the world, and a bridge to the United States. This implies that some anglophile countries in Europe (Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark) would feel “a bit isolated” and perhaps lose a powerful ally in E.U. discussions on some issues where they share an interest and perspective.4 For example, back in 2005 Chris Patten pointed out that there is no European policy on a big issue unless France, Germany and the U.K. are on side. This could clearly be witnessed by the events in Libya in 2011 where France and the U.K. were pushing for action and Germany remained hesitant.5 Indeed, it abstained in the important UN Security Council vote. Generally speaking, the Brexit will most likely affect the E.U.’s C.S.D.P. in several ways. On the one hand, the E.U. would lose one permanent member of the UN Security Council and thus a veto power, leaving France as the only member until an eventual UN reform materializes. The U.K.’s exit is also likely to force Germany, together with France, to play a more central role in the E.U.’s C.S.D.P., also militarily.6 Moreover, a Brexit would significantly weaken the role of the E.U. as an autonomous global actor, as its diplomatic networks, capabilities, and soft powers will be less influential on the world stage without the U.K.7

3 See

https://atlantic-community.org/strategic-autonomy-and-european-security-after-brexit. Dumoulin, Andre (2016). Brexit and European defence An in-depth analysis. RHID E-Note No. 20, 2. 5 See Patten, Chris (2005). Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths About World Affair. London: Allen Lane, 159–160. 6 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36619129 [03.07.2016]. See also Niklas Helwig (Ed.): “Europe’s New Political Engine: Germany’s role in the EU’s foreign and security policy”, FIIA Report, available online at http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/585/europe_s_new_ political_engine/ (accesses last on 10.5.2017). 7 Niklas Helwig and Isabelle Tannous. “Gemeinsame Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik”, in Werner Weidefeld and Wolfgang Wessels, Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2016, p. 343. 4 See

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Furthermore, British positions often allowed the E.U. to consider a realist view of international relations, as the U.K. was proactive in the field of making proposals within the E.U. in some European crises (terrorism, Ukraine, Iran, Ebola, Syria).8 This perspective will most likely vanish should the U.K. leave the Union. Above all, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the E.U. would significantly undermine the E.U.’s security capabilities. Specifically, the United Kingdom is the only European country that both respects the agreed NATO target (investment of 2% of GDP on defence), as well as meeting the UN aspiration of allocating 0.7% of GDP to development aid. Although it will still be able to participate in C.S.D.P. missions in the future in case the Brexit fully materializes, it would likely have to do so through a third country ‘framework participation agreement’ which would not allow it to participate in defining future missions’ mandates or in their initial planning stage for that matter, but only at the margins and not right and centre where it is now. When assessing the U.K.’s participation in C.S.D.P., and although it is essentially the 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo declaration that spurred the birth of what is now the C.S.D.P., the United Kingdom has long been reluctant about further developing various aspects of the policy, as well as about engaging or even committing its security capabilities in C.S.D.P. missions. It always felt that while deploying its defence, diplomatic, and development capabilities under the ‘E.U.-ticket’ it would lose some of its autonomy and thus national sovereignty. More specifically with regards to particular E.U. missions, to use two examples, while the operational headquarters of the E.U.’s Atalanta counter-piracy operation was located in Northwood and now shifted to Rota in Spain, and while the U.K. has provided two ships to the E.U.’s operation Sophia in the Mediterranean, its overall contributions to field personnel of CSDP civilian and military missions remained rather low (around 5–7% of the current total of deployed personnel).9 Furthermore, concerning the Berlin-Plus based operation EUFOR Althea, the Operations Commander has shifted from the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), General Everard, to the SHAPE Vice Chief of Staff (VCOS) Lieutenant General Olivier Rittimann, which suggests a downgrading of importance. This is juxtaposed to the fact that the British have various and significant security assets, which if pooled with E.U. assets could indeed provide a significant contribution to the future and viability of the (autonomous) European security and defence project. In particular, these assets include the following10 : • Significant armed forces: The British Army currently has more than 85,000 active military personnel, in addition to 27,000 reservists. Alongside its size, the British Army’s extensive combat experience from recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq is also important for both NATO as well as C.S.D.P.

8 See

Dumoulin (2016), 2. EU Observer https://euobserver.com/opinion/134256 [20.06.2019]. 10 See Riordan, Shaun (2019). Post-Brexit Relations between the EU and the U.K., AIES Fokus 1/2019, 2. 9 See

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• A 34,000-strong air force, with air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities along with transport and refueling capability, which is in high demand in C.S.D.P. as very few E.U. member states do not possess any of these capabilities.11 • A smaller navy, which is however currently in the process of procuring two new aircraft carriers12 (the HMS Queen Elizabeth II, at present in the final testing phrase, and the HMS Prince of Wales) and more than six nuclear-powered submarines.13 • A nuclear deterrent based on four Vanguard class submarines armed with Trident II nuclear warheads. Combined with the French Force Frappe, this could ensure a sufficient nuclear deterrent for the E.U. against Russia. • Considerable intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities, both in the areas of human intelligence and signal intelligence. Alongside these internal capabilities, the United Kingdom is also a member of the Five Eyes Intelligence Network (U.S.A, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom). Although it is not always able to directly pass on information it receives through this network to other E.U. members who are not members of this network, it is allowed to disclose analyses drawn up using such data. Thus, this analysis can be vitally important for the E.U. and its member states in, for example, combatting terrorism.14 • In recent years the United Kingdom has massively expanded its offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities, which have been further boosted by the close cooperation between the British GCHQ and its American counterpart, the NSA. • The United Kingdom is also among the few European countries15 that both respects the NATO target (investment of 2% of GDP in defence) as well as meeting the UN aspiration of allocating 0.7% of GDP to development aid. The only country with comparable security capabilities and combat experience is France. The French armed forces and their nuclear deterrent are larger than those of the British, which makes it the largest military power in Europe (the French Army, Navy and Air Force total 155,000 personnel).16 Thus, British defence spending accounts for about twenty five percent of the E.U.’s defence spending, and roughly the

11 France and Germany do, but in the case of the latter those transport planes have had a long record of breakdowns and extensive repairs. 12 This is all in spite of the fact that the U.K. experiences significant procurement problems. For example, its Royal Air Force’s transport planes (the Airbus A400M) not only cost the UK £2.6 billion; only two of the 20-strong fleet are able to fly. 13 This contributed in part to an 8.5% decrease of the U.K. defence budget in real terms from 2010– 2015 (Malcolm Chalmers, Decision Time: The National Security Capability Review 2017–2018 and Defence, Whitehall Report 1–18 (London: RUSI, 2018), 5), and resulted in an overall reduction of the U.K.’s purchasing power (International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Europe,” Chap. 4 in The Military Balance 2018 (London: IISS, 2018), 80). 14 See also Peter Keith Levene, Defence Reform: An Independent Report into the Structure and Management of the Ministry of Defence (London: Ministry of Defence, 2011). 15 As of July 2019, these countries are the following (in alphabetical order): Estonia, Greece, Romania, Poland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 16 For a more detailed discussion see also Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Eine nukleare Neuausrichtung der NATO”, SIRIUS 2017; 1(4): 359–366; https://doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2017-0086.

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same percentage of all deployable E.U. forces.17 Having said that, while the French military is larger in size, France’s capability for deployment in additional operations is limited. The country already has 37,000 personnel deployed abroad, mainly in French-speaking West Africa. A further 10,000 are active at home on Operation Sentinelle, protecting sensitive targets against Islamist terrorism. The deployment of soldiers on Operation Sentinelle has also been beset by problems resulting from inadequate training and low morale due to poor living conditions. These operations have been a heavy burden for the French Army, which only has limited capabilities. The British Government has made it clear that it is interested in continuing to cooperate closely with the E.U. post-Brexit.18 In its document Consultation and Cooperation on External Security, the U.K. calls for the establishment of a framework for consultation and cooperation with the E.U., which would enable both the United Kingdom and the E.U. to pool their foreign policy efforts in order to achieve the best possible effects internationally. In particular, the U.K. proposes that • intelligence and analysis be exchanged through INTCEN; • a bespoke administrative arrangement be agreed upon with the European Defence Agency (EDA). To be sure, this is possible according to article 23 of the Council Joint Action (2004/551/CFSP) on the establishment of the EDA.19 It sets out the procedures under which third countries could contribute to the EDA and its budgets. In order to enable the participation of third states in specific projects and programs, the EDA can enter into Administrative Agreements to facilitate the exchange of information and views. Such agreements were signed with Norway in 2006, Switzerland in 2012, Serbia in 2013, and the Ukraine in 2015.20 • arrangements be made in order to participate in the European Commission’s European Defence Fund; • there be the option to participate in PESCO projects as a third country (see further below). The nature of the agreements proposed by the British Government would require the European Commission to show flexibility and to prioritise pragmatism over ideological clarity on the part of the E.U. The signs at present are not that promising, at least with regards the security-related Galileo Project. Galileo is the European contribution to the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). It was developed in order to end European dependence on the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS). Although it offers wide-ranging civilian uses, it also has an important defence and security component. The United Kingdom has until now been actively involved in the project, with British aviation and aerospace companies providing sensitive technology, whilst at the same time U.K. dependent territories have expanded its global 17 Ian

Bond, “NATO, the EU and Brexit: Joining forces?” Insight, Brussels: Centre for European Reform, 5. July 2016. 18 Peter Ricketts, National Security Relations with France after Brexit (London: RUSI, 2018), 5–6. 19 Only Denmark is not member of the EDA. 20 von Ondarza, Nicolai, and Camille Borrett. Brexit and EU Agencies: What the agencies’ existing third country relations can teach us about the future EU–U.K. relationship. Working Paper no. 02. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2018, p. 20.

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reach. The British Government continues to regard its future participation in Galileo as a “strategic choice which will have a permanent effect on our future defence and defence industrial collaboration.”21 In this regard, it is important to stress that the “U.K. wants Galileo to be a core part of a future U.K.—E.U. security partnership.” The Government has argued that any exclusion of British firms from security-related areas of Galileo would result in delays of up to three years and additional costs of up to e1 billion. Moreover, it would prevent Galileo from benefiting from British encryption technologies and overseas territories and induce the United Kingdom to develop its own GNSS (which would now be relatively cost-efficient as a lot of preliminary work has been carried out under the aegis of Galileo). As a result, leaving behind Galileo would have negative implications for security cooperation between the E.U. and the United Kingdom (including interoperability).22 Nevertheless, the European Commission argues that British access to Galileo after Brexit would jeopardize the security of the E.U., and it wants Britain to stay out of Galileo if it indeed leaves the E.U. at the end of 2020. Action has therefore started to exclude the British aerospace industry from the production of securityrelevant elements of the satellite programme, even though the United Kingdom is developing the critical encryption software for the system. The Commission does not appear to be moved by arguments concerning the central role of Galileo within future U.K.—E.U. security cooperation, or by the benefits for the project that would result from the continuing participation of the United Kingdom (along with the costs of its exclusion). Public statements that the United Kingdom’s participation would put E.U. security at risk do not bode well for the establishment of broader trust or security cooperation. Consequently, the British Government has announced first steps and budgeted for the development of an independent British GNSS.

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Future of Defence Integration The European Commission’s initial reaction to Brexit, especially as it relates to the area of security and defence, was provocative and almost triumphalist in tone. It was argued that, freed from British intransigence, Europe would now be able to focus more on an integrated approach in the area of defence and security—that is to deepen the integration process in this policy field. The irony is that it was the United Kingdom and France that in 1998 proposed the Saint-Malo Declaration that aimed to enhance the E.U.’s defence capabilities and boost its capacity to act independently, although it was subsequently held back by the reluctance of other Member States to increase their spending on defence. The desire to “draw benefit” from Brexit in order to deepen the integration of European defence and security policy (far from the 21 HM 22 Ibid.

Government: Technical Note: U.K. Participation in Galileo.

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creation of a “European army”) led to the implementation of the modest Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).23 The topic of PESCO has not been a new one. The mechanism has been inserted in the Lisbon Treaty in Art. 42.6. The Treaty of the European Union (T.E.U.) and the Protocol No. 10 of the Lisbon Treaty related to PESCO, however, due to diverging interest of member states about the exclusivity of that project, it has taken almost a decade to start a proper implementation of PESCO. In simple terms, PESCO aims to deepen defence cooperation between the E.U. Member States that are willing and able to do so. It envisages the development of special projects to enhance cooperation and interoperability, also with NATO.24 Participation in the projects is voluntary, although those that have committed to do so are bound by this commitment. All in all, PESCO has made European defence a bit more efficient, and provides greater output for boosting the “strategic autonomy”25 of the E.U., whilst at the same time leaving national Member State sovereignty untouched. To date, 25 E.U. Member States with very wide-ranging military capabilities have signed up, and 17 projects involving various levels of cooperation have been approved. As an immediate follow-up to the Brexit referendum and the release of the E.U. Global Strategy, E.U. member states, led by France and Germany, triggered the activation of the PESCO mechanism in an effort to get the best of both worlds, namely opening a path towards a European Defence Union while maintaining close bilateral defence ties with the U.K. In turn, it clearly is in the U.K.’s declared interest that the E.U. does not slip into its comfort zone as a ‘civilian power’,26 but instead that the E.U. maintains a high level of defence cooperation on the one hand, and at the same time that it remains open to flexible arrangements with third countries on the other hand.27 According to Art. 42(6) of the T.E.U., PESCO is established by “those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions.” This enables defence cooperation in smaller committed groups, below the threshold of 27 Member States, and within the E.U.-framework rather than outside of it. Although originally conceived as an exclusive project, the Council of the European Union opted for an inclusive PESCO, which opens up the 23 EU Commission: Permanent Structured Cooperation—PESCO: Deepening Defence Cooperation among EU Member States; “Permanent Structured Cooperation—PESCO,” European Union External Action Service, March 9, 2018. 24 Indeed, NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg considers PESCO as a means to strengthen NATO’s European pillar. See Doorstep statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg prior to the European Union Foreign Affairs Council meeting https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_ 160495.htm. 25 This is something that the EU has called for in its own Global Strategy document. See European External Action Service. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A stronger Europe. 26 June 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. 26 For an extensive review of the debate see Antonio Missiroli (Hrsg.): Towards an EU Global Strategy—Consulting the Experts, Paris 2015. 27 Van Ham, Peter (2016). Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe A Scenario Study. Clingendael Report, 15.

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possibility of putting the bar as low as possible, instead of creating a defence avantgarde that can pave the way forward. There is an inherent contradiction between the idea of an inclusive PESCO and an ambitious PESCO.28 PESCO envisages the development of special projects to enhance cooperation and interoperability. Participation in the projects is voluntary, although those who have committed to do so are bound by this commitment. All in all, PESCO should make European defence more efficient and provide greater output for boosting the strategic autonomy of the E.U., whilst at the same time leaving the sovereignty of E.U. Member States untouched. To date, 25 E.U. Member States (all except the U.K., Malta and Denmark) with very wide-ranging military capabilities have signed up to PESCO, and 34 projects involving various levels of cooperation have been approved thus far.29 Contrary to other forms of defence cooperation, PESCO provides for a legally binding nature of member states’ commitments. The list of ambitious and more binding common obligations undertaken by each of the participating PESCO members contains 20 individual pledges, split into the five key areas set out by Art.2 of Protocol N°10 on PESCO that is annexed to the Lisbon Treaty. However, the structure and set-up of PESCO entails a number of problems.30 Firstly, since membership is limited to E.U. member states, this by definition would exclude British participation in case the Brexit materializes and thus military capability (although the British Government has asked to participate in individual projects of PESCO as a third country). Secondly, the ambition of the respective projects has been very modest to date and limited to enhancing cooperation in very closely defined areas. Instead of focusing on some prime projects, it seems that current PESCO initiatives aim at allowing all participating member states to provide for their ‘own’ PESCO project. PESCO does not offer any unequivocal incentives for integrating E.U. armed forces and provides only a limited contribution to capability enhancement. In all seriousness, this may possibly reflect a growing divide between political rhetoric and military facts on the ground. As mentioned above, the prime objective of PESCO is to enhance the strategic autonomy of the E.U., without undermining E.U. Member’s sovereignty. This is already in itself paradoxical. Extolling the strategic autonomy of the E.U. is a dangerous game to play where the Union does not dispose of the necessary military resources to support that autonomy. Such calls will only strengthen the hand of those in the Trump administration, along with the wider U.S. defence community, who seek to scale back U.S. engagement within NATO and with European defence more generally. The risk is that the U.S.A. might take the E.U.’s strategic autonomy seriously and leave the Union without the capability to implement it.

28 See

De France, Olivier/Major, Claudia/Sartori, Paola (2017): How to make PESCO a Success. Armament Industry European Research Group Policy Paper No. 21, 8. 29 See https://pesco.europa.eu/ [20.06.2019]. 30 See Riordan (2019), 3.

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This argument may be substantiated with reference to the example of the German Bundeswehr.31 With almost 180,000 soldiers, the Bundeswehr is the second-largest army in Europe after France. In comparative terms, it is thus larger than the British Army. However, since the end of the Cold War it has had to adapt to a dramatic fall in financing, training and operational readiness. For political reasons, international deployments have only involved support and logistical roles. As a result, in contrast to the British and French armed forces, it has practically no combat experience, the only moderate exception being Afghanistan. Increased financing was announced in 2015 in order to improve training and enable modernisation of the Bundeswehr. Nevertheless, German defence spending will not reach 1.3% of its GDP until 2021. In any case, the operational readiness of the German armed forces is much more concerning. A report on the operational readiness of the primary weapons systems used by the Bundeswehr, which was presented to the Bundestag in February 2018, stated that only 29% of combat aircraft, 22% of transport helicopters, 19% of combat helicopters, 20% of transport aircraft, 47% of tanks and 30% of frigates were ready for deployment. Germany had so few deployable tanks that it would be unable to take up its leadership of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) at the start of 2019. Whilst Berlin engages in ambitious rhetoric and declares itself ready “to take on responsibility for European security”, the Government is not ready to finance the necessary resources for the Bundeswehr. Significant time and investment will be required to make up for the lack of operational readiness shown up in the Bundestag report. It thus comes as no surprise that Germany prefers to propose PESCO projects that are not focused on cooperation in relation to combat deployments, or that the E.U. countries most vulnerable to Russian pressure view the strategic autonomy promised by PESCO with scepticism. Moreover, rather than enhancing the strategic autonomy of the E.U. by leaving national sovereignty untouched PESCO could reinforce existing differences in national strategies between E.U. Member States, lobby groups, and companies, or at least bring them to the fore. France is concentrating on the E.U.’s unpredictable neighbours to the south. It is aiming to secure not only the strategic autonomy of the E.U. (which has long since been a central plank of French security policy), but also the autonomy of the European defence industry (which will entail benefits for the French industry). Essentially, it is attempting to project its own security policy goals onto the E.U. as a whole. Germany has traditionally aimed to rely on NATO in questions relating to European security. Its change of heart towards a European strategic autonomy has essentially come as a reaction to President Trump, as noted above. Berlin continues to be reticent in its usage of military resources for crisis and conflict management activities. The eastern flank of the E.U.—Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states— are sceptical as to the value of PESCO. These countries regard PESCO as being too strongly focused on the challenges originating from the southern neighbours,

31 George

Allison: Less than a third of German military assets are operational says report, U.K. Defence Journal, June 21 2018.

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rather than the Russian threat from the east, which is more imminent for them.32 PESCO is beneficial primarily for the development of military capabilities for crisis management deployments and interventions, rather than defence and deterrence. In addition, it appears to bring benefits mainly to the defence industries of the largest countries. Other eastern European countries share these doubts, although they are more willing to back PESCO in order to avoid adding the issue to existing contentious matters with Paris and Berlin (such as e.g. migration).

European Intervention Initiative (E2I) and the U.K. In September 2017, the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, launched the idea of a “European Intervention Initiative” (EI2).33 EI2 would introduce a common doctrine alongside budgetary instruments for military interventions outside the territory of the E.U. The overarching aim is to equip Europe by the beginning of the next decade with a “common intervention force”, a “common defence budget“, and a “common doctrine for action” to enable Europeans to act “convincingly” together militarily.34 Participation is by invitation only. A letter of Intent launching the initiative was signed by nine European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the U.K.) on 25 June 2018. France thus appears to be seeking a strategic-cultural convergence around rapid multilateral deployments in dangerous theatres. Finland has since joined the EI2, taking the number of participating European countries up to 10 now.35 France argues that EI2 must have the necessary deployment capabilities in the future, otherwise it will be impossible to achieve strategic autonomy for the E.U. Meanwhile, Germany’s participation, coupled with its lack of enthusiasm for operational readiness, could call into question the entire efficacy of E2I. At its heart the EI2 will be a flexible and non-binding forum of European states that are able and willing to engage their military forces when and where necessary in order to protect European security interests across the spectrum of a potential crises, and without prejudice to the framework through which action is taken (i.e. the UN, NATO, the E.U. or as an ad hoc coalition). Participation in any of its specific initiatives or any military operations that result will be subject to sovereign national

32 For an extensive discussion of the Eastern European member’s perspectives see Benjamin Zyla, and Arnold Kammel (eds.). Peacebuilding at Home: NATO and its ‘New’ Member States. BadenBaden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2018. 33 Alice Pannier: Macron´s “European Intervention Initiative”: More Questions than Answers, European Leadership Network, 23 November 2017. 34 See Mauro, Frederic (2018). The European Intervention Initiative: Why we should listen to German Chancellor Merkel, available at https://www.iris-france.org/115776-the-europeanintervention-initiative-why-we-should-listen-to-german-chancellor-merkel/ [20.06.2019]. 35 See Mills, Claire (2019). The European Intervention Initiative. House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper No. 8432.

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decision-making. EI2 operates independently of the E.U. Military Staff and Committee, thereby enabling the creation of a more flexible, adaptable and responsive leadership structure. It will also be separated from NATO, although it will coordinate closely with it. It is still unclear whether E2I will concentrate on a defensive mission in northern and Eastern Europe, expeditions to French-speaking Africa, or peacekeeping and civil/military missions. Contrary to PESCO, E2I aims to improve operational capabilities. Having said that, the Letter of Intent concerning EI2 states that “EI2 participating states will strive to ensure that EI2 serves the objectives and projects of PESCO to the maximum extent possible, while taking into consideration national legal constraints and the issue of third parties’ access to PESCO.”36 Thus, E2I at least indirectly calls for the augmentation of capabilities. Two major differences between E2I and PESCO, however, stand out: first E2I is focused on operational aspects, and secondly it is clearly not suitable for nonEuropean countries (including primarily the United Kingdom post-Brexit). This should not come as a surprise. Despite the much-acclaimed Franco-German brigade (in which the French downgraded their involvement in 2014 and the efficacy of which has also been undermined by poor German operational readiness), the French have increasingly focused their attention on bilateral cooperation with the British. This started with the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration and culminated in the Defence and Security Agreement signed in 2010 (separate agreements have been reached concerning the management of nuclear stocks, operational questions, industry and armaments). The agreement was concluded outside the NATO and E.U. frameworks. A consequence of this agreement was the 6-year development of a Franco-British Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), on which E2I appears to be based. In practical terms, the CJEF involved the adoption of procedures to enable France and the United Kingdom to maintain forces with a high level of readiness, which could be deployed together if needed. France’s demand to continue its defence cooperation with the United Kingdom was spelled out in France’s 2017 request to join the Five Power Defence Agreement (FDPA). The FDPA was created in 1971 in order to defend Malaysia and Singapore against Indonesia. The FDPA members are Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. At present it is a rather moribund organisation. France justified its application to join primarily because of its desire to make a greater contribution to security in the Asia and Pacific area, although in reality the aim was to find an institutional framework for pursuing cooperation with the United Kingdom. E2I appears to have taken on board this idea (presumably since the Asian FDPA members appear determined to reject France’s membership). In January 2018, the U.K. showed its intent to get involved in E2I following a Franco-British summit on defence cooperation. It is also one of the signatories to the Letter of Intent. After the signing of that Letter, the British Minister of the Armed Forces stated that “The European Intervention Initiative does not affect the 36 Letter of Intent concerning the development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), June 2018, para. 9.

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independence of the U.K. Armed Forces in any way. It is a flexible, non-binding forum, that provides a framework for increased co-operation between participating European states. It is not a standing force.”37 Given that the EI2 is a defence initiative outside of the governance purview of the European Union, U.K. participation in such initiative will not be affected in any way by the Brexit. However, U.K. participation in an initiative that is so closely linked to E.U. defence projects, and PESCO in particular, has raised some concerns among pro-Brexit commentators who fear that the initiative could involve Britain in an embryonic European Army through the back door.38

U.K. Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) An alternative forum for pragmatic cooperation that would enable continuing British participation in European security post-Brexit is the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force noted above.39 Created in 2012 under the aegis of the NATO Framework Nations Concept, it builds on the U.K.’s experience in working with other northern European countries in Afghanistan and Iraq. Initially focused on the Near/Middle East, it was subsequently redirected to address the Russian threat within the context of the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of eastern Ukraine. It is made up of a British-led force, to which eight other countries contribute, and which seeks to achieve rapid deployment, in particular in northern Europe. Three of these are long-standing NATO members (Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands), three are relatively new NATO members (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) whilst two are neutral E.U. Member States (Sweden and Finland). Although falling within the NATO framework, deployment of the JEF is a sovereign decision of the British Government (presumably following consultation with the other participating governments). This results in a much more flexible and mobile instrument than for example the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which can only be deployed with the approval of all 29 full members of the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest political institution that governs the alliance. Reaching such agreements takes time and, given the increasing alienation of Turkey from the rest of the Council, this might not be a viable option in the near future. In addition, the focus on the Russian threat is more on easing the worries and concerns of northern and eastern members of the E.U.

37 PQ160129,

EU Defence Policy, 10 July 2018. “Nine states to launch joint military force as Paris pushes for post-Brexit crisis defence group”, The Daily Telegraph, 25 June 2018. 39 Håkon Lunde Saxi: The U.K. Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), IFS Insights 5/2018, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. 38 See

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The E.U. is currently confronted with a range of internal as well as external challenges. On the one hand, the Brexit is showing that the E.U. integration process as such is not only being put on hold; it is actively in question. Moreover, nationalist as well as disintegration forces in various E.U. countries seem to gain political ground and influence. On the other hand, looking at the external challenges, the E.U. is confronted with the most imminent and threatening of these over the short term, namely a hostile Russia and protracted instability in the Middle/Near East and North Africa. Doubts concerning the commitment of President Trump to NATO and the growing rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow show that European states cannot rely on NATO attending to their security requirements. Moreover, in cases of an imminent emergency it is certain that it will be difficult to activate NATO mechanisms, which requires the consent of all 29 members—such as e.g. the VJTF—in good time, should Turkey have any objections. The increasing tensions between Brussels and Washington alongside growing foreign policy differences (e.g. in relation to the Iranian nuclear agreement and the threat that country poses for the entire Middle East) have also boosted arguments in favour of boosting European strategic autonomy. This concept of strategic autonomy underlies the European Global Strategy. However, the eastern European members states are not alone in fearing that there is a growing divide between rhetoric and reality. In addition, any impulsive and ill-thought-out promotion of strategic autonomy would risk encouraging those in America (both within and outside the Trump Administration) who would like to refocus on the Asia/Pacific area and to rein in transatlantic obligations. Simply put, Europe’s current military capabilities are inadequate for to the needs of a strategic union. The French armed forces, as Europe’s largest army, already have wide-ranging obligations both at home and abroad, and thus have limited capacity for new deployments. In addition, they are heavily focused on the instability affecting their southern neighbours and French-speaking Africa. The Bundeswehr, Europe’s second-largest army, is chronically under-financed, with an average readiness for deployment of only 30%. It lacks combat experience and will only play a limited role in operational interventions in the near future. Although the German Government has recently committed to modest increases in the defence budget, it is still hesitant © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Zyla, The End of European Security Institutions?, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_6

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to use military instruments as part of crisis management. Brexit exacerbates this problem by excluding the British armed forces, along with its intelligence services and cyber-capabilities. The United Kingdom has made it clear that it wishes to continue to contribute to European defence and security post-Brexit; however, at the present time there is no E.U. security architecture in place that could enable this. Realistically, if the E.U. is to achieve strategic autonomy it will have to integrate the military capabilities of non-E.U. countries such as the United Kingdom and Norway. However, until now the European Commission appears to have promoted ideological clarity above pragmatism to find a suitable solution that satisfies all negotiating partners. The European Commission’s proposal to exclude the United Kingdom from the non-military aspects of the E.U.’s security and defence architecture will undermine the interoperability of the British armed forces with those of the E.U. Moreover, in the aftermath of Brexit it will have far-reaching implications for military and security cooperation between the E.U. and the United Kingdom. With the positive Brexit vote in December of 2019 by the British House of Commons, it will also place significant pressures on the U.K. Ministry of Defense to work out the detailed proposals for the U.K.’s security relationship with the E.U. The E.U.’s formal initiative to enhance security capabilities after Brexit by definition excludes the United Kingdom (despite the British willingness to cooperate on special projects), whilst at the same time little is being done to expand the operational capabilities of the E.U. Most projects are focused on enhancing non-operational cooperation, such as for example the provision of logistical support. The Member States that feel most threatened by Russia view such efforts as being focused too much on the south, whilst only benefiting the defence industries of the larger E.U. countries. France has answered to these developments by proposing E2I. This focuses on the development of a common doctrine along with budgetary instruments for military interventions outside the E.U. As E2I is detached from the E.U., its military, the Military Staff Committee as well as E.U. officials working therein, the initiative allows for the membership of the United Kingdom and other non-E.U. countries. In actual fact, the United Kingdom is one of the nine E.U. countries that have joined E2I. To be sure, E2I is clearly operational. However, the initiative seems to be focused on operational interventions in dangerous areas in southern countries that in direct vicinity of the E.U. (and in French-speaking Africa), whilst once again disregarding the fears of E.U. states that see Russia as the main threat. An alternative pragmatic way of continuing cooperation with the United Kingdom is the British-led JEF. Although it is part of the NATO Framework Nations Concept, it is not subject to NATO’s cumbersome procedures and is made up of European states (not all E.U. or NATO members), which participate in a British-led Joint Force focused in particular on the Russian threat for northern Europe. As long as the European Commission continues to insist on ideological clarity after Brexit, and as long as the British military and intelligence capabilities are regarded as important for European security, it is likely that the United Kingdom will be involved in the E.U.’s institutional security and defence framework in one way or another, most likely through initiatives such as E2I or the JEF. Whilst the U.S. and above all Turks have called into question the reliability of NATO as the

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cornerstone of European security, the organisation is still able to offer an important framework within which pragmatic ways of integrating the United Kingdom can be found. However, this could prove to be a dangerous development for the European Commission and the E.U. as a whole. At present, both E2I and the JEF operate outside the E.U. security architecture, and both are led at the national level and focused on the needs of their sponsors. Moreover, both tend towards rendering PESCO irrelevant in terms of enhancing the independent operational capabilities of the E.U. More problematic perhaps is the fact that neither of the two operates under the aegis of the CFSP, which means that the “force” that is set to shoulder the burden of Europe’s strategic autonomy will be commanded from outside of CFSP, which is primarily responsible for determining the E.U.’s military and security strategy, as well as its security responses. Against this backdrop, it is likely that the influence of the European Commission and the European External Action Service on European security policy will wane. It would be in the interest of the E.U. Commission to choose a more flexible approach to the United Kingdom’s participation (alongside other non-E.U. states, such as for example Norway) in E.U. security instruments.1 Having the former German Minister of Defence, Ursula von der Leyen being elected President of the European Commission and former Spanish Foreign Minister Borrell as the next High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, two staunch Europeans will have an important influence on that particular approach that could foster Europe’s strategic autonomy. They also bring a wealth of political experience with them to their new job, with von der Leyen being Germany’s former Minister of Defence. Depending upon the approach ultimately taken by the European Commission, individual E.U. Member States will have to fall into line and increase their defence spending as well as improve operational readiness. President Trump is not the only person to take the view that Europe should contribute more to its defence. There is a widely held view within U.S. defence and foreign policy circles that the U.S.A. should scale back its obligations in Europe and instead enhance its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Even former President Obama made similar arguments. Every post-Trump Administration will insist that Europe pulls its weight more, albeit not in such sharp tones. The United Kingdom is not expected to become an ‘old’ third country even after a possible withdrawal from the E.U. To the contrary, it will be integrated into the E.U.’s security policy both politically and economically. It may therefore be presumed that close cooperation on security issues will be continued with the E.U., in particular in relation to the fight against terrorism, defence against cyber-attacks, the protection of European citizens, intelligence sharing, the Schengen Information System for border control, passenger information lists for flights, the Europol law enforcement data bases and the European Criminal Records Information System. If such cooperation 1 See

also House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee: Implications of the referendum on EU membership for the U.K.’s role in the world, 26.4.2016, available online at http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmfaff/545/545.pdf; accesses 20.08. 2017.

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were not pursued by the U.K., it would immediately loose access to Europol and Eurojust’s sensitive databases with the Brexit.2 This would clearly be a disadvantage for the U.K., if not a downgrading, and harmful with regards to its internal and external security interests. If the Brexit materializes as planned by the British government, the U.K. would not represent anyone else on the UN Security Council in matters of security policy other than itself. France will de facto become the ‘E.U. representative’ on the Security Council, whilst the United Kingdom will lose this role. On the one hand this means that the British are going to have a considerable interest in future cooperation on security policy, especially with regards to European crisis management initiatives, also because they will be reliant on support from the E.U. Member States when it comes to more extensive peace operations (e.g. such as in Afghanistan). At the same time, it will be difficult for the E.U. to achieve strategic autonomy with the nuclear and maritime potential of France alone. Meanwhile, as a result of Brexit the British armaments industry is most likely to lose its position as a European supplier and will be forced to ensure that it does not completely lose contact with the European armaments market by concluding a variety of bilateral cooperation agreements with other E.U. Member States. In that regard it has to be noted that traditionally the U.K. has been pushing for a lighter approach with regard to the application of Art. 346 of the T.F.E.U., which permits disapplication of E.U. rules when considered necessary to protect their “essential security interests.”3 Switching the institutional perspective from the E.U. to NATO, the U.K. will most likely make every effort to become the de facto leading European power within NATO, and in particular to take on the role as the representative of the eastern European and other countries that consider Russia to represent a particular danger. Whether France and Germany will let the U.K. acquire this role will remain to be seen. However, it is unlikely that these two important players will concede their own roles and aspirations so easily. From the viewpoint of the smaller E.U. states, this will involve maximizing the usage of British capability within the E.U. framework in order, amongst other things, to offset negative implications for the emergence of a common security and defence policy. In actual fact, the protective function of the British Army in the event of Russian aggression is at least as great as that of France, and greater than that provided by Germany. Moreover, this dynamic also applies vis-à-vis operational readiness in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Middle East. For these reasons, cooperation with the United Kingdom in the area of security policy will always be desirable.

2 Mortera-Martinez,

C. (2017). “Hard Brexit, soft data: How to keep Britain plugged into EU databases.” Centre for European reform. London, 23 June. https://www.cer.eu/insights/hard-brexitsoft-data-how-keep-britain-plugged-eu-databases; see also Simon Duke. Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence? The Impact on the UK and EU (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), Chap. 4. 3 See Butler, L. (2016). Legal implications of Brexit on U.K. Defence Procurement, Bristol, June 20. https://legalresearch.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2016/06/legal-implications-of-brexit-on-ukdefence-procurement/ [18.08.2019].

6 Conclusion

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At the time of writing, the prospects for a hard Brexit, meaning the U.K. leaving the E.U. without an agreement, seems to be the most plausible option. After the resignation of Prime Minister Theresa May, the newly elected Tories leader and Prime Minister Boris Johnson has continued to call for a hard divorce between the E.U. and the U.K. and thus almost leaving aside any new contractual relationship between the two negotiating parties. As a result, both the U.K. and the E.U. are likely to remain for some time inwardly-focused through a lengthy, phased implementation process. The U.K. will need to renew governing capacities required of an E.U. external partner, while maintaining political consensus and assuring unity among the U.K. domestically. The E.U. will focus on balancing member states’ views and interests with concern for E.U. reform implications, pressures for potential multi-speed integration, and enduring challenges to internal unity over the rule of law, migration, Eurozone governance and security and defence cooperation. With regards to the alliance, we noted that it is reasonable to posit that the U.K. will remain a close like-minded transatlantic partner and committed NATO ally with important influence in Europe while acquiring its new autonomy and agility in international relations. It will nonetheless face new and difficult choices given its diminished relative influence and its pressing need to deploy all means available to advance its trade and economic interests. An illiberal or protectionist U.K. is unlikely but could well emerge in response to the dire economic consequences of an acrimonious ‘no deal’ scenario or break with agreed terms. In short, it is likely that the U.K. will enhance its participation in NATO in order to demonstrate leadership on international security and defence policy and will treat its strong commitment to NATO as a key source of international legitimacy and influence. The U.K. will work closely with the U.S. on pressuring its NATO allies to raise defence spending to the target of 2% of GDP. U.K.–E.U. tensions are unlikely to substantially affect the functions of the Alliance. As a final word and irrespective of the final Brexit outcome, the U.K. will remain committed to European security as common challenges and shared values will provide for a solid base of future cooperation. Leaving the European Union institutionally, however, poses the question what implications the Brexit might generate regarding the future of CSDP missions. Although, the E.U. will lose its biggest spender in defence and one of its most capable members alongside France, the prevailing intergovernmental character of CFSP and CSDP will allow for cooperation between the E.U. and the U.K. in the interest of European security. Both sides have already indicated their interest to cooperate closely in the future; they just have to move beyond the stalled Brexit negotiations to do so. In any case, based on the Lisbon Treaty, the U.K. can remain an active player in Europe’s security and defence by participating in E.U.-led or ad hoc coalitions as discussed above. Specifically, it can actively participate in the EI2 as well as push for better E.U.–NATO cooperation. The United Kingdom is not expected to become any old third country even after a possible withdrawal from the E.U. On the contrary, it is most likely to be integrated into the E.U.’s security policy politically. It may therefore be presumed that close cooperation on security issues will be continued, in particular in relation to the fight against terrorism, defence against cyber-attacks, the protection of European citizens,

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intelligence sharing, the Schengen Information System for border control, passenger information lists for flights, the Europol law enforcement data bases and the European Criminal Records Information System. For the E.U. member states and E.U. institutions it will per se mean to take up greater responsibility in terms of defence spending and the provision of operational capacity and effectiveness. Furthermore, the level of ambition regarding CFSP and CSDP needs to be newly assessed. The extent to which Brexit has serious strategic consequences for European security will therefore depend on whether the U.K. and the E.U. are able to move beyond Brexit to create a new and substantial security partnership based on mutual respect and trust. Both the U.K. and the remaining 27 E.U. Member States have strong interests in negotiating new agreements, at strategic and operational levels, that can help fill the post-Brexit institutional gap in defence and security cooperation. It also needs to be witnessed how inner E.U. initiatives, such as PESCO, will enhance the development of a more autonomous E.U. action in security and defence. Also, the debate of a stronger European pillar within NATO will remain a subject of debate, and could be even further triggered by the British leaving the E.U. At the end of the day, however, the British government will have to recognize that the security of the E.U. is indivisible from the security of the United Kingdom and vice versa. Also, the challenges faced in security and defense terms will remain quite similar across the Channel, despite of Brexit. Thus, there exists a mutual interest for both negotiating parties, the E.U. and U.K., to have a close cooperation and a pragmatic approach of how to best collaborate in order to deliver security to both the E.U. and British citizens.