Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security 9780773567856

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
Contributors
Introduction
PART ONE: CONCEPTUAL DEBATES OVER ENLARGEMENT
Fountain of Youth or Cure Worse Than Disease? NATO Enlargement: A Conceptual Deadlock
The Case for Opening up NATO to the East
Why Spain Should Have Been NATO'S Last Member
Will Enlargement Succeed?
PART TWO: NATIONAL DEBATES OVER ENLARGEMENT
NATO Enlargement and the United States: A Deliberate and Necessary Decision?
NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs
NATO Enlargement: Germany's Euro-Atlantic Design
Canada and the Enlargement of NATO
The NATO of Its Dreams? Canada and the Cooperative-Security Alliance
PART THREE: IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON RUSSIA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
NATO'S Eastward Enlargement: An Instructive Historical Precedent
NATO Enlargement as an Issue in Russian Politics
The Atlantic Dimensions of Central European Security
Phase II Candidates: A Political or Strategic Solution?
Conclusion: Will NATO Live to Celebrate Its 100th Birthday?
Notes

Citation preview

The Future of NATO Enlargement, Russia, and European Security

In The Future of NATO the leading authorities in the field address the complexity of present-day NATO, its inherent contradictions, and its current direction. The authors reflect on the significance of these issues for the Alliance's future prospects, for Russia, and for European security generally. Contributors look at the conceptual and theoretical approaches that underlie the question of enlarging NATO'S membership and the consequences of enlargement on international relations. They examine the policies of some of NATO'S leading member states - including Canada, which has recently begun a two-year term on the UN Security Council - and deal with the issue of enlargement from the point of view of the East European candidates, focusing on Russia and its opposition to the current process. CHARLES-PHILIPPE DAVID is professor of political science, Universite du Quebec a Montreal, and holds the Teleglobe+Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies. JACQUES LEVESQUE is professor of political science and director of the Centre for Security and Foreign Policy Studies, Universite du Quebec a Montreal.

FOREIGN POLICY, SECURITY, AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Editors: Jacques Levesque and Charles-Philippe David The Foreign Policy, Security, and Strategic Studies Series seeks to promote analysis of the transformation and adaptation of foreign and security policies in the post Cold War era. The series welcomes manuscripts offering innovative interpretations or new theoretical approaches to these questions, whether dealing with specific strategic or policy issues or with the evolving concept of security itself. The Future of NATO Enlargement, Russia, and European Security Edited by Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque

The Future of NATO Enlargement, Russia, and European Security Edited by Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque

Published for The Centre for Security and Foreign Policy Studies and The Teleglobe+Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies by McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal &c Kingston • London • Ithaca

© The Centre for Security and Foreign Policy Studies and The Teleglobe+Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies 1999 Pages 27-3 5 © Jane Sharpe 1999 ISBN 0-7735-1850-9 (cloth) ISBN 0-773 5-1872.-X (P a P er )

Legal deposit second quarter 1999 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper McGill-Queen's University Press acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program for its activities. We also acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: The future of NATO: enlargement, Russia and European security (Foreign policy, security and strategic studies) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-7735-1850-9 (bound) ISBN o-7735-i87z-x (pbk.) i. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2. National security — Europe. 3. Russia (Federation) — Foreign relations - Europe. 4. Europe - Foreign relations - Russia (Federation), i. David, Charles-Philippe. n. Levesque, Jacques, 1940. in. Teleglobe Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, iv. Universite du Quebec a Montreal. Centre d'etudes des politiques etrangeres et de securite. v. Series. JZ593O.F88 1999 355'.o3i'o9i82.i C99-900354-2 Typeset in Sabon 10/12 by Caractera inc., Quebec City

hhh

Acknowledgments

vii

Contributors

ix

Introduction

3

JACQUES LEVESQUE PART

ONE

CONCEPTUAL

OVER

DEBATES

ENLARGEMENT

Fountain of Youth or Cure Worse Than Disease ? NATO Enlargement: A Conceptual Deadlock 9 C H A R L E S - P H I L I P P E DAVID

The Case for Opening up NATO to the East

27

JANE M.O. SHARP

Why Spain Should Have Been NATO'S Last Member

35

DAVID LAW

Will Enlargement Succeed ? 51 RICHARD L. KUGLER PART

TWO

NATIONAL

OVER

ENLARGEMENT

DEBATES

NATO Enlargement and the United States: A Deliberate and Necessary Decision? 79 GALE A. MATTOX

NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs 95 MARIE-CLAUDE PLANTIN

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Contents

NATO Enlargement: Germany's Euro-Atlantic Design

108

PAUL LETOURNEAU AND P H I L I P P E HEBERT

Canada and the Enlargement of NATO

119

ANDRE P. DONNEUR AND MARTIN BOURGEOIS

The NATO of Its Dreams? Canada and the Cooperative-Security Alliance 138 DAVID G. H A G L U N D PART

THREE

RUSSIA

AND

IMPACT CENTRAL

OF AND

ENLARGEMENT EASTERN

ON

EUROPE

NATO'S Eastward Enlargement: An Instructive Historical Precedent 157 JACQUES LEVESQUE

NATO Enlargement as an Issue in Russian Politics SERGEI

168

PLEKHANOV

The Atlantic Dimensions of Central European Security 186 ANDRAS BALOGH

Phase II Candidates: A Political or Strategic Solution? 197 STANISLAV J.

KIRSCHBAUM

Conclusion: Will NATO Live to Celebrate Its looth Birthday? C H A R L E S - P H I L I P P E DAVID

Notes

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2.16

Acknowledgments

The editors would like to express their gratitude to the authors, the organizations, and all others who made this book possible. Our foremost thanks go to our dedicated editorial assistant, Bruno Desjardins, PhD candidate in political science at Universite du Quebec a Montreal, who did not count the endless hours this project took to ensure that we reached the end. As well, the contribution of John Detre was invaluable for his translation of the French chapters. The staff of CEPES and the Teleglobe+Raoul-Dandurand Chair deserve our deepest appreciation for their constant support. McGill-Queen's University Press, particularly Aurele Parisien, encouraged us all the way in publishing the book as well as creating this new series in foreign policy, security, and strategic studies. This book is made possible by the financial support of the following organizations: the Security and Defence Forum of the Canadian Department of National Defence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Office of Information and Press, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Programme d'aide a la publication of UQAM. Charles-Philippe David Jacques Levesque February 1999

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Contributors

ANDRAS BALOGH is director general of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs and professor of modern world history at the Loran Eotvos University of Budapest. As a member of the Strategy Task Force for European Integration, he is an adviser to the prime minister on foreign policy and national-minority issues. From 1988 until 1994, he was Hungary's ambassador to India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, the Maldive Islands, and Afghanistan. He is the author of more than 100 articles and books. MARTIN BOURGEOIS is an MA candidate at the Universite du Quebec a Montreal, his area of expertise being Canadian foreign and defence policy. He has recently co-authored "Le Canada et la consolidation de la paix; La formulation d'une nouvelle approche pour la politique etrangere canadienne" (Etudes Internationales, 2.9, no. 3, September 1998). CHARLES-PHILIPPE DAVID is professor at the Universite du Quebec a Montreal, where he holds the Teleglobe Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies. He taught in the Department of Strategic Studies at the Canadian Military College in Saint-Jean, Quebec, from 1985 to 1995 and has been a visiting professor at a number of Quebec universities as well as the Institut du Droit, de la Paix et du Developpement, Universite de Nice; Centre d'etude sur la defense et la securite internationales, Universite de Grenoble; Fondation pour les etudes de defense nationale; and UCLA'S Strategic Studies Center. His recent publications include La consolidation de la paix (1997) and, as editor, Les institutions de la paix (1997). ANDRE P. DONNEUR has been a professor at the Universite du Quebec a Montreal since 1969. He has also taught at the Beijing Foreign

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Contributors

Studies University, at the Universite des sciences sociales de Toulouse; at the Ecole avancee des sciences sociales de Paris, at the University of Geneva, and at a number of Canadian universities. The focus of his studies is Canadian foreign policy. Recent publications include La politique exterieure du Canada 1996 (1997) and Les forces transnationales (1996). DAVID G. HAGLUND is director of the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, and professor in the Queen's Department of Political Studies. He has held visiting professorships in France, at the University of Strasbourg (1989-90), and in Germany, where he was affiliated with the German-Canadian Centre of the University of Bonn (1996-97). He has also been a visiting researcher at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen (1997). His research focuses on transatlantic security and on Canadian international security policy. His most recent book is The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End (i997)PHILIPPE HEBERT is a doctoral candidate in history at the Universite de Montreal and a research assistant at the Centre for the Studies of Foreign and Defence Policies. His current area of study is German foreign and security policy. STANISLAV j. KIRSCHBAUM is professor of international studies and political science at Glendon College, York University, Toronto. Since 1980, he has been secretary of the International Council for Central and East European Studies. He is a specialist on Central European politics with a specific focus on Slovak politics in the post-Second World War era. His latest publications are A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival (1996); A Historical Dictionary of Slovakia (1998); and Historical Reflections on Central Europe (1998), of which he is the editor. RICHARD L. KUGLER is a distinguished research professor at the National Defense University, Washington, where he advises senior Department of Defense officials on strategic policy issues. His specialty is NATO and global defence strategy. He holds a PHD from the Massachussets Institute of Technology, where he currently studies defence analysis and management. From 1988 to 1997 he was senior social scientist at RAND, and from 1975 to 1984 he was a senior executive in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is the author of multiple books on u.s. defence policy, as well as articles in Foreign Affairs,

Contributors

xi

Survival, and other journals. He is one of the original advocates and architects of NATO enlargement. DAVID LAW is a senior fellow at the Queen's University Centre for International Relations in Kingston, Ontario. He has taught international relations at a number of Canadian universities, including Queen's and the Universite du Quebec a Montreal, and currently lectures at the Royal Military College in Saint-Jean, Quebec, and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Concurrently, he operates scenarioplanning exercises on behalf of private- and public-sector clients in Europe and North America. From 1984 to 1994 he served with the Political Directorate of NATO, where, as head of the policy-planning unit, he played a leading role in the development of the Alliance's approach to post-Communist Europe. A Sovietologist by training, David Law has written widely on transatlantic and pan-European security issues. Research activity presently focuses on the impact of technological change on state profiles and governmental systems. PAUL LETOURNEAU is a professor in the History Department of the Universite de Montreal. He has published numerous articles on the foreign and security policies of Germany, and he recently directed a special number of Revue d'Allemagne (April-June 1998) which examined democracy and the military in Germany during the twentieth century. JACQUES LEVESQUE is professor of political science and director of the Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Etrangeres et de Securite (CEPES) at the Universite du Quebec a Montreal. He has written seven books, some of which have been translated to English, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Polish, and Hungarian. They are: Le conflit sino-sovietique et I'Europe de I'Est (1970); Le conflit sino-sovietique (1973 and 1979); The USSR and the Cuban Revolution (1978); Italian Communists versus the Soviet Union (1987); L'URSS et sa politique Internationale, de Lenine a Gorbatchev (1988); L'URSS en Afghanistan (1990); and The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (i997)GALE MATTOX is a professor of political science at the U.S. Naval Academy (1981-) and president of Women in International Security (wns), an international, non-partisan network for women working on international security issues. From 1994 to 1995 she served on the policy-planning staff, u.s. Department of State, focusing on European and non-proliferation issues. She has worked for the Congressional

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Contributors

Research Service and been a Fulbright Scholar, a Bosch Fellow in the German Defence Ministry, and a NATO Research Fellow. She has published widely on security and NATO issues. MARIE-CLAUDE PLANTIN is a senior researcher at the centre d'etude et de recherche de 1'institut des etudes politiques (CERIEP) at the Universite Lumiere Lyon 2,, France. She is also in charge of the Centre de documentation europeenne de 1'institut and teaches at the Centre international d'etudes franchises (CIEF). Her main research interests are European and Atlantic security and defence issues. She is the author of many articles; the latest focused on WEU enlargement. SERGEI PLEKHANOV is associate professor of political studies and coordinator of the Post-Communist Studies Programme at York University. Until 1993, he was deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow. His research interests include issues in the political and economic transformation of Russia and other post-Communist states, as well as problems of Russian foreign policy. His latest book is Transforming Russian Enterprises: From State Control to Employee Ownership (with John Logue and John Simmons, 1995). JANE M.O. SHARP is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, London, and directs the Defence and Security Programme at the Institute for Public Policy Research. She was formerly senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and has held research and teaching appointments at Harvard and Cornell. Recent publications include Honest Broker of Perfidious Albion: British Policy in Former Yugoslavia (1997), and About Turn, Forward March with Europe: New Directions for Defence and Security Policy (1996).

The Future of NATO Enlargement, Russia, and European Security

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Introduction Jacques Levesque

Nothing succeeds like success! On the face of it, this saying should apply perfectly to NATO as it celebrates fifty years of existence. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and then of the USSR has been NATO'S most striking historic success - a triumph in the view of those who believe that NATO played a key role in that outcome. But even the camp which argues that the fall of the Communist regimes stemmed essentially from internal fundamental flaws will agree that a victory by default is a success nonetheless. In the early 19905, NATO'S mission and indeed its raison d'etre seemed to have fallen victim to its own success. Many observers of international relations were predicting its demise in the relatively near future. But, in fact, quite the contrary happened. One after the other, the countries of Eastern Europe and some of the former Soviet republics came knocking on NATO'S door, asking to be officially admitted to the winner's circle. The Partnership for Peace (PFP) was created to give NATO some breathing room - time to digest new successes, to give them meaning and direction. But the breather was brief. The PFP was so successful that, after long hesitating, even Russia decided to join, hoping to slow the process from within. NATO'S success thus spurred the process of enlargement which marks the organization's fiftieth anniversary. With the apparent end of its original mission and its new successes, NATO is to have a new, less ad hoc role for the long term. This argument is put by many of NATO defenders, who now see it as a collective-security organization and a community primarily dedicated to building and reinforcing common democratic values. But has NATO'S nature really changed? Has it indeed found a new mission and ways to build on its recent triumphs? On this score, the picture is not so clear; in fact, it is quite ambiguous in many respects.

4

The Future of NATO

One of the purposes of this volume is to examine these ambiguities. Paradoxically, it is the aspiring new members who are most strongly committed to the traditional conception of what NATO is, while it is among the old members that a new vision and a new role are advocated. This, however, is only an apparent paradox, one that is readily explained. The essays in this collection address the complexity and contradictions that inhabit NATO'S nature and direction at this time. They seek to foster reflection on the meaning of these contradictions and their implications for the Alliance's future prospects. Throughout the debate that has surrounded the enlargement process, the thorniest issue has been Russia and its objections. Russia therefore occupies a central place in this volume. As shall be seen, Russia's concerns and objections have been based on two types of considerations. On the one hand, despite Washington's and NATO'S protests to the contrary, Russia has legitimate cause to feel, without being accused of paranoia, that it is being targeted by NATO enlargement, despite all its efforts to join the ranks of democratic states. Statements by a number of leaders of aspiring NATO members in Eastern Europe are quite telling on this point. And the intentions of which Russia complains are sometimes present, if only implicitly, even in the West, as some of the essays in this volume make clear. On the other hand, Russians who believe that spheres of influence, geopolitics, and narrow military considerations are outdated, and who believe in the potential success of the project advocated by the proponents of a new mission for NATO, similarly view enlargement, which will inevitably leave Russia on the sidelines for the foreseeable future, as unacceptable. While NATO does seem destined to become the only real collectivesecurity structure in Europe, Moscow can hardly accept exclusion from full membership, given Russia's importance and its legitimate aspirations. This is why it has consistently called for a new European security architecture which fully reflects the great historic event that has occurred with the end of the Cold War. NATO, led by the United States, has of course considered the Russian objections. While keeping on the path of enlargement, it has tried to address Moscow's concerns, contending that it is possible to enlarge NATO and improve relations with Russia at the same time. This bid, which amounts to an attempt to square the circle, seems to have met with at least partial success. The Founding Act of May 1997 on relations between NATO and Russia, the meaning and scope of which are analysed in this book, created a formal but non-binding structure for cooperation between Russia and NATO. Will it be able to perform its intended function and make Russia a genuine and satisfied partner?

Introduction

5

Russian reactions to the Madrid summit of July 1997, which approved the first phase of the enlargement process, have been muted to say the least, especially compared with what was portended by Moscow's previous stance. The weak Russian reaction and the signing of the Founding Act made it appear that Russia had dropped its opposition to enlargement. Yet this is not in fact the case. Russia continues to state its opposition to even the first phase of enlargement, though in a less vociferous manner. If Russia continues to fight Phase I, which is virtually an accomplished fact, it is above all to avoid legitimating Phase II, which it fears much more than the first and wants to be able to oppose effectively. Moscow has already served notice that the admission of the Baltic states or Ukraine into NATO would spark an overall revision of its relations with NATO and its members. Consequently, the questions and dilemmas faced by NATO and its member states, which are analysed in this collection of essays, will become more pointed still when the time comes to make decisions on Phase II, which already has the support in principle of the United States. Meanwhile, Russia is pursuing a profoundly ambivalent policy, trying to develop ties with NATO in the hope that these will become important enough to the organization to dissuade it from further expansion, for fear of compromising them. At the same time, the United States and NATO hope that building a strong relationship of trust and cooperation with Russia will bring Moscow to an entirely different view of matters and lead it to accept further enlargement, even to the Baltic states. If this occurs, NATO will have virtually succeeded in squaring the circle and might even contemplate a second fiftieth anniversary! But let us not anticipate too much. At this stage, it is still uncertain whether a viable European security system can be built without firmly anchoring Russia within an institutional framework, and whether NATO is the most suitable instrument and arena for this purpose. This is one of the questions addressed in this collection of essays. The scope of the volume therefore extends to the general question of European security. It is evident that NATO enlargement is being pursued in the context of and on the basis of a Pax Americana. While NATO is a multilateral organization and a focal point of multilateralism, the tendency towards American unilateralism within the organization has not abated; indeed, it has increased since the end of the Cold War. If this trend continues, will it prove compatible with the objectives, capabilities, and aspirations of NATO'S other members and with the new role the organization

6

The Future of NATO

wants to play? The frequent displays of friction between the United States, its allies, and the new Russia have never reached the critical point. Does this mean that, as we approach the twenty-first century, the Pax Americana is the only one possible, and therefore the only one desirable? This volume seeks to foster reflection on all these issues. It is divided into three parts. Part One deals with the conceptual and theoretical approaches that underlie the question of NATO enlargement, the surrounding debate, and the possible consequences. It underscores the issue's complexity and importance for the study of the theory of international relations, given that NATO'S configuration and nature in the years to come are yet to be decided: the manner in which enlargement is carried out could have a significant bearing on the direction the organization takes, which at this stage is largely undetermined. The essays in the second part examine the policies and interests of some of NATO'S leading member states, and they also focus on Canada, despite its more modest role. They consider the debates, past and present, in each of these countries and the significance that the future of NATO holds for them. Part Two seeks to shed light on the degree of compatibility among the goals of the various parties, and how this may affect the future course of events. The third part deals with the issues involved in enlargement from the point of view of the East European candidates and, most important, Russia. It takes the measure of the gulf that separates their aspirations and provides a full analysis of the reasons for Russia's opposition to the current process. It also discusses the scope and limits of the options available to Russia in light of the broader questions which were submitted to the analysts who have contributed their reflections to this collection of essays and the wider considerations underpinning it.

PART

ONE

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

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CHAPTER

ONE

Fountain of Youth or Cure Worse Than Disease? NATO Enlargement: A Conceptual Deadlock Charles-Philippe David "NATO is now an Alliance that opposes no one." Sergio Balanzino, deputy secretary general of NATO, 2.2. June 1994 "Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era." George Kennan, 5 February 1997 "The truth is that the Europe of Maastricht has neither the organization nor the instruments necessary to guarantee orphans of the Soviet system a steady transition to European democracy and stability." La Republica, 10 March 1997

Fifty years ago, few would have predicted that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be viable in the long term or that American troops would remain in Europe. In February 1951 NATO'S commanderin-chief (SACEUR), General Eisenhower, stated, "If in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed."1 Yet U.S. troops were sent to Europe in large and increasing numbers throughout the Cold War. When the Cold War ended in 1989, experts again predicted the demise of NATO. "NATO may soon be seen as suffering from old age - not a midlife crisis because it is becoming less relevant to the emerging European security system," commented Christopher Layne in an echo of George Kennan's proposal of the early 19505 for the mutual disengagement of the superpowers and their alliances from the European continent. "The more fundamental problem is that NATO itself may be an idea whose time

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Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

has passed," wrote Ronald Steel. "It is time to recognize that NATO expired in August 1989," proclaimed Congressman Sam Brownback.2 Though some of these observations were, and still are, intellectually defensible, it cannot be denied that NATO has, rather surprisingly, been enjoying a new lease on life since the early 19908. Who, in 1949 or prior to 1989, would have predicted that Central and Eastern European states might be admitted into NATO, or that NATO would want to work with Russia to build a new, pan-European security architecture? Who, in NATO'S early days or at the end of the Cold War, would have predicted that the future of the organization lay in eastward expansion? NATO, in short, is gaining new energy. Is it seeking a rejuvenation of its missions and structures, or, as Albert Legault puts it, trying "to slim down and put on weight at the same time"? 3 In either case, recent moves indicate a desire for change: a new Strategic Concept (the London summit of July 1990 and the Rome summit of November 1991), the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in March 1992 (replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in J 997)? the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in January 1994, the adoption in September 1995 °f enlargement procedures and objectives, the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, and, finally, the announcements of the Madrid summit in July 1997, with the prospective admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance, along with the signing of a NATO-Ukraine Charter.4 While the matter of who and when was partially settled at Madrid, there are still questions about what will happen beyond 1999. Also still at issue is whether countries not selected during the Spanish round may yet become members. While these developments are signs of vitality, the historic move NATO is poised to make by proceeding with the inclusion of Central and Eastern European states is open to question. The debates spurred by the enlargement plan indicate that the efforts to renew NATO also involve grave risks, which the elixir of eastward enlargement might not eliminate or may even cause. If we review security theory and concepts of security, we will see why NATO'S enlargement plan may well lead it into an impasse from which there is no exit.

THE

NATO E N L A R G E M E N T : YALTA OR MAASTRICHT F O R M U L A ?

This chapter attempts to bring the conceptual debates surrounding the enlargement plan into new focus. Our purpose is not to recount the facts or practical considerations related to the offer of admission extended to Central and Eastern European states, but to highlight the

A Conceptual Deadlock

n

disturbing contradictions that these debates raise about the future of security and stability in Europe. We argue that the enlargement formula is proving to be a red herring and cannot resolve issues that are fundamental to peace in Europe. To support our thesis, we will examine the (mostly American) conceptual approaches which argue for and against NATO enlargement. We find that contradictory or nonsensical assertions on a number of points undermine the logic of these approaches. Unless there is a shift in the philosophy of the enlargement plan, it is to be feared that applying these approaches as they stand to NATO in its current form may in the long run ill serve the interests of European security and stability. Does opening up to the East enhance the security of Central and Eastern European states and Europe, or is it occurring at the expense of Russian interests and, consequently, of long-term stability on the European continent? What threat would be countered and what security needs would be met by expanding the Alliance eastward? Is it the purpose to offer Central and Eastern European states guarantees of protection or prospects of economic inclusion in order to ensure greater security and stability? Is NATO necessarily the way to achieve these goals and, if so, can they both be accomplished at the same time? Is there a sustainable future for NATO in a changed security context? What solution could be contemplated which would take into account the political hurdles to enlargement? There are two opposed visions on these questions, based on two very different sets of theoretical literature. We find diverse, even contradictory, opinions on the enlargement plan both within and between these two bodies of literature. These visions yield irreconcilable judgments on the appropriateness of enlargement, with no consensus even among writers from the same school of thought. Consequently, our survey of the literature reveals abundant, but rather confused, debate on the desirability of NATO'S planned eastward move. What we refer to as the "Yalta" and "Maastricht" approaches are the currently dominant views in discussions on enlargement.5 "Yalta" is the geopolitical approach. On this view, the enlargement proposed by NATO in 1997 would enshrine a new (fictional?) partition of Europe, much like the division of Europe, according to myth, by the United States and Russia at Yalta in February 1945. This partition, like the earlier one, reflects prevailing geopolitical realities, which today are dominated by the end of the Cold War. As the victorious powers, the United States and NATO, wishing to control the strategic space vacated in Central and Eastern Europe, have responded favourably to the Central and Eastern European states' request, particularly since these states are seeking protection from hypothetical Russian

12.

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

aggression. However, there is no universal support among theorists for the prospect of a new Yalta, a redesigned partition of Europe, since it poses a yet more serious threat to security than the plight of the Central and Eastern European states, namely Russia's antagonism. The Cold War is over, but will enlargement lead to a "cold peace" between Russia and the United States? American Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Dietrich Genscher did, after all, promise Soviet leaders in February 1990 that they had "no interest in extending NATO to the east."6 There is a paradox here: for NATO, the price of ensuring the security of the Central and Eastern European states is the risk of fostering Russian insecurity, precisely the scenario feared by the eastern candidates for NATO membership. The "Yalta" approach is therefore a controversial solution which offers dubious benefits for European security. Using the theoretical concepts of the structuralrealist school, we shall consider the role of security within the new European geopolitical context. "Maastricht" is the regionalist approach. The 1991 treaty, which came into effect in 1993, fulfils the long-standing desire to develop the European Union (EU), an enterprise that is not without its difficulties. The philosophy of Maastricht is based on peace through integration and institutionalism, which is expected to secure the stability needed to ensure the growth and prosperity of member states European regionalism and the development of European institutions are of interest to NATO insofar as they can offer Central and Eastern European states the advantages of a security community which is able to promote the development and strengthening of democracy and the free market. According to the proponents of this approach, a new regional identity, encouraged by NATO, would stimulate cooperative or common security among the old and new states in the region, an essential condition for peace through integration. But, again, the advocates of the institutional-liberal approach underlying this view are not in agreement that NATO enlargement is the ideal solution for stabilizing the Central and Eastern European states. A number of writers suggest other organizations (such as the EU, the Western European Union [WEU], and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]) as more appropriate than NATO for implementing Maastricht's regionalist philosophy. This view is warranted, since NATO is still essentially a collective defence alliance (unless it were to take over from the weak OSCE, which would then cease to exist). But, in this case, what of OSCE members that do not belong to NATO? And if NATO'S mission is to stimulate cooperative security at the regional level, how can partners (such as Russia) - with which cooperation is just as important as with the Central and Eastern European states, if not more so - be excluded?

A Conceptual Deadlock

13

The conceptual impasse that the debate on enlargement has reached is illustrated by the fact that NATO is attempting to reconcile the "Yalta" and "Maastricht" approaches by operating at both levels at once. But the negative effects of the "Yalta" approach (the Russian factor) are making implementation of a "Maastricht" policy difficult at the security and regional levels. The problematic effects of Maastricht (NATO'S partial unsuitability) are an indication of the obsolescence of the geopolitical arrangements sought by the "Yalta" scheme. Theoretically, the two approaches are mutually exclusive; in our view, NATO'S attempt to pursue both at the same time may well be disappointing (possibly ending in failure on both fronts) for the contradictions between "Yalta" and "Maastricht" will continue to deepen. Ultimately, NATO may leave the Central and Eastern European states and Europe without any real security or stability.

THE "YALTA" APPROACH AND THE CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING A NEW G E O P O L I T I C S In the new geopolitical context that characterizes the post-Cold-War period, is the "Yalta" approach appropriate for planning and justifying NATO enlargement? The structural-realist school of thought offers two general responses to this basic question. The first, based on an analysis of the balance of forces among the great powers, suggests that the old bipolar system could ultimately be replaced by a new one, or by a multipolar system, which enlargement may not be able to prevent and, in fact, could even promote. That NATO continues to exist, despite the lack of a clearly defined military threat, is something of an anomaly, one that has received scant attention from commentators. The second response suggests that strategic order is maintained by hegemony - in this case u.s. hegemony - which can improve prospects for security and stability through enlargement. While the first argument perceives "balancing" as a source of conflict, the second sees "bandwagoning" as a guarantee of stability. In the final analysis, the structural-realists are in no agreement on the desirability of NATO enlargement. The Structural-Realist View and the Future of NATO The structural-realist school of international relations focuses on power relationships between states. It attaches great importance to the system's geopolitical balance (bipolar, multipolar, and so on), which determines the evolution of these relationships. Alliances remain a central element in defining this balance since they bring states together in an effort to establish or preserve a power relationship that provides

14

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

these states with security. That is why, according to this approach, alliances can exist only in a context in which they promote balance and protect their member states from the threat posed by other states and alliances. Alliances are therefore an extension of power politics.7 There are two possible variants of this approach that apply to the specific case of Europe and NATO. 8 One is the "balancing" argument - that is, the need to counter geopolitical threats through the balance of forces - which attributes the existence of alliances to the need for balance. Without threat (especially of a military nature), there would be no need for balance and there would therefore be no alliances.9 Such situations are rare. But, in the view of some structural-realists, there is less justification for an alliance such as NATO in the current European geopolitical context since no threat exists today. "NATO'S days are not numbered, but its years are,"10 writes Kenneth Waltz. On the other hand, in this view, it is not inconceivable that a different balance should one day replace the bipolar system. For example, a multipolar system - which is by definition less stable - could develop, organized around several opposed powers in Europe. Whatever the validity of this view may be, NATO will not be able to forestall the emergence of a new geopolitical balance. As shall be seen, NATO enlargement may even help speed up the reconfiguration of power relationships and transform security conditions. The structural-realists thus view "balancing" as the only criterion for assessing the need for an alliance. And in theory, without a "balancing" function, NATO has no raison d'etre. Other observers question this assertion. Robert McCalla and Fred Chernoff point out that, for the moment, NATO is not reducing but increasing its missions, although there is no military threat.11 John Mearsheimer and Jane Sharp suggest that it is the prospect of a longterm threat that makes it necessary to maintain a symbolic balance against Russian or even German hegemony; without NATO, these could re-emerge in the form of traditional spheres of influence.12 It is therefore unclear whether the demise of the bipolar system signals the disappearance of NATO; it is also not clear that enlargement can ward off a return to forms of "balancing" in Europe. In our view, these considerations must be borne in mind. The other hegemonist argument - the "bandwagoning" one (that is, jumping on a moving train) - postulates a tendency to join the winning power and alliance in times of fundamental change in the international system.'3 Where a hegemonic force exists, in which one country's dominance leads to the emergence of a unipolar system (historically rare and short-lived), states tend to support and tap into this dominance in order to share in the benefits.14 In the case of some countries,

A Conceptual Deadlock

15

even partial backing for the bandwagon can save them, at least in theory, from the primary threat they face. The international system is now in such a "unipolar moment,"15 especially in Europe. With the disappearance of the USSR, small Central and Eastern European countries, the Baltic states, and even Russia are looking to take advantage of the opportunities the rising hegemony is leaving in its wake. It can therefore be said that there has been a particularly pronounced tendency to jump on the u.s. bandwagon since the end of the Cold War. In terms of security, this movement can be explained not by fear of threat but by the opportunity for gain. States are not forced to join the bandwagon; they are voluntarily moving into the winning camp, siding with the most powerful player. Writers who apply a bandwagoning analysis agree that Central and Eastern European states want NATO enlargement not to protect themselves against Russia but to climb aboard the NATO train (they also covet the EU caravan). The debate therefore centres on the scope and feasibility of bandwagoning. There is concern that NATO defence guarantees and missions may become overly diluted - to the point of becoming impracticable - not to mention the fact that some passengers who jump on the train (the Russians, for example) may wish to change its direction. This type of disorderly conduct clearly is not in the interest of u.s. hegemony. The two versions of the structural-realist approach analyse power relations differently. They do not agree on the relevance of NATO as an alliance capable of keeping unknown threats at bay or of rallying "conquered" states such as Russia. The proponents of the "balancing" and "bandwagoning" arguments are thus sharply divided on the issue of enlargement. An Inconclusive Geopolitical Debate on Enlargement In one form or another, realist views on the opening to the East reflect two sets of perceptions. The first view holds that the United States must benefit from the geopolitical void left by the fall of the Soviet empire in Europe (through "bandwagoning") and prevent the rise of a new Russian threat in the long term (far-sighted "balancing"). Proponents of this view support the enlargement plan. The second view is that eastward expansion can lead only to the re-emergence of the Russian threat, producing the opposite of the desired effect (a deadly "debalancing" effect). Consequently, proponents of this view consider the impact on European security to be cause for concern. The pro-enlargement argument is put by a number of realist strategists, including Henry Kissinger, Zbignew Brzezinski, and William Odom.16 Their thesis can be summarized in the following three observations:

16

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

• If NATO does not admit Central and Eastern European states, a strategic void will develop between Germany and Russia, increasing the likelihood of confrontation between these two great powers and the emergence of an unstable, multipolar system in Europe. • The admission process should be launched and completed rapidly to take advantage of Russia's weakness (its military weakness in particular) and prevent Russia from reclaiming its former sphere of influence. • NATO enlargement opens the possibility of a new security architecture in Europe. Although the inclusion of Russia in this architecture is the subject of considerable debate, the realists generally reject as nonsensical the possibility of Russian membership in NATO. These arguments are based on the hope that the "bandwagoning" effect will take hold and on fear that the "balancing" phenomenon will re-emerge. Other realists, such as George Kennan, Michael Mandelbaum, and Michael Brown,17 voice a more pessimistic view, opposed to the realistoptimist argument. Their main points - which reflect a fear that eastward expansion may cause a "debalancing"18 - are: • Russia currently poses no military threat, but hasty enlargement could herald the return to power of a radical nationalist regime in Moscow, creating the equivalent of a Weimar Russia dedicated to rebuilding a security zone in opposition to NATO; for example, the commonwealth of Independent States (cis) might be turned into a military alliance. • Once the enlargement process is under way, Russia would be less inclined to honour disarmament treaties or generally to maintain the climate of trust that has developed between it and the United States, particularly since it would fear further eastward moves by NATO, drawing ever closer to its borders. • If Central and Eastern European states truly feel threatened, why are they scaling back their military forces (albeit redeployed to the east) and why have countries with legitimate concerns, such as Ukraine, expressed no intention of joining NATO ? In reality, there is no strategic void in Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the enlargement formula raises the whole question of exclusion that is, the discrimiNATory treatment meted out to the countries that want to join NATO but are being shut out of the process (at least for now). • A new security architecture already exists in the form of "common security" (to use Mandelbaum's expression). It has yielded the

A Conceptual Deadlock

17

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (start) and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) disarmament agreements, confidence-building measures, and the shift towards defensive military doctrines. In seeking a military alliance with the Central and Eastern European states, NATO would be undermining the progress of common security in favour of a conception of defence rendered obsolete by the end of the Cold War. While they attach considerable importance to security for Central and Eastern European states, the geopolitical arguments for and against the "Yalta" approach focus mainly on the Russian question. The real issue raised by the structural-realist analysis is how it is possible to come to terms with Russian power, not to which Central and Eastern European states security should be offered or when. As it stands, the enlargement plan barely touches on this point, though it is fundamental to peace.

THE "MAASTRICHT" APPROACH AND THE HOPES INVESTED IN R E G I O N A L I S M "Maastricht" is the second major approach to NATO enlargement. We have defined it as the regionalist path, an attempt to develop and consolidate a European economic, political, and security space founded on integration and institutionalism.19 While proponents of this view do not dismiss the existence of power relationships between states, they argue that conditions in Europe today are such that states are seeking prosperity and security through cooperation. The Maastricht treaty reflects this desire for peace, secured not through geopolitical balance but through regional stability. Stability is produced by three factors propounded by three complementary points of view, all belonging to the institutional-liberal school of thought on international relations: cooperative security, democratic peace, and economic interdependence. Their implications for the debate on NATO enlargement are to complicate further the question of how Russia and the Central and Eastern European states should be treated, insofar as traditional defence concerns are giving way to a broader perspective on the attainment of stability. The Institutional-Liberal View and the Future of NATO Without security there is little hope for trade and prosperity, but without trade and prosperity security remains an illusion. This is the classic chicken-or-egg dilemma. Theoreticians of the realist school adhere to the first axiom, whereas institutional-liberals are convinced

18

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

that the second holds true.10 The dilemma may never be resolved, although interdependence and cooperation are more important today than in the past. They are redefining national and regional identities to a point where, at the close of the twentieth century, security is being viewed less than ever before in military terms. In this context, alliances are tending to change their vocation. Whereas they once were instruments of power, they are now becoming tools for the dissemination and sharing of security, values, and resources. This sharing signifies a decline in national interests and an expansion of the collective benefits that assure stable change in international relations. The institutionalliberal position can be subdivided into three theses: on security, politics, and economics. The security thesis affirms that institutions such as NATO reduce the significance of often divergent national interests by forcing states to negotiate and to respect common principles and standards.21 Multilateral cooperation is thereby favoured by member countries since their ability to resolve security problems by themselves is minimal. This is even more true when problems are non-military in nature. The growing interdependence of nations (with regard to refugees, human rights, terrorism, the drug trade, illegal transfers of technology, and so on) makes multilateral institutions particularly well suited to coordinating national policies. States appreciate and back such institutions, not because of threats against them, but because they facilitate mutual cooperation. This philosophy differs significantly from that of the structural-realists. In terms of security, cooperation translates into the institutionalization of mechanisms for consultation, crisis prevention, peacekeeping, military transparency, confidence-building, and disarmament. (However, not everyone agrees that it is the role of NATO to transform itself along these lines.) Allen Sens puts the question incisively: "If NATO no longer stands against the threat of the Soviet Union, then what does it stand /or?" 22 Many writers believe that revamping the Alliance reinforces the security community and consolidates European stability, to which NATO has always made a contribution.23 The examples of the CJTF, the nacc, and the PFP confirm the success of multilateralism in various areas of cooperation. Nevertheless, writers such as Josef Joffe and Michael Mandelbaum seriously doubt that NATO can transform itself into an organization for crisis management and peacekeeping - the successes of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia notwithstanding.14 Others wonder if NATO is really better qualified than the OSCE to carry out the new missions of cooperative security. In the opinion of Peter Schulze, the OSCE precisely matches the institutionalists' profile of a security community that can reinforce

A Conceptual Deadlock

19

cooperation - especially since the OSCE has carried out its tasks more effectively since the end of the Cold War and, in contrast to NATO, includes the former Soviet adversary as well as all the Central and Eastern European states.25 The political thesis may be summarized as the beneficial effects of a "democratic peace." It postulates that democracies avoid combat since they tend to share a community of identical values and to promote ever greater interdependence/ 6 When confidence reigns among elites and in the community as a whole, peace is assured by support for the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Traditionally, the principal causes of war have included those that relate to the internal situations of states, whether these reflect the nature of their political regimes, their ideologies, their ethnic and secessionist problems, or even their levels of militarism/ 7 For proponents of the democratic thesis, it is precisely the growing identification with liberal values (what an American writer calls the "we-feeling") which determines the chances for a durable peace in Europe. Is NATO necessary in a Europe that already includes a large majority of peaceful liberal democracies? Over the years the Alliance has contributed to containing crises involving some of its members - the dispute between Greece and Turkey comes to mind. As such, to use a formulation by Karl Deutsch revived by Emanuel Adler and endorsed by Thomas Risse-Kappen, it acts as a political alliance with a view to maintaining or reinforcing, among other things, democratic norms although this was contradicted by the era of authoritarian regimes in Greece, Turkey, and Portugal.28 In fact, as suggested by recent studies, the danger to security may also originate in the very process of democratization, since elites may dread the spread of values contrary to their interests.29 If the existence of NATO is based on the spread of democratic values, a segment of Russia's political elite might fear for its safety and oppose a "democratic peace." Thus, when a security community propagates values that originate beyond the frontiers of the Alliance, it must take into account the need for a transition period. The economic thesis seeks the reinforcement of regionalism through the adoption and consolidation of free markets, which inevitably create enhanced security. This results from the production and distribution of wealth as well as from increased trade, which make national and regional economies more interdependent. Such is the view of Richard Rosecrance, who believes that the achievement of economic security will in the future constitute the main objective of states, including, and perhaps especially, those he calls "late developers," such as the Central and Eastern European states and Russia.30 Stability flows from economic rather than military deterrence. This deterrence is effective to

2.o

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

the extent that it becomes impossible - unless one wishes to jeopardize one's survival - to elude strategies for trade and investment within regions and between blocs. Owing to the impossibility of avoiding the trend towards integration, which is led by regional and international coalitions, no great power can consider autarchy. According to Rosecrance, this outcome has the effect of gradually decreasing chances for conflict, and he notes in particular that "violating all historical precedents, Russia, rather than seeking to balance against this strong central coalition [the EU], is rather trying to join it."31 In this respect, the Russian position greatly resembles that of the Central and Eastern European states, something that can only encourage peace though integration. Institutional-liberals are not counting on NATO to bring stability to Central and Eastern Europe. There are three approaches to achieving economic regionalism. The EU, continuing along the Maastricht and Amsterdam path, contemplates expansion to Central and Eastern Europe - and one day perhaps even to Russia - so as to lessen chances for conflict.3Z The economic alliance replaces the military alliance while reducing Russian security concerns. A more modest approach consists in starting up projects, such as the European Coal and Steel Community of forty years ago, which promote the development of intra-state regional cooperation in a form which is less cumbersome than the EU. 33 Finally, regionalism can develop by way of "super-regions," structures that lie half way between the individual European state and the continental level and that might be more effective in pursuing common economic-integration goals.34 The institutional-liberal school is divided over the relevance of NATO in consolidating the "Maastricht approach." Its supporters are roughly agreed on the benefits of regionalism, but where the enlargement plan is involved, some give more weight to institutions other than NATO. The Unresolved Debate on Regional Enlargement Supporters of the Maastricht approach seek an opening to the East to ensure greater stability for Europe. They nevertheless adopt two contrasting attitudes with regard to NATO: one that perceives the Alliance as an ideal institution for rapidly bringing Central and Eastern European states on board the process of regional integration, and one that judges the Alliance as the least appropriate mechanism for embedding Central and Eastern European states in European regionalism. Once again, this debate barely addresses the basic question of the fate of Russia. The pro-enlargement viewpoint has been advanced by, among others, Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, Stephen Larrabee, Allen Sens,

A Conceptual Deadlock

2.1

Steve Weber, and, from an official perspective, Strobe Talbott.35 Their reasoning contains three basic ideas: • The fragile democracies of Central and Eastern Europe must be stabilized. If the process of democratization were to suffer a setback, the costs would be immense, in fact much greater than those associated with expanding NATO. Every case of incomplete democratization would in all likelihood seriously undermine efforts to prevent new territorial, irredentist, and ethnic conflicts. • Enlargement would provide the small Central and Eastern European states with all the benefits of multilateral security, benefits that are fundamental to the policy objectives of theses states: in a climate of reduced uncertainty, a significant benefit in itself, Central and Eastern European states would gain the opportunity to influence decisions made by the great powers as well as to make their own voices heard. • NATO'S eastward enlargement must be carried out in tandem with other institutions, such as the EU, since Central and Eastern European states require both economic growth and security. The admission timetables for NATO and the EU should therefore be synchronized to achieve coordination among the institutions beyond what now exists. These arguments assign an important role to NATO enlargement in the development of regionalism. The liberal-institutional viewpoint opposed to NATO enlargement has been expressed by writers such as John Newhouse, Emanuel Adler, Philip Zelikow, and Charles William Maynes. 36 Its main tenets are: • The need for stability and democracy has not been challenged by the Central and Eastern European states targeted for expansion. For the foreseeable future none of them runs the risk of political upheaval or ethnic violence. If the "democratic peace" justification is imperative, then it is countries such as Albania, Rumania, Estonia, and even Russia that should immediately be admitted into the Alliance. That, to be sure, would fundamentally transform the nature of NATO, turning it into a larger-than-life OSCE. • The OSCE forum acts precisely as a multilateral mechanism for building a security community in various fields of cooperation among great powers and small states. The OSCE agenda is more closely attuned to the contemporary security situation than is NATO'S traditional defence role. • There should be expansion to Central and Eastern Europe but without NATO. If the purpose is to promote regional stability, then

22

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

institutions such as the WEU and the EU should take the initiative in eastward enlargement before NATO does so. Theoretically, this avenue would increase the economic security of Central and Eastern European states while decreasing the geopolitical insecurity of Russia, which, furthermore, might eventually benefit from the largesse of the EU. "NATO or Tomato?" asks Mandelbaum. "We are going to extend the NATO nuclear umbrella to the Eastern Europeans, so that the Western Europeans won't have to buy their tomatoes. It's like America telling Mexico it can join NATO but not NAFTA." 37 Quite the opposite, maintain the supporters of NATO. One can provide the tomatoes and the (security) basket simultaneously. The debate remains unresolved.

CONCLUSION: R E C O N C I L I N G "YALTA" AND "MAASTRICHT" In the coming months and years, several scenarios will be available to NATO for conceptualizing an eastward move and ensuring security in Europe. According to Richard Kugler, five outcomes are possible38: 1 Following the example of the osce, NATO creates a vast security community. Would this effort be redundant and would it thus expose itself to the problems, such as institutional paralysis, encountered by its sister organization? 2 By way of a transcontinental treaty, NATO sets up a system for collective security. But would this system become an empty shell in which national interests clash and in which consensus is unachievable? 3 The Alliance and the Eastern states continue developing an institutional framework. Would such a strategy needlessly provoke Russia? 4 NATO expands even further. Would hostility grow between Ukraine and the Baltic states, on the one hand, and Russia on the other? 5 An East-West bipolar structure is created once again in Europe, comprised of NATO and the cis, with both strengthened militarily. Would this represent a return to the concept of "balancing"? According to Kugler, the Alliance seems to be opting at the moment for the third path and, consequently, risks having to choose eventually between the fourth and fifth scenarios. This is a prospect whose logic, from the standpoint of peace, is far from reassuring, although a new bipolar structure could in principle be stable from a geopolitical perspective (if one is to believe the structural-realists).

A Conceptual Deadlock

2.3

Though starting with a "Maastricht" approach, NATO would ultimately end up with a "Yalta" strategy. While one may reason that such a development is foreseeable, it would work against the interests of security and stability in Europe. A binary strategy makes no sense if it pursues the benefits of the Maastricht approach but yields the regrettable outcomes of Yalta. To be sure, there are lessons to be learned from each approach and each contains both positive and negative features. As such, the institutional-liberal thesis regarding enlargement seems justified. The "Maastricht" approach can probably co-exist with NATO'S efforts to reinforce regional stability in Europe. On the other hand, the pessimistic structural-realist thesis on the admission of Central and Eastern European states is without doubt well founded. The "Yalta" approach probably indicates the limits of a security built on a new geopolitical division of continental Europe. Thus, the contradictions can be resolved only by taking Russia into account. In the spirit of Lincoln's axiom about making friends of our enemies, we may ask: why expand and concentrate on Central and Eastern European states if the real problem remains the security and exclusion of the Russians? The conceptual impasse that NATO confronts is that, in rewarding Central and Eastern European states, the Alliance is punishing Russia - at least in Russian eyes, unintentional as this might be. This is surely not the real objective of the enlargement plan. Consequently, NATO should conceive both a plan and credible means for rallying the Russians, one that goes beyond the efforts made over the last year (the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the proposal to create a common brigade, and the revision of the CFE Treaty). In our view, NATO must continue to promote regionalism but must also consider the second scenario suggested by Kugler, that of collective security. Such a change in perspective could resolve several of the basic contradictions that beset an enlargement plan located midway between the "Yalta" and "Maastricht" approaches. To state the matter differently, it would be desirable that NATO and not a weak OSCE, which wields no coercive power, "fashion a larger Western community within the framework of a stable security system for the entire region." 39 Although other institutions might fulfil the objectives of cooperative security and regionalism, none is a match for NATO and it is entirely unrealistic to believe that the latter would subordinate itself to another security organization. Clearly, any scenario that includes the downsizing of NATO must be ruled out. What other options are available? One that has until now remained dormant and that might merit revival is the "Geneva" approach - that is, an improved League of Nations adapted to current conditions in

24

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

the European security system.40 In addition, a number of experts are proposing that Europe shift from a system of collective defence to one of collective security. "Europe's peace depends on the transition from alliances to collective security arrangements built on new concepts of common security," argues Beverly Crawford.41 Charles Kupchan suggests that the EU and NATO join efforts to create a new "Atlantic Union" that would seek to strengthen the integrated economic market and establish collective security.42 "Enlargement must be part of an evolutionary process, which could ultimately transform the Alliance into a collective security system which could include Russia," says Allen Sens.43 Zbignew Brzezinski, along with Kupchan and Sens, contemplates Russia joining such a system: "The decision of the Alliance to enlarge its membership should be accompanied by a simultaneous invitation to Russia to help create a new transcontinental system of collective security, one that goes beyond the expansion of NATO proper."44 This idea makes sense and indicates the real security and stability challenge for the Europe of the future: the formal inclusion of Russia in a reorganized NATO dedicated to collective security. Conditions have never been more favourable for putting this idea into practice, and the possibility has long been studied. While the supporters of collective security have always had great difficulty in gaining acceptance for the idea - given the failure of the League of Nations - two trends in the waning years of this century give cause for optimism regarding the feasibility of such a security system.45 First of all, for the first time in its history, all of Europe is evolving inexorably towards a "democratic peace." Secondly, economic security is gradually replacing military security and other traditional forms of defence, owing to growing regional interdependence. These conditions are unique and favour the setting up of a collective-security system. Such a system, moreover, would benefit from the participation of Russia and the preservation of u.s. hegemony, both of which constitute additional conditions needed to ensure the success of Europe. Here is why. Admitted into a NATO moving towards collective security, Russia would be free of its worst anxieties and embrace the advantages of regionalism, "democratic peace," and cooperative security.46 It would grow more peaceful and its behaviour would become more predictable were it permitted to fully enjoy the benefits of the bandwagon effect. Conversion to the principles of institutional liberalism would entail security advantages for Russia. Instead of perpetually regarding Russia as the vanquished of the Cold War, Americans and Europeans would treat it as Germany and Japan were treated after the Second World War or France after the defeat at Waterloo.

A Conceptual Deadlock

25

Also, preservation of an American hegemonic presence within the Alliance will ward off any return to the "balancing" approach, although the chances of such a reversion are slim in any event. It will prevent a "re-nationalization" of defence policies and the constant risk of a security competition among the large European nations, this in spite of the praiseworthy efforts of the Maastricht Treaty to establish a European security system based on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). In particular, the traditional double containment of Russia and Germany, this time within a collective security system, would still have its raison d'etre. The Americans would continue to play the role of "night watchman," their military presence akin to a "sprinkler system," inside the Alliance.47 Finally, the United States's commitment to Europe would be secured since Russia would now be in NATO - a circumstance that might enable it to avoid the fate of the League of Nations seventy years ago.

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CHAPTER

TWO

The Case for Opening up NATO to the East ]ane M.O. Sharp

Today, former adversaries in Western Europe never even contemplate settling disputes between themselves by force. This is the state of affairs we should strive for throughout the continent, by gradually bringing into the fold all those European states that achieve genuine pluralistic democracy, market economies, and a healthy respect for the rule of law. No one advocating the opening of NATO to the new democracies claims that the process will be trouble-free, but this does not undermine the case for spreading the benefits of the Western security community eastwards. As German Defence Minister Volker Riihe put it in October 1993: "If we don't export stability we shall import instability." Western Europe cannot put up a barrier between itself and the former Communist states; it must open up its institutions to those striving to meet Western standards. One obvious benefit of signalling in 1994 that NATO was prepared to take in new members has been the dramatic modification in behaviour since then among those states that aspire to join. Some have accelerated civilian controls over military forces, others have peacefully settled long-standing disputes over minority rights and borders. In January 1997 the Czech government gave a formal "expression of regret" for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia in 1945 and 1946.: Over a number of years Hungary and Romania transformed their relationship with each other, as did Romania, Ukraine, and, to a lesser extent, Hungary and Slovakia.1 In March 1997 the Polish government sacked a general who was unwilling to accept civilian control over Polish military forces.3 Estonia and Latvia both softened their attitudes towards their Russian minorities, not least to make themselves more acceptable partners to the West.4 These actions reflect real progress towards democracy and deserve recognition. Yet, at present, it often appears to Central Europeans (including

z8

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

the Baltic states) that Western governments keep moving the goal posts farther and farther away from full membership in the Western club. Far from aggressively expanding eastwards as some have charged, until 1994 most NATO states were reluctant to take in new members, some because they feared provoking Russia, others because they were not yet ready to provide security throughout Europe. The initiative for enlargement came not from NATO but from the former Warsaw Pact states who in 1991 felt themselves in a security vacuum as violence erupted in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. Initially, NATO offered two outreach programs but fell short of offering membership. In December 1991 NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) for all former Warsaw Pact states including all the former Soviet Republics, and in January 1994 it offered the Partnership for Peace (PFP) to the European neutrals as well as to NACC members. It was Germany's interest in stability on its eastern border that finally drove the Alliance to consider accepting new members. Germany also felt, more strongly than the other allies, a heavy responsibility to right the wrongs of Yalta and to bring back into Western Europe those pre-war democracies on whom Moscow had imposed Communist governments in 1945. The other European allies acquiesced, realizing that if NATO did not provide security in Central Europe, sooner or later either Germany or Russia would - thereby taking us back to the uncertainties of the 19305. The Clinton administration did not endorse enlargement until 1994, when Richard Holbrooke returned from his post as U.S. ambassador in Bonn, and only seriously began to communicate the rationale for enlargement to the Congress in early 1997.5 France was perhaps the most resistant to opening up NATO. 6 Even at the NATO ministerial meeting in Sintra, Portugal, in late May 1997, France still seemed reluctant, unless NATO agreed to take in Romania and Slovenia as well as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.7 France is always nervous about too much American influence in NATO, as well as about too much northern as opposed to southern weight in European institutions. ANSWERING

THE

CRITICS

OF

ENLARGEMENT

Will Enlargement Create a Grey Zone Vulnerable to Russia? Some warn that enlargement could create new divisions in Europe, because states left out of the first intake of new members would constitute a new grey zone increasingly vulnerable to pressure from a Russia that would be angered and humiliated by an enlargement which seems to exclude them.8 There might be some grounds for this anxiety

The Case for Opening up NATO to the East

2.9

if NATO had not changed its Cold War priorities and if it planned a one-time intake of the three Central Europeans currently at the head of the queue: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. But NATO has changed from its exclusive focus on collective defence to include a collective-security role, and, as U.S. and German spokesmen repeatedly emphasize, the NATO door will remain open for all those who meet the criteria, even Russia in the long term.9 To quote from an address by President Clinton to West Point graduates in late May 1997: "NATO'S doors will remain open to all those willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities of membership."10 Some Western strategists argue that Russia could never join NATO because the Alliance cannot offer security guarantees against China. Longer-term thinkers, however, adopt a "never say never" approach to Russia because, in the event that Russia did adopt genuine democracy, respect for the rule of law, openness, and civilian control of the military, the world would have become such a different place that NATO too would have to change beyond recognition. Fears that enlargement will provoke Russian president Boris Yeltsin to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus or Kaliningrad, or press the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis) into a new military alliance, appear to be unfounded. Some Russian scholars argue that opposition to NATO enlargement has been exaggerated by equating the extremists in the Duma with the public in general.11 In fact, when in charge of the Russian cabinet, Boris Nemtsov, Anatol Chubais, and the other pragmatists appear to have overruled the isolationists and the expansionist imperialists to persuade Yeltsin to work for better relations with the West parallel to enlargement. 11 Yeltsin accepted Clinton's reassurances in Helsinki, in late March, that NATO would enlarge in a way that was sensitive to Russian concerns, and that Russia could expect not only a partnership with the new NATO but also a closer relationship to the Gj group of industrialized democracies/3 Since the Helsinki summit, far from reacting negatively, Yeltsin has shown a new spirit of cooperation. In Moscow on 12 May 1997, for example, Yeltsin and President Asian Mashkhadov of the Republic of Chechnya signed a second peace agreement, and on 13 June they signed another agreement about the use of 150 kilometres of the Chechen section of the oil pipeline that goes from Azerbaijan to the Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. In addition, Russia lifted its economic blockade of Chechnya.14 In Paris in late May 1997, at the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act (which provides the framework for the new NATO-Russia relationship), Yeltsin announced a less aggressive nuclear targeting policy.15 Since then Yeltsin has signed an agreement with Ukraine, which settled

30

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

several previously outstanding issues including the leasing of the Ukrainian port of Sebastapol to the Russian navy/ 6 In early June, in a dramatic reversal of policy, Yeltsin even began a conciliatory dialogue with Japan.' 7 NATO obviously needs to reinforce this new spirit of conciliation by putting meat on the bones of not only the Founding Act but also the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, a new organization designed to prepare non-NATO states to work with NATO on crisis management.18 NATO must also make its own planning as transparent and open as possible so that the defensive orientation of the Alliance is unambiguous/ 9 Meanwhile, Western opponents of enlargement would do well to ponder the damage they do by encouraging Russian nationalists and xenophobes to believe that NATO has not changed since the end of the Cold War and still sees Russia as an adversary. Far more constructive are those who encourage Russians across the political spectrum to appreciate the extent to which Western governments are thoroughly invested in Russian reform. Many critics of enlargement seem surprisingly ignorant of the ways in which NATO has already changed during the 19908. NATO governments have cut their defence budgets, pulled back nuclear and conventional forces, replaced their former adversarial doctrines with polices that emphasize cooperation and conciliation, and invested substantial sums in helping Russia to clean up its nuclear-power plants and safely dismantle excess nuclear warheads/ 0 NATO governments also tolerated Russian violations of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty in November 1995, and they made significant efforts to meet Russian concerns at the May 1996 CFE review conference by redrawing the flank zone and permitting higher limits for Russia/1 NATO has also made further concessions to the Russians in the negotiations now under way to adapt the CFE treaty/2 NATO can still draw on a formidable military capability, but it can hardly be described as an offensive alliance. Indeed, the only operations that NATO has conducted since its inception in 1949 are air strikes on behalf of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 199495 and peace-enforcement operations (Implementation Force/Stabilization Force, or IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia since January 1996. In these operations, far from being belligerent, NATO has been criticized for being combat-shy and risk-averse. Why Not Enlarge the EU or the WEU instead? Some critics of enlargement, especially in Washington and Moscow, argue that Central Europeans are being thrown the bone of NATO membership to compensate for exclusion from the European Union

The Case for Opening up NATO to the East

31

(EU). Central Europeans, however, do not see these two organizations as alternatives, but as complementary; and indeed, all of them have signed association agreements and are on track to join the EU. Membership in both NATO and the EU is logical since, for most Western Europeans, these are the two main institutions that comprise the Western security community. It is true that former neutrals (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) joined the EU but not NATO. But, for several reasons, the Central European states are unlikely to be satisfied with EU membership only. First, unlike the European neutrals, especially Finland and Sweden, which undertake substantial investments in military forces to make their neutrality credible, none of the Central European countries can afford similar investments. Rather, they need to pool their military capability with others to achieve credible defence postures. Second, Central Europeans find it difficult to see the EU as providing anything more than economic security given the EU'S failure to mediate the crises in the former Yugoslavia in 1991-9z. A third problem is that joining the EU means turning one's economic structure and legal system upside down to become compatible with other EU members. The criteria for EU membership are much more demanding than those for joining NATO. As agreed by the EU in Copenhagen in June 1993 and in Madrid in December 1995, in addition to the NATO criteria of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities, EU applicants must also have a fully functioning market economy able to withstand competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; they must adhere to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union; and they must adjust their administrative structures to make them compatible with those of other EU members/ 3 Even fast-track Sweden took five years to achieve EU standards. So even those states that have signed association agreements with the EU will probably take at least a decade to achieve full EU membership. Some prominent American statesmen suggest that enlargement of the Western European Union (WEU) would be less provocative to Russia than enlarging NATO/ 4 Despite some recent attempts to rejuvenate the WEU to perform light peacekeeping duties, and despite efforts by the WEU to offer various degrees of association to the aspirants to EU and NATO, Central Europeans do not regard the WEU as any kind of substitute for NATO. There are at least two reasons. The first is that the operations undertaken by the WEU so far (such as monitoring the arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia and providing police for the divided city of Mostar) have been unimpressive. The WEU now has a planning cell in Brussels, but, as Sir Peter Inge, the recently retired British chief of defence staff, told Defense Week in

32,

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

March 1997, the organization is far from achieving a serious military capability/5 The second reason is that, despite its ambition to be the European pillar of NATO, the WEU has no direct connection to the United States. Like the current European members of the Alliance, aspirants to NATO are convinced that the key function of NATO is to prevent the domination of the continent by either Germany or Russia, a function that, history teaches, requires the engagement of the United States. Why Not Strengthen the OSCE? In 1990 many of those now backing NATO enlargement, including this author, argued that because the Warsaw Pact was manifestly about to collapse, Western governments could accord less priority to NATO and invest more resources in the pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; since 1994, the OSCE) as the main postCold War security organization. Since then, the OSCE'S inability to do anything about the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya has undermined confidence in the organization and reinforced NATO as the security organization of choice. The OSCE can perform useful monitoring and early warning functions, but it is unlikely to be endowed with any military capability by its members states. THE

IMPACT

OF

THE

WAR

IN C H E C H N Y A

Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the reformist Yabloko Party in Russia, asserts that NATO is enlarging because of the Russian war against Chechnya/ 6 This is not quite true, for Central Europeans had already aspired to join NATO in 1991. Yavlinsky is right, however, to point to Chechnya as a factor strengthening the motivation for enlargement. Yavlinsky chastises Yeltsin for his misguided policy in Chechnya, and he also criticizes the West, especially the Clinton administration, for its mindless support of all Yeltsin's actions since 1991, however undemocratic: not only the war in Chechnya, but also the closing of the Russian parliament by force in 1993 as well as non-compliance with the CFE treaty from 1992. to 1995. Yavlinsky claims that Western support for Yeltsin hindered Russian reforms and alienated ordinary Russians. One of the benefits of opening up NATO is to show Russia that, for Western democracies, the interests of small states in the new Europe are just as important as those of big powers - something that Yeltsin is only just beginning to understand. As Yavlinsky argues, Western leaders would have helped Russia more by setting higher standards of state practice than by consistently rewarding bad behaviour.

The Case for Opening up NATO to the East

33

In the event, the lessons of Chechnya for Central Europe were stark and unambiguous. Yeltsin ordered the attack on Chechnya in December 1994 just three days after leaving a CSCE summit meeting in Budapest at which he had signed a code of conduct urging the peaceful resolution of internal conflict. The bombing of civilians in Chechnya not only undermined confidence in Russian reform but also destroyed any vestige of confidence that Central Europeans had in the OSCE. From the perspective of Warsaw, Prague, or Budapest, as long as Russia had the potential to influence the OSCE, that organization was unlikely to generate a European security system based on respect for the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. If anyone had doubts before, Chechnya confirmed the view in Central Europe that NATO was the only organization capable of defending the Western values that Central Europeans crave.27 These are values to which many Russians also aspire. Keeping the NATO door open, and constantly reassuring Russia that NATO'S new priority is collective security for the whole of Europe, is not only the best insurance policy for the smaller powers of Central Europe but also the best hope for transforming Russia itself into a law-abiding and peaceful democracy/8 THE

IMPACT

OF THE

WAR

IN B O S N I A

Had NATO moved with greater speed to prevent the war in Bosnia, as it could well have done by punishing Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic for the bombing of Vukovar and Dubrovnik in 1991, or by deploying preventive forces as requested by President Aliji Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1991, Central Europeans might have been reassured that NATO would protect them even if they remained outside the Alliance, that NATO was (as it later demonstrated) indeed concerned with more than the security of its own members. As it was, however, in the absence of u.s. leadership NATO did not take serious action until mid-1995. The message Central European leaders learned from NATO'S procrastination was that European security was divisible and that, unless states were inside NATO, protection would be uncertain at best. When NATO eventually did act to save Bosnia, it soon became clear that Bosnia had also saved NATO. Before taking decisive action in Bosnia, the direction NATO would take after the Cold War was still uncertain. Then deployment of IFOR in 1996, and of the SFOR that followed in 1997, demonstrated that (as long as the united States is unambiguously in the lead) NATO has the capability for effective peacekeeping and collective security. IFOR and SFOR also reflected the

34

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

success of NATO'S PFP program, which prepared non-NATO partners for effective military action with the allies in joint task forces/9 NATO could do much more to implement the Dayton Accords, but it deserves credit for ending the fighting in 1995 and for preventing the renewal of hostilities. DEALING

WITH

THE

HAVE-NOTS

The NATO operations in Bosnia also began to answer a basic question: what should NATO do about those states that aspire to membership but that will not be in the first tranche? One answer, obviously, is to build up NATO'S PFP to maintain strong military and political links with non-NATO partners, to establish NATO missions in the capitals of partner states, and, where necessary, to take appropriate actions to prevent or contain conflict. NATO cannot do this alone, but with willing partners it can provide the backbone for peace operations throughout Europe. To give credence to NATO'S proclaimed open-door policy, Alliance leaders must now pay at least as much attention to those not in the first tranche as they do to the successful new members.30 It is also clear that those left out of the first intake, like the Baltic states, will be even more anxious to join the EU. The United States will surely pressure its NATO allies who are also major powers in the EU to accelerate the EU accession process. The EU summit in Amsterdam in June 1997 did not give cause for optimism on this score, being devoted to much navel gazing and arguments about monetary union. But the United States is right to apply pressure on the EU, not least to make the internal adjustments in the Common Agricultural Policy and the distribution of structural funds which are preconditions for EU enlargement.

CHAPTER

THREE

Why Spain Should Have Been NATO'S Last Member David Law

Lest the title mislead, this chapter does not take the view that NATO should go out of business. On the contrary, notwithstanding the sea change that has taken place in the strategic environment that gave rise to its founding fifty years ago, the organization remains irreplaceable. NATO binds the two North American democracies to Europe in a way that none of its sister institutions can replicate, and in a way that brings benefits that none of them can provide. It is the only multilateral security institution capable of dealing with anything other than the most minor of military contingencies in Europe, and for that matter and if it were so inclined - anywhere else in today's troubled world. It is the Western democracies' main instrument for their ongoing effort to shore up the security of the transition countries of post-Communist Europe. Beyond that, NATO remains indispensable as a pacifier of bilateral relationships among its traditional members. However, it does not follow, as the champions of NATO enlargement hold, that for others to partake of such benefits, the Atlantic Alliance needs to expand its membership. NATO enlargement, like so much else in life, is too much of a good thing. As the author and many other observers have argued, NATO'S projected expansion of membership does not make good strategic sense and this for three reasons in particular.1 First, enlargement is not fair because, as it has been conceived, it brings into the Alliance first those countries least needing a security umbrella and leaves to later - or leaves out altogether - those needing it most. One can, of course, argue that when it comes to decisions about security, fairness is neither here nor there. Such a standpoint ignores, however, how a sentiment of feeling ill done by can shape a community's security perceptions over the longer term. Second, enlargement is not stabilizing, for at the very least it complicates the delicate process of reordering security

36

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

relationships in post-Cold War Europe - and not just between the West and Russia. But it also runs the risk of engendering substantially more security problems - for new, non-, and old members alike - than the architects of enlargement claim it can resolve. Third, enlargement is in reality not necessary, because NATO has a more efficient and effective way of addressing the security problems of today's and tomorrow's Europe, namely, through further development of the already quite impressive security arrangements organized under NATO'S Partnership for Peace (pfp). With the invitations issued to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland at the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 and the relative ease with which one NATO country after another has ratified the enlargement protocols, it now seems probable that the Alliance will celebrate its fiftieth birthday with three new members.2 William Jefferson Clinton, if he is still in office, will preside over the first expansion of NATO membership since the end of the Cold War, and there will be a collective sigh of relief at NATO headquarters and in nineteen capitals. This chapter argues, however, that the most difficult part of the enlargement process could well lie ahead, after the anniversary summit scheduled for Washington in the spring of 1999.3 POLICY

WITHOUT

STRATEGY

If enlargement is so strategically flawed, how do we explain why the project got off the ground in the first place? In actual fact, the enlargement process was not launched within the Alliance as the result of any serious debate on the strategic imperatives of the times. The enlargement process was initiated because the United States and Germany thought it made political sense, and because they thought that if it made political sense to them, it would by definition make political sense to others - as had almost invariably been the case during the Cold War. For the Clinton administration, but also for the Republican opposition in Congress, enlargement seems to have been driven initially by domestic politics. A first consideration was that enlargement could be electorally useful in strategically located electoral districts with a Central and Eastern European ethnic profile.4 A second consideration was that there was campaign money to be raised from a military/industrial complex seeing dollar signs in NATO expansion, estimated by the State Department to be worth as much as $80 billion dollars in arms sales in the period running up to 2009.5 While the first issue has received some attention, the second issue has been afforded relatively little. It may have been decisive in launching the enlargement initiative.

Why Spain Should Have Been NATO'S Last Member

37

Since the end of the Cold War, defence budgets have been downsized worldwide. In the United States, the amount spent on procurement in 1996 was only half as much as it was ten years earlier. Production lines have shrunk and there is increased competition for markets both at home and abroad. At the same time, weapons systems have become much more expensive to develop. This has led to far-reaching consolidation in the u.s. defence industry. The number of players has been significantly reduced and unemployment in the industry is down by almost half relative to the mid-1980s. In an effort to keep costs manageable, the defence industry has attempted to maximize economies of scale. For example, to maintain the costs of the latest, state-of-the-art, joint fighter aircraft at the level of $30 million per plane - roughly the cost of the F-i6 developed in the 19705 - it is planned to have a production line of 2900 planes, and to this end, to customize models for several countries and services. The bottom line is basically this: the longer the production line, the lower the cost.6 In fact, Alliance membership does not really impose an obligation to purchase expensive weapons systems. Alliance members have widely varying defence profiles, as comparison of the extremely limited capabilities of Iceland and Luxembourg with those of most other NATO members readily demonstrates. Moreover, NATO has made repeatedly clear that it is not in the business of hedging against the kind of Cold War threat that would require new members to make major new procurement expenditures. In December 1997, for example, NATO foreign ministers issued a statement estimating the cost of its first enlargement to be a relatively modest $1.5 billion (u.s.). 7 Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine how certain interests within the American military-industrial complex may have concluded that NATO enlargement would be better for defence sales than the pfp. In the pfp there has been little peer pressure to modernize and standardize. NATO membership, on the other hand, has been associated with a high degree of interoperability of weapons systems. In its 1997 report to the Congress on NATO enlargement, the State Department provided a lengthy list of the kinds of military restructuring new members' militaries might be expected to undergo. This included training of various kinds, ground-force modernization, surface-to-air missile procurement, and air-force modernization, including the procurement of one squadron of refurbished Western combat aircraft per new member.8 It is this kind of numbers that may have convinced u.s. defence manufacturers in the run-up to the 1994 NATO summit to attempt to build support among Democrats and Republicans alike for membership expansion. This coincided with the approach of the u.s. mid-term

38

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

elections and the typically frantic efforts of both parties to raise funds for their campaigns. As it was, defence contractors gave, by conservative estimate, some $7.5 million through Political Action Committees to congressional candidates in 1993-94. In an industry where production of a new fighter aircraft can cost over $2.00 billion, this is a pittance; for u.s. legislators, contributions from the defence sector can be of decisive importance in running for office.9 And, despite NATO attempts to downplay cost concerns, reports coming out of Central and Eastern Europe in 1998 underlined that the push for arms sales by u.s. defence manufacturers was still going strong.10 The calculation in Bonn seems to have quite different. Indeed, Volker Ruhe, the former German defence minister and the first Alliance figure to call publicly for enlargement, is on record as describing the need for new members to acquire new weapons systems as "pure drivel."11 But in Germany as well there was initially no internal debate over the strategic impact of enlargement. Bonn had even less interest than Washington did in embarking on a policy that could lead to serious friction with Russia. Yet, from the perspective of 1993, it must have hardly seemed possible that enlargement would complicate relations with a Russia that only three years earlier had been prepared to swallow German unification. In an absence of strategic concern about Russia, Bonn would be moved by other considerations. Germany, in an Alliance of only sixteen, was at the extreme western edge of post-Communist instability. By bringing its neighbours into the Alliance, Germany could seek to create a buffer zone between itself and Europe's most unstable stretches. The inclusion into NATO of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, all three of which had been primary targets of German capital investment from the early 19905, could have the additional advantage of enhancing confidence about their economic future. Perhaps most important, by taking the lead on enlargement, Germany could help overcome memories of its past role in Mitteleuropa and uneasiness about its possible intentions in the area. Beyond that, how could Germany, which had only recently celebrated its own reunification and the concomitant enlargement of NATO and the European Union (EU) to include the former East Germany, deny to its neighbours what it had gained for itself? IZ If the Washington-Bonn consensus was a precondition for the launching of the enlargement project, the situation in other key capitals was favourable. Paris, for example, preferred to delay EU expansion, fearing the implications for its domestic politics of the serious reform that this would necessitate on the European level. It was therefore prepared to abandon its traditionally minimalist approach to the Alliance and

Why Spain Should Have Been NATO'S Last Member

39

support NATO enlargement as a quick and easy fix that would reduce Central and Eastern European pressures for early EU enlargement. London, on the other hand, wanted to stave off efforts, primarily French-led, to build a European Security and Defence Identity; for Whitehall, enlargement was a way of thwarting plans to push for integration of the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU. Other EU governments would soon come round to similar conclusions. Some acted out of genuine enthusiasm for enlargement; others were simply reluctant to oppose the enlargement initiative once it had become clear that the Clinton White House had become wedded to its consummation. Finally, the issue was driven by the strident demands for membership lodged by the Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles. They had, and continue to have, a strong case for inclusion. They have insisted that they are caught in a security vacuum, that they are natural extensions of the Western and Central European cultural, historical, and economic community, and that they have suffered more than once as a result of strategic neglect on the part of the leading Western democracies. In fact, a major argument in favour of enlargement that could be heard at NATO headquarters in the run-up to the Madrid summit was that the three countries had grown so accustomed to the notion that they would be included in the Alliance, that to disappoint them would have represented a strategic faux pas. This may have been one of the most important factors pushing the process. NATO decision making on enlargement is a classic case of "part to whole" politics. Partial arguments and individual interests came to dominate reflection early on. There was no attempt to review whether and why enlargement might be advantageous from a pan-European standpoint. The issue soon took on a life of its own. At the 1994 NATO summit, the decision was taken "to open a perspective on enlargement." Even though it would take another three and a half years before NATO would actually extend membership invitations, it was already clear at that junction that any further debate among Alliance governments would be about "how, when, and who." Actually, even the "who" question was partially resolved by this time, however unofficially. Barring a major reversal in their internal reform process, the Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles could be more or less certain that they would be among the first invitees.13 From this point on, NATO policy - when not preoccupied with the conflict in Bosnia - was fixated on the question of how to adapt the European security situation to the pending mini-enlargement. This remained true, notwithstanding the emergence of a number of developments that suggested that the light might not be worth the candle. One was the rising opposition to enlargement in traditionally pro-

40

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

NATO policy circles in Alliance countries. A second was the increasing nervousness in Central and Eastern European capitals, other than Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw, as they realized that their prospects for inclusion in the first wave were weak, and that a second and/or third wave would be highly problematic. As an indication of such concerns in the Baltic states, it was quasi-officially rumoured that no enlargement would be preferable to an enlargement that excluded them. Additional difficulties emerged as the question of just how much enlargement was going to cost and who was going to pay for it heated up in the Unites States.14 Then, as NATO struggled to please and appease old, new, possible, and unlikely members, and address their widely conflicting interests, it was confronted with the full complexity of the enlargement project. Finally, NATO'S biggest headache - and the catalyst for many of the other problems - was Russia's sharpening opposition. But for many observers, well before the Madrid summit, "the train had left the station." This chapter now looks at some of the more daunting challenges that the conductors of this train will have to contend with as it makes its journey through the Europe of the turning millennium. 15

"EDUCATING RUSSIA" NATO has consistently radiated optimism about its ability to bring the enlargement process to a successful conclusion. Its assumption has been, that with sound arguments, the occasional concession, and new institutional devices, it would prove possible to overcome the reservations and scepticism that have accompanied the project in some European capitals from the beginning. This hope has been particularly on display in NATO'S attitude towards Russia. One argument put forward by the proponents of enlargement has been that Russia needs NATO as a pole of stability for its own reform process. An example sometimes cited is the way Moscow took advantage of the Alliance's extended "hand of friendship" during the decisive days of August 1991, in particular when Boris Yeltsin made his famous phone call to then secretary general Manfred Worner at NATO headquarters to appeal for the organization's continuing support for Russia's embryonic democracy. This argument finds its continuation in the idea that the charter on Russia-NATO relations and the NATO-Russia Council that have been agreed to as part of the enlargement process can be of similar utility. A related notion is that enlargement will bring concrete benefits for Russian security, because it will have a stabilizing effect on European security in general and on Russia's western flank in particular. With

Why Spain Should Have Been NATO'S Last Member

41

Central and Eastern European countries tidily tucked into the Alliance - so the argument goes - there will be much less risk of instability in their relations, and hence much less for Russia to worry about to its west. A third aspect is the Alliance's stated determination to go the extra mile in meeting any Russian concerns that are in its view reasonable. NATO has, in fact, worked hard to make enlargement decision making fully transparent to Russia, keeping it informed of developments as necessary and as possible. "No surprises" has been the proviso as the process has unfolded. A further argument has been the slow pace with which NATO has moved ahead on the enlargement front. Most important, NATO has pledged that its defence posture on new members' territory will be non-threatening. While not prepared to promise not to station nuclear weapons or troops on the territory of new members under any circumstances, Alliance officials have said that there is "no plan, no reason and no intention" to deploy either.16 The fourth part of the NATO'S sales pitch is that it recognizes Russia's apprehension about exclusion and the need to include it as appropriate. Just as the Alliance wanted Russia to participate in the pfp, it now wants the relationship to develop further through the NATO-Russia Council. The view is that, if Russia is going to be excluded, it will be because of decisions in Moscow, not in Brussels. At the same time, NATO members have taken measures to open the door of other institutions. Russia was admitted the Council of Europe in 1996 and to the G7 at its 1997 meeting in Denver.17 Finally, there is the as yet very hazy idea of possible membership for Russia in the Alliance, an idea not necessarily excluded by the United States and some other NATO members but by no means uniformly accepted in the Alliance.18 In addition to this quasi-official view, a number of other perspectives on Russia are at work in NATO decision making. One is that Russia will ultimately overcome its objections to enlargement, even if it remains in disagreement in principle. While by no means an official line, this perspective figures strongly in Alliance thinking. It is underpinned by the notion that Russia has been brought around in the past when the price was right and there are no reasons to believe this cannot continue to be the norm in future. This view is fed by two assumptions about Russia's situation and interests. The first idea is that the country is financially "on the make" and can be bought with new injections of capital. Whether this kind of horse-trading actually exists is difficult to prove. It is worth noting, however, that after the Madrid summit, such Western-dominated institutions as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank took a number of initiatives designed to ease the Russian government's liquidity problems. 19 The second

42

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

assumption idea is that Russia is strategically "on the make" and can be persuaded to fall into line through Western concessions on arms control, especially in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) context, and tacit Western agreement to treat the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis) as Russia's sphere of influence.20 Again a direct connection is difficult to prove. Russia did, however, obtain de facto recognition of some of the adjustments it had demanded in the CFE treaty in an "agreement in principle" to revise certain clauses that was reached in July 1997.2I Another standpoint, thankfully much less widespread, is that it does not really matter an awful lot whether Russia accepts NATO enlargement or not. In this view, Russia's lowly post- Cold War status means that it is no longer is a key consideration in Alliance decision making. Put another way, Russia can like NATO enlargement it or lump it and if it lumps it, it is simply too weak or ineffectual for this to make much of a difference. Still another view is that Russia is on its own trajectory and that, no matter what NATO does, it will again become the "bad guy" of European politics. It is, therefore, incumbent on NATO to act now while it still can and to use the available window of opportunity to build a strong anti-Russian alliance. Whether intended or not, this is the kind of thinking that seems likely to become self-fulfilling. A related view from Henry Kissinger, one of the patrons of the realist school of international relations, is that NATO has already given Moscow too much of droit de regard over its own decision making by virtue of the Russia-NATO Council.22 WHY

RUSSIA

WON'T

BUY

With the membership invitations extended, and ratification proceeding smoothly, the NATO-Russia debate over the pros and cons of enlargement has lost much of its earlier prominence. Nevertheless, fundamental differences persist, and the possibility of new tensions over the pending new memberships and any others that may follow should not be excluded. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, opposition to enlargement has been shown to pay. NATO efforts to persuade Russia to accept enlargement have encouraged Russia to "play hard to get" on issues that it might otherwise have been more prone to resolving in cooperation with the West. The Yeltsin government cannot overplay this hand, particularly in view of its financial dependence on the West. Still, it would seem to enjoy a certain amount of room for manoeuvre, especially in the area of arms control and disarmament.23 At the same

Why Spain Should Have Been NATO'S Last Member

43

time, NATO efforts to placate Russia through the creation of the NATORussia Council can have the effect of fostering precisely those feelings of Russian superiority in European affairs that the Alliance should be encouraging it to shed. The organization has made a point of practising "one country, one vote," notwithstanding the huge disparities in the profiles of its members. It has been disconcerting to see it promoting a framework for consultation with Russia that de facto acknowledges in the NATO context the superior power position in Central and Eastern Europe and the cis to which part of the Russian elite continues to aspire.14 The traditional allies of the United States would never have bestowed on it such a status within the Alliance, even in the unlikely event that they had been petitioned to this effect. Second, a good case can be made for the probability that enlargement will lead to a deterioration of Russia's security situation. The main problems here are not in the area of CFE ceilings or NATO intentions, but concern the impact of enlargement on stability in Central and Eastern Europe and on the cohesion of the Russian Federation.15 With regard to Central and Eastern Europe, there are reasons for being apprehensive about the impact of enlargement on relations between those states that are slated to join in the first wave of enlargement, and those hoping to be included in a later phase or doubting their future chances altogether. Romania, for example, worked hard in the run-up to the Madrid summit to address issues that could stand in the way of its accession to the Alliance. It sought to resolve problems in its relations with its Ukrainian and Hungarian neighbours and to meet the concerns of its sizeable Hungarian minority. In acknowledgement of this, the Romanian candidacy received much support prior to the Madrid summit and was rewarded with a half-promise that it would be included in the next wave of enlargement. But, as doubts have grown about the likelihood of the second enlargement, extreme nationalist forces in Romanian politics have been strengthened at the expense of the moderate nationalists who have dominated the government in recent years. At the same time, Hungary's new government, elected in June 1998, has signalled its determination to do more for the two million Hungarians living in adjacent countries.16 To bring one country in while leaving the other out could make it extremely difficult for the two countries to manage their bilateral security relationship. Similar problems can arise between other countries that share ethnic or religious, communities and/or difficult pasts, and that find themselves on opposite sides of the enlargement divide. A related concern is the evolution of new members' policies towards Russia. Will anti-Russian revanchisme in Central and Eastern Europe

44

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

be encouraged or checked by enlargement? In neither instance is the track record of security institutions encouraging. Joint Greek-Turkish membership in the Alliance certainly helped efforts to check bilateral friction during the Cold War, but it is questionable to what extent this can be relied to keep conflict at bay under current strategic circumstances. Nor has the experience of the WEU, where Greece enjoys full membership but Turkey only associate status, been encouraging in this regard. Another set of strategic concerns relates to the cohesion of Russia and the viability of the cis as a vehicle for addressing common problems in post-Soviet territory. Russia can be forgiven for being apprehensive about the impact of Central and Eastern European integration on postSoviet space. This could strengthen centrifugal forces in the Russian Federation, for example, in Kaliningrad. NATO membership for the Baltic states, and perhaps in time for Ukraine, would lock sizeable Russian and Russian-speaking communities into a different security community, and position at Russia's doorstep the world's most powerful military alliance. It is unrealistic for the West to expect that Russia will not be alarmed by this prospect. Already, the enlargement process has encouraged Yeltsin's government to drop earlier reservations and move closer towards Lukashenka's unreforming Belarus.27 The result - a Potemkin-like Union - is less important than the direction. The efforts of the Baltic countries to distance themselves from the near abroad have also raised concerns in Moscow. For example, then foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov warned after the Yeltsin-Clinton summit in Helsinki in March 1997 that inclusion of the Baltic states would irrevocably compromise the Russia-NATO relationship/8 The third reason why Moscow will continue to resist enlargement is that from a Russian perspective, it symbolizes the West's lack of preparedness to seek Russia's integration into the post-Cold War Western-led community. The contrast with other post-Communist states and particularly neighbouring Poland - is akin to a Western vote of non-confidence in Yeltsin's government and the prospects for the reform process. In the Russian domestic debate, this can be used as a dagger in the government's back. For example, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov castigated the results of the Clinton-Yeltsin summit as a crushing defeat for the government's foreign policy. In the Duma two weeks prior to the summit, a vote opposing NATO enlargement was supported by 300 to i. Z9 Yeltsin's position is too weak, his relations with the West have been too close, and the resistance in the Duma is too strong for him to accept enlargement on any terms short of Russia receiving a veto over NATO decision making. For obvious reasons, this will not be forthcoming. His only option is to put on a

Why Spain Should Have Been NATO'S Last Member

45

brave face and to argue that the NATO-Russia Council can be used to limit the damage to Russian interests. Beyond that, for Russians in and outside the government committed to working for the normalization and modernization of their country, enlargement is a threatening diversion. For those in the Duma who wish to focus the country's energies on building a strong military in a strong state and who press for Soviet Reunion, however, enlargement can be a welcome ally. In particular, it can serve as the centrepiece of future attempts to rally the masses around political programs featuring anti-Western policies. A R I S I N G RUS SIAN REVANCHIST STATE?

As yet there is little sign that Russia's beleaguered population is overly concerned about NATO enlargement and Russia's responses. However, in a community that has been invaded on four occasions from the West in as many centuries, this can change. In the 19905, for the first time in its modern history, Russia has had an opportunity to devise a broadly based foreign policy that is not predicated on the country being challenged by an imminently menacing national or a class enemy. Enlargement seems set to narrow the opportunities for Russia escaping from this historical pattern. In its reaction, Russia can prove strategically bothersome to the West over the short term. The really crucial issue, however, is what impact it will have on post-Yeltsin governments, on those who are now learning their political trade, trying to win a public profile for themselves and reflecting on political platforms for the first decade of the next millennium. History never repeats itself exactly, but there are some disconcerting parallels between Germany's development after the First World War and that of Russia after the Cold War. Yeltsin's Russia now, like preHitler Germany then, is locked in an economic hypercrisis. Yeltsin's Russia faces the prospect of exclusion, just as pre-Hitler Germany was excluded from the post-First World War order. After 1918, Germany's exclusion had a major impact on the debate between those in the country who wanted to seek accommodation with the winners of the war and the traditionalists who sought to keep Germany anchored in the East. Exclusion from the Versailles order decided the debate in favour of the latter and paved the way for the Rapallo Treaty of 1912.. This in turn set the stage for the strategic cooperation that was the stuff of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. Russia's modern-day exclusion increases the likelihood of Russian participation in the anti-Western coalitions of the next decade.

46

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

While this parallel should not be taken too far, the possibility of developments such as a Sino-Russian Rapallo cannot be entirely dismissed.30 The crisis-management systems of post-First World War and post-Cold War are similarly weak. The League of Nations failed because Germany and Russia were excluded, and the united States excluded itself. The European security architecture of the 19908 can yet fail because of a combination of factors, including Russia's exclusion, exaggerated expectations of the role the united States is prepared to play in European security in the post-Cold War era, and the inadequate contribution of the developed European states to their own security affairs. We will return to the issue in the concluding section. For the time being, the point to be stressed is that, from a Russian perspective, NATO enlargement can constitute a bifurcation point in the country's development. NATO-Russia strategic partnerships, charters, and councils are well meaning, but these are diplomatic constructs that fail to seize the deeper-lying issues shaping Russia's future. THE

SOLANA

SCHEDULE

Symptomatic of this approach is NATO Secretary General Javier Solana's view of how the enlargement process will unfold, as related to a group of Russia experts visiting the Alliance in the spring of 1997.31 For the secretary general, enlargement is a process of security "socialization" that will do for the new Central and Eastern European members what it did for his own country when it emerged from Franquist dictatorship two decades ago. Moreover, it is for him an ongoing process that, in the ten-year period stretching from the Alliance's fiftieth to its sixtieth anniversary, will see, in three or four additional waves of enlargement, all the (current) twelve would-be members of NATO joining the Alliance. The deadlines laid out by the secretary general - the signing of the Russia-NATO Charter in May 1997, the invitations issued at the Madrid summit in July 1997, the preparation of the protocols of accession by the end of 1997 - have so far all been met with ease. But schedules for playing out political agendas can be notoriously inexact. Take that of the Spanish accession to the Alliance. If there had not been a change in government in Madrid in 1982, Spain's process of accession would have been simple and straightforward. As it was, the assumption of power of the Spanish Socialists - Solana's party - led to a freezing of Spain's status in the Alliance. Four years then transpired before a referendum could be organized on the principle and on the terms of Spanish membership. While a majority of the electorate supported NATO membership, the referendum text stipulated inter alia

Why Spain Should Have Been NATO'S Last Member

47

that Spain would stay out of NATO'S integrated military structure. It was to be the next decade before negotiations could be completed on the "coordination" agreements required to govern the relationship between Spain's national forces and the integrated forces of the Alliance. Then, in 1996, following another change in government, Madrid announced that it wished Spain to participate fully in the integrated military structure. At the July 1997 summit, it was confirmed that Spain would reintegrate once NATO had completed its review of its command structure. With the completion of this process in the leadup to the December 1997 NATO foreign ministers' meeting, the way was free for Spain to become a full member of the Alliance - no less than fifteen years after the country's original accession. This does not need to be the way of NATO'S next new members. It could, however, well be. The domestic political circumstances of the three invited states are rather more complicated than those of NATO'S last new member, as are their relations with neighbouring states, large and small. The then Soviet Union was hardly a major consideration in Spanish decision making in the 19808. By the end of 1997, two referenda on enlargement had already taken place in Central and Eastern Europe: in Slovakia, whose membership bid was rejected at the Madrid summit, and in successful Hungary. The Solana schedule will also encounter obstacles if, as we have suggested, an overall worsening of security relations in Europe accompanies the first wave of enlargement. Just how far this could go is clearly difficult to assess. While a return to Cold War politics can be safely excluded, we could witness a resurrection of some of the more disconcerting strategic realities of the Cold War. If there is growing apprehension over the security situation, NATO could find itself addressing the issue of how new members interests are to be defended in more detail and under more pressure than appeared likely when new memberships were first embraced as a policy option. This could mean new debates about the high cost of enlargement. More seriously, it could give enhanced prominence to questions of nuclear defence and nuclear roles.32 This could prove particularly problematic if the Alliance fails to wrap up rapidly the review of the Strategic Concept that was announced at the December 1997 foreign ministerial meeting.33 Against this background, NATO may begin its second half-century with more new problems than new members, and in several respects a more fragile institutional framework, much less capable of playing a stabilizing role. Already in the lead-up to enlargement, institutional arrangements seem to have become hopelessly complex. Post-Madrid, NATO consultations on political issues are configured at sixteen (the existing members), at 16 + i (the existing members with both Russia

48

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

and Ukraine), at 16 + 3 (with the three invitees), at 16 + 28 (in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), and at another version of 16 + i (with each of NATO'S six Mediterranean partners). It remains to be seen what will be the impact on this institutional hydra when the NATO core group passes from sixteen to nineteen. In the wake of enlargement, the structure for European security may be weakened on a number of fronts. The Organization on Security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the only all-inclusive security institution in Europe and the only one in which all European states enjoy equal status. It may find its effectiveness undercut once countries, for which it was the sole institutional home when the Warsaw Pact folded, join the Alliance. Similarly, Alliance enlargement raises questions about the future memberships of the WEU and the EU, and about the congruity of their rosters with those of both NATO and one another. For the time being, all ten full members of the WEU are members of both the Alliance and the EU. The next phase of EU enlargement is to make members of not only the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, but also Cyprus, Slovenia, and Estonia. Theoretically, this should be manageable as long as the latter three countries opt for a status similar to that of the four members that are not members of the EU - Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and Austria. But the security traditions of these states are as different as night from day. It seems unlikely that the newcomers will bend their identities to meet the requirements of European institutional coherence. All this promises to discourage the Alliance from undertaking a second round of enlargement. Should the Alliance limit itself to nineteen members, this would put the countries that have wanted to join NATO but have not been invited for the first round of enlargement in an even more difficult situation than if there had been no enlargement at all. The air in their security vacuum will become correspondingly lighter. For some of the second-round hopefuls, the process of adjusting to non-inclusion may have already started. For example, the Romanian prime minister has acknowledged that it is "unlikely" that his country will be invited to join NATO in 1999 and "more realistic" to view membership as "possible" between 2000 and 2003. He has also warned that there should be no repeat of the "hysteria" that accompanied Romania's membership bid in i99y. 34 Any number of Eastern capitals, including Moscow, would welcome a successful effort to downplay the urgency and importance of the membership issue. But this will not be easy. NATO'S fiftieth anniversary will not be a quiet affair, and enlargement fortunes and failures easily lend themselves to domestic political infighting. This points to the fundamental dilemma that has underlain the enlargement project from its very inception.

Why Spain Should Have Been NATO'S Last Member

49

While any enlargement at all is anathema to Moscow, too much enlargement is worse still; too little enlargement, on the other hand, can mean a deterioration in the security situation of the non-included Central and Eastern European states. THE

ALLIANCE

THAT

IS

NO

LONGER

There is a twofold irony about NATO enlargement that has thus far received little attention. One part of this irony is that the NATO that Central and Eastern European countries have been lining up to join no longer exists. The second part is that, for the reasons outlined above, enlargement may well end up calling into question the NATO that still does, with unfortunate consequences for European security as a whole. NATO is no longer the NATO it was during the Cold War in several respects. One relates to the security guarantee embodied in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This foresees that "an armed attack against one or more of [the member nations] in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all." Actually, there was never anything automatic about this guarantee; a decision to go to war as an Alliance, as with any other NATO decision, requires a consensus decision. In practice, however, this article became associated with "automaticity" owing to the strategic circumstances of the Cold War, the existence of the nuclear threat, and the likelihood that any shooting war pitting NATO and Warsaw Pact countries against one another would invariably involve a nuclear exchange. This perspective assumed that members would have very little leeway, if any at all, in deciding whether or not to defend an ally. In the strategic circumstances of postCold War, not only have Article 5 contingencies become highly unlikely but the prospect that mutual guarantees would actually be acted upon in such contingencies is extremely questionable. This change in the quality of Article 5 was already signalled in the fall of 1990 when there was considerable hesitation within the Alliance about taking measures to reinforce Turkey, at that time facing a menacing Saddam Hussein.35 In the meantime, it has become clear that, whether NATO countries are prepared to do battle for a just cause has little to do with membership considerations. Bosnia is not a member, nor of course is Kosovo; membership is not currently an issue for either. As argued above, today's NATO remains the most effective multilateral security organization in Europe, perhaps anywhere. But this is a NATO that is far removed from the organization that enjoyed a virtual monopoly over Western security affairs during the Cold War. In the 19905, the pattern is for NATO to share, and sometimes contest,

50

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

responsibility with other institutions. Similarly, NATO countries can find themselves, as in Bosnia, participating in coalitions whose nonNATO member countries outnumber them. This underscores that NATO membership is no longer the badge of exclusivity that it once was. But it also says that it makes little sense to approach the issues of interoperability and joint training from any context other than that of the pfp. A third feature of "the Alliance that no longer exists" concerns the American role. One of the most compelling attractions of NATO has been the link it provides with the North American democracies, and particularly the United States. But the nature of this link has evolved considerably. During the Cold War, NATO was associated with unflinching U.S. leadership, and U.S. leadership was associated with NATO. This has changed. Post-Cold War, the united States has reduced its involvement. It has also signalled that it will no longer always wish to take the lead in the continent's security. Washington will follow a credible Euro-lead, but short of that, the best Europe can expect is the kind of temperamental shifting between neo-leadership and neoisolationism that the White House has put on display in the Yugoslav saga. As U.S. attitudes about American involvement in European security have evolved, so have their institutional manifestations. The transatlantic link is no longer the exclusive property of NATO. In the Europe of the 19905, it has more diverse but also more modest dimensions: the bilateral arrangement with the EU, the Concert-like function in the OSCE and the Contact Group, and the pivotal pan-European role in pfp. To conclude, NATO membership offers little that could not have been better provided for elsewhere, without the negative repercussions for European security generated by Alliance politics of inclusion and exclusion. The pfp, now five years old, offers a flexible self-differentiating framework for security cooperation. It has an impressive track record as a school for preparing multilateral security cooperation. It offers participating countries the opportunity to request consultations when faced with serious security challenges.36 Working in tandem with the pfp is the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. With its forty-four members, it constitutes a framework for political consultation that is even more inclusive than its predecessor, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. These two institutions provide all European countries that are so inclined with a post-Cold War version of the transatlantic link - downsized, more diffuse, and less dependable. That is about as much America as can be hoped for in today's Europe. But it is already quite a lot. The challenge now for those who have the Alliance's best interests at heart will be to ensure that enlargement does not end up putting all of this at irreparable risk. 37

CHAPTER

FOUR

Will Enlargement Succeed? Richard L. Kugler

When the controversial idea of enlarging NATO burst upon the public scene in 1994, it gave rise to an impassioned debate over a single burning issue: Is NATO enlargement a good idea and should it become u.s. policy? Although this debate continues with undiminished fervour in many places today, the past few months have brought important policy changes that are altering the terms of reference for thinking about enlargement, and for quarrelling about it. The issue of whether NATO will enlarge is now all but settled. Like it or not, NATO is going to enlarge, and soon. As a result, a new issue is likely to come to the forefront: Will enlargement succeed? Will it be carried out in ways that actually bring about the powerful strategic benefits it is intended to produce? Or will it fall on its face and produce a disaster - or a mess and a dud? These important questions are only in the kindling stage today, but soon they may start burning, for their answers are not obvious. With these questions foremost in mind, this chapter addresses the benefits, costs, and risks of NATO enlargement. In particular, it analyses how these critical performance indicators are likely to be affected by the political-military strategy chosen by NATO for implementing enlargement. There are many different strategies for enlargement, and NATO has not yet determined which one to pursue. The strategy chosen by NATO will be key to determining whether enlargement evolves into a success or a failure. Consequently, this chapter offers some insights on how the benefits, costs, and risks are likely to play out as a function of how the United States and NATO grapple with the challenges and dilemmas of implementing enlargement. This chapter flows in a straightforward fashion. It begins with general observations that set the stage. It then describes the potential benefits of NATO enlargement. Next, it discusses the importance of

52

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

implementation strategy in achieving these benefits. It then discusses the costs of enlargement, and the risks. Finally, it suggests policy changes that might help NATO implement enlargement successfully, in ways that maximize the benefits, control the costs, and minimize the risks. SETTING

THE

STAGE

I write from the perspective that, although NATO enlargement is opposed in some quarters, it is destined to happen. The Clinton administration has issued a study strongly endorsing the idea, and NATO has officially agreed. At NATO'S 1997 summit meeting in Madrid, the Alliance has extended membership offers to several countries from East-Central Europe, namely Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Provided parliaments approve, NATO evidently intends to admit these countries in mid-1999: the Alliance's fiftieth birthday. Moreover, the Clinton administration and NATO have made clear that enlargement will not end with this first group. Fully nine other countries have applied, and some may be invited to join in the following years. Indeed, the door is being kept open to any European country that meets NATO'S standards for democracy and peaceful relations with its neighbours. Today's Alliance of sixteen nations will become a larger alliance tomorrow - perhaps considerably larger. Hence, our task here is not to judge whether NATO enlargement should happen, but to help assess whether it will be a success once it starts unfolding. Although there is room for honest debate, my appraisal is cautiously optimistic. To me, NATO enlargement makes sense because its potential benefits are powerful, its costs are affordable, and its risks are manageable. It has the necessary ingredients to produce a success. But this optimistic thesis is based on the premise that enlargement will be implemented effectively: that is, strongly, in limited ways, while wisely handling the countries outside an enlarged NATO, including Russia. If enlargement is not implemented effectively, the opposite could happen: a disappointing or even disastrous outcome. The benefits, costs, and risks thus are not a constant. Instead, they are a variable. They will depend upon how NATO enlargement is carried out. In a journal article, I wrote: "Enlargement is an endeavour that must be done right or it should not be done at all." This is a stark portrayal, but it illuminates the stakes. Although NATO is launching enlargement in the right direction, I am worried that the Alliance does not yet have a clear idea of where it is headed and how it intends to get there. I am also concerned that NATO has some questionable policies on its mind, or at least policies whose internal consistency and coordination

Will Enlargement Succeed?

53

with each other is not apparent. Finally, I wonder whether NATO'S governments as yet grasp the extent to which they will have to work hard and commit resources if enlargement is going to yield something more than lacklustre strategic results. Owing to these reasons, my overall impression is that, at the moment, NATO enlargement may be headed for trouble because a welldeveloped implementation strategy has not yet been formed. Some time ago, the main fear was trouble with Russia. Now that this fear is fading, a different concern may be about to rise to the fore. It is that NATO enlargement might deteriorate into a mess and a dud. A mess because the many thorny complications are not worked out; a dud because the process of enlargement is not carried out energetically enough. If this lacklustre fate is to be avoided, a well-articulated implementation strategy must be developed and then executed strongly.1 In saying this, I intend to be constructive, not critical. NATO enlargement poses complex policy questions that are made more difficult by the need to achieve agreement among many governments. Moreover, NATO'S decision to delay announcing new members until the Madrid summit has made it difficult for all governments, as well as NATO'S headquarters, to forge specific plans. To date, NATO has made good progress on defining its military strategy for enlargement and deciding upon new mechanisms for better consultations with Russia. But it has not yet addressed a host of other weighty issues: for example, new military roles and missions within NATO, the sharing of defence costs, military reform in East-Central Europe, the admission of additional members beyond the first tranche, better outreach programs to nonmembers, and the future strategic order in the former Soviet Union. The agenda of unresolved issues is thus quite large. Although the u.s. government and NATO may be slow in developing a coherent strategy, the reason is not that the issues raised by this chapter are unknown on the inside. Nobody should be under the illusion that forming a sound strategy is easy. Because multiple objectives and complications are at work, no single line of reasoning provides an across-the- board solution. A sound strategy will have mixed features and multiple dimensions. It will spring from a calculus that weighs trade-offs, balances priorities, and accepts some painful sacrifices. These realities mean that the act of forming a sound strategy poses not only challenges, but also dilemmas. This is all the more reason for serious thinking, starting now. Notwithstanding the difficulties ahead, I favour NATO enlargement. I expect that, when the dust settles, enlargement will be done right. NATO has a long track record of stumbling in confusion at first, then getting its strategic bearings straight and finishing strong. The same

54

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

thing can happen again, and probably will occur. Even so, an era of hard but worthy labour lies ahead. Because enlargement is a leap into a strategic and intellectual void, a sound strategy cannot be crafted by resorting to old, well-tested doctrines. A well-articulated plan based on innovative thinking and hard work is a strategic necessity - not something to be postponed in the hope that the Alliance can safely muddle along, waiting to let the future make the tough choices for it. The task facing NATO is to shape the future, not to be hostage to it. The reality is that the enlargement drama will not end on the day that new members enter the Alliance in 1999. Indeed, the drama will just be starting. What happens afterward will be key to determining whether NATO enlargement becomes a mess and a dud, or instead succeeds in the ways that the future requires. Much depends upon the constructive actions of many countries, and upon NATO'S ability to resurrect its excellence at using coalition planning to master the challenges and dilemmas of a complex new era. Much also depends upon U.S. leadership. The coming agenda is too important and too difficult to allow the United States to sit on the sidelines, passively watching events transpire. Passivity is a sure-fire recipe for failure; active leadership is a recipe for success. NATO enlargement is one of the United States's most important foreign-policy priorities. If the United States wants a success, it will have to throw itself into the fray in order to make success happen. Although I have played a role in developing the theory of NATO enlargement, my intent in this chapter is not to engage in advocacy. Instead, my aim is to employ the methodology of "cost-benefit analysis" in order to put forth a useful framework for thinking about the implementation issue. Whether I accurately weigh the benefits, costs, and risks of alternative implementation strategies is for readers to decide. Because the future is so uncertain, we are all left speculating about the likely consequences of NATO'S actions. This does not imply that reasoned analysis is beyond the pale. Truth in this murky arena, nonetheless, is partly a function of one's angle of vision. What I can offer is informed judgment, nothing more. If this chapter has an enduring contribution to make, it is more fundamental than appraising the trade-offs and offering policy suggestions. The contribution lies in pointing out that the debate about whether NATO should enlarge is coming to a close. I am struck by how much intellectual energy is still being spent on this dying issue, and how little energy is being invested on the tough new issue of deciding how to enlarge wisely. There are good ways to enlarge, and bad ways. Doubtless governments everywhere will need help in sorting out the difference between the two. Perhaps the academic community can help by drawing focus on the increasingly important issue of devising

Will Enlargement Succeed?

55

sensible strategies for NATO enlargement. Goodness knows, there are plenty of weighty implementation issues to analyse, and to quarrel about too. THE

BENEFITS

Enlargement will produce benefits to the extent that it helps achieve NATO'S objectives, but what are these objectives? Critics charge that enlargement is a narrow-minded replay of the Cold War: an exercise in threat-based planning and wartime thinking aimed at preparing for a new military confrontation with Russia. In fact, the opposite is true. On countless occasions, the U.S. government and NATO have proclaimed that enlargement is driven by peacetime political and strategic goals, and that they do not regard Russia as an adversary. Indeed, they portray NATO enlargement as unfolding alongside a budding partnership with Russia and a stable overall European security architecture. Yet NATO is a military alliance. The act of admitting new members means that solemn security commitments are being extended to these countries. How can the act of extending peacetime security commitments, made in the absence of threats and enemies, produce benefits in terms of the announced objectives? TOWARDS

A

STABLE

EUROPE

Proponents of NATO enlargement answer this question by citing realist and idealist arguments. To them, the main strategic benefit is that NATO enlargement will help produce a more stable, peaceful Europe in the years ahead. Many proponents see Europe as endangered by future instability if NATO does not enlarge. They do not believe that Western Europe can be walled off from Eastern Europe. Nor do they view East-Central Europe - the large zone of ten countries and 150 million people separating Germany and Russia - as being owned by Russia. What they hear is not Russia's complaints about NATO enlargement, but the desperate pleas of nearly all these countries for the West to come eastward so that they can adopt the West's values. As a result, the proponents are willing to move key Western institutions into this region - not only the European Union (EU) but also NATO. After all, East-Central Europeans eagerly want to join the Western community, and the Western countries have powerful reasons to welcome them. This is an impending strategic marriage borne of both passion and interest - one that allegedly should not be denied. To the extent that the proponents are correct in predicting a rosy future because of NATO enlargement, Europeans will obviously benefit in direct ways because their homeland will be a safer, more prosperous

56

Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

place. For its part, the United States will benefit not only directly but also indirectly. It will benefit directly because a stable Europe is a vital American interest. It will benefit indirectly because a stable Europe will ease its broader, global security dilemmas in the coming era. The United States will be better able to turn its attention to the endangered regions of the Persian Gulf and Asia with less need to be always looking over its shoulder to see whether Europe is coming unravelled. Moreover, a stable Europe may allow several European countries to contribute more help to the United States in these other theatres than now. Today, for example, the United States is responsible for defending the Persian Gulf almost alone - even though the Europeans need Gulf oil as much as do the Americans. A stable Europe may allow European members of NATO to contribute more military forces to defend the Gulf, thereby lessening the burdens on the United States. DIRECT

BENEFITS

OF

ENLARGEMENT

How can NATO enlargement produce a more stable Europe? One direct way, proponents claim, is to help keep NATO alive by giving it a meaningful reform agenda. Advocates of this view argue that NATO may unravel from irrelevance if it does not enlarge and otherwise take on important new security missions that have a major bearing on Europe's stability. If NATO unravels, this calculus holds, Europe may unravel with it. Potential aggressors would be given a broader licence to engage in roguish conduct. Equally worrisome, NATO'S own members might fall victim to renationalization. They might return to their old ways and start competing with each other. Renewed security competition among Germany, France, and Britain is one possibility. If so, the EU could also start unravelling, thereby administering a double shock to Europe's stability. Beyond this, the collapse of NATO could result in the United States not only losing its most important source of influence in Europe but also disengaging from Europe itself. In this event, Europe's stability would be dealt a triple shock. Along with keeping NATO alive, enlargement is portrayed as contributing to Europe's stability in three other direct ways. First, it allegedly will help promote good strategic outcomes in East-Central Europe. Second, it will help prevent bad outcomes in this region. Third, it will help make NATO better prepared to handle bad outcomes if they occur. These three contributions can be summarized in the peacetime mantra "promote, prevent, and prepare." The proponents argue that NATO enlargement will help promote good strategic outcomes through several mechanisms. Enlargement will help bring East-Central Europe back into Europe, its original home in

Will Enlargement Succeed?

57

the centuries before it was pulled into the USSR'S orbit by the Cold War. NATO enlargement will help bond this region to the transatlantic alliance and Western Europe by bringing several countries into the West's premier security organization, while also making it easier for them to join other organizations, including the EU. NATO enlargement will help promote integration and community-building with Western countries, and within East-Central Europe itself, through such mechanisms as joint security planning and military cooperation. Perhaps most important, proponents assert, NATO enlargement will lay the rock-solid security foundation in East-Central Europe that is critical to enabling democracy, market capitalism, and interstate cooperation to take shape. The proponents argue that if NATO does not enlarge into this region, the countries there will be left in an environment of chronic insecurity, thereby inhibiting them from becoming democrats and capitalists who regard military power as an instrument of selfdefence, not a club for menacing neighbours. In addition to fostering democracy, they say, NATO enlargement will have practical economic effects. It will do more than merely allow the East Europeans to become capitalists. It allegedly will also create the favourable security environment that allows Western businesses safely to invest capital in the region. As a result, the region's prosperity will be elevated. As economic prosperity grows, the likelihood of democracy taking hold will further increase. This dynamic, proponents say, is how Germany became a prosperous democracy and a good ally. Germany's entrance into NATO in 1954 laid the foundation for all that followed. The same thing allegedly can happen in East-Central Europe. How will NATO enlargement help prevent bad strategic outcomes? Proponents answer this question by pointing out that the current situation - a neutral East-Central Europe - is allegedly unhealthy because its creates a security vacuum (that is, the absence of credible security guarantees) laid atop multiple imbalances of military power. As a result, practically everybody is vulnerable to everybody else: if not today, then some years from now. History shows that an unhealthy situation like this can be a powder keg for a broad spectrum of future disasters. One possibility is an upsurge of nationalism and militarism among these countries, leading to intense conflict with each other. Another possibility is perpetual vulnerability to Russia, when it again acquires the willingness and strength to pursue imperial policies towards Europe. The most feared outcome is renewed rivalry between Germany and Russia, perhaps in ways that could pull Germany out of NATO and thereby bring about a return of Europe's old and unlamented tripolar security system. Proponents assert that NATO enlargement can head off all these potential disasters by calming the

58

Conceptual debates over Emargement

East-Central Europeans, by reassuring Germany, and by sealing off this region from future Russian intrigue. What about preparing for bad outcomes if they occur? Proponents argue that NATO enlargement will greatly strengthen the West's capacity to resolve crises in their early stages. Moreover, an enlarged NATO will possess greater military capabilities to intervene if crises start escalating out of control. Proponents point out that NATO'S failure to intervene earlier in Bosnia allowed an initially small ethnic war to become genocide. To them, NATO will be far better able to act if it already is present on the scene. The East-Central European countries provide a good jump-off point for intervening in local conflicts anywhere along the vast arc stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and beyond. OTHER

BENEFITS

Another important strategic benefit is that NATO enlargement allegedly will contribute to the broader task of building a stronger all-European security architecture. Proponents argue that an enlarged NATO will give the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) more muscle and better enable NATO to assist nearby countries that may not be joining the Alliance (for example, Ukraine). Also, they say, an enlarged NATO will be better able to pursue active military partnership relations with Russia. NATO will move physically closer to Russia, and by working with the East Europeans it will become more familiar with Russian-style forces and doctrines. The proponents view the combination of NATO enlargement and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) as a vehicle for building a web of closer military ties to these and other countries, thus enhancing security cooperation among many nations. Their broader vision is that an enlarged NATO and Russia will collaborate together in making Europe a stable place. The proponents further assert that NATO enlargement will enhance the prospects for spreading democracy and other Western values even farther eastward - in ways that affect the countries of the former Soviet Union. Whereas critics argue that NATO enlargement is a recipe for an authoritarian Russia, proponents judge that the step of bringing East European countries into Western institutions will put greater pressure on Russia, Ukraine, and other countries to become Western themselves. They rest their case on the recent admission of former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. When Kozyrev was in office, he warned that NATO enlargement could elevate Russia's nationalists and Communists into power in Moscow. But since leaving office, he has begun to argue the opposite: that a proper NATO enlargement will make it harder for

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these people to gain power because it means that Western values are truly coming East. Irrespective of the impact on Russia, proponents argue, NATO enlargement will have a positive effect on European military affairs by reducing budget expenses. They assert that because East-Central Europe is vital to Europe's stability, it would have to be defended by NATO regardless of whether it is brought into the Alliance or not. Enlargement allegedly will enable NATO to defend this region at far less cost than would be the case if it is left outside NATO. The reason is that alliances save money by allowing for combined planning and other efficiencies. Moreover, NATO enlargement will allow the countries of this region to defend themselves at far lower cost. If they are not brought into NATO, they will have to provide for their self-defence by maintaining their own large military forces. If they join NATO, by contrast, they will gain security commitments from powerful allies. As a result, they will be able to protect themselves with smaller forces and budgets, while focusing their defence investments on better-quality forces that can work closely with NATO'S forces. The final strategic benefit of NATO enlargement is that it allegedly will help enable the Alliance better to prepare itself for new security missions outside East-Central Europe. Proponents point out that NATO today lacks the capability to project military power outside its borders. Enlargement will compel NATO to become better at this mission in order to carry out new security commitments in East-Central Europe. This will be the case because, owing to Russian sensitivities, NATO will not be stationing large u.s. or West European forces in East-Central Europe. As a result, NATO will be required to develop a powerprojection capability for the region. This step, in turn, will elevate NATO'S capacity to project forces elsewhere: for example, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf.

A

BIG BENEFITS REQUIRE SOUND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

If these are the anticipated strategic benefits of enlargement as seen by the proponents, how significant are they likely to be? Will these benefits be major: enough to make a truly big difference? Or will they be minor: mostly a ripple? What are the implications for NATO'S implementation strategy? Proponents argue that the degree of strategic benefit will be huge. They perceive that NATO enlargement will greatly enhance Europe's stability and integration. The opponents argue the opposite. Some assert that NATO enlargement may yield benefits, but only in modest

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ways because Europe is already marching towards enduring stability on its own. Other opponents argue that, although Europe may be endangered, NATO enlargement is not the correct solution. Indeed, enlargement may make the situation far worse. They especially fear that enlargement will cause big, unwarranted troubles with Russia. The wiser choice, they say, is to handle the future with other mechanisms. Although both sides raise valid issues, I sided with the proponents when this debate broke out three years ago, and I still do. I think that Europe is genuinely endangered in ways that are mostly silent and unseen but real all the same. The opponents are wrong in judging that the current neutral zone in East-Central Europe will remain stable for long if NATO does not enlarge there. The opponents are too fixated on Russia. Many seemingly fail to realize that Germany is now Europe's most important country and that Russia does not have the Soviet Union's strength. Russia has legitimate interests that should be respected, but some of its demands are inspired by unhealthy statist motives that should not be honoured at the expense of other countries. Placating Russia on this issue is not the way to make Europe stable, and standing up to Russia's improper demands is not destined to cause a crisis. Russia is far less able than NATO to contemplate the trouble and expense of a new Cold War. Nor will standing up to Russia wreck democracy in that country. The best way to encourage democracy in Russia is to support it strongly in East-Central Europe. In the final analysis, democracy in Russia will rise or fall on its own merits, not in response to a prudent NATO enlargement that poses no threat to Russia. The Helsinki summit shows that, although Russia remains unhappy about NATO enlargement, President Yeltsin does not want a confrontation and is willing to negotiate. At Helsinki, the Clinton administration said "no" to Russia on five key European issues: Russian veto power over NATO enlargement, delays of enlargement, second-class citizens in NATO (new members not to have NATO troops on their soil or to be protected by the u.s. nuclear umbrella), exclusion of any country from NATO, and subordination of NATO to the OSCE. But the administration said "yes" on three issues: a charter (the Founding Act), a partnership council, and CFE adaptation. It also made clear its intent not to place nuclear weapons on the soil of new members in absence of a threat. These u.s. concessions plus other pot-sweeteners - a START III (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) negotiation on deeper nuclear reductions and support for Russian interests in the World Trade Organization and Gj - evidently were enough to gain Yeltsin's begrudging acquiescence that NATO enlargement is inevitable. Although Russia would be far happier if the West enlarges by other mechanisms, NATO must be a key part of the process. Yes, the EU must

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also enlarge. But the EU is an economic institution, not a security alliance. Because strong security and economic measures must be launched, the two bodies must enlarge together. One cannot substitute for the other. I judge that NATO enlargement can greatly ease the dangers ahead while working with an enlarged EU to produce a democratic and prosperous East-Central Europe. Yet I do not regard a positive outcome as a given. Much depends upon how the two bodies enlarge. If the proponents of NATO enlargement can be faulted, it is not for failing to think boldly. Unlike the opponents, they are showing the imagination and creativity to look beyond the status quo and to think about how to achieve something better. They are seeking a huge transformation of the European security order for the purpose of greatly enhancing the continent's security. For something this big to succeed, more is involved than merely projecting NATO and the EU eastward in ill-defined ways. A host of details about specific policies, plans, and programs must be worked out before there are grounds for confidence that the act of enlargement will bring about its desired effects and benefits. A clear implementation strategy is needed. Moreover, this strategy must be backed by adequate energy and resources if its hoped-for benefits are to be fully attained. An old axiom holds that "there is no free lunch." Another axiom holds that "you get what you pay for." NATO enlargement is aimed at producing big strategic benefits: otherwise an innovation this earth-shaking would never be contemplated. Ceteris paribus, big benefits normally require strong efforts, and lacklustre results are the typical consequence of weak efforts. This likely will hold true for NATO enlargement, for plenty of problems and constraints lie ahead in its path. Do NATO'S governments grasp the heavy lifting that will be needed if enlargement is to yield something worthwhile? Are they so inward-looking and reluctant to annoy Russia that they plan only to go through the motions: to admit new members but not truly extend NATO'S presence, and that of the EU, into East-Central Europe? If so, they may get exactly what they pay for. The need for hard, effective work by NATO and its new members is made especially important because the enlargement agenda is broader than was NATO'S agenda during most of the Cold War. From the 19605 onward, NATO'S agenda was mostly military. It was focused primarily on creating a force posture for deterrence and defence. The upcoming enlargement agenda must take deterrence and defence into account as an insurance clause, but its broader purposes are more political and more complex. NATO enlargement is being targeted at shaping the internal politics and defence affairs of new members and the interstate relations of countries across the East-Central European region. The

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twin goals are democracy for the new members and stability for a big and diffuse region whose security structure will not be rigidly bipolar, but instead fluidly multipolar. Proponents are confident that this demanding agenda can be accomplished, and perhaps they are right. But accomplishing this agenda will not be easy, and it will not be attained merely by admitting some countries into NATO. The act of admitting new members merely sets the stage for the drama that is about to unfold. It does not make the play a success. The outcome depends upon how the actors perform. Their script is anything but simple. Do the U.S. government and NATO have a properly comprehensive and robust strategy worked out in the necessary detail? This question is for them to answer. But I can attest to the importance of answering it. My colleagues and I at RAND have published considerable material about the military side of enlargement. The more that we plunged into the details, the thornier they became. In the end, we were able to bring coherence to the analysis of NATO'S military strategy for enlargement. But, although we came away believing that the complex challenges can be handled, we also were left painfully aware of the many ways that these challenges can be mishandled, with quite negative consequences. Moreover, enlargement involves a lot more than military strategy. It also requires a political, economic, and diplomatic strategy: each with thorny details of its own. These separate strategies must be coordinated so that a "grand strategy" is produced. This is not child's play. It is not an impossible task, but it is a hard task. Because there are more ways to fail than to succeed, skilful planning and strong execution are critical. The proper conclusion, therefore, is that the benefits of NATO and EU enlargement are real, but they are best regarded as a reward for a job well done, not as outcomes that will be gained merely because the job is attempted. If NATO and the EU enlarge wisely and effectively, they can achieve the ambitious objectives being set for them and thereby provide great strategic pay-offs. But if they enlarge unwisely and ineffectively, they can fall far short of their objectives and thereby produce few benefits, or even cause outright harm. This is why a sound implementation strategy is key - especially for NATO. THE COSTS What will be the costs of enlargement? By "costs," I mean the financial expense of defence-preparedness measures. I will address the issue of possible negative strategic consequences when risks are discussed below. Awhile back, public speculation about costs was dominated by

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two polarized viewpoints. One viewpoint held that the costs would be negligible because NATO enlargement is a purely political step with no military consequences. The other viewpoint held that the costs would be stratospheric - several hundred billion dollars - because NATO allegedly will want to build a big-warfighting posture in East-Central Europe akin to the one it maintained in the Cold War. In recent months, a new consensus has been forming in the middle. It holds that, although some military preparations will be needed, they will be modest and the costs therefore affordable. RAND was the first to stake out this position. In mid-199 5 we issued an internal study (I was a co-author) on costs of NATO enlargement, assuming that the Visegrad states of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic were admitted. Our study addressed the costs of carrying out enlargement's defence measures per se, not the separate issue of keeping NATO'S forces and those of the East-Central Europeans at proper preparedness: an issue handled by existing defence plans and budgets. We concluded that the costs would depend upon NATO'S military strategy for enlargement. Our analysis laid out a wide spectrum of three strategy options. It said that, if NATO'S strategy is one of merely providing command, control, communications, intelligence, and logistics support to new members, who must provide all of the combat forces for defending themselves, the costs will be very low: $io-zo billion through 2.010 for both NATO and the new members. We argued against this option because it would provide an insufficient NATO commitment to its new members. At the other extreme, our analysis said that, if NATO stations large forces in East-Central Europe, the costs will be much higher: about $110 billion. We argued against this option because it is unnecessary on strategic and military grounds. In the middle of this spectrum, we put forth our preferred option: a power-projection strategy in which NATO would develop the capacity to move forces from Western Europe eastward in a crisis. Depending upon the exact reinforcement posture chosen, we said, the costs will be $30-52 billion. We singled out a mid-point posture costing $4Z billion as the one most likely to be adopted. The results of this analysis were presented in the fall 1996 edition of Survival.2Subsequently, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued a similar study using the RAND methodology, but it put forth higher cost estimates for a power-projection strategy. The costs, according to the CBO, would be $1x5 billion. The difference between RAND'S estimate of $42. billion and the CBO'S estimate of $115 billion largely boils down to three variables. The CBO includes about $30 billion of measures to modernize new-member forces: an expense excluded by RAND because it will be necessary even if these countries do not join NATO. Also, the

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CBO contemplates a larger NATO reinforcement posture than RAND'S posture. Whereas the CBO'S posture includes about twelve divisions and twelve wings, RAND'S posture is five divisions and ten wings. The cost difference is $30 billion. The remaining $2,0 billion owes to more ambitious CBO programs in such areas as command structures, communications systems, exercise facilities, infrastructure enhancements, and prepositioning of equipment.3 These two cost estimates are animated by different theories of requirements for carrying out a power-projection strategy. The RAND estimate calls for sufficient NATO force commitments to meet peacetime needs in such areas as training, exercises, building multinational formations, handling local contingencies, and reassuring new members about their long-term security. By contrast, the CBO'S estimate identifies the NATO posture that would be needed if preparing for a major regional war is a dominant concern. The CBO rejects the criticism that its analysis is anchored in threat-based planning. But it acknowledges that a NATO force of this large size would be intended to balance a real Russian military threat of about 25 divisions and 1000 combat aircraft. The Pentagon released its own estimate, which also employs the RAND methodology for calculating the costs of a power-projection strategy. The Pentagon's estimate projects a cost of $28-35 billion for three categories of measures: NATO reinforcement, new-member restructuring, and direct enlargement (for example, common infrastructure). This estimate falls at the lower end of RAND'S spectrum of a $30-52 billion cost. The principal difference between this estimate and RAND'S $42-billion estimate is the size of the NATO reinforcing posture. Whereas RAND'S posture includes five divisions and ten wings, the Pentagon's posture is a little smaller: four divisions and six wings. Had RAND costed the Pentagon's posture, its estimate would have been $28-34 billion. The Pentagon has publicly said that the two estimates are in the same ballpark. I agree.4 What these three studies accomplish is to lay a solid foundation for thinking about NATO military strategy for enlargement. They reject the argument that, because peacetime planning is at work, all defence estimates are purely political and therefore arbitrary. In reality, peacetime requirements can be calculated with about the same precision as wartime requirements. Moreover, the act of meeting these peacetime requirements has major implications for determining the way that NATO enlargement is carried out, and whether it will be a success. In important ways, the associated military measures will be key to shaping the political consequences of enlargement. An adequate defence program will make NATO'S new members genuinely secure. From this

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outcome will flow the benefits that NATO enlargement is intended to bring. All three studies endorse a power-projection strategy. This strategy, moreover, was endorsed by NATO'S enlargement study of late 1995. This portion of the defence debate now seems settled. Indeed, the Pentagon's study suggests that the issue is no longer purely theoretical. A sensible defence plan for NATO enlargement is now starting to take shape. In the coming months, NATO military authorities will be studying the details in ways that allow this plan to gain further life and momentum. As for costs, the Pentagon's estimate is now being appraised by some media critics as too low. My reaction is that the cost should be regarded as a variable. Much will depend upon the number of countries admitted. The Pentagon's study assumes admission of four countries. Since the number is now three, the cost will drop by about $2-3 billion. If the number admitted grows to six, the cost will rise to $42-48 billion. Likewise, the cost to the United States could rise above the Pentagon's estimate of $200 million annually. This figure includes only costs for common infrastructure programs. The need to fund some purely national programs (for example, bases, facilities, and outreach measures) could double the cost. My expectation is that, when the dust settles, RAND'S original estimate will stand up well: $42 billion for the entire program, of which the United States will pay about $5-6 billion if the West Europeans carry their fair share of the burden. Regardless, the key point is that we are in the early stages of a lengthy process. In the months and years ahead, the cost estimates may rise or fall as more is learned about the coming defence agenda. But the conclusion of moderate costs is unlikely to change. The core reason is that no new military forces must be built: the necessary forces already exist. NATO has more than ample forces to carry out a limited commitment through a power-projection strategy. If anything, East-Central European forces should be downsized because they are larger than needed once these countries enter NATO. The defence task is merely to configure NATO and new-member forces so that they are compatible and interoperable. This is a demanding agenda, but it is not costly. To those uninitiated in defence-budget analysis, an expense of $42 billion sounds like a huge amount and therefore induces bumper-sticker shock. In reality, this expense is moderate when judged in relation to the major strategic innovation being pursued. Indeed, the CBO'S position is that a cost of $125 billion is not excessive when the objectives and benefits are taken into account. A cost of $42 billion is only twothirds the expense of buying a single u.s. army division or navy carrier

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battle group. Moreover, this expense is readily affordable. To fund their share, the West Europeans will need to allocate only 1-2 per cent of the money now planned for defence through 2010. The United States will need to allocate even less: about two-tenths of i per cent. The East Europeans will have to increase their defence spending. But they would need to do so anyway because their defence spending today is low and their military readiness has suffered. They can pay their share by merely increasing their defence spending in response to the growth of their economies. Clearly, the expectation of moderate costs is based on the premise that NATO enlargement will be managed prudently, in ways that economize and avoid gold-plating. Provided this is the case, bumper-sticker shock is the wrong reaction. These costs are not trivial, but they are far from unbearable or unjustifiable. President Clinton did the best job of framing the issue in his speech at Detroit in the fall of 1996. He said that he expects NATO enlargement to impose moderate costs. He also said that he is willing to pay the bill because the benefits make it worthwhile. Here again, nonetheless, a sense of caution is in order. The history of U.S. and NATO defence policy is littered with programs that started out with an affordable price tag and then suffered huge cost inflation. Sometimes the initial cost estimates were wrong. Most often, however, costs rose because programs were given added features as they evolved. They became better at what they were designed to accomplish, but unnecessarily so, and they broke the bank in the process. NATO enlargement is vulnerable to this form of cost inflation. TJie programmatic measures being contemplated - infrastructure, projection assets, modernized technology in East- Central Europe - are an open invitation to rising costs. Beyond this, the defence costs could skyrocket if a military confrontation with Russia evolves: RAND and the CBO agree on this judgment. The proper conclusion is that a low-cost NATO enlargement is possible but not foreordained. It will require skilful implementation, guided by a management philosophy that is equally attuned to the twin tasks of fulfilling defence requirements and controlling costs. The importance of the first task - fulfilling requirements - should not be forgotten. Thus far, the cost debate has been animated by the hope of minimizing expenses. While this perspective is natural in today's climate, it is noteworthy how little public attention is being given to the issue of whether adequate resources are being committed to make enlargement a success. These cost figures are more a metaphor for gauging serious intent than they are a measure for calibrating the drain on national defence budgets. The financial drain is minor; the

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level of effort is far bigger. It is possible to work very hard while not spending a great deal of money. A common thesis holds that the military details do not matter because no threat exists. This thesis is wrong because the defence preparations that take shape will have a large bearing on whether NATO'S peacetime goals in East-Central Europe are attained. My judgment is that the level of resources identified by the Pentagon and RAND studies is enough to get the job done. But this money must actually be spent, and the associated activities must take place. Otherwise, NATO enlargement could be a dud. In the final analysis, costs will be determined by the defence goals set by NATO and its new members. Achieving these goals will have a major impact on determining whether enlargement succeeds. The issue of future defence goals will be addressed by NATO'S civilian and military authorities in the coming period. The goals adopted may not be identical to the numbers being contemplated by current studies. One key issue will be the number of reinforcing combat units committed by NATO. The CBO'S illustrative posture of nearly twelve divisions and twelve wings seems too high - a posture this large may not even be necessary to defend against a Russian threat, should it emerge. The CBO'S analysis may downgrade the capabilities of new-member forces too far, thereby posing NATO reinforcement requirements that are too high. The RAND and Pentagon estimates seem more plausible for both peacetime needs and as a deterrent hedge. Yet their estimates are notional. The final and authoritative estimate is something to be decided by NATO. Success at building the decided-upon posture will be determined by whether NATO'S current members take the new reinforcement mission seriously. Another key issue will be the defence goals set for the new members. At the moment, the quantity of their forces is high, but their quality is low. How much of a qualitative improvement is to be sought? All three current studies implicitly assume that new-member forces should achieve a qualitative level that is about average for NATO: that is, not as high as Germany and Britain but higher than Turkey and Greece. This concept seems adequate and achievable when judged in relation to the strategic situation and the current capabilities and future budgets of new members. Yet the future will be determined by NATO'S decisions and by the efforts of the new members. Thus, the costs of NATO enlargement are a variable. But so are the defence arrangements that take shape. The easiest way to minimize costs is to make few preparations. But this approach would be a recipe for an ineffective enlargement that falls far short of its anticipated benefits. A moderate amount of money needs to be spent in order to make NATO enlargement a success. This is why the costs should be

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viewed not as something to be avoided but as an opportunity to make an intelligent investment in affordable ways. THE

RISKS

What are the risks facing NATO enlargement? The risks of a negative strategic outcome fall into seven categories. Space does not allow for a full treatment of these risks, but they merit a brief discussion. All of them are serious enough to be safeguarded against. Equally important, they are not mutually exclusive. To the extent that they spring to life in batches, they could make enlargement a bungled affair and rob the effort of its benefits or even worse. The first risk is that NATO might fail to mobilize a satisfactory internal consensus on how to carry out enlargement, quarrel over policies, and thereby damage its own cohesion in ways that affect not only East-Central Europe but the Alliance's effectiveness as a whole. At the moment, NATO'S governments agree on enlargement, but their enthusiasm for the enterprise varies. This situation likely will not prevent new members from being admitted, but trouble could arise when NATO must start spending money and accepting serious commitments in East-Central Europe. At this juncture, the unenthused countries might back away, thereby casting the burdens on the more enthused powers, including Germany and the United States. When these powers start making decisions on how to implement enlargement, the less involved countries might disagree with the priorities being pursued and fail to provide even the minimum necessary support. If this negative dynamic gets out of control, serious cleavages could develop. It is not difficult to imagine NATO'S central countries and southern countries drifting apart. Indeed, Britain and France plausibly could drift away from Germany and the United States. NATO'S ability to act as a unified alliance could suffer in multiple regions and policy settings. The second risk is that NATO and the EU might not enlarge in tandem. In particular, NATO might enlarge quickly, but the EU might decide to stand pat for several years in an effort to avoid the disruption of absorbing East European countries with their troubled economies. In this event, NATO'S new members would join the Alliance without the benefit of the Western assistance needed to bring their economies to life. They would lack the resources needed to carry out their military responsibilities to NATO. Their commitment to democracy might weaken. As a result, Western enlargement would unfold partly crippled, with only one arm. Inevitably its effectiveness would be damaged. The third risk is that NATO might enlarge weakly, earring out the defence side of enlargement in ways that produce a hollow commitment

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in East-Central Europe: that is, a political commitment without the military capability to carry it out in peace, crisis, and war. This especially could happen if a widespread consensus favouring a strong enlargement is not developed across the Alliance, but it could also occur if the enthused powers themselves do not take the military side of enlargement seriously enough or fail to generate the necessary funding. As a result, NATO might not develop the appropriate powerprojection capabilities or work with the new members to reform their defence postures in the required ways. The negative consequences could be severalfold. The political benefits of multinational military cooperation would not be realized. NATO'S flag would fly in several East-Central European capitals, but the region would not enjoy much greater military security than exists today. In event of a crisis there, NATO and its new members might not be able to react with the necessary speed and power. NATO might find itself unable to promote or prevent much of anything, but hopelessly entangled in this region's still-turbulent affairs: the classic nightmare of treaty-making run amok. The fourth risk is that NATO enlargement's reform agenda for the new members may fall well short of achieving its goals. The new members might fail to reform their defence postures in the ways needed to make their forces interoperable with NATO. Worse, they might take their admission into NATO as an opportunity to become free-riders: they might both slash their defence spending and not reform their postures. Equally important, they might not continue making progress to becoming democracies, and their economic progress could slacken. As a result, they might emerge as weighty albatrosses around NATO'S neck - as countries that consume security but do little to enhance NATO'S overall health. The fifth risk is that NATO might enlarge too far and too fast by admitting more new members than prudence dictates. This outcome could occur if NATO'S open-door policy is taken literally. Although NATO has invited only three new members so far, the nine others are standing at the door, eager to march through if given the opportunity. How many new members can NATO safely absorb? The answer is unclear, but the prospect of admitting the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Albania, and Macedonia is enough to give even the most enthusiastic proponents cause for concern. These countries would consume far more security than they produce. NATO could find itself stretched thin, unable to concentrate its scarce resources in the ways needed to absorb successfully even the attractive candidates. Beyond this, a decision to admit twelve new countries would elevate NATO'S total to twenty-eight members. NATO might no longer be an alliance capable of serious collective defence planning and decisive reaction in a crisis. Instead, it

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might become a loose collective security body: something akin to the OSCE. The sixth risk is the converse of the fifth. Since the first wave of enlargement will soon allow three new members into NATO, the Alliance may appear to have failed in its goal of strengthening security ties to the countries not gaining admission - the "have-nots." This oversight could leave several important countries, such as Romania, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, with nothing more than PFP to cling to. As a result, Europe would not become unified in security terms. A two-tier structure would evolve in East-Central Europe: the favoured few that belong to NATO and the majority on the outside looking in. The negative psychological and political reaction could be severe. In several countries, democracy could give way to authoritarianism and nationalism. Some countries might seek closer relations with Russia. Regardless of the steps taken, an enlarged NATO could find itself facing the prospect of a dangerous frontier along its new borders. The seventh risk is the one most feared by the opponents of NATO enlargement. It is that, in the aftermath of enlargement, NATO'S relations with Russia might turn sour. An authoritarian government might gain power in Moscow, energize the economy, and use its growing funds to rearm. Russia might succeed in subordinating the cis states to its control, including Belarus and Ukraine. It might then station large forces on Poland's border in an effort to intimidate NATO and the Poles, and also reach out to establish stronger ties with such countries as Slovakia and Bulgaria. The consequence could be what NATO most wants to avoid: a new Cold War, including a dangerous military stand-off on the Bug River. This development, in turn, would open the door to a vastly more expensive NATO enlargement, thereby blowing moderate cost estimates out the window. How serious are these seven risks? The answer is that they are serious enough to have already gained the attention of several NATO governments. Steps are under way to develop an enhanced PFP program for those countries not gaining admission in the first tranche. NATO'S willingness to adapt the CFE treaty reflects more than an effort to placate Russia. It also reflects an attempt to start dampening the coming military interactions in NATO-Russian relations as the Alliance enlarges. For all their importance, however, these and other measures are merely initial steps. They do not guarantee that the full spectrum of risks will be effectively handled. The ultimate disaster scenario is one in which, owing to a bungled NATO implementation of enlargement, almost everything goes wrong. NATO'S cohesion would come unravelled. The EU would stand pat. NATO would enlarge weakly in ways producing a hollow commitment

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and no gain in security. The Alliance would badly overextend itself by admitting too many new members, all of which would be defended weakly and integrated poorly. Meanwhile, NATO would turn a blind eye to Ukraine and other important have-nots. To top things off, relations with Moscow would plummet downhill and a new Cold War would ensue with an aggressive and rearmed Russia. Something this extreme is quite improbable. But there are other, less disastrous scenarios that are more plausible and still spell failure for NATO enlargement. The most plausible failure scenario is a NATO enlargement that becomes a mess and a dud. This scenario could have four components: a NATO that merely goes through the motions, new members that become free-riding albatrosses, endless controversies and no progress with the have-nots, and continued complaining by Russia. This scenario is less menacing than that of a new Cold War with Russia. But it is bad enough to make NATO enlargement an unappetizing meal with no dessert. The proper conclusion is that reduction of these risks must be an important part of any sensible NATO implementation strategy. A case can be made that NATO should start shifting its current approach to managing the risks facing enlargement. For the past six years, it has been so preoccupied with reducing the risk of bad relations with Russia that it has paid much less attention to the other risks. As enlargement gets under way, these other risks will loom increasingly important, and they will require more attention by NATO. Enlargement can fail, or at least not succeed in big ways, even if good relations with Russia are maintained. Likewise, enlargement can succeed even if relations with Russia are cool. What matters most is whether an enlarged NATO remains an effective alliance, can carry out its new security commitments, succeeds in fostering valuable new members, and has strong ties to other European countries deserving of its help. The risks of failure in this critical area should be guarded against carefully. T O W A R D S A BETTER S T R A T E G Y FOR IMPLEMENTING ENLARGEMENT

If the U.S. and NATO strategy for implementing enlargement is critical to determining the endeavour's success or failure, to what degree does a sensible strategy already exist? What ideas can be offered for fashioning an improved strategy? These important questions are addressed in this section. Again, space does not allow for a complete treatment. What the following paragraphs offer is a brief discussion of the basics. For NATO enlargement to succeed, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance need a strategy that can maximize the benefits, control the

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costs, and minimize the risks. Moreover, they need a comprehensive strategy that can pursue multiple objectives and juggle several different policy balls at once. Such a strategy must craft a coherent relationship between ends and means. It should establish priorities and apply adequate resources to fulfil these priorities. This strategy should focus on the key actors in the enlargement process: NATO'S current members, the early invitees, later members, the enduring have-nots, Russia, and other cis countries. This strategy should have political, economic, and military components. Each component should make sense on its own, and all of them should be coordinated together. Each component must also be endowed with adequate resources to get its job done. These considerations add up to a need for a strategy as well as an accompanying strategic plan: not necessarily a fixed blueprint, but a flexible creation that sets basic directions and provides a general game plan for implementing enlargement over the coming decade. This is a tall order, but illuminating it helps focus a bright spotlight on where the current strategy stands today. Beyond doubt, NATO has gotten off to a slow but decent start. At Madrid, it announced which countries are to join the Alliance in the first tranche in 1999. NATO has also identified its basic military strategy for implementing enlargement: a combination of new-member self-defence and NATO power projection from Western Europe. It has decided to develop an enhanced PFP for the have-nots. It has expressed willingness to adapt the CFE. NATO has moved to create a charter and a partnership council with Russia (Founding Act). All of these steps are to the good, but they fall considerably short of qualifying as a comprehensive strategy. The core problem today is not that NATO has a bad implementation strategy but that it does not yet have a complete strategy at all. Several potential problems account for my judgment that the current strategy may be headed towards trouble, or at least towards a lacklustre performance. One problem is that a truly comprehensive strategy has not yet been forged. Another problem is that NATO and its new members may not yet be prepared to carry out the hard work that must be performed. Still another problem is that NATO may be shying away from the tough task of setting firm priorities. This applies to dealing both with the have-nots and with Russia and its immediate neighbours. Unless these problems are resolved, NATO enlargement may yield fewer benefits than anticipated, and it may see more risks coming to life than wanted. Enlargement might wind up becoming a mess and a dud with lots of prickly thorns. What needs to be done to improve NATO'S strategy? Until recently, NATO has been mostly preoccupied with two issues: determining who is to be admitted and when, and trying to calm Russia's anger. Now

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73

that the first issue has been resolved and the second issue at least partly settled, the time has arrived to begin addressing the many other issues on enlargement's plate. For openers, NATO and the EU must develop a better strategy for enlarging in tandem and working together. At the moment, the EU wants NATO to enlarge first so that it can delay the expense of having to enlarge itself. In the interim, the EU wants the luxury of attending to its internal agenda: Maastricht, the monetary union, subsidiarity, and other issues. This internal focus is understandable, but it leaves the West headed for trouble as it enlarges. The West cannot afford a strategy whereby NATO starts entering East-Central Europe in two years, and the EU arrives many years later. This approach risks leaving new NATO members too poor to carry out their new NATO responsibilities, such as reforming their defence postures and building market democracy. A faster EU enlargement is needed, and it should focus on those countries that will be joining NATO. As for NATO, it needs to put its internal house in better order than is the case today. It needs to mobilize a stronger consensus on behalf of enlargement. It needs to make decisions on roles and missions for carrying out enlargement. It needs to assign future missions on the basis of strategic effectiveness and fair burden-sharing. It needs to determine which countries are to take primary responsibility for carrying out enlargement, to give these countries adequate authority, and to ensure that they are backed with adequate Alliance resources. Moreover, these important decisions must be taken in the context of equally weighty decisions for allocating roles and missions for new Alliance strategic departures elsewhere. These considerations add up to the conclusion that NATO should write a new Strategic Concept and associated planning documents. The current Strategic Concept was written in 1991. It is badly out of date. A replacement is needed if NATO is to determine how it is to implement enlargement in ways that are effective and that leave the Alliance's internal cohesion intact. NATO also needs to develop a sensible defence plan and program to ensure that enlargement is not hollow: that the necessary defence arrangements take shape so that enlargement's political and strategic goals vis-a-vis the new members are accomplished. NATO needs to determine how many reinforcing units are to be committed to help integrate new members and defend them. It needs to develop programmatic measures to ensure that these forces acquire the necessary projection capabilities on the appropriate schedule. It also needs to develop a military-reform agenda for the forces of new members, one that downsizes these forces, enhances their quality, and elevates their compatibility and interoperability for performing NATO missions under

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Article 5 and Article 4. This demanding agenda calls for a ten-year NATO defence plan of the sort pursued by the long-term defence program and GDI initiatives of the 19705 and 19805. Nothing of this sort exists today. Once this plan has been created, NATO needs to roll up its sleeves and get to work so that this plan is actually carried out. It needs to put pressure on its current members, especially unenthused West Europeans, to ensure that they carry out their measures. It also needs to work hard with the new members to ensure that they reform their defence postures. NATO needs to persuade new-member parliaments to increase defence spending in the necessary amounts. It needs to persuade defence ministries to undertake the painful reorganizations that are required. NATO forces need to exercise and train with new-member forces so that they learn NATO'S doctrine. An activist u.s. and NATO effort of this sort is needed to ensure that plans become realities in ways that make enlargement succeed. Equally important, NATO needs to develop a better strategy for dealing with the have-nots. At the moment, NATO is adrift in this critical arena. It is suspended between the theory of the open door and the reality that, at least for the coming period, the door is not truly open to everybody. My judgment is that NATO will be best off by acknowledging that, although the door must remain open in theory, enlargement will have its limits in the coming period. To me, NATO is best advised to limit enlargement to the western part of East-Central Europe. This means that Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia may enter in the coming decade if they continue to make adequate progress in relation to NATO'S criteria for admission. But the Baltic states are unlikely to gain admission at least until they can do a better job of defending themselves. Ukraine is unlikely to join, and the same applies to the Balkan states. At the moment, NATO is planning an enhanced PFP for these ten countries. The trouble is that the PFP today is so minimalist and undifferentiated that enhancing it might not matter. What the situation requires is for NATO to develop a differentiated but genuine security agenda for each of these countries. An enhanced PFP may suffice for countries not destined to draw close to NATO. For those countries that are likely to join NATO, an agenda that powerfully prepares them for membership is needed. For those countries that may not join but will have quite close ties to NATO, there is a broad spectrum of potential security relationships between the PFP and Article 5. Something akin to associate membership may make sense. Although NATO is averse to the specific concept of "associate member," the key point is that collective security ties, as opposed to collective defence ties, can be an effective mechanism for promoting stability and

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75

preventing conflict. An example is a relationship that offers important non-members not only promises of consultation in a crisis but also credible assurances of sympathetic consideration and a best-faith response. This form of relationship undergirds u.s. strategy across Asia. If it works in Asia, why can't it work in Europe? The final topic for a better NATO implementation strategy is Russia and the cis. At the moment, NATO'S strategy seems focused on proliferating institutional mechanisms for reassuring Russia that it will be treated as a true European power. NATO already has created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the PFP, and the "16+1" formula. It has also created the Founding Act and transformed the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in order to consult more effectively with everybody. NATO cannot forever continue creating new institutions every time that Russia objects to enlargement policy. Moreover, nearly all of these institutions provide only a forum for diplomatic meetings and related consultations. Meetings can matter for little if there is nothing to agree about. What the emerging situation requires is an engagement of the strategic basics. The issue of greatest concern to Russia is whether NATO will eventually enlarge into the former Soviet Union while not bringing Russia into the fold. Russia's concerns are real. NATO will come under growing pressure to admit the Baltic states and perhaps even Ukraine. Moreover, Russia will not gain entrance into NATO or the EU anytime soon. Among other considerations, NATO will not be willing to commit itself to defending Russia's border with China, and Russia will not be willing to help defend Spain and Italy from nuclear-armed countries in North Africa. If NATO is going to bow to Russia's interests by not entering into the former-USSR, then a mechanism must be found for protecting the sovereignty and independence of countries there that are important to NATO. The principal countries are the Baltic states and Ukraine, but Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan also matter. Close, non-membership ties by NATO and the EU with these countries can help, but the key will be their relationship with Russia. At the moment, the United States and NATO are preoccupied with encouraging democracy in Russia. Notwithstanding the importance of this concern, an equal concern is the development of democratic relations between Russia and its immediate neighbours. If democratic interstate relations can be brought to life within the former Soviet Union, then NATO will have less incentive to enlarge there, and less reason to worry about the safety of important countries. Russia, moreover, will be less able to mobilize the support of its CIS neighbours for imperial adventures if it must treat these neighbors as equal partners, not subordinates. At the

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Conceptual Debates over Enlargement

moment, the United States and NATO are saying little about this critical subject. If they are to fashion a sound implementation strategy for enlargement, they will need to say more. In summary, the alternative strategy put forth here has six key features. It aspires to prod the EU to enlarge faster, mobilize a stronger consensus within NATO, carry out the defence side of enlargement in robust ways, accept limits on enlargement, build stronger security ties with the have-nots, and foster democratic relationships between Russia and its immediate neighbours. Will this strategy work better than the strategy currently being pursued? I think so, but the question is one that must be answered through scrutinizing analysis. The key point is that NATO will not know whether its strategy is the right one unless it assembles the alternatives and evaluates them on the basis of their likely performance. Equally important, a proper strategy will not by itself guarantee success. NATO and its new members must be willing to perform the hard work needed to bring this strategy to life, or enlargement will become a mess and a dud. A sound strategy can be fashioned and carried out in ways that make NATO enlargement succeed. But this positive outcome will emerge only if the United States leads in strong and visionary ways. The coming enlargement agenda is too important and too difficult for the United States to stand on the sidelines. It is NATO'S leader today, and it will remain so tomorrow. The quality and energy of its leadership will have a huge bearing on whether enlargement becomes a mess and a dud, or instead evolves into a stellar contribution to Europe's health and the United States's own vital interests. CONCLUSION

This chapter has advanced the thesis that NATO'S strategy for implementing enlargement will have a major impact on how the benefits, costs, and risks play out. It has tried to assess emerging trends as objectively as possible, and to present some recommendations for developing a better strategy. It supports NATO enlargement as a good idea provided the endeavour is carried out right. It is guardedly optimistic about the future, but it judges that NATO needs to do a better job of fashioning a proper strategy. Regardless of whether its specific ideas are accepted, the more fundamental issue raised by it has greater importance. The debate over whether NATO should enlarge is coming to an end. The agenda for the future is one of determining how NATO enlargement can best unfold. This is a complex agenda, and it merits considerable thought by everyone - inside government, and outside as well.

PART

TWO

National Debates over Enlargement

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CHAPTER

FIVE

NATO Enlargement and the United States: A Deliberate and Necessary Decision1 Gale A. Mattox

Critics have argued that the u.s. decision on NATO enlargement was made without debate or thorough consideration of the implications of enlargement to the Atlantic Alliance.1 This is not the case: a review of the governmental and public discussion in the United States reveals that there was indeed close consideration of the issue and of the ramifications of such a decision for the United States and for NATO. NATO enlargement fulfilled the u.s. objective of engagement and enlargement laid out in the National Security Strategy 1994 articulated during the first year of the Clinton administration and it was viewed as the appropriate policy for European security and the Alliance. Not only has enlargement been a persistent theme of the Clinton presidency, but the bipartisanship of the policy has been striking in an era of divided government and contentious debates between the two political parties. The events of 1989 may today be traced to a series of problems and tensions plaguing Central and Eastern Europe over the course of several decades. Yet no scholar today can honestly claim to having predicted an eruption of revolutions which may have been "velvet" and relatively bloodless but represented nonetheless momentous change in the course of history itself. It is not surprising that the Western reaction generally and the u.s. reaction specifically were initially hesitant. After an enthusiastic reaction to the newly emerging democracies and a move towards admitting them to the European Union (EU), the EU process then slowed as the then-twelve members focused instead on adoption of the single market, the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, which had unexpectedly become more complicated and less sure of ratification with the Danish referendum, and, not least, the admittance instead of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, which coincidently were net contributors

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National Debates over Enlargement

to the Union rather than costly dependants (as the Central European states were predicted to be). For the United States, the initial reaction to the events of 1989 was cautious and focused particularly on a smooth German unification. The combined impact of the Persian Gulf War and public desire for a peace dividend resulted in substantially reduced force levels in Europe (from over 300,000 stationed forces to near 100,000), albeit not yet a clear definition of the direction of relationships with the newly emerging democracies and the disintegrating Soviet Union. On the one hand, the United States looked to Europe to address the mounting conflict in the former Yugoslavia while, on the other hand, becoming agitated over independent European initiatives (witness the "Bartholomew Blast" after announcement of a German-French brigade). By 1993-94, a consensus had begun to form over the necessity to reach out to the former East Bloc in a more substantial manner than that represented by the early North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). For the United States, such an announcement by NATO would reinforce the traditional u.s. role in Europe, and for Europe it would anchor the united States to the continent in a period of change and guard against the risks posed by German unification. PURSUING

NATO E N L A R G E M E N T :

THREE

PHASES

The policy of NATO enlargement underwent three distinct phases after the revolutionary period of 1989-91, and with the Madrid summit in July 1997 it entered a fourth phase. The first period was one in which, first, policy makers attempted to deal with the changed geopolitical situation on the continent within the existing security structures of Europe, unifying Germany and adjusting NATO and the other organizations to reflect the new circumstances without major disruption. This phase spanned the Bush and Clinton administrations and could be described only as a holding pattern for NATO while Germany and the East were, in fact, undergoing major transformation. The period included the decision to establish NACC and culminated in the introduction of the Partnership for Peace (pfp), a transition to what would become more substantial changes. The u.s. policy with respect to NATO entered a second phase following the establishment of the pfp program, which, to the chagrin of its supporters, did not quiet the movement for enlargement. The policy shifted to adoption of enlargement as an objective with the speech delivered by President Bill Clinton in the summer of 1994 in Warsaw and later repeated in Prague. The final decision for enlargement was

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driven by the president's instinct as well as his sincere belief that the Central and Eastern Europeans should be given the opportunity to participate in the Atlantic partnership to which they had been so long barred after the Second World War. While internal debate continued and the allies wavered during this period, the president's decision was clear. In December 1994 the North Atlantic Council adopted the principle of enlargement while leaving open the issue of who, how, and when. In the bureaucratic style that plagues international organizations as well as national governments, the following nine months were filled with intra-alliance debate and haggling over the details, culminating with the September 1995 issuance of the guidelines for enlargement.3 This second period was one of consolidation both within the U.S. government and within the NATO alliance and was marked by a forging of a consensus on the terms of enlargement. After the adoption of the principle of NATO enlargement to the East in December 1995, the debate shifted from the internal governmental and Alliance discussions to an external selling of the policy. Attention now turned both to the opponents of enlargement, some of whom would be necessary to win over in order to get approval by NATO on the specific invitations to membership, and, perhaps even more important, to the national governments that would be required to ratify the decision to be taken in Madrid in July 1997. In the case of the United States, the internal interagency debate had almost ceased by the fall of 1996, if not earlier, but the enlargement decision was vociferously opposed by important segments of elite foreign-policy intellectual circles, particularly the community of U.S. experts on Russia. In addition, there was a determined opposition outside the Alliance by the Russians, who would not be a party to the enlargement. In the case of the latter, a NATO-Russian Founding Act a month before the Madrid summit was forged to address Russian concerns (followed, five weeks later, by a Ukraine-NATO Charter). The fourth phase of the debate was surprisingly less contentious than expected and took place after the Madrid summit when the treaty faced ratification in the national governments, requiring a referendum in some countries. While the votes appeared assured in the u.s. Senate, a number of issues surfaced from July to final Senate ratification in April 1998: the potential for the applicant countries to slide backward; the threat of Russian opposition to other issues on the Russian-u.s. agenda; the impact of the cost of enlargement for Western defence budgets; and, finally, the inability of a weakened presidency to assure ratification. Despite strong Republican support for enlargement at the time, there was anxiety over the impact of the spring 1998 timing of the ratification vote in the Senate, which would coincide with both the

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National Debates over Enlargement

height of the congressional election campaigns and with the debate over u.s. force withdrawal from Bosnia - not necessarily a recipe for the necessary bipartisanship. P H A S E ONE: TINKERING

WITH

THE

STRUCTURE

In the immediate period after fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolutions of 1989, the task of dealing with German unification was uppermost on American and European minds. In Europe, opinion was divided between the more sceptical, who feared a unified Germany, and those younger people who were less influenced by the events of the 19405 and generally comfortable with unification.4 Until late 1990, German unification took centre stage, followed then by the withdrawal of Russian troops from the former Warsaw Pact.5 While there was already pressure by the Central and Eastern Europeans for entrance into NATO, their interest was far greater in membership in the EU. But with the introduction of freer trade between the former Communist bloc and the West, disparities in the cost of labour and production gave rise to a fear of loss of jobs to the East. The prospects for membership began to dim and the initially open arms of Western Europeans folded shut. By 1993 the Central and Eastern Europeans appear to have come to the decision that the more likely and quicker road to Europe was through NATO. In contrast to the major transformation achieved with the unification of Germany, the initial reaction to the vastly changed security situation on the European continent generally was much more one of tinkering with the structure than of innovation and change. In fact, NATO and the disintegrating Warsaw Pact continued their Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations and signed a CFE accord in November 1990 that was virtually out of date before final signatures were attached.6 As Western government leaders looked around Europe for structures to accommodate the new security order, the initial impulse for many was away from the NATO alliance, which was perceived as a relic of the Cold War, and towards the old concept of a European security home embedded in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE). German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was probably the most outspoken and prominent of the policy makers who appeared to consider this idea seriously. There was also support for the development of a European foreign and defence policy which would take responsibility for Europe and reduce greatly the need for a continued American presence. Although

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usually couched in a way that assumed the United States would remain on the continent, it was clear what the long-term and quite natural implication would be - a Europe more detached from the United States. In principle, this latter concept supported the "peace dividend" that many political leaders were fond of predicting and that the public was very willing to believe would now come their way. In practice it was more difficult to implement - the United States was not so sure that the Europeans could assure the security of the continent or that it was ready to bring all its troops home. Even if it did not see the necessity for a continued u.s. military presence in Europe, it did see the utility of remaining in Europe, close to many other less peaceful regions. President Mikhail Gorbachev's assent to continued German membership in NATO in July 1990 a few months before unification had surprised a number of European policy makers, who then began to reconsider the viability of NATO, perhaps (at that point) in combination with CSCE and other instruments but in an arrangement that included the Americans. In contrast to the musings over radical institutional changes, in the end NATO members (some earlier, some later), including the United States, opted to tinker with the existing system that had been successful for over forty-five years. Why not adapt it instead of throwing it overboard? Members began a slow adjustment of NATO doctrine to fit the new "world order." If its feelings by this point about a European security identity were not clear, the Bush administration's sharp reaction to the proposal for a French-German brigade made it plain that the United States would not tolerate any institutional development of an European Community(ec)-only security structure if such development were to come at NATO'S expense.7 NATO then began talks on a European pillar at its June 1991 meetings and in November it issued the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, which outlined a new strategic concept. In essence, the decision at this point was to work with the existing structure of NATO and adapt it to the postCold War world. The decision to adapt NATO was not without its detractors nor problems of its own. While retaining the old structures maintained long-developed practices of cooperation, it also made innovation more difficult. The changes came incrementally and slowly.8 As the ambivalence of the European Community on the EC membership of the newly emerging democratic states became more evident, the United States was increasingly convinced of the need to incorporate these states into the Atlantic community. A u.s. concept, NACC, was the first step in the recognition that NATO needed to encourage democratic developments in these countries and demonstrate that they were not to be excluded.9 Its outlines were first drawn in the policy-planning

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staff of the U.S. State Department, and NACC held its first meeting in 1992-93. But NACC membership was broad and included many states whose readiness to participate in the Alliance more than on very general cooperative issues was doubtful. Throughout 1993 the U.S. interagency process worked to address the needs of the countries that wanted deeper military cooperation, finally settling on the establishment of the pfp in the fall of 1993. In a refined form, the pfp was offered to former Warsaw Pact countries in December 1993/January 1994 in Brussels.10 It "launched an immediate and practical program that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states."11 For the United States, this approach was in essence the lowest-common denominator acceptable to the interagency process. It fulfilled the need to tie the East closer to the Atlantic Alliance in a way that did not commit NATO to an Article 5 commitment and that assuaged fears that NATO was a threat to the East. Its thrust was, however, still in essence a tinkering with the process and structure. Cold War organizations were being adjusted, but within the framework of the past. The United States entered an essentially second phase on the issue of enlargement in the months after the pfp was established. PHASE

TWO:

GETTING

TO

YES

Within the U.S. government, the agreement on the pfp was clearly seen as a compromise. Two factors were then at work and a third then entered the equation. First, there were a number of committed European experts who from the time of the 1989 revolutions had been arguing for the West to offer membership to the democratizing East, at minimum on a selective basis as an enticement towards further political and economic reform. Their approach was not always uniform, with some arguing for EU membership while a smaller number argued for NATO membership or NATO/EU coordinated membership. There were also differences in motivation for the conviction that the West needed to move quickly to incorporate the former East Bloc countries into NATO. On the one hand, some wanted to undo the mistakes made in the post-Second World War era and encourage particularly those countries that had been forced into Communism to find a home in the Western community of democratic nations. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott commented that "it would be the height of injustice and irony - the ultimate in double jeopardy - if these countries were, in effect, punished for the next fifty years because they had been, very much against the will of their people, part of the

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Warsaw Pact for the past fifty."12 Yet there were others whose motivation was to avoid a situation in which the Central and Eastern European countries would be pulled back into a reconstituted Soviet Union. In both cases, membership in the Western structures could be an avenue to resolving their concern. A second factor was the conviction of the countries themselves and the lobbying effort they undertook on Capitol Hill and with the administration. Whereas initially the focus of the Central and Eastern Europeans had appeared to be on membership in the EU, by 1994 it was clear that such an invitation would not soon be forthcoming. 13 Their apparent assessment - which proved correct - was that the United States would be their main advocate and this dictated a shift in focus to NATO. In addition, the pfp provided the opportunity to demonstrate their readiness for membership and to begin to adapt their forces to appropriate standards. A final and third factor at this point was the political campaign for the U.S. Congress. While the congressional Republicans centered their attention most directly on domestic affairs and their campaigns reflected this focus, the one foreign-policy issue that resonated - and was an aspect of point 10 in the Contract with America - was a call for NATO enlargement. The ethnic constituencies could not have played a minor role in this decision, but also important was the argument that a resurgence in Russian strength might propel a grab at Central Europe. Discussion in Russia of the "near-abroad" and the emergence of far-right Russian parties, led by leaders such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, reinforced this perception. The administration's change of view came prior to the Contract with America, and it is debatable how large a factor the Contract actually was in the speech by President Clinton during his trip to Warsaw and again during his stop in Prague, when he declared that it was not a matter of "whether, but when and how NATO will admit new members. We are committed to NATO expansion."14 That speech and later comments by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher set in motion an interagency process to make sure that the president's promise became reality. To this point, the lines had been starkly drawn between the State Department, which under new leadership in the European Bureau of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke had been attempting to pull along many of the other agencies, and a Defense Department nervous that the United States would be over-extended by an enlargement that carried an Article 5 commitment. The argument within the Defense Department was that the pfp had only begun to be instituted and should be given a chance to develop. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Kruzel had become

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particularly identified with the pfp and was especially adamant about the need to wait for a few years and permit the new partners to adapt to the pfp program. While NACC had not satisfied the countries concerned with membership, the pfp was designed to involve interested countries in the activities of NATO more directly and bring partners into the NATO community in a more direct way, even at headquarters. 15 Because of the prevailing reluctance at the Defense Department in both the civilian and Joint Chiefs of Staff (jcs) ranks, the process of striking agreement on the issue was slow and arduous. The role of Assistant Secretary Holbrooke was critical at this point in reminding the interagency players of the president's speech and bringing about agreement at his equivalent levels at State and Defense.16 By December 1994 the United States, with like-minded allies, had an agreement at NATO that enlargement would occur, but still to be determined was the how, when, and who.17 According to a background briefing given at Brussels at the time of the decision, the U.S. position had been fashioned in October and early November, with teams sent to Europe and President Clinton meeting with at least three foreign leaders on the issue. "It was not," this administration spokesman commented, "as simple as flying from, let's say Prague or Warsaw or Budapest to Brussels and picking up the locker key to the NATO club."18 Proceeding painfully at times, more easily at other times, the intraAlliance process produced an enlargement study in September 1995 which would form the basis for an Alliance decision in December 1995. The u.s. interagency process was perhaps even more difficult than the Alliance process, but by the spring of 1995 the most vociferous opponents had been quieted and their efforts concentrated on delaying the final decision as long as possible.19 In the United States, the public debate was interesting. First and foremost, it was primarily and overwhelmingly an experts debate.10 There was public support for enlargement, but the understanding of the commitments involved was admittedly thin. Second, the debate was quite late in beginning and appeared to remain a few steps behind the process throughout. While the support from outside the government was led by a number of researchers at RAND with expertise on Central Europe, Russian experts feared that enlargement would force the Russians into a corner and either drive them into further isolation or even provoke an aggressive reaction/1 One opponent of enlargement, however, argued after the Russian presidential elections in June 1996 that NATO could now enlarge without fear of influencing adversely the elections. During the Russian presidential elections and again during Boris Yeltsin's subsequent illness, there was the added fear that the NATO

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87

enlargement issue would strengthen the hands of the far right and give rise to radical tendencies. The Russian outcry ranged at first from warnings of the impact of a decision to enlarge by NATO to official "threats" about the results of enlargement. The Russian reaction also rose and ebbed over the course of nearly three years of intra-Alliance discussion, with each side of the American intellectual debate grabbing for the pronouncement most favourable to its own stance.11 PHASE

THREE:

DESIGNING

THE

PACKAGE

By the winter of 1996-97, there was a firm closing of the ranks within the u.s. government behind NATO enlargement. After the fall 1996 campaign announcement in Detroit by President Clinton that enlargement would in effect occur by 1999, the administration pursued the matter quickly both at home and in NATO. 13 The 1996 presidential campaign was fought overwhelmingly on domestic issues, but NATO enlargement did emerge briefly when Republican candidate Robert Dole charged the administration with foot-dragging and promised that, if elected, he would push for broader NATO membership by 1998. When the president repeated the objective of enlargement by 1999 in his state of the union address in January 1997,Z4 attention became directed in a very focused manner on the "package" to be presented to the Russians as an assurance that NATO enlargement would not be aimed against them. Negotiations on the final Founding Act between NATO and Russia were conducted until the last minutes before its signing in Paris on 2.6 May 1997. The act surprised many outside the process with its breadth and the potential it opened for a far closer and cooperative relationship than thought possible in the past/ 5 The negotiators fashioned a Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council that could substantially deepen the ties between NATO members and Russia. Paragraph 13 stated that the council "will provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern." But "the consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member states or Russia."16 The operative word, however, is "potential." While the act lays out a joint council, the explicit issues to be discussed and the nature of those discussions and/or any decisions are vague - hence the quite varied interpretations by NATO members and Russia over whether Russia would in effect be able to exercise the veto over NATO affairs which opponents of enlargement warned about and supporters dismissed. Yet, whatever powers the eventual council will or will not

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yield, the mere agreement on the Founding Act has in itself been historic for the Alliance. As Deputy Secretary of State Talbott indicated in the weeks preceding the signing of the Founding Act, there will be expanded exchanges and inclusion of Russian officers "at all top levels of the alliance command structure. " zy How the NATO-Russian relationship will develop remains to be seen and is highly dependent on both the Alliance enlargement discussion in the West and the direction of the internal Russian domestic debate/8 Despite the fairly contentious debate within Russia as well as in the West before the Founding Act, the official negotiations and contacts have been businesslike and the rhetoric over enlargement has become significantly muted.29 There is also frequent mention of other avenues through which the once-enemy states could broaden their cooperation and defuse differences, for example, the osce.3° In sum, there is no question of the historic nature of the Founding Act, but whether it achieves its potential is an open issue. There is an inherent contradiction between its operation at high-levels in NATO at the same time that the member states have declared their determination not to permit any veto of NATO actions.31 In another aspect of the package, NATO announced in December 1996 that it did not plan to station nuclear weapons in the new member states: NATO members have "no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. " 3Z Furthermore, it announced that it does not foresee the need to station any permanent forces in those countries, although joint manoeuvres are to be expected. All these efforts - the 1994 inclusion of Russia in the pfp, the Founding Act, and the assurances about nuclear forces - have been designed to address the Russians' desire for an inclusive process of broader European security. This outreach to Russia has been accompanied at a somewhat lower level with efforts also to reassure the Ukrainians. As the third-largest recipient of U.S. aid after Israel and Egypt since it agreed to dismantle all nuclear capabilities, Ukraine has had a particular significance for Washington. While its difficulties with democratic and market reforms have often strained the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship, there has been a broad recognition by both the united States and its NATO allies of the need to reinforce the progressive factions in Ukraine. Negotiated prior to the summit, the NATOUkraine Charter was signed in Madrid, symbolically underscoring a special relationship without detracting from the more prominent NATO-Russia act. In short, although opponents criticized these various measures as insufficient, NATO has attempted to assure the perception of a NATO

Enlargement and the United States

89

enlargement not aimed against Russia or excluding any other state or group of states. Rather, the objective is a stable relationship with Russia and others, maintained at reduced levels of tension with "no new lines" created. As the Alliance prepared to convene the July 1997 Madrid summit, NATO (and the United States) hoped that this package to bring in selected Central and Eastern European countries while forging a new relationship with Russia would lay the foundations for a more secure Europe. PHASE

FOUR:

SELLING

THE

ENLARGEMENT

The Alliance entered the fourth and final phase with its July 1997 summit. Attention now had to turn to the selling of enlargement to parliaments to secure ratification. While the European parliamentary system all but assured a smooth ratification of an agreement signed by heads of state/government, there was no desire to repeat the embarrassment of the Danish rejection only a few years before during the EU Maastricht Treaty ratification process.33 The NATO heads of state met at Madrid determined to craft an agreement which would not face difficult ratification processes, and the Madrid Declaration on EuroAtlantic Security and Cooperation reflected that objective. The declaration addressed a number of issues: an offer to three states to begin accession talks; an enhanced NACC for the states not acceding to NATO; an enhanced pfp; an acknowledgment of the importance of a European Security and Defence Identity and of the Mediterranean region/oscE/ cfe Treaty; and, of high priority, a reinforcement of the concept of security for Europe as a whole (that is, with specific reference to the Founding Act and the Ukrainian-NATO Charter). In contrast to the European ratification process, the divided u.s. government portended a potentially more difficult hurdle. For the u.s. debate, the two Madrid issues of NATO membership for Central and Eastern European states and of a form of cooperative security that is inclusive for the continent were most critical and will be addressed more fully below. A final potentially contentious issue was thought to be one of cost, but it proved less important in the Senate treaty debate.34 Membership For the United States, President Clinton could expect the Senate to examine particularly carefully the readiness of the membership candidates in terms of their domestic stability (democratic processes, market economies, civilian control of the military, and so on) and therefore their ability to contribute to the Alliance they would join. Both the

T-6o. Meanwhile, an opponent of Slovakia's membership in NATO wrote: "NATO should be replaced by a more modern pan-European model which would act on the basis of broad European and world security ... If it enters NATO, the Slovak Republic will lose its state sovereignty and its independence." Jan Dobransk, "NATO a naa suverenita" (NATO and Our Sovereignty), Slovenske ndrodne noviny, 50 (1996), 17 Dec. 1996, 3. 72 "The Finnish example clearly shows that not belonging to a military bloc in no way means passivity in defence policy or national isolation," kodd ek, 7 (1997), 18 Feb. 1997, 9. The Slovak National Party, a member of the governing coalition, openly advocated neutrality. 73 John Karch, "For Peace on Earth ... and in Central Europe," Jednota, 25 Dec. 1996, 2.

160

Notes to pages 213-18

74 The Slovak National Party unsuccessfully proposed an amendment including a fourth question on Slovak neutrality. 75 Nata Hos ovecka, "Ucta k ob anovi" (Respect for Citizens), Slovenske ndrodne noviny, u (1997), 18 March 1997, 4. 76 Anna Siskova, "Slovakia's Western Integration in Danger," OMRI Analytical Brief I, no. 552, 14 Feb. 1997. One Slovak daily argued that the government's real intentions on the matter of Slovakia joining NATO would be revealed by the degree to which the members of the government participated in the referendum campaign. See Pravda (Bratislava), 8 March 1997. 77 Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest, Part II, 24 March 1997. 78 Duan D. Kern, "Kto vymyslel rozirovanie NATO?" (Who Thought of Enlarging NATO?), Slovenske ndrodne noviny, 22 (1997), 3 June 1997, 7. 79 Julius Pecha, "Uvahy o neutralite" (Reflections on Neutrality), Slovenske ndrodne noviny, 3 (1997), 5 Aug. 1997, 7. 80 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 141, Part II, 20 Oct. 1997. 81 Reka Szemerkenyi, "Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk," Adelphi Paper, 306 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 1996). It is interesting to note that this study covers the Visegrad four. The problems of democratic development in these countries do not seem to have weighed in the balance in the case of the three which have been accepted for Phase I of NATO enlargement. CONCLUSION 1 Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse?," Survival, 39 (spring J 997). !56-792 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1995), and "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press 1996), 357-99; John Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in Ngaire Woods, Explaining International Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), 337-54. 3 Alison Mitchell, "NATO debate: From big risk to sure thing," New York Times, 20 March 1998, Ai, A8. 4 Philip Gordon, NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (Baltimore: Rowman and Littlefield 1997); Rob de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus (London: Brassey's 1997); Gerald Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, i^yo-iyy/ (Washington: CSIS Press 1998); the conference report The Pros and Cons of NATO Expansion: Defining US Goals and Options

Notes to pages 218-22

5 6

7 8

261

(Washington: Stanley Foundation 1997); and "The Debate over NATO Expansion," Arms Control Today, 27 (September 1997), 3-10. Katharine Seelye, "Arms contractors spend to promote an expanded NATO," New York Times, 30 March 1998, Ai, A6. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997-1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), 268-73 (figures based on studies by RAND, Congress, the Pentagon, and NATO); see also Amos Perlmutter and Ted Galen Carpenter, "NATO'S Expensive Trip East," Foreign Affairs, 77 (January-February 1998), 2-6. Institut franc.ais des relations internationales, Ramses 1998 (Paris: Dunod J 997K 40. The possibility of Russian membership is discussed by Richard Biondi, "Evaluating the Sufficiency of NATO Reforms for the Inclusion of Russia," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, 17-21 March 1998, 33; Djanguir Atamali, "The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation," report on the conference organized by the Czech Atlantic Commission, NATO Summit 1997, and Further Enhancement of European Security, Cesky Krumlov, October I 997> 5~8. See also Richard Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russian Factor (Santa Monica: RAND 1996).