The 2020 Presidential Election: Key Issues and Regional Dynamics (Palgrave Studies in US Elections) 3030838714, 9783030838713

Table of contents :
Preface
Acknowledgments
Contents
List of Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
Understanding Presidential Elections
Approach of This Book
Bibliography
2 How Biden Rebuilt the Blue Wall
Time and Money
Political Geography
How 2020 Differed from 2016
Lessons for 2024
3 Pennsylvania: A New Bellwether?
2016: A Blue Wall (in a Purple State) Crumbles
2018: Democrats Resurgent—Conor Lamb’s Upset, Redistricting, and Statewide Wins
Conor Lamb—The Special Election Earthquake in Southwestern PA
Gerrymandering Ruled Unconstitutional; New Congressional Districts Drawn; Dems Reelected
2020: Reassembling a (Fragile) Blue Wall—How Biden Won
2016–2020: Republican Gains in Party Registration
Election Results: A Suburban Surge for Biden, a Red Mirage on Election Day, and Marginal Gains
Biden Brings Back Two of Three Obama-Trump Counties (Barely)
Suburban Surge Protectors: Allegheny and Montgomery County
Pennsylvania—Battleground 2024: What Lies Ahead?
4 The Sun Belt Beginning to Shine for Democrats
What Is the Sun Belt and Why Is It Important?
Diversification of the Sun Belt States
What Happened in the 2020 Election in the Sun Belt?
A Deeper Dive into Three Sun Belt Battlegrounds
Conclusion
References
5 Progressive Grassroots Organizing (2016–2020)
Describing the Resistance
Taking Action: Protesting and Canvassing
Central New York Case Study
Resistance Groups, Elections, and the Democratic Party
6 The Polarized Pandemic
7 Judicial Nominations and Trump’s Complicated Relationship with the Courts
2016, the Courts, and McConnell
Remaking of the Judiciary: A Regional Story
Administrative Procedure Act Cases: Policy Failures in All Regions
2020 Election: Courting Voters and Judges
Conclusion
8 Endless Love: Evangelical Voters, the Republican Party, and Donald Trump
White Evangelical Voters
The Republican Party and White Evangelical Voters
White Evangelical Voters and Trump
Regional Differences and Implications for 2024
References
9 Looking Down the Barrel of the 2020 Elections
The National Backdrop
The Candidates and Guns
The Parties on Gun Policy
Gun Policy in New York
The Results
10 2020—A Pivotal Moment in America’s Climate Change Efforts
Introduction
Setting the Political Stage for Climate Change in 2020
The 2020 Democratic Primary and Climate Change
Climate Was Not the Determining Factor in the Democratic Primary
Biden’s Big Tent Approach Shaped Climate as an Issue in the November Election
Fall 2020: The General Election
Since the Election—The First 100 Days
Conclusion
11 “America First” Finished Second: Foreign Policy in the 2020 Presidential Campaign
Polling Data on Foreign Policy in 2020
Public Opinion on Foreign Policy in Presidential Campaigns
Foreign Policy in the 2020 Campaigns
Strategic and National Use of Foreign Policy in the 2020 Campaigns
Tactical and Situational Use of Foreign Policy in the 2020 Presidential Election
The Blue Wall—Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin
Florida
The Southwest and the Mountain West
Conclusion
References
12 Conclusion: Main Themes and Implications for 2024
The Midwest is more purple than blue
The Sunbelt is on the cusp of rerouting traditional paths to victory in presidential elections
The 2020 election was heavily influenced by idiosyncratic factors that complicate predictions for 2024
Donald Trump was not able to capitalize on policy areas where his administration had a big impact, such as remaking the federal courts and foreign policy.
2020 helped illustrate how the issues of guns and religion are becoming less beneficial to Republican presidential candidates, while climate change increasingly animates Americans across the political spectrum
The 2024 election will likely unfold in a very different social, economic, and political context than 2020.
Index

Citation preview

PALGRAVE STUDIES IN US ELECTIONS SERIES EDITOR: LUKE PERRY

The 2020 Presidential Election Key Issues and Regional Dynamics Edited by Luke Perry

Palgrave Studies in US Elections

Series Editor Luke Perry, Utica College, Utica, NY, USA

This Pivot series, established in collaboration with the Utica College Center of Public Affairs and Election Research, brings together cuttingedge work in US Politics focused on trends and issues surrounding local, state, and federal elections. Books in this series may cover but are not limited to topics such as voting behavior, campaign management, policy considerations, electoral social movements, and analysis of significant races. While welcoming all projects on US elections within and across all three levels of government, this series proceeds from the truism that all politics is fundamentally local. As such, we are especially interested in research on state and local elections such as mayoral races, gubernatorial races, and congressional elections, with particular focus on how state/local electoral trends influence national electoral politics, and vice versa. This series is open to any relevant scholar and all methodological approaches.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/16164

Luke Perry Editor

The 2020 Presidential Election Key Issues and Regional Dynamics

Editor Luke Perry Department of Political Science Utica College Utica, NY, USA

Palgrave Studies in US Elections ISBN 978-3-030-83871-3 ISBN 978-3-030-83872-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is dedicated to everyone harmed in the January 6, 2021 domestic terrorist attack on the U.S. Capitol.

Preface

This Palgrave Series in U.S. Elections, established in collaboration with the Utica College Center of Public Affairs and Election Research, brings together cutting-edge work in U.S. Politics focused on trends and issues surrounding local, state, and federal elections. Books in this series cover topics such as voting behavior, campaign management, policy considerations, electoral social movements, and analysis of significant races. Previous titles include: The 2020 Democratic Primary: Key Developments, Dynamics, and Lessons for 2024 Luke Perry, ed. (2021) Redistricting and Gerrymandering in North Carolina J. Michael Bitzer (2021) Donald Trump and New Hampshire Politics Christopher J. Galdieri (2020) From the Iowa Caucuses to the White House Andrew Green (2020) The Politics of Spectacle and Emotion in the 2016 Presidential Campaign Heather E. Yates (2019)

vii

viii

PREFACE

Donald Trump and the 2018 Midterm Battle for Central New York Luke Perry (2019) Utica, USA

Luke Perry

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the political editors from Palgrave Macmillan, including Michelle Chen and Rebecca Roberts, for the pleasant and productive relationship we have developed over years of partnership with the Utica College Center of Public Affairs and Election Research (ucpublicaffairs.com). This book would not be possible without the work of my friends and colleagues who persevered through a pandemic to produce an extraordinary body of work. I am humbled and grateful to share in this collaboration. Luke Perry

ix

Contents

1

1

Introduction Luke Perry

2

How Biden Rebuilt the Blue Wall Luke Perry, Quinlyn Beaver, and Jamie Nelson

15

3

Pennsylvania: A New Bellwether? Kevan M. Yenerall

31

4

The Sun Belt Beginning to Shine for Democrats Lawrence Becker and Tyler Hughes

51

5

Progressive Grassroots Organizing (2016–2020) Kristi Andersen

71

6

The Polarized Pandemic Philip A. Klinkner

83

7

Judicial Nominations and Trump’s Complicated Relationship with the Courts Daniel Tagliarina

93

Endless Love: Evangelical Voters, the Republican Party, and Donald Trump Christopher Cronin

113

8

xi

xii

CONTENTS

9

Looking Down the Barrel of the 2020 Elections Robert J. Spitzer

10

2020—A Pivotal Moment in America’s Climate Change Efforts Aaron L. Strong

143

“America First” Finished Second: Foreign Policy in the 2020 Presidential Campaign Paul S. Adams

163

11

12

Conclusion: Main Themes and Implications for 2024 Luke Perry

Index

131

185

197

List of Contributors

Paul S. Adams University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg, Greenburg, PA, USA Kristi Andersen Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Quinlyn Beaver Utica College, Utica, NY, USA Lawrence Becker California State University, Northridge, Los Angeles, CA, USA Christopher Cronin Methodist University, Fayetteville, NC, USA Tyler Hughes California State University, Northridge, Los Angeles, CA, USA Philip A. Klinkner Hamilton College, Clinton, NY, USA Jamie Nelson The University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA Luke Perry Utica College, Utica, NY, USA Robert J. Spitzer State University of New York, Cortland, NY, USA Aaron L. Strong Hamilton College, Clinton, NY, USA Daniel Tagliarina Utica College, Utica, NY, USA Kevan M. Yenerall Clarion University, Clarion, PA, USA

xiii

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2

Graph 6.1

Graph 8.1

Percentage change to racial/ethnic democraphic in the Sun Belt, by State 2010–2019 Percentage decline in non-Hispanic White share of the electorate in the Sun Belt, by State 2000–2018 Ratio of COVID case and death rates in Biden and Trump Counties (numbers greater than one indicate higher rates in Biden Counties than in Trump Counties) Religious rhetoric in political platforms

55 57

87 119

xv

List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 6.1 Table 6.2

Table Table Table Table Table

7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1 10.1

Table 10.2

Population growth in the Sun Belt States, 2010–2020 Comparison of Biden 2020 margin with Clinton 2016 margin in Sun Belt States Democratic vote margin in selected Sun Belt States Democratic margin in selected “Slow-growing” Sun Belt States Trump performance, 2016–2020 by COVID cases and deaths Regression results: Impact of COVID case and death rates on change in Trump share of two-party vote 2016–2020 Federal district court appointments Federal court of appeals appointments Trump administration APA cases in article III courts Religious rhetoric in political platforms The percentage of Alarmed Americans has increased steadily from 2010 to 2020. Assessment of stances of congressional candidates’ stances on climate change, where Alarmed = 6, Concerned = 5, Cautious = 4, Disengaged = 3, Doubtful = 2, Dismissive = 1

53 58 59 60 84

85 97 99 102 118 145

155

xvii

CHAPTER 1

Introduction Luke Perry

Abstract This chapter introduces scholarship on presidential elections and the approach to this book. Keywords Presidential elections · 2020 election · 2016 election · Joe Biden · Donald Trump · Electoral College · Swing states · COVID-19 · Economy

The 2020 presidential election was the most dramatic election in recent memory unfolding during a once-in-a-century global pandemic. The unorthodox and strident politics of Donald Trump prompted an embattled campaign with both sides contending the soul of the nation was at stake. Joe Biden dispatched Trump and restored the priorities of the Obama administration, though the state of U.S. democracy and party politics were decidedly different than 2016.

L. Perry (B) Utica College, Utica, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0_1

1

2

L. PERRY

Trump refused to concede, launched several unsuccessful lawsuits challenging the results in pivotal states, which culminated in an unprecedented insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, the day Congress formally certified Biden’s victory. Trump’s speech beforehand and response afterward will forever cloud his presidency. A majority in both chambers of Congress, consisting of Democrats and Republicans, voted to impeach and convict Trump in an unprecedented second impeachment, though fell shy of the two-thirds Senate requirement to remove him from office. Trump became the first one-term president in nearly 30 years, though his presidency was significant. 226 of Trump’s nominations for federal judges were confirmed, including 54 U.S. Court of Appeals judges, and three new Supreme Court Justices.1 Under unified government, Republicans failed to repeal The Affordable Care Act, after years of related campaign pledges, but passed The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, a federal income tax cut comparable to recent GOP presidencies. Following the 2018 midterm, ushering in divided government, Congress passed The First Step Act, bipartisan criminal justice reform, and five COVID relief bills in 2020. The U.S. economy experienced several years of economic growth following the Great Recession with G.D.P. growing 2.5% annually during Trump’s first three years, nearly identical to President Obama’s final three years. Trump rejected the pro-active military approach in foreign affairs emblematic of his Republican predecessor George W. Bush, and favored by other recent GOP presidential nominees, such as John McCain and Mitt Romney. In turn, Trump pivoted away from a wartime presidency consumed with terrorism that dominated the office during the early twentieth-first century. Trump revolutionized mass communication by using social media like no other president, Tweeting 24 hours a day from a personal account in unfiltered direct messaging. Trump incorporated this medium into U.S. political communication akin to previous presidents who engaged twentieth-century technologies, including radio and television, to help promote their political agendas. Joe Biden ran on change, experience, and temperament. Biden prioritized ending the pandemic, turning the economy around, racial justice, and combating global climate change. This book examines how Biden won, how the outcome was a product of various state and regional dynamics that often get overlooked in understanding presidential elections, and how several prominent issues influenced the 2020 campaign.

1

INTRODUCTION

3

This chapter introduces scholarly research on presidential elections and provides the framework for the rest of the book.

Understanding Presidential Elections Scholars have employed many perspectives in seeking to analyze and make predictions about presidential elections, including political considerations and economic considerations. Presidential incumbents have fared better than challengers throughout U.S. history. Since 1788, incumbents were reelected 22 times and defeated 11 times.2 Open seat contests were closer on average than those with incumbents. 12 of 26 open seat races experienced less than a five-point difference in the popular vote between candidates. Trump’s incumbent defeat was preceded by three incumbent presidential victories. Trump was narrowly elected in 2016 with the third lowest popular vote margin ever (−2.1%), ahead of only Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876 and John Quincy Adams in 1824, two instances when no candidate won an Electoral College majority.3 Trump was clearly vulnerable upon taking office, but George W. Bush transformed a popular vote loss in 2000 into a reelection victory, in part thanks to presidential leadership responding to the national crisis. Whether voters want more of the same or desire change is a fundamental question every four years with or without an incumbent running.4 Since 1952, the incumbent party in the White House lost 88% of the time (eight out of nine) when in power eight or more years. Conversely, the incumbent party won 77% of the time (seven out of nine) when in power just four years.5 Trump benefited from empirical crosswinds facing Democrats in 2016, irrespective of candidate or campaign particulars, then failed to capitalize on these same trends in pursuing reelection. 2020 was just the second time in 70 years the incumbent party lost after only four years of controlling the White House. Increased parity among vote shares for each party has contributed to close presidential elections over the last 40 years, including the last three presidential cycles. During the twentieth century, landslide elections were common with many contests settled by double-digit popular vote margins.6 Since the 1960s, voters are more closely connected to the party that fits their ideological preferences and overwhelmingly vote to support these candidates. Ronald Reagan’s reelection in 1984 was the only landslide victory in the last forty years. Reagan had a 58% job

4

L. PERRY

approval rating on Election Day in 1984, when he secured 49 of 50 states. Reagan’s number fluctuated throughout his presidency, often hovering around 50%, while also spiking to nearly 70%.7 Job approval has been a core element of forecasting presidential elections for decades.8 Every incumbent president with job approval ratings around or above 50% have been reelected over the last 72 years since polling began.9 The growth of non-white voters since 1992 has created a modest but significant advantage for Democrats, particularly among Latino-American and Asian-American voters.10 The share of eligible non-Hispanic White voters fell in all 50 states over the last 20 years with 10 states experiencing double-digit declines.11 The largest growth of Hispanic voters occurred in the South and West in states like California, Texas, and Nevada. This growth has impacted swing states, such as Florida, and Arizona. The percent of eligible Hispanic voters in Florida doubled this century to 20% of eligible voters, and grew to one-quarter of the electorate in Arizona, which narrowly voted Democratic in 2020 for the first time since 1996, and just the second time since 1952. Democrats have a strong advantage among people of color, though white adults historically register to vote and turn out to a larger degree than other racial and ethnic groups. Moreover, increased growth and participation by racial and minority groups may amplify and reflect various sub-group identities and disparate political attitudes, complicating predictions of Democratic dominance in presidential elections with an increasingly multi-racial and multi-ethnic electorate. At the same time, Republicans have won the popular vote just once since 1988. Following Mitt Romney’s 2012 defeat, party leaders identified greater inclusion of Hispanic, Black, and Asian Americans as a top priority of the Republican National Committee in its post-election autopsy, the “Growth and Opportunity Project.” This was before Trump upended Republican Party politics, including the fault lines of race, ethnicity, and immigration, creating uncertainty about the focus of the party moving forward. Voters reward or punish incumbent presidential candidates depending on the economy,12 particularly incumbent presidents. Key economic variables include GDP, income, consumer confidence index, inflation, unemployment, and job creation.13 Scholars examine existing rates at set times within a presidential campaign and rates of change over time. One challenge is that the actual state of the economy and perceptions of economic performance among voters do not always neatly overlap.

1

INTRODUCTION

5

Economic assessments are predominately retrospective for incumbent presidents and prospective during open seat presidential elections.14 Economic conditions were going to be the foundation of Trump’s reelection campaign prior to the COVID pandemic, beginning in March of 2020. Trump’s messaging hyperbolically touted the economy as the best ever in U.S. history. Journalists deemed the economy Trump’s “golden ticket” to reelection up until February of election year, just prior to the national COVID spike in March.15 Public health measures around the country contributed an economic recession, which brought the largest single decline (31%) in GDP for a quarter during the second quarter of 2020. Trump voters were less likely to have lost their job or income than Democratic or independent voters.16 The president enjoyed majority support for his management of the economy leading up to Election Day and was preferred over Biden in this capacity.17 GDP rebounded in the third quarter, rising 35%, ending in September, though unemployment remained high, settling at 6% in December after peaking at 14% in April, the highest level since 1948.18 The economic situation was far from ideal, generally, and particularly for an incumbent president, whose handling of the COVID pandemic was not held in high regard. Prior to the election, Biden had a 17-point advantage on handling the pandemic with only 40% of voters expressing confidence in Trump.19

Approach of This Book Trump’s upset victory in 2016 sparked many books examining the outcomes and implications.20 These dissected campaign strategies, forecasting models, national voting behavior, campaign finance, and the impact of societal forces, such as the news media and mass communication. One gap in the literature is the limited attention paid to regional dynamics and campaign issues. Some books included a chapter on issues,21 while others focused exclusively on swing states,22 emphasizing what makes states “swing,” not regional or sub-cultural dynamics. This book adopts a regional approach to understanding 2020 presidential election outcomes. Incorporating this perspective into the analysis of presidential elections is necessary and beneficial to understanding the tribalism that has come to define contemporary U.S. politics23 and building a path to 270 Electoral College votes.24 The U.S. is the third largest country in the world25 and the third most populated.26 The country

6

L. PERRY

consists of many sub-cultural units, shaped by history, geography, politics, economics, and the arts. Regions vary by heritage, demographics, and worldviews. U.S. government has multiple ways of delineating American regions. The number varies from four, for the U.S. Census Bureau, to ten “standard federal regions,” developed by the Office of Management of Budget and utilized by several federal agencies. This book seeks to capture this nuance with four chapters devoted to specific regions and states. In Chapter 2, Luke Perry, Quinlyn Beaver, and Jamie Nelson examine how Biden was able to rebuild “the blue wall” in the Midwest with strong support in urban centers and among women and college graduates in Michigan and Wisconsin. Though these two states typically vote Democratic in presidential elections, replicating Biden’s success is not guaranteed moving forward, particularly in Wisconsin, considering historically high turnout via absentee balloting in 2020 and a strong desire for change over the last two election cycles. In Chapter 3, Kevan Yenerall explains how Biden similarly benefitted from an enthusiastic base in Pennsylvania, big suburban gains, and preventing the expansion of Republican margins with non-collegeeducated white voters. Biden’s success did not provide coattails for downballot Democratic candidates; however, reflecting a decidedly purple state beneath Pennsylvania’s Democratic propensities in presidential elections. Arizona and Georgia were the two most surprising pick-ups for Biden in 2020. In Chapter 4, Lawrence Becker and Tyler Hughes examine the Sun Belt, the large Southern region encompassing 15 states, half of whom have experienced double-digit population growth. Increased urbanization and diversification of the electorate help explain Biden’s success. This is part of a larger shift toward competitiveness in the region, which will likely become a new path to Electoral College success in the near future. In Chapter 5, Kristi Andersen examines the rise of grassroots organizing in response to Trump’s election in 2016. Following his inauguration, women’s marches took place throughout the country. Over a million people downloaded Indivisible’s political organization guide and formed over 5000 groups nationwide. Andersen compares “the resistance” to other recent movements, such as the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street, and provides a firsthand account of internal dynamics from upstate New York. Grassroots organizing clearly benefited Democrats in the 2018 and 2020 elections, though how to understand this dynamic—past, present, and future—remains fluid and uncertain.

1

INTRODUCTION

7

From this foundation, the book aspires to provide a comprehensive assessment of prominent issues in 2020, considering both national significance and regional variance. Six issue-based chapters address four core questions: (1) How did each campaign engage this issue in terms of policy and strategy? (2) What is similar and different about the approach in 2020 compared to previous presidential campaigns? (3) How did regional dynamics and considerations influence public opinion and campaign politics regarding this issue? (4) What are the future implications for this issue over the next four years and 2024 campaign? In Chapter 6, Phillip Klinkner examines the political implications of the COVID pandemic, the most significant issue in 2020. COVID quickly became politicized as the pandemic unfolded during a presidential election year. President Trump was hindered by unfavorable national perceptions of his handling of the pandemic. Klinkner uses county-level analysis to illustrate how the impact of COVID on voting behavior was not particularly harmful beneath the surface. The ability to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court helped Trump get elected in 2016. In Chapter 7, Daniel Tagliarina examines Trump’s efforts to similarly accentuate the courts in 2020. Remaking the federal judiciary was arguably the most impactful accomplishment of the Trump presidency. In contrast to 2016, this generated substantial anti-Trump enthusiasm among Democrats, heightened by the nomination and confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett just prior to Election Day. White Evangelical Christians were the cornerstone of Trump’s electoral coalition. In Chapter 8, Christopher Cronin explains how Trump engendered and retained Evangelical support throughout his political rise in 2016 and fall in 2020. White Evangelicals are not monolithic religiously, though share a deep and wide allegiance to the Republican party. This partisan devotion is cultivated by conservative candidates and strategic party appeals, mitigating potentially weaker support among White Evangelicals for less religious presidential candidates, like Trump. Guns have been a perennially divisive political issue over the last decade. In Chapter 9, Robert Spitzer explains how gun-related issues infused the campaign and election aftermath. Statewide gun reforms did not appear on any ballots, due to signature challenges resulting from COVID, but guns were a central component to protests against COVID restrictions, the use of deadly force by police officers against unarmed black people that animated the Black Lives Matter movement, and the Capitol insurrection on January 6.

8

L. PERRY

Climate change has become an increasingly prominent national issue in recent years as public opinion studies now indicate a majority of Americans are concerned about the climate crisis. In Chapter 10, Aaron Strong illustrates how climate change has emerged as a top-tier issue in presidential elections, though has yet to fully mature politically. There was a large partisan divide over how to respond, while the big tent approach adopted by Biden during the campaign left proposed climate policies ill-defined. On the surface, foreign policy appeared to be less of an issue compared to recent presidential elections, given the heavy attention devoted to the pandemic and the economy. In Chapter 11, Paul Adams illuminates how foreign policy was more integral to the campaign than conventional thinking suggests. Trump’s political persona, encapsulated in the slogan, “Make America Great Again,” incorporated both domestic and foreign policy. Both candidates exhibited stark differences toward foreign policy that constituted key elements of their messaging and targeting of specific voting blocs, particularly in swing states. As a whole, this book seeks to offer a unique perspective on the 2020 election that provides a bottom-up, contextual understanding of key issues and electoral developments. This is a beneficial complement to the literature, which largely provides national perspectives on how the winning campaign prevailed. The next chapter examines how Biden secured Michigan and Wisconsin, two of the most pivotal states in the 2020 election.

Notes 1. Grimlach, John. 2020. “How Trump Compares with Other Recent Presidents in Appointing Federal Judges.” Pew Research Center. January 13. Accessed at https://www.pewresearch.org/ fact-tank/2021/01/13/how-trump-compares-with-other-recentpresidents-in-appointing-federal-judges/. 2. Mayhew, David. 2008. Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Presidential Elections: The Historical Record.” Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 2: 201–228. 3. Patel, Jugal and Wilson Andrews. 2016. “Trump’s Electoral College Victory Ranks 46th in 58 Elections.” The New York Times, December 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 2016/12/18/us/elections/donald-trump-electoral-college-pop ular-vote.html.

1

INTRODUCTION

9

4. Abramowitz, Alan. 1988. “An Improved Model for Predicting Presidential Election Outcomes.” PS: Political Science and Politics 21 (Autumn): 843–847. 5. Mayer, William. 2014. “What, If Anything, Have We Learned from Presidential Election Forecasting?” PS: Political Science and Politics 47, no. 2: 329–331. 6. Abramowitz, Alan. 2014. “Long-Term Trends and Short-Term Forecasts: The Transformation of US Presidential Elections in an Age of Polarization.” PS: Political Science and Politics 47, no. 2: 289–292. 7. Pinto, Jennifer. 2011. “Ronald Reagan’ Presidency: A Polling Retrospective.” CBS News, February 6, 2011. https://www.cbs news.com/news/ronald-reagans-presidency-a-polling-retrospec tive/. 8. Campbell, James and Kenneth Wink. 1990. “Trial-Heat Forecasts of the Presidential Vote.” American Politics Quarterly 18: 251– 269; Lewis-Beck, M. and Tom Rice. 1992. Forecasting Elections. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press; Campbell, James. 1992. “Forecasting the Presidential Vote in the States.” American Journal of Political Science 36: 386–407; Soumbatiants, Souren, Henry Chappell and Eric Johnson. 2006. “Using State Polls to Forecast U.S. Presidential Election Outcomes.” Public Choice 127, no. 1: 207–223. 9. Jones, Jeffrey. 2020. “Presidential Job Approval Related to Reelection Historically.” Gallup, May 29, 2020. https://news.gallup. com/poll/311825/presidential-job-approval-related-reelectionhistorically.aspx. 10. Abramowitz, Alan. 2014. “Long-Term Trends and Short-Term Forecasts: The Transformation of US Presidential Elections in an Age of Polarization.” PS: Political Science and Politics 47, no. 2: 289–292. 11. Igielnick, Ruth and Abby Budman. 2020. “The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition of the U.S. Electorate.” Pew. September 23, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/2020/09/23/the-cha nging-racial-and-ethnic-composition-of-the-u-s-electorate/. 12. Erikson, Robert S. and Christopher Wlezien. 2012. “The Objective and Subjective Economy and the Presidential Vote.” PS: Political Science and Politics 45, no. 4: 620–624.

10

L. PERRY

13. Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. 1982. “On the Demand for Economic Outcomes: Macroeconomic Outcomes and Mass Political Support in the United States, Great Britain and Germany.” Journal of Politics 44, no. 2: 426–462; Abramowitz, Alan. 1988. “An Improved Model for Predicting Presidential Election Outcomes.” PS: Political Science and Politics 21 (Autumn): 843–847; Fair, Ray. 1988. “The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: 1984 Update.” Political Behavior 10, no. 2: 168–179; Fair, Ray. 1996. “The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: 1992 Update.” Political Behavior 18, no. 2: 119–139; Erikson, Robert. 1989. “Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote.” American Political Science Review 83, no. 2: 567–573; Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Charles Tien. 2012. “Election Forecasting for Turbulent Times.” PS: Political Science and Politics 45, no. 4: 625–629. 14. Richard, Nadeau and Michael Lewis-Beck. 2001. “National Economic Voting in U.S. President Elections.” The Journal of Politics 63, no. 1: 159–181. 15. Soergel, Andrew. 2020. “Trump’s Golden Ticket: The Economy.” U.S. News. February 7, 2020. https://www.usnews.com/news/ elections/articles/2020-02-07/trump-could-win-in-2020-bec ause-of-the-economy. 16. Tankersley, Jim. 2020. “Why Trump’s Approval Ratings on the Economy Remain Durable.” The New York Times. August 25, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/24/us/politics/ trump-economy.html. 17. Silver, Nate. 2020. The Economy Was Trump’s One Remaining Advantage. Now He Might Have Blown It. Five-Thirty-Eight. October 6, 2020. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-eco nomy-was-trumps-one-remaining-advantage-now-he-might-haveblown-it/. 18. See “Unemployment Rates During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ R46554.pdf. 19. See “Amid Campaign Turmoil, Biden Holds Wide Leads on Coronavirus, Unifying the Country,” October 9, 2020. Pew Research. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/10/09/amid-cam paign-turmoil-biden-holds-wide-leads-on-coronavirus-unifyingthe-country/.

1

INTRODUCTION

11

20. Bitecofer, Rachel. 2017. The Unprecedented 2016 Presidential Election. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave; Cavari, Amon, Richard Powell and Kenneth Mayor, eds. The 2016 Presidential Election: The Causes and Consequences of a Political Earthquake. Lantham, MD: Lexington; Crotty, William. 2017. Winning the Presidency 2016. London: Routledge; Nelson, Michael. 2017. The Election of 2016. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press; Warner, Benjamin, Dianne Bystrom, Mitchell McKinney and Mary Banwart, eds. 2017. An Unprecedented Election: Media, Communication, and the Electorate in the 2016 Election. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. 21. Aldrich, John, Jamie Carson, Brad Gomez and David Rhode. 2020. Change and Continuity in the 2016 and 2018 Elections. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press. 22. David, Schultz and Rafael Jacob. 2018. Presidential Swing States: Why Only Ten Matter. Latham, MD: Lexington. 23. Zogby, John. 2016. We are Many, We are One: Neo-Tribes and Tribal Analytics in 21st Century America. Rochester, NY: Paramount Books. 24. Wayne, Stephen. 2020. The Road to the White House. Boston, MA: Cengage. 25. See “The 30 Largest Countries in the World by Landmass.” https://www.statista.com/statistics/262955/largest-countries-inthe-world/. 26. See “U.S. Census Bureau Current Population.” https://www.cen sus.gov/popclock/print.php?component=counter.

Bibliography Abadi, Mark. 2018. “Even the US Government Can’t Agree on How to Divide Up the States into Regions.” Business Insider. May 10, 2018. https://www. businessinsider.com/regions-of-united-states-2018-5. Abramowitz, Alan. 1988. “An Improved Model for Predicting Presidential Election Outcomes.” PS: Political Science and Politics 21 (Autumn): 843–847. ———. 2014. “Long-Term Trends and Short-Term Forecasts: The Transformation of US Presidential Elections in an Age of Polarization.” PS: Political Science and Politics 47, no. 2: 289–292. Aldrich, John, Jamie Carson, Brad Gomez and David Rhode. 2020. Change and Continuity in the 2016 and 2018 Elections. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press.

12

L. PERRY

Bartels, Larry. 1996. “Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 1 (1996): 194–230. ———. 2014. “Presidential Elections in an Age of Polarization.” PS: Political Science and Politics 47, no. 2: 289–292. Bitecofer, Rachel. 2017. The Unprecedented 2016 Presidential Election. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave. Campbell, James. 1992. “Forecasting the Presidential Vote in the States.” American Journal of Political Science 36: 386–407. ———. 2012. “Forecasting the Presidential and Congressional Elections of 2012: The Trial-Heat and the Seats-in-Trouble Models.“ PS: Political Science and Politics 45, no. 4: 630–634. Campbell, James and Kenneth Wink. 1990. “Trial-Heat Forecasts of the Presidential Vote.” American Politics Quarterly 18: 251–269. Cavari, Amon, Richard Powell and Kenneth Mayor, eds. The 2016 Presidential Election: The Causes and Consequences of a Political Earthquake. Lantham, MD: Lexington. Crotty, William. 2017. Winning the Presidency 2016. London: Routledge. David, Schultz and Rafael Jacob. 2018. Presidential Swing States: Why Only Ten Matter. Latham, MD: Lexington. Erikson, Robert. 1989. “Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote.” American Political Science Review 83, no. 2: 567–573. Erikson, Robert S. and Christopher Wlezien. 2012. “The Objective and Subjective Economy and the Presidential Vote.” PS: Political Science and Politics 45, no. 4: 620–624. Fair, Ray. 1988. “The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: 1984 Update.” Political Behavior 10, no. 2: 168–179. Fair, Ray. 1996. “The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: 1992 Update.” Political Behavior 18, no. 2: 119–139. Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. 1982. “On the Demand for Economic Outcomes: Macroeconomic Outcomes and Mass Political Support in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany.” Journal of Politics 44, no. 2: 426–462. Holbrook, Thomas M. 2012. “Incumbency, National Conditions, and the 2012 Presidential Election.” PS: Political Science and Politics 45, no. 4: 640–643. Igielnick, Ruth and Abby Budman. 2020. “The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition of the U.S. Electorate.” Pew. September 23, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/2020/09/23/the-changing-racial-andethnic-composition-of-the-u-s-electorate/. Jones, Jeffrey. 2020. “Presidential Job Approval Related to Reelection Historically.” Gallup, May 29, 2020. https://news.gallup.com/poll/311825/presid ential-job-approval-related-reelection-historically.aspx. Lewis-Beck, M. and Tom Rice. 1992. Forecasting Elections. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.

1

INTRODUCTION

13

Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Charles Tien. 2012. “Election Forecasting for Turbulent Times.“ PS: Political Science and Politics 45, no. 4: 625–629. Lockerbie, Brad. 2012. “Economic Expectations and Election Outcomes: The Presidency and the House in 2012?” PS: Political Science and Politics 45, no. 4: 644–647. Mayhew, David. 2008. Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Presidential Elections: The Historical Record.” Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 2: 201–228. Mayer, William. 2014. “What, If Anything, Have We Learned from Presidential Election Forecasting?” PS: Political Science and Politics 47, no. 2: 329–331. Nelson, Michael. 2017. The Election of 2016. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press. Patel, Jugal and Wilson Andrews. 2016. “Trump’s Electoral College Victory Ranks 46th in 58 Elections.” The New York Times, December 2016. https:// www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/18/us/elections/donald-trump-ele ctoral-college-popular-vote.html. Pinto, Jennifer. 2011. “Ronald Reagan’ Presidency: A Polling Retrospective.” CBS News, February 6, 2011. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ronald-rea gans-presidency-a-polling-retrospective/. Richard, Nadeau and Michael Lewis-Beck. 2001. “National Economic Voting in U.S. President Elections.” The Journal of Politics 63, no. 1: 159–181. Silver, Nate. 2020. The Economy Was Trump’s One Remaining Advantage. Now He Might Have Blown It. Five-Thirty-Eight. October 6, 2020. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-economy-was-trumps-oneremaining-advantage-now-he-might-have-blown-it/. Soergel, Andrew. 2020. “Trump’s Golden Ticket: The Economy.” U.S. News. February 7, 2020. https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/202002-07/trump-could-win-in-2020-because-of-the-economy. Soumbatiants, Souren, Henry Chappell and Eric Johnson. 2006. “Using State Polls to Forecast U.S. Presidential Election Outcomes.” Public Choice 127, no. 1: 207–223. Tankersley, Jim. 2020. “Why Trump’s Approval Ratings on the Economy Remain Durable.” The New York Times. August 25, 2020. https://www.nytimes. com/2020/08/24/us/politics/trump-economy.html. Warner, Benjamin, Dianne Bystrom, Mitchell McKinney and Mary Banwart, eds. 2017. An Unprecedented Election: Media, Communication, and the Electorate in the 2016 Election. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. Wayne, Stephen. 2020. The Road to the White House. Boston, MA: Cengage. Zogby, John. 2016. We are Many, We are One: Neo-Tribes and Tribal Analytics in 21st Century America. Rochester, NY: Paramount Books.

CHAPTER 2

How Biden Rebuilt the Blue Wall Luke Perry, Quinlyn Beaver, and Jamie Nelson

Abstract This chapter examines how Joe Biden was able to rebuild “the blue wall” in the Midwest with strong support in urban centers and among women and college graduates in Michigan and Wisconsin. These two states typically vote Democratic in presidential elections, but replicating Biden’s success is not guaranteed moving forward, due to historically high turnout in 2020 and strong desire for change over the past two election cycles. Keywords 2020 election · Presidential elections · Midwest · Blue wall · Joe Biden · Donald Trump · Michigan · Wisconsin

L. Perry (B) · Q. Beaver Utica College, Utica, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected] Q. Beaver e-mail: [email protected] J. Nelson The University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0_2

15

16

L. PERRY ET AL.

Reclaiming the Midwest was Joe Biden’s best path to defeating Donald Trump in 2020. Trump won Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Iowa in 2016, totaling 111 Electoral College votes. Michigan and Wisconsin had previously gone Democratic since 1988 and 1984, respectively, and their 26 electoral votes were pivotal to Trump’s success. Biden won both states, plus Pennsylvania, tipping the election in his favor and rebuilding the blue wall. Michigan was separated by just over 300,000 votes out of six million casts. Biden won by 2.8%. The Democratic US Senate candidate prevailed by less than one percent. Wisconsin’s presidential election was separated by just over 21,000 votes out of three million casts. Biden won by less than one percent, while the Democratic US Senate candidate won by 2.4%. Democrats secured these pivotal statewide races, but did so narrowly. Midwestern voting patterns are fluid. The region is likely to remain competitive in statewide elections, including for president. Indiana is safely Republican, Illinois safely Democratic. Minnesota has gone Republican just once in the last 60 years, but this included slim victories in 2000 and 2016, following two-term Democratic presidencies. Trump won Ohio and Iowa twice, after Barack Obama did the same. This leaves Michigan and Wisconsin, the focus of this chapter, as two of the most pivotal states in the region and central to any path to 270 Electoral College votes in 2024.

Time and Money Trump’s 2016 upset victories in Michigan and Wisconsin were impressive, but tenuous. Trump won Michigan by 0.3%, Wisconsin by 0.7%, with a combined total of 34,000 votes and 47% of the vote in each state.1 Trump trailed in Michigan’s polls after securing the GOP nomination, yet held eight rallies after July 2016, and visited three times during the final week of the campaign.2 Hillary Clinton visited Michigan several times leading up to Election Day,3 in contrast to Wisconsin, which she did not visit following the Democratic National Convention. Both candidates allocated their overall time in Michigan (Trump 5.7%; Clinton 4.3%) and Wisconsin (Trump 2.9%; Clinton 0%) in remarkably similar fashion during the final months of the campaign.4 Neither was a major priority.

2

HOW BIDEN REBUILT THE BLUE WALL

17

Clinton narrowly lost the Michigan primary to Bernie Sanders, sparking concerns about outreach and organizing. These concerns resurfaced in the general election in the form of internal warnings on the ground that things were not going well.5 Clinton prioritized television, direct mail, and digital efforts and spent exponentially less money in Michigan and Wisconsin, than other battleground states, believing these states were safe.6 Democratic Party models forecasted a five-point win for Clinton in Michigan up until Election Day.7 Clinton outspent Trump US$3.2 million to US$1.6 million in Michigan ad buys,8 though much of this was in the final week of the campaign.9 The situation was flipped in Wisconsin. Trump outspent Clinton US$6.9 million to US$3 million. In 2020, both campaigns significantly increased spending in Michigan and Wisconsin, putting both states among the top five in terms of campaign spending. Biden’s campaign spent over US$30 million in Michigan,11 double that of Trump, including US$4 million a week following Labor Day compared to Trump’s US$2 million a week.12 Biden’s financial advantage in Michigan was three to one when considering outside expenditures added another US$120 million behind both candidates.13 Biden’s campaign had a larger advantage in Wisconsin, outspending Trump over US$30 million to over US$10 million, though outside expenditures closed the overall spending gap to two to one in Biden’s favor.14 Total spending in Wisconsin exceeded US$101 million. Trump’s campaign cut about US$10 million from Midwestern ad buys a month before Election Day, including US$2 million in Michigan and Wisconsin, and reallocated these expenditures to the Sun Belt.15 Campaign travel schedules were altered by the COVID pandemic, limiting comparisons to 2016. Biden visited Michigan and Wisconsin more than Clinton did in 2016, including visits during the final week of the campaign. Learning from 2016 was a prominent consideration in Biden’s 2020 operation, who did not underestimate Trump’s “ability to claw his way back into consideration in the final days of a campaign.”16 Senior advisers from the Clinton campaign also acknowledged an overreliance on voter modeling behavior at the expense of direct voter outreach in 2016, a mistake they believe Biden effectively avoided in 2020.17 Biden’s campaign messaging frequently cautioned supporters against complacency, even if the polls indicated Biden was ahead.18 Trump’s rallies, a hallmark of his 2016 campaign, were complicated by concerns over lack of masking and social distancing, while both states

18

L. PERRY ET AL.

struggled with high COVID infection rates.19 These concerns unfolded in a national climate where public opinion believed that medical centers, national public health officials, and state/local elected officials were all doing a better job responding to the COVID pandemic than President Trump. Just 37% of voters believed Trump was responding well to COVID in August of 2020, one month before mail-in voting began.20 Trump’s marks exhibited large partisan splits, though one in four Republicans did not rate Trump’s COVID response favorably. In contrast, every other category of government official received over 50% favorability for their COVID response from both parties.

Political Geography Michigan is the tenth most populated state, bolstered by the Detroit metro area, home to over four million people and ranking fourteenth nationally, second only to Chicago in the Midwest. Detroit and surrounding Wayne County make up nearly 20% of Michigan’s population. Well educated, and racially diverse, Michigan’s large cities have been the reliable backbone of Democratic support since the 1980s. Obama won Wayne County, and Genesee County, home to Michigan’s largest African-American communities, by 439,202 votes. Clinton was 130,932 votes shy of this mark in 2016.22 Millennials were a second Democratic-friendly demographic where Clinton was unable to match Obama. Michigan’s five counties with the largest college-age population were Washtenaw, Ingham, Kalamazoo, Isabella, and Marquette. Clinton was 50,207 votes shy of Obama’s vote totals in 2016 in these counties.23 The Northern suburbs of Detroit experienced population growth in recent years, while other regions have waned, making them more politically competitive. Macomb County and Oakland County were consistent Republican strongholds since the 1980s until demographic shifts, specifically college education, benefited Democrats in 2016. Oakland County, where 46% of residents are college graduates, supported Clinton by eight points. Trump won Macomb County, where 25% of residents are college graduates, by 12 points.24 Both counties voted Democratic in the 2018 gubernatorial race, though Gretchen Whitmer carried Macomb by just three points. Trump dominated rural Michigan in 2016, carrying nearly every county in the Western, Central, and Northern parts of the state, including

2

HOW BIDEN REBUILT THE BLUE WALL

19

the Upper Peninsula. Trump won 60% or more support in 48 of Michigan’s 83 counties, while exceeding 70% in six of these counties (Hillsdale, Kalkaska, Missaukee, Montmorency, Oscoda, and Sanilac).25 This performance far surpassed Mitt Romney in 2012, who failed to reach 70% anywhere and topped 60% in just nine counties. Romney was a Michigan native, whose father was once the governor. Trump flipped 11 counties Obama won in 2012, including several middle-income counties, stretching from the southeast border with Ohio to the Saginaw Bay. Before 2016, Democratic support in cities like Flint and Saginaw outweighed the losses of more rural conservative areas of Michigan. As their populations decreased, these areas became more Republican, allowing Trump to dominate in 2016.26 Wisconsin shifted rightward following Obama’s dominating 2008 victory, when he won 58 of the state’s 72 counties. From 2010 to 2018, Republicans dominated state politics, made gains in the House, including the Speakership and Vice-Presidential Candidate Paul Ryan, and witnessed Wisconsinite Reince Priebus become Republican National Committee Chair. Trump carried Wisconsin for the first time since 1984 by over 24,000 votes out of nearly three million cast. Turnout among eligible voters was 66%, the lowest since 1996.27 In 2011, Wisconsin passed a law requiring photo-identification to vote, described as “the most restrictive in the United States” by University of WisconsinMadison Political Science Professor David Canon.28 Proponents argued the measure prevented voter fraud, though voter impersonation was not common. Opponents expressed concern that approximately 300,000 Wisconsin voters lacked a government-issued photo ID at the time.29 The controversial law was implemented in advance of the 2016 election, Like Michigan, Democrats dominate the two most populous counties in Wisconsin, Milwaukee County, and Dane County. The latter is the fastest-growing part of Wisconsin and home to the university town of Madison. In 2016, Clinton earned 39,110 votes less in Milwaukee than Obama did in 2012, and was shy another 4508 votes outside of the city. Trump also underperformed in Milwaukee compared to Romney, falling short 11,265 votes in the city and another 17,590 votes outside of the city, including typically conservative counties, such as Waukesha County.30 Trump excelled with strong performances in the rural Northwest and Southwest, where Trump flipped nine counties Obama won twice. Trump also did well in the Northeast, where Democrats have an

20

L. PERRY ET AL.

advantage but Republicans are competitive, and parts of the Southeast, where manufacturing has declined in communities that depend on it. Trump’s success can be partially understood through demographics. Wisconsin is whiter and less college-educated than the country at large. Nearly 90% of the population is white. Wisconsin’s African-American population is almost half the national average. Wisconsin has a higher school graduation rate than the country at large, but a lower college graduation rate.31 Fifty-seven percent of Wisconsin voters this century were white voters without college degrees.32 Trump had a 15-point advantage nationally among white voters in 2016, and a 36-point edge among non-college-educated white voters. Trump capitalized on the Democratic Party losing support from rural white voters and white suburban voters who shifted rightward.34

How 2020 Differed from 2016 Turnout was much higher in 2020 than 2016. A record 5.4 million people voted in Michigan, compared to 4.5 million four years earlier.35 A record 3.2 million people voted in Wisconsin,36 compared to 2.4 million in 2016.37 Seven in ten eligible voters voted in each state, the largest amount since 1960 for Michigan,38 and 2004 for Wisconsin, and before that, 1960.39 Increased turnout benefitted Democrats in Michigan, who have a voter registration advantage of about seven points.40 This was less of a factor in Wisconsin, where the electorate is more evenly divided. Biden excelled by growing Democrats’ urban and college educated base. Biden won Wayne County with more votes than Obama received in 2012 as voter turnout grew by ten percent.41 Biden’s 69% of the vote share was higher than Clinton (67%) but lower than Obama (73%). Biden grew the Democratic advantage in Oakland County by six points, and in Washtenaw County, home to the University of Michigan, by four points. Biden won 65% of the vote in Ingham County, home to Lansing, besting Clinton by four points and Obama by two points. Similarly, Biden won 58% of the vote in Kalamazoo County, besting Clinton by five points and Obama by two points. Biden’s growth in Democratic support in these two counties alone netted nearly 30,000 more votes than Clinton. Biden did not match or rival Obama everywhere. Obama won Genesee County with 64% of the vote in 2012, where African-Americans comprise 20% of residents.42 Biden only bested Clinton by one point, winning 53% of the vote.

2

HOW BIDEN REBUILT THE BLUE WALL

21

Trump won 72 of 83 counties in Wisconsin. Trump grew his support in Republican strongholds as well, including Missaukee, Hillsdale, Oscoda, and Sanilac counties, carrying each county with over 70% of the vote. The problem for Trump was that increased support in these four counties only netted about 7000 more votes. Biden flipped three counties from 2016: Kent, Saginaw, and Leelanau. Kent is the fourth most populous county in Michigan, and home to Grand Rapids, where Biden won 70% of the vote in the city of 200,000, propelling him to a six-point victory. 20 years prior George W. Bush won Kent County by 50,000 votes and nearly 60% support.44 Demographic change is part of the reason. The percentage of Hispanics in Grand Rapids grew from five percent to 15% since 1990. The Hispanic vote is not monolithic, though Kent County Hispanics include a large Mexican and Guatemalan immigrant population that leans left.45 In 2016, Trump was the first Republican candidate to win Saginaw County since Ronald Reagan in 1984. Local Republican leaders believe Trump’s focus on NAFTA helped make him competitive. Biden just narrowly won the county in 2020. Leelanau County is as politically divided as any county in Michigan, voting for Obama, Romney, Trump, and Biden. Sixty percent of Michigan voters believed the country was headed in the wrong direction.47 Biden had a 17-point advantage with women, a ten-point advantage among suburban voters, and won all age groups but 45 to 64. Ninety-three percent of black voters and 68% of urban voters supported Biden. Trump won 53% of white voters and had an 18-point advantage among rural voters.48 College graduates preferred Biden, while support among non-college graduates was divided between the candidates.49 Like Michigan, Biden’s path to victory in Wisconsin consisted of growing Democrats’ more urban and more educated base. The city of Milwaukee did not experience increased turnout, though Democrats surged in the larger metropolitan county (also named Milwaukee). Biden still netted more than 3,000 votes in the city than Clinton by increasing Democratic vote share from 77 to 79%.50 Biden bested Clinton in parts of Milwaukee with larger white populations, while Clinton outperformed Biden in 2016 in neighborhoods with majority Hispanic or Latino populations.51 Turnout grew by 20,000 in Milwaukee County compared to 2016, but still lagged behind 2008 and 2012. Biden outperformed Clinton, and Obama in 2012, by three points countywide, netting 20,000 votes from 2016.52

22

L. PERRY ET AL.

As its population grows, Dane County is becoming more influential in statewide elections to the benefit of Democrats. Biden won Dane County, which includes Madison, with 75% of the vote. Obama and Clinton both won the county with 71% of the vote, though Clinton netted 2000 more votes than Obama. In 2020, Biden added another 42,000 votes. Biden not only won Dane County, but most of the surrounding counties in the second Congressional district, including Iowa County, Sauk County, and Green County.53 Rural voters have become increasingly conservative in Wisconsin. Trump again dominated in places like Taylor County, winning by 46 points, up two points from 2016.54 Trump grew his voter margins in 42 counties, but these gains were modest, averaging just a 2.3% increase per county.55 This was similar to Biden’s 2.8% increase, but Biden benefitted from gains in Wisconsin’s two most populous counties, Milwaukee and Dane.56 In the 49 counties where Trump gained raw votes, he gained an average of 733 votes, compared to Biden’s gain of 1100 votes in the counties where his totals increased.57 Like Michigan, Biden won a small number of Wisconsin counties (14 of 72). Biden flipped two counties, including Sauk County and Door County, both of which experienced large increases in voter turnout.58 Biden won by only 300 votes in Door County out of 20,000 casts. Sauk County voted with the presidential victor in 9 of 10 past presidential elections.59 Sauk epitomizes an evenly divided state, where 2020 became the fourth time in six cycles the presidential election was decided by less than a point.60 Like Michigan, 60% of Wisconsin voters believed the country was headed in the wrong direction.61 Wisconsin had the third most COVID cases (per capita). Sixty percent of Wisconsinites did not think the virus was under control, compared to just ten percent of voters, who thought it was. One in four believed COVID was somewhat under control. COVID was by far viewed as the most important issue (40%) followed by the economy (25%). Sixty percent of Wisconsinites described economic conditions as not good or poor. The two candidates split over age and education. People under 45 years old preferred Biden, over 45, Trump. College graduates preferred Biden, non-college graduates, Trump. Biden and Trump had a strong advantage with urban and rural voters, respectively, while Biden had a modest advantage among suburbanites.62

2

HOW BIDEN REBUILT THE BLUE WALL

23

Lessons for 2024 The Midwest is not a monolithic region. The Democrats have an advantage in key states but this is not all-encompassing, nor certain. Several Midwestern states have been solidly Republican in recent presidential cycles, including Indiana, Ohio, and Iowa. Democrats have buttressed this with Illinois and Minnesota, leaving Michigan and Wisconsin as the lynchpins to the region and key components of a path to 270. Trump and Biden benefited from a desire for change in 2016 and 2020, respectively. As discussed in Chapter One, the incumbent party has lost all but one presidential election when in power for eight or more years since 1952. This historical crosscurrent bolstered Trump’s 2016 performance in Michigan and Wisconsin, in addition to race-specific factors, including Trump’s ability to mobilize non-college-educated white voters and Clinton’s inability to maintain Obama era levels of Democratic turnout. The situation changed dramatically four years later. Biden’s success was predicated on Trump’s unpopularity. This was evident in Michigan and Wisconsin in nearly identical fashion, where most voters believed the country was headed in the wrong direction and the Trump administration’s response to the COVID pandemic was inadequate. Moreover, Democrats mobilized urban strongholds and retained their suburban advantage from 2018. The Democrats rebuilt the Blue Wall, though 2016 and 2020 revealed how this wall is made of straw, not brick. Michigan and Wisconsin will likely remain competitive heading into 2024. Only five of the 155 counties (three percent) in these two states flipped in 2020. Polarization is expected to continue moving forward, preventing large shifts in either direction. Trump won 84% of the counties in Michigan and Wisconsin, but Biden won by large enough margins in urban/suburban centers to secure statewide majorities. One key consideration in 2024 is whether Biden is rewarded for overcoming COVID or if a desire for change defines the campaign as was the case in the last two cycles. Turnout is primed to be particularly important in 2024. Michigan and Wisconsin both experienced record turnout in 2020, which will be difficult to replicate. Following Trump’s contested defeat, state governments around the country proposed hundreds of voting bills, battling over whether to tighten voting qualifications or make registration and voting simpler and easier.63 Michigan adopted the latter approach per referendum in the 2018 election, adopting no-excuse absentee ballots,

24

L. PERRY ET AL.

same-day registration, and other voting reforms.64 This new law, coupled with the COVID pandemic, helps explain why absentee voting constituted 57% of the votes cast in 2020. At the time, no one anticipated the pandemic or Trump’s extraordinary and unfounded attacks on state electoral processes. Absentees comprised 41% of Wisconsin voters in 2020.65 The following year Republican state legislators proposed a voting-reform package that would require absentee voters to provide identification for each election, set limits on the total number of people who can request absentee ballots per election, and more.66 Republicans controlled both chambers of the Wisconsin state legislature and governorship from 2011 to 2017, before Tony Evers (D) was elected Governor in 2018. Following 2020, Republicans retained to control the Assembly and Senate, but did not secure a veto-proof majority.67 Evers reelection bid in 2022 could be pivotal in determining the fate of Wisconsin voting procedures heading into 2024. Michigan and Wisconsin were restored to the blue column in 2020. Both will likely need to stay there in 2024 for a Democrat to remain in the White House. Michigan appears to be the more secure of the two states, provided Democrats can maintain strong turnout in and around Detroit and Madison. Wisconsin is poised to become one of the three most targeted swing states, alongside Georgia and Arizona, which in total comprise 37 electoral votes, one more than Biden’s 2020 margin of victory.

Notes 1. Ibid. 2. Beaumont, Thomas. 2020. “Biden’s Lessons Learned; Spending Time, Money in Midwest.” AP. October 21, 2020. https://apn ews.com/article/election-2020-virus-outbreak-joe-biden-hillaryclinton-wisconsin-bff011f68c9b28fae03dcc98b390a2c7. 3. Przybyla, Heidi. 2016. “Hillary Clinton Adds Michigan Stop to Campaign Schedule.” USA Today. November 5, 2016. https:// www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/11/ 05/hillary-clinton-michigan/93356788/. 4. Silver, Nate. 2017. “Donald Trump Had a Superior Electoral Strategy.” Five Thirty Eight. February 6, 2017. https://fivethirt yeight.com/features/donald-trump-had-a-superior-electoral-col lege-strategy/.

2

HOW BIDEN REBUILT THE BLUE WALL

25

5. Silver, Nate. 2017. “Clinton’s Ground Game Didn’t Cost her The Election.” Five Thirty Eight. February 13, 2017. https://fiveth irtyeight.com/features/clintons-ground-game-didnt-cost-her-theelection/. 6. Dovere, Edward-Issac. 2016. “How Clinton Lost Michigan - and Blew the Election.” Politico. December 14, 2016. https://www. politico.com/story/2016/12/michigan-hillary-clinton-trump232547. 7. Ibid. 8. Dumenco, Simon. 2016. “ How the Clinton and Trump Camps Spent $595 Million on Tv, Radio Ads.” Ad Age October 28, 2016. https://adage.com/article/campaign-trail/ how-clinton-trump-camps-spent-595-million-TV-radio/306496. 9. Mauger, Craig. “Presidential Campaigns Ran Nearly $3 Million in TV Ads in Michigan in the Last Week.” Michigan Campaign Finance Network. https://mcfn.org/node/5979/presidentialcampaigns-ran-nearly-3-million-in-tv-ads-in-michigan-in-the-lastweek. 10. Montanaro, Domenico. 2020. “Presidential Campaign TV ad Spending Crosses $1 Billion Mark in Key States”. October 13, 2020. https://www.npr.org/2020/10/13/923427969/presid ential-campaign-tv-ad-spending-crosses-1-billion-mark-in-keystates. 11. Ibid. 12. Kamisar, Ben. 2021. “Latest News, Analysis and Data Driving the Political Discussion.” NBC News. September 18, 2021. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/blog/meetpress-blog-latest-news-analysis-data-driving-political-discussionn988541/ncrd1244916#blogHeader. 13. Montanaro, Domenico. 2020. “Presidential Campaign TV ad Spending Crosses $1 Billion Mark in Key States”. October 13, 2020. https://www.npr.org/2020/10/13/923427969/presid ential-campaign-tv-ad-spending-crosses-1-billion-mark-in-keystates. 14. Ibid. 15. Cassady, Daniel. 2020. “Extremely Confident’ Trump Campaign Pulls Midwest Ad Buys, Moves Focus To Sun Belt.” Forbes. October 7, 2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielcassady/

26

L. PERRY ET AL.

2020/10/07/extremely-confident-trump-campaign-pulls-mid west-ad-buys-moves-focus-to-sun-belt/?sh=331577946c1a. 16. Beaumont, Thomas. 2020. “Biden’s Lessons Learned; Spending Time, Money in Midwest.” AP. October 21, 2020. https://apn ews.com/article/election-2020-virus-outbreak-joe-biden-hillaryclinton-wisconsin-bff011f68c9b28fae03dcc98b390a2c7. 17. Ibid. 18. Itkowitz, Cody and Hannah Knowles. 2020. “Trump Holds Back-to-Back Rallies in Midwest, Biden Campaign Warns Race Is Neck-and-Neck.” The Washington Post. October 18, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/2020/10/17/ trump-biden-live-updates/. 19. McCarthy, Tom. 2020. “US Coronavirus Cases Surge in Midwest as Trump Heads There in Campaign Push.” The Guardian. October 27, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ 2020/oct/27/us-coronavirus-cases-midwest-trump-us-politics. 20. Pew Research Center. 2020. “Views of COVID-19 Responses by Trump, Hospitals, CDC, and Other Officials”. August 6, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/08/06/views-ofcovid-19-response-by-trump-hospitals-cdc-and-other-officials/. 21. Weigel, David and Lauren Tierney. 2020. “The Six Political States of Michigan.” The Washington Post. August 9, 2020. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/michigan-pol itical-geography/. 22. Mack, Julie. 2016. “How Did Donald Trump win Michigan?” Michigan Live. November 10, 2016. https://www.mlive.com/pol itics/2016/11/how_did_donald_trump_win_michi.html. 23. Ibid. 24. Weigel, David and Lauren Tierney. 2020. “The Six Political States of Michigan.” The Washington Post. August 9, 2020. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/michigan-pol itical-geography/. 25. Mack, Julie. 2016. “How did Donald Trump win Michigan?” Michigan Live. November 10, 2016. https://www.mlive.com/pol itics/2016/11/how_did_donald_trump_win_michi.html. 26. Weigel, David and Lauren Tierney. 2020. “The Six Political States of Michigan.” The Washington Post. August 9, 2020. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/michigan-pol itical-geography/.

2

HOW BIDEN REBUILT THE BLUE WALL

27

27. Jones, Malia. 2016. “How and Where Trump Won Wisconsin in 2016.” WisCONTEXT. November 21, 2016. https://www.wiscon text.org/how-and-where-trump-won-wisconsin-2016. 28. Johnson, Shawn and Laurel White. 2016. “As Voting Begins, A Look Back At the Fight Over Wisconsin’s Voter ID Law.” WPR. September 26, 2016. https://www.wpr.org/voting-begins-lookback-fight-over-wisconsins-voter-id-law. 29. Fessler, Pam. 2015. “Supreme Court Declines to Hear Challenge To Strict Wisconsin Voter ID Law.” NPR. March 23, 2015. https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/03/23/394 898151/supreme-court-declines-challenge-to-strict-wisconsinvoter-id-law. 30. Weigel, David and Lauren Tierney. 2020. “The Seven Political States of Wisconsin.” The Washington Post. August 16, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/wis consin-political-geography/. 31. See U.S. Census Bureau: https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q= ACSDP1Y2014.DP02&g=0400000US55&tid=ACSDP1Y2016. DP02&hidePreview=true. 32. Weigel, David and Lauren Tierney. 2020. “The Seven Political States of Wisconsin.” The Washington Post. August 16, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/wis consin-political-geography/. 33. Pew Research Center. 2018. “An Examination of the 2016 Electorate, Based on Validated Voters.” August 9, 2018. https:// www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/08/09/an-examination-ofthe-2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters/. 34. Weigel, David and Lauren Tierney. 2020. “The Seven Political States of Wisconsin.” The Washington Post. August 16, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/wis consin-political-geography/. 35. Nissen, Jack. 2020. “Michigan’s 2020 Voter Turnout Blows Past Previous Record Set in 2008.” Fox2Detriot. November 5, 2020. https://www.fox2detroit.com/news/michigans-2020voter-turnout-blows-past-previous-record-set-in-2008. 36. Volpenhein, Sarah. 2020. “Efforts to Lift Voter Turnout in Milwaukee Fell Flat Despite Record Participation in Wisconsin. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. November 7, 2020. https://www. jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/07/ele

28

L. PERRY ET AL.

ction-results-milwaukee-turnout-flat-despite-wisconsin-surge/618 8097002/. 37. Jones, Malia. 2016. “How and Where Trump Won Wisconsin in 2016.” WisCONTEXT. November 21, 2016. https://www.wiscon text.org/how-and-where-trump-won-wisconsin-2016. 38. Eggert, David. 2020. “Record 5.5 M Voted in Michigan; Highest Percentage in Decades.” AP. November 5, 2020. https://apnews. com/article/record-votes-michigan-highest-turnout-1f7802d2a 2e67966ba8ccb02e3d1cbed. 39. See Wisconsin Election Results: https://elections.wi.gov/electi ons-voting/statistics/turnout. 40. Gallup. 2017. “2017 U.S Party Affiliation by State.” https:// news.gallup.com/poll/226643/2017-party-affiliation-state.aspx. 41. Mack, Julie and Scott Levin. 2020. “See 2020 Election Turnout by Michigan County Compared to 2016.” Michigan Live. November 5, 2020. https://www.mlive.com/politics/2020/11/see-2020election-turnout-by-michigan-county-compared-to-2016.html. 42. See U.S. Census: https://censusreporter.org/profiles/05000U S26049-genesee-county-mi/. 43. Eggert, David. 2020. “Biden Won Michigan with a Surge in Cities, Suburbs.” AP. November 7, 2020. https://apnews.com/ article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-mic higan-f667cdcbfb02ba8f5b80553d3e1153f8. 44. Roelofs, Ted. 2020. “Biden Wins in Kent County Latest Evidence of Region’s Demographics Shifts”. November 12, 2020. Bridge Michigan. https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/ biden-win-kent-county-latest-evidence-regions-demographicshifts. 45. IbId. 46. Johnson, Bob. 2020. “Biden Narrowly Wins Saginaw County After Trump Won the County in 2016.” Michigan Live. November 4, 2020. https://www.mlive.com/politics/2020/11/biden-nar rowly-wins-saginaw-county-after-trump-won-the-county-in-2016. html. 47. Seewer, John. 2020. “AP VoteCast: Michigan Voters Sour on State of Nation.” AP. November 4, 2020. https://apnews.com/ article/votecast-michigan-voters-state-of-nation-93d3f0a3b953 c59284839c71a0a04d60.

2

HOW BIDEN REBUILT THE BLUE WALL

29

48. Eggert, David. 2020. “Biden Won Michigan with a Surge in Cities, Suburbs.” AP. November 7, 2020. https://apnews.com/ article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-mic higan-f667cdcbfb02ba8f5b80553d3e1153f8. 49. Seewer, John. 2020. “AP VoteCast: Michigan Voters Sour on State of Nation.” AP. November 4, 2020. https://apnews.com/ article/votecast-michigan-voters-state-of-nation-93d3f0a3b953 c59284839c71a0a04d60. 50. Jannen, Jeramey. 2020. “8 Takeaways, How Biden Won Wisconsin.” Urban Milwaukee. November 4, 2020. https:// urbanmilwaukee.com/2020/11/04/8-takeaways-how-bidenwon-wisconsin/. 51. Vetterkind, Riley. 2020. “Cities Propelled Joe Biden to Wisconsin Win as Rural Areas Doubled Down on Donald Trump”. Wisconsin State Journal. November 8, 2020. https://madison.com/wsj/ news/local/govt-and-politics/cities-propelled-joe-biden-to-wis consin-win-as-rural-areas-double-down-on-donald-trump/art icle_fd26b21c-42c9-5b31-8989-5de7b6de293f.html. 52. Jannen, Jeramey. 2020. “8 Takeaways, How Biden Won Wisconsin.” Urban Milwaukee. November 4, 2020. https:// urbanmilwaukee.com/2020/11/04/8-takeaways-how-bidenwon-wisconsin/. 53. See The New York Times’ Election Result: https://www.nytimes. com/interactive/2020/11/03/us/elections/results-wisconsin. html. 54. Jannen, Jeramey. 2020. “8 Takeaways, How Biden Won Wisconsin.” Urban Milwaukee. November 4, 2020. https:// urbanmilwaukee.com/2020/11/04/8-takeaways-how-bidenwon-wisconsin/. 55. Denzin, Nathan. 2020. “How a Handful of Counties Turned Out en Masse, Winning Wisconsin for Joe Biden.” Daily Cardinal. November 6, 2020. https://www.dailycardinal.com/article/ 2020/11/how-a-handful-of-counties-turned-out-en-masse-win ning-wisconsin-for-joe-biden. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Wilson, Reid. 2019. “The 10 Counties That Will Decide the 2020 Election”. The Hill. September 4, 2019. https://thehill.com/

30

L. PERRY ET AL.

homenews/state-watch/459832-the-10-counties-that-will-decidethe-2020-election. 60. Vetterkind, Riley. 2020. “Cities Propelled Joe Biden to Wisconsin Win as Rural Areas Doubled Down on Donald Trump”. Wisconsin State Journal. November 8, 2020. https://madison.com/wsj/ news/local/govt-and-politics/cities-propelled-joe-biden-to-wis consin-win-as-rural-areas-double-down-on-donald-trump/art icle_fd26b21c-42c9-5b31-8989-5de7b6de293f.html. 61. “AP Exit Poll: Why Wisconsin Voters Cast Their Ballots How They Did.” AP. November 4, 2020. https://www.wisn.com/ article/ap-exit-poll-why-wisconsin-voters-cast-their-ballots-howthey-did/34571992#. 62. “AP VoterCast: Wisconsin Voters Sour on State of Nation.” AP. November 16, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-don ald-trump-virus-outbreak-wisconsin-chicago-9d0e5876377c7c4 4afbfb0dab8abd902/. 63. Corasaniti, Nick and Reid J. Epstein. 2021. “Georgia’s G.O.P Fires Opening Shot in Fight to Limit Voting.” The New York Times. March 26, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/us/ politics/voting-rights-laws-georgia.html/. 64. Gibbons, Lauren Gibbons. 2020. “One Big Winner in Michigan’s 2020 Election Cycle: No-Reason Absentee Voting.” Michigan Live. November 11, 2020. https://www.mlive.com/politics/ 2020/11/one-big-winner-in-michigans-2020-election-cycle-noreason-absentee-voting.html. 65. See Wisconsin Election Commission Report: https://www.wispol itics.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/D.-November-2020Election-Data-Report-Updated.pdf. 66. Beck, Molly, and Patrick Marley. 2021. “Republican Lawmakers Seek to Overhaul Voting in Wisconsin, Including New Rules for Absentee Ballots.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. February 22, 2021. https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/ 2021/02/22/republican-lawmakers-seek-overhaul-voting-wiscon sin/4546046001/. 67. Schmidt, Mitchell. 2020. “GOP Falls Short of Veto-Proof Majorities in the Wisconsin Legislature.” Wisconsin State Journal. November 5, 2020. https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govtand-politics/gop-falls-short-of-veto-proof-majorities-in-wiscon sin-legislature/article_bea6e54b-62e1-56ed-aa05-455ecac11808. html.

CHAPTER 3

Pennsylvania: A New Bellwether? Kevan M. Yenerall

Abstract Pennsylvania, a perennial battleground state, voted for every Democratic presidential candidate from 1992 to 2012. Then came Donald Trump. After Trump upended two decades of Democratic dominance in the keystone state—defeating Clinton by 0.7%—parties, candidates, and their constituencies assessed the dynamics that facilitated the Republican-Trump resurgence, considered strategies, and set their sights on mobilization for the 2018 midterms, gubernatorial and senatorial races, and then, 2020. With all eyes on assessing the election results and state of the parties in battleground Pennsylvania in the tumultuous 2020 pandemic presidential election, this chapter will review essential factors and takeaways from the Republican resurgence and Trump victory in 2016, briefly examine the context and key elections leading up to 2020, and then consider key demographic trends that facilitated Joe Biden’s triumph over Donald Trump.

K. M. Yenerall (B) Clarion University, Clarion, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0_3

31

32

K. M. YENERALL

Keywords 2020 election · Presidential elections · Blue wall · Pennsylvania · Joe Biden · Donald Trump

2016: A Blue Wall (in a Purple State) Crumbles When most people think of battleground America, they think of Florida and Ohio, two of only three states (along with Nevada) that have voted for the winner of every presidential election since 1996….But in 2016, Pennsylvania could be the keystone of the Electoral College and the ultimate arbiter of whether Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton resides at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. —David Wasserman, House editor, Cook Political Report (May 17, 2016)1

In one of the closest presidential elections in Pennsylvania history, Hillary Clinton, the heavily favored former first lady, US Senator, and secretary of state—a fixture of the Democratic Party and national politics for decades—lost a state that, along with Michigan and Wisconsin, comprised part of the Democratic Party’s so-called rust belt electoral college “blue wall.” While the polls closest to election day had Clinton ahead but either within or just slightly above the margin of error—for example, the Real Clear Politics average Pennsylvania polls from October 29 to November 5, 2016, had Clinton’s lead at 2.1%—given that Clinton never trailed in state polls and the commonwealth had delivered for Bill Clinton (twice), Al Gore, John Kerry, and Barack Obama (twice), conventional wisdom and recent electoral history suggested it would be another close election in an essential electoral college state … ultimately carried by the Democrats.2 But this was no ordinary election, and as in Michigan and Wisconsin, the Democrats’ proverbial presidential blue wall came crumbling down, sending Republican Donald Trump to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue by a margin of roughly 77,000 across three demographically similar industrial and post-industrial states that were—at least at the presidential level — highly competitive but reliably Democratic. A brash and proudly profane tabloid fixture, real estate impresario, and reality TV star—sans governmental, military, or public service experience—had effectively ended the

3

PENNSYLVANIA: A NEW BELLWETHER?

33

Clinton political dynasty and delivered a state for his party and candidacy that had eluded Republican presidents and heavyweights alike for the previous 20 years, succeeding where the likes of seasoned politicos President George H.W. Bush, Senator Bob Dole, Governor and President George W. Bush, Senator John McCain, and Governor Mitt Romney had failed. In Pennsylvania and beyond, partisans, pundits, and political scientists alike wondered: What happened? With voter turnout in the commonwealth hovering around 61%, in 2016 Donald Trump narrowly defeated Hillary Clinton in Pennsylvania by 44,292 votes, or 0.7%, out of over six million casts.3 Heading into Election Day both major-party candidates were by far the most unpopular in Gallup’s polling history, with Trump having the highest unfavorable rating (61%) and Clinton coming in second (52%) in the organization’s final “scalometer” unfavorable ratings, administered in every presidential election since 1956.4 And although Pennsylvania is historically a strong, stable two-party state, third parties often have a difficult time getting on the ballot and even when they do they rarely have a significant impact— and until 2019, Pennsylvania was one of the only seven states with a straight-party ticket voting option—third parties performed better in 2016 than they had in decades. Led by Libertarian Gary Johnson (2.4%; 146,715 votes) and followed by Green Party nominee Jill Stein (0.8%; 49,485 votes), these two third party candidates combined for 3.2% of the vote in an election decided by a razor-thin margin.5 In 2012, when President Obama carried Pennsylvania by over five points, the same third parties mustered a mere 1.2%. The previous two presidential elections saw third parties performing even more poorly.6 What seemed to some like a sudden eruption of Republican support in a Democratic state belied what had been transpiring at the grassroots and ballot box over a few decades: a slow-moving realignment of the parties along geographical and ideological lines largely tethered to race, educational attainment, and age. Large swaths of the once Democraticdominated blue collar, pro-union, economy-, and health care-minded lunch bucket legions of southwestern Pennsylvania had been gravitating to Republican candidates and values over several election cycles, even as their party registration lagged behind their voting behavior. The rise and enduring primacy of a panoply of social-cultural issues, deindustrialization, automation, and economic dislocation—coupled with the decline of organized labor and an increasingly fractured and fevered mediapolitical ecosystem—led a significant contingent of culturally conservative,

34

K. M. YENERALL

older, and white non-college-educated Democrats to the GOP. Similarly, but not as dramatically, in the northeastern corner of the state, perennial Democratic counties such Lackawanna (home to Scranton) and Luzerne, among others, saw voters with similar demographic and ideological profiles voting for Republican candidates and, in Luzerne especially, formally registering with the GOP. Meanwhile, in southeastern Pennsylvania, a different but just as steady and profound partisan defection had been underway. Portions of the four suburban “collar counties” in the metro-Philadelphia area (Montgomery, Delaware, Chester, and Bucks) which, in decades past, paved the way for Republican Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, US Senators Arlen Specter and John Heinz, and a trail of governors, mayors, and members of Congress, had been drifting away from the GOP. Here, more socially liberal and economically moderate college-educated voters were increasingly voting for Democratic candidates and affiliating with the party, providing an electoral boost to offset the party’s hemorrhaging in the southwest. Slowly but surely, in different corners of the state, party registration was finally catching up with demographic dynamics and voting behavior. The tip of the presidential election iceberg may have been blue—and statewide party registration remained significantly Democratic—but beneath the surface, tectonic socio-economic and political plates had been shifting for some time. A purple state was ripe for the right type of Republican to win at the right time—and Donald Trump delivered. In 2016, astute observers of electoral and demographic trends connected the dots between the data and Donald Trump’s meteoric rise and nomination. As he belittled, taunted, and vanquished establishment Republican stalwarts and rising stars in the primaries, it became clear that Trump performed particularly well with older, white, non-college voters. And Pennsylvania, notably in a number of former solid-Democratic blue-collar bastions in the southwest—and, to a different degree, the northeast—provided fertile terrain for his style, tone, and message. In 2016, Pennsylvania’s economic confidence was well below other recent swing states, such as Colorado and Virginia, it was the sixth oldest state in the union, and, perhaps most prescient, only 29% of non-Hispanic whites age 25 and older had earned a college degree.7 Pennsylvania, therefore, had the demographic raw materials for a candidate like Trump to succeed—provided these voters turned out in droves and/or the

3

PENNSYLVANIA: A NEW BELLWETHER?

35

Democrats saw slight dips in turnout, with one or more core elements of their electoral coalition underperforming. And that is what transpired. In many ways, Trump’s win over Clinton boiled down to flipping three traditionally Democratic counties: Erie in the northwestern corner and Luzerne and Northampton in the northeastern and eastern regions. Luzerne County in particular is illustrative of emerging GOP strength aided by demographics and Trump’s candidacy. A county won by Barack Obama in 2008 (8%) and 2012 (5%) shifted Republican by over 24% in 2016, with Trump carrying the county by 19.5%. His 26,237-vote win in the county constituted roughly 60% of his statewide margin, and, as such, Luzerne’s seemingly stark path from Obama to Trump garnered considerable attention. Journalist Ben Bradlee, Jr.’s, examination of Luzerne County, The Forgotten, included direct reflections from county denizens that felt the political and economic system, and the socioeconomic and cultural transformations that had transpired alongside it, had left them behind. The result was palpable anxiety and righteous anger at these changes, the system, the Democratic Party, and the pervasive and perceived forces shaping their environs. Bradlee’s work was buttressed by once-a-week visits to Luzerne for 14 months in the aftermath of Trump’s win, speaking with, among others, clerks, hair salon workers, truck drivers, real estate investors, and even white supremacists.8 But while much attention was understandably placed on Trump flipping three long-standing Democratic counties, one could just as easily credit Trump’s win to his ability to get superhuman numbers out of the GOP base: the ruby red rural and exurban counties. Especially, but not limited to the so-called “T”—the areas running along interstate 80 across the north, and cutting down through the center of the state to the Maryland border—these regions, already reliably Republican, performed at levels unseen in modern presidential elections. Thus, Trump’s massive margins in the vast majority of these smaller counties meant that the Democratic Party’s dominance in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, and its increasing electoral muscle in formerly Republican suburban bastions in the southeast, were insufficient to win the popular vote and the state’s coveted 20 electoral votes. Democratic presidential candidates win Pennsylvania by doing less terribly in overwhelmingly Republican rural areas of the state, running up crushing margins in large cities, maintaining edges in cities such as Erie, Scranton, and Harrisburg, and, most recently, getting stronger numbers in inner-ring college-educated suburbs outside

36

K. M. YENERALL

Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. But if Democrats in Republican rural counties across the state cannot hold up their end of the bargain and get their 35% or so, then that can be every bit as devastating as the GOP gains in the southwest and northeast.9 Trump’s win in Pennsylvania was a stark reminder that, while Democrats may have been dominant at the presidential level during the Clinton and Obama era that was not the norm below the surface. The keystone state is a quintessential purple entity, despite the perennial party registration advantage for Democrats. Governors, judges, and state row offices are usually fairly-to-very competitive races that shift between the parties depending on a range of socio-economic and policy dynamics (and the quality and quirks of the candidates). And like much of the country, voting patterns at the precinct level reveal that polarization in the state is ascendant. Red areas are trending redder and blue areas bluer as citizens sort themselves socially, culturally, politically, and economically, with Democrats primarily centered in cities and suburbs and Republicans disproportionally dispersed across wider swaths of the exurban and rural landscape.10

2018: Democrats Resurgent---Conor Lamb’s Upset, Redistricting, and Statewide Wins Conor Lamb—The Special Election Earthquake in Southwestern PA Demoralized, depressed, anxious, and angry over Trump’s win in 2016, a coalition of Pennsylvania Democrats and progressive groups, such as Indivisible We Rise and Progress PA—in many cases spearheaded by suburban women—led a grassroots awakening and resistance in 2017– 2018, recruiting candidates, leading protests, raising money, and running for office. Then in 2018, the first significant sign of Democratic resurgence after Trump’s win occurred when there was a minor political earthquake in a former Democratic-turned-GOP-friendly southwestern corner of the keystone state. In a March 2018 special election in a congressional district Trump won by 20% in 2016 (PA-18)—one that ran from suburban Pittsburgh enclaves of professionals to post-industrial and rural towns in Greene and Washington Counties near the West Virginia border—moderate Democrat Conor Lamb eked out a very narrow victory over Republican Rick Saccone.11 As it became, in part, a proxy war in the age of Trump and

3

PENNSYLVANIA: A NEW BELLWETHER?

37

a precursor to the fall midterms, the race garnered national attention, an avalanche of interest group money, a never-ending buffet of 30-second television ads, and visits from President Trump (who hosted a signature raucous rally to aid Saccone), Vice President Pence, and even former Vice President Biden (who stumped for Lamb with union workers and at Robert Morris University). In the end, Lamb, the 33-year-old marine officer, federal prosecutor, and member of a prominent Pittsburgh political family, won the special election by 755 votes out of 227,449 cast, or 0.3%.12 It appeared that dispirited Democrats in the region finally had some mojo back, wind at their sails, and a strategic recipe for competing (and winning) in a critical Republican-leaning corner of the state. The Lamb win was notable for several reasons, the first being that the right kind of Democratic candidate with a particular ideological profile and disciplined message—socially moderate, economically populist, prolabor, and favoring social insurance and safety net programs—could do just well enough in Republican-trending areas hospitable to Trump and rally the Democratic base in suburban Pittsburgh strongholds. Moreover, the special election upset showed that a relentless focus on specific issues—starting with health care (preserving and expanding Medicare, Medicaid, and the Affordable Care Act) and extending to other kitchen table matters (Social Security, jobs, infrastructure, wages, and pensions) could resonate in some communities in a region that had shifted rightward in the decades since deindustrialization, declining union density, and a hollowing out of the middle class took root. Finally, the 2018 Lamb-Saccone special election was significant for the critical role played by the labor movement in a range of grassroots mobilization efforts. Pennsylvania has roughly 700,000 union members and the 18th congressional district was home to 90,000 people in union households. The Republican candidate chosen by the party establishment, ultraconservative Rick Saccone, held vehemently anti-labor positions. This meant that organized labor had serious skin in the game and had to get engaged given the immediate and severe policy stakes.13 Local and national unions, supported by the PA AFL-CIO, recommitted to engaging their members directly about the issues in the congressional district and election. In robust person-to-person outreach—door-todoor, one-on-one—and via “local union coordinators” (members of local unions tasked as point persons in ground-level issue education and outreach), and an extensive absentee ballot effort, labor leaders worked diligently with their locals to support the labor-friendly Lamb. The

38

K. M. YENERALL

Democratic challenger was viewed by state labor leaders as a “different kind of candidate” whose policy platform and temperament resonated with rank-and-file workers and union officials alike and provided a framework for policy advocacy and coalitional politics moving forward.14 On the trail, Lamb spoke about his support for union workers and the labor movement, and on election night at the Hilton Garden Inn at Southpointe, Pennsylvania’s PA AFL-CIO President Rick Bloomingdale and Secretary-Treasurer Frank Snyder were on hand when Lamb declared victory. Gerrymandering Ruled Unconstitutional; New Congressional Districts Drawn; Dems Reelected Another political earthquake sent tremors across the state in early 2018 when the Pennsylvania State Supreme Court declared the state’s notorious gerrymandered US congressional map—one of the most blatant and infamous in the nation, concocted by the Republican legislature after the 2010 census—had to be thrown out. The League of Women Voters, supported by a bevy of other civic and grassroots associations— took the lead in challenging the constitutionality of the existing map. One of the more creatively drawn districts that met its maker was PA7, stretching out, bending, and twisting curiously across and beyond suburban Philadelphia. The district was referred to as “Goofy kicking Donald Duck”—as that is actually an image conjured by its cartoonish contours. Ruling that the state’s existing congressional map “clearly, plainly, and palpably” violated the state constitution, the state Supreme Court ordered that new districts be drawn in time for the fall midterm elections. Per constitutional mandate, the new congressional districts, like those at the state level, must be contiguous, compact, and preserve political subdivisions.15 After the landmark redistricting decision mandated a new map, and the effective recruitment of effective candidates, Democrats made major gains in the fall midterms, turning what had just two years prior been a 13–5 Republican congressional delegation into a 9–9 tie. The new party breakdown in the US House was much more representative of Pennsylvania’s purple reality, demographics, and political geography. Conor Lamb, who won the aforementioned special election (PA-18) in March, would go on to win in a slightly revamped and more politically hospitable district

3

PENNSYLVANIA: A NEW BELLWETHER?

39

(PA-17) in November. But the most historic shift after the new congressional map and the 2018 midterms were gains made by women in the PA delegation. Dubbed the “Fab Four” by Democrats, Madeleine Dean, Susan Wild, Mary Gay Scanlon, and Chrissy Houlahan made history as Pennsylvania elected the most women to its US House delegation. Their wins—running from a slice of Philadelphia to its surrounding suburban collar counties to the Lehigh Valley—were a microcosm of the ongoing changes in the state’s political geography: Democrats’ growing strength in the suburbs and the southeastern corner of the commonwealth. More good news for Democrats followed in the fall, when incumbent Democratic US Senator Bob Casey and Governor Tom Wolf coasted to reelection, besting their Republican opponents by 13% (Casey) and 17% (Wolf), respectively. Perhaps more significantly, both performed much better in or carried all of the previously Democratic counties that Trump flipped in 2016. Wolf won in all three of these counties—Luzerne (+4.6) and Northampton (+16) in the northeast and Erie (+19) in the northwest. Casey carried two of the three Obama-to-Trump counties, taking Erie (+18) and Northampton (+10) while losing to Republican US Rep. Lou Barletta in Luzerne (−10). The latter margins were not surprising given the Republican challenger’s political base and pedigree: Barletta represented Luzerne County in the US House from 2011 to 2019 and rose to prominence as the mayor of Hazleton (1999–2010) as an outspoken critic of illegal immigration and an advocate for English-only and other immigration-related ordinances. Yet, despite the apparent “blue wave” of Democratic success in the new 9–9 congressional delegation, the landslide wins for an incumbent governor and U.S. senator—and truly historic gains for Democratic women in the House with the election of Houlahan, Scanlon, Dean, and Wild in the southeast and Lehigh Valley—voting behavior and the two party’s coalitions throughout the state spoke to a much more polarized and cemented partisan reality. Indeed, even as Democrats scored dramatic wins in a midterm year, red areas responded in kind, further cementing the geopolitical divisions of the state. As the Philadelphia Inquirer noted in its exhaustive and essential post-election analysis of over 9000 precincts in 2018, the overall electoral picture and voter behavior “shows an acceleration of the years-long trend of Pennsylvania voters pulling apart from each other, separating into partisan camps along visible geographic divides.”16

40

K. M. YENERALL

2020: Reassembling a (Fragile) Blue Wall---How Biden Won 2016–2020: Republican Gains in Party Registration While Democrats scored landslide wins in the gubernatorial and US Senate races and made major gains in congressional representation in the midterms in 2018, party registration trends in the Trump presidency further demonstrated that party affiliation in Pennsylvania was catching up with trends in voter behavior and the slow-moving geopolitical realignment of the past two decades. With a record statewide voter registration figure nearing 10 million (9,908,777) in 2020, Democrats had a 715,000 edge over the Republicans.17 But it was the GOP that was gaining the most ground. The keystone state—along with fellow battlegrounds Florida and North Carolina—saw the GOP making significant strides in party registration. While the Democratic Party continued to hold its longstanding advantage, the GOP cut into their margins, gaining 150,000 registrants since 2016, while the Democrats lost 50,000 members. Here, however, context is crucial. In key Pennsylvania and rust belt counties, these are not necessarily new Trump voters per se; they are, as David Wasserman of the Cook Political Report noted, existing Trump voters who have finally formally changed their party registration to reflect their partisan inclinations.18 Election Results: A Suburban Surge for Biden, a Red Mirage on Election Day, and Marginal Gains In 2016, Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton by 44,292 votes out of nearly six million casts in Pennsylvania. Four years later, by the time all of the same-day, mail, absentee, and provisional ballots were tabulated and certified—and lawsuits from President Trump and Pennsylvania Republican members of Congress challenging the results and voting-bymail procedures were dismissed—former Vice President Joe Biden had defeated President Donald Trump. With a record voter turnout of 71% in the midst of the virulent COVID-19 pandemic that would kill nearly 16,000 Pennsylvanians in 2020, Biden beat Trump by 1.2%, or 80,555 votes.19 Pennsylvania was every bit the tipping state, the one state most likely to put either candidate

3

PENNSYLVANIA: A NEW BELLWETHER?

41

over the top in the Electoral College.20 Intense, exhausting, and unprecedented—with Biden/Harris and Trump/Pence making more stops in the state than any other, and over 6.9 million Pennsylvanians exercising their right to vote—a more emotional, consequential electoral roller coaster was hard to fathom. While the blue wall crumbled in 2016, Biden and the Democrats reconstituted the frail structure by winning Pennsylvania and carrying Michigan (by nearly three percent) and Wisconsin (by 0.6%). A dive into the voting data show that, first and foremost, a mighty suburban surge for Biden in the four Philadelphia suburban counties and Allegheny County in the southwest made the biggest difference. His numbers significantly surpassed Clinton’s already exceptional performance in those locales four years before. In addition, Biden benefited from higher margins among younger and college-educated voters. These dynamics—coupled with modest but crucial gains in a number of white working-class counties across the commonwealth—were key to Democrats reclaiming the keystone state. While Biden had enjoyed modest leads of between three and seven percent in leading national and state polls in the weeks prior to the election, the Real Clear Politics average of the final polls for October 29-November 2 was 1.2%.21 In the end, that was his margin of victory in the state. As noted by Muhlenberg College political scientist Christopher Borick, it was a victory in a battleground state aided by strategic gains on the margins—a little bit here, a little bit there.22 Biden made slight but strategically significant gains and, in most counties, kept Trump from expanding his dominance among white working-class voters. Given the demographic makeup of Pennsylvania this was crucial.23 At the same time, any concerns that Trump could not duplicate his remarkable showing in the Republican rural counties and exurban enclaves were put to rest by a massive red wave on Election Day—which constituted 80% of all of the Trump’s votes. Furthermore, Trump at the top of the ticket was a force of nature that clearly buoyed Republicans down ballot. Some state elected officials were keenly aware of this likely scenario and not surprised by the fervent, unwavering support and high turnout for the incumbent Republican president, pandemic or not. In a lengthy post-election interview Pennsylvania Lt. Governor John Fetterman noted that President Trump and GOP had adopted an “incredibly muscular, barnstorming protocol that energized their small county base, and did so with a level of ferocity that I had never seen before from either party, quite frankly.”24

42

K. M. YENERALL

However, the remarkable Election Day turnout for Trump was met by an even greater force: Democrats getting out the vote for Biden in their urban bases (aside from Philadelphia, which saw Trump’s biggest improvement from 2016 and another dip in Democratic performance), and, most dramatically, in the four suburban counties outside Philadelphia and Allegheny County in western PA. The Philadelphia collar counties of Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery gave Biden an advantage of roughly 100,000 more votes than Hillary Clinton in 2016, swelling his suburban Philly edge to more than 280,000.25 A similar dynamic occurred in Allegheny County, home to the Pittsburgh metro area, where Biden’s lead increased by more than 30,000 compared to Clinton in 2016. Yet if you were expecting a winner to be declared on election night, as Americans have been primed to do since the advent of television, the aforementioned geopolitical and demographic dynamics would not necessarily have been readily apparent, as a few million votes had yet to be counted. In fact, you may have assumed that President Trump had won in a landslide. With a once-in-a-century pandemic and record voting by mail due to the public health concerns—facilitated by a 2019 Pennsylvania law, Act 77 (passed by a Republican state House and Senate and signed by a Democratic Governor), that dramatically expanding voting by mail—election experts warned of “red and blue mirages” on election night, with Democrats ahead in states where early and mail ballots were already counted (Arizona, Florida, and Texas), and Republicans ahead in states (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan) that had yet to or were forbidden from counting mail ballots.26 The red mirage was evident in high definition on election night in Pennsylvania, as the wildly incomplete initial totals, without the overwhelming majority of mail ballots, had Trump ahead by over 600,000 votes. Yet, since Pennsylvania counties could not begin canvassing their mail ballots until Election Day, there were well over 1.4 million votes left to be counted as Americans went to bed. With Biden winning 77% of all mail ballots in Pennsylvania (nearing 80% in Allegheny County and 90% in Philadelphia), and Trump dominating with in-person voting on Election Day, this meant that the vast majority of the sea of ballots left to be counted would be Biden votes. Day by day, Trump’s lead shrunk, and by Friday Biden went ahead of the incumbent president. On Saturday morning, November 7, Biden was far enough ahead that he was declared the projected winner by all major media outlets. It took four days and an

3

PENNSYLVANIA: A NEW BELLWETHER?

43

initial red mirage, but Pennsylvania’s status as the tipping and keystone state was ultimately confirmed. Biden Brings Back Two of Three Obama-Trump Counties (Barely) Given the importance of Trump flipping three Obama counties in 2016, it’s necessary to examine how Biden fared there four years later. The edge was razor slim, but Biden won two of the three counties that flipped to Trump in 2016, bringing Erie (+1) and Northampton (0.7) back into the Democratic fold. And while Luzerne County—shifting ever-rightward in county governance and party registration since 2016— remained firmly in the Republican column (+14), Biden reduced Trump’s margin by five percent, a pattern he repeated, at similar and smaller levels, in other counties. These improvements in predominantly white workingclass environs made a difference in a state decided by only 80,000 votes.27 Similarly, in Lackawanna County, where Biden’s hometown of Scranton is located, he staunched the bleeding in the traditionally Democratic county, winning by over eight percent, performing four percent better than Clinton in 2016. Biden also outperformed Clinton in a number of post-industrial rural and suburban enclaves in increasingly Republican areas of southwestern and northeastern Pennsylvania. In addition to race, age, and gender considerations that potentially worked to his advantage in Pennsylvania—bluntly stated, Biden won the state as a 78-year-old white man in the moderate-liberal wing of the Democratic Party—his ability to corral more votes in the aforementioned areas may have something to do with his explicit outreach to a declining yet still vital component of the state’s socio-economic and political fabric: labor unions. Often tragically overlooked in some of the modern coverage of parties, elections, and grassroots GOTV efforts, organized labor continues to play a significant role in Pennsylvania even in the face of declining union density and an array of daunting challenges. Unions and union members in Pennsylvania are also an incredibly diverse lot, from both a race/class/gender, blue collar/white collar, and private/public sector perspectives. Shepherding collective action between diverse factions and sectors can be a difficult and delicate task. These challenges notwithstanding, Joe Biden was the most explicitly pro-union presidential nominee of any major-party nominee in modern history, citing “union jobs” in his campaign events and in TV ads that blanketed the state in the closing days. He began and ended his campaign

44

K. M. YENERALL

in labor-heavy western PA, starting with a rally at Teamsters Local 249 in Pittsburgh in the spring of 2019 and concluding the race outside Heinz Field, the home of the Steelers, introduced by a local union member. Moreover, Biden’s campaign events were coordinated with a diverse array of labor unions in nearly every appearance in the state, from plumbers in Erie to operating engineers in Johnstown to service sector and health care employees at the Pittsburgh Amtrak station. When he toured western Pennsylvania by train after his first debate, each stop featured a component—speaker, policy, or announcement—that was part of or relevant to the labor movement. On the eve of the election in Beaver County in western Pennsylvania—a former Democratic stronghold that has been shifting Republican the last few decades—Biden told a group of iron workers, steamfitters, painters, and firefighters “I will be the most prounion president you have ever seen. I guarantee you a seat at the table.”28 Rick Bloomingdale, President of the PA AFL-CIO could not recall any presidential candidate in the last 50 years who spoke about unions as clearly and frequently as Biden.29 Suburban Surge Protectors: Allegheny and Montgomery County Two counties in particular—Allegheny and Montgomery, the second and third most populous in the state—are the prime suburban reasons for Biden’s win. Biden’s margin of 134,000 (Montgomery) and 147,000 (Allegheny) were the suburban equivalent of Trump’s astounding, recordbreaking margins out of rural Republican rural counties. No candidate had carried Allegheny County by such a lopsided margin since Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater in 1964. Moreover, “Allegheny County delivered around 47,000 more votes for Biden than the average Democratic presidential candidates since 2000. And he won more than 37,000 additional votes compared to Hillary Clinton in 2016.”30 Biden’s percent of the vote in Allegheny was the best since Bill Clinton in 1992. Precinct-level data reveals more evidence of Democratic improvement from 2016, with some of the most significant gains for Biden coming “in suburban and rural precincts, some of which he still lost.”31 Meanwhile, a portion of Trump’s improvements over 2016 were evident in Black neighborhoods in Pittsburgh and in Philadelphia, where Trump gained among Black, Hispanic, and white voters in specific neighborhoods.

3

PENNSYLVANIA: A NEW BELLWETHER?

45

Yet it is important to note that Biden’s surge in the suburbs did not translate to down ballot success for Democrats, who suffered significant letdowns with painful losses in competitive state house and senate races in suburban and exurban Pennsylvania. To this extent, while Trump was rejected, Trumpism and the Republican brand were not. As one Democratic campaign manager for a state house race in suburban-exurban Pittsburgh put it, “There’s a significant difference between a referendum on a clown show, which is what we had at the top of the ticket, and embracing the values of the Democratic ticket….People bought into Joe Biden to stop the insanity in the White House. They did not suddenly become Democrats.”32 Despite the lack of Biden coattails in the suburbs and statewide, his ability to make gains where Clinton could not was critical. Again, margins in such a competitive state matter. Compared to 2016, Biden increased the Democratic margin by over three percent in Allegheny County and impressive 4.7% in Montgomery County. Aside from Attorney General Josh Shapiro, who was a State Representative and County Commissioner in Montgomery County before being elected statewide, Biden ran ahead of all major ballot Democrats across the state, evidence that, in election, state, and nation deeply polarized, a sliver of ticket-splitters aided his efforts to reclaim Pennsylvania’s electoral votes. And despite slight setbacks in the city of Philadelphia, which has seen Democratic declines in three straight presidential election, the party’s base and broader coalition largely delivered. Pennsylvania—Battleground 2024: What Lies Ahead? With Biden as the Democratic standard-bearer in 2020, the party reclaimed the presidency by winning Pennsylvania by just over one percent. Biden won Pennsylvania by turning out the Democratic coalition, riding to a nail-biting victory via significant gains in suburban Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, an energized base, and strategically significant, if slight, inroads in the southwest and northeast, preventing President Trump from increasing his massive margins among non-collegeeducated and working-class white voters. Biden made explicit appeals to labor unions which, while suffering from decreasing density, have proven to be a durable and reliable force in grassroots mobilization, especially with Democrats’ GOTV efforts hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic. Biden performed much better with 18–44 years olds than Clinton in

46

K. M. YENERALL

2016, a promising sign for the party, and he gained more support from college-educated voters. In the end, the incumbent president increased his percentage of the vote in only nine out of 67 counties. However, while Biden reinvigorated and reconstituted the Democratic coalition in a perennial battleground state—and defeating any incumbent president is a daunting task—the popular vote margin was just 80,555, and Democrats struggled to win down ballot races critical to redistricting after the 2020 census. Their suburban dominance at the presidential level did not translate to wins in state House and Senate races. Taken as a whole, a close presidential election coupled with the continuation and, in some cases, exacerbation of the geopolitical and demographic foundations of each party indicates that the fever of modern political polarization is very much intact and unlikely to break in the keystone state. If the present and recent past is prologue, despite Joe Biden’s toppling of Donald Trump, there is reason to believe that the fault lines of education, age, and race will continue to buoy the GOP and bedevil the Democrats in Pennsylvania. This appears especially likely when comparing the trends in states with similar (but not exact) demographic profiles, Michigan and Wisconsin. While white non-college-educated men remained essentially status quo in Pennsylvania in 2020—neither Biden nor Trump made gains overall—in the latter states there were significant swings toward Biden and the Democrats from 2016 to 2020; for example, a 14-point shift in Michigan and a 13-point swing in Wisconsin.33 Moreover, while Biden gained impressive ground with senior citizens in Michigan (+12), Trump improved with over-65 voters in Wisconsin (+5%). Nationwide, Biden performed better among white, male noncollege-educated voters (+6%) but Trump held down the fort among women, with no gains for the Democrats.

Notes 1. Wasserman, David. “Why Pennsylvania Could Decide the 2016 Election.” May 17, 2016, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ pennsylvania-could-be-an-electoral-tipping-point/. 2. Real Clear Politics. “Pennsylvania: Trump v. Clinton,” https:// www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/pa/pennsylva nia_trump_vs_clinton-5633.html. 3. For the official 2016 presidential election results in Pennsylvania (statewide and county-by-county) see: https://www.electionretu

3

PENNSYLVANIA: A NEW BELLWETHER?

47

rns.pa.gov/General/SummaryResults?ElectionID=54&ElectionT ype=G&IsActive=0. 4. Saad, Lydia. “Trump and Clinton Finish with Historically Poor Images. November 8, 2016, https://news.gallup.com/poll/197 231/trump-clinton-finish-historically-poor-images.aspx. 5. Levy, Marc. “Pennsylvania Bill Would Remove Straight-Party Voting Option While Moving Registration Deadline.” Morning Call. October 21, 2019, https://www.mcall.com/news/pennsy lvania/mc-nws-pa-voting-changes-20191021-ijml6xopwvftvgw 4m25y5vsgxy-story.html. See also, The National Conference on State Legislatures. “Straight Ticket Voting States.” https://www. ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/straight-ticket-voting. aspx. 6. Third parties performed worse in all preceding presidential elections in PA in the twenty-first century, garnering 1.2% in 2012, 1.05% in 2008, and .59% in 2000. Official PA election results for 2012: https://www.electionreturns.pa.gov/General/Summar yResults?ElectionID=27&ElectionType=G&IsActive=0. 7. Wasserman, David. “Why Pennsylvania Could Decide the 2016 Election.” May 17, 2016, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ pennsylvania-could-be-an-electoral-tipping-point/. 8. Bradlee, Jr., Ben. The Forgotten: How the People of One Pennsylvania County Elected Donald Trump. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2018. 9. Sokolove, Michael. “Will Trump Win Pennsylvania Again?” September 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/10/ opinion/sunday/2020-election-trump-pennsylvania.html. 10. Lai, Jonathan and Jared Whalen. “Pennsylvania, Polarized.” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 7, 2019. https://www.inquirer. com/politics/inq/pennsylvania-polarization-election-results-dem ocrats-republicans-trends-map-20190207.html. 11. Baker, Peter and Michael D. Shear. “Strong Performance by Democrat Conor Lamb in Pennsylvania Shakes Trump and G.O.P.” New York Times, March 14, 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/03/14/us/politics/pennsylvania-congressional-raceconor-lamb-trump.html. 12. PA-18 special election results in March 2018 (Lamb v. Saccone): https://www.electionreturns.pa.gov/Special/OfficeRes ults?ElectionID=62&ElectionType=S&IsActive=0.

48

K. M. YENERALL

13. Tumulty, Karen. “What a Democrat Succeeding in Trump Country Would Mean for November.” Washington Post, March 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/ 2018/03/14/what-a-democrat-succeeding-in-trump-countrywould-mean-for-november/. 14. Author interview with PA AFL-CIO President Richard Bloomingdale and Secretary-Treasurer Frank Snyder, December 2020. 15. Ingraham, Christopher. “‘Sprawling,’ ‘Rorschachian,’ ‘Corrosive’ to Democracy: Pennsylvania’s Top Court Condemns State’s Gerrymandered Districts.” Washington Post, February 8, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/02/ 08/sprawling-rorschachian-corrosive-to-democracy-pas-top-courtcondemns-states-gerrymandered-districts/. The 139-page Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in League of Women Voters v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (2018): https://www.pubint law.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2018-02-07-MajorityOpinion.pdf. For background on how one of the most notorious and egregious modern examples of gerrymandering came to pass, see: Ingraham, “How Pennsylvania Republicans Pulled Off Their Aggressive Gerrymander.” Washington Post, February 6, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/02/ 06/how-pennsylvania-republicans-pulled-off-their-aggressivegerrymander/. “Goofy Kicking Donald Duck” (PA’s seventh congressional district)—see: Gabriel, Trip. “In a Comically Drawn Pennsylvania District, the Voters Are Not Amused.” January 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/us/pennsylva nia-gerrymander-goofy-district.html. 16. Lai, Jonathan and Jared Whalen. “Pennsylvania, Polarized.” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 7, 2019. https://www.inquirer. com/politics/inq/pennsylvania-polarization-election-results-dem ocrats-republicans-trends-map-20190207.html. 17. Party registration in Pennsylvania prior to the 2020 presidential election: 4,175,532 Democrats; 3,459,627 Republicans; 875,191 (other minor parties or no affiliation). 18. Bronner, Lenny. “If Joe Biden Loses It Probably Won’t Be Because of an Increase in GOP Voter Registration.” Washington Post, October 22, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/pol itics/2020/10/22/if-joe-biden-loses-it-probably-wont-be-bec ause-an-increase-gop-voter-registration/.

3

PENNSYLVANIA: A NEW BELLWETHER?

49

19. For COVID-19 deaths in Pennsylvania, see: Pennsylvania Department of Health, “Weekly Report for Deaths Attributed to COVID-19 Issued December 18, 2020,” https://www.hea lth.pa.gov/topics/Documents/Diseases%20and%20Conditions/ COVID-19%20Death%20Reports/Weekly%20Report%20of%20D eaths%20Attributed%20to%20COVID-19%20--%202020-12-18. pdf. For the record voter turnout in Pennsylvania, see: Southwick, Ron. “PA Election Turnout May Set Record, Nearly All Provisional Ballots Counted.” Penn-Live. November 17, 2020, https://www.pennlive.com/elections/2020/11/pa-election-tur nout-may-set-record-nearly-all-provision-ballots-counted.html; United States Election Project, “2020 November General Election Turnout Rates.” December 7, 2020, http://www.electproj ect.org/2020g. For 2016 presidential election results in Pennsylvania, see: https://www.electionreturns.pa.gov/General/Summar yResults?ElectionID=54&ElectionType=G&IsActive=0. For 2020 presidential election results in Pennsylvania, see: https://www.electionreturns.pa.gov/General/SummaryRe sults?ElectionID=83&ElectionType=G&IsActive=1. 20. Rakich, Nathaniel. “Why Pennsylvania Could Decide the Election.” September 15, 2020, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ why-pennsylvania-could-decide-the-2020-election/. 21. Real Clear Politics. “Pennsylvania: Trump v. Biden,” https:// www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2020/president/pa/pennsylva nia_trump_vs_biden-6861.html#polls. 22. Finnerty, John. “Biden Rode Wave of Suburban Support to Win Pennsylvania.” Tribune-Democrat, November 12, 2020, https:// www.tribdem.com/news/biden-rode-wave-of-suburban-supportto-win-pa/article_84a4b4c9-f074-5bc9-91bf-bada691ee9ff.html. 23. Terruso, Julia and Shawn Collins Walsh. “Biden’s BlueCollar Appeal Brought in Just Enough White WorkingClass Voters to Help Him.” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 11, 2020, https://www.inquirer.com/news/white-working-classbiden-trump-pennsylvania-luzerne-westmoreland-20201111.html. 24. “John Fetterman: RS Interview Special Edition.” November 12, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RrkZxYr6y8c. 25. Tamari, Jonathan and Julia Terruso. “How Joe Biden Won Pennsylvania.” November 8, 2020, https://www.inquirer.com/

50

K. M. YENERALL

politics/election/joe-biden-wins-pennsylvania-2020-election-202 01107.html. 26. Wasserman, David. “Beware the ‘Blue Mirage’ and the ‘Red Mirage’ on Election Night.” November 8, 2020, https://www. nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/beware-blue-mirage-redmirage-election-night-n1245925. 27. Terruso, Julia and Shawn Collins Walsh. “Biden’s Blue-Collar Appeal Brought in Just Enough White Working-Class Voters to Help Him Win Pennsylvania.” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 11, 2020, https://www.inquirer.com/news/white-working-classbiden-trump-pennsylvania-luzerne-westmoreland-20201111.html. 28. Fontaine, Tom et al. “On Eve of Delivers Pro-Labor Message in Western Pa.” Tribune-Review, November 2, 2020, https:// triblive.com/local/regional/biden-delivers-pro-labor-message-inbeaver-county/. 29. Interview with the author, December 2020. 30. Morrison, Oliver. “How Allegheny County Delivered Pennsylvania to Biden.” Public Source. November 12, 2020, https://www.pub licsource.org/biden-trump-allegheny-county-pittsburgh-vote-bre akdown/. 31. Ibid. 32. Gabriel, Trip. “How Democrats Suffered Crushing DownBallot Losses Across America.” New York Times, November 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/28/us/politics/dem ocrats-republicans-state-legislatures.html. 33. Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

The Sun Belt Beginning to Shine for Democrats Lawrence Becker and Tyler Hughes

Abstract For 40 years, Republicans have dominated the Sun Belt in presidential elections. Stretching from the Carolinas in the east to California in the west, the Sun Belt is large, growing, and importantly, is becoming more urban and demographically diverse. The demographic changes in the region are causing an electoral shift that we saw play out in Joe Biden’s narrow victories in both Arizona and Georgia in 2020. This chapter examines the changing demographics of the Sun Belt and we argue that the shift toward Democrats in the Sun Belt did not begin and is not likely to end with Joe Biden. While Republicans, like Donald Trump in 2020, are still winning a majority of the Electoral votes in the region, the Sun Belt is

L. Becker (B) · T. Hughes California State University, Northridge, Los Angeles, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected] T. Hughes e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0_4

51

52

L. BECKER AND T. HUGHES

likely to represent a new path to Electoral College success for Democrats in the near future. Keywords 2020 election · Presidential elections · Sunbelt · Joe Biden · Donald Trump · Georgia · Arizona

In the simplest terms, Joe Biden won the 2020 presidential election by winning every state Hillary Clinton won in 2016 and by flipping three Rust Belt states—Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin—the Second Congressional District in Nebraska, and two Sun Belt states—Georgia and Arizona. While the Rust Belt and the Sun Belt constituted two separate potential pathways to victory for Biden in the lead-up to the 2020 election, we argue that these two regions also present a contrast between the Democratic Party’s past and future in electoral terms. To be sure, the Biden-Harris coalitions in these states are not all that different from one another. In both regions, the Biden campaign was dependent on a coalition of urban voters, young voters, non-white voters, and white college-educated voters. The key difference is that each of these groups is growing more rapidly in the Sun Belt states. Therefore, we argue Democrats will see continued success in future presidential elections as Sun Belt states shift from red to purple and from purple to blue.

What Is the Sun Belt and Why Is It Important? Most credit Kevin Phillips with developing the name “Sun Belt” in his 1969 book, The Emerging Republican Majority. Phillips (1969) understood the Sun Belt as stretching east to west across the southern tier of the continental United States from the Carolinas to California and, importantly, as a place where Republicans were likely to dominate politically in the latter part of the twentieth century. Phillips was right—since 1980, Democrats won the majority of electoral votes in the Sun Belt just once (in 1996). The northern border of the Sun Belt has been a matter of some dispute but, for our purposes, the Kinder Institute’s (Fulton et. al. 2020) use of the 36 30 parallel makes the most sense as it both provides the clearest geographic boundary between states and includes the largest metropolitan statistical areas in states not fully below the parallel, such as California and Nevada.

4

THE SUN BELT BEGINNING TO SHINE FOR DEMOCRATS

53

Defined in this way, the Sun Belt includes 15 states—Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. In terms of population, the Sun Belt is growing and diversifying at a rapid rate, with most of the growth contained to urban centers. The overall population of the Sun Belt states grew by 10.04% over the last ten years, while the rest of the country grew just 3.53% in the same timeframe.1 In fact, the six states with the most population growth over the last decade (Texas, Florida, California, North Carolina, Arizona, and Georgia) are all in the Sun Belt. However, the amount of growth varies by state. For our purposes, it is useful to separate out the seven “fastgrowing” Sun Belt states from the eight “slow-growing” states. These states are detailed in Table 4.1. There is utility in the distinction between these groups of states beyond just those that are growing more or less. The distinction between fast and slow-growing states has major implications for future presidential elections. In 1960, the Sun Belt accounted for 176 electoral votes. By 2024, it is projected this number will be 236 (authors’ calculations based on Table 4.1 Population growth in the Sun Belt States, 2010–2020

“Fast-growing” Sun Belt States

“Slow-growing” Sun Belt States

State

State

Arizona Florida Georgia Nevada North Carolina South Carolina Texas

% Population change

% Population change

15.83 15.32 10.27 16.13 10.72

Alabama Arkansas California Louisiana Mississippi

2.84 3.71 5.49 2.22 −0.13

12.56

New Mexico

2.02

16.32

Oklahoma Tennessee

5.87 8.36

Source Authors’ calculations comparing July 1, 2020 resident population estimates with July 1, 2010 estimates in US Census Bureau, Population Division, “Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and the District of Columbia: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2020” (NST-EST2020)

54

L. BECKER AND T. HUGHES

Adamy and Overberg 2020),2 but these gains will be concentrated in less than half the states in Table 4.1. Moreover, the fast-growing states were more competitive in the 2020 presidential race, compared to the “safe” (blue or red) nature of all eight slow-growing states.

Diversification of the Sun Belt States There is clear variation in growth across Sun Belt states, and these trends are driven by changes with politically relevant demographic groups. Specifically, fast-growing Sun Belt states displayed larger increases among racial/ethnic minority populations—especially those groups that traditionally vote for the Democratic candidate—than their slow-growing counterparts. These dynamics suggest greater success for Democrats in future presidential elections. Figure 4.1 displays the percentage change in population within different racial/ethnic groups across fast-growing and slow-growing Sun Belt states between 2010 and 2019.3 Overall, the fast-growing Sun Belt states display more growth, but there is variation across racial/ethnic groups. In particular, the larger increases in the African American population in fast-growing Sun Belt states helps to explain the emergence of these new battlegrounds and Joe Biden’s 2020 victory. In only one of the fast-growing states (South Carolina) did the African American population increase by less than ten percent between 2010 and 2019. Arizona and Nevada display the largest increases of 39 and 40%, respectively, but these states have comparatively small African American populations. Four other states (Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas) saw increases in their African American population of greater than ten percent over this timespan, with Texas having the largest increase of 22%. Within this group, more than ten percent of each state’s 2010 population was comprised of African Americans, with Texas having the lowest proportion (11.76%) and Georgia having the highest proportion (30.65%). Therefore, these increases represent substantial population gains within the demographic group and the state. African Americans have been a key part of the Democratic voting bloc for decades, with the vast majority of African Americans identifying as Democrats (Kidd et al. 2007; Black 2004; Johnson and Gordon 2005). Only three slow-growing Sun Belt states showed an increase in their African American population of at least ten percent over this period (New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Tennessee).

4

THE SUN BELT BEGINNING TO SHINE FOR DEMOCRATS

55

Arizona

Fast-Growing Sun Belt

Florida

Georgia

Nevada

North Carolina

South Carolina

Texas States

White African Ameican

Alabama

Lano Arkansas

Asian American American Indian

Slow-Growing Sun Belt

California

Louisiana

Mississippi

New Mexico

Oklahoma

Tennessee 0

20

40

60

80

100

Percentage Change

Fig. 4.1 Percentage change to racial/ethnic democraphic in the Sun Belt, by State 2010–2019

56

L. BECKER AND T. HUGHES

Given these dynamics, significant increases to the African American population in fast-growing Sun Belt states help to explain the gains made by Democrats over the last 20 years and the success of Joe Biden in states like Georgia, where the growth of African American eligible voters accounted for almost half of the growth in Georgia’s electorate since 2000 (Budiman and Noe-Bustamante 2020). The non-Hispanic White population in fast-growing Sun Belt states also increased at a faster pace than slow-growing Sun Belt States, with Arizona, Texas, and Florida each displaying a change greater than 20%. The only exceptions are Nevada and Georgia—each display less than a six percent increase in their non-Hispanic White populations. However, the increases in the non-Hispanic White population in fast-growing Sun Belt states were less than those among other racial/ethnic groups, highlighting the overall population growth and racial/ethnic diversification within these states. The Hispanic and Asian American populations in all of the states listed in Fig. 4.1 saw dramatic increases between 2010 and 2019. These changes are consistent with a larger national trend—Hispanics and Asian Americans are the two fastest-growing racial/ethnic groups in America (Brown 2014). Based on polling data, over 60% of both Hispanics and Asian Americans identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party (Pew Research Center 2020a), and voters within these groups displayed a greater propensity to vote for the Democratic candidate in recent elections (de la Garza and Cortina 2007). However, these groups contain a heterogenous group of voters with varied cultural and ethnic backgrounds (Kaufmann 2003; Dutwin et al. 2005) and resulting voting patterns. In sum, the large increases in both groups across most states in Fig. 4.1 underscore a rapidly diversifying electorate. This diversification creates obstacles for long-term Republican success in the Sun Belt and nationwide, especially as the Democratic Party’s electoral coalition becomes more racially/ethnically diverse and the Republican Party’s coalition less so (Williams 2010; Zingher 2018). The racial/ethnic changes described above directly translate to shifts in the states’ share of the electorate comprised of non-Hispanic White voters. Figure 4.2 shows the percentage loss in the non-Hispanic White share of the electorate between 2000 and 2018 for fast-growing and slow-growing Sun Belt states.4 In only two fast-growing Sun Belt states did the share of the electorate comprised of non-Hispanic White voters decrease by less than 10% (North Carolina and South Carolina—six

4

THE SUN BELT BEGINNING TO SHINE FOR DEMOCRATS

57

Arizona

Fast-Growing Sun Belt

Florida Georgia Nevada North Carolina South Carolina

States

Texas Alabama

Slow-Growing Sun Blt

Arkansas California Louisiana Mississippi New Mexico Oklahoma Tennessee 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Percentage Difference

Fig. 4.2 Percentage decline in non-Hispanic White share of the electorate in the Sun Belt, by State 2000–2018

percent and two percent, respectively). The non-Hispanic White share of the electorate in the other fast-growing states (Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, and Texas) decreased by larger margins, ranging from ten percent (Georgia) to 18% (Nevada). In fact, Nevada displayed the largest percentage difference in the nation over this timespan. In contrast, the non-Hispanic White share of the electorate decreased at lower rates in the other Sun Belt states. In only one slow-growing Sun Belt state (solidly blue California) did the non-Hispanic White share of the electorate decline by greater than ten percent between 2000 and 2018. Taken together, recent racial/ethnic demographic shifts and decreases in the non-Hispanic White share of the electorate among fast-growing Sun Belt states outpace those observed in other Sun Belt states. These dynamics help to explain why some states in the Sun Belt recently

58

L. BECKER AND T. HUGHES

emerged as major Electoral College battlegrounds and why other Sun Belt states remain uncompetitive. If these patterns continue, it is likely some traditionally “safe” Republican Sun Belt states—such as Texas and South Carolina—will emerge as new battlegrounds, while current battlegrounds—including Nevada, Georgia, and Arizona—will trend further toward the Democratic Party.

What Happened in the 2020 Election in the Sun Belt? Joe Biden was the first Democrat to win more total votes in the Sun Belt states since Barack Obama did so in 2008 and, while Obama received more votes in the Sun Belt states by a margin of just 0.33% over John McCain in a year where Obama won the national popular vote by more than seven percent, Biden was able to win 1.59% more votes in the Sun Belt states in a year when he won the national popular vote by less than 4.5%. But Biden’s gains in the Sun Belt were greater in some states than in others. Table 4.2 compares the Democratic candidates’ vote margins between the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. Biden’s Sun Table 4.2 Comparison of Biden 2020 margin with Clinton 2016 margin in Sun Belt States “Fast-growing” Sun Belt States State

Biden 2020 (%)

Arizona 0.31 Florida −3.36 Georgia 0.24 Nevada 2.39 North −1.35 Carolina South −11.68 Carolina Texas −5.58

“Slow-growing” Sun Belt States

Clinton 2016 Dem State (%) change (%) −3.55 −1.20 −5.13 2.42 −3.66 −14.27 −9.00

Biden 2020 Clinton 2016 Dem (%) (%) change (%)

Alabama Arkansas California Louisiana Mississippi

−25.46 −27.62 29.16 −18.61 −16.54

−27.73 −26.92 30.11 −19.64 −17.83

2.26 −0.70 −0.95 1.03 1.29

2.59 New Mexico 3.42 Oklahoma Tennessee

10.79

8.21

2.58

−33.09 −23.21

−36.39 −26.01

3.30 2.80

3.85 −2.16 5.37 −0.03 2.31

Sources Author’s calculations based on 2020 vote data compiled by Wasserman et. al., “National Popular VoteTracker” and 2000–2016 vote data compiled by Federal Election Commission, “Election and Voting Information”

4

THE SUN BELT BEGINNING TO SHINE FOR DEMOCRATS

59

Belt gains—compared with Hillary Clinton’s in 2016—were greatest in the “fast-growing” states of Georgia, Arizona, and Texas though Biden’s worst state relative to Clinton’s margin in 2016 was the fast-growing state of Florida (more on this later). Over the longer term, Democratic prospects have improved a lot more in some Sun Belt states than others. A more granular look at the six states in the Sun Belt where the non-Hispanic White share of the electorate is declining most rapidly based on Pew Research Center (2020a) data displays where Democrats are making the greatest gains. The change in the Democratic margin in the presidential vote between 2000 and 2020 in each of these states is displayed below in Table 4.3. As can be seen there, there were double-digit shifts toward the Democrats in California, Texas, and Georgia with six percent and seven percent shifts toward Democrats in Nevada and Arizona, respectively. Florida is the one state in this group where Republicans’ electoral prospects actually improved over this time period although only modestly and Florida is also unusual in that it remained a battleground state throughout these two decades. We discuss the puzzle of Florida in greater detail below. On the other hand, there are a number of Sun Belt states that saw significant shifts towards Republicans over this same time period. Table 4.4 below displays the fives Sun Belt states that each saw at least doubledigit shifts toward Republicans between 2000 and 2020. All of these states are among the “slow-growing” states in the Sun Belt and, with the exception of Oklahoma, each of these states has seen the non-Hispanic White share of the electorate decline by five percent or less between 2000 and 2018. One other thing to note about these states is that four of these Table 4.3 Democratic vote margin in selected Sun Belt States

NV CA FL AZ TX GA

2000 (%)

2004 (%)

2008 (%)

2012 (%)

2016 (%)

−3.55 11.80 −0.01 −6.29 −21.32 −11.69

−2.59 9.95 −5.01 −10.47 −22.86 −16.60

12.49 24.06 2.82 −8.52 −11.77 −5.21

6.68 23.12 0.88 −9.06 –15.78 −7.82

2.42 30.11 −1.20 −3.55 −9.00 −5.13

2020 (%) Total shift (%) 2.39 29.16 −3.36 0.31 −5.58 0.24

5.94 17.37 −3.35 6.60 15.74 11.92

Sources Authors’ calculations based on 2020 vote data compiled by Wasserman et al., “National Popular VoteTracker” and 2000–2016 vote data compiled by Federal Election Commission, “Election and Voting Information”

60

L. BECKER AND T. HUGHES

Table 4.4 Democratic margin in selected “Slow-growing” Sun Belt States

AR TN OK LA AL

2000 (%)

2004 (%)

2008 (%)

2012 (%)

2016 (%)

2020 (%)

Total Shift (%)

−5.44 −3.86 −21.88 −7.68 −14.92

−9.76 −14.27 −31.14 −14.51 −25.62

−19.85 −15.07 −31.29 −18.63 −21.58

−23.69 −20.40 −33.54 −17.21 −22.19

−26.92 −26.01 −36.39 −19.64 −27.73

−27.62 −23.21 −33.09 −18.61 −25.46

−22.18 −19.34 −11.21 −10.93 −10.54

Sources Authors’ calculations based on 2020 vote data compiled by Wasserman et al., “National Popular VoteTracker” and 2000–2016 vote data compiled by Federal Election Commission, “Election and Voting Information”

states (Tennessee, Alabama, Arkansas, and Oklahoma) are the Sun Belt states with the largest share of their populations made up of White evangelical voters (Pew Research Center 2020b), arguably the demographic most loyal to the Republican Party over the last several decades (Williams 2010). For instance, according to the CNN Exit Poll in Alabama, Donald Trump won support from 92% of White born-again or evangelical voters in 2020 and this group made up 48% of all voters in the state (CNN 2020).

A Deeper Dive into Three Sun Belt Battlegrounds The 2020 election has revealed the promise of the Sun Belt as a future winning electoral pathway for the national Democratic Party as a result of varying rates of population growth, changing demographics, and the resulting changing politics of different states. We close with a more indepth look at three important battlegrounds in the Sun Belt—Arizona, Georgia, and Florida—to help explain both the emerging importance of the Sun Belt and the complexity of the politics of the region going forward. Arizona, Georgia, and Florida are not the only battlegrounds in the Sun Belt. Nevada and North Carolina have been battleground states for at least the last four presidential election cycles and Texas is clearly an emerging-battleground state in the next cycle or two. But the individual discussions of Arizona, Georgia, and Florida provide a window into both the unique politics of these particular battlegrounds as well as a look at the way the growth and demographic change we outline above are playing out in electoral terms.

4

THE SUN BELT BEGINNING TO SHINE FOR DEMOCRATS

61

Arizona—Joe Biden was the first Democrat to win Arizona since 1996—and only the second Democrat since 1948. But Biden’s victory didn’t just spring out of nowhere. Democratic prospects in the state had been improving as the state became more urban and suburban and more diverse, particularly over the last decade. John Kerry lost Arizona by a double-digit margin in 2004 and Barack Obama lost Arizona by a little more than nine percent as recently as 2012. But Hillary Clinton lost Arizona by just about 3.5% leading up to Biden’s 2020 victory in the state. Part of the reason for Biden’s victory in Arizona has to do with the demographic changes described earlier. Between 2000 and 2018, the non-Hispanic White share of the electoral declined by 12%—the fourth greatest decline in the country (Igielnik and Budiman 2020) but there were also two other important factors that have helped to accelerate the Democratic surge in Arizona. First, the share of the state electorate that is college graduates has been steadily rising from about 32% of voters in 2004 to about 40% of voters in 2016 (Hatley and Kennedy 2020). Second, and partly related to the first point, Arizona’s state Republican Party has shifted significantly to the right during this period and this has both caused division within the Republican political elite of the state and, more importantly, it has caused some more moderate Republican and independent voters in the state to defect and vote for Democratic candidates (see, for instance, Del Real and Knowles 2020). This ideological shift of Arizona’s Republican Party has played out in a series of issues and stories that have all garnered national attention from the enactment of S.B. 1070 (the punitive anti-immigration law) in 2010 to the related rise of the profile of ultra-conservative Sheriff Joe Arpaio and, finally, to the increasing electoral challenges to Republican Senator John McCain from the right (Weigel and Tierney 2020a). Of course, President Trump himself was endlessly at odds with McCain including his 2015 criticism of McCain’s status as a war hero—“I like people who weren’t captured”—McCain’s dramatic and decisive 2017 vote against the repeal of Obamacare, and even continuing to denigrate McCain after his passing, among other things, for having passed the Steele dossier on to the FBI (Stieb 2019). Not to be over-looked, Trump also feuded with Arizona’s junior Republican Senator, Jeff Flake, who decided not to run for reelection in 2018. The result of all this has been a dramatic shift in the fortunes of Democrats in Arizona. In 2018, Democrat Kyrsten Sinema narrowly

62

L. BECKER AND T. HUGHES

defeated Martha McSally in the Senate race to replace Sen. Flake. After the election, Republican Governor Doug Ducey appointed McSally to hold the seat previously held by McCain but McSally lost again in the 2020 special election to Democrat Mark Kelly. In the space of just a few years, Arizona has shifted from a state that had two Republican senators and a state that had voted for a Democrat for president just once since 1948 to a state that Joe Biden won and that has two Democratic senators for the first time since the 1950s. Georgia—Joe Biden’s victory in Georgia was much more of a surprise than his victory in Arizona. Like Arizona, Democrats have long believed that the demographics of Georgia were moving in their direction and although Hillary Clinton’s five-point loss in 2016 was closer than they’d been in 20 years, other Sun Belt battlegrounds, such as Arizona, North Carolina, and Florida, seemed like they might be easier opportunities for Democratic gains. In addition, the last time a Democratic nominee had won Georgia was in 1992. North Carolina and Florida had been won by Obama as recently as 2008 and 2012, respectively. North Carolina, in particular, shares some of the same demographic characteristics as Georgia suggesting the states could move in tandem but with most pundits and election analysts believing Biden would run a little bit better in North Carolina than in Georgia.5 So how and why did Biden win in Georgia? As Weigel and Tierney (2020b) pointed out, the seeds of Biden’s win could be found in Hillary Clinton’s 2016 loss in the state. Even though Clinton had lost the state by more than five percent, she had improved on the margin that Barack Obama had achieved, even in 2008 when he won the national popular vote by more than seven percent and Clinton even won in formerly solidred Cobb and Gwinnett counties in the Atlanta suburbs (Weigel and Tierney 2020b). Just as in Arizona, some of this was a function of the demographic changes described above but Biden’s win was also the result of activists and Democratic Party officials, most notably Stacey Abrams, who had worked for years to register new voters and get them out to vote. In 2017, Democrats came up just short of electing Jon Ossoff to Congress in a special election in the sixth House district, which included parts of Atlanta and significant parts of suburban and traditionally red Cobb County. In 2018, Stacey Abrams came up just short statewide in her race for Governor. Despite her loss, she continued state-level organizing with the formation of groups like the New Georgia Project and Fair Fight Action

4

THE SUN BELT BEGINNING TO SHINE FOR DEMOCRATS

63

to continue the work of registering Georgians and getting them to the polls (Brown and Reed 2020). Significantly, though Abrams was narrowly defeated in 2018, Democrat Lucy McBath won in the sixth district where Ossoff had lost a year earlier and Democrat Carolyn Bordeaux came up just a few hundred votes short in the neighboring seventh district. By 2020, Biden was able to win the state by running up big margins in Atlanta and its suburbs, driven by high turnout among voters of color and young voters. Stacey Abrams’s campaign had registered 200,000 new Georgia voters in the run-up to the midterm elections in 2018 and the New Georgia Project and Fair Fight Action registered about 800,000 new voters, primarily voters of color and young people (King 2020). Clearly, this was the difference in Biden’s win with a margin of victory under 12,000 votes and there is reason to believe Biden’s win was not a oneoff. For one thing, Carolyn Bordeaux won in the seventh congressional district where she had lost just two years earlier and her win represented the only House seat gained by national Democrats outside of North Carolina where redistricting had led to a couple of pick-ups. Even more impressive, Democrats Raphael Warnock and Jon Ossoff flipped both Georgia Senate seats in run-off elections on January 5, 2021, handing the Senate majority to Democrats. Warnock and Ossoff both eclipsed Biden’s margin in the state from just two months earlier and exit polls indicated approximately two percent (CNN 2021) of voters were new voters which would equate to close to 100,000 new voters since the November election. Florida—Florida’s 2020 outcome merits particular attention in any discussion of the Sun Belt because it is a large, rapidly growing battleground state and a rare case of Democrats underperforming, relative to the 2016 election. Biden lost Florida by 3.4%, while Clinton lost Florida by 1.2% four years earlier. Just eight states swung toward Trump in 2020 compared with 2016 and Florida’s swing of about 2.2 points in Trump’s direction was, by far, the greatest in the Sun Belt. This swing presents something of an interesting puzzle, since Florida is becoming more and more racially and ethnically diverse at an even faster rate than Arizona and Georgia. The non-Hispanic White share of the electorate in Florida declined by 13% between 2000 and 2018. Among all states, only Nevada and California saw greater declines of the non-Hispanic White share of the electorate (Igielnik and Budiman 2020). Interestingly, Nevada and California were also two states that swung toward Trump compared with 2016 (more modest shifts than Florida to be sure) and this offers one

64

L. BECKER AND T. HUGHES

explanation for the puzzling outcome in Florida. Florida, California, and Nevada are three of the top six states in the nation in terms of Hispanic share of the electorate (Igielnik and Budiman 2020) and Joe Biden did slightly underperform compared to Clinton’s margins among Hispanic voters according to CNN’s (2016, 2020) national exit polls.6 Of course, in Florida the particular makeup of the Hispanic vote explains a significant part of why Biden underperformed relative to Clinton. The largest group of Hispanic voters in Florida are CubanAmericans and Trump dramatically overperformed among CubanAmericans—as well as other groups of voters who identify as Venezuelan, Nicaraguan, and Colombian—in part, because the Trump campaign had emphasized “anti-socialism” rhetoric throughout the campaign, including in Spanish-language ads in south Florida (Equis Research 2020). Whatever the message, according to Florida exit polls, Trump lost among Hispanic voters statewide by just seven points after losing among Hispanic voters in Florida by 27 points in 2016. It is true that Biden’s winning margin among Hispanic votes narrowed in other states too. For instance, in Georgia, Biden’s winning margin of 25% among Hispanic voters was well short of Clinton’s margin of 40% in 2016. But Hispanic voters made up approximately 19% of all voters in Florida and just seven percent of all voters in Georgia in 2020 (CNN 2020). The Hispanic vote is not the only reason Joe Biden lost in Florida however. One way to think about this is that Biden lost the state of Florida by nearly 375,000 votes and a lot of attention is paid to the Biden campaign’s underperformance in Miami-Dade County where CubanAmerican voters play a significant role. In 2016, Hillary Clinton won Miami-Dade by more than 290,000 votes while Biden won Miami-Dade by just about 85,000 votes (Washington and Persaud 2020). So, if Biden had performed exactly as well as Clinton in Miami-Dade (gained a net additional 205,000 votes), he still would have lost the state of Florida by 170,000 votes—a greater margin than Clinton’s 2016 loss of about 113,000 votes. At least some of this can be explained by looking at the particular mix of educational attainment and age among Florida’s voters. More than 21% of Floridians are 65 and older and the only state with a higher proportion of the population 65 and older is Maine (KFF 2020). Even though Biden performed a little better in percentage terms among older voters than Clinton did, the surge of older voters in Florida was significant with older voters making up 32% of the statewide electorate in 2020 compared with just 21% in 2016 (CNN 2020). Florida also ranks

4

THE SUN BELT BEGINNING TO SHINE FOR DEMOCRATS

65

in the bottom half of states in terms of educational attainment and is near the bottom of all states in terms of the growth of college degrees among its voters (Hatley and Kennedy 2020). There are some urban corners of the state, notably Duval County, home of Jacksonville, where Biden outperformed Clinton—Biden actually became the first Democrat to win Duval County since 1976 (Pantazi 2020). But in many of Florida’s less urban counties and counties where there are more voters who are 65 and older, Trump exceeded his already very significant 2016 margins. For example, Sumter County is a relatively small county that David Wasserman of Cook Political Report wrote about a great deal in the run-up to the 2020 election as it is home to The Villages, a massive retirement community in central Florida packed with very conservative voters. Before the election, Wasserman speculated that if we were going to see signs of a Democratic victory in Florida, we would see it first in a place like Sumter County with Biden cutting into Trump’s 30,000 vote net margin from 2016 (Wasserman 2020). With turnout surging in Sumter and elsewhere, Biden lost Sumter County by more than 33,000 votes (Leip 2020). This kind of gain among many rural and exurban counties across the state added to Trump’s lead. In summary, Trump was able to build on his 2016 margin of victory by improving significantly among some segments of Hispanic voters and by turning out significantly larger numbers of older voters and rural voters in his base.

Conclusion The Sun Belt is rich in Electoral College votes and it is growing rapidly but it is also a region where Democratic presidential prospects are improving with each cycle. While the so-called “Blue Wall” states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin were decisive in both 2016 and 2020 for Trump and Biden, respectively, we have argued that the Sun Belt presents an alternative, perhaps better, electoral pathway for Democrats going forward. Democratic victories in Arizona and Georgia in both the presidential race and in the US Senate races appear to be more the result of long-term trends than the result of particular candidates or messaging specific to 2020. The Electoral College vote-rich prizes of Florida and North Carolina are likely to remain closely contested battlegrounds into the future and rapid demographic changes in Texas are likely

66

L. BECKER AND T. HUGHES

to turn this soon-to-be 40+ Electoral College vote giant into a presidential battleground as well. In sum, while Donald Trump won the majority of electoral votes in the Sun Belt in 2020, it is not hard to imagine a future where Democrats are building new pathways to 270 that run through the Sun Belt.

Notes 1. Calculations based on the Census Bureau’s “Annual Population Estimates.” 2. Adamy and Overberg estimate the Sun Belt will gain either five or six House seats based on recently released population estimates from the Census Bureau. Whether it is five or six depends on the final Census count and whether Alabama loses a seat (the alternative would be New York losing a second seat in 2020) or not. 3. Authors’ calculations using the US Census Bureau’s 2010 and 2019 American Community Survey. 4. These are differences in percentages of the White share of eligible voters in 2000 compared with 2018 compiled in Igielnik and Budiman (2020). 5. For instance, on October 31, 2020, just a few days before the election, David Wasserman tweeted out (see https://twitter.com/Red istrict/status/1322686184385110016?s=20) his rank-ordered list of states most likely to flip from Trump 2016 to Biden 2020 and he ranked North Carolina just ahead of Georgia. Similarly, Nate Silver’s final election forecast model at fivethirtyeight.com gave Biden a 64% chance of winning North Carolina and a 58% chance of winning in Georgia (see https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2020-electionforecast/). 6. The 2016 National Exit Poll had Clinton winning among Latino voters by 38% (66%–28%) while the 2020 National Exit Poll had Biden winning among Latino voters by 33% (65%–32%).

References Adamy, Janet, and Paul Overberg. 2020, December 22. “New Population Data Suggest Which States Will Win and Lose Seats in Congress.” Wall Street Journal.

4

THE SUN BELT BEGINNING TO SHINE FOR DEMOCRATS

67

Black, Merle. 2004. “The Transformation of the Southern Democratic Party.” The Journal of Politics. 66.4: 1001–1017. Brown, Anna. “U.S. Hispanic and Asian Populations Growing, but for Different Reasons.” Pew Research Center, May 30, 2020. https://www.pewresearch. org/fact-tank/2014/06/26/u-s-hispanic-and-asian-populations-growingbut-for-different-reasons/. Brown, Nadia E., and Bry Reed. “Stacey Abrams’s Success in Georgia Builds on Generations of Black Women’s Organizing.” Washington Post, December 10, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/10/staceyabramss-success-georgia-builds-generations-black-womens-organizing/. Budiman, Abby, and Luis Noe-Bustamante. “Black Eligible Voters Make Up 48% of Growth in Georgia Electorate Since 2000.” Pew Research Center, December 21, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/12/ 15/black-eligible-voters-have-accounted-for-nearly-half-of-georgia-electo rates-growth-since-2000/. CNN. “Georgia 2020 Senate Special Runoff Exit Polls.” Cable News Network, 2021. https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/exit-polls/senate-spe cial-election-runoff/georgia. ______. “National 2020 President Exit Polls.” Cable News Network, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/exit-polls/president/national-results. ______. “National 2016 President Exit Polls.” Cable News Network, 2016. https://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls/national/president de la Garza, Rodolfo O., and Jeronimo Cortina. 2007. “Are Latinos Republicans But Just Don’t Know It? The Latino Vote in the 2000 and 2004 Presidential Elections.” American Politics Research. 35.2: 202–223. Del Real, Jose A., and Hannah Knowles. “Arizona’s Political Transformation Began Long Before Biden Was On the Ballot.” Washinton Post, November 7, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/arizona-trump-biden/ 2020/11/07/9f64475a-1fb7-11eb-ba21-f2f001f0554b_story.html. Dutwin, David, Mollyann Brodle, Melissa Hermann, and Rebecca Levin. 2005. “Latinos and Political Party Affiliation.” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences. 27.2: 135–160. Equis Research. “Florida: Background on the LatAm Vote.” Medium, October 20, 2020. https://equisresearch.medium.com/florida-backgroundon-the-latam-vote-d44c2193f4da. Federal Election Commission, “Election and Voting Information.” FEC.gov, 2020. https://www.fec.gov/introduction-campaign-finance/election-and-vot ing-information/. Fulton, William, Shelly G. Hazle, Wendie Choudary, Stephen Sherman, “The Urban Sun Belt: An Overview,” Report. Kinder Institute for Urban Research, Rice University. Houston, TX: Kinder Institute for Urban Research, 2020. https://doi.org/10.25611/08bz-kj50.

68

L. BECKER AND T. HUGHES

Hatley, Nick, and Courtney Kennedy. Rep. A Resource for State Preelection Polling. Pew Research Center, August 18, 2020. https://www.pewresearch. org/methods/2020/08/18/a-resource-for-state-preelection-polling/. Igielnik, Ruth, and Abby Budiman. Rep. The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition of the U.S. Electorate. Pew Research Center, September 23, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/2020/09/23/the-changing-racial-andethnic-composition-of-the-u-s-electorate/. Johnson, Martin and Stacy B. Gordon. 2005. “The Racial Composition of Social Networks.” In Diversity in Democracy. Eds. Gary M. Segura and Shaun Bowler. University of Virginia Press. Kaufman, Karen M. 2003. “Cracks in the Rainbow: Group Commonality as a Basis for Latino and African-American Coalitions.” Political Research Quarterly. 56.2: 199–210. KFF. “Population Distribution by Age.” Kaiser Family Foundation, October 23, 2020. https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-age/?cur rentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22%3A%2265%2B%22%2C%22s ort%22%3A%22desc%22%7D. Kidd, Quentin, Herman Diggs, Mehreen Farooq, and Megan Murray. 2007. “Black Voters, Black Candidates, and Social Issues: Does Part Identification Matter?” Social Science Quarterly. 88.1: 165–176. King, Maya. “How Stacey Abrams and Her Band of Believers Turned Georgia Blue.” POLITICO, November 8, 2020. https://www.politico.com/news/ 2020/11/08/stacey-abrams-believers-georgia-blue-434985. Leip, David. “2020 Presidential General Election Results.” Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, November 3, 2020. https://uselectionatlas.org/ RESULTS/. Pantazi, Andrew. “Joe Biden Was the First Democrat to Win Duval County Since ‘76. What Does That Mean?” Florida Times-Union, November 4, 2020. https://www.jacksonville.com/story/news/politics/elections/presid ential/2020/11/04/joe-biden-first-democrat-win-duval-blueval-2020-ele ction-results-jacksonville-donald-trump/6155858002/. Pew Research Center. 2020a. “In Changing U.S. Electorate, Race and Education Remain Stark Dividing Lines.” Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy. Pew Research Center, August 28, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/pol itics/2020/06/02/in-changing-u-s-electorate-race-and-education-remainstark-dividing-lines/. Pew Research Center. 2020b. “Religion in America: U.S. Religious Data, Demographics and Statistics.” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project, September 9, 2020. https://www.pewforum.org/religious-lan dscape-study/. Phillips, Kevin P. 1969. The Emerging Republican Majority: (2. Print.). New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House.

4

THE SUN BELT BEGINNING TO SHINE FOR DEMOCRATS

69

Stieb, Matt. “A Brief History of Trump’s Feud With John McCain.” Intelligencer, March 21, 2019. https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/03/anabbreviated-history-of-trumps-feud-with-john-mccain.html. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and the District of Columbia: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2020 (NST-EST2020), Release Date: December 2020. Washington, Wayne, and Chris Persaud. “Inside Democrats’ Florida Flop: Turnout, Rural Success Propelled Trump in Sunshine State.” USA Today, November 8, 2020. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/ele ctions/2020/11/08/how-donald-trump-won-florida-rural-success-beat-joebiden/6214043002/. Wasserman, David. “What One Florida County Could Tell Us About a ‘Gray Revolt’ on Election Night.” The Cook Political Report, October 16, 2020. https://cookpolitical.com/analysis/national/national-pol itics/what-one-florida-county-could-tell-us-about-gray-revolt. Wasserman, David, Sophie Andrews, Leo Saenger, Lev Cohen, Ally Flinn, and Griff Tatarsky. “2020 Popular Vote Tracker.” The Cook Political Report, November 3, 2020. https://cookpolitical.com/2020-national-popular-votetracker. Weigel, David, and Lauren Tierney. “The Four Political States of Arizona.” Washington Post, September 20, 2020b. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ graphics/2020/politics/arizona-political-geography/. Weigel, David, and Laura Tierney. “The Six Political States of Georgia.” Washington Post, September 27, 2020c. https://www.washingtonpost.com/gra phics/2020/politics/georgia-political-geography/. Williams, David K. 2010. “Jerry Falwell’s Sunbelt Politics: The Regional Origins of the Moral Majority.” Journal of Policy History. 22.2: 125–147. Zingher, Joshua N. 2018. “Polarization, Demographic Change, and White Flight from the Democratic Party.” The Journal of Politics. 80.3: 860–872.

CHAPTER 5

Progressive Grassroots Organizing (2016–2020) Kristi Andersen

Abstract This chapter describes the grassroots resistance organizations that emerged throughout the US in late 2016 and early 2017. Their initial goals were often very general: a somewhat inchoate “pushing back against Trumpism.” But almost immediately there were instances of these groups jumping into Congressional races. I will attempt to give a general picture of when, where, and how these groups emerged and to what extent they have persisted, along with a brief case study of resistance groups in a particular Congressional District, NY-22 in Central New York. To what extent can we generalize about the membership, policy positions, and goals of these groups? Under what circumstances have they been electorally successful? Finally, what can be said about the impact of this “movement” (if we can call it that) on Democratic Party organizations over the last few years and in the near future?

K. Andersen (B) Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0_5

71

72

K. ANDERSEN

Keywords 2020 election · Grassroots organizing · Indivisible · Donald Trump · Democrats · Liberals

As the night of November 8, 2016 rolled on, supporters of Hillary Clinton were at first disbelieving, then despondent. But by the next day, or the next week, or by the start of 2017, they were angry and determined. Their friends and colleagues felt the same way, and all over the country many of these people decided that they “had to do something.” Many were members of “Pantsuit Nation,” a Facebook group with about three million members prior to the election—one of a number of channels that facilitated the organization of the January 21st “Women’s Marches,” involving over five million people in over 600 cities nationwide. The avowed purpose of these marches was to “send a message to the new administration that women’s rights are human rights,” but most observers agreed that the protests were seen—and experienced—as anti-Trump events. Meanwhile, in December 2016, a group of former Democratic Congressional staffers took their reaction to the election results in a different direction—they developed and put online a 23-page handbook, Indivisible: A Practical Guide for Resisting the Trump Agenda. Just what was needed by the burgeoning number of informal anti-Trump “resistance” groups that were forming across the US, the Indivisible Guide provided a road map for how ordinary people could have an impact on local and national decision-making. This chapter describes the grassroots resistance organizations that emerged throughout the US in late 2016 and early 2017. Their initial goals were often very general: a somewhat inchoate “pushing back against Trumpism.” But almost immediately there were instances of these groups jumping into Congressional races. In April 2017, in a Georgia election to replace Tom Price, who was appointed to a position in the Trump administration, Democrat Jon Ossoff won a surprising victory in the first round of the special election. Though he lost in the run-off, Ossoff ran an energetic campaign that depended on newly actiated networks of white suburban women. In November, the Virginia House of Delegates flipped to Democratic control after 17 years of a Republican majority. Of the 15 sets flipped by Democrats (all held by men), 11 were won by women. And women working through Indivisible groups were also key contributors

5

PROGRESSIVE GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING (2016–2020)

73

to Conor Lamb’s narrow victory in a Trump-friendly district in Western Pennsylvania in 2017. Some journalists initially drew parallels with the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011. Many others immediately compared the burgeoning resistance movement to the Tea Party groups that emerged after Barack Obama’s 2008 election. Here I will attempt to give a general picture of when, where, and how these groups emerged and to what extent they have persisted, along with a brief case study of resistance groups in a particular Congressional District, CD 22 in Central New York. To what extent can we generalize about the membership, policy positions and goals of these groups? Under what circumstances have they been electorally successful? Finally, what can be said about the impact of this “movement” (if we can call it that) on Democratic Party organizations?

Describing the Resistance Facebook was full of sadness and anger after the 2016 election, especially among supporters of Hillary Clinton and, more broadly, among people who had been shocked and repelled by Donald Trump’s misogyny and racism; his record of financial misdeeds; and his clear willingness to shatter long-standing political norms. People wanted to take action, and the organization of the wildly successful Women’s Marches the day after this inauguration was an outlet for this need. But more than a month prior to that day, groups of (mostly) white, mostly middle-aged women were organizing themselves into what, collectively, might be termed the “anti-Trump resistance.” And other opportunities for action abounded: the protests at airports in reaction to the Trump’s “Muslim ban;” demonstrations for racial unity and in support of science; protests supporting the Affordable Care Act. By early February 2017, a million and a half people had downloaded the Indivisible Guide, and 5300 groups appeared on Indivisible’s online map. The Indivisible Guide seemed like a godsend to the 1000s of political neophytes who wanted to take effective political action but didn’t quite know where to begin, how to “push back” against the Trump agenda. This document, created by former Congressional staffers Ezra Levin and Leah Greenberg, drew from their experience after Obama’s 2008 election when thousands of “Tea Party” groups organized first to protest against Democrats and “the socialist in the White House,” and subsequently to lobby their representatives and to support conservative

74

K. ANDERSEN

challengers in Republican primaries. The lesson that Levin and Greenberg drew from Tea Party successes, and passed on to the anti-Trump groups, was that one’s power as a citizen is primarily over your own representative (two Senators and a Representative); thus resistance should be based on “staying local” and exerting pressure on those specific political actors in very specific ways, including protest at their offices, letters in local papers, phone calls, and meetings. Local constituents showing up at a district office could be more influential than hundreds of letters or calls from non-local activists—because the representatives are centrally focused on being reelected. The Indivisible interactive map made it easy for individuals to find nearby “resistance” groups and for the groups to contact one another. The people who came together to form these groups were predominantly middle-aged or older white college-educated women with work experience as teachers, professors, health care and human service workers, and managers. Most were Democrats, or independents who “leaned toward” Democrats.1 In mid-2017 there were at least 5800 local affiliates registered on the Indivisible website, in all 50 states and the vast majority of Congressional districts.2 It should be noted, however, that some groups registered as a general indication that they supported the anti-Trump resistance but remained fundamentally local groups without strong interest in being a part of a national organization. In 2019 Putnam and Perez-Putnam calculated that about one-third of the groups on the map were “active on the ground.” The 130 districts where Hillary Clinton performed best in 2016 had a median of eight per district, while the 130 most pro-Trump districts had seven. The middle 175 districts had a median of 11, meaning that this locally based protest movement “was strongest in exactly those places where its electoral impact would matter most.”3 Skocpol and Gose calculated that listings of groups per 100,000 population ranged from 8.29 in Vermont to 0.84 in Mississippi, with the vast majority of states having between one and 4.5 groups. Normalizing for state population, there is not a much of a regional pattern to the emergence of local resistance groups, though they were proportionally somewhat more numerous in pro-Clinton states.4 But there are undoubtedly regional differences in the geopolitical context in which the groups are working. In the Midwest, especially the lesspopulated states like the Dakotas, Nebraska, Kansas, and Iowa, collaboration among distant groups was difficult. At the same time, since these

5

PROGRESSIVE GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING (2016–2020)

75

states have only two or three Congressional districts, so that coordinating electoral work would be less necessary. The Facebook page of Indivisible Omaha, for example, describes a “grassroots organization of voters in Omaha’s CD2 district.” In contrast, resistance groups in the Midwestern swing states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and especially Michigan and Illinois would have had more incentives to collaborate within Congressional districts (and probably state legislative districts as well). Groups in more populated areas found themselves in “a maze of overlapping, oddly shaped jurisdictions that do not line up well with natural communities” (Skocpol ch. I8 p 1 80) and thus had challenges building coalitions appropriate to particular electoral maps. Like the Mid-Atlantic States, this situation characterizes the political landscape in most of New England as well as urban areas of the western states (particularly California, Oregon, Washington, and Colorado).

Taking Action: Protesting and Canvassing The rise of the resistance was of immediate interest to political scientists and sociologists. There has been useful work published on the movement’s direct action and protests as well as a comprehensive book examining the resistance from historical, sociological, and institutional points of view.5 The most granular, close-to-the-ground research on the local resistance groups has been produced by Theda Skocpol, Lara Putnam, and their colleagues, who have written a series of articles in various press outlets as well as a number of scholarly pieces. Their research looks neither at demonstrations or other large events, nor at progressive organizations which helped to mobilize people against Trump administration policies. Rather, they focus on local resistance organizations which, like the Tea Party groups which they have also studied, are locally based and “loosely federated.” From early 2016 through 2019 this project focused on ten groups in eight counties outside big cities: two medium-city counties and two smaller, more rural counties in different regions of North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. These were Trump-supporting counties in 2016, but they had been originally selected for a project on social, economic, and political change during the Trump presidency. The researchers attended meetings, accessed groups’ Facebook pages,

76

K. ANDERSEN

and searched for information in local media. Online questionnaires were completed in mid-2017 by 337 group members. A related project in Pennsylvania studied about 75 groups, not all resistance groups, and included a similar questionnaire. In the end the researchers had 36 “organizational biographies” from groups in different parts of Pennsylvania and similar data from groups in the “eight counties.” Like groups across the US, the groups in Pennsylvania and the other three states drew both inspiration and concrete tactical advice from the Indivisible Guide. Most of them quickly created Facebook pages and/or newsletters. Because the central motivation of the organizers was strong opposition to Trump’s approach to immigration, reproductive justice, voting rights, health care, and climate change, many groups quickly created task forces dealing with these issues. Most worked to support and save the Affordable Care Act; many took action against Trump’s immigration policies. They wrote letters and phoned their elected representatives in Congress, state legislators, and those elected locally. They wrote letters to the editor, posted on Facebook, demonstrated in front of district Congressional offices, and attended town halls. They participated in large-scale events like the People’s Climate March in April 2017, and the many “Marches for Our Lives” after the Parkland shooting in February 2018. But fairly quickly, many of these groups began to include electoral work in their activist repertoires. Most of the Pennsylvania groups surveyed (all but four of 82 groups) engaged in political action around the 2018 elections. Members were reported to be involved in canvassing, fundraising for candidates, voter registration, phone banking, and postcard writing; they endorsed candidates and volunteered to be poll workers.6 Central New York Case Study My own story is similar to those uncovered by Skocpol and her colleagues as well as by numerous journalists who have described the rise of resistance groups since the 2016 election. In our case, four longtime friends who had known one another for years raged and commiserated about the election of Donald Trump. One of our daughters had worked in the Obama administration and alerted us to a conference call convened by the organization “United State of Women” to be held in early December. We thought that hearing from women like Valerie Jarrett, Cecile Richards, and Brittany Packett from Black Lives Matter might help us figure out

5

PROGRESSIVE GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING (2016–2020)

77

what we could do in our little town in Central New York—and it would be a way to bring people together. We sent out an email to friends, and to our surprise, 35 people showed up on a Saturday evening, while many more responded that could not attend but wanted to be on our list. The first iteration of the Indivisible Guide had just shown up online, and we found it inspiring. “You have power over three people,” it said— “your Congressional representative and your two Senators.” And, the authors went on in some detail, “here are the ways that you can effectively exercise that power.” As of November 2016, we now had a Congresswoman, Claudia Tenney, who bragged that she was “Trump Before Trump.” We named our group Cazenovia Call to Action—and like many similar groups popping up around the country, particularly those in Republican areas like ours, we initially emphasized our nonpartisanship. Setting out to learn how to exercise our power as citizens and constituents, we signed up for the limited “office hours” that Claudia Tenney set up (she refused to have town hall meetings open to the public) and showed up every week to stand in front of her district office. We urged our members to email or write to Representative Tenney. For example, on March 13, 2017 our “asks” included: “Call Claudia Tenney and ask her to put American interests ahead of the interest of Wall Street and Big Banks by voting against the bill to abolish the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; she sits on the Financial Services Committee.” We included notices for nearby protests and meetings focusing on threats to the Affordable Care Act and persecution of undocumented farmworkers. We publicized upcoming local elections. In the spring of 2017, with several potential Democrats emerging as possible Congressional candidates, we realized the advantages that would accrue if all the resistance groups in the 22nd District were working together. Integrating these organizations was a challenge, in part because of the size and diversity of the district—running from Lake Ontario in the north to the Pennsylvania border and including the cities of Utica and Binghamton, several college towns, and a number of extremely rural counties. In early April we managed to convene a meeting attended by 35 people representing 15 groups. Together, they agreed on goals and created a steering committee; and, importantly, agreed that all potential Congressional candidates would be invited to future meetings and that during the process of decision-making we would “seek consensus and coordinate toward a common end.” This effort echoes Lara Putman’s claim that the groups she observed in Pennsylvania and elsewhere were

78

K. ANDERSEN

“nationally aware, but locally initiated and guided. They were also increasingly regionally networked.”7 The imagined challenging situation for CD22 (multiple candidates supported by different areas or constituencies within the district) did not materialize, and in the following weeks Anthony Brindisi, a young State Assemblyman from Utica, emerged as the presumptive candidate. Since then, the resistance groups in the district have continued to work together. When the Brindisi campaign opened campaign offices around the district during the summer of 2018 (including one in Cazenovia), resistance group members helped find desks and office supplies and worked shifts at the offices, welcoming volunteers and sending them out to canvass. These offices became headquarters for the last month or so of the campaign. Leading up to the intensive GOTV prior to the election, the staff positions (staging location manager, phone bank captains, canvass captains, “turf czar”) were all filled by Call to Action members. During the hectic five days of the “last weekend,” we registered 214 volunteer “sign-ins.” Similar efforts on the part of the local resistance groups were taking place in the diverse cities and villages of the 22nd District. It was a close race, and Anthony Brindisi was finally declared the winner in mid-November. Brindisi lost the 2020 rematch in an even closer election that took several months to formally declare a winner, due to extensive electoral irregularities. COVID precautions prevented the Brindisi campaign from sending canvassers door-to-door (though this did not deter his opponent from in-person campaigning). Throughout the district, the various resistance groups held regular Zoom phone banks and text banks. Roughly 1,300 volunteers made 720,000 calls and sent 200,000 texts. Resistance Groups, Elections, and the Democratic Party In early 2017, an article in The Nation had described “a remarkable surge of energy on the left in response to (Trump’s) election” and cited a poll reporting that one in three Democrats, and 40% of Democratic women, planned to become “more involved in the political process in the next year” as a result of the election. Turnout in both the 2018 midterm elections and the 2020 election was record-breaking. The Pew Research Center’s survey in mid-November 2020 found that Democrats’ belief that “ordinary citizens can do a lot to influence the government” had

5

PROGRESSIVE GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING (2016–2020)

79

increased by about ten percentage points since 2016, while Republicans’ agreement with that statement had declined by 25 points. For numerous political contests from 2017 through 2020 there is reasonably good evidence that the efforts of resistance groups to register voters and turn out the vote for their preferred candidates made a difference. During Conor Lamb’s 2017 special election campaign in Pennsylvania, grassroots groups began canvassing voters early—by early January they were talking to three or four thousand voters each weekend. Similarly, Jon Ossoff’s special election campaign in the Atlanta suburbs in 2017 was an early demonstration of the political energy of largely women-led resistance groups. By the fall of 2018, writes Lara Putnam, “the role of new grassroots groups in channeling volunteers into midterm election campaigns had become fully visible,” as documented in articles from the Washington Post, New York Times, Buzzfeed, Time, and other outlets.8 Maxmilian Frank’s detailed research in six contested counties in southeastern Pennsylvania demonstrates how a combination of new candidates produced by the grassroots groups and the support of volunteers in the 2018 offyear elections “altered the electoral landscape of the collar counties and Lehigh Valley in favor of Democratic candidates.”9 Statewide, more than 60 candidates ran for local office in Pennsylvania in 2017 with the support of one or more of the new grassroots groups. “Most were first-time candidates; more than half were women; four out of five won.”10 Not surprisingly, relationships between new grassroots groups and local Democratic parties have varied widely depending on the personalities and preferences of local officials. In Pennsylvania, many local party organizations were “either moribund or unfriendly to the new organizers.” Gose and Skocpol’s 2017 questionnaires found that more than half the resistance groups had cooperative ties with local Democrats, while 14 had hostile relations or no ties at all. By the time of the 2018 elections, the same areas saw more cooperative relationships, particularly as candidates saw the advantages of the strong volunteer networks.11 In New York’s 22nd District, top staffer for Congressional candidate Anthony Brindisi said that in 2018 the campaign “saw [the resistance groups] leading the charge—so the question was, how do we mobilize that energy? Making use of resistance groups and their leaders and their communication channels was critical in both 2018 and 2020.”

80

K. ANDERSEN

As our political system moves beyond the Trump presidency we can speculate about the possible role of the “resistance movement” and specifically the local resistance groups on the Democratic Party. Arguably it has helped the party attract new supporters and encourage some longtime Democrats to be more actively involved. Turnout is higher; the candidate pool may be diversifying. The possible impact in two areas is particularly worth watching: the ideological “map” of the party and the way it structures campaigns. Many analysts have made interesting comparisons between the post2016 anti-Trump resistance movement and the Tea Party movement that arose in reaction to Barack Obama’s election in 2008. Both arose to “push back” against the agenda of a newly elected president. And both, unlike the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement, focused on electoral politics as well as engaging in collective actions of various sorts. But there are important differences. The Tea Party demonstrated a clear ideological agenda, and members of the 1000 or so Tea Party organizations tended to have negative stereotypes about Blacks and Muslims and to be particularly fearful of immigration. And they showed “an uncompromising approach to conservative politics.” This clear ideological position meant that much of the Tea Party’s electoral work involved backing candidates to challenge “establishment” Republicans.12 In contrast, the anti-Trump resistance groups tend to be relatively non-ideological. This has varied according to location and membership of course—a number of resistance groups in heavily Democratic areas of New York, for example, helped to challenge long-term Democratic incumbents and elect more progressive state legislators. But in general, these groups have welcomed members with a wide swath of ideological stances and policy interests. Gose, Skocpol, and Williamson say that “empirical indications suggest that grassroots resistance organizing crosses geopolitical divides and unites moderates, liberals, and progressives of many stripes. As a result, grassroots resistance efforts have tended to enhance citizen engagement in center-left politics without pushing the Democratic Party as much toward left extremes as Tea Party mobilizations pushed Republicans toward the far right.”13 This relatively non-ideological positioning may be useful for Democrats at various levels who are looking at ways to expand their base. With regard to the structure of campaigns, quite a bit of research has documented the collapse of the Obama campaign canvassing/voter contact infrastructure after the 2012 campaign. In the 2008 presidential

5

PROGRESSIVE GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING (2016–2020)

81

race, the Obama campaign was pathbreaking in its use of technology, especially text messaging, but also made good use of on-the-ground, in-person canvassing, in particular mobilizing both local and non-local young people to reach out to voters. Lara Putnam and others have argued that since then, Democrats have largely used that infrastructure to “automate pseudo-personal contacts”—along with expensive advertising campaigns—to support their candidates. The resistance groups, Putnam argues, provide a model for Democrats to use in reaching out to people, listening to them, creating connections, and building local organizations to support their candidates; and the existing groups can provide local party organizations and campaigns with willing and experienced volunteers.14

Notes 1. Leah Gose and Theda Skocpol, “Resist, Persist and Transform: The Emergence and Impact of Grassroots Resistance Groups Opposing the Trump Presidency,” Mobilization: An International Journal 2019 24(3). 2. Meghan E. Brooker, “Indivisible: Invigorating and Redirecting the Grassroots,” in The Resistance: The Dawn of the Anti-Trump Opposition Movement, ed. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (New York: Oxford University Press), 171. 3. Lara Putnam and Gabriel Perez-Putnam, “How Today’s AntiTrump Protests Will Shape the 2020 Election” Washington Monthly July 12, 2019. 4. Leah Gose and Theda Skocpol, “Resist, Persist and Transform: The Emergence and Impact of Grassroots Resistance Groups Opposing the Trump Presidency,” Mobilization: An International Journal 2019 24(3), 297. 5. Dana R. Fisher, American Resistance: From the Women’s March to the Blue Wave (New York: Columbia University Press) 2019; David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., The Resistance: The Dawn of the Anti-Trump Opposition Movement (New York: Oxford University Press), 171. 6. Leah Gose and Theda Skocpol, “Resist, Persist and Transform: The Emergence and Impact of Grassroots Resistance Groups Opposing the Trump Presidency,” Mobilization: An International Journal 2019 24(3), 311.

82

K. ANDERSEN

7. Lara Putnam, “Middle America Reboots Democracy: The Emergence and Rapid Electoral Turn of the New Grassroots,” in Upending American Politics, ed. Theda Scocpol and Caroline Tervo (New York: Oxford University Press), 2020. 8. Ibid., 187. 9. Maxmilian Frank, “How Grassroots Resistance Networks Boosted Pennsylvania Democrats” in Upending American Politics, ed. Theda Scocpol and Caroline Tervo (New York: Oxford University Press) 2020, 273–74. 10. Lara Putnam, “Middle America Reboots Democracy: The Emergence and Rapid Electoral Turn of the New Grassroots,” in Upending American Politics, ed. Theda Scocpol and Caroline Tervo (New York: Oxford University Press), 2020, 181. 11. Leah and Theda Skocpol, “Resist, Persist, and Transform: The Emergence and Impact of Grassroots Resistance Groups Opposing the Trump Presidency.” Mobilization: An International Journal 2019 24(3), 311. 12. Leah E. Gose, Theda Skocpol, and Vanessa Williamson, “Saving America Once Again, from the Tea Party to the Anti-Trump Resistance,” in Upending American Politics, ed. Theda Scocpol and Caroline Tervo (New York: Oxford University Press), 2020, 196–97. 13. Ibid., 1993. 14. Lara Putnam, “Digital Fixes Won’t Solve the Democrats’ Problems,” The American Prospect, April 5, 2018.

CHAPTER 6

The Polarized Pandemic Philip A. Klinkner

Abstract This chapter examines the political implications of the COVID pandemic, the most significant issue in 2020. COVID quickly became politicized as the pandemic unfolded during a presidential election year within a larger political context of hyper-partisanship. President Trump was hindered by unfavorable national perceptions of his handling of the pandemic, but county-level analysis illustrated how the impact of COVID on voting behavior was not particularly harmful beneath the surface. Keywords 2020 election · Political parties · COVID · Polarization · Donald Trump · Pandemic · Partisanship · Public opinion

For decades, political scientists have accumulated substantial evidence that voters reward incumbent politicians when things go well and punish them when things go poorly. This dynamic is most evident with economic

P. A. Klinkner (B) Hamilton College, Clinton, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0_6

83

84

P. A. KLINKNER

Table 6.1 Trump performance, 2016–2020 by COVID cases and deaths Change in Trump’s share of the two-party vote, 2016–2020 (%) Counties Counties Counties Counties

w/Above w/Below w/Above w/Below

Average Average Average Average

Cases per 100,000 Cases per 100,000 Deaths per 100,000 Deaths per 100,000

−0.05 −0.90 2.00 −0.90

conditions and wars. Peace and prosperity are strongly associated with support for incumbent politicians, while recessions, panics, depressions, and military quagmires are recipes for defeat. And while incumbents at least theoretically have some control over economic and military policy, voters have also been known to hold elected officials accountable for seemingly random and uncontrollable occurrences such as shark attacks, unusual weather, and home team wins or losses.1 Given this pattern, it seems logical to expect that the COVID-19 pandemic would have hurt President Trump’s electoral performance in 2020. At the national level this is undoubtedly true. Except for very early in the pandemic, voters consistently disapproved of Trump’s handling of the crisis, usually by anywhere from 15 to 20 points.2 In addition, according to the AP’s VoteCast survey conducted just prior to the election, a plurality of voters (41%) rated the pandemic as the top issue and among those that did, Biden defeated Trump by a margin of 73 to 25%.3 Looking below the national level at regional patterns in the vote, we find a very different story, with no indication that higher levels of COVID cases or deaths impacted President Trump’s vote. On Election Day, US counties averaged approximately 2977 COVID cases per 100,000 people and approximate 59 COVID deaths per 100,000 people. As Table 6.1 shows, Trump actually did slightly better in 2020 compared to 2016 in counties with higher rates of COVID cases and deaths. To examine this finding more precisely, I ran two separate regression models, one looking at the impact of county-level COVID cases per 100,000 people and another looking at county-level COVID deaths per 100,000 people. In both models the dependent variable was the swing in Trump’s share of the two-party vote between 2016 and 2020. Furthermore, I controlled for a number of state and county-level factors that might also have influenced the vote. These include percent of county

6

THE POLARIZED PANDEMIC

85

Table 6.2 Regression results: Impact of COVID case and death rates on change in Trump share of two-party vote 2016–2020 Variable

Model 1

Cases per 100,000 population Deaths per 100,000 population Percentage population age 65 and over Median income (US$1000s) Percentage population White w/BA or more Percentage population Latino Percentage of population African American Battleground State New York Utah Constant

0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** −0.048*** 0.074*** 0.031*** 0.007*** 0.000 −0.003 −0.027***

Model 2

0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 −0.041*** 0.071*** 0.018*** 0.007*** −0.003 0.004 −0.024***

population aged 65 or older, county median income, percent of county population white with a bachelor’s degree or higher, percent county population Latino, and percent county population African American. I included dummy variables for battleground states (AZ, FL, GA, IA, MI, NV, NH, NC, OH, PA, and WI), New York (due to the high number of cases and deaths in the state early in the pandemic), and Utah (which saw a big swing to Trump due to the absence of a third-party candidate who received over 20% of the vote in 2016). Finally, I weighted each model to account for total population of the county.4 Table 6.2 indicates once again that Trump paid no electoral penalty at the county level for higher rates of COVID cases or deaths. In fact, Trump’s share of the two-party vote actually rose by a negligible (but statistically significant) amount as the rate of COVID cases and deaths increased. This result is somewhat perplexing since it’s impossible that voters would actually reward an incumbent, even a slight amount, for more disease and death. To make sense of this result we need to understand the politicized nature of the COVID pandemic and the way in which it spread across the US in the months leading up to Election Day. As a result, voters interpreted the pandemic through partisan lenses regardless of its actual impact in their location. From the very start, the COVID pandemic was presented to voters in a highly partisan way. President Trump’s earliest statements on the

86

P. A. KLINKNER

pandemic dismissed its severity and claimed that it was a hoax perpetrated by Democrats to undermine confidence in his leadership or to wreck what had been a strong economy. On February 28th, the date that the CDC reported the first death from COVID in the US, Trump spoke at a rally in South Carolina and told the audience, “Now the Democrats are politicizing the coronavirus … this is their new hoax.”5 By mid-March, however, the disease was spreading quickly and was clearly no hoax. President Trump acknowledged reality and announced new federal guidelines effectively shutting down schools and businesses in an effort to slow the spread of the disease. These steps were mirrored in almost every state by governors of both parties. Nonetheless, the partisan messaging quickly returned. By late March, President Trump touted various quack treatments as potential “miracle” cures and expressing confidence that the country would return to normal in a few weeks. This politicized response was also seen at the state level, as Democratic governors tended to continue stay-at-home orders and impose mask and social distancing mandates, while many Republican governors sought to reopen quickly and with as few restrictions as possible. By mid-April, President Trump was urging states to reopen and attacking Democratic Governors who refused to do so. On April 15, protestors converged on Michigan’s state capitol opposing Democratic Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s stay-at-home order.6 Two days later, President Trump tweeted, “LIBERATE MINNESOTA!,” “LIBERATE MICHIGAN!,” and “LIBERATE VIRGINIA.” All three states were led by Democratic governors whom Republicans had criticized for their stayat-home orders to fight the pandemic.7 Protests against lockdowns spread to several other states. This politicized response to the pandemic was made all the easier because of the way that the disease spread across the country. COVID cases and deaths were initially concentrated much more heavily in Democratic counties. As Graph 6.1 indicates, on April 1, there were approximately 3.5 times as many COVID cases per 100,000 people in counties won by Joe Biden than in counties won by Donald Trump. That ratio declined through the summer and fall but it wasn’t until Election Day that the case rate in Trump counties exceeded that in Biden counties. There was a similar pattern with the COVID death rate. On April 1, there were three times as many COVID deaths per 100,000 in Biden counties than in Trump counties. That ratio also fell over the ensuing

6

THE POLARIZED PANDEMIC

87

4

RaƟo of COVID Case and Death Rates between Biden CounƟes and Trump CounƟes

3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5

1 April 1

May 1

June 1

July 1 Cases

August 1

September 1 October 1 ElecƟon Day

Deaths

Graph 6.1 Ratio of COVID case and death rates in Biden and Trump Counties (numbers greater than one indicate higher rates in Biden Counties than in Trump Counties)

months but on Election Day there were still about 40% more COVID deaths per 100,000 people in Biden counties than in Trump counties.8 As a result of this pattern, Republican voters were much less likely to have direct experience with the pandemic and therefore more likely to rely on partisan messaging to assess its impact in the early months of the pandemic. And the messages they received from most GOP leaders, from Trump on down, were that the virus was not a major threat, that social distancing and mask mandates were ineffective at best and an infringement of personal freedom at worst, and that the disease was being politicized by Democrats.

88

P. A. KLINKNER

Partisan media sources consistently reinforced these messages. Viewers of Fox News, the most popular source of information for Republican voters,9 were a consistent outlier in opinions about the pandemic. Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Dolores Albarracin found that those who relied on conservative news sources such as Fox News or Rush Limbaugh were significantly more likely to be misinformed about the pandemic.10 In October, among those who cited Fox News as their main source of information, 26% said that the coronavirus outbreak was very important in deciding for whom to vote in the election, compared to 52% of all adults. In November, 79% of Fox viewers stated that they believed that the “US has controlled the outbreak as much as it could have,” compared to just 36% of all adults. That same month, 62% of Fox viewers thought that “the coronavirus outbreak has been made a bigger deal than it really is,” compared to only 34% of all adults.11 Furthermore, as the pandemic wore on, Republicans and Democrats diverged in how much attention they paid to it. From March until May, both Republicans and Democrats paid a great deal of attention to the pandemic, but by September 44% of Democrats were following coronavirus news very closely, compared to only 26% of Republicans.12 Since this was an election year, voters received a large and consistent amount of partisan messaging via the presidential candidate campaigns. Trump and Biden presented sharply different messages on the pandemic. Trump largely avoided mentioning the pandemic. When he did he stressed how well he had handled it and that it was likely to end in a very soon. Even after contracting the disease himself, Trump sought to minimize it. Upon leaving the hospital he sent out a video message, saying: And I learned so much about coronavirus. And one thing that’s for certain—don’t let it dominate you. Don’t be afraid of it. You’re going to beat it. We have the best medical equipment. We have the best medicines, all developed recently. And you’re going to beat it.13

Trump’s election messages usually focused on the economy, socialism, China, and law and order topics. On the other hand, Biden continued to highlight the pandemic in his messaging, with particular emphasis on what he believed was Trump’s bungled approach. By Election Day, voter responses to the pandemic were heavily skewed by partisanship. Early in the pandemic, Republican voters were much less

6

THE POLARIZED PANDEMIC

89

exposed to the COVID cases and deaths. This created more opportunities for GOP leaders and media sources to influence Republican voters’ perception of the pandemic before cases and deaths began to rise in those areas. Democrats, however, were much more likely to live in areas with high rates of cases and deaths, and Democratic leaders and news sources consistently emphasized the seriousness of the pandemic. Public opinion toward COVID reflected this partisan divide. As the pandemic began in March of 2020, large majorities in both parties supported businesses closures, travel restrictions, school closings, and other health-related measures. Three months later, Republicans were more comfortable going out from their homes than Democrats, across the board, irrespective of where, be it a grocery store, salon, or restaurant. By 2021, about half as many Republicans (around 40%) viewed COVID as a major health threat compared to Democrats (around 80%).14 The polarized response to the COVID-19 pandemic presents an interesting contrast with the response to the 1918 influenza pandemic. That pandemic also began in an election year, albeit, an off-year election. Nonetheless, its impact was staggering with over 675,000 deaths, or a death rate of 654 per 100,000 people. As of this writing, there have been over 754,000 COVID deaths for a rate of 229 deaths per 100,000 people. In other words, more than two million Americans would have to die for the COVID pandemic to be as bad as the 1918 pandemic. Despite this immense tragedy, there seems to have been little if any electoral impact from the 1918 pandemic. Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels found no relationship between mortality rates from the pandemic and election results in either 1918 or the 1920 presidential election. According to them, political leaders and the media failed to “socially construct” the 1918 pandemic as something other than a natural occurrence and to place the blame squarely on the shoulders of incumbent politicians. Achen and Bartels write: The striking absence of a broad-based electoral response to the flu pandemic dramatically illustrates the importance of voters’ cultural understandings of causation and responsibility …. [V]oters thought of the pandemic as part of the natural world (“the realm of fate and accident”) rather than as part of the social world (“the realm of control and intent”). Obviously, such cultural understandings are subject to change. But at the time, while hundreds of thousands of people died, no one thought to blame the pharaoh.15

90

P. A. KLINKNER

Achen and Bartels’s description of the 1918 pandemic actually provides a great deal of insight into the response to the 2020 COVID pandemic. Unlike the 1918 pandemic, the 2020 pandemic was heavily politicized, but in sharply divergent ways. Democrats went out their way to “blame the pharaoh” (President Trump) for the virus, but in contrast Republicans defined COVID as “fate and accident” outside of their control or, failing that, President Trump had actually done an outstanding job handling the crisis and deserved thanks from voters, not blame. In the heavily polarized political environment of 2020, these contrasting messages largely canceled each other out.

Notes 1. For a recent review of this evidence, see Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government (Princeton University Press, 2017) and Lynn Vavreck, The Message Matters: The Economy in Presidential Campaigns (Princeton University Press, 2009). On the impact of home wins or losses, see Andrew J. Healy, Neil Malhotra, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo, “Irrelevant Events Affect Voters’ Evaluation of Government Performance,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, July 20, 2010 107 (29) 12,804– 12,809, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1007420107. 2. “How Americans View Biden’s Response to the Coronavirus Crisis,” FiveThirtyEight website. https://projects.fivethirtyeight. com/coronavirus-polls/ (Website also includes Trump’s approval ratings.). 3. “Understanding the 2020 Electorate: AP VoteCast Survey, https://www.npr.org/2020/11/03/929478378/understandingthe-2020-electorate-ap-votecast-survey. 4. Data on COVID cases and deaths was obtained from the New York Times database at https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19data. Election data was purchased from Dave Leip’s Atlas of US Presidential Elections (www.uselectionatlas.org). All other data was obtained from the US Census website (www.census.gov). Since New York City COVID cases and deaths are not broken down by borough, all other data are aggregated for NYC overall. 5. Philip Bump, “What Trump Did About the Coronavirus in February,” Washington Post, April 20, 2020. https://www.was

6

THE POLARIZED PANDEMIC

91

hingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/20/what-trump-did-aboutcoronavirus-february/. 6. Paul Egan and Kara Berg, “Thousands Converge To Protest Michigan Governor’s Stay-Home Order in ‘Operation Gridlock,” USA Today, April 15, 2020. https://www.usatoday.com/story/ news/nation/2020/04/15/lansing-capitol-protest-michiganstay-home-order/5139472002/. 7. Craig Mauger and Beth LeBlanc, “Trump Tweets ‘Liberate’ Michigan, Two Other States with Dem Governors,” Detroit News, April 17, 2020. https://www.detroitnews.com/story/ news/politics/2020/04/17/trump-tweets-liberate-michiganother-states-democratic-governors/5152037002/. 8. For a fuller discussion of the way that the early pandemic fell more heavily on Democratic than Republican areas, see Philip A. Klinkner, “The Pandemic Is Hitting Counties That Voted For Hillary Clinton Harder—For Now,” Vox, May 1, 2020. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/5/1/ 21243357/coronavirus-covid-19-trump-protests. 9. Elizabeth Grieco, “Americans’ Main Sources For Political News Vary By Party and Age,” Pew Research Center, April 1, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/01/americ ans-main-sources-for-political-news-vary-by-party-and-age/. 10. Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Dolores Albarracin, “The Relation Between Media Consumption and Misinformation at the Outset of the SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic in the US,” Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, April 2020. https://misinforeview. hks.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/April19_FORM ATTED_COVID-19-Survey.pdf. 11. Data obtained from Pew Research Center’s American News Pathways Project at https://www.pewresearch.org/pathways-2020/ COVIDDEAL/main_source_of_election_news/us_adults. 12. Amy Mitchell, Mark Jurkowitz, J. Baxter Oliphant and Elisa Shearer, “How Americans Navigated the News in 2020: A Tumultuous Year in Review,” Pew Research Center, February 2021, p. 42. https://www.journalism.org/2021/02/22/how-americ ans-navigated-the-news-in-2020-a-tumultuous-year-in-review/. 13. “’Maybe I’m Immune’: Trump Post Video From White House After Returning From Walter Reed,” Yahoo New, October 5,

92

P. A. KLINKNER

2020. https://news.yahoo.com/maybe-im-immune-trump-posts014956086.html. 14. Deane, Claudia, Kim Parker, and John Gramlich. March 5, 2021. “A Year of U.S. Public Opinion on the Pandemic.” Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/2021/03/05/a-year-of-us-public-opinion-on-the-coronavirus-pandemic/. 15. Achen and Bartels, p. 142.

CHAPTER 7

Judicial Nominations and Trump’s Complicated Relationship with the Courts Daniel Tagliarina

Abstract Donald Trump, aided by McConnell’s control of the Senate, was able to use the courts as an important election issue in 2016. In office, Trump outsourced the selecting of judges to the Federalist Society and filled an impressive 234 Article III judicial vacancies in a single term. This shifted the balance of Democratic to Republican appointees in three courts of appeals, as well as appoint more than a quarter of the entire federal judiciary. Despite success in judicial appointments, the Trump administration struggled to defend their policies in courts across the country, losing 80% of their Administrative Procedure Act cases. Moreover, Trump could not turn failed policies or judicial appointments into a successful election victory in 2020, nor could he use the courts to overturn his electoral loss. Nonetheless, the changes in the federal courts will be felt for decades to come.

D. Tagliarina (B) Utica College, Utica, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0_7

93

94

D. TAGLIARINA

Keywords 2020 election · Donald Trump · Judicial nominations · Supreme court · 2020 campaign · Federal judges · 2020 presidential campaign

In his 2016 presidential campaign, then-candidate Trump worked hard to make federal courts, and in particular the United States Supreme Court an election issue to persuade potentially reluctant Republican voters to his cause. In May of 2016, he released a list of potential Supreme Court nominees to shore up support from skeptical Republicans.1 In a June 2016 meeting with conservative Christian leaders he went so far as to say, “They [his Supreme Court nominees] will be great intellects, talented men at what they do—and women—but also be pro-life.”2 Here Trump emphasized not only that he would nominate staunch conservative justices, he emphasized that they would be “pro-life” in an attempt to solidify his support from the Christian Right. Trump was able to use these moves to galvanize support within his party and win a narrow electoral college victory while losing the popular vote. In 2020, President Trump tried to repeat this performance again making federal courts a campaign issue. However, by this point, Trump, through an unprecedented number of appointments, had already substantially remade the federal judiciary. While this was a major accomplishment during his presidency, it was one that also roused support for Democratic candidate Joe Biden.3 In addition to mobilizing Democratic voters, Trump’s judiciary failed to deliver policy victories across his presidency4 and failed to deliver the election for him after voting was done.5 This chapter will discuss Trump’s electoral legacy in relation to the courts, the effect of President Trump’s remaking of the judiciary, the regional impacts Trump’s nominees have on the federal judiciary, and the prospect of courts as an electoral issue looking to 2024.

2016, the Courts, and McConnell The contentious 2016 presidential election was upended on February 13, 2016 when Justice Antonin Scalia unexpectedly died.6 It was an election year with a sitting second-term president. While precedent supported a president in this position to nominate a replacement, that was not what happened in this instance. On March 16, 2016, President Obama

7

JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND TRUMP’S COMPLICATED …

95

nominated Merrick Garland to replace Scalia on the Supreme Court.7 However, before this nomination was even made, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell declared that the Senate would not move forward on any nomination that Obama made.8 True to his word, the nomination process was never followed and Garland was not given any hearings, let alone a vote on his confirmation. As the Senate was refusing to consider the president’s nomination for the open Supreme Court seat, candidate Trump was making the courts, and the Supreme Court, in particular, an election issue for his campaign. Trump saw promises of reliably conservative and partisan judges and justices as a way to lockdown support among Republicans who, at the time, were still not sure about the prospects of a Trump candidacy. In May of 2016, Trump released a list of 11 Supreme Court nominees he might make.9 Trump’s initial list was formulated in consultation with the Heritage Foundation.10 As stated in the opening of this chapter, in June of 2016, Trump also promised Christian Right leaders that his nominees to the federal judiciary would be “pro-life.”11 By giving up, in advance, the president’s prerogative over nominations, ceding control to conservative organizations, Trump made a promise to voters that he would make a political issue of the courts.12 Trump was aided in this quest not only by McConnell’s obstruction of Garland’s nomination, but also in McConnell’s efforts to shut down a large number of Obama’s judicial appointments. While Obama enjoyed early success in his judicial confirmations, this dropped off precipitously once the Republicans gained control of the Senate.13 This drop-in confirmations was further aided by Senate Republicans using the process of Senatorial courtesy—the convention of allowing Senators to stop judicial nominations to courts in their state if they object—to prevent Obama from filling federal district court vacancies.14 McConnell’s and the Republicans’ obstructionism went so far as to limit Obama’s judicial confirmations to 28.6% in his last two years in office, the lowest percentage the Congressional Research Service found going back to at least 1977 (the initial year of the study).15 Only two of Obama’s court of appeals nominees were confirmed in his last two years, and these two were renominations from 2014.16 By comparison, “In Reagan’s, Clinton’s, and Bush’s final two years, the other-party Senate confirmed circuit nominees that had been submitted in the eighth year as late as June (Reagan), February (Clinton), and April (Bush).”17 Obama’s seven other court of appeals nominees submitted in 2015 and 2016 were never confirmed.18

96

D. TAGLIARINA

The Senate left 42 of Obama’s judicial nominees, all nominated before May 2016, unconfirmed. The effect of McConnell’s and Senate Republicans’ actions was to guarantee that whoever won the 2016 election would have the chance to appoint a large number of federal judges, including at least one Supreme Court justice as Scalia’s seat was intentionally left open. This played into Trump’s emphasis on the courts as an election issue. Pew found in July of 2016 that 65% of the voters polled indicated that the Supreme Court would be a very important issue for deciding for whom to vote.19 The Court was not the number one issue, but it was a relevant consideration for a substantial number of voters in the presidential election. Moreover, 70% of Republicans said the Supreme Court was very important for their vote (the 6th highest issue for Republican voters) compared to only 62% of Democratic voters (the 11th highest issue for Democratic voters).20 These numbers suggest that Republican voters were more motivated by judicial appointments as an election issue than Democrats in 2016. In addition, a Supreme Court vacancy and other judicial seats left open by the Senate had the potential to increase the salience of this issue for Republican voters. This increased salience appears to be supported by exit poll data from the 2016 election. One in five voters in a CNN exit poll indicated the Supreme Court was a motivating factor for their vote.21 Of these 20% of voters, Republican voters were more likely than Democratic voters to say Supreme Court appointments were the most important factor. This correlates with approximately one-third of voters saying they voted for Trump and that the Supreme Court was either the most important, or an important, factor in their decisions. The Washington Post had a similar finding, that 26% of Trump voters indicated the Supreme Court was the basis for their vote for Trump.22 The Pew data indicates that Republicans across the country cared about judicial appointments more than Democrats.23 Moreover, Democrats cared less about the courts than Republicans, and cared unequally across the country, with lower levels of concern over judicial nominations among Democrats showing up in regions where Trump won more states.24 Unfortunately, the exit poll data is not granular enough to see if these patterns held on election day in 2016. While nothing is ever the sole cause of an election outcome, it is evident that Trump’s promise of nominating conservative, pro-life judges and justices, combined with a Supreme Court vacancy that McConnell ensured would be an election issue, aided Trump’s eventual narrow electoral college victory.

7

JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND TRUMP’S COMPLICATED …

97

Remaking of the Judiciary: A Regional Story Upon taking office, in no small part thanks to McConnell’s control of the Senate,25 President Trump started with more than 100 federal judicial vacancies to fill, the highest number for an incoming president since Clinton took office in 1993.26 By the end of his presidency, Trump had 234 confirmed Article III judges: 174 district court judges, 54 courts of appeals judges, 3 Court of International Trade judges, and 3 Supreme Court justices.27 This means that in a single 4-year term, Trump appointed 27% of the federal judiciary. While Trump’s numbers are still lower than Obama’s, it took President Obama 8 years in office to appoint 39% of the federal judiciary, including 2 Supreme Court justices.28 Trump nearly matched Obama’s numbers in half the time, while also getting to fill one of the Supreme Court vacancies that Obama was denied. In fact, no recent president has had as many judicial appointments in only one term as Trump. These appointments range across the levels of the federal judiciary, as well as across the country. Table 7.1 depicts the regional breakdown of Trump’s federal judicial appointments. As is shown in the table, Trump was able to make district court appointments in every region, and in sizable numbers in most regions. His effect on the district courts in New England was the smallest, whereas he appointed more than one-third of judges in both the South and the Southwest. He was greatly aided in these efforts by the use of senatorial courtesy under Obama, where Republican Senators in the South and Southwest held district court seats open, Table 7.1 Federal district court appointments Region

Number of Trump appointees in the region

New England Mid-Atlantic South Midwest Southwest West Puerto Ricoa

3 31 63 34 29 12 2

Percent of district judges in the region that are Trump appointees 9.375 22.79412 35.19553 26.77165 34.11765 10.71429 28.57143

a Please note, the district court in Puerto Rico is an Article III court, but does not fall within the

prescribed regions

98

D. TAGLIARINA

preventing Obama from confirming judges to these courts.29 Moreover, in 2017 and 2018, McConnell wielded his control of the Senate to eradicate the practice of senatorial courtesy, sometimes referred to as “blue slips” for both the district courts and the courts of appeals, to prevent Democrats from doing to Trump exactly what Republicans did to Obama with judicial nominations.30 Thus, Trump was able to appoint many judges in many different regions, in part, through Senate actions under Obama and during his own time in office. Not only has Trump appointed more federal judges than most oneterm presidents, many of these are in the incredibly important courts of appeals. Trump appointed 54 of the court of appeals judges, which counts for 30% of the entire court of appeals seats. On top of this, his appointments in the Second (covering the district courts in Connecticut, New York, and Vermont), Third (covering the district courts in Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands), and Eleventh Circuits (covering district courts in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida) changed the balance of judges from a majority of Democratic appointees to now a majority of Republican appointees.31 Presenting these courts of appeals appointees on a regional basis is somewhat difficult, as the geographic boundaries of the courts of appeals do not align with the geographic boundaries being used for regional analysis. As Table 7.2 shows, the various courts of appeals cover anywhere from part of one region to parts of three separate regions. Despite the difference in regional breakdowns, a few things can be observed from the distribution of these appointments. Trump had few appointments at the district level in New England, and this largely carried through to the First Circuit, which covers a portion of New England. At the district level, Trump had a large percentage of appointments in the South and Southwest, which was mirrored in the appointments to the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. Also noteworthy is that Trump appointed nearly half of the Seventh Circuit that covers a portion of the Midwest, and over one-third of the judges on the Ninth Circuit, which was a common target of Trump’s court-based ire. In general, where Trump and Republicans enjoyed more support in 2016 is roughly where we see more of his judicial appointments going at both the district and appellate levels. But, overall, Trump’s judicial appointments were spread out across all of the regions, with the exception of New England. However, there is more to Trump’s appointments than just where they ended up. Who they are also matters. Much like Trump’s original list of

7

JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND TRUMP’S COMPLICATED …

99

Table 7.2 Federal court of appeals appointments Courts of appeals

States/Territories covered by the circuit

Regions covered by the circuit

Number of Trump appointees in the circuit

Percent of court of appeals judges in the circuit that are Trump appointees

1st Circuit

Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island Connecticut, New York, Vermont

New England (partial)

0

0

5

38.46154

4

28.57143

3

20

6

35.29412

6

37.5

5

45.45455

4

36.36364

10

34.48276

2

16.66667

2nd Circuit

New England and Mid-Atlantic 3rd Circuit Delaware, New Mid-Atlantic Jersey, Pennsylvania, (partial) Virgin Islands 4th Circuit Maryland, North Mid-Atlantic Carolina, South and South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia 5th Circuit Louisiana, South and Mississippi, Texas Southwest 6th Circuit Kentucky, Midwest and Michigan, Ohio, South Tennessee 7th Circuit Illinois, Indiana, Midwest Wisconsin (partial) 8th Circuit Arkansas, Iowa, Midwest and Minnesota, South Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota Southwest and 9th Circuit Alaska, Arizona, West California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Northern Marianas, Oregon, Washington Midwest, 10th Circuit Colorado, Kansas, Southwest, and New Mexico, West Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming

(continued)

100

D. TAGLIARINA

Table 7.2 (continued) Courts of appeals

States/Territories covered by the circuit

11th Circuit Alabama, Georgia, Florida D.C. Circuit Washington, D.C. Federal Circuit

National

Regions covered by the circuit

Number of Trump appointees in the circuit

Percent of court of appeals judges in the circuit that are Trump appointees

South (partial)

6

50

Mid-Atlantic (partial) N/A

3

27.27273

0

0

potential Supreme Court nominees, the vast majority of Trump’s appointments were picked by and through conservative organizations. Whereas the Heritage Foundation played an early important role, the Federalist Society largely took the lead during Trump’s presidency with respect to judicial appointments. Overwhelmingly, Trump’s judicial appointments had direct ties to the Federalist Society.32 In addition, Trump’s nominees were younger, and more often white and male, when compared to the nominations of other presidents.33 On top of this, Trump’s nominees had less judicial experience than most nominees and far more experience with political groups, specifically conservative political groups, before being nominated.34 As the New York Times reported, “[Trump’s judicial appointees] more typically held a political post in the federal government and donated money to political candidates and causes. Just four had no discernible political activity in their past, and several were confirmed in spite of an unfavorable rating from the American Bar Association—the first time that had happened at the appellate level in decades.”35 Unsurprisingly, the process for these nominees was far more contentious than under most administrations. Focusing specifically on Trump’s courts of appeals nominees, more than one-third of them were not supported by the senators covered by the relevant courts of appeals (something that would have stopped a nomination prior to 2017), and over two-thirds of these nominees had the support of fewer than 60 senators (something that the filibuster, which no longer applies to judicial nominees, might have stopped).36 Looking at all of Trump’s judicial

7

JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND TRUMP’S COMPLICATED …

101

nominees, they received three times as many “no” votes as all of the judicial nominees in the twentieth Century.37 Some of this is an artifact of rancorous partisanship, but some of it also reflects McConnell’s altering of Senate rules to remove other ways that Senators had to show disapproval of a given nominee. Previously, judges likely to receive “no” votes often did not proceed to a floor vote. The takeaway is that Trump nominated a large percentage of the federal judiciary. These appointments covered just about every region except New England. These appointees flipped the balance from Democratic appointees to Republican appointees in three courts of appeals. These appointees were far more experienced in politics and far less experienced in judging than previous appointees. Finally, these appointees were overwhelmingly chosen by conservative political groups specifically for their conservative political experience. While the effects of these appointments are likely to be long ranging, in the short term, they did not directly benefit Trump or his administration.

Administrative Procedure Act Cases: Policy Failures in All Regions The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), originally passed in 1946, is a federal law that governs how administrative agencies engage in adjudications, licensing, and perhaps most importantly, rulemaking. Covering the core administrative functions, APA cases often become a large portion of the challenges to any administration’s policies.38 While most administrations win about 70% of the challenges to their actions under the APA, the Trump administration stands out as a glaring counterexample. According to the Institute for Policy Integrity, the Trump administration won only 38 of 198 APA cases, or just 19%.39 If we look only at cases that ended up in Article III courts, the Trump administration won 37 of 182 APA cases, which is still only 20% of the cases they faced. These levels of APA losses indicate a failure to follow basic policymaking rules and procedures, and gross indifference to process that led to catastrophic losses that were “virtually unprecedented.”40 Even with a federal judiciary that would come to be full of Trump’s appointees, his administration had an incredibly difficult time defending their actions in courts. In this way, the courts could not save the Trump administration from itself. In looking at the cases on a regional basis, we see that the APA losses were spread fairly evenly across the country. Table 7.3 depicts the APA

102

D. TAGLIARINA

Table 7.3 Trump administration APA cases in article III courts

District court region

Wins

Losses

New England Mid-Atlantic DC South Midwest Southwest West Court of Appeals 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 7th 8th 9th 10th D.C. National Supreme Court Court of International Trade

1 1 8 2 1 0 7 Wins 0 0 0 3 0 1 3 0 8 Wins 2 0

0 26 31 1 0 0 49 Losses 5 2 1 0 1 0 6 2 17 Losses 2 2

cases under the Trump administration, separated by region for the district courts, circuits for the courts of appeals, and the two national courts that also heard APA cases. At the district court level, the Trump administration lost more cases than they won overwhelmingly in the Mid-Atlantic, D.C., and the West. Note, while D.C. is in the Mid-Atlantic region, because they hear so many APA cases, they were separated out here for purposes of clarity. The places where the Trump administration won more APA cases than they lost at the district level where places where almost no APA cases arose—New England (1-0 record), the South (2-1 record), and the Midwest (1-0 record), accounting for approximately 3% of all Trump-era APA cases, but 11% of all Trump APA victories. Places where APA cases were common, the Trump administration did not do well. The courts of appeals ruled fairly consistently with the district courts. Only the Fifth (3-0 record) and Eighth (1-0 record) Circuits ruled in favor of the Trump administration more than against. These courts cover portions of the South, Midwest, and Southwest, and are areas where Trump had a particularly high percentage of appointments, although

7

JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND TRUMP’S COMPLICATED …

103

Trump did fare better with Republican appointees than with Democratic appointees. Everywhere else, spread equally across the country, the Trump administration lost case after case. These APA losses reflect that the Trump administration was treated more or less the same in every region, which was overwhelmingly negative. Trump’s judicial appointments were not enough to save much of his administration’s attempts at unmaking federal policy. These APA losses reflect a lack of meaningful regional differences in how the courts treated the Trump administration. Moreover, the court losses slowed down or sometimes stopped the Trump administration’s policy agenda. This left Trump’s reelection bid in 2020 without many victories to point to in terms of selling his administration’s success.41

2020 Election: Courting Voters and Judges In his reelection bid in 2020, as he had in 2016, President Trump tried to emphasize that he would deliver federal courts for conservatives. In November of 2019, Trump was emphasizing his role in reshaping the federal judiciary as part of his early pitch for reelection.42 On June 18, 2020, after the Supreme Court delivered two major setbacks to Trump’s priorities—including one APA case, and one opinion written by one of his own appointees—Trump took to Twitter to lambast the Supreme Court: These horrible & politically charged decisions coming out of the Supreme Court are shotgun blasts into the face of people that are proud to call themselves Republicans or Conservatives. We need more Justices or we will lose our 2nd. Amendment & everything else. Vote Trump 2020!43

Echoing points he had made during both campaigns, Trump attacked the Court as political, but in the wrong direction, and tried to stir up Republican voters by mentioning the 2nd Amendment despite the fact that neither case had anything to do with the 2nd Amendment. Trump would go on to spend several months promising to release a new list of potential Supreme Court nominees, as he had done in 2016.44 He released the list in September of 2020,45 and on September 9, 2020, in remarks about his judicial appointments, Trump stated: Over the next four years, America’s President will choose hundreds of federal judges, and, in all likelihood, one, two, three, and even four

104

D. TAGLIARINA

Supreme Court justices. The outcome of these decisions will determine whether we hold fast to our nation’s founding principles or whether they are lost forever.46

It appeared that Trump was trying to repeat many of his same campaign promises from 2016, while also emphasizing that he had already made a substantial impact with court appointments. Then, in another twist on 2016, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg died on September 18, 2020, more than half a year closer to the election than when Scalia died in 2016.47 Before Ginsburg was even buried, and before there was even a nominee, McConnell announced that he would confirm whomever Trump appointed before the election.48 On September 26, 2020, a mere 8 days after Ginsburg’s death, Trump nominated Judge Amy Coney Barrett to replace Ginsburg on the Supreme Court.49 Barrett was confirmed in an incredibly fast 30 days,50 with the vote to confirm, 52-48 in the Senate, occurring on October 26, 2020.51 Trump gained another major victory in getting to appoint a third justice to the Supreme Court, and one that would drastically alter the ideological balance of the Court. However, Gallup found that all three of Trump’s Supreme Court nominees were unpopular, with Barrett having a 51% favorable rating regarding her confirmation, while Kavanaugh and Gorsuch were both below 50%.52 Moreover, all three nominees were incredibly unpopular with Democrats.53 This, combined with progressive groups on the left emphasizing the importance of courts, shifted one of the advantages that Trump had in 2016.54 When asked in exit polling about the importance of Supreme Court appointments in their votes, 57% of Democratic voters said the Court was very important, compared with 51% of Republican voters; and 28% of Democratic voters said the Court was somewhat important compared to a similar 29% of Republican voters.55 While the global pandemic was listed by voters as more important as an election issue, it is worth noting that Democratic voters cared more about the courts in 2020 than they did in 2016, which is in part an extension of how successful Trump was at confirming judicial appointments, especially three at the Supreme Court level. Thus, one of Trump’s largest successes in office helped to motivate opposition voters. In addition, in his efforts to baselessly challenge the election results, Trump ran into a rather impenetrable judicial wall. Trump and his surrogates filed more than 60 cases in state and federal courts challenging

7

JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND TRUMP’S COMPLICATED …

105

election results. Trump lost almost all of these, and the few victories he found were incredibly minor, and even some of those were overturned on appeal.57 These cases were filed in state and federal courts in the MidAtlantic, South, Midwest, Southwest, and West regions. In every region, these cases went against Trump’s claims. Sometimes, these loses came specifically at the hands of judges appointed by Trump. Even more clearly than with the APA cases, the courts across the country could not and would not deliver victories for Trump. Just like so many of his administration’s policies found defeat in the courts in most regions, the president’s attempts to undo a free and fair election floundered in courts across the United States.

Conclusion In the end, a president known for politicizing the judiciary and lobbing personal insults at judges who rule against him was unable to use the courts to enforce his policies or deliver an election that he lost.58 While there was some variation by region, overwhelmingly these are losses that Trump faced in every part of the country. In short, a regional analysis of the courts regarding Trump’s policies and attempts to subvert democratic elections shows that the courts across the country found the administration to be incapable of governing according to established rules and procedures. Moreover, Trump’s attempt to campaign in 2020 again, in part, on the court, did not pay off as it had in 2016. The law and legal norms held across the country, in every region. However, this does not in any way undercut the sweeping change we have also seen in the judiciary. Trump has appointed more than a quarter of the active federal judiciary, including one-third of the Supreme Court. While 55% of the federal judiciary has been appointed by Democratic presidents, the balance has clearly shifted.59 The Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals all now have more Republican appointees than Democratic appointees.60 In addition, Trump’s appointees were picked overwhelmingly because of their political experience, not their judicial experience. This poses potential problems for future Democratic administrations, and potential opportunities for future Republican administrations. Whereas the Trump administration, which often relied heavily on political outsiders with little governing experience, ran into many issues with

106

D. TAGLIARINA

the APA, future Republican administrations that follow proper procedures are likely to have an easier time in court justifying sweeping policy changes—changes that many of Trump’s appointees have previously worked on before becoming federal judges. Similarly, Democratic administrations are likely to find judicial ideological objections to their policies. While judges are bound by the law, they are also political, ideological actors.61 In the short term, Trump’s presidency was a fairly resounding failure, in part due to bad policymaking that was easily struck down in court. However, McConnell’s push to get so many judges— picked by the Federalist Society—in place, including three Supreme Court seats will likely have a long-term effect on the federal judiciary, and will create a potential legacy from this administration that is not based on direct victories for the administration. With the balance changing in three of the courts of appeals, this shift is also likely to have differential regional effects, with the Mid-Atlantic, thanks to the Second and Third Circuits, experiencing the greatest change.

Notes 1. Alan Rappeport and Charlie Savage, “Donald Trump Releases List of Possible Supreme Court Picks,” The New York Times, May 18, 2016, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/us/pol itics/donald-trump-supreme-court-nominees.html. 2. Sarah McCammon, “Inside Trump’s Closed-Door Meeting, Held to Reassure ‘The Evangelicals,’” National Public Radio, June 21, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/06/21/483018976/insidetrumps-closed-door-meeting-held-to-reassures-the-evangelicals. 3. Pew Research Center, “American News Pathways,” Pew Research Center (blog), 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/pathways2020/. 4. The Institute for Policy Integrity, “Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts,” February 11, 2021, https://policyintegrity. org/trump-court-roundup. 5. Alanna Durkin, “Trump Loves to Win but Keeps Losing Election Lawsuits,” US News & World Report, December 4, 2020, //www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2020-12-04/ trump-loves-to-win-but-keeps-losing-election-lawsuits. 6. Eva Ruth Moravec, Sari Horwitz, and Jerry Markon, “The Death of Antonin Scalia: Chaos, Confusion and Conflicting Reports,”

7

JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND TRUMP’S COMPLICATED …

107

The Washington Post, February 14, 2016, sec. Politics, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/politics/texas-tv-station-scalia-diedof-a-heart-attack/2016/02/14/938e2170-d332-11e5-9823-02b 905009f99_story.html. 7. Ron Elving, “What Happened With Merrick Garland In 2016 And Why It Matters Now,” National Public Radio, June 29, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/whathappened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now. 8. Elving. 9. Rappeport and Savage, “Donald Trump Releases List of Possible Supreme Court Picks.” 10. Tessa Berenson, “Trump Offers Conservatives a Deal on Supreme Court,” Time, March 21, 2016, https://time.com/4266700/don ald-trump-supreme-court-nominations/. 11. McCammon, “Inside Trump’s Closed-Door Meeting, Held To Reassure ‘The Evangelicals.’” 12. Ed Kilgore, “Can Trump Make the Supreme Court a Campaign Issue Again?,” Intelligencer, July 13, 2020, https://nymag.com/ intelligencer/2020/07/supreme-court-campaign-issue-2020-ele ction.html. 13. Jon Greenberg, “Fact-Check: Did Obama Leave Trump with 128 Judges to Appoint?,” Austin American-Statesman, October 5, 2020, https://www.statesman.com/story/news/politics/electi ons/2020/10/05/fact-check-did-obama-leave-trump-with-128judges-to-appoint/114225090/. 14. Greenberg. 15. Barry J McMillion, “Judicial Nomination Statistics and Analysis: U.S. District and Circuit Courts, 1977–2018,” Congressional Research Service, March 21, 2019, 40. 16. Russell Wheeler, “Senate Obstructionism Handed a Raft of Judicial Vacancies to Trump—What Has He Done with Them?” Brookings (blog), June 4, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/ 2018/06/04/senate-obstructionism-handed-judicial-vacanciesto-trump/. 17. Wheeler. 18. Wheeler. 19. Pew Research Center, “Top Voting Issues in 2016 Election,” Pew Research Center—U.S. Politics & Policy (blog), July

108

D. TAGLIARINA

7, 2016, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2016/07/07/4top-voting-issues-in-2016-election/. 20. Pew Research Center. 21. Jane Coaston, “Polling Data Shows Republicans Turned out for Trump in 2016 Because of the Supreme Court,” Vox, June 29, 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018/6/29/17511088/ scotus-2016-election-poll-trump-republicans-kennedy-retire. 22. Philip Bump, “A Quarter of Republicans Voted for Trump to Get Supreme Court Picks—And It Paid Off,” The Washington Post, June 26, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ politics/wp/2018/06/26/a-quarter-of-republicans-voted-fortrump-to-get-supreme-court-picks-and-it-paid-off/. 23. Pew Research Center, “Top Voting Issues in 2016 Election.” 24. Pew Research Center. 25. “Sen. McConnell: No Chance the President Is Going to Be Removed from Office,” Fox News, December 13, 2019, http:// video.foxnews.com/v/6115454801001/. 26. Matthew Impelli, “Trump Has Appointed 216 New Federal Judges and It Could Be 230 By Election Day,” Newsweek, September 18, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/trump-hasappointed-216-new-federal-judges-it-could-230-election-day-153 2901; Russell Wheeler, “Judicial Appointments in Trump’s First Three Years: Myths and Realities,” Brookings (blog), January 28, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/01/28/ judicial-appointments-in-trumps-first-three-years-myths-and-realit ies/. 27. United States Courts, “Judgeship Appointments By President,” United States Courts, accessed March 19, 2021, https://www.usc ourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/judgeshipappointments-president. 28. John Gramlich, “How Trump Compares with Other Recent Presidents in Appointing Federal Judges,” Pew Research Center (blog), January 13, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2021/01/13/how-trump-compares-with-other-recent-pre sidents-in-appointing-federal-judges/. 29. Greenberg, “Fact-Check.” 30. Karoun Demirjian, “McConnell Wants to End Practice of Allowing Senators to Block Appeals Court Judges,” Washington Post, September 13, 2017, sec. Powerpost, https://www.washin

7

JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND TRUMP’S COMPLICATED …

109

gtonpost.com/powerpost/senate-gop-leader-wants-to-end-pra ctice-of-allowing-senators-to-block-circuit-court-judges/2017/ 09/13/d10aa028-98d9-11e7-87fc-c3f7ee4035c9_story.html; David Hawkings, “GOP Slips Past Another Senate Custom, and Democrats Turn Blue,” Roll Call, May 30, 2018, https://www. rollcall.com/2018/05/30/gop-slips-past-another-senate-customand-democrats-turn-blue/. 31. Rebecca R. Ruiz et al., “A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the Federal Courts,” The New York Times, March 14, 2020, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/ trump-appeals-court-judges.html. 32. Ian Millhiser, “Trump Says He Will Delegate Judicial Selection To The Conservative Federalist Society,” Think Progress (blog), June 15, 2016, https://archive.thinkprogress.org/trump-says-he-willdelegate-judicial-selection-to-the-conservative-federalist-society26f622b10c49/; Ruiz et al., “A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the Federal Courts.” 33. Ian Millhiser, “What Trump Has Done to the Courts, Explained,” Vox, December 9, 2019, https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/12/9/20962980/trump-supreme-court-federaljudges. 34. Ruiz et al., “A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the Federal Courts.” 35. Ruiz et al. 36. Ruiz et al. 37. Thomas Jipping, “Filling the Judicial Confirmation Stocking,” The Heritage Foundation, The Heritage Foundation, December 22, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/filling-thejudicial-confirmation-stocking. 38. Fred Barbash and Deanna Paul, “The Real Reason the Trump Administration Is Constantly Losing in Court,” The Washington Post, March 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ national-security/the-real-reason-president-trump-is-constantlylosing-in-court/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-b51b7f f322e9_story.html. 39. The Institute for Policy Integrity, “Roundup.” 40. Barbash and Paul, “The Real Reason the Trump Administration Is Constantly Losing in Court.” 41. Barbash and Paul.

110

D. TAGLIARINA

42. Ruiz et al., “A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the Federal Courts.” 43. Ruiz et al. 44. Kilgore, “Can Trump Make the Supreme Court a Campaign Issue Again?” 45. Melissa Quinn and Kathryn Watson, “Trump Unveils List of Possible Supreme Court Nominees If He Wins Reelection,” CBS News, September 10, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ trump-releases-list-new-supreme-court-nominees-second-term/. 46. Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump on Judicial Appointments,” The White House, September 9, 2020, https:// trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-pre sident-trump-judicial-appointments/. 47. Nina Totenberg, “Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Champion of Gender Equality, Dies At 87,” National Public Radio, September 18, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/09/18/100306972/jus tice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-champion-of-gender-equality-dies-at-87. 48. Kelsey Snell, “McConnell: Trump’s Nominee To Replace Ginsburg Will Receive A Vote In The Senate,” National Public Radio, September 18, 2020, https://www.npr.org/sections/deathof-ruth-bader-ginsburg/2020/09/18/914650878/mcconnelltrumps-nominee-to-replace-ginsburg-will-receive-a-vote-in-thesenate. 49. Nina Totenberg, “Amy Coney Barrett: A Dream For The Right, Nightmare For The Left,” National Public Radio, September 28, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/09/28/917554001/amyconey-barrett-a-dream-for-the-right-nightmare-for-the-left. 50. Adrian Blanco, Tim Meko, and Kevin Uhrmacher, “Is It Too Close to the Election to Confirm a Supreme Court Nominee?” The Washington Post, September 19, 2020, sec. National, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/ 19/is-it-too-close-election-confirm-supreme-court-nominee/. 51. Barbara Sprunt, “Amy Coney Barrett Confirmed To Supreme Court, Takes Constitutional Oath,” National Public Radio, October 26, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/10/26/927640 619/senate-confirms-amy-coney-barrett-to-the-supreme-court. 52. Megan Brenan, “51% in U.S. Want Amy Coney Barrett Seated on Supreme Court,” Gallup, October 20, 2020, https://news.gal

7

JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND TRUMP’S COMPLICATED …

111

lup.com/poll/322232/amy-coney-barrett-seated-supreme-court. aspx. 53. Brenan. 54. Kilgore, “Can Trump Make the Supreme Court a Campaign Issue Again?”; “Vote the Courts 2020,” People For the American Way (blog), accessed March 19, 2021, https://www.pfaw.org/votethe-courts-2020/. 55. Pew Research Center, “American News Pathways.” 56. Kadhim Shubber, “Lawsuit Tracker: Donald Trump’s Legal Battle Runs into Repeated Dead Ends,” Financial Times, December 11, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/20b114b5-5419-493b9923-a918a2527931. 57. Jacob Shamsian and Sonam Sheth, “Trump and His Allies Filed More than 40 Lawsuits Challenging the 2020 Election Results. All of Them Failed.,” Business Insider, February 22, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-campaign-law suits-election-results-2020-11. 58. Katie Shepherd, “Trump ‘Violates All Recognized Democratic Norms,’ Federal Judge Says in Biting Speech on Judicial Independence,” The Washington Post, November 8, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/11/08/ judge-says-trump-violates-democratic-norms-judiciary-speech/. 59. Barbash and Paul, “The Real Reason the Trump Administration Is Constantly Losing in Court.” 60. Ruiz et al., “A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the Federal Courts.” 61. Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make (Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 1998); Jeffrey Allan Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

CHAPTER 8

Endless Love: Evangelical Voters, the Republican Party, and Donald Trump Christopher Cronin

Abstract White Evangelical Conservatives are a cornerstone of Donald Trump’s base. Though not a religious man, conservative faithful helped propel Trump to office and consistently supported him during his first term. This chapter examines the basis of this support, the central role of White Evangelicals in Trump’s reelection bid, the interplay between policy advocacy and personal behavior in the voting behavior of religious conservatives, and the implications for presidential campaigns and candidates in 2024. Keywords 2020 election · Donald Trump · Evangelicals · Republicans · 2020 presidential campaign

C. Cronin (B) Methodist University, Fayetteville, NC, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0_8

113

114

C. CRONIN

In 1981, director Franco Zeffirelli asked Lionel Richie to write an instrumental track for the movie Endless Love.1 Richie, still with the Commodores at the time, wrote the track with inspiration from a previous version of the film. Late in the production schedule, Zeffirelli changed his mind and decided it should be a duet. He was able to land Diana Ross to sing alongside Richie. When Ross showed up to the studio (at 3:30 a.m.), she wanted the part Richie had written for himself. Up against a deadline, Richie adapted to the other part despite the difficult key. Lionel’s piece of work resulted in an iconic pairing and song. This piece of music folklore serves as a metaphor for the topic of this chapter. Like Richie, evangelical voters in America adapted to a new kind of candidate in Donald Trump. The Republican Party consistently relies upon the relationship to deliver positive electoral outcomes. And though the pairing may seem incongruous to outside observers, it endures in the spirit of the titled movie above. The early 1980s were years when evangelical Christians were first beginning to establish a foothold in American politics. Whereas the first two decades of the 1900s saw a religious left affecting political change, the last two decades saw the opposite with the emergence of the religious right. Conservative Christianity has grown into the single most significant religious element in political campaigns. This is especially true for Republican candidates and the effects can be seen throughout primary and general elections. This two-step voting process is important to the study of religion in political campaigns. For many years the conventional wisdom and strategy for winning office involved appealing to the base in the primaries and then moderating to appeal to centrist voters in the general election. A new turnout-based strategy has emerged in contemporary campaigns that simply skip the second step and the focus remains on core partisan messaging. This allows a candidate like Donald Trump to campaign in a targeted way. The messaging is not intended for centrist or progressive voters and as such does not register. From these perspectives it is easy to wonder how a candidate with questionable personal morals and behavior can become the champion of conservative religion. The most direct answer to this preponderance is that there are many reasons the relationship works (as this chapter will explore).

8

ENDLESS LOVE: EVANGELICAL VOTERS, THE …

115

White Evangelical Voters One of the main challenges when tackling the subject of religion in politics is measuring religion. Belief is a hard variable to quantify and qualify. Survey data is important. Citizens self-report and self-identify how they characterize faith. Many voters do not overtly identify their religious preferences and habits. Church attendance helps fill in for measuring faith. How often a voter goes to church and the number of hours spent in worship are useful metrics. Where religion intersects with political campaigns common strategic approaches provide clues as to how different sects vote. Campaigns have become more professional and specialized as best practices from private sector marketing seep into the political world. This allows for more detailed targeting, focus groups, polling, and mobilization. These campaign behaviors help shape an understanding of particular kinds of voters (like religious voters). There are two main ways to identify evangelical voters. The first way is to survey Americans about their religious beliefs and then categorize them based on their answers. This involves questions like how fundamentalist or literal their beliefs are about the bible. The other way is through selfidentification—counting all Americans that call themselves Evangelical. There are some differences between these two groups. The self-identified group (“Nominal Evangelicals”) is bigger and includes more voters who vote for Democrats and Independents. This is an ongoing measurement issue. Further difficulty arises when matching this element of identity (religion) with another identity element like partisanship. Trying to measure the support of “Evangelicals” for Republicans can take on aspects of endogeneity (the two ideas may overlap in their meaning). Increasingly, a conservative American who holds religious beliefs is assumed to be an Evangelical. If this is how one defines “Evangelical voters” then measuring one variable includes some of the other and, obviously, there will be a strong relationship. Social science measurements of religion are mindful of this problem and, for the most part, the two approaches mentioned above succeed in avoiding these measurement problems.2 The term “Evangelical Voters” can be a contentious one,3 but, fortunately, for the purposes of understanding evangelical voters and support for Republicans (or Donald Trump more specifically), both categories of evangelicals (nominal and survey-defined) produce similar results. Both show overwhelming support.4

116

C. CRONIN

White evangelical voters as a category of the electorate are a significant portion of overall voters. They are also a consistent percentage of voters making up 26% of the electorate in recent elections (2008, 25% in 2010, 26% in 2012, 26% in 2014, 26% in 2016, 26% in 2018).5 Though this group of voters is a consistent part of the American electorate, it is not without internal differences. Evangelical voters are not a monolith. Like any religious cross-section, there are those who attend more regularly and are otherwise more devout. There are Cultural Evangelicals who attend less often and are less rigorous in their fundamentalism. Approximately 19% of Evangelicals are black.6 These Evangelical voters overwhelmingly support Democrats.7 Most Evangelicals, however, are white. When discussing evangelical voters, it is generally the majority white component (about 76%) that is the main element, and is the focus of this chapter. White Evangelical Voters (WEV) are spread fairly evenly across the socio-economic spectrum. 35% make less than $30,000 a year, while 14% make $100,000 or more a year.8 This economic diversity provides an example of the wide range of political socialization. There are WEV from many different backgrounds. It also helps clarify how they vote. Sometimes reports hint at a higher rate of turnout among these voters, but when controlling for income, the turnout is consistent with other voters (generally wealthier voters vote more).9 WEV voted for Donald Trump over Joe Biden by a wide margin. Conservative estimates show between 76–81% went for Trump in 2020, with 18–24% voting for Biden.10 Larger trends in political polarization in America can be seen in how campaigns target these loyal voters.11 Religion as a part of citizens’ identities interacts with a deepening cultural rift in ways that are reflected in electoral outcomes and partisanship. While some religious traditions are split by conservative and progressive polarities, Evangelicals and Catholics have shifted the most. Both have moved in the direction of conservatism and the Republican Party. While Catholics have shifted from strong Democratic affiliation to a more independent orientation, Evangelical voters have increased their Republican Party patterns of identification.12

8

ENDLESS LOVE: EVANGELICAL VOTERS, THE …

117

The Republican Party and White Evangelical Voters 2016 measures show that WEV may have voted for Trump at a rate of 90%.13 That is an impressive level of commitment to a Republican candidate. However, non-evangelical republican voters show similar levels of support. Thus the simplest answer to why evangelicals support Trump is that evangelical voters are conservative and conservatives support Trump. Further evidence of this can be seen in studies that measure reactions to political events like the Access Hollywood tape14 where evangelical identification has little impact separate from partisanship. In other words, in a highly polarized political climate, the most important variable for voters is not religion but partisanship. Being Republican may be more important to voter choice than being evangelical. At the aggregate level, this is an important point. Evangelicals are conservative and thus support the conservative candidate for president. However, this doesn’t address why evangelicals don’t endorse and support other conservative candidates who have more religious profiles.15 While a snapshot view of the presidential election follows this logic, the larger process may not. Primaries provide ample opportunity for a more religious candidate to attract evangelical support. There is some evidence that this is precisely what happened in the case of Donald Trump. He was not the first choice of religious voters in the primaries.16 For example, Trump placed fourth in the precinct at Liberty University in Virginia despite having received an endorsement from the school’s president.17 Initially, in 2016, the more devout evangelical support was behind Senator Ted Cruz. The less devout and more cultural evangelicals backed Donald Trump.18 This, again, shows the diversity of evangelical political support, but it also points to how internal party politics affects voter choice. The Republican Party is not a monolith either. It has factions and divisions that emerge most clearly in the primaries. From the point of view of the party, it is less about how Trump appealed to evangelicals (or turned them off) and more about internal factional dynamics. Once Trump became the front-runner, evangelicals followed the political momentum and adapted. The Republican Party is aware of and actively engaged with maintaining white evangelical political activism. The party makes strategic choices to mitigate the effects of less religious candidates. This placation can be found in the construction of political platforms. Platforms are put

118

C. CRONIN

together after the candidate is known and reflect the party’s position on important issues while accounting for presidential candidate’s profile. In particular, the use of religious rhetoric in political platforms has been a strategic tool for the Republican Party in signaling to WEV. The following is a chart showing the frequency of religious rhetoric in Republican Party Platforms (Table 8.1). Matching the trends in Republican platform rhetoric with the different primary elections and their religious cast of candidates, a pattern is evident.19 For the Republican Party the main relationship has to do with a significant religious presence in the primary matched with an eventual nominee who does not represent active conservative religion in a significant way. In other words, since 1980, when the primary has religious energy in its candidates and the eventual winner of the primary season does not; the Republican Party platform sees a spike in religious rhetoric. The platform is a document that shapes the general election campaign and communicates ideology. But the platform is also a central tool the party uses to placate, serve, or pay lip-service to different factions within the party. Such was the interaction during the candidate-selection process of 2016. A non-religious candidate in Donald Trump was strategically compensated for by the party with a much larger use of religious rhetoric Table 8.1 Religious rhetoric in political platforms # of Religious references in platform Year 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020

Rep 2 1 4 3 4 16 12 12 14 11 20 33 49 49

Total religion across parties platforms Dem 0 2 2 2 2 1 1 4 5 5 9 7 16 15

Total 2 3 6 5 6 17 13 16 19 16 29 40 65 64

8

ENDLESS LOVE: EVANGELICAL VOTERS, THE …

119

Graph 8.1 Religious rhetoric in political platforms

in the platform (49 different times). In 2020 the Republican Party made no changes to its platform and so retained the new high of 49 uses. In years with less religious candidates, the party compensates by signaling a continued commitment to the values of evangelical voters. And it does this explicitly through religious language in platforms.

White Evangelical Voters and Trump Aside from party affiliation, Trump as a candidate and elected official has made many calculated moves to ensure a connection to WEV. Beyond his messaging, there are many evangelical voters who see “Christ” in Trump. These true believers look past personal morality to the concept of a “Christian Prince.”20 Voting for Trump was a symbolic defense of the United States’ perceived Christian heritage.21 Some have questioned whether the evangelicals that follow Trump are “real believers,” but the evidence shows the most traditional evangelicals are putting aside personal aspects of Trump’s morality and identifying strongly with him as a candidate.22 As president, Trump has delivered substantial benefit for conservative religious interests in the courts. Judicial appointments, executive orders pertaining to religious freedom, and the positions of the Justice Department have all furthered WEV interests.23 Additionally, the

120

C. CRONIN

material benefits sought by WEV in the areas of economic and defense spending have been fulfilled by President Trump.24 Trump as the “not liberal” candidate is another aspect of his continued support from WEV. In a time of intense polarization, negative partisanship plays a major role in voting trends.25 The dislike of the opposing party may explain a great deal of evangelical support for any Republican candidate.26 During the Obama presidency the evangelical community feared religious freedom was under assault and candidate Trump was able to tap into this resentment.27 This negative partisanship carried through to 2020 with a large majority of WEV feeling Biden would make a poor president.28 There is evidence that Trump taps into conservatism in a way that informs religious belief.29 In other words, it is possible that conservative political beliefs are guiding WEV rather than the other way around.30 Overt signals have maintained Trump’s relationship to evangelical voters. He walked to a nearby church during upheaval to hold a bible for the cameras, and he displayed a willingness to convert and to be born again in the Christian tradition. His spiritual adviser, Paula WhiteCain, also serves as a clear symbol of commitment. These signals register strongly with WEV.31 The anti-government aspects of Trump as a candidate work well with a conservative Christian tradition32 and this engenders trust.33 There is a large body of scholarship detailing many reasons evangelicals support non-religious candidates. These arguments range from appeals based on racism,34 sexism, views about gender roles, authoritarianism, populism, political efficacy, and conspiracy theories like QAnon. Donald Trump employs religious rhetoric, and is joined in this effort by authors and surrogates that portray him as a religious champion who doesn’t need to share their beliefs to succeed on their behalf.35 Acceptance of Trump under these terms and WEV support for him can be summed up with the lyrics to Endless Love, as Ross sings “I’ll be a fool for you I’m sure,” and Richie responds, “You know I don’t mind.”

Regional Differences and Implications for 2024 The biggest difference among geographic regions in America is the percent of the voters that are WEV. In the Northeast, evangelicals make up 13% of the population, while in the South they make up 34% of the population. In the Midwest 26% are evangelicals, while the West

8

ENDLESS LOVE: EVANGELICAL VOTERS, THE …

121

has 22%.36 In the larger geography of the Sunbelt, WEV are the decisive anchor for conservative candidates against the demographic changes creating increasingly competitive races.37 The greater the percentage of voters, the greater the effect evangelicalism has on electoral outcomes (denominational traditions also play a role).38 Religious leaders in different parts of the nation affect different attitudes about how specifically the church should support candidates. Generally churches in the South advocate for individual candidates more than those in the Northeast or West. As mentioned above, Jerry Falwell in Virginia vocally supported Trump, and Robert Jeffress at First Baptist in Dallas followed a similar path. Ralph Reed’s efforts in the South (as one of the pioneering voices of the Christian Coalition) yielded big returns by registering as many evangelical supporters as possible.39 The differences in population percentage and the regional differences at the church leadership level are likely to continue into the next several election cycles. Perhaps both parties should take the white evangelical vote for granted in future elections. There are signs that the Catholic vote is more volatile. It is possible that Biden’s Catholicism provided an electoral edge in the rust belt in 2020, for example. That has not been true over time for Democratic candidates,40 but Catholic voters are less polarized in voting behavior than WEV.41 There are growing tensions within evangelicalism sparked by the Trump presidency that may lead to some starker divisions,42 nevertheless, white evangelical voters in 2024 will be reliably behind a Republican challenger. That challenger will likely continue the successful rhetoric and symbolism employed by President Trump. The Republican Party will continue to strategically satisfy the political desires of WEV and will continue to receive their overwhelming support.

Notes 1. Zeffirelli, Franco, dir. Endless Love. 1981. Universal Pictures. 2. Burge, Ryan P., and Lewis, Andrew R. 2018. “Measuring Evangelicals: Practical Considerations for Social Scientists.” Politics and Religion, 11, 745–759. 3. Djupe, Paul A, Ryan P. Burge, and Andrew R. Lewis. 2017. “Do We Have Any Idea Who Evangelicals Are?” Religion in Public. December 14.

122

C. CRONIN

4. Margolis, M. F. 2020. Who wants to Make America Great Again? Understanding Evangelical Support for Donald Trump. Politics & Religion, 131, 89–118. 5. Gonzales, N. L. 2018. “Are White Evangelicals the Saviors of the GOP?” Roll Call. December 6. 6. Cox, Daniel, and Jones, Robert P. 2017. “America’s Changing Religious Identity.” Public Religion Research Institute, September 6. Retrieved September 8, 2017. 7. Smith, Gregory A., and Martínez, Jessica. 2016. “How the Faithful Voted: A Preliminary Analysis.” Pew Research Center Fact Tank, November 9. Retrieved March 1, 2018. 8. Pew Research Center. 2014. “Religious Landscape Study.” Religion and Public Life. https://www.pewforum.org/religious-lan dscape-study/ 9. Claassen, Ryan L. 2015. Godless Democrats and Pious Republicans? Party Activists, Party Capture, and the “God Gap.” New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 10. Newport, Frank. 2020. “Religious Group Voting and the 2020 Election.” Gallup: Polling Matters. November 13. 11. Lipka, Michael, and Smith Gregory A. 2020. “White Evangelical Approval of Trump Slips, But Eight-in-Ten Say They Would Vote For Him.” Pew Research Center Fact Tank. July 1. Retrieved December 16, 2020. 12. Brooks, C., and Manza, J. 2004. A Great Divide? Religion and Political Change in U.S. National Elections, 1972–2000. Sociological Quarterly, 453, 421–421+ . 13. Jelen, Ted G., and Wald, Kenneth D. 2018. “Evangelicals and President Trump: The Not So Odd Couple.” In God at the Grassroots 2016. The Christian Right in American Politics, eds. Rozell, Mark J. and Clyde, Wilcox, 19–46. Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield. 14. Cassese, E. C. 2020. Straying From the Flock? A Look at How Americans’ Gender and Religious Identities Cross-Pressure Partisanship. Political Research Quarterly, 731, 169–183. 15. Margolis, M. F. 2020. 16. Guerra, David Patrick 2016. “Actually, Most Evangelicals Don’t Vote Trump.” Christianity Today. March 18. 17. Byrnes, Jesse. 2016. “Trump Finishes 4th at Liberty University Despite Falwell Endorsement.” The Hill. March 1.

8

ENDLESS LOVE: EVANGELICAL VOTERS, THE …

123

18. Scala, D. J. 2020. “The Skeptical Faithful: How Trump Gained Momentum Among Evangelicals.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 504, 927–947. 19. The use of religious rhetoric in political platforms has grown over time. While somewhat rare before 1980, such rhetoric is now common and trending upward. Appearing or sounding religious has become more attractive to both political parties. Pre-1980, the frequency of religious rhetoric is very often zero. Meaning that in the years since 1908 there were often political platforms from both parties that had no mention of God or religion at all. Republican platforms have gone from a pre-1980 average of one single use of religious rhetoric to 33 individual cases in 2012 (Democratic platforms have followed the same trend to a lesser magnitude from a pre-1980 average of 1.3 to cases closing in on 10). The Republican primary season of 1988 featured a prominent conservative Christian in the candidacy of Pat Robertson. His campaign ran strong through South Carolina as he, George H. W. Bush, and Bob Dole slugged it out. Robertson captured 25% of the vote in Iowa and 19% in South Carolina. The eventual nominee was Bush who, though an Episcopalian, was not a strongly religious candidate. This is the first case of a religious primary meeting a not-so-religious candidate and the result is a big spike in religious rhetoric with 19 separate pieces of religious rhetoric. The previous high in the party’s platform history was 4. That is a dramatic escalation in the amount of religious rhetoric and likely a result of the party’s need to include and serve that religious energy behind Pat Robertson. The primary season of 1980 involved an important conservative Christian activist energy for the Republicans. There were two Evangelical Christians (John Anderson and Phil Crane) campaigning early in the season. On top of that there were two candidates considered good representatives of conservative religion in Ronald Reagan and John Connally. The eventual nominee was drawn from these two (Reagan) and so the use of religious rhetoric was minimal (3 cases of religious language). This is an increase from the pre1980 average, but an all-time low relative to every election since. The election of 1984 featured Reagan running unopposed and a similar low rhetorical result with 4 cases.

124

C. CRONIN

In 1992, though the party had a sitting president in Bush, there were some primary campaigns. These campaigns included two conservative, evangelical Christians—Pat Robertson and David Duke. Again in South Carolina, Robertson pulled in a significant percentage of the vote with 26%. Bush, however, won easily with 67%. The fact that Bush was the incumbent probably helped to mitigate the effects of Robertson. The effect on the platform followed these intra-party factional contests, though somewhat diminished due to the incumbency. Religious rhetoric is not quite as high as 1988, but remains strong at 12. This has essentially become the new floor for religious rhetoric in Republican Party platforms, with no platform falling below 11 since. Bob Dole won the candidacy in 1996, but not before a rather competitive primary season. Several viable candidates pulled strong percentages through South Carolina, including Pat Buchanan and Steve Forbes. These other contenders, however, did not carry with them the energy of past candidates in conservative religious circles. Whether issue-driven or candidate-driven, the religious energy of the past few seasons did not carry through here. Thus, despite ending up with a not-so-religious candidate in Bob Dole, there was little need to placate restless religious factions and the platform reflected this with a consistent carry-over of the previous platform’s 12. In 2000, George W. Bush competed with several candidates for the candidacy. The field represented a number of different denominations and certainly some religious energy from activists. With a prominent story of personal faith, though, Bush was the frontrunner for conservative religious voters throughout. His eventual victory was essentially a win for conservative religious interests. Plenty of evidence of factional energy resulted in a slight uptick from the previous platform (14), but not much of an increase. In 2004, running unopposed, Bush did not have to compete for his candidacy and thus did not encounter any “more religious” opponents. The result in the platform is a slight decrease in religious rhetoric (11) and the lowest amount since 1984. Without an incumbent or clear successor, the election of 2008 saw a big field of potential Republican candidates. Among these candidates were several that energized the conservative religious base. Headlining these was Mike Huckabee. Huckabee performed

8

ENDLESS LOVE: EVANGELICAL VOTERS, THE …

125

well throughout the primary season tallying 34% in Iowa and 30% in South Carolina. The eventual nominee, however, was a not-so-religious candidate—John McCain. Though strong on foreign policy and with years of Senatorial experience, McCain did not have the natural connection to conservative Christianity. The platform for this year reflected this factional tension reaching a new high with 20 different instances of religious rhetoric. 2012 followed a similar pattern with a strong primary season for religious conservatives—two evangelical Christian candidates and a conservative Catholic candidate in Rick Santorum. The eventual nominee for the party, however, was (in relative terms) a notso-religious (not-so-classically-Christian) candidate. Mitt Romney was Mormon, but not especially fond of talking about it as a religion since many Americans were/are unfamiliar with the specifics of the religion. This presented the ultimate need within the party to placate conservative Christianity. Evangelical Christians, for the most part, do not recognize the Mormon faith as “Christian.” Therefore, to these members of the party, the nominee was the first non-Christian nominee the party had ever nominated—pair that with a primary season that featured plenty of religiosity in campaigns and the result was a big increase in platform rhetoric. Bypassing the previous high with McCain (20), the 2012 platform used religious rhetoric 33 different times. 20. Jacques, B. 2019. “Donald J. Trump, the White Evangelicals, and Martin Luther: A Hypothesis.” Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology, 731, 18–30. 21. Whitehead, A. L., Perry, S. L., and Baker, J. O. 2018. Make America Christian Again: Christian Nationalism and Voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election. Sociology of Religion, 792, 147–171. 22. Margolis. 2020. 23. Sherwood, Harriet. 2020. “White Evangelical Christians Stick by Trump Again, Exit Polls Show.” The Guardian. November 6. 24. Barna, George. 2018. “The Economy and Defense Spending Sustain Trump’s Evangelical Support.” The Christian Post. January 30. 25. Margolis. 2020, 110. 26. Abramowitz, Alan, and Webster, Steven. 2017. “Negative Partisanship Explains Everything.” Politico. September/October.

126

C. CRONIN

27. Mansfield, Stephen. 2017. Choosing Donald Trump: God, Anger, Hope, and Why Christian Conservatives Supported Him. Grand Rapids: Baker Books. 28. Lipka and Smith 2020. 29. Patriokios, Stratos. 2008. “American Republican Religion? Disentangling the Causal Link Between Religion and Politics in the U.S.” Political Behavior, 303, 367–389. 30. Egan, Patrick. 2019. “Identity as Dependent Variable: How Americans Shift Their Identities to Better Align with their Politics.” American Journal of Political Science, 64(3), 699–716. 31. Jennings, Jay T. 2016. “Mixed Reactions: How Religious Motivation Explains Responses to Religious Rhetoric in Politics.” Political Research Quarterly, 69(2), 295–308. 32. Cronin, Christopher. 2010. The Cross, the Fall, and the Resurrection: The Social Gospel Movement and the Democratic Party. LAP Lambert. 33. Heatherington, Marc. 2015. “Trust in Trump Comes from Lack of Trust in Government.” Brookings Institute. September 16. 34. Muhammad, E. 2020. Weaponizing Religion: A Document Analysis of the Religious Indoctrination of Slaves in Service of White Labor Elites. In Finley, S., Gray, B., and Martin, L., eds., The Religion of White Rage: Religious Fervor, White Workers and the Myth of Black Racial Progress, 192–212. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 35. Barrett-Fox, R. 2018. A King Cyrus President: How Donald Trump’s Presidency Reasserts Conservative Christians’ Right to Hegemony. Humanity & Society, 424, 502–522. 36. Pew Research Center. 2014. “Religious Landscape Study.” Religion and Public Life. https://www.pewforum.org/religious-lan dscape-study/. The category of “West” includes the Southwest in the geography of Pew studies. 37. Rubin, Jennifer. 2020. “What the Election Tells Us About Religion in America.” The Washington Post. November 12. 38. Kellstedt, Lyman A., and Green, John C. 1993. “Knowing God’s Many People: Denominational Preference and Political Behavior.” Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics, eds. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, 52–71. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

8

ENDLESS LOVE: EVANGELICAL VOTERS, THE …

127

39. Ingraham, L., and Boey, V. 2019. “2020 Democrat Fanatics Disconnected with the Priorities of African American Voters; Ralph Reed Says He Will Mobilize the Most Ambitious Evangelical Turnout for Trump on Record;” Tomorrow Night, President Trump is Formally Launching his Reelection Campaign in Orlando, Florida; Evangelical Vote Crucial to President Trump’s Reelection Prospects.” New York: CQ Roll Call. 40. Jelen T. G. 2018. “Can We Get the Catholic Vote?” the Effects of Catholic Running Mates in Presidential Elections. In Catholics and US Politics After the 2016 ElectionsGayte, M., Chelini-Pont, B., and Rozell, M. Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. 41. Gjelten, Tom. “2020 Faith Vote Reflects 2016 Patterns.” NPR. November 8. https://www.npr.org/2020/11/08/932263516/ 2020-faith-vote-reflects-2016-patterns 42. Mansfield. 2017.

References Abramowitz, Alan, and Steven Webster. 2017. “Negative Partisanship Explains Everything.” Politico. September/October. Barna, George. 2018. “The Economy and Defense Spending Sustain Trump’s Evangelical Support.” The Christian Post. January 30. Barrett-Fox, R. 2018. A King Cyrus President: How Donald Trump’s Presidency Reasserts Conservative Christians’ Right to Hegemony. Humanity & Society, 424, 502–522. Brooks, C., and Manza, J. 2004. A Great Divide? Religion and Political Change in U.S. National Elections, 1972–2000. Sociological Quarterly, 453, 421–421+. Burge, Ryan P., and Lewis, Andrew R. 2018. “Measuring Evangelicals: Practical Considerations for Social Scientists.” Politics and Religion, 11, 745–759. Byrnes, Jesse. 2016. “Trump Finishes 4th at Liberty University Despite Falwell Endorsement.” The Hill. March 1. Cassese, E. C. 2020. Straying From the Flock? A Look at How Americans’ Gender and Religious Identities Cross-Pressure Partisanship. Political Research Quarterly, 731, 169–183. Claassen, Ryan L. 2015. Godless Democrats and Pious Republicans? Party Activists, Party Capture, and the “God Gap.” New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

128

C. CRONIN

Cox, Daniel, and Jones, Robert P. 2017. “America’s Changing Religious Identity.” Public Religion Research Institute, September 6. Retrieved September 8, 2017. Cronin, Christopher. 2010. The Cross, the Fall, and the Resurrection: The Social Gospel Movement and the Democratic Party. LAP Lambert. Djupe, Paul A, Ryan P. Burge, and Andrew R. Lewis. 2017. “Do We Have Any Idea Who Evangelicals Are?” Religion in Public. December 14. Egan, Patrick. 2019. “Identity as Dependent Variable: How Americans Shift Their Identities to Better Align with their Politics.” American Journal of Political Science, 64(3), 699–716. Gjelten, Tom. “2020 Faith Vote Reflects 2016 Patterns.” NPR. November 8. https://www.npr.org/2020/11/08/932263516/2020-faith-vote-reflects2016-patterns Gonzales, N. L. 2018. “Are White Evangelicals the Saviors of the GOP?” Roll Call. December 6. Guerra, David Patrick. 2016. “Actually, Most Evangelicals Don’t Vote Trump.” Christianity Today. March 18. Heatherington, Marc. 2015. “Trust in Trump Comes from Lack of Trust in Government.” Brookings Institute. September 16. Ingraham, L., and Boey, V. 2019. “2020 Democrat Fanatics Disconnected with the Priorities of African American Voters; Ralph Reed Says He Will Mobilize the Most Ambitious Evangelical Turnout for Trump on Record;” Tomorrow Night, President Trump is Formally Launching his Reelection Campaign in Orlando, Florida; Evangelical Vote Crucial to President Trump’s Reelection Prospects. New York: CQ Roll Call. Jacques, B. 2019. “Donald J. Trump, the White Evangelicals, and Martin Luther: A Hypothesis.” Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology, 731, 18–30. Jelen, T. G. 2018. “Can We Get the Catholic Vote?” the Effects of Catholic Running Mates in Presidential Elections. In Catholics and US Politics After the 2016 Elections, eds. Gayte M., Chelini-Pont B., and Rozell M. Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. Jelen, Ted G., and Wald, Kenneth D. 2018. “Evangelicals and President Trump: The Not So Odd Couple.” In God at the Grassroots 2016. The Christian Right in American Politics, eds. Rozell, Mark J. and Clyde, Wilcox. Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 19–46. Jennings, Jay T. 2016. “Mixed Reactions: How Religious Motivation Explains Responses to Religious Rhetoric in Politics.” Political Research Quarterly, 69(2), 295–308. Kellstedt, Lyman A., and John C. Green. 1993. “Knowing God’s Many People: Denominational Preference and Political Behavior.” In Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics, eds. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, 52–71. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

8

ENDLESS LOVE: EVANGELICAL VOTERS, THE …

129

Lipka, Michael, and Gregory A. Smith. 2020. “White Evangelical Approval of Trump Slips, But Eight-in-Ten Say They Would Vote For Him.” Pew Research Center Fact Tank. July 1. Retrieved December 16, 2020. Mansfield, Stephen. 2017. Choosing Donald Trump: God, Anger, Hope, and Why Christian Conservatives Supported Him. Grand Rapids: Baker Books. Margolis, M. F. 2020. Who Wants to Make America Great Again? Understanding Evangelical Support for Donald Trump. Politics & Religion, 131, 89–118. Muhammad, E. 2020. Weaponizing Religion: A Document Analysis of the Religious Indoctrination of Slaves in Service of White Labor Elites. In Finley, S., Gray, B., and Martin, L. Eds., The Religion of White Rage: Religious Fervor, White Workers and the Myth of Black Racial Progress, pp. 192–212. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Newport, Frank. 2020. “Religious Group Voting and the 2020 Election.” Gallup: Polling Matters. November 13. Patriokios, Stratos. 2008. “American Republican Religion? Disentangling the Causal Link Between Religion and Politics in the U.S.” Political Behavior, 303, 367–389. Pew Research Center. 2014. “Religious Landscape Study.” Religion and Public Life. https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/. Rubin, Jennifer. 2020. “What the Election Tells Us About Religion in America.” The Washington Post. November 12. Scala, D. J. 2020. “The Skeptical Faithful: How Trump Gained Momentum Among Evangelicals.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 504, 927–947. Sherwood, Harriet. 2020. “White Evangelical Christians Stick by Trump Again, Exit Polls Show.” The Guardian. November 6. Smith, Gregory A. 2020. “White Christians Continue to Favor Trump Over Biden, But Support Has Slipped.” Pew Research Center Fact Tank, October 13. Retrieved December 15, 2020. Smith, Gregory A., and Martínez, Jessica. 2016. “How the Faithful Voted: A Preliminary Analysis.” Pew Research Center Fact Tank, November 9. Retrieved March 1, 2018. Whitehead, A. L., Perry, S. L., and Baker, J. O. 2018. Make America Christian Again: Christian Nationalism and Voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election.Sociology of Religion, 792, 147–171. Ziffirelli, Franco, dir. Endless Love. 1981. Universal Pictures.

CHAPTER 9

Looking Down the Barrel of the 2020 Elections Robert J. Spitzer

Abstract This chapter explains how gun-related issues infused the campaign and election aftermath. Statewide gun reforms did not appear on any ballots, thanks in large part to COVID, but guns were an important component of protests against COVID restrictions, the use of deadly force by police officers against unarmed black people that animated the Black Lives Matter movement, and the deadly Capitol insurrection on January 6, 2021. Keywords 2020 election · Gun policy · 2020 campaign · NRA · Republicans · Joe Biden · Donald Trump

R. J. Spitzer (B) State University of New York, Cortland, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0_9

131

132

R. J. SPITZER

The 2020 elections were dominated by three overriding issues that no one could have anticipated before the start of 2020: the COVID-19 pandemic, the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, and an explosive Black Lives Matter movement. One might have thought that these crisis issues would have pushed the gun issue well down or even off the 2020 election agenda. In a certain respect that was true. Owing to the pandemic, 2020 was the first election year since 2012 that a statewide gun reform measure did not appear on any state ballot.1 The reason had nothing to do with any lack of enthusiasm on the part of gun safety advocates. Rather, the process of collecting petition signatures to place referenda on state ballots was short-circuited by health restrictions.2 Despite this, however, guns and gun controversies infused each of the dominant national issues, and the election itself.

The National Backdrop Measures enacted to combat the spread of the virus provoked a sharp and sometimes armed response from right-wing groups. Beginning in the spring and summer of 2020, armed protestors showed up in several state capitals, including in Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, and Wisconsin to express opposition to pandemic lockdown policies they believed to be unnecessary and a violation of their rights.3 But firearms-expressed anger extended beyond public protests, including, in one alarmingly extreme case, a foiled plot hatched by at least fourteen so-called militia members in Michigan to kidnap that state’s governor, Democrat Gretchen Whitmer, in reprisal for her administration’s anti-virus measures. A similar plot was uncovered against Virginia’s Democratic governor, Ralph Northam.4 A series of legally dubious police shootings of Black people in incidents around the country were the proximate motivation for widespread protests, coalescing under the Black Lives Matter movement banner. Less dramatic, but arguably more significant, was the increase in shootings and homicides, especially in urban areas— an increase attributed, at least in part, to the interruption of programs devised to reduce gun violence because of the adverse economic effects of the pandemic. A dramatic upsurge in gun buying during this period may also have been a contributing factor. The murder increase was all the more notable given that crime in virtually every other category continued to decline.5 Hovering over the entire fall election was the ominous specter of an armed presence during election time amidst the rallying of right-wing

9

LOOKING DOWN THE BARREL OF THE 2020 ELECTIONS

133

armed groups who spread fears that the elections would be somehow hijacked by opponents of President Donald Trump.6 All of this occurred in the context of mass demonstrations around the country, which in a few instances led to violence, including armed violence, most notably in Kenosha, Wisconsin, and Portland, Oregon. Yet despite news coverage suggesting that the nationwide protests over racial injustice were typically violent—a misimpression amplified by President Trump—the opposite was the case. According to a study of the protests by the nonprofit Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, of the 7,750 protests held in all 50 states from May to August 2020, 93% of them were non-violent. Violent protests were defined as those that involved interpersonal clashes or property damage. Up to the end of August, virtually no gun violence occurred, although individuals did carry firearms in some instances. One notable shooting instance occurred in Kenosha, when an armed 17-year-old counter-protestor shot three people, killing two of them.7 For his part, President Trump failed to condemn armed counter-protestors and instead expressed sympathy for the Kenosha shooter. He also sought to paint the demonstrations in dire terms, playing on fears of a breakdown of law and order. Biden denounced violence on all sides and urged calm.8 The other notable trend spurred by the climate of uncertainty and concerns over violence was an upsurge in gun sales. The spread of the pandemic and generalized anxiety about national instability throughout 2020 prompted a significant increase in gun sales, a seemingly puzzling response, given that firearms bear no relationship to viral infection. Yet this trend is not new; spurts in gun purchases at moments of national crisis have occurred in the recent past as well.9 Second Amendment rights re-entered the political debate with the nomination of Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court to replace Ruth Bader Ginsberg, who passed away in September. During her confirmation hearings a month before the election, Judge Barrett was quizzed about her views on gun rights, along with many other subjects. Yet the most revealing piece of information about her position on gun rights came from a dissenting opinion she wrote as a federal judge in a 2019 court of appeals case upholding a law that barred felons from obtaining guns. The case then under consideration involved a man whose felony conviction was non-violent. In her dissent, Barrett, a self-proclaimed constitutional originalist, said that the historical record of gun laws showed that guns could only be stripped from owners who had “demonstrated a proclivity

134

R. J. SPITZER

for violence.” The problem with her view is that the actual historical record of old gun laws demonstrates the opposite—that literally 100s of gun laws in the colonies and states allowed for guns to be taken away from owners under circumstances that had nothing to do with committing a violent felony.10 Barrett’s addition to the high court will undoubtedly provide a firm five-member majority for significantly expanding gun rights.11

The Candidates and Guns The presidential candidates spoke little about gun policy per se during the campaign, but guns and gun violence were a critical subtext throughout the campaign season. Trump and Biden approached the subject very differently. Far from allaying or ignoring fears of violence, President Trump stoked those fears. For example, shortly after the plot against Governor Whitmer was revealed by the FBI, Trump spoke at a rally in Michigan on October 17. When some in the crowd started to shout “lock her up!” referring to Whitmer, Trump replied with a smile, saying “lock ‘em all up!” Whitmer responded, saying “This is exactly the rhetoric that has put me, my family, and other government officials’ lives in danger.”12 Earlier, in his first debate with Joe Biden, during an exchange in which Trump refused to repudiate white supremacist armed extremist groups, including a group called the Proud Boys, the president said that they should “stand back and stand by.” Members of the group immediately seized on his comments calling them “historic” and an endorsement.13 According to one counterterrorism expert, “Language from campaign materials and Trump’s extemporaneous speeches at rallies have been used as justification [by extremists] for acts of violence.”14 A comparison of Trump and Biden reveals diametrically opposed visions of gun policy. During his term as president, Trump mostly lived up to the National Rifle Association’s enthusiastic and early endorsement of his campaign in 2016, though at times he expressed plain support for new gun measures. Most notably, that occurred in the aftermath of a mass shooting at a high school in Parkland, Florida in early 2018. During a White House meeting with survivors of that and other shootings and during a follow-up meeting, Trump expressed support for strengthening background checks and keeping guns from the mentally ill or others considered dangerous. He even criticized members of Congress who

9

LOOKING DOWN THE BARREL OF THE 2020 ELECTIONS

135

he said were afraid of the NRA. Yet after meeting with NRA leaders, Trump quietly backed away from these positions. The one exception was an administrative ban on “bump stocks,” devices that have the effect of turning semi-automatic weapons into those that can fire nearly fully automatically. The devices were used by a mass shooter who killed over 50 people and injured over 500 in Las Vegas in 2017. (Trump took this step, however, with a tacit green light from the NRA).15 For his part, during the campaign Biden extolled his early and consistent support for stronger gun laws, citing his leading role while in the Senate in the enactment of the Brady law in 1993 and the assault weapons ban in 1994. Then-Vice-President Biden also chaired the special task force convened by President Obama in late 2012 in the aftermath of the Sandy Hook elementary school shooting that recommended a series of new gun measures to Congress in early 2013. None of the measures survived Senate votes. Both Biden and the Democratic party viewed support for stronger gun measures as a popular issue that has garnered even greater support from Americans in recent years, a view buttressed by the Democrats’ significant victories in the 2018 midterm elections where the gun safety issue was an important component to their victories around the country.17 Gun policy groups lined up with the candidates accordingly. The NRA again swung support to Trump, but the organization’s resources were severely strained by successive body blows, including severe financial problems, wasteful spending, and allegations of extensive corruption leveled against top leaders including against executive director Wayne LaPierre, and related expensive legal entanglements. Gun safety groups lined up behind Biden. As of post-Election Day 2020 the NRA had spent $24.4 million on the campaign overall (roughly a third of what it spent in 2016). Of that, $16.3 million went to the Trump campaign, less than the over $31 million it spent on Trump in 2016. Among gun safety groups in 2020, Everytown for Gun Safety spent $21.6 million, the Giffords group two million dollars, and the Brady Coalition $300,000. In two special US Senate elections held in January 2021 in Georgia, the NRA spent five million dollars in support of the two Republican candidates (party control of the Senate hinged on the outcome of these two races). Yet that effort fell short, as both seats were captured by the Democratic candidates.18

136

R. J. SPITZER

The Parties on Gun Policy The customary national party nominating conventions of the two major parties were interrupted by the pandemic, forcing them to hold virtual conventions. The 2020 Democratic party platform called for ending what it labeled “the epidemic of gun violence,” detailing its support for “evidence-based programs that prevent gun deaths” with particular focus on better mental health care, domestic violence and gun suicide prevention. It lent support to greater government funding for gun violence research (which had mostly ceased for the previous 25 years), implementation of universal background checks for gun purchases, ending online gun and ammunition sales, barring guns to those convicted of domestic violence, renewal of assault weapons and high capacity magazine ban, nationwide firearms licensing, a federal extreme risk protection order law for gun owners deemed an immediate risk to themselves or others, a home safe gun storage law, and repeal of special liability immunity for the gun industry.19 In an unprecedented move, the Republican National Committee voted to not adopt a new platform, instead approving a motion that its 2016 platform remain in force, which it appended to its 2020 resolution. The 2016 platform extolled the “natural inalienable right” to keep and bear arms and the “God-given right of self-defense.” It criticized the prospect of “anti-gun justices” appointed to the Supreme Court as well as efforts by the District of Columbia and other cities to restrict gun ownership and carrying. It supported national “firearm reciprocity” legislation that would require the gun license of any state to be accepted by every other, and also so-called “constitutional carry” state laws that allow citizens to carry guns openly. It voiced opposition to restrictions on ammunition magazines and assault weapons, lawsuits against gun manufacturers, federal gun licensing, ammunition registration, and called for further investigation of Operation Fast and Furious (an undercover operation during the Obama administration involving gun trafficking between the US and Mexico in which an American agent was killed, possibly with a gun that was part of the operation).20

Gun Policy in New York New York is one of the most liberal states in the country and that extends to gun policy as well. In the context of the 2020 election cycle, it is

9

LOOKING DOWN THE BARREL OF THE 2020 ELECTIONS

137

no coincidence that the armed demonstrations described in this chapter occurred mostly in the Midwest and South, not in the Empire State. To be sure, New York has an active gun community, especially in rural upstate counties, but the movement’s political bark has proven to be greater than its bite. Two gun controversies illustrate. In 2013, the state legislature enacted, at the urging of Democratic Governor Andrew Cuomo, a tough new gun law, the SAFE Act. It came less than a month after the shocking Sandy Hook elementary school shooting, and it imposed a series of new gun measures, including stricter regulations affecting assault weapons. Gun rights activists took great offense to the law, and “Repeal the SAFE Act” lawn signs appeared by the thousands in the months that followed. Some of those signs can be seen even today. Yet for all the furor, opponents never mounted a serious effort to repeal the law, and a court challenge failed: except for one minor provision, the law was upheld, including by the Second Circuit US Court of Appeals (the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of that ruling). Further, the fury of the law’s opponents was not reflected in popular opinion. Several state polls in the months after the law’s enactment found consistently that 60 percent of New Yorkers supported the law. Even in more conservative upstate, support and opposition split roughly 50–50.21 A more recent evidence of gun rights advocates’ dismay with gun laws emerged in the so-called “Second Amendment sanctuary” movement. Beginning around 2018, some local governments in Western states enacted resolutions in which they proclaimed their intention to refuse to enforce any federal or state gun laws they believed violated Second Amendment rights. As of early 2020, more than 120 municipalities in at least 30 states had done the same, including two counties in rural New York. Early in 2020, three towns in rural Cortland County, New York enacted the measures. While these measures have no legal foundation and would surely be unenforceable, proponents nevertheless used them to express their disapproval of new gun laws.22 But this movement seemed to grind to a halt because of the pandemic, and also because of the greater attention focused on other issues in the fall campaign.

The Results The gun issue was one that united gun rights activists with the Trump campaign. But there was no evidence that it played any measurable independent role in either voter activation or election outcomes in 2020. The

138

R. J. SPITZER

same can be said of two central New York congressional races, which were among the highest profile, most expensive, and fiercely contested in the country. Three-term Republican incumbent John Katko faced a strong challenge from Democratic nominee Dana Balter in the 24th congressional district, who had challenged him unsuccessfully two years earlier. Notably, Democratic enrollments outnumbered Republican in the district. In the neighboring 22nd district, one-term Democratic incumbent Anthony Brindisi faced Republican challenger and previous one-term representative Claudia Tenney, whom he narrowly defeated two years earlier. In this district, Republican enrollments exceeded Democratic. The candidate websites reflected predictable issue positioning for an upstate region that combined rural areas with medium-sized cities. Of the four candidates’ campaign websites, only one—Katko’s—failed to include the gun issue, although in other venues, Katko expressed support for gun measures like red flag laws. The other three all led with support for Second Amendment rights. Balter’s and Brindisi’s websites also described support for various gun safety measures. Tenney’s only described her opposition to “unconstitutional gun laws” like the state SAFE Act. In either races, support for or opposition to Biden or Trump dominated issue messaging by all the candidates. With that backdrop, Katko retained his seat, while the Tenney-Brindisi contest was so close that it was the last congressional race to be decided in the nation. In the final tally, Tenney won her seat back by 109 votes out of over 300,000 cast. In major local advertising media buys, the gun issue received no attention, although Republican ads playing up fears of violence were prominent in central New York as they were around the country. In a more normal political environment, one would have expected the gun issue to play a prominent role, as it had in 2018. But the pandemic, the economy, and race-related turmoil pushed issues like this aside. Returning to the national picture, despite polls showing that large majorities of Americans feared election-day violence, none materialized, as the election itself went off without any notable violence or disruption. Data reported by SeeSay20, an organization that compiled incidents of voter intimidation, noted fewer than 200 incidents of election-related intimidation nationwide from the period spanning the start of early voting through Election Day, a count considered normal.23 With electoral results showing a decisive win by Biden, a few scattered pro-Trump vote-counting protests emerged in the days and weeks after Election Day as President Trump refused to concede defeat and insisted,

9

LOOKING DOWN THE BARREL OF THE 2020 ELECTIONS

139

without evidence, that the outcome was somehow fraudulent. Armed (but peaceful) protestors appeared in swing states, including Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon (the one state on the list that was not a swing state as it went decisively for Biden), and Pennsylvania. Over a week after the election a pro-Trump rally was held in Washington D.C. and drew roughly 10,000, including members of right-wing so-called militia groups like the Oathkeepers and hate groups including the Proud Boys, Patriot Front, and American Guard (gun carrying is not allowed in D.C.). Opposing armed groups skirmished in the Washington state capitol the weekend before electoral college voting. On the day that electors convened around the country to cast their electoral votes, December 14, the Michigan State Legislature was closed to protect the electors based on credible threats of violence. Elected officials in some states who rejected Trump’s charges of fraud were also subject to threats of violence. In the most disturbing moment of post-election mayhem, Trump gave an incendiary speech to a crowd of supporters near the White House on January 6, the day Congress convened to count the electoral ballots. Again citing false information alleging election fraud, a crowd of many 1000s descended on the Capitol at Trump’s urging, where they broke down barricades, overwhelmed understaffed and underprepared police, and rampaged through the building. After several hours in which some occupied the Senate floor and House Speaker Pelosi’s office, they were forced out, leaving a trail of broken windows, smashed doors, and rifled desks. One protestor was shot and killed by an officer defending the House chamber. One officer died from injuries during the riot. Three others died from other causes. Several of the rioters carried guns and bullet holes were observed in parts of the building. The 2020 election cycle presaged a political fork in the road on the gun issue for America: generalized support for stronger gun laws fanned by revulsion at violence, especially gun-related violence and public gun threats, yet an ever-more conservative court poised to roll back longestablished and accepted gun laws. How the nation confronts these divergent trends will reveal much about how this issue will shape the political order in the months and years to come.

140

R. J. SPITZER

Notes 1. “Firearms on the Ballot,” https://ballotpedia.org/Firearms_on_ the_ballot#By_year. 2. Jennifer Mascia, “Missing from 2020 Ballots: Proposals to Expand Gun Restrictions,” The Trace, October 12, 2020, https://www. thetrace.org/2020/10/gun-buyer-background-check-measuresohio-oregon-oklahoma/. 3. Robert J. Spitzer, “Why are People Bringing Guns to AntiQuarantine Protests? To be Intimidating,” Washington Post, April 27, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/ 04/27/why-are-people-bringing-guns-anti-quarantine-protestsbe-intimidating/. 4. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, “F.B.I. Says Michigan AntiGovernment Group Plotted to Kidnap Gov. Gretchen Whitmer,” New York Times, October 8, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2020/10/08/us/gretchen-whitmer-michigan-militia.html. 5. Emily Badger and Quoctrung Bui, “Pandemic Has Hindered Many of the Best Ideas for Reducing Gun Violence,” New York Times, October 9, 2020. 6. Robert J. Spitzer, “Guns Don’t Belong Near Polling Places. Right Wingers Want Them There Anyway,” Washington Post, September 30, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/ 09/30/guns-polling-places-intimidation/. 7. “Demonstrations & Political Violence in America,” September 2020, https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/upl oads/2020/09/ACLED_USDataReview_Sum2020_SeptWeb PDF_HiRes.pdf. 8. “Fact Check: Joe Biden has Condemned Violent Protests in the Last Three Months,” Reuters, September 4, 2020, https://www. reuters.com/article/uk-factcheck-biden-condemn-violence/factcheck-joe-biden-has-condemned-violent-protests-in-the-last-threemonths-idUSKBN25V2O1. 9. Melinda Wenner Moyer, “Will a Gun Keep Your Family Safe? Here’s What the Evidence Says,” The Trace, June 18, 2020, https://www.thetrace.org/2020/04/gun-safety-researchcoronavirus-gun-sales/. 10. Robert J. Spitzer, “Originalism, Shot Full of Holes: A Primer for Amy Coney Barrett,” New York Daily News, October 14,

9

LOOKING DOWN THE BARREL OF THE 2020 ELECTIONS

141

2020, https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-conser vatives-hold-your-fire-20201014-f3kmfsuirfgqxnw675gyeq3yxestory.html. 11. “What a Justice Barrett Might Mean for the 2nd Amendment, “Los Angeles Times, October 13, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/ opinion/story/2020-10-13/amy-coney-barrett-supreme-courttrump-gun-control-rights-2nd-amendment. The case is Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019). 12. Chris Megerian, “Trump Takes Attack to Michigan Governor,” Los Angeles Times, October 18, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/pol itics/story/2020-10-17/trump-michigan-governor-extremism. 13. “Trump Now Tells Far Right to ‘Stand Down’ Amid White Supremacy Row,” BBC, October 1, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/ news/election-us-2020-54359993. 14. Elizabeth Neumann, “The Threats Against Democratic Governors Prove Trump’s Rhetoric Encourages Violence,” Washington Post, October 16, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opi nions/2020/10/16/threats-against-democratic-governors-provetrumps-rhetoric-encourages-violence/. 15. Robert J. Spitzer, “Conclusion: The Five Rules of Trump,” in Presidential Leadership and the Trump Presidency, Charles M. Lamb and Jacob R. Neiheisel, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 157–158. 16. https://joebiden.com/gunsafety/#. 17. Elaine Godfrey, “Democrats’ Unprecedented Embrace of Gun Control,” The Atlantic, August 20, 2020, https://www.theatl antic.com/politics/archive/2020/08/democrats-unprecedentedsupport-gun-control-dnc/615514/?utm_source=The+Trace+mai ling+list&utm_campaign=ec89ad65cc-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_ 2019_09_24_04_06_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_ term=0_f76c3ff31c-ec89ad65cc-69360165. 18. Daniel Nass, “How Much is the NRA Spending to Reelect Donald Trump?” The Trace, December 31, 2020, https://www.thetrace. org/features/nra-2020-election-spending-trump/. 19. “2020 Democratic Party Platform,” 47–48, https://www.demcon vention.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2020-07-31-Dem ocratic-Party-Platform-For-Distribution.pdf.

142

R. J. SPITZER

20. “Resolution Regarding the Republican Party Platform,” approved in 2020, https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/docs/Resolution_Plat form_2020.pdf. 21. Robert J. Spitzer, Guns across America: Reconciling Gun Rules and Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 160–161. 22. Robert J. Spitzer, The Gun Dilemma (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), ch. 5; Spitzer, “5 Reasons to be Concerned About ‘Second Amendment Sanctuaries,’” Syracuse.com, January 30, 2020, https://www.syracuse.com/opinion/2020/01/5-rea sons-to-be-concerned-about-second-amendment-sanctuaries-com mentary.html. 23. Larry Buhl, “Polling Place No-Shows: Intimidation and Chaos,” Capital and Main, November 4, 2020, https://capitalandmain. com/polling-place-no-shows-intimidation-and-chaos-1104? utm_source=The+Trace+mailing+list&utm_campaign=108c72 a656-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_09_24_04_06_COPY_01& utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_f76c3ff31c-108c72a656-693 60165.

CHAPTER 10

2020—A Pivotal Moment in America’s Climate Change Efforts Aaron L. Strong

Abstract The 2020 Presidential Election will always mark the year that climate change emerged as an issue of national political salience. This chapter traces the emergence and evolution of climate change as an issue in the 2020 Presidential Election, from President Trump’s announcement in 2017 that the US would withdraw from the Paris Agreement to the 2019 introduction of the “litmus test”-like Green New Deal resolution, to the first-ever appearance of major party primary candidates running on the single issue of climate action. While climate change has now emerged as a top-tier issue in Presidential elections, it has yet to fully mature. Because of the “big tent” approach taken by President Biden to unite the moderate and progressive wings of the Democratic Party, distinctions between proposed climate policy approaches remain ill-defined politically at the national level.

A. L. Strong (B) Hamilton College, Clinton, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0_10

143

144

A. L. STRONG

Keywords 2020 election · Climate change · 2020 campaign · Democrats · Climate crisis · Environmental policy

Introduction The 2020 Presidential Election will always serve as a historical point of reference: the backdrop of voting during a century-scale global public health emergency was eclipsed by unprecedented efforts by Republican elected officials and partisan operatives to overturn the election results, which made county-level election certification processes international news.1 Political scientists and historians will focus on the 2020 election when analyzing the trajectory of our democratic institutions and the arc of the American historical narrative for the rest of the 21st century. Of course, the election itself, prior to the post-election turmoil, was also historic: the largest number of voters ever cast ballots, resulting in the first election of a woman and the first election of a person of color as Vice President. The year 2020 will also always mark the climate change emerged as an issue of national political salience. While political attention to climate change has been on the presidential radar since President George H.W. Bush’s administration negotiated the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992,2 the 2020 Presidential Election represents a dramatic shift for climate change as a political issue. Climate action was a signature issue for several primary candidates, what to do about climate change was a consistent debate topic throughout the Democratic primary and in the Presidential and VicePresidential debates, and climate change was consistently one of the top-polled issues for voters, especially for young Democratic voters. These factors set 2020 apart from any previous presidential election cycle. The increased salience of the climate crisis in the 2020 Presidential Election is, of course, not surprising given the increasing impacts of the climate crisis in the US. The seven years from 2014 through 2020 were the hottest seven years on record, globally.3 Annually in the US, extreme weather events attributable to anthropogenic climate change are already causing and are projected to cause billions of dollars of damage per year.4 These include the extreme rainfall from Hurricane Harvey (2017),5 the devastation of Hurricane Maria (2017),6 the flooding damage from

10

2020—A PIVOTAL MOMENT IN AMERICA’S …

145

Hurricane Florence (2018),7 the economic damage of repeated extreme flooding in the Northeast and Midwest,8 and the drumbeat of devastating impacts from wildfires in the West.9 Of course, these are just the stories that make the news. The persistent property damages caused by sea-level rise,10 and significant agricultural losses associated with whiplash winter weather attributable to climate change have become regular parts of life in the US.11 Estimates of the economic and human toll of climate change in the US project future losses of 2.4% of domestic GDP with warming of 2.0°C.12 And there is increasing evidence that Americans are paying attention to—and becoming more concerned about—the climate crisis. The Yale Program on Climate Communication, led by Anthony Leiserowitz, has tracked Americans’ views of climate change for over a decade. Specifically, the Yale Program has developed a system of categorizing views on climate change, dubbed the “Six Americas.” Rather than dichotomously asking if Americans understand climate science or not, or if they agree with climate action or not, the Six Americas survey framework distinguishes six distinct social and political perspectives on climate change— (1) Alarmed, (2) Concerned, (3) Cautious, (4) Disengaged, (5) Doubtful, and (6) Dismissive.13 From repeated surveys of 1,000s of Americans, the Six Americas analysis has found that the percentage of Americans that are either Alarmed or Cautious has steadily grown (See Table 10.1). In December 2020, a significant majority (55%) of Americans were either Alarmed (26%) or Concerned (29%) about the climate crisis—both stances associated with Table 10.1 The percentage of Alarmed Americans has increased steadily from 2010 to 2020. Six Americas

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

2020 (%)

Overall change

Alarmed Concerned Cautious Disengaged Doubtful Dismissive

10 29 27 6 13 16

17 31 24 6 11 10

26 29 19 6 12 8

+16% No Change −8% No Change −1% −8%

Source Yale Program on Climate Communications; some sums don’t equal 100 percent due to rounding

146

A. L. STRONG

strong belief in the need for policy action to address climate change14 Meanwhile, despite frequent rhetorical references to an evenly divided America on climate change, in December 2020 the number of Doubtful and Dismissive Americans—those who are most likely to be opposed to climate action—was only 20%.15 Table 10.1 shows the dramatic increase in Alarmed Americans in just 10 years. These numbers also reflect the widely identified pattern of greater polarization of American voters.16 The number of Americans in the “middle” who are either Cautious or Disengaged has dropped by eight percent in 10 years. Taken as a whole, these data show that, compared with a decade ago, fewer Americans dismiss the truth of climate science, and significantly more Americans are alarmed by the impacts of the climate crisis. And, indeed, issue-based polling in the lead up to the 2020 Presidential Election demonstrated strong concern about the climate crisis. In the 2020 primary, a poll of voters in early voting states showed that climate change was the second most highly ranked issue for Democratic primary voters when deciding on a candidate, behind only health care.17 In a December 2019 poll of registered voters aged 18–29 across both parties, John Zogby Strategies found that 80% of voters said that climate change was a “major threat” and one of the top four issues affecting their vote.18 In July and August 2020, a Pew Research Poll found that 42% of all voters said that climate change would be a “very important” issue in how they voted in the November election.19 And campaign strategists were keenly aware of the salience of climate in issue polling. In April 2019, I spoke with a former campaign advisor to President Obama and asked him whether he thought climate change was now a major issue for voters heading into 2020. At the time, the Democratic field was filling rapidly with candidates taking stances on climate change, including Washington Governor Jay Inslee who announced in March 2019. Obama’s former advisor’s view was clear: 2020 was different. In the 2020 Election, climate change was now a kitchen table conversation issue and, unlike in 2008, 2012, or 2016, candidates would now have to develop issue-specific strategies and platforms on how to address climate change. In this chapter, I trace the emergence and evolution of climate change as a salient political issue in the 2020 Presidential Election. I analyze the political role that addressing climate change played in the election, and, ultimately, I argue that while climate change has now emerged as a toptier issue in Presidential elections, it has yet to fully mature politically.

10

2020—A PIVOTAL MOMENT IN AMERICA’S …

147

Thus, while climate change will remain a top issue of concern for many voters, President Biden’s administration’s actions on climate change will strongly shape the electoral role that climate change will play as an issue in future Presidential elections.

Setting the Political Stage for Climate Change in 2020 In addition to the drumbeat of climate change impacts, three key factors set the political stage for climate change as an issue in the 2020 Presidential Election: (1) Donald J. Trump’s statements as both a candidate and his actions as President, including references to climate change being a “hoax” and his decision to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement, (2) the 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C,20 which catalyzed a global set of policy announcements targeting net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 as being aligned with what the best available “science says,” and (3) the introduction in February 2019 of H. Res. 109, the Green New Deal resolution by Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY-14).21 As a new entrant to politics setting the stage for his successful Presidential bid in 2016, Donald J. Trump sought to shape political narratives around a variety of issues, from immigration to race to health care to climate change. In what was to become a salient, memeified refrain in the 2020 campaign, on November 6, 2012, Donald J. Trump—then a private citizen—tweeted, “The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.” On December 6, 2013, Donald J. Trump would subsequently use the word hoax: “Global warming is a total, and very expensive, hoax!” and again on the same day: “We should be focused on magnificently clean and healthy air and not distracted by the expensive hoax that is global warming!” He would go on to repeatedly dismiss or cast doubt on the settled science of anthropogenic climate change throughout the 2015-2016 Presidential campaign. Donald J. Trump’s repeated his description of climate change as a “hoax,” during the years of the Obama Administration and as a candidate for President in 2016.22 Trump’s early comments, while they were repeatedly referenced by Democratic primary candidates, were eclipsed by his actions as President. In May 2017, President Trump announced his intention to withdraw the US from the Paris

148

A. L. STRONG

Agreement—an international treaty built on individual, nationally determined pledges for climate action by all countries of the world. While receiving perhaps less political attention, the Trump Administration also took numerous actions to reduce the impact of Obama-era environmental regulations, including opening up more federal land to oil and gas exploration, rescinding the Clean Power Plan which regulated greenhouse gas emissions from power plants, weakening the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for vehicles, and reducing the use of the social cost of carbon to inform federal decision-making. Collectively, these actions set up a broad political space for Democrats considering a run in 2020: President Trump had made clear he had no interest in developing comprehensive climate change policies, and so it would not be challenging for any Democrat to demonstrate significant differences from the President in order to attract the growing number of voters concerned about the need for climate action. The second key factor which shaped the political development of climate change in the 2020 Presidential Election was the publication in Fall 2018 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C. This report, which had been commissioned as part of the 2015 Paris Agreement, laid out a scientific analysis of the emissions reductions required to avoid dangerous climate change. The report concluded that global greenhouse gas emissions have to be reduced to net-zero emissions by 2050, and in the interim, emissions need to be reduced by 45% by 2030 if humanity is to have a chance to avoid catastrophic warming.23 These scientific findings immediately led to major political announcements and news headlines that we have “a decade left to save the planet.24 ” The new scientific assessment also led in 2019 to widespread adoption of policy targets of or net-zero emissions by 2050 from dozens of countries around the world, including Chile, China, New Zealand, the UK, and many others,25 as well as from major multinational corporations like Amazon, Mercedes-Benz, Microsoft, and Unilever.26 In July 2019, New York State passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act which set a goal of net-zero emissions by 2050 for the state. The collective push for net-zero targets would strongly shape former Vice President Biden’s climate policy planning in 2020. The third major force shaping the political development of climate change in the 2020 Presidential Election was the February 2019 introduction of the Green New Deal resolution. The Green New Deal resolution,

10

2020—A PIVOTAL MOMENT IN AMERICA’S …

149

which calls for a ten-year mobilization to set the US on a path for netzero emissions in 2050 and 40–60% emission reductions by 2030, draws its only numerical targets from the 2018 IPCC Special Report. The actual text of the Green New Deal includes few other numerical targets, but places a strong emphasis on climate justice, on investment in clean energy infrastructure, and on preventing ecological degradation. Despite being short on details, the Green New Deal resolution served a more important political function. Its role was to serve as a progressive litmus test of sorts. The Green New Deal placed strong intersectional emphases on racial and social inequity, wage stagnation, labor, and dismantling systemic racism.27 Because of these intersectional emphases, the Green New Deal’s vision became a rallying cry for opposition from the right and supporting the Green New Deal would become a bonafide progressive credential. Collectively, when coupled with the rise in concern about climate change within the electorate, these three factors created a dynamic where, for Democratic candidates looking toward 2020, (a) climate was a concern for their voters, (b) it was easy to separate themselves from Trump, (c) there was an available political litmus test that was a measure of progressiveness, rather than an endorsement of specific policies, and (d) there was a newly scientifically endorsed universal policy goal sufficiently far in the future: reduce emissions to net-zero in the next 30 years.

The 2020 Democratic Primary and Climate Change The 2020 Democratic primary field was historically large and diverse. The large size of the field created an opportunity for candidates to campaign on particular issues. Running a campaign with a core focus on a highprofile evocative issue can serve several purposes. One purpose is that it helps the candidate stand out by connecting symbolically with issue voters most directly.28 Especially in a large primary field, voters, especially those who care about a particular issue, may be attracted to the candidate, gaining a critical foothold in wide-open primary races, where every vote counts. Another purpose is to raise the visibility of the issue and thus the candidate’s own profile so as to attract attention to the candidate’s current work and past record.29 A third purpose is to brand the politician with the issue so that they are positioned to assume leadership roles in the future.30 The large primary field created an opportunity for single-issue candidates, and the increased salience of the climate crisis in the eyes of voters led two particular candidates to focus on climate change: Governor

150

A. L. STRONG

Jay Inslee of Washington and business and philanthropist Tom Steyer. Governor Inslee, who announced his candidacy on March 1, 2019,31 explicitly took the mantle of the “climate candidate” building on a track record of environmental policies in Washington state and experience internationally (he attended international climate change negotiations in 2017 and 2018). Tom Steyer, who announced his bid in July 2019, and who had previously led a campaign effort to impeach President Trump, had a long track record of work on climate action and climate justice causes and placed a primary campaign focus on climate action. But, of course, climate change’s salience had risen enough that other Democratic candidates did not ignore the issue. The majority of Democratic primary candidates explicitly endorsed the Green New Deal resolution, including Senator Kamala Harris, Senator Bernie Sanders, and Senator Elizabeth Warren. In the large, multi-night format debates of Summer 2019, there was very little differentiation on climate policy in response to questions. All of the candidates were committed to rejoining the Paris Agreement, to investing in a renewable energy economy that would create jobs, and to tackling this urgent issue. The lack of differentiation created for somewhat boring discussions on climate change, and early in the primary, it was clear that candidates still had trouble connecting with voters on climate change.32 Climate activists, however, wanted more substantive discussions and more focus on climate change than the brief debate segments that were being offered. Both Governor Inslee and the Sunrise Movement, a youth climate movement strongly aligned with implementing the Green New Deal resolution, called explicitly for a Climate Debate, something the Democratic National Committee did not endorse.33 The compromise solution, of sorts, was an unusual televised spectacle: the CNN Climate Town Hall on Wednesday September 4, 2019. For seven hours straight, ten Democratic candidates got up one by one to discuss their visions for climate action.

Climate Was Not the Determining Factor in the Democratic Primary Yet, despite the strong attention to climate change in Summer 2019, candidates who ran on “climate” did not gain any traction with voters in polling or in the actual primary balloting. Governor Jay Inslee and Tom Steyer were features of the debates in Summer 2019, but they did

10

2020—A PIVOTAL MOMENT IN AMERICA’S …

151

not last long. Governor Inslee dropped out in August 2019, having failed to qualify for upcoming Fall debates polling at levels below two percent in major national polls. In announcing his exit from the race, Governor Inslee vowed to keep other candidates focused on climate change. Tom Steyer—buoyed by millions of dollars of his own money spent on advertising—kept going through Fall 2019 and into the voting in early 2020. In Iowa, Tom Steyer placed seventh. In New Hampshire, Steyer came in sixth, after which his campaign focused squarely on South Carolina, where he had invested heavily. With his campaign resting entirely on a win in South Carolina, Tom Steyer placed third on February 29, 2020. He subsequently dropped out, having spent nearly US$250 million of his own money on his campaign. What these candidates did do, however, was to elevate climate into the conversation, cementing it as an “issue” that required a platform and detailed policy prescriptions. When a candidate runs on climate and brings up climate as a talking point at nearly every turn, others are forced to address the topic. The debates of Summer and Fall 2019 and the September 2019 Climate Town Hall collectively elevated climate policy discussions in the Democratic Primary, recognizing the importance of the issue to Democratic voters. By March 2020, the dynamics of the Democratic race had fully crystallized. Though Senator Bernie Sanders was the early front runner, former Vice President’s Biden’s victory in the South Carolina primary in February launched his front runner status. With endorsements arriving from Senator Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota and former South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg, Joe Biden won 10 of 14 state primaries on Super Tuesday (March 3, 2020), including a surprise victory in Massachusetts, establishing a delegate lead that would prove insurmountable. As the COVID-19 pandemic struck and began to shut down the US economy in mid-March 2020, the parade of Biden’s primary wins became larger and it became clear that he would win the Democratic nomination over Bernie Sanders. There have been numerous analyses of Biden’s primary victory. While nearly all point out the turning point moment of South Carolina and the substantial role of the African American vote, others point to his appeal to moderate Democratic voters, union voters, and white working-class voters.34,35 Numerous polls in mid-March 2020 showed that likely voters preferred former Vice President Biden to Senator Sanders in head-tohead match-ups with President Trump. For example, an NBC News/Wall

152

A. L. STRONG

Street Journal poll of registered voters conducted by Hart Research Associates March 11–13, 2020 (after Super Tuesday), showed Senator Sanders with a 49–45 (+4) polling lead in a head to head matchup with President Trump. Meanwhile, in the same poll, Joe Biden led President Trump, 52–43 (+9).36 Few analyses of the Democratic primary dynamic have regarded the candidate’s climate stances as a deciding factor in the outcome of the primary, despite strong voter preference for climate action. Senator Sanders was an early endorser of the Green New Deal, while former Vice President Biden was more equivocal. During the primary campaign, Biden’s announcements consistently tied “clean energy” to jobs, focusing on infrastructure planning and deployment of clean energy, rather than wholescale changes in climate and energy policy like a carbon tax or nation-wide cap and trade program. Nonetheless, while the short-lived race between Biden and Sanders was billed as a choice between a moderate and a progressive, relatively little political attention was paid to their differences in stances on climate change, which largely amounted to Sanders’ endorsement of the Green New Deal resolution and the greater frequency with which he spoke about the issue on the campaign trail.

Biden’s Big Tent Approach Shaped Climate as an Issue in the November Election By April 2020, former Vice President Biden had all but ensured the nomination and the pandemic minimized further campaigning as Sanders dropped out. At this stage Biden began to develop strategies for the general election. Typically, at this stage in the electoral process, we see candidates shift politically toward the center in order to appeal to independent voters. Indeed, extremist nominees have been empirically shown to suffer in general elections because they can activate the opposing party’s base.37 Appealing to moderates and tacking to the center can thus minimize turnout for the opposition party’s base. Because of the political sensibility of turning toward the center, within the left-wing of the Democratic Party there were significant fears that, because he might not need to be seen as a climate change advocate to secure left-wing votes, the President Biden would minimize climate policy discussions and reduce climate action ambition in his policy proposals as he tacked toward the center. Yet, having essentially cemented the Democratic nomination, candidate Biden took a very different tack. On May 13, 2020, Biden announced a

10

2020—A PIVOTAL MOMENT IN AMERICA’S …

153

new Climate Task Force that would craft his general election policy platform on climate change. Notably, the new Task Force, announced as a “Unity Task Force” jointly with Senator Sanders’ staff, included both progressive voices, such as Representative Ocasio-Cortez and Varshini Prakash, the co-founder of the climate activist group Sunrise, as well as more moderate voices. It also included significant climate policy leadership from former Secretary of State John Kerry, creating a high and visible political profile for climate action. The “joint leadership” of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and John Kerry was billed as a “climate dream team.”38 In effect, the task force created a “big tent” approach for climate policy. Progressive voices would be listened to, included and given a seat at the table and climate change would, given the profile of the task force, be a signature policy issue for candidate Biden in the Fall. Rather than a tack toward the center, Biden used climate change as a way to incorporate progressives into his large tent of the Democratic Party. In the midst of a summer dominated by protests against continued system racism and policy brutality, Biden’s task force released his Climate and Environmental Justice Plan in July 2020. While as a candidate, Biden was not explicitly endorsing the Green New Deal resolution, Biden’s plan included unprecedentedly ambitious climate targets for a mainstream American politician. Notably, these targets were aligned with the latest scientific understanding: net-zero emissions by 2050. Biden also announced a target of 100% zero-carbon electricity by 2035. Much of the plan was dedicated to a strong emphasis on using federal government investments in a renewable energy economy to spur job growth. With his ambitious plan unveiled, Biden had strategically minimized any potential progressive resistance on climate change. Biden was not an explicit advocate of the Green New Deal, but Biden’s plan had many of the elements of the Green New Deal’s vision in it. (In the now-infamous October 2020 debate with President Trump, Biden stated “The Green New Deal is not my plan … I support the Biden Plan.”)39 The policy proposals in the Biden Climate and Environmental Justice Plan ensured that Biden would not be attacked meaningfully from the left on climate as an issue in the general election, yet he could still position himself as attractive to more moderate and independent voters, despite building a climate policy plan that referred to the Green New Deal as a “crucial framework.”

154

A. L. STRONG

Fall 2020: The General Election With the comfort of his big tent, Biden did not have to do much to distinguish himself on climate for voters concerned about the issue; he had already made it clear that he took climate change seriously and that President Trump did not. While there were some attempts by Republican strategists to pin Biden down on the question of whether he supported banning fracking40 —and most of these seemed targeted at swing-state voters in Pennsylvania—most political attention to climate change in the general election stayed focused on the wide gulf between the two parties on this issue. With wildfires linked to anthropogenic climate change raging in California, and President Trump’s statements focused on sweeping forest floors,41 rather than substantively addressing the causes of climate crisis, it remained easy throughout the general election season for Biden to paint strong and sharp differences from President Trump in his stance on climate change. But, while President Trump was a highly unusual candidate and politician, it is important to note that the differentiation on climate change stances between the parties was not just pronounced at the Presidential level. Using the Six America’s framework that distinguishes stances on climate change as Alarmed, Concerned, Cautious, Disengaged, Doubtful, or Dismissive, my research assistants and I categorized the public stances on climate change of each of the 2020 Congressional candidates, based on information on their campaign websites or recent public statements about climate change. For each candidate for whom an assessment was possible (i.e., some candidates did not address climate change in any public way, so no assessment was possible), we assigned their stance to one of the Six Americas categories. Table 10.2 below shows that Democratic candidates had dramatically significantly stronger concern about climate change than Republican candidates across all Congressional districts (Two tailed t-test, t = 28.5, d.f. 374, p < 001). It is not possible to argue that President Biden’s approach to climate change alone won him the election, especially given the sharp differences on numerous issues between the two candidates and the polarizing effect of President Trump as a candidate. What is clear, however, is that President Biden won the election handily, and that, based on Yale’s December 2020 survey, a majority of Americans who voted favor climate action.42

10

Table 10.2 Assessment of stances of congressional candidates’ stances on climate change, where Alarmed = 6, Concerned = 5, Cautious = 4, Disengaged = 3, Doubtful = 2, Dismissive = 1

2020—A PIVOTAL MOMENT IN AMERICA’S …

155

Six America’s Score (mean ± s.d.) Democratic Candidates (n=373) Republican Candidates (n=229)

5.23±0.78 2.94±1.07

Since the Election---The First 100 Days Many politicians, when campaigning for President, announce what they will do as soon as they get in office. And as soon as he was inaugurated, President Biden fulfilled several of his climate change campaign promises: rejoining the Paris Agreement, halting drilling leases on federal lands and canceling the Keystone XL Pipeline in his first week., In so doing, Biden signaled a theme for his Presidency on climate—to keep a focus on climate action as a job-creation engine. In announcing these first-week-in-office orders said “Today is Climate Day at the White House, which means it’s Jobs Day at the White House.”43 He has also maintained a high profile for climate action in his Presidency by appointing John Kerry as his Global Climate Envoy—a position which for the first time is being given a seat on the National Security Council, and by appointing former EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy—a serious and high-level climate policy expert—as his Domestic Climate Policy lead. Further, by nominating Rep. Deb Haaland—a favorite of climate action oriented progressive groups— as his Secretary of the Interior, President Biden acknowledged again the need to bring “pro-Green New Deal” perspectives to the table. Collectively, these appointments and policy announcements have maintained the “big tent” approach to climate change that candidate Biden had established in 2020. His actions and the actions of his administration have thus far made it clear that progressive voices on climate action are to be taken seriously and that climate will remain a high-level policy focus in his first term.

156

A. L. STRONG

The campaign plans for investment in the clean energy economy are now the focus of President Biden’s proposed infrastructure bill, the American Jobs Plan. The Plan calls for unprecedented investment in electric vehicles and electric vehicle charging infrastructure.44 Coupled with other announcements of expanded opportunities for off-shore wind development, the first 100 days of President Biden’s term have revealed that his approach to achieving the lofty climate action targets ensconced in his platform—100 percent zero carbon electricity by 2035 and a net-zero US by 2050—will be initially pursued by a pathway of heavy government spending focused on renewable electricity generation and electrifying transportation, rather than regulatory restrictions. The success of this approach—politically and technologically—over the next three years will strongly shape the ways in which climate change functions as a national political issue in the 2024 Presidential Election and beyond.

Conclusion As a newly high-profile political issue, climate change is not going away as a key issue for voters or Presidential administrations. Climate change has finally arrived as a top-tier issue. Yet, in other ways, climate has also not yet fully matured politically. Unlike the protracted political and policy debates about health care, guns, police reform, or immigration, which all have hotly publicly debated policy proposals, climate change is different. Once we move beyond the “is it real or not” debate that still distinguishes Democrats and Republicans, within the Democratic Party right now there are no clearly defined disputes over emissions reduction targets or specific climate spending priorities or about technological approaches. A “100% zero-carbon electricity which then powers newly electrified transportation and buildings” has emerged as the consensus view in academic and policy circles.45 While there have been dust-ups in academic discussions over whether carbon pricing as a mechanism is politically dead or not,46 there has been almost no public political friction over carbon pricing at a national level. Yet there are sharper divides on the political horizon. There has been, even in the 2020 Presidential Election, almost no political attention to or discussion of the right way to adapt to climate change. In a review of the September 4, 2019, CNN Climate Town Hall, only two of the ten candidates who spoke even briefly mentioned specific policies about adapting to climate change. Whether we invest in protective infrastructure or pursue

10

2020—A PIVOTAL MOMENT IN AMERICA’S …

157

managed retreat has enormous daily-life level political ramifications in many communities—ramifications which have not yet appeared on the national political stage. The degree to which climate action is a function of individual responsibility for emissions reductions or whether fossil fuelbased energy systems will be regulatorily banned will likely also feature prominently, especially as it cleaves to well-trodden political debates about the appropriate size and role of government. As the urgency of climate action (and many of Biden’s currently policy proposals) will require rapid shifts in energy infrastructure, whether people and communities resist new renewable energy infrastructure deployment will also emerge as salient political themes in the near future. Thus, while climate change’s rise into national political prominence is complete, what happens next politically for this issue is not yet clear. But of course, one thing is clear: in the near term, the impacts of anthropogenic climate change will continue to wreak havoc on American communities. In early April 2021, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide passed 420 parts per million for the first time,47 and the first three months of 2021—significantly warmer than average—have already seen a billion-dollar weather disaster in the US.48 The urgency of climate action alone will maintain the salience of climate change as a political issue that simply cannot afford to be ignored. Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge Kaitlyn Bieber and Sarah Ferland for their hard and detailed work analyzing the climate change stances of candidates in 2020 Congressional races.

Notes 1. Sadeghi, McKenzie. November 19, 2020. “Fact Check: Wayne County Board of Canvassers voted twice on certifying election results.” USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ factcheck/2020/11/19/fact-check-wayne-county-board-votedtwice-certify-election-results/3776203001/ (Accessed April 1, 2021). 2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. New York: United Nations, General Assembly, 1992. 3. NASA. January 14, 2021. “2020 tied for warmest year on record, NASA analysis shows.” https://www.nasa.gov/press-rel

158

A. L. STRONG

ease/2020-tied-for-warmest-year-on-record-nasa-analysis-shows (Accessed April 1, 2021). 4. Leahy, Stephen. September 27, 2017. National Geographic, “Hidden costs of climate change running hundreds of billions a year.” https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/cli mate-change-costs-us-economy-billions-report (Accessed April 1, 2021). 5. Risser, Mark D., and Michael F. Wehner. “Attributable humaninduced changes in the likelihood and magnitude of the observed extreme precipitation during Hurricane Harvey.” Geophysical Research Letters 44.24 (2017): 12–457. 6. Keellings, David, and José J. Hernández Ayala. “Extreme rainfall associated with Hurricane Maria over Puerto Rico and its connections to climate variability and change.” Geophysical Research Letters 46.5 (2019): 2964–2973. 7. Reed, Kevin A., et al. “Forecasted attribution of the human influence on Hurricane Florence.” Science advances 6.1 (2020): eaaw9253. 8. Davenport, Frances V., Marshall Burke, and Noah S. Diffenbaugh. “Contribution of historical precipitation change to US flood damages.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118.4 (2021). 9. Goss, Michael, et al. “Climate change is increasing the likelihood of extreme autumn wildfire conditions across California.” Environmental Research Letters 15.9 (2020): 094016. 10. Hino, M., Belanger, S. T., Field, C. B., Davies, A. R., & Mach, K. J. (2019). High-tide flooding disrupts local economic activity. Science advances 5.2: eaau2736. 11. Reidmiller, D. R., Avery, C. W., Easterling, D. R., Kunkel, K. E., Lewis, K. L. M., Maycock, T. C., & Stewart, B. C. (2019). Fourth national climate assessment. Volume II: Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States. 12. Hsiang, Solomon, et al. “Estimating economic damage from climate change in the United States.” Science 356.6345 (2017): 1362–1369. 13. Maibach, Edward, Connie Roser-Renouf, and Anthony Leiserowitz. 2009. “Global warming’s six Americas 2009: An audience segmentation analysis.” https://cdn.americanprogress.org/ wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/05/pdf/6americas.pdf.

10

2020—A PIVOTAL MOMENT IN AMERICA’S …

159

14. Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Rosenthal, S., Kotcher, J., Wang, X., Carman, J., Goldberg, M., Lacroix, K., & Marlon, J. (2021). Climate activism: A Six-Americas analysis, December 2020. Yale University and George Mason University. New Haven, CT: Yale Program on Climate Change Communication. 15. Ibid. 16. Smidt, Corwin D. “Polarization and the decline of the American floating voter.” American Journal of Political Science 61.2 (2017): 365–381. 17. Super Tuesday Climate Action National Poll Memo. March 2020. Yale Program on Climate Communication. https://www.climat echangecommunication.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ Voters-in-Upcoming-Primary-States-Support-Climate-Action-Cli mate-Nexus.pdf. 18. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6670126-USCMNational-Youth-Poll-FINAL-1-21-1-1.html. 19. Tyson, Alec. October 6, 2020. “How important is climate change to voters in the 2020 election?” Pew Research. https://www.pew research.org/fact-tank/2020/10/06/how-important-is-climatechange-to-voters-in-the-2020-election/ (Accessed April 1, 2021). 20. IPCC, 2018: Global warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, H. O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P. R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J. B. R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M. I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, T. Waterfield (eds.)]. 21. H.Res.109—Recognizing the duty of the Federal Government to create a Green New Deal. 116th Congress. Introduced 02/07/2019. Text at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-con gress/house-resolution/109/text 22. https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016/12/trumpclimate-timeline/. 23. IPCC, 2018: Global warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of

160

A. L. STRONG

climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, H. O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P. R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J. B. R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M. I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, T. Waterfield (eds.)]. 24. UN 2019. “Only 11 years left to prevent irreversible damage from climate change, speakers warn during general assembly highlevel meeting.” March 28, 2019. https://www.un.org/press/en/ 2019/ga12131.doc.htm 25. https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/06/14/countriesnet-zero-climate-goal/. 26. https://www.environmentalleader.com/2020/12/unilever-mic rosoft-11-more-companies-join-the-climate-pledge/. 27. Hathaway, Julia Robertson. “Climate change, the intersectional imperative, and the opportunity of the Green New Deal.” Environmental Communication 14.1 (2020): 13–22. 28. Rabinowitz, George, and Stuart Elaine Macdonald. “A directional theory of issue voting.” The American Political Science Review (1989): 93–121. 29. Benoit, William L., Penni M. Pier, and LeAnn M. Brazeal. The primary decision: A functional analysis of debates in presidential primaries. Vol. 1062. No. 5623. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002. 30. Ryoo, J., & Bendle, N. (2017). “Understanding the social media strategies of US primary candidates.” Journal of Political Marketing 16.3–4: 244–266. 31. CNN. Washington Governor Jay Inslee Announces 2020 Presidential Bid. https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/01/politics/inslee2020-presidential-campaign/index.html (Accessed April 1, 2021). 32. Worland, Justin. June 27, 2019. Time. https://time.com/561 6355/climate-change-2020-democratic-debate/. 33. DNC Denies 2020 Climate Debate. US News and World Report. https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2019-06-06/ dnc-denies-2020-democrats-a-climate-change-debate (Accessed April 1, 2021). 34. https://www.npr.org/2020/08/16/902640265/joe-bidenslong-and-rocky-road-to-the-democratic-nomination.

10

2020—A PIVOTAL MOMENT IN AMERICA’S …

161

35. Klein, Ezra. April 13, 2020. How Joe Biden won Over Bernie Sanders. Vox. https://www.vox.com/2020/4/13/21219715/ bernie-sanders-joe-biden-endorsement-democratic-primary-2020. 36. March 14, 2020 Final Poll. Hart Research Associates/Public Opinion Strategies Study #200149 https://assets.documentcloud. org/documents/6810602/200149-NBCWSJ-March-Poll-Final3-14-20-Release.pdf. 37. Hall, Andrew B., and Daniel M. Thompson. “Who punishes extremist nominees? Candidate ideology and turning out the base in US elections.” American Political Science Review 112.3 (2018): 509–524. 38. https://insideclimatenews.org/news/13052020/biden-ocasiocortez-kerry-climate-task-force/. 39. Roberts, David. October 7, 2020 Vox. What Joe Biden was trying to say about the Green New Deal. https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21498236/ joe-biden-green-new-deal-debate. 40. Green, Mark. “Joe Biden will not ban fracking”. October 9, 2020. https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/blog/2020/ 10/09/joe-biden-will-not-ban-fracking. 41. White, Jeremy. August 20, 2020. Politico. https://www.politico. com/states/california/story/2020/08/20/trump-blames-califo rnia-for-wildfires-tells-state-you-gotta-clean-your-floors-1311059. 42. Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Rosenthal, S., Kotcher, J., Wang, X., Carman, J., Goldberg, M., Lacroix, K., & Marlon, J. (2021). Climate activism: A Six-Americas analysis, December 2020. Yale University and George Mason University. New Haven, CT: Yale Program on Climate Change Communication. 43. Biden Hits ‘Pause’ On Oil and Gas Leasing On Public Lands And Waters. https://www.npr.org/sections/president-biden-takesoffice/2021/01/27/960941799/biden-to-pause-oil-and-gas-lea sing-on-public-lands-and-waters. 44. Fact Sheet: American Jobs Plan. White House https://www.whi tehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/ fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/ (Accessed April 5, 2021). 45. Roberts, David. Oct. 27, 2017. Vox. The key to tackling climate change: electrify everything. https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/ 12938086/electrify-everything.

162

A. L. STRONG

46. Michael E. Mann Tweet. https://twitter.com/MichaelEMann/sta tus/1269017583010951172. 47. Washington Post. April 5, 2021. Carbon dioxide spikes to critical record, halfway to doubling preindustrial levels. https://www.was hingtonpost.com/weather/2021/04/05/atmospheric-co2-con centration-record/ (Accessed April 13, 2021). 48. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. “First 3 months brought billion dollar disaster, warm start to Spring for U.S.” April 8, 2021. https://www.noaa.gov/news/first-3-mon ths-of-2021-brought-billion-dollar-disaster-warm-start-to-springfor-us (Accessed April 13, 2021).

CHAPTER 11

“America First” Finished Second: Foreign Policy in the 2020 Presidential Campaign Paul S. Adams

Abstract The 2020 campaigns of Donald Trump and Joe Biden superficially seemed centered less on foreign policy than other recent elections. Polling also indicated that voters deemphasized the importance of foreign policy in the race. In the debates, domestic issues including the economy, coronavirus response, racial tensions, and Trump’s presidential style dwarfed foreign policy. However, foreign policy was more integral to the campaigns and the results than has been generally argued. The stark differences on foreign policy were well integrated into the “brand” of each candidate and were used consistently at the national level. In many swing states, foreign policy was an important part of both campaigns’ messaging to key voter blocks for whom it was more salient than at the national level. Hence, rather than affirm that foreign policy was marginal

P. S. Adams (B) University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg, Greenburg, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0_11

163

164

P. S. ADAMS

to the 2020 campaign and its results, this chapter argues that it was integral at both the national level and in critical swing states. Keyword 2020 election · Foreign policy · Donald Trump · Joe Biden · America first

Foreign policy preferences and rhetoric dramatically differentiated President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden in the 2020 contest for the presidency. Trump’s 2016 run, term in the White House, and 2020 campaign embodied “America First” by attacking many of the pillars of postwar American foreign policy.1 He attacked trade agreements with China, Mexico, Canada, and much of the rest of the world. His brash and undiplomatic style destabilized long-standing relationships with allies and competitors alike. He disparaged American membership in multilateral international institutions including the United Nations and NATO. He withdrew the US from the Paris Climate Accords. Trump polarized many with his recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and nonchalance toward increasing settlements in the West Bank. Igniting a trade war with China, directly negotiating with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, and delegitimizing evidence of Russia’s role in a social media disinformation campaign in the 2016 presidential election all demonstrated Trump’s unconventional and transactional foreign policy machinations. Joe Biden, not surprisingly given his long Senate career on the Foreign Relations Committee and eight years as Vice President, reflected an establishment-oriented set of foreign policy preferences. Biden hailed multilateral institutions and existing alliances.2 Biden ran on a platform of restoring American leadership in global affairs in line with traditional postwar US preferences.3 Biden criticized Trump on a variety of foreign policy fronts especially on North Korea, Russia, China, traditional alliances, and trade. Trump countered with attacks that linked Biden with China and, late in the campaign, Joe Biden’s son, Hunter Biden, with corruption in Ukraine. Perhaps no set of issues was more emblematic of substantive and philosophical distinctions between the candidates than foreign policy.

11

“AMERICA FIRST” FINISHED SECOND: FOREIGN POLICY …

165

Polling Data on Foreign Policy in 2020 Despite the wide chasm between the candidates, voters appeared to view foreign policy as far from the most urgent issue in the campaign.4 The economy, coronavirus, racial tensions, as well as Trump’s presidential style itself, left foreign policy as a less central concern to voters. Pew poll results from August 2020 showed only 57% of registered voters named foreign policy as “very important” to their vote, falling behind the economy (79%), health care (68%), Supreme Court appointments (64%), coronavirus outbreak (62%), and violent crime (59%). Interestingly, there was no distinction between Trump and Biden supporters with each candidate’s supporters identically rating foreign policy.5 In 2016, a similar Pew poll ranked foreign policy at 75% behind just terrorism (80%) and the economy (84%).6 In 2012, only 52% ranked foreign policy as “very important.”7 The inconsistency of foreign policy in the last three election cycles is notable but not atypical. Despite the volatility regarding the importance of foreign policy in presidential elections, 2020 also saw the development of an even more consistent and identifiable partisan divide over foreign policy issues. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll conducted in July 2020 confirmed developments from over the past three decades. Americans have become more polarized and there are larger partisan gaps on many important foreign policies including trade, international institutions, NATO, and American exceptionalism.8 As the report concluded: Commentators have questioned whether the American public is committed to remaining involved in world affairs or whether the country is drifting toward isolationism. But this isn’t the most relevant question, as a majority of Americans continue to support global engagement. Rather, the most important question is how the United States should relate to the rest of the world. President Trump’s foreign policy is largely based on the importance of “America First,” emphasizing the central role of nationalism and sovereignty … In contrast, Biden has emphasized the importance of working with other countries to address global challenges…While these ideas no doubt reflect the candidates’ perspectives on how the United States should engage the world, they’re perfectly tailored to appeal to their respective constituencies.9

The polling illuminated a paradox in the role of foreign policy in presidential elections. While voters and candidates are striking more polarized

166

P. S. ADAMS

positions on foreign policy, indicating that foreign policy and party identification are converging, the actual ranking of foreign policy as a key priority remains inconsistent. This would seem to suggest that foreign policy is a key factor in party identification even if such policies are not always of the highest perceived importance.

Public Opinion on Foreign Policy in Presidential Campaigns The inconsistency of foreign policy as an important issue in presidential elections has been a common territory for scholars of elections and foreign policy. The long-held assumptions of the Almond-Lippmann Consensus, that the public’s views on foreign policy are volatile, inconsistent, and ultimately unimportant, have been replaced by scholarship and evidence that is far more likely to argue that public opinion on foreign policy has much more salience, predictability, and occasional importance.10 The discord over the role and importance of foreign policy remains vibrant to this day. Robert Jervis states that “foreign policy is simply too distant from the lives of most Americans” to be a highly salient issue in most American elections.11 Norman J. Ornstein argued that while presidential elections rarely focus on foreign policy, “foreign policy issues are rarely absent as pivotal points” in campaigns.12 Nincic and Hinckley argue that “foreign policy issues not only shape public evaluation of candidates but their influence does not compare unfavorably with that of economic circumstances.”13 Foreign policy is perhaps one of the most inconsistent set of issues from campaign to campaign. While contending that the Almond-Lippmann Consensus is both over-simplistic and flawed, 2020 did nonetheless demonstrate significant inconsistency with 2016 on the importance of foreign policy. In 2012, with the US still in recovery from the Great Recession, foreign policy rated an even lower priority among voters than in 2020. However, this chapter argues that foreign policy, even while not considered one of the most critical issues in 2020 by voters, was still an instrumentally and integrally significant part of both campaigns.

Foreign Policy in the 2020 Campaigns Foreign policy was more important in the 2020 election than has been generally perceived. Both campaigns tactically and situationally used

11

“AMERICA FIRST” FINISHED SECOND: FOREIGN POLICY …

167

foreign policy as important tools especially in regions with high electoral value swing states where such issues were more salient to blocks of voters. This was notable in Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. In this way, Biden and Trump used foreign policy in a surgical manner based on electoral math. More broadly, both campaigns, and their supporters and detractors, integrated the well-established differences on foreign policy into the overarching labels and identities for each candidate. Trump’s nationalist “America First” and “Make America Great Again” slogans were infused with foreign policy preferences on trade, China, Russia, international institutions, immigration, and foreign aid. Campaign advertising, events, language, branding, outside political campaign groups, and communications within the social networks of Trump supporters reinforced and reemphasized the president’s nationalist foreign policy stances and identity throughout the 2020 campaign. Trump’s campaign and its allies were able to capably motivate and even expand the Trump base in many swing states, like Florida, even if some were ultimately lost, such as Pennsylvania. Stokes argued that there was “fertile ground for a 2020 US presidential campaign where discussion of foreign policy issues” was nested in the “voters’ views of themselves as not only aggrieved by the pandemic but by a rapidly changing world in general.”14 In essence, even issues that were seemingly domestic—such as the coronavirus—were sketched on a nationalist canvas built by Trump’s foreign policy and worldview. Biden, as a known establishment candidate with strong foreign policy credentials, did not need to make foreign policy a paramount part of his campaign. The consideration of Biden as a moderate, reasonable, establishment foreign policy operator was well known and so differentiated from Trump’s persona that even modest focus on the chasm between the two was sufficient to attract moderates, conservatives, and independents for whom foreign policy was a higher consideration. For those that viewed Trump’s foreign policy as radical, dangerous, and inconsistent, Biden’s projected image as a traditional and experienced member of the foreign policy establishment was important. The remainder of this chapter will detail and analyze where, when, and how the Biden and Trump campaigns utilized foreign policy in the 2020 election and its impact on the results. Strategically, foreign policy was integrated into the overarching label and identity of the candidate based on their past rhetoric, experiences, and accomplishments. The

168

P. S. ADAMS

Trump campaign continued to tout their candidate as the more nationalist, protectionist, and successful in promoting US interests especially with China. The Biden campaign used the long foreign policy record of the candidate along with the staunch bipartisan support of much of the foreign and defense policy establishment. Both campaigns also went negative in attacks on the competition’s foreign policies. Biden regularly attacked Trump’s North Korea, Russia, and trade policies while Trump regularly tried to paint Biden as pro-China and a representative of the more “globalist” establishment of US foreign economic and security policies. Both campaigns perhaps more inconsistently used foreign policy at the regional and state levels. In critical swing states and regions such as the Southwest (Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas), Florida, and the “blue wall” states of the Great Lakes and Northeast (Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin), both campaigns used foreign policy issues in nuanced ways. The results of 2020 are those that some may point to as an example of the continuing inconsistency and occasional unimportance of foreign policy in presidential election campaigns. The evidence, to the contrary, shows that foreign policy issues are integral in presidential elections. Even in times of domestic crisis, campaigns use foreign policy at strategic and tactical levels to attract voters.

Strategic and National Use of Foreign Policy in the 2020 Campaigns Foreign policy was not as explicitly central to the 2020 reelection campaign of President Donald Trump as it had been in 2016. Foreign policy was a critical and successful portion of Trump’s 2016 campaign. Trump’s nationalist “America First” and “Make America Great Again” rhetoric was a series of attacks on trade, multilateral institutions, immigration, and relations with Latin America and China. Despite the downplaying of foreign policy in the 2020 campaign, Donald Trump continued his “America First” strategy punctuated by his accomplishments of renegotiating NAFTA, tough stance on trade with China, and aversion to multilateralism. Trump touted his own Middle East accomplishments through his strong pro-Israel record including recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, increasing support for Israeli settlement policy, and the recognition of Israel by the UAE and Bahrain. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s unusual endorsement of Trump at the Republican Convention,

11

“AMERICA FIRST” FINISHED SECOND: FOREIGN POLICY …

169

broadcast via video from Israel, was part of the shoring up of militant pro-Israel US voters. In 2020, Trump continued to rely upon a similar campaign playbook in terms of foreign policy even though it had a more domestic orientation. In blaming China for the coronavirus, threatening to defund the World Health Organization, and continuing antipathy toward trade, NATO, and other historic pillars of postwar US foreign policy, Trump was replaying his “America First” foreign policy rhetoric. This appeal to “us against them” with Americans as victims of global and foreign influences was a critical way that Trump merged foreign and domestic policies.15 Trump’s appeal to “deep-seated nationalist sentiment long-held by his core supporters” was critical.16 Wright suggests that Trump’s extraordinarily unconventional stances on foreign policy are a strong part of his appeal to his supporters.17 While the Trump campaign publicly argued for a more sizable portion of the third debate to be dedicated to foreign policy, neither the moderators nor voters seemed particularly interested.18 Approximately 20 minutes of the final debate were related to foreign policy.19 In those minutes, Biden attacked Trump over his close ties to authoritarian rulers, especially North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un.20 Biden, clearly taking aim at Trumps dismissal of evidence of interference in the 2016 election, promised that Russia and others would “pay a price for interfering in the US elections.”Trump defended his détente with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un.22 After a brief exchange over the Paris Climate Accord, the debate shifted back to domestic affairs.23 Ward argues that Trump could have used foreign policy as a much stronger weapon in the campaign. Trump’s accomplishments, though controversial, were numerous and Biden had a long record that would have been difficult to defend in every instance.24 However, the combination of Biden’s deep knowledge of foreign policy, Trump’s significant failures in foreign policy, and the polling indicating that the public did not prioritize foreign policy issues led Trump’s campaign to focus on domestic issues.25 Biden’s efforts to paint Trump’s foreign policy as inconsistent and dangerous seemed to have gained traction with some moderate Republicans and independents. The vast majority of the foreign policy and security establishment supported Biden.26 Many former Republican national security officials openly supported Biden.27 These officials also linked up with the larger anti-Trump conservative networks to raise hundreds of thousands of dollars for media buys in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan,

170

P. S. ADAMS

Arizona, North Carolina, and Florida.28 The criticism of Trump’s foreign and security policy by many Republicans, as well as many former disaffected members of the Trump administration, such as John Bolton, James Mattis, and John Kelly, was an invaluable asset to Biden. Foreign policy was a core issue for these officials and other moderate Republicans and independents. Biden was able to use Trump’s policy inconsistencies on trade, NATO, and American global leadership as recruitment tools.29 Throughout the campaign, Biden regularly and consistently attacked Trump on foreign policy, even if it was less overt and less frequent than those on Trump’s coronavirus response and leadership style. Biden differentiated himself by regularly stating he would reverse many Trump-era foreign policy decisions including those on Iran, climate change, and the World Health Organization.30 Biden ridiculed Trump’s relations with Kim Jong-un and North Korea numerous times.31 While it certainly did not appear to be the most critical set of issues in 2020, foreign policy was nonetheless an important element in defining both candidates and for attracting pliable voters. While less overt than 2016, Trump’s nationalist “America First” and “Make America Great Again” rhetoric was replete with strong foreign policy preferences and accomplishments. Biden, the candidate with substantially more experience and expertise, could have made foreign policy an even more central part of his campaign. Biden did effectively use foreign policy to sway moderate and conservative foreign policy elites and voters, as well as to demonize the inconsistency and dangers of Trump’s global views. Even with the perceived lack of emphasis in the 2020 presidential campaign, foreign policy ultimately did play a notable role in both campaigns at the national level.

Tactical and Situational Use of Foreign Policy in the 2020 Presidential Election While it seemed to take a back seat to domestic issues at the national level, foreign policy was utilized by both campaigns in some key regions and states where electoral votes were up for grab and races were viewed as competitive. There were several critical toss-up states where foreign policy seems to have played a much larger role in the campaigns and may have influenced the election results including Florida, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Unlike at the national level, where foreign

11

“AMERICA FIRST” FINISHED SECOND: FOREIGN POLICY …

171

policy remained a secondary issue to most voters, in some of these valuable swing states, foreign policy was a much higher voter concern and the candidates responded with more intense and salient campaigning.

The Blue Wall---Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin Three states that Trump won in 2016, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, were critical to both the Trump and Biden campaigns. Trump won these historically more Democratic states by less than 80,000 combined votes and all were considered toss-ups for 2020. As valuable sources of electoral votes, Pennsylvania (20), Michigan (16), and Wisconsin (10) would be critical to Trump’s reelection strategy as well as Biden’s path to victory. In these states, Biden campaign operations, advertising, and efforts were almost entirely void of foreign policy. The Biden campaign and allied groups spent heavily in these three states throughout the 2020 campaign. Most ads were focused on Biden’s plans for the economy, coronavirus response, and other domestic issues. Some ads appeared as early as November 2019 and used testimonials from former Trump supports who had defected to Biden.32 Television, radio, billboard, and digital advertising also used veterans, many of whom were Republicans that had defected to Biden.33 While the use of veterans had an implicit foreign and security policy dimension, the use of wider foreign policy issues in these states was limited. In all three states, Trump’s campaign utilized advertising that emphasized differences on foreign policy by touting the “America First” narrative as well as attacking and discrediting Biden as pro-China. In May 2020, the Trump campaign, along with America First Action, launched their first major anti-Biden campaigns in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.34 Painting Biden as “pro-China” was one of the primary messages of this blitz. The multi-million dollar ad campaign highlighted past Biden comments on China and used images of Biden in meetings with Chinese officials while serving in Congress and as Vice President.35 This stream of advertising continued to Election Day, though Trump ultimately had to divert resources from Michigan and Wisconsin to Arizona, Minnesota, Georgia, and Texas. While Trump ultimately lost all three states, his 2020 performance bettered his 2016 tallies in all three races.

172

P. S. ADAMS

It is unclear if the “Beijing Biden” strategy was significant in the gains in any of the three states. Given victory in all three states, the initial assessment is that the Biden campaign was ultimately more effective by sticking to domestic issues. Trump’s attempt to discredit Biden on China and his general “America First” foreign policy narrative could, at best, be said to have firmed up and increased his base but nonetheless did not gain effective traction with enough swing voters to win the states. The Biden campaign and its allies focused almost exclusively on domestic issues. In these states, the de-emphasis of foreign policy issues was successful.

Florida Perhaps in no state was foreign policy more important than in Florida. With a large population of Latino backgrounds and the importance of South Florida as the gateway between the US and Latin America, Florida’s electoral value and perceived toss-up status made it a critical contest for the Trump and Biden campaigns. A Biden victory in Florida would have eliminated any chance for a second term for Trump. For Trump, Florida was a must-win. Unlike the blue wall states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, foreign policy was a much more important and integral part of Trump’s victory in Florida in 2020. Foreign policy in Latin America, specifically Trump’s tougher stances against Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela seemed to gain traction with many Latinos in Florida especially from the Cuban, Venezuelan, and Colombian communities.36 Trump’s strong and frequent campaigning in Florida and his association of Biden and Democrats with socialism and communism further reinforced the division. Trump appearances made significant inroads with these Latino voters.37 This was a significant turn in Florida where the pre-election consensus had been that the state was a toss-up and that Biden would do well with most Latinos.38 While Biden may have done better with voters of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Central American descent, the communities of Cuban-, Colombian, and Venezuelan-Americans appeared to bolster Trump’s numbers in South Florida where Biden needed to earn a substantial lead to win the state.39 The large Colombian-American community, that had leaned Democratic in most recent elections, was an area that Trump actively cultivated.40 A September 2020 poll result from Quinnipiac saw Florida Latinos slightly favoring Trump.41 Despite a late surge in advertising by Biden, Cuban-Americans decisively polled in favor of Trump by better

11

“AMERICA FIRST” FINISHED SECOND: FOREIGN POLICY …

173

than two to one.42 Biden fared far more poorly with these voters than Hillary Clinton in 2016 (41%) and Barack Obama in 2012 (49%).43 Trump carried Florida by nearly 400,000 votes, twice the margin than 2016. Biden won Miami-Dade by seven points, in 2016 Clinton won the county by 30.44 Trump won 55% of the Cuban-American vote, 30% of the Puerto Rican vote, and 48% of the other Latin American communities in Miami-Dade.45 Biden’s campaign had been staunchly criticized for failing to recognize Trump’s growing success in the Latino communities in Florida throughout 2020.46 The late response of increased money, ad buys, and attention was insufficient to meet the Trump’s campaigns investments in Florida. Biden should have been able to more successfully lambast Trump’s policies toward Latin America, immigration, and trade that would seem critical to these voters. Yet by assuming that Latinos would flock to Biden, the campaign made a significant blunder. Biden’s campaign failed to respond adequately and quickly to the Trump campaign’s associations of Biden and Democrats with socialism and communism and did not go on the offense until late in the campaign. Ultimately, foreign policy played a critical role in Trump’s efforts with Latino voters in Florida. In many ways, Florida juxtaposes the results of the blue wall states. Foreign policy was a critical issue for many Latino voters in Florida and the Biden campaign’s focus on domestic issues and overly optimistic assumptions of high Latino support were misplaced. The Trump campaign effectively used hardline foreign policy accomplishments toward Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua to entice many Latino voters of Cuban, Colombian, and other backgrounds. These were critical to Trump’s victory as Biden’s lead in Miami-Dade was insufficient to offset the stronger pro-Trump vote totals in other parts of the state.

The Southwest and the Mountain West While the Trump campaign highlighted foreign policy for some Latinos in Florida, in other states, Trump significantly reduced focus on foreign policies related to Latin America and increased attention on the economy. Trump’s 2016 campaign was bombastic and direct in criticizing Mexico and Central America and in disparaging immigrants from those regions. The border wall and security were near the top of the “America First” priorities of the Trump candidacy. Trump’s 2020 strategy toward Latinos

174

P. S. ADAMS

was centered on the economy and economic opportunity that deemphasized immigration, asylum, and foreign policies relating to Latin America.48 Trump barely mentioned the border wall and security issues with migrants as they appealed to Latino voters in Texas, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico. Texas and Arizona, states Trump had won in 2016, were considered in play in 2020. Trump’s narrow Arizona win in 2016 and the 2018 victory of Democrat Krysten Sinema made the state a prime target for the Biden campaign. Texas had also shown its possible vulnerability in the close 2018 senate race between Ted Cruz and Beto O’Rourke. While the Trump campaign sought to de-emphasize immigration, border, and contentious foreign policies in these states, he also used a meeting with Mexico’s president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), in July 2020 as evidence of a growing positive relationship between the US and Mexico. This meeting was explicitly used by Trump as a foreign policy accomplishment in partnership with Mexico to mitigate the antipathy of Latino voters.49 Despite these efforts, Latinos in the Southwest and Mountain West, who unlike in Florida are dominantly of Mexican and Central American descent, did lend strong support to Biden and helped secure victories in Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and Colorado. While Trump retained Texas, it was at a high cost of campaign resources. Biden captured the toss-up states of the Southwest and Mountain West, save Texas, in taking Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona. In Arizona, Biden captured approximately 63% of the Latino vote in 2020, an increase of 2% over Clinton in 2016.50 While Latinos were cultivated by the Biden campaign through Spanish language ads, none of the ads were particularly focused on foreign policy. Yet, the criticisms of Trump’s style and attacks on those of Mexican and Central American descent were implicit. Some have argued that the Biden campaign did little to cultivate Latino votes in the region, rather Trump himself turned those of Mexican and Central American descent decisively toward Biden.51 The Southwest and Mountain West exhibited an even more divergent model of the use of foreign policy in the Trump 2020 campaign than in Florida and the blue wall states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Rather than strongly use foreign policy accomplishments and toughness to recruit Cubans, Colombians, and other Latinos in Florida, or to rely upon the “America First” mantra and “Beijing Biden” tactics in the Blue

11

“AMERICA FIRST” FINISHED SECOND: FOREIGN POLICY …

175

Wall states, the Trump campaign worked to deflect the long-standing foreign, border, and immigration policies and preferences of the president. Recruiting Latinos through the selective use of modest successes like the AMLO meeting in July 2020 was part of these efforts. Yet, other than in Texas, the results were insufficient to garner Trump any victories. The Biden campaign replicated some of its failures in courting Latino voters in Florida. Yet, because the Latino communities of the Southwest and Mountain West were dissimilar to those in Florida, with much higher percentages of Mexican and Central American descended populations, Biden gained victories, as Trump was unable to escape his past rhetoric on immigration, border, and foreign policies.

Conclusion In remembering the 2020 presidential campaign, the issues of the economy, coronavirus, Trump’s governing style, and Black Lives Matter, will overwhelm any memory of the role of foreign policy. Yet, foreign policy was often a more influential factor in campaigns at the national and state levels than is recognized. Both Trump and Biden had integrated their ideological and practical stances on foreign policy issues into their “brand.” Trump’s “America First” narrative is so tied to his positions on trade, multilateral institutions, relations with China, immigration, and other international issues that disaggregating the candidate from his foreign policy preferences is almost impossible. Biden’s long record of foreign policy experience from the Senate to the Vice Presidency was engrained on the candidate as the conventional and establishment foreign policy operator. At a strategic and national level, Trump and Biden both utilized foreign policy as notable parts of their campaigns and political identities. Trump’s attempts to utilize attacks on Biden’s foreign policy record as “pro-China” seemed to garner little additional support in the key swing states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin where foreign policy failed to resonate with swayable voters. Domestic considerations did seem more important in the vast number of state races, with Florida being a notable exception. Trump’s successful use of foreign policy accomplishments with some Latinos, especially Cuban- and Colombian-American voters, was perhaps the one state where foreign policy played a critical role in the electoral outcome. Biden’s campaign failed to recognize these voters and their interests early enough to respond

176

P. S. ADAMS

adequately. While Biden swept most of the Mountain West and Southwest states that were in play, it is unclear if there was a cohesive and lasting strategy to recruit and retain Latino voters based on foreign policy preferences. What 2020 has taught us is that foreign policy has become more partisan and more polarized than perhaps at any point since the end of World War II. The implications for the 2024 and future elections are significant. Candidates and campaigns must account for the more polarized and partisan nature of foreign policy, yet they must also recognize that it plays an unpredictable and inconsistent role with American voters. Latino voters have grown in importance but it is far from a monolithic bloc and is highly divided on many domestic and international issues. The Trump campaign’s success in using foreign policy in Florida was notable but may not be able to replicated in other high percentage Latino states due to the unique and powerful Cuban-American community. Biden’s reliance on a domestically oriented campaign strategy in most swing states worked, save Florida. In the end, foreign policy may not have been one of the most critical issues of the 2020 presidential election, but it certainly was integral to both campaigns and the results in some key swing states.

Notes 1. Paul K. Macdonald, “America First? Explaining Continuity and Change in Trump’s Foreign Policy”, Political Science Quarterly 133, no. 3 (2018). 2. Thomas Wright and Fred Dews, “Foreign Policy’s Role in the 2020 Election.” October 9, 2020, The Brookings Institution, accessed November 15, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/ podcast-episode/foreign-policys-role-in-the-2020-presidential-ele ction/. 3. Kylie Atwood and Nicole Gaouette, “How Biden Plans to Undo Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy and Return US to World Stage”, CNN , October 31, 2020. 4. Paul D. Shinkman, “Why Foreign Policy Has Been Missing From the 2020 Campaign”, U.S.News & World Report, October 13, 2020, accessed November 10, 2020. https://www.usnews. com/news/elections/articles/2020-10-13/why-foreign-policyhas-been-missing-from-the-2020-campaign; Wright & Dews, “Foreign Policy’s Role”.

11

“AMERICA FIRST” FINISHED SECOND: FOREIGN POLICY …

177

5. Pew Research Center, “Election 2020: Voters Are Highly Engaged, but Nearly Half Expect To Have Difficulties Voting”, August 13, 2020, accessed November 15, 2020. https://www. pewresearch.org/politics/2020/08/13/election-2020-votersare-highly-engaged-but-nearly-half-expect-to-have-difficulties-vot ing/. 6. Pew Research Center, “Campaign 2016: Strong Interest, Widespread Dissatisfaction”, July 7, 2026, accessed November 15, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2016/07/07/ 2016-campaign-strong-interest-widespread-dissatisfaction/. 7. Pew Research Center, “With Voters Focused on Economy, Obama Lead Narrows”, April 17, 2012, accessed November 15, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2012/04/17/ section-2-issues-of-the-2012-campaign/. 8. Dina Smeltz et al., Divided We Stand: Democrats and Republicans Diverge on Foreign Policy. 2020. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Accessed November 17, 2020. https://www.thechicagoco uncil.org/sites/default/files/2020-12/report_2020ccs_america divided_0.pdf. 9. Ibid. 10. Andrew Johnstone and Andrew Priest, US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy: Candidates, Campaigns, and Global Politics from FDR to Bill Clinton, University of Kentucky Press, 2007; Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Revised Edition. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004; John H. Aldrich et al., “Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection”, Annual Review of Political Science 9, no. 1 (2006): 477–502. 11. Shinkman, “Why Foreign Policy”. 12. Norman J. Ornstein, “Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election”, Foreign Affairs 71, no. 3 (1992): 1–16, accessed January 2, 2021. 13. Miroslav Nincic and Barbara Hinckley, “Foreign Policy and the Evaluation of Presidential Candidates”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 333–355. 14. Bruce Stokes, “USA vs Everybody? Why Foreign Policy Will Be a Backdrop to Domestic Policy in 2020”, April 16, 2020. Chatham House, accessed November 10, 2020. https://americas.chatha mhouse.org/article/usa-vs-everybody-why-foreign-policy-will-bea-backdrop-to-domestic-policy-in-2020/. 15. Ibid.

178

P. S. ADAMS

16. Ibid. 17. Wright & Dews, “Foreign Policy’s Role”. 18. Alex Ward, “Trump’s Team is Pushing for a Debate on Foreign Policy”, October 21, 2020. Vox, accessed November 20, 2020. https://www.vox.com/2020/10/21/21525008/2020-president ial-debate-election-trump-biden-foreign-policy. 19. USA Today. Debate transcript: Trump, Biden final presidential debate moderated by Kristen Welker. October 23, 2020, accessed November 15, 2020. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ politics/elections/2020/10/23/debate-transcript-trump-bidenfinal-presidential-debate-nashville/3740152001/. 20. Alexandra Brzozowski, “Trump and Biden remain thin on foreign policy in final debate”, October 23, 2020. EURACTIV.com, accessed November 10, 2020. https://www.euractiv.com/sec tion/global-europe/news/trump-and-biden-remain-thin-on-for eign-policy-in-final-debate/. 21. Ibid. 22. USA Today, “Debate Transcipt”. 23. Brzozowski, “Trump and Biden Remain Thin”; USA Today, “Debate Transcript”. 24. Ward, “Trump’s Team is Pushing”. 25. Ibid. 26. Josh Rogin. “GOP Foreign Policy Defectors form an Alliance with Biden—For Now”, The Washington Post, August 20, 2020, accessed November 14, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost. com/opinions/gop-foreign-policy-defectors-form-alliance-withbiden--for-now/2020/08/20/abea34be-e31a-11ea-8181-606 e603bb1c4_story.html. 27. Former Republican National Security Officials for Biden, accessed November 12, 2020, https://www.defendingdemocracytogether. org/national-security/. 28. Rogin, “GOP Foreign Policy”. 29. Ibid. 30. Kylie Atwood and Nicole Gaouette, “How Biden Plans to Undo Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy and Return US to World Stage”, CNN, October 31, 2020. 31. Ibid. 32. Malachi Barrett, “Democratic ads put a Spotlight on Midwest Trump deserters”, November 13, 2019. M Live, accessed

11

“AMERICA FIRST” FINISHED SECOND: FOREIGN POLICY …

179

December 1, 2020. https://www.mlive.com/public-interest/ 2019/11/democratic-ads-put-a-spotlight-on-midwest-trump-des erters.html 33. Sahil Kapur, “Democratic Group American Bridge launches $4 M Midwest ad Buy Hitting Trump on Vets”, September 4, 2020. NBC News, accessed November 17, 2020. https://www.nbcnews. com/politics/2020-election/democratic-group-launches-4-mil lion-midwest-ad-buy-hitting-trump-n1239363. 34. David Catanese, “‘Start Pressing Fire’: Pro-Trump Forces Launch First Major ad Blitz against Biden”, May 7, 2020. McClatchy, accessed November 19, 2020. https://www.mcc latchydc.com/news/politics-government/election/article24257 5836.html; Mike Memoli and Marianna Sotomayor. “Biden Campaign Launches New Video Attacking Trump on Coronavirus Response”, April 18, 2020, accessed November 12, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/blog/ meet-press-blog-latest-news-analysis-data-driving-political-discus sion-n988541/ncrd1187041#blogHeader; Marianna Sotomayor, “Biden Campaign Launches General Election Ad in Battleground States”, April 18, 2020, accessed November 12, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/blog/ meet-press-blog-latest-news-analysis-data-driving-political-discus sion-n988541/ncrd1187041#blogHeader. 35. Mark Murray and Melissa Holzberg. “GOP super PAC releases new ads targeting Biden on China”, April 17, 2020. NBCnews.com, accessed November 16, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/pol itics/meet-the-press/blog/meet-press-blog-latest-news-analysisdata-driving-political-discussion-n988541/ncrd1186386#blogHe ader. ; Sotomayor “Biden Campaign”. 36. Phil Prazan, “Biden Campaign Invests in Hispanic Outreach After Slump in Polls”, nbcmiami.com, September 4, 2020, accessed November 14, 2020. https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/ biden-campaign-invests-in-hispanic-outreach-after-slump-in-polls/ 2288346/. 37. Luis Fajardo, “Could Biden’s Latino problem lose him the White House?” BBC News, September 16, 2020, accessed November 16, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-541 62722; Saraiva, Augusta. “In Florida, Many Colombian Americans

180

P. S. ADAMS

Fear Biden Is Soft on Socialism”, Foreign Policy, October 26, 2020, accessed November 16, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2020/10/26/in-florida-many-colombian-americans-fear-bidenis-soft-on-socialism/; Stephania Taladrid, “As Trump Gained Latino Support in Florida, Biden’s Campaign Ignored Warnings”, November 10, 2020. The New Yorker, accessed November 17, 2020. https://www.newyorker.com/news/campaign-chronicles/ as-trump-gained-latino-support-in-florida-bidens-campaign-ign ored-warnings. 38. Fajardo, “Biden’s Latino Problem”. 39. Saraiva “In Florida”; Fajardo, “Biden’s Latino Problem”. 40. Saraiva, “In Florida”. 41. Prazan, “Biden Campaign Invests in Hispanic Outreach”. 42. Fajardo, “Biden’s Latino Problem”; Taladrid, “As Trump Gained Latino Support”. 43. Fajardo, “Biden’s Latino Problem”. 44. Taladrid, “As Trump Gained Latino Support”. 45. Ibid. 46. Taladrid, “As Trump Gained Latino Support”; Saraiva “In Florida”; Fajardo, “Biden’s Latino Problem”. 47. Fajardo, “Biden’s Latino Problem”; Taladrid, “As Trump Gained Latino Support”. 48. Niskanen Center. “Why Latinos Moved Toward Trump (and Why Most Are Still Democrats)”, December 2, 2020, accessed December 14, 2020. https://www.niskanencenter.org/why-lat inos-moved-toward-trump-and-why-most-are-still-democrats/. 49. Max De Haldevang, “Trump Talks Up Ties With Mexico’s Leader in Bid to Cut Biden’s Latino Lead”, October 30, 2020. Bloomberg, accessed January 2, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2020-10-30/trump-talks-up-his-amlo-ties-in-bid-to-trimbiden-s-latino-lead. 50. Dianna M. Náñez, “How Did Latino Voters Shift Arizona Toward Biden? Their Voices Prove There’s Not One Answer”, November 22, 2020. AZCentral, accessed December 4, 2020. https:// www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/ 22/much-has-been-said-national-pundits-and-partisans-latinovote-and-latino-voter-but-little-has-been-s/6319351002/. 51. Ibid.

11

“AMERICA FIRST” FINISHED SECOND: FOREIGN POLICY …

181

References Aldrich, John H., Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Thompson Sharp. “Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection.” Annual Review of Political Science 9, no. 1 (2006): 477–502. Atwood, Kylie, and Nicole Gaouette. “How Biden Plans to Undo Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy and Return US to World Stage.” October 31, 2020, CNN . Accessed November 17, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/2020/ 10/31/politics/biden-foreign-policy-plans/index.html. Ballotpedia. “Donald Trump Presidential Campaign 2020: Campaign Ads.” Accessed November 20, 2020. https://ballotpedia.org/Donald_Trump_pre sidential_campaign,_2020. Ballotpedia. “Joe Biden Presidential Campaign 2020: Campaign Ads.” Accessed November 20, 2020. https://ballotpedia.org/Joe_Biden_presidential_campai gn,_2020. Barrett, Malachi. “Democratic Ads Put a Spotlight on Midwest Trump Deserters.” November 13, 2019, M Live. Accessed December 1, 2020. https://www.mlive.com/public-interest/2019/11/democratic-ads-put-a-spo tlight-on-midwest-trump-deserters.html. Brzozowski, Alexandra. “Trump and Biden Remain Thin on Foreign Policy in Final Debate.” October 23, 2020, EURACTIV.com. Accessed November 10, 2020. https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/trumpand-biden-remain-thin-on-foreign-policy-in-final-debate/ Catanese, David. “‘Start Pressing Fire’: Pro-Trump Forces Launch First Major ad Blitz Against Biden.” May 7, 2020, McClatchy. Accessed November 19, 2020. https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-govern ment/election/article242575836.html. De Haldevang, Max. “Trump Talks Up Ties With Mexico’s Leader in Bid to Cut Biden’s Latino Lead.” October 30, 2020, Bloomberg. Accessed January 2, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-30/trumptalks-up-his-amlo-ties-in-bid-to-trim-biden-s-latino-lead. Fajardo, Luis. “Could Biden’s Latino Problem Lose Him the White House?” September 16, 2020, BBC News. Accessed November 16, 2020. https:// www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-54162722. Former Republican National Security Officials for Biden. Accessed November 12, 2020. https://www.defendingdemocracytogether.org/national-security/. Holsti, Ole R. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Revised Edition. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. Johnstone, Andrew, and Andrew Priest. US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy: Candidates, Campaigns, and Global Politics from FDR to Bill Clinton. University of Kentucky Press, 2007. Kapur, Sahil. “Democratic Group American Bridge Launches $4M Midwest ad Buy Hitting Trump on Vets.” September 4, 2020, NBC News. Accessed

182

P. S. ADAMS

November 17, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/ democratic-group-launches-4-million-midwest-ad-buy-hitting-trump-n12 39363. Lindsay, James M. “Campaign Foreign Policy Roundup: Biden and Trump Debate Foreign Policy, Kinda.” October 23, 2020, Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed December 12, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/blog/campaign-for eign-policy-roundup-biden-and-trump-debate-foreign-policy-kinda. Macdonald, Paul K. “America First? Explaining Continuity and Change in Trump’s Foreign Policy.” Political Science Quarterly 133, no. 3 (2018). Memoli, Mike, and Marianna Sotomayor. “Biden Campaign Launches New Video Attacking Trump on Coronavirus Response.” April 18, 2020. Accessed November 12, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/ blog/meet-press-blog-latest-news-analysis-data-driving-political-discussionn988541/ncrd1187041#blogHeader. Murray, Mark, and Melissa Holzberg. “GOP Super PAC Releases New Ads Targeting Biden on China.” April 17, 2020, NBCnews.com. Accessed November 16, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/ blog/meet-press-blog-latest-news-analysis-data-driving-political-discussionn988541/ncrd1186386#blogHeader. Náñez, Dianna M. “How Did Latino Voters Shift Arizona Toward Biden? Their Voices Prove There’s Not One Answer.” November 22, 2020, AZCentral. Accessed December 4, 2020. https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/pol itics/elections/2020/11/22/much-has-been-said-national-pundits-and-par tisans-latino-vote-and-latino-voter-but-little-has-been-s/6319351002/. Nincic, Miroslav, and Barbara Hinckley. “Foreign Policy and the Evaluation of Presidential Candidates.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 333–355. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002791035002009. Niskanen Center. “Why Latinos Moved Toward Trump (and Why Most Are Still Democrats).” December 2, 2020. Accessed December 14, 2020. https:// www.niskanencenter.org/why-latinos-moved-toward-trump-and-why-mostare-still-democrats/. Ornstein, Norman J. “Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election.” Foreign Affairs 71, no. 3 (1992): 1–16. Accessed January 2, 2021. https://doi.org/10. 2307/20045226. Pew Research Center. “With Voters Focused on Economy, Obama Lead Narrows.” April 17, 2012. Accessed November 15, 2020. https://www.pew research.org/politics/2012/04/17/section-2-issues-of-the-2012-campaign/. Pew Research Center. “Campaign 2016: Strong Interest, Widespread Dissatisfaction.” July 7, 2026. Accessed November 15, 2020. https://www.pewres earch.org/politics/2016/07/07/2016-campaign-strong-interest-widespreaddissatisfaction/.

11

“AMERICA FIRST” FINISHED SECOND: FOREIGN POLICY …

183

Pew Research Center. “Election 2020: Voters Are Highly Engaged, but Nearly Half Expect To Have Difficulties Voting.” August 13, 2020. Accessed November 15, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/08/13/ election-2020-voters-are-highly-engaged-but-nearly-half-expect-to-have-diffic ulties-voting/. Prazan, Phil. “Biden Campaign Invests in Hispanic Outreach After Slump in Polls.” September 4, 2020, nbcmiami.com. Accessed November 14, 2020. https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/biden-campaign-investsin-hispanic-outreach-after-slump-in-polls/2288346/. Rogin, Josh. “GOP Foreign Policy Defectors form an Alliance with Biden—For Now.” August 20, 2020, The Washington Post. Accessed November 14, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/gop-foreign-policy-def ectors-form-alliance-with-biden--for-now/2020/08/20/abea34be-e31a11ea-8181-606e603bb1c4_story.html. Saraiva, Augusta. “In Florida, Many Colombian Americans Fear Biden Is Soft on Socialism.” October 26, 2020, Foreign Policy. Accessed November 16, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/26/in-florida-many-colomb ian-americans-fear-biden-is-soft-on-socialism/. Shinkman, Paul D. “Why Foreign Policy Has Been Missing From the 2020 Campaign.” October 13, 2020, U.S. News & World Report. Accessed November 10, 2020. https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/ 2020-10-13/why-foreign-policy-has-been-missing-from-the-2020-campaign. Smeltz, Dina, Ivo H. Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Brendan Helm. Divided We Stand: Democrats and Republicans Diverge on Foreign Policy. 2020. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Accessed November 17, 2020. https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2020-12/ report_2020ccs_americadivided_0.pdf. Sotomayor, Marianna. “Biden Campaign Launches General Election Ad in Battleground States.” April 18, 2020. Accessed November 12, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/blog/meet-press-bloglatest-news-analysis-data-driving-political-discussion-n988541/ncrd1187041# blogHeader. Stokes, Bruce. “USA vs Everybody? Why Foreign Policy Will Be a Backdrop to Domestic Policy in 2020.” April 16, 2020, Chatham House. Accessed November 10, 2020. https://americas.chathamhouse.org/article/usa-vs-eve rybody-why-foreign-policy-will-be-a-backdrop-to-domestic-policy-in-2020/. Taladrid, Stephania. “As Trump Gained Latino Support in Florida, Biden’s Campaign Ignored Warnings.” November 10, 2020, The New Yorker. Accessed November 17, 2020. https://www.newyorker.com/news/cam paign-chronicles/as-trump-gained-latino-support-in-florida-bidens-campaignignored-warnings.

184

P. S. ADAMS

USA Today. Debate transcript: Trump, Biden final presidential debate moderated by Kristen. Welker. October 23, 2020. Accessed November 15, 2020. https://www.usa today.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/10/23/debate-transcripttrump-biden-final-presidential-debate-nashville/3740152001/. Ward, Alex. “Trump’s Team is Pushing for a Debate on Foreign Policy.” October 21, 2020, Vox. Accessed November 20, 2020. https://www.vox. com/2020/10/21/21525008/2020-presidential-debate-election-trumpbiden-foreign-policy. Wright, Thomas, and Fred Dews. “Foreign Policy’s Role in the 2020 Election.” October 9, 2020. The Brookings Institution, accessed November 15, 2020. https://www.bro okings.edu/podcast-episode/foreign-policys-role-in-the-2020-presidential-ele ction/.

CHAPTER 12

Conclusion: Main Themes and Implications for 2024 Luke Perry

Abstract This chapter highlights the main findings of this book and explores the implications for the 2024 presidential election. Keyword 2020 presidential election · 2024 presidential election · Joe Biden · Midwest · Sunbelt · COVID · Race · Gender · Donald Trump · Grassroots organizing · Foreign policy · Gun policy · Religion

The regional and issue-oriented approaches to the 2020 presidential election adopted in this book illuminated six prominent themes that help explain what happened in 2020 and what to expect in the 2024 election.

L. Perry (B) Utica College, Utica, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0_12

185

186

L. PERRY

The Midwest is more purple than blue Chapters 2 and 3 illustrated how Joe Biden secured victory by reclaiming Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. These states are far from guaranteed for Democrats moving forward. Donald Trump’s 2016 victory reflected larger shifts in the electorate, including rural and rustbelt communities moving to the right as geographical and ideological tendencies became increasingly tethered to race, educational attainment, and age. Deindustrialization, automatization, and economic dislocation corresponded with declining organized labor and fevered political media. This helped propel a significant contingent of culturally conservative, older, white, non-college-educated Democrats to the GOP. The 2020 election demonstrated how the blue wall could be rebuilt with record-high turnout, strong showings in cities and college/university towns, and winning the battle for the burbs. Still, Biden won by just one to two points in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. Democrats have dominated at the presidential level in these states, but that was not the norm below the surface in Congressional and/or state and local elections. Slight shifts in Democratic enthusiasm or turnout could quickly erode this presidential election advantage, evident in 2016. Pandemicrelated ballot procedures in 2020 are unlikely to be duplicated creating uncertainty regarding voter mobilization. Elsewhere in the region, Ohio and Iowa once again went Republican in convincing fashion (eight points each). Neither appears to be swinging back towards the Democrats anytime soon. This is significant considering Ohio’s longtime bellwether status, eroded in recent years by the state becoming whiter, older, and less educated than America at large.1 The result is a fairly even split in electoral votes between Ohio and Iowa for Republicans compared to Illinois and Minnesota for Democrats. In close elections, like 2016 and 2020, this made Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania crucial swing states. Their 44 Electoral Votes will be among the most heavily contested in 2024. Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, in particular, are two of the strongest pick-up opportunities for Republicans.

12

CONCLUSION: MAIN THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 2024

187

The Sunbelt is on the cusp of rerouting traditional paths to victory in presidential elections Chapter 4 discussed how Biden’s winning Midwestern coalition was similar to that in the Sunbelt, where key demographics (urban, younger, non-white, college-educated voters) are growing quickly. The Sunbelt is home to six states that experienced the most population growth over the last decade: Texas, Florida, California, North Carolina, Arizona, and Georgia. Half the region experienced double-digit population growth in this timespan, elevating Democratic electoral prospects by diversifying the electorate. Conversely, white voters have declined by at least ten percent in nearly every state. If this continues, current battleground states, such as Nevada, Georgia, and Arizona, will move further left, while traditionally Republican states, including Texas and South Carolina, may become new swing states. Arizona and Georgia were major Democratic flips in 2020. Democrats became more competitive in Arizona starting in 2016, when Clinton lost by three points. In 2020, Arizona voted Democratic and had two Democratic US Senators for the first time since 1950. The state experienced a large decline in white voters this century, while college-educated voters grew by eight percent from 2004 to 2016. Meanwhile, the state Republican Party moved to the right, fracturing GOP elite, evident in the rift between John McCain and Donald Trump, causing some Republicans to switch parties. Biden’s victory in Georgia was more surprising. Demographic trends were similarly positive, and Clinton’s five-point loss in 2016 was the closest margin in over 20 years, thanks to a strong performance in the Atlanta suburbs. Still, a Democrat had not won Georgia since 1992. State-level organization was pivotal, including work by the New Georgia Project and Fair Fight Action. These two groups alone registered 800,000 new voters, primarily people of color and young people. Biden narrowly prevailed by accumulating big margins in Atlanta and its suburbs. Democrats also swept the two US Senate races, dramatically securing control of the chamber via runoff election, and won in GA-7, one of just a few pickups nationwide among House races. Republicans retained Florida, which technically remains a swing state, going twice for Obama then twice for Trump, though Republicans have won eight out of the last 11 presidential elections. Florida has the second

188

L. PERRY

largest number of voters 65 or older, comprising over 20% of the electorate. Trump lost Hispanic voters in Florida both times, but gained 20 points in 2020, effectively appealing to Cuban-Americans, the largest group of Hispanics in the state, as well as Hispanics of Venezuelan, Nicaraguan, and Colombian decent. Biden was the first Democrat to win the most overall votes in the Sunbelt since Barack Obama in 2008. Biden’s biggest gains compared to Hillary Clinton in 2016 occurred in the fastest-growing states: Georgia, Arizona, and Texas. Democratic margins increased 5–15 points over the last 20 years in Nevada, Arizona, Georgia, Texas, and California. Conversely, slow-growing Sun Belt States have experienced doubledigit increases in Republican margins this century, including Arkansas, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Alabama. Population trends are pulling the region leftward, while furthering internal ideological polarization.

The 2020 election was heavily influenced by idiosyncratic factors that complicate predictions for 2024 Democrats capitalized on demographic and turnout trends to help secure victory in 2020. Biden also benefited from two unique idiosyncratic factors that are unlikely to be similarly present in 2024: the COVID pandemic and the Resistance Movement. Chapter 6 discussed how Trump’s handling of COVID was a major challenge for his presidency and reelection prospects. Voters consistently disapproved of Trump’s response, typically by15–20 points. Over 40% of voters identified the pandemic as their top issue. Biden won this group by nearly 50 points, securing 73% support. Unfolding during an election year, responses to COVID were politicized, including by President Trump, who initially described the virus as a hoax perpetuated by Democrats. This entangled partisan attitudes with impressions toward the public health crisis and the appropriate role for government. Republicans, led by Trump, sought to minimize the political repercussions of the pandemic, even after contracting the virus himself and being hospitalized. Democrats, led by Biden, prioritized the issue, emphasizing what they believed was a bungled national response and inadequate presidential leadership.

12

CONCLUSION: MAIN THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 2024

189

Polarization manifested itself at the state level with varying approaches to executive leadership. Democratic governors tended to require more public safety measures, such as stay-at-home orders and mask/distancing requirements. Republican governors tended to favor reopening more quickly with fewer safety precautions. Some of this reflected pandemic trends. Early on, Democratic counties experienced exponentially more COVID cases than Republican counties. Some of this also drew on strategic and ideological differences between the parties. Republicans sought to deflect blame for the health and economic situation, while accentuating the importance of individual freedom in the face of increased government regulation. Not surprisingly, attitudes toward the pandemic and Trump varied geographically as fluid trends in infection rates fused with longstanding partisan attitudes. Trump’s reelection campaign was not hindered at the county level by disproportionately high rates of COVID cases or deaths. Negative perceptions of Trump’s approach to COVID were a factor in pivotal swing states; however, including Michigan and Wisconsin, where COVID rates were high, electoral margins close, and suburban support was crucial. Most voters disapproved of Trump’s handling of COVID and believed Biden would do a better job. This not only weakened Trump’s overall political capital but undercut his greatest strength among voters, handling of the economy, which was going to be the centerpiece of his reelection campaign. There is no doubt that the pandemic, and its multifaceted implications, reshuffled traditional campaign dynamics and strategies in an unprecedented manner for a modern presidential election. Biden was better positioned than Trump to capitalize on this. How effectively Biden responds to the health crisis and economic recession will shape his presidency and reelection prospects. Biden also benefitted from anti-Trump grassroots organizing dating back to his inaugural in January of 2017. The Women’s March in Washington (as well as cities around the country) was the largest protest of a presidency in US history. Indivisible, a guide to grassroots organizing focused on defending democracy, grew rapidly into thousands of local organizations around the country. Adherents were predominately liberal, women, middle-aged or older, white, and college-educated. Chapter 5 discussed the importance of these groups in rebuilding the canvassing and voter contact infrastructure that collapsed after the Obama administration.

190

L. PERRY

The Trump resistance movement naturally draws comparisons to the Tea Party movement, which arose in opposition to President Obama. Unlike the Tea Party, the resistance lacked an ideological agenda to take on “establishment” Democrats, nor was primed by a particular policy issue, like immigration. Rather, grassroots liberal organizations were mobilized by deep concern about the fate of democracy during the Trump presidency. Trump’s impeachments provided a connected and similarly remarkable dimension to his tenure and campaign, helping to galvanize scrutiny and mobilize opposition. Like the pandemic, there is no doubt this was beneficial to the Democrats retaking the House in 20182 and the presidency in 2020. What happens with the resistance movement after the Trump presidency and with Democrats in control of US government will have major implications for 2024. As 2020 illustrated, voter mobilization in metro centers is crucial to Democrats winning swing states. Diminished grassroots liberal organizing could have a negative impact on Biden’s reelection prospects.

Donald Trump was not able to capitalize on policy areas where his administration had a big impact, such as remaking the federal courts and foreign policy. Trump’s successful 2016 campaign was galvanized by a captivating message of “Make America Great Again.” Chapter 11 illustrated how an “America First” approach to foreign policy produced unilateralism, renegotiating trade agreements, controversial new alliances with dictators, and new tensions with longstanding allies. Foreign policy was not a central issue in the 2020 campaign, unlike 2016, reflecting an uneven public prioritization of this issue in recent presidential campaigns. Yet Trump’s unorthodox and transactional foreign policy was one area his presidency exerted significant influence. Not surprisingly, Trump’s foreign policy preferences and rhetoric were dramatically different than Biden, who had extensive foreign policy experience as Vice President and a longstanding member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Biden campaigned on rebuilding historic alliances, reengaging multilateral institutions, and restoring American leadership in global affairs. Both campaigns integrated foreign policy into the overall presentation and identity of their candidate, grounded in their experiences

12

CONCLUSION: MAIN THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 2024

191

and accomplishments. Trump presented himself as the more nationalist, protectionist, and effective leader in promoting US interests, particularly with China. Biden presented himself as the only candidate with extensive foreign policy experience whose record had staunch bipartisan support from much of the foreign policy and defense establishment. Importantly, even during moments of domestic crisis, this illustrates how the issue of foreign policy was utilized at a tactical level to try to attract voters. The nature and effectiveness of these appeals varied per region and state. Foreign policy was emphasized in Trump’s campaign messaging in Florida and Midwestern swing states with success in the former, but not the latter. Trump’s outreach to Latinos in the Southwest centered upon economic opportunity and downplayed immigration and US foreign policy toward Latin America. Unlike 2016, the border wall with Mexico and security issues with migrants were scarcely mentioned in Trump’s campaign communication in Texas, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico. The 2020 election illuminated how foreign policy has become more partisan and polarized than any other moment in the post-World War II era. Looking ahead to 2024, candidates must account for this, while recognizing the fluid nature with which voters prioritize this policy area. Biden’s heavy reliance on domestic issues worked well in most swing states, but the dynamics could easily change over the next four years. America’s troubled withdrawal from Afghanistan was not a strong start for the Biden administration. One aspect of US politics unlikely to change quickly is the composition of federal courts, thanks to lifetime appointments. Judicial nominations, particularly a Supreme Court vacancy, were a major element of Trump’s 2016 campaign. GOP Senate leader Mitch McConnell prioritized obstructing Barack Obama’s nominees, leading to the lowest confirmation rate (28%) in decades. This created a window of opportunity in 2016 if Republicans could win the presidency, while retaining control of the Senate. This helped to consolidate the GOP around Trump, a non-traditional presidential candidate. Chapter 7 explained how efforts to replicate Trump’s judicial campaign strategy fell short in 2020, in large part due to the success of the Trump administration and Republican-controlled Senate to substantially remake the federal judiciary. In just four years, Trump nominated one in four federal judges, an unprecedented amount for one term. The impact varied geographically and by judgeship. Trump nominated one-third of federal

192

L. PERRY

judges in the Sunbelt, while having little impact in the Northeast, and appointed 54 court of appeal judges overall, 30 percent of the entire court. These appointments, coupled with three Supreme Court nominees, were a defining accomplishment of the Trump presidency, fueling political opposition and enthusiasm on the political left. In contrast to 2016, judicial appointments became a more important issue for Democrats than Republicans in 2020.

2020 helped illustrate how the issues of guns and religion are becoming less beneficial to Republican presidential candidates, while climate change increasingly animates Americans across the political spectrum Chapter 9 explained how COVID prevented gun reform measures from being on a single statewide ballot in 2020, though guns were a key element to national and campaign politics. The 2020 presidential candidates devoted little attention to gun policy during the campaign, but guns and gun violence were a critical subtext. Guns were prominently featured in protests against pandemic-related health restrictions and central to Black Lives Matter protests against the inappropriate use of deadly force by police officers. Biden extolled steady and consistent support for stronger gun safety laws, citing his record in the US Senate working on the Brady Act (1993) and assault weapons ban (1994). Trump mostly embodied the enthusiastic endorsement he received from the National Rifle Association (NRA) early in 2016 campaign. Four years later the NRA was bankrupt, in legal trouble, and suffering under mismanagement.3 The NRA still spent US$16 million in support of Trump’s campaign, far less than the US$31 million the NRA spent in 2016, and less than Everytown for Gun Safety (a gun safety group founded by Michael Bloomberg) spent in 2020 (US$21 million). The NRA also spent US$ 5 million in support of the two unsuccessful GOP Senate candidates from Georgia. Guns were not a mobilizing issue for conservatives in 2020 and the NRA found itself weaker and less impactful than past presidential cycles. While this could change in 2024, enthusiasm for expanding gun rights is limited outside of rural communities, who constitute a consistent but shrinking demographic in presidential elections. In the meantime, the

12

CONCLUSION: MAIN THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 2024

193

issue of guns will play out amidst tensions between larger public support for strong gun laws, inspired by growing revulsion toward gun-related violence, and a more conservative Supreme Court poised to repeal longstanding gun safety laws. How these tensions are resolved are primed to shape this issue and related campaign politics moving forward. White Evangelical Christianity, another cornerstone of the Republican coalition, found itself under scrutiny and with diminished influence in 2020 compared to years past. Chapter 8 explained how White Evangelicals overwhelmingly supported Trump, but this more reflected their politically conservative orientation than Trump passing a religious litmus test. After the Access Hollywood tape went public during the 2016 campaign, political observers wondered if Trump’s personal behavior and lack of public piety would hamper him among White Evangelicals. That has not been the case, evident in over 75% support from White Evangelicals in 2020. In a highly polarized political climate, partisanship was the most important variable for voters, not religion. Evangelical and non-Evangelical voters exhibited similar levels of support for Trump. This provides some good news and bad news looking to 2024. Republican Party strategic appeals demonstrated an ability to steadily harness strong support from White Evangelical voters during Trump’s tumultuous tenure. At the same time, the number of Christians in America has declined significantly over the last decade, diminishing the relative impact of these voters. This decline of 10–13% is relatively similar across gender, race/ethnicity, education levels, and region.4 Age is the most bifurcated variable with large splits between Christians of the Silent Generation, whose numbers are relatively unchanged, to Millennial Christians, who have declined 16%. Meanwhile, one in four Americans is now religiously unaffiliated, up 30 million from 10 years ago. Trends in religious identification are fluid throughout US history. The 1960s, for instance, was another period of exile from religious identification, which a few decades later, was followed by the Reagan Revolution and the rise of Compassionate Conservatism. At the same time, White Evangelicals and hot-button social issues regarding sexuality were unable to propel Trump to reelection in 2020 like they did George W. Bush. 2004 was arguably the peak of national political influence by White Evangelicals for the foreseeable future. White Evangelicals will likely continue to have a major influence on the Republican Party and the 2024 GOP presidential primary, but this group’s sway on culture, society, and

194

L. PERRY

national politics is waning and tenuous. Many White Evangelical leaders talk openly of now being a counter-culture movement.5 Chapter 10 contended that 2020 will mark the year that climate change emerged as an issue of national political salience. This issue has been involved in presidential politics since President George H.W. Bush negotiated and signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. Three decades later climate action became a signature issue for several 2020 primary candidates and was discussed throughout the primary and general election debates. In 2020, 56% of Americans were alarmed or concerned about the state of the climate, nearly triple the number of Americans who were doubtful or dismissive toward the climate crisis. The six years between 2015 and 2020 were the hottest ever recorded globally and included many extreme weather events throughout the US creating a human and financial toll. Climate change ascended to a kitchen table issue, in contrast to previous election cycles, necessitating candidates to adopt issue-specific strategies and platforms. Within this shifting political context, President Trump demonstrated a clear lack of interest in developing comprehensive climate change policies. This made it easy for Democrats to exhibit contrast and appeal to voters wanting climate action. Two Democratic primary candidates ran on this issue, Washington governor Jay Inslee and businessman Tom Steyer. These candidates elevated climate in the national political conversation, requiring others in the crowded field to develop and articulate policy prescriptions. The Green New Deal also served as a progressive litmus test within the Democratic Party. This 2019 House resolution called for emission reduction targets modeled after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and emphasized climate justice, investment in clean energy, and preventing economic degradation. Though Biden was more moderate than progressive, his campaign did not pivot away from climate action after securing the nomination. Instead, Biden formed a new Climate Task Force that created his election policy platform, united progressive and moderate Democratic voices, and distinguished himself from Trump in regards to climate action and policy. Climate change has matured into an issue that is unlikely to fade in 2024 and subsequent presidential campaigns. Democrats are currently poised to benefit politically from this development, though sharp divides

12

CONCLUSION: MAIN THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 2024

195

remain on the horizon. There has been little political attention or discussion of the best way to adapt to climate change. This is bound to change as urgency intensifies. The nature of this public debate, and the political ramifications, are uncertain, though are primed to prompt further maturation of climate action as a prominent national issue.

The 2024 election will likely unfold in a very different social, economic, and political context than 2020. The 2020 presidential election was among the most unique and contested in modern US politics. The country experienced several tumultuous years of presidential politics with historic national crises and impeachments. Democrats were able to restore key aspects of Barack Obama’s coalition and develop a successful path to victory, but Biden’s election was narrower, and thus less certain moving forward. Biden won back key swing states in the Midwest, and secured new victories in leftward trending Sunbelt states, amid historically high turnout. Can this be replicated in 2024? How will state voting procedures differ from 2020? Will new paths to 270 further change and solidify with regional demographic shifts? How will the COVID pandemic or its aftermath shape campaign dynamics? Will Donald Trump continue to be a major figure in the Republican Party? These are some of the many questions facing scholars in 2024.

Notes 1. Sewell, Dan and Jon Seewer. November 14, 2020. “No Longer Mirror of US; Ohio’s Electoral Bellwether Quiets.” AP News. https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donaldtrump-elections-ohio-dab40fe319d7c13b17fe309caaf09a67. 2. Perry, Luke. 2019. Donald Trump, Central New York, and the 2018 Midterm Battle for Central New York. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 3. Hakim, Danny and Mary Williams Walsh. April 11, 2021. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/07/us/nra-ban kruptcy-wayne-lapierre.html.

196

L. PERRY

4. “In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace.” October 17, 2019. Pew Research. https://www.pewforum.org/2019/10/ 17/in-u-s-decline-of-christianity-continues-at-rapid-pace/. 5. Perry, Luke. 2020. Religious Responses to Marriage Equality. London: Routledge.

Index

A Approval ratings, 4 Arizona, 4, 6, 24, 42, 52–54, 56–63, 65, 139, 168, 170, 171, 174, 180, 187, 188, 191

B Biden, Joe, 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 16, 17, 20–24, 26, 28–30, 37, 40–46, 48–50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 59, 61– 66, 84, 86–88, 90, 94, 116, 120, 121, 133–135, 138–140, 147, 148, 151–157, 161, 164, 165, 167–176, 178–180, 186–192, 194, 195 Bush, George W., 2, 3, 21, 33, 34, 95, 123, 124, 144, 193, 194

C Climate action, 8, 144–146, 148, 150, 152–157, 194, 195

Climate change, 2, 8, 76, 144–161, 170, 192, 194, 195 Clinton, Hillary, 16–25, 32, 33, 35, 36, 40–45, 47, 52, 58, 59, 61–66, 72–74, 91, 95, 97, 173, 174, 187, 188 Conservative, 7, 19, 22, 33, 65, 73, 80, 88, 94–96, 100, 101, 103, 109, 114–121, 123–125, 137, 139, 167, 169, 170, 186, 192, 193 Court of Appeals, 2, 95, 98, 99, 133, 137, 192 COVID, 2, 5, 7, 10, 17, 18, 22–24, 40, 45, 49, 78, 84–87, 89, 90, 132, 151, 188, 189, 192 D Democrats, 2–4, 6, 7, 18–24, 32, 34–42, 45, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 59, 61–63, 65, 66, 72–74, 77–82, 86–90, 96, 98, 104, 109, 115, 116, 135,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Perry (ed.), The 2020 Presidential Election, Palgrave Studies in US Elections, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83872-0

197

198

INDEX

141, 148, 156, 172, 173, 180, 186–188, 190, 192, 194, 195 Demographics, 6, 20, 28, 35, 38, 60, 62, 187

E Evangelicals, 7, 114–117, 119–125, 193

F Florida, 4, 32, 40, 42, 53, 54, 56–60, 62–65, 98, 134, 167, 168, 170, 172–176, 179, 180, 187, 188, 191 Foreign policy, 8, 125, 164–178, 190, 191

G Georgia, 6, 24, 30, 52–54, 56–60, 62–66, 98, 135, 171, 187, 188, 192 Gun policy, 134–136, 192 Guns, 7, 132–134, 136, 139, 140, 156, 192, 193

I Indivisible, 6, 36, 72–77, 81, 189

J Judges, 2, 8, 36, 95–98, 101, 103–107, 133, 191, 192 Judicial nominations, 95, 96, 98, 107, 191

L Liberal, 34, 43, 80, 136, 189, 190

M McConnell, Mitch, 94–98, 101, 104, 106, 108, 110, 191 Michigan, 6, 8, 16–30, 32, 41, 42, 46, 52, 65, 75, 86, 91, 132, 134, 139–141, 167–172, 174, 175, 186, 189

N New York, 6, 66, 73, 76, 77, 79, 80, 85, 90, 98, 136–138, 148

O Obama, Barack, 1, 2, 16, 18–23, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 43, 58, 61, 62, 73, 76, 80, 81, 94–98, 120, 135, 136, 146–148, 173, 187–191, 195

P Partisanship, 88, 101, 115–117, 120, 122, 193 Pennsylvania, 6, 16, 32–50, 52, 65, 73, 75–77, 79, 82, 98, 139, 154, 167–172, 174, 175, 186 Polarization, 23, 36, 46, 116, 120, 146, 159, 188, 189 Polling, 4, 16, 17, 32, 33, 41, 56, 63, 64, 76, 78, 96, 104, 108, 115, 137, 138, 142, 146, 150–152, 165, 169, 172, 179 Population, 6, 11, 18, 20–22, 53, 54, 56, 60, 64, 66, 74, 85, 120, 121, 172, 175, 187, 188

R Republicans, 2, 4, 6, 7, 16, 18–24, 30, 32–45, 48, 52, 56, 58–62, 72, 74, 77, 79, 80, 86–91,

INDEX

94–96, 98, 101, 103–106, 108, 114–118, 120, 121, 123, 124, 135, 136, 138, 144, 154–156, 168–171, 186–189, 191–193 S Sunbelt, 121, 187, 188, 192, 195 Supreme Court, 2, 7, 27, 38, 48, 94–97, 100, 103–108, 110, 111, 133, 136, 137, 165, 191–193 T Trump, Donald, 1–8, 10, 16–30, 32–37, 39–49, 60, 61, 63–66, 72–78, 80–82, 84–88, 90, 91, 94–98, 100–111, 114–122, 125,

199

126, 133–135, 137–139, 141, 147–154, 164, 165, 167–176, 178, 180, 186–194 2016 election, 19, 46, 47, 63, 73, 76, 96, 107, 108, 127 2018 election, 23, 76, 79 2020 election, 6, 8, 52, 58, 60, 65, 78, 103, 132, 136, 139, 144, 146, 166, 167, 188 2020 pandemic, 90

W Wisconsin, 6, 8, 16, 17, 19–24, 27–30, 32, 41, 42, 46, 52, 65, 75, 132, 133, 167–172, 174, 175, 186, 189