Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections: Biden Chases the ‘Swing Vote' (Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy) 3030822117, 9783030822118

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 The “Catholic Vote” in the United States
The Catholic Voter in the United States
The Evangelical-Catholic Alliance
Conclusion
Chapter Plan
Part I Political Parties and Ideologies
2 Catholic Patterns in the American Left
Introduction
The Emergence of a New Catholic (Religious) Left in US Politics
A Long, Overshadowed, History of Progressive Activism Among American Catholics
George W. Bush’s Presidency: A “Wake-Up Call” for Liberal Religious Americans
A New Alliance Between Catholics and Democrats
From Donald Trump to Joe Biden: The Resilience of Progressive Catholicism in Times of Crisis
The Trump Presidency and the Institutional Deficiencies of Liberal Catholics
Joe Biden as the Embodiment of the Catholic Left
Can Liberal Catholics Remain Relevant for the Democratic Party?
Conclusion
References
3 The American Catholic Right in the Making of US Christian Populism and Its European Incursion
The Trumpist Turn
National Populist / “Christianist” Turn
European Counterpart
Transatlantic Connections
Catholic Contribution to American Christianism
American Christianism as a Specific National Populism
Natural Rights and Christian Religious Freedom
White Christendom
Spiritual Warfare
Christianist Connections Through Catholic Networks in Europe
Gay Lobby and Jewish Plot
Connections to Nationalist and New Radical Parties
The 2019 European Campaign Against “The Davos Party”
The Myth of the Empire
4 Did Donald Trump End the Religious Right?
The 2016 Campaign
The History of the Religious Right
The 2016 Election
The 2020 Election
Part II The Bishops and the Holy See
5 A Climax in the Culture Wars? The US Bishops and the 2020 Election
Entering the Political Fray
Democratic and Catholic: A Difficult Equation for the Bishops
Priorities Which Seems to Favor the GOP, but Which Conceal Tensions Among the Bishops
2016, a Pause in an Otherwise Inexorable Process?
The 2020 Election: The Culture Wars Back in Force at the USCCB
Donald Trump and the Bishops
Biden and the Bishops
The End of the Election, but Not of the Divisions
6 The Holy See and the Catholic Community in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections
The Holy See and the United States
The Changing Status of American Catholics
Changing Attitudes of American Catholics Toward Church Authority
The Election of 2016
The 2020 Election: Catholics and a Pro-choice President
Part III Catholics and U.S. Elections
7 The Growing Influence of the Catholic Latino Vote
General Catholic and Latino Catholic Voting Behavior in 2020
The Latino Community Electoral Potential
The Latino Electorate Structural Challenges
Florida Still Matters
2016 and 2020 as Mirror Images of Each Other
Conclusion
8 “Can We Get the Catholic Vote?” The Effects of Catholic Running Mates in Presidential Elections
The “Catholic Vote”
Data and Method
Findings
When a Catholic VP Runs for President
9 Conclusion: Catholics Come Home? Helping to Elect a Catholic President Again
Similarities and Differences Between Catholic Voters
In the Minds of Catholic Voters
Conclusions
Index

Citation preview

PALGRAVE STUDIES IN RELIGION, POLITICS, AND POLICY

Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections Biden Chases the ‘Swing Vote’

Edited by Marie Gayte Blandine Chelini-Pont Mark J. Rozell

Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy

Series Editor Mark J. Rozell, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Arlington, VA, USA

This series originated under the co-editorship of the late Ted Jelen and Mark J. Rozell. A generation ago, many social scientists regarded religion as an anachronism, whose social, economic, and political importance would inevitably wane and disappear in the face of the inexorable forces of modernity. Of course, nothing of the sort has occurred; indeed, the public role of religion is resurgent in US domestic politics, in other nations, and in the international arena. Today, religion is widely acknowledged to be a key variable in candidate nominations, platforms, and elections; it is recognized as a major influence on domestic and foreign policies. National religious movements as diverse as the Christian Right in the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan are important factors in the internal politics of particular nations. Moreover, such transnational religious actors as Al-Qaida, Falun Gong, and the Vatican have had important effects on the politics and policies of nations around the world. Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy serves a growing niche in the discipline of political science. This subfield has proliferated rapidly during the past two decades, and has generated an enormous amount of scholarly studies and journalistic coverage. Five years ago, the journal Politics and Religion was created; in addition, works relating to religion and politics have been the subject of many articles in more general academic journals. The number of books and monographs on religion and politics has increased tremendously. In the past, many social scientists dismissed religion as a key variable in politics and government. This series casts a broad net over the subfield, providing opportunities for scholars at all levels to publish their works with Palgrave. The series publishes monographs in all subfields of political science, including American Politics, Public Policy, Public Law, Comparative Politics, International Relations, and Political Theory. The principal focus of the series is the public role of religion. “Religion” is construed broadly to include public opinion, religious institutions, and the legal frameworks under which religious politics are practiced. The “dependent variable” in which we are interested is politics, defined broadly to include analyses of the public sources and consequences of religious belief and behavior. These would include matters of public policy, as well as variations in the practice of political life. We welcome a diverse range of methodological perspectives, provided that the approaches taken are intellectually rigorous. The series does not deal with works of theology, in that arguments about the validity or utility of religious beliefs are not a part of the series focus. Similarly, the authors of works about the private or personal consequences of religious belief and behavior, such as personal happiness, mental health, or family dysfunction, should seek other outlets for their writings. Although historical perspectives can often illuminate our understanding of modern political phenomena, our focus in the Religion, Politics, and Policy series is on the relationship between the sacred and the political in contemporary societies.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14594

Marie Gayte · Blandine Chelini-Pont · Mark J. Rozell Editors

Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections Biden Chases the ‘Swing Vote’

Editors Marie Gayte History Department Universite De Toulon Et Du Var Marseille, France

Blandine Chelini-Pont FDSP/LID2MS Aix-Marseille University Aix-en-Provence, France

Mark J. Rozell Schar School of Policy and Government George Mason University Arlington, VA, USA

Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy ISBN 978-3-030-82211-8 ISBN 978-3-030-82212-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82212-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: @ American Photo Archive/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1

The “Catholic Vote” in the United States Mark J. Rozell

1

Part I Political Parties and Ideologies 2

Catholic Patterns in the American Left Amandine Barb

3

The American Catholic Right in the Making of US Christian Populism and Its European Incursion Blandine Chelini-Pont

4

Did Donald Trump End the Religious Right? Neil J. Young

25

47 77

Part II The Bishops and the Holy See 5

6

A Climax in the Culture Wars? The US Bishops and the 2020 Election Marie Gayte

103

The Holy See and the Catholic Community in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections Gerald P. Fogarty

133

v

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CONTENTS

Part III Catholics and U.S. Elections 161

7

The Growing Influence of the Catholic Latino Vote Olivier Richomme and Wendy Chen

8

“Can We Get the Catholic Vote?” The Effects of Catholic Running Mates in Presidential Elections Cammie Jo Bolin, Ted G. Jelen, and Clyde Wilcox

187

Conclusion: Catholics Come Home? Helping to Elect a Catholic President Again Mark M. Gray

215

9

Index

225

List of Contributors

Amandine Barb Georg-August-Universität, Göttingen, Germany Cammie Jo Bolin Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA Blandine Chelini-Pont Aix-Marseille University, Marseille, France Wendy Chen Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, USA Gerald P. Fogarty University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA Marie Gayte British and American Studies Department, Universite de Toulon, Marseille, France Mark M. Gray Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA Ted G. Jelen University of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV, USA Olivier Richomme Université Lyon II, Lyon, France Mark J. Rozell Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA Clyde Wilcox Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA Neil J. Young Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Washington, DC, USA

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List of Figures

Fig. 7.1

Fig. 7.2

Fig. 7.3

Fig. 7.4

Fig. 7.5 Fig. 7.6 Fig. 7.7 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12

Fig. 7.13

2020 Election exit poll results of Catholic voting behavior across major polling sources (Source https:// www.ncregister.com/news/2020-catholic-vote) The national Latino vote over time (Source https:// www.as-coa.org/articles/chart-how-us-latinos-voted2020-presidential-election) Latino voter support by age (Source https://circle.tufts. edu/latest-research/election-week-2020#the-latinoyouth-vote) Latino voters by age and region of origin (Source https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/election-week2020#the-latino-youth-vote) Percentage of foreign-born Latinos, US census Median age by racial/ethnic group 2016 Estimation of generation percentage in electorate by racial/ethnic group 2020 Registration and turnout rate by age group Latino registration rate by presidential election year Turnout rate by racial/ethnic group Electoral participation per ethno-racial group Latino population concentration per state 2015 census estimates Evolution of Partisan affiliation of newly registered Latinos 2006–2016

163

168

168

168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 175 177

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 9.1

Fig. 9.2

Image 8.1 Image 8.2 Image 8.3

Poll averaged two-party presidential vote of US Catholics, 1952–2020 (Note Percentages do not always add to 100% due to votes for other candidates. Averaged publicly available results from Media Exit Polls, Gallup, American National Election Studies, General Social Survey, Associated Press/NORC as of 4/29/2021) Ideological self-placement of US Catholic voters by 2020 vote choice Predicted vote choice: early period with Catholic VP Predicted vote choice: early period with no Catholic VP Predicted vote choice: late period with Catholic VP

216 219 202 203 205

List of Tables

Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 9.1

Presidential vote by affiliation and race, Pew Research Center Percentage of Latinos in 2020 battleground states Multivariate models of vote for democratic ticket without interactions Multivariate linear probability models of vote for democratic ticket Which party do you think would do a better job handling

166 176 196 200 220

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CHAPTER 1

The “Catholic Vote” in the United States Mark J. Rozell

The presidential election of Joe Biden in 2020 marked the second time in U.S. history that a Catholic nominee for the nation’s highest office won. John F. Kennedy broke the Catholic barrier in 1960 with an overwhelming percentage of Catholic votes.1 But in 2020, exit polls revealed that Joe Biden won the presidency without definitively winning the Catholic vote. For example, Edison Research gave the edge to Biden over Trump among Catholics, 52% to 47%, a reversal from its 50–46% in favor of Trump in 2016. AP VoteCast in 2020 had Biden taking 49% to President Donald J. Trump’s 50% of Catholic voters.2 As Mark Gray shows in the conclusion to this volume, an average of all the exit polls gives the edge to Biden over Trump among Catholics 52–47%. The very different electoral results across six decades reveal much about the Catholic vote in the United States. In 1960, Catholics were a reliable

M. J. Rozell (B) Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Gayte et al. (eds.), Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82212-5_1

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voting block for Democratic candidates for office, and Kennedy’s religious identity especially mattered that year to Catholic voters who were conscious of their still outsider status in U.S. government.3 In 2020, the Catholic vote split between the major-party nominees, even though one is a devout Catholic who played up his religious identity often in the campaign in the hope of mobilizing Catholic voters. In 2020, Catholics no longer perceive themselves as outside the mainstream of U.S. society, and many Catholics hold prominent positions in the government at all levels, including a majority of the members of the U.S. Supreme Court. I used quotation marks in the title of this chapter to signify that there really is no unified Catholic vote in U.S. politics today. That is, Catholics comprise a large segment of the population, about 21% of the United States, and usually about one-fourth of the adult voting population.4 Many political observers create a misleading portrait when they refer to the phenomenon of “the Catholic vote” as though it is a united force waiting to be mobilized by one political party or the other. The Catholic electorate in the United States is diverse and varied. White Catholics vote differently than Latino Catholics (which is the fastest growing population). Frequent Church-going Catholics vote very differently than Catholics who occasionally or rarely attend services. The most substantial concentrations of Catholics are in the Midwest, northeast, mid-Atlantic regions, and somewhat the west coast. In presidential elections, it is in many of the usually competitive states in the Electoral College—such as Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin— that Catholics have their most significant numbers. Prior to the presidential nomination of Donald J. Trump by the Republican Party in 2016, the self-identified Catholic vote in the United States actually was remarkably similar to the overall national vote totals in modern elections. In 2012, President Barack Obama won 50% and Mitt Romney 48% of the Catholic vote, the same percentages by which each won the national vote. In 2008, Obama won 54% of the Catholic vote, while his overall national vote total was 53%. In 2004, George W. Bush won similar-sized majorities both of the national vote and among Catholics. In 2000, Al Gore barely won the popular vote and the Catholic vote as well. In 1996, Bill Clinton won a comfortable national majority and an even better turnout among Catholics. The notable exceptions to this trend are the 2016 and the 2020 elections. In the 2016 election Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton won the national popular vote 48–46%, and yet Republican Donald J. Trump, by

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most accounts, won the Catholic vote. In 2020 Joe Biden handily won the national popular vote over Trump, 51–47%, but the Catholic vote either went slightly for Biden or it was too close to call for either candidate. It is hard to imagine the Catholic vote as a monolithic force given these varied results. The Catholic vote now is deeply divided between the major parties. It is important to understand the diversity of that group and the challenges any candidate faces when trying to make special appeals to Catholics.

The Catholic Voter in the United States It was not always this way. The Catholic vote in the United States was once nearly monolithic. Catholics were once a key constituency of the New Deal Coalition that anchored the Democratic Party. From the 1930s to about the 1970s, The Democratic Party’s coalition of voters formed during the New Deal comprised Catholics, blacks, Jews, many immigrant groups, and labor union members. Many Catholics of that era were from immigrant families, lived in the inner-cities, and they identified with labor union sentiments. Thus, low economic status and ethnicity largely explained Catholic support for the Democrats during that era. The splintering of the Catholic vote began in the 1970s when Democratic presidential nominee George McGovern in 1972 appealed to abortion-rights advocates and the Supreme Court in 1973 issued the Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion. The Republican Party began to directly appeal to anti-abortion-rights voters, and many religious Catholics began to shift their political allegiances. President Richard M. Nixon rejected the proposals of his own appointed “Commission on Population Growth and the American Future” that there be public financing of abortion and of family planning services and contraceptive devices for minors.5 The GOP picked up other issues as well to appeal to religious Catholics. Government aid to parochial schools became a staple of Republican appeals to Catholics. Conservative political strategists of that era believed that if Catholics in the northeast and Midwest aligned on social and moral issues with evangelical Protestants throughout the South, this alliance would fundamentally change U.S. politics for years. There is evidence that the splintering of the once solid Catholic vote for the Democratic Party has had a big impact on elections and policy.

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Indeed, from 1980 to 2004, only one Democratic presidential candidate secured a majority of the Catholic vote: Bill Clinton in his 1996 landslide reelection. Al Gore won more Catholic votes than George W. Bush in 2000, but less than 50% nonetheless due to votes for third party candidate Ralph Nader. Bush improved on Bob Dole’s showing among Catholics by an impressive 12%, according to National Election Studies data. Nonetheless, religious beliefs are not the dominant influence on the voting behavior of many Catholics. Unlike conservative evangelical Protestants who had the Moral Majority and then the Christian Coalition and also Focus on the Family, there is no political-based organization that mobilizes Catholics as a voting bloc. The Church hierarchy is sometimes reluctant to offer signals of voting preferences. And even when certain U.S. Catholic Bishops offer such signals, most Catholic voters ignore these appeals. The loosening of the Democratic Party identity and voting among Catholics occurred in part due to economic trends and population shifts. Although their parents or grandparents were of the immigrant underclass and loyal Democrats, many Catholics today have achieved economic success, moved to the suburbs, and become Independents or even Republicans. One scholar of Catholic voting trends, the late William Prendergast, stated that the Catholic community has experienced the same “homogenization” of other immigrant groups in the U.S. “Catholics went through the melting pot and came out very much like other Americans”, he wrote.6 In brief, Catholics are now more educated, wealthy, suburban, and employed in the higher professions than ever before. Many Catholic professionals are business owners who care about economic growth, trade, and taxes, whereas their parents and grandparents focused more on economic fairness, the minimum wage, and welfare. The Republican Party’s strong embrace of conservative social issue positions also has appealed to the very traditional, regular church-going Catholics who care more about such issues as abortion and contraception than the economy or foreign policy. Some of them maintain that most policy issues are negotiable, but then some moral issues are “non-negotiable” and thus central to their voting decisions. Nonetheless, the shift away from the once Democratic Party dominance of the Catholic vote has not meant a full embrace of the Republican Party by Catholics. Thus, the existence of what is called the Catholic

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swing vote in U.S. elections. Democrats experienced substantial losses in party identification among Catholics, but Republicans experienced only moderate gains. Rising incomes among Catholics, as with many previous marginalized groups, was good for Republicans for many years, given that in the past higher incomes and higher education tracked with Republican support in the electorate. Today high-income earners are splitting their votes between the parties and the more highly educated Americans are strongly voting Democratic. In the past two decades, the Democratic Party share of Catholic identifiers has dropped about ten percentage points whereas the Republican gain is less than half of that amount. Unless the current trend reverses, Republicans can no longer count on increased educational and economic achievement as a vehicle for improving their standing with Catholics. Like the rest of the electorate, Catholics have become increasingly independent of the political parties. The trend among partisan identifiers is increased Republicanism among white Catholics (who are about 60% of all Catholics, but declining) and strong support for Democrats among new immigrant, non-white Catholics, especially the fast-growing Latino population which is about one-third of all Catholics. In 2020, President Trump won the white Catholic vote 57–42%, but Joe Biden won the Latino Catholic vote 67–32%. In 2016, although estimates vary slightly based on the source of data, according to the reliable Pew Research Center about 60% of white Catholics voted for Trump and about two-thirds of Latino Catholics supported Hillary Clinton.7 The drop in white Catholic votes for Trump in 2020 may have been critical to the very close outcomes in several of the key states in the Electoral College. Significantly too, given the closeness of the 2016 election in key battleground states, Trump received about 10% more Latino votes than did Mitt Romney in 2012, and the widely predicted Latino voting surge against Trump never materialized that year. In the 2012 election, a majority of white Catholics voted for Mitt Romney, and about threequarters of Latino Catholics voted for President Obama. In 2008, a majority of white Catholics voted for John McCain; two-thirds of Latino Catholics supported Barack Obama. As the white component of the Catholic vote declines, and the Latino component increases, the political fortunes of Democrats nationally should improve—assuming of course that Democrats remain into the future the preferred political party for

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most Latinos. Today about half of U.S. Catholics under 40 years of age are Latino. Republicans have strong support among those Catholics who attend religious services often. Democrats have strong support among the socalled nominal, or “cultural” Catholics. Among all religious groups, those who attend religious services at least weekly favored Trump over Biden 61–37%. Among the occasional, or non-religious services attenders, Biden held a 57–41% lead over Trump.8 In 2016, GOP presidential nominee Trump won a comfortable majority of the votes of weekly (or more often) church-attending Catholics (56–40%). Given the substantial numbers of Catholic voters in the key upper Midwest states that determined the outcome of the 2016 presidential election, this showing by Trump was clearly a key to his victory. Trump and Clinton split the occasional churchattending Catholic vote, and Clinton commanded a 31% margin over Trump among Catholics who do not attend religious services. In 2012, GOP nominee Romney won a majority of weekly (or more often) churchattending Catholics and Obama’s Catholic majority was anchored by his strong support from occasional and non-church attending Catholics. The Catholic identity of politicians doesn’t appear to mean much to most Catholic voters today. For my parents’ generation—my maternal grandparents were Italian immigrants and devout Catholics—identity mattered a lot. When John F. Kennedy ran for president in 1960 he commanded huge majorities of Catholic voters, who took enormous pride that one of their own could become president.9 The only other Catholic previously nominated for president, New York Governor Alfred E. Smith in 1928, lost his campaign in part due to anti-Catholic bigotry in the country at that time. Nonetheless, the Gallup polling organization has estimated that likely 85–90% of Catholics voted for Smith that year.10 Even by 1960, many Americans wondered if it was possible for a Catholic to be elected in a heavily Protestant country. Much of that doubt centered on the outright hostility to his candidacy among many prominent evangelicals who had warned their supporters of the dangers of putting a Catholic in the White House. The president of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) wrote to pastors that “public opinion is changing in favor of the church of Rome. We dare not sit idly by – voiceless and voteless”. Christianity Today editorialized that the Vatican “does all in its power to control the governments of nations”.11 To overcome fears among some Americans of a Catholic as president, Kennedy gave a speech in Houston before a group of Protestant ministers in which

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he pledged that if elected, he would exercise independent governing judgment and not take direction from the Vatican. Today, no one can imagine such a speech by a Catholic candidate for the presidency. We have had Catholics as nominees for president and vice president, including every election cycle since 2004. The U.S. President and former two-term vice president Joe Biden is Catholic, as are six of the nine members of the U.S. Supreme Court. The 2016 Democratic vicepresidential nominee Senator Tim Kaine (Va.) is Catholic and a former missionary, and even former vice president Mike Pence calls himself “an evangelical Catholic”. In 2012 as well, both vice presidential nominees were Catholic. It is considered quite ordinary now. After 1960 and the breaking of the Catholic barrier to the presidency, there is little evidence that having a Catholic on the national ticket improves a party’s chances with Catholic voters. Barry Goldwater (R), George McGovern (D), and Walter Mondale (D) all lost massive landslides with Catholic vice presidential nominees (William E. Miller, Sargent Shriver, and Geraldine Ferraro, respectively) and Hillary Clinton (D) lost the presidency with a Catholic vice presidential nominee. And Catholic voters similarly will vote against one of their own if the candidate’s policies do not align with their preferences. In 2004, John Kerry, a Catholic and former seminary student, lost the overall Catholic vote to a Methodist, George W. Bush.12 White Catholics backed a Mormon, Mitt Romney, in 2012, largely because they agreed with his more socially conservative views, and many of those voters were offended by President Obama’s policies on contraception, U.S. aid for international family planning organizations, and his eventual support for gay marriage. One way to understand the political differences of U.S. Catholics is to identify them into two groupings: those who focus on what they call life issues and those who focus on what they call social justice issues. The former group is the Republican Party voting one: these Catholics are the ones who care most deeply about ending abortion and preventing the use of stem cells for scientific and medical research, and they are also the Catholics who have the strongest views against gay marriage, or in favor of what they call “traditional marriage”. Most easily this group is called the conservative Catholics. Although they call themselves “prolife”, many of them have been highly supportive of the U.S.’s wars in the Middle East as what they believe to be morally “just” wars. This group tends to be highly respectful of the authority of the Church hierarchy, and

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it tends to support the Church’s positions against ordination of women priests, or of allowing priests to marry and have families. The social justice Catholics are the Democratic Party voters mostly and, by contrast, they focus more on supporting social welfare programs for the poor, humanitarian aid abroad, and also accepting and aiding new immigrants to the country. They have been highly critical of the U.S. wars in the Middle East, and they tend to have a critical view generally of the use of the U.S. military abroad. They are among the most outspoken opponents of the death penalty. Social justice Catholics are more likely to say that although they have a personal opposition to abortion, they accept that the United States is a pluralistic society with many different moral frameworks and therefore do not believe that a uniquely Catholic view on that issue should be made national policy. These are most easily understood as the liberal Catholics, and they are less accepting of the Church hierarchy’s positions on a number of issues, including ordination of women and allowing priests to marry and have families. The political leanings of Catholics therefore come down to how they prioritize issues. The difficulty is that prioritizing an issue may lead some to miss the inherent interrelatedness of many issues. Those who focus on anti-abortion activities, for example, may ignore the socioeconomic problems in society that lead many women in the first place to seek abortions. Here the political leanings of Catholics actually somewhat conflict with the message of their Church, which is that there should be a consistent ethic of human life. That is, the Church teaches that Catholics should care both about life issues and social justice, not just one or the other. The Church teaches both opposition to abortion (aligned with the Republican Party) and opposition to the death penalty (aligned with the Democratic Party). In national surveys, the percentage of American Catholics who both oppose abortion rights and the death penalty is very small. In this respect, the Catholic Church in the United States is neither Republican nor Democratic leaning. The U.S. Catholic Bishops have issued calls to combat abortion and also poverty. They have opposed stem cell research and some U.S. military engagements abroad. They have taken a strong stand against homosexual conduct and gay marriage while also urging tolerance for gays, and compassion and caring for victims of AIDS. In the past they have issued calls to reduce nuclear weapons and have even been critical of “American style capitalism” for fostering substantial economic inequalities. The Church leadership has supported

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open borders, and it has been very active in pushing for a compassionate policy to welcome to the country with citizenship rights the many people who are living there currently without legal documentation. In short, the U.S. Catholic Church leadership adopts issue positions that overall do not fit comfortably within one political party or the other. Church doctrine generally does not dovetail more with one political party than the other. And in elections, most voters make prudential judgments that cannot be dictated by the Church leadership or doctrine. We are thus left with the conclusion that although religious identity is a strong component of the makeup of American Catholics, most of them are more susceptible to partisan leanings in politics than to religion. Time and again, for example, U.S. Catholic bishops have signaled to Catholics that they should withhold political support for candidates who do not oppose abortion, and then most Catholic voters ignored these instructions. Scholar Gregory A. Smith ventured into numerous dioceses to study political messaging from the pulpit, and what he found is that Catholic parishioners are exposed to a variety of moral and social issues messages, depending upon where they happen to be attending services.13 The growing Latino component of the Catholic population is very instructive. Latinos tend to be more socially conservative than white Catholics in the U.S. Latino Catholics are more likely than white Catholics to oppose abortion, but these Latinos still vote heavily for Democratic Party candidates. The Democratic Party positions on immigration reform and on policies that affect the poor are especially important to Latinos, and these issues trump the social issues agenda for many of them in voting.14 To conclude, the scholar William Prendergast was right when he said that Catholics in the United States, once immigrant outsiders and a minority subject to deep prejudices, now are thoroughly integrated into the mainstream. He described U.S. Catholics as blended into the “melting pot” and no longer a distinctive voting block and political force. Nonetheless, as long as a significant-sized and activated minority of Catholics is persuadable in elections based on religious beliefs, then the Catholic swing vote phenomenon remains a potent force.

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The Evangelical-Catholic Alliance We may draw two key conclusions to this point: first, the Catholic vote is not monolithic, and second, a significant percentage of Catholic voters are highly independent and can swing from one political party to the other, depending on the political context. That political independence raises the question of whether Catholics can ever be more than a potential swing vote and become a reliable partner in alliance with other religious-based voting groups. In 1995, the Rev. Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition, then the nation’s leading religious conservative political organization, announced it was launching a new affiliate group called the Catholic Alliance. Christian Coalition political director Ralph Reed said that the purpose of the new group was to forge a stronger bond between conservative evangelicals and Catholics who, though perhaps unable to agree on theology, could work together in politics to promote common issues. Reed boasted that the goal of the Catholic Alliance was to recruit a million conservative Catholics into the Christian Coalition by year 2000 and thus build a powerful pro-life force that would change the landscape of American politics. At the same time, I was working with several colleagues on a survey research project examining the religious orientations and political attitudes of delegates to Republican Party conventions in several states.15 Although that project initially came out of our interest in better understanding the role of the largely conservative Protestant-led religious right movement in the GOP, our surveys revealed a significant percentage of Catholic delegates at these conventions, many of whom self-identified as being a part of the religious right. The survey findings revealed two realities about the effort to align Catholics and evangelicals politically: first, there was little likelihood for the success of the Catholic Alliance in the Christian Coalition because, even among a population of very religiously conservative activists in the GOP, the Catholics in this group were distinctive on certain issues, and many were not comfortable with becoming a part of conservative Protestant-led interest group organization. Second, despite the fact that many of these Catholic Republicans were not eager to join the Christian Coalition, they were nonetheless very happy to work together with conservative evangelicals to support the candidates and issue positions

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where these groups agreed with one another. This convergence of interests was actually not easily achieved and emerged only after many years of antipathy between these two religious groups that had kept them from working together in politics. The Catholic Alliance did not come close to the stated goal of recruiting a million Catholics by year 2000, and by that time the Catholic Alliance had splintered away from the Christian Coalition to become an independent unit and it was being run by a Democrat. The conservative National Review called the hopes of recruiting Catholics into the Christian Coalition “hopelessly naïve” and continued: “Catholics weren’t about to answer to Pat Robertson”.16 Nonetheless, there were many reasons to believe that Christian Right organizations could potentially attract conservative Catholics. First, there are several issues where the official positions of the Catholic Church resemble those of the Christian Coalition, Family Research Council, and other religious right organizations—most notably abortion and eventually school vouchers. Second, there are significant numbers of Catholics who are in substantial agreement with certain other issue positions of the Christian Right. Third, Catholics have historically comprised a significant part of earlier right-wing movements and groups. Fourth, there had already been political cooperation in some dioceses between the Catholic Church and the Christian Coalition, particularly on school board races in some communities. Finally, some Catholics have adopted evangelical styles of religiosity, and research suggests that these Catholics are more likely to share evangelical political attitudes on issues where the Catholic Church has not staked a position.17 Yet Catholic teachings and tradition, particularly as articulated by the American Catholic Bishops, often depart from Christian Right organization positions. The Catholic Church has supported social welfare programs and expanded opportunities for women, and has opposed the death penalty and nuclear weapons. The Bishops have issued a critique of income inequality that is the inevitable result of unregulated capitalism. A statement by a committee of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops called for acceptance, love, and pastoral care of homosexuals. Although the Church did not abandon its traditional prohibition against homosexual activity, it recognized that a homosexual orientation is a deep-seated dimension of personality that is not in itself sinful. The statement also reiterated traditional Catholic teaching about respecting the inherent dignity of every person and insisted that nothing in the Bible or

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in Catholic teaching could be used to justify prejudicial or discriminatory attitudes and behaviors. The Pope’s widely reported comment about gays and lesbians, “who am I to judge?”, summarized quite well the feelings of most American Catholics. In the research project with my colleagues, we conducted a survey of Republican Party convention delegates in several state-level nominating conventions.18 We gathered delegates’ lists from conventions in the mid1990s in Washington, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota. For a separate project, we also conducted a survey of GOP delegates in Virginia.19 In the mid-1990s, each of these states had held nominating conventions that featured contests between moderates and religious conservative candidates. There were heavy contingents of religious conservative identifying delegates at each convention, and within this group as well there were large numbers of Catholics. The survey respondents constituted an ideal group for measuring the potential for a political alliance between evangelicals and Catholics. The Catholic GOP delegates were largely conservative-leaning or conservative, politically aware and active, and they had high levels of familiarity with conservative Christian organizations and leaders. They constituted the most favorable potential target group among Catholics for recruitment into Christian Right organizations. The survey data thus provide some telling insights regarding the relationship between conservative evangelicals and Catholics. In brief, the surveys revealed that the Catholic Republicans tended to have softer positions than the evangelicals on a variety of policy issues, and even though the differences were degrees of conservatism, the differences were significant enough to evidence the fragility of this political alliance. Consider as well Catholic beliefs about respecting the inherent dignity of every person and that nothing in the Bible or in Catholic teaching justifies prejudicial or discriminatory attitudes and behaviors. In the 2016 presidential campaign Donald J. Trump’s controversial statements about certain groups and mocking of a man with a disability stood in sharp contrast to this culture and led many political observers to conclude that he would lose substantial support among Catholic voters. Indeed, some polls in late summer suggested that Trump’s support among Catholics was falling far behind the margins attained even by losing GOP nominees Mitt Romney and John McCain. Despite his objectionable behavior as a candidate and the earlier polls showing slippage among his Catholic support, by most accounts Trump

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won the Catholic vote, far outpacing the results of the previous two GOP presidential nominees. Given the closeness of the election in the Electoral College, it would be easy to argue that the Catholic vote in 2016 delivered the presidency to Trump. But of course, in an election so close and with the support of a coalition of many groups, it would be easy to argue that any one of them was the key to his victory. The big surprise of the election perhaps was not the Catholic vote for Trump, but actually that the GOP nominee fared better than Romney, McCain, and even George W. Bush among evangelical voters. The evangelical component certainly was as much a key to Trump winning, perhaps even more so than the Catholic vote. Trump won Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin—states with significant Catholic populations—by about 80,000 votes combined. There are substantial numbers of evangelicals as well in those states. If Trump merely did as well as Romney and McCain among evangelicals in those states, he likely would have lost two or three of them and the presidency, and the Catholic vote would have been irrelevant to the outcome. Yet in 2020, Trump failed to pull off the same result, having lost the three critical upper-Midwest states by significant margins, with declining support from Catholic voters in these states being notable. He also saw a slippage of white evangelical support across the two election cycles, with 81% support nationally in 2016 and 76% in 2020. The Catholic vote for several consecutive presidential election cycles tracked very consistently with the overall national vote percentages, but that did not happen in 2016 and 2020. The two Trump campaigns tell different stories about the Catholic vote—with the GOP winning that component of the electorate in the first cycle, but either slightly losing or at least splitting the Catholic vote in the next.

Conclusion The Catholic vote was once distinctive, a reliable component of the New Deal Democratic Party coalition. As social issues came to the fore in the 1970s, and Catholics began to move from the immigrant underclass to the middle class and above, many of them became either politically independent or Republicans. The Catholic vote generally is no longer distinctive, although a minority of religiously devout and politically active conservative Catholics is persuadable on religious grounds and numerous enough to make a difference in close elections, as happened in 2016. The

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2020 election tough showed that the “swing vote” can somewhat swing back in one cycle, as Trump lost his advantage with Catholic voters. In 2016, the Catholic majority for Trump mattered most in the key upper-Midwest states that delivered him the Electoral College majority. His 2020 loss of a clear majority among Catholics though also mattered to the outcome in his reelection quest. Importantly though, in 2016 as opinion polls began to show a potential slide in Catholic support for Trump, the GOP nominee softened much of his usually strident rhetoric on such issues as immigration and deportations, as well as some of his policy positions. It is highly likely that given the power of the Catholic vote in several of the very critical states in the Electoral College, Trump tamped down some of his strident appeals, and he also made specific outreach to Catholic voters that did not capture much media attention but delivered the message for its intended audience. By 2020, there was no softening of rhetoric or policy positions by President Trump. By that time, he had firmly aligned himself with the very hard right wing in the hopes of activating his base enough to pull off another Electoral College win. Although current exit polling data cannot bear this out definitively, it is likely that Trump’s ideological hardening of his stands turned off some of the Catholic voters who had previously supported him. Not to be missed in this analysis is Trump’s nomination of U.S. Circuit Court Judge Amy Coney Barrett to the U.S. Supreme Court in late 2020, and her expedited confirmation on a party-line vote—with one Republican opposing—by the GOP Senate majority. The nomination of Barrett, a conservative Catholic, elicited extensive commentary on her belonging to a controversial covenant community “People of Praise”, and whether that was relevant to her judicial beliefs and temperament. Here the Trump campaign tried to seize on an opportunity to characterize Democratic opponents of Barrett’s confirmation as somehow anti-Catholic, whereas the opposition largely focused on the nature of a rushed confirmation process late in a presidential campaign, after the GOP Senate in 2016 had refused to hold hearings during an election year on President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee at that time. Democrats stepped very carefully around discussions pertaining to Barrett’s religious views and their potential bearing on her future court opinions, recognizing that the president’s choice of a nominee was a kind of political tripwire that could hurt the party’s chances in the elections.

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A notable contrast between 2020 and 2016 was the extent to which the Republican and Democratic campaigns actively courted Catholic voters. Longtime religious conservative leader Ralph Reed noted that the Trump campaign in 2016 microtargeted Catholic voters “deliberately and extensively”, particularly in the key upper-Midwest states with large Catholic populations, and there were a “number of outside efforts” ongoing to support these Trump campaign efforts.20 Among those efforts outside the campaign apparatus was The Faith & Freedom Coalition, a successor to the Christian Coalition, which targeted about 15 million faith-based voters in battleground states. Reed estimated that about one-third of those contacted were Roman Catholic.21 Additionally, according to F.H. Buckley, there was a Catholic Advisory Committee organized by conservative Catholic activist Deal Hudson that pushed the importance of Catholic outreach and got the candidate to appear on EWTN (the global Catholic television network) and to put out a video on the occasion of the canonization of Mother Terese, among other efforts.22 The 2020 Trump campaign stepped up its Catholic outreach efforts, particularly in the key states of the Electoral College, and it formed a large “Catholics for Trump” organization with a number of prominent figures such as former House Speaker Newt Gingrich.23 The 2016 Clinton campaign had no comparable effort of targeted outreach to Catholic voters. There was no Catholics for Clinton VIP group or other such entity to rival the dedicated efforts on the GOP side. All of that changed in 2020, as the Biden campaign made very targeted and deliberate outreach to Catholic voters and had a large Catholics for Biden advisory committee of prominent religious leaders, political leaders, and scholars such as my former Catholic University of America colleagues Stephen Schneck and John Kenneth White.24 For the religiously devout Catholic it mattered that Trump was unwavering on his pro-life stand on abortion. Critics often noted the disconnect between the beliefs of conservative Catholics about marriage and family, alongside Trump’s personal life, alleging that support for him was hypocritical. Yet among those Catholics for whom the life issue is predominant, was it more important that Trump married three times and had extra-marital affairs or that he would appoint pro-life judges to the Supreme Court if elected? The question obviously answers itself, and to those conservative Catholics he delivered on his promise on judicial

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appointments. Most voters do not preference personal character considerations over the potential impact on millions of lives from the policies likely to be promoted by the successful candidate for office. For Joe Biden’s Catholic supporters, other issues than abortion mattered most, as the nation was in the midst of a debilitating pandemic that had created major economic dislocations, especially for the most vulnerable populations. Biden’s appeals to social justice and financial assistance to those suffering through a pandemic economy aligned with the views of social justice Catholics who prioritize different issues than the social conservative Catholics. In sum, although U.S. Catholics generally are no longer a distinctive voting bloc, the 2016 and the 2020 presidential elections proved that the swing vote component of that group matters in close elections. What Trump gained from his strong showing among Catholics in 2016, he lost in 2020, bringing the nation its second Catholic U.S. president in Joe Biden.

Chapter Plan The chapters that follow build on many of the themes identified in this introduction and develop additional insights about Catholics and U.S. politics. The first section of the volume is comprised of papers that focus on ideological patterns in the politics of U.S. Catholics as well as key alliances. Amandine Barb opens with an analysis of the rise of the Catholic Left since the mid-2000s. As she correctly points out, since the legalization of abortion in 1973, most of the attention on the evolution of Catholic political engagement in the United States has been on increased conservative activism and Republican voting. Barb makes clear that there has been an active counter-mobilization among progressive Catholics who focus on such issues as social welfare, the environment, immigration, and health care, among others. Among religious progressives, Catholics are actually the largest and perhaps most politically active, and they were key to a large segment of Joe Biden’s support in 2020. Blandine Chelini-Pont presents an overview of the rise and evolution of the Christian populist movement that took hold of the Republican Party since Trump’s 2016 election. This populist movement has roots in the religious right, but is a nationalist mutation that combines religious fervor, racial resentment, and the America First Ideology. Along

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with white evangelicals, conservative Catholics, the focus of this chapter, are an important component of this newly radicalized far-right movement. This chapter also examines Christian populist networks in Europe and the possibility of a transatlantic Christian populist connection. The conservative Catholic-evangelical alliance is the topic of Neil J. Young’s chapter. Donald J. Trump surprised many observers not only by heavily winning the evangelical vote in 2016 and in 2020, but by winning the Catholic vote in 2016, and remaining competitive with Catholic voters in 2020. As Young points out, many observers took the Republican presidential nominee’s bellicose rhetoric and reports of his unsavory personal conduct as evidence that he would lose some substantial evangelical and especially Catholic support in his campaigns. Reports of the eventual political demise of the Religious Right—many of which came to the fore in 2016 and 2020—have missed its endurance as a grassroots movement or theological development and not merely as an ordinary interest group. Nonetheless, the Religious Right is a potentially fragile alliance of mostly evangelicals, Catholics and some Mormons, and a combination of potent social issues and Supreme Court appointments powered the alliance to support an admittedly flawed candidate in Donald Trump as a necessary compromise. The second section of the volume is comprised of two contributions on the political influences of the U.S. Catholic Bishops and the Holy See. Marie Gayte traces the origins of the active political engagement of the U.S. Catholic Bishops who, until the mid-1970s, had largely refrained from involvement in electoral politics. But in the 1970s, just as the Catholic vote was beginning to shift away from the Democratic monolith, the U.S. Bishops became more politically vocal than before, and their pronouncements since have both comforted and alienated Catholic voters at times. Gayte traces the political engagement of the Bishops beginning with the 1976 presidential campaign and through the two presidential campaigns of Donald J. Trump. This overview reveals that the actual political effect of the Bishops’ political involvement is very limited, though still controversial, and at times within the Catholic community very divisive. Gerald P. Fogarty provides a broad history of the role of the Holy See in the United States, from the period of independence through the 2020 presidential election, as well as the changing status of U.S. Catholics over time. His analysis addresses in particular the changing attitudes over time of Catholics toward Church authority. Fogarty concludes his analysis with

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how the Catholic community engaged in recent presidential elections and the issues of concern to Catholics addressed in the Trump Administration. The third section is comprised of three chapters on Catholics and U.S. elections. Although in past modern elections going back to the 1980s, the Catholic vote tracked closely with the overall popular vote in the nation, in 2016 Donald J. Trump won a larger percentage of Catholics than his 46% of the national vote. The salience of social issues and a pending appointment to the Supreme Court weighed heavily on many religious Catholics, and the Hillary Clinton campaign failed to shed much of the baggage surrounding her candidacy, making special appeals to Catholics much more difficult for her. Close contests in several upper-Midwestern states with heavy Catholic populations ultimately decided the outcome of the presidential election in the Electoral College, and Trump’s successes with evangelical and Catholic voters played a huge role. Olivier Richomme and Wendy Chen examine the fastest growing segment of the Catholic vote: Latinos. Although Latinos now are the largest Catholic ethnic group, their political influence is limited by such factors as low rates of citizenship, registration, and voting, as well as their geographic concentrations that dilute their Electoral College impact. Further, there is evidence of trending away from Catholicism among Latinos, especially among the young. Many are becoming non-religious, and evangelical Protestant churches have made significant inroads with attracting Latino adherents. Thus, although the Latino population is growing fast in the United States, the political influence of the Catholic component is uncertain. Finally, although Biden clearly won the Latino vote in 2020, President Trump fared better than most analysts expected, especially in some of the states that many analysts had expected to be competitive, such as Florida and Texas. Does having a Catholic on the national ticket as a presidential or vice presidential nominee affect the outcome of the Catholic vote? Cammie Jo Bolin, Ted G. Jelen, and Clyde Wilcox examine the historical record and find that in most races, there is little evidence that a Catholic on the ticket delivers enough Catholic votes to make any difference. The clear exception is of course John F. Kennedy, and Joe Biden likely benefited among Catholic voters due to his Catholic identity. In the case of Al Smith in 1928, being Catholic most likely was a detriment to his candidacy, and for John Kerry in 2004 there is little evidence that his Catholic identity made any difference. As for vice presidential nominees who are Catholic, the latest example is 2016 with vice presidential

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nominee Senator Tim Kaine (VA) unable to help the Democratic national ticket with Catholic voters. Indeed, Catholic vice presidential nominees on losing tickets also occurred in 1964, 1968, 1972, and 1984. The counter-examples are 2008 and 2012, with the Catholic Joe Biden as the vice presidential nominee in winning campaigns (and in 2012 Rep. Paul Ryan was the GOP vice presidential candidate). Little evidence exists that Catholic identity had much or anything to do with these vice presidential selections, or that they had a major impact on voting by Catholics. At most, the data show that having a Catholic on the Democratic ticket somewhat reduces the propensity of Catholics to vote Republican. Mark Gray concludes the volume with an analysis of Catholic voting patterns in 2020. He notes the difference in voting patterns of the major subgroups—non-Hispanic white Catholics and Hispanic Catholics. Whereas some have suggested that shifting demographics change the composition of the Catholic vote, Gray demonstrates that in recent election cycles, turnout rates among the subgroups are more important determinants. He takes us through the Catholic vote in both the Democratic primaries and in the general election and finds some perhaps surprising results regarding the key issues for Catholic voters—particularly the pandemic, the economy, and immigration, but not so much social issues.

Notes 1. There are multiple sources estimating different percentages of the Catholic vote for John F. Kennedy in 1960, ranging from 70 to 83 percent. Michael McGough, “Not All Catholics Venerated (or Voted for) JFK”, Los Angeles Times, November 23, 2013. https:// www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2013-nov-22-la-ol-jfk-obamacatholics-20131122-story.html (accessed November 25, 2020). 2. https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/324410/rel igious-group-voting-2020-election.aspx (accessed November 22, 2020). 3. Thomas J. Carty. 2018. “Secular Icon or Catholic Hero? Religion and the Presidency of John F. Kennedy”, in Mark J. Rozell and Gleaves Whitney, eds., Religion and the American Presidency (3rd edition). New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press: 153–170.

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4. Pew Research Center. 2014. “Religious Landscape Survey”. http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ (accessed January 2, 2016). 5. Richard Nixon. 1972. “Statement about the Report of the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future” (May 5). http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3399 (accessed September 5, 2016). 6. William Prendergast. 1999. The Catholic Voter in American Politics: The Passing of the Democratic Monolith. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press: 32. This book is an excellent detailed history of Catholic voting in the U.S. up through the 1990s. A more recent and equally recommended volume is Steven P. Millies, 2018. Good Intentions: A History of Catholic Voters’ Road from Roe to Trump. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press. 7. Jessica Martinez and Gregory A. Smith, “How the Faithful Voted: A Preliminary Analysis, Pew Research Center Fact Tank”, November 9, 2016. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/ 2016/11/09/how-the-faithful-voted-a-preliminary-2016-ana lysis/ (accessed November 25, 2020). 8. Yonat Shimron. 2020. “Exit Polls Show Few Changes in the Religious Vote”, Religion News Service, November 5. https:// religionnews.com/2020/11/05/exit-polls-show-few-changes-inthe-religious-vote/ (accessed November 25, 2020). 9. See Thomas J. Carty. 2004. A Catholic in the White House? Religion, Politics, and John F. Kennedy’s Presidential Campaign. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan Press. 10. Reported in Prendergast: 96–97. 11. Laurie Goodstein. 2004. “The ‘Hypermodern’ Foe: How Evangelicals and Catholics Joined Forces”, The New York Times (May 30). 12. See John Kenneth White and William D’Antonio. 2007. “Catholics and the Politics of Change: The Presidential Campaigns of the Two JFKs”, in Mark J. Rozell and Gleaves Whitney, eds., Religion and the Bush Presidency. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan Press: 51– 68. 13. Gregory A. Smith. 2008. “One Church, Many Messages: The Politics of the U.S. Catholic Clergy”, in Kristen E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell, and Michael A. Genovese, eds., Catholics and Politics:

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The Dynamic Tension Between Faith and Power. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press: 43–60. 14. Adrian Pantoja, Matthew Bareto, and Richard Anderson, “Politics Y La Iglesia: Attitudes toward the Role of Religion in Politics Among Latino Catholics”, in Heyer, Rozell amd Genovese, eds.: 113–126. 15. Mark J. Rozell, John C. Green, and Clyde Wilcox. 1998. “Religious Constituencies and Support for the Christian Right in the 1990s”, Social Science Quarterly. Vol. 79, No. 4 (December): 815– 820; Mary E. Bendyna, RSM, John C. Green, Mark J. Rozell, and Clyde Wilcox. 2000. “Catholics and the Christian Right: A View from Four States”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. Vol. 39, No. 3 (September): 321–332; Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox. 1996. Second Coming: The New Christian Right in Virginia Politics. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 16. Kathryn Jean Lopez. 1998. “Religious Fight”, National Review (May 18): 42–43. On this point, Deal W. Hudson, who served on the board of the Catholic Alliance, observes that the organization collapsed from a combination of poor leadership and a lack of funding after Ralph Reed departed the Christian Coalition in 1997 and then open opposition from U.S. Catholic bishops to a political arm of an evangelical-run entity using the name “Catholic” in its title. See Deal W. Hudson. 2008. Onward, Christian Soldiers: The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States. New York: Threshold Editions: 146–147. This book is a nicely comprehensive history and analysis of the Catholic and evangelical political alliance from a Republican insider (Hudson is also the former Chairman of Catholic Outreach of the Republican National Committee). 17. Michael R. Welch and David C. Leege. 1991. “Dual Reference Groups and Political Orientations: An Examination of Evangelically Oriented Catholics”, American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 35: 28–35. 18. Mary E. Bendyna, RSM, John C. Green, Mark J. Rozell, and Clyde Wilcox. 2000. “Catholics and the Christian Right: A View from Four States”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. Vol. 39, No. 3 (September): 321–332.

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19. Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox. 1996. Second Coming: The New Christian Right in Virginia Politics. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Mary E. Bendyna, RSM, John C. Green, Mark J. Rozell, and Clyde Wilcox. 2001. “Uneasy Alliance: Conservative Catholics and the Christian Right”, Sociology of Religion. Vol. 62, No. 1 (Spring): 51–64. 20. Author interview with Ralph Reed, January 3, 2017 (by email correspondence). 21. Author interview with Ralph Reed, January 4, 2017 (by email correspondence). 22. F.H. Buckley. 2016. “Catholic Surprise: Another Way That Trump Is Remaking the GOP”, New York Post, December 19. http://nypost.com/2016/12/19/catholic-surprise-anotherway-trump-is-remaking-the-gop/ (accessed January 3, 2016). Author interview with Buckley, January 2, 2016 (by email correspondence). Buckley is a professor of law at George Mason University and was a speech-writer for the Trump campaign. 23. https://catholics.donaldjtrump.com/ (accessed November 25, 2020). 24. Christopher White. 2020. “NCR Exclusive: Campaign Names Three Dozen ‘Catholics for Biden’ Co-Chairs”, National Catholic Reporter, September 14. https://www.ncronline.org/news/peo ple/ncr-exclusive-campaign-names-three-dozen-catholics-bidenco-chairs (accessed November 25, 2020).

PART I

Political Parties and Ideologies

CHAPTER 2

Catholic Patterns in the American Left Amandine Barb

Introduction In 2008, the Evangelical theologian Jim Wallis, founder of the Christian social justice organization Sojourners, published a book titled The Great Awakening: Reviving Faith and Politics in a Post-Religious Right America (Wallis 2008). Wallis argued that, as George W. Bush’s twoterm presidency was coming to an end, a growing number of Americans, especially among the younger generations, had gotten increasingly frustrated with the conservative Christian agenda of the Republican Party, essentially focused on moral and family values. Wallis further suggested that more voters—including Protestant Evangelicals and Catholics—were now willing to embrace a pluralistic and liberal approach to religion and politics, one articulating faith(s) with such issues as poverty relief, climate change, and health care reform. Accordingly, in the aftermath of John Kerry’s defeat against Bush four years earlier, Democratic strategists, along with religious social activists such as Wallis, had attempted to

A. Barb (B) Georg-August-Universität, Göttingen, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Gayte et al. (eds.), Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82212-5_2

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build a progressive religious coalition that could become for Democrats what the Religious Right had been for Republicans since the 1980s: a key ideological and electoral ally. Progressive Catholics—historical figures of the Church’s social movement as well as younger militants—played a crucial role in these efforts to establish a “Religious Left”. If Obama’s tenure in the White House did give these actors greater visibility and influence in national politics, Trump’s victory in 2016 and the subsequent four years, dominated by an aggressive Christian nationalism, dashed the hopes of Catholics and other liberal activists as well as any idea of a “PostReligious Right America.” In November 2020, however, the election of Joe Biden, the second Catholic only to enter the White House after John F. Kennedy in 1961, has offered a cautious sense of relief and optimism to progressive religious Americans—especially members of the Church—as the Democratic President has extensively relied on his faith and Catholic social teaching to advance his policy agenda. The chapter will first retrace the genealogy of the Catholic (Religious) Left in the United States, from the Social Gospel movement of the early twentieth century to its resurgence at the forefront of the national political scene in the early 2000s. It will then turn to more recent developments—namely Trump’s presidency and Biden’s election—and assess to what extent, in the context of broader demographic changes, Catholics, and religious Americans more generally, can remain relevant actors for the political Left.

The Emergence of a New Catholic (Religious) Left in US Politics A Long, Overshadowed, History of Progressive Activism Among American Catholics Religious liberals have been a constant and active presence in American public life. Accordingly, as Laura Olson puts it, “during much of the twentieth century, the dominant faith-based voice in American politics came from the Left” (Olson 2011, p. 272). Among Catholics more particularly, there is a long tradition of advocacy for causes that are traditionally defended by the political Left, such as poverty relief, support to refugees, and a more inclusive health care system. At the beginning of the twentieth century, for instance, Catholics, alongside Protestants and Jews, were part of the Social Gospel movement that sought to

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foster education and social justice. Founded in 1933 in the midst of the Great Depression by Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin, the Catholic Workers Movement also targeted economic inequalities, while promoting pacifism in international relations (Mountin et al. 2001). In the 1960s, Catholic organizations took part in the civil rights and anti-war protests across the country (Marsh 2005). In the 1980s, the “Sanctuary movement” saw American Catholics offer shelter as well as material and legal support to refugees fleeing the civil wars in Central America. In doing so, Catholic churches defied the restrictive Federal immigration policies of the Reagan Administration. These mobilizations did not always enjoy the support of the Church’s hierarchy in the United States, represented by the US Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB). But the commitment of many American Catholics to these progressive issues directly stems from Catholic theology, most importantly the Church’s “social teaching” doctrine, which emphasizes the need to promote the values of solidarity, dignity, and hospitality.1 This activism is also in line with the recommendations put forward by the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II, 1962–1965), which encouraged Catholics to engage in worldly affairs. Aside from the Catholic Workers Movement, several other organizations have long represented the interests of progressive Catholics in the United States. These include, for example, the US branch of the anti-war group Pax Christi International, established by lay American Catholics in 1952, but also Network, which describes itself as a “Lobby for Catholic Social Justice.”2 Founded in 1971 by a group of Catholic nuns who had previously been involved in the civil rights movements and the anti-war protests, Network has advocated for many progressive causes, including economic equality, immigration, and health care reform (Barb 2017). Yet after abortion was legalized by the Supreme Court in 1973, conservative pro-life Catholics started to mobilize and to gain greater visibility on the national public scene, partnering with conservative Protestant Evangelicals in what would later be known as the “Christian Right”, i.e. an informal coalition of religious groups who argue that the United States, founded by Christian men on Christian values, has been corrupted by the ideologies of liberalism and secularism. As a result, their activism has mainly focused on such issues as reproductive rights, the place of religion in public schools, and the defense of traditional marriage. A few conservative Catholic leaders, such as Richard Neuhaus, a priest, editor of the magazine First Things, and author of The Naked Public Square (Neuhaus 1986), have managed to establish themselves as influential

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figures within the Religious Right. Following the emergence of conservative Christianity as a prominent electoral force under Ronald Reagan’s first presidency (1981–1985), religious Americans advocating for social justice and other progressive issues, although still active, were overshadowed by the discourse on moral and family values that seemed to dominate the political sphere. The year Roe v. Wade was decided by the Supreme Court, for example, a group of lay members of the Church had founded the organization Catholics for Choice, in order to defend a pro-choice position compatible with Catholic theology. Their mobilization was however quickly disavowed by the USCCB, and the group’s public visibility and influence have since been limited. With the ideological alliance between conservative Christians and the Republican Party in the 1980s, a binary divide between what has commonly been described as a “faith-friendly” Right and a “secular” Left emerged within the US political landscape. Over the years, this religious polarization has led, in electoral politics, to what Robert Putnam and David Campbell have called a “God Gap”, i.e. the fact that the more often an individual attends religious services, the more likely they are to vote for the Republican candidate (Putnam and Campbell 2010). George W. Bush’s Presidency: A “Wake-Up Call” for Liberal Religious Americans In that context, the first term of Republican President George W. Bush, and its reelection in 2004 against the Catholic Democrat John Kerry, marked a political turning point, if not a “wake-up call,” for many progressive religious (Catholic) Americans. Accordingly, Bush’s presidency was perceived by many as the climax of the Christian Right’s decade-long rise in national politics. The Republican president, who had named Jesus as his favorite “political philosopher,” talked at length about the influence of his Christian faith on his life and on his work in the White House. Several of his administration’s policies also more concretely reflected the traditional agenda advanced by conservative Christians, namely the opposition to same-sex marriage and the funding limitations for stem-cell research. This was all the more problematic for religious progressives—but also for Democrats—that in November 2004, Bush’s reelection over Kerry was thought to have been made possible by the “value voters”, i.e. Americans who cast their ballot based primarily on a

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candidate’s position on moral and family values, such as abortion, homosexuality, or the place of religion in public life (Olson 2011). Kerry, the third Catholic presidential candidate in US history,3 only received 47% of the Catholic vote (vs. 50% for Gore in 2000) (Pew Research Center 2016). More particularly, many liberal Catholics were frustrated by the support that members of the Church hierarchy, including some prominent Archbishops, had given to Bush during the presidential campaign. The leadership’s insistence on abortion and on the defense of traditional marriage, as well as its silence on the environment, the Iraq war, and on issues of social justice, left progressive Catholics with the growing feeling that the complexity of their beliefs and values were not properly taken into consideration. In August 2004, in the midst of the presidential campaign, young Catholic social activists, concerned with the “poor representation of Catholic values in the election,” launched the Catholic Voting Project (Kelley and Korzen 2008, p. xxv). The Project ’s purpose was to counter-attack the attempts made by Republicans and conservative Catholics to discredit Kerry’s candidacy because of his pro-choice position. It condemned discourses that “isolate issues without taking into consideration the full richness and breadth of Catholic social teaching,” and thus “risk putting a partisan agenda before Catholic principles” (Catholic Online 2004). Members of the USCCB had indeed repeatedly argued that abortion was a “litmust test” for politicians (Dionne 2008, p. 170). In recent years, however, American Catholics, especially among the younger generation, have become less conservative than the Church’s institutional hierarchy on family and moral values: a majority of Catholics (56%) agrees that abortion should be “legal in all or most cases,” and an even greater percentage (68%) opposes the complete overturn of Roe v. Wade (Pew Research Center 2020). 61% of American Catholics also favor same-sex marriage (Fahmy 2020). As a result, while Democrats felt the urgency to narrow the “God Gap” and to reach out to faithful voters, liberal religious Americans realized that they had to get more deeply involved into politics, in order to finally give a voice to their coreligionists whose vote was also motivated by their faith, but who disagreed with the conservative politics of the Christian Right. In the aftermath of the 2004 presidential elections, several news articles and books were published that called for a “Great Awakening” of the “Religious Left” in the United States. The authors, such as Jim Wallis, the Catholic journalist E.J. Dionne, or the rabbi Michael Lerner,

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editor of the interfaith magazine Tikkun (Lerner 2006), claimed that it was time for the many, but often too invisible, progressive religious Americans to come together and reinvest the public sphere. Although they disagreed on some topics, notably abortion, they sought to emphasize the compatibility of their respective theology with the defense of issues long neglected by conservatives, such as the environment, the reform of the health care system, the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals, and immigration. They attacked the discourse of the Christian Right for sidelining the core teachings of their faith on poverty and social justice, and for ignoring the complex concerns of many religious Americans. A New Alliance Between Catholics and Democrats Among Democrats as well, many lawmakers and strategists were seeking new ways to appeal to religious voters: they hired people to be specifically in charge of the outreach to the Evangelical and Catholic electorate, or asked candidates to talk more about their personal faith. Catholic Democrats, in particular, felt the need to be more vocal and visible in order to counter-balance the influence of their Republican counterparts, particularly in the crucial Midwestern “swing states”, such as Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin, home to a significant white Catholic population. For that purpose, in February 2006, six months before the first mid-term elections of Bush’s second presidency, a group of Democratic lawmakers released a text titled “Statement of Principles by Fifty-Five Catholic Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives.” They acknowledged that there can be “disagreements with the Church in some areas,” but also asserted that they were “proud to be part of the living Catholic tradition,” which, through its “social teaching,” “highlights the need to provide a collective safety net to those individuals in society who are most in need”—the “poor and disadvantaged.” One of the “Statement”’s signatories, Rosa DeLauro, a Representative for Connecticut, explained that Catholic Democratic lawmakers “understood it was time to take a stand” when, during the 2004 presidential campaign, the Church hierarchy “singled out some of us for our pro-choice position on abortion while failing to show significant interest in all we were doing to advance the (…) Church’s rich tradition of social justice” (DeLauro 2010, p. 6). In the aftermath of Kerry’s defeat, when “Democrats were (…) being portrayed as godless heathens” (DeLauro 2010, p. 8), the “Statement of Principles” was thus meant to make clear that “our faith

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does have bearing on the broad range of issues that we champion in the Congress and in our communities” (DeLauro 2010, p. 1). As a result of these calls for mobilization from religious leaders and Democrats alike, several new Catholic advocacy organizations were founded, among which Catholic Democrats (2004), Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good (2005), and Catholics United (2005), the latter group being directly born out of the Catholic Voting Project. These organizations, launched by young Catholic activists (Kelley and Korzen 2008), aimed at promoting a more progressive approach to the Church’s theology, and at giving a new place and relevance to its social teaching in American public life. Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good’s official goal, for instance, was to “promote the social justice of (…) the Catholic Church in American politics, media and culture.”4 Yet as Bush was beginning his second term in the White House, these organizations also sought to give liberal Catholics a more concrete influence in national politics, by creating a bridge between members of the Church and progressive lawmakers. Catholics in Alliance, for example, was founded by Alexia Kelley, who had worked for the USCCB’s national anti-poverty program before occupying the position of “religious outreach director” in Kerry’s presidential campaign. She created the advocacy group in reaction to what she perceived as the “suppression of authentic Catholic values in 2004,” and with the hope of “rebuild[ing] th[e] relationship [between Catholics and the Democratic party] that had historically done much to advance the call to peace and the common good” (Kelley and Korzen 2008, p. xxvi). If Catholics in Alliance and Catholics United were officially non-partisan, Catholic Democrats were explicitly founded to “bring the rich tradition of Catholic social teaching” to the Democratic party, while at the same time “present[ing] [to the Catholic community] the Democratic way of working for justice and peace in the political world.”5 Convinced that “the Religious (…) Right owed its dominance to its superior ability to deliver its message” rather than to its “theological accuracy” (Kelley and Korzen 2008, p. xxvii), these organizations adopted the successful mobilization strategies of their conservative counterparts in order to achieve a similar visibility and influence in national politics: they lobbied politicians, endorsed candidates for elections, kept “scorecards” on Senators’ and Representatives’ legislative action, frequently intervened in the media, and drafted amici curiae in support of court cases. In contrast to conservative Christians, however, progressive Catholics have

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taken part in interfaith coalitions alongside Protestants and non-Christian minorities, for example via PICO National Network, Faithful America, or Faith in Public Life.

From Donald Trump to Joe Biden: The Resilience of Progressive Catholicism in Times of Crisis The Trump Presidency and the Institutional Deficiencies of Liberal Catholics In 2008, the election of Barack Obama, who embraced a “faith-friendly secularism” (Lacorne 2012), and somewhat managed to narrow the “God Gap”,6 signaled a first concrete political achievement for the nascent Religious Left. Throughout his two-term presidency, Obama’s administration fostered an inclusive, pluralistic, and constitutionally sound approach to religion, closely working with faith groups at the national and local levels in order to advance its agenda, most prominently the health care reform adopted in March 2011 (Barb 2017). Yet the fragility of the efforts deployed since 2004 to build a liberal religious coalition that would become a reliable, long-term political ally of the Democratic party appeared in plain sight when Donald Trump was elected President in November 2016. In that context, the Democratic failure was most striking with Catholics: despite picking a member of the Church as running-mate—the Senator of Virginia Tim Kaine—Hillary Clinton lost the Catholic vote by 7 points (45% vs. 52% for Trump). Most significantly, 60% of white Catholics chose to cast their ballot for the Republican candidate, giving him a decisive edge in the Midwestern “swing states”, and thereby in the Electoral College. The Christian Right, supposedly on the verge of decline after Bush’s presidency (Wallis 2008), showcased its pragmatic efficiency as it quickly rallied behind Trump, despite the latter’s lack of interest in religion and the many scandals surrounding his private life and presidential campaign. Over the following four years, Trump sought to implement the conservative, nationalist agenda of his Christian supporters: in the early days of his presidency, he signed an Executive Order restricting immigration from a number of Muslim-majority countries (the so-called “Muslim travel ban”); his administration fostered an extensive conception of religious freedom, often at the expense of the rights of women and LGBTQ+ people (Barb 2019); and, perhaps most importantly, Trump appointed

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two conservative Justices to the Supreme Court—Neil Gorsuch, who was raised Catholic but started to attend an Episcopal church after his marriage, and Amy Coney Barrett, member of an ecumenical Christian community, People of Praise, born out of the Catholic charismatic movement. The reasons behind Clinton’s defeat have been extensively discussed. Several factors may more particularly explain why Democrats failed to mobilize the faithful voters they had attracted in 2008 and 2012—one being the latter’s disappointment at Obama’s religious politics during his second term in office. Accordingly, the “contraceptive mandate” adopted in 2012 (which obliges employers to fully reimburse the cost of contraceptives used by their employees, including the morning-after pill), and what was subsequently construed as his administration’s contempt for the rights and autonomy of faith-based institutions,7 triggered a strong backlash among (even moderate) Catholics and Protestant Evangelicals. Catholic universities, schools, nurseries, hospitals, and charities were among the most vocal opponents to the mandate, and one of the two lawsuits brought against it before the Supreme Court was filled by a Catholic women’s congregation, Little Sisters of the Poor. The subsequent demobilization of Catholic voters at the expense of the Democratic party might have been made worse by the fact that some of the key organizations that had been founded after 2004 with the goal of building up a “Religious Left”—namely Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good and Catholics United—all but disappeared from the political scene in the early 2010s. As some of their leaders, such as Alexia Kelley, moved on to different responsibilities in Washington, these groups’ media presence largely waned and their political activism became almost insignificant.8 In the aftermath of Trump’s victory, however, voices among progressive Catholics were also quick to point to the strategical missteps made by Clinton and her team, once again seemingly too negligent of religious voters. Despite an energetic outreach campaign by the Democratic party, the ticket leaders had been reluctant to talk publicly about their faith. Hence Matthew Sitman, editor at the Catholic magazine Commonweal, lamented the “moral austerity” of the Democratic discourse and the fact that Kaine in particular did not appear willing to further articulate his Catholicism with the defense of the Democratic agenda, showing too much “restraint” and “[speaking] as if religion could matter in one of only two ways: as a private, personal ethic or something imposed on everyone else.” Pleading for more pragmatism on the part of Democrats,

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Sitman argued that at a time of “political unrest and moral crisis,” the “liberal left” should finally “embrace[] the messy work of democratic politics: connecting with those of different views [and] seeking converts wherever they might be found (…).” According to him, this would allow Democrats to form a “broader and stronger coalition of secular and religious progressives” that could “forcefully show[] that moral concerns are not limited to those peddled by the Religious Right” (Sitman 2017). Yet if they bemoaned a missed opportunity to capitalize on the outreach efforts that had been made since 2004, liberal religious Americans also found a new sense of urgency, and thus purpose, during the Trump presidency. Conservative Catholics—among them several members of the Church hierarchy, such as New York Archbishop Timothy Dolan—joined like-minded Protestant Evangelicals in embracing Trump’s Christian nationalism. Many of their coreligionists, however, became fierce opponents to the Republican president, relying on Catholic theology and the language of faith to lift up and organize the progressive side. Priests all over the country once again welcomed refugees and undocumented immigrants in their “sanctuary churches”; the Covid-19 pandemic gave greater relevance to the religious calls for a more inclusive health care system; and, in the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement, racial justice and voting rights turned into forefront issues for many liberal Catholics. The organization Catholics United for Black Lives, for example, was founded by young members of the Church in the aftermath of George Floyd’s murder by a white policeman in Minneapolis on May 25, 2020. These activists claim that the Church’s leadership— although the USCCB did release several statements condemning police brutality—has a religious and moral duty to fight for racial equality with the “same energy” and “passion” that go into its opposition to Roe v. Wade (Clemmer 2020). Likewise, a few days after Floyd’s murder, Network released a statement asserting that white Catholics especially “have a responsibility to notice, educate [them]selves, speak, and act to change the racist systems of oppression (…)” (Network 2020). As racial, ethnic, but also sexual minorities and women felt threatened in their rights during the Trump presidency, the Women-Church Convergence, a coalition of twenty-two Catholic feminist and LGBTQ+ organizations—including Catholic for Choice, Sisters Against Sexism, and DignityUSA—similarly lamented that “virtually nothing about this administration’s policies (…), is remotely related to Catholic social teaching.” Arguing that “the coronavirus, the economic meltdown, and the national shame of racism and

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white supremacy combine to ignite a new moment of worldwide awakening,” the coalition urged Americans to choose a “justice agenda,” and “candidates (…) who support economic equality [and] who favor inclusion of marginalized people of all sorts in our diverse society” (Women-Church Convergence 2020). In late 2020, on the eve of the elections, Democratic Socialists of America, the largest socialist organization in the country, also called for a comprehensive renewal of the Catholic social movement, which could play a valuable role against the conservative forces dominating American politics and the Church’s leadership. Writing that “although few [today] in the United States look to the Church for liberal thought,” the history of American Catholics shows that they have been “leading advocates wherever work for the common good is found.” Retracing the genealogy of the Catholic Left in the country, the organization further argued that “[i]t may be winter in the Catholic Church in the United States, but the roots are still alive, and there are hopes for a socialist spring” (Venner 2020). Joe Biden as the Embodiment of the Catholic Left A “socialist spring” is still unlikely in the United States, yet the “roots” of liberal Catholicism may have started to spring up again with Joe Biden’s victory in November 2020. Leading up to the elections, the Democratic party had launched an important outreach strategy in order to mobilize religious voters and counter Trump’s attacks against their party’s supposed hostility to religion—Trump had gone as far as saying that Biden “hurt the Bible” and was “against God” (Pulliam Bailey 2021). Coordinated by the Evangelical Josh Dickson, Director of national faith engagement for the Biden campaign, these efforts once again heavily focused on the older white Catholic population in the battleground states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Against the backdrop of a severe health and economic crisis, Democrats, following the rhetorical strategy used during the previous presidential campaigns, minimized the divisive question of abortion, while stressing the importance of “healing,” “social justice,” and “common good.” They emphasized the connection between the Church’s teachings and Biden’s stance on health care, poverty relief, and immigration, drawing frequent parallels between their candidate and Pope Francis, a fierce critic of neoliberalism and a staunch advocate for

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environmental policies. Organizations such as Catholic Democrats also contributed to voter registration efforts throughout the country. This time around, however, the party’s and militants’ grassroots activism was decisively helped by a candidate who is himself fully at ease talking about how his faith has deeply shaped both his private life and his political engagement (Faggioli 2021). Educated by nuns in parochial schools, Biden attends mass every weekend, carries a rosary in his pocket, and regularly quotes the Bible and various Catholic saints. Throughout the campaign, the Democratic candidate closely articulated his advocacy for progressive issues with Catholicism. In an op-ed he wrote for the Christian Post in late October 2020, for instance, he drew from the Gospel and from his own Catholic upbringing in the blue-collar communities of Pennsylvania in order to bring a religious legitimacy to his proposals on the Covid-19 pandemic: “[m]y Catholic faith drilled into me a core truth—that every person on earth is equal in rights and dignity (…). To beat COVID-19, we must all work together to pull our country out of this crisis. We must all wear masks. It’s not a political statement—it’s a manifestation of God’s commandment to love our neighbors as ourselves, so we can save lives. My faith implores me to embrace a preferential option for the poor (…).” In the same text, filled with calls for “unity” and “healing,” Biden also promised that his administration, as part of a “diverse, and inclusive coalition,” would work together with religious organizations, “at the forefront of many of our country’s most important achievements for justice, equality, and peace” (Biden, 29 October 2020). Likewise, in a speech he had previously given at the occasion of George Floyd’s funeral in June 2020, and in which he declared that “now is the time for racial justice,” Biden explained how liberal Catholic theology is at the source of his concern for equality, reminding the audience that “I grew up with Catholic social doctrine, which taught me that faith without works is dead” (Biden 2020, June 9). The emphasis put by Biden on economic and social issues contrasts with his relative silence on questions related to moral and family values: while being “personally” opposed to abortion as a Catholic, Biden has also made it clear that he refuses to “impose [his religious beliefs] on other people” by supporting a repeal of Roe v. Wade (Bennett 2021). In accordance with the party’s line, he has kept defending pro-choice policies, even recently endorsing a repeal of the 1970 Hyde Amendment,

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which bans Federal subsidies for most abortions (ibid.). As Obama’s vicepresident, Biden had also voiced his support for same-sex marriage a few years before it was legalized by the Supreme Court in 2015. The Democratic strategy proved partly successful, since—although the Catholic vote was almost equally split between both candidates9 —Biden’s appeal to white Catholics in the Midwestern “swing states” may have decisively contributed to his final victory: whereas those key states went for Trump in 2016, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania shifted to the Democratic side in 2020. Even though local data is lacking to precisely assess how the Catholic voting pattern changed within four years in those states, exit polls show that, overall, a greater proportion of white Catholic Americans voted for Biden (42%) than for Clinton (31%) (Crary and Schor 2020). Josh Dickson has argued in this regard that “in the Midwest, we saw gains that in a number of ways outpaced our margin of victory. (…). I think the work we did to engage Evangelicals and Catholics undoubtedly helped us get there” (Newport 2020). Unsurprisingly, the Church’s hierarchy did not show much enthusiasm for Biden’s election—several Archbishops even argued that, because of his pro-choice position, he should be denied communion (White 2021).10 But the Democratic victory was celebrated and praised by the main figures and organizations representing progressive Catholicism in the United States. Simone Campbell, executive director of Network, declared, for example, that “[t]he Catholic advocates of Network are excited to partner with [Joe Biden and Kamala Harris] to begin to heal our nation” and are “especially heartened by their administration’s focus on racial equity and economic justice” (Network 2021). In that respect, liberal Catholics have also been keen on framing Biden’s first progressive policy initiatives—e.g. a 6 trillion-dollar budget plan significantly expanding the scope of Federal spending; a re-entry into the Paris agreement on climate change; and the repeal of the “Muslim travel ban”—as the political fulfillment of the Church’s “social teaching” doctrine. The American Rescue Plan (ARP), adopted in March 2021 in order to provide economic relief to those affected by Covid19, was praised as “Catholic social doctrine in action,” as a repudiation of trickle-down economics and of the “idolization of market forces, [that] has been denounced by every pope since Leo XIII in 1891” (Winters 2021). Parallels were also made between the ARP and Francis’ recent Encyclical Fratelli Tutti “On Fraternity and Social Friendship,” written in October 2020 as a call for more inclusive economic policies in the

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context of the pandemic.11 Other commentators have further argued that Biden’s repeated emphasis on the importance of “dignity,” “respect,” and “hospitality” in both his Inaugural and State of the Union addresses directly “fall under the Catholic vision of the common good” (Nate Tinner-Williams, quoted in McCormick 2021), and “assumes as much from Catholic teaching as it does from the Declaration of Independence” (Copeland 2021). From that perspective, another significant gesture from President Biden has been the reestablishment of an ecumenical, socialjustice oriented White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships. Initially created by Bush in 2001 (as the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives ), expanded and renamed by Obama, the Office had been left vacant by Trump, who had instead launched a Center for Faith and Opportunity Initiatives that mainly focused on religious liberty. According to the Executive Order signed by Biden in February 2021, the Office will again bring together “leaders of different faiths and backgrounds who are the front lines of their communities in crisis and who can help us heal, unite, and rebuild,” particularly on issues related to Covid-19, the economy, and racism (White House 2021). On the one hand, therefore, the election for the second time in US history of a Catholic as President testifies to how unproblematic this religion, once considered fundamentally “un-American,” has become in public life. On the other hand, the Biden presidency also represents prima facie a materialization of the Catholic, and more generally religious, progressive political agenda, especially as it had re-emerged since the early 2000s. All the more so that even besides Biden himself, Democrats in general appear more willing today to embrace a brand of liberal Christianity that had long been peripheral and subdued in the party’s platform and discourse. This trend is perhaps best exemplified by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, one of the youngest members of the House of Representatives and a prominent figure among the party’s left-wing, who has been outspoken about the impact Catholicism has had on her commitment to social justice. Echoing Joe Biden’s rhetoric, Ocasio-Cortez, who is affiliated with Democratic Socialists of America, has stressed the connection between her defense of a universal health care system and the “biblical stories” and values “we were raised with,” while also pointing to how her idea of a “Green New Deal” corresponds to Pope Francis’ views on climate change (Feuerherd 2020). In a text she wrote in 2018 for the Jesuit magazine America, Ocasio-Cortez argued that a reform of the

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criminal justice system was a matter of Christian necessity, quoting the Gospel of Matthew and explaining that “for Catholics,” questions related to “punishment,” “rehabilitation,” and “forgiveness” “tie directly to the heart of our faith” (Ocasio-Cortez 2018). Can Liberal Catholics Remain Relevant for the Democratic Party? Ocasio-Cortez, whose family comes from Puerto Rico, more particularly illustrates the growing importance of Hispanic Catholics for the Democratic Party: first or second-generation immigrants, they comprise an increasing share of the US population and tend to be less preoccupied by traditional “moral values” than by economic and social issues. If some Hispanic Catholics, especially in Florida, are more conservative, notably on abortion, and thus more receptive to the Republican discourse, both Biden and Clinton received a clear majority—67%—of their vote (Crary and Schor 2020). On the other hand, and although they are still a key constituency in the Midwestern “swing states”, white Catholics are quickly declining,12 and, as a result, are also likely to become less electorally salient in the coming years: in 2019, only 12% of all registered voters in the United States identified as “white Catholics”, a decrease of 5% over a little more than ten years (Pew Research Center 2020). Against the backdrop of these rapid demographic changes, and even though Joe Biden has put the rhetoric and programmatic agenda of the Catholic Left at the forefront of the national political scene, it is difficult to precisely assess the latter’s long-term influence within the Democratic party. Aside from the decline of white Church members, the “usefulness” of Catholic liberal theopolitics for Democrats could especially be undermined by the rapidly increasing presence of non-religious individuals in the United States: only 7% in 1990, Americans who do not identify with a religion comprise today 26% of the population—and their importance is bound to keep expanding since many of these “nones,” as they are often nicknamed by the media, are young and belong to the so-called “Generation Z”—among them, interestingly, a growing number of Hispanics (Pew Research Center 2019). Consequently, these Americans also make up a rising share of the electorate—28% of registered voters identified as “unaffiliated” in 2019 vs. only 15% in 2008 (ibid.). The “nones” are of particular interest for Democrats, as they tend to be liberal on many key, contentious social issues, such as abortion, climate change, and immigration: accordingly, they already comprised more than one

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third—38%—of the Democratic electorate in 2019 (vs. 18% in 2008). As Matthew Sitman writes, therefore, progressive religious Americans today “ha[ve] to operate in tandem with a broad liberal left that is rapidly secularizing, or at least becoming more spiritual than religious” (Sitman 2021). These developments inevitably raise strategical questions and challenges for the Democrats. Recent studies have shown, indeed, that one of the main reasons behind the growing disaffiliation of Americans—besides doubts over sacred teachings and distrust toward religious organizations—is a sense of frustration with the entanglement of faith and politics in the contemporary United States (Burge 2021; Pew Research Center 2018). In that sense, the non-religious part of the electorate is presumably less likely to be interested in, or receptive to, a faith-based political discourse, even when this discourse revolves around issues of social justice.

Conclusion Owing to his biography, personal faith, and political trajectory, Joe Biden has been able to position himself as the embodiment of the Catholic Left’s mission, and his election as President has certainly given a renewed visibility and resonance to the agenda of liberal Church members. More generally, seventeen years after Kerry’s defeat, Democrats seem to have established a solid outreach strategy to faithful voters, although its future relevance and effectiveness appear uncertain in the context of increasing religious disaffiliation among the party’s electorate. Overall, however, the project of a unified, Catholic (Religious) Left is still largely incomplete today, as progressive religious groups remain impaired by structural, systemic liabilities, which de facto limit their political impact—i.e. institutional weakness, an absence of cohesive identity among very diverse actors and, for Catholics more particularly, a persistent lack of support among the Church hierarchy, overly fixated on moral issues. Even though, therefore, their future at the forefront of national politics is unclear in the long-run, recent developments have shown that progressive Catholics—historical organizations like Network and Pax Christi, but also the many local activists that help immigrants, women, racial minorities, and low-income individuals—remain an ever-resilient presence within American society, consistently practicing and spreading the Church’s social teaching on the ground. More generally, as the United States has become bitterly divided over the past years, confronted with

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outbursts of violence, riots, and a deadly pandemic, liberal Catholics, although lacking in organizational efficiency and political pragmatism, have once again proved that they are a reliable, rallying voice of resistance for the Left, still able to inspire and mobilize Americans in times of crisis.

Notes 1. Catholic “social teaching” stems from the encyclical letter Rerum Novarum, edict by Pope Leo XIII in 1891. 2. www.networklobby.org. 3. The first Catholic major party presidential nominee was the Democrat Al Smith in 1928 (he lost against Herbert Hoover). The second was John F. Kennedy in 1960. 4. www.catholicsinalliance.org/about (last access: 14 January 2017). The website has become inaccessible. 5. “About Catholic Democrats”, catholicdemocrats.org/about (last access: 2 June 2021). 6. In 2008, Obama received 43% of the vote of those who said they attended “worship services weekly or more” (vs. 39% for Kerry and Gore, in 2004 and 2000 respectively) (Pew Research Center 2012). 7. The “contraceptive mandate” initially contained an explicit exemption for churches, but not for religiously affiliated institutions, such as day care centers, adoption agencies, schools, universities, or hospitals. Although the Obama administration subsequently proposed an arrangement that made sure these institutions would not have to provide direct funding for contraception, Protestant Evangelicals and Catholics continued to protest the mandate, partially winning before the Supreme Court in 2014 (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby). In November 2017, the Trump administration made exemptions available to any employer opposed to contraception on “religious” or “moral” grounds. These exemptions were ruled constitutional by the Supreme Court in 2020 (Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania). 8. The websites of Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good and Catholics United have become inaccessible. Both organizations only keep a very limited presence on social media (e.g. Facebook and Twitter).

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9. The Edison exit polls estimate that Biden received 52% of the Catholic vote, versus 47% for Trump. According to the AP VoteCast, 49% of Catholics voted for Biden and 50% for Trump (Newport 2020). 10. On the day of Biden’s inauguration, the head of the USCCB, Los Angeles Archbishop José H. Gomez, released a statement showcasing his lukewarm feelings, as he wrote that “I must point out that our new President has pledged to pursue certain policies that would advance moral evils and threaten human life and dignity, most seriously in the areas of abortion, contraception, marriage, and gender” (USCCB 2021). 11. Fratellli Tutti, 4 October 2020, https://www.vatican.va/con tent/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_202 01003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html (last access: 28 May 2021). 12. Whereas in the early 1990s “whites” comprised 87% of all American Catholics, this number has fallen to 55% three decades later (Cox and Jones 2017).

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Clemmer, Jon. 19 November 2020. “Summit Challenges White Students to be True Allies in Battle against Racism”. National Catholic Reporter. Copeland, M. Shawn. 11 March 2021. “President Joseph Biden and the Common Good”. Berkley Forum. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/res ponses/president-joseph-biden-and-the-common-good (last access: 26 April 2021). Cox, Daniel, Jones, Robert P. 9 June 2017. “America’s Changing Religious Identity”. Public Religion Research Institute. Crary, David, Schor, Elana. 6 November 2020. “AP Vote Cast: Trump Wins White Evangelicals, Catholics Split”. Associated Press. DeLauro, Rosa. 2010. “Introduction”. In Katznelson, Ira, Wolfe, Alan, eds. Religion and Democracy in the United States. Danger or Opportunity? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Dionne, E.J. 2008. Souled Out: Reclaiming Faith and Politics After the Religious Right. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Faggioli, Massimo. 2021. Joe Biden and Catholicism in the United States. New London: Bayard. Fahmy, Dalia. 20 October 2020. “8 Key Findings about Catholics and Abortion”. Pew Research Center. Feuerherd, Peter. 27 October 2020. “AOC Credits Her Catholic Faith for Positions on Health Care, Environment”. National Catholic Reporter. Kelley, Alexia, Korzen, Chris. 2008. A Nation for All. How the Catholic Vision of the Common Good Can Save America from the Politics of Division. San Francisco: Jossey Bass. Lacorne, Denis. 2012. Religion in America. New York: Columbia University Press. Lerner, Michael. 2006. The Left Hand of God: Taking Back Our Country from the Religious Right. San Francisco: HarperCollins. Marsh, Charles. 2005. The Beloved Community: How Faith Shapes Social Justice, From the Civil Rights Movement to Today. New York: Basic Books. McCormick, Bill. 29 April 2021. “Was Joe Biden Preaching Catholic Social Teaching to the Congress Last Night? Supporters Think So”. America. The Jesuit Review. Mountin, Susan, Runkel, Phillip M., Thorn, William J., eds. 2001. Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker Movement: Centenary Essays. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Network. 29 May 2020. “Network Lobby Decries the Murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis Police”. https://networklobby.org/news/network-lobby-dec ries-the-murder-of-george-floyd-by-minneapolis-police/ (last access: 2 June 2021). ———. 20 January 2021. “Catholic Sisters Celebrate Second Catholic President, First Female Vice President”. https://networklobby.org/news/cat

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holic-sisters-celebrate-second-catholic-president-first-female-vice-president/ (last access: 14 May 2021). Neuhaus, Richard. 1986. The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing. Newport, Frank. 13 November 2020. “Religious Group Voting and the 2020 Election”. Gallup. https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/ 324410/religious-group-voting-2020-election.aspx (last access: 3 May 2021). Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria. 27 June 2018. “Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez on the Catholic Faith and the Urgency of Criminal Justice Reform”. America, The Jesuit Review. Olson, Laura R. 2011. “The Religious Left in Contemporary American Politics”, Politics, Religion & Ideology, Vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 291–294. Pew Research Center. 7 November 2012. “How the Faithful Voted: 2012 Preliminary Analysis”. ———. 9 November 2016. “How the Faithful Voted: A Preliminary 2016 Analysis”. ———. 8 August 2018. “Why America’s ‘Nones’ Don’t Identify with a Religion”. ———. 14 May 2019. “Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage”. ———. 17 October 2019. “In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace”. ———. 26 October 2020. “What the US Electorate Looks Like by Party, Race and Ethnicity, Age, Education and Religion”. Pulliam Bailey, Sarah. 8 January 2021. “Josh Dickson: The Evangelical Behind Joe Biden’s Outreach to Religious Voters”. The Washington Post. Putnam, Robert D., Campbell, David E. 2010. American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us. New York: Simon & Schuster. Sitman, Matthew. Summer 2017. “Against Moral Austerity: On the Need for a Christian Left”. Dissent. ———. 15 April 2021. “Whither the Religious Left?”. The New Republic. The White House. 14 February 2021. “President Biden Reestablishes the White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships”. https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/14/factsheet-president-biden-reestablishes-the-white-house-office-of-faith-based-andneighborhood-partnerships/ (last access: 25 May 2021). ———. 20 January 2021. “USCCB President’s Statement on the Inauguration of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., as 46th President of the United States of America”. https://www.usccb.org/news/2021/usccb-presidents-statem ent-inauguration-joseph-r-biden-jr-46th-president-united-states (last access 23 May 2021). Venner, Marie. Winter 2020. “Time for a Catholic Spring?”. Democratic Left (A Publication of Democratic Socialists of America).

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Wallis, Jim. 2008. The Great Awakening: Reviving Faith and Politics in a PostReligious Right America. New York: HarperOne. White, Christopher. 24 May 2021. “Bishops Denying Communion to Catholic Politicians a ‘Distinctively American’ Approach”. National Catholic Reporter. Winters, Michael Sean. 12 March 2021. “Biden’s American Rescue Plan is Catholic Social Doctrine in Action”. National Catholic Reporter. Women-Church Convergence. July 2020. “An Open Letter to Catholic Voters and All Voters for Justice in the United States”. https://www.women-chu rchconvergence.org/images/Stmts/July2020Stmt.pdf (last access: 15 May 2021).

CHAPTER 3

The American Catholic Right in the Making of US Christian Populism and Its European Incursion Blandine Chelini-Pont

Christian Right populism is not the Christian conservatism of yesteryear. It is its nationalist mutation, using Christian identity and confusing it with racial resentment and an America First ideology. It has taken hold of the Republican Party since Donald Trump’s election in 2016. Previously, the Christian reference served to nurture a long political mobilization, partly linked to Catholic actors, that gave birth to the religious right,1 with successful coalitions such as the former Moral Majority, Christian Coalition and Evangelicals and Catholics together. Newer nationalist and extremist coalitions have taken over the Republican Party and transformed the profile and discourses of many of its candidates, at all electoral levels.

B. Chelini-Pont (B) Aix-Marseille University, Marseille, France e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Gayte et al. (eds.), Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82212-5_3

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The Christian Right has played a major role in the so-called God gap between Republicans and Democrats. Its role was elevated in 1994 by inclusion of pro-family agendas in the Republican Party’s Contract with America (the so-called Gingrich Revolution), which helped the Republicans to win the House of Representatives after forty years of Democratic control. The Republican Party’s alliance with the Christian Right continued unabated in the following years and within it the previously unthinkable coalition between conservative Evangelicals and Catholics. Conservative positions contributed to a gradual partial Catholic shifting to the Republican Party, which we have presented in our previous edition.2

The Trumpist Turn Catholic conservative influence in the Republican Party was strongly represented in the 2012 presidential primaries, by three candidates with such a background: Rick Santorum, Newt Gingrich, and Paul Ryan. In the 2016 primaries, Donald Trump was not at all a good fit for the Catholic conservatives, so much so that, in March 2016, influential Catholic conservative intellectuals George Weigel and Robert P. George published an appeal in the National Review signed by more than thirty Catholic intellectual leaders, who denounced Donald Trump as a man “clearly unfit to be President of the United States.”3 Emphasizing Trump’s racist prejudices and highly opportunistic reversal on the abortion issue, the signatories urged responsible Catholics not to vote for him. Despite this principled stance, many other religious conservatives mobilized for Trump. Phyllis Schlafly, before her death, made her case in her last book, The Conservative Case for Trump. Her website published in September 2016, a counter-list of thirty-three Catholic leaders backing candidate Trump, with former candidate Rick Santorum among them.4 An influential ally, National Catholic Prayer Breakfast’s founder Joseph Cella, became the Trump campaign’s chief liaison for Catholic affairs during the summer 2016, while Trump surrounded himself with selfdeclared Catholic advisers, like Steve Bannon, head of Breibart News 5 website. Among the 2016 members of Trump’s Catholic Advisory Council, there was Father Frank Pavone, a famous anti-abortion activist, who staged a few days before the election his support for the future President, by displaying an aborted fetus on an altar. Pavone headed

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the CatholicsforTrump movement in the 2020 presidential campaign. To this 2016 list, we can add Catholic tycoons like Robert Mercer,6 former supporter of 2016 candidate Ted Cruz, Breitbart News’ financer and coinvestor with Steve Bannon in Cambridge Analytica, a data company later accused of illegal access to millions of Facebook accounts, insidiously influencing opinion in favor of candidate Trump. With the support of these ardent Catholics and their even larger evangelical counterparts, Donald Trump’s rhetoric captured the hearts of Christian voters and seemed to win over most Catholic voters in 2016. Even if he did not repeat this feat in 2020, his single term in office contributed to subvert the identity of the Christian Right, which was co-opted by presidential populism. National Populist / “Christianist” Turn The Christian Right aligned itself with the new ideology it helped forge, because of its support for Donald Trump. Analysts have taken some time to define this ideology, because it creatively combines neo-rightist, antiliberal economic and international political theses,7 carried by intellectuals such as Michael Anton8 or Yoram Hanozy,9 with Christian identity, ancient beliefs about a migrants’ invasion and an Islamic threat, combined into a new nationalism. It permitted to gather a common vision of American elites: that they were corrupt, greedy, lawless, and had turned into a kind of globalist mafia; that they would be responsible for the collapse of the nation’s traditional heritage and Christian values. In the first attempts to define this ideological combination, some analysts proposed to call it National Conservatism or National Populism, some others preferred to label it Christian Nationalism 10 or even Christian Populism 11 or Christianism.12 We propose to call it American Christianism. Its tone was well set with the help of actors from the Christian Right, including some influential conservative Catholics. They turned Donald Trump into the American providential savior of all that was great about America, but under threat from leftist institutions and the Deep State.

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European Counterpart Christianist ideology, assembled during the 2016 Trump campaign and revived during the 2020 campaign, seems to have had a parallel development on the other side of the Atlantic. Far-right populist parties and identitarian movements have surged in advocating seemingly similar Christianist ideas, with a strong focus on a perceived Islamic invasion, in a context where a large part of immigrants and refugees from outside the European Union are Muslim. This phenomenon has given rise to abundant academic research since 2016.13 Behind this apparent similarity, however, there were differences, which Marie Gayte explains in her article on the place of religion in Donald Trump’s populism.14 The dosage of American Christianism was not the same as that of European Christianism, which can be divided at least into two quite distinct groups. First, there are identarian movements and parties with a nationalpopulist temperament that use Christianity as an exclusivist cultural compass, to rally voters who oscillate between fear and hatred of Islam. This identity has thus been determined as fundamentally Christian for the last fifteen years, to better reject foreign immigrants and their descendants. Immigrants, who were the first historical target of these parties, have been meanwhile transformed into Muslim enemies.15 Olivier Roy demonstrates in his work on the religious dynamics of the French National Front, how the party, now called National Rally, instrumentalized Christianity in its politics to build nostalgia for a golden national past and render Islam an intrinsically foreign culture.16 In the United States, Christian populist identity has a more pronounced racial dimension, which holds out the hope of a total halt to Hispanic and other non-white immigration. It captures the fear of white peoples to be no longer the majority. European populist themes of overwhelming Islamization, by demographic and cultural replacement and conflation of Muslims and terrorists, seem not to be so race-focused—although that dimension exists in Christian German populism and the rest of northern Europe.17 Secondly, not all national-populist parties in Europe have made use of the Christian identity trope, especially when they are sovereigntists and founded by political entrepreneurs,18 as it is the case with the Independence Party of the United Kingdom. When they do use the Christian reference, the national-populist parties of Western Europe such as the National Rally in France do not officially defend the traditional family, nor

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do they call for the disappearance of gay marriage. They accept and defend secularism,19 women’s rights, and gay rights, as does the Dutch Party for Freedom, because of the status of women and gays in much of Islamic beliefs.20 These parties therefore rely on secularism, sexual freedom, and women’s rights among their electorates. They say nothing about legalized abortion, whereas such moral and social issues are at the heart of American Christianism. Then, from a completely different perspective, there are in Central and Eastern Europe reactionary parties and movements, openly nationalCatholic or national-orthodox. Their countries have vivid memories of the Ottoman and communist pasts. They see themselves as defenders of their intrinsically Christian people’s identity, because they entered civilization, through past conversion, baptism, and Christian coronation of their (tribal) king.21 Some of them have become governing parties, in Poland, Hungary, and Croatia. They easily take up the rhetoric of the war of civilizations that has allegedly resumed with the acceptance of immigration and the lack of hard control along the borders of the European Union (EU). European Islamization has been, according to them, confirmed by the growing Islamist terrorism in the continent. And above all, they easily linked Islamization to Western liberalism, which would allow for such a development. Liberalism appears as a system, “imposed” on the peoples of Europe. Furthermore, it would spread a “tyranny” of false liberties and openness,22 leading both to economic decline23 and to domination of cultural pluralism and of the gay lobby’s proponents. Voices therefore were raised in these parties to de-liberalize democracy, or even to turn away from it, in favor of an authoritarian regime, Bonaparte-style, which would protect the People-Nation. American Christianism would more closely resemble this reactionary strain, although it does not articulate quite as openly its disdain on liberal democracy and it has no monarchical-authoritarian model to idealize. Transatlantic Connections Despite these differences, proponents of American Christianism began to transfer their own ideological synthesis into transatlantic networks of conservative Christians, particularly Catholic ones, some of which date back to the Cold War.24 A large part of these networks developed in the 1990s.25 A more recent part developed under Donald Trump’s era, through new groups, counter-media, think tanks, NGOs, ecumenical or

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Catholic associations, and are largely financed by some wealthy contributors. They have come to represent a counterforce within the EU’s civil society, which Carlo Ruzza calls the “conservative uncivil society.”26 Steve Bannon and his attempt to regroup a European Christianist “Movement” from Brussels, targeting the European Union in the 2019 European elections, has been the most high-profile example of this push,27 even though Bannon failed and came back to the United States with nothing to show for his efforts.

Catholic Contribution to American Christianism Through its theoretical contributions and renewed mobilization, the American Religious Right has supported the new national conservatism, as French American scholar Maya Kandel has called it,28 which is heavily tinged with Christian populism. It defined the Trump era, as neoliberalism represented the Reagan era or neoconservatism the George W. Bush era. As Maya Kandel writes, this new national conservatism has overthrown the other pillars of old-fashioned conservatism, namely anti-state libertarianism and foreign interventionism. The Christian Right has not suffered at all from this marginalization of traditional conservatism, to the contrary. While after the end of George W. Bush’s presidency, many commentators predicted its decline,29 it has found itself at the heart of the neo-national apparatus, as Kevin Phillips predicted fifteen years ago in his essay American Theocracy, The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century. The Christian Right gave national populism its Christianist label. American Christianism as a Specific National Populism The term national-populist was coined by sociologist Gino Germani in 1978 in his book Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism, to define the Latin American regimes of the 1930s through the 1950s (Peronism-Getulism) and their combination of charismatic power, identity mythology, and authoritarian state. French historian Jacques Rupnick has also used this expression in his overview of current regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and evoked a planetary national-populist wave that, from the election of Donald Trump to the White House, to that of Narendra Modi in India, is shaking democracies.

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During the 2016 election campaign, Trump’s group of populist backers and influencers, including his visionary War of Civilizations strategist Steve Bannon, ostensibly relied on the narrative produced by Christian conservatives since the early 1990s, namely that of a faithful Christian people dispossessed of its democratic sovereignty by liberal, secularist elites open to the four winds of globalization.30 According to Philip Gorski, the incorporation of this narrative into Trump campaign communications, in a way, served as a foundational narrative for the national populism that emerged.31 In their study Make America Christian Again: Christian Nationalism and Voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Elections, sociologists Andrew L. Whitehead, Samuel L. Perry, and Joseph O. Baker have shown that Christian referencing was the most important factor of support in the choice for Trump in 2016.32 It functioned, for the first time, as a popular rallying lever, calling for the defense of America’s distinctive Christian identity and future. According to Whitehead, it was this set of beliefs and ideal, which constructed at the national level an allegedly unique Christian identity and tended to preserve Christianity as the original national culture. Gorski, on the other hand, speaks of a religious nationalism in a secularized-civil form, which now makes American Christian identity the decisive incubator of national belonging. The result has been a succession of rapid theoretical alignments in a new political synthesis, which takes up the themes of the Religious Right. The alleged immorality of the secularist elites who are destroying Western civilization with their institutional atheism and distorted interpretation of rights and freedoms echoed national-populist denunciation of the elite’s conspiracy, sacrificing their homeland on the altar of free markets and mass immigration. Natural Rights and Christian Religious Freedom What has been the specific Catholic right’s contribution to American Christianism under the Trump presidency, if we can distinguish it? Many conservative Catholic political leaders and activists provided an important foundation of support for Donald Trump’s presidential campaigns and they saw in him the opportunity to elevate conservative moral and social views in the executive branch and especially the judiciary. In doing so, they have embraced the victimization rhetoric of Christian discrimination and liberal Christianophobia by turning them into powerful arguments to denounce what they believe are the false

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rights imposed on the people by liberals, contrary to the true rights defended by the Constitution, whose inalienability comes from natural law. Per se, the naturalist position is not “populist” nor “Christianist,” and comes from the Catholic Thomistic philosophy. But it becomes so when it is expressed in the name of a constitutional law philosophy. Once in power, the narrative of the constitutional (natural) rights restoration legitimized the freeze or even roll back of legal advances in favor of women’s and LGTBQ’s sexual and reproductive rights.33 This was particularly obvious in the 2019 rule banning abortion referrals, and requiring coercive anti-abortion counseling for pregnant patients, and imposing stringent financial standards for clinics offering federally funded reproductive healthcare. Close to this mindset, President Trump led the renewal of the federal judiciary as he promised during his campaign, thanks to the counsel of conservative Catholic Leonard Leo, Vice President of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies.34 Leo is credited in some corners with having influenced the Supreme Court nominations of President George W. Bush, and then later of President Donald Trump. Three of these justices are devout and very conservative Catholics, including most recently appointed Justice Amy Coney Barrett. With Leo’s active guidance, President Trump also appointed a quarter of the Seventh Circuit judges, the second most powerful federal court in the country. These judges play a decisive role in any proceedings leading to the Supreme Court. Beyond the federal district, the former president has nominated in the course of three years fifty court of appeal judges, i.e., one in four, almost as many as the fifty-five appointed by Barack Obama in eight years. According to Leo, in his rousing speech at the Federalist Society Convention in November 2019, by the end of his term, Donald Trump would have appointed one-third of the federal courts of appeals judges. In addition, more than 130 District Court judges nominated by Trump now sit on the bench. In total, almost two hundred judges were appointed by President Trump during his single term, many of them social conservatives and members of the Federalist Society. To President Trump’s critics, he accomplished in just one term in office a kind of social conservative colonization of the judiciary. The conservative Catholic and evangelical influence during the Trump years extended well beyond the judicial branch. There were leading figures in his administration or advising the president such as Steve Bannon, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone, Secretary of Education Betsy Devos,

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Attorney General William Barr, and entities such as the Catholic Advisory Council, the Evangelical Advisory Council, the expanded Office of Faith and Opportunity Initiative, and various new commissions and directorates where natural rights’ philosophy was promoted. At the State Department headed by Mike Pompeo, a Commission on Universal Inalienable Rights was created, who appointed Catholic social conservative law professor Mary Ann Glendon. Within the Department of Health, a new Division of Conscience and Religious Freedom was created in 2018 within the Office of Civil Rights, to monitor the activity of the latter, whose mission is normally devoted to enforcing laws on discrimination and to ensure equal access for all to health. The defense of religious freedom during Donald Trump’s term enjoyed strong support from conservative Catholics. Although not populist nor Christianist, the definition of religious freedom being promoted was that people of faith have a right to object to laws that violate their conscience and ultimately not be bound by such laws. As defined, this turns religious freedom into a Christian privilege to pick and choose which laws one is compelled to follow. The Department of Justice defended such a view of what religious freedom is. Since Attorney General Barr assumed his post in February 2019, the Justice Department filed statements of interest in many cases involving Catholic and other religious institutions over religious liberty issues. Barr also stirred controversy in his speeches, speaking out from his office, against the “militant” and “growing ascendancy” of secularism and the doctrine of moral relativism.35 Barr delivered speeches at Catholic universities and similarly in February 2020 at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention in Tennessee.36 He spoke at the National Catholic Prayer Breakfast at the end of March 2020, where he received an award for his “long history of dedicated public service and his commitment to the defense of the vulnerable religious freedom.”37 White Christendom Demographic changes in the United States carry important political implications, and much has been made of President Trump’s predominantly white Christian base of support as representing something of a backlash against rising immigration and the steady decline of the white majority population. A 2014 Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) survey indicated that white Christians only represented 29% of the 18– 29 age group while they accounted for 67% of Americans 65 and older.

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The PRRI also found that while in 1991, 87% of US Catholics were white, they are just now 55% while 36% are Hispanic (PRRI 2018). In their November 2016 study, Explaining Nationalist Political Views: The Case of Donald Trump, Gallup researchers Jonathan T. Rothwell and Pablo Diego-Rosell showed that racial isolation of whites, as revealed by their zip code, was one of the most reliable predictors of support for Trump. According to exit polls from the Edison Research for the National Election Pool,38 Trump did gather a broad white majority coalition in 2016. Trump tapped into a sense among many white Christians that they were fast becoming a minority in the country their ancestors had founded. White Christian America, which they considered to be the authentic country, the “heartland” in Paul Taggart’s words, was threatened. Identity racism confusing the Christian faith with defense of white survival resulted in support for the Administration’s anti-immigration policies and the President’s stoking of racial tensions that amplified during his term. Trump’s proposed southern border wall with Mexico, for example, received 67% of white evangelical Protestants and 56% of white Catholics’ approval in March 2019. Among the defenders of white Christianity, there were some Catholic paleo-conservatives who expanded on Samuel Huntington’s cultural fear in Who Are We: The Challenges to America’s National Identity (2005). These paleo-conservatives came into consonance with white grievances, and the rise of what became known as the Alt-Right. This movement, whose name was coined in 2010 by Richard Spencer, former editor of The American Conservative magazine and president of the supremacist National Policy Institute, had been first anti-Christian. Greg Johnson, one of the Alt-Right’s most influential theorists, who held a Ph.D. in philosophy from the Catholic University of America, previously declared as editor-in-chief of the white nationalist imprint CounterCurrents Publishing,39 that Christianity was one of the main causes of white decline through its “racial suicide.” Christianity had become, he said, the religion of Third World immigrants and self-hating whites. While such ideas continue to circulate among neo-pagan racist groups, like the Vinland Wolves in Lynchburg, this anti-Christian paganism is for the most part defunct, since the emerging Alt-Right switched to a defense of white Christianity. Richard Spencer in the early 2010s was inspired by the personal evolution of American decline theorist, Samuel T. Francis,40 former adviser to paleo-conservative and devout Catholic Pat

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Buchanan, who also wrote extensively on the issue.41 A contributor to conservative publications, editor-in-chief of The Council of Conservative Citizens ’ newsletter Citizens Informer, and columnist for The Occidental Quarterly published by The Charles Martel Society funded by billionaire publisher William Regnery, Samuel Francis denounced Christianity as the enemy of the West and its white race. Francis later came back to his Catholic faith and dreamed of white Christendom’s revival.42 In the same vein, Southern blogger Hunter Wallace (Bradley Dean Griffin), linked to the racist League of the South and an avid reader of Pat Buchanan, has taken up the biblical terminology of God’s Nations in his blog Occidentaldissent.com, which was essentially devoted to denouncing Jewish power, having allegedly dethroned Christianity as the dominant American culture through a century-long takeover of academia and the media. Spiritual Warfare Alongside the Catholic Westerners fearing American decline and merging their Christendom dream with that of the white Nation, another intransigent faction of the Catholic right which shares Catholic Westerners’ Manichean vision of the political field as the locus of the final spiritual battle, has nurtured American Christianism too. Active intransigents have loudly oriented their political commitment to Donald Trump in 2016. On July 13, 2017, Father Antonio Spadaro, editor of the Italian Jesuit journal La Civiltà Cattolica, published a particularly incisive article, Evangelical Fundamentalism and Catholic Integralism in the US: A Surprising Ecumenism, which described traditionalist Catholics’ unexpected connections with the rising dominionist-inspired neo-Pentecostal movements,43 in favor of “an ecumenism of hate” targeted to “apocalyptic geopolitics.” Their vision, according to Spadaro, was fuelled by conspiracy and prophetism, similar in their narrative logic to radical Islamism. Integralist activists singled out Pope Francis as the figurehead of globalism’s diabolical forces, according to the words of Archbishop Viganò, former nuncio to the United States and prominent protagonist of this faction. According to this narrative, Pope Francis has reached the throne of Peter thanks to occult Masonic, liberal, and even possibily paedophilic networks, which seek the destruction of both the Church and the United States.44 Such RadCaths have set up movements to support Donald Trump during the 2020 presidential elections, through new groups like CatholicsforTrump,

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CatholicVote, or The Freedom Club, and through websites such as LifeSiteNews. These groups have almost come to monopolize digital Catholic media. Their supporters targeted Joe Biden as a fake Catholic and even as an anti-Catholic politician, claiming, like CatholicVote, that Biden was “hurting the Bible,” and “hurting God,” a mantra taken up by President Trump. The founder of this lobby, Brian Burch, accused the Democrats of stirring up a “climate of hate” against Christians and their symbols (statues, churches, etc.). “This is the most Catholic administration we’ve had in American history, both at a policy level and at a personnel level,” Burch told the Washington Examiner, citing Trump’s support for the “sanctity of life, the family as the foundational social unit, and the necessity of religious liberty.”45 Messages about the final battle against abortion and for religious freedom have been relentlessly relayed by the CatholicsforTrump campaign. It organized zoom sessions, prayer calls, weekly rosaries, and priestly blessings for Trump’s victory. Minnesota-based Freedom Club launched an inquisitive website, anticatholicticket.com. Integralist media figures moved to the partisan front. Father Ed Meeks of Towson, MD, gave a special anti-Biden sermon on YouTube, entitled Staring into the Abyss. This sermon, in which Biden was compared to the Antichrist, has been viewed 2.3 million times.46 According to integralist YouTuber Taylor Marshall, author of Infiltration, the Plot to Destroy the Church from Within (2020), the presidential election was truly the final choice for the world, between on one hand Trump and the defenders of the Faith, and on the other hand fake Pope Francis and his apostate acolyte Joe Biden. Former nuncio to the US Abp. Viganò published a letter to the President on LifeSiteNews in June 2020. Viganò described himself unambiguously as the equivalent of Trump and as his ally in the final struggle of the soldiers of Christ against the Deep State and the Deep Church. Catholic soldiers were ready for martyrdom against “globalism, aligned thinking, the New World Order.” Trump retweeted his letter with glowing comments, and he reiterated that praise on the influential fundamentalist Catholic network EWTN.47 In late August 2020, Father James Altman of Wisconsin intoned in a video that Catholics voting for Democrats must repent or “face the fires of hell.”

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Christianist Connections Through Catholic Networks in Europe In addition to this set of specific characters that Catholic personalities and networks brought to American Christianism, Donald Trump’s term in office had also been a time of spreading the Christianist trend to Europe, with the help of various media linked to the American and Canadian radical right,48 but also of inter-Christian and Catholic conservative networks. Despite the abundant literature devoted to the transnational circulation of political ideas from the United States toward Western Europe and vice versa—such as studies on the dissemination of neoliberalism through transnational think tanks such as the Mont Pelerin Society—little has been written on transnational conservative networks, and even less so Christian conservative networks. One of the first ones has been the Center for European Renewal,49 which has brought together scholars and intellectuals from across Europe and the United States once a year since 2006, and whose mission is to foster “a renewal of Western culture and to promote conservative and Christian thinkers and ideas from Europe, the Americas, and other areas of the world.”50 After these first transatlantic Christian/Catholic conservative networks were born in the 1990–2000s,51 it seems that new Christian/Catholic militant networks followed, tinged with a more populist dimension. They have drawn closer to national-Catholic and national-Orthodox parties of Central and Eastern Europe. Under Donald Trump, they sought to give birth to new identity-grounded parties in Western Europe and to penetrate existing populist parties, reaffirming their religious identity. Gay Lobby and Jewish Plot Among the first Christian networks formed between the United States and Europe, there were those advocating essential freedoms and natural rights. They worked to defend and implement religious freedom after the USSR’s collapse. Recently, they have fought to have Christian bioethics and natural family written into legislation. They have been devoted to advising civilian movements which sprung up to fight acceptance of homosexuality, through its legal recognition in marriage and parenthood, such as the French federation of Catholic associations La Manif pour tous, created in 2013. This federation was able to generate mass protests

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against legalizing same-sex marriage, but it remained very cautious to not stigmatize gay and lesbian people and to focus its campaign on the need to protect complementarity between women and men in marriage to procreate and raise children.52 Nevertheless, other more offensive Christian networks mixed homophobic and anti-feminist preaching, with accusations of feminist and LGBTQ plots to destroy Christian families. They began to denounce the influence of the gay lobby over Christian societies, including up to the Vatican.53 Such has been the case of the European Center for Law and Justice, the European branch of the American Center for Law and Justice, founded in 1990 by televangelist Pat Robertson, whose mission is to “protect constitutional and religious freedoms.” Its current director, French Catholic lawyer Gregor Puppink, has been instrumental in advising and facilitating media debates and appeals to the European Court on end-of-life and gay marriage issues. Author of Les Droits dénaturés (Cerf, 2018) and Objection de conscience et droits de l’homme (Tequi, 2020), Puppink has taken a new path. The ECLJ officially led a visit of French Catholic associations to Russia in 2014, amid the international crisis provoked by the annexation of Crimea. His delegation was welcomed by the Patriarchate of Moscow, the Russian Parliament, and various ministries. The purpose of that visit was how to defend the traditional family, as this issue was officially resolved in Russia by the vote in June 2013 of a federal law banning “homosexual propaganda.” The law was promoted by United Russia, Vladimir Putin’s party.54 The ECLJ’s denunciation is linked with that of the US Center for Law and Justice, to which ECLJ is subordinated. Its Chief-Counsel Jay Sekulow, who’s also the head of the Constitutional Litigation and Advocacy Group and as such served as Donald Trump’s lawyer during the first impeachment trial,55 declared in its 2019 activity report, to be fighting against the “Deep state … as secret political faction aimed … to influence national policy.” Along with the ECLJ, Sekulow’s ACLJ also funds a special Slavic branch in Europe, the Slavic Center for Law and Justice, to develop close ties with Hungarian conservatives and the party of President Vladimir Putin, United Russia, in the war against “homosexual propaganda.” In February 2020, the ECLJ also denounced the stranglehold of American billionaire George Soros on the ECHR in a report presented as an exclusive news story by radical right French weekly magazine Valeurs Actuelles entitled “NGOs and the Judges of the ECHR.”56 The report

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stated that the ECHR judges’ recruitment was linked, through NGOs such as Amnesty International, to George Soros and his Open Society foundation. American Fox News’s programs hosted by Bill O’ Reilly and Glenn Beck57 presented Soros as a “puppet master” who wanted to destroy traditional American values.58 Soros became the number one public enemy of the American Alt-right. Vocativ website counted more than 800 conspiracy theories linked to Soros on internet Alt-Right forums—including Alex Jones’ Infowars site—during the 2016 campaign and after Donald Trump’s election. In the 2018 midterm elections, President Trump accused Soros of funding protest groups against Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination to the Supreme Court.59 President Trump also accused him of being behind the “migrants’ caravan” walking at that time from Central America to the US border. Populist governments in Europe have targeted Soros too since 2015. Born in Hungary, Soros has spent hundreds of million dollars to support democratic NGOs in former communist countries. In 1991, he financed the founding of the Central European University in Budapest, nicknamed “Soros University.” At the time of the refugee crisis, Soros sponsored hundreds of associations to assist them and spoke publicly in favor of welcoming them.60 In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban did not hesitate to label him an “American financier who speculates against the European people.” Soros was the subject of a “national consultation” in his native country, which falsely alleged he was conspiring with the European Commission to bring one million refugees a year into Europe. Eight million Hungarian citizens were sent a questionnaire including questions about Soros’ alleged plot. Orban put up posters all over the country showing him smiling, accompanied by the phrase: “Don’t let Soros have the last laugh.”61 Since then, Soros has been the subject of incessantly incendiary remarks from Hungarian Fidesz party. Connections to Nationalist and New Radical Parties Following the example of the ECLJ, other networks developed in the 2010s, ready to provide arguments and slogans to the nationalist parties of the Visegrad group (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, plus Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia) and those of Orthodox Eastern Europe, using the rhetoric of anti-Christian discrimination and pro-gay and antifamily lobbies’ manipulation. Thus, the new organization Agenda Europe, founded in 2013 in London by some 20 pro-life and anti-SRR (Sexual

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and Reproductive Rights) leaders and activists, set out to thwart, reverse (and ban) the legalization of abortion and other sexual and reproductive rights. Among the founders of the group,62 there were leaders of the Federation of Catholic Family Associations in Europe, the French associations Manif pour tous and Les Survivants, the transatlantic lobby Alliance Defending Freedom. There are also American and Catholic Live Action, Priests for Life, Center for Family and Human Rights,63 Family Watch International, European Citizens’ Initiatives Mum, Dad & Kids and One of Us, the Spanish organization Hatze Oir, and the Polish organization Ordo Juris,64 Italian Fondazione Novae Terrae. The heavyweight of this group was the American Brian Brown, President of the USbased National Organization for Marriage and of the international NGO, World Congress of Families, both flagships of the communication war against the “gay lobby.” Agenda Europe quickly became a go-to point for traditionalist perspectives on sexual and reproductive rights (SRR) but also developed a reputation for its vitriolic language. In 2013 and 2014, various speeches from religious advocates heralded its new blog,65 as a promising new initiative in the movement to preserve religious authority in the battle for sexual and reproductive rights, called Restoring the Natural Order: an Agenda for Europe (RNTO).66 Its manifesto asserts that it is necessary to develop an offensive political agenda, “that will hurt their opponents,” to halt and roll back the Cultural Revolution. In fact, legislative or judicial effectiveness of the members of Agenda for Europe since 2014 has been very important, depending on the effective power of national-Catholic or national-Orthodox parties, claiming the nonnegotiable character of their country’s Christian identity. Their action has led to numerous restrictions and even blockages on abortion implementation and gay marriage legalization.67 The Agenda Europe network has accompanied the agenda and personalities of nationalist Christian parties, after having been close to old Christian Democratic parties. Former members of these center-right parties now belong to Agenda Europe, such as Rocco Buttiglione, and Luca Volonté then the President of the largest political group in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European People’s Party. Several Members of the European Parliament also belong to Agenda Europe, among them anti-SRR political leaders such as Senator Ronan Mullen from Ireland, and Zejlka Markic, founder of the Croatian nationalist party Harst. Leo van Doesburg, Director of European Affairs

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of the European Christian Political Movement (ECPM), the new network of national Christian parties across 20 European countries, became a regular Agenda Europe participant. Senator Mullen and Markic’s party Hrast are themselves affiliated with the ECPM. Paul Moynan, a political advisor to the European Conservatives and Reformist Party (ECR), attended several Summits. Within European institutions, the Pole Jakob Cornides, an official at the Directorate-General for Trade at the European Commission and legal counsel of Ordo Juris, featured as a speaker at the 2014 Agenda Europe Summit. Finally, the Slovak Jan Figel, former EU Commissioner, and then EU Special Envoy for Freedom of Religion or Belief, was a guest speaker at the 2016 Summit. At a ministerial level, Agenda Europe was able to attract personalities from Poland such as the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Konrad Szymanski, who spoke at the 2016 Summit, and the Polish Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aleksander Stepkowski, who was also President of Ordo Juris and a regular participant in Agenda Europe summits. Between 2016 and 2018, Agenda Europe conducted two opinion campaigns whose slogans were reflected by the national-populist parties of the Visegrad group. First, the anti-“gay lobby” campaign, accusing homosexual culture of destroying the family as a pillar of society and Christianity, and secondly, the associated anti-“gender lobby” campaign, accusing the latter to hide their goal behind the 2011 Istanbul Convention, devoted to eradicating domestic violence against women: this Convention, according to Agenda Europe’s network, would in fact be a weapon against the family unit.68 With this mantra on the alleged threat posed by the “gay and gender lobbies,” the idea of threats to the family became a slogan of nationalpopulist politicians in Europe. Parallel networks supported and financed the founding of new Christian populist parties, providing them with an ideological framework. British online media outlet, openDemocracy, investigated in its Countering the Radical Right program 69 that the new Vox party in Spain, created in December 2013 with among its objectives the repeal of same-sex marriage legislation, was funded by American organizations Howard Center for Family and Religion and Society.70 Vox has also pledged to build walls around Spanish enclaves in North Africa, to imprison Catalan independence leaders, to relax gun control laws, and to make “Spain great again.” In Croatia, Zejlka Markic, founding member of the Civic Initiative in the Name of the Family, first President of the

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conservative Croatian party Hrast and Vice President of anti-SRR Voice of Parents Association, fiercely campaigned against Istanbul Convention’s ratification by Croatia (2017). The 2019 European Campaign Against “The Davos Party” Another openDemocracy inquiry from March 2019 estimated that over the past decade, American Christian Right networks have spent at least $50 million to fund anti-EU campaigns and advocacy.71 Among these actions, we can quote the birth of Christian petition platform CitizenGo, officially established in Madrid in 2013, by Brian Brown and Ignacio Arsuaga Rato, former member of the American Phoenix Institute and founder of the Spanish anti-LGBTQ organization Hazte Oír, which campaigns against the “gay inquisition.” The platform’s interfaces are in English, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Italian, German, Polish, Russian, Croatian, Hungarian, Dutch, and Slovak. It currently has fifty national sites and repeated petitions. Although it claims not to accept support from any private or public organization, Russian Orthodox priest Alexey Komov sits on its board of directors. Komov is responsible for the Russian branch of the World Congress of Families and President of the Associazione Culturale Lombardia-Russia. According to The Daily Beast, this association is alleged to have financed the populist La Lega (Northern League), thanks to the money from its donor, oligarch Konstantin Malofeev. Brian Brown has forged enough links with politicians and far-right movements in several European countries, including Italy, Hungary, Poland, Spain, Serbia, Croatia, Moldova, and Russia, to be able to bring them together in Verona, Italy, in March 2019, during the campaign for elections to the European Parliament for the 13th World Congress of Families, with Matteo Salvini, then Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary General of the League, as keynote speaker. In his address, Salvini described the WCF as a showcase for the “Europe we love.” Ed Martin, Republican pundit who coauthored The Conservative Case for Trump with Austin Ruse, said at the podium: “The Bible, borders and Brexit will make Europe great again.”72 Thus, the 2019 European elections took place as a time of intense connections between the American Religious Right and the nationalpopulist parties of Western Europe, linking their defense of Christian peoples to the destruction of the European Union. The latter is accused of

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being a globalist club disseminating “false” rights philosophy and favoring uncontrolled emigration. Similarly, the Beckett Fund for Religious Liberty contributed in 2011 to the birth in Italy of a Catholic foundation dedicated to the West’s survival, the Dignitatis Humanae Institute, headed by British citizen Benjamin Harnwell, under the prestigious patronage of Archduke Otto von Hapsburg73 and the honorary presidency of Cardinal Martino, soon replaced, after his prudent withdrawal, by the very conservative and infamous American cardinal Raymond Burke. The Institute, having apparently started as an elite club for Middle Europa aristocrats defending “the Judeo-Christian foundations of Western civilization,” took a political turn when it invited Steve Bannon to its first major event of 2014. Bonds were formed and financial promises (from Bannon) materialized. After Bannon was dismissed by President Trump, he moved to Europe. Then, in Rome, Bannon imagined with Benjamin Harnwell a new kind of missionary school, called the Western Judeo-Christian Academy previewed for 2022 and ruled by the Dignitatis Humanae Institute 74 to educate future populist leaders from Europe. In 2018, Harnwell negotiated—before the agreement failed in 2019—with the Italian state a 100,000 dollar, 18-year lease on the magnificent Trisulti Cistercian monastery: American donors promised to fund it, including Steve Bannon himself, who pledged 800,000 dollars. In addition to this ambitious project, Steve Bannon also founded in July 2018 an association in Brussels called The Movement, which hired 10 full-time staff before the European Parliament elections, to foster a great continental alliance of European populisms and lead it to victory in the election.75 Bannon initially discussed his plans with The Daily Beast, saying he wanted to create a “supergroup” bloc that could win up to a third of all 700+ European deputies’ seats. He thought of that idea, he said, when he was invited to speak at an event hosted by Marine Le Pen.76 Bannon believed then that Sweden’s 2018 elections created the perfect timing to launch The Movement.77 He repeated to the press a new mantra: he wanted to break up the Davos party—that financial, managerial, and cultural elite that he believed was leading the Western world to its ruin.78 Media coverage of Bannon’s initiative seemed first to benefit the project. In July 2018, Bannon and other former and current staff members of Donald Trump met with the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Željka Cvijanovi´c, in Washington, D.C, although Bosnia was not in the Union.79 Bannon attracted attention from Hungarian

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Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who spoke positively of the group.80 In September 2018, it was reported that Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini had joined Bannon’s new Eurosceptic network.81 The UK Independent Party stated it would work with the group. The Movement has also attracted the attention of Geert Wilders, the famous leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom, a Eurosceptic and anti-Islam party. Wilders said he arranged to meet Bannon and discuss the group. Another Dutch contact was Thierry Baudet, the leader of Eurosceptic small party Forum for Democracy. It was reported that French National Rally party (formerly the National Front), led by Marine Le Pen, would also be joining The Movement.82 This initial period of successes was followed by many disappointments. In September 2018, Luigi Di Maio, leader of the Italian Eurosceptic party Five Star Movement, met with Bannon and spoke positively of The Movement, without committing to anything. One year later, The Five Star Movement formed a pro-European center-left government with the Democratic Party. One of the leaders of the Alternative for Germany Party, Alexander Gauland, rejected The Movement as an American Trojan horse.83 The next day, The Freedom Party of Austria’ s Secretary General, Harald Vilimsky, stated, like Gauland’s, that his party was independent and unwilling to cooperate with Bannon nor to accept American influence on European populist movements.84 The United Kingdom Independent Party’ s leader, Gerard Batten, after he stated he would work with the group, had a change of heart in September 2018. UKIP, according to him, “did not fit” into what Bannon was proposing across Europe. It would instead pursue its own specific aims “for the British people.”85 In October 2018, Marine Le Pen downplayed Bannon’s plans for The Movement, saying that only European forces could “save Europe.”86 Steve Bannon was finally declared persona non grata by the National Rally.87 Last but not least, Polish Law and Justice (PiS) MEP Karol Karski, speaking to the Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, said The Movement was not an offer for his party. PiS could never ally with European parties working with Russia, such as the French National Rally or the German Alternative for Germany.88 In January 2019, Michaël Modrikamen, leader of the Belgian People’s Party, officially registered with the group, but his party was dissolved in June 2019.

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The Myth of the Empire Despite his claim that the European elections would prove to be a political earthquake and that the populist parties of all stripes would reach 30% of the vote, Steve Bannon lost his gamble. Nationalist and populist parties scored relatively low in the 2019 European elections and in relative disorder. Steve Bannon failed to federate them, because of their antagonistic and often overblown sense of pride. Furthermore, he and others must overcome for the future the main pitfall of any transnational far-right alliance, namely what their Christian identity’s demands entail. Bannon’s failure indicates that there is not yet a Christianist, European or transatlantic Internationale, despite the obvious amount of energy displayed by US-linked conservative Catholic and Christian networks to set it up. However, after the 2020 American elections, we do not know yet if Christianism is in a reflux phase or if it is on the verge of a new wave, which can seek to overcome the gap between American and European populisms and create a boomerang effect. Steve Bannon candidly put it when explaining his 2019 attempt: “My theory is that political ideas move like capital markets. That is why I spend so much time in Europe. Trump would not have been elected president without Brexit. It gave momentum. If the populists make more than 30 percent in the (next) European elections, it will give that momentum that will help Trump in the (2020) campaign.” While it is difficult to speculate on the prospects of such an Internationale’s effectiveness, we would like to conclude on our hypothesis of a transatlantic Christian populist connection, supported by a powerful American network. It seems that the next reconfiguration could reduce American and Eastern European focus on a “homosexual lobby,” to target national glorification and the protection of a Judeo-Christian identity. A recent initiative seems to go in this direction. The Israeli Yoram Hanozy, President of the Herzl Institute in Jerusalem, which is dedicated to Zionism promotion and Jewish-Christian friendship, became the new chairman of the American Edmund Burke Foundation, originally a Catholic conservative think tank. On February 3 and 4, 2020, this foundation organized a major summit in Rome entitled National Conservatism.89 This summit brought together prominent figures of right-wing populism around the theme God, Honor, Country: President Ronald Reagan, Pope John Paul II , and the Freedom of Nations. Along with the Edmund Burke Foundation, this event was co-organized and funded by

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the Italian Nazione Futura (created in 2017), the Herzl Institute, the Danube Institute (founded in 2013 by a former member of the National Review and the Hudson Institute), the International Reagan Thatcher Society, and other foundations promoting national conservatism such as the Scottish Edinburgh Foundation. There were Americans, Britons, Hungarians, Italians, Dutch, Israelis, and French people in attendance. Marion Maréchal, the very Catholic niece of Marine Le Pen and her future challenger, was present at the summit and received a standing ovation for her speech. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was the biggest star, recounting his memories of John Paul II and declaring this pope as the greatest defender of the captive nations of Central Europe at the end of the Cold War.90 The hagiographic pretext of Ronald Reagan’s relationship with John Paul II allowed for a hybrid narrative of national romance and providential history. The Polish pope and the American president were portrayed as worthy successors to Charlemagne and Leo III, standing up to the Lombardy Barbarians and creating the Empire of Faith, protector of Christian Nations. Images of this providential couple sealing the Empire were contrasted with those of another alleged couple, the EU and Pope Francis, which, instead of playing their role of potential guardians of Christendom, had become its gravediggers. The cohesive power of this narrative, intersecting with Israeli nationalistic soft power,91 set in motion a new dynamic. During the spring of 2020, the Stowarzyszenie Tworców dla Rzeczypospolitej [Association of Creators for the Republic], a Polish NGO founded by Polish Law and Justice, (PiS) party member Zdzisław Krasnod˛ebski, released on social media a Preamble for the Constitution of a Federation of European Nations. Advocating for a Confederation of Nation States, this constitutional project relies on an allegedly common Western European culture. That culture would have been “shaped by various sources, out of which we have to particularly underline the teaching of the Old Testament, Greek thought, Roman State art, the Christian revelation and the heritage of the Romanic, Germanic and Slavic people. It was incarnate in an institutionalised form since the making of Church spiritual sovereignty and the restoration in 800 of imperial political authority.”92 Far from being an exclusively Polish project, the Preamble was drafted by David Engels, a Belgian historian, professor at the Université libre de Bruxelles and, since 2018, at the Instytut Zachodni (Western Institute) in Poznan, Poland. Engels’ Preamble for the Constitution of a Federation of

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European Nations, together with his book Renovatio Europae (2019), are part of some renewed attempt to find a common language of all Christian populisms, allied to defeat evil Empires, like the Islamic threat, the European Union and liberalism.

Notes 1. Patrick Allitt, Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America: 1950–1985, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993; Blandine Chelini-Pont, La droite catholique aux Etats-Unis, Rennes, PUR, 2014. 2. Blandine Chelini-Pont, “Catholic Colonization of the American Right: Historical Overview”, in Marie Gayte, Blandine CheliniPont, and Mark J. Rozell (eds.), Catholics and US Politics after the 2016 Elections: Understanding the Swing Vote, Palgrave MacMillan, 2018, Studies in Religions, Politics and Policy, 43–63. 3. Robert P. George and George Weigel, “An Appeal to Our Fellow Catholics”, National Review, March 7, 2016. 4. Catholic New Agency, “Struggling with Catholics, Trump Taps Conservative Catholic Advisers”, September 23, 2016. 5. Joshua Green, Devil’s Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump and the Nationalist Uprising, NY, Penguin Books, 2017, republished under the title Devil’s Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency, 2019. 6. Carole Cadwalladr, “Robert Mercer: The Big Data Billionaire Waging War on Mainstream Media”, The Guardian, February 26, 2017. 7. Maya Kandel, “The Populist Challenge to Foreign Policy: A Transatlantic Policy”, in Karine Tournier-Sol and M. Gayte (eds.), The Faces of Contemporary Populism in Western Europe and the US, 2021, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 239–259. 8. Upon Trump’s victory, Anton was recruited to the White House National Security Council and helped draft the Trump administration’s national strategy released in December 2017. 9. Price of the Best Conservative Book with The Virtue of Nationalism, Basic Books, 2018. Cf also, Y. Hazony and O. Haivry, “What Is Conservatism?” American Affairs, 1(2), 2017.

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10. Andrew L. Whitehead, and Samuel L. Perry, Taking America Back for God. Christian Nationalism in the United States, Oxford, OUP, 2020. 11. Jeffrey Haynes, “Right-Wing Populism and Religion in Europe and the USA”, Religions, online open access, September 2020. Nick Spencer, “The Rise of Christian Populism”, Theos, online, January 7, 2021. 12. Ben Ryan, “Christianism, A Crude Political Ideology and the Triumph of Empty Symbolism”, Blog LSE, November 5, 2018. 13. Nadia Marzouki, Duncan McDonnell and Olivier Roy (eds.), Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion, London, Hurst, 2016; Philippe Poirier, “Partis politiques et religion aux Amériques et en Europe”, in P. Portier and A. Dieckhoff (eds.), Religion et Politique, L’Enjeu mondial, Paris, SciencesPo les Presses, 2017, 275–286; Populisme et religion de l’Europe à l’Amérique, November 5, 2018, Colloque CERI, Science Po; Tobias Cremer, “Defenders of the Faith: Why Right-Wing Populists Are Embracing Religion”, The New Statesman, May 30, 2018; Yann Raison du Cléziou, “National-populisme et christianisme: les ressorts d’un ralliement paradoxal”, Esprit, April 2020; Olivier Roy, Is Europe Christian? London, Hurst, 2019; Jeffrey Haynes, “Right-Wing Populism and Religion in Europe and the USA”, Religions, online open access, September 2020; Karine Tournier-Sol and Marie Gayte, The Faces of Contemporary Populism in Western Europe and the US, Cham, Palgrave McMillan, 2021. 14. Marie Gayte, “Religion, A Significant Factor in Donald Trump’s Populism”, in Karine Tounier-Sol and Marie Gayte, op.cit., 234– 254. 15. Jose Pedro Zúquete, “Populism and Religion”, in Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Oxford University Press, 2017, 445–466; Patrick Moreau, “ADF et FPÖ: Rejection of Immigration—The Basis of a Common National-Populist Identity”, in Karine Tournier-Sol and Marie Gayte; op. cit., 79–128. 16. Olivier Roy, “The French National Front: From Christian Identity to Laicité”, Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion, op. cit., 79–93.

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17. Rogers Brubaker, “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Movement in Comparative Perspective”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(8), 2017, 1191–1226. 18. Vít Hlousek, Lubomír Kopeˇcek, and Petra Vodov, The Rise of Entrepreneurial Parties in European Politics, Palgrave McMillan, 2021. 19. Rogers Brubaker, “A New Christianist Secularism in Europe”, The Immanent Frame, October 11, 2016. 20. Geert Wilders, who founded the Party for Freedom in 2006 in the Netherlands is one of the most extreme opponents to Islam in Europe, declaring it a fascist ideology. 21. Andrew Arato, Jean L. Cohen, “Civil Society, Populism and Religion”, Constellations, 24, 2017, 283–295. 22. Ryszard Legutko, The Demon of Democracy, Totalitarian Temptations in Free Democracies, NY, Basic Book, 2018; Valentin Behr, “Le tyran démocratique. Découvrir le théoricien polonais du néonationalisme, Riszard Legutko”, Le Grand continent, online, no date. 23. G. Ivaldi and O. Mazzoleni, “Economic Populist Attitudes in Western Europe and the United States”, in K. Tournier-Sol and M. Gayte (eds.), The Faces of Contemporary Populism in Western Europe and the US, 165–181. 24. Valentin Behr, “From Anticommunism to Illiberalism. Polish Conservatives Intellectual Involvement in the Transnational Circulation of Ideas”, in Elzbieta ˙ Hałas and Nicolas Maslowski (eds.), Politics of Symbolization Across Central and Eastern Europe. Strategies, Conflicts, Solutions, Peter Lang (Studies in Sociology: Symbols, Theory and Society), 2021, 241–259. 25. Blandine Chelini-Pont, “Le conservatisme catholique américain à la conquête de l’Europe. Genèse d’un nouveau courant politique”, in Christophe Grannec and Bérengère Massignon (eds.), Les religions dans la mondialisation, entre acculturation et contestation, Paris, Karthala, 2012, 53–73. 26. Carlo Ruzza, The Institutionalisation of Populist Political Discourse and Conservative Uncivil Society in the European Union, Nordicom Review, online, March 3, 2021. 27. Sébastien Fath, “Le monde selon Steve Bannon”, CERI, Sciences Po, online, November 2018.

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28. Maya Kandel, “Le conservatisme national: La nouvelle droite américaine et le monde”, Le Débat, 208, 2020, 30–41. 29. Luiza Ch. Savage, “The Decline of America’s Religious Right”, McLeans, 7 July 2008; Paul Waldam, “The Continued Decline of the Religious Right”, The American Prospect, 10 December 2011; Mickael Kazin, “The End of the Religious Right”, The New Republic, 17 January 2012; C. Smidt and alii, The Disappearing God Gap? Religion in the 2008 Presidential Elections, NY, Oxford University Press, 2010. 30. A. L. Whitehead and C. P. Scheitle, “We the (Christian) People: Christianity and American Identity from 1996 to 2014”, Social Currents, 5(2), April 2018, 157–172; J. B. Straughn and S. L. Feld. “America as a ‘Christian Nation’? Understanding Religious Boundaries of National Identity in the United States”, Sociology of Religion, 71, 2010, 280–306. 31. Thesis of his book, Philip Gorski, Christianity and Democracy Before and After Trump, Routledge, 2020. 32. Andrew L. Whitehead, Samuel L. Perry, and Joseph O. Baker, op. cit., Sociology of Religion, A Quarterly Review, 79(2), Summer 2018. 33. M. Schwartzman, C. Flanders and Z. Robinson (eds.), The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty, OUP, 2016. 34. Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Ideas Have Consequences, The Federalist Society and the Conservative Counter-Revolution, NY, OUP, 2015. 35. The Department of Justice, “Attorney General William P. Barr Remarks to the Law School and the De Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at the University Notre-Dame”, October 11, 2019. 36. Anthony Leonardi, “Barr Warns Strain of Progressivism That Embraces Secular Age and Socialism Is Undermining Democracy”, Washington Examiner, February 26, 2020. 37. Nicolas Rowan, “Barr to Speak at National Catholic Prayer Breakfast”, Washington Examiner, February 27, 2020. 38. Alec Tyson, “Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender and Education”, Pew Research, November 9, 2016. 39. Through the imprint, he has published over 40 books, several of which he wrote himself, either under his real name or the pseudonym Trevor Lynch. Cf. G. Macklin, “Greg Johnson and Counter-Currents”, in M. Sedgwick, (ed.). Key Thinkers of the

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Radical Right: Behind the New Threat to Liberal Democracy, Oxford, OUP, 2019, 204–223. 40. Samuel T. Francis, America Extinguished: Mass Immigration and the Disintegration of American Culture, 2001; Ethnopolitics: Immigration, Race, and the American Political Future, 2003; Essential Writings on Race, 2007. 41. Pat Buchanan, State of Emergency, The Third World Invasion, and the Conquest of America, 2006; The Death of The West: How Dying Population and Immigrant Invasion Imperil Our Country and Civilisation, 2010; Suicide of a Superpower, Will America Survive to 2025? 2011. 42. Michael Brendan Dougherty, “How an Obscure Adviser to Pat Buchanan Predicted the Wild Trump Campaign in 1996”, The Week, January 19, 2016. 43. About these movements, André Gagné, Ces Evangéliques derrière Trump, Hégémonie, Démonologie et Fin du Monde, Genève, Labor et Fides, 2020. 44. Kathryn Joyce, “Deep State, Deep Church: How Q-Anon and Trumpism Had Infected the Catholic Church”, Vanity Fair, October 30, 2020. 45. Nicholas Rowman, Staff Writer, “The Most Catholic Administration We ‘ve Had”, The Washington Examiner, March 13, 2020. 46. Tish Durkin, “The Catholics Who Hate Joe Biden- and Pope Francis. So Who Is He?” The Atlantic, October 21, 2020. 47. Michael J. O’Loughlin, “President Trump Tweeted About Archbishop Vigano”, America, June 11, 2020. 48. Likee Texan Harris Media, New Yorker Gatestone Institute, Canadian Rebel Media Group, the two latter cofinanced by Robert Mercer and Robert Shillman, who is a big donor too for the Horowitz Center and the Middle East Forum. Cf. Laurie Goodstein, “Pompeo and Bolton Appointments Raise Alarm over Ties to Anti-Islam Groups”, The New York Times, April 6, 2018. 49. Valentin Behr, “From Anticommunism to Illiberalism. Polish Conservatives Intellectual Involvement in the Transnational Circulation of Ideas”, op. cit., 241–259. 50. Cf its website http://europeanrenewal.org/ and its “Paris Statement” at https://thetrueeurope.eu/.

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51. Blandine Chelini-Pont, “Le conservatisme catholique américain à la conquête de l’Europe. Genèse d’un nouveau courant politique”, op. cit., 53–73. 52. R. Carnac, D. Guidi and G. Roucoux, Les autorités religieuses face aux questions de genre. Reconfigurations contemporaines des mondes confessionnels autour des nouvelles questions sexuelles, Rennes, PUR, 2019. 53. Accusation brought by Mgr Vigano, in a letter of testimony, diffused by transatlantic conservative media, on August 22, 2018: https://online.wsj.com/media/Viganos-letter.pdf. 54. Mickaël Corre, “Interrogation autour d’une délégation catholique française en Russie”, La Croix, March 3, 2014. 55. Samuel Laurent, “L’avocat de Donald Trump finance une ONG proche de la Manif pour tous”, Le Monde, March 3, 2020. 56. NGOs and the Judges of the ECHR (2009-2019). 57. Author of The Real America: Messages from the Heart and Heartland, Threshold Editions, 2005. 58. Eric Lutz, “How George Soros Became the Target of Republican and Far-Right Conspiracy Theorists”, Mic, October 31, 2018. 59. https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-goes-full-conspiracy-nutsays-kavanaugh-protestors-paid-for-by-soros. 60. George Soros, “Mastercard to Partner to Aid Migrants, Refugees”, Reuters Agency, January 19, 2017. 61. Will Martin, “Hungary is Pushing a Conspiracy that Billionaire George Soros Wants to Bring Millions of Refugees in Europe”, Business Insider, October 3, 2017. 62. Annexe 2, European Parliament Forum Report, “Restoring the Natural Order, The Religious Extremists Vision to Mobilize European Societies Against Human Rights on Sexuality and Reproduction”, EPF, 2018, online. 63. Its President, Austin Ruse, incidentally Knight of Malta and Holy Sepulchre, campaigned for Donald Trump in 2020, with his book The Catholic Case for Trump, Regnery Publishing. 64. Lidia Kuransinska, “This Ultra-Conservative Institute Has Infiltrated the Polish State, on a Relentless Quest to Ban Abortion”, openDemocracy, July 30, 2018. 65. https://agendaeurope.wordpress.com/. 66. https://agendaeurope.wordpress.com/restoring-the-naturalorder/.

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67. “Croatians Vote to Ban Gay Marriage”, The Guardian, December 1, 2013; “Slovenia Says No to Gay Marriage”, Politico, 20 December 2015; “3 Million Romanians Sign Petition to Enshrine Natural Marriage in Constitution”, Lifesitenews, 25 May 2016; “Civic Legislation Initiative: Equal Legal Protection for Children Before and After Birth”, Ordo Juris website, 3 April 2016. 68. R. Kuhar and D. Paternotte, Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe— Mobilizing against Equality. London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2017. 69. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/. 70. Francesc Badia, “Reconquering Europe? Vox and the Extreme Right in Spain”, openDemocracy, 27 March 2019. 71. Claire Provost, Adam Ramsey, “Trump-linked US Christian Fundamentalists Pour Millions of Dark Money into Europe, Boosting the Far-Right”, OpenDemocracy, 27 March 2019. Among them, American Center for Law and Justice, Alliance Defending Freedom, Human Life International, Acton Institute, Focus on the Family, Home School Legal Defense Association, Population Research Institute, American Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family, Property, International House of Prayer, Family Watch International. 72. https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/03/27/anti-lgbthate-group-world-congress-families-convene-verona. 73. http://www.dignitatishumanae.com/index.php/about-us/aboutthe-institute/. 74. School outside Rome will highlight West’s Judeo-Christian roots, interview of Benjamin Harnell, EWTN, March 14, 2019. 75. Nico Hines, “Inside Bannon’s Plan to Hijack Europe for the FarRight”, Daily Beast, July 20, 2018; Peter Stubley, “Steve Bannon to Set Up ‘The Movement’ Foundation to Boost Far-Right Across Europe”, The Independent, July 22, 2018. 76. “Steve Bannon plans Brussels-based foundation ‘The Movement’ for EU Far-Right”, Deutsche Welle, July 21, 2018. 77. Mark Bendeich and Crispian Balmer, “Steve Bannon Hopes to Unite Europe’s Populists Under ‘The Movement’”, The Christian Science Monitor, September 11, 2018. 78. Alexandra Bocchi, “Capitalism versus Tradition in Italy”, First Things, May 18, 2018.

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79. K. Krauthamer, Ky “Ex-Trump Staffers Court Bosnian Serbs”, Transitions Online, September 7, 2018. 80. “Viktor Orbán Welcomes Steve Bannon’s Efforts on Behalf of the European Far Right”, Hungarian Spectrum, July 30, 2018. 81. Lorenzo Tondo, “Italy’s Matteo Salvini Joins Bannon’s European Populist Group”, The Guardian, September 8, 2018. 82. “Marine Le Pen’s Far-Right Party to Join Bannon Populist Project”, Financial Times, September 9, 2018. 83. “German Far Right Rebuffs Steve Bannon’s Effort to Forge Europe-Wide Populist Movement”, The Telegraph, August 11, 2018. 84. “Austria’s Far-Right Unwilling to Collaborate with Bannon”, The Times of Israel, September 12, 2018. 85. W. James, “UKIP Will Not Join Steve Bannon’s Anti-EU Movement, Says Leader”, Reuters, September 21, 2018. 86. A. Giuffreda, “Marine Le Pen: Steve Bannon has no part to play in ‘saving Europe’”. The Guardia, October 8, 2018. 87. Adam Nossiter, “Bannon’s Populists, Once a ‘Movement’, Keep Him at Arm’s Length”, The New York Times, May 24, 2019. 88. P. Sieminski, ´ “PiS will nicht an Zerschlagung der EU teilnehmen” [PiS does Not Want to Participate in Smashing the EU]. Polskie Radio, September 27, 2017. Retrieved February 2, 2021. 89. https://nationalconservatism.org/natcon-rome-2020/. 90. https://youtu.be/9WP8xzxH7YY?t=407. 91. Despite the strong anti-Semitic past and current undertones of nationalist forces such as the Austrian FPÖ or Alternative for Germany, not to mention anti-Semitic reactivation of Christianracist groups of the European Alt-right such as German PEDIGA, in May 2020, German AFD (Alternative for Germany) released a poster quoting the son of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, calling for “the return of a free, democratic and Christian Europe” and declaring the Union an enemy of Israel. 92. https://www.davidengels.be/preamble.

CHAPTER 4

Did Donald Trump End the Religious Right? Neil J. Young

No sooner had Donald Trump announced his run for the Republican nomination for president in the summer of 2015 than political pundits began to argue that Trump’s success would mean the end of the Religious Right. A latecomer to the Republican Party with little conservative credentials, Trump also had a spotty personal life and an intemperate personality that seemed to make him an unacceptable candidate for religious conservatives. That Mormon and Catholic voters largely rejected Trump through the Republican primaries while evangelicals gradually, if somewhat begrudgingly, grew to support him only seemed to strengthen the arguments that the Religious Right was cracking apart. For forty years, conservative evangelicals, Catholics, and Mormons had largely voted en masse for Republican presidential candidates, but the splintering brought about by Trump’s rise suggested the political trend

N. J. Young (B) Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Washington, DC, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Gayte et al. (eds.), Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82212-5_4

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had come to an end. Trump’s eventual victory, ensured in part by his winning a majority of Catholic, evangelical, and Mormon voters, repudiated this notion, even as it still raised questions about the nature of the Religious Right in the twenty-first century. In the end, Trump’s unexpected rise to the Republican nomination and his surprising win of the presidency raised real questions about the interfaith political strategies of the Religious Right—what they look like today and how we have understood them historically. Rather than signaling the end of the Religious Right, Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign and victory highlighted the Religious Right’s history of division and disunity even in moments of political victory. His ensuing presidency and 2020 loss in his reelection campaign reinforced much of the same. Yet that history has been overshadowed by a scholarly narrative that emphasizes the Religious Right as a monolithic power operating in relative harmony. As Donald Trump upended many prevailing notions about American politics and society, one of his most significant contributions was how he disrupted some of the most persistent myths about the Religious Right.

The 2016 Campaign Since almost as soon as the Religious Right emerged on the national scene as a potent political force for the Republican Party, both insider activists and outsider political pundits have predicted its demise, though for different reasons. As early as the 1984 election, just four years after Ronald Reagan’s historic 1980 win that served to announce the Religious Right’s entry into national politics, Christian conservative leaders warned that the movement could fall apart if the president continued to ignore it. “If those concerns of the coalition…are met with symbolic gestures alone,” the grassroots organization Christian Action Council wrote following Reagan’s reelection win, “the diverse movement that brought him to power will dissolve.”1 Moments of political defeat only fueled ideas among movement activists that the Religious Right had reached its final days. “Twenty years of fighting has brought us nothing,” two Moral Majority leaders lamented near the end of Bill Clinton’s second term. Christian conservatives, they argued, should abandon politics and focus their efforts on saving the lost rather than trying to win elections.2 The talk of the Religious Right’s end in 2016, therefore, represented nothing new, but its connection to the rise of Donald Trump exposed

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some of the faulty assumptions that underlay both political and historical interpretations of the Religious Right since the 1980s. With Trump, the conversation centered on a disbelief that evangelicals—the only conservative religious group to show Trump consistent support throughout the campaign—could support such a man. “By conventional standards,” The Atlantic observed in 2015, “evangelical Christians should despise him.”3 Although evangelicals’ backing of Trump, a thrice-married casino magnate who showed little familiarity with or interest in the most basic aspects of Christian faith, did seem an unusual development, it hardly suggested the end of evangelical political power. Yet political coverage throughout the 2016 primary season contended that if evangelicals did not act as commentators expected—that is, by rallying behind a socially conservative candidate of deep religious faith, like Mike Huckabee or Rick Santorum—then this meant that evangelicals no longer enjoyed the political influence within the GOP they once had. No doubt, those evangelical figures who led the #NeverTrump movement contributed to such conclusions. “If Donald Trump has done anything, he has snuffed out the Religious Right,” ran the headline of a Washington Post editorial by the Southern Baptist Convention’s Russell Moore, one of Trump’s most consistent evangelical critics.4 But all of this commentary from both insiders and outsiders rested on the faulty presumption that evangelicals had to act a certain way politically in order to still be understood as the Religious Right. The results from the primaries, however, indicated just the opposite. Indeed, Trump’s winning of the nomination depended on evangelicals’ increasing support for his candidacy through the primaries. As evangelicals consolidated behind Trump, they ensured him the Republican nomination, a certain sign that evangelicals remained the kingmakers of the GOP rather than insignificant sideliners. As evangelicals gathered behind the candidacy of Trump through the spring of 2016, attention shifted to the continued resistance to Trump from conservative Mormons and Catholics, the other two pillars of the Religious Right. Trump fared particularly poorly with LDS voters. In Utah’s Republican caucus, Trump suffered his worst loss in the state races, earning only 14% of the vote to Ted Cruz’s 70% landslide win.5 Mormons offered numerous reasons for opposing Trump, including his lewd and profane manner and outlandish lifestyle. Aside from those character objections, Mormons also rejected several of Trump’s policy recommendations, including his anti-immigration position and his proposed ban on Muslim

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entry to the U.S.6 After Trump announced the latter initiative, the LDS Church made the rare decision to respond directly to a political candidate by issuing a statement that defended religious freedom and highlighted the collaborative humanitarian work of Mormons and Muslims.7 The entry of Evan McMullin, a former CIA operative and devout Mormon, into the presidential race as an independent candidate further weakened Trump’s standing among Mormons. Polls soon showed McMullin leading Trump in Utah, a state that had reliably voted for the Republican presidential candidate since Lyndon B. Johnson’s landslide win in 1964.8 After a leaked audiotape from the entertainment news show Access Hollywood from 2005 revealed Trump bragging about sexually assaulting women, the LDS Church’s Deseret News called for Trump to withdraw from the presidential race just a month before Election Day. “What oozes from this audio is evil,” the editorial lamented. “We ask him to step aside.”9 Like Mormons, conservative Catholics also bristled at Trump’s unsavory character and demeanor. In a particularly surprising move for an American politician, Trump deemed Pope Francis’ visit to Mexico “very political.” After the pontiff suggested that Trump was “not Christian,” Trump lashed back, calling the Pope’s comments “disgraceful.”10 Aside from his poor treatment of their spiritual leader, Trump further hurt his standing among American Catholics with his aggressive anti-immigration stance. Trump’s call for mass deportation and the construction of a border wall between the U.S. and Mexico alarmed Hispanic-American Catholics, a growing segment of the church, but they also angered many white Catholics who had long watched their bishops advocate for comprehensive immigration reform and preach for compassionate responses to the immigration issue in their sermons. Strangely, Trump’s campaign team further provoked such sentiments when Steve Bannon, the campaign’s chief executive, scoffed that “Catholics want as many Hispanics in this country as possible because their church is dying.”11 For many Catholic voters, Trump’s bellicose and aggressive nativism had dark undertones of a not-too-distant anti-Catholic American past, and his campaign seemed unwilling to change those perceptions. Writing in the National Review, the conservative scholars Robert P. George and George Weigel issued “An Appeal to Our Fellow Catholics.” “We urge our fellow Catholics…,” the two wrote as the state primaries began, “to reject his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination by supporting a genuinely reformist candidate.”12

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Even after Trump had secured the Republican nomination, a poll conducted in the summer of 2016 by the Public Religion Research Institute showed him trailing Hillary Clinton by 23%.13 In modern elections, winning, or at least splitting, the Catholic vote has been critical for Republican candidates to gain the White House, so Trump’s enormous deficit with Catholic voters portended disastrous results for his election prospects. As the Washington Post soon concluded, Donald Trump had a “massive Catholic problem.”14 Yet a closer analysis of Catholic polling numbers revealed a more complicated picture, suggested a possible path forward for Trump, and underscored how shifting demographic trends among Catholics might unsettle traditional political patterns. Trump’s most “massive Catholic problem” owed to Hispanic Catholics who another poll showed favored Clinton by a whopping 77–16% margin. Among white Catholics, the same July poll showed Trump leading by a closer 50–46% advantage over Clinton.15 A month later, those numbers had flipped, with Clinton grabbing a 44–41% edge over Trump.16 But the back and forth polling numbers among white Catholics demonstrated how Catholic moderates—thought to be as much as one-third of Catholic voters—would ultimately determine the Catholic vote as much as it indicated some insurmountable deficit for Trump.17 If Trump could swing Catholic moderates back to his side and gain even a few more percentage points among Hispanic Catholics by Election Day, he stood to win among Catholics overall. Trump’s uneven standing among evangelicals, Catholics, and Mormons stood out as a unique problem for a Republican presidential candidate. Since the Religious Right’s rise in the late 1970s, all three religious groups had united, often quite easily, behind the GOP’s ticket. Ronald Reagan’s historic win in 1980 had depended, in part, on capturing a majority of Catholic voters—only the third time that a Republican presidential nominee had done so—along with winning 61% of white evangelicals and 80% of Mormon voters.18 Ensuring a similar coalition of voters became a priority for every Republican candidate, and the party dedicated substantial efforts to appealing to and mobilizing religious conservatives through the years.19 That evangelicals now stood divided from Catholics and Mormons over the candidacy of Trump represented a significant divergence from this recent past and inspired frequent commentary. Writing in the Washington Post, the political scientist Mark J. Rozell rightly pointed out that Trump’s candidacy was “splitting apart” the coalition of evangelicals

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and conservative Catholics who had supported the Republican Party for almost four decades.20 Yet others were tempted to make the far grander pronouncement that what was being witnessed was the end of the Religious Right.21 While academics such as Rozell merely noted the potential fraying of a decades-long political order, media figures, political pundits, and even Christian activists and news outlets rushed to conclude that the separate voting patterns of its different constituent members meant nothing short of the death of the Religious Right.22 Such prognostications reveal certain assumptions, prevalent both in political commentary and historical scholarship, about the Religious Right and how it is understood politically. First, the prediction of the Religious Right’s end demonstrates an over-attention to elections as a way of understanding the Religious Right. Significant historical trends contributed to this understanding, for certain. In many ways, it was landmark presidential elections that made the Religious Right visible, from its breakthrough moment in Reagan’s important 1980 win to its impressive “reemergence” with George W. Bush’s two victories in 2000 and 2004. And that visibility was underscored by the virtual unanimity of conservative evangelicals, Catholics, and Mormons at the ballot box, a noteworthy development considering the longer history of Catholic and white southern evangelical alignment with the Democratic Party. But the common electoral support by conservative Catholic, Mormon, and evangelical voters for the Republican Party since at least 1980 has distorted our thinking about what the Religious Right means politically and all the ways we understand how it acts politically and organizationally. Politics is much more than what happens on Election Day, and the Religious Right’s activism and influence must be understood far beyond the results of the first Tuesday in November every four years. Recent historical scholarship on the Religious Right has begun to move away from a focus on election-centered politics for a broader understanding of the Religious Right as a grassroots movement or a theological development.23 In my own book, We Gather Together: The Religious Right and the Problem of Interfaith Politics, I ask what we might see differently by approaching the Religious Right as a religious history with political consequences rather than framing it as a political history of religious actors, as typically done. In doing so, my work foregrounds the historic divisions, theological differences, and ongoing tensions among the interfaith members of the Religious Right and places its political organizing and election results in that context. This interpretive framework more

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clearly illuminates all that the Religious Right had to overcome and also continue to struggle with in order for it to align and work strategically. As I argue, the history of the Religious Right demonstrates it was always a fragile coalition that navigated long-standing historic animosities and religious disagreements and divided on political issues and tactics as much as it united. By situating Trump’s 2016 candidacy and victory in this history, we can understand his polarizing campaign and controversial win not as the end of the Religious Right but rather as yet another moment that reveals the challenges and complications inherent to the coalitional nature of the Religious Right.

The History of the Religious Right A few examples from the history of the Religious Right might make this clearer. Although historians of the Religious Right have tended to look to the political events of the 1960s and 1970s, including the Supreme Court’s banning of prayers and Bible reading in public schools, the legalization of abortion, and the Equal Rights Amendment, as the context in which evangelicals, Catholics, and Mormons first united, these conservative religious groups had actually begun to align in the 1950s as a religious response to the ecumenical movement coming out of mainline Protestantism. Concerned that mainline and liberal Protestants were abandoning historic interpretations of Scripture and long-standing Christian convictions for the purposes of unity, conservative Catholics, evangelicals, and Mormons opposed the ecumenical movement as an un-Christian and even anti-Christian social agenda and religious heresy. Mormons and evangelicals, especially, criticized the ecumenical movement for advocating Christians all unify in “one church,” thus obliterating the denominational divisions that marked Protestantism. In opposing ecumenism, these conservative religious faiths recognized one another as defenders of traditionalism and conservatism, even as they maintained their theological critiques of each other. Their common position as opponents of liberal Christianity drew evangelicals, Catholics, and Mormons together in religious sympathy and cultural affinity, but their shared role as religious outsiders of the mainline Protestant culture that dominated midcentury American society and politics meant they also sought to distinguish themselves from each other as the only “true” Christian faith. While conservative Catholics, evangelicals, and Mormons appreciated each other’s opposition to the nation’s secularizing trends, especially

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in regards to issues of sexuality and gender which grew more visible by the 1960s, this appreciation did not forestall their own theological disputes and religious competition. Mormons and evangelicals, for example, responded critically to the Second Vatican Council (1962– 1965), arguing that the Catholic Church’s plans for internal reform could never fully address the doctrinal errors of Catholicism. Evangelicals particularly worried that Vatican II ultimately sought to bring all Christians back under the control of Rome, much as they had argued the Protestant ecumenical movement desired to create a “one church” organization that would abandon Christian truth for a false harmony. Catholics and especially evangelicals, in another example, pushed back on the LDS Church’s expansive growth in these decades—the LDS Church tripled its membership between 1950 and 1970—by developing antiMormon publications and materials to use among their own members. “Those Mystifying Mormons,” read an article from a Catholic magazine in 1967 that outlined LDS theology it described as “unheard of in other Christian religions.”24 Evangelical publications routinely defined Mormonism as a “cult” and “menace,” an unbiblical heresy that threatened to lure well-meaning Americans into its trap—and away from the truth of evangelicalism—by pretending to be just another branch of historic Christianity.25 For America’s conservative faiths, this religious context of competition and disagreement continued to develop through the 1960s and 1970s, ultimately shaping the political alliance that emerged among evangelicals, Catholics, and Mormons. In the early years of the pro-life movement, even after the Supreme Court’s surprising Roe v. Wade decision granting the federal legalization of abortion in 1973, evangelicals and Mormons largely resisted joining the anti-abortion cause because of its close association with the Catholic Church. When W. A. Criswell, pastor of the nation’s largest Southern Baptist congregation and a staunch conservative, was asked about the Catholic Church’s pro-life efforts shortly after the Roe decision, Criswell saw only sinister motives. “I think the Catholics have it in their heads…that they’re going to outbreed the rest of us,” he told the evangelical magazine Christianity Today.26 By the end of the 1970s, Southern Baptists and other evangelicals had wholeheartedly endorsed the pro-life cause, but they still resisted close partnership with Catholics. The National Right to Life Committee, the nation’s largest and most important anti-abortion organization, struggled to attract nonCatholic members to the group that had been created by the Catholic

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Church in the late 1960s. Instead, evangelicals and Mormons created their own pro-life organizations or worked against abortion through their own churches or denominational channels rather than uniting in an interfaith organization. By Reagan’s election in 1980, the pro-life movement appeared to have a broad and diverse base of support, but its decentralized nature spelled political disaster. While Mormons, evangelicals, and Catholics stood united in opposing abortion rights and electing pro-life politicians, most notably Ronald Reagan to the White House, it proved far more difficult to agree on legislation or political strategy once their candidates were in office. During the Reagan administration, battles broke out within the prolife movement with divisions opening up largely along sectarian lines. Some of this owed to different theological views on abortion. Catholic teaching, for example, opposed abortion in all circumstances, so the church and Catholic organizations were unwilling to back anti-abortion legislation that allowed for exceptions such as in the case of rape or to protect the health of the woman. “Protestants are dismayed by the United States Catholic Conference,” an important evangelical pro-life leader lamented in 1981 after the Catholic Church and the National Right to Life Committee refused to endorse the anti-abortion legislation backed by most evangelical groups, choosing instead a different bill that only drew Catholic support. Other disagreements reflected the persistent prejudices and longstanding distrust that had shaped the long history of interfaith relations among conservative Christian faiths. In the end, the pro-life movement accomplished none of its political goals during Reagan’s presidency. “We are a movement in disarray,” a prominent Catholic activist mournfully concluded at a particularly divisive moment in the 1980s. Similar divisions emerged over other issues the Religious Right held dear in the 1980s and beyond. Advocates for the return of school prayer, for example, found they could not agree on the legislation once they had a president who endorsed their cause. Calling for the return of school prayer turned out to be an effective way to stir the base to support conservative candidates, but the school prayer cause stalled when Mormons, Catholics, and evangelicals realized they didn’t want each other drafting a prayer that might subject them to others’ beliefs.27 More broadly, the Religious Right’s divisions manifested at the organizational level even as conservative Christian activists touted the movement’s broad ecumenical nature. Moral Majority’s very name suggested

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the group’s wide base of support, but the reality was far different. Fundamentalist Christians made up 90% of Moral Majority in the 1980s, as Catholics and Mormons stayed away from the group they saw as antagonistic to their faith traditions, even if they supported Moral Majority’s political agenda.28 Christian Coalition, a Moral Majority for the 1990s, repeated many of its predecessor’s habits, boasting of its ecumenical makeup while building up the organization through a network that only tapped into evangelical churches. When its leaders realized that Catholics did not want to belong to a group they perceived as strictly evangelical, the Christian Coalition created a sister organization, the Catholic Alliance, they could join. But it soon failed as the Catholic Bishops attacked the new organization and cautioned Catholics from joining.29 These select examples demonstrate a persistent theme of the Religious Right: that it has operated not as a monolith, but as a diverse and often divided political movement characterized as often by its own internal disagreements, divisions, and defeats as by its common causes, united purposes, and political victories. In seeing this bigger, boisterous history, Donald Trump’s rise appears less as an aberration or an “end,” but rather a moment that fits in the history of the Religious Right as a fractious, contested, and never inevitable interreligious political movement. That Donald Trump’s 2016 candidacy was interpreted by many scholars and journalists as unsettling and destabilizing for the Religious Right suggests we need a deeper and more historically attuned understanding of what the Religious Right has meant in American politics and society for the last fifty years, especially given what ultimately transpired on Election Day in 2016.

The 2016 Election While I have argued here that we shouldn’t exaggerate the meaning of election results, we ought not to ignore them either. In his 2016 victory, Donald Trump won among evangelical, Catholic, and Mormon voters— the three pillars of the Religious Right. White evangelicals provided Trump with his greatest demographic triumph, as he earned 81% of their vote, even more than George W. Bush achieved in his two races.30 Among Catholics, Trump garnered a 52% majority, reversing the trend of the previous two elections where Catholics had supported the Democratic ticket.31 A solid majority of Mormons—61%—voted for Trump, but this represented a significant decline from recent elections where LDS support

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for GOP presidential candidates approached closer to 80%.32 Even within these wins, the voting breakdown of each group underscored the divergences within the Religious Right and suggested some of the challenges a Trump presidency might face with this constituency moving forward. Still, understanding how Trump won among evangelicals, Catholics, and Mormons, particularly given his struggle with the latter two groups throughout the campaign season, provides insight into both the changing nature of the Religious Right and its persistent characteristics. In terms of character and personal demeanor, Donald Trump did not run as a typical Religious Right candidate. But the issues Trump advocated and the political strategies his campaign deployed drew from the traditional playbook for winning conservative religious voters. Trump’s hardline stance on abortion, an about-face from his previous support of abortion rights, aligned with religious conservatives’ position on the issue. His aggressive comments on abortion—at one point Trump told an interviewer that women who had abortions should be criminally punished—showed him to be out of touch with the pro-life movement’s typical approach, but they also tapped into the nearly forty years of frustration grassroots religious conservatives felt toward Republican candidates who made bold promises but little effort to overturn abortion rights.33 For religious conservatives, Trump’s pledge to appoint Supreme Court judges in the vein of Antonin Scalia, a beloved figure of the Religious Right, drew one of the starkest contrasts to the liberal court they imagined a Clinton presidency would yield. Among evangelicals, maintaining (and even increasing) the Supreme Court’s conservative majority became the most common justification for supporting Trump, especially to fellow evangelicals who resisted his candidacy.34 In his frequent appearances on conservative shows leading up to the 2016 election, Franklin Graham, repeatedly reminded evangelicals that “the most important issue of this election is the Supreme Court.”35 Jerry Falwell, Jr., Trump’s most ardent evangelical backer, drew a finer point. “We have an election between someone who promises he will support issues important to us as Christians, including appointing justices to the Supreme Court who would make us all proud. That’s Donald Trump. And someone who promises she will do just the opposite. That’s Hillary Clinton,” Falwell told a gathering in New York of several hundred evangelical ministers over the summer.36 Other issues, particularly immigration and terrorism, figured prominently in Trump’s 2016 appeal to religious conservatives, even as they

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confounded some political observers. Commentators suggested this attention to matters other than the typical causes of abortion, school prayer, and gay marriage demonstrated the undoing of the Religious Right as a political force, but such observations only revealed how “social” issues had been allowed to over-dominate political analysis of the Religious Right. While there’s no denying the importance of social issues, particularly on matters of gender and sexuality, in the history of the Religious Right, the movement’s political agenda had always incorporated a far broader set of issues, including support for free-market capitalism, a strong national defense, tighter immigration restrictions and border control, and a healthy aversion to environmental regulations. In just one example, Jerry Falwell’s 1980 book, Listen, America!, seen by many as a blueprint for the Religious Right, advocated for increased military spending and a larger nuclear arsenal, attacked the welfare system, and warned that the nation had “drifted from the concepts of free enterprise and limited government.”37 The support for Trump’s full policy proposals represented the Religious Right’s endorsement of a broad conservative agenda far beyond the realm of social issues, much as it had in the support of other figures like Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. Beyond particular issues, Trump’s bold defense, both explicit and implicit, of an unabashed white Christian nationalism attracted support, especially from rural evangelicals. The 2016 campaign slogan to “Make America Great Again” stoked a nostalgia for a pre-1960s nation that had not yet succumbed to liberal secularism. On the campaign trail, Trump repeatedly promised to return Christians to their rightful place of power. “The government has weeded it [power] away from you pretty strongly,” Trump told the group of evangelical ministers in New York. “But you’re going to get it back.”38 His attacks on political correctness, such as his pledge that Christians would be able to say “Merry Christmas” again rather than “Happy Holidays” when he became president, resonated with conservative evangelicals who felt their values and beliefs were under attack from Washington and Hollywood. What Trump offered was an unapologetic defense of conservative Christians’ cultural and political dominance, a hope to those Christians who worried they were being displaced by forces beyond their control, including the nation’s rapidly changing racial demographics and the culture’s increasing support for women’s rights and gay rights. As Robert P. Jones of the Public Religion Research Institute explained, “Trump’s line – ‘let’s make America great

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again’ – and his last minute saying – ‘look folks, I’m your last chance’ – was really powerful for white evangelicals who see their numbers in the general population slipping.”39 With Catholics, Trump’s campaign team pulled from the traditional political playback to reach potential voters, courting key Catholic activists and the Catholic bishops. A month before the election, Trump issued a letter to those Catholic leaders, promising his steadfast commitment to the pro-life cause and defending religious liberty. “I have a message for Catholics,” Trump wrote. “I will be there for you. I will stand with you. I will fight for you.”40 One prominent Catholic leader likened Trump’s letter to “a desperate Hail Mary pass,” but far more seemed convinced by Trump’s words or at least determined to stop his opponent. Almost singlehandedly, Trump’s supposed pro-life commitment validated him among these Catholic leaders, helping them overlook his personal flaws and his inconsistent conservatism. “I think his comments are utterly disgusting,” the prominent conservative Catholic activist Gaily Buckley said shortly after the Access Hollywood scandal, “but I have no other choice than to vote for him.”41 That calculus seemed heightened by Hillary Clinton’s poor reputation among religious conservatives, dating back to her time as First Lady. Religious conservatives had long viewed Clinton as a radical feminist who threatened the traditional family and advocated big-government liberalism. Clinton’s strong defense of abortion rights, including the controversial procedure known as “partial birth abortion,” in the final presidential debate, less than a month before the election, may have also hurt her with Catholics, even those who identify as pro-choice but who wouldn’t be comfortable with what seemed like an unrestrained endorsement from Clinton.42 Clinton’s prospects with Catholics suffered an additional blow when WikiLeaks published a set of Clinton campaign staff members’ emails that seemed to mock conservative Catholics.43 Groups like Catholic Vote and Catholic League quickly denounced the Clinton campaign.44 Finally, the future of the Supreme Court seemed to loom large in Catholic decisions about the election, much as it did for evangelicals. “With the makeup of the Supreme Court on the line,” the Catholic news website Crux concluded after the election, “believers felt they had much to fear from Clinton appointments.”45 Although they had shown steady resistance to Trump’s candidacy throughout the year, a majority of Mormon voters ultimately came home to the GOP and its candidate in the end, just as Republicans of every

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stripe did.46 Unlike white evangelicals who got on board with Trump during the 2016 primary season, a larger number of Mormon voters—and also Catholics—broke for Trump at the last minute. Among Mormons, some polling showed that those voters who attended religious services most tended to give Trump less support. Trump did better with “somewhat active” and “less active” Mormons than he did with the “very active” LDS Saints, more of whom supported Evan McMullin.47

The 2020 Election As president, Donald Trump enjoyed solid and often increasing support from religious conservatives. Much of Trump’s challenges with religious conservatives in the 2016 election regarding questions of his personal character, policy agenda, and conservative credentials all but disappeared as president. While many Americans found Trump’s combative role with journalists and his caustic tweets unbecoming of a president, his base of religious conservatives believed he was defending them and their beliefs against the liberal “fake news” media. And with each passing month as the nation’s chief executive, Trump claimed a growing record of delivering on religious conservatives’ agenda. These included appointing three conservative Supreme Court justices, including the devout Catholic Amy Coney Barrett. Many religious conservatives, especially white evangelicals, had rationalized voting for Trump because of his potential appointments to the Supreme Court alone. But three conservative jurists were more than most had even dreamed possible since all three seemed reliable votes to overturn Roe v. Wade. Additionally, Trump reinstated the so-called “Mexico City policy,” a rule that banned federal funding for international family planning agencies that advocate or provide abortions, and expanded it to cover all global health organizations.48 In addition to abortion, Trump emphasized his defense of religious liberty in his selection of Supreme Court judges and in his administration’s new regulation that permitted employers with religious or moral objections to not provide birth control coverage to women under the Affordable Care Act.49 He also moved the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv, long a priority of Christian conservatives if not American Jews. He also banned travel to the U.S. from seven Muslim countries. This executive order along with his other aggressive immigration policies, including the directive to separate immigrant children

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from their parents who crossed the U.S. Southern border, had overwhelming support among white evangelicals who wanted Trump to slow the nation’s accelerating demographic transformation. But these policies were less supported among Mormons and Catholics, both with growing Hispanic memberships.50 “We are deeply troubled by the aggressive and insensitive treatment of these families,” the LDS Church’s leadership announced.51 Along with this record, Trump’s disastrous handling of COVID-19 worked to his benefit among religious conservatives, especially white evangelicals who hold high levels of distrust of scientific authority and a general distrust of governmental power.52 Especially for those experiencing church closures in some Democratic-led states, Trump’s resistance to federal lockdown mandates was perceived by many as another example of his strong defense of religious liberty and his recognition of churchgoing folks as aggrieved and embattled. In his initial run for the White House, Trump had tapped into religious conservatives’ sense of persecution and cultural marginalization. As he prepared for his 2020 reelection bid, Trump leaned heavily on this tactic again, a fear-based strategy for riling up his base with doomsday strategies of what would happen should he lose. At the 2019 Values Voter Summit, an annual event of the most powerful religious conservative leaders and organizations, Trump warned that “the ultraleft is waging war on the values shared by everyone in this room.”53 Such fearmongering raised many eyebrows once Joe Biden, a devout Catholic who spoke frequently of his faith as the basis of his political vision, became the Democratic nominee. But that didn’t stop Trump from charging ahead, telling an Ohio crowd in August 2020 that Biden was “against God” and would “hurt the Bible, hurt God,” if elected.54 Catholic conservative groups, like “Catholics for Trump” and CatholicVote.org, took a more sophisticated approach, spending millions of dollars on targeted ads to Catholic-heavy cities that focused on Biden’s support for abortion rights and same-sex marriage.55 The emphasis by both the Trump campaign and conservative religious organizations on conservative, churchgoing Catholic voters resembled old strategic patterns used by the Religious Right to turn out voters but also reflected the recognition that Catholics in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania had been the key to Trump’s 2016 victory. While Republican presidential campaigns had spent decades focusing on running up their margins with white evangelicals, the 2016 results spoke to the

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particular power Catholic voters in key states had to swing an election, something that the Religious Right of the late 1970s and early 1980s had been more attuned to as they first began cobbling a coalition of religious conservatives together. On the one hand, the extra work the Trump 2020 campaign had to do in turning out religious conservatives, including significant outreach to LDS voters in Nevada and Arizona and to Catholics in the upper Midwest and Pennsylvania, might be viewed by some as proof of Trump’s devastating impact on a once powerful and coordinated Religious Right, especially since he lost in all these places. Yet viewed from the perspective of a shifting electorate and changing political playing field, the focus on those voters in these states might be seen instead as proof of religious conservatives’ ongoing importance for Republicans’ electoral success and also in keeping with the early history of the Religious Right that imagined a national, coalitional strategy for winning elections rather than the increasing focus on white, southern evangelicals in recent years. Having to spend huge time and resources on Mormons, Catholics, and white evangelicals certainly is evidence of the unusual candidate Donald Trump was, but it doesn’t mean that the Religious Right has gone—or is going—away. Indeed, Trump’s solid standing with white evangelicals— most polling showed him receiving the same or near 81% of support he earned in 2016—and his improved performance with Mormons— winning 69% up from 61% four years before—demonstrates the strength and durability of religious conservatives’ endorsement of Republican presidential candidates and the GOP, generally.56 Just as in 2016, Catholics may have been the deciding factor of the 2020 election. Different exit polls put the Catholic vote for Biden from 49 to 52%, nationally.57 But the big impact of those numbers was mostly likely felt in the small margins of victory Biden was able to achieve in the Midwestern swing states that handed him the election, just as had been the case for Trump in 2016. Ultimately, Trump’s greatest gift to the Religious Right may have been his election loss. The Religious Right has always done better at mobilizing when it is out of power, and the Democrats’ control of the White House and both chambers of Congress will be a powerful galvanizing force for greater political coordination and action in the months ahead. Donald Trump was a divisive figure, not least among the different groups that make up the Religious Right. But those divisions and disagreements have always been there, appearing in different moments. Trump ultimately kept the Religious Right intact. In 2021, the Republican Party is also more

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concentrated around its white religious base, not less so. As Republicanled state legislatures across the country take up anti-trans bills and enact further restrictions on abortion rights, it’s clear that the GOP plans to use a “culture wars” political playbook as its path back to power.58 Trump may or may not run again for president in 2024. But if he does, the Religious Right will be the ones deciding his political future.

Notes 1. “Reagan by a Landslide, Pro-Life Gains in Congress!” Action Line: Christian Action Council Newsletter, November 16, 1984, Wilcox Collection, Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas. 2. Cal Thomas and Ed Dobson, Blinded By Might: Can the Religious Right Save America? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1999), 24. 3. Jonathan Merritt, “Why Do Evangelicals Support Donald Trump?” The Atlantic, September 3, 2015, https://www.the atlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/why-do-evangelicals-sup port-donald-trump/403591/. 4. Russell Moore, “If Trump Has Done Anything, He Has Snuffed Out the Religious Right,” Washington Post, October 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/ 2016/10/09/if-donald-trump-has-done-anything-he-has-snu ffed-out-the-religious-right/?utm_term=.a09af15f0b34. 5. “Utah Republican Primary Results,” CNN.com, http://www.cnn. com/election/primaries/states/ut/. 6. McKay Coppins, “Mormon Voters Really Don’t Like Donald Trump—Here’s Why,” BuzzFeed.com, March 19, 2016, https:// www.buzzfeed.com/mckaycoppins/mormon-voters-really-dontlike-donald-trump-heres-why?utm_term=.iuLQZR8Vp#.vjX p0bZlW. 7. Tad Watch, “LDS Church Releases Statement on Religious Freedom as Donald Trump’s Muslim Controversy Swirls,” DeseretNews.com, December 8, 2015, http://www.deseretnews. com/article/865643265/LDS-Church-releases-statement-onreligious-freedom-as-Donald-Trumps-Muslim-controversy-swirls. html.

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8. Rebecca Savransky, “McMullin Tops New Poll of Utah Voters,” TheHill.com, October 19, 2016, http://thehill.com/blogs/bal lot-box/presidential-races/301838-mcmullin-tops-new-poll-ofutah-voters. 9. “In Our Opinion: Donald Trump Should Resign His Candidacy,” Deseret News, October 8, 2016, http://www.deseretnews.com/ article/865664336/In-our-opinion-Donald-Trump-should-res ign-his-candidacy.html. 10. Jim Yardley, “Pope Francis Suggests Donald Trump Is ‘Not Christian’,” New York Times, February 18, 2016; Ben Jacobs, “Donald Trump Calls Pope Francis ‘Disgraceful’ for Questioning His Faith,” Guardian.com, February 18, 2016, https://www. theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/18/donald-trump-pope-fra ncis-christian-wall-mexico-border. 11. “Trump’s Catholic Problem,” Economist.com, September 1, 2016, http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/ 2016/09/trump-s-catholic-problem. 12. Robert P. George and George Weigel, “An Appeal to Our Fellow Catholics,” NationalReview.com, March 7, 2016, www.nationalr eview.com/article/432437/donald-trump-catholic-opposition-sta tement. 13. “Clinton Leads Trump by 13 Points Among Registered Voters,” PRRI.org, August 25, 2016, http://www.prri.org/research/polllgbt-transgender-bathroom-bill-presidential-election/. 14. Aaron Blake, “Donald Trump Has a Massive Catholic Problem,” Washington Post, August 30, 2016. 15. “Religion and the 2016 Campaign,” Pew Research Center, July 13, 2016, http://www.pewforum.org/2016/07/13/rel igion-and-the-2016-campaign. 16. “Clinton Leads Trump by 13 Points Among Registered Voters.” 17. Alexandra DeSanctis, “Trump’s Catholic Problem,” NationalReview.com, August 30, 2016, http://www.nationalreview.com/art icle/439526/donald-trumps-catholic-voter-problem. 18. Neil J. Young, We Gather Together: The Religious Right and the Problem of Interfaith Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 174–75.

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19. On the GOP’s efforts to consolidate religious conservative voters as a reliable base, see Daniel K. Williams, God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 20. Mark J. Rozell, “Evangelicals and Catholics, Who Have Voted Together for Decades, Are Splitting Apart,” Washington Post, September 8, 2016. 21. Such commentary appeared throughout the 2016 campaign in connection with Donald Trump’s candidacy, but especially as polling and primary voting showed a divergence between white evangelical voters and conservative Catholics and Mormons. For a sampling of some of this commentary see, Jonathan Merritt, “Trump Reveals the End of the Religious Right’s Preeminence,” Atlantic.com, February 27, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/ politics/archive/2016/02/the-demise-of-conservative-christianpolitical-prominence/471093; Sarah Posner, “Is This the End of the Religious Right?” New York Times, May 10, 2016, http:// www.nytimes.com/2016/05/10/opinion/campaign-stops/isthis-the-end-of-the-religious-right.html; and Laura Turner, “Will Trump’s Nomination Be the End of the Religious Right,” Politico.com, July 11, 2016, http://www.politico.com/mag azine/story/2016/07/2016-donald-trump-religion-christian-con servatives-republican-party-gop-faith-voters-evangelicals-214037. 22. Michael Farris, “Trump’s Meeting With Evangelical Leaders Marks the End of the Christian Right,” ChristianPost.com, June 21, 2016, http://www.christianpost.com/news/trump-mee ting-evangelical-leaders-end-of-the-christian-right-165473/; Rod Dreher, “The Religious Right: A Eulogy,” TheAmericanConservative.com, October 24, 2016, http://www.theamericanconserv ative.com/dreher/the-religious-right-a-eulogy/. 23. For just two outstanding recent examples, see Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2011); Molly Worthen, Apostles of Reason: The Crisis of Authority in American Evangelicalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). Notably, both books concern only white evangelicals, not the larger interfaith coalition of the Religious Right.

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24. Audra Hendrickson, “Those Mystifying Mormons,” Extension, July 1967, 24. 25. For example, see, J. K. Van Baalen, “The Latter-day Saints Today,” Christianity Today, June 19, 1964, 27–28; Dick Ostling, “The Mormon Surge,” Christianity Today, August 28, 1964, 42–43. 26. “Abortion Decision: A Death Blow?” Christianity Today, February 16, 1973, 32. 27. Young, We Gather Together, 215–22. 28. Ibid., 201–7. 29. Ibid., 246–48. 30. Kate Shellnutt, “Trump Elected President, Thanks to 4 in 5 White Evangelicals,” ChristianityToday.com, November 9, 2016, http:// www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/2016/november/trumpelected-president-thanks-to-4-in-5-white-evangelicals.html. 31. “Trump Wins Catholic Vote in Election That Awoke Religious Feeling,” Cruxnow.com, November 9, 2016, https://cruxnow. com/church-in-the-usa/2016/11/09/trump-wins-catholic-voteelection-awoke-religious-feeling/. 32. Robert Gehrke, “While Mormons Nationally Stuck with Trump, in Utah He Lagged,” Salt Lake Tribune, November 12, 2016, http://www.sltrib.com/home/4573783-155/while-mormonsnationally-stuck-with-trump. 33. Steve Benen, “Trump Backs Abortion Ban, Calls for ‘Punishment’ for Women,” Msnbc.com, March 30, 2016, http://www.msnbc. com/rachel-maddow-show/trump-backs-abortion-ban-calls-pun ishment-women. 34. Wayne Grudem, “Why Voting for Donald Trump Is a Morally Good Choice,” Townhall.com, July 28, 2016, http://townhall. com/columnists/waynegrudem/2016/07/28/why-voting-fordonald-trump-is-a-morally-good-choice-n2199564. 35. Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra, “Why Trump Tape Caused Only One Evangelical Leader to Abandon Him,” Christianitytoday.com, October 10, 2016, http://www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/ 2016/october/why-trump-tape-cause-evangelical-leader-switchwayne-grudem.html. 36. Jon Ward, “Transcript: Donald Trump’s Closed-Door Meeting With Evangelical Leaders,” Yahoo.com, June 22, 2016, https:// www.yahoo.com/news/transcript-donald-trumps-closed-doormeeting-with-evangelical-leaders-195810824.html.

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37. Jerry Falwell, Listen, America! (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980), 103. 38. Ward, “Transcript.” 39. Lauren Markoe, “White Evangelicals, Catholics and Mormons Carried Trump,” Religionnews.com, November 9, 2016, http:// religionnews.com/2016/11/09/white-evangelicals-white-cathol ics-and-mormons-voted-decisively-for-trump/. 40. “Read Donald Trump’s Letter to Catholic Leaders,” Catholic News Agency, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/readdonald-trumps-letter-to-catholic-leaders-88473/, October 6, 2016. 41. Rhina Guidos, “As Outrage Mounts, Trump’s Catholic Problem Gets Worse.” 42. Theresa Avila, “Hillary Clinton Passionately Defended a Woman’s Right to Choose During the Final Debate,” NYMag.com, October 19, 2016, http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/10/hillary-clintonpassionately-defended-abortion-during-debate.html. 43. Sarah Pulliam Bailey, “WikiLeaks Emails Appear to Show Clinton Spokeswoman Joking About Catholics and Evangelicals,” Washington Post, October 13, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost. com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/10/12/wikileaks-emailsshow-clinton-spokeswoman-joking-about-catholics-and-evangelic als/?utm_term=.3c2ffbb23f34. 44. “Clinton Campaign Under Fire for Critical Emails on Catholic Church,” Cruxnow.com, October 12, 2016, https://cruxnow. com/church-in-the-usa/2016/10/12/clinton-campaign-fire-cri tical-emails-catholic-church/. 45. “Trump Wins Catholic Vote in Election That Awoke Religious Feeling,” Cruxnow.com, November 9, 2016, https://cruxnow. com/church-in-the-usa/2016/11/09/trump-wins-catholic-voteelection-awoke-religious-feeling/. 46. Gehrke, “While Mormons Nationally Stuck With Trump, In Utah He Lagged”; Jana Riess, “Most Mormons Planned NOT to Vote for Trump. What the Heck Happened?” Religionnews.com, November 15, 2016, http://religionnews.com/2016/11/15/ most-mormons-planned-not-to-vote-for-trump-what-the-heckhappened/. 47. Gehrke, “While Mormons Nationally Stuck with Trump, in Utah He Lagged.”

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48. Curt Mills, “Trump Reinstates International Abortion Funding Ban,” U.S. News & World Report, January 23, 2017, https:// www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-01-23/donaldtrump-reinstates-mexico-city-policy-banning-international-abo rtion-funding. 49. Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court Upholds Trump Administration Regulation Letting Employers Opt Out of Birth Control Coverage,” New York Times, July 8, 2020, https://www.nytimes. com/2020/07/08/us/supreme-court-birth-control-obamacare. html. 50. Harry Bruinius, “Why Evangelicals Are Trump’s Strongest Travel-Ban Supporters,” Christian Science Monitor, March 3, 2017, https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2017/0303/ Why-Evangelicals-are-Trump-s-strongest-travel-ban-supporters. 51. Alex Thompson and Laura Barron-Lopez, “Mormons Rejected Trump as Blasphemous. Now He Likely Can’t Win Without Them,” Politico.com, September 13, 2020, https://www.pol itico.com/news/2020/09/13/trump-biden-mormons-church412234. 52. Gregory A. Smith, “Most White Evangelicals Satisfied with Trump’s Initial Response to the COVID-19 Outbreak,” Pew Research Center, March 19, 2020, https://www.pewresearch. org/fact-tank/2020/03/19/most-white-evangelicals-satisfiedwith-trumps-initial-response-to-the-covid-19-outbreak/. 53. Philip Bump, “The Trump Administration Fans Out to Defend Christianity Across the Political Spectrum,” Washington Post, October 14, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 2019/10/14/trump-administration-fans-out-defend-christianityacross-political-spectrum/. 54. Jonathan Lemire, “Playing Electoral Defense, Trump Claims Biden Opposes God,” APnews.com, August 6, 2020, https:// apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-election-2020-global-tradeap-top-news-religion-a3c57cdcf8e44755d15930b29c660e36. 55. Tom Gjelten, “For Trump, Conservative Catholics Are the New Evangelicals,” NPR.org, October 26, 2020, https://www.npr. org/2020/10/26/926659149/for-trump-conservative-catholicsare-the-new-evangelicals.

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56. Frank Newport, “Religious Group Voting and the 2020 Election,” Gallup.com, November 13, 2020, https://news.gallup.com/opi nion/polling-matters/324410/religious-group-voting-2020-ele ction.aspx; Jana Riess, “Younger US Mormons Voted for Biden, But Trump Performed Well Overall,” Religionnews.com, April 1, 2021, https://religionnews.com/2021/04/01/younger-u-s-mor mons-voted-for-biden-but-trump-performed-well-overall/. 57. Newport, “Religious Group Voting and the 2020 Election.” 58. Jo Yurcaba, “‘State of Crisis’: Advocates Warn of ‘Unprecedented’ Wave of Anti-LGBTQ Bills,” NBCnews.com, April 25, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/state-crisis-advoca tes-warn-unprecedented-wave-anti-lgbtq-bills-n1265132.

PART II

The Bishops and the Holy See

CHAPTER 5

A Climax in the Culture Wars? The US Bishops and the 2020 Election Marie Gayte

The presidential election of 2020 presented the bishops with a complex situation. On one hand, they were faced with an outgoing president whose faith appeared nominal at best, who on one hand had taken measures and made pronouncements that went against some Church teachings on immigration, the death penalty, racism, and foreign policy. On the other hand, the same president had taken a number of measures that were welcomed by the same bishops on matters of life, religious freedom, and the family, issues that have been at the forefront of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ (USCCB) agenda in the past years, going further on these fronts than any president before him. Facing him in the general contest was a lifelong, devout Catholic whose agenda coincided with many social justice issues espoused by the Church,

M. Gayte (B) British and American Studies Department, Universite de Toulon, Marseille, France e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Gayte et al. (eds.), Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82212-5_5

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but who also clashed with its teaching on the issues of abortion, religious freedom, and LGBTQ+ rights. This resulted in disagreements among the bishops over which issues to prioritize—if any—in their election year voting guide, fearing it could be seen as an endorsement for one party over the next. Their eventual choice to prioritize abortion over all issues has been interpreted as confirmation of their behavior in the past years that they no longer fear being seen as stepping into the partisan fray. This decision, which led to a de facto encouragement for Catholic voters to choose Trump over Biden, has revealed tensions among the bishops, tensions which mirror those between the Holy See and the USCCB. This has also resulted in both campaigns largely bypassing the bishops. Before going into these two points, we will remind the reader of the history of the bishops’ involvement in presidential politics, from a reluctance to engage United States electoral politics to the latest election cycle and the polarization evidenced by renunciation to this reluctance.

Entering the Political Fray The story of the bishops’ reluctance to make their voices heard in US electoral politics is that of the leaders of a church considered as foreign, whose loyalties were allegedly divided between a President and a Pope who was not only a spiritual head but also the ruler of a state, and who professed for a long time that democracy and religious pluralism were errors.1 US Catholics, it was believed, would be tempted once in positions of power to impose their beliefs, both religious and political, to the rest of the country. Faced with this situation, any public intervention from the bishops in an election would have been construed as confirmation that Catholics were trying to violate the separation of church and state.2 Changes occurring in the 1950s and 1960s on both sides of the Atlantic made it eventually possible for the US bishops to get a say in national politics. On the American side, Catholics’ unconditional support for the cold war crusade against communism burnished their patriotic credentials. John F. Kennedy’s election in 1960 signified to many the mainstreaming of Catholics. In the meantime, in Rome, the Council opened by John XXIII and concluded by Paul VI relaxed the Vatican’s hard-line stance on church/state relations and religious freedom. Council document Gaudium et Spes also called on Catholics in general and bishops in particular to encourage government to make changes they thought right.3 The council also mandated the creation of national

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bishops’ conferences.4 Building on the early council formed in 1917 to support the war effort, the US bishops established the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) in 1966 and now spoke with one voice. The event that truly drew the NCCB into the political fray was the 1973 Supreme Court ruling legalizing abortion, a decision on which it was able to broadcast its opposition to a nationwide audience. As the bishops started to make their voices heard in presidential campaigns, a major shift was occurring as Catholic voters, a hitherto solid Democratic constituency, started casting their ballot for Republican candidates, at least among the white, church-attending segment of this group. This shift is partly the result of a Republican strategy to enlarge its voting base through the wooing of “value voters” uncomfortable with what they felt as a secularizing drift of society. Catholic Church doctrine tends to pull US Catholic voters in opposite directions of the political spectrum. Opposition to abortion and gay marriage, and defense of religious freedom point toward the Republican Party’s agenda, while support for immigration reform and opposition to the death party clearly lean Democratic. This is something the bishops have acknowledged on repeated occasions, including the current president of the bishops’ conference—now the USCCB—Archbishop José Gomez of Los Angeles, who remarked in his January 20, 2021 inauguration day statement: “On some issues we find ourselves more on the side of Democrats, while on others we find ourselves standing with Republicans”5 The apparent choice made by the bishops to lay extra emphasis on “life issues” around presidential election times gave the impression they favored Republican candidates. Catholics were now the ultimate swing constituency, and one that became the target of aggressive courting by both major parties, given that they represented around 25% of the electorate and they were geographically concentrated in contested states with large numbers of electoral votes, such as Ohio, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.6 They were also unique in that no other Christian denomination had a single ecclesiastical body speaking authoritatively on its behalf on a large spectrum of issues intersecting with the political sphere.7 Whether the bishops exerted any actual influence on the laity was far from certain; politicians from both parties long believed that the bishops’ access to Catholic voters—along with their significant resources—is tantamount to influence over Catholic votes, which made candidates sensitive to the

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bishops and anxious to identify areas of agreement with them.8 This led presidential candidates to engage in the overt courting of Catholic bishops. Depending on which party they belong to, they use different lines in their courtship: Republicans have tried to show how much they agreed on abortion, at least initially (they have since added gay marriage, euthanasia, federal funding for stem cell research, religious freedom, and defense of the “traditional” family), while Democrats have attempted to prove that they agreed on just about everything else (immigration, workers’ rights, the death penalty, and racial justice).9 The 1976 contest marked a real turning point, as the bishops as a collegial body publicly engaged the two major-party candidates, who were both very keen to appear with the leaders of the US Church. They had been very active since 1973 and had launched a political plan to fight abortion through passage of a constitutional amendment. The Democratic Party convention’s passing of a pro-abortion plank led to criticism from NCCB president Joseph Bernardin,10 who lamented that Jimmy Carter did not support a constitutional amendment despite his personal opposition to abortion.11 The Democratic candidate desperately tried to show alignment with the bishops’ position and to distance himself from his party’s platform. He thus met with the executive committee of the NCCB in late August, but the meeting did not yield the expected outcome, as Bishop Bernardin told the press on their way out that they were “disappointed” with Carter’s position on abortion,12 despite the candidate’s assurances that he would not oppose efforts to obtain a constitutional amendment.13 Incumbent Gerald Ford also needed their support, as he was hoping to repeat Richard Nixon’s 1972 performance with Catholic voters (he had won almost 60% of the Catholic vote14 ), all the more so as he took it for granted that he was going to lose the South to the Georgia governor. He, therefore, appeared alongside Card John Krol of Philadelphia at a Eucharistic Congress in Philadelphia and attended mass in Buffalo in which the local bishop, Edward Head, preached a sermon against abortion.15 In September 1976, Ford invited the NCCB’s executive committee to the White House. The Republican candidate did support an amendment to the Constitution on abortion, although not one as far-reaching as that advocated by the Catholic hierarchy. Nevertheless, Joseph Bernardin judged Ford’s position to be “encouraging.”16 This statement—and the one judging Carter’s position to be disappointing—gave many the impression that the bishops were positioning themselves on the Republican side of the contest. To dispel

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suspicion, the NCCB released a statement indicating that the church leadership was “absolutely neutral” and that its recent statements on abortion indicated no preference for either candidate or party.17 Suspicion of an alignment with the Republican Party led the bishops’ conference to adopt a low profile in the 1980 presidential contest and to warn against single-issue voting, at a time when the Christian Right was mobilizing its troops for the first time to bring Ronald Reagan to the Oval Office.18 Subsequently, in 1983, Archbishop Bernardin developed the concept of a “consistent ethic of life” and “seamless garment,” arguing that the prolife position of the church must be comprehensive and include every stage of its development, a stance which has been seen as a way to avoid being co-opted by any one party.19

Democratic and Catholic: A Difficult Equation for the Bishops While the 1976 contest did not involve any Catholic candidate, subsequent presidential campaigns have shown that bringing a Catholic on the Democratic ticket is a sure way to bring the bishops into the fray. Catholic Democrats have consistently used the same position—that of distinguishing between their privately held pro-life stance and their reluctance to impose their faith onto others in public life. Throughout their voting guides, however, the bishops have made it clear that this position was not acceptable coming from a Catholic. In its 1998 Living the Gospel of Life, the NCCB insisted on the fact that “Catholics who are privileged to serve in public leadership positions have an obligation to place their faith at the heart of their public service, particularly on issues regarding the sanctity and dignity of human life,” and that it was the bishops’ mission “[a]s chief teachers in the Church, [to] therefore explain, persuade, correct and admonish those in leadership positions who contradict the Gospel of life through their actions and policies.”20 This attitude—correcting and admonishing—was on full display when some bishops singled out Democratic Catholics in the 1984 and 2004 presidential contests. In 1984, Democratic candidate Walter Mondale, aware of a decline in Catholic votes for his party, chose New Yorker Geraldine Ferraro, a prochoice Catholic, to be his running mate. This came soon after the appointment, in January 1984, as archbishop of New York of John O’Connor, one of the members of the new generation of “John Paul II bishops,” social conservatives for whom abortion was

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the ultimate moral issue.21 On September 8, 1984, at a pro-life convention during which a taped message by incumbent President Reagan was broadcast—after which O’Connor quipped: “I didn’t tell you to vote for Ronald Reagan, did I?”—the archbishop attacked Geraldine Ferraro by exhuming a letter she had signed in 1982, in which she asserted that “the Catholic position on abortion is not monolithic and there can be a range of personal and political responses to the issue.” He accused her of misrepresenting the Roman Catholic views on abortion and declared that as an “officially appointed teacher of the Catholic Church, […] what has been said about Catholic teachings is wrong—it’s wrong.”22 September was also the month chosen by Archbishop Law of Boston— another member of the John Paul II “new generation” to release a statement by the eighteen bishops of New England that mentioned abortion as the “critical issue” in the campaign, indicating it should be “voters’ central concern.”23 It was also the month Geraldine Ferraro had to pull out of the annual Philadelphia Columbus Day parade when Cardinal Krol threatened to withdraw all the marching bands and children from Catholic schools from the celebration.24 In October, Scranton Bishop James Timlin called a press conference as Geraldine Ferraro was holding a campaign rally there, and he condemned her position on abortions as “absurd and dangerous.”25 In the meantime, several bishops, including Krol and Buffalo’s Edward Head appeared at rallies alongside Ronald Reagan.26 The candidacy of another Catholic, this time at the head of the Democratic ticket, elicited similar reactions on the part of the leaders of the US Catholic Church. In January 2004, Archbishop Raymond Burke of St. Louis said he would deny John Kerry communion should the Democratic candidate present himself in one of his diocese’s churches, and that voting for him was a sin.27 Kerry’s own archbishop, Sean O’Malley from Boston, while not explicitly saying the Democrat could not take communion, suggested that Catholic politicians whose political views contradict Catholic teaching “shouldn’t dare come to communion.”28 This resulted in a “wafer watch,” with journalists following the candidate to mass to see whether he would be denied communion.29 Denver’s archbishop Charles Chaput declared that voting for Kerry was a sin that must be confessed before receiving communion and organized a voter registration drive in his archdiocese, while Cardinal Justin Rigali of Philadelphia, who

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had preached that Catholics had an obligation to vote for pro-life candidates, made an appearance with incumbent George W. Bush in the critical swing state of Pennsylvania, at a time when the Republican was courting religious voters in an unprecedented fashion.30

Priorities Which Seems to Favor the GOP, but Which Conceal Tensions Among the Bishops The bishops have tended to voice their disapproval of prochoice presidential candidates individually, but they’ve also made their voices heard collectively through official NCCB statements. Since 1975, the bishops’ conference has developed the habit of releasing a voting guide ahead of election years to inform Catholics’ choice.31 These documents identify several issues that should receive special consideration when choosing which candidate to vote for, but they often single out abortion and other life issues as worthy of particular attention. Thus, the 1998 edition, Living the Gospel of Life, said that “opposition to abortion and euthanasia was foundational for Catholics and that Catholics should weigh candidates’ positions on abortion above other social justice issues such as poverty and war.” It urged bishops to confront prochoice Catholic politicians, privately at first and then publicly if necessary.32 Their 2003 installment, Faithful Citizenship: A Catholic Call to Political Responsibility, stated that abortion is never “morally acceptable.”33 In its 2007 Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, the NCCB identified as priorities racism, abortion, global social injustice but insisted that the taking of innocent life is not “just one issue among many,” and placed abortion and racism both in the “intrinsic evils” category.34 The centrality of abortion and other “life issues” to the bishops means that no matter what disagreement they may have had with an incumbent Republican president, when election times come, these disagreements are quietly shelved to give way to an almost exclusive focus on life issues, leading almost inevitably to the impression that the bishops side with the Republican candidate. This impression is partly due however to the pronouncements of individual bishops critical of Democratic candidates, and who, although not in a majority, receive a disproportionate amount of attention in the media. Some of the most heated campaigns of recent years, that of Kerry, for instance, are evidence of such a phenomenon. While the 2004 campaign is remembered for the virulent attacks against prochoice Catholic John Kerry, it is worth noting that almost as many

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bishops stated their opposition to the use of communion as a sanction as did those who advocated such a measure. Key Church figures, such as Cardinals Roger Mahony of Los Angeles and Theodore McCarrick of Washington voiced their reluctance to see communion turned into a political weapon.35 Cardinal William Keeler of Baltimore said that sentiment against the denial of communion was 3–1 at the NCCB.36 Nonetheless, the “headline war” was won by those opposing the Democrats.37 This seems to indicate that regardless of the NCCB’s official statements on voting, the NCCB is conflicted on whether it should intervene in presidential campaigns. Joseph Bernardin had put forward in 1983 his seamless garment and consistent ethic of life approach to avoid being seen as overly partisan. But in the following election cycle, the media resonated with attacks on Walter Mondale’s running mate from Archbishops Law and O’Connor. Voices protesting their approach were almost inaudible. Yet, on October 14, NCCB President Bp James Malone had cautioned the clergy against expressing support for candidates, and a few days later, 23 bishops led by Detroit’s Thomas Gumbleton criticized their fellow conservative bishops for elevating the issue of abortion over nuclear war; a few days later, now Archbishop Bernardin reaffirmed his consistent ethic of life and criticized the single-issue focus on abortion.38 Political scientist Timothy Byrnes argued as early as 1991 that “there are essentially two camps within the NCCB when it comes to public policy and political priorities.” He distinguished between one camp made up of bishops “who emphasize a whole series of modern threats to human life,” including abortion, nuclear weapons, poverty, and capital punishment, “in a more or less even-handed way.” These bishops argue that “an exclusive emphasis on abortion inappropriately places the NCCB in political alliance with right-to-life forces whose views conflict with the church’s official position on virtually every other issue.” They are opposed by a group of bishops who believe that “abortion should be the American church’s first political priority” and that it is “fatuous and dangerous to equate merely potential threats to human life, such as nuclear war, with the actual destruction of millions of foetuses every year.” They argue that the consistent ethic of life approach “dilutes the bishops’ commitment to the protection of the unborn and undercuts the potential effectiveness of the bishops’ antiabortion activities.” They also “minimize the costs of an alliance with political forces who disagree with the bishops on other issues, pointing out that “these disagreements tend to be over the most appropriate means to agreed-upon ends.”39 This should not hide

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the fact that all bishops support their church’s condemnation of abortion, but they do disagree on how their agenda should be pursued “in circumstances where its major components (pro-arms control, pro-social spending, and antiabortion) cut across the prevailing cleavage of American national politics.” The way the bishops have chosen to frame their public presentation of church teaching—whether through the antiabortion lens exclusively or through that of the consistent ethic—lends support to candidates and parties who agree with the bishops on that one issue.40 The bishops’ polarization was again visible at the 2015 USCCB annual conference, where they discussed the updated version of their voting guidance, Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship. Some bishops said the guidance had not been updated to include Pope Francis’s recommendations. Chicago Archbishop Blase Cupich lamented that the voting guide did not address immigration reform, and the fact that the document’s goals were too inward-facing in general, while San Diego Bishop Robert McElroy deplored that “it tilts in favor of abortion and euthanasia and excludes poverty and the environment,” “provid[ed] a warrant for those who will misuse this document outside this room to exclude poverty and exclude the environment as key issues and say they are secondary, and cite this document as they have done for the last two election cycles.”41

2016, a Pause in an Otherwise Inexorable Process? The 2016 presidential election cycle was unprecedented in that it defied all the patterns which had seemed to be solidifying for the past 40 years. For the first time in years, bishops who single out abortion as the essential issue when deciding who to cast one’s vote for were faced with a Republican candidate whose personality and record on the issue was far from satisfactory. In addition, the Vatican has had at its helm since 2013 a pontiff who has clearly called on US bishops to rebalance their concerns. This became manifest when, six months into his papacy, he declared in an interview that the Church had grown “obsessed” with abortion, gay marriage, and contraception, and announced that the Church had to “face a new balance.”42 These new orientations were later confirmed in the United States by the appointment as bishops of men known for their advocacy on issues such as immigration reform, refugee resettlement, gun control, and the fight against global poverty, not just abortion and gay marriage.43 The choice of new US cardinals—elevating some surprising names, and leaving behind the heads of notorious sees—was further

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evidence of this shift.44 This led Vaticanist John Allen to conclude that “with Pope’s cardinal picks, Bernardin’s ‘seamless garment is back’.”45 The appointment in July 2016 of Chicago’s Cardinal Blase Cupich to the Congregation of Bishops, whose task it is to select bishops and thus shape the episcopate in individual countries, could herald a new generation of “Francis bishops,” slowly replacing the “John Paul II bishops” whose focus on life issues has for the past 30 years resulted in a de facto alignment with the Republican Party.46 The bishops were clearly uncomfortable with the presidential candidates in the 2016 election. Hillary Clinton’s stance on abortion and lack of interest for Catholic voters were far from compensated by the choice of a Catholic running mate, Tim Kaine, who told a LGBTQ+ rights group he believed the Catholic Church would one day change its teachings to embrace same-sex marriage, unleashing the anger of his bishop, Francis DiLorenzo, who made it clear that the Catholic Church’s teaching about “marriage remains unchanged and resolute.”47 The heads of USCCB committees on doctrine and marriage and family life published a statement entitled “God’s Plan Doesn’t Change,” reminding readers of the permanent nature of marriage as the union of a man and a woman.48 Kaine had been previously attacked by Archbishop Chaput of Philadelphia for “publicly ignor[ing] or invent[ing] the content of [his] Catholic faith as [he] go[es] along”49 and by Bishop Thomas Tobin of Providence who had questioned his Catholic credentials in a Facebook post entitled “VP Pick, Tim Kaine, a Catholic?”50 The alternative looked equally unsatisfactory to the bishops, with his flip-flopping on abortion, his opposition to and toxic rhetoric on immigration, and his clashes with Pope Francis. This unusual setup had, for instance, Archbishop Charles Chaput, who had been very critical of Barack Obama in the 2012 campaign, declare that “[b]oth major candidates are so problematic that neither is clearly better than the other,” denouncing “their astonishing flaws.”51 In the fall of 2016, Bishop Thomas Paprocki, far from issuing, as he had done in 2012, a letter informing members of his diocese that “a vote for a candidate who promotes actions or behaviors that are intrinsically evil and gravely sinful makes you morally complicit and places the eternal salvation of your own soul in serious jeopardy,”52 decided that the best option for Catholics may be to abstain from voting altogether.53 On the whole, the bishops pulled their punches on Trump, but a critical tone was to be heard in some circles. After Trump entered the fray for the Republican nomination, Cardinal Timothy Dolan, who had been extremely critical of Barack

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Obama in the 2012 campaign, published a column entitled “Nativism rears its big-haired head: Donald Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric is a sad return to a terrible American tradition,” in which he lambasted Trump’s xenophobic rhetoric.54 Yet, the bishops’ attacks were somehow muted once the campaign finally started. Santa Fe Archbishop John Wester, a Francis appointee, condemned Trump’s rhetoric as “scapegoating and targeting people like the immigrant, the refugee and the poor,” while Cardinal Blase Cupich said he respected the choice of voters, but that he’d keep a close eye on how the campaigns proceed on issues that are “important to him,” such as immigration and life issues.55 Both the primary and general election campaigns were marked by statements of bishops who, while critical of Trump, insisted on their reluctance to intervene in the political process, a caution that seemed odd in light of their interventions in 2004 and 2012. Thus Archbishop Jose Gomez, while denouncing Trump’s vitriol on immigration as “not right,” declared his reluctance to wade into political waters; Dolan wrote in his op-ed that he’s “not in the business of telling people what candidates they should support.”56 No episcopal stars rose to the attention of the public the way they had in 2012 against Obama and in favor of the pro-life Republican Mitt Romney. Appeals not to vote for prochoice candidates could be heard from the bishop of Rockville Centre, and the archbishop of Kansas City, who highlighted the importance of judicial appointments when choosing a president,57 but not much came from New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Los Angeles.

The 2020 Election: The Culture Wars Back in Force at the USCCB While the bishops were reluctant to show direct or indirect support for any candidate in 2016, there was much less reluctance in the last election, which marked a return—with a vengeance—to the 1980s debate between the seamless garment and abortion as single most important issue positions among the bishops, with polarization within the USCCB reaching unprecedented levels. Between a Republican candidate at odds with some of the Church teachings, but who did more than any of his predecessors on defense of life, religious freedom, and the “traditional family,” and the presence of a prochoice—yet devout—Catholic on the top of the Democratic ticket who championed many of the social justice issues promoted

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by Pope Francis, the majority of the USCCB seemed to have made its choice fairly early on. If the episcopate reflects the visions of the pontiff who has appointed them, it bears mentioning that six years of Francis papacy was not enough to reshape the USCCB to reflect more faithfully his call to rebalance the Church’s priorities.58 As of 2019, a majority of the 273 active bishops with right to vote at USCCB conferences had been appointed by John Paul II and Benedict XVI and it is widely considered that conservatives still dominate the conference; in 2016, just 13% had been appointed by Francis, 42% by Benedict, and 45% by John Paul II. In 2019, the figure had risen to 20% of the US bishops appointed by Francis, with the remaining 80% having been elevated by either John Paul II or Benedict XVI. Changing the makeup of a conference takes a long time according to USCCB expert Tom Reese.59 This constitutes almost a mirror image of the 1980s conference which saw the first major tensions arise, that time between a fairly liberal and moderate majority and a vocal conservative minority led by Abp O’Connor.60 There is now a minority of more progressive bishops trying to ensure Francis’s teaching is factored into the documents issued by the USCCB, facing a majority of bishops who have emphasized abortion and religious liberty in recent years.61 Chief among them is the aforementioned Cardinal Blase Cupich, the recently created Cardinal Wilton Gregory, Joseph Tobin, as well as Robert McElroy and John Stowe. These divisions were on full display at their fall 2019 conference, where they were to update their voting guide Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship. From the start, papal nuncio Archbishop Christophe Pierre insisted that “[t]he pastoral thrust of this pontificate must reach the American people.”62 The update consisted of five videos and a letter to be added to the document, and a major rift appeared during the debate on the content of the letter. The more conservative bishops supported a motion by Portland Archbishop Alexander Sample calling for abortion to be called the “preeminent priority.” “We are at a unique moment with the upcoming election cycle to make a real challenge to Roe v. Wade, given the possible changes to the Supreme Court,”63 he declared, evidencing the political dimension of this prioritization. He was joined by several other bishops, like Archbishop Joseph Naumann, chair of the Pro-life Committee.64 This move was opposed by those who feared it would make the conference aligned with the GOP,65 such as Bishop McElroy, who

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said this was in opposition to the pope’s teaching,66 and shortly thereafter in the media by Bp Stowe, for whom claims of abortion as trumping other issues “has been exploited for too many elections” and that “[t]he whole point of the pope’s teaching is we have to be consistent across the board,” 67 But it appears that Francis’s concerns stood second to those of the bishops’, as evidenced by Archbishop emeritus of Philadelphia Chaput’s response: “We do support the Holy Father completely. […] But it has been very clearly the articulated opinion of the bishops’ conference for many years that pro-life is still the preeminent issue.”68 Several media cautioned at the time that the phrase chosen by the conference was sure to be used by the Trump campaign as proof that real Catholics ought to vote for him and not “fake Catholic” Biden, a mantra resorted to continuously by GOP campaigners.69 Sure enough, during the launch of “Catholics for Trump,”, member of its Advisory Board and former Representative Tim Huelskamp tweeted: “Unfortunately, every single member of “Catholics for Biden” failed to point out the unambiguous declaration from the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops: “The threat of abortion remains our preeminent priority.”70 The debate also centered around a request from Cardinal Cupich that the letter quote more extensively from Francis’s apostolic exhortation Gaudete and Exsultate to reflect all his concerns, especially the paragraph which stipulated that the call to holiness requires a “firm and passionate” defense of the “innocent unborn” but “[e]qually sacred are the “lives of the poor, those already born, the destitute, the abandoned and the underprivileged, the vulnerable infirm and the elderly exposed to covert euthanasia, the victims of human trafficking, new forms of slavery, and every form of rejection.”71 Cupich warned against those bishops who bring an “ideological mindset” to issues by either “dismissing some issues by labeling them as part of an objectionable political camp or by taking a reductionist approach in defending only one issue.” He called for the letter to speak more about the climate crisis, and for “more candor” on immigration, which meant acknowledging the “presence of demonizing rhetoric and abusive, violent policy directed at a group of human beings who are denounced as dangerous or worse by top elected officials.” The committee made minor additions, mentioning “gun violence, xenophobia, capital punishment and other issues that affect human life and dignity,” but it voted against adding the paragraph and for the addition of the word “preeminent” by a 143–69 majority.72 The outgoing

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USCCB President Card Daniel DiNardo made the priorities of the conference abundantly clear when he labeled climate change “important” but not “urgent” at a press conference following the close of their meeting.73 On top of these divisions, the 2020 general campaign presented the bishops with a rather complex situation. It pitted the outgoing president, a nominal Christian who defended some of the priorities of the conference, while neglecting others, especially those which were highlighted by Francis as being equally important (climate change, immigration, and the death penalty) against a lifelong mass-going Catholic who kept emphasizing the importance of faith in his life, while supporting some of the Pope’s priorities on social justice, but also fully embracing the Democratic prochoice agenda.

Donald Trump and the Bishops The incumbent gave the bishops both cause for satisfaction and reprobation in the four years of his presidency. On the pro-life front, one can mention his efforts to defund Planned Parenthood, his restoring and toughening of the Mexico City Policy, his appointment of three conservative prochoice justices to the Supreme Court, and of many more to the lower courts. On the religious liberty front, his administration enacted conscience protection clauses for healthcare workers, going as far as setting up a Religious Freedom Division within the Health Department, and made the defense of religious freedom a priority of the Justice and State Departments. He also appointed conservative Catholics to key government positions, following the adage that “personnel is policy,” On other issues, he stood in stark contrast with the Pope’s teaching, whether it be through the construction of a border wall, the separation of immigrant children from their parents, his leaving the Paris Agreement on climate change, his resumption of the federal death penalty after a 17-year hiatus … Thomas Reese conducted an analysis of the contents of more than 160 statements from the USCCB to determine whether they praised or condemned Trump the most.74 He concluded that “[t]here’s no doubt that the bishops make a priority of abortion and other pro-life issues” and that “[w]hile the conference’s various committees also issued statements critiquing Trump over the death penalty and some other issues, none of those had the reach of the ‘pro-life’ stamp of approval. And the criticisms invariably did not mention Trump by name, only making oblique references to ‘the administration.’”75

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At the beginning of his campaign, Trump tried to leverage these prolife and pro-religious liberty accomplishments with the bishops, and some seem to have let themselves drawn into partisan politics. When Trump’s Catholic outreach started virtually in April, the President had several phone calls involving Catholic leaders. These revealed that Card Dolan had had a striking change of heart regarding Trump since 2016. An April 17 call with faith leaders concerning the re-opening of houses of worship, in which Cardinal Dolan and Archbishop Gomez participated, was used by Trump to seek reelection support.76 Dolan is reported to have thanked the President for his defense of religious liberty and the prolife cause, after which the President warned those on the call that these issues would be in jeopardy if a Democrat were elected in November.77 During another call on April 25 with 600 Catholic leaders, one could find Cardinals Timothy Dolan and Sean O’Malley, USCCB President Archbishop Jose Gomez, and chair of the USCCB committee of Catholic Education Bishop Michael Barber (since the original focus of the call was the impact of COVID on Catholic schools). In the course of the conversation, Trump identified himself as the “best [president] in the history of the Catholic Church” and mentioned time and again his support for pro-life and religious liberty policies, which has “been at a level that no other president has seen before, according to everybody.” He emphasized that the upcoming election presented Catholics with a situation “the likes of which have never been more important for the Church.” After mentioning the anti-life stance of the Democratic Party, he insisted that “[y]ou’re going to have a very different Catholic Church” if he is defeated. Bishop Barber thanked the president for his selection of justices Brett Kavanaugh and Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court.78 However, the bishop who really went out of his way to praise Trump was Timothy Dolan. The Cardinal was the first to take the floor after Trump called him a “great friend of mine,” to which he replied “the feelings are mutual sir,” and that they had been on the phone so often in recent months that the cardinal’s mother had complained her son talked to the President more than he did to her. He went on to praise Education Secretary Betsy DeVos, Housing Secretary Ben Carson, and presidential advisor Kellyanne Conway as “champions” and “cherished allies in our passion for our beloved schools.”79 Trump could not miss the opportunity to capitalize on such a call. He tweeted about it immediately after and announced that he would be joining virtually the mass celebrated by Dolan from St. Patrick’s Cathedral the following Sunday, something acknowledged

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by the Cardinal at the start of the mass. This provided Trump with one more opportunity to take to Twitter to show how close he was to the cardinal. The story does not stop here, as the following Monday, Dolan was on Fox News, where he “saluted the President’s leadership” and claimed that “the president has seemed particularly sensitive to the […] feelings of the religious community.80 ” In mid-July, Dolan offered the invocation at an event during which Secretary of State Pompeo presented the first report of the Commission on Unalienable Rights, whose mission was to determine which ones were to be granted priority status given the recent “proliferation of rights”,81 and during which religious freedom was presented by Pompeo as “foremost” among human rights. Finally, Dolan gave a prayer at the 2020 Republican National Convention, in which he “prais[ed] the Lord for a country where freedom of religion is so cherished.”82 Except Dolan, just a few bishops expressed strong support for the outgoing president, among which Bishop Strickland,83 but as we will see later, one might argue that the choice of words in their 2019 letter was enough to convey clearly to voters where they stood, even though it remains to be seen just how many Catholic read it. Apparently though, this was not enough for Trump, who is reported to have felt frustrated at the bishops’ lack of gratitude, and by statements such as those of Bishop John Stowe, who declared that “[f]or this president to call himself prolife, and for anybody to back him because of claims of being pro-life, is almost wilful ignorance,” and who tweeted that Donald Trump “is so much anti-life.”84 When the Trump campaign announced in March it intended to launch “Catholics for Trump” at a rally in Wisconsin, Archbishop Listecki of Milwaukee went out of his way to distance his diocese from the initiative,85 declaring that the Church was “in no way affiliated to or sponsoring this event or campaign, locally, statewide or nationally,”86 But what apparently made Trump stop his engagement with the bishops was the very strong reaction of DC’s Archbishop Wilton Gregory, who did not mince words when Trump visited the John Paul II shrine the day after Lafayette Square was violently cleared of protestors to allow for a photo op of the President brandishing a bible in front of a damaged Episcopal church. Gregory declared it “baffling and reprehensible that any Catholic facility would allow itself to be so egregiously misused and manipulated in a fashion that violates our religious principles, which call us to defend the rights of all people, even those with whom we might disagree. [Saint Pope John Paul II] certainly would not condone the use

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of tear gas and other deterrents to silence, scatter or intimidate them for a photo opportunity in front of a place of worship and peace.”87 Trump is said to have been “pissed about that” by administration officials, as such reactions on the parts of bishops were hard to understand for him. This was all the more worrying for his campaign as his ratings among Catholics were dropping.88 Several administration officials thus confided that this prompted a change of strategy in Trump’s Catholic outreach. In the wake of the shrine visit, White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications and Trump’s social media advisor, Dan Scavino, himself a Catholic, decided to turn to more “fringe” Catholic figures, which he saw as a better way of turning up the base than courting the bishops. The figures now wooed by Trump included Archbishop Vigano, the formal papal nuncio to the US, infamous for having accused Francis of covering up the Cardinal McCarrick sex abuse scandal and for calling on him to resign, and Taylor Marshall.89 Some Trump’s advisors, like Scavino and Stephen Miller, did not appear to be aware of the disagreements which are tearing the USCCB apart and see the bishops as “all shades of Pope Francis, especially on immigration.” Therefore the new strategy consists in bypassing the bishops altogether to speak to “real Catholics,” that is to say those who are on the same wavelength as Trump, and they seem to value a “combative stance against the bishops as a good in itself.”90 In doing so, these Trump administration Catholics participate in the narrative that the Church as it exists today deviates from true Catholicism, especially as far as the Pope is concerned, and that Francis and the bishops need to be “corrected” by true, faithful Catholics, a stance that is so vocal these days that it has led to talks of a looming schism within American Catholicism, or between it and the Pope.91 Thus, in the week following the shrine visit, Trump retweeted a letter that Vigano has sent him, saying: “So honored by Archbishop Viganò’s incredible letter to me. I hope everyone, religious or not, reads it!” In his letter, Vigano praised Trump and shared his conspiracy theories on the existence of a “Deep Church” along the same lines of the “Deep State” that Trump was facing, and added: “Both of us are on the same side in this battle.” On July 2, Trump tweeted about a TV appearance during which Taylor Marshall said “there is a war on Christianity.” Marshall is (in)famous for having authored a book denouncing a freemason plot to infiltrate and subvert the Church, a plot in which bishops are not innocent.

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Biden and the Bishops As we have seen previously in this chapter, being a Catholic candidate certainly does not guarantee that you will enjoy the bishops’ support. To the contrary, it is synonymous with heightened scrutiny and judgment, especially if one calls oneself Catholic while making statements contrary to Church doctrine on an issue deemed “preeminent” by the bishops. Joe Biden had already incurred the wrath of some bishops while running on the Democratic ticket alongside Barack Obama in 2008. The leading conservative bishop at the time, then Denver Archbishop Charles Chaput, said Biden should not present himself for Communion given his public support for abortion.92 Bishop Joseph Martino of Biden’s own hometown diocese of Scranton warned during the campaign against any Catholic politician supporting the “culture of death” approaching Holy Communion, and the bishops of Colorado Springs and PensacolaTallahassee sent Biden similar warnings,93 while Biden own diocese of Wilmington indicated that it would not allow him to speak in Catholic schools should he be elected Vice President.94 Biden then came under fire from a large number of bishops, including from Archbishop Chaput95 and then Archbishop Timothy Dolan for claiming on NBC’s “Meet the Press” that his support for abortion was in keeping with his Catholic faith, that while he accepted that life begins at conception he was unwilling to impose that judgment on everyone else in pluralistic society.96 Even though his home bishop, Wimington’s William Malooly, had declared in 2008 himself ready to enter into dialog and not to deny him communion,97 it appears that Biden knew at the start of the 2020 presidential campaign not to count on the USCCB to rally white Catholic voters. His stance on abortion (ending his support of the Hyde Amendment, vowing to enshrine abortion rights into law should it be overturned by the Supreme Court), on religious liberty (his promise to support the Equality Act and to roll back the conscience protections exempting the Little Sisters of the Poor from having to comply with the contraceptive mandate), and his strong support for LGBQT+ rights put him on a collision course with most bishops. Early evidence of that came to light in October 2019, when he was denied communion by a South Carolina Priest following guidelines on politicians and communion issued by the diocese.98 While Cardinal Dolan said in October 2020 that he would not deny Biden communion, several bishops were very critical of the Catholic candidate, including Thomas Paprocki,99 Thomas Daly,

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Joseph Strickland, and Thomas Tobin, who all stated that no Catholic in good conscience could vote for Biden given what he intended to do on abortion.100 This election cycle is noteworthy for the role played by conservative traditional and social media, both secular and Catholic, with the bishops taking to Twitter and other platforms to vent their frustration with the Biden candidacy, gaining thus a soapbox allowing them to reach beyond their diocese, or even beyond retirement.101 These media, which represent an opposition of sorts to Francis, include online radical outfits like LifeSite News and Church Militant, TV networks like EWTN, and magazines such as the National Catholic Register, Crisis, or First Things. A 2016 comprehensive survey of the US episcopate revealed that the bishops favor conservative media: thus Fox is the most-watched secular network (47% of bishops), and in terms of print Catholic publications, the very conservative National Catholic Register, part of the EWTN empire, tops the ranking, being read by 61% of bishops.102 Thus the darling of the conservative Cathosphere, retired Cardinal Raymond Burke, took to the Catholic News Agency, another member of the EWTN family, in August 2020, and to Fox in October 2020, to declare that Biden was not a Catholic in good standing and should not approach to receive communion,103 while active bishops took to Twitter, with Bishop Stika of Knoxville declaring himself in September “confuse[d] that both Joe Biden and Nancy Pelosi time and time again state that they are faithful Catholics and yet promote unlimited abortion as well as deny so many of the teachings of our faith”,104 or Bishop Thomas Tobin tweeting at the time the Biden-Harris ticket was announced: “DNC Biden-Harris. First time in awhile that the Democratic ticket hasn’t had a Catholic on it. Sad.”105 Despite these statements, however, Crux Now reported that contrary to 2004, it had found few bishops willing to discuss communion for Biden.106 Despite all that, Joe Biden still needed to draw some white Catholics away from Trump, especially in the swing states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, and thus had to build a strong outreach. The strategy seems to have been complicated to come by, as one has to wait till September 2020 for the Democrat to launch his “Catholics for Biden” campaign. It consisted in bypassing the bishops and their “preeminent priority” altogether and presenting Joe Biden as a “Pope Francis Catholic,” reflecting the apparent division within the episcopate, and between the USSCB and the Vatican itself, over which issues to

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prioritize. The “Catholics for Biden” website homepage featured a large photo of the two men in deep conversation,107 and the campaign insisted repeatedly on the commonality of concerns between Pope Francis and the Democratic candidate, emphasizing social justice issues such as the environment, the protection of workers, and the promotion of racial justice. At the campaign’s launch, speakers urged Catholics not to be singleissue voters on abortion and challenged Trump’s pro-life record. After the call, organizers encouraged people to take an online quiz, entitled “Are you a Pope Francis Voter?,” in which voters were told “Donald Trump rejects the vast majority of Catholic Social Teaching,” while claiming that Biden shares the “Catholic priorities” of “Pope Francis.” According to the quiz, President Biden would protect people in poverty, the elderly, and migrants and reject racism. The quiz told voters: “you must prioritize these sacred issues in the voting booth this November.”108 As to the bishops themselves, very few stood up for Biden. Cardinal Joseph Tobin said in September that people could vote for Joe Biden in good conscience, and implied he would have difficulty voting for Trump, and that people should avoid reducing an election to “how a candidate stands on a single issue.109 ”

The End of the Election, but Not of the Divisions This chapter does not end with Joe Biden’s victory. His victory, when it was finally announced, did not put to rest the divisions within the conference, or whatever tensions may have arisen between the Democratic candidate and the bishops as to his worthiness as a Catholic. The presence of a devout Catholic in the White House who publicly disagreed with the national leadership of his Church was bound to lead to an unprecedented configuration. USCCB President Archbishop José Gomez congratulated Joe Biden and Kamala Harris on November 7, but at the USCCB fall conference, held just ten days later, on November 16–17, he sounded a different tune. On the last day of the conference, Gomez read a statement saying Biden’s inauguration “presents certain opportunities but also certain challenges.” If there is “reason to believe that Biden’s Catholic faith would motivate him to pursue policies that aligned with Catholic teaching on immigration reform, refugees, the poor, initiatives against racism, the death penalty and climate change,” he indicated that Biden’s opposition to the Hyde Amendment and his support of Roe v. Wade is “against some fundamental values we hold dear as Catholics,”

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since “[b]oth of these policies undermine our preeminent priority of the elimination of abortion.” He also mentioned Biden’s support for the restoration of the contraceptive mandate, the Equality Act and the “unequal treatment of Catholic schools.” In addition, he added that the problems were compounded “[w]hen politicians who profess the Catholic faith support them. Among other things it creates confusion with the faithful about what the Church actually teaches on these questions.” The Archbishop then announced the formation of a working group to “navigate” this “difficult and complex situation,” to be chaired by the vice president of the USCCB, Archbishop Allen Vigneron, which would include the heads of various bishops’ committees whose remit overlapped with these policy concerns, along with the heads of the committees on doctrine and communication.110 Since then, the working group, made of ten bishops, among whom Cardinal Dolan, San Francisco’s Archbishop Salvatore Cordileone, and Archbishop Naumann, known for having said Biden should be denied communion111 has met virtually twice,112 and has been disbanded after having formulated recommendations to Archbishop Gomez, which he made public on March 1. The first was for Gomez to write a letter to the new president, promising support for the new administration in areas of agreement. It would also identify administration policies, including abortion, that the bishops believed violated human dignity, and it would urge the new president to reassess his positions on these questions. The second initiative proposed by the group was the drafting of a statement on the Church’s “eucharistic coherence” by the Doctrine Committee.113 Rather than a private letter, the bishops took the unprecedented step of having their president publicly issue an unusually lengthy statement on inauguration day.114 If Gomez confided “look[ing] forward to working with President Biden and his administration,” he indicated that “[a]s with every administration, there will be areas where we agree and work closely together and areas where we will have principled disagreement and strong opposition.” He went on to say: “I must point out that our new President has pledged to pursue certain policies that would advance moral evils and threaten human life and dignity, most seriously in the areas of abortion, contraception, marriage, and gender,” and shared his “deep concern” for the “liberty of the Church and the freedom of believers to live according to their consciences.” He once again highlighted abortion as the “preeminent priority” for US bishops. Arbishop Gomez tried to show that the bishops were in agreement with the Pope, by saying that “[p]reeminent

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does not mean ‘only.’ We have deep concerns about many threats to human life and dignity in our society. But as Pope Francis teaches, we cannot stay silent when nearly a million unborn lives are being cast aside in our country year after year through abortion.” He then went on to discuss abortion at great length.115 This statement laid bare once again the divisions among the episcopate. While some bishops, like Archbishop Cordileone, endorsed it,116 Cardinal Cupich released his own statement calling Archbishop Gomez’s statement “ill-considered,” claiming there was no precedent for issuing one, and that “internal institutional failures involved must be addressed” because, according to him, the statement had been issued without prior consultation of the bishops’ administrative committee.117 The biggest rebuke of all however seemed to have come from the Vatican. Not only did the Pope call Joe Biden on November 12 to congratulate him and send him a signed copy of his book Let Us Dream through Cardinal Gregory.118 He also sent Biden a telegram on inauguration day which had a much more conciliatory than the bishops’ statement. The pontiff offered his prayers that “under your leadership, may the American people continue to draw strength from the lofty political, ethical and religious values that have inspired the nation since its founding,” and made no direct mention of abortion, except when praying for Biden’s decisions to “be guided by a concern for building a society marked by authentic justice and freedom, together with unfailing respect for the rights and dignity of every person, especially the poor, the vulnerable and those who have no voice.” Vatican expert John Allen insists this was not what he called “a case of ‘good cop/bad cop’ meaning a coordinated strategy to allow the Pope to dangle a carrot while the bishops wield a stick.” To him this is a reflection of “a genuine tension between Rome and the USCCB, with neither side especially delighted with the approach of the other.”119 Evidence could be found in the fact that when the Vatican, which had not been informed of the USCCB’s decision to publish a statement,120 found out about its existence only hours before it was to be released.121 It appears that on the eve of the inauguration, Cardinals Joseph Tobin, Blase Cupich, and the apostolic nuncio Christophe Pierre put intense pressure on Archbishop Gomez not to release the statement.122 Gomez decided to go ahead anyway with a 9:00 a.m. release, three hours before the ceremony was to begin. Then the Secretariat of State of the Holy See intervened, demanding

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that the release be delayed123 to let the Pope’s telegram reach the President first.124 The Vatican released the telegram immediately after the swearing-in of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris,125 before the USCCB issued its statement. With Biden and Harris now in office, it looks as though the division among the bishops, and tensions with the Vatican, are to become a fixture of the next four years. The Vatican hasn’t weakened in its attempt to show goodwill toward the recently installed administration. America Magazine thus reported that the Vatican officials it had interviewed had shown “negative reaction” to the Gomez statement, calling it most unfortunate and likely to create even greater divisions within the Church in the United States.”126 The fact that Cardinal Cupich was granted a private audience with Pope Francis just ten days after his rebuke of Archbishop Gomez has been interpreted as a sign from Francis that he shared Cupich’s approach. Meanwhile, statements keep emerging from bishops, with those, like DC Cardinal Gregory stating that he would be available “to speak to [the President] about faith, about the works that he is trying to accomplish that we can be supportive of, but also areas where we’re not going to agree. But I’m going to always try to do it in a respectful way,”127 and that he would not deny him communion because he “[doesn’t] want to go to the table with a gun on the table first.”128 It is worth noting that Gregory’s conciliatory stance has been attacked in conservative Catholic media because by engaging in dialog with Biden, he’s accused of undermining the Church and the USCCB’s position and work.129 In the meantime, in the weeks following his inauguration, several high ranking bishops, including Archbishop Cordileone as recently as May 1, and Archbishop Naumann, have made the case that Biden should be denied communion on repeated occasions, including, unsurprisingly, on the day of the March for Life, which Trump had addressed, the first president ever to do, the previous year in yet one more attempt to woo Catholic voters.130

Notes 1. See for instance Byrnes, Timothy. 1993. Catholic Bishops in American Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Millies, Steven. 2018. Good Intentions: A History of Catholic Voters from Roe to Trump. Collegeville: Liturgical Press.

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2. Sammon, Margaret Ross. 2008. “The Politics of the US Catholic Bishops: The Centrality of Abortion.” In Catholics and Politics The Dynamic Tension between Faith and Power, ed. Kristin E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell, and Michael A. Genovese, 12. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 3. Sullivan, Amy. 2008. The Party Faithful: How and Why Democrats are Closing the God Gap, 55. New York: Scribner. 4. Sammon, “The Politics of US Catholic Bishops,” 12–13. 5. USCCB’s President statement on the inauguration of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., as 46th president of the United States of America. 2021. USCCB. https://www.usccb.org/news/2021/usccb-pre sidents-statement-inauguration-joseph-r-biden-jr-46th-presidentunited-states. 6. Mockabee, Stephen. 2007. “The Political Behavior of American Catholics: Change and Continuity.” In From Pews to Polling Places, ed. J. Matthew Wilson, 81. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 7. Davison, Donald, and Michael A. Krassa. 2011. “The Myth of the Catholic Vote: The Influence of Ideology and Theology on Catholics in Presidential Elections.” Journal of Religion and Society 13: 2. 8. Byrnes, Timothy. 1991. Catholic Bishops in American Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 4. 9. McKenna, George. “Criss-Cross: Democrats, Republicans, and Abortion.” Human Life Review 32 (3/4): 70. 10. Marlin, op. cit., 289. 11. Byrnes, op. cit., 72. 12. Prendergast, William. 1999. The Catholic Voter in American Politics: The Passing of the Democratic Monolith. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 170. 13. Moore, Andrew. 2011. “Jimmy Carter’s ‘Catholic Problem’, Not to Mention His Protestant One: The Democratic Coalition and the Struggle over Religious Liberty in the Late 1970s.” Journal of Church and State 53: 2, 183–202. 14. Sullivan, op. cit., 63. 15. Prendergast, op. cit., 173. 16. Ibid., 171. 17. Shabecoff, Philip. 1976. “Archbishop Asserts Church is Neutral in White House Race.” New York Times, September 17.

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18. Prendergast, op. cit., 183. William, D’Antonio. 2012. “Catholic Bishops and the Electoral Process in American Politics.” In Voting and Holiness: Catholic Perspectives on Political Participation, ed. Nicholas P. Cafardi, 50. New York: Paulist Press. 19. Byrnes, op. cit., 8. 20. Living the Gospel of Life: A Challenge to American Catholics. 1998. NCCB. 21. Sullivan, op. cit., 68. 22. “O’Connor Critical of Ferraro Views.” 1984. New York Times, September 9. 23. Miller Patricia. 2014. Good Catholic: The Battle over Abortion in the Catholic Church. Berkeley: University of California Press, 106. 24. Sullivan, op. cit., 71. 25. Prendergast, op. cit., 188. 26. Miller, op. cit., 109. 27. Rice, Patricia. 2004. “Burke Would Refuse Communion to Kerry.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 30. 28. Seelye, Katharyne. 2004. “Kerry Ignores Reproaches of Some Bishops.” New York Times, April 11. 29. Henneton, Lauric. 2012. Histoire religieuse des Etats-Unis. Paris: Flammarion, 10. 30. Miller, op. cit., 227–228. 31. Lisa Sowle Cahill. 2012. “Voting and Living the Common Good.” In Voting and Holiness: Catholic Perspectives on Political Participation, ed. Nicholas Cafardi, 29. New York: Paulist Press. 32. Miller, Patricia. 2016. “The Catholic Bishops and the Rise of Evangelical Catholics.” Religions 7: 1. 33. Marlin, op. cit., 340. 34. Sowle Cahill, op. cit., 27–29. 35. Miller, op. cit., 223. 36. Miller, op. cit., 224. 37. D’Antonio, “Catholic Bishops and the Electoral Process in American Politics,” 56. 38. Miller, Good Catholic, 113. 39. Byrnes, op. cit., 6. 40. Ibid., 7. 41. O’Loughlin, Michael. 2015. “US Bishops Press On With Marriage, Religious Freedom Goals.” Crux, November 18.

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42. Goodstein, Laurie. 2013. “Pope says Church is ‘Obsessed’ with Gays, Abortion and Birth Control.” New York Times, September 19. 43. Tamara, Audi, and Francis X. Rocca. 2015. “The Bishops’ Theological Divide.” Wall Street Journal, September 20. 44. Goodstein, Laurie. 2016. “Pope Francis Names 17 New Cardinals, including 3 Americans.” New York Times, October 9. 45. Allen, John. 2016. “With Pope’s Cardinal Picks, Bernardin’s ‘Seamless Garment’ Is Back.” Crux, October 9. 46. O’Loughlin, Michael. 2016. “How Cupich’s Appointment to Bishops’ Committee Could Shape the US Hierarchy.” America Magazine, July 7. 47. Fraga, Brian. 2016. Contrasting Beliefs: How Clinton and Kaine are Wooing Catholic Voters. National Catholic Register, September 16. 48. Roewe, Brian. 2016. “US Bishops Squelch Tim Kaine’s Hope That Church May Embrace Same-Sex Marriage.” National Catholic Reporter, September 24. 49. Chaput, Charles. 2016. “Some Personal Thoughts on the Months Ahead.” Catholic Philly, August 12. 50. “Tim Kaine, a Catholic VP? Bishops Voice Their Concern.” 2016. Catholic News Agency, July 26. 51. Chaput, op. cit. 52. Paprocki, Thomas. 2012. “Think and Pray Before Your Vote in the Upcoming Election.” Catholic News Agency, September 27. 53. Paprocki, Thomas. 2016. “Unprecedented and Challenging Election Ahead.” Catholic Times, October 2. 54. Dolan, Timothy. 2016. “Nativism Rears Its Big-Haired Head: Donald Trump’s Anti-immigrant Rhetoric Is a Sad Return to a Terrible American Tradition.” New York Daily News, July 29; O’Loughlin, Michael. 2015. “US Catholic Bishops Take on Donald Trump.” Crux, August 3. 55. O’Loughlin, Michael. 2016. “Trump v. Clinton Matchup has Catholic Leaders Scrambling.” Crux, May 9. 56. O’Loughlin, Michael. “US Catholic Bishops Take on Donald Trump,” op. cit. Dolan, Nativism rears its big-haired head, op. cit. 57. Editorial. 2016. “One Issue Obsession Imperils Credibility.” National Catholic Reporter, October 14.

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58. Reese, Thomas. 2020. “Pope Francis Remakes the American Hierarchy, One Bishop at the Time.” National Catholic Reporter, January 29. 59. Schlumpf, Heidi. 2019. “Conservatives Still Rule the US Bishops’ Conference.” National Catholic Reporter, June 3. 60. O’Loughlin, Michael. 2021. “The Bishops were Divided on how to Approach Joe Biden. This Is Not the First Time a Dispute Goes Public.” America Magazine, February 16. 61. Ibid. 62. Lawler, Philip. 2019. “Pope Francis and the American Bishops.” First Things, November 19. 63. “Why the Catholic Bishops Were Wrong to Cozy Up to Trump.” 2020. Millenial Journal, April 29. 64. Reese, Thomas. 2019. “Abortion Preeminent Issue, Global Warming Not Urgent, Say Bishops.” National Catholic Reporter, November 14. 65. Schlump, Heidi. 2019. “Bishops’ Meeting Reveal Divisions over How to Influence the Political Debate.” National Catholic Reporter, November 15. 66. Reese, Abortion Preeminent Issue, op. cit. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid. 69. Winters, Michael Sean. 2019. “US Bishops Are Not Really Interested in Forming Consciences.” National Catholic Reporter, November 18; “Joe Biden, the Pope, and the Looming Schism in America’s Catholic Church.” 2021. Deutsche Welle, April 24. 70. Huelskamp, Tim. 2020. twitter, September 4, https://twitter. com/CongHuelskamp/status/1301668891257704450. 71. Pope Francis. 2018. Gaudete et Exulate. 72. Schlump, Heidi. 2019. “Bishops’ Meeting…,” op. cit. 73. Ibid. 74. Reese, Thomas. 2019. “Catholic Bishops Reprimand Trump as Often as They Praise Him.” National Catholic Reporter, August 4. 75. Editorial. 2021. “It’s Time for the Vatican to Investigate the Bishops’ Conference.” National Catholic Reporter, January 28. 76. White, Christopher. 2020. “Trump Says He’s ‘Best President in the History of the Church’ in Call with Catholic Leaders.” Crux Now, April 26.

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77. White, Christopher. 2020. “In Call with Religious Leaders on Reopening Churches, Trump Sought Election Support.” Crux Now, April 21. 78. White, Christopher. 2020. “Trump Says He’s ‘Best President’ in History of Church History in Call with Catholic Leaders.” Crux Now, April 26. 79. Ibid. 80. White, Christopher. 2020. “Cardinal Dolan Defends Himself after Letter Criticizing Him for Trump Call.” Crux Now, May 1. 81. Hadro, Matt. 2020. “Religious Freedom Is «foremost» in Unalienable Rights, US Commission Reports.” Catholic News Agency, July 16. 82. Warren Davis, Michael. 2020. “The USCCB Just Showed Its Hand.” Crisis Magazine, November 18. 83. Warren Davis, Michael. 2020. “How to Red-Pill the Bishops.” Crisis Magazine, November 16. 84. Joyce, Kathrin. 2020. “Deep Church and Deep State. How Qanon and Trumpism have infected the Catholic Church.” Vanity Fair, October 30; Bürger, Martin. 2020. “Pro-gay Catholic Bishop: Trump Is so Much Anti-life.” LifeSite News, August 10. 85. Gjelten, Tom. 2020. “Trump Seeks Catholic Voters but Some Catholics Push Back.” NPR; May 5. 86. “The Trump Campaign Makes Its Pitch to Catholic Voters.” 2020. The Economist, April 25. 87. Warren Davis, Michael. 2020. “Go or the mob?” Crisis Magazine, June 4. 88. Joyce, op. cit. 89. Condon, Ed. 2020. “Why White House Catholics Are Concerned about Trump’s Catholic Tweets.” Catholic News Agency, July 9. 90. Ibid. 91. Senèze, Nicolas. 2019. Comment l’Amérique veut changer de pape. Paris: Bayard. 92. Westen, John Henry. 2008. “Biden’s Bishop Will Not Permit Him Even if Elected VP to Speak at Catholic Schools.” LifeSite News, August 26. 93. Harris, Elise. 2019. “No Stranger to the Vatican, Biden Has a Rocky Past with the Church.” Crux Now, April 27; “Biden

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Touts Catholic Faith as Campaign Falters.” 2020. Catholic News Agency, February 19. 94. Westen, op. cit. 95. Waggoner, Tim. 2008. “Fourteen Bishops and Counting Correct Senator Biden.” Lifesite News, September 15. 96. Harris, op. cit. 97. Ibid. 98. Lisi, Clemente. “Examining the Role of the Catholic Bishops in the 2020 Presidential Race.” Religion Unplugged, May 12. 99. Robertson, Charles. 2020. “US Bishop: Voting for Biden Requires Reason That Outweighs 860,000 Abortions.” Lifesite News, October 16. 100. Robertson, Charles. 2020. “List of Cardinals, Bishops, Priests Who Are Warning Catholics about Pro-abortion Biden Harris Ticket.” LifeSite News. 101. Faggioli, Massimo. 2021. “US Catholic Group Giving Biden a Surprisingly Frosty Reception.” Los Angeles Times, February, 3. 102. Fichter, Stephen et al. 2019. Catholic Bishops in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 40–42. 103. Joyce, op. cit. 104. Sitka, Rick. 2020. twitter, September 1, https://twitter.com/Bis hopStika/status/1300775377330151424. 105. Tobin, Thomas. 2020. twitter, August 11, https://twitter.com/ thomasjtobin1/status/1293302808901562370. 106. Harris, op. cit. 107. Catholics for Biden, https://joebiden.com/catholic/. 108. Hadro, Matt. 2020. “Catholics for Biden Claims Democratic Candidate Shares Pope’s Priorities.” Catholic News Agency, September 4. 109. “Cardinal Tobin Says Biden Remarks Not Endorsement of Biden.” 2020. Catholic News Agency, September 13. 110. White Christopher. 2020. “US Bishops Issue Warming to President-Elect Joe Biden on Abortion.” National Catholic Reporter, November 17. 111. Bennett, Brian. 2021. “Joe Biden’s Presidency Has Highlighted the Rifts in the American Catholic Church.” Time, March 31. 112. Ibid. 113. Weigel, George. 2021. “Archbishop Gomez, a Profile in Episcopal Courage.” First Things, January 21; Asher, Julie. 2021.

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“US Bishops Working Group Set Up Last November Completes Work.” Crux Now, March 2. 114. Weigel, op. cit. 115. USCC President Statement on the Inauguration of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., as 46th President of the United States. 2021. USCCB, January 20. 116. White, Christopher. 2021. “Dueling Statements from Bishops, Pope, on Inauguration Day.” National Catholic Reporter, January 21, 2021. 117. O’Loughlin, Michael. 2021. “The Bishops Were Divided…” op. cit. 118. Bennett, op. cit. 119. Allen, John. 2021. “Mixed Messages on Biden Reveal Not Just Competing Camps, but Divided Hearts”. Crux Now, January 22. 120. “Vatican Intervened to Spike US Bishops’ Biden statement release.” 2021. The Pillar, January 20. 121. Ibid. O’Connell, Gerald. 2021. “Pope Francis Sends Greetings to President Biden, Contrasting with Sharper Message from Head of US Bishops.” America Magazine, January 20. 122. Weigel, op. cit. 123. The Pillar, op. cit. 124. O’Connell, op. cit. 125. Ibid. 126. The Pillar, op. cit. 127. Hohman, Maura. 2021. “America’s First Black Cardinal, Wilton Gregory, Opens Up about Experience with Racism.” Today/NBC, February 15. 128. Jenkins, Jack. 2020. “DC’s Wilton Gregory, first AfricanAmerican Cardinal, on Joe Biden, race, and Covid 19.” Religion News, December 11. 129. Condon, Ed. 2020. “Will Gregory’s ‘Dialogue’ with Biden undermine USCCB.” Catholic News Agency, November 25. 130. White, Christopher. 2021. “Bishops’ Working Group on Biden Works in the Shadows, Excludes His Local Bishops.” National Catholic Reporter, January 29.

CHAPTER 6

The Holy See and the Catholic Community in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections Gerald P. Fogarty

The relation between religion, particularly Catholicism, and politics in the United States has always been something of an enigma to outsiders. First of all, unlike in Europe and Latin America, there has never been a union of the Catholic Church and the state. Most British colonies in North America had an established church, but the English Catholics who founded Maryland practiced religious liberty from the beginning in 1634. They had a very practical approach to keeping Church and State separate by having the English Jesuits who served the colony come as settlers and take up property on the same basis as other settlers, Catholic or not. This practice enabled Catholics to continue practicing their religion, even when the Church of England was later established and they were disenfranchised, but were allowed to have Mass in private homes. After American independence, however, prejudice against Catholicism continued, exacerbated by the influx of immigrants, initially from Ireland

G. P. Fogarty (B) University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Gayte et al. (eds.), Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82212-5_6

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and Germany, and, later, from Italy and Poland. There was even at one point in the 1850s an anti-Catholic party, the Native American Party, more popularly known as “The Know Nothings.” The Virginia branch claimed it had nothing against any religious beliefs but only against any religion that followed a leader from abroad. Loyalty to the pope would actually be a recurring theme against Catholics. To give a broad overview of the role of Catholicism in American politics, this paper will address: first, the role of the Holy See in American life; second, the change in class and status of American Catholics; and, finally, the changing attitudes of Catholics toward Church authority.

The Holy See and the United States In 1797, after American independence, the new government did establish consular relations with the Papal State. In 1846, under the false perception that Pius IX was moving in a liberal direction, the nation established diplomatic relations and appointed a minister to the Papal States—the United States had no ambassadors anywhere until the 1890s. In 1867, the Congress of the United States, during the period of Reconstruction after the Civil War, cut off funding for the mission beginning in the fiscal year 1868. The basis for the bill was that Pius IX had addressed Jefferson Davis, the president of the Confederate States, as “Mr. President,” and thus recognized the legitimacy of the seceded states. Technically, however, diplomatic relations remained unbroken, but unfunded. This was the situation until 1984. There were, however, some unofficial contacts. President Woodrow Wilson was no friend to Catholics or “hyphenated Americans,” but he did at least respectfully respond to a letter from Benedict XV. As he was on the way to Versailles, moreover, he was persuaded that he should pay a courtesy call on the Pope. This first audience of a sitting president with a pope occurred on January 4, 1919, but it did not signal any continuing contact. There were, however, hints of a change in the 1930s. During his campaign for president in 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt cited Pius XI’s encyclical Quadragesimo Anno in which the pontiff condemned the accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of the few. Roosevelt used the reference to argue that if he was “radical,” as his opponents charged, so was the pope. He was, of course, also appealing to Catholic citizens, so many of whom belonged to his Democratic Party. A few months after his inauguration in March 1933, he received the new apostolic delegate,

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Archbishop Amleto Cicognani, in his office. He remarked, as the archbishop reported to Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, the secretary of state, that he hoped soon to address him as “ambassador.”2 Again, this may have been a sop to the Vatican, although he did discuss formal relations with Pacelli who visited the United States in October and early November 1936. Pacelli came to the United States, nominally as the houseguest of Genevieve Garvan Brady, a papal duchess and widow of Nicholas, CEO of the Chrysler Corporation. His arrival in October occurred in the midst of Roosevelt’s campaign for a second term and of Father Charles Coughlin’s strident radio broadcasts against him. But immediately the Cardinal’s tour was taken over by Bishop Francis J. Spellman, auxiliary bishop of Boston, who had formerly worked in the Vatican Secretariat of State. Pacelli carefully removed himself from any discussion of the presidential campaign and of Coughlin. Some prominent bishops chartered a plane to fly the cardinal out to the west coast with stops along the way to show him the strength and influence of the Catholics in the United States. At the end of the cardinal’s journey, Roosevelt had won his second term in office. Pacelli had wanted to have a personal visit with whoever won the election. Cicognani was working with the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the bishops’ conference at that time, to arrange a meeting with Roosevelt. All was almost set when the delegate received a phone call from the cardinal that Spellman had arranged a private meeting through Joseph P. Kennedy. On November 5, 1936, the meeting between the cardinal and president took place at the home of Roosevelt’s mother at Hyde Park, NY, not an official government venue. Present, besides Pacelli and Roosevelt, were Spellman and Kennedy. No one took notes and the press was barred. From Spellman’s diary, however, it is clear that some form of diplomatic relations was discussed.3 Any form of diplomatic relations, however, would have to wait. In the meantime, Europe was moving toward war. In February 1939, Pius XI died. While Secretary of State Cordell Hull expressed his nation’s condolences at the loss of a leader working for peace, the United States sent no representatives to the funeral. Much different was the coronation of Pius XII. Elected on the first day of balloting, Pacelli was the first pope ever to have known the US president. Roosevelt showered his grace upon the occasion by appointing, for the first time, an American representative for the ceremony inaugurating a new pontificate. He designated Joseph P. Kennedy, then the ambassador to Great Britain, to represent the nation at the coronation. At the ceremony on March 12, however, Kennedy created

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a diplomatic crisis. Usually, only the spouse would accompany the representative to such an event, but Kennedy brought not only his wife but his entire family, except for his oldest son, Joseph, Jr., who was traveling elsewhere in Europe. The party of ten made it necessary to rearrange the seating. The result was that when Count Ciano, Mussolini’s son-in-law and Italian foreign minister, arrived to take his place as Italy’s representative to the ceremony, he found a young Kennedy in his seat. Giovanni Battista Montini, later Paul VI, recalled that Ciano loudly protested and threatened to leave St. Peter’s. Two days later, incidentally, Pius XII said Mass for the Kennedy family and gave Teddy his First Communion.4 The election of Pius XII had repercussions in the American Church. Roosevelt’s favorite among the bishops was Cardinal George Mundelein, Archbishop of Chicago. Of German ancestry, Mundelein told his clergy in May 1937, that he was embarrassed that the German people had accepted “an Austrian paper-hanger” as their leader. The term “paperhanger” was used for a person who claimed to be an artist, but who simply reproduced common scenes—Hitler had been refused admission to the Viennese academy of art. Despite protests from the German government, the Vatican stood by the cardinal’s right to freedom of speech in his own diocese. Pius XI further showed his respect for the cardinal by naming him the delegate to preside over the Eucharistic Congress held in New Orleans in the fall of 1938 and, shortly later, had him preside in Rome over the beatification of Frances Cabrini, foundress of the Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart, who worked in Chicago and died there. The cardinal obviously enjoyed the pope’s favor, but this trip to Rome was also the occasion for him to receive a public display of Roosevelt’s favor. The president ordered the flagship of the Mediterranean fleet to dock in Naples to meet the ship conveying the cardinal. At the same time, the United States Ambassador to Italy went to Naples personally to escort Mundelein to a dinner aboard the navy ship and then accompany him by train to turn him over to his Vatican escort.5 A year later, Mundelein died suddenly at his home at the seminary he had established outside Chicago. Roosevelt would now have to look for a new favorite among the bishops. The Archdiocese of New York had been vacant since the death of Cardinal Patrick Hayes in September 1938. In April 1939, Francis Spellman was named to succeed him. To some, the appointment was a surprise, but not to those who realized that he had worked in the Vatican Secretariat of State for seven years before becoming auxiliary bishop of

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Boston in 1932. Although Roosevelt had discussed Vatican relations at some length with Mundelein, he would now have to deal with Spellman. The State Department was in favor of diplomatic relations with the Vatican on the pragmatic grounds of having as many listening posts in Europe as possible as the world moved closer to war. But Roosevelt still had to be cautious about the opposition of the American people. In October, he met Spellman at the White House and discussed sending some kind of “special mission” to the Holy See. Such an arrangement would not require congressional approval of funding. With the Vatican’s agreement, Roosevelt announced on December 24, 1939, that he was sending a “Personal Representative” to the pope and had chosen Myron C. Taylor for the post. Taylor was the former chairman of US Steel and an Episcopalian. He owned a villa in Florence, from which he could travel to Rome from time to time to consult the pope. Despite Roosevelt’s cautious approach to contact with the Vatican, there were public protests against his action, for, although he had sent letters to the American leaders of the Jewish and Protestant communities, he had sent an emissary only to the pope. Although Taylor had no official diplomatic status, the State Department assigned a professional Foreign Service officer, Harold H. Tittmann, as his assistant. When the United States entered the war in December 1941, Tittmann, with Roosevelt’s approval, received the title of charge d’affaires. This enabled him to move into Vatican City with other Allied diplomats. From there, he kept up regular correspondence with the State Department through a circuitous and often time-consuming route through the American legation in Bern. This arrangement lasted until June 4, 1944, when the Allies entered the city. Tittmann was given another diplomatic post and his two successors were designated simply as “assistants” to the “personal representative.” Taylor remained in office, but alienated Vatican officials by visiting other religious leaders, implying that the pope was only one among them. Early in 1951, he submitted his resignation to President Harry S. Truman. The State Department then shut down the Rome office without notifying the Vatican. Spellmann was named a cardinal in 1946 at Pius XII’s first consistory, then attempted to mobilize support for establishing full diplomatic relations with the Holy See. Among those whose assistance he enlisted was Joseph Kennedy, who forwarded to the cardinal a letter he had received from Truman. To the best of my knowledge, the president here made the only allusion to the legislation of 1867. As he wrote Kennedy, the State

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Department was then studying the question, “because of certain legislation which followed the discontinuance of or representation to the old Papal States, it may be necessary to seek authority from the Congress.”6 In October 1951, Truman submitted to the Senate for confirmation as the first “Ambassador to Vatican City” the name of General Mark Clark, commander of the Allied forces in Italy. Immediately, there was an outcry from a vast spectrum of Protestant leaders and some Jewish ones arguing that such an appointment was a violation of the American separation of Church and State and illustrated the political designs of the Catholic Church. Opposition within the Senate came from another source. As commander of the Allied forces invading Italy in 1944, Clark had been responsible for the massive losses of the 36th Texas Infantry Division in the Battle of the Rapido River. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was Senator Thomas Connolly, who, with his fellow Texans, blamed Clark for the slaughter. Clark had no chance of having his name confirmed. He withdrew his name in January 1951, and Truman made no effort to nominate anyone else. For more than 30 years, there was no further discussion of diplomatic relations with the Vatican. But the controversy surrounding the Clark nomination provided the context for John Kennedy having to address the question when he ran for president. In both a magazine interview and an address to a group of Protestant ministers, he stated his opposition to diplomatic relations on the grounds that the controversy surrounding the confirmation hearings of an ambassador would undermine any effectiveness the appointee would have. He also stated that, if there were ever any conflict between his “conscience” and his office, he would resign. Under questioning by one of the ministers during his campaign, he made it clear that he was speaking of his “conscience,” not his “Church.” This may have been an adequate answer for “political” questions, such as diplomatic relations, about which even some bishops disagreed. But Kennedy’s answer set a tone for subsequent Catholic candidates for office who applied it to “moral” questions like abortion. I will return to this in the second part of my presentation. Although there were no official contacts between the United States and the Vatican, there were unofficial ones or signs of respect. After the death of Pius XII, there were nine Masses on consecutive days. On the one after which the pope’s body was interred, James Zellerbach, United States Ambassador to Italy, was invited to sit with diplomats accredited to the Holy See. At the final Mass on October 19, Secretary of State John Foster

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Dulles was injured on the flight from Washington and could not attend the ceremony, but President Eisenhower’s other two representatives, John McCone, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Claire Booth Luce, former United States Ambassador to Italy, were both in attendance. At the coronation of John XXIII, on November 5, the United States was represented by James P. Mitchell, a Catholic and Secretary of Labor, Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, and Mrs. Luce. The climate surrounding American participation in such ceremonies of respect had now changed. At each subsequent funeral of a pope and installation of his successor, the United States was represented. Visits to popes by American dignitaries were also becoming routine, made more possible by air travel. In 1962, Vice President Lyndon Johnson visited John XXIII as did Jacqueline Kennedy, the president’s wife. These visits were partly to test the political waters. A visit was planned for Kennedy in the summer of 1963, but the pope died before it took place. In July 1963, however, a few days after the election of Paul VI, the president did visit him. The American public now accepted such visits but was still leery over certain aspects. Kennedy stewed over what the reaction would be to his greeting the pope as Catholics like his wife customarily did—by genuflecting before the pontiff and then kissing his ring. Paul VI solved the dilemma by extending his hand for a heartfelt handshake. The pope praised Kennedy’s work for racial equality, and the president applauded Paul’s promotion of peace.7 On October 4, 1965, Paul VI became the first pope to visit the United States when he came to New York to address the United Nations in a speech pleading for peace. President Lyndon Johnson, who succeeded Kennedy who was assassinated in November 1963, wished to meet the visiting pontiff. But there remained a protocol problem of how the president could meet the pope on American soil when there were still no diplomatic relations. The solution was found by Johnson coming to New York the night before the pope addressed the UN, having dinner with Arthur Goldberg, US Ambassador to the UN, and then meeting the pope there for over 40 minutes.8 The Vietnam War created the situation where there were closer contacts between the Holy See and the US. Johnson paid an impromptu visit to Paul VI just before Christmas in 1967 when he was returning from a whirlwind tour of Southeast Asia and a visit to American troops in Vietnam. This created a new protocol problem, since the president’s plane would have to land on Italian soil, so a visit to the president of the

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Republic of Italy was obligatory. From the meeting with Italian government officials, John then flew by helicopter to the Vatican and a meeting of more than an hour with the pope. He discussed the possibility of the pope intervening with the North Vietnamese about the treatment of American prisoners,9 but also on his agenda was to persuade the pope not to condemn American policy in his New Year’s address. In March 1968, Johnson shocked his nation torn apart by the Vietnam War by announcing that he would not run for another term, so that the office of the presidency would not be diminished by partisan politics. At the same time, he enlisted Vatican diplomatic channels to arrange the Paris talks that ultimately ended the war.10 Vietnam provided the context for the next American initiative toward closer diplomatic ties with the Holy See. In February 1970, President Richard M. Nixon was in Rome to visit Italian leaders. He then announced he would like to see Paul VI, only to be told that the pope was on retreat. Nixon had to visit other European leaders and then return to Rome on March 2, 1970, to meet the pope. Rumors circulated that the president was about to establish some type of formal relations with the Holy See, a position that mainline Protestant groups still opposed. While the White House denied these rumors, on July 4, 1970, Nixon reinstituted the office of personal representative to the pope, created by Roosevelt. He appointed to the office Henry Cabot Lodge, his former running mate against Kennedy and Johnson in 1960, and ambassador to South Vietnam.11 The protests against this appointment were mainly pro forma. The selection of Lodge, a former ambassador to South Vietnam is indicative that the United States still feared that the pope might publicly oppose American policy in Vietnam. In September 1970, Nixon paid another visit to the pope and met for over an hour to discuss increased efforts for peace, not only in Vietnam but in the Middle East.12 With Vietnam as the primary backdrop, both Super Powers sought the support of the Holy See. In November, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, had an 80-minute audience with the pope, the exact same length as Nixon’s audience. But the conservative Italian paper Il Tempo chided the pope for showing more warmth to Gromyko than the “chilly” reception he gave to Nixon in September. It was in fact, Gromyko’s second visit to the pope.13 The position of the Holy See in world affairs had obviously changed dramatically over the previous three decades. Gradually the United States would accord it greater recognition.

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Presidents Gerald Ford, who succeeded to the White House after Nixon resigned, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan continued the office of personal representative to the pope. Carter even hosted Pope John Paul II at the White House in the fall of 1979, when the pope offered Mass on the National Mall—Popes Benedict and Francis also visited Washington, but chose other venues for Mass. What brought about the establishment of diplomatic relations was probably more a domestic issue that had international repercussions. By the 1980s, more than a decade after Vatican II, the American bishops then in office had, for the most part, not participated in the council, but had been influenced by it. At their annual meeting in 1980, they appointed committees to draft pastoral letters on “The Challenge of Peace,” chaired by Cardinal Joseph Bernardin of Chicago and issued in 1983, and “Economic Justice for All,” chaired by Archbishop Rembert Weakland, O.S.B., of Milwaukee, published in 1986. The process for these pastorals was analogous to that of a council with public hearings held on the various drafts before the final version, approved by the majority of bishops, was promulgated. Such activism on the part of the American bishops in regard to atomic weapons and the arms race in general alarmed President Reagan. By the late fall of 1982, the bishops were completing their pastoral in which they challenged the first use of nuclear weapons and were developing their position that deterrence was tolerable only if it led to negotiations for disarmament. In October, General Vernon Walters, ambassador-at-large, visited John Paul II, at Reagan’s request. Journalists reported that he was trying to have the pope squelch the American bishops’ “nuclear heresy.” They reported that the pope made a positive response to Reagan’s emissary, when he summoned Cardinal Bernardin to Rome to discuss the pastoral that his committee was developing.14 Closer ties between the United States government and the Holy See seemed to be a viable option to episcopal activism. But there were other motivations for establishing diplomatic relations. In June 1981, Representative Clement Zablocki of Wisconsin and William Wilson, Reagan’s personal representative to the pope represented the president at the funeral of Cardinal Wyszinski of Warsaw. Later, at a Mass in St. Peter’s in Rome, Zablocki was chagrined that Wilson was not seated with other ambassadors. Zablocki’s Catholic piety and patriotism was insulted by this slight to his government. As chairman of the

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House Foreign Affairs Committee, on June 30, 1983, Zablocki introduced an amendment to the Department of State’s appropriation bill, with the support of the majority of his committee. He called for the repeal of the legislation of 1867 cutting off funding to the mission to the Papal State—the legislation to which Truman had alluded to in 1951— and the restoration of “diplomatic relations with the Vatican,” because “the United States is virtually alone in not having full and formal diplomatic relations with the Holy See.” Even some Communist nations, he continued, had formal relations.16 In the meantime, President Reagan informed Protestant evangelicals, who opposed such recognition, that he himself desired diplomatic relations.17 While the administration was controlling possible opposition to the ties with the Vatican, the House of Representatives adopted Zablocki’s amendment by a voice vote. The Senate soon passed the amended bill for fiscal year 1984. The secular press, such as the New York Times and Washington Post took no notice of this action, but, on September 24, 1983, it was reported in the International Herald-Tribune, then owned by the New York Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times. The House and Senate versions of the bill passed on November 1, 1983. While the bill was awaiting Reagan’s signature, the secular press also ignored the visit to the While House on November 22 of Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, the papal Secretary of State. By December, the journalists were starting to take notice of these diplomatic maneuvers. On January 10, 1984, the Holy See announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States. The United States did the same six hours later and Reagan made the formal nomination of Wilson to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The usual procedure had been for the nation to announce the establishment of diplomatic relations and then the Holy See would consider its response. In this case, Secretary of State George Shultz had twice delayed the nomination of Wilson as ambassador, much to the annoyance of Archbishop Pio Laghi, the apostolic delegate. The Vatican took no chances on a further postponement after almost 50 years of negotiation. In the meantime, the pastoral on the economy was published in 1986. This time, however, there was a counter-pastoral from a group of prominent lay people, who drafted their document over a short period. It challenged the bishops’ right to teach on such matters including the right of the government to intervene to guarantee a more equitable distribution of wealth. The pastoral on peace was a new development for the

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bishops and stemmed from the teaching of Vatican II. The document on the economy reflected a tradition, as will be seen, that began among the bishops in the 1880s. A third pastoral, incidentally, had been planned for 1989, but was never finished—its topic was the role of women. The pastoral on the economy, moreover, was the last one issued by the American hierarchy, although there had been ten national pastoral letters in the nineteenth century and an annual one from 1919 to the 1960s. Part of what contributed to the end of this practice was the 1998 motu proprio, Apostolos Suos , that forbade conferences to issue pastoral letters unless they received the unanimous consent of the bishops or the prior approval of the Holy See, analogous to the legislation of a local council. But the people to whom the bishops expressed their concerns were in a state of flux.

The Changing Status of American Catholics At the time of American independence, Catholics comprised roughly two per cent of the American population, centered principally in Maryland. By 1850, they were the single largest religious body in the nation, due principally to immigration. At present, they number approximately 70 million or roughly 23% of the country. Again, this number results from earlier immigrants and their descendants, with contemporary immigration continuing, especially from Latin America. The rapid increase in the Catholic population due to immigration created an intensification of anti-Catholicism. Catholics were not only foreign in their countries of origin but in their allegiance to a religious leader in Rome. For the most part, they were poor and virtually drove out the existing Protestant populations from their neighborhoods in cities in the northeast part of the nation—it was not uncommon for a Catholic parish to take over an abandoned Protestant church. What attracted immigrants in the nineteenth century was the industrialization of the new world. This meant the American Church had to adapt to dealing with the laboring class and educate its children. In response, the church created a vast educational apostolate, ranging from parochial schools to universities. In 1884, under pressure from the Holy See, the bishops at the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, the last legislative assembly of the American hierarchy, passed a decree that every quasi-canonical parish should have a parochial school within two years of the council. But the American Church also invested in secondary and university education.

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After the mid-nineteenth century, the system was designed to protect the children of immigrants from the hostile environment of public education, for “public” in the nineteenth century meant Protestant and that meant anti-Catholic. Yet, it should be noted that even in the present age, the American Church has over 200 institutions of higher education or universities. These institutions, as will be seen, enabled immigrants to be assimilated to American culture and, by the end of World War II, enter the middle-class. But there was another, equally important movement that kept the American Catholic working class in the Church and led to the development of Catholic social thought. The emergence of labor unions in the United States was controversial because most of them imitated Masonic structures and used the “strike” as an ordinary tool of protest. One of the first labor unions in the United States was the Knights of Labor, originally founded in 1869. By the 1880s, its membership was heavily Catholic as was its leadership. Thomas Powderly, a Catholic, was the Grand Master Worker, the head of the union, and the Mayor of Scranton, PA. The Third Plenary Council passed legislation that, if a “secret society” was held suspect of falling under the universal condemnation of Free Masonry, the case should be submitted to the full body of archbishops. If they failed to reach a unanimous vote for toleration, however, the case then had to be sent to Rome. In the fall of 1886, the archbishops examined the case of the Knights of Labor, but failed to gain unanimous approval for the organization. The case of the labor union, however, became enmeshed with that of Henry George, a semi-socialist thinker in New York City, who developed a theory that a single tax on the unearned increase in the value of land would solve the problem of poverty. This had great appeal both to the Irish Land League and to some Catholic supporters of reform. In 1886, George ran for mayor of New York, where he had the support of a prominent priest, Edward McGlynn, and the Knights of Labor. The Archbishop of New York, Michael A. Corrigan, then requested that the Holy See condemn the writings of George. In the spring of 1887, Archbishop James Gibbons, who had presided over the plenary council, went to Rome to receive the red hat as the nation’s second cardinal. He took with him two papers, one defending the Knights of Labor and the other recommending that, instead of a condemnation of Henry George, the pope should issue an encyclical on the mutual rights of capital and labor. This led to Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum in 1891. The language of the

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document, of course, was not American, but Thomistic, but the American impetus in obtaining the encyclical illustrated the American Church’s support for the labor movement.18 The American Church’s support of labor rights continued for several more generations. John A. Ryan, professor of economics at the Catholic University of America continued the work, first through his pamphlet, A Program for Social Reconstruction, adopted by the National Catholic War Council, at the end of World War I. It called for a number of progressive issues, such as a graded income tax and competition of the government with the private sector in utilities and commodities. After the war, he became the director of the Social Action Department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, a national conference of the American bishops, established in 1919. This progressive social thought not only continued the marriage of the working class with the Church but also caused negative reaction from the business class and some bishops. Still, Catholics were regarded with suspicion. In 1928, Al Smith, four-time governor of New York, was the Democratic and first Catholic nominee for president. Yet, he lost his own state of New York, but carried the Deep South, Catholics were convinced they would always be second-class citizens. But, for the most part they were solidly in the Democratic ranks. The Great Depression solidified the alliance with workers, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt appealed to this with his citation from Quadragessimo Anno, during his campaign for president in 1932. His “New Deal” further increased the relationship between the Democratic Party and American Catholics. Within a decade, they would again prove they were American by fighting in World War II, whether they were of Irish, German, or Italian ancestry. There were few Catholics of any ethnic origin who would be “conscious objectors.” This expression of patriotism had mixed results for the future of the American Church. The GI Bill of Rights guaranteed that the government would pay the tuition of every veteran to receive a university education. What this meant on the practical level was that a whole generation of Catholics were catapulted from the urban working class to the suburban middle-class. The bill affected both men and women, because, although most veterans were young men, the bill allowed families also to free up money to send their daughters to universities. By the 1950s, the American Church was changing from urban to suburban. The urban parish was characterized by a large church and parochial school to which most of the parishioners walked on Sundays—it was a neighborhood. The suburban parish

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was characterized by a large parking lot to which families drove every Sunday with little knowledge of the beliefs of their neighbors. It was the beginning of the privatization of religion, much more of an expression of Protestantism than of the ethnically supported public display of urban Catholicism. One of the best examples of this transformation was the response to the encyclical Mater et Magistra (1961), which took account of changes since the war and called for the obligations of richer nations toward poorer ones. The response of a group of well-educated middle-class Catholics was “Mater si, Magistra no.” Dissent from papal encyclicals became a hallmark of the post-conciliar Church in the United States and elsewhere. Although the protests against Humanae Vitae in 1968 gained greater publicity, the one against Mater et Magistra was significant because that encyclical reflected a tradition of the universal Church that had its beginning in the United States. American Catholics had undergone a significant change in regard to their political affiliation and were no longer solidly in the Democratic camp for reasons to be seen. They also altered their stance toward Church authority.

Changing Attitudes of American Catholics Toward Church Authority In many ways, the election of Kennedy and Vatican II initially brought a sense of achievement to American Catholics. With a Catholic president, they were no longer second-class citizens. Because of the ecumenical outreach of the council, they could take a more active role in shaping American society. But that euphoria was short-lived. There were, first, political changes. Catholics were prominent either in seeking the presidency or in being nominated for vice president in the campaigns of 1964, 1968, and 1972. In 1973, however, the Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade that abortion was legal. On other issues, Catholics were already shifting to the Republican Party, a shift that became more dramatic when the Republicans put an anti-abortion plank in their party platform, as the Democrats put a “pro-choice” platform in theirs. In 1984, the Democrats nominated Walter Mondale, former vice president under Jimmy Carter, as their presidential candidate. He chose as his running mate Geraldine Ferraro, a Catholic member of the House of Representatives. At the time of her nomination, she stated in a press conference in regard to her Catholic faith that, if there were a conflict between her conscience and

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her office, she would resign her office. In other words, she gave the same answer Kennedy had given in 1960, but now the question was a moral one and not merely a political one. During her televised debate with George H. W. Bush, the Republican vice-presidential candidate, she altered her answer to say that, if there was a conflict between her religion and her office, she would resign her office.19 Reagan and Bush won the 1984 election, and there was strong opposition to the Mondale-Ferraro ticket from prominent members of the hierarchy, such as Archbishops John O’Connor of New York and Bernard Law of Boston. But there were also strong voices urging Catholics not to become single issue, such as Cardinal Joseph Bernardin of Chicago. In a speech at Fordham University in 1983 and, in a later version, at St. Louis University in March 1984, he called for a “consistent ethnic of life,” a position tying together the nuclear arms race, care for the poor, as well as abortion.20 Other bishops held similar views to Bernardin. Archbishop W. Donald Borders of Baltimore wrote to his people that many times Catholics might agree on some issues with those who favored abortion. He recommended dialogue on those areas of agreement in terms of the political agenda and perhaps win them to see the Catholic position.21 As the 2004 presidential campaign began, the bishops held their annual meeting in Denver. Cardinal Theodore McCarrick of Washington reported consultation with then-Cardinal Josef Ratzinger who wrote him about Catholics voting for a pro-abortion candidate. In McCarrick’s summary of Ratzinger’s position, he stated: “when a Catholic does not share in a candidate’s stand in favor or abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be permitted if there are proportionate reasons.”22 In regard to pro-choice candidates for office, however, a small minority of bishops said they would refuse communion to pro-choice candidates. The situation came to the fore when John Kerry, a pro-choice senator, became the first Catholic since Kennedy to be the presidential nominee of a major party.23 The bishops, however, carefully avoided endorsing George W. Bush, but just addressed the issue of abortion.24 In the 2012 campaign, moreover, both parties were conscious of trying to woo the Catholic vote and invited Cardinal Timothy Dolan of New York to offer a prayer at their respective conventions. Since 2012, the bishops have officially supported a campaign, expressed in their conference statement “Our First, Most Cherished

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Liberty,” to argue that even the provision in President Obama’s healthcare plan that Catholic organizations can opt out of providing birth control or abortion is a violation of religious liberty, for it meant that the process of “opting out” of paying for birth control or abortion still meant they were allowing other agencies to pay for the procedures. In other words, they are still trying to repeal the legalization of abortion. Some scholars, Catholics, and others, saw the danger of imposing Catholic teaching on others. Commonweal magazine, a Catholic lay-edited journal, presented a series of articles by a wide range of authors on this question in June 2012.25 The controversy is indicative that perhaps both parties should remove the issue from their official platforms and thus enable a pro-choice Republican or pro-life Democrat to discuss other issues. As the United States entered another election campaign in 2016, a new situation emerged. Abortion was hardly mentioned as an issue. For one thing, even when Republicans controlled the three branches of government, abortion remained legal. Other issues surfaced in what was shaping up to be one of the most contentious elections in American history. But abortion aside, there were other issues that made conservative Catholics see the Republican Party as the guardian of Catholic values, until Donald Trump began to emerge as the party’s prime contender. In March 2016, two prominent conservative Catholics, Robert George, professor at Princeton University, and George Weigel, director of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, wrote in the conservative journal, National Review, that Trump was “unfit” to be president. Trump further seemed to have alienated Catholics by his attacks on immigrants. As noted above, Catholics were once regarded as unwelcome in this country. Condemning immigrants was condemning the ancestors of most American Catholics.26 In the meantime, Catholics continue to be candidates for high office in both parties. Joseph Biden has been Obama’s vice president since 2008. Hilary Clinton has chosen Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia, a practicing Catholic, as her running mate. Trump chose Governor Mike Pence of Indiana, who was raised a Catholic, but had become an evangelical Protestant. In the past, being a former Catholic would have been a liability. But there are other significant changes among Catholics. On his way back from his visit to Mexico in February of 2016, Pope Francis was asked about Trump’s proposal to build a wall between the United States and Mexico. He replied that “a person who thinks only of building walls

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… and not building bridges is not Christian.” He was careful not to accuse Trump of actually saying he wanted to build a wall, even though it was true.27 Trump, in turn, thought it was “disgraceful” for a religious leader to challenge the religion of someone else.28 But some Catholics accused the pope of entering politics.29 Mentioned above were the occasions when Catholics dissented publicly from social teaching. But there is another dimension to this. Some Catholics have adopted the concept of “Church” of American Protestants, for whom the church is strictly spiritual and religion is private. This conflicts with the Catholic belief that the Church is the Mystical Body of Christ, visibly inserted in human affairs. Another factor of this problem is a movement among some Catholics that popes should restrict their proclamations to religious topics, which cannot extend to issues like climate change. In short, their recent assimilation into American society has meant the acceptance of individualism. There is great irony in this new development. As some Catholics now criticize Francis for being too political, others condemn Pius XII for not being political enough and for not more openly condemning Hitler. The Election of 2016 In preparing my text for publication, I realized that, like many commentators and pollsters, in 2016 I had presumed, wrongly, that Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton would win the presidency. Nevertheless, I do not deny some of the insights I had before the election. First of all, an explanation is owed to international readers of how Clinton could receive almost three million votes more than Trump and lose the election. This is due to the peculiarity of the United States Constitution and its provision that the president be elected, not by direct votes, but by states, hence keeping the balance between the central government and the individual states that comprise it. According to this system, each state has as many electors as it has total representatives in Congress—the total number in the House of Representatives plus two senators. States with smaller populations, therefore, have greater representation among the electors. In 2016, Trump won 306 electoral votes and Clinton won 232, with 270 needed for victory. Part of what tainted the popular view of Clinton was the suspicion that, as Secretary of State, she had not followed security protocol and used a private e-mail server for her official correspondence. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated these allegations in the summer of

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2016, but director James Comey announced on July 5 that Clinton may have been “careless” in her handling of confidential e-mails, but her actions did not warrant any criminal actions.30 Then on October 28, less than ten days before the election and at a time that some states were already accepting absentee ballots, Comey wrote a letter to Congress stating that, in view of another investigation, he was reopening the Clinton case. On November 6, he then announced that he was standing by his decision in July that there was no basis for criminal charges.31 By that time, of course, the harm had been done. The polls, nevertheless, suggested that Clinton would win and would gain the majority of Catholic voters. They were, of course, wrong. Crux, a Catholic information service that works closely with the Knights of Columbus, reported that 52% of self-reporting Catholics voted for Trump, in contrast to the 81% of Evangelicals who voted for him. Trump’s opposition to abortion seems to have been the overriding motive for the Catholic support he gained.32 Other issues, such as social justice, that had played such a major part in shaping American Catholicism were now pushed aside. Was this because the issue of abortion concerned the direct taking of an innocent life or because issues not directly related to life, even if, in fact, they concerned justice and quality of life, were cast aside or were even considered outside the competence of the Church? This was the point I made in my original address in noting some American Catholic opposition to John XXIII’s Mater et Magistra in 1961. In 2015, other American Catholics would challenge Pope Francis’ right to address climate change in Laudato si. President Trump took actions on issues that brought out a broader range of Catholic concerns beyond abortion. Within a week of taking office, he announced that he would build the wall that he proposed in his campaign between the United States and Mexico and would have Mexico bear the expense. This led Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto to cancel his planned meeting with President Trump and the creation of strained relations between the two nations that had not existed for many years. President Trump then issued an executive order banning immigration for 120 days from seven predominantly Muslim countries and even the return to the United States of those with “green card” work permits. This led to a formal protest from Bishop Joe S. Vásquez of Austin, Texas, chairman of the Committee on Migration of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops.33 Shortly later, Cardinal Daniel DiNardo, Archbishop of Galveston-Houston and president of the United States Conference

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of Catholic Bishops, and Archbishop José Gomez of Los Angeles, vice president of the conference, issued a strong statement against the presidential order. Other prominent bishops issued their own statements against the order. These included Cardinal Sean O’Malley of Boston, Cardinal Timothy Dolan of New York, Cardinal Blase Cupich of Chicago, Cardinal Donald Wuerl of Washington, and Cardinal Joseph Tobin of Newark, who, as Archbishop of Indianapolis, challenged Michael Pence, then governor of Indiana, on his policy of excluding Syrian immigration. A Federal district court in Seattle, Washington, challenged the constitutionality of Trump’s executive order and suspended its implementation. A panel of three judges of the ninth circuit, the appellate branch of the Federal system, upheld the lower court’s decision. In the meantime, Bishop Robert McElroy of San Diego, penned a provocative article for America, the weekly magazine published by the Jesuits of the United States and Canada. He drew a sharp distinction between patriotism, a virtue praised by several popes, and chauvinism, a disordered position that always places one’s nation first, contrary to papal teaching.34 In some ways, what happened in the American presidential election of 2016 has parallels in other nations. Both France and Italy have undergone similar changes. Great Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union is illustrative of a widespread desire of many in Britain to withdraw from European affairs and be subject to no foreign restrictions. Isolationism had also been a characteristic of the United States for much of its history. Although President Woodrow Wilson had proposed the League of Nations, his own government rejected membership. But the world has now changed dramatically. It is difficult to conceive of the United States withdrawing from world affairs, but it is also difficult to imagine how the nation can continue to influence those affairs if it always places itself and its interests before those of other nations. Few, if any, periods of American history have been so chaotic as Trump’s four years in office. The 2020 Election: Catholics and a Pro-choice President On November 3, 2020, Joseph Biden, former Senator from Delaware and two-term Vice-president, became the second American Catholic to be elected President of the United States. He won both the popular and the Electoral College vote, unlike the election of 2016, when Hillary Clinton won the popular vote, but Donald Trump won the electoral vote.35 One analysis of the election returns indicate that 50% of Catholics voted for the

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incumbent, President Trump, while approximately 49% voted for Biden. Yet several other analyses had Biden slightly winning the Catholic vote. What we know for sure is that the Catholic vote was close, a statistical tie perhaps. The major issue for Catholics was Trump’s voiced opposition to abortion and Biden’s support of the Democratic Party platform that supported the right to abortion. This did not necessarily mean Biden supported abortion, as such, but that he would not criminalize it. Trump refused to accept defeat and claimed fraudulent election returns, a claim that has been refuted by subsequent bi-partisan investigations. His public statements occasioned, if they did not cause, a mob attack on and occupation of the Capitol on January 6, 2021, leading to the evacuation of representatives and senators from the building, and the death of one police officer and one demonstrator. Trump, however, used Facebook to continue to spread his claims of fraud. As a result, Facebook barred him from using it, a ban that was repeated in May. He also broke from the tradition of most other defeated presidents and refused to attend the inauguration of Biden. In view of the controversy surrounding the election and the almost even split of the Catholic vote, an analysis of some of the issues in the election and its aftermath might shed some light on the situation, but offer no definitive solution to the controversy. Of particular interest is the mixed reaction of Catholic leaders to Biden’s election. Within a few days of his election, Biden received a phone call from Pope Francis congratulating him. The two then discussed topics of cooperation that had been seriously lacking during the Trump administration.36 On the day of Biden’s inauguration as president, the pope sent him a telegram noting the areas in which he looked forward to future cooperation, areas in which the pope and Trump had not agreed. On that same Inauguration Day, however, Archbishop Jose Gomez of Los Angeles, president of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, stated that Biden’s position on abortion raised serious questions and announced the appointment of a committee of bishops to develop a position on whether Biden should be refused communion because of his position on abortion.37 Some bishops, like Joseph Strickland of Tyler, TX, were adamant that Biden should not be allowed to receive Communion. Other bishops took a decidedly different stance. Cardinal Blase Cupich, Archbishop of Chicago, publicly challenged Gomez’ statement and noted that it had been made without consultation of the administrative committee of the bishops’ conference.38 In other words, Cupich was alerting readers to

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the fact that Gomez ignored episcopal collegiality and acted as though he was the only authentic voice in the American Church. At the same time, former Trump supporters in the hierarchy, such as Cardinal Timothy Dolan, Archbishop of New York, publicly stated that he would not refuse communion to Biden.39 Other bishops and prominent lay Catholics shared Cupich’s concerns. While defending the Church’s stance against abortion, for example, Bishop Robert McElroy of San Diego argued that prohibiting pro-choice elected officials from receiving Communion was a misuse of the sacrament. David Gibson, director of the Center on Religion and Culture at Fordham University, a Jesuit-founded institution, noted “That the pope called to congratulate Biden and discussed working together while the American bishops capped their meeting with plans to do battle with the incoming president says it all.”40 But some other prominent bishops, such as Archbishop Salvatore J. Cordileone of San Francisco, publicly opposed giving communion to Biden or any other politician, who supported the right to abortion.41 Among the Catholic members of his archdiocese, incidentally, is Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House. Cardinal Michael Czerny, S.J., undersecretary for Migrants and Refugees of the Vatican Secretariat for Promoting Integral Human Development, stated that it was not up to a national conference of bishops to determine who should receive communion, but the person’s local bishop.42 For the record, neither the bishop of Wilmington, DE, William F. Malooly, where Biden has his home, nor the Archbishop of Washington, where Biden resides as president, Cardinal Wilton Gregory, have restricted him from receiving communion. Malooly’s successor, Bishopelect William Koenig, said he hoped to discuss this and other issues with the president. In short, the bishops who have jurisdiction over Biden, where he usually resides or where he resides as president, have not said they would restrict his receiving communion. But it is not only the bishops who approach the issue of Biden and other “pro-choice” politicians differently. The laity also shows a variety of opinions. The National Catholic Reporter, a liberal lay-edited journal, sides with Biden on this issue and argues in favor of other issues that have not necessarily arisen in regard to Biden. But it also reported on a recent, “virtual,” symposium—one which is conducted, not in person, but by electronic means—on the issue held at Villanova University in Pennsylvania. Patrick McKinley Brennan, a professor of law at the university, argued that Biden should be denied communion because of his stance on

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abortion. He compared Biden with former Cardinal Theodore McCarrick, the Archbishop of Washington, now defrocked, who, he argued, should have been banned from communion long ago for his molesting seminarians and other clerics.43 The conference was illustrative of the division among the American Catholic laity, for Villanova is also where Professor Massimo Faggiolo, a more progressive theologian and historian, also teaches. His recent book, Joe Biden and Catholicism in the United States, argues for the similarity between Biden and Pope Francis on a wide spectrum of social and international concerns.44 In the meantime, the American controversy had further drawn the Vatican’s attention. In May, Cardinal Luis Ladaria, S.J., prefect of the Congregation of the Faith, wrote Gomez. News of it first appeared in America, the national Jesuit periodical. He warned that “dialogue occurs in two stages: first among the bishops themselves, and then between bishops and pro-choice Catholic politicians within their jurisdictions.” He further argued that any such policy adopted should receive the unanimous approval of all the American bishops. Furthermore, he urged that the second stage should be conversation with politicians on a broader range of moral issues to avoid the impression that the Church was concerned only with abortion and euthanasia. He reminded Gomez that such a policy, agreed upon by a national hierarchy, could not infringe upon the rights of local bishops, guaranteed in canon law. Finally, he strongly urged that the Americans enter dialogue with other episcopal conferences to “preserve the unity” of the Church.45 The document subsequently appeared in the Vatican News Service, indicating that it was not merely Ladaria’s private opinion. As a historical note, it is important to note the former role of the American Catholic laity in social and political affairs. The American Church grew from a very small minority—about two percent of the population—at the time of the Revolution to the largest single denomination by 1850—roughly 20%. This growth was due primarily to immigration, first from Ireland, then Germany, and, after the Civil War, from Italy, Poland, and Eastern Europe. With the Industrial Revolution, many immigrants from those countries were laborers and joined labor unions. These, in turn, were championed by the Democratic Party. In the 1880s, an early union, the Knights of Labor, fell under suspicion, largely because of its support by Henry George, an American socialist thinker. Several bishops urged a papal condemnation of George. In the meantime, Archbishop James Gibbons of Baltimore went to Rome in the spring of 1888

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to receive the red hat as the United States first cardinal. In a letter to Leo XIII, he urged that, instead of a condemnation of George, the pope should issue an encyclical on the rights of labor and management. Because the American Church had preserved the loyalty of the working class, the pope issued Rerum Novarum, which addressed the rights of both capital and labor, including the right to organize in unions.46 The social class of most Americans changed especially after World War II, when many sons— and some daughters—served in the military and then took advantage of the GI Bill of Rights to attend college, enter the middle-class, and join the Republican Party, increasingly identified with capitalism. This change in social status, in turn, would change the way many Catholics viewed the Church and its role, especially in regard to such issues as openness to immigrants and social justice. These latter issues were probably the gist of Pope Francis’ telephone conversation with Biden after the latter’s election. In other words, other than abortion, the Democratic Party still bears greater similarity to Catholic social teaching and papal concern for political and economic development in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. One final reflection—the bishops should also consider what is happening in regard to abortion in nations where Catholics constitute a majority. In Poland, for example, encouraged by the bishops, the government increased restrictions on abortion, more lenient in the Communist days; this led in early 2021 to public demonstrations in the streets of major cities.47 In Ireland, early in 2020, voters overwhelmingly voted for new laws that placed few restrictions on abortions for the first 12 weeks of pregnancy.48

Notes 1. New York Times, Oct. 3, 1932, p. 1. 2. ASV, DAUS, V, Affari Esteri., Pos. 153: Cicognani to Pacelli, Washington, June 12, 1933. 3. Gerald P. Fogarty, S.J., The Vatican and the American Hierarchy from 1870 to 1965, Vol. 21 of Päpste und Papsttum (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1982), pp. 248–249. 4. David Nasaw, The Patriarch: The Remarkable Life and Turbulent Times of Joseph P. Kennedy (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012), pp. 374–375. 5. Fogarty, pp. 253–254.

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6. Archives of the Archdiocese of New York, Truman to Kennedy, Washington, Feb. 3, 1950 (copy), given ibid., 321. 7. New York Times, July 3, 1963, p. 1. 8. Ibid., Oct. 5, 1965, p. 1; see also ibid., Supplement, p. 1. 9. Ibid., Dec. 24, 1967, pp. 1 and 3. 10. Joseph A. Califano, “The President and the Pope: L.B.J., Paul VI, and the Vietnam War,” America, 165 (Oct. 12, 1991), 238–239. 11. New York Times, July 4, 1970, p. 18. 12. Ibid., Sept. 28, 1970, p. 3 and Sept. 29, 1970, p. 1. 13. Ibid., Nov. 13, 1970, 7; Nov. 16, 6. 14. The Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1982, A 15. 15. Wilson, ms. Chapter IV, p. 6, in author’s files. Wilson’s papers are at Georgetown University, but the draft of this memoir is not there. 16. Congressional Record (1983), E 3316. 17. James A. Coriden, “Diplomatic Relations between the United States and the Holy See,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 19 (1987), 361–362. 18. The best study of this is Sabine Schratz, Das Gift des alten Europa und die Arbeiter der neuen Welt: zum americanischen Hintergrund der Enzyklika Rerum novarum (1891) (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2011). 19. For the text of her statement, see New York Times, Oct. 12, 1984, p. B4. 20. For an analysis of the bishops’ positions on abortion, see Margaret Ross Sammon, “The Politics of the American Bishops: The Centrality of Abortion,” in Kristin Heyer, Mark J. Rozell, and Michael Genovese (eds.), Catholics and Politics: The Dynamic Tension between Faith and Power (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2008), pp. 17–20; e-book retrieved September 13, 2016. 21. [Baltimore] Catholic Review, Sept. 28, 1984, A 6. 22. For the full text, see http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/fai thful-citizenship/church-teaching/interim-reflections-tf-bishopspoliticians-statement.cfm, accessed on Sept. 14, 2016. 23. See, for example, New York Times, July 11, 2004, L 12. 24. Ibid., Oct. 12, 2004, A 1. 25. http://docslide.us/documents/commonweal-june-15-2012issue-the-bishops-and-religious-liberty.html, accessed on Sept. 14, 2016.

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26. http://religionnews.com/2016/07/20/why-trump-has-a-cat holic-voter-problem/, accessed on Sept. 14, 2016. 27. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/world/americas/popefrancis-donald-trump-christian.html?_r=0#permid=17614689, accessed on Sept. 14, 2016. 28. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/18/donaldtrump-pope-francis-christian-wall-mexico-border, accessed on Sept. 14, 2016. 29. For a survey of this mentality by the New York Times, see http:// www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/19/us/politics/readersrespond-pope-francis-donald-trump.html, accessed on Sept. 14, 2016. 30. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/us/politics/hillary-cli nton-fbi-email-co, accessed on Jan. 27, 2017. 31. http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/06/james-comey-fbi-has-notchanged-its-conclusions-clintons-email-server-since-july-decision. html, accessed on Jan. 27, 2017. 32. https://cruxnow.com/church-in-the-usa/2016/11/09/trumpwins-catholic-vote-election-awoke-religious-feeling/ accessed on Jan. 29, 2017. 33. http://www.usccb.org/news/2017/17-026.cfm, accessed on Jan. 30, 2017. 34. Robert McElroy, “What Is the Catholic Response to Nationalism?” America, http://www.americamagazine.org/politics-soc iety/2017/01/24/what-catholic-response-rise-nationalism?utm_ source=Full+List+with+Groups&utm_campaign=55828b6c09EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_01_27&utm_medium=email&utm_ term=0_0fe8ed70be-55828b6c09-57344793, accessed on Feb. 1, 2017. 35. The United States electoral system is confusing even to many Americans. When the US Constitution was adopted in 1789 making possible the United States as we know it, it was largely due to Article II, which sought to provide a balance between larger and smaller states in national affairs. Each state has two senators, but its number of representatives is determined by its population. The “Electoral College” is formed by the total number of senators—two for each state—and the total number of members of the House of Representatives, determined by the population of each

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state. Hence, in 2016, Clinton won the popular vote but lost to Trump in the Electoral College. 36. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-pope/pope-fra ncis-congratulates-biden-stepping-into-political-fray-idUSKBN27 S2TQ. 37. https://apnews.com/article/biden-inauguration-joe-biden-enviro nment-pope-francis-a9317d1cf99fe15711107e063e9d9a1d. 38. https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/246183/in-unprec edented-move-cardinal-cupich. 39. https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/246183/in-unp recedented-move-cardinal-cupich-criticizes-usccb-statement-onbiden. 40. https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-donald-trump-joebiden-elections-presidential-elections-ebeb54b08dc8fee544fd9bf7 4c9db730. 41. https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2021/05/03/archbi shop-cordileone-abortion-communion-politicians-240580. 42. https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2021/05/ 06/denying-com-240606munion-eucharist-biden-us-bishops-vat ican. 43. https://www.ncronline.org/news/people/villanova-conferenceelevates-calls-biden-be-denied-communion. 44. https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/distinctly-catholic/ massimo-faggiolis-book-biden-and-catholicism-explains-our-cri tical. 45. https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2021/05/10/vaticancommunion-bishops-biden-catholic-politicians-abortion-240627; https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2021-05/vat ican-letter-ladaria-bishops-us-communion-politics-abortion.html. 46. I treat this at greater length in The Vatican and the American Hierarchy from 1870 to 1965 (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1982), 101–196. 47. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55838210. 48. https://theconversation.com/one-year-on-its-clear-that-the-newirish-abortion-services-have-serious-limitations-129491.

PART III

Catholics and U.S. Elections

CHAPTER 7

The Growing Influence of the Catholic Latino Vote Olivier Richomme and Wendy Chen

The 2020 presidential election was one of the most contentious in US history, with nearly 160 million ballots and a turnout rate of 66.8%.1 Moreover, with the Democratic candidate, former vice president Joe Biden, being Catholic, there was substantial speculation during the campaign how the Catholic vote ultimately would break out in the election. The fastest-growing component of the Catholic vote in the United States is Latino, and some observers speculated during the campaign that Latinos generally could tip the balance to Democratic nominee Joe Biden,

O. Richomme (B) Université Lyon II, Lyon, France e-mail: [email protected] W. Chen Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Gayte et al. (eds.), Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82212-5_7

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given the significant percentages of Latino voters in several critical states in the Electoral College.2 Regarding the Democratic nominee’s faith, roughly 63% of those who identified as Democrat/lean Democrat even knew that Biden is Catholic, compared to 55% of those who identified as Republican/lean Republican. In the Catholic community generally, 66% knew that Biden shared the same religion. Meanwhile, 55% of Republican Catholics were skeptical of his faith, with some even stating that due to his pro-abortion rights stance he should not be allowed to receive Communion. However, the response changed when asking the Latino Catholic community. Here, 23% of Latino Catholics believed he should not be allowed to receive Communion compared to 33% of White Catholics.3 But how did these divides play out in the election? This chapter will discuss the Catholic and Latino affiliations to try and describe their combined effect on the vote in 2020. In so doing, it will provide the context framed by the pattern of the growing Latino vote in the United States, as well as the 2016 election of Republican nominee Donald J. Trump and the impact of his presidency.

General Catholic and Latino Catholic Voting Behavior in 2020 In his reelection bid, President Trump counted heavily on maintaining his strong support among conservative Christians. Republican presidential candidates since at least the 1980s have reached out in particular to conservative evangelicals and Catholics on social issues. There is evidence that the strategy has been effective.4 As the conservative Christian component of the electorate is overwhelmingly Anglo, Democratic presidential candidates rely on a coalition of religious minorities to tip the electoral scales in their favor. Looking at the overall Catholic vote in 2020, exit polls were consistent in showing that it was a close contest between Trump and Biden. Whether Biden actually won the overall Catholic vote depends on which exit poll is consulted. What we do know for certain is that Biden increased his share of the Catholic vote over Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton’s showing in 2016, that Trump won the white Catholic vote, and Biden won the Latino Catholic vote (Fig. 7.1). To fully understand the Catholic vote, therefore, it is important to untangle the Catholic Latino vote. Indeed, in electoral behavior terms,

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52% 51% 50% 49% 48% 47% 46% 45% Washington Post

Associated Press Trump

Fox News

Biden

Fig. 7.1 2020 Election exit poll results of Catholic voting behavior across major polling sources (Source https://www.ncregister.com/news/2020-catholicvote)

race and ethnicity are important fault lines in the United States. Therefore, any discussion about a Catholic Latino vote eventually comes down to a discussion of the Latino vote. Catholic Latinos present the same structural potential and constraints as the Latino vote in general. While Latinos have become the largest Catholic block and the largest ethnoracial minority in the country, their political impact has remained limited at the national level due to their geographical concentration, low rate of citizenship and registration, and even lower turnout rates. Yet because of their demographic dynamism Latinos represent a key segment of the future of American politics. In the introduction to this volume, Mark J. Rozell explains that “there really is no unified Catholic vote in United States politics.” One of the reasons for that is that the Catholic vote, much like the rest of the country is split along racial/ethnic lines. The largest ethno-racial group in the Catholic community is the Latino category which overall behaves electorally quite differently from the Anglo category.5 Catholics are about as diverse as Americans overall, but their specific racial and ethnic composition is somewhat different and that has important electoral implications.6 As of 2014, although Catholics were primarily made up of Whites (59% compared to their 66% composition of the population overall), Latinos made up 34% of the Catholic population (compared to their 15% of the

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population overall).7 Consequently, the evolution of Latinos has a larger impact on the Catholic community. For example, geography plays a vital role in the ethno-racial profile of Catholics. Since the Latino community is one of the fastest-growing ethno-racial groups in the United States, it is understandable why many seek to study it. Yet, many assume that all Latinos are Catholic. In reality, according to the 2019 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, the percent of Hispanic Catholic declined from 57% in 2009 to 47% in 2019.8 This is easily explained by the fact that the Latino community is on average younger than other ethno-racial groups and that young Americans overall tend to be less religious.9 Latinos over 50 years old are much more likely to declare being Catholic than Latinos under 30. This leads to the paradoxical situation in which Catholics are decreasing as a share of the Latino population but this population is increasing so much faster than the general population that Latinos are becoming a sizable ethno-racial group among Catholics. Therefore, the perception is that Latinos Catholic affiliation is on the rise while it is actually decreasing.10 This does not mean that Catholicism is not an important feature of Latino identity, but rather it is not as important as it once was and it is only one factor among many, which makes the Latino identity quite complex to decipher. Moreover, it is difficult to talk about a cohesive Catholic community because Latino Catholics present different characteristics. Latino Catholic Parishes are generally poor and concentrate high level of immigrants that sometimes do not speak English. Therefore, “parishes with Hispanic ministry are often centers where Hispanics seek spiritual accompaniment alongside support to meet other immediate needs.”11 From an electoral standpoint, Latino Catholics make different choices than Anglo Catholics.12,13 As we can see during presidential elections the Anglo Catholic vote and Latino Catholic votes are reverse images of each other. They follow the Anglo/Latino pattern of the vote. Religious affiliation seems to be less salient than ethno-racial affiliation. Despite its inherent heterogeneity, Latino identity operates socially in a cohesive manner in the United States because of internal and external factors. The internal factors are historical in the sense that people in Latin America have a common language that, despite national and regional differences, allows for the sharing of cultural goods, ideas, and world views. They share this cultural heritage because they share a common

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history of colonization by the Spaniards and Portuguese.14 Colonization and fights for independence, along with a complicated relationship with the United States that has always perceived the western hemisphere as its zone of influence, have brought a sense of commonality in many Latin American countries.15 In the United States, as Douglas Massey and Magaly R. Sánchez have shown in their book Brokered Boundaries, people of Latin American origin have faced an external force in the form of an anti-immigration discourse that explains, in part, their sense of identity as a community: “For Latin American immigrants in the United States today, the processes of assimilation and identity formation are unfolding within a context characterized by an exceptional degree of anti-immigrant framing and immigrant-isolating boundary work. The tail wagging the dog is undocumented migration.”16 Therefore, the Latino community, at the mass level, has distinct policy concerns.17 Immigration is only one of many issues but it carries “tremendous emotional weight and is inevitably tied to these other issues.”18 That is why immigration remains a rallying cry for Latinos and crucial policies such as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) represent great mobilization tools.19 These internal and external factors help explain why scholars have been talking so much about a Latino vote.20 A fundamental aspect of American society is that according to exit polls ethno-racial divisions are much more susceptible to be correlated to electoral behavior and these divisions drive identity politics nowadays.21 Some may argue that there is evidence that Latino Catholics, Latino Protestants, and unaffiliated Latinos vote in different ways. The Pew Research Landscape Survey of 2020 (Table 7.1), shows that 52% of Protestant/Other Christian Latinos voted for President Trump while Catholic Latinos voted for President Trump at a rate of 26%. However, this 26% gap might need to be mitigated. Without mentioning the technical difficulty of such fine-tuned surveys and polls, one might notice that George W. Bush was the most popular Republican candidate among Latinos in a long time, maybe ever, as he was credited with 40–44% of the Latino vote, and he was particularly popular among Evangelicals. Moreover, since 2004, the Republican brand’s popularity in the United States, and especially in the Latino community, has decreased to reach, in 2016, a 24-year low of 30%.22 In 2014, a Pew Research survey showed a much lower gap (around 10%) in political preferences between Evangelical Latinos and Catholic Latinos.23 Then, in

Kerry 43% 65%

Gore 45% 65%

Bush 52% 33%

2004

2000 Bush 56% 33%

Obama 47% 72%

2008 McCain 52% 26%

Obama 40% 75%

2012

Presidential vote by affiliation and race, Pew Research Center

Anglo Catholics Latino Catholics

Table 7.1

Romney 59% 21%

Clinton 37% 67%

2016 Trump 60% 26%

Biden 44% 67%

2020 Trump 52% 26%

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2019, 93% of Latinos who were Democrats or leaned Democrat disapproved of Trump, while 67% of the Latino population as a whole was satisfied with the way things were going in the country.24 When it comes to Latino Catholics, their views are very much in line with the general Latino population. Overall, Latino Catholics strongly favor the Democratic Party and this preference is steady over time. Latino Catholics registered voters supported or leaned Democrat at a rate of 68% in 2018–2019. That rate was 66% in 2002.25 In general, Latino Catholics support of Republicans tends to be much lower. However, partisan affiliation varies according to denomination with evangelical Latinos being more favorable to the Republican Party26 This might help to explain Donald Trump’s floor among Latinos in 2016 and 2020.27,28

The Latino Community Electoral Potential The second preconceived idea about Latinos is that they are an electoral giant tilting American politics toward the Democrats. While this may be true locally in a city such as Los Angeles, it is not the case nationally, at least not yet. The Latino community has become a demographic giant and at the same time, at the national level, it is still an electoral dwarf. While in 1980 the Latino population comprised only 14.5 million, according to the census, in 2019 it represented almost 18.5% of the US total population.29 However, Latino population growth has slowed (Fig. 7.2).30 According to Census estimates, there are about 60 million Latinos in the United States (18.5% of the US population in 2019). In 2020, Latinos cast 16.4 million votes, which is an increase of 30.9% over the 2016 presidential election. It is worth noting that Latino youth voter turnout was a significant force in 2020, and many of them were first-time voters.31 According to the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE)’s analysis with the AP VoteCast data, 63% of Latinos voted for Joe Biden in 2020 while only 35% voted for Donald Trump.32 In addition, of those who voted for Biden, most of them were Latino youth regardless of their national origins, indicating a generational shift in the vote choice for the Latino population in the United States (Figs. 7.3 and 7.4).33

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Fig. 7.2 The national Latino vote over time (Source https://www.as-coa.org/ articles/chart-how-us-latinos-voted-2020-presidential-election)

Fig. 7.3 Latino voter support by age (Source https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-res earch/election-week-2020#the-latino-youth-vote)

Fig. 7.4 Latino voters by age and region of origin (Source https://circle.tufts. edu/latest-research/election-week-2020#the-latino-youth-vote)

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On average, Latino voters had higher confidence in Biden than Trump in handling the public health impact during the pandemic (71%), bringing the country closer together (70%), making good decisions about foreign policy (68%), handling law enforcement and criminal justice issues (66%), and making good decisions about economic policy (68%).34

The Latino Electorate Structural Challenges The Latino electorate as a structural whole does face some challenges. First, to be eligible to vote requires US citizenship. Many Latinos still are born abroad, even if that percentage is decreasing.35 In 2018, 25% of foreign-born Americans were born in Mexico. 33% of the Latino population (19 million people) was born outside the United States while 67% was born in the United States (39 million people). The foreign-born rates for other ethno-racial groups were 17% for Anglos, 9.5% for African Americans, and 27% for Asian Americans (Fig. 7.5).36 100 90

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The second reason for this low electoral impact is that one needs to be 18 years old to be eligible to vote in the United States and the Latino community is on average much younger than the rest of the population or other ethno-racial groups.37 Figure 7.6 shows the median age according to race/ethnicity. The fact that the Latino population is on average younger than the rest of the country means that fewer people are over 18 years of age and therefore eligible to vote. According to the Pew Research Center, 93% of Latino youths are US-born citizens and therefore will automatically become eligible to vote once they reach 18. It is estimated that every year about 800,000 Latinos turn 18. By 2030, this number could grow to 1 million per year, adding a potential electorate of more than 16 million new Latino voters to the rolls by 2030 (Fig. 7.7).38 In 2016, millennials represented the single largest cohort of eligible voters for the Latino community.39 This has important electoral consequences since young people register and turnout at much lower rates than older people. Voting rates have historically varied by an array of demographic factors and age is one of them. Even in 2020 where registration 48 43

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rates and turnout were historically high, age was still a decisively important factor as shown in Fig. 7.8. 18- to 24-year-olds vote at a rate that was 20–25 percentage points lower than the older cohorts (Fig. 7.8). Consequently, the third reason that the Latino vote remains much weaker than its total population numbers might suggest is that registration rates, despite massive registration drive efforts on the part of activists over the years, have remained extremely low. Since 1992, it has hovered around 58% and peaked at 61% in 2020 while Anglos and African Americans have registered at rates above 70% (Fig. 7.9). This low registration rate is combined with an anemic turnout rate. The Latino turnout rate has gone over 50% once in 2020 when it reached 53.7%. Latinos and Asians are the two groups that lag consistently in turnout rate when compared to Anglos or African Americans. Moreover, during mid-term elections, all groups suffer from a massive decrease, so much so that Latino turnout rates can dip below 30% (Fig. 7.10).

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90 79.1

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Fig. 7.8 2020 Registration and turnout rate by age group

All these combined factors help explain why the Latino electorate is at a disadvantage compared to Anglos and African-Americans. For instance, in 2020, Latinos still lagged behind Anglos and African Americans in registration rate but also turnout rate among registered voters (even though they greatly increased that number in 2020) and especially among eligible voters.40 In other words, Latinos “waste” a lot of votes (Fig. 7.11). Finally, one of the reasons why the Latino electorate has had a moderate impact on the presidential election is that Latino populations are highly concentrated in uncompetitive states such as California and Texas. Thus, their votes do not influence other states on a meaningful level (Fig. 7.12). This concentration has even more dire consequences during mid-term elections. Latinos represent less than 5% of eligible voters in the most competitive Senate states, and about 4% of eligible voters in those races, that is to say they accounted for about 2.4% of the people voting. The situation is almost as calamitous in the House of Representatives where

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La no registra on rate

Fig. 7.9 Latino registration rate by presidential election year

half of all Latinos live in just 15% of the nation’s 435 congressional districts.41 Only a handful of swing states have a Latino population that can have a real electoral impact during the presidential elections as the percentage of Latino voting-age citizens was equal or superior to 5% in only 4 of the 2020 battleground states (Table 7.2).

Florida Still Matters Florida is obviously the greatest prize because of its 29 Electoral College votes and the Democrats’ failure to win Florida again in 2020 is probably their biggest regret. The demographic situation of the state is different from other states because the Latino population is roughly divided into three groups: 1/3 Cuban, 1/3 Puerto Rican, and 1/3 other Latino. This is crucial because Cubans and Puerto Ricans do not see immigration issues in the same light as Mexican Americans. Unlike foreign immigrants, Puerto Ricans arrive as citizens because of the island’s status as a US

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80 70 60 50

71

66.6

66

65

65 50

47

64

59

48

49 47

46

47

44

40

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40

63 59

57

53

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40

31 30 27

31

27

20 2008

2010 Anglos

2012

2014

African-Americans

2016 La nos

2018

2020 Asians

Fig. 7.10 Turnout rate by racial/ethnic group

territory. As residents of the island, they cannot vote in the general election, but once they relocate to a US state, they can establish residency and become registered to vote. Thanks to the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act almost all Cuban migrants have been admitted under a special parole power exercised by the US Attorney General that instantly grants them full legal status and puts them on a path to US citizenship. And historically speaking Cubans have supported the Republican Party because of its tough position toward the Castro regime.42 For this reason, the Florida legislature is an exception among the States because its Latino caucus is mostly Republican. Moreover, Cubans have the highest turnout rate of all Latinos. According to an analysis of the Census Bureau, in 2016, 58% of Cubans voted, compared with 46% of Puerto Ricans and 44% of Mexicans. However, Cuban support for the Republican Party has eroded over the years.43 According to the national exit polls in 2004, 78% of Cuban Americans voted for George W. Bush, while in 2012, the Cuban vote in Florida was split 49-47 between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney. In 2016 the

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100

92.7

90 80 70

90.8

175

87.9

76.5 69.8

69

66.2

61.1 60

53.7

50 40 30 20 10 0 registra on %

% of registered vo ng Anglos

African-Americans

% of eligible voters La nos

Fig. 7.11 Electoral participation per ethno-racial group

Fig. 7.12 Latino population concentration per state 2015 census estimates

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Table 7.2 Percentage of Latinos in 2020 battleground states

Florida Arizona Pennsylvania Georgia North Carolina Michigan Ohio Wisconsin

Total eligible voters

Latino eligible voters

% who are Latino

15,342,000 5,042,000 9,786,000 7,487,000 7,632,000 7,549,000 8,871,000 2,326,000

3,143,000 1,188,000 521,000 377,000 338,000 261,000 241,000 183,000

20 24 5 5 4 3 3 4

split seemed to continue.44 According to exit polls, 54% of Cubans in Florida voted for Donald Trump, compared with 35% of the state’s Latino voters overall and 28% of Latinos nationwide. This drop in popularity of the GOP can be seen in the evolution of partisan affiliation of registered Latinos in Florida (Fig. 7.13).45 Yet, according to a Pew Research Center Survey, 58% of Cuban registered voters nationwide say they affiliate with or lean toward the Republican Party, while 38% identify with the Democratic Party or lean Democratic. By comparison, around 65% of non-Cuban Latino voters identify as or lean Democratic, while 32% affiliate with the Republican Party.46 According to exit polls, Trump won the Catholic vote in Florida 59– 41% which is the same rate as for other Protestants/other Christians.47 He also did much better with the Latino community which he lost only 46–53% (other polls confirm that the best performances for the GOP are in Florida). In the end, Biden won Miami-Dade County, where Latinos account for 58% of registered voters, by only about 7 points, compared to Clinton’s 30-point margin in 2016. Therefore, in Florida, Trump outperformed his national numbers among Catholics and Latinos. The Democrats lost Florida in 2020 by almost 400,000 votes and almost 3% points. However, they managed to hold on to the presidency by the thinnest of margins in some other states. The miraculous Trump victory in 2016 was echoed by almost-just-as-miraculous Biden victory in 2020. To prevent such scenarios from happening again both parties will invest heavily in Florida in the future and will focus on the Latino vote in that state.

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1000 948 900

880 798

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662

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575 514

471 445

414

476

400 405

370 300

313 2006

373 2008

2010

Dems (in thousands)

2012 Reps

2014

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no affilia on

Fig. 7.13 Evolution of Partisan affiliation of newly registered Latinos 2006– 2016

2016 and 2020 as Mirror Images of Each Other In 2016, Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton lost Florida by about 113,000 votes or 1.2%. However, it ended up not being the most crucial state because even without Florida, GOP nominee Donald Trump would still have reached 270 electoral votes because of his very narrow margins in Wisconsin, which he won by 22,748 votes (0.77% of the votes), Michigan, which he won by 10,704 votes (0.22% of the votes) and Pennsylvania which he won by 44,292 (0.72% of the votes). In those states, Latinos represented 3.6%, 3.1%, and 4.5% of eligible voters. In such a tight election, any small constituency can claim to be a decisive swing vote but one thing is sure: while Anglo Catholics might have helped in winning those states, Latinos and therefore Latino Catholics, as a part of the electorate, were negligible in those states. The same was true in 2020. The Democrats lost Florida but won the presidency because of razor-thin victories in Arizona 0.31% (+10,500 votes), Georgia 0.23% (+11,800 votes) or Wisconsin 0.7% (+20,700 votes), and Pennsylvania

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1.2% (+80,000 votes). Of those crucial states, only Arizona can boast having a decisive Latino electorate. According to exit polls, Biden won 59% of Latino voters, including 65% of Latinos of Mexican heritage, who made up the vast majority of the Latino electorate. Latino voters comprised 18% of the electorate, up from 15% in 2016.48 In the end, Biden could have clinched the presidency without Arizona’s 11 Electoral College votes. In 2016, Trump did not need the Latino vote to win. In 2020, Biden did not rely heavily on the Latino vote in any of the decisive states, either. However, in both cases, the results were extremely close. As we look ahead, both parties will look at the potential of the Latino electorate because the Latino population in the United States keeps increasing. After all, 31% of Arizona’s population was estimated to be Latino in 2019, representing 24% of its electorate. Hillary Clinton lost Arizona by 3.5%, whereas Obama lost it by almost 10% in 2012 and 2008. Biden barely won Arizona and only won the Latino vote by 20 points while Clinton had won it by a solid 30 points. When looking at the precinct level, Trump’s 2020 margins were better in south Phoenix and Maryvale than they were against Hillary Clinton in 2016. Trump still lost precincts in those areas by large amounts, but the margins narrowed.49 This is a trend the Democrats need to address in future election cycles. In the same vein, Biden lost the state of Texas by 6 points, in a noncompetitive state where none of the candidates campaigned, a state where almost 30% of eligible voters in 2020 were Latinos. Clinton lost Texas by less than 10%, a substantial margin, but it was an improvement from 2012 when Obama lost by 16%. The big picture suggests Texas (and its now 38 Electoral College votes) could soon be a competitive state and it’s not out of the realm of possibilities given the vast Latino population growth there. However, Trump did better than expected in the Rio Grande Valley in 2020. In Hidalgo County, the largest county in the Rio Grande Valley where Latinos make up 92% of the population, Biden won by 18 points with about 220,000 total votes cast. Clinton won the county by a massive 40-point margin in 2016, though only 167,000 people voted that year. Biden won by substantially thinner margins in Cameron, Starr, Hidalgo, Webb, and Maverick counties, despite a substantial increase in turnout. Just as in Florida’s Miami-Dade county, the Democrats underperformed in the south Texas border region. Any indication of a loss of support in the Latino community should push the Democrats to reexamine their outreach strategy, especially since many activists have found

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it lacking. When combined with the African American vote, this growing Latino presence already helped flip Virginia and made North Carolina and now Georgia competitive. So, the argument that this demographic evolution is bound to benefit the Democrats appears solid. Nonetheless, it does not mean that Democrats can take the Latino vote for granted. Even if the Republican brand among Latinos is at an all-time low, especially among young Latinos.50 As a consequence, the future of the GOP among the next generation of voters is potentially bleak. Furthermore, this rejection of the GOP by Latino youth indicates that the pattern of partisan polarization among Latinos might increase. Latinos do not vote Democrat at rates close to that of the African Americans but these polls and 2020 voting pattern analyses suggest that Latinos are rejecting the GOP at the national level but the GOP still has the potential to make gains locally, thanks to tailor-made conservative messaging that resonates with Latinos or even thanks to less traditional strategies such as disinformation campaigns or voter restriction measures.

Conclusion The issue of Catholic Latino voters is complex because the Latino category is not monolithic, as many of the Latino demographic groups have different political preferences. Meanwhile, younger generations, including Latinos, are leaving religion behind, making it unclear how this trend will impact Latino voting behavior. The Catholic component of the Latino population is also in decline. Meanwhile, there are consistent trends among Latinos including their still strong preference for the Democrat Party and their overall increasing population in the country. In 2020, the Latino vote, though not critical to the outcome, helped Joe Biden’s successful quest to become president. The question however remains whether the Democrat Party can continue to hold the Latino vote into the future. To do so, it seems it’ll need to rely more on its local organizational capacities as Latinos in California, Arizona, Texas and Florida have different expectations and display, at times, different electoral behavior. It appears that the battle for the Latino electorate will, in part, depend on the capacity of the two major parties to operate at the granular level to address sub-categories and cross-reference different characteristics among which is religious affiliation.

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Notes 1. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Elections of November 2020, April 2021, https://www.census.gov/data/ tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-585.html (last accessed May 5, 2021). 2. Rozell, Mark J., “The Looming Battle Over Latino Voters,” The Hill, October 30, 2020, https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/ 523666-the-looming-battle-over-latino-voters?rnd=1604090799 (last accessed May 2, 2021). 3. “Most Democrats and Republicans Know Biden Is Catholic, but They Differ Sharply About How Religious He Is,” 2021, https:// www.pewforum.org/2021/03/30/most-democrats-and-republ icans-know-biden-is-catholic-but-they-differ-sharply-about-howreligious-he-is/. 4. Rozell, Mark J., John C. Green and Clyde Wilcox, “Religious Constituencies and Support for the Christian Right in the 1990s,” Social Science Quarterly, 79, No. 4 (December 1998): 815–827. 5. We use the word ethno-racial in the sense that historian David Hollinger uses it when he described the ethno-racial pentagon. Hollinger, David, Post-Ethnic America, New York: Basic Books, 1995. According to the Directive 15 of the OMB, the official definition of the Hispanic/Latino category of the census is that it is an ethnic and not a racial category. However, from a practical standpoint this category works as another racial category especially in the field of public policies aimed at monitoring and fighting against discriminations. The Latino statistical category is another exclusive category. 6. Lipka, Michael, “The Most and Least Racially Diverse U.S. Religious Groups,” Pew Research Center, July 27, 2015, https:// www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/27/the-most-andleast-racially-diverse-u-s-religious-groups/ (last accessed, Amy 5, 2021) 7. Lipka, Michael, “A Closer Look at Catholic America,” Pew Research Center, September 14, 2015, http://www.pewresearch. org/fact-tank/2015/09/14/a-closer-look-at-catholic-america/ (last accessed April 21, 2017). 8. “Catholics No Long a Majority Among U.S. Hispanics,” Pew Research Center, https://www.pewforum.org/2019/10/17/in-

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u-s-decline-of-christianity-continues-at-rapid-pace/ (last accessed April 21, 2017). 9. “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” Pew Research Center, Religion and Public Life, May 12, 2015, http://www.pewforum. org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/ (last accessed April 21, 2017). 10. “The Shifting Religious Identity of Latinos in the United States,” 2014. 11. Ospino, Hosffman, “Hispanic Ministry in Catholic Churches: A Summary Report From the Findings of the National Study of Catholic Parishes with Hispanic Ministry,” Boston College School of Theology and Ministry, in collaboration with CARA, 2014, http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/stm/ pdf/2014/BC-NatlStudyParishesHM-Rep1-201405.pdf (last accessed April 21, 2017). 12. Smith, Gregory A. and Jessica Martínez, “How the Faithful Voted: A Preliminary 2016 Analysis,” The Pew Research Center, November 9 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/ 2016/11/09/how-the-faithful-voted-a-preliminary-2016-ana lysis/ (last accessed April 8, 2021). 13. Smith, Gregory A., “White Christians Continue to Favor Trump over Biden, but Support Has Slipped,” October 13, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/13/whitechristians-continue-to-favor-trump-over-biden-but-support-has-sli pped/ (last accessed April 8, 2021). 14. It is more complicated to talk about an Asian community in the US because of this lack of internal unifying factors such a common language or a common history of colonization. 15. The very expression Latin America implies this sense of commonality. 16. Massey, Douglas and Magaly R. Sanchez, Brokered Boundaries: Creating Immigrant Identity in Anti-immigrant Times, New York: Russell Sage, 2010, 24. 17. Martinez-Ebers, Valerie, Luis Fraga, Linda Lopez and Arturo Vega, “Latino Interest in Education, Health, and Criminal Justice Policy,” PS: Political Science and Politics, 33 (2000): 547–554; Fraga, Luis Ricardo, Linda Lopez, Valerie Martinez-Ebers and Ricardo Ramirez, “Gender and Ethnicity: Patterns of Electoral Success and Legislative Among Latina and Latino State Officials

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in Four States,” Journal of Women, Politics and Policy, 28 (2007): 121–145. 18. Rouse, Stella M., Latinos in the Legislative Process: Interests and Influence, Cambridge University Press, 2016, 45. 19. Barreto, Matt A. and Loren Collingwood, “Group-Based Appeals and the Latino Vote in 2012: How Immigration Became a Mobilizing Issue,” Electoral Studies, 40 (2015): 490–499. 20. Abrajano, Marisa A. and R. Michael Alvarez, New Faces New Voices: The Hispanic Electorate in America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton U. Press, 2010; Barreto, Matt and Gary M. Segura, Latino America: How America’s Most Dynamic Population Is Poised to Transform the Politics of the Nation, New York: Public Affairs, 2014; DeSipio, Louis, Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos a New Electorate, University of Virginia Press, 1996; García, John A., Latino Politics in America: Community, Culture, and Interests, 2nd ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012; Pantoja, Adrian, Matthew Baretto and Richard Anderson, “Politics y la Iglesia: Attitudes Toward the Role of Religion in Politics Among Latino Catholics.”. In Kristen E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell and Michael Genovese, eds., Catholics and Politics: The Dynamic Tension Between Faith and Power, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008, 113–128. 21. Saavedra Cisneros, Angel, Latino Identity and Political Attitudes: Why Are Latinos Not Republicans, Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2017. 22. http://www.people-press.org/2016/04/28/gops-favorability-rat ing-edges-lower/ (last accessed April 17, 2021). 23. “The Shifting Religious Identity of Latinos in the United States,” Pew Research Center, May 7, 2014, http://www.pewforum.org/ 2014/05/07/the-shifting-religious-identity-of-latinos-in-the-uni ted-states/ (last accessed April 21, 2017). 24. Krogstad, J., A. Gonzalez-Barrera and C. Tamir, “Latino Democratic Voters Place High Importance on 2020 Presidential Election,” Pew Research Center, 2020, https://www.pewresearch. org/fact-tank/2020/01/17/latino-democratic-voters-place-highimportance-on-2020-presidential-election/ (last accessed May 2, 2021). 25. Smith, Gregory A., “8 Facts about Catholics and Politics in the U.S.,” Pew Research Center, September 15, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/15/8-

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facts-about-catholics-and-politics-in-the-u-s/ (last accessed May 5, 2020). 26. Religious landscape Study, “Party Affiliation Among Evangelical Protestants Who Identify as Latino by Religious Group (2014),” Pew Research Center, https://www.pewforum.org/religiouslandscape-study/compare/party-affiliation/by/religious-family/ among/racial-and-ethnic-composition/latino/religious-tradition/ evangelical-protestant/. 27. According to exit polls he won the White evangelical vote 80–16%. Bailey, Sarah Pulliam, “White Evangelical Voted Overwhelmingly for Trump, Exit Polls Say,” Washington Post, November 6, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/ wp/2016/11/09/exit-polls-show-white-evangelicals-voted-ove rwhelmingly-for-donald-trump/?utm_term=.87d6536121df (last accessed April 21, 2017). 28. Smith, G., “White Christians Continue to Favor Trump over Biden, but Support Has Slipped,” Pew Research Center, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/13/whitechristians-continue-to-favor-trump-over-biden-but-support-has-sli pped/. 29. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/07/u-s-his panic-population-surpassed-60-million-in-2019-but-growth-hasslowed/ (last accessed May 2, 2021). 30. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/07/u-s-his panic-population-surpassed-60-million-in-2019-but-growth-hasslowed/ (last accessed May 2, 2021). 31. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/young-latinos-mobili zed-voted-were-pivotal-2020-organizers-want-keep-n1246853. 32. https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/election-week-2020#thelatino-youth-vote (last accessed May 2, 2021). 33. https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/election-week-2020#thelatino-youth-vote (last accessed May 2, 2021). 34. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/16/latinovoters-have-growing-confidence-in-biden-on-key-issues-while-con fidence-in-trump-remains-low/ (last accessed May 2, 2021). 35. People born in Puerto-Rico are not considered foreign-born. 36. Budiman, Abby, “Key Findings about US Immigrants,” Pew Research Center, August 20, 2020, https://www.pewresearch. org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/

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(last accessed May 15, 2021); Budiman, Abby, Christine Tamir, Lauren Mora and Luis Neo-Bustamente, “Facts on US Immigrants 2018,” Pew Research Center, August 20, 2020, https:// www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2020/08/20/facts-on-u-s-imm igrants-trend-data/ (last accessed May 14, 2021) 37. Patten, Eileen, “The Nation’s Latino Population Is Defined by Its Youth,” Pew Research Center, April 20 2016, http://www.pew hispanic.org/2016/04/20/the-nations-latino-population-is-def ined-by-its-youth/ph_2016-04-20_latinoyouth-02/ (last accessed April 21, 2017). 38. Taylor, Paul, Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Jeffrey S. Passel and Mark Hugo Lopez “An Awakened Giant: The Hispanic Electorate Is Likely to Double by 2030,” Pew Research Center, November 14 2012, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/11/14/an-awakenedgiant-the-hispanic-electorate-is-likely-to-double-by-2030/ (last accessed April 21, 2017). 39. Krogstad, Jens Manuel, “Key Facts About the Latino Vote in 2016,” Pew Research Center, October 14 2016, http://www.pew research.org/fact-tank/2016/10/14/key-facts-about-the-latinovote-in-2016/ (last accessed May 2, 2021). 40. Eligible voter population includes people over 18 years-old but excludes felons barred from voting. 41. https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/interactives/mappingthe-latino-electorate/. 42. This is consistent over the years in opinion polls, Grenier, Guillermo J. and Hugh Gladwin, “2016 FIU Cuba Poll,” http:// cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/2016-cuba-poll.pdf (last accessed April 21, 2017). 43. Krogstad, Jens Manuel, “After Decades of GOP Support, Cubans Shifting Towards Democratic Party,” Pew Research Center, June 24 2014, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/24/ after-decades-of-gop-support-cubans-shifting-toward-the-democr atic-party/ (last accessed April 21, 2017). 44. Krogstad, Jens Manuel and Antonio Flores, “Unlike Other Latinos about Half of Cuban Voters in Florida Backed Trump,” Pew Research Center, November 15 2016, http://www.pewres earch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/15/unlike-other-latinos-abouthalf-of-cuban-voters-in-florida-backed-trump/ (last accessed April 21, 2017).

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45. Florida Department of State, Election Division, Bookclosing Report—Regular, http://dos.myflorida.com/elections/datastatistics/voter-registration-statistics/bookclosing/bookclosingreports-regular/; The registration numbers for 2016 are as of October 18 2016, http://dos.myflorida.com/media/697212/ 2016general_partyrace.pdf (last accessed April 21, 2017). 46. Krogstad, Jens Manuel, “Most Cuban American Voters Identify as Republican in 2020,” Pew Research Center, October 2, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/02/ most-cuban-american-voters-identify-as-republican-in-2020/. 47. https://edition.cnn.com/election/2020/exit-polls/president/flo rida. 48. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/03/us/electi ons/ap-polls-arizona.html. 49. O’Dell, Rob, McGlade, Caitlin, Hansen, Ronald J., “How Did Biden Win Arizona? Map of Maricopa County’s Votes Reveals One Key Path to Victory,” Arizona Republic, November 18, 2020, https://eu.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/ 11/18/how-did-president-elect-joe-biden-win-arizona-map-mar icopa-county-votes-reveals-one-key-path-victory/6328880002/. 50. Sargent, Greg, “If This New Poll Is Right, Trump Is Absolutely Shredding the GOP Brand with Latinos,” Washington Post, September 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ plum-line/wp/2016/09/02/if-this-new-poll-is-right-trump-isabsolutely-shredding-the-gop-brand-with-latinos/?utm_term=. 27b544d1416b (last accessed April 21, 2017).

CHAPTER 8

“Can We Get the Catholic Vote?” The Effects of Catholic Running Mates in Presidential Elections Cammie Jo Bolin, Ted G. Jelen, and Clyde Wilcox

Although Vice Presidents vary in their importance within presidential administrations, they often have a substantial policy portfolio. Moreover, the office is frequently a launching pad for presidential campaigns and presidencies. Many vice presidents go on to be nominees of their party in subsequent elections, in some cases winning (Nixon, Bush, and Biden)

C. J. Bolin · C. Wilcox (B) Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] C. J. Bolin e-mail: [email protected] T. G. Jelen University of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Gayte et al. (eds.), Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82212-5_8

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and in other cases losing (Nixon, Humphrey, Mondale, and Gore). Still others ascend to the presidency through the death or resignation of the sitting president (Johnson and Ford). In this chapter, we explore the questions of whether the presence of a Roman Catholic candidate for Vice President affects individual vote decision in Presidential elections. Are Catholic voters more likely to support national tickets that contain one of their co-religionists? Conversely, does the presence of a Catholic on the ticket reduce support among some groups of non-Catholics, such as white evangelical Protestants? And finally, how has the relationship between Catholic VP candidates and vote choice changed over time? Finally, because 2020 was the first time that a former Catholic Vice President ran for and won the presidency, we will discuss the way that Joe Biden and Donald Trump both targeted subsets of Catholic voters, and what the initial releases of polling data show. There is a rather extensive literature that suggests that the religious affiliation of Vice-Presidential candidates will have no impact on vote decisions. Most empirical attempts to isolate the electoral influence of Vice-Presidential candidates have shown such effects to be non-existent1 or very small.2 Further, any relationship between attitudes toward VicePresidential candidates and vote intention may be spurious, since support for a favored candidate’s running mate may present a form of post-hoc rationalization.3 That is, the causal arrow may run from vote intention to evaluation of the candidate occupying the second spot on the ticket, rather than the reverse. Once a voter has decided to support a presidential candidate, she might then increase her evaluations of that candidate’s running mate. However, some studies have shown that specific running mates may have small, but potentially consequential, effects on vote decisions. For example, at least two analyses of the 2008 election showed that the VicePresidential candidacy of Sarah Palin may have reduced the likelihood of some voters (notably independents) to cast votes for the GOP ticket.4 Ulbig has suggested that the effects of Vice-Presidential candidacies may be contingent on the extent of media coverage such candidates receive.5 However, this may well be a spurious relationship, since the positive or negative characteristics of these candidates may well influence media coverage.

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Thus, the extant academic literature suggests that the electoral effects of Vice-Presidential candidates are quite limited, and any such effects are likely to be unique to specific electoral contexts. The findings of these academic studies are often based on considerations that are theoretically and temporally proximate to voting choice in particular elections. The effects of the Vice-Presidential nominee on vote choice for the national ticket are often estimated using respondent evaluations of the specific running mate, and, in such studies, the personal characteristics and campaign performances of running mates clearly matter. It is difficult to evaluate the effects of the choice of running mate in specific elections without considering such phenomena as Spiro Agnew’s ethnic gaffes, Thomas Eagleton’s psychiatric history, Dan Quayle’s numerous gaffes, or Sarah Palin’s inexperience or poor media interview performances.6 But these cases suggest that Vice-Presidential candidates are greatest when the nominee is seen as unfit to be president. Nevertheless, journalistic and scholarly analyses alike have suggested that Presidential candidates often choose running mates for strategic purposes, and regard potential Vice-Presidential candidates (at least in part) as representatives of electorally important groups. “Balancing the ticket” is often considered an important element in the selection of a potential Vice President.7 Vice-presidential nominees are often said to have been selected to bring geographical balance to a national ticket (witness the Kennedy-Johnson and Dukakis-Bentsen “Boston-Austin” tickets in 1960 and 1988, respectively), or to provide ideological balance (e.g., Eisenhower-Nixon in 1952 and 1956, Reagan and George H.W. Bush in 1980; McCain and Sarah Palin in 2008, and, arguably, TrumpPence in 2016). Running mates may also be selected to enhance the chances for the national ticket in a specific electorally important state or for a specific constituency.8 For example, in the 2016 Presidential election, Michael Pence was chosen as Donald Trump’s running mate to reassure socially conservative evangelicals who had reservations about Donald Trump and to strengthen his appeal in the Midwest. Conversely, Hillary Clinton’s selection of Timothy Kaine as her running mate may have been motivated by her desire to carry Kaine’s home state of Virginia, which was regarded as very competitive, and electorally crucial, as well as to appeal to white Catholic voters in the upper Midwest.9

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The “Catholic Vote” After the Al Smith debacle of 1928, Catholic candidates for national office were considered by some to be electoral poison. However, even before John F. Kennedy’s victory in 1960, the idea that adding a Catholic to a national ticket could be electorally advantageous was occasionally asserted. Indeed, when Kennedy sought the Vice-Presidential nomination in 1956, Kennedy aide Theodore Sorensen wrote a memo, arguing that the selection of a Catholic running mate for presumptive nominee Adlai Stevenson could be a net advantage in a number of competitive states that would be important in putting together an Electoral College majority. This document, circulated under the name of Connecticut party chair John Bailey, was entitled “The Catholic Vote in 1952 and 1956.” The “Bailey memo” suggested that the Catholic vote could be decisive in as many as 14 states.10 Kennedy’s narrow victory in 1960 laid to rest the notion that a Catholic could not win national office, and religion clearly mattered in the election. To demonstrate that he could win votes in heavily protestant states, Kennedy entered and won the West Virginia Democratic primary. In a campaign stop in Dallas, Kennedy made it clear that he did not speak for the Catholic Church in politics nor did the church speak for him. Kennedy is reported to have carried fully 80% of the Catholic vote with record turnout in ethnic Catholic neighborhoods, and despite organized opposition from nationally known Protestant preachers such as Billy Graham, received about the same share of the Protestant vote as had Stevenson in 1956. For many Catholics, the Kennedy campaign was a moment of immense pride—Joe Biden has frequently spoken of the inspiration he took from the Kennedy candidacy. In the next three elections, Catholics were on the ticket as Vice-Presidential nominees. Barry Goldwater chose William Miller, a Congressman from New York, in 1964. Hubert Humphrey chose Edward Muskie, a Senator from Maine, in 1988. George McGovern chose first Thomas Eagleton, a Senator from Missouri, and then Sargent Shriver, a former ambassador to France and brother-in-law to John Kennedy, in 1972. Then after an interregnum, Walter Mondale chose Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro in 1984, Obama chose Senator Joseph Biden in 2008 and 2012, Mitt Romney chose Congressman Paul Ryan in 2012, and Hillary Clinton chose Senator Timothy Kaine in 2016. The 2012 election

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was the first in history to feature Catholic Vice-Presidential candidates from both major parties. It is difficult to determine the extent to which the Catholicism of potential running mates was an important consideration in their selection. With the unfortunate counterexample of Adlai Stevenson’s decision to leave the choice of running mate to the national convention in 1956, the selection of a Vice-Presidential candidate is a choice for which newly named Presidential nominees have unusual discretion.11 Clearly, the importance of the religious affiliation of potential Vice-Presidential candidates will vary from election to election. Some journalistic accounts have emphasized that Thomas Eagleton’s Catholicism as well as his forthright opposition to legal abortion were important considerations in George McGovern’s choice of Eagleton as a Vice-Presidential nominee. Conversely, after Eagleton’s controversial withdrawal from the national ticket, Eagleton’s replacement by Catholic R. Sargent Shriver was the result of McGovern’s extended and humiliating public search for a replacement. It seems unlikely that Shriver’s selection was in any way related to Shriver’s Catholicism. The religious affiliation of Mondale’s running mate, Geraldine Ferraro, in 1984, was overshadowed by Ferraro’s status as the first female candidate for national office in US history. Similarly, although Joseph Biden’s Catholicism was mentioned in many news stories (particularly in 2008), it seems likely that Biden’s longtime Washington experience, especially in foreign policy, was a more important consideration. Of course, these conjectures are mere speculation, since the choice of running mate is often made by a very small group of campaign insiders.12 It is reasonable to suppose that the Catholic affiliation of potential Vice-Presidential candidates might be a consideration in their selection and that such affiliation might have some impact on individual vote decisions. Catholic voters might be more likely to support a ticket with a Catholic Vice-Presidential candidate, but any voter who harbor antiCatholic animus might in turn be less likely to vote for that ticket. White evangelicals Protestants have traditionally held negative views of the Catholic Church, and this has been especially true among those who supported Christian Right groups.13 Thus, a ticket with a Catholic VicePresidential running mate might win additional votes among Catholics, but lose votes among white evangelicals. But this expectation is contingent on changing political alignments and elite messaging, and on the changing composition of the Catholic

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Church. Over time the demographics of the Catholic Church have changed and with them the partisanship of Catholics. Since World War II, the white Catholic population in the United States has shifted from a largely immigrant, working-class group to a segment of the population in which educational, economic, and social class characteristics do not differ substantially from other Americans.14 The assimilation of white Catholics seems virtually complete. As white Catholics have moved into the middle class, their partisanship has changed, making them a crucial swing vote in most elections.15 As white Catholics have moved to the GOP, the church has increasingly welcomed Hispanic immigrants who now constitute a sizable bloc in the church. By 2020, more than a third of all American Catholics were Hispanic, and fully 41% are racial-ethnic minorities.16 As the church becomes diverse, white Catholic voters have moved strongly to the GOP, peaking with 60% casting ballots for Donald Trump in 2016, with Hispanic Catholic voters leaning heavily to Democrats. The partisan leanings of both American Catholics and evangelicals have changed markedly over time, with Catholics becoming a “swing vote” in elections, and evangelicals becoming the most dependable core of the GOP. Wuthnow has argued that American religion has undergone a “restructuring,” in which religious cleavages are no longer based on differences in denomination or doctrine but are rather focused on degrees of religiosity.17 In other words, the American religious landscape has come to resemble a two-party system, in which religious traditionalists are pitted against more progressive and perhaps less religious groups in the population.18 In this landscape, religious identity is less important than partisan attachment, which itself is a powerful identity.19 Wilson has provided an insightful comparison of the differences between the Kennedy campaign of 1960 and the Kerry campaign of 2004.20 Both Kennedy and Kerry were Catholic, Democratic senators from Massachusetts (with a common set of initials). However, Wilson’s analysis shows that the electoral bases of the two candidacies were quite different. Kennedy appealed primarily to voters identifying as Catholic, across levels of religiosity, and was opposed rather strongly by religiously observant Protestants. By contrast, Kerry drew disproportionate support from less observant Christians, regardless of denominational affiliation. Put another way, Kennedy’s most loyal constituency in 1960 was comprised of Roman Catholics who frequently attended religious services.

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By 2004, Kerry was relatively popular with Catholics who attended church less frequently, but Bush drew a majority of the votes of frequent Mass attenders. Thus, one very careful comparison of the Catholic Presidential vote in 1960 and 2004 is entirely consistent with Wuthnow’s restructuring hypothesis. But this religious restructuring did not happen entirely on its own. Rather, political and partisan actors put great effort into creating cultural cleavages that would benefit their candidates and parties. Republican activists helped create organizations to woo conservative religious groups to their party.21 The most visible of these efforts was the Christian Right organizations of the 1980s through early 2000s, which conducted voter registration drives and passed out millions of voter guides. In its earliest forms the movement targeted white evangelicals, and especially the fundamentalist wing of evangelicalism, but by the late 1990s the Christian Coalition and other groups were attempting to appeal explicitly to conservative Catholics.22 Republican efforts to woo conservative white Catholic voters kicked into high gear in the early years of the Reagan presidency, targeting voters with appeals on issues such as abortion, “family values,” antiCommunism, and racial issues. Although the bishops frequently quarreled with the Reagan administration on issues, their primary focus was on the abortion issue, and Reagan’s conversion to the pro-life cause led conservative Catholics to rally to his reelection campaign. Whereas Catholic leaders in other countries frequently focused on poverty, inequality, social justice, and the health of the community, many leading voices in the Catholic community were single-issue advocates. As a result, John Kerry, whose Catholic faith was so deeply held that he once considered entering the priesthood, was denied communion during the campaign on orders of some bishops. In 2008, more than 80 American bishops proclaimed that Catholics should make abortion the defining issue in their vote. As conservative white Catholics moved into the Republican Party, white Evangelical antipathy waned. The conservative teachings of Pope John Paul II appealed to many evangelicals, who found themselves working in politics on the same issues, in the same interest groups, and on behalf of the same candidates. Second-generation Christian Right groups such as the Christian Coalition did heavy messaging to alleviate anti-Catholic sentiments among their evangelical members.23

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The engagement with Evangelicals changed also affected Catholics. A subset of white Catholics became involved in a charismatic renewal movement within the faith, regularly viewed evangelical televangelists, and/or identified as evangelical. Some came to support second-generation Christian Right organizations, although they retained distinctive positions on some issues.24 As church leaders came to prioritize opposition to abortion above other teachings, these conservative Catholics became the most frequent attendees at mass, while more moderate to liberal Catholics became less observant, especially in dioceses with conservative Bishops. The focus of this study is on the effects of Catholic candidates for Vice President on individual vote choices from 1968 to 2016. We hypothesize that the presence of a Roman Catholic as a Democratic running mate will, ceteris paribus, slightly increase the share of the Catholic vote, and decrease the vote share among white evangelicals. But we expect that these relationships will change over time. Because GOP efforts to woo conservative Catholics kicked into high gear during Reagan’s first term, we will divide the study into two periods—an early period between 1968 and 1980, and a later period from 1984 through 2000. During this period, Republicans nominated only a single Catholic Vice-Presidential candidate, in 2012, but since that election also featured a Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate, we will exclude this election from our analysis. Thus, all of the Catholic Vice-Presidential candidates in our study are Democrats. We further expect that the relationship between Catholicism and Democratic vote choice will not be consistent for all Catholics. Rather, we expect the relationship between Catholic religious identity and vote choice to vary based on an individual’s religiosity. In the first period, we expect that the presence of a Catholic running mate might increase the share of the Catholic vote among frequently attending Catholics. In the later period, we expect to find that Catholics who hold strong attachments to the church holding constant attendance to be the most influenced by a Catholic candidate on the ticket.25 In 2020, a former Catholic Vice President won the presidency, becoming only the second Catholic president in US history. Biden mounted substantial outreach to Catholic voters, and especially to white Catholics in the upper Midwest-states that were essential for his victory. The final portion of this chapter will examine the 2020 Presidential election, one that pitted a man who regularly attended mass and who carried his son’s rosary always in his pocket against an incumbent president who

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was the poster boy for each of the seven deadly sins. We are writing this chapter before survey data are available to duplicate the statistical analysis below. We will therefore discuss the Catholic vote in the 2020 election, and Biden’s courting of that vote, using qualitative sources.

Data and Method Data for this study come from the General Social Surveys (GSS), 1972– 2018. Separate analyses were conducted using pooled surveys for elections in which the Democratic Party nominated a Roman Catholic for Vice President (1968, 1972, 1984, 2008, and 2016) and for those in which the Democratic Vice-Presidential nominee was not a Catholic (1976, 1980, 1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000).26 We exclude the 2004 and 2012 presidential elections, because the former featured a Catholic Democratic presidential candidate, and the latter pitted two Catholic running mates against one another. In this chapter, we present the results of Linear Probability Models with Ordinary Least Squares multivariate regression because these models can be interpreted directly. We also conducted Logit models for each set of analyses.27 Over the course of these surveys, the partisanship of Catholics changed substantially. In the 1972 survey, 58% of Catholics identified as Democrats and only 21% identified as Republicans. By the 1990 survey, only 43% identified as Democrats and 41% identified as Republicans. By the 2016 survey, the figures had dropped to 37% Democrats and 38% Republicans. Among white Catholics, Democratic identification dropped from 57% in 1972 to 34% in 2018, and Republican identification increased from 21 to 44% during this period. Since we control for partisanship in the models, this underlying change is important to keep in mind. Our dependent variable is recalled presidential vote, coded as one for the Democratic ticket, and zero for the Republican ticket. All third-party votes are excluded from the analysis. In Table 8.1, the main independent variable is the voter’s religious affiliation, coded as a dummy variable in which the voter is classified as a Catholic or as a non-Catholic, with a dummy variable also for evangelicals. In the second set of analyses, we use interaction terms to examine the extent to which vote choice varies among Catholics: we include an interaction term between Catholic selfidentification and church attendance, in order to isolate the effects of

Weighting variable

Other race

Black

Woman

Highest degree

South

Democrat

Evangelical

Attendance

−0.011*** (0.002) −0.035* (0.014) 0.504*** (0.011) −0.122*** (0.012) 0.020*** (0.005) 0.015 (0.011) 0.391*** (0.018) 0.013 (0.100) −0.010 (0.014)

0.047*** (0.014)

0.035** (0.013)

−0.007*** (0.002) 0.027* (0.012) 0.571*** (0.010) 0.010 (0.010) −0.011** (0.004) 0.017’ (0.010) 0.238*** (0.013) 0.070 (0.043) −0.023’ (0.012)

Early period: Catholic VP (2)

Early period: no Catholic VP (1)

Dependent variable

−0.009 (0.009) −0.025*** (0.004) −0.010*** (0.002) −0.065*** (0.009) 0.592*** (0.009) −0.042*** (0.008) 0.023*** (0.003) 0.034*** (0.007) 0.323*** (0.011) 0.144*** (0.021) −0.021** (0.008)

−0.021** (0.008) −0.014*** (0.004) −0.010*** (0.002) −0.051*** (0.008) 0.647*** (0.007) −0.031*** (0.007) 0.006* (0.003) 0.029*** (0.006) 0.208*** (0.010) 0.081*** (0.019) −0.013 (0.007)

Late period: no Catholic VP Late period: Catholic (3) VP (4)

Multivariate models of vote for democratic ticket without interactions

Strength of religious identity

Catholic

Table 8.1

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0.148*** (0.020) 5389 0.381 0.380 0.388 (df = 5378) 331.029*** (df = 10; 5378)

0.227*** (0.018) 6991 0.402 0.401 0.387 (df = 6980) 468.354*** (df = 10; 6980)

Note Robust standard errors in parentheses ’p < 0.1; * p; ** p; *** p < 0.001

Observations R2 Adjusted R 2 Residual std. error F Statistic

Constant

Early period: Catholic VP (2)

Early period: no Catholic VP (1)

Dependent variable

0.262*** (0.013) 13,531 0.514 0.513 0.349 (df = 13,519) 1299.260*** (df = 11; 13,519)

0.257*** (0.015) 9376 0.507 0.507 0.351 (df = 9364) 877.064*** (df = 11; 9364)

Late period: no Catholic VP Late period: Catholic (3) VP (4)

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being a religious observant Catholic, and, in the latter period, an interaction between the strength of attachment to the church and Catholic affiliation. Also, of interest to this study, we identify Evangelical Protestants. Finally, we control for church attendance and religious attachment, to better interpret the interaction effects. Because this study has as its primary focus the distinctive effects of religious variables, the models presented below include fairly elaborate multivariate controls, including party identification, residence in the South, race, education, and gender. Our strategy is to compare the coefficients for Catholics and evangelicals, and for frequently attending Catholics and those who are strongly attached to their church, in election cycles in both periods where there were Catholic Democratic Vice-Presidential candidates, and where there were not.

Findings The first two columns of Table 8.1 show the voting behavior of Catholics and evangelicals in the early period of the religious restructuring from 1968 through the 1980 elections. We first compare the coefficients for Catholics, and for Evangelicals, in years without a Catholic VicePresidential candidate (1976 and 1980) with years with a Catholic running mate (1968 and 1972). Because the measure of religious attachment was not asked in the 1972 survey, we do not include that variable in this table, but separate analysis (not shown) reveals that its inclusion does not change the results.28 The presence of a Catholic running mate does affect the vote choice of Catholics in this period, with the relationship between Catholic identity and Democratic vote choice reaching statistical significance. We find that in both elections without a Catholic Vice-Presidential candidate on the ticket and years with a Catholic Vice-Presidential candidate, Catholics are more likely to vote for the Democratic ticket than are non-Catholics. While the relationship between Catholic identity and Democratic vote choice is positive in both years with a Catholic on the ticket and years without, in support of our hypotheses, we find that this relationship is stronger in years with a Catholic on the Democratic ticket. Catholic religious identity is associated with a 4.7% increased likelihood in voting for the Democratic ticket in years with a Catholic on the ticket in comparison to a 3.5% increased likelihood to vote for the Democrats in years without a Catholic running mate.

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We also find a relationship between the presence of a Catholic running mate and Evangelical vote choice in this early period. In years without Catholic Vice-Presidential candidates, evangelicals were modestly but significantly more likely to vote for the Democratic ticket, and in those with a Catholic on the ticket they were less likely to do so. Moreover, southerners were less likely to support the Democratic ticket when Catholics occupied the Vice-Presidential slot. Evangelical antipathy toward Catholics, especially among fundamentalists, appears to have cost the Democrats votes in both 1968 and 1972. In both periods, those who exhibit more public or private religiosity are less likely to cast Democratic ballots. The connection between generic religious attachment and voting for conservative parties is well documented across the globe. In Table 8.2 we add interaction effects to determine which groups of Catholics are most affected by the presence of a Catholic VP candidate. We find that in years without a Catholic on the Democratic ticket in the early period, Catholicism and church attendance are positively related. More frequently attending Catholics are more likely to support the Democratic ticket than are less frequently attending Catholics. In comparison, for non-Catholics in the same period, a respondent’s likelihood of supporting the Democratic ticket decreases as their religious attendance increases. In years with Catholics on the ticket, frequency of church attendance leads to higher levels of Republican voting among Catholics and non-Catholics alike. But among Catholics, the effects of church attendance are far less—that is, the rate of defecting from the Democratic Party is smaller for Catholics than it is for non-Catholics. This relationship narrowly misses the conventional standards of statistical significance and should be interpreted with caution (Images 8.1 and 8.2). In the later period of our analysis (i.e., the 1984–2016 elections) we find that in elections without a Catholic Vice-Presidential candidate on the ticket, Catholics are slightly but significantly less likely to vote for the Democratic ticket, holding constant other factors. In elections with a Catholic Vice-Presidential candidate on the ticket, the relationship between Catholic identity and vote choice is not statistically significant, suggesting that Catholics are no more or less likely to vote for Republican candidates in years with a Catholic Vice-Presidential candidate on the ticket. We also find that regardless of whether or not a Catholic is on the Democratic ticket. Evangelicals in this period realigned to become

Other race

Black

Woman

Highest degree

South

Democrat

Evangelical

Catholic, attendance interaction

Attendance

Catholic, strength of religious identity interaction −0.013*** (0.002) 0.009’

(0.005) −0.027’ (0.014) 0.496*** (0.011) −0.115*** (0.012) 0.021*** (0.005) 0.016 (0.011) 0.387*** (0.019) 0.029 (0.102)

(0.005) 0.030* (0.012) 0.570*** (0.010) 0.011 (0.010) −0.011** (0.004) 0.017 (0.010) 0.239*** (0.017) 0.071 (0.043)

−0.006 (0.030)

−0.010 (0.025)

−0.009*** (0.002) 0.010*

RC VP (2)

Early period: 1968–1980 elections No RC VP (1)

Dependent variable: vote for democratic ticket

(0.004) −0.063*** (0.009) 0.592*** (0.009) −0.041*** (0.008) 0.023*** (0.003) 0.034*** (0.008) 0.324*** (0.011) 0.144*** (0.021)

(0.012) −0.010*** (0.002) −0.003

(0.010) −0.010*** (0.004) −0.003 (0.004) −0.050*** (0.008) 0.646*** (0.007) −0.031*** (0.006) 0.006* (0.002) 0.029*** (0.006) 0.209*** (0.010) 0.081*** (0.019)

−0.067* (0.029) −0.030*** (0.005) 0.026*

RC VP (4)

−0.047’ (0.024) −0.017*** (0.004) 0.013

Late period: 1984–2016 elections No RC VP (3)

Multivariate linear probability models of vote for democratic ticket

Strength of religious identity

Catholic

Table 8.2

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−0.008 (0.015) 0.146*** (0.021) 5304 0.372 0.371 0.389 (df = 5292) 285.032*** (df = 11; 5292)

−0.024* (0.012) 0.236*** (0.018) 6991 0.402 0.401 0.387 (df = 6979) 426.502*** (df = 11; 6979)

Note Robust standard errors in parentheses ’p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Observations R2 Adjusted R 2 Residual std. error F statistic

Constant

Weighting variable

RC VP (2)

Early period: 1968–1980 elections No RC VP (1)

Dependent variable: vote for democratic ticket

−0.013’ (0.007) 0.266*** (0.014) 13,518 0.514 0.514 0.349 (df = 13,518) 1100*** (df = 13; 13,517)

Late period: 1984–2016 elections No RC VP (3)

−0.021** (0.007) 0.266*** (0.016) 9363 0.508 0.507 0.351 (df = 9362) 742.9*** (df = 13; 9362)

RC VP (4)

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Image 8.1 Predicted vote choice: early period with Catholic VP

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Image 8.2 Predicted vote choice: early period with no Catholic VP

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one of the consistently strongest GOP voting bloc, as evident by their strongly negative coefficient in both sets of models. As seen in Table 8.2, the interaction between Catholic affiliation and church attendance is not significant in the later time period. The interaction between religious identity and strength of religious affiliation, however, is significant in elections with a Catholic Vice-Presidential candidate on the ticket. As the strength of religious affiliation increases, the likelihood that a respondent votes for the Democratic ticket decreases for both Catholics and non-Catholics. But once again, the rate of decline is smaller for Catholics than it is for non-Catholics (Image 8.3). Other relationships in the tables confirm the changes in the electorate that have been observed by others. In both the early and later periods, Black respondents are substantively and statistically significantly more likely to support the Democratic ticket than are white respondents. The gender gap became statistically significant in the second period. The relationships among religious identity, strength of affiliation, attendance, and vote choice are small, and their statistical significance is helped along by a large number of cases in the pooled GSS data sets. But small effects can have major consequences in close presidential elections, and in recent elections both parties have devoted substantial resources to targeting diverse sets of Catholic voters. Overall, they confirm the religious restructuring discussed above. In the first period, Catholics were more likely to vote for the Democratic ticket regardless of the faith of the Vice-Presidential candidate but a Catholic running mate cost the Democratic ticket votes among white evangelicals. In the second period, Evangelicals vote for the Republican ticket regardless of the VicePresidential candidate’s religious identity and a Catholic running mate may prevent Catholic voters from defecting from the Democratic Party. Despite breathless journalistic headlines that crop up every four years, there is no single Catholic vote. Catholics are divided as are most groups of Americans by partisanship, by ideology, by issue positions, by region, by class, and by ethnicity. Over the period of this study white Catholics have moved strongly toward the Republican Party but are offset by a rapidly growing Hispanic cohort in the church. As previous research has shown, the results of this study suggest that the characteristics of candidates for Vice President generally matter very little in national elections in the United States. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a recent Presidential election (with the possible exception of

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Image 8.3 Predicted vote choice: late period with Catholic VP

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1960) in which the choice of a running mate could plausibly be considered decisive. Specifically for purposes of this study, it seems unlikely that the presence of a Roman Catholic on a national ticket significantly affected the outcome of any particular Presidential election. Despite the attention paid to the selection of running mates by political activists and the news media, the effects of Catholic running mates do not appear to have mattered much in specific national elections.

When a Catholic VP Runs for President In 2008, Joe Biden became the first Catholic to serve as Vice President. The death of his son Beau in 2015 led him to abandon any effort to seek the presidency in 2016. In 2020 he prevailed in a crowded Democratic field to become the Democratic nominee for president, and in the general election to become the second Catholic president in US history. We write this chapter before the final release of academic surveys of this election cycle, and exit polls of the 2020 election are problematic as pollsters struggled to adapt to an election with record early voting by mail and dropbox. What happens when a Catholic Vice President runs for president? In 2016 Donald Trump had surprised all observers including himself by squeezing out a narrow Electoral College victory despite losing by nearly three million popular votes. Although Trump repeatedly demonstrated his lack of familiarity with religion on the campaign trail, including dropping money in a communion plate, he carried the white evangelical vote by an overwhelming margin. Evangelical leaders who had emphatically declared that Bill Clinton’s personal conduct made him unfit to be president, now declared with equal fervor that the private life of a candidate is not important. Despite the presence of an observant Catholic on the Democratic ticket, validated exit polls by the Pew Center showed Trump carrying the Catholic vote 52-44, with Trump’s total equaling that of George W. Bush in his race against Catholic John Kerry. Trump entered the 2020 campaign hoping to do as well as he had in 2016. Joe Biden ran as the most overtly devout Catholic presidential candidate in history. Throughout his life, he has regularly attended Mass every week, and now carries his son Beau’s rosary in his pocket at all times. He sought to frame the 2020 election as a clear moral choice. Throughout the campaign, his speeches were liberally laced with biblical verses, and with references to God or the Pope. He regularly framed issues of racism,

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poverty, health care, and government in terms of Catholic teaching, and biblical language. He steered clear of social issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage—both issues on which his position has evolved and become more liberal. Biden initially supported the pro-life Constitutional amendment in 1982 and supported the Mexico City policy and the Hyde amendment, but by 2020 was running as a solidly pro-choice candidate. Aides begged John Kerry to release a statement of his faith in 2004, but he refused.29 In contrast, Biden aired three ads centered on his faith in key states, focusing on how his faith has shaped his values, how it sustained him through the death of his wife and daughter and later of his son, and one featuring interviews with his parishioners about his regular participation in mass. In each case, these ads were not specifically about Catholic doctrine, but rather about how faith had formed and sustained him. These ads were targeted in part at a group that is imprecisely called “cultural Catholics”—a group which includes those with some identity as Catholic in some way, and who vary in their level of overt religiosity and their doctrinal beliefs. They have less attachment to the institutional church, although a substantial majority of them hold core Christian beliefs. Cultural Catholics tend to be younger and more ethnically diverse and to care about issues such as taking care of the poor and vulnerable. But surveys, including those cited below, frequently do not identify these voters as Catholic. In contrast, the Trump campaign appealed to pro-life Catholics by touting his conservative court appointees, and by nominating Amy Coney Barrett to replace the late Justice Ruth Ginsburg on the Supreme Court. When Democrats raised questions about her membership in a tight-knit group called People of Praise, Trump defended the charismatic group. Trump had for years quarreled visibly with the Pope, who criticized his plan to separate families with a border wall among other policies. The Pope questioned Trump’s Christian credentials, to which Trump responded in typical fashion, calling the Pope disgraceful. During the campaign, Trump tweeted an endorsement from a bishop who had called on the Pope to resign while calling efforts to lockdown against COVID and Black Lives Matter protests part of the battle of children of darkness against children of light. Both campaigns targeted particular segments of the Catholic population, with Trump targeting frequently attending, conservative white Catholics, and Biden targeting both less observant white Catholics and

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Hispanic Catholics. Both campaigns used micro-targeted mailings and phone calls. The 2020 election presented a clear but complex choice for Catholics. Trump quarreled publicly with the Pope, and his values and lifestyle were clearly at odds with Catholic teachings. His policies on poverty, health care, death penalty, family separation, and many other issues were inconsistent with church teachings. But for those who cared about abortion above all other issues, Trump’s record of judicial appointments was exemplary. Biden was a lifelong devout Catholic whose family values and lifestyle were in line with church teachings. And his policies on poverty, health care, death penalty, and family separation and many other issues were in line with the church, but his position on abortion was clearly and unequivocally pro-choice. Exit and post-election polls have produced mixed results on the voting of Catholics in 2020. The surveys used complicated mixed methods to deal with an electorate that voted in different ways at different times. AP Votecast showed the Catholic vote evenly divided, with 50% for Trump and 49% for Biden. The AP Votecast poll was not conducted in 2016, so we cannot compare this with the previous election. Traditional exit polls by Edison Research showed that Biden won the Catholic vote 52 to 47%, a marked change from the 2016 exit polls that showed Trump carrying Catholics 50 to 46%. By Edison’s reckoning, Biden increased the Democratic share of the Catholic vote from 46 to 52%, while Trump’s share declined from 50 to 47%. As noted above, neither of these sets of surveys identifies the “cultural Catholics” who were targeted by the Biden campaign. The Edison exit polls also suggest that Biden did slightly better among evangelical Protestants than had Clinton. Biden had worked hard to win a bigger slice of the evangelical vote, using his own faith language and personal testimony as a key element in the appeal. Edison showed that Biden increased the Democratic vote share from 16 to 24% and that Trump’s share dropped from 80 to 76%. Ryan Burge, using the preliminary release of data from the Cooperative Election Study Common Content, concludes that Trump did slightly better among evangelicals than he had in 2016 and that Biden did no better than had Clinton. He concluded that Trump did slightly better among white Catholics in 2020 than he had in 2016 and did slightly better among Hispanic Catholics than in 2016 as well. But the substantially higher turnout among Hispanic Catholics in 2020 helped offset

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Trump’s higher share of this group. Burge notes that these results are preliminary, awaiting voter validation and possible reweighting.30 Although these results yield different interpretation of whether Biden increased his share among Catholics, all three studies confirm that the Catholic vote was once again divided evenly. And in an election that pitted the most devout Catholic in history running openly on his faith against a non-Catholic whose knowledge of religion is superficial at best, this might seem counterintuitive. The explanation does not lie in the abortion issue—indeed Catholics do not hold distinctively conservative positions on abortion. The answer lies instead in partisanship. Over the past decade, partisan polarization has increased sharply. Voters increasingly use partisan cues to shape their interaction with the political world and their perceptions of candidates and parties. A survey in March 2021 by the Pew Center for Religion in Public Life shows the impact of partisanship in perceptions of the faith of Joe Biden and Donald Trump. When asked if Joe Biden was very religious, somewhat religious, not too religious, or not religious at all, 88% of Democrats replied that he was at least somewhat religious. But only 36% of Republicans perceived Biden this way, with fully 29% of Republicans saying that he was “not religious at all.” Among Catholics, 90% of Democrats perceived Biden as at least somewhat religious, but only 43% of Catholic Republicans did so. In contrast, a majority of Republicans perceive Donald Trump as at least somewhat religious, including Catholic Republicans.31 Against such powerful partisan filters, it is difficult for even the most clear-cut religious messages to get through.

Notes 1. Adkinson, Daniel. 1972. “The Electoral Significance of the Vice Presidency,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 12: 330–336; Romero, David W. 2004. “Requiem for a Lightweight: Vice Presidential Candidate Evaluations and the Presidential Vote,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 3: 454–463; Grofman, Bernard, and Reuben Kline. 2010. “Evaluating the Impact of Vice Presidential Selection on Voter Choice,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 40: 303–309. 2. Wattenberg, Martin P. 1995. “The Role of the Vice-President Candidate Evaluations in Presidential Voting,” American Politics Research 23: 504–514.

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3. Romero, 2004. 4. Knuckey, Jonathan. 2012. “The ‘Palin Effect’ in the 2008 US Presidential Election,” Political Research Quarterly 63: 275– 289; Ulbig, Stacy G. 2010. “The Appeal of Second Bananas: The Impact of Vice Presidential Candidates on Presidential Vote Choice, Yesterday and Today,” American Politics Research 38: 330–335; Grofman and Kline, 2010. 5. Ulbig, 2010. 6. Knuckey, 2012. 7. Natoli, M.D. 1985. American Prince, American Pauper: The Contemporary Vice Presidency in Perspective. Westport, CT: Greenwood; Nelson, Michael. 1988. “Choosing the Vice President,” PS: Political Science and Politics 21: 858–868; Polsby, Nelson, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1991. Presidential Elections: Contemporary Strategies of American Electoral Politics (8th edition). New York: Free Press; Mayer, W.G. 2000. “A Brief History of Vice Presidential Selection,” in William G. Mayer (ed.) In Pursuit of the White House: How We Choose Our Presidential Nominees. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House: 313–374. 8. Devine, Christopher J., and Kyle C. Kopko. 2016. The VP Advantage: How Running Mates Influence Home State Voting in Presidential Elections. Manchester University Press. 9. Of course, it may be the case that running mates are chosen for idiosyncratic reasons that are unique to specific electoral contexts. For example, I am tempted to speculate that Gore’s choice of Joseph Lieberman in 2000 may have been motivated by Lieberman’s reputation for religiosity and conservative lifestyle, which would have constituted a welcome antidote to the allegations of Bill’s Clinton’s sexual activities. Similarly, John McCain’s selection of Sarah Palin in 2008 may have been based on McCain’s desire to deflect public attention from Barack Obama’s triumphant nomination during the prior week. 10. Shat, John T. 2013. JFK in the Senate: Pathway to the Presidency. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 168. 11. Uscinski, Joseph. 2012, “Smith (and Jones) Go to Washington: Democracy and Vice-Presidential Selection,” PS (January): 58–66. 12. Uscinski, 2012. 13. Wilcox, Clyde, 1989. “Evangelicals and the Moral Majority” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 28: 400–414; Kellstedt,

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Lyman, 1988. “The Falwell Issue Agenda: Sources of Support Among White Protest Evangelicals,” in M. Lynn and D. Moberg (eds.) Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion. New York: JAI Press. 14. Jelen, Ted G. 2007. “The American Church: Of Being Catholic and American,” in Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence C. Reardon, and Clyde Wilcox (eds.) The Catholic Church and the Nation-State: Comparative Perspectives. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press: 69–88. 15. For example, Catholic priests have changed their votes across election cycles. See Jelen, Ted G. 2003. “Catholic Priests and the Political Order: The Political Behavior of Catholic Pastors,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 43: 591–604. 16. Espinosa, Gaston. 2020. “Response to Catholic Faith in the 2020 Election,” Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-cat holic-factor-in-the-2020-election. 17. Wuthnow, Robert. 1988. The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith Since World War II . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 18. Hunter, James Davison. 1991. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York: Basic Books; Hunter, James Davison. 1994. Before the Shooting Begins. New York: The Free Press. 19. Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identity of Voters. New Haven: Yale University Press. 20. Wilson, J. Matthew. 2007. From JFK to JFK: The Changing Catholic Voter,” in David E. Campbell (ed.) A Matter of Faith? Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election. Washington, DC: Brookings. 21. Leege, David C., Kenneth D. Wald, Brian S. Krueger, and Paul Mueller. 2002. The Politics of Cultural Differences: Social Change and Voter Mobilization Strategies in the Post-New Deal Period. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 22. Rozell, Mark J., and Clyde Wilcox. 1996. Second Coming: The New Christian Right in Virginia Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 23. Wilcox, Clyde, and Carin Robinson. Onward Christian Soldiers: The Christian Right in American Politics (4th edition) Boulder,

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CO: Westview Press; Robinson, Carin. 2008. Doctrine, Discussion and Disagreement: Evangelical Protestant Interaction with Catholics in American Politics. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University; Robinson, Carin. 2010. “Cross-Cutting Messages and Political Tolerance: An Experiment Using Evangelical Protestants,” Political Behavior 32: 495–515; Wilcox, Clyde, 2010. “The Christian Rightand Civic Virtue,” in Alan Wolfe and Ira Katznelson (eds.) Religion and Democracy in the United States: Danger or Opportunity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 24. Welch, Michael R., and David C. Leege. 1991. “Dual Reference Groups and Political Orientations: An Examination of Evangelically Oriented Catholics,” American Journal of Political Science 35: 28–56; Bendyna, Mary, John C. Green, Mark J. Rozell, and Clyde Wilcox. 2000. “Catholics and the Christian Right: A View from Four States,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 39: 321–332; Mark J. Rozell, Clyde Wilcox, and John C. Green. 1998. “Religious Constituencies and Support for the Christian Right in the 1990s,” Social Science Quarterly 79: 815–827. 25. The variable that measures strength of religious affiliation, was not asked by the GSS in all the years within the early period of our analysis. Because of this, we include the Catholicism, strength of religious affiliation interaction in the second period of our analysis but not the first. 26. In order to facilitate comparison, the GSS asked about presidential vote in multiple years. We therefore use recalled presidential vote in all survey years. In those surveys include recalled votes from two separate presidential elections we include only the latter variable to avoid double counting a particular survey. See the GSS codebook for more information. Andersen (1979) has shown that recall data about presidential votes is generally accurate (Andersen, Kristi. 1979. The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928–1936. Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 27. In both the LPM and Logit models, the same variables were statistically significant, so we feel comfortable presenting the Linear Probability Models in this chapter. 28. By including the religious salience and interaction in these equations we lose the 1968 election, which is recalled in the 1972 survey. But the coefficients are remarkably similar with and without it in the equation.

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29. John C. Green, Mark J. Rozell, and Clyde Wilcox (eds.). 2006. The Values Campaign?: The Christian Right in the 2004 Elections. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 30. Burge, Ryan. 2021, March 29. “The 2020 Vote for President by Religious Groups—Christians,” https://religioninpublic.blog/ 2021/03/29/the-2020-vote-for-president-by-religious-groupschristians/. 31. https://www.pewforum.org/2021/03/30/most-democrats-andrepublicans-know-biden-is-catholic-but-they-differ-sharply-abouthow-religious-he-is/.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion: Catholics Come Home? Helping to Elect a Catholic President Again Mark M. Gray

The combined results of exit polling data reveal that the 2020 presidential election marks the first occasion in 60 years that a majority of Catholics have voted for a Catholic candidate for president. The only other opportunity to do so since the election of John Kennedy came in 2004 where the split in the Catholic vote was too close to call. The Catholic electorate has been nearly evenly divided in three of the six latest elections—regardless of the presence of a Catholic candidate. The 2020 election marked a return for a Democratic majority among Catholic voters that was last won by President Obama in 2008 and again in 2012 (Fig. 9.1). Another pattern is emerging as well. A Republican candidate has not carried a clear majority of the Catholic electorate in presidential elections since President George H.W. Bush won the election in 1988. Yet,

M. M. Gray (B) Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Gayte et al. (eds.), Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82212-5_9

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Democrat

Republican

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1950

1960

1970

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1990

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Fig. 9.1 Poll averaged two-party presidential vote of US Catholics, 1952–2020 (Note Percentages do not always add to 100% due to votes for other candidates. Averaged publicly available results from Media Exit Polls, Gallup, American National Election Studies, General Social Survey, Associated Press/NORC as of 4/29/2021)

when Republican candidates split the Catholic vote with the Democratic candidate, they have managed to win. President Biden’s 2020 Catholic vote share comes in just below what President Clinton won in 1996 and what President Obama won in 2008 and 2012. The major national surveys measuring the election outcome are not in agreement for 2020. In the American National Election Study (ANES) Biden is estimated to have won 55% of the Catholic vote and Donald Trump 43% of the Catholic vote.1 In the Media Exit Polls, Biden is estimated to have won 52% of the Catholic vote compared to Trump’s 47% of the vote. Finally, a new study conducted by NORC for the Associated Press estimated that Biden won 49% of the vote compared to 50% for President Trump. Overall, this averages out to a 52% share for Biden and 47% for Trump. What changed in the Catholic electorate from 2016 where 48% voted for Hillary Clinton and 47% for Donald Trump? How did the profile of a

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Catholic Trump voter shift? What happened among Catholic Democrats and Independents? The 2020 ANES allows for some insight into the choices made by Catholics in 2020.2

Similarities and Differences Between Catholic Voters One of the interesting characteristics of Catholicism is that it has a global hierarchical structure. It has a single leader, one Catechism, and a single system of Canon law. How then do voters under one shared umbrella of faith make such different political choices that invariably impact issues related to the Catholic Church’s teachings? To better understand how the Catholic vote split in 2020, one can compare those who voted for Biden to those who voted for Trump. What is remarkable, in many cases, is how similar these Catholics are. The few key differences speak to the key cleavages that likely play a role in determining vote choices among Catholics. The median age of Catholic voters who cast a ballot for Biden was 51 compared to 52 for Trump. Twenty-four percent of Catholic Biden voters were under the age of 34 compared to 18% for Trump. An equal share of voters for both candidates was 55 and older (45% each). Fifty-four percent of Biden’s Catholic voters were female compared to 51% of Trump’s. Forty-four percent of Biden’s Catholic voters had earned a four-year college degree or more compared to 37% of Trump’s Catholic voters. Even viewership of specific cable news channels did not generate big differences in candidate choice and sometimes produced counterintuitive results. For example, 15% of Biden’s Catholic voters indicated watching Sean Hannity on Fox News compared to ten percent of Trump’s voters. Only a few percentage points of differentiation are evident among Catholic voters for each candidate for CNN, Fox, and MSNBC evening shows. Most 2020 voters who voted in 2016 stayed within the same party when making their presidential choice. Eighty-nine percent of Trump’s Catholic voters from 2016 voted for him again in 2020. Eighty-six percent of Hillary Clinton’s 2016 voters voted for Biden in 2020. Eight percent of Biden’s Catholic voters were former Trump voters in 2016. Six percent of Trump’s Catholic voters were former Hillary Clinton voters in 2016. Biden and Trump also attracted some 2016 Catholic voters who

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didn’t vote for Trump or Clinton (six percent of Biden’s 2020 Catholic voters and four percent of Trump’s 2020 Catholic voters). One of the biggest differences in 2020 vote choice is in the selfidentification of race and/or ethnicity. Eighty-five percent of Catholic Trump voters self-identify as non-Hispanic white. By comparison, 59% of Catholic Biden voters self-identify as such. Thirty percent of Biden’s Catholic voters self-identify as Hispanic compared to ten percent of Trump’s. Another distinctive demographic feature is marital status. Sixty-five percent of Trump’s Catholic voters are married compared to 58% of Biden’s Catholic voters. Biden’s Catholic voters were more likely than Trump’s to be never married (25% compared to 18%).3 Religious behavior, as measured by Mass attendance, also shows a category of difference. This is a difficult aspect to study for the 2020 election given that it was not possible for most Catholics to attend Mass during the administration of the pre-election survey where this question was asked. The ANES question asked, “Lots of things come up that keep people from attending religious services even if they want to. Thinking about your life these days, do you ever attend religious services, apart from occasional weddings, baptisms or funerals?” Given the patterns of response we assume respondents were reporting their typical pre-pandemic behavior. Sixty-four percent of Trump’s Catholic voters said they attend religious services compared to 51% of Biden’s Catholic voters.4 Gun ownership also is associated with a difference in Catholic vote choices. Fifty-three percent of Trump’s Catholic voters have a gun in their household compared to 26% of Biden’s Catholic voters. Catholic voters appear to be divided politically by ethnicity, marital status, frequency of worship, and gun ownership. These are among the central cleavages that can be discerned by understanding the demographics and background of Catholic voters.

In the Minds of Catholic Voters Demography is clearly not electoral destiny. One of the most important attitudinal dimensions separating Catholic vote choices is political ideology. Thirty-nine percent of Catholic Biden voters describe themselves as liberal compared to two percent of Catholic Trump voters. Biden has a majority of Catholic moderates or ideologically unaligned voters at 53% compared to Trump’s 27%. Nine percent of Catholic Biden voters

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describe themselves as conservative compared to 71% of Catholic Trump voters. Biden was much more capable of crossing ideological lines among Catholic voters than Trump was (Fig. 9.2). In addition to ideology, Joe Biden benefited from Catholic voters who believed the country was on the wrong track. Ninety-five percent of Catholics who cast a ballot for Biden felt that the country was on the wrong track compared to 44% of Catholics who voted for Trump. Clearly, some of the opinions on right and wrong track was likely influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic consequences. Ninety-seven percent of Biden’s Catholic voters had no one in their household test positive for COVID-19 before the election compared to 94% of Trump’s Catholic voters. Forty-two percent of Biden’s Catholic voters believed that the limits placed on public activity due to the pandemic were not strict enough and 52% felt these were about right. By comparison, 46% of Trump’s Catholic voters felt that these limits were too strict and 39% felt these were about right.5 Although there is a distinct difference in how Catholics voted depending on whether they had a gun in their home, they are less divided on policies related to guns. For example, 83% of Catholics who voted for Biden

Trump

45% 40%

40%

38%

35% 30% 25% 20%

21%

19%

17%

18% 15%

15%

11% 9%

10% 5% 0%

2% 0% Extremely liberal

1% Liberal

1%

6% 3% 0%

Slightly liberal Moderate; Haven't Slightly ConservaƟve Extremely middle of the thought conservaƟve conservaƟve road much about this

Fig. 9.2 Ideological self-placement of US Catholic voters by 2020 vote choice

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Trump support background checks for gun purchases compared to 96% of Catholics who voted for Biden. Catholics who voted for Trump were more in agreement than those who voted for Biden about the party they preferred for handling the nation’s economy and taxes. Catholics who voted for Biden were more in agreement than those who voted for Trump about the party they preferred for handling health care, the environment, and COVID-19 (Table 9.1). Although Trump’s Catholic voters were more in agreement than Biden’s that his party would handle the economy better, Biden’s Catholic voters were more worried about the economy than Trump voters. Half of Biden’s Catholic voters were “very” (37%) or “extremely” (13%) worried about the economy compared to 16% of Trump’s voters who were “very” (10%) or “extremely” (6%) worried about the economy. One issue that clearly divides Catholic voters is abortion. Twenty-one percent of Trump’s Catholic voters believe “by law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.” Table 9.1 Which party do you think would do a better job handling Responses among Catholics by vote choice Democrats

Biden voters Trump voters Biden voters Trump voters Biden voters Trump voters Biden voters Trump voters Biden voters Trump voters

No difference

The nation’s economy 58% 32% 1% 9% Health care 83% 14% 9% 21% Taxes 55% 34% 2% 16% The environment 86% 13% 28% 32% The COVID-19 pandemic 81% 18% 5% 39%

Republicans

10% 90% 3% 69% 11% 82% 2% 40% 2% 56%

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By comparison, 64% of Biden’s Catholic voters agree with that statement. Most of Trump’s Catholic voters believe that “by law abortion should never be permitted” (19%) or that “the law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when a woman’s life is in danger” (40%). Abortion is a salient issue for both Biden and Trump voters. Majorities of both groups among Catholics say this issue is either very or extremely important to them. When asked how they would feel if the Supreme Court reduced abortion rights, 43% of Trump’s Catholic voters said they would be pleased, 21% upset, and 36% neither pleased nor upset. Sixty-three percent of Biden’s Catholic voters said they would be upset if the Court reduced abortion rights, nine percent would be pleased, and 28% neither pleased nor upset.

Conclusions One of the defining characteristics of the vote of Catholics in presidential elections is that it has been a bellwether. Voters of most other religious affiliations vote in a majority for the same party in the election after the election. This has not been the case for Catholics and is unlikely to be so in the future. Studying what divides the Catholic vote in elections can provide some insight into how the electorate, as a whole, shifts over time. While the Catholic vote in 2016 was too close to call, there were important state-level outcomes that appeared to be determinative. Trump’s majorities among Catholic voters in Ohio, Michigan, Iowa, and Florida were essential in determining the Electoral College outcome. In 2020, it is not possible to compare states because the Media Exit Polls only report on religious affiliation in three states: California, Florida, and Pennsylvania. Trump won more Catholic votes than Biden in the latter two but fewer in the former by a wide margin. Polls in 2020, both pre-election and on Election Day, tended to exclude a religious question. This appears to be a growing trend as the news media and other pollsters may be assuming that religion has little influence on the outcome of presidential elections. When this is queried it is often a question that asks respondents if they are evangelical Christian or not. This shift means the American National Election study is one of the few resources that can be used to study the political decisions of Americans by their religious affiliation.

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Catholics remain as a center-right leaning sub-group of US voters who are more likely to edge toward Democratic candidates when voting for president. However, when Republicans can erode this edge and create an even split of the Catholic vote they have won nationally in recent elections. The perception that Joe Biden was relatively non-ideological and encouraging of bipartisanship on the campaign trail, Catholic moderates and even some conservatives crossed over their ideological predispositions to give Biden and the Democratic Party a solid edge in the Catholic vote in 2020. It is unlikely that Biden’s religious affiliation was an important element in voter’s decisions.7 In 2020, the typical Catholic Trump voter was non-Hispanic white, ideologically conservative, a relatively frequent Mass attender, a gun owner, believed Republicans and Trump would be better managers of the economy and taxes, and opposed abortion. The typical Catholic Biden voter was less likely to be Non-Hispanic white, attended Mass less frequently, was most likely to be moderate or non-ideological, and believed there are circumstances where abortion should be legal. They also believed Biden and the Democrats have better policies for managing health care, the environment, and the pandemic. They also were more concerned about the economy than Trump’s voters prior to the election. Looking to the future, one of the most common predictions about the Catholic electorate is that it will begin to lean more Democratic in the future because of demographic shifts—primarily based on the assumption that the Hispanic share of the Catholic voter will grow. While the Hispanic population has grown, so too has the religious diversity of this population. According to the General Social Survey (GSS), 71% of Hispanics self-identified as Catholic in 2000. This share has dropped steadily over the years.8 In 2012 it dropped to 57%. In 2018, it fell below a majority, at 48%, for the first time in the GSS. Given current trends it is unlikely that the proportion of Catholics who are Hispanic, and more inclined to vote for Democratic candidates, will grow enough to disrupt the dynamic of a perpetually divided Catholic vote. While many pollsters and the news media in the United States have seemingly lost interest in religious influences at the ballot box, the one religious group that will remain salient in terms of election outcomes nationally and at the state level will likely continue to be found in the Catholic electorate.

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Notes 1. In the ANES the non-Catholic Christian vote is nearly the opposite of Catholics with 40% voting for Biden and 58% for Trump. 2. American National Election Study 2020 (www.electionstudies.org). These materials are based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under grant numbers SES 1,444,721, 2014– 2017, the University of Michigan, and Stanford University. 3. Ninety-nine percent of Trump’s Catholic voters self-identify as “heterosexual or straight” compared to 96% of Biden’s Catholic voters. Three percent of Biden’s Catholic voters self-identify as “homosexual, gay, or lesbian,” and 1.5% as “bisexual.” Fewer than 15 of Trump’s Catholic voters self-identify as “bisexual.” 4. There are also differences by frequency of attendance. However, given the complexities of responding to this question during the pandemic these may not be usable. 5. Very few voters indicated having any difficulty voting during the pandemic. Ninety-five percent of Biden’s Catholic voters said voting was not difficult at all (87%) or a little difficult (8%). Ninety-six percent of Trump’s Catholic voters said voting was not difficult at all (92%) or a little difficult (4%). 6. Gray, Mark M. (2018). “Catholics and the 2016 Elections.” Catholics and US Politics After the 2016 Elections Understanding the “Swing Vote.” Eds. Marie Gayte, Blandine Chelini-Pont, Mark J. Rozell. Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, 216. 7. Gray, Mark M., Paul M. Perl, and Mary E. Bendyna. “Camelot Only Comes but Once? John F. Kerry and the Catholic Vote.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. Volume 36(2). 8. Smith, Tom W., Davern, Michael, Freese, Jeremy, and Morgan, Stephen L., General Social Surveys, 1972–2018 [machine-readable data file]/Principal Investigator, Smith, Tom W.; Co-Principal Investigators, Michael Davern, Jeremy Freese and Stephen L. Morgan; Sponsored by National Science Foundation—NORC ed.— Chicago: NORC, 2019. 1 data file (64,814 logical records) + 1 codebook (3758 pp.)—(National Data Program for the Social Sciences, no. 25).

Index

A Abortion, 3, 4, 7–9, 11, 15, 16, 27, 29, 30, 35–37, 39, 42, 48, 51, 54, 58, 62, 83–85, 87–91, 93, 104–116, 120–124, 131, 138, 146–148, 150, 152–156, 162, 191, 193, 194, 207–209, 220–222 Agenda Europe, 61–63 Apostolos Suos , 143 A Program for Social Reconstruction, 145

Bernard Law, 147 Biden, President Joseph, 1, 3, 5–7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 26, 32, 35–40, 42, 58, 91, 92, 104, 115, 120–126, 129–132, 148, 151–155, 161, 162, 166, 167, 169, 176, 178–181, 183, 185, 187, 188, 190, 191, 194, 195, 206–209, 216–223 Black Lives Matter, 34, 207 Borders, Archbishop W. Donald, 147 Brady, Genevieve Garvan, 135 Buchanan, Patrick J., 57, 73

B Bailey memo, 190 Bannon, Steve, 48, 49, 52–54, 65–67, 69, 71, 75, 76, 80 Barrett, Justice Amy Coney, 14, 33, 54, 90, 207 Barr, William, 55, 72 Bernardin, Cardinal Joseph, 106, 107, 110, 112, 128, 141, 147

Burke, Cardinal Raymond, 65, 108, 121 Bush, President George H.W., 147, 189, 215 Bush, President George W., 2, 4, 7, 13, 25, 28–32, 38, 52, 54, 82, 86, 88, 109, 147, 165, 166, 174, 187, 193, 206

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Gayte et al. (eds.), Catholics and US Politics After the 2020 Elections, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82212-5

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226

INDEX

C Cabrini, Frances Xavier, 136 Carter, President Jimmy, 106, 126, 141, 146 Casaroli, Cardinal Agostino, 142 Catholic Alliance, 10–12, 16, 17, 31, 84, 86 Catholic Church, 8, 9, 11, 27, 31, 35, 73, 84, 85, 97, 105, 108, 112, 117, 129–131, 133, 138, 190–192, 217 Catholic conservatives, 3, 7, 10–17, 27, 29, 34, 48, 49, 51, 53–55, 59, 67, 77, 80, 82, 83, 89, 91, 95, 116, 148, 162, 193, 194 Catholics for Biden, 15, 115, 121, 122, 131 Catholics for Trump, 91, 115, 118 Catholic vote, 1–7, 9, 10, 12–15, 17–19, 29, 32, 33, 37, 42, 49, 77, 80, 81, 89, 91, 92, 96, 97, 104–107, 112, 120, 125, 130, 147, 150, 152, 161–164, 176, 188–195, 204, 206, 208, 209, 215–223 Cella, Joseph, 48 Chaput, Archbishop Charles, 108, 112, 115, 120, 128 Christian Coalition, 4, 10, 11, 15, 21, 47, 86, 193 Christian Right, 11, 12, 21, 22, 27–30, 32, 47–49, 52, 64, 95, 107, 180, 191, 193, 194, 212 Ciano, Count Galeazzo, 136 Cicognani, Cardinal Amleto, 135, 155 Clark, General Mark, 138 Clinton, President Bill, 2, 4, 6, 15, 78, 206, 210, 216 Clinton, Secretary Hillary, 2, 5, 7, 18, 32, 33, 37, 39, 81, 87, 89, 94, 97, 112, 128, 148–151, 158,

162, 166, 176–178, 189, 190, 208, 216–218 Connolly, Thomas, 138 Contraceptive mandate, 33, 41, 120, 123 Conway, Kellyanne, 117 Corrigan, Archbishop Michael A., 144 Coughlin, Charles, 135 Covid-19 pandemic, 34, 36, 219, 220 Cruz, Rafael Edward, 49, 79 Cuban-Americans, 174, 185 Cupich, Cardinal Blase, 111–115, 124, 125, 151–153 D Davis, President Jefferson, 134 Death penalty, 8, 11, 103, 106, 116, 122, 208 Democratic Party, 3–5, 8, 9, 13, 31–33, 35, 39, 62, 66, 82, 106, 117, 134, 145, 152, 154, 155, 167, 176, 184, 195, 199, 204, 222 DiNardo, Cardinal Daniel, 116, 150 Dolan, Cardinal Timothy, 34, 112, 113, 117, 118, 120, 123, 128, 130, 147, 151, 153 E Election Day, 80–82, 86, 221 Electoral College, 2, 5, 13–15, 18, 32, 151, 157, 158, 162, 173, 178, 190, 206, 221 Environment, 16, 29, 30, 36, 88, 111, 122, 144, 220, 222 Euthanasia, 106, 109, 111, 115, 147, 154 Evangelical Christian, 79, 221 Evangelical Protestants, 3, 4, 18, 25, 27, 33, 34, 41, 56, 142, 148, 183, 188, 198, 208

INDEX

Evangelicals, 6, 10–13, 17, 18, 21, 25, 30, 35, 37, 47–49, 54, 77–79, 81–92, 95, 97, 150, 162, 167, 183, 189, 191–196, 198–200, 204, 206, 208, 210 EWTN, 15, 58, 75, 121

F Facebook, 41, 49, 112, 152 Faith & Freedom Coalition, 15 Faithful Citizenship: A Catholic Call to Political Responsibility, 109 Falwell, Jerry, Jr., 87 Falwell, Jerry, Sr., 88, 97 Family Research Council, 11 Family values, 25, 28, 29, 36, 193, 208 Ferraro, Geraldine, 7, 107, 108, 146, 147, 190, 191 Ford, President Gerald R., Jr., 106, 141 Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, 109, 111, 114 Fox News, 61, 118, 217 Freedom of religion, 63, 118

G Gaudium et Spes , 104 Gay marriage/same-sex marriage, 7, 8, 28, 29, 37, 51, 60, 62, 63, 75, 88, 91, 105, 106, 111, 112, 128 George, Henry, 144, 154 George, Robert P., 48, 80, 148 Gibbons, Archbishop James, 144, 154 Gingrich, Speaker Newton Leroy, 15, 48 God Gap, 28, 29, 32, 48 Goldberg, Arthur, 139 Goldwater, Barry M., 7, 190

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Gomez, Archbishop José, 42, 105, 113, 117, 122–125, 131, 151–154 Gorsuch, Justice Neil, 33, 117 Gregory, Cardinal Wilton, 114, 118, 124, 125, 132, 153 Gromyko, Andrei, 140

H Hayes, Cardinal Patrick, 136 Healthcare, 16, 25–27, 30, 32, 34, 35, 38, 54, 116, 207, 208, 220, 222 Hispanics, 19, 39, 50, 56, 80, 81, 91, 164, 180, 192, 204, 208, 218, 222 Holy See, 17, 104, 124, 134, 137–144, 156 Hull, Secretary Cordell, 135 Humanae Vitae, 146 Hyde Amendment, 36, 120, 122, 207

I Immigration, 9, 14, 16, 19, 27, 30, 32, 35, 39, 50, 51, 53, 55, 70, 80, 87, 88, 90, 103, 105, 106, 111–113, 115, 116, 119, 122, 143, 150, 151, 154, 165, 173, 182

J Johnson, President Lyndon, 80, 139, 140, 189

K Kaine, Senator Tim, 19, 32, 33, 112, 128, 148, 189, 190 Kennedy, Jacqueline, 139 Kennedy, Joseph P., 135, 137

228

INDEX

Kennedy, President John F., 1, 6, 18, 19, 26, 41, 104, 138, 190, 215 Kerry, Secretary John, 7, 18, 25, 28–31, 40, 41, 108, 109, 147, 166, 192, 193, 206, 207, 223 Knights of Labor, 144, 154 Know Nothings, 134 Krol, Cardinal John, 106, 108

L Laghi, Archbishop Pio, 142 Latino Catholics, 2, 5, 9, 18, 161–167, 177, 182 Latino electorate, 169, 170, 172, 177–179 Latino vote, 5, 18, 162, 163, 165, 167–174, 176, 178, 179, 182, 184 Latter-day Saints (LDS), 79, 80, 84, 86, 90–92 Laudato si, 150 Leo, Leonard, 54 Liberal, 8, 25–27, 29, 31, 32, 34–41, 49, 51, 53, 54, 57, 69, 83, 87–90, 114, 134, 153, 194, 206, 207, 218 Libertarians, 52 Living the Gospel of Life, 107, 109 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 140

M Mahony, Cardinal Roger, 110 Mater et Magistra, 146, 150 McCain, John, 5, 12, 13, 166, 189, 210 McCarrick, Cardinal Theodore, 110, 119, 147, 154 McElroy, Bishop Robert, 111, 114, 151, 153, 157 McGlynn, Edward, 144

Mondale, Vice President Walter, 7, 107, 110, 146, 147, 188, 190, 191 Moral Majority, 4, 47, 78, 85, 86, 210 Mormons, 7, 17, 77–87, 89–93, 95–97, 99 Mundelein, Cardinal George, 136, 137

N National Catholic Prayer Breakfast, 48, 55, 72 National Catholic War Council, 145 National Catholic Welfare Conference, 135, 145 National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), 11, 105–107, 109, 110, 127, 145, 153 Native American Party, 134 Nixon, President Richard M., 3, 20, 106, 140, 141, 187–189 Non-Hispanic white, 19, 218, 222

O Obamacare, 90, 148 Obama, President Barack, 2, 5–7, 14, 26, 32, 33, 37, 38, 41, 54, 112, 113, 120, 148, 166, 174, 178, 190, 210, 215, 216 Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria, 38, 39 O’Connor, Archbishop John, 114, 147 O’Malley, Cardinal Sean, 117, 151

P Pacelli, Cardinal Eugenio, 135, 155 Palin, Sarah, 188, 189, 210 Paprocki, Bishop Thomas, 112, 120, 128

INDEX

Partisan polarization, 179, 209 Peña Nieto, President Enrique, 150 Pence, Vice President Michael, 7, 151, 189 Polls, 1, 12, 14, 37, 42, 56, 80, 81, 92, 149, 150, 162, 165, 174, 176, 178, 179, 183–185, 206, 208, 221, 222 Pompeo, Secretary Mike, 55, 73, 118 Pope Benedict XVI, 114 Pope Francis, 35, 38, 57, 58, 68, 73, 80, 94, 111, 112, 114, 119, 121, 122, 124, 125, 128, 129, 132, 148, 150, 152, 154, 155 Pope John XXIII, 104, 139, 150 Pope John Paul II, 67, 68, 107, 108, 112, 114, 118, 141, 193 Pope Leo XIII, 37, 41, 144, 155 Pope Paul VI, 104, 136, 139, 140, 156 Pope Pius IX, 134 Pope Pius XII, 135–138, 149 Populism, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 65, 67, 69–71 Powderly, Thomas, 144 Q Quadragesimo Anno, 134 R Ratzinger, Cardinal Josef, 147 Reagan, President Ronald, 27, 28, 52, 67, 68, 78, 81, 82, 85, 88, 93, 107, 108, 141, 142, 147, 189, 193, 194 Religious belonging, 14, 53, 86 religious freedom, 32, 53, 55, 58–60, 80, 103–106, 113, 116, 118, 127, 130 Religious Left, 26, 29, 32, 33 Religious restructuring, 193, 198, 204

229

Religious Right, 10, 11, 16, 17, 26, 28, 34, 47, 52, 53, 64, 72, 77–79, 81–83, 85–88, 91–93, 95 Religious voters, 30, 33, 35, 87, 109 Republican Party, 2–4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 16, 25, 28, 47, 48, 77, 78, 82, 92, 105, 107, 112, 146, 148, 155, 167, 174, 176, 193, 204 Rerum Novarum, 41, 144, 155 Rigali, Cardinal Justin, 108 Roe v. Wade, 3, 28, 29, 34, 36, 84, 90, 114, 122, 146 Romney, Mitt, 2, 5–7, 12, 13, 113, 166, 174, 190 Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 134–137, 140, 145 Ryan, John A., 145 Ryan, Speaker Paul, 19, 48, 190 S Santorum, Rick, 48, 79 Schlafly, Phillys, 48 Schultz, Secretary George, 142 Second Vatican Council, 27, 84 Smith, Governor Al, 6, 18, 41, 145, 190 Social justice, 7, 8, 16, 25, 27–31, 35, 38, 40, 103, 109, 113, 116, 122, 150, 155, 193 Social teaching, 26, 29–31, 34, 40, 41, 122, 149, 155 doctrine, 27, 37 Soros, George, 60, 61, 74 Southern Baptist Convention, 79 Spellman, Bishop Francis J., 135–137 Stem cell research, 8, 106 Supreme Court, 2, 3, 7, 14, 15, 17, 18, 27, 28, 33, 37, 41, 54, 61, 83, 84, 87, 89, 90, 98, 105, 114, 116, 117, 120, 146, 207, 221 Swing state, 30, 32, 37, 39, 92, 109, 121, 173

230

INDEX

Swing vote, 5, 9, 10, 14, 16, 177, 192, 223

T Taylor, Myron C., 137 Third Plenary Council, 143, 144 Tittmann, Harold H., 137 Tobin, Cardinal Joseph, 114, 121, 122, 124, 131, 151 Tobin, Thomas, 112, 121, 131 Trump, President Donald J., 1–3, 5, 6, 12–18, 22, 26, 32–35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 47–61, 65, 67, 69, 70, 73–75, 77–81, 83, 86–99, 104, 112, 113, 115–119, 121, 122, 125, 128–130, 148–153, 158, 162, 165–167, 169, 176–178, 181, 183–185, 188, 189, 192, 206–209, 216–223

Vásquez, Bishop Joe S., 150 Vatican, 6, 7, 60, 104, 111, 112, 121, 124, 125, 129, 130, 132, 135–138, 140, 142, 153, 154 Vatican II, 27, 84, 141, 143, 146 Vice-Presidential candidates, 19, 147, 188, 189, 191, 194, 198, 199, 204, 209, 210 Viganò, Archbishop Carlo Maria, 57, 58, 119

U United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), 27–29, 31, 34, 42, 103–105, 111–117, 119, 120, 122–126, 130, 132, 150–152 U.S. Catholic Bishops, 4, 8, 9, 11, 17, 21, 86, 89, 106, 127–129, 131

W Walters, General Vernon, 141 Weakland, Archbishop Rembert, 141 Weigel, George, 48, 69, 80, 94, 131, 148 Wester, Archbishop John, 113 White Catholics, 2, 5, 7, 9, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 39, 56, 80, 81, 120, 121, 162, 189, 192–195, 204, 207, 208 WikiLeaks, 89, 97 Wilson, President Woodrow, 134, 142, 151, 192 Wilson, William, 141 Working class, 144, 145, 155, 192 World War II, 144, 145, 155, 192 Wuerl, Cardinal Donald, 151 Wyszinski, Cardinal Stefan, 141

V Value voters, 28, 105

Z Zablocki, Clement, 141, 142