Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939-1941 074250784X, 9780742507845

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Acronyms
A Note to the Reader
Introduction: The Many Mansions of Anti-interventionism
1. War, Phony and Real
2. Early Hopes for Peace
3. A Matter of War Aims
4. American Goals: An Object of Suspicion
5. Initial Engagements
6. The Fall of Western Europe
7. Protecting the Republic
8. Military Defense of the Hemisphere
9. Economic Survival in the Americas
10. War, Peace, and Elections
11. Lend-Lease and the "Futile War"
12. A Troubled Spring
13. Great Britain: An Unfit Ally
14. The British Empire: A Dubious Cause
15. The Soviets: A Greater Enemy
16. A Pivotal Summer
17. Projections of Conflict
18. Waging Undeclared War
19. The Domestic Front
20. The Asian Cauldron
21. Toward the Pacific War
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
About the Author

Citation preview

Storm on the Horizon

Storm on the Horizon The Challenge to American Intervention,

1939-1941

Justus D. Doenecke

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

Lariham • Boulder • New York • Oxford

ROWMAN 8c LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Published in the United States of America by Rowman 8c Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 4720 Boston Way, Lanham, Maryland 20706 http://www.rowmanlittlefield.com 12 Hid’s Copse Road Cumnor Hill, Oxford 0X2 9J), England Copyright © 2000 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A ll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Doenecke, Justus D. Storm on the horizon : the challenge to American intervention, 1999-1941 / Justus D. Doenecke. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7425-0784-X (alle, paper) 1. United States—Foreign relations—1933-1945. 2. Intervention (International law)—History—20th century. 3. World War, 1939-1945—United States. 4. World War, 1939-1945—Diplomatic history. I. Title. E806.D628 2000 327.73'09'044—dc21

00-038738

Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

To Carol

Contents

Preface

ix

A cknow ledgm ents

xiii

List o f A cronym s

xvii

A N ote to the R eader

xix

In troduction: T he M any M ansions o f A nti-interventionism

1

1.

W ar, Phony and Real

9

2.

Early H opes for Peace

21

3.

A M atter o f W ar Aim s

29

4.

A m erican Goals: An O bject o f Suspicion

42

5.

Initial Engagem ents

59

6.

T he Fall o f W estern Europe

83

7.

Protecting the Republic

100

8.

M ilitary Defense o f th e H em isphere

119

9.

Econom ic Survival in the A m ericas

139

War, Peace, an d Elections

150

10.

11. Lend-Lease and th e “Futile W ar”

165

12.

177

A Troubled Spring

vii

viii

Contents

13.

G reat B ritain: An U nfit Ally

189

14.

The B ritish Em pire: A D ubious Cause

203

15.

T he Soviets: A G reater Enem y

212

16.

A Pivotal Sum m er

228

17.

Projections o f C onflict

241

18.

W aging U ndeclared W ar

253

19.

T he D om estic Front

270

20.

T he Asian C auldron

285

21.

Toward the Pacific W ar

304

C onclusion

323

N otes

329

Bibliography

501

Index

527

A bout the A uthor

551

Preface

“W e are passing,” said H erbert Hoover, “through the m ost serious m om ent in th e history o f the w orld since the year 410 a .d .— the year o f the fall o f the Rom an Em pire and the capture o f Rome by the barbarian king, Alaric.” The for­ m er president was addressing the b ar association o f Nassau C ounty, New York, o n 25 May 1940, ju st as G erm an troops had reached the English C hannel.1 By D ecem ber 1941, w hen th e U nited States entered W orld W ar II as a fullscale belligerent, m ost A m ericans found th e w orld situation even m ore p er­ ilous. A dolf H itler totally dom inated the E uropean continent. T hough m ajor G erm an a ir losses and d ie intense Russian cam paign had caused the F ührer to abandon im m ediate plans for invading B ritain, England’s fate was precar­ ious. In Asia, th e situ atio n appeared equally threatening. By the end o f 1941, Im perial Japan n o t only controlled eastern C hina. It extended its rule to In ­ dochina and was ready to strike at th e Philippines, Singapore, an d th e N ether­ lands East Indies. H ence, d u rin g th e years 1939-41, th e fate o f th e w orld lay “in th e balance,” an d it is litde w onder th at historian G erhard L. W einberg has used th at very phrase to introduce one o f his studies.2 To A m ericans, any w rong m ove m ight b rin g im m inent peril. Late in 1939, th e Saturday Evening Post editorialized, “T he decision we m ake m ay alter the history o f the w orld for a thousand years.”3 T he issue was a crucial one: how best to survive as the Eurasian land m ass cam e u nder th e increasing dom ination o f a predatory Axis. In one o f the m ost im passioned debates in the n ation’s entire history, m any citizens, including H oover him self, opposed the ever-increasing efforts o f F ranklin D elano Roosevelt to intervene on the side o f the Allies. Any m ove o f th e president was fought resolutely by people w ho found such policies literally IX

X

Preface

endangering th e U nited States. Such people feared th a t th e adm inistration’s agenda, even be it piecem eal, w ould inevitably lead to full-scale participation, w hich in tu rn w ould destroy the nation itself. O n one side stood a group often called “iso la tio n ist” although it is f ir m ore accurate to call it “anti-interventionist" o r “noninterventionist," o r— for heuristic purposes— to use such term s as “Roosevelt critics,” “FDR foes,” o r “adm inistration adversaries." T he nation’s leading scholar o f isolationism de­ fines the stance as involving opposition to “A m erican intervention in Euro­ pean wars,” w ith “noninterventionist views generally extended to Asia and Latin America.” Its proponents were also unilateralists, opposing A m erican in ­ volvem ent in such “entangling alliances” as collective security agreem ents o r such international organizations as the League o f N ations.4 O nly a few w ore the label isolationist w ith pride, one being th e New York Daily News, w hich felt no com punction about describing its position as such.s M ost FDR critics, however, claim ed th at th e term had m isrepresented th eir position, for they never sought “isolation” from th e rest o f th e w orld. “I am an isolationist from war,” said C ongressm an H am ilton Fish (Rep.-N.Y.), “b u t n o t an isolationist from arb itratio n , m ediation, and peaceful m ethods o f settling international disputes.”6 C ertainly the term isolationist does little justice to either th e com plexity o f the anti-interventionist stance o r the reasoning behind it, particularly if one adds pacifists, people w ho in principle opposed participation in any given conflict.7 Said the prom inent New York m inister John Haynes H olm es, in deem ing w ar itself a crim e, “There are no circum stances o r causes th at can justify m urder.”8 In the period 1939-41, isolationists and pacifists cooperated to a surprising degree, often advancing sim ilar argum ents in th eir opposition to Roosevelt’s foreign policies. If a m arriage o f convenience was at w ork, suf­ ficient overlap existed to call the com m on position “anti-interventionist.” Since the 1960s, undoubtedly partly because o f the V ietnam W ar, scholar­ ship on anti-interventionism has blossom ed, and an annotated bibliography com pleted in 1987 listed close to sixteen hundred entries.9 Interspersed in such accounts are various explanations for this phenom enon, though all have th eir lim itations. Som e find the stance rooted in such ethnic groups as G er­ m an and Irish A m ericans; however, the great m ajority o f anti-interventionists cam e from A nglo-Saxon backgrounds. O thers see anti-interventionism grounded in the G reat Plains and upper M ississippi Valley. C ertainly an ex­ planation based on m idw estern and agrarian roots holds tru e for such leading anti-interventionists as Senator G erald P. Nye (R ep.-N .D ak.). W ithin the “in ­ terventionist” N ortheast, however, m any people, including city dwellers, op­ posed the president’s diplom acy, and this stance transcended such predictable ethnic groups as G erm an and Irish A m ericans. At tim es, p arty affiliation played a crucial role, w ith D em ocrats leaning far m ore to intervention th an Republicans. All the sam e, by 1940 it was a Senate D em ocrat, B urton K.

Preface

xi

W heeler o f M ontana, w ho led the attack in his cham ber against FDR; on the oth er side, W endell W illkie, presidential standard-bearer for the G rand O ld Party th at year, soon show ed him self to be a strong in terv en tio n ist Several so­ cial scientists have portrayed anti-interventionism as a form o f psychological m arginality, in w hich a xenophobic “in-group” struck blindly a t a w orld it never m ade.10 Still in all, this explanation is greatly oversim plified, neglecting the m any anti-interventionists w ho were clearly tied by family, education, and occupation to the nation’s m ost elite political and econom ic institutions. In the long ru n , to best understand anti-interventionism during the 1939-41 period, one should focus on far m ore than geographic regions, so­ cioeconom ic factors, ethnic groups, o r even party politics. Rather, one m ust exam ine an ideology possessing roots deep in the A m erican past. From the tim e o f the nation’s founding, and for m any years thereafter, its leaders be­ lieved th a t continental and com m ercial expansion could go hand in hand— in fact, be protected— by totally avoiding international pow er politics. M oreover, since at least 1776, A m ericans as a people had felt both separate from — indeed, superior to — a Europe perceived as co rru p t, effete, m aybe dow nright degenerate. If, in reality, they found them selves slaughtering Indians and en­ slaving blacks, they saw them selves launching a com m unity o f pristine repub­ licanism , one th at by th e early nineteenth century rem ained untainted by the tw in evils o f the O ld W orld: anarchistic revolution and predatory im perial­ ism . By the 1920s, a hundred years later, it was the dream s o f B ritish im peri­ alist Cecil Rhodes and the visions o f the Russian Bolshevik V. I. Lenin th at could em body such perils.11 D uring the years 1939-41, this entire posture was p u t to the test. M ost histo­ rians have stressed prom inent personalities, leading action groups, and m ajor debates th at often centered on such m atters as neutrality legislation and con­ scription.12 This book skirts none o f these m atters bu t rather puts them in a w ider fram ew ork, one focusing on underlying m ilitary, econom ic, and geopo­ litical assum ptions.13 How did anti-interventionists perceive the ideology, arm ed potential, and territorial aspirations o f Germany, the British Em pire, Japan, and the Soviet Union? To w hat degree did they envision Nazi G erm any as a bulw ark against the Soviets? W hat role w ould the U nited States play in a w orld increasingly com posed o f com peting econom ic blocs and m ilitary al­ liances? W hat w eapons and strategies could best defend their nation’s sphere o f influence, and how far should this sphere extend? W hat was the optim um m il­ itary readiness? W hat w ould be the likely scenarios if the U nited States fought a fiill-scale w ar against G erm any o r Japan o r both? Were noninterventionists “doves” in Europe, “hawks” in Asia? W hat prospects did they see for a negoti­ ated peace, particularly in Europe, and w hat w ould be the context o f such a peace? W hy did they fear th at a defense boom w ould injure the A m erican econ­ omy, n o t aid it? These are ju st a few o f the questions addressed in a study th at exam ines the m ental universe o f President Roosevelt’s strongest critics.

Acknowledgments

Few books involving m ajor research are w ritten w ithout assistance. This has been especially tru e in m y case, particularly as I have researched this project for well over a q u arter o f a century. My greatest debt is to m y wife C arol, for w hom no dedication is sufficient My obligation to her is inestim able, as her co ntribution has ranged over the years from reading innum erable drafts to copying countless item s in untold collections. Several scholars have read the m anuscript intensely and critically, spending countless hours to aid a colleague in diplom atic history. Irw in F. G ellm an, de* spite unusual burdens, has scrutinized the entire m anuscript at least once and som e chapters a second tim e. The sam e holds tru e for George H . Nash, who, like Irw in, offered detailed com m entary th at extended to the m ost m inute m a­ terial. J. G arry Clifford exam ined the bulk o f these chapters, sent m e pages o f detailed analysis, and continually probed fram ew ork and focus. He also lent m e his notes o f the W illiam R. Castle papers th at were later supplem ented by my personal exam ination. W ayne S. Cole, the dean o f scholars o f W orld W ar II anti-interventionism , aided greatly in fram ing the project, both in analyzing th e preface and conclusion and engaging in m any encouraging conversations over the years. I’ve also benefited from Raym ond A. Esthus’s critique o f m y chapters on East Asia and Raym ond G. O ’C onnor on naval incidents. I could n o t have been blessed w ith m ore perceptive and conscientious readers. It is such generosity th at m akes the enterprise o f scholarship so rew arding. Equally indispensable is m y indebtedness to the various foundations th at helped finance this research. Forem ost is the Institute for H um ane Studies o f M enlo Park, C alifornia, w here I was senior research fellow in the academ ic year Xlll

XIV

Acknowledgments

1977-78 and resident sum m er fellow in 1975,1976,1978, and 1981. T he nam es o f Leonard R Liggio, form er IHS president, and K enneth S. Tem pleton Jr., for­ m er IHS vice president, stand o u t in this regard. Again, I owe both an obliga­ tio n th at can never be repaid. To w ork in such gracious and supportive su r­ roundings was indeed a privilege. I am also grateful to the John A nson K ittredge Educational Fund o f C am bridge, M assachusetts, and in particular to W alter M uir W hitehill and Ernest R. May, for aid in 1975 and 1980. In 1981, th e H erbert H oover Library A ssociation o f W est Branch, Iowa, supported re­ search in the H erbert H oover papers. The E arhart Foundation o f A nn A rbor, M ichigan, aw arded m e a travel grant in 1995, and I m ust single o u t A nthony Sullivan, its secretary and program director. For these, too, I am m ost thankful. T he staff o f any library can either aid o r h inder a project, and in this regard I have been singularly blessed. Personnel o f the Jane B ancroft C ook Library o f th e U niversity o f South Florida (USF) at Sarasota have offered superb service. Special m ention m ust be given to H olly Barone, Kim G rohs, and Gail N ovak, all o f w hom assisted in countless ways, extending them selves far beyond the call o f duty. The staffs o f USF libraries at Tam pa and St. Petersburg have also been m ost cooperative. C ertain o th er librarians and adm inistrators, along w ith th eir in stitutional cow orkers, deserve to be singled out. These include R osem ary Allen Little, li­ brarian o f public adm inistration, politics, and law a t Princeton U niversity’s Firestone Library; R obert S. W ood o f the H erbert H oover Presidential Library at W est Branch, Iowa; M ilorad M. D rachkovitch, R obert H essen, C harles Palm , A dorjan I. de Galffy, and Elena D anielson, all o f the H oover Institution on W ar, R evolution and Peace, Stanford U niversity; Judith Schiff o f Sterling Library, Yale U niversity; Gene M. Gressley o f th e U niversity o f W yoming; M artin Schm itt o f th e U niversity o f O regon; Gladys M acKenzie, entrusted w ith the papers o f th e N ational C ouncil for the Prevention o f W ar a t the Sw arthm ore College Peace C ollection; and A rchie M otley o f the Chicago H is­ torical Society. In addition, I am m ost appreciative o f the efforts o f the staffs o f the H oughton Library, H arvard U niversity; Providence College; th e Ban­ croft Library o f the U niversity o f C alifornia at Berkeley; C ornell U niversity; the archives division o f th e New York Public Library; th e m anuscript division o f the Library o f Congress; the State H istorical Society o f W isconsin, M adi­ son; and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library at Hyde Park, New York. C ertain library staffs were extrem ely kind in allow ing m e to exam ine firsthand the cam pus new spapers o f th eir institu tio n s du rin g m y research trips: A m herst College, Brown University, Bryn M awr College, C ity U niversity o f New York, D artm outh College, Fordham University, George W ashington University, G eorgetow n University, H averford College, Johns H opkins U ni­ versity, M ount Holyoke College, New York University, Sm ith College, U nion Theological Sem inary o f New York, and Vassar College.

Acknowledgments

xv

C ertain individuals, o n cam pus and off, have been m ore th an encouraging. T hey in d u d e A rthur M . Schlesinger Jr., Leo P. Ribuffo, James T. Patterson, Forrest and Ellen M cD onald, Betty M iller U nterberger, W illiam H am ilton, and Stephen Fischer-G alati. O ver the years I was also able to interview such prom inent anti-interventionists as Frank C ullen Brophy, R. D ouglas S tuart Jr., A braham K aufm an, H enry Regnery, Eugene D avidson, Page H ufty, Felix M orley, Frank W aldrop, B onner Fellers, and Lawrence and D ora D ennis. A dria H olm es Katz has given m e perm ission to cite papers from the collection o f John Haynes H olm es. At New College o f the U niversity o f South Florida, I have benefited from superb academ ic leadership; again, certain nam es o f ad­ m inistration and staff should be singled out: Laszlo D em e, Eugene Lewis, R obert B enedetti, A nthony P. Andrews, G ordon M ichalson, G ordon Bauer, James Feeney, and Susan Janney. For perm ission to reproduce, w ith m odifica­ tions, th e contents o f one article, I am indebted to A rthur J. V idich, editor o f the International Journal o f Politics, Culture, and Society. Finally, I w ish to express m y deep appreciation to Stephen M . W rinn, ac­ quisitions ed ito r o f Row m an & Littlefield; to M ary C arpenter, assistant edi­ tor; and to M ary C. H ack and Renee Jardine, p roduction editors. I have never experienced such enthusiastic su p p o rt for a project o f this m agnitude. I am tru ly grateful.

Acronyms

AFC CDAAA

A m erica First C om m ittee C om m ittee to D efend A m erica by A iding the Allies

CR CT

Congressional Record Chicago Tribune

FOR HFAC HHPL

Fellowship o f R econciliation H ouse Foreign Affairs C om m ittee H erbert H oover Presidential Library

IDU

In Danger Undaunted

KAOWC M EPW DC NCFSD NCPW

Keep A m erica O u t o f W ar Congress M ake Europe Pay W ar D ebts C om m ittee N ational C om m ittee on Food for the Small D em ocracies N ational C ouncil for th e Prevention o f W ar

NYDN NYT NYWT

New York Daily News New York Times New York World-Telegram

SCPC

Sw arthm ore College Peace C ollection

SFE SFN

San Francisco Examiner San Francisco News

SFRC

Senate Foreign R elations C om m ittee

WFL

Weekly Foreign Letter

WIL

W omen’s International League for Peace and Freedom , U.S. Section

WTH

Washington Times-Herald

XVII

A Note to the Reader

D ue to constraints o f space, the m aterial in th e index is often constricted to th e data presented in the text itself. A dditional data, however, often appears in th e endnotes. For exam ple, in chapter one, endnote eight, H am ilton Fish and Edw in M . B orchard are cited in the index b u t references to H ugh Johnson, W illiam R. C astle, an d John Bassett M oore are not. For a full investigation o f any given topic o r them e, th e reader should exam ine th e particular endnote. At tim es, certain m em bers o f C ongress are only cited in th e endnotes. W hen first m entioned, th e individual is identified by first an d last nam e, state, and p arty affiliation. A fter th a t first citation, there is no fu rth er endnote reference. For exam ple, for full data o n “Keefe” as cited in chapter 10, endn o te 90, see th e in itial reference to “Frank B. Keefe (R ep.-W is.)” as given in ch ap ter 3, endnote 67. T he sam e situ atio n holds tru e for o th er historical fig­ ures. For instance, for th e occupation an d full nam e o f “N eilson,” chapter 15, en d n o te 4, see th e in itial reference to “revisionist w riter Francis N eilson,” chapter 1, endnote 129.

xix

Introduction: The Many Mansions of Anti-interventionism

T he anti-interventionists o f W orld W ar II have seldom done well before the b ar o f history. To m ost professional historians, and to m uch o f the general public ever since, it was crim inal folly to have opposed m ajor A m erican efforts to check H itler’s Reich and Im perial Japan. In the heat o f W orld W ar II, such people were often accused o f being naive, obstructionist, o r even dow nright lunatic. At best, according to such establishm ent weeklies as Time and Life and such left-leaning dailies as New York’s PM , they were unw itting handm aidens o f the Axis. In terio r Secretary H arold Ickes referred to aviator C harles A. Lind­ bergh, th e n ation’s best-know n anti-interventionist, as uNo. 1 Nazi fellow trav­ eler.” 1 The Friends o f Dem ocracy, Inc., a p ro -adm inistration action com m it­ tee, attacked th e leading anti-interventionist group by issuing a pam phlet titled “T he A m erica First C om m ittee— N azi Transm ission Belt.” In reality, such attacks were m ost unw arranted, though even today negative stereotypes rem ain in the popular im agination. D uring the 1930s, however, the U nited States ardently opposed intervention. Public opinion polls indicated th a t at least u ntil Septem ber 1938, w hen the M unich conference took place, the A m erican people as a w hole favored a strong neutrality policy, supporting above all an em bargo on w ar supplies to an y to m ^ n g n ia An lab» as the sum m er o f 1939, anti-interventionists controlled Congress. Federal legislation prohib­ ited the extension o f credits and sale o f arm s to any belligerent, even if a gen­ eral consensus existed th at said nation had experienced o utright aggression. In the Senate, anti-interventionists ran the gam ut from arch-conservatives to disillusioned progressives and individuals often to th e left o f Franklin D. Roosevelt.3 C ertainly, R obert A. Taft ranked as one o f the m ore conservative critics o f FDR’s foreign policy. A strong critic o f the New Deal, the O hio Re­

1

2

Introduction

publican said in 1933, “T here is very little the G overnm ent can do to really m odify th e trem endous econom ic forces involved in a w orld-w ide business depression”4 H iram Johnson o f C alifornia stood far m ore squarely in the p ro ­ gressive fold, being th e running m ate o f T heodore Roosevelt in 1912 and re­ m aining particularly outspoken in prom oting the public ow nership o f u tili­ ties. In 1932, though a Republican, he endorsed FDR and backed m uch o f his earlier legislation, though by 1937 he broke w ith th e New Deal over such m at­ ters as Suprem e C ourt “packing,” sit-dow n strikes, and above all foreign pol­ icy.5 G erald R Nye took a som ew hat sim ilar route. A foe o f big business and o f Wall Street in particular, the m averick Republican from N orth D akota fought continually w ith President H erbert Hoover. O riginally friendly to FDR’s do­ m estic agenda, by 1939 he was blasting governm ent spending and “tinker­ ing.”6 A nother liberal, R obert M arion La Follette Jr. (Prog.-W is.), rem ained firm ly in th e Roosevelt cam p, endorsing three o u t o f four o f his election bids w hile being m ore radical on such m atters as labor.7 In the H ouse, sim ilar diversity existed. A dm ittedly it was th e conservative R epublicans w ho predom inated, people strongly anti-N ew Deal and often hailing from w est o f the Alleghenies. A lm ost anom alous am ong this group was th eir leader, H am ilton Fish. A H arvard-educated blueblood from FDR’s ow n congressional district, Fish supported social security and m inim um wage laws w hile opposing co u rt “packing,” governm ent reorganization, and massive relief program s.8 Yet som e in th eir m idst were quite radical. V ito M arcantonio (Am. Lab.-N.Y.), far to the left o f th e New Deal, first called W orld W ar II an “im perialist” struggle, although he sought a declaration o f w ar soon after the Soviet U nion entered the conflict.9 U sher B urdick (Rep.-N .D ak.) had been state president o f the Farm H oliday A ssociation, a group radical enough in the early thirties to ru n sheriffs off foreclosed lan d .10 C ertain Republican leaders possessed strong noninterventionist senti­ m ents, am ong them form er president Hoover, retired diplom at W illiam R. Castle, and A lfred Landon, governor o f Kansas from 1933 to 1937 and presi­ dential candidate in 1936.11 The m ost prom inent labor leader in the nation, John L. Lewis, found Roosevelt’s foreign policy repellent, as did m any business and labor jo u rn als.12 U niversity students often opposed involvem ent, being far m ore adam ant on th e issue than th eir professors.13 T here were, however, som e prom inent scholars resisting involvem ent, including— in the field o f in ­ ternational law alone— Edwin M . B orchard o f Yale, Philip Jessup o f C olum ­ bia, and John Bassett M oore, form er justice on the W orld C o u rt.14 W ithin the Roosevelt adm inistration itself, som e figures could be m ost cautious in p u b ­ lic b u t som ew hat adam ant in private, the m ost pronounced being Joseph P. Kennedy, am bassador to B ritain u n til D ecem ber 1940.1S O thers include John Cudahy, am bassador to Belgium from January to N ovem ber 1940; m ilitary advisers Stanley Em bick and T rum an Sm ith; and anglophobe assistant secre­ tary o f state A dolf A. Berle.16

Introduction

3

A viator C harles A ugustus Lindbergh, one o f th e m ost fam ous people in the w orld, was so outspoken o n th e m atter th at he served as the leading draw ing card o f th e president’s opponents. B eginning in 1935, eight years after his fa­ m ous flight to Paris, C olonel Lindbergh lived four years in Europe, reporting on G erm an a ir pow er for A m erican m ilitary intelligence. In the late 1930s, he m aintained th a t w ar betw een G erm any and th e W estern pow ers w ould be sui­ cidal, for a predatory Soviet U nion lurked on th e sidelines. H is w ife, A nne M orrow Lindbergh, articulately supported h er husband’s position, though h er argum ents to o k o n a m ore hum anitarian th ru st.17 Powerful dem ents o f the A m erican press bitterly fought FDR. The arch­ conservative W illiam R andolph H earst rem ained in control o f the nation’s lead­ ing new spaper chain. In 1940, H earst ow ned seventeen dailies, including such highly influential papers as the San Francisco Examiner said the Chicago HeraldAmerican. At least tw o H earst papers, the New York Joumal-American and the New York Mirror, possessed circulations well above h alf a m illion. Beginning in late February 1940, H earst w rote his ow n front-page colum n, uIn the News,” com m enting o n m atters ranging from C leopatra’s role in history to contem po­ rary m ilitary tactics. H is views were strongly reinforced by H earst colum nist Boake C arter, a radio com m entator w ho w rote tw o anti-interventionist prim ers: W hyM eddlein the Orient? (1938) and Why Meddle in Europe? (1939).18 Roy W. H ow ard directed an o th er anti-in terv en tio n ist chain, ScrippsH ow ard, th a t possessed nineteen dailies in 1940. H ow ard personally edited the chain’s flagship, th e New York World-Telegram, w ith a circulation o f over four h u ndred thousand in 1940. T hough his chain had backed Roosevelt enthusi­ astically in the 1932 and 1936 elections, it broke w ith him in 1940, in p a rt be­ cause o f the president’s foreign policy. In M arch 1941 Time claim ed th a t the publisher had converted to interventionism , yet th e chain rem ained sharply critical o f the president.19 T hough the Scripps-H ow ard chain featured certain pro-FD R w riters, in ­ cluding R aym ond C lapper an d E leanor Roosevelt, it gave his foes a m ajor forum . O ne such critic was G eneral H ugh Johnson, w ho in 1933 had headed th e N ational Recovery A dm inistration (NRA), th e linchpin o f the early New D eal. Eight years later, Johnson was totally estranged from the president. H is Hell-Bent for War (1941) assailed Roosevelt’s foreign policy: it claim ed th at G erm any was overextended, found little danger in H itler’s econom ic p enetra­ tio n o f the W estern hem isphere, and accused the B ritish o f fighting in p a rt to preserve th eir em pire.20 B eginning in D ecem ber 1939, Scripps-H ow ard car­ ried John T. Flynn, a financial w riter best know n am ong intellectuals for his attacks on W all Street speculation, w ho m ade no secret o f finding FDR a t­ tem pting to lift the U nited States o u t o f the depression by seeking m artial ad­ ventures.21 The firm ’s m anagem ent found one colum nist, the polem ical scholar H arry Elm er Barnes, so provocative th at he contributed exclusively to th e New York

4

Introduction

World-Telegram. A prolific historian and sociologist, Barnes w rote th irty books and over a hundred essays in a lifetim e spanning seventy-nine years. He began a career o f controversy by w riting pro-A llied propaganda in W orld W ar I and ended it by denying H itler’s Final Solution. W hen W orld W ar II broke o u t, Barnes claim ed th at th e B ritish and French “deserved” H itler, called the conflict a “back room brawl,” and hoped th at neither side w ould be victorious. In M ay 1940, th e World-Telegram dism issed Barnes, declaring th a t the edito­ rial page needed lighter m aterial.22 A nti-interventionism also found a cham pion in the New York Daily News. In 1941, w ith tw o m illion readers daily and three and a h alf m illion on Sun­ day, this tabloid led th e entire nation in circulation. Staunchly pro-N ew Deal through the 1940 election, it was published by C aptain Joseph M edill Patter­ son. T he News’s editorial w riter, Reuben M aury, w ho w on a Pulitzer Prize in 1940, opposed Roosevelt’s foreign policy in the News w hile supporting it in Collier’s m agazine.23 Patterson’s first cousin, Colonel Robert R. M cCorm ick, published the Chicago Tribune. He veered sharply from Patterson’s m ilitant support o f the New Deal b u t shared his opposition to the president’s overseas policies. Possessing a daily circulation in 1940 o f d o se to a m illion, the Tribune was the m ost widely dis­ tributed full-sized paper in the nation, second overall only to th at o f Patterson’s News.24 Patterson’s sister, Eleanor M edill (“Cissy”) Patterson, published the Washington Times-Herald, w hich had a circulation o f tw o hundred thousand in 1941. N ot only did she share her brother’s views to such a degree th at she usu­ ally ran News editorials verbatim , bu t her foreign editor, Frank W aldrop, also frequently contributed an anti-interventionist colum n o f his own.25 These new spaper m agnates found additional support: H . L. M encken, the caustic cofounder o f th e American Mercury and colum nist for the Baltimore Sun; Felix M orley, chief editorial w riter o f the Washington Post u ntil M arch 1940; R aym ond Moley, form er FDR b rain tru ster and contributing editor o f Newsweek; George Sokolsky, colum nist for the New York Sun; W illiam H enry C ham berlin, foreign correspondent for th e Christian Science Monitor u n til 1940; freelance journalist Freda Utley; B urton Rascoe, critic for the American Mercury; and P orter Sargent, publisher o f an anti-interventionist bulletin.26 Several conservative journals opposed involvem ent The Saturday Evening Post, w hich drew well over three m illion readers in 1941, published weekly ed­ itorials opposing Roosevelt's policies. C hief editorial w riter G aret G arrett (originally Edw ard Peter), w ho joined the weekly in the m iddle o f 1940, and foreign correspondent D em aree Bess were particularly vocal on foreign pol­ icy. In M ay 1941, the Post claim ed th at the passage o f lend-lease had closed the debate, im plying th at th e public should rally around th e adm inistration. Yet u ntil th e Japanese attacked Pearl H arbor, it still m aintained its attack.27 Scribner’s Commentator, a m onthly digest, was even m ore anti-interven­ tionist. Published by C harles S. Payson, husband o f m illionaire Joan W hitney,

Introduction

5

an d edited by G eorge T. Eggleston, it fired its volleys in m any different direc­ tions, all arch-rightist in tone. It carried industrialist H enry Ford’s attack on "international bankers,” articles blasting th e French Republic and praising the Portugal o f A ntônio de O liveira Salazar, book reviews by philosophical an ar­ chist A lbert Jay N ock, an d w arnings against “fifth colum ns” o f refugees, som e essays m entioning Jews as a distin ct category.28 Some journals far m ore friendly to Roosevelt’s dom estic policies suspected his pro-A llied sentim ents, at least w hen W orld W ar II first began. O f these, the New Republic, edited by Bruce Bliven and possessing a circulation o f a little over th irty thousand in 1940, undoubtedly claim ed the m ost influence. In late April 1940, as Norway cam e under siege, die liberal weekly started to shift, a circum stance aided by pressure from its ow ner and founder, D orothy W hitney Elm hirst, w ho had long lived in Britain. W ithin m onths John T. Flynn, whose financial colum n increasingly w arned o f the perils o f m ilitarization, was fired.29 T he m onthly Common Sense, edited by A lfred M . B ingham an d Selden Rodm an, possessed a m oderate noninterventionism , com bining its endorsem ent o f aid to B ritain w ith calls for a negotiated peace. Frank H anighen, its W ash­ ington correspondent, had gained prom inence as coauthor o f Merchants o f Death (1934), a m uckraking account o f th e global m unitions industry.30 In June 1940, th e Progressive, an eight-page tabloid published in M adison, W isconsin, cam e under th e direct control o f Senator R obert M. La Follette Jr. an d his brother, form er W isconsin governor Philip La Follette.31 It served as a refuge for such exiles from interventionist journals as publisher Osw ald G ar­ rison V illard, w ho had ju st resigned from the Nation, and pacifist E rnest L. M eyer, w ho had left th e New York Post Also co ntributing were air pow er ad­ vocate M ajor A1 W illiam s, w ho also w rote for Scripps-H ow ard, an d liberal econom ist S tuart C hase, au th o r o f the an ti-interventionist The New Western Front (1939).32 Uncensored could well have been th e m ost im aginative liberal journal. A m im eographed weekly sponsored by th e W riters A nti-W ar B ureau, it offered new s n o t usually found in th e daily press. In 1940, it was edited by Sidney H ertzberg, a pro m in en t socialist journalist w ho had served on th e staff o f the New York Times, Time, and Current History. A lthough the jo u rn al operated, in H ertzberg’s w ords, o n “a frayed shoestring” and reached only a thousand sub­ scribers, it found its articles attacking Roosevelt foreign policy reproduced by th e Progressive and the Socialist Party’s C all33 By the fall o f 1939, all political parties o n the left strongly opposed “en tan ­ glem ent.” A m ong them were the socialists, w hose presidential candidate since 1928 had been N orm an T hom as, form erly a Presbyterian m inister.34 In his book Keep America Out o f War: A Program ( 1939), w ritten w ith fellow radical B ertram D. W olfe and published ju st after hostilities com m enced, T hom as m ade his position clear. “We set it dow n as o u r opinion th at this Second W orld W ar is th e continuation o f the First,” he stated, going on to describe “age-old

6

Introduction

pow er politics” an d “m odem im perialist conflicts.”35 T he Call, an eight-page weekly tabloid, served as th e party’s m ajor vehicle. T hom as’s weekly colum n, “Your W orld and M ine,” attacked th e “delusions” o f fellow liberals, w hile Lil­ lian Symes’s “H old T hat Line” assailed the interventionist press. T he weekly American Guardian acted as the C alls G reat Plains version. Published in O k­ lahom a C ity and having a circulation o f close to fifty thousand in 1940, it was edited by O scar A m eringer, a veteran O klahom a socialist, w ho once titled a self-descriptive colum n “Isolationist: H ard-B oiled and U nasham ed.”36 For a belated, in term itten t, and thoroughly expediential recruit to an ti­ interventionist ranks, one could find no b etter exam ple th an the C om m unist Party o f th e Lln itad States o f America. W hen, in late sum m er 1939, th e Soviet U n to n a n d G erm any signed a nonaggression pact, th e p arty abruptly ceased its long-standing cries for collective security and, follow ing the dictates o f Moscow, called for strict isolation.37 At th e beginning o f the conflict, th e Daily Worker, a tabloid published in New York, acted as th e official C om m unist Party organ, b u t several o th er journals echoed th e Stalinist position as well.36 Especially d o se to th e p arty was the weekly New Masses, w hich usually re­ m ained silent concerning G erm any w hile saving its m ost frequent and b itter abuse for B ritain.39 In June 1940, a four-page weekly bulletin, In Fact, was launched. C laim ing to expose “th e w ar-m ongering press,” it was edited by G eorge Seldes, form er foreign correspondent and au th o r o f Iron, Blood, and Profits (1934), an indictm ent o f th e m unitions trade.40 T hat A ugust, the new weekly Friday, a picture m agazine patterned o n Life and Look, prom oted the com m unist position.41 M ardi 1941 saw the b irth o f th e M ilw aukee-based US Week, a tw enty-four-page com m unist rival to Time an d Newsweek.42 O nce the Soviet U nion entered the war, all these vehicles tu rn ed vehem ently interven­ tio n ist overnight. H enceforth, it w ould be hard to find a prom inent critic o f FDR w hom they did n o t thereafter po rtray as pro-A xis. V arious Trotskyist journals offered an o th er left perspective. Products o f a m ost arcane political w orld, they possessed a richly diverse group o f w riters, w ho were prone to excom m unicate alleged deviators.43 W ithin Trotskyism ’s ranks w ere the Partisan Review, in w hose pages editor D w ight M acdonald, en route to philosophical anarchism , predicated his anti-interventionism on the prem ise th at revolutionary socialism was the only way to destroy fascism; the Socialist Appeal, organ o f the Socialist W orkers Party, in w hich colum nist James B urnham , soon to be a u th o r o f The M anagerial Revolution (1941), de­ nounced “isolationists” for tacitly endorsing the defense o f C anada; and the New International, in w hich Hal D raper w ent so far as to w arn th at even the w ar referendum m ovem ent m asked aggressive im perialism .44 In a class by itself lay the m im eographed four-page Weekly Foreign Letter, w ritten by Lawrence D ennis, form er infantry officer, lower-level diplom at, and financial expert. By 1934, D ennis saw salvation from th e G reat D epression lying in th e corporate state. H e was n o t afraid to use th e term fascism in es-

Introduction

7

pousing a o ne-party governm ent, strid en t nationalism , continental autarchy, and centralized econom ic controls. In February 1939, D ennis joined the Weekly Foreign Letter, w hich had ju st been founded eight m onths previously. H e shared editorial responsibilities w ith V. D. G ravenhoff, a W hite Russian, u n til m id-M arch 1940, w hereupon he becam e sole author. T he bulletin, w hich received $1,200 from the G erm an embassy, was far m ore extrem e th an m ost oth er noninterventionist journals. It attacked the “isolationists” from w ithin, claim ing they w ere foolish to endorse lim ited aid to B ritain and to hold Roo­ sevelt accountable to his antiw ar pledges. O nly by com bining a program o f absolute nonparticipation w ith prom ises o f a welfare state o r th e annexation o f the entire continent could the president’s adversaries, he argued, secure a m ass base. T hough his circulation rem ained a few hundred, it reached certain leading anti-interventionists, m any o f w hom were far m ore in the political m ainstream th an D ennis him self.45 A nti-interventionism found a strong voice in certain religious journals. The Christian Century was certainly one o f the im portant Protestant periodicals in the w orld, though its circulation in 1940 was only tw enty-nine thousand. Edi­ to r C harles Clayton M orrison, a Disciples o f C hrist m inister, vigorously sup­ ported social reform (including the New D eal), liberal theology, and panProtestant church union. He felt im passioned enough about the outlaw ry o f w ar to w rite a book by th at title. A lthough, in 1941, he denied th at either he o r his journal was pacifist, his editorials opposed all o f FDR’s moves overseas. Even the m ost m ilitant o f pacifists were far m ore welcome as contributors than were interventionists.46 If the absolutist pacifists had a leader w ith national vis­ ibility, it was John Haynes H olm es, U nitarian m inister o f the C om m unity C hurch o f New York, w ho edited the Chicago-based bim onthly Unity.47 M uch o f the Rom an C atholic press felt sim ilarly.46 The Jesuit weekly Amer­ ica, edited by Francis X. Talbot, often backed New Deal m easures; yet it was so opposed to U.S. involvem ent in W orld W ar II th at it carried an article attack­ ing B ritain by th e anti-Sem itic and pro-M ussolini poet Ezra Pound.49 James M . G illis edited th e Paulist m onthly Catholic World, w hose opposition to Italy’s Benito M ussolini and Spain's Francisco Franco did not hinder it from being acerbic concerning b o th Roosevelt’s foreign policy and th e New D eal.50 T he lay weekly Commonweal, far m ore liberal dom estically, expressed sim ilar criticism o f FDR’s diplom acy, though at tim es its entire staff was so divided th at certain editorials had to be signed.51 Social Justice, a weekly tabloid launched in 1936, reflected th e views o f Fa­ th er C harles E. C oughlin, w hose broadcasts from Royal O ak, M ichigan, had once reached forty m illion people, giving him the largest radio audience in the w orld. By 1938, C oughlin’s early calls for inflation and a currency based solely o n silver gave way to vehem ent anti-Sem itism (he reprinted The Protocob o f the Learned Elders o f Zion in his journal) and praise for fascist regim es. In August 1941, his jo u rn al even charged th a t “because Jewish International bankers

8

Introduction

ow n o r control the gold o f the w orld, it is their war.”52 In 1939, Social Justice was first edited by E. Perrin Schwartz, form er city editor o f the Milwaukee Journal and then by Louis B. W ard, a business consultant personally closer to C oughlin. At all tim es, however, the radio priest (w ho contributed the colum n "From the Tower”) was firm ly in control. Its foreign editor was M ajor James Strachey Barnes, an Englishm an w ho had joined the Italian fascist party and been decorated by M ussolini.53 O bviously, peace organizations opposed Roosevelt’s policies.54 O n th e su r­ face, the W om en’s International League for Peace and Freedom , U.S. Section (W IL), was m ore m oderate, as it was open to b o th pacifists and nonpacifists and thereby encom passed those w ho believed in strict neutrality and those w ho w ould favor som e form s o f collective security. Indeed, its h onorary in ­ ternational president, educator Emily G reene Balch, favored such nonm ilitary form s o f international coercion as m oral, diplom atic, and econom ic pressure. Its national secretary, D orothy Detzer, however, spoke o u t continually against all interventionist m easures, even w hen she could n o t rally her ow n organiza­ tio n behind her. In 1938, the W IL had reached a m em bership peak o f ju st over fourteen thousand. By A pril 1940, its enrollm ent had dropped to slightly under thirteen thousand.55 O ther peace groups produced th eir ow n journals. The N ational C ouncil for the Prevention o f W ar (N C PW ), an um brella organization o f pacifist and nonpacifist groups, sponsored Peace Action, an eight-page m onthly bulletin edited by executive secretary Frederick ). Libby. A Q uaker pacifist, Libby said in 1940 th at he w ould n o t participate in any w ar in w hich the U nited States m ight engage. H is new sletter com bined pragm atic argum ent w ith scriptural injunction, thereby reasoning on the basis o f global pow er relationships as well as on abstract ethical im peratives.56 The Fellowship o f R econciliation (FOR) sponsored its ow n m onthly organ, Fellowship, w hich expressed a for m ore overt pacifism . By the end o f 1940, the FOR, w hich was the nation’s m ajor pacifist body, listed eight thousand active m em bers and tw o thousand inactive ones. In 1941, Fellowship's editor was John N evin Sayre, an A nglican clergym an w ho chaired the international FOR. A. J. M uste, a form er D utch Reform ed m inister and M arxist w ho becam e FOR secretary in A pril 1940, contributed often to the jo u rn al.57 O bviously the house o f anti-interventionism contained m any m ansions, and the bitterest o f enem ies m ight agree on only one prem ise: the necessity o f avoiding full-scale A m erican involvem ent in W orld W ar II. Reasons could be contradictory: opposition to fundam ental social reform o r fear o f radical so­ cial change; lack o f the needed arm am ent o r Jesus’s injunctions against "the sw ord”; a global analysis th at predicted eventual victory o f the w orld’s to tali­ tarian pow ers o r one th at predicted th eir defeat. All these factors, and m any others besides, cam e into play once G erm any invaded Poland, an event th at took place on 1 Septem ber 1939.

1

War, Phony and Real

The attack began before daw n. At 0445 hours G erm an tanks crossed th e Pol­ ish frontier. The Luftwaffe im m ediately crushed the Polish air force. T hat evening Prim e M inister Neville C ham berlain told the H ouse o f C om m ons th a t B ritain had sent an ultim atum to Reichchancellor H itler dem anding an im m ediate tro o p w ithdraw al. W hen tw o days later, 3 Septem ber 1939, G er­ m any rejected B ritain’s w ithdraw al deadline o f 11 A.M., C ham berlain broad­ cast th at “all m y long struggle to w in peace has failed.” By the end o f the day, B ritain and France had declared w ar on G erm any, thus tu rn in g th e Poland in ­ vasion into W orld W ar II. H itler justified his attack on the grounds th at the Poles w ould n o t cede the G erm an-speaking areas o f D anzig and th e Polish C orridor.1

★

O nce w ar broke out, blam e for the conflict varied.2 C ertain nonintervention­ ists accused H itler o f triggering the conflict as did over 80 percent o f G allup poll respondents.3 W rote Oswald G arrison V illard o f the Allies, “Theirs is the righteous cause; they were w illing to negotiate; the records show th at H itler w ent around lying an d in haste.” Using data ju st released in B ritain’s White Book, the Chicago Tribune argued th at H itler had sought war, w hereas B ritain desired only peace and the integrity o f Poland.4 The socialist Call conceded the legitim acy o f G erm any’s claim to D anzig and the C orridor b u t found H itler’s attack p u ttin g Poland’s sheer existence at stake. C harles A. Lindbergh saw “the fault o f the w ar about evenly divided in Europe.” The liberal m onthly

9

10

Chapter 1

Common Sense th o u g h t it irrelevant to assess guilt, asserting n o one in Europe really w anted a d ash .5 A surprising num ber o f anti-interventionists had little sym pathy for the Al­ lies. To understand th eir position, one m ust exam ine th eir views o n D anzig and th e C orridor, H itler’s earlier diplom atic overtures to Poland, th e A ngloFrench guarantee to the Poles o f M arch 1939, th e M unich pact o f Septem ber 1938, and the G erm an-Soviet accord o f A ugust 1939. To begin w ith, several figures accepted a m ajor G erm an d aim — namely, th at th e Polish crisis was rooted in the status o f D anzig and the Polish C orridor. T he Versailles treaty o f 1919 had designated D anzig, w hose population was overw helm ingly G erm an, as a free city, self-governing under the general supervision o f a high com m is­ sioner responsible to the League o f N ations. At the sam e tim e, D anzig was in ­ corporated into th e Polish custom s system , and Poland represented the city in foreign affairs. To assure Poland “free and secure access” to th e Baltic Sea, the language o f W oodrow W ilson’s Fourteen Points, Poland obtained a “co rrid o r” lying along the V istula River. A lthough th e C o rrid o r contained m ore Poles th an G erm ans, it severed the relatively sm all territo ry o f East Prussia from G erm any proper. N o G erm an leader ever supported Polish dom ination o f ei­ th er D anzig o r its surroundings.6 Even after th e G erm an attack, noninterventionists often m aintained th at th e G erm an position o n th e C o rrid o r was just. In 1919, they recalled, Presi­ dent W ilson had w arned th a t depriving G erm any o f such areas w ould lead to an o th er war. Prim e M inister Lloyd G eorge’s fam ous Fontainebleu m em oran­ dum to C lem enceau, dated 25 M arch 1919, prophesied th a t p u ttin g G erm an nationals under foreign rule w ould create conflict.7 Still m ore im portant to such anti-interventionists, Danzig and the C orridor rem ained unquestionably G erm an. Danzig, said Congressm an H am ilton Fish (Rep.-N.Y.), was “97 percent G erm an, 97 percent Prussian, and 97 percent Nazi.” To Yale law professor Edwin M. Borchard, “M orally H itler has a good case.”8 O f course, attacks on Poland’s dom ination o f th e C o rrid o r were far from lim ited to th e anti-interventionists. In 1933, for exam ple, FDR him self told th e B ritish th a t the C orridor should be retu rn ed to Germ any.9 Yet all polls taken in A ugust and Septem ber 1939 indicated th at A m ericans, by a large m argin, found H itler’s claim s to D anzig and the C orridor unjustified.10 Even w hen the fighting started, several anti-interventionists m aintained th at H itler had sought peace w ith Poland. Such a view was based on the G erm anPolish negotiations launched in late O ctober 1938. G erm an foreign secretary Joachim von R ibbentrop offered Josef Lipski, Polish am bassador to Berlin, a se­ ries o f term s, including D anzig’s incorporation into Germany, a G erm an-controlled road and rail link w ith East Prussia, G erm an guarantee o f the Polish frontier, a tw enty-five-year extension o f the 1934 nonaggression pact betw een the tw o countries, and Polish m em bership in the A nti-C om intern Pact th at in ­ cluded G erm any, Japan, and Italy. Realizing th at such term s w ould result in

War, Phony and Real

11

Poland's subordination to the Reich, Polish foreign m inister Josef Beck re­ fused.11 T he entire spring and sum m er o f 1939 were consum ed by relentless G erm an pressure, b o th p ro p ag an d ists and m ilitary, against the Poles. H itler’s form al term s— as filtered through the popular press— appealed to som e anti-interventionists, including m ore th an th e obvious profascist ele­ m ents.12 H arry Elm er Barnes found G erm any’s form al dem ands "very reason­ able.” Frank C. W aldrop o f th e Washington Times-Herald suggested th at Poland should have linked itself w ith either Russia o r G erm any an d have de­ clared W arsaw an open city.13 Several anti-interventionists bestow ed m ajor responsibility for th e conflict o n B ritain and France, accusing them o f foolishly encouraging Polish resist­ ance. Such critics p ointed to one A llied assurance to Poland after another, each increasing th e degree o f com m itm ent. A lthough France had entered in to a form al alliance w ith Poland in 1925, only o n 31 M arch 1939 did th e B ritish governm ent prom ise A nglo-French aid in case independence was threatened. O n 25 A ugust, the B ritish intensified th eir com m itm ent, entering in to a m u­ tu al assistance pact w ith Poland and, in a secret protocol, specified G erm any as the potential aggressor.14 Less th an a m o n th before w ar began, C ongressm an Fish sought negotiation o f the D anzig crisis. President o f the A m erican delegation to the Interparlia­ m entary U nion C onference, w hich m et in m id-A ugust 1939, Fish first spoke w ith E uropean leaders, including the foreign m inisters o f B ritain, France, and G erm any. O n th e 17th, he introduced a resolution at the O slo m eeting calling fo r arb itratio n , m ediation, and a cooling-off period o f th irty days.15 Because o f the opposition from B ritish and N orw egian representatives, he w ithdrew h is proposal. In Septem ber, Fish blam ed the B ritish for rejecting a proposal th a t m ight have "saved Poland from being crucified by invasion and war.”16 D uring th e last week o f peace, som e noninterventionists were particularly b lu n t. B orchard claim ed th at B ritain’s "churlish refusal” to accept H itler’s de­ m ands created an o th er case in w hich "H itler will again appear to be right and th e Allies w rong.” Felix M orley, chief editorial w riter for d ie Washington Post, found th e B ritish fighting to save "face,” n o t Poland. W riting o f B ritish in ­ transigence, p oet A nne M orrow Lindbergh w rote, "Is th is courage o r is it stu ­ pidity?” To h er husband C harles, "Poland is beyond help under any circum ­ stances.”17 O nce th e B ritish and French entered th e conflict, attacks on th eir Polish guarantee becam e even m ore strident. G eneral H ugh Johnson called B ritain’s declaration o f w ar "one o f the greatest and m ost stupid blunders in histo ry —if n o t th e greatest.”18 To many, the fundam ental erro r w ent far beyond the Anglo-French guaran­ tee to Poland. R ather it lay in failing to follow through on the genuine détente established by the M unich conference o f late Septem ber 1938. At th at tim e B ritain and France acceded in the transfer o f the Sudetenland to Germany, an event th at w ithin six m onths led to the dism em berm ent o f Czechoslovakia.

12

Chapter 1

True, som e anti-interventionists attacked M unich bitterly, including Sena­ to r W illiam E. B orah (R ep.-Idaho), w ho referred to “th e dism em bered body o f Czechoslovakia, the only real republic in th at p o rtio n o f the w o rld ”19 O thers defended the pact.20 By signing the agreem ent, they said, th e W estern pow ers had bought tim e to defend them selves.21 Furtherm ore, M unich m ight tu rn G erm an expansion in an easterly direction, thereby creating conflict w ith the Soviet U nion. “H aving given H itler at M unich th e keys to Eastern Europe,” w rote Lawrence D ennis, “the B ritish decided six m onths later to forbid him to use the keys.”22 A ccording to journalist W illiam H enry C ham berlin, France had m issed its o p p o rtu n ity to crush G erm any single-handedly du rin g the R hineland crisis o f 1936. H ence, it had only one reasonable policy left: to ac­ quiesce in G erm an expansion eastw ard.29 The G erm an-Soviet accord o f 23 A ugust 1939 created even m ore diverse re­ action. Earlier th a t m onth, an A nglo-French m ilitary m ission had traveled to Moscow, seeking to explore the possibilities o f containing an obviously ex­ panding G erm any. W hen the Russians insisted on th e right to tran sp o rt troops across Poland as p art o f any agreem ent, the head o f th e B ritish m ission balked. In th e 23 A ugust agreem ent, G erm any and the Soviet U nion, h ith erto th e bitterest o f enem ies, signed a nonaggression pact. Both parties pledged to refrain from attacking th e oth er and prom ised neutrality if either p arty were attacked by a th ird . A secret codicil was attached th a t divided Eastern Europe into spheres o f influence.24 N ot surprisingly, A m erican com m unists endorsed the agreem ent. T he pact, predicted p arty head Earl Browder, w ould break the Axis, w hile com m entator T heodore D raper alleged th at the pact had tem porarily shattered “the ap­ peasem ent front.”25 Conversely, Father C harles E. C oughlin found the pact em barrassing. W hen news o f the agreem ent was released, he told a radio au­ dience th at A m ericans m ust henceforth treat com m unism and N azism alike. Sooner o r later, he w ent on, Stalin’s and H itler’s star w ould set.26 A few opponents o f intervention saw th e agreem ent as reducing th e chances for conflict, th e New York Daily News m aintaining it show ed Stalin’s unw ill­ ingness to enter a general war.27 A nd even if the pact did n o t advance the cause o f peace, it could still be defended. Senator Borah, form er chairm an o f the Senate Foreign R elations C om m ittee, th o u g h t the B ritish deserved such trea t­ m ent, for they had excluded th e Soviets from the M unich conference, w hile seeking th eir aid in protecting Poland. H istorian H arry Elm er Barnes w ent further. H e conceded the Soviet U nion was guilty o f aggression b u t asserted th a t it was the Soviets’ desire for peace and security th at induced them to sign th e 23 A ugust agreem ent.2* T he agreem ent, som e anti-interventionists correctly suspected, involved se­ cret understandings. T he New York Daily News suggested th a t th e pact m ight involve th e p artitio n o f Poland.29 To H ugh Johnson, th e agreem ent included th e retu rn o f th e Baltic states to Russia and th e p a rtitio n o f R um ania.30 W ithin

War, Phony and Real

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ten years, Social Justice predicted, H itler w ould control the Balkans, dividing its rich m arkets w ith Stalin, w hile the USSR w ould com m and Ibrkey, Iraq, and Persia.31 O n 27 Septem ber, Soviet troops advanced from th e east, m eeting th e G er­ m ans at Brest-Litovsk tw o days later. Again, the com m unists strongly de­ fended the m ove, quoting B ritish politician D avid Lloyd George and play­ w right George B ernard Shaw on th e m atter.32 Several noninterventionists expressed outrage.33 To ju rist John Bassett M oore, Russia had becom e "the chief exponent o f the sp irit o f aggression.” The New York Daily News stressed such Soviet perfidies as th e shooting o f priests. At the sam e tim e, it argued, B ritain had gone to w ar fully aware th at th e Soviets w ould n o t com e to Poland’s aid.34 Why, som e anti-interventionists asked, had n o t th e Allies declared w ar on Russia as they had on Germany?33 In noting th e observation m ade by B ritish Foreign Secretary Lord H alifax— nam ely, th at th e Soviet-Polish b order sim ply follow ed th e ethnic C urzon line drafted a t the 1919 Paris conference— the Christian Century accused B ritain o f acquiescing in the Soviet annexation o f m ore th an a th ird o f Poland.”36 Socialist leader N orm an Thom as requested Roosevelt to extend his neutrality proclam ation banning arm s and m unitions to th e USSR, though he m aintained th at Poland’s Jews and W hite Russians w ould be b etter satisfied u nder Stalin th an they had been under either H itler o r th e old Polish autocracy.37 A m ong the anti-interventionists, Poland had its share o f sym pathizers.38 "M y h eart bleeds,” said C ongressm an Lewis D. T hill (Rep.-W is.), for a people w ho "so valiantly defended th eir hom eland against G erm an and Russian at­ tacks.” Senator James J. Davis (Rep.-Pa.) w arned, "N azi ruthlessness is eradi­ cating a people from the face o f th e earth.” To H am ilton Fish, Poland had been "crucified.” In February 1941, th e usually reticent C harles A. Lindbergh told th e Senate Foreign R elations C om m ittee th at he was "very m uch opposed to w hat happened in the G erm an invasion o f Poland.” Before the Soviets invaded Poland, the com m unist Daily Worker urged "m axim um aid.”39 Rom an C atholic journals voiced particular concern, no d o u b t partly be­ cause o f Poland’s historic prom inence as a C atholic nation.40 Even Social Jus­ tice saw W arsaw displaying "a heroism unsurpassed in the annals o f m ilitant patriotism ,” w hereas H itler em bodied "the pagan plottings o f anti-C hrist.”41 The fact th at C oughlin’s jo u rn al was published in a suburb o f D etroit, a heav­ ily Polish area, was undoubtedly a factor in its position. As news spread o f G erm an atrocities against Poland’s Jews, anti-interven­ tionists vehem ently denounced H itler’s anti-Sem itic policies.42 H itler’s new "Jewish State” there, predicted Villard, w ould becom e "nothing m ore than a huge concentration cam p and charnel house.” Calling for mass protest m eet­ ings, he continued, "The Jews are treated literally as no G erm an w ould be al­ lowed under the law to treat a dum b anim al.”43 N ot since Genghis Khan and At-

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tila, suspected H ugh Johnson in January 1940, had there been such barbarism .44 In February 1941, H erbert Hoover, speaking to the Jewish W elfare Fund o f Chicago, called for the creation o f a new refugee state in C entral Africa.45 A few noninterventionists w ere m ore reserved. Pacifist leader D orothy D etzer conceded th at atrocity stories concerning Poland m ight well be tru e, b u t she accused th e B ritish o f deliberately tim ing news releases so as to influence neutrality debates in Congress.46 Catholic World even saw the G erm ans as pos­ sible victim s. In review ing Polish Acts o f Atrocity Against the German Minority in Poland* published by th e G erm an L ibrary o f Inform ation, the Paulist m onthly judged th at Berlin’s claim s were as credible as those w ho stressed Nazi atrocities.47 M any anti-interventionists were unsym pathetic to Poland, and several fo­ cused on Poland’s long history o f anti-Sem itism .46 M ore Jews had been perse­ cuted in Poland, said Senator B urton K. W heeler (D em .-M ont.), th an in any o th er country in the w orld.49 Furtherm ore, such noninterventionists depicted th e Polish governm ent as oppressive, its ruling class exploitative.50 H arry Elm er Barnes cited socialist w riter M ax N om ad in claim ing th at Poland’s regim e was "hated by the m a­ jo rity o f its ow n people.”51 A ccording to the Christian Century* civil liberties had ceased to exist w hen G eneral Joseph Pilsudski had launched his coup in 1926.52 Call colum nist Lillian Symes contended th at th e Allies were fighting for the restoration o f “a sem i-fascist governm ent o f less m ilitary significance than Czechoslovakia.”53 Poland’s recent conduct in Europe was severely questioned. T he Christian Century recalled th at even before the Paris Peace Conference o f 1919 had even adjourned, Poland had attacked G alicia and w ithin a year had invaded Soviet Russia.54 After M unich, C ongressm an John M arshall Robsion (Rep.-Ky.) noted, Poland had seized seven thousand square m iles o f Czech territory.55 Barnes accused the nation’s leaders o f envisioning a "G reat Poland” stretching from th e Baltic to the Black Sea.56 A nti-interventionists occasionally pilloried Poland’s w ar leaders for fleeing to R um ania. P undit H . L. M encken, for exam ­ ple, accused them o f looting the gold resources o f th eir ow n nation.57 To several figures, Poland’s fall did n o t sim ply result from its leadership. Publisher R obert R. M cCorm ick indicted B ritain and France for rem aining to ­ tally in ert during the G erm an invasion.58 Joseph P. Kennedy asserted England w ould rath er "sell 100 Polands dow n the river than risk the life o f a B ritish soldier o r the loss o f a B ritish pound.” Even if Poland was restored, declared M encken, B ritain w ould m ake it a "puppet state” sim ilar to Egypt and India.59 C ongressm an Bruce B arton (Rep.-N.Y.) found W estern aid infeasible. A look at th e atlas, he said, show ed th at there was no way France and England could com e to Poland’s aid.60 O nce Poland’s fate was decided, certain anti-interventionists sought to alle­ viate its disasters. H erbert H oover launched a full-scale cam paign to feed starv­

War, Phony and Real

15

ing Poles, establishing the C om m ission for Polish Relief and raising som e $6 m illion.61 In February 1940, Senator A lexander W iley (Rep.-W is.), pointing to Polish forces fighting in France, urged $15 m illion in congressional aid. Fish found surplus A m erican w heat and cotton able to clothe and feed the Poles.62 Indeed, som e anti-interventionists rem ained optim istic concerning Poland’s ultim ate survival.63 C ongressm an T hill predicted th at the division o f Poland w ould n o t last forever: "T he w orld is to o sm all for b o th H itler and Stalin.”64 Yet, irrespective o f their analysis, all such com m entators concurred w ith one d a im o f the Chicago Tribune the U nited States had n o t created the Danzig sit­ uation; it therefore had no stake in i t Even if the U.S. so desired, it could n o t eject H itler from the old free city o f Danzig, m uch less force Stalin to return his p o rtio n o f Poland.63 Senator R obert A. Taft sym pathized w ith the invaded Poles b u t saw "no reason why we should ru n on the field and play quarterback.”66

D espite th e loss o f Poland, m any anti-interventionists did n o t th in k th e Allies w ould be defeated. T he A m erican public itself was equally optim istic; a Fortune poll taken in O ctober predicted an Allied victory 64 percent to 7 percent, w ith 29 percent uncertain.67 At best H itler’s foes w ould em erge victorious, a t w orst experience stalem ate.68 Said G eneral H ugh Johnson in Novem ber, “An ignorant an d brutal u p start has shot craps w ith destiny once too often.”69 Several reasons w ere given. First, Allied ground forces appeared invincible. N ot only did the French possess th e largest effective arm y in the w orld; it was th e best. T he Allies, w rote colum nist Boake C arter, could p u t three soldiers in th e field for every one th e G erm ans could m uster.70 Second, so b o th H erbert H oover and C harles A. Lindbergh noted, th e M aginot line served to deter the G erm ans.71 T hird, as H oover stressed, A llied naval strength appeared for su­ perior. T he French and B ritish w ould continue to control th e seas.72 O nly one factor was debated: air power. Boake C arter foresaw G erm an fac­ to ries dem olished by B ritish and French bom bs; ten m illion G erm ans, he pre­ dicted, w ould die.73 A rguing to th e contrary, C olonel Lindbergh envisioned G erm any as soon possessing com plete air suprem acy.74 T he discussion was often taken to an o th er level, for several anti-interventionists denied th at air pow er alone could ever conquer a nation. H ugh Johnson, w riting in O ctober, called G erm an raids on B ritish naval forces "flops”; new defenses m ade m ass raids o n large cities too dangerous even to attem pt.73 The Chicago Tribune, w hich acknow ledged G erm an air superiority, found th a t p u rsu it planes and antiaircraft w eapons could defend cities against air attack.76 D ennis and G ravenhoff w ere particularly skeptical o f bom bing, for even if G erm any sho u ld capture th e N etherlands an d use it as an air base, th e Luftwaffe could n o t inflict m uch dam age o n B ritain. N inety percent o f London itself consisted

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o f open spaces; therefore, over three-fourths o f any bom bs dropped there w ould be w asted.77 To th e noninterventionists, th e Allies held advantages in resources. B ritain and France, m aintained Boake C arter, dom inated th e w orld’s entire financial resources and 70 percent o f its m aterial ones.78 As H oover noted, the Allied nations possessed 115 m illion people, G erm any only 80 m illion. In regard to foodstuffs, he found France practically self-supporting, B ritain well supplied from its dom inions. Germ any, in contrast, was starting th e w ar ao n bread cards.”79 In fact, Commonweal believed conditions in G erm any so bad th at it suggested a relief organization. The strategic situation itself, w rote Newsweek editor R aym ond Moley, w orked to Allied advantage. G erm any, he said, feared the enorm ous sacrifice th at an attack on th e w estern front w ould entail, for “if she weakens herself Russia will m ove westward.”80 Conversely, several a n ti­ interventionists saw G erm any internally weak, lacking essential foodstuffs and such raw m aterials as iron ore and oil. Besides, it risked ram pant inflation.81 Even if G erm any won the war, according to such reasoning, it could not dom ­ inate Europe for long.82 Senator Tafi envisioned any dictator facing countless oc­ cupation difficulties.83 Senator Robert Rice Reynolds (D em .-N .C.) concurred, stressing the colossal task Germ any w ould face in holding dow n the French and British em pires.84 M oreover, there were the punative lessons o f history, as shown by ill-fated w ould-be conquerors ranging from Julius Caesar to Napoleon.85 Several saw a possibility o f H itler’s Reich dissolving internally.86 John T. Flynn spoke o f econom ic collapse o r a leftist revolt.87 In due tim e, predicted Senator W illiam J. Bulow (D em .-S.D ak.), the G erm an people w ould over­ throw th eir Nazi rulers. D raw ing on José O rtega y G asset’s Revolt o f the Masses (1930), C ongressm an B arton claim ed th at a long w ar w ould trigger popular revolts in b o th G erm any and the Soviet U nion. Already, w rote Boake C arter in Septem ber, som e eight m illion Czechs were prepared to revolt.88 To Oswald G arrison V illard, a close observer o f G erm an affairs, G erm any lacked the strength for a long-term struggle. A rriving there ju st before the o u t­ break o f war, he rem ained three and a h alf weeks and then reported on his trip to b o th the public and Roosevelt him self.89 From w hat he observed, G erm any was a m ost unhappy land, the bulk o f its people w orn, tired, depressed, and in som e cases hopeless. W hile denying the possibility o f an early collapse, he said th at internal differences w ithin the Reich, centering on opposition to Nazi policy, w ould eventually result in H itler’s defeat. At one p o in t, he noted th at 75 percent o f the people he m et in G erm any opposed H itler’s regim e and th at as m any as 90 percent were against the war.90 H is firsthand account, Within Germany ( 1940), received favorable reviews.91 A few w ent fu rth er in em phasizing G erm any’s internal problem s.92 Early in D ecem ber 1939, N orm an Thom as found discontent reaching the high com ­ m and. In January 1940, the New York Daily News discovered G erm any ra ­ tioning h o t w ater.93

War, Phony and Rod

17

A m id such optim ism , there was one w arning: th e Allies m ust n o t go o n the offensive.94 Any such blunder, H oover w arned, w ould exhaust B ritish and French m anpow er. A t th e very outset o f th e conflict, C olonel Lindbergh feared th a t th e B ritish and French w ould attem p t to bom b G erm an cities, a m ove th a t could only draw terrible retaliation. O nly one prom inent anti-interven­ tio n ist urged an A llied offensive: W illiam R andolph H earst. B ritain and France, suggested th e publisher in M arch 1940, should place them selves un d er such capable “w ar dictators” as French foreign m inister E douard D aladier, th en secure Thrkish su p p o rt and attack through Italy, thereby assuring control o f th e M editerranean.95 T hroughout th e w inter o f 1939-40. a n ti-interventionists saw only deadlock ahead.96 They frequently pointed to lack o f com bat in W estern Europe, a cir­ cu m stan ce th a t changed only in A pril 1940. C ongressm an John R ankin (D em .-M iss.) quipped th at th e troops “are m erely playing pinochle.”97 If, said Senator Edwin Johnson (D em .-C olo.), th e Allies could neither crack the Siegfried line n o r starve the G erm ans, w ho were supplied w ith unlim ited So­ viet assistance, victory w ould be extrem ely difficult. G erm an subm arines, lacking bases o n th e A tlantic, w ould soon be neutralized.9* T he New York Daily News kept stressing th a t any fight to th e finish w ould result in unspeakable ills— starvation, com m unism — and th a t b o th sides realized it.99 “England and France are in no position,” w rote H ugh Johnson, “to fight any kind o f w ar ex­ cept an interm inable affair o f siege, blockade and starvation. D o you w ant to encourage that?” Lawrence D ennis and V. D. G ravenhoff denied th at any G er­ m an leader advocated “lightning w ar” against th e Allies. Rather, Germany*s “extrem ely logical” plan was based o n subm arine and air offensives against Al­ lied shipping and naval bases.100 Several foes o f intervention found th e w hole situation on th e W estern front absurd. H earst’s San Francisco Examiner called th e conflict “about as senseless as tw o m en quarreling in a b oat w hich is about to carry them over N iagara Falls.” T he Allies, it was argued, lacked a fighting spirit. “T here is som ething phony ab o u t this war,” said Senator Borah, coining a fam ous phrase, for he was accusing the Allies o f pulling th eir punches against G erm any. Why, asked H ugh Johnson, had th e Allies n o t bom bed th e K rupp w orks at Essen? Social­ ist editor O scar A m eringer answ ered such queries by claim ing, “T he p lu to ­ crats are n o t going to bom b th eir own.”101 O th er noninterventionists, however, rejoiced in th e static situ atio n .102 At th e present pace, rem arked Senator Lynn Frazier (R ep.-N .D ak.), H itler could never sm ash th e Allies. To New Republic editor Bruce Bliven, “T he m ass slaughter o f hum an beings is about die m ost dreadful th in g I know,” and he deem ed it best for th e Allies to “sit still and starve G erm any out.” T he title o f h is article: “I Like a Phony War.”105 C ertain figures in th e Roosevelt adm inistration were less optim istic.104 Ad­ m iral H arold Stark, chief o f naval operations, was in a decided m inority in

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seeing stalem ate ahead.105 Secretary o f State C ordell H ull envisioned the de­ feat o f B ritain and France, th e p artitio n o f Eastern Europe betw een G erm any and the Soviet U nion, and th e severing o f all trade betw een th e U nited States an d E urope.106 A ssistant Secretary A dolf Berle an d In terio r Secretary H arold Ickes saw little reason for the Allies to count on a victory.107 In N ovem ber, b o th th e state departm ent and m ilitary experts, noted Ickes, predicted a G er­ m an drive to th e C hannel through the N etherlands.108 Roosevelt’s ow n attitu d e fluctuated. H e told Ickes in O ctober th a t G erm an m orale w ould crack; at o th er tim es he gave the Allies only a fifty-fifty chance o f victory.109 W ithin higher B ritish circles only C olonel H astings Ismay, m ili­ tary secretary to the w ar cabinet, predicted th a t France w ould collapse in the face o f a G erm an onslaught.110

A lm ost as soon as th e w ar started, som e noninterventionists saw peace in the offing. Early in Septem ber, N orm an Thom as declared th at the w ar m ight stop w ith th e conquest o f Poland. O n 9 O ctober, John Rankin predicted peace w ithin a few days.111 O thers were a b it m ore vague b u t still hopeful.112 "Som e so rt o f peace,” com m ented H earst’s San Francisco Examiner in m id-O ctober, m ight com e by C hristm as, after w hich a w orld conference w ould undo the "obvious and alm ost universally hated injustices o f th e Versailles Treaty.”115 Signs included a w arm G erm an reception for a false arm istice report, the re­ tu rn hom e o f a hundred thousand French troops, G erm an seizing o f tw o sup­ posed B ritish peace agents on the D utch border, and the scuttling o f th e G er­ m an battleship G raf Spec off the A rgentine coast, w hich show ed H itler could n o t endure the heavy casualties involved in a battleship fight.114 Just before he died on 19 January 1940, B orah told a reporter he expected peace th at spring, follow ed by a general revision o f th e Versailles treaty.115 Some were wary. As early as O ctober, H erbert H oover predicted th at the im passe w ould only last u n til the spring.116 A nne M orrow Lindbergh foresaw the conquest o f Poland an d m erciless bom bing o f London and Paris. She thought in term s o f "a new Spain,” referring to the civil w ar th at had ju st ended. To her husband C harles, it was again "T he Charge o f the Light Brigade.” In M arch 1940, V illard feared th at H ider w ould soon attack B ritain by both air and sea.117 A few an ti-in terv en tio n ists divined an A llied initiative, th o u g h n o t nec­ essarily in W estern E urope. In m id-F ebruary, th e New York Daily News an ­ ticip ated an A llied m ove in th e M iddle East. N oting th e sudden appearance o f th irty th o u san d A nzac tro o p s a t Suez, it contem plated a drive to sever th e Soviet U nion’s Baku oil fields from H ider. To block th e m ove, G erm any

War, Phony and Real

19

an d R ussia m ight p ush in to R um ania, attacking th e strategically vital C on­ sta n tin o p le.11'

For m any, if n o t m ost, anti-interventionists, th e greatest danger to th e w orld cam e n o t from G erm any b u t from the Soviet U nion.119 W ho, queried A nne M orrow Lindbergh, was “the potential invader o f Europe, the real th reat o f E uropean civilization?” “Ask the Balkans and the Baltic states. Ask Finland; ask R um ania; ask Turkey.” W ith Europe “bled w hite by w ars and prostrated by devastation, her [Russia’s] advance w ill be slow, inevitable, and deadly—like a flow o f lava.”120 So far, som e argued, H itler was already a loser, n o t a w inner. O n th e p o liti­ cal right, such opinions were expected.121 Read one editorial headline in the Chicago Tribune: “The W inner, Red Josef.”122 But liberal noninterventionists too saw Stalin as th e victor.123 N orm an T hom as found th e G erm an d ictator doing “th e fighting,” th e Soviet dictator “the annexing.”124 Even G erm any was n o t excluded from going Red.123 V illard envisioned a com m unist takeover w ithin five years.126 H earst correspondent H . R. Knicker­ bocker gave H itler's Reich six years.127 D ire consequences, several w arned, w ould n o t be lim ited to G erm any alone. O nce th e belligerents had been “bled w hite,” predicted Representative Fish, “the C om m unist vulture w ill sweep dow n o n th e bloody rem ains o f Europe.”12* Stalin's aim s appeared insatiable.129 Reynolds spoke o f Russia “creeping dow n” o n Persia and India.130 C ongressm an George A. D ondero (Rep.-M ich.) suspected Soviet designs on C hina an d the Philippines. N orm an T hom as w arned o f “a kind o f w orld hegemony.” By th e w ar’s end, th e New York Daily News predicted, the U nited States “m ay be the only non-C om m unist nation left in th e world.”131 To Social Justice, the W est faced a series o f revolutions, led in France by such “C om m unists” as Leon Blum , in B ritain by such “rocking chair C om m unists” as A nthony Eden and W inston C hurchill, and in the U nited States by such figures as financier B ernard B aruch and labor leaders H arry Bridges and W alter R euther.132 W ithin in te rv en tio n ist circles, such apprehension was occasionally shared.133 To Ickes, H itler had “a big an d unm anageable bear by the tail th at will destroy him in his tu rn even if he succeeds in destroying France and Eng­ land.”134A ssistant Secretary o f State Berle found Stalin and H itler ruling “from M anchuria to th e R hine, m uch as G enghis Khan once ruled.”135 W alter Lippm ann, undoubtedly th e m ost respected colum nist am ong the interventionists, defined w hat he saw as the real issue o f the war: “W hat shall be the boundary o f Europe against the expanding invasion o f Russian im perial Bolshevism?”

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O nly Roosevelt dissented slightly, denying th at G erm any could ever go “C om ­ m unist in th e Russian m anner,” for it had always honored th e values o f private property and fam ily independence.136 Fortunately, so m any hoped, a negotiated peace m ight be in the offing, one th at could end th e bloodshed and deflect th e w ide-sw eeping am bitions o f the Soviets.

Early Hopes for Peace

O n 6 O ctober 1939, in th e wake o f his conquest o f Poland, H itler addressed the Reichstag. The G erm an d ictator called for an end to hostilities in the W est, follow ed by a general peace conference to discuss such m atters as disarm a­ m ent, colonies, international econom ic reorganization, uthe Jewish problem ,” the redivision o f Eastern Europe “according to the various nationalities,” and the form ation o f a Polish state friendly to G erm any.1 Several anti-interventionists gave credence to H itler’s bid, am ong them N orm an T hom as, John Haynes H olm es, and H arold E. Fey, field editor o f the Christian Century and form er FOR field secretary.2 C om m ented the Protes­ tan t weekly itself, “H itler w ants peace. He w ants it badly; he w ants it now.”3 Such pacifists were n o t alone.4 H earst’s San Francisco Examiner suspected th at H itler m ight negotiate peace and then tu rn suprem e com m and over to Reichsm arschall H erm ann G oering.5 Professor B orchard rem arked th at the Führer realized how seriously w ar w ould affect G erm any’s internal life.6 N ot all anti-interventionists were so optim istic. W hen, in m id-Septem ber, H itler first m ade peace overtures, retired diplom at W illiam R. Castle called him a liar and his address “piffle.”7 In January, V illard w rote, “I do n o t suppose th at in all history there has ever been a w orse m an o r a less trustw orthy one w ith w hom to m ake solem n agreem ents.” The liberal editor placed his hopes on elem ents o f the G erm an arm y and foreign office.6 To the New Republic, H itler sim ply w anted to celebrate his victories, n o t to negotiate w ith his ene­ m ies.9 Several anti-interventionists, including the New York Daily News, p u t little credence in the G oering o p tio n .10 Som e noninterventionists saw th e Allies prim arily at fault, finding them b o th obstinate and unrealistic. O nce w ar com m enced, B ritain asserted it w ould never negotiate w ith H itler. O n 12 O ctober, C ham berlain rejected the 21

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Führer’s peace bid o f six days earlier: "After o u r past experience it is no longer possible to rely o n the unsupported w ord o f th e present G erm an G overn­ m ent.” H is nation, he said, w ould continue fighting u n til H itler's regim e was rem oved and independence restored to th e E uropean countries he had con­ quered. F urtherm ore, any peace m ust so restrict G erm any as to prevent fu r­ th er efforts to conquer Europe and seek w orld dom in atio n .11 A nti-interventionists q u id d y responded to th e prim e m inister.12 Insistence on th e destruction o f th e Nazi regim e and th e restoration o f Czechoslovakia and Poland, w arned th e San Francisco Examiner; w ould cancel H itler’s peace offer.13 V illard deplored a speech o f First Lord o f the A dm iralty W inston C hurchill th at, so he alleged, prevented "a friendly attitu d e o n d ie p a rt o f H ider” tow ard D utch and Belgian proposals.14 If England and France per­ sisted in restoring the Polish governm ent, w arned W heeler, dem ocracy w ould be "driven from the face o f th e earth.” To B orah, Allied intransigence proved th a t France and B ritain sought territo ry an d power, n o t the elim ination o f N azism . O nly a few and-interventionists thought th at B ritain genuinely de­ sired peace, am ong them the jo u rn al Uncensored, journalist C. H artley G rat­ tan , and even V illard.15 U nknow n to the general public, b o th in the U nited States and overseas, C ham berlain did keep open contacts w ith G erm ans w hom he saw as "m oder­ ate,” including conservative generals an d R eichsm arschall G oering. The B ritish blockade, he hoped, could ultim ately destroy th e G erm an econom y, thereby prom pting th e overthrow o f H itler. U nlike Roosevelt, th e prim e m in ­ ister saw tim e on th e side o f th e Allies. Rejecting the aim o f total victory, he stressed th e need to elim inate N azism and m aintain B ritain as a w orld power. R esponding to any "specious appeal” from H itler could only divide the Allies w hile leading to strong pressure from the neutrals. H istorian D avid Reynolds w rites, "H istorically B ritish leaders had conceived o f a strong b u t peaceful G erm any as a potential source o f stability in central Europe. E lim inating the N azi m enace a t the cost o f exposing the C ontinent to the Soviet th reat was hardly a desirable prospect.” 16 C ham berlain was far from alone. Foreign Secretary H alifax privately hoped a peace m ight be m ade on th e basis o f p artial G erm an retirem ent from Poland, restoration o f an independent Czech state, the surrender o f h alf G er­ m any’s air force, and— in his w ords— “a lo t m ore.”17 Even C hurchill, w ho found the prim e m inister’s m ilitary strategy too passive, said in O ctober 1939 th at he did n o t oppose a "genuine” G erm an offer. Indeed, th e first lord o f the adm iralty thought th at G oering m ight be glad to play the role o f G eorge M onk, the general w ho fostered th e tran sitio n from Crom w ell’s C om m on­ w ealth rule to th e later S tuarts.1* Those w ho publicly endorsed negotiation w ere m uch applauded. T here was, m aintained John Haynes H olm es, m ore peace sentim ent in b o th B ritain and France th an th e A m erican press acknow ledged.19 A nti-interventionists

Early Hopes for Peace

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gave m uch atten tio n to Lloyd George’s peace approaches.20 O n 3 O ctober, in addressing th e H ouse o f C om m ons, th e form er prim e m inister claim ed th at a tolerable settlem ent could be im posed by the m ajor neutral pow ers, w ho could enforce disarm am ent, th e redistribution o f colonies, and the restoration o f Czechoslovakia and Poland.21 T he "W elsh w izard” found endorsem ents in a w ide span o f anti-interven­ tio n ist journals, ranging from th e H earst press to New Masses.22 In Novem ber, C ongressm an R ankin praised th e truce bid o f th e m an he called "the B aptist lay leader o f the B ritish Empire.” U ntil the U nited States entered the war, som e noninterventionists speculated hopefully o n U oyd George’s retu rn to pow er an d a possible peace bid, although others— such as Oswald G arrison V illard an d W illiam H enry C ham berlin— were dubious.23 W hen playw right George B ernard Shaw urged B ritain give u p the "pretense” o f war, leaving the Russians and G erm ans to com e to term s, he, too, found anti-interventionist support, particularly am ong A m erican com m unists.24 T hose o f pacifist leanings pointed to o th er B ritons as well. The Christian Cen­ tury noted the tw enty thousand-m em ber Scottish m iners union, tw o Scottish railwaym en’s organizations, and various clergy.23 In its D ecem ber 1939 issue, Fellowship m agazine led w ith a parliam entary speech by prom inent Laborite George Lansbury. In January 1940, Peace Action covered com m ents by Eam on De Valera, prim e m inister o f Ireland.26 These voices had all called for im m edi­ ate peace. So, too, had various Englishm en featured by the A m erican left, such as various trade unions, w riter H . G. Wells, and James M axton and his Inde­ pendent Labor Party. In N ovem ber 1939, New Masses cited a G allup poll re­ portin g th at 25 percent o f th e B ritish people opposed the war.27

C ertain noninterventionists discussed concrete term s. If, said Castle, th e G er­ m ans an d Russians reconstituted an ethnic Poland, B ritain w ould have to ac­ cede to th eir moves. V illard thought th at H itler w ould probably consent to a sm all Poland and Czechoslovakia, not "the H um pty D um pty o f th e old Poland o r th e old Czechoslovakia.” B orchard envisioned Poland as a "rum p state” and th e possible cession o f B ritish colonies in retu rn for G erm an acqui­ escence in strong B ritish aviation and subm arine forces. "Som ething,” he con­ tin u ed vaguely, "m ay be done for Czechoslovakia.”28 Germ any, said the social­ ist American Guardian, w ould dem and a $5 billion bribe plus access to raw m aterials and w orld m arkets.29 Pacifists spoke in m ore W ilsonian concepts. D irect negotiation betw een the belligerents, averred Frederick J. Libby, could likely reach agreem ent on such m atters as arm s reduction, econom ic and financial cooperation, political in ­ dependence for sm all nations, and "a so rt o f association o f nations.” To the

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Fellowship o f R econciliation, the forthcom ing peace conference could focus on such m atters as tariffs, currency, equal access to raw m aterials, interna­ tional control o f colonies, and ultim ately w orld governm ent E rnest Frem ont T ittle, a leading M ethodist clergym an from Evanston, Illinois, offered an en­ tire agenda ranging from peaceful revision o f th e Versailles treaty to a general agreem ent to outlaw econom ic w arfare. The Reverend H arold E. Fey elabo­ rated on a sim ilar program , one th at included a Polish state, possible federal­ ism for the Balkans, and the liberation o f som e colonies, such as India, and in ­ ternational control o f others. John Haynes H olm es urged the plan oudined in Sir A rthur Salter’s Security: Can We Retrieve It? (1939), w hich endorsed abro­ gation o f the Versailles treaty, establishm ent o f free trade betw een B ritain and G erm any, and com m on access to colonial resources.30 N ot only pacifists talked o f turning swords into plowshares o r flirted w ith W ilsonianism . The New York Daily News suggested som e term s, vague to be sure, b u t including a U nited States o f Europe, incorporation o f unnam ed sm all nations into larger ones, and a return o f som e o f G erm any’s form er colonies.31 According to H arry Elm er Barnes, no “reasonable m an” could object to colonial restitution o r an econom ic conference. In endorsing “a peace w ithout victory,” Barnes called for a w orld organization potent enough to deal w ith the “tough realities” o f the day. John Cudahy, Am erican am bassador to Belgium, thought Britain and France m ust perm it G erm an penetration o f their w orld m arkets, even though the move w ould reduce their living standards.32 The Chicago Tri­ bune sought independent states for the Poles, Czechs, and other nationalities; sim ilarly the British m ust acquiesce in a general disarm am ent and the abolition o f Versailles boundaries.33 Any negotiated peace, said Commonweal, m ust pro­ vide greater access to the raw m aterials o f all em pires, tariff reduction, and cred­ its for financial rehabilitation and com m ercial developm ent34 At this stage only a sm all m inority o f anti-interventionists opposed A m eri­ can participation in the possible peacem aking. In February 1940, H erbert H oover adm onished, “Intervention o f any kind is m ore likely to aggravate the situation than to im prove it.” A m onth later N orm an Thom as, w hile continu­ ing to call for neutral m ediation, w arned against the A m erican underw riting o f any peace term s o r the use o f th e U.S. m ilitary to enforce any settlem en t35

Needless to say, all during the fall and w inter o f 1939-40, anti-interventionists suspected pending negotiations. By late Septem ber, various rum ors concern­ ing papal intervention had em erged.36 Such noninterventionists as N orm an Thom as and the New York Daily News backed the initiative.37 Sim ilarly, they relied on the collective action o f W estern Europe’s neutral pow ers.38 O n the day th at the G erm an-Soviet pact was announced, King Leopold o f Belgium

Early Hopes for Peace

25

invited th e foreign m inisters o f seven sm all states, the so-called O slo pow ers, to m eet in Brussels w ithin forty-eight hours, there to present a peace plan to Europe’s m ajor pow ers.39 O n 6 Novem ber, Leopold paid a h u rried visit to the H ague, w here he m et w ith Q ueen W ilhelm ina o f the N etherlands. Fearing im ­ m inent G erm an invasion, the tw o m onarchs issued a public appeal, offering m ediation to th e belligerents. At the very least, they m ight delay the G erm ans u n til w inter, w hen invasion w ould becom e to o difficult.40 A nti-interventionists were encouraged by the D utch-Belgian initiative.41 N ot surprisingly, those closest to pacifism welcom ed the bid.42 So too did som e sen­ ators.43 To D. W orth G a rk (D em .-Idaho), the m ediation offer seem ed the last chance to save Europe. In responding, the Allies asserted th at they w ould be glad to entertain proposals th at prom ised a genuinely just peace. FDR was char­ acteristically vague, pledging Am erican friendship b u t avoiding even the sug­ gestion o f com m itm ent Pope Pius XII supported the proposal.44 Roosevelt, m ore th an any o th er figure, was m entioned as potential m edia­ tor. Early in O ctober, diplom atic legations in Berlin representing varied neu­ tral pow ers hinted th a t H itler w ould accept unconditionally an FDR m edia­ tion proposal.45 A m bassador Kennedy cabled th e president, saying th at “som e o f m y English friends” believed th at only Roosevelt, w hom he called a com bi­ nation o f th e H oly G host an d prizefighter Jack Dempsey, could save the w orld.46 In Novem ber, B ritish am bassador L othian saw an early peace de­ pending on FDR. T he m oderate interventionist W illiam Allen W hite, n ation­ ally respected editor o f the Emporia (Kans.) Gazette, endorsed the president though he also w anted H erbert H oover p a rt o f any negotiations.47 Those o f pacifist leanings lobbied FDR.40 In January 1940, V illard lunched w ith the president, urging him to jo in w ith various neutrals in requesting the w ar aim s o f all belligerents, then to convene “a m eeting o f plenipotentiaries w ith o r w ithout an arm istice.”49 In early Decem ber, the decidely nonpacifist New York Daily News headlined an editorial “We T hink th e Tim e Has Com e for Roosevelt to M ediate.” In fact, it said, the president should threaten eco­ nom ic reprisals if he were snubbed.50 A lthough surprising in retrospect, oth er pronounced Roosevelt critics called for presidential intercession, am ong them Senators Edwin Johnson and B urton K. W heeler an d C ongressm an Fish.51 H ugh Johnson said, “There is nobody m ore com petent to deal w ith this kind o f deadly poker player th an M r. Roosevelt.”52 Senator Nye also backed the president’s m ediation, though he w arned th a t any change in the U nited States’s neutrality status w ould lead th e G erm ans to consider FDR “one o f th e gang o f defenders o f the older im ­ perial system s o f the w orld.”53 A few anti-interventionists expressed m istrust o f the president, am ong them law professor Edwin M . B orchard and pacifist leader Frederick J. Libby, b o th o f w hom found th e president far to o biased.54 T he president’s responses, though cautious, could appear encouraging.55 In O ctober, w hen N orm an T hom as approached Roosevelt direcdy on the m atter,

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the president’s reply was guarded, saying he m ust act "w ith th e greatest cir­ cum spection.”56 In m id-N ovem ber, a delegation o f the N ational Peace C on­ ference (N PC ), a coalition o f pacifist and internationalist organizations, im ­ pressed on Roosevelt th e need for a continuous m ediation conference. In responding to th eir appeal, FDR im plied th at m ore was being done than he could m ention.57 Two days before C hristm as, in a message to Pius XII, Roo­ sevelt denied th at any w orld leader could m ove forw ard o n a specific peace plan b u t th at th e "tim e for th at w ould surely come.”58 W hen V illard had called on the neutral pow ers to ask the belligerents to state th eir w ar aim s, a m ove he hoped w ould be follow ed by negotiation, the president replied th at he was thinking "along sim ilar though n o t identical lines.”59 At tim es anti-interventionists spoke o f U.S. m ediation w ithout m entioning the president.60 O ne idea centered on establishing m achinery w hereby such neutral pow ers as the U nited States w ould engage in continuous m ediation. D uring W orld W ar I, the International Congress o f W om en, headed by re­ form er Jane A ddam s, had offered such a proposal.61 W hen, o n 6 Septem ber, the N PC unanim ously called on the U.S. to initiate a conference o f neutral na­ tions tow ard th at end, individual pacifist groups and leaders gave th eir en­ dorsem ent.62 A variety o f people endorsed the bid o f publisher D avid Lawrence, soon a strong interventionist, w ho frequently w rote th at the U nited States should request a nine-pow er peace conference.63 All such efforts failed. In m id-O ctober, H ull announced th at th e U.S. did n o t contem plate any peace efforts. W ith H itler currently occupying Czecho­ slovakia, A ustria, and m uch o f Poland, n o t to m ention im posing a Nazi regim e on his ow n people, the secretary found chances for a real peace dubi­ ous. Later in th e m onth, FDR said he w ould only act w hen all belligerents of­ ficially requested.64 D espite his public posture, however, the president was already involved in surreptitious peace feelers. In early fall 1939, w ith Roosevelt’s tacit approval, independent oil operator W illiam Rhodes Davis m et w ith Reichsm arschall G oering in Berlin. G oering proposed th at FDR m ediate the conflict and retain the existing neutrality act (w hich contained an arm s em bargo) in retu rn for a free hand in the Far East. A lthough FDR rem ained suspicious, Davis feared th at continued w ar w ould only exhaust Europe, leaving com m unism in its wake.65 D uring th e first week o f Decem ber, FDR told A ssistant Secretary o f State Berle th at he, in Berle’s w ords, "proposed to m ake peace next Spring on the basis o f having everybody produce everything they need; take w hat they need; and let the countries w hich needed th e balance draw it as needed, through the cartels.”66 The president also told B ritish am bassador L othian th at, before his term ended, he w anted to intervene as "a kind o f um pire [a n d ]. . . lay dow n th e conditions for an arm istice.” To overcom e G erm an fears o f a new Ver­ sailles, he w ould stress four basic freedom s: freedom s o f speech and religion, freedom from fear, and freedom o f trade and access to raw m aterials.67

Early Hopes for Peace

27

Early in 1940, Roosevelt in itiated m ore peace m oves. First, he asked G en­ eral M otors executive Jam es D. M ooney to travel to G erm any an d approach certain high-level officials w hom he had long know n. M ooney was to in d i­ cate th at, b o th sides being w illing, Roosevelt w ould be glad to m ediate.6* Sec­ o n d , th e president asked forty-six n eu tral nations to present th eir views on arm s control and econom ic stability; his ultim ate object involved th e p ro ­ posing o f jo in t m ediation, peace term s, an d a place at th e conference table.69 T h ird , th e president announced th e ap p o in tm en t o f M yron Taylor, board chairm an o f U nited States Steel, as special representative w ith am bassadorial ran k to th e V atican, a m ove th a t obviously concerned possible coordination o f peace efforts. W hen, on 9 February, various n eu tral pow ers called a m eet­ ing to preserve th eir rights, state dep artm en t officials saw in its form ation a chance for m ediation.70 M ost im p o rtan t o f all, on 9 February 1940, Roosevelt announced th at U n­ dersecretary o f State Sum ner W elles w ould visit Europe. As H ull was often ill an d W elles was personally closer to th e president, the undersecretary was often singled o u t for special assignm ents. T he ostensible assignm ent: to rep o rt on conditions there.71 U ndoubtedly FDR's focus extended far beyond the gather­ ing o f inform ation. Such a m ission, if successful, could possibly end th e Euro­ pean conflict before it escalated beyond repair. F urtherm ore, it could strengthen his political hand if he decided to seek reelection in 1940 as a peace candidate.72At th e very least, it m ight w ean M ussolini, a m an Welles m uch ad­ m ired, away from H itler.73 In forty-one days, the dapper urbane Welles cov­ ered fourteen thousand m iles, m eeting th e leaders o f Italy, France, B ritain, and G erm any, though n o t H itler him self.74 Several anti-interventionists suspected interventionist m otives behind the president’s m ove, and U.S. entry into w ar was n o t ruled out.75 C ertainly W elles’s m ission appeared all to o sim ilar to an earlier venture by W oodrow W ilson’s confidant and troubleshooter C olonel E. M . H ouse.76 O n 22 February 1916, H ouse had signed an agreem ent w ith B ritish foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey. H e indicated th at if G erm any tu rn ed dow n an A m erican invitation to a peace conference, the U nited States w ould probably enter the w ar on the Allied side. M oreover, if the conference was held and the G erm ans rejected "term s n o t unfavorable to the Allies,” the U.S. w ould join the Allies as a b elligerent77 T he Daily Worker accused the undersecretary o f seeking to convert the exist­ ing conflict into w ar against the Soviet U nion.78 According to the Chicago Tri­ bunes W ashington correspondent, A rthur Sears H enning, the m ission signified a Roosevelt ploy to m old the structure o f the w orld as effectively as M etternich did at Vienna in 1815. If an international federation resulted from the proceed­ ings, FDR w ould consider him self the logical choice for its first president.79 W elles him self was personally attacked.80 H iram Johnson approvingly cited a friend w ho called W elles "a rat, w ith all a rat’s cunning.”81 Recalled were his controversial activities in C uba, w here, as U.S. am bassador in 1933, he helped

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topple a regim e. To N orm an Thom as, W elles was “the m an w hose m aneuvers in C uba prepared th e way for B attista [sic] an d fascism.”82 A few found the Welles m ission a self-aggrandizing sham . It was “fantastic,” said colum nist Boake Carter, “to im agine he can get one um pteenth o f w hat Joe Kennedy can get from Cham berlain in one-half hour o f conversation.” H erbert Hoover suspected th at once Welles returned, Roosevelt w ould suggest a six-week truce, during w hich tim e peace term s w ould be discussed. Even if they were re­ fused, the president w ould have gained votes in the forthcom ing election.83 A nti-interventionists w ere, however, by n o m eans all o f one m ind, som e being m ore hopeful concerning Welles’s m ission and denying any parallel w ith C olonel H ouse.84 Those o f pacifist leanings expressed particular sup­ p o r t85 Frederick J. Libby claim ed th at Roosevelt's long-aw aited peace offen­ sive had now been launched: “T here is no halting place on this road sh o rt o f ultim ate success.”86 T he Christian Century saw “som e so rt o f free Poland and Czechoslovakia” in th e w orks.87 Even several centrist and rightist opinion-m akers expressed hopes in the m ission. The New York Daily News hoped th a t Am erica’s “peace effort” had begun.88 W illiam R andolph H earst gave Roosevelt “th e greatest credit.” Father C oughlin surm ised th a t th e trip m ight restore full diplom atic relations be­ tw een the U nited States and G erm any.89 In a private rep o rt to th e president, W elles asserted th a t the Allies should n o t bargain w ith a dictator they could n o t tru st b u t th a t th e U nited States and o th er neutral nations m ust take th e lead in any m ovem ent tow ard peace. Roo­ sevelt thanked the undersecretary for his pains b u t m inim ized any peace prospect. T he m ission rem ained as stillborn as a negotiated peace itself. T he B ritish and French strongly opposed the visit, w ith C ham berlain w arning FDR th a t it w ould sim ply friel G erm an peace propaganda, arouse false hopes w ithin th e dem ocracies, and encourage th e n eutral Scandinavian nations to ob stru ct a proposed Allied expeditionary force to help the Finns.90 C ertainly W elles’s varied conversations convinced FDR th a t H itler w ould never endorse th e type o f settlem ent he sought.91 H ad th e president desired to take a fu rth er initiative, he could have had a m ajority o f the public behind him . A G allup poll released early in M arch found a 58:42 ratio in favor o f negotiations betw een th e belligerents and a 55:45 ratio for A m erican p articipation in a peace conference. As far as term s w ere concerned, 62 percent opposed G erm an retention o f Czechoslovakia, and 70 percent were against its keeping Poland.92 Given G erm an strength and in ten tio n , the possibility o f realizing such term s was m ost unlikely. D espite the frequency and intensity o f th eir call for m ediation, anti-interventionist ef­ forts w ere singularly ineffective. Furtherm ore, by launching the Welles m is­ sion in February 1940, Roosevelt had outm aneuvered them . Even m ore tro u ­ blesom e was the m atter o f A llied w ar aim s, often seen as m ore im perialistic th an those o f th e G erm ans.

3

iz A Matter of War Aims

It was crucial, felt m any noninterventionists, to debunk the Allied cause, so as to reveal any lofty w ar aim s as a m ask for aggrandizem ent and im perialism . To be countered were such figures as Kansas editor W illiam Allen W hite, w ho called the conflict “a clash o f ideologies," in w hich "these E uropean dem ocra­ cies were carrying o u r banner, fighting the A m erican battle.”1 Foes o f intervention argued ju st the opposite. W orld politics rem ained dom inated by the law o f the jungle. B urton B. K endrick, a historian at the U ni­ versity o f N orth C arolina, denied th at such ideals as justice and dem ocracy ex­ isted in the political w orld. "B irth, grow th, conflict, defeat, decay, death— these are the facts o f life. T hey exist and th eir existence calls neither for tears n o r laughter.”2 Europe, such people m aintained, had never stopped fighting.3 In the w ords o f C harles A. Lindbergh, "T he history o f Europe has always been interw oven w ith co n flict Experience w ould w arn us to be surprised if m uch m ore tim e had passed w ithout a war.” O ccasionally an anti-interventionist offered an en­ tire list o f Europe’s wars. T hat o f C ongressw om an Frances B olton (Rep.O hio), for exam ple, began in 1801.4 Reasons for Europe’s supposed proclivity for conflict ranged from unsatis­ fied m inorities to dem ands for land, food, and raw m aterials.5 H ence, it was n o t surprising to po rtray the cu rren t conflict as ju st another traditional Euro­ pean clash. Pacifist m inister John Haynes H olm es found the fighting a con­ tin u atio n o f W orld W ar I, "the old w ar o f U oyd George against the Kaiser, ju st as Richelieu’s struggle against M axim ilian in 1637 was the sam e old w ar th at E m peror Ferdinand began against Frederick o f Bohem ia in 1618.”6

29 D ig itize d by

Google

O rig in a l fro m

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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A surprising num ber perceived W orld W ar II as an o u trig h t im perialistic struggle, differing little, if at all, from m any conflicts o f the past.7 A G allup poll revealed the nation itself split evenly o n the topic, h alf finding the strug­ gle one for pow er and w ealth, h alf seeing the cause o f dem ocracy at stake.8 W ithin the past q uarter century, V. I. Lenin had outlined the nature o f such a crisis in his tract Imperialism: The Highest Stage o f Capitalism (1917), an in ­ dictm ent o f the pow ers participating in W orld W ar I.9 Both the com m unists and the extrem e right stressed the them e o f im perialist war, albeit in vastly different ways. Radical C ongressm an V ito M arcantonio (Am. Lab.-N.Y.) saw a deeply rooted conflict betw een “the Rom e-Tokyo-Berlin Axis” and “the W all Street-D ow ning Street Axis.”10 C ongressm an M artin L. Sweeney (D em .O hio), a pugnacious follow er o f Father C oughlin, found control o f the w orld’s gold at issue. At issue, claim ed Father C oughlin, was w hether the Bank o f Eng­ land w ould rem ain suprem e.11 Scholars, too, were vocal.12 H arry Elm er Barnes found the w ar centering on “the old thieves” versus “the new thieves,” the form er possessing “the m an­ ners,” th e latter “the best case.” 13 Students concurred. M arguerite H iggins, Berkeley, class o f 1941, and soon a prom inent w ar correspondent, rem arked th at A m erican students should stay o u t o f w ar “ru n by C ham berlainD aladier-H itler inc. in the interest o f th eir em pires.” A nother U niversity o f C alifornia student, future film critic Pauline Kael, called the conflict “a w ar o f rival im perialism s for the econom ic and political dom ination o f the w orld.”14 To som e noninterventionists, control o f the w orld itself was at issue.15 Sen­ ator Nye com pared the conflict to “the long im perial w ar by w hich England ousted France from w orld em pire, and, before th at, France ousted Spain.” To James Gillis o f the Catholic World, the w ar was being waged for nothing less than “th e redistribution o f the surface o f the earth.” Uncensored m entioned “the control o f native populations in Africa, Asia and Europe.”16 O thers cited m ore narrow econom ic factors.17 E ducational consultant Porter Sargent said, “C apitalist im perialism is now face to face w ith socialist im perialism .” James D. M ooney, vice president o f G eneral M otors, asserted th at G erm any and Italy were fighting “to keep from being starved to death.” Senator La Follette queried w hether B ritain sought to destroy G erm any’s form o f governm ent, doing so to replace it w ith one th at w ould leave its trad e and interests in southeastern Europe u ntroubled.18 In C harles Lindbergh’s eyes, the G erm ans sought “territo ry and power,” the B ritish and French preservation o f th eir “influence and em pire.” If th e French and English vowed they were “fighting to m aintain th eir possessions and th eir ethics, and to keep the status quo o f th eir last victory,” the G erm ans could equally “claim the right o f an able and virile nation to expand— to conquer territo ry and influence by force o f arm s as o th er nations have done at one tim e o r another.” Unlike so m any oth er anti-interventionists, the colonel did n o t criticize im perialism per se; rather, he sought to see this “influence and em -

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p ire” shared. O nce th e necessary red istribution took place, th e W estern na­ tio n s, acting together, w ould be strong enough to serve as a w orld police force. "G erm any,” Lindbergh continued, was "as essential to this group as England o r France, for she alone can either dam th e A siatic hordes o r form th e spear­ head o f th eir penetration in to Europe.”19 If there was a trad itio n al aggressor, it was B ritain.20 "I see n o reason why E ngland should dom inate th e world,” said John Haynes H olm es. D uring the past 150 years, said Senator E rnest Lundeen (Farm er-L ab.-M inn.) in 1939, the B ritish had engaged in fifty-four w ars, th e French in fifty-three.21 Senator Sheridan D ow ney (D em .-C alif.) began w ith a reference to th e year 1066: "D o n o t underrate th e English people; they have been engaged in these conquests fo r a thousand years.” James Gillis concurred w ith H itler’s claim th a t the G er­ m an people "have n o t conquered by w ar forty m illion square m iles o n this earth as England has.”22 A ccording to som e foes o f intervention, G erm any was sim ply aping B ritain’s longtim e behavior.23 To Idaho novelist Vardis Fisher, G erm any was repeating B ritish aggression in India and South Africa. Pacifist leader A. ). M uste cited B ritish ju rist Sir A rthur Salter, w ho saw th e “so-called” dem ocra­ cies controlling th irty m illion square m iles and 80 percent o f th e earth’s re­ sources, the Axis and its allies only one m illion square m iles and 15 percent o f th e w orld’s w ealth. C ongressm an Jam es F. O ’C onnor (D em .-M ont.) found contem porary relevance in President W ilson’s com m ent, m ade in Septem ber 1919: The seed of war in the modem world is industrial and commercial rivalry. The real reason that the war that we have just finished took place was that Germany was afraid her commercial rivals were going to get the better of her, and the rea­ son why some nations went into the war against Germany was that they thought Germany would get the commercial advantage of them.24 O bviously, such noninterventionists asserted, the B ritish w ere fighting to preserve th eir suprem acy over the "u p start” G erm an natio n .2s A m bassador K ennedy cabled Roosevelt th a t B ritain was fighting "for her possessions and a place in th e sun ju st as she has in th e past.”26 W illiam A. O rto n , an econom ist a t Sm ith College, labeled th e conflict B ritain’s Second Punic W ar against a new pow er attem pting to “m uscle in.” To colum nist R aym ond Moley, Germ any, Italy, and Japan w ere joining together "to crack the B ritish Em pire, w hich, for 150 years has been a w orldw ide im perial, capitalistic trad in g organization.” T he pro-Soviet sociologist Edward A. Ross p u t the m atter quite succinctly: "G erm any got tired o f this hogging o f w orld space by Britain.”27 Som e indictm ents o f B ritain w ere m ore specific. R obert La Follette Jr. sus­ pected th at London sought to replace G erm any’s regim e w ith one th a t w ould leave B ritish trad e and interests in southeastern Europe untouched. New Masses editor Joseph Starobin found th e w ar m otivated by B ritain’s desire to

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m aintain control o f G erm an capitalism and redirect the Reich against th e So­ viet U nion. T he war, argued the New York Daily News, was rooted in the fact th at “G erm any was gradually recovering the 1914 boundaries o f th e C entral Powers, and England told her to stop.” By N ovem ber 1941, it w ent decidedly further, finding th e underlying reason for th e w ar lying in B ritain’s need for food and oil.28 To such people, th e course o f the w ar itself m anifested evidence o f B ritish im perialism . As early as O ctober 1939, Senator Reynolds blam ed the B ritish for sending “a m illion sons o f French m others to death” to provide the con­ tinued superiority o f its em pire. In M arch 1941, Nye noted th at B ritish troops were currently occupying Iceland, C rete, and Libya and were pressing into Er­ itrea, Italian Som aliland, and Ethiopia. Yet only w ith respect to th e “desolate stretches” o f Iceland had England prom ised to retu rn territory.29 T hat m onth, Uncensored noted item s in the Times o f London show ing th at recent B ritish fi­ nancial arrangem ents w ith the D utch East Indies, the French C am eroons, and the Belgian Congo tied those nations to a currency system based on th e ster­ ling bloc. Such agreem ents im plied th at a victorious B ritain m ight end up w ith the French, Belgian, and D utch em pires in tow. In Septem ber, Frank Wal­ drop observed th at the B ritish em pire had gained nearly eight hundred th o u ­ sand m ore square m iles o f territo ry th an had Germany. B ritain controlled the exile governm ents o f W estern Europe, w hich took in diam onds (from A ntw erp), securities (from Paris), and peoples o f “th e docile races, listless in the custody o f a few strong-m inded and w ell-arm ed w hite m en.” New tracts o f em pire included Libya and Italian Som aliland (strategic locale), Iran and Iraq (oil), th e D utch East Indies (rubber, tin , spices), and the C ongo (“Africa’s richest prize”).30

M ost noninterventionists frequently expressed abhorrence o f H itler’s regim e. Pacifist leader A. J. M uste was far from alone in saying, “I do n o t w ant to m in­ im ize th e evil o f a G erm an victory. I recoil from every prospect o f it.”31 Some reaction was m ore qualified. W hen French scientist Alexis C arrel w arned th at a G erm an victory m eant the fall o f W estern civilization, his friend C olonel Lindbergh dem urred. “Germany,” the aviator replied, “is as m uch a p art o f W estern civilization as France o r England.”32 A ccording to one ob­ server, the H arvard biblical scholar H enry J. C adbury, w ho was a staunch Q uaker pacifist, told audiences a G erm an victory was inconsequential.33 A ccounts o f Nazi brutalities, b o th in the waging o f w ar and th e subsequent occupation, soon reached A m erican shores. In particular, the persecution o f Jews, b o th w ithin G erm any and its occupied lands, was becom ing increasingly severe, culm inating in January 1942, ju st a m onth and a h alf after the U nited

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States entered th e war, a t the W annsee conference held outside Berlin, w here plans for w hat is now called th e H olocaust were solidified.34 At th e beginning o f th e conflict, however, a few anti-interventionists scoffed a t reports o f G erm an atrocities. C ongressm an Jesse P. W olcott (Rep.-M ich.) doubted w hether G erm an troops either shot hostages indiscrim inately o r cut the tongues o f Rom an C atholic priests. W hen, in a broadcast delivered o n 26 M ay 1940, Roosevelt m entioned G erm an strafing o f civilians from the air, W illiam R. C astle was skeptical.35 O thers attem pted to relativize such G erm an activity. W heeler did express h o rro r a t G erm any’s persecution o f its Jews. At the sam e tim e, he noted th at few A m ericans were calling for w ar w ith M exico, although he found its op­ pression o f Rom an C atholics unm atched. In w arning against atrocity propa­ ganda, H ugh Johnson w rote, “W ar itself is an atrodty.” Ralph Townsend, a m inor state departm ent offidal from 1930 to 1933, com pared A m erican si­ lence concerning B ritish im prisonm ent o f M ahatm a G andhi w ith its outrage over G erm an internm ent o f P rotestant pastor M artin N iem oeller, A m erican acquiescence concerning B ritish bom bing o f French civilians w ith indignation w hen the G erm ans engaged in such activity. H arry Elm er Barnes was p articu ­ larly acid: “H ad H itler to rtu red and then killed every one o f the h alf m illion Jews living in G erm any in 1933 such a foul and detestable act w ould still have left him a piker com pared to B ritain’s blockade o f 1918-19.” The historian called th e blockade “for and away th e greatest a tro d ty in all hum an history.”36 The alleged inequities o f th e Versailles treaty were often stressed.37 “N ot since Rome punished Carthage,” said Senator Rush Dew H olt (Dem.-W .Va.), “was there such a treaty placed o n any people.” According to the New York Daily News, th e treaty m ade “geographical hash o f Europe.” The Allies, re­ called H erbert Hoover, “secured a total area larger th an the U nited States east o f the M ississippi.”3* Social Justice serialized Edwin D. Schoonm aker’s Democ­ racy and World Dominion (1938), a w ork th at com bined attacks on “Jewish” Bolshevism w ith the d a im th at th e w ar guilt clause was “unheard o f in all the annals o f war.”39 M any anti-interventionists linked th e settlem ent directly to the rise o f N azism .40 As p ad fist leader Kirby Page p u t th e issue, “If you sow a Versailles Treaty, you reap a Hitler.”41 To Senator H enrik Shipstead (R ep.-M inn.), B ritain and France were as responsible for th e G erm an leader as “the royal, co rru p t m onarchy o f France [was] responsible for M arat and for Robespierre.”42 Such attitudes did n o t lack articulation w ithin the Roosevelt adm inistra­ tion. D espite th eir strong sym pathy for the Allies, b o th FDR and H ull blam ed the rise o f H itler and M ussolini on those E uropean pow ers w ho betrayed W ilsonian p rin d p les. W illiam E B ullitt, U.S. am bassador to France, and U n­ dersecretary Berle both opposed any w ar waged to create another Versailles and feared th a t a decisive Allied victory could lead to ju st th at result. A year before W orld W ar II started, Welles— backed by Berle and J. P ierrepont M of­

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fat, chief o f th e state departm ent’s D ivision o f European Affairs— had sought a general settlem ent on the grounds th a t the 1919 settlem ent was b o th unjust and untenable.43 T he Versailles peace, certain anti-interventionists argued, em bodied the w orst o f b o th w orlds: it was neither too severe n o r to o lenient to preserve peace. To au th o r A lbert Jay N ock, th e victors had only one choice: uto exter­ m inate the G erm ans o r to understand them .” Yet they picked a th ird option, to “reduce them to servitude and use them as labor-m otors.” The treaty needed revision as tim e passed, said C harles A. Lindbergh, o r B ritain and France w ould be forced to keep G erm any weak.44 O thers, w hile n o t attacking Versailles directly, blam ed Allied policies for G erm an behavior.4S D. W orth C lark criticized “European capitalism ” for strangling the W eim ar Republic, France and England for form ing “a ring o f steel” around Germ any.46 Given such a perspective, H ider was sim ply trying to rectify Versailles.47 As th e New York Daily News saw th e issue, the conflict em bodied “a w ar to und o the effects o f the 1919-20 treaty m akers’ passion for punishing conquered nations by cutting them o ff from th e sea.”4* G erm any, n o t the Allies, it was argued, was th e pow er w ith th e m ore lim ited am bitions, these being restricted to the European c o n tin e n t49 Even here, however, G erm an w ar aim s were n o t perceived as m odest. In th e fall o f 1939, th e New Republic pointed to designs on French A lsace-Lorraine, Belgian Eupen-M alm edy, D anish Schleswig, A ustrian Tyrol, and th e w hole o f H un­ gary. To the Chicago Tribune^ G erm any sought recognition o f its conquest o f Poland and econom ic leadership in southeastern Europe, perhaps in Scandi­ navia as well. The G erm an people, said V illard, w ould accept reduced sover­ eign entity for both Poland and Czechoslovakia. The New York Daily News thought H ider m ight well im prove the lot o f occupied Poles, Bohem ians, M oravians, and Slovaks, though certainly n o t restore th eir independence. Both Lawrence D ennis and Boake C arter praised G erm an rule in the new col­ laborationist state o f Slovakia for granting national autonom y an d fostering high living standards.50 Some saw m ore sw eeping goals. Barnes found G erm any w anting “m ore M unichs.” To pacifist leader John Swomley, a G erm an victory w ould sim ply lead to Versailles in reverse. John T. Flynn posited th at G erm any sought to re­ cover its old em pire, as well as th at o f A ustria, and to strip B ritain o f its im ­ p o rtan t colonies.51 By A ugust 1941, the financial colum nist conceded th at G erm any w ould incorporate into the Reich such conquests as France, oil-rich R um ania, and the fertile U kraine.52 In com m enting on R um ania and the U kraine, Flynn was n o t alone. Several anti-interventionists stressed H ider’s drive for Eastern E urope.53 To radio com m entator Boake C arter, G erm an hegem ony in central Europe was as in ­ evitable as U.S. m astery o f the W estern H em isphere. C asde em phasized H ider’s desire for the U kraine, adding th at the Russian peasant could n o t be

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3b

w orse o ff under H itler’s dom ination th an u nder Stalin’s.54 T he New York Daily News saw G erm any still focused on the Kaiser’s dream o f a G erm an-dom i­ nated M itteleuropa, w ith th e Nazis ruling everything from the Baltic to the Black Sea. As G erm any’s population, sixty-five m illion in 1933, lacked suffi­ cient space, the News found "som e justice” in H ider’s desire to expand east.55 O thers envisioned G erm any driving even farther. Senator Nye noted the oil o f Iran and Iraq and th e “unexploited w ealth o f Africa.” Call w riter Lillian Symes added th e “treasures o f India,” the cotton o f Egypt, and such A frican re­ sources as m anganese, tim ber, rubber, and tin .56 N oninterventionists differed over H ider’s intentions concerning B ritain it­ self. In M ay 1940, H earst denied th at the G erm an leader w anted to conquer B ritain; his only tru e objective lay in the east. “H ider has no h eart in this war,” he rem arked. Flynn, claim ing th at G erm any w ould find a conquered England a liability, said the Reich m erely sought to reign over the old G erm an and Aus­ trian em pires and to strip B ritain o f its im p o rtan t colonies. Econom ist Stuart Chase invoked the teachings o f G erm an geographer Karl H aushofer, pioneer in the new field o f geopolitics, to assert th at G erm any did n o t seek to bring the B ritish to th eir knees b u t rath er to hold the “H eartland” against all attack.57 A rguing contrariw ise, D ennis found th e defeat o f B ritain, w hile n o t p ro ­ posed by H ider, the m ost popular aim o f the war. The goal had long been fa­ vored by G erm any’s Kaiser, aristocracy, masses, and arm y. In A pril 1940, the New York Daily News w ent further, declaring th at H ider w ould have originally setded for D anzig and a passage to East Prussia through the C orridor; now he m ight well dem and dissolution o f th e B ritish Em pire.58 In A pril 1941, Father C oughlin’s Social Justice saw, as did C ongressm an U sher Burdick an d W illiam R andolph H earst, H ider seeking a U nited States o f Europe patterned on the U nited States. A com m on federal au th o rity w ould control th e arm y and navy, the banking system , and postage and com m unications.59 O ccasionally adm inistration opponents described how Europe m ight be parceled. Uncensored envisioned France rew arded for its collaboration, losing A lsace-Lorraine, b u t ruling th e channel ports and Belgium’s W alloon section. A p uppet N etherlands w ould absorb Flanders. Italy w ould exercise political control over th e newly created state o f C roatia. Spain and Portugal m ight be organized in to a united m onarchy, w ith G eneral Franco as m ilitary leader and Salazar as prem ier. “Keeping it running w ill be quite a job even for A dolf Hitler,” it said.60 Father C oughlin spoke o f a Europe divided into three sec­ tions: a G erm anic bloc th at w ould include A ustria, H ungary, the Scandinavian nations, th e N etherlands, n o rth ern Belgium , and a sm all section o f France; a Slavic bloc, com posed o f Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey; and a Latin bloc consisting o f France, Italy, southern Belgium , Spain, Portugal, and p a rt o f N orth Africa.61 A nti-interventionists differed over th e possible severity o f G erm any’s rule over Europe. If G erm any w on the war, com m ented correspondent W illiam

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H enry C ham berlin, its form o f m ilitary state socialism w ould be extended over the entire continent. A central au thority in Berlin w ould order each n a­ tio n to concentrate on specific priorities: France, agriculture; Norway, fish­ eries; R um ania, oil and w heat; Czechoslovakia, textiles and glass. “A right ob­ jective, the econom ic unification o f Europe, w ould be achieved by terribly w rong m eans,” he judged. Early in 1941, Lawrence D ennis stressed H itler's de­ sire to revive N apoleon’s continental system . An organized M itteleuropa, D ennis continued, w ould be able to bargain as a u n it w ith overseas countries, thus securing b etter trading term s. In fact, a G erm an-engineered social revo­ lution w ould give masses everywhere secure em ploym ent, high wages, m edical care, recreation, and good housing.62 Several noninterventionists, however, denied th at G erm any sought political dom ination o f all Europe. D iplom at John C udahy said H itler did n o t seek to incorporate H olland and Belgium in to the Reich.63 Peace Action took at face value H itler’s 1941 interview w ith Cudahy, published in Life, in w hich the Führer spoke o f reorganizing Europe along econom ic lines. Social Justice cor­ respondent J. S. Barnes claim ed G erm any w ould retain econom ic and politi­ cal suprem acy over conquered areas w hile perm itting cultural and adm inis­ trative autonom y o f the sm aller ethnic groups.64 A nti-interventionists disagreed on one m ajor claim m ade by m any o f their foes— namely, th at H itler sought w orld dom ination.65 To som e, such as H earst, D ennis, and H enry Elm er Barnes, H itler had no such goal.66 Charles A. Lind­ bergh specifically denied that G erm any had m ilitary aspirations in the W estern H em isphere.67 O thers did believe, as did Roosevelt, th at H itler w anted w orld conquest.68 New York Times m ilitary correspondent H anson Baldwin, for exam ­ ple, asserted th at the T hird Reich harbored “w ell-defined views o f w orld em ­ pire.”69 Such com m entators, however, found such a goal im possible to achieve. H itler’s bravado, said W heeler, no m ore im pressed him than earlier boasts o f Lenin and Trotsky th at they were going to m ake a w orld revolution.70 W hen advocates o f collective security pointed w ith alarm to H itler’s Mein Kam pf (1925), they found the w ork derided. C ongressw om an Jessie Sum ner (R ep.-Ill.) called it H itler’s “cam paign literature,” a garbled version o f Oswald Spengler. Senator H olt asked w hether the Führer’s m em oir differed from those Soviet w riters “w ho proclaim ed th eir desire for a w orld revolution, the day o f control o f com m unism .”71 Sim ilar trea tm e n t was m et o u t to H erm ann R auschning, a form er N azi politician w ho had broken w ith th e regim e in 1935. In his Revolution o f Ni­ hilism (1939) an d The Voice o f Destruction (1940), R auschning stressed th e anarchistic an d expansionist aspects o f th e regim e, w hich could “no m ore dispense w ith its p u rsu it o f hegem ony th an w ith its governm ent by violence at hom e.”72 Few anti-interventionists believed Rauschning.73 O nly W illiam R. Castle gave The Voice credence, saying it showed H itler was “determ ined to have G erm any

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dom inate the world.”74 Lundeen called 77ie Voice “curdling bedtim e stories.”75 H arry Elm er Barnes equated it w ith Lord Bryce’s spurious report on W orld W ar I atrocities and A ndré Cheradam e’s The Pan German Plot76 Senator Nye ac­ cused R auschning o f falsifying conversations w ith H itler m ade years before: “We all know w ith w hat skepticism all such alleged evidence m ust be regarded.”77 T hen there was the speech supposedly m ade by W alther D arré, som etim e late in 1939, in w hich H itler’s m inister o f agriculture said, “We will introduce . . . a new aristocracy o f G erm an m asters.. . . We have actually in m ind a m od­ em form o f m edieval slavery w hich we m ust and w ill introduce because we urgently need it to fulfill o u r great tasks.” D arré spoke o f G erm any’s desire to control A m erican ind u stry and trade. T he New York Times prin ted excerpts, believing it authentic. Life m agazine reproduced th e text w ith th e caveat th a t it m ight n o t have been delivered exactly as recorded. Secretary Ickes pointed to passages threatening th e econom ic ru in o f th e U nited States.7* D arré sub­ sequently denied m aking the address. O f the populace polled by G allup, 80 percent found the speech credible.79 N oninterventionists rebutted im m ediately. U niversity o f Chicago physiolo­ gist A nton J. C arlson classified it w ith such bogus docum ents as the Protocols o f Zion. Senator D. W orth G a rk com pared it to W orld W ar I atrocity reports, those “faked and forged pictures o f Belgian children w ith th eir hands cut off, o f m utilated w om en, and o f crucified m en.”*0 Even if G erm any did w in the E uropean war, so such com m entators m ain­ tained, its hegem ony w ould rem ain precarious. A ccording to Flynn, H itler’s Reich, divided by hatreds and drained by war, w ould be unable to dom inate a continent. Even should G erm any be foolish enough to incorporate B ritain, France, Spain, and Italy, it w ould find them liabilities, unable to su p p o rt th eir ow n populations. In due tim e, said John Haynes H olm es, “the national fron­ tiers shall be elim inated, the separate nationalistic prides and prejudices purged away through the sheer experience o f suffering, and o u t o f th e fire o f disaster and death a united Europe emerge.”*1 The New York Daily News predicted, “Europe can be expected to begin com ­ ing unglued as soon as H itler’s Nazism shows itself unable to m ake life com ­ fortably livable for m ost people under its hooked-cross banner.” Soon after a G erm an victory, one m ight reasonably expect th e death o f an exhausted H itler, follow ed by such dissension am ong his successors th at the newly cre­ ated em pire w ould fall apart.*2 In offering such analyses, the anti-interventionists failed to convince m uch o f th e A m erican public, w hich, as soon as w ar had broken o u t, was revealed by a G allup poll to be far m ore negative about G erm an aim s. In late Septem ­ ber 1939,63 percent o f the public predicted th at a victorious G erm any w ould eventually sta rt a w ar against the U nited States; in early June 1940,65 percent took th a t position. In A pril 1941, a Fortune poll found over 69 percent con­ vinced th a t H itler sought to dom inate th e U.S.*3

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İt If m any noninterventionists could rem ain tacitly sanguine about G erm any’s sup­ posed w ar aim s, finding them either reasonable o r impossible to achieve, they were seldom satisfied w ith Britain’s official statem ents o f policy.84 The British, they believed, were at best stonewalling, at w orst envisioning a C arthaginian peace. “The holy w ar boys and girls,” m used historian Barnes, “alm ost im ply that H arold Laski is Prim e M inister and Bernard Shaw Foreign Minister.”85 O n 3 Septem ber 1939, w hen B ritain declared w ar on G erm any, Neville C ham berlain addressed th e H ouse o f C om m ons: “I tru st I m ay live to see the day w hen H itlerism has been destroyed and a liberated E urope has been re­ established.” A nti-interventionists responded quickly. T he prim e m inister, com m ented th e Chicago Tribune, should n o t have issued “an ultim atum ” at th e outset b u t rath er have stressed treaty obligations and pledges o f good faith. Father G illis, ed ito r o f the Catholic World, conceded th a t H itler was a m urderer b u t insisted th a t th e G erm ans had to find o u t this fact for th em ­ selves. The New York Daily News rem onstrated w ith C ham berlain’s reference to the d estruction o f H itlerism , saying such language invariably led to “the exterm ination o f th e G erm an people.” O sw ald G arrison V illard was in a de­ cided m in o rity in w elcom ing C ham berlain’s com m itm ent to a stable in ter­ national system .86 Lord L othian, B ritain’s am bassador to th e U nited States w hen w ar com ­ m enced, offered a quasi-official statem ent o f w ar aim s. Speaking late in O cto­ ber 1939 to th e annual d inner o f the A m erican section o f the Pilgrim s, an A nglo-A m erican society, he endorsed “autonom ous freedom ” for all nations o f Europe, including th e elim ination o f the G estapo w ithin th eir borders. The New York Daily News accused L othian o f harboring utopian goals: fighting u n til A ustria, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, and A lbania were restored and secret police elim inated everywhere in Europe.87 In a radio speech on 7 N ovem ber 1939, Lord Halifax, B ritain’s foreign m in­ ister, gave his rendition o f B ritish w ar aim s, claim ing th at his nation was fight­ ing against “bru te force, bad faith, injustice, oppression and persecution.” The New York Daily News responded, “If you can m ake anything o u t o f th at, you’re a b etter m aker-outer th an we are.” Gillis called H alifax “a good honest m an, and religious” b u t w ondered why he never espoused these values w hen M us­ solini annexed E thiopia and A lbania.88 Few B ritish advocates aroused such hostility as did Alfred D uff C ooper, for­ m er first lord o f the adm iralty, appointed m inister o f inform ation in M ay 1940.89 Early th at year, w hile visiting th e U nited States o n a speaking tour, D uff C ooper announced, “We are n o t fighting for th e Czechs, the Poles o r the Abyssinians, o r anybody, b u t for ourselves.” At first only the com m unists re­ sponded, the Daily Worker accusing him o f seeking w orld dom ination.90

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F urther rem arks m et w ith w ider opposition. T he entire G erm an people, said D uff C ooper in A pril, bore heavy responsibility for its nation’s crim es; hence, “it w ould be a good thing to break G erm any up into sm all states.” In at­ tacking G erm any’s political heritage, he called Frederick th e G reat “p er­ verted,” branded Bism arck a “m ountebank,” and found W illiam II “the vain c rip p le . . . the slave o f the h alf crazy Ludendorff.”91 T his tim e noninterventionists responded rapidly. Commonweal noting th at D uff C ooper had charged the “w hole G erm an people” w ith responsibility for Nazi crim es, denied th at people o f one nation essentially differed from those o f another. Uncensored recalled one D uff C ooper rem ark m ade in A pril 1939: “H atred o f any race was a sign o f m ental deficiency.”92 D espite the statem ents o f various B ritish leaders, anti-interventionist pres­ sure for m ore concrete B ritish aim s grew louder, reaching a crescendo early in 1941 during the debate over lend-lease.93 A nti-interventionists cited peace queries from the B ritish them selves, including the Times [London], m ilitary w riter B. A. Liddell H art, an archbishop, and such prestigious publications as the New Statesman and Nation, Time and Tide* an d die Manchester Guardian.94 Such pressure for w ar aim s stem m ed from m otives th at were obviously m ixed, w ith genuine concern interm ingled w ith a deliberate effort to em bar­ rass B ritain at a tim e w hen direct assistance was m ost fervendy debated. O n 27 January 1941, Senators Nye and W heeler subm itted a resolution calling on all belligerents to publicize th eir w ar aim s, peace conditions, and any secret treaties involving territo rial spoils. In W orld W ar I, so the resolution noted, the secret treaties o f B ritain and France clearly revealed th at “th eir purpose was to conquer people and n o t to preserve dem ocracy o r to end all war.”93 The W IL N ational B oard asked Roosevelt to press b o th B ritain and the Axis to state peace term s; the peace organization was acting in the hope o f bringing the w ar to a close o n the basis o f m utual disarm am ent.96 By M arch 1941, L othian had died and Lord H alifax had becom e his succes­ sor. W hen th e new em issary spoke to th e Pilgrim s th a t M arch, he stressed th at B ritain sought liberation o f occupied countries and global econom ic cooper­ ation. A nti-interventionists disapproved. To Uncensored, H alifax had im plied th at B ritain and the dom inions w ould n o t give up th eir preferential tariffs, m uch less even consider redistributing raw m aterials. According to th e Chris­ tian Century, H alifax adm itted th at “B ritain is fighting to retain the status quo w ithin B ritain and w ithin the em pire.” The New York Daily News found the am bassador dem anding th e policing o f G erm any “u n til th e G erm ans see the light as we see it,” an effort b o u n d to fail.97 W hen, in May, Foreign Secretary A nthony Eden offered his assessm ent, he fared no better. O n 29 M ay 1941, w hile speaking at the M ansion H ouse on B ritish w ar aim s, he said, “O u r political and m ilitary term s for peace will be designed to prevent repetition o f G erm any’s m isdeeds.” A lthough th e Christ­ ian Century w elcom ed his stress on w orldw ide social security and econom ic

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health and on Europe’s ow n econom ic reorganization, several anti-interven­ tionists still found a new Versailles in the w orks.98 A m id the concrete responses to the various B ritish spokesm en, an ti-in ter­ ventionists stressed one m ajor them e: th e w ar did n o t involve ideology. C er­ tainly B ritain was n o t fighting fascism per se. D estroying H itler th e m an was by no m eans the sam e as crushing Nazism the system . C om m ented the New Republic in Septem ber 1939, “O bviously term s m ight be set w ith H itler o u t o f the way th at w ould be nearly as bad as those set w ith H itler in power.” T hat Novem ber, R aym ond M oley m aintained th at B ritain sim ply sought a m iniste­ rial crisis in Germ any.99 A m onth later, Uncensored alleged th at the B ritish stood ready to conclude a peace w ith a N azi regim e headed by the “m oderate” H erm ann G oering.100 “Such a peace,” it continued, “w ould leave fascism en­ trenched in Germ any, buttressed by econom ic aid from the Allies as a defense against expansionist Russia.”101 O n the eve o f G erm any’s attack on Norway, the Socialist Party saw only one way th at any Allied victory could lead to a genuine defeat o f H itler: French and G erm an w orkers m ust keep Allied troops from overthrow ing the type o f G erm an revolution th a t took place in 1918, w hen G erm any’s last despotism was overthrow n.102 As late as M arch 1941, Lawrence D ennis claim ed th at “the m ore enlightened British,” as well as FDR and his chief troubleshooter H arry H opkins, m erely sought a Europe led by a G erm any denuded o f H itler and operating u nder A nglo-A m erican tutelage.103 The Allies, som e noninterventionists believed, sought to restore the H apsburg m onarchy, o r even th at o f the H ohenzollem s.104 In O ctober 1939, Un­ censored noted D uff C ooper’s prediction o f a possible m erger o f C atholic Aus­ tria and Bavaria u nder O tto von H apsburg, grandson o f E m peror Franz Joseph and pretender to the A ustro-H ungarian crow n.103 Such a restoration, it soon said, w ould be packaged as a D anubian Federation th at w ould include A ustria, H ungary, Czechoslovakia, p arts o f Poland, and adjoining fragm ents o f C entral an d Eastern E urope.106 Indeed, O tto him self had recently called for such an arrangem ent, and in D ecem ber 1940, C hurchill privately endorsed the idea.107 A m ong ad m in istratio n critics, such schem es drew little enthusiasm .108 T he Christian Century asked, “H aving fought one w ar to get rid o f a Kaiser, are th e Allies now fighting an o th er to b rin g a K aiser back?” 109 T he New Re­ public rep o rted th a t O tto represented th e very governm ent, led by C hancel­ lo r E ngelbert D ollfuss, th a t in 1934 had bom barded th e m unicipal w orkers’ houses o f V ienna.110 Besides, m ere elim ination o f H itler and Nazism in them selves could n o t bring peace.111 Bullets could n o t kill ideologies.112 “Kaiserism” and “Prussian m ilitarism ,” argued pacifist m inister Kirby Page, did n o t end in W orld W ar I. To Commonweal, “H itlerism ,” however one defined it, could n o t be elim inated from the w orld by “paragraphs in a peace treaty.” V illard asserted th at real cleaning o f G erm any m ust com e from w ithin: “O nly the G erm ans can do

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away w ith th e Nazis and th eir totalitarian state." Furtherm ore, he continued, to eradicate Nazism by force was useless unless one elim inated Russian com ­ m unism as well, for b o th were "sisters u nder the skin."113 "B ehind H itler are substitute quarterbacks six deep,” w rote H ugh Johnson. As to w hether the G erm ans sought dem ocracy: "T he H einies never had done m uch o f th at kind o f yearning. T hey seem always to have liked to be goosestepped and verboten. A nd th e only difference in this regard betw een H itler and the Kaiser is the cut o f his m oustache and the droop o f the drawers.”114 To m any anti-interventionists, th e issue transcended the installation o f a H apsburg ruler and th e elim ination o f Nazism . Any repetition o f 1919 was es­ pecially to be abom inated.115 Nye approvingly quoted George B ernard Shaw’s claim , " If we w on, it w ould be Versailles all over again, only worse— w ith an ­ oth er w ar less than tw enty years off.” Conversely, several anti-interventionists, including Frederick J. Libby, doubted w hether B ritain w ould ever have the pow er to restore the Paris settlem ent.116 C ertainly m uch anxiety existed over possible dism em berm ent o f G er­ m any.117 The French were perceived as particularly villainous.118 Both V illard and th e New York Daily News accused them o f seeking to seize the left bank o f the R hine and split G erm any into C atholic and P rotestant states.119 In M arch 1940, Libby pointed to a m ap published in Newsweek as evidence th at they sought detachm ent o f the R hineland and the subdivision o f Prussia.120 For som e anti-interventionists, the alleged Allied strategy o f massive destruc­ tion was even m ore fatal. Villard quoted British author H. G. Wells as saying th at Berlin m ust be destroyed, som ething th at only encouraged G erm any to fig h t H arold E Fey, executive secretary o f the FOR, feared bloody reprisals on G er­ m an leaders. A few anti-interventionists spoke in term s o f forced population control, perhaps genocide. O ne anti-interventionist cited a dem and to sterilize all m en o f G erm an blood. Uncensored quoted a young French soldier on the M aginot line, w ho supposedly said, "O n this continent there exists a breed which m ust be exterm inated.” W hen the lend-lease bill was passed, W heeler asked w hether C hurchill sought "the annihilation o f 80,000,000 G erm an people.”121 To som e anti-interventionists, B ritain was n o t the only culprit. Som e lead­ ers o f th eir ow n n ation, th e U nited States, possessed the m ost sw eeping o f im ­ perial designs, in th e process betraying th eir nation’s birth rig h t.

4

American Goals: An Object of Suspicion

By late 1940, the label "im perialism ” was applied to th e U nited States. "M any interventionists,” claim ed historian H ow ard K. Beale, "w ant to intervene be­ cause they w ish to establish an A nglo-A m erican dom ination o f the w orld.”1 H ere the left grew particularly vocal. A. J. M uste w rote, "We shall be the next nation to seek w orld-dom ination— in oth er w ords, to do w hat we condem n H itler for trying to do.” If the U nited States w ent to war, said N orm an T hom as, w ithin ten years it w ould fulfill Leon Trotsky’s prophecy o f becom ­ ing the m ost ruthless pow er in th e w orld. Uncensored accused the co u n try o f seeking a huge custom s union, one th at w ould include all o f Latin A m erica and the B ritish D om inions.2 The left, however, was n o t alone in m aking such accusations. Q ueried ad ­ vertising executive C hester Bowles, "Are we to dom inate the w orld by force and establish o u r ideas o f justice in Africa, India and the Far East?” Senator G eorge Aiken (R ep.-V t.) referred to A m erican interventionists w ho "envision th eir flag w aving in glory over the oil fields o f Asia M inor and the plantations o f the East Indies.” D ennis predicted th at prolonged w ar w ould weaken b o th G erm any and B ritain, thereby perm itting the U nited States to fall heir to B ritish possessions in the W estern H em isphere and becom e th e w orld’s lead­ ing sea power.3 N oninterventionists singled o u t certain figures as prom oting either an au ­ tonom ous A m erican em pire o r one in league w ith B ritain. A m ong these were interventionist colum nists D orothy T hom pson and W alter L ippm ann, p u b ­ lisher H enry R. Luce, Secretary o f W ar H enry L. Stim son, and H arvard po lit­ ical scientist W illiam Yandell Elliott.4 An often-quoted Life editorial o f Febru­ ary 1941, proclaim ing the "Am erican C entury,” so terrified V illard th at he

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foresaw th e U nited States as an o th er seeker after “w orld dom ination,” “ju st as great a m enace to m ankind as G erm any, o r Russia, o r Japan.”5 W hen Secretary o f th e Navy Frank Knox, speaking to the A m erican Bar A ssociation o n 1 O c­ to b er 1941, asserted th a t th e w orld's sea pow er m ust rem ain w ith th e U nited States an d B ritain for the next hundred years, adm inistration critics were again outraged. Libby accused FDR’s secretary o f th e navy o f m aking the U.S. “th e senior p a rtn e r dom inating th e w orld.”6 T he left paid particular atten tio n to a speech th a t V irgil Jordan, president o f th e N ational Industrial C onference Board, gave o n 10 D ecem ber 1940 to the Investm ent Bankers A ssociation, m eeting in H ollyw ood, Florida. T he U nited States, he said, was com m itted— if necessary—to replacing th e B ritish Em ­ pire. “W hatever th e outcom e o f th e war, A m erica has em barked upon a career o f im perialism , b o th in w orld affairs and in every o th er aspect o f h er life,” w ith p articu lar areas o f expansion lying in th e S outhern H em isphere and th e Pa­ cific. New Masses called th e address “the m ost cynical revelation o f A m erican w ar aim s we have yet seen, a real insight in to th e m inds o f th e m en w ho rule an d have ruled this country.”7 Even the idealistic language o f Franklin D. Roosevelt was suspect. In his an ­ n u al m essage to Congress o n 6 January 1941, the chief executive endorsed the F our Freedom s as Am erica’s postw ar aim s. Included were “freedom o f speech an d expression”; “freedom o f every person to w orship G od in his ow n way”; “freedom from w ant— w hich, translated in to w orld term s m eans econom ic understandings w hich will secure to every nation a healthy peacetim e life for its in h abitants”; and “freedom from fear—w hich, translated into w orld term s, m eans a w orld-w ide reduction o f arm am ents to such a p o in t and in such a th o ro u g h fashion th a t n o n ation will be in a position to com m it an act o f physical aggression against any neighbor.” A fter each freedom , th e president ad d ed th e phrase “everyw here in the w orld,” then stressed th a t his “is no vi­ sion o f a distan t m illennium . It is a definite basis for a kind o f w orld attain ­ able in o u r ow n tim e and generation.”8 Surely, to th e president’s opponents, the scope o f such aim s was m ost awe­ som e, particularly as it im plied th e guaranteeing freedom o f religion and ex­ pression to th e entire w orld.9 Professor B orchard com m ented, “At least cru ­ sades o f a thousand years ago had a m ore lim ited objective.”10 For R obert M aynard H utchins, president o f the U niversity o f Chicago, the Four Freedom s m eant “a program o f perpetual w ar in Latin A m erica, w ar in th e Far East, w ar in th e South Seas, and even w ar w ith Britain.” 11 C ertainly any effort at en­ forcem ent w ould be highly irresponsible.12 Besides, it was argued, the Four Freedom s did n o t even exist at hom e. Sena­ to r R obert La Follette Jr. recalled his recent role as chairm an o f a Senate sub­ com m ittee investigating violent intim idation o f trade unions: “I urge,” he said, “th a t we m ake the ‘four freedom s’ prevail in A m erica before we try to ram them dow n the throats o f people everywhere in the world.” Furtherm ore, entering

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the w ar conflict w ould betray the four freedom s, n o t prom ote them . Congress­ m an George H olden T inkham (Rep.-M ass.) denied th at “freedom from w ant” could be obtained by th e “waging o f w ar and the subsidizing o f w orld wars,” o r “freedom from fear” by suspending the Bill o f R ights.13 Even setting th e Four Freedom s aside, noninterventionists found th e price o f sw eeping victory far too high.14 To journalist U pton Close (w riting under th e pseudonym Josef W ashington H all), B ritain w ould be too tired and bank­ ru p t to im pose any new o rder upon Europe; therefore, th e U nited States w ould have to assum e th e task. M erely to reestablish th e balance o f pow er w ould fail, for it had been this very balance th at had “kept Europe divided for a hundred years.” Flynn feared th at th e U nited States w ould be policing Eu­ rope for a century. W hat, Taft w ondered, w ould the U.S. do w ith eighty m il­ lion G erm ans?15 H istorian C harles A. Beard asked, Does Congress intend to supply money, ships, and commodities of war until the French Republic is restored, until the integrity of its empire is assured, until all the lands run over by Hitler are once more vested with full sovereignty, until Rus­ sia has returned to Finland and Poland the territories wrested from them, until democracy is reestablished in Greece, until the King of Albania has recovered his throne? Is Congress prepared to pour our American wealth until the Chungking Government in China has conquered the Nanking Government, until Japan is expelled from the continent, until Chinese Communists are finally suppressed, and until Soviet Russia is pushed back within the old Russian borders?16 To adm inistration critics, the m ost W ilsonian o f peace aim s could be the m ost dangerous o f all. O n 22 July 1941, U ndersecretary W elles spoke at the N orw egian legation, describing an ideal postw ar order in term s o f in tern a­ tional arm s control, an end to aggressive arm am ent, and equal access to the w orld’s raw m aterials. The Chicago Tribune responded th at the G erm ans, too, had endorsed equal access to th e w orld’s m arkets and th at therefore a w ar over the m atter seem ed unnecessary. T he Versailles treaty, it continued, already had m ade provision for international control o f arm s.17 W hen Welles called for a new international organization th at Novem ber, the Tribune argued th at such a goal could only be obtained at th e price o f reducing G erm any, the Soviet U nion, Italy, and Japan to im potence.18

A m ong the concerns over A m erican aim s, international organization loom ed as a m ajor one. O nly a m inute num ber o f prom inent anti-interventionists had favored U.S. m em bership in the League o f N ations.19 Nye sought som e new “m ore international organization” th at w ould see to it th at “no m en go m ad.” T his body, he stressed, m ust n o t be “under control by som e lone em pire,” an

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obvious allusion to B ritain. Veteran League foe H earst suggested an arb itra­ tion trib u n al, to w hich all nations w ould refer disputes, though in 1935 he had staunchly opposed U.S. m em bership in the W orld C ourt.20 M ost anti-interventionists held the League o f N ations in strong contem pt.21 C ritics accused it o f serving as a m ajor instrum ent o f the Versailles con­ querors.22 A ccording to journalist C arleton Beals, the international body, act­ ing as the tool o f B ritain and France, “crucified sm all nation after nation, abet­ ting injustice, while hypocritically and piously denouncing them .” Besides, it was argued, the organization could only em broil the U nited States in contin­ ual conflict. The very concept o f collective security, said w riter John C ham ­ berlain, was ua pernicious, w ar-breeding” one. By refusing even to consider tw o legitim ate sides to any conflict, the system , said B orchard, “constitutes a charter for perpetual war.” T he legal scholar was particularly distressed w ith A rticle 16 o f the League C ovenant, w hich authorized econom ic and m ilitary action against an offending state.23 To such people, Clarence K. S treifs U nion Now m ovem ent appeared par­ ticularly om inous. Form erly the New York Times correspondent in Geneva, Streit in 1939 established the Inter-dem ocracy Federal U nionists, w hich in 1940 was took on the nam e Federal U nion. By M arch 1941, the organization had 60 chapters in the U nited States plus 250 in B ritain. M oreover, a G allup poll estim ated th at eight m illion U.S. citizens believed in an international o r­ ganization along his lines.24 H is first book, Union Now (1939), becam e a veritable m anifesto for his cause. In it Streit proposed a federal union o f dem ocracies, am ong them the U nited States, six units o f the B ritish Em pire, the Low C ountries, four Scan­ dinavian countries, and Sw itzerland. In January 1941, Streit updated his w ork, giving it the title Union Now with Britain. An im m ediate union w ith the C om ­ m onw ealth nations w ould serve as an eventual nucleus for a Federal U nion o f the W orld. C ertain nations n o t originally slated for m em bership, including such “outside peoples” as the G erm ans and Italians, could join later. Streit as­ serted his new union w ould offer b o th countries relief from arm am ents as well as adm ission to the greatest m arket in the w orld. Federation citizens w ould enjoy the benefits o f a com m on currency, defense force, custom s union, and postal and com m unications system . In local m atters, m em ber na­ tions w ould retain com plete authority. The union’s structure w ould replicate the A m erican federal system , com plete w ith a low er house, based on popula­ tio n , and a senate, in w hich each nation w ould be represented. The executive m ight consist o f a five-person board o r a single chairm an. Streit preferred two concurrent executives serving like Rom an consuls, and he envisioned FDR and C hurchill filling these slots. A lthough a m em ber state m ight be socialist o r capitalist, a republic o r m onarchy, each w ould have to conform to a Bill o f Rights th a t guaranteed freedom o f speech, w orship, and the press and the right to peaceful assembly. Streit called on the president o f the U nited States

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to issue a D eclaration o f th e D ependence o f Free M en, invite o th er dem ocra­ cies to sign it, and then call a constitutional convention.25 Pending the convention, an intercontinental congress w ould be convened. There w ould be one representative for each m em ber dem ocracy and an addi­ tional representative for every five m illion inhabitants. The U nited States w ould hold twenty-seven seats, other nations a total o f tw enty-tw o. U ntil direct elec­ tion o f the U.S. legislators could be arranged, the president could either appoint them o r suggest a slate to the Am erican Congress. Am ong Streit’s ow n candi­ dates were H erbert Hoover, Republican leader W endell W illkie, and James Cox, form er governor o f O hio and D em ocratic presidential candidate in 1920.26 Such a schem e, asserted Streit, w ould n o t precipitate a full-scale A m erican m ilitary intervention; rather, it w ould preclude it. W hile m aintaining th at U.S. entry into the w ar was otherw ise inevitable, he boasted th at his plan “offers th e only reasonable prom ise o f overthrow ing dictatorship w ithout need o f any great A m erican expeditionary force w hether in Europe, Africa, Asia o r Latin America." W ith the U nion established, H itler could be blockaded in Europe and the conquered nations w ould gain incentive to throw o ff his yoke. T hus, his plan could tem pt Axis pow ers to negotiate individually w ith th e U nion.27 At any rate, Streit argued, “isolation” was infeasible, for once H itler po s­ sessed the British fleet, he w arned, he w ould gain “w orld control.” To protect “o u r vital N orth A tlantic seaboard,” th e U nited States w ould have to m ove its ow n fleet from the Pacific, in the process abandoning A ustralia, New Zealand, and perhaps even Alaska to Japan. Such loss o f the sea w ould cost the U.S. m ost o f its trade, w ith ensuing “chaos in factory and farm ” and “panicky d e­ m ands for dictatorship from w ithin.”28 To adm inistration antagonists, Federal U nion seem ed th e logical outcom e o f FDR’s foreign policy, the ultim ate goal to w hich it was leading. The A m er­ ica First C om m ittee (AFC), by 1941 th e leading an ti-interventionist body, even prom oted the slogan “B ritish U nion Now? Soviet U nion Next?” A con­ gressional investigation into th e w hole m atter, it suggested, was m uch needed. Social Justice carried a story “Fifth C olum n Discovered!” Representative T inkham called the group “disloyal and traitorous.” In O ctober 1940, Senator H olt listed various prom inent supporters, indicated th eir previous ties to B ritain, and cited a Newsweek article stating th at Franklin and E leanor Roosevelt w ere holding private discussions w ith Streit.29 By O ctober 1941, the Saturday Evening Post depicted A m erican and British leaders m ounting a concentrated effort to advance Streit’s scheme. Included were the president’s wife; John W inant, U.S. am bassador to Britain; Leslie H oreBelisha, form er British w ar secretary, w ho suggested a com m on A m ericanBritish citizenship; and Colonel Josiah W edgwood, a prom inent Labor Party leader.30 T hat M arch the weekly had quoted an English journalist w ho predicted th at in 1944, after the defeat o f Germany, FDR w ould take up tem porary resi­ dence in Britain while the king and queen m oved to M ount Vernon.31

American Goals

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C ertainly, U nion Now becam e an o th er stick w ith w hich to beat the B ritish.32 A ccording to several anti-interventionists, Streit’s plan was steeped in conspiracy. Boake C arter, Rush H olt, and publisher P orter Sargent im ag­ ined th e plan fulfilling the A nglo-Saxon un ity schem es o f C ed i R hodes.33 John B. Trevor, president o f the A m erican C oalition o f P atriotic Societies, in d u d ed th e supposed designs o f S cottish-born steel m agnate A ndrew C arnegie. E rst­ w hile reform er Am os P inchot saw the hand o f the B ritish Labor Party a t w ork. Even the m ore urbane Uncensored understood U nion Now n o t as a vast ex­ p erim en t in dem ocratic federalism b u t as a sinister plot, advanced by "the M en o f M unich” an d designed to enable th e U nited States to underw rite the B ritish Em pire. If proponents o f u nion w ere really serious, said th e Chicago Tribune* nothing prevented B ritain from applying for A m erican statehood. Econom ically, th e U.S. w ould profit, gam ing forty m illion m ore custom ers for its m anufactures and agricultural products.34 To the organization’s critics, national sovereignty was a crucial m atter.3S C hallenging Streit’s claim s, Sargent m aintained th at th e U nited States w ould inevitably be outvoted; India alone w ould ensure B ritain a substantial m ar­ gin.36 M oreover, som e foes argued, the schem e was dow nright reactionary. In July 1939, even before the E uropean conflict broke o u t, liberal broadcaster Q uincy Howe w arned th a t it w ould lead to “a grand crusade against social changes th at are overdue in b o th E urope and Asia.”37 O thers expressed a dif­ ferent fear, th at o f G reat Power im perialism . Streit, said journalist Freda Utley, ignored th e colonial question, taking an entirely legalistic approach. C olum ­ n ist George Sokolsky asked, “Are we to control the M alay States an d is H ong Kong to becom e an A m erican colony and is th e U nion o f South A frica to throw the Boer nationalist m ovem ent in to o u r laps?”3* At best, the proposal appeared overly am bitious. W ere it to go into effect, re­ m arked the New York Daily News, “Jusdy and m agnanim ously, we’d tell Japan n o t to expand anywhere; we’d give G erm any the sam e orders; we’d treat the col­ ored folks in Africa as kindly as A ugustine S t Clare in ‘U nde Tom’s Cabin’ treated the slaves in contrast to the wicked Sim on Legree.” N orm an Thom as found Streit’s plan, o r any other proposal for w orld governm ent, totally im ­ practical, because any such system could no t be achieved w ithout dictatorship. Instead, he stressed, w orld reconstruction m ust center on econom ic coopera­ tio n , involving equal access o f all nations to raw m aterials, fiscal systems, and com m erce and providing for the rights o f colonial peoples.39 M ost im portant, anti-interventionists o f m any political persuasions feared th at U nion Now w ould accelerate U.S. p artid p atio n in the war. Trevor w arned th at U nion Now w ould lead to A m erican troops defending British possessions in Asia and Africa, th e policing o f the seven seas by the U.S. fleet, and the exploitation o f A m erican econom ic resources so as to pay all w artim e bills o f the British Em pire.40 A few anti-interventionists refused to condem n Streit o u t o f hand. C hester Bowles, for exam ple, called U nion Now at least "an honest effort” to discuss

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the postw ar order.41 Some anti-interventionist clergy appeared m ildly in ­ trigued.42 The m ore A m ericans Streit “can prepare for a surrender, even a dim inution, o f jealously held sovereign rights,” said the Christian Century in D ecem ber 1939, “th e m ore quickly will we reach a tim e w hen it will be prac­ ticable to w ork for a rational w orld order.” In M arch 1941, th e Protestant jo u r­ nal hoped th at Streit’s plan m ight enable the U nited States to obtain a consid­ erable m easure o f control over B ritish policy, though it feared th at the U.S. w ould assum e responsibility for m aintaining an im perialist system th at was historically doom ed.43 O ccasionally noninterventionists w ent further.44 W hen the European w ar first began, th e Washington Posfs Felix M orley recom m ended th at France and B ritain acquiesce in H itler’s dom ination o f Poland and then w ork on building a practical A nglo-French-A m erican union along Streit’s lines.45 H arry Elm er Barnes found strength in Streit’s original proposal. His plan encom passed a population o f about 350 m illion, w hich w ould control about h alf the w orld’s surface, govern nearly h alf the hum an race, carry on tw o-thirds o f the w orld’s trade, and possess a t least 50 percent o f the w orld’s raw m aterials, including over 60 percent o f basic w ar m aterials.46 Streit was n o t alone in advancing federalist views. A few an ti-intervention­ ists toyed w ith sim ilar notions. W hoever w on the conflict, w rote econom ist S tuart Chase in the Progressive, Europe was bound to becom e m ore central­ ized, federated, and socialized. As far as the behavior o f the victors w ent, “T he gentlem en in London will be kinder, the gentlem en in Berlin will be m ore ef­ ficient.” Germany, in fact, possessed an appeal to w orkers, peasants, and m em ­ bers o f the lower m iddle class “sick and tired o f plutocrats, landlords, and ex­ ploiters.” Extending his analysis beyond Europe, Chase envisioned the postw ar w orld com prised o f four pow er blocs: the U nited States, Japan, Germ any, and Russia. Sm aller nations w ould either have to “snuggle under the alum inum w ings o f one o f the four” o r surrender th eir ow n sovereignty. Even the B ritish Em pire could no longer qualify as a com pact fighting u n it.47 H arry Elm er Barnes saw a som ew hat sim ilar revolution currently at w ork, one com parable to such events as the decline o f the Rom an Em pire and the dow nfall o f the m edieval w orld. The tren d tow ard state control o f a nation’s econom y seem ed inevitable. So did a greater pro p o rtio n o f production for use, no t profit. N ations faced a stark choice: they m ust either adopt the M id­ dle Way o f a dem ocratic planned econom y, exem plified by Sweden and Fin­ land, o r find them selves subject to totalitarian revolution. As p art o f the new revolution, individual states w ould inevitably be supplanted by large-scale po­ litical units th at w ould em brace entire continents.48 A m ong the m ore liberal anti-interventionists, especially those w ith pacifist instincts, som e sentim ent for w orld governm ent existed. Few w ent as far as D orothy Detzer, w ho told the W IL, “The thing we m ust eventually stand for is a w orld state.”49 In O ctober 1941, the W IL itself endorsed a resolution in tro ­

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duced by C ongressm an R udolph G. Tenerow itz (Rep.-M ich.)» w hich supp o rted w orld federation.50 The Christian Century, w hile pushing regionalism , prom oted a w orld league, b u t one lim ited to control o f arm am ent plants, cod­ ification o f international law, and th e sponsoring o f various studies.51 For th e problem s o f the E uropean continent, federated blocs appeared to offer som e solution.52 A fter th e war, suggested international law professor Philip Jessup, a W estern E uropean federation should be form ed, consisting o f England, France, Belgium , Luxem bourg, and possibly the Scandinavian coun­ tries.55 N orm an T hom as saw such a E uropean union as a m odel for the re­ gional unification o f all pow ers.54 C ongressm an John M . Vorys (R ep.-O hio) h in ted at a European cooperative com m onw ealth.55 Senator B urton W heeler and th e New York Daily News found a U nited States o f Europe the only solu­ tio n to the continent’s recurring wars.56 A lfred M. Bingham , coeditor o f the liberal weekly Common Sense, offered the m ost extensive schem e presented by an anti-interventionist. In his book The United States o f Europe (1940), published ju st before H itler’s blitzkrieg, Bing­ ham favored organizing th e continent along federal lines. G overnm ent w ould reside in a C ouncil o f States, w hich w ould contain representatives o f various countries according to th eir “relative weight,” and a European Assembly, based o n population. The executive w ould em erge from the C ouncil o f States. Such a Europe w ould possess a com m on arm y and navy, establish forts th ro u g h o u t the continent, an d control such strategic seas as G ibraltar and Suez. V arious adm inistrative agencies w ould supervise disarm am ent, m an­ dates, nationalities, citizenship, raw m aterials, a m onetary system , and a post­ w ar reconstruction agency. The new entity w ould possess visible sym bols o f sovereignty— including a flag, coinage, an d postage— as well as a capital city. B ingham even suggested a site: ju st n o rth o f Basel a t the ju n ctu re o f France, G erm any, and Sw itzerland. T his new system , Bingham claim ed, m et principal grievances o f the Nazi regim e, as it advanced the internationalization o f colonies and assured access to raw m aterials. “A G erm an governm ent still ostensibly Nazi,” he surm ised, “could accept the guarantees o f autonom y for m inority groups and em igra­ tio n for individuals.” W ere H itler to be overthrow n, he continued, tw o G er­ m an federations— n o rth ern and southern— m ight enter a U nited States o f E urope as separate entities; conversely, for the Allies to divide G erm any in to m any states w ould “perpetuate the dangerous neurotic features o f G erm an nationalism , and m ake trouble for the future.” The best hope, he said, “m ay be a chastened Nazi regim e, w ith a sufficient change in th e top leadership to m ake rational negotiation possible ”57 Bingham explained how such a peace could be obtained. A peace confer­ ence w ould be called, first consisting o f th e neutral pow ers and backed by the pope; it w ould establish perm anent m achinery, both to m ediate and to design v arious aspects o f a perm anent settlem ent. A lthough “som e token restoration

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o f independence to Poles, Czechs and Slovaks” was needed, it was, he said, ab­ surd to restore the old boundaries, even if th e Russians w ithdrew from newly conquered territories.5* O pponents o f interventionism differed over Bingham ’s proposals. Freda U tley called it “realistic, com prehensive, and profound.” U nlike Streit, she said, Bingham realized th at federation could n o t w ait for th e establishm ent o f dem ocracy w ithin each constituent state.59 In critiquing Bingham ’s book, journalist John C ham berlain accused him o f im posing FDR’s N ational Recov­ ery A dm inistration o n th e entire E uropean c o n tin e n t A lthough dem ocracy w ould still exist in Bingham ’s Europe, it w ould be Ma sterile so rt o f dem oc­ racy—an eternal round o f plebiscites on th e proposals p u t forw ard by experts. T he race w ould breed tw o predom inant types: sam urai and yes-m en, each a little less th an hum an.” E conom ist Peter F. D rucker, n o t a p arty to th e debate over intervention, w ent even further, w riting in Bingham ’s ow n jo u rn al th at th e plan w ould m ake G erm any m aster o f Europe. Social revolution and civil w ar w ould break o u t in every n ontotalitarian country there, for such nations w ould be deprived o f th eir internal and external defenses.60 A fter H itler’s blitzkrieg against W estern Europe, Bingham ’s Common Sense opposed im m ediate entrance in to the w ar and endorsed a negotiated peace. Even if total victory becam e feasible, he w rote, it was n o t w orth th e hum an cost. T hough Bingham personally grew fatalistic concerning A m erican claim s o f rem aining aloof, he rem ained convinced th a t m ilitary stalem ate w ould fos­ ter negotiations th at w ould center on fairer distrib u tio n o f th e w orld’s re­ sources.61 O f all th e belligerents, only the B ritish leaders stressed E uropean federation as a positive w ar aim . O n 26 N ovem ber 1939, Prim e M inister C ham berlain spoke o f establishing such a u n it. It w ould ensure a constant flow o f trade, general though gradual disarm am ent, and the rig h t o f each n ation to choose its ow n form o f governm ent. The Christian Century first w elcom ed C ham ­ berlain’s proposal b u t soon expressed the fear th a t such a body w ould sim ply becom e a victor’s alliance, designed to dom inate E urope perm anently. Any genuine system , it continued, m ust include all o f Europe, particularly those states w hose disabilities produced th e present catastrophe.62 A m bassador L othian too asserted th at a t least p a rt o f Europe needed “som e form o f econom ic federation, perhaps o f political federation.”63 How, asked journalist C. H artley G rattan in response, could countries w ith long-estab­ lished trad itio n s o f independence surrender au th o rity over arm ies and tariffs? M oreover, he added, Spain, Italy, and the Soviet U nion were unlikely to coop­ erate w ith any central authority.64 O n the one hand, according to th e New York Daily News, th e Allies sought “a glorified League o f N ations,” possessing a cen­ tral governing o r supervisory body. O n the o th er hand, they endorsed th e restoration o f Poland, Czechoslovakia, and A ustria and sought to guarantee

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th e independence o f all oth er sm all nations.65 In th e long ru n , the first aim w ould probably dom inate, as econom ic pressures were invariably pushing all Europe into ubigger states and fewer states.”66 Even if intervention’s foes could accept som e concept o f E uropean federa­ tio n , however, and even if a sm all m inority w ithin th eir ranks refused to con­ dem n Streit as an arch-traitor, they greatly feared any suggestion o f collective security, and beginning in Septem ber 1939 som e w rote entire books attacking this concept. Forem ost was historian C harles A. Beard, long one o f its m ost articulate op­ ponents. Beard, w ho always thrived on controversy, had strongly supported the Roosevelt adm inistration in its early years, for he believed firm ly in cen­ tralized planning and econom ic self-sufficiency.67 By 1935, however, he saw th e adm inistration avoiding radical and necessary m easures, such as national­ izing the nation’s banks, to pursue m ere piecem eal reform . Beard feared th at the U nited States m ight well find a convenient rem edy for continued depres­ sion in foreign conflict, particularly one fought in the Pacific.66 The title o f his article for Harper’s Magazine o f Septem ber 1939, also pu b ­ lished as a sm all book th at year, encapsulated Beard’s thesis. Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels is taken from the fam ous advice given by Shakespeare’s H enry IV as his son was about to ascend th e English throne: “busy giddy m inds w ith foreign quarrels; th at action, hence borne o u t, m ay waste the m em ory o f the form er days.” N o blanket critic o f FDR’s leadership, Beard praised such Roosevelt polices as abrogating the P latt am endm ent, w hich had tu rn ed C uba in to a quasi-protectorate o f the U nited States; w ithdraw ing m arines from the C aribbean; granting conditional independence to the Philippines; abandoning th e chim era o f the C hina m arket; and recognizing th e Soviet U nion. At the sam e tim e, he was sharply critical o f the m unitions em bargo to Spain’s Loyalist governm ent; Roosevelt’s speech o f 5 O ctober 1937, w hich called for “quarantining” aggressor nations; th e naval appropria­ tio n bill o f 1938; backstage involvem ent in the M unich conference; and the cu rren t effort to repeal the arm s em bargo. All such activity, said Beard, proved th at the president sought to collaborate w ith B ritain and France in “th eir ever­ lasting w rangle” w ith Germany, Italy, and Japan.69 N ot surprisingly, FDR’s critics praised the essay, w hich reached th e public ju st as w ar began again in Europe.70 Similarly, interventionists were quick to offer objections, defending collective security and affirm ing the need for for­ eign trade.71 C om m unist w riter A. B. M agil took a unique tack. Such “liberal isolationism ,” said the New Masses editor, was essentially utopian, based on a retu rn to th e era o f prem onopoly capitalism .72 Just as W estern Europe was overrun, Beard offered a m ore comprehensive pre­ scription for w hat he called C ontinental Americanism. He began A Foreign Pol­ icy for America (1940) by praising the nation’s founders for prom oting sim ple

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comm erce while avoiding destructive m ilitary and political entanglem ents. After the American Civil War, however, he claim ed the U nited States lost its bearings, becom ing ensnared in navalism, colonialism , and the quixotic quest for massive foreign m arkets. By the tim e o f the First Hague Conference o f 1899, another de­ structive tendency had emerged: "internationalism ,” a policy th at prom ised nothing less than the peace o f the entire w orld, to be pursued by perm anent links w ith the European state system. To the negative examples offered in Giddy Minds, Beard added the Welles m ission and dem ands for aiding Finland. He also at­ tacked "im perialists” w ho sought war against Japan and retention o f the Philip­ pines as a base for comm ercial expansion.73 A nti-interventionists im m ediately endorsed the w ork.74 NCPW staffer Ruth Sarles, for exam ple, found Beard's definition o f C ontinental A m ericanism sim ­ ply "com m on sense.”75 Yet criticism was strong. C olum bia University historian Allan Nevins, for exam ple, accused Beard o f outright distortion o f certain his­ torical facts (e.g., his claim th at in 1898 Spain had prom ised to free Cuba) and betraying a “frigid indifference” to H itler’s invasion o f W estern Europe.76 Readers often com pared th e book to Isolated America (1940), an in te r­ v en tio n ist volum e w ritten by R aym ond Leslie Buell, staff m em ber o f th e in ­ terv en tio n ist m agazine Fortune and form er presid en t o f th e Foreign Policy A ssociation.77 C hallenging B eard’s claim th a t th e U nited States could p ro s­ p er by rem aining totally self-sufficient, Buell stressed political v u lnerability am id an A xis-dom inated w orld an d U.S. econom ic dependence o n foreign goods. T heologian R einhold N iebuhr accused Beard o f "m oral indifferentism ,” w hile finding Buell affirm ing th e ethical basis o f A m erican dem oc­ racy. In ad d itio n , said N iebuhr, Buell show ed how m ajor fascist gains w ould seriously dam age its A m erican econom y. R adio co m m en tato r E lm er D avis also favored th e Fortune editor, m ain tain in g th a t Beard offered n o fool­ p ro o f form ula for survival, in e ith er politics o r econom ics. C om m unist Bruce M inton saw b o th Beard and Buell neglecting th e underlying class basis b eh in d th e c u rre n t “im p erialist war.”78 Even those w ho preferred Buell did n o t always find him w ithout flaw. Po­ litical scientist Max Lem er agreed w ith his claim th at 150 years o f technolog­ ical change had forced the U nited States to rethink its entire relationship to Europe. Lerner, however, feared th at Buell's alternative— massive aid to the Al­ lies— could lead to m ajor econom ic dislocation and a garrison state. N orm an C ousins, literary editor o f Current History, challenged Beard’s assum ption th a t a victorious G erm any w ould "have no p a rt o f us,” b u t he found Buell’s in­ ternationalism possibly leading to war. W alter M illis, an ed ito r o f the New York Herald Tribune, had w ritten a popular account o f U.S. entry into W orld W ar I so revisionist th at in O ctober an d N ovem ber 1939 the Chicago Tribune offered excerpts in its Sunday supplem ents. A convert to intervention, M illis cam e dow n squarely on Buell’s side though he regarded his vision o f a m ore ju st w orld order as a b it naive.79

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At th e sam e tim e Beard’s Foreign Policy was being debated, A nne M orrow Lindbergh’s The Wave o f the Future: A Confession o f Faith (1940) was pu b ­ lished. Poet, aviator, heiress, and wife o f C harles A. Lindbergh, she had been greatly shaken by the events o f the spring.80 In The Wave’s forty-one pages, she deeply opposed th e cu rren t “aggression, terror, class o r race persecution” b u t found th e “D em ocracies”— a term she p u t in quotation m arks— by no m eans innocent. T heir m oral case, she argued, resem bled th at o f the rich young m an in Jesus’s fam ous parable. If th e “Have N ations” had shared m ore o f the w orld’s possessions w ith the “H ave-nots,” o r if the dem ocracies had given “reasonable econom ic and territo rial concessions” to G erm any’s budding re­ public, neither Nazism n o r the ongoing w ar w ould have taken place. T he evils currendy existing in G erm any could occur in any nation experiencing war, revolution, defeat, frustration, and suffering. T he com placent status quo o f the 1930s could n o t last: “A w orld in w hich young people, w illing to w ork, could n o t afford a hom e o r family, in w hich one found on every side dissatis­ faction, m aladjustm ent and m oral decay— th at w orld was ripe for change.” To resist inevitable change was “to sin against life itself.” Inadvertendy coining a phrase th a t w ould h au n t her the rest o f her life, she w rote, “There is no fight­ ing the wave o f the future any m ore than as a child you could fight against a gigantic roller th at loom ed ahead o f you someday.”81 Certainly, w rote A nne Lindbergh, the cu rren t struggle did n o t p it good ver­ sus evil; rather, the “Forces o f the Past” were fighting the “Forces o f the Fu­ ture.” She w ent so far as to see “som e new, and perhaps ultim ately good, con­ ception o f hum anity trying to com e to b irth , often through evil and horrible form s and abortive attem pts.” T his new conception was “in its essence, good; b u t because we are blind we cannot see it, and because it was slow to change, it m ust force its way through the heavy crust violendy— in eruptions. Some o f these eruptions take terrible form s, unrecognizable and evil form s.”82 A nne Lindbergh specifically denied th at the evils o f Nazism em bodied these “Forces o f the Future.” N oting th at the dictators were using these “new social an d econom ic forces,” she w rote, “They have felt the wave o f the future and they have leapt upon it. T he evils we deplore in these system s are no t in them ­ selves the future; they are scum on the wave o f the future.” C om paring current totalitarian behavior to the French R evolution, she recalled E dm und Burke’s fam ous denunciation o f its atrocities b u t added, “Few seriously question the fundam ental necessity o r ‘rightness’ o f the m ovem ent.”83 Given such prem ises, M rs. Lindbergh found only one policy acceptable: iso­ lation. C ivilization, she m aintained, could n o t be saved sim ply by entering the war, n o r could dem ocracy, liberty, o r “o u r way o f life.” If A m ericans did n o t prom ote these values at hom e, fighting to preserve them overseas was useless: “They will crum ble away under th e very feet o f o u r arm ies.” Conversely, if A m ericans sacrificed th eir selfish interests, “giving up p a rt o f the ease o f liv­ ing an d the high m aterial standards we have been noted for,” there m ight

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ensue “a gain in spirit, in vigor, and in self-reliance, for w hich no price could be too high.” Let A m ericans foster a peaceful dem ocratic revolution, n o t en­ gage in crusading abroad.84 The book im m ediately becam e a best-seller. Fifty thousand copies were purchased in the first tw o m onths alone. Several noninterventionists, partic­ ularly w ithin th e religious and pacifist ranks, w arm ly endorsed the w ork.85 The m ore m oderate Wall Street lawyer John Foster D ulles w rote her, uIn a prose w hich I cannot equal and to an audience w hich I cannot reach, you have expressed som e o f the fundam ental problem s w hich have been troubling m e for a good m any years past. It is never easy o r popular to tell people to pause and th in k at a tim e w hen em otion is d o m in an t” Poet W. H . A uden sim ply called it “a beautiful book.”86 O ther anti-interventionists, however, were m ore reserved. Common Sense regarded Wave as “one o f the m ost successful efforts to p u t the present act o f the hum an dram a into w ords” b u t was troubled by her im precise prose. N or­ m an Thom as called the book a good one, though he hoped th e au th o r over­ rated “the hopeful elem ent” in the both E uropean revolution and th e totali­ tarian state. Socialist Lillian Symes thought A nne Lindbergh a liberal reform er w ho lacked an understanding o f basic econom ic forces. T he Christian Century praised her for placing the w ar in th e context o f a vast and inevitable revolu­ tion. It did, however, take issue w ith any “wave” analogy th at depicted h u ­ m anity only as helpless victim o r fortunate beneficiary.87 Some reviewers shared the Protestant jo u rn al’s concern over a certain de­ term inism . The bim onthly jo u rn al o f the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, edited by C olum bia Teachers College professor Clyde M iller, found her views sim ilar to those o f the collectivist elitist Lawrence D ennis: “The very title o f her book suggests her belief th at the revolution will w in inevitably.” Even the noninterventionist Commonweal stressed th at “m an” was “free,” possessing the potential to “p u t the m oral m ark on any environm ent, to m oderate it and o r­ ganize for truly hum an purposes.”88 N ot surprisingly, interventionists harped on w hat they saw as a fatuous fa­ talism . Playw right Clare B oothe, wife o f H enry Luce, insisted th at “the w orld has progressed only because it has n o t allow ed the waves to sweep over it.” Said E. B. W hite, m onthly colum nist for Harper's Magazine, “I th in k I shall go on resisting any change I disapprove of, for I do n o t th in k change per se is any­ thing m uch, n o r th at change is necessarily good.” H erbert Agar, editor o f the Louisville Courier-Journal, saw her m ind “painfully divided against itself”; it had produced “som e ugly exam ples o f confused thought.”89 M ore significantly, one interventionist after another accused A nne Lind­ bergh o f softness tow ard fascism :90 a H itlerian view o f “th e W agnerian saga,” according to the New Republia “appeasem ent” and “demagoguery,” com ­ m ented M argaret M arshall, book colum nist for the Nation. Foreign corre­ spondent Reuben M arkham called the wave o f the future sheer to talitarian­

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ism . H arvard political scientist W illiam Yandell E lliott spoke o f “anthropolog­ ical prim itivism .” O ne com m entator attacked Lindbergh’s explanation for to ­ talitarianism , asserting the phenom enon was rooted in greed an d revenge, n o t frustration and privation.91 In June 1941, using the pages o f th e Atlantic Monthly; M rs. Lindbergh re­ sponded to h er critics. She reiterated acute revulsion to the h o rro rs o f Europe, w hich she described in m ore concrete term s: “th e suppression o f free speech, o f free action, the relinquishing o f individual rights to the control o f one m an, th e end o f dem ocratic governm ent, the w ielding o f hate as a w eapon, th e unrestricted use o f force and terror, m ob riots, class w arfare, racial and re­ ligious persecution.” Furtherm ore, she becam e m ore concrete in describing th e “wave.” It m arked n o inevitable wave o f com m unism , fascism , and Nazism “to w hich we m ust bow dow n in abject subm ission.” Far from accepting a fascist-dom inated Europe, she denied th at such an o rder was all-pow erful, inevitable, o r perm a­ n e n t An occupied Europe could never function successfully, for prosperity is “n o t a flow er th at grows from oppression.” Rather, she stressed, th e wave involved “a m ovem ent and adjustm ent to a highly scientific, m echanized, and m aterial era o f civilization, w ith all its a t­ tendant im plications, and as such it seem s to m e inevitable.” To say th at the revolution was in its essence good sim ply m eant th at “th e effort to adjust to the m echanized w orld is a necessary one.” In discussing her claim th at the evils in fascism were “the scum ” on th e wave’s surface, she rem arked, “C ertainly it is necessary to deal w ith the scum ; b u t I feel th at if we do n o t deal w ith the wave first we shall have no pow er to deal w ith th e scum .” She w anted B ritain— “w ith its justice, tolerance and com passion”— to survive b u t w ondered w hether continued w ar w ould contribute to th at end.92 If som e found A nne Lindbergh’s Wave far too vague, the sam e could n o t be said o f Lawrence D ennis’s treatise on w orld politics, The Dynamics o f War and Revolution (1940), a w ork far less com forting to defenders o f com petitive cap­ italism and parliam entary dem ocracy.93 D ennis began his career on the lower rungs o f th e A m erican establishm ent. Receiving his form al education at Phillips Exeter and H arvard and serving overseas as an infantry officer in W orld W ar I, D ennis w orked several years in the foreign service, follow ed by em ploym ent abroad w ith J. 8c W. Seligm an and the N ational C ity Bank o f New York. In 1930, he began to attack the overseas activities o f A m erican invest­ m ent banking, publishing his broadsides in such liberal journals as the Nation and th e New Republic By the m iddle o f the decade, he started to advocate a “desirable fascism ” and, in H itler’s early years o f power, expressed adm iration for him . A ccording to D ennis’s schem a, a new A m erican riding elite w ould as­ sum e pow er legally, call private enterprise to “the colors as conscripts in war,” reorganize th e C ongress on vocational lines, and replace th e tw o-party system w ith a single p arty “holding a m andate from th e people.” Specific econom ic

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m easures included nationalization o f banks and m ajor m onopolies, redistrib­ utio n o f w ealth and incom e through progressive taxation, and subsidization o f sm all enterprises and farm ing. In the new society, all institutions— press, radio, cinem a, schools, and churches— m ust foster a “national plan” designed to coordinate the entire econom y.94 D ennis’s self-defined version o f “fascism” m ade him som ew hat o f a “loner,” even am ong adm inistration critics. By late 1939, his only consistent outlet lay in his weekly m im eographed bulletin, th e Weekly Foreign Letter. O ccasionally anti-interventionists spoke o f him highly o r recom m ended his w ork.95 H e was also involved in som e ghostw riting for m ore prom inent and centrist antiinterventionists.96 He was acquainted w ith th e Lindberghs, b u t it rem ains u n ­ clear how m uch they were influenced by him .97 In Dynamics, D ennis again stressed th at w orld capitalism had played itself out. To alleviate poverty and stagnation, “capitalist im perialism ” m ust be re­ placed by “socialist revolution,” a concept th at— to D ennis— included Russian-style com m unism , fascism , Nazism , and even the New Deal. Several m ajor “socialist im perialist” blocs w ould emerge: “The U nited States over the W est­ ern H em isphere, G erm any over a considerable p a rt o f Europe, Italy over a considerable p art o f the M editerranean and N orth Africa, France over its selfsufficient territo ry in Europe and som e o f N orth Africa, Russia over eastern Europe and central Asia and Japan w ith /o r C hina over the Far East.”98 Even such a new order w ould no t bring stability, for international politics was invariably D arw inistic. Society, so he stated, always needed w ar to keep it from stagnating. Just as capitalistic and dem ocratic countries had fought each other in the past, so, too, w ould socialist countries battle against each other in the fu­ ture. The harshness o f the new rule “m ay be, usually is, m itigated w ith tim e.”99 To D ennis, W orld W ar II was sim ply “another B ritish bid to A m ericans to com e over to Europe to help the British and the French to p u t and keep the G erm ans in th eir place, w hich is the doghouse.” W hile approvingly citing M arx to the effect th at anti-Sem itism was “the socialism o f fools” and criticiz­ ing the U nited States in his bulletin for n o t adm itting “a few hundred th o u ­ sand refugees,” he found efforts to hinder G erm any’s natural expansion b oth futile and dangerous.100 Were A m erica tru ly hum anitarian, D ennis argued, it w ould persuade the Allies to “stop the war,” prom ising in retu rn full responsibility for rehabilitat­ ing B ritain itself as well as “the defense o f such parts o f the em pire, u nder o u r flag, as we m ight decide, on strategic grounds, we could reasonably carry out.” The U.S. w ould “have to take over” C anada and A ustralia and revam p its ow n econom y to absorb tw enty m illion B ritish im m igrants. B ritain in tu rn m ust abandon its possessions in Africa, Asia, and the M editerranean “to those best able to grab and hold them .” The U nited K ingdom w ould becom e “another Sweden,” w ith the royal fam ily possibly retained “like th e quintuplets in Canada.” In retu rn , a new Anglo-Saxon w orld w ould be created, one “n o t only

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invincible in a m ilitary way b u t w orkable in an econom ic way” 101 Even if A m erican intervention was tem porarily successful in defeating im ­ m ediate enem ies, w rote D ennis, in the long ru n it could n o t preserve its cap­ italist system . “The quickest and surest route to an A m erican Fascism o r Nazism,” he w rote, “is a w ar to end Nazism in Europe.” As th e conflict contin­ ued, taxes w ould bilk ow ners o f w ealth while business w ould be continually w eakened by increasing regim entation; the bureaucratic elite and organized labor w ould expand. In tim e th e inevitable “bereavem ent and sacrifices” and the ensuing disillusionm ent w ould create “a drastic phase o f revolutionary change” based o n “hate for the persons, ideas and institutions responsible for o u r entry into war.” At the sam e tim e, “such hate m ay give b irth to a new A m erican folk un ity and dynam ism .”102 A few anti-interventionists offered qualified approval.103 So, too, did Suprem e C ourt chief justice H arlan Fiske Stone, w ho called it “the m ost thought-provoking book I’ve read in m any a day.” H arry Elm er Barnes found D ennis’s ideology contrary to his ow n “prejudices” bu t recognized an u n ri­ valed critique o f “the term inal stage” o f capitalism and liberalism .104 Yet practically no reviewers treated the book uncritically. Karl Korsch, a Germ an-bom revisionist M arxist, concurred w ith Dennis’s claim that dem ocracy in the concrete was synonym ous to capitalism . However, as Korsch w ent on, the leaders o f Dennis’s contem porary “revolution”— Hitler, M ussolini, and Stalin— were in reality “reactionaries,” seeking the destruction o f genuine revolutionary forces. To W illiam H enry Cham berlin, the book was well w ritten, provocative, and som ewhat on target concerning capitalism ’s failures. Problems lay in Den­ nis’s willingness to “accept fascism at the valuation o f its professed upholders,” a tendency that blinded him to the terror systems adopted by both the Nazi and C om m unist Parties. Freda Utley endorsed his picture o f the declining capitalist order, but she held other presum ptions m ore suspect, including D ennis’s belief in ethical relativism and rule by elites and his assertion that the Soviet U nion was a genuinely socialist power. Alfred M. Bingham, while praising Dennis’s m astery o f social forces, criticized sloppy definitions and an “obvious yearning for a su­ perm an.”105W illiam Z. Foster, chairm an o f the American C om m unist Party, saw no m erit in the work, although he still devoted som e thirty-four colum ns o f the Communist to its contents. Foster attacked Dennis for denying that the USSR was a democracy; linking the USSR w ith Germany, Italy, and Japan as “socialist” states; portraying Germ any as a “revolutionary” power; and predicting th at gen­ uinely “socialist” nations w ould fight each other. At least one reviewer, form er Commonweal editor M ichael W illiams, called Dennis “a poisonous propagandist for the diabolically evil forces o f the atheistic w orld revolution”; he concretely fruited D ennis for denying the reality, m uch less the validity, o f m oral and ethi­ cal principles in statecraft.106 Several reviewers w ho were by no m eans anti-interventionist, however, be­ stowed som e value to the w ork. E ditor Charles R. W alker praised D ennis’s

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analysis o f dem ocratic capitalism . D ennis fell short, said Walker, w hen it cam e to asserting th at genuine fascism could solve unem ploym ent w ithout the dy­ nam ics o f war. H arvard political scientist Pendleton H erring found D ennis often penetrating bu t claim ed th at his am oral realpolitik ignored the fact that the “dynam o o f dem ocracy” generated “the highest hum an voltage m ankind has ever seen.”107 Frederick L. Schum an, governm ent professor at W illiams College, engaged him in debate. In an open letter to the Nation, Schum an en­ dorsed several D ennis tenets, including the death o f com petitive capitalism and traditional pow er politics, the W est’s lack o f will, and the inevitability o f w hat G erm an philosopher Oswald Spengler called “Caesarism .” Schum an’s rem edy called for ju st the opposite: a “dynam ic and revolutionary America,” linked to a “dynam ic and revolutionary Britain.” By im m ediately declaring w ar on Ger­ many, b o th nations could “rem ake the w orld in a fashion w hich m ight be preferable (to you and m e as A m ericans) to th e fashion in w hich the Nazis will rem ake it.”108 In his rejoinder, D ennis found m uch in com m on w ith Schum an’s “m ethod, attitude, and conclusions,” b u t he fully expected H itler to conquer B ritain and continue “cooperative relationships w ith the other dynam ic totalitarians.” A sserting th at Schum an sought alliance w ith B ritain so as to check the foes o f capitalism , D ennis saw it futile to fight for such a goal. A people as fa­ vored as Am ericans possessed the natural resources, geographic isolation, and sheer size to becom e again “dynam ic”— th at is, if they adopted “som e variant o f an expansive totalitarian collectivism directed by a non-hereditary func­ tional elite.” Political scientist M ax Lemer, in com m enting on both w riters, at­ tacked D ennis for scorning dem ocracy, Schum an for advancing “Caesarism.” Democracy, said Lemer, “is substance as well as dream ,” “som ething to die for, to live for, to give o u r talent and energy to extending.”109 A m id all such speculation, however, a m ore im m ediate task lay at hand: to com bat the initial policies o f President Roosevelt th at risked leading the na­ tio n in to the conflict.

5

it Initial Engagements

O n 21 Septem ber 1939, in addressing a special session o f C ongress, Roosevelt urged repeal o f the existing arm s em bargo. At the sam e tim e, he w anted the U nited States to m aintain its ban on w ar credits and require all item s to be tran sp o rted in foreign vessels. Buyers o f A m erican goods m ust take title be­ fore leaving th e U.S. “C ash-and-carry,” as the policy was im m ediately called, should avert the torpedoing o f A m erican vessels and the destruction o f A m er­ ican p roperty in com bat zones. “By repeal o f the em bargo,” said the president, “th e U nited States w ill m ore probably rem ain at peace th an if the law rem ains as it is today.” Furtherm ore, Roosevelt called on Congress to give him au th o r­ ity to establish w ar zones from w hich A m erican vessels, planes, and citizens w ould be banned. T hough FDR was far from explicit, his bill obviously had one aim : to aid the Allies. Roosevelt did rem ind Congress th at th e cu rren t em bargo deprived sea pow ers (i.e., B ritain and France) o f a natural advantage over land pow ers (i.e., G erm any), b u t he w ould go no further. Instead, he stressed gains to A m erican industry, asking why the U nited States should send “all m anner o f articles across the ocean for final processing there, w hen we could give em ploym ent to thousands by doing it here.”1 Time m agazine was far m ore b lu n t about FDR’s real m otive, noting th at the cu rren t A m erican arm s em bargo had given H itler “alm ost th e equivalent o f an A tlantic fleet, because G reat B ritain and France can get no arm s from the U.S.”2 At the beginning o f the debate over the president’s bill, Newsweek foresaw a b attle as intense as th at over the League o f N ations in 1919. A fter Key P ittm an (D em .-N ev.) an d W illiam E. Borah led o ff the debate before a packed Senate gallery, however, argum ents soon becam e repetitive, and m uch public interest

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quickly w aned.3 Speeches in both houses did continue alm ost a m onth, d u r­ ing w hich seventy senators contributed m ore than a m illion w ords.4 The president’s adversaries were no t as strong as m any thought. U ntil the fall o f 1940, w hen the A m erica First C om m ittee (AFC) was founded, th e Keep A m erica O ut o f W ar Congress (KAOWC) was the only national organization specifically created to retain strict neutrality and hence to oppose Roosevelt’s foreign policy. It had been founded in M arch 1938 w hen die NCPW , FOR, W IL, and Socialist Party all had joined forces w ith several o th er peace groups. From Septem ber 1939 u n til late 1941, John T. Flynn served as national chair­ m an. C oncentrating on trade unions, pacifists, and socialists, it possessed its ow n youth affiliate.5 The KAOWC adam antly opposed cash-and-carry, b u t it lacked the m em ­ bership and the m ass backing to be effective. Philip La Follette, form er gover­ n o r o f W isconsin, proposed a nationw ide organization supposedly to be fi­ nanced by m eat packer Jay H orm el. H is plans, however, aroused opposition by such Republican isolationists as Senator A rthur H . V andenberg (R ep.-M ich.), w ho feared the rise o f a La Follette-dom inated th ird party.6 Roosevelt’s political skill neutralized m uch potential opposition. T he A m er­ ican Legion contented itself w ith a general “stay o u t o f w ar” resolution. The A m erican Federation o f Labor favored cash-and-carry, provided th at “it can be show n th at such a step will n o t lead us into war.” An influential ad hoc body was soon organized to back the president: the N on-partisan C om m ittee for Peace through the Revision o f the N eutrality Law. It was led by the prom inent journalist, W illiam Allen W hite, a Republican long active in the Progressive m ovem ent and a m an w ho w ielded considerable influence. According to a G allup poll, 62 percent believed th at the U nited States should do everything possible to aid the Allies “sh o rt o f war.”7 Several figures later prom inent in anti-interventionist ranks backed Roo­ sevelt’s proposal, though occasionally w ith reservations.8 T hey raised a bevy o f argum ents. It was “Pharisaical,” said R obert A. Taft, for the U nited States to supply steel, m achinery, cotton, alcohol, and nitrate w hile “o u r hands are too clean to com plete the process o f m anufacture.” The O hio senator saw such shipm ents quite perm issible under international law, invoking the nam es o f D aniel W ebster and John Hay in the process.9 The New York Daily News noted the potential em ploym ent for ten m illion A m ericans still lacking jobs and contributed as well a defense argum ent, de­ claring th at the U nited States needed factories geared to w ar production and w orkers w ho knew how to operate such m achinery. M oreover, retention o f the arm s em bargo w ould inevitably lead to sm uggling, w hich in tu rn w ould cause G erm any and B ritain to sink A m erican vessels.10 Lying in back o f all argum ents was one underlying fact: retention o f the arm s em bargo aided G erm any; its elim ination helped the A llies.11 “O u r ‘N eu-

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trality’ Act—A H elp to Hitler,” read the headline o f one Daily News editorial. If H itler could n o t crack the M aginot line o r the British blockade, it w arned, he m ight well cut loose his air force against London o r Paris. The G erm an dic­ tato r w ould be far less likely to com m it such “civilian m urder and city devas­ tation” if he knew th at the Allies had access to A m erican aircraft factories, giv­ ing them th a t “m uch m ore chance to retaliate by raining bom bs on Berlin, M unich, H am burg, o r som e o th er beautiful and valuable G erm an city.”12 M ost figures later prom inent in th e anti-interventionist m ovem ent were far less supportive. Borah’s initial speech expounded several m ajor argum ents used by the bill’s foes. T he proposal w ould endanger the U nited States: “The spy, th e dynam ite, and the air bom b will have standing invitations to visit the m unitions plants.” The U.S. w ould be acting im m orally, entering “th at d irty trade” o f arm s com m erce. W ar-stricken European nations could never supply the funds to repay the U nited States. M ost o f all, the bill took the first step on the road to war. Said the Idaho senator, “H earing and heeding the M acedon­ ian cry for arm s, will we, if a m ore critical h o u r should occur, tu rn a deaf ear to th e M acedonian cry for arm ies?”13 O ther argum ents were raised. Sinking even foreign ships m ight endanger A m erican neutrality. A m erican vessels them selves m ight be sunk by m istake. Suppose belligerent nations violated an inter-A m erican declaration, p ro ­ claim ed at Panam a in O ctober 1939, by arm ing th eir ow n m erchant ships in pursuit o f A m erican trade. They could be “subject to exterm ination” by the U.S. Navy. B ritain and France possessed huge factories w here cannon and shells were m ade for m ore cheaply than in the U nited States. In fact, it was the U.S. th at lacked crucial m unitions, n o t the Allies. T he proposal m ight even en­ danger the Allies, no t Germany. If H itler saw the U nited States com ing to th eir aid, he w ould im m ediately launch air attacks on France and E ngland.14 M uch attention centered on the bill’s econom ic consequences. C ited fre­ quently was the president’s fam ous C hautauqua address, delivered on 14 Au­ gust 1936, w hich referred to w artim e trade as “fool’s gold.” 15 Boom w ould in ­ evitably be follow ed by b u st.16 Massive w ar trade w ould cause the U nited States to accum ulate the w orld’s gold supply, a circum stance th at— contrary to appearance— really crippled the nation’s prosperity by tying up a crucial m edium o f exchange.17 The A m erican m erchant m arine w ould be endan­ gered, as m any vessels w ould be taken o ff the seas.18 The lack o f neutrality, the president’s critics claim ed, was absolutely bla­ t a n t 19 Fish com pared the m atter to “changing the rules after the kick-off in a football game.” Borah quoted B ernard Baruch, the original au th o r o f cashand-carry, w ho denied th at the schem e was genuine neutrality. “N ot by 20 sea miles,” said th e financier. “It am ounts to giving active assistance to w hatever nation has com m and o f the seas.”20 Congressm an George A. D ondero asked, “If tw o m en are fighting in the street and you are standing nearby and give one

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o f them a knife, are you neutral?”21 C andid pro-A llied com m ents by such ad­ m inistration defenders as Senator Frederick Van Nuys (D em .-Ind.) were quoted as evidence as to Roosevelt’s real intentions.22 Above all, feared adm inistration foes, the bill seem ed to be the first step to ­ w ard A m erican entry into th e conflict.23 B ennett C lark com m ented th at “cash and carry” had already degenerated into “credit and carry” and w ould soon be followed by “crash and carry,” and ultim ately “clash and carry.” Recent activi­ ties o f Allied purchasers were seen as destructive precedents.24 The rem em brance o f W orld W ar I was n o t reassuring. O nce the Allies ran o u t o f cash, so the bill’s opponents m aintained, they w ould seek loans. In 1915 and 1916, the W ilson adm inistration first perm itted short-term banking cred­ its, then m ajor loans.25 Soon the entire A m erican econom y was dependent on a w ar boom , and Senator Nye was quick to recall the frankness o f leading W il­ son officials on the m atter.26 C ongressm an Bruce B arton w ent even further. Recalling the sinkings o f A m erican ships early in 1917, he said, “The G erm an people had been m ade insane w ith anger because it was o u r guns, o u r shells, o u r gas, and o u r airplanes th at were m urdering th eir sons.”27 Journalist C. H artley G rattan quickly rushed to press w ith a book bearing th e om inous title The Deadly Parallel (1939). Repeal o f the arm s em bargo, he w arned, uwill

mark the beginning o f the collapse o f American neutrality!*2* In m aking such claim s, anti-interventionists relied heavily o n w hat Roo­ sevelt him self called “the age-old and tim e-honored doctrine o f international law.” Such law, th e president said, perm itted neutrals to trade w ith belligerents in “goods and products o f all kinds.” Recalling the 1807 em bargo o f T hom as Jefferson, FDR asserted th at the action o f the th ird president had precipitated a ruinous econom y and a destructive war.29 C ertain scholars responded quickly. Edwin M . B orchard, professor at Yale Law School, was particularly disturbed by the president’s proposal. A prolific au th o r on various aspects o f international law and a leading consultant on m atters o f international arbitration, Borchard possessed a singular attach­ m ent to traditional legal principles, while at the sam e tim e stressing underly­ ing econom ic issues. M any o f the conflicts o f the interw ar period, he believed, could be elim inated by the cancellation o f w ar debts, tariff reduction, arm s lim itation, and redistribution o f foreign m arkets an d raw m aterials. Before W orld W ar I, he argued, carefully defined international law protected nations from purposeless involvem ent, perm itted com m ercial prosperity, lim ited the scope o f fighting, and allowed for neutral m ediation. President W oodrow W il­ son and Secretary o f State R obert Lansing, however, defied all precedents, re­ fusing to press for genuine neutral rights and in the process m aking U.S. entry into W orld W ar I inevitable. Postw ar efforts to freeze the status quo and check “aggressors” sim ply ensured th at all nations w ould be em broiled in endless conflict. If understood correctly, B orchard m aintained, the League o f N ations was an arm ed alliance, the K ellogg-Briand pact a foolproof device to involve

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the U nited States in continual conflict. To oppose the expansion o f Germ any, Italy, an d Japan could be com pared to sitting on a safety valve. D uring the de­ bate over neutrality revision and the others to follow, Borchard continually of­ fered advice to a host o f congressional figures, including Senators Borah, La Follette, H iram Johnson, and John A. D anaher (R ep.-C onn.) an d C ongress­ m an James A. Shanley (D em .-C onn.).30 In m any battles against intervention, B orchard was supported by tw o aca­ dem ic colleagues. First was a scholar m any years his senior, John Bassett M oore, w ho from 1921 to 1928 had been th e first A m erican judge o n the W orld C o u rt and had long served on the faculty o f C olum bia University. Al­ though he certainly did n o t consider him self an “isolationist,” M oore was c rit­ ical o f w hat he saw as international m oralism and, like B orchard, could be quite biting. Such traditional devices as international arbitration and concili­ ation, he thought, w ere always the best m eans o f preserving peace and lim it­ ing c o n flict31 Second, there was Philip C. Jessup, also a C olum bia professor, w ho had w ritten m ajor w orks on neutrality. Jessup sharply differed w ith M oore and B orchard, w ho had been his teachers, over such m atters as sanc­ tions against aggressors (w hich Jessup favored) an d presidential discretion in penalizing an aggressor (w hich he also supported). Yet he follow ed his m en­ to rs in opposing Roosevelt's policies once w ar broke o u t.32 If B orchard advocated one policy, it was legal neutrality, w hich, he con­ ceded, was n o t th e sam e as practical even-handedness. Several m onths before th e European w ar began, he said, “N eutrality is n o t expected to place equal handicaps o n b o th belligerents. It is an institution designed to protect your people from involvem ent in foreign quarrels by enabling you to justify your conduct and th u s avoid the charge th at you are consciously discrim inating be­ tw een the belligerents, th u s exposing yourself to a charge o f participating in the war.” As far as m orality w ent, th e neutral pow er was neither “a so rt o f ref­ eree having the privilege o f pronouncing m oral judgm ents” n o r a judge “be­ tw een good and evil”; rather, it was “obliged to disregard m oral considerations w hich th at state is n o t in a position to exam ine.”33 In regard to cash-and-carry, Borchard m aintained th at the relaxing o f a na­ tio n ’s neutral obligations, if done w ith the m otive o r even th e effect o f aiding one belligerent a t the expense o f another, involved a m arked violation o f in­ ternational law and— m ore im p o rtan t—was itself “an act o f w ar and in ter­ vention.” Germ any, he feared, m ight in desperation justly take reprisals. Bor­ chard had opposed the original passage o f the neutrality acts on the grounds th at they surrendered tim e-honored international rights.34 He now stressed th at the only changes a neutral pow er could m ake while a w ar was in progress were those in the direction o f tightening th at nation’s neutrality.35 O thers echoed B orchard’s fears. Law professors Jessup and C harles C heney Hyde, also o f C olum bia University, found th e U nited States n o t only acting hypocritically b u t possibly exposing itself to brutal retaliation by a victorious

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Germany. Roscoe Pound, form er dean o f H arvard Law School, w arned th at any change in the neutrality act w ould p u t the U nited States into the war. D anaher accused the president o f seeking to engage the nation in a conflict th at “m ight involve o u r very livelihood and o u r very continued existence.”36 Several FDR opponents offered related argum ents. They found little prece­ dent for m aking radical changes in neutral practice once a m ajor w ar had b ro ­ ken o u t, and they offered a host o f citations from President W ilson to Sir Ed­ w ard Grey, B ritish foreign m inister a t the beginning o f W orld W ar I.37 N eutral nations, they said, had no obligation to trade w ith belligerents and, fu rth er­ m ore, had often refused to do so from the tim e o f the A m erican R evolution.38 Roosevelt’s discussion o f Jefferson’s em bargo was seen as flawed, som e saying th at the m ove did n o t really dam age the A m erican econom y.39 C ongressm an A lbert J. Engel (Rep.-M ich.) w ent so far as to say th at since H itler had been in power, “G erm any has apparently scrupulously obeyed the rules o f interna­ tional law.” Conversely, Professor Jessup accused the U nited States o f em ulat­ ing G erm any’s chancellor in diluting the rules o f international law by dis­ crim inating betw een belligerents.40 Several adm inistration foes expressed skepticism at the entire concept o f an international law, b u t they leveled th eir criticism s only at FDR’s use o f the concept, no t B orchard’s. Publisher P orter Sargent called international law, as Roosevelt invoked it, “largely the creation o f the B ritish w ith the acquiescence o f th eir satellites to foster British ends and em barrass rebel peoples.” C harles A. Beard found the m atter so tangled th at it was hard to discern w hat Roo­ sevelt m eant. T he Christian Century denied th at there was any definite body o f accepted rules for the protection o f neutral rights, know n to all nations and obeyed by all belligerents.41 W here, it was asked, was the m echanism needed to enforce international law? Finding no refuge in w hat he saw as a chim era, C. H artley G rattan per­ sonally w rote B orchard, “The belligerents are com m itted to anarchy, will act as anarchists, will tw ist the law, cite the precedents w hich suit them , and o th ­ erw ise m ake the law a m are’s nest o f the first o rd e r.. . . [U ]nlike violators o f national law, violators o f international law cannot be either convicted o r jailed by the good law o f the prosecuting attorney.”42 Several anti-interventionists w anted to reverse the president’s request, seek­ ing even tighter legislation. True neutrality, insisted the Jesuit America, m ust include a ban on foodstuffs as well as m unitions, and it quoted N apoleon to the effect th at “an arm y crawls on its belly.”43 Pacifist leader D orothy D etzer sought the em bargoing o f “basic w ar m aterials,” a category th at included oil, cotton, and steel. T he Reverend John Haynes H olm es opposed a single “pound o f goods” shipped anywhere in the service o f this war.”44 Senator Nye w anted a total em bargo; any lost trade w ith European belligerents could be com pen­ sated by com m erce w ith Latin A m erica.45

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O thers suggested a stronger arm s em bargo. T he em bargo, said N orm an Thom as, should n o t only be applied to belligerents b u t to Japan, Italy, and the Soviet U nion as well. Senator H enry C abot Lodge (Rep.-M ass.) endorsed its extension to all neutral pow ers.46 H erbert H oover w anted to distinguish betw een offensive and defensive w eapons. Such “offensive” w eapons as bom bers, poison gas, and subm arines should n o t be sent overseas, and he pointed to the “barbarism ” created by such m unitions in C hina, Spain, E thiopia, and Poland.47 C harles A. Lindbergh, w ho had been in touch w ith H oover on the m atter, concurred (as confidentially did the m ore interventionist Kansas editor W illiam Allen W hite). The aviator con­ ceded th at certain w eapons were “borderline cases” b u t found the bom ber an unequivocally offensive w eapon.48 Interventionists responded im m ediately, denying th at th at one could dis­ tinguish betw een th e offensive and defensive nature o f planes and tanks.49 Several o f th eir political opponents agreed w ith them . If G erm any were about to invade France o r vice versa, said Senator B ennett C lark, antiaircraft guns could serve as an offensive w eapon to shoot dow n the enem y’s defensive planes.50 W illiam P. Lage, New York attorney and B orchard’s coauthor for Neutrality for the United States (1937), accused H oover and Lindbergh o f “a t­ tem pting to m ollify th eir consciences w hile at the sam e tim e giving expression to the A m erican desire for the defeat o f Hitler.” H oover privately adm itted th at his proposal was unlikely to “develop into anything very practical” b u t hoped th at “som e day som ething m ay com e o f i t ” He also believed th at “defensive” arm s sales w ould “give an em otional o utlet to the A m erican people,” thereby reducing the pressures for intervention.51 M any FDR foes supported an am endm ent introduced on 4 O ctober by Sen­ a to r C harles W. Tobey. The New H am pshire Republican w anted to retain the arm s em bargo while restoring cash-and-carry for all oth er item s. If the U nited States sent arm s to belligerents, he said, “We m ay find ourselves on the brink o f entrance into a w ar w hich will cost us billions o f dollars, m any thousands o f m en, econom ic instability, and greatly increase the depth and length o f the post-w ar depression.” H is proposal drew m uch support.52 O ther am endm ents were offered. Taft, w ho had spoken in favor o f cashand-carry, suggested several. O ne obligated Congress to declare a w ar zone th a t covered all w aters w ithin three hundred m iles o f Europe; it was safer, he said, to send U.S. ships to belligerent B erm uda than to neutral Belgium .53 O thers specified th a t a foreign governm ent provide cash before the A m ericanm ade goods left p o rt, th at credits be prohibited to individuals and corpora­ tions o f belligerent nations, and th at no U.S. governm ent agency finance ex­ p o rts to belligerents.54 Fearing an artificial w ar boom , Senator La Follette introduced an am endm ent to lim it U.S. foreign trade to the average o f peace­ tim e years.55 Senator Edwin Johnson w anted the president, w henever he

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found a state o f w ar existing betw een foreign states, to issue a proclam ation nam ing the nations involved.56 All such am endm ents were defeated. Roosevelt’s proposal passed the Senate on 27 O ctober 63 to 20, the H ouse o n 2 N ovem ber by 243 to 181. A G allup poll show ed a 58:42 ratio in favor o f lifting the arm s em bargo.57 Som e noninterventionists took the defeat hard. H iram Johnson felt "ru n over by a truck.” To pacifist leader D orothy Detzer, it was “as though m y baby had died.” W rote Professor B orchard to Borah, “The cam paign to get us into the w ar is now on.”58 O thers rem ained optim istic. John T. Flynn credited the KAOWC and the “N eutrality Bloc” w ith saving “cash-and-carry” by defeating an adm inistra­ tio n offer o f a ninety-day credit period. The n ation, he said, had been aroused and public opinion changed. V andenberg claim ed a “great m oral victory,” as­ serting th at die Senate forced FDR and his supporters “to becom e vehem ent in their peace devotions.” Uncensored m aintained th at neutrality forces “cam e o u t far ahead.” It found th e cash-and-carry provisions were, contrary to Roo­ sevelt’s w ishes, fairly stringent; A m ericans show ed them selves determ ined to keep o u t o f war; and m ost antiem bargo senators and representatives w ere on record against intervention.59 O nce the 1939 neutrality bill was signed, die A m erican m erchant m arine ex­ perienced a severe blow. W ith A m erican shipping barred from all com bat areas, som e ninety-tw o vessels rem ained in harbor, and six thousand seam en suffered unem ploym ent. M oreover, bankruptcy faced every steam ship line in the U.S., w ith annual revenue losses estim ated at $52.5 m illion. W hen the chief victim , the U nited States Lines, asked the U.S. M aritim e C om m ission for perm ission to allow nine o f its ships to enter com bat zones flying the Panam anian flag, it ruled th at such transfer o f registry was w holly w ithin the law. It had already perm itted the sale o f 106 vessels to Brazilian, H onduran, Panam anian, and other interests. The com m ission pointed o u t th at the vessels involved were nearly tw enty years old and were currently being replaced by new craft. As the U nited States Lines had prom ised no t to carry U.S. crews o r passengers, A m er­ ican lives w ould no t be lost if the “reflagged” vessels were ever sunk. At first FDR and H ull approved the deal, b u t once barraged w ith protests, they rescinded the decision pending “full investigation.” “It w ould have been a mistake,” said Roosevelt, “to furnish th e m eans to a sister Republic to adopt a different form o f neutrality from o u r ow n. Panam a ought n o t to send Panam a flag ships into th e w ar zones any m ore th an we do.” M eanw hile, A m erican ships could be transferred to foreign registry only in cases o f a bona fide sale.60 O nly one anti-interventionist defended Panam anian registration. A ccord­ ing to H ugh Johnson, the m ove did n o t violate th e spirit o f th e new law, w hich did not seek to surrender U.S. com m erce on any p a rt o f th e high seas.61 M ost noninterventionists, however, saw evidence o f the adm inistration’s bad faith. O n 8 Novem ber, the Daily Worker carried the headline “Trying to G et around

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It A lready” To the New Republic, the ploy em bodied “a dangerous attem pt to circum vent cash-and-carry. “T here is plenty o f w ork for them ,” it said in re­ ferring to U.S. ships, “in o th er p arts o f the w orld, w ith 100 m erchant vessels already sent to the boom o f the ocean since the w ar began.” The schem e, m used the New York Daily News, involved an effort to “m ake a profit o u t o f a w ar from w hich o u r law m akers do n o t w ant A m ericans to m ake open and aboveboard profits.” The U nited States, it suggested, should retu rn to the old neutrality principle by w hich A m erican sailors and shippers could trad e any­ w here at th eir ow n risk. Panam anian registry, w arned N orm an T hom as, w ould invite G erm an subm arines into the Panam a Canal region.62 Several FDR critics w ere dow nright acid. H iram Johnson called the m ove a “contem ptible expediency.” Commonweal thought the M aritim e C om m ission ruling “a case o f duplicity rarely paralleled in this country in recent years.” The Panam a caper, com m ented the com m unist New Masses, proved th at “em bargo repeal was obtained by cynical subterfuge an d calculated trickery,” the prod­ uct o f “the newly organized firm o f Wall Street & Roosevelt.” Said John Bas­ sett M oore, “th e transfer o f o u r ships to Panam a renders it unnecessary for a person like m yself to go to a playhouse to see a burlesque.” In tu rn , M oore re­ ceived the follow ing sarcastic message from Borchard: “We m ight tell the Ad­ m inistration th at the thousands o f A m erican seam en w ho are thus threatened w ith unem ploym ent m ight also becom e naturalized as Panam anians. A little cocoanut oil w ould m ake th eir skins darker, and tw o o r three w ords o f Span­ ish could easily be taught to them . They w ould then sail as Panam anian citi­ zens, and thus o u r trade w ould go on.”63 D espite the anxieties o f th e anti-interventionists th at th e new com m erce w ould soon lead to A m erican belligerency, at first only the French placed sub­ stantial orders. B ritain lacked th e foreign exchange and could produce planes m ore quickly than the A m ericans. For Neville C ham berlain, the repeal o f the arm s em bargo lay m ore in its negative effect on G erm an m orale th an on any actual arm am ents B ritain found itself needing. Roosevelt and his treasury sec­ retary, H enry M orgenthau Jr., privately expressed disappointm ent over the lack o f m ajor Allied orders. B oth m en saw such purchases essential in resist­ ing a m ajor G erm an offensive the president found inevitable th at spring, n o t to m ention playing a vital role in encouraging A m erican m anufacturers to convert plants to m ilitary use. O nly in M arch 1940, w ith its productive capac­ ity strained to the full and acting under strong French pressure, did the B ritish place a m ajor o rd er for A m erican aircraft. The lim ited nature o f A nglo-A m er­ ican cooperation was not solely due to A m erican isolationism . N either coun­ try saw a full-scale com m itm ent as desirable, m uch less necessary.64 In p a rt, C ham berlain’s ow n apparent indifference lay in his belief th at by spring H itler w ould resign. G oering w ould then lead a transitional govern­ m ent th a t w ould m ake peace. O nce the G erm an Führer departed, G erm any w ould be accom m odating on a host o f issues, including Poland, Czechoslova­

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kia, Jews, and disarm am ent. T he only “real trouble” w ould com e from th e re­ calcitrant French. The U nited States m ight no t be needed at all, som ething the egotistical prim e m inister found ju st as well, for A m erican “m eddling” was the last thing he w anted.65 C ham berlain's optim ism was rooted in assum ptions long held by B ritish in­ telligence— namely, th at the G erm an econom y was w orking at such a high pace th at it w ould inevitably face exhaustion. Because it lacked essential raw m aterials and foodstuffs, it w ould crack under B ritish blockade w ithin eight­ een m onths. O ne sim ply had to w ait for a G erm an collapse.66

All du rin g the debates over cash-and-carry, som e an ti-interventionists re­ m ained strongly suspicious o f B ritain. Response to the Athenia sinking show ed how deep such attitu d es were. O n 3 Septem ber, th e very day the B ritish declared war, C unard passenger ship Athenia, b o u n d for C anada from Liverpool, was reportedly torpedoed o ff th e H ebrides Islands. O f the th o u ­ sand passengers, som e three h u ndred w ere A m erican citizens. O ne hundred eighty-three people drow ned; th e rest were rescued. T he B ritish said the ship was sunk by a G erm an torpedo, b u t th e G erm ans insisted th a t the B ritish had sunk it them selves, doing so for propaganda purposes. Sixty percent o f G allup poll respondents accused th e G erm ans; only 9 percent denied th eir culpability.67 C ertain anti-interventionists com bined calls for restrain t w ith expressions o f absolute horror, accusing the G erm ans o f w antonly sinking the craft. Boake C arter, im plying th at G erm any had attacked th e ship, called th e sinking a crim inal act.68 O thers were less sure. H erbert H oover doubted w hether a sub had sunk the boat, saying, “It is such po o r tactics th at I cannot believe even th e clum sy G erm ans w ould do such a thing.” R obert Rice Reynolds denied G erm any had any m otive for sinking the boat; at best, such an act “could only fu rth er in ­ flam e the w orld, and particularly Am erica, against Germ any, w ith no appre­ ciable profits from the sinking.” Conversely, said the N orth C arolina senator, B ritain could well have a secret m otive: “to infuriate the A m erican people.”69 Social Justice declared o u trig h t th at British guns sank the ship.70 O nly during the N urem berg trials o f 1946 did A dm iral Erich Raeder, com m ander-in-chief o f the G erm an navy, testify th at one o f his inexperienced com m anders had sunk the vessel by accident.71 For international law experts am ong th e anti-interventionists, fu rth er evi­ dence o f British cupidity was found in the Altmark incident. O n 16 February 1940, the British destroyer Cossack entered N orw egian territo rial w aters and rem oved 326 British sailors from the G erm an prison ship Altmark. John Bas-

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sett M oore accused B ritain o f violating Norw ay’s neutrality, for no belligerent ship, be it m an-of-w ar o r m erchantm an, was subject to capture in neutral wa­ ters, even if it entered those w aters for purposes o f safety.72 Philip C. Jessup concurred: “O ur sym pathies for the Allied cause against the Nazis should n o t blind us to the ju st rights o f a sm all neutral.” Such views were picked up by anti-interventionists at large, the Chicago Tribune accusing th e British o f en­ dangering N orw egian peace and security.73 From the outset o f the conflict, the president’s critics found th e Roosevelt adm inistration unneutral in m atters pertaining to th e high seas. W ithin weeks after w ar was declared, B orchard learned th at the U nited States had decided to adm it "defensively arm ed” British vessels to its ports. As G erm an subm arines could easily confuse A m erican ships w ith B ritish ones, the “overt” w arlike act sought by th e interventionists w ould follow. Furtherm ore, by supplying these arm ed ships w ith the m eans to operate, he continued, the U.S. itself had be­ com e a de facto naval supply base. To John Bassett M oore, n o t only was the U.S. position unsupported by legal authority: it was directly contrary to w hat its ow n Suprem e C ourt had decided.74 O thers sim ilarly found the U nited States acting in a m ost one-sided fash­ ion. H ugh Johnson accused B ritain o f flouting the D eclaration o f Panam a, w hich had forbidden belligerent ships to enter w aters w ithin three hundred m iles o f neutral hem ispheric powers. T he Altmark and Graf Spee incidents re­ vealed th at B ritain never intended to respect neutral w aters w ithin the speci­ fied three h u n d red -m ile lim it. Boake C arter charged the U nited States w ith partiality. W hen a B ritish cruiser captured the G erm an freighter Düsseldorfo ff the C hilean coast, the U nited States did n o t protest, although the m ove con­ stituted a legal act o f war. O n m any such m atters, the state departm ent did lodge official protests, although certainly th e Roosevelt adm inistration was leaning over backw ard to accom m odate the Allies.7S If such concerns h ith erto were sporadic, Allied seizure o f A m erican ships triggered absolute outrage. D uring th e first tw o m onths o f w ar, said Newsweek, the Allies had detained forty-eight A m erican ships. At tim es o th er num bers were offered. O n 1 Novem ber, the Chicago Tribune denounced the M aritim e C om m ission, claim ing it had suppressed evidence th at th e B ritish had searched 580 non-B ritish ships since the w ar began. According to C on­ gressm an Engel, B ritain and France had seized tw enty-tw o U.S. vessels by early N ovem ber.76 O n 25 N ovem ber 1939, B ritish am bassador L othian announced th at B ritish officials w ould inspect neutral ships at the p o rt o f loading. If the origin, des­ tin atio n , and n ature o f the cargo were approved, the vessel w ould receive a naval certificate, o r “navicerts,” th at supposedly w ould m inim ize chances o f its seizure on the high seas. At first the state departm ent stressed th at the arrange­ m ent was strictly a private one betw een the A m erican exporter and th e B ritish governm ent.77

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Exactly one week later, th e B ritish p u t in to effect a blockade o f G erm an ex­ p orts. B ritain planned to strangle G erm any econom ically, thereby gaining suf­ ficient tim e to build up a huge bom ber force th a t w ould adm inister th e coup de grâce. U nder its term s, any neutral ship sailing from an enem y o r enem yoccupied p o rt m ight be forced to discharge its goods in an A llied p o rt. T he sam e held tru e for goods shipped from one n eu tral co u n try to an o th er if these goods had originally been bought in G erm any o r had draw n o n G erm an goods in the m anufacturing process.78 A nti-interventionists found th e B ritish blockade outrageous.79 H ugh John­ son com pared it to th e ex tortion o f A1 C apone.80 O ver a m o n th before B ritain m ade its announcem ent, B orchard called all such actions illegal.81 O n 8 and 14 D ecem ber, H ull said th a t th e U nited States could n o t view such m easures w ith equanim ity b u t lodged no form al protest.82 In early January, after the B ritish had taken U.S. vessels to Kirkwall, Scotland, for exam ination, H ull protested, saying B ritain w ould be held for loss o r dam age suffered d u r­ ing d eten tio n .83 Som e noninterventionists saw th e com plicated odyssey o f an A m erican freighter, The City o f Flint, as exem plifying th e adm inistration's d o u b le-stan ­ d ard , although th is tim e B ritain was n o t involved. O n 3 O ctober 1939, th e sh ip left New York, b o u n d for Liverpool and Glasgow, its hold loaded w ith fo o d ­ stuffs, tracto rs, lum ber, and oil. Som e cargo was deem ed contraband. Six days later, a boarding p arty from th e pocket battleship Deutschland assum ed co n ­ tro l o f th e vessel and detained forty-one A m ericans, as it had th e B ritish crew o f th e Stonehenge, a ship th at it had sunk earlier. The G erm ans to o k th e ship, o n w hich it p u t the D anish flag, as a prize vessel in to th e N orw egian p o rt o f Trom sö. In th e p o rt th e G erm ans raised th eir ow n flag, b u t the N orw egian a u ­ th o rities, o n establishing its tru e identity, refused to perm it sailing u n til A m er­ ican flags had been repainted on its sides. T he B ritish seam en w ere taken off, b u t before th e Flint could be tu rn ed over to its original crew, th e G erm ans m anaged to escape w ith th e ship, including the forty-one A m ericans, a n d sailed to M urm ansk, w here in tu rn th e Russians interred the G erm ans a n d held th e ship. Stalin ordered th e Russians to release the Flint and expedite its im m ediate dep artu re. O n 28 O ctober, w ith the A m ericans still in tow , th e freighter left M urm ansk, finally being forced by th e N orw egians in to th e p o rt o f H augesund, w here the G erm ans were im prisoned for violating N orw ay's n eu tral w aters. T he ship was retu rn ed to the A m erican crew.84 T he R oosevelt a d m in istratio n protested. It realized full w ell, how ever, th a t th e ship’s p lig h t offered a telling argum ent for a m ajo r provision o f th e p en d in g n e u tra lity act, one th a t w ould have p ro h ib ited th e A m erican vessels from sailing in to belligerent w aters. M oreover, a d m in istratio n an g er w as d i­ rected far m ore at th e R ussians, w ho appeared ob stin ate an d c ircu ito u s, th a n to th e G erm ans, w ho w ere quick to g ran t Secretary H ull every assu ran ce h e requested.85

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T he U nited States, adm inistration critics claim ed, had overreacted. Q uite predictably th e com m unist New Masses defended Soviet behavior. As early as 1915, recalled Senator B ennett C ham p C lark (D em .-M o.), th e B ritish and French had repeatedly acted as did th e G erm ans. T he New Republic found the City o f Flint was "apparently loaded w ith contraband consigned to B ritain”; therefore, u n d er intern atio n al law, it could be seized o r destroyed by its ene­ m ies. Philip Jessup, w ho had w ritten books o n prize c o u rt procedures, said th a t legally th e Soviets could hold the Flint u n til a G erm an prize co u rt had de­ cided on d ie fate o f vessel and cargo.86 O verall, alleged several an d-interventionists, th e B ritish had been by far th e greater offenders. T he U nited States, therefore, was applying a double stan ­ d ard in n o t protesting sufficiendy.87 H ugh Johnson accused the B ritish o f "h i­ jacking” th irty U.S. ships to G erm any’s one, claim ing the state departm ent began to issue press releases only in the case o f th e Flint. Is it pro-N azi, he asked, to call atten tio n to B ritish conduct, particularly as previous state de­ p a rtm en t silence ab o u t past B ritish seizures was one reason th e U nited States had entered W orld W ar I? "A plague on b o th yo u r houses,” invoked H earst’s San Francisco Examiner, bringing u p for good m easure B ritish atrocities in India as well as G erm an ones in C zechoslovakia.88 C ontroversy w ith B ritain was ju st beginning. By early January 1940, the B ritish had confiscated A m erican m ail at B erm uda en route to neutral ports. In terventionist Senator H arry S. T rum an (D em .-M o.) said the B ritish had stru ck "one hell o f a note,” and such leading adm in istratio n backers as Key P ittm an concurred.89 O f course, adm inistration critics w ere particularly o u t­ spoken. The H ague C onvention, attested B orchard, had ruled such m ails im ­ m une from seizure. R eferring to B erm uda as the site o f m any o f th e m ail seizures, th e Chicago Tribune om inously w arned th a t "only by a serious fault o f diplom acy does th a t island rem ain in its present jurisdiction.” W hen, in m id-F ebruary, th e A ssociated Press reported th at an A m erican clipper had been boarded by a boatload o f B ritish m arines, B ennett G a rk accused the B ritish o f "using high-handed procedure in taking A m erican m ails at the p o in t o f a bayonet an d rifling them .”90 N oninterventionists offered varied solutions for British offenses. Lundeen called for seizing Berm uda, Nye for barring the island to A m erican traffic Rep­ resentative M elvin M aas (Rep.-M inn.) proposed th at A m erican w arships carry th e m ail, doing so, he said, to prevent the British from filching valuable business inform ation. According to Congressm an Jacob Thorkelson (R ep.-M ont), a dem ­ agogue best know n for anti-B ritish and anti-Jewish ranting, the U nited States should ship no goods to England until it allowed free delivery o f Am erican car­ goes to neutral nations. The New Republic, predictably expressing itself in m ilder term s, called for prom pt adjudication by the Hague court o f arbitration.91 In an unexpectedly vigorous protest to L ondon delivered on 2 January, H ull accused th e B ritish o f violating the 1907 H ague C onvention th at forbade such

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activity. B ritain rejected th is protest, asking w hy no sim ilar n o te w as sent to G erm any. H ull in tu rn w arned th a t A m erican air service to B erm uda m ight be suspended if B ritish au th o rities continued to open U.S. m ail aboard its ow n planes. Pan A m erican Airways helped resolve th e m atter by an n o u n cin g th a t after 25 M arch, its clippers w ould n o t stop at B erm uda o n eastbound trip s b u t rath er fly to the Portuguese-ow ned Azores in one hop.92 In January 1940, Uncensored raised an o th er issue: a blacklisting o f th o se A m erican firm s trad in g w ith G erm any. Since the outbreak o f th e w ar, it n o te d , B ritain’s M inistry o f E conom ic W arfare had drafted four such listings; th e French, two. Betw een them , th e tw o Allied pow ers cited Latin A m erican firm s, m any o f them engaged in doing business w ith th e U nited States fo r years. C anadian firm s, how ever, rem ained free to trad e w ith anyone. As w ith th e blockade, B orchard found the blacklist illegal.93 B ritain’s decision, m ade in January 1940, to curtail im p o rts o f A m erican to ­ bacco also drew scorn. In m aking th is m ove, th e B ritish had tw o m otives: first, th e desire to conserve dollars by purchasing w ithin the sterling areas; second, to assure a B ritish m arket to tw o strategically vulnerable nations, T urkey a n d G reece. Because th e overw helm ing m ajority o f congressional d elegations from V irginia, Kentucky, an d N orth C arolina had voted for repealing th e a rm s em bargo, th e Chicago Tribune noted, “If the farm ers o f th e tobacco grow ing states d o n ’t like w hat happened they know w here to ask questions.”94 N eville C ham berlain had little sym pathy w ith A m erican com plaints. H e w rote privately: Then the U.S. goes right back on us because while we spend all our dollars on buying war stores from them we have none left to buy tobacco. And they declare they are insulted when we examine their mails which are the vehicle o f a carefully organised system o f aid & relief to our enemies. Heaven knows I don’t w ant the Americans to fight for us—we should have to pay too dearly for that if they had a right to be in on the peace terms— but if they are so sympathetic they might at least refrain from hampering our efforts and comforting our foes.

T he B ritish Foreign Office felt sim ilarly. T he U nited States, it m ain tain ed , had passed a n eu trality law th a t forced B ritain to restrict its purchasing o r sell its securities. Roosevelt’s proclam ation o f a com bat zone strained B ritish s h ip ­ ping resources, thereby operating to G erm any’s advantage. T he D eclaration o f Panam a kept th e w ar away from the W estern H em isphere w hile extending U .S. econom ic an d political p en etratio n in Latin A m erica.95 O n all these m atters, so adm inistration critics believed, H ull’s protests w ere far to o weak.96 “O u r protests are now m ade for hom e consum ption,” said P orter Sargent. T he Chicago Tribune questioned how f ir the secretary w as w ill­ ing to back up his w ords. H ad th e G erm ans been the offenders, said Social Jus­ tice, headlines w ould rin g w ith governm ent protests. Far m ore cau tio u s, th e

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New York Daily News did n o t th in k the U nited States should “get tough” b u t added th at B ritain should realize th at th e U.S. was no m in o r E uropean power.97 D espite anti-in terv en tio n ist suspicions, leading adm inistration officials w ere genuinely concerned over such m easures, opposing in p articu lar the nav­ icert system and finding econom ic intelligence gleaned by B ritain’s censor used to its advantage. C ordell H ull and Special A ssistant Secretary Breckin­ ridge Long accused B ritain o f sheer stupidity; it was creating hostility am ong th e A m erican public by giving th e im pression o f n o t playing fair. To A dolf Berle, B ritain was "treating us as though we w ere a sm all n atio n — say, C zecho­ slovakia.” U ndersecretary o f State Sum ner W elles replied th at his natio n re­ served all rights u n d er international law. Roosevelt him self cabled W inston C hurchill, first lord o f th e adm iralty, w arning th a t th e B ritish policies were being severely criticized by th e A m erican public: "T he general feeling is th at th e n et benefit to yo u r people an d to France is hardly w orth th e definite an ­ noyance caused by you.”9® A few adm inistration officials even suspected sinister designs. J. P ierrepont M offat an d A dolf Berle saw th e B ritish establishing a closed A nglo-French trad in g bloc. Such d istru st was m isplaced; N eville C ham berlain never sought to take advantage o f th e w ar to create a trad in g o rb it, always believing th e Em ­ pire needed b o th E uropean an d A m erican com m erce.99 T he B ritish did m odify th eir ways, at least to H ull’s satisfaction. M ail cen­ sorship in the B ritish W est Indies was suspended. E xam ination o f A m erican ships at G ibraltar was speeded up. U.S. ships w ere no longer hauled in to B ritish p orts. T he blockade was loosened for certain A m erican m anufacturers. T he navicert system no longer discrim inated com m ercially against A m erican craft. O nce G erm any seized D enm ark, Norway, and th e Low C ountries, it closed th eir p o rts to A m erican ships. B ritain, therefore, had no fu rth er need to inspect U.S. cargoes in th e n o rth A tlantic.100

By M arch 1940, the president’s adversaries w ere p ointing to o th er m atters th at, in th eir eyes, proved th a t his adm in istratio n was acting in a highly u n ­ n eu tral m anner. O n 19 M arch 1940, Jam es H . R. Crom w ell, new ly appointed m in ister to C anada, addressed a luncheon in Toronto. In rem arks th at were broadcast th ro u g h o u t th e dom inion, he accused G erm any o f enslaving the Poles, w hereas th e B ritish E m pire was advancing a dem ocratic econom ic and social order. H e fu rth er castigated those A m ericans w ho failed to distinguish betw een the belligerents as being "shortsighted and cynically m inded.” 101 H ull im m ediately w ired Crom w ell th at such com m ents were "likely to dis­ tu rb relations betw een this and o th er governm ents,” w arning him n o t repeat

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th e offense. T he speech, said th e secretary, "contravened standing in stru ctio n s to A m erican diplom atic officers” to refrain from "public discussion o f c o n tro ­ versial policies o f o th er governm ents, particularly w ith governm ents engaged in w ar, w ith o u t th e p rio r know ledge an d perm ission o f this governm ent.” Newsweek no ted th a t few diplom ats had been so publicly chastised.102 N evertheless, anti-in terv en tio n ists fum ed.103 Calls for C rom w ell’s resigna­ tio n w ere freq u en t.104 To Uncensored, Crom w ell was a "diplom atic dope.” "N ever before,” said H am ilton Fish, "has an A m erican M inister in a foreign lan d attem p ted to destroy A m erican n eutrality by m aking a speech in a w ar­ rin g n atio n denouncing an o th er belligerent nation.” T he vehem ently a n tiB ritish C ongressm an G eorge H olden T inkham (Rep.-M ass.) w rote H ull a scathing epistle: "D isloyalty an d sedition should n o longer be to lerated by th e A m erican people.”105 C rom w ell’s w ealthy background and large co ntributions to th e D em ocratic P arty w ere noted. "Let’s have no m ore playboy diplom ats,” w arned th e New Republic As th e husband o f th e heiress D oris D uke, Crom w ell was accused b y th e Chicago Tribune o f seeking "to use graves o f A m erican soldiers for a d izzier social clim b.” A ccording to C ongressm an John Jennings Jr. (R ep.-T enn.), " O u r playboy M inister to C anada, M r. D uke Crom w ell, after w ending his w ay th ro u g h th e highballs, was caught am ong the sheep w ith w ool in his teeth.” A s Nye, B orchard, and New Masses all saw it, Roosevelt him self was b eh in d th e T oronto address.106 A few ad m in istratio n foes reacted m ore m oderately. C rom w ell, co m m en ted th e Christian Century, undoubtedly spoke for m ost A m ericans in expressing sym pathy for th e A llies. H e erred, however, it w ent on, w hen he em braced A l­ lied w ar aim s an d identified th eir cause w ith th at o f liberty and dem ocracy. S enator A lexander W iley discovered som e good com ing from C rom w ell’s statem ent: it w ould m ake all U.S. diplom ats “b etter A m ericans,” he rem arked. Even F ather C oughlin said attacks on th e em issary should be lim ited to “ju s t criticism ,” for C rom w ell’s w ritings on capitalism revealed him discharging th e obligations o f his fo rtu n e m ore creditably th an m any o th ers.107 N o so o n er was th e Crom w ell m atter resolved w hen a book by co lu m n ists Joseph A lsop and R obert K intner appeared th at A pril. T itled American White Paper, it covered th e past eighteen m onths o f U.S. diplom acy. In th is w ork, th e au th o rs found Roosevelt an d the Congress o f necessity being forced “to d o good by stealth.” If necessary, they hinted, the president w ould send naval a n d air assistance to th e Allies although no t an A m erican expeditionary fo rce.108 T he presid en t’s critics stressed those p o rtio n s th at im plied th a t R oosevelt sought to lead th e n ation in to the conflict. Senator Lundeen rem arked, “E very act o f M r. Roosevelt confirm s th e view o f the authors th at th e P resident is d e ­ term ined to drag o u r co u n try in to Europe’s war.” To Uncensored, A m erican tro o p s w ould definitely be sent overseas if o th er form s o f m ilitary assistance were inadequate. “For practical purposes, then, it m ay be assum ed th a t th e re

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are n o lim its to Roosevelt’s d eterm ination to seek an A llied victory.” N orm an T hom as urged FDR to clarify him self o n th e m atter. T he book, noted Senator Nye, revealed th a t th e U nited States had never m ade a peace m ove.109 In June 1940, the New York firm o f H ow ell, Soskin published The German White Paper. O riginally th e w ork was called “Polish D ocum ents Bearing o n Events T hat Led Up to th e War.” T he book contained m em oranda, recently captured by th e G erm ans, w ritten by Polish diplom ats stationed such in places as th e U nited States, B ritain, and France. Journalist C. H artley G rattan, noted for his W orld W ar I revisionism , w rote th e forew ord. T he G erm ans, G rattan stressed, had deliberately chosen docum ents th a t they hoped w ould help clear th eir n atio n o f w ar guilt an d conversely prove th a t A m erican diplom ats had encouraged the Allies to precipitate th e conflict. M oreover, he claim ed, the docum ents “fit neatly in to th e Roosevelt line o f ‘action sh o rt o f w ar’ in su p ­ p o rt o f B ritain and France.”110 T he Polish am bassadors to W ashington and London reported th a t the U nited States had prom ised to su p p o rt B ritain and France if they to o k up arm s against H ider. True, A m erican prom ises varied: shipping a thousand planes w ithin ten days; placing th e entire financial an d m aterial resources o f th e U.S. a t Allied disposal; eventually entering the w ar as a full-scale belliger­ ent. W ashington allegedly w arned th e Allies against discussing territo rial changes w ith th e to talitarian pow ers. T he Poles in particular had been reas­ sured by th e fact th a t in January 1939, th e U nited States was already spending $1.25 billion o n m ilitary preparations. W illiam C. B ullitt, A m erican am bassa­ d o r to France, was frequently cited as being particularly partisan, although Joseph P. Kennedy, U.S. am bassador to B ritain, received sim ilar billing.111 The Roosevelt adm inistration was quick to deny the authenticity o f th e doc­ um ents, even though diplom at Breckinridge Long suspected “m ore tru th than fiction” in them . Two interventionist colum nists, Drew Pearson and R obert S. Allen, thought they were genuine, as did New York Times W ashington corre­ spondent A rthur Krock. The president described the w ork as sheer propaganda, to be taken w ith “three grains o f salt.” B ullitt added, “W ith even m ore » It.” H ull and th e state departm ent gave the m aterial no credence. C ount Jersy Potocki, Poland’s am bassador to the U nited States, denied ever having conversed w ith B ullitt on A m erican participation in th e war. Kennedy refused to com m ent publicly, though he told C harles A. Lindbergh th at the w hite paper had de­ scribed his ow n role accurately and im plied its account o f B ullitt was correct.112 N ot surprisingly, an ti-interventionists pounced o n the m aterials as au th en ­ tic .113 Rush H olt accused B ullitt o f speaking u nder th e influence o f “foreign liquor.” To Senator Lundeen, such A m erican assurances “surely helped bring o n the second w orld war.” W ere th e docum ents to prove valid, said th e Chris­ tian Century, they im posed a “m oral responsibility on M r. Roosevelt o f terrific proportions.” H inting a t im peaching th e president, H am ilton Fish said, “If these charges are tru e, they w ould constitute virtually a treasonable act.” 114

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Som e found the docum ents be credible. T he Washington Post, w hose chief editorial w riter was still the increasingly anti-interventionist Felix M orley, said th at "the excerpts so far published sound plausible.” T he Chicago Tribune saw the m aterial deserving serious study.115 Even if forgeries, Senator Reynolds stated, they "sound very m uch like m any things we have heard over th e radio from any people in high office from tim e to tim e.” 116 H e and Fish introduced resolutions calling for a full investigation.117 At first the New York Daily News dow nplayed th eir im portance, declaring, "W hat really m atters is w hat the President says and does w hile th e w ar goes on.” In January 1941, it w anted B ullitt to testify on the m atter.118 O thers seem ed m ore certain. The socialist Call approvingly quoted Sir W ilm ott Lewis, London Times correspondent in W ashington, w ho stated th at th e papers were au th en tic.119 H arry E bner Barnes, w ho reportedly had chosen G rattan to edit th e docum ents, said th e published edition "should be read by every A m erican interested in his country’s destiny.”120 W hy, anti-interventionists asked, had G erm any released th e docum ents? V illard and H earst w riter Paul M allon tied the action to th e W elles m ission, w hich they found th e G erm ans hoping to sabotage.121 T he extrem e left p u t its ow n spin o n the m aterials. A ccording to George Seldes’s weekly new sletter In Fact, th e w hite paper linked B ullitt and K ennedy to a shady anti-Soviet plot; it accused th e B ritish o f betraying Poland. To com m unist New Masses, th e m a­ terials revealed th at FDR sought U.S. en try in th e E uropean w ar early enough to preserve th e B ritish E m pire an d to prevent the advance o f socialism th ro u g h o u t E urope.122 To som e journals leaning tow ard the interventionist cam p, the docum ents’ significance was highly exaggerated. T he m aterials, said Time, only proved th at "U.S. diplom ats som etim es talk w ith an unprofessional lack o f reticence”; it was nonsense to claim th at A m erican officials had conspired to fom ent war. B ullitt’s views, com m ented Newsweek, had never been secret and hence were discounted in every capital in the w orld.123 Several ad m inistration critics concurred. Form er diplom at C astle found the representations o f b o th B ullitt and Kennedy accurate. H e continued, however, "W hat has been published does n o t show, as the G erm ans pretend, th a t we in ­ stigated th e w ar o r anything like it.”124 Sim ilarly, to Commonweal, th e docu­ m ents revealed nothing n o t already know n, particularly in regard to B ullitt’s sym pathy for the Allied cause. T he Jesuit weekly America w ent further, assert­ ing th at any G erm an-sponsored m aterial was highly suspect.125 T he nam es o f B ullitt and K ennedy led to a w ider issue, the supposed in ter­ ventionism o f b o th am bassadors. A nti-interventionists o f th e right denied th at B ullitt had ever abandoned his earlier sym pathies w ith com m unism .126 Conversely, those o n th e left believed him to o anti-R ussian.127 Even th e m ore m oderate C astle w rote in his diary, "I w ish there was som e way to elim inate th at fellow from public life as he w ill always be a danger.” 128 N ot content w ith

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m aterial in th e German White Paper, Fish indirectly cited Gringoire, a pro-N azi and anti-Sem itic French weekly, to the effect th a t B ullitt pressured D aladier and Juliesz Lukasiewicz, Polish am bassador to France, to fight G erm any.129 B ullitt fought back, rhetorically asking in a speech delivered A ugust 1940 on the steps o f Philadelphia’s Independence H all, wHow m any A m ericans today are playing th e dictators’ gam e w ithout know ing it?”130 A lthough surprising in retrospect, A m bassador K ennedy was first portrayed as a m ilitan t interventionist. H ugh Johnson, recalling th e partisanship o f W il­ son’s am bassador to B ritain, asked w hether the U nited States had ua new W al­ ter H ines Page a t th e C ourt o f St. James.’’131 The Chicago Tribune com m ented, ttT he A m erican am bassador is frequently one o f th e m ost serviceable m em ­ bers o f the B ritish diplom atic service.”132 Unlike B ullitt, Kennedy did receive praise from several Roosevelt opponents. In D ecem ber 1939, th e Christian Century eulogized the am bassador for urging the U.S. to stay o u t o f w ar.133 W illiam R andolph H earst personally endorsed him for th e presidency.134

All d u rin g this tim e, a crisis was em erging in th e Baltic. In O ctober 1939, the Soviet U nion dem anded th at Finland cede territo ry on the Karelian Isthm us and in the A rctic region. It also sought to lease H angö h arb o r and certain is­ lands in th e G ulf o f Finland. In retu rn , it offered Finland territo ry along the central p o rtio n o f th e R ussian-Finnish frontier. W hen the Finns refused on 30 N ovem ber, th e Soviets launched a full-scale attack. R ussian w arships shelled Finland’s coast, its bom bers raiding H elsingfors. Yet, for three m onths, it appeared as if the Finns m ight be able to repel the invasion, at least if they received m aterial and volunteers from outside. Even w ithin th e adm in istratio n , only an occasional voice, such as B reckinridge Long, expressed skepticism concerning Finland’s ability to hold o u t. Roosevelt strongly condem ned th e Soviets, released forty-four p u rsu it planes, and granted $10 m illion nonm ilitary credits. H e perm itted som e private loans on his ow n authority, th en asked C ongress for m ore funds. U nder his aegis, the Senate B anking C om m ittee proposed a token loan o f $20 m illion, o u t o f w hich Finland could purchase trucks, raw m aterials, and agricultural goods. T he Finns could n o t, however, buy w hat they really needed, w hich w ere A m er­ ican arm s.135 T he general p o pulation, anti-interventionists included, exhibited far m ore sym pathy for th e Finns th an for th e Poles.136 A dolf Berle was n o d o u b t accu­ rate in n oting in his diary on 5 Decem ber, wT he neutrality o f this co u n try is n o t as solid as it was a week ago.” Publisher Roy H ow ard found th e sponta­ neous indignation greater th an th at created by the “rape” o f Belgium in 1914 o r th e sinking o f the Lusitania a year later. To N orm an T hom as, the invasion

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was “a piece o f stu p id an d outrageous b ru tality w hich m atches o r exceeds any perform ance o f H itler.”137 John H aynes H olm es placed th e Finnish flag in his M anhattan p u lp it and included th eir national anthem as p a rt o f his w orship service.138 N ot surprisingly, th e com m unist press staunchly backed th e Soviets.139 M oreover, a few noncom m unist foes o f interventionists either found th e So­ viet dem ands ju st o r w arned th e Finns against resistance. B orchard did n o t see Russian dem ands as excessive, finding it q uite n atu ral for it to seek protection against th e loom ing G erm an danger. Publisher P orter Sargent, w hile claim ing to adm ire Finland’s “valiant an d vigorous defense o f freedom ,” m aintained th a t th e Soviet U nion could n o t afford to tolerate neighboring territo ry in hostile hands. At the beginning o f th e crisis, th e New York Daily News, fearing th e total liquidation o f Finland, called o n it to surrender som e p o rt rights o r naval sites.140 O nce the attack took place, th e New York Daily News and th e Chicago Tri­ bune hoped th a t th e Allies m ight rescue Finland. In m id-D ecem ber, they sug­ gested th a t B ritish w arships in the N orth Sea block Russian sea com m unica­ tio n s betw een M urm ansk and Petsam o, th e only place w here Russia had gained ground. If H itler tru ly feared th e Bolshevik threat, he w ould encourage N orw ay and Sweden to aid Finland.141 Soon b o th papers expressed far m ore caution. Early in January, th e Chicago Tribune th o u g h t th a t A llied m ilitary involvem ent m ight backfire, p u ttin g all o f Scandinavia in great peril. M oreover, if such aid w ere forthcom ing, th e Rus­ sians m ight invite th eir G erm an allies in to th e conflict, thereby im periling Finland even m ore.142 The New York Daily News noted th a t C hurchill was planning to ship B ritish troops to Finland via N orw ay o r Sweden. T he m ove, it said, could only result in “terrific” carnage. Early in M arch, th e News sug­ gested Swedish m ediation. R ather th an experience certain defeat, th e Finns could enter in league w ith N orw ay and Sweden, thereby m aking th e Scandi­ navian area “th a t m uch m ore o f a north-E urope battlem ent against Red an d Brow n Bolshevism.” 143 As in th e m atter o f cash-and-carry, the Finland issue caused som e fissures am ong m any w ho usually stood united. M ost o f th e debate took place over th e bill introduced by Senator Prentiss M . Brown (D em .-M ich.), w ho proposed th e $20 m illion credit from th e E x p o rt-Im p o rt Bank. Several anti-interventionists favored a m odest loan, am ong them H earst’s San Francisco Examiner.144 H am ilton Fish sought $20 m illion, to be spent u n d er Roosevelt’s personal d irectio n .145 Since neith er side had officially de­ clared war, it was argued, anti-interventionists denied th at th e restrictions o f th e N ovem ber 1939 neutrality act applied to the conflict.146 In defending fi­ nancial aid, certain legislators posited an early version o f the dom ino theory. If Finland fell, Sweden, Norway, and D enm ark all lay in p eril o f Moscow, w ith n o rth ern E urope an d the Balkans threatened as well and the possibility exist-

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ing o f a Soviet ships o n th e A tlantic.147 C ertainly, said R epresentative R ichard T. Buckler (Farm er-L ab.-Ill.), th e defeat o f Finland w ould p u t Stalin ao n the way to ruling all o f Europe.” 14* O ther noninterventionists stood strongly opposed such loans.149 T he U.S. C onstitution lacked any provision th a t p erm itted foreign loans for w ar p u r­ poses.150T he proposal left too m uch discretion to th e E x p o rt-Im p o rt B ank.151 A lthough Finland had adm ittedly paid interest o n its w ar debt, it had n o t re­ paid th e $8.2 m illion principal o f th e debt itself.152 Som e argum ents were m ore diffuse. Let the B ritish and French supply the loans.153 D om estic poverty rem ained Am erica's priority. N orm an Thom as re­ m arked, “We have m ore refugees from o u r ow n dust bowl than there are refugees from Finland; o u r unem ployed far outnum ber all the Finns there are in th e w orld!”154 The allocation was too sm all to aid any nation fighting the So­ viets.155 If the U nited States so opposed com m unism , said Reynolds, “we should begin cleaning house here at hom e.” Slaps at M exico were n o t excluded.156 C ertain claim s appeared m ore telling. In stating th a t th e a loan was illegal, B orchard found such action “exposing the U nited States to legitim ate reprisals now o r hereafter, o n th e p a rt o f the Soviet U nion.”157 T he precedent was om i­ nous, said others, foreshadow ing sim ilar loans th ro u g h o u t the w orld.15* M ost im p o rtan t o f all, m any anti-interventionists argued, th e m ove sim ply m eant one m ore step forw ard.159 H ad there n o t been such loans in W orld W ar I, said Senator Pat M cC arran (D em .-N ev.), “We should n o t have row o n row o f w hite crosses in Flanders fields.” Pacifists becam e particularly alarm ed, one calling th e m easure “th e Trojan horse o f intervention.”160 Socialists lacked one m ind o n th e issue, th e Call stressing Finland's need for arm s, th e p arty ’s executive com m ittee speaking in term s o f sending m oney an d supplies directly to Finnish labor organizations. Yet, N orm an T hom as, in calling for Finnish nonviolent resistance to th e Soviet U nion, found even an u n restricted U.S. loan dangerous.161 At tim es, alternatives w ere offered. O ne o p tio n centered on to tal cancella­ tio n o f Finland’s w ar d eb t.162 A nother focused o n severing various form s o f trad e w ith th e Soviet U nion.163 A n em bargo, it was argued, should be levied o n A m erican copper, tools, dies, and m achinery, all used in Red A rm y opera­ tio n s.164 A sim ilar solution involved severing A m erican gold purchases and w heat exports.165 M uch atten tio n riveted on still an o th er option: voluntary co n trib u tio n s to F inland.166 At the behest o f th e Finns, th e ubiquitous H erbert H oover estab­ lished the Finnish Relief Fund, w hich enlisted th e su p p o rt o f over twelve th o u ­ sand new spapers. By early M arch, it had am assed som e $3.5 m illion.167 Even here, several anti-interventionists dem urred. T he private charitable drive, said th e New Republic, was backed by individuals w ho w ere seeking to enlist th e U nited States in an anti-Soviet crusade. N orm an T hom as called H oover antilabor an d pro-B ritish. From the opposite end o f the political spec­

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tru m , the Chicago Tribune rem em bered th a t H oover had risen to prom inence through aid to Belgium: wWe cannot forget th a t Belgian relief was th e first step on th e m arch th at ended in th e A rgonne forest.”168 A proposal to sever diplom atic relations w ith the Soviet U nion drew intense controversy.169 In Decem ber, Senator V andenberg subm itted a resolution ask­ ing th e president to rep o rt to the Senate on w hether Russia had flagrantly b ro ­ ken th e R oosevelt-Litvinov agreem ents o f 1933, by w hich th e Soviets prom ­ ised to abandon subversive activities and com m itted them selves to settling m ajor debts. If the Russians had indeed violated th e accord, Roosevelt should recall th e entire A m erican delegation from M oscow.170 In February, 105 m em ­ bers o f th e H ouse voted to am end an appropriations bill so th at th e salary o f an A m erican am bassador in M oscow w ould be elim inated.171 W ithin th e ad ­ m inistration, as high an official as U ndersecretary o f State W elles favored the n o tio n .172 T his proposal secured no consensus. Several anti-interventionists opposed a diplom atic ru p tu re. W heeler feared the loss o f a potentially strong trading partner. R etaining an em bassy in Moscow, asserted H ugh Johnson, m ight ex­ pedite a peace. N orm an T hom as feared th at th e U nited States w ould be de­ prived o f any effective vehicle to m ake protests. Breaking diplom atic relations, said Senator Clyde Reed, could n o t “stay the w ings o f a single Red plane.” C as­ tle w arned his friend H oover, w ho favored th e m ove, th a t the m easure m ight even lead to w ar.173 T he New York Daily News conceded th a t the Soviets had m urdered five m illion o f its ow n citizens and was m aintaining an agency in th e U nited States th a t “unabashedly w orks to underm ine o u r G overnm ent.” It continued to say, however, th a t recognition did n o t necessarily im ply approval o f a governm ent’s philosophy o r m ethods. M oreover, “H adn’t we b etter stay in position to act as m ediator in this E uropean w ar— and hope th at the chance so to act m ay com e soon?” Expressing a view prevalent in th e adm inistration, A m bassador Lawrence Steinhardt w rote from M oscow th at any such gesture com pared to striking “an elephant w ith a feather.” 174 T he Brown bill passed th e Senate o n 13 February by forty-nine to tw entyseven, the H ouse o n 28 February by voice vote. O n 12 M arch, th e Finns were forced to sign a peace agreem ent, in w hich they ceded strategic p arts o f th eir territo ry as well as rich forest resources, 10 percent o f the arable land, th eir fo u rth largest industrial center, and 625 m iles o f railroad. C ertain noninterventionists reacted to th e surrender by attacking th e Al­ lies.175 Even before the capitulation, som e were heaping scorn. T he Christian Century, referring to th e “effective aid ” prom ised by B ritain and France, asked, “W here is it?”176 O nce th e conflict had ended, aviation w riter Al W illiam s blam ed th e B ritish leaders for n o t letting “th eir w ar lose itself in a great reli­ gious and m oral w orld cam paign against Red Russia.” To Uncensored, the Finnish struggle deflected Soviet supplies from G erm any and kept th e Soviets

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occupied w hile th e Allies contem plated an attack in th e N ear East. "Realists w ill decide th a t it was a case o f B ritain expecting every Finn to do his duty,” it rem arked.177 Lawrence D ennis concurred, though he conceded th at any B ritish invasion o f Finland was suicidal: "Setting a gam e little terrier o n a big b ear is n o t o u r idea o f good clean sport.” 178 O thers suggested Finland never had a chance. Even had it sufficient tim e to use the A m erican loan, claim ed John T. Flynn, its defeat w ould have m erely been postponed a m onth. T he New York Daily News found th e Finns acting wisely. An A llied E xpeditionary Force o f necessity w ould have overextended itself as G erm an troops poured into Sweden. "In th e end, Scandinavia w ould have becom e a bloody sham bles, w hile th e A llied fighting w ould have becom e greatly extended.” O nly a federation o f all Scandinavian countries, said W illiam R andolph H earst, could have prevented th e recent invasion. The F innish fiasco provided an o th er exam ple o f th e Versailles folly, w hich had left to o m any insignificant states too w eak to defend them selves.179 O ccasionally a n ote o f optim ism resounded. People o f such sp irit, said the Christian Century, could n o t be perm anently defeated. T he New Republic saw F inland giving th e Allies a tem porary respite; by occupying the energies o f the Soviet U nion, th e conflict delayed any aid th e Soviets m ight be giving th e G er­ m an Reich. T he Finns, rem arked H erbert H oover, had pricked the bubble o f th e m ighty Russian arm y and thereby relieved the sm all nations o f E urope o f th e ir fears. T he New York Daily News hoped th at th e peace in Finland m ight signify th at th e general conflict had begun to ebb. John Bassett M oore even as­ serted th at Stalin’s term s revealed his actions "b etter th an som e o th er coun­ trie s . . . th a t professed to regard him w ith abhorrence.” 180 O verall, a m ore assertive policy could have done little for th e Finns. T he U nited States was n o t producing enough arm s for its ow n defense, m uch less fo r th a t o f the Allies and Finland. F urtherm ore, tran sp o rtatio n logistics and th e tim e factor w orked strongly against th e Finns.181 If anti-interventionists w ere divided, so was FDR's adm inistration. Roosevelt, w ho a t first considered a stro n g er aid m essage, was unw illing to buck H ull, w ho exaggerated a n ti­ in terv en tio n ist stren g th .182 Pressure for an arm s loan, the president believed, w ould revive charges th a t he sought to enter th e w ar, underm ine his guarded aid to B ritain an d France, an d weaken reelection chances.183 The m ilitary to o opposed th e sale o f any surplus arm s.184 A ccording to G allup polls, a slight m ajo rity o f A m ericans favored U.S. governm ent loans for n o nm ilitary sup­ plies b u t balked w hen it cam e to w eapons.185 T h ro u g h o u t th e debates, B orchard had been disturbed by the sudden in ter­ ventionism o f H oover and H am ilton Fish, w ho had offered a bill to launch a F innish lo an .186 "It seem s extraordinary how fragile is a m atter o f principle a n d how few people seem to realize how th eir sym pathies m ay ru n away w ith th e ir principles.” Still, w hen the crisis ended, he said, "I th in k a d o o r to o u r in ­

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tervention has been do sed . T hey [the adm inistration] w ill have to find o th er d o o rs”187 All such debates w ere suddenly called sh o rt in th e spring o f 1940, for A dolf H itler launched his long-aw aited blitzkrieg. By th e end o f June 1940, th e bulk o f W estern E urope lay in his hands.

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In th e early daw n o f 9 A pril 1940, G erm an colum ns m oved across th e D anish border, an d w arships appeared in C openhagen harbor. T here was litde resist­ ance, and w ithin a day th e D anes surrendered. M ore significantly, o n th a t sam e day, th e G erm ans m ade six landings in Norw ay: O slo, K ristiansand, Bergen, T rondheim , Stavanger, and N arvik. As th e first week o f com bat ended, H itler’s forces occupied all m ajor p o rts, securing possession o f every im por­ ta n t airfield. O n 8 A pril, ju st a day earlier, th e B ritish had begun m ining N orw ay’s coast, try in g to force G erm an ore tran sp o rts from N arvik to the open seas. A week later, to counter th e G erm an invasion, the B ritish started landing troops along N orw ay’s A tlantic shore, although these forces did n o t arrive u n til the G er­ m ans had established strongholds. Furtherm ore, the B ritish forces num bered only o n e-ten th o f the G erm ans they sought to evict. T hough H itler’s com ­ m and stru ctu re was confused, th e grossly incom petent B ritish generals had to evacuate by early May. Late th at m onth, the W estern pow ers tem porarily seized N arvik, b u t the G erm an offensive in Belgium soon forced them to w ithdraw . T he G erm ans did take heavy losses a t sea, losing several o f th eir larger surface ships.1 T he fiasco resulted in a m ajor shakeup in B ritish leadership. O n 10 May, C ham berlain resigned as B ritain’s prim e m inister. King G eorge VI appointed W inston C hurchill, a far m ore aggressive personality, to succeed him . Several noninterventionists expressed absolute shock over G erm any’s a t­ tack o n Norway. A nne M orrow Lindbergh w rote in her diary, “I felt th at fa­ m iliar sick-at-the-pit-of-the-stom ach shock th at all m oves o f G erm any give instinctively to you.”2 H erbert H oover was discouraged, b o th over the extent

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o f N azi p en etratio n and B ritish tardiness. O sw ald G arrison V illard w ent fu r­ ther, even praising Roosevelt ufor his adm irable characterization o f th is latest G erm an crim e.”3 Yet, for m any, it was th e B ritish w ho w ere ultim ately at fault. Pacifist John Swomley, FOR youth secretary for New England, denounced B ritain and France for continuing th e “butchery” in the face o f G erm an an d neutral peace offers.4 The B ritish were frequently accused o f p rom pting the G erm an attack by m ining N orw egian w aters.5 Lawrence D ennis n o t only stressed B ritish m ines; he also denied H itler had any desire to fight in Scandinavia. Uncensored p rin ted a chronology show ing B ritish aspirations in Scandinavia and its vio­ lations o f th e area’s neutrality.6 Several w ithin th e Roosevelt adm inistration concurred in such indictm ents: Sum ner W elles and B reckinridge Long held the B ritish responsible for th e G erm an strike.7 O ccasionally anti-interventionists blam ed b o th sides.8 America, for exam ­ ple, pointed o u t th a t neither G erm any n o r the Allies had respected n eutral pow ers. To th e New York Daily News, th e fight resem bled “the proverbial struggle betw een the shark an d the elephant.” In such a conflict, it com ­ m ented, “sm all nations have no rights.”9 A few speculated on th e m otives behind B ritain’s N orw egian cam paign. T he Christian Century th o u g h t the B ritish sought to distract G erm any from its W estern front. New Masses accused them o f planning to extend die w ar to Sweden, “perhaps very soon.” A lthough, said Uncensored, th e B ritish m ining aim ed at blocking G erm an access to th e rich iron ore deposits o f Sweden, G er­ m any could still obtain this ore from th e Swedish p o rt o f Luleä. Furtherm ore, it was becom ing steadily less dependent o n outside sources. To D ennis, spreading th e w ar to the Scandinavian peninsula sim ply gave the B ritish navy and air force “a th eater in w hich to do stu n ts”; th e action lacked decisive m il­ itary value. By forcing the issue, he continued, B ritain w ould sim ply com pel G erm any and th e Soviet U nion into a “business alliance” th a t w ould u lti­ m ately lead to th e B olshevization o f G erm any itself. E ditor and critic B urton Rascoe presented a particularly bizarre analysis, suspecting th at the B ritish se­ cretly approved o f G erm any’s entrance into N orw ay an d its dom ination o f D enm ark, Norway, and possibly Sw eden.10 T he B ritish even received strategic advice, although belatedly. A pessim istic H oover th o u g h t th e B ritish should m ine the K attegat and Skagerrak, doing so as to isolate th e Scandinavian peninsula. H earst w ent further, claim ing th at B ritain should have been active on o th er fronts, taking aggressive m easures in the M editerranean, lining up Turkey and th e Balkans, and com pelling Italy to abandon the Axis.11 O n 10 May 1940, th e sam e day C hurchill took office, H itler com m enced his m ain attack through Belgium and th e N etherlands. A lthough b o th sides were roughly equal in m anpow er, the G erm ans totally dom inated in aircraft. The

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D utch capitulated in five days, the Belgians in eighteen. By 20 May, H itler’s forces had reached th e English C hannel. Ever since th e w ar began, anti-interventionists had strongly praised th e neu trality o f th e Low C ountries and th e Scandinavian nations, som e finding them as a m odel for A m erican policy.12 W hen C hurchill sought to enlist the n eutral pow ers in A llied ranks, th e Chicago Tribune backed a D utch reply th a t asserted th eir m oral rig h t to rem ain aloof.13 Indeed, several an ti-in terv en tio n ­ ists blam ed the Allies for infringing on th eir sovereignty. O ne w riter in Amer­ ica accused th e W estern pow ers o f deliberately th ro ttlin g Belgian and D utch com m erce, doing so by holding m erchant vessels for weeks in B ritish harbors. H earst found B ritish raids o n the Low C ountries to be m erely creating hostil­ ity. B orchard spoke o f “th e Allied illegality o f cutting o ff trad e betw een G er­ m any and neutrals.” 14 W hen th e Low C ountries were invaded, several anti-interventionists ex­ pressed b o th shock and outrage, as in th e case o f Norw ay.15 To America, the m ove was “dastardly.”16 C om m ented A nne M orrow Lindbergh o f th e G er­ m ans, “T hey must be stopped.” 17 O n 24 May, h er husband C harles said to her, “I can’t keep those troops o u t o f m y m ind. I know w hat hell is going o n there, w hat hell.”18 O nly evacuation by sea rem ained. Between 27 M ay and 4 June, alm ost 340,000 B ritish an d French tro o p s w ere evacuated by b oat from th e channel p o rt o f D unkirk, an enterprise carried o u t u n d er intensive G erm an air bom ­ bardm ent and brillian t rearguard actions. O n 28 May, King L eopold o f Belgium surrendered his arm y, in p a rt b e­ cause o f a calam itous French defeat farth er south. If his m otives w ere debat­ able, th e consequences w ere clear. T he engagem ent for th e channel p o rts was lost by th e Allies th a t very m orning, for u n til th en th e Belgian arm y had been holding th e n o rth e rn arm o f a rough crescent centering on D unkirk. Even before these events to o k place, a clear m ajority o f A m ericans found th e Allies to be losing th e w ar.19 By surrendering, the Belgian m onarch created th e b itterest o f controversies. French prim e m inister Paul Reynaud called Leopold’s decision “w ithout precedent in history.” T he prem ier o f Belgium dem anded th a t th e king be de­ posed. O n th e day he stepped dow n, Leopold w rote Roosevelt a letter th at w ould be m ade public m onths later. Stressing th at th e Belgian arm y was ex­ hausted and surrounded, he argued th at continued fighting “w ould have today led to o u r exterm ination w ithout a p rofit for the allies.”20 Som e foes o f intervention justified Leopold’s action, m aintaining he had no choice.21 W hen Leopold surrendered, said the New York Daily News, ninetenths o f Belgium already lay in G erm an hands, a half-m illion civilians had been m ade hom eless by the B attle o f Flanders, and th e capture o f Ypres seem ed im m inent. John Cudahy, U.S. am bassador to Belgium an d later an

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outspoken an ti-interventionist, com m ented, “W hen th e tru th is know n ab o u t King Leopold his decision to surrender w ill be applauded.”22 O ne w riter in Scribner’s Commentator called Leopold “th e real m arty r” o f D unkirk. W rote J. Perry C arm er, “H is was the arm y th a t held th e line w hile th e B ritish to o k to th e boats.” O nly W illiam R andolph H earst struck a dissenting note. H e ac­ cused Leopold o f surrendering several thou san d m en fighting in Flanders, to ­ gether w ith im p o rtan t strongholds, w hile the B ritish w ere risking th eir ow n hom eland to protect Belgium and H olland.23 If m any an ti-interventionists praised th e Belgians, a few attacked A llied leadership. Socialist jo u rn alist Devere A llen blam ed B ritain for triggering th e G erm an invasion by landing expeditionary forces and th en by m aking th e Low C ountries fight its battles. C oncerning B ritain's hasty d ep artu re from France, D ennis w rote scathingly, “It was so noble o f th e B ritish to ru n o u t w ith 330,000 soldiers w hile th e French covered th eir retreat.”24 In late May, w hen th e fate o f B ritain's continental arm y rem ained in d o u b t, its cabinet considered peace term s. Foreign Secretary H alifax was open to any conditions th a t w ould preserve B ritish integrity and independence, th a t is, n o cession o f eith er th e fleet o r the Royal A ir Force. Prim e M inister C hurchill d id n o t rule o u t negotiation, b u t only “provided we retained the essentials an d th e elem ents o f o u r vital strength.” O n 26 and 27 May, he voiced w illingness to recognize G erm an “overlordship o f central Europe” an d cession o f M alta, G ibraltar, and som e A frican colonies to th e Reich. Yet if the new prim e m in ­ ister m ight eventually trad e B ritish territo ry to G erm any an d Italy, such b a r­ gaining held little prom ise w hile France was falling.25

O n 5 June, th e G erm ans resum ed th eir offensive against French arm ies in th e south, w ithin a day breaking through th e low er Som m e an d reaching th e River A isne. T he French governm ent fled to Tours, then Bordeaux. O n 22 June, G erm any an d France signed an arm istice in th e C om piègne forest, by w hich France agreed to surrender all its naval forces an d dem obilize land an d a ir forces. Term s also provided for N azi occupation o f approxim ately tw o -th ird s o f France, including Paris, th e entire th e A tlantic coast, m ost in d u strial a n d m ining areas, an d nearly all grain-producing regions. M arshal Philippe Pétain assum ed full legislative and executive pow ers o n 12 July, com bining in him self th e offices o f president an d prem ier u n d er a u n iq u e tide: chief o f state. A bjuring th e “false idea o f th e natural equality o f m en,” h e proposed to su bstitute “a society based on a hierarchy o f ability and service to th e state.” R ather th an “ liberté, fraternité, égalité,” th e w atchw ords becam e “ travail, famille, patrie” The new regim e, sovereign in unoccupied France, w as form ally renam ed Etat Français, inform ally called the Vichy governm ent. It

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soon becam e d e a r th a t form er prem ier Pierre Laval was th e m ost pow erful figure in th e new governm ent, assum ing th e titles, respectively, o f m inister o f state (23 June), deputy prim e m inister (27 June), designated successor o f Pé­ tain (12 July), an d foreign m inister (24 O ctober 1941). U ntil th e A llied inva­ sion o f N o rth Africa, th e U nited States m aintained full diplom atic relations w ith Vichy. M ost A m ericans w ere shocked by th e French defeat, the an ti-in terv en tio n ­ ists no exception. H iram Johnson called th e fall o f France “a h orrible th in g to contem plate.” Journalist W illiam H enry C ham berlin, w ho had covered th e de­ feat for th e Christian Science Monitor, was rem inded o f th e fall o f C onstan­ tinople in th e fifteenth century.26 In retrospect, th e defeat was far from inevitable. G erm any had entered the w ar sh o rt o f essential raw m aterials an d was econom ically unable to sustain a long conflict. By M ay 1940, it possessed a th ird less fuel th an in Septem ber 1939. C o n trary to m yth, France had prepared for m obile w arfare and defense in depth. T hough th e G erm ans had m ore planes, the French possessed m ore tanks an d m otorized units. It was th e French strategy o f advancing into Bel­ gium plus th e G erm an blitzkrieg tactic th a t assured H itler’s victory.27 A few FDR critics blam ed th eir ow n president for France’s dem ise. A ccord­ ing to th e Chicago Tribune, he had prom ised th a t all U.S. m aterial resources w ould be a t th e disposal o f th e Allies; hence, th e French naturally took A m er­ ican su p p o rt for granted. H iram Johnson accused Roosevelt o f having “gone far beyond w hat th e responsible head o f a governm ent should, an d repeatedly indulged in dem onstrations th a t he m ight b etter have left unsaid.”28 O f course, anti-interventionists— like th e rest o f th e population— engaged in m ilitary analysis o f France’s defeat, though th eir com m ents w ere usually q uite conventional.29 C olonel R obert R. M cC orm ick pointed to a tw o-to-one disadvantage in m anpow er, four-to-one in tanks (here he was incorrect), sixto -o n e in airplanes. W illiam H enry C ham berlin added m ore statistics: a fouro r five-to-one G erm an superiority in industrial pow er, a preem inence in divi­ sions o f 160 to 60, an d an added bonus o f eleven arm ored divisions. Lawrence D ennis cited B ritish m ilitary w riter an d fascist su p p o rter J. F. C. Fuller, w ho in Towards Armageddon (1937) opposed constructing the M aginot line w hile recom m ending th e form ation o f highly m obile arm y groups. R ather th an re­ m ain o n th e defensive, said th e New York Daily News, France had foolishly re­ sponded to “scream s” ab o u t G erm an outrages by ordering its best troops in to B elgium .30 Such m ilitary analyses did n o t conceal one overarching fact: an ti-interven­ tio n ists o f all persuasions had serious m isgivings ab o u t m odem France. O ne indictm ent centered o n its entire tw entieth-century record o f behavior. To H arry Elm er Barnes, France bore th e m ajor responsibility for creating H itler, doing so by its “vindictive diplom acy” o f 1919-33.31 H ugh Johnson accused France o f tossing “b o th Prague and W arsaw to the wolves,” violating its ow n

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treaty obligations in the process.32 Uncensored noted French seizure o f m ail from an A m erican ship, though the occurrence was denied by Secretary H ull. Back in W orld W ar I, Boake C arter could n o t help recalling, th e French had even charged th e U nited States for cem eteries used to b u ry its w ar dead.33 C ertain Rom an C atholic anti-interventionists p ointed to France’s long record o f antidericism . Father James G illis, for exam ple, could n o t forget the “persecution” o f his church under René W aldeck-Rousseau, prim e m inister from 1899 to 1902. In fact, so G illis w rote, Freem asonry still kept C atholics from enjoying th eir rightful place in governm ent.34 Its em pire tainted France’s reputation even further.35 T he sw ords o f its im ­ perialists, said Senator Lundeen, were “d ripping w ith blood.” To N orm an T hom as, forced labor an d disease conveyed by w hite settlers had reduced the population o f French E quatorial Africa from tw enty m illion to three m illion. Furtherm ore, he rem arked, th e French had conducted ruthless w arfare against th e Riffs o f M orocco. Rush H olt, n oting th e tw o thousand casualties from the French bom bing o f Syria’s capital in 1925, quoted a jo u rn alist w ho w rote, “T he scream ing and burstin g shells th a t spattered th e streets o f D am ascus w ith th e blood o f innocent m en, w om en, an d children sent a th rill o f h o rro r th ro u g h o u t the civilized w orld.”36 To conservatives, th e fall o f France show ed th e folly o f th e Popular Front, a French “New D eal” launched in the sum m er o f 1936. Lasting ju st over a year, it was led by a leftist coalition headed by socialist prem ier Léon Blum . Its agenda included a fo rty -h o u r w ork week, paid vacations lasting tw o weeks, com pulsory arb itratio n , nationalization o f arm am ent factories, and a public w orks program s. W hile visiting France, actress Lillian G ish w itnessed “th at great co u n try grow soft, dem anding m ore and m ore, w hile w orking less and less.”37 French politicians, com m ented prom inent Iowa R epublican H anford M acN ider, espoused “the doctrines o f Moscow.” To th e m ore subtle Lawrence D ennis, the changes initiated by the “partially C om m unist” Blum governm ent w ere long overdue, b u t they produced destructive social cleavages.38 C on­ gressm an John C. Schafer (Rep.-W is.) added foreign policy to th e indictm ent, accusing the Blum governm ent o f m aking “an offensive and defensive alliance w ith the ungodly, u n-C hristian C om m unist butchers in Moscow,” even though the agreem ent had been signed by Prem ier Pierre Laval a year before Blum took control. The extrem e rightist jo u rn al Scribner's Commentator was particularly m ilitant o n this issue, denouncing Blum for blocking com pletion o f th e M aginot line, authorizing the fatal nationalization o f th e aircraft in ­ dustry, and alienating Italy, Spain, an d Belgium .39 A h o st o f an ti-in terv en tio n ists found an accurate in d ictm en t in C ount René de C ham brun’s I Saw France Fall: Will She Rise Again? (1940), an ac­ co u n t by a p ro m in en t French officer w ho was also Laval’s son-in-law . If his firsthand n arratio n focused prim arily o n secret dispatches and harrow ing es­ capes, it blam ed th e Blum regim e for w recking France’s m oral fiber and serv­

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ing as an unw itting in stru m en t o f Stalin’s foreign policy.40 S tanton B. Leeds’s book, These Rule France: The Story o f Edouard Daladier and the Men Around Daladier (1940), possessed a som ew hat sim ilar focus. Leeds, an A m erican w ho had lived in France for sixteen years, offered a personal attack o n Blum w hile lauding P étain.41 Some adm inistration foes, however, defended the Popular Front. Uncensored specifically denied th at France’s dire plight was caused by “com m unized w ar in­ dustries” o r the "sabotage o f Popular Front G overnm ent.” Rather, nationaliza­ tion o f defense industries did no t in itself lim it production, n o r did th e fortyho u r week slow dow n aircraft m anufacture.42 Frank H anighen, w ho had m ade a special survey o f the French economy, saw nationalization taking place too late, n o t too early. The so-called "French New Deal,” he said, suffered because Blum did n o t institute currency reform and supervise the private banks.43 The Progressive blam ed rightist regim es o f the early thirties for the lag in French p ro ­ duction. Q uoting Air M inister Pierre C ot, it claim ed th at during the Popular Front, production in the basic w ar industries was overtaking the Nazis.44 Even before France entered the war, several anti-interventionists denied its status as a dem ocracy. T he French Republic, said Senator W heeler, had really died in M arch 1939, w hen th e C ham ber o f D eputies gave th e governm ent p er­ m ission to rule through N ovem ber by decree. B ennett C lark called D aladier as m uch a d ictato r "as any o f the rest o f them .” To N orm an T hom as, w riting in D ecem ber 1939, "France today is virtually fascist.” C ontrol o f all w orkers from age eighteen to forty, observed John T. Flynn, was in the hands o f the m inis­ ter o f labor; th e state determ ined wages and place o f w ork.45 Particularly galling was France’s treatm en t o f refugees and pacifists.46 In N ovem ber 1939, the New Republic reproached th e French governm ent for in ­ tern in g thousands o f G erm an antifascist refugees in concentration cam ps, w here they lived in an inhum ane situation. Barnes found th eir conditions w orse th an those in G erm an concentration cam ps, for prisoners had to sleep o n hard stadium seats and barely possessed enough food to keep them alive. T hat O ctober Uncensored reported th e arrest o f som e th irty intellectuals w ho had dem anded an im m ediate peace, including the philosopher Em ile-A uguste C hartier A lain. D orothy Detzer, o n learning th a t th e French W IL had been practically dissolved, called France a "com plete dictatorship.”47 A ccording to certain noninterventionists, France had abolished civil liber­ ties. W rote publisher P orter Sargent in February 1940, “In France, th e penalty for free speech is the guillotine.” Pointing to French suppression o f its ow n C om m unist Party, w hich num bered over three hundred thousand m em bers and had seventy-tw o seats in the C ham ber o f D eputies, the New Republic asked, "W hen th e French get through fighting for dem ocracy, u nder leaders w hose allegiance to it is dubious, how m uch dem ocracy are they going to have left?” T he New York Daily News n o t only cited th e com m unist p ro h ib itio n b u t accused France o f arresting people for saying kind w ords about H itler.48

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E douard Daladier, prim e m inister w hen the w ar began, was strongly at­ tacked.49 Barnes referred to “th e weak and double-crossing D aladier and the cynical stooge [Foreign M inister Georges] B onnet” Finding him far less sinister, W illiam H enry C ham berlin nonetheless labeled D aladier—along w ith M aurice G am elin, French com m ander at the tim e G erm any invaded the Low C oun­ tries— “unim aginative m ediocrities,” unable to grasp the nature o f m odem war.50 To Frank H anighen, the prim e m inister served as the political tool o f the generals. H earst, m ore friendly, called D aladier a “fine m an,” who, if unham ­ pered by party opposition, w ould m ake a pow erful dictator in w ar o r peace.51 W hen, on 21 M arch 1940, Paul Reynaud succeeded D aladier as prem ier, Uncensored presented th e difference in m inistries as sim ply “betw een a tisket an d a tasket.” M oreover, it th o u g h t th at R eynaud, a m an closely tied to heavy industry, sought econom ic rapprochem ent w ith H itler. H anighen saw th e new prim e m inister as th e in stru m en t o f W inston C hurchill, w ho had convinced him to send French troops in to Belgium an d oppose D aladier’s desire for a separate peace.52 O n 29 July 1940, th e Vichy regim e convened a co u rt o f seven judges to try those responsible for th e defeat. In less th an tw o weeks, it began sessions at R iom , a tow n in central France. A m ong th e accused were D aladier, Reynaud, and G am elin. A m erican extrem ists o f all shades supported the Riom trials. New Masses had n o sym pathy for the defendants. “The thieves have fallen out,” it said, predict­ ing th at even Pétain and G eneral M axim e W eygand w ould soon face the docket. W riting from the opposite side o f the political spectrum , journalist Stanton B. Leeds referred to “those B lum -sponsored incom petents w ho wrecked France, w ho let her be draw n into a fight before she was ready.” Even the relatively m od­ erate Chicago Tribune m aintained th at such trials m ight “tell us a great deal about European politics in the recent past th at otherw ise w ould have rem ained forever in the realm o f conjecture.”53 John Haynes H olm es, w ho considered the Vichy governm ent fascist, called the trials sham eless. “Nevertheless,” he ratio n ­ alized, “we cannot help feeling th at, apart from the persons and circum stances involved, this is a good thing —to put on trial the makers o f w arr 54 A nti-interventionists levied one accusation th a t was particularly severe: trading w ith the enemy. W hile the French and G erm an arm ies w ere a t war, they charged, industrialists o f b o th nations exchanged th e m aterials o u t o f w hich shells and cannons were m ade. “W ithin th e sound o f artillery duels,” w rote H anighen, “trainloads o f these m aterials have m et an d passed each other, each b o u n d for enem y territory.” Coke cam e from G erm any and iron ore from France, w ith th e m eeting p o in t at A thus, a railroad ju n ctio n in Bel­ gium . Devere Allen, retu rn in g to the U nited States after a year in Europe, re­ p o rted th at French barges traversed dow n the R hine aro u n d Strasbourg w ith­ o u t G erm an interference, carrying apples from N orm andy and dates from southern France to export m arkets.55

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O nce France was conquered, however, a few anti-interventionists expressed g reat confidence in M arshal Pétain. O n first hearing th at th e French leader w ould seek peace term s, A nne M orrow Lindbergh w rote in h er diary, “T hey can tru st him ; he is devoted to France, has know n victory and defeat. I feel re­ lieved th a t they have such a m an at such a terrible tim e.” T he Jesuit America praised France’s new ruler. “G reat in w ar an d great in peace, he is first in the h earts o f his people.”56 W hen th e new governm ent began, th e m arshal's role becam e disputed.57 T he New York Daily News referred to “th e senile M arshal P é ta in ,. . . probably n o th in g b u t a H itler p u p p et now adays, w ith all th e strings jerked from Berlin: a sad spectacle.” John H aynes H olm es accused Pétain o f playing “th e tragic role o f traitor.” D ennis predicted th a t Pétain w ould eventually be replaced by a new elite, one th a t could provide “bread and circuses” for th e m asses, h o n o r a n d pow er for th e new rulers, and adm inistrative efficiency for th e econom y.58 Sim ilar disagreem ent concerned th e n atu re o f th e Vichy regim e. In July 1940, Social Justice lauded th e new France as genuinely fascist, a regim e dedi­ cated to bringing “m ental, spiritual, an d social developm ent” to a co u n try th at h ad been ruled in th e sp irit o f th e “atheist Voltaire.” H oover th o u g h t the French w ere “well on th e way to totalitarian governm ent.” T he Christian Cen­ tury doubted w hether, in th e long ru n , France w ould rem ain fascist, for it fo u n d “th e average Frenchm an probably th e w orld’s m ost inveterate individ­ ualist.”59 By Septem ber, th e P rotestant jo u rn al suspected th a t loss o f em pire an d “capitalistic dom ination in in d u stry ” could eventually lead to greater prosperity as well as th e recovery o f cultural and spiritual leadership. (T he Century foresaw the creation o f a jo in t French-Italian-Spanish “L atin bloc” th a t m ight check G erm an pow er.)60 In January 1941, W illiam H enry C ham ­ b erlin sim ply found Vichy a m ixture o f anti-Sem itism , old-fashioned conser­ vatism , and diluted fascism .61 T hroughout 1941, som e anti-interventionists, w ith o u t totally em bracing Vichy o r its form al leader, gave it the benefit o f th e doubt. In January, P orter Sargent com bined his pro-V ichy posture w ith a touch o f veiled anti-Sem itism by w riting, “T he m uch abused Pétain G overnm ent, n o t pop u lar in low er New York, has been trying to rem edy abuses.” A m onth later, America saw Pétain as “a m ost im p o rtan t factor in the obstru ctio n o f H itler.” France’s leader, it claim ed, had refused pow er to th e “universally detested” Laval, placed G eneral M axim e W eygand in th e m ost strategic sp o t in Africa, and encouraged G en­ eral Francisco Franco to seek self-determ ination for Spain. In A pril, H earst called Pétain a loyal Frenchm an, doing his best to protect French independ­ ence and territo rial integrity. N ot surprisingly, Social Justice becam e one o f Vichy’s leading defenders. T he regim e, it said, had replaced universal m an­ h o o d suffrage w ith a corporate state, m oved against th e “G od-haters” w ho gave allegiance to “th e bloodstained rag” o f Moscow, and sought to curtail the activities o f “foreign” Jews (in contrast to French Jews). O nly N orm an T hom as

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appeared to be a m arked critic, accusing Vichy o f com plicity w ith H itler and n oting th at the new French governm ent had tu rn ed tw o prom inent social de­ m ocrats, R udolf H ilferding and R udolf Breitscheid, over to G erm any.62 Roosevelt him self was less th an enam ored w ith th e new France. D isillu­ sioned by m ost French leadership in th e interw ar period, he was bitterly dis­ appointed w hen th e n atio n fell so swiftly.63 D uring 1941, th e U nited States m aintained diplom atic relations w ith the Vichy regim e. Furtherm ore, it con­ tin u ed to supply w heat to unoccupied France an d provisions to V ichy-con­ trolled N orth Africa. By m idyear, however, Roosevelt had grow n increasingly alarm ed over France’s collaboration w ith G erm any, sym bolized by th e m eet­ ing th at M ay betw een H itler and A dm iral Jean D arlan, Pétain’s pow erful naval m inister. O n 15 May, th e president publicly w arned against collaboration, m uch less entering into any kind o f alliance “w hich w ould deliver u p France an d its colonial em pire” to G erm an control. Early in June, H ull cautioned the Vichy governm ent to avoid cooperating w ith G erm any beyond the specified term s o f capitulation; he hinted at breaking diplom atic relations.64 Even as th e Vichy regim e was draw ing ever closer to H itler, certain n o n ­ interventionists tacitly defended its increasingly pro-G erm an stance. France, com m ented H earst, had to look o u t for itself. W hile England could offer n o th ­ ing, th e Reich could gran t participation in a U nited States o f Europe, in w hich France w ould rem ain a w orld pow er possessing an extensive em pire. In the eyes o f the Chicago Tribune, France had received only verbal prom ises from th e U nited States; therefore, it was forced to m ake the best term s possible w ith G erm any. Frederick J. Libby found th e French governm ent pursuing the only policy by w hich it could survive.65 O nly the New York Daily News offered a slight note o f optim ism . “France,” it said, “is tied to H itler's chariot w heels” because o f its inability to buy m ore food from th e U nited States and ship it through th e B ritish blockade. It pre­ dicted, however, th at G erm any w ould becom e “fat and drow sy from to o m uch m ilking o f France and o th er countries,” at w hich tim e “th e lean and hungry Frenchm en will m ove in and slash the G erm ans dow n.”66 In a radio speech delivered o n 12 A ugust 1941, Pétain pledged his regim e to collaboration w ith H ider's “new order.” America, heretofore pro-V ichy, n oted th at “the high-m inded M arshal is by no m eans surrounded by m en as highm inded and idealistic as him self.” As to a U.S. diplom atic break w ith Vichy, W illiam R. C astle asked, “W hy break relations w ith Vichy if we have n o t done so w ith Germ any?”67

If som e anti-interventionists em pathized w ith the Vichy governm ent, m ost held no sym pathy for the Italy o f B enito M ussolini. O n 10 June 1940, Italy en­ tered the w ar as G erm any’s ally and attacked southern France. T hat sam e day,

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speaking at C harlottesville, Roosevelt said, "O n this ten th day o f June, 1940, th e hand th at held th e dagger has stuck it in to th e back o f its neighbor.”68 U ntil th at p o in t, anti-interventionists lacked any consensus concerning the Italian n ation o r its dictator. Som e views w ere q uite predictable. Social Justice, fo r exam ple, often praised the regim e. Its foreign correspondent, J. S. Barnes, w rote in D ecem ber 1939 th a t II D uce had yet to be proven w rong.69 Also u n ­ surprisingly, N orm an T hom as rem arked th at M ussolini only rem ained neu­ tra l because he was holding o u t for the greatest rew ard. If and w hen he ever intervened on the Allied side, the socialist leader continued, the New York Times and o th er groups w ould undoubtedly find som ething noble to say ab o u t him ! T hree m onths before Italy entered the conflict, th e New York Daily News envisioned M ussolini as organizing central Europe in to a large custom s u n io n . A m o n th later it called M ussolini “the sm artest o f the E uropean pow er politicians”; his natio n was sim ply “sitting back and m aking w hat m oney it can o u t o f th e war.”70 W hen Italy attacked France, reaction varied. “W hat business is it w hether Italy goes N azi o r Ally?” asked Senator Lundeen. “H ow does this feeble in ter­ national m eddling square w ith th e sturdy Farewell A ddress o f th e Father o f o u r C ountry?”71 Far m ore n o ninterventionists w ere critical. To C ongressm an H arold K nut­ son (R ep.-M inn.), Italy was a “buzzard.” A nne M orrow L indbergh th o u g h t M ussolini was playing “a lying an d deceitful game.” America rem arked th a t M ussolini had “struck a dagger in to th e back o f his ow n people,” hu rlin g forty-five m illion unw illing people in to w ar on the side o f a m an w hose views they detested.72 A few reacted negatively to b o th M ussolini’s m ove an d Roosevelt’s response. C harles A. Lindbergh com pared th e crow ds gathering to hear th e Italian dic­ ta to r to “a pack o f anim als ready for the kill,” though he also called Roosevelt’s C harlottesville speech “dem agogic.” Sim ilarly, C astle w rote o f Italy’s strike, “It m akes one despise M ussolini,” b u t he, too, blam ed FDR for preventing “decent relations” w ith Italy. W ithin th e adm inistration, several policym akers found th e C harlottesville speech insulting, Long an d Welles am ong them .73 Som e saw th e U nited States partly responsible for Italy’s grow ing strength. Uncensored attacked the ad m inistration for sending scrap iron to Italy— in fact, over the previous four m onths tw ice as m uch as shipped to Japan: “The steel dagger w ith w hich M ussolini executed his ‘stab in the back’ m ight well have been m arked ‘M ade in U.S.A.”’ The New Republic noted th at A m erican capitalists had befriended M ussolini, m aking reckless investm ents u nder his regim e. Even Lundeen said, “We helped to set M ussolini up in business,” doing so first by m aking substantial loans to Italy, th en by canceling $12 billion o f th em in 1926.74 O ccasionally anti-interventionists castigated W estern diplom ats for having been far too severe o n Italy. The E thiopian crisis, claim ed C harles L indbergh, h ad unnecessarily throw n Italy into G erm an arm s. H ad the B ritish and French

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foreign secretaries, Sir Sam uel H oare and Pierre Laval, been p erm itted to com prom ise w ith M ussolini, said th e Chicago Tribune, Europe m ight have re­ m ained at peace. W riting before th e attack, H earst conceded Italy’s am bition for an em pire th at included th e b etter p a rt o f N orth A frica, A lbania, Yu­ goslavia, Piedm ont, C orsica, N ice, and perhaps all o f Provence. Yet he found such aim s quite understandable, for after W orld W ar I, Italy had been “throw n o u t o f th e international gam bling jo in t, n o t only w ithout due division o f the swag b u t w ith h er pockets rifled and h er distinguished service in th e stacked card gam e o f strip poker unrecognized.”75

In M ay and June 1940, as H itler’s blitzkrieg sw ept through W estern Europe, form er president H erbert H oover launched a m ajor relief effort. H oover had always been m ore m oderate th an m any anti-interventionists, supporting U.S. m em bership in th e W orld C o u rt and th e League o f N ations an d finding th at th e neu trality acts o f the 1930s could “place us in practical econom ic alliance w ith th e aggressor.” In th e M o f 1939, as noted, H oover favored defensive arm s sales to th e Allies. In May 1940, as th e Low C ountries w ere being con­ quered, he reversed his criticism o f m ilitary appropriations, going so far as to back FDR’s call for $1.8 billion on national defense. Six m onths later he advo­ cated “all the su p p o rt for E ngland th a t we can.”76 W hen w ar broke out, H oover focused increasingly on projects to feed nations occupied o r under siege, as show n by efforts on behalf o f Poland and Finland. In late Septem ber 1939, at the request o f the Polish governm ent, he organized th e C om m ission for Polish Relief. T hough Roosevelt was always w ary o f his predecessor, H oover’s renewed political influence forced FDR and the A m erican Red Cross to supply far m ore aid to both nations than they had ever intended.77 In addition to hum anitarian m otives o n H oover’s p a rt, he obviously had political ones as well. By directing relief efforts th e year before the R epublican convention, he could show him self as “above politics” w hile still keeping his nam e before th e public. T he bread lines o f th e recent depression an d the m em ories o f “H oovervilles” m ight fade w hereas his m assive relief efforts in Belgium during W orld W ar I w ould be recalled. In th e w ords o f h istorian Hal E lliott W ert, “H oover’s W orld W ar II relief activities served to resurrect a ta r­ nished reputation. For H oover, these projects represented a second chance, an o p p o rtu n ity for personal justification and political renewal.”78 If H oover had any luck, he could again be a m ajor player on th e diplom atic scene, laboring w ith b o th the B ritish and th e G erm ans to m itigate, perhaps end, th e conflict. W ith the G erm an spring offensive u n d er way, H oover w orked b ehind th e scenes w ith representatives o f Poland, Belgium , th e N etherlands, Luxem ­ bourg, an d Norway. H is aim : to send A m erican food through th e B ritish

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blockade and in th e process persuade th e governm ents in exile to request his help openly. Such activity m et w ith B ritish resistance. As in the N apoleonic w ars and W orld W ar I, continental blockade becam e a linchpin o f B ritish strategy—along w ith m ass bom bing, subversion, and psychological w arfare. O nly by such m eans, B ritain believed, could th e trench w arfare th at had proven so deadly in W orld W ar I be avoided. W hen C hurchill assum ed the reins o f pow er, B ritain becam e— if anything— even m ore adam ant concern­ ing th e blockade. Because W ashington cooperated w ith B ritish policy, if at tim es half-heartedly, it w as H oover w ho gave th e occupied countries th eir hope for direct relief. In M ay 1940, a H oover-sponsored C om m ission for the R elief o f Belgium was reconstituted.79 H oover soon found su p p o rt for feeding Belgium from A m bassador C ud­ ahy. In an interview given in L ondon early in A ugust, th e diplom at w arned th at starvation aw aited Belgium th a t com ing w inter. aN o w ords in English w ill be able to describe it,” he said. H ence, th e B ritish should allow food through th eir blockade. C udahy continued to voice his views, including them in his book The Armies M arch A Personal Report ( 1941).®° A nti-interventionists were quick to express sym pathy to C udahy’s pleas.81 O n 11 A ugust 1940, a t Yellowstone, M ontana, H oover launched a for m ore am bitious effort: to feed som e tw enty-seven m illion Europeans, m ostly w om en an d children. Unless food was im m ediately m ade available, he w arned, Norway, H olland, Belgium , Finland, an d Poland faced “w holesale starvation, disease and death.” Possibly France, too, w ould be “in difficulties.” T he G erm ans, he continued, m ust agree to safeguards concerning tran sp o rta­ tio n an d distrib u tio n w hile B ritain had to guarantee passage through the blockade. Soon his prelim inary body, th e E uropean Food D istribution C om ­ m ittee, was predicting th a t eight m illion (C udahy’s estim ate) were approach­ ing starvation in Belgium , eighteen m illion (H oover’s ow n figure) elsew here in Europe. It was, however, unable to provide indisputable data.82 In a m ost revealing letter to interventionist radio com m entator R aym ond G ram Swing, H oover outlin ed his early strategy. Feeding occupied Europe, he w rote o n 19 A ugust 1940, could m ake no difference in th e w ar’s outcom e. H ad the B ritish adopted H oover’s proposal, the G erm ans “in th eir present arrogant m ood w ould have unquestionably refused th e w hole thing.” T he m oral re­ sponsibility quite correctly w ould have fallen on th e Reich, “w here o f course it belongs.” At th at p o in t, public pressure w ould eventually force th e G erm ans to accept H oover’s plans o r provide relief them selves.83 At first, H oover was optim istic, thinking th a t B ritain w ould perm it food to pass through its blockade once it had w on th e still-contested air war.84 H e soon found th e B ritish adam ant in opposition. In th is war, stressed W inston C hurchill o n 20 A ugust, “th e front lines ru n through th e factories.” Feeding a factory w orker in Belgium was in reality feeding th e enem y w ar m achine. M entioning th e H oover food plan by nam e, th e prim e m inister said, “T he

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Nazis are boasting th at they have created a new unified econom y in Europe. T hey have repeatedly stated th at they possess am ple resources o f food and th at they can feed th eir captive peoples.”85 Early in O ctober, H oover responded. T he E uropean peoples, he stressed, were n o t asking th e A m erican governm ent for appropriations, charity, ships, o r even th e rig h t to purchase food in th e U nited States. R ather, they sought perm ission to im p o rt food from o th er p arts o f Europe, if there was any food there, o r from elsew here overseas. A neutral in ternational organization could supervise th e o peration, protecting all supplies from the occupying arm ies. O n 15 N ovem ber 1940, in a nationw ide broadcast, he denied th at his schem e involved feeding the G erm ans, for at any p o in t only three days’ supply w ould be on hand. T he B ritish them selves, he noted, w ere p erm ittin g food ships to pass through th eir blockade o f Spain. In an article for Collier’SyH oover w arned th at if th e occupied peoples w ere n o t fed, th eir skilled w orkers w ould be forced to take jobs in G erm an m unitions factories.86 O n 18 Novem ber, the ex-president’s N ational C om m ittee o n Food for th e Small D em ocracies (NCFSD) was form ally constituted. W ithin th e U nited States, th e organization gained real support. Even th e interventionist Time m agazine called H oover “an eloquent keeper o f th e U.S. public conscience,” and such notables as G eneral John J. Pershing and A dm iral W illiam V. P ratt, n o t particularly stalw art in opposing Roosevelt’s m easures, endorsed his ef­ forts.87 Soon H oover could list am ong his supporters 504 college presidents and educators; 60 publishers, editors, and colum nists; and innum erable clergy o f all faiths. Som e 2,500 local com m ittees sprang in to operation.88 W ithin the adm inistration, Berle privately supported the feeding, w riting in his diary, “I w ould supply food to anybody w ho is really hungry— including G erm ans.”89 O n 11 Decem ber, H ull challenged H oover, denying th at any starvation w ould occur in E urope for five o r six m onths. T he U nited States, he m ain­ tained, “w ould n o t attem pt to form ulate a policy o n th e subject u n til h alf th at period had passed.” H oover was far less certain, telling jo u rn alist W illiam H enry C ham berlin early in January 1941 th a t he anticipated fam ine in Bel­ gium and th at N orw ay was in serious condition.90 In a public speech given in February, H oover predicted th e “extinction o f m illions.”91 By then th e Belgian governm ent in exile had approved his test plan, w hich involved operating soup kitchens for one m illion adults and tw o m illion children. In February, H oover spoke to th e secretary o f state concerning the role food could play in Spain, N orth Africa, and unoccupied France. “We m ust use food,” he said, “am ongst neutrals and sem i-neutrals b o th for purposes o f confidence and af­ fection and also as a Sword o f D am ocles.”92 Late in February 1941, H oover th o u g h t he had w on a m ajor victory, for the G erm an governm ent consented to the establishm ent a Food C om m ission su­ pervised by A m ericans and headquartered in Brussels. F urtherm ore, it agreed to refrain from confiscating im ported supplies, cease rem oving food from

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Belgium , an d im p o rt potatoes and grain. A m erican supervisors could oversee th e d istrib u tio n . G erm any’s concurrence failed to benefit H oover, as m ost A m ericans— horrified by atrocity and d ep o rtatio n accounts— m istrusted the G erm ans intensely.93 O n 10 M arch, th e B ritish gave th eir form al refusal. It was, they claim ed, th e responsibility o f th e G erm an governm ent to assure th e m aterial w elfare o f the countries it had overrun; any form o f outside relief w ould sim ply strengthen th e enem y’s w ar effort. Let th e G erm ans use th e roads o f W estern Europe to carry food, rath er th an troops, fuel, and bom bs for the cam paign against B ritain. If they so acted, th e needed surplus n u trim en t could be tran sp o rted , particularly to Norway, D enm ark, and th e N etherlands. Even if food shortages w ere likely, th e B ritish w ould regard it as “false hum anitarianism ” to adm it foodstuffs, know ing th at th e action w ould prolong th e w ar an d in the long ru n add to “the sum o f hum an misery.” W hile no one could im pugn H oover’s ef­ forts, such action was incom patible w ith “a speedy B ritish victory and th e re­ lease o f E urope from enem y dom ination.”94 O n th e sam e day, H oover issued a reply, p o inting to th e plan’s safeguards.95 A m ong anti-interventionists, feeding occupied Europe becam e a favorite cause, and one w ould be hard p u t to find any w ho disapproved. T he n ation’s leading pacifist organizations backed th e effort, as did m any Rom an C atholic jo u rn als and clergy.96 T he Christian Century spoke for m uch o f th e P rotestant clergy prom oting H oover’s cause at every opportunity, a t one p o in t calling the starvation o f eighteen m illion noncom batants “the incom parable atrocity.”97 Also in su p p o rt w ere retired diplom ats, m ajor new spaper publishers and jo u r­ nalists, m em bers o f C ongress, m any m em bers o f th e A m erica First N ational C om m ittee, an d th e AFC itself.98 In addition, som e H oover backers favored th e feeding o f unoccupied France, a natio n n o t covered by th e ex-president’s com m ittee.99 In N ovem ber 1940, D ennis accused “all tru e lovers o f w orld liberty” o f deliberately starving th e French so as “to hasten th e dow nfall o f H itler.” In January 1941, the Chicago Tribune reported forty m illion Frenchm en cold and hungry. Senator Edw in Johnson quoted approvingly th e com m ent o f A dm iral Jean D arlan, Vichy’s vice prem ier, w ho said in M arch th a t G erm any was m ore h u m an itar­ ian tow ard France th an was B ritain. He also cited A m bassador B ullitt’s claim th a t B ritain’s blockade sim ply involved “playing the G erm an game.”100 In June 1941, B orchard rem arked, “T his policy o f starving France has helped to throw h er people in to th e arm s o f G erm any, th e only reed on w hich France can lean.”101 In June 1941, u n d er A m erican pressure, C hurchill did agree to perm it som e m edical goods and foodstuffs to enter Pétain’s France.102 All d u rin g 1940 and 1941, n o ninterventionists continually found E uro­ pean conditions deplorable. Publisher Frank G annett saw E urope threatened w ith th e w orst fam ine in all history. R epresentative Louis Ludlow (D em .In d .) said th a t the Belgians w ere forced to eat cats and dogs. Fear o f disease

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was particu larly strong. W hen interventionists m aintained th a t th e blockade m ight spaw n m assive plagues th a t could reach G erm any, th e Christian Cen­ tury asked, "W ho can steer an epidem ic?” Besides, th e P rotestant w eekly con­ tin u ed , "Looked a t from any angle, th e in h u m an ity o f starving yo u r friends to h u rt yo u r enem ies reaches depths o f m oral degradation w hich can n o t pos­ sibly serve any w orthy end.” Such a scourge, w arned th e New York Daily News, w as "ap t to ju m p th e A tlantic O cean, ju st as th e Spanish influenza d id in the last war.” P ointing to M adison G ran t’s The Passing o f the Great Race ( 1916), it asserted th a t a E urope enfeebled by fam ine m ight w ell be "easy pickings” for “th e yellow hordes o f Asia.” 103 Som e com m ents concerning B ritish opposition were particularly biting.104To H ugh Johnson, British behavior was "positively obscene.” 105 The Chicago Tribune accused FDR and C hurchill o f sanctioning "the slaughter o f babies.” To Fa­ th er James Gillis, B ritain’s rationale bespoke "the kind o f logic th at was used to justify the sinking o f th e Lusitania.” "M ust we becom e the m ost hated nation on earth?” queried Senator George Aiken. Representative U sher Burdick w anted Congress to w ithhold further assistance unless it lifted the blockade.106 At best, the food blockade was counterproductive. R em arked Senator H en­ rik Shipstead o f th e starving E uropeans, "It w ill n o t d o very m uch good to save them for dem ocracy after they are dead.” If, com m ented th e New York Daily News, B ritain ever launched its m uch-prophesied E uropean offensive, it w ould badly need th e goodw ill o f th e con tin en t’s population. W hen o p p o ­ nen ts o f th e plan alleged th at starvation w ould cause th e occupied peoples to revolt, th e Christian Century caustically referred to "unarm ed, ravenous peo­ ple . . . attem pting w ith th eir bare hands to w rest m achine guns an d planes” from th eir conqueror. As for th e claim th at th e G erm ans, m oved by self-pity o r self-interest, w ould feed th e occupied people o u t o f th eir ow n supplies, th e Century denied th at H itler’s Reich w ould risk its ow n starvation. To Lawrence D ennis, decim ation o f occupied populations by fam ine an d m aln u tritio n w ould only enhance the relative strength o f th e occupiers. M oreover, he con­ tin u ed , the m ore E urope was devastated by A m erican bom bs and starved by th e B ritish blockade, th e closer the entire w orld m oved tow ard B olshevism .107 C ertainly, said th e plan’s supporters, B ritain was acting in a m ost h ypocrit­ ical fashion. Why, asked Senator Reynolds, should th e B ritish object to feed­ ing the starving children o f Belgium w hen th e U nited States was attem pting to save B ritish children by evacuating them at th at very tim e? “We can n o t p er­ m it M r. H oover to send food to aid starving peoples in occupied Europe,” re­ m arked H arry Elm er Barnes, “b u t we let dow n th e bars to shipm ents to Rus­ sia, w hich can send even w ar m aterials to Germany.” B oth Uncensored and Friday, a weekly totally su pporting th e com m unist line, accused B ritain o f o p ­ posing th e H oover plan b u t w inking a t w heat shipm ents to Franco’s Spain.108 T he U.S., too, was portrayed as lacking in candor, m ocking its ow n rhetoric concerning freedom o f th e seas.109

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By au tu m n 1941, H oover realized th a t his effort had failed. T he govern­ m ents in exile, including th e Belgians, w ere publicly repudiating his com m it­ tee; only th e Poles stood u p to B ritain. Sum m er harvests, claim s historian Jam es H . G eorge Jr., relieved th e im m ediate need for cross-blockade relief. At n o p o in t did th e polls ever indicate m ajority su p p o rt for H oover’s program .110 D ining th e balance o f the year, G eorge continues, th e NCFSD was relatively inactive. Senator V andenberg consistently trie d to have th e Senate Foreign Re­ lations C om m ittee hold hearings o n th e proposal, b u t he was unsuccessful. O n 19 O ctober, in a speech at Chicago, H oover attem pted to revive interest b u t offered n o new initiatives.111 W hen Japan attacked Pearl H arbor, his p ro ­ posal rem ained b uried in com m ittee, w ith no chance o f being released. A lthough H oover had draw n m uch su p p o rt, his plan rem ained tangential to th e fundam ental debates over intervention. T he fall o f W estern E urope led th e Roosevelt adm inistration to em bark on a series o f m easures th a t had n o t been rem otely envisioned earlier th a t year. A lthough FDR’s proposal m et w ith occasional anti-in terv en tio n ist endorsem ent, m ost foes o f involvem ent re­ m ained m ore suspicious o f th e president th an ever. Even his proposals for m ilitary defense w ere scrutinized m ost carefully.

7 ★

Protecting the Republic

Just as w ar was breaking o u t in Europe, O sw ald G arrison V illard offered an entire defense policy based on a strict continentalism . In Our Military Chaos (1939), he w rote th a t even if G erm any w on a E uropean conflict, it w ould be as unable to send an arm y to th e planet M ars as to th e U nited States. Sim ilarly, a Japan victorious in Asia w ould be too exhausted to undertake fu rth er m ili­ tary ventures overseas. T he real problem w ith the U.S. m ilitary, he m aintained, lay n o t in too little effort b u t rath er in too m uch. H e found the problem rooted in th e lack o f any com prehensive policy, for th e budget-breaking ex­ penditures had no relation to any established m ilitary program . A p opular w ar referendum was needed. So, too, was a blue-ribbon com m ission, com ­ posed o f b o th civilians and m ilitary officers, th at w ould define w hat was to be defended, how and w here it w ould be protected, and ju st w hat sum s w ere needed. To V illard him self, th e ultim ate choice lay in “w hether we are only to defend o u r shores, o r to prepare again to fight abroad.” 1 A nti-interventionists o f pacifist leanings strongly endorsed th e book, FOR executive H arold E. Fey calling V illard “a pacifist w ho can m eet m ilitary au ­ th o rities on th eir ow n ground.”2 H ugh Johnson, m ore cautious concerning the w ork, praised V illard’s call for an im partial, no n p artisan , an d extragovernm ental com m ission to exam ine defense policy.3 O th er com m entators w ere m ore critical. To Lindsey Rogers, political scien­ tist at C olum bia, V illard was too sim plistic in offering such suggestions as a cabinet secretary for national defense: “W hat is needed first is n o t unified ad ­ m in istratio n , b u t m ore thought.” G eorge Fielding Eliot, a m ilitary w riter soon active in interventionist ranks, concurred w ith V illard’s attack o n w aste b u t argued th a t defense o f U.S. shores was best assured by a navy “prepared to act 100

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offensively against enem y forces.” Livingston H artley, form er state d ep artm en t official and outspoken interventionist, endorsed th e call for a defense secre­ tary, b u t he asserted th at th e U nited States should incorporate L atin A m erica, particularly Brazil, into its plans. M ilitary w riter R. E rnest D upey found little m erit in th e entire w ork, saying o f V illard’s chapter KT he H uge G row th o f O u r M ilitary Forces,” “W ould it w ere tru e!”4 V illard continued his attack in th e American Mercury. T he arm y, he m ain­ tained in A pril 1940, was w asteful, antiquated, poorly adm inistered, and pos­ sessed too m any officers. N ot only was it caste-ridden, having one officer to fourteen soldiers, b u t its defense lacked even 25 percent efficiency. For exam ­ ple, scores o f arm y posts w ere outm oded tho u g h C ongress retained them for political reasons.5 Even presidential prom ises m et w ith V illard’s scorn. In attacking FDR’s fire­ side chat o f 26 M ay 1940, in w hich Roosevelt took credit for existing prepara­ tions, V illard accused him o f ignoring th e lack o f planes, antiaircraft guns, m ortars, and arm ored and scout vehicles. In May, V illard did endorse Roo­ sevelt’s appo in tm en t o f a civilian arm am ent board.6 In th e spring o f 1940, as W estern E urope fell to the N azi onslaught, n o n ­ interventionists bem oaned the n ation’s lack o f preparedness. O bviously som e partisanship co n trib u ted to th e criticism . Senator W iley, for exam ple, re­ m arked, “T he President an d H itler cam e in to pow er at th e sam e tim e. H itler prepared, th e President slept.”7 TTie critique, however, still rem ained.8 A m os P inchot m ourned, “We have no A rm y to speak of, a very sm all a ir force, inadequate coast defenses, p racti­ cally no antiaircraft guns, and a paralyzing public debt w hich w ill m ake ade­ quate m ilitary preparations possible only at th e cost o f a serious sacrifice in th e standard o f living.”9 Besides, anti-interventionists argued, th e U nited States lacked such crucial resources as chrom ite, bauxite, an d quicksilver. T here was n o t a single heavy tan k and only thirty -eig h t light and m edium ones. T here were fewer th an forty m illion m odern rifles and only a few dozen m odem cannon. T he arm y needed shoes, blankets, and canteens.10 A ccording to C ongressm an R obsion, th e U.S. had only one m echanized division, com ­ posed o f ab o u t fifteen thousand m en, and pitifully little antiaircraft equip­ m en t.11 As Senator D anaher saw it, th e n ation had n o t even retrained its labor force: “A m an w ho m akes pins does n o t know how to bore a gun barrel.” Chicago Tribune publisher R obert R. M cC orm ick was m ost succinct: “We have practically n o army.” 12 C om parisons were m ade to E uropean pow ers. Even recently defeated Bel­ gium , it was m aintained, had been b etter prepared. In M ay 1940, W illiam R andolph H earst contrasted the U.S. regular arm y o f 227,000, ill arm ed and insufficiently equipped, to “little Sw itzerland,” w hich had 480,000 m en fully prepared. As late as M arch 1941, C harles A. Lindbergh found the U nited States as unready as France and England had been in 1939.13

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Such com m ents w ere n o t o ff th e m ark. If th e U.S. led th e w orld in produc­ tio n , it ranked tw entieth in m ilitary pow er, even behind th e N etherlands. N oninterventionists often quoted to p adm inistration officials them selves: G eneral G eorge C. M arshall, arm y chief o f staff, o n th e lack o f a n titan k guns; A ssistant Secretary o f W ar Louis Johnson o n th e shortage o f new G arland ri­ fles; G eneral H ugh D rum , form er deputy chief o f staff, o n th e need for th e type o f equipm ent used currently in France.14 By th e spring o f 1940, Roosevelt was already responding to such criticism . O n 16 May, as G erm an arm ies poured in to n o rth ern France, he asked C on­ gress to authorize th e p roduction o f a t least fifty thou san d m ilitary planes a year, a sum th a t dw arfed recom m endations o f his ow n service officers. Al­ though he had requested tw enty thousand planes in 1938, his pleas now su d ­ denly intensified.15 He also sought $1.18 billion in defense appropriations; over h alf was slated for a “larger and m ore thoroughly ro unded Army.” 16 In his attem p t to gain su p p o rt, th e president presented som e frightening scenarios. A E uropean air squadron could d ep art from th e C ape Verde Islands o ff th e A frican coast, refuel in Latin A m erica, then strike such A m erican cities as St. Louis, Kansas City, and O m aha— all w ithin ju st over eighteen hours. Sim ilar attacks could be m ade via Alaska, G reenland, o r th e Azores. Ten days later, in his “fireside chat,” FDR used a m etaphor from th e recent Spanish Civil W ar, w arning against “th e fifth colum n th at betrays a n atio n unprepared for treachery.” H e also assailed those w ho had “closed th eir eyes to events abroad.”17 W ithin tw o weeks, C ongress exceeded FDR’s request by $320 m il­ lion, and w hen o n 31 M ay Roosevelt called for m ore m assive funds, C ongress appropriated an additional $1.7 b illio n .18 Still in all, for anti-interventionists, lack o f planning rem ained a sore po in t. W hat areas d id th e U nited States intend to defend? In opposing Roosevelt’s re­ quest o f M ay 1940, Uncensored asked, “If we do n o t know w here o u r vital in ­ terests begin, how can we decide intelligently w hat o u r defense needs are?”19 C ertainly Roosevelt’s m assive build u p involved risks o f th eir ow n. C olum nist Frank W aldrop w ent so far as to accuse the w ar dep artm en t o f planning fo r a new A m erican E xpeditionary Force, a “pay-roll arm y” involving “m asses o f m en, underarm ed, un d ertrain ed , and oversized.” O nly by planning offensive w ar, w rote Lawrence D ennis, could one spend in one year th e $9 o r $10 b il­ lion currently projected for defense.20 M oreover, it was sheer folly to take on pow erful enem ies.21 “G o to war?” asked Taft. “W ith w hat?” N oting th a t from 1925 to 1940 th e U nited States had spent only $21 m illion a year on the arm y, D ennis com m ented: “A n atio n th a t has been spending th is litd e o n its arm y has n o business indulging in rig h t­ eous indignation over w hat happens in E urope o r in im pulses to do som e­ th in g m ilitary abo u t it.”22 Such people countered w ith their ow n m ilitary proposals. W aldrop spoke in general term s o f “a really m echanized, m obile, fast-m oving, professional defense

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striking force o f the sort to repel boarders in this hem isphere” The New York Daily News, suspecting H itler o f w orld conquest, envisioned a ground force o f at least a m illion highly trained m en. The arm y, it said, could becom e Ha West Point for the masses.”23 In June 1940 M cCorm ick sought eighteen national guard divisions, eight regular arm y divisions o f 15,000 m en each, and an arm y totaling 280,000 m en ready to go anywhere on the N orth A m erican continent.24 A nti-interventionists becam e particularly uneasy w hen, o n 20 June, ju st tw o days before France sued for an "honorable peace,” Roosevelt announced tw o appointm ents to his cabinet. T he first was H enry L. Stim son, age seventytw o, slated to head th e w ar d epartm ent. A staunch R epublican, Stim son had been secretary o f w ar once before, from 1911 to 1913 u n d er President W illiam H ow ard Taft, an d had m ore recently served as H erbert H oover’s secretary o f state. H e was an ard en t interventionist w ho publicly endorsed com pulsory m ilitary training, th e im m ediate repeal o f th e 1939 n eutrality act, and the opening o f all U.S. p o rts to B ritish an d French ships needing repairs. In seek­ ing a m arked acceleration o f aircraft shipm ents to th e Allies, he m entioned the possibility o f A m erican ships convoying such arm am ents.25 The departing secretary o f w ar, H arry W oodring, had long been in th e a n ti­ interventionist cam p.26 For exam ple, in January 1940, his praise o f th e 1939 “cash-and-carry” act centered o n its role in lessening A m erican involvem ent in the war. Supposedly, three m onths before he was rem oved, W oodring told friends in Topeka th a t "a com paratively sm all clique o f international finan­ ciers” sought full-scale A m erican en try in to th e E uropean conflict. In stepping dow n, W oodring publicly claim ed th a t increased aid to Europe’s dem ocracies endangered national defense; in fact, he denied th a t th e U nited States had any quarrels overseas.27 H e claim ed to have been fired because he opposed Roo­ sevelt’s efforts to supply th e Allies, particularly th e transfer o f such w eapons as B-17s, called Flying Fortresses, to B ritain. Five days after th e secretary’s de­ p artu re, however, Roosevelt w rote him to th e effect th at th e bom bers should stay in th e U.S.28 Roosevelt’s second ap pointm ent was Frank Knox, publisher o f th e Chicago Daily News, w hom he chose to head th e navy departm ent. R epublican vicepresidential candidate ju st fo u r years previously, Knox had recently called for an arm y o f a m illion m en an d th e largest a ir force in th e w orld. M oreover, he w ould p u t "at th e disposal o f the B ritish all th e m unitions an d supplies needed to keep th e b attle going.”29 A nti-interventionists harped on the advanced years o f b o th nom inees, n o t­ ing th e irony o f Roosevelt’s w ell-know n attack in 1937 o n "over-aged” Suprem e C o u rt justices.30 M ore significant, th eir entire past record was strongly assailed. Knox and Stim son, W heeler said, em bodied th e "h eart o f W all Street.”31 A nti-R oosevelt statem ents by candidate Knox w ere dug u p w ith relish, including th e publisher’s claim th a t FDR was "overconfident, incau­ tious, self-w illed, uncertain, and unreliable,” a m an w hose leadership in tim e

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o f w ar "w ould be disastrous.”32 Nye condem ned Knox for having "denounced every single social reform w hich has been m ade.” H olt recalled th a t Stim son had favored conscription in 1916, opposed President W ilson’s peace efforts o f th at year, and— as President C oolidge’s m ediator in N icaragua— favored the sending o f m arines to p rotect $15 m illion o f A m erican investm ents.33 M ost im p o rtan t o f all was th e cu rren t interventionist views o f b o th nom i­ nees.34 The Japanese were right, w rote W illiam R. C astle, in considering Stim ­ son "th eir greatest enemy,” continuing th at "we need th e friendship o f Japan.” But Knox, too, appeared threatening. W heeler accused him , by prom oting aid to B ritain, o f encouraging "H ider, M ussolini, and C hurchill to keep on bom b­ ing cities, killing innocent w om en an d children, filling the hospitals w ith m en m ade insane by war.”35 O ccasionally an and-intervendonist endorsed one o r both appointm ents. The New York Daily News called Knox "an able and energetic m an, w ith an ex­ cellent record o f service in both the Spanish-A m erican and W orld Wars.” To the News, Stim son, though "a bit on the elderly side for w hat m ay be a m ankilling job,” was— like Knox— a m an o f "courage and honesty.” Vandenberg favored Knox’s confirm ation, though n o t Stim son’s, noting th at the Chicago publisher had spoken against U.S. convoys. O n 9 July, Stim son was confirm ed by a vote o f fifty-eight to tw enty-eight; on the next day, Knox was approved sixty-six to six­ teen.36 W ithin the adm inistration, the balance was now decisively tipped in favor o f the m ore m ilitant interventionists.37 T he firing o f W oodring raised a related issue: interventionist efforts to sup­ ply the Allies w ith vital w eapons th at, so anti-interventionists argued, the U nited States itself needed. In M arch 1940, C ongressm an John C. Schafer p ro ­ posed an am endm ent to a m ilitary ap propriations bill: no foreign pow er should be allow ed to purchase any type o f aircraft o r related equipm ent. O n hearing th at th e arm y m ight sell th e Allies planes capable o f flying four h u n ­ dred m iles p er hour, including the C urtiss P-40 fighter, he w arned, "A friendly co u n try today m ay be an enem y tom orrow , o r be u n d er th e control o f an u n ­ friendly country.”38 O n 6 June, the navy d epartm ent, w ith th e president’s approval, announced th a t som e fifty C urtiss-W right scout bom bers w ere being sold to the besieged French. " If we give unlim ited arm s and w ar supplies to th e Allies,” asked Lundeen, "how are we going to train o u r ow n Army? W ith cornstalks and broom ­ sticks?” Even if ju st lim ited to train in g pilots, such aircraft, argued colum nist A1 W illiam s, was crucial.39 W ithin tw o weeks, the ad m inistration had released tw enty o f th e navy’s fastest torp ed o boats and subm arine chasers to th e B ritish. Also scheduled were m ilitary aircraft and huge stocks o f th e arm y’s W orld W ar I rifles, seventy-five-m illim eter guns, m ortars, m achine guns, and am m unition.40 A nti-interventionists offered m any objections: France had already fallen. A rticle V III o f the H ague C onvention o f 1907 forbade such acts. T he U nited

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States could face legal action from G erm any. T he m ove violated U.S. crim inal codes. A m erican naval crews and fliers w ould be shipped next. Indeed, th e na­ tio n was com m itting an act o f war.41 R epresentative Schafer called for th e res­ ignation o f H enry M orgenthau because— as acting secretary o f the navy— the treasury secretary had approved th e sale.42 T he controversy soon blew over, for Roosevelt canceled the release on 24 June, doing so on the grounds th at his attorney general had found th at the transfer violated a law enacted in 1917.43 O n 28 June, th e Senate passed an am endm ent to th e Naval Expansion Bill, introduced by Senator D avid I. W alsh (D em .-M ass.) and subsequently signed by FDR, forbidding the disposal o f any arm y o r navy m atériel unless either the chief o f staff o r the chief o f naval op­ erations certified th e w eapons involved as unessential to A m erican defense.44 All du rin g this tim e, B ritain’s chances o f survival appeared poor. In th e 24 June issue o f Life m agazine, w hich reported on th e G erm ans entering Paris, th e interventionist weekly found it “alm ost beyond hope th at E ngland can stand o ff G erm any very long.” In July, it described B ritain as facing a “life-anddeath” fight o n its ow n shores.45 O n 11 June, C aptain Alan G. Kirk, U.S. naval attaché in L ondon, predicted invasion by 1 August. B ritain, he said, was no m ore prepared to defend itself th an Long Island, New York. In m id-June, B reckinridge Long did n o t rule o u t a B ritish collapse w ithin a m onth.46 Key P ittm an w rote o ff Europe altogether, saying B ritain m ust “fight from th e New W orld w ith o u r Navy.”47 H ence, w ithin th e Roosevelt ad m inistration itself, strong reluctance to aid­ ing B ritain existed. Even th e shipm ent o f a thousand planes, argued Long, could only last th e Allies a week. T he U nited States, advised w ar departm ent planners o n 22 May, should confine its defense to th e A m erican co n tin en t and possessions east o f Midway. C hief o f Staff G eorge C. M arshall in particu lar objected to expending A m erican m atériel in w hat appeared a hopeless cause. H e vetoed the sale o f any fighter plane requested by C hurchill, disapproved o f any ship transfer, and agreed only to send rifles, m achine guns, and field pieces left over from W orld W ar I.48 T he loss o f even a hundred A m erican planes, cautioned arm y air force chief G eneral H enry (“H ap”) A rnold, w ould set pilo t train in g back six m onths, cu t th e U.S. supply by o n e-fo u rth , and expose H aw aii, th e C anal Z one, and th e C aribbean to attack. Even shipping seventyfive-m illim eter guns w ould p u t th e natio n behind by tw o years.49 M ajor W al­ ter Bedell Sm ith, a m em ber o f th e G eneral Staff C orps, w arned th at if th e U.S. eventually needed such w eapons, “everyone w ho was a p arty to the deal m ight hope to be found hanging from a lam p post.” Treasury Secretary H enry M or­ genthau Jr., w ho favored aiding the Allies, m ourned, “We haven’t got one air­ plane today th at has got the things they [the Allies] needed if they w ent up against a G erm an plane. N ot one. G uns are o f such sm all caliber th at they can’t pierce th e arm o r o f th e G erm ans. We have n o t got one bom ber flying th a t has a gun on its tail to defend itself.”50

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At this stage, in fact, historians J. G arry Clifford and Sam uel R. Spencer Jr. find M arshall’s views com patible w ith the “G ibraltar America” ideas soon espoused by the Am erica First Com m ittee. “It seems plain,” said Assistant Secretary Berle, “th at o u r job is to collect the strongest and solidest defense force we can, and not to fritter away sm all detachm ents to the other side o f the Atlantic.”51 T he G allup poll o f late M ay 1940 revealed caution, 64 percent opposing aid to B ritain and France if such assistance risked U.S. en try in to th e war.52 In re­ gard to the five thousand planes retained by th e A m erican arm ed forces, less th an 50 percent polled by G allup w anted any sale at all.53 By m id-June, G allup indicated 35 percent predicting a G erm an-Italian victory; 32 percent, an Al­ lied one; and 33 percent, undecided.54 Q uite possibly only in m id-July d id Roosevelt him self really believe th a t th e B ritish m ight survive and thereby m eet adm in istratio n criteria for m assive aid.55 Early in July, Roosevelt had seen B ritain’s chances as one in three; by late July, fifty-fifty.56 H ere a m ission to B ritain o f a close friend, C olonel W illiam J. D onovan, played a crucial role, for D onovan subm itted an optim istic rep o rt.57

D ebate over torp ed o craft and subm arine chasers soon to o k o n m uch w ider ram ifications, and to u nderstand anti-in terv en tio n ist sentim ent, one m ust ex­ am ine various appraisals o f sea pow er.58 As p a rt o f its general rearm am ent program , th e Roosevelt adm inistration requested a vastly strengthened navy. In January 1940, for exam ple, th e adm inistration sought to increase naval strength som e 25 percent, to be gained by a congressional allocation o f $1.3 billion. All du rin g th e spring o f 1940, it kept u p the pressure. U ntil the fall o f France and often thereafter, m any noninterventionists re­ sisted. To the New Republic, such efforts reflected a “m ilitarism gone m ad.” T he Christian Century concurred, accusing Roosevelt o f shifting away from needed electrification, highw ay construction, and farm relief. H am ilton Fish attacked th e naval lobby. Just before naval ap propriations w ere due, said the New York congressm an in A pril 1940, A m ericans w ould be to ld th at Japan was building sixty-five-thousand-ton battleships, th a t its navy was larger th an th a t o f th e U nited States, an d th at “we are alm ost in th e sam e category as C hina o r Abyssinia o r Poland.” Besides, Fish argued, a prospective enem y was b o u n d to see m assive naval increases as provocative. The U.S. should n o t “extend the M onroe D octrine 10,000 m iles to th e Far East.”59 T hen there was the factor o f m ilitary effectiveness. All d u rin g th e debates over intervention, certain an ti-interventionists deem ed battleships, in p artic­ ular, obsolete.60 T hey never appeared in any engagem ents, said th e H earst press; they could n o t be tended at m ost d ry docks and w ere incapable o f pass­ ing through the Panam a C anal.61 In particular, such critics rem arked, air

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pow er had m ade th e battleship antiquated.62 W arships, com m ented C harles A. L indbergh, invariably suffered heavy losses w hen com ing w ithin striking dis­ tances o f enem y aviation. It to o k a battleship ten days, rem arked Senator Reynolds, to travel from San Francisco to New York; a fleet o f bom bers, tran s­ p o rtin g to n s o f high explosives, could m ake the sam e trip in eleven hours.63 Such criticism was often prom pted by a com m ent o f Secretary o f th e Navy C harles Edison, w ho, early in M ay 1940, asserted th a t U.S. naval vessels needed revam ping because th eir topsides w ere vulnerable to air attack.64 H arry Elm er B arnes had his ow n authority, A dm iral Yates Stirling, form er chief o f staff o f th e U.S. Fleet, w ho m aintained th at th e navy was building unseaw orthy ships a t exorbitant cost.65 Recent incidents w ere cited as evidence o f the battleship’s im potence, including th e sinking o f th e B ritish Royal Oak in Scapa Flow and th e G erm an Bismarck in th e n o rth A tlantic and the B ritish pulverization o f the Italian fleet a t Taranto.66 C ost, too, was a factor in th e a ir-se a com parison.67 An entire a ir fleet, said Senator Reynolds, could be purchased for about $80 m illion, som ething th at certainly could n o t be said o f a m ajor naval force. D anaher asserted th a t the $120 m illion spent o n tw o battleships could be far b etter spent on twelve h u n ­ d red planes ready for delivery w ithin a few m onths.68 To such people, talk o f a tw o-ocean navy appeared particularly irresponsi­ ble.69 A ccording to C olonel M cC orm ick, a “one-ocean navy,” using the Panam a C anal, could be ju st as effective. If navies o n b o th m ajor oceans si­ m ultaneously attacked th e U nited States, he continued, A m erican ships could defend o n one side w hile attacking o n th e other. In a broadcast in Septem ber 1940, th e C hicago publisher w ent further, saying, “Surface sea pow er is dying, an d it is a very good th in g for us th a t it is.” T he A m ericans, he said, had n o t been a seafaring people since th e days o f th e clippers. T he U nited States lacked th e needed reserve forces; it had co ntributed little to naval design; its ship­ builders w ere “the w orst in th e w orld”; an d its m erchant seam en w ere organ­ ized “in a com m unist u nion ready to sabotage o u r n ation on orders from Moscow.” In th e future, predicted M cC orm ick in June 1941, th e navy’s role w ould be lim ited to providing floating landing fields, from w hich dive bom bers an d torp ed o planes could destroy any surface craft.70 Yet am ong anti-interventionists, consensus rem ained elusive. Certainly, there was no massive bloc o f congressional anti-interventionists opposing the m ajor appropriations. Even Fish, a strong critic o f a large navy, ended up voting for them .71 In the H ouse, only left-w ing Congressm an V ito M arcantonio dissented from the Ship C onstruction Bill and Aviation Expansion Bill o f May 1940.72 C ertainly adm in istratio n critics stressed th e potential o f th e existing A m er­ ican navy, im plying th a t m assive increases w ere n o t needed.73 In M arch 1940, Fish found th e U nited States already possessing the greatest navy in its history, one already equal to th a t o f th e B ritish, three and a h alf tim es as large as G er­ m any’s, tw ice as large as Italy’s, and 50 percent larger th an Japan’s.74 In A ugust

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1941, W heeler said th at he had n o t found an A m erican naval officer w ho be­ lieved th at th e U.S. fleet was outnum bered by G erm any’s. F urtherm ore, G er­ m an craft was n o t b u ilt for long-range service b u t sim ply for action o n the Baltic Sea o r along Europe’s coast.7S Such confidence in th e U.S. Navy had m ore erudite proponents. Two m ajor con trib u to rs to Common Sense, Flem ing M acLiesh an d C ushm an Reynolds, called th e fleet the m ost pow erful in existence; its gunnery was probably the best, its ships able to venture fu rth er th an those o f any o th er n ation. To H an­ son Baldw in, th e com bined sea pow er o f all four o f th e U nited States’s p o ten ­ tial enem ies— G erm any, Japan, Russia, and Italy— was som ew hat superior, b u t it was n o t sufficient to endanger A m erican security.76 C ertainly th e U.S. Navy could n o t be o u tb u ilt, even if H itler engaged all Europe, including a con­ quered E ngland, to the task.77 Som e noninterventionists w anted th e fleet, o r at least certain aspects o f it, expanded.78 In the Senate, D avid W alsh was particularly outspoken. C hairm an o f its Senate Naval C om m ittee, th e M assachusetts D em ocrat specifically de­ nied th a t air pow er had m ade th e batdeship obsolete. Heavily gunned an d a r­ m ored battleships, he m aintained, could w ithstand any arm or-piercing p ro ­ jectiles.79 In M ay 1940, Taft pointed to th e slow ness o f U.S. naval construction as com pared to th at o f the Japanese.80 H earst stressed th e building o f naval cruisers, em phasizing th e factor o f speed.81 C ertain adm inistration critics, such as C harles A. Lindbergh and W illiam Castle, specifically called for a tw o-ocean navy.82 The New York Daily News en­ gaged in a veritable crusade on its behalf.83 Using the m otto Mtw o ships for one,” m eaning th at the U nited States should have a tw o-to-one superiority over any potential rival, the News saw such a navy insuring continued access to a host o f goods: coffee, rubber, rare m etals needed for steel alloys, an d drugs produced in the tropics.84 In July 1940, it endorsed FDR’s signing o f “a tw o-ocean Navy bill,” providing for a navy o f three m illion tons.85 Even after calling for accom ­ m odation w ith Japan, the News sought naval dom inance in the Pacific.86

If an ti-interventionists had a favorite w eapon, it lay in aviation.87 As A1 W illiam s w rote, “T he nation th at rules by air will rule th e w orld.” A rchitect Frank Lloyd W right found a “super-air force” as essential to the n atio n ’s wel­ fare as “a tru e non-w ar-breeding organic internal economy.”88 To such people, the controversial aviation pioneer G eneral Billy M itchell was a prophetic fig­ ure and he was often so treated.89 T he airplane appeared to offer th e ideal defense, dovetailing nicely w ith the anti-in terv en tio n ist stress on hem ispheric protection. F urtherm ore, air pow er prom ised victory independent o f o th er m üitary branches, m ade m inim al de-

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m ands o n th e A m erican populace, and supposedly acted as an in stru m en t o f surgical precision, thereby incapacitating an enem y w ithout slaughter.90 A1 W illiam s was particularly vocal in this regard, and various an ti-in te r­ ventionists cited him w ith approval. W illiam s w rote a daily aviation colum n for th e Scripps-H ow ard press an d a weekly one for th e Progressive. A flight train er for th e navy d u rin g W orld W ar I, he designed a com bat plane and flew in air races w hen the conflict ended. By 1929, he was th e m ost fam ous naval aviator in th e n ation. In 1932, he entered the M arine C orps A viation Reserve, receiving th e ran k o f m ajor w ithin three years. Yet his outspoken persistence o n behalf o f an independent air force and, above all, a unified defense plan for all services drew official reprim ands. In July 1940, W illiam s was forced to re­ sign from the corps, to w hich he replied, “Free speech, hell! T hat freedom is only for those in power.”91 W illiam s’s book Airpower (1940) was a veritable m anifesto o n the topic. T he bulk o f th e tact focused o n appraisals o f specific aircraft. H is firsthand observations o f E uropean politics, however, based on trip s m ade in 1936 and 1938, m ade it a m ost controversial w ork. An arch-conservative, W illiam s con­ sidered France’s Popular Front com m unist, opposed B ritish pressure o n M us­ solini d u rin g th e E thiopian crisis, and strongly defended the new Spanish gov­ ernm ent o f G eneral Francisco Franco. H e w ent so far as to blam e the d estruction o f G uernica o n “th e dynam ite and incendiarism o f the Reds and anarchists.”92 Sim ilarly, the New D eal m et w ith W illiam s’s scorn. H e saw contem porary A m erican interventionism rooted in the effort to alleviate th e nation’s eco­ nom ic disasters. N ot only was Roosevelt’s dom estic policy a failure b u t the president had also acted irresponsibly in placing a m oral em bargo on Italy d u rin g the E thiopian war, “tolerating” th e Sino-Japanese conflict for years, an d failing “to enforce th e law against recruiting A m erican m anpow er for the Spanish Loyalist Army.” The aviator opposed U.S. gold purchases from Eng­ land and Russia, th e latter pow er being “th e bloodiest sponsor o f m ass m u r­ d er in the pages o f history.” Now, he said, the ad m inistration was seeking to enter th e conflict directly. O nce the public realized th a t “A m erica’s political an d financial clothing was becom ing shabby an d w orn,” “o u r in ternational politicians began w eaving a dread w ar cloak o f om inous hue for Am erica’s u n ­ w illing shoulders, designed to hide th e threadbare and shiny spots o f o u r n a­ tio n ’s econom ic garb.”93 M ore particularly, said W illiam s, the entire U.S. defense system rem ained in deplorable shape, “about o n e-q u arter b u ilt and m ore th an tw ice paid for.”94 H e called the U nited States a seventh-rate arm y pow er, a seventh-rate sea pow er, and a fifth- o r sixth-rate air power. A m erican leaders had n o t even sketched a coordinated national defense plan. Particularly opposed to sending “o u r first-line w arplanes” overseas, W illiam s blam ed th e Roosevelt adm inis­ tratio n , “B ritish and French money,” and “th e interventionist financiers o f

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Wall Street* for betraying th e nation to such a degree th a t B enedict A rnold w ould “look like a sportsm an and th e exposures o f 1914-1918 look like nurs­ ery rhym es.”95 N ot unexpectedly, several an ti-in terv en tio n ists strongly endorsed his w ork.96 H anson Baldw in found th e book to contain m uch valuable inform a­ tio n , though he accused W illiam s o f overstating his case, acting as tta partisan w ith a grievance.”97 O ther review ers w ere less certain. Newsweek praised his description o f various aircraft in recent m ilitary cam paigns, w hile finding him a m an o f "vituperative rhetoric,” "shrill to th e p o in t o f fanaticism .” G eorge Fielding Eliot challenged W illiam s’s assertion th at th e day o f sea pow er was over, for— Eliot claim ed— “the seas rem ain th e great com m ercial highw ay o f th e w orld.” W hile conceding air pow er as an essential elem ent o f w arfare, Eliot p ointed to G erm any’s recent cam paign in W estern E urope as evidence th a t it was m ost effectively used in coordination w ith ground forces. W riting in the New Republic, M ax Gissen saw W illiam s as “clear and fo rth rig h t” o n such m at­ ters as "fixed-pitch versus controllable-pitch propellers” b u t said his politics w ere uncom fortably close to Father C oughlin’s Social Justice,n In his crusade for air pow er, W iliam s had m any allies. H earst’s press was particularly adam ant on th e issue. For exam ple, an editorial in his San Fran­ cisco Examiner, published in N ovem ber 1939, was titled "T he Best D efense for U.S.”99 Like several o th er an ti-in terv en tio n ists, H earst cited L ieutenant C olonel T hom as R. Phillips, a general staff officer w ho boasted th a t the bom ber repelled all th reat o f invasion.100 T he New York Daily News was equally enthusiastic. In D ecem ber 1939, it stated th a t U.S. defense depended on the purchase o f fast p u rsu it planes, w hich cost one-fifth as m uch as th e overrated bom ber. If placed in m ajor strategic points— for exam ple, C uba, New York, Jacksonville, C old H arbor, H awaii, the A leutians, and possibly Sam oa— enem y bom bers m ight be "cut dow n” before they reached A m erican coasts.101 Recent m ilitary events were frequently cited to prove air pow er’s superiority. Aviation, said Senator Reynolds, played the prim ary role in subjugating Poland, Finland, and Norway.102 O n 10 May, som e seventy-two G erm an paratroopers had captured the fort o f Eben Emael, the key to Belgium’s entire defense system. Tem porary air suprem acy m ade the m iraculous evacuation at D unkirk possible. Both the Battle o f Britain and the strikes on G erm an cities revealed air power’s invincibility.103 In the G erm an capture o f Crete for the first tim e in history, a m ajor m ilitary victory had been gained entirely by an air force.104 By the m iddle o f 1940, therefore, FDR critics were am ong th e m ost vocal in deploring the paucity o f A m erican planes.10S In May, C olonel M cC orm ick w anted five thousand new aircraft. The U nited States, A1 W illiam s w arned, lacked a single squadron capable o f m atching th e perform ance o f G erm an Spitfighters, M esserschm itts, and H einkels. "We are defenseless in th e air,” he w rote tw o m onths later.106

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As in th e case o f evaluating air strength, an ti-interventionists quoted A m er­ ican m ilitary leaders them selves. A m ong them was Navy Secretary Edison, w ho in M ay 1940 reported th a t th e U.S. had been provided w ith only eightyseven new planes since w ar began; A rm y A ir C orps G eneral H ap A rnold, w ho noted th a t only fifty-tw o U.S. planes w ere equipped for m odem w arfare; and an arm y colonel w ho found th e U nited States needing 50,000 pilots, 750,000 g ro u n d personnel, and 9,000 antiaircraft guns.107 P articular atten tio n was given to th e views o f C aptain Eddie Rickenbacker, W orld W ar I ace an d general m anager o f E astern A ir Lines. In A ugust 1940, R ickenbacker called for a q uarter-m illion planes and h a lf a m illion pilots to protect th e n atio n from air invasion.106 A p articu lar hero to an ti-in terv en ­ tionists, Rickenbacker was nom inated by th e Chicago Tribune to direct avia­ tio n p rocurem ent.109 W hen th e A m erica First C om m ittee was first organized, Rickenbacker served o n th e national com m ittee b u t w ithdrew alm ost im m e­ diately, giving n o reason.110 As p a rt o f his address given to a jo in t session o f C ongress o n 16 M ay 1940, Roosevelt, as noted, called for building fifty thou san d m ilitary planes.111 Som e anti-interventionists, including th e New York Daily News, strongly su pported th e m ove.112 An arm y o f a m illion, it stressed, should be supplem ented by technical train in g o f ab o u t a h u n d red thou san d pilots an d fifty thousand fighter planes.113 T he Chicago Tribune w elcom ed the president’s a ir program an d endorsed th e president’s call for train in g a large num ber o f flyers, al­ tho u g h it found him evasive o n such crucial m atters as artillery, am m unition, an d an tiaircraft w eapons.114 M ore noninterventionists dem urred. To C olonel L indbergh, it was childish to speak in term s o f fifty thou san d planes w hen th e cost was so prohibitive. A rguing th a t th e aircraft w ould cost at least $7 billion, John T. Flynn asked, “W ho is to pay for it? How? A nd w hen?” T he sum , A1 W illiam s feared, could go even higher, reaching $10 billion. L indbergh also raised an o th er m atter, th at o f train ed personnel. To im plem ent th e president’s request, he said, at least a q u arter o f a m illion m en w ere needed, n o t sim ply th e twelve thousand FDR m en tio n ed .115 As often concerning Roosevelt, his adversaries suspected u lterio r m otives. D ennis denied th e U nited States could use even ten thousand planes; fifty thou san d planes, he argued, could only be used effectively by an arm y o f three m illion m obile troops. Flynn called th e president’s proposal a “gigantic w arscare hoax.” Such requests, L indbergh believed, w ere predicated on th e U.S. fighting in th e E uropean w ar.116 T he m ore m oderate H anson Baldw in saw no th reat w arranting Roosevelt’s request. T he U nited States, he m aintained, had noth in g to fear from Japan, a w eak a ir pow er. G erm any possessed eight th o u ­ sand planes at m ost, w ith only a handfiil being able to cross th e southern A t­ lantic. At any rate, argued W illiam s, th e new aircraft w ere earm arked for Eu­ rope, w here they could do little to defend th e U.S.117

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Yet in 1941, dem ands for increased a ir pow er rem ained. M ost planes on hand, Lindbergh asserted in January, w ere obsolete. In an article published in Collier’s late in M arch, th e aviator claim ed th a t th e weekly w arplane p roduc­ tio n o f G erm any surpassed th e total inventory o f A m erican fighting planes.11' In June 1941, the A m erica First C om m ittee considered plane pro d u ctio n dis­ tressingly sm all, particularly th a t o f long-range bom bers. It also noted Boake C arter’s claim th at th e U nited States was sending overseas up to 70 percent o f th e w eapons needed to m eet any invasion. By Septem ber 1941, A1 W illiam s was finding A m erican bom bers first-rate b u t m aintained th a t th e fliers still needed a year’s train in g .119 A good m any noninterventionists— Lundeen, W illiam s, and Representative James Van Z andt (Rep.-Pa.) am ong them — called for a separate departm ent o f the air, citing Billy M itchell as authority.120 The proposal had no m ore m ilitant and persistent advocate than the New York Daily News.121 The British and G er­ m ans served as the News's m odels, both nations possessing the m ost pow erful air forces in the w orld.122 O f all the first-class m ilitary powers o f the w orld, only caste-bound Japan, stated the News, did n o t have an independent air force.123 Som e anti-interventionists, however, found air pow er’s p o tential exagger­ ated, and a t tim es even outspoken air proponents tem pered th eir enthusiasm . A viation was insufficient, it was often argued; it m ust be used in conjunction w ith o th er forces. In the w ords o f C olonel M cC orm ick, “It is only a p a rt— th o a vital p a rt— o f the army.” A nother tim e the C hicago publisher said, “If the ground forces are equal, sup erio rity in th e air w ill be decisive; if air forces are equal, superiority on th e ground w ill decide.” The New York Daily News con­ curred, saying, “T he air plane can n o t besiege a city as effectively as an arm y can.” Furtherm ore, the in fan try m ust hold territo ry “after th e planes and tanks have blasted th eir way.”124 Any b elief in th e sufficiency o f air pow er, w rote Lawrence D ennis, resem ­ bled faith in the prow ess o f such com ic strip figures as Superm an o r Popeye. N ot a single m ilitary leader, he continued, believed th a t planes alone could de­ feat G erm any. “W ars are n o t w on w ith o r by m achines b u t by m en— good fighting m en,” he w rote. H ugh Johnson w ent so far as to take on th e ghost o f Billy M itchell. C alling th e aviation prophet “an air enthusiast w ith th e show ­ m anship o f P. T. B arnum ,” Johnson m aintained th at M itchell had been unable to sink a battleship in tests th at replicated com bat conditions an d th at his bom bing raids on naval bases had flopped.125 M oreover, to air pow er critics, n o t all recent events show ed its efficacy. The Spanish Civil W ar proved th at th e bom bing o f cities alone could n o t w in a w ar. In Finland, th e Russians dropped 6,667 bom bs b u t killed only eighteen civilians.126 In referring to G erm any’s recent conquest o f W estern Europe, the New York Daily News com m ented, “B om bing did n o t topple these countries; th e infantry did.” To Lawrence D ennis, th e fall o f France offered sufficient ev­ idence: “W hat the G erm ans have done to th e French in 1940 w ith planes they

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did in 1870 w ith o u t planes o r tanks. A nd C aesar did it a couple o f th o u san d years ago w ith o u t fire arm s. T he G erm ans have had in 1940 sup erio rity in the air, b u t it w ould have been useless w ithout superiority on the land in quality an d q u an tity o f fighting m en.” 127 C ontinued evidence appeared daily. The Japanese controlled th e air over C hina b u t still could no t defeat the governm ent o f C hiang Kai-shek. A lthough M alta and G ibraltar had been bom bed innum erable tim es, they rem ained invul­ nerable bases for the British Em pire. The survival o f the British Isles themselves, com m ented H earst, show ed th at “we have overestim ated the im portance o f air pow er as an aggressive force operating at a distance from its base.” 128All these ob­ servations led to one conclusion. W hile air pow er m ight be the one essential w eapon in A m erican defense, it could not in itself cause G erm any’s d e fe at129 Ironically, such a n ti-in te rv e n tio n ist a ir advocates as L indbergh an d W illiam s helped prepare th e way for Roosevelt’s ow n deepening em phasis on a ir pow er. T he president m ight be calling for fifty thou san d planes w hile Lind­ bergh found ten thousand sufficient, b u t b o th presented aircraft as the linch­ p in o f hem ispheric defense.130 A year before w ar broke o u t, in th e m idst o f th e M unich crisis, FDR had fo u n d th a t any G erm an defeat lay in a sim ultaneous air pounding by B ritain, France, an d th e Soviet U nion. In th e president’s o pinion, recorded Ickes,“T his k in d o f w ar w ould cost less m oney, w ould m ean few casualties, and w ould be m ore likely to succeed th an a trad itio n al w ar by land an d sea.” C ertainly a “huge a ir force” w ould preclude th e need for a “huge army,” som ething th at— according to Treasury Secretary M orgenthau— FDR saw as b o th “undesirable an d politically o u t o f th e question.”131 T h o u g h FDR alw ays rem ained a stro n g navalist, he— like L indbergh— exaggerated th e scope an d stren g th o f G erm an aircraft, w hose n u m b er o f fro n t-lin e planes hid w eaknesses in train in g , reserve, an d in d u stria l capac­ ity. G erm an field m arshal E rhard M ilch, th e d o m in a n t figure in G erm an a irc ra ft p ro d u ctio n , claim ed th a t h ad France attacked ju st after his n a tio n invaded P oland, th e Luftw affe w ould have been relegated to th e sidelines. In F eb ru ary 1940, th e U.S. naval attach é to G erm any estim ated G erm an a ir p ro d u c tio n a t eighteen h u n d red to tw o th o u sa n d planes p e r m o n th ; in re ­ ality th e average fo r all 1940 w as u n d e r n in e h u n d red a m o n th .132 In fact, th o u g h G erm any possessed th e largest fleet o f bom bers in E urope, it d id n o t a tte m p t to develop long-range heavy bom bers u n til 1942, an d even th e n its effo rt w as h a lf-h e arted .133

T he Roosevelt adm inistration never placed total faith in air pow er. O n 20-21 June 1940, as France was signing su rren d er term s in the C om piègne forest,

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S en ato r E dw ard R. B urke (D em .-N ebr.) a n d R epresentative Jam es S. W adsw orth (Rep.-N.Y.) sponsored th e first peacetim e conscription bills in A m erican history. B oth proposals called for registering som e forty m illion m en betw een ages tw enty-one and forty-five for possible m ilitary training. At th e tim e th e B urke-W adsw orth bill was introduced, th e regular arm y con­ sisted o f 255,000 m en, th e national guard o f 230,000. T he bill w ould increase th e regular arm y to 500,000, th e N ational G uard to 400,000.134 Roosevelt a t first appeared h esitant abo u t su pporting th e proposal, w hich was th e b rainstorm o f th e prom inent lawyer G renville C lark an d th e M ilitary T raining C am ps A ssociation. In accepting his p arty ’s n om ination o n 19 July, th e president asserted th a t "som e form o f selection by draft is as fair and nec­ essary today as it was in 1917 and 1918.” Ttao weeks later, a t a press conference, he fo rthrightly endorsed "a selective train in g bill.” T he U nited States, said FDR, did n o t ju st require w eapons; it needed the train ed m en to use them . H e w ent on: “You cannot get a sufficiently train ed force o f all kinds at th e front, in th e Navy yards and the arsenals, tran sp o rtatio n , supply system , and m u n i­ tions o u tp u t, you cannot get it ju st by passing an Act o f C ongress w hen w ar breaks o u t, an d you cannot get it by th e m ere volunteer system.” H ence, im ­ m ediate conscription was crucial. G eneral G eorge C. M arshall, arm y chief o f staff, backed th e president fully.135 Several prom inent anti-interventionists also favored conscription. O n 15 June, C harles A. Lindbergh to ld a radio audience, “T he m en o f this co u n try m ust be w illing to give a year o f th eir lives to m ilitary train in g — m ore if nec­ essary.” C olum nist Frank W aldrop found conscription needed as th e U nited States itself em barked o n a new wave o f im perialism . R obert Rice Reynolds, chairm an o f the Senate A rm ed Services C om m ittee, w ent so far as to prom ise th a t th e bill w ould im prove th e n ation’s health, for th e conscripts w ould re­ ceive m edical and dental care plus “three good w holesom e m eals every day.” 136 The New York Daily News, in backing conscription, argued th a t only th e d raft could “ro u n d up th e cream o f o u r strong, sm art, young and b ru tal m ale population, an d p u t it as fast as we can through a course o f train in g in the m ethods o f total war.” 137 It called for th e universal m ilitary train in g o f every A m erican m ale, beginning a t age nineteen.138 H ugh Johnson voiced particular enthusiasm . In 1917, serving u nder Judge Advocate G eneral Enoch Crowder, Johnson had directed the entire selective service effort. Now he found volunteer recruitm ent lagging dangerously. M ore­ over, in conscription lay the m ost efficient way to raise an arm y, as draftees cost only a fraction o f the sum needed to m aintain volunteers. Johnson’s m ain de­ fense o f conscription was, however, staunchly anti-interventionist: “W ith o u r strength o f m en and resources we can take a defensive position w hich nobody will ever dare threaten.” H e hoped th at he w ould again be called to direct the draft, b u t, having tangled w ith the president continually in his new spaper col­ um n, he rem ained persona non grata at the W hite H ouse.139

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A m ong the anti-interventionists, th e proconscription view attracted only a decided m inority. Far m ore opposed B urke-W adsw orth. To such people, the bill often sm acked o f totalitarian ism .140 W illiam H enry C ham berlin saw the m ove a greater danger to the U nited States th an H itler. H arry Elm er Barnes called th e draft “th e first step to A m erican fascism,” saying th a t it w ould “give us m illions o f h alf-trained an d half-baked little m ilitarists, m ore cocky and conceited th an one o f H itler’s storm troopers. T hey w ould th in k them selves perfect N apoleons.” 141 W heeler even doubted th e bill’s constitutionality.142 Loss o f liberty becam e a m ajor argum ent. N ot only w ould th e n ation’s young m en be deprived o f elem entary civil liberties; A m ericans as a w hole w ould lose fundam ental rig h ts.143 To Taft, th e logical conclusion o f peacetim e conscription was “th e conscription o f everything— property, m en, industries, an d all labor.”144 Besides, th e m echanics o f th e bill appeared m ost unfair. T he selection process was arbitrary, salaries low. U rban m unitions w orkers could be de­ ferred w hile ru ral youth w ere m ustered.14S N ot only did th e procedure unnec­ essarily d isru p t m any lives; em ploym ent after service w ould invariably be dif­ ficu lt.146 A dm inistrative problem s were heavy, cost and provisioning steep, an d the n atio n ’s econom y w eakened in th e process.147 T raining was skim py, fa­ cilities m iserable.148 T he needed equipm ent m ight be lacking for tw o years.149 M ore im p o rtan t from a strategic p o in t o f view, m ass arm ies appeared o u t­ m oded. To W heeler, sheer num bers o f troops did n o t com pensate for lack o f effectiveness; they actually increased th e danger. “M illions o f m en,” said Wiley, if lacking th e m eans o f stopping “these superdreadnoughts an d the a ir a r­ m ada,” were “sheep before the wolf.” 150 A nti-interventionists could n o t help n oting th a t n either C anada n o r Aus­ tralia had resorted to this device.151 Furtherm ore, as H itler's spring blitzkrieg h ad show n, conscription in Belgium , H olland, and France had done those n a­ tio n s little good. In fact, fifty thousand train ed and w ell-equipped G erm ans h ad defeated tw o m illion French conscripts.152 C ertainly, as will later be show n, FDR’s foes always m aintained th a t danger o f invasion was n o t com pelling.153 Any potential enemy, m aintained Fish, faced a superior A m erican navy and air force. A ccording to Senator Downey, m ilitary experts argued th at w hen soldiers and m atériel were tran sp o rted five thou san d m iles, th eir potential was reduced five to ten tim es.154 How, it was asked m ore pointedly, could H itler threaten th e U nited States w hen he could n o t conquer B ritain?155 A few anti-interventionists suspected th a t a new A m erican E xpeditionary Force lay in th e w ings. Asked V andenberg, “W hy th is positively frenzied speed to upset th e volunteer system? W hat is in th e w ind?” 156 Perhaps, asked th e socialists, hem ispheric im perialism lay b ehind it all. The Call offered a unique analysis, claim ing th at th e new conscripts w ould be sent to Latin A m erica. The greatest w ar danger, w rote N orm an T hom as, resided in

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U.S. action against M exico o r an even m ore distan t South A m erican lan d .,S7 T he anti-interventionist alternative? Again th e stress lay o n a sm all highly train ed m obile force designed to protect th e U nited States from attack. The nation’s first line o f defense, m aintained Taft, lay w ith th e navy, follow ed by in ­ num erable bom bers, an tiaircraft guns, an d a m echanized professional arm y.158 N um bers o f troops varied, ranging from 150,000 to 750,000.159 The H earst press took a slightly different tack, endorsing th e Swiss system o f u n i­ versal m ilitary train in g .160 As far as an im m ediate alternative to B urke-W adsw orth was concerned, th e an ti-in terv en tio n ists focused o n on e op tio n : c o n tin u atio n o f th e volun­ tary system . Fish in tro d u ced a cleverly w orded am endm ent au th o rizin g the p resident to m ake tw o calls for volunteers, th e first tw o m o n th s after th e b ill’s en actm en t, th e second o n 1 January 1941. O nly if fo u r h u n d red th o u ­ sand volunteers w ere n o t forthcom ing could th e p resident begin d rafting. H e said th a t his am endm ent w ould actually speed u p in d u ctio n , w hereas u n d er th e H ouse’s W adsw orth bill, th e arm y could n o t in d u ct any draftees u n til 15 N ovem ber o r after sixty days, an d th en it w ould take only seventyfive th o u san d m en .161 The volunteer system had several supporters.162 Some w ith pacifist leanings were particularly enthusiastic.163 Uncettsored noted Senate testim ony, given by the nation’s m ilitary leaders on 12 July, to the effect th at every previous quota had been filled by volunteers.164 Form er A m erican conflicts— including, surprisingly, the Civil W ar—were used as evidence that the old system had worked well.165 T hose anti-interventionists favoring conscription found little good in Fish’s approach. H ugh Johnson called th e Fish am endm ent “cheap political m on­ key-business.” W hen “trad itio n al volunteering” was tried in the W ar o f 1812, W ashington was bu rn ed an d D etroit surrendered.166 O n 5 Septem ber, th e H ouse approved th e Fish am endm ent b u t soon gave it up in conference com m ittee. O n th e 16th, conscription legislation, having passed b o th houses, was signed by the president. O nly those betw een the ages o f tw enty-one and thirty-five w ere required to register. In m id-A ugust, the G allup poll had indicated 66 percent in favor o f th e d ra ft.167 Even after Congress adopted B urke-W adsw orth, som e noninterventionists voiced concern over th e n ation’s defenses. To Senator Lodge, it w ould take from six to seven years to build a tw o-ocean navy, six years alone to finish the double set o f locks needed to protect the Panam a C anal. D ennis pointed to the absence o f any concerted defense schem e. To defend A m erica, one needed a highly specialized professional arm y, based on the ideas o f G erm an general H ans von Seeckt and French general C harles de G aulle.168 Little w onder anti-interventionists kept proposing th eir ow n solutions. T he Chicago Tribune called for prom oting the subm achine gun, abolishing the arm y’s present division o f services (e.g., infantry, cavalry, engineers), and dow nplaying th e role o f the tan k — w hich, it claim ed, could n o t protect the in ­

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fantrym an in d o se com bat. T he Saturday Evening Post pushed a tw o-ocean navy an d an “im pervious antiaircraft wall.” R ather th an rush in to conscrip­ tio n , said Senator W iley, th e U nited States should m ake its ships im m une from torpedoes an d bom bs, develop an adequate naval a ir fleet, tra in ground forces in blitzkrieg techniques, an d acquire tanks and antiaircraft g uns.169 Even in th e spring o f 1941, H anson Baldw in found th e U.S. attem pting to expand th e arm y too rapidly. N ot only were pow der and am m unition danger­ ously low b u t th e needed tanks and field artillery could n o t be delivered for m onths. In th e past, he asserted, throw ing m asses o f sem i- o r u n train ed m en in to com bat had sim ply resulted in casualties. Now th e situation risked re­ peating itself, for all arm y u n its drew m ost heavily on raw recru its.170

All this tim e, interventionists— finding B ritain in dire peril— dem anded the shipm ent o f m ajor A m erican w eapons to th e besieged isles. O n 12 Septem ber, th e C om m ittee to D efend A m erica by A iding th e Allies (CDAAA) said B ritain needed tw enty-five Flying Fortresses, tw enty torpedo (m osquito) boats, and “as m any p u rsu it planes as possible.” Tanks, Lee-Enfield rifles, an d the new N orden bom bsight w ere added. So w ere loans to enable paym ent o f all such item s. T he CDAAA had avoided any position on th e draft, for it feared th at the ensuing controversy w ould sim ply delay aid to B ritain, its first priority.171 Such proposals greatly alarm ed its political foes.172 Above all, th e U nited S tates's ow n m ilitary needs w ere stressed. T he Saturday Evening Post m o u rn ed , “We have n o t a rifle, a gun, an airplane, o r a row boat to spare, n o r any industrial capacity.” N ational guardsm en were train in g w ith im aginary m achine guns devised by plum bers o u t o f gas pipe. B oth Senator Edw in John­ so n an d pacifist Frederick J. Libby w arned th at such w eapons m ight well be needed in any conflict w ith Japan. B ennett C lark accused th e adm inistration o f risking enem y capture o f th e N orden bom bsight, “th e m ost vital m ilitary secret th a t th e U nited States has ever had.” 173 O n 5 Septem ber 1940, G eneral H ugh Johnson officially launched th e A m er­ ica First C om m ittee w ith a nationw ide radio broadcast. H e noted th a t th e ex­ istin g U.S. A rm y possessed fewer th an three h u ndred first-line com bat planes a n d only fifty-nine heavy bom bers; it lacked enough m odern equipm ent to o u tfit a h u n d red thousand m en. W hen, o n 3 O ctober, the AFC started placing advertisem ents in th e press, it stressed th e danger o f sending w eapons over­ seas: “We need guns. We need m en. We need ships enough for a tw o-ocean navy independent o f any o th er power. Let nobody take them away from us. Let n o b o d y give them away.”174 O th e r argum ents w ere raised as w ell: Such sales violated th e H ague co n ­ v e n tio n o f 1907 as w ell as A m erican legislation o f 1917 an d 1940. T he

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tran sfe r involved an act o f w ar against G erm any, thereby invitin g c o u n te r­ m easures th a t could rap id ly draw th e U nited States in to full-scale em b ro il­ m e n t.175

To b o th th e an ti-interventionists and th eir critics, th e issue o f rearm am ent led logically to a m uch greater question, th is one dealing n o t so m uch w ith how to defend th e natio n b u t w ith the geographical scope o f any such defense. H ow m uch o f the W estern H em isphere belonged in the defense o rb it o f th e U nited States? W hat was th e optim um sphere o f influence by w hich th e n ation could best assure its ow n safety?

8

k

■i

Military Defense of the Hemisphere

O n 3 O ctober 1939, exactly a m o n th after B ritain an d France had declared w ar o n G erm any, an inter-A m erican conference, designated the C onsultation o f M inisters for Foreign Affairs o f th e A m erican Republics, issued the D eclara­ tio n o f Panam a. D rafted u n d er U.S. prom pting, th e declaration proclaim ed a “security b elt” reaching several h u n d red m iles from th e shores o f th e neutral A m erican republics. W ithin this zone, any hostile action by any non-A m eri­ can belligerent was strictly forbidden. In case o f violation, m utual consulta­ tio n w ould lead to enforcem ent.1 C ritics opposed th e Panam a declaration o n several grounds.2 First, they fo u n d th e declaration w arlike. Because such B ritish possessions as C anada, N ew foundland, and th e Baham as w ere w ithin the new zone, C ongressm an Paul Shafer (R ep.-M ich.) w arned, “If we attem p t to enforce this guardianship, it w ill m ean w ar for th e U nited States.” Sim ilarly, th e Chicago Tribune* envis­ aging U.S. naval vessels patrolling several h u n d red m iles o ff th e A tlantic, ac­ cused the adm inistration o f “provocative steps,” likely a t any tim e to produce th e torpedoing o f a U.S. destroyer. F urtherm ore, it argued, nations did hold an unquestioned rig h t to send th eir ow n w arships to th eir ow n possessions; in fact, interference was an act o f war.3 C ertainly, it was argued, enforcem ent was difficult.4 Policing an area three to six h u n d red m iles o ff the A m erican coast, said Senator W allace W hite (R ep.-M aine), m eant taking o n “the m ost gigantic task ever assum ed by any n atio n in history.”5 In addition, FDR opponents found th e declaration bla­ tan tly illegal. T he m anifesto, posited John Bassett M oore, had “no foundation in law o r in com m on sense” an d furtherm ore violated the very principle o f freedom o f th e seas. M oore raised an additional factor— nam ely, th a t the dec­

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laration was hypocritical. O n 21 D ecem ber, after th e ad m in istratio n an­ nounced th at it w ould ask G erm any to heed the new zone, M oore m used th at th e U nited States had never protested the activities o f B ritish cruisers already carrying on "hostile operations to th e very verge o f th e three-m ile lim it, if n o t w ithin it.” In reality, th e ju rist contended, th e declaration could serve as a de­ vice to protect A llied possessions in th e W estern H em isphere. N oting th a t sev­ eral B ritish bases lay w ithin th e neutrality zone, B orchard rem arked, “These are presum ably to be kept im m une from attack by England’s enem ies.”6 O f the critics o f th e Panam a declaration, only the chauvinistic Chicago Tri­ bune suggested an alternative policy. T he G ulf o f M exico, it said, should be proclaim ed a Pan-A m erican lake, and all w arships o f any nonhem ispheric bel­ ligerent should be perm anently banned. Such acts w ould only require agree­ m ent o f th e U nited States, M exico, and C uba, although o th er A m erican re­ publics m ight also desire to endorse it. It also called for extending the neutrality cordon to th e C aribbean, w hich th e U.S. Navy was able to guard. W hile doing so, th e ad m inistration should dem and the cession o f th e B ritish and French islands.7 W ithin the Roosevelt cam p itself, there were m ajor m isgivings. H ull objected to the declaration o n grounds sim ilar to those o f the anti-interventionists: the neutrality zone was unenforceable, had no legal standing, and could well in­ volve the U.S. in w ar through an incident on the high seas. T he fact th at his state departm ent rival, Sum ner Welles, had designed th e plan only increased his m isgivings.8 T he navy, too, protested, finding the patrolling task im possible.9 By D ecem ber 1939, th e declaration had already proven ineffective, for the B ritish sank a m ajor G erm an battleship, the Graf Speey in M ontevideo harbor. O n U.S. prom pting, th e A m erican republics issued a jo in t note o f protest al­ though it was obvious they lacked the m eans to take fu rth er action. Roosevelt him self show ed little anxiety, undoubtedly in p a rt because there was relative calm on the A tlantic afterw ard. Toward the end o f 1940, the president ac­ cepted H ull’s proposal for a m ore flexible zone w hose range w ould be deter­ m ined by cu rren t circum stance. A lthough G erm any publicly rejected th e neu­ trality belt, b o th H itler’s Reich and the Allies ended up privately honoring it. H ence, as one historian notes, th e announcem ent proved an “extrem ely p o ten t w eapon in Roosevelt’s diplom atic arsenal.”10

In the wake o f G erm any’s conquest o f W estern Europe, apprehension quickly developed concerning the fate o f French and D utch possessions in th e W est­ ern H em isphere. Such C aribbean islands as French M artinique and D utch C uraçao, it was feared, m ight well com e u nder G erm an dom ination. A G allup poll show ed 87 percent in favor, if necessary, o f taking im m ediate posses­

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sio n .11 As B ritain was fighting for its survival, anxieties centered as well on its m any islands in th e W est Indies. O n 17 June 1940, the Senate unanim ously passed a resolution introduced by Key P ittm an. R eaffirm ing the M onroe D octrine, the resolution specified th a t th e U nited States w ould n o t recognize th e transfer o f any geographic re­ gion in th e W estern H em isphere from one wnon-A m erican pow er” to another “non-A m erican power.” Further, in the event th a t such transfer should appear likely, th e U.S. w ould consult im m ediately w ith o th er A m erican republics. A day later th e H ouse adopted th e identical resolution, introduced by C ongress­ m an Sol Bloom (D em .-N .Y .), chairm an o f its Foreign Affairs C om m ittee, by a vote o f 381 to 8.12 T he pronouncem ent determ ined little, however; it was H itler’s desire to avoid challenging W ashington, n o t any jo in t resolution o f C ongress, th at decided m atters.13 Several adm inistration critics supported the P ittm an-B loom resolution. C ongressm an John Vorys, for exam ple, said, “We are sim ply repainting o u r ‘no trespassing’ sign so th a t w ould-be trespassers w ill be sure to see it.” 14 T he G erm ans w ere quick to reply. O n 1 July, Foreign Secretary Joachim von R ibbentrop denied any G erm an aspirations and th en stated th at the M onroe D octrine could in principle be valid legally only u n d er one condition: if the A m erican nations did n o t “interfere” in E uropean affairs. Four days later, H ull in tu rn replied th a t the U nited States pursued no involvem ent in the “purely political affairs o f Europe,” w hile cooperating w ith all nations to advance “the cause o f international law an d order.” 15 Several anti-interventionists adopted R ibbentrop’s logic o f tw o separate spheres. Fish com m ented, “We w ant A m erica for A m ericans and E urope for E uropeans, and th a t is a good A m erican doctrine.”16 O th er argum ents were used as well: Efforts to legislate on th e M onroe D octrine w ere unnecessary. T he consultation provisions o f the resolution unduly restrained the U nited States. T he resolution was far to o encom passing. T he Washington Daily News, a Scripps-H ow ard paper, described th e bill as involving “a responsibility th at stretches from pole to pole, from ocean to ocean, and from H ell to breakfast.” C ongressm an A ndrew Schiffler (Rep.-W .Va.), w ho had endorsed th e Senate resolution, feared th at Iceland and p arts o f th e USSR could be included. C on­ gressm an R obert C hiperfield (R ep.-Ill.) cited a state departm ent geographer w hose findings im plied th a t G reenland, th e A ntarctic, New Zealand, an d the Sam oan and Solom on islands w ere p a rt o f th e hem isphere.17 Besides, it appeared th a t the U nited States had invoked the M onroe D oc­ trin e in a m ost hypocritical m anner. To political w riter K atherine Rodell, the U nited States had first been the offender w hen it entered W orld W ar I, m ore recently w hen it p erm itted th e French an d English to land troops in A ruba and C uraçao. Furtherm ore, th e M onroe D octrine appeared to have been m ore honored in the breach th an in th e observance. It had n o t, P orter Sargent ar­ gued, prevented B ritain’s seizure o f the Falkland Islands o r G uatem alan terri-

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tory, France from taking St. B arthélem y island, o r the D utch from ruling A ruba and C uraçao.1* M ore im p o rtan t, th e resolution appeared w arlike. T he Christian Century feared th at th e M onroe D octrine m ight be in terpreted as bestow ing aa d u ty to help police every A m erican governm ent all the way south to th e Straits o f M agellan.” Asked C ongressm an C harles L. G ifford (R ep.-M ass.), "D oes this m ean th a t we w ill fight w ith a foreign n atio n if it attem pts to take possession o f th a t w hich it m ay have a legal rig h t to possess?” 19 A nti-interventionists soon confronted an o th er m atter, th e H avana C onfer­ ence o f July 1940. H ere, at a m eeting o f Pan-A m erican foreign m inisters, the delegates— led by Secretary H ull— unanim ously declared an attack on one to be an attack o n all. In case o f a threatened strike, any A m erican republic could m ove unilaterally in seizing any colony u n d er th reat. T he assem blage signed a declaration, the Act o f H avana, th at provided for an Inter-A m erican C om ­ m ission for T erritorial C oncessions in th e New W orld. T he new body w ould assum e tem porary control o f any E uropean possessions hieing tran sfer to an ­ o th er sovereignty.20 R eactions to H avana varied. O nly th e U nited States possessed a navy and air force pow erful enough, said th e Chicago Tribune, to prevent th e tran sm ittal o f holdings from one E uropean state to another. To im ply th a t any hem ispheric alliance could control such territo ries jo intly could only breed confusion and feebleness. John T. Flynn offered a m ore radical critique. If a E uropean pow er should lose such a possession, the A m erican republics should prom ote its per­ m anent independence. A w riter in th e socialist CaU saw the H avana m eeting bestow ing on a m arket-hungry U.S. hegem ony over all lands south o f th e Rio G rande. Conversely, th e Christian Century praised H ull’s skillful and success­ ful diplom acy, arguing, “T his defense m easure is good in itself and m ay tu rn o u t to be very useful.”21 T hough the P ittm an-B loom resolution had overw helm ing congressional su p p o rt, th e questions raised by a m in o rity o f dissenters w ere d isturbing in ­ deed. The ad m inistration m ight offer m ost sw eeping definitions o f the areas to be covered by the M onroe D octrine, som ething th at could create endless anxiety. Even th e H avana declaration had its pitfalls.

Such reactions could n o t m ask one thing: certain an ti-interventionists them ­ selves sought dom ination o f E uropean possessions in th e hem isphere. W hen, on 9 A pril 1940, G erm any conquered D enm ark, several an ti-in te r­ ventionists sought U.S. purchase o f its largest colony, G reenland. B oth Lundeen and Fish filed bills to th a t effect.22

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A certain geographic determ inism was m anifested. Lundeen cited claim s o f A rctic explorers V ilhjalm ur Stefonsson and A dm iral R obert E Peary to the effect th at G reenland belonged to the U nited States. To Fish, “progress” could not be halted. For over a hundred years, he said, D enm ark had foiled to develop its vast colony, w hich still possessed a population o f less than tw enty thousand.23 O ther factors also m ade G reenland attractive, including a trade potential; considerable fish, fur, and graphite, and the w orld’s largest deposits o f cryolite.24 To such advocates o f A m erican ow nership, however, defense was th e crucial foctor.2S In enem y hands, L undeen claim ed, G reenland w ould threaten the populous Eastern Seaboard. A flight from G reenland to New York, noted Fish, to o k only six hours. A Chicago Tribune w riter stressed th e im portance o f es­ tablishing an A m erican naval base near C ape Farewell, lying a t G reenland’s low er tip .26 T he New York Daily News noted th a t its fjords could be used for subm arine bases, som e o f its flat areas tu rn ed into a ir outposts. “We should n eith er delay n o r m um ble o u r w ords,” it proclaim ed, b u t declare a protec­ to rate u n til D enm ark again becam e free.27 O th er an ti-interventionists dow nplayed G reenland’s role, finding little d an ­ ger if it was in hostile hands. Suppose, w rote Frank W aldrop, H itler was “ju st n u tty enough to claim G reenland and declare th e Eskim os a suppressed G er­ m an m inority”; th e G erm an d ictato r still had no friendly ocean betw een him a n d his objective. Besides, said W aldrop, th e B ritish w ould prevent any such m ove. Senator Reynolds stressed th at th e distance betw een G reenland and N ew York equaled th at betw een New York and London. C olonel L indbergh th o u g h t th a t secondary bases m ight be placed in G reenland b u t found any in ­ vasion o f th e U nited States from th a t locale hazardous. In the sum m er o f 1933, w hile surveying its coast for several weeks, the aviator had found its cli­ m ate severe, sum m er season sh o rt, and seas and terrain icy.28 T he M ake Europe Pay W ar D ebts C om m ittee, later called th e Islands for W ar D ebts Defense C om m ittee (IFW D D C ), articulated a m ore general de­ m an d for E uropean possessions.29 Founded on 3 D ecem ber 1939, the organi­ zatio n was secretly fostered by G erm an A m erican propagandist G eorge Sylvester V iereck and financed, at least in p art, w ith G erm an funds.30 A rguing th a t th e E uropean pow ers owed the U nited States $14 billion, the com m ittee dem anded cession o f th eir island possessions in th e W estern H em isphere. Som e Allied leaders, including French prem ier E douard D aladier, had them ­ selves m ade overtures in th a t direction, b u t the diplom ats lacked follow th ro u g h .31 T he m ilitant anti-interventionist Lundeen was national chairm an, a n d anti-interventionists dom inated the group.32 E ncouragem ent cam e from F rank Knox, publisher o f th e Chicago Daily News and soon to be secretary o f th e navy, though he d id n o t jo in , and form er treasury secretary and senator W illiam G. M cAdoo, w ho had long backed the proposal.33

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In m id-O ctober 1939, Lundeen called on his natio n to use force in th e m at­ ter. Unless England an d France paid th eir w ar debts, he threatened, uwe w ill send th e arm ed forces” in accordance w ith “th e Jacksonian theory.” N ot a re­ taliatory shot w ould be fired, for th e Allies “are pretty busy o n th e w estern fro n t, a t th e west w all, th e Siegfried line, an d the M aginot line.”34 Senator R obert Rice Reynolds was also adam ant o n the issue. T he only South­ ern D em ocrat w ho was consistently anti-interventionist, in M ay 1941 Reynolds becam e chairm an o f the Senate M ilitary Affairs C om m ittee, although he lacked the political d o u t usually wielded by one holding such office.35 Reynolds pre­ sented a veritable shopping list o f possessions, ind u d in g Berm uda, N ew found­ land, the M exican territory o f Lower C alifornia, and the disputed island o f W rangel in the Arctic, although he did not call for taking them by force.36 O ther anti-interventionists also sought C aribbean islands.37 In defending Reynolds’s position, th e Chicago Tribune found any asking price inconsider­ able in relation to th e debt owed th e U nited States. T he Tribune envisioned an A m erican m ilitary presence stretching from G reenland to th e coast o f Brazil.38 Fish w ould even pay France ua p a rt o f th e utterly useless gold b u ried o u t in the State o f Kentucky.”39 Those o f m ore liberal politics suggested p lebisdtes by local inhabitants, jo in t ad m inistration by the Latin A m erican nations, and chances for repurchase after the war.40 D efenders o f such schem es pointed to a survey by th e A m erican In stitu te o f Public O pinion. Taken in N ovem ber 1939, it revealed th a t 66 percent favored exchanging cancellation o f w ar debts for m ajor C aribbean islands, w ith 34 percent opposed.41 T he Senate Naval Affairs C om m ittee endorsed th e plan, com bining its endorsem ent w ith calls for air bases in the southeast co m er o f th e C aribbean, fortification o f the Panam a C anal, and th e possible building o f a canal across N icaragua.42 Strategic argum ents were forem ost: The islands w ould protect th e Panam a C anal. G erm any m ight attem p t m ilitary dom ination. Even B ritish fortifica­ tio n o f its ow n C aribbean possessions, w arned th e Chicago Tribune^ could p u t the U nites States in danger.43 Given such dangers, U.S. m ilitary action was essential.44 T he New York Daily News called o n the A m erican fleet to seize the French an d D utch possessions. If the tw o E uropean nations w ere eventually restored to fiili sovereignty, the U nited States should present them w ith a bill for expenses incurred w hile in protective custody.45 C ertain islands in particular w ere stressed. T he Chicago Tribune called B erm uda tta dagger” pointed a t the U.S., for it could house bom ber bases w ithin easy flying range o f New York City.46 It also found the G alapagos Is­ lands o f no value to E cuador b u t possible protection for th e Panam a C anal.47 Reynolds focused on St. Pierre and M iquelon, tw o French islands o ff th e coast o f N ew foundland; th eir acquisition, he said, w ould enable the U nited States to m eet any attack from Iceland, G reenland, o r the n ortheast in general.48

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A few noninterventionists opposed any such action.49 B orchard feared th at th e U.S. m ight experience legal difficulties over th e m atter. Venezuela, he noted, had already protested against any transfer o f T rinidad on the basis o f history an d contiguity. To H ugh Johnson, the transfer o f “a few islands” and “banana belt” countries w ould n o t “scratch th e surface” o f the W orld W ar I debts. M ore im p o rtan t, obtaining them w ithout th e consent o f th eir ow n people w ould p u t th e U nited States “in th e class o f pickle-puss A dolf and w al­ ru s m ug Joe Stalin.”50

O n 2 Septem ber 1940, m uch o f this debate becam e a b it m oot. T he W hite H ouse announced th a t th e U nited States was sending fifty overage destroyers to B ritain. B eginning o n 15 May, in his first letter to FDR as prim e m inister, C hurchill had asked for “th e loan o f th e forty to fifty o f y our older destroy­ ers.”51 Such craft were vital, he said, for p atrol against invasion and facilitating antisubm arine escorts o n th e A tlantic.52 In this and subsequent m essages, he also requested such w eapons as aircraft, rifles, and torpedo boats. In retu rn for th e destroyers, the U.S. w ould receive ninety-nine-year leases for th e im m ediate construction o f m ilitary bases in N ew foundland, B erm uda, th e B aham as, Jam aica, St. Lucia, T rinidad, A ntigua, and B ritish G uiana. W hen Roosevelt m et w ith G eorge VI o f England in June 1939, he had raised th e m at­ ter, acting in th e belief th at no E uropean em pire had any business being there anyway.53 Now Roosevelt was m aintaining th at the bargain “was probably the m ost im p o rtan t th in g th a t has com e for A m erican defense th a t has been taken since th e Louisiana Purchase.”54 T he destroyer issue had been debated in the U nited States since th e begin­ ning o f August. D uring th e negotiations th e previous m onth, fo u r prom inent lawyers— including D ean A cheson— w rote to the New York Times, claim ing th a t A m erican statutes p erm itted th e sale on th e ground th a t th e ships had n o t been specifically b u ilt for G reat B ritain. A ttorney G eneral R obert H . Jackson, in a m uch-publicized o pinion, offered sim ilar reasoning.55 T he leading interventionist organization, the C om m ittee to D efend A m er­ ica by A iding the Allies, endorsed th e m ove. O f th e 176 destroyers w ith w hich B ritain had begun th e war, only seventy were left.56 Yet, th e CDAAA w ent on, the B ritish w ere facing a huge task: deterring invasion o f th eir ow n isles, p ro ­ viding for th e defense o f G ibraltar, preventing Axis shipping from leaving con­ tin en tal E urope and th e M editerranean, and protecting convoys o n w hich its im ports and exports depended. In early A ugust, a G allup poll show ed 60 p er­ cent favoring the destroyer sale. By late O ctober, G allup indicated a fifty-fifty split over th e general m atter o f helping B ritain at the risk o f w ar, b u t w ithin a m onth th e ratio was sixty-forty in favor o f such aid.57

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As w ith m any adm in istratio n actions, n o t all o f FDR's usual critics w ere hostile to th e arrangem ent o r his supporters friendly.58 O nce th e bargain was solidified— in fact, even d u rin g th e negotiations— som e applauded th e arrangem ent.59 T he New York Daily News called th e m ove "the greatest single achievem ent— o r at any rate th e m ost im p o rtan t— o f Franklin D. Roosevelt's adm in istratio n to date.”60 T he Chicago Tribune, boasting th a t th e bargain had fulfilled a policy it had advocated since 1922, praised th e acquisition as "the greatest co n trib u tio n o f this new spaper to th e co u n try ’s history since the nom in atio n o f Lincoln.”61 "T hank God,” said C olonel M cC orm ick, th e C aribbean was now "an A m erican lake.”62 By m id-O ctober, th e Tribune p u b ­ lisher cited th e new leases in boasting th a t th e U nited States had becom e "the m ost pow erful n ation in the w orld.”63 A gain, however, far m ore an ti-in terv en tio n ists voiced alarm .64 John T. Flynn called for R oosevelt’s im peachm ent. B oth Senator Lodge an d his fellow Bay State R epublican, C ongressw om an E dith N ourse Rogers, sought an in ­ vestigation.65 Any agreem ent involving th e transfer o f destroyers, such critics argued, was bo u n d to em broil th e U nited States in conflict.66 T he next steps, predicted Senator La Follette, involved "m iddle-aged” battleships, th en "youngish” cruisers, and finally "rig h t aged” sons.67 Furtherm ore, claim ed th e president’s opponents, th e accord usurped congressional power. T he St Louis PostDispatch began its editorial w ith th e w ords, "M r. Roosevelt today com m itted an act o f war. He also becam e A m erica’s first dictator.”68 As in th e case o f cash-and-carry, legal issues w ere raised.69 A m ong th e statutes supposedly violated w ere th e H ague C onvention o f 1907, ratified by the Senate in 1908, w hich forbade a neutral from supplying a belligerent w ith “w arships”;70 th e Treaty o f W ashington o f 1871, w hich prohibited the d epar­ tu re o f any vessel intended to conduct w ar;71 and th e W alsh A m endm ent o f 28 June 1940, w hich required th e chief o f naval operations to issue a certificate denying th at such m aterial was essential to U.S. defense.72 M oreover, it was claim ed, A ttorney G eneral Jackson m isconstrued an act o f 15 June 1917 th a t m ade it unlaw ful to send any A m erican vessel to a belligerent.73 C riticism o f Jackson grew particularly strong.74 Edw ard S. C orw in, Prince­ to n scholar and au th o r o f m ajor w orks on th e presidency, asserted th a t ac­ cording to Jackson’s reasoning, th e president as com m ander in chief w ould have the pow er to transfer th e entire navy to a foreign governm ent. "N o such dangerous opinion,” he continued, "was ever before penned by an A ttorney G eneral o f the U nited States.” C harles Francis A dam s, form erly H oover’s sec­ retary o f the navy, found the decision so dishonest th at he privately called for Jackson’s im peachm ent.75 Som e an ti-interventionists found th e bargain itself a bad one. First, th e bases arrangem ent was n o t lasting; eventually all th e islands w ould revert back to G reat B ritain. Besides, Boake C arter rem arked, B ritain received th e ships

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w ith in sixty days, w hereas it w ould take three to ten years to equip th e hem i­ spheric bases properly.76 T here was also th e m atter o f cost. In February 1941, B ennett C lark quoted colum nists D rew Pearson and R obert S. A llen to th e effect th at som e 125 acres slated in B erm uda w ould really cost $1.5 m illion, o r $12,000 an acre.77 Sena­ to r Reynolds cited th e sam e tw o journalists in m aintaining th a t th e U nited States gained thousands o f acres o f m ere sw am p in T rinidad, for w hich the ow ners dem anded an exorbitant price.78 Some FDR adversaries believed th at th e U nited States still needed th e de­ stroyers.79 Why, asked H ugh Johnson, if th e destroyers were so obsolete, was it argued th at the life o f the B ritish navy depended on them ?80 It was claim ed th at th e destroyers had recently been p u t into first-class condition; th at the craft were valuable for training in seam anship, navigation, gunnery, and engineering; and th a t it w ould take tw o years to construct replacem ents for the fifty ships.81 If, said Senator Nye, th e Panam a Canal blew up w hile the U.S. fleet was stationed in the Pacific, d ie fifty destroyers could be p u t to good use in the A dantic.82 Som e alternatives w ere offered. B orchard sought the direct transfer o f either N ew foundland and th e W est Indies, or, less preferably, B ritain’s retention o f th e bases. To Professor C orw in, it seem ed th e president should ask C ongress to ratify th e agreem ent.83 H ugh Johnson and H am ilton Fish raised th e old islands- for-w ar-debts issue.84 Lundeen sim ilarly renew ed his dem and for ces­ sio n o f th e B ritish an d French W est Indies; he sought a tim e lim it and urged th a t th e U nited States engage in actual threats. T he New York Daily News kept pushing th e seizure o f M artinique, adding for good m easure D evil’s Island, D utch and French G uiana, St. Pierre an d M iquelon, and the French Leeward an d W indw ard Islands.85 H anson Baldw in suggested U.S. ow nership o f B ritish H onduras and possibly T rinidad, Jam aica, B erm uda, and certain unnam ed is­ lands in the Pacific. D orothy D etzer favored a schem e advanced by the Scripps-H ow ard papers by w hich the U.S. should purchase th e islands, place th em u n d er th e Pan-A m erican flag, an d in tim e conduct a plebiscite.86 Several an ti-interventionists opposed any additional U.S. presence in the C aribbean. New Masses accused th e U nited States o f having “actually taken the first m easure o f aggression in South Am erica,” for Brazil, Venezuela, and C o­ lum bia w ere now placed w ithin th e range o f A m erican guns.87 To O sw ald G ar­ riso n V illard, even such a provisional change in status quo necessitated con­ su ltin g a local population bitterly hostile to th e U.S. color line, particularly because blacks in som e B ritish islands enjoyed a considerable m easure o f so­ cial equality.88 N oting th e 50 percent unem ploym ent in a sim ilar area, P uerto R ico, Frederick J. Libby rem arked, “Em pire is n o t o u r forte.” Roosevelt him self opposed direct U.S. sovereignty over th e islands, calling th eir population “tw o m illio n h ead ach es,. . . w ho w ould be a definite econom ic drag on this coun­ try , and w ho w ould stir u p question [s] o f racial stocks by v irtu e o f th eir new sta tu s as A m erican citizens.”89

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H ad Roosevelt’s adversaries know n o f th e hesitant, even suspicious m anner in w hich he conducted th e negotiations, they m ight have seen a president m ore protective o f th eir interests. All du rin g June, Roosevelt feared above all th at the B ritish and French w ould surrender th eir fleets to G erm any. H ence, he tu rn ed away C hurchill’s plea ju st w hen the destroyers w ere m ost needed. O n 5 June, C hurchill cabled M ackenzie King, prim e m inister o f C anada, w ith one eye to the U nited States in the process, “I f . . . A m erica continued neutral, and we were overpow ered I cannot tell w hat policy m ight be adopted by a p roG erm an adm inistration such as w ould undoubtedly be set up.” N ot only did the debacle in France strengthen Roosevelt’s w orst fears; C hurchill’s w arnings about defeat only strengthened the president’s reluctance to provide the destroyers. Little w onder th at w hen th e transaction was an ­ nounced, th e B ritish governm ent issued a statem ent th at if th e n atio n fell, the Royal Navy w ould be neith er sunk n o r surrendered. F urtherm ore, Roosevelt him self initially doubted th e constitutionality o f such a m ove, particularly in light o f the W alsh am endm ent. D espite the argum ents o f A m erican a n ti­ interventionists, th e B ritish cabinet correctly th o u g h t th e exchange was far from equal.90 As far as the actual deal was concerned, its im pact on th e w ar was slight. As th e B ritish lacked experienced crews and the ships needed m uch refitting, only th irty destroyers were in use by th e follow ing May. T he precise sites and term s for the bases w ere n o t settled u n til M arch, and th e rifles, B -17 aircraft, an d to r­ pedo boats did n o t arrive im m ediately.91 T he anti-interventionists m ourned th a t th e destroyer-bases deal brought th e U nited States closer to war. T he president, however, was “hedging his bets” (to use th e w ords o f historian D avid R eynolds), though the Axis pow ers read the agreem ent as an A m erican com m itm ent. T he arrangem ent certainly con­ trib u ted to the form ation o f the trip a rtite pact, th e alliance am ong G erm any, Italy, and Japan signed in Septem ber 1940.92

D uring all such debates, interventionists continually stressed dangers to Latin A m erica. A fter th e M unich pact, one historian argues, FDR’s m ain anxieties centered far m ore on the hem isphere than on B ritain o r France. Early in 1939, th e A rm y W ar College called for th e creation o f a H em isphere D efense Force com posed o f over a h u ndred thousand m en, special equipm ent for projected Latin A m erican operations, and th e acquisition o f necessary shipping. T hat May, FDR foresaw a possible w ar in w hich G erm any w ould neutralize the B ritish fleet, secure dom ination o f Latin A m erica, and— in coordination w ith Japan— wage open w arfare against the U nited States.93 H istorian D avid H aglund w rites, “In those dark days o f late M ay and early June 1940, th e con­

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sensus o f th e adm inistration was th a t E ngland— brave as it m ight be — might be finished and th at th e U nited States m ight shortly be fighting th e b attle o f its life in L atin A m erica. T his was n o t a prospect th at pleased him , yet Roo­ sevelt accepted it as a probable, if gloomy, scenario.”94 O thers am ong th e president’s backers felt sim ilarly.95 In June 1940, Drew Pearson and R obert S. Allen asked, “C an We Keep H itler O ut o f th e A m eri­ cas?” The tw o colum nists w arned o f Axis influence in Bolivia, Peru, A rgentina, an d Brazil. A m o n th later, Time feared th at G erm any m ight launch an inva­ sion o f the U nited States from South A m erica via th e C aribbean, doing so by in itiatin g a flanking drive to d o se th e Panam a C anal. In A ugust, W illiam Bul­ litt predicted th at H itler w ould reach South A m erica before C hristm as.96 A ccording to th e CDAAA, th e eastern shoulder o f Brazil was particularly vulnerable. Enem y parachutists could seize th e airp o rts o f N atal (n o t to be confused w ith the A frican province o f th e sam e nam e) and Pernam buco, then invade th e n atio n itself. Brazil possessed only six m illion people (m ost o f w hom , said th e CDAAA, w ere “negroes and m ulattos”) an d lacked a decent com m unications system .97 Som e noninterventionists stressed U.S. defense o f Latin A m erica, in to to o r in p art. In m id-June 1940, C harles A. Lindbergh endorsed the building o f m il­ itary bases “w herever they are needed for o u r safety, regardless o f w ho ow ns th e territo ry involved.”98 W ithin a year, th e aviator recom m ended w ar if any foreign pow er attem pted to establish a base in either N orth o r South A m erica. H e called for U.S. air bases as far south as the A m azon valley, specifically in such locales as C olom bia, Venezuela, th e G alapagos Islands, and the G uianas.99 Ten thousand U.S. planes, he m aintained, could raid enem y com m unications lines to South A m erica.100 O th ers, to o , spoke in term s o f m assive hem ispheric involvem ent.101 C on­ gressm an Jam es E. Van Z andt, form er n atio n al com m ander o f th e V eterans o f Foreign W ars, called o n th e n a tio n to “m ilitarize South A m erica before tu rn in g o u r a tten tio n to th e p lig h t o f E uropean nations.” 102 T he U nited States, said P hilip La Follette, should “draw a line from th e A rctic C ircle to th e tip o f C ape H orn an d w ith in th e area it bounds enforce th e M onroe D octrine.” 103 W iley advocated agreem ents th a t w ould p erm it th e use o f air bases in Venezuela an d h arb o rs in Brazil. W illiam E. C astle sou g h t a defense treaty w ith such n atio n s as B razil, C hile, U ruguay, an d A rgentina; th e U.S. w ould gain access to th e ir a irp o rts and receive perm ission to land tro o p s o n th e ir territo ry . At th e sam e tim e, he declared th a t com plete p ro tectio n o f the hem isphere was beyond U.S. capacity, especially if a foreign presence cam e in th e wake o f an in tern al rev o lu tio n .104 T he Chicago Tribune m ade detailed recom m endations, w hich included U.S. possession o f all th e bases near its ow n shores an d th e Panam a C anal; C uban co n tro l o f Jam aica; th e tran sfer o f th e Falklands to A rgentina; an d perm ission to develop such bases as Per­ nam b u co .105

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A few endorsed stark im perialism . Louis B. W ard, editorial directo r o f So­ cial Justice* sought a m ilitary protectorate over b o th continents. Boake C arter spoke o f "m ilitary control” o f M exico, th e W est Indies, an d C entral A m erica dow n to th e C anal Zone. "P artial m ilitary co n tro l” o f C anada an d South A m erican nations w ould be assum ed as well. In late July 1941, D. W orth C lark told reporters th a t th e U nited States should take full possession o f th e W est­ ern H em isphere, including C anada. T he Idaho senator m used, "We could m ake som e kind o f arrangem ent to set u p pu p p et governm ents w hich we could tru st to p u t A m erican interests ahead o f those o f G erm any o r any o th er n atio n in th e w orld.” 106 O th er an ti-interventionists em phasized U.S. circum scription. T he n atio n , claim ed Fish, should draw the line a t A rgentina, U ruguay, Paraguay, and pos­ sibly Brazil. Business leader G raem e H ow ard recom m ended th e creation o f a N orth A m erican Federation, to be com posed o f th e U nited States, C anada, th e C entral A m erican an d C aribbean nations, Venezuela, and C olom bia. C hicago investor Sterling M orton spoke o f guarantees to Peru and lands n o rth o f the A m azon. In O ctober 1940, AFC head G eneral R obert E. W ood, bo ard chair­ m an o f Sears, Roebuck, said th e U.S. m ust insist th at “no governm ent in M ex­ ico, C entral A m erica an d th e C aribbean South A m erican countries w ill be to l­ erated unless it is friendly to th e U nited States and th at, if necessary, we are prepared to use force to attain th at o b jec t” Seven m onths later, W ood asserted he w ould defend L atin A m erica to th e bulge o f B razil.107 Som e m ilitary experts concurred. To best defend th e U nited States, w rote H anson Baldw in, one m ust establish bases o n B erm uda, th e Azores, and th e Panam a C anal and create a strin g o f o utposts th a t w ould reach to such locales in Brazil as Behia, Belém, o r Sao Luiz de M aranhao.108 To Flem ing M acLiesh an d C ushm an Reynolds, an a ir an d naval base a t Pernam buco, linked w ith o th er bases ru n n in g through T rinidad and th e W est Indies, could ham string any expeditionary force striking at the southern p a rt o f South A m erica.109 Still o th er noninterventionists th o u g h t in far m ore lim ited term s. In A ugust 1940, Taft favored sending tro o p s to som e C aribbean islands so as to protect the Panam a C anal, b u t only if C ongress had previously been consulted. T hat O ctober, N orm an T hom as endorsed U.S. bases in th e C aribbean and aro u n d th e Panam a C anal. Several m onths later, th e socialist leader said he w ould p ro ­ tect C ape Verde o r th e C anary Islands.110 T hreats com ing from South A m erica, som e argued, m ight be greatly exag­ gerated. A ccording to retired general W illiam C. Rivers, even a G erm any vic­ to rio u s in E urope lacked the battle fleet needed to reach L atin A m erica. If, com m ented Senator Sheridan Downey, th e G erm ans landed a h u n d red th o u ­ sand troops there, these forces w ould lack guns and supplies an d find th eir tran sp o rtatio n lines cu t by U.S. "airplane fleets.” M oreover, said the C alifornia D em ocrat, South A m erican countries were p roud, independent, and defiant, unlikely to "subm it th eir heads to the noose o f any E uropean dictatorship.”

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Senator Nye developed a w orst-case scenario, hypothesizing a U.S. Navy de­ feated in th e C aribbean and H itler’s capture o f th e Panam a C anal. Even then, m aintained th e N orth D akota senator, th e surro u n d in g jungle was im passa­ ble; hence, it w ould be im possible for a G erm an arm y to m arch n o rth . T he U.S. Navy alone, said Taft, could prevent a G erm an arm y from com ing to South A m erica. H earst w ent so far as to find th e South A m erican republics a m ilitary liability, as they lacked a train ed navy o r an adequate arm y.111 H ugh Johnson w arned against policing a co n tin en t o f nations th a t a t best w ere suspicious and hostile. Besides, the U nited States could n o t afford to p o ­ lice every n atio n from th e N orth Pole to C ape H orn. G oing m uch further, Senator D ennis Chavez (D em .-N . M ex.) recalled th a t th e U.S. had often acted aggressively in Latin A m erica, citing as evidence such events as the w ar w ith Spain an d th e landing o f M arines in H aiti, N icaragua, and Santo D om ingo.112 Journalist C arleton B eak w as em phatic o n th is p o in t, w riting in Pan America ( 1940) th a t L atin A m erican natio n s could n o longer serve as “o u r oyster to be devoured, o r as shock tro o p s for o u r safety, o r as paw ns in th e gam e o f w orld politics.” T here should, he con tin u ed , be n o change w ith o u t jo in t Pan-A m er­ ican agreem ent. C oncrete recom m endations included inter-A m erican con­ tro l o f th e Panam a C anal, eventual political independence o r statehood for P u erto Rico, a plebiscite for th e V irgin Islands, and cancellation o f B ritish o r French debts w henever th e E uropean pow ers set free th eir New W orld p o p u ­ la tio n .113 H ad th e m ore strict an ti-interventionists been privy to ad m inistration thin k in g , they scarcely w ould have been reassured. C hief o f naval operations A dm iral H arold Stark, G eneral M arshall, U ndersecretary W elles, and FDR de­ sired noth in g less th an “preventive occupation” o f any strategic areas m enac­ ing either th e U nited States itself o r th e Panam a C anal. O therw ise, they feared, a netw ork o f Nazi satellite regim es w ould em erge th ro u g h o u t Latin A m erica. R eferring in May 1940 to possibilities o f “N azi-inspired revolution” in Brazil an d “w idespread disorders” in M exico, M arshall considered preventive occu­ p atio n o f E uropean possessions in th e W estern H em isphere, “offensive-defen­ sive o perations in South Am erica,” and “lim ited offensive operations” south o f th e Rio G rande.114 T hat July, th e w ar dep artm en t drew up contingency plans to take b o th M artinique an d G uadeloupe; 9,600 ground troops and fifteen fighting ships w ould be involved.115 W hen, in June 1940, M arshall called for federalizing the national guard, he referred to th e “indirect, subversive m ethods” th at could em erge in Latin A m erica; in particular, he said, th e Panam a C anal could be threatened. N or­ m an T hom as responded th at such a m ove was bound to appear im perialistic to th e indigenous p o p u latio n .116 V illard w arned against suppressing a revolu­ tio n a ry m ovem ent th o u g h t friendly to dictatorships overseas. W ould the U nited States, for exam ple, hold Rio de Janeiro unless a republican govern­ m en t were establkhed in Brazil?117

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To such liberal anti-interventionists, th e situation in U ruguay appeared particularly alarm ing. W hen, in m id-June 1940, U.S. m inister Edw in C. W il­ son feared a Nazi coup, Roosevelt sent th e heavy cruiser Quincy, stationed a t G uantanam o, and th e Wichita, p a rt o f th e A tlantic fleet, to U ruguay’s capital, M ontevideo.11* A variety o f an ti-interventionists w ere quick to voice alarm . Roosevelt, feared Libby, m ight m ake w ar o n U ruguay. D orothy D etzer w rote, M A couple o f years ago N orm an T hom as was jokingly speaking o f'd e a r A m erican boys dying for Patagonia’— well, th at’s ju st w hat m ay happen.” New Masses cited Scripps-H ow ard colum nist R aym ond C lapper, w ho feared th a t th e U nited States m ight be engaged in "protective occupation.” 119 If th e U.S., Taft w arned, sent an arm y to th at co u n try w hile th e G erm ans had control o f th e S outh A t­ lantic, th at force w ould be expendable.120 A pprehensions also centered o n Brazil. D uring a fifth-colum n panic in th e spring o f 1940, the co u n try ’s president, G etulio Vargas, announced th a t his natio n w ould rem ain strictly neutral in th e cu rren t E uropean conflict. O n re­ ceiving a B ritish w arning th a t six thousand N azi forces could be headed th ere w ith th e possible in ten t o f seizing th e governm ent, Roosevelt directed A dm i­ ral Stark to devise plans for m oving a t least ten thousand U.S. tro o p s to Brazil by air, follow ed by a hundred thousand by sea. O peration Pot o f G old w ould involve four battleships, tw o carriers, n ine cruisers, and three squadrons o f d e­ stroyers. Brazil im m ediately sought cooperation w ith th e U nited States o n de­ fense m atters, and the plan was never executed.121 Because o f rum ors concerning this U.S. action, som e anti-in terv en tio n ists th o u g h t th e w orst.122 Libby offered a scenario w hereby Brazil’s G erm ans m ight sta rt a revolution in th e southern p a rt o f th at n atio n , the B razilian gov­ ern m en t w ould recognize th e rebels, and th e U.S. N ational G uard w ould a t­ tem pt interv en tio n .123 T he procom m unist weekly In Fact cited jo u rn alist C lapper, w ho spoke o f a possible U.S. m ilitary occupation to keep Brazil’s iro n ore o u t o f G erm an h an d s.124 If som e an ti-interventionists w orried th a t the U nited States m ight intervene m ilitarily any tim e it perceived a fascist coup in th e offing, others w arned against aligning the n atio n w ith a fascism they already saw prevalent there. As early as D ecem ber 1939, D orothy D etzer accused th e U.S. o f defending police states so reactionary th a t they even failed to offer th eir people the advantages o f fascism . In January 1941, W heeler indicted his co u n try for "trying to ap ­ pease all the dictators in South Am erica.” 123 T he entire region, it was argued, was th e antithesis o f representative gov­ ernm ent. T he Christian Century questioned w hether th e sou th ern h a lf o f th e hem isphere was tru ly dem ocratic. C ongressm an Fred Bradley (R ep.-M ich.) m ade a p ointed com parison to c o rru p t D em ocratic Party m achines: "T here’s about as m uch dem ocracy in m ost o f those countries as there is in C hicago o r Jersey City.” Pacifist N icholas B roughton recalled th a t even the co n tin en t’s

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greatest heroes, Sim on Bolivar an d José de San M artin, had been dictators. A uthoritarian o r n o t, w arned Chicago financier Sterling M orton, Latin A m er­ ican nations w ould confiscate th e pro p erty o f others, assured th at if retrib u ­ tio n should draw near, “the strong arm o f U ncle Sam will w ard it off.” If the “stream o f m ilk” from the U.S. “m ilk cow” dried up, th e G ood N eighbor w ould again becom e th e hated C olossus o f th e N o rth .126 C ertain nations w ere singled o u t. Santo D om ingo, asserted H ugh Johnson, w as as bloody an d ruthless as anything H itler ever dream ed. New Masses ac­ cused Brazil's ru ler G etûlio Vargas o f eulogizing H itler an d M ussolini.127 M exico was subject to p articu lar debate. Journalist Paul A rden contended th a t a t least 80 percent o f M exico's population opposed U.S. foreign policy, sought to trad e w ith any E uropean victor, and found th eir n atio n ’s G erm an settlers am ong th e m ost adaptable an d law -abiding foreign elem ents in th eir lan d . Lawrence D ennis rem arked th a t ideologically and institutionally “M ex­ ico is closer to M oscow o r Berlin th an to W ashington and W all Street.” In M ay 1940, th e New York Daily News m aintained th at G erm any had tw o hu n d red agents in M exico and th at th e Soviet U nion was also active there. “M exico is already on th e ragged edge o f com plete C om m unism ,” it said. Besides, it was ju st conceivable th a t M exico m ight serve “as th e jum p in g -o ff p o in t for an in ­ vasion o f th e U nited States— o r a t least for som e kind o f violation o f th e M on­ roe D octrine.” A rguing to the contrary, H earst, w ho in 1916 had called for w ar w ith M exico, called o n the U nited States to be as friendly tow ard M exico as it w as tow ard C anada. M exico, he w ent o n , had been “d o se friends now for nearly a h u ndred years.” 128

A nti-interventionists focused o n Alaska as well. In 1940, th e U.S. m ilitary was building installations a t Fairbanks, A nchorage, Sitka, Kodiak, D utch H arbor, A nnette Island, and Yakutat. Such co nstruction greatly increased in 1941, w ith w ork continuing o n navy posts at Sitka, Kodiak, and D utch H arbor; airfields a t A nnette Island, Juneau, an d N om e; and arm y posts nam ed Fort Ray, Fort Greeley, Fort M ears, an d Fort R aym ond. N o real consensus existed on th e m atter. Som e Roosevelt critics continually called for m ore Alaskan bases, particularly airfields.129 Finding threats in b o th Japan and the Soviet U nion, in A pril 1940, Senator Reynolds sought an air sta­ tio n at either A nchorage o r D utch H arbor.130 T hat sam e m o n th H ugh John­ so n pointed w ith alarm to five Russian m ilitary stations a t K am chatka and G erm an technical m issions a t V ladivostok and K om andorski.131 Flem ing M acLiesh and C ushm an Reynolds stressed th at the A leutian Islands lay alm ost o n th e G reat C ircle R oute betw een Yokohama and San Francisco.132 To C olonel L indbergh, it was essential th a t the U nited States m aintain defense

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bases there, tho u g h he found little likelihood th a t uth e w ilds o f C anada” could be crossed an d th e U.S. itself invaded. H anson Baldw in suggested various bases in Alaska b u t denied th e U.S. could possibly—o r needed to— protect its entire coastline. “If an enemy,” he continued, “ever attem pted an overland cam paign strike for Seattle he w ould leave behind him a trail bleached in bones, and in the w ords o f one officer, th e soldiers w ho started w ould n o t reach Seattle.”133 Som e anti-interventionists w ere less concerned. Fish noted th a t th e closest distance from Soviet Russia to th e B ering S trait was som e tw enty-five hundred m iles, m aking it im possible for an enem y arm y ever to reach Alaska. If enem y tro o p s crossed the B ering S trait, said Senator Alva A dam s (D em .-C olo.), they w ould be in barren country, w ithout m eans o f tran sp o rta tio n .134 In late June 1941, th e adm inistration im plied th at Alaska was threatened. H ence, so it argued, U.S. fighter planes should be granted use o f Soviet bases in Siberia and th e Bering Sea.135 T he CDAAA soon w arned th a t if Japan occu­ pied eastern Siberia, Alaska w ould becom e th e m ost vulnerable spot in the W estern H em isphere.136 T he AFC strongly opposed such m oves. N oting th e U.S. m ilitary bases being b u ilt in Alaska’s panhandle, o n th e A leutian Islands, and o n th e m ainland, it said th at A m erican subm arines, surface raiders, and bom bers could im m edi­ ately sm ash any invasion attem p t and bom b any bridgehead an enem y m ight establish. F urtherm ore, bases in Siberia w ould be difficult to construct, as they could n o t be reached by railroad, only by ships an d planes. T he new U.S. su­ perbom ber, th e B-19, could reach th e industrial cities o f a hostile Japan d i­ rectly, m aking Alaska superfluous in the process. At one p o in t, th e A m erica First C om m ittee claim ed th at occupation o f the Siberian bases could only be justified if th e U nited States w ere taking offensive action in th e Far E ast.137

Alaska and M exico w ere no t th e only debated invasion routes. A larm also cen­ tered on A frica and the W estern M editerranean islands. In M ay 1941, R oo­ sevelt w arned th at G erm any threatened the city o f D akar in French Senegal and “th e island outposts o f th e New W orld,” the Portuguese-ow ned Azores and C ape Verde Islands. The C ape Verdes, FDR w arned, lay “only seven h o u rs’ distance from Brazil by bom ber o r planes carrying troops.” 138 Such interventionists as the CDAAA developed th e president’s argum ent. In enem y hands, said the interventionist action group, th e w hole strin g o f A t­ lantic islands— C ape Verde, M adeira, and th e C anaries— w ould perm it G er­ m an U -boats and bom bers to assault B ritain’s m ajor A tlantic and A frican sea lanes and threaten U.S. com m erce w ith Brazil, Uruguay, an d A rgentina as well. Furtherm ore, noted CDAAA staffer Livingstone H artley, B ritish shipping to

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th e Red Sea, India, Singapore, an d A ustralia w ould all be m enaced. T he CDAAA coyly stated th a t if G erm any crossed th e Pyrenees, "m any experts” had suggested th at th e U nited States should seize th e islands. Such a m ove, it m aintained, w ould underm ine the confidence o f France, Spain, Portugal, and Japan in a G erm an victory an d w ould help restrain Japan from striking a t the D utch East Indies an d Singapore.139 O n this issue, th e public leaned tow ard intervention. A ccording to one poll, over h a lf th e p opulation said th e U.S. should keep G erm any o u t o f such A frican islands.140 T hroughout th e conflict, particularly in 1941, Roosevelt’s adversaries found U.S. m oves o n any such sites w arlike.141 H is ad m in istratio n was particularly suspected o f m aking plans for n o th in g less th an seizing D akar an d the A tlantic islands.142 W ere th e U nited States to occupy such areas, w arned Uncensored, it w ould only be exposing itself to “defeat in detail,” for its forces could be bom bed from Spanish Rio de O ro .143 T he Portuguese had stationed som e six­ teen thou san d tro o p s o n th e island, equipped w ith batteries and m otorized vehicles. F urtherm ore, G erm an planes stood only a few h o u rs away.144 Conversely, an ti-interventionists portrayed any G erm an th reat via W est A frica an d Brazil as absurd.145 To attack th e U nited States from D akar, troops w ould need a supply line from E urope via th e A frican base, extending over practically tw o thou san d m iles o f ocean, as sea tran sp o rtatio n was th e only possible ro u te.146 T ransport was no sm all undertaking, argued Philip La Fol­ lette, for G erm an troops in A frica w ould require forty thou san d field guns, a h u n d red thousand vehicles, n ine m illion p ounds o f food p er day, ten th o u ­ sand airplanes, an d n ine m illion to n s o f shipping. If such forces did attem pt to cross from A frica to South A m erica, they w ould— so Boake C arter said— be sunk by th e U.S. Navy.147 Invading Brazil presented its ow n problem s. C harles A. Lindbergh claim ed th a t one required dozens o f previously prepared airfields, equipped w ith tanks an d fuel, and crew s o f skilled m echanics, all o f w hich had to be tran sp o rted by sea. O ne m ust fu rth er presuppose th at G erm any had already w on th e w ar in Europe; th a t its conquered countries rem ained so docile th a t it could devote atten tio n to an interhem ispheric struggle; th a t it could ignore Asia, “always at h e r back d o o r”; and th a t it had A frica “well in hand.” 148 Suppose G erm any d id take th e eastern bulge o f B razil, critics argued. Its problem s w ould ju st begin. W ere H itler to statio n a m illion tro o p s there, th ese forces w ould lie ju st as far from th e U nited States as w hen they began o p eratio n s. F u rth erm o re, “T here is n o link by rail w ith th e rest o f S outh A m erica,” said H anson B aldw in. “T here are no roads, n o facilities.” 149 How, asked Fish, could panzer divisions survive in th e A m azon sw am p in a te rri­ to ry as vast as G erm any, France, an d E ngland com bined? T hen th e G erm ans w ould still have to trek n o rth . “P ractically all o f this 5,530-m ile hike,” said th e New York Daily News, “w ould be th ro u g h m o u n tain s, jungles o r deserts, n o t to m en tio n h ostile p o p u latio n s, h eat, snakes, tro p ical disease germ s,

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taran tu las an d gila m onsters.” W ere G erm any to attack across th e C aribbean, w arned Taft, U.S. naval d o m in atio n w ould m ake th e effort ten tim es as dif­ ficult as crossing th e English ch an n el.150 Conversely, asserted th e AFC research bureau, any U.S. seizure o f D akar w ould be far from easy. In th e w ords o f C olonel Frederick Palm er, a no ted m il­ itary expert, the effort em bodied “an invitation to m assacre in detail.” Land­ ing o n a defended shore involved th e m ost difficult o f all m ilitary operations. At least a h u ndred thousand m en, fo u r h u n d red thou san d tons o f shipping, a h u n d red ships, an d a pow erful naval escort w ere required, all serving as a p er­ fect target for dive-bom bers an d subm arines. Even to land in Freetow n, Sierra Leone— five h u n d red m iles south o f D akar— could, rem arked Uncensored, cost th e attacker m any tro o p s.151 If the U nited States did take D akar, th e A frican city w ould be difficult to hold. “H ow can we protect D akar from recapture,” asked V incent Gilroy, for­ m er ed ito r o f The Democrat, “unless we advance, step by step, N orth, South, East and W e s t . . . u n til the entire co n tin en t o f A frica is th e field o f o u r oper­ ations?” Sim ilarly, John T. Flynn noted th e difficulty o f supplying U.S. troops an d ships and holding the population u n d er A m erican control. W ar and m er­ chant ships w ould be diverted from aiding B ritain.152 D akar itself was deem ed a w orthless area, a useless bridgehead, being six­ teen h u n d red m iles from N o rth A frica and tw enty-five h u n d red m iles from Axis bases in Libya. It lacked ro ad an d railro ad access; 98 percent o f its m a­ terials needed to com e by ship. F u rth erm o re, th e B ritish could destroy th e p o rt by a blockade an d b o m b ard m en t from nearby B ath u rst.153 T he AFC research b u reau called D akar ua steam ing, squalid, h u rrican e-sw ep t tro p i­ cal p o rt in French Senegal w hich is loyal to Vichy,” sorely n eeding a m ajor a ir base an d lacking a single d ry dock. H anson B aldw in fo u n d it lacking storage facilities for coal, oil, o r gasoline, m uch less an a m m u n itio n d u m p o f any size.154 G eneral M arshall him self found any such m ove “strategically unsound.” W riting A dm iral Stark, he said, “We are n o t prepared to undertake any large scale defensive operations on land for som e tim e to come.” A Fortune poll o f O ctober 1941 found fewer than h alf th e population supporting its defense.155 It w ould also be difficult, so ad m inistration critics argued, to defend th e is­ lands on th e w estern A tlantic. Such outposts, adm itted Uncensored, could be used by hostile subm arines and bom bers, b u t the liberal new sletter denied th a t th eir occupation was vital to hem ispheric defense; it preferred bases in Brazil. T he exposed Azores w ould be as difficult for th e U nited States to hold as w ould be B erm uda for an enem y.156 The AFC research bureau also feared a dom ino effect. “If we occupy the Azores, m ust we n o t then occupy Portugal to protect the Azores? If we occupy the C ape Verde Islands and D akar, m ust we then n o t occupy p o rtio n s o f the A frican coast to protect those outposts?” 157

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O nly one an ti-interventionist, C olonel M cC orm ick, favored a base a t the Azores, arguing th a t such a p o st was necessary to prevent any m ove from D akar. W ere H itler to conquer Portugal and establish a p u p p et governm ent o n those islands, he said, th e U.S. Navy should occupy them . T he Azores, com ­ m ented th e Chicago Tribune itself, flanked any E uropean approach to Africa, could easily be defended against a ir attack from continental Europe, an d lay w ithin easy steam ing distance o f a fleet based at B erm uda.158 O n 22 M ay 1941, in response to Pétain’s collaborationist speech o f th e pre­ vious week, Roosevelt secretly prepared expeditionary forces for possible pre­ em ptive strikes. W ithin a m o n th , th e Azores an d o th er A tlantic islands m ight be seized.159 T he w ar dep artm en t opposed th e proposal, focusing instead on th e im portance o f Brazil. For over a m o n th , a task force was prepared, troops even being issued tropical clothing. Yet, probably acting on rum ors concern­ ing a m assive G erm an onslaught o n Russia, FDR suspended th e Azores p ro j­ ect, pushing instead th e Iceland in cursion.160 W hen he m et w ith C hurchill th a t A ugust, Roosevelt prom ised to occupy the Azores as soon as B ritain had m ade arrangem ents w ith Portuguese president A ntönio de O liveira Salazar, though continued Russian resistance and a paucity o f forces persuaded b o th m en to postpone such plans.161 G eneral M arshall, finding his forces unprepared, always argued against such use o f A m erican forces outside th eir hem isphere. In p a rt because o f such w arnings, Roosevelt dropped plans for invading either th e Azores o r D akar.162 Even in O ctober, noted a Fortune poll, less th an 50 percent o f th e public favored A m erican defense o f th e tw o areas.163

A m ericans as a w hole w ere far m ore w illing to fight G erm any over Latin A m erica th an over the d om ination o f Europe. As early as Septem ber 1939, G allup polls indicated th a t 72 percent o f th e public backed th e use o f A m eri­ can force against any G erm an incursion w ithin fifteen h u ndred m iles o f the Panam a C anal. F urtherm ore, som e 53 percent w ould fight to repel an invasion o f Brazil, C hile, o r any o th er m ajor South A m erican n atio n .164 A nxieties concerning political and m ilitary threats to Latin A m erica were greatly exaggerated.165 B eginning in 1938, B ritish intelligence planted fabri­ cated stories o f N azi plots there. In M ay 1940, G eneral M arshall, stressing the lim ited range o f all existing bom bers, claim ed th a t A m erican cities m ight face sporadic air strikes, b u t only enem y air bases in close proxim ity could expose them to continuous attack. In January 1941, C olonel Joseph T. M cNam ey, a m em ber o f the G eneral Staff, and C aptain R ichm ond Kelly T urner, d irector o f th e Navy’s W ar Plans D ivision, drew u p a m em orandum for the Joint Arm y and Navy B oard th at included th e statem ent “T he U nited States can safeguard

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th e N orth A m erican co n tin en t and probably th e w estern hem isphere, w hether allied w ith B ritain o r not.” 166 W ithin th e A m erican m ilitary, however, strong anxieties concerning Brazil rem ained. Rear A dm iral E rnest J. King, appointed com m ander o f th e A tlantic Patrol Force, continually w orried abo u t an invasion o f Brazil via Senegal. M arshall, learning in M ay 1941 from th e A rm y Intelligence D ivision th a t G er­ m any w ould probably invade W est A frica, w anted to send nine thou san d U.S. tro o p s to N atal. To counter th e G erm an m ove, he an d Stim son sought to sta­ tio n U.S. troops there; only H itler’s attack o n th e Soviet U nion reduced anxi­ eties over any such strike. In addition, in M arch 1941, th e m ilitary drew u p contingency plans to occupy all C entral A m erican countries south o f M exico as well as Ecuador, C olom bia, and Venezuela— said action taking place w ithin forty-eight h o u rs.167 A ccording to th e adm inistration, th e G erm an th reat was n o t only m ili­ tary — it was econom ic as well. H ere, too, debate rem ained im passioned.

9 '&

Economic Survival in the Americas

T he Roosevelt adm inistration often pointed w ith alarm to th e G erm an eco­ nom ic p enetration o f L atin A m erica.1 As early as January 1939, the president him self saw G erm any as being able to isolate the U nited States by m eans o f econom ic control. Increasingly he feared th at G erm any m ight form a co n ti­ n ental trad in g u nion to negotiate w ith Latin A m erica an d thereby threaten U.S. security.2 N ot only did as m uch as h alf o f South A m erica’s total exports depend on a E uropean m arket, noted U ndersecretary Welles in January 1941, b u t G er­ m any’s b a rte r system , w ith its atten d an t political m anipulation, could im pose a com m ercial and financial stranglehold on these nations. Large-scale subver­ sive m ovem ents could soon follow, then actual physical invasion.3 In his book You Can't Do Business with Hitler (1941), D ouglas M iller elab­ orated on W elles’s w arning. A ccording to M iller, recently U.S. econom ic a t­ taché to B erlin, G erm an econom ic strangulation o f th e U nited States w ould begin slowly. Latin A m erica had long sold tw ice as m uch to E urope as to the U.S., already was hom e to num erous G erm an and Italian nationals, and de­ rived its culture from such G erm an-controlled nations as Spain, Portugal, France, and Italy. Fearful o f “revolution from w ithin and aggression from w ithout,” South A m erica w ould eagerly buy G erm an arm s, especially as m any o f its inhabitants still cherished suspicions against the C olossus o f die N orth. Soon one w ould see a series o f N azi-inspired revolutions “exploding like a pack o f firecrackers.”4 In an attem pt to com bat possible G erm an b arter agreem ents, on 21 June 1940 Roosevelt endorsed the establishm ent o f an Inter-A m erican Trading C orpora­ tion. This body w ould engage in jo in t m arketing o f the im portant staples

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throughout the Am ericas. U nder such aegis, the U nited States could conduct the trade relations o f the tw enty Latin A m erican republics in a m anner sim ilar to the way W ashington regulated the com m erce o f the forty-eight states.5 N oninterventionists were negative, m aintaining th a t creation o f such a car­ tel was highly im practical. To m ake th e system w ork, said Uncensored, strict control o f all agricultural produce was needed, a com plex m atter w hen the w heat and cotton o f A rgentina, C anada, an d Brazil was added to th a t o f th e U nited States C ost was also a factor. To John T. Flynn, purchasing th e coffee o f Brazil, th e copper o f C hile, and th e nitrates o f Peru w ould cost at least a bil­ lion dollars a year. In enforcem ent, too, lay a huge problem . W ould th e U nited States, asked free m arket econom ist Frank C hodorov, send its fleet to chase G erm an m erchantm en from South A m erican w aters w hen G erm any u n d er­ sold it? "Are we ready to back up o u r econom ic w ar m easures w ith force?”6 O th er objections to the cartels appeared. It was futile, w rote H ugh Johnson, to becom e business agent for som e tw enty-odd Latin A m erican republics th at lacked the naval and air bases needed for th eir ow n protection. These nations, argued the Christian Century, had no m ore desire to en ter in to such a schem e th an did N orth A m erican capital.7 Roosevelt soon abandoned th e project. In A ugust 1940, th e president to ld a press conference th at his n atio n sought no inclusive arrangem ent w ith all o f Latin A m erica. In continuing efforts to protect A m erican m arkets against to ­ talitarian dum ping, he said, th e adm inistration w ould consider each problem individually. H ull feared for the fate o f his reciprocity program , w hich freed congressional renew al later in th e year, and did n o t seek fu rth er controversy. T he treasury d epartm ent, although com m itted to currency stabilization, found the cartel schem e to o grandiose. As G reat B ritain appeared increasingly capable o f survival, such efforts at hem ispheric cartelization becam e increas­ ingly irrelevant.* Still and all, th e ad m inistration found increased trad e betw een the U nited States and Latin A m erica em inently desirable. H ence, o n 22 July 1940, R oo­ sevelt asked C ongress for h alf a billion dollars, lent through th e E xportIm p o rt Bank, to relieve Latin A m erica’s econom ic difficulties. T he w ar, noted H ull, had m ade it difficult for Latin A m erican countries to pay for necessary im ports; therefore, im m ense stores o f export com m odities w ere piling up.9 A few an ti-interventionists favored such loans, b u t endorsem ents w ere half­ h earted .10 To th e Christian Century, the loans indicated a recognition th at a problem existed, b u t they were n o t in them selves a so lu tio n .11 Journalist F rank H anighen found the sum s far too m odest, the Roosevelt ad m in istratio n far to o fixated o n "the vested interests an d the upper classes.” 12 M ore adm in istratio n critics, however, opposed the proposal.13 As w ith th e cartel schem e, cost was a factor. Flynn w rote, wWe can do a nice jo b in th e d i­ rection o f ruin in g ourselves if we undertake to pay th e bills involved in the ru in o f South A m erica.” 14 F urtherm ore, such loans m ight subsidize econom ic

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rivals. W hen, for exam ple, th e U nited States announced a $20 m illion loan th at w ould enable Brazil to erect a steel m ill, th e Chicago Tribune claim ed th at th e m ove w ould sim ply create com petition for dom estic steel producers.15 O n 26 Septem ber, C ongress approved th e m easure, though it forbade loans for w ar m aterials to countries still ow ing m oney to th e U.S. governm ent. In 1941, th e U.S. m ade an accord w ith Brazil and M exico, offering stable export prices at relatively high levels.16 To m any o f the adm inistration’s adversaries, th e U nited States certainly could com pete w ith G erm any in Latin A m erica.17 A gricultural expert G eorge Peek w rote, “Q uality is rem em bered long after price is forgotten.” H ugh John­ son saw n o th reat in G erm any’s m uch-touted b arter policies, for those Latin A m erican nations th a t traded w ith the Reich w ould soon possess an over­ abundance o f aspirins, bicycles, an d cam eras. “Ignorant nations,” he pre­ dicted, “w ill n o longer trad e tusks o f ivory an d wedges o f gold for calico, squarefaced gin an d strings o f beads.” A ccording to the research bureau o f the A m erica First C om m ittee, th e U.S. already possessed 50 percent o f the C aribbean’s trade; nearly 30 percent o f Brazil’s; nearly 25 percent o f such Pa­ cific C oast countries as Bolivia, Ecuador, C hile, an d Peru; an d over 10 percent o f such A tlantic-oriented nations as A rgentina, Paraguay, and U ruguay.18 From th e o utset o f th e w ar, several an ti-interventionists called for closer econom ic ties w ith L atin A m erica.19 If th e tw o continents, said th e New York Daily News, could pool resources an d develop adequate d istrib u tio n , “every m an, w om an and child in th e W estern H em isphere could be well fed, well clothed, well housed.” N oting in O ctober 1940 th at B ritain’s South A m erican tra d e had been heavily reduced, it rem arked, “We o ught to go after th at trade, an d aim to keep th e bulk o f it after th e war.”20 V arious techniques w ere proposed. R obert La Follette Jr. spoke in general term s o f U.S. financial assistance, econom ist S tuart Chase o f linking th e entire hem isphere in to one self-sufficient econom ic u n it. If th e Axis dom inated E urasia, th e Chicago Tribune suggested th at th e U nited States m ust organize its hem isphere’s com m erce along m onopolistic lines. Social Justice ed ito r Louis B. W ard favored th e broadening o f th e developm ent o f th e Pan A m erican U nion an d the creation o f an Inter-A m erican Bank. H istorian J. M artin K lotsche ad­ vocated spending th e sum s currently slated for th e Allies o n Latin A m erican trad e . If necessary, said G eneral R obert E. W ood and N orm an T hom as, the U.S. could establish export cartels and m ass purchasing organizations against th e G erm ans. E ducator R obert M. H utchins saw the nation adopting Secretary K nox’s proposal o f an im m ediate custom s u nion w ith th e Latin A m erican na­ tio n s.21 P articular atten tio n was given to th e ru b b er o f Brazil and th e tin o f Bo­ livia.22 T he U nited States was currently deriving 90 percent o f its crude ru b ­ b e r an d 75 percent o f its tin from M alaya and th e N etherlands East Indies.23 If th e U.S. purchased b o th resources w ithin th e hem isphere, it could bolster

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Latin A m erican econom ies w hile avoiding dependence o n areas threatened by Japan. Said th e AFC research b u rea u ,MWe need n o t go to w ar for ru b b er o r tin ; A m erican boys need n o t fight and die in D ong D ang o r Bangkok,” as it p ointed to tin sm elters currently being b u ilt in Texas. H ugh Johnson stressed th at D urango, M exico, produced tin . C ongress, said H am ilton Fish in M ay 1940, should appropriate $2 m illion to erect a tin sm elter in Bolivia an d su r­ vey L atin A m erica’s p o tential for ru b b er p ro d u ctio n .24 Taft favored develop­ m en t loans from the E xport-Im port Bank.25 O ther Latin Am erican products received attention. Uncensored suggested buy­ ing m anganese in Cuba and Brazil and chrom ium , platinum , and tungsten throughout the entire continent. Senator R obert La Follette recom m ended shift­ ing U.S. cocoa purchases from Africa, w here the product was “cheaper b u t dis­ tinctly inferior,” to such nations as Venezuela and Ecuador. Fleming M acliesh and C ushm an Reynolds endorsed purchases o f cocoa beans, tapioca, long-staple cotton, cashew nuts, and such vegetable fibers as sisal and henequen.26 Som e proposals w ere m ore com prehensive. New M exico senator D ennis Chavez offered an entire list o f proposals, including th e subsidizing o f U.S. shipping; constructing a canal through N icaragua and possibly T ehuantepec, M exico; building additional tran scontinental highways; m aking long-term in ­ vestm ents in tran sp o rtatio n , com m unication, and w ater pow er; an d enlarging th e Panam a C anal’s facilities. Taft suggested insuring sh o rt-term credits, re ­ ducing steam ship rates, increasing coffee purchases from Brazil, an d possibly low ering taxes o n profits from th e export trad e.27 A nti-interventionists found com fort in C arleton Beals, w hom th e in terv en ­ tio n ist Time m agazine had called the best inform ed w riter on Latin A m erica. Educated at th e U niversity o f C alifornia an d C olum bia U niversity, Beals h ad w ritten books o n everything from Porfirio D iaz to H uey Long. In 1940, he called th e present w ar a fight over raw m aterials, “a struggle b o u n d to grow bitter, w hoever w ins.”28 In Pan America^ Beals stressed hem ispheric integration, w ith Latin A m erica focusing on p roduction o f the raw m aterials needed for com m on defense. To Beals, the adm ittedly needed U.S. investm ent m ust have expiration deadlines. M ore im p o rtan t, th e producing co u n try m ust always control and eventually ow n all such stocks. H e suggested a variety o f trad in g m ethods, including preferential tariffs, m arkets, and contracts, and guaranteed quotas and prices. Som e anti-interventionists, such as th e AFC research bureau, strongly to u ted his w ork.29 O ther anti-interventionists, however, w ere far less sanguine.30 Uncensored offered a barrage o f figures. Europe, it noted, norm ally received 93 percent o f A rgentina’s beef, 80 percent o f its corn, 40 percent o f its hides, and m ost o f its w heat; from Brazil alone, E urope bought 40 percent o f its coffee an d m ost o f its cotton. At its height, rem arked broadcaster Fulton Lewis Jr., th e trad e o f C entral and South A m erica only consum ed 6.7 percent o f U.S. business.31

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A m erica First leader W ood p u t the p o in t sim ply. T he products o f Latin A m erica’s tropical b elt, he noted, com plem ented U.S. m anufactured goods. H ence, M exican m etals, Venezuelan oil, B razilian coffee, and C entral A m eri­ can bananas w ere sure to find m any buyers to th e n o rth . It was in confronting th e pro d u cts o f the tem perate zone— Brazil’s cotton, A rgentina’s m eat, cotton a n d w ool, and C hile’s copper and n itrates— th a t the U nited States w ould find tro u b le. aWe can n o t sell unless we buy,” th e general declared, “an d th a t is a far greater obstacle th an all nazidom .” Furtherm ore, argued the New York Daily News, any m arkets gained d u rin g th e w ar w ould be transitory, for “m ost o f the w orld w ill be broke after th is orgy o f shoveling tangible w ealth in to th e fire.” For th e U.S. to com pete w ith Europe, it m ust eith er subsidize its exports o r cu t th e wages o f its ow n w orkers “to th e bone.”32 Som e an ti-interventionists w ent further. A G erm an victory, said H anson B aldw in, could lead to a reduction in th e A m erican standard o f living as well as “a fierce econom ic w ar for o u r m arkets in South A m erica” an d possibly a m ilitary conflict. Irrespective o f w ho w on the cu rren t global struggle, w arned b o th Joseph P. K ennedy an d th e New York Daily News, th e U nited States faced a b itte r trad e rivalry there.33 T he conclusion becam e obvious: w hatever pow er alignm ents existed in Eu­ ro p e, Latin A m erica depended o n its business. Should the G erm ans end u p in c o n tro l o f Europe, Latin A m ericans w ould still have to deal w ith them an d possibly w ith Japan, too.34 To Lawrence D ennis, the en tire debate over th e Latin A m erican m arket was irrelevant. T he region, he said, “is econom ically very sm all peanuts for H itler a n d for us”; for Europe it was a m atter o f “life and death.” If H itler knocked o u t B ritain, he w ould speedily incorporate Eurasia and A frica in to his to tali­ ta ria n system , giving him — on th e basis o f 1937 figures— 56.3 percent control o f to ta l w orld exports an d im ports. H is Latin A m erican trade, only 5.9 percent o f th e to tal, w ould be th e least o f his concerns. If the G erm ans really sought to con q u er th e w orld, D ennis continued, they w ould n o t w aste econom ic re­ sources in try in g to undersell the U nited States in L atin A m erica o r establish­ ing useless m ilitary bases five h u n d red m iles so u th o f th e Panam a C anal. R ather, they w ould concentrate on building a navy o r air force strong enough to defeat the U.S. T he entire Axis w ould be w iser to engage an A m erican Ex­ p ed itio n ary Force in scattered p o in ts in Europe, Africa, and Asia, w here U.S. forces w ould be overw helm ed.35 A dm ittedly, by 1938, G erm any’s bilateral trad e policies in Latin A m erica h a d led to significant econom ic gains. H itler’s Reich had becom e th e m arket fo r 10.5 percent o f all the area’s exports and supplied 17.5 percent o f all im ­ p o rts. Yet despite th e U nited States’s relative decline in its ow n exports to o th er hem ispheric republics, it was never in real danger in being replaced as th e re­ g ion’s leading supplier. In general, U.S. exports were n o t o f m ajor m agnitude, in th e late 1930s averaging betw een $500 and $600 m illion. Besides, B ritish sea

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pow er was increasingly term inating w hatever m arket p o tential G erm any hoped to possess.36

T he adm inistration’s efforts a t rechanneling hem ispheric trad e pattern s m ight have been relatively half-hearted, b u t its concern over a w ider G erm an eco­ nom ic th reat was palpable indeed. In D ecem ber 1939, Roosevelt w arned W illiam Allen W hite th at a com bined G erm an-R ussian victory w ould so jeop­ ardize U.S. trad e as to im peril wyour civilization and m ine.” W hen, o n 27 M ay 1941, Roosevelt declared a national em ergency, he stressed th a t a G erm an vic­ to ry w ould force th e A m erican w orker to com pete w ith “slave labor” th ro u g h ­ o u t the w orld. W ith H itler “fixing” wages an d hours, “th e dignity and pow er and standard o f living o f th e A m erican w orker and farm er w ould be gone.” Sim ilarly, th e A m erican farm er, no longer able to sell in a com petitive m arket, “w ould face obvious disaster and com plete regim entation.” T he president w ent on: “Freedom to trad e is essential to o u r econom ic life. We do n o t eat all th e food we can produce; we do n o t b u m all th e oil we can pum p; we do n o t use all th e goods we can m anufacture. It w ould n o t be an A m erican w all to keep N azi goods out; it w ould be a Nazi wall to keep us in.” Roosevelt ended th e address on a m ost som ber note. “O u r B unker H ill o f tom orrow ,” he said, “m ay be several thousand m iles from Boston.”37 T he president's sentim ents w ere echoed by o th er pro m in en t in tervention­ ists, am ong them C ordell H ull, W illiam C. B ullitt, and colum nists W alter L ippm ann and D orothy T hom pson.38 A ccording to a Fortune poll taken th a t m onth, m uch o f the business com m unity shared sim ilar anxieties.39 In his You Can't Do Business with Hitler, state departm ent attaché D ouglas M iller offered the m ost frightening account o f all. H itler’s Reich, he w arned, w ould force subject nations to supply it w ith food and raw m aterials w hile im ­ posing G erm an m anufactured goods on them at will. All com m ercial transac­ tio n s ranging from “the N orth C ape in the Land o f the M idnight Sun to the tip o f South Africa” w ould be coordinated by a central bureaucracy in Berlin. O bviously such m assive pow er w ould ru in th e U.S. econom y. O nce G erm any had integrated Latin A m erican into its econom ic em pire, it w ould cut the U nited States o ff from vital raw m aterials, dangerously curtailing any defense program . In addition, th e n ation w ould suddenly experience trem endous overproduction in such crucial item s as cotton, grain, and tobacco, thereby facing the dilem m a o f trad in g o n H itler’s term s o r curtailing production. W ith U.S. political and social in stitu tio n s shattered an d all hopes for “a fuller an d freer existence” lost, only “State Socialism ” lay ahead. “Am erica,” M iller m ourned, “w ould pass from a civilized era into a long nig h t o f siege.”40 T hough M iller received his share o f laudatory reviews, anti-interventionists struck back. Financial w riter Sam uel C row ther found th e argum ent flawed. If

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G erm any’s Führer w anted econom ic self-sufficiency for his n ation, C row ther observed, he w ould have to lim it im ports. If, o n th e o th er h and, he really sought control o f th e m arkets o f th e w orld, he w ould be forced— m erely in o rd er to trad e— to m axim ize them . In any case, autarchy and com m ercial ex­ pansion were incom patible: to p u t th e issue sim ply, the G erm ans could n o t have it b o th ways.41 T he adm inistration also cast one eye o n Asia, w here— so it feared— an o th er en tire section o f th e w orld m ight be subject to an autarchic econom ic system . Suppose, FDR asked th e A m erican Society o f N ew spaper E ditors in A pril 1940, “the Yangzi rem ains perm anently closed to A m erican products,” n o t to m ention the C hina treaty p o rts, C ochin C hina [southern Indochina], Xiang­ gang [H siang River], Siam , the Straits Settlem ents, and th e D utch Indies? As histo rian Jonathan G. U tley paraphrased th e adm inistration’s view, "T his was a question n o t o f a few supplies, b u t o f th e preservation o f a w orld o rder th a t had b rought unparalleled prosperity for the in d u strial nations in general and th e U nited States in particular.”42 T he adm in istratio n , so anti-interventionists feared, m ight be leading A m er­ icans to believe econom ic survival depended on o u trig h t war. Such rhetoric, w rote R aym ond M oley, w ould intensify criticism o f th e U nited States "from Tokyo to Lisbon,” for A m ericans w ould aptly be charged w ith focusing on "the w orld situation” only because o f th eir ow n pocketbooks.43 C ertainly, to FDR’s critics, th e com m ercial price o f intervention was far too high. Asked M erle T horpe, ed ito r o f Nation’s Business, "W hen has w ar helped a n atio n ’s trad e in th e long run?” "T he trem endous d estruction o f w ar is greater in 1 year,” said S enator Tafr, "than the benefits derived by us in 20 years o f foreign trade.”44 W hatever took place, several anti-interventionists argued, the future was bleak. Even if B ritain w on, rem arked pacifist leader Florence Brewer Boeckel, th e U nited States w ould invariably face an econom ically united Europe. Sheer co n tin u atio n o f th e conflict, w arned Joseph R Kennedy, m eant th e loss o f all foreign m arkets.45 O ne possible solution to Axis victory lay in autarchy.46 A nti-interventionists differed o n the percentage o f A m erican incom e dependent on trade, their esti­ m ates ranging from 3 to 7 percent.47 “If worse cam e to worse,” said Kennedy, "we could gear ourselves to an intelligent self-contained national econom y and still enjoy a fair am ount o f prosperity.” "We have the best hom e m arket in the w orld,” rem arked G eneral W ood. To political scientist Brooks Emeny, the na­ tio n already possessed h alf th e w orld’s industrial capacity. If the w ar continued m uch longer, it w ould ow n 75 percent.46 As far as im ports w ent, Peek only found a few item s taken in bulk. T hough they did include tin and rubber, the U nited States could produce substitutes.49 O ffering a m ild dissent, John T. Flynn m aintained th at U.S. trade, though seldom rising above $5 billion, was im p o rtan t for both th e n ation and th e w orld. Yet, if H itler ended up dom inat­ ing Europe, th e U nited States w ould n o t have to lose its trade w ith C anada o r L atin A m erica, areas th a t in 1938 com prised alm ost h a lf o f U.S. com m erce.50

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E conom ist S tuart C hase’s entire book, The New Western Front, had been w ritten to stress U.S. self-sufficiency. C hase denied th at Italy, France, Russia, and Japan “rolled in to one” could approach the n ation’s industrial poten tial. Except for th e Soviet U nion, C hase observed, th e U nited States was th e m ost integrated continental em pire in th e w orld, possessing easy access to all th e raw m aterials it needed. A m ericans, he asserted at one p o in t, can “feed an d clothe ourselves w ithout any im p o rts whatever.”51 H erb ert H oover found autarchy quite feasible. R easoning th a t Axis victories invariably dim inished U.S. exports, the form er president called for m ore hom e industries. New A m erican factories, producing for dom estic consum p­ tio n , w ould hire th e newly displaced w orkers and, at th e sam e tim e, free th e n atio n from foreign dependence. W hile he did “n o t relish it,” he saw th e U nited States as 97 percent self-sufficient, if necessary. “A nd th e cost o f it w ould be less over tw enty years th an one year o f war.”52 In ad d itio n to econom ic self-sufficiency, there was som e flirtatio n w ith barter. Senator Lodge saw b o th b arterin g and dum ping as effective retaliatio n against G erm an pen etratio n . “T his is a gam e a t w hich tw o can play,” said Peek. To Lawrence D ennis, th e U nited States could adjust itself b etter to th e Axis “New Econom ics” th an any o th er nation— could, in fact, be d o m in an t com ­ m ercially. If th e G erm ans sought to m anipulate th e price o f cotton, w heat, an d tobacco, th e U nited States “can destroy them , as Brazil has done w ith m illions o f bags o f coffee, give them away to o u r ow n people o r elim inate them a lto ­ gether by b etter agricultural m anagem ent.”53 A m ong th e an ti-interventionists, Flynn again voiced dissent. G erm any’s ow n b a rte r practices in South A m erica served as a negative exam ple as th ey tu rn e d o u t to be unprofitable.54 Besides, the system p u t trad ers at a fatal d is­ advantage in dealing w ith an unfettered foreign com petitor, particu larly o n e w ith gold in its pockets.55 O ne an ti-in terv en tio n ist offered a related strategy: th a t o f dividing th e w orld in to spheres o f influence. In 1940, G raem e H ow ard, vice presid en t in charge o f overseas operations for G eneral M otors, offered a com m ercial m an ­ ifesto, America and a New World Order.* Several n o n interventionists en ­ dorsed the book.57 T he auto executive proposed dividing th e w orld in to rec­ ognizable econom ic blocs, suggesting as entities continental E urope, th e B ritish Em pire, th e USSR, Latin A m erica, N orth A m erica, an d Japan's “N ew O rd er” in Asia. C ooperative regionalism , said H ow ard, could su b stitu te m u ­ tu al interdependence for “intern atio n al econom ic chaos, revolution and co n ­ flict.” True, th e U nited States faced keen postw ar com petition from E ngland, G erm any, Italy, and Japan, all nations w hose survival depended o n exports. It could, however, still sell its cotton, lard, tobacco, and w heat surpluses overseas as well as supply loans for productive projects. In addition, it could m ediate the w orld’s conflicts an d thereby keep such nations as G erm any, Japan, Italy, Russia, and Spain o u t o f th e “international doghouse.” All such n a tio n s,

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H ow ard insisted, had no quarrel "other th an the quarrels we ourselves w ish to initiate,” and th e U.S. w ould be wise to avoid fu rth er "bellicose criticism ” o f th e ir regim es.58 M any o f th e adm inistration critics stressed neith er autarchy, barter, n o r re­ gionalism . R ather, they sim ply asserted th at th e U nited States could n o t only survive in an A xis-dom inated w orld b u t could m eet any new econom ic rival.59 As H ugh Johnson rem arked, "T here is only one rule for success. It is goods o f b etter quality, at low er prices th an com petitors can offer.”60 A gricultural leader G eorge Peek raised a related factor— nam ely, th a t the U.S. possessed th e greatest international purchasing pow er in th e w orld. Pro­ claim ing w ith pride, "T his is o u r high card,” he n o ted th a t th e U nited States bou g h t m assive am ounts o f coffee, sugar, an d w ool w ithin th e hem isphere, n o t to m ention 40 percent o f the w orld’s tin , 50 percent o f Southeast Asia's rubber, and 90 percent o f Japan’s entire exports. G erm any, he continued, w ould find it difficult to d isru p t this m arket.61 F urtherm ore, John T. Flynn argued, G erm any possessed w ithin itself the seeds o f its ow n econom ic d estruction. C iting interventionist colum nist W al­ te r L ippm ann as an authority, Flynn denied th a t H itler could ever m anage a peacetim e em pire. D ebts w ould be unm anageable, industrial stru ctu re dislo­ cated, th e entire G erm an n atio n o n the verge o f starvation. Excessive regula­ tio n w ould first m ake private p ro fit im possible and then destroy capitalism it­ self. O nce the governm ent was forced directly to appropriate businesses, collapse w ould becom e inevitable. A fter a disorderly struggle for pow er, the Reich was likely to go com m unist.62 Som e an ti-interventionists w ent so far as to claim th a t it was G erm any— n o t th e U nited States— th a t w ould end up the dependent country.63 In con­ tending th at th e n atio n always held th e n atu ral advantage, th e AFC research bureau cited a study sponsored by the B rookings In stitu tio n , C leona Lewis’s Nazi Germany and World Trade.6* A ccording to Lewis’s findings, th e ravaged E uropean continent w ould be o n such sh o rt rations th a t G erm any sim ply w ould be unable to exclude U.S. im ports. Sim ilarly, w ith o u t A m erican raw m aterials, E uropean industries w ould be crippled. Conversely, as Europe’s ex­ p o rts w ere n o t indispensable to th e U.S. econom y, th e bargaining pow er w ould naturally lie w ith th e W estern H em isphere. T he U nited States could even force th e G erm ans to pay in dollars. Even before W orld W ar II, said the AFC, G erm any depended on im ports o f certain food an d raw m aterials. T he w ar m erely accentuated th e Reich’s dilem m a, m aking it even m ore econom ically dependent. O f all tw enty nations u n d er N azi sway, only three— Bulgaria, R um ania, an d Yugoslavia— com ple­ m ented th e N azi econom y by supplying these tw o elem ents. Som e nations— D enm ark, H ungary, th e N etherlands, and Sweden, for exam ple— needed food them selves. Still others required b o th food and raw m aterials, am ong them such significantly industrialized states as Belgium , France, Italy, Sw itzerland,

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and Czechoslovakia. If th e Nazis controlled every n atio n bordering the M editerranean, they still w ould possess few raw m aterials.65 T he AFC research bureau soon dealt w ith th e econom ic im plications o f H itler’s possible conquest o f th e Soviet U nion. Q uoting again from Lewis’s study, it asserted th at dom ination o f undeveloped Soviet plains w ould hardly im prove G erm any’s position. T he USSR had n o t exported m uch food since W orld W ar I; its ow n deficiencies had been considerable, and it could supply G erm any w ith ju st 14 percent o f th e food it needed. O nly by deliberately starving the Soviets could H itler receive m uch food from th e USSR, b u t star­ vation w ould only low er Russia’s productivity. As far petroleum w ent, despite its huge oil o u tp u t, the Soviet U nion was actually sh o rt o f regular an d aviation gasoline. M oreover, the Soviets possessed little surplus coal and iron and could n o t m ake up G erm any’s deficiencies in such m ajor raw m aterials as tin and tungsten.66 A few anti-interventionists were even m ore explicit in claim ing th a t a G er­ m an-dom inated postw ar o rder could operate to U.S. advantage. To pacifist N icholas B roughton, the breakup o f th e B ritish Em pire could lead to greater U.S. trad e w ith an independent C anada and o th er self-governing dom inions. T he U nited States, he argued, w ould no longer be ham pered by B ritain’s im ­ perial preference system , by w hich the em pire was exclusively open to B ritish m anufactured goods.67 Such critics found little m erit in Roosevelt’s ow n argum ent concerning “slave labor”— nam ely, th a t th e low wages w ithin A xis-dom inated countries created a real th reat.68 A fter all, a host o f ad m inistration foes argued, th e U.S. had long trad ed w ith a num ber o f totalitarian and low-wage countries, in ­ cluding C hina, Japan, India, an d th e Soviet U nion.69 The U nited States, m ain­ tained Frank C hodorov, w ould counter the bargains m ade by G erm an slave labor w ith th e products o f its ow n free laborers, w ho in tu rn had far m ore wages to spend. True, G erm any controlled tw ice as m any buyers as th e U nited States, b u t these buyers w ere paupers.70 Even access to raw m aterials presented little problem . In January 1941, Un­ censored strongly challenged FDR’s claim , m ade in his recent message to C on­ gress, th at the populations and resources o f Europe, Asia, Africa, and Aus­ tralia— in the president's w ords— “exceeds the sum total o f the population and the resources o f the w hole o f the W estern H em isphere— yes, m any tim es over.” W hile conceding th at th e U nited States only had 6 percent o f the w orld’s pop­ ulation and th e entire W estern H em isphere ju st double th at, it stressed th at the nation retained vast shares o f the w orld’s resources. “Judged by th eir potential capacity to produce,” it said, “A m ericans should never be faced w ith the grim choice o f guns o r butter.”71 Certainly, several anti-interventionists argued, the U.S. either possessed w hat it needed o r could easily stockpile scarce goods.72 In som e ways, th e president’s adversaries had the b etter o f th e im m ediate argum ent over trade. D uring the 1930s, only 3 percent o f th e U.S. gross na­

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tional p ro d u ct had gone to nations outside N o rth A m erica. A m erican busi­ nesses invested slightly u nder 6 percent o f th eir w ealth abroad. As far as the balance o f trad e w ith G erm any was concerned, it lay substantially in W ash­ ington’s favor.73 In regard to resources, th e U nited States was already involved in m ajor stockpiling. In June 1940, th e M etals Reserve C om pany, a subsidiary o f the Re­ construction Finance C orporation (RFC), began engaging in m assive p u r­ chases o f foreign tin , copper, an d tungsten. A nother RFC firm , the R ubber Re­ serve C om pany, u n d erto o k th e sam e activity. In M ay 1941, th e O ffice o f P roduction M anagem ent altered stockpiling prio rities to assure a three year’s supply o f such m aterials as chrom ite, m anganese, an d graphite.74 Both Roo­ sevelt and W elles conceded the U.S. was n o t dependent on Southeast Asian tin an d rubber, for sources w ere available elsew here.75 M oreover, if the adm inis­ tra tio n saw m arkets as a linchpin o f its policy, it w ould have rem ained reluc­ ta n t to em bargo Japan, for its exports to th a t land were several tim es larger th an its sales to beleaguered C hina. H opefully, for b o th interventionists an d th eir foes, econom ic survival am id a hostile w orld w ould rem ain m oot. M uch depended o n B ritain’s chances for survival after th e fall o f France, th e possibilities o f a negotiated peace, and the individual w ho assum ed th e presidency in January 1941.

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D ebates over m ilitary an d econom ic survival to o k place am id a background th a t was certainly grim . O nce France fell, B ritish leaders had every reason to fear an im m inent G erm an strike. O n 15 May, in his very first m essage to Roo­ sevelt as prim e m inister, C hurchill said, “We expect to be attacked here, b o th from th e air an d by parachute in the near future.” Twelve days later, th e B ritish m ilitary w arned C hurchill th a t if G erm any obtained a ir suprem acy, th e Royal Navy could n o t fend o ff invasion. Even w orse, land defenses w ere insufficient to repel enem y forces. W ithin a m onth, th e belief in inevitable invasion was w idespread.1 C hurchill biographer M artin G ilbert entitles his chapter cover­ ing July 1940 “T he G reat Invasion Scare.” O n 4 Septem ber, th e prim e m inister gave the B ritish th ree-to -o n e odds o f staving o ff the assault. Less th an three weeks later, C hurchill received an intelligence sum m ary: “T he th reat o f inva­ sion to this co u n try cannot be said to have lessened.”2 By m id-A ugust, the fam ous air w ar know n as the B attle o f B ritain had begun in earnest. O n 15 Septem ber, aerial com bat reached its clim ax, w ith th irteen h u ndred G erm an sorties against London. The G erm ans found costs so high th at tw o days later H itler postponed invasion indefinitely. B ritain was by no m eans secure, however, and u n til M ay 1942 it experienced sustained bom bing in w hat was called the blitz. A m erican officials kept a w ary eye on developm ents. In m id-July, G eneral R aym ond E. Lee, A m erican m ilitary attaché and head o f intelligence in Lon­ don, believed invasion was in the offing, though he predicted the B ritish w ould repel it.3 W ithin six m onths, according to the U.S. Joint Planning C om ­ m ittee, B ritain w ould n o t be an active com batant.4 To A dolf Berle, there was “a long b itter stalem ate” ahead, w ith each side “pounding the o th er to a

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bloody pulp.” O nly occasionally was there slight optim ism . Early in Septem ­ ber, th e A m erican m ilitary was n o tin g th e grow ing strength o f the Royal A ir Force an d th e developm ent o f an arm y sufficient to fight in A frica and the N ear East.5 In th e sam e m onth, B ullitt w ould n o t rule o u t a B ritish invasion o f th e E uropean co n tin en t w ithin a year.6 To A m ericans in general, B ritain’s fate rem ained black. A Fortune poll con­ ducted in July found slightly over 40 percent predicting a G erm an victory.7 T h at A ugust, th e sam e poll indicated 39.8 percent denying th a t G erm any w ould conquer B ritain b u t 37.5 percent th inking it w ould.8 Even som e m ost sym pathetic to B ritain w ere discouraged. Early in June, for exam ple, Life m agazine forecast several h u n d red thou san d G erm an troops landing “in fast m otorboats a t night.” A m o n th later it offered an article th at described a hypothetical invasion.9 A nti-interventionists w ere divided over th e m atter o f B ritain’s fate. Som e com m ents w ere bleak. In m id-M ay, Chicago business leader Sterling M orton expected the invasion o f England, if only by paratroopers, w ithin th e next few weeks. O n th e day King Leopold surrendered, Joseph R K ennedy saw negoti­ atio n o n G erm any’s term s as th e only hope for b o th France and B ritain. O n 25 July, th e am bassador gave three weeks for H itler to arrive in L ondon.10 A1 W illiam s repeatedly w arned o f a G erm an invasion, stressing in p articu lar the role bom bing w ould play.11 “The invasion o f England is poised,” th e aviation colum nist w rote early in A ugust.12 O n 1 A ugust, Lawrence D ennis predicted invasion w ithin th e m o n th .13 Even in M ay and June o f 1940, o th er FDR critics envisioned B ritain’s suc­ cessful resistance. To W illiam R andolph H earst, th e English C hannel could successfully “engulf” arm ies as th e Red Sea had “engulfed th e hosts o f Pharaoh.”14 T he Chicago Tribune claim ed B ritain could prevent a m ajor lan d ­ ing by blow ing u p its docks.15 If, said publisher M cC orm ick, the G erm ans dis­ em barked near H astings, th e w ell-trained regular English arm y, “reinforced by th e splendid A ustralians an d th e indom itable C anadians,” could hold a narrow fro n t.16 By 24 July, the New York Daily News could predict th at B ritish ships, planes, an d m inefields m ight “pile up so m any G erm an dead in th e w ater th at th e attack w ill crum ble.” If th e G erm ans did get ashore, th e B ritish possessed over a m illion train ed soldiers w aiting to m eet them , plus “an unknow n n u m ­ b e r o f hom e guards, ‘parashoots,’ bloodthirsty school kids w ith .22’s, and old gendem en w ho used to d o som e h u n tin g o r som e W orld W ar soldiering.”17 Even in B ritain’s blackest m om ents, a few an ti-interventionists denied th at G erm any could ever really succeed. Senator Taft continued his prediction th at E urope could never succum b to one-m an ru le.18 H ugh Johnson quoted N apoleon’s m axim : “Em pires always die o f indigestion.” John T. Flynn found G erm any’s heavy w ar expenditures inadvertendy revealing the desperate con­ d itio n o f its econom y; the entire G erm an system was headed for a crack-up.19 Even if G erm any w on its im m ediate cam paigns, com m ented H anson Bald­

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w in, it w ould still confront the m istrust o f Russia and Italy, find th e dom ina­ tio n o f conquered peoples difficult, and experience the exhaustion resulting from any war. “Wolves for long do n o t lie dow n w ith lions.”20 Even before th e arrival o f au tu m n , such an ti-interventionists expressed confidence th at B ritain w ould hold o u t.21 A com bination o f th e Royal A ir Force and pestilence on th e co ntinent, m aintained H earst in Septem ber, w ould give H itler n o stom ach for fu rth er aggression. T he publisher found G erm an aircraft incapable o f tran sp o rtin g sufficient invasion troops.22 In the sam e m onth, th e Chicago Tribune p ointed to approaching storm y w eather and to th e suprem acy o f B ritish fighters over G erm an bom bers.23 In O ctober, som e continued to deny th e possibility, m uch less th e success, o f an invasion. T he New York Daily News, n oting the increasing fogs and storm s in th e C hannel, guessed th at B ritain could at least hold off G erm any for the w inter.24 Radio broadcaster Q uincy Howe denied th at H itler ever con­ sidered an invasion o f B ritain, an d was certainly unable to w in the war.25 O thers spoke in m ore general term s. In Decem ber, Sterling M orton ques­ tioned w hether B ritain could ever be conquered. Even if it was, G erm any faced an unparalleled policing job. “T he m ore H itler conquers,” asserted R epublican leader A lf L andon, “the w eaker he becom es.” T he task o f perm anently govern­ ing “a free, courageous, and patrio tic people like th e French, D utch, an d N or­ w egians” was “insurm ountable.”26 H itler, said th e Chicago Tribune, had gone farther an d faster th an N apoleon b u t still faced three things th at had stym ied B onaparte: B ritish sea power, a Russian alliance th a t was unreliable, and the “volcanic pow ers latent in people w ho had lost th eir liberty.”27 As early as O c­ tober, V illard expected th e G erm an people to suffer a terrible w inter, experi­ encing inadequate food supplies, exposed cities, and incessant air raids.28 In fact, he argued, th e m ajority o f th e F ü h rers ow n people w ere sullen, un d er­ nourished, and “sick and tired o f the w hole business.”29 C ertainly, B ritain’s fate rem ained unclear. Italy’s entrance in to th e w ar caused B ritain severe problem s in A frica an d th e M editerranean. In June, Italian aircraft raided M alta an d bom bed A den an d P ort Said. A m o n th later Italians stationed in E thiopia overran B ritish Som aliland. T h at Septem ber Italy’s forces in Libya began th e long-aw aited invasion o f Egypt, follow ed in late O ctober by an invasion o f Greece via A lbania. A m erican naval experts of­ fered a m ost pessim istic analysis, predicting Axis dom in atio n o f th e M editer­ ranean, to be follow ed by th e failure o f B ritish blockading efforts and th en m ilitary disaster.30 O nly in D ecem ber did th e B ritish begin th eir co u n terat­ tack in N o rth A frica, reaching T obruk o n 22 January 1941 an d Beda Fom m on 6 February. Little w onder som e adm inistration foes forecast defeat o r at least an im ­ passe. Frederick J. Libby, estim ating th at G erm an air superiority rem ained at least four-to-one, predicted th at G erm any w ould w in the Battle o f B ritain. If it ju st m aintained its bom bing, W illiam R. C astle feared, it could “b ring the

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B ritish people to th eir knees th ro u g h sheer h u n g er” Senator Taft saw th e d e­ stru ctio n o f th e B ritish fleet an d the breakup o f its em pire as a distin ct possi­ bility. To H ugh Johnson, B ritain’s only hope lay in revolution w ithin the con­ quered nations. Even w ithout invasion, argued Lawrence D ennis, B ritain faced starvation. H e saw B ritain losing N o rth A frica, E thiopia, and th e M editer­ ranean and th en , after defeat, experiencing proletarian revolution.31 T he New York Daily News forecast G erm any closing B ritain’s M editerranean lifeline a t b o th sides, thereby boxing in th e B ritish fleet, blockading th e sou th ern end o f th e Suez C anal, an d cutting o ff th e B ritish-dom inated N ear East from the hom e country. If such tactics succeeded, th e w ar m ight continue for years, re­ su ltin g in m utual starvation and “Stalin picking u p the pieces.” C. H artley G rattan drew u p a w hole scenario for B ritish dissolution, including massive unem ploym ent, chaos for th e p o u n d sterling, drastic curtailm ent in agricul­ tu re an d m ining, and loss o f m ajor colonies.32 At tim es, noninterventionists found B ritain already defeated. “T he to tali­ tarian d om ination o f G erm any and Italy,” predicted H erbert H oover in Sep­ tem ber, “w ill cover m ost o f th e C ontinent from Russia to the A tlantic.” In ad ­ d itio n , G erm any w ould control m any A llied dependencies in A frica an d the East Indies.33 T he D akar fiasco sim ply added to the pessim ism . O n 23 Septem ber 1940, B ritish naval forces and Free French officers landed at th e V ichy-held p o rt o f D akar, b u t after tw o days o f desultory fighting, they w ere forced to abandon o perations. T he B ritish repulse, com m ented th e New York Daily News, was “d ie m ost om inous setback G reat B ritain has yet suffered,” a m ove th a t m ight persuade Spain to jo in th e Axis and obviously encourage th e Japanese.34 A m o n th later B ritain’s fate appeared little better.35 In O ctober, A nne M or­ row Lindbergh w rote th a t eventually B ritain w ould have to m eet H id er’s term s. W ith G ibraltar and Suez still threatened, the New York Daily News stated, “T he B ritish Em pire’s near future looks dark— darker a t the m om ent th a n th a t o f G reat B ritain proper.” T he Chicago Tribune expected th e G erm ans to strike at such areas as G ibraltar, Egypt, the Balkans, Russia, o r Greece.36 N ovem ber an d D ecem ber b rought m ore discouragem ent. C harles A. Lind­ bergh rem arked privately th at England could n o t w in the w ar unless G erm any collapsed internally.37 T hough the B ritish were show ing courageous resistance, th e G erm ans were by far inflicting the m ost dam age.38 Libby com m ented, “We are to o late. B ritain can not w in, even w ith o u r help,” though he argued a peacetim e G erm any could no t rem ain totalitarian. A ccording to A m bassador Kennedy, alm ost every B ritish p o rt was seriously dam aged; therefore, its food supply w ould last only tw o m onths. Furtherm ore, the am bassador continued, th e loss o f N orth Africa was inevitable if the G erm ans w anted to pursue it. T he Chicago Tribune did n o t rule o u t the actual invasion o f the British Isles.39 G iven such prognoses— a high chance o f B ritish survival, a low chance o f B ritish victory— anti-in terv en tio n ist talk increasingly centered on stalem ate.40

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B oth sides, m aintained the New York Daily News, could w ithstand any pres­ sure th e o th er could exert. As V illard rem arked, wH itler is n o t w inning this w ar and isn’t going to w in it— nobody is except hunine, disease, u tte r m isery and probably C om m unism .”41

All d u rin g H itler’s blitzkrieg o f W estern Europe, anti-interventionists talked continually o f m ediation. Neville C ham berlain, his dream o f an im m inent peace suddenly shattered, concurred w ith Joseph K ennedy in believing th at B ritain’s sheer survival depended o n Roosevelt’s appeal for an arm istice. T he D uke o f W indsor secretly added his su p p o rt to such an enterprise.42 W ithin th e U nited States, tw o pacifist groups— the Fellow ship o f Reconcil­ iation and th e W om en’s Intern atio n al League— called for negotiation by the president him self. In A pril 1940, the Federal C ouncil o f C hurches, th e leading P rotestant organization, requested the neutral nations to create a perm anent coordinating body dedicated to consultation; b o th Frederick L. Libby and the Christian Century concurred.43 In May, the New York Daily News endorsed Pius X II’s recent call for peace, calling him "the w isest statesm an in Europe today.”44 As U.S. particip atio n in th e w ar w ould m ake no difference, “W hy n o t patch u p som e kind o f peace w ith H itler, then p u t the Allies’ best diplom ats, go-betw eens, agents provocateurs, stool pigeons, finks and finooglers o n the jo b o f busting u p th e H itler-Stalin friendship?”45 Even as Norway, th e Low C ountries, and France w ere being overrun, hopes rem ained high.46 Senator W heeler hinted at a B ritish peace w ith H erm ann G oering. Lawrence D ennis saw peace sentim ent existing am ong b o th rig h tw ing “appeasers” and th e B ritish Labor Party. A uto executive Jam es D. M ooney, w hom FDR had sent to E urope on a scouting m ission several m onths earlier, cautiously reported th a t negotiation was n o t im possible. N eeded was “a form ula providing security for th e English and French and re­ m oving th e th reat o f starvation for th e G erm ans.” Frank W aldrop foresaw H itler ruling Europe from th e A rctic Circle to th e Pyrenees b u t believed th at all th is conquest was “im poverished, sullen, fractured an d useless in its pres­ en t state to anybody.” B ritain, he suggested, should offer th e Führer th e Bel­ gian C ongo, France’s A frican colonies, an d a free hand in th e East “before he integrates all th at vast pow er in to a m achine to use on England.”47 Som e peace term s appeared a b it cosm ic. T he plan o f A lbert W. Palm er, president o f Chicago Theological School, included im m ediate disarm am ent, a w orld court, equal access o f all nations to m arkets and raw m aterials, and an A m erican rehabilitation fund o f $4 billion for b o th Europe and C hina.48 Com­ mon Sense looked tow ard a E uropean federation and the beginning o f w orld

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governm ent.49 Frederick J. Libby sought general disarm am ent, independence restored to occupied countries, a G erm an sphere o f influence in southeastern Europe, and th e p erp etu atio n o f such pow erful blocs as th e B ritish and French em pires, Russia, G erm any, Italy, the U nited States, and uan oriental federa­ tio n ”50 O n 19 July 1940, H itler addressed th e Reichstag. As at th e end o f the Polish cam paign, he called o n B ritain to end th e struggle. “I can see no reason w hy th is w ar m ust go on,” he said, though he m entioned no concrete peace term s.51 C hurchill adam antly refused to negotiate.52 By now th e B ritish had rescued th e bulk o f th eir continental arm y, G erm an atten tio n was still focused on France, and A m erican aid appeared possible. If th e prim e m inister privately m ight have feared th at victory was unattainable, he still th o u g h t B ritain could hold o u t for m ore acceptable term s.53 F urtherm ore, C hurchill m istakenly be­ lieved th a t th e G erm an w ar m achine was approaching m axim um efficiency, th a t th e B ritish blockade w ould begin taking a heavy toll, and th a t an A m eri­ can declaration o f w ar was im m inent.54 A G allup poll w ithin B ritain revealed strong su p p o rt for continuing th e war.55 Som e an ti-in terv en tio n ists sought a positive response to H itler’s bid. B ritain, suggested V illard, should call H itler's bluff; hopefully, threatened fam ine in E urope, w ar w eariness am ong th e G erm an people, and a Soviet th rea t in th e Balkans w ould create an honorable peace. Just before the F ührer’s speech, th e New York Daily News called o n B ritain to trea t any p ro ­ posal seriously. Five to ten years o f arm ed tru ce w ould give th e B ritish tim e to prepare for a final show dow n; th e alternative sim ply m eant fam ine th ro u g h o u t all E urope.56 O thers w ere m ore tentative. A nne M orrow L indbergh noted th a t the speech containing no real term s, though she dreaded "the suffering and th e terro r and h o rro r” continued fighting w ould involve.57 The Chicago Tribune endorsed th e B ritish rejection; H itler’s "collected w orks” revealed “a unique disdain for good faith.”58 For th e rest o f the year, calls for negotiation continued from voices as dis­ parate as N orm an T hom as and C harles A. Lindbergh, Social Justice, and the W IL 59 T he New York Daily News and the H earst press suggested papal in ter­ vention; G eneral W ood and Frederick Libby w ould include Roosevelt as well.60 B ritain could m ake a settlem ent by w hich it could keep its fleet and colonies, said W ood in O ctober, though adm ittedly G erm any w ould be left possessing econom ic control o f W estern E urope.61 If the U nited States af­ firm ed th a t it w ould n o t enter the war, rem arked th e general tw o m onths later, peace could be m ade by th e spring o f 1941.62 He proposed peace term s in ­ volving the liberation o f Norway, D enm ark, H olland, and Belgium and the co n tin u atio n o f th e B ritish Em pire, w ith perhaps the ow nership o f tw o for­ m er G erm an colonies subm itted to neutral m ediation.63

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In D ecem ber, W illiam H enry C ham berlin endorsed a com prom ise peace m ade a t the expense o f th e Soviet U nion. T he Chicago Tribune w arned B ritain th a t chances o f sustaining a long w ar w ere less th an equal. Fortune staffer John C ham berlain, a b it m ore cautious, sought ua real negotiated peace, n o t a fake one th a t w ould leave h er governm ent and arm am ent in hands sym pathetic to H itler.”64 T he alternative appeared to be Red revolution. W riting in his diary th a t O c­ tober, Felix M orley confided th a t from the beginning o f the conflict he had felt th a t G erm any w ould w in. Labor Party obstinacy, so he feared, could create a "com m unist E ngland” though he blam ed th e U nited States as well.65 W illiam R. C astle, John Bassett M oore, John Cudahy, and C harles A. Lindbergh shared the anxiety.66 R um ors appeared everyw here. In O ctober, D evere Allen’s N ofrontier N ew s Service reported th a t secret peace negotiations via Spain had recently been "in full tid e” b u t th a t th e destroyer bases deal and possible access for the A m eri­ can fleet in Singapore term inated th e negotiations.67 A m onth later, A m os P inchot heard "on good au th o rity ” th at B ritain could keep its em pire an d c o n ­ tro l o f th e M editerranean, adm ittedly a "gam ble” b u t one preferable to m u tu al annihilation. Joseph P. Kennedy forecast th a t B ritish defeats w ould lead to n e ­ gotiation u n d er a Lloyd G eorge prem iership.68 In Decem ber, B orchard su p ­ posedly had learned from sources in G erm any and Sw itzerland th a t th e N azis sought to end th e war. Uncensored noted th at "responsible W ashington sources” w ere seriously en tertaining th e idea o f a negotiated peace.69 In early O ctober, a resolution o f C ongressm an John G. A lexander (R ep.M inn.) received m ild anti-in terv en tio n ist support. H is proposal included th e cessation o f hostilities under jo in t neutral supervision an d th e advancem ent o f a w orld federation— all u n d er th e aegis o f the A m erican president a n d o th er leaders o f neutral nations. T erritorial questions, he later added, w ould be referred to a convention th at w ould draw up a co nstitution for a U nited States o f the W orld along the lines o f the U.S. C onstitution.70 At the end o f 1940, B urton W heeler m ade a m ajor proposal. Its term s in ­ cluded restoration o f G erm any’s 1914 boundaries; the retu rn o f form er G er­ m an colonies; an autonom ous P oland an d Czechoslovakia; th e resto ratio n o f an independent France, H olland, Norway, Belgium , and D enm ark; th e re tu rn o f A lsace-Lorraine to France; protection o f religious and racial m in o rities in all countries; internationalization o f the Suez Canal; no indem nities o r rep a ­ rations; and arm s lim itation. “T he President,” he m aintained, “should m ake a determ ined effort to bring th e w arring nations o f Europe together” by in sist­ ing th at "a ju st peace be w orked out.”71 A ccording to a hostile jo u rn alist, W heeler conceded th at a negotiated peace m ight sim ply serve as an arm ed truce b u t asserted th at the U nited States had "gotten along” w ith ty ran ts in th e past and w ould be forced to do so in th e future.72

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Several an ti-interventionists w ere always pessim istic abo u t such proposals. As early as A pril, W illiam R. C astle, after hearing N orm an T hom as speak, claim ed he could n o t “follow him so earnestly in w ishing for a negotiated peace rath er th an continuance o f th e war.” W illiam H enry C ham berlin judged w ar passions to be so intense th a t a com prom ise peace rem ained “perhaps the least probable outcom e o f th e war.”73 Roosevelt soon voiced his opposition to any such overtures. In a nationw ide address given o n 28 D ecem ber 1940, th e president attacked th e entire notion: Is it a negotiated peace if a gang o f oudaws surrounds your com m unity and on threat o f exterm ination makes you pay tribute to save your skins? Such a dictated peace would be no peace at all. It would only be another arm istice, leading to the m ost gigantic arm am ent race and the m ost devastating trade wars in history. And in these contests the Americas would offer the only real resistance to the Axis Powers.74

A nti-interventionists quickly responded. Libby deplored th e president’s o p ­ p o sitio n , citing colum nist E rnest K. Lindley to th e effect th a t peace sentim ent w as grow ing in B ritain. N orm an T hom as challenged Roosevelt’s claim th at any negotiation m eant to tal victory for H itler. T he Führer, said th e socialist leader, had no occupation tro o p s in B ritain, d id n o t seek its navy, an d was forced to divert his ow n strength to bolster his w eak ally M ussolini. O ne a n ti­ in terventionist jo u rn al, America, did back th e president, concurring in FDR’s claim th a t G erm any sought only to “dom inate an d enslave the hum an race.”75

All th e tim e an ti-interventionists discussed the fate o f th e w ar and prom oted a negotiated peace, a presidential cam paign was under way, one in w hich such m atters played an increasingly crucial role. A m id w idespread dissatisfaction over a stagnant econom y, n o t to m ention bottlenecks in defense, th e R epubli­ cans hoped to capture the W hite H ouse and C ongress. W ithin the ranks o f the G rand O ld Party, alm ost every w ould-be standard-bearer voiced a n ti-in te r­ v en tio n ist sentim ents. S enator R obert A. Taft o f O hio was particularly vocal o n this issue. T hough h e had ju st entered C ongress a year earlier, in January 1940 Time found “the w isem en” deem ing him “today the No. 1 R epublican Presidential possibility.” In som e ways, Taft had been a relative m oderate concerning intervention, hav­ in g su p p o rted repeal o f the arm s em bargo and a governm ent loan to Finland. In M ay 1940, he publicly preferred the defeat o f B ritain to A m erican p artici­ p a tio n in th e E uropean war, even adding, “I don’t understand why, if peace is once restored, we could n o t trad e as well w ith G erm any as w ith England.” Taft

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biographer Jam es T. Patterson has called th is address, m ade at St. Louis on 20 May, the m ost dam aging speech o f his cam paign, as it dism issed any n o tio n th a t th e Nazis posed a th reat to the U nited States.76 It was, however, th is very staunchness th at b rought su p p o rt from m any anti-interventionists, including th e Christian Century, liberal advertising executive C hester Bowles, and the usually cynical Lawrence D ennis.77 M ore popular am ong th e voters, at least those w ho voted in prim aries, was T hom as £ . Dewey, M anhattan’s d istrict atto rn ey w ho had gained a natio n al rep u tatio n as a racket buster.78 In A pril 1940, United States News predicted Dewey as th e probable nom inee.79 Dewey condem ned Roosevelt for "m isery, lack o f jobs, heavier taxes, and th e eventual underm ining o f the n atio n itself,” although the N ew York crim e buster wavered o n foreign policy.80 T hat Janu­ ary, he had looked forw ard to “the m om ent w hen we m ight, w ithout en tan ­ glem ent, use o u r good offices to effect a genuine peace.” Yet in late M arch, he w arned the U nited States to “reject every entanglem ent in th e affairs o f E u­ rope,” and he called o n his natio n to “rem ain genuinely neutral.” In fact, he urged th e U.S. to “keep its hands w holly o u t o f th e E uropean w ar and o u t o f any negotiations th a t m ay take place betw een the w arring nations, now o r a t any o th er tim e.” Early in May, Dewey again backtracked, declaring th a t th e U nited States could n o t so isolate itself as to be unaffected by events in o th e r nations. O n 21 June, th e eve o f th e R epublican convention, he endorsed th e “extension to th e victim s o f aggression o f all p roper aid,” b u t abhorred “fo r­ eign entanglem ents.” O n arrival a t th e convention, Dewey to ld reporters he opposed selling U.S. w arships and revealed he was thinking prim arily in term s o f surplus W orld W ar I am m unition.81 T hough the New Yorker show ed m ore vacillation th an Taft, som e FDR o p ­ p onents saw him as th e decidedly superior vote getter. M oreover, he was deem ed sufficiently m ilitan t to receive strong n oninterventionist su p p o rt.82 In endorsing him for th e G O P n o m ination, th e New York Daily News approv­ ingly labeled Dewey “an isolationist, m eaning th a t if elected he w ill be 100% for arm ing to the teeth for defense o f th is country, b u t against buying any fu r­ th e r in to Europe’s war.”83 Sim ilarly, in an editorial entitled “T he V oters W ant Dewey,” th e Chicago Tribune found him th e clearest o f th e candidates in o p ­ posing w hat it saw as FDR’s attem p t to involve the U nited States in war.84 O th ­ ers thought Dewey far to o superficial.85 For exam ple, th e outspoken dau g h ter o f T heodore Roosevelt, Alice Roosevelt Longw orth, deem ed his speeches an d foreign policy to be lacking intelligence.86 O f th e contenders m ost often m entioned for th e R epublican n o m in atio n , Senator A rth u r H . V andenberg o f M ichigan had show n him self to be the m o st consistently anti-in terv en tio n ist, even opposing cash-and-carry. H is b io g ra­ pher C. D avid Tom pkins w ent so far as to w rite, “A fter Senator B orah’s death in early 1940, V andenberg becam e th e R epublican isolationist leader.”87

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As ed ito r o f th e Grand Rapids Herald, V andenberg had endorsed A m erican possession o f th e Philippines, th e O pen D oor policy, and en try in to the League o f N ations. H is service o n th e Nye C om m ittee had caused him to re­ gret U.S. particip atio n in W orld W ar I an d w arn th a t additional involvem ent w ould lead to dictatorship at hom e. B orah had prom ised to deliver th e p rin ­ cipal nom inating speech a t th e p arty convention. W hen V andenberg entered th e W isconsin prim ary, Nye to u red th e state for him . John T. Flynn also gave a relu ctan t endorsem ent. M ilton M ayer was less enam ored, finding him m ore o f a political o p p o rtu n ist th an a genuine a n ti-in te rv en tio n ist T he liberal jo u r­ nalist found danger in such V andenberg positions as th e abrogation o f the 1911 trad e treaty w ith Japan and severance o f U.S. diplom atic relations w ith th e Soviets w hen Finland was invaded.88 In late N ovem ber 1939, th e New York Daily News predicted V andenberg’s no m in atio n . So, too, d id over 60 percent o f som e fifty W ashington correspon­ d en ts polled early in D ecem ber by Look m agazine.89 In A ugust 1939, FDR had th o u g h t he w ould be a h ard candidate to beat.90 Yet once he lost th e W iscon­ sin an d N ebraska prim aries, he no longer seem ed a m ajor contender. A lm ost all th e G O P d ark horses w ere an ti-interventionist. Labor leader John L. Lewis, w hose relations w ith FDR had becom e extrem ely em bittered, sought to launch a boom for H erbert H oover.91 A m os P inchot cam e o u t strongly for N ew York State publisher Frank G annett, w ho, like V andenberg, claim ed B orah’s endorsem ent.92 E ditor Verne M arshall o f C edar R apids, Iowa, placed th e nam e o f a prom inent Iowa businessm an, C olonel H anford M acN ider, in n o m ination at th e p arty convention. H ugh Johnson considered C on­ gressm an Bruce B arton o f New York m ost able. H am ilton Fish, increasingly th e leader o f th e H ouse anti-interventionists, briefly entered th e race him self. Social Justice found Senator A rth u r C apper (Rep.-K ans.) acceptable and sug­ gested C harles L indbergh’s candidacy.93 T he p arty n om ination w ent to W endell W illkie, a utilities lawyer an d W all S treet m agnate w ho had been a D em ocrat all b u t four years o f his life and w ho cam e in to th e convention w ith only a handful o f pledged delegates.94 A lm ost u n til th e m om ent o f his nom ination, w hich took place o n 28 June on the sixth b allo t, W illkie was know n prim arily as a liberal business leader w ho opposed specific New D eal program s w hile endorsing som e governm ent intervention in th e econom y. A lthough urging A m erican m em bership in the League o f N a­ tio n s in th e 1920s, he only spoke o u t directly on foreign policy in A pril 1940, after H itler attacked D enm ark and Norway. W illkie accused FDR o f tardiness in aiding th e Allies, criticized o th er R epublicans for th eir "isolationism ,” and asked C ordell H ull "w hat help— sh o rt o f troops— th e A m erican people can give.” In recognition th at m any A m ericans still harbored deep-lying a n ti­ in terv en tio n ist sentim ents, he did announce in his last preconvention speech in B rooklyn, " It is th e d u ty o f th e President o f the U nited States to recognize

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th e determ ination o f th e people to stay o u t o f w ar and to do noth in g by w ord o r deed to underm ine th at determ ination.”95 T he m ore an ti-interventionist C harles L. M cNary, senator from O regon, was chosen as ru n n in g m ate.96 H ad th e foes o f intervention coordinated th eir efforts, they m ight have stopped th e W illkie boom . Before the balloting began, Dewey offered Van­ denberg th e vice-presidential nom ination. V andenberg sim ply reciprocated the invitation, even offering to "flip a coin to see w hich end o f th e ticket we each take.” N o future com m unication occurred betw een th e tw o m en, though h istorian D onald Bruce Johnson claim s th at they "probably could have w on th e nom ination as a jo in t slate.” Sim ilarly, Taft’s chances plum m eted w hen such anti-interventionists as V andenberg, Dewey, H oover, and M acN ider stayed in th e race. H ad Dewey accepted the vice-presidential bid on a Taft ticket, speculates h istorian Patterson, th e O hio R epublican m ight have w on th e nom ination. In the hopes o f prom oting his ow n fortunes, H oover en­ couraged Dewey to rem ain a contender.97 Even b efore W illkie’s n o m in a tio n , som e a d m in istra tio n o p p o n e n ts voiced suspicion o f th e p a rty ’s new stan d ard -b earer.98 Late in June, five Re­ p ublican senators and ab o u t fo rty H ouse m em bers, p rim arily from the M idw est an d W est, atten d ed a m eeting to oppose W illkie’s n o m in atio n . E ight signed an appeal requesting th e delegates to no m in ate a candidate w hose view s, b o th foreign and dom estic, w ere far m ore in lin e w ith th e p a rty ’s congressional record.99 T he debate over intervention carried over into a struggle over th e platform . In th e final draff, th e p arty found itself "firm ly opposed to involving this na­ tio n in foreign war.” At th e sam e tim e, it favored "die extension to all peoples fighting for liberty, o r w hose liberty is threatened, o f such aid as shall n o t be in violation o f international law o r inconsistent w ith the requirem ents o f o u r ow n national defense.” A ccording to A lf L andon, w ho headed th e platform subcom m ittee on national defense and foreign policy, the docum ent was flex­ ible enough to "allow o u r candidate to cam paign effectively, in view o f the changing w orld conditions.” Indeed, it em bodied th e position o f th e m oder­ ate anti-interventionist H erbert H oover.100 M ost adm inistration critics were far less sanguine. H . L. M encken acidly rem arked, "It is so w ritten th at it will fit b o th th e triu m p h o f dem ocracy and the collapse o f dem ocracy, and ap­ prove b o th sending o f arm s to England o r sending only flowers.” 101 As nom inee, W illkie kept straddling the foreign policy issue. O n th e one hand, he endorsed econom ic aid to C hina and the developm ent o f air bases in the Pacific. In his acceptance speech o f m id-A ugust, he found som e form o f selective service absolutely necessary. " If B ritain falls,” he continued, "we are utterly and savagely alone.” O n the o th er hand, w hile endorsing the results o f the destroyer bases deal, he attacked the way it had been negotiated as "the m ost arb itrary and dictatorial action ever taken by any President.” W hen FDR said he w ould do all he could to keep w ar away from A m erican shores, W illkie

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often reto rted th a t Roosevelt’s reelection m eant th a t A m erican troops w ould soon be o n th e tran sp o rts.102 A nti-interventionists w ere to m over th e R epublican nom inee. Som e backed th e candidate w holeheartedly.103 T he Chicago Tribune titled an editorial “W illkie and Peace, o r Roosevelt and War.” Even though th e candidate had forthrightly repudiated Father C oughlin, th e 4 N ovem ber issue o f Social Jus­ tice ran th e headline “V ote for W illkie to Avert W ar and D ictatorship.” 104 O thers, w hile endorsing the H oosier businessm an, w anted him to be far m ore strid en t.105 H iram Johnson, w ho endorsed W illkie as th e lesser o f tw o evils, said th at by backing conscription, “He slapped every one o f us in the face, w ho w ere thinking A m erican, and acting A m erican.” 106 Still others re­ m ained critical o f W illkie all d u rin g th e cam paign.107 W heeler called him “an acknow ledged Wall Street lawyer and one w ho openly espoused th e policy o f A m erican intervention in Europe’s blood baths u n til a few weeks— if n o t days— ago.” 108 A broad spectrum o f FDR’s critics hoped th a t the D em ocrats, too, w ould choose a less interventionist nom inee. In 1939, Sterling M orton had sup­ p o rted the an ti-N ew Deal senator Edw ard Burke o f N ebraska, later coauthor o f the conscription law. N ovelist Sinclair Lewis endorsed R obert M aynard H utchins, president o f th e U niversity o f Chicago, w hose dom estic liberalism w on him m ild su p p o rt from presidential aide H arry H opkins. At one p o in t d u rin g th e D em ocratic convention, H opkins told th e educator th at FDR w anted him as a ru n n in g m ate.109 Joseph P. Kennedy briefly tested th e w aters. In January, Social Justice praised Vice President John N ance G arner, w ho had announced his candidacy, calling him th e type o f “old line A m erican” w ho carved o u t th e frontier. W hen the convention m et, C oughlin’s weekly praised Senator C arter Glass o f V irginia for nom inating Postm aster G eneral Jam es A. Farley.110V illard felt content w ith a h o st o f candidates, som e o f w hom had be­ com e strongly interventionist. In m entioning th e nam es o f W heeler and Ben­ n e tt C lark, he found th e latter absolutely trustw orthy o n th e “all-im p o rtan t question o f w ar and peace.”111 T he greatest speculation centered o n Senator W heeler, u n til recently an arch-liberal w ho had first achieved fam e by leading a Senate inq u iry in to the “Teapot D om e” scandal.112 T hroughout FDR’s first term , W heeler had backed m ost o f th e New Deal. By leading th e opposition to the president’s co u rt­ packing proposal in 1937, however, he gave Roosevelt his first m ajor setback. In the process he created a rift th a t was never closed. T hough he opposed A m erican en try in to th e W orld C o u rt and cash-and-carry, he first took on Senate leadership am ong the anti-interventionists by opposing th e sending o f U.S. A rm y and Navy m atériel to belligerents.113 At th e outbreak o f war, a m odest W heeler-for-president organization had been established, operating in relatively few states and possessing few fu n d s.114 Always a political realist, W heeler realized th at he could only be nom inated if

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Roosevelt refused to ru n .115 It is still debated w hether FDR offered him the vice-presidential slot to secure his allegiance.116 In his bid, W heeler sought to trad e o n his anti-interventionism . D efining his position in A pril 1940, he sought a negotiated peace w hile accepting an Al­ lied victory m oderate enough to preserve G erm any itself in tact.117 O n 12 June, W heeler threatened to form a th ird party, prom ising he w ould oppose in te r­ ventionist standard-bearers o n either m ajor ticket.118 To som e degree, W heeler's bid for anti-in terv en tio n ist su p p o rt was success­ ful. A nti-interventionists o f all political persuasions supported his candi­ dacy.119 John L Lewis toyed w ith p rom oting a W heeler boom . In January 1940, th e labor leader invited him to address th e U nited M ine W orkers in C olum bus, O hio, an d early th at July endorsed him directly.120 T he ultim ate issue was never in doubt. Roosevelt, acting w ith characteristic coyness, arranged to be "drafted" for an o th er term , accepting th e party 's n o m ­ ination o n 18 July. As w ith th e R epublicans, th e platform involved a com pro­ m ise. T he U nited States, it said, w ould aid th e Allies w ith "all th e m aterial at o u r com m and, consistent w ith the law an d n o t inconsistent w ith th e interests o f o u r ow n national self-defense.” At th e sam e tim e, it w ould "n o t particip ate in foreign w ars, and we w ill no t send o u r Army, naval o r a ir forces to fight in foreign lands outside th e A m ericas, except in case o f attack.” 121 N ot surprisingly, m any an ti-interventionists opposed Roosevelt’s renom in atio n , sharing C harles A. Lindbergh's opin io n th a t those "w ho have failed to solve even o u r peacetim e problem s” were currently leading th e n atio n steadily tow ard "th at clim ax o f all political failure— war.” 122 Even som e w ho had n o t been ard en t R epublicans felt sim ilarly.123 To the Christian Century, R oosevelt's acceptance speech undercut his ow n party's platform by proposing "th e Eng­ lish channel as the front line o f o u r defense,” w hile his claim s o f indispens­ ability m ade him "th e F ührer” o f an "inchoate fascism.” Socialist w riter R ichard Rovere th o u g h t it disingenuous for Roosevelt to attack "appeaser fifth-colum nists” in his acceptance speech. A fter all, w rote th e radical jo u rn a l­ ist, th e president had approved th e M unich conference, offered irresponsible overtures to M ussolini, and acquiesced in Japanese expansion.124 To John T. Flynn, FDR n o t only sought to "cook up a w ar scare” an d "m ili­ tarize th e co u n try ” b u t was also engaged in nothing less th an attem p tin g to create a totalitarian regim e. Flynn co ntributed a m ajor cam paign broadside, Country Squire in the White House ( 1940). A lthough m uch o f his bo o k in ­ volved an attack on the New Deal, th e chapter "T he President G oes to W ar” accused FDR o f being "one o f those lovers o f peace w ho is too ready to choose war.” C urrent defense plans, Flynn argued, m erely "take th e m inds o f o u r p eo ­ ple o ff the failure to solve o u r ow n problem s an d will furnish a new excuse to spend an o th er ten o r fifteen billion dollars to retu rn his p arty to power.” 125 A nti-interventionists were quick to endorse Flynn’s w ork.126 P orter Sargent devoted an entire bulletin to its co n ten ts.127 The Chicago Tribune n o t only em ­

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braced th e b ook b u t com m enced serializing it.128 O th er review ers found Flynn to o one-sided.129 John C ham berlain, by n o m eans a strong interventionist, differed w ith Flynn’s w hole th ru st tow ard disarm am ent. HD ependence on the Panam a Canal,” he said, “inevitably im plies enough arm am ent to w in a prospective battle o f Peru o r th e G uineas.” 130 Conversely, som e anti-interventionists w ere so enthusiastic about th e New D eal they were w illing to risk Roosevelt’s foreign policy.131 W hile th e New York Daily News considered b o th candidates interventionists, it saw FDR th e better inform ed an d m ore experienced, particularly in naval m atters.132 O thers found little difference betw een th e candidates.133 To Uncensored, “T he great body o f noninterventionist A m ericans w ho depend on the tw op arty system have been hoaxed.” 134 In contrasting Roosevelt and W illkie, Lawrence D ennis found th e choice lying “betw een a knave and a fool.” M encken w rote o f W illkie, “W hen he sw allowed th e Roosevelt foreign policy all th e rest o f th e New D eal rum ble-bum ble w ent dow n w ith it, an d he has since presented th e spectacle o f a m an choking on his ow n false teeth.”13S Som e o f pacifist leanings w ere particularly unenthusiastic. The FOR’s A. J. M uste feared W illkie w ould “play a role sim ilar to W oodrow W ilson after the election o f 1916.”136 Predictably, m any an ti-in terv en tio n ists o n th e D em ocratic left su p p o rted N orm an T hom as.137 To jo u rn alist R ichard Rovere, th e Socialist leader was th e only candidate w ho opposed co n scrip tio n , rearm am ent, and in terv en ­ tio n , all m ilestones o n th e ro ad to fascism . W heeler later h in ted to T hom as o f his su p p o rt.138 In th e election o f 5 Novem ber, Roosevelt polled 27.3 m illion votes, alm ost 5 m illion m ore th an W illkie. H is electoral vote was even m ore im pressive, 449 to W illkie’s 82. T hough th e H oosier drew m ore votes th an any previous GOP candidate, he captured only ten states. Roosevelt had successfully neutralized W illkie’s attacks o n his interventionism by continually stressing his peace goals. O n 30 O ctober, for exam ple, th e president had told a B oston rally, “I have said this before, b u t I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are n o t going to be sent into any foreign wars.”139 Even now, historians differ on th e role foreign policy played in th e elec­ tio n .140 C ertainly m any anti-interventionists believed W illkie lost th e election by failing to fight the president m ore vigorously in this regard.141 H ad W illkie taken th e stand o f the A m erica First C om m ittee, w rote Lawrence D ennis, he m ight have secured a m ajority in such close states as New York, Illinois, O hio, an d M issouri. In H earst’s opinion, Dewey could have done b etter.142 W ithin weeks W illkie’s subsequent em brace o f Roosevelt’s plan to aid B ritain w ould ad d to th e bitterness. T here was only one result in w hich anti-interventionists could take heart: th e retu rn to the Senate o f every outspoken opponent o f the president’s for­ eign policy and o f m any H ouse m em bers as w ell.143 To Frederick J. Libby, in

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the senatorial races lay "p ro o f th at th e election was a d e a r m andate to keep th e co u n try o u t o f war.” Conversely, the Socialist Party expressed relief th a t cer­ tain staunch interventionists were defeated.144 O verall, Roosevelt’s adversaries found th e consequences o f th e 1940 race m ost awesome. H iram Johnson rem arked to his son, "It is going to be hell here th e next six m onths o r a year. If we can escape th e concentration cam ps we’ll be lucky.”145 H ad he learned th at he w ould soon have to vote o n a bill w ith the innocent title o f "lend-lease,” he w ould n o t have been reassured.

11 it

Lend-Lease and the "Futile War"

D uring th e election o f 1940, the A m erica First C om m ittee established itself as the prim ary anti-interventionist organization in the U nited States, ready to do battle w ith the C om m ittee to D efend A m erica by A iding the Allies. The ubiq­ uitous John T. Flynn headed the sem iautonom ous New York chapter. T he o r­ ganization rem ained in existence u n til G erm any d ed ared w ar on the U nited States, battling all o f Roosevelt’s interventionist m oves except term extension for draftees. O nly on 11 D ecem ber 1941 did it form ally disband. By then it had 450 u n its and at least a q u arter o f a m illion m em bers. Such legislators as Nye, H olt, Fish, W heeler, and B ennett C lark spoke at th eir rallies, as did C harles Lindbergh and N orm an T hom as.1 T he AFC’s financial base lay in th e Chicago business com m unity. G eneral R obert £. W ood, board chairm an o f Sears, Roebuck, served as acting chair­ m an. W idely respected as one o f the n ation’s m ost progressive business lead­ ers, W ood had backed m uch o f th e New Deal, balking only on such issues as spending and labor policy. Foreign intervention, the general believed, w ould ru in A m erican capitalism .2 R. D ouglas S tuart Jr., a Yale law student, was first national director, then executive secretary. Publishers C olonel M cC orm ick and C aptain P atterson helped finance the com m ittee. The m ore vocal m em bers o f the AFC national com m ittee were staunch conservatives, including C harles A. Lindbergh (w ho joined in A pril 1941), W illiam R. C astle, M ajor A1 W illiam s, G eneral H ugh Johnson, and George Peek. N onetheless, pacifists and liberals assum ed crucial positions in drafting position papers. R uth Sarles, d irector o f the research bureau, had edited the N CPW ’s Peace Action. Socialist lawyer James Lipsig bore sole responsibility for the bureau’s Did You Know? bulletins, a series o f position papers.3

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For an extrem ely b rie f p erio d , th e AFC h ad a rival. In m id-D ecem ber 1940, V erne M arshall, e d ito r o f th e Cedar Rapids (Iow a) G azette, established a sim ilar o rg an izatio n , th e N o Foreign W ar C om m ittee. T he leader’s m er­ cu rial personality, how ever, soon led to its dem ise, p articu larly w hen M ar­ shall— an extrem e rig h tist— tacitly accused th e R oosevelt a d m in istratio n o f ig n o rin g a secret G erm an peace p lan .4 A n ti-in terv en tio n ists needed th e re­ sources o f m ass o rg an izatio n , fo r th e U nited States w as a b o u t to lau n ch th e m o st extensive assistance pro g ram a n a tio n at peace ever extended to a co u n try at war.

By the beginning o f w inter 1940-41, G erm any had grow n ever stronger. Its al­ lies now included H ungary and a tru n cated R um ania, th e latter occupied by W ehrm acht troops. B ritain was experiencing heavy shipping losses—over four h u ndred thousand tons th a t O ctober. In Decem ber, Secretary o f W ar Stim son told governm ent officials th a t B ritish sea pow er m ight be sw ept from th e A tlantic w ithin ninety days.5 M oreover, B ritain’s dollar reserves w ere ru n ­ ning low, threatening its capacity to purchase A m erican supplies. As early as A ugust 1940, th e B ritish governm ent foresaw im m inent financial collapse ahead. Privately, A m bassador L othian alerted C hurchill on 12 N ovem ber, wIt is obvious th a t o u r capacity to carry on the w ar o n th e cu rren t basis m ust abruptly com e to an end.”6 O n 8 D ecem ber 1940, C hurchill cabled Roosevelt, w arning th a t B ritain w ould soon lack th e cash needed to buy A m erican arm s. H e po in ted to heavy losses a t sea, th e danger o f th e Vichy governm ent (w hich controlled W est A frica) joining the Axis, and th e possibility o f a Japanese th ru st in th e direc­ tio n o f Singapore and th e D utch East Indies.7 At a press conference held on the 17th, Roosevelt spoke o f a plan w hereby th e U nited States itself w ould "lease o r sell” w hat it th o u g h t the B ritish needed.* N ine days later, in one o f his fireside chats, th e p resid en t offered his full ratio n ale. T he B ritish E m pire, R oosevelt asserted, spearheaded "resistance to w orld conquest.” If E ngland fell, "th e Axis pow ers w ill c o n tro l th e c o n ti­ n en ts o f E urope, Asia, A frica, A ustralasia, an d th e high seas— an d they w ill be in a p o sitio n to b rin g en o rm o u s m ilitary an d naval resources against th is hem isphere.” R ather th a n exposing th e U nited States to "th e p o in t o f a gun,” he sought all possible aid to B ritain. W arning against those "A m erican citizens, m any o f th em in high places,” w ho w ere o ften unw ittingly "aiding an d ab ettin g ” th e w ork o f destructive foreign agents, he b ran d ed any nego­ tia ted accord "a d ictated peace,” in reality "an o th e r arm istice, leading to the m ost gigantic arm am en t race an d th e m ost devastating trad e w ars in all history.” M ore th a n B ritain’s d o llar crisis w as a t issue; R oosevelt could use

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th e A llied o rd ers as th e m eans o f galvanizing a sluggish defense in d u stry in to greater o u tp u t.9 W ithin an o th er four days, Roosevelt’s bill reached C ongress. T hough the concept was phrased in innocent term s (“lend-lease”) an d colored in p atrio tic pleas (the H ouse bill was deliberately labeled H R 1776), its scope was sw eep­ ing. T he president could provide m ilitary articles an d inform ation to any co u n try "w hose defense th e President deem s vital to th e defense o f th e U nited States.” If he so desired, th e term s defense article and defense information could cover virtually everything, m ilitary secrets included. N o lim its were set o n the q u an tity o f w eapons loaned o r th e sum s to be allocated. Friendly belligerents could use A m erican p o rts. Newsweek inadvertently concurred w ith th e A m er­ ica First C om m ittee in finding th a t FDR w anted au th o rity to lend "anything from a trench shovel to a battleship.” N o A m erican, said Time, had ever asked for th e pow ers Roosevelt requested.10 To som e o f th e president’s foes, th e end o f th e w orld could hardly be less foreboding.11 H istorian H ow ard K. Beale saw "th e very frite o f o u r dem ocratic governm ent at stake.” T he Christian Century called it "the m ost un-A m erican proposal w hich th e A m erican people have ever had seriously to consider.” 12 Tlie bill, it was argued, m ade the U nited States an appendage o f G reat B ritain. If B ritain was fighting Am erica’s battles, rem arked C ongressm an Paul Shafer, "we had best accept a dom inion status and be done w ith it.” Represen­ tative W illiam R L am bertson (Rep.-K ans.) quipped about th e D uchess o f W indsor, "Since England is broke, we should pay for th e lifting o f W ally’s face.” C ongressm an R obert R. Rich (Rep.-Pa.) suggested th at B ritain m ight som eday use lend-lease planes against th e U.S., w hile V ito M arcantonio envisaged U.S. bom bers used "in m assacring the Indian tribes w ho are seeking independence an d freedom from B ritish exploitation.” O n a m ore serious note, the research bureau o f the A m erica First C om m ittee argued th at lend-lease dollars w ere de­ signed to m aintain th e B ritish p o u n d in the w orld m arket.13 M any critics stressed th e m assive extension o f presidential pow ers as well as th e bill’s all-encom passing language.14 To John Bassett M oore, "T he question is w hether we shall have a governm ent o f law o r a governm ent o f m en.” H am ilton Fish quoted A. Lawrence Lowell— form er president o f H arvard, p o ­ litical scientist, and usually a strong interventionist— w ho m aintained th at the bill could practically give away th e entire A m erican navy an d air force as well as th e natio n ’s entire m ilitary m anufacturing pow er.15 W ith certain scholars so apprehensive, it was hardly surprising for o thers to voice alarm .16"I w ould n o t give such pow ers to th e A rchangel G abriel,” V illard w rote. B oth the New York Daily News and John H aynes H olm es saw the bill as m aking FDR d ictato r o f th e U nited States. T he Reverend N orm an V incent Peale, secretary o f th e N ational C om m ittee to U phold C onstitutional Gov­ ern m en t, asserted th a t H R 1776 gave th e president “the pow er to com m it the A m erican people to any w ar anyw here, and w ith o u t action by Congress.”17

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A nti-interventionists continually stressed th a t lend-lease aid to B ritain w ould certainly weaken the U nited States. H anford M acN ider called it "th e trip le-th reat bill— lease, lend, an d lose A m erica’s defenses.” Joseph P. Kennedy, w ho form ally endorsed the bill, stated th a t A m erican pro d u ctio n was by no m eans adequate for the U.S., let alone aiding B ritain. T he AFC found any a t­ tem p t to expand beyond cu rren t defense plans to o taxing, and it pointed es­ pecially to bottlenecks existing in various types o f skilled labor.1* In p a rticu ­ lar, the U.S. w ould be giving away planes essential to an effective air force, though antiaircraft guns an d naval craft w ere m entioned as w ell.19 Senator W alsh introduced an am endm ent opposing transfer o f any A m erican naval craft.20 At tim es even the com m ents o f leading adm in istratio n experts— such as G eorge M arshall and H enry L. Stim son— were used to stress th e n ation’s shortages.21 D om estic consequences w ere also noted.22 Lend-lease could cause th e real incom e o f A m erican consum ers, according to th e AFC, to plum m et for a host o f reasons, including increased taxes on consum ption, forced saving, rising prices, and curtailm ent o f m any governm ent services. By specifying repay­ m ent o f arm s in kind after th e w ar, the B ritish, reported Frank H anighen, could m aintain th eir pro d u ctio n w hile A m erican arm s plants, w hich w ould include practically all A m erican industry, w ould have to sh u t dow n. Uncen­ sored predicted an o th er postw ar depression. Civil liberties w ould also suffer, w ith th e possibility existing th at all criticism o f th e adm inistration could be labeled rebellion o r treason.23 Senator D anaher sought an am endm ent for­ bidding any law interfering w ith freedom o f speech.24 As w ith cash-and-carry, several a n ti-in te rv en tio n ists saw lend-lease as vi­ o latin g in te rn atio n al law an d agreem ents.25 To W illiam C. D ennis, presi­ d en t o f E arlham C ollege an d fo rm er state d e p artm e n t official, lend-lease epitom ized "th e law o f th e ju n g le, th e V igilantes, and th e In d ian a W hite C aps.” In tern a tio n al law, he m ain tain ed , specified th a t private sales to b el­ ligerents w ere p erm itted b u t p ublic tran sac tio n s w ere n o t.26 T he W ashing­ to n T reaty o f 8 M ay 1871, w hich settled th e Alabama claim s; th e 1907 H ague C onvention; th e K ellogg-B riand Pact ren o u n cin g w ar as "an in stru ­ m en t o f n atio n al policy”; th e P anam a D eclaration o f 1939— lend-lease breached all such agreem ents.27 Above all, to its opponents, th e bill was tan tam o u n t to w ar.28 N orm an T hom as found it so belligerent th a t even a G erm an w ho hated H itler could n o t su p p o rt the legislation.29 To a group o f H arvard scholars, th e bill involved irrecoverable m ilitary collaboration w ith o th er nations, b u t evaded th e m eans o f collaboration, th e hum an and m aterial cost, and the ends involved.30 C on­ gressw om an Jeanette R ankin (R ep.-M ont.) introduced an am endm ent calling for fu rth er authorization before th e president could o rd er troops outside the hem isphere.31 Several critics stressed th at G erm any had n o t acted belligerently tow ard the U nited States.32

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N ot only was a new A m erican E xpeditionary Force feared.33 T he sheer m e­ chanics o f th e bill could ensnare th e U nited States. T he legislation, said Vandenberg, w ould p erm it a B ritish battleship, th e Renown, to be repaired in th e B rooklyn Navy Yard, w hich in tu rn w ould "invite Axis subm arines in to the H udson River, and Axis m ines o ff Sandy H ook, an d Axis w ings over New York City.”34 AFC natio n al d irecto r R. D ouglas S tu art Jr. expected G erm an sabotage o f U.S. in d u strial p ro d u ctio n , w ith th e consequent inflam m ation o f natio n al feeling.35 R obert A. Taft w as p articu larly vocal. H e w arned th a t th e p resid en t, “s it­ tin g b en eath th e scenes,” could “p ull th e strin g s w hich fire th e guns an d d ro p th e bom bs o n arm ed forces an d helpless civilians alike.” O nce lendlease passed, R oosevelt could land a regim ent o f A m erican soldiers at G ibraltar, claim ing th a t its defense involved th e defense o f th e U nited States.36 R ecalling th e fam ous Alabama claim s issue, he in tro d u c ed an am en d m en t to p revent A m erican p o rts from being used by th e B ritish fleet; otherw ise, th e G erm ans could m ine these p o rts an d p u rsu e B ritish vessels in to U.S. h a rb o rs.37 A n ti-in terv en tio n ists stressed one m atter above all: convoys— th a t is, in technical naval language, those w arships “escorting” a “convoy” o f m er­ c h an t ships. If th e U nited States leased strateg ic w ar goods to th e B ritish, such esco rtin g appeared th e next step— an d a fatal one. To m any th e bill it­ self im plied A m erican convoying o f B ritish ships an d th e sending o f A m er­ ican craft in to w ar zones.3* S enator G uy M . G illette (D em .-low a) favored an am en d m en t p ro h ib itin g A m erican m erch an t vessels from carry in g m a­ terials to belligerents in those com bat zones specified in th e 1939 n e u tra l­ ity act.39 A lthough Roosevelt had secretly been considering convoying an d a d iplo­ m atic break w ith the Axis, he to ld a press conference in m id-January th a t con­ voys were about th e “last th in g we have in o u r m inds.” At th e sam e tim e, the ad m inistration never retreated from th e position th a t th e president had the constitutional pow er to o rd er such escorting w ithout congressional ap­ proval.40 O n 6 February, th e H ouse, by a vote o f 111 to 74, defeated an a n ti­ convoy am endm ent introduced by R epresentative Karl M undt (R ep.-S.D ak.). U ltim ately th e adm inistration accepted an am endm ent to H R 1776 specifying th a t th e act itself did n o t authorize such convoys.41 Som e an ti-in terv en tio n ist concerns, however, w ere m ore subtle. T he R oo­ sevelt ad m in istratio n had been quick to em phasize B ritain’s desperate finan­ cial co n d itio n , w hich in reality was m ost dire. Roosevelt him self, tem pted by a vision o f B ritish im perial opulence, first suggested th e B ritish sell th eir as­ sets in th e W estern H em isphere, tho u g h he was soon disabused o f th e n o tio n . As Secretary o f th e T reasury H enry M orgenthau Jr. p u t th e issue, “W hen it com es to finding th e dollars to pay for anything like w hat they need, they ju st haven’t got it.”42

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M any o f the president’s adversaries, however, felt th e B ritish w ere far from broke. C harles A. Beard suggested th a t B ritain pledge its vast assets in the U nited States, w hich others valued a t sum s o f $2 to $10 billion.43 G eneral W ood cited specific B ritish-ow ned firm s operating in th e U nited States, am ong them Lever B rothers, th e A m erican Viscose C orp o ratio n , an d D unlop Tire. By selling such assets, said W ood, B ritain could survive an o th er year. (U nder M orgenthau’s pressure, th e B ritish d id dispose o f A m erican Viscose, doing so at a price well below m arket value.)44 O nly if B ritain w ere to m arket its entire holdings in the W estern H em isphere, including extensive railroad interests in A rgentina, anti-interventionists argued, should credit be extended.45 Some told B ritain to draw o n its resources through­ o u t the entire globe.46 Taft estim ated the B ritish held $14 billion w orth o f assets, w hich was “a very large proportion o f the property o f th e world.”47 Even before FDR’s form al lend-lease proposal, Uncensored had proposed m ortgaging the British Em pire’s gold production.48 The im m ense w ealth held by prom inent British citizens, such as the Astors and the D uke and D uchess o f W indsor, was noted.49 Retired advertising executive W illiam B enton proposed using the entire British M useum as collateral.50 Several a n ti-in te rv en tio n ists p o in ted to B ritain’s supposed p ro sp erity in tim e o f w ar. A n u m b er o f claim s w ere m ade: D u rin g th e w ar, B ritain had m anaged to increase im p o rts 33 percent w hile losing only 2 percent o f its ex p o rt trad e .51 T he B ritish E m pire w as p ro d u cin g 60 percent o f th e w orld’s gold, w hich th e U nited States w as buying “a t very fancy prices.”52 D espite th e conflict, B ritain h ad added to its com m ercial shipping to reta in its m o ­ nopoly th e U .S .-S outh A m erica ro u te.53 B ritish cargo facilities to taled over tw enty-six m illion to n s, ten m illio n m ore th a n a t th e b eginning o f the year.54 If th e shipping shortage w as so m arked, asked th e Chicago Tribune, w hy n o t use th e 150 vessels o f th e St. Law rence fleet? Even resen tm en t over B ritain’s co n tin u ed trad e w ith th e d o m in io n s was sh arp , as W heeler n oted th a t India, one o f th e richest n atio n s o f th e w orld, “had n o t yet passed any lend-lease bill.”55 Each lend-lease opponent, it seem ed, had a different alternative to FDR’s com prehensive legislation. M erw in K. H art, president o f th e New York State Econom ic C ouncil and an arch-rightist, m erely called for the contin u atio n o f cash-and-carry.56 O thers spoke in term s o f a straight loan, w ith sum s ranging from $2 to $10 billion.57 Taft, for exam ple, suggested offering $2 billion in loans to B ritain, C anada, and Greece.58 O thers considered o u trig h t gifts.59 Edw in Johnson w ould authorize the president to tu rn over $2 billion w orth o f m unitions to B ritain for “testing.” H erbert H oover w ould give B ritain all th e defense m aterial th e U nited States could spare and som e $2 to $3 billion to m ake o th er purchases. T he U.S., said Senator G eorge A iken, should donate o u trig h t th e larger p a rt o f a $2 billion lend-lease appropriation in th e form o f m aterials to C anada.60 G eneral W ood

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suggested th a t B ritain exhaust its U.S. resources, after w hich it w ould receive gifts o r loans o f planes, artillery, an d tanks, all carried in B ritain’s ow n vessels. M ore m oderate th an som e anti-interventionists, W ood did favor selling A m erican m erchant ships to B ritain, provided th e U.S. m erchant m arine w ould n o t be crippled in th e process.61 Several an ti-in terv en tio n ists proposed bargaining over certain B ritish colonies w ithin th e W estern H em isphere.62 The B ritish, said th e New York Daily News, should sim ply give th e U nited States its pick o f sites as well as o th er "conveniently located pieces o f th e em pire.” W ood spoke o f th e transfer o f N ew foundland o r B ritish H onduras.63 Fish’s eye was on th e W est Indies.64 R epresentative M elvin J. M aas proposed an am endm ent enabling the U.S. to purchase all B ritish possessions in th e W estern H em isphere, w ith th e obvious exceptions o f C anada and Nova Scotia.6S O th er goods an d concessions were sought. C ongressm an W illiam J. B arry (D em .-N .Y.) noted such B ritish raw m aterials as m anganese, chrom ium , tin , and nickel. Nye w anted B ritain’s com m ercial shipping. W iley desired revision o f th e H ay-Pauncefote treaty (1901) w ith B ritain, w hich provided free access to th e Panam a C anal for ships o f all nations on equal term s.66 A few an ti-interventionists used th e debate over lend-lease to suggest.total im partiality in th e conflict. Journalist and m aritim e h istorian Lincoln C olcord argued, MWe should n o t have taken sides.” In fact, he accused th e A m erica First C om m ittee o f "trying to carry w ater on b o th shoulders,” for it was endorsing aid to B ritain in principle w hen strict neutrality was called for.67 Sim ilarly Lawrence D ennis, in an obvious reference to th e sentim ent em bodied in the AFC, said th a t th e noninterventionists should never have abandoned absolute neutrality. By endorsing "all-aid-short-of-w ar,” they could only fight rear­ guard actions and postpone th e inevitable.68 O th e r a n ti-in te rv e n tio n ists su p p o rte d th e c o n tin u ed flow o f w ar goods to B ritain. G eneral W ood so u g h t to ru sh steel an d rem ove bottlenecks on planes.69 C olonel M cC orm ick w anted B ritain to have w hatever it req u ired , th o u g h he d id n o t th in k it needed an y th in g .70 C harles A. L indbergh, far m ore cau tio u s, favored c o n tin u in g c u rre n t aid to B ritain b u t stressed th e need fo r neg o tiated peace; hence, such assistance sh o u ld n e ith er be in ­ creased n o r c o n tin u ed indefinitely.71 Tim e an d spending lim its w ere often raised, however, as w ere lim its on w hat th e president could send.72 V andenberg an d Vorys, for exam ple, proposed th at th e service chiefs certify the transfer o f any m ilitary goods.73 M uch su p p o rt w as given to th e varied form s o f an am endm ent introduced by Senator Allen E ilender (D em .-L a.), w hich, in its original form , stated th a t nothing in th e act authorized th e use o f A m erican arm ed forces outside th e U nited States o r its territo ries.74 O n 8 M arch 1941, the Senate passed th e lend-lease bill 60 to 31 (w ith tw o paired for an d against), an d three days later th e H ouse approved th e bill as

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am ended 317 to 71. T hat sam e day, Roosevelt signed th e legislation.75 O n 7 M arch th e G allup poll had reported 61 percent o f th e A m erican public favor­ ing th e bill.76 V andenberg correctly saw th e im plications o f w hat had taken place. “We have said to B ritain: ‘We will see you through to victory’—and it w ould be unbelievably dishonest for us to stop sh o rt o f full particip atio n in th e w ar if th a t w ould be necessary to a B ritish victory.”77 W ithin th e adm inistration itself, there was at least one dissenter. A dm iral E m ory Land, chairm an o f th e U.S. M aritim e C om m ission, w arned an u n ap ­ preciative FDR, “If we don’t w atch o u r step, we shall find th e W hite H ouse en ro u te to England w ith th e W ashington M onum ent as a steering oar.”78 Ironically, given th e extensive debate, for the rest o f 1941 lend-lease was nei­ th er outstandingly novel n o r notably altruistic. If, for tw o years, Roosevelt had envisaged th e E uropean dem ocracies as A m erica’s fro n t line, th e supplies w ere n o gift, as repaym ent was postponed, n o t waived. Later adm inistration d is­ cussions revealed th at “consideration” w ould n o t necessarily be in m oney o r even in kind; instead, it involved a com m itm ent to the U.S. conception o f th e postw ar w orld econom y. T he U nited States w ould press B ritain in to abolish­ ing its com m ercial system o f im perial preference, thereby elim inating dis­ crim inatory tariffs against A m erican goods.79 In 1941, B ritain received n o im m ediate benefit. O nly later was th e B ritish C om m onw ealth given som e $31 billion in supplies and th e Soviet U nion som e $11 billion. T hroughout 1941 lend-lease provided only 1 percent o f B ritain’s m un itio n s total. (A nother 7 percent cam e from th e U nited States u n d er older contracts, w hich th e B ritish paid for in cash.)80 T he bill d id m ark a significant tu rn in g p o in t. P residential speech w rite r R obert E. Sherw ood w as later rem in d ed o f th e Webster's Dictionary d efin i­ tio n o f common-law marriage: “An agreem ent betw een a m an an d a w om an to en te r in to th e m arriage relatio n w ith o u t ecclesiastical o r civil cerem ony, such agreem ent being provable by th e w ritings, d eclaratio n s, o r co n d u ct o f th e p arties.”81 By assum ing resp o n sib ility for B ritain’s lo n g -term purchases, R oosevelt relieved th e B ritish governm ent o f a costly and cum bersom e b u r­ den an d d em o n strated his faith in B ritain’s survival. W ith th a t irrevocable co m m itm en t, a genuine A nglo-A m erican alliance was forged. T he later ex­ ten sio n o f lend-lease to th e Soviet U nion w as equally significant. W ith o u t lend-lease, claim h isto rian s T hom as A. Bailey an d Paul B. Ryan, “T he R us­ sians p robably could n o t have b eaten H itler o n th e ir fro n t, at least n o t as soon as they did.”82 O ne need n o t accept any n o tio n o f conspiracy to acknow ledge th at lendlease to o k the co u n try to th e edge o f the E uropean conflict. H aving gam bled its w ealth on B ritain’s survival, the U nited States was n o t ap t to stand by an d w atch its investm ent go dow n if an Axis victory appeared im m inent. H istorian W arren F. Kim ball notes th at today few can quarrel w ith th e stated purpose o f the bill, though he finds legitim ate an objection raised by th e an ti-in terv en ­

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tionists. Because o f its long-term im plications, Mone is still disturbed and even shocked by the lack o f candor displayed by th e Roosevelt adm inistration d u r­ ing th e evolution o f its legislation.”83

W hile th e U nited States debated lend-lease— indeed, all d u rin g th e w inter o f 1941— th e B ritish were experiencing m ajor setbacks. Early in th e year, such B ritish p o rts as Plym outh, S outham pton, and Clydeside continued to be h it h ard. T he B ritish suffered in ship tonnage as well, losing 517,000 to n s in M arch. W hen, early in February, G eneral Erw in Rom m el assum ed com m and o f th e A frika Korps, th e num erically inferior G erm ans w on one engagem ent after another, leaving the B ritish about as vulnerable as they w ere w hen the desert w ar had started. In Greece, the B ritish w ere increasingly com m itting tro o p s to a m ost risky venture, w hile at the sam e tim e exposing th eir N orth A frican u nits to R om m el’s units. For exam ple, on 6 January 1941, C hurchill ordered reinforcem ents to Greece and, on 4 M arch, a four-division contingent com m anded by G eneral M aitland W ilson left from Egypt. O nly one unequiv­ ocally b right spot appeared: East Africa, w here the B ritish w ere taking Italian Som aliland, E thiopia, an d E ritrea. T hroughout th e w inter, m any anti-interventionists judged B ritain to be in n o danger o f conquest. G erm any supposedly lacked th e needed bases from w hich to launch an assault, m uch less sufficient gasoline for an all-out air b litz.84 Furtherm ore, said C olonel M cC orm ick, G erm any possessed a lim ited am o u n t o f am m unition, was unable to tran sp o rt heavy guns and tanks by air, an d w ould find its paratroopers repulsed by B ritish m otorized units.8S H is Chicago Tribune was so optim istic th at it endorsed C hurchill’s diversion o f G eneral A rchibald W avell’s forces to Salonika, claim ing th at Libya was o f scant m ilitary im portance.86 In January, the New York Daily News had im agined B ritain in such dire peril th at its governm ent faced transfer to C anada. By m id-M arch, it found an invasion o f England increasingly unlikely, for B ritain still controlled th e air an d had a strong navy.87 Lincoln C olcord did n o t rule o u t a G erm an invasion b u t had little expectation o f its success. Even if H itler w ere successful, th e resulting occupation w ould be difficult. “To hold forty m illion B ritishers in subjection,” w rote Frederick J. Libby, “is a task to o form i­ dable for any B ritish ty ran t to attem pt, m uch less a foreigner.”88 By early 1941, som e anti-interventionists w ere predicting th at ultim ately G erm any could n o t w in the war, thereby concurring w ith close to a th ird o f th e A m erican public.89 From the A thenians at Syracuse to th e Russians in M anchuria, C olonel M cC orm ick noted, “th e greatest catastrophes” faced n a­ tio n s em barking on d istant m ilitary adventures.”90 Besides, H itler was already overextended. To Senator W heeler, the great m ass o f Russian peasants could

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be kept in subjection, b u t n o t such "intelligent people” as the D utch, Belgians, o r French.91 N orm an T hom as th o u g h t th a t th e N azis m ight n o t even rule G er­ m any for m ore th an a generation, adding, “Even th e terrible T artar E m pires w ere civilized by C hina in th e end.”92 Even if H itler d id conquer E urope, said th e Christian Century, he needed raw m aterials an d foodstuffs, w hich w ould force him continually to seek new and destructive m ilitary ventures. H e faced “th e eternal Russian th reat” on his flank an d w ould find th e patrolling o f sub­ ject populations exhausting.93 Suppose, speculated jo u rn alist W illiam H enry C ham berlin, G erm any con­ tin u ed to dom inate Europe. Its rule w ould rem ain uneasy. A dm ittedly, he w rote, a E urope organized u n d er G erm an econom ic leadership has the p o ­ tential o f being a m ore productive u n it, b u t so far H itler’s em pire had been hopelessly lopsided, oversupplied in m en and m achines w hile lacking suffi­ cient foodstuffs and raw m aterials.94 A few analyses w ere even m ore upbeat. Senator Bulow saw th e end o f H itler in sight. If England could only hold o u t u n til July, speculated C astle, G erm any m ight break dow n. In H earst’s opinion, B ritain w ould actually add to its em ­ pire, ending up controlling Iceland, G reenland, a few Pacific islands, th e D utch East Indies, an d m ost o f A frica.95 To m any foes o f in tervention, B ritain was still far from victory. T he island n atio n , argued th e New York Daily News, could fight H itler only to a draw . V illard found B ritain’s M editerranean an d A frican successes invaluable in bolstering m orale, b u t he saw n o possibility o f eith er a co n tin en tal invasion o r an in tern al collapse w ithin G erm any. N either B ritish victories in A frica n o r G reek victories in A lbania, said Uncensored, could decide th e outcom e, w hich could only be resolved in th e c u rren t a ir b attle over B ritain itself. H ighly relevant in this regard, how ever, was an ap p aren t decline in B ritish p ro d u ctio n , particu larly in planes.96 C olonel T rum an Sm ith, an a n ti-in te r­ ventionist w ho was a m em ber o f th e m ilitary intelligence division o f the G eneral Staff, predicted th a t by early sum m er, th e Reich w ould launch “a new air-an d -lan d onslaught.”97 Lawrence D ennis ascribed B ritain’s early victories in N orth A frica to inher­ en t weaknesses in M ussolini’s regim e, n o t to B ritish prow ess. Italy suffered from th e sam e weakness as th e U.S. R epublican Party: “to o m any ‘nice’ b u t technically useless people in positions o f com m and.”98 Issue after issue o f the Weekly Foreign Letter centered o n th e com ing B ritish defeat.99 Som e anti-interventionists found G erm any im pregnable.100 A m bassador John C udahy saw B ritain’s chances for surviving th e spring as “alm ost nil.” “It is a desperate fight,” rem arked the New York Daily News, “and th e odds against the B ritish and th eir friends are heavier th an they w ere in 1914-18.” Joseph P. K ennedy estim ated th at B ritain had m obilized one and a h alf m illion m en u n d er arm s, G erm any six m illion. In January 1941, C harles A. L indbergh had publicly denied th at G erm any could invade B ritain w ithout a previous in ter­

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n al collapse o f th e Reich. Privately he estim ated th at th e B ritish had only five th o u san d fighter planes to G erm any's tw enty-five th o u san d .101 A m erica First continually stressed B ritain’s precarious position. Late in Jan­ uary, it cited unnam ed “high circles” in the U.S. A rm y w ho forecast a G erm an a ir offensive in A pril involving three to fo u r thousand planes daily. A fter such “softening,” invasion was possible. B ritain, it said, had only a 50 percent chance o f surviving th e sum m er. By m id-February, the AFC was anticipating a successful jo in t G erm an-B ulgarian attack o n Greece and the subsequent n eutralization o f Yugoslavia.102 A few noninterventionists predicted radical upheaval w ithin B ritain itself. Even if it w on th e war, said John T. Flynn, th e ensuing poverty an d class stru g ­ gle w ould be so great th a t its ruling aristocracy could well o p t for fascism . A m erica w ould be facing an o th er fascist pow er, this one ow ning m ore land in th e W estern H em isphere th an did th e U nited States itself.103 Social Justice fore­ saw “Socialism in its various m anifestations— C om m unism , N ational Social­ ism and Fascism,” all serving as “a people’s defense m echanism against bank­ ru p tcy and insolvency in hum an efforts.” Soon C hurchill w ould yield to labor m in ister E rnest Bevin, w ho was already B ritain’s “v irtu al boss.”104 Lawrence D ennis, m ore cautious, ju st predicted increased strikes as class cleavages in ­ creased.105 Such pessim ism was n o t lim ited to anti-interventionists alone. In late D e­ cem ber 1940, Life noted G erm an preparations to invade B ritain, quoting Lord B eaverbrook, m inister o f aircraft p roduction, on the likelihood o f it happen­ ing before spring. Roosevelt w arned C hurchill in m id-January 1941 th at B ritain m ight be invaded w ithin th e m onth; G erm any m ight seize the Balkans, U kraine, and Portuguese islands as w ell.106 W hen, in late January, H arry H op­ kin s w ent to L ondon as the president’s personal representative, he reported th a t m ost o f the B ritish cabinet, as well as high m ilitary figures, believed a G erm an invasion o f B ritain im m inent, though he personally denied it w ould succeed.107 Early in February, H ull feared G erm any m ight invade w ithin n in ety days.108 At one p o in t th at sam e m onth, attaché R aym ond Lee did n o t th in k invasion could be long delayed.109

D u rin g th is tim e, an ti-interventionist enthusiasm for a negotiated peace re­ m ained stro n g .110 V andenberg told Foreign Correspondent, a B ritish propa­ ganda weekly, th at th e U nited States should guarantee such a settlem ent p ro ­ vided it m et w ith the approval o f the A m erican people. If H itler refused to negotiate, th e U.S. should enter the w ar.111 Lindbergh, in testim ony before the H ouse Foreign Affairs C om m ittee, said, “I prefer to see neither side win.”112 Any B ritish victory, he m aintained, w ould involve years o f w ar and an inva­

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sion o f Europe, w hich in tu rn w ould create p ro stratio n , fam ine, and disease th ro u g h o u t th e entire co n tin en t.113 O ther reasons w ere given as well, including anxieties over the Bolshevizatio n o f E urope and com m ercial isolation o f B ritain.114 In his plea for negotia­ tio n , C astle found E ngland’s chances o f survival “alm ost nil.” Form er d iplo­ m at W illiam C. D ennis asserted th a t peace w ould free E ngland to do w hat Lord L othian had advised long before: desist from fu rth er attem pts to control th e E uropean co ntinent. Libby denied th a t such a settlem ent w ould depend o n H itler’s w ord; rath er it rested “on the consent and cooperation o f th e peo­ ples concerned.”115 As in th e past, several anti-interventionists sought A m erican m ediation.116 T he New York Daily News and N orm an T hom as b o th m entioned Roosevelt by nam e.117 C harles A. Lindbergh w ould have had th e president initiate a m ove b u t opposed any subsequent U.S. participation in the proceedings.118 As in the past, Pope Pius XII was deem ed an interm ediary.119 C ertain peace term s w ere suggested, som e m odest, som e elaborate. If, said Senator Bulow, B ritain w ould announce th a t it w ould only destroy H it­ lerism — n o t G erm any itself—th e F ü h rer’s subjects w ould soon revolt. M ethodist m issionary E. Stanley Jones spoke o f a w orldw ide cooperative com ­ m onw ealth, equal access to th e w orld’s raw m aterials, and th e red istrib u tio n o f the w orld’s “land opportunities.” 120 T he Christian Century offered a plethora o f item s, basically W ilsonian in n ature, including th e liberation o f occupied nations, th e outlaw ry o f w ar, regional federations o f nations, an d a w orld league.121 Some real optim ism existed over the m atter.122 Despite FDR’s denunciation o f “appeasem ent,” Uncensored found W ashington grasping the desperateness o f B ritain’s situation; therefore, it claim ed, the Roosevelt adm inistration was se­ cretly considering peace negotiations. It quoted C hurchill him self as possibly threatening an “uneasy truce” should A m erican aid fail. The Christian Century pointed to a variety o f peace feelers: an early statem ent o f Lord Tavistock, dis­ closure o f attem pted Spanish m ediation, and the uproar over oil m agnate W illiam Rhodes Davis, w ho in 1939 had carried a supposed peace proposal from H erm ann G oering to FDR. In C hurchill’s appeal to the Italian people, the Protestant weekly said, he virtually offered a negotiated peace on the single re­ quirem ent th at they get rid o f “one m an.” In fact, H itler him self had assured the G erm an people th at peace w ould be followed by general disarm am ent.123 Several anti-interventionists held litde hope for negotiation.124 In a radio speech delivered in January, Kennedy accused G erm any o f rejecting peace.125 Even Amos Pinchot, who favored the initiative, referred to “H itler’s com plete u n ­ reliability.”126 In late January 1941, a G allup poll indicated th at 79 percent o f the Am erican public w anted Britain to keep on fighting only 15 percent said it should d esist M oreover, 74 percent predicted any G erm an invasion w ould fail.127 Advice and projections w ere always easy to com e by. It w ould n o t be an easy spring.

12

iz A Troubled Spring

T he passage o f th e lend-lease bill far from alleviated B ritain’s predicam ent. B ritain rem ained threatened, particularly on the high seas. Shipping losses am o u n ted to 381,000 tons in A pril, 436,500 in May, and 415,000 in June. O n a single night early in A pril, G erm any sank ten o f tw enty-tw o ships in a B ritish convoy. A dm iral H arold R. Stark, Roosevelt’s chief o f naval operations, be­ lieved B ritain could n o t last o u t the year w ithout the U nited States convoying lend-lease goods at least partly across the A dantic.1 T he C om m ittee to D efend A m erica by A iding the Allies was quick to voice alarm . At the cu rren t rate o f sinkings, the CDAAA noted in m id-M arch, oneth ird o f the tonnage currendy engaged in supplying the B ritish Isles w ould be lost. E ither m ore ships should be provided to B ritain, o r U.S. craft m ust guard th e lifeline.2 In th e latter case, it argued, G erm any w ould n o t declare war, for such acdon w ould only increase A m erican aid to its enem ies and perm it the U nited States to strike at H ider’s Reich direcdy.3 By m id-M ay, the CDAAA was stressing th at such setbacks n o t only w eak­ ened th e B ritish Isles b u t also affected its offensive capacity on oth er battlefronts.4 If June an d July brought a slight reduction in the sinkings, th e CDAAA n o ted quite accurately th at the Battle o f the A dantic was far from w on. The u r­ gency o f the convoy issue was real.5 G iven th e increasing dem and for convoys, the president’s critics becam e u n ­ derstandably uneasy.6 M uch o f th e daily press, including som e m ajor in ter­ v entionist new spapers, pointed to rum ors concerning the m atter.7 A num ber o f anticonvoy resolutions were proposed in C ongress, the m ost publicized ef­ fo rt being led by Senator C harles W. Tobey.8 The New H am pshire R epublican received letters from A m erican naval personnel w ho said they had already

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been assigned to convoy duty.9 A fter m uch discussion, o n 30 A pril, th e Senate Foreign R elations C om m ittee tabled Tobey’s bill com m ittee th irteen to n in e.10 Yet, for Roosevelt’s adversaries, such anxieties w ere only com pounded w hen, o n 10 A pril, the president announced an agreem ent w ith th e D anish governm ent perm ittin g th e U nited States to occupy G reenland for defensive purposes. In his press conference, FDR invoked the M onroe D octrine.11 T he D anish m inister in W ashington, H enrik de K auffinann, lacked th e au th o rity to m ake such an agreem ent, w hich was disavow ed by th e N azi-dom inated governm ent a t hom e. For th e U.S., th e action was unprecedented and ran counter to conventional international procedure. But n o m atter. A ssistant Secretary A dolf A. Berle a r­ ticulated ad m inistration views w hen he w arned th at hostile planes from G reenland could strike a t New York. Conversely, in friendly hands, Berle found th e island invaluable; it expedited th e delivery o f short-range aircraft to B ritain and its w eather stations w ere essential to later bom bing raids o n G er­ m any.12 By A ugust, close to 80 percent o f Fortune poll respondents favored its defense by U.S. arm ed forces.13 C ertain an ti-interventionists criticized the G reenland arrangem ent, arguing th a t th e m ove inevitably b rought th e w ar closer to th e U nited States. Uncen­ sored endorsed th e agreem ent w hile fearing th e m easure w ould expedite A m erican convoys. Such naval operations, the new sletter continued, were an open invitation for arm ed clash, particularly as H itler had declared th e w aters betw een G reenland and Iceland to be in th e zone o f his ow n blockade.14 O thers expressed little anxiety.15 H earst’s San Francisco Examiner adjudged G reenland an area o f little m ilitary value b u t denied th at occupation w ould bring th e U.S. closer to war. T he New York Daily News backed FDR’s m ove, finding it preferable for th e U nited States, n o t G erm any, to have its "hooks” there. G reenland, it continued, stood only about a thou san d m iles from M aine and was w ithin easy bom bing distances o f new A m erican bases in N ew found­ land. Conversely, m ilitary w riters Flem ing M acLiesh an d C ushm an Reynolds saw little at stake: G reenland’s anchorage w ould be untenable for any pow er n o t already controlling th e seas; C ape Farewell lay w ithin th e radius o f an A m erican fleet operating from Boston; U.S. C oast G uard cutters, patrol planes, and subm arines could offer am ple p ro tectio n .16 O n 11 A pril, Roosevelt infuriated his opponents w hen he issued a procla­ m ation rem oving th e Red Sea from com bat zone status, thereby p erm itting A m erican shipping there. By m id-M ay, tw enty-seven A m erican m erchant ships were en route to th e area, laden w ith supplies for B ritish troops in A frica an d the M iddle East. Senator W heeler found the policy "asinine,” as it m ight force the U nited States to fight single-handedly in all p arts o f th e w orld.17 T hen, scarcely over a week later, Roosevelt established a "neutrality p atro l” in th e w estern A tlantic, though he lacked the ships to m ake it effective. By flashing locations o f G erm an U -boats, the p atrol w ould alert B ritish m er­

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chantm en to veer away w hile inviting B ritish cruisers an d destroyers to attack. T he U.S. neu trality o r security zone reached as far as tw enty-six degrees west longitude; it included all o f G reenland plus th e Azores, w hat h istorian W aldo H einrichs calls “th e great basin o f th e N o rth A tlantic.”18 Since th is vast ex­ panse overlapped a G erm an com bat zone proclaim ed o n 25 M arch, an even­ tu a l clash appeared inevitable.19 In a press conference held o n 25 A pril, FDR tried to m inim ize th e m ove by distinguishing betw een a “patrol,” w hich was lim ited to scouting, and an “es­ cort,” w hich offered th e possibility o f actual com bat. U.S. patrols, he co n tin ­ u ed , w ould be sent “as far o n the w aters o f th e seven seas as m ay be necessary fo r th e defense o f th e A m erican H em isphere.”20 Four days later, at an o th er press conference, FDR claim ed to possess the legal au th o rity to send A m eri­ can w arships in to com bat zones, although, he continued, he m ight n o t take such action. By early June, Newsweek reported th a t 52 percent o f those polled favored convoys; only 41 percent opposed them .21 At best, so adm inistration foes found, th e president had acted provoca­ tively.22 To H erbert H oover, either convoys o r patrols w ould m ean “joining in th is w ar, once an d for all,” w ith the consequence o f less— n o t m ore— aid for th e B ritish.23 Som e critics raised logistical factors. V illard noted th at in convoy travel, the faster ships w ere held dow n to th e speed o f the slower, w hich was usually a b o u t ten o r eleven knots, and therefore stood prey to G erm an subm arines a n d Stuka dive-bom bers. Unless convoys were protected by interceptor planes, argued th e AFC, long-range bom bers and subm arines w ould continue to sink th em . Those interventionists requesting convoys should ask for planes in ­ stead. To guarantee the safety o f all trans-A tlantic cargoes, said Uncensored, a large p a rt o f the A m erican fleet w ould have to m ove from th e Pacific, w hich m ean t scrapping existing Far Eastern policy.24 U nloading too was deem ed a critical factor.25 A considerable percentage o f U.S. m unitions, Taft noted, was destroyed after it had arrived in B ritain, for docks and w arehouses experienced continual bom bardm ent.26 All this tim e, an ti-interventionists denied th at A m erican convoys were needed. If, advised th e Chicago Tribune, B ritain m oved naval un its from the M editerranean— w here it had ju st w on som e victories— to the A tlantic, it co u ld protect those ships carrying A m erican m unitions. O n 7 May, V andenb erg cited a letter from A dm iral Em ory S. Land, chairm an o f the U nited States M aritim e C om m ission. A ccording to Land, o f th e 158 B ritish vessels sunk in all p arts o f th e w orld betw een 1 January an d 30 A pril 1941, only twelve were cleared from U.S. p o rts, and eight were b o u n d for B ritain.27 H eadlined a Christian Century editorial, “A dm iral Land Lets th e C at O ut o f the Bag.”28 L and, obviously em barrassed by th e use o f his m aterial by the a n ti-in te r­ ventionists, soon reto rted , “T here is reason to believe th at actual losses ru n substantially greater th an reported losses.”29 T he B ritish them selves stated

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they had suffered m ajor losses in A pril, th at V andenberg’s figures w ere in co r­ rect, an d th a t even if convoys protected m unitions, ships carrying steel and food rem ained exposed to U -boats.30 T he m atter o f econom ic com petition was also raised.31 Why, it was asked, did B ritain need A m erican convoys w hen its ships rem ained engaged in p ro f­ itable— and com petitive— trade? C ongressm an Philip A. B ennett (R ep.-M o.) pointed to th e sale o f Scottish, English, and Irish liquors.32 Shafer n o ted B ritish soaps, china, earthenw are, clothing m aterials, and tobacco. B ritain, he w arned, was “em barking on a trade-w ar program th at m ay eventually cru sh th e U nited States econom ically.”33 In A pril, Roosevelt also sought congressional au th o rity to purchase o r lease som e eighty-three E uropean ships lying idle in New York harbors. Involved were one Belgian ship, thirty-six D anish, fourteen French, tw o E stonian, one L ithuanian, one R um anian— and tw o G erm an and tw enty-six Italian— som e h a lf a m illion tons in all. C ongressm an Schuyler O. Bland (D em .-Va.), w ho in ­ troduced the bill in the H ouse, asserted th a t alm ost every n ation was w illing to tu rn th e ships over to th e U nited States. F urtherm ore, th e G erm an an d Ital­ ian ships, the only craft creating controversy, belonged to th e U.S. by reason o f forfeiture.34 A nti-interventionists raised various argum ents against the bill, m any cen ­ tering on the status o f the G erm an and Italian craft.35 Fish called th e m ove “the grossest breach o f international law in history.”36 A ccording to Vorys, th e U nited States h ad violated “the ancient law and right o f sanctuary.”37 B orchard denied any rig h t to seizure unless sabotage was an issue. Ironically, he w ent o n , sabotage only becam e relevant w hen it was possible th at the U.S. w ould ille­ gally seize th e ships.38 C ongressm an Leo Allen (R ep.-Ill.) w arned o f retalia­ tion: G erm any o r Italy m ight seize the p roperty o f A m erican citizens, even perhaps the U.S. em bassy in Greece.39 O pponents feared, above all, th a t th e U nited States w ould tu rn the confiscated ships over to the B ritish, a m atter o n w hich C ongressm an Bland hedged.40 V andenberg was particularly outspoken, labeling the m ove a “provocative step tow ard war.” The B ritish them selves, he argued, had refused to recognize the right o f tem porary seizure w hen the governm ent o f C hile seized three in ­ terned D anish vessels. In fact, they threatened to capture th e craft at sea.41 Such aid to B ritain, FDR critics fu rth er m aintained, was n o t needed. In lig h t o f the m any ships the U nited States was providing to the B ritish, th e tw entysix Italian and tw o G erm an ships represented “only a drop in th e bucket.” T he U.S. itself had th e greater need.42 O n 7 May, however, the bill passed th e H ouse and o n the 15th th e Senate.43 O n 27 May 1941, FDR gave a m ajor address in w hich he asserted th at th e European w ar centered on nothing less th an H itler's drive for w orld d o m in a­ tio n . He w arned against G erm an control o f certain areas, am ong them Ice­ land, G reenland, Labrador, D akar, the C ape Verdes, and the Azores. R eassert­

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ing “th e ancient A m erican do ctrin e o f freedom o f th e seas” an d n oting th a t A m erican patrols were helping ensure the delivery o f w ar goods to the B ritish, he proclaim ed an “unlim ited national em ergency”44 As yet, FDR was m ost vague. In a subsequent press conference, he specifi­ cally denied he sought am endm ent, m uch less repeal, o f th e 1939 neutrality act. H e denied contem plating any im m ediate executive orders th a t w ould use any o f th e bro ad pow ers conferred on him by the proclam ation.45 “H e was tru stin g to luck,” scholar Jam es M acG regor B um s w rites, “to his long-tested flair for tim ing, and to the fortunes o f war. H e had n o plans.”46 C om m ents Roosevelt scholar Frank Freidel, “Just w hat th e proclam ation m ight m ean no one knew.”47 Som e anti-interventionists w ere optim istic concerning th e president’s ad­ dress. T he AFC, for exam ple, expressed relief th at FDR had “resisted the w arm akers” and later to o k credit for his relative m ildness.48 Still, som e apprehen­ sion rem ained.49 C ongressm an Roy O. W oodruff (R ep.-M ich.) labeled the speech “a declaration o f u n d ed ared war.”50 N o ad m inistration o pponent was pleased w ith FDR’s invocation o f freedom o f th e seas. To th e AFC research bureau, the president was seeking to aid one belligerent w ithout danger o f interference by th e other. If A m erican ships tran sp o rted contraband, obviously G erm an ships w ould attem pt to stop them , as accepted rules o f international law so provided. U.S. craft could n o t even d a im exem ption from visit and search, m uch less capture.51 Uncensored called th e w hole concept o f freedom o f th e seas a chim era, for it existed on the sufferance o f w hatever pow er controlled the particular seas in question. C on­ gressm an B ennett com pared th e U nited States policy to “the position o f a cit­ izen w ho insists upon exercising his right o f freedom o f streets regardless o f how m any bullets are flying across them .” B ritain itself, m aintained Senator Nye, had never sought freedom o f the seas; it w anted “dom inance and sover­ eignty over them .”52 T he anti-interventionists had reason to be suspicious o f Roosevelt’s moves. From late M arch through May, the president told such intim ates as H arold Ickes and H enry M orgenthau th at he hoped an incident on the high seas m ight result in providing convoys o r possibly even a state o f w ar w ith Germ any.53

T he A tlantic was n o t th e only focus o f anti-interventionist atten tio n , n o r was Roosevelt th e only A m erican leader under scrutiny. Events in the Balkans aroused anxiety as did the activities there o f C olonel W illiam J. (“W ild Bill”) D onovan. D onovan was a flam boyant figure, having been a hero in W orld W ar I, federal prosecutor in th e 1920s, and prom inent New York State R epublican leader. In late 1940 and early 1941, D onovan u n dertook a secret m ission to

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southeastern E urope and the eastern M editerranean. H is assignm ent: to re­ p o rt on th e strategic situation to b o th Roosevelt and C hurchill. From 23 to 25 January 1941, he m et in Belgrade w ith leading Yugoslav officials. At a lunch­ eon w ith Prince Regent Paul, D onovan hinted th at Yugoslavia w ould receive A m erican aid if the n eutral ru ler chose to fight the G erm ans. T he prince, in ­ fluenced by his pro-G erm an wife, ignored the h in t. A fter lunch, D onovan vis­ ited G eneral DuSan Sim ovic, com m ander o f th e Yugoslav a ir force an d a strong foe o f G erm any, show ing Sim ovic a telegram signed by Roosevelt also hin tin g at U.S. su p p o rt.54 O n 25 M arch, Prince Paul joined th e Axis by signing the trip a rtite pact. Four days later, as four B ritish divisions established a beachhead in Greece, Sim ovic overthrew Prince Paul an d his governm ent, renounced th e treaty w ith G erm any, and placed th e young king, Peter II, on th e throne. O n 6 A pril, G erm any attacked b o th Yugoslavia and Greece. By m id-m onth, th e greater p a rt o f Yugoslavia had been conquered; b o th th e king and Sim ovic had fled. O n 27 A pril, the G erm ans entered A thens, and w ithin a day the B ritish had evacuated Greece itself. T he G erm an attack on C rete began on 20 May, en d ­ ing in conquest on 1 June. Roosevelt him self th o u g h t th at B ritain m ight lose th e M editerranean.55 D em aree Bess, foreign correspondent for th e Saturday Evening Post an d an an ti-interventionist, soon blam ed the 29 M arch coup and Yugoslavia’s subse­ quent fate on direct U.S. involvem ent. "O u r representatives,” he said, “m ade com m itm ents for us w hich virtually established a new A m erican fro n tier o n the D anube.” D onovan had assured the Yugoslavs th at th e U nited States w ould guarantee th at they cam e o u t o n th e w inning side, a pledge— w rote Bess— th at could only be fulfilled by all-out w ar against G erm any. A m erican am bas­ sador A rthur Bliss Lane also m et w ith Bess’s scorn, for he supposedly h ad w orked tirelessly to underm ine Paul’s pro-G erm an diplom acy.56 Som e FDR foes quickly tu rn ed Bess’s article in to an o th er in d ictm ent against the president.57 O thers were slightly cautious ab o u t his account.58 If th e Postvtas reliable, claim ed Uncensored, the U nited States had engaged in “a quixotic b u t dangerous attem pt to play a h an d in a deadly serious gam e w ith­ o u t any particular cards to tu rn over in the show dow n.”59 C ertainly a n tiinterventionists shared a unanim ous sentim ent th a t the U.S. bore heavy responsibility for Yugoslavia’s fall. In Fish’s w ords, the U nited States had en ­ couraged it “to fight the m ighty Nazi arm ies w ithout o u r raising a finger to help them .”60 To a lesser extent, D onovan was also attacked for giving sim ilar assurances to Bulgaria, w hich joined th e trip a rtite pact on 1 M arch 1941 and opened its borders to G erm an troops the sam e day.61 Frank H anighen accused R oo­ sevelt’s troubleshooter o f attem pting an abortive countercoup in Iraq, d e­ signed to overthrow th e pro-N azi regim e there.62 Even the colonel’s past record m et w ith strong attack. He was accused o f hindering the Teapot D om e

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investigation o f 1923-24 and th e w ork o f Nye’s probing o f th e m unitions in ­ d u stry du rin g the m id-1930s.63 In reality, D onovan’s critics had m isperceived the issue. It was the British, n o t "W ild Bill” and the U nited States, w ho had taken th e initiative in encouraging Balkan resistance to H itler. They assum ed th at their ow n forces in the M iddle East could operate successfully in th at region and perhaps encourage a resist­ ance th at m ight m ake Turkey an active ally. T he U.S. played only a lim ited role.64 T he Balkans im broglio led anti-interventionists to a w ider p o in t, th e fact th a t none o f th e nations there w ere dem ocracies. Social Justice, itself a de­ fender o f fascist regim es, was outspoken. A ttacking th e O rthodox Serbs’ trea t­ m ent o f th e Rom an C atholic C roatians, it called Yugoslavia "a to talitarian gangster in th e w orst sense o f the term ,” w hich— in p ro p o rtio n to popula­ tio n — could well have been "the scene o f m ore racial persecution, m ore m ass m u rd er and arrests an d m ore m ass terrorism ’’ th an any o th er co u n try in Eu­ rope. T urning to Greece, Father C oughlin’s weekly spoke in term s o f a onep arty system , m uzzled press, and concentration cam ps.65 M ore m oderate anti-interventionists, too, stressed the lack o f G reek dem oc­ racy. "T he G reeks don’t even w ant self-governm ent,” flippantly rem arked Sam uel B. Pettengill, colum nist an d form er D em ocratic congressm an from Indiana. "T hey crave a dom estic yoke.” T he Christian Century indicted Rum a­ n ia o n sim ilar grounds, finding it a land riddled w ith anti-Sem itism , "reeking” o f political co rru p tio n , and possessing a "heartless landlord system ” th at "ex­ ploited a helpless peasantry.”66 Several noninterventionists found G erm an conquest o f the Balkans in ­ evitable. Even before th e G erm an successes, H oover had predicted th at the N azis w ould overrun Yugoslavia and Greece. To Lawrence D ennis, such sm all natio n s faced th e dilem m a o f becom ing either "econom ic provinces o f a G reater G erm any o r else satellites o f Russia.”67 At th e sam e tim e, som e asserted, th e Balkans m ight well be strategically ir­ relevant. T he Chicago Tribune called Greece a sideshow, o f little value to either belligerent. Even the D ardanelles, argued the New York Daily News, was over­ rated , its possession bestow ing neith er oil n o r food. Sim ilarly, if H itler seized Suez and G ibraltar, he w ould experience stalem ate unless he could either starve o r invade B ritain itself.66 N ot all reactions w ere so sanguine.69 C astle thought th at th e expulsion o f B ritish forces from Greece m ight force it to seek a peace.70 C om m enting on th e fall o f C rete, th e Chicago Tribune asked, “Is Egypt Next?”71

All d u rin g this tim e, the gaze o f the anti-interventionists w ent beyond th e A t­ lantic and the Balkan m ainland. D uring the spring o f 1941, several continued

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to stress G erm an weakness. H itler's Reich, said C ongressm an M undt, could n o t w in so long as th e B ritish Isles and its navy w ithstood attack. T he New York Daily News called one B ritish naval victory o ff C ape M atapan, Greece, late in M arch th e blackest day the Axis had yet experienced; the engagem ent p ro m ­ ised to rank w ith A boukir, Trafalgar, and possibly Jutland.72 At tim es a longer view was taken. A nne M orrow Lindbergh w rote, “Pros­ perity is n o t a flower w hich grows from oppression." W heeler predicted th at Nazi rule was b o u n d to fail, for Europe’s diverse nationalities and religious groups w ould prove to o troublesom e.73 If G erm any did w in, forecast th e New York Daily News, H itler w ould soon die, as “he w ill have ru n his race and spent all his creative force.” At th at p oint, the Nazi leaders w ould fight am ong th em ­ selves, destroying th eir new U nited States o f Europe in th e process.74 Far m ore noninterventionists saw B ritain itself as being in serious trouble. O n 8 A pril, a raid on C oventry m arked the end o f a tem porary bom bing lull. From 16 to 19 A pril, London was h it, creating over tw o thousand fatalities and striking 148,000 hom es. T he night o f 10-11 May, the last night o f th e blitz, saw the heaviest attack o f all: 1,436 were killed, 1,792 seriously injured, and o n e-th ird o f the streets rendered im passable. O ne gloom y com m ent follow ed another. Late in A pril, Uncensored noted B ritish plane production falling far behind G erm any’s; it cited a rep o rt th at th e G erm ans were fitting o u t heavily arm ored fo ur-m otor planes so as to bom b B ritain from nearby French bases. B ritain, th e Chicago Tribune said in m id-M ay, was suffering tw enty-five tim es as m uch as the G erm ans. AFC staffer R uth Sarles asserted th at “official quarters” in W ashington, including the visiting air force chief G eneral H ap A rnold, found B ritain in “a very bad way.” Liverpool rem ained the only effective p o rt, pilots in train in g lacked a ir space, and shaken m orale had w eakened p roduction.73 To m any such people, it appeared B ritain could well go under.76 In A pril, Senator Nye judged victory odds to favor the Axis. C ontinued ship sinkings, feared H anson Baldw in, w ould cause B ritain to fall. C ertainly, he m aintained, the British could n o t defeat the Nazis w ithout full p articipation o f the A m er­ ican arm y and air force.77 A m onth later, G eneral W ood predicted G erm an dom ination o f the M editerranean areas, including G ibraltar, M alta, an d Egypt. H itler w ould probably get “w hat he w ants” in Europe b u t w ould n o t be able to destroy the B ritish E m pire.78 Libby thought the w ar was in its last stages, for in every category— m anpow er, air strength, food, equipm ent— B ritain was hopelessly outclassed.79 N ot surprisingly, Lawrence D ennis’s Weekly Foreign Letter and Father C oughlin’s Social Justice kept stressing B ritish defeat.80 Early in A pril, H erbert H oover appeared the m ost pessim istic o f all. T hough forecasting th at the B ritish w ould drive the Italians o u t o f all A frica, thereby securing naval control o f the M editerranean, he thou g h t the G erm ans m ight try to invade B ritain w ithin six m onths. Conversely, the B ritish lacked

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sufficient planes to crack G erm an m orale. By m id-M ay, the form er president d id express som e hope, enough to keep endorsing A m erican m ilitary aid. W hile opposing convoys, he called for continuing the sending o f tanks, m u n i­ tions, food, m erchant ships, an d bom bers.*1 Such anxieties w ere echoed w ithin th e Roosevelt ad m inistration itself. U ntil early June, A m erican leaders thou g h t G erm an activity in th e A tlantic presaged eith er an invasion o f th e B ritish Isles o r m oves against such an A tlantic o u t­ post as G ibraltar.82 Furtherm ore, an official rep o rt from A m erican m ilitary in ­ telligence greatly exaggerated Luftwaffe strength, finding it to possess eleven thou san d front-line com bat planes w hen in reality G erm any had ju st over three thousand bom bers and fighters.83 A ccording to H arold Ickes, “the best m ilitary o pinion” saw th e B ritish as having difficulty rem aining in N orth Africa. By the end o f May, n o t only did the in terio r secretary share this fear him self b u t he also spoke o f G erm an dom ination o f G ibraltar, Portugal, and Spain. T he interventionist Life show ed pictures o f a possible G erm an invasion o f B ritain. In A pril, however, a G allup poll found 50 percent predicting a B ritish victory; in May, 55 percent.84 U ntil early sum m er, FDR took few initiatives. T he president felt constrained by public opinion, lacked th e w arships needed to intervene decisively on the A tlantic, and feared a Japanese advance in Southeast Asia. In addition, he was unclear as to w here H itler w ould m ove next: th e N ear East, M orocco, D akar, o r the Soviet U nion. He had still to be assured th at th e U nited States and B ritain shared com m on peace aim s.85

D uring the spring o f 1941, anti-interventionists continued to back a negotiated peace.86 In so doing, a few refused o u trig h t to endorse a British victory, thereby taking th e position always m aintained by C harles Lindbergh. Nye hoped both sides w ould becom e econom ically and physically exhausted, for only then could one secure a lasting settlem ent. If H itler lost, com m ented Philip La Fol­ lette, th e G erm ans w ould have to overturn him . “In fifteen years,” he continued in referring to th e war, “it will n o t m atter w ho w on this struggle.”87 In any such negotiation, it was argued, B ritain w ould n o t fare th at badly. “E ngland has been offered a peace w hich w ould respect and insure the in ­ teg rity o f th e B ritish Em pire,” H earst w rote; C hurchill should realize th at never, in its entire history, had his n ation ever conquered Europe. If, rem arked G eneral W ood, B ritain could secure term s by w hich it kept its navy, its inde­ pendence, an d m ost o f its colonies, it should seek term s a t once.88 Som ew hat less upbeat, the New York Daily News conceded th at such a setdem en t w ould invariably result in an arm ed truce, w ith H itler initially do m i­ n a n t in Europe, the Soviet U nion and Japan sharing m ost o f Asia, the U nited

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States rem aining suprem e in th e W estern H em isphere, an d B ritain possibly keeping all o f its present em pire. But, th e News continued, except for th e four h u n d red years o f Pax R om ana, m ost o f recorded history show ed peace to be a m ere interval betw een w ars. If th e cu rren t conflict persisted long enough, “w e shall all sink together into com m unism o r a new d ark age.”89 T he spring o f 1941 m arked th eir height o f optim ism concerning such ne­ gotiation.90 Som e signs appeared particularly auspicious. In late May, W heeler and th e New York Daily News reported on th e Paris press com m unicating H itler’s desire th at FDR m ediate the conflict.91 Early in June, Senator Tom C onnally said th a t peace talks w ere in progress. “As far as we are concerned,” said the Texas D em ocrat, “if England keeps h er independence an d h er navy, th at is all we can ask. It is th eir war, after all.”92 W hen John W inant, w ho h ad replaced K ennedy as U.S. am bassador to B ritain th a t February, retu rn ed to W ashington for consultations, a few anti-interventionists incorrectly sus­ pected th a t he b rought G erm an peace term s w ith him .93 H eightening all such speculation was the flight, m ade on 10 M ay 1941, o f R udolph Hess to B ritain.94 T he deputy Führer, acting w ith o u t H itler’s back­ ing, was involved in an effort to initiate peace talks ju st a little over a m o n th p rio r to G erm any’s attack o n the Soviet U nion.95 Som e anti-interventionists saw th e flight m arking an official G erm an bid. Uncensored th o u g h t Hess had b rought peace term s to C hurchill. H erbert H oover th o u g h t th e flier had offered B ritain an alliance against Russia. Sup­ posedly, said Hoover, C hurchill had been greatly im pressed, b u t FDR denied th at any H itler term s could be trusted. To th e com m unist Daily Worker, the flight show ed b o th B ritain and G erm any fearing th at th e w ar was term inating the en tire capitalist order.96 H istorian W ill D u ran t suggested H ess had p ro ­ posed G erm an w ithdraw al from th e Scandinavian countries and occupied countries o f W estern E urope in retu rn for d om ination o f th e U kraine.97 O thers w ere m ore cynical concerning any peace prospects. T he Christian Century believed th at the deputy Führer was so outraged over the prospect o f G erm an-Soviet p artn ersh ip th at he had broken w ith H itler.98 Soon the Protes­ ta n t jo u rn al said, “Hess was in an abnorm al m ental condition. W ho am ong th e G erm an leaders is not?”99 America suspected th at he was th e victim o f a Nazi purge. Sim ilarly, D ennis w rote, “Hess’s case is sim ply th at o f a bew ildered and naive idealist in revolt against th e new Nazi R usso-G erm an policy w hich ran counter to all he held dear in the Nazi program .” 100 T he New York Daily News did n o t rule o u t th e possibility th at he m ight be a decoy, giving th e B ritish phony secrets.101 New Masses featured an article asserting th at th e flight m ight have been m ade w ith H itler’s know ledge. As N azi rule was shaky, w ith extrem e dissatisfaction existing am ong th e G erm an m asses, it said, Hess fled like “a rat leaving a sinking ship.”102 All this tim e, pacifists w ere extrem ely busy. In May, C harles Boss, executive secretary o f th e M ethodist C om m ission for W orld Peace, organized th e M in­

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isters’ N o W ar C om m ittee, w ith him self as executive secretary and A lbert W. Palm er, president o f C hicago Theological Sem inary, as chairm an. B oasting a m em bership o f twelve h u n d red , it announced a nationw ide series o f p ro ­ gram s, featuring such pro m in en t clergy as £. Stanley Jones, H arry Em erson Fosdick, an d G eorge B uttrick. O n 9 -1 0 May, the group launched th e C hurch­ m an’s C am paign for Peace T hrough M ediation. Jones, a pro m in en t m ission­ ary, served as a m ajor organizer. Five-sixths o f the FOR attended th e organiz­ ing session, and th e Christian Centurÿs C harles C layton M orrison gave it full backing. In June, th e A m erican Friends Service C om m ittee called for a general peace based o n universal disarm am ent and international organization.103 In C ongress several an ti-interventionists m ade concrete proposals. In May, C ongressm an Jerry V oorhis (D em .-C alif.) introduced a resolution requesting th a t a conference o f parliam entary bodies draw u p a basis for a lasting settle­ m en t.104 C ongressm an R udolph G. Terenow itz called for im m ediate action by th e C ongress, acting w ith the legislatures o f o th er nations, to b ring abo u t the cessation o f hostilities and th e organization o f peace.105 O ne o f th e m ore publicized efforts cam e from C ongressm an John M . Vorys, w ho late in A pril advocated “an A m erican peace offensive.”106 T he U nited States, he said, should state its postw ar peace aim s, call for an im m ediate arm istice, and offer to m ediate. T he ensuing negotiations w ould n o t be dic­ tated by a single pow er b u t w ould lead to a free E uropean com m onw ealth. If H itler refused equitable term s, Vorys continued, he w ould lose his follow ing am ong his ow n people, w hose w artim e losses had m ade them genuine peace partisans. True, th e G erm an leader m ight n o t be trustw orthy, b u t term s could be enforced by econom ic retaliation, im pounding arm s on b o th sides, and jo in t o r international control o f strategic positions. In addition, th e prom ise o f food, m oney, and m atériel could be used to keep the peace.107 O thers, too, sought A m erican initiative, w ith som e m entioning Roosevelt o r Pius XII by nam e.108 For exam ple, on 20 May, M undt suggested th a t FDR call a m ediation conference o f n eu tral pow ers.109 Even the com m unists p ro ­ m oted a negotiated peace. Late in May, M ike G old, novelist and Daily Worker colum nist, endorsed th e term s outlined by Sidney Bradshaw Fay. T he H arvard h istorian opposed large reparations and th e division o f G erm any in to sm all u n its w hile calling for a federation o f E uropean states and th e restoration o f all nations conquered by H itler.110 Several noninterventionists supported sem iofficial peace agendas. A m ong th e m ore pop u lar were th e five points o f Secretary o f State C ordell H ull, o u t­ lined in a broadcast delivered on 18 May. T he secretary proposed his favorite panacea: a postw ar reconstruction program th a t included ( 1) an end to exces­ sive trad e restrictions; and (2) nondiscrim ination in com m ercial relations; (3) equal availability o f raw m aterials to all nations; (4) protection o f consum ing countries an d th eir people; and (5) loans conducive to trade. C ongressm an Louis Ludlow introduced a H ouse resolution in w hich th e president, backed

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by th e tw enty-one A m erican republics, w ould offer H ull’s five points as the tentative basis for stopping th e war. A m ediation m ovem ent, he m aintained, m ight gain trem endous m om entum . C ongressm an M undt endorsed H ull’s five peace proposals b u t added a few m ore o f his ow n: a clearinghouse to set­ tle controversies, revitalization o f th e League o f N ations, an d expansion o f C larence Streit’s U nion Now to include all nations. If prelim inary discussion so w arranted, direct invitations could be sent to G erm any and B ritain.111 O ccasionally personal agendas w ere offered. Sterling M orton’s included the restoration o f N orw ay; a buffer state in th e Low C ountries; a “sem i-inde­ p endent” France th at w ould accept th e loss o f A lsace-Lorraine; G erm an dom ­ in atio n o f th e Balkans, either by straight annexation o r th e creation o f buffer states; a G erm an interest in th e Suez C anal; G erm an hegem ony over Italy and its colonies; and B ritish retention o f territo rial gains m ade in Abyssinia. W ithin tw o years, B ritain could increase th e strength o f its island fortress, m aking it practically im pregnable, w hile th e U nited States could com plete its tw o-ocean navy, develop a m assive m erchant m arine, and tra in several m illion m ore m en. T he socialist Call spoke in term s o f B ritish independence, reten­ tio n o f m uch o f the B ritish Em pire, loss o f form er G erm an colonies an d the M editerranean, and jo in t G erm an-B ritish control over the Suez C anal.112 In his “national em ergency” speech o f 27 M ay 1941, Roosevelt again stressed his opposition to negotiated peace. In such bargaining, he said, “G er­ m any w ould literally parcel o u t the w orld— hoisting th e sw astika itself over vast territories and populations and setting up p uppet governm ents o f its ow n choosing, w holly subject to th e w ill and th e policy o f a conqueror.”113 G allup polls, m oreover, usually show ed strong public disapproval, revealing a faith th a t the B ritish w ould pull through. In early May, a G allup poll found 62 per­ cent preferring U.S. en try into th e w ar to B ritain’s surrender.114 Even w hen th e fate o f B ritain appeared m ost precarious, however, a good m any o f th e m ore vocal an ti-interventionists sought to discredit its cause. H ere the rhetoric was at its m ost im passioned.

13

it Great Britain: An Unfit Ally

W hile B ritain’s fate rem ained in do u b t, m any noninterventionists expressed strong sym pathy for the beleaguered n atio n .1 T he Chicago Tribune, u n d o u b t­ edly aw are o f its reputation as an A nglophobe jo u rn al, specifically denied any hostility. England, it said, had follow ed the U nited States far on th e road to self-governm ent and freedom . In A ugust 1940, N orm an T hom as expressed hope th at the B ritish w ould stave o ff the Nazi invasion. T he U.S., he co n tin ­ ued, should n o t reim pose an em bargo on B ritain o r cease purchasing its gold. In th e sam e m onth, the New York Daily News supported C hurchill w hen he spoke in C om m ons o f th e intertw ining o f A m erican-B ritish interests.2 T hat A pril C harles A. Lindbergh had told an A m erica First rally, uIt will be a tragedy for th e entire w orld if the B ritish Em pire collapses.” In M ay 1940, W illiam R andolph H earst ordered E. D. C oblentz, supervisor o f his chain’s editorial d i­ vision, to kill any editorials unfriendly to England. Just less th an a year later, H earst reprinted an address he had given in 1927 in w hich he advocated a guarantee o f m utual su p p o rt w ith B ritain to m aintain the peace o f the w orld.3 A dm inistration critics, however, fully realized th at popular sym pathy for B ritain could result in the consequence they m ost feared: full-scale entry into th e war.4 H ence, it was to th eir interest, and they fully realized it, to “balance” positive accounts o f B ritain’s leadership, diplom acy, and heritage w ith nega­ tive ones, doing so in the hopes th at such “m odification” w ould create a m ore cautious foreign policy. The great o u tb u rst o f philanthropic and m edia sup­ p o rt, m anifested in such varied ways as the Bundles for B ritain relief program an d such film s as A Yank in the R.A.F. (1941), irritated som e an ti-interven­ tionists. Even A nne M orrow Lindbergh, far from unsym pathetic to the B ritish w ar effort, reacted negatively to “the sm art w om en w earing B ritish lions con­

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spicuously on th eir bo so m s”5 F urtherm ore, w ithin th e opposition cam p, there existed bitterly anti-B ritish individuals w ho becam e alm ost livid o n the subject o f “perfidious Albion.” At all tim es, concern over B ritish m anipulation existed.6 To H arry Elm er Barnes, speaking in M ay 1940, “G reat B ritain is o u r m ost dangerous enem y today, because we are ‘suckers’ for h er propaganda.”7 O ften cited was a 1938 exposé by form er B ritish intelligence officer Sidney R ogerson, Propaganda and

the Next War.* T he m ore-strident A nglophobes found th e B ritish peril to be extrem ely se­ rious. Two au thors held such pronounced views th at the bulk o f th eir com ­ m ents involved a veritable indictm ent o f th at nation. First was novelist T heodore D reiser, w ho had becom e increasingly procom m unist, although n o t yet a p arty m em ber. In his book America Is Worth Saving ( 1941 ), he offered a leftist in terp retatio n , denouncing an “International o f Privilege,” interp retin g th e w ar as a frenzied struggle for w orld m arkets, stressing A m erica’s dom estic poverty, and praising Soviet society. He continually returned to th e crim es o f B ritain and its em pire, w hich he presented as the greatest evil facing th e w orld. Indeed, th e U nited States had long been “England’s first enemy.”9 Equally anti-B ritish was P orter Sargent’s Getting US into War (1941), a com pilation o f weekly bulletins “exposing” B ritish propaganda th at circulated prim arily to private school and university leaders. Publisher o f th e annual Handbook o f Private Schools, a standard reference w ork, Sargent was a H ar­ vard-educated B ostonian w ho, w ithout sharing D reiser’s dom estic politics, saw the w orld’s ills rooted in B ritish perfidy.10 A host o f noninterventionists endorsed the b u lletin s." T he book received sim ilar praise.12 T he U nited States itself, so som e pugnacious critics m ain tain ed , w as ac­ tually subservient to B ritain .15 To H . L. M encken, th e U.S. w as serving as “th e client and goon” o f its tra d itio n a l enem y, “acting precisely like a Eng­ lish colony.” 14 T he Chicago Tribune accused A m erican “colonials” o f believ­ ing, even m ore th an th e C anadians, th a t it was th e ir d u ty to assist B rita in .15 If, said John B assett M oore, th e U nited States sou g h t to p a rticip a te in all w ars w aged by B ritain, it w ould be m ore sensible to “add ourselves to th e n u m b er o f self-governing d o m in io n s u n d er th e B ritish crow n.” 16 In N o­ vem ber 1940 S enator H om er Bone (D em .-W ash.) observed th a t relatio n s w ith B ritain w ere becom ing so tig h t th a t he snidely endorsed a Society fo r th e P rom otion o f D om inion S tatus for th e U nited States. T he New York Daily News assailed th e R oosevelt a d m in istratio n for seeking to preserve th e B ritish E m pire, ju st as W ilson had supposedly done earlier. By S eptem ­ b e r 1941, it proclaim ed th e U nited States “unofficially a p a rt o f th e B ritish Em pire,” a situ atio n th a t, it said, had existed since th e S panish-A m erican W ar. T hat N ovem ber, John H aynes H olm es asserted: “T his is evidently a w ar to m ake the w orld safe for th e B ritish E m pire, and U.S.A. is evidently expected to do th e job!” 17

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To such extrem ists, B ritain rem ained fundam entally hostile to th e U nited States, said enm ity being long-standing.1* To Senator Sheridan Downey, for exam ple, B ritain had threatened th e safety o f th e U nited States m ore th an any o th er country; by contrast, G erm any had never sought to interfere w ith A m er­ ican rights. N ot only, said jo u rn alist C arleton Beals, had B ritain’s m onopolis­ tic system held m ost o f th e w orld in bondage b u t thanks to it, th e U.S. “has long seen its ow n econom y w arped, distorted, depressed, its pro p erty endan­ gered, th e national defense w eakened.”19 Asked P orter Sargent, “H as any o th er co u n try ever landed one uniform ed soldier in N o rth Am erica?” Senator H olt also listed B ritain as th e only n atio n th at ever sought to invade th e U nited States. G oing fu rth er back, Social Justice added th a t d u rin g the W ar o f 1812, B ritain had com m itted atrocities on the w om en and children o f H am pton, V irginia.20 O th er B ritish m isdeeds included attem pted suppression o f the A m erican R evolution, opposition to th e M on­ roe D octrine, and su p p o rt o f th e C onfederacy.21 W orld W ar I provided a prim e exam ple o f B ritish deception.22 Said C on­ gressm an Sweeney, B ritain “took o u r blood an d o u r m oney in th e last w ar and left us holding th e bag.”23 W heeler quoted from C hurchill’s The Aftermath (1929) to show Lloyd G eorge’s resistance to W ilson’s peace effort.24 A fter th e w ar, according to th e m o re A nglophobic am ong th e a n ti-in te r­ ven tio n ists, B ritain still treated th e U nited States poorly. D reiser w rote o f efforts to exclude th e U.S. from new ly o pened oil fields in th e M iddle East. D u rin g th e W ashington N aval C onference o f 1921-22, argued S enator D en­ nis C havez, “we scrapped b attlesh ip s w hile B ritain th rew away a few blue p rin ts.” In discussing th e M anchurian crisis o f 1931-33, B arnes accused B ritish foreign m in ister Sir John Sim on o f leaving Secretary o f S tate H enry L. S tim son “o u t o n a lim b.” Sim ilarly, S enator La Follette blam ed B ritain fo r n o t co o p eratin g w ith A m erican efforts to restra in Italian aggression in E thiopia. It was B ritish pressure d u rin g th e Spanish C ivil W ar, com m ented B arnes, th a t, m ore th a n anything else, kept th e U nited States from sending supplies to Loyalist S pain.25

B ritain supposedly presented a trad e th reat as well. Even w hen w ar began, B ritain’s foes continued indictm ents o f com m ercial hostility th at had been m ade since th e tw enties, if n o t before.26 In M arch 1939, several an ti-in terv en ­ tio n ists argued, B ritain had sought again to edge th e U nited States o u t o f w orld com m erce.27 At th a t tim e an agreem ent was m ade at D üsseldorf in w hich th e Federation o f B ritish Industries and th e R eichgruppe Industries concurred in sharing certain overseas m arkets. F urtherm ore, the tw o pow ers w ould, in th e w ords o f the text, be “elim inating undesirable com petition” and

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"taking concrete steps to increase w orld consum ption o f th e products in w hich G erm an an d B ritish industries are in terested ”28 N orm an T hom as saw the arrangem ent as an effort to use state-subsidized trad e to capture U.S. cus­ tom ers in South A m erica. Senator C harles Tobey called it "a B ritish-N azi con­ spiracy to enter in to a trade-pooling agreem ent for the purpose o f fleecing us o f o u r South A m erican trade.” Philip La Follette even cited The Economist [L ondon], w hich stated th at the Federation o f B ritish Industries "contem ­ plates seeking B ritish G overnm ent subsidies to help G erm an trad e against A m erica.”29 D üsseldorf was ju st one exam ple. In D ecem ber 1939, Uncensored faulted th e adm inistration for m aintaining a price o f $35 for an ounce o f gold, thereby giving B ritish im porters com petitive advantage in th e w orld m arket. In M arch 1940, W illiam Philip Sim m s, Scripps-H ow ard foreign editor, noted th a t th e B ritish had ordered all th eir exporters— w hen selling such item s as rubber, tin , ju te, and w hiskey—to dem and paym ent in dollars. Such a prac­ tice, alleged Senator Reynolds, had m ade "E ngland th e m aster o f in ternational com m erce, and a t the expense o f th e U nited States”; he called for im m ediate retaliation.30 Indeed, said som e antagonists, the B ritish w ere stealing from th e U nited States at th e very tim e th a t A m erica was sacrificing to aid th eir w ar effort. In M arch 1940, Fish accused them o f "m onopolizing th e m arkets o f the w orld,” in p articu lar by destroying the cotton m arkets o f th e A m erican South an d re­ placing them w ith Egyptian co tto n .31 Latin A m erica was a p articu lar sore p o in t.32 C ongressm an Frances Case (R ep.-S.D ak.), speaking in N ovem ber 1941, rem arked th a t every dock in C entral and South A m erica was piled high w ith boxes labeled "B ritain delivers th e goods.”33 Lend-lease sim ply m ade th e situ atio n w orse.34 N oting B ritish sales o f such item s as bicycles and shoes, in Septem ber 1941 the Chicago Tribune challenged Roosevelt’s claim th at m aterials supplied to the B ritish did n o t com pete w ith U.S. exports.35 Senator Nye claim ed th at B ritish m anufacturers w ere m olding A m erican lend-lease steel into m achines th at they w ould sell back to the U nited States and to South A m erican republics. C ongressm an R obert F. Jones (R ep.-O hio) w arned against industrial espionage. T he B ritish, he said, "are in every airplane factory, in every tan k factory, in every ordinance plant, in every engine plant.”36 N either the state departm ent n o r the staff o f lend-lease adm inistrator H arry H opkins could find m uch to substantiate these allegations. To m eet such charges, however, they forced the British in m id-Septem ber to prom ise th at A m erican lend-lease goods w ould n o t be reexported. Even goods sim ilar to those provided in the lend-lease program w ould no t be perm itted to enter new m arkets at the expense o f U.S. m erchants. By such m eans, A m erican m anufac­ turers supplanted Britain in m any m arkets, particularly in Latin Am erica.37 British control o f m ajor natural resources rem ained another sore p o in t In February 1941, W heeler found the em pire to possess a virtual m onopoly o f

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m any such item s. A m onth later, the Chicago Tribune protested against w hat it saw as artificially high prices for rubber, diam onds, and cocoa. The Tribune sin­ gled o u t tin for special attention, in the process blam ing the state departm ent for being overly solicitous in failing to challenge British control.3* Besides, so such anti-interventionists reasoned, the B ritish w ere n o t sim ply stealing A m erican trad e and m onopolizing resources— they w ere m aking in ­ roads on A m erican shipping, doing so ju st as the A m erican m erchant m arine was declining.39 In February 1941, Uncensored noted th at B ritain had requisi­ tioned ships o f occupied countries, thereby assum ing control o f 45 percent o f th e w orld’s ocean tonnage. M oreover, it had sent increasing num bers o f ships to trad e routes far rem oved from belligerent w aters, in the process threatening U.S. com m ercial prospects.40 T he end o f the w ar im plied even greater com m ercial conflict.41 T he U nited States, w arned pacifist leader A. J. M uste, was already saving its new est ships for this rivalry. Som etim es a noninterventionist acknow ledged th at postw ar B ritain needed to rem ain econom ically aggressive. If it defeated G erm any, Senator La Follette predicted, it w ould be forced to exercise its control o f w orld trad e to preserve its n atio n and em pire. C harles A. Lindbergh, hearing th at th e B ritish feared th e com petition o f Pan A m erican A irlines in A frica, w rote in his diary, “A fter all, they have got to live after th e w ar as well as through it; and th a t is n o t as sim ple a problem for them as it is for us (n o t th at it looks so very sim ple for us a t th e tim e).”42 Yet even before th e war, the Roosevelt adm inistration itself was fin from be­ nign concerning a t least som e aspects o f a B ritish com m ercial threat. Since sum ­ m er 1937, W ashington had been suspicious o f an A nglo-G erm an arrangem ent by w hich B ritain w ould have access to M itteleuropa while the Reich’s goods could penetrate th e em pire. Sum ner Welles, for exam ple, protested against the D üsseldorf agreem ent.43 H ull and his staff, never believing th at B ritain could be short o f dollars w hile operating a vast em pire, continually sought to use lendlease as a lever w ith w hich to crack Britain’s im perial preference system, whose potency they m uch exaggerated.44 He and Welles b o th were m ost disappointed, for exam ple, w hen A rticle 4 o f the A tlantic C harter, w hich seem ed at first glance to look tow ard a general low ering o f tariffs, contained the language “due re­ spect” for “existing obligations.” In August, C hurchill stated th at “a vast break­ ing dow n o f tariffs and other barriers” was essential to any “great future o f the world.” Yet only in 1942, in the forging o f a m ajor lend-lease accord, did the British agree to a clause calling for “the elim ination o f all form s o f discrim ina­ tory treatm ent in international comm erce.”45

To som e anti-interventionists, th e B ritish w ere n o t only w orking at cross-pur­ poses to th e U nited States— they were plotting to reincorporate the U.S. into

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th eir ow n m assive em pire. C rucial in this regard was th e entire netw ork o f Rhodes scholarships. T he first w ill o f B ritain's m ost successful im perialist had called for th e establishm ent o f a secret society th a t w ould prom ote B ritish set­ tlem ent over th e entire continents o f A frica and South A m erica, th e M iddle East, C anada, th e Pacific Islands, th e M alay archipelago, an d th e seaboard o f C hina and Japan. U ltim ately it envisioned th e recovery o f th e U nited States. T he docum ent had been drafted w hile Cecil R hodes was still an O xford stu ­ d en t and before he had m ade his fortune. To th e end o f his life, R hodes dream ed o f a federal u n io n o f th e U.S. an d B ritain u n d er B ritish aegis.46 To John T. Flynn, the R hodes organization was “th e greatest fifth colum n in th e w orld." T he Christian Century saw th e scholarships “as effective a m ethod o f propaganda as was ever devised." P orter Sargent q uoted from th e book Last Will and Testament o f Cecil J. Rhodes (1902) to com pare R hodes’s schem es to th a t o f th e Jesuits.47 At least tw o anti-interventionists deem ed B ritain a possible m ilitary th rea t to th e U nited States. W hen asked by interventionist C laude Pepper (D em .Fla.) if he ever feared B ritain and France attacking th e U.S., form er diplom atic consul Ralph Tow nsend replied, “You never know. T he sentim ent in G reat B ritain was very m uch against us in th e 1920s.” In A ugust 1941, L indbergh suggested th at “before th is w ar is over, England herself m ay tu rn against us, as she has tu rn ed against France an d Finland."48 A nti-interventionists n o t only em phasized B ritain’s p redatory n atu re to ­ w ard the U nited States b u t also attacked th e entire B ritish record in th e w orld at large. A lbert Jay N ock quoted T hom as Jefferson, w ho had called th e B ritish governm ent “the m ost flagitious w hich has existed since th e days o f Philip o f M acedon.”49 Senator Chavez cited legal philosopher Jerom e Frank’s Save America First (1938) to th e effect th a t the B ritish balance-of-pow er d o ctrine had produced m ore w ars than it had prevented.50 B ritain’s en tire tw en tieth -cen tu ry d iplom atic record w as denounced. “W ithout an exception,” said Tow nsend, “the B ritish betrayed every ally in th e W orld W ar, and did so by plan rath er th an by accident.” A ccording to such critics, th e B ritish allow ed the Turks to destroy A rm enia and drive th e G reeks into the sea at Salonika. T hey undercut th e W eim ar Republic and, in a sense, created H itler, for they su rro u n d ed G erm any w ith m ilitary alliances, doing so at the instigation o f France.51 T here was hardly a reactionary ru ler in E urope, w rote T heodore D reiser, w hom th e B ritish had n o t backed. “E ngland’s aim was to keep dow n th e m asses o f all the new states o f E urope an d m ake them accept kings and dictators subservient to her.”52 T hrough the th irties, anti-interventionists argued, B ritain had kept acting in a highly irresponsible fashion. In the R hineland crisis o f 1936, it prevented French general M aurice G am elin from confronting th e G erm ans. D uring the E thiopian crisis, it sold huge quantities o f gasoline and oil to th e invading Ital­

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ians. W hen th e Spanish Civil W ar broke o u t, B ritain and France b o th w ithheld supplies from th e besieged Spanish republic.53 As Senator B orah saw th e issue, B ritain had connived a t the F ührer’s repudiation o f the m ilitary provisions o f th e Versailles treaty, agreed to th e creation o f th e new G erm an navy, urged France to disregard its treaty for th e p rotection o f Czechoslovakia, and schem ed at H itler’s seizure o f A ustria.54 M oreover, it was argued, B ritain had helped to bankroll G erm any’s entire rearm am ent. W heeler accused B ritish industrialists and financiers o f lending H itler $2 billion on sh o rt-term credits an d $1 billion in long-term loans.55 O thers m aintained th at B ritain helped supply the Reich’s entire w ar m a­ chine.56 Rush H olt, for exam ple, cited Merchants o f Death, th e m uckraking in ­ dictm ent o f the international m unitions trad e by H . C. E nglebrecht and Frank H anighen, to allege th at th e B ritish and French b o th aided in arm ing H itler.57 Indeed, several argued, B ritain had deliberately fostered Nazi G erm any to contain com m unism . O nce th e Soviet five-year plans Mgave the Tories th e jit­ ters,” w rote Sargent, the B ritish w elcom ed M ussolini and H itler. Even after W orld W ar II broke o u t, B orah said, "B ritain w ants H itler to becom e suprem e in all C entral Europe. B ritain regards H itler as a stabilizing influence an d a b arrier against com m unism .”58 Even after w ar began, econom ic dealings betw een B ritain and G erm any ap ­ peared to be continuing. T he Bank o f England, noted Uncertsored in N ovem ­ ber 1939, still accepted G erm an paper as collateral for loans to B ritish banks. Because B ritain regarded G erm an credits as sound, it could quite possibly sell them to neutrals, th u s helping prom ote a lively trad e w ith its official enem y.59 F urtherm ore, B ritain was as yet trad in g w ith the USSR, an ally o f G erm any.60 In O ctober 1939, Nye, n oting an exchange o f Russian tim ber for B ritish ru b ­ ber and tin , asked w hether "B ritish ru b b er going to Russia w ill tu rn up as ru b ­ ber tires o n G erm an airplanes o r G erm an arm ored cars.”61 Uncensored found th e entire arrangem ent "rem iniscent o f the W orld W ar days w hen contraband nickel (essential alloy for arm am ents) was shipped in to Brem en w ith the p er­ m ission o f th e French governm ent, w hen a constant supply o f G erm an m ag­ netos sparked French airplane engines, an d w hen G erm an soldiers w ere im ­ paled o n G erm an-m ade barbed w ire bought by th e British.”62 A few an ti-interventionists labeled the U nited States as B ritain’s collabora­ to r in this endeavor. In his 1941 book, D reiser titled a chapter "H ave English and A m erican Finance C o-operated w ith H itler to D estroy D em ocracy?” Nye accused A m erican industrialists o f helping G erm any rearm in "u tter viola­ tio n ” o f Versailles. Labor m agazine, the jo u rn al o f the R ailroad B rotherhoods, m aintained th a t A m erican bankers, too, furnished H itler w ith hundreds o f m illions o f dollars. B ennett C lark saw th e U.S. sales as aiding in the creation o f G erm any’s form idable air force, w hile H arry Elm er Barnes focused on paten t agreem ents.63

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If opponents held th e B ritish diplom atic record in such contem pt, one could hardly expect th at they w ould treat B ritish leaders warmly. A nti-intervention­ ists, however, were o f tw o m inds concerning Neville C ham berlain. For allow ­ ing G erm an expansion in Eastern Europe, the prim e m inister, said th e Chicago Tribune, was uth e w orld’s cham pion boob.”64 M oreover, it continued, he was foolish to fight G erm any w ithout a strong French air force, Belgium and the N etherlands as allies, and recourse to Czech fortifications.65 Liberal and leftist anti-interventionists concurred, seeing th e prim e m inister as sacrificing Span­ ish freedom to B ritish investm ent efforts and m aking only halfhearted efforts to create an alliance w ith th e Soviets.66 At tim es, som e anti-interventionists, including again th e Chicago Tribune an d th e New York Daily News, praised th e prim e m inister.67 A fter C ham ber­ lain’s death in N ovem ber 1940, H earst saw die form er prim e m inister as rig h t even w hen his public w anted him to be w rong. Even Social Justice praised him for attem pting to arb itrate such "tension spots” as D anzig, the Saar, "the stolen colonies,” and "the m ad rearm am ent race.”68 G reater anti-interventionist consensus centered o n Lord H alifax, w hose policies w ere opposed by all sides o f th e an ti-interventionist spectrum .69 H al­ ifax headed the foreign m inistry from February 1938 u ntil D ecem ber 1940, w hen he was appointed British am bassador to th e U nited States. H is ard en t pleas for A m erican lend-lease, including direct approaches to th e A m erican public and th e C ongress, resulted in strong criticism .70 In fact H alifax’s entire record was portrayed as cloudy at best. As governorgeneral o f India brom 1925 to 1931, Halifax, according to Uncensored, had violendy suppressed every m anifestation o f political activity there, jailing fortyseven th o u sa n d In d ian s, in clu d in g M ahatm a G an d h i.71 Even m o re controversial was his diplom atic record, for he was presented as an archappeaser.72 W heeler rem arked, "It should be rem em bered th at Lord H alifax was shooting w ild b o ar w ith G oering at a tim e w hen in the U nited States som e o f us, including myself, were denouncing H itler h o rn one end o f th e co u n try to th e other.”73 Several an ti-interventionists stressed H alifax’s ties to Sir George A m brose Lloyd, w hose book The British Case (1940) found n o q u a r­ rel w ith fascism p er se; Halifax had w ritten th e preface.74 Even his personality and m ien w ere against him . As Halifax was know n fo r his piety, Sargent called him "a high churchm an, m edieval in m ind and o u t­ look, Jesuitical in his m ethods, autocratic, aristocratic.” H e was "in close touch w ith G od w ith w hom he is said to com m unicate several tim es a day.” M arcantonio referred to "his cadaverous appearance o f an unw rapped Egyptian m umm y.”75 As w ith Neville C ham berlain, Halifax did receive an occasional com plim ent, however. To John Haynes H olm es, for exam ple, he was "a m an o f exalted idealism ,” “one o f the noblest m en now in public life.”76

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In retrospect, H alifax m ight have been a som ew hat inept envoy, ignorant o f th e A m erican political system and at best lukew arm tow ard FDR. T he “holy fox” only becam e popular after the U nited States entered th e war, at w hich p o in t he tu rn ed into a skilled negotiator.77 Roosevelt initially feared th at the foreign secretary had been to o m uch o f an appeaser to serve as B ritish am ­ bassador. H arold Ickes found H alifax’s record o f “appeasem ent” sticking in his “craw,” though in hindsight he called the policy “the m ost reasonable and log­ ical.” H arry H opkins, w ho liked H alifax as a m an, labeled him “a hopeless Tory,” w ho should have as little to do w ith any forthcom ing peace as possi­ ble.78 D uring th e tim e the A nglo-A m erican alliance was being form ed, H ali­ fax played a m in o r role.79 Sim ilar am biguity existed concerning Lord L othian, am bassador to the U nited States before Halifax. As w ith C ham berlain and H alifax, Lothian’s friendly attitu d e tow ard G erm any aroused hostility.80 Even after w ar broke o u t again in 1939, asserted W heeler, L othian had expressed confidence in H er­ m ann G oering.81 Senator Lundeen inserted in to th e Congressional Record an anti-L othian pam phlet w ritten by G erm an-A m erican propagandist G eorge Sylvester Viereck, w ho used the pseudonym Jam es B urr H am ilton. T he tract com pared the diplom at’s m ore recent interventionist statem ents w ith earlier ones far m ore favorable to Nazi G erm any.82 W hen L othian called for U.S. su p p o rt in th e new conflict, n onintervention­ ists again attacked him .83 In January 1940, in a speech before the Chicago C ouncil o f Foreign R elations, L othian h inted a t m utual Am ericain-British d e­ pendence, at w hich p o in t the vehem ently anti-B ritish G eorge H olden T inkham dem anded his recall.84 In N ovem ber 1940, th e am bassador drew m ore criticism . H e broadcast from London thanking the U nited States for its aid b u t supposedly declaring, “we also need planes, m en, and ships if we are to be sure o f defeating th e Nazi th reat to liberty.”85 Again as w ith C ham berlain and H alifax, som e anti-interventionists, includ­ ing H earst and Lindbergh, sincerely adm ired L othian.86 To this day, the role o f L othian rem ains debated; he is portrayed as either a skilled am bassador o r an envoy hopelessly o u t o f touch w ith A m erican life.87 A n ti-in terv en tio n ists w ere also o f tw o m inds concerning Lord Beaverb ro o k , th e p ro m in e n t C an ad ian -b o rn p u b lish er w ho was m in ister o f a ir­ c ra ft p ro d u ctio n in 1940 an d o f supply in 1941.88 In prew ar days, claim ed Uncensored, B eaverbrook had been an “em pire iso latio n ist”; he still m ight deal w ith H itler. W hen, in M arch 1940, B eaverbrook suggested th a t the U nited States an d B ritain m ight be “jo in ed to g eth er again” w hen th e co n ­ flict w as over, th e New York Daily News accused him o f seeking to reu n ite “th is o n etim e c o lo n y . . . to th e m o th er country.” O ccasionally B eaverbrook g arn ered praise, b o th H earst and th e Chicago Tribune w elcom ing his d e­ fense a p p o in tm en ts.89 W inston C hurchill, w ho becam e prim e m inister in M ay 1940, attracted by far the greatest atten tio n — and n o t surprisingly— the greatest hostility. C om ­

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m ented N orm an T hom as, “C hurchill is a great m an in m any ways, b u t C hurchill is an im perialist to th e core.”90 Som e m ilitant A nglophobes judged C hurchill to have been a negative force alm ost from b irth . As a young officer, he had supposedly helped suppress na­ tionalist risings in India and th e Sudan.91 Sim ilarly, w hile a rep o rter d uring th e Spanish-A m erican War, he had participated in atrocities against C ubans struggling for independence in w hich capacity he expressed, in Rush H olt’s w ords, a “delicious yet trem ulous sensation” in killing A m erican boys.92 W hile first lord o f th e adm iralty du rin g W orld W ar I, he backed th e costly G allipoli cam paign w hile denouncing th e U nited States for apparent tardiness in en ter­ ing the war.93 T hen, in 1936, C hurchill supposedly told a m inor A m erican publisher th a t U.S. p articipation in th e conflict had prevented a needed tru ce w ith G erm any.94 H e also sought to stifle the Bolshevik R evolution, attacked G andhi, and em braced M ussolini’s rule over Italy and invasion o f E thiopia.95 In 1937, he said o f G erm any’s Führer, “O ne m ay dislike H itler’s system an d yet adm ire his p atrio tic achievem ent. If o u r co u n try were defeated I hope we should find a cham pion as indom itable to restore o u r courage and lead us to o u r place am ong the nations.”96 O nce W orld W ar II began, C hurchill becam e first lord o f the adm iralty and then o n 10 M ay 1940, prim e m inister. C riticism soon accelerated.97 In both these offices, his m ilitary strategy was deem ed foolhardy. A nti-interventionists accused him o f botching th e N orw egian cam paign, pushing a dangerous of­ fensive in Belgium and France, and being responsible for the loss o f Yugoslavia and G reece.98 H is desire for total victory and supposed intrigue appeared particularly dangerous.99 “I ju st don’t tru st him ,” Joseph Kennedy confided to his diary. “He always im pressed m e th at he was w illing to blow up th e A m erican Em ­ bassy and say it was the G erm ans if it w ould get the U nited States in.” To the New York Daily News, his ascendancy indicated th at “hopes o f a peace before a vast explosion and a colossal w ar are about gone.” 100 O ccasionally an ti-interventionists did praise aspects o f C hurchill's ru le.101 T he Chicago Tribune found C hurchill to be the best possible replacem ent for C ham berlain.102 N oting his speech o f 4 June 1940 (“We shall fight on the beaches”), it said th at th e new prim e m inister had already dem onstrated he was w orth “a q u arter o f a m illion o r m ore soldiers.”103 In February 1941, w hile conceding such m ilitary blunders as Norw ay and G allipoli, C astle saw it Altai to rem ove him from office: “C hanging horses in the m iddle o f a w ar is p retty po o r business.” Uncensored criticized him for losing C rete and neglecting w ar p roduction b u t m aintained, “W inston C hurchill has given Englishm en lead­ ership o f a calibre they have lacked since the heyday o f D avid Lloyd George.”104 C hurchill’s critics did no t always speak in a vacuum . W hen he first assum ed office, som e leading officials w ithin th e Roosevelt ad m inistration w ere less

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th an enthusiastic. N ot only did W elles an d Berle find th e new prim e m inister far to o heavy a drinker b u t FDR him self apparently told Ickes th at C hurchill was “d ru n k h a lf th e tim e.” O nly in m idsum m er 1940 did such opinions change. Even th en , diplom at Averell H arrim an recalled, Roosevelt always saw C hurchill as a n ineteenth-century im perialist. H opkins noted th at th e presi­ d en t loved W inston as “a m an for the w ar” b u t was h orrified at his “reac­ tio n ary attitu d e” concerning th e subsequent peace.105 N oninterventionists also attacked o th er B ritish leaders. A nthony Eden, C hurchill’s foreign m inister, was cast as at best a lightw eight, a t w orst th e a r­ chitect o f B ritish defeat.106 Several w ere accused o f being profascist: Neville H enderson, prew ar am bassador to G erm any; O liver Stanley, w ho becam e sec­ retary o f state for w ar in 1940; and Sir Sam uel H oare, lo rd privy seal in 1999 an d 1940.107 At tim es a B ritish leader received praise. H earst said th a t Leslie H oreBelisha, w ho resigned as secretary for w ar in January 1940, should be consid­ ered for prim e m inister.108 T he New York Daily News pushed Lloyd G eorge for th e cabinet.109 Lawrence D ennis found Laborites, particularly H ugh D alton an d E rnest Bevin (“th e B ritish John L. Lewis”), to be th e ablest figures in the w ar cabinet. In fact, D ennis felt Bevin should be groom ed for th e prim e m in­ istership.110 Social Justice lauded th e D uke o f W indsor, w ho had bucked th e ow ners o f th e W elsh m ines by protesting against th e squalid conditions. So, too, did H earst, w ho in D ecem ber 1940 w anted th e duke to replace the late L othian as am bassador to th e U nited States. T he duke, H earst continued, was “a progres­ sive,” “a b rain for th e problem s o f his tim e.” 111

E xtrem ists w ithin an ti-interventionist ranks were n o t content w ith attacking B ritain's leaders; th e entire people w ere vilified. H ollyw ood actor Francis X. B ushm an w rote o f the B ritish: “To m e they stink. T hey are so contem ptuous o f us, th at even the so called cultured cannot hide it until they need to com e to SHYLOCKas to a paw n shop for cash.” Anyone w ho tru sted them , said au th o r A lbert Jay N ock, w ould be “sold dow n th e river at a m om ent’s notice”; victim s included the Jews, A rabs, Poles, and French. “A B ritisher is n o t a national,” re­ m arked Social Justice. “H e is an in ternationalist dw elling in the capitals o f the w orld an d w orshiping th e god o f gold in the tem ple o f the Bank o f England.” W hile A m ericans sacrificed for the B ritish cause, th eir new w ards were ac­ cused o f still living m ost frivolously, indulging them selves w ith golf, racing, an d joy rides. T he AFC, w hile hoping the B ritish w ould n o t lose, was unspar­ ing in spreading anti-B ritish stories, including them in one bulletin after an ­ o ther, each tale stressing th eir singular ungratefulness.112

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C ertainly, such critics asserted, B ritain was no dem ocracy.113 “In spite o f all the hullabaloo o f centuries,” w rote Al W illiam s, “th e English com m oner has never been a free m an in fa c t.. . . In England, liberty is regarded as an alien­ able gift by the governm ent, n o t an unalienable gift o f G od.” Because o f an a r­ chaic and unfair electoral system , com m ented H arry Elm er Barnes, th e H ouse o f C om m ons did n o t represent the B ritish people. Furtherm ore, th e cabinet did n o t itself speak for die C om m ons. T he colum nist found an even greater obstacle to dem ocracy lying in the all-pow erful bureaucracy o r civil service, never touched by elections o r changes in the ruling party.114 As evidence, anti-interventionists drew o n com m ents m ade by prom inent B ritons, including novelists J. B. Priesdey and H . G. Wells and diplom at A n­ thony Eden, all o f w hom denied B ritain was a genuine dem ocracy.115 Even had it been so before it had entered the war, em ergency regulations now m ade it a regim ented state. In an interview w ith the Boston Globe held in N ovem ber 1940, Joseph P. Kennedy curdy com m ented, “D em ocracy is finished in Eng­ land. It m ay be here. Because it com es to a question o f feeding people. It’s all an econom ic question.” T he am bassador continued th a t England faced “n a­ tional socialism .” W riting in N ovem ber 1941, Barnes saw B ritain as being m ore thoroughly regim ented th an G erm any o r Italy was in 1939. H e cited M encken’s portrayal o f B ritain as “a so rt o f Asiatic despotism , w ith every cit­ izen com pletely at th e m ercy o f the politician.”116 For several, the w ord dictatorship was n o t too stro n g .117 The Chicago Tri­ bune continually stressed this them e. In “th e B ritish w ar dictatorship,” it noted as the conflict broke o u t, all by-elections for Parliam ent had been term inated; in ad dition, B ritain planned to cancel the m ajor election scheduled for N o­ vem ber 1940.118 By O ctober 1940, th e Tribune reported B ritish life as so tighdy controlled th at the state determ ined w here one lived and w orked as well as w hat one purchased, heard on the radio, and read in the press.119 T he Tribune was far from alone. Because m anufacturing and selling were li­ censed and taxes “autom atically zoom ing,” said H ugh Johnson, liberty o f con­ trac t had disappeared: “The appalling to tal o f all this seem s to m ake H itler a piker and M ussolini a m aundering m onk.” In February 1940, the New York Daily News alleged th a t th e w ar pushed B ritain “a long way tow ard to talitari­ anism ”: “W hen the governm ent begins to tell people to douse th eir lights, send th eir children to the country, and how m uch m eat they can eat, th a t is state control o f the individual w here he lives.”120 O ne m easure was continually cited. O n 22 May 1940, after three h o u rs o f debate, Parliam ent passed a new Em ergency Powers Defense Bill th at, in the w ords o f historian A. J. P. Taylor, “gave the governm ent practically unlim ited au th o rity over all B ritish citizens and th eir property.” C ertainly its sw eeping provisions guaranteed control over m ajor facets o f B ritish life, including in ­ d ustry and banking. Newsweek w arned o f “tem porary state socialism as far reaching as Soviet Russia’s o r Nazi G erm any’s.” 121

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A nti-interventionists o f all persuasions w ere quick to com m ent.122 T he

Christian Century editorialized, “B ritain Establishes a W ar D ictatorship.” 123 To the Chicago Tribune, B ritain had becom e “a H itler governm ent to fight H itler,” abandoning th e fam ous charter o f 1215 to avoid the defeat o f 1066.124 Such legislation, it was said, was irrevocable, even w hen B ritain reverted back to peacetim e co n d itio n s.125 T he extrem e rig h t and extrem e left saw th e im plications differently. To D en­ nis, pow erful L aborites had launched th e overthrow o f B ritish capitalism and w ere establishing a socialist d ictatorship.126 Conversely, New Masses concluded th at th e 22 M ay legislation m arked the “B ritish M -D ay” o r M obilization Day. U nder the new “gleischaltung rules,” w orkers m ight be com m andeered for anything th a t suits H is M ajesty.127 For m ost critics, it was B ritish socialism — n o t m onopoly capital— th a t w ould em erge from th e war. B ritain, stated N orm an T hom as, w ould o f neces­ sity em erge from th e conflict highly collectivized. W heeler, undoubtedly less sanguine abo u t th e m atter, saw th e B ritish Labor Party as seeking to im pose “Intern atio n al Socialism ” o n th e postw ar w orld, in th e process abolishing all “national sovereignties” and treating th e w orld as a “single econom ic unit.”128 Several rightists underscored th e supposedly pro m in en t role o f H arold J. Laski, a M arxist political th eo rist w ho, they claim ed, w ould be the em inence gris in th e new international socialist o rder.129 N ot all an ti-interventionists foresaw a socialist o rder ahead. A m bassador Kennedy, for exam ple, denied th a t the profit system was in danger.130 T he Pro­ gressive, m uch to its regret, could n o t envision a Labor governm ent assum ing pow er after th e w ar.131 B ritain was often indicted for term inating trad itio n al civil liberties.132 In A ugust 1939, Parliam ent passed a m ost severe law; it involved d etention w ith­ o u t trial, outlaw ing the possession o f certain books an d articles, and strict control o f public m eetings.133 Senator Jam es J. Davis accused the nation o f blacking o u t freedom o f speech and the press— indeed, freedom itself.134 In A ugust 1940, th e San Francisco Examiner quoted Lloyd G eorge’s protest against “th e N azification o f B ritain,” in w hich th e form er prim e m inister called threats o f punishm ent and persecution “principles o f the G estapo.” 135 In January 1941, the Chicago Tribune alleged o f b o th B ritain and C anada, “It is possible now for th eir people to be in concentration cam ps w ithout trial, m erely by th e w ord o f authority.” 136 W hen an ti-interventionists w anted to attack adm inistration policy tow ard dissent, however, they w ould often hold u p B ritain as a positive m odel. At this p o in t B ritain ceased to be an oppressive nation; it m anifested extrem e to ler­ ance.137 In O ctober 1939, Uncensored discovered a tolerance for conscientious objectors unknow n in W orld W ar I.138 O ver a year later, W illiam H enry C ham berlin com pared B ritain favorably to France; B ritain had system atically published G erm an com m uniqués in its press, perm itted listening to G erm an

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radio, and had "m aintained a civil liberties record in th e m idst o f a grim lifeand-death struggle.” *39 In N ovem ber 1940, Joseph K ennedy rep o rted to H er­ b e rt H oover th a t B ritain m anifested m ore free speech an d less vitu p eratio n th an th e U nited States.140 Again the an ti-interventionists w ere far from alone. A m ong them selves, in ­ terventionists w ere often highly critical o f th e B ritish. Roosevelt did share a sense o f com m unity w ith the B ritish, referring to them as his "cousins” and believing strongly in A nglo-A m erican naval cooperation to confront G erm an pow er. At the sam e tim e, he held th e characteristic A m erican suspicion o f B ritain’s u pper class. In January 1939, he told L othian th a t th e "w ealthy class” in B ritain so feared com m unism th at it threw itself in "the arm s o f Nazism .”141 To FDR, B ritain was b o th indispensable p a rtn e r and m align force. In an offthe-record session w ith th e A m erican Society o f N ew spaper E ditors, held in m id-A pril 1940, Roosevelt com bined his affirm ation o f m utual interest w ith th e qualification th a t he could n o t be fooled by "all th eir tricks.” H e alerted W endell W illkie, "It is always th e sam e w ith th e B ritish. T hey are always foxy and you have to be the sam e w ith them .” 142 Several others w ithin th e adm inistration felt m uch stronger. Berle could hardly w rite a m em o w ithout show ing anxiety. “W hile we w ant to give every help to the British,” he com m ented in O ctober 1940, "we m ust n o t m ake th e m istake we m ade in 1917 and becom e virtually th eir adjuncts.”143 T he A m er­ ican services w ere ever suspicious o f B ritish m achinations. N ot only was M ajor G eneral Stanley D. Em bick, arm y representative o n th e Joint Defensive B oard, continually w arning against a B ritish alliance b u t his boss G eneral M arshall could never shake his ow n w ariness in dealing w ith th em .144 In th eir effort to discredit B ritain, the m ore strid en t anti-interventionists experienced an uphill battle. Even had B ritish propaganda n o t been effective, as it certainly was, m uch o f the public w ould still see th e defeat o f G erm any, and w ith it the accom panying B ritish victory, as being m ore im p o rtan t th an keeping o u t o f war. A G allup poll taken in A pril 1941 revealed th a t som e 68 percent w ould enter the w ar if G erm any and Italy could be defeated in no o th er way. In May, 54 percent o f those polled favored im m ediate e n try if Roo­ sevelt said th at otherw ise the B ritish w ould be defeated.145 T he ideological debate was still n o t finished. If one could b ran d B ritain w ith a crude and u n rep en tan t im perialism and, in fact, successfully p o rtray its em pire as the w orld’s m ost despotic pow er, A m erican o p in io n m ight still be w on over.

14 ★

The British Empire: A Dubious Cause

If th e m ore m ilitan t noninterventionists stressed one p o in t concerning B ritain, it was th a t th e island n atio n ruled over a m assive and exploitative em ­ pire. Father Jam es G illis, w hile endorsing aid to B ritain itself, called its em pire uan im possible organization, created and sustained by m onstrous injustice.” L iterary critic B urton Rascoe found him self “deeply” supportive o f the B ritish w ar effort b u t took slaps at th e em pire’s “profiteer rulers.”1 Such people m ade little apology for continually using th e w ord empire in describing B ritain’s realm . In th e language o f th e Chicago Tribune, w hich in ­ cluded th e French em pire in its d escrip tio n , “th a t is exactly w hat they are, th a t is w hat they are pro u d ly ad m itted to be, and th a t is w hat they w ill re­ m ain if th e people o f B ritain an d France, o r at least th e governm ents o f B ritain an d France, can successfully defend them .” To these critics, th e w ord commonwealth em bodied a deceptive euphem ism , th e w ord dominion being sim ilarly suspect.2 O ften attacks w ere m ade in m ost sw eeping term s. W heeler called B ritain “th e greatest aggressor in th e pages o f history.”3 To Nye it was "the ace aggres­ sor o f all tim e.”4 L undeen referred to “th e bleeding B ritish Em pire, this em pire w ith nearly 600,000,000 people, this em pire w hose sw ord has been dripping w ith th e blood o f enslaved and oppressed peoples for a thousand years.”5 To D. W orth C lark, B ritish im perialism was n o t essentially different from G er­ m an N azism , Italian fascism , and R ussian com m unism .6 T he sheer scope o f the B ritish E m pire was stressed. A nglophobic congress­ m an M artin Sweeney spoke in term s o f B ritain dom inating th ree-fo u rth s o f th e w orld’s land area and h alf th e w orld’s population. H ouse colleague John M arshall R obsion saw three h u n d red m illion B ritish subjects as little m ore

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th an slaves.7 H . L. M encken asserted th a t the B ritish E m pire “ow ned and o p ­ erated th e sea,” was d o m inant a t b o th ends o f th e A m ericas, and “ran” Europe, Africa, an d m ore th an h alf o f Asia. All over the globe, m aintained th e Chicago Tribune* B ritain ruled by m ilitary occupation and m ilitary courts, bom bing open tow ns to sustain its rule.8 Even a far m ore m oderate figure could express concern. C hester Bowles said o f th e B ritish, “Like every o th er n atio n , they have been ruthless and hard and cruel.”9 B ritish treatm en t o f subject peoples, it was stated, rem ained poor. N orm an T hom as described the B ritish as establishing a “slum em pire” in A frica and the W est Indies, w here th e indigenous p opulation and resources had been totally and stupidly exploited.10 A w riter for the Call argued th at subjects in A frica were practically treated as slaves, needing passes to change jobs, no m atter how badly they were treated .11 O fficial reports were cited, including the gov­ ernm ent’s C om m ittee on C olonial N utritio n and the Royal C om m ission In­ vestigating C onditions in th e B ritish W est Indies.12 A few w ent so far as to com pare the B ritish record unfavorably to th at o f the G erm ans. True, com m ented the New York Daily News, G erm any had d isturbed the peace o f the w orld five tim es in the past century, b u t the B ritish Em pire had “hung up a higher per-century record o f peace disturbance than that.” To Ralph Tow nsend, B ritish m ethods did n o t seem to differ significantly from those H itler used in Czechoslovakia and Poland. B ennett C lark m ade his com parison to th e Japanese, w ho w ere allegedly im itating in Asia precisely th e m ethods the B ritish used there. N orm an T hom as differed, though he m ain­ tained it was quite ridiculous to be sentim ental over B ritish virtues. C on­ gressm an M arcantonio felt sim ilarly, saying the difference was to o sm all to w arrant positing any juxtaposition betw een dem ocratic and Nazi forces.13 C ertainly, these anti-interventionists argued, subject populations possessed such little loyalty to th eir B ritish rulers th at they w ould never rally to the Al­ lied cause. If, in fact, they were tru ly content, they w ould have enlisted volun­ tarily in B ritish ranks. N ovelist Vardis Fisher said th at Ireland and India w ere n o t assisting B ritain, th e U nion o f South Africa had alm ost rebelled, and at first C anada was “very lukew arm .” O f five hundred m illion living under the B ritish flag, rem arked C ongressm an R obsion, only seventy m illion w ould fight on its behalf.14 Event after event, region after region was brought up. Nye offered a w hole litany o f B ritish offenses, ranging from the co rru p tio n o f W arren H astings, governor-general o f India, in the 1770s to the violation o f Lord Passfield’s 1930 pledges th at the trib al lands o f Kenya w ould be reserved to the “natives” forever. Senator W allace W hite accused th e B ritish o f sm ashing the p o rts o f C hina “to force opium dow n the throats o f the Chinese.”15 Nye found B ritainguilty o f violating the neutrality o f the Suez C anal, im posing the autocratic rule o f Lord C rom er on Egypt, and m aking false prom ises to th e Egyptian people.16 Bowles, reflecting on the Boer W ar, asserted th at th e only crim e o f

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the D utch settlers "lay in th e fact th a t they w anted to farm the land w here B ritish financiers knew there was gold.” 17 T he B ritish w ere accused o f playing a double gam e in th e Palestine m an­ date, m aking m utually occlusive prom ises to th e Jewish and A rab popula­ tio n s.18 Several saw th e B ritish as persecuting th e Jews there, H olt arguing th at B ritish "terrorism ” against the Jews o f Palestine was "just as bad as th e te rro r­ ism against th e Jews and Czechs in Czechoslovakia.”19 O ne o f th e m ost bizarre condem nations cam e from Father C oughlin, w hose Social Justice was n o to ri­ ously anti-Sem itic. In th e afterm ath o f the B ritish w hite paper o f 1939, w hich lim ited fu rth er Jewish im m igration to Palestine, th e radio priest claim ed to sym pathize w ith "th e p o o r Jews” o f Palestine w ho, after investing th eir "hardearned money,” found th e B ritish governm ent tu rn in g against them .20

Two exam ples o f supposed B ritish tyranny w ere continually cited: India and Ireland. From th e outset, it was m aintained, B ritish rule had been oppressive in b o th lands.21 "T he B ritish conception o f ruling India,” w rote A lbert Jay N ock, "has never for one m om ent risen above th e conception o f a PolizeistatC Senator Tobey spoke o f "the black hole o f C alcutta.” C iting Indian claim s, Ralph Tow nsend in 1941 said th a t a q u arter o f a m illion people had been jailed d u rin g th e past tw o decades. Ita o o u t o f every ten B ritons, W heeler es­ tim ated, w ere involved in the exploitation o f som e 350 m illion Indian sub­ jects. D raw ing in p a rt from firsthand observation, th e M ontana D em ocrat com m ented, "T here is greater poverty in India th an can be found in any o th er place in th e w orld.”22 C ontem porary incidents o f repression w ere given full play, including RAF bom bings o f villages on th e northw est frontier.23 Sim ilarly, Indian nationalism received m uch encouragem ent. Bowles, later A m erican am bassador to India, asserted th a t 350 m illion people had "clam ­ ored” for freedom for several generations. If th e U nited States becam e a bel­ ligerent, said Sterling M orton, it should prepare to fight a B ritain th a t w ould n o t free India.24 A m ong all w ings o f anti-interventionism , trem endous sym pathy existed for Jaw aharlal N ehru’s Indian N ational C ongress m ovem ent.25 C ertainly a n ti­ interventionists did all they could to give visiting Indians a forum .26 T he leftw ing A m erican Youth C ongress featured Rajni Patel, a political scientist w ith a degree from C am bridge and president o f the A ll-Indian S tudent Congress, w ho denounced th e conflict as an im perialist w ar.27 Also on th e college circuit was Reginald Babu Lai Singh, O xford graduate, m em ber o f the foreign de­ p artm en t o f th e Indian N ational C ongress, and adherent o f G andhi’s paci­ fism . "N on-violence w ill triu m p h over violence,” Singh said, "because hum an beings are n o t by n ature sadistic.”28

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To som e anti-interventionists, m ajor resistance appeared im m inent.29 In N ovem ber 1939, for exam ple, C ongressm an John G. A lexander th o u g h t India was on th e p o in t o f insurrection.30 O n 13 O ctober 1940, such predictions were in p a rt realized, for M ahatm a G andhi announced renew ed satyagrata, o r civil disobedience— a cam paign for full independence.31 For his ow n p a rt in the cam paign, N ehru was im prisoned, resulting in w idespread an ti-in terv en tio n ­ ist protest.32 As long as N ehru stayed in jail, rem arked N orm an T hom as, it was quite im possible to believe th a t the triu m p h o f B ritish im perialism w ould solve th e w orld’s problem s.33 C ertain B ritish prom ises w ere m ost suspect. W hen, in O ctober 1939, B ritish viceroy Lord Linlithgow pledged B ritain to discuss dom inion status after the war, th e Christian Century recalled sim ilar false assurances after W orld W ar I.34 N or, according to th e P rotestant weekly, did the ap pointm ent o f Lord Lloyd as secretary o f state for th e colonies appear a good sign, for Lloyd was “the m ost diehard Tory im perialist in India.” In O ctober 1940, B ritain reiter­ ated its su p p o rt for postw ar dom inion status, b u t the P rotestant jo u rn al con­ dem ned it for n o t endorsing full independence.35 Yet, surprisingly enough, at tim es several anti-interventionists com pli­ m ented th e B ritish o n th eir rule. If B ritain left India, w arned H earst’s San Francisco Examiner, rio ts could well break o u t betw een H indus and M oslem s, m aking it easy for a predatory Russia to im pose an even greater tyranny. T he New York Daily News offered dow nright praise. T he B ritish kept peace am ong over forty-five races speaking tw o h u ndred languages and divided in to tw enty-four h u ndred castes and tribes. Besides, they did “an excellent jo b o f cleaning up and disinfecting th e Indian population.” If India suddenly re­ ceived the self-determ ination G andhi dem anded, “it w ould m ore than likely tu rn into self-exterm ination.” Frank W aldrop concurred, attacking the naive G andhi for seeking “a peaceful, goat’s m ilk -d rin k in g civilization in w hich people weave th eir ow n b reechdouts, speak kindly to one another, avoid b irth control, th in k beautiful thoughts, and live happily.”36 In th eir hostility to B ritish rule in India, th e anti-interventionists w ere n o t alone. W ithin the state departm ent, som e already advocated full dom inion status. India in particular was a sore p o in t w ith the president.37 Several m onths before the U nited States becam e a full-scale belligerent, Roosevelt him self pushed for Indian self-governm ent, an d A rticle 2 o f the A tlantic C har­ ter was fram ed in p a rt w ith India in m ind. D uring the war, the president con­ tinually raised the issue in correspondence o r through em issaries.38

★ Prim e case num ber tw o was Ireland, and here the rhetoric was equally ex­ trem e. C om m ented D. W orth C lark in O ctober 1939: “Paint m e a picture o f 6

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years o f persecution o f the Jews, th e C atholics, an d the Protestants in G er­ m any, p ain t it as gory and as bloody as you please, an d I will p ain t you one 10 tim es as bru tal, 10 tim es as savage, 10 tim es as bloody in the 500 years o f B ritish d estruction, pillage, rape, and bloodshed in Ireland.” T he Chicago Tri­ bune accused England o f suppressing Ireland for centuries, only desisting w hen th e Irish m ade good th eir revolution.39 T he B ritish repression ju st after W orld W ar I, im plem ented through the Black an d Tans, was noted by people as diverse as liberal advertising executive Bowles and C oughlinite congressm an Sweeney.40 Several anti-interventionists cited the findings o f th e A m erican C om m ission on C onditions in Ireland, a group o f prom inent reform ers w ho in 1921 attacked B ritish policy.41 Even after W orld W ar II began, B ritain was accused o f persecution. D is­ cussing U lster in Septem ber 1939, journalist Frank H anighen noted a rep o rt o f the B ritish C ouncil for Civil Liberties, w hich asserted th at th e Bill o f Rights had been perm anently abolished in N orthern Ireland, th at the R om an C atholic m inority had been oppressed, and th at in general an intolerable state o f affairs persisted in th e region. H anighen, w ho had personally investigated conditions, said he could confirm the council's rep o rt.42 W hen w ar cam e, anti-interventionists often endorsed Ireland's neutrality, though they did n o t speak for the broader A m erican public.43 By th e end o f 1940, B ritain was seeking access to Irish ports. T he Irish Free State refused.44 C ritics o f B ritain rem ained vocal on th e m atter.45 If four m illion Irishm en had n o rights th at forty m illion Englishm en were bo u n d to respect, com m ented th e Saturday Evening Post, w hat rights had forty m illion Englishm en th at eighty m illion G erm ans m ust honor? In June 1941, Scribner’s Commentator accused Roosevelt o f refusing to supply food to Ireland, w hose situation was "painful.” It acidly suggested th at "a few ships” could m iraculously be found if th e Irish p erm itted B ritish naval bases in its p o rts.46 Even if the Irish granted perm ission, som e anti-interventionists saw logisti­ cal problem s. Bases in southern Eire, Uncensored rem arked in D ecem ber 1940, w ould be o f com paratively little use to B ritain, as shipping did n o t pass th at way. M oreover, it w ould take six m onths to fit any such ports. The real reasons b ehind B ritain’s pressure, it continued, were quite different: a rationalization for its navy’s failure to break up th e G erm an subm arine attacks and a ploy to b rin g Eire in to th e war, thereby transform ing Irish A m ericans into interven­ tionists.47 If th e B ritish tru ly sought bases there, stated H anighen, the p o rt o f Lough Folye, ju st across the border in N orthern Ireland, w ould serve ju st as w ell as Lough Swilly in the south.48 Som e voices were m ore m oderate. B ritain, asserted the Chicago Tribune, could n o t allow Ireland to serve as a G erm an base. N oting in January 1941 th a t bom bs had recently been dropped on D ublin, the New York Daily News said Ireland m ust choose betw een B ritain and G erm any, continuing, “B ritain now adays, for all its bloody record in Ireland in o th er tim es, is very gentle w ith

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all its possessions except India w hen India gets to o fresh.” If th e G erm ans a t­ tem pted to invade Ireland, th e News rem arked, th e Irish could only throw them back w ith the aid o f th e B ritish navy and th e q u arter m illion B ritish ground troops stationed in N orthern Ireland.49 Always there were rum ors o f direct U.S. involvem ent in Ireland. In July 1941, Tafr and W heeler pointed to reports th at th e U nited States was con­ stru ctin g a naval base in n o rth ern Ireland for B ritish use.50 Senator D anaher suspected an A m erican occupation o f n o rth ern Ireland in th e w orks. T he AFC research com m ittee cited the construction o f U.S. bases there, n oting th a t one construction co n tract had gone to a subsidiary o f J. P. M organ.51

Even C anada, long th e friendliest o f A m erican neighbors, did n o t escape an tiinterventionist attack. O n 14 A pril 1939, Roosevelt had pledged defense o f all the A m ericas, singling o u t C anada by nam e. T hat Septem ber, a G allup poll show ed a m ajority favoring w ar if a E uropean pow er invaded th at n atio n .52 O n 3 Septem ber 1939, C anada entered the w ar alongside B ritain, a m ove th at m any adm inistration critics viewed w ith suspicion.53 As it was C anada, n o t G er­ many, th at first declared war, several noninterventionists— including America m agazine, H ugh Johnson, G erald Nye, and Edwin M. Borchard— labeled it the aggressor.54 "The C anadians jum ped into the w ar like a bunch o f sheep w ithout any provocation,” w rote H arry Elm er Barnes. "If this is independence, then G er­ m any is dem ocratic.”55 W hen, on 12 Septem ber, Roosevelt w arned th at the U nited States could no t "stand idly by” if C anada was threatened "by an o th er em pire,” H ugh Johnson denied any com m itm ent to defend th at land.56 C harles A. Lindbergh expressed the greatest concern o f all. In a rad io speech in O ctober 1939, he conceded th at "we m ust protect o u r sister A m erican na­ tions from foreign invasion, both for th eir w elfare and o u r own.” N onetheless, he questioned the right o f any people "to draw this hem isphere in to a E uro­ pean w ar sim ply because they prefer the C row n o f England to A m erican in ­ dependence.” M entioning C anada by nam e, he asked, "C an we rightfully p er­ m it any country in A m erica to give bases to foreign w arships, o r to send its arm y abroad w hile it rem ains secure in o u r protection a t hom e?” "Sooner o r later,” he noted, "we m ust dem and th e freedom o f this continent and its su r­ rounding islands from th e dictates o f E uropean power.”57 Several a n ti-in te r­ ventionists gave Lindbergh strong su p p o rt, including Boake C arter and H ugh Johnson.50 Som e advocates o f collective security found the colonel to be be­ having in an outrageous fashion, calling for noth in g less th an A m erican dom ­ ination o f its n o rth ern neighbor.59 Even w ithout Lindbergh, the issue o f annexing C anada drew som e a tten ­ tion. The socialist American Guardian had already stated th at only by such a

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u n io n could th e U nited States protect itself. T he New York Daily News denied th e U.S. should m ake th e attem pt, though individual C anadian provinces were welcom e to apply for statehood. H istorian C harles C allan Tansill suggested th at th e C anadians them selves hold a plebiscite o n joining th e U nited States.60 M ore debate was provoked w hen, on 4 June 1940, C hurchill to ld Parliam ent th a t defeat in th e B ritish Isles w ould be follow ed by a retreat to C anada. T he Christian Century queried, "T his co u n try has already given a pledge o f p ro ­ tection to C anada; w ould it be expected to protect th e transplanted B ritish th ro n e as well? W ould th is natio n welcom e th e idea o f using th e A m erican co n tin en t as a base for an o th er w orld w ar to reestablish the B ritish em pire?”61 N evertheless, several FDR critics sought closer ties w ith C anada.62 T he Chicago Tribune endorsed a defensive alliance, declaring th at C anada was the only n ation (besides th e U nited States) possessing a dem onstrated capacity for w aging m odem w arfare.63 M oving th e seat o f th e B ritish Em pire, H earst stated, in reality testified to its expansion an d regeneration, for it w ould be separated from Europe’s "constantly recurring trib al wars.”64 O n 18 A ugust 1940, after m eeting in O gdensburg, New York, Roosevelt and C anadian prim e m inister M ackenzie King announced a perm anent jo in t board o f defense. T he agreem ent, a t least in p art, served as a device to acquire control over any rem nants o f the B ritish fleet seeking refuge in the New W orld.65 Sev­ eral anti-interventionists endorsed th e move.66 H earst, in calling for Senate ra t­ ification, referred to the agreem ent as "a beneficial thing,” though it m eant th at “the U nited States w ill defend C anada m ore than C anada will defend the U nited States.” T he Chicago Tribune w anted additional jo in t action, including th e building o f a four-lane highway across w estern C anada to Alaska; a com ­ m on pool o f such resources as nickel, alum inum , zinc, and copper; an d com ­ bining o f th eir massive w heat surpluses, a m ove th at w ould give b o th nations the "w hip h and” w ith the com ing o f peace. By O ctober, it was calling the agreem ent the m ost im p o rtan t event since the R evolutionary W ar.67 To th e New York Daily News, th e arrangem ent provided "insurance against invasion.” O therw ise a frightening scenario m ight take place: if H itler con­ quered E urope th a t w inter, he w ould im m ediately grab N ew foundland, con­ tin u e to M ontreal, cross th e St. Lawrence plains to Lake C ham plain, and go dow n "excellent roads” to A lbany and New York City, thereby isolating th e in ­ dustrial East from th e rest o f the nation. Surplus divisions could fan o u t from A lbany u p th e strategic M ohaw k Valley an d across to B oston.68 C olonel M cC orm ick, too, initially feared an attack through C anada via th e C ham plain-H udson Valley. A strike o n New E ngland “could be reinforced by m ore tro o p s th an we now have available to eject them .” Parachute troops, aided by "the com m unist fifth colum n o f New York,” could capture the forts o f the city, an d its h arb o r could be lost before A m erican troops could be b rought up. H ence, the Chicago publisher called for form ing a defensive al­ liance w ith C anada, raising nine divisions o f regulars and eighteen o f th e n a­

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tio n al guard, conducting m ilitary train in g in th e schools, and keeping th e U.S. fleet intact and d o se to shore. Soon, however, M cC orm ick was m aintaining th a t N ew foundland and N ova Scotia could be easily protected. W ere a hostile arm y som ehow able to advance further, it could still be blocked by th e St. Lawrence River an d th e m ountains o f M aine.69 N ot all noninterventionists cheered th e O gdensburg agreem ent.70 V illard found the agreem ent “one o f th e m ost unprecedented events” in all A m erican history”; it was uth e first tim e th at we have sought to m ake an effective defense u nion w ith a co u n try actively engaged in a w ar in w hich we are supposed to be neutral.” To C ongressm an Roy O. W oodruff, th e arrangem ent “sm acks to o m uch o f dictatorship to suit a good m any people.” New Masses expressed th e greatest outrage, practically accusing FDR o f d ed arin g war.71 “A v irtual m ili­ tary alliance,” said th e Christian Century, “has been co n d u d ed w ith a n atio n th a t is already at w ar an d th a t may, in a future already previsioned by M r. C hurchill, becom e th e seat an d m ilitary center o f a w arring em pire.”72 Iro n i­ cally, once FDR was assured th a t th e B ritish fleet was safe, he lost interest in the entire m atter.73 D uring th e follow ing year, th e m atter o f C anada still incurred debate. Som e Roosevelt adversaries stressed closer ties.74A G erm an victory in Europe, stated Lawrence D ennis, w ould force th e full in tegration o f b o th C anada an d B ritain’s hem ispheric possessions into th e A m erican “system.”75 In late M ay 1941, A rth u r V andenberg avowed, “C ertainly D etroit, M ich., cannot w ait u n til an invasion reaches W indsor, O nt., before it starts to shoot.” Sociologist Ed­ w ard A. Ross hoped to see th e nine provinces o f C anada seek A m erican state­ hood so th a t all N orth A m erica, from the Rio G rande to th e N o rth Pole, could constitute a single defense u n it.76 Senator D. W orth C lark created som e em ­ barrassm ent w hen, in late July 1941, he included C anada in his call for U.S. control o f the hem isphere.77 O thers sought restraint. In late May, B urton W heeler and Felix M orley stressed th at th e defense o f C anada should involve no aggressive action against pow ers in Europe, Africa, o r Asia. Libby w arned against being dragged in to w ar if C anada becam e the seat o f the B ritish Em pire: “We have n o t been con­ sulted regarding th at w ar and m ust n o t be responsible for its outcom e.”70 As far as civil liberties w ere concerned, C anada— like B ritain— could be considered a negative object lesson as to w hat w ar could do to a n ation. H ugh Johnson, w riting ju st as th e conflict began, judged th a t in C anada th e M agna C arta was “already in the ash can,” th e Bill o f Rights “o u t the w indow.” H e con­ tinued, “You have to do th at in w ar today. We d id som e o f it in 1918.” By Jan­ uary 1940, Sargent was n oting th at th e M ounties w ere raiding residences for subversive books. F urtherm ore, new spapers had been banned and radio broadcasts censored. A ccording to an AFC bulletin issued a year later, any p e r­ son w ho predicted a G erm an victory stood guilty o f violating Defense o f C anada R egulations, regardless o f the sp irit in w hich th e rem ark was m ade. In

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M ay 1941, th e Call quoted a C anadian labor leader w ho asserted th a t w ar had bro u g h t fascism to C anada.79

A gain, th e Roosevelt adm in istratio n itself possessed m any antiem pire senti­ m ents. H istorian W arren K im ball accurately paraphrases th e president’s ow n attitude: “T he m onster o f colonialism threatened to bite if n o t devour the w orld by plunging it in to an o th er huge war.” D uring W orld W ar I, Roosevelt believed, colonialism had w orked against reasonable setdem ent, and th e 1919 negotiations in Paris had revealed a squalid scram ble for territory. In D ecem ­ ber 1939, he told L othian th a t B ritain should state publicly th a t it had aban­ doned em pire building and was firm ly com m itted to self-governm ent. In 1941, in addressing correspondents, he said, “We believe th at any nationality, no m atter how sm all, has th e inh eren t rig h t to its ow n nationhood.” W hen the U nited States becam e a full-tim e belligerent, FDR continually challenged the entire im perialist system .80 Indeed, his feelings w ere so strong on th e m atter th a t B ritish histo rian D. C am eron W att can w rite o f th e president’s conviction “th a t all argum ents in favour o f colonial rule w ere in itiated by the self-interest o f those w ho ad­ vanced them .” If noth in g else, th e president’s very fear o f an isolationist resur­ gence m ade him determ ined n o t to fight for B ritish aim s. T he state d ep art­ m ent harbored sim ilar sentim ents: if th e B ritish E m pire b ro u g h t progress to indigenous peoples, it still was an empire and as such needed to be gradually dissolved.81 N either th e an ti-interventionists n o r th eir foes realized how m uch th e em ­ pire d rained B ritain itself. T he w hite dom inions had long been m oving to ­ w ard self-governm ent. O n th e eve o f th e w ar, only 1 percent o f B ritain's in ­ com e cam e from this source. At th e sam e tim e, B ritain had th e task o f defending vulnerable territo ry in every p a rt o f th e globe, certainly a m ajor strategic liability. India alone absorbed a th ird o f th e B ritish arm y w hile con­ trib u tin g little in retu rn . A ccording to th e m ap, th e em pire was th e largest the w orld had yet seen, holding a q u arter o f the w orld’s population. In reality, as histo rian Clive Ponting notes, it resem bled a Potem kin village.82 U ltim ately, th e fact th a t B ritain was an im perialist pow er did little to m od­ ify th e strongly pro-B ritish sym pathies o f th e A m erican people. H opefully, in anti-in terv en tio n ist eyes, the th reat o f any alliance w ith the Soviet U nion m ight cause th e n atio n to rethink its cu rren t course.

15

The Soviets: A Greater Enemy

Ever since the Bolshevik R evolution o f N ovem ber 1917, relations betw een the U nited States and the newly founded U nion o f Soviet Socialist R epublics, com m only called the Soviet U nion o r Russia, had usually been strained. T he Soviets recalled the stationing o f A m erican troops at V ladivostok and A rchangel in 1918 and th e U.S. refusal to recognize th eir governm ent un til 1933. To m ore conservative A m ericans, the Soviet U nion stood for the perse­ cution o f religion, failure to pay the debts incurred by th e czarist regim e, and the liquidation o f the entire Kulak class. For m any liberals, Russia only becam e “the G od th at failed” in th e m iddle 1930s. Reform ers, however, were deeply disillusioned by the fam ines in the U kraine, the liquidation o f th e top arm y com m and, the obviously tru m p ed -u p accusations o f Stalin’s purge trials, and th e establishm ent o f labor cam ps in w hat was later know n as the G ulag.1 Pres­ ident Roosevelt him self told delegates o f the left-w ing A m erican Youth C on­ gress, gathering on th e W hite H ouse law n in February 1940, th at th e Soviet U nion m anifested “a dictatorship as absolute as any in the w orld.”2 U nques­ tionably, hostility to the Soviet U nion was a deeply rooted phenom enon, by no m eans sim ply prom pted by the M olotov-R ibbentrop pact o f 23 A ugust 1939 and th e Soviet attack on Finland o f 30 N ovem ber.3 M any anti-interventionists saved th eir strongest invective for th e Soviet U nion, no t for Nazi G erm any. Al W illiam s called the Soviet U nion “the blood­ iest sponsor o f m ass m urder in the pages o f history.” The New York Daily News asserted, “The Soviets’ C hristian victim s have far outnum bered the Nazis’ Jew­ ish victim s.”4 Journalist Freda Utley, a British subject w ho w ould soon becom e an A m eri­ can citizen, was particularly adam ant: “The Russian brand o f national social-

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ism is even m ore oppressive, and far m ore destructive o f life and m aterial pros­ perity, th an the G erm an. So th at absorption by th e U.S.S.R. is even m ore feared th an Nazi dom ination by the little states d o se to Russia.” A form er com m unist w ho had w orked for the C om intern for six years, U tley had bitterly repudiated Stalinism after her husband had disappeared in the G ulag in 1936.5 In late sum m er 1940, U tley’s book The Dream We Lost: Soviet Russia Then and Now was published. A fter detailing th e appalling conditions o f w orkers an d peasants, she predicted th a t Stalin w ould be u tterly unable to oppose H ider, for his regim e was to o weak, his u n p o p u larity w ith his people to o great, and his arm y o f dubious strength. She nonetheless w arned th a t con­ tin u ed w ar betw een B ritain an d G erm any could ultim ately m ake th e Russian d ictato r victorious. H ence, in h er last chapter, she called for a negotiated peace. O therw ise, she asserted, E urope w ould com e uto resem ble those an ­ cient lands along th e T igris and E uphrates w here a M ongol conquest p u t an end to the oldest o f civilizations.”6 U dey even found G erm an hegem ony over the continent preferable to con­ tinuing the war. In com paring Stalinism and H iderism , she judged the Reich ua litde m ore likely to bear the seed o f a b etter ordered w orld than Stalin’s bastard socialism .” A dm ittedly, she said, H ider had im prisoned and expelled tens o f thousands, b u t Stalin had consigned hundreds o f thousands to concentration cam ps. “The very fact th at so m any G erm ans and G erm an Jews have been al­ lowed to leave the country and tell the w orld about it, instead o f being shot o r interred for life in concentration cam ps, proves the comparative m ildness o f the Nazi regime.” Give the Nazis econom ic op p o rtu n ity and peace, she w rote, and G erm any could well tu rn tow ard dem ocracy. U dey did adm it her w ish m ight end u p being “a vain delusion” b u t thought it “the only hope for Europe.”7 Several anti-interventionists approved o f h er account.8 N orm an T hom as endorsed U dey’s claim th a t Stalin’s rule was even m ore cruel th an H ider’s b u t found one contradiction: If Stalin’s regim e operated as incom petendy as she m aintained, how could he ever dom inate W estern Europe?9 Even those w ho w ere n o t pronouncedly anti-interventionist found som e m erit in the book, though certain endorsem ents were qualified.10 Russian expert M ichael T. Florinsky o f C olum bia U niversity found her treading “on dangerous ground” in her vision o f a N ational Socialist G erm any giving up its racial theories, m il­ ita n t sp irit o f conquest, and persecution o f the Jews. C hina scholar N athaniel Peffer accused her o f seeking either a G erm an victory o r “a draw n peace th at leaves th e Nazis m asters o f the w hole E uropean continent.” Socialist com ­ m en tato r R ichard Rovere questioned h er claim th at Nazism w orked m ore ef­ fectively th an Russian com m unism . H er call for a negotiated peace, Rovere re­ m arked, was “a counsel o f despair, for she feels th at England is altogether incapable o f achieving her w ar aim s.”11 O thers to o highlighted the record o f Josef Stalin. To the New York Daily News, he was “even m ore o f a beast” than H ider, and the News was n o t alone in this re­

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gard. The Chicago Tribune found him possessing an "unparalleled record o f brutality and treachery”; he was "the m an responsible for m ore hum an m isery than any since the M ongolian invasions” In the 1920s, Senator H iram Johnson had ardently sought U.S. recognition o f the Soviets. By 1941, he was saying o f the Russian dictator, "T he greatest blood-letting th at was ever com m itted on this earth occurred through him .” C ongressm an John Robsion called Stalin "the bloodiest, m ost cruel and ruthless despot th at the w orld has ever know n.” M ore­ over, rem arked the Kentucky Republican, the Soviet dictator had w orked harder at destroying the U nited States than any other person in the w orld.12 T h ro u g h o u t 1940 an d m uch o f 1941, n o n in terv en tio n ists co n tin u ed to w arn o f Soviet expansion.13 By rem aining on th e sidelines, asserted W illiam H enry C ham berlin, Stalin w ould be th e u ltim ate v icto r.14 F rank W aldrop n o ted such concrete Soviet aim s as conquest o f Persia and th e D ardanelles.15 O th ers talked in term s o f all E urope.16 H arry E lm er B arnes included B ritain an d th e U.S. as w ell. G eneral R obert E. W ood w arned o f "th e end o f cap ital­ ism all over th e w orld.” T he Christian Century feared th e en tire w orld w ould becom e “Stalinist.” 17 H ence, for som e ad m in istratio n critics, G erm any had to rem ain stro n g .1* It alone, m aintained C harles A. L indbergh, "can eith er dam th e A siatic h o rd es o r form th e spearhead o f th eir p en etratio n in to Europe.” 19 T he tim e m ig h t com e, w arned th e New York Daily News, w hen th e Allies w ould w ant H itler’s Reich to "side w ith th em against Russia, in a concerted attem p t to throw th e R ussian hordes an d th e m u rd er an d robbery th a t go w ith them back in to Asia.” T he new spaper called th e F ührer “th e bulw ark against Bolshevism .” T he B ritish, it speculated, m ight w ith A m erican help w in th e c u rren t stru g ­ gle, b u t E urope w ould be rendered so p ro strate as to becom e “easy prey fo r th e R ussian Reds.” W ould th e U nited States th en be called o n to supply th e m anpow er for a new war?20 A few an ti-interventionists denied any Soviet th reat. Felix M orley, in calling for a W estern E uropean league to contain th e Soviets, posited th a t th e Rus­ sians needed tran q u illity to govern th eir spraw ling em pire. R epublican leader H anford M acN ider believed the Soviets w ould always be to o w eak to dom i­ nate th e w orld. A ccording to O sw ald G arrison V illard, Stalin could n o t even ru n an efficient governm ent at hom e.21 Particularly irritatin g , however, was continued A m erican trad e w ith th e USSR.22 John H aynes H olm es accused th e A m erican petroleum in d u stry o f supplying gasoline for planes used in bom bing th e Finns.23 A m ericans, claim ed Senator D anaher in M ay 1940, w ere paying $35 for gold th a t “som e C om m unist Russian” produced for $8. H oover opposed U.S. shipm ent o f gasoline, cooper, and alloys. “We sw at H itler and th e Japs and cuddle up to Big Joe,” asserted colum nist Sam uel Pettengill. “Figure it o u t for yourself.”24 O n 6 A ugust 1940, after negotiations betw een U ndersecretary o f State Sum ­ n er W elles and Soviet am bassador C onstantine O um ansky, th e U nited States

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renew ed its annual trad e agreem ent w ith th e Soviets. Since 1937, the USSR had been b o u n d to m ake at least $40 m illion w orth o f U.S. purchases each year. By th is new accord, som e $7 m illion w orth o f em bargoed A m erican m a­ chine tools w ere released, and w ithin tw o days A m erican tankers loaded w ith gasoline w ere o n th eir way.25 A nti-interventionists quickly expressed anger. B ennett C lark saw the “Russian bear—w ith its daw s still dripping from patriotic Finnish blood”— receiving $5 m illion w orth o f m achine tools “now im peratively needed for the defense o f the U nited States.”26 O n 21 January 1941, th e U nited States lifted th e m oral em bargo o f D ecem ­ b er 1939, w hich had forbidden Soviet purchases o f planes, aviation p arts, and p aten t processes for producing high-quality aviation gasoline.27 A nti-inter­ ventionists again voiced outrage.26 Russia, protested C ongressm an Shanley, had becom e th e U nited States’s leading custom er in certain m ajor strategic m aterials: tin , rubber, copper tubing, m olybdenum , gasoline, and m achine tools.29 In light o f a new G erm an-Soviet trad e agreem ent, th e Chicago Tribune w arned th a t A m erican-m ade planes, originally shipped to Russia, m ight soon be am ong th e G erm an bom bers flying over B ritain.30 T hroughout th e debate, th e New York Daily News to o k a m in o rity position am ong th e anti-interventionists, as it continually favored A m erican overtures to th e Soviets.31 In A pril 1941, for exam ple, the News suggested th a t th e U nited States “prom ise Stalin as m uch o f G erm any as he can get, ju st as in retu rn for going to w ar E ngland prom ised Poland as m uch o f Poland as it could keep.”32 From the tim e th at th e G erm an-R ussian alliance was form ed, m any an tiinterventionists denied it w ould last. A G erm an attack on the Soviets was often predicted o r a t least seen as possible.33 In D ecem ber 1939, Uncensored envisaged a huge coalition— G erm any, B ritain, France, and Italy— all lined up against th e Soviet U nion.34 G erm any w ould attack the Soviets, said John T. Flynn in January 1941, to secure th e grain it needed.35 Already, an ti-interventionists kept saying, tension existed. In D ecem ber 1939, Flynn anticipated th e USSR sealing G erm any o ff from the U kraine, n o t to m ention the oil o f R um ania and th e iron ore o f Scandinavia. T hat January Call w riter H enry Haskell divined an im m inent Soviet attack o n R um ania. N oting th e Soviet occupation o f th e R um anian province o f Bessarabia in June 1940, th e Chicago Tribune foresaw th at w ithin m onths, H itler m ight attack the Soviet U nion w ith th e greatest m ilitary force th e w orld had yet know n. C iting th e im m inent abdication o f R um anian King C arol, the New York Daily News referred to N apoleon’s m ajor victory over A ustria and Russia: “Is it possible H itler is thinking o f an o th er A usterlitz, w ith Soviet Russia as th e patsy this tim e?” At one p o in t, the News headlined an editorial, “T hey Spell It ‘Rom ania,’ B ut It Looks as If T hey W on’t Be Spelling It at All Pretty Soon.”36 In any such confrontation, th e odds— as several an ti-interventionists spec­ ulated— lay overw helm ingly w ith G erm any. Freda U tley found th e Soviets so

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weak th at Stalin m ight prefer to serve as H itler’s Russian gauleiter rath er th an risk a w ar th at w ould topple him .37 If H itler w ould ju st prom ise land to the Soviet peasants, asserted the New York Daily News, they w ould probably wel­ com e him as a deliverer.38 Speaking in the m inority, Lawrence D ennis repeatedly saw no conflict ahead. T he visit o f Soviet foreign m inister Vyacheslav M olotov to Berlin in N ovem ber 1940 proved th at H itler an d Stalin w ere in “perm anent business partn ersh ip . . . to rem ake the w estern w orld.” T he Soviets possessed a vested interest in a G erm an victory, D ennis w rote, for its defeat w ould destroy Stalin’s regim e as well, and they had secretly given approval to H itler’s dom i­ n ation o f H ungary, Yugoslavia, R um ania, and Bulgaria.39 Several ad m inistration critics concurred. As late as m id-June 1941, Uncen­ sored, w hich had anticipated friction, suspected such talk hid a week o f bar­ gaining, w ith Stalin holding o u t for a high price. Besides, it said, H itler m ight well be hiding plans for a m ove elsew here, perhaps a new bom bing assault on the B ritish Isles. N orm an T hom as thou g h t the Führer w anted unrestricted use o f the D nieper-D unia C anal, w hich ran from O dessa to Riga, b u t m aintained th at he w ould n o t fight over th e m atter.40 Such anti-interventionists w ere not alone. W hen the USSR attacked Fin­ land, Roosevelt him self suspected “a fairly definite arrangem ent” to p artitio n Europe, Africa, and th e N ear East.41 T he president an d his closest advisers thought th at G erm any w ould Erst invade B ritain, and only then assault the Soviet U nion.42 By M arch 1941, there was som e m inor dissent w ithin th e ad­ m inistration, w ith A dolf Berle predicting, “T he G erm ans w ill tackle Russia, and probably will sm ash her.”43

O n 22 June 1941, H itler’s legions launched the greatest onslaught in th e his­ to ry o f w arfare. T hey attacked the Soviet U nion w ith 3.2 m illion m en, organ­ ized into 148 divisions th at ranged a thousand m iles from the A rctic Circle to the Black Sea. “T his is the real war,” w rote Flynn. It m ade the B ritish struggle “a m ere flea bite.”44 A nti-interventionists saw various m otives at w ork. The New York AFC stressed the d ictator’s desire for the U kraine, w ith its huge am ounts o f grain, coal, m anganese, and iron, and for Baku, w hich produced close to 20 percent o f the w orld’s petroleum . T he New York Daily News suggested th at H itler in ­ vaded to keep his massive arm y occupied. “He didn’t know w hat else to do to keep his m en in fighting trim .” It later asserted th at H itler planned to chase Stalin a thousand m iles into the Urals, develop a large U krainian grain supply, and reorganize Russian industries, thereby protecting him self from any attack from the W est.45 N orm an T hom as em phasized raw m aterials, fear o f a Russian

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double cross, and a desire to w in over anticom m unist sentim ent in the W est, including th at o f the Rom an C atholic C hurch.46 In late June, D ennis cheerfully adm itted surprise, finding the attack rooted in a variety o f factors: G erm any’s latest peace offensive, B ritain’s indifference to th e Hess m ission, Roosevelt’s determ ination to prevent peace, Stalin’s grow ­ ing dem ands as th e price o f m ore supplies, and indications from Vichy, M adrid, Rom e, and th e Balkans th at an econom ic U nited States o f Europe could be secured by w ar against th e Soviets.47 Publisher W illiam Randolph H earst blam ed the Russians themselves. The USSR, w rote H earst, had double-crossed G erm any by seizing a variety o f territo­ ries— the Baltic states, parts o f Finland, h alf o f Poland. Furtherm ore, it had de­ faulted on prom ised oil and grain shipm ents to Germany, while dem anding even m ore land and concessions. The socialist Call’s H enry Haskell found the Nazi strike due in large part to the U.S. policy. Seeing a powerful Anglo-Am erican al­ liance in the m aking, G erm any did no t w ant the Russian arm y at its rear.4* Som e FDR foes hoped for a w ar o f m utual exhaustion. In retrospect, m uch atten tio n has been given to Senator H arry T rum an’s fam ous statem ent: "If we see th a t G erm any is w inning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is w inning we ought to help G erm any, and th at way let them kill as m any as possible, al­ though I don’t w ant to see H itler victorious under any circum stances.”49 It was th e anti-interventionists in particular w ho voiced such sentim ents.50 T he m ore dam age the G erm an and Russian arm ies did to each other, accord­ ing to C ongressm an Roy W oodruff, "the safer th e w orld o f free and honest m en and w om en an d children will be.” H iram Johnson rem arked, "I w ould take b o th H itler and Stalin, confine them securely in an elevated cage, and let them fight it out.”51 W hen th e invasion first took place, Roosevelt acted cautiously, dodging questions about extending lend-lease to th e Soviets. By m id-July, he had u n ­ frozen som e $39 m illion o f Russian funds and directed the release o f m achine tools. He also refrained from invoking the 1939 neutrality pact, th u s enabling A m erican ships to carry m unitions to Russian p o rts.52 At the end o f July 1941, the president authorized his leading adviser, H arry H opkins, to visit Moscow, there to see w hether th e Soviets were strong enough to hold o u t against the G erm an onslaught and to appraise w hether the U nited States should risk sending m ilitary aid. Before H opkins com m enced his m is­ sion, he was skeptical o f Russian strength. O nce he arrived, he estim ated th at p ro m p t A m erican aid could enable the Soviets to stop the G erm an advance. Even if the G erm ans captured M oscow, he continued, the defenders were de­ term ined to continue fighting.53 O n 18 Septem ber, Roosevelt sent to C ongress a supplem entary lend-lease bill th at included aid to the Soviets. O n 10 O ctober, C ongressm an R obert F. Rich’s am endm ent, banning aid to the Soviets, was defeated 21 to 162. T he leg­ islation was passed in the H ouse 323 to 67, in the Senate, 59 to 13.54

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D espite th e belief o f m ost m ilitary analysts th a t the Soviets faced im m inent defeat, m any interventionists strongly supported such assistance.55 Should H itler dom inate Russia, w arned th e CDAAA, th e danger to b o th B ritain an d the U nited States w ould be far greater. As far as th e im m ediate danger w ent, G erm any could strike from th e C aucasus o r th ro u g h Iraq, flank th e B ritish p o sitio n in Iraq an d th e P ersian G ulf, a n d m ove o n In d ia th ro u g h A fghanistan. Should Siberia fall u n d er Axis control, Singapore w ould be vul­ nerable. Conversely, an undefeated Russia w ould be able to fight u n til m ilitary and econom ic a ttritio n , com bined w ith “blows in th e W est,” caused G er­ m any’s collapse.56 W hile conceding A m erican abhorrence o f com m unism , th e CDAAA d e­ nied th a t th e Soviet U nion endangered th e security o f th e W estern H em i­ sphere. W hen th e Soviets o btained victory, th e interv en tio n ist group m ain ­ tain ed , they w ould be so w eakened th a t they m ight n o t even be com m unist any longer. F urtherm ore, they possessed no bases o n th e N o rth A tlantic, lacked th e sea pow er to th reaten Alaska, an d could n o t reach th e South A t­ lantic. A loosely k n it and backw ard n atio n , th e USSR had show n it could n o t expand effectively, as seen by failures to install com m unist regim es in H u n ­ gary an d Spain. G erm any, in co n trast, was so tightly centralized an d in d u s­ trially efficient th a t w ithin tw o years it had b ro u g h t m ost o f E urope u n d e r th e N azi flag.57 A m in o rity o f the president’s critics favored such aid.58 In add itio n to th e com m unists, w hose sudden conversion to interventionism was th e least o f surprises, th e Militant called for defense o f th e Soviet U nion. T he USSR itself, said the Trotskyist weekly, m ust be distinguished from “the bureaucrats” w ho “had usurped th e seats o f power.”59 Commonweal found the case for aiding th e Soviet U nion “unassailable,” fearing th a t “th e Nazi régim e will directly, o r in ­ directly, control and determ ine the political and social o rd er o f th e w orld.” V illard, in calling th e attack “indescribably base,” deem ed Roosevelt and W elles courageous to announce th at th e U nited States w ould provide all pos­ sible help.60 Several anti-interventionists w anted to lim it any such relief. W heeler found no objection to giving m oney o r m atériel to Russia b u t sought assurance th at A m erican ships w ould n o t be sunk o n th eir way to V ladivostok.61 T he Christ­ ian Century w anted the U.S. to give the Soviet U nion enough aid to hold o ff H itler, n o t enough to create a “Russian avalanche.” Taft was inclined to favor assistance provided it was n o t used against Finland, though he did m use, “A p­ parently we are to follow Bundles for B ritain w ith Packages for Petrograd.” M undt suggested th at th e B ritish adm inister all such assistance, w ith th e U nited States reim bursing th eir supplies. He w arned, “Let us n o t have Uncle Sam becom e th e generalissim o o f the w ar n o r th e bedm ate o f com m unism .”62 Yet m ost noninterventionists strongly opposed A m erican aid to th e Soviets. O ne o f th e m ost extrem e com m ents cam e from C harles L indbergh, w ho said

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in San Francisco o n 2 July, “I w ould a h u n d red tim es rath er see m y co u n try ally herself w ith E ngland, o r even w ith G erm any w ith all h er faults, th an the cruelty, th e G odlessness, an d the barbarism th a t exists in Soviet Russia.”63 At a New York C ity rally in O ctober, th e aviator recalled th a t in 1938 he had hoped B ritain and France w ould "perm it G erm any to expand eastw ard w ithout de­ claring w ar”64 O n m oral grounds alone, it was argued, th e Soviets did n o t deserve aid.65 Bestow ing m ilitary assistance sim ply m ade a travesty o f any w ar against to ta l­ itarian dictatorship. R epresentative Fish accused "fire-eaters” o f proposing to tu rn th e "lend-lease” bill in to a "Lenin-lease” bill. Sterling M orton confessed his disdain o f "M ufflers for Moscow.” To th e New York Daily News, the G erm an-R ussian struggle was sim ply the latest event in a conflict stem m ing back to th e Teutonic knights o f the th irteen th century— n o "m ore o f o u r business th an any o f th e previous w ars were.” Boake C arter called for a jo in t A m ericanB ritish-Japanese alliance to check b o th G erm any and th e Soviets. C om m ented C hester Bowles, "T he A dm inistration and th e interventionists w ill, however, soon begin to attem p t to build up Russia as a fine, G od-fearing benefactor o f th e dow ntrodden. O r at w orst a rath e r nice am iable benefactor w ith w hich we happen to have a slight disagreem ent on various details o f econom ic and so­ cial organization.”66 In attem pting to secure backing for Russian aid, th e president, in a press conference o f 30 Septem ber, asserted th a t A rticle 124 o f th e 1936 Soviet con­ stitu tio n protected th e free exercise o f religion, a claim his critics challenged im m ediately.67 N oninterventionists w ere quick to respond.68 R om an C atholics w ere vocal, one poll show ing 90 percent o f th e clergy opposed to aiding the Soviets.69 Less th an tw o years previously, the Christian Century recalled, Roo­ sevelt had told th e A m erican Youth Congress how m uch he detested Russia’s "banishm ent o f religion.” Stalin, m used socialist w riter Lillian Symes, m ight o rd er com pulsory attendance a t m ass o n penalty o f liquidation o r tw enty years’ h ard labor. Uncensored accused Roosevelt o f show ing "sym ptom s o f ju ­ ridical cretinism .”70 In C ongress, too, th e response was quick. Fish suggested th a t Roosevelt bap­ tize Stalin in th e W hite H ouse sw im m ing pool. C ongressw om an E dith N ourse Rogers sought to am end th e aid bill: no assistance w ould be im plem ented u n til th e Soviet U nion guaranteed freedom o f religion and ended com m unist propaganda w ithin th e U nited States.71 G erm any, som e argued, was m ore to leran t o f C hristianity th an were the So­ viets. For every specim en o f blasphem y spoken o r w ritten in H itler’s Reich, said Catholic World, a thou san d had been officially approved in th e land o f Lenin an d Stalin. In challenging Roosevelt’s im plicit com parison, Common­ weal stressed th a t th e G erm an people could go to church, th at its arm y had chaplains, and th a t th e sacram ents were adm inistered. It did concede, how ­ ever, th at in n either co u n try was it safe for a p arty m em ber publicly to profess

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C hristianity o r participate in com m unity w orship and charity.72 O n 25 O cto­ ber, Uncensored noted th at H itler m ight establish a C hristian state in occupied Russia, w ith possible options including toleration for all C hristian groups; ac­ ceptance o f L utheranism , Rom an C atholicism , and “th e G reek O rthodox reli­ gion o f old Russia”; and encouragem ent for the U niate C hurch, a m ove likely to be supported by the V atican.73 In opposing A m erican aid, the Chicago Tribune questioned th e logistics o f supply: It was physically im possible for the U nited States to deliver m unitions. G erm any occupied Greece and held th e keys to th e D ardanelles. A rchangel was icebound, M urm ansk cut o ff by th e Finnish advance. The railroad from Iran to the Soviet U nion ran through steep m ountain grades and had a 250m ile gap. Loading facilities at V ladivostok w ere m eager, an d the T rans-Siber­ ian R ailroad operated a poorly equipped single-track line.74 Given such anxieties, even continued aid to B ritain was suspect. In n oting a pending lend-lease appropriation bill, the AFC w arned th at B ritain m ight still tu rn its ow n supplies over to Russia w hile receiving A m erican lend-lease. Sim ­ ilarly, G eneral W ood asked, “Are we to continue o u r aid to B ritain w ithout som e assurance th at everything we send will n o t be relayed to Stalin?”75 At th e outset o f th e Russian attack, several anti-interventionists stressed th at th e Soviets had n o chance. T he G erm ans were advancing to o fast, were too well equipped, and possessed to o m uch strategic genius for th e USSR to survive. In late June, ju st after th e A rm y G roup South o f G eneral G erd von R undstedt captured D ubno, H erbert H oover claim ed, “These R ussians will be prom ptly m opped up.”76 Early in July, as th e G erm ans broke through Soviet lines on th e Latvian b o r­ der, H iram Johnson w rote to his son, “I never did believe th e Russians were good fighters o r good soldiers.”77 H anson Baldw in, referring to th e fam ous Russian defeat in W orld W ar I, saw in the offing “a T annenburg far m ore de­ cisive and disastrous than the first.” C ertainly a G erm an victory was “well on the way to accom plishm ent.” Late th at m onth, colum nist G eorge Sokolsky forecast th at Russian troops w ould revolt against th eir Stalinist leaders, estab­ lishing a pro-G erm an governm ent sim ilar to France’s Vichy regim e.78 Such analysis persisted all through August. O n the 9th, ju st after Russian pockets a t Sm olensk and U m an surrendered and over four h u n d red thousand Soviet prisoners were taken, Uncensored quoted unnam ed “W ashington ob­ servers” w ho deem ed the Red A rm y doom ed. By the end o f the m onth, as the Soviets w ere evacuating the industrial center o f D nepropetrovsk and blow ing the great dam on the D nieper at Z aporozhe, Flynn w rote in his diary, “Russia in bad way. Looks as if th a t w ar in its last stages.” W hen H itler reached the C aspian Sea and th e Ural M ountains, H oover predicted, he m ight initiate peace m oves w ith Stalin, both o f them henceforth fighting C hurchill.79 Early in Septem ber, w hen the siege o f L eningrad began, m any FDR adver­ saries stressed th e reverses suffered by th e Soviets.80 The New York C hapter o f

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A m erica First could n o t find a single m ilitary expert w ho believed th at they could hold o u t, m uch less w in the war. Before w inter set in, noted its weekly bulletin, G erm an arm ies w ould conquer M oscow and Baku; Stalin m ight then retire beyond the Urals. In m id-m onth, ju st after the G erm ans took Kiev, C olonel M cC orm ick announced to a radio audience, uIt looks as if the com ­ m unist m enace to the w orld has been destroyed.” W ith th e collapse o f th e So­ viet U nion expected by B ritish and A m erican experts alike, Libby thought H itler w ould be able to consolidate all Europe, including Turkey, in to a single econom ic bloc. T hough B ritain w ould encourage acts o f sabotage through "Fifth C olum n activities,” it could n o t trigger an effective revolt against him .81 To H anson Baldw in, G erm any had lost th e battle o f tim e, b u t th e colum nist still p u t odds on its victory.82 Freda U tley appeared m ost vocal o f all. In a m em o drafted in the initial weeks o f fighting, she predicted a rapid G erm an victory. T he Reich, she w rote, need n o t conquer th e entire nation; th e U kraine, rich in grain and oil, and the C aucasus, also abundant in petroleum , w ere sufficient. In fact, G erm any p ro b ­ ably w ould n o t require large-scale occupation garrisons, for it could rely on U krainians em bittered by the m ass starvations. W riting in th e Septem ber issue o f th e American Mercury, she speculated th at a rum p Soviet state m ight relo­ cate to Asia, Stalin flee to M exico, and Russia face a new th reat from Japan.83 D uring O ctober, certain noninterventionists envisaged G erm any successful everyw here.84 T he Soviets, asserted Frank W aldrop, had already lost the w ar; th e Russian people were about to "deliver a bloody bill to Stalin.” R. D ouglas S tuart Jr. o f A m erica First was so confident o f G erm an victory th at he feared a desperate Roosevelt m ove to prevent a peace. Uncensored forecast a G erm an "knockout” w ithin tw o m onths. John C udahy found th e USSR "just about gasping.” Again m ore cautious, Baldw in saw G erm any ultim ately advancing to th e Volga, though th e m ove m ight take a year.83 In m id-N ovem ber, on th e day before R ostov-on-D on was taken, the Chicago Tribune predicted th at w inter w ould n o t ham per G erm an operations in th e C rim ea and the oil-rich C aucasus. F urtherm ore, because the com m u­ nists had treated the U krainians so m iserably, they were passively casting th eir lot w ith the invader. Uncensored expected a Nazi occupation o f the D onets Basin an d fu rth er advance on the Black Sea.86 To som e Roosevelt foes, massive G erm an conquests o f the Soviet heartland re­ ally aided the U nited States and Britain, not threatened them . Late in June, Taft found the invasion postponing for m any m onths any attack H itler could possi­ bly m ake o n the U.S. The New York Daily News called the attack Britain’s "biggest break in the war.” Even if G erm any captured Moscow, m aintained the Chicago Tribune, the m ost favorable season for invading Britain w ould have passed.87 By 1 A ugust 1941, the AFC’s research bureau reported th at H itler’s conquest o f the USSR w ould co ntribute little to G erm an w ealth. O nce G erm any de­ prived th e Soviet U nion o f m ost o f its oil, Russia’s “econom ic life w ould be re­

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duced to a hopeless state o f non-productivity, w hich w ould be sm all help to the Nazis in w ar o r peace.” M oreover, the USSR was sh o rt o n food, n o t having been a m ajor food exporter since W orld W ar I. “To get m uch food o u t o f Rus­ sia,” rem arked th e AFC, H itler "m ust keep th e tracto rs ru n n in g full blast and starve the Russians, th u s low ering th eir productivity.” A nd unless Soviet in­ d u stry disappeared, the n ation had little coal an d iron to export.88 Even a victorious H itler, such anti-interventionists kept saying, w ould n o t have it easy. Representative C hiperfield stressed th at the G erm an leader needed to rest his troops, replace lost planes, and police a vast area before tu rn in g his attention again to England and W estern Europe. According to Hoover, H itler w ould need one m illion m en "to garrison the place against the conspiracies o f the OGPU.”89 Uncensored anticipated social disruption at hom e.90 O ccasionally voices o f apprehension w ere heard. Several an ti-in terv en tio n ­ ists w arned th a t any truce betw een G erm any and th e USSR w ould seriously harm the W est. In early O ctober, for exam ple, C ongressm an James O ’C onnor feared th at the Soviet leader "m ight double-cross us overnight” by m aking peace w ith H itler: "Rem em ber, hum an m onsters are all yellow.”91 At tim es certain noninterventionists were n o t so quick to see a G erm an vic­ tory, m uch less a "quisling” peace, in the offing. G erm any’s Führer, they pre­ dicted, w ould lose the Russian cam paign, for a com bination o f huge distances and the Soviets’ scorched-earth policy w ere bo u n d to defeat him . In June, the Chicago Tribune stressed th e m assive distances, p o o r com m unications, and th e USSR’s vast arm y.92 T he New York Daily News rem arked, “H itler w on’t find Russia full o f filling stations for his panzers, any m ore th an N apoleon found it full o f feed for his horses.”93 T he Reich, noted Senator A lexander W iley early in A ugust, had been greatly w eakened in planes, ships, and m orale and had al­ ready lost a m illion m en in the invasion. " If H itler keeps on pursuing his course in Russia,” rem arked the W isconsin R epublican, "the Russian bear m ay do so m uch dam age there w ill n o t be any H itler.” T he m ore H itler spread him ­ self, W heeler asserted, th e weaker he becam e. "L eningrad m ay fall,” com ­ m ented Christian Century in Septem ber, ju st as the G erm an siege o f th a t city began. "M oscow m ay fall; O dessa m ay fall— b u t Russia will n o t fall.”94 O n 8 Novem ber, five days after th e G erm ans had captured Kursk, H iram Johnson believed th at although G erm any had "w hipped” the USSR, it was hard to see how the Reich could w ithstand th e losses in m en and m aterial. Less th an three weeks later, Baldw in found the struggle still undecided; even th e G erm an cap­ tu re o f M oscow m ight no t be fatal to the Soviet cause. Four days before the Pearl H arbor attack, the New York Daily News, noting H itler’s recent reverse at Rostov, found him facing a severe w inter ahead.95 To several ad m inistration critics, a Soviet victory w ould n o t necessarily constitute good news.96 If Stalin w on, w arned N orm an Thom as, he w ould dic­ tate the peace.97 H elicopter m anufacturer Igor Sikorsky, a native Russian, feared th at a victorious USSR could reach the Balkans and Scandinavia. Rob-

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sion m entioned the Baltic states.98 John H aynes H olm es predicted th e USSR w ould occupy East Prussia and the D ardanelles and w ould probably take over M anchukuo and M ongolia. In D ecem ber 1941, the Christian Century gave ten -to -o n e odds th a t G erm any w ould be in Soviet hands. Senator W illiam Bulow saw the Soviets’ eye on B ritain. G eorge Sokolsky w orried th a t U.S. arm s shipped to th e Soviets m ight eventually "find th eir way in to th e m aking o f a social revolution in th is country.”99 C onflict betw een th e Soviets and th e W est was b o u n d to follow. "W here w ould Stalin stop?” asked th e Chicago Tribune. "W ould an o th er w ar begin w ith B ritish and A m erican troops trying to stem forces they had supported?” Q ueried th e Saturday Evening Post, "H aving saved the w orld from N azism , should we n o t be m orally obligated to go o n and save it from Bolshevism?” 100 At least one anti-interventionist faced a genuine dilem m a. T his was W illiam H enry C ham berlin, w ho had served as Christian Science Monitor correspon­ d ent in M oscow from 1922 to 1936, before being transferred to Tokyo and Paris. Like his personal friend and fellow jo u rn alist Freda Utley, he had begun his career as a radical, w elcom ing th e Soviet experim ent and m arrying a na­ tive Russian. D isillusioned by Stalinism , however, he later becam e one o f the Soviets’ m ost b itter foes.101 In 1940, C ham berlin published Confessions o f an Individualist. In this w ork he staunchly opposed collective security. If, he w arned, it w ould take th e Al­ lies three years to crush G erm any (w hich was the B ritish estim ate), m illions w ould have been killed o r w ounded, thousands o f ships sunk, an d scores o f beautiful cities devastated— a price he found too high. T he Red A rm y w ould be in a position to seize all o f Poland and m uch o f th e Balkans. To avoid an­ o th er and stern er Versailles, G erm any m ight well go com m unist. "G reat B ritain and France, already strained to the utterm ost, w ould find them selves confronted by a hostile land m ass stretching from th e R hine to the Pacific.” Far b etter to "keep clear o f adventurous crusades” than to risk such an outcom e.102 As expected, Roosevelt’s adversaries praised C ham berlin’s w ork.103 Vera M icheles D ean, research director and editor o f th e Foreign Policy A ssociation, was m ore am bivalent. W hile lauding C ham berlin’s "faith in th e intrinsic w orth o f hum an personality,” she asserted th at he had underestim ated Soviet w eakness and naively assum ed H itler’s am bitions w ere lim ited to C entral Eu­ rope. She rejected his belief th at, in h er w ords, the U nited States could view E urope w ith “unconcern and detachm ent.” 104 Between H itler’s invasion o f Russia and U.S. en try in to war, C ham berlin wavered o n th e m atter o f Soviet victory. In July 1941, he w rote th at the Red A rm y could retreat a thousand m iles, exploiting its vast hinterland and in ­ d u strial centers to its east.10S Two m onths later, he estim ated th at H itler’s de­ feat w ould be "little sh o rt o f a m iracle.” N evertheless, in late O ctober, C ham ­ berlin hailed Russia’s “am azing resistance,” som ething th at he credited to an indoctrinated youth, a m odernized arm y, a seasoned m unitions industry, and

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the sheer vastness o f th e nation. Speculating abo u t a free Russia p articipating in a free Europe, he called for A m erican aid to th e USSR as a m atter o f “hardboiled, calculating A m erican self-interest.” In N ovem ber, speaking at Stanford U niversity, he saw risks in U.S. assistance, am ong them a victorious Stalin overrunning E urope.106 From the tim e o f H itler’s invasion, certain noninterventionists used th e So­ viet theater o f w ar as a m eans o f attacking th e B ritish, w hom — so they as­ serted— w ere singularly inactive w hile the USSR was experiencing a m ajor o n ­ slaught.107 In m id-O ctober, Pettengill accused B ritain o f throw ing Russia “to th e dogs” to save its em pire and q uite possibly to m ake peace w ith G erm any.108 T he Chicago Tribune was vehem ent o n th e m atter, blam ing C hurchill for sit­ tin g b ehind a tw enty-m ile dike o f w ater, w aiting for H itler to defeat th e Rus­ sians and absorb th eir resources before attacking B ritain. Regarding th e B ritish forces, it declared, “T he arm ies o f an em pire o f 500 m illion people are w earing o u t noth in g b u t th eir pants seats.”109 H earst dem urred, m aintaining th a t any effort to invade Europe m eant the sacrifice o f a large p a rt o f B ritain’s defense forces.110 Even B ritish aid to the Soviets was view ed w ith a jaundiced eye. C ongress­ m an R obert F. Jones indicted th e B ritish for m aking all deliveries to Russia a t w orld prices w ith contracts in sterling. In claim ing th a t B ritain was n o t send­ ing planes to th e Soviets, R epresentative R obsion said, “She never fights except to save h er ow n skin.” 111 At no tim e after H itler’s invasion o f Russia did th e anti-in terv en tio n ist pos­ tu re dom inate general public sentim ent. O n 30 June, R. D ouglas S tuart Jr., the AFC’s executive secretary, w rote H erbert H oover, “T he outbreak o f w ar be­ tw een Russia and G erm any has had a notable influence on public opinion. People realize there is no choice for us. If G erm any w ins, Russia w ill go Fas­ cist. If Russia w ins, G erm any will go C om m unist. T he A m erican people are n o t anxious to fight to m ake th e w orld safe for com m unism .” 112 In a G allup poll taken in July 1941, however, 72 percent o f the respondents endorsed a Russian victory, only 4 percent a G erm an one. In fret, adm inistra­ tion critics could take heart in ju st one statistic: the percentage favoring im ­ m ediate U.S. entry into the w ar dropped from 24 percent to 21 percent. O n 5 August a G allup poll found only 35 percent supporting the inclusion o f Russia in the lend-lease program . Yet, w hen asked w hether the U nited States should sell w ar supplies to the Soviets, 70 percent endorsed the move. In late Septem ­ ber, G allup noted a 49:44 ratio in favor o f credits if the Soviets could n o t pay cash.113 Fortune m agazine, canvassing the public in O ctober, found 51.4 p er­ cent o f the respondents saying the U.S. should w ork alongside th e Russians. A n additional 21.9 percent believed th at the Soviets should be treated as full p a rt­ ners. O nly 13.5 percent took th e position held by m ost anti-interventionists: the U nited States should cu t off all aid to the R ussians.114 G allup polls in b oth June and Septem ber also show ed a m ajority predicting Soviet victory.115

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W ithin the adm inistration, prognosis concerning Soviet success varied. Stim son, Knox, Stark, and B ullitt all anticipated Soviet defeat by th e year's end.116 In June, Laurence A. Steinhardt, U.S. am bassador to Moscow, gave the Russians only tw o m onths to hold o u t.117 O n the other hand, Joseph C. Grew, A m erican am bassador to Japan, thought the Russians w ould fight harder than m any be­ lieved.118 Berle and H ull supported lend-lease, undoubtedly believing th at the USSR w ould survive.119 By m id-A ugust, a reluctant Sum ner Welles had been w on over.120 At first th e A llied m ilitary was usually pessim istic. T he B ritish W ar Office and chiefs o f staff believed th at once G erm any had reached the U rals, Soviet resistance w ould cease.121 O f th e to p A m erican m ilitary, only G eorge M arshall saw th e possibility o f Soviet survival, and even he opposed any shipm ent o f scarce A m erican aircraft. To th e chief o f staff, greater p riorities included the Philippines an d B razil.122 At tim es M arshall envisioned Soviet defeat ahead, w riting Sum ner W elles in m id-July, “T he G erm an A rm y is o n th e verge o f dis­ ru p tin g the Russian forces."123 Stim son concurred w ith M arshall’s opposition, privately protesting against depleting A m erican forces.124 C olonel T rum an Sm ith o f G -2 predicted a quick G erm an victory over the Soviets, after w hich the Reich w ould attem p t to negotiate a peace w ith B ritain. If B ritain refused, H itler w ould eith er invade the B ritish Isles o r seek to elim inate B ritish influ­ ence in th e en tire M editerranean region.125 O nly early in A ugust did m ore o p ­ tim istic reports reach the president; these centered m ore o n G erm an setbacks, n o t actual defeats.126 D espite th e intensity o f th e debate over Russia, A m erican lend-lease had lit­ tle in itial im pact. O nly in late Septem ber did Lord B eaverbrook, representing B ritain, and W. Averill H arrim an, representing the U nited States, m ake an agreem ent in M oscow by w hich the U.S. pledged a billion dollars o f aid .127 D e­ livery was always difficult. Roosevelt an d H opkins them selves saw such aid as m ore a pledge o f A m erican “good faith” th an o f im m ediate value to the Soviet w ar effort. As for th e w inter o f 1941-42, they realized th at U.S. supplies w ould play a negligible p a rt in th e battle for Moscow. Little could arrive u n til after th e m ilitary outcom e had already been decided. O f course, by 1944, lend-lease w ould play a m ajor role in th e Soviet victory, as th e $10 billion w orth o f U.S. equipm ent an d supplies filled critical gaps in th e Russian o u tp u t. T he tide o f battle, however, had sw ung in th e Soviets’ favor long before A m erican aid had arrived in quantity.128

D uring th e en tire debate over aiding th e Soviets, an ti-interventionists sup­ p o rted one o f th e USSR’s m ost em bittered and understandable enem ies, Fin­ land. O n 26 June, in th e wake o f the G erm an onslaught, th e Finns attacked the

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USSR. "For th e liberty o f th e Fatherland,” President Risto Ryti announced, Finland was going to w ar alongside G erm any an d "h er leader o f genius, R eichchancellor H itler.” O n 30 A ugust, it reclaim ed Vyborg. Soon it was m aking long th ru sts in to Soviet te rrito ry all along the frontier. Its leading general, Field M arshal C arl G ustav Em il von M annerheim , proclaim ed publicly th a t Finland could no longer be satisfied w ith old, inadequate frontiers: "New days are daw ning ever b righter before o u r eyes.”129 T he B ritish told th e Finns o n 22 Septem ber n o t to advance in to “purely Russian territory.” 130 W ithin a m o n th and a half, H ull announced th at the ad­ m in istratio n had recently called o n th e Finns to w ithdraw th eir troops from th e USSR. T he U nited States, he claim ed, had notified Finland on 18 A ugust th a t th e Soviet U nion w anted to discuss peace o n th e basis o f territo rial com ­ pensation. Finland did n o t reply, an d its tro o p s continued to advance. O n 25 N ovem ber, th e Finns signed th e an ti-C om intern pact w ith the Axis countries. O n 6 D ecem ber, B ritain declared w ar o n Finland, an d the U.S. took six Finnish ships in to custody.131 Finland still had m uch anti-in terv en tio n ist su p p o rt. T he country, said th e Chicago Tribune^ was fighting for its freedom . T he Christian Century noted th a t "nine o u t o f ten A m ericans w ould rejoice to see th e Finns m arch tri­ um phantly in to Leningrad.” H earst’s San Francisco Examiner rep rin ted m ajor p o rtio n s o f Finland’s w hite book, justifying its reentry in to war. O pposing A m erican aid to the Soviet U nion, the new spaper's editorial headline read, "O u r H onor Periled by Aid to Finland’s Foe.” C ongressm an Fred Bradley queried, "Shall we now furnish Russia w ith planes to bom b Finland?” 132 M any an ti-interventionists severely criticized H ull’s N ovem ber w arning. Finland, they stated, was acting in self-defense. A ccording to R epresentative C lare H offm an (R ep.-M ich.), th e Finns had refused to "subm it them selves to th e tender m ercy o f the m an w ho has starved and m urdered his ow n subjects by the thousands.” For Finland to m ake a separate peace w ith Russia, com ­ m ented th e Calk w ould expose itself to m assacre by its erstw hile Nazi allies.133 Furtherm ore, FDR critics found the Am erican w arning hypocritical. How, asked W heeler, could the U nited States dem and th at Finland n o t protect its ow n soil while the U.S. extended the w ar to G reenland, Iceland, and Asia and Britain invaded Libya, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Iran? Hoover w ondered w hether his nation had "lost all sense o f hum an and m oral proportions.” Taft rem arked, "We will be deeply asham ed in all tim e to come.” Said Senator Shipstead, "We are being placed in the position o f Uncle Sam being the errand boy for Joe Dlugashvili [sic], alias Joe Stalin, otherw ise Joe the Steel M an, and W inston Churchill.”134 T he B ritish in p articu lar w ere strongly assailed. Stated H iram Johnson, "I could n o t find it in m y h eart to blam e this little n ation, b u t I saw, w ith indig­ natio n , B ritain bom bing her ports.” W aldrop asserted th a t B ritain’s blocking o f Red Cross supplies m ade Finland dependent on the Nazis. "T he British,” he

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continued, “learned a long tim e ago to stand alo o f o f o th er nations except to th e extent they could be used for B ritain’s interest.”135

In retrospect, as h istorian G eorge C. H erring Jr. notes, A m erican neutrality in th e R usso-G erm an w ar involved risks th at a t the tim e appeared too great to shoulder. True, th e burdens o f governing a large, alien, and hostile territo ry m ight w eaken, n o t strengthen, H itler’s Reich. In the sh o rt term , however, the consequences could have been catastrophic for the Allies. T he G erm ans w ould have obtained vast quantities o f food and raw m aterials, th e N ear East w ould be exposed to Nazi penetration, an d Japan w ould have been given a free hand in th e Far East. T he balance o f pow er w ould have shifted from the U nited States an d B ritain to the Axis pow ers. O ne could also argue th a t Roosevelt’s personal rationale in aiding th e Soviets was quite self-serving: th e exhaustion o f G erm an forces on th e Russian fro n t w ould decrease the need for any A m er­ ican troops on the E uropean co n tin en t.136 To th e anti-interventionists, even a G erm an conquest o f th e USSR placed th e U.S. in less danger, n o t m ore. T herefore, the occupation o f Iceland and the lengthening o f selective service term s w ere m ost unnecessary.

16

A Pivotal Summer

By the sum m er o f 1941, the adm inistration focus had centered increasingly o n Iceland, w here Roosevelt feared a G erm an takeover. A sovereign state in p er­ sonal u nion w ith D enm ark, Iceland had been scheduled for full independence in 1944. T he island instead becam e totally o rphaned in A pril 1940, w hen G er­ m any occupied its m other country. First, B ritain and C anada stationed tro o p s there. T hen, in sum m er 1941, encouraged by th e B ritish, Iceland accepted A m erican “protection,” an d o n 7 July a brigade o f nearly four thousand A m er­ ican m arines arrived. H istorian W aldo H einrichs aptly calls Iceland “th e tu rn tab le o f the A t­ lantic.” 1W ere the G erm ans to occupy th at strategic island, said Roosevelt as he announced th e m ove, they w ould pose an intolerable th reat to all “th e inde­ pendent nations o f the New W orld.” H ostile naval and a ir bases there w ould m enace G reenland, threaten shipping in th e N orth A tlantic, and in te rru p t th e steady flow o f m unitions, the last item “a broad policy clearly approved by Congress.” In friendly hands, Iceland possessed tw o critical advantages: it p ro ­ vided indispensable refueling bases for convoys, and it controlled th e D en­ m ark Strait, a passage betw een G reenland and Iceland w here G erm an ships had been active.2 T he CDAAA backed Roosevelt strongly. If the U nited States had n o t sent troops, it argued, th e Battle o f th e A tlantic w ould be lost, and B ritain itself w ould face defeat. The A m erican position in G reenland w ould be untenable, as G erm an bases w ould be lodged w ithin six h u n d red m iles o f C anada.3 A G allup poll estim ated 75 percent favoring U.S. convoys to th a t area.4 In 1940, som e an ti-interventionists had called for U.S. occupation o f Ice­ land. In A pril, H earst noted th at its excellent harbors m ade for a valuable base.

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Two m onths later, Lundeen— ever the im perialist— said Iceland was “an A m erican island belonging to th e W estern H em isphere, and it ought to be u n d er o u r flag.”5 T hat A ugust, th e Chicago Tribune, w hile denying Iceland lay in th e W estern H em isphere, expressed hope th at the U nited States could o b ­ tain it after th e war. At the very least, th e U.S. should insist th at n o o th er pow er be perm itted to use it for m ilitary purposes.6 C olum nist Frank W aldrop dissented, claim ing th a t four-fifths o f Iceland was uninhabitable. It lacked any harbor, was to o rem ote to serve as an a ir base, and produced “noth in g b u t hay, geysers, an d herring.” M oreover, its 108,000 citizens w ere “highly literate, quarrelsom e, individualistic A ryans,” w ho “w ould be m ighty m ean to an invader.”7 O nce Roosevelt m ade his announcem ent, th e New York Daily News stood alone am ong th e anti-interventionists in partially endorsing the m ove. T he U.S. Navy, it said, had testified to Iceland’s strategic value. M oreover, th e oc­ cupation w ould relieve an estim ated sixty to eighty thousand troops for serv­ ice elsew here and, w hen fogs w ere n o t to o thick, facilitate the provisioning o f A m erican ships. O pposing th e president’s prom ise to retu rn th e island to D enm ark after the conflict, it called for a p erm anent U.S. protectorate. T he News did object to th e fact th at FDR did n o t consult C ongress, and, m ore im ­ p o rtan t, it found the m ove “a long step tow ard war.”8 M any o f the president’s critics, flu* less am bivalent than the News, strongly op­ posed his action. To Charles A. Lindbergh, the decision was “the m ost serious step we have yet taken.” N orm an Thom as sought a congressional investigation o f the m atter. T he Christian Century headlined its editorial: “The President En­ ters the War.” A m erican troops sent to Iceland, com m ented the AFC’s R. D ou­ glas S tuart Jr., w ould have been considerably safer had G erm any been inform ed beforehand o f the occupation; otherw ise, th e Reich m ight have attacked U.S. vessels accidentally discovered in its declared w ar zone.9 C astle denied th a t H itler had threatened Iceland. Furtherm ore, to R obert A. Taft, an A m erican occupation was a liability. W ere G erm any to conquer the B ritish Isles, the entire U.S. force in Iceland m ight easily be defeated, as it w ould be in easy reach o f a G erm an-dom inated Ireland and Scotland b u t too far to be defended by th e A m erican fleet.10 Even if Iceland were lost, said C olonel Mc­ C orm ick, the rough terrain o f G reenland an d L abrador w ould hold o ff any in­ vader. Uncensored raised a different p oint. Unless th e B ritish were going to abandon the island, a Nazi attack w ould be fantastic. H ad there been danger, the already seasoned B ritish troops obviously w ould have rem ained.11 Roosevelt’s use o f presidential pow er was also questioned. Taft found no legal o r constitutional rig h t to send A m erican troops; the president’s legal pow er was lim ited to U.S. citizens and property. “T he m ere fact th at pow er m ay be usurped is no evidence o f legal right,” he continued. “If the occupa­ tio n o f Iceland is defense, then any act the President cares to o rder is de­ fense.”12

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T he agreem ent m ade w ith Iceland, several ad m inistration foes argued, was illegal. B orchard doubted w hether Iceland had officially seceded from D en­ m ark o r w hether D enm ark had recognized this secession. Unless either fre t was verified, Iceland was n o t an independent country, and Roosevelt had com m itted an international offense. Civil liberties lawyer John Finerty, Flynn’s replacem ent as national chairm an o f th e Keep A m erica O u t o f W ar Congress, denied th a t Iceland had ever invited th e U nited States; certainly D enm ark had n o t given its approval. V illard challenged Roosevelt’s claim th at defense exi­ gencies gave th e U.S. the rig h t to declare special jurisd ictio n in th e w aters aro u n d Iceland. As th e high seas w ere th e com m on pro p erty o f all nations, Roosevelt’s assertion was “noth in g less th an bizarre.” 13 By O ctober, Boake C arter was w riting th at A m erican tro o p s w ere ruining Iceland’s decent and orderly life. T he “lure o f gold” and fantastic wages had driven farm ers to tow n, causing fields to be abandoned. H ence, there could only be dislocation and ru in w hen th e conflict ended. Pacifist leader D orothy D etzer sought an investigation in to the num ber and task o f U.S. tro o p s in Ice­ land, n oting th at its president had pointed to “serious difficulties betw een n a­ tives an d o u r soldiers.” 14

If the Iceland move m et w ith anti-interventionist attack, lengthening the term served by conscripts drew far greater hostility. T he B urke-W adsw orth Act o f 1940 had lim ited the tim e o f service for draftees to twelve m onths. Furtherm ore, it prohibited draftees from being stationed outside the W estern H em isphere. By 1941, however, G eneral M arshall was expressing alarm . Testifying before the Senate M ilitary Affairs C om m ittee on 9 July, he urged C ongress to extend indefinitely the term s o f draftees. N ational G uardsm en, and reserve officers. O therw ise, he continued, “o u r present train ed forces will largely m elt away.” M ore specifically, the chief o f staff opposed efforts to restrict th e term o f serv­ ice to six m onths—o r any o th er precise lim it, for th at m atter. A few days after M arshall m ade his report, the w ar departm ent requested th at th e hem ispheric restrictions be lifted. O n 23 July, in testim ony before the H ouse M ilitary Af­ fairs C om m ittee. M arshall stressed certain potential dangers: w ar clouds gath­ ering in the Far East, the Axis threat to Alaska, and Nazi uprisings in Bolivia, Brazil, and C olom bia.15 In a special message sent to Congress on 21 July, Roosevelt backed M arshall. The peril, he w arned, was “infinitely greater” than it had been a year before. Each G erm an conquest brought Nazi dom ination th at m uch closer. “W ithin tw o m onths, disintegration, w hich w ould follow failure to take C ongressional action, will com m ence in the arm ies o f the U nited States.” R ather than take the tim e to am end the 1940 act. Congress should parallel his ow n declaration

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o f 27 M ay by “acknow ledging” a national em ergency. T he m ove w ould give the president au th o rity to hold soldiers “for th e duration.”16 T he public was far from receptive: a G allup poll o f 29 July indicated th at only 51 percent favored elim inating th e one-year lim it.17 In bargaining w ith congressional leaders, Roosevelt was forced to retain the ban on serving o u t­ side the hem isphere, though he did m anage to secure endorsem ent for lifting th e one-year restriction. A few noninterventionists saw logic in th e adm inistration's claim s. M ore th an a year’s train in g , Boake C arter stated, was needed for such groups as en­ gineers an d antiaircraft gunners. However, th e H earst colum nist did oppose perm ission to send forces overseas.18 T he New York Daily News backed M ar­ shall’s assertion th at th e loss o f th ree-fo u rth s o f th e officers, due for release w hen th e year’s term was up, w ould dam age the b udding arm y. Taking issue w ith M arshall's sim ilar concerns abo u t th e loss o f tw o-thirds o f th e draftees, it argued for ro tatio n .19 U sually an ti-interventionists balked. Som e found th e existing arm y suffi­ ciently strong; C ongressm an Dewey S hort (R ep.-M o.) pointed to a force o f close to fo u r an d a h a lf m illion m en. T he M issouri R epublican suggested th a t ju st as enlistm ents w ere staggered over all twelve m onths, so to o could be the dem obilizations.20 Vorys challenged th e claim th a t tw o-thirds o f th e arm y w ould vanish. By M arch 1942, he asserted, only o n e-ten th w ould be lost, and th is n u m b er could be replaced by draftees w ho had seven m onths’ train in g .21 T he Chicago Tribune claim ed th a t a volunteer force o f less th an h a lf a m illion, if properly arm ed and train ed , w ould be able to defend th e n ation. A1 W illiam s was satisfied w ith a h u n d red thousand.22 T he adm in istratio n , said its critics, had reversed its position. B ennett C lark no ted th a t M arshall had originally found eighteen m onths o f train in g suffi­ cient. W heeler claim ed n o t to have m uch faith in a chief o f staff w ho, o n one day, said th e U nited States needed 375,000, a few days later called for 450,000, and th e next tim e spoke in term s o f 1.7 m illion. If an expert testified this way o n th e w itness stand, W heeler asserted, a judge w ould tell th e ju ry to disregard his com m ents.23 T he a d m in istratio n , said its critics, was acting u n d e r A llied pressure. D anaher p o in ted to M arshall’s interview in th e 24 June issue o f th e Wash­ ington Post, in w hich th e ch ief o f staff had prom ised th a t th e bulk o f trainees could re tu rn hom e once they sp en t twelve m o n th s in un ifo rm . O nly after C hurchill, G eneral Sir A rchibald W avell, and G eneral Sir C laude J. E. A uchinleck had spoken, n o ted th e C onn ecticu t senator, d id M arshall change his p o sitio n .24 W avell, in relinquishing his po st as com m ander in ch ief o f B ritish forces in th e M iddle East, an d his replacem ent A uchinleck had stated early in July th a t a second A m erican E xpeditionary Force w ould be needed.25 Early in A ugust, C hurchill created a m ild flu rry by arguing th a t the U nited States was “advancing w ith rising w rath an d conviction to th e very

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verge o f war.”26 T he Call observed th at C harles de G aulle, leader o f th e Free French, endorsed th e W avell-A uchinleck view .27 Furtherm ore, FDR’s foes accused the adm inistration o f breaking faith w ith the draftees.2* They frequendy cited the claim o f the staunch interventionist Senator Claude Pepper, w ho noted that m en m ight be kept in the arm y for ten years.29 To the New York Daily News, “a dirty trick” was being played.30 M iserable train in g conditions only com pounded th e breach o f prom ise. C ongressm an W illiam Blackney (R ep.-M ich.) found frequent instances w hereby draftees w ere required to walk long distances, perhaps as m uch as a m ile, for m eals and toilets.31 T he Chicago Tribune endorsed exposés o n cam p m orale published in Life an d th e Nation, both interventionist jo u rn als.32 M arked salary inequities, it was noted, existed betw een soldiers an d civilian factory w orkers, n o t to m ention C anadian troops. M oreover, soldiers could be used as strike breakers.33 Lawrence D ennis observed draftees, m ustered o u t after a year’s training, uw ho are n o t fit to take p art in anything m ore m ilitary than a Boy Scout’s jam boree.”34 A dm inistration critics asserted th at o th er countries, ranging from C anada to G erm any, trained th eir recruits in far less tim e.35 An internal arm y rep o rt conceded th at th e service was experiencing a m ajor m orale problem .36 T he w hole m atter o f equipm ent was stressed. Pointing to th e lack o f pro p er m atériel, B ennett C lark cited m aneuvers in w hich an o rdinary tru ck bore the sign: uT his is a tank.”37 T he U nited States, said the Chicago Tribune, lacked a single dive-bom ber, possessed only a few attack planes and light bom bers, and had no m edium -sized tanks o r self-propelling gun m ounts. N ot a single divi­ sion in the U.S. Arm y equaled a Nazi contingent.38 A nti-interventionists challenged Roosevelt’s claim th a t th e U nited States was in greater danger in 1941 than it had been in 1940. In late July, the Chris­ tian Century asked rhetorically, “Is the N ation in Peril?” and answ ered w ith a resounding no. Senator Alva Adam s queried, “C an we im agine G erm any, su r­ rounded by hostile peoples w hom she has overrun, w ith her hands m ore th an filled in m eeting Russia, and w ith the B ritish fleet on th e o th er side, un d er­ taking to invade the U nited States?”39 Allied successes o n th e battlefield were presented as evidence th at fu rth er A m erican preparations were n o t needed. W ithin a year, Senator W iley stressed, B ritain had conquered Italian East A frica, Ethiopia, and French Syria. It was “out-C oventrying, on G erm any’s soil, the G erm an Luftwaffe’s bom ­ bardm ent o f Coventry.”40 M oreover, England did n o t appear th at alarm ed.41 The AFC pointed to a num ber o f factors: H itler’s indefinite postponem ent o f invading B ritain, G erm any engaged in fighting its strongest o pponent o n the European continent, a fall in B ritish sea losses du rin g the sum m er, an d a m uch stronger British air defense.42 N or was the Far East neglected. G eorge B ender (R ep.-O hio) stressed th a t C hina was holding out. Singapore an d th e N etherlands East Indies, said

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W iley, w ere equipped an d garrisoned. M oreover, despite Japan’s recent m ove in to Indochina, it had been w eakened in b o th finances and m anpow er. C on­ versely, th e U nited States had strengthened its navy, fortified its island pos­ sessions, an d severed fuel oil to Japan.43 In addition, the U.S.’s ow n defenses appeared m uch im proved. To W iley, the new A m erican bases had tu rn ed the C aribbean in to Man A m erican lake.” In the final analysis, said Senator W alsh, th e n ation’s protection depended on sea and air pow er, n o t ju st ground forces. C ongressm an B artel J. Jonkm an (Rep.M ich.) po in ted to the exam ple o f Frederick th e G reat, w ho— w hen lim ited by treaty to a h u n d red thousand— created a m agnificent arm y by providing in ­ tensive train in g .44 M arshall’s desire to lift th e ban o n service overseas m et w ith p articu lar anx­ iety. A new A m erican E xpeditionary Force, it was feared, m ight well be in th e m aking. MIf this is an arm y for an expedition abroad,” com m ented C ongress­ m an D aniel A. Reed (Rep.-N.Y.), “then we should be beginning now to lay o u t o u r hospital program .” G eneral W ood used th e term “fraud.”45 T he AFC research bureau denied th a t Iceland, Siberia, D akar, the Azores, o r th e C ape Verde Islands were endangered. A fter exam ining all th e supposed routes by w hich the U nited States could be invaded, it found th e n atio n well protected. N or could any m ythical danger o f invasion from E urope be used to justify A m erican e n try into com bat zones along th e coasts o f N o rth ern Ire­ land, Scotland, o r Norway. It cited H anson Baldw in, w ho w rote, “T he argu­ m ent th at we have to establish bases in an o th er hem isphere to protect o u r ow n land quickly reaches a strategic absurdity.”46 As frequently in th e past, noninterventionists stressed th e possible abuses o f presidential power. In particular, Roosevelt’s request th at C ongress declare a national em ergency caused m uch concern. Such a proclam ation, said th e AFC research bureau, “w ould create an am orphous situation in w hich drastic pow ­ ers w ithout definite lim its w ould becom e available for exercise by th e A dm in­ istration.” Some 223 supplem entary laws m ight be tapped, including those th a t could control labor, industry, agriculture, tran sp o rtatio n , com m unica­ tio n , and the m erchant m arine.47 T he AFC n a tio n al co m m ittee to o k n o official stan d o n term extension, largely because its ch airm an , G eneral W ood, d id n o t w ant to be p u t in th e p o sitio n o f challenging th e arm y ch ie f o f staff. M any local chapters, how ­ ever, strongly resisted th e proposals. T he AFC d id p ro m o te th e slogan “N a­ tio n al D efense a t Any Expense, b u t Keep O u r Boys a t H om e.” Its research b u reau conceded th a t it was im possible to tra in a m ass arm y w ith in a year b u t p resen ted its ow n o p tio n to M arshall’s plan: reta in all existing arm y d i­ visions an d n atio n al guard u n its, b rin g in g them u p to full stren g th by e n ­ listm en ts, if necessary, an d giving th em extensive train in g . At th e sam e tim e, all draftees an d new officers sh o u ld be placed in en tirely new u n its. By th is device, regular arm y an d n atio n al guard u n its w ould be in stru cted

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quickly. T he U nited States could have n in e fully prep ared arm y divisions, ready fo r any contingency, plus m any p artially train ed u n its. U nder p resen t policy, existing u n its w ere spread so th in th a t th e U.S. only possessed tw o w ell-prepared and -eq u ip p ed divisions.4* As in the original debate over th e draft in th e sum m er o f 1940, ad m in istra­ tio n adversaries offered a m ajor alternative: a retu rn to th e volunteer system . G eneral W ood called for a special reenlistm ent bounty, suggesting $150 p er m an. If a sufficient num ber could n o t be induced to reenlist, special provision could be m ade to keep those draftees stationed in such places as H aw aii, Panam a, and T rinidad from three to six m ore m onths.49 O thers offered suggestions as well. V illard sim ply called for p u ttin g all 472,000 three-year regulars in to equipped divisions. If they w ere provided w ith the best officers, th e U nited States w ould have an arm y ready for service. G eneral T hom as S. H am m ond, president o f the W hiting C orporation an d chairm an o f the Chicago AFC chapter, outlined a schem e by w hich selectees w ould enlist for three years in the arm y, then spend three years in th e national guard, follow ed by three m ore years in th e reserve. H earst repeated his pleas for the Swiss system o f a citizen arm y.50 T he Christian Century considered calling for th e dem obilization o f th e d raft arm y. C iting recent colum ns o f W alter L ippm ann, it noted the im possibility o f arm ing B ritain, the Soviet U nion, and C hina w hile building a dom estic m ass force in the U nited States at the sam e tim e. The interventionist colum nist also argued th at expansion o f the A m erican arm y could not be rushed th ro u g h ef­ fectively and th at the arm y lacked the com petent officers, m uch less th e equip­ m ent. needed to train soldiers effectively.51 As in the case o f previous legislation, congressional anti-in terv en tio n ists o f­ fered m any am endm ents. Taft sought to lim it national guard term extension to tw o years, draftee extension to six m onths.5* Edwin lohnson called for a raise o f S7.50 per m onth (“so m odest th at I am alm ost asham ed to offer it” ).53 Fish proposed a m easure th at w ould perm it the release o f all m arried soldiers, national guardsm en, and selectees; set a m axim um o f two m illion m en for the arm y; and retain the one-vear lim it on service provided th at no m ore th an forty-five thousand be discharged in any one m o n th .54 The bill's sponsors encountered som e difficulties. O n 7 August, by the com ­ fortable m argin o f forty-five to thirty, the Senate offered only an eighteenm onth extension, provided for a pay raise after one year’s service, and sought to expedite the release o f m en over age tw enty-eight. O n 12 August, th e H ouse narrow ly passed the sam e bill. 203 to 202. The news that the Vichy govern­ m ent was on the verge o f capitulating to Germ any, analvzed AFC staffer R uth Sarles, served at the last m om ent to swing sufficient votes to pass the bill. Two historians, I. G arry C lifford and Samuel R. Spencer Ir., have seen Roo­ sevelt's leadership as erratic. He tailed to explain the need for longer se m c e and had left W ashington during the final voting to m eeting w ith C hurchill in

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N ew foundland. A G allup poll indicated th a t 71 percent favored a one-year d raft for m en betw een the ages o f eighteen and thirty-tw o.55 T he vote has often been m isunderstood. Even if th e eighteen-m onth exten­ sion had been tu rn ed dow n, undoubtedly a com prom ise w ould have been reached, and draftees w ould still have had to serve from six to twelve m ore m onths.56 AFC leaders w ere far from despondent. T he CDAAA, o n th e o th er hand, found little com fort in th e closeness o f th e tally, claim ing it w ould en­ courage th e Axis in fu rth er aggression.57

D u rin g th e debate over lengthening th e term s o f co n scrip tio n , one event ap ­ peared to m ark th e m ost dangerous step th u s far: a su m m it m eeting be­ tw een th e p resid en t an d W inston C hurchill. From 9 to 12 A ugust, th e tw o m en, to g eth er w ith civilian a n d m ilitary advisers, rendezvoused o ff th e coast o f N ew foundland n ear A rgentia, a base recently tran sferred to the U nited States as p a rt o f th e destroyer bases deal. U seful if inconclusive discussion focused o n p ro d u ctio n p rio rities as w ell as th e w ider m atter o f b eating G er­ m any and heading o ff Japan. T he inform al m eeting o f B ritish an d A m erican leaders, how ever, far tran scen d ed any concrete agreem ents m ade, w hich w ere o f lim ited im p o rtan ce an d soon m odified by th e dem ands o f w ar. It w as th e face-to-face encounters th a t expedited com m on p lan n in g once the U.S. entered th e w ar.58 For years, atten tio n has focused m ore o n th e eig h t-p o in t declaration o f A nglo-A m erican w ar aim s, w hich has gone dow n in history as th e A tlantic C harter, th an on th e inform al conversations.59 For C hurchill, the Eight Points aligned th e U nited States and B ritain m ore closely w hile bringing th e A m eri­ cans a step closer to war. C ontrariw ise, Roosevelt, w ho did n o t fully tru st th e B ritish, saw th e jo in t declaration as a device to head o ff the kind o f secret and concrete agreem ents th a t had been so troublesom e after W orld W ar I. M ore­ over, it m ight rally people in occupied countries to defy th e Nazis, and, by pledging an equitable peace, even m ove th e G erm an people to resist H itler. T hen, too, a peace statem ent ringing w ith exalted phrases could distract a t­ ten tio n from the w eighty discussions o f m ilitary assistance an d spike an tiinterventionist criticism o f th e m eeting. A nti-interventionists dissected the Eight Points m ost carefully, often stress­ ing th e danger o r naiveté involved. C oncerning p o in t 1, in w hich the U nited States and B ritain denied seeking any “aggrandizem ent, territo rial o r other,” th e AFC research bureau responded th a t th e docum ent was n o t signed by such A llied governm ents in exile as th e N etherlands. T herefore, nothing could pre­ vent territo rial acquisition o n th eir p art. N or d id it d eter any o f th e B ritish d o ­ m inions o r th e Soviet U nion from seizing territo ry held by o th er nations.60

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In p o in t 2, th e tw o countries expressed th eir "desire to see n o territo rial changes th at do n o t accord w ith th e freely expressed w ishes o f th e peoples con cern ed ” Uncensored found th e w hole issue m oot, for nations fighting for th e status quo ante bellum obviously had no interest in territo rial changes.61 To John T. Flynn, the w ords rem ained m eaningless unless applied to such na­ tions as “India, Indo-C hina, the D utch Indies, B ritish M alaya, L ithuania, Latvia, Estonia, an d Finland.”62 A ccording to p o in t 3, th e U nited States and B ritain agreed to “respect the rights o f all peoples to choose the form o f governm ent u nder w hich they will live; an d they w ish to see sovereign rights and self governm ent restored to those w ho have been forcibly deprived o f them .” H earst listed an entire group o f nations for w hom the Eight Points w ould n o t apply, am ong them India, Persia, Egypt, A rabia, Syria, Tunis, Algeria, M orocco, M adagascar, and Tripoli. M oreover, w ould dem ocracy be advanced, asked th e AFC research bureau, by the restoration o f such m onarchs as Zog o f A lbania, H aakon VII o f Norway, Peter o f Yugoslavia, and George o f Greece?63 Point 4 involved an effort, w ith “due respect” for “existing obligations, to fu rth er the enjoym ent by all states, great and sm all, victor o r vanquished, o f access, on equal term s, to th e trad e and to the raw m aterials o f the w orld w hich are needed for th eir econom ic prosperity.” The New York Daily News saw an A m erican com m itm ent to d istribute its vast natural w ealth overseas, som ething only done by rem oving all im m igration restrictions and ta riff bar­ riers. “T he rest o f the w orld,” it said, “will flood in gladly and sta rt sharing o u r w ealth w ith loud cheers.”64 T he “due respect” phrase was particularly disconcerting. To Uncensored, it entailed the preservation o f th e B ritish Em pire, the O ttaw a com m ercial agree­ m ent, A m erican tariff and gold policies, and international B ritish cartels over rubber and tin . To H enry N oble M cCracken, president o f Vassar College, the pow er to guarantee equal access to the earth’s raw m aterials necessarily im plied im perialistic control o f the countries in w hich these m aterials were located.65 In responding to p o in t 5, w hich spoke o f “im proved labor standards, eco­ nom ic advancem ent and social security,” the AFC w arned th a t the provision necessitated a functioning econom ic league o r possibly even agreem ents to d i­ vide w orld m arkets.66 Far m ore controversy was created by the next p o in t, w hich stated, “Sixth, after the final destruction o f the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace w hich will afford to all nations the m eans o f dw elling in safety w ithin th eir ow n boundaries, and w hich will afford assurance th at all the m en in all the lands m ay live o u t th eir lives in freedom from fear and w ant.” Point 6, said th e AFC research bureau, was conspicuously silent concerning the destruction o f fascism as “a way o f life,” m uch less the breakup o f Italian fascism , Soviet totalitarianism , the Spanish dictatorship, o r Japanese tyranny. Even m ore dis­ turb in g was the phrase “final destruction o f Nazi tyranny,” as it im plied the

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com plete destruction o f G erm any, an effort th a t w ould require full-scale bel­ ligerency.67 By p o in t 6, feared th e AFC, th e president had “com m itted us to ac­ tive particip atio n in th e present war.”68 A few peace leaders found slight hope in th e language. R uth Sarles in te r­ preted th e statem ent as neither requiring th e “destruction o f N azism in G er­ m any” n o r “th e break-up o f the G erm an state.” Sim ilarly, Libby expressed g ratitude th a t p o in t 6 aim ed a t the “destru ctio n o f th e Nazi tyranny,” n o t the “overthrow o f H itler an d the N azi regim e.” T he effort to overthrow th e G er­ m an governm ent an d to force dem ocracy on th e G erm an people, he co n tin ­ ued, had always been unreal, for dem ocracy— properly understood— could n o t be im posed o n a people from w ithout.69 Point 7 referred to the rig h t o f “all m en to traverse th e high seas and oceans w ithout hindrance.”70 In w ar, said Uncensored, freedom o f the seas always be­ com es a “h oary hoax,” for the B ritish and U.S. fleets inevitably dom inated ac­ cess. Furtherm ore, reported the AFC research bureau, b o th th e 1939 n eu tral­ ity act an d U.S. acquiescence in B ritish restrictions involved self-lim itations o f th is rig h t.71 T he New York Daily News w ent further, n oting th at th e U nited States even backed the B ritish in preventing A m erican food shipm ents to France “u n til old M arshal Pétain has finally leaped in to the arm s o f H itler.”72 P oint 8 m ight have been th e m ost controversial o f all, as it im plied in tern a­ tional peacekeeping: Eighth, they believe that all o f the nations o f the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonm ent o f the use o f force. Since no farther peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be em­ ployed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment o f a wider and permanent sys­ tem o f general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Such a schem a, som e anti-interventionists argued, was inherently unw ork­ able. “W ould,” America asked, “the nations o f the w orld rise to th e high ideal­ ism o f th e A m erican and B ritish dem ocracies?” Lawrence D ennis, pointing to the phrase “abandonm ent o f the use o f force,” w rote, “T he pursuit o f this ab­ surd chim era by w ar will be th e screw iest and bloodiest and costliest futility yet com m itted by dem ocracy. A longside it, prohibition was sane and successful.”73 T he one-sided natu re o f th e proposed disarm am ent was found especially offensive. A ccording to the AFC research bureau, th e tw o leaders visualized an intern atio n al police force, probably A nglo-A m erican, w ith ju st p o tential ag­ gressors dem ilitarized.74 N orm an T hom as spoke in term s o f an arm ed im pe­ rialism . H earst correspondent Karl von W iegand, w riting from G erm any, re­ p o rted th a t fam ine alone could follow any plan to disarm th e Nazis. Uncensored noted th a t the G erm an press did n o t even b o th er to com m ent on

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th e points; it m erely p rin ted them in full, w ith th e eighth p o in t in boldface.75 A m ong the anti-interventionists, only pacifist Libby, a m em ber o f th e Society o f Friends, concretely endorsed p o in t 8, saying th a t th e sentence involving abandonm ent o f force “m ight well have been borrow ed from th e Q uaker book o f D iscipline, because it is th e ultim ate in disarm am ent.”76 C ertainly, for m any anti-interventionists, the Eight Points w ere m ost alarm ­ ing. T hey m ight possibly hold th e character and force o f executive agreem ents such as th e T aft-K atsura n ote o f 1905, th e H ouse-G rey m em orandum o f 1916, and th e L ansing-Ishii agreem ent o f 1917. D raw ing on such co n stitu ­ tio n al scholars as Edw ard S. C orw in, th e AFC research bureau did n ote th at th e president possessed the legal pow er to “undertake m any dangerous actions on his ow n initiative. All th e Senate o r th e H ouse could do w ould be to voice approval o r disapproval o f any o r all o f them , o r ap p o in t a com m ittee to in ­ quire into th eir form ulation o r adoption.”77 T he precedent o f W oodrow W il­ son’s diplom acy appeared h aunting.78 T he research bureau m ade a detailed com parison betw een Roosevelt and C hurchill’s eight-point m anifesto an d W ilson’s Fourteen Points, though AFC vice chairm an Janet Ayer F airbank noted, “T he A m erican people are m ore cynical and a lot m ore realistic th a n they were in 1918.”79 Conversely, som e anti-interventionists found the Eight Points m eaningless. “A lo t o f w ords,” said Nye. “Eight platitudes,” rem arked D ennis. “A rehash o f old ideas,” com m ented C asde.80 To others they w ere too weak. A nne M orrow L indbergh w rote in h er diary, “As usual, beautiful w ords, ideals— how is it to be done?” “Alien nations,” said H earst, w ould endorse the Eight Points so long as the belligerents needed A m erican aid b u t w ould disregard them once th e w ar ended. The Christian Century noted the verbs used ( desire, wish, will en­ deavor, hope, will aid, encourage) and those om itted (pledge, promise). Fur­ therm ore, th e Century saw the agreem ent as silent o n m any crucial m atters, including colonial issues, reparations, E uropean unification, general disarm a­ m ent, an d a new association o f nations.81 At tim es a few anti-interventionists « p re sse d su p p o rt o f the charter.82 G en­ eral W ood thought th e peace plan m ight even find a receptive hearing in G er­ many.83 Som e liberals and pacifists were particularly pleased.84 The W1L offi­ cially expressed “very deep gratitude” for the Eight Points, particularly for those providing for a perm anent system o f general security and raising the living standard for all nations.8S Libby called the statem ent “a step tow ard peace,” say­ ing it struck a conciliatory note absent in official B ritish utterances. Indeed, he continued, “We can look forw ard hopefully to peace negotiations on the basis o f th e Eight Points.”86 He was particularly pleased th at all peoples w ould be given the right to self-governm ent and access to th e m arkets and raw m aterials o f the w orld. Fellow pacifist A. J. M uste dissented from Libby’s view: the Eight Points contained som e fundam ental principles o f a lasting peace, b u t the state­ m ent was too vague, in reality serving as an instrum ent o f intervention.87

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Regardless o f how an ti-interventionists reacted to th e Eight Points, suspi­ cions rem ained concerning th e real reason for th e sum m it m eeting: secret agreem ents th a t m ight well be com m itting th e U nited States to full-fledged belligerency.83 To Boake C arter, th e conference “sm acks o f th e so rt o f secret H itler-M ussolini m eetings a t th e B renner Pass, w here th e tw o dictators blandly decided how m any lives should be carved u p to accom plish th eir ag­ gressive purposes.”89 Chesly M anly o f th e Chicago Tribune saw a jo in t m ilitary invasion o f E urope as being in th e w orks.90 N orm an T hom as th o u g h t th e U.S. had agreed to fight for Singapore an d th e D utch East Indies.91 T he Christian Century speculated o n an entire agenda: aid to Russia; intervention against Japan, given an attack o n Singapore, th e D utch East Indies, Siberia, and T hai­ land; unspecified “action” concerning France; and an eventual A m erican Ex­ p editionary Force.92 Som e in C ongress w ere equally apprehensive.93 AFC staffer Fred B urdick rep o rted th a t th e p resid en t’s critics shared a consensus th a t R oosevelt had com m itted th e n a tio n to a n o th er AEF.94 C ongressm an G eorge H olden T inkham considered charging th e ch ief executive w ith treaso n , fo r FDR had m ade “a declaratio n o f w ar, w ith o u t C ongress, o n a B ritish battleship.” Sev­ eral m em bers suspected th a t th e m eeting w ould lead to a U .S.-B ritish m ili­ ta ry m ission to R ussia.95 T he A m erica F irst C om m ittee w as p articu larly distressed. It w as, said its research b u reau , n o coincidence th a t th e N ew foundland m eeting w as fol­ low ed by a jo in t n o te to Stalin concerning fu tu re allocation o f resources and by th e an n o u n cem en t th a t A m erican planes w ere being ferried to A frica via Brazil. R uth Sarles saw a n u m b er o f w arlike o p tio n s lying ahead: th e break­ ing o ff o f U.S. relations w ith Vichy, th e sending o f U.S. tro o p s to L iberia an d Sierra Leone, and o u trig h t belligerency if Japan m oved tow ard th e N ether­ lands East Indies o r Singapore. T he New York chapter suspected th e aerial ferrying o f supplies in to th e nonw ar zones o f A frica o r actual e n try in to th e sh o o tin g w ar.96 In th e opin io n o f o th er FDR critics, no secret agreem ent was involved.97 C ongressm an H arold K nutson found th e U nited States to be farther from w ar than ever. T he jo in t statem ent, said G eneral W ood, was utterly devoid o f com ­ m itm ents on Roosevelt’s p art— no prom ise o f convoys, troops, o r fu rth er oc­ cup atio n o f d istan t points.98 R. D ouglas S tuart Jr. was slightly m ore cautious, saying, “We all knew th a t C hurchill w ent fishing, b u t from w hat they tell us the big one got away.” C hicago lawyer Clay Judson noted th at th e U.S. had n o t yet declared th at its navy was joining th e B ritish o r convoying vessels. N or was it occupying D akar o r sending troops to E urope.99 A nti-interventionists w ould n o t have been reassured had they sat in o n a B ritish cabinet m eeting held 19 August. H ere C hurchill m aintained th a t at the A rgentia conference “th e President said he w ould wage war, b u t n o t declare it, and th at he w ould becom e m ore an d m ore provocative. If th e G erm ans did

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n o t like it, they could attack A m erican forces.” Roosevelt also prom ised th a t th e U nited States w ould assum e responsibility for escorting N orth A tlantic convoys w ithin th e defensive zone w est o f tw enty-six degrees west. C hurchill reported, uT he President’s orders to these escorts w ere to attack any U -boat w hich showed itself, even if it were 200 o r 300 miles away from the convoys.. . . Everything was to be done to force an ’incident.*” For the B ritish, th e conference proved a b itter anticlim ax. W hen Roosevelt retu rn ed to W ashington, he did nothing to im plem ent any such policy. O n 28 A ugust, C hurchill cabled H opkins th at th e president’s continued statem ents th a t the U nited States was no nearer w ar had caused “a wave o f depression” in th e cabinet. T he N ew foundland conference had only decided o n detailed con­ tingency plans in case FDR did o rd er convoys. As historian D avid Reynolds w rites, “C hurchill an d his colleagues did n o t travel 3,000 m iles across th e U b o at infested A tlantic in the hope o f a press release.”100 T he m ain value o f the m eeting lay in th e personal relationships established by th e tw o national leaders an d by th eir m ilitary staffs as well. As for as edito­ rial opinion was concerned, a governm ent survey found strongly favorable re­ action b o th to the m eeting and to th e A tlantic C harter. A Fortune poll th a t O c­ to b er revealed ju st over h a lf th e respondents voicing unequivocal approval.101 To m ost anti-interventionists, any inform al alliance was b o u n d to be danger­ ous, particularly since, as an ti-interventionists never ceased arguing, any w ar w ith G erm any could entail tragic consequences.

17

'k Projections of Conflict

All d u rin g th e debates over conscription and w ar aim s, anti-interventionists continually retu rn ed to one them e above all: it was the height o f folly ever to th in k o f invading Europe. U nder no circum stances should an A m erican Ex­ p editionary Force be attem pted. Som e anti-interventionists offered gruesom e descriptions o f the horrors produced by W orld W ar I.1B orah referred to “chunks o f hum an flesh . . . quiv­ ering on the branches o f trees.” H ugh Johnson spoke o f “glistening w hite hum an bones sticking through th e quivering shreds o f bloody flesh.” C on­ gressm an Louis T hill quoted A lan Seeger’s poem “I Have a Rendezvous w ith D eath.” R epresentative John M ain Coffee (D em .-W ash.) cited Stephen V in­ cent Benét’s pacifist w o rk “ 1936.”2 Several anti-interventionists, including S tu­ a rt Chase and the New York Daily News, approvingly noted Johnny Got His Gun ( 1939), a b itter antiw ar novel w ritten by procom m unist D alton T rum bo.3 If grim descriptions o f past butchery were n o t enough, the sheer logistical problem s o f invading Europe seem ed overw helm ing.4 C harles A. Lindbergh predicted the U nited States w ould face a “superhum an task o f crossing an ocean and forcing a landing on a fortified continent against arm ies stronger th an o u r ow n and hardened by years o f war.”5 W ith B ritain being pounded by Nazi bom bers, A1 W illiam s noted, th e U.S. could n o t deliver the needed fight­ ers, m uch less operate from B ritain.6 Using the term “ghastly gamble,” Frank W aldrop noted exposure to air attack, lack o f landing harbors, and beach­ heads defended by artillery, planes, and m achine guns.7 Any assault, estim ated the New York Daily News, required 420 A m erican d i­ visions. Even then victory was uncertain: “It is possible th at o u r boys m ay suf­ fer one o r m ore super-D unkirks, rath er th an enjoy a victory m arch to Berlin.

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A nd th e A tlantic O cean is a trifle w ider an d harder to evacuate large forces across th an is th e English C hannel.”8 C om parisons w ere continually m ade to W orld W ar I. To Iowa ed ito r V erne M arshall, it w ould now take tw ice th e m anpow er; to Social Justice, tw o to th ree tim es; to Lawrence D ennis, fo u r to five.9 The factor o f tran sp o rtatio n was also raised. In W orld W ar I, recalled V illard, the U nited States had used th e vessels o f fourteen different countries; in 1941 the ships o f Japan, Italy, an d France w ere unavailable. F urtherm ore, he continued, it then required twelve to n s o f shipping to supply a single soldier. C urrently fo u r to five tim es th a t m uch w as needed. T he w orld itself, said Senator W heeler, did n o t contain enough ships to m ove a m illion m en, plus th eir equipm ent, across th e A tlantic.10 T here w as also th e m atter o f allies. In th e last conflict, th e U.S. h ad tw enty allies; th is tim e it had only th e B ritish E m pire by its side. Even in W orld W ar I, G erm any was able to stave o ff an arm y o f tw o to th ree m illion F renchm en, a m illion E nglishm en, th e arm ed forces o f Italy, an d a vast arm y o n th e east­ ern flank o f Russia. At th e beginning o f 1941, how ever, G erm any already d o m in ated th e c o n tin e n t.11 Even if an AEF tu rn ed o u t to be successful, noninterventionists found th e price too high. Projections varied from tw o to tw enty m illion m en12 and from 150 to 280 divisions.13 O ne o u t o f every three m en betw een th e ages o f eig h t­ een and forty-five, predicted V illard, w ould participate in th e onslaught.14 Sim ilarly th e num ber o f fatalities was expected to be extrem ely steep, this tim e th e range lying betw een one to ten m illion.15 “We cannot,” w rote H anson Baldw in, “re-conquer a co n tin en t w ithout w holesale death.” 16 T he financial cost was equally form idable. Edwin Johnson spoke in 1939 o f $40 billion, H am ilton Fish in 1940 o f $100 billion, and H anson Baldw in in 1941 o f $300 b illio n .17 F urtherm ore, th e tim e needed to secure E urope w ould be long indeed.18 N o such effort, w rote S tuart Chase in D ecem ber 1940, could begin before 1944; th e w ar itself w ould last tw enty years.19“A m erican children yet unborn,” com m ented Fish, “m ay be serving in th a t w ar in C hina, A frica, and Europe. A nd the end m eans bankruptcy and ru in , an d probably after th a t com m unism .”20 It w ould take ten years ju st to bu ild th e needed forty tons o f shipping, said H oover.21 C olonel M cC orm ick o u tlin ed an en tire invasion scenario. T he U nited States, he asserted in O ctober 1940, could ultim ately beat th e G erm an arm y, b u t the to ll could be prohibitive. N oting th a t th e n o rth e rn E uropean coast­ line stretched from Kiel to Brest, he m aintained th a t any invasion a t a single p o in t could n o t easily be reinforced, especially in th e face o f enem y a ir su p e­ riority. T herefore, a series o f feints, attacks, and counterattacks w as required u n til a fro n t had been established at least a h u n d red m iles long, possibly from C alais to D enm ark. By this tim e, all docks from th e Z uider Zee to B ordeaux w ould be destroyed, all h arb o rs o bstructed. T he cost: a conflict lasting fo u r h u n d red days, a price o f $400 billion, a m illion deaths, and several m illio n

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ru in ed lives. In to tal, th e U nited States w ould have to m obilize tw enty m illion m en as well as creating separate arm ies to “w atch” Japan and, oddly enough, M exico. C ertainly, th e “liberated” people w ould be “ungrateful” to “an arm y w hich w ould have to destroy th eir every tow n, every city, every stru ctu re in o rd er to deliver them .”22 M cC orm ick raised a crucial factor: th e long-term consequences o f victory. E nforcing a postw ar division o f G erm any, speculated Sterling M orton, m ight take five h u n d red years w hile creating a sp irit o f revenge in the process.23 W ould th e U nited States be required to use its m ilitary m ight, th e New York Daily News asked, to restore such m onarchs as G eorge II o f Greece, Peter o f Yugoslavia, W ilhelm ina o f H olland, and Leopold o f Belgium to full power?24 H . L. M encken w rote, “If H itler is p u t dow n by force we’ll get n o m ore thanks th an we got then, and a bill tw o o r three tim es as large. A nd if H itler is n o t p u t dow n w e'll face th e ju st and b itte r enm ity o f th e strongest m ilitary pow er on earth , and th e disdain an d derision o f all th e rest o f th e hum an race.”25 O nly one anti-in terv en tio n ist rem ained m ildly optim istic a t any such an endeavor. W ere th e U nited States to becom e a hill-scale belligerent, asserted H anson Baldw in, it w ould begin action by convoy operations in the A dantic, using naval forces augm ented by p atrol planes and long-range bom bers. At the sam e tim e, the U.S. w ould supply ships an d planes to B ritain an d the M editerranean and seize the Azores, C anaries, C ape Verdes, an d points in Africa. O nce a com bined A nglo-A m erican-G reek force o f four m illion m en was assem bled, it could begin landings in th e sou th ern M editerranean, possi­ bly a t Sardinia, Sicily, o r sou th ern France. A fter th e w ar, th e U nited States w ould have to accept som e so rt o f intern atio n al body, “a u nion w ith B ritain,” and a jo in d y adm inistered police force to keep w orld peace.26 Even w ith o u t invasion, B aldw in saw G erm any as vulnerable. H id er's new em pire lacked essential w ar m aterials, an d ersatz su b stitu tes could n o t in ­ definitely replace such resources as nickel an d copper. F urtherm ore, dissi­ dence existed w ith in G erm any, b ittern ess aroused by N azi m ethods an d “the slavery o f souls.”27 Interventionists them selves m inim ized any need for an AEF, accusing th eir opponents o f raising a spurious issue. In A pril 1941, the CDAAA specifically denied th a t th e w ar could be w on by “m asses o f m en.” Rather, “m echanized striking power,” particularly in th e air, rem ained crucial. Even if an AEF o f two m illion w ere added to B ritish forces, the new contingent w ould be inferior to the G erm an arm y. If, however, B ritain received sufficient w eapons, its forces w ould surpass G erm an striking pow er.28 As early as N ovem ber 1940, A dm iral Stark took issue w ith such views. B ritain, he th o u g h t, m ight conceivably defeat G erm any by m eans o f bom bing and blockade. But only by th e sending o f large A m erican naval, air, and land forces to E urope did B ritain really stand a chance. Final victory still w ould not be certain.29

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By Septem ber 1941, th e w ar departm ent had drafted a contingency plan th at involved successful invasion, preponderantly A m erican, o f the European continent. Even if G erm any dom inated Moscow, th e Volga, and Russian te rri­ to ry w est o f the W hite Sea, the departm ent found an AEF technically feasi­ ble.30 A so-called V ictory Program , drafted by M ajor A lbert C. W edem eyer o f the W ar Plans D ivision, w ould entail five field arm ies, 215 divisions, seven m illion tons o f shipping, and six m illion m en, all to engage in “offensive task forces” organized for European com bat. At one p o in t, the rep o rt concurred w ith the anti-interventionists— nam ely, in th e assum ption th at G erm any could n o t be defeated w ithout direct A m erican intervention. Ironically, W ede­ m eyer him self was an anti-interventionist, sym pathetic to the A m erica First C om m ittee.31 N o form al authorization for th e program was ever given, and all du rin g th e fall, th e arm y feared m anpow er cutbacks. O ne official m ilitary his­ to ry called the plan “a hypothesis w ithout real influence.”32 Four days before th e Pearl H arbor attack, a person still unknow n leaked the projection to the Chicago Tribune, w hich created a sensation by incorrectly claim ing th at the schem e proved th at th e adm inistration had already com m itted the natio n to full-scale belligerency.33 It rem ains highly questionable w hether Roosevelt him self sought an AEF u n til th e Japanese attacked Pearl H arbor. Privately, he had always m aintained th at an expeditionary force was politically im possible. M ore im p o rtan t, he genuinely believed th at strategic bom bing, w ith th e deliberate aim o f h ittin g G erm an tow ns as well as industrial centers, w ould m ake a large-scale arm y su­ perfluous.34 F urtherm ore, he realized fiili well th at the U nited States still lacked the m atériel to be a m ajor p articipant. M oreover, a land invasion o f G erm any w ould sim ply strengthen loyalties to th e Nazi regim e.3SAs Roosevelt w rote Stim son late in A ugust 1941, his p rim ary concern centered on “the reservoir o f m utual m unitions pow er available to the U nited States and h er friends” being sufficient to defeat the Axis.36 Q uite possibly Roosevelt did n o t abandon his belief in a “low casualty-high tech w ar” u n til th e C asablanca C onference o f January 1943.37 W hile C hurchill and th e B ritish chiefs hoped for an A m erican declaration o f war, they saw its value centering on aircraft, tanks, ships, an d supplies, n o t on an o th er AEF. G eneral M arshall was n o t so sanguine, finding a massive ground assault on Festung E uropa absolutely necessary; m illions o f casualties m ight be needed, for strategic bom bing and blockade alone could never de­ feat Germ any.38

Roosevelt’s critics kept stressing a converse p o in t as well— nam ely, th at G er­ m any could never invade th e U nited States. C ertain interventionists had

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voiced ju st such fears. In Septem ber 1939, H arold Ickes privately expressed be­ lief th a t th e U.S. was on H itler’s tim etable.39 Early th a t O ctober, A ssistant Sec­ retary o f W ar Louis Johnson publicly pronounced th e U.S. as threatened as Poland, a com m ent attacked by foes o f intervention.40 In M arch 1940, W illiam B ullitt quietly agreed th at th e U nited States was in danger.41 T hat sam e m onth, Roosevelt w anted to m ake sure th e V irginia-W ashington, D.C., railroad bridge was secure in case o f sudden attack Mby a foreign enem y o r by a sudden dom estic uprising.”42 Even th e A tlantic appeared perilous. O n 22 Septem ber 1939, th e president had confirm ed rum ors o f subm arines o ff Key W est an d B oston, to w hich Sen­ a to r H olt replied th at th e supposed m enace was m erely “snapping tu rtles striking th eir heads o u t o f th e w ater looking for air.”43 R um ors o f th e sup­ posed sinking o f tw o B ritish ships, th e Southgate an d Coulmore, o ff th e A m er­ ican coast were later proven to be unfounded.44 Particularly after the fall o f France, m any scare stories arose concerning such a th reat. Even one as sophisticated as A. A. Berle could m om entarily ac­ cept th e ir credibility.45 In the spring o f 1940, w hen the fate o f th e French and B ritish fleets w ere still in do u b t, arm y planners feared th at a vastly increased G erm an navy could tran sp o rt a considerable num ber o f tro o p s across th e A t­ lantic.46 Life m agazine show ed G erm ans bom bing the Panam a C anal, landing in Brazil, defeating th e A m erican fleet, and invading New Jersey to overrun the industrial N ortheast.47 In th e second h alf o f 1940, Liberty m agazine presented a fictionalized series th at dealt w ith such an assault, as did a novel w ritten by pop u lar h istorian H endrik W illem Van Loon.40 All th e tim e H itler was conquering W estern Europe, noninterventionists m ocked such anxieties. A dvertising executive C hester Bowles facetiously re­ ferred to “th e possibility o f G erm an parachutists capturing New York’s C ity H all and blow ing up B oulder Dam .” “Every tim e an autom obile backfires,” scoffed H am ilton Fish, W ashingtonians “envision th e panzer divisions m arch­ ing u p Pennsylvania Avenue.” “People are seeing airplanes flying over the Rocky M ountains,” stated W heeler, “seeing subm arines o n th eir coasts, and are th inking they are abo u t to be bom bed.” T he Christian Century described A m erican m others “arm ed w ith rifles, ready to shoot dow n parachutists.”49 In th e w ords o f John H aynes H olm es, “T he co u n try is going m ad.” Even the p ru ­ d en t Berle spoke o f “a steady wave o f hysteria” w ithin th e n atio n .50 N oninterventionists argued th a t H itler w ould always be preoccupied w ith th e E uropean co n tin en t. Before he could begin an A m erican invasion, re­ m arked Uncensored in June 1940, he m ust overcom e a host o f problem s: con­ querin g E ngland an d France; keeping in subjugation som e 142 m illion oc­ cupied E uropeans; w orking o u t “his self-proclaim ed destiny in th e East,” w here he confronted Russia, Italy, an d Turkey; an d w hipping up “his w arw eary people in to a frenzy o f h atred against th e U nited States.” To attack th e U nited States, com m ented P hilip La Follette in F ebruary 1941, eighty m illion

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exhausted G erm ans needed sufficient reserve stren g th to risk leaving tw ice as m any em bittered subject peoples in th e ir rear; fu rth erm o re, "a vast an d unpredictable R ussian m ilitary m achine” w as o n th e ir flank.51 R etired m a­ rin e general Sm edley B utler had joked in O ctober 1939, "N obody in E urope can afford to leave hom e. W hy, if H itler leaves G erm any w ith a m illion sol­ diers to com e over here, if he ever got back he’d find everyone speaking ei­ th e r French o r R ussian. T hose babies w ould m ove in o n him w hile he w as gone.”52 Again, in February 1941, H erbert H oover, m eeting w ith C ordell H ull, chal­ lenged the secretary’s claim th at G erm any intended to attack N orth an d South A m erica, m uch less conquer the w orld. T he USSR and th e Balkans together, he noted, possessed far m ore undeveloped resources th an d id th e en tire W est­ ern H em isphere. W hile th e Soviet U nion could be conquered w ith tw o arm y corps, an attack on th e hem isphere w ould require trem endous am ounts o f equipm ent.55 M ore th an H itler’s continental concerns, however, entered into play. To ad ­ m in istratio n critics, the U nited States seem ed to possess an airtig h t defense: three thousand m iles o f ocean betw een itself an d Europe. Said Taft in M ay 1941, "An ocean is th e m ost effective b arrier o f defense th a t th e w orld p ro ­ vides.”54 A nti-interventionists often cited a rep o rt dated 15 M ay 1940, issued by th e Senate C om m ittee o n Naval A ffairs.55 D enying th at the U.S. was m en­ aced by foreign arm ies, it countered, "T he U nited States at th e present tim e is n o t vulnerable to direct attack by any m eans w hatsoever save those w ith w hich a thoroughly m odern Navy and air force can deal adequately.”56 Several anti-interventionists w rote entire books on how the U nited States could best defend itself. U ndoubtedly, H anson W. Baldw in, m ilitary corre­ spondent for the interventionist New York Times, received th e m ost general re­ spect. An A nnapolis graduate w ho spent three years on active duty, Baldwin had w orked for the Baltimore Sun, o f w hich his father was m anaging editor, before joining th e New York Times in 1929.57 H is w ritings received m any en­ dorsem ents from the president’s adversaries.58 Privately, Baldw in told an tiinterventionists th a t he opposed A m erican en try in to th e war.59 Baldwin’s system atic treatm en t o f U.S. defense, United We Stand!, was pu b ­ lished in th e spring o f 1941. In it he firm ly denied th at th e natio n could be in ­ vaded. N o potential hostile pow er possessed territo ry o r bases in the W estern H em isphere; the A tlantic stretched three thousand m iles, the Pacific from fo u r to seven thousand. "Invaders can reach this co u n try only by ship o r plane; arm ies cannot sw im to victory.”60 Suppose, he speculated, th at th e USSR, G erm any, Japan, an d Italy all planned a jo in t attack on the U nited States. Eleven m illion troops, o r betw een six and seven h u ndred divisions, w ould be needed. Also required w ould be from th irty to sixty thousand planes, although the flying range o f m ost o f these w ould be lim ited. O nly a handful o f the w orld’s bom bing planes, said

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Baldw in, possessed an operating radius o f m ore th an tw o thousand m iles, and m ost o f these w ere A m erican. T he great m ajority, probably 90 percent, had operating rad ii o f from three to n ine h u n d red m iles. For a m ass bom bard­ m ent, five h u n d red m iles o u t an d five h u n d red back was about the lim it, as G erm an operations had recently show n. A few p o in ts on the A tlantic coast could be bom bed by one-w ay raiders, b u t these ranges m eant little m ilitarily.61 Any united fleet w ould scarcely outm atch th e U nited States’s ow n. Even if it possessed tw enty-five battleships to th e U.S.'s fifteen, th is sum included tw o G erm an pocket battleships plus only three Russian battleships— all unable to cross th e seas. T he disem barkation “m ight well result in a far w orse sham bles th an G allipoli.”62 G enuine defense, Baldw in argued, required n eith er th e em placem ent o f heavy guns n o r profuse co nstruction o f airfields n o r naval patrols covering every square m ile o f coast. Essential, rather, was sufficient control o f certain strategic p oints, those crucial to guarding vital areas an d preventing th e con­ stru ctio n o f enem y bases. N o rth ern approaches to th e hem isphere w ould be guarded by bases in th e L abrador-N ew foundland-N ova Scotia area; southern approaches w ould be protected by bases in Brazil. T urning to th e Pacific coast, Baldw in sought use o f E cuador's G alapagos Islands and C osta Rica’s Cocos Is­ lands as well as th e U.S. islands o f O ahu, Midway, W ake, and G uam . Add bases in th e A laskan-A leutian-H aw aiian area, and the Pacific sector w ould be prac­ tically im pregnable.63 In A ugust 1941, he suggested bases in N o rth ern Ireland, Scotland, Freetow n, and possibly th e Azores an d C ape Verde.64 FDR foes praised his volum e, as did such interventionists as historian W alter Millis and Time m agazine.65 New Republic editor M alcolm Cowley lauded Bald­ win’s detailed com m ents on the arm ed forces b u t saw the defense o f B ritain as far m ore vital to A m erican safety than Baldwin was w illing to adm it.66 At th e sam e tim e Baldw in’s book appeared, Flem ing M acLiesh an d C ush­ m an Reynolds's Strategy o f the Americas was published. M acLiesh was a li­ censed a ir p ilo t an d poet. Reynolds edited Uncensored after Sidney H ertzberg stepped dow n to prepare bulletins for the A m erica First C om m ittee. C laim ing th a t defense o f th e entire hem ispheric land m ass was neither practicable n o r necessary, M acLiesh and Reynolds quoted the adage o f Fred­ erick th e G reat: “If you defend everything, you defend nothing.” All th at was required was effective control o f strategic points, so as to prevent any enem y from establishing a bridgehead. M uch o f th eir vision resem bled Baldw in’s, as it involved U.S. bases in Alaska, N ew foundland, N ova Scotia, Prince Edw ard Island, C ape Verde, and th e bulge o f Brazil and such Pacific islands as H aw aii, Midway, and W ake.67 As Baldw in had done, M acLiesh and Reynolds also drew u p a w orst-case scenario. Seizure o f Pernam buco, Brazil, w ould ju st begin G erm any's p ro b ­ lem s. Long- an d m edium -range A m erican bom bers, convoyed by p u rsu it planes from nearby bases, could blast th e isolated beachhead continually.

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Even an invasion force o f ten th o u san d soldiers w ould be d ependent o n highly vulnerable supply lines and subject to A m erican fire. If H itler a t­ tem pted a m ore n o rth ern route, he w ould face an even greater co n cen tratio n o f A m erican pow er. T he C aribbean, w ith its three narrow w ater passages a n d U.S. bases, presented superb strategic advantages. Any strike along th e A t­ lantic seaboard o r in eastern C anada w ould b ring him u p against A m erican coastal artillery an d a first-class m echanized arm y. Suppose, they w rote, H itler’s aircraft carriers launched nig h ttim e raids against W ashington, Philadelphia, New York, and B oston. C arriers could tra n sp o rt a t m ost sev­ enty sm all planes, w hich w ould be required to ru n a gauntlet o f an tiaircraft guns and pow erful concentrations o f interceptor, fighter, and attack planes. Such raids w ould lack any m ilitary value, as th e ensuing dam age could n o t com pensate for th e enorm ous losses. Even if every A m erican battleship was sent to th e b o tto m , U.S. bom ber squadrons could still cripple gun tu rre ts, blast supply lines, p u t carriers o u t o f action, w ipe o u t any bridgeheads, and sink tran sp o rts, destroyers, and flotilla craft.68 A n ti-interventionists praised th e w ork, w hich received o th er favorable review s as w ell.69 In his ow n version o f a prospective invasion, John T. Flynn stressed p ro b ­ lem s o f m atériel. An attacking force o f even a h u ndred thousand troops, he said, required 750,000 tons o f shipping. W ith each ship averaging five th o u ­ sand tons, this force w ould need 150 vessels, convoyed by a flotilla o f seven battleships, seven light cruisers, several m ine layers, and a t least seventy d e­ stroyers. Such an im m ense arm ada, m oving slowly over three thou san d m iles o f seas, w ould stand at th e m ercy o f th e A m erican navy and air force. W ere H itler to invade w ith a m illion m en, Flynn continued, his problem s w ould sim ply increase. He w ould need forty-four thousand guns; over a h u n d red thousand vehicles, including forty-five h u n d red tanks; and nearly ten th o u ­ sand planes. Each day his arm y w ould use up nine thousand tons o f rations and supplies, 1.5 m illion gallons o f gasoline, and 150,000 gallons o f oil. A fter the arm y arrived on shore, it w ould have to keep open a continuous flow o f provisions, fuel, an d arm s. T ransportation alone lay "beyond the pow er o f any country.”70 A dm inistration adversaries stressed one them e continually: shipping needs alone, they said, w ould prevent th e G erm ans from invading.71 W heeler, find­ ing an invasion force to need tw o m illion troops for success, denied th at all the ships o f th e w orld could carry a force h alf th at size.72 Even m oving tw o h u n ­ dred thou san d troops, H ugh Johnson agreed, w ould take 2.4 m illion to n s o f shipping, a "m athem atical im possibility.”73 "C ould th e U.S. Be Invaded? Yes, b u t W hat a Job!” was th e headline o f a Chicago Tribune article.74 A ir attack was deem ed n o threat. N o bom ber in existence o r under con­ stru ctio n , said Uncensored in M ay 1940, could fly a bom b load tw o thousand m iles, dro p it, and retu rn to its base.75 O ver a year later, th e AFC cited G eneral Johnson H agood, executive officer o f supply in W orld W ar I, w ho had recently

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w ritten, “T he best know n au th o rities have agreed th a t th e average A m erican is in m uch m ore danger o f an autom obile o r a gangster th an he is o f a G er­ m an bom b even if we should be drafted in to th e war.”76 O f all th e anti-interventionists, no one was m ore frequently quoted o n air defense th an C harles L indbergh.77 In M ay 1940, th e aviator conceded th at bom bing planes could be b u ilt w ith sufficient range to cross th e A tlantic and retu rn , b u t “th e cost is high, the target large and the m ilitary effectiveness sm all.” F urtherm ore, he continued, few such bom bers w ould exist; they w ould have to be accom panied by thousands o f sm aller ones and p u rsu it planes; and planes could only tran sp o rt relatively sm all forces o f m en over thousands o f m iles.78 N one o f th e fo u r m ajor air routes, Lindbergh m aintained, threatened the U nited States. T he n o rth ern route, via G reenland and Iceland, was to o m o u n ­ tainous, th e seas too filled w ith ice, th e A rctic clim ate too severe. T he G reat C ircle ro u te over N ew foundland and Iceland spanned nearly nineteen h u n ­ dred m iles; an enem y still w ould have to refuel in either N ew foundland o r C anada. The sou th ern route, over B erm uda and th e Azores, involved an even longer nonstop flight over w ater. T he South A tlantic route, betw een A frica and Brazil, extended only sixteen h u n d red m iles (he once personally m easured the route from C ape Verde) and possessed relatively good w eather conditions, b u t an invader could be repulsed by a U.S. air base in South A m erica.79 M oreover, so FDR critics claim ed, bom bers needed fighters accom panying them . “B ringing dow n such a bom ber unprotected by escort fighters,” Nye said, “w ould be as easy for o u r p u rsu it ships an d interceptors as it w ould be for an expert rifle shot to fell a sittin g target.” Som e bom bers, he conceded, m ight reach th e U nited States, b u t they presented no serious danger to its p ro ­ ductive capacity.80 Boake C arter noted th a t G erm an air raids o n B ritain had been ineffective, for the Reich lacked th e fighters required to defend G erm an bom bers. As the range o f m ost fighters was nine h u n d red m iles, they certainly w ould be unable to m ake th e fo u r th o u san d -m ile ro u te from the Azores to th e A m ericas an d back.81 W hat if the G erm ans used aircraft carriers? W ithout th e protection o f a fleet, said Nye, a carrier was the m ost vulnerable type o f w arship afloat. Even u nder such escort, carriers w ere none too secure. A ccording to Taft, the G er­ m ans did n o t possess a sufficient n um ber anyhow.82 Sim ilarly, m ajor airstrips w ere required. V illard conceded Roosevelt’s claim th a t fliers could reach th e U nited States from G reenland and South A m erica w ithin a few hours; he stressed, though, th at b o th areas w ere deficient in the huge su p p o rt bases th a t m ust supply th e th irty m echanics needed to tend each plane.83 Besides, it was argued, effective coastal defense could repel any initial lan d ­ ing.84 A m erican bom bers, com m ented C olonel M cC orm ick, could prevent any invasion o f the eastern seaboard. (T he C hicago publisher had been a line officer in W orld W ar I an d saw him self as a m ilitary strategist.)85 To H iram

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Johnson, striking a “slow, lum bering an d defenseless arm ada” w ould be “like shooting fish in a barrel.” For any invasion to succeed, Sm edley B utler argued, h arb o rs w ere essential: “You can’t stop 25 m iles o u t a t sea, dro p a 5 -ton a r­ m ored tan k overboard, and tell it to sw im ashore an d m eet you o n B roadw ay” To clog u p New York H arbor, w hich was th e only large h arb o r o n th e A tlantic coast, all one had to do was to dum p tw o days* garbage in the channel! V illard cited G eneral H agood to th e effect th at an invading arm y could disem bark at one o f only five p o rts— New York, B oston, N orfolk, San Francisco, an d Seat­ tle— for an arm y required docks and pow erful cranes.86 M oreover, suggested D. W orth C lark, such havens could be so m ined so th at battleships and planes w ould n o t be needed to deter a foreign fleet.87 Suppose enem y troops were able initially to land on U.S. shores. T hey w ould be repulsed quickly.88 Sterling M orton envisioned G erm ans being bayoneted as they disem barked.89 T he state o f Florida alone, asserted Senator Downey, could decim ate over ten thousand soldiers as they landed on its beaches.90 C ongressw om an Jeanette R ankin quoted an A m erican Legionnaire w ho said th at if the G erm ans invaded fifty thousand a t a tim e, “the police could take care o f them , b u t if they cam e over in 6,000 loads, the Boy Scouts could handle them .”91 D if­ ferent estim ates were given as to the defensive m anpow er involved, w ith V illard offering th e highest num ber, six hundred thousand.92 T he sheer expanse o f the U nited States, m aintained the New York Daily News, w ould stifle any expeditionary force th a t m ight get a foothold o n its shores. “Look w hat the C hinese are doing to the Japanese.” M oreover, superior U.S. tran sp o rtatio n facilities could shuttle defense force arm ies from coast to coast, w elcom ing the aggressors “w ith bloody hands to hospitable graves.”93 Even in W orld W ar I, w rote Frank W aldrop, a tw o m illio n -stro n g AEF needed the su p p o rt o f three navies, the m erchant m arine o f five nations, and dom i­ n atio n o f friendly shores. “C an they really gang up o n us?” he asked.94 Sim ilarly, certain cam paigns o f W orld W ar II w ere presented to show inva­ sion difficulties. Senator Chavez p ointed to problem s G erm any encountered in tran sp o rtin g troops a few hundred m iles to Norway.95 Uncensored w arned against “unscrupulous interventionists w ho im ply th a t a m urderous m a­ rauder baffled by th e English C hannel w ould find the A tlantic O cean a duck pond.”96 W heeler, n oting the exam ple o f B ritish resistance, asked in A ugust 1941, “If it is as easy as all th a t for the G erm ans to com e over and land m en and have them blow up everything in the city o f New York an d in Buffalo, w hy in th e nam e o f G od do n o t the B ritish send m en over to G erm any and blow up Berlin and then pick them up again and bring them back?”97 H itler, it was fu rth er argued, w ould need m uch m ore tim e to prepare.98 In Septem ber 1940, C ongressm an John Jennings estim ated it taking five years to organize an expeditionary force, by w hich tim e the U nited States w ould possess a tw o-ocean navy. No attack, said Uncensored in January 1941, could com e be­ fore 1943, at w hich tim e the U.S. w ould have tw enty-three battleships.99

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A related concern centered on the B ritish fleet, a m ajor issue w ith th e in ter­ ventionists. Stim son w arned, “We are in very great danger o f invasion by air in th e event the B ritish Navy should be destroyed o r surrendered.” If B ritain fell, so th e CDAAA argued, the Axis pow ers w ould (w ithout having any B ritish craft) possess a battleship superiority o f three to four over th e U nited States and m ore than eight tim es the nation’s shipbuilding capacity. H aving the B ritish navy w ould m ake th e danger th at m uch m ore om inous, for possible invasion o f th e U.S. itself could be in th e offing. From 30 July to 1 A ugust 1940, th e CDAAA ran advertisem ents declaring "Betw een Us an d H itler Stands th e B ritish Fleet,” an argum ent used particularly frequently d u rin g the destroyer bases deal.100 N oninterventionist opposition responded quickly, using th e fleet m atter as an o th er o p p o rtu n ity to indict E ngland.101 B ritain, Nye recalled, was “th e only pow er th a t has ever b rought aggression to the Am ericas.” 102 Even m ore m od­ erate voices, including N orm an T hom as, p ointed to B ritain’s supposed record o f aggression. In reality, rem arked H anson Baldw in, A m erican security never lay w ith th e B ritish fleet b u t was em bodied in such factors as geographic iso­ lation, th e U nited States’s ow n inherent strength, the balance o f pow er in Eu­ rope, an d th e preoccupation o f th e O rient w ith its ow n developm ent.103 Even if, however, A lbion was as perfidious as th e m ore extrem e a n ti-in te r­ v entionists believed, it w ould never su rren d er its flo tilla.104 Nye cited C hurchill’s ow n pledge to th a t effect. Uncensored noted unnam ed “m ilitary ex­ p erts” w ho predicted th a t in any m ajor battle in th e English C hannel, oneth ird o f B ritain’s ships w ould be sunk; the rest m ight m ake a ru n to em pire o r A m erican ports. If necessary, th e entire fleet m ight be scuttled. In th e process, H itler, too, w ould experience severe losses.105 W ere G erm any to possess th e B ritish fleet, crossing the A tlantic w ould still be by n o m eans easy.106 A ccording to M acLiesh and Reynolds, H itler w ould still face incredible p reparation: train in g crews, plotting strategy, coordinating use o f guns and shells, conducting the m aneuvers o f a com bined B ritish-G erm an-F rench-Italian fleet. Even if a m assive air arm ada lay at his disposal, only p a rt o f it could fly across the A tlantic and retu rn to hom e base w ith o u t refu­ eling. P reparation alone w ould take tw o years, d u rin g w hich tim e the U nited States’s ow n naval schedule w ould be com pleted.107 In the w orst o f circum stances, a few anti-interventionists argued, th e U.S. could still m aintain its defenses.108 W ere th e G erm ans to seize the B ritish navy, said C olonel M cC orm ick, “We could stop the fleet anyway.” Taft cited Roo­ sevelt him self to th e effect th a t no enemy, even one th at possessed the B ritish navy, w ould be stupid enough to invade w ithout th e needed strategic bases.109 Pacifist N icholas B roughton envisioned “an understanding betw een ourselves an d G erm any sim ilar to the one we had w ith G reat Britain.” If the Reich was recalcitrant, G erm any m ight be confronting an A m erican-Japanese détente w herein Japan “w ould guard the Pacific w hile we patrolled the A tlantic.” 110

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W ithin th e adm inistration, pow erful voices stressed th a t th e n atio n was fully capable o f self-defense. In January 1941, th e m ilitary Joint P lanning C om m ittee reported, “The U nited States can safeguard th e N orth A m erican contin en t an d probably th e w estern hem isphere, w hether allied to B ritain o r not.” Pleading for caution in regard to m ilitary com m itm ents, it w arned against sacrificing A m erican interests.111 T hat sam e m onth, Roosevelt accused th e an ti-interventionists o f m isstating th e issue. In his State o f th e U nion address to C ongress, FDR denied th at any enem y “w ould be stu p id enough to attack us by landing troops in the U nited States across thousands o f m iles o f ocean.” T he real issue centered o n dom i­ n ation o f strategic bases th at could serve as launching pads and th at w ould be occupied “by secret agents and th eir dupes.” 112 From th e beginning o f th e E uropean conflict, polls indicated fears th at a victorious G erm any w ould attack th e W estern H em isphere. Yet, in A pril 1941, a Fortune poll found well over h a lf th e recipients denying th at H itler was able to invade the U nited States.113 To m uch o f the A m erican public, U.S. security was dependent on o th er factors, am ong them th e survival o f G reat B ritain in th e sum m er an d fall o f 1941.

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D uring the second h alf o f 1941, th e B ritish w ound up th eir cam paign in East Africa, seizing G ondar in E thiopia late in Septem ber. They w ere less success­ ful in N orth A frica, w here the tro o p s o f G eneral A lan C unningham w ere fight­ ing indecisively against R om m el’s A frika Korps, w hich recovered alm ost the entire coast east o f Tunisia. In A ugust, B ritish civilian losses totaled 169, the equivalent o f a low toll for a single nig h t w hen the blitz was at its m ost in ten ­ sive.1 Fortunes also im proved o n th e A tlantic, w ith shipping losses rising above tw o h u n d red thousand tons only in Septem ber. As B ritain, however, depended o n its convoys escaping an ever-increasing num ber o f G erm an U -boats, such losses w ere crucial. O n 25 June, C hurchill w arned th a t invasion o f the B ritish Isles could take place any tim e from 1 Sep­ tem ber on. In O ctober, G eneral M arshall, still n o t sanguine, ordered a survey o f B ritish land defenses.2 Several anti-interventionists stressed G erm an weakness. In July, N orm an T hom as saw the B ritish E m pire surviving as long as th e w ar lasted. In Sep­ tem ber, H erbert H oover found B ritain grow ing daily m ore im pregnable to a t­ tack; conversely, H itler’s E urope lacked needed food and m aterial. To the Chicago Tribune, B ritain was sim ply “sitting p retty” as G erm any an d the USSR w ore them selves o u t.3 D uring the rest o f th e fall, such optim ism continued, reflected in public opinion polls show ing up to 85 percent o f the respondents predicting a G er­ m an defeat.4 A nti-interventionists noted accounts o f sabotage and uprisings w ithin th e occupied countries and w idespread depression w ithin G erm any it­ self. O ne Christian Century editorial headline ran, “N azi-O ccupied Lands Seethe w ith Revolt.”5 In early N ovem ber, Senator Shipstead said, “G erm any

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m ay have w ithin h er borders m ore seeds o f d estruction th an we have any idea of.” D raw ing on firsthand observations, C udahy pointed to inadequate food and clothing, a depleted tran sp o rtatio n system , and ua crying shortage o f lab o r” T he form er am bassador, w ho had interview ed H itler th at June, ob­ served, “I never saw a m an w ho looked so ill as he did w hen I saw him .” In fact, he called the G erm an Führer "only a passing fad.” Speaking som ew hat vaguely, Fish predicted th at th e G erm an leader w ould eventually die and his em pire collapse.6 All th is tim e, predictions o f stalem ate rem ained. “To defeat Germany,” as­ serted C ongressm an Shanley, “w ould be difficult, w ith industrial areas in Rus­ sia now in her hands. But H itler will fall dow n w hen it com es to achieving peace.” C iting D em aree Bess’s article in the Saturday Evening Post, “P ut Up o r Shut Up,” V illard denied th at the w orld contained enough Englishm en to de­ feat G erm any.7 B ritain, several FDR foes stated, was too weak to fight alone.8 In July, H oover predicted th at once the G erm ans had defeated Russia, they w ould propose a peace th at Britain w ould invariably tu rn dow n, at w hich poin t the U nited States w ould enter the w ar as a full-scale belligerent. Britain, suspected the New York Daily News in m id-N ovem ber, planned to fight a defensive w ar through 1942, hoping th at the Soviets w ould keep G erm any occupied until a jo in t A m ericanBritish invasion was launched in 1943. Early in December, A lf Landon suspected th at Britain m ight intentionally be seeking others to do its fighting, perm itting the Soviet U nion and the U nited States to engage in m ajor hostilities: “If Russia and Am erica do fight it o u t w ith Germany, is there any possibility th at we may w ind up bankrupt, both as a people and as a governm ent, w ith England sitting in the best financial position o f any country in the world?”9 Even full-scale A m erican p articipation, som e argued, could n o t defeat the G erm ans.10 B ritain and the Soviet U nion together, claim ed Freda Utley, had not m ade a dent on th e G erm an w ar m achine; how could it be assum ed th at England and the U nited States, the latter som e three thousand m iles away from the fighting, possessed the potential to defeat H itler? G erm any, she con­ tinued, had actually secured about tw ice as m any w ar m aterials from occupied France than B ritain had from the U.S. Because o f G erm any’s long head start, the thousands o f A m erican planes scheduled for delivery in 1942 and 1943 still could not give England the needed air superiority. B om bing was ineffec­ tive to achieve victory, for as G eorge B ernard Shaw had noted, it did n o t de­ stroy m orale; rather, it m ade people “fighting m ad.” To Felix M orley, U.S. in ­ volvem ent— beyond w hat was necessary to let B ritain negotiate a peace on equal term s— was “u tter m adness. O f such m adness, however, the adm inistra­ tio n is fully capable.”11 Several adm inistration critics on the extrem e right frequently changed th eir analyses. In July, Lawrence D ennis predicted the launching o f a B ritish Expe­ ditionary Force, but by Septem ber he denied th at either H itler o r Roosevelt w ould soon precipitate full-scale war. “FDR will have m ost o f the naval hon-

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ors along w ith th e B ritish. T he G erm ans w ill have the m ilitary o r land h o n ­ ors.” If th e U nited States really w anted to m ake tro u b le for H itler, it stood a b etter chance by continuing its present policy o f supplying arm s, tanks, and planes to th e Reich's enem ies.12 In July, Social Justice spoke in term s o f a jo in t B ritish-A m erican attack o n th e E uropean continent. As th e Nazis w ere fight­ ing o n tw o fronts, th e invaders m ight be able to secure a solid foothold either in a G erm an-occupied n ation o r in n o rth ern G erm any itself. Early in Sep­ tem ber, C oughlin’s jo u rn al denied th a t th e U nited States w ould enter th e w ar; it foresaw B ritain itself joining th e Axis. Yet w ithin tw o weeks, it again shifted its position, asserting th a t to save an international banking system based on Mgold” an d "debt,” Roosevelt w ould plunge his n atio n in to a losing w ar.13

Little w onder th a t d u rin g th e sum m er an d fall o f 1941, an ti-interventionists kept calling for a negotiated peace.14 T hose o f pacifist leanings w ere p a rticu ­ larly vocal. In O ctober, C harles C layton M orrison dem anded explicit peace aim s, saying n o Eight o r Fourteen Points w ould suffice. If th e G erm an people w ere offered “a decent peace,” said A. J. M uste, m uch bloodshed w ould be avoided.15 T he pro m in en t M ethodist leader E rnest Frem ont T ittle called for an intern atio n al conference.16 D espite th e obvious anim osity against him , Roosevelt was still m entioned as a facilitator.17 John H aynes H olm es, in his capacity as chairm an o f th e C it­ izens Peace P etition C om m ittee, requested the president "to use th e influence w hich he possesses as th e elected representative o f th e A m erican people for th e cessation o f hostilities an d th e achievem ent o f a ju st peace.”18 AFC executive R. D ouglas S tuart asked educator R obert M . H utchins to lead a m ediation drive. H utchins consented to lend his nam e to a m ediation m ovem ent b u t refused to assum e leadership.19 In m id-N ovem ber, John T. Flynn sought a peace offensive, led by such prom inent clergy as P rotestant m inister H arry Em erson Fosdick an d R om an C atholic archbishop Francis Beckm an o f D ubuque.20 As always, rationale varied. "A E urope at peace,” said W heeler, "m eans th at the H itler em pire will crack and crum ble.” T he G erm an leader, C astle specu­ lated, could n o t survive in peacetim e: As th e F ührer’s governm ent was based o n w ar an d conquest, th e starvation accom panying any peace w ould lead to his overthrow . T he Reverend H olm es predicted th a t H itler w ould abandon his conquests if B ritain w ould abandon its ow n, including its rule o f India. If he him self d id n o t respond, H olm es continued, th e G erm an people w ould accept th e term s o n th eir ow n.21 Som e an ti-interventionists were less sanguine b u t found no alternative. A co n tin en t dom inated by H ider, said Alfred M. Bingham , was n o t "a pleasant prospect to look forw ard to, b u t it is a t least possible th at we shall have to

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m ake the best o f it as th e m ost we can hope for.” Suppose the peace were one o f arm ed w atchfulness, com m ented the Chicago Tribune; the burdens w ould still be far less than those o f uan interm inable w ar w ith no foreseeable results.” T he New York Daily News agreed w ith presidential adviser Joseph Davies, re­ cent A m erican am bassador to Russia, w ho found H itler’s w ord n o t "w orth a tinker's dam n,” b u t it spoke o f a peace th at G erm any itself w ould find in its in ­ terest to keep. Even if such a settlem ent ju st served as an arm ed truce, it could last ten years, long enough for at least som e w orld leaders to lose power. Freda U tley agreed, conceding th at one could never tru st H itler. A fully arm ed U nited States and a rejuvenated B ritain, however, w ould be strong enough to m aintain th e integrity o f th eir territories and spheres o f influence— indeed, probably to force G erm any into a peace o f equals.22 From July through Septem ber, som e optim ism prevailed. In July, Taft thought th at H itler m ight m ake a reasonable peace proposal by th e fall. Just over a m onth later, Libby suspected th a t G erm any and B ritain w ere already in ­ volved in secret peace negotiations. Late in Septem ber, C harles A. L indbergh saw at least an even chance o f a negotiated peace by th e follow ing spring.23 If anything, O ctober bought even m ore such predictions.24 C udahy found the G erm ans so eager for settlem ent th at th e general staff w ould force H itler ("only a passing phase”) to negotiate.25 To B orchard, Russia’s defeat w ould likely lead to the overthrow o f C hurchill’s governm ent, at w hich p o in t B ritain w ould m ake a "reasonable peace.”26 R uth Sarles noted W ashington rum ors, th e activity o f Lloyd G eorge, and H itler’s ow n desire, w hich, she rem arked, was opposed by th e G erm an m ilitary. A victorious Führer m ight propose a peace w hile resigning as chancellor.27 Even in O ctober, D ennis also believed H itler ready to m ake a peace; Lloyd G eorge was already m aking him self avail­ able for negotiation. Social Justice predicted peace by th e end o f the year, cit­ ing as evidence G erm any’s dom ination o f Europe and im m inent victory over th e Soviets. It was no m ere coincidence, Father C oughlin’s weekly continued, th at n either London n o r the m ajor G erm an cities had been bom bed efficiently in m any m onths.28 If H itler, said C hester Bowles, restored th e dem ocratic pow ers o f W estern Europe, B ritain m ight ju m p a t negotiation, particularly if the Soviets were defeated.29 Each anti-interventionist had his ow n idea o f w hat the peace term s could be. Libby found a basis for negotiation in a supposed G erm an proposal, published on 7 August in the New York Times and supposedly com m unicated via A nkara, whose term s included com plete G erm an w ithdraw al from Norway, D enm ark, the N etherlands, Belgium, and France.30 According to the Chicago Tribune, G er­ m any sought retention o f A lsace-Lorraine and a jo in t crusade w ith B ritain against Bolshevism. In O ctober, Uncensored speculated th at the G erm an people w ould accept a peace that allowed the Reich to retain only A ustria and the Pol­ ish C orridor, both areas where the m ajority had favored Anschluss. Its source was Inside Germany Reports, the journal o f the A m erican Friends o f G erm an

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Freedom . C udahy saw H itler as offering “the restoration o f the W estern Euro­ pean dem ocracies” w hile insisting on “control o f the continent.”31 C ertain individual peace agendas were prepared. Libby envisioned a settle­ m ent based o n th e Eight Points th a t “w ould have th e su p p o rt o f all peoples, including Germ any.” To enforce such a peace, various international com m it­ tees w ould have to focus on such m atters as econom ic grievances, tariffs, dis­ arm am ent, an d currency.32 Edw in B orchard spoke o f ta riff adjustm ent, cus­ tom s unions, and th e allocation o f econom ic spheres o f influence so as to m ake every industrial n atio n self-sufficient. All distinction betw een victor and vanquished w ould be dropped; so w ould “all ideas o f coercion, w hich w ere fundam ental to th e peace enforcers o f 1919.”33 Late in N ovem ber, C hester Bowles outlined an entire peace agenda, one th a t included the rem oval o f H itler, M ussolini, an d C hurchill from any peace ne­ gotiations; G erm an w ithdraw al behind form er w estern frontiers, w hich m ight include A lsace-Lorraine; th e restoration o f th e B ritish and Italian em pires; fix­ ing th e political and econom ic future o f C entral and Eastern E urope by a con­ ference o f th e pow ers involved; A m erican sharing o f resources; an d a disar­ m am ent program in w hich th e form er belligerent nations an d th e U nited States w ould participate. A lthough such a peace, said Bowles in a m em o to H erbert H oover, w ould leave th e Nazis in possession o f m uch o f th e E uropean co ntinent, th e G erm an people should be preoccupied for m any years. Bowles reluctantly conceded to U.S. guarantees o f Europe’s bou n d ary lines and an al­ liance w ith B ritain. Yet, he m aintained, such a com bination m ight readily in ­ volve o th er nations, thereby w inning over th e B ritish and “m iddle-of-theroad” interventionists to acquiesce in his proposal. T he m ilitary provisions, he hoped, w ould gradually dro p in to th e background.34 H oover saw no im m edi­ ate possibility o f its im plem entation, b u t he th o u g h t th a t th e schem a m ight be m ade effective before th e w inter was over.35 N ot all adm inistration critics favored negotiations, m uch less w ere o p ti­ m istic abo u t them . Several strongly opposed such agitation. N egotiation, for exam ple, never becam e p a rt o f the AFC official program . To A m erica First vice chairm an H anford M acN ider, the recom m endation o f a negotiated peace involved ju st as m uch “m isguided m eddling” as Roosevelt’s activity.36 A m eri­ cans, said C harles A. Lindbergh, w ere n o t sufficiently acquainted w ith E uro­ pean conditions to accept any practical plan. “We w ould find ourselves in the position o f guaranteeing a peace th a t could n o t possibly last.”37 Interventionists continually stressed th eir opposition. Even a sh o rt truce, th e CDAAA argued in July, w ould p erm it H itler to m ake u p his shortages o f raw m aterials and consolidate his strik in g force. Conversely, th e B ritish, th eir w ill for victory gone, w ould be unable to con tin u e th eir unprecedented n a­ tional effort.38 Sharing such fears, H arold Ickes found th e B ritish susceptive to a Lloyd G eorge governm ent th a t w ould bargain w ith th e G erm ans. In his Labor Day speech, Roosevelt attacked th e “appeasers and N azi sym pathizers”

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w ho “even ask m e to negotiate w ith H itler— to pray for crum bs from his vic­ to rio u s table. T hey do, in fact, ask m e to becom e th e m odern B enedict A rnold and betray all I hold dear.” A gain th e polls su p p o rted th e p resident o n th e m atter.39

All th e tim e th a t cam paigns w ere analyzed an d negotiation debated, A m erican conflict w ith G erm any was steadily intensifying o n the high seas. O n 21 May, th e G erm ans sank th eir first U.S. ship. T he Robin Moor, a m erchant vessel fly­ ing th e A m erican flag, was headed for B ritish South A frica carrying steel rails and trucks. Such craft had been spared torpedoing outside the belligerent danger zones recognized u n d er th e neutrality act o f 1939; hence, th e ship’s ow ners had reason to expect im m unity. N o lives were lost. O nly in early June did A m ericans receive th e news.40 T he CDAAA used th e incident to call for im m ediate A m erican “policing” o f th e entire A tlantic. G erm any, it conceded, had been en titled to stop and search th e vessel b u t had n o rig h t to sink it w ithout providing for th e safety o f pas­ sengers and crew.41 A nti-interventionists held n o b rie f for th e sinking, th e AFC calling th e G er­ m an behavior “unjustified and ruthless” and form er senator D avid A. Reed (R ep.-Pa.) finding it “p u re piracy.”42 Still and all, th e fear continually arose th a t Roosevelt w ould use th e incident to intensify A m erican involvem ent. T he New York Daily News suspected a new Lusitania incident, recalling th a t th e C unard lin er’s m anifest, w hich revealed th a t th e ship had been carrying m unitions, was n o t published u n til years later.43 T he Daily Worker headlined an editorial, “T he People W ant N o ‘Incidents.’”44 T hough A m erica First expressed relief th at C ongress show ed little anxiety, its research bureau stressed th at, co n trary to the claim s o f interventionists, th e Robin Moor was carrying co ntraband an d thereby ran the risks th a t such cargoes involved.45 O n 17 June 1941, Roosevelt announced th at th e U nited States had n o t p u t into operation plans for arm ing m erchant vessels, although such designs had existed since 1918. The AFC replied th a t any arm ing o f m erchant vessels tu rn ed them into auxiliary w arships and therefore w ould lead to conflict.46 T hree days later, in a m essage to C ongress, Roosevelt called th e Robin Moor in ­ cident “a first step in assertion o f th e suprem e purpose o f th e G erm an Reich to seize control o f the high seas.” Invoking th e do ctrin e o f freedom o f th e seas, he m aintained th at th e U.S. w ould n o t yield to “piracy.”47 U nlike W oodrow W ilson in the case o f th e Sussex, he did n o t do w hat th e AFC m ost feared: use the Robin Moor incident to take m ore radical m easures. In th e w ords o f histo­ rian James M acG regor B urns, “T he President still had n o strategy except a strategy o f n o strategy.”4*

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C olum nist G eorge Sokolsky replied th a t B ritain itself had never agreed to freedom o f the seas, quoting C hurchill’s The Aftermath (1929) on the m atter. T he AFC research bureau accused th e president o f violating international law by attem pting to help one belligerent defeat another.49 O n 25 July 1941, in a conference w ith th e to p G erm an naval com m ander, A dm iral Erich Raeder, H itler denied seeking a w arlike incident w hile the Russ­ ian cam paign was still in progress; he w ould, however, never call a subm arine com m ander to account if he accidentally torpedoed an A m erican ship.50 Such torpedoing soon becam e a reality. O n 17 August, the Sessa, an A m eri­ can freighter sailing u nder Panam anian registry, was shelled near G reenland w hile tran sp o rtin g foodstuffs and lum ber to Iceland. O n 6 Septem ber, som e survivors were rescued, though tw enty-four m em bers o f its crew were lost, in ­ cluding one A m erican. W ord reached th e U nited States o n 9 Septem ber w hen a U.S. Navy patrol picked up three survivors. O n 5 Septem ber, the U.S. freighter Steel Seafarer, flying the A m erican flag, was bom bed in the Red Sea. T here were no fatalities. A m ericans learned about the incident three days later.51 A nti-interventionists addressed them selves to b o th incidents. F inerty o f the KAOWC claim ed th at th e Sessa was carrying contraband. V illard argued th a t th e Sessa had been w arned. In th e case o f th e Steel Seafarer, G eneral W ood noted th at it, too, was supplying contraband and th at th e ship had entered the Red Sea, obviously belligerent w aters an d som e twelve thousand m iles from A m erican shores.52 T he practice o f P anam anian reg istry w as strongly attacked. Betw een th e o u tb reak o f w ar an d 1 July 1941, according to th e AFC, six ty -th ree ships had been tran sfe rred to th e P anam anian flag. “L ittle Panam a,” w hose lan d area w as less th an th a t o f In d ian a, had suddenly becom e one o f th e leading ship p in g n a tio n s o f th e w orld. F inding an obvious c o n tra d ic tio n in U.S. policy, th e AFC recorded, “O n th e on e h an d , th e A d m in istratio n seeks to place A m erican ships in th e w ar trad e fo rbidden by o u r law s, placing th em u n d e r foreign flags, an d , o n th e o th e r h an d , claim s th a t American ships are being attacked w hen those foreign-flag ships ru n th e risks to w hich th a t policy necessarily subjects them .” Besides, said th e AFC, such practice h arm ed U.S. defense, fo r in F ebruary 1941 th e M aritim e C om m ission in d i­ cated an acute shortage o f ships needed to carry vital defense m aterials. F in erty soon alleged th a t P anam anian reg istry violated th e law, even if th e M aritim e C om m ission had claim ed san ctio n from “som e A ttorney G en­ eral.” F u rth erm o re, he charged, because P resident A rnulfo Francisco A rias o f Panam a h ad opposed arm in g these ships, th e U nited States h ad helped m an ip u late th e overthrow o f his governm ent th a t very O ctober. G eneral W ood w as m ore direct: “A m erican ship ow ners h id b eh in d a foreign flag to m ake som e m oney. A re A m erican m en to die for th e ir ‘d ividends’”?53 Early in Septem ber, A m ericans learned th at the U.S. destroyer Greer had been attacked by an unidentified subm arine en route to Iceland. The im m ediate

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response o f FDR’s critics was predictable. “We have,” said Senator M cC arran, “been sticking o u r nose o u t so far th at we can expect anything.” The fu rth er A m erican ships entered into w ar zones, added D anaher, “the m ore likely we are to be em broiled in war.”54 Roosevelt bided his tim e o n such m atters u n til 11 Septem ber, w hen he to ld a nationw ide radio audience th at, exactly one w eek earlier, a G erm an subm a­ rin e had fired on th e Greer. Also m entioning th e attacks o n th e Robin Moor, Sessa, and Steel Seafarer, FDR found “a N azi design to abolish freedom o f th e seas, and to acquire absolute control and d o m in atio n o f these seas for th em ­ selves.” T he next G erm an steps w ould include “dom in atio n o f th e U nited States” and “dom in atio n o f th e W estern H em isphere by force o f arm s,” to be follow ed by th e ir u ltim ate goal: “w orld conquest and p erm an en t w orld dom ­ in atio n by sw ord.” T he president issued a w arning. To w ard o ff “th e rattlesnakes o f th e A t­ lantic,” A m erican ships and planes w ould henceforth “strike th eir deadly blow — first”; th at is, they w ould shoot o n sight and ask questions later. Fur­ therm ore, U.S. patrolling vessels and planes w ould “protect all m erchant ships— n o t only A m erican ships b u t ships o f any flag— engaged in com m erce in o u r defensive w aters,” an area (though he did n o t say so) th at currently ex­ tended to som e four hundred m iles o ff th e Scottish coast. For roughly threeq uarters o f th e A tlantic, therefore, A m erican naval and air vessels w ould escort friendly convoys, in th e process elim inating any Axis forces encountered o n th e way. H istorical precedents, Roosevelt said, included actions against piracy by John A dam s an d T hom as Jefferson. An undeclared w ar in the A tlantic had officially begun.55 O n the follow ing day, th e CDAAA supported th e president’s speech, assert­ ing th at A m erican ships m ust n o t be “sitting targets” for H itler’s raiders. O nce the U.S. Navy took th e offensive, it predicted, G erm an subm arines w ould hes­ itate to co u rt destruction. Besides, it continued, th e U.S. was defending its rights o n th e high seas.56 Follow ing FDR’s speech, a G allup poll indicated 62 percent in su p p o rt o f the president’s position.57 Two prom inent an ti-interventionists backed the president. Roosevelt, m aintained H am ilton Fish, was rig h t in defending A m erican vessels going to Iceland, though he deplored th e fact th at they were there.58 H erbert H oover found FDR justified in protesting th e sinking o f m er­ chant ships w ithout adequate p rotection for crew. H e did w arn against send­ ing A m erican w arships in to danger zones, however.59 M ost noninterventionists opposed Roosevelt on th is m atter. C ertainly, they argued, the president was guilty o f hypocrisy. “An am azing speech,” w rote A nne M orrow Lindbergh in her diary. “A w izard he is to m ake so plausible th e thesis th at we w ill continue to give all possible aid to th e enem ies o f H itler w hile being affronted if H itler does n o t respect o u r rights as a ‘n eu tral’!” To C astle, it was th e U.S. th a t was breaking international law: “Even th e President

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o f th e U nited States cannot m ake law to suit him self from day to day." Profes­ sor Philip Jessup found no relationship betw een FDR’s new policy and the ac­ tivities o f A dam s an d Jefferson. T he AFC, he suggested, should indirectly broach th e m atter o f im peachm ent. Nye, B ennett C lark, and A m erica First all w anted th e Greer incident investigated.60 N orm an T hom as sought th e total w ithdraw al o f A m erican forces from Iceland.61 T he Christian Century recalled th at a m uch m ore serious incident, Japan’s attack o n th e Panay in D ecem ber 1937, had been peacefully resolved.62 O n 14 O ctober, th e chief o f naval operations, A dm iral H arold Stark, re­ leased an official rep o rt n o tin g th a t the Greer had sought o u t the G erm an sub, trailed it doggedly for h ours, and given B ritish planes inform ation to facilitate th eir attack.63 T he CDAAA still justified th e Greeks action: "T he fact th a t a B ritish plane dropped bom bs near th e subm arine earlier in n o way gave the subm arine any rig h t to fire o n an A m erican w arship.”64 To m any o f the president’s critics, th e Stark rep o rt again revealed Roo­ sevelt’s duplicity.6S T he Chicago Tribune carried th e editorial headline "T he T ruth C om es O ut.”66 Am os P inchot com pared th e Greer incident to Bis­ m arck’s fam ous Ems telegram , w hich triggered th e Franco-Prussian war.67 Som e an ti-interventionists suddenly saw th e G erm an action as quite ra­ tional.68 To Senator D anaher, it was th e A m ericans w ho w ere com m itting "fla­ gran t acts o f war.” Nye said, "W hat th e G erm an subm arine did was probably less th an we w ould have done u n d er like circum stances.” H oover now called the Greer “the aggressor.” W heeler cited a sailor o n th e Greer w ho had w ritten him to th e effect th a t his ship, u n d er orders, had fired first.69 As far as FDR’s shoot-on-sight orders were concerned, adm in istratio n foes w ere even m ore furious.70 Fifty-eight prom inent A m ericans signed a petitio n calling Roosevelt’s speech a "grave th reat to th e dem ocratic principle o f m a­ jo rity rule.”71 G eneral W ood accused th e president o f initiatin g "an undeclared war, in plain violation o f th e C onstitution.”72 A detailed AFC position paper charged FDR w ith violating the 1939 neutrality act and m isrepresenting the concept o f “freedom o f the seas.” T he AFC accused th e president n o t o f elim ­ inating subm arines b u t o f elim inating C ongress. T he New York chapter found FDR to be “annexing” th e w aters o f the A tlantic, a p a rt o f th e Pacific, and p o r­ tions o f th e Red Sea— indeed, alm ost everything b u t th e M editerranean: "N ever in th e history o f th e co u n try has there been so gross usu rp atio n o f pow er by any executive save H uey Long.”73 Roosevelt’s term piracy was disputed. To Lincoln C olcord, th e A m ericans w ere the real pirates for com m itting “repeated acts o f w ar w ithout declaring war.” To C hicago attorney Clay Judson, piracy could easily apply to B ritain, for it was the pow er preventing the U nited States from sending food to th e babies o f occupied Europe. Sim ilarly, th e Chicago Tribune com pared G erm any, w hich seldom interfered w ith peaceful A m erican com m erce, to B ritain, w hich was interfering “every m om ent o f every day in every p o rt an d every ocean,” in the

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process keeping A m erican form ers an d m anufacturers from exporting th eir products to occupied E urope.74 N oninterventionists challenged o th er Roosevelt claim s as well. Axis dom i­ n atio n o f Eurasia, said b o th th e AFC and th e socialist Call, w ould n o t lead to a shipbuilding gap. In fact, one A m erican steel com pany in 1941 could p ro ­ duce m ore steel th an all o f G erm any. Sim ilarly, freedom o f th e seas was again found to be a m isnom er, being neith er trad itio n al A m erican do ctrin e n o r rec­ ognized in international law. In the w ords o f th e AFC, th e president really sought “freedom to aid at w ill one belligerent nation w ithout danger o f in ter­ ference by th e o th er belligerent.”75 O n 11 Septem ber, the day FDR gave his shoot-on-sight speech, th e freighter Montana, heading tow ard Iceland, was torpedoed 260 m iles southw est o f its destination. Its entire crew was saved. C hartered to a private A m erican firm , it flew th e Panam anian flag. T he event was reported a day later. Few a n ti-in ter­ ventionists com m ented. Finerty asserted th at the ship was probably traveling in convoy, w hich w ould give th e G erm ans legal rights to sink it.76 O n 17 Septem ber 1941, the U.S. Navy began escorting its first British convoy. O n the sam e day, H itler gave instructions to avoid any incident before the m id­ dle o f O ctober. Just a week later, the Royal Navy w ithdrew com pletely from the western A tlantic, leaving escorting there to the Am ericans and the Canadians.77 O n 19 Septem ber, the m erchant ship Pink Star, also u nder Panam anian reg­ istry, was sunk betw een G reenland and Iceland u n d er circum stances alm ost identical to th e Montana. O f the twelve m en lost, n o t one was an A m erican. W ithin ten days, the public learned o f th e incident. To Roosevelt the U nited States had an obligation to protect ships flying th e Panam anian flag, for "today freedom o f the seas includes very definitely the protection o f this W estern H em isphere and all o f the tw enty-one Republics therein.”78 A n ti-in terv en tio n ists responded quickly. As in previous cases, th ey em ­ phasized th a t th e Pink Star carried c o n trab an d an d was arm ed .79 Fish, n o t­ ing th e P anam anian registry, held th e U.S. no m ore responsible fo r such ships th an for those “flying th e Sw edish flag” o r representing “th e Swiss Navy.”80 C ongressm an B radley stressed th a t th e Pink Star was sailing in a C anadian convoy in to an area th a t th e G erm an governm ent had declared a blockade zone. G erm any, said A m os P in ch o t, had a rig h t, possibly a duty, to sin k such vessels.81 W hile the president was im plem enting his convoy orders, on 27 Septem ber still an o th er sinking took place. A G erm an U -boat struck the I. C. White, a tanker th at belonged to the Standard O il C om pany o f New York b u t th at flew the Panam anian flag. Sailing alone from C uraçao to C ape Town carrying a cargo o f fuel oil, it was h it som e six hundred m iles east o f Pernam buco, Brazil. T hree o f its crew were lost, all A m ericans. The public learned o f th e event w ithin the week. Roosevelt’s adversaries again stressed the m atter o f co n tra­ band and the fact th e ship was arm ed.82

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A id to B ritain was still lim ited by th e 1939 neutrality act, w hich forbade A m erican vessels from entering com bat zones previously designated by the president. C ould such ships sail directly to England, w ith o u t having to tra n s­ fer cargoes a t Iceland, th e em battled isle w ould receive substantially m ore lend-lease m atériel. M oreover, interventionists argued, these freighters could assist in th eir ow n defense if they could m o u n t one o r tw o guns.83 Fully aw are o f th e narrow ness o f the H ouse vote o n extending draft term s, the president d id n o t to seek im m ediate repeal o f th e entire 1939 act. R ather, he w ould sim ply alter section 2, w hich banned A m erican vessels from bel­ ligerent zones; section 3, w hich authorized th e president to proclaim com bat zones aro u n d belligerent countries; and section 6, w hich prohibited th e arm ­ ing o f U.S. m erchant vessels. T he adm inistration decided to test opinion in the H ouse, w here opposition seem ed stronger, by asking it to approve th e arm ing o f m erchant ships. If the H ouse did so, th e Senate w ould then be requested to repeal all three sections, a t w hich tim e th e H ouse w ould again vote, this tim e o n th e com prehensive Senate bill.84 A few anti-interventionists th o u g h t th at th e president had th e a u th o rity to act o n his ow n, tho u g h o f course they hoped he w ould n o t do so.85 O n 9 O ctober, Roosevelt proposed the arm ing o f Am erican m erchant ships— an old practice, he said, never prohibited by international law or, until 1937, by any federal statute. By such m eans, aid could be delivered w ith far greater effec­ tiveness against the “trem endous forces now m arching tow ard conquest o f the world.” The president did concede th at “the arm ing o f m erchant vessels does not guarantee their safety,” b u t “it m ost certainly” added to i t M ost o f the vital goods authorized by Congress were being delivered, he noted; nevertheless, too m any craft were still being sunk. He added a general wish that Congress w ould give its “earnest and early attention” to elim inating the ban on entering com bat zones, thereby perm itting Am erican m erchant ships to reach belligerent ports. FDR de­ nied th at he was calling for a declaration o f war; he was sim ply concerned w ith the “essential defense o f A m erican rights” and “the freedom o f the seas.”86 T he CDAAA, in defending th e arm ing o f m erchant ships, m aintained th at such vessels could keep a subm arine subm erged, thereby lim iting th eir speed to eight knots and giving A m erican craft a good prospect o f escaping. If U.S. ships encountered a bom ber, th eir guns w ould keep th e plane so high th a t a t­ tack was less likely. Recalling th a t W oodrow W ilson had arm ed such ships on his ow n a u th o rity in 1917, CDAAA spokesm an Livingstone H artley praised th e president for subm itting th e issue to C ongress, som ething th a t gave lie to any claim s th a t FDR was dictatorial.87 A few noninterventionists supported the move. To Fish, the m easure w ould probably be ineffective, but, he continued, “o u r ships have the right to defend themselves on the seven seas, outside the w ar zones.88 G eneral W ood did not feel he could conscientiously testify against the arm ing o f m erchant ships, as long as adm inistration leaders were advancing the proposal as a defense m easure.89

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M ost critics, however, saw such arm ing n o t as protecting A m erican seam en b u t as endangering them . R epresentative Shafer m ade th e analogy o f sending “a 10-year-old boy o u t in to th e jungles to h u n t ferocious tigers w ith a sling­ shot.” C ongressm an Short com pared th e proposal to a boxing m atch betw een com edian Eddie C antor and heavyweight cham pion Joe Louis. By elim inating all w arning, said C harles A. Beard, a sea w ar w ould be far m ore m erciless.90 O bjections were detailed: There was difficulty in firing guns from th e deck o f a m oving ship, particularly w ith aircraft o r U -boats in th e vicinity. A rm ed m erchantm en were easy targets, for in convoys th e fastest ship was forced to travel at the speed o f the slowest. M ines presented a danger, as did as such raiders as the Graf Spee o r the Scharnhorst.91 The U nited States only possessed fo u r hundred four- and five-inch guns, m ost nearly forty years old an d often ineffective in W orld W ar l.92 Prevailing shortages m ade it im possible to arm tw o h u ndred ships in a m erchant m arine o f som e twelve h u ndred vessels.93 T he technology o f the subm arine was stressed. M odem subs possessed d i­ rectional sound devices th at enabled them to strike before th eir presence be­ cam e know n.94 There had never been a case in w hich a lone m erchantm an had successfully defended itself against such craft.95 T hen there was the m atter o f professional testim ony. Som e B ritish officers denied the efficacy o f such protection, claim ing th at it was too difficult to co­ ordinate the entire crew o f a ship.96 A m erican experts, too, w ere quoted, as was Navy Secretary Knox, w ho said th at the guns slated for arm ing m erchant ships w ere needed for naval vessels.97 A dm iral Stark him self asserted th a t arm ed ships w ere m ore likely to escape b u t conceded, “O ccasionally you m ight lose a lo t o f lives w here you w ould n o t otherw ise.”98 T he experience o f W orld W ar I was recalled: A rm ed ships then could n o t defend them selves, even though the U -boats and aircraft w ere far less efficient.99 If all these factors were n o t enough, a b attery o f in ternational law experts— including C harles C heney Hyde, Philip Jessup, John Bassett M oore, and Edw in M. B orchard— found th at such arm ing violated international law. O nce a m erchant ship was arm ed, it lost all im m unity as a neutral vessel.100 F urtherm ore, argued B orchard, “There is no right to send U nited States m u­ nitions to G reat B ritain.”101 M ost anti-interventionists also opposed Roosevelt’s effort to elim inate w ar zones. T he president, w arned G eneral R obert E. W ood, was “asking Congress to issue an engraved drow ning license to A m erican seam en.” In a private let­ ter, the general portrayed H itler as “trying hard ” n o t to sink U.S. ships bou n d for Iceland, though the Führer w ould certainly attack if they ventured all the way to th e B ritish Isles.102 C ritics continued to harp on Roosevelt’s assertion concerning freedom o f the seas. As Lincoln C olcord saw it, such freedom did n o t exist in w artim e. W hen the U nited States spoke in such term s, it only m eant th at it supported B ritain’s control o f th e seas. “It w ould be m ore honest and useful for us to say

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so,” he said. F inerty added th a t Roosevelt’s request violated existing treaties w ith Italy an d G erm any; th e AFC rep rin ted an entire treaty o f 1928 w ith G er­ m any.103 As th e Senate began debate, the G erm ans sank tw o m ore m erchant ships. O n 16 O ctober, th e W. C. Teagle, a large Standard O il tanker, and th e Bold Venture w ent dow n. Both vessels w ere en route to B ritain, carried Panam anian registry, and w ere h it som e five hundred m iles south o f Iceland. N o A m erican lives were lost o n either ship. The public learned o f the incidents w ithin the w eek.104 Few anti-interventionists com m ented o n th e m atter. B oth ships, noted Fin­ erty, were loaded w ith contraband; furtherm ore, th e Bold Venture was p a rt o f a B ritish convoy. D anaher stated th a t th e Bold Venture was arm ed.103 O n th e next day, 17 O ctober, th e navy departm ent announced th at th e USS Kearny, a crack destroyer scarcely a year in service, had been torpedoed. C om ­ ing to th e aid o f som e fifty m erchant ships th a t had left a C anadian p o rt in convoy early th at m onth, it was struck by G erm an subs about four hundred m iles from Iceland. T he ship was dam aged, n o t sunk, b u t eleven lives were lost, th e first A m erican fatalities o n a U.S. ship since th e w ar began. T he news was reported im m ediately.106 A dm inistration adversaries proposed various alternatives to the adm inis­ tra tio n bill. V illard sought to keep each A m erican ship unarm ed an d th en hold G erm any to strict accountability.107 F inerty w ould have preferred to d o ­ nate several ships rath er th an “donate th e lives o f o u r seam en.” “Give them the guns to m an them if they w ant,” he said at an o th er p o in t, “and if necessary give them th e crew to m an them .”108 In its ow n rep o rt, th e m inority bloc o f th e H ouse Foreign Affairs C om m ittee suggested placing such A m erican m er­ chant ships u n d er B ritish registry. T he m ove, it m aintained, w ould save A m er­ ican lives; elim inate th e subterfuge o f Panam anian registry; enable th e U nited States to provide B ritain w ith m erchant ships, arm ed o r unarm ed as it chose; provide B ritain w ith shipping space equal to any o th er program ; conform to existing legislation; and serve as a genuine “lend-lease,” w ith provisions for perm itting A m erican ow nership and retu rn to th e U.S. o n dem and.109 T he naval incidents, particularly th e attack on the Kearny, all had th eir ef­ fect. O n the sam e day th e Kearny was h it, 17 O ctober, the H ouse, voting 259 to 138, allow ed th e arm ing o f A m erican m erchant ships. Two days later, a G allup poll show ed 72 percent favoring such arm ing, and 46 percent su p ­ p o rtin g th e entering o f com bat zones.110 R esponding to th e H ouse action, H ider publicly confirm ed secret orders on 18 O ctober: “I f . . . an A m erican ship s h o o ts . . . it will do so at its ow n peril. T he G erm an ship w ill defend itself, an d o u r torpedoes w ill find th eir m ark.” 111 Now th e m atter lay before th e Senate. T he bill, w hich added th e abolition o f w ar zones to th e arm ing o f m erchant ships, was seen as particularly c ru ­ cial.112 E x-senator Reed com m ented, “I regard it as th e m ost critical decision th a t had to be m ade since 1861.” T he Christian Century en tid ed its editorial

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o n n eu trality repeal "T he Last Stand.” Said an AFC pam phlet, "T he w ar p a rty is dem anding a one way passage to Davy Jones’ Locker for A m erican sea­ m en— a one way passage to th e battlefield o f E urope for a huge new AEF.” 113 In th e m eantim e, th e sinking o f m erchant ships continued. O n 19 O ctober, th e freighter Lehigh, b o u n d from Bilbao, Spain, to the A frican G old C oast, was sunk w ithout w arning som e seventy-five m iles o ff Freetow n, an area n o t staked o u t as a com bat zone by any belligerent. A B ritish destroyer rescued all th irty -n in e crew m em bers. The ship belonged to the U nited States Lines, flew the A m erican flag, an d was carrying only ballast. W ithin three days, A m eri­ cans knew o f th e sinking.114 T his tim e even Roosevelt foes found G erm any to be totally in th e w rong. V illard called th e sinking th e "one absolutely indefensible case.” To V andenberg it was "the act o f a w anton pirate,” for w hich G erm any m ust be held strictly accountable. If th e practice continued, w arned Taft, "we shall have a cause for war.” 115 O n 27 O ctober, in a Navy Day address, Roosevelt stated th a t w ith th e strike against th e Kearny, an A m erican w ar vessel, the natio n itself had been at­ tacked. Furtherm ore, the president claim ed to possess a secret m ap th a t re­ vealed H itler’s plans to weld South and C entral A m erica into five vassal na­ tions. M oreover, he had covert evidence th a t H itler planned to abolish all existing religions and establish an international Nazi church.116 Before and after th e president’s speech, anti-interventionists w ere quick to com m ent on the Kearny sinking. "So we are in the war,” said the New York Daily News. H oover noted the destroyer was "convoying B ritish ships— n o t even A m erican-flag vessels.” Senator W heeler rem arked, “T he Kearny gave chase; she tossed o ff depth charges; she was o u t for the kill.”117 The Chicago Tribune had one solution to such incidents: Roosevelt should dem and th at B ritish arm ed forces w ithdraw from Iceland, thereby giving com plete control to th e U nited States and depriving H itler o f any excuse for interfering w ith A m erican com m unications. A ddressing a different po in t, Vorys m used th at if a subm arine could sink such a w ell-arm ed destroyer, w hat chance had “tram p steam ers arm ed w ith old W orld W ar guns”?118 FDR’s opponents questioned his claim s concerning Nazi designs.119 T he president, noted G eneral W ood, had refused to perm it public inspection o f the presum ed Nazi docum ents. The Chicago Tribune asserted th at sw eeping contingency plans, such as those FDR said th e G erm ans possessed, had been drafted by every general staff in the w orld against every conceivable enemy. W ere the chief executive to exam ine th e files o f his ow n w ar and navy dep art­ m ents, he could find plans for attacking B ritain and seizing C anada.120 T he m ap is now suspected o f being a doctored B ritish p la n t.121 A nti-interventionists also criticized Roosevelt’s com m ents on religion. Five days before th e president’s speech, rem arked D. W orth C lark, th e Christian Science Monitor had p rin ted a story stating, "T he Bible w ould be superseded

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by Mein Kam pf an d o th er sym bols o f th e church by a sw ord.” O bviously, de­ duced th e Idaho senator, som eone had woven th e Monitor article in to the president’s speech. Socialist w riter D evere A llen accused th e president o f stealing his m aterial from Nazi th eo rist A lfred R osenberg’s The Myth o f the Twentieth Century (1930), a w ork th at he claim ed th e N azis them selves had long ign o red .122 Again th e issue o f presidential w ar-m aking pow er rem ained crucial. W heeler found no peacetim e legal sanction giving the president au th o rity to send an A m erican w arship to assist a belligerent convoy. To Philip La Follette, FDR was treating A m erican ships as his personal property, n o t those o f the A m erican people. John C udahy com pared Roosevelt to H itler, w ho plunged his co u n try in to w ar and told th e Reichstag about it afterw ard. A m erica First cited Suprem e C o u rt decisions ruling th at w ar m aking rem ained w ith C on­ gress, including even th e provocative C urtiss-W right (1936) judgm ent th a t stressed th e broad inherent pow ers th e president possessed in th e realm o f for­ eign affairs.123 Lawrence D ennis attrib u ted M achiavellian designs to th e president. D eny­ ing th a t Roosevelt sought a full-scale war, D ennis found FDR to be hoping to see B ritain and G erm any so weaken each o th er th at th e U nited States w ould "fall h eir to B ritish possessions in this hem isphere” and “hold sway as th e in ­ disputably first sea pow er in th e w orld.” H ence, th e debate over neutrality re­ vision, he said, was “largely an unreal farce.”124 Som e ad m inistration critics n o t only argued th at B ritain was doing rela­ tively well on the b attleffont b u t also found B ritish shipping to be in good shape.125 Taft saw the B ritish com m anding m any m ore ships than th e U.S., the tonnage ratio being tw enty-five m illion tons to four o r five m illion, in B ritain’s favor.126A ccording to the AFC, the B ritish possessed m ore shipping than w hen the w ar began. It quoted C hurchill, w ho told the H ouse o f C om m ons o n 1 O c­ tober th a t sinkings o f B ritish, A llied, and n eutral ships du rin g th e past four m onths had only been o n e-th ird those o f A pril, May, and June. England’s p ri­ vations in th e A tlantic, the AFC continued, had becom e alm ost negligible. M oreover, A m erican and B ritish shipyards w ere tu rn in g o u t new ships at an unprecedented rate, exceeding by m any tim es th e com bined rate o f losses.127 In general, so it was argued, th e B ritish were doing quite well. G erm an re­ servists, n o t regular troops, w ere stationed across th e C hannel; the Luftwaffe was n o t over London b u t over M oscow; G erm an panzer divisions w ere fight­ ing o n a tw o th o u san d -m ile battlefront, in th e process experiencing casualties num bering in the m illions.128 A fter tw o years o f war, the B ritish forces, in ­ cluding A ustralians and New Zealanders, had tallied only 142,000 casualties in all, som e 3 percent o f its total arm ed strength.129 As th e Senate was debating its ow n version o f Roosevelt’s proposals, m ore sinkings took place. O n the night o f 29-30 O ctober, the arm ed U.S. Navy tanker Salinas was torpedoed southw est o f Iceland w hile traveling in convoy.

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N o serious injury, m uch less loss o f life, was involved, an d the Salinas reached p o rt safely. T he event was reported several days later.130 O n 31 O ctober, a hur m ore pivotal incident took place. A G erm an U -boat torpedoed the U.S. destroyer Reuben James, p art o f a five-destroyer escort, six hundred m iles west o f Ireland. T he attack took place at daybreak, so the U boat com m ander probably knew he was firing on an A m erican ship. O f the 160 m en on board, only 45 were rescued. T he news was released im m ediately. T he president condem ned th e sinking b u t took no fu rth er actio n .131 A nti-interventionists m ade fam iliar responses.132 Senator Aiken held FDR personally responsible for every life lost. W heeler cited A rthur Krock, New York Times W ashington correspondent, to the effect th at th e Reuben James, acting as p art o f a convoy, was aiding another ship w hen attacked. C ongress­ m an R obert Rich accused the adm inistration o f “com m itting m urder on the m en in o u r ow n Navy.” “We can’t expect the G erm ans,” said Amos P in ch o t,uto refrain from doing w hat we w ould do in th eir place.” Nye rem arked, “The sinking had about as m uch to do w ith the defense o f o u r shores as the sinking o f a freighter by an iceberg.” N orm an Thom as found H itler “extraordinarily p atien t” in the face o f repeated acts o f w ar.1'3 O n 7 N ovem ber, after eleven days o f b itter debate, th e Senate voted fifty to thirty-seven to a rm A m erican m erch an tm en an d p erm it th e e n try o f U.S. ships in to w ar zones. B ennett C lark sought to separate the q u estio n o f o p en ­ ing belligerent p o rts an d co m b at zones from th at o f arm in g m erch an t ships, b u t he was voted d o w n .134 T he legislation th en w ent back to th e H ouse, which now h ad to consider th e w ar zone issue. T he second H ouse vote pro d u ced , if anything, even stronger an ti-in terv en ­ tionist anxieties th a n h ad th e previous H ouse an d Senate bills. K nute Hill (D em .-W ash.) called the tally “a declaration o f w ar by C ongress."135 W illiam Pfeiffer (Rep.-N.Y.) envisioned U.S. ships en terin g such far-flung areas as M urm ansk, the Black Sea, an d the Suez C a n a l/3* O n 13 N ovem ber, iust eleven m in u tes before the tim e lim it o n debate was reached. H ouse M ajority Leader lo h n W. M cC orm ack (D em .-M ass.) p ro ­ duced a letter from the president. A rm ing A m erican m erchant ships was nec­ essary. Roosevelt declared, because o f “the co n tin u ed sinking o f A m erican flag ships in m any parts o f the ocean.” By convoying in the com bat zones, tim e an d m oney could be saved, therebv increasing the q u an tity o f supplies being sent to “those nations fighting H itlerism .” As C lark h ad d o n e in th e Senate, C o n ­ gressm an Everett M cKinley D irksen t Rep.-Ill. > so u g h t to d irid e the bill, w hich— he hoped— could result in securing the arm in g o f ships an d retaining the existing w ar zones. This move, too, was unsuccessful. ''' The House voted 2 12 to 194 to elim inate the war zones. * Four davs later Roo­ sevelt signed the bill. For practical purposes, the neutrality act o f l *>39 was dead. A shift o f ten votes w ould have defeated the m easure. T hose m em bers o f Congress opposing revision, said G eneral W ood, represented ab o u t h alf o f the

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A m erican voters. M oreover, th e m argin was far too narrow to encourage any declaration o f war, som ething th at th e public, according to th e polls, co n tin ­ ued to oppose.139T he polls did show approval o f A m erican convoys to B ritain, w ith 59 percent o f the respondents in agreem ent. Furtherm ore, the G allup poll indicated 47 percent favored th e sending o f an AEF if such a m ove was needed to defeat G erm any; 46 percent were opposed.190 O n th e day o f th e H ouse action, H itler held a naval conference at w hich he approved a new set o f orders for G erm an “surface forces.” O nce A m erican naval vessels began action, including “shadow ing,” th e G erm an com m ander m ust n o t be “too late in using his w eapons.”141 Som e anti-interventionists still hoped th at th e U nited States could avoid full-scale w ar.142 T he Christian Century hoped th a t th e sheer closeness o f the vote m ight slow Roosevelt dow n. Flynn th o u g h t the president w ould w ait at least a m onth before using any new pow ers.143 FDR, com m ented Pinchot, w ould be held responsible if m ore lives and ships were lo st.144 O ther a n ti-in ­ terventionists w ere less optim istic, th e Chicago Tribune entitling its editorial on the tally “T he Vote for War.”145 Nonetheless, even in late N ovem ber and early December, Roosevelt rem ained cautious. O n 22 November, w ith characteristic ambivalence, he spoke o f creating routes to Britain and the USSR: “The use o f Am erican flag ships m ust com e very soon b u t should be worked into gradually.” Three days later, the adm inistration decided th at A m erican vessels traveling to Lisbon should no t be arm ed bu t that U.S. m erchant ships bound for Archangel needed such protection. In giving his orders, Roosevelt cryptically asserted, “Ships under the Am erican flag go to Great Britain as soon as they becom e available b u t th at this procedure progress gradu­ ally w ith only a sm all num ber o f ships being so routed in the beginning. This num ber m ay be increased at a later date if in accordance w ith A dm inistration policies and instructions.” Presumably, these vessels w ould have been included in British convoys, thereby postponing a decision about w hether to send a convoy o f Am erican ships under its own escorts. The orders were n ot publicized— hardly the all-out effort to provoke w ar th at Churchill believed FDR had prom ised him in A ugust If the president was trying to protect the A tlantic supply line, he was doing so in the least provocative m y .146 O f course, in th e end, it was H itler w ho w ould decide w hat constituted provocation. But th e G erm an d ictato r was never in any h u rry to sta rt a w ar w ith th e U nited States w hile his E uropean problem s rem ained unsettled. In Septem ber 1941, m ilitary intelligence in W ashington predicted th at G erm any w ould n o t use its large subm arine force in th e N orth A tlantic “u n til she is ready to provoke the U nited States o r u n til hostilities w ith A m erica begin.”147 W hile all such debates w ere being conducted— in fact, from th e tim e th at H itler invaded Poland— an ti-interventionist atten tio n was n o t solely focused overseas. FDR critics saw the dom estic consequences o f full-scale involvem ent as possibly th e m ost fatal o f all.

19 k

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All d u rin g th e debate over A m erican policy, critics o f intervention expressed long-range concerns over the n ation’s dom estic life. Som e were so anxious about developm ents on th e hom e front th at they genuinely saw tyranny in the offing. In N ovem ber 1940, for exam ple, John T. Flynn referred to “a condition o f terror, grow ing alarm th at it is only a question o f a little tim e w hen we shall have to m eet the Nazi terro r in o u r ow n streets and o u r ow n hom es.” 1 A dm ittedly, H itler’s blitzkrieg in W estern E urope had produced som e gen­ uine panic. Particularly alarm ing was an incipient spy scare.2 New Masses told o f G erm an A m ericans in St. Louis finding sw astikas painted o n th eir hom es and religious proselytizers being driven from a Texas border tow n as suspected N azi sym pathizers. Even the New Republic, by now increasingly intervention­ ist, told o f a trib e o f M iam i Indians w ho felt com pelled to w rite th e secretary o f Indian affairs, inform ing him th at they w ere n o t fifth colum nists.3 To ad m inistration opponents, Roosevelt was exploiting w ar scares so as to use m ilitary spending as a m eans o f recovery.4 Journalist C. H artley G rattan w ent further, w riting, “M r. Big is doing his dam ndest to get us in [the w ar].”s C oncern increased as the debate over lend-lease heated up.6 In January 1941, Idaho novelist Vardis Fisher was rem inded o f th e recent radio broad­ cast o f producer O rson W elles, a sensationalist d ram atization o f H . G. Wells’s War o f the Worlds (1898), w hich portrayed the U nited States being invaded by M artians.7 To C ongressm an W oodruff, the ad m in istratio n “w ould have us believe th a t M r. H itler is practically ready to sail in to New York h arb o r w ithin a few days after E ngland subm its to his bom bs.” T he m ore sober A lan Valen­ tin e, president o f th e U niversity o f Rochester, deplored “prophecies o f m ass a ir attacks at 45,000 feet, o f gas bom bing, o f planes bom bing D etroit from

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bases in N ew foundland, o f econom ic collapse in th is hem isphere if England is defeated.”8 Even after lend-lease was enacted, adm inistration critics saw th eir oppo­ nents as continually attem pting to create panic. N oting th a t FDR had recently asserted th a t D enver and O m aha could lie w ithin striking distance o f G erm an a ir pow er, Fish said in A pril 1941, “T he people near th e M ississippi Valley are now dem anding battleships for th e M ississippi River for protection, and soon they w ill be asking for subm arines in th e D ust Bowls.”9 T he m any violations o f civil liberties com m itted du rin g W orld W ar I, n o n ­ interventionists feared, m ight well be repeated. B orchard, w riting in February 1941, rem arked, uWe have abo u t th e sam e attitu d e th a t prevailed here betw een January an d A pril 1917, w hen any sane m an was looked on askance.” W heeler hauntingly rem em bered, “M en w ere hanged for th eir opinions. O thers were taken in to cellars and beaten.” 10 Already th e signs appeared om inous. W hen, in A pril 1941, H arold Ickes called O sw ald G arrison V illard and N orm an T hom as allies o f G erm any’s Führer, V illard in tu rn accused th e in terio r secretary o f attem pting to choke o ff opposition: “T he Ickes tactics are exactly those o f A dolf H itler.” C astle in ­ dicted Secretary Stim son for stating th a t criticism o f the w ar effort should be suppressed. T he U nited States, com m ented th e retired diplom at, was n o t far from being a d ictatorship.11 At tim es Roosevelt him self was seen as leading th e w itch h u n t. W hen the president called for unspecified governm ent action against “a few slackers o r troublem akers in o u r m idst,” V illard w rote, “Such w ords are unprecedented in o u r history. It was the first tim e th a t a President o f th e U nited States has threatened to use th e pow er o f governm ent in peacetim e to suppress criticism and dissent— this in a dem ocracy!” R obert M aynard H utchins saw Roosevelt as “conducting a w ar o f n e rv e s. . . against his ow n people.” 12 Given such an environm ent, so anti-interventionists claim ed, little room fo r dissent existed.13 Several quoted M ark IW ain’s Mysterious Stranger ( 1916), in w hich th e p rom inent novelist w arned against w artim e p anic.14 A fter the 1940 election, N orm an T hom as predicted, the governm ent w ould crack dow n o n an tid raft agitation “an d all o th er opposition o r criticism .” H arry Elm er Barnes predicted “a scapegoat period after th e w ar w hich w ill m ake H ider seem a Judophile by com parison.” 15 “As this psychosis rises,” feared H erbert H oover in A pril 1941, “every w ord o f caution uttered by honest A m ericans w ill be denounced as being ’a call from H ider.’”16 Even dom estic fascism was n o t unthinkable. Porter Sargent w arned, “We m ay becom e fascist by fighting fascism , as H uey Long prophesied.” W hile the O ld W orld faced “th e prospect o f a C om m unist totalitarianism ,” rem arked H arry Elm er Barnes, th e resulting fascism in the U nited States m ight “last longer th an o u r Federal C onstitution has lasted.” “M ore terrible th an H ider,” w rote pacifist M ilton Mayer, “is the H ider, the Fascist, the anim al, in all o f us.”17

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Analogies w ere m ade to b o th G erm any and th e Soviet U nion. In June 1941, R epresentative V ito M arcantonio recalled news flashes em erging from Nazi G erm any in 1936: “Four m illion so-called aliens fingerprinted and registered; 500 noncitizens rounded up and im prisoned w ithout bail; strike broken by troops using bayonets against w orkers; concentration cam ps being prepared; w ork-or-fight order given to w orkers, m inister o f justice urges concentration cam ps and w holesale deportations.” By N ovem ber, socialist leader M aynard K rueger found the natio n already in its “B rüning” stage.18 Lawrence D ennis, w ho had w ritten The Coming American Fascism (1936), nonetheless could n o t see FDR as an incipient to talitarian d e sp o t FDR “m ay be a Kerensky,” D ennis w rote in July 1940, “b u t he w on't be a Lenin for he lacks th e personality, ideology, system and lieutenants for a dictator.” Close to a year later, however, D ennis accused the president o f using the w ar em ergency to es­ tablish an A m erican dictatorship. Signs included arm y intervention in a C ali­ fornia strike, the R ussell-O verton “seize-property” proposal, and a barrage o f alarm ist statem ents about subversive activities.19 Evidence o f oppression cam e from m any quarters. In Septem ber 1939, Un­ censored noted th a t the N ational Protective League, organized recently by Toledo industrialists, was offering a $25 b o u n ty for inform ation leading to the arrest o f “foreign agents.” M odeled after th e vigilante A m erican Protective As­ sociation o f W orld W ar I, the group was endorsed by no less th an the d irector o f th e Federal B ureau o f Investigation (FBI), ). Edgar H oover. A m o n th later, Commonweal observed th e A m erican Legion’s call for registration an d finger­ p rin tin g o f all aliens and the outlaw ing o f the G erm an A m erican B und and th e C om m unist Party. It also noted the A m erican Labor Party’s purge o f com m unists and John L. Lewis's call for sim ilar cleaning o f his C ongress o f In­ dustrial O rganizations. In February 1940, P orter Sargent offered his ow n list: th e conviction o f com m unist leader Earl Browder on spurious charges; the ro u n d u p o f eighteen follow ers o f Father C oughlin’s param ilitary group, the C hristian Front; th e closing o f a Russian bookshop; the disbanding o f the Friends o f the Soviet; and th e cutting o ff o f foreign scientific periodicals. He claim ed th at nothing less th an a new Red scare was in the offing. T hat July, Commonweals coeditor Philip B urnham expressed concern over H ouse pas­ sage o f a bill to d ep o rt H arry Bridges, the longshorem en’s u nion leader and m ilitant leftist, and an appropriations bill denying relief aid to com m unists and G erm an A m erican B undists; m em bership in b o th groups, he noted, was q uite legal. In A ugust 1940, Nye condem ned the arrest w ithout charges o f G er­ ald H arris, vice president o f the Farm ers’ U nion o f A labam a in B irm ingham , for intending to speak against conscription at a county Farm ers’ U nion con­ vention. T hat sam e m onth, W illiam H enry C ham berlin observed th a t Fulton O ursler, ed ito r o f Libertyytold an audience th at he endorsed suspension o f all civil liberties and suppression o f th e foreign-language press.20

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In 1941, b o th Uncensored an d a w riter in New Masses gave credence to a col­ um n by A rthur Krock, W ashington correspondent for th e New York Times, th a t m aintained th at “m em bers o f th e in n er W hite H ouse circle” sought n a­ tional censorship, including the banning o f anti-interventionist speeches given by m em bers o f C ongress.21 K rock was also cited concerning suspension o f congressional elections in 1942. In Novem ber, N orm an T hom as p ointed to the Suprem e C ourt decision w ritten by Justice Felix Frankfurter, w ho ruled th at th e Jehovah's W itnesses could be com pelled to salute th e flag.22 O ne practice was m ost disturbing: th e tu rn in g over o f an ti-interventionist letters, w ritten to governm ent leaders in protest against interventionist poli­ cies, to federal enforcem ent agencies. In O ctober 1940, constitutional scholar Edw in S. C orw in referred to the possibility o f an A m erican G estapo, noting th a t O. John Rogge, assistant attorney general, delivered antiadm inistration correspondence to th e crim inal division o f th e departm ent o f justice, includ­ ing a letter by noted m usic scholar D aniel G regory M ason.23 T he A m erican Civil Liberties U nion (ACLU) was presented as an expert w itness. Sargent cited an ACLU statem ent: “T he guns o f reaction are boom ­ ing.” In June 1940, D orothy D etzer quoted Roger Baldw in, its director, to the effect th a t w ithin th e past m o n th m ore violations o f civil liberties had been re­ p o rted th an du rin g th e entire w ar period o f 1917-18.24 C ertain legislation, though never enacted, appeared dow nright dangerous. In 1939, the H ouse passed a bill introduced by C ongressm an Sam H obbs (D em .-A la.) th at included provisions for im prisoning aliens w ithout trial.25 In June 1940, th e Senate added crippling am endm ents to th e La Follette civil lib­ erties bill. In N ovem ber 1941, the H ouse judiciary com m ittee reported o u t an am endm ent to th e antisabotage law: a m andatory death penalty w ould be re­ quired if an “offense resulted in death o r serious injury to any o th er person o r placed any o th er person in grave danger o f death o r serious injury.” In the sam e m onth, th e H ouse voted for a m easure enabling th e Federal C om m uni­ cations Agency to revoke a radio license if there was a “reasonable probability” th e o p erato r was subversive. R epresentative H atton W. Sum ners (D em .-Tex.) sought a law th at w ould m ake illegal even the voicing o f opinions th at w ould please a foreign principal.26 If such proposals were never enacted, others w ere, an d m uch alarm was created in th e process. Liberal an ti-in terv en tio n ists w ere particularly frig h t­ ened by th e A lien R egistration Act, a bill passed by C ongress in June 1940. It outlaw ed m em bership in any group teaching th e violent overthrow o f the U.S. governm ent. K now n as th e Sm ith Act after its H ouse sponsor, C ongress­ m an H ow ard W. Sm ith (D em .-V a.), it also strengthened existing laws gov­ ern in g th e adm ission an d d ep o rtatio n o f aliens as well as requiring th eir fin­ g erp rin tin g .27 Sargent w arned th a t such legislation w ould m ake illegal his keep-out-of-w ar bulletins. N orm an T hom as called th e bill “th e m ost vicious,

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fascistic m easure yet enacted by o u r w ar-hysterical C ongress” It perm its, he said, “in tim e o f excitem ent a m ore drastic control o f public discussion th a n th e Espionage Act o f th e first W orld War.”28 T hom as also opposed congres­ sional passage o f a bill, intro d u ced by C ongressm an Jerry V oorhis, an e rst­ w hile an ti-in terv en tio n ist, th a t required th e registration o f organizations th a t w ere subject to foreign control, engaged in civilian m ilitary o perations, o r advocated the overthrow o f th e U nited States by force. T he socialist leader feared th a t th e bill was so sw eeping th a t his ow n party, as well as trad e un io n s, in tern atio n al veterans societies, an d even th e English-Speaking U nion, m ight fall u n d er its ju risd ictio n .29 Som e noninterventionists offered th eir ow n solutions. T he real rem edy to such spies, traito rs, and saboteurs, observed Commonweals Philip B urnham , lay in “norm al precautions an d a m ild registration system.” “If foreign agents are violating th e law,” w rote D ennis, “they could be prom ptly apprehended, tried , convicted and punished” w ithout th e use o f unverifiable innuendoes.30 Even th e direction o f A m erican culture appeared to be a m atter o f grave concern. In th e spring o f 1940, A rchibald M acLeish, poet an d librarian o f C ongress, castigated his fellow artists for apathy tow ard the fascist m enace. In particular, he attacked novelists John D os Passos and E rnest H em ingw ay fo r im plying th a t n o t only “th e w ar issues b u t all issues, all m oral issues, w ere false— w ere fraudulent— were intended to deceive.”31 T he response was vehem ent.32 Uncensored called M acLeish “th e literary de­ p artm en t o f th e W ashington w ar party.” A co n trib u to r to Partisan Review re­ called th a t M acLeish had been strongly isolationist through 1935. T he real “irresponsibles,” according to socialist w riter Lillian Symes, w ere “those naive enough to believe th a t we can fight this w ar w ith o u t any essential dam age to, o r alterations in, the prevailing dem ocratic structure.”33 Even greater alarm was voiced over th e com m ent o f N icholas M urray B ut­ ler, seventy-five-year-old president o f C olum bia U niversity, w ho in O ctober 1940 defined th e cu rren t w ar as one “betw een beasts and hum an beings.” H is in stitu tio n , he continued, w ould cooperate frilly w ith th e governm ent in its “attem p t to strengthen th e defenses o f o u r A m erican system o f econom ic, so­ cial an d political liberty.” Any faculty w hose personal convictions w ould “ham per an d em barrass th e ideals o f th e U niversity” in th is regard, B utler said, should resign.34 C ritics found the speech a prim e exam ple o f w ar-engendered hysteria. Ben­ n ett C ham p C lark called B utler “a senile reactionary.” To the Chicago Tribuney Butler was “C olum bia’s Fuehrer.” John Haynes H olm es accused the educator o f trying to do for C olum bia “w hat H itler had done com pletely to G erm an u n i­ versities.”35 A fter the im m ediate ruckus, B utler appeared to backtrack, as he de­ clared th at his students and faculty possessed frill freedom o f expression.36 A nti-interventionists could p o in t to one instance after an o th er w here— they m aintained— censorship, either form al o r inform al, was becom ing a re­

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ality. Early in 1941, P orter Sargent observed, th e follow ing an ti-in terv en tio n ­ ist colum nists had been dropped from th eir journals: D orothy D unbar B rom ­ ley and E rnest L. M eyer from the New York Post, H arry Elm er Barnes from the New York World-Telegram, O sw ald G arrison V illard from th e Nation, John T. Flynn from th e New Republic, and H . L. M encken from the Baltimore Sun.37 T he Christian Century noted efforts to suppress the radio broadcasts o f H ugh Johnson as well as short-w ave program s from foreign capitals.38 In late February 1941, th e ad m inistration established an Office o f G overn­ m ent R eports. Lowell M ellett, a strong New D ealer w ho had m anaged the Scripps-H ow ard News A lliance, was chosen director. Its aim : to keep local com m unities inform ed o f defense preparedness.39 Uncensored found M ellett uan honest, liberal m inded, capable journalist,” b u t it w arned th a t censorship could be im posed by a q uiet appeal to publishers' patriotism , friendly h in ts to reporters th a t sources m ight be closed, and the Espionage Act o f 1917, w hich was still on th e books.40 By th e m iddle o f 1941, even liberal ad m inistration critics found th eir speak­ ing engagem ents term inated, th eir m eetings banned. W hen the Youth C om ­ m ittee A gainst W ar sought to hold its convention in M adison, W isconsin, in D ecem ber 1940, th e U niversity o f W isconsin and th e First C ongregationalist C hurch b o th refused to lend th eir facilities. Sim ilarly in 1941, O hio U niversity and the U niversity o f C alifornia at Los Angeles w ould n o t perm it N orm an T hom as to speak on th eir cam puses. T hat Novem ber, W heeler found d uring a to u r o f C alifornia th a t the Fraternal O rder o f Eagles had denied him a hall.41 The A m erica First C om m ittee often experienced trouble finding locales for its rallies, as seen by objections m ade by the county com m issioners o f M iam i and th e city council o f O klahom a City.42 For som e o f the m ore outspoken noninterventionists, the FBI was a target for criticism .43 In January 1940, Uncensored spoofed the arrest o f seventeen m em bers o f Father C oughlin’s param ilitary C hristian Front, m arking in p ar­ ticu lar FBI director H oover’s rejoinder to criticism : “It took only 23 m en to overthrow Russia.”44 A m o n th later, Nye opposed adding “G -m en” to an “al­ ready overloaded governm ent payroll.”45 T he FBI, n o n in terv en tio n ists charged, reciprocated by investigating the N orth D akota senator though he had been supposedly cleared by Hoover.46 John T. Flynn was especially outspoken, w riting, “C om m unism is subversive, let us say. But w hat is com m unism ? W hat is a C om m unist? W ho is to define a m an’s political views and activities and determ ine w hether they are subversive o r not?” To such critics, the FBI’s ow n director was f ir from sacrosanct “ J. Edgar H oover runs a G estapo in the U nited States,” w rote Flynn, a circum stance he laid directly at Roosevelt’s door.47 In a special supplem ent on the FBI, Uncen­ sored accused H oover o f spying on senators, cabinet m em bers, and diplom ats.48 O f equal concern was the H ouse C om m ittee on U n-A m erican A ctivities (HU AC), established in 1938 and chaired by th e flam boyant M artin Dies

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(D em .-Tex.). Even before w ar broke o u t, m any liberals had fought the com ­ m ittee bitterly. The com ing o f the conflict did little to assuage th eir anxieties.49 In O ctober 1939, Commonweal criticized Dies’s effort to purge nearly th ree thousand know n com m unists from key positions in the governm ent. Several m onths later, Barnes called th e Dies com m ittee “p a rt and parcel o f th e sam e un-A m erican drive th at has been m ore dram atically focused by th e C hristian Front.” W hen C ongressm an D ies rem arked th at Ma trip le gangup o f N azi, Fas­ cist and C om m unist agents” was “trying to d isru p t national defense and p re­ vent the U nited States from giving aid to G reat Britain,” America countered quickly: “An A m erican w ho is opposed to a declaration o f w ar, im m ediately, against G erm any, does n o t draw his conviction from Nazi propaganda.”50 In an effort to clear itself o f any profascist tin t, the A m erica First C om m it­ tee asked for an FBI probe o f its C hicago m em bership lists. A fter initial reluc­ tance, the bureau investigated.51 W hen the New York C ity AFC m ade a sim ilar request, d irector H oover tu rn ed it dow n, declaring th a t such investigation was outside th e scope o f its activities.52 In a letter to G eneral W ood, H oover stated, “At no tim e has th e FBI directly o r indirectly a t any place in th e U nited States tapped th e w ires, interfered w ith the m ail, o r checked the m em bership lists o f the A m erica First C om m ittee.” W hen C harles A. Lindbergh was told th e FBI was tapping his phone, he w rote in his diary th a t he w ould gladly clarify any conversations for the bureau. “It really m akes very little difference as far as I am concerned,” he said. “My m ain interest lies in know ing w hether o r n o t these tactics are being used by the A dm inistration.”53 All this tim e, however, the FBI was supplying the adm inistration w ith reports on the AFC.54 Sim ilarly, the AFC w elcom ed a HUAC probe.55 In the fall o f 1941, th e com ­ m ittee started to investigate th e AFC b u t dropped its investigation w hen Japan attacked Pearl H arbor and the organization im m ediately disbanded.56 A nti-interventionist anxieties concerning civil liberties were well founded. Far too often Roosevelt’s response to critics involved use o f th e FBI, the de­ p artm en t o f justice, and his ow n personal investigator, John Franklin C arter. The president did n o t always m eet th e argum ents o f his critics directly; at tim es he used th e loyalty issue to intim idate opponents.57 Even H arold Ickes m ourned, “Som e o f o u r superpatriots are sim ply going crazy.”58 O ne histo­ rian, Leo P. Ribuffo, sees the ad m inistration fostering a Brown Scare, in w hich it deliberately and falsely linked reputable anti-interventionists to fascist sym ­ pathizers.59

T hroughout the th irties, m any and loud were the accusations th at Roosevelt sought to regim ent the nation’s econom y, and rightist and business circles used the w ords fascist and communist w ith abandon.60 Such attacks took on a

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special intensity d u rin g th e years 1939-41, and this tim e m ore th an anti-N ew D eal Liberty Leaguers w ere involved.61 W ar, it was said, inevitably m eant regim entation, and even a president o f the m ost dem ocratic leanings could n o t escape th at fact. T he first act o f any nation at war, w rote John T. Flynn, was to tu rn its prem ier o r president into a dicta­ tor. In fact, A m erica was m oving tow ard th e sam e totalitarian m odel G erm any em bodied. D raw ing on m aterial in G ustav Stolper’s highly respected German Economy, 1870-1940 (1940), Flynn saw th e U nited States, like H itler’s Reich, com bining “rationalization o f industry under governm ent supervision” w ith “social welfare m easures to ease over the jolts o f capitalism in trouble.”62 Som e FDR critics were even m ore apprehensive th an Flynn. Predicting the destruction o f “all o u r liberties,” John H aynes H olm es w rote, “I fear w ar m ore th an I fear H itler.” To Frederick J. Libby, Roosevelt him self was “m ore danger­ ous to the people o f the U nited States” th an the G erm an leader. War, stated Trotskyist Jam es B urnham , m arked the end o f “bourgeois democracy.” Sena­ to r Tobey quoted C harles Evans H ughes, chief justice o f th e Suprem e C ourt, w ho m aintained th at the U nited States could n o t survive as a dem ocracy if it entered th e war. Joseph P. K ennedy concurred.63 In describing the A m erican experience o f W orld W ar I, H erbert H oover was n o t afraid to use the term “clam ps o f fascism ” to describe w artim e controls. T he ex-president recalled, “We becam e an effective dictatorship.” N ot only d id th e governm ent partially suppress m uch freedom o f speech and th e press, “it told th e people w hat to eat an d w hat to wear.”64 To liberals, som e predictions w ere particularly frightening, for— they feared— th e social gains m ade by th e New Deal w ould be canceled. Senator La Follette saw w orkers as being confronted “w ith a choice o f starving o r w ork­ ing w here, w hen, an d u n d er w hat conditions they ought to work.” C iting con­ gressional testim ony o f financier B ernard B aruch, w ho had directed th e m o­ bilization effort o f W orld W ar I, La Follette continued, “Farm ers w ould have th eir prices fixed. Business w ould be p u t in a strait jacket.” Libby saw an a t­ m osphere “in w hich b o th em ployers and w orkers can be held in line, double taxes w ill be accepted, non-defense expenditures elim inated, a com prehensive price ceiling will be agreed to and a sp irit o f self-sacrifice w ill prevail gener­ ally.” If necessary, “national u nity” w ould be im posed by coercion.65 Som e com m ents w ere even m ore sw eeping. “We have the econom ic power,” com m ented H arry Elm er Barnes, “to build a U topia in this co u n try in four o r five years, o r we m ay have ten o r fifteen years o f w ar th a t will com pletely w ipe o u t civilization.” If it didn’t dissipate its energies in war, the U nited States pos­ sessed th e potential to develop a cooperative society th a t w ould solve the problem s o f d istrib u tio n . B orchard feared for private property itself. Because o f ad m inistration needs to assum e dictatorial pow ers over prices, wages, and prod u ctio n , A m erican capitalism , asserted D ennis, w ould be elim inated. “Ed­ ucation will cease,” w arned R obert M . H utchins, to be replaced by vocational

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and m ilitary training. S tuart Chase offered an entire catalog o f evils: “M -Day, th e liquidation o f political dem ocracy, o f C ongress, th e Suprem e C o u rt, p ri­ vate enterprise, the banks, free press and free speech; th e persecution o f G er­ m an A m ericans and Italian A m ericans, w itch h unts, forced labor, fixed prices, rationing, astronom ical debts and th e rest.”66 Feared Freda Utley, uIf the w ar goes on to th e p o in t o f one side trying to w in absolute victory over th e other, I th in k we shall have a form o f au th o ritarian state m ore closely approxim at­ ing the Soviet tyranny than anything else th at has yet developed.”67 C ertain noninterventionists blam ed business itself for m anipulating the de­ fense effort on its ow n behalf. C iting conservative editor D avid Lawrence, w ho claim ed th at defense m obilization threatened the wages and h o u rs law, th e Christian Century found ua big business fifth colum n” seeking to use m ilitary preparation “as cover for an attack to overthrow recent dem ocratic advances in the econom ic and social sphere.” To Trotskyist D w ight M acdonald, reaction reigned triu m p h an t, for b o th m ajor parties were using th e cause o f national defense to foster a series o f destructive m easures: “anti-alien laws, ‘coordina­ tio n ’ o f N orth and South A m erica u nder th e State D epartm ent, ‘fifth colum n’ attacks on Reds and unions, relaxing o f w ar profits curbs and sabotaging o f the W agner Act and wages and hours law, universal conscription in peacetim e, etc., etc.”66 M ore conservative leaders expressed still greater alarm . H ugh Johnson spoke in term s o f increased debt, tarns, and confiscation o f property, w ith A m erican dem ocracy probably being destroyed in the process. “U nder th e sm okescreen o f national defense,” stated A lf L andon, “a little group o f new dealers” sought to establish a “collective state,” one th at involved state-m an­ aged cartels and elim ination o f “th e 80-acre farm er and th e sm all business m an.” C ongressm an Karl M undt offered still an o th er gloom y scenario, one th at involved conscription o f all m anpow er, full nationalization o f th e bank­ ing system , repeated réévaluation o f gold reserves, confiscation o f liquid p ri­ vate property by capital levies, th e fixing o f prices and wages, and governm ent operation o f all basic industries as well as o f tran sp o rtatio n , com m unication, and hydroelectric power.69 W ere C ongress to declare a national em ergency, w arned th e AFC research bureau, labor conditions w ould be determ ined by fiat and th e eight-hour day jeopardized. The president w ould assum e direct control o f the m erchant m a­ rine, industry, radio broadcasting, banking, railroads, agriculture, and prop­ erty rights. If C ongress decided th at a pow er shortage existed, it could p rohibit the use o f w ashing m achines, refrigerators, m ilking m achines, an d o th er elec­ trical appliances.70 Given such anxieties, a variety o f anti-interventionists were particularly concerned about the various w ar m obilization plans espoused in W ashington. M uch anxiety centered o n “M-Day,” o r M obilization Day, w hen the U nited States w ould go on a com plete w artim e footing and all A m erican life w ould be

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regim ented.71 T he purpose o f such thinking was obvious: to avoid th e m is­ takes o f W orld W ar I by having a full-scale b lu ep rin t a t hand if th e U nited States ever entered a conflict. Such plans had been d rafted by W ashington officials in 1931,1933, 1936, and 1939, though none had th e sanction o f law. A ssistant Secretary o f W ar Louis Johnson, w ho by 1939 was en tru sted w ith directing th is program , had repeatedly suggested an advisory b o ard o f in d u strial leaders to check the b lu ep rin ts as they w ere periodically revised. O nly o n 4 A ugust 1939, however, d id FDR establish a W ar Resources B oard (W RB), w hose chief assignm ent was to review th e w ar d ep artm en t’s existing In d u strial M obilization Plan, hence perfecting plans already m ade to p u t th e n atio n o n a w ar footing. C haired by Edw ard S tettinius Jr., b o ard chairm an o f U nited States Steel, its m em bers included Dr. K arl C om pton, president o f th e M assachusetts In sti­ tu te o f Technology; W alter S. G ifford, president o f th e A m erican Telephone and Telegraph C om pany; John Lee P ratt, a d irecto r o f G eneral M otors; and H arold G. M oulton, president o f th e B rookings In stitu tio n . G eneral R obert E. W ood, bo ard chairm an o f Sears, R oebuck and later th e AFC’s acting chair­ m an, w as also a m em ber.72 A nti-interventionists balked alm ost instantaneously. To H ugh Johnson, the WRB represented “th e highest type” o f businessm an; at th e sam e tim e, he found th e ap pointm ent an “incredible political blunder,” as th e m em bers were closely tied to the financial interests o f the d u Ponts an d J. P. M organ.73 Sim i­ larly, although th e New Republic called the m em bers “singularly patriotic,” it asserted, “T hey are hardly th e m en w hom one w ould elect to govern th e eco­ nom ic life o f th e country.”74 O ther objections w ere m ore pronounced, for to som e Roosevelt critics the W RB em bodied regim entation o n a grand scale.75 B oth Social Justice an d the Saturday Evening Post saw com plete dictatorship ahead. Senator V andenberg quoted an unidentified new spaper account as evidence th a t labor and busi­ ness w ould be regim ented; strikes outlaw ed; prices, wages, and hours set by th e governm ent; and light, heat, and food rationed. H e continued, “T he Bill o f R ights w ould need a gas m ask, an d individual liberty o f action w ould sw iftly becom e a m odern m em ory.” B ennett C lark, the m ost prom inent congres­ sional critic, saw im plicit threats to ru in businesses th at ignored governm entset priorities. Such activity, he argued, w ould be “blushed at in G erm any o r Italy.” Senator D ow ney estim ated th a t o n e-th ird o f the n ation’s w ealth w ould be “blow n away,” prices raised up to 150 percent, and a new dictatorship cre­ ated th a t “w ould virtually m ake us all serfs.” V illard, citing th e Saturday Evening Posfs G aret G arrett, spoke o f using up tw o-thirds o f th e n ation’s w ealth. Uncensored hearkened to rum ors th a t wages w ould be low ered and p o ­ litical m eetings banned. T he Washington Times-Herald attacked th e secrecy surro u n d in g th e com m ittee; in w artim e “som e second lieutenant o f o rd ­ nance” m ight close dow n m ost o f the city’s new spapers.76

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All this tim e, ad m inistration opponents pointed w ith alarm to books and articles friendly o r n eutral to such planning, including political scientist H arold J. Tobin’s “Preparing C ivilian A m erica for W ar” and radio new scaster Larry N ixon’s edited volum e What Will Happen and What to Do When War Comes.77 T he last chapter in N ixon’s w ork, w ritten by journalist M alcolm Logan, predicted a com ing dictatorship. Look m agazine presented a frighten­ ing pictorial essay, “W ar C om es to Am erica,” based on N ixon’s w ork.78 E conom ist Leo C herne’s Adjusting Your Business to W ar (1939), containing a forew ord by A ssistant Secretary Louis Johnson, drew particular alarm .79 T he book was candid in declaring th at the w ar an d navy departm ents expected C ongress to give the president legal a u th o rity o n such m atters as the fixing o f prices and the com m andeering o f m aterials an d plants.80 W ere C hem e’s schem e to be im plem ented, w arned P orter Sargent, the president “w ould end up m ore pow erful th an H itler.”81 Because o f Johnson’s preface, the C herne study em barrassed th e Roosevelt adm inistration. D uring a cabinet m eeting held on 26 Septem ber 1939, Secre­ tary o f W ar W oodring, a b itter rival o f Johnson, called the president’s a tten ­ tio n to th e w ork, expressing considerable dissatisfaction over Johnson’s in tro ­ duction. FDR said little at th e m eeting b u t told the subsequent press conference n o such book had his adm inistration’s im prim atur.82 The WRB rep o rt, com pleted o n 12 O ctober 1939, rem ained secret though it was relatively innocuous. Totally rejecting th e idea o f any “superagency” to control a w ar econom y, it called for a num ber o f tem porary agencies th at could be disbanded prom ptly a t the end o f an em ergency.83 By 1941, the en ­ tire schem e was a dead letter.84 D espite the dissolution o f th e WRB and the tentative n ature o f all m obi­ lization proposals, anti-interventionists still kept u p th eir fire.8S In January 1940, pacifist editor H arold E. Fey w arned, “D ictatorship is being definitely planned for th e U nited States in the event o f w ar o r o f som e as yet undefined national em ergency sh o rt o f war.”86 A m onth later, V illard accused Roosevelt o f having already approved legislation th at w ould destroy liberty “the day w ar is declared.” D ennis, w riting in May 1940, saw the industrial m obilization plan as a conspiracy “to replace the A m erican system w ith a totalitarian dictato r­ ship.” By A pril 1941, th e Call found existing w artim e controls so strong as to offer a front-page headline: “M-D ay Plan Comes to U.S.; Sneaked Over on

Workers.”87 Any M obilization Day edict, several critics feared, w ould rem ain long after a conflict ended. N ot only w ere such codes inevitable in w artim e, com m ented Flynn, b u t once the fighting stopped, th e U nited States w ould face the sam e kind o f disorder th at characterized Italy in 1922 and G erm any in 1933, thereby m aking continued controls irresistible. Pacifist Kirby Page referred to a w ar departm ent pam phlet th at, so he m aintained, proposed a w artim e dic­ tatorship th at could last indefinitely.88

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Even w ithout any M -D ay in th e w orks, certain adm inistration proposals caused m uch alarm .89 O n 3 January 1940, C harles Edison, acting secretary o f th e navy, w rote to H ouse speaker John Bankhead (D em .-A la.) to the effect th a t th e president needed the au th o rity to com m andeer ships, factories, and w ar m aterials. If Edison’s proposal w ere im plem ented in peacetim e, feared B orah, "you could also provide suspension o f the Bill o f Rights; you could p ro h ib it free press an d the right to trial by jury.” The Christian Century offered an editorial, “T he Navy W ants a D ictator.”90 N oninterventionists expressed apprehension over the abortive R ussellO v erto n am en d m en t, in tro d u c ed late in A ugust 1940, ju st after th e B urke-W adsw orth bill had passed th e Senate. C osponsored by Senators R ichard Russell (D em .-G a.) and John H . O verton (D em .-L a.), the bill w ould have given th e president au th o rity to seize uncooperative industrial plants, thereby show ing th a t the president was n o t afraid to draft w ealth as well as m en. W hen the proposal passed th e Senate, Flynn com m ented, "T he notio n th at o u r terrified businessm en can enjoy the luxury o f being frightened o u t o f th eir w its by M r. Roosevelt’s propaganda departm ent and n o t pay for it is as naïve as anything business m en have done for years.”91 D uring th e Senate debate, th e firm ly interventionist Josh Lee (D em .-O kla.), a strong Roosevelt backer, supported th e am endm ent as a m eans o f allow ing the governm ent to take over "a m an, a factory, o r even a radio station o r news­ paper for propaganda purposes if the n ation is in danger.” Senator C laude Pepper, if anything even m ore interventionist th an Lee, favored an additional g ran t o f pow er w hereby the president m ight, at his discretion, suspend th e o p ­ eration o f any statutes th at, in his opinion, interfered w ith his defense m eas­ ures. "If this be dictatorship,” he said, "m ake the m ost o f it.” The Christian Century, in citing his rem arks, entitled its editorial sim ply "C andor o n the Prospects for D ictatorship.” America’s editorial o n the L ee-Pepper proposals saw th e n ation being "Nazified.”92 T he w artim e d ebt alone, so FDR adversaries asserted, w ould create a revo­ lu tio n ary situation.93 Eventually the sum w ould be so high, B orchard w arned, th a t it w ould be repudiated, causing "a social upheaval the consequences o f w hich no m an can foresee.” To Senator Lundeen, it seem ed the inevitable con­ vulsion w ould create a dictatorship. D ennis predicted th at rising taxes, to ­ gether w ith sharp cuts in living standards, w ould lead to the overthrow o f in ­ com petent “rascals” by com petent ones.94 Even w ithout m assive debts, revolution m ight result. H erbert H oover pre­ dicted an outraged public reacting violently. Veterans retu rn in g from th e con­ flict, said Senator La Follette, w ould be so radicalized th at the Russian troops o f W orld W ar I w ould appear conservative by com parison. B ennett C lark re­ ferred to veterans "n o t only w racked w ith w ounds b u t shocked an d poisoned by th e revolutionary excesses w hich every expert an d student expects to signal th e end o f th is war.” By 1945, speculated th e pacifist colum nist E rnest L. M eyer

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in a harrow ing scenario, tw enty thousand unem ployed veterans o f a victori­ ous AEF w ould launch a bonus m arch to W ashington, w here they w ould be fired on by state troopers w hile the president laid a w reath at the tom b o f the unknow n soldier.95 All this tim e, anti-interventionists argued, poverty still perm eated th e na­ tio n .96 It was claim ed th at 40 percent o f all A m ericans lacked a decent living standard, th at sixty-tw o m illion A m ericans were im poverished, and th at ten m illion rem ained unem ployed.97 A ccording to th e N ational Resources B oard, 55 percent o f A m ericans lived on an incom e o f less than $1,500 a year, n o t enough— estim ated Fortune m agazine— to su p p o rt a fam ily o f four.98 W heeler quoted Roosevelt’s fam ous phrase o f 1937: uon e-th ird o f a nation illfed, ill-housed, and ill-dad.” N ot a single internal problem , said C hester Bowles w hen the European w ar first broke o u t, could be solved by again em ­ barking on an expeditionary force to Europe, be th e m atter m edical care and security for th e aged, abolition o f child labor, shorter hours, increased wages, o r education for all w ho desired to leant. H am ilton Fish, in opposing a $650 m illion naval bill in M arch 1940, noted th at the U nited States was trim m ing all form s o f relief. T hat D ecem ber, Lawrence D ennis w rote interventionist correspondent D orothy T hom pson, “Your passion for an unhappy m inority is p roportionate to th eir distance from you. It is great enough to condem n m il­ lions o f o u r youth to die for Jews in Poland and Chinese in Asia b u t n o t great enough to insure adequate nourishm ent to A m erican babies w ithin a block o f w here you live.”99 To Roosevelt’s foes, a w ar boom was no solution. The resulting prosperity, they believed, w ould be tem porary and ultim ately fatal.100After W orld W ar I, the nation had experienced postw ar inflation, strikes, and unem ploym ent; it w ould certainly do so again. The Christian Century sum m arized the entire saga: First, a tremendous factory expansion to produce for a foreign war. Second, a rush of workers for the high pay which such emergency work will offer. Third, big profits for the shareholders in the "lucky” corporations. Fourth, the necessity to keep the expanded plant going if there is not to be an industrial crash. Fifth, peace—and no more use for the expanded plant. Sixth, the crash.

C onceding in April 1941 th at the sudden prosperity had already brought “joy” to m any com m unities, Nye w arned th at the return o f peace w ould p ro ­ duce “ghostlike, idle new industrial plants w ith thousands o f unem ployed.” R obert M . H utchins foresaw a postw ar U nited States w ith at least ten m illion unem ployed. A lthough subsequent repudiation and inflation m ight rid the na­ tion o f an enorm ous debt, it w ould wipe o u t its entire m iddle class as well.101 W hen the European w ar first broke out, the econom y responded sluggishly, causing som e anti-interventionists to find the new w ealth a chim era.102 As far as any Wall Street boom was concerned, said the still anti-interventionist New Republic, “All the lam bs w ho were sheared in 1929 and in 1937 have rushed

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in to the m arket to be shorn again.” It predicted another recession w ithin four m onths, one “likely to be ever sharper th an the tum ble we took after o u r spree in the sum m er o f 1917.”103 John T. Flynn thought such industries as steel, cop­ per, and even grains w ould benefit m oderately from a year o f w ar; others, such as cotton and cotton textiles, faced severe dam age. O n balance, he concluded, the conflict w ould bring the nation’s econom y no im m ediate benefits.104 Un­ censored predicted, “The m etal industries and industries dependent on m etal production will grab the em pty profits o f w ar by dragging the farm boys into the factories, only to tu rn them loose again after the boom is over.”105 Even in 1940, som e doubts rem ained as to any new prosperity.106 The ex­ pected B ritish and French w ar orders had n o t been subm itted. The Call titled an article “W ar Business Flops.”107 C ertainly any new prosperity appeared m ost uneven.108 W hereas the aviation industry had a backlog o f unfulfilled orders, thousands o f tobacco w orkers— so Uncensored noted in February 1940— risked starvation. A nd though the steel ind u stry had already experi­ enced one boom , m igratory farm w orkers on the Pacific coast faced new h ard ­ ships for lack o f an export fruit m arket.109 In April 1941, Nye said th at A m er­ ican farm ers continued to face decreasing m arkets abroad and depressed farm prices at hom e. In com paring long-range w inners and losers, D ennis found corporate bureaucracies, together w ith skilled labor, to be grow ing m ore pow ­ erful; however, sm all businessm en, “coupon clipping rentiers,” inefficient sm all storekeepers, and farm ers were sinking into “poverty, pow erlessness, de­ spair and dependence on a governm ent dole.”110 C ertainly, FDR critics argued, unem ploym ent w ould still rem ain.111 Expert w itnesses were cited. In the spring o f 1940, C olonel F. C. H arrington, chief ad­ m inistrator for the W orks Progress A dm inistration, feared th at unem ploy­ m ent in the fiscal year 1941 could reach nine m illion, a forecast th at caused Frank H anighen to assert, “I believe th at this country is facing the sam e sort o f depression w hich I w itnessed in B ritain and France in the year preceding the outbreak o f war.” In August 1941, Leon H enderson, adm inistrator o f the Office o f Price A dm inistration and Civilian Supply, estim ated th at during the next few m onths, unem ploym ent w ould increase by tw o m illion, a 25 percent increase in the total num ber o f unem ployed. Peter N ehem kis Jr., special assis­ ta n t to the chief o f the defense contract service, had noted ten entire indus­ tries forced to close dow n o r enter a new line o f production. “As the tem po o f th e w ar econom y gains increased m om entum ,” N ehem kis stated, “you m ay ex­ pect to find, for a tim e, no t less b u t m ore unem ploym ent; no t less b u t m ore idle m achines.” Officials o f the Office o f Production M anagem ent rem arked th a t diverting strategic m aterials away from civilian industries w ould cause at least five thousand factories to shut dow n.112 C onverting plants from peacetim e to w artim e production was far from easy. Factories producing radios, radiators, o r inexpensive autom obiles, a r­ gued Lawrence D ennis, could not easily be transform ed into those m aking

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m unitions, tanks, o r w arplanes. T ransform ation m ight literally take years, in the m eantim e producing terrible unem ploym ent and trad e dislocation.113 M oreover, the econom ic consequences o f such conversion were highly de­ structive. Even in 1941, Uncensored found Am erican industrial potential decid­ edly lim ited, so m uch so th at only “a trem endous dom estic setback” could en ­ able the U.S. econom y to add British w ar orders to its ow n dom estic needs. O nce factories were producing arm am ents instead o f consum er goods, prices for even secondhand autom obiles, refrigerators, radios, and w ashing m achines w ould skyrocket The nation’s living standards were bound to be reduced.114 At the sam e tim e, m assive defense orders could be highly destructive. To su ­ perim pose a huge arm s program for B ritain on th e U nited States’s ow n de­ fense program , said th e AFC research bureau as late as O ctober 1941, w ould b ring the nation to th e verge o f an o th er depression. Such firm s as B ethlehem Steel, G eneral M otors, and C urtiss-W right already had m assive backlogs o f o r­ ders, resulting in bottlenecked production and a defense jam .115 Even if the econom y experienced a genuine w ar boom , som e anti-interven­ tionists found the new prosperity m ost im m oral.116 As the w ar was ending its very first week, the New York Daily News noted impressive gains in the com ­ m odity and stock m arkets. T hen it added th at if the conflict continued, “o u r u n ­ em ploym ent problem will be pretty largely solved. M illions o f us will be m ak­ ing m unitions and w ar gear for the Europeans to kill one another w ith, o r grow ing food for their soldiers to eat.” In January 1940, Uncensored noted th e irony o f an advertising caption: “Transports for trade and bom bers for democRACY/Look to Lockheed for leadership in both.” “The distinction betw een bom bers for dem ocracy and bom bers for, say, fascism,” it m aintained, “is a new departure for dealers in death,” particularly as Lockheed in 1935 had sought to sell bom ber designs th at could have easily ended up in H itler’s hands.117 At tim es, anti-interventionists saw the w ar boom as all to o real— indeed, dangerously so.118 As early as Septem ber 1939, a Christian Century editorial began, “Wall Street and the w heat p it are o ff on a joy-ride.” Just over a year later, noting the m arked increase in profits for D u Pont, D ouglas A ircraft, and Bethlehem Steel, it com m ented, “Bethlehem ’s star is rising as th e Star o f Beth­ lehem goes into eclipse.” In January 1941, N orm an T hom as adm itted th at prosperity existed b u t found it lopsided: Even those w orkers w ho received large wages w ould find th eir gains partly nullified by price increases. T hat May, T hom as m ade another prediction: the boom w ould leave at least four m illion unem ployed. In Novem ber, D ennis acknow ledged a rise in real wages, em ploym ent, and farm prices b u t predicted “grow ing class w arfare over w ho gets w hat.” As labor increased its dem ands, he w rote, collective bargaining w ould becom e im possible, a fascist regim e inevitable.119 Given such awesom e consequences, anti-interventionists felt all efforts m ust be m ade to avoid full-scale p articipation in a m ajor conflict. Such a threat m ight com e, som e feared, over a relatively neglected area: East Asia.

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In July 1937, ju st outside Peking, an accidental skirm ish betw een C hinese and Japanese forces triggered a full-scale if undeclared w ar on the C hinese m ain­ land. The Japanese soon captured such coastal cities as Shanghai as well as te r­ rito ry several hundred m iles inland. T hey conducted w ar in such a m anner th at A m ericans w ould refer for years to the conquest o f C hina’s capital as the "rape o f Nanking.” By 1940, public outrage was frequendy expressed.1 Some noninterventionists strongly condem ned the Japanese activity.2 As early as N ovem ber 1938, H erbert H oover called Japan’s w ar on C hina “as h o r­ rible as th at o f G enghis Khan.” In February 1940, the Chicago Tribune saw Japan’s m ethods in C hina as the equal o f H itler’s persecutions and Stalin’s m urder o f m illions.3 By Novem ber, even the strongly pro-Japanese Ralph Townsend, form er U.S. consular official in C hina, conceded th at the Japanese w ere “n o t angels” in C hina.4 In A ugust 1941, the New York AFC chapter agreed th at th e Japanese were “behaving badly” there.5 Just before the Pearl H arbor attack, W illiam R andolph H earst referred to Japan as an aggressor.6 O f all the president’s critics, few had been as em pathetic to Japan as W illiam R. Casde Jr. Form erly chief o f the state departm ent’s division o f W estern Euro­ pean affairs and undersecretary o f state, Castle developed his sym pathy tow ard Japan while A m erican am bassador there in 1930. An ardent Republican and a m an particularly close to H erbert Hoover, Castle left the state departm ent in 1933. He retained his contacts w ith Japanese diplom ats and prom inent civilians, however, and rem ained som ething o f a W ashington “insider.”7 “M any o f the condem ned are great people,” he said o f the Japanese in Septem ber 1939. Yet he strongly opposed the Japanese invasion o f C hina, confiding to his diary in June 1940, “W hy did those dam n Japanese bom b C hungking again yesterday?”8

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To som e anti-interventionists, even a less “barbarous” Japan w ould still have presented a clear danger to U.S. interests. In 1939, publisher Roy H ow ard w arned against Japan’s “tieup” w ith the anti-C om intern powers, while accusing it o f violating A m erican rights in C hina.9 To the New York Daily News, it ap­ peared th at Japan sought to m onopolize the C hina m arket, rule all Asia, tu rn the Pacific into “a Japanese lake,” and eventually conquer the U nited States.10 In January 1940, while endorsing a British and French victory in Europe, it w arned, “O ur big, decisive w ar is m ost likely com ing on the Pacific, anyway.”11 “Europe’s political business is none o f o u r business,” it continued in February; “Japan is the real danger to the U nited States.”12 Conversely, like certain other anti-interventionists, the News endorsed aid to C hina. The Chinese, it said, were “a quiet, peaceable people,” w ho sought “to be left alone so th at they can w ork their farm s” and “dream about w hat rem arkable people their ancestors were.”13 C ertain oth er anti-interventionist critics denied th at C hina needed A m eri­ can aid. T hat country, asserted the Chicago Tribune, was “an old hand at fend­ ing for itself against invaders.” Lawrence D ennis predicted th at the Chinese w ould eventually force Japan ou t o f th eir land, w hereas sudden Japanese w ith­ draw al w ould throw som e tw o m illion dem obilized soldiers back into an im ­ poverished hom eland.14 Several Roosevelt foes called for the w ithdraw al o f the sm all contingents o f A m erican m arines in C hina, stationed there to protect U.S. lives and prop­ erty.15 A m erican troops in C hina, asserted the Chicago Tribune in Septem ber 1939, were too few to defend them selves b u t too m any to be needlessly sacri­ ficed. “We have no C hina front,” it m aintained.16 W hen, in N ovem ber 1939, the British w ar office started pulling its own troops o u t o f no rth ern C hina, the New York Daily News w arned against replacing them w ith U.S. forces.17 Furtherm ore, som e anti-interventionists were quite negative about be­ sieged C hina. R aym ond M oley thought the Chinese w ould betray the U nited States if they had the chance. B urton W heeler stressed the continuation o f slavery th ere.18 O ne derogatory article, published in Scribner’s Commentator, accused the C hinese o f selling th eir own infants in tim e o f distress. In fact, the au th o r found nothing o f m erit in the entire n atio n .19 In tim e, the New York Daily News joined the attack. By June 1940, it had changed its entire posture tow ard the Pacific, now fearing th at continued confrontation w ith Japan could serve as a dangerous back d o o r to war. Sud­ denly the C hinese were accused o f stripping “the good earth,” practicing an ­ cestor w orship, and possessing the potential for becom ing “a m uch m ore p er­ ilous Yellow Peril than the Japanese ever were.” It called on th e W est to end its self-destruction; otherw ise, the “yellow race” m ight be the next rulers o f the entire w orld, “no t a bad thing” except th at the C hinese and Japanese had cre­ ated sim ilar sham bles in Asia. In referring to the cu rren t w ar betw een the B ritish and the G erm ans (the “tw o m ost vital and vigorous peoples in Eu-

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rope”) and th e “starvation” o f th e E uropean con tin en t, it w arned, “European racial suicide today m ay be paving the road for an o th er M ongol invasion a few years hence.”20 Even those o f m ore m oderate persuasion harbored suspicions concerning C hina.21 In February 1940, for exam ple, H ugh Johnson denied th at C hina w ould ever repay a $20 m illion loan.22 Certainly, it was argued, C hina was no dem ocracy. A ccording to Ralph Townsend, w ho had served in the A m erican consular service there, all o f its recent rulers had gained pow er through re­ pression and assassination. T he New York Daily News found political parties in C hina m ere “cliques, lodges, m ore o r less secret societies, as we see them — faintly com parable to o u r big city m achines, b u t not to o u r national political organizations.”23 C hina’s ruler, C hiang Kai-shek, was denounced. A uthor B urton Rascoe called him “a cheap gangster w ho w ould sell o u t, as he has sold o u t, tim e and tim e again, for the perpetuations [sic] o f th e fortunes o f his wife’s family.” H ugh Johnson called th e generalissim o C hina’s “present absolute dictator,” a m an by tu rn s “dem ocratic, dictatorial and C om m unist— w hatever it takes to get the persim m on.”24 Any effort to aid th e C hinese, argued a few anti-interventionists, sim ply ex­ pedited th e spread o f com m unism in Asia.25 Rival com m unist groups, H earst w rote, had been m urdering each oth er there for tw enty years; he saw no m ore reason why the U nited States should “sym pathize w ith C om m unist C hina th an w ith Fascist Japan.”26 D ennis referred to C hina’s rulers as “m ilitary gang­ sters, m any o f w hom are com m unists and m ost o f w hom are rascals” and w ho w ould “enjoy nothing b etter than giving th eir erstw hile allies th e bum ’s rush o u t o f Asia.” Should C hina em erge victorious from the conflict w ith Japan, predicted Townsend, it w ould succum b to Russian control, and m illions o f m en w ould be required for garrison duty. Far b etter to let Japan and the USSR cancel o u t each o th er’s influence.27 O thers found C hina ungovernable, m ore o f a geographic entity than a n a­ tio n .28 D riving Japan o u t o f C hina, said Raym ond Moley, was one thing; p u t­ ting “H um pty-D um pty together” was another. If the Sino-Japanese W ar should cease, observed Castle, “C hina w ould again becom e the sp o rt o f the w ar lords and despair o f the rest o f the world.” Why, asked Congressm an G eorge Bender, could n o t C hina's four hundred m illion people form a m ighty nation?29 Jurist John Bassett M oore, claim ing forty years o f diplom atic expe­ rience in Far Eastern relations, saw C hina as m erely “a geographic nam e, w ith som ew hat uncertain application, rath er than a coherent rational and political entity.” “Why,” he m used, “if we love the Chinese so m uch, [do] we exclude them from the U nited States?”30 Several noninterventionists stressed th at the m uch-touted econom ic open do o r policy had vanished, never to retu rn .31 Speaking o f earlier A m erican arrangem ents w ith the oth er industrial powers, H ugh Johnson rem arked, “We

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tried to share the loot, bu t we w ere new and inexperienced in this interna­ tional chiseling.” H arry Elm er Barnes called the open do o r “a B ritish sub­ terfuge to insure open season for all on robbing C hina.” No m atter w hat hap­ pened in C hina, w rote Lawrence D ennis, B ritish and A m erican capitalists were Mon the way out.”32 Q ueried historian C harles C allan Tansill, “Is the A m erican public ready to go to w ar to com pel these stubborn children o f N ip­ pon to accept a political pabulum th at they despise?”33 To such people, th e N ine Power Pact was equal folly. Signed in 1922 by m ajor pow ers as p art o f th e W ashington agreem ents, it com m itted signatories to com m ercial equality and adm inistrative integrity in C hina; “frank and full com m unication” w ould take place in the event o f possible violation. To Judge M oore, the agreem ent was “one o f the greatest im postures ever com m itted to w riting”— an agreem ent th at no signatory had ever attem pted to carry o u t n o r w ould any ever do so. N ot only did it n o t in reality guarantee the te rrito ­ rial integrity o f C hina, w rote H ugh Johnson, bu t it had becom e as “dead as a dodo” as early as 1932, w hen B ritain refused to cooperate w ith Secretary Stim son over M anchuria.34 If Japan had few o u trig h t supporters am ong anti-interventionists, several am ong them em pathized w ith its econom ic predicam ent. Senator W iley stressed the need for raw m aterials and m arkets. Senator D anaher questioned w hether the U nited States could continually keep eight hundred Japanese lim ­ ited to a single square m ile, particularly as nations possessing a large land m ass barred Japanese im m igrants. Pacifist Kirby Page found its truculence psycho­ logically understandable: “In Japan’s shoes w ould A m erican p atrio ts be less aggressive and belligerent than the Japanese are now?”35 To certain noninterventionists, Japan was sim ply seeking a legitim ate sphere o f influence. Just as the U nited States, said H earst, had sought to extend its influence over the W estern H em isphere, so it was only natural for Japan as well to seek expansion: “Are we not denying to o th er nations the rights w hich we claim in exaggerated form for ourselves?”36 A m erica, asserted Am os Pinchot, had no m ore right to dem and th at Japan relinquish its C hina conquest th an Japan had to ask the U.S. to give up the Philippines and Puerto Rico. P orter Sargent w ent even further: “Japan’s present purpose is to take up w hat C hina failed to do and drive the W estern exploiter and usurper o u t o f the East w here he doesn’t belong.”37 Castle cogendy articulated w hat he called “a M onroe D octrine for Japan.” “A highly industrialized territory,” he w rote, “always dom inates econom ically neigh­ boring territories which are technically less advanced.” Besides, greater continen­ tal coordination would result in general prosperity and therefore an increased dem and for foreign goods.3* (A nother tim e, though, Casde characterized the Japanese as essentially a “hom e people.” Indeed, whenever they violated their her­ itage by attem pting to colonize China, they had found themselves stym ied. Even­ tually China’s four hundred m illion w ould defeat Japan’s eighty m illion.39)

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Several anti-interventionists w ent still further. G eneral M otors executive G raem e H ow ard stated th at Japan needed a preferred position am ong the non-O ccidental pow ers o f th e O rient.40 “T he A m erican people should thank th eir lucky stars,” w rote Lawrence D ennis, “th at there is so m uch conquerable territo ry for th e Japanese in the Far East, rath er th an seek to frustrate Japan­ ese southw ard expansion.”41 In 1941, the New York Daily News noted th at th e Japanese, as “th e m ost oc­ cidental race in th e Far East,” had a “vital urge” to grow and expand, to dom ­ inate its seas and control its neighbors. No harm w ould com e, it said, “if we were to m ind o u r ow n business, stay in this hem isphere, and organize it w ith C anada’s cooperation, and let th e Japs organize Asia and the South Seas if they can. These tw o econom ic and political un its could then trade w ith each o th er and the rest o f the w orld, to th eir m utual profit, we think.”42 Occasionally, it was alleged th at Japan was bringing progress to a benighted C hina. Sterling M orton, for exam ple, thought the island kingdom had re­ stored peace and order to large sections o f the form er C hinese em pire. The Chicago investor saw the Japanese puppet state o f M anchukuo in particular as a positive m odel, a m agnet pulling m illions o f C hinese w ho had em igrated there to escape w arlords, excessive taxation, and bandits.43 Even som e anti-interventionists w ho saw Japan as harboring extensive te r­ ritorial am bitions felt no alarm . According to W illiam R andolph H earst, w rit­ ing in June 1940, n o t only did Japan seek the N etherlands East Indies and the Philippines b u t its aspirations also extended to Alaska and the Pacific C oast. Yet he feared th at the U nited States m ight provide Japan w ith an o p p o rtu n ity for war, ju st as France had recently supplied Italy w ith an excuse to gain Savoy, Nice, C orsica, and Tunisia.44 The nature o f Japanese governm ent and society fostered disagreem ent. Ralph Townsend found Japan m ore o f a dem ocracy than China. U ntil 1937, w hen the C hina war began, the Japanese Diet’s authority m atched th at o f the British gov­ ernm ent. Furtherm ore, he asserted, no one in Japan ever exercised the sweeping personal authority o f President Roosevelt. The New York Daily News stressed Japan’s kinship w ith the U nited States, noting its penchant for technology and commerce, not to m ention love o f baseball. “They are physically dean,” it added. (The News still found certain aspects o f Japan’s w ar “barbarous,” but it contin­ ued: “We cannot undertake to protect every aggressors’ victim from the aggres­ sors. In plainer English, we’ll be behind the 8 ball if we get into a two-ocean w ar”) Though not going so far, NCPW staffer M ark Shaw pointed to positive features in Japan’s recent heritage, inducting general com pulsory education, recognition o f property rights, and “a responsible constitutional governm ent.” Castle called Prince Kbnoye Fum im aro, Japan’s erstwhile prim e m inister, “one o f the m ost honorable m en in public life,” a m an w ho would be the first to tu rn his nation back to a parliam entary system. W riting in O ctober 1940, however, the retired diplom at saw Japan rapidly becom ing a totalitarian state.45 T hat May, Dennis

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had found Japan’s civilian leadership to be m ore traditionalist than totalitarian. Even a year later, he was claim ing th at the Japanese m ilitary possessed neither an “up-to-the-m inute, w ave-of-the-future ideology n o r a corresponding blitz, m il­ itary technique.”46 W ithin th e Roosevelt ad m in istratio n itself, som e voices occasionally sounded sym pathetic to Japan. Early in 1940, A m bassador Joseph G rew be­ lieved th at Japan was a “have-not” n atio n , lacking essential raw m aterials, de­ p endent o n overseas m arkets, and plagued by excess population. “Japan in C hina has a good case an d a strong case if she knew how to present it,” he com m ented privately, “b u t her stu p id ity in publicity and propaganda is only exceeded by her stu p id ity in m ethods.”47 Even A dm iral Stark, in designing W ar Plan D og, w arned against reducing Japan to inferior m ilitary an d econom ic status. W riting Secretary Knox th a t Novem ber, he rem arked, “A balance o f pow er in th e Far East is to o u r interest as m uch as is a balance o f pow er in Eu­ rope.” C riticizing D utch rule in th e East Indies, th e chief o f naval operations questioned w hether Japan really sought to invade th at area.48 All du rin g the debates over intervention, critics w arned against defending W estern im perialist holdings.49 If, said Sterling M orton, the U nited States was going to guarantee W estern em pires in Asia, “perhaps the Javanese and the An­ nam ites m ight first be consulted.”50 W illiam H enry C ham berlin asked, “H ow m any A m ericans, o n a referendum vote, w ould w ish to die for th e D utch East Indies, for Singapore, for T hailand o r Senegal?” H e continued, “I am antici­ pating the day w hen th e possession o f T ibet and A fghanistan w ill be repre­ sented as vitally necessary to th e security o f Kansas an d N ebraska.”51 T he Japanese m ight well think, com m ented America, th at the U.S. held to a double standard. Foreign M inister M atsuoka Yosuke, the Jesuit weekly noted, found th e U nited States protesting strongly over M anchuria in 1932 w hile being rel­ atively silent over the G erm an naval base erected in Shantung in 1898.52 Above all, ad m inistration critics argued, A m ericans m ust avoid— in the w ords o f H arry Elm er Barnes— any effort “to m ake the Pacific safe for the B ritish Em pire.” A fter all, they asserted, the B ritish had m any stakes in East Asia, the A m ericans few. As H ugh Johnson presented th e issue, “O u r stake in the Far East w hich m ight be m enaced by Japan is to th a t o f G reat B ritain as a m olehill to a m ountain.”53 The entire British presence in Asia m et w ith strong attack.54 The New York AFC chapter claim ed th at B ritain was “parked” in the Pacific sim ply for gold, oil, rubber, silver, diam onds— th at is, those rich supplies th at its capitalists had “stolen” from the Asian people.55 Similarly, the New York Daily News, in refer­ ring to British interests in H ong Kong, M alaya, and India, said, “The British have no m ore historic o r racial right to be in any o f these places than the G erm ans have to be in France.” Even recent history was brought into the anti-interven­ tionist indictm ent. The Chicago Tribune, for exam ple, accused the British o f “de­ serting” Secretary o f State Stim son in the M anchurian crisis o f 1931-33.56

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C ertain ad m inistration critics suspected secret accords already existed be­ tw een B ritain and the U nited States.57 In M arch 1940, C ongressm an T inkham m aintained, quite incorrectly, th a t tw o years earlier B ritain and the U nited States had entered in to a binding m ilitary alliance, w ith B ritain to defend C an­ to n and E nderbury islands.58 T hat May, A1 W illiam s w arned th at th e B ritish foreign office had assigned the U nited States th e task o f attacking Japan un d er th e guise o f m aintaining th e status quo in the Far East. A m onth later, Rush H olt proclaim ed th a t the A m erican fleet was serving in th e Pacific to protect B ritish interests.59 In M arch 1941, C ongressm an R obsion pointed w ith alarm to press reports th a t A m erican cruisers and destroyers lay o ff the coast o f Aus­ tralia and A m erican bom bers had been shipped to Singapore.60 Some anti-interventionists even cautioned against possible U.S. designs.61 Roosevelt, feared N orm an T hom as, was “policing the Far East for th e benefit o f A m erican im perialism over Japanese im perialism .” W arning th at the U nited States could soon be in Singapore, R aym ond M oley queried, “Are we going to be a n ation o r an em pire?”62 A m id such suspicions, anti-interventionists m ight well have m inim ized A m erican econom ic interests in m uch o f Asia, particularly th e low er region. By 1941, U.S. trad e there exceeded Japan’s. Even in the th irties, th e U nited States was th e best custom er o f M alaya, the th ird leading custom er o f In ­ dochina, an d th e th ird m ajor im p o rter to th e D utch East Indies.63

From 1939 u ntil the actual attack on Pearl H arbor, som e anti-interventionists supported various form s o f econom ic pressure. H ere they w ere in accord w ith w idespread public sentim ent, for as early as August 1939 a G allup poll show ed 82 percent o f its respondents opposing die sale o f any w ar m aterials to Japan.64 In particular, th e trad e in w ar m aterials m ade people furious. In A pril 1940, th e Socialist P arty called th e U nited States “a v irtu al p a rtn e r o f Japan in th e assault o n C hina.”65 A ccording to B arnes, th e n ation was supplying over 50 percent o f Japanese w ar m aterials; according to V illard an d Senator C apper, 70 percent.66 In the w ords o f C ongressm an R obert T. Secrest (D em .O hio), “We have been a p arty to th is grinding o f a n atio n o f 400,000,000 h u ­ m ans to d u st and abject slavery.”67 A few anti-interventionists accused th e U.S. o f playing a double gam e, fu r­ nishing b o th sides w ith im plem ents o f destruction.68 D anaher rem arked in O ctober 1939, “We have assisted Japan in m aking a w ar and C hina in co n tin ­ uing it.” O ne B aptist clergym an w rote in the FOR’s Fellowship three m onths later, “We have shipped m unitions to Japan and prayers to C hina.” In Febru­ ary 1941, V ito M arcantonio noted th at C hina had been unable to buy a single significant A m erican w eapon w hile A m erican exports to Japan had increased

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m arkedly over th e past six m onths: “We give C hina ju st a b it to keep Japan busy, b u t never will we give C hina sufficient to m ake C hina win.”69 C ertain an ti-interventionists accused the Roosevelt ad m inistration o f hypocrisy while denying any inconsistency them selves. “M any a lover o f democracy,” rem arked the AFC, had long w ondered why the U nited States w ould “froth at th e m outh against the Axis, and at the sam e tim e continue to appease Japan, a m em ber o f the Axis, by shipping it w ar m aterial.” C apper found little conflict betw een his opposition to lend-lease and his dem ands for an arm s em bargo on Japan; both positions were essentially peace m easures, preventing arm s from going to w arring nations.70 All du rin g 1940, a variety o f em bargoes were proposed.71 Freda Utley sought to prohibit trad e in “th e sinews o f war.” Reynolds stressed “im plem ents o f death.”72 The New York Daily News used the term “w ar m aterials.”73 An A m erican ban on m ilitary supplies, m aintained C ongressm an A ugust H . Andresen (R ep.-M inn.), w ould end the C hina cam paign w ithin sixty days.74 By 1941, som e no longer w anted to lim it em bargoes to arm s. Each an ti­ interventionist appeared to have a different preference for additional bans. W illiam H enry C ham berlin spoke generally in term s o f resources essential to A m erican security. C ongressw om an Jessie Sum ner referred to “m anufactured goods.” In the late spring, Senators Nye and W heeler listed oil.75 Scrap iron was particularly noted.76 For th e past tw o years, Fish said in A pril 1940, he had sponsored a bill prohibiting its shipm ent to Japan, b u t th e p ro ­ posal had been bottled in com m ittee.77 A m onth later, Common Sense asserted th at such shipm ents m ight eventually p u t A m erican troops in danger, saying th at an epitaph m ight eventually read, “They died for th e sake o f the A m eri­ can ju n k business.”78 W hile in its initial hawkish phase, the New York Daily News suggested the m ost radical pressure o f all. “We think,” it said in late August 1939, “there should be a long-distance naval blockade o f Japan, based on Singapore, Hawaii and the Aleutian Islands.” Because o f the danger from the USSR, Japan w ould be so pre­ occupied that “an American em bargo alone will be iron-dad enough to squeeze the m ilitary caste off the necks o f the peaceable Japanese people.”79 By Septem ­ ber, it was proposing a joint effort whereby Britain w ould string com m erce raiders south horn Singapore, and the U.S. Navy, basing its operations in Hawaii, would keep Japanese comm erce out o f the W estern Hemisphere.80 T hough m any anti-interventionists supported pressure on Japan, others ex­ pressed the concern th at such efforts no t go too far. For exam ple, in Decem ­ ber 1939, a coalition o f pacifist organizations urged the m aintenance o f n o r­ m al trade relations w ith Japan.81 V arious reasons were given for such a position. Japan, it was argued, could respond by blockading C hinese ports, shutting o u t all im ports, applying m ar­ tial law wherever its arm ies were located, and excluding all foreigners from C hina.82 It could also reto rt by venturing southw ard, conquering such areas as

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B orneo, th e D utch East Indies, th e Philippines, and Singapore.83 It m ight be pushed into th e arm s o f such totalitarian states as G erm any and Italy, even the Soviet U nion, thereby upsetting the w orld balance o f pow er, besides leading to an increased arm s race.84 In speaking o f an oil em bargo, form er congressm an Sam uel B. Pettengill, speaking in A ugust 1940, noted Tokyo’s ow n w arning th a t its reaction w ould be "very great,” w hich in tu rn w ould cause the U nited States to build m ore battleships.85 A few m aintained th a t Japan could certainly survive econom ic pressure. H istorian A rth u r J. M ay estim ated th at Japan possessed sufficient resources at hom e and alternate sources o f supply. T hough th e severing o f U.S. supply lines, said H anson Baldw in, m ight eventually be effective, Japan probably had stored a year’s reserve o f fuel oil; it also had access to oil shale in M anchukuo and could receive sm all quantities o f iron ore and o th er m etab across the S trait o f Tsushim a.86 Above all, it was argued, th e U nited States conducted a rich trad e w ith Japan, particularly in com parison w ith the m inuscule am ount o f its trad e w ith C hina.87 In June 1941, th e New York Daily News noted th at Japan norm ally bought $200 m illion w orth o f A m erican goods each year, C hina about $80 m illion. "It seem s grotesque to fight th e good custom er on behalf o f th e n o t so good custom er.”88 T he C hina trad e an d investm ent w ere continually denigrated.89 In recent years, w rote P orter Sargent, less th an 3 percent o f U.S. com m erce had been w ith C hina, including H ong Kong. M oreover, asserted lum ber m erchant G eorge H . Cless, A m ericans had p u t less th an $200 m illion into C hina, "slightly m ore th an we paid for chew ing gum last year.” In fact, in all the Far East, A m erican investm ents did n o t exceed $750 m illion, "m aterially less than o u r total cigarette bill last year.” The sum , said H ugh Johnson, involved fewer dollars th an "H arry H opkins used to toss away in a single m erry m onth o f raking leaves” or, as Boake C arter rem arked, th an A m ericans spent annually to w atch athletic events. C ertainly, claim ed th e H earst colum nist, th e cost to A m erican taxpayers for one year’s m ilitary an d trad e services in th e O rient ex­ ceeded th e n atio n ’s perm anent investm ent there.90 By contrast, trade w ith Japan was often touted. For decades, said the New York Daily News in July 1941, Japan had been "far and away o u r best custom er in the Far East.” In January 1940, H earst’s San Francisco Examiner had found Japan to be the th ird largest purchaser o f A m erican goods.91 A ccording to Townsend, Japan norm ally bought about as m uch as all the rest o f Asia com ­ bined, in som e years m ore th an all South A m erican countries, and usually four to five tim es as m uch annually as C hina. Furtherm ore, o f all the m ajor pow ers, only the Tokyo governm ent had never defaulted on a single dollar o r debt.92 W illiam J. Baxter, a Wall Street investm ent consultant active in A m erica First, offered an elaborate rationale in his book Japan and America Must Work To­ gether ( 1941 ). W ith its plethora o f virtues— large population, stable fam ily life, habits o f th rift, long hours o f w ork, and absence o f trad e unions— Japan was

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ideally suited for U.S. investm ent and exports. Like the G erm ans and A m eri­ cans, the Japanese were p art o f “N ature’s chosen people.” N ot only could Japan contain the spread o f “Russian C om m unism ” bu t it alone, he im plied, was able to bring recovery to the depression-ridden U nited States, a nation th at m ust ei­ th er help the Japanese “A m ericanize” Asia o r go to w ar over the m atter.93 Such anti-interventionists denied th at Japan had really closed the open door.94 U.S. trade in M anchukuo alone, com m ented H earst, was three tim es th at w ith C hina. The Chicago Tribune foresaw a Japanese-dom inated Asia cre­ ating a far greater need for A m erican products, particularly cotton and food­ stuffs. T hough the U nited States w ould probably have to extend credits, it w ould end up in a favorable trading position.95 M oreover, in February 1941, the New York Daily News asserted th at Japan had n o t stifled A m erican trade elsewhere. C iting the U.S. D epartm ent o f C om m erce’s figures, it noted th at exports to such places as C hina, Japan, T hai­ land, and the N etherlands East Indies had increased from 1939 to 1940. W ere Japan to dom inate o th er nations, the News surm ised, it probably w ould n o t shut the U nited States o ff from trading w ith the others.96 Even the low er wages o f Asian nations involved no threat. A fter all, said John T. Flynn, the U nited States had long com peted w ith such “slave labor” countries as Japan, C hina, and “B ritain’s India.”97 It was in Japan’s ow n financial interest, anti-interventionists m aintained, to m aintain good com m ercial relations. Ralph Townsend thought th e Japanese norm ally drew betw een o ne-fourth and on e-th ird o f th eir national incom e from foreign trade. M oreover, he continued, the U.S. offered the best values in m any com m odities and was the w orld's best m arket for others.98 W ere the U nited States to sever trade w ith Japan, som e anti-interventionists argued, certain sections o f the nation w ould suffer inordinately. So, too, w ould certain industries. The Chicago Tribune predicted th at the W est C oast, partic­ ularly its shipping industry, w ould suffer from an em bargo. Japan, stressed H ugh Johnson, was one o f the nation’s principal outlets for cotton, on w hich the entire econom y o f “o u r threatened and im poverished South” depended.99 Townsend found cotton to be the nation’s m ost overproduced com m odity, w ith a surplus o f tw enty-five m illion bales, equaling roughly tw o years o f A m erican production. As business recovery in the cotton states depended on disposing o f this surplus and as m any norm al European outlets were closed, he stated, Japan loom ed m ore im p o rtan t than ever. The Chicago Tribune m ade a sim ilar poin t concerning silk-related industries.100

U ntil the Japanese attacked Pearl H arbor, m any anti-interventionists stressed th at Japan could never threaten the continental U nited States.101 They scoffed

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a t rum ors, prevalent in th e spring o f 1940, th a t th e Japanese stood poised to capture San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, and P ortland, O regon.102 Call w riter H enry Haskell found th e possibility equal to th a t o f an invasion o f G er­ m any by Luxem bourg. aI suppose,” m used Rush H olt, “she is going to fly her big tanks over th e C anadian Rockies.” Any invasion o f th e U.S. via Alaska, Flem ing M acLiesh an d C ushm an Reynolds w rote, w ould be repulsed by “a good-sized army.” T he w orst Japan could do, said C astle, was to strike at the P hilippines.103 Several anti-interventionists quoted w hat m ight be taken as an unim peachable authority, Franklin D. Roosevelt him self. In an article w ritten in 1923 in Asia m agazine, the future president found invasion o f th e w estern shores o n th e Pacific probably im possible, certainly im practical.104 Sheer logistics, it was argued, worked against any strike on the Am erican m ainland. Japan, asserted the Chicago Tribune, was fully three hundred tim es as far from the U nited States as H itler was from the still-unoccupied Britain. In fact, predicted Taft, the stationing o f two hundred thousand U.S. troops on the Pacific Coast w ould make a Japanese landing impossible. According to Villard, Japan lacked the bases needed to launch an air strike across the Pacific.103MacLiesh and Reynolds envisioned an Am erican fleet, operating out o f Hawaii w ith “air wings,” harrying any advancing Japanese force. Were a Japanese fleet to engage in a frontal attack on Pearl H arbor, the land-based guns there w ould outshoot Japan’s sea-based ones. Anyone w ho had seen Japanese poverty firsthand, m aintained Senator W heeler, w ould realize th at Japan could no t attack the U nited States.106 Even the m uch-touted Japanese navy, som e argued, em bodied no threat. C ertain noninterventionists, for exam ple, strongly challenged a claim by Rear A dm iral Joseph K. Taussig, com m andant o f the Fifth Naval D istrict a t N orfolk and form er chief o f staff o f the U.S. Fleet. O n 22 A pril 1940, in testifying be­ fore th e Senate Naval Affairs C om m ittee, the adm iral had called for larger b at­ tleships, im pregnable bases in G uam and th e Philippines, and an agreem ent w ith B ritain, France, an d th e N etherlands for jo in t action. T he reason? The Japanese m ilitary sought w orld dom ination. H ull and Stark im m ediately dis­ avowed his rem arks, b u t th e dam age was d o n e.107 A dm inistration critics were incensed. B ennett C lark dem anded Taussig’s co u rt-m artial. Fish called Taussig’s rem arks “perhaps th e m ost provocative, inflam m atory, and dangerous rem arks th at have been m ade by any Navy offi­ cer in o u r tim e and generation.” 108 C ertainly, a naval race in the Pacific appeared th e height o f folly. Flynn found the costs prohibitive. So long as th e U nited States had th e w orld’s largest and strongest navy, said H anford M acN ider, Japan could n o t be a m en­ ace.109 G eneral Johnson H agood predicted th at th e A m erican fleet w ould be able to keep Japanese expeditionary forces from U.S. hom e w aters w hile land fortifications— defended by m ines, subs, an d aircraft— w ould prevent the en try o f stray ships. M ilitia w ould stop even sm all Japanese detachm ents from attacking m ainland forts from b eh in d .110

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N ot all anti-interventionists spoke so confidently. H earst w anted at least a 5:3 naval ratio over Japan. Even th e Spanish-A m erican War, he recalled, was n o t concluded for a year though the A m erican navy was tw ice th e size o f Japan's. In fact, th e publisher becam e dow nright alarm ist, finding even the cities o f th e A m erican W est C oast in jeopardy. If Japan invaded, he w rote in June 1940, it w ould be best to declare Los Angeles an open city, for th e A m er­ ican arm y, lacking tran sp o rtatio n facilities, w ould have to w ithdraw . "O ne can im agine the highways obstructed by long lines o f refugees, com posed m ainly o f real estate operators and m otion picture stars, fleeing before an advancing arm y o f Japanese vegetable gardeners.”111 A lthough by spring 1940 the New York Daily News had opposed any naval confrontation in the w estern Pacific, it still pushed for a strong navy. Even then, it noted a year later, the U nited States m ight easily becom e overextended. If it took on Germany, Italy, Japan, and perhaps the Soviet U nion all at once, "the Japs” could m ake a "sham bles” out o f M anila, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.112 Several noninterventionists used a possible Japanese m enace to w arn against com m itm ents in E urope.113 If, w arned W heeler in June 1940, the U.S. fought a naval w ar w ith G erm any, it w ould be open to attack by Japan, "an axis pow er w ho hates us.” 114 T he Chicago Tribune a llied for a political settlem ent in the Pacific, so the U nited States could then use its fleet in the A tlantic, w here it was m ost needed.115 In 1940, D ennis declared th at A m erican involvem ent in Europe was exposing the Philippines to attack. T he New York Daily News m ade th e sam e claim concerning H aw aii.116 Conversely, m ilitary defeat o f Japan itself was deem ed extrem ely difficult. Libby saw such a w ar lasting five years, w ith victory still n o t assured. Even if U.S. tro o p s em barked from H awaii, predicted Senator Downey, it w ould take three to fo u r "bloody years” to occupy islands som e eight h u ndred m iles away from Japan.117 B arnes forecast th a t "som ew here betw een 100,000 and 1,000,000 A m erican boys w ould be fed to th e Pacific sharks o r ro t u n d er the glare o f the O riental sun.” T he estim ated financial cost: $100 billion.118 M ost im portant o f all, it was asserted, victory in any naval conflict was at best uncertain.119 Factors o f distance and tim e rem ained p a ra m o u n t120 To Senator David W alsh, chairm an o f the Senate Naval Affairs C om m ittee, a battle on the other side o f the Pacific m ight prove "naval suicide”: the greater the distance from Hawaii, the m ore hazardous the engagem ent.121 To fight Japan, said Senator Lundeen, the U nited States w ould have to extend its naval lines six o r seven thousand miles and possess a navy three o r four tim es its present size.122 Villard quoted m ilitary w riter George Fielding Eliot, w ho had him self becom e an intervention­ ist, as saying th at it w ould take the U.S. Navy two years to reach G uam w ith a hundred thousand m en, and only then could a real w ar really be fought.123 Naval com bat w ould be no easy m atter. Even if, said Uncensored, A m erican battleships blasted the entire Japanese line from Pearl H arbor to Singapore, the enem y still w ould n o t be defeated. Japan could unleash an air attack from

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bases in Indochina, draw th e A m erican fleet in to battle around the Philip­ pines, and even refuse to fight a m ajor engagem ent, thereby leading th e U nited States to levy a costly long-distance blockade th at could go o n for years.124Avi­ atio n expert A1 W illiam s predicted th at Japan w ould n o t engage the A m erican fleet “in N elson style” u n til its air and subm arine forces had trim m ed dow n A m erican sea pow er.125 Japan, w arned the New York Daily News, m ight fight a m ajor engagem ent in th e Pacific, chase the rem nants o f th e A m erican fleet east o f H aw aii, w hich w ould certainly fall after a siege, an d institu te naval bom bardm ents against th e U.S. Pacific C oast.126 C ertainly, invasion o f Japan itself w ould be m ost difficult.127 T he U nited States w ould undoubtedly w in such a war, predicted H anson Baldw in, if it was only fighting on one front. Yet the conflict w ould probably be “a long, hard, grueling w ar o f attritio n ,” leaving Ma trail o f blood” across th e Pacific.128 The effort w ould require a m illion troops, thereby probably m aking it “the m ost costly expedition in history.”129 Senator D ow ney claim ed Japan could n o t be invaded. O perating o u t o f its ow n bases, and possessing subm arines, airplanes, and arm ies, the island em ­ pire could easily destroy any arm y w ithin a distance o f four o r five thousand m iles.150 T he U.S. Pacific Fleet, Johnson H agood argued, w ould be unable to operate a t full strength, for it w ould face such diverse tasks as protecting Alaska and th e A m erican Pacific C oast, convoying across the ocean, and se­ curing trad e routes to B ritish M alaya, a m ajor source o f rubber. If th e U.S. landed tw o m illion m en and penetrated a h u ndred square m iles, problem s w ould have ju st begun. The Japanese fleet, lying quietly am ong num erous shelters, w ould prevent reinforcem ents and supplies. “T he A m erican boys on shore,” H agood continued, w ould “begin to feel the pangs o f hunger, and after holding o u t for sixty days, o r perhaps a hundred, th e w hole thing w ould end up pleasantly, the um pires deciding th a t the little fellows had won.” 151 W illiam R andolph H earst believed Japan w ould choose to defend its excel­ lently fortified shores w ith its planes, ships, and land batteries. T hough the U nited States could destroy its paper houses, they were hardly w orth bom bing. It w ould still have to conquer Japan w ith ground troops, in the process facing superbly trained arm ies. M eanwhile, Japan’s cruisers and carriers could bom b Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Any conquest w ould take years. O ne should realize, the publisher stressed, th at Japan had never been conquered, even by the apparently overw helm ing forces o f Kublai K han.152 Even victory w ould present problem s. T he Chicago Tribune forecast th at A m erican bom bers w ould destroy the populous Japanese cities, w hose flim sy construction invited disaster, b u t questioned any “nobility” in such action.155 H istorian A rthur J. May denied th at the U nited States w ould accept im m ense responsibilities in the Far East; hence, only the Soviet U nion stood to benefit. Libby felt sim ilarly: Even if the U.S. tu rn ed all Japan into a desert, it still could n o t triu m p h in the long ru n , for com m unism w ould sweep over b o th Japan

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and C hina. “Stalin w ould w in o u r war.” The New York Daily News com m ented on the defeated Japanese people: “Unless we sterilize them , they will proceed to breed, half-starve, hate, and build new arm am ents, and in due tim e the 'yellow peril’ will bounce up again, m ore perilous than ever before.”134 R ather than fight Japan, several Roosevelt adversaries proposed th e U.S. in ­ stigate various defense strategies. H ugh Johnson sought a ring o f ou tp o sts from the A leutians through Hawaii to th e Galapagos. H earst called for fortifi­ cation o f the West C oast, retention o f the navy in Pacific w aters, an d th e es­ tablishm ent o f new m ilitary and naval academ ies on the Pacific. Retired m ajor general W illiam C. Rivers w anted a defense line th at included the A leutians, and Johnson, Palm yra, and M idway islands, all in the eastern Pacific and p a rt o f a defense line proposed by A dm iral W illiam Leahy, chief o f naval opera­ tions. Dow ney saw the U nited States’s defenses extended as far as Pago Pago.13S

N ot only did anti-interventionists often call for caution in dealing w ith Japan itself b u t m any also sought U.S. w ithdraw al from the Philippines, an A m eri­ can possession slated for independence in 1946. U ntil then, however, it held the status o f “com m onw ealth” and lay under U.S. sovereignty. In 1934, C on­ gress had passed the Tydings-M cD uffie Act, w hich targeted Philippine inde­ pendence in twelve years, provided for the rem oval o f A m erican m ilitary posts, and envisioned negotiation w ith th e Filipinos over naval bases. N ot surprisingly, those o f pacifist leanings favored A m erican disengage­ m ent. A group o f neutrality organizations m eeting in D ecem ber 1939, for ex­ am ple, called for the islands’ earliest possible liberation as well as neutraliza­ tion by international treaty.136 The pacifists were far from alone. T he Chicago Tribune found the Philippines to hold no vital U.S. interest. The New York Daily News suggested dividing the Pacific along the international dateline, thereby allotting them to the Japanese.137 The entire nature o f the Philippines, w rote Frank W aldrop, m ade them a d u ­ bious ally. C om posed o f 7,091 individual islands and populated by forty-three ethnographic groups, they were not— said the colum nist— a national u n it in the sam e sense as either Japan o r Britain. M oreover, they had long served as “a way station for all kinds o f breeds and conquerors,” including the Spaniards, D utch, British, and A m ericans.138 Besides, said the New York Daily News, the Filipinos were ungrateful, having “constantly hated w hat we’ve tried to do for them .”139 Certainly, so such anti-interventionists as Hugh Johnson and the Chicago Tribune stressed, they them selves w anted the Am ericans o u t.140 To H arry Elm er Barnes, it was apparent th at Japan had long controlled the Philippines anyhow. Politically they dom inated the N ational Assembly. Eco­ nom ically they were influential in fishing, hem p, m ining, lum ber, and the re­

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tail trade. Even M anuel Q uezon, elected president o f the Philippine com m on­ w ealth in 1935, courted th eir su p p o rt.141 Conversely, FDR critics m aintained, th e U nited States held little econom ic stake there. T hey deem ed th e cost o f m aintaining the islands prohibitive. N ei­ th er th e n ation’s best custom er n o r its m ost im p o rtan t source o f raw m ateri­ als, th e Philippines— in the w ords o f Uncensored—w ere a long-term drain on A m erican finances, “th e biggest headache in U.S. defense plans.” T he A m eri­ can taxpayer, rem arked H ugh Johnson, spent $3 there for every $1 received in benefits. To Barnes, the Philippines were n o t w orth a slight fraction o f the cost involved in defeating Japan. Any conflict waged over th eir future, com m ented Flynn, w ould only serve th e interests o f a few dozen corporations. Boake C arter feared th e influence o f “th e sugar barons o f M anila,” w ho— supported by th e U.S. Navy—w ould dem and th at a new Singapore be b uilt in th e Philip­ pines, th en keep h alf the A m erican fleet aro u n d M anila.142 At any rate, several anti-interventionists found the islands indefensible, the Chicago Tribune calling them a “m ilitary liability o f the gravest so rt to the U nited States.” 143 M ost naval experts, said th e New York Daily News, denied th at the islands could survive an attack by a destroyer flotilla.144 W ere the A m erican navy to operate som e six thousand m iles from hom e base, w arned H ugh Johnson, its striking pow er w ould be trim m ed tw o-thirds, a discrepancy th at could be offset only by a vast preponderance o f tonnage. Even then, chances o f victory w ere uncertain, for th e Philippines w ere literally su r­ rounded by Japanese-m andated islands, m any o f w hich were reportedly fo rti­ fied.145 D uring the debate over B urke-W adsw orth, C ongressm an Bruce Bar­ to n offered an am endm ent to exclude th e Philippines from th e definition o f th e U nited States and its possessions, declaring th at m ilitary authorities had claim ed the islands could n o t be defended.146 C ertainly, argued several a n ti­ interventionists, the continual replenishm ent o f U.S. m ilitary aid sim ply cre­ ated m ore anxiety.147 H anson Baldw in challenged such analysis, denying th a t Japan could con­ quer th e islands easily. Such a cam paign w ould require at least ten thousand m en, three h u ndred planes, and a h u ndred tran sp o rt ships. H e did concede th a t th e Philippines w ere sh o rt in aircraft and possessed inadequate docking an d repair facilities, an ill-equipped and underm anned garrison, and a w oe­ fully inadequate arm y. W hen w orld conditions perm itted, he continued, the U.S. should w ithdraw , substituting its unilateral guarantee w ith an in tern a­ tional neutralization. If such w ere n o t possible, it should build a huge naval base and large land garrison and station at least th irty thou san d troops and at least three h u ndred planes th ere.148 O f all th e noninterventionists, probably no one was m ore cited than retired general W illiam C. Rivers, form er chief o f the Philippine constabulary, w ho offered an entire battery o f argum ents supporting U.S. w ithdraw al. In fact, Rivers was so adam ant o n th is subject th at he joined sem ipacifist groups.

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A m erican trade w ith the Philippines, he said, was always disappointing. The islands lacked the rubber, oil, coal, and hardw ood needed for lucrative com ­ m erce; in fact, they failed to raise sufficient rice for th eir ow n population. The U nited States itself had subsidized the Philippine sugar industry, even though it could purchase sugar cheaper in C uba o r Hawaii. W ere the Japanese to con­ quer the islands, Rivers argued, Japan itself w ould be m ore vulnerable, not less, for its em pire w ould be split into tw o parts, each separated by a stretch o f alm ost tw o thousand m iles and leaving a threatening C hina lying in betw een. At any rate, the Philippines' new rulers were hardly dem ocratic. Rivers cited th e Filipino Civil Liberties U nion, w hich accused Q uezon o f seeking to create a totalitarian regim e. T he president had supposedly called for the abolition o f political parties. As far as defending the Philippines was concerned, Rivers quoted A dm iral H arry E. Yamell, form er com m ander in chief o f the Asiatic fleet, on the need for dry docks, a naval base, and a fleet possessing a 2:1 ratio over Japan.149 A few noninterventionists sought to retain the islands o r to fight if they were attacked.150 W heeler and Fish spoke o f w ar if Japan attem pted to conquer them .151 H earst’s San Francisco Examiner called the Philippines the first U.S. line o f defense, as now here was Am erica’s peace and security so seriously threatened. M oreover, it asserted, the Filipinos probably desired and certainly needed A m erican protection.152 W ithdraw al, w rote H earst him self, w ould only result in Japanese occupation. D eem ing the Philippines ten tim es as im portant as Hawaii, he said they should be twice as well fortified. O nce the U nited States constructed m ajor bases there, it could threaten any naval expedition bound for its ow n west coast. Furtherm ore, if the islands rem ained an Am erican pos­ session, its population could contribute an arm y o f one m illion.153 The U.S. m ilitary had been at best am bivalent about defending this vast a r­ chipelago. Joint arm y-navy plans devised in 1936 envisioned a Philippine gar­ rison holding the entrances to M anila Bay u n til superior sea pow er cam e to the rescue. Any fu rth er com m itm ent, com m ented G eneral Stanley D. Em bick, was “an act o f m adness”; Em bick, w ho had com m anded the C orregidor gar­ rison three years earlier, had called then for neutralization o f the islands. As late as May 1941, Stim son— w ho had been appointed governor general o f the Philippines in 1928— found the islands indefensible.154 O nly on 31 July 1941 did M arshall define their defense as official U.S. pol­ icy. The islands w ould play host to som e 165 Flying Fortresses, B-17 bom bers th at w ould serve as a deterrent and if necessary an attack force. Suddenly the w ar departm ent was tacitly affirm ing th at the Philippines were defensible if sufficient tim e existed to com plete a reinforcem ent program and train the Philippine army. By m id-Septem ber, the first contingent o f nine bom bers had arrived; in m id-N ovem ber, tw enty-six m ore had com e.155 Exorbitant claims were m ade concerning the deterrent potential o f the new aircraft. To Stim son and M arshall, they could break up the Axis alliance. In H ull’s

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eyes, the B -17s gave “punch” to the Am erican diplom atic effort. The w ar plans d i­ vision saw them as “a powerful threat to Japan proper.”156 Douglas M acA rthur, recently recalled to active service as com m anding general o f “U.S. Arm y Forces, Far East,” had long been giving assurances th at the islands were defensible.157

A m ong anti-interventionists, G uam , too, served as a m atter o f debate. An A m erican possession, it was th e largest island in the M arianas chain (the re­ m aining ones belonging to Japan) and was adm inistered by the navy d ep art­ m ent. In February 1939, C ongress had voted dow n a $5 m illion ap propriation to co n stru ct h arb o r w orks there. B oth th e state and w ar departm ents dispar­ aged th e h arb o r proposal, fearing th at th e m ove w ould antagonize Japan.158 A few anti-interventionists, including the H earst press, endorsed G uam ’s fortification. Late in 1940, the New York Daily News m aintained th at th e island should be m ade into an effective naval station: “It w ould at least give us an o u tp o st to m ake som e trouble in case o f a fight.” H anson Baldw in sought a sm all subm arine and p atrol base.159 M ost Roosevelt critics, however, strongly opposed G uam ’s fortification.160 First, they claim ed, there could be no salient m ore exposed.161 It lay 3,000 m iles w est o f Pearl H arbor, th e w esternm ost U.S. naval base, b u t was only 1,350 m iles from Tokyo. As the effective operating radius o f th e U.S. fleet from a m ajor base was abo u t 2,500 m iles, G uam w ould be difficult to hold. In ad ­ d itio n , m any o f th e surrounding Japanese islands possessed good subm arine and airplane h arb o rs.162 Second, fortification was costly and possibly futile. Boake C arter, noting A dm iral Stark’s assertion th at an expenditure o f $250 m illion w ould secure G uam , found the sum m ore th an th e total o f U.S. investm ent in th e P hilip­ pines, Japan, and C hina com bined. A ccording to Uncensored, th e proposed construction o f G uam ’s A pra harbor, w hich w ould consist o f im provem ents an d a few bom b shelters, was far too weak to be effective.163 Besides, it was argued, the m ove was provocative, as m uch so— said Libby— as w ould be reciprocal action by Japan in the G alapagos Islands o r by G er­ m any in B erm uda.164 To the Chicago Tribune, G uam appeared to be th e linch­ pin in a m ajor anti-Japanese alliance consisting o f th e U nited States, B ritain, A ustralia, and New Z ealand.165 In c o n tra st to such suspicions concerning th e P hilippines an d G uam , m any a n ti-in te rv en tio n ists believed H aw aii to be im pregnable.166 “T he greatest m ilitary o u tp o st an d m aritim e fo rtress in th e w hole w orld,” Sena­ to r D ow ney called it. In O ctober 1941, th e Chicago Tribune specifically d e­ n ied th a t th e A m erican base at H aw aii lay w ith in strik in g pow er o f the Japanese fleet.167

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Even if th e Japanese attem pted an attack, it was argued, the effort w ould be futile. Troops a t Schofield B arracks, declared Flem ing M acLiesh an d C ushm an Reynolds, m anned a greater concentration o f antiaircraft guns th an anyw here on the m ainland. All o f O ahu was protected by m ountain ranges. T he New York Daily News was equally optim istic. Heavily fortified and stocked w ith m unitions and food supplies, Pearl H arbor alone, it said, could hold o u t u n til an A m erican rescue fleet arrived.168 W ere th e Japanese able to occupy Hawaii, Uncensored predicted they could n o t hold it easily. O nly G eneral Rivers o f­ fered a slight dissent, saying th at th e A m erican fleet should leave H aw aii for territo ry east o f th e Panam a C anal, probably the C aribbean.169

T he im pending crisis, certain an ti-in terv en tio n ists m ain tain ed , could be avoided if th e ir ow n suggestions for peace w ere follow ed. In th e tw o years before th e w ar, they offered various proposals, in som e cases full-scale plans, o n how to alleviate th e tension. In Septem ber 1939, N orm an T hom as fa­ vored m ediation betw een C hina an d Japan, w ith th e U nited States taking “an intelligent lead.” 170 Four m o n th s later, S enator W iley referred to a “ro u n d -tab le m eth o d ” used successfully by M ethodist m issionary E. Stanley Jones in In d ia .171 P ublisher Roy H ow ard called for a com m ission, com posed o f A m ericans possessing som e respect for “o rien tal psychology,” th a t w ould rep o rt to C ongress an d th e p resident on th e “fundam entals” o f th e entire A sian situ a tio n .172 In F ebruary 1941, th e Christian Century suggested a w orld parley.173 T h at May, th e W om en’s In tern atio n al League spoke o f an “econom ic conference” betw een th e U.S. an d Japan centering o n access to th e resources o f th e Pacific.174 Several proposals centered o n C hina. Before it joined the ranks o f th e in ­ terventionists, the New Republic suggested relinquishm ent o f all foreign gar­ risons and ex traterritorial privileges. By this arrangem ent, Japan w ould still be able to develop m uch o f C hina’s econom y.175 Pacifists concurred in such a W estern w ithdraw al.176 In January 1940, the New York Daily News suggested an agreem ent am ong the U nited States, Japan, B ritain, th e Soviet U nion, and C hina th at w ould keep th e C hinese m arket open to all.177 In Septem ber, claim ­ ing th at the Japanese people were “seriously fed up w ith th e w ar in C hina,” the News called for A m erican m ediation betw een C hiang K ai-shek, th e Japanese p uppet ru ler W ang C hing-w ei, and Japan’s leaders. T he U nited States could be rew arded for its efforts by obtaining “a fair show for U nited States business­ m en in C hina, M anchukuo and Japan.” 178 Even in A ugust 1941, it suggested a face-saving settlem ent by w hich th e Japanese w ould abandon m ost o f C hina w hile being perm itted “a reasonable degree o f expansion from th eir cram ped, over-populated islands.” 179

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O ne ad hoc task force was established. Early in the fall o f 1941, at th e invita­ tio n o f publicist O. K. A rm strong, a sm all group o f church leaders, w riters, and scholars m et in New York to discuss strengthening U.S. relations w ith Japan. It issued a public statem ent calling for reconciliation and form ed a C om m ittee on Pacific Relations, b u t the group lacked the strength o r the tim e to be effective.180 In any discussion concerning term s, pacifists and liberals stressed th e need to repeal th e Japanese Exclusion Act o f 1924. A m erican recognition o f racial equality was deem ed crucial.181 N orm an T hom as endorsed a program o f lim ­ ited im m igration, controlled by treaties and quotas, saying the U nited States could n o t receive great num bers. D orothy D etzer saw lifting the 1924 act as p a rt o f a bargain concerning Japan’s w ithdraw al from C hina. T he FOR spoke in term s o f establishing a custom s u n io n o f “all Pacific and A m erican peoples” and assisting general econom ic developm ent.182 To best understand th e context o f all such general attitudes, a detailed know ledge o f the varied events leading up to the Pearl H arbor attack is crucial.

21 ★

Toward the Pacific War

From the fill o f 1939 through th e spring o f 1940, anti-interventionists lacked a com m on perspective o n events in East Asia. M any saw Japan, n o t C hina, as th e n ation experiencing the m ost tro u b le.1 In Septem ber 1939, Osw ald G arri­ son V illard th o u g h t th at Japan felt so betrayed by G erm any th at it was less in ­ clined than ever to begin hostilities against the U nited States.2 Four m onths later, the Chicago Tribune alleged th at th e recently installed Japanese govern­ m ent, headed by A dm iral Yonai M itsum asa and Foreign M inister A rita H achiro, sought accom m odation.3 In M arch 1940, the New York Daily News found Japan to be “on the ragged edge o f national bankruptcy.”4 Tensions betw een the tw o nations, however, steadily increased. C oncrete anxiety first centered o n the 1911 U.S. com m ercial treaty w ith Japan, w hich in d u d ed a m ost-favored-nation provision. In June 1939, in the C raigie-A rita agreem ent, the C ham berlain governm ent surrendered to Japanese dem ands th at its conquests in C hina be recognized. O pposing the m ove, Roosevelt and H ull believed th at Japan m ust be show n th a t it could n o longer conquer w ith im punity.5 H ence, o n 26 July, H ull sent o u t th e necessary six-m onth notice o f possible abrogation o f the 1911 agreem ent.6 A fter 26 January 1940, th e secre­ tary w arned, the U nited States m ight sever th e iron, steel, and oil needed for the Japanese w ar m achine, thereby crippling its m ilitary e ffo rt M oreover, the U.S. treasury w ould be free to curtail purchases o f Japanese gold and silver, Japan’s chief source o f foreign exchange an d essential to its com m ercial life.7 Trade w ould thenceforth be conducted on a tw enty-four-hour basis, n o t au­ tom atically severing valuable w ar supplies b u t keeping Japan in a high state o f uncertainty. A ccording to a G allup poll, the A m erican public approved can­ cellation o f th e treaty by over a four-to-one m argin.’

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Several noninterventionists supported abrogation, including Roy H ow ard and the New York Daily News.9 To D orothy Detzer, abrogation w ould express strong Am erican disapproval o f Japanese action w ithout exerting further coercion.10 O ne anti-interventionist, Senator A rthur Vandenberg, had long sought such a m easure. Six days before Roosevelt’s initial announcem ent, the M ichigan Repub­ lican had introduced a resolution calling for rescinding the 1911 treaty and the reassem bling o f the Brussels conference o f N ovem ber 1937, an effort by the sign­ ers o f the N ine Power Pact o f 1922 to curb Japanese expansion. W hen colum nist W alter Lippm ann accused the M ichigan senator o f taking a m ajor step on “the road to war,” V andenberg replied th at his resolution w ould create just the oppo­ site effect: a bellicose em bargo w ould have been avoided. At the sam e tim e, con­ ditions for a new Japanese-Am erican treaty, one providing for Am erican rights in Japan and C hina, w ould be fostered.11 Indeed, he was discouraged w hen he saw the state departm ent using his resolution to threaten the Japanese rather than as an opportunity to seek accom m odation.12 O ther anti-interventionists were apprehensive.13 Borah thought abrogation w ould be insulting, and found the possibility o f a discrim inatory em bargo disas­ trous.14Asked the Chicago Tribune, "Is there a t W ashington any desire to prom ote the nation’s foreign trade?”15 Even if the U nited States did not radically raise its duties, feared W illiam Castle, contracts w ould be uncertain, and therefore trade w ould languish.16 To Borchard, it seem ed the U.S. had already broken the 1911 treaty by levying m oral em bargoes on Japan.17 H earst’s San Francisa) Examiner asserted th at the indignities suffered by the U.S. in the Sino- Japanese w ar had not been great; in fact, they could easily be alleviated w ith the restoration o f good re­ lations. O n the other hand, A m erican hostility m ight force Japan into an alliance w ith the USSR.18 A t tim es w ar was m entioned. C harles C allan Tansill accused H ull o f seeking to reduce Japan to a second-class power. "Is th e A m erican public ready to go to war,” questioned th e Fordham historian, "to com pel these stubborn chil­ dren o f N ippon to accept a political pabulum th a t they despise?” Lawrence D ennis an d V. D. G ravenhoff predicted th at Japan w ould n o t succum b to A m erican dem ands concerning C hina, although it w ould avoid open clash.19 D uring th e w in ter an d sp rin g o f 1939-40, ru m o rs floated concerning ac­ co m m o d atio n betw een Japan an d G reat B ritain, causing a q u ite d ifferen t set o f anxieties am ong n o n in terv en tio n ists. T he U nited States, feared th e Chicago Tribune in January 1940, m ight end u p fro n tin g fo r "occidental im ­ perialism ” in C hina. T h at A pril, w riter B urton Rascoe accused E ngland o f d ividing th e o p iu m m onopoly w ith Japan w hile establishing a com m on bulw ark against th e Soviet U nion. New Masses n o ted th a t th e B ritish -d o m ­ in ated A ng lo -Iran ian O il C om pany had ju st sold a m illion b arrels o f cru d e o il to Japan an d th a t th e B ritish am bassador to Japan had given a concilia­ to ry speech. "T he B ritish,” said th e com m unist weekly, “are once m ore e n ­ gaged in sidesw iping th e ir m ost form idable A m erican rival, A m erican im ­

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perialism .” F u rth erm o re, b o th C hina an d th e Soviet U nion w ere in ten d ed to be th e victim s.20 O n 30 M arch 1940, the “AU C hina governm ent” o f W ang C hing-w ei, a p ro Japanese rival o f C hiang K ai-shek, was inaugurated at Peking, though sover­ eignty was confined to th e Japanese-occupied areas o f K iangsu, C hekiang, an d Anhwei. H ull im m ediately announced th a t th e U nited States w ould n o t rec­ ognize th e new regim e.21 Before the signing o f a form al peace treaty o n 30 N o­ vem ber 1940, Japan itself offered only de facto recognition although it was al­ ready treating it as a puppet. B orchard opposed H ull's statem ent, fearing th at im m inent B ritish recogni­ tio n o f th e de facto protectorate m ight leave th e U nited States “o u t on a lim b.”22 In an editorial entitled “V ictorious C hina,” th e Chicago Tribune im ­ m ediately claim ed th at W ang had m ade th e Japanese recognize a “free an d in ­ dependent C hina,” som ething th at C hiang, for aU his hard fighting, had been unable to do. W hile acknow ledging Japanese control o f th e new governm ent’s financial, industrial, and educational structures, th e new spaper found W ang th e possible “savior o f his country.”23 O n 15 A pril 1940, Foreign M inister A rita, a n ticip atin g a request from th e N etherlands fo r U.S. occu p atio n o f its East Indies, publicly w arned against any change in th e statu s q u o th ere. HuU d readed any Japanese m ove in to th is territo ry . H e resp o n d ed tw o days later by stressing A m erican d ep en d ­ ence o n th e ir ru b b er an d tin . Any forceful a ltera tio n o f th e existing situ a ­ tio n , he co n tin u ed , w ould be p rejudicial to th e secu rity o f th e en tire Pacific region. O n th e follow ing day, a spokesm an for Japan asserted th a t his co u n ­ try fully co n cu rred w ith H ull’s statem en t.24 A nti-interventionists opposed raising th e issue.25 “A pparendy,” said Bor­ chard, “we are getting to the p o in t w here n o change can be m ade in th e w orld’s political control w ithout offense to the U nited States.”26 Fish w arned against extending th e M onroe D octrine som e ten thousand m iles from A m erican shores. H e continued th at H ull’s doctrine logically applied to th e N etherlands itself.27 T he Christian Century feared th a t th e U.S. w ould assum e responsibil­ ities for the D utch islands. T he state departm ent, argued C asde, should have com m unicated the m essage privately, a m ove th at w ould have served H ull’s purpose equally w hile n o t irritatin g th e Japanese.28 The New York Daily News found H ull’s statem ent to contain the seeds o f possible war. If th e U.S. Navy should try to stop a Japanese naval strike on the Indies, it m ight experience de­ feat in a salient even weaker th an th at o f the Philippines.29 C ertainly, argued certain ad m inistration critics, the N etherlands had n o t treated the indigenous population well. T he Daily News accused th e D utch o f exploiting the Indies “as system atically and as coolly as th e Japanese could.”30 U pton Close concurred. “Even th e nym phs o f Bali shun a H ollander,” he re­ m arked. John T. Flynn pointed o u t th at th e fifty-three m illion inhabitants were ruled by a governor general and council nam ed by “th e dem ocratic process” o f appointm ent by Q ueen W ilhelm ina.31

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U ntil the U nited States entered th e war, such interventionists as th e CDAAA focused on th e D utch East Indies, w arning th a t Japanese dom ination w ould sever Am erica’s tin supply. A dm inistration critics strongly debated am ong them selves claim s th at Southeast Asia supplied essential resources. Because th e U.S. needed this resource, Social Justice th o u g h t th e co u n try could well go to w ar over the m atter. As, in th e w ords o f U pton Close, “we live, m ove and have o u r being” o n rubber, the U nited States needed to protect its supply routes by aiding C hina, “gathering in” all Japanese m erchant ships, and upset­ ting the boom ing Japanese trad e in South A m erica. Further, he proposed th at the U.S. build “a naval base in th e A leutians from w hich we could fire every paper-and-m atchw ood city in Japan.”32 O th er FDR foes saw no th reat in any Japanese designs. T he Japanese, they asserted, depended o n U.S. im ports o f b o th rubber and tin . H ugh Johnson de­ nied th a t Japan w ould toss away h alf th e w orld’s m arket. John C ham berlain asserted th at any n ation ow ning th e East Indian m ines “m ust sell in A kron o r P ittsburgh o r also face prolonged depression.”33 T he New York Daily News was particularly adam ant o n th e subject: “If we play ball w ith Japan, Japan will play ball w ith us, com m ercially at least. Japan always has.” As late as June 1940, th e News called for renew ing the 1911 treaty and “soft-pedaling” m oral indignation over “h er aggression in C hina.” O th er­ wise, particularly if B ritain was in jeopardy, th e U nited States m ight be facing “a possible G erm an-R ussian-Italian-Japanese gang-up against us.”34 Besides, certain noninterventionists asserted, rubber could be obtained else­ where. In O ctober 1940, G eneral W ood noted th at the G erm ans were filling 90 percent o f th eir rubber requirem ents w ith substitutes. A year earlier, D ow ney had stressed th at D u Pont was producing synthetic rubber in the U.S. Flem ing M acLiesh and C ushm an Reynolds pointed to such production by Firestone, D u Pont, B. F. G oodrich, and Standard O il o f New Jersey. Firestone and Ford, the Christian Century noted in Septem ber 1941, were currently cultivating ru b ­ ber in A frica and South Am erica. H ugh Johnson observed th at th e U nited States could draw on six substitutes w ithin the W estern H em isphere, all o f w hich were far superior to rubber. “I have heard Texans claim,” w rote editor John C ham berlain, “th at rubber trees can thrive in the lower Rio G rande Val­ ley.”35 O nly Social Justice dissented, declaring th at synthetic production was in the “dark ages” and th at developing useful substitutes w ould take years.36 Som e anti-interventionists th o u g h t tin too could be m ade artificially.37 In O ctober 1940, H ugh Johnson alleged th at processes existed for m aking a p ro d u ct far superior, n o t to m ention cheaper, than East Indian tin .38 “About th e w orst th at should happen,” w rote M acLiesh and Reynolds, “w ould be th at baked beans, condensed m ilk, tom ato soup m ight be sold in cans coated w ith lacquer, alum inum o r silver.” Again Social Justice balked, saying th a t n o t one electric bulb could function w ith o u t tin , th at it was prim arily im ported from M alaya, and th a t th e U nited States was endangering this supply by antagoniz­ ing Japan.39

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In June 1940, France fell to H itler's arm ies and Indochina becam e subject to Vichy adm inistration. In p art acting o u t o f anxieties concerning th e general fate o f Southeast Asia, Roosevelt signed a treasury departm ent proclam ation o n 25 July lim iting th e export o f aviation gasoline and scrap m etal.40 In late D ecem ber 1939, the U nited States had started to exert econom ic pressure by placing a m oral em bargo o n the export o f planes, plants, m anufacturing rights, and technical inform ation required to produce high-quality aviation gasoline.41 T he D ecem ber m ove had m et w ith fragm entary su p p o rt am ong ad m inistration critics and no opposition.42 T he 25 July o rd er was a som ew hat different m atter, for this tim e th e president’s opponents w ere m ost hostile.43 M orally, asserted th e Chicago Tribune, the U nited States was justified in stopping supplies; politically, however, taking o n an o th er enem y was unw ise.44 B orchard w arned, "W hile threatening Japan w ith dire consequences if she touches the N etherlands East Indies, o u r em bargoes force h er to look in th a t direction.” To the New York Daily News, such actions w ould n o t prevent Japan from seizing either Indochina o r th e D utch East Indies, moves th a t could be prevented only by concentrating a tw o-ocean navy in th e Pacific. C astle re­ gretted th at Grew had n o t privately approached th e Japanese.45 Taking a m ore acquiescent tone, th e Christian Century found the im pact o f th e m ove slight, for Japan had received virtually no A m erican gasoline since the m oral em ­ bargo was im posed the previous year. N evertheless, th e m easure w ould lend su p p o rt to the hard-pressed B ritish, w hose nationals living in Tokyo had been im prisoned. New Masses denied th at th e m ove was prom pted by th e desire to halt Japanese aggression; rather, it involved haggling over exploitation rights.46 To ease Japan’s need for oil, and thereby to control any im pulse to seize the D utch East Indies, the state departm ent interpreted Roosevelt’s ban as includ­ ing only high-octane fuels, a move th at perm itted Japan to purchase the m id­ dle-octane gasolines th at satisfied its needs. The navy departm ent shared state’s anxiety.47 Roosevelt had rebuffed such m ilitants as H enry M orgenthau Jr. to side w ith Sum ner Welles, w ho feared th at m ore overt action could push Japan into the D utch East Indies.48 The British, too, dreaded any m ove th at m ight provoke the Japanese into attacking the islands, for they were the recipient o f h alf th eir oil exports. At the sam e tim e, the m ove strengthened those m iddle-level officers in Japan w ho sought to accelerate their nation’s southw ard advance.49 T he closing o f the B urm a Road created additional debate. O n 12 July, ten days after the Japanese leadership com m itted itself to m oving into Indochina and T hailand, the B ritish governm ent announced its decision to cu t o ff th e B urm a Road for three m onths, beginning on 18 July. T hanks to th e road, C hiang’s governm ent had been receiving eighteen m illion tons o f supplies p er m onth. M ilitarily its closing bore little significance, for du rin g th e rainy sea­ son it w ould have been im passable anyway.50 A nti-interventionists reacted differently. A ssum ing incorrectly th at the British took m easures w ithout consulting the U nited States, D orothy D etzer ac­

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cused the U nited States o f acting "like sm all puppy dogs, determ ined to do everything that England w ants, and quite uncritically.”51 In noting Am erican opposition, Borchard m used, "They talk about the freedom o f roads 8,000 m iles away, while abandoning freedom o f the seas.” Castle found the state departm ent protest unjustified, by either law o r com m on sense. The Chicago Tribune w ent so far as to praise the British for closing the road to reduce conflict.52 O n 8 O ctober, the B ritish reopened the route. T he Chicago Tribune sus­ pected collusion, linking the Burm a Road m atter to H ull’s w arnings, cooper­ ative efforts o f naval and arm y officers concerning the N etherlands East In­ dies, and a naval agreem ent by w hich the U nited States secured access to the base at Singapore.53 Journalist Lincoln C olcord stated the U.S. had show n it­ self ready to fight if the Japanese invaded Singapore o r the D utch Indies.54 In late February 1941, W heeler interpreted the reopening, together w ith the pos­ sible sending o f A m erican troops to Singapore, as an effort to enter the w ar through the back door.55 The Roosevelt adm inistration itself was by no m eans ready for any Singa­ pore com m itm ent.56 W hen C hurchill had proposed th at the U nited States order a naval squadron to Singapore, M arshall, Welles, and Stark all opposed it, stressing the im portance o f the A tlantic theater over the Pacific one.57"Sending th e fleet to Singapore,” said H ull several m onths earlier, "w ould leave o u r entire A tlantic seaboard, n o rth and south, exposed to possible European threats.”58 Indochina rem ained a source o f adm inistration anxiety. O n 22 Septem ber, its governor general perm itted the Japanese to establish three air bases in the Tonkin area and m aintain a sm all force at H aiphong. O n the 23rd, the Japanese crossed the Indochina frontier at Lang Son. The French resisted, halting the Japanese invasion on the 25th. O n the following day, Roosevelt lim ited steel and scrap iron shipm ents, effective 16 O ctober, to the W estern Hem isphere; only Britain was m ade an exception. Stim son confided to his diary, "This is a direct h it on Japan, a point w hich I had hoped we w ould h it for a long tim e.”59 A nti-interventionists strongly opposed th e president’s move.60 The Chicago Tribune saw no real difference betw een France’s original "grabbing” o f th e ter­ rito ry and Japan’s trying to w rest it. It suspected Roosevelt o f seeking a w ar, as it found his prospects in the 1940 election dim .61 W arning against possible A m erican am bitions in the region, the Tribune said, "A dem ocracy cannot rule subject peoples and rem ain a democracy.” C om m ented the New York Daily News, "T he Japanese w ould be pretty dum b if they didn’t have designs on any French p roperty lying near them .” Given Japan’s population problem s, the News concluded, the U nited States was "badgering” the nation.62 Castle as­ serted th at Indochina’s m illions were being exploited by a few hundred Frenchm en w ho supported the G erm an-controlled Vichy governm ent.63 FDR antagonists shared Castle’s antipathy tow ard French colonialism .64 Porter Sargent pointed to decades o f repression, stating th at bom bs, firing squads, and the guillotine had been used. Boake C arter soon w ent even further,

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citing an Associated Press dispatch from M anila th at reported th at the French had shot tw o thousand “natives” at the Saigon airport.65 Roosevelt him self was f ir from enam ored w ith th e French presence in In ­ dochina, his only concern being strategic. H e told reporters in 1945, “They have been there over a h u ndred years and have done noth in g abo u t educating [the people]. For every dollar they have p u t in, they have taken o u t ten.” H is ow n solution for the area lay in th e form o f a trusteeship, albeit w ith France as the trustee.66 A lthough such m atters as the Burm a Road and n orthern Indochina obvi­ ously produced tension in Japanese-Am erican relations, it was the form ation o f the trip artite pact th at m arked a crucial turn in g point. By the term s o f the agree­ m ent, signed on 27 Septem ber 1940, Japan recognized G erm an and Italian lead­ ership o f a “new order in Europe” in retu rn for their acquiescence o f Japan’s own sphere in “G reater East Asia.” Signers pledged m utual arm ed support if any were attacked by “a Power at present no t involved in the European w ar o r in the C hi­ nese-Japanese conflict.” O bviously the three powers had the U nited States fore­ m ost in m ind, though the Soviet U nion was n o t overlooked.67 In ad m inistration eyes, the pact m ade one thing clear. As Roosevelt w rote G rew in January 1941, “I believe th at th e fundam ental proposition is th at we m ust recognize th a t th e hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts o f a single w orld conflict.”68 To R aym ond Moley, the trip a rtite pact signified “the m ost frightening news since th e w ar began.”69 M ost anti-interventionists believed th e U.S. was finally reaping th e folly o f its ow n policies.70 A ccording to the Christian Century, th e newly form ed Axis suspected th e U nited States o f taking over the dying B ritish Em pire, doing so by occupying naval bases in Singapore, the N etherlands East Indies, South Africa, and Sierra Leone. V illard pointed to the increase in U.S. Pacific strength, including a possible base on G uam , appropriations for a tw o-ocean navy, negotiations for a share o f the B ritish base at Singapore, and protests concerning the status quo in Indochina and the N etherlands East Indies. The m ore the U nited States frustrated the Japanese, argued Lawrence D ennis, the m ore it drove them in to th e hands o f th eir ow n “soldier socialists” as well as G erm any and the USSR.71 A few adm inistration critics deplored Japan’s action. C alling th e new al­ liance “a perfectly n atu ral response” to U.S. pressure, B orchard found th e pact to be encouraging A m erican intervention.72 Wesley W inans Stout, editor o f the Saturday Evening Post, concurred: “To back dow n to Japan now w ould be to back dow n to H itler, and th at is n o t possible even w ere B urt W heeler to be elected President in November.” H anson Baldwin saw Japan’s m em bership in the Axis as m enacing vital A m erican interests b u t w arned th e U.S. against driving Japan to desperation o r engaging in a tw o-ocean c o n flict He sug­ gested such steps as evacuation o f rem aining A m ericans from Japan and C hina, w ithdraw al o f A m erican gunboats from the Yangtze, reten tio n o f the

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A siatic fleet along th e C hina coast, and transfer o f U.S. m arines from Shang­ hai, T ientsin, an d Peking to the Philippines. T he U nited States, he continued, m ight recall its am bassador to Tokyo w hile keeping m in o r diplom atic repre­ sentation there.73 All du rin g the fall o f 1940, several noninterventionists suspected a Pacific w ar w as im m inent.74 In O ctober, D ennis th o u g h t th at Japan m ight experience a palace revolution: E m peror H irohito w ould be replaced by his seven-yearold son, and th e cu rren t prim e m inister, Prince Konoye Fum im aro, w ould dom inate a new regency. C olonel H ashim oto K ingoro, w ho w ould be th e na­ tio n ’s actual ruler, m ight then fight th e U.S.75 The Christian Century alluded to a num ber o f om inous signs, including th e state dep artm en t’s advising all A m ericans to leave Japan an d th e Asian m ainland, th e recall o f Pacific Fleet com m ander Jam es O. R ichardson for secret consultations, and th e rushing o f fifty-three m erchant vessels for use as fleet auxiliaries.76 T he U nited States, said H erbert H oover, was behaving fin to o aggressively.77 A m erican provocation, C astle feared, only fell sh o rt o f actual actions o f war.78 The U.S. could do n o th in g ab o u t Japan’s ultim ate aim to create a new o rd er in Asia, he felt, although it could have helped steer th a t policy “in sane lines.” T he retired diplom at even doubted w hether Japan sought to annex the P hilip­ pines, th e D utch East Indies, o r M alaya; rather, it m erely w anted to dom inate them econom ically, so as to assure itself o f raw m aterials. Furtherm ore, any Far E astern crisis w ould so distract th e ad m inistration th a t it w ould term inate needed w ar supplies to B ritain. Stationing th e A m erican navy perm anently in th e Pacific sim ply assisted H itler.79 Roosevelt’s foes saw th e U nited States as too w eak to engage any Far East­ ern co n flict80 “We m ust be careful,” said W heeler, “n o t to get into a tw o-ocean w ar w ith o u r one-ocean navy.” If the U.S. attem pted to save Indochina o r the D utch East Indies, w arned G eneral W illiam Rivers, it m ight be tem pting th e G erm ans o r Italians to attack South o r C entral A m erica.81 To the dovish New York Daily News, a num ber o f m easures had now becom e essential, including th e expansion o f facilities in H awaii, securing the right to use the Galapagos Islands, and developing air bases in the A leutians.82 A few anti-interventionists denied th a t any m ajor w ar lay in th e offing. As Japan was becom ing bogged dow n in C hina, noted H earst, it had its “hands full” an d had, therefore, decided n o t to m ake w ar on th e U nited States.83 P rotestant ed ito r H arold E. Fey, w ho ju st retu rn ed from a trip to th e Far East, found Japan in such bad econom ic straits th a t A m erican fears o f w ar were ridiculous. T he dire econom ic situation, he continued, was causing its arm y to evacuate m uch o f C hina, leaving th e pathetic W ang C hing-w ei to fend as best he could. D ennis to o predicted th at a depression-stricken Japan w ould com e to term s w ith C hina, though he saw the situation m ore dangerous as a result. O nce Japan an d C hina in tu rn reached an understanding w ith the Soviets, Japan w ould sta rt seizing B ritish and D utch possessions. T he USSR w ould levy

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its ow n price for its neutrality in the m atten a Japanese attack o n the capital­ ist pow ers and respect for its ow n interests in n o rth ern China.®4 In light o f such reactions, possibly both the anti-interventionists and the adm inistration overreacted to the trip a rtite pact. H istorian A kira iriye finds th at the agreem ent never succeeded in com m itting Japan irrevocably to southern expansion o r an anti-A m erican stand. Even early in 1941, the Japan­ ese arm y sought a com prom ise w ith the U nited States.85 Be th at as it may, 60 percent o f the A m erican public, according to a G allup poll, perceived Japan as a serious threat th at September.®* A Fortune poll for N ovem ber 1940 show ed close to h alf the respondents endorsing “strong m eas­ ures against Japan” and less than a q u arter opposed.8' By then close to 60 per­ cent o f those polled favored sending massive m ilitary supplies to C hina.88

All during the w inter o f 1940-41, som e anti-interventionists continued to foresee a w ar w ith Japan ahead.84 Such predictions cam e from m any quarters. The Axis pact and Japanese advances, asserted Castle in January, were m aking peace difficult.'1" Social Justice anticipated a Japanese attack on Singapore, pos­ sibly tim ed sim ultaneously w ith G erm an attacks on Suez and G ibraltar, th at w ould prom pt A m erican entrance into wrar. A m onth later, Boake C arter called the Far East the m ost dangerous spot in o u r w orld. His evidence in ­ cluded the A m erican “scramble*’ to build bases in G uam and Sam oa, m aior Japanese naval units appearing off French Indochina, and the announcem ent by the N etherlands East Indies th at if invaded it w’ould fight. In M arch, D en­ nis anticipated a naval w ar w ith Japan, for that nation could not afford to back dow n over Singapore and the D utch Indies.41 O ther noninterventionists were m ore hopeful, thereby being somewhat in ac­ cord w ith a Gallup poll taken in February 1941, in which only 14 percent w ould have supported war with Japan. The newly organized America First C om m ittee denied that arm ed conflict was im m inent The United States, said the AFC, real­ ized that Asian involvement would weaken its aid to Britain. Japan did not w ant to fight the U.S. o r start hostile action against Britain o r the N etherlands East In­ dies, particulars' before H ider began his spring cam paign.4* Even to seize the Dutch Indies, said FOR cosecretary John Nevin Sayre, would require three h u n ­ dred thousand troops, which Japan could not spare from China.45 D uring the spring and early sum m er o f 1941, such adm inistration critics still rem ained optim istic.44 Japan, said Boake C arter in A pril, sought to end the C hina war, for its strength was drained and its people weary.'® C arter’s boss, W illiam Randolph H earst, claim ed th at the Soviet-Japanese nonaggres­ sion pact, signed on 13 April, could m ake for peace.4* The com m unist press, which in February had found war im m inent throughout Southeast .-\sia, now

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feared A m erican "appeasem ent” in th e Far East.97 "A group in th e State D e­ partm ent,” said US Week in June, sought to recognize Japan’s claim s in C hina in exchange for a Japanese prom ise n o t to fight in a Germ any-U .S. conflict. New Masses noted th e ru m o r th a t th e A m erican fleet was m oving in to th e A t­ lantic, signifying th at Japan had "prom ised to be good.”98 By sum m er, however, o th er anti-interventionists saw crisis ahead. In late June, Social Justice no ted A m erican ships exploring th e m agnitude o f Singa­ pore, U.S. fighting m en receiving com m issions at H onolulu an d M anila, and A m erican "volunteers” assisting th e a ir force in w hat it caustically called "the great dem ocracy” o f C hina. As the Japanese w ere sh u t o u t o f th e A nglo-A m er­ ican w orld by tariff and im m igration barriers, said D ennis in July, they w ould eventually be forced to conquer such areas as French Indochina, Siam , V ladi­ vostok, and th e Philippines.99 In United We Stand!, the m ore sober H anson Baldwin spoke o f deterrence. C alling for "em bargoes” o n Japan by using th e pretext o f defense "priorities,” he also endorsed additional long-range subm arines an d patro l planes and p er­ haps an additional heavy cruiser for th e U.S. A siatic fleet. T his fleet, he w ent on, should pay friendly visits to Singapore, A ustralia, New Z ealand, and pos­ sibly a p o rt in East India. T he U nited States should also m ake secret agree­ m ents w ith the Allies for its use o f Singapore and th e N etherlands East Indies. In a Life article published in A ugust, Baldw in added o th er steps: gradually lim ­ iting th e strategic com m odities sent to Japan, helping m aintain Soviet Far Eastern arm ies, and sending th e m axim um num ber o f bom bers to "o u r A nglo-N etherlands-A m erican outposts.” 100 Tensions accelerated o n 23 July w hen th e Vichy governm ent yielded to Tokyo’s dem ands for m ilitary bases in Indochina. In retu rn , Japan agreed to "protect” th a t colony from B ritish an d Free French "dom ination.” Speaking for th e U nited States, Sum ner W elles accused Japan o f pursuing "an objective o f expansion by force o r th reat o f force.” Predicting Japanese seizure o f ad d i­ tio n al territo ries, he expressed A m erican concern over tin , rubber, an d oil. O n 26 July, acting together, th e U.S. and B ritain froze all Japanese assets; Roosevelt placed the arm ed forces o f th e Philippines u n d er direct A m erican com m and. A lthough th e president’s ultim ate in ten t rem ained uncertain, historians W illiam E. Langer an d S. Everett G leason are undoubtedly correct in calling the freezing order "probably the crucial step in th e entire course o f JapaneseA m erican relations before Pearl H arbor.”101 W ithout so declaring, the U nited States had em bargoed Japan’s m ost crucial resource: oil. Interventionists had long been concerned over Japanese control o f In­ dochina. O nce Japan possessed bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon, they stressed, it stood w ithin six hundred m iles o f Singapore and M anila. F urther­ m ore, it w ould possess land access to T hailand and Rangoon, B urm a, the city w here A m erican m aterials bound for C hina were being stored.102 A m erican leaders saw the Japanese step as p art o f a broader Axis threat, H ull and Roosevelt

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b o th believing th at the m ove seriously ham pered Britain’s chances for victory in Europe. T hat m onth, a G allup poll revealed m ore than h alf the respondents fa­ voring w ar to keep Japan from seizing either the D utch East Indies o r Singapore. Similarly, a governm ent survey o f editorial opinion found strong support for the adm inistration action.103 C ertain FDR foes found his m ove belligerent. Japan, said Commonweal, m ight see n o alternative b u t to call A m erica’s bluff, thereby creating th e very w ar th a t Roosevelt’s “appeasem ent” had tried to prevent. If th e U nited States entered the w ar over Indochina and th e D utch East Indies, m aintained N or­ m an T hom as, an unforgivable crim e w ould have been com m itted against th e A m erican people.104 Now th a t the Soviets were in th e war, th e Stalinist press no longer objected to Roosevelt’s m oves. To others o f the left, th e freezing o rd er proved th at the entire Asian struggle centered on resources. T he adm inistration, said th e so­ cialist Call, had show n it was acting on behalf o f “dear old Standard O il, U.S. R ubber an d Electric Bond and Share.” B oth the freezing o rd er and th e ap­ po in tm en t o f G eneral D ouglas M acA rthur as A m erican m ilitary chief in th e Far East, com m ented a w riter in th e Trotskyist Militant, signaled a w ar for “im perialist p lunder” ahead.105 T he U nited States ap p aren tly was n o t p ro tectin g any m aterial in terests o f its ow n; rath er, it w as greatly overreaching itself o n b eh alf o f a foreign colony.106 If it intervened in In d o ch in a, cau tio n ed th e executive com m ittee o f th e New York AFC, Japan could claim th e rig h t o f p reventing th e co n ­ stru c tio n o f A m erican bases in B razil.107 “We m ay deplore these m oves,” it co n tin u ed concerning th e latest Japanese actio n s, “b u t they are n o n e o f o u r v ital business.” 108 B orchard felt sim ilarly, saying, “I w onder w hat difference it w ill m ake to an Indo-C hinese w hether a French G eneral o r a Japanese G eneral occupies th e th atch ed h u t in C am bodia.” 109 C astle denied th a t th e U.S. could prevent th e establishm ent o f Japanese bases in Indochina, fo r th e m ove was m ade w ith V ichy’s concurrence. H ad th e a d m in istratio n allow ed Japan access to food and raw m aterials, th e A m erican press w ould n o t have to be d istu rb ed ab o u t th e sudden availability o f Indochinese rice to Japan. “If th e U nited States is going to object every tim e som e h u n g ry n a tio n sets fo rth to grab itself som e food,” w arned th e New York Daily News, “it w ill p recip itate endless wars.” 110 Indochina was not the only colony under anti-interventionist scrutiny. O n 26 July, the day th at the U nited States and Britain announced their freezing orders, the Chicago Tribune asked pointedly, “Are we to fight Japan for good old Singa­ pore and queen W ilhelmina?” Both the British and the D utch, it said, sought to pu t the Indies under the protection o f the Am erican flag; furtherm ore, the British desired to make Singapore “an outpost o f the Am erican republic”111 The Tribune struck a m ajor an ti-interventionist them e— nam ely, th at A m erican Far Eastern policy was increasingly centering o n defense o f B ritain’s

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East Asian em pire, w hose focal p o in t was Singapore.112 Som e interventionists them selves conceded as m uch. In Japanese hands, com m ented CDAAA spokesm an Livingstone H artley, Singapore could be th e keystone o f its new o rd er in Eastern Asia, enabling it to force B ritain and th e U nited States o u t o f th e region. In addition, B ritain’s lifeline to A frica an d th e N ear East w ould be severed, an action th a t in tu rn could lead to a sudden Axis attack through Spain. T he long-range result: th e Axis w ould possess all the petroleum , w heat, and cotton it needed. T he B ritish o u tp o st was crucial in an o th er way as well: W ere Japan to control b o th Singapore and th e D utch East Indies, it w ould en ­ circle th e P hilippines.113 M ore th an ever, anti-interventionists m aintained, peace was now crucial. H earst denied th a t Japan sought w ar w ith th e U nited States, predicting instead th a t th e U.S. m ight well have its next "squabble” w ith B ritain. N oting state de­ p artm en t language concerning "flexibility” o f enforcem ent, th e Call dow n­ played any change in com m ercial patterns. Lawrence D ennis denied th a t ei­ th e r Tokyo o r W ashington w anted to fight, though b o th were playing "a dangerous gam e w ith loaded pistols.” M aintaining th a t Japan could n o t easily be defeated, he m used, "We don’t see how A m erica can p rofit from th e de­ stru ctio n o f th e only conservative regim e in th e Far East and th e enhancem ent o f th e radical regim es o f M oscow and C hungking.”114 A ccording to th e New York Daily News, Japan was "sick” o f th e w ar in C hina and sought to settle its differences w ith th e U nited States. As noted, the News m ade a sw eeping proposal based on its ow n b ran d o f realpolitik: "Japan and the U nited States o ught to divide Pacific hegem ony betw een them , the divid­ ing line corresponding roughly w ith the International D ateline. T he P hilip­ pines u n d er such an agreem ent w ould fall in th e Japanese sphere, tru e; b u t we th in k th a t w ould be fine and th at we ought to seize w ith glad cries this chance to cu t them adrift before 1946.”115 O n 6 A ugust, public atten tio n was centered o n a different area: T hailand. W hen H ull stated publicly th at Japanese activity w ould endanger A m erican security in th e Pacific, anti-interventionists again becam e apprehensive. T he New York AFC chapter, w arning against any effort to stop th e Japanese in Siam , noted th a t Japan possessed a large arm y ju st across the T hai bo rd er and a greater fleet at hand th an any th e U nited States could m obilize. C hester Bowles found "w hooping up this Siam problem ” to be evidence th at th e ad­ m inistration was involved in guaranteeing th e future safety o f the B ritish Em ­ pire and the dow nfall o f H itler.116 W hen Roosevelt and C hurchill m et o ff the N ew foundland coast on 9-12 Au­ gust, noninterventionists becam e even m ore frightened. In a front-page story, the Call m aintained th at th e tw o had agreed on the precise m om ent w hen they w ould go into action in the Far East. W heeler suspected th at Roosevelt w ould take th e lead in com bating Japanese threats to M alaya, thereby involving the U nited States in a Pacific war. N oting th at som e U.S. trade w ith Japan was con­

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tinuing, he com m ented, “There is no reason w hy we should n o t live in peace w ith her.”117 AFC staffer R uth Sarles believed Roosevelt and C hurchill had m ade a m utual pledge to defend Singapore o r the D utch East Indies. H earst thought the com m itm ent also covered O uter M ongolia and eastern Siberia, in particular th e protection o f Vladivostok. In m id-A ugust, th e AFC executive com m ittee unanim ously endorsed a resolution th at opposed w ar w ith Japan: “In the absence o f attack on this country we should m aintain peace.”118 In reality, Roosevelt had prom ised Churchill litde. D uring die m eeting, the president and the prim e m inister had agreed to subm it parallel Am erican and British notes to Japan w arning that further encroachm ent in the southwest Pacific m ight lead to conflict Once FDR returned to W ashington, however, he disap­ pointed Churchill by om itting any reference to possible war. A Gallup poll re­ leased 5 August revealed only 24 percent supporting im m ediate w ar w ith Japan.119

In Septem ber, the interventionist CDAAA found tim e to be w orking o n the U.S. side. A head lay an im pending rainy season in M alaya and th e N etherlands East Indies, th e approach o f w inter in Siberia, th e progressive effect o f sanc­ tions on Japan, an d an increase in Allied m ilitary strength in the Far East— all representing an advantageous position th a t could only be seriously com pro­ m ised by “any retreat from o u r present firm attitu d e tow ards Japan.” 120 All d u rin g the sum m er— in fact, u n til the first p a rt o f O ctober— adm inis­ tratio n adversaries continued to express guarded optim ism .121 Frederick J. Libby claim ed th at Japan had proposed a Far Eastern settlem ent th at m arked genuine collaboration am ong the East Asian nations. Uncensored even speci­ fied the com ing peace term s, w hich included U.S. recognition o f M anchukuo and o f Japanese dom ination o f French Indochina, A m erican loans and trad e concessions to Japan, Japanese renunciation o f the Axis, and Japanese, A m er­ ican, and B ritish w ithdraw al from C hina. It found Roosevelt reluctant b u t be­ lieved Japan anxiously sought a settlem ent. In m id-Septem ber, suspected th e Chicago Tribuney the U nited States had bought o ff Japan w ith a prom ise to recognize its conquest o f M anchuria and “sundry o th er item s o f C hinese real estate.” The Christian Century sim ply hoped th at the negotiations w ould be conducted “in a sp irit o f generosity,” so th at Japan m ight be w ooed away from G erm any.122 A few anti-interventionists supported th e continued pressure o n Japan. Fish favored the ad m inistration em bargo program , the freezing o f Japanese assets, and restrictions o n w ar goods w ith Japan, though he w arned th at fu rth er steps risked war. C ongressm an John M . Vorys w ent so far as to call for a w hole se­ ries o f m easures: an A m erican em bargo, term ination o f the silk trade, the de­ fense o f the Philippines, and the w ithholding o f oil, m etal, and m achinery.

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“We can b ring Japan to her knees w ithout firing a shot,” he said, “sim ply by re­ fusing to buy from h er certain things.” 123 H erbert H oover m aintained th a t Roosevelt’s action was necessary w hile concurrently blam ing adm inistration leaders for “doing everything they can to get us in to w ar through the Japanese back door.” He was even w illing to give the Japanese advice: take eastern Siberia, thereby relieving itself o f th e “te rri­ ble m enace” o f V ladivostok’s air bases as well as giving them “a vast un p o p u ­ lated area into w hich to expand.” He even th o u g h t Japan w ould w illingly give up everything south o f the G reat W all for eastern Siberia and peace w ith the W est, an arrangem ent surely in the A m erican interest. At one p o in t, he sug­ gested a six-m onth freeze on m ilitary action, th e relaxation o f A m erican sanc­ tions, and a sum m it m eeting in H onolulu. Using attorney R aoul D esverine as his interm ediary, th e ex-president unsuccessfully sought to prom ote his plan w ith diplom ats on b o th sides.124 By m id-O ctober, several anti-interventionists felt th a t U .S.-Japan negotia­ tions w ere in trouble. The Christian Century accused W ashington o f engaging in stalem ate, “keeping th e Japanese o n th e anxious seat and daily advancing o u r ow n preparations for a tw o-ocean war.” In m id-Septem ber, Lawrence D ennis had expressed d o u b t about w hether W ashington could offer Japan enough to call o ff its arm y. Japan, he continued, could n o t solve its unem ­ ploym ent problem w ithout continuous expansion and conquest.125 Such anxieties w ere com pounded w hen, on 16 O ctober, th e Konoye regim e resigned after its m inisters failed to agree on national policy. Ttoo days later, L ieutenant G eneral Tojo H ideki, long know n as a pronounced m ilitarist, form ed a new Japanese cabinet, assum ing th e portfolios o f prim e m inister, w ar, and hom e m inistries. T he A m erican public rem ained am bivalent, a For­ tune poll o f th at m onth indicating a natio n split o n defending th e D utch East Indies, Singapore, the B urm a Road, and T hailand.126 By now m ore noninterventionists were seeing w ar in th e offing.127To Flynn, th e fall o f th e m ore m oderate Konoye show ed the situation “deteriorating swiftly.” Lincoln C olcord predicted th at the U nited States w ould fight in de­ fense o f Singapore o r V ladivostok. T he Chicago Tribune reported th at the Japanese w ere offering considerable concessions to FDR, b u t th at negotiations had stalled on th e m atter o f tw o Japanese bases rem aining in C hina.128 O thers w ere m ore hopeful.129 Late in O ctober, D ennis saw Roosevelt as hes­ itating on w ar w ith Japan, doing so on th e advice o f older navy m en and ca­ reer diplom ats. H oover, predicting the Japanese seizure o f V ladivostok, denied th a t the Roosevelt ad m inistration w ould take any action, for neith er th e U.S. n o r B ritain sought war. Indeed, if the U.S. acquiesced in th e V ladivostok m ove, Japan m ight secure “th e face” needed to w ithdraw from C hina.130 Several FDR critics o f pacifist leanings suggested term s. The W IL and N CPW proposed a quid pro quo: cessation o f hostilities o n the Asian m ain­ land in exchange for such concessions as a fresh trade agreem ent w ith Japan.

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H arold E. Fey w rote o f dem ilitarization o f th e Pacific and opening equal ac­ cess to oil and o th er m aterials.131 D uring Novem ber, intensive negotiations to o k place in W ashington. O n th e 10th, A m bassador N om ura K ichisaburo subm itted "Plan A,” a proposal call­ ing o n th e U nited States to restore norm al trad e w ith Japan and persuade C hiang to m eet Japan’s term s. If the generalissim o refused, th e U nited States w ould agree to term inate all aid to C hina. In retu rn , th e Japanese w ould n o t autom atically h o n o r th e trip a rtite pact b u t w ould rath er decide any obligation "independently.” Provisions concerning evacuation from C hina and In ­ dochina an d guaranteeing th e open d o o r w ithin th e Japanese em pire were m ost vague.132 W ithin five days, the A m erican governm ent rejected Plan A. O n 17 November, veteran Japanese diplom at Kurusu Saburo arrived in W ash­ ington to assist N om ura. Kurusu spoke in term s o f a return to the status quo ante o f July 1941, w hereby the U nited States w ould lift its trade restrictions and Japan w ould w ithdraw from southern Indochina. By a decoding process know n as "Magic,” Am erica soon learned th at K urusu had exceeded his instructions. W ithin three days, N om ura proposed "Plan B”: Japan to advance n o further in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific, rem ove all troops from southern to northern Indochina, and w ithdraw from Indochina after a general settlem ent o r restoration o f peace w ith China; the U.S. to discontinue support for Chiang, u n ­ freeze Japanese assets, supply Japan w ith "a required quantity o f oil,” and press the D utch to reopen the East Indies to Japanese trade. The U nited States found the term s unacceptable.133 In the m eantim e, on 14 November, Roosevelt had o r­ dered U.S. m arines to leave garrisons in Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin. A few adm inistration adversaries rem ained o ptim istic.134 T he New York Daily News, for exam ple, speculated th at Japan’s sending o f a special envoy in ­ dicated it did n o t w ish to fight.135 Yet as negotiations resum ed, m any a n ti-in ­ terventionists grew pessim istic, placing the onus strictly on R oosevelt.136 Sen­ ato r Nye m aintained th at relatively m in o r concessions in C hina, for exam ple, perm itting Japan air bases in such areas as Shanghai, could end th e crisis. "T he trouble is,” he continued, "the A dm inistration doesn’t w ant to settle th is thing.” Taft w rote, “I know th at H ull and Stim son are so very anti-Japanese th at they m ay precipitate a w ar w hen it is w holly unnecessary.”137 Japan, said D ennis, had spoken in term s o f abandoning the Axis alliance and w ithdraw ­ ing its arm y from C hina, b u t it insisted th at the U nited States m ust abandon its econom ic boycott and recognize the Japanese occupation o f French In ­ dochina. FDR, however, he found to be intran sig en t.138 O n 25 Novem ber, th e Roosevelt adm inistration abandoned thoughts o f one ad hoc proposal it had briefly considered, a three-m onth m odus vivendi. By such a tem porary accord, b o th pow ers w ould have pledged to avoid m ilitary action in the South Pacific, Japan to evacuate southern Indochina "forthw ith,” and th e U nited States to resum e norm al trad e w ith Japan, and direct negotia­ tions w ould have com m enced betw een Japan and th e C hiang governm ent.139

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Two things prevented th e U nited States from m aking th e proposal: first, the news th at Japanese troops were sighted o ff Taiwan; second, th e strong o p p o ­ sition o f B ritain and C hina. A day later, H ull subm itted proposals to the Japanese diplom ats th at were strictly “for the record.” They included w ithdraw al o f Japanese arm ed forces from C hina and Indochina, m utual lifting o f trade restrictions, the unfreezing o f as­ sets, and the conclusion o f a nonaggression pact am ong the U nited States, Japan, C hina, the N etherlands, the British Em pire, the Soviet U nion, and Thailand. The public sim ply learned th at H ull had again subm itted traditional principles cen­ tering on peaceful restraint and th at talks were stalled bu t n o t broken.140 O n 27 N ovem ber, th e adm inistration received w ord th a t Japan was m assing troops in Indochina. A day later, dispatches from Shanghai reported th at sev­ enty tran sp o rts w ere m oving som e th irty thousand Japanese troops so u th ­ w ard. R um ors abounded th a t Japanese troops w ere headed to the Isthm us o f Kra in T hailand. Such m easures w ere hardly reassuring to W estern leaders q uite aw are th a t Singapore lay at the tip o f this isthm us. A few noninterventionists still did n o t th in k w ar inevitable.141 T he FOR proposed a release o f Japanese assets and renew ed Japanese access to nonm il­ itary supplies, thereby resum ing m uch trade im m ediately. D ennis saw Roo­ sevelt as being u n d er B ritish pressure to com prom ise w ith Japan, though he said th at A ustralia and C hina were balking. AFC congressional representative Fred B urdick th o u g h t th a t th e alarm generated by th e Chicago Tribunes ex­ posé o f a m ajor w ar m obilization plan w ould m ake it m ore difficult to th ru st th e U nited States in to a Pacific w ar.142 Fear was still m ore prevalent than hope, particularly as eyes were cast on T hailand. According to H earst colum nist Paul M allon, such a m ove w ould bring B ritish troops stationed in Malaya into conflict, then eventually involve the A m erican fleet. C ongressm an Ross Rizley (Rep.-O kla.) rem arked, UI don’t know anybody in the country w ho w ants to go to w ar over aggression in the Far East. As for fighting over T hailand, m ost people don’t even know w here it is.”143 Even w ithout the T hai crisis, m ost anti-interventionists reflected general p u b ­ lic opinion in believing th at w ar was sim ply a m atter o f tim e.144 O n 29 Novem ­ ber, for exam ple, H oover envisioned the U nited States heading for a Pacific w ar (w hile planning an expeditionary force to Egypt as well). Several in Congress, to use the w ords o f Fred Burdick, desired an “avalanche” o f m ail to the W hite H ouse asking th at the negotiations w ith Japan be publicized, doing so in the hopes o f curbing the president and avoiding w ar.145 Congressm en M undt and Ludlow suggested a congressional inquiry into U.S. Far Eastern policy.146 T he ad m in istratio n ’s diplom acy was accused o f being b o th secret an d ir­ responsible. S enator D anaher attacked th e ad m in istratio n fo r supposedly having com m itted th e U nited States to w ar over C hina o r T hailand. O n 1 D ecem ber, C astle feared th a t negotiations had broken dow n. If w ar cam e, he asserted, W ashington “w ill be at least equally guilty w ith Tokyo.” C ongress­

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m an W illiam P. L am bertson accused th e ad m in istratio n o f presenting uan u ltim atu m ” to Japan, th o u g h he confessed ignorance o f th e A m erican p ro ­ po sals.147 T he Christian Century presented a m ore com plicated p ictu re, c rit­ icizing th e U.S. fo r su b m ittin g a list o f “unacceptable” th o u g h u n identified d em an d s.148 O n 6 D ecem ber, th e day before th e Pearl H arb o r attack, the N ew York AFC ch ap ter charged th e ad m in istratio n w ith im posing irresp o n ­ sible con d itio n s, such as rem oval o f Japanese tro o p s from T hailand’s b o r­ ders and ending th e C hina w ar.149 Such anxieties had som e grounding in reality. O n 3 D ecem ber, Roosevelt gave a private verbal assurance to B ritain. H e w ould offer “arm ed su p p o rt” if Japan invaded B ritish o r D utch possessions, even though in reality he could n o t guarantee congressional su p p o rt.150 T hrough th e Pacific crisis, th e U.S. had seldom coordinated action w ith England. T he U nited States w ould n o t concentrate its naval strength in East Asia, m uch less at Singapore. It excluded the B ritish from its negotiation w ith Japan, n o t consulting them over such vital m atters as th e oil em bargo. D uring the entire fall, the president’s foes w arned th at a Pacific w ar w ould endanger the Allied effort against G erm any.151 A Pacific conflict, noted H oover, w ould be “G od's gift to H itler,” for th e U.S. Navy w ould be preoccu­ pied in convoying across th e Pacific and Indian oceans. O nce the U nited States was com m itted in Asia, Senator W iley feared, G erm any w ould force it in to a E uropean conflict as w ell.152 Journalist Lincoln C olcord anticipated th e re­ verse— nam ely, th at the m om ent the U.S. entered a w ar in th e A dantic, Japan w ould advance in Asia. The result w ould be the sam e: A m erica w ould experi­ ence a conflict on tw o fro n ts.153 W ithin th e R oosevelt a d m in istratio n itself, anxiety existed over a tw ofro n t w ar. Such cabinet m em bers as M orgenthau, S tim son, an d K nox co n ­ sistently to o k a strid e n t p o sitio n , as d id such low er-ranking b u t in flu en tial figures as Stanley K. H ornbeck, ch ief o f th e state d e p artm e n t’s division o f Far E astern affairs. As far back as Septem ber 1940, how ever, b o th A dolf Berle an d B reckinridge Long no ted th a t co n fro n tatio n in th e Pacific could tie A m erican h an d s in E urope.154 T hough th e U.S. Navy h ad always seen Japan as its n a tu ra l enem y, th e arm y always opposed fighting in A sia.155 In those last few days before th e Japanese attack , b o th M arshall an d S tark ad­ m onished th a t challenging Japan could endanger th e m ore cru cial struggle against G erm any.156

O n 7 D ecem ber 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl H arbor, a strike th a t cost the U nited States the lives o f 2,323 m en and practically every airplane o n O ahu. All eight battleships w ere disabled, tw o perm anently destroyed.

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A nti-interventionists im m ediately endorsed a w ar against Japan.IS7 The only th in g to do now, said Senator W heeler, was “to lick hell o u t o f them ,” though he privately felt he had no apologies for his an ti-interventionism .158 MWe stand w ith o u r country,” cried th e Christian Century. Senator D anaher spoke o f "w ar to th e hilt.” "W hen you are attacked, there is noth in g to do b u t fight,” asserted th e New York Daily News.159 T he Japanese received th e bulk o f the blam e.160 Sterling M orton, G eneral W ood, an d N orm an T hom as referred to Japan’s "treachery.” 161 T he Chicago Tribune used th e term "perfidy.” To C astle, Japan had sim ply gone "m ad.” H earst rem arked th at Japan had long sought w ar; it was "sw aggering around Asia” an d "m urdering a lo t o f unarm ed C hinese m en.”162 Even those o f pacifist leanings spoke out. Libby called Japan a "ruthless ag­ gressor.” “C rim inality” and “w ickedness” w ere V illard’s w ords. John Haynes H olm es found th e attack "outrageous,” though he added it did n o t "change the history o f w hat w ent on before.”163 Sim ilarly, the Socialist Party condem ned the "w anton attack,” w hile claim ing th a t underlying the event w ere long­ standing im perialist rivalries.164 Usually anti-interventionists refused to renounce their prew ar position.165 Said the AFC national com m ittee, "O ur principles were right. H ad they been followed, w ar could have been avoided.” 166T he KAOWC expressed itself in sim ­ ilar term s. “We will be proven right historically,” w rote C hester Bowles.167 “The powers th at be,” regretted Am os Pinchot, "did not take o u r advice about war.” Scribner's Commentator possibly hinted at a postw ar revisionism w hen it said, "It is ours to do o r die. It is for the historians o f the dim future to reason why.”168 C ertainly, m any anti-interventionists were m ost critical o f A m erican d iplo­ m acy tow ard Japan. O nly R aym ond Moley, George Sokolsky, and D orothy D etzer w ent so far as to praise the way Roosevelt had conducted negotiations. Senator V andenberg th o u g h t the U nited States could have conceded Japanese control o f M anchukuo and perm itted Japan m ore com m ercial and territo rial concessions in C hina. G eneral W ood privately suspected th at Japan "was prac­ tically forced in to action at the tim e by the notes from o u r ow n Executive and State D epartm ents.”169 Som e anti-interventionists criticized th e U.S.’s entire Asian policy.170 Ac­ cording to D anaher, as the U nited States had levied econom ic sanctions and had supplied aviators to bom b the Japanese, Japan to o k steps th at it "in na­ tional h o n o r was b o u n d to take in face o f o u r conduct.” C harles A. Lindbergh entered in his diary, "We have been prodding them into w ar for weeks. They have sim ply beaten us to the gun.” "T his continuous p u ttin g pins in ra t­ tlesnakes,” rem arked H oover, had “finally got this co u n try bitten.” T he form er president was particularly concerned about H ull’s "ultim atum ” o f 26 N ovem ­ ber, w hich “sooner o r later” m eant w ar.171 T hose o f pacifist leanings w ere particularly vocal. C iting the Japanese ex­ clusion act o f 1924, the A m erican naval rivalry w ith Japan, and the fortifica­

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tio n o f G uam , Libby m aintained th at th e U nited States drove Japan in to a p o ­ sition w here the only alternatives were “to back dow n o r fight.” The Christian Century accused A m erica o f failing to apply neutrality legislation in 1937, a m ove— it argued— th at w ould have stalled Japan's w ar m achine quickly. Fur­ therm ore, th e U nited States was unresponsive to Japan’s “terrible problem o f providing a decent livelihood for her teem ing population.” Sim ilarly, th e FOR offered a w hole catalog o f offenses, ranging from initial W estern incursions in to Asia to selling w ar m aterials to Japan w hile m aking loans to C hina.172 To several anti-interventionists, the outlook was gloomy. H oover feared th e loss o f Singapore and the Philippines, estim ating th at recapture m ight take ten years. W ith th e loss o f Japan’s “stabilizing influence,” feared C astle, Asia w ould revert to “the old type o f special privilege in th e Far East,” in p articu lar th e in ­ fluence o f B ritain and th e Soviets. M ore optim istic, H earst said th a t once th e U nited States “w ashed up” Japan, it could “straighten things o u t” in E urope.173 O thers stressed m ore long-range goals. T he AFC w arned against “secret treaties com m itting A m erica to im perialistic aim s o r vast burden in o th er p arts o f the w orld.” Frederick J. Libby an d D orothy D etzer hoped for an early peace, adding th e w ish th at the U.S. w ould n o t “stoop to th e bom bing o f help­ less civilians in Japan.” C alling for restrain t in w aging th e conflict, Common­ weal cautioned, “We cannot fight u n til w rong has left the w orld.”174 Several FDR critics w ondered why the base at Hawaii had been so unprepared. General W ood called the attack “a disgrace to both the Arm y and Navy.” Colonel M cCorm ick had no t im agined “the shocking state o f lack o f discipline in th e navy and arm y th at led to the catastrophe.” The New York Daily News sought a congressional investigation, asking w hether “som e dead w ood in high U.S. Navy circles” needed to be retired.175 Why, queried Lawrence Dennis, were no t A m eri­ can destroyers patrolling several hundred miles around Hawaii?176 Som e h ints o f conspiracy existed. “T he adm inistration,” noted B orchard, “m ust have know n th a t a quick attack w ould be the indicated Japanese w ar policy.” Fearing th a t m ilitary com m anders m ight be m ade scapegoats, H oover had a series o f questions for G eneral Frank R. McCoy, a m em ber o f th e inves­ tigating com m ission chaired by Associate Suprem e C o u rt Ow en J. Roberts: Did the State Department appraise the Army and Navy o f the ultimatum [of 26 November] and its serious import? If so, did the Washington heads o f these de­ partments transm it it to the forces in the field? Now the only reason why 1 write this is the feeling that perhaps some Admiral or some General in the Pacific may be a goat for action or lack o f action higher up, and thus a great injustice done.177

The seeds o f Pearl H arbor revisionism had already been planted.

Conclusion

H istory has n o t been kind to the anti-interventionists o f 1939-41. For years, except in occasional scholarly studies, they have been perceived in th e m ost negative o f term s. In the retrospect o f m ore th an a half-century, however, it is far less easy to be supercilious o r patronizing. T heir heritage, like th at o f the interventionists they so bitterly fought, contains prophetic elem ents as well as foolish ones. T hey possessed a healthy suspicion o f executive pow er, as m anifested in such m atters as the destroyer bases deal and the A m erican occupation o f Iceland. T hey were alert to presidential duplicity, as exhibited in the case o f th e Greer. T hey correctly saw an A m erican E xpeditionary Force as a m ost risky m ilitary venture, for one m ust ask w hat w ould have been its likely fate if the b ru n t o f H itler’s W ehrm acht had n o t been blunted o n the Russian steppes.1 T hough th eir anticom m unism could b order on the hysterical, noninterventionists cor­ rectly challenged pro -ad m in istratio n claim s th a t G erm any's defeat w ould have little bearing on Soviet expansion. T hey felt unjustly m aligned, and de­ servedly so, w hen ad m inistration officials n o t only branded them en m asse as p o tential traito rs o r Nazi dupes b u t used th e FBI as an in stru m en t o f in tim i­ dation. Such practices, they correctly surm ised, were creating a clim ate o f opinion in w hich dissent was confused w ith disloyalty, a circum stance th at bade ill for A m erican dem ocracy. D espite stereotypes o f apathy and ignorance, certain m ajor vehicles o f an ti­ interventionism w ere highly inform ed concerning the events o f th e day. The editorials o f th e Chicago Tribune, New York Daily News, and H earst press re­ veal a detailed know ledge o f the m ilitary cam paigns and b attlefront shifts.

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Such journalists as Frank H anighen, W illiam H enry C ham berlin, and H anson Baldw in offered sober com m entary. At th e sam e tim e, m any anti-interventionists could be quite o ff the m ark. T hey harped o n the proclivity o f E urope for continual conflict, interpreted th e cu rren t struggle as sim ply an o th er im perialist war, and found B ritain— n o t G erm any— bearing the greater guilt in b o th im m ediate and long-range his­ tory. Journalist Elm er Davis m ade a telling p o in t w hen, in conceding the checkered record o f the B ritish in such areas as Ireland and India, he w rote, “T here is hope— som e hope—o f a decent peace if th e Allies w in; if the G er­ m ans w in there is n o evidence o n w hich to base any hope at all.”2 Similarly, few noninterventionists realized th e precariousness o f all such overseas h old­ ings, w hich had long m ade them a continual d rain o n th e E uropean pow ers. M any colonies could n o t be retained once the w ar ended. A nti-interventionists often found G erm any’s w ar aim s quite lim ited, p er­ ceiving them strictly in term s o f trad itio n al continental balance-of-pow er pol­ itics. At m ost, it was th o u g h t, G erm any sought to dom inate C entral Europe. If it ventured fu rth er east, in th e direction o f the Soviet U nion, either the tw o dictatorships w ould slaughter each o th er into bloody exhaustion o r H itler w ould rid th e w orld o f the com m unist scourge. C ertainly such FDR critics w oefully m isunderstood the dynam ism o f the G erm an regim e o r its potential th reat to a w ider w orld balance. A nti-interventionists pointed to prospects for a negotiated peace at every o p p o rtu n ity and irrespective o f changing battleffonts. H itler’s initial peace bids o f O ctober 1939 found m uch hearing. C uriously, though often suspicious o f the president, som e o f his bitterest foes suggested him as m ediator. At tim es, such people advanced peace aim s as u topian as those posited in the At­ lantic C harter and ju st as unlikely to see fulfillm ent. O ne m ight naturally ex­ pect pacifists and clergy to advance th e m ost cosm ic o f schem es. M ore soberm inded figures, however— such as Sterling M orton, C hester Bowles, R obert E W ood, and B urton W heeler— also offered relatively far-reaching proposals. To th e anti-interventionists, overseas involvem ent invariably led to dom es­ tic ru in . An A m erica at w ar was an A m erica bereft o f civil an d econom ic lib­ erties. W hile conceding— in fact at tim es em phasizing— the degree o f poverty in th e n ation, they rem ained highly skeptical concerning any w ar boom : Dic­ tatorship, n o t prosperity, m ay well be in store. A nti-interventionists could be irresponsibly dem agogic, attacking th e B ritish and th eir em pire to such a degree th a t an u n tu to red listener m ight place th eir behavior o n a m oral equivalency w ith th at o f the Axis. T hough one m ight expect such com m ents from P orter Sargent and Rush H olt, T heodore D reiser and Father C oughlin, m ore m ainstream figures also shared deep sus­ picion. Journalist C arleton Beals, for instance, said th a t in any forthcom ing peace, the U nited States “m ay as little likely expect generosity from England as from Germany.”3 At a tim e w hen the B ritish Isles w ere u nder siege, certain

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an ti-interventionists deliberately stressed historic tensions betw een th e tw o countries. W hen, asked C ongressm an Dewey S hort, "did B ritain ever fight o u r battle? Was it in 1775 w hen som e o f o u r flesh an d blood were spilled w ith W ashington a t Valley Forge to throw o ff th e yoke o f B ritish oppression an d to escape th e hell o f B ritish tyranny?”4 The president’s critics sim ilarly indicted Allied leadership, w ith W inston C hurchill held up to particular opprobrium . D w ight M acdonald found the prim e m inister only differing from one o f the “M unichm en” in being “m ore en­ ergetic, able, and m ore realistically aware o f the threat offered by H itler to British im perialism .”5 Britain, several argued, was never a democracy, and emergency w artim e legislation m ade it even less o f a one. Early in O ctober 1939, A rthur Vandenberg brandished an unidentified headline o f the previous week: “British Find Liberties Vanish w ith War: Traditional Freedom Is Blackened O u t”6 A few ad­ m inistration critics found the British people themselves highly suspect. Furtherm ore, th e Roosevelt adm inistration was perceived as m ere dupes o f B ritish pow er, th e object o f sinister m anipulation by D ow ning Street. Jurist John Bassett M oore found th e U nited States so tied to th e B ritish it w ould have m ore freedom as a self-governing dom inion.7 W ashington ed ito r Frank W aldrop w rote in Septem ber 1941, “Those o f us w ho are isolationists believe C hurchill is bossing Roosevelt and leading us dow n th e road to a profitless w ar as a m ere B ritish Em pire goonsquad.”8 The Rhodes scholar program and C larence Streit’s U nion Now plan w ere presented as centers o f a B ritish plot. T he w orldview o f FDR critics could bo rd er on th e conspiratorial in o th er m atters as well. In particular, som e harped on Polish docum ents allegedly cap­ tu red by th e G erm ans, claim ing they proved th a t th e Roosevelt adm inistration had plotted a general m ilitary conflagration by prom ising m ilitary and finan­ cial aid to th e Allies if w ar erupted. In so doing, they inadvertently helped bol­ ster one claim o f W orld W ar II revisionism — nam ely, th a t FDR pressed C ham ­ berlain to give irresponsible com m itm ents to th e Poles.9 Yet one should be careful in speaking o f the anti-in terv en tio n ist position. True, there occasionally existed an incredible m arriage o f convenience, as w hen th e Chicago Tribune serialized an antiw ar novella by fellow traveler D al­ to n T rum bo an d th e Daily Worker praised C harles L indbergh’s defense stra t­ egy. It is hard to realize in retrospect th a t every single A m erican political p arty o f th e left opposed intervention from Septem ber 1939 u n til at least June 1941. At th e sam e tim e, the C om m unist Party continually attacked such m ainstream groups as A m erica First, m aintaining th at its ow n A m erican Peace M obiliza­ tio n was th e only tru ly au thentic antiw ar group.10 O bviously the n o n in ter­ ventionists were a highly diverse coalition, one th at ranged from com m unists and profascists to C hristian pacifists, though th e great bulk professed a b ran d o f politics far m ore in th e A m erican m ainstream . In resisting Roosevelt’s m ajor proposals— lend-lease, th e extension o f the term o f draftees, convoys to B ritain— m uch agreem ent existed am ong adm in­

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istratio n foes. T here was sim ilar accord o n certain relatively m in o r m atters— islands-for-w ar-debts, for exam ple, o r th e O gdensburg agreem ent w ith C anada. Sim ilarly, in dealing w ith the origins o f the E uropean w ar, a n ti-in te r­ ventionists concurred as to the evils o f the Versailles treaty, th e legitim acy o f G erm an claim s to D anzig and th e C orridor, and the folly o f any B ritishFrench guarantee to Poland. C hances for A llied victory usually appeared neg­ ligible, even w ere the U nited States to intervene as a full-scale belligerent. A nd suppose the U.S. and B ritain did triu m p h — th e costs to civilization w ould still be ruinous. A nti-interventionists concurred in m aintaining th a t th e Axis posed neith er a m ilitary n o r econom ic th reat to th e U nited States. O ften they defined m ili­ tary safety in term s o f a “Fortress Am erica,” econom ic survival dependent o n either national self-sufficiency o r hem ispheric integration. As G erm any’s ex­ pansion w ould sim ply m ake H itler’s Reich weaker, n o t stronger, they m ain­ tained, th e w inning h an d always lay w ith th e U.S. Conversely, so they believed, w ar m obilization w ould ru in th e A m erican econom y, w hile an AEF w ould decim ate the n ation’s arm ed forces. If th e anti-interventionists had one predom inating fear, it was th a t th e So­ viet U nion w ould em erge as th e conflict’s only victor. Its accom panying social system o f com m unism , w ith its possible ecum enical appeal, m ade th e peril appear far m ore threatening th an th a t o f th e Axis nations, w hich could be pre­ sented as a bulw ark against a Red onslaught. W hen, in June 1941, H itler in ­ vaded th e USSR, th e president’s critics often predicted its im m inent dem ise w hile stressing the im m orality o f com ing to its aid. It w ould hardly be exag­ gerating to find in the anti-interventionist posture a kind o f rehearsal for the C old W ar, although certain “old isolationists” retained th eir hostility to global com m itm ents through at least 1949.11 The picture concerning Asia is m ore com plicated. C ertainly, the great m a­ jo rity o f FDR’s foes opposed th e Japanese conquest o f C hina, b u t they were equally hostile to E uropean im perialism in the Far East. T hey debated eco­ nom ic pressure o n Japan, som e opposing continued shipm ent o f w ar goods to th at n ation. Conversely, others found em bargoes b o th self-destructive and dangerous, and a few acquiesced in a “Japanese M onroe D octrine” for Asia. Som e o f th e m ost articulate anti-interventionists opposed a continued A m er­ ican m ilitary presence in the Philippines and the fortification o f G uam , argu­ ing th at b o th areas w ere m ilitarily indefensible. As in the case o f Europe, m any found the continental U nited States secure from any Japanese attack, w hile seeing any A m erican invasion o f Japan as m ost costly. It was, they believed, for b etter for th e U.S. and Japan to negotiate, particularly over th e contentious issue o f C hina. Such disagreem ent over Asia leads one to a w ider point: the degree to w hich ad m inistration critics differed am ong them selves on som e quite significant is­ sues. Even if one elim inates the m ore extrem e in th eir ranks (e.g., Father

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C oughlin, Lawrence D ennis, R alph Tow nsend, th e Daily Worker, hard-core pacifists), incredible diversity rem ained. Roosevelt’s foes were divided o n the w isdom o f th e M unich agreem ent, th e justice o f Poland’s cause, and th e de­ sirability o f aiding Finland, a m atter th at revealed th e greatest fissure o f all. As far as m ilitary defense w ent, they differed o n defending Alaska, occupying G reenland, and integrating South A m erica in to a U .S.-dom inated system . Som e spoke in term s o f controlling G reenland and the C aribbean, several seeking th e o u trig h t seizure o f such islands as M artinique. O thers saw all South A m erica as needing protection. Still others desired U.S. bases as far south as Brazil. T hey could n o t concur on th e effectiveness o f air and sea pow er, p articu ­ larly o n th e use o f bom ber an d battleship, though m any supported a large air force an d expanding th e A m erican fleet. Pow erful voices w ithin th eir ranks, albeit a m inority, w ere n o t averse to a large conscript arm y. T hey also dis­ agreed as how best to m eet Axis econom ic com petition, som e pushing barter, others autarchy. C ertain Roosevelt initiatives could create dissidence w ithin anti-in terv en tio n ist ranks, am ong them th e W elles m ission o f February 1940 an d th e Eight Points o f th e A tlantic C harter. A dm inistration critics lacked a com m on analysis regarding th e prognosis o f th e w ar— indeed, concerning chances for B ritish an d Soviet survival. At th e sam e tim e, m ost never changed th eir fundam ental position as a result o f shift­ ing events. Irrespective o f all Allied prospects, they m aintained th a t th e U nited States could only w eaken itself fatally by m assive overseas com m itm ents, in th e process m oving tow ard th e very totalitarianism it was fighting abroad. Particularly in the early phases o f th e w ar, noninterventionists agreed at tim es w ith the Roosevelt adm inistration, w hich itself could be divided. The president him self extended peace feelers in the w inter o f 1939-40 and recog­ nized the Vichy regim e. Far from being a tool o f th e B ritish Em pire, Roosevelt was profoundly wary, espousing opposition tow ard French dom ination o f In ­ dochina as well. T he rise o f H itler and M ussolini, he m aintained, lay in the W est’s betrayal o f its ow n W ilsonian principles. Strong voices w ithin the A m erican m ilitary always rem ained suspicious o f m assive arm s shipm ents overseas. Sim ilarly, certain ad m inistration figures initially expressed pes­ sim ism concerning B ritain’s and later the Soviet U nion’s survival. O thers rec­ om m ended accom m odation w ith Japan. In th e end, th e an ti-in terv en tio n ists w ere defeated at every p o in t. O f course, seldom — if ever— in A m erican h istory have political “outsiders” de­ term in ed m ajor foreign policy. T he years 1939-41 m arked n o exception. W ith consum m ate skill, Franklin Roosevelt set th e agenda, defined th e issues, and chose his tim ing. H is critics w ere forced to respond to th e president’s in i­ tiatives. Besides, n o n interventionists w ere far to o diverse to offer any unified alternatives o f th eir ow n, even to o divided to offer any alternative vision o f a positive in tern atio n al order. T he A m erica First C om m ittee m ight take credit

328

Conclusion

for a n um ber o f m in o r victories (e.g., an am endm ent to th e original lendlease bill pro h ib itin g actual delivery o f supplies), b u t such triu m p h s w ere trivial a t b est.12 To th e degree th at opinion polls reflected popular sentim ent, adm inistra­ tio n critics found little com fort in th eir findings. O nce issues shifted from the general question o f directly entering the w ar to such m ore concrete proposals as cash-and-carry and convoys, th e president’s opponents drew only m inority support. T he polls m ight show consensus o n such m atters as th e desirability o f islands-for-w ar-debts in N ovem ber 1939 o r a negotiated peace in M arch 1940, b u t certainly n o t o n such m ajor legislation as lend-lease.13 W hen th e U nited States entered th e w ar w ithout reservation, an ti-interven­ tionists felt a profound sense o f personal tragedy. T heir anxiety was com ­ pounded by th e fact th a t o n 11 D ecem ber 1941, G erm any and Italy had de­ clared w ar o n the U nited States. ttI feel as if m y w orld has pretty well com e to an end,” w rote N orm an T hom as, "th at w hat I have stood for has been de­ feated, and m y ow n usefulness m ade sm all.” John H aynes H olm es recalled a passage in A ugustine's City o f God, describing a conqueror w ho looked ever m ore like the conquered; the New York m inister feared "nothing b u t disaster all around.” Ttao days after th e attack, A nne M orrow Lindbergh w rote in her diary, "I feel as if all I believed was A m erica, all m em ories o f it, all history, all dream s o f th e future were m arching gaily tow ard a precipice— and unaw are, unaw are.” 14

N otes

PREFACE 1. Hoover, bar association of Nassau County, NewYork, New York Times (hereafter cited as N Y T ), 26 May 1940,15. 2. Gerhard L Weinberg, World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes o f World War II (Hanover, N.H.: Brandeis University Press of New England, 1981). 3. ‘‘America,” Saturday Evening Post 212 (7 October 1939): 22. 4. Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-1945 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1983), 7. 5. See, for example, “An Isolationist,” New York D aily News (hereafter cited as N YD N ), 22 June 1940,13. For similar use, see Representative George Holden Tinkham (Rep.-Mass.), House Foreign Af­ fairs Committee (hereafter cited as HFAC), 21 January 1941, 246; Senator Hiram Johnson (Rep.Calif.), speech, “Peace or War,” NBC, 6 November 1941, in Congressional Record (hereafter cited as CR), A5042; Hiram Johnson to John Bassett Moore, 26 July 1940, the Papers of John Bassett Moore (here­ after cited as Moore Papers); “Isolation,” America 61 (30 September 1939): 589. 6. Fish, speech, NBC, 23 September 1939, in CR, A20. For similar attitudes, see diplomat John Cu­ dahy, testimony, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (hereafter cited as SFRC), 23 October 1941,160, 161,176; Lawrence Dennis, Weekly Foreign Letter (hereafter cited as WFL) 117 (24 October 1940): 4. 7. For a distinction between isolationist and pacifist, see Howard Brinton, “Pacifist Not Isolation­ ist,” Fellowship 6 (June 1940): 91. 8. Holmes, U nity 124 (15 January 1940): 154. 9. Justus D. Doenecke, A nti-Intervention: A Bibliographical Introduction to Isolationism and Paci­ fism from World War I to the Early Cold War (New York: Garland, 1987). 10. For the ethnic interpretation, see Samuel Lubell, The Future o f American Politics, 3d ed., rev. (New York: Harper, 1965), 131-55. For the debate over Populism, see Ray Allen Billington, “The Ori­ gins of Middle Western Isolationism,” Political Science Q uarterly 60 (March 1945): 44-64; William G. Carleton, “Isolationism and the Middle West,” M ississippi Valley H istorical Review 33 (December 1946): 377-90; Warren F. Kuehl, “Midwestern Newspapers and the Isolationist Sentiment,” D iplom atic H istory 3 (Summer 1979): 283-306. For case studies of agrarian figures, see Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald P. N ye and Am erican Foreign Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962);

329

330

Notes to Pages xi-2

Peter Baldwin Bulkley,"Daniel A. Reed: A Study in Conservatism” Ph.D. diss., Clark University, 1972. For the South, see Wayne S. Cole, "America First and the South, 1940-1941,” Journal o f Southern H is­ tory 22 (February 1956): 36-47. For party patterns, see David L. Porter, The Seventy-sixth Congress and World War II, 1939-1940 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979), 180-82. For xenophobia, see Bernard Fensterwald Jr., "The Anatomy of American ‘Isolationism* and Expansion,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution 2 (June 1958): 111-39; (December 1958): 280-307; Daniel Bell, ed., The Radical Right (Gar­ den City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963); Edward A. Shils, The Torm ent o f Secrecy (Glencoe, I1L: Free Press, 1956). 11. For more extensive discussion, see Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), especially chap. 2; Justus D. Doenecke, N ot to the Sw ift: The O ld Isolationists in the Cold War Era (Lewisburg, Pa..: Bucknell University Press, 1979), 22-31. 12. See, for example, Wayne C. Cole, America First: The Batde Against Intervention, 1940-1941 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953); Cole, Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against In ­ tervention in World War II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974); Cole, Roosevelt and the Iso­ lationists; Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1939-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); J. Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer Jr., The First Peacetime D raft (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986); Justus D. Doenecke, ed., In Danger Undaunted: The A nti-Interventionist M ove­ m ent o f 1940-1941 as Revealed in the Papers o f the America First C om m ittee (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990) (hereafter cited as /DU). 13. For some preliminary findings, see Justus D. Doenecke, The Battle Against Intervention, 1939-1941 (Malabar, Ha.: Krieger, 1997). INTRODUCTION 1. Harold Ickes, New York Times, 14 April 1941,19. 2. Philip E. Jacob, "Influences of World Events on U.S. 'Neutrality* Opinion,” Public O pinion Q uar­ terly 4 (March 1940): 48-65. 3. Major studies of Congress include Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists; Porter, Seventy-sixth Congress, For overviews of the Senate, see Thomas N. Guinsburg, The Pursuit o f Isolationism in the U nited States from Versailles to Pearl Harbor (New York: Garland, 1982); Ronald L Feinman, TWilight o f Progressivism: The Western Republican Senators and the New Deal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni­ versity Press, 1981). 4. James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography o f Robert A. Taft (NewYork: Knopf, 1972), 151. 5. Richard Coke Lower, A Bloc o f One: The Politics and Career o f H iram W, Johnson (Stanford, Calif.; Stanford University Press, 1993); Peter Gerald Boyle, "The Study of an Isolationist: Hiram John­ son,” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1970; Howard Arthur DeWitt, "Hiram W. John­ son and American Foreign Policy, 1917-1941,” Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 1972. 6. Cole, Nye; John E. Wiltz, In Search o f Peace: The Senate M unitions Inquiry, 1934-1936 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963). 7. Patrick J. Maney, uYoung Bobn La Follette: A Biography o f Robert M . La Follette, Jr., 1895-1953 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1978); Alan Edmond Kent Jr., "Portrait in Isolationism: The La Follettes and Foreign Policy,” Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1956. 8. Richard Kay Hanks, "Hamilton Fish and American Isolationism, 1920-1944,” Ph.D. diss., Uni­ versity of California, Riverside, 1971; Anthony C. Troncone, "Hamilton Fish, Sr., and the Politics of American Nationalism” Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1993; Hamilton Fish, M em oir o f an American Patriot (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1991). 9. Norman Jay Kaner, "Vito Marcantonio and American Foreign Policy,” Ph.D. diss., Rutgers Uni­ versity, 1968; Louis Schaffer, Vito M arcantonio: Radical in Congress (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Univer­ sity Press, 1966). 10. Edward C. Blackorby, "Usher Lloyd Burdick,” in D ictionary o f Am erican Biography: Supplem ent Six, 1956-1960, ed. John A. Garraty (New York: Scribner s, 1980), 85-87.

Notes to Pages 2-3

331

11. See, for example, Gary Dean Best, H erbert Hoover: The Postpresidential Years, 1933-1964,2 vols. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1983); Justus D. Doenecke, “The Anti-Interventionism of Herbert Hoover,“ Journal o f Libertarian Studies 8 (Summer 1987): 311-40; Alfred L Castle, “William R. Castle and Opposition to United States Involvement in an Asian War, 1939-1941,“ Pacific Historical Review 54 (August 1985): 337-51; Alfred L Castle, D iplom atic Realism: W illiam R. Castle, Jr., and Am erican Foreign Policy, 1919-1953 (Honolulu: Samuel N. and Mary Casde Foundation, 1998); Don­ ald McCoy, Landon o f Kansas (Lincoln: University of Kansas, 1966). 12. For Lewis, see Melvyn Dubofsky, “John L Lewis and American Isolationism,“ in Three Faces o f M idwestern Isolationism , ed. John H. Schacht (Iowa City, Iowa: Center for the Study of the Recent His­ tory of the United States, 1981), 23-33. For business and labor opinion, see William Arthur Weinrich, “Business and Foreign Affairs: The Roosevelt Defense Program, 1937-1941,“ Ph.D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 1971; John W. Roberts, lo ttin g Foreign Policy to W ork The Role o f Organized Labor in Am erican Foreign Relations, 1932-1941 (New York: Garland, 1995). 13. There is no general study of student opinion. For studies of left-wing activity, see Robert Cohen, W hen the O ld Left Was Young: Student Radicals and the First Mass Student M ovem ent, 1929-1941 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Eileen M. Egan, Class, Culture, and the Classroom: The Student Peace M ovem ent o f the 1930s (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980); Dennis N. Mihelich, “Stu­ dent Antiwar Activism during the Nineteen Thirties,“ Peace and Change 2 (Fall 1974): 29-40. 14. Richard H. Kendall, “Edwin M. Borchard and the Defense of Traditional American Policy,“ Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1964; Justus D. Doenecke, “Edwin M. Borchard, John Bassett Moore, and Opposition to American Entry in World War II,“ Journal o f Libertarian Studies 6 (Winter 1982): 1-34; Marshall R. Kuehl, “Philip C. Jessup: FromAmerica First to Cold War Interventionist,” Ph.D. diss., Kent State University, 1985; Richard Megaree, “Realism in American Foreign Policy: The Diplomacy of John Bassett Moore,“ Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1963. 15. Studies of Kennedy include Michael J. Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt: The Uneasy Alliance (New York: Norton, 1980); David E. Koskoff, Joseph P. Kennedy: A Life and Times (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1974); Richard J. Whalen, The Founding Father: The Story o f Joseph P. Kennedy (New York: New American Library, 1964). 16. Patrick J. Hearden, “John Cudahy and the Pursuit of Peace,“ M id-Am erica 68 (April-June 1986): 99-114; Mark A. Stoler,“FromContinentalism to Globalism: General Stanley Embick, the Joint Strate­ gic Survey Committee, and the Military View of American National Policy during the Second World War,“ D iplom atic H istory 6 (Summer 1982): 303-21; Ronald Schaffer, “General Stanley D. Embick: Mil­ itary Dissenter,“ M ilitary Affairs 37 (October 1973): 89-95; Robert Hessen, ed., Berlin Alert: The M em ­ oirs and Reports o f Trum an Sm ith (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984); Jordan A. Schwarz, Liberal: A d o lfA . Berle and the Vision o f an Am erican Era (NewYork: Free Press, 1987); Beatrice Bishop Berle and Travis Jacobs, eds., N avigating the Rapids, 1918-1971: From the Papers o f A d o lfA B erk (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973). 17. For Lindbergh's findings in Germany, see Hessen, Berlin Alert. Truman Smith was then U.S. military attaché to Germany. For superior material on the Lindberghs, see Cole, Lindbergh; The W artim e Journals o f Charles A Lindbergh (NewYork: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970); A. Scott Berg, Lindbergh (New York: Putnam's, 1998); Anne Morrow Lindbergh, The Flower and the Nettle: Dairies and Letters, 1936-1939 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976); Anne Morrow Lindbergh, War W ithin and W ithout: Diaries and Letters, 1939-1944 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980); Dorothy Herrmann, A G ift fo r Life: A nne M orrow Lindbergh (NewYork: Ticknor 8c Fields, 1993). 18. For Hearst circulation, see J. Percy Johnson, ed., Directory o f Newspapers and Publications (Philadelphia: Ayer, 1940), 640,645 (hereafter cited as Ayer's, followed by date of publication). By for the best work on Hearst's foreign policy is Rodney P. Carlisle, Hearst and the New Deal: The Progressive as Re­ actionary (New York: Garland, 1979). See also W. A. Swanberg, Citizen Hearst (New York: Scribner’s, 1961). For Carter, see Boake Carter and Thomas H. Healy, W hy M eddk in the Orient? Facts, Figures, Fic­ tions and Follies (New York: Dodge, 1938); Boake Carter, W hy M eddk in Europé? Facts, Figures, Fictions and Follies (NewYork: McBride, 1939). For the only scholarlywork on Carter, see David H. Culbert, News fo r Everyone: Radio and Foreign Affairs in Thirties America (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976).

332

Notes to Pages 3-4

19. For Scripps-Howard circulation, see Ayer's, 1941,676. There is no full-scale biography of Roy W. Howard. For superior sketches, see Alfred Lawrence Lorenz, “Roy W. Howard,” in D ictionary o f Literary Biography; vol. 29: American Newspaper Journalists, 1926-1950, ed. Ferry G. Ashley (Detroit: Gale, 1984) , 123-31; Irving Dilliard, “Roy Wilson Howard,” in D ictionary o f American Biography: Supplem ent Seven, 1961-1965, cd. lohn A. Garraty (NewYork: Scribner's, 1981), 369-70. For Howard and Roosevelt, see Graham J. White, FDR and the Press (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979), 55-39. For the issue of a policy shift, see“Howard’s Heart Change,” Time, 10 March 1941,59; “Neutrality Repeal,” San Francisco News (hereafter cited as SFN), 25 September 1941,14; “Undeclared War,” SFN , 1 November 1941,6. 20. For Johnson’s book, see H ell-Bent fo r War (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1941). For his career, see John Kennedy Ohl, Hugh S. Johnson and the N ew Deal (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1985) . For endorsements from anti-interventionists, see business leader Robert E. Wood to Hugh Johnson, 30 April 1941, Box 56, the Papers of the America First Committee, Hoover Institution, Stan­ ford, California (hereafter cited as AFC Papers); Nick Broughton, “Books in a World at War,” Peace Ac­ tion 1 (April 1941): 7. 21. Richard C. Frey Jr., “John T. Flynn and the United States in Crisis, 1928-1950,” Ph.D. diss., Uni­ versity of Oregon, 1969; Michele Flynn Stenejem, A n American First: John T Flynn and the Am erica First Com m ittee (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1976). 22. For Barnes on the New Deal, see Roy Carroll Tumbaugh Jr., “Harry Elmer Barnes: The Quest for Truth and Justice,” Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1977,219-22,234-35; for foreign policy, see 251. For Barnes on the war, see“Russian Tie-up with Nazis,” New York World-Telegram (hereafter dted as N Y W T ), 3 October 1939,18; “War Held No Armageddon,” N YW T, 27 October 1939,26; “Course of U.S. in the War,” N YW T, 15 January 1939,14. For correspondence concerning Barnes’s firing, see Lee B. Wood to Harry Elmer Barnes, 1 and 11 May 1940, both in the Papers of Harry Elmer Barnes, Uni­ versity of Wyoming, Laramie (hereafter cited as Barnes Papers); Harry Elmer Barnes to Roy W. Howard, 7 May 1940 (hereafter cited as Howard Papers); Roy W. Howard to Harry Elmer Barnes, 11 May 1940 and 13 June 1940, the Papers of Roy W. Howard, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C 23. For the News’s circulation, see Ayer's, 1942,669. There is no scholarly biography of Joseph Pat­ terson. For brief sketches, see William V. Shannon, “Joseph Medill Patterson,” in D ictionary o f A m eri­ can Biography: Supplem ent Three, 1941-1945, ed. Edward T. James (New York: Scribner’s, 1974), 645-46; “Joseph Medill Patterson,” in Current Biography, 1942, ed. Maxine Block (New York: Wilson, 1943), 648-51; Ronald S. Marmarelli, “Joseph Medill Patterson,” in D ictionary o f Literary Biography, vol. 29,269-84. For the debate over Maury, see George Britt, “Ethics for Editors,” New Republic 105 (25 August 1941): 246-49; “Reuben Maury Replies,” New Republic 105 (8 September 1941): 312. 24. For work on McCormick and his Tribune, see Frank J. Waldrop, M cCormick o f Chicago: A n Un­ conventional Portrait o f a Controversial Figure (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966); Jerome E. Edwards, The Foreign Policy o f C ol McCormick's Tribune, 1929-1941 (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1971); Lloyd Wendt, Chicago Tribune: The Rise o f a Great Am erican Newspaper (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1979); Joseph Gies, The Colonel o f Chicago (NewYork: Dutton, 1979); Richard Norton Smith, The C olonel The Life and Legend o f Robert R. McCormick, 1880-1955 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997). For Tribune circulation, see Ayer's, 1940,220. 25. Paul F. Healy, Cissy: The Biography o f Eleanor M. "Cissy” Patterson (Garden City, N.Y.: Double­ day, 1966); Ralph G. Martin, Cissy (NewYork: Simon 8cSchuster, 1979). For Tim es-H erald circulation, see Ayer's, 1941, 155. 26. For biographies and autobiographies, see Felix Morley, For the Record (South Bend, Ind.: Regnery Gateway, 1979); Warren I. Cohen, The Chinese Connection: Roger S. Greene, Thomas W. Lam ont, George E Sokolsky, and Am erican-East Asian Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); William Henry Chamberlin, The Confessions o f an Individualist (NewYork: Macmillan, 1940); Robert Hobbs Myers, “William Henry Chamberlin: His Views of the Soviet Union,” Ph.D. diss., Indiana Uni­ versity, 1973; Freda Utley, Odyssey o f a Liberal M emoirs (Washington, D.C.: Washington National Press, 1970). Comprehensive works are needed on Moley and Rascoe. Mencken has many biographies, including Charles A. Fecher, M encken: A Study o f H is Thought (New York: Knopf, 1978). Sargent will be discussed in detail in chap. 14.

Notes to Pages 4-5

333

27. For Post circulation, see Ayer's, 1942, 842. For Garrett, see Carl Ryant, Profit's Prophet: Garet Garrett (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). For Bess, see Demaree Bess, “Put Up or Shut Up,” Saturday Evening Post 214 (22 November 1941): 14-15,84-86; “Demaree (Caughey) Bess,” in Current Biography, 1943, ed. Maxine Block (NewYork: Wilson, 1944), 40-41. For an interventionist attack on Bess’s reporting, see “’Uncensored’: Mr. Bess Visits German Europe,” N ation 152 (18 January 1941): 62. On the Posfs supposed shift, see “The Peril,” Saturday Evening Post 213 (24 May 1941): 28, 80. See also N Y T , 17 May 1941,1; 18 May 1941,38; 21 May 1941,12; “Satevepost Turns a Page,” Time, 26 May 1941,67; Newsweek, 2 June 1941,17; Lillian Symes, “Hold That Line: Satevepost Capitulates,” Call, 7 lune 1941, 5. For claims that the Post was holding firm, see Robert L Bliss, “The Saturday Evening Post,” AFC Bulletin #283, 27 May 1941, Box 279, AFC Papers; Hanford MacNider to K. A. Greene, 31 October 1941, the Papers of Hanford MacNider, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa (hereafter cited as HHPL; MacNider Papers). 28. For its history, see Justus D. Doenecke, “ Scribner's Commentator, 1939-1942,” in The Conserva­ tive Press in Twentieth-Century America, ed. Ronald Lora and William Henry Longton (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1999), 273-82. For its birth, see“Isolationist Organ,” Time, 30 December 1940,34. For Eggleston’s own account, see Roosevelt, Churchill, and the World War II Opposition: A Revisionist Autobiography (Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin-Adair, 1979). On bankers, see Henry Ford, “An Ameri­ can Foreign Policy,” Scribner's Com m entator 9 (December 1940): 30-36. On France, see “These Rule France” [picture essay], Scribner's Com m entator 9 (January 1941): 13-20; Lois and Donaldson Thorbum, “Dear Elmer,” Scribner's Com m entator 8 (August 1940): 30-32,41-42. On Portugal, see Paul R. Sanders, “Europe’s Mildest Dictator,” Scribner's Com m entator 11 (November 1941): 31-36; On refugees, see Albert Hall, “Reviewing the Refugee Problem,” Scribner's Com m entator 10 (September 1941): 45-51; Howard M. Yates, Scribner's Com m entator 10 (October 1941): 47-50. For work on Nock, see Robert M. Cninden, The M ind and A rt o f A lbert Jay Nock (Chicago: Regnery, 1964); Michael Wreszin, The Superfluous Anarchist. Albert Jay Nock (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1972). 29. For a brief account, see John M. Muresianu, War o f Ideas: American Intellectuals and the World Crisis, 1938-1945 (New York: Garland, 1988), 127-30. For New Republic circulation, see Ayer's, 1941, 661. For contemporary suspicions concerning Mrs. Elmhirst’s role, see Lillian Symes, “Hold That Line,” Call, 15 February 1941,5; Lawrence Dennis, WFL 131, (31 January 1941): 2; Sidney Hertzberg to Edmund Wilson, 29 August 1941, the Papers of Sidney Hertzberg, New York Public Library (here­ after cited as Hertzberg Papers); Norman Thomas to William Attwood, 1 February 1941, Norman Thomas to Bruce Bliven, 16 February 1941, both in the Papers of Norman Thomas, New York Public Library (hereafter cited as Thomas Papers); Fred Rodell, Yale law professor, to “Barbara,” 1 February 1941, AFC Papers. For denial of Elmhirst intervention, see Bruce Bliven, Five M illion Words Later: An Autobiography (New York: Day, 1970), 196-97. For a claim of Elmhirst intervention, see Michael Straight, A fter Long Silence (New York: Norton, 1983), 158-59. For the Flynn controversy, see Bruce Bliven to John T. Flynn, 4 November 1940, John T. Flynn to Bruce Bliven, 8 January 1941, the Papers of John T. Flynn, University of Oregon Library (hereafter cited as Flynn Papers); “A Communication: Mr. Flynn Speaks for Himself,” New Republic 104 (3 February 1941): 148-50. 30. Donald L. Miller, The New American Radicalism: Alfred M. Bingham and N on-M arxian Insur­ gency in the New Deal Era (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat, 1979); Alfred M. Bingham, Insurgent America: Revolt o f the M iddle-Classes (New York: Harper, 1935); Muresianu, War o f Ideas, 130-33. For a summary of its foreign policy, see “Why Short of War?” Common Sense 10 (May 1941): 144-45. For Hanighen, see H. C. Engelbrecht and Frank Hanighen, M erchants o f Death: A Study o f the International A rm am ent Industry (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934). 31. For La Follette control, see Maney, La Follette, 234-35; Kent, “Portrait,” 306-8. For a history of thejournal, see John Alan Ziegler, “ The Progressive's Views on Foreign Affairs, 1909-1941: A Case Study of Liberal Economic Isolationism,” Ph.D. diss„ Syracuse University, 1970. 32. For Villard, see Stephen A. Themstrom, “Oswald Garrison Villard and the Politics of Pacifism,” H arvard Library Bulletin 14 (Winter 1960): 126-52; Michael Wreszin, Oswald Garrison Villard: Pacifist a t War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965); Anthony Gronowicz, ed., Oswald Garrison Vil­ lard: The D ilem m a o f the Absolute Pacifist in Two World Wars (NewYork: Garland, 1983). For Williams,

334

Notes to Pages 5-6

see Maxine Block, ed.,"Alford Joseph Williams, Jr.,- C urrent Biography, 1940 (NewYork: Wilson, 1941), 870-72. For Chase, see uStuart Chase," in Current Biography, 1940, 162-64; James Carpenter Lanier, "Stuart Chase: An Intellectual Biography (1888-1940),” Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1972; Stuart Chase with Marian Tyler, The N ew Western Front (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1939). There is no work on Ernest L. Meyer. 33. In January 1941, Cushman Reynolds became editor, and that July both Reynolds and Hertzberg shared the responsibility. By the summer of 1941, Hanighen became its Washington correspondent. Editorial sponsors included Barnes, Chase, Flynn, Meyer, Rascoe, Rodman, and Villard as well as columnist Dorothy Dumbar Bromley, Fortune editor John Chamberlain, and military writer Fleming MacLiesh. Among those intermittently with Uncensored were radio broadcaster Quincy Howe, editor George Leighton, Latin American expert Hubert Herring, author Ferdinand Lundberg, and journalists Marquis Childs, C. Hartley Grattan, and Richard Neuberger. For "shoestring,” see Sidney Hertzberg to Morris L. Ernest, 30 January 1940. For circulation, see Hertzberg to Edmund Wilson, 29 August 1941. For examples of endorsements, see Boake Carter to Hertzberg, 30 November 1939; Abraham Kaufman, War Resisters League, to Hertzberg, 15 October 1940; advertising executive William Benton to Hertzberg, 3 October 1940, Hertzberg Papers. 34. Major work on Thomas and the Socialist Party includes W. A. Swanberg, N orm an Thomas: The Last Idealist (NewYork: Scribner's, 1976); Bernard K. Johnpoll, Pacifist's Progress: Norm an Thomas and the Decline o f Am erican Socialism (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970); Stephen Mark Gens, "Paranoia Bor­ dering on Resignation: Norman Thomas and the American Socialist Party,” Ph.D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 1982; John Dennis McGreen, "Norman Thomas and the Search for an All-Inclusive So­ cialist Party,” Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1976. 35. Norman Thomas and Bertram D. Wolfe, Keep America O ut o f War: A Program (New York: Stokes, 1939), 145. Endorsements by anti-interventionists include Bruce Bliven, "KAOW,” N ew Republie 102 (18 March 1940): 385; "Books in a World at War,” Peace Action 6 (November 1939): 7. A second book, We Have a Future (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941), stressed how socialism could stop the nation's drift toward the conflict. 36. For the story of Ameringer and the Guardian, see James R. Green, Grass-Roots Socialism: Radi­ cal M ovem ents in the Southwest, 1845-1943 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978); I f You D on't Weaken: The Autobiography o f Oscar Am eringer (New York: Holt, 1940). For circulation, see Ayer's, 1941,780. For isolationism, see American Guardian, 19 January 1940,4. 37. "Revised Reds,” Time, 4 September 1939,11. For descriptions of the party's condition, see Har­ vey Klehr, The Heyday o f American Communism: The Depression Decade (NewYork: Basic Books, 1984); Maurice Isserman, W hich Side Were You On? The American C om m unist Party during the Second World War (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1982); Samuel Walker, "Communists and Isola­ tionism: The American Peace Mobilization, 1940-1941,” M aryland Historian 4 (Spring 1973): 1-12. 38. Clarence Hathaway, former semiprofessional baseball player and tool and die maker, served as editor. In mid-1940, in an effort to avoid possible suppression, it formally cut party ties and became published by the nominally independent "Freedom of the Press, Inc.” Louis F. Budenz, a labor jour­ nalist who joined the party in 1935, replaced Hathaway. At the time it had a daily circulation of dose to fifty thousand and seventy-two thousand on Sundays. Isserman, W hich Side, 72; Ayer's, 1941,676. Benjamin J. Davis Jr. and Harold G. Bolt were also listed as editors though Budenz ran day-to-day op­ erations. Hathaway was eventually expelled from the party. N Y T , 13 January 1941,1. 39. In November 1939, there were five editors: Crockett Johnson, A. B. Magil, Ruth McKenney, Joseph North, and Samuel Sillen. In 1940, it boasted a subscription of thirty-two thousand, pladng it slightly ahead of the New Republic See Ayer's, 1941,661. 40. George Seldes, Iron, Blood, and Profits: A n Exposure o f the W orld-W ide M unitions Racket (New York: Harper, 1934). For Seldes s own account of In Fact, see his Never Tired o f Protesting (New York: Stuart, 1968). 41. Editor Dan Gillmore, son of a retired admiral, denied he was a communist. Dan Gillmore,"A Reply to a Letter,” Friday, 4 April 1941,2. In 1940, circulation was 164,000. Ayer's, 1941,650. 42. It was staffed by former employees of the interventionist New York daily PM ; edited by Doris

Notes to Pages 6-7

335

Berger, daughter of a former socialist congressman from Milwaukee; and bankrolled by the William E. Dodd Foundation, a fund administered by two children of the former U.S. ambassador to Germany. See "Dodd’s Memorial,” Time, 31 March 1941,42-43. 43. For an able description of American Itotskyism, see Constance Ashton Myers, The Prophet’s Arm y: Trotskyists in America, 1928-1941 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1977). 44. For Partisan Review, see James Burkhart Gilbert, W riters and Partisans: A H istory o f Literary Radicalism in America (NewYork: Wiley, 1968); Michael Wreszin, A Rebel in Defense o f Tradition: The Life and Politics o f D w ight M acdonald (NewYork: Basic Books, 1994), chap. 5; Muresianu, War o f Ideas, 133-35. For Burnham, see The M anagerial Revolution (NewYork: Day, 1941); James Burnham, "Their Government,” Socialist Appeal, 20 October 1939,4. In February 1941, Socialist Appeal, which had been edited by Max Shachtman and Felix Morrow, became the M ilitant. For Draper, see "The Friends of the War Referendum,” N ew International 5 (October 1939): 302-5. 45. For an extensive treatment of Dennis, see chap. 4 of this book. For the history of the bulletin, see Justus D. Doenecke, “ Weekly Foreign Letter, 1938-1942,” in Lora and Longton, Conservative Press, 283-94. For German financial support, see Klaus Kipphan, Deutsche Propaganda in den Vereinigten Statten (Heidelberg: Winter 1971), 174-75. For Dennis on mass base, see WFL 127, (2 January 1941): 1-3; 232 (6 February 1941): 1-2. Among the newsletter’s subscribers were Oscar Ameringer, Harry Elmer Barnes, George T. Eggleston, H. L Mencken, Gerald R Nye, Albert Jay Nock, advertising execu­ tive Chester Bowles, international lawyer John Foster Dulles, pacifist leader Frederick J. Libby, pub­ lisher Porter Sargent, journalist Freda Utley, and German American propagandist George Sylvester Viereck. Subscription list, no date, Box 19, the Papers of Lawrence Dennis, Hoover Institution (here­ after cited as Dennis Papers). 46. There is no biography of Morrison. For brief portraits, see Justus D. Doenecke, "Charles Clayton Morrison,” in Biographical D ictionary o f M odem Peace Leaders, ed. Harold Josephson (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1985), 664-66; "Apostle in Print,” C hristian C entury 86 (16 March 1966), 323-25; "Voice of the Century,” Newsweek, 23 June 1947,72; Muresianu, War o f Ideas, 54-59. For the C hristian C entury and foreign policy, see Donald B. Meyer, The Protestant Search fo r Political Realism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), chap. 18. For peace views, see Morri­ son, The O utlaw ry o f War (Chicago: Willett, Clark 8c Colby, 1927). On pacifism, see Morrison, tes­ timony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,630; "Light amid Chaos,” C hristian C entury 57 (9 October 1940): 1241. For circulation, see A yer’s, 1941,212. 47. The best source on Holmes is his own autobiography, I Speak fo r M yself (New York: Harper, 1959). For brief scholarly accounts, see Charles D. Benedetti, "John Haynes Holmes,” in Biographical D ictionary o f M odem Peace Leaders, 422-44; Ralph E Luker, "John Haynes Holmes,” in D ictionary o f Am erican Biography: Supplem ent Seven, 355-57. U nitys circulation in 1940 was six hundred. Ayer’s, 1941,226. In April 1941, it became a monthly. At that time, interventionist managing editor Curtis W. Reece and thejournal’s directors took U nity out of Holmes’s hands, though Holmes continued to write anti-interventionist material under his own name. For Holmes's troubles with Unity, see John Haynes Holmes to Mrs. Helen B. Anthony, 24 April 1941; to editor, C hristian Leader, 6 June 1941; to Llewellyn Jones, 14 April 1941, the Papers of John Haynes Holmes, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as Holmes Papers). 48. George Q. Flynn, Roosevelt and Romanism: Catholics and Am erican Diplomacy, 1937-1945 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976), chap. 3. 49. Pound, "The Inedible: Russia Has It,” America 62 (9 March 1940): 593-94. For a brieftreatment, see Muresianu, War o f Ideas, 73-78, 151-55. America’s circulation was twenty-six thousand in 1941. Ayer’s, 1942,643. 50. There is no biography of Gillis. For brief sketches, see John Cogley, "James Martin Gillis,” in D ictionary o f Am erican Biography, Supplem ent Six, ed. John A. Garraty (New York: Scribner’s, 1980), 237-38; "Rev. James M(artin) Gillis,” in Current Biography, 1956, ed. Marjorie Dent Candee (NewYork: Wilson, 1957), 214-16; Muresianu, War o f Ideas, 78-82,155-58. 51. Beginning in 1938, Commonweal was edited by Philip Burnham and Edward Skillin Jr., who had taken over an ailing journal and raised its circulation to a modest fourteen thousand by 1941.

336

Notes to Page 8

Ayer's, 1942,651. For divisions among the staff, see Edward R. Skillin Jr. to Justus D. Doenecke, 20 Feb­ ruary 1970, in the author’s possession. For a history, see Rodger Van Allen, The Commonweal and American Catholicism: The Magazine, the M ovement, the M eaning (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974). See also Muresianu, War o f Ideas, 68-73, 149-51. On the editors, the only sketch existing is “Edward S. Skillin,” in Current Biography, 1949, ed. Anne Rothe (New York: Wilson, 1950), 572-74. 52. Standard works on Coughlin include Sheldon Marcus, Father Coughlin: The Tum ultuous Life o f the Priest o f the Little Flower (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); Charles J. Tull, Father Coughlin and the N ew Deal (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1965); Donald Warren, Radio Priest: Charles Coughlin, the Fäther o f H ate Radio (New York: Free Press, 1996). Circulation of Social Justice was steadily declin­ ing, from 228,000 in 1939 to less than 185,000 by 1940. Ayer's, 1940,441; Ayer's, 1942,451. On Jewish bankers, see Social Justice, 8August 1941,3; emphasis thejournal’s. For wider matters of anti-Semitism and anti-interventionism, see Cole, America First, chap. 8; Cole, Lindbergh, chap. 21; Doenecke, 1DU, 37-40, 390-401; Jonas, Isolationism in America, 253-56; and Edward S. Shapiro, “The Approach of War: Congressional Isolationism and Anti-Semitism, 1939-1941,” American Jewish H istory 74 (Sep­

tember 1984): 45-65. 53. For Barnes, see Marcus, Father Coughlin, 290; Richard Griffiths, Fellow Travellers o f the Right. British Enthusiasts fo r N azi Germany (London: Constable, 1980), 16-17. Barnes gives his own views in Fascism (New York: Holt, 1931). 54. The best history of interwar pacifism remains Charles Chatfield, For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1971). 55. Histories of the W1L include Carrie A. Foster, The Women and the Warriors: The U.S. Section o f the Women's International League fo r Peace and Freedom, 1915-1946 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Anne Marie Pois, “The Politics and Process of Organizing for Peace: The United Sûtes Section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 1919-1939,” Ph.D. diss., Univer­ sity of Colorado, 1988; Linda K. Schott, Reconstructing Women's Thoughts: The Women's International League fo r Peace and Freedom (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997). For Batch, see Mer­ cedes M. Randall, Improper Bostonian: Em ily Greene Balch (New York: IWayne, 1964). Detzer sorely needs a biographer. For preliminary work, see Rosemary Rainbolt, “Women and War in the United Sûtes: The Case of Dorothy Detzer, National Secretary W.I.LP.F.,” P eau and Change 4 (Fall 1977): 18-22; Rainbolt, “Dorothy Detzer,” in Biographical D ictionary o f M odem Peace Leaders, 210-12. For Detzer’s autobiography, see A ppointm ent on the H ill (NewYork: Holt, 1948). For membership, see “Re­ port of the National Organization Secretary to the Annual Meeting,” Pittsburgh, 27-30 April 1940, the Papers of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, American Section, Swarthmore College Peace Collection (hereafter cited as W1L Papers; SCPC). 56. For scholarly work on Libby and the NCPW, see George Peter Marabell, “Frederick J. Libby and the American Peace Movement, 1921-1941,” Ph.D. diss., Michigan Sute University, 1975; Justus D. Doenecke, “Frederick Joseph Libby," in Biographical D ictionary o f M odem Peace Leaders, 562-64. Libby tells his own story in To End War: The Story o f the N ational Council fo r the Prevention o f War (New York: Fellowship Publications, 1969). For Libby’s pacifism, see N YT, 6 February 1940,6. 57. For Sayre, see Charles F. Howlett, “John Nevin Sayre and the International Fellowship of Rec­ onciliation,” Peace and Change 15 (April 1990): 123-49. The best study of Muste is Joann Ooiman Robinson, Abraham W ent Out: A Biography o f A. /. M uste (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981 ), but for his views, see also A. J. Muste, Nonviolence in an Aggressive World (New York: Harper, 1940). Other contributors to Fellowship included Harold E. Fey, former educator in the Philippines and Sayre’s predecessor as Fellowship editor, and Kirby Page, a prolific author who published a ninety-three-page manual, How to Keep Am erica O ut o f War (pamphlet; Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee et al., 1939). For Page's life, see Charles Chatfield and Charles DeBenedetti, eds., Kirby Page and the Social Gospel: An Anthology (NewYork: Garland, 1976); Harold E. Fey, ed., Kirby Page, Social Evangelist: The Autobiography o f a Twentieth C entury Prophet fo r P ea u (Nyack, N.Y.: Fellowship, 1975). For membership, see minutes, executive committee, Fellowship of Reconciliation, 14 January 1941, 1, in the Papers of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, SCPC (here­ after cited as FOR Papers).

Notes to Pages 9-11

337

CHAPTER 1: WAR, PHONY A N D REAL

1. Chamberlain speech summary, NYT, 1 September 1939, 1,3; German response, 2. For Cham­ berlain’s text, see "Chamberlain Talk Announcing War,” NYT, 4 September 1939,8. 2. Former state department consul Ralph Townsend was almost alone in saying directly that Hitler might have had some justification for his invasion of Poland. Testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,810. 3. Gallup poll, 30 August 1939, in Hadley Cantril with Mildred Strunk, Public O pinion, 1935-1946 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), 1075. 4. Oswald Garrison Villard, "Men and Events: London Blackout," N ation 149 (16 September 1939): 293; "The War Guilt," Chicago Tribune (hereafter cited as CT). 4 September 1939,18. For a more modified opinion, see "The War the World Feared," CT, 2 September 1939,10. 5. "Polish Corridor an Imperialist Jungle," Calk 16 September 1939, 2; Lindbergh, testimony, House Foreign Affairs Committee (hereafter cited as HFAC), 23 January 1941, 378; "Peace Terms Now,” Common Sense 8 (October 1939): 16. 6. C. E. Black and E. C. Helmreich, Twentieth Century Europe, 3d ed. (NewYork: Knopf, 1966), 95. 7. For Wilson, see Congressman John M. Robsion (Rep.-Ky.), CR, 2 November 1939, 1925. For Lloyd George, see "The Fate of Poland," Christian Century 56 (20 September 1939): 1128; A. J. Muste, "At Versailles," Christian C entury 58 (28 May 1941): 727; Hearst, “In the New," San Francisco Exam ­ iner (hereafter cited as SF£), 20 September 1940,1; Nye, CR, 4 August 1941,6672; Wheeler, W illiams [College] Record, 15 April 1941,1. Social Justices foreign correspondent J. S. Barnes noted that most of the British delegation at the Paris peace conference—including Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, Sir Eyre Crow, and General Jan Christian Smuts-—opposed the Danzig/Corridor settlement. "The Real Issues of War," Social Justice, 9 October 1940,7. 8. Fish, CR, 9 Octoberl939,222; Edwin M. Borchard to James A. Shanley, 30 August 1939, the Pa­ pers of Edwin M. Borchard, Yale University Library (hereafter cited as Borchard Papers). See also Hugh Johnson, SFN, 5 July 1940,17; William R. Castle to Edwin M. Borchard, 13 December 1940; John Bas­ sett Moore to Edwin M. Borchard, 31 August 1939, Borchard Papers. Several months before war broke out, Borchard said that "Hitler has again been given a nearly perfect case to appear to the patriotism of the German people to break the barriers that England seeks to build around Germany." See Edwin M. Borchard to William P. Lage, 7 April 1939, Borchard Papers. For similar views of those more sym­ pathetic to fascism, see poet Ezra Pöund, "The Inedible: Russia Has It," America 62 (9 March 1940): 593-94; Social Justice, 4 September 1939, 7; Philip Johnson, "Poland's Choice Between War and Bol­ shevism Is a 'Deal* with Germany," Social Justice, 11 September 1939,4. 9. Arnold A. Offner, "The United States and National Socialist Germany," in The Fascist Challenge and the Policy o f Appeasem ent, ed. Wolfgang L Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker (London: Allen 8c Unwin, 1983), 415. 10. Cantril, Public O pinion, 1165. 11. P.M.H.Bell, The Origins o f the Second World War in Europe (London: Longman, 1986), 250-51. For Hitler's terms to Foreign Minister Beck as conveyed on 5 January 1939, see"The German Demands on Poland," in Docum ents on Nazism , 1919-1945, ed. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (NewYork: Viking, 1974), 55-58. For Hitler’s first public divulgence of his terms, see text of Reichstag address, N Y T , 29 April 1939,10. 12. For outright profascist views, see“After Peace, What?" Social Justice, 30 October 1939,9; George Sylvester Viereck, letter to editor. New York Herald Tribune, 27 September 1939, sect. 2,11. 13. Harry Elmer Barnes to "Mr. Elliott," 14 February 1940, Barnes Papers; Waldrop, "The Voice of the Victim,” W ashington Tim es-H erald (hereafter cited as W TH ), 8 July 1940,6. See also Freder­ ick J. Libby to Mrs. S. Foster Hunt, 1 June 1940, the Papers of the National Council for the Preven­ tion of War, SCPC (hereafter cited as NCPW Papers); pacifist journalist Devere Allen, "Who Is Re­ sponsible for the War?" Call, 14 October 1939, 1; Senator D. Worth Clark (Dem.-Idaho), CR, 16 October 1939,447. 14. "Chamberlain’s Statement," N Y T , 1 April 1939,3; “The Text of the British-Polish Treaty," N YT, 26 August 1939,4; Black and Helmreich, Twentieth Century Europe, 534.

338

Notes to Pages 11-12

15. The most thorough accounts of Fish's efforts are found in Hanks»“Hamilton Fish»" 163-95» and Troncone,“Fish," chap. 18. For Fishand French officials, see NYT, 13 August 1939»5. For his speech before Interparliamentary Union Conference, Oslo, 17 August 1939, see CR, A8-9. Fish was quoted as saying that “the great danger is that the Communists will provoke an incident in connection with Danzig to unleash war's furies.'' Nation 149 (19 August 1939): 183. See also NYT, 13 August 1939,5; NYT, 18 August 1939,4. 16. Fish, radio speech, NBC, 23 September 1939, in CR, A19-20. See also radio address, 18 April 1940, A2302. For Fish’s later blame on Roosevelt for pressuring Britain and France into war, see Hamil­ ton Fish, FDR: The O ther Side o f the Coin (New York: Vantage, 1976), 105-6. 17. Edwin M. Borchard to WilliamOrton, 28 August 1939, Borchard Papers; the diary of Felix Moriey, 2 September 1939, HHPL (hereafter cited as Moriey Diary); Anne Morrow Lindbergh, entry of 18 August 1939, War W ithin and W ithout, 3; Charles A. Lindbergh, entry of 24 August 1939, Wartime Journals, 245. 18. Hugh Johnson, “One Man's Opinion,** SFN, 5 July 1940,17. See also “Neville Chamberlain Dead,“ NYDN, 12 November 1940,25; William R. Castle to Edwin M. Borchard, 13 December 1940, Borchard Papers; the diary of William R. Castle, 1 September 1939, in Houghton Library, Harvard University, 28 February 1941 (hereafter cited as Castle Diary); Lawrence Dennis, WFL 93 (9 May 1940): 3; “The War Nobody Knows," Christian Century 56 (1 November 1939): 326; Congressman Harold Knutson (Rep.Minn.), CR, 6 October 1941, 7682; Frank C Waldrop, “Something in Common," W TH, 2 November 1939,13; Waldrop, “Who Are We to Condemn?" 3 July 1940,13; Waldrop, “The Voice of the Victim," 8 July 1940,6; William Henry Chamberlin, “France in June: The Collapse," Atlantic M onthly 166 (Septem­ ber 1940): 302; Charles A. Lindbergh, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,559; Moriey Diary, 2 Septem­ ber 1939; Gillis, “The War: What Else but the War?" Catholic World 150 (October 1939): 6. 19. Borah, CR, 2 October 1939,73. See also Hugh Johnson, “Deadly Blundering," N YW T, 19 Sep­ tember 1939,17; Hugh Johnson, “Join or Die," 23 January 1940,17; Harry Elmer Barnes to “Mr. El­ liott," 14 February 1940, Barnes Papers; Barnes, “Poland Victim of Exploiters," N YW T, 22 December 1939,12; D. Worth Clark, CR, 14 October 1939,447; John P. Delaney, “Stay Out of It!" America 61 (16 September 1939): 532-33; A. J. Muste to H. W. Foote, 28 October 1941, FOR Papers; Rep. Daniel Reed (Rep.-N.Y.), CR, 19 March 1941,2372; Senator Rush Holt (Dem.-W.Va.), CR, 18 October 1940,551; Nye, radio address, 30 September 1939, in CR, A83. 20. See, for example, attorney Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, 1 February 1939; publisher Frank E. Gannett to Amos Pinchot, 11 February 1939, the Papers of Amos Pinchot, Library of Congress (here­ after cited as Pinchot Papers); “Chamberlain Resigns," N YD N , 4 October 1940,37. 21. See, for example, Joseph P. Kennedy, radio speech, 29 October 1940, in CR, A6539; Chicago at­ torney Clay Judson, “Is This Our War?" n.d., Box 56, AFC Papers; General Robert E Wood to P. I. B. Lavan, 20 December 1940, AFC Papers; “Munich and After," CT, 22 November 1940,12; “But Boake Carter Says," SFE, 4 October 1940,17. At one point, Hugh Johnson, who had attacked the agreement, claimed that the Western powers were too weak to do anything else. “One Man’s Opinion," SFN, 13 De­ cember 1940,25; Joseph P. Kennedy in entry of 11 June 1940, George Bilainkin, D iary o f a D iplom atic Correspondent (London: Allen 8c Unwin, 1942), 105. 22. Dennis, WFL 117 (24 October 1940): 2. See also Dennis, WFL 85 (14 March 1940): 1,3; Den­ nis, The Dynamics o f War and Revolution (New York: Weekly Foreign Letter, 1940), 201-2. 23. Chamberlin,“France in June: The Collapse," 298. See also Chamberlin, Confessions, 264; Hearst, “In the News," SFE, 26 March 1940,1; “Political Consequences of the Nazi-Soviet Pact," Social Justice, 18 September 1939,7; memorandum of conversation, Herbert Hoover and Cordell Hull, 28 February 1941, the Papers of Herbert Hoover, HHPL (hereafter cited as Hoover Papers); Stanton B. Leeds, “The Lesson of France," Scribner’s Com m entator 8 (April 1941): 64. 24. For those parts of the treaty made public, see “Text of the Beriin-Moscow Treaty," NYT, 24 Au­ gust 1939,1. For the nonpublished terms, see “Secret Additional Protocol," in World War II Policy and Strategy: Selected Documents w ith Commentary, ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Arthur L. Smith Jr. (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1979), 25-26. 25. Browder quoted in “Children of Moscow," Time, 18 September 1939,12; Draper, “The Case of the Stupid Statesmen," New Masses 32 (5 September 1939): 3. In contrast, James Burnham, Trotskyist professor of philosophy at New York University, called the pact a definite capitulation to Hitler, who

Notes to Pages 12-13

339

received more advantages than the Soviet Union. It resulted from the determination of the Russian bu­ reaucracy to destroy minority opposition and seize land. Burnham» W ashington Square College [New York University] Bulletin, 23 October 1939» 4. 26. Coughlin»“What of the Future?” broadcast dated 27 August 1939» in Social Justice, 4 September 1939» 15. See also Father Edward Lodge Curran» address at Cincinnati» Social Justice, 25 August 1939, 3; Curran, “Here and There,” Social Justice, 4 September 1939» 4. For earlier anxiety, see “What Is the Cost?” Social Justice, 12 June 1939,6. 27. “How’s the Nerves» Buddy?” N YD N , 31 August 1939,25. See also “Surprise from Stalin,” NYDN, 23 August 1939,31; Dennis and Gravenhoff, WFL 56 (25 August 1939): 2. Dennis and Gravenhoff also predicted that the alliance would lead to “a let-up” on Germany's Jews, lews were no longer needed as scapegoats once the British and capitalists were playing its role. WFL 64 (19 October 1939): 5. 28. Borah, CR, 2 October 1939,73; Barnes, “Russian Tie-up with Nazis,” N YW T, 3 October 1939, 18; Barnes, “Russian Pact with Nazis,” N Y W T , 20 October 1939,26. Barnes cited with approval foreign correspondent lohn Gunther, “Behind the Pact,” Living Age 357 (October 1939): 122-25. 29. “Surprise from Stalin,” N YD N , 23 August 1939,31. See also “Status Quo Ante 1914,” NYDN, 25 August 1939,25. 30. Johnson, “Deadly Blundering,” N Y W T, 19 September 1939, 17. See also Villard, “Issues and Men,” N ation 149 (19 September 1939): 499. 31. “What the Hitler Stalin Pact Means for the World,” Social Justice, 4 September 1939,7. See also Coughlin, “A Statement to the Press,” 4 September 1939,1; “Political Consequences of the Nazi-Soviet Pact,” 18 September 1939,7. 32. Lloyd George, D aily Worker, 29 September 1939, 2; Shaw, 21 September 1939, 1. On Lloyd George, see also draft memo, 29 September 1939, Box 276, the Papers of Ernest Lundeen, Hoover In­ stitution (hereafter cited as Lundeen Papers). For Lloyd George’s statement, see NYT, 28 September 1939,5. For Shaw, see NYT, 20 September 1939,8. 33. For samples of outrage, see Waldrop, “No Surprise in Red Attack on Poland,” W TH , 28 Sep­ tember 1939,7; “Behind the Bombers' Curtain,” W TH , 20August 1940,10; “What Stalin Has Lost” New Republic 101 (27 September 1939): 197; “Russia Shakes the World,” New Republic 101 (27 September 1939), 200-201. 34. John Bassett Moore to Edwin M. Borchard, 11 October 1939, Borchard Papers; “British Diplo­ macy and the War,” N YD N , 24 September 1939, 15; “The Social Revolution,” 29 September 1939,35; “Stalin Cuts Himself Another Piece of Cake,” 4 October 1939,39; “Red 'Missionaries’ in Poland,” 19 October 1939,35; “Tragic Poland,” 25 January 1940,27. For an attack on a recent trade treaty with the Soviets, see “What about Russia?” CT, 25 October 1939,14. 35. “What about Russia?” CT, 25 October 1939,14; James Gillis, “What Are They Fighting For?” Catholic World 150 (December 1939): 259; Chester Bowles to Philip La Follette, 28 September 1939, the Papers of Philip La Follette, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin (hereafter cited as Philip La Follette Papers); Ben Mardn [pseud.], “Fight Bolshevism at Home Before Fighting It Abroad,” Social Justice, 160ctober 1939,3; D. Worth Clark, CR, 24 February 1941,1296; John P. De­ laney, “Why Fight in Their War? Why?” America 62 (14 October 1939): 6. Of the more mainline anti­ interventionists, retired diplomat William R. Castle took a different position, claiming that such a dec­ laration of war would get England and France “nowhere” and might do much damage. Castle Diary, 18 September 1939. See also C. Hartley Grattan, “The Struggle for Peace,” H arper’s M agazine 180 (Feb­ ruary 1940): 300-301. According to Ezra Pöund, no force could get Russia out of eastern Poland in a hundred years. “The Inedible: Russia Has It,” America 62 (9 March 1940): 594. 36. “Britain Approves Russia’s Polish Grab,” Christian Century 56 (8 November 1939): 1363. See also “The War Nobody Knows,” Christian Century 56 (1 November 1939): 1327; Congressman John Rankin (Dem.-Miss.), CR, 1 November 1939,1172. For an attack on Halifax, see Frank Waldrop, “Something in Common,” W TH , 2 November 1939,13. For Halifax's own statement, see NYT, 27 October 1939,2. 37. Norman Thomas to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 23 September 1939, Thomas Papers; Norman Thomas, “YourWorld and Mine,” Call, 11 November 1939,2. For a similar comment about better conditions under Soviet rule, see “Russia Shakes the World,” New Republic 101 (27 September 1939): 200-201.

340

Notes to Pages 13-14

38. See, for example, John Bassett Moore to George H. Ryden, 19 September 1939, Moore Papers. 39. Congressman Lewis D. Thill (Rep.-Wis.), CR, 30 October 1939,595. Davis, CR, 4 March 1940, 2290; Fish, CR, 9 October 1939,222; Lindbergh, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,511; D aily Worker, 5 September 1939,6. 40. See, for example, “Remember Poland,” America 62 ( 10 February 1940): 491; “Atrocities: 1940” Catholic World 150 (March 1940): 641; James McCawley, “Atrocities—Fact and Fiction,” Catholic World, 152 (September 1940): 724-28. 41. On Warsaw, see “Causes, Effects and Potentialities of Christian Poland’s Assassination,” Social Justice, 2 October 1939, 15. On Hitler, see 6. For acknowledgment of German atrocities, see 25 No­ vember 1940,12. For other manifestations of sympathy with Poland, see 16 October 1939,20; 23 Oc­ tober 1939,17; 4 March 1940,16; “Poland—A ‘Lost’ People,” 31 March 1941,9. 42. See, for example, Holmes, “The Plight of the Jews,” U nity 124 (1 January 1940): 137; Devere Allen, “Chaos in Conquered Poland,” U nity 125 (18 March 1940): 26; Frank C. Waldrop, "This Winter in Poland,” W TH , 4 December 1939,7; writer Milton Mayer, “I Think I’ll Sit This One Out,” Saturday Evening Post 212 (7 October 1939): 97. 43. Villard, “Issues and Men: The Latest Anti-Jewish Horror,” N ation 149 (December 1939): 735. Moreover, he said, every Jew in Germany or Czechoslovakia “sits in his home expecting with every ring of the doorbell that his death sentence has arrived.” Villard, N YT, 6 January 1940,12. 44. Johnson, “Polish Jews,” N Y W T, 11 January 1940,13. See also Johnson, “One Man’s Opinion,” SFN, 1 February 1940,13. 45. Hoover, CT, 12 February 1941,5. 46. Dorothy Detzer to Emily Greene Balch, 4 November 1939, W1L Papers. Borchard accused William C. Bullitt, American ambassador to France, of telling Anthony J. Drexel Biddle Jr., U.S. am­ bassador to Poland, to exaggerate atrocity stories so as to influence the congressional debates on neu­ trality legislation. Edwin M. Borchard to William E. Borah, 29 September 1939, Borchard Papers. For another suspicion of atrocity accounts in Poland, see Fish, radio address, 18 April 1940, in CR, A2302. 47. “New Books,” Catholic World 152 (November 1940): 253. 48. See, for example, John Haynes Holmes to Harry Ward, 31 October 1939, Holmes Papers; “Pol­ ish Persecution,” Uncensored 19 (10 February 1940): 2. 49. Wheeler, CR, 11 October 1939,287. See also John Haynes Holmes, “A Holy War!” U nity 124 (6 November 1939): 67; “Europe’s Fateful Hour,” Christian C entury 56 (6 September 1939): 1063; Harry Elmer Barnes, “War Held No Armageddon,” N Y W T, 27 October 1939,26. 50. See, for example, Upton Close [Josef Washington Hall], “Common Sense for Americans,” Liv­ ing Age 55% (August 1940): 511; “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 16 September 1939,13; “To the Brink,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 11 June 1940. 51. Harry Elmer Barnes, “Poland Victim of Exploiters,” N YW T, 22 December 1939,12, citing Max Nomad [Max Podolsky], “Poland Without a Halo,” American M ercury 48 (December 1939): 442-48. Barnes’s column was endorsed by the dissident TVotskyite Max Schactman. See “In This Comer,” So­ cialist Appeal 4 (6 January 1940): 3. See also Barnes, “World’s Fate in Balance,” N Y W T , 13 October 1939,2. 52. “The Fate of Poland,” Christian C entury 56 (20 September 1939): 1128. See also Flynn, “Other People’s Money: First-Person Singular,” New Republic 101 (6 September 1939): 131. 53. Lillian Symes to Oscar Lange, 7 November 1939, Thomas Papers. 54. “The Fate of Poland,” Christian Century 56 (20 September 1939): 1128. See also Dorothy Det­ zer to Mrs. Robert E. Park, 1 November 1939, WIL Papers. 55. Robsion, CR, 2 November 1939,1296. 56. Barnes, “Poland Victim of Exploiters,” N YW T, 22 December 1939, 12. See also Harry Elmer Barnes to “Mr. Elliott,” 14 February 1940, Barnes Papers; “Realism and the Coming Peace TYeaty,” Christian C entury 58 (9 April 1941): 485. 57. H. L. Mencken, “Notes on a Moral War,” B altim ore Sun, 8 October 1939. See also “Dying for Danzig,” CT, 22 September 1939, 14; “What Hinders Peace?” C hristian C entury 56 (18 October 1939): 1264.

Notes to Pages 14-15

341

58. McCormick, address to American Legion banquet, CT, 26 September 1939,4. For additional at­ tacks on Britain, see Social Justice* 2 October 1939,4; Coughlin, “From the Tower,” Social Justice* 25 September 1939, 5; Theodore Draper, “Hanging the Kaiser in 1940,” New Masses 34 (20 February 1940): 7. 59. Kennedy in William C. Rock, Chamberlain and Roosevelt: British Foreign Policy and the U nited States, 1937-1940 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press), 236; H. L Mencken, “Notes on a Moral War,” Baltim ore Sun* 8 October 1939. 60. Barton, CR* 18 June 1940,8545. For similar views, see Senator Bennett Champ Gark (Dem.Mo.), 14 October 1939,402; Waldrop, “The Help That Never Came,” WTH* 8 October 1939, C13; Den­ nis and Gravenhoff, WFL 60 (21 September 1939): 2-3; Senator Lynn D. Frazier (Rep.-N.Dak.), CR* 14 October 1939,402. In March 1940, the Chicago Tribune conceded that it might have been impossible for Poland's allies to come to its aid, though the Poles should not have been led to believe such aid was possible. See “Reproaches from Mr. Stanley,” 24 March 1940,14. 61. For Hoover’s activities, see George J. Lerski, comp., H erbert Hoover andPoland: A Docum entary H istory o f a Friendship (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 43-45, 101-12; Hal Elliott Wert, “The Specter of Starvation: Hoover, Roosevelt, and American Aid to Europe, 1939-1941,” Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1991, chap. 1. See also Wert, “U.S. Aid to Pôles Under Nazi Domination, 1939-1940,” H istorian 57 (Spring 1995): 511-24; Castle Diary, 29 February 1940,27 March 1940,16 April 1940. 62. Wiley, CR*9 February 1940,1288; Fish, CR* 24 January 1940,643. 63. See, for example. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (Rep.-Mich.), CR* 4 October 1939, 104; William J. Bulow (Dem.-S.Dak.), CR* 12 October 1939, 313; “The Defense of Warsaw,” CT, 24 Sep­ tember 1939,1; “Lessons from Poland,” CT* 17 September 1939,16; “Pôland Will Rise Again,” N ew Republic 101 (4 October 1939): 227. For less optimistic views, see “What About Russia?” CT* 15 October 1939,14; Delaney, “Why Fight in Their War? Why?” America 62 (14 October 1939): 6; “To the Editor and the Readers,” America 62 (6 January 1940): 343. 64. Thill, CR* 30 October 1939,595. 65. “Not Our War,” CT* 2 September 1939, 10. The independent socialist weekly American Guardian considered the editorial important enough to put some of it on page 1 with approval. Issue of 8 September 1939. 66. Taft, “Nonpartisanship in Domestic and Foreign Policy, “ speech at Milwaukee, 19 January 1940, in CR* A364. For a similar view, see John P. Delaney, “Stay Out of It!” America 61(16 September 1939): 532-33. 67. Fortune poll of October 1939, Cantril, Public Opinion* 1185. For related polls, see 1185. 68. See, for example, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Rep.-Mass.), CR* 10 October 1939,39; Lodge, speech to NewYork Herald Tribune Forum, 16 October 1939, in CR* A553; “Who Will Win?” N ew Re­ public 101 (13 September 1939): 145, quoting military writer George Fielding Eliot; Amos Pinchot to “Ranny" [Randolph Walker], 29 September 1939, Pinchot Papers. 69. Johnson, “One Man’s Opinion,” SFN* 8 November 1939,17. 70. “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE* 9 September 1939, sect. SF, 3. See also Senator Sheridan Downey (Dem.-Calif.), CR* 6 October 1939,171; Hoover, interview with Roy Howard dated 3 October 1939, in CR* 13 October 1939,366 (hereafter cited as Hoover, Roy Howard interview). 71. Hoover and Lindbergh in Lindbergh entry of 2 October 1939, W artim e Journals, 269; Lind­ bergh in Castle Diary, 2 September 1939. See also Senator Edwin C. Johnson (Dem.-Colo.), speech de­ livered Mutual, Minneapolis, entered CR* 28 September 1939, A62; Dennis and Gravenhoff, WFL 65 (26 October 1939): 1. 72. Hoover, Roy Howard interview. For a similar view, see Congressman Robsion, CR* 2 November 1939,1296. 73. “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE* 9 October 1939,13. For further confidence in Allied air power, see Downey, CR* 6 October 1939,171. 74. Lindbergh, entry of 22 October 1939, W artim e Journals* 280. Lindbergh added that he had long been convinced that the Germans would have soon complete supremacy of the air and “hold about the

342

Notes to Pages 15-16

same place in European air that England held on European seas* Indeed, he felt it desirable that Ger­ many regain strength, for he found a strong Germany was essential to the welfare of Europe. He did not like to see England fall so far behind in air strength, because he regarded “a strong British Empire essential to world stability." 75. Hugh Johnson, "War Stalemate," N Y W T, 13 October 1939,25. 76. "Guide to the War," CT, 3 September 1939,6. The Tribune did concede that though air power might not be decisive within the first thirty days, it might prove so in the final outcome, for the nation that controlled the air would know of enemy movements. For similar stress on ground protection, see Hoover, Roy Howard interview. 77. Dennis and Gravenhoff, WFL 73 (21 December 1939): 2-3; WFL 68 (16 November 1939): 2; WFL 79 (1 February 1940): 2. 78. "But Boake Carter Says," SFE, 20 September 1939, sect SF, 3. For similar views, see historian Eric F. Goldman, Johns H opkins Newsletter,, 10 November 1939,1; John T. Flynn, "Economic Odds on the Allies," N YW T, 12 December 1939,22. 79. Hoover, Roy Howard interview. See also Thill, CR, 3 November 1939,815. 80. "The Unlimited Claim to Relief," Commonweal 30 (13 October 1939): 545; Raymond Moley to H. C. Chatfield-Taylor, 16 December 1939, the Papers of Raymond Moley, Hoover Institution (here­ after cited as Moley Papers). 81. See, for example, "Inside Germany," Uncensored 2 ( 14 October 1939); “Who Will Win?" New Re­ public 101 (13 September 1939): 146; Edwin M. Borchard to Leslie H. Thompson, 12 October 1939, Borchard Papers. For a dissenting picture stressing German prosperity, see Porter, Bulletin #22,15 De­ cember 1939; Sargent, G etting US into War (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1941), 198,208 n. 4. 82. See, for example, Hugh Johnson, speech to Veterans of Foreign Wars, SFE, 9 October 1939,11; Hiram Johnson, CR, 20 October 1939,631; sermon of Harry Emerson Fosdick, Riverside Church, New York, 1 October 1939, CR, A339. 83. Taft, CR, 13 October 1939,356. See also Taft speech, Vienna, Illinois, 20 September 1939, A76; "Nonpartisanship in Foreign and Domestic Policy," speech at Milwaukee, 19 January 1940, A364. 84. Reynolds, CR, 21 October 1939,698. 85. For Caesar, see Congresswoman Jessie Sumner (Rep.-lll.), CR, 1 November 1939,1258; Con­ gressman Knute Hill (Dem.-Wash.), CR, 13 November 1941,8857. For Napoleon, see Hiram Johnson in CR, 20 October 1939,631; B. C. Clark, CR, 17 February 1941,1044; Hill, CR, 13 November 1941, 8857; Taft, "Shall the United States Enter the European War?" radio address, 17 May 1941, in CR, A2344; A. J. Muste, “A Plea to Enlist," Fellowship 6 (September 1940): 103. 86. For skepticism concerning any German revolution, see "The Indian Summer of This War," CT, 19 November 1939,12. 87. Flynn, "War Economy Vital Factor," N YW T, 20 September 1939,22. See also Flynn, "Other Peo­ ple’s Money: War on the Home Front," New Republic 101 (30 September 1939): 188. 88. Bulow, CR, 12 October 1939,312; Barton, CR, 26 October 1939,1163; "But Boake Carter Says," SFE, 20 September 1939, Sect. SF, 3. Anne Morrow Lindbergh was one anti-interventionist who chal­ lenged any idea of internal collapse. See entry of 9 September 1939, War W ithin, 51. See also "How Long Will the War Last?" N YD N , 7 September 1939,33, which pointed to a strong German general staff and the Soviet alliance. 89. See, for example, "Oswald Garrison Villard on the Present European Situation," attached to NCPW minutes, 20 December 1939, NCPW Papers; "Issues and Men: Germany Has Power," N ation 149 (25 November 1939): 582; "Issues and Men: Communism from Above," N ation 149 (16 December 1939): 681; “My Four Weeks in Nazi Germany," Look, 12 March 1940,14-19; D aily Northwestern, 14 February 1940, 1-2. For reference to his meeting with Roosevelt, see Oswald Garrison Villard to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 7 January 1940, the Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Roosevelt Presidential Li­ brary, Hyde Park, New York (hereafter cited as Roosevelt Papers). 90. Villard, Yale Daily News, 31 January 1940,1,3. 91. Oswald Garrison Villard, Within Germany (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940). For praise, see Margaret Marshall, "Faith, Hope, and Clarity," Nation 150 (2 March 1940): 312; unsigned.

Notes to Pages 16-18

343

N Y T Book Review, 18 February 1940,6; John C DeWilde, "Behind the Westwall,** Saturday Review o f Literature, 17 February 1940, 15; Bruce Bliven, "Behind the Westwall,**New Republic 102 (25 March 1940): 416; Joseph Barnes, New York Herald Tribune Book Review, 11 February 1940,6; Porter Sargent

to Oswald Garrison Villard, 3 August 1940, the Papers of Oswald Garrison Villard, Harvard University (hereafter cited as Villard). Tim e printed a summary of the book with no editorial comment See"Lib­ eral Among Nazis," 29 January 1940,28. 92. See, for example, "Our Army," Call, 11 November 1939,4; Lillian Symes to Oscar Lange, 7 No­ vember 1939, Thomas Papers. For the claim that Germany could only be changed by revolution, see Faul Porter, "The Struggle of the Empires," Call, 23 September 1939,2. 93. Thomas, "Your World and Mine," Call, 2 December 1939,2; “Tragic Poland,” N YD N , 25 Janu­ ary 1940,27. 94. See, for example, "Can England Lick Germany in an Offensive War?" N YD N , 21 September 1939,37. 95. Hoover, Roy Howard interview; Hoover and Lindbergh in Lindbergh, entries of 2 October 1939, W artim e Journals, 269; Lindbergh in Castle Diary, 2 September 1939; Hearst tfIn the News,” SFE, 26 March 1940,1. 96. See, for example, Nye, CR, 13 October 1939, 365; Congressman Roy O. Woodruff (Rep.Mich.), 13 October 1939,387; Congressman James A. Shanley (Dem.-Conn.), CR, 31 October 1939, 1116; Norman Thomas to George V. Denny, 30 March 1940, Thomas Papers; Libby, "Shall We Try to Stop the War in Europe?" Peace Action 6 (March 1940): 1, based on "The Periscope," Newsweek, 18 March 1940,11; "Invincible Unde Sam," N YD N , 7 April 1940,43; "The First WorldWar,” S t Louis PostDispatch, 31 March 1940; "Nazi Aims," Uncensored 21 (24 February 1940): 4. 97. Rankin, CR, 23 October 1939,762. See also Frazier, CR, 13 October 1939,401; B. C Gark, CR, 14 October 1939,402; Reynolds, CR, 21 October 1939,692. 98. Johnson, speech delivered Mutual, Minneapolis, in CR, 28 September 1939, A62. 99. "Allies Can Win,” N YD N , 22 December 1939, 23. See also “A War to Finality," 4 September 1939,21; “The Third Quarter Is the Hardest," 9 September 1939,15; “A Christmas Truce—Why Not?" 22 November 1939,37. In March, it claimed the Allies had an even chance of winning a long conflict "Will the Allies Win?" 11 March 1940,21. 100. Hugh Johnson, “Where Are We?" N YW T, 20 September 1939, 25; Dennis and Gravenhoft, WFL 65 (26 October 1939): 1; WFL 68 (16 November 1939): 2. 101. "Finland Falls: But War Is Not Yet Over," SFE, 16 May 1940,8; Borah, N YT, 19 September 1939, 13; Johnson, “One Man's Opinion," SFN, 28 February 1940, 13; Ameringer, "What Price Plutocracy?" American Guardian, 22 September 1939,4. See also “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 16 March 1940,9. 102. One anti-interventionist, however, did not believe the phony war could last Charles A. Lind­ bergh feared heavy losses. Anne Morrow Lindbergh, entry of 20 September 1939, War W ithin, 60. 103. Frazier, CR, 13 October 1939,401; Bruce Bliven,"I Like a Phony War,” New Republic 150 (18 October 1939): 291-92. See also Lillian Symes to Oscar Lange, 11 November 1939, Thomas Papers. 104. See, for example, Fred L Israel, ed., The War D iary o f Breckinridge Long: Selection from the Years 1939-1944 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 10, 13; Long in Rock, Churchill and Roosevelt, 236; Joseph P. Kennedy to Roosevelt, 30 September 1939, in William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation: The World Crisis o f 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper 8c Brothers, 1952), 252; Kennedy to Hull, 12 September 1939, in Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1939, vol. 1: General (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 551-52. For an exception, see William C. Bullitt, entry of 11 February 1940, in The Secret D iary o f Harold L Ickes, vol. 3: The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon 8c Schuster, 1954), 133. 105. Stark in Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939-1941: The Partnership That Saved the West (NewYork: Norton, 1976), 87. 106. Hull in Breckinridge Long, entry of 2 September 1939, War Diary, 1. 107. Berle, entry of 23 March 1940, Navigating, 299; Long, entry of 23 March 1940, War Diary, 71; Ickes, entry of 26 August 1939, in The Secret D iary o f Harold L Ickes, vol. 2: The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon 8c Schuster, 1954), 704.

344

Notes to Pages 18-19

108. Ickes, entry of 11 November 1939, Secret Diary* 3:60. 109. Roosevelt in Ickes, entry of 14 October 1939, Secret Diary* 3:37; David Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941: A Study in Com petitive Co-operation (Chapel Hill: Univer­ sity of North Carolina Press, 1982), 67. 110. David Reynolds, **1940: Fulcrum of the Twentieth Century," International Affairs 66 (April 1990): 329. 111. Norman Thomas to lohn Newton Thurber, 8 September 1939,Thomas Papers; Rankin, C R ,9 October 1939,210. See also Reynolds, CR, 21 October 1939,692; “Peace Terms Now," Com m on Sense 8 (October 1939): 16-17. 112. See for example, Barnes, “U.S. Held Key to War Course," N Y W T, 11 October 1939,32; Hugh lohnson, “One Man's Opinion," SFN, 10 October 1939,13. 113. SFE, 14 October 1939,15. It continued that offsetting this possibility were White House as­ surances to the Allies pledging fiili American support. 114. For armistice report and French troops, see Barton, CR, 1 November 1939,1163. For British agents, see C hristian Century 56 (6 December 1939): 1491. For G raf Spec, see SFE, 25 December 1939, 15. The two British agents hoped to make contact with dissident figures in the German military. John Costello, Ten Days to Destiny: The Secret Story o f the Hess Peace Initiative and British Efforts to Strike a Deal w ith H itler (NewYork: Morrow, 1991 ), 64,533 n. 38. 115. Borah, W TH , 3 February 1940,2. See also Castle Diary, 26 September 1939. 116. Hoover in Lindbergh, 2 October 1939, W artim e Journals, 269. See also fames Burnham, “Their Government," Socialist Appeal, 10 November 1939,4; Roy W. Howard to Nelson T. Johnson, 19 Janu­ ary 1940, Howard Papers; Libby, “Immediate Mediation the Hope of the World," Peace Action 6 (Jan­ uary 1940): 1, drawing on British ambassador Lothian's speech to Chicago Council of Foreign Rela­ tions, N YT, 5 January 1940,4; military writer Hanson Baldwin, “Factors Are Forming to Prevent War Deadlock," N YT, 7 January 1940,4E; Porter Sargent, Bulletin #22,15 December 1939, G etting US into War, 205-6. 117. Anne Morrow Lindbergh, entry of 3 September 1939, War W ithin, 47-48, quotation on page 48; Charles A. Lindbergh, entry of 1 September 1939, W artim e Journals, 249; Villard, “Issues and Men: Will Hider Strike at England?" N ation 150 (16 March 1940): 366. See also Villard, “Issues and Men: Germany Has Power," N ation 149 (25 November 1939): 581; Villard, Yale D aily News, 31 January 1940, 1; “Villard Says Germans Are Confident," Progressive, 4 May 1940,3. 118. “War on TWo Fronts," N YD N , 14 February 1940,29. See also “Now for the Real War—Maybe,” N YD N , 5 April 1940,31; Dennis and Gravenhoff, WFL 85 (14 March 1940): 5. 119. See, for example, Joseph P. Kennedy to Roosevelt, 30 September 1939, in Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 252; report of Kennedy to army and navy officers, 15 December 1939, in Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 345; Patrick J. Hearden, “Cudahy," 108. Such anxieties were not limited to anti-interventionists. See diary entry, 3 September 1939, in Claude Denson Pepper with Hays Gorey, Eyewitness to a C entury (NewYork: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), 92. 120. Anne Morrow Lindbergh, “A Prayer for Peace," Reader's Digest 36 (January 1940): 5. 121. See, for example, Reynolds, CR, 21 October 1939,691; SFE, 10 October 1939,1,6, quoting George Bernard Shaw; Waldrop, “Who Is Now Boss in the Balkans?" W TH , 18 March 1940,7; Den­ nis and Gravenhoff, WFL 60 (21 September 1939): 6. By late October, Dennis and Gravenhoff were suspecting that Germany and Russia might well have decided on an eventual partition of the Balkans. Involved might be a swift Russian war against Turkey. WFL 65 (26 October 1939): 6. Once the Finnish crisis took place, Dennis and Gravenhoff found Stalin in Hitler’s power. WFL 75 (4 Jan­ uary 1940): 2. 122. “The Winner, Red Josef," CT, 10 March 1940, 12. On 17 November 1939, the Tribune also printed a Shaw article saying that the two neutrals, the United States and Russia, were the war’s real winners. CT, 1,9. For other claims that Russia had won or would win the war, see also Delaney, “Why Fight in Their War? Why?" America 62 (14 October 1939): 6; Chicago investor Sterling Morton, ad­ dress to Illinois Manufacturers Association, 13 October 1939, the Papers of Sterling Morton, Chicago Historical Society (hereafter cited as Morton Papers); Barton, CR, 1 November 1939,1163.

Notes to Pages 19-21

345

123. See, for example, “The Partition of Poland,” New Republic 101 (4 October 1939): 230; Bliven, “I Like a Phony War,” 291; Ameringer, American Guardian, 13 October 1939,1. 124. Thomas, Wesleyan [University] Argus, 12 October 1939,4. 125. See, for example, “Peace Talk,” N YD N , 30 September 1939,17; Senator Dennis Chavez (Dem.N.Mex.), CR, 25 October 1939,826; Hugh Johnson,“One Man’s Opinion,” SFN , 8 November 1939,17; Hugh Johnson, “If Hitler Wins, America Will Be Next—‘Bunk*,” Look, 21 November 1939, 13-15. When a United Press report from London noted that Britain and the exiled Polish government would not ask Russia to restore the Polish territory it grabbed, the New York D ally News asked if the Allies in­ tended to destroy Hitlerism and bolster Stalinism. “What Are the Allies’ War Aims?” 21 October 1939, 15. 126. “Oswald Garrison Villard on the Present European Situation,” attached to NCPW minutes, 20 December 1939, NCPW Papers; Ickes, entry of 4 February 1940, Secret D iary, 3:123. 127. Knickerbocker lecture quoted in American Guardian, 15 December 1939,2. See also SFE, 11 October 1939, sect SF, 5. 128. Hamilton Fish, radio speech of 27 November 1939, as reprinted in Fish, The Red Plotters (New York: Domestic and Foreign Affairs Publishers, 1947), 37. See also Robert A. Taft, Congressional Digest 18 (October 1939): 245; D. W. Clark, CR, 16 October 1939,448. 129. See, for example, “Retrospect,” Christian C entury 56 (27 December 1939): 1598; Fish, CR, 1 November 1939,1170; Fish, speech, NBC, 28 October 1939, in CT, 701; entry of 28 September 1939, revisionist writer Francis Neilson, The Tragedy o f Europe: A D ay-to-D ay Com m entary o f the Second World War, 5 vols. (Appleton, Wis.: C. C. Nelson, 1940-46), 1:79; Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, [City Col­ lege of NewYork] Campus, 10 November 1939,1. 130. Reynolds, CR, 21 October 1939,691. For other predictions of designs on India, see J.S. Barnes, “Big Drive to India Soviet Aim in 1940,” Social Justice, 8 January 1940,3,18. See also J. S. Barnes, “Pos­ sible Developments of the War in Europe,” Social Justice, 26 February 1940,9; J. S. Barnes, “The Situa­ tion in India,” Social Justice, 13; Dennis and Gravenhoff, WFL 70 (30 November 1939): 4. 131. Dondero, CR, 31 October 1939,1133; Norman Thomas to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 8 October 1939, Thomas papers; “Stalin Is 59,” N YD N , 14 October 1939,15. For other News comments concern­ ing the Soviet Union, see “Stalin Cuts Himself Another Piece of Cake,” 4 October 1939,39; “The Dry Peter the Great,” 10 October 1939, 29; “The War on the Neutral Fronts,” 24 November 1939,49; “As We’ve Said Before—,” 2 December 1939,15; “Stalin is 60, Hider Is 50,” 22 December 1939,33. 132. Ben Marcin [pseud, for Social Justice staff], “Fight Bolshevism at Home Before Fighting It Abroad,” Social Justice, 16 October 1939, 3; Social Justice, 20 November 1939, 3. See also J. S. Barnes, Social Justice, 9 October 1939, 7. For the fictitious use of name “Ben Marcin,” see Marcus, Father Coughlin, 254. 133. See, for example, Breckinridge Long, entries of 26 September 1939, War Diary, 20; 5 October 1939,24-25; 11 October 1939,26-27. See also entry of 1 September 1939 in Nancy Harvison Hooker, ed., The M offat Papers: Selections from the Diplom atic Journals o f Jay Pierrepont M offat, İ9İ9-İ943 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), 261. 134. Ickes, entry of 14 October 1939, Secret Diary, 3:37. 135. Ickes, entry of 13 September 1939, Navigating, 254. See also 3 March 1940, 292; 21 March 1940,297. 136. Lippmann quoted in Thomas R. Maddux, Years o f Estrangement. American Relations w ith the Soviet Union, 1935-1941 (Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1980), 107; Roosevelt to Joseph P. Kennedy, 30 October 1939, in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, ed. Elliott Roosevelt (NewYork: Duell, Sloan 8c Pearce), 949. CHAPTER 2: EARLY HOPES FOR PEACE

1. N YT, 7

“Text of Chancellor Adolf Hider’s Address on His War Aims Before the German Reichstag,” October 1939,8. See also “Text of Hider’s War Relief Speech,” Berlin, N YT, 11 October 1939,4.

346

Notes to Pages 21-22

2. Norman Thomas to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 8 October 1939, Thomas Papers; Holmes, "Anti-war Sentiment,** U nity 124 (20 November 1939): 88; Holmes, “How Long Will This War Go On?" U nity 124 (4 December 1939): 103; Fey, "America’s Greatest Opportunity," Fellowship 5 (November 1939): 3. For a more cautious statement of Thomas, see Wesleyan (University] Argus, 12 October 1939,1. 3. "What Hinders Peace?” Christian C entury 56 (18 October 1939): 1264-65. See also "The War Nobody Wants” (4 October 1939): 1191; "Neutral Monarchs Make New Peace Appeal” (22 November 1939): 1427-28. 4. See, for example, David Lawrence, "Peace Bids by Neutrals Traditional,” W ashington Evening Star, 9 October 1939; D aily Worker, 14 October 1939,1; "The Asiatic Barbarism in Europe,” CT, 4 De­ cember 1939,14; "Peace Now or After Exhaustion?” CT, 5 December 1939,14; Edwin Johnson, SFE, 8 October 1939, Sect. 1,17; Edwin Johnson, CR, 9 October 1939,174; Frazier, CR, 14 October 1939,402. 5. SFE, 11 October 1939, sect SF, 5. The Hearst press kept up its optimism into the following year. See SFE, 13 February 1940,1. For an administration focus on Goering, see Breckinridge Long, entry of 11 October 1939, War D iary, 27-28. 6. Edwin M. Borchard to Leslie H. Thompson, 10 October 1939, Borchard Papers. 7. Castle Diary, 19 September 1939. Hitler denied that he coveted territory of Britain or France and claimed that Germany desired lasting peace. "Text of Chancellor Hitler’s Speech at Danzig Pro­ fessing His Desire for Peace,” N Y T , 20 September 1939,18. 8. Villard, "Europe Longs for Peace: An Analysis of Europe Today,” Peace Action 6 (January 1940): 4,8; "Issues and Men,” N ation 150 (27 January 1940): 101. Villard had said earlier that the vast major­ ity of Britons were determined to eliminate the German menace by force of arms. "Issues and Men,” N ation 150 (28 October 1939): 469. 9. "Hider Proposes,” New Republic 101 (18 October 1939): 283-84. 10. "Chamberlain’s 89% No,” N YD N , 4 October 1939,39; Dennis and Gravenhoff, WFL 68 (16 No­ vember 1939): 3-4; WFL 75 (4 January 1940): 3; "What Price Plutocracy?” Am erican Guardian, 22 Sep­ tember 1939,4; "Peace at Hider’s Price,” New Republic 101 (4 October 1939): 225. Gerhard L Wein­ berg sees Goering as wandng more time for economic preparations and thereby genuinely interested in a respite in hostilities. A World a t Arms: A Global H istory o f World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 89. 11. Chamberlain, address to Commons, N YT, 13 October 1939,4. 12. See, for example, "Hider Is 50, Chamberlain Is 70,” N YD N , 14 October 1939,15; Paul Mallon, "The News Behind the News,” SFE, 10 November 1939,15; Frazier, CR, 14 October 1939,402; D. Worth Clark, CR, 16 October 1939,446. 13. SFE, 11 October 1939, sect. SF, 5. 14. "Oswald Garrison Villard on the Present European Situation,” attached to NCPW minutes, 20 December 1939, NCPW Papers. Villard might well have been referring to a speech Churchill made on 12 November in which the admiralty chief said that "either all that Britain and France stand for in the modem world will go down, or that Hider, the Nazi regime and the recurring German or Prussian menace will be broken and destroyed.” See "Text of Churchill's War Broadcast,” N YT, 13 November 1939,4. The New Masses blamed Churchill for declining a Soviet-backed peace offer, hence "revealing thereby how sinister and thoroughgoing the war against Germany will become should Churchill come to the helm in England.” See “The Peace Offer,” 33 (10 October 1939): 23. 15. Wheeler, SFE, 8 October 1939, sect. 1,17; Borah, N Y T , 23 October 1939,8; "Unity in Washing­ ton,” Uncensored 6 (4 November 1939): 3; "Of Things to Come,” Uncensored 9 (2 December 1939): 3; C. Hartley Grattan, “The Struggle for Peace,” Harper's M agazine 180 (January 1940): 304; "Oswald Garrison Villard on the Present European Situation.” 16. David Reynolds, "Churchill and the British ‘Decision’ to Fight On in 1940,” in Diplom acy and Intelligence D uring the Second World War, ed. Richard Langhome (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 151-52. See also C. A. MacDonald, The U nited States, Britain, and Appeasement, 1936-1939 (NewYork: St. Martin’s, 1981 ), 177. On 10 September, Chamberlain had thought that Mus­ solini had viable peace proposals. See Rock, Chamberlain and Roosevelt, 215. 17. Andrew Roberts, uThe H oly Fox**: A Life o f Lord H alifax (London: Macmillan, 1991), 177.

Notes to Pages 22-24

347

18. For Churchill on genuine offer, see Reynolds, Creation* 9,84; Clive Fonting, 1940: M yth and Re­ (Chicago: Dee, 1990), 97; Martin Gilbert, W inston 5. Churchill* vol. 6: Finest Hour, 1939-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), 57. 19. John Haynes Holmes to Robert Whitaker, 16 October 1939, Holmes Papers. 20. For the role of Lloyd George, see Paul Addison, “Lloyd George and the Compromise Peace in the Second World War,** in Lloyd George: Twelve Essays, ed. A. J. P. Taylor (London: Hamilton, 1971), 368. For interventionist attention, see “Life on the Newsfronts of the World: Ancients for Peace,” Life* 16 October 1939,22. 21. “Text of the Chamberlain and Lloyd George Statements in the House of Commons,” N Y T , 4 October 1939,4. See also N YT, 10 October 1939,5; 22 October 1939,35. For a later reiteration of Uoyd George’s call for negotiations, see Bilainkin, entry of 28 July 1940, Diary* 169. 22. Lloyd George, SFE* 15 October 1939, Sect. 1,16; news stories in SFE* 14 October 1939,15; 22 October 1939, 16; “The Role of the Neutrals,” N ew Masses 33 (17 October 1939): 21. See also “What Hinders Peace?” C hristian C entury 56 (18 October 1939): 1264; D aily Worker, 13 October 1939,1. 23. Rankin, CR* l November 1939,1171. For optimism, see Hearst-Lloyd George correspondence, “In the News,” SFE, 25 May 1941, A; memo, conversation of Herbert Hoover and Joseph P. Kennedy, 22 November 1940, Hoover Papers; Dennis, WFL 150 (12 June 1941): 3; WFL 168 (16 October 1941): 5; “Aid to Churchill,” Uncensored 107 (18 October 1941): 2-3. For pessimism, see Villard, “Men and Events,” N ation 150 (11 May 1940): 599; diary of William Henry Chamberlin, 19-26 April 1941, Prov­ idence College (hereafter cited as Chamberlin Diary). 24. For Shaw, see NYT* 10 October 1939, 4; 28 August 1939, 4. For communist backing, see D aily Worker, 25 September 1939,1; N ew Masses 33 (7 November 1939): 21 ; Joseph Starobin, “God Better Save the King,” N ew Masses 33 (14 November 1939): 16; J. B. S. Haldane, “Britain’s Writers Under the Bombs,” D aily Worker, 3 September 1940, 13. For other endorsements, see Am erican G uardian, 29 September 1939,1; Downey, CR, 9 October 1939,190; Frazier, CR* 14 October 1939, 399; Holt, CR* 18 October 1939,547. 25. “Let Mr. Chamberlain Be Specific!” Christian C entury 56 (27 October 1939): 1295; “Neutral Monarchs Make New Peace Appeal,” Christian Century 56 (22 November 1939): 1428. Those listed by the C entury as asking FDR to mediate included Bishop of Chichester G. K. A. Bell, Methodist leader Leslie Weatherhead, Labor party members George Lansbury and Richard R. Stokes, classical scholar Cyril Bailey, and philosopher C. E. M. Joad. 26. Lansbury, “No New World by War,” Fellowship 5 (December 1939): 2-3; “‘Peace Now* Drive Gets New Support,” Peace Action 6 (January 1940): 6. 27. For forty Labor candidates, Lanarkshire miners, the fifty thousand members of the Ayrshire Federation of the Labor Party, and the Scottish cooperative movement, see Joseph Starobin, “God Bet­ ter Save the King,” New Masses 33 (14 November 1939): 16. For Wells, see D aily Worker, 29 March 1940, 1. For Maxton and the ILP, see the Call* 30 September 1939, 2. For other accounts of various trade unions, see Allen Hunt, “Cannon, Not Butter, Says Chamberlain,” New Masses 35 (9 April 1940): 13; “British Labor Calls for Peace,” New Masses 35 (9 April 1940): 14. 28. Castle Diary, 26 September 1939; “Oswald Garrison Villard on the Present European Situation”; Edwin M. Borchard to Leslie H. Thompson, 12 October 1939, Borchard Papers. In January, Borchard thought that the British might be satisfied with“some kind” of Czechoslovakia or Poland but that FDR wanted a “knockout” on Germany. See Edwin M. Borchard to Oswald Garrison Villard, 31 January 1940, Borchard Papers. 29. “What Price Plutocracy?” Am erican Guardian* 22 September 1939,4. 30. Libby, “Truce, with Neutral Mediation, Only Solution,” Peace Action 6 (October 1939): 2; “War in Europe: A Statement by the 1939 National Conference of the Fellowship of Reconciliation,” Fellow­ ship 5 (October 1939): 4; Harold E. Fey, “America’s Greatest Opportunity,” Fellowship 5 (October 1939): 3; Ernest Fremont Tittle, “How Can Hitler Be Stopped?” Fellowship 5 (October 1939): 6-7; Holmes, “How Can Hitler Be Stopped?” Fellowship 5 (September 1939): 4, citing Sir Arthur Salter, Se­ curity. Can We Retrieve It7 (London: Macmillan, 1939). ality

348

Notes to Pages 24-25

31. “After This War, What?" NYDN, 15 October 1939,47. The News continually maintained that economic pressures were pushing Europe in the direction of larger and fewer states. See “Status Quo Ante 1914," NYDN, 25 August 1939,25. 32. Barnes, “World’s Fate in Balance," N Y W T, 13 October 1939,26; Barnes, “Course of U.S. in the War," 16 January 1940,14; Hearden, “Cudahy," 108. 33. The Czechs and Poles would been given commercial, but not political, rights to a Baltic port In addition, “the Mongols" with “their Red banner" would be ejected from the lands they had seized. It said the economic claims of smaller nations could be satisfied without disturbing anyone’s rights. See “Hope of Peace Persists," CT, 2 January 1940,12. See also “Europe’s Hope for Peace," 11 February 1940, graphic section, 1. In February, it called for peace pleas by the neutral peoples. See“Peace Now or After the Final Battle," 26 February 1941,10. 34. “The Belgium-Holland Mediation Offer," Commonweal 30 (17 November 1939): 85. 35. Herbert Hoover to John Callan O’Laughlin, 18 February 1940,O’Laughlin-Hoover correspon­ dence filed separately in Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter cited as Stanford Files). Norman Thomas to George Denny Jr., 30 March 1940, Thomas Papers. At the same time, the Call endorsed me­ diation. “Mediation Now," Calk 2 March 1940,4. 36. For rumors of a “behind-the-scenes" effort by Pius to sponsor a peace conference, out of which would result a Polish buffer state designed according to ethnic lines, see NYT, 28 September 1939,1,5. 37. For endorsements of papal efforts, see Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine," Calk 6 Janu­ ary 1940,2; “What Are the Allies’ War Aims?" NYDN, 17 September 1939,33; “Peace Talk," NYDN, 30 September 1939, 17; “The Pope Calls for Peace," NYDN, 26 March 1940, 21; entry of 29 September 1939, Francis Neilson, Tragedy, 1:81. At one point, the NYDNeven mentioned Mussolini, who was not yet a belligerent. “Peace Talk," 30 September 1939, 17. Weinberg notes that Mussolini wanted addi­ tional time to prepare for war with Britain and France. See World a t Arm s, 90. 38. See, for example, “Mediation Now," Calk 2 March 1940,4. 39. “Text of King Leopold’s Appeal for Peace Negotiations," and statement of Hubert Pierlot, Bel­ gian foreign minister, NYT, 24 August 1939,5. The seven nations included Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway. See, for example, “King Leopold of Belgium Makes Move for Peace," Christian C entury 56 (8 August 1939): 1036; “Can the United States Stay Out of the War?" Commonweal 30 (15 September 1939): 465. 40. “Visit," NYT, 7 November 1939,1,21; “Text of Two Rulers’ Offer," NYT, 8 November 1939,4. For a previous secret bid to Roosevelt, see lekes, entry of 17 October 1939, Secret Diary, 3:39; Roosevelt to Joseph E. Davies [October 1939], F.D.R.: H is Personal Letters, 938-39. For the monarchs’ fears, see The M emoirs o f Cordell H ull, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1:712. 41. See, for example, SFE, 9 November 1939,12; “The Appeal for Peace," CT, 9 November 1939,14; “European Devil Dance," NYDN, 9 November 1939, 33; “Royal Gestures for Peace," D aily Worker, 9 November 1939,6. 42. Frederick J. Libby, “Belgium and Holland Have Right to Protest," Peace Action 6 (November 1939) : 2; John Nevin Sayre, [NewYork University] Heights D aily News, 10 November 1939,1; “Neutral Monarchs Make New Peace Appeal," Christian C entury 56 (22 November 1939): 1427-28; “Oswald Garrison Villard on the Present European Situation"; Villard, “Europe Longs for Peace: An Analysis of Europe Today," Peace Action 6 (January 1940): 1,8; Villard, “Issues and Men," N ation 150 (27 January 1940) : 101. 43. Senators Richard Russell (Dem.-Ga.), Alva Adams (Dem.-Colo.), James E. Murray (Dem.Mont.), Ernest W. Gibson (Rep.-Vt.), and Clyde L. Herring (Dem.-Iowa) all endorsed the bid. SFE, 10 November 1939,1,9; 11 November 1939,2. 44. Clark, SFE, 11 November 1939, 2. Roosevelt in Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 265-66; Pius, SFE, 11 November 1939,2. 45. NYT, 7 October 1939,1,3; Hearst correspondent Karl H. Von Wiegand, SFE, 3 Octq|>er 1939, 1. The Germans officially denied such an appeal. NYT, 14 October 1939,3. 46. Kennedy to Roosevelt, 3 November 1939, in Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt, 194. See also Kennedy to Cordell Hull, 13 September 1939, in Foreign Relations, 1939,1:423-24.

Notes to Pages 25-26

349

47. Lothian in Rock» Chamberlain and Roosevelt, 234. William Allen White to Bruce Bliven, 23 Sep­ tember 1939»in Selected Letters o f W illiam Allen W hite, ed. Walter lohnson (NewYork: Holt, 1947), 398. 48. See» for example, John Nevin Sayre, United States News, 30 October 1939,4; report, national sec­ retary to national board, WIL, 21-22 October 1939, 5; Dorothy Detzer to Greta Engkvist, 23 January 1940, WIL Papers; minutes, governing committee, Keep America Out of War Congress, 29 September 1939, the Papers of the Keep America Out of War Congress, SCPC (hereafter cited as KAOWC Papers); "Europe’s Fateful Hour," Christian Century 56 (6 September 1939): 1063. For peace leaders encouraged by resolutions introduced by Senator Edwin C Johnson calling for presidential initiative, see "To Stop War and Build Peace,” Peace Action 6 (October 1939): 3; Dorothy Detzer to Emily Greene Baldı, 9 Octo­ ber 1939, WIL Papers; minutes, annual meeting, WIL, 29 April 1940, Pittsburgh, 1, WIL Papers. 49. Conversation summarized in Oswald Garrison Villard to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 17 January 1940, Roosevelt Papers. For an earlier bid for presidential mediation, see Villard to Roosevdt, 20 Oc­ tober 1939, Roosevelt Papers. See also "Oswald Garrison Villard on the Present European Situation”; Ickes, entry of 4 February 1940, Secret D iary, 3:123. For another statement that both the German peo­ ple and foreign office sought peace, see Villard, "Issues and Men: Germany Has Power,” N ation 149 (25 November 1939): 581. For other references to Villard’s call for a negotiated peace, see Villard com­ ments, General Staff, Neutrality Bloc, 8 January 1940, KAOWC Papers; Villard to Cordell Hull, un­ dated, Villard Papers; [University of Rochester] Tower Times, 23 February 1940,1. 50. N YD N , 8 December 1939,39. The newspaper said FDR’s hand would be strengthened if he in­ vited the pope and Mussolini to join his bid. See also "Why Not Make the Armistice Official?” 9 Janu­ ary 1940,31; "Big Shots and Little Shots,” 12 March 1940,25. News columnist Doris Fleeson claimed that FDR was "bitterly angry” at Hitler for suggesting to certain correspondents that FDR mediate, but at the same time, "the President would like nothing better than a bona fide offer to assume the role of mediator of the Second World War.” "Capitol Stuff,” 16 October 1939,4. 51. Johnson, CR, 9 October 1939,174; Wheeler, SFE, 8 October 1939, sect. 1,17; Fish, radio speech, NBC, 28 October 1939, in CR, A701. Wheeler’s views were supported by senators Arthur Capper (Rep.Kans.), Holt, and Reynolds, and Congressman Rankin. CR. See also Senator Ernest Lundeen (FarmerLab.-Minn.) in Newsweek, 23 October 1939,28. See also Senators Pat McCarran (Dem.-Nev.) and El­ bert D. Thomas (Dem.-Utah) and Congressman Rankin in N Y T , 8 October 1939,3. For Frazier, see CR, 14 October 1939,402. At the convention of the American Federation of Labor in Cincinnati, the delegates endorsed their council's recommendation that FDR offer his services as mediator. N Y T , 2 October 1939,1,8; Time, 16 October 1939,28. 52. Hugh Johnson, SFN, 10 October 1939,13. For a general call for U.S. mediation, see Johnson, SFN, 20 September 1939,13. 53. Nye, CR, 13 October 1939,363. For other linkages of negotiations to retention of the neutral­ ity legislation, see Congressman James A. Shanley, CR, 31 October 1939, 1116; Harold E. Fey, "Save Neutrality! Save Peace!” C hristian Century 56 (11 October 1939): 1236. Senator John A. Danaher (Rrp.-Conn.) claimed in June 1940 that repeal of the arms embargo ruined an impending negotiated peace. CR, 3 June 1940,7375. 54. Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 3 January 1940, Borchard Papers; Libby, "Truce, with Neutral Mediation, Only Solution,” Peace Action 6 (October 1939): 2. Libby also blamed Roosevelt for not backing the mediation efforts of the Dutch and Belgian monarchs. See "Immediate Negotia­ tion the Hope of the World,” Peace Action 6 (January 1940): 1. Roosevelt, Libby said, would take no steps without Allied approval. Minutes, General Staff, Neutrality Bloc, 8 January 1940, KAOWC Pa­ pers. Libby always maintained this position. See also Libby, testimony, HFAC, 14 October 1941,71. See also Hugh Johnson, "U.S. Peace Role,” N Y W T , 25 January 1940,15. 55. See, for example,"The Role of the Neutrals,” New Masses 32 (17 October 1939): 21;"But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 22 December 1939,9; “F.D.R.’s Four F’s,” Uncensored 8 (25 November 1939): 1. The newsletter predicted that the British Foreign Office would tell Roosevelt when it sought peace. "In Washington,” Uncensored 15 (13 January 1940): 1. 56. Norman Thomas to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 8 October 1939, Thomas Papers; Franklin D. Roo­ sevelt to Norman Thomas, 17 October 1939, Roosevelt Papers. The previous day Secretary of State

350

Notes to Page 26

Cordell Hull had written a draft reply. Memo, Hull to Roosevelt, 16 October 1939, Roosevelt Papers. For Thomas’s continued optimism, see uYour World and Mine,” Calk 2 December 1939,2; 6 January 1940,2; 13 January 1940,2. 57. Walter Van Kirk to Dorothy Detzer, 16 November 1939, WIL Papers. Among the delegation were Walter Van Kirk, NPC director; Henrietta Roelofs, NPC president; John H. Lathrop, NPC vice president; and Mrs. Norman Thomas. 58. “President’s Letter to Pope Pius,” N Y T , 24 December 1939,6. For optimistic responses to Roo­ sevelt’s message, see John Haynes Holmes, “President, Pope, and Peace,** U nity 124 (15 January 1940): 151;“Roosevelt Peace Stand Commendable,” SFE, 26 December 1939,1. See also Hearst correspondent H. R. Knickerbocker on FDR’s role, [University of] M ichigan Daily, 13 December 1939,1. 59. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Oswald Garrison Villard, 17 January 1940; Roosevelt to Villard, 18 January 1940, Roosevelt Papers. Yet Villard may well have mistrusted the president. According to Borchard, Villard believed that FDR sought to take the United States into the war but did not yet dare. Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 31 January 1940, Borchard Papers. 60. In November, Senator Capper called on the United States to offer negotiations. SFE, 10 No­ vember 1939,1,9. See also Harry Elmer Barnes, “U.S. Influence for Peace,” N YW T, 1 November 1939, 26; Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, (City College of New York] Campus, 10 November 1939,1; Lundeen, U nited States News, 30 October 1939,4. 61. For extensive discussion, see Randall, Improper Bostonian, chaps. 6-9. 62. Text, M Peace Forces Unite on Six-Point Program,” Peace Action 6 (September 1939): 3. The NPC was founded in 1935 as a coalition encompassing some thirty pacifist and internationalist organiza­ tions. The WIL was particularly active in this body. At an emergency meeting of theWIL executive com­ mittee, held on 13 September 1939, with about sixty present, Dorothy Detzer called for WIL coopera­ tion with the NPC. Minutes, WIL Papers. On 28 September 1939, the WIL executive committee met again. Detzer noted that at her request, Senator Capper and Representative Robert Allen (Dem.-Pa.) agreed to introduce a resolution in Congress asking for a conference of neutrals. Minutes, WIL Papers. On 22 October, theWIL national board called on all neutral nations to establish a conference that would sit continually offering mediation. Resolutions, WIL Papers. See also Libby, "President Should Initiate Neutral Mediation Commission,” Peace Action 6 (September 1939): 2; “War in Europe: A Statement by the 1939 National Conference of the Fellowship of Reconciliation,” Fellowship 5 (October 1939): 4; Harold E. Fey, “Save Neutrality! Save Peace!” Christian Century 56 (6 October 1939): 1234; annual ses­ sion, Methodist General Commission on World Peace, 19-20 September 1939, in Peace Action 6 (Octo­ ber 1939): 3. Even early in 1940, peace groups and leaders sought U.S. involvement. See, for example, Libby, “Immediate Mediation the Hope of the World,” Peace Action 6 (January 1940): 1-2; minutes. Na­ tional Board, WIL, Washington, D.C., 20-21 January 1940,1, WIL Papers; John Nevin Sayre, “Mediate Now,” Fellowships (February 1940): 26; Ernest Fremont Tittle, Sm ith College Weekly, 14 February 1940, I. See also Alfred Bingham to Sidney Hertzberg, 6 December 1939, Hertzberg Papers. 63. “Peace Bids by Neutrals Traditional,” Washington Evening Star, 9 October 1939. The nine pow­ ers would include Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union, and three neutral nations. “Peace Now!” United States News, 23 October 1939,14. For the backing of Libby, see governing com­ mittee, KAOWC, 30 October 1939, KAOWC Papers; Libby, “Enlist for ‘Peace Now* Until We Get It,” Peace Action 6 (November 1939): 1. Libby reproduced David Lawrence’s editorial of U nited States News of 23 October 1939. See “Let’s Skip the War and Work for Peace Now!” Peace Action 6 (November 1939): 4-5. The Daily Worker featured calls for mediation by Lawrence and Heywood Broun. See “The People Can Halt the War Now!” 10 October 1939, 1. Columnist Broun, a recent convert to Roman Catholicism, endorsed the peace proposed by Pius XII and a conference sponsored by the neutral na­ tions. Unlike many anti-interventionists, however, he favored repeal of the arms embargo. Broun, “It Seems to Me,” SFN, 27 October 1939,21. 64. For Hull, see Newsweek, 16 October 1939,29; Hull, Memoirs, 1:711; Breckinridge Long, entry of 11 October 1939, War Diary, 27-28. For FDR, see N YT, 8 October 1939,1,39; 11 October 1939,5; 14 October 1939,1,3. For doubts within the administration concerning any peace, see Long, entry of 13 September 1939, War Diary, 13.

Notes to Pages 26-27

351

65. Cole, Roosevelt, 335-37; Berle diary entry, 19 September 1939, Navigating1256-57; 13 October 1939,265; 16 October 1939,266; entry of 12 October 1939, M offat Papers, 273-76. 66. Berle, entry of 5 December 1939, Navigating, 275. Berle suspected that Roosevelt would call a general peace conference in early spring. Entry of 29 December 1939,281. 67. MacDonald, United States, B ritain, 177. 68. Franklin D. Roosevelt to lames G. Mooney, 24 lanuary 1940, Roosevelt Papers. For material on Mooney’s entire activities, see Costello, Ten Days, 60-61,64,67-68,134-35,142,144,399-403; Ickes, entry of 13 December 1940, Secret D iary, 3:395. 69. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Am erican Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Ox­ ford University Press, 1979), 216. 70. “President’s Letter to Pope Pius,” N Y T , 24 December 1939,6; Berle, entry of 11 lanuary 1940, Navigating, 283-84; 15 January 1940,284-85; 27 January 1940,288. For earlier state department plans, see Berle, entry of 29 December 1939, Navigating, 280-81 ; FrankWarren Graff, Strategy o f Involvement: A D iplom atic Biography o f Sum ner Welles (New York: Garland, 1988) 382-84. 71. N Y T , 10 February 1940,1. 72. Warren F. Kimball, Forged in W ar Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War (New York: Morrow, 1997), 44-45; Dallek, Roosevelt, 216-18; Irwin F. Gellman, Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sum ner Welles (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 171; Mark M. Lowenthal, “Roosevelt and the Coming of the War: The Search for United States Policy, 1937-1942,” tournai o f Contemporary H istory 16 (July 1981): 419-20; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 375; Arnold A. Offner, The Origins o f the Second World War (New York: Praeger, 1975), 169-73; Reynolds, Creation, 71. 73. For focus on Mussolini, see Stanley E Hilton, “The Welles Mission to Europe, February-March 1940: Illusion or Realism?” tournai o f American H istory 58 (June 1971): 93-120; Gellman, Secret Affairs, 198; Welles, “Italy and Peace in Europe,” Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov­ ernment Printing Office, 1959), 113-16. For praise by both Welles and Breckinridge Long, see Long, entry of 2 September 1939, War Dairy, 2 , 4. Long had been Roosevelt's ambassador to Italy. For FDR's perception of Italy as a key to peace, see David F. Schmitz, The United States and Fäscist Italy, 1922-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 205. 74. For accounts, see “Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe,” Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), 21-117; Sumner Welles, The Tim e fo r Decision (NewYork: Harper, 1944), chap. 3; Graff, Strategy o f In volvement, chap. 6; M offat Papers, 291-304. 75. See, for example, Edwin M. Borchard to John A. Danaher, 12 and 17 February 1940, Borchard Papers; Hiram W. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson Jr., 10 February 1940, the Papers of Hiram Johnson, University of California, Berkeley (hereafter cited as Johnson Papers); Dennis and Gravenhoff, WFL 81 (15 February 1940): 1-2; WFL 83 (29 February 1940): 1-2; Senator Robert R. Reynolds, N Y T , 2 April 1940,12. 76. See, for example, Norman Thomas to Wendell Willkie, 12 February 1940, Thomas Papers; “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 16 February 1940,8; Gerald P. Nye, “We’re Already in the War,” Look, 23 April 1940,8; Morris Kamman, “Britain Expects FDR to Do His Duty,” New Masses 34 ( 19 March 1940): 3-6; “Mr. Roosevelt Sends Mr. Welles to Europe,” CT, 11 February 1940,16; “Sending Mr. Welles to Europe,” CT, 13 February 1940,12; “As Mr. Welles Follows Col. House,” CT, 19 February 1940,12; “Mr. Welles in Europe,” CT, 28 February 1940,10; C. Hartley Grattan to Sidney Hertzberg, n.d., Hertzberg Papers; B. C. Clark in Sargent, Bulletin #37,16 February 1940, G etting US into War, 287. 77. For the text of the House-Grey memorandum, see Arthur S. Link, Wilson, vol. 4: Confusion and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), 134-35. 78. “Mr. Welles Completes His Trip,” D aily Worker, 21 March 1940, 1. See also “The Specter of Peace,” New Masses 35 (2 April 1940): 19; “Why Is Sumner Welles Going to Europe? Envoy to Probe for Anti-Soviet Front,” Socialist Appeal (a Trotskyist paper), 17 February 1940,1. The pro-Soviet interpre­ tation also received surprising confirmation from Demaree Bess, European staff correspondent for the Saturday Evening Post See“Our Election and Hitler’s War,” Saturday Evening Post 212(11 May 1940): 9.

352

Notes to Pages 27-29

79. Henning cited in CR, 21 February 1940,2073. For further attack, see M Mr. Welles Hits the Trail Back,” CT, 16 March 1940,14. 80. See, for example, Congressman John C Schafer (Rep.-Wis.), CR, 12 March 1940,2748; “How America Is Entrapped in Maze of Secret Diplomacy," Social Justice, 18 March 1940,9. 81. Hiram W. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson Jr., 10 February 1940, Johnson Papers. See also Den­ nis and GravenhofF, WFL 81 (15 February 1940): 1-2; WFL 83 (29 February 1940): 1-2. 82. Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine," 9 March 1940, Calk 3. See also Dorothy Detzer to Gertrude Baer, 21 March 1940, W1L papers; J. S. Barnes, "The Prospects of a Good Peace," Social Jus­ tice, 18 March 1940,9; "Minister Non-Potentiary," Uncensored 21 (24 February 1940): 2. 83. "But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 16 February 1940,8. Hoover in Castle Diary, 18 February 1940. See also Castle Diary, 13 February 1940; "From Washington," Uncensored 22 (2 March 1940): 2; Sar­ gent, Bulletin #37,16 February 1940, G etting US into War, 287. 84. See, for example, Hugh Johnson, SFN, 13 February 1940, 13. See also Reynolds, CR, 2 April 1940,3821; "Mr. Roosevelt Sends an Envoy to Europe," Christian C entury 57 (21 January 1940): 236; Dorothy Detzer to Emily Greene Batch, 26 February 1940, WIL papers. 85. See, for example, John Haynes Holmes, "The President and Peace," U nity 125 (4 March 1940): 4; Norman Thomas to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 12 February 1940, Thomas Papers; Thomas, "Your World and Mine," Calk 9 March 1940,3. 86. "Cautious Exploratory Peace Moves Begin," Peace Action 6 (February 1940): 1. See also Libby, U nited States News, 23 February 1940,22. 87. "Mr. Roosevelt Sends an Envoy to Europe," C hristian C entury 57 (21 February 1940): 235. 88. "Roosevelt Moves for Peace," N YD N , 10 February 1940,13. The News soon expressed concern over the derisive comments on the mission made by the British, French, and Italian press, which treated Welles as "a babe in the woods." The masses in all the belligerent nations, it noted, were still ap­ athetic and morose about the conflict. See "The Hecatombs of Spring," 23 February 1940,29. See also "Why Not ‘Implement’ Welles?" 5 March 1940,23. By late 28 February, it found Welles's mission based on "a slender hope," for the Allies appeared determined to apply the "recipe" of General John J. Persh­ ing who had said just two days previously that the Allies should have marched to Berlin in 1918. See "‘On to Berlin,’" 28 February 1940,29. 89. Hearst, "In the News," SFE, 5 March 1940, 2; Coughlin, "From the Tourer," Social Justice, 25 March 1940,3. 90. For Roosevelt, see Gellman, Secret Affairs, 192-93. For Britain, see Reynolds, Creation, 81; Rock, Chamberlain and Roosevelt, 267. For France, see Henry Blumenthal, Illusion and Reality in FrancoAmerican Diplomacy, 1914-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 255-57. 91. Kimball, Forged in War, 45. 92. Gallup polls, N YT, 10 March 1940,27. See also N YT, 29 October 1939,29. For related polls, see Cantril, Public O pinion, 1136.

CHAPTER 3: A MATTER OF WAR A IM S

1. Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 47-48. 2. Kendrick, letter to Common Sense 10 (August 1941): 225. 3. See, for example, Downey, CR, 9 October 1939,186; Robsion, CR, 5 February 1941,642; Hugh Johnson, “International Sucker," N YW T, 30 September 1939,19; "‘Roll Up That Map,’" NYD N , 1 June 1940,13; Barton, broadcast, NBC, 29 October 1939, in CR, A593; Hoover, "We Must Keep Out," Satur­ day Evening Post 212 (28 October 1939): 9; Chavez, CR, 12 October 1939,316; "Required Reading for Eu­ ropeans," Saturday Evening Post 212 (28 October 1939): 22; Colonel Robert R. McCormick, speech, Pot­ tawatomie Park, St. Charles, Illinois, in CT, 4 September 1939,5; Borchard, address to YaleAlumni, South Orange, New Jersey, 27 January 1940, in CR, A602; Nye, “Shall the United States Make Available to Eng­

Notes to Pages 29-31

353

land Some of Its WorldWar Destroyers?” American Forum of the Air, 25 August 1940, in CR, A5661; Re­ publican leader Hanford MacNider to Milo ). Warner, 20 December 1940, MacNider Papers. 4. Lindbergh, "What Substitute for War?” A tlantic M onthly 165 (March 1940): 304; Bolton, CR, 19 February 1941, A761-62. For the exact same list, see Waldrop, W TH , 12 November 1941. Historian Charles A. Beard made a list of two hundred years of Europe's wars that was published in the Chicago Tribune. See issue of 27 July 1941,10. 5. For minorities, see Taft, CR, 13 October 1939,355. For resources, see Senator Henrik Shipstead (Rep.-Minn.), address, Northfield, Minnesota, 4 July 1940, in CR, A4384. 6. Holmes, M If America Enters the War,” C hristian C entury 57 (11 December 1940): 154. See also Holmes to Barnett R. Brickner, 24 October 1939, Holmes Papers. For other examples, see Sterling Mor­ ton to Ralph E. Church, 16 May 1940, Morton Papers; historian Eric F. Goldman, Johns H opkins Universify Newsletter, 10 November 1939,1; Borah, CR, 2 October 1939,73; Capper, broadcast, CBS, 29 September 1939, in CR, A88; Vandenberg, CR, 4 October 1939,99; Senator Guy Gillette (Dem.-Iowa), CR, 16 October 1939,462; Bulow, CR, 21 February 1941,1258; Chester Bowles to Philip La Follette, 28 September 1939, La Follette Papers. 7. See, for example, "America,” Saturday Evening Post 212 (3 October 1939): 22. Only rarely did an anti-interventionist directly argue against such accusations. The Jesuit weekly America denied that neutrality was aided, or peace furthered, by thundering that the conflict was a mere scramble between capitalists for imperialist power or a hopeless mess in which no principles of right and justice were in­ volved. To use such language, it said, was merely to play into communist hands. "Comment,” America 63 (15 June 1940): 254. 8. For Gallup poll of 22 September 1939 and related polls, see Cantril, Public O pinion , 1076. 9. V. I. Lenin, Im perialism : The Highest Stage o f Capitalism , new rev. trans. (New York: Interna­ tional, 1939). 10. Marcantonio, CR, 5 February 1941,657. See also activist Helen Keller, Calk 21 October 1939,2. 11. Sweeney, speech over NBC red network, 6 May 1941, in CR, A2154; Coughlin, "From the Tower,” Social Justice, 25 September 1939,5. See also "In the News,” Social Justice, 25 March 1940,3. 12. See, for example, philosopher E. L. Burtt, Cornell [University] D aily Sun, 20 April 1940,1. 13. Barnes, [University of] M ichigan Daily, 17 May 1940,1. See also "Real Americanism: Neutral­ ity Held Mark,” N Y W T, 5 April 1940,26; "Europe's War and America’s Democracy,” Virginia Q uarterly Review 16 (October 1940): 553. 14. Higgins, [University of California, Berkeley] D aily Californian, 19 September 1939, 4; Kael, Am erican Guardian, 15 December 1939,2. 15. For stress on empire, see Congressman Jerry Voorhis (Dem.-Calif.), CR, 2 October 1939, A124; Robsion, CR, 1 November 1939,1295; Congressman John G. Alexander (Rep.-Minn.), CR, 9 December 1940, A6809; Reynolds, CR, 20 February 1941,1212; diplomat J. Reuben Clark, quoted in "But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 4 April 1941,9; Hearden, "Cudahy,” M id-America 68 (April-June 1986), 107-8. 16. Nye, CR, 13 October 1939,383; Gillis, “The War: What Else but the War?” Catholic World 150 (October 1939): 6; "Economics of Empire,” Uncensored 76 (25 March 1941): 4. For further stress on colonies, see sociologist Edward A. Ross, [University of Wisconsin] Sum m er Cardinal, 4 July 1940,10. 17. See, for example, Robsion, CR, 1 November 1939, 1295; Congressman Clare Hoffman (Rep.Mich.), CR, 18 March 1941,2341; Congressman Philip A. Bennett (Rep.-Mo.), radio address over KMOX, St Louis, 10 May 1941, in CR, A2360; Congressman Dewey Congressman Dewey Short (Rep.-Mo.), CR, 29 May 1941,4566; historian Franklin C. Palm, [University of California, Berkeley] Daily Californian, 11 October 1939,1; Herbert Zam, “A War for Profits,” Call, 23 September 1939,2; firm leader George N. Peek to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 1 January 1941, AFC Papers; McCarran, CR, 22 February 1941,1271. 18. Sargent, Bulletin #22, 15 December 1939, 266; James D. Mooney, speech to University Club, Cleveland, 1 June 1940, in CR, 7822; La Follette, CR, 12 October 1939,321. 19. Lindbergh, "What Substitute for War?” A tlantic M onthly 165 (March 1940): 306-7. At another point, Lindbergh said that the war centered on "the division of territory and wealth among nations,” which "has caused conflict in Europe since European history began.” Speech, Soldier's Field, Chicago, 4 August 1940, in CR, 4794.

354

Notes to Pages 31-37

20. See» for example, B. C. Clark, CR, 1 November 1941,8410. John Haynes Holmes to Barnett R. Brickner, 24 October 1939, Holmes Papers; Holmes to General John F. O’Ryan, 21 May 1940, Holmes Papers; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine: War Aims and Peace Terms,” Call, 5 April 1941,5; Sweeney, CR, 14 August 1940,10359. 21. John Haynes Holmes to Sherwood Eddy, 17 October 1940, Holmes Papers; Lundeen, CR, 9 Oc­ tober 1939,189. For the exact same figures, see McCarran, Armistice Day address, Las Vegas, 11 No­ vember 1939, in CR, 4 April 1940,4009. According to Barbara McDonald, chairman of the AFC speak­ ers bureau, over the past five hundred years Spain had been at war 67 percent of the time; England, 50 percent; Russia, 46 percent; Austria, 40 percent; Italy, 35 percent; and Prussia and Germany, 28 percent. Memorandum to all speakers, 11 Mardi 1941, Barnes Papers. 22. Downey, CR, 9 October 1939,186,187,191; GUlis, “The War What Else but the War?” Catholic World 150 (October 1939): 6. 23. See, for example, Lundeen, CR, 27 August 1940,10994; socialist economist Maynard Krueger, [University of Chicago) Daily Maroon, 24 May 1940,1. 24. Fisher, [Boise) Idaho Daily Statesman , 17 January 1941; A. J. Muste to Mrs. H. W. Foote, 28 Oc­ tober 1941, FOR Papers; O'Connor, CR, 21 January 1941,212. 25. See, for example, John T. Flynn diary notes, 27 June 1941, Box 32, Flynn Papers; Reynolds, CR, 21 October 1939, 692; H. L. Mencken, “Notes on a Moral War,” Baltim ore Sun, 8 October 1939; Mencken, [Georgetown University] Hoya, 25 October 1939,2; Albert Jay Nock, “You Can’t Do Busi­ ness with Hitler,” Scribner's Com m entator 11 (November 1941 ): 84; Hear$t,“ln the News,” SFE, 29 May 1941,1; Neilson, entry of 6 June 1941, Tragedy, 2:364; Libby, “WeTry to Stop the War in Europe?” Peace Action 6 (March 1940): 3. 26. Joseph P. Kennedy to Roosevelt, 30 September 1939, in Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt, 193. At one point, he told a British correspondent Britain was fighting for “self-preservation.” Bilainkin, entry of 8 April 1940, Diary, 59. 27. Orton, M t. Holyoke [College] News, 14 February 1941,1. Raymond Moley to Alf Landon, 20 March 1941, Moley Papers; Ross in [University of] Wisconsin Sum m er Cardinal, 4 July 1940,10. 28. La Follette, CR, 12 October 1939,321; Starobin, Brooklyn College Vanguard, 8 Mardi 1940,4; “A Long War Means a Spreading War,” N YD N , 17 January 1940,29; “Food—Oil—Jealousy,” N YD N , 9 No­ vember 1941,61. 29. Reynolds, CR, 21 October 1939, 692; Nye, CR, 4 March 1941, 1730. See also Thomas, “Your World and Mine,” 5. 30. “Economics of Empire,” Uncensored 76 (15 March 1941): 4; Waldrop, “Who's Getting What?” W TH , 20 September 1941,18. Though, Waldrop continued, Germany had picked up nearly 150 mil­ lion more people than Britain, this factor simply gave Hitler “the bad bargain of more mouths to feed and more industrial machinery of which he already had plenty before he began.” The German dicta­ tor also had “under his uncertain thumb the most contrary, perverse, plot-minded, and revolutionary segment of the human race.” 31. Muste, [University of] Wisconsin D aily Cardinal, 6 May 1941,4. 32. Lindbergh, entry of 28 May 1940, W artime Journals, 351. In 1941, under congressional ques­ tioning, Lindbergh did claim that privately he had been critical of Germany. Testimony, HFAC, 23 Jan­ uary 1941,435. 33. Cadbury in Chamberlin Diary, 19-26 April 1941. 34. For the significance of the Wannsee Conference of January 1942, see Michael R. Marrus, The Holocaust in History (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1987), 32-33. 35. Wolcott, CR, 9 October 1939,215; Casüe Diary, 27 May 1940. 36. Wheeler, CR, 11 October 1939, 288; Johnson, “Regarding Atrocities,” N YW T, 16 September 1939, 15; Townsend, "Mercy—Strictly Political,” Scribners Com m entator 9 (March 1941): 83-84; Barnes, “This Unholy War: Crimes of the British,” N YW T, 29 March 1940,22. 37. See, for example, Barnes, “New Peril Seen to Neutrality,” N YW T, 1 December 1939,32; Con­ gressman Charles Hawks Jr. (Rep.-Wis.), CR, 14 October 1939,401; Wheeler, CR, 6 August 1940,9930; “No Hostility to England,” C7’, 1 November 1939, 14; Lindbergh, speech, 13 October 1939, in CR,

Notes to Pages 33-34

355

A302; Gillis, “The War: What Else but the War?“ 8; Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 8 July 1940, Moore Papers. John T. Flynn expressed a minority view in claiming even “a much better peace“ still could not have prevented Germany’s collapse, for “her economic system was in distress and the war had crippled it beyond repair.“ In fact, Italy, a victor nation, “cracked up“ before Germany did. Tes­ timony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,208. 38. Holt, CR* 18 October 1939,548; “Shall We Fight for the Versailles TVeaty?“ NYDN* 1 December 1939, 31; Hoover, “We Must Keep Out,“ Saturday Evening Post 212 (28 October 1939): 76. See also Hoover, “The First American Crusade,“ Saturday Evening Post 214 (1 November 1941): 9-11,35-39; “‘You May Be Sure That I Shall Fight Shy*: The First American Crusade,“ 214 (8 November 1941): 14-15,41-50; “The Only Nation Since the Crusades That Has Fought the Battles of Other Peoples at Her Own Gigantic Loss,“ 214 (15 November 1941): 31,128-31. 39. “Versailles Treaty Impossible Peace,“ Social Justice* 23 October 1939,8; Schoonmaker, Democ­ racy and World D om inion (New York: Smith, 1939). For further serialization of Schoonmaker, see So­ cial Justice* 2 October 1939,10; 30 October 1939,18. 40. See, for example, William Henry Chamberlin, Christian Science Monitor* 7 August 1939; Ben­ nett Clark, CR* 11 October 1939, 280; Senator Clyde Reed (Rep.-Kans.), CR* 11 October 1939, 280; Nye, 13 October 1939, 365; Daniel M. O’Connell, S.J., “War Objective,“ Catholic World 151 (April 1940): 72; Methodist missionary E. Stanley Jones, “What Is America’s Role in This Crisis?“ Christian C entury 58 (9 March 1941 ): 388; “War in Europe,“ statement of 1939 National Conference of FOR, Fel­ lowship 5 (October 1939): 3; Rankin, CR* 24 April 1941,3282; Colonel Robert R. McCormick, letter to Lord Kemsley, entered CR* 28 November 1941, A5330; Socialist writer Bertram D. Wolfe, Washington Square College [New York University] Bulletin* 11 November 1939, 1; Dorothy Detzer to Frederick Brown Harris, 14 October 1939, WIL Papers; Holt, CR* 18 October 1939,548. 41. Page, Am herst [College] Student* 27 November 1939,1. See also Page, Brown (University] D aily Herald* 21 November 1939,1. 42. Shipstead, CR* 25 February 1941,1350. 43. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as W artime Statesm an (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni­ versity Press, 1991), 68; John Lamberton Harper, American Visions o f Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt* George E Kennan* and Dean G. Acheson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 54,57-60. 44. Nock, review of Arthur Bryant, Unfinished Victory (London: Macmillan, 1940), in Scribner’s Com m entator 9 (April 1941): 17; Lindbergh, text of address, NYT* 16September 1939,9. See also Den­ nis, WFL 100 (27 June 1940): 2. 45. See, for example, free market economist Frank Chodorov, “Hitler—Economic Threat?“ Scrib­ ner’s Com m entator 9 (March 1941): 33. 46. dark, CR* 24 February 1941,1295. 47. See, for example, Edwin M. Borchard to William E. Borah, 18 April 1939; Borchard to George Norris, 27 February 1941; Borchard to Hiram W. Johnson, 19 February 1941, Borchard Papers; Sena­ tor David I. Walsh (Dem.-Mass.), CR* 21 June 1940,8784; Hearst, “In the News,“ SFE* 12 April 1940, 1; “Not America’s War,“ Christian Century 56 (22 November 1939): 1433. 48. “Bloody Merry-Go-Round,“ NYDN* 29 November 1940,35. The News accused the peacemak­ ers of lopping off Bulgaria’s Mediterranean outlet, excluding Russia from the Baltic, and erasing Aus­ tria-Hungary’s long Adriatic coastline. 49. See, for example, Hoffman, CR* 6 February 1941, 722; “What Price Plutocracy?“ American Guardian* 22 September 1939,4. 50. “The Peace Offensive,“ New Republic 101 (11 October 1939): 256, which also mentioned Ger­ many’s former colonies; “Hitler’s Terms,“ CT, 7 October 1939, 10; Villard, W ithin Germany* 54-55; “The Damned and Dangerous Fascination of War,” N YD N *29 December 1939,19; Dennis, WFL 99 (20 June 1940): 3; “But Boake Carter Says,“ SFE* 16 March 1940,9. 51. Barnes, “Course of U.S. in the War,“ NYWT* 15 January 1940, 14; FOR staffer John Swomley, Wesleyan [University] Argus* 22 April 1940,3; Flynn, Harvard [University] Crimson, 8 May 1941, l.The New York Daily News had called for Britain to voluntarily give Germany some African colonies, but it did not say which ones. See “Treaty of Versailles Tom Up,” N Y D N 15 October 1939,47.

356

Notes to Pages 34-36

52. Flynn, "Nazi Economy—A Threat?” Scribner's C om m entator 10 (August 1941): 24. See also Flynn, "Stalin Moves in Europe,” N YW T, 13 December 1939,30. 53. See, for example, Amos Pinchot to W. Earl Hall, 1 December 1941, Pinchot Papers; Lindbergh, entry of 21 September 1939, W artim e Journals, 260; entry of 3 October 1939,269; Cudahy, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,169,177. 54. "But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 16 September 1939,13; William R. Castle to R. D. Stuart Ir., 11 March 1941, Box 63, AFC Papers. See also Castle Diary, 28 February 1941. 55. "A Long War Means a Spreading War,” N YD N , 17 January 1940,29; "Stumblebum Diplomacy Here,” 24 June 1940,21. 56. Nye, CR, 26 February 1941,1435; Symes,"Hold That Line: Whither Hitler?” Calk 29 June 1940, 4. See also Symes, "Hold That Line: American ‘Opportunity’?” Calk 12 July 1941,5. 57. Hearst, "In the News,” SFE, 6 May 1940,1; Flynn, Harvard [University) Crimson, 8 May 1941, 1; Chase, “What Are the Germans After?” Progressive, 29 November 1941,1. 58. Dennis, WFL 68 (16 November 1939): 2; "The Germans Will Starve Last,” N YD N , 6 May 1940,21. 59. "A Prediction: Hitler’s Peace Plan,” Social Justice, 7 April 1941,15; Burdick, CR, 12 August 1941, 7002; Hearst, see "In the News,” SFE, 29 May 1941,1. 60. "Washington Picture,” Uncensored 89 (14 June 1941): 4. The projection came from Frank Hanighen’s memo to the journal, 15 May 1941, Hertzberg Papers. 61. Charles E. Coughlin, "A Page of Comment,” Social Justice, 20 May 1940,20. For further projec­ tions in Social Justice, see J. S. Barnes, “The Real Issues of War,” 9 October 1939,7; J. S. Barnes, "After Peace, What?” 30 October 1939,9; "Forecast of Peace Terms,” 14 October 1940,8; "Outlining the New Europe,” 21 October 1940, 8; "A New Deal for the Old World,” 28 October 1940, 13; "A Prediction: Hitler’s Peace Plan,” 7 April 1941,15. 62. Chamberlin, “The Coming Peace,” American M ercury 51 (November 1940): 264-65; Dennis, WFL 136 (6 March 1941): 5; WFL 99 (20 June 1940): 3. For further Dennis projections, see WFL 85 (14 March 1940): 4; 124 (12 December 1940): 3. 63. Cudahy, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,148. See also Lundeen, CR, 11 July 1940,9512. 64. Cudahy, "Hitler or Americas,” Life, 9 June 1941,34-37; "Britain’s War Aims; Germany’s Peace Feelers,” Peace Action 7 (May 1941): 5; J. S. Barnes, "The Real Issues of War,” Social Justice, 9 October 1939,7. 65. For the scholarly literature on Hitler's war aims, see Ian Kershaw, The N azi Dictatorship: Prob­ lems and Perspectives o f Interpretation, 2d ed. (London: Arnold, 1989), chap. 6; Meir Michaelis, "World Power Status or World Dominion? A Survey of the Literature on Hitler’s 'Plan of World Dominion,'” H istorical Journal 15 (1972): 331-60; John Lukacs, The H itler o f H istory (NewYork: Knopf, 1997),chap. 5. For stress on continental goals, see, for example, Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler's Weltanschauung: A Blue­ p rin t fo r Anver (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1972), chap. 2; Geoffrey Stoakes, H itler and the Q uest fo r World Dom ination: N azi Ideology and Foreign Policy in the 1920s (New York: Berg, 1986). For stress on world mastery, see, for example, Gerhard L Weinberg, Germany, H itler, and W orld War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Milan Hauner, "Did Hitler Want World Domi­ nation?” Journal o f Contemporary H istory 13 (January 1978): 15-32. 66. Hearst, "In the News,” SFE, 29 May 1941,1; Henry Elmer Barnes, "Keep Out of War and Inves­ tigate the War-Mongers” [draft], 47-48, Box 252, Lundeen Papers; Dennis, WFL 126 (26 December 1940) : 4. See also General Robert E. Wood, "Our Foreign Policy,” address to Chicago Council of Inter­ national Relations, 4 October 1940, in CR, A6302. 67. Lindbergh, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,538. 68. Among those who believed that Hitler sought world conquest were Congressman Frank B. Keefe (Rep.-Wis.), CR, 3 September 1940,11,373; Vandenberg, CR, 18 February 1941, 1102; attorney John Finerty, testimony, HFAC, 14 October 1941,44. For Roosevelt, see "President's Call for Full Re­ sponse on Defense,” N YT, 30 December 1940,6. 69. Baldwin, U nited We Stand! D efense o f the W estern H em isphere (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941) , 41.

Notes to Pages 36-39

357

70. Wheeler cited in I. F. Stone, "Munichman from Montana,” N ation 152 (11 January 1941): 36. See also Princeton America First Committee chapter, [Princeton University] D aily Princetonian , 28 October 1941,4; Congressman Robert Rich (Rep.-Pa.), CR, 4 October 1940,13225. 71. Sumner, CR, 1 November 1939,1259; Holt, CR, 2 January 1941,14,013. 72. Rauschning, The Revolution o f N ihilism (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City, 1939), 285. See also Rauschning, The Voice o f Destruction (New York: Putnam, 1940). For historians’ debate over Rauschning’s evidence, see Thedor Schieder, H erm ann Rauschnings "Gespräche m it H itler9 als Geschichtsquelle (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1972); Wolfgang Hänel, H erm ann Rauschnings uGesprache m it H itler9—Eine Geschichtsfälschung (Ingolstadt: Zeitgeschichte Forschungstelle, 1984). 73. See, for example, General Robert E. Wood, speech to National Association of Manufacturers, 13 December 1940, Box 286, AFC Papers. 74. Castle Diary, 17 April 1940. For similar respect for Rauschning, see Gillis, "Scandinavian Inva­ sion: Crime or Blunder?” Catholic World 151 (May 1940): 129. 75. Lundeen, CR, 11 July 1940,9512. 76. Barnes, "New Peril Seen to Neutrality,” N YW T, 1 October 1939,22. Barnes did find Hitler un­ reasonable in occupying non-German regions in Czechoslovakia and in conquering areas in Poland beyond the Corridor. 77. Nye, CR, 26 February 1941,1435. 78. Darré, "Nazis Envision Chattel Slavery for People of Conquered Nations,” NYT, 6 December 1940,1,10; "Secret Nazi Speech,” Life, 9 December 1940,43-44; Ickes, speech to Jewish National Work­ ers' Alliance of America, 13 April 1941, in CR, A1770. See also NYT, 6 December 1940,1; "Nazis Ob­ ject,” Time, 19 May 1941,63. 79. Darré denial, NYT, 8 December 1940,55; Gallup, NYT, 27 December 1940,5. 80. A. J. Carlson, unpublished letter to Life [copy], 9 December 1940, Box 289, AFC Papers; Clark, CR, 24 February 1941,1297. For other doubts of its authenticity, see Nye, CR, 25 February 1941,1364; Norman Thomas,"Your World and Mine: Some Pro-War Propaganda,” Call, 21 December 1940,5; Cu­ dahy, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,179. 81. Flynn, "Nazi Economy—A Threat?” Scribner's Com m entator 10 (August 1941): 22-23; John Haynes Holmes to William Roger Greeley, 28 May 1940, Holmes Papers. At one point, Holmes claimed that he could not look upon a German victory with equanimity. Letter to John Middleton, 30 April 1940, Holmes Papers. 82. "After the Ball,” NYDN, 9 June 1941,19. 83. For general public opinion, including Fortune of April 1941, see Cantril, Public O pinion, 774-76. For Gallup polls, NYT, 29 September 1939,13; 2 June 1940,24. 84. Commonweal, for example, blamed the British and French for stating their war aims in the most hazy and negative terms. See "The Belgium-Holland Mediation Offer,” 31 (17 November 1939): 85. 85. Barnes, "This Unholy War! Crimes of the British,” N Y W T , 29 March 1940, 22. Laski was a prominent socialist political scientist. 86. Chamberlain, text, NYT, 4 September 1939,8; "The Spreading War,” CT, 19 September 1939, 12; Gillis, "Crazy Leader of a Sane People,” Catholic W orld 150 (October 1939): 4; "Peace Talk,” NYDN, 30 September 1939,17; Villard,"Men and Events,” N ation 149 (14 October 1939): 12. 87. Lothian, text, NYT, 26 October 1939,4; “The ‘Phony War,'” NYDN, 27 October 1939,37. 88. Halifax, text, NYT, 8 November 1939,2; "European Devil Dance,” NYDN, 9 November 1939,9; Gillis, "What Are They Fighting For?” Catholic World 150 (December 1939): 259-60. 89. For attacks on Cooper as propagandist, see "Family Album,” Uncensored 9 (2 December 1939): 1; Thomas, "Your World And Mine,” Call, 4 November 1939, 3; "British Propaganda,” Call, 18 May 1940,3; Burton Rascoe to George Britt [copy], 5 September 1940, Hertzberg Papers. 90. Duff Cooper quoted in D aily Worker, 8 January 1940,6. For similar Communist attacks, "IWo Fronts,” New Masses 35 (7 May 1940): 21; "Duff Cooper Gives the Game Away,” D aily Worker, 24 April 1940,6. 91. Duff Cooper, speech to London’s Royal Society of St. George, NYT, 24 April 1940,3; speech to constituency meeting, NYT, 26 April 1940,11 ; Tim e, 6 May 1940,29.

358

Notes to Pages 39-40

92. “Should the German People Be Punished?” Commonweal 32 (3 May 1940): 29; “British Pro­ paganda,” Uncensored 33 (18 May 1940): 3. See also Dennis, WFL 91 (25 April 1940): 5; Theodore Dreiser, America Is Worth Saving (New York: Modem Age Books, 1941 ), 220. 93. See, for example, Hoffman, CR, 13 January 1941, 129; Congressman George Bender (Rep.Ohio), CR, 16 January 1941,162; Bender, CR, 19 January 1941,384; Keefe, CR, 30 January 1941,421; Rich, CR, 4 February 1941,560; O'Connor, CR, 21 February 1941,212; “The Bitter Question,” Satur­ day Evening Post 213 (8 March 1941): 24; “What Are British War Aims?” S t Louis Post-Dispatch, 2 March 1941; Charles A. Lindbergh, “Letter to Americans,” Collier's 107 (29 March 1941): 75; “War Aims,” America 64 (1 March 1941 ): 575; “Should America Formulate Peace Aims Now?” Commonweal 33 (28 March 1941 ): 555; “War Aims?—Churchill Still Keeps Them a Secret,” D aily Worker, 15 Febru­ ary 1941,6; Vandenberg, NYT, 2 January 1941,1; “Q 8cA,” Uncensored 66 (4 January 1941): 4; “What Are Our War Aims?” NYDN, January 29,1941,27. 94. For Times, see Herbert O'Brien, chairman, NewYork Committee to Keep America Out of War, testimony, SFRC, 7 February 1941, citing Times of that day. See 637. For Liddell Hart, see “A War for Sea Power,” Christian C entury 58 (16 April 1941): 521. For archbishop, see Wheeler, CR, 27 February 1941, 1472. For varied journals and for such leaders as Lord Ponsonby; Richard Stokes, Labor M.P. from Ipswich; editor Wickham Steed; and Eleanor Rathbone, Independent M.P. for the Combined English Universities, see “Statement of War Aims Urged by British Parliament and Press,” Peace Action 7 (January 1941): 6-7. 95. Nye and Wheeler, CR, 27 January 1941,311. For endorsement of the Nye-Wheder resolution, see “What Are Our War Aims?” NYDN, 29 January 1941,27. 96. Resolutions, WIL National Board, Baltimore, 18-19 January 1941,2, in WIL Papers. 97. Halifax, text, NYT, 26 March 1941, 10; “Halifax and War Aims,” Uncensored 78 (29 March 1941 ): 4; “Lord Halifax Reveals British War Aims,” C hristian Century 58 (9 April 1941): 485; “Our War Aims,” N YD N , 27 March 1941,29. See also “What Are Our War Aims?” NYDN, 29 December 1940,35; “What Revolution?” NYDN, 13 January 1941,19; “Halifax's Speech,” M ilitant, 29 March 1941,6. 98. Eden, excerpts, NYT, 30 May 1941,4; “Eden Gives First Outline of British War Aims,” C hrist­ ian C entury 58 (11 June 1941): 772-73. 99. “Are the Allies Shadow-Boxing?” New Republic 101 (27 September 1939): 197; Moley, speech to Harvard Club, Boston, 8 November 1939, in Hoover Papers. 100. For other accusations that theAllies would deal with Goering, see“America anda Federal Europe,” Christian Century 57 (24 January 1940): 104; A. B.Magil, “Who’s Afraid of Peace?” New Masses 35 (9April 1940): 3, citing Duff Cooper, “Does England Expect Us to Fight?” Current H istory 51 (December 1939): 18-20,63; G. S. Johnson, “Is Britain's Government Democratic?” New Masses 39 (8 April 1941): 10. 101. “Of Things to Come,” Uncensored 9 (2 December 1939): 3-4. Evidence of such negotiations included the kidnapping of two British secret agents at Venloo, Holland, who supposedly were carried across the border by Goering's rivals, and the flight of German industrialist Fritz Thyssen, who real­ ized that continued war meant his liquidation at the hands of Russian imperialists or German revolu­ tionaries. See also “Of Things to Come,” Uncensored 10 (9 December 1939): 3, where Uncensored found that the British Blue Book showed former ambassador to Berlin Sir Neville Henderson and former am­ bassador to Warsaw Sir Howard W. Kennard both whitewashing Goering. 102. Socialist Party, resolutions of 6-8 April 1940, in CR, A2293. 103. Dennis, WFL 136 (6 March 1941): 3. 104. For references to the Hohenzollems, see Philip La Follette, testimony, SFRC, 4 February 1941, 286; Dwight Macdonald, “Sparks in the News,” Socialist Appeal, 16 December 1939,4. The Christian C entury denied the possibility. “What Hinders Peace?” Christian C entury 56 (4 October 1939): 1265. See also Berle, entry of 15 November 1939, Navigating, 270. 105. “War Aims,” Uncensored 4 (28 October 1939): 1-2. In the same issue, it also noted the strong belief in France that only the restoration of monarchies in Central and Eastern Europe could check the absolutism of Hitler and Stalin. For further mention of the Hapsburgs or of a Bavarian-Austrian union, see “War Aims” [special supplement], Uncensored 60 (25 November 1939): 1; Frank Hanighen, “How France Is Taking the War,” New Republic 101 (30 December 1939): 256; Sargent, Bulletin #22,15

Notes to Pages 40-41

359

December 1939, G etting US into War, 211; "British Propaganda," Uncensored 33 (18 May 1940): 3; Libby, "Behind This War a Problem of Populations," Peace Action 6 (January 1940): 2; "What's Behind This HapsburgVisit?” Christian C entury 57 (27 March 1940): 403; Czech theologian Matthew Spinka, "A Hapsburg Trojan Horse," Christian C entury 57 (20 March 1940): 379-81. 106. "Restoration Drama," Uncensored 23 (9 March 1940): 2. 107. N Y T , 7 March 1940,3; Gilbert, Churchill, 6:943-44. 108. See, for example, newsletter editor Franklin Roudybush to Sidney Hertzberg, ca. spring 1940, Hertzberg Papers; Henry Haskell, "A Socialist Peace for Europe," Call, 25 November 1939,1. 109. "If Repeal Wins,” Christian Century 56 (8 November 1939): 1369.1nApril 1940, the Protestant weekly considered the restored Hapsburg kingdom as "that 'Catholic buffer state' which the Vatican, only a little while ago, was hoping might be erected on the ruins of Poland." "Roman Catholic Inter­ ests in the German Reich," 57 (24 April 1940): 532. 110. "One for Goebbels," New Republic 102 (18 March 1940): 359. 111. Some interventionists, too, distinguished between Nazism and German militarism but saw their own policies as the only means of eliminating the latter, more fundamental enemy. Livingstone Hartley and Frank S. Goodwin, "Behind the Nazis," Washington Office Inform ation Letter 44 (14 No­ vember 1941): 3-4, Box 35, the Papers of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, Princeton University (hereafter cited as CDAAA Papers). 112. See, for example, Norman Thomas, Vassar M iscellany News, 21 May 1941,4; C. Hartley Grat­ tan, “The Struggle for Peace," Harper's M agazine 180 (February 1940): 300; "The President's Message," Progressive, 4 January 1941,8; theologian Albert Palmer, testimony, SFRC, 22 October 1941,96; Vassar president Henry Noble MacCracken, testimony, SFRC, 22 October 1941,101; Holt, CR, 21 June 1940, 8815; American Guardian, 22 September 1939,4; "What Hinders Peace?" Christian C entury 56 (4 Oc­ tober 1939): 1265; AFC Speakers Bureau, "Questions Posed to Speakers of the William Allen White Committee," [1941], in Doenecke, IDU, 116. 113. Kirby Page, How to Keep America O ut o f War, 3; "The War Aims of the Nations," Commonweal 30 (13 October 1939): 54; Villard, "Issues and Men—If This Be Treason—," N ation 150 (3 February 1940): 130; Villard, "The President's Address," Progressive, 7 June 1941,5. See also Villard, "Adolf Hitler Is Not the Sole Enemy," Progressive, 29 November 1941,8. 114. Johnson, "None of Our Gravy," N Y W T , 4 October 1939, 25; Johnson, SFN, 28 September 1940,13. 115. For references to another Versailles, see Bruce Barton, broadcast, NBC, 29 October 1939, in CR, A593; John La Farge, "The Peace Aims of Europe Should Unify the States," America 63 (10 Febru­ ary 1940): 480; "The Allies* War Aims,” New Republic 101 (4 October 1939): 226; Harry Elmer Barnes, "Course of U.S. in the War," N YW T, 15 January 1940,14; Harry Elmer Barnes, "Peace at Once! Keep­ ing Hitler Appeased," N YW T, 27 March 1940,28; "The Voice of Versailles Again,” CT, 3 June 1941,12; "Treaty of Versailles Tom Up,” NYD N , 15 October 1939,47; “The Pendulum Swings Back,” NYD N , 12 April 1941,15; "How Will They Cut Up the Bearskin?” N YD N , 31 May 1941,13; “Double Talk," NYD N, 1 June 1941,41; Robert R. McCormick to Congressman Charles S. Dewey (Rep.-Ill.), 25 November 1941, in CR, A5330; John Swomley, Wesleyan [University] Argus, 22 April 1940,3; John Haynes Holmes to Henry Smith Leiper, 20 November 1939, Holmes Papers. 116. Nye, CR, 12 October 1939, 382; Frederick J. Libby, "Our People Want Neither War nor Em­ pire,” Peace Action 7 (February 1941): 2. See also "The Search for a Lasting Peace II: Germany and Eu­ rope's Chaos," Christian C entury 58 (19 February 1941 ): 249. 117. See, for example, Reynolds, CR, 21 October 1939,693; Chavez, CR, 25 October 1939,826; Henry Haskell, "A Socialist Peace for Europe," Call, 25 November 1939,4; "What Hinders Peace?" Christian Cen­ tury 56 (4 October 1939): 1265; Dennis, WFL 131 (30 January 1941): 4; WFL 68 (16 November 1941): 2. William Henry Chamberlin thought France might gain the Rhineland but would have to follow British lead in all such matters. "The Coming Peace," American Mercury 51 (November 1940): 268-69. 118. In January 1940, the Christian C entury noted that Le Temps, frequently a voice of the French Foreign Office, had recently suggested that Russia too be partitioned. "America and a Federal Europe,” Christian Century 57 (24 January 1940): 104.

360

Notes to Pages 41-43

119. “Oswald Garrison Villard on the Present European Situation,” 20 December 1939, NCPW minutes; Villard, “Issues and Men: Collective Security Must Come,” N ation 149 (23 December 1939): 711; “De Valera Also Raises His Voice for Peace,” N YD N , 27 December 1939,27; “A Long War Means a Spreading War,” N YD N , 17 January 1940,29. 120. Libby, “Shall We Try to Stop the War in Europe?” Peace Action 6 (March 1940): 3. See also Libby, “Behind This War a Problem of Populations,” Peace Action 6 (January 1940): 2; Sargent, Bulletin #37,16 February 1940, G etting US into War, 287. 121. Villard, “How Long Can Europe Endure?” Christian C entury 57 (2 October 1940): 1207; Fey, “Save Neutrality! Save Peace!” Christian C entury 56 (11 October 1939): 1234; sterilization, Christopher Hollis, “The Situation in Europe,” Catholic Digest 4 (December 1939): 79; “From the Maginot Line,” Uncensored 33 (18 May 1940): 4 (emphasis in original); Wheeler, NIT, 21 March 1941,8. See also La Follette Jr., CR, 12 October 1939,331; John A. Danaher to Philip C. Jessup, 18 June 1940, the Papers of Philip C. Jessup, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as Jessup Pipers). CHAPTER 4: AM ERICAN GOALS

1. Howard K. Beale, “Some Fallacies of the Interventionist View” (pamphlet; Washington, D.C.: author, 1941), 7. 2. Muste, “This Senseless War,” Fellowship 7 (August 1941): 140; Thomas, Cornell [University] D aily Sun* 23 May 1941,1; “Halifax and War Aims,” Uncensored 78 (29 March 1941 ): 4. See also Nor­ man Thomas to Ralph Harlow, 4 October 1940, Thomas Papers. 3. Chester Bowles to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 30 July 1941, AFC Papers; Aiken, CR, 25 February 1941,136; Dennis, WFL 170 (30 October 1941): 3. 4. For Lippmann and Luce, see Frederick J. Libby to Mrs. William F. Comfort, 7 April 1941, NCPW Papers. Similarly, the Christian C entury pointed disapprovingly to columnist Walter Lipp­ mann, who called the struggle a war for sea power, with the control of the Atlantic at stake. See “A War for Sea Power,” C hrbtian C entury 58 (16 April 1941): 521. Under attack was Lippmann's article “The Atlantic and America,” Life, 7 April 1941,84-92. For the including of Stimson and Thompson, see Taft, radio address, “Shall the United States Enter the European War?” 17 May 1941, in CR, A2344. For El­ liott, see “God, Inc.,” Uncensored 110 (1 November 1941): 2; Social Justice, 8 December 1941,20. 5. Villard, “America Is Not God,” Progressive, 21 June 1941, 5. See also Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine: Which American Century’?” Call, 22 March 1941,5. For Luce’s editorial, see “Amer­ ican Century," Life, 17 February 1941,61-65. For its origin, see Robert E. Herzstein, H enry R. Luce: A Political Portrait o f the M an W ho Created the American C entury (NewYork: Scribner’s, 1994), chap. 16; Robert T. Elson, Tim e Inc.: The Intim ate H istory o f a Publishing Enterprise, 1923-1941,v ol. 1 (NewYork: Atheneum, 1968), 460-64. 6. For Knox’s speech, see “Secretary Knox’s Address Before the Bar Association,” N Y T , 2 October 1941,4. For Libby, see testimony, HFAC, 14 October 1941,64. For protests, see, for example, attorney John Finerty, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941, 199; “The Knox War Theses,” Commonweal 34 (17 October 1941): 605; “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 8 October 1941,11; Detzer, report of national sec­ retary, WIL, 18 October 1941, WIL Papers; Vandenberg, CR, 27 October 1941,8258; Capper, CR, 31 October 1941,8386; B. C. Clark, CR, 1 November 1941,8407; Edwin M. Borchard to John A. Danaher, 13 October 1941, Borchard Papers; “Eight Points vs. One Hundred Years,” Uncensored 110 (8 Novem­ ber 1941): 1; “The Road to War,” N YD N , 3 October 1941,37; “A War on TWo Fronts?” N YD N , 6 Octo­ ber 1941, 6; Mrs. Orris Gravener [Dorothy Meeders Robinson] and Dorothy Detzer to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11 October 1941, WIL Papers; Amos Pinchot to K. C. Warder, 10 October 1941, and Philip C. Jessup to Amos Pinchot, 10 October 1941, both in Pinchot Papers. 7. Jordan in “Out of Their Mouths,” New Masses 38 (13 December 1940): 4; “Question," New Masses 38 (28 January 1941): 20. See also “Design for Empire,” New Masses 38 (31 December 1940): 3-5; Marcantonio, CR, 5 February 1941,659; “A Frank Admission of FDR’s War Aims,” D aily Worker, 27 December 1940,1,4.

Notes to Pages 43-45

361

8. Roosevelt« annual message« CR, 6 lanuary 1941, 46. In March 1941, Roosevelt conceded he might have gone too far by saying that “they may not be immediately attainable throughout the world.” See “President’s Address to the Democracies,” N Y T , 16 March 1941,42. 9. See, for example, Alf Landon and B.C. Clark, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,689-90; “ALot of Loose Talk,” CT, 8 lanuary 1941,10; “The President's Message,” N YD N »7 January 1941,19; Capper, radio broadcast, “Shall the United States Police the World?” in CR, 21 January 1941, A169; Marcantonio, CR, 4 February 1941, 539; Vandenberg, CR, 18 February 1941, 1101; Capper, CR, 22 February 1941, 1273; Shipstead, CR, 25 February 1941, 1349; Wheeler, CR, 9 June 1941, 4864; John Haynes Holmes to Franldin D. Roosevelt, 16 April 1941, Holmes Papers; ed. Paul Palmer, “New Deal World Tour,” Scribner's C om m entator 10 (May 1941): 8. 10. Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 13 January 1941, Borchard Papers. For a compari­ son to the original crusades, see “After the Crusade, What?” N YD N , 27 July 1941,37. 11. Hutchins, sermon, Rockefeller Memorial Chapel, University of Chicago, 30 March 1941, in CR, A1581. 12. For similar attacks, see Congressman Noah Mason (Rep.-Ill.), CR, 24 January 1941, A235; Woodruff, CR, 29 May 1941,4574; “The NewApocalypse,” Saturday Evening Post 2 13 (22 March 1941): 26; Hiram Johnson, radio speech, NBC, 31 May 1941, in CR, A2596; Burdick, CR, 4 February 1941, 539; Archbishop Francis Joseph Beckman of Dubuque, “Brother Against Brother,” Time, 4 August 1941,46; Castle Diary, 24 July 1941; Robert La Follette Jr., CR, 24 February 1941,1302; Amos Pinchot, “To the Editor,” 3 March 1941, Pinchot Papers. 13. La Follette, CR, 24 February 1941,1308; Tinkham, CR, 5 February 1941,626. See also resolu­ tions, National Board, WIL, Baltimore, 18-19 January 1941,2, W1L Papers; Harry Elmer Barnes cited by Nye, 26 February 1941,1431; Senator Charles Tobey (Rep.-N.H.), CR, 5 March 1941,1791; Robsion, CR, 7 November 1941,8689. 14. See, for example, Voorhis, CR, 21 March 1941,2483; Keefe, CR, 30 January 1941,421. 15. Upton Close [Josef Washington Hall],“Common Sense for Americans,” Living Age 358 (August 1940): 511; Flynn, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,21; Taft, “Shall the United States Enter the Eu­ ropean War?” radio address, 17 May 1941, in CR, A2344. See also historian Fred Harvey Harrington, [University of] Wisconsin D aily Cardinal, 12 April 1940,1. 16. Beard, testimony, SFRC, 13 February 1941, A627. See also Senator Danaher, Yak D aily News, 7 January 1941,5. 17. Welles, N Y T , 23 July 1941,1; “The Gentleman from Oxon Hill Road,” CT, 24 July 1941,8. 18. “Alternative Paths of Foreign Policy,” CT, 23 November 1941,12. For Welles’s remarks, see N YT, 12 November 1941,3. 19. See, for example, Cudahy, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,160; publisher Frank Gannett to Justin Wroe Nixon, 14 October 1941, the Papers of Frank Gannett, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York (hereafter cited as Gannett Papers); Felix Morley to R. E. Wood, 4 January 1941, the Papers of Felix Morley, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa (hereafter cited as Morley Pa­ pers); John Haynes Holmes to Rabbi S. E. Starrels, 20 November 1939, Holmes Papers. 20. Nye, [University of North Carolina] D aily Tar Heel, 19 November 1941, 1; Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 5 February 1941,2. 21. For representative anti-League comments, see Charles A. Lindbergh, testimony, SFRC, 6 Febru­ ary 1941,523; Charles Clayton Morrison, testimony, SFRC, 24 October 1941,247; Raymond Moley to Alf Landon, 1 August 1941, Moley Papers; Norman Thomas to Margaret Snyder, 22 August 1941, Thomas Papers; Anne Morrow Lindbergh to Robert E. Wood, 11 October 1940, the Papers of Robert E. Wood, HHPL (hereafter cited as Wood Papers); Quincy Howe, “Is War Inevitable If Britain Falls?” Am erican Forum o f the A ir 3 (9 February 1941): 5; Barnes, “Keep Out of War and Investigate the WarMongers” [draft], 41, Box 252, Lundeen Papers. For milder comments, see publicist O. K. Armstrong, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,569; Albert W. Palmer, testimony, SFRC, 22 October 1941,94; May­ nard Krueger, testimony, SFRC, 24 October 1941,230; Shipstead, CR, 16 October 1939,451,455. 22. See, for example, “Watch Out for Propaganda,” Social Justice, 18 September 1939, 6; Barnes, “Armistice Day Reminders,” N Y W T , 11 November 1939,16.

362

Notes to Pages 45-47

23. Beak, Pan America: A Program fo r the Western Hemisphere (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940), 115; Chamberlain, uBeware the Wilsonian Ghost," Progressive* 22 November 1941, 5; Edwin M. Borchard to Dr. Alberto Ulloa, 17 November 1941, Borchard Papers; Edwin M. Borchard, letter to SFRC, 25 January 1941, committee hearings, 653. See also Congressman Melvin J. Mass (Rep.-Minn.), "Fur­ ther Aid to Britain," Am erican Forum o f the A ir 2 (23 November 1940): 12. 24. "The Case for Union," Time* 17 March 1941,15-16. 25. Time, 17 March 1941,16; Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Trium ph o f Internationalism D uring World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 38-39. He did not think China, Japan, and India were yet ready for membership and saw no likelihood of the Soviet Union applying. See Clarence K. Streit, Union Now w ith B ritain (New York: Harper, 1941), 188-93. 26. Time* 17 March 1941,16. 27. Streit, Union Now*46; Time* 17 March 1941,16. 28. Streit, Union Now w ith Britain* 17. 29. Richard A. Moore, Bulletin #388, 3 July 1941, Box 279, AFC Papers; AFC Research Bureau, "Union Now?" D id You Know 16 (6 August 1941), in Doenecke, IDU*248; Social Justice* 29 July 1940, 14; George Holden Tinkham to Secretary of the Navy, in CR* 17 June 1941,5266; Holt, CR* 3 October 1940,13,085-86. See also Nye, CR* 7 November 1941,8627. 30. "Whose America?" Saturday Evening Post 214 (25 October 1941): 24. Hore-Belisha, in calling for union of the United States and Britain, said the Declaration of Independence must be replaced with a "declaration of interdependence." NYT* 18 September 1941,8. Wedgwood endorsed a federal union that included the United States, Britain, the Low Countries, Norway, China, and even a Germany purged of Nazism. NYT* 10 October 1941,4. In attacking Hore-Belisha, the N Y D N claimed that not only would such a union lead to marrying the United States to Britain’s eternal quarrels in Europe but it would also permit British goods to undersell the United States at home. "I'm Gonna Get My Big Brother to Lick You," NYDN* 15 June 1941,41. 31. "A Vision of Unity," Saturday Evening Past 213 (22 March 1941): 26. 32. See, for example, Sargent, Time* 25 December 1939, 34; Nye, CR* 4 March 1941, 1725; "Cab­ bages and Kings," Scribner's C om m entator 10 (July 1941): 3; "Postwar Union with Britain?" NYDN* 13 February 1941, 29; Eleanor Hart, "Times Have Changed," Scribner's Com m entator 10 (July 1941): 51-53; Congressman Stephen Day (Rep.-Ill.), radio address, 15 June 1941, in CR* A2878. Day’s book We M ust Save the R epublic A B rieffor the Declaration o f Independence and the C onstitution o f the U nited States (Washington, D.C.: Shaw, 1941) was an all-out assault on Union Now. 33. "But Boake Carter Says," SFE* 24 November 1939, 9; 15 November 1939, 15; 12 January 1940,9; Holt, CR* 3 October 1940,13,086; Sargent, "The Dream of Cecil Rhodes," Bulletin #11,16 October 1939, G etting US into War* 143-46. Journalist Edward Price Bell denied that Cecil Rhodes

ever foresaw a conflict involving Germany; rather, he wanted joint British-German-American lead­ ership. The noted journalist saw Union Now an offshoot of "New Dealism." Letter, C T* 29 April 1941,10. 34. TVevor, “Union Now?" in CR* 5 June 1941, A2698; Amos Pinchot, open letter to President Roo­ sevelt, 20 June 1941, Pinchot Papers; "Inside England," Uncensored 90 (21 June 1941): 1-2; "Britain as a State in Our Union," CT* 21 September 1940,10. For an additional attack, see "Britain and Federal­ ism," CT* 23 March 1941, 16. For explicit endorsements of Uncensoreds position, see Frank C Wal­ drop, “Union How?" WTH*25 July 1941,13. 35. See, for example, Bennett Champ Clark, “Union Now?" Rotarian 57 (October 1940): 57; “Com­ ment," America 64 (15 March 1941): 619; Waldrop, “Whose Union?" W TH * 13 August 1941,8; “The Fetish of Independence," Saturday Evening Post 213 (19 April 1941 ): 28. 36. Sargent, “The Dream of Cecil Rhodes," Bulletin #11, 16 October 1939, G etting US into War* 143-46,148. 37. Howe, “Union Now Means War Tomorrow," Forum 102 (July 1939): 31-32. See also John Haynes Holmes to Trufant Foster, 27 April 1940, Holmes Papers; Lundeen, CR* 11 July 1940, 9512; Dennis, “The Party-State and the Elite," Nation 152 (11 January 1941): 39; Congressman Paul Shafer (Rep.-Mich.), CR* 19 May 1941, A2380.

Notes to Pages 47-49

363

38. Utley, “What Kind of Peace for Europe?“ Saturday Review o f Literature 22 (25 May 1940): 7; Sokolsky, “These Days: Anglo-American Union,“ N ew York Sun, 25 January 1941,16. See also Albert Jay Nock,“'Union Now’: A Review,“ Scribner's C om m entators (May 1941): 21. 39. “Postwar Union with Britain?“ N YD N , 13 February 1941, 29; Norman Thomas to Mercedes Randall, 2 March 1940, Thomas Papers. See also Norman Thomas to Dr. Minnee Maffett, National Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Cubs, 26 August 1941, Thomas Papers. 40. Trevor, “Union Now?“ in CR, 5 June 1941, A2698. See also Norman Thomas, testimony, HFAC, 22 January 1941, 347; Sidney Hertzberg, “Admission of Britain a Reactionary Move,“ Living Age 360 (June 1941): 319; Burton Roscoe to Admiral W. H. Standley [copy], 25 November 1940, Hertzberg Pa­ pers; Libby, “Discussions of Post-War World Begin,” Peace Action 7 (September 1941 ): 4. 41. Chester Bowles to Roy Larsen, 30 April 1941, in Doenecke, 1DU, 286. See also Stuart Chase to Sidney Hertzberg, 18 January 1940, and Sidney Hertzberg to Stuart Chase, 25 January 1940, both in Hertzberg Papers. 42. See, for example, Harold E. Fey, “Save Neutrality! Save Peace!“ Christian C entury 56 (11 Octo­ ber 1939): 1235. For a debate among FOR leaders, see Vernon Nash, “Federal Union and Mediation,“ Fellowship 6 (May 1940): 76-77; A. J. Muste, “What 'Federal Union’ Lacks,“ 78. 43. “A Federated Europe?“ C hristian C entury 56 (6 December 1939): 1496; “The Search for a Last­ ing Peace, IV: America’s Stake,“ 58 (5 March 1941): 312. 44. For stronger endorsements, see Quaker leader Richard R. Wood, “Fresh Hope in Union Now,“ Fellowship 5 (October 1939): 23; Villard, “Issues and Men,“ N ation 149 (14 October 1939): 414; Villard, “Issues and Men: Collective Security Must Come,“ N ation 149 (23 December 1939): 711. 45. Morley Diary, 2 September 1939. In November 1940, he was listed as an endorser of Inter­ democracy Federal Unionists. Sm ith College Associated News, 26 November 1940,1. In June 1940, Mor­ ley voiced some skepticism, claiming Union Now would focus the United States away from the hemi­ sphere and into a European grouping toward which the mass of American opinion was, to say the least, apathetic. “The Formula of Federation,“ Asia 40 (June 1940): 294. 46. Barnes, “Hope for Peace Seen in Union,“ N Y W T , 29 December 1939,12. 47. Chase,“TheWar as a Revolution,” Progressive, 5 April 1941,5; “Ideologies for Export,“ 31 May 1941, 5; “Why Germany Keeps On Winning,“ 6 September 1941,1; “Balancing the Risks,“ 17 May 1941,5. 48. Barnes, “The War and World Revolution,“ Progressive, 15 November 1941,9. 49. Dorothy Detzer to Mrs. Louis N. Robinson, 21 August 1940, WIL Papers. See also John Haynes Holmes, “Is There Any Feasible Plan for Banning War from the World?“ U nity 124 (19 February 1940): 186; Holmes to Shlomo Katz, 26 October 1939, Holmes Papers. 50. WIL National Board meeting, resolutions, 18-19 October 1940, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, 2, WIL Papers. In April 1941, Norman Thomas offered a qualified endorsement of the Tenerowitz reso­ lution, expressing the hope that it might start people thinking all “the right lines,“ but denying that world conditions permitted much action and fearing that Roosevelt might use the initiative to bring the nation into war. Norman Thomas to Edith Wynner, Campaign for World Government, 10 April 1941, Thomas Papers. In October 1939, Thomas had denied that conditions were ready for a federa­ tion of the world. Sm ith College Weekly, 25 October 1939,2. For endorsement of the proposal, see John Haynes Holmes to Tracy Mygatt, 1 October 1941, Holmes Papers. 51. “A Sketch for a Possible Peace Treaty,” Christian C entury 58 (12 March 1941): 353. 52. See, for example, Stuart Chase quoted in Isabel Bacon La Follette, “A Room of Our Own: Stuart Chase aVisitor,“ Progressive, 17 February 1940,7; Paul Porter, “The Struggle of the Empires,“ Call, 23 Sep­ tember 1939,2; Cudahy, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,160; William A. Orton, W illiams [College] Record^27 April 1940,5; RepresentativeAnton Johnson (Rep.-Ill.), CR, 24 April 1941, A3007; Bender, CR, 24 April 1941,3282; “Toward European Federation,“ New Republic 102 (8 January 1940): 38-40. 53. Jessup, Bryn M awr College News, 24 April 1940,2. He recommended similar federations for the Danubian, Balkan, and Baltic areas. 54. Norman Thomas to Ernest Minor Patterson, 27 February 1940, Thomas Papers; Thomas, Brown [University] D aily Herald, 26 April 1940,1; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine: War Aims and Peace Terms,“ Call, 5 April 1941,8. For more socialist endorsement, see Thomas, “Your World and

364

Notes to Pages 49-51

Mine: A Foreign Pblicy for America,” Calk 24 May 1941,5; Henry Haskell, "For a United Socialist Eu­ rope,” Calk 21 October 1939,4; Am erican Guardian, 13 October 1939,1. Communist Joseph Starobin commented that a United States of Europe would involve the military domination of capitalism and ua united front against the USSR.” “The United Sûtes of Europe,” N ew Masses 34 (13 February 1940): 5-7; quoUtion, 7. 55. Vorys, CR, 5 May 1941,3592. 56. Wheeler, CT, 22 June 1941,3; “The Case for Isolation,” N YD N , 5 November 1939,49. See also “Satellite Nations,” N YD N , 17 March 1940,47. In “A United Sûtes of Europe,” 10 December 1939,63, the News noted that Lothian and Chamberlain had recently endorsed the idea although the scheme could only work if England “sUys on the sidelines.” 57. Alfred M. Bingham, The United States o f Europe (NewYork: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1940), 296, 299,302. 58. Bingham, U nited States, 311. 59. Utley, “What Kind of Peace for Europe?” Saturday Review o f Literature 22 (25 May 1940): 7, 20-21. For another favorable comparison of Bingham to Streit, see Harry Elmer Barnes, “Keep Out of War and Investigate the War-Mongers” [draft], n.d., 40, Box 252, Lundeen Papers. 60. Chamberlain, “Europe, Incorporated,” N ew Republic 103 (1 July 1940): 32-33; Drucker, “Feder­ ation,” Common Sense 9 (May 1940): 27. 61. “Why Short ofWar?” Common Sense 9 (May 1941): 144-45; Miller, New American Radicalism, 196. 62. Chamberlain broadcast, text, N YT, 27 November 1939,2; “A Federated Europe?” C hristian C en­ tury 56 (6 December 1939): 1495-96; “America and a Federal Europe,” 57 (24 January 1940): 104. See also the C enturÿs response to the pledge of the inter-Allied council, meeting in London on 28 March 1940, to make peace on the basis of “an effective and lasting guarantee” of mutual security. “Post-War Security for France,” 57 (10 April 1940): 468. For another endorsement of Chamberlain, see John La Farge, “The Peace Aims of Europe Should Unify the Sûtes,” America 62 (10 February 1940): 480. 63. Lothian, address to the Pilgrim Society, N Y T , 26 October 1939,4. See also address, Council of Foreign Relations, N Y T , 5 January 1940,4. 64. Grattan, “The Struggle for Peace,” Harper's M agazine 180 (February 1940): 301, 303. See also “Propaganda,” Saturday Evening Post 212 (10 February 1940): 26. 65. “A Long War Means a Spreading War,” N YD N , 17 January 1940,29. Amos Pinchot feared that United Sûtes would be fighting to drive Germany out of Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, and other conquered nations. Letter to E. F. Hutton, 5 September 1940; to Hiram Johnson, 2 October 1940, Pin­ chot Papers. 66. “Status Quo Ante Bellum,” N YD N , 25 August 1939, 25. See also “The Case for Isolation,” N YD N , 5 November 1939,49; “Satellite Nations,” N YD N , 17 March 1940,47; Bruce Barton to Harry Elmer Barnes, 21 November 1939, Barnes Papers. 67. For Beard’s belief in a planned economy, see Richard HofsUdter, The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Partington (New York: Knopf, 1968), 322-34. For an unusually able exposition of Beard’s whole career, including his foreign policy, see Ellen Nore, Charles A . Beard: A n Intellectual B i­ ography (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983). 68. Beard, “National Politics and War,” Scribner's M agazine 97 (February 1935): 65-70. 69. Charles A. Beard, Giddy M inds and Foreign Quarrels: A n Estim ate o f Am erican Foreign Policy (NewYork: Macmillan, 1939), 57. For the magazine version, see “Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels,” Harper's M agazine 179 (September 1939): 337-51. 70. See, for example, John Haynes Holmes to Harry L Kadet, 11 October 1939, Holmes Papers; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine,” Calk 4 November 1939,3; Lillian Symes, “Hold That Line,” CaU, 28 September 1939,4; Barnes, “Keep Out of War and Investigate the War-Mongers” [draft], 54, Box 252, Lundeen Papers; C. Hartley Grattan, N Y T Book Review, 15 October 1939,3; NCPW official Florence Brewer Boeckel, “Books in a World at War,” Peace Action 6 (September 1939): 7; Edwin M. Borchard to Charles A. Beard, 1 September 1939, Borchard Papers; Congressman Francis H. Case (Rep.-S.Dak.), radio broadcast, 19 September 1939, in CR, A29; Page Hufty, “America First Book List,” Bulletin #476,7 August 1941, in Doenecke, ID U , 121. For excerpts, see Charles A. Beard, “What Should

Notes to Pages 51-54

365

Our Foreign Policy Be?” Peace Action 6 (September 1939): 5. For entire text, see entry of D. Worth Gark, CR, 10 July 1941, A3351-56. 71. Garence A. Berdahl, Kenneth Colegrove, William Rice Sharp, and Quincy Wright, '‘Coopera­ tion of States Held Necessary to World Peace,” NIT, 12 November 1939, sect. 4,8-9. 72. "The Beards Lose the Thread of History,” New Masses 33 (12 December 1939): 25. 73. Beard, A Foreign Policy fo r America (New York: Knopf, 1940). 74. See, for example, Nye, CR, 21 June 1940,8792; Hugh Johnson, “One Man's Opinion,” San Fran­ cisco News, 7 May 1940,13; Hufty, “America First Book List”; Holmes, “American Foreign Policy,” U nity 124 (20 November 1939): 98. 75. Sarles, “Books in a World at War,” Peace Action 6 (May 1940): 7. 76. Ncvins, N Y T Book Review; 26 May 1940,1. See also Ralph Thompson, “Books of the Times,” N YT, 15 May 1940, 23. For a specific attack on Nevins’s review, see Edwin M. Borchard to Spencer Brodney, 28 June 1940, Borchard Papers. 77. See, for example, Quincy Wright, “America's Foreign Relations,” Survey Graphic 29 (August 1940): 443-44; “Fundamentalist v. Modemist,” Tim e, 10 May 1940,90-93. 78. Buell on vulnerability, Isolated America (NewYork: Knopf, 1940), 229-45; Niebuhr, “American Foreign Policy,” N ation 150 (25 May 1940): 656-58; Davis, “America and the War,” Saturday Review o f Literature 22 (10 May 1940): 5,11-12; Bruce Minton, “Spokesmen of the Past,” New Masses 36 (9 July 1940): 26-29. 79. Lerner, “In the Hour of Decision,” N ew Republic 102 (3 June 1940): 765-67; Cousins, “The World Today in Books,” C urrent H istory 51 (June 1940): 1-5; Millis, “Is It Internationalism or 'Continentalism’?” N ew York Herald TYibune Book Review, 19 May 1940, sect. 9,3. For excerpts of Walter Millis’s, Road to War: America, 1914-1917 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1935), see CT, Sunday issues of 8 October-12 November 1939. 80. Anne Morrow Lindbergh, letter to Mrs. Dwight [Elizabeth] Morrow begun 5 June 1940, War W ithin, 100; entry of 4 September 1940,142. 81. Anne Morrow Lindbergh, The Wave o f the Future: A Confession o f Faith (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1940); quotations, respectively, 24,22,12, and 34. 82. Lindbergh, Wave, 16-18. See also entries of, 29 April 1940, and 27 May 1940, War W ithin, 80,93. 83. Lindbergh, Wave, 18-19. See also entry of 29 April 1940, War W ithin, 81. 84. Lindbergh, Wave, 25,40. 85. For best-seller status, see Berg, Lindbergh, 406. For favorable reviews, see, for example, Mary L. Dunn, America 64 (30 November 1940): 221; Catholic W orld 152 (January 1941): 510; Nicholas Broughton, “Books in a World at War,” Peace Action 7 (October 1940): 7; Mario Collaci, “Books in Re­ view,” Fellowship 6 (December 1940): 161; Robert E. Wood to Anne Morrow Lindbergh, 11 October 1940, Wood Papers; “Anne Lindbergh Urges U.S. Pay Price of Peace,” Progressive, 12 October 1940,7; John Haynes Holmes to Ruth Benedict, 17 April 1941, Holmes Papers; Holmes to Mrs. George [Mar­ got] Picksen, 16 February 1941, Holmes Papers; Frederick J. Libby to Anne Morrow Lindbergh, 27 Sep­ tember 1940, NCPW Papers; Philip C. Jessup to Anne Morrow Lindbergh, 24 October 1940, Jessup Pa­ pers. The Reader's Digest reproduced it in condensed form. See 37 (November 1940): 1-12. 86. John Foster Dulles to Anne Morrow Lindbergh, 8 October 1940, Box 19, the Papers of John Fos­ ter Dulles, Princeton University (hereafter cited as Dulles Papers); Auden in Berg, Lindbergh, 406. 87. “The Wave of the Future,” Common Sense 10 (March 1941): 80; Norman Thomas to Comrade Waldron, 29 November 1940, Thomas Papers; Symes, “Hold That Line: Who's a Fascist?” Call, 1 Feb­ ruary 1941,5; “Wave of the Future,” Christian C entury 57 (30 October 1940): 1335. Dorothy Dunbar Bromley called the wave “pure socialism.” Entry of July 1941, War W ithin, 209. 88. Miller, “War Aims in War Propaganda,” Propaganda Analysis 4 (27 May 1941): 8; “On Using Freedom to Lose Freedom,” Commonweal 33 (17 January 1941): 316. 89. Clare Boothe, “Half aWorm,” Current H istory and Forum 52 (7 November 1940): 4; E. B. White, “One Man’s Meat,” Harper's M agazine 181 (November 1940): 330; Agar in Time, 6 January 1941,11. 90. See, for example, Leon Bryce Bloch, Living Age 359 (December 1940): 384; philosopher Irwin Edman, “The Poetry of Appeasement,” N ew York Herald Tribune Book Review, sect 9,20 October 1940,

366

Scies to Pages 55-57

2: M ax berner, speech. H am pshire Counts- Progressive C iub. Smtth CoLege Weekh. 5 N ovem b er 1940.

l : D orothy T h o m p so n . “An O p en Letter to A nne Lindbergh.' Look. 25 M arch 1 9 4 1 .1 1. For a direct a t­ tack o n T h o m p so n s interpretation, see 'C abbages and Kings: Explain T his.' Scnhier's Commentator

\hip' and “in general m ore collectivism and less individualism .' See xxiv. 99. D en n is. Dynamics, xxvii, 7, 1 0 2 -1 3 , 2 1 4 -1 6 . 100. O n the war, D en n is, Dynamics. 213; on an ti-S em itism , Dynamics, xxxi; o n refugees, IVFL 130 January 1941 ): 5. 101. D en n is, Dynamics, 1 3 8-59.

Notes to Pages 57-60

367

102. Dennis, Dynam ics, xv, 139,188-89. 103. For reserved approval, see Robert E. Wood to Sterling Morton, 7 May 1941, and Sterling Mor­ ton to Robert E Wood, 12 May 1941, both in Morton Papers. 104. Harlan F. Stone to Mr. Palmer, 1 September 1940, Dennis Papers; Harry Elmer Barnes, South­ ern Economic Journal 7 (April 1941): 559. 105. Korsch, “Lawrence Dennis’s ‘Revolution/" Partisan Review 8 (May-June 1941): 244-47; Chamberlin, “Advocate of a Fascist America,” Christian Science M onitor, 19 October 1940, 11; Utley, “Mr. Dennis’s Dangerous Thoughts,” Common Sense 9 (September 1940): 23-24; Bingham, M odem Q uarterly 15 (Summer 1940): 83-87. In a private letter, Bingham found that certain events tended to confirm Dennis’s thesis, while others “tend to confirm the view that the liberal humanistic ideals are more vital than ever.” Alfred M. Bingham to Lawrence Dennis, 18 January 1941, Dennis Papers. 106. Foster, “American Fascism Speaks Out,” C om m unist 20 (April 1941): 333-40; Wiliams, “Views and Reviews,” Commonweal 33 (8 November 1940): 78-79. Williams’s original review was far less crit­ ical. Commonweal 32 (13 September 1940): 428-29. 107. Walker, “Lowdown on the Democracies,” N ew Republic 103 (25 November 1940): 728-29; Pendleton Herring, Annals o f the Am erican Academ y o f Political and Social Science 213 (January 1941): 197. See also Leon Whipple, “Dynamisms,” Survey Graphic 29 (October 1940): 517. 108. Schuman, “Who Owns the Future? The Will to Survive,” Nation 152 (11 January 1941): 36-39, quotation on 38. See also Frederick L Schuman to Lawrence Dennis, 3 September 1940, Dennis Papers. 109. Dennis, “Who Owns the Future? The Party-State and the Elite,” N ation 152 (11 January 1941): 39-41; Lemer, “The Dynamics of Democracy,” 41-44, quotation on 42. CHAPTER 5: IN ITIA L ENGAGEM ENTS

1. Roosevelt, address to Congress, 21 September 1939, CR, 11-12. 2. Tim e, 25 September 1939,12. 3. Newsweek, 9 October 1939,27. For major accounts of the bill, see Divine, The Illusion o f N eu­ trality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), chap. 9; Guinsburg, Pursuit o f Isolationism , chap. 9; Porter, Seventy-sixth Congress, chap. 4; Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 320-30. Dallek claims Borah privately favored the bill but feared further warlike steps. See Roosevelt, 203. 4. Newsweek, 6 November 1939,24. 5. The other peace groups included the Peace Section of foe American Friends Service Committee, foe World Peace Commission of foe Methodist Church, and foe War Resisters League. For a brief history of foe KAOWC, see Justus D. Doenecke, “Non-interventionism of foe Left The Keep America Out of foe War Congress, 1938-1941,” Journal o f Contemporary History 12 (April 1977): 221-36. For foe background and history of left-wing youth activity, including foe KAOWC-affiliated Youth Committee Against War, see Cohen, Old Left; Eagan, Class, Culture; and Mihelich, “Student Antiwar Activism.” 6. T.R.B., “Washington Notes: Ordeal by Lung-Power,” New Republic 100 (19 October 1939): 299. Possible members included aviators Charles A. Lindbergh and Eddie Rickenbacker, auto manufacturer Henry Ford, Herbert Hoover, and Charles A. Beard. CT, 23 September 1939, 1. See also KAOWC, Newsweek, 2 October 1939,29; editor John C. O’Laughlin to Hoover, 9 September 1939, Hoover Pa­ pers; Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, “Washington Merry-Go-Round,” [University of] M ichigan D aily, 27 September 1939,4; Chester Bowles to Philip La Follette, 28 September 1939, Philip La Fol­ lette Papers; Maney, La Follette, 231. 7. American Legion, N Y T , 28 September 1939,5; AFL, N Y T , 3 October 1939,1. White commit­ tee in Walter Johnson, Battle, 39-57; Jane Harriet Schwar, “Internationalist Propaganda and Pressure Groups in foe United States, 1937-1941,” Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1973, chap. 6. Gallup poll, N Y T , 24 October 1939,14. For related polls, see Cantril, Public O pinion, 967-70,1157-59. 8. See, for example, Raymond Moley to Jouett Shouse, 26 September 1939, Moley Papers; “Free­ dom of the Seas Again,” W TH , 27 September 1939,10; Amos Pinchot to Robert La Follette, 13 Oc­ tober 1939, Pinchot Papers; Hearst in Carlisle, Hearst, 202. Hugh Johnson claimed that he and his

368

Notes to Pages 60-61

patron, financier Bernard Baruch, had long worked to develop cash-and-carry. “Neutral Rights," N Y W T , 23 September 1939,1. For combining endorsement of cash-and-carry with mistrust of Roo­ sevelt, see Harry Elmer Barnes, “Embargo Issue Realistic,” N Y W T , 29 September 1939, 22; Hoover to lohn C. O’Laughlin, 18 July 1939, Stanford Files. 9. Taft, CR, 13 October 1939, 358. 10. “National Unity Against War," N YD N , 22 September 1939,29; “Our‘Neutrality’ Act—A Help to Hitler," 5 September 1939,27. See also “War Machines Need Fuel," 26 September 1939,25; “Let’s Tune Up Our Factories," 2 October 1939,21. 11. See, for example, Taft, CR, 13 October 1939, 358; Waldrop, “European Reasons for Us to Say Out," W TH , 9 September 1939, Al 1. 12. “Our ‘Neutrality’ Act—A Help to Hitler," N YD N , 5 September 1939,27; “What the Neutrality Debate Is About," 5 October 1939,33. 13. Borah, CR, 2 October 1939,71-73. On munitions plants, see also Senator Reed, CR, 16 Octo­ ber 1939,476-77; Congressman William B. Barry (Dem.-N.Y.), CR, 31 October 1939,1125; Congress­ man Dewey Short (Rep.-Mo.), CR, 1 November 1939,1167. On immorality, see also “Keep the Arms Embargo!" Christian C entury 56 (20 September 1939): 1126; Fish, radio broadcast, CBS, 26 September 1939, in CR, A67; Fish, radio speech, NBC, 28 October 1939, in CR, A701; Senator Charles Tobey, CR. 5 October 1939, 114; retired marine general Smedley Butler, “Arms Credits Sure Path to War," entered in CR, 14 October 1939, 409; “Keep the Embargo," America 62 (21 October 1939): 42; pacifist poet Sarah N. Cleghom to Franklin D. Roosevelt (mimeographed), October 1939, WIL Papers; Sweeney, CR, 2 November 1939,1314. 14. For foreign ships, seeVandenberg, CR, 4 October 1939,102. For accidental sinkings»Walsh, ^Oc­ tober 1939,359; Congressman Leslie C Arends (Rep.-Ill), CR. 1 November 1939,1253. For Declaration of Panama, see Schafer, CR, 11 October 1939,305. For Allied factories, see Fish, speech, NBC 28 Octo­ ber 1939, in CR, A701; Hiram lohnson, CR, 20 October 1939,629; Vorys, CR, 1 November 1939,1205. For U.S. shortages, see Reynolds, CR, 21 October 1939, 698; Congressman Thomas E. Martin (Rep.Iowa), CR, 1 November 1939,1265. For endangering Allies, see Shafer, CR, 31 October 1939,1144. 15. See, for example, “Roosevelt vs. Roosevelt," CT, 29 September 1939,18; B. C. Clark, CR, 11 Oc­ tober 1939, 276. 16. “We’ll Need a Parachute," 2 October 1939, in CR, 327. For other warnings of a war boom, see T. R.B., “Washington Notes: The Peace-Party Republicans," New Republic 100 (27 September 1939): 213; meat packer Jay C. Hormel, “Proposal for Domestic Recovery,” CR, inserted 28 September 1939, A68: constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin, letter to N YT, 2 October 1939,16; Wheeler, CT, 2 Oc­ tober 1939, 1; John T. Flynn, Washington Daily News, 3 October 1939; Downey, CR, 6 October 1939, 161; Maynard Krueger, [University of Chicago] Daily Maroon, 11 October 1939,2; Congressman An­ drew C. Schiffler (Rep.-W.Va.), CR, 19 October 1939, A376. For a focus on damage done to agricul­ ture, see Fish, speech, CBS, 26 September 1939, in CR, A67; D. W. Gark, CR, 18 October 1939,564; Reynolds, CR, 18 October 1939,565. 17. Downey, CR, 6 October 1939,169; Vandenberg, CR, 21 October 1939,387; Congressman Au­ gust H. Andresen (Rep.-Minn.), CR, 1 November 1939,1229; Joseph P. Kennedy in Koskoff, Kennedy, 264. 18. Hiram W. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson Jr., 24 September 1939, Johnson Papers; Hiram W. Johnson, CR, 10 October 1939,249; Walsh, CR, 17 October 1939,499; Robsion, CR, 2 November 1939, 1297; Castle Diary, 23 October 1939. Such pressure had some effect, for, on 24 October 1941, the Sen­ ate approved a state department amendment relaxing restrictions on American shipping. NYT, 25 Oc­ tober 1939, 1. Not all anti-interventionists concurred. Borchard said he hated to give up the right of U. S. vessels to trade with European belligerents, but he feared that the sinking of an American ship might “arouse a war spirit." Edwin M. Borchard to Hiram Johnson, 26 September 1939, Johnson Pa­ pers. Said Senator Bulow, “I would rather be a live coward on land than to be a dead hero in Davy Jones’ locker.” CR, 12 October 1939,312. 19. See, for example, William R. Castle, US News, 11 September 1939, 4; Congressman James W. Mott (Rep.-Oreg.), CR, 1 November 1939,1262; Dondero, CR, 31 October 1939,1129; B. C. Clark, CR,

Notes to Pages 61-63

369

1 1 October 1939,252; Shipstead, CA, 16 October 1939,449; Hiram Johnson, CA, 20 October 1939,630; professors Samuel Flagg Bemis, Philip Jessup, Charles Cheney Hyde, and Irwin N. Griswold as cited by Congressman Albert Engel (Rep.-Mich.)* CA, 23 October 1939, 760; historian Max Savelle, Stanford [University] Daily ; 20 October 1939,10; Philip C. Jessup to Edwin M. Borchard, 12 October 1939, Borchard Papers. 20. Fish, radio address, NBC 25 September 1939, in CA, A20; Borah, CA, 2 October 1939,70. 21. Dondero, CA, 31 October 1939,1129. 22. For examples, see references to Van Nuys by Senator John H. Overton (Dem.-La.), CA, 5 Octo­ ber 1939,119; to Senator Warren R. Austin (Rep.-Vt) by B. C. Clark, 11 October 1939,267; to Edward R. Burke (Dem.-Nebr.) and Wallace W. White (Rep.-Maine) by Hoffman, 12 October 1939,349. 23. For the variety of people offering this argument, see Norman Thomas to editor, New York Heraid TYibune, 12 September 1939, Thomas Papers; Coughlin, “From the Tower: This Is Stalin’s War,” So­ cial Justice, 9 October 1939, 5; Professor Herbert Briggs, ComeU [University] D aily Sun, 13 October 1939, 1; William Z. Foster, “The Arms Embargo,” D aily Worker, 25 October 1940, 6; Dennis and Gravenhoff, WFL 60 (21 September 1939): 3; Holt, CA, 18 October 1939,553; Congressman William J. Miller (Rep.-Conn.), CA, 25 September 1939, A47. 24. B. C. Clark, CA, 11 October 1939,268. Particularly noted was a French military mission which, in May 1939, arrived to survey possible war orders. See Lundeen, CA, 14 October 1939,415, quoting W ashington Post of 4 May 1939. Also recalled was an air accident which exposed the presence of a French purchasing mission. See Rush Holt, CA, 18 October 1939,552. Uncensored noted that despite the arms embargo, American airplane manufactures were filling Allied orders. See “More Coopera­ tion,” 3 (21 October 1939): 1. 25. See, for example, attorney William Potter Lage to James A. Shanley, 28 October 1939, copy in Borchard papers; Engel, CA, 2 November 1939,1331-32; John Haynes Holmes to Edgar J. Fisher, 25 September 1939, Holmes Papers. 26. Nye cited Wilson’s secretary of state Robert Lansing, who claimed that reduction of the new American trade would result in “industrial depression, idle capital, and idle labor,” which in turn would cause “general unrest and suffering among the laboring classes.” He also quoted Federal Reserve Board member Paul M. Warburg, who had found possible cuts in wartime trade jeopardizing America’s po­ tential “to become the masters of the world,” and Walter Hines Page, American ambassador to Britain, who had claimed that credits to the Allies were needed to “prevent the collapse of world trade and of the whole European finance.” Nye, CA, 13 October 1939,373,379. Nye had been chairman of a famous Senate committee investigating the role of the munitions industry in U.S. entry into World War I. 27. Barton, broadcast, NBC, 29 October 1939, in CA, A593. See also Philip La Follette, radio broad­ cast, 3 October 1939, in CA, A189. 28. C. Hartley Grattan, The D eadly Parallel (New York: Stackpole, 1939), 79; emphasis in original. For praise of Grattan, see Hiram Johnson, CA, 20 October 1939, 632; Ernest L. Meyer, “Fish Learn Quicker,” Progressive, 20 September 1941,4; Thomas, “Your World and Mine,” Call, 4 November 1939, 3. For citation of Grattan, see Holt, CA, 18 October 1939,562. For a positive review, see Fellowship 5 (December 1939): 19. For opposition to Grattan’s interpretation of American entry into World War I, see reviews by Harvard historian Sidney B. Fay, “Recipes for Neutrality,” Saturday Review o f Literature 21 (4 November 1939): 3-4,16, and S. T. Williamson, N Y T B o o k Review, 19 October 1939,16. 29. Roosevelt, speech, 21 September 1939, CA, 10-11. 30. For biographical material on Borchard, see Kendall, “Borchard,” and Doenecke, “Edwin M. Bor­ chard, John Bassett Moore.” 31. For studies of Moore, see Megaree, “Moore,” and Doenecke, “Edwin M. Borchard, John Bassett Moore,” 1-34. For Moore on collective security, see “What of the Night?” Virginia Q uarterly Review 17 (January 1941): 75-88. 32. For a study of Jessup’s career, see Marshall R. Kuehl, “Jessup.” Jessup’s own works include Philip C Jessup and Francis Deàk, N eutrality: Its History, Economic and Law, vol. 1: Its Origins (NewYork: Co­ lumbia University Press, 1935); Jessup, vol. 4: Today and Tomorrow (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936).

370

Notes to Pages 63-64

33. Edwin M. Borchard to William E Borah, 16 February 1939; Edwin M. Borchard to Elbert D. Thomas, 18 October 1939, Borchard Papers. 34. Borchard, speech to Council of Foreign Relations, Chicago, as cited by Borah, CR, 17 October 1939,510; Edwin M. Borchard to Leslie H. Thompson, 12 October 1939, Borchard Papers; Divine, il­ lusion, 146-47. For fear of reprisal, see also William Potter Lage to John Bassett Moore, 11 September 1939, Moore Papers. 35. Edwin M. Borchard to William E Borah, 20 and 29 September 1939, Borchard Papers; Bor­ chard, address to the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 14 October 1939, in CR, A415-18. Many anti-interventionists adopted Borchard’s reasoning. See Borah, CR, 2 October 1939, 72; Shanley, 31 October 1939,1107; letters to Shanley by William Potter Lage, William C. Dennis, Fred­ erick C. Dunn, and John Bassett Moore, 3 November 1939, A761-62; “American Peace and Neutrality,” CT, 13 September 1939,14; California attorney general Earl Warren to Hiram Johnson, 23 October 1939, Johnson Papers. Castle challenged the claim that it was illegal to revoke an embargo during a war, saying that Columbia scholar Charles Cheney Hyde confused the illegal with the inexpedient “We still have a right to do anything we please with our own laws but it may be unwise at any time to do what we want to do.” Castle Diary, 26 September 1939. 36. Philip C. Jessup and Charles Cheney Hyde, letter, NIT, 21 September 1939,17; Pound cited by Vandenberg, CR, 4 October 1939,100; Danaher, CR, 17 October 1939,508. 37. WoodrowWilson by Shanley, CR, 31 October 1939,1112; Sir Edward Grey by Vandenberg, CR, 4 October 1939,100; former secretary of state William Jennings Bryan by McCarran, CR, 19 October 1939,598; Robert Lansing by Keefe, CR, 1 November 1939,1185; Henry S. Frazer, technical expert to the League of Nations Committee for the Codification of International Law, byVandenberg, CR, 4 Oc­ tober 1939,100; Key Pittman by Congressman Joshua Johns (Rep.-Wis.), CR, 19 October 1939,617; “Pittman vs. Pittman,” CT, 26 September 1939,1. 38. Edward S. Corwin, letter, NIT, 2 October 1939, 16; statements of Borchard, John Bassett Moore, and legal scholar Manley O. Hudson, in B. C. Clark, CR, 11 October 1939,277; Congressman Frederick C. Smith (Rep.-Ohio), CR, 12 October 1939,344-45; Walsh, CR, 17 October 1939,494; Con­ gressman Everett Dirksen (Rep.-Ill.)* CR, 27 October 1939,1045; John Bassett Moore’s Digest o f Inter­ national Law , in CR, 27 October 1939,1045. 39. See, for example, historian William B. Hesseltine, “HowMuch History Does Franklin Roosevelt Know?” CT, 22 October 1939,16; historian Charles Callan Tansill to Harry Elmer Barnes, 30 October 1939, Barnes Papers; “Reciting History,” Saturday Evening Post 212 (28 October 1939): 22; Holt, CR, 18 October 1939,554; Vandenberg, CR, 4 October 1939,103; Johns, CR, 19 October 1939,617; Nye, CR, 20 October 1939, 654; Downey, CR, 6 October 1939, 165; Senator Clyde Reed, speech of 1 October 1939, in CR, A130; “Reciting History,” Saturday Evening Post 212 (28 October 1939): 22. 40. Engel, CR, 23 October 1939,760; Jessup, Barnard [College] B ulletin, 24 October 1939,1. 41. Sargent, Bulletin #8,28 September 1939, G etting US into War, 128; Beard, “‘International Law* Complex and Shifting,” N Y W T , 26 September 1939,18; “The Mirage of International Law,” Christian C entury 56 (27 September 1939): 1160. See also Charles Callan Tansill, “Neutrality Debate Speaks Peace, but Moves Toward War,” Am erica 62 (28 October 1939): 66; Coughlin, “From the Tower: ‘A Greater Consistency’—Mr. President,” Social Justice, 2 October 1939,7. 42. C. Hartley Grattan to Edwin M. Borchard, 30 October 1939, Borchard Papers. See also Senator Bulow, CR, 12 October 1939, CR, 315. 43. “Spot Cash,” Am erica 61 (7 October 1939): 614. See also Congressman Louis L Ludlow (Dem.Ind.), CR, 16 October 1939,486. 44. Dorothy Detzer to Helen Essary, 11 September 1939, WIL Papers; John Haynes Holmes to Barnett Brickner, 24 October 1939; Holmes to Paul Crosbie, 2 October 1939, both in Holmes Papers. At one point Holmes found the embargo a symbolic issue, not really relevant to the underlying issues that determined American belligerency. Letter to Robert Whitaker, 31 October 1940, Holmes Papers. 45. Nye, CR, 5 October 1939,114. In an article, he conceded that the nation had not yet found ma­ chinery to subsidize many industries that would certainly suffer at the result of trade curtailment See “Keep Our Money Out of War,” Look 3 (7 November 1939): 22-23. See also J. Max Weis, research di­ rector, World Peaceways, United States News, 11 September 1939,4.

Notes to Pages 65-66

371

46. Thomas, Vassar [College] M iscellany News, 25 October 1939,1; Lodge, speech to NewYork Her­ ald Tribune Forum, 26 October 1939, in CR, A554. Borchard conversely favored exporting arms to all neutrals, even though he knew that such goods could ultimately reach the belligerents. “This would be not our problem, nor our fault.” Letter to William £. Borah, 29 September 1939, Borchard Papers. 47. Hoover, in CR, 12 October 1939,320; Hoover, radio address, 20 October 1939, in CR, A497-98. For discussion on the background of Hoover’s proposal, see Castle Diary, 30 September 1939,11 Oc­ tober 1939; Herbert Hoover to William R. Castle, 14 September 1939, the Papers of William R. Castle, HHPL (hereafter cited as Castle Papers). Hoover had made a similar proposal to the World Disarma­ ment Conference in 1932 but lacked a consensus. 48. Lindbergh, entry of 2 October 1939, W artim e Journals, 267; Lindbergh, radio speech, 13 Octo­ ber 1939, in CR, A301-3. For White, see Best, Hoover, 1:136. 49. See, for example, Senator Alben W. Barkley (Dem.-Ky.), GR, 14 October 1939,415; Senator Key Pittman, GR, 14 October 1939,441-42. 50. Clark, GR, 14 October 1939,416. See also Lundeen, CR, 14 October 1939,415; “Ganging Up on Neutrality,” N ew Masses 33 (24 October 1939): 21. 51. William P. Lage to Edwin M. Borchard, 16 October 1939, Borchard Papers; Herbert Hoover to Philip C. Jessup, 2 October 1939, Jessup Papers; Herbert Hoover to John C. O’Laughlin, 4 September 1939, Stanford Files. 52. Charles W. Tobey to Alben W. Barkley, Senate majority leader, and text of amendment, GR, 4 October 1939,105. Cash-and-carry terminated only on 1 May 1939. For examples of support, see Nye, CR, 4 October 1939,114; B. C. Clark, 11 October 1939, CR, 269-70; staff writer Gerald B. Donnelly, “Neutrality Planned to Keep Us Out of War,” Am erica 61 (23 September 1939): 556-57; Donnelly, “Neutral We Must Remain in the TVuest Way,” Am erica 61 (30 September 1939): 580-81; report of Dorothy Detzer to WIL National Board, Detroit, 21-22 October 1939, W1L Papers, SCPQ Edwin M. Borchard to John A. Danaher, 7 October 1939, Borchard Papers; Edwin M. Borchard to Senator Fran­ cis T. Maloney (Dem.-Conn.), 7 October 1939, Borchard Papers; “Either-Or,” Uncensored 1 (7 October 1939): 1; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine,” Call, 14 October 1939,2. 53. Taft, GR, 24 October 1939, 790-94. For a similar view, see William P. Lage to Edwin M. Bor­ chard, 26 September 1939, Borchard Papers. Borah differed, saying Taft “would practically sink all our ships.” CR, 24 October 1939,792. 54. Taft, GR, 13 October 1939, 357. Lage had also suggested the ban on government agencies. William P. Lage to Edwin M. Borchard, 26 September 1939, Borchard Papers. For the House counter­ part to Taft’s amendment concerning the role of government agencies, see Jesse P. Wolcott, GR, 1 No­ vember 1939,1209. 55. La Follette, CR, 25 October 1939,846. For endorsements, see Capper, GR, 851; Frazier, 853; Nye, 854. Even before La Follette made his proposal, socialist leader Norman Thomas had offered a similar suggestion, saying that England and France could obtain their raw materials from their own “mighty empires.” U nited States News, 11 September 1939,4; Norman Thomas to Dorothy Detzer and Freder­ ick J. Libby, 5 October 1939, WIL Papers. See also Lodge, address to NewYork Herald Tribune Forum, 26 October 1939, in GR, A553; Kirby Page, Christian C entury 56 (1 October 1939): 1248; KAOWC po­ sition, A. L. Dodge to D. Detzer, 24 September 1939, WIL Papers; Dorothy Detzer, United States News, 18 September 1939,10. 56. Johnson, GR, 25 October 1939,830. 57. GR, 27 October 1939,1023-24; 2 November 1939,1344-45; Gallup poll, N Y T , 29 October 1939,29. 58. Hiram Johnson to Frank Doherty, 3 November 1939, Johnson Papers; Dorothy Detzer to Emily Greene Baldı, 4 November 1939, WIL Papers; Edwin M. Borchard to William E Borah, 3 November 1939, Borchard Papers. 59. Flynn, minutes, governing committee, KAOWC, 6 November 1939, KAOWC Papers; diary entry, 27 October 1939, in The Private Papers o f Senator Vandenberg, ed. Arthur H. Vandenberg Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 3; “Exit Embargo,” Uncensored 6(11 November 1939): 1. 60. N Y T , 8 November 1939,1,12; Hull, M em oirs, 1:697-98; Roosevelt to William Allen White, 13 November 1939, FDR: H is Personal Letters, 954. For general discussion, see Langer and Gleason,

372

Notes to Pages 66-70

Challenge to Isolation, 234; "Neutrality Striking Hardest at U.S. Ships and Seamen" Newsweek, 20 November 1939,15-16. 61. Johnson, "One Man’s Opinion," SFN, 9 November 1939,15. See also 10 November 1939,19; 13 November 1939,13. 62. D aily Worker; 8 November 1939,1; "Getting Around the Law," New Republic 101 (22 November 1939): 127; "Pecunia Non Ölet," N YD N , 8 November 1939,31; "Ships, Flags, and Men," N YD N , 13 No­ vember 1939,21; Norman Thomas, "Your World and Mine," Calk 25 November 1939,2. See also Con­ gressman Shanley, United Suites News, 20 November 1939,4. 63. Hiram Johnson to John Bassett Moore, 5 January 1940, Moore Papers; "The Arms Embargo Re­ peal," Commonweal 31 (17 November 1939): 86; "Under a False Flag," New Masses 33 (21 November 1939): 18; John Bassett Moore to Harlan Fiske Stone, 11 November 1939, Moore Papers; Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 8 November 1939, Borchard Papers. 64. Dallek, Roosevelt, 212; Reynolds, Creation, 69,75-76,90,95; Divine, Illusion, 332. 65. Rock, Chamberlain and Roosevelt, 229,246,311; Kimball, Forged in War, 25. 66. Ponting, 1940,43-44,60. 67. Gallup poll, 27 September 1939, in Cantril, Public O pinion, 1147. 68. "But Boake Carter Says," SFE, 9 September 1939,9. See also "Americans Are Also Calm," Chris­ tian C entury 56 (20 September 1939): 1123; "The ‘Athenia,’" New Republic 101 (13 September 1939): 141; "It Seems to Have Been a Submarine," N YD N , 6 September 1939,37. For original accounts of the sinking, see N YT, 4-9 September 1939. 69. Herbert Hoover to John C. O’Laughlin, 4 September 1939, Stanford Files; Reynolds, CR, 21 Oc­ tober 1939, 689. Bennett Gark concurred; see 690. Reynolds also suspected the Russians, who—he said—desired to pit Germany and Britain against each other; see 691. Social Justice featured Reynolds’s comments. Issue of 13 November 1939,4. 70. It cited an affidavit by Gus Anderson, Chicago travel agent, to the state department. Anderson claimed that the ship was not torpedoed, that it carried munitions and gun emplacements, and that on reaching Canada, it was to be outfitted as a British sea raider. Issue of 30 October 1939,10. See also N Y T , 18 October 1939,6. 71. Hull, M em oirs, 1:677. 72. John Bassett Moore to Edwin M. Borchard, 24 February 1940, Borchard Papers. See also Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 22 February 1940, Borchard Papers. For a debate with a promi­ nent maritime lawyer, see James Ryan, N YT, 25 February 1940, sect. 4,8; Borchard, N Y T , 10 March 1940, sect. 4,8. See also Borchard, "Was Norway Delinquent in the Case of the A ltm arld " Am erican Journal o f International Law 34 (April 1940): 289-94. 73. Jessup, letter to N ew York H erald Tribune, 22 February 1940; "America and Other Neutrals," C T, 21 February 1940, 120. See also "Report Russian Advances in Finland," C hristian C entury 57 (28 February 1940): 269; "Comment," Am erica 62 (2 March 1940): 542; "Extending the War," N ew Masses 35 (5 March 1940): 20; "A Set-Back to the Imperialist War-Intrigues," D aily Worker, 27 Feb­ ruary 1940,6. 74. Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 14 September 1939, Borchard Papers; Borchard, memorandum to George Holden Tinkham, 23 December 1939, Borchard Papers; John Bassett Moore to Edwin M. Borchard, 19 September 1939, Borchard Papers. For U.S. policy, see "Hull Neutrality Statement," N Y T , 15 September 1939,14; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 283. 75. Johnson, "Rights at Sea," N Y W T , 23 February 1940,20; “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 3 Jan­ uary 1940,9; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 282-83. For the D üsseldorf, see N Y T , 16 December 1939,4. 76. "Neutral Navicerts," Newsweek, 11 December 1939,16; "The Admirable Russian Friend," CT, 1 November 1939,14; Engel, CR, 2 November 1939,1333 (chart given). 77. Robert W. Matson, N eutrality and Navicerts: Britain, the United States, and Economic Warfare, 1939-1940 (New York: Garland, 1994), 9,12. 78. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation , 280; "British Orders on Blockade," N Y T , 28 No­ vember 1939,2.

Notes to Pages 70-72

373

79. See, for example, Roy W. Howard to Lord Beaverbrook, 27 January 1940, Howard Papers; Fish, 12 March 1940,2730-31. 80. Johnson, “U.S. Rights,” NYW T* 27 November 1939, 17. For further protests of Johnson, see "British Racket,” M iam i D aily Herald* 29 December 1939; SFN* 8 January 1940,13. 81. Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 29 September 1939, Borchard Papers. See also John Bassett Moore to Edwin M. Borchard, 6 December 1939, Borchard Papers; Coughlin,"The Presidents Message to Congress,” Social Justice* 2 October 1940,4. 82. Hull, "U.S. Note on Blockade,” NYT* 9 December 1939,4. 83. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation* 358; "Text of Hull Note to British,” NYT* 6 January 1940,2. 84. John Garry Clifford, "The Odyssey of C ity o f Flint," Am erican N eptune 32 (April 1972): 100-116. For a contemporary account, see "Neutral Problem Spotlighted by C ity o f Flint Seizure,” Newsweek* 6 November 1939,13-15. 85. Laurence A. Steinhardt, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, to State Department, "Text of Envoy’s Report,” NYT* 28 October 1940,3; "U.S. Statement on Flint,” NYT* 29 October 1939,36. For Roosevelt’s anger, see Roosevelt to Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles, 22 December 1939, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 974. 86. "City o f Flint*" N ew Masses 33 (7 November 1940): 19-20; " C ity o f Flint*" N ew Masses 34 (13 February 1940): 23; Clark, CR* 25 October 1939,830; "The Flitting "‘City of Flint,’” N ew Republic 101 (8 November 1939): 5; Jessup, Columbia [University] Spectator*26 October 1939,1. See also Professor Edward S. Corwin, NYT* 24 October 1939,6; Rich, CR, 25 October 1939,4863. 87. See, for example, Shafer, CR* 1 November 1939,1203; Social Justice* 6 November 1939,8; Edwin M. Borchard to Bennett C. Clark, 27 September 1939, and Borchard to James A. Shanley, 6 October 1939, Borchard Papers. 88. Johnson, "Taking Sides,” NYW T* 14 November 1939,17; “The Pot and the Kettle,” SFE, 27 No­ vember 1939,8. 89. "U.S. Note on Mail Seizure,” N Y T , 30 January 1940,10; Matson, N eutrality and Navicerts* 27; Truman, NYT* 16 February 1940,9; Pittman, NYT* 19 February 1940,8. 90. Borchard, memorandum to George Holden Tinkham, 23 December 1939, Borchard Papers; "Bermuda and American Mails,” CT* 23 February 1940,12; Clark quoted in Time* 4 April 1940,13. For Associated Press report on use of bayonet, see NYT* 22 February 1940, 1, 2. For British denials, see NYT* 30 February 1940, 1; NYT* 27 February 1940, 3. For further protest, international law scholar Herbert Wright, testimony, SFRC, 5 February 1941, 461; Congressman Jacob Thorkelson (Rep.Mont.), CR* 7 February 1940, A632; Thill, CR* 28 February 1940, A1041. 91. Maas, NYT* 16 February 1940, 9; Thorkelson, CR* 7 February 1940, A623; "Britain and the Mails,” New Republic 102 (29 January 1940): 133. 92. "U.S. Note on Mail Seizure,” NYT* 30 January 1940, 10; "The British Foreign Office to the United States Embassy at London, 17 January 1940,” in Documents on Am erican Foreign Relations: July 1939-June 1940* 2 vols., ed. S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1940), 2:715-18; NYT* 20 January 1940,1,4; Pan American Airways, NYT* 26 February 1940,1,3. 93. "Business as Usual,” Uncensored 16 (20 January 1940): 2; Edwin M. Borchard to Bennett C. Clark, 27 September 1939, and to James A. Shanley, 6 October 1939, Borchard Papers. For further protest, see Social Justice* 11 August 1941,6; Congressman Dirksen, SFE* 19 November 1941,19. For the blacklist, see Matson, N eutrality and Navicerts* 22-24. 94. NIT, 21 January 1940,1; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation* 359; "Tobacco for Britain,” CT* 20 January 1940,10. 95. Reynolds, Creation, 78-79. Quotation of Chamberlain, 27 January 1940,78. He was obviously incorrect about spending "all our dollars.” 96. See, for example, Hugh Johnson, "U.S. Rights,” NYW T* 27 November 1939,17; Hugh Johnson, "Rights at Sea,” NYW T* 23 February 1940,20; “Ghost Writers,” Uncensored 20 (17 February 1940): 1-2; Social Justice, 6 November 1939,15; Borchard, memorandum to George Holden Tinkham, 23 Decem­ ber 1939, Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 3 January 1940, William P. Lage to Edwin M. Borchard, 24 CR*

374

Notes to Pages 73-75

January 1940, Borchard Papers; “Neutrality Violations," New Masses 34 (16 January 1940): 19. There was some support for Hull’s approach. See “America Protests Against British Policy," Christian C entury 56 (20 December 1939): 1565; “Trade or War," America 63 (18 May 1940): 156; “The British and the Mails," New Republic 102 (5 February 1940): 164. 97. Sargent, Bulletin #26,12 January 1940, G etting US into War, 235; “Mr. Hull Protests to Britain," CT, 8 January 1940,12; “British Ships and Sealing Wax," CT, 25 January 1940,10; Social Justice, 6 No­ vember 1939,15; “Page Mason and Slidell," N YD N , 24 January 1940,29. 98. For administration, see Reynolds, Creation, 68; James MacGregor Bums, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956), 415. For Berle, see entry of 15 March 1940, Navigating, 296. For Hull, see Breckinridge Long, entry of 15 March 1940, War Diary, 65; Hull, Memoirs, 1:733-36. For Long, see entry of 4 March 1940, War Diary, 61. For Welles, see N YT, 22 November 1939,3. For FDR, see Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, 1 February 1940; in Churchill and Roosevelt: The Com plete Correspondence, vol. 1: Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942, ed. Warren F. Kimball (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 34. 99. For Moffett, see Reynolds, Creation, 68. See also entries of 2,6, and 22 November 1939, M of­ fa t Papers, 276-79; 19, 20, and 25 January 1940,286-87, 290; and 12 March, 300-301. For Berle, see memorandum, 20 January 1940, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. 2: General and Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofice, 1957), 6-7. For Chamberlain, see Reynolds, Creation, 77. 100. Hull, M emoirs, 1:735-36; Matson, N eutrality and Navicerts, 51-52. 101. “Text of Minister Cromwell’s Talk to Canadians," N YT, 20 March 1940, 6. For a similar Cromwell speech, see N YT, 4 March 1940,2. 102. Hull, N YT, 22 March 1940, 1, 4; “Spanked Envoy," Newsweek, 1 April 1940,14-15. See also “The Head of Cromwell," Time, 1 April 1940, 15; “Neutrality’s Headaches," U nited States News, 29 March 1940,12-13. 103. See, for example, “Jimmy Cromwell Tells ’Em," N YD N , 21 March 1940, 31; Hearst, “In the News," SFE, 23 March 1940,1,2; “Not Our War: Mr. Cromwell Twice Wrong," SFE, 25 March 1940,16; Holt, CR, 4 April 1940,4006; Ernest L. Meyer, “As the Crow Flies," Progressive, 4 May 1940,8; Barnes, “Keep Out of War and Investigate the War-Mongers" (draft], 38, Box 252, Lundeen Papers. 104. See, for example, Congressman Sweeney, CR, 20 March 1940, 3161-62; “Minister Cromwell Spreads War," D aily Worker, 21 March 1940,1,6; “Through Cromwell, Britain Hopes to Get U.S. In," Daily Worker, 5 April 1940,6; Bennett C. Clark, Newsweek, 1 April 1940,14. 105. “Diplomatic Dope," Uncensored 26 (30 March 1940): 3-4; Fish, CR, 20 March 1940,3165; let­ ter, George Holden Tinkham to Cordell Hull, 20 March 1940, in CR, A1575. 106. “Playboy Diplomacy," New Republic 102 (1 April 1940): 424; “Cromwell Goes to War in Canada,” CT, 21 March 1940, 13; Jennings, CR, 3 April 1940,3966; Nye, Newsweek, 1 April 1940,14; Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 20 March 1940, Borchard Papers; “Recall Cromwell," N ew Masses 35 (2 April 1940): 18. 107. “Minister Cromwell Makes a Speech,” Christian C entury 57 (3 April 1940): 436; Wiley, CR, 5 April 1940,4073; Coughlin, “From the Tower," Social Justice, 25 March 1940,5. Cromwell had written the books The Voice o f Young America (NewYork: Scribner’s, 1933) and In Defense o f Capitalism (New York: Scribner’s, 1937). 108. Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, Am erican W hite Paper (NewYork: Simon 8cSchuster, 1940), 78,81-82,87. For the background of the book, see Robert W. Merry, Taking on the World: Joseph and Stewart Alsop, Guardians o f the Twentieth C entury (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 79-81. 109. Lundeen, CR, 11 June 1940, 9511; “Ersatz White Paper," Uncensored 31 (4 May 1940): 1-3. Norman Thomas, press release, 11 May 1940, the Papers of the Socialist Party [microfilm], Hoover In­ stitution (hereafter cited as Socialist Party Papers); Nye, CR, 8 March 1941, 2086. See also Bruce Minton, “American White Paper,” New Masses 35 (14 May 1940): 23-24; Amos Pinchot, open letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 20 May 1940, in CR, A3378; Lawrence Dennis, WFL 93 (9 May 1940): 5; Fred­ erick J. Libby to S. Foster Hunt, 1 June 1940, NCPW Papers; Libby to C. P. Jcrvey, 6 May 1940, NCPW Papers; Harry Elmer Barnes, “Keep Out of War and Investigate the War-Mongers" (draft], 10, Box 252, Lundeen Papers.

Notes to Pages 75-76

375

110. The German W hite P aper Full Text o f the Polish D ocum ents Issued by the Berlin Foreign Office (NewYork: Howell, Soskin, 1940), 11. 111. For the contemporary debate concerning Bullitt and the white paper, see Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For the President, Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and W illiam C. B u llitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 406-9; Will Brownell and Richard N. Billings, So Close to Greatness: A Biography o f W illiam G B ullitt (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 250,273. 112. Breckinridge Long, entry of 27 March 1940, War D iary, 74; Pearson and Allen, “Washington Merry-Go-Round,w[University of] M ichigan D aily, 4 April 1940,4; Krock, “In the Nation: The Tim­ ing and Target of the White Paper,” N Y T , 3 April 1940,22. “Statement by Secretary of State on Alleged Documents, 29 March 1940,” in Jones and Myers, D ocum ents 2: 364; Bullitt, Roosevelt, and Potocki, NYT, 30 March 1940,1,4; Kennedy in Lindbergh, entry of 29 November 1940, W artim e Journals, 420; Kennedy in Herzstein, Luce, 153,449. 113. For affirmations of their veracity, seeWilliam P. Lage to Edwin M.Borchard, 4 April 1940,Borchard Papers, expressing mutual concurrence; Sidney Hertzberg to Harry Elmer Barnes, 3 April 1940, Barnes Papers; Oswald Garrison Villard, “Men and Events,” N ation 150 (6 April 1940): 450. 114. Holt, N Y T , 30 March 1941,4; Lundeen, CR, 11 July 1940,9510; “Did the United States Start the War?” Christian C entury 57 (10 April 1940): 468; Fish, speech, NBC blue network, 30 March 1940, in CR, A1797. 115. “The Element of Truth,” W ashington Post, 31 March 1940; “Documents from Our Own Archives,” CT, 31 March 1940,18. See also “Our War Birds in the Polish Archives,” CT, 1 April 1940, 12. Under the byline of Washington bureau chiefArthur Sears Henning, the Tribune carried a page one story declaring that both the foreign diplomatic community and American officialdom found the doc­ uments genuine. See “Capital Scents Ring of Truth in Nazi Charges: Notes Familiar Tone in Polish Pa­ pers,” 1 April 1940,1. 116. Reynolds, CR, 1 April 1940,3745-46. See also Paul Mallon,“The News Behind the News,” SFE, 3 April 1940,13. Amos Pinchot, open letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 April 1940, Roosevelt Papers. Pinchot cited Bullitt’s speech to Paris’s American Club on 22 February 1939 and FDR’s endorsement of a W ashington Posteditorial on 11 April 1939. 117. Reynolds, CR, 30 March 1940,3747; CR, 2 April 1940,3820; Fish, CR, 1 April 1940,3803; Fish, speech, NBC blue network, 30 March 1940, in CR, A1796-98. In introducing his resolution, Reynolds asked the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to examine a number of matters: reasons for the Welles trip; complete information with respect to the German W hite Paper; copies of all speeches made by Bullitt, Kennedy, and Cromwell; and the circumstance of a recent Bullitt speech made in Bordeaux. 118. “A German White Book,” N YD N , 30 March 1940,15; “Paging Bullitt and Kennedy,” N YD N , 15 January 1941,29. See also Washington columnists John O’Donnell and Doris Fleeson, “Capitol Stuff,” N YD N , 31 January 1941,4; “Tragic Anniversary,” 3 September 1940,25; “Neville Chamberlain Dead,” 12 November 1940,25. 119. “Democracy’s Parties,” Call, 8 November 1941,4. Both the D aily Worker and communist leader Earl Browder saw the documents as genuine and quoted such anticommunist journalists as Drew Pear­ son and Arthur Krock to this effect See “What the Polish Documents Say About Mr. Bullitt,” Daily Worker, 8 April 1940,1; Browder, quoted in speech at Boston on 31 March in same editorial. 120. On Barnes and Grattan, see PM , 25 August 1940,7. On Barnes endorsement, see Harry Elmer Barnes to N Y T , 26 November 1940, Barnes Papers; Barnes, “Keep Out of War and Investigate the WarMongers” [draft], 29, Box 252, Lundeen Papers. See also N Y T , 22 November 1940, 13; 4 December 1940,7. 121. Oswald Garrison Villard, “Men and Events,” N ation 150 (6 April 1940): 450; Mallon, “The News Behind the News,” SFE, 3 April 1940,13. See also “Propaganda Trap,” Newsweek, 8 April 1940,17. 122. Seldes, In Fact 1 (3 June 1940): 1; “After the Nazi White Book,” New Masses 35 (16 April 1940): 22. See also review by Joseph Starobin, New Masses 37 (1 October 1940): 18-19; Congressman John Main Coffee (Dem.-Wash.), [University of Wisconsin] D aily Cardinal, 12 April 1940,1. 123. “Nazi White Book,” Time, 8 April 1940,15; “Propaganda Trap,” Newsweek, 8 April 1940,17. 124. Castle Diary, 31 March 1940. See also entry of 3 April 1940.

376

Notes to Pages 76-78

125. “The Nazi-Polish Documents," Commonweal 31 (12 April 1940): 521; “The White Book," 15. See also Danaher, NYT* 30 March 1941,4. 126. See, for example, Thorkelson, CR, 3 April 1940, A1844; B. C. Clark, CR, 19 August 1940, 10,480; Senator Reed, 10,485. 127. See, for example, George Seldes, In Fact 1 (9 September 1940): 1-2; uMr. Bullitt Likes French Fascism," D aily Worker, 22 July 1940,6. Seldes quoted Ambassador Dodd's Diary, 1933-1938 (NewYork: Harcourt Brace, 1941) to indicate that Bullitt opposed the French-Soviet understanding of 1935. In Fact 2 (24 February 1941): 1. 128. Castle Diary, 3 April 1940. See also entry of 7 January 1941, referring to Bullitt’s personal life. For other claims that Bullitt was warlike, see SFN* 1 April 1940,13; Holt, GR, 18 October 1939,552; Holt, GR, 12 June 1940, 8056; Reynolds, GR, 3 April 1940, 3923; Amos Pinchot, open letter to Roo­ sevelt, 20 May 1940, in GR, A3686; Nye, GR, 29 April 1941,3382; Senator Wheeler quoted in Cham­ berlin Diary, 16 February 1941. 129. Fish, GR, 26 December 1940, A6977. Fish quoted from the New York Herald Tribune* 22 De­ cember 1940, which cited Gringoire. For another use of the Gringoire article, see "What About It, Mr. Bullitt?" Scribner's Com m entator 9 (March 1941): 79. For quotations from another collaborationist paper, Le Nouveau Temps* concerning Bullitt, see GT, 9 November 1940,5, and editorial “Busy Billy Bullitt," 10 November 1940,10. 130. William Bullitt, speech, Philadelphia, in GR, 18 August 1940, A5074-76. For attacks on the Au­ gust speech, see B. C. Gark, GR, 19 August 1940,10,479; Schafer, GR, 19 August 1940,10,519; Knut­ son, GR, 19 August 1940,10,519; “Badly Timed: Bullitt’s Speech Earned Rebuke," SFE* 22 August 1940, 10; “Comment," Am erica 63 (31 August 1940): 562; “Orson Welles—Bullitt,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch* 19 August 1940; “Internationalist Hall of Fame," Scribner's C om m entator 9 (December 1940): 18; “Bullitt Orders the People to Shed Their Blood," D aily Worker* 20 August 1940,1; “FDR’s Trigger Man," N ew Masses 36 (27 August 1940): 15. 131. Hugh Johnson, “British Racket," M iam i D aily Herald* 29 December 1940. See also Sargent, Bulletin #4,23 June 1939, G etting US into War* 114. 132. “Our Envoy to Britain," CT* 25 November 1939,8. For hostile linking of Bullitt and Kennedy, see Fish, speech, CBS, 2 March 1940, in GR, A1154; “Defense of Lord Lothian," CT* 29 October 1939, 16; “Our Hot Ambassadors," CT* 4 April 1940,16. 133. “Kennedy Says,’Stay Out,’" Christian Century 56 (27 December 1939): 1595-%. For other claims that Kennedy sought peace, see Dennis, WFL 85 (14 March 1940): 5; Castle Diary, 21 February 1940. 134. Hearst, “In the News," SFE* 12 March 1940,2. See also “Kennedy’s Refusal Reflects Character,” SFE* 16 February, 1940,7. In September, Hearst columnist Boake Carter suggested Kennedy for a new cabinet post, secretary for national defense. “But Boake Carter Says," SFE* 30 September 1940,11. 135. Long, entry of 6 December 1939, War Diary* 39; Roosevelt policy, Travis Beal Jacobs, America and the W inter War* 1939-1940 (New York: Garland, 1981), 129. 136. For examples of anti-interventionist opinion, see “Sibelius Is Forced to Decline ...," Com­ monweal 31 (25 December 1939): 173; Fish, GR, 27 February 1940,2036. 137. Berle, Navigating* 275; Roy W. Howard to Madame De Pblignac, 16 December 1939, Box 157, Howard Papers; Norman Thomas to Mary Fox, 4 December 1939, Thomas Papers. Thomas thought that in 1930 Finland might have gone fascist. He still found reactionary forces there but claimed that its turn to democracy had been “a magnificent performance." See Norman Thomas to David Dubinsky, 21 December 1939, Thomas Papers. 138. John Haynes Holmes to Roger William Riss, 6 December 1939; Holmes to Clarence R. Skin­ ner, 11 December 1939, Holmes Papers. 139. See, for example, issues of the D aily Worker and New Masses. 140. Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 1 December 1939, Borchard Papers; Sargent, Bulletin #21,8 December 1939, G etting US into War* 187-95; “Finland and Russia," N Y D N * 17 No­ vember 1939, 35. 141. “Allies to Help Finland," N YD N * 20 December 1939, 35; “Finland’s Fate Depends on Ger­ many," NYDN* 22 January 1940,19; “The War in Finland," CT* 20 December 1939,18. Am erica 63 (13 August 1940):

Notes to Pages 78-79

377

142. “The Problem of Aid to Finland” CT, 7 January 1940,16; “Finland and Its Defenders,” 12 Jan­ uary 1940,14. See also “Reproaches from Mr. Stanley,” CT, 24 March 1940,14. 143. “Why Did Hore-Belisha Quit?” N YD N , 31 January 1940,27; “The Finnish Theatre,” N YD N , 8 March 1940, 33. For other defenses of British inaction, see “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 22 March 1940,9; Castle Diary, 14 March 1940; Cushman Reynolds, “General Mud,” Common Sense 10 (August 1941): 232. 144. “Laudable: Right That U.S. Aid Finland,” SFE, 14 December 1939,16. However, the Exam iner opposed anything smacking of a war loan. “War Loan: U.S. Must Avoid Involvement in War,” SFE, 20 January 1940,6; “War Loans,” SFE, 8. See also C. David Tompkins, Senator A rthur H. Vandenberg: The Evolution o f a M odem Republican, 1884-1945 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1970), 176; Hiram Johnson and D. Worth Clark in Jacobs, W inter War, 107,132. 145. Fish, NYT, 11 January 1940,12; 28 February 1940,5; 29 February 1940,1. 146. See, for example, Congressman Robert M. Chiperfield (Rep.-lll.), GR, 27 February 1940, 2058-59; Taft, CR, 13 February 1940,1313. A dissident view was taken by the WIL, which claimed that Congress had a responsibility to declare that a state of war existed. Resolutions, National Board, 20-21 January 1940, Washington, D.C., WIL Papers. On 16 January 1940, Senator Danaher offered a concur­ rent resolution to invoke the 1939 neutrality act, so that neither belligerent would receive U.S. aid. See Porter, Sixth-sixth Congress, 110; N Y T , 17 January 1940,1. 147. See, for example, Congressman William A. Pittenger (Rep.-Minn.), CR, 23 January 1940, A319; Congressman Harold Knutson (Rep.-Minn.), CR, 27 February 1940,2064; Frank Waldrop, “The Real Issue of Finnish Loans,” W TH , 30 January 1940,9; “Real Reason for Our Loan Dodging,” W TH , 1 February 1940,13. 148. Buckler, CR, 27 February 1940,2080. 149. See, for example, Bennett C. Clark and Hiram Johnson in Porter, Sixth-sixth Congress, 102; Borah, Holt, and Congressman Clifford Hope (Rep.-Kans.) in Porter, Sixth-sixth Congress, 106; Hiram W. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson Jr., 10 February 1940, Johnson Papers; Harry Elmer Barnes to Mr. Elliott, 14 February 1940, Barnes Papers; Nye, CT, 17 January 1940,2. 150. On Constitution, see Wiley, CR, 18 January 1940,1289. 151. On Export-Import Bank, see Congresswoman Jessie Sumner, CR, 28 February 1940, 2100; Danaher, CR, 9 February 1940,1292; Hiram Johnson, CR, 13 February 1940,1401; Fred Bradley (Rep.Mich.), CR, 21 February 1940, A895. 152. Danaher, CR, 9 February 1940,1293; Sargent, Bulletin #42,6 March 1940, G etting US into War, 317-19; Vorys, CR, 27 February 1940,2041; Barry, CR, 28 February 1940,2112; “Look Out for Booby TVaps!”“—and That War Debt Gratitude,” New Republic 101 (25 October 1939): 323-24. Congressman Keefe sought an amendment specifying that the Export-Import Bank could make no loan either di­ rectly to a government or indirectly to any agency established by that government, which was in de­ fault on its loans. Text, CR, 28 February 1940,2100-2102. It was voted down the same day sixty-nine to ninety-eight. See 2102. 153. On British and French, see “Congress Ponders Loans to Finland,” C hristian C entury 57 (31 January 1940): 131; “Thunder Heads,” N ew Republic 102 (22 January 1940): 100. See also “Aid to Fin­ land,” N ew Republic 102 (29 January 1940): 132. 154. Thomas, [University of North Carolina] D aily Tar Heel, 31 January 1940,1. See also Reynolds, CR, 13 February 1940,139; Holt in Porter, Sixth-sixth Congress, 107; Oscar Ameringer, “This Thing of Worrying About Europe,” Am erican Guardian, 2 February 1940,1. 155. On size of allocation, see Johns, CR, 27 February 1940,2076; Congressman John Taber (Rep.N.Y.) in Pörter, Sixth-sixth Congress, 107. 156. On domestic communism, see Reynolds, CR, 13 February 1940,1396. On Mexico, see Barry, CR, 17 February 1940,2062; Sumner, 27 February 1940,2060. 157. Borchard cited by Senator Alexander Wiley, CR, 9 February 1940,1286. For other expressions of Borchard’s opposition, Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 12 December 1939, and to John A. Danaher, 12 February 1940, Borchard Papers; Borchard, U nited States News, 26 February 1940,23. For other anti-interventionists, see William P. Lage to Borchard, 4 January 1940, and John Bassett

378

Notes to Page 79

Moore to Hiram lohnson [copy], 8 January 1940, Borchard Papers; Senator Clyde Reed, Newsweek, 29 January 1940,13; Philip C. Jessup to James A. Shanley, 6 March 1940, Jessup Papers. 158. Wiley, CR, 18 January 1940,1289; Wiley, “American Forum of the Air,**28 January 1940, in CR, A617; Senator Alva Adams, Newsweek, 29 January 1940,13; Hiram Johnson to John Bassett Moore, 10 and 16 February 1940, John Bassett Moore to Edwin M. Borchard, 19 January 1940, Moore Papers. 159. See, for example, Rankin, CR, 28 February 1940, 2102; ed. Verne Marshall, Cedar Rapids Gazette, 15 January 1940; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine,” Call, 13 January 1940,2; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine,” Call, 27 January 1940,2; Frank Waldrop, [University of North Car­ olina] D aily Tar Heel, 19 January 1940,1; “Will Scandinavia Become a Battleground?“ C hristian Cen­ tu ry 57 (17 January 1940): 69; “How to Get into War,“ Am erica 62 (17 January 1940): 435-36; memo of George Holden Tinkham, attached to letter to Borchard, 23 December 1939, Borchard Papers; Cap­ per, CR, 13 February 1940,1389; labor leader Leonard Woodcock as quoted by Ben Fischer to Travers Clement, 22 January 1940, Socialist Party Papers; Hugh Johnson, “One Man’s Opinion,“ SFN, 19 Jan­ uary 1940, 19; “Congress Should Take a Long Think About This One,“ N YD N , 18 January 1940, 27; Bennett C. Gark, Newsweek, 29 January 1940,13; “That of Our Own,“ Saturday Evening Post 212 (23 March 1940): 26; Nye, N Y T , 11 January 1940,12; Borah, N Y T , 3 January 1940,2. 160. McCarran, CR, 13 February 1940,1383. For pacifists, see Donovan E. Smucker, youth secre­ tary of the FOR,“The Finnish Invasion,“ Fellow ships (February 1940): 21; Frederick J. Libby,“No War Loans to Finland,“ Peace Action 6 (February 1940): 2; Libby, U nited States News, 26 February 1940,23; Dorothy Detzer to Emily Greene Balch, 13 February 1940, WIL Papers; John Haynes Holmes to John Macfarlane Howie, 5 February 1940, Holmes Papers. 161. Gerry Allard, “Support the Finns!“ Call, 9 December 1939,4; National Executive Commit­ tee, Socialist Party, statement, Milwaukee, 10 December 1939, 4, Socialist Party Papers; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine,” Call, 27 January 1940, 2; Thomas, Yale [University] D aily News, 20 January 1940,2. See also pacifist and former Episcopal bishop Paul Jones, letter to Call, 6 Janu­ ary 1940,3. 162. See Borah and editorial, “America Honors Finland on Heroic Anniversary,“ SFE, 7 December 1939,14; Norman Thomas, interview, Yale [University] D aily News, 20 January 1940,1; James A. Shan­ ley to Edwin M. Borchard, 16 January 1940, Borchard Papers. Not all anti-interventionists concurred. Borchard said that once further installments on Finland’s debt were forgiven, it would be impossible to argue against the cancellation of all Allied debts to the United States. Edwin M. Borchard to James A. Shanley, 18 January 1940, Borchard Papers. 163. Reynolds, citing CT, in CR, 13 February 1940,1397-98. See also “Business as Usual,“ Uncen­ sored 16 (20 January 1940): 2. Of the mainstream anti-interventionists who spoke on the matter, only Borchard opposed any moral embargo. Borchard declared that administration efforts to prevent rub­ ber and tin dealers from making shipments to Russia violated the Sherman anti-trust act. Edwin M. Borchard to William P. Lage, 30 March 1940, Borchard Papers. 164. Congressman Robert Secrest (Dem.-Ohio), CR, 27 February 1940,2076; Daniel Reed, CR, 27 February 1940, 2082; “American Supplies for Red Josef,“ CT, 6 March 1940, 14; “American Aid to Stalin,“ CT, 14 March 1940,14; Nye, “We’re Already in the War,” Look, 23 April 1940,8. Not surpris­ ingly, New Masses found no proof that any U.S. strategic materials sent to the USSR wound up in Ger­ man hands. “And Churchill,” 35 (9 April 1940): 22. 165. Andresen, CR, 7 February 1940, 1179. For more stress on the gold trade, see Social Justice, 5 February 1940,18; Danaher, Wesleyan [University] Argus, 15 January 1940,1; Waldrop, “Why Stalin Doesn’t Declare War,“ W TH , 13 January 1940,11; “Russia Befriended,” CT, 22 February 1940,14. 166. See, for example, Casde, U nited States News, 26 February 1940,23; “Comment,” America 62 (2 March 1940): 562; Edwin M. Borchard to Alexander Wiley, CR, 9 February 1940,1286; Congressman Earl C. Michener (Rep.-Mich.), 27 February 1940,2040; Norman Thomas interview, Yale [University] D aily News, 20 January 1940,2; “Congress Ponders Loans to Finland,” C hristian C entury 57 (31 Janu­ ary 1940): 131; John Bassett Moore to Hiram Johnson [copy], 18 January 1940, James A. Shanley to Edwin M. Borchard, 16 January 1940, Borchard Papers; Father Coughlin contribution of $1,000, N Y T , 16 January 1940,5; “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 24 January 1940,13; John Bassett Moore to Hiram

Notes to Pages 79-81

379

Johnson, 12 February 1940, Moore Papers; Robert James Maddox, W illiam £ Borah and Am erican For­ eign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 246. Wiley introduced a bill to per­ mit contributions to Finland to be tax-deductible. CR, 18 January 1940,456. 167. Best, Hoover, 1:141; M For Finland," Time, 11 March 1940,16. 168. "Charity for Finland," New Republic 102 (5 February 1940): 163; Norman Thomas to David Dubinsky, 21 December 1939, Thomas Papers; "European Relief," CT, 19 December 1939,16. See also"Brave Litde Finland," N YD N , 14 December 1939,39. Even the arch-rightist Ralph Townsend claimed that most of the publicity for Finnish relief "seemed worded, not so much to stir compassion for Finns, as to stir war hate against Russia." "Mercy—Strictly Political," Scribner’s Com m entator 9 (March 1941): 81. 169. Support for such a move came from such anti-interventionists as Hiram Johnson and Con­ gressman Mason. Jacobs, W inter War, 69. See also Social Justice, 5 February 1939,5. 170. Vandenberg, CT, 5 December 1939, 4; CR, 18 January 1940, 457. When Finland signed the armistice, Senator D. Worth Clark introduced a resolution calling on the United States to recall the American ambassador. CR, 15 March 1940,2919. 171. CR, 12 February 1940, 1354. One hundred eight opposed the measure. See also Fish, CR, 25 January 1940,689-90; Herbert Hoover in Newsweek* 11 December 1939,24; Social Justice, 5 February 1940, 5, 18; Hamilton Fish and Congressman James A. Van Zandt (Rep.-Pa.), U nited States News, 2 February 1940,25. 172. Entry of 30 November 1939, M offat Papers, 280-81. 173. Wheeler, U nited States News, 2 February 1940,24; Johnson, "One Man's Opinion," SFN, 6 De­ cember 1939, 15; Johnson, "Tom-Tom Beating," N YW T, 10 February 1940, 13; Thomas, "Finland’s Fight A World Cause," Call, 16 December 1939,2; Reed in Porter, Sixty-sixth Congress, 106; William R. Castle to Herbert Hoover, 7 December 1939, Castle Papers. Hoover replied that while Castle theoreti­ cally was correct, "if we are going to pursue a course of conduct toward Germany, Mr. Roosevelt ought to take responsibility for his friendly leanings towards the Communists." Herbert Hoover to William R. Castle, 11 December 1939, Castle Papers. 174. “Break Off with the Soviets?” N YD N , 5 December 1939,38; Steinhardt in Jacobs, W inter War, 93. 175. See, for example, "Finland Falls: But War Is NotYet Over," SFE, 16 March 1940,8; Coughlin,"From the Tower," Social Justice, 25 March 1940,3. More than a year later, Hanson Baldwin wrote of the Finns, "Their cause was lost when the world cheered their victories but, cheering, delayed its help." See Baldwin, United We Standi 10. The Allies, he said, could have reduced the amount of raw materials Russia was giv­ ing Germany, severed Germany's iron ore routes to northern Swedish towns, and established a northern front on Germany's exposed flank, thus forcing Germany into a major defensive effort He did concede strategic difficulties but claimed "war cannot be won without taking risks." United We Stand! 10-11. 176. "Report Russian Advances in Finland," C hristian C entury 57 (28 February 1940): 269. See also Hugh Johnson, "Join or Die," N Y W T, 23 January 1940,17; Edwin M. Borchard to John A. Danaher, 9 February 1940, Borchard Papers; "But Boake Carter Says," SFE, 25 January 1940,15; "Allies, Nordic Na­ tions Can Wisely Aid Finland," SFE, 20 December 1939,12; "England and France Must Fight in Fin­ land's Cause," SFE, 6 February 1940,8. 177. "War Proves Ships Helpless," 5 May 1940, in pamphlets of Al Williams columns, Box 276, Lundeen Papers (hereafter cited as Williams Pamphlets); "Duty Done," Uncensored 24 (16 March 1940): 1. See also "Johnny-Come-Lately," Uncensored 23 (9 March 1940): 9. Uncensored did concede that Britain could not have easily come to Finland's aid, for Norway and Sweden would not have allowed the pas­ sage of Allied troops, and an attack on Petsamo would have been folly. 178. Dennis, WFL 86 (14 March 1940): 1-2. 179. Flynn, SFN, 21 March 1940,16; "Salute to Finland," N YD N , 14 March 1940,29; Hear$t,"ln the News," SFE, 15 March 1940,1. Such anti-interventionists were not alone. See, for example, Ickes, entry of 3 December 1939, Secret D iary, 3:75. 180. "Finland and Russia Make Peace," Christian C entury57 (20 March 1940): 371;"The Peace Cri­ sis," New Republic 102 (18 March 1940): 363; Hoover, Stanford [University] Daily, 1 March 1940, 1; "Has War Tide Reached Its Peak?" N YD N , 14 March 1940,29; John Bassett Moore to George H. Ryden, 2 May 1940, Moore Papers.

380

Notes to Pages 81-84

181. Jacobs, W inter War, 223-24,235; Maddux, Years o f Estrangement, 126-27. 182. Jacobs, W inter War, 231-38; Porter, Sixty-sixth Congress, 125-26; Matson, N eutrality and N av­ icerts, 60-62; entry of 16 January 1940, M offat Papers, 282-83. 183. Dallek, Roosevelt, 210; Maddux, Years o f Estrangement, 112-13. 184. Entry of 30 January 1940, M offat Papers, 290-91. 185. On the issue of farm and other nonmilitary supplies, those with opinions voted 58 percent in favor, 42 percent opposed. Nine percent had no opinion. On the matter of planes and other weapons, the tally was 61 percent opposed, 39 percent in favor. N Y T , 1 February 1940,4. There was a 73:27 ratio in favor of permitting Finland to sell bonds in the United States. N Y T , 10 March 1940,27. 186. The Fish bill was voted down eighty-two to thirty-five. CR, 28 February 1940,2116. 187. Edwin M. Borchard to William P. Lage, 19 January 1940, 16 March 1940, Borchard Papers. Lage felt betrayed by the fact that Hiram Johnson, La Follette, and Vandenberg backed the Brown bill in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. William P. Lage to Edwin M. Borchard, 8 February 1940, Borchard Papers. For Fish, see N Y T , 11 January 1939, 12. Asked interventionist Congressman Albert A. Gore (Dem.-Tenn.) of Fish, “Where is the great isolationist now?wCR, 28 February 1940,2113. CHAPTER 6: THE FALL OF W ESTERN EUROPE

1. Weinberg, W orld a t Arm s, 115-18. 2. Anne Morrow Lindbergh, entry of 16 April 1940, War W ithin, 79. Among those who expected such a strike, see Charles A. Lindbergh, entry of 10 October 1940, W artim e Journals, 402; and author A. Fleming MacLiesh, memo [spring 1940], Hertzberg Papers. 3. Hoover cited in Castle Diary, 20 April 1940; Villard, “Issues and Men,” N ation 150 (27 April 1940): 542. For Roosevelt’s comments, see N Y T , 14 April 1940,1. 4. Swomley, Wesleyan [University] Argus, 22 April 1940,3. 5. See, for example, Reynolds, Congressman Jacob Thorkelson, CR, 11 April 1940,4353; Fred­ erick J. Libby, “Calmly, Coolly, America Must Stay Out,” Peace A ction 6 (April 1940): 1; Edwin M. Borchard to James A. Shanley, 10 April 1940, Borchard Papers; “Britain’s War Shadow,” D aily Worker, 9 April 1940,6; 10 April 1940,1; Shipstead in D aily Worker, CR, 11 April 1940,6; “The War Spreads,” N ew M asses 35 (16 April 1940): 22; “A Policy for the American People,” N ew M asses 36 (23 April 1940): 4; J. S. Barnes, “The Scandinavian Adventure,” Social Justice, 3 June 1940, 13; Villard, “Issues and Men,” N ation 150 (20 April 1940): 514; “This 1$ Not Our War,” Socialist Appeal, 13 April 1940,4; “The Sea Fights Off Norway,” CT, 13 April 1940,12; Professor Herbert Wright, testimony, SFRC, 5 February 1941,454-55; Judge John A. Matthews, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,776; Ralph Townsend, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,809,814. National Executive Committee, So­ cialist Party, Progressive, 11 May 1940, 7; William Randolph Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 10 April 1940,2. Hearst did concede that Churchill in honor could not have refused to take action. “In the News,” SFE, 6 May 1940,1. 6. Dennis, WFL 89 (11 April 1940): 2; 95 (23 May 1940): 2; “Chronology,” Uncensored 28 (13 April 1940): 3-6. See also Hugh Johnson, SFN, 10 April 1940, 15; “Scandinavia Between the Mill­ stones,” Christian C entury 57 (17 April 1940): 502-3. 7. Welles and Long in Long, entry of 9 April 1940, War D iary, 76. 8. See, for example, “The War Spreads,” CT, 10 April 1940,18; National Executive Committee, Socialist Party, “The Nazi Invasion of Scandinavia,” Call, 20 April 1940,1; Albert W. Hamilton, “The Struggle for Control of Norway,” Call, 4 May 1940,5; “The War Begins,” New Republic 102 (15 April 1940): 491. By the next issue, the N ew Republic was becoming interventionist. If British sea power could not keep Hitler out of Norway, so it reasoned, it could not exclude him from Sweden, Rumania, Holland, “or any other remote quarter.” Moreover, it could not keep Spain out of Gibraltar, Japan out of Singapore and the Indian Ocean, or Italy out of Yugoslavia, Greece, “Asia Minor,” or Africa. “Let Britain lose the Norway campaign, and the empire of the mistress of the seas will be eroded like a sand­ bag in a flooded torrent.” “If Germany Wins,” 102 (22 April 1940): 525.

Notes to Pages 84-86

381

9. “Comment," America 63 (20 April 1940): 30; “They've Found the Battleground," N YD N , 10 April 1940,33; “The Rights of Small Nations," N YD N , 9 April 1940,25. 10. “Scandinavia Between the Millstones," Christian C entury 57 (17 April 1940): 502-3; “Strategy in Norway," N ew Masses 25 (7 May 1940): 21; “Sweden’s Ore," Uncensored 28 (13 April 1940): 1-2; Dennis, WFL 90 (18 April 1940): 2; 89 (11 April 1940): 1; Burton Rascoe to Quincy Howe, 13 April 1940, Hertzberg Papers. 11. Hoover in Casde Diary, 20 April 1940; Hearst, “In the News," SFE, 10 April 1940,3. 12. See, for example, Senator Guy Gillette, October 16,1939,465; Ludlow, 16 October 1939,485; Capper, broadcast, CBS, 29 September 1939, in CR, A88. 13. “The Moral Right to Peace," CT, 26 January 1940,12. See Churchill speech text, NIT, 21 Janu­ ary 1940,30; Netherlands reply, NYT, 25 January 1940,5. 14. John E. Kelly, “Ist Dies Nicht ein Cockeyed War!" Am erica 62 (30 March 1940): 682; Hearst, “In the News," SEE, 13 March 1940,2; Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 24 November 1939, Borchard Papers. 15. See, for example, “The Bulldog Breed," C hristian C entury 57 (22 May 1940): 663; Castle Diary, 31 May 1940. For lack of surprise, see John T. Flynn, Call, 1 June 1940,1. Of all the anti-intervention­ ists, only Hiram Johnson even hinted at Germany's defeat. Hiram W. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson Jr., 11 May 1940, Johnson Papers. 16. “Comment," Am erica 63 (18 May 1940): 142. 17. Anne Morrow Lindbergh, entry of 20 May 1940, War W ithin, 88; emphasis in original. 18. Charles A. Lindbergh in Anne Morrow Lindbergh, entry of 24 May 1940, War W ithin, 88. See also entry of 24 June 1940, War W ithin, 117. 19. A Gallup poll found 67 percent seeing the Germans as winning; 8 percent, the Allies. N YT, 19 May 1940,16. 20. Reynaud, N Y T , 29 May 1940,4; Belgian premier Hubert Pierlot, text of statement, N Y T , 29 May 1940,4; “Leopold’s Suppressed Letter," CT, 3 January 1941,10. Hearst, finding the letter true, accused Roosevelt of suppressing its contents. “In the News," SFE, 28 April 1941, A. 21. Lawrence Dennis, WFL 96 (29 May 1940): 3; Castle Diary, 30 May 1940, 1 September 1940; “Justice for Leopold of Belgium," CT, 18 June 1941, 6; “Nations in Defeat," CT, 2 January 1941, 10; Schafer, CR, 10 June 1940,7904; Congressman Thorkelson, CR, 10 June 1940,7094; Coughlin, Memo­ rial Day speech, Social Justice, 10 June 1940,3; “Let's Hear from Leopold," Social Justice, 10 June 1940, 8; Devere Allen, Yale [University] D aily News, 4 November 1940, 3; Devere Allen, “Belgium and the War,” U nity 126 (17 February 1941): 185-86; Herbert Hoover, Life, 25 November 1940,75; Joseph P. Kennedy in Bilainkin, entry of 20 August 1940, D iary, 189-90. 22. “Leopold III Calls It Off," N YD N , 29 May 1940,21; Cudahy, Newsweek, 19 August 1940,13. See also Cudahy in Lindbergh, entry of 17 September 1940, W artim e Journals, 391; Cudahy, “Belgium’s Leopold," Life, 25 November 1940,75-83. The Chicago Tribune took Cudahy to task, saying that Cud­ ahy regarded himself less as the representative of the American people in Belgium than as the repre­ sentative of the Belgian crown to America. “Whose Ambassadors?" 3 December 1940,14. 23. Carmer, “Leopold and Dunkerque," Scribner's C om m entator 11 (December 1941): 65-68; Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 30 May 1940,1-2. Hearst also claimed that King Christian surrendered Denmark without striking a blow in its defense. Similarly, Wilhelmena exhorted the Dutch to fight to the last ditch while herself fleeing to England. Hearst evidently soon mellowed, for he blamed Roo­ sevelt for suppressing Leopold's letter to the American people. “In the News," SFE, 20 August 1940,1. 24. Allen, Brown [University] D aily Herald, 23 April 1941,1; Dennis, WFL 100 (27 June 1940): 4. See also Dennis, WFL 96 (29 May 1940): 1,3; Dennis, WFL 94 (16 May 1940): 2. 25. Reynolds, C reation, 104; Reynolds, “Churchill and the British 'Decision,'" 150-53; Ponting, 1940; 110. John Charmley finds such comments a momentary concession to Halifax and not in­ dicative of his real views. C hurchill, the End o f Glory: A Political Biography (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1993), 405. 26. Hiram W. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson Jr., 16 June 1940, Johnson Papers; William Henry Chamberlin, “France in June: The Collapse," A tlantic M onthly 166 (September 1940): 298.

382

Notes to Pages 87-89

27. David Reynolds, " 1940," 326-27; R. H. S. Stolfi, "Equipment for Victory in France in 1940," H is­ 155 (February 1970): 1-20; Ponting, 1940, chap. 5. 28. "Busy Billy Bullitt,” CT, 10 November 1940, 10; "State Trial in France,” CT, 29 July 1940, 10; Hiram W. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson Jr., 4 July 1940, Johnson Papers. See also Nye, CR, 21 June 1940,8795. 29. See, for example, Al Williams, "Claims Proved,” 5 June 1940, in Williams pamphlet, Box 276, Lundeen Papers; Hugh Johnson, "One Man’s Opinion,” SFN, 25 June 1940,13; Devere Allen, "Why Did France Collapse?” U nity 125 (15 July 1940): 152; Lindbergh, entry of 10 October 1940, W artim e Journals, 402. 30. Colonel Robert R. McCormick, broadcast of 20 October 1940, in Addresses by Colonel Robert R. M cCormick (Chicago: WGN, 1940), 68-69; William Henry Chamberlin, “France in June: The Col­ lapse,” A tlantic M onthly 166 (September 1940): 302; Dennis, WFL 96 (29 May 1940): 2; "Eighteen Days of War,” N YD N , 28 May 1940, 23. Fuller’s work is Towards Armageddon: The Defence Problem and 1 (London: Dickson, 1937). See also "Can Hitler Invade England?” N YD N , 11 May 1941,17; "Confusion .. . Critical,” N YD N , 22 May 1940, 31; “The Fall of France,” N YD N , 14 July 1940, 35; "What France Lacks,” CT, 16 June 1940,14. 31. Harry Elmer Barnes to Mr. Elliott, 14 February 1940, Barnes Papers. See also John Bassett Moore to Edwin M. Borchard, 14 June 1940, Moore Papers; "What the Hitler-Stalin Pact Means to the World,” Social Justice, 4 September 1939,7. 32. Johnson, "Join or Die,” N YW T, 23 January 1940,17. See also "How France Was Betrayed," New Masses 36 (25 June 1940): 4; Henry Nelson Weiman and Arthur E. Holt, "Keep Our Country Out of War,” Christian C entury 56 (27 September 1939): 1162. 33. "Double Negative,” Uncensored 16 (20 January 1940): 2; Carter, Philadelphia Evening Ledger, 29 September 1939. 34. Gillis, "France: God’s Instrument?” Catholic World 151 (March 1940): 649. See also Social Jus­ tice, 22 July 1940,3. 35. See, for example, Frank Hanighen, "Making the World Safe for Empire,” Common Sense 8 (Sep­ tember 1939): 20; African American editor George Schuyler cited by Robert L Birchman, “The Negro Question,” Socialist Appeal, 15 June 1940,3; "Shock-Troops,” Uncensored 1 (7 October 1939): 2. 36. Lundeen, CR, 14 October 1939,428; Norman Thomas to William Pickens, 25 September 1939, Thomas Papers; Holt, CR, 18 October 1939,549. 37. Gish, speech to Executives’ Club, Chicago, 9 May 1941, in CR, 9 May 1941, A2563. See also “What France Lacks,” CT, 14 June 1940,14; “When France Lost the War,” CT, 31 July 1940,10; "Com­ ment,” America 63 (9 June 1940): 310. 38. MacNider, speech to Young Republican League, Des Moines, Iowa, 12 June 1940, in CR, A3937; Dennis, WFL 105 (1 August 1940): 1-2. 39. Schafer, CR, 1 November 1939, 1277; “These Wrecked France” (photo essay), Scribner’s Com­ m entator 9 (February 1941): 13-20. See also Lois and Donaldson Thombum,"Dear Elmer,” Scribner’s C om m entators (August 1940): 30-32,41-42. 40. René de Chambrun, / Saw France Fall: W ill She Rise Again ? (New York: Morrow, 1940). For fa­ vorable treatment, see Newsweek, 21 November 1940,50; "Concrete Guy,” Time, 21 October 1940,34, 36; George T. Eberle, America 64 (26 October 1940): 78; Stanton B. Leeds, "Chambrun—Soldier of France,” Scribner’s Com m entator 9 (January 1941): 11-12,21-23; Sargent, Bulletin #96,30 December 1940, Getting US into War, 550; Gilbert Twiss, CT, 16 October 1940,23. Joseph Barnes, foreign editor of the New York Herald Tribune, treated most of the book with respect but objected to Chambrun’s praise of the Vichy government. “A Frenchman Speaks for Victory,” New York Herald Tribune Book Re­ view, 20 October 1940, sect. 9,5. 41. Stanton B. Leeds, These Rule France: The Story o f Edouard Daladier and the M en Around D al­ adier (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940). Most reviews were critical, accusing him of an extreme rightist bias. See, for example, Leo Gershoy, "French Affairs,” Yale Review 29 (Summer 1940): 823-24. 42. "French Plane Production,” Uncensored 37 (15 June 1940): 3. For approval of Uncensoreds po­ sition, see "Blum’s Government,” Call, 29 June 1940,4. tory

Notes to Pages 89-90

383

43. Hanighen, “Were the Social Reforms of the Popular Front Responsible for the French Defeat?” Uncensored 4 \ (13 July 1940): special supplement, 1-4. See also C. Hartley Grattan, letter to the editor, N ew Republic 103 (29 July 1940): 143. 44. "Campaign of Nonsense,” Progressive, 9 November 1940,8. 45. Wheeler, CR, 20 February 1941, A784; Clark, CR, 23 October 1939, 717; Norman Thomas, "Your World and Mine,” C all 30 December 1939,7; Flynn, “Other People's Money: War on the Home Front,” N ew Republic 100 (27 September 1939): 188. For similar accusations, see Villard, [University of Rochester] Tower Times, 23 February 1940, 1; Harry Elmer Barnes, “This Unholy War!” N Y W T , 29 March 1940,22; Pierre Crabites and lohn Earle Uhler, “France Is Not a Democracy,” Catholic W orld 153 (March 1941): 665; Robsion, CR, 2 November 1939, 1295; Reynolds, CR, 14 October 1939, 428;

Reynolds, CR, 21 October 1939,693. Ernest L Meyer recommended journalist Pierre Van Paassen’s Days o f O ur Years (NewYork: Hillman-Curl, 1939), a book that—as noted by the socialist journalist— denied that either France or Britain was a democracy. Am erican Guardian, 15 September 1939, 4. Porter Sargent drew on André Simone’s J’Accuse! The M en W ho Betrayed France (New York: Dial, 1940). See Bulletin #96,3 January 1941, G etting US into War, 548. 46. See, for example, Porter Sargent, Bulletin #22, 15 December 1939, G etting US into War, 200; Sargent, Bulletin #28,15 January 1940, G etting US into War, 245; “Refugees,” Uncensored 1 (7 October 1939): 1; “France Hunts Down Dissenters,” C hristian C entury 56 (25 October 1939): 1291-92; Devere Allen, “Frenchmen Without Tears,” Fellowship 6 (September 1940): 105; “Path of Resistance,” Uncen­ sored 9 (2 December 1939): 3; “French Liberties,” Uncensored 31 (4 May 1940): 4. 47. “Fighting for What Democracy?” New Republic 101 (8 November 1939): 1; Barnes, “Debunking Holy War,” N Y W T , 5 February 1940,5; “French Pacifists,” Uncensored 4 (28 October 1939): 1; Detzer, WIL National Board meeting, 20-21 January 1939, WIL Papers. 48. Sargent, Bulletin #34, February 3,1940, G etting US into War, 273; “Fighting for What Democ­ racy?" New Republic 101 (8 November 1939): 1; “Toward Totalitarianism,” N YD N , 11 February 1940, 47. Conversely, the Chicago Tribune had little sympathy for the French communists, accusing diem of practically preparing for a French defeat by reducing production and presenting the country with an outmoded air force. “The End of the French Communists,” 20 January 1940,10. For other attacks on the French communists, see Hearst,“In the News,” SFE, 25 June 1940,1; William Henry Chamberlin, “France in June: The Collapse,” A tlantic M onthly 166 (September 1940): 302-3. 49. See, for example, Am erican Guardian, 3 November 1939, 1; Am erican Guardian, 1 December 1939,2; Social Justice, 23 September 1940,3-4. 50. Barnes, “This Unholy War!” N Y W T , 29 March 1940,22; William Henry Chamberlin, “France in June: The Collapse,” A tlantic M onthly 166 (September 1940): 301-2. See also Chamberlin, “Daladier: The TVagedy of France,” Am erican M ercury 50 (August 1940): 477-83. 51. Hanighen,“How France Is Taking the War,” New R epubliclO l (20 December 1939): 257; Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 26 March 1940,1. See also SFE, 11 April 1940,2. 52. “A Tisket a Tasket,” Uncensored 25 (23 March 1940): 1; Hanighen memo, 18 May 1940, Hertzberg papers. See also Dennis, WFL 86 (21 March 1940): 4. 53. “Thieves Fall Out,” New Masses 36 (6 August 1940): 16; Stanton B. Leeds, “Chambrun, Soldier of Fortune,” Scribner’s C om m entator 9 (January 1941): 11; “The French Trials,” CT, 19November 1940, 12. For its initial disapproval of the trials, see “State TYial in France,” CT, 29 July 1940,10. 54. Holmes, “AWay to Stop It!” U nity 125 (2 September 1940): 4; emphasis in original. 55. Hanighen, “Selling to the Enemy,” H arper’s M agazine 180 (March 1940): 387; Allen, “French­ men Without Tears,” Fellowship 6 (September 1940): 105. For indictments of the trade in raw materi­ als, see“Business as Usual,” Uncensored 12 (23 January 1939): 1-2; Leon Hamilton, “Profits of War Are Taken on Both Sides,” Social Justice, 22 January 1940,7; Dreiser, America Is Worth Saving, 255; Aaron Levenstein, “Business as Usual,” C all 6 January 1940,4, all citing “Germany and France Exchange Ore and Coal Through Belgium,” Iron Age 144 (7 December 1939): 87. See also Sargent, Bulletin #24,29 December 1939, G etting US into War, 218; “What Price Patriotism?” New Masses 34 (9 January 1940): 21 ; Kelly, “Ist Dies Nicht ein Cockeyed War!” 682; Holmes, “Enemies Helping One Another,” U nity 124 (19 February 1940): 184; Holmes, “The Munitions Scandal,” U nity 125 (1 April 1940): 35-36.

384

Notes to Pages 91-94

56. Lindbergh, entry of 17 June 1940, War W ithin, 111; “Comment," America 63 (29 June 1940): 310. 57. For interventionist doubts concerning Pétain, see lekes, entryof 3 August 1940, Secret Diary, 3:277. 58. “Congratulations to Britain," N YD N , 6 July 1940,13; Holmes, “Men Who Live Too Long,” U nity 125 (5 August 1940): 164; Dennis, WFL 100 (27 June 1940): 1. 59. Social Justice, 22 July 1940,3; Herbert Hoover to John C. O’Laughlin, 8 July 1940, Stanford Files; “Fascist France," Christian C entury 57 (17 July 1940): 894. 60. “The Future of France," Christian Century 57 (25 September 1940): 1166. It claimed that the pa­ pacy had hoped for a Latin bloc within the fascist order, one bound together by a religious tie and able to resist inundation by a culture based on state totalitarianism. Into such a bloc would enter Italy, Spain, France, and perhaps some of the succession states that Mussolini might create as spoils of war. Such a Latin bloc “would bring Europe back into sanity." Arguing to the contrary, America, in praising Vichy’s opposition to divorce and birth control, questioned whether the government would become fascist. “Comment," America 63 (24 August 1940): 535. 61. Chamberlin, “Hitler’s Alternatives: Is He a Prisoner of Conquest?" A tlantic M onthly 167 (Janu­ ary 1941): 8. 62. Sargent, Bulletin #96, 3 January 1941, G etting US into War, 562; “Comment," America 64 (22 February 1941): 53; Hearst,“In the News," SFE, 19 April 1941, A; Social Justice, 16 June 1941,19; Social Justice, 21 July 1941, 7; Social Justice, 8 September 1941, 3; Norman Thomas to Ambassador Gaston Henry-Haye, 13 February 1941, Thomas Papers. 63. Mario Rossi, Roosevelt and the French (NewYork: Praeger, 1993), 155; Kimball, Forged in War, 87. 64. Roosevelt, N Y T , 16 May 1941,1,4; HuU, N Y T , 6 June 1941,1. 65. Hearst, “In the News," SFE, 19 April 1941, H2; “France in a Tough Spot," CT, 9 June 1941,12; “Herr Hitler’s Union," CT, 26 April 1941,10; Libby, “War Method Makes Enemies of Former Friends," Peace Action 7 (May 1941): 2. See also Congressman Karl Mundt (Rep.-S.Dak.), CR, 28 June 1941, A3157; Dennis, WFL 147 (22 May 1941): 3. 66. “France," N YD N , 17 May 1941,15. 67. Pétain broadcast, text, N YT, 13August 1941,4; “Comment,” America 65 (23 August 1941): 534; Castle Diary, 13 August 1941. 68. Roosevelt, address at Charlottesville, text, N YT, 10 June 1941,6. Welles, who consistently had confidence in Mussolini, wanted the phrase omitted. See Berle, entry of 11 June 1940, Navigating, 322. 69. Barnes, “The War Profiteers," Social Justice, 11 December 1939, 11. See also Barnes, “Hope of Christian Europe Lies in Rome," Social Justice, 5 February 1940,7. 70. Thomas, Wesleyan [University] Argus, 12 October 1939, 1; “Heirs of the British Empire," NYD N , 10 March 1940,47; “The War on the Neutral Fronts," N YD N , 24 November 1939,37. The News wavered on Italy's ultimate role in the conflict, at one time predicting that it would join the Allies, at other times Germany. See “What Will Mussolini Do?" N YD N , 2 March 1940,15; “Is It a Deal?" N YD N , 6 March 1940,33; “What Did Hitler and Mussolini Say," N YD N , 21 March 1940,31. 71. Lundeen, CR, 5 June 1940, A3591. 72. Knutson, CR, 11 June 1941, 7997; Lindbergh, entry of 10 June 1940, War W ithin, 106; “Com­ ment," America 63 (22 June 1940): 282. See also “The Hand and the Dagger," America 63 (22 June 1940): 294-95; “Mussolini Comes In," N YD N , 11 June 1940,23. 73. Lindbergh, entry of 10 June 1940, W artime Journals, 356; Castle Diary, 10 June 1940; Long, entry of 13 June 1940, War Diary, 104; Welles in Berle, entry of 11 June 1940, Navigating, 322. 74. “Daggers Made in U.S.A.," Uncensored 38 (22 June 1940): 1-2; “The Men Behind Mussolini," New Republic 102 ( 17 June 1940): 808; Lundeen, CR, 27 August 1940,1 1,026. 75. Lindbergh, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,509; “Mussolini’s Wars," CT, 19 November 1940, 12; Hearst, “In the News," SFE, 12 April 1940,1-2. 76. N YT, 18 May 1940, 8; Hoover, speech in Lincoln, Nebraska, in Addresses upon the Am erican Road, 1940-1941 (New York: Scribner’s, 1941 ), 50. He did stress that such aid must be given within the framework of existing loans that, at the time, prohibited loans to any nation, such as Britain, delin­ quent in war debts. 77. Wert,“Specter," 393; Wert,“Aid to the Poles,” 511-24. For shadowboxingbetween FDR and Hoover concerning Hoovers possible leadership of an administration initiative, see Wert, “Specter," 81-92.

Notes to Pages 94r-96

385

78. Wert, “Specter," 60. For the claim that relief efforts distracted Hoover from normal political ac­ tivity, see Best, Hoover, 1:141-44. 79. Wert, “Specter," 4,281; Belgium commission, N Y T , 16 May 1940,11. For British rationale, see Gordon Wright, The Ordeal o f Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper 8c Row, 1968), 47. 80. Cudahy, N YT, 7 August 1940,1,3; The Arm ies March: A Personal Report (New York: Scribner's, 1941 ), chap. 14. In June 1940, Cudahy claimed that of some 8.4 million Belgians, some 8.3 million were subsisting on starvation rations. “Belgium Is Hungry," Life 10 (2 June 1941): 81. In October 1941, he told the SFRC that he had seen children in the first stages of pellagra, rickets, and other diseases of mal­ nutrition. Testimony, 23 October 1941,146. 81. For anti-interventionist endorsements of Cudahy's remarks, see, for example, “Jangling Am­ bassadors,” Am erica 63 (24 August 1940): 546; lohn Nevin Sayre, “Peace Is Not Built on Hunger," Fel­ lowship 6 (September 1940): 125; McCarran, CR, 29 May 1941,4553; Villard, “Chaos in the Cabinet,” C hristian C entury 58 (25 June 1941): 828; Edward ). Skillin Jr., “Case Against," Commonweal 35 (5 De­ cember 1941): 181-82. 82. Hoover, press statement, “Starvation in the Occupied Democracies," 11 August 1940, Addresses, 1940-1941,117-18; Wert, “Specter,” 304-6. 83. Herbert Hoover to Raymond Graham Swing (copy), 19 August 1940, Castle Papers. See also Castle Diary, 21 August 1940 and 5 October 1940. 84. Hoover in Anne Morrow Lindbergh, entry of 12 August 1940, War W ithin, 136; Charles A. Lindbergh, entry of 12 August 1940, W artim e Journals, 378. 85. Churchill’s speech, text, N YT, 21 August 1940,4. 86. Hoover, “Reply to a Statement of British Refusal to Allow Relief of the Invaded Democracies," 6 October 1940, in Addresses, 1940-1941,119-20; Hoover, speech at Poughkeepsie, New York, 15 No­ vember 1940, in Addresses, 1940-1941,128; Hoover, “Feed Hungry Europe," Collier's 106 (23 Novem­ ber 1940): 72. 87. Tim e, 24 Fëbruary 1941, 18. Among the interventionists backing Hoover's effort were David Lawrence, Raymond Gram Swing, Lowell Thomas, Clare Boothe Luce, Raymond Gapper, and the Luce publications. Publisher Henry Luce himself left the interventionist Century Group over the mat­ ter. Herzstein, Luce, 170. In an editorial dated December, the N Y T declared that “it would be a bitter awakening for Great Britain, if... she were to win the war and discover that the democratic peoples. .. had been alienated." “Should We Feed Europe?" 10 December 1940,24. In the Senate such individ­ uals included Elbert D. Thomas, Francis T. Maloney, Charles O. Andrews (Dem.-Fla.), Joseph Ball (Rep.-Minn.), John H. Bankhead 2nd (Dem.-Ala.), William W. Barbour (Rep.-N.J.), Theodore G. Bilbo (Dem.-Miss.), Ralph Owen Brewster (Rep.-Maine), Harold Burton (Dem.-Ohio), and John Thomas (Dem.-ldaho). Signers to Thomas Resolution, CR, 2 June 1941,4589. Interventionist colum­ nist Dorothy Thompson toyed with a mild food relief plan. Herzstein, Luce, 184-85. 88. James H. George fr., “Another Chance: Herbert Hoover and World War II Relief," D iplom atic H istory 16 (Summer 1992): 396-97. 89. Berle, entry of 8 July 1940, Navigating, 327. See also 28 September 1940,339. For contrary views, see Roosevelt to Harry Hopkins, 1 March 1941, F.D.Ä.; His Personal Letters, 1129; Ickes, entry of 27 July 1940, Secret Diary, 3:274-75; 10 August 1940,296; 1 December 1940,385; Hull, Memoirs, 2:1052. 90. Hull, N Y T , 12 December 1940,12; Hoover in Chamberlin Diary, 10 January 1941. 91. Hoover, “The March of Hunger in Europe," Chicago, 16 February 1941, in Addresses, 1940-1941,150. An NCFSD report maintained that the daily ration of bread and meat in Belgium was one-third that of the Germans. The British Ministry of Economic Warfare denied this, claiming that the daily ration was actually 79 percent what the Germans were allowed. While doubting all claims, Wert cites John Gillingham's Belgian Business in the N azi N ew Order (Ghent: Jan Dhondt Foundation, 1977) to argue that while hunger was the rule for most Belgians, famine never occurred. As Hoover had predicted famine by 15 February, the British argument gained credibility. Wert, “Specter," 365-67. As Wert writes, “Without famine, there was no exigency, no need for intervention. The time factor, originally an ally of Hoover, now worked against him." 367. 92. Wert, “Specter,” 352; Hoover, memorandum, conversation with Cordell Hull, 28 February 1941,5, Hoover Papers.

386

Notes to Pages 96-98

93. Hoover, A n American Epic vol. 4, The Guns Cease Killing and the Saving o f Lifo from Famine Begins, 1939-1963( Chicago: Regnery, 1964), 40-41. For Hoover’s confidence concerning the Germans, see Castle Diary, 28 February 1941. For popular mistrust, see Wert, “Specter,” 372-73. 94. “Statement on the Blockade Policy of the British Government,” 10 March 1941, in CR, 17 March 1941,2293-94. 95. Hoover, “A Reply to British Refusal to Permit Relief,” 10 March 1941, Addresses; 1940-1941 ,159. See also Hoover, letter to [London] Times, 16 April 1941, in Am erican E pic 62-64; Herbert Hoover to Cordell Hull (copy), 24 April 1941; Cordell Hull to Herbert Hoover (copy), 10 May 1941, Casde Pa­ pers. 96. For concrete support of the NCFSD, see minutes, FOR Executive Committee, 11 March 1941, FOR Papers; A. ). Muste to Lord Halifax, 11 March 1941, FOR Papers; program, NCPW, 15 November 1941, Peace Action 7 (October 1941): 3. The WIL annual meeting, while not referring directly to the Hoover plan, appealed to the president to break “the hunger blockade” by using “his high influence upon the governments of Europe to allow ships to carry food and clothing to pass through the block­ ade.” Minutes, 1-4 May, 1941,3, WIL Papers. For examples of Roman Catholic opinion, see Edward S. Skillin, “Blockading the Conquered Peoples of Europe,” Commonweal 32 (18 October 1940): 518; “The Food Blockade,” Catholic World 153 (April 1941): 4-9; Social Justice, 2 September 1940,8. Among the anti-interventionist Roman Catholic clergy, one finds Cardinal William Henry O'Connell of Boston and Archbishop lohn T. McNicholas of Cincinnati. In total, twenty-one bishops and archbishops sup­ ported the plan, as did eighty-four other prominent clergy. 97. For an example of the Christian Century, see “The Incomparable Atrocity,” 57 (11 December 1940): 1543-45. The Century also published Devere Allen, “For Every Reason: Feed Europe!” 57 (20 No­ vember 1940): 1147-49; Ernest Fremont Tittle, “Stricken Souls and Empty Stomachs,” 57 (27 November 1940): 1476-78; and Rose Wilder Lane, “A Question for Americans,” 58 (23 April 1941): 558-59. 98. Diplomats included William R. Casde, I. Reuben Clark, and Henry P. Fletcher. Publishers and journalists included Boake Carter, William Randolph Hearst, Frank Gannett, George Sokolsky, Emil Hurja, Wheeler McMillan, Raymond Moley, Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, Roy Howard, and Freda Udey. See also “Why Starve Our Friends?” CT, 28 August 1941, 14; “Food for Europe,” N YD N , 13 August 1940,21. AFC national committee members included MacNider, Pinchot, Flynn, Villard, banker and former navy secretary Charles Francis Adams, aviator Eddie V. Rickenbacker, manufacturer Igor Siko­ rsky, manufacturer Edward L. Ryerson )r., Methodist bishop Wilbur Emery Hammaker, novelist Kath­ leen Norris, and Alice Roosevelt Longworth, the outspoken daughter of Theodore Roosevelt Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh supported the Quaker feeding of Europe. See Charles A. Lindbergh, en­ tries of 5 September 1940 and 6 October 1940, W artime Journals, 392,397; Anne Morrow Lindbergh» entries of 27 October 1940 and 26 December 1940, War W ithin, 149,156; N YT, 25 December 1940,14. For AFC National Committee, see minutes, 27 October 1941, Box 337, AFC Papers. 99. See, for example, “Shall We Fight France?” Progressive, 31 May 1941, 8; “Just Let France Starve?” NYD N , 11 March 1941,23; Villard, “Will France Fight England?” Progressive, 8 March 1941,6; William Hague, “Should We Feed Europe?” Scribner's C om m entator9 (January 1941): 33. 100. Dennis, WFL 122 (28 November 1940): 4; “Hunger in France,” Christian C entury 58 (20 Jan­ uary 1941): 10; Johnson, CR, 17 March 1940, 2292. See also William Henry Chamberlin, Yale D aily News, 13 March 1941,1; Social Justice, 24 March 1941,8. 101. Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 6 June 1941, Borchard Papers. See also General Wood, SEE 8 July 1941,2. 102. Winston Churchill to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 3 June 1941, in Kimball, C hurchill and Roo­ sevelt, 1:125. 103. Gannett, speech at Rutland, Vermont, 7 June 1940, in CR, A3731; Ludlow, CR, 14 April 1941, A1675; “In Humanity’s Name,” Christian C entury 57 (13 November 1940): 1407; “The Question of Food for Europe,” NYD N, 4 December 1940,39; “Passing of the Great Race?” N YD N , 24 March 1941, 19. See also “Belgian Belt Buckles,” NYD N , 2 February 1941,43. 104. See, for example, John Nevin Sayre, “Peace Is Not Built on Hunger,” Fellowship 6 (September 1940): 125; Congressmen Barry, CR, 27 March 1941,2677; Pittenger, CR, 3 March 1941, A953; Knute

Notes to Pages 98-101

387

Hill to NCFSD, 20 May 1941, the Papers of the National Committee on Food for the Small Democra­ cies, Hoover Institution (hereafter cited as NCFSD Papers); Gerald P. Nye to NCFSD, 20 May 1941, NCFSD Papers. 105. Johnson, “One Man's Opinion," in CR, 20 March 1941,1289. Earlier Johnson had been more fa­ talistic, doubting that Hoover could keep such food from reaching the Germans and claiming that the “dilemma" was an inescapable part of modem war. “One Man's Opinion," SFN, 29 November 1940,21. 106. “Innocent Blood," GT, 27 October 1941,12; Gillis,“The Food Blockade," Catholic World 153 (April 1941): 5; Aiken, CR, 25 February 1941, 1362; Burdick, CR, 22 May 1941,4320. See also “Food for Europe," NYDN, 13 August 1940,21; “Hunger in Europe,” CT, 21 October 1941,12. 107. Shipstead, CR, 17 May 1941,2291; “Big Chance for Great Britain," N YD N , 21 November 1940, 31;“In Humanity’s Name," Christian C entury57 (13 November 1940): 1407; Dennis, W F L 103 (18 July 1940): 3; 124 (12 December 1940): 4. See also William R. Castle to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 11 March 1941, Box 63, AFC Papers; “Greece Starves," NYDN, 3 July 1941,21. 108. Reynolds, CR, 8August 1940, A4900; Barnes, cited by Nye, CR, 26 February 1941,1431;“Pragmatism," Uncensored 62 (7 December 1940): 1-2; Friday, 3 January 1941,5. 109. See, for example, Clay Judson to Page Hufty, 12 September 1941, Box 283, AFC Papers; Cud­ ahy, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,146. See also John Finerty, testimony, HFAC,14 October 1941, 57; “Washington Summary," NYDN, 15 November 1941,15. 110. Wert, “Specter," 382-84; George, “Another Chance," 399; polls in Cantril, Public O pinion, 1103. 111. Arthur H. Vandenberg to R. S. Richmond, 17 July 1941,15 September 1941, NCFSD Papers; Hoover, NYT, 20 October 1941,1,4. Hoover's own committee opposed hearings on the grounds that opponents of the plan would use themas a forum for their views, while pro-plan arguments would go unnoticed. Far better to have it brought out of committee and onto the House floor. This maneuver would have been quite unorthodox. Yet, if the plan's advocates were successful, a full debate, it was hoped, could bring about adoption of the pro-plan resolution by a handsome majority. Raymond S. Richmond to William B. Barry, 16 November 1941, NCFSD Papers. CHAPTER 7: PRO TECTIN G THE REPUBLIC

1. Villard, O ur M ilitary Chaos (New York: Knopf, 1939), ii, 186; emphasis in original. The book was typeset just before the outbreak of war, but Villard was able to make minor alterations during proofreading and saw no need for substantive changes. See also “Issues and Men: The United States and the War," N ation 149 (23 September 1939): 324. Villard offered similar views in “Billions for What?” Progressive, 17 February 1940, 3; “True American Preparedness," Progressive, 28 September 1940,6. 2. Fey, “We Recommend," Fellowship 6 (March 1940): 51. See also Paul Hutchinson, “Pouring Money down the Drain," C hristian C entury 56 (6 December 1939): 1507; Ruth Sarles, “Books in a World at War," Peace Action 6 (January 1940): 7. 3. Johnson, “Military Chaos," N Y W T , 16. See also “Big-Navy Nightmare," New Republic 102 (22 January 1940): 103. Villard repeated his plea in “Issues and Men," N ation 153 (13 January 1940): 47. 4. Rogers, “Defense in a Vacuum," N ation 149 (4 November 1939): 501; Eliot, N ew York H er­ ald Tribune, 19 November 1939,6; Livingstone Hartley, “The Greatest Neutral," New Republic 102 (15 April 1940): 511; Dupey, “The Dilemma of Defense," Saturday Review o f Literature 21 (4 No­ vember 1939): 18. 5. Villard, “Investigate the Army!” Am erican M ercury 49 (April 1940): 427-34. The army replied that it was always under the scrutiny of efficiency experts, that the existence of General Marshall (not a West Pointer) disproved the caste charge, and that a plethora of officers was needed to build up a sat­ isfactory number of well-schooled leaders for an emergency. Newsweek, 8 April 1940,15-16. Newsweek conceded the existence of army posts in out-of-the-way areas rather than strategic ones. 6. Villard, “Issues and Men," N ation 150 (8 June 1940): 710. For Villard’s continual pleas for mod­ ernization, see “Germany's Military Successes," A tlantic M onthly 166 (August 1940): 176; “The Wrong

388

Notes to Pages 101-103

Way to Prepare," Christian C entury 58 (8 Januaryl941 ): 57-58. On 28 May, Roosevelt announced the formation of a seven-person civilian board to fulfill the industrial side of the armament program. N Y T , 29 May 1940,1,15. In some ways differing from Villard, Dennis said neither "the big shot busi­ ness men" nor Roosevelt had any idea of "the social and industrial reorganization necessary for a mod­ em war machine equal to that of Germany." WFL 100 (27 June 1940): 5. 7. Wiley, CR, 14 September 1940,12,169. See also Wiley, CR, 31 May 1940,7286. 8. See, for example, "To the Brink," St. Louis Pöst-Dispateh, 11 June 1940. 9. Pinchot, open letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, in CR, 20 May 1940, A3685. See also Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, 27 May 1940, Pinchot Papers; Lindbergh, speech, 19 May 1940, The Radio A d­ dresses o f CoL Charles A. Lindbergh, 1939-1940 (pamphlet; NewYork: Scribner’s Commentator, 1940), 11; A1 Williams, speech to National Aviation Forum, 29 May 1940, in CR, A3401. 10. For resources, see Wiley, CR, 11 June 1940,7918. For tanks, see Vorys, speech to War Veterans Republican Club of Ohio, Columbus, 25 May 1940, in CR, A3271. For rifles, see "It’s Time to Think of America," CT, 18 June 1940,12. For provisions, see Lundeen, speech, 10 June 1940, in CR, A3753. 11. Robsion, CR, 13 June 1940, A4168. 12. Danaher, CR, 3 June 1940,7373; McCormick, broadcast of 15 June 1940, Addresses, 9. 13. Belgium comparison, "Arm Our Army at Once," CT, 13 May 1940, 1; Switzerland, Hearst, "In the News," SFE, 14 May 1940, 9; Lindbergh, "A Letter to Americans," C ollier’s 107 (29 March 1941): 15. 14. For general U.S. weakness, see David Reynolds, "1940," 334. For Marshall, see Bender, CR, 11 June 1940,7998. For Johnson, see Vandenberg, radio address, 9 June 1940, in CR, A3691. For Drum, see "Second Rate Armies Aren’t Armies," CT, 17 May 1940,14. 15. See, for example, such FDR defense pleas as NYT, 31 May 1940,1,8; N Y T , 29 June 1940,1,16. For Roosevelt's 1938 wishes, see Mark Skinner Watson, C h ief o f Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: United States Army, 1950), 137. 16. Roosevelt address, text, N Y T , 17 May 1941,10. 17. Roosevelt address, text, N Y T , 17 May 1941,10; Roosevelt address, text, N Y T , 26 May 1940,12. 18. Dallek, Roosevelt, 223-24. 19. "National Defense," Uncensored 33 (18 May 1940): 1. See also Dennis, WFL 95 (23 May 1940): 3; Resolutions, W1L annual meeting, Pittsburgh, 27-30 April 1940,3; "The WIL Today," n.d., attached to Mrs. S. Foster Hunt, 9 September 1940, WIL Papers; "Shotgun Defense," Saturday Evening Post 213 (31 August 1940): 28; Lindbergh, CT, 16 June 1940. 20. Waldrop, "Where Will Our Army Fight?" W TH , 7 June 1940,11A; Dennis, WFL 148 (29 May 1941): 5. 21. See, for example, “Will We Do It?” Saturday Evening Post 213 (6 July 1940): 26; McCormick, broadcast of 14 July 1940, Addresses, 21; Hiram W. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson Jr., 23 June 1940, Johnson Papers; Short, CR, 6 May 1941,3666; Wheeler, speech, Floyd B. Olson memorial exercises, Minneapolis, 17 June 1940, in CR, A3961; Dennis, WFL 156 (24 July 1941): 2; WFL 157 (31 July 1941): 2. 22. Taft, address, "New Dealism or Real Defense?" 20 June 1940, in CR, A4111; Dennis, WFL 97 (6 June 1940): 4. See also WFL 156 (24 July 1941): 2. 23. Waldrop, “Where Will Our Army Fight?" 11 A; "We’d Better Arm at Once,” N YD N , 11 May 1940,17; “West Point of the Masses," 19 May 1940,41. See also News editorials “Close Up," 3 Au­ gust 1940,13; "Pass the Conscription Bill Now!” 26 August 1940, 19. For its concrete recommen­ dations, see "An Army of 1,000,000 Sergeants," 12 May 1940,43; "Whatever Happens, We Need an Army," 14 May 1940, 25; "Our Job," 29 May 1940, 21; "Hitler and Napoleon," 20 June 1940, 33; "Blitzkrieg Technic," 2 June 1940,41. 24. McCormick, broadcast of 9 June 1940, Addresses, 7. He soon endorsed plans for the creation of nine regular army divisions, eighteen national guard divisions, five thousand new planes, thirteen thousand cannon, tanks, and antiaircraft artillery. Speech, 15 June 1940, Addresses, 9. For previous views of his newspaper, see "America’s Defense,” CT, 11 September 1939,10; "Is It a New A.E.F.?" CT, 26 October 1939,14; "No Army for Aggression," CT, 12 November 1939,16.

Notes to Pages 103-105

389

25. Stimson, radio address at Yale University, NBC N Y T , 19 June 1940,1. 26. His biographer Keith D. McFarland writes that "although the isolationists never counted Woodring among their number and while he never considered himself one of them, there is no doubt that they shared identical views when it came to the question of American involvement in a foreign war." H arry H. Woodring: A Political Biography o f FDR’s Controversial Secretary o f War (Lawrence: Uni­ versity of Kansas Press, 1975), 201. Castle said Woodring was "just about as fond of Roosevelt as 1 am." Castle Diary, 5 February 1940. 27. Woodring, speech, Gridiron Club, St. Louis, 30 January 1940, in CR, A556; Woodring, N Y T , 21 June 1940,4; statement of 21 June in MacFarland, "Woodring," 231; speech, 9 July 1940, WoodringTes­ timonial Dinner, in CR, A4430. 28. David G. Haglund, Latin America and the Transformation o f U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 204. 29. Knox, speech to bankers convention, Grand Rapids, cited by Wheeler, address to the American Anti-War Crusade of the Keep America Out of War Congress, Auditorium Theater, Chicago, 30 June 1940, CBS, in CR, A4313. 30. See, for example, Holt, CR, 8 July 1940,9264; Dennis, WFL 100 (27 June 1940): 2. 31. Wheeler, CR, 20 June 1940,8694. 32. See, for example. Holt, CR, 21 June 1940, 8820; Wheeler, Chicago speech, 30 June 1940, CR, A4313; Bone, CR, 9 July 1940,9317. 33. Nye, CR, 9 July 1940, 9314; Holt, CR, 8 July 1940, 9267. See also "Stimson and Knox," New Masses 35 (2 June 1940): 25; Senator Dennis Chavez, CR, 9 July 1940,9314; Lawrence Dennis, "Inter­ ventionist with a Record," 7 July 1940, in CR, A9315-16. 34. See, for example, B. C. Clark, CR, 20 June 1940,8701; B. C. Clark, CR, 21 June 1940,8809; Holt, CR, 20 June 1940, 8696; Fish, radio speech, 22 June 1940, NBC red network, in CR, 4186-87; Van Zandt, address to various state VFW conventions, entered in CR, 25 July 1940, A4573; Van Zandt, speech, Williamsport Consistory of the Scottish Rite Masonry, Williamsport, Pennsylvania, 28 June 1940, in CR, A5183. One dissent came from Villard, who considered Woodring"a lightweight." "Issues and Men," N ation 150 (8 June 1940): 710. 35. Castle Diary, 29 June 1940; Wheeler, Chicago address, 30 June 1940, in CRA4313. For Knox, see also Bone, CR, 9 July 1940,9321. 36. "Secretary Knox, Secretary Stimson," N YD N , 22 June 1940,13; Vandenberg, CR, 8 July 1940, 9261; roll call on Stimson, N Y T , 10 July 1940,13; on Knox, N Y T , 11 July 1940,3. 37. Reynolds, Creation, 110; Harper, American Vision, 69. 38. Schafer, CR, 12 March 1940, 2748. Schafer's amendment was rejected, after which the appro­ priation went through 305 to 37, with 88 not voting. See 2752-53. See also Al Williams, Washington D aily News, 24 April 1940. 39. Navy department announcement, N Y T , 7 June 1940,1,14; Lundeen speech, Washington, D.C., 10 June 1940, in CR, A3753; Williams, "Courting Disaster," 13 )une 1940, in Williams pamphlet, Box 276, Lundeen Papers. For other examples, see Shafer, CR, 10 June 1940,7890-92; Lundeen, CR, 15 June 1940,8334; Holt, CR, 12 June 1940,8052; Holt, CR, 15 June 1940,8337; Nye, "What Is Delaying the Defense Program?" address to New England Town Hall, Boston, 14 August 1940, in CR, A10821; Al Williams, "Keep Our Planes," 8 June 1940, in Williams pamphlets. The Chicago Tribune favored send­ ing World War I Enfield rifles to the Allies but opposed the dispersal of first-line planes. See "Ameri­ can Arms and American Battles," 6 June 1940,20. 40. W TH , 19 June 1940. 41. For France's fall, see Lundeen, CR, 19 June 1940,8606. For Hague, see Case, CR, 20 June 1940, 8884. For legal action, see Fish, CR, 22 June 1940, 9055-56; "The Alabama Precedent," CT, 24 June 1940,12; B. C. Clark, CR, 20 June 1940,8698. For criminal codes, see Keefe, CR, 20 June 1940, A4045. For crews, see "Undeclared War," CT, 20 June 1940,20. For act of war, see D. W. Clark, radio speech, "A Deadly Parallel," 20 June 1940, in CR, A4137. 42. Schafer, CR, 21 June 1940,8885. 43. N Y T , 25 June 1940,1. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation , 522.

390

Notes to Pages 105-107

44. Walsh amendment, CR, 21 lune 1940,8828. 45. Life, 24 |une 1940,30; 15 July 1940,17-23. 46. Kirk in lames Leutze, Bargaining fo r Supremacy: Anglo-Am erican Naval Collaboration, 1937-1941 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977), 83; Long, entry of 13 June 1940, War Diary, 104. 47. Pittman, N Y T , 26 June 1940,6. 48. Long, entry of 12 lune 1940, War Diary, 103; war department in Reynolds, Creation, 110; Mar­ shall in David G. Haglund, “George C Marshall and the Question of Military Aid to England, May-lune 1940,“ Journal o f Contemporary H istory 15 (October 1980): 745-60; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington, D.C: Department of the Army, 1955), 33. 49. Arnold in John Morton Blum, From the M orgenthau Diaries, vol. 2: Years o f Urgency, 1938-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 151, 163; Marshall, “Memorandum for the Secretary of War,“ 18 June 1940, in The Papers o f George C atlett Marshall, vol. 2: uWe Cannot Delay9*: July 1,1939-D ecember 6, 1941, ed. Larry Bland (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 246— 47; Watson, C h ief o f Staff, 305,311. 50. Smith in Watson, C hief o f Staff, 312; Morgenthau, Diaries, 142-43. 51. Clifford and Spencer, First Peacetime D raft, 246 n. 12; Berle, entry of 15 May 1940, N avigat­ ing, 314. 52. Poll of 23 May 1940, Cantril, Public O pinion, 973. For related polls, see 973,1159-60. 53. The breakdown was as follows: to sell all U.S. planes, 9 percent; to sell some, 38 percent; to sell none, 49 percent; no opinion on the matter, 4 percent. The public was split over the matter of general aid, with 51 percent favoring U.S. credit for Allied air purchases and 49 percent opposed. Poll of 29 May 1940, Cantril, Public O pinion, 1159. 54. Gallup poll of 25 lune 1940, Cantril, Public O pinion, 1186. In a Fortune poll, 40.1 percent pre­ dicted a German victory; 30.3 percent, a win for the Allies. See 1186. 55. Haglund, Latin America, 197. Reynolds dates Roosevelt’s decision as early August. Creation, 68. Presidential aide Harry Hopkins told Churchill it was the British bombing of the French fleet at Oran, an event that took place on 3 July, that convinced Roosevelt that Britain would continue the fight. Gilbert, Churchill, 643-44. 56. Reynolds, Creation, 112; Leutze, Bargaining, 290 n. 53. 57. Clifford and Spencer, First Peacetime Draft, 257 n. 51; Leutze, Bargaining, 97-103. Donovan gave the British 60:40 odds in repelling an invasion. Entry of 2 August 1940 in The London Journal o f General Raym ond E. Lee, 1940-1941, ed. James Leutze (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971 ), 27-28. 58. For a wider context to the entire debate over defense, see lohn A. Thompson, “The Exaggera­ tion of American Vulnerability,“ Diplom atic H istory 16 (Winter 1992): 23-43. 59. “Big-Navy Nightmare,“ New Republic 102 (22 January 1940): 103; “Another Scare from the Ad­ mirals,“ Christian C entury 57 (4 lanuary 1940): 99-100; Fish, CR, 29 April 1940, 4899; Fish, U nited States News, 10 May 1940, 25. See also Dennis, WFL 102 (11 July 1940): 5. 60. See, for example, Social Justice, 15 lanuary 1940,20. 61. “Big Ships: Superior Craft Seem Fantastic,“ SFE, 12 lanuary 1940,8. See also SFE, 30 December 1939, 11; Hearst.“ln the News,“ SFE, 1 March 1940,1. 62. See, for example, Burdick, CR, 19 June 1940, A3728; AFC, Washington News Letter 16 (4 June 1941 ): 4, Box 284, AFC Papers; Wiley, CR, 31 May 1940,7280. For initial hesitancy of the aircraft-bat­ tleship issue, see “Sea Power vs. Air Power,“ NYD N , 20 September 1939, 35; “A Question Still Unan­ swered,“ NYD N, 11 December 1939, 31; Frank C. Waldrop, “European Reasons for Us to Stay Out,“ W TH , 9 September 1939, Al 1. 63. Lindbergh, speech at Hollywood Bowl, 20 lune 1941, in CR, A3184; Reynolds, CR, 29 April 1940, A2442. See also Reynolds, Washington D aily News, 11 May 1940. 64. Edison, N YT, 2 May 1940, 14. See, for example. Danaher, speech to Republican State Con­ vention, Hartford, 14 May 1940, in CR, A3053. For similar approval of Edison’s remarks, see Hiram lohnson to Hiram Johnson Jr., 5 May 1940, lohnson Papers; “Design of Warships Needs Reconsid­

Notes to Pages 107-108

391

eration,” C hristian C entury 57 (15 May 1940): 627-28; Alf Landon, speech, NBC, 17 May 1940, in CR, A3090. 65. Stirling, "Bureaucracy Rules the Navy," Current H istory 51 (March 1940): 50-52; Barnes, N Y W T , 1 April 1940,12. 66. For the Royal O a k see Libby, "Proposed Naval Expansion Is Clearly without Excuse,” Peace Ac­ tion 6 (February 1940): 3. For the Bism arck see "The H ood and the Bismarck,” N YD N , 28 May 1940, 29; A1 Williams, "Decline of Seapower,” Progressive, 25 October 1941,4. For Taranto, see "Design of Warships Needs Reconsideration,” C hristian C entury 57 (15 May 1940): 627-28; "Taranto Revives an Old Debate,” C hristian C entury 57 (27 November 1940): 1469; Villard, "Is Sea Power Tottering?” Pro­ gressive, 30 November 1940,6. For stress on the limitation of air power at Taranto, see "Men and Ma­ chines in This War,” CT, 21 November 1940,16. 67. See, for example, Libby, "Vinson Naval Bill Made Foolish by Events,” Peace Action 6 (April 1940): 3; Lundeen, CR, 21 May 1940,6500. 68. Reynolds, CR, 29 April 1940, A2442; Danaher, speech, Republican State Convention, Hartford, 14 May 1940, in CR, A3053. 69. See, for example, Sargent, Bulletin #25,5 January 1940, G etting US into War, 219; Johnson, "One Man’s Opinion,” SFN, 20 June 1940, 13. Libby was an exception among such people. He denied op­ posing a two-ocean navy, provided it was for defense and not aggression. Frederick J. Libby to Mrs. S. Foster Hunt, 1 June 1940, NCPW Papers. 70. McCormick, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,480; McCormick, broadcast of 29 September 1940, Speeches, 58; McCormick, radio speech, CT, 29 June 1941,3. For varying views on naval expan­ sion presented by McCormick’s newspaper, see "America’s Defense,” CT, 11 September 1939,10; "Be­ hind the First Line of Defense,” CT, 23 May 1940,16; "Arm Our Army at Once,” CT, 13 May 1940,1. 71. See, for example, Fish, CR, 12 March 1940,2749-50. In the Senate vote for a major naval bill, only Capper, Danaher, Reed, and Edwin Johnson were in opposition. NYT, 19 April 1940.1. For fur­ ther Senate action, see N Y T , 22 June 1940,6. 72. NIT, 29 May 1940,14. 73. See, for example, Nicholas Broughton, "America in a Hostile World,” Scribner's Com m entator 9 (November 1940): 74. 74. Fish, CR, 12 March 1940,2729. By June, Fish had claimed that the U.S. Navy possessed seven times the strength of the Germans. CR, 30 June 1940,9696. 75. Wheeler, CR, 7 August 1941,6873. 76. Fleming MacLiesh and Cushman Reynolds, Strategy o f the Americas (NewYork: Duell, Sloan 8c Pearce, 1941), 105; Baldwin, "Wanted: A Plan for Defense,” Harper's M agazine 181 (August 1940): 233-34. A unified enemy fleet might have twenty-five battleships to the United States’s fifteen, but the sum would include two German "pocket battleships” and only three Russian battleships, the latter un­ able to cross the seas. U nited We Stand! 128. Baldwin did say the United States needed two to three more battleships, another aircraft carrier, and more cruisers, submarines, and mine and net layers. The navy department also needed to change its design and procurement methods, slice the red tape, and shake up the navy yards. See 234. Baldwin called for increased shipbuilding facilities, greater speed in construction, and concentration on ships that could be built quickly. See 175. In April 1941, he claimed that the United States lacked sufficient ships to provide a battlefleet for both coasts. Furthermore, he said, some American battleships in the Pacific were in poor condition and possessed fleet auxiliaries that were too slow (e.g., cargo ships, tugs, seaplane tenders, etc.). See "The Naval Defense of America,” Harper's M agazine 182 (AprU 1941): 453-54. 77. Baldwin, "What of the British Fleet?” Reader's Digest 39 (August 1941): 1-2. For positive refer­ ences to Baldwin’s article, see Robert La Follette Jr., CR, 29 October 1941,8323; Waldrop, "They Weep,” W TH , 2 November 1941, El; O’Connor, CR, 6 October 1941,7684; "Shipbuilding,” Uncensored 102 (13 September 1941): 4; AFC Research Bureau, "One-Man War,” D id You Know7 22 (September 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 202-3; "Are American Bottoms Needed to Deliver Materials to Britain?” D id You Know? 28 (25 October 1941): 427-28. 78. See, for example, Social Justice, 15 January 1940,20; 27 May 1940,1.

392

Notes to Pages 108-110

79. W alsh, CR, 14 M ay 1 9 4 0 ,6 0 8 1 ; W alsh, Washington Daily Sew s, 11 M ay 1940. 80. Taft, sp eech , “Peace an d Preparedness," 20 M ay 1940, in CR, A 3178. See also sp eech o f 29 M ay 1940, in CR, 3385. 81. H earst, “In th e News," SFE, 22 M arch 1940, 2. O n 19 April 1940, h e repeated his plea, then m en tio n ed b attleships as w ell. See 2. 82. C harles A. L indbergh, testim ony, HFAC, 23 January 1941, 377; C astle, “W hat ab ou t the M o n ­ roe D o ctrin e Now?" Saturday Evening Post 213 (2 7 July 1 9 4 0 1: 40. See also "D esign for Freedom," Sat­

urday Evening Post 212 111 N ovem b er 1939): 24. 83. See, for exam p le, “A ‘T w o-O cean ’ Navy," S Y D S , 23 O ctob er 1 9 3 9,23; “Let’s T h in k ab ou t O u r ­ selves," S Y D S . 11 June 1940, 23. 84. “L\S. Siege Unworkable," S I D S , 6 N ovem b er 1 9 3 9 ,3 3 . 85. “A T w o-O cean Navy," S T D S , 22 July 1 9 4 0 ,1 9 . 86. “D o W e H ave to Fight Japan?" S T D S , 17 February 1941, 19. See also “A rticle 8," S Y D S , 25 June 1940, 32; “Keep It in O n e Ocean," S Y D S , 15 July 1940. 21. “Two Ships for One," S I D S , 14 O c ­ tober 1940, 25; “S om eb od y Stumbled," S I D S , 1 1 June 1941, 33. 87. See, for exam p le. Joseph P. K ennedy, in B reckinridge Long, entry o f 7 N ovem b er 1940. War Diary, 148; R ankin, CR, 19 M arch 1941, 2356; W iley, CR, 6 lu n e 1941, 4820; “T h e Long R ange Bomber," CT, 1 June 1940. 10; M acLiesh and R eynolds, Strategy, 172; Stuart C hase to D oroth y D ctzer, 3 O ctob er 1939, W1L Papers; Al W illiam s, Airpower ?N ew York: C ow ard-M cC ann, 1940 *,415. Even Y illard, w h o claim ed that the fall o f France did n ot alter th e n ation s strategic situ ation , fo u n d that p o p ­ ular an xieties w arranted a sm all, highly efficien t air force. Lener to N orm an T h om as, 16 July 1940. T h om as P ipers. 88. W illiam s, Airpower, 405; “W right s Foreign P o lio ' as A m erican as H is Art," Progressive. 27 Julv 1940, 5. 89. See, tor exam p le, H earst. “In th e News," SFE, 24 M ay 1940. 1, 2; M ichener, CR, 4 Septem ber 1940, 11,494: Social Justice, 1 July 1940, 8; Yillard, “G erm anv’s M ilitary Success," Atlantic Monthly 166 (A ugust 1940»: 175;“T he Rise and Fall o f Billy Mitchell," S T D S , 19 June 1 9 4 1,31; H earden, “Cudahy."

111. 90. M ichael S. Sherry, The Rise o f American Air Power: The Creation o f Armageddon en, “The Eagles T hey Fly High." New Republic 103 (7 O ctob er 1940): 482. 99. “T he Best D efen se for U.S.," SFE, 14 N ovem b er 1939, 10. In April 1940, Hearst cabled e d ito ­ rial superv isor E dm ond D. C ob len tz, calling for a cam paign in his papers for air power. C able. 19 .April

Notes to Pages 110-111

393

1940, the Papers of Edmond D. Coblentz, University of California at Berkeley. See also “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 24 September 1940,13; Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 18 April 1940,1. 100. Hearst, “In the News,” 24 September 1941,1 A. For the original article, see A rm y Ordnance 22 (September-October 1941): 217-20, reprinted in “The Bombing Plane Has Made America InvasionProof,” Reader’s Digest 39 (November 1941): 64-66. For other references to Phillips, see Barry, CR, 16 October 1941, 9765; Wheeler, CR, 6 November 1941, 8553; John Haynes Holmes, letter to H arvard [University] Crimson, 3 October 1941,2; “U.S. Impregnability,” Uncensored 104 (27 September 1941): 3; Stuart Chase, “Forgotten Facts,” Progressive, 18 October 1941,5. 101. “Where the Blitzkrieg?” N YD N , 18 December 1939,27. Its source was an article by Cy Cald­ well in the December Aero D igest See also “War in the Air,” N YD N , 20 December 1939, 35. By May 1941, the News embraced the bomber. It warned, “We may be invaded from Canada or Mexico,” as it called on the United States to rely on long-range bombers that would intercept enemy craft from coastal bases. “Why Not a Separate Air Force?” 5 May 1941,19. 102. Reynolds, CR, 29 April 1940, A3175. For other references to Norway, see Al Williams, speech to National Aviation Forum, 29 May 1940, in CR, A3402; retired major general WilliamC. Rivers, radio speech, “Europe’s War and America’s Security,” 18 May 1940, in CR, A3039; MacLiesh and Reynolds, Strategy, 172-73. For other references to Poland, see Case, CR, 6 June 1941,4819; Nye, CR, 26 Febru­ ary 1941,1434; Williams, Airpower, 368-78. 103. Eben Emæl, “Schmeling; SeparateAir Force,” N YD N, 30 May 1941,17; Dunkirk, Villard, “No De­ fense Against Airplanes,” Progressive, 7 September 1940,6; Battle of Britain, Case, CR, 6 June 1941,4819. 104. See, for example, AFC, Washington News Letter 16 (4 lune 1941): 3-4, Box 284, AFC Papers; Congressman Melvin Maas, report of Fred Burdick, 3 June 1941, AFC Papers, Box 65; Sokolsky,“These Days: The Planes Have It,” N ew York Sun, 5 June 1941,22; Williams, “Brass Hats Die Hard,” Progressive, 7 June 1941,8. 105. See, for example, Taft, speech, 29 May 1940, in CR, A3385; Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 14 May 1940, 9; Social Justice, 19 August 1940, 20; Vorys, speech, War Veterans' Republican Club of Ohio, Columbus, 25 May 1940, in CR, A3271; Norman Thomas to Anton Gardon, 29 May 1940, Thomas Pa­ pers; Vandenberg, radio address, 9 June 1940, in CR, A3961; “It’s Time to Think of America,” CT, 18 June 1940,12. 106. McCormick, broadcast of 15 May 1940, Addresses, 9; Williams, speech to National Aviation Forum, 29 May 1940, in CR, A3401; Williams, “British Orders,” 29 July 1940, in Williams pamphlets. 107. Edison in Hearst,“In the News,” W TH , 14 May 1940,9; Arnold in Maas, address, Williamsport Consistory, Scottish Rite Masonry, Williamsport, Pennsylvania, 28 June 1940, in CR, A5182; Colonel George Chase Lewis, “The Thith about Our Air Defenses,” Scribner’s C om m entator 8 (July 1940): 3-5. 108. Rickenbacker, “We Need 250,000 Planes and 500,000 Pilots,” Look, 27 August 1940,8-12. He had previously called for fifty thousand planes and twenty-five thousand pilots. U nited States News, 16 October 1939,4. 109. “Rickenbacker Is the Man,” CT, 15 May 1940,12. See also “A Page of Comment,” Social Justice, 3 June 1940,5; 1 July 1940,8; Don Rogers, “Rickenbacker—Air Lines Wizard,” Scribner’s C om m enta­ tor 10 (June 1941 ): 45-52; “Why Not Ask the Air Men?” N YD N , 7 July 1941,19. 110. Doenecke, IDU, 14. General Robert E. Wood, its national chairman, suspected that Ricken­ backer feared losing valuable mail delivery contracts for Eastern Air Lines, the firm he headed. For Wood on Rickenbacker, see R. Douglas Stuart Jr. to Page Hufty, 2 February 1941, Box 64, AFC Papers. 111. Text, Roosevelt speech, N Y T , 17 May 1941,10. 112. See, for example, “West Point of the Masses,” N YD N , 19 May 1940, 41; Robert E Wood to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 17 May 1940, Wood Papers. 113. For stress on technical training, see “How to Get a Mechanized Army,” N YD N , 9 July 1940,23; “Why a Big Army?” 29 July 1940,19; “Draft Bill Approved, 13-3,” 7 August 1940,2. For planes and pi­ lots, see “Calling Out the Guard,” N YD N , 31 July 1940,25. 114. “The New Arms Program,” CT, 17 May 1940,14. 115. Lindbergh on cost and men, in Castle Diary, 19 May 1940; Flynn, “Other People's Money: Who’s Going to Pay the Defense Bill?” New Republic 102 (10 June 1940): 792; Williams, “Real Air Power

394

Notes to Pages 111-113

for America," Scribner's C om m entator 8 (August 1940): 107. For cost, see also Castle Diary, 27 May 1940. For manpower, see also Al Williams, “Real Air Power for America," Scribner's C om m entator 8 (August 1940): 107. Both Marshall and General Hap Arnold, chief of the air corps, concurred on the need for trained pilots. Marshall to Bernard M. Baruch, 14 May 1940, in Marshall, Papers, 2:212. 116. Dennis, WFL 97 (6 June 1940): 4; Flynn, SFN, 24 May 1940, 22; Lindbergh radio broadcast cited in “The Roosevelt War Plan Exposed,” CT, 16 October 1940,16. For a previous example of such skepticism, see Fish, CR, 12 March 1940,2729. 117. Baldwin, “Wanted: A Plan for Defense," Harper's M agazine 181 (August 1940): 235; Al Williams, “Real Air Power for America," Scribner's Com m entator 8 (August 1940): 107. 118. Lindbergh, testimony, HFAC, 23 January 1941,420; Lindbergh, “A Letter to Americans," Collier's 107 (29 March 1941): 15. In citing the Lindbergh artide, Fish claimed that U.S. aircraft, when compared to first-line British and German planes, lacked self-sealing tanks, adequate gun power, and suffident speed. CR, 21 March 1941,2481. See also Wheeler, speech, Indianapolis, 28 May 1941, in CR, A2628. 119. AFC, W ashington News Letter 16 (4 June 1941): 3, Box 284, AFC Papers; Williams, “Panicky Promises," Progressive, 13 September 1941,4. For other Williams indictments, see testimony, SFRC, 7 February 1941,583,588; “I Rebuke Seversky," Scribner's C om m entator 10 (July 1941): 10. 120. Lundeen, CR, 21 May 1940,6499; Lundeen, CR, 19 June 1940,8606; Lundeen, CR, 27 August 1940, 11,010; Van Zandt, “A Department of National Defense," speech, NBC, 23 May 1940, in CR, A3239; Williams, speech to National Aviation Forum, 29 May 1940, in CR, 3401; Williams, Washing­ ton D aily News, 14 June 1940, in CR, 5294; MacLiesh and Reynolds, Strategy, 164; Wheeler, CR, 24 Au­ gust 1940, 10,730. For the support of Capper, General Rivers, General Johnson Haygood, Congress­ man Maas, and General Wood, who was uncertain about giving the office cabinet rank, see U nited States News, 13 September 1940,27; U nited States News, 20 September 1940,26. Hanson Baldwin was a lone dissenter, saying that a separate air force would simply create confusion in a time of crisis. U nited We Stand! 221. To Baldwin, its creation would only cause bitterness; if the U.S. Navy were de­ prived of its “flying fleets," the Allied ability to dominate the seas might be crippled. “Sea Power Is Dominant," N Y T , 27 October 1941,4. 121. See, for example, News editorials all titled “United States Air Force,” 8 June 1941,51; 17 June 1941,19; 14 July 1941,19; 20 July 1941,37; 11 August 1941,15; 8 September 1941,19; 19 September 1941,31; 30 September 1941,21; 14 October 1941,35. 122. “How about a Separate Air Force?" N YD N , 14 March 1941, 31. Al Williams denied that the British air force possessed real autonomy, a factor helping weaken that nation. “An Accounting Is Due," Progressive, 17 May 1941,4. 123. “Why Not Ask the Air Men?" N YD N , 7 July 1941,19. 124. McCormick, broadcast of 21 July 1940, Addresses, 26; McCormick, broadcast of 28 July 1940, Addresses, 29; “Bombs Wreck Commons Chamber," N YD N , 13 May 1941,23; “The ‘Bomb Hell Out of ’Em* Theory," N YD N , 18 May 1941,43. 125. Dennis, WFL 145 (8 May 1941): 4; 125 (19 December 1940): 3; 77 (18 January 1940): 5; John­ son, “One Man's Opinion,” SFN, 19 October 1939,21. 126. For Spain, see Wood, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations speech, 4 October 1940, in CR, A6301. For Finland, see “Air Bombs on Finland," CT, 5 February 1940, 12; “The Purpose of the Air Bogy," CT, 26 February 1940,10. 127. “Can We Lick Germany without Fighting?” N YD N , 16 February 1941,41; Dennis, WFL 97 (6 June 1940): 4. For France, see also Charles A. Lindbergh, “A Letter to Americans," Collier's 107 (29 March 1941): 76; Baldwin, United We Stand! 118-19. 128. Japan, “Can We Lick Germany without Fighting?" 41; Hearst, “In the News," SFE, 14 Septem­ ber 1940,13A. 129. See, for example, “Bombs Wreck Commons Chamber," N YD N , 13 May 1941,23; Cudahy, tes­ timony, SFRC, 23 October 1940,140; Libby, HFAC, 14 October 1941,60,66; Gillis, “The ‘Isolationist’ Argument," Catholic World 155 (December 1941): 262. 130. Sherry, Rise, 85,92. For Lindbergh, see testimony, HFAC, 23 January 1941,425-26; SFRC, 6 February 1941,520.

Notes to Pages 113-115

395

131. Ickes, entry of 18 September 1938» Secret D iary, 2:469; Morgenthau, Diaries, 2:48. 132. David Kahn»"United Sûtes Views Germany and Japan in 1941,” in Knowing One's Enemies: In ­ telligence Assessments Before the Two W orld Wars, ed. Ernest R. May (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni­ versity Press, 1984), 492; Ronald Lewin, H itler's M istakes (New York: Morrow, 1984), 89-93, 103-5; Milch quoUtion in Lewin, H itler's M istakes, 103; Sherry, Rise, 77. 133. R. J. Overy, "From ‘Uralbomber* to ‘Amerikabomber’: The Luftwaffe and Strategic Bombing,” Journal o f Strategic Studies 1 (September 1978): 154-78; John Killen, A H istory o f the Luftw affe (New York: Doubleday, 1968), especially 101,164,183. 134. Clifford and Spencer, First Peacetime D raft, 110-11. 135. Roosevelt, acceptance speech, text, N Y T , 12 July 1940,2; Roosevelt, press conference, 1 August 1940, in The Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 9: War— and A id to Democracies, 1940, comp. Samuel I. Rosenman (NewYork: Random House, 1950), 320; Marshall in Charles E. Kirk­ patrick, A n Unknown Future and a D oubtful Present: W riting the Victory Plan o f 1941 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990), 44. 136. Lindbergh, speech, NBC, 15 June 1940, in "Radio Addresses,” 14; Waldrop, “The U.S. Becomes a Nation in Arms,” W TH , 29 July 1940, 7; Reynolds, CR, 21 August 1940, 10,669. See also General Robert E Wood to Marvin McIntyre, 5 May 1940, Wood Papers; Maas, CR, 7 September 1940, A5672. 137. "Total War Is Here to Suy,” N YD N »12 September 1940,31. For atucks on the News editorial, see "‘Brutes Wanted’—Capitalism’s Ideal for Civilization,” D aily Worker, 13 September 1940,1; letter of Frederick J. Libby to C hristian C entury 57 (16 October 1940): 1285; Wheeler, CR, 14 September 1940,12,166; Sargent, Bulletin #80,20 August 1940, G etting US into War, 431 n. 5. For the N ew fs de­ fense of the word "brutality,” see editorials "War Is Brutality,” 17 September 1940,21; "Not Enough Vol­ unteering,” 20 September 1940,33. 138. "No Substitute for Men and Guns,” N YD N , 5 July 1940,21. See also "Make It Universal M ilitory Training,” N YD N , 23 June 1940,37. 139. Johnson, "One Man’s Opinion,” SFN, 6 June 1940,15. See also Johnson, SFN, 10 July 1940,13; 30 July 1940, 13; "Selective Service Right Now,” CBS speech, 23 August 1940, in Vital Speeches 6 (15 September 1940): 729-30. He was critical of aspects of the Burke-Wadsworth bill, for he wanted more stress on trained personnel. Johnson, "One Man’s Opinion,” SFN, 7 July 1940,21; SFN, 3 August 1940, 11. For Johnson's hopes to direct selective service, see "One Man’s Opinion,” SFN, 10 August 1940,11; 13 September 1941,23. In 1941, the Roosevelt administration went even further, denying his applica­ tion for a renewal of his military commission as brigadier general. Ohl, Hugh S. Johnson, 301-3. 140. See, for example, Wheeler, 13 August 1940, CR, 10,239; Congressman U. S. Guyer (Rep.-Kan.), CR, 4 July 1940, A5299; John Haynes Holmes to Walter Van Kirk, 11 July 1940, Holmes Papers; Fish, CR, 3 September 1940,11,361; Flynn, SFN, 18 June 1940,14; "No Conscription,” America 63 (24 Au­ gust 1940): 547. 141. Entry of 6-9 August, 1940, Chamberlin Diary; Barnes, statement to Sidney Hertzberg, 16 Au­ gust 1940, Hertzberg Papers. See also Norman Thomas, "Your World and Mine: On the Road to Amer­ ican Fascism,” Call, 14 September 1940,5. For other anxieties concerning militarism, see Capper, CR, 19 August 1940,10,477; "Conscription,” America 63 (6 July 1940): 351; Fish, CR, 11 July 1940,9534; William Hubben, "If Conscription Comes,” C hristian C entury 57 (7 August 1940): 995; "Why Was Conscription Demanded?” C hristian C entury 57 (16 October 1940): 1269; Ludlow, CR, 4 September 1940,11,466; Norman Thomas to Henry Sloane Coffin, 6 August 1940, Thomas Papers. 142. Wheeler claimed that though the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Benjamin Cardozo, affirmed the government had a right to levy conscription in wartime, it was silent as to a peace­ time draft. CR, 20 August 1940,10,595. A lawyers’ committee noted that even under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, there was neither an implied nor an expressed power to enact conscription ("Brief on the Peacetime Military Conscription [Burke-Wadsworth Bill] [S. 4164] and the Maloney Amendment”), prepared by the Lawyers’ Committee to Keep the United States Out of War, inserted by Wheeler in CR, 23 August 1940, A5206-10. 143. See, for example, Max Frimmel, "Conscription and the Jones,” N ew Masses 36 (9 July 1940): 21-22; Julian Webb, "Conscription: Straitjacket for 42,000,000,” New Masses 36 (6 August 1940): 3-5;

396 L iz.r1 .1 : 6

y,

2*ew

Keefe. CF. I Septem ber I 9+'.

115":

56 * August 194*'.

14: V

ä

c

’. CF. 15 A ^ t- ä '->+-.

S o r s a n Tr.omaci to r a e e b e r v H c c a e V __^ir* A ti_ * i

G*.rr.:r..T*ee. y . '..v !9+'. Tr>xr.zj Piper*. 144. Tar- CF. 14

1 >4*':. 1'. 50" For K m lar anxieties corjcern_r.g seoa-:> m . « e en trv x 2?

’

I >+'. Cha:r..jer..r. Irar#*. 143 for tne sa~ar* -«--e. « e r.evi.paper cciumn. former Congressman Sarnie: 5. P et^rg !. I r r . Ind. er.*ered .r. CF. 19 A««*-« I W . A5*>1. For the n atter of arrttrarress. « e Congressman Carl H.n»r.aw Fep -Ga..:. . CF, 14 Septemoer 1*40. 12,21": D écria '**72 10* 15 August 19+ : 2. ro rtn e rura. _«-.-e. 1« Pepreser.ta:r*e Herr* G Dworshak Rep.-IrC. . CF. 4 ’u.s 19+j- 1 1.4"*. 14*. See- for examp-.e b-rd:cx. CF, 14 August İ94C- 10 Jyr. Nve. C F ,15 August 19+! 1 . A*. >. T ir speecr.. 5 Sep^emoer 19+3 :r. CF. A549L. Î4T. For adm.r.nrrarr#e p r o je m * . « e D en n is. *#*72 105 25 îu>* 19+} : 4. For cost and p r o v ^ c c -

.r.vL see W heeier CF. 5 A _ g u « I 9+3. I';C23: author u n k n ow n . ‘ Facts U nderSung P eacetim e C o n sc r ıp n o n ! in CF. 9 »’x v .b e r :9+V A 6256. For w eakening the ecor.ortr*. see “The A rm v and the İ m a n ! C T 25 i- .v 19+3 10. •4>. See, for exam p .e. W oodruff. CP. I A ugust 1*40. A 4**“ : Burdick. CF. L A ugust I>4*1 A 4 “ I :.

Bonn C.

(or.r.son. OF. 7 A ugust I 9+3 :‘3.9"3: Nve. broadcast. 9 A ugust 19 + 1 le CF. A 4+ f~: Bender.

CF, 3 3ep*rmner 19+ î. 1 1394: ‘G m scr.pt ion W _ H am per D e fe n se ! CT. 24 fur* 19+}. 10. For t i c l r;ev see *Mer. w .tr.out W e a p o n s! CT. 9 Septem ber 1 9 + 1 12: R evnolds. CF. 19 .August 1 9 + 1 1 0 .+ 5 1 Wr.eeter. CF. 22 .August İ9+0. 10.“ 27; K nutson. CP. 3 Septem ber 19+j . i l . +12: Dennus. W 72 112

19

Septem ber 19+0 ; 5. i 49. See. for example . 4Expanding Our .Armed Forces." CT. 31 luiv 19+}. !•>. Yandenbrrg, CF. 9 Au­ gust 19+3. 10 >9*: Var.der.berg. CF. 12 August 1940. 10.128: “Knights without Armor! L * ^ « o n n i4 ê i 7 August •940 : 2: Fors ion. CF. 3 Septem œ r 19+3, 1 I .+32; Congressman lohn M. W obertoc Rep.V* Ya. . CF. 7 September i9+0. A3533. .Auto executive William S. Knutson, one of the seven members National Defense .Ad**:sor.' Commission and America s foremost production specials. was frequent!* quoted on the rwo-vear mafter. » 50. W r.tf.tr. CF, 13 Auzu.it 1940. 10,222; W iles, CF, 28 .August 19+J. 1 1.«1-8*. See also “B ob La Fol­ lette Saw. A m erica D oesr. r Want a M an-P ow er M u d d le ! P^ogressnc. 27 fuis 19+}. 1. 131. O n Canada, set Fur.. CF, 30 fulv 1940.96*3; Fish. C F .6 .August 1 9 4 0 .9 9 5 9 .“C o n s c n p c o o — 1 -5. and C anadian M o d e u ! CT. 2 .August 1940, 8. O n Australia, see W heder. CF. 14 August 19+}. 1«>,>**. 0>r.zre**m an T hom as E. Martin noted that B ntam enacted the draft oniv on ce it entered the war. CF. 4 Septem net 1940. I i,458. Converse:v. said Representative Frederick C. Sm ith, ncartv ail Latin .American countries had conscription, vet that con tin en t “teem s w ith com m unism ." CF. 1 1 fulv 19+ 3.96"8. 152. See. for exam ple. Taft. CF. 14 A ugust 19+J, 10.309: W alsh. CF. 21 A ugust 1940. 10.654: W alsh. CF. 28 August i9 + j, 1 l . l + r D en n is. WFL i0 6

1 A ugust 19+j : 3.

133. See. for exam ple. W heeier. CF, 3 A ugust 1940. 9838; “Expanding O ur U narm ed Forces." CT.

31 Juiv 19+j. 10: “C o n sc r ip tio n ! Ame^rc^ 63 27 fulv 19+j : 435; D orothy D etzer to H annah G o th ie r Hull and Em ilv G reene Baich. 21 A ugust 19+j , WIL Papers. 134. Fish. CF. 30 June 1940, 9696; Downes-. CF, 13 A ugust 1940, 10.391. 155. See, for exam ple. Senator G eorge N o m s

Ind.-Nebr.», CF. 22 A ugust 1940. 10.428; Taft. CF.

14 A ugust 19+?, 10.3 iO: Lr^dge. CF, 22 A ugust 19+J. 10,729: Baldw in, “W anted: A Plan for D e fe n s e !

Harper's Magazine 181 A ugust 19+J : 236. 136. Vandenberg, CF, 25 fuh* 19+J. 10,128. See also ‘ Preparation for What?" C T 10 fuh* 1940.10: “An Arms for E urope! CT, l i fulv 19+J. I: “An Arms for a Caesar," CT. 18 Septem ber 1940,14; “C onscripting C o n scrip tio n ! Uncensored 43 17 fulv 19+) : 4; “N o C o n scrip tio n ! .America 63 1 24 .August 19+ ) : 347. 137. “*Gor>d N eighbor G ets T o u g h ! CaiL 7 Septem ber 1940,1; N orm an T h o m a s,“Your W orld and M ine: “War or D em ocracy! C alL 28 Septem ber 19+J. 5. 158. Taft, CF, 21 A ugust 1940, 10.634. 159. For a proposal o f 150.000 to 200,000 m en. see “Preparation for What?" CT, 10 fulv 1940, 10. For a proposal o f 750,000. see Taft, CF, 14 A ugust 1940, 10,308. For a proposal o f 4 0 0 ,000, see H an son Baldw in, “Wanted: A Plan tor D e fe n se ! Harper's M agazine 181 ; A ugust 1940 : 238; B aldw in, United

Notes to Pages 116-118

397

We Stand! 259. For excerpts from Baldwin’s Harper's article, see "Rational Defense,” Uncensored 42 (20 July 1940): 2-4; "Hanson Baldwin Rejects Conscription,” Peace Action 6 (August 1940): 7. For left-wing use of Baldwin, see In Fact 1 (9 September 1940): 3. 160. See, for example, letter of Rush Holt, 8August 1940, in SFE* 10 August 1940,1; news story, SFE* 13 August 1940,2; "But Boake Carter Says,” SFE* 15 August 1940,15; letter of Senator Millard lydings (Dem.-Md.), SFE* 19 August 1940,1-2; SFE* September 4,1940; letter from Congressman Knutson, SFE* 7 September 1940, l. 161. Fish, CR* 5 September 1940, 11,572; Fish, CR* 14 September 1940, 12,214; Clifford and Spencer, First Peacetime Draft* 216. 162. See, for example, "Peace-Time Conscription,” America 63 (10 August 1940): 491-92; Cham­ berlin Diary, 22 July 1940; Philip Burnham, "Alternative to War,” Commonweal 32 (12 July 1940): 246. 163. Norman Thomas to Wintrow Morse, 10 December 1940, Thomas Papers; Dorothy Detzer to Mrs. Louis M. Robinson, 21 August 1940, WIL Papers. 164. "Conscripting Conscription,” Uncensored 43 (27 July 1940): 2-5. See also "Conscription Slow­ down,” Uncensored 44 (3 August 1940): 2-3; "Conscription Confusion,” Uncensored 45 (10 August 1940): 2; "Knights without Armor,” Uncensored 46 (17 August 1940): 2; Fish quoting Adjutant General E. S. Adams, CR* 11 July 1940, 9533; Frank Hanighen to Cushman Reynolds, n.d. [July 1940], Hertzberg Papers; Capper, CR* 5 August 1940, A4749; Wiley, CR* 28 August 1940,11,086; "Conscrip­ tion for the lliird Term,” CT, 31 August 1940,10. 165. Dondero, CR* 7 August 1940,10,000. See also author unknown, "Facts Underlying Peacetime Conscription,” in CR* 9 October 1940, A6254; Vandenberg, CR* 25 July 1940,9598. 166. Hugh Johnson, SFN* 9 September 1940,14; Johnson, "Selective Service Right Now,” 749. See also "Pass the Conscription Bill Now!” NYDN* 26 August 1940,19; "Bunk about Bombing,” NYDN* 10 September 1940,23; "Politics and the Draft,” NYDN* 11 September 1940,31; "Not Enough Volunteer­ ing,” NYDN* 20 September 1940,33. 167. House vote, 5 September 1940, CR* 11,604; Roosevelt, "Proclamation Calling for Draft Regis­ tration on Oct. 16,” NYT* 17 September 1940,1; Gallup, New York Times* 11 August 1940,6. For polit­ ical maneuvering, see Clifford and Spencer, First Peacetime Draft* 220-21. 168. Lodge, "The Drift Toward War,” radio broadcast, 25 September 1940, in CR* 5905; Dennis, WFL 132 (6 February 1941): 4. 169. “NewTactics, NewWeapons,” CT* 14 September 1940,12; "While Yet There Is Time to Think,” Saturday Evening Post 213 (7 September 1940): 26; Wiley, CR* 14 September 1940, 12,169. See also Wiley, CR* August 23,1940,10,794. 170. Baldwin, U nited We Stand! 250-52. MacLiesh and Reynolds differed, finding U.S. officers more imaginative, knowledgeable, and efficient than ever, though they did find coastal defenses dangerously inadequate. See 29,131. For their own listing of army shortages, see Strategy* 235. 171. For CDAAA plan, NYT* 13 September 1940, 6. For internal dissidence, Johnson, Battle* 119-22. For CDAAA on draft, see Clifford and Spencer, First Peacetime Draft* 178-79. 172. See, for example, “Notes on a Day’s News,” Uncensored 49 (7 September 1940): 4; B. C. Clark, CR* 26 September 1940,12,644; "Your Government,” Saturday Evening Post 213(12 October 1940): 30; Lodge, radio speech, "The Drift to War,” 25 September 1940, in CR* A5906; Lodge, CR* 25 September 1940,1589; Social Justice* 9 September 1940,6. 173. “While Yet There Is Time to Think,” Saturday Evening Post 213 (7 September 1940): 26; John­ son, U nited States News* 180ctober 1940,35; Libby, “France, Too, Went to War Unprepared,” Peace Ac­ tion 7 (October 1940): 3; Clark, CR* 25 September 1940,12644. See also B. C. Clark and Holt, CR* 14 September 1940,12,167. In November, Roosevelt denied that the Norden bombsight was attached to the forty-six bombers sent to Britain. Rather, Britain was receiving a more obsolete Sperry sight. CT, 22 November 1940,4. 174. Johnson, "Defend America First,” address delivered over NBC network, 5 September 1940, in V ita lS p eech es6 (l October 1940): 763; AFC advertisement, NYT* 3 October 1940,21. 175. For Hague, see Short, CR* 3 September 1940,11,364; Keefe, CR* 4 September 1940,11,429. For act of war, see John Nevin Sayre, U nited States News* 18 October 1940,35.

398

Sûtes to Pages 119-121 CHAPTER 8: MILITARY DEFENSE O F THE HEM ISPHERE

1. “D eclaration o f Panama,” Jones and M yers, Document, 2 :1 1 3 -1 7 . C anada and “th e u n d isp u ted co lo n ies and p ossession s o f European co u n tries” w ere excluded. For b ack ground, see Irw in F. G ellm an ,

Good Setghbor Diplomacy: U nited States Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945 i Baltim ore: Johns H o p ­ kins U niversity Press, 1979», 8 3 -8 3 . 2. B en n en C h am p Clark was an excep tion in p raising R oosevelt and H ull for their "brilliant lead ­ ership" in th e matter. CR, 18 February 1941, 1099. See also John H aynes H olm es, “T hree H undred Miles," U nify 124 MS January 1940;: 132, th o u g h H o lm es d a im e d it cou ld n ot b e en forced “b y guns." 3. Shafer, CR, 12 O ctob er 1939, A289; “H ostile Acts," CT, 4 O ctob er 1 9 3 9 ,1 6 ; “A m erican Waters," CT, 9 O ctob er 1 9 3 9 ,1 0 . See also “T he War in A m erican Waters," CT. 22 D ecem b er 1 9 3 9 ,1 6 ; John Bas­ sett M oore to E dwin M . Borchard, 11 M arch 1940, Borchard Papers; John Bassett M oore to H iram Johnson, 8 January' 1940, M oore Papers; Edwin M . Borchard to John Bassett M oore, 3 Januars' 1940, Borchard Papers. 4. See, for exam p le, D oroth y D etzer, m in u tes, WIL N ational Board, D etroit, 2 1 -2 2 O ctob er 1939, W IL Papers; A lf Landon to Verne M arshall, 30 O ctob er 1939, th e Papers o f Verne M arshall, H erb en H oover Presidential Library, W est Branch, Iowa (hereafter cited as Verne M arshall Papers); John Bas­ sett M oore to Edwin M. Borchard, 3 January 1940, Borchard Papers; “D esign for Freedom ,” Saturday

Evening Post 212 (11 N ovem b er 1939): 24; John Bassett M oore to Rear A dm iral W illiam L. R odgers, 21 D ecem b er 1939, co p y in Borchard Papers; “Is It a ‘Safety* Belt?” Christian Century 56 (1 8 O ctob er 1939): 1261; “A D efen se Belt for th e W estern H em isphere?” Christian C entury 56 ( 11 O ctob er 1939): 1228; Edwin M . Borchard to John Bassett M oore, 12 M arch 1940, Borchard Papers. 5. W hite, CR, 1 N ovem b er 1939, 1237. See also A lf L andon, N TT, 2 N ovem b er 1 9 3 9 ,1 1 . 6. John Bassett M oore to Rear A dm iral W illiam L. Rodgers, 21 D ecem b er 1939, co p y in Borchard Papers; Edw in M . Borchard to John Bassett M oore, 3 January 1940, Borchard Papers. For sim ilar ac­ cu sation s, see also H ugh Johnson, SF S, 22 D ecem b er 1939, 13; A lf Landon, N YT, 2 N ovem b er 1939, 11; Sargent. Bulletin « 2 3 , 5 January 1940, G etting US into War, 222. For U.S. a n n o u n cem en t, see N YT, 21 D ecem b er 1 9 3 9 ,1 .6 . 7. “A m erican Waters." CT, 9 O ctob er 1939, 10. Furtherm ore, th e Tribune co n tin u ed , C anada sh ou ld acquire N ew fou n d lan d , Labrador, and G reenland; th e U nited States sh ou ld take over Euro­ p ea n -o w n ed islands in N orth and C entral Am erica; C uba or H aiti sh ou ld p ossess Jamaica; an d A r­ gentina sh ou ld receive th e Falklands. “For an A m erican Foreign Policy," CT, 22 O ctob er 1 9 3 9 ,1 6 . 8. H ag!u n d , Latin America, 149; G ellm an, Secret Affairs, 169; Berle, en try o f 6 O cto b er 1939, Nav-

igating, 262. 9. Berle, entry o f 30 Septem ber 1939, Navigating, 260. 10. For ad m in istration reaction, see “Statem ent o n Safety Z one,” N YT, 24 D ecem b er 1939, 4; H aglund, Latin America, 157; D allek, Roosevelt, 206; H ull, Memoirs, 1 :691-92. Q u o ta tio n from G ell­ m an, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 91. 11. G allup p oll, 3 July 1940, C antril, Public O pinion, 1169. 12. O p p osed w ere R epublicans Bradley, Schafer, H offm an , T hill, H aw ks, John F. H arter (N .Y .), an d John C. Kunkel (Pa.) and D em ocrat A ndrew E dm iston (W .Va.). A nsw ering present w ere R epublicans C hiperfield, T h ork elson , T in k h am , D w orshak, H inshaw , and B enjam in Jarrett (P a.). See CR, 18 June 1 9 4 0 ,8 5 6 0 . 13. For a classic d escrip tion o f H itler’s policy, see H ans L ouis Trefousse, Germany and American Neutrality, 1939-1941 (N ew York: B ook m an , 1951). 14. Vorys, CR, 18 June 1940, 8595. See also V andenberg, radio sp eech , 9 June 1940, in CR, A 3690; V illard ,“M en and Events,” Nation 150 (15 June 1940): 734. 15. H ull, text o f statem ent, N YT, 6 July 1 9 4 0 ,6 ; G erm an p o sitio n , 1 ,8 . 16. Fish, CR, 18 June 1940, 8536. See also “Europe’s Wars," America 63 (2 0 July 1940): 4 0 7 . 17. Washington Daily News, 13 June 1940; Schiffler, CR, 18 June 1940,2188; Chiperfield, CR, 16 June 1940, 8550. U nk n ow n to Chiperfield, Hull told Am bassador Lothian in m id-A pril that G reenland lay w ithin the Western H em isphere and was hence protected by the M onroe D octrine. H ull, Memoirs, 1:755.

Notes to Pages 121-124

399

18. Katherine Rodell, “How to Defend This Hemisphere,” Com m on Sense 9 (July 1940): 12; Sar­ gent, Bulletin #69,20 July 1940, G etting US into War, 389. See also “Big Stick Policy,” N ew Masses 35 (28 May 1940): 22. 19. “The Future of the Monroe Doctrine,” Christian Century 57 (19 |une 1940): 788; Gifford, CR, 18 June 1940,8553. See also Warren Mullin, information letter, NCPW, 7 June 1940, NCPW papers; Congressman Daniel Reed, CR, 18 June 1940,8554; “The Monroe Doctrine: A Cloak for Aggression,” D aily Worker, 15 May 1940,6. 20. N Y T , 28 July 1940,1,13; Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 100. 21. “Mr. Hull at Havana,” CT, 26 July 1940, 8; Flynn, SFN, 3 August 1940,12; Sidney Steinman, “American Imperialism Faces Southward,” Call, 10 August 1940, 2; “Havana Conference Ends with United Action,” Christian C entury 57 (7 August 1940): 964. For further praise, see Isabel B. La Follette, “A Room of Our Own,” Progressive, 27 July 1940,7; “Bob La Follette Says: Havana Conference Is a Great Step Forward,” Progressive, 3 August 1940,1. 22. Lundeen, S.J. Res. 119, CR, 17 June 1940,8392; Fish, CR, 18 April 1940,4770. See also comments by William R. Castle, Senator Gillette, and author and public official Theodore Roosevelt Jr., U nited States News, 26 April 1940,24. 23. Lundeen, CR, 6 June 1940,7681; Fish, radio address, 18 April 1940, in CR, A2302-3. 24. See, for example, Lundeen, CR, 17 June 1940, 8392; “Greenland, Denmark, and the United States,” N YD N , 13 April 1940,15; Fish, radio address, 18 April 1940, in CR, A2302. 25. See, for example, “Curaçao and Iceland,” CT, 13 May 1940,12; Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 16 April 1940,1-2; Philip C. Jessup to Lloyd K. Garrison, 20 May 1940, Jessup Papers. 26. Lundeen, CR, 17 June 1940,8312; Fish, radio speech, 18 April 1940, in CR, A2302; “Our Prob­ lem of Upholding the Monroe Doctrine,” CT, 11 August 1940,7. 27. “Greenland, Denmark, and the United Sûtes,” N YD N , 13 April 1940,15; “Problem of Green­ land,” N YD N ; 16 April 1940,27. 28. Waldrop, “Hitler Still Far from Greenland,” W TH , 10 April 1940, 13; Reynolds, CR, 11 April 1940,4353; Lindbergh, testimony, HFAC, 373. See also Lindbergh in “Guarding the Americas,” CT, 11 August 1940,14. 29. See, for example, Bennett Clark, N Y T , 5 October 1939,14. 30. Niel M. Johnson, George Sylvester Viereck: G erman-American Propagandist (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 198-99; Alton Frye, N azi Germany and the Am erican Hemisphere, 1933-1941 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), 138; Kipphan, Deutsche Propaganda, 187. 31. See, for example, William E Bullitt to Roosevelt, 22 February 1939, in For the President, 315-17; 23 March 1939,326-27; 4 April 1939,334-36. For British feelers, see Reynolds, Creation, 53-54. 32. Among the vice chairmen were Senator Reynolds, Congressman Sweeney, marine general Smedley Butler, Senator Jennings Randolph (Dem.-W.Va.), and former senator Smith W. Brookhart (Rep.-lowa). Among the endorsers were congressmen Shafer, Ludlow, and John W. McCormack (Dem.-Mass.); former congressman Abe Murdock (Dem.-Utah); Governor John Moses (Dem.N.Dak.); Governor E. P. Carville (Dem.-Nev.); Michael O’Reilly, editor of the Gaelic American; and John B. Patterson, director of the school of public affairs at American University. Historian Charles C. Tansill was director of historical research. Prescott Dennett, executive editor of the Columbia Press Service, was national secreUry. Prescott Dennett to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 7 October 1940, Box 284, AFC Papers; CT, 3 December 1939,7. In April 1940, Lundeen resigned, pleading lack of time. Letter to Linn Gale and Prescott Dennett, 29 April 29, Box 234, Lundeen Papers. 33. Frank Knox to Prescott Dennett, 12 January 1940, Box 234, Lundeen Papers; McAdoo in un­ dated press release, Make Europe Pay War Debts Committee (MEPWDC), Box 234, Lundeen Pa­ pers. See also Knox in Ickes, entry of 23 June 1940, Secret D iary, 3:213; Leutze, Bargaining, 104; Crowded Years: The Reminiscences o f W illiam G. M cAdoo (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931), 419-31. 34. Lundeen, CR, 14 October 1939,411. See also 436. 35. Julian M. Pleasants, “The Senatorial Career of Robert Rice Reynolds,” Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1971; “Robert Rice Reynolds,” Current Biography, 1940,680-82. One other legislator

400

Notes to Pages 124-125

from th e D eep S ou th , R epresentative H ugh Peterson (D e m .-G a .), w as som ew h at an ti-in terven tion ist, v o tin g against len d -lease and th e arm in g o f m erchant ships. 36. R eynolds, CR, 14 O ctob er 1939, 4 1 2 -1 3 ; 4 M arch 1940, 2285; 11 April 1 9 4 0 ,4 3 4 3 ; A m erican Forum o f th e Air, entered in CR, 2 M ay 1940, 5 4 0 3 -5 ; radio broadcast, R aleigh, entered CR 3 April 1940, A 1839; text, S.J. Res. 221, CR, 17 June 1 9 4 0 ,8 3 9 2 ; speech to A m erican D efen se Society, 13 April 1940, in CR, A 2441. H earst to o sou gh t Lower C alifornia, stressing a base at M agdalena Bay. “In the News," SFE, 12 M arch 1 9 4 0 ,1 . 37. Such a m o v e w as favored by W iley, CR, 11 April 1940, 4355; W aldrop, cited in M E PW D C re­ lease, entered in CR, 22 M ay 1940, A 3309; H earst, “In th e News,** SFE, 13 lu ly 1940, 1; “H eirs o f th e British Em pire,” NYD N , 10 M arch 1 9 4 0 ,4 7 ; “W orld s Fare,” Social Justice; 16 O ctob er 1 9 3 9 ,6 ; Edw in C. Johnson, M utual netw ork sp eech , 15 June 1940, in CR, A 3 9 18-20; Edwin C. Johnson, L ouis Ludlow, Senator H om er B on e (D em .-W a sh .), and A rthur C apper in United States News, 17 July 1940, 2 6 -2 7 ; W illiam R. C astle, “W hat ab ou t th e M on roe D o ctrin e N ow ?” Saturday Evening Post 213 (27 July 1940): 40; P hilip C. Jessup to Lloyd K. G arrison, 20 M ay 1940, Jessup Papers. 38. “Islands for D efense,” CT, 2 O ctob er 1 9 3 9 ,1 2 . In A ugust 1940, th e C T called for a naval o u tp o st an d air base near C ape Farewell, G reenland; u se o f th e C anadian naval base at Halifax; and air facili­ ties at Labrador and B otw orth H arbor, N ew fou n d lan d . It also sou gh t con trol o f th e British naval base at Jamaica and the D u tch naval base at C uraçao, th e latter d o m in a tin g th e W indw ard Strait; B erm uda, w h ich sto o d directly in the way o f an en em y frontal advance; and the A zores, w h ich con trolled th e A t­ lantic sea lanes. T h e U nited States sh ou ld also con trol th e D utch islands o f C uraçao, Aruba, an d B onaire and th e British islands o f Trinidad an d Tobago, w h ich d om in ated V enezuelan oil o u tp u t. It also sou gh t U.S. bases o n th e Baham as, G u ad elou p e, an d M artinique. To protect U.S. C aribbean bases and Latin A m erica, the A m erican pow ers sh ou ld con trol British, French, and D u tch G uiana. A U.S. fleet sh ou ld be based at P ernam buco, Brazil. “G uarding th e A m ericas,” 11 A ugust 19 4 0 ,1 4 ; “O ur Prob­ lem o f U p h o ld in g th e M on roe D octrin e,” graphic section , 11 A ugust 1 9 4 0 ,7 . 39. Fish, CR, 28 M ay 1940, 7049. See also Fish, United States News, 26 July 1 9 4 0 ,2 6 . 40. P lebiscite, Detzer, m in u tes, W IL executive board, 21 February 1940, W IL P ipers; Latin A m eri­ can ad m in istration , K atherine R odell, “H ow to D efen d T h is H em isphere,” Common Sense 9 (July 1940): 11; repurchase, “A n oth er M odest Proposal,” New Republic 102 (3 June 1940): 7 4 4 -4 5 . T h e W IL annual m eetin g stressed that th e interest o f th e inhabitants m ust b e th e prim ary con sid eration in any transfer. M inutes, 2 7 -3 0 April 1940, 4, W IL Papers. For N orm an T h o m a s en d orsem en t o f n eg o tia ­ tio n s, see United States News, 26 July 1940, 2 6 -2 7 . 41. Poll, N YT, 12 N ovem b er 1939, 30. T h e tally centered o n a bill in trod u ced b y R epresentative Franck R. H avenner (D e m .-C alif.), w h ich called for peaceful cession throu gh n egotiation . 42. Washington Daily News, 16 M ay 1940. 43. “W est Indies Mystery,” CT, 26 February 1 9 4 0 ,1 0 . 44. See, for exam ple, W iley, CR, 23 A ugust 19 4 0 ,1 0 ,7 9 6 ; C o lo n el M cC orm ick, statem en t to resolu ­ tion s co m m ittee, R epublican n ational co n v en tio n , CT, 20 June 1 9 4 0 ,1 2 . 45. “S o m e W est Indies Wards for U .S.A.,” NYD N , 27 June 1940, 29. See also “H eirs to th e British Empire,” NYD N, 10 M arch 1 9 4 0 ,4 7 . T h e News also urged U.S. bases in Natal, C hile, Peru, and M exico. “Let’s G et the T itle First,” 27 A ugust 1 9 4 0 ,2 3 ; “Naval Bases from Britain,” 21 A ugust 1 9 4 0 ,2 9 . 46. “A tlantic O utpost," CT, 23 July 1 9 4 0 ,1 0 . Lundeen’s c o m m ittee cited FDR’s statem en t, m a d e to C ongress o n 16 M ay 1940, that B erm uda in h o stile hands w ould greatly threaten th e U n ited States. R oosevelt, address to C ongress, 16 M ay 1940, in CR, 6243; IF W D D C press release, entered in CR, 22 May 1940, A 3309. See also “If B erm uda Fell in to H ostile H ands,” CR, 18 M ay 1 9 4 0 ,1 2 . 47. “A tlantic O u tp ost,” CT, 23 July 1 9 4 0 ,1 0 . 48. R eynolds, A m erican Forum o f th e Air, entered in CR, 2 M ay 1940, 5403. R eynolds also m e n ­ tion ed Curaçao. See CR, 6 June 1940, 7 6 8 2 -8 3 . 49. For predictable attacks from the A m erican left, see “U.S. Im perialism O u t to Grab,” D a i/y

Worker, 2 M ay 1 9 4 0 ,6 ; Daily Worker, 18 M ay 1 9 4 0 ,6 ; James B urnham , “T heir G overnm ent,” Socialist Appeal, 20 O ctob er 1 9 3 9 ,4 . 50. Edwin M. Borchard to James Shanley, 7 June 1940, Borchard Papers; H ugh Johnson, “A llied D ebts,” N YW T, 18 January 1 9 4 0 ,1 3 .

Notes to Pages 125-126

401

51. Churchill to Roosevelt, 15 May 1940, in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 1:37. 52. Reynolds, Creation, 114,127. 53. Leutze, Bargaining, 43-44; Kimball, Forged in War, 57. 54. "Roosevelt's Message and the Diplomatic Exchanges," N Y T , 4 September 1940,10; press con­ ference, 3 September 1940, in Samuel 1. Rosenman, comp., Roosevelt Papers and Addresses, 9:378. For a comprehensive study of the agreement, see Robert Shogun, H ard Bargain: H ow FDR TWisted Churchill's A rm , Evaded the Law, and Changed the Role o f the Am erican Presidency (New York: Scrib­ ner's, 1995). 55. Lawyers* letter, N Y T , 11 August 1940, sect. 4, 8; "Text of Attorney General Jackson’s Opinion Upholding the Transfer of Destroyers," N Y T , 4 September 1940,16. 56. For histories of the CDAAA and its more interventionist offshoot, the Fight for Freedom Com­ mittee, see Schwar, "Internationalist Propaganda"; Johnson, Battle; Mark Lincoln Chadwin, The Hawks o f World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968). For a case study of the debate involving such groups and their foes, see James C. Schneider, Should America Go to War? The Debate over Foreign Policy in Chicago, 1939-1941 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). 57. CDAAA, "Progress Bulletin," 12 August 1940, 2, Box 34, CDAAA Papers; poll, 9 August 1940, Cantril, Public O pinion, 1160; polls of 22 October and 19 November 1940, Cantril, Public O pinion , 973. 58. For an example of an interventionist misgiving, see Breckinridge Long, entry of 19 December 1940, War D iary, 163. 59. See, for example, Wiley, CR, 23 August 1940,10,798; Hugh Johnson, SFN, 5 September 1940, 19; "But Boake Carter Says," SFE, 4 September 1940,7. Wheeler favored canceling part of Britain’s war debt in exchange for the bases but opposed trading the destroyers. N Y T , 18 August 1940,1. 60. “The More We Think of It the Better We Like It," N YD N , 5 September 1940,27. 61. “We Get the Bases," CT, 4 September 1940,14. See also “The New North America," CT, 5 Sep­ tember 1940,16; "America Second," CT, 1 October 1940,14. 62. McCormick, radio address of 8 September 1940, Addresses, 46. 63. “Today the Strongest Nation in the World," CT, 13 October 1940, graphic section, 1. 64. See, for example, Knutson, N Y T , 4 September 1940,16; Lindbergh, testimony, HFAC, 23 Janu­ ary 1941,391. 65. Flynn, in Social Justice, 23 September 1940,7; Lodge, CR, 20 September 1940,12,387; Rogers, CR, 12 September 1940,12,047. 66. See, for example, Hugh Johnson,“One Man's Opinion," SFN, 6August 1940,13; Nye, Newsweek, 16 September 1940,17; Walsh, “Our Navy for Our Own Defense,” speech, CBS, 13 August 1940, in CR, A5226; Lundcen, CR, 24 August 1940, A5217; Sterling Morton to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 23 August 1940, Morton Papers; "Scheming for War," CT, 6 August 1940,10; Social Justice, 9 September 1940,4; Marcantonio, N Y T , 4 September 1940,16; Johns, CR, 6 September 1940,11,647; Hearst, “In the News," SFE, 6 September 1940,11. 67. La Follette, AFC speech, in CT, 12 September 1940,9. 68. "Dictator Roosevelt Commits an Act of War," S t Louis Post-Dispatch, 3 September 1940. For an endorsement of the editorial, see CT, 4 September 1940,14. For other attacks on Roosevelt’s supposed arbitrary power, Congressmen Wolcott, CR, 3 September 1940, 11,399; Sweeney, CR, 4 September 1940, 11,414; Fish, CR, 6 September 1940,11,664; Earl R. Lewis (Rep.-Ohio), CR, 9 September 1940, 11,829; Taft, CR, 14 September 1940,12,168; B. C. Clark, CR, 26 September 1940, 12,644; George E. Sokolsky, “These Days," New York Sun, 6 September 1940,20; Castle Diary, 7 September 1940. Hiram Johnson said he did not object to aiding Britain but opposed the"manner" and "hypocrisy" of the deal. Hiram Johnson to John Bassett Moore, 4 September 1940, Moore Papers. 69. John Bassett Moore to Hiram Johnson, 17 September 1940, Moore Papers; Bone, CR, 15 August 1940,10,406; undated memo, “The WIL Today," attached to Mrs. C. F. Hunt to G. C. Bussey, 9 Septem­ ber 1940, WIL Papers; Dorothy Detzer to Katherine Devereaux Blake, 31 October 1940, WIL Papers. 70. For Hague Convention, see"Dictator Roosevelt Commits an Act of War," S t Louis Post-Dispatch, 3 September 1940; Herbert W. Briggs, cited in “A Demolishing Indictment," S t Louis Post-Dispatch, 7 September 1940; Holt, CR, 26 September 1940, 12,644; Libby, “Shall the United States Discontinue Diplomatic Relations with the Axis Powers?" American Forum o f the A ir 2 (15 December 1940): 13;

402

Notes to Pages 126-127

Charles Cheney Hyde in CT* 8 September 1940,6; Borchard, “The Attorney General’s Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases,” American Journal o f International Law 34 (October 1940): 690-97; Norman Thomas, radio broadcast of 4 September 1940, Calk 14 September 1940,1. 71. For lYeaty of Washington, see Herbert W. Briggs, cited in “A Demolishing Indictment,” Sr. Louis Post-Dispatch* 7 September 1940; “On Going to War,” Saturday Evening Post 213 (19 October 1940): 26; Danaher, American Forum of the Air, 25 August 1940, in Cft, A5393. Danaher noted the nontransfer agreement adopted by the Conference of Panama and signed on 3 October 1939. 72. For Walsh amendment, see Borchard, “Attorney General’s Opinion”; Briggs cited in “A Demol­ ishing Indictment”; Edward S. Corwin, letter to NYT, 13 October 1940, sect. 4,6; Danaher, American Forum of the Air, 25 August 1940, in CR, A5393. 73. Borchard, “Attorney General’s Opinion”; Congressman Earl Lewis, CR, 9 September 1940, 11,827; “Notes on a Day’s News,” Uncensored 49 (7 September 1940): 3; Briggs, "A Demolishing In­ dictment”; Danaher, American Forum of the Air, 25 August 1940, in CR, A5393. 74. See, for example, Congressman Dirksen, CR, 6 September 1940,11,647; Congressman Earl Lewis, CR, 9 September 1940,11,828; “Notes on a Day’s News,” Uncensored 49 (7 September 1940): 2; Castle Diary, 7 September 1940; Porter Sargent, Bulletin #87,18 September 1940, Getting US into War, 459 n. 11; Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 4 and 28 September, 3 October 1940, Borchard Pipers. Moore concurred, saying that“Nothingtoo unfavorable couldbe saidof Jackson’s opinion.... His so-calledopin­ ion was no opinion at alL” Letter to Borchard, 5 October 1940, Borchard Papers. 75. Edward S. Corwin to NIT, 13 October 1940, sect. 4,6. Charles Francis Adams in Casde Diary, 20 September 1940. For other criticism of Jackson, see William Dennis, president of Earlham College and former diplomat, to Frederick J. Libby, 6 September 1940, NCPW Papers. 76. Transient agreement, Hoffman, CR, 3 September 1940,11,399; “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE* 10 September 1940,13. For similar comments, see B. C. Clark, CR, 14 September 1940,12,168; Mencken, 6 October 1940, in Sargent, Bulletin #87,18 September 1940, G etting US into War, 456 n. 4. 77. Clark, CR, 28 February 1941,1536. 78. Reynolds, CR, 1 March 1941, 1598. For the Pearson-Alien column, undated, A937. See also Wheeler, CR, 1 March 1941,1598. The Chicago Tribune suggested that the British government buy the needed real estate from its own subjects, then give it to the United Sûtes in exchange for more valu­ able ships. See “Payment for the Bases,” 11 March 1941,12. 79. See, for example, “DicUtor Roosevelt Commits an Act of War,” St Louis Post-Dispatch* 3 Sep­ tember 1940; Lundeen, CR, 24 August 1940, A5217; Danaher, CR, 9August 1940,10,102; Hoffman, CR, 3 September 1940,11,399; Dirksen, CR, 6 September 1940,11,664; Edith Nourse Rogers, CR, 12 Sep­ tember 1940,12,047; Hugh Johnson, SFN, 6 August 1940,13; Edwin C. Johnson, American Forum of the Air, 1 September 1940, in CR, A5664; SFE* 10 September 1940,13; “Fifty Destroyers to Britain?” N YD N *6 August 1940,21; Bone, NIT, 4 September 1940,16. 80. Johnson, “One Man’s Opinion,” SFN, 17 August 1940,13. Wiliam R. Casde presented the con­ verse argument. If the destroyers, he said, could save England, he would have endorsed the gift He claimed, however, that a “large part of our navy people” did not think the ships would affect the out­ come. Casde Diary, 20 August 1941. The N ew York D aily News predicted that by the time the destroy­ ers were reconditioned, the war would probably be over. “The Consequences of Stumble-Bum Diplo­ macy,” 24 August 1940,13. See also “Naval Ships for Britain,” NYDN, 21 August 1940,29. 81. Congressman Frederick C. Smith, CR, 4 September 1940, 11,413; Lodge, “The Drift Toward War,” radio speech, 25 September 1940, in CR, A5905; “Those 'Obsolete’ Destroyers,” Progressive* 7 Sep­ tember 1940,8. 82. Nye, CR, 23 August 1941,10,811. 83. Edwin M. Borchard to Gerald P. Nye, 1 July 1941, Borchard Papers; Corwin, letter to NYT, 13 October 1940, sect. 4,6. See also George E. Sokolsky, “These Days,” New York Sun* 25 October 1940,22; Bender, CR, 6 September 1940,11,647; Hanson Baldwin, U nited We Stand! 49; Hugh Johnson, testi­ mony, HFAC, 23 January 1941,444. 84. Hugh Johnson, SFN, 25 September 1940,13; Fish, CT* 24 November 1940,10. If Britain turned the offer down, Fish would—with the consent of Congress—pay Britain a billion dollars and give her an additional fifty destroyers.

Notes to Pages 127-129

403

85. Lundeen, CR, 24 August 1940, A5217. For New York D aily News focus on Martinique alone, see “Better Take Martinique,” 15 November 1940,33; “Let's Take Martinique,” 14 April 1941,19; “To Make Crete Safe for Greece—or Martinique Safe for Democracy,” 23 May 1941,29. For addition of St Pierre and Miquelon, see “British Bases for U.S. Destroyers,” 4 September 1940, 35. For addition of other French islands, “Why Stall? Take Martinique Now,” 5 fanuary 1941, 41; “This Question of Aid to Britain,” 27 November 1940,35. For addition of Dutch Guiana, “Why the Guff about Guiana?” 26 No­ vember 1941,37. 86. Baldwin, U nited We Stand! 52; Dorothy Detzer, report to WIL National Board, 30 October-1 November 1940,7-8, WIL Papers. 87. “Bases, Destroyers, Empire,” N ew Masses 36 (17 September 1940): 16. See also “Taking the Lion’s Share,” N ew Masses 36 (27 August 1940): 16; “Still Deeper into War,” D aily Worker, 4 September 1940.1. 88. Villard, “Should We Buy the West Indies?” Christian C entury 58 (23 April 1941): 560-62. VIIlard was such a continentalist that he would not resist an enemy in Bermuda but would wait until it reached the U.S. Testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,187. 89. Libby, “WeWant No More Islands,” Peace Action 7 (April 1941): 2; Roosevelt to Cordell Hull, 11 January 1941, F.D.R.: H is Personal Letters, 1104-5. 90. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier o f Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 11. Reynolds, Creation, 113-30; Kimball, Forged in War, 57. 91. For the practical problems with the ships, see Philip Goodhart, Fifty Ships That Saved the W orld (NewYork: Doubleday, 1965), chap. 14. For delays, see Reynolds, Creation, 131. 92. Reynolds, Creation, 132,287. 93. Hemispheric focus, Haglund, Latin America, 99; War College, Watson, C h ief o f Staff, 94; FDR noted in Berle, entry of 26 May 1939, Navigating, 223-24. 94. Haglund, Latin America, 185. For the argument that Roosevelt deliberately exaggerated the limited scope of the Nazi movement in the Americas so as to aid the Allies, see Gellman, Good Neigh bor Diplomacy, 115-16. 95. See, for example, Livingstone Hartley and Donald C Blaisdell, “Tinning the Tables,” CDAAA, Washington Office Inform ation Letter 17 (9 May 1941): 4, Box 35, CDAAA Papers. 96. Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, “Can We Keep Hitler Out of the Americas?” Look, 16 June 1940,20-22; “If Britain Should Lose,” Time, 22 July 1940,20; Bullitt in Long, entry of 13 August 1940, War Diary, 122. 97. Hartley and Blaisdell, “A Lesson from Crete,” CDAAA, Washington Office Inform ation Letter 20 (30 May 1941): 3, Box 35, CDAAA Papers. For concurrence, Breckinridge Long, entry of 21 April 1941, War Dairy, 199. 98. “Text of Colonel Lindbergh’s Address,” N Y T , 16 June 1940,37. See also Lindbergh, speech, 19 May 1940, “Radio Addresses,” 10. 99. Lindbergh, testimony, HFAC, 23 January 1941, 384. He called for air bases in Hawaii, Bermuda, Alaska, Canada, and Newfoundland, then a separate dominion. See also Charles A. Lind­ bergh to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 13 November 1940, Wood Papers. 100. Lindbergh, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941, 522. Walter Lippmann had written an article positing that only by controlling the seas could a nation supply such South American bases. “The Lind­ bergh Doctrine of United States Defense,” W ashington Post, 30 January 1941. Lindbergh replied that the very reason for installing such air bases was to assist the U.S. Navy in holding command of the sea. Testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,539. For an endorsement of Lindbergh, see Fish, CR, 28 May 1940, 7049; Fish, speech, NBC, 22 June 1940, in CR, A4187. 101. For example, see Frank Gannett to Frank P. S. Glassey, 25 April 1940, Gannett Papers; Kather­ ine Rodell,“How to Defend This Hemisphere,” Common Sense9 (July 1940): 12. 102. Van Zandt, address to Consistory of Scottish Rite Masonry, Williamsport, Pa., 28 June 1940, in CR, A5184. See also Capper, radio broadcast, 10 October 1940, in CR, A6296. 103. La Follette, address to annual law school dinner, (University of Chicago] Daily Maroon, 7 May 1940.2. The anti-interventionist and architect Frank Lloyd Wright labeled La Follette’s policy “out of the frying pan into the fire.” Frank Lloyd Wright to Philip La Follette, 27 July 1940, Philip La Follette Papers.

404

Notes to Pages 129-131

104. Wiley, CR, 23 August 1940,1079; Castle, “What about the Monroe Doctrine Now?" Saturday (27 July 1940): 38,40. 105. “Mr. Hull at Havana,” CT, 26 July 1940,8; “Guarding the Americas,” CT, 11 August 1940,14. See also “Our Problem of Upholding the Monroe Doctrine,” CT, graphic section, 11 August 1940, 7; “Hemispheric Defense,” CT, 3 July 1941,10. In October 1940, Tribune publisher McCormick claimed that the U.S. southern defense crescent protected oil deliveries from Mexico, Venezuela, and the Dutch West Indies. McCormick, “Today the Strongest Nation in theWorld,” graphic section, 13 October 1940, 2. At one point, the Tribune downplayed any threat from Pernambuco. See “Let’s Look at the Facts,” 1 February 1941,28. Publisher McCormick mentioned Natal as a good spot for a U.S. base. McCormick, CT, 1 June 1941,3. 106. Ward, “Future for Americas,” Social Justice, 10 June 1940,15; “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 19 February 1941,13; Clark, NIT, 30 July 1941,8. For an attack on Clark, see “In the News,” Gift 9 Au­ gust 1941,1. 107. Fish, U nited States News, 6 June 1941,26; Graeme Howard, Am erica and a N ew World Order (New York: Scribner’s, 1940), 86-90; Morton, Let’s Think This M atter Through (pamphlet; Chicago: privately printed, 1941 ), entered in CR, 21 February 1941, A786; Wood, “Our Foreign Policy,” address to the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, 4 October 1940, in CR, A6302; interview with Kenneth Crawford, PM, 25 May 1941,5. In words that were much attacked. Wood said, “Offhand, I would say only defend it to the bulge but that is not a settled opinion and it is only my personal opinion,” mean­ ing that he was not speaking for the America First Committee. The CDAAA accused him of permit­ ting more than 70 percent of the Latin American people to fall under the Nazi regime, inviting Ger­ man bombers within range of the Panama Canal, and abandoning the Monroe Doctrine. Livingstone Hartley and Donald C. Blaisdell, “A Sabotage Policy,” CDAAA, W ashington Office Inform ation Letter 20 (30 May 1941 ): 4, Box 35, CDAAA Papers. 108. Baldwin, U nited We Stand! 96, 101-3,107-9. Baldwin had mentioned the use of Valparaiso, Pernambuco, Belem, St. Paul Island, Aruba, Curaçao, Trinidad, and air bases in Venezuela. “Wanted: A Plan for Defense,” H arper’s M agazine 181 (August 1940): 230. For support for Baldwin, see Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine: Into War through Hysteria,” C a ll 7 June 1941,8. 109. MacLiesh and Reynolds, Strategy, 1-52. They also wrote of a supplementary base at Para, as it possessed an abundance of cranes, tugs, and marine railways. See 65. 110. Taft, CR, 26 August 1940, 10,901; Norman Thomas to John D. Luckey, 5 October 1940, Thomas Papers; Thomas, testimony, HFAC, 22 January 1941, 337. In November 1941, Thomas said that the U.S. arms program was laden with imperialist ambitions that would frighten, not gain, the support of Latin Americans. Cornell [University] D aily Sun, 20 November 1941,1. 111. Rivers, radio speech, “Europe’s War and America’s Security,” 18 May 1940, in CR, A3039; Downey, CR, 9 October 1939,183; 6 October 1940,171; Nye, CR, 26 February 1941,1434; Taft, “Shall the United States Enter the European War?” radio address, 17 May 1941, in CR, A2344; Hearst,“In the News,” SFE, 21 August 1940,1. See also broadcaster Fulton Lewis Jr., [Dartmouth College] The D art­ m outh, 9 January 1941,1; Robert R. McCormick, broadcast, 23 June 1940, Addresses, 12. 112. Johnson, SFN, 8 June 1940,11; Johnson, SFE, 24 August 1940,11,21; Chavez, “America Must Choose—Pan-Americanism or War,” broadcast, NBC, 8 July 1940, in CR, A4351. See also Congress­ man Frederick C. Smith, broadcast, NBC, 11 July 1940,9678. 113. Beak, Pan America, 450-51. Quotation, 429. 114. Marshall in Haglund, Latin America, 201-2; Marshall, “National Strategic Decisions,” 22 May 1940, in Marshall, Papers, 2:218-19. For the “general agreement” of Roosevelt, Stark, and Welles, see Marshall, “Memorandum for the War Plans Division,” 23 May 1940, in Marshall, Papers, 2:220. 115. “Joint Plan for the Occupation of Martinique and Guadeloupe,” 8 July 1940, in Am erican War Plans, 1919-1941, vol. 4: Coalition War Plans and H emispheric Defense Plans, 1940-1941, ed. Steven T. Ross (New York: Garland, 1992), 169-76. 116. Marshall, N Y T , 5 June 1940,14; Norman Thomas to Bella Kussy, 11 June 1940, Thomas Pa­ pers. See also Norman Thomas to “Lyn,” 17 July 1940, Thomas Papers. 117. Villard, “Issues and Men,” N ation 150 (15 June 1940): 734. Evening Post 213

Notes to Pages 132-134

405

118. Haglund, Latin America, 175-78; Hull, M emoirs, 1:820-21. 119. Frederick). Libby to W.B. Wächter, 22 June 1940, NCPWPapers; Dorothy DetzertoMary Farquharson,21 June 1940, W1L Papers; “Hemispheric Hysteria,” New Masses 35 (11 June 1940):21.The journal also pointed to American air missions already assigned to Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, and Colombia. See also wPlu$ Battleships," New Masses 36 (2 July 1940): 24. 120. Taft, CR, 26 August 1940,10,900. 121. For background, see Haglund, Latin America, 178-80; Watson, C h ief o f Staff, 95-96; Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 136; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. M arshall, vol. 2: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942 (New York: Viking, 1966). 122. See, for example, Villard, “Issues and Men," N ation 150 (15 June 1940): 734; "The Future of the Monroe Doctrine," Christian C entury 57 (19 June 1940): 788. 123. Libby, report to executive board, NCPW, 18 September 1940, NCPW Papers. In November 1941, Libby’s NCPW accused the United States of encouraging the Latin American countries to build up armaments, saying this move would only promote internecine strife. “Program Adopted by the Na­ tional Council for the Prevention of War," 15 November 1941, Peace Action 7 (October 1941): 3. 124. In Fact l (17 June 1940): 2. 125. Detzer, report to WIL executive, December 1939, WIL Papers; Wheeler, American Forum of the Air, 12 January 1941, in CR, A179. See also Clarence Senior, "Will Pan Americanism Last?" Co#, 16 August 1941,2. 126. "Defending Democracy," C hristian C entury 57 (5 June 1940), 776-77; Bradley, address to Michigan Commercial Secretaries Association, Mackinac Island, 30 August 1940, in CR, A5440; Broughton, "America in a Hostile World," Scribner's C om m entator 9 (November 1940): 73; Morton, Let's Think This M atter Through [pamphlet], entered in CR, 21 February 1941, A786. For focus on dic­ tatorship, see also "Havana Conference Ends with United Action," Christian C entury 57 (7 August 1940): 964; John T. Flynn, article datelined 24 August 1940, in CR, A5306; Robert E. Wood, interview, PM, 25 May 1941,5; MacLiesh and Reynolds, Strategy, 243. 127. Johnson, SFN, 8 June 1940,11; "Plus Battleships," N ew Masses 36 (2 July 1940): 16. 128. Arden, "Pan American Relations: Part I," Scribner's Com m entator 11 (December 1941): 63; Dennis, WFL 100 (27 June 1940): 6; “The Mexican Mystery," N YD N , 25 May 1940,15; Hearst, "In the News," W TH , October 4,1940,16; Hearst, W TH , 15 February 1941,17. For Hearst in 1916, see Swanberg, C itizen Hearst, 296-98. 129. See, for example, Hearst, "In the News,” SFE, 11 March 1940,1; Reynolds, American Forum of the Air, 28 April 1940, in CR, 5045. 130. Reynolds, CR, 8 April 1940,4131. For additional anxiety concerning Japan, see also "Alaska and the Far East," Commonweal 32 (16 August 1940): 339. 131. Johnson, "One Man’s Opinion," SFN, 19 April 1940,23. 132. The authors endorsed the current efforts to build bases at the panhandle, Sitka, Juneau, Ketchikan, Point Barrow, Nome, the Seward Peninsula, the Kodiak Islands, Dutch Harbor, and Kiska. Needed too was a military highway through British Columbia, so as to give the United States an over­ land supply line to Alaska. MacLiesh and Reynolds, Strategy, 69-71,234. 133. Charles A. Lindbergh, testimony, HFAC, 23 January 1941,37; Baldwin, U nited We Stand! 111, 114. Baldwin favored patrol plane bases at Sitka and Kodiak, submarine bases at Kodiak and Dutch Harbor, an advance base at Fairbanks, and a staging field at Annette Island near Ketchikan. He sug­ gested an outpost for patrol bases and small bases farther down the Aleutian chain, perhaps at Agattu and Kiska. For anti-interventionist use of Baldwin on Alaska, see AFC Research Bureau, "Wings over Nome," D id You Know? 5 (1 July 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 297-98; AFC Research Bureau, "Nobody Know the Trouble We’re In," D id You Know ? 12 (24 July 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 363; "This Chang­ ing Hemisphere," Uncensored 93 (12 July 1941): 4. 134. Fish, CR, 28 June 1941,6364; Adams, CR, 6 August 1941,6820. 135. N ew York Herald Tribune, 30 June 1941. 136. Livingstone Hartley and Frank S. Goodwin, "Our North Pacific Front," CDAAA, W ashington Office Inform ation Letter 32 (22 August 1941): 1, Box 35, CDAAA Papers.

406

Notes to Pages 134-136

137. “Wings over Nome,“ 295-98; “Nobody Know the Trouble We’re In," 363. 138. “Text of President’s Address Depicting Emergency Confronting the Nation,” N YT, 28 May 1941,12. See also “President’s Call for Full Response on Defense," NYT, 30 December 1940,6. For fur­ ther anxiety over Dakar, see Berle, entry of 10 September 1940, Navigating, 335; 14 February 1941,357; 26 May 1941,369. 139. Livingstone Hartley, “Threat to the South Pacific,” CDAAA, Washington Office Inform ation bet­ ter 5 \ (15 August 1941): 2, Box 35, CDAAA Papers; Hartley, “Keys to the South Atlantic“ (pamphlet; New York: CDAAA, 1941 ), 3-4; Hartley and Donald C. Blaisdell, “Danger from Drifting,“ CDAAA, Washing­ ton Office Inform ation Letter 15 (25 April 1941 ): 2-3, Box 35, CDAAA Papers. For concurrence, see Breck­ inridge Long, entry of 25 April 1941, War Diary, 199. See also “The Danger,“ Life%5 May 1941,30; Ickes, entry of 4 May 1941, Secret Diary, 3:503; Lee, entry of 24 September 1940, London Journal, 69. 140. Office of Public Opinion Research, poll of 10 July 1941, Cantril, Public O pinion, 1061. For re­ lated polls, see 1061-62. 141. See, for example, Hugh Johnson, “One Man’s Opinion," SFN, 8 July 1940,13. 142. See, for example. Social Justice, 11 November 1940,9; Ruth Sarles to Kendrick Lee, 20 April 1941, Box 34, AFC Papers; Sarles to Richard A. Moore, 4 June 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 252; AFC Re­ search Bureau, “Our Iceland Outpost,“ D id You Know? 7 (9 July 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 312; Wheeler, Time, 21 July 1941,16; “The Dakar Illusion,“ N YD N , 24 August 1941,23. For doubts that the United States would occupy the Atlantic islands, see Warren Mullin, minutes, executive board, NCPW, 20 May 1941,3, NCPW Papers. 143. “Freedom of FDR," 87 (31 May 1941): 3. See also AFC Research Bureau, “Our Iceland Out­ post,” D id You Know? 7 (9 July 1941 ), in Doenecke, IDU, 312. 144. “Islands," Uncensored 90 (21 June 1941): 4. 145. See, for example, Landon, N YT, 3 June 1941,8; intelligence officer Truman Smith cited in Her­ bert Hoover, memorandum, 1 June 1941, Hoover Papers. 146. AFC Research Bureau, “Our Iceland Outpost," D id You Know? 7 (9 July 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 312; Samuel B. Pettengill, “Heavy Weight Champ," Release 219,23 January 1941, Box 11, the Pa­ pers of Samuel B. Pettengill, University of Oregon (hereafter cited as Pettengill Papers). 147. La Follette, [University of Wisconsin] D aily Cardinal, 10 May 1941, 1; “But Boake Carter Says," SFE, 28 May 1940,19. 148. Lindbergh, “A Letter to Americans," Collier's 107 (29 March 1941): 77. See also Nye, CR, 26 February 1941,1433. 149. Baldwin, “The Realities of Hemisphere Defense," Reader's Digest 39 (July 1941 ): 118. Baldwin did claim that St. Louis in Senegal afforded a quite defensible outpost but that if the United States did enter the conflict, it would be wiser to send troops to Alexandria, Egypt, for the fete of Africa would be decided there. “Potential U.S. Bases—III,” N YT, 23 July 1941,6. 150. Fish. CR, 20 May 1941,4283; “The Dakar Illusion," NYD N , 24 August 1941, 23; Taft, CR, 22 February 1941,1283. See also Senator Adams, CR, 6 August 1941,6820. 151. AFC Research Bureau, “Our African Outpost,” D id You Know? 8 (11 July 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 306-7; “Items,” Uncensored 96 (2 August 1941): 2. 152. Gilroy, “—And Willkie Threw It Away,” Scribner's Com m entator 9 (February 1941): 50-51; Flynn, SFN, 12 May 1941,14. 153. “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 24 May 1941,7. 154. AFC Research Bureau, “Our African Outpost,” D id You Know? 8(11 July 1941 ), in Doenecke, IDU, 305; Baldwin, “The Realities of Hemisphere Defense,” Reader's Digest 31 (July 1941): 118. 155. Marshall to Harold R. Stark, 27 June 1941, in Marshall, Papers, 2:551; Fortune poll, Cantril, Public Opinion, 783; 41.2 percent were in favor, 28.3 percent were opposed, and 30.5 percent had no opinion. For a earlier Fortune poll showing 56.9 percent in favor, see August 1941, Cantril, Public O pin­ ion, 1170. 156. “ 1941 Campaign," UncensoredSO (12 April 1941): 1-2. 157. AFC Research Bureau, “Our Iceland Outpost,” D id You Know? 7 (9 July 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 312.

Notes to Pages 137-140

407

158. McCormick, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,477-79,483; “Let’s Look at the Facts," CT, 1 February 1941,28. 159. Reynolds, Creation, 201. 160. Marshall, Papers* 2:547; in Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 68-71; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework o f Hemisphere Defense (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1960), 117-19,121-22,138-39; Hull, M emoirs, 2:941-42; “Joint Army and Navy Basic Plan for the Oc­ cupation of the Azores," May 1941, in Ross, Am erican War Plans, 4:351-59. 161. Dallek, Roosevelt, 285. 162. Mark A. Stoler, George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesm an o f the Am erican C entury (Boston: TWayne, 1989), 81; Conn and Fairchild, Framework, 139-41; “Joint Army and Navy Basic Plan for the Capture and Occupation of the Azores," 23 September 1941, in Ross, American War Plans, 4:342-50. For Roosevelt’s lingering expectation of possible invasion, see his letter to Emory S. Land, 1 August 1941, F.D.R.: H is Personal U tters, 1193. 163. For the Azores, one found 45.9 percent favoring defense, 24.7 percent opposed, and 29.4 per­ cent having no opinion. For Dakar, the ratio was 41.2 percent, 28.3 percent, and 30.5 percent Cantril, Public O pinion, 783. 164. Gallup poll, 22 September 1939, Cantril, Public O pinion, 782. For related polls, see 782-83. 165. Dallek, Roosevelt, 235-36. 166. Haglund, Latin America, 52,116-19,249-50 n. 24; Watson, C hief o f Staff, 150,371. 167. Thomas B. Buell, M aster o f Sea Power: A Biography o f Fleet A dm iral Ernest /. Xing (Boston: Lit­ tle, Brown, 1980), 125; Marshall, Papers, 2:547-48; Conn and Fairchild, Framework, 119-21,278-89; “Joint Army and Navy Plan to Provide Armed Support to Recognized Latin American Governments," 15 March 1941, in Ross, Am erican War Plans, 4:207-13.

CHAPTER 9: ECO N OM IC SURVIVAL IN THE AM ERICAS

1. See, for example, Breckinridge Long, entry of 23 March 1940, War Diary, 72; Hull, M emoirs, 1:814. 2. Ickes, entry of 29 January 1939, Secret Diary, 2:568; Haglund, Latin America, 137-38; Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 9. 3. Welles, N Y T , 31 January 1941,6; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 31 January 1941. 4. Douglas Miller, You C an't Do Business w ith H itler (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941), 151-72; quo­ tations, 153,157. 5. “The President’s Statement," N YT, 22 June 1940,1,9; Haglund, Latin America, 211. 6. “America Incorporated," Uncensored 40 (6 July 1940): 4; Flynn, SFN, 26 July 1940, 20; Chodorov, “South American Dynamite," Scribner's C om m entator 8 (October 1940): 4. See also Hugh Johnson, “One Man’s Opinion," SFN, 16 July 1940, 20; Flynn, SFN, 13 July 1940, 13; “Allies to the South," CT, 3 July 1940,12. 7. Johnson, “One Man’s Opinion," SFN, 20 June 1940,13; “What Will Come Out of Havana?" Christian C entury 57 (24 July 1940): 917. For Latin American reluctance, see also Flynn, SFN, 26 July 1940,20; “America Incorporated," Uncensored 40 (6 July 1940): 3. 8. Press conference, N Y T , 10 August 1940, 2; Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 93-94; Haglund, Latin America, 212. 9. Roosevelt, message to Congress, text, N YT, 23 June 1940,15; Hull, address to Foreign Minis­ ter’s Conference, Havana, text, N Y T , 23 July 1940,14. 10. See, for example, Norman Thomas to John D. Luckey, 5 October 1940, Thomas Papers. 11. “Havana Conference Ends with United Action," Christian C entury 57 (7 August 1940): 964. See also “Economic Solidarity with South America," Christian C entury 57 (28 August 1940): 1043-44. 12. Frank C. Hanighen, “South of the Border," Progressive, 3 May 1941,9. See also Frank Waldrop, “Hemisphere Security Must Be Bought," W TH , 1 August 1940,14.

408

Notes to Pages 140-142

13. See, for example, Congressman Bradley, address to Michigan Commercial Secretaries Associa­ tion, Mackinaw Island, 30 August 1940, in CR, A5440; “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 30 July 1940,11. 14. Flynn, W ashington D aily News, 25 July 1940. See also Flynn cited by Reynolds, CR, 23 August 1940,10,284. For earlier Flynn misgivings, “Other People's Money: South American Bubble," NewRe­ public 101 (25 October 1939): 33. 15. “America Second," CT, 1 October 1940,14. For more on cost, see also “A Half Billion for Good Neighbors," CT, 24 July 1940,10; “The Half Billion for Latin America," 2 August 1940,8. 16. Gellman, Good Neighbor D iplomacy, 162; Albert E. Eckes, The U nited States and the Global Struggle fo r M inerals (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 98. 17. See, for example, Charles A. Lindbergh, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,538-39; John Cud­ ahy to Claude Pepper, 15 October 1941, Flynn Papers; “Fair Deal for American Exports,” CT, 30 De­ cember 1939,6; “We Can Stay Out," CT, 11 January 1940,12. 18. Peek, memorandum to America First Committee, in CR, 19 May 1941, A236; Johnson, H ell Bent fo r War, 100; AFC Research Bureau, “The Economics of Hemisphere Defense," D id You Know? 23B (19 September 1941), in Doenecke, /DU, 178. See also Philip La Follette, testimony, SFRC, 3 February 1941,270. 19. See, for example, William Orton, W illiam s [College] Record, 23 April 1940, 1; Roger Wylie, “Latin America: Economic Pawn," Scribner's Com m entator 10 (May 1941 ): 50; Williams, Airpower, 414; Robert La Follette Jr., CR, 12 October 1939,334; Katherine Rodell,“How to Defend This Hemisphere," Common Sense 9 (July 1940): 12; Nye, CR, 23 October 1941,743; “Gains in Exports Are Misleading," CT, 4 December 1940,16. The Tribune did warn that much of this trade might revert back to Europe once the war ended. 20. “Citadel of Civilization," N YD N , 8 October 1939,51; “We Can Get Used to It, Too,” 18 October 1940,37. 21. La Follette, CR, 12 October 1939,15; Chase, “Four Assumptions about the War," Uncensored, 28 December 1940, special supplement, 3; “A Choice of Evils," CT, 9 February 1941,16; Ward, “Future for Americas," Social Justice, 10 June 1940,15; Klotsche, [Northwestern University] D aily Northwestern, 6 December 1940,1; Wood, “Our Foreign Policy," address to Council of Foreign Relations, Chicago, 4 October 1940, in CR, A6302; Norman Thomas to John D. Luckey, 5 October 1940, Thomas Papers; Hutchins, “America Has a Choice," Progressive, 31 May 1941,9. 22. For references to Latin American tin and rubber, see “Economic Solidarity with South Amer­ ica," C hristian C entury 57 (28 August 1940): 1044; Chavez, radio broadcast, NBC, 8 July 1940, in CR, A4352; Downey, CR, 6 October 1939, 117-18; MacLiesh and Reynolds, Strategy, 45. For rubber, see Downey, CR, 9 October 1939,171; La Follette Jr., CR, 24 February 1940,1306. For tin, see “America In­ corporated," Uncensored 40 (6 July 1940): 4; Dorothy Detzer, report to WIL executive, Geneva, De­ cember 1939, WIL Papers; Hugh Johnson, “Pacific Trade," N YW T, 6 February 1940, 17; Baldwin, United We Stand! 54. 23. Christopher Thome, Allies o f a Kind: The U nited States, B ritain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 17. 24. AFC Research Bureau, “The All-American Front," D id You Know? 17 (8 August 1941), in Doe­ necke, IDU, 169; “Nobody Knows the Ttouble We’re In," D id You Know ? 12 (24 July 1941), in Doe­ necke, IDU, 365; Johnson, “Anchors Away,” Saturday Evening Post 213 (5 October 1940): 78; Fish, CR, 15 May 1940, 6195-96. Fish claimed Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace and Interior Secretary Harold Ickes backed his proposals. See also “Tin Tintype,” Uncensored 46 (17 August 1940): 4-5. Hanighen privately reported that “the tin smelter people" wanted too much government money to es­ tablish their plants. Frank Hanighen to Sidney Hertzberg, ca. July 1940, Hertzberg Papers. “Our Tin Supply," CT, 13 August 1940,10, also suggested building smelting plants in Bolivia. 25. Taft, CR, 19 September 1940,11,846. 26. “America Incorporated," Uncensored 40 (6 July 1940): 4; La Follette, CR, 24 February 1940, 1306; MacLiesh and Reynolds, Strategy, 48. For manganese, see also Downey, CR, 6 October 1939,172. 27. Chavez, 25 October 1939, CR, 825; Chavez, radio speech, NBC, 11 August 1940, in CR, A4923; Taft, CR, 10 September 1940,11846.

Notes to Pages 142-144

409

28. Beals quoted in M Carleton Beals” in C urrent Biography, 1941,60-62. For a scholarly biography, see John A. Britton, C arkton Beals: A Radical Journalist in Latin America (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1987). 29. For endorsement of Beals's work, see AFC Research Bureau, “All-Out Aid for the Western Hemisphere,” D id You Know? 23B (22 September 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 181-82; Norman Thomas, testimony, HFAC, 22 January 1941,338; Nicholas Broughton, “Books in a World at War,” Peace Action 7 (December 1940): 7; Harry Elmer Barnes, N Y W T , 17 April 1940,22; memorandum introduced by Nye, CR, 9 November 1941,8616. For critical reviews accusing him of being insufficiendy aware of the Nazi menace, see Samuel Putnam, “Two Hearts That Beat as One,” New Masses 39 (27 May 1941): 21-22; Samuel Guy Inman, N ew York Herald Tribune Book Review, 8 December 1940,6. Economist Peter F. Drucker accused Beals of adopting the very economic imperialism be claimed to be con­ demning. “A Policy for the Americas,” Saturday Review o f Literature 33 (21 December 1940): 14. 30. See, for example, Sterling Morton, interview, Midsummer Industrial Conference, Illinois In­ dustrial Council, Green Lake, Wisconsin, 22 August 1940, Morton Papers; Dennis, WFL 100 (27 June 1940): 5-6; Casde,“What about the Monroe Doctrine Now?” Saturday Evening Post 213 (27 July 1940): 38; Knutson, CR, 5 January 1941,591; B. C. Clark, CR, 18 February 1941,1099; Libby, “Which Way to the Brave New World?” Peace Action 6 (July 1940): 2; Taft, CR, 10 September 1940,11,846; Hoover quoted by Libby, Peace Action 9 (October 1940): 1; AFC Research Bureau, “The Economics of Hemi­ sphere Defense,” D id You Know? 23A (19 September 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 175-76; historian Arthur May, This Bewildering Democracy: Reflections on Am erican Foreign Policy (pamphlet; Rochester, N.Y.: privately printed, 1941 ), 14; MacLiesh and Reynolds, Strategy, 44-45; “Beef and the Axis,” N YD N , 22 March 1941,15; Flynn, “Other's People's Money: South American Bubble,” N ew Republic 101 (25 October 1939): 339. 31. “America Incorporated,” Uncensored 40 (6 July 1940): 3; Lewis, [Dartmouth College] The D art­ m outh, 9 January 1941,1. 32. Wood, “Our Foreign Policy,” A6302; “Wine, Lace and War,” N YD N , 25 January 1941,15; “South American Trade after the War,” N YD N , 21 April 1941,23. 33. Baldwin, “Wanted: A Plan for Defense,” Harper's M agazine 181 (August 1940): 231; Kennedy, tes­ timony, HFAC, 21 January 1941,294; “South American lYade after the War,” N YD N , 21 April 1941,23. 34. See, for example, Mundt, CR, 21 April 1941, A1823; Nicholas Broughton, “America in a Hostile World,” Scribner's Com m entator 9 (November 1940): 7; D. W. Clark, CR, 24 February 1941, 12%; Charles A. Lindbergh, testimony, HFAC, 23 January 1941, 434; Beals, Pan America, 514; “The Latin American Trade Crisis,” CT, 7 April 1941,14; “Common Sense in Latin America,” CT, 13 September 1940, 8; “Hider’s Speech,” N YD N , 12 December 1940, 39; Hoover, “Our Future Economic Prepared­ ness,” 18 September 1940, in Vital Speeches 7 (15 November 1940): 94; Norman Thomas, testimony, SFRC, 27 January 1941,297; Howard, America and a New World Order, 86-91; Flynn, Washington D aily News, 25 July 1940; Flynn, “Other People's Money: An American Bubble,” New Republic 101 (25 Octo­ ber 1939): 339; Castle, address to Worcester Foreign Policy Association, 14 May 1940, in CR, A2999; Morton, speech. National Small Businessmen’s Association, Chicago, 12 August 1940. 35. Dennis, WFL 111 (12 September 1940): 4; [Lawrence Dennis],“The Economic Consequences of American Intervention,” unpublished manuscript [1941], in Doenecke, IDU, 201-2. In July 1940, Hider did order the resumption of a huge “blue-water” naval construction program. By fall, he tabled the program to concentrate on the forthcoming war against the Soviets. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II, 199. 36. Haglund, Latin America, 137; Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 104. 37. Roosevelt to William Allen White, 14 December 1939, F.D.R.; His Personal Letters, %8; Roo­ sevelt, text of address, N YT, 28 May 1941,2. 38. Hull, address, text, N Y T , 19 May 1941,1,2; Bullitt, “What Next?” Life, 21 April 1941,95,97; Lippmann, “The Economic Consequences of a German Victory,” Life 9 (22 July 1940): 64-69; Thompson, “World Germanica,” Reader's Digest 37 (July 1940): 115-18. See also historian Allan Nevins, “Facing the Nazi Revolution,” Reader's Digest 37 (August 1940): 63-66; Wendell Willkie, “Americans, Stop Being Afraid!” Collier's 107 (10 May 1941): 65. Many such positions are summarized in Patrick J. Hearden,

410

Notes to Pages 144-146

Roosevelt Confronts Hitler: America's Entry into World War II (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1987), and Paul A. Varg, “The Coming of the War with Germany,” Centennial Review 20 (Fall 1976): 219-27. 39. Fortune poll, Cantril, Public O pinion, 1120. For related polls, see 1129-20. 40. Miller, You C a n t Do Business, 87,135-36, 205-11; quotation, 167. 41. Crowther,“We Don't Have To,” in CR, 6 November 1941,8565-66. For favorable reviews, see Gus­ tav Stolper, Viennese economist and former member of the German Reichstag, Yale Review 2 \ (Autumn 1941 ): 182; William L Shirer, Saturday Review o f Literature 24 (5 July 1941 ): 7. For negative reaction, see Stuart Chase, “Must We Fight for Our Foreign Trade?” Progressive, 26 July 1941, 5; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine: Imperialism Rampant,” Gift 16 August 1941,5; Pettengill, “Post War Trade,” Re­ lease 275, 7 August 1941, Box 11, Pettengill Papers; AFC Philadelphia chapter, The Voice o f the People, 6 October 1941; Social Justice, 15 September 1941, II; Wheeler, CR, 6 November 1941,8565; Nock, review, Scribner's Commentator 11 (November 1941 ): 82-83; John Cudahy to Claude Pepper [copy], 15 October 1941, Flynn Papers; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine,” Gift 16 August 1941,5. 42. fonathan Utley, Going to War w ith Japan, 1937-1941 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985), 85,86. 43. Moley, “Perspective: Why We Help England,” Newsweek, 3 February 1941,60. See also Sena­ tor La Follette, CR, 29 October 1941, 8322; Norman Thomas to Alfred P. Perkins, lune 2, 1941, Thomas Papers. 44. Thorpe, “National Defense for War? For Pfeace?” Nation's Business 29 (February 1941): 13; Taft, “Shall the United Sûtes Enter the European War?” radio address, 17 May 1941, in CR, A2344—45. See also Robert M. Hutchins, “America Has a Choice,” Progressive, 31 May 1941,9. 45. Boeckel, “Lend-Lease Misses the Bus,” Peace Action 7 (February 1941): 5; Kennedy, testimony, HFAC, 20 January 1941, 236. Senator George Aiken saw postwar agricultural markets as being de­ stroyed beyond repair. CR, 25 February 1941,1362. 46. See, for example, political scientist Landrum Bolling, Brown [University] D aily Herald, 23 No­ vember 1939, 1; Bulow, CR, 21 February 1941, 1254; Stuart Chase, “Must We Fight for Our Foreign Trade?" Progressive, 26 July 1941, 5. 47. For under 8 percent, see Ludlow, CR, 16 October 1939, 487. For under 7 percent, see Freda Utley, “How Could We Combat a Hitler-Dominated Europe?” American Forum o f the A ir 3 (16 No­ vember 1941 ): 5. For 7 percent, see General Wood, interview with Kenneth Crawford, PM, 25 May 1941, 5; Hoover, “A Call to Reason,” speech, Chicago, 29 June 1941, in Addresses, 1940-1941,96. For 5 percent, John Chamberlain, The American Stakes (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1940), 152. See also Joseph P. Kennedy, speech at Oglethorpe University, 24 May 1941, in CR, A2492; farm editor Wheeler McMillen, “Hitler: Economic Threat?” Scribner's Com m entator 9 (March 1941): 29. For 3 percent, see Nye, Bryn M awr College News, 1 May 1941, 4. See also George Peek, address entered in CR, 21 July 1941, A3528. 48. Kennedy, CR, A2492; Wood, Crawford interview, 5; Emeny, testimony, HFAC, 22 January 1941,466. 49. Peek said that rubber accounted for 12 percent of U.S. imports; tin, 5.1 percent; coffee, 5 per­ cent; raw silk, 4.9 percent; cane sugar, 4.5 percent; newspaper print, 4.9 percent; and all other items, no more than 3 percent, except wool, which was 3.3 percent. Peek noted the possibility of producing sub­ stitutes, claiming that the United States could produce its own rubber, that rayon and nylon could re­ place silk, and that the United States was preparing itself to smelt tin from ore coming from Latin America. Address, in CR, 21 July 1941, A3528. 50. Flynn, SFN, 9 June 1941,14; 9 August 1940,22. In the 9 August column, he also warned against intervention and claimed that the United States had the option of economic isolation. 51. Chase, [Dartmouth College] The D artm outh, 10 October 1940,1; “We Can Get Along Alone,” Progressive, 9 August 1941,9. See also Chase, “Autarchy,” Progressive, 23 August 1941,5. For examples of anti-interventionist endorsement of Chase, see Barnes, “Keep Out of War and Investigate the WarMongers” [draft], 56, Box 252, Lundeen Papers; Chamberlain, American Stakes, 150; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine,” Call, 4 November 1939,3.

Notes to Pages 146-147

411

52. Hoover, “A Call to Reason,” Chicago, 29 June 1941, in Addresses, 1940-1941, 96; “Our Future Economic Defense,” 18 September 1940, in Addresses, 1940-1941, 22. See also speech to Republican National Convention, 25 June 1940, in Addresses, 1940-1941,221. 53. Lodge, CR, 10 February 1941,825; Peek, address, entered in CR, 21 July 1941, A3528; [Dennis], “The Economics of American Intervention” [1941], in Doenecke, 1DU, 204-5. See also Herbert Hoover, journal of Raymond Moley, 11 June 1940, Moley Papers. 54. Flynn, SFN, 24 September 1940,14. See also Chodorov, “Germany: Economic Threat?” Scrib­ ner's Com m entator 9 (March 1941): 34. 55. Flynn, “Nazi Economy: A Threat?” Scribner's C om m entator 10 (August 1941): 21. For skeptical comments about the use of gold in commerce, see “Is Uncle Sam Gold-Poor?” Christian C entury 57 (7 August 1940): 965; Danaher, CR, 25 August 1940, A5662; Norman Thomas, testimony, SFRC, 3 Feb­ ruary 1941,292. For a pro-gold position, see Ralph Townsend, Seeking Foreign Trouble (pamphlet; San Francisco: privately printed, 1940), 18. 56. The manuscript was read in draft by William R. Castle, Hoover’s undersecretary of state; inter­ national lawyer John Foster Dulles; and James Mooney, head of General Motors Export Corporation and advocate of a negotiated peace in Europe. Major General James G. Harbord, board chairman of the Radio Corporation of America and chief of staff to General John J. Pershing during World War 1, wrote the foreword. 57. For endorsements, see Scribner's C om m entator 10 (July 1941): 59; Page Hufty, “America First Book List,” AFC Bulletin 476 (7 August 1941), in Doenecke, 1DU, 121; Neilson, entry of 6 June 1941, Tragedy, 2:362; Norman Thomas to Graeme Howard, 4 October 1940, Thomas Papers; Porter Sargent to Norman Thomas, 11 October 1940, Thomas Papers; Castle Diary, 30 July 1940; Robert E. Wood, “American Foreign Policy Today,” in We Testify, ed. Doris Fielding Reid and Nancy Schoonmaker (New York: Smith 8cDurrell, 1941), 111; Moley, “Perspective: World Trade and the Future,” Newsweek, 9 June 1941,72. For more critical reactions, see political scientist Elizabeth M. Lynskey, “America's Part,” Com­ monweal 33 (7 February 1941): 402-4; Nicholas Broughton, “Books in a World at War,” Peace Action 7 (October 1940): 7. Interventionist political scientist Robert Strausz-Hupé found the work thoughtful but questioned whether tranquillity could exist among the large power blocs. “Brave New World Order,” Current H istory and Forum 52 (24 December 1940): 24. 58. Howard, America and a New W orld Order, quotations respectively on 79,115,107,109. 59. See, for example, Peek, address, in CR, 21 July 1941, A3258; Hanford MacNider, testimony, HFAC, 22 January 1941,359; Taft, speech at Vienna, Illinois, 30 September 1939, in CR, A76; Taft, “Pre­ paredness and Peace,” speech at St. Louis, 20 May 1940, in CR, A3178; Taft, CR, 22 February 1941,1282; Robert E. Wood, “Our Foreign Policy,” A6302; “A World Divided,” N YD N , 12 May 1941,19; press re­ lease, Lundeen speech in honor of Duke Saxe-Coburg, Washington, D.C., 20 March 1940, Box 306, Lundeen Papers; Nye, speech, CBS, 21 June 1941, in CR, A307; Cudahy cited in Long, entry of 16 Au­ gust 1940, War D iary, 123; Charles A. Lindbergh, “Speech Appealing for Peace Plea to Europe,” N YT, 5 August 1940,6. 60. Johnson, Hell Bentfo r War, 97-100. See also Verne Marshall, debate,“Aid to Britain: Give, Lend, or Withhold?” New England Town Meeting of the Air, 16 January 1941, Verne Marshall Papers; Nye, speech, CBS, 21 June 1941, in CR, A3075; Yale economist Richard Bissell, Yale D aily News, 16 October 1940,1; Amos Pinchot to Burton K. Wheeler, 19 May 1941, Pinchot Papers; Wood, “Our Foreign Policy,” A6302; Flynn, SFN, 9 August 1940,22; Freda Utley, “How Could We Combat a Hitler-Dominated Europe?” 5. 61. Peek, address, in CR, 21 July 1941, A3527-28. 62. Flynn, SFN, 10 June 1941, 14; “Nazi Economy: A Threat?” Scribner's Com m entator 9 (August 1941): 19-26. 63. See, for example, Nye, speech, CBS, 21 June 1941, in CR, A3075; Flynn, “Nazi Economy: A Threat?” 22; Broughton, “America in a Hostile World,” Scribner's C om m entator 9 (November 1940): 72; Chodorov, “Germany: Economic Threat?” Scribner's C om m entator 9 (March 1941 ): 33-34. Emeny, tes­ timony, HFAC, 22 January 1941,466. 64. Cleona Lewis, N azi G erm any and World Trade (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1941 ). For an endorsement of Lewis’s study, see Anti-War News Service, “The Economic ‘Menace* of Nazism,”

412

Notes to Pages 148-150

Call, 13 September 1941,6. Commenting on the study, Newswedlrclaimed that isolationists were justi­ fied in pointing to it with pleasure. 23 June 1941,40. 65. AFC Research Bureau, “Buy or Die,” D id You Know? 6 (5 July 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 159-63. 66. AFC Research Bureau, "Swastika over Sickle,” D id You Know? 15 (1 August 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 164-68. 67. Broughton, "America in a Hostile World,” 72. See also Nye, CT, 17 June 1941. 68. For the interventionist argument, see Livingstone Hartley and Donald C Blaisdell, "Wages in Conquered Countries,” CDAAA, Washington Office Inform ation Letter 22 (13 June 1941): 3-4, Box 35, CDAAA Papers. For example of opposition, see Norman Thomas, [University of Wisconsin] D aily Cardinal, 27 May 1941,1. 69. See, for example, William Henry Chamberlin, "War: Short Cut to Fascism,” Am erican M ercury 51 (December 1940): 398; Barry, CR, 160ctober 1941,7965; Peek, address, in CR, 21 July 1941,A3528; Philip La Follette, testimony, 3 February 1941, SFRC, 269; Vorys, address, Charlottesville, Institute of Public Affairs, 24 June 1941, in CR, A3101; Norman Thomas, "Your World and Mine: Into War through Hysteria,” Call, 7 June 1941, 8; Wheeler, address, Indianapolis, 28 May 1941, in CR, A2628; Freda Utley, "How Could We Combat a Hitler-Dominated Europe?” 5. Utley did assert that in prod­ ucts involving unskilled labor, such as timber produced by concentration camps, the Soviets could un­ dersell the West. 70. Chodorov, "Germany: Economic Threat?” Scribner's C om m entator 9 (March 1941): 33. 71. "All America,” Uncensored 67 (11 January 1941): 2-3. As far as percentages went, the United States produced 30 percent of the world’s iron ore, 32 percent of the copper ore, 22 percent of the lead, 30 per­ cent of the zinc, 62 percent of the petroleum, 50 percent of the cotton, and 34 percent of the coal It also produced three-fifths of the world’s oil, at least a third of the world’s electric power, and generated at least half of the world’s total horsepower. See also Amos Pinchot to Renee von Eulenburg-Wiener, 10 October 1941, Pinchot Papers. For Roosevelt’s address, see CR, 6 January 1941,45. 72. See, for example, Hugh Johnson, "Anchors Away,” Saturday Evening Post 213 (5 October 1940): 778; "Tin Tintype,” Uncensored 46 (17 August 1940): 5; Flynn, SFN, 25 February 1941,15; McCormick, "Today the Strongest Nation in the World,” CT, 13 October 1940, graphic section, 5; MacLiesh and Reynolds, 12; AFC Research Bureau, "The All-American Front,” D id You Know? 17 (8 August 1941 ), in Doenecke, IDU, 169-73; AFC Speakers Bureau, "What Strategic Materials Do We Lack in the United States?” [undated 1941], in Doenecke, IDU, 156-57; "The Strategic Materials”; "How Self-Sufficient Are We?” Peace Action 7 (March 1941): 6. Peace A ction cited the statement of Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones, as reported in N Y T , 20 February 1941,35, and the report of industrialist Edward Stettinius of the National Defense Advisory Commission, NYT, 14 July 1940,1,14, in which both spoke of do­ mestic developments in tin, magnesium, and rubber. 73. Robert M. Hathaway, "1933-1945: Economic Diplomacy in a Time of Crisis,” in Economics and World Power: A n Assessment o f Am erican Diplom acy since 1789, ed. William H. Becker and Samuel F. Welles (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 303; Jeff Frieden, "Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988): 64. 74. Stockpiling, Jonathan Marshall, To Have and Have Not: Southeast Asian Raw M aterials and the O ri­ gins o f the Pacific War (Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1995), chap. 2; RFC, Mira Wilkins, The M a­ turing o f M ultinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge, Mass.: Har­ vard University Press, 1974), 253-55; Roosevelt and Welles, Eckes, Global Struggle, 99. 75. Utley, Going to War w ith Japan, 85.

CHAPTER 10: WAR, PEACE, A N D ELECTIONS

1. Churchill to Roosevelt, 15 May 1940, in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 1:37; Lee, entry of 4 August 1940, London Journal, 29; Gilbert, Churchill, 6:408; Ponting, 1 940,161. 2. Lee, entry of 5 September 1940, London Journal, 44; Gilbert, Churchill, 6:811. See also Lee, entry of 15 September 1940, London Journal, 58; 4 October 1940,78.

Notes to Pages 150-152

3. 4. 5. 6.

413

Lee, entry of 24 June 1940, London Journal* 6; 15 July 1940,16; 18 July 1940,18. Leutze, Bargaining, 96. Berle, entry of 6 September 1940, Navigating* 334. See also 30 September 1940,338. Berle, entry of 21 September 1940, Navigating, 336; Bullitt in entry of Ickes, 22 September 1940, Secret Diary* 3:329. 7. Fortune in Cantril, Public O pinion* 1186. Thirty percent predicted a British victory. See also “What the U.S.A. Thinks,” Life* 29 July 1940,20, in which 56 percent predicted a German victory and just over 33 percent said the United States should surrender in the face of defeat. For related polls, which sporadically showed optimism concerning Britain, see Cantril, Public O pinion* 1186-87. 8. Fortune poll, Cantril, Public Opinion* 1108. 9. Life* 10 June 1940,28; “The Defense of Britain,” 15 July 1940,17-23. 10. Sterling Morton to Ralph Church, 16 May 1940, Morton Papers; Joseph P. Kennedy to Cordell Hull, 27 May 1940, in Foreign Relations* 1940* 1:233; Kennedy in Koskoff, Kennedy* 257. For Kennedy’s general pessimism, see Whalen, Founding Father* chaps. 17-20; Koskoff, Kennedy* 210-316; Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt* 190-243. 11. See, for example, Williams, “Real Scrap Coming!” 28 May 1940; “Key to Invasion,” 19 June 1940; “England by Fall,” 25 June 1940; “Two Gladiators,” 10 July 1940; “People’s War,” 22 July 1940, in Williams Pamphlets. 12. Williams, “Vital Lessons,” 7 August 1940, in Williams Pamphlets. 13. Dennis, WFL 105 (1 August 1940): 2. See also 98 (13 June 1940): 5; 101, (3 July 1940): 1-2. 14. Hear$t,“In the News,” SFE* 24 June 1940,1. The publisher even said Britain could cause a little trouble on its own. If it still wanted to fight, Hearst suggested that it could blockade Italy, stiffen Balkan resistance, and find a “true war leader” such as Lloyd George or former war secretary Leslie Hore-Belisha. See SFE* 6 May 1940,1. 15. “An Overseas Army Needs Docks,” CT* 16 June 1940,14. For slightly more caution, see “Italy Enters the War,” CT* 11 June 1940,14. 16. McCormick, broadcast of 30 June 1940, in Addresses* 14-15. 17. “The Battle of Britain Begins,” NYDN* 24 July 1940,27. For a slightly more pessimistic estimate, see “Mahan Revised,” 1 July 1940,25; “War Jitters,” 1 August 1940,25; “Blitzkrieg on Britain,” 13 Au­ gust 1940,21; “50-50,” 13 September 1940,33. 18. Taft, “Peace and Preparedness,” 20 May 1940, in CR* A3148. For other Taft claims along this line, see CR, 22 February 1941,1282; “Shall the United Sûtes Enter the European War?” radio address, 17 May 1941, in CR* A2344. 19. Johnson column, entered in CR* 13 June 1940, A4141; Flynn, CR* 8 May 1940, 14. See also Flynn, CR* 26 June 1940,16. 20. Baldwin, “Wanted: A Plan of Defense,” Harper's M agazine 181 (August 1940): 231. 21. See, for example, Herbert Hoover to John C. O’Laughlin, 15 August 1940, Sunford Files; Hugh Johnson, SFN* 27 August 1940,19; Castle Diary, 14 September 1940; Charles A. Lindbergh in Castle Diary, 9 September 1940; General Wood, “Our Foreign Policy,” speech to Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, 4 October 1940, in CR* 6301. 22. Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 12 September 1940,1. In October, Hearst claimed that the Axis in­ vasion of England was “off” for good. SFE, 12 October 1940,15. 23. “The Coming Test of Air War,” CT* 6 September 1940,12; “Bombing Ranges,” 22 September 1940,16. See also “News from England,” 29 September 1940,14. 24. “Another War Winter,” N YD N *3 October 1940,21. See also “What Would Napoleon Do Now?” CT, 7 October 1940,10; “The Air Forces,” CT, 6 December 1940,16. 25. Howe, radio script, 4 October 1940, Jessup Papers. 26. Sterling Morton, “Let's Think This Matter Through” [pamphlet], in CR, 21 February 1941,787; Landon, “Stand by the Neutrality Act,” speech to Kansas City Cooperative Club, 26 November 1940, in CR* A6737. See also “Germans in Rumania,” CT, 13 October 1940,18; “Trying to Crack Hitler's Em­ pire,” CT, 26 November 1940,11; “Rumanian Preview of Europe,” CT, 25 January 1941,8.

414

Notes to Pages 152-154

27. “Hitler in Control of Europe," CT, 23 November 1940,8. For further optimism, see “The War Against Shipping," CT, 11 December 1940,16; “The Italian Front," CT, 8 December 1940,26. 28. Villard, “How Long Can Europe Endure?" Christian Century 57 (2 October 1940): 1207. See also Villard, “How Long Can England Stand It?” Progressive, 21 September 1940,6. For a similar reference to the winter, see Morley Diary, 20 October 1940; “As theWar Goes intoWinter," CT, November 27,1940,12. 29. Villard, “Will Hitler Invade America?" C hristian C entury 57 (23 October 1940): 1313. 30. Leutze, Bargaining 188. 31. Libby to executive board, NCPW, 18 September 1940, NCPW Papers; Castle Diary, 9 Septem­ ber 1940; Taft, CR, 14 August 1940,10,307; Johnson, SFN, 28 September 1940,14; Dennis, WFL 102 (11 July 1940): 1-3; 103 (18 July 1940): 3-4; 106 (8 August 1940): 1-2; 107 (15 August 1940): 2. For another prediction of social revolution, see Social Justice, 14 October 1940,3. For general pessimism, see “The Outlook for Britain," Christian C entury 57 (3 July 1940): 844. 32. “Gibraltar, Greece and the Blitzkrieg," N YD N , 22 August 1940, 29; C. Hartley Grattan, “If Britain Goes Under: A Speculation," N ew Republic 103 (1 July 1940): 20. 33. Hoover, “Our Future Economic Defense," 18 September 1940, Addresses, 1940-1941,15. See also John Haynes Holmes, sermon, 29 September 1940, in CR, A6061; Dennis, WFL 112 (19 September 1940): 5; Social Justice, 16 September 1940,3. 34. “Defeat at Dakar," N YD N , 27 September 1940, 37. See also Social Justice, 7 October 1940, 3; Kennedy to Hull, 27 September 1940, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. 3: British Commonwealth (Wash­ ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), 48-49. 35. See, for example, Morley Diary, 20 October 1940; Dennis, WFL 114 (3 October 1940): 3-4; 118 (31 October 1940): 3; 117 (24 October 1940): 2; 120 (14 November 1940): 4. 36. Anne Morrow Lindbergh to Robert E. Wood, 130ctober 1940, Wood Papers; “Hold'Em, Lion," N YD N , 4 October 1940, 37; “What Would Napoleon Do Now?” CT, 7 October 1940, 10. See also “Where Is Hitler Going Next?" N YD N , 28 December 1940,13. Mention was made of Salonika, the Dar­ danelles, Istanbul, and Rumania. 37. Lindbergh, entry of 3 November 1940, W artim e Journals, 412. See also Lindbergh, testimony, HFAC, 23 January 1941,398. 38. Charles A. Lindbergh to Robert E. Wood, 12 November 1940, Wood Papers. For stress on the heavy impact of German bombing, see “Kriegsozialismus," N ew Masses 37 (22 October 1940): 22; So­ ria/ Justice, 7 October 1940,3; Social Justice, 9 December 1940,3. 39. Libby, [University of] California [Los Angeles] D aily Bruin, 4 December 1940,1; memorandum of conversation, 22 December 1940, HHPL “Air Invasion of England," CT, 31 December 1940,6. 40. See, for example, William Henry Chamberlin, “The Coming Peace," Am erican M ercury 51 (No­ vember 1940): 267; Amos Pinchot to Edgar J. Cook, 28 November 1940, Pinchot Papers; “The Air Forces,” CT, 6 December 1940,16; “Loss from Air Bombing," CT, 10 December 1940,16; “How Long a War?” CT, 21 December 1940,10; Robert E. Wood to J. H. Meyer, 12 September 1940, Box 286, AFC Papers; “The Big Picture," Uncensored 63 (14 December 1940): 5. 41. “How Long a War?" CT, 21 December 1940,10; Oswald Garrison Villard to Philip Bernstein, 4 December 1940, Villard Papers. 42. Rock, Chamberlain and Roosevelt, 278; Fulton Oursler Jr., “Secret TYeason," Am erican Heritage 42 (December 1991): 52-76. 43. FOR Council, 20 April 1940, Fellowship 6 (May 1940): 74; minutes, WIL annual meeting, 27-30 April 1940, Pittsburgh, 1, WIL Papers; Federal Council, “The Churches and the World Situation," Peace Action 6 (April 1940): 6; Libby, “Chaco Mediation Points Way Now," Peace Action 6 (April 1940): 3; “What Can America Do for Peace?” Christian C entury 57 (15 May 1940): 631. 44. “The Wisdom of Pius XII," NYD N, 7 May 1940,27. For Pius's statement, see N YT, 6 May 1940,2. 45. “Hitler and Napoleon,” N YD N , 14 April 1940,45. On 1 June, the News declared the Allies “well advised" to make a negotiated peace before Hitler “starts slashing France to pieces as he did Belgium and Holland." As Hitler was fifty-one years old, it added, he could not last forever. See “Roll Up That Map,” 1 June 1940,13. 46. See, for example, John O’Brien, Social Justice, 3 April 1940,10; Hearst, “In the News," SFE, 17 April 1940,2; Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 24 June 1940,1.

Notes to Pages 154-156

415

47. Robert Bendiner, “Men Who Would Be President: Burton K. Wheeler” N ation 150 (27 April 1940): 536; Dennis, WFL 100 (27 June 1940): 4; 97 (6 June 1940): 2; Mooney, “War or Peace in Amer­ ica?” address to Case Alumni Association, University Club, Cleveland, 1 June 1940, in CR, A4057; Wal­ drop, “The Peace Balance Sheet,” W TH , 30 June 1940, C15. For similar optimism in June, see author Lincoln Colcord to Amos Pinchot, 28 June 1940, Pinchot Papers. 48. Albert W. Palmer, “The Road Away from War,” Christian C entury 57 (19 June 1940): 793. 49. “Democracy and Blitzkrieg,” Common Sense 9 (June 1940): 17. 50. Libby, “Early Mediation Can Save Civilization,” Peace Action 6 (April 1940): 2. 51. Hitler speech, text, N YT, 20 July 1940,4-5. 52. Halifax speech conveying British refusal, text, N YT, 23 July 1940,4. Halifax privately sought a German peace offer so as to gain time. If necessary both Halifax and Churchill would have agreed to a peace involving surrender of some British colonies, Mediterranean possessions, French overseas ter­ ritory, and possible de jure recognition of Hitler’s eastern conquests, although not conceding the British navy, air force, independence, or ability to wage a future war. Roberts, H oly Fox, 181,214. 53. Reynolds, Creation, 105; Kimball, Forged in War, 54-55. 54. David Reynolds, “Churchill and the British Decision,” 159-62. 55. Gallup poll, 20 July 1940, Cantril, Public O pinion, 1136. The breakdown: 70 percent for contin­ ued fighting, 22 percent for making peace. 56. Villard, “Should Britain Talk Peace?” Christian C entury 57 (31 July 1940): 946; “Hopes of Peace,” N YD N , 17 July 1940,31. See also “Negotiated Peace Is the Alternative,” Peace Action 6 (July 1940): 2. 57. Lindbergh, entry of 20 July 1940, War W ithin, 129. 58. “Hitler’s Peace,” CT, 22 July 1940,10. 59. See, for example, Norman Thomas to H. L Green, 3 July 1940, Thomas Papers; Norman Thomas to S. K. Ratcliffe, 8 October 1940, Thomas Papers; Thomas, testimony, HFAC, 22 January 1941,320; Lindbergh, speech of 4 August 1940, “Radio Addresses,” 18; Social Justice, 7 October 1940, 3; WIL Executive Board, minutes, 18 December 1940, WIL Papers. 60. “Christmas Truce—Why Not?" N YD N , 5 December 1940, 39; “The Pope Prays for Peace,” N YD N , 3 October 1940,21; “The Wisdom of the Pöpe,” N YD N , 26 November 1940,32; Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 25 July 1940,9; Wood, N Y T , 12 December 1940, 18; Wood, CT, 12 December 1940, 1; Wood, “America First,” Time, 23 December 1940,13; Frederick J. Libby to Harry Emerson Fosdick, 19 December 1940, NCPW Papers. The Chicago Tribune thought that Roosevelt himself might be dis­ qualified. See “Peace by Spring or What?” 15 December 1940,18. 61. Wood, speech to Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 4 October 1940, in CR, A6302. The Chicago Tribune endorsed the speech. “A Negotiated Peace,” 19 October 1940,12. In November, Joseph P. Kennedy told Herbert Hoover that two months earlier Germany had offered Britain a peace based on “full maintenance of their empire, fleet, and everything else,” although the Germans could, in Hoover's words, “make the entire Continental settlement without interference from the British.” Mem­ orandum, Hoover-Kennedy conversation, 22 November 1940, Hoover Papers. 62. Wood, CT, 12 December 1940,1. 63. Robert E. Wood to Roy Howard, 14 December 1940, Wood Papers; Robert E. Wood to Horace Bowker, 19 December 1940, Box 22, the Papers of the Fight for Freedom Committee, Princeton Uni­ versity. See also Wood to Sterling Morton, 13 May 1941, Morton Papers; Wood to R. J. Finegan, 22 Jan­ uary 1941, Box 292, AFC Papers. In July 1941, Wood was more detailed. He endorsed the restoration of the Netherlands, France, Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Finland; denied that Czechoslovakia, Lux­ embourg, and Austria could be restored; and feigned ignorance about Poland, Yugoslavia, Estonia, and Latvia. Peace, he said, would be more sound if some smaller, economically unsound nations “were eliminated.” Robert E. Wood to B. E. Maidenberg, 11 July 1941, AFC Papers. 64. Chamberlin Diary, 12 December 1940; “War to What End?” CT, 25 December 1940,16; John Chamberlain to Mark Prentiss, 30 December 1940, in Doenecke, IDU, 220. 65. Morley Diary, 21 June 1940; 4 July 1940; 20 and 27 October 1940. Conversely, Dennis saw the British “lower classes” as the more restive element. WFL 102 (11 July 1940): 3. 66. In September, Castle, Lindbergh, and Cudahy all said privately they hoped Britain might somehow win, but they feared that a decisive victory would mean the wiping out of Germany and

416

Notes to Pages 156-157

general Bolshevism throughout Europe. Castle Diary, 20 September 1940. For Cudahy's claim that a German victory would bring no disadvantage to the United States, see Breckinridge Long, entry of 16 August 1940, War D iary , 123. For Moore, see John Bassett Moore to Nicholas F. Lenssen, 7 May 1940, Moore Papers. 67. Allen, “Peace Negotiations or War to the Death?" C hristian C entury 57 (30 October 1940): 1333. Hitler’s terms supposedly included German control of all conquered territory in Europe, English dom­ ination of French colonies, a common military move against Russia, German economic control of Latin America, and North America as Britain’s economic sphere. 68. Amos Pinchot to Edgar J. Cook, 28 November 1940, Pinchot Papers; Joseph P. Kennedy in memorandum of Hoover-Kennedy conversation, 11 November 1940, Hoover Papers; Herbert Hoover in Castle Diary, 21 September 1940. Castle concurred. For Kennedy Lloyd George, see Long, entry of 6 November 1940, War D airy , 147. 69. Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 21 December 1940, Borchard Papers; “The Big Pic­ ture," Uncensored 63 (14 December 1940): 5. 70. Alexander, CR, 4 October 1940, 13,223; Alexander, radio broadcast, Mutual station WOL, 16 December 1940, in CR, A6912. For endorsements, see William B. Lloyd Jr., director of the Campaign for World Government, to Senator Rush Holt, 2 December 1940, in CR, A6807-8; Libby, “Why No Pre­ paredness for Peace?" Peace Action 7 (November 1940): 1; WIL National Board meeting, resolutions, 30 October-1 November 1940, Washington, D.C., 3. Congressman Rich, in concurring, said only a new U.S. president, one “who can take a position whereby the people of the world will have confidence in him and faith in him," could take such action. CR, 4 October 1940,13,224. 71. Wheeler, speech, NBC, 30 December 1940, in CR, A7031; Wheeler, New sw eek 6 January 1941, 16. The same article reported that he was backed by senators Holt, Tydings, and Vandenberg. A few anti-interventionists were opposed. Philip Burnham, an editor of the Commonweal* stressed Hider’s untrustworthiness. “Peace and/or Appease—Senators," Commonweal 33 (10 January 1941): 293. The Trotskyist M ilitant claimed to concur with the Stalinist D aily Worker in declaring that Wheeler’s peace would be made on Hider’s terms. Moreover, it said Wheeler wanted FDR to encourage a war between Germany and Russia. J. W., “What Negotiated’ Peace Means," Militant* 5 May 1941,5. 72. I. F. Stone,“Munichman from Montana," Nation 152 (11 January 1941): 36. Wheelersaid besought to make his proposal before the United States attempted lend-lease. Washington D aily News* 11 January 1941. Possibly Wheeler had litde hope for his proposal, for he wrote Norman Thomas that he suggested the peace bid to “locus attention on the idea" that FDR was encouraging war. Burton K. Wheeler to Nor­ man Thomas, 24 January1941, Thomas Papers. In late February, Wheeler endorsed a British victory but hoped that a peace would introduce disarmament Wheeler, CR, 27 February 1941,1475. 73. Castle Diary, 14 April 1940; William Henry Chamberlin, “The Coming Peace," Am erican M er­ cury 51 (November 1940): 271. See also Dennis, WFL 122 (28 November 1940): 4. 74. Roosevelt, speech, 28 December 1940, in CR, A6992. 75. Libby, “President's Speech Alters None of These Facts," Peace Action 7 (December 1940): 3; Thomas, “Your World and Mine," Call* 11 January 1941,5; “We Go to War,” America 64 (11 January 1941): 379. For criticism of FDR, sec also“The President’s War,” C hristian C entury 58 (8 January 1941): 48; “If Not a Negotiated Peace,” C hristian C entury 58 (15 January 1941): 79. 76. “Up from Plenty," Time* 29 January 1940,22; Taft, “Peace and Preparedness," speech in St. Louis, 20 May 1940, in CR, A3177; Patterson, Taft, 217. 77. “Senator Taft Firm for Neutrality,” C hristian C entury 57 (12 June 1940): 756; Chester Bowles to Robert A. Taft, 28 May 1940, the Papers of Robert A. Taft, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as Taft Papers); Dennis, WFL 108 (24 August 1940): 4. Among the anti-interventionists for Taft were Ray­ mond Moley, George E. Sokolsky, Republican leaders John Hamilton and Mrs. Preston Davie, Con­ gressman J. Edgar Chenoweth (Colo.), Congressman Knutson, banker and former U.S. vice president Charles G. Dawes, Chicago businessman Kent Clow, and public relations executive James T. Selvage. See Boxes 62-76, Taft Papers. Hoover told Castle he found Taft the best candidate as far as intellect and honesty were concerned but lacking, in Castle’s paraphrase, a “fanatical corps who will direct and vi­ talize his campaign." Castle Diary, 20 April 1940. Castle himself favored Taft. Diary, 29 January 1940.

Notes to Pages 157-160

417

78. For details of the Dewey campaign, see Richard Norton Smith, Thom as E. Dewey and His Times (NewYork: Simon & Schuster, 1982), chap. 9; Barry K. Beyer, Thomas E Dewey, 1937-1947: A Study in Political Leadership (New York: Garland, 1979), chaps. 7 and 8. 79. “Newsgram—Tomorrow,” United States News, 19 April 1940,4; see also U nited States News, 26 April 1940,4. 80. Smith, Dewey, 298. 81. For Dewey speeches, see N Y T , 21 January 1940,32; 30 March 1940,8; 31 March 1940,7; 4 May 1940,18; 22 June 1940,11; 23 June 1940,2. 82. Among the anti-interventionists supporting Dewey were Colonel Theodore Roosevelt Jr. (SF E 13 April 1940,8); Oklahoma Republican leader Herbert K. Hyde (CT, 18 June 1940,13); and Hiram Johnson (John C. O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, 11 May 1940, Stanford Files; Hiram W. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson Jr., 4 July 1940, Johnson Papers). For the prominent role of one stanch anti-inter­ ventionist in the Dewey campaign, see Kristie Miller, Ruth H anna M cC orm ick A Life in Politics 1880-1944 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992), 257-79. 83. “Thomas E. Dewey,” N YD N , 14 June 1940, 29. See also M An Isolationist,” N YD N , 22 June 1940,13. 84. CT, 18 June 1940,12. See also uDewey,” CT, 22 June 1940,10. In a news story of 22 June, the Tribune's Washington correspondent Arthur Sears Henning called him the outstanding noninterven­ tionist in the field of Republican aspirants. See 9. 85. For negative comments, see Dennis, WFL 84 (7 March 1940): 6; Flynn, "Other People’s Money: The Republican Campaign Huddle,” New Republic 102 (8 April 1940): 472; Amos Pinchot to “Sir,” 19 March 1940, Pinchot Papers; Villard, “Issues and Men,” N ation 149 (19 August 1939): 197; Social Jus­ tice, 25 December 1939,5. 86. Castle Diary, 29 January 1940. Castle concurred with Longworth’s opposition. 87. Tompkins, Vandenberg, 176. Tompkins offers the best discussion of Vandenberg’s brief bid for the presidency. See 175-85. 88. Nye in Tompkins, Vandenberg, 178, 180; Flynn in Frey, “Flynn,” 183; Milton S. Mayer, “Men Who Would Be President: VI. Try to Find Vandenberg,” N ation 150 (11 May 1940): 587. 89. “Republican Politics,” N YD N , 26 November 1940,49; “Confidentially Washington Correspon­ dents Think—,” Look, 6 December 1939,4. Sec also Kenneth G. Crawford, “War and the Election,” N a­ tion 150 (10 February 1940): 163-64. 90. Roosevelt in Ickes, entry of 26 August 1939, Secret Diary, 2:707. 91. Melvin Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine, John L Lewis: A Biography (New York: Quadrangle, 1977), 351-52. For Hoover’s attempt to receive the nomination, see Best, Hoover, 1:120-22 plus chap. 5; Richard Norton Smith, Art Uncommon M an: The Trium ph o f Herbert Hoover (New York: Simon 8c Schuster, 1984), 281-86. 92. Amos Pinchot to Randolph Walker, 26 January 1940, Pinchot Papers. On Borah, see Frank Gan­ nett to James O’Malley, 24 January 1940, Gannett Papers. 93. For MacNider, see N Y T , 28 June 1940,3. For Barton, see Burke, N Y T , 7 February 1940,14. For Fish, see Troncone, “Fish,” 345-46; N YT, 25 February 1940,1. For Capper, see Social Justice, 24 April 1940,20. For Lindbergh, see Social Justice, 3 June 1940,1. 94. The best account of the entire Willkie campaign is found in Donald Bruce Johnson, W endell W illkie and the Republican Party (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), chaps. 2-4. 95. See, for example, N Y T , 5 May 1940,3; 12 May 1941,3; 29 May 1940,16; 19 June 1940,17. 96. McNary had opposed repeal of the arms embargo in 1939 but voted for conscription in 1940. 97. Vandenberg, undated entry, Private Papers, 5-6; Johnson, W illkie, 9; Patterson, Taft, 228. See also Dennis, WFL 115 (25 September 1940): 2; Best, Hoover, 1:164. Richard Norton Smith notes that Dewey and Vandenberg made overtures to Taft on the fifth ballot but were stymied by Willkie back­ ers. See Dewey, 313. 98. See, for example, “The Phenomenon of Wendell Willkie,” Christian C entury 57 (5 June 1940): 275; Norman Thomas to Wendell Willkie, 11 May 1940, Thomas Papers; Frank Hanighen, memo, 18 May 1940, Hertzberg Papers.

418

Notes to Pages 160-161

99. Johnson, Willkie, 77. The eight who signed the petition were Knutson, Mundt, Keefe, Woodruff, Cliff Clevenger (Ohio), George W. Gillie (Ind.), Stephen Bolleş (Wis.), and Earl Lewis (Ohio). 100. "Republican Platform of 1940,**in N ational Party Platforms, 2 vols., comp. Donald Bruce John­ son (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978), 1:390; Landon, Newsweek, 8 July 1940, 15; Best, Hoover, 1:163. 101. Mencken, Time, 1 July 1940,17. See also Norman Thomas to Alice Dodge, 8 July 1940, Thomas Papers; Dennis, WFL 100 (27 June 1940): 2; Social Justice, 8 July 1940,3; Flynn, “Other People's Money. The Republicans Steal FDR’s Issue," N ew Republic 103 (8 July 1940): 53-54; Wheeler, speech, American Anti-War Crusade, KAOWC, 30 June 1940, in CR, A4313; Edwin C Johnson, “A Plea for a Peace Plank," address at Chicago, 14 July 1940, in CR, A4497; “The Republican Platform," N YD N , 28 June 1940,27. 102. On London conference, China, air bases, and draft, see Willkie, acceptance speech, text, N Y T , 18 August 1940,3; on Britain, N Y T , 22 September 1940,1; on destroyer bases, NYT, 4 September 1940, 1,14; on FDR, Johnson, W illkie, 155. 103. See, for example, Casde Diary, 29 June 1940; “The Third Terma Bugaboo," C atholicW orld 152 (November 1940): 129-38; Hugh Johnson, “One Man’s Opinion," SFN, 19 June 1940,13; Congress­ man Charles Halleck (Ind.), speech. Republican National Convention, 27 July 1940, in CR, A4252; Sterling Morton to Chicago Herald-American, 28 September 1940, copy in Morton papers; Oswald Garrison Villard to Harry Elmer Barnes, 19 August 1940, Barnes Papers; Felix Morley, H averford [Col­ lege] News, 5 November 1940,6; novelist Kathleen Norris, SFE, 4 August 1940,14; “Text of John L Lewis’s Appeal for the Support of Wendell Willkie," N YT, 26 October 1940,12; Anne Morrow Lind­ bergh, entry of 28 June 1940, War W ithin, 119-20; Philip Jessup to Barton Leach Jr., 8August 1940, Jes­ sup Papers; John Bassett Moore to Hiram Johnson, 25 November 1940, Moore Papers. Among the prominent anti-interventionist Democrats endorsing Willkie were Senator Burke, a conservative de­ feated for renomination in 1940; former senator James A. Reed (Dem.-Mo.); former justice Daniel F. Cohalan of the NewYork Supreme Court; Alan Valentine, president of the University of Rochester; exgovernor William F. (“Alfalfa Bill") Murray of Oklahoma; and humorist Irvin S. Cobb. Newsweek, 29 July 1940,17-18. Additional bolters included Dean George H. Whipple of the University of Rochester medical school, a Nobel Prize winner (Newsweek, 5 August 1940, 17), and General Robert E. Wood (Newsweek, 16 September 1940,17). Among the American Writers for the Opposition or American Writers for Wendell Willkie, chaired by novelist Booth Tarkington, one found such anti-intervention­ ists as O. K. Armstrong, Bruce Barton, George T. Eggleston, George Sokolsky, and anthropologist and author Daniel Gregory Mason. Letterhead, Flynn Papers. 104. CT, 16 September 1940, 12; Social Justice, 4 November 1940, 1. For Willkie renunciation of Coughlin, see N Y T , 28 August 1940,1,12. 105. See, for example, “But Boake Carter Says," SFE, 9 October 1940, sect. SP, 5; Hearst, “In the News," SFE, 10 September 1940,1-2; Raymond Moley to John Bassett Moore, 26 July 1940, Moley Pa­ pers; “Foreign Policy in the Campaign," C hristian C entury 57 (23 October 1940): 1302-4; Charles A. Lindbergh and Arthur Vandenberg in Lindbergh, entry of 17 September 1940, W artim e Journals, 390; Herbert Hoover to John C. O’Laughlin, 3 September 1940, Stanford Files; Philip Burnham, “Man for the White House: Willkie," Commonweal 33 (1 November 1940): 44-47; “Wendell Willkie," America 63 (6 July 1940): 350; J. H. Gipson, president of Caxton printers, to Frederick J. Libby, 26 October 1940, NCPW Papers; Jay Hormel to Wendell Willkie [copy], 26 October 1940, Wood Papers; Amos Pinchot to Wendell Willkie, 9 October 1940, Pinchot Papers. An unsigned memo in the AFC Papers said that Flynn was not personally voting for Willkie but would give a broadcast on 3 November stressing the dangers of FDR getting the nation into war. No date, Box 282. See also Frey, “Flynn," 184; Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, “The Lesser Danger" (special supplement), Uncensored 57 (2 November 1940): 1. 106. Hiram W. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson Jr., 30 August 1940, Johnson Papers. 107. See, for example, insurance executive Asa V. Call to Hiram W. Johnson, 1 July 1940, Johnson Papers; “The Third World War," N YD N , 1 July 1940,35; John Bassett Moore to Edwin B. Borchard, 5 October 1940, Borchard Papers; Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 3 October 1940, Borchard Papers; “Mr. Willkie’s Speech," C hristian C entury 57 (28 August 1940): 1045-47; Harry Elmer Barnes, [George Washington University] Hatchet, 17 December 1940,1.

Notes to Pages 261-162

419

108. Wheeler, speech to Anti-War Crusade, KAOWC, 30 June 1940, in CR, A4312. 109. Sterling Morton to Kenneth McEwen, 10 May 1939, Morton Papers; Harry S. Ashmore, Un­ seasonable Truths: The Life o f Robert M aynard H utchins (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989), 207-9; Milton Mayer, Robert M aynard H utchins: A M em oir (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 209-12, 222. For additional treatment of Hutchins’s views, see Joseph E. Jaffe Jr.,tfIsolationism and Neutrality in Academe, 1938-1941,” Ph.D. diss., Case Western Reserve University, 1979, chaps 1-3. 110. For Kennedy, see Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt, 202-3; Koskoff, Kennedy, 234-37. For Gar­ ner, see Social Justice, 1 January 1940,20. For Farley, see Social Justice, 29 July 1940,6. Though he stu­ diously avoided comments on public policy, Farley later claimed to be an anti-interventionist. James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years (NewYork: Whittlesey House, 1948), 241. 111. Villard suggested Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, Agriculture Secretary Henry Wallace, Secre­ tary of State Cordell Hull, Joseph Eastman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Governor Her­ bert Lehman of NewYork, and Associate Justice William O. Douglas. Villard, “Issues and Men,” N ation 150 (2 March 1940): 310. 112. For the best work on Wheeler, see John Thomas Anderson, “Senator Burton K. Wheeler and United Sûtes Foreign Relations,” Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1982. For the Wheeler campaign, see Cole, Roosevelt, 385-88. 113. “Evolution of a Senator,” Time, 14 June 1940,15-16. 114. Burton K. Wheeler with Paul F. Healy, Yankee from the West (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), 363. 115. Wheeler’s view in Frank Hanighen to Sidney Hertzberg, 8 July [1940], Hertzberg Papers. 116. Wheeler, Yankee from the West, 366-88, to Bernard F. Donahoe, Private Plans and Public D an­ gers: The Story o f FDR's Third N om ination (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 14,228-29 n. 56. 117. Robert Bendiner,“Men Who Would Be President: V. Burton K. Wheeler,” N ation 150 (27 April 1940): 536. 118. Wheeler, N Y T , 13 June 1940,1,8; CR, 12 June 1940,8055; Wheeler, speech, American AntiWar Crusade, KAOWC, 30 June 1940, in CR, A4313. For other threats to bolt the Democratic Party over the war issue, see Bennett Champ Clark, Newsweek, 1 July 1940,29; Edwin C. Johnson, “A Third Party May Be the Answer,” radio address, Mutual Network, 15 May 1940, in CR, A3920. 119. Roy W. Howard in Wheeler, Yankee from the West, 363; Frank Hanighen to Sidney Hertzberg, 8 July [1940], Hertzberg Papers; Social Justice, 11 March 1940, 20; Robert E. Wood to Burton K. Wheeler, 14 June 1940, Wood Papers; Chester Bowles to Philip La Follette, 8 July 1940, Philip La Fol­ lette Papers; Edwin M. Borchard to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 3 October 1940, Borchard Papers; Edwin Johnson, “A Plea for a Peace Plank,” address at Chicago, 14 July 1940, in CR, A4498. The pro-Roosevelt N YD N , in endorsing Wheeler as vice-presidential candidate, saw his anti-interventionism as a positive factor. "Why Not Draft Wheeler?” 12 July 1940,23. 120. Lewis, N Y T , 27 January 1940,1; N Y T , 3 July 1940,1. 121. “Democratic Platform of 1940,” in Johnson, Platforms, 382-83. 122. Lindbergh, N Y T , 15 October 1940,1,8. 123. See, for example, Hugh Johnson, W TH , 6 September 1940; merchandiser Ira Hirschmann to Dorothy Detzer, 7 September 1940, WIL Papers; Robert E. Wood, CT, 16 October 1940, 8; David 1. Walsh, Castle Diary, 23 August 1940. 124. “An Ominous Nomination,” Christian C entury 57 (31 July 1940): 943; Rovere, “Campaign Caravan: Who’s an Appeaser?” Call, 12 October 1940,4. 125. Flynn, “Other People’s Money: Happy Days Are Here Again,” N ew Republic 103 (16 September 1940): 385; C ountry Squire in the W hite House (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1940), 106,113. 126. See, for example, Alf Landon to John T. Flynn, 3 September 1940, Flynn Papers; Hiram John­ son to William F. Knowland, 28 July 1940, Johnson Papers; John Haynes Holmes to Oswald Garrison Villard, 3 October 1940, Villard Papers; Castle Diary, 14 August 1940; John Haynes Holmes, “The Real Roosevelt,” U nity 126 (16 September 1940): 30; Aaron Levenstein, “Roosevelt, the Militarist,” Calk 10 August 1940,4; Alf Landon to John T. Flynn, 19 September 1940, Box 18, Flynn Papers.

420

Notes to Page 163

127. Sargent, Bulletin #82,26 August 1940, G etting US into War, 439-41. 128. For endorsement, see CT, 1 September 1940,6. For the beginning of serialization, see CT, 21 October 1940,1. 129. See, for example, John C. Cort, Commonweal 33 (1 November 1940): 60-61; Hamilton Basso, “Books in Review: The Great Profile,” New Republic 103 (29 July 1940): 146-47; anonymous writer, “The President,” N Y T Book Review, 14 July 1940,15. 130. Chamberlain, “The New Books,” Harper's M agazine 181 (October 1940), in advertising section. 131. See, for example, John Chamberlain and Stuart Chase in “Poll,” Uncensored 57 (2 November 1940): special supplement, 2; Quincy Howe, “Roosevelt, Willkie, Thomas?” (special supplement), Un­ censored 55 (19 October 1940); Will Durant to NIT, 31 October 1940, Roosevelt Papers; Alfred Bing­ ham, “HowThey Are Voting: III,” N ew Republic 103 (21 October 1940): 553; St Louis Post-Dispatch* 13 October 1940; Charles A. Beard, [University of] Rochester Tower Times, 4 October 1940; Sidney Hyman, The Lives o f W illiam Benton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 238; “Bob La Fol­ lette Says,” Progressive, 5 October 1940,1; Harry Elmer Barnes to Lowell Mellett, 11 November 1940, Barnes Papers. Barnes had written Villard in August that Willkie was no more than “Coolidge with a goat-gland operation and a gardenia. We will have to vote for Norman (Thomas] and despair of the Republic.” Letter, 16 August 1940, Villard Papers. 132. “Thinking Out Loud,” N YD N , 30 July 1940,19. See also “Should Draft Roosevelt,” N YD N , 10 July 1940,31. Cissy Patterson’s Washington Times-Herald, whose editorials were usually direct reprints of those of the N YD N , was the only pro-FDR paper in the nation’s capital. 133. See, for example, Usher Burdick, CR , 3 September 1940,11,380. 134. “The Campaign,” Uncensored 52 (28 September 1940): 1. See also “Voice of the People,” Un­ censored 39 (29 June 1940): 1. 135. Dennis, WFL, 31 October 1940,3; Mencken, “Heil Roosevelt,” Baltimore Sun, 25 September 1940. 136. A. J. Muste to Lucille B. Milner, 30 October 1940, W1L Papers. See also Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine,” Call, 9 November 1940,6; Libby, “Willkie Is Surrounded by Interventionists,” Peace Action 7 (September 1940): 2. Noting that the Senate was bound to remain Democratic, Libby hoped that the Republicans could capture the House, thereby restoring “checks and balances.” 137. For example, see Cushman Reynolds, Burton Rascoe, Sidney Hertzberg, and Frank Hanighen, “Poll,” Uncensored 57 (2 November 1940): special supplement, 2; John Haynes Holmes and critic Ed­ mund Wilson, “How They Are Voting: III,” New Republic 103 (21 October 1940): 554; Am erican G uardian, 1 November 1940,1; economist William Orton, Sm ith College Weekly, 11 October 1940,2. Several anti-interventionists said they would vote for Thomas in protest if Roosevelt’s election ap­ peared certain. See Selden Rodman, “Poll,” Uncensored 57 (2 November 1940): special supplement, 2; political scientist Fred Rodell, “How They Are Voting: III,” N ew Republic 103 (21 October 1940): 553. 138. Rovere, “How They Are Voting: II,” N ew Republic 103 (30 September 1940): 445; Burton K. Wheeler to Norman Thomas, 7 January 1941, Thomas Papers. 139. Roosevelt address at Boston, N Y T , 31 October 1940,14. 140. For stress on foreign policy, in particular the claim that the distressing European situation aided Roosevelt, see Johnson, W illkie, 162; Robert Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1940-1960; 2 vols. (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), l: 85; Justus D. Doenecke, “The Election of 1940,” in Running fo r President: The Candidates and Their Images, 2 vols., ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (New York: Simon 8c Schuster, 1994), 2:209. For the claim that in some ways Willkie’s anti-interven­ tionist posture helped him, see Herbert S. Parmet and Marie B. Hecht, Never Again: A President Runs fo r a Third Term (NewYork: Macmillan, 1968), 276-77. In June, Gallup polls showed 66 percent ready to vote for the candidate standing for increased aid to the Allies. Newsweek, 10 June 1940,32. 141. See, for example, Hanighen, “Capital Letter: Hard Words for the New Deal,” Common Sense 9 (November 1940): 11; “President Roosevelt’s Responsibility,” Christian C entury 57 (13 November 1940): 1408; Sargent, Bulletin #78, G etting US into War, 423; Hugh Johnson, “One Man’s Opinion,” SFN, 1 November 1940,11; Chamberlin Diary, 5 November 1940. Amos Pinchot bore Willkie no bit­ terness, finding him “pretty nearly a great man.” Amos Pinchot to Douglas Johnson, Columbia Uni­ versity, 7 November 1940, Pinchot Papers.

Notes to Pages 163-167

421

142. Dennis, WFL 119 (7 November 1940): 1; Hearst, “In the News,** SFE, 7 November 1940,1-2. 143. Uncensored noted the election of such senators as Johnson of California, Thomas of Idaho, Shipstead of Minnesota, Vandenberg of Michigan, Wheeler of Montana, Walsh of Massachusetts, Mal­ oney of Connecticut, La Follette of Wisconsin, and Brooks (Rep.-IU.). Both Jeanette Rankin (Rep.Mont.) and Fish were sent to the House. See “The Mandate,” Uncensored 58 (9 November 1940): 1-2. See also Sargent, Bulletin #94,19 November 1940, G etting US into War, 516 n. 1; “President Roosevelt's Responsibility," Christian C entury 57 (13 November 1940): 1408; “Election Postscript," N ew Masses 37 (26 November 1940): 11. 144. Libby, “Election Showed Nation Anti-War," Peace Action 7 (November 1940): 2,8; “Discussion Outline," issues by National Education Committee of the Socialist Party and the Young People's So­ cialist League, [December 1940?], Socialist Party Papers. Mentioned were senators William H. King (Dem.-Utah) and Sherman Minton (Dem.-Ind.), and New Jersey Democrat James Cromwell, former minister to Canada who was nominated for the Senate. 145. Hiram W. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson Jr., 9 November 1940, Johnson Papers. For other ex­ amples of such disillusion, see Yale economist Richard Bissell, Yale D aily News, 6 November 1940,1-2; Dennis, WFL 119 (7 November 1940): 1; Castle Diary, 6 November 1940.

CHAPTER 11: LEND-LEASE A N D THE "FUTILE WAR"

1. For histories of the AFC, see Cole, Am erica First, and Doenecke, IDU. For Flynn and the AFC, see Stenehjem, Am erican First. 2. For portraits of Wood, see Justus D. Doenecke, “General Robert E. Wood: The Evolution of a Conservative," Journal o f the Illinois State Historical Society 71 (August 1978): 162-75; Doenecke, “The Isolationism of General Robert E. Wood," Three Faces o f M idwestern Isolationism, ed. John H. Schacht (Iowa City, Iowa: Center for the Study of the Recent History of the United States, 1981), 11-22. 3. Doenecke, IDU, 16,57 n. 55. Lipsig was aided by Cushman Reynolds, who intermittently ed­ ited Uncensored. 4. Justus D. Doenecke, “Verne Marshall’s Leadership of the No Foreign War Committee, 1940," Annals o f Iowa 41 (Winter 1973): 1153-72. 5. Stimson in Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Lend-Lease: Weapon fo r Victory (New York: Macmillan, 1944), 65. 6. For Britain's condition, see Pönting, 1940,205-10; quotation, 209. 7. Winston Churchill to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 8 December 1940, in Kimball, Churchill and Roo­ sevelt, 1:102-9. 8. N Y T , 18 December 1940,10; press conference, 17 December 1940, in Rosenman, Roosevelt Pa­ pers and Addresses, 9:604-15. 9. “President's Call for Full Response on Defense," N Y T , 30 December 1940,6; Reynolds, Cre­ ation, 159. 10. “Text of Lease-Lend Bill," N Y T , 11 January 1941,1,3; Newsweek, 20 January 1940,16; AFC, “A Factual Analysis of H.R. 1776," n.d. [1941], inserted by D. W. Clark, CR, 28 February 1941, A901-2; “No. 1776," Time, 20 January 1941,15. 11. See, for example, Van Zandt, CR, 5 February 1941,587; Amos Pinchot to John T. Flynn, 29 Jan­ uary 1941, Pinchot Papers; Fish, CR, 3 February 1941,501; McCarran, Time, 3 March 1941,16; Tinkham, CR, 5 February 1941,627; Shipstead, CR, 26 February 1941,1346; Danaher, CR, 8 March 1941,2078. 12. Howard K. Beale to Charles A. Plumley [copy], 27 January 1941, NCPW Papers; “No Com­ promise!” Christian C entury 58 (22 January 1941 ): 113. 13. Shafer, CR, 5 February 1941,598; Lambertson, CR, 7 February 1941, A530; Marcantonio, CR, 4 February 1941, 560; “The Economic Consequences of the Lease-Lend Program," n.d. [1941], Box 279, AFC Papers. See also Maas, speech to sixteenth Women's Patriotic Conference on National De­ fense, 28 January 1941, in CR, A694; Robert Rice Reynolds, Time, 3 March 1941,16.

422

Notes to Pages 167-168

14. For examples, see resolution, American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, 27 January 1941, SFRC, 656; Congressman Day, CR, 3 February 1941,518; Congresswoman Rogers, CR, 6 February 1941,654; Henry Cabot Lodge, CR, 10 February 1941,627; B. C. Clark, CR, 18 February 1941,1098; Wheeler, CR, 28 February 1941, 1520; “Spirit of ’76,” Uncensored 68 (18 January 1941): 3; “Power of the Purse,” NYDN, 14 January 1941,21;“Secretary Hull on the Dictatorship Bill“ N YD N , 17 January 1941,27; Roy W. Howard to Ralph Heinzen, 21 January 1941, Box 179, Howard Papers; Alan Valentine, testimony, SFRC, 5 February 1941,401; Charles A. Beard, testimony, SFRC, 4 February 1941,309; “Comment,” America 64 (25 January 1941): 422; Waldrop, “What Are Munitions?” WTH, 7 March 1941,12. 15. John Bassett Moore to Hiram Johnson, 25 January 1941, in CR, 653; Fish, 7 February 1941, CR, 769. 16. See, for example, Senator Tobey, CR, 5 March 1941,1791; Norman Thomas, testimony, HFAC, 22 February 1941,340; Thomas, testimony, SFRC, 3 February 1941,301; John Danaher to Philip Jes­ sup, 13 January 1941, Jessup Papers; Representative Thomas K. Winter (Rep.-Kans.), CR, 5 February 1941,608. 17. Villard, “Crossing the Rubicon,” Progressive, 15 February 1941,6; “Secretary Hull on the Dicta­ torship Bill,” N YD N , 17 January 1941,27; Holmes, “Editorial Comment,” U nity 127 (April 1941): 22; Peale, 14 February 1941, Box 62, AFC Papers. See also "Behold! The Brass Serpent,” Saturday Evening P o s t2 \l (15 February 1941): 26. 18. MacNider, radio broadcast over Washington, D.C., station WOL, 22 January 1941, in CR, A259; Joseph P. Kennedy to Congressman Louis Ludlow, 14 December 1940, in CR, 30 January 1941,423; “The Economic Consequences of the Lease-Lend Program,” n.d. [1941 ), Box 279, AFC Papers. See also “Butter or Guns,” Uncensored 75 (8 March 1941): 3-4. 19. Lindbergh, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941, 526, 528; Fish, CR, 5 February 1941, 659; Wheeler, CR, 17 February 1941,1045,1052; Mundt, CR, 5 February 1941,611; Keefe, CR, 30 January 1941, 420; Woodruff, CR, 7 February 1941, 774; A1 Williams, testimony, SFRC, 7 February 1941, 578-79; Al Williams, “U.S. Air Power,” Progressive, 15 February 1941,5. 20. Walsh, CR, 7 March 1941, 2003. Walsh’s amendment lost 33 to 56, with 6 not voting. CR, 8 March 1941,2050. For support, see Taft, CR, 7 Mardi 1941,2039; AFC, W ashington News Letter 4 (19 February 1941): 1, Box 281, AFC Papers. 21. See, for example, Van Zandt’s use of Marshall and Stimson, CR, 5 February 1941,558. 22. Lumber merchant George Cless, testimony, HFAC, 24 January 1941,566; Congressman Freder­ ick C. Smith, CR, 5 February 1941,670; Sokolsky, “These Days: Merchants of Doom,” N ew York Sun, 8 February 1941,16; “These Days: Let There Be Light!” N ew York Sun, 15 February 1941,16. 23. “The Economic Consequences of the Lease-Lend Program,” n.d. [1941], 7-21, Box 279, AFC Papers; Frank Hanighen to Uncensored, received 20 December (1940], Hertzberg Papers; “Ubiquitous $$$,” Uncensored 64 (21 December 1941): 2. See also “Our Passing Democracy,” Am erica 64 (25 Janu­ ary 1941): 435. 24. Danaher, CR, 7 March 1941,1995. The amendment was defeated 33 to 48, with 14 not voting. See 1996-97. For similar concerns by Carl Ackerman, dean of the Columbia University School of Jour­ nalism, see Ackerman to Robert A. Taft, n.d., entered in CR, 3 March 1941,1654. 25. See, for example, John A. Danaher to Edwin M. Borchard, 13 January 1941, Borchard Papers. Congressman Dworshak introduced an amendment prohibiting the authorization of any violation of international law. It was defeated 94 to 142. See CR, 8 February 1941,814. 26. Dennis, “Memorandum on Certain Points Raised in Connection with the Lend-Lease Bill,” en­ tered in CR, 7 March 1941,2005; Dennis, testimony, HFAC, 24 January 1941,577. 27. For the Washington Treaty and the Hague Conference, see Danaher, CR, 24 February 1941, 1313. For the Kellogg-Briand pact, see Taft and Danaher, CR, 24 February 1941,1319. For the Panama Dedaration, see Chavez, speech, NBC, 1 March 1941, in CR, A934; Castle, testimony, HFAC, 23 Janu­ ary 1941,518; Norman Thomas, testimony, SFRC, 3 February 1941,291; AFC, “A Factual Analysis of H.R. 1776,” inserted by D. W. Clark, 28 February 1941, A902. 28. See, for example, “Road Out of Crisis?” Commonweal 33 (24 January 1941): 339; “Is It a ‘Go-toWar’ Bill?” C hristian C entury 58 (12 March 1941 ): 347; Roy W. Howard to Nelson T. Johnson, 24 March 1941, Box 180, Howard Papers; Howard to Lord Beaverbrook, 14 May 1941, Box 180, Howard Papers;

Notes to Pages 168-170

423

William Dennis»testimony, HFAC, 24 January 1941,580; Edwin M. Borchard, letter to SFRC, hearings, 25 January 1941,653. 29. Thomas, HFAC, 22 January 1941,349. 30. Signers included Wendell H. Furry, Frederick Merk, F. O. Matthiessen, Edmund S. Morgan, Mark Schorer, Carl E. Schorske, Delmore Schwartz, Paul M. Sweezy, Kirtley Mather, and Frederick B. Tolies. H arvard [University] Crimson, 7 February 1941,1,4. 31. Rankin, CR, 8 February 1941,813. It was voted down 82 to 137. See 814. 32. See, for example, Jonathan T. Pratt,“War Partnership—It Can’t Be Limited,” Scribner's Commenta­ tor 9 (March 1941): 71-72; HiramW. Johnson to HiramW. Johnson Jr., 5 May 1941, Johnson Papers; Taft, CR, 22 February 1941,1281; “Why Destroy Ourselves?” CT, 1 March 1941,16; international lawprofessor Herbert Wright in Frank Hanighen to Cushman Reynolds, n.d. [9 February 1941], Hertzberg Papers. 33. Wheeler, American Forum of the Air, 12 January 1941, in CR, A178; “Untruthful... Dastardly ... Unpatriotic... Rottenest,” N YD N , 16 January 1941,25. 34. Vandenberg, CR, 18 February 1941, 1106. For another such reference to the Brooklyn Navy Yard, see“Our Passing Democracy,” America 64 (25 January 1941 ): 435. During the appropriations de­ bate, Mundt introduced an amendment banning the outfitting of foreign ships in U.S. ports. See sup­ port from Representatives Bolton and Francis H. Case (Rep.-S.Dak.). CR, 19 March 1941, 2367-70. The amendment was voted down 67 to 107. See 2372. 35. R. Douglas Stuart Jr. to Donald McDonald, 10 January 1941, Box 62, AFC Papers. 36. Taft, CR, 22 February 1941, 1281; 5 March 1941, 1823. Taft conceded that the president had some power to send naval vessels outside the Western Hemisphere. However, the bill, he claimed, would permit him to establish bases in Singapore, Gibraltar, Egypt, and even Britain itself. CR, 7 March 1941,1971,1973. 37. Taft, CR, 8 March 1941,2079. Castle also recalled the Alabam a claims issue. Testimony, HFAC, 23 January 1941,501. 38. See, for example, Congressman Arends, CR, 29 January 1941,383; Hugh Johnson, testimony, HFAC, 23 January 1941,439; Castle, testimony, HFAC, 24 January 1941,506,513; General Wood, tes­ timony, SFRC, 4 February 1941,350; Professor Herbert Wright, testimony, SFRC, 5 February 1941,457; Alf Landon, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941, 664; Robsion, CR, 5 February 1941, 641; Frank Hanighen to Cushman Reynolds, 9 January 1941, Hertzberg Pipers; Edwin M. Borchard to James Shanley, 13 January 1941 and 8 February 1941, Borchard Pipers; “Bad Logic by Morgenthau,” N YD N , 30 January 1941,23; Fish, CR, 13 January 1941,136; Wheeler, CR, 1 March 1941,1602. 39. Gillette, CR, 8 March 1941,2064. It was voted down 33 to 55, with 7 not voting. See 2065. 40. N Y T , 22 January 1941, 1; Warren F. Kimball, The M ost Unsordid A c t Lend-Lease, 1939-1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 180-81; Watson, C hief o f Staff, 125. 41. CR, 6 February 1941,749; Kimball, M ost Unsordid Act, 201. 42. Kimball, Forged in War, 71; Morgenthau in Newsweek, “Battle of *1776,’” 27 January 1941,14. 43. Beard, testimony, SFRC, 3 February 1941, 313. See also “Britain Has Resources in America,” C hristian C entury 58 (19 February 1941 ): 245. For concrete estimates, see Robsion ($8 billion), CR, 8 February 1941, A577; Reynolds ($10 billion), CR, 20 February 1941,1214; John T. Flynn ($4.5 billion), memo to HFAC, in CR, 18 February 1941,1116; Fish ($3 billion), radio broadcast, 13 January 1941, in CR, A91; R. Douglas Stuart Jr. ($2 billion), letter to General Wood, 5 December 1940, Box 63, AFC Pa­ pers; Congressman Andresen (between $7 billion and $10 billion), CR, 7 February 1941,767; C T (be­ tween $4 billion and $5 billion) in editorial “Britain’s Financial Position,” 12 December 1941,16; Un­ censored ($6 billion) in “Dollar Assets,” 69 (25 January 1941 ): 4. 44. Wood, testimony, SFRC, 4 February 1941,373; Kimball, M ost Unsordid Act, 225. 45. See, for example, “Mr. Roosevelt’s Lost Opportunity,” Christian C entury 58 (1 January 1941 ): 6; Congressman Fred L. Crawford (Rep.-Mich.), CR, 19 March 1941, 2360-1; Congresswoman Rogers, HFAC, 22 January 1941,331; Maas, CR, 22 February 1941,1276; Castle, testimony, HFAC, 24 January 1941,532; Hanford MacNider to Milo J. Warner, 20 December 1940, MacNider Papers. 46. See, for example, B. C. Clark, CR, 18 February 1941, 1118; Senator Albert J. Eilender (Dem.La.), CR, 5 March 1941,1807-8; Bulow, CR, 21 February 1941,1258.

424

Notes to Pages 170-171

47. Taft, CR, 22 February 1941,1276. See also Shipstead, CR, 18 February 1941,1119. 48. “Dollars vs. Empire,” Uncensored 62 (7 December 1940): 2. 49. See, for example, Bone and B. C. Clark, CR, 20 February 1941,1119, 1120; Reynolds, CR, 20 February 1941,1213; Helen Essary, “Dear Washington,” W TH , 28 January 1941,8. 50. William Benton to R. M. La Follette Jr. 17 December 1940, in Doenecke, ID U , 100-101. See also Benton, CT, 8 January 1941,1. The paper was friendly to the idea. “The Benton Test and Some Oth­ ers,” 11 January 1941,10. 51. Nye, speech, Mutual network, 19 January 1941, in CR, A1334. 52. George N. Peek to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 11 December 1940, AFC Papers. For additional men­ tion of gold production, see Congressman John R. Jennings Jr., CR, 5 February 1941,665. 53. Marcantonio, CR, 4 February 1941, 555. See also Maas, CR, 4 February 1941, 555; Flynn in Stenehjem, Am erican First, 68. For similar concerns, see “Dollars vs. Empire (con’t),” Uncensored 7 \ (8 February 1941): 2. R. Douglas Stuart Jr., however, stressed Britain’s sorry plight Shipping losses, he said, exceeded the rate of April 1917. Shipment of fruit had been curtailed entirely. Meat rationing had been severely increased. Several ports were dosed. R. Douglas Stuart Jr. to Robert E. Wood, 5 Febru­ ary 1941, Box 63, AFC Papers. 54. “Status of British Shipping,” CT, 16 December 1940,16. See also “Mr. Roosevelt's Crisis,” CT, 19 December 1940,18. 55. “The British Ship Supply,” CT, 23 December 1940,10; Wheeler, CR, 18 February 1941,1120. For reaction to the dominions, see “Canada Doesn't Lend-Lease,” N Y W T , 8 February 1941; Taft, CR, 18 February 1941,1116; B. C. Clark, CR, 18 February 1941,1118; Congressman Clifford Hope, CR, 7 Feb­ ruary 1941,775. 56. Hart, testimony, SFRC, 7 February 1941,756. 57. See, for example, Hugh Johnson, testimony, HFAC, 23 January 1941, 441; William R. Castle, HFAC, 24 January 1941,532; Congressman Walter C. Ploeser (Rep.-Mo.), CR, 4 February 1941,568; Charles A. Beard, testimony, SFRC, 3 February 1941,313; Professor Herbert Wright, SFRC, 5 February 1941,453. Fish sought $2 million. Troncone, “Fish,” 361. Rich suggested $5 billion. See CR, 4 February 1941,560. Sokolsky suggested $10 billion. “Shall the Small Invaded Nations Be Fed?” Am erican Forum o f the A ir 3 (23 February 1941): 9. 58. Taft added several qualifiers. First, the president must certify that the borrower nation is unable to provide for its U.S. purchases. Second, such sums can only be used for buying U.S.-made goods. Third, the president shall require either adequate security, territory and investments, or naval and mil­ itary bases in South America or elsewhere. Fourth, the chief of staff and the chief of naval operations must certify to the president that the articles shipped are dispensable. If more money was needed, Taft said, he was willing to adjust the sum. His proposal was voted down 29 to 62, with 4 not voting. Taft, CR, 8 March 1941,2080-82. Kimball claims that the figure of $2 billion appeared to hold some fasci­ nation for the Republicans. They introduced three amendments containing this amount M ost Unsordid Act, 201. See also Fish, CR, 3 February 1941,488; Richard B. Wigglesworth (Rep.-Mass.), 5 Febru­ ary 1941,610; House minority report in CR, 5 February 1941,663-64. 59. See, for example, Joseph P. Kennedy, radio address, 28 January 1941, in CR, in testimony, HFAC, 261; Vermont manufacturer Ralph Flanders to Senator George Aiken, in CR, 13 February 1941, A635; Congressman Clifford Hope, CR, 5 February 1941,607; Alf Landon, testimony, SFRC, 7 February 1941, 684; Landon to Verne Marshall, 30 December 1940, Verne Marshall Papers; Hugh Johnson, testimony, HFAC, 23 January 1941,442. 60. Johnson, CR, 28 January 1941,258; Herbert Hoover to William R. Castle, 1 March 1941, Castle Papers; Aiken, CR, 6 March 1941,1869. Aiken said the United States could provide patrol bombers and supply shipbuilding funds, so Canada could recondition British warships and construct torpedo boats. 61. Wood, testimony, SFRC, 4 February 1941,347-49. Robert E. Wood to R. J. Finnegan, 22 Janu­ ary 1941, Box 292, AFC Papers; debate with Senator Ernest W. Gibson Jr., Advertising Men’s Post #38, American Legion, Chicago, 3 February 1941, in Box 35, AFC Papers. For another mention of gifts or loans, see “Aid to Britain Without H.R. 1776,” CT, 3 February 1941,12.

Notes to Pages 171-172

425

62. See, for example, Lindbergh, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,534; Merwin K. Hart, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,769; Barry, testimony, HFAC, 25 January 1941,682; Jennings, CR, 5 February 1941,665; Tobey, GR, 5 March 1941,1790; John Chamberlain to Mark Prentiss, 30 December 1940, Box 35, AFC Papers; Frank Hanighen to Uncensored, received 20 February [1941 ], Hertzberg Papers. 63. “What Is Your Life Worth?” N YD N , 5 January 1941,41; Wood, testimony, SFRC, 4 February 1941,375-76. 64. Any further amount could be repaid in rubber, tin, or tea, or by a mortgage on British gold pro­ duction. Fish, radio broadcast, CBS, 13 January 1941, in GR, A91. Once Britain could no longer sup­ ply securities and collateral, U.S. supplies should be given. Fish, HFAC, 21 January 1941, 315. A few anti-interventionists balked at taking Britain’s hemispheric possessions. Norman Thomas called them “run-down slum property.” Testimony, HFAC, 22 January 1941, 331. The CT, denying that any rela­ tionship could be forced, said that eventually the islands would gravitate naturally to the American flag. “British Citizens and American Bases,” 28 January 1941,10. 65. Maas, GR, 4 February 1941,557. The Washington Daily News, a Scripps-Howard paper, found $16 billion to be overpayment but stressed the role of the British possessions in defending the Panama Canal See“The Billion Dollars for Britain,” 5 February 1941. Seealso CongressmanGeraldW. Landis (Rep.-Ind.), GR, 4 February 1941,563; Mundt, GR, 5 February 1941,650. However, on 6 February the chair ruled that the amendment was not germaine to the bilL See 727. See also the amendment of Congressman John M. Costello (Dem.-Calif.), GR, 7 February 1941,767. Andresen spoke for the amendment. GR, 767,769. 66. Barry, GR, 4 February 1941,528; Nye, speech, Mutual network, 19 January 1941, A1334; Wiley, GR, 4 March 1941,1717. 67. Lincoln Colcord to Robert R Wood, 6 January 1941, Box 59, AFC Papers. R. Douglas Stuart Jr. found Colcord correct in thinking an absolutely neutral stand more rational. However, he told Col­ cord to be aware of the intense public sentiment and the fact that “logical consideration [sic] do not prevent those who advocate strict neutrality from being widely and hopelessly discredited.” R. Douglas Stuart Jr. to Lincoln Colcord, 8 February 1941, Box 59, AFC Papers. 68. Dennis, WFL 27,2 January 1941,2. 69. Wood, testimony, SFRC, 3 February 1941,348. 70. McCormick, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,487. 71. Lindbergh, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941, 494. Senator Claude Pepper (Dem.-Fla.), a strong interventionist, doubted if Lindbergh’s policies and judgments would have permitted the send­ ing of one rifle or round of ammunition to Britain. Lindbergh concurred with Pepper. GR, 527. 72. For time limits, see, for example, William R. Castle, testimony, HFAC, 24 January 1941, 514; Benjamin Marsh, executive secretary, People’s Lobby, testimony, HFAC, 550; “No Blank Check,” S t Louis Post-Dispatch, 24 January 1941; “Bad Logic by Morgenthau,” N YD N , 30 January 1941,23; Fish, GR, 4 February 1941, 559. For spending limits, see Joseph P. Kennedy, testimony, HFAC, 24 January 1941, 231. The AFC mistrusted time limits on the grounds that they gave a false sense of security. Washington News Letter 1 (31 January 1941), in Doenecke, IDU , 226. 73. Vandenberg, GR, 7 March 1941,1991-92. It was defeated 36 to 45, with 14 not voting. See 1994. For Vorys, see GR, 6 February 1941,727. For support, see Raymond Moley,“H.R. 1776,” Newsweek, 20 January 1941,64. A similar amendment by Fish, centering on congressional consent for the transfer of any navy vessel, was defeated 123 to 183. See GR, 7 February 1941,775. 74. Kimball, M ost Unsordid Act, 210-11,214-16. 75. N Y T , 9 March 1941,1; N Y T , 12 March 1941,1,3. 76. Gallup poll, 7 March 1941, in Cantril, Public O pinion, 410. For related polls, see Cantril, Public O pinion, 409-10. 77. Diary entry, 8 March 1941, in Private Papers, 10. Emphasis Vandenberg's. 78. Land in J. Garry Clifford, “A Connecticut Colonel's Candid Conversation with the Wrong Commander-in-Chief,” Connecticut H istory 28 (November 1988): 28. 79. Reynolds, Creation, 167,273-82. For continued anxieties over the British closed economy, see Berte, entry of 17 July 1941, Navigating, 373.

426

Notes to Pages 172-175

80. Reynolds, Creation* 275-82. 81. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intim ate H istory (NewYork: Harper, 1948), 270. 82. Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt: The Undeclared Naval War (NewYork: Free Press, 1979), 113. 83. Kimball, M ost Unsordid Act, 241. 84. M Air Power and the Battle of Britain,” Uncensored 76 (15 March 1941 ): 3-4; article by Sherman B. Altick in memo, Barbara McDonald, speaker’s bureau, 27 February 1941, AFC Papers. 85. McCormick, WTH* 6 February 1941, 2. See also McCormick, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,485-86. 86. “Salonika: The Back Door,” CT, 15 Mardi 1941,12. For other examples of TYibune optimism, see “An Exdted Spokesman,” 7 January 1941,12; “Prospects in Africa and Elsewhere,” 1 February 1941,16; “British and GreekVictories,” 10 February 1941,10; “A Campaign of Fear and Hysteria,” 6 Mardi 1941,14. 87. “The Big Spring Rush,” NYDN* 30 January 1941,23; “Will Hitler Invade?” NYDN* 15 March 1941,15. See also “What Is Hitler Up To?” 28 January 1941,19. 88. Lincoln Colcord to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 12 February 1941, Box 69, AFC Papers; Libby, “An­ swers to Some Vital Questions,” Peace Action 7 (January 1941): 2. 89. See, for example, SauthofF, CR, 19 March 1941,2377; Hugh Johnson, testimony, HFAC, 23 Jan­ uary 1941,452. For American opinion, see Office of Public Opinion Research, 28 January 1941. Thirtytwo percent saw Germany winning, 23 percent expected stalemate, and 16 percent were underided. Cantril, Public Opinion* 1187. 90. McCormick, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941,479. See also Sweeney, CR* 5 February 1941, 581; Flynn, SFN*8 February 1941,12. 91. Wheeler, CR, 17 February 1941,1044. See also Morton, Let's Think the M atter Through [pam­ phlet], entered in CR, 21 February 1941, A787; Short, CR, 6 February 1941,740. 92. Thomas, testimony, HFAC, 22 January 1941, 349. For more pessimistic views, see Thomas, Wesleyan [University] Argus* 9 January 1941,1; Stuart Chase,“Balancing the Risks,” Progressive* 17 May 1941,5. For supposed opposition to the war inside Germany, see Nofrontier News Service, “Germany from the Inside,” U nity 126 (3 February 1941): 173. 93. “The Search for a Lasting Peace, II: Germany and Europe’s Chaos,” C hristian C entury 58 (19 February 1941): 249. 94. Chamberlin, “Hitler’s Alternatives: Is He a Prisoner of Conquest?” A tlantic 167 (January 1941): 7-8. 95. Bulow, CR, 21 February 1941, 1256; Castle Diary, 22 February 1941; Hearst, “In the News,” SFE* 30 January 1941, extra, A. 96. “Can Blockade Win Victory?” NYDN* 22 January 1941,29; Villard, “Disregarding War Facts,” Progressive* 25 January 1941,6; “The Long View,” Uncensored 67 (11 January 1941): 1. See also “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE* 21 February 1941, 7; “If Not a Negotiated Peace,” C hristian C entury 58 (15 January 1941): 80. 97. Watson, C hief o f Staff* 371. When Smith was military attaché to Germany, he showed himself to be a strong Germanophile, but he was most accurate in technical matters and hence highly respected by General Marshall. For Smith’s technical competence, see Kahn, “United States Views,” 489-90. For his prewar reports and a summary of his career, see Hessen, Berlin A lert For praise by Marshall, Mar­ shall to James G. Harbord, 17 February 1940, in Marshall, Papers* 2:161. 98. Dennis, WFL 131 (30 January 1941): 5. For Dennis on Italy, see also 124 (12 December 1940): 1; 125 (19 December 1940): 2; 133 (13 February 1941): 2; 140 (3 April 1941): 3. 99. See, for example, Dennis, WFL 127 (2 January 1941): 1-2; 130 (23 January 1941): 4; 133 (13 February 1941): 1. 100. See, for example, Edwin M. Borchard to John A. Danaher, 6 January 1941, Borchard Papers; Morley Diary, 30 January 1941; Social Justice* 27 January 1941, 9; Jonathan T. Pratt, “War Partner­ ship—It Can’t Be Limited,” Scribner's Com m entator 9 (March 1941): 73. 101. Cudahy quoted in William R. Castle to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 14 February 1941, in Doenecke, IDU* 127; “Don't Kid Ourselves,” N YD N * 19 March 1941,31; Kennedy, radio address, 18 January 1941,

Notes to Pages 175-176

427

attached to testimony, HFAC 21 January 1941, 263; Lindbergh, testimony, HFAC 23 January 1941, 404,415-16; Lindbergh in Castle Diary, 15 February 1941. For the argument that many overestimated the potential of the German air force, see Lewin, H itler’s M istakes, 103-5. 102. General memo, AFC Washington Office, 29 January 1941 and 12 February 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 225,229-31. In other bulletins, the office noted the threat of a Turkish-Bulgarian nonaggression pact to Greece, temporary closing of the Suez Canal, Luftwaffe mastery over Libya, a German subma­ rine drive, German troops in Bulgaria, the exposed position of Gibraltar, and the possibility that the British lacked the forces to back the Greeks effectively. General memos, AFC Washington Office, 18 February, 20 February, 23 February, and 4 March 1941, in IDU, 231-7. 103. Flynn, SFE, 20 January 1941,14. 104. "England Is Faced with Revolution," Social Justice, 6 January 1941,7-8; 20 January 1941,4. See also 27 January 1941,12. 105. Dennis, WFL 135 (27 February 1941): 3. 106. Life, 30 December 1940, 14; Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, 16 January 1941, in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 1:129. 107. Dwight William Ibttle, H arry L H opkins and Anglo-Am erican-Soviet Relations, 1941-1945 (New York: Garland, 1983), 69-70; George D. Mcjimsey, H arry Hopkins: A lly o f the Poor and Defender o f Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 146; Marshall, "Memorandum for General [Leonard T.J Gerow,” 26 February 1941, in Marshall, Papers, 2:431. 108. Hull in Ickes, entry of 2 February 1941, Secret D iary, 3:422. See also Breckinridge Long, entry of 7 February 1941, War D iary, 175. 109. Lee, entry of 20 December 1940, London Journal, 183. He soon qualified this opinion. Entry of 22 December 1940,185. 110. See, for example, Chamberlin Diary, 1 February 1941; "The *Wave’ of the Future,” Common Sense 10 (March 1941): 81; NCPW official Paul Harris, [Northwestern University] D aily Northwestern, 19 February 1941,1; Alfred Bingham, Brown [University] D aily Herald, 10 February 1941,4; Lincoln Colcord to Edwin M. Borchard, 8 January 1941, Borchard Papers; Alanson B. Houghton, former U.S. ambassador to Germany, as noted in Castle Diary, 21 March 1941; "Welles Cold to Tokyo Plea; Warns Axis of Firm Stand,” N YD N , 28 February 1941, 29; "Is It Table Stakes?” N YD N , 20 March 1941, 31; Robert E Wood to R. J. Finnegan, 22 January 1941, Box 292, AFC Papers; Clay Judson to James B. Conant, 3 February 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 125. 111. Vandenberg,NYT,2 January 1941,1,6. New Masses claimed that Vandenberg was actually pro­ posing a scheme, similar to the House-Grey understanding, for getting the United States into the con­ flict. "What About’ the Peace Talk,” 38 (14 January 1941): 19. For endorsement of Vandenberg’s gen­ eral call for negotiations, see "An Inquiry America Should Make,” CT, 28 December 1940,6; Senators Wheeler, lydings, and Harry F. Byrd (Dem.-Va.), CT, 27 December 1941,1. 112. Lindbergh, testimony, HFAC 23 January 1941, 378. Such a negotiated peace, he continued, would not be a peace"that I would particularly approve of,” but he found the alternative a disastrous war. See 413. Sterling Morton said Lindbergh expressed his own views poorly, for he probably meant that con­ tinued war meant ruin for all Europe. Morton to Amos Pinchot, 24 January 1941, Pinchot Papers. 113. Lindbergh, testimony, SFRC, 6 February 1941, 490. When asked by Senator Tom Connally (Dem.-Tex.) whether he would restore Denmark or Belgium, he said he would not attempt to suggest the concrete settlement See 497. “The situation changes from week to week; and it depends a great deal on the status of the war.” See 498. Such a peace would have to take in "realities” neglected at Versailles, such as the need to eliminate the Polish Corridor and alleviate the condition of minorities in Czecho­ slovakia. See 558. 114. See, for example, "Congress Should Summon Kennedy,” N YD N , 10 January 1941,27; “Britain's Stake in an Early Peace,” CT, 22 February 1941,10; "Prospects in Africa and Elsewhere,” CT, 1 Febru­ ary 1941,16. 115. William R. Castle to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 14 February 1941, AFC Papers; Dennis, memo on lend-lease, in CR, 7 March 1941,200; Libby, "Answers to Some Vital Questions,” Peace Action 7 (Janu­ ary 1941): 8.

428

Notes to Pages 176-177

116. See, for example, “The Search for a Lasting Peace, IV: A Basis for Negotiations," Christian Cen­ 58 (12 March 1941): 354; William R. Castle to R. Douglas Stuart |r., 11 March 1941, AFC Papers; Taft, CR, 22 February 1941, 1276, 1281; Rankin, CR, 7 February 1941, 754; McCarran, CR, 22 Febru­ ary 1941,1271; Bulow, CR. 21 February 1941,1253. 117. "Is It Table Stakes?" N YD N , 20 March 1941,31; Norman Thomas, Wesleyan [University] Argus, 9 January 1941,2. See also Arthur ). May, This Bewildered Democracy, 15. 118. Lindbergh, testimony, HFAC, 23 (anuary 1941,378; SFRC, 6 February 1941,490. See also "But Boake Carter Says," SFE, 16 lanuary 1941,9. 119. lames M. Gillis, "Friendly Challenge to the Pope," Catholic World 152 (January 1941 ): 387; "The Search for a Lasting Peace, IV: A Basis for Negotiations," Christian Century 58 (12 March 1941): 354; "The Pope's Peace Effort," NYD N, 21 March 1941,31; Lindbergh, testimony, HFAC, 23 January 1941,378. 120. Bulow, CR, 21 February 1941,1254; E. Stanley Jones,"What Is Americas Role in This Crisis?" Christian C entury 58 (19 March 1941 ): 389-90. Jones claimed to have reviewed the article with about twenty members of Congress, who—he claimed—were much in sympathy with his position. E. Stan­ ley Jones to A. J. Muste, 18 April 1941, FOR Papers. 121. "The Search for Lasting Peace, 1: Britain and the Future," Christian C entury 58 (12 February 1941 ): 214; "The Search for Lasting Peace, V: A Basis for Negotiations," Christian C entury 58 (12 March 1941): 351-53. Territorial readjustments might include restoration of Norway, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands; an independent Poland, perhaps possessing new boundaries; internationalization of all colonies in North Africa under a mandate system; transfer of all other African colonies to mandate status; admission of India to the British Commonwealth; confirmation of the independence of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Syria; an independent Palestine; restoration of Czechoslovakia, with a plebiscite to de­ termine the status of the Sudeten area; annexation of Austria to Germany; incorporation of the Hun­ garian parts of Transylvania into an independent Hungary; the establishment of a Balkan federation; restoration to Siam of territories taken by the European empires; immediate independence for the Philippines; withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and its restoration to full sovereignty; admin­ istration of Manchuria and Mongolia as mandates, with a plebiscite in fifteen years to determine their status; transfer of French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, and Malaya to mandate status; a plebiscite in Burma to determine its fate; the dismantling of U.S. and Japanese island bases in the Pacific; and an American loan for world rehabilitation. See 354. 122. See, for example, Harry Elmer Barnes, “Where Are We Headed?” Uncensored 73, special sup­ plement (21 February 1941): 2; Social Justice, 10 February 1941,4. 123. “The Long View," Uncensored 67(11 January 1941): 2; "If Not a Negotiated Peace," Christian C entury 58 ( 15 January 1941): 80. See also Charles Clayton Morrison, testimony, SFRC, 7 February 1941, 626. The Century also noted such peace rumors as British efforts at Madrid through Samuel Hoare, British ambassador to Spain, and Lord Chancellor John Simon and German efforts through Franz von Papen, German ambassador to Turkey. "The Search for a Lasting Peace, V: A Basis for Ne­ gotiations," Christian C entury 58 (12 March 1941): 351. For material on Tavistock, see N YT, 4 March 1940,4. For Davis, see N YT, 31 December 1940,1. 124. See, for example, Dorothy Detzer to Emily Greene Batch, summarizing their common posi­ tion, 2 February 1941, WIL Papers; Henry Cabot Lodge, CR, 8 March 1941,2061. 125. Kennedy, speech, 18 January 1941, in testimony, HFAC, 260. Several days later he claimed that Hitler sought to dominate the world. See testimony, 21 January 1941,288. 126. Amos Pinchot to J. E. McEldowney, 11 March 1941, Pinchot Papers. 127. Gallup poll, 3 January 1940, Cantril, Public O pinion, 1108; Gallup poll, 9 January 1941,1136; Gallup poll, N YT, 31 January 1941,6. For related polls, see Cantril, Public O pinion, 1187. tury

CHAPTER 12: A TROUBLED SPRING

1. B. Mitchell Simpson III, Adm iral Harold R. Stark: Architect o f Victory, University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 84.

1939-1945

(Columbia:

Notes to Pages 177-179

429

2. Livingstone Hartley and Donald C. Blaisdell, “Threat to the Lifeline,” CDAAA, Washington O f­ 10 (21 March 1941): 1-2, Box 35, CDAAA Papers. See also Hartley and Blais­ dell, “The Patrol System and the Atlantic Lifeline,” Washington Office Inform ation Letter 16 (2 May 1941): 1, Box 35, CDAAA Papers. 3. Hartley and Blaisdell, “Limitations on the Risk of War,” W ashington O ffice Inform ation Letter 12 (4 April 1941): 2-3, Box 35, CDAAA Papers. 4. Hartley and Blaisdell, “Allied Ship Losses,” W ashington Office Inform ation Letter 18 (16 May 1941): 1, Box 35, CDAAA Papers. 5. Hartley and Blaisdell, “Ship Losses,” Washington Office Inform ation Letter 24 (27 June 1941): 4, Box 35, CDAAA Papers; Hartley and Blaisdell, “Good News from the Atlantic,” W ashington Office In ­ form ation Letter 27 (18 July 1941): 2-3, Box 35, CDAAA Papers. 6. See, for example, Nye, CR, 15 April 1941,3113; O'Connor, CR, 17 April 1941,3165; journalist Samuel Crowther to Charles W. Tobey, 1 May 1941, in CR, 3780; Bender, CR, 24 April 1941,3281,3283; Taber, CR, 29 April 1941,3382. 7. Tobey, CR, 15 April 1941,3110; 18 April 1941,3176-78. 8. Tobey, NIT, 1 April 1941,13. For other resolutions, see for example, Mundt, CR, 3 April 1941, A1628; Fish and Congressman Carl Curtis (Rep.-Nebr.), CR, 3 April 1941,2949. 9. “Tobey's Nose,” Time, 28 April 1941,14. For endorsements of Tobey’s position, see“Let the People Know the Truth,” Daily Worker, 19 April 1941,14; Waldrop, “For the Record,” W TH , 25 April 1941,12. 10. Tobey, N Y T , 1 May 1941,1. 11. Text of agreement, NYT, 11 April 1941,4; press conference, 12 April 1941, Roosevelt Papers and Addresses, voL 10: The Call to B attle Stations, 1941, comp. Samuel Rosenman (New York: Random House, 1950): 117-20. 12. Berle in Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold o f War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and Am erican Entry into World War II (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1988), 87; entry of 6 February 1941, Navigating, 356. See also Livingstone Hartley and Donald C. Blaisdell, “Defeatism,” and “Implications of Greenland,” CDAAA, W ashington Office Inform ation Letter 15 (25 April 1941): 1,3, Box 35, CDAAA Papers. 13. Fortune poll, August 1941, Cantril, Public O pinion, 782. 14. “Campaign 1941,” Uncensored 80 (12 April 1941): 2. See also Bender, CR, 24April 1941,3284; Case, CR, 24April 1941,3284;“FromGreenland to the Red Sea,” Christian C entury 58 (23 April 1941): 548; “War 1,000 Miles Closer as U.S. Takes Greenland,” U.S. Week, 19 April 1941,2; Castle Diary, 16 April 1941. 15. See, for example, “The United States Moves into Greenland,” CT, 12 April 1941,8. 16. SFE, 18 April 1941, 13; “U.S. Bases on Greenland,” N YD N , 14 April 1941, 19; MacLiesh and Reynolds, Strategy, 53. The latter two authors suggested maintaining a seasonal base there. See 234. 17. “The President’s Red Sea Order,” text, N Y T , 12 April 1941,7; Time, 19 May 1941,17; Wheeler, CT, 13 April 1941,4. See also Woodruff, CR, 24 April 1941,3284. 18. Heinrichs, Threshold, 47. 19. Bailey and Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt, 134; William L Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (New York: Harper, 1953), 446. 20. Press conference, 25 April 1941, N Y T , 26 April 1941,1,4. For criticism of Roosevelt's distinc­ tion between patrols and convoys, see “Washington Picture,” Uncensored 85 (17 May 1941): 3; “Con­ voys Mean Shooting and Shooting Means War,” Christian C entury 58 (7 April 1941 ): 611. 21. Roosevelt, N Y T , 30 April 1941,1; “Pressure Parade,” Newsweek, 2 June 1941,17. 22. See, for example, R. Douglas Stuart Jr. to Robert E. Wood, 26 April 1941, Box 69, AFC Papers; William R. Castle to Sterling Morton, 8 August 1941, Morton Papers; Marcantonio, CR, 30 April 1941, 3465; Fish, CR, 5 May 1941,3583. 23. Hoover, speech, NewYork, 11 May 1941, in CR, A2315. Endorsements included General Charles G. Dawes, New York Herald Tribune, 14 May 1941; Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 13 May 1941,1; Rankin, CR, 14 May 1941, A2315. In private Hoover predicted that a warlike incident would occur, saying, “Wewill see our ships sunk and American boys killed.” Letter to William J. Gross, 7 April 1941, Hoover Papers. 24. Villaid, “The Truth about the Convoy Outcry,” Uncensored, 10 May 1941,4; AFC, W ashington News Letter 16 (4 June 1941): 3;“Washington Picture,” Uncensored%5 (17 May 1941): 3. fice Inform ation Letter

430

Notes to Pages 179-181

25. See, for example, Alf Landon and Frederick ). Libby dted in Libby, "Britain Can’t Hold Out Many Months More,” Peace Action 7 (May 1941): 2; "Washington Picture,” Uncensored 85 (17 May 1941): 3. 26. Taft, radio address, "Shall the United States Enter the European War?” 17 May 1941, in CR, A2343. See also Villard, “Some Vital War Facts,” Progressive, 24 May 1941,5; Amos Pinchot to Lincoln Colcord, 13 May 1941, Pinchot Papers. 27. "Through Falsehood to War,” CT, 5 April 1941,12; Vandenberg, CR, 7 May 1941,3693. Inter­ ventionists had often claimed 205 ships had been sunk. 28. C hristian C entury 58 (21 May 1941): 676. For other citations of the Land letter, see open letter, Amos Pinchot to Henry L. Stimson, 6 May 1941, in CR, 4097; Taft, radio address, "Shall the United States Enter the European War?” 17 May 1941, CR, A2343; "Convoys,” Uncensored 84 (10 May 1941): 1-2; "The Convoy Fraud Exposed,” CT, 9 May 1941,14; Joseph Starobin, “The Convoy Conspiracy,” N ew Masses 39 (20 May 1941 ): 4. 29. "Land and the British,” Time, 19 May 1941,17; NYT, 13 May 1941,7; Roosevelt to Emory S. Land, 10 May 1941, F.D.R.: H is Personal Letters, 1152-53. In a letter to anti-interventionist Bruce Bar­ ton, Roosevelt said that he was fully cognizant of the problems in getting goods to Britain, for the problem not only came from submarines, as in World War 1, but from "the heavily armed fast surface raider, the bombing plane operating for off shore, and the night bombing of English, Scotch and North Irish ports after a ship actually gets there.” He claimed that Land’s figures were of "no value,” being "foisted on him by a young statistician who made them up from newspaper stories.” Letter dated 19 May 1941, Roosevelt Papers. 30. Admiralty statement, NYT, 9 May 1941,7. 31. See, for example, "How Desperate Is Britain?” Christian C entury 58 (7 June 1941): 614; "Sensa­ tional Charge by Maritime Union,” In Fact 2(21 April 1941 ): 2-3; "Through Falsehood to War,” CT, 5 April 1941,12; "Where the War Stands,” New Masses 39 (6 May 1941): 4. 32. Bennett, CR, 23 April 1941,3254. See also Sweeney, CR, 30 April 1941,3437. 33. Shafer, CR, 22 May 1941, A2437. 34. N Y T , 9 April 1941,1,4; Bland, CR, 5 May 1941,3585; 6 May 1941,3669. 35. See, for example, Bender, CR, 6 May 1941,3589; Dondero, CR, 6 May 1941,3590. Only one anti­ interventionist backed the bill, claiming that any government could seize any property it deemed in the public need. "But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 5 April 1941,7. 36. Fish, CR, 5 May 1941,3582. See also Fish, CR, 6 May 1941,3669. 37. Vorys, CR, 5 May 1941,3592. See also Representative Francis Culkin (Rep.-N.Y.), 3589; Short, CR, 6 May 1941,3665; Short in Newsweek, 19 May 1941,17. 38. Edwin M. Borchard to William R. Castle, 5 May 1941, Borchard Papers. Borchard found legal the protests by Denmark and Italy. Edwin M. Borchard to George Holden Tinkham, 16 April 1941, Borchard Papers. 39. Allen, CR, 5 May 1941,3584. 40. Bland, CR, 5 May 1941,3587. House Republicans backed an amendment introduced by Con­ gressman Culkin that would have prevented the president from transferring German and Italian ships to the British. It was defeated 222 to 160. CR, 6 May 1941,3678. In the Senate Vandenberg offered an amendment similar to that of Culkin, which was voted down 38 to 43. CR, 15 May 1941,4103-4. For general narrative, see "Overt Act,” Tim e, 19 May 1941,17. 41. Vandenberg, CR, 15 May 1941,4068,4099. For the accusation that the move was warlike, see also House Minority Report cited by Robsion, CR, 6 May 1941,3657; Fish, 5 May 1941,3580; Bradley, 5 May 1941,3594; Raymond S. Springer (Rep.-Ind.), 8 May 1941, A2178; "Comment,” Am erica 65 (24 May 1941): 170. 42. Culkin, CR, 5 May 1941,3590; Robsion, CR, 6 May 1941,3659. 43. House roll call, N YT, 8 May 1941,12; Senate roll call, 16 May 1941,4. 44. Roosevelt address, text, NYT, 28 May 1941,12; "Text of Proclamation,” NYT, 1. 45. NYT, 29 May 1941,1,2. 46. Burns, Soldier, 91. 47. Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with D estiny (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 371.

Notes to Pages 181-183

431

48. AFC in Newsweek, 9 June 1941, 14; Doenecke, IDU, 49. For similar comments, see General Wood in AFC, W ashington News Letter 15 (30 May 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 262-63; “Mr. Roosevelt’s Oration,” N YD N , 29 May 1941,19; “Freedom of FDR,” Uncensored 87 (31 May 1941): 1, 3; Dennis, WF1148 (29 May 1941): 3. 49. See, for example, Ruth Sarles to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 31 May 1941, in Doenecke, ID U , 128. 50. Woodruff, CR, 29 May 1941,4573. 51. AFC Research Bureau, “Freedom of the Seas,” D id You Know? 3 (26 June 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 276-78. See also Edwin M. Borchard to John A. Danaher, 30 May 1941, Borchard Papers; Her­ bert W. Briggs, Cornell [University] D aily Sun, 26 May 1941, 5; Waldrop, “The Free Seas,” W TH , 11 June 1941,12; Waldrop, “This Freedom,” W TH , 17 September 1941,12. 52. “Freedom of FDR,” Uncensored 87 (31 May 1941): 2; Bennett, speech, NBC red network, 2 June 1941, in CR, A2654; Nye, “Fraudulent Freedoms,” address of 12 June 1941, in CR, A2864. See also Robsion, CR, 12 August 1941,7007. 53. Reynolds, Creation, 347 n. 38. For firsthand accounts, see, for example, Ickes, entry of 12 April 1941, Secret Diary, 3:466; 25 May 1941,3:347. 54. Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: W ild B ill Donovan (NewYork: Times Books, 1982), 156. 55. Roosevelt to Churchill, 10 May 1941, in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 1:184. On 2 May, Churchill had said to Eden, “There has been a considerable recession across the Atlantic,” with the con­ sequences that “quite consciously we are being left very much to our fate.” Warren F. Kimball, “Churchill and Roosevelt: The Personal Equation,” Prologue 6 (Fall 1974): 178. 56. Demaree Bess, “Our Frontier on the Danube: The Appalling Story of Our Meddling in the Balkans,” Saturday Evening Post 213 (24 June 1941): 9,118-20. 57. See, for example, Nye, CR, 23 May 1941,4365-66; “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 29 May 1941, 5; Case, CR, July 3,1941,5821. 58. See, for example, “Who Killed Yugoslavia and Greece?” N YD N , 26 May 1941,21. 59. “Promises,” Uncensored 80 (12 April 1941): 1. See also “The Big Picture,” Uncensored 81 (19 April 1941): 1-2. Donovan called Uncensoreds claims about him “wholly and completely untrue.” William J. Donovan to Cushman Reynolds, 2 June 1941, Hertzberg Papers. Editor Cushman Reynolds replied that he was giving an objective appraisal of the situation. Cushman Reynolds to William J. Donovan, 13 June 1941, Hertzberg Papers. Donovan again denied the charges. William J. Donovan to Cushman Reynolds, 16 June 1941, Hertzberg Papers. 60. Fish, CR, 14 April 1941,3084. For similar comments, see Charles Gayton Morrison, address, AFC, Chicago Rally, 27 April 1941, in NCPW Papers; Wheeler, SFE, 16 April 1941,5. For a similar claim concerning both Greece and Yugoslavia, see “Comment,” America 65 (26 April 1941): 59; Herbert Hoover to John O'Laughlin, 13 April 1941, Stanford Files. 61. See, for example, Demaree Bess, “The Battle of the Balkans,” Saturday Evening Post 213 (26 April 1941): 14-15,60-62; Nye, CR, 29 April 1941,3382; Sokolsky, “These Days: Colonel Donovan’s Mission,” New York Sun, 29 April 1941,20. 62. Hanighen,“Wild Bill at Large,” memo, ca. April 1941, Hertzberg Papers. 63. For Teapot Dome, see Wheeler, CR, 31 July 1941,6501. For the Nye Committee, see Hanighen, “Wild Bill at Large.” 64. Gilbert, Churchill, 6: chaps. 55-58; Brown, Last Hero, chap. 10; Peter B. Lane, The U nited States and the Balkan Crisis o f 1940-1941 (New York: Garland, 1988), 248,289-90. 65. “Facts about Yugoslavia,” Social Justice, 21 April 1941,11; Social Justice, 11 November 1940,9. 66. Pettengill, “The ’Noble Democracies,’” Release 224,11 February 1941, Box 11, Pettengill Papers; “Getting Ready for the Next War,” Christian Century 57 (11 September 1940): 1103. See also Taft, “Rus­ sia and the Four Freedoms,” speech, CBS, 25 June 1941, in CR, A3077; Nye, “TWo Men in a Boat,” speech to AFC rally, NewYork City, in CR, 13 November 1941, A1501; Devere Allen, "Some Dictators Are Nice,” Call, 18 January 1941,2; Wheeler, CR, 28 February 1941,1522; Norman Thomas, testimony, SFRC, 3 February 1941,305; Robert Rice Reynolds, SFRC, 8 February 1941,683. 67. Herbert Hoover to William J. Gross, 7 April 1941, Hoover Papers; Dennis, WFL 138 (20 March 1941): 2. See also 139 (27 March 1941): 2.

432

Notes to Pages 183-186

68. “The Drive on Suez,“ CT, 16 April 1941,12; “What Next?" N YD N , 2 May 1941,29. 69. See, for example, Social Justice, 5 May 1941,3; Sokolsky, “These Days: The Neo-Defeatists,“ New York Sun, 3 May 1941,16; “A Possible Road to Peace,“ C hristian C entury 5$ (11 June 1941): 775; Henry Haskell, “Stalin Bound to Axis; Looks to Middle East,“ Call, 31 May 1941,2. 70. William R. Castle to Edwin M. Borchard, 9 April 1941, Borchard Papers. See also Castle Diary, 6 April 1941. 71. CT, 6 June 1941,14. See also “The Lesson of Crete,“ CT, 3 June 1941,12. 72. Mundt, CR, 22 May 1941, A2463; “A Black Day for the Axis,“ N YD N , 2 April 1941,35. 73. Lindbergh, “Reaffirmation,“ A tlantic M onthly 167 (June 1941): 686; Wheeler, [University of] M ichigan Daily, 6 May 1941,1. See also Ernest L. Meyer, “The Man in the Alcove,“ Progressive, 24 May 1941,4. 74. “After the Ball,” N YD N , 9 June 1941,19. For a similar prediction, see “Stalin Is 60, Hitler Is 50," N YD N , 22 December 1939,23. 75. “Worse News,“ Uncensored 82 (26 April 1941): 4; “Bombing Results Compared,” CT, 17 May 1941, 10; Ruth Sarles to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 24 May 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 249. See also “Peace Talk’ Rumors Gain in Washington,” Call, 14 June 1941,8. 76. See, for example, Truman Smith cited in Herbert Hoover, memorandum, 1 June 1941, Hoover Papers; Morley Diary, 13 April 1941; John Haynes Holmes, “Editorials,” U nity 127 (June 1941): 56; Charles A. Lindbergh cited in Chamberlin Diary, 3 June 1941; Lindbergh, entry of 28 June 1941, W artim e Journals, 511. 77. Nye, Yale [University] D aily News, 25 April 1941,3; Baldwin, Yale D aily News, 24 April 1941,1. In his book, Baldwin was slightly more optimistic. Underground resistance in Czechoslovakia and Poland, he said, could indicate the shape of things to come. United We Stand! 45-46. 78. Wood interview, PM, 25 May 1941,4-5. See also Robert E. Wood to Sterling Morton, 25 May 1941, Morton Papers. 79. Frederick J. Libby to Gilbert Stinger, 22 May 1941, NCPW Papers. 80. WFL 149(5 June 1941): 4-5; 150(12 June 1941): 3; 141 (lOApril 1941): 1; Social Justice, 7 April 1941,6; Social Justice, 5 May 1941,3; “Comment: The German Record,” Social Justice, 16 June 1941,4. 81. Herbert Hoover to William J. Gross, 7 April 1941, Hoover Papers; “The Immediate Relation of the United States to This War,” address, New York City, 12 May 1941, in CR, A2315-16. For further stress on British weakness by Hoover and Lindbergh, see Charles A. Lindbergh, entry of 31 May 1941, W artim e Journals, 498. 82. For a denial that Britain would be invaded, see Berle, entry of 26 May 1941, Navigating, 369. For doubts of an invasion among British leaders, see entry of 22 April 1940, Lee, London Journal, 254. 83. See Kahn, “United States View,” 493. 84. Ickes, entries of 4 March and 30 May 1941, Secret Diary, 3:503,527; Life, 21 April 1941,96-99; polls of 25 April and 29 May 1941, Cantril, Public O pinion, 1187. 85. Waldo Heinrichs, “FDR and the Entry into World War II,” Prologue 26 (Fall 1994): 124-26. 86. See, for example, Clay Judson to R. M. Hutchins, 19 May 1941, AFC Papers; Robert E Wood to Sterling Morton, 25 May 1941, Morton Papers; Chiperfield, CR, 24 June 1941, A3026; Edwin Johnson and D. Worth Clark in CT, 2 June 1941,5; “Why Short of War?” Common Sense 10 (May 1941): 145; Wheeler, CT, 22 June 1941, 3. For a more cautious estimate by Common Sense, see “Russia and the War,” 10 (August 1941 ): 240, in which the liberal monthly said that such a peace could only serve as an armed truce among enemies and last only as long as it was mutually convenient. 87. Nye, Yale D aily News, 25 April 1941, 3; La Follette, [University of North Carolina] D aily Tar Heel, 15 May 1941,1. 88. Hearst,“ln the News,” SFE, 25 April 1941,1; Robert E. Wood to Sterling Morton, 25 May 1941, Morton Papers. For a similar view of the British Empire, see Rankin, CR, 4 June 1941,4727; Edwin M. Borchard to Henry Houghton, 10 April 1941, Borchard Papers. 89. “Last Call,” N YD N , 20 April 1941,25. 90. See, for example, Chester Bowles to Roy Larsen, 30 April 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 286; John T. Flynn to Robert E. Wood, 5 June 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 112; Villard, “The Fate of England,” C hrist­

Notes to Pages 186-187

433

ian C entury 58 (11 June 1941): 781; Dennis, W F L 149 (5 June 1941): 2; 147 (22 May 1941): 4; "Are We Afraid of Peace?" C hristian C entury 58 (18 June 1941): 795; Hoover in Lindbergh, entry of 31 May 1941, W artim e Journals, 498; Case, CR, 6 June 1941,4820. For a rare example of pessimism, see Lin­ coln Colcord to Amos Pinchot, 14 May 1941, Pinchot Papers. 91. Wheeler, Newsweek, 2 June 1941,14; “Peace Feelers," N YD N , 21 May 1941,31. For Paris press, sec NIT, 19 May 1941,6. 92. Connally, Newsweek, 2 June 1941,14. For rumore concerning Connall/s statement, see Ruth Sarles to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 24 May 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 249; AFC, Washington News Letter 16 (4 June 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 264; “War or Peace for America," CT, 24 May 1941,8; “Peace," Uncensored 86 (24 May 1941): 2; “‘Peace Talk* Rumors Gain in Washington," Call, 14 June 1941,8. 93. See, for example, Villard noted in Chamberlin Diary, 31 May 1941. For Roosevelt's denial, see Ickes, entry of 8 June 1941, Secret Diary, 3:535; Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 347. For additional spec­ ulation concerning peace terms, see Ruth Sarles to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 31 May 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 129; AFC, W ashington News Letter 16 (4 June 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 264; Case, CR, 6 June 1941,4820; Sokolsky, “These Days: The Peace Offensive," N ew York Sun, 10 June 1941,10; Dennis, WFL 149 (5 June 1941): 2; “Peace in the Offing," Social Justice, 2 June 1941,3. 94. For claims that Hess was offering a peace bid, see Rankin, CR, 20 May 1941,4279; Hoffman, CR, 31 July 1941,6561; Wheeler and Voorhis in Newsweek, 2 June 1941,14; Herbert Hoover in Smith, Uncommon M an, 298. 95. Gabriel Gorodesky, “The Hess Affair and Anglo-Soviet Relations on the Eve of‘Barbarossa,'" English H istorical Review 101 (April 1986): 405-20; Alan Bullock, H itler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (New York: Knopf, 1992), 713-14. 96. “Washington Picture: Logic," Uncensored 85 (17 May 1941): 2; Hoover cited in Helen Essary, “Dear Washington," W T H ,3 July 1941,10; D aily Worker, 21 June 1941,1,4. See also Frederick J. Libby to Cyrus H. Karraker, 22 May 1941, NCPW Papers; Libby to Gilbert Stinger, 22 May 1941, NCPW Pa­ pers; “Peace Discussions, Not Peace Negotiations, Have Begun," Peace Action 7 (May 1941): 1; Devere Allen, “Was Hess Visit His Third?" Call, 9 August 1941,2; “Peace in the Offing,” Social Justice, 2 June 1941,3; Seldes, In Fact 3 (30 June 1941): 1. 97. Hess in CT, 29 October 1944,19. 98. “Mystery Surrounds the Flight of Hess," C hristian C entury 58 (21 May 1941): 676. See also the Trotskyist M ilitant, 17 May 1941,1. 99. “Nazi Madness," C hristian C entury 58 (28 May 1941): 712. See also Lincoln Colcord to Amos Pinchot, 14 May 1941, Pinchot Papers; TYavers Clement, “Wishful Thinking Seen in Buildup Given Hess," Call, 24 May 1941,1. 100. “Comment," Am erica 65 (24 May 1941): 170; Dennis, WFL 146 (15 May 1941): 2. Similarly Cudahy saw no backing in Germany for the flight. Testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,171. 101. “The Flight of Hess,” N YD N , 14 May 1941,29. 102. Oscar Mannheimer, “What Rudolph Hess Was After," N ew Masses 39 (27 May 1941 ): 68. 103. Report of Frederick J. Libby, 20 May 1941, NCPW Papers; report of John Nevin Sayre, 28 March-25 May 1941, FOR Papers; American Friends Service Committee, “A Call to Persons of Good Will," in Christian C entury 58 (18 June 1941): 801. 104. Voorhis, CR, 19 May 1941,4234. 105. For reference to H.J. Res. 131, see CR, 3 March 1941, 1699. For endorsement by the NCPW Council, see minutes, 29 May 1941,6, NCPW Papers. 106. For endorsements of Vorys’s effort, see Libby minutes, NCPW executive board, 20 May 1941, NCPW Papers; “Comment,” America 65 (5 July 1941): 338-39. The AFC gave the proposal publicity while not endorsing a negotiated peace. See R. A. Moore, Bulletin #383,2 July 1941, AFC Papers; AFC, W ashington News Letter 16 (4 June 1941 ), in Doenecke, IDU, 264. Norman Thomas endorsed the gen­ eral notion of a peace offensive but feared that if Roosevelt were involved, he would lead the nation into war. Norman Thomas to John M. Vorys, 8 May 1941, Thomas Papers. As late as November, Vorys pressed his peace offensive, declaring that a five-point program of Secretary Hull, the speeches of Un­ dersecretary Sumner Welles, and the Atlantic Charter could become the basis of more concrete pro-

434

Notes to Pages 187-189

posais. Vorys, CR, 13 November 1941,8883. The German people, he said, should be offered an alter­ native just so that their government would have to accept or face insurrection. If the United States re­ fused to deal with Hitler, it should state the terms it would offer if he were overthrown. CR, 28 No­ vember 1941,8883. 107. For Vorys's plan, see “An American Peace Offensive,“ speech at Williams College, 26 April 1941, in CR, A1984-86; Vorys, CR, 5 May 1941, 3592; 9 May 1941, 3880; “The United Sûtes, the War, and the Future," speech before the Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 24 May 1941, in CR, 3100-3101; John H. Vorys to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 3 May 1941, Roosevelt Papers. Roosevelt replied that he would take Vorys’s views into account. FDR to John H. Vorys, 17 May 1941, Roosevelt Papers. 108. For Roosevelt, see Edwin M. Borchard to Henry Houghton, 4 April 1941, Borchard Papers; Robert A. Taft, speech, CBS, 25 June 1941, in CR, 3077; Ludlow, radio speech, WJSV, Washington, D.C, 27 May 1941, in Box 11, Fettengill Papers. For Pius, see SFE, 16 April 1941,14; actress Lilllian Gish, speech, 9 May 1941, Executives’ Club of Chicago, in CR, A2563. 109. Participants would include Pius XII, President Ernst Wetter of Switzerland, King Gusuv of Sweden, President ismet Inonu of İbrkey, and a South American represenudve of the Pan-American conference. These five, or their personal representatives, could meet with a U.S. represenudve. Mundt, CBS broadcast “America’s Rendezvous with Destiny," 20 May 1941, in CR, A2426. See also Mundt, CR, 22 May 1941, A2463; Mundt, Am erican Forum o f the A ir 3 (8 June 1941): 8. Norman Thomas opposed Mundt’s bid, fearing that Roosevelt would use it to issue an ultimatum to Germany and Japan, the re­ jection of which would be another reason for bringing the United Sûtes into war. Norman Thomas to Karl Mundt, 12 June 1941, Thomas Papers. 110. Sidney BradshawFay,“Problems of PeaceSentiment," Events: The M onthly Review o f World Affairs 9 (April 1941): 241-48; 9 (May 1941 ): 321-30; Gold, D aily Worker, 29 May 1941,7. Gold stressedthat com­ munist-sponsored American Peace Mobilization included all of Fay’s planks in its peace program. 111. Hull address, text, N Y T , 19 May 1941, 1, 2; Ludlow, speech, CBS,“The Peace Side," 28 May 1941, in CR, A2599-2600, which also notes endorsements of Ludlow’s resolution came from Harry Emerson Fosdick and William Cardinal O’Connell of Boston; Louis Ludlowto Samuel B. Pettengili, 30 May 1941, Box 11, PettengiU Papers; Mundt, CBS broadcast “America’s Rendezvous with Destiny," 20 May 1941, in CR, A2426. 112. Sterling Morton to Robert R. McCormick, 23 May 1941, Morton Papers; “‘Peace Talk* Rumors Gain in Washington," Call, 14 June 1941,8. 113. “Text of President's Address Depicting Emergency Confronting the Nation," N Y T , 28 May 1941,12. 114. GaUup poU, 6 May 1941, Cantril, Public O pinion, 975. One GaUup poll, taken on 8 April 1941, showed 47 percent in favor of Britain negotiating with the Germans, 46 percent opposed, and 7 percent possessing no opinion. Other polls showed much stronger opposition. Cantril, Public Opinion, 1136. CHAPTER 13: GREAT BRITAIN

1. Manfred Jonas, “Pro-Axis Sentiment and American Isolationism," H istorian 29 (February 1967): 221-37. 2. “No Hostility to England," CT, 1 November 1939,14; Norman Thomas to Henry Sloane Coffin, 6 August 1940, Thomas Papers; “The Consequences of Stumblebum Diplomacy," N YD N , 24 August 1940,13. For further endorsement of British victory, see “Dicutor ChurchiU," N YD N , 24 May 1940, 29; “We’re Not Anti-British," N YD N , 23 February 1941,43. 3. Charles A. Lindbergh, “We Cannot Win This War for England," speech. NewYork AFC meeting, 23 April 1941, in Vital Speeches 7 (1 May 1941): 424; Hearst, “In the News," W T H ,2 April 1941,9. 4. For a description of British efforts in this regard, see Nicholas John CuU, Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against Am erican uN eutralityn in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). For the accusation that British intelligence successfuUy led in this enterprise, see Thomas

Notes to Pages 190-191

435

Earl Mahl, Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-1944 (Washing­ ton, D.C.: Brassley’s, 1998). 5. Lindbergh, entry of 28 December 1940, War W ithin, 456. 6. For a full-scale treatment of the interwar period, see John E. Moser, Twisting the Lion's T ail Am erican Anglophobia Between the World Wars (New York: New York University Press, 1999). 7. Barnes, [University of] M ichigan Daily; 17 May 1940,2. See also John Haynes Holmes, address, “Getting America into War Has Started Again,” 27 September 1939, in CR, A200. 8. Sidney Rogerson, Propaganda and the N ext War (London: Bles, 1938). For citations, see Holt, CR, 18 October 1939,542; Holmes, “Getting America into War Has Started Again”; Sargent, Bulletin #2, June 1939, G etting US into War, 102-3. 9. Dreiser, America Is Worth Saving, 71. For attacks on the book, see ELDuflus,“Dreiser to the Res­ cue,” NYT Book Review, 9 February 1941,22; “Counsel from Hollywood,” Time, 3 February 1941,76. For a mixed review, see Granville Hicks, “Dreiser to die Rescue,” Saturday Review o f Literature 23 (22 Febru­ ary 1941), 13. For praise, see Samuel Sillen, “Dreiser’s J'AccuseT New Masses 38 (28 January 1941): 24-26. 10. For brief biographies of Sargent, see “Sargent’s Bulletins,” Tim e, 25 December 1939,34; George H. Cless Jr., “Sargent: Oracle of Education,” Scribner's Com m entator 9 (February 1941 ): 58-63; “Porter (Edward) Sargent,” in C urrent Biography, 1941,751-52. 11. Among the bulletin’s endorsers were such anti-interventionists as H. L Mencken, Boake Carter, Alfred M. Bingham, Gerald P. Nye, Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, George Holden Tinkham, Hubert Her­ ring, Burton Rascoe, Al Williams, Upton Gose, Burton Wheeler, and Bennett Champ Clark. Educators included philosopher John Dewey, university president Robert Maynard Hutchins, Anglican educator Bernard Iddings Bell, historians Charles A. Beard and Will Durant, biologist Raymond Pearl, anthro­ pologist Earnest Hooton, sociologist R A. Ross, astronomer Harlow Shapley, and psychologist Good­ win Watson. See G etting US into War, passim. See also Norman Thomas to Porter Sargent, 28 Febru­ ary 1940, Thomas Papers; Oswald Garrison Villard to Porter Sargent, 30 July 1940, Villard Papers; Dorothy Detzer to Helen Lyle Creed, 4 April 1940, WIL Papers; John Haynes Holmes to Porter Sargent, 24 May 1940, Holmes Papers. 12. See, for example, Dennis, WFL 145 (8 May 1941): 5; Social Justice, 26 May 1941,14; pacifist ac­ tivist Edwin C. Johnson, Fellowship 7 (August 1941): 143; Morris H. Rubin, “The Last Column,” Pro­ gressive, 7 June 1941,12; Ernest L Meyer, “Fish Learn Quicker,” Progressive, 20 September 1941,4; Al­ bert Jay Nock, “Getting US into War,” Scribner's Com m entator 10 (September 1941): 81-84; Paul Hutchinson, “The Spirit of Sam Adams,” C hristian C entury 58 (2 July 1941): 865. 13. See, for example, Holt, CR, 9 Octoberl939,184; Theodore Dreiser to Frederick V. Field, 25 No­ vember 1940, Hertzberg Papers; “Let’s Fight for Peace,” Social Justice, 18 September 1939,3. 14. Mencken, “Notes on a Moral War,” Baltim ore Sun, 8 October 1939. See also Mencken, [Prince­ ton University] D aily Princetonian, 4 March 1941,1. 15. “The War Parties,” CT, 22 September 1939,14. See also “Unequal Partners,” CT, 29 November 1940,12. 16. John Bassett Moore to Edwin M. Borchard, 6 December 1939, Borchard Papers. See also John Bassett Moore to Hiram Johnson, 28 March 1940, copy in Borchard Papers. 17. Bone, statement of 5 November 1940, cited in Sargent, Bulletin #12,16 October 1939, G etting US into War, 151 n. 13; “The Status Quo—It Is Always to Be Maintained but Never Is,” N YD N , 29 Sep­ tember 1940,45; “Conversation Piece,” N YD N , 18 September 1941,31; John Haynes Holmes to Fred­ erick J. Libby, 7 November 1941, NCPW Papers. See also “Cost of Saving British Empire,” N YD N , 26 July 1941,13; “Lafayette, We Are Here,” N YD N , 21 September 1941,41. 18. Ralph Townsend was an exception among the extreme anti-interventionists in finding relations “fairly good” between two nations. Testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,812. 19. Downey, CR, 9 October 1939,183; Beals, Pan America, 157. 20. Sargent, Bulletin #69,20 July 1940, G etting US into War, 395 n. 12; Holt, CR, 9 October 1939, 18; Social Justice, 20 June 1940,5. For other comments on the War of 1812, see Coughlin, “The Presi­ dent’s Message to Congress,” Social Justice, 2 October 1939,4; Harrison George, “Change the World,” D aily Worker, 17 January 1940,7; Dreiser, America Is Worth Saving, 63.

436

Sc:** te Pışts 191-193

2 i . Ffif i zerr.eti. ır.dıct.-r.er.:. see Harvev Weston. “Ar.gio-American Relations." V ^ H r ? Cc—m e n Septerr.'îer 1*41 : Weston used as his w u r a a book S ’ B d Moose poeneai wr^er George H err. Pivr.e. £r*:ued. H«rr Treatment r Amencj New York: Sears* 1931 . For American Rev­ olution. see Short- CA 5 Fesruarv :941. 6m ). For Monroe Doctrine. see Nve. CA “ No%err.Ser 1*41. 66 : > Vor.v CA i» ?ur.e 1940 »343: Chaves CA 2“ Februarv 1941. 148". For Confederacy. seeVirc_i Faner. idak.: i>*w. in tesman. " far.uarv 1941. 22. See. for example. “Nve vs. Morgen thau." S e n t r y ’s Commentator 9 A rrJ 1941 : lô. 23. Sweer.ev. CP. !4 Ausu.it 1940. 10.339. See aiso CP. 4 September 1940. Iİ-5I i. 24. Church:.!. 7Ae Anerm ath New York: Scrbr.er s. İ929 : Wneeier. CA 5 November 1*41. »52“. 25. I/rr*ser. A/re^ica U Worth *r«:re 71: Chavez. CA 2“ Februarv 1941. L484: Barnes* ‘Course oc CS. sn the War." V/W T. 16 January 1940 14: La Follette. CA 12 October Î939. 332. Conversed. Sen­ ator La Fo..erte artacked both B r tain and France for failing to work with the L'mted Sûtes ut > 3 “ m imposing an arms ban or. Spam. CA 12 October 1939. 332. 26. Da%id A Richards. ‘.America Conquer* Britain: .Ang!«>.American Connie: in the Popular Media during the 192 A" Journal of American Culture 3 Spr.ng i960 : 95-103. zazo* V:

27. See for exam ple. R«#ger WVlie. ‘ Latin America; E con om ic PawTi." $cnrne~'s Com m entator 10

Mav 194! : 45.

28. For the complete text of Düsseldorf, see Leslie Gou!d. “Trade after the War—Is Düssetdorf Pact a Straw3'" New York Journal-American. 10 Februarv 1941. 29. Norman Thomas to Mr. Goldman. 19 fanuarv 1941. Thomas Papers: Norman Thomas. ‘ Your World and Mine- The Problems We Face." C a ll 17 Mav 1941.8: Charles Tobev to .Alfred L Steams* 10 Mav 1941. in CP. A2271: La Follette, testimony. SFRC 3 Februarv İ941. 268-69. 30. "Gold Mme." Uncensored 9 2 December 1939 : 1; William Philip Simms."Britain* Demands." article dated 12 March 1940. in CA 19 March 1940. A1514: Reynolds, CA 29 March 1940. A I5!4. 31. F:sh CA 12March 1940.2730-31. He also accused the British of holding goods that .American merchants had bought m Germany and refusing permission to American exporters seeking to seil cot­ ton to Finland. See also fudge fohn A Matthews of New York Chancery Court, broadcast. IS February 1940. in CA A1770. 32. See. for example, anxieties voiced bv foseph P. Kennedy in Beschloss. Kenneth and RocıeıeiL 197; ‘f ambages and Kings: Bevond His Powers," Scnbner’s Commentator II !November 1941 : 5-b; “The British Trade Offensive." CT. 23 March 1940,8; “Various Trade Wars." CT. 11 December 1939.14: “Fair Deal for American Exports." CT. 30 December 1939.6. 33. Case. CA 13 November 1941,8859. 34. See. for exam p le D en n is. WFL 154 10 fulv 1941 : 2 -3 : “C abbages and Kings: Patient G riseida." Scribner s Commentator 10 O ctob er 1941.: 5; WTieeler. C A 5 N ovem b er 1 9 4 1.8532: W heeler in Time. 17 N ovem ber 1941. 14.

35. “Competition from an Ally."" CT. 21 September 1941. 16. See also “Is This a Serious War for Britain'" CT. 17 June 1941, 10. 36. Nve, CA 7 November 1941.8*05: Jones, CA 6 October 1941, 7801. 37. Revr.oids. (station. 273; P on tin e, J940. 227. 38. WTieeler. C A 28 Februarv 1941, 152; “W hat A m erica N eed s from Britain." CT, 19 M arch 1941, 14;“Tin and the State Departm ent." CT. 6 N ovem ber 1 9 4 0 .1 2 ;“O ur Tin Supply" CT. 13 A ugust 1940, 10. See also “Tin Tintype." Uncensored 46

17 A ugust 1940 »: 4 -5 . Shrewd bargaining, so H ugh Johnson

claim ed, cou ld crack the British tin cartel. “Pacific Trade." S Y WT. 6 Februarv 1940, 17. 39. See, for exam ple, Viliard, ‘ T he Fate o f England." Christian CenturvSS . 11 Fune 1941 :: 781; C o n ­ gressm an Harrv Sau th off

Prog.-W 'is.i, C A 16 O ctob er 1941, 7994; “Ships for Britain." CT. 6 lu n e

1941, 14; “Its T im e to T hink o f Ourselves," CT, 23 Septem ber 1941, 12; Sweenev. broadcast. N B C , 6 M av 1941, in C A A 3 I 5 4 . 40. “ D ollars vs. Em pire s'Cont.»." Uncensored 71 '8 Februarv' 1941 »: 3. See also Frank H an igh en , “C apitol Letter: M inority Report o n Lease-Lend Bill." Common Sense 10 ! February 1 9 4 1 1: 52.

41. See. for example, Dennis, WTL 163 ; 11 September 1941 •: 5; Congressman O’Connor, CA 21 fanuary 1941,213; Robert La Follette, CA 24 Februarv* 1941.1303; “Q & A," Uncensored 66 c4 lanuary 1941 K 3.

Notes to Pages 193-195

437

42. Muste, (University of Wisconsin) D aily C ardinal 1 May 1941,1; La Follette, CR, 24 February 1941,1303; Lindbergh, entry of 6 October 1941, W artim e Journals, 547 (emphasis his). See also Nor­ man Thomas, testimony, HFAC, 22 January 1941,343. 43. Callum A. MacDonald, “The United States, Appeasement and the Open Door,” in Mommsen and Kettenacker, Fascist Challenge, 403,407. 44. Kimball, Juggler, 49,59; Theodore A. Wilson, The First Sum m it: Roosevelt and Churchill a t Pla­ centia Bay, 1941, rev. ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 155-58; William Roger Louis, Im perialism a t Bay: The United States and the Decolonization o f the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 24. 45. Hull, M emoirs, 2:975-76; Graff, Welles, 391; Churchill in Thome, Allies, 101; Kimball, Forged in War, 101. 46. J. G. Lockhart and C. M. Woodhouse, Cecil Rhodes: The Colossus o f South Africa (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 57-58; Robert I. Rotberg, The Founder: Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit o f Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 101-2,666. 47. Flynn, "Other People’s Money: Fascists at Home,” New Republic 103 (14 October 1940): 525; "The Death of Lord Lothian,” Christian C entury 57 (25 December 1940): 1603; Sargent, Bulletin #11, 16 October 1939, G etting US into War, 144. See also Holt, CR, 16 December 1940,13,920; Edward Price Bell, letter to editor, CT, 29 April 1941,10; Albert Hall, "Cecil Rhodes: Father of Union Now,” Scrib­ ner's C om m entator 10 (June 1941): 77-78. 48. Townsend, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,812; Lindbergh, N Y T , 30 October 1941,5. Lind­ bergh was undoubtedly referring to Britain’s attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir, the British in­ terception of three Finnish ships, and a blockade of the northern Finnish port of Fetsamo. 49. Nock, review of Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom (New York: Day, 1941), in Scribner’s Com­ m entator 10 (August 1941 ): 91. See also Nock, review of Douglas Reed, A Prophet a t H om e (London: Cape, 1941), in Scribner’s C om m entator 10 (October 1941): 20. 50. Jerome Frank, Save Am erica First: H ow to M ake O ur Democracy Work (New York: Harper, 1938); Chavez, CR, 25 October 1939,821. For another positive reference to Frank, see Sargent, G et­ ting US into War, 19. When conflict broke out in 1939, Frank himself switched to a more interven­ tionist position. Jerome Frank to Louis Mumford, 30 September 1939, the Papers of Jerome Frank, Yale University Library. 51. Townsend, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,800. For Ibrks, see White, CR, 12 March 1940, 2749. For Weimar, see Henry Nelson Weiman and Arthur E. Holt, "Keep Our Country Out of This War,” C hristian C entury 56 (27 September 1939): 1162; Devere Allen, “Why Did France Collapse?” U nity 125 (15 July 1940): 15; Sargent, G etting US into War, 20-23. 52. Dreiser, speech to American Peace Mobilization, CBS, 9 November 1940, clipping of People’s World, n.d., Hertzberg Papers. See also economist William A. Orton, Mr. Holyoke News, 14 February 1941,1. 53. For Rhineland, see Guyer, CR, 13 November 1941,8838. For Ethiopia, see Reynolds, CR, 18 Oc­ tober 1939,559. For Spain, see Weiman and Holt, 1162. 54. Borah, broadcast, NBC, 27 October 1939, in CR, A463. 55. Wheeler, CR, 6 August 1941,9931. See also Tobey, address to the American Mothers of Massa­ chusetts, Boston Commons, 11 May 1941, in CR, A2267; Sargent, G etting US into War, 21. 56. See, for example, Dwight Macdonald, "Sparks in the News,” Socialist Appeal, 16 December 1939, 4; Boake Carter in Rock, Chamberlain and Roosevelt, 239 n. 52; "England Is Faced with Revolution,” Social Justice, 6 January 1941, 8; Thomas, "Your World and Mine,” Call, 4 November 1939, 3, citing [London] D aily Telegram; Aaron Levenstein, "Do Nazis Get British Arms?” Call, 25 November 1939,2; Levenstein, "Bankers Do Business with Nazis,” Call, 9 December 1939,3. 57. Holt, CR, 18 October 1939,549. 58. Sargent, G etting US into War, 20-23; William K. Hutchinson, “Hitler-British Tie Suspected by Borah,” W TH , 2 February 1940. 59. "Business as Usual,” Uncensored 8 (25 November 1939): 1. For similar indictments, see "Busi­ ness as Usual,” Uncensored 10 (9 December 1939): 2; Socialist Appeal, 16 December 1939,4; Aaron Lev­ enstein, "Trading with the Enemy,” Call, 9 December 1939,1.

438

Notes to Pages 195-197

60. Canada met with similar criticism. In January 1940, Uncensored noted that at the very time Britain was aiding Finland to resist Russian invasion, Canada was selling a million bushels of wheat to the aggressor. Such imports, it said, could release Russian-grown wheat for Germany’s granaries, which in turn would operate to further Hitler’s original strategy in making the Nazi-Soviet trade and mutual assistance agreements. “Business as Usual," Uncensored 16 (20 January 1940): 2. See also Sargent, Bul­ letin #30,26 January 1940, G etting US into War, 248. 61. Nye, CR, 12 October 1939,361. See also Senator La Follette, CR, 12 October 1939,331; D. Worth Clark, CR, 16 October 1939,447; “Is Britain Willing to Arm Her Enemies?" C hristian C entury 56 (25 October 1939): 1292; Aaron Levenstein, “Do Nazis Get British Arms?" Call, 25 November 1939, 1; “Merchants of Blood and Iron," Call, 30 December 1939,4. 62. “Business as Usual," Uncensored 6(11 November 1939): 1. 63. Dreiser, Am erica Is W orth Saving, chap. 14; Nye, CR, 9 October 1939,192; “Let’s Put an End to This Hysteria," Labor, 11 June 1940; Clark, CR, 18 October 1939, 548; Barnes, “Keep Out of War and Investigate the War-Mongers" [draft], Box 252, Lundeen Papers. 64. “Blunder upon Blunder," CT, 2 October 1939,12. See also Dennis, WFL 94 (16 May 1940): 1. 65. “Mr. Chamberlain in Peace and War,” CT, 13 November 1941,12. 66. See, for example, “Mr. Chamberlain’s Record," New Republic 101 (13 September 1939): 142; “Guardians of Democracy: Chamberlain," Uncensored 15 (13 January 1940): 4; “Our Buzzards Come to Roost," Am erican Guardian, 8 September 1939,4; In Fact 1 (10 March 1940): 3. 67. “Exit Chamberlain and Enter Churchill," CT, 12 May 1940,16; “Chamberlain Resigns," N YD N , 4 October 1940,37. See also Lois and Donaldson Thorbum, “Beau Saboteur," Scribner's C om m entator 10 (April 1940): 68-69. 68. Hearst, “In the News," SFE, 13 November 1940, 1; “What Hitler-Stalin Pact Means to the World," Social Justice, 4 September 1939,7. 69. For rightist criticism, see Dennis, WFL 131 (30 January 1941): 1; Social Justice, 10 June 1940,4. 70. See, for example, Catherine Curtis, chairman, Women’s National Committee to Keep the United States Out of War, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,825; “Halifax, Propagandist," SFE, 18 July 1941,10; “Cabbages and Kings: 'Quaint Yankee,’" Scribner's C om m entator 10 (August 1941): 5. 71. “Guardians of Democracy: Halifax," Uncensored 15 (13 January 1940): 4. See also Jim Cork, “British Statesmen and India," Call, 12 April 1941,2; Sargent, G etting US into War, 39. Idaho author Vardis Fisher said Halifax jailed one hundred thousand Indians at one time. See “Propaganda, Then and Now," Idaho Sunday Statesm an, 20 April 1941. 72. See, for example, “The 'Reformed’ Appeaser," D aily Worker, 24 December 1940,7; Marcantonio, CR, 5 February 1941,656; Sargent, G etting US into War, 39; “Halifax Is Real," M ilitant, 4 January 1941, 4; “Guardians of Democracy: Halifax," Uncensored 15 (13 January 1940), 4. 73. Wheeler, CR, 4 August 1941,6673. See also speech, “Unity for Peace," 20 March 1941, in CR, A1341. 74. George Ambrose Lloyd, The British Case (New York: Macmillan, 1940). For attacks, see In Fact 2(10 March 1941): 2; Sargent, G etting US into War, 39; “Mr. Brailsfbrd’s Appeal," C hristian C entury 57 (2 October 1940): 1200. 75. Sargent, G etting US into War, 38; Marcantonio, CR, 5 February 1941,656. 76. John Haynes Holmes to Dr. Hedwig S. Kuhn, 10 October 1939,6 December 1939, Holmes Pa­ pers. See also Helen Essary, “Dear Washington," W TH , 6 November 1941,10; Merwin K. Hart, testi­ mony, SFRC, 8 January 1941,745; “Lord Halifax,” CT, 10 May 1941,10; “Britain’s Spokesman," CT, 27 March 1941,10. 77. Roberts, H oly Fox, chap. 30; Cull, Selling War, 126,134. For the claim that Halifax got along well with government and press from the outset, see Kimball, Forged in War, 79. 78. FDR in Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 273; Ickes, entry of 8 February 1941, Secret Diary, 3:428; Hopkins in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 237. 79. Reynolds, Creation, 179. 80. For example, see Congressman Bartel Jonkman (Rep.-Mich.), CR, 4 February 1941,530; “Man of Britain," Saturday Evening Post 213 (18 January 1941 ): 26; George Cless, testimony, SFRC, 8 Febru­

Notes to Pages 197-198

439

ary 1941» 706; Philip Jessup to Hiram Johnson, n.d., read to SFRC, 24 October 1941,252; Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 2 February 1941,1-2; Sargent, G etting US into War, 23,26-31; “Lothian, Before and After,” NYDN, 19 January 1941,43; Nye, CR, 25 February 1941, 1365; Nye, CR, 4 August 1941,6674; “Special Supplement: Lord Lothian,” Uncensored 17 (27 January 1940): 3-4; Ferdinand Lundberg to Sidney Hertzberg, n.d. [ca. late January 1940], Hertzberg Papers. 81. Wheeler, CR, 4 August 1941,6673. For a general attack by Wheeler, see “Unity for Peace,” radio address, 20 May 1941, in CR, A1341. 82. James Burr Hamilton [George Sylvester Viereck], Lord Lothian versus Lord Lothian (Scotch Plains, N.J.: Flanders Hall, 1941), in CR, 19 June 1940, A4036. 83. See, for example, Borah, NYT, 23 October 1939, 1,4; John Bassett Moore to Edwin M. Borchard, 26 October 1939, Borchard Papers. 84. Lothian, address, NYT, 5 January 1940,4; George Holden Tinkham to Cordell Hull, 30 March 1940, entered in CR, 21 March 1940, A1575. For similar criticism, see also “Lothian, British Keynoter,” NYDN, 8 January 1940,17; Holt, NIT, 6 January 1940,3; FrankWaldrop,“Ambassadors and Luncheon Clubs," WTH, 21 April 1940, C15. 85. Associated Press dispatch in CR, 20 November 1940, A6684. When the inevitable protests came, the British news agency denied that Lothian ever included the word “men.” See New York Sun, 16 No­ vember 1940. For the controversy over the word“men,” see B. C. Clark, CR, 26 November 1940,A6707. For an example of anti-interventionist outrage, see Holt, speech. Mutual network, 5 December 1940, in CR, A7054. 86. Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 20 December 1940, 1; Lindbergh, entry of 13 December 1940, W artim e Journals, 428. See also Roy Howard to Lord Beaverbrook, 11 May 1940, Howard Papers; Edwin M. Borchard to George Holden Tinkham, 12 September 1940, Borchard Papers; “Defense of Lord Lothian,” CT, 29 October 1939,16; “Lord Lothian,” CT, 13 December 1940, l;“Lord Lothian,” CT, 4 January 1940, 12; Castle Diary, 12 December 1940; “Cabbages and Kings: He Knew What He Wanted,” Scribner's C om m entator 9 (February 1941): 5; “The Death of Lord Lothian,” Christian Cen­ tu ry 57 (25 December 1940): 1603. 87. For a positive view, see David Reynolds, “Lord Lothian and Anglo-American Relations, 1939-1940,” Transactions o f the American Philosophical Society 73 (pamphlet; Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1983). For a negative one, see Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, “The Inestimable Advan­ tage of Not Being English: Lord Lothian's American Ambassadorship, 1939-1940,” Scottish Historical Review 63 (April 1984): 105-10; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, “Lord Lothian and American Democracy: An Illusion in Pursuit of an Illusion," Canadian Review o f American Studies 17 (Winter 1986): 411-22. 88. For negative reaction, see Social Justice, 30 October 1939,20; Nye, CR, 25 February 1941,1364; Nye, CR, 4 August 1941,6673; G. S. Jackson, “Is Britain's Government Democratic?” New Masses 39 (8 April 1941): 9 ;In F a c tl (1 July 1940): 3; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine: The Problems We Face," Call, 12 May 1941,5; Holt, CR, 18 October 1939,542. 89. “Peace and Power Politics," Uncensored 88 (7 June 1941): 4; “Text of Lord Beaverbrook's Speech," N Y T , 24 March 1941, 4; “Union with Britain?" NYDN, 25 March 1941, 23; Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 7 August 1940,1; “British Cabinet Changes,” CT, 5 May 1941,10. 90. Thomas, testimony, HFAC, 4 February 1941, 333. See also John Haynes Holmes to Alfred P. Perkins, 13 February 1941; Holmes to Max Tashna, 14 May 1941, Holmes Papers. 91. See, for example, Holt, “Is Churchill Good Enough for Roosevelt?" Scribner's Com m entator 9 (July 1941): 35; Nye, CR, 26 February 1941,1729; Nye, CR, 8 March 1941,2083. 92. Holt,“Is Churchill Good Enough for Roosevelt?” 34-36. See also Social Justice, 17 March 1941,13. 93. See, for example, Holt, CR, 18 October 1941, 558; Holt, CR, 12 December 1940, 13,897; AFC cited in NYT, 19 March 1941,8; Wheeler, N Y T , 21 March 1941,8; Ralph Townsend, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,801; Sargent, Bulletin #32,26 January 1940, G etting US into War, 257; Dennis, WFL 94 (16 May 1940): 1; “Winston Churchill,” NYDN, 15 November 1939,39. 94. See William Griffin, publisher of the New York Enquirer, “When Churchill Said Keep Out!" Scribner's C om m entator 9 (2 February 1941): 25-28. For additional material on the interview from Griffin's standpoint, see Frazier and Reynolds, CR, 21 October 1939,686-87; entries of Congressman

440

Sates to Pages 198-199

M ichael J. Kenneth* *D e m .-N .Y ı, 10 April 1940, in CR. A 1994. For a friendly sketch o f G riffin’s back* grou n d , see Bill C u n n in gh am , Boston Post, 20 January 1941. For am i-in terven tion ist u se o f Griffin, see S v e , C R , 26 February 1941, 1412; H olt, CR, 12 D ecem b er 1940. 13,896: Tobey, CR, 7 N ovem b er 1941, 8647; “T hen and Now." C a ll 7 D ecem ber 19 4 0 ,4 ; Social Justice , 14 April 1941. 15: Sargent c itin g h im ­ self and Yillard, B ulletin *32, 26 January* 1940, Getting i 'S into W ar, 261 n. I; John H aynes H o lm es to Ralph Sussm an, 17 February 1941, H olm es Papers. For British denials o f th e interview , see N TT. 11 O ctob er 1939, 2; 9 M arch 1 9 4 0 .4 ; 29 M arch 1940, 5; 6 April 1 9 4 0 ,4 . 95. For C hurchill and B olsh evism , see G. S. Jackson. “Is Britain's G overn m en t D em ocratic?' S e w M asses 39 8 April 1941 •: 8; Sherm an Staley, “W h o Is W in ston Churchill?" Socialist AppeuL 9 S ep tem ­

ber 1939, 3; Sargent. Getting U S into W ar, 38. For G andhi, see Yardis Fisher. “Propaganda. T hen and Now," Idaho Sunday Statesman, 20 April 1941; Jim C ork, “British Statesm en and India." C alL 12 April 1 9 4 1 ,2 . For M ussolini, see Nye, CR, 25 February* 1941, 1364; W heeler, radio speech. “U n itv for ftace." 20 March 1941, in C R , A 1341 ; W heeler, C R , 15 July 1 9 4 1,6046: Richard Rovere, “W in ston C hurchill s ‘D u stv Answer,’" C a ll 4 January* 1 9 4 1 ,4 . For a claim that C hurchill was in sufficiently a n ti-R u ssu n . see Sym es, “H old That Line," C a ll 4 Januars* 1 9 3 9 ,4 . 96. “W in n ie the Pooh," Uncensored 26 '3 0 M arch 1940*: 4. For oth er references to C hurchill o n Hitler, see N ve, CR, 8 M arch 1 9 4 1,1364: “C om m ent," Social Justice, 8 Septem ber 1941.9; Sargent, B ul­ letin *22, 15 D ecem b er 1939, Getting U S into W ar, 197. Yet C hurchill's supposedly* lon g-stan d in g o p ­ p o sitio n to Germans* w as also stressed. G eneral W ood recalled a conversation in 1936 in w h ich C hurchill allegedly had told h im . “G erm any is gettin g to o strong. We m ust sm ash her." Testimony*. SFRC, 4 February 1941, 389. 97. See, for exam ple. Hearst, “In the News," SFE, 25 April 1941.1; 28 May 1941. A: 11 June 1 9 4 0 .1; 7 August 1940,1; H anıghen. “Blood, Sweat and Illusions," Progressive, 14 June 1941,9; D ennis, IVFL 115 10 O ctober 1940.i: 3; 153*3 luly 1941 >: 2; Dwnght M acdonald, editorial replv to Stephen Spender. Partisan Re­ view* 7 ' Septem ber-O ctober 1940*: 407; Yardis Fisher. “Propaganda, Then and Now," Idaho Sunday’ Statesman, 20 April 1941: Ezra P b u n d .“The Inedible: Russia Has It," A m en ai 62 '9 March 1940 :5 9 4 .

98. See, for example, “W'hv Did France Crack Up?" .\YP.V, 3 July 1940, 19; “The Fall of France," 14 July 1940. 35; “Churchill as Orator." S Y D S , 29 April 1941,23; Hearst, “In the News," WTH, 3 May 1941,3; WTH, 10 April 1941, 1.

SYD S,

99. See, for exam p le. “C h u rch ill’s O ld Age," S e w M asses 35 ( 18 June 1940»: 21; Libbv, letter to N C P W executive board and branch offices, 4 June 1941, N C P W Papers; W aldrop, “C hild Eating Mother?" WTH. 28 Septem ber 1941, E l. 100. K ennedy in C ostello. Ten Davs, 50; “C hurchill In," S Y D S , 9 M ay 1940, 33. See also “T h e C o n ­ sequences o f Stu m b leb u m Diplomacy*," S Y D S , 24 August 1940, 13. See also “D ictator Churchill." S Y D S , 24 May 1940, 29. 101. See, for exam ple, D en n is, WTL 118 '’ 31 O ctober 1941 ): I. 102. “Exit C ham berlain and Enter Churchill," CT, 12 May 1 9 4 0 ,1 5 . For p revious tributes, see “Mr. C hurchill Takes Over." CT. 5 April 1940, 16; “C ham berlain’s Speech," CT. 8 M ay 1 9 4 0 ,1 8 . Tribune p u b ­ lisher Robert M cC orm ick said, “I have k n ow n W'inston C hurchill for 25 years. A m ore th orou gh ly h o n ­ orable m an never lived." M cC orm ick, testim ony, SFRC, 6 February 1 9 4 1 ,4 8 0 . 103. “Mr. C h u rch ill’s W ords and D eeds.’’ CT, 6 June 1940, 20. See also A n n e M orrow L indbergh. Wave. 33. 104. C astle Diarv, 16 April 1 9 4 1 ;“Inside England," U ncensored90 (21 June 1941 ): I. 105. R evnolds. Creation, 114; W. Averell H arrim an and Elic Abel, Special Envoy’ to C h u rch ill a n d Stalin, 1 9 4 1 -1 9 4 6

N ew York: R andom H ouse, 1975), 191; Kim ball, Forged in W*ar, 13. For oth er FDR

criticism , see Lash, Roosevelt and C h u rch ill 273. 106. See. for exam ple, D en n is, WTL 92 12 M ay 1940.»: 1; WTL 94 ( 16 May 1940): 1; Social Justice, 10 June 1940,4; Yillard, “ Issues and Men," S a tio n 150 «T 1 May 1940): 599; Jackson,“Is Britain's G o v ern ­ m ent Dem ocratic?" .Yew* M asses 39 8 April 1941 r. 9; Lois and D on ald son T h o r n b u m . “Beau S ab o­ teur," Scribner s Com m entator 8 June 1 9 4 0 1: 6 4 -6 5 . Yet it w as n ot on ly such an ti-in terven tion ists w h o disliked Eden. H op k in s found him to be a m an possessin g “n o d eepiv rooted m oral stamina," w h o se lack o f substance p erm itted C hurchill to be his ow*n foreign secretary. P önting, 1940 ,

75.

Notes to Pages 199-200

441

107. For Henderson, see Burton Rascoe to Quincy Howe, 13 April 1940, Hertzberg Papers; Sargent, Malcolm Cowley, “The Other England,” New Republic 102 (29 April 1940): 581-82; Herbert Rosen, D aily Worker,27 April 1940,7; “War Aims,” Uncensored 8 (25 Novem­ ber 1939): special supplement, 1. For both Stanley and Hoare, see "Guardians of Democracy,” Uncen­ sored 15 (13 January 1940): 4-5. On Stanley, see also "The Belisha Beacon,” New Masses 34 (16 Janu­ ary 1940): 19. 108. Hearst, “In the News,” SFE* 11 April 1940,2. See also Hearst, SFE, 9 March 1940,2. For further praise of Hore-Belisha, see "Chamberlain Drops a War Minister,” CT, 9 January 1940,14; "Mr. Cham­ berlain Doesn’t Explain,” CT, 18 January 1940,12; "Hore-Belisha and the Generals,” CT, 2 February 1940, 10; "Guardians of Democracy,” Uncensored 15 (13 January 1940): 3; Sargent, Bulletin #26, 12 January 1940, G etting US into War*233-34; “Why Did Hore-Belisha Quit?” NYDN* 31 January 1940, 27; Frank Waldrop, "The Man Behind the Blowup,” WTH* 9 January 1940,9. 109. "David Lloyd George,” NYDN* 10 May 1940,31. For a surprising endorsement, see Ickes, entry of 12 May 1940, Secret Diary* 3:176. 110. Dennis, W F L 105 (1 August 1940): 2; 115 (10 October 1940): 3. Conversely Social Justice found Bevin to be a carefully built-up front for Marxist powers that sought Britain’s downfall. Issue of 14 Oc­ tober 1940,4. 111. Social Justice* 24 June 1940,20; Hearst, "In the News,” SFE* 14 April 1940,2; 23 December 1940, 1-2. 112. Francis X. Bushman to Verne Marshall, 23 December 1940, Verne Marshall tapers; Nock, Nehru review, Scribner's C om m entator 10 (August 1941): 91; Social Justice* 1 July 1940,4. For an ex­ ample of AFC anti-British views, see tage Hufty, Bulletin #615,9 October 1941, Box 279, AFC tapers. See also Congressman Lambertson, CR* 26 September 1940, 12,704; "Cabbages and Kings: Brussels Sprouts,” Scribner's C om m entator 10 (October 1941): 6. 113. Reynolds, Creation* 23. See, for example, Senator La Follette, CR* 12 October 1939, 332; Wheeler, CR* 28 February 1941,1522; Norman Thomas to Robert Alexander, 19 June 1941, Thomas tapers; Thomas, testimony, HFAC, 22 January 1941,325; Sweeney, CR* 5 February 1941, 581; Ernest L Meyer, “‘For Democracy*—‘Oh Yeah*,” American Guardian* 15 September 1939,4; Villard, (Univer­ sity of Rochester] Tower-Times* 23 February 1940,1; Theodore Dreiser to Frederick V. Field, 25 No­ vember 1940, Hertzberg tapers; Dreiser, America Is Worth Saving, chap. 7. 114. Williams, Airpower* 402; Barnes, "Political Rule in Britain,” NYWT* 3 November 1939, 26. Barnes continued that according to "Britain’s Unknown Ruler,” an article in the London Sunday Ex­ press reprinted as “Persons and Personages” in Living Age 357 (October 1939): 145-48, the real ruler of Britain was Sir Horace Wilson, head of the three hundred thousand bureaucrats who ran the nation. Wilson appointed all the heads of government departments, was personally close to Chamberlain, and was the supreme economic adviser to the government. 115. For Priesdey, see Sargent, Bulletin #15, 14 November 1939, G etting US into War* 165. For Wells, see Downey, CR* 9 October 1940,190. For Eden, see Robert Maynard Hutchins, sermon at Rock­ efeller Memorial Chapel, 30 March 1941, in CR* A1580; Tobey, CR* 15 July 1941,6046; Johns, speech, 11 June 1941, in CR, A2834. 116. Kennedy, interview, Boston Globe* 10 November 1940; Barnes, “The War and World Revolu­ tion,” Progressive* 15 November 1941,9. 117. See, for example, Reynolds, CR* 21 October 1940,693; “NY Post Does Its Duty for War Pro­ paganda,” D aily Worker*2 November 1939,6. 118. "The War Parties,” CT* 22 September 1939, 14. See also "War and Dictatorship,” CT* 7 Sep­ tember 1939,15; "Let’s Have the Regular Order,” CT* 25 September 1939, 12; Senator La Follette, CR* 12 October 1939,329. 119. "A Democracy of Voteless Men,” CT, 15 October 1939, 14. See also "People at War,” CT, 10 March 1940,18. 120. Johnson, "One Man’s Opinion,” SFN* 26 September 1939, 13; "Toward Totalitarianism,” N YD N * 11 February 1940, 47. See also Vandenberg, CR* 4 October 1939, 97; Rankin, CR* 9 October 1939, A206. G etting US into War* 38; critic

442

Notes to Pages 201-202

121. N Y T , 23 May 1940,1,4; A. J. P. Taylor, British History: 1914-1945 (New York: Oxford Univer­ sity Press, 1965), 479; “Last Ditch," N ew sw eek 3 June 1940,18. 122. See, for example, “A Page of Comment,’*and "England Goes Totalitarian,” Social Justice, 3 June 1940,3,6; Kennedy, testimony, HFAC, 21 January 1941,237. 123. “Britain Establishes a War Dictatorship,” C hristian C entury 57 (5 June 1940): 723. 124. “It Has Happened in England,” CT, 24 May 1940,14. For a similar claim that Britain was as totalitarian as Germany, see Neilson, entry of 9 August 1940, Tragedy 1:579; “No Conscription,” Amer­ ica 63 (24 August 1940): 457. 125. See, for example,“Toward Totalitarianism,” N YD N , 11 February 1940,47; Dennis, WFL95 (23 May 1940): 1; Herbert Hoover to Edmond G. Lincoln, 5 August 1940, Hoover Papers. Joseph P. Kennedy was an exception, claiming that though such legislation could well be an inevitable by-prod­ uct of any war, “that does not mean that some form of democracy could not come back at the end of the war.” Testimony, HFAC, 21 January 1941,237. 126. Dennis, WFL 95 (23 May 1940): 1. For the dictatorship theme, see also WFL 150 (12 June 1941), 3. 127. “M-Day in London,” N ew Masses 35 (4 June 1940): 19. For other such left-wing comments on the condition of labor, see Marcantonio, CR, 5 February 1941, 657-58; Seldes, In Fact 2 (9 January 1941): 1;G. S. Jackson, “Is Britain's Government Democratic?” New Masses 39 (8 April 1941): 9. 128. Thomas, testimony, HFAC, 22 January 1941,324-25,343; Wheeler, speech of 25 June 1941, in Anderson, “Wheeler,” 216. See also Vandenberg, NYT, 1 January 1941, 6; Koskoff, Kennedy, 287; “What’s Coming in England?” NYDN, 15 September 1940,47; Sokolsky, “These Days: The Four Free­ doms,” New York Sun, 5 December 1940,24; Coughlin, “World Heads Towards Total War,” broadcast of 12 May 1940, in Social Justice, 20 May 1940,3; Merwin K. Hart, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,744. 129. See, for example, Sokolsky, “These Days,” New York Sun, 12 April 1941, 18; Shafer, CR, 19 March 1941, A1419; Scribner's Com m entator 9 (April 1941), inside front cover, Amos Pinchot, “The Roosevelt-Laski Scheme,” Scribner's C om m entator 8 (October 1940): 62-68. 130. Kennedy, testimony, HFAC, 21 January 1941,237. 131. “Britain’s Goal,” Progressive, 5 April 1941,12. It cited Geoffrey Crowther, “Is Britain Ibrning Socialist?” N Y T M agazine, 23 March 1941,3,24. 132. See, for example, Catherine Curtis, “Washington Affairs and National Defense,” speech to Mothers of the United States of America, Detroit, 13 June 1941, in CR , A5269; Wheeler, GR, 21 April 1941,3; “Cabbages and Kings: Remember This Symbol: 18B,” Scribner's C om m entator 11 (December 1941 ): 5. Extremist anti-interventionists stressed the “persecution” of those whom they found kindred spirits overseas. See, for example, Social Justice, 15 July 1940,6; “Duke of Buccleuch,” Social Justice, 14 October 1940,8; “The Week Suppressed,” New Masses 35 (18 June 1940): 21. 133. Ponting, 1940,149. 134. Davis, CR, 23 October 1939,913. 135. “Only by Peace Can Liberty Be Protected," SFE, 12 August 1940,8. 136. “A Bill to Destroy the Republic,” CT, 12 January 1941,1. 137. See, for example, “Cabbages and Kings: Freedom,” Scribner's C om m entator 10 (June 1941): 3; Lillian Symes, “Hold That Line,” Call, 26 July 1941,5; Holmes, “Civil Liberties in Time of Crisis,” U nity 126 (7 October 1940): 37; “Criticism Here and There,” CT, 15 October 1941,12. 138. “British GO.’s,” Uncensored 3 (21 October 1939): 2. See also “British Peace Sentiment,” Uncen­ sored 23 (9 March 1940): 3; Devere Allen, U nity 124 (20 November 1939): 96. For anxieties over British pacifists, see “Britain Bears Down on Opponents of War,” Christian Century 57 (22 May 1940): 660. 139. Chamberlin, “War: Shortcut to Fascism,” American M ercury 51 (December 1940): 394-95. 140. Hoover, memorandum of conversation with Joseph P. Kennedy, 22 November 1940, Hoover Papers. 141. Reynolds, Creation, 24-25; Kimball (with Fred E. Pollock), Juggler, chap. 7; Ickes, entry of 29 January 1939, Secret Dairy, 2:571. 142. Harper, Am erican Vision, 36-37; Roosevelt to editors, cited in Rock, Chamberlain and Roo­ sevelt, 287; Roosevelt to Willkie in Thome, Allies, 98.

Notes to Pages 202-204

443

143. Leutze, Bargaining, 176; Harper, Am erican Vision, 54; Thome, Allies, 99. For Berle’s attacks on their entire diplomatic record, see entry of 3 May 1940, Navigating, 309. 144. Leutze, Bargaining, 179; Pogue, Marshall, 2:132-33; Stoler, “Embick"; Schaffer, "Embick," 89-95. 145. Gallup polls, 8 April and 20 May 1941, in Cantril, Public O pinion, 976. At the same time a July poll showed only 14 percent favoring immediate entrance into the war; of 86 percent who either op­ posed entry or had no opinion, 31 percent claimed the United States should fight only if invaded. Gallup poll of 9 July 1941, in Cantril, Public O pinion, 976. Even in a Gallup poll taken on 22 October, only 17 percent wanted immediate entry. Cantril, Public O pinion, 977. The highest record, 27 percent, was readied in a Gallup poll taken on 29 May 1941. Cantril, Public O pinion, 973.

CHAPTER 14: THE BRITISH EM PIRE

1. Gillis, "All-Out Aid for Britain," Catholic World 153 (March 1941): 643; Burton Rascoe to Sid­ ney Hertzberg, 6 July 1940, Hertzberg Papers. See also Knutson, CR, 10 October 1940, A6275; Con­ gressman James P. McGranery (Dem.-Pa.), CR, 1 November 1939,1213; Congressman Homer D. Angell (Rep.-Oreg.), CR, 1223-24; Alexander, CR, 1 November 1939,1259; Vöorhis, CR, 2 October 1939, A123; "All Is Not Lost," Catholic World 151 (July 1940): 133; Upton Close, "Common Sense for Amer­ icans," Living Age 358 (August 1940): 510. 2. "The Empires," CT, 18 October 1939, 16. On commonwealth, see GUlis, “Good Old Unde Sam," Catholic World 153 (March 1941): 642. On dominion, see Dreiser, America Is Worth Saving, 104. 3. Wheeler, CT, 26 June 1941,2. See also CR, 27 February 1941,1488. 4. Nye,4March 1941, CR, 1722. See also Nye, [University of North Carolina] D aily Tar Heel, 19 November 1941,1; CR, 26 February 1941,1730. 5. Lundeen, CR, 18 October 1939, 547. See also speech, Washington, D.C., 9 June 1940, in CR, A3754; CR, 27 August 1940,11,017. 6. Clark, CR, 4 November 1941,8485. See also CR, 24 February 1941,1297. 7. Sweeney, CR, 5 February 1941, 581; Robsion, CR, 2 November 1939, 1295. See also Ralph Townsend, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,798. 8. Mencken, “Notes on a Moral War," Baltim ore Sun, 8 October 1939; "No Hostility to England,” CT, 1 November 1939,14. See also “How about It, Mr. Churchill?" CT, 2 October 1941,12. 9. Chester Bowles to Phil La Follette, 28 September 1939, Philip La Follette Papers. 10. Thomas, letter to the editor, New Republic 104 (20 June 1941): 118-19. 11. Jim Cork, “This England,’" Call, 6 December 1941,2. See also Dreiser, Am erica Is Worth Sav­ ing, 108-9. 12. Hanighen, "Making the World Safe for Empire," Com m on Sense 8 (September 1939): 22; Seldes, "Tuberculosis for Natives; $$$ for Britons," In Fact 2 (27 January 1941): 2-3. 13. "Double Talk," N YD N , 1 June 1941, 41; Townsend, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941, 798; Clark, SFRC, 8 February 1941,709; Norman Thomas to Henry Pinski, 8 April 1941, Thomas Papers; Marcantonio, CR, 22 January 1941,238. See also Dreiser as noted in "Books in a World at War," Peace Action 7 (February 1941): 7. 14. Fisher, Idaho D aily Statesm an, 17 January 1941; Robsion, CR, 6 May 1941,3660. For spedfic remarks concerning Egypt's apathy, see Wheeler, CR, 28 February 1941, 1522. For the demands of Burma, see “Freedoms in Burma and India,” CT, 23 September 1941,12; “U Saw’s Own View of the Freedoms," CT, 6 November 1941,14. For general comments, see “Poverty of India Monument to Em­ pire,” Social Justice, 27 October 1941,11; Dreiser, America Is W orth Saving, 106. 15. Nye, CR, 26 February 1941,1726-32; White, CR, 5 February 1941,657. For further comments concerning opium, see Lutheran radio minister Walter Maier, Am erican Guardian, 9 February 1940,2; Marcantonio, CR, 5 February 1941,581. 16. Nye, CR, 4 March 1941,1731. See also Gillis, “What Are They Fighting For?” Catholic World 150 (December 1939): 259; Dreiser, America Is Worth Saving, 108.

444

Notes to Pages 205-206

17. Chester Bowles to Philip La Follette, 28 September 1939, Philip La Follette Papers. For further comment on the Boer War, see Lundeen, CA, 18 October 1939, 550; Holt, CA, 18 October 1940, 549-50; Marcantonio, CA, 5 February 1941,657; Edwin M. Borchard to James A. Shanley, 30 August 1939, Borchard Papers; Walter Maier cited in Am erican Guardian, 9 February 1940,2; Dreiser, A m er­ ica Is W orth Saving, 69; Theodore Dreiser to Frederick V. Field, 25 November 1940, Hertzberg Papers; M A Page of Comment," Social Justice, 3 June 1940, 3; Sweeney, CA, 5 February 1941, 581; Nye, CA, 4 March 1941,1729. 18. See, for example, Chester Bowies to Philip La Follette, 28 September 1939, Philip La Follette Papers; "Axis Cashing In on Blunders in Near East," Social Justice, 9 June 1941,9; D. Worth dark, CA, 16 October 1939,448; John Arnold, "Mr. Chamberlain Looks at Zion," New Masses 34 (19 March 1940): 26-27. 19. Holt, CA, 18 October 1939,551. See also Nye, CA, 4 March 1941,1731; Sweeney, CA, 20 March 1940,3162; Sweeney, speech, NBC red network, 6 May 1940, in CA, A2154; "But Boake Carter Says," SFE, 5 December 1941,17. 20. Coughlin, "Shrine Dinner Chats," Social Justice, 5 June 1939,3. 21. See, for example, Nye, CA, 4 March 1941,1725; D. W. Clark, CA, 16 October 1939,446; Mar­ cantonio, CA, 5 February 1941,657; Seldes, "Facts about 'Democracy9in India," In Fact 2 (27 January 1941): 3; "Washing the Empire Linen," New Masses 33 (31 October 1939): 16; Sweeney, CA, 5 February 1941,581; James McCawley, "Under British Rule: A Study in 'Benevolent* Imperialism," Catholic W orld 150 (March 1940): 703-10. 22. Nock, review of Nehru, in Scribner's C om m entator 10 (August 1941): 87-90; Tobey, CA, 4 March 1941,1732; Townsend, testimony, SFRC, 8 February 1941,798; Wheeler, CA, 28 February 1941, 1522; Wheeler, CA, 15 July 1941,6047. For his firsthand observations, see Wheeler, CA, 24 February 1941,1311-12. 23. For bombing, see Social Justice, 25 September 1939,8; Nye, CA, 4 March 1941, 1732; Marcan­ tonio, CA, 4 February 1941,560; Marcantonio, CA, 5 February 1941,657. 24. Chester Bowles to Philip La Follette, 28 September 1940, Philip La Follette Papers; Sterling Morton to Robert E. Wood, 3 April 1941, Morton Papers. See also U.S. Week, 22 May 1941,7. 25. See, for example, Frazier, CA, 14 October 1939,399; "India in This War," CT, 8 November 1939, 16; "India in the War," CT, 17 December 1939,16; John Haynes Holmes, A. J. Muste, Roger Baldwin, J. Holmes Smith, and Gordon Halstead, letter to the editor, New Republic 102 (17 June 1940): 827; "War Aims," Uncensored 4 (28 October 1939): 2; "India Strikes for Freedom," C hristian C entury 56 (18 Oc­ tober 1939): 1260. 26. See, for example, Mrs. Kamaladevi, educator and a member of the Indian National Congress, to Youth Committee Against War, [City College of New York] M ain Events, 13 November 1939,1. 27. Patel, D aily Worker, 22 December 1939, 2. See also Barnard [College] Bulletin, 14 November 1939,4; [University of Chicago] D aily Maroon, 8 December 1939,1; [Dartmouth College] The D art­ m outh, 15 November 1939, 1; [Bryn Mawr] College News, 29 November 1939, 1, 3; Vassar [College] M iscellany News, 6 December 1939, 1; [Northwestern University] D aily Northwestern, 7 December 1939, 2; [City College of New York] Campus, 8 March 1940, 1; [Clark University] Scarlet, 5 March 1940,1; [University of North Carolina] D aily Tar Heel, 12 April 1940,1. For Patel's background, see Vassar M iscellany News, 6 December 1939,1. 28. Singh, [University of Chicago] D aily Maroon, 29 January 1941, l. For Singh, see also (NewYork University] Washington Square College Bulletin, 6 November 1939,1; [City College of NewYork] C am ­ pus, 8 November 1939, 1; 11 November 1939, 1; Wesleyan [University] Argus, 13 November 1939, 2; [Northwestern University] D aily Northwestern, 26 September 1940, 1; 3 October 1940, 2; 4 October 1940,1; 8 October 1940,3. 29. See, for example, Coughlin, "May India Succeed," Social Justice, 25 December 1939,4; Gerald Griffin, "In Darkest India," New Masses 34 (27 February 1940): 12-14; Marion Greenspan, "India: 360,000,000 in Motion," New Masses 35 (28 May 1940): 13-14; Dennis, WFL 86 (21 March 1940): 5. Within a year, Dennis predicted that irrespective of the outcome of the war, Britain would not be rul­ ing India much longer. WFL 134 (20 February 1941): 2. 30. Alexander, CA, 1 November 1939, 1259.

Notes to Pages 206-207

445

31. While most anti-interventionists said little about nationalist leader Mahatma Gandhi himself» some on the extreme left attacked him. See» for example» lames Burnham» “Their Government»** So­ cialist Appeal, 27 October 1939,4; Greenspan, “India: 360,000,000 in Motion,“ 13-14; Andrew Roth, “Behind the Arrest of Nehru,** New Masses 37 (26 November 1940): 12. 32. For protest from the extreme left, see Roth, “Behind the Arrest of Nehru,** 12; Michael Sayers, “Nehru of India: Spokesman of Awakening Millions,** Friday, 13 December 1940, 8-9; “How about India?** D aily Worker, 6 November 1940,6. For others, see Robert Carroll, “Is This My War?** Scribner's Com m entator 10 (July 1941): 61; Villard, “India: An Acid Test,** Progressive, 20 September 1941, 4; Dorothy Detzer to Emily Greene Baldı, 24 March 1941, W1L Papers; “Political Imprisonment Grow­ ing in India,** C hristian C entury 58 (9 January 1941): 876. 33. Norman Thomas to Mirza Ahmad Schrab, 6 December 1940, Thomas Papers. 34. “British Empire Faces Growing Unrest in India,** Christian Century 56 (1 November 1939): 1325. See also “Washing the Empire Linen,” New Masses 33 (31 October 1939): 16; Lillian Symes to Oscar Lange, 7 November 1939, Thomas Papers. 35. “Bad News for India,” Christian Century 57 (22 May 1940): 659; “No Democracy for India,” C hristian Century 57 (21 August 1940): 1022. 36. “Divided India: Natives Should Beware Russia,” SFE, 18 March 1940,16; “India's Opportunity,” N YD N , 8 February 1940,29; Waldrop, “The Man in the Loindoth,” W TH , 16 August 1940,16. 37. Thome, Allies, 103; Louis, Im perialism , 8-10. 38. Kimball, Juggler, 132-40. See also Thome, Allies, chaps. 8,14,21, pp. 710-11. 39. Clark, CR, 16 October 1939,446; “No Hostility to England,” CT, 1 November 1939,14. See also Holt, CR, 18 October 1939,549; Congressman McGranery, CR, 1 November 1939,1215. 40. Chester Bowles to Philip La Follette, 28 September 1939, Philip La Follette Papers; Sweeney, CR, 5 February 1941,581. 41. See McGranery, CR, 1 November 1939,1214-15; Holt, CR, 2 December 1940, A6983-85. Nye quoted an address to the Congress of the United States issued in the early 1920s by Irish nationalists. CR, 4 March 1941,1733. 42. Hanighen, “Making the World Safe for Empire,” Common Sense 8 (September 1939): 21. For general comments, see William Griffin, “Churchill’s Attack on Neutrality,” New York Enquirer, 11 No­ vember 1940; Drieser, America IsW orth Saving, 110-11; “Irish Victory,” N ew Masses 39 (10 June 1941): 21; Nye, CR, 25 February 1941,1370. 43. See, for example, “The Irish Are Not Fooled,” D aily Worker, 10 January 1940,6; Daily Worker, 26 April 1940,4; Holt, CR, 15 November 1940, A6590; Professor John O’Brien, speech to Catholic Women's Club, Madison, Wisconsin, in CT, 18 March 1941,8. For the broader picture, see Raymond James Ray­ mond, “American Public Opinion and Irish Neutrality, 1939-1945,” Eire-lreland 18 (Spring 1983): 20-45. 44. For Churchill’s concern, see N Y T , 6 November 1940,25,26. For Ireland’s rejection, see N Y T , 7 November 1940,1,6. 45. Sargent, Bulletin #26, 5 January 1940, G etting US into War, 231; D aily Worker, 17 February 1941,6; Los Angeles lawyer Joseph Scott, address, San Francisco Civic Auditorium, in CR, 10 February 1941, A556; Congressman O’Connor, CR, 17 April 1941,3166; William Griffin, New York Enquirer, 11 November 1940. 46. Editorial, Saturday Evening Post 213 (19 April 1941): 28; “Cabbages and Kings: Turning on the Heat,” Scribner's C om m entator 10 (June 1941): 5. For other intimations that Britain was starving Ire­ land, see “Irish Victory,” New Masses 39 (10 June 1941): 21; “Ireland Menaced by Starvation,” U.S. Week, 26 April 1941,7. 47. “Irish Bases,” Uncensored 64 (21 December 1940): 1. See also “Irish Bases,” Uncensored 67 (11 January 1941): 2. Interventionist military writer George Fielding Eliot questioned UncensoretTs claim that the bases were not important to Britain. Blacksod Bay, he maintained, would be of great value. Eliot also disputed the claim that it would take six months to erect a temporary base. George Fielding Eliot to Sidney Hertzberg, 23 December 1940, Hertzberg Papers. Associate editor Cushman Reynolds replied to Eliot, saying that although bases in Eire would be assets, they would not necessarily break up Germany’s intense submarine campaign. Letter of 31 January 1940, Hertzberg Papers.

446

Notes to Pages 207-209

48. Frank Hanighen to Cushman Reynolds, 9 January 1941, Hertzberg Papers. 49. "Ireland Next?” CT, 9 July 1940,10; “When Eire Eyes Arc Smiling,” N YD N , 8 January 1941,29; “Easter in Ireland,” NYDN, 15 April 1941,28. See also Castle Diary, 3 January 1941. 50. Taft and Wheeler, Time; 16 July 1941,16; Newsweek 21 July 1941,11. See also rumors reported by Warren Mullin, minutes, NCPW executive board, 19 March 1941, NCPW Papers; Sargent, Bulletin #26,5 January 1940, G etting US into War, 230-31 n. 4. 51. John A. Danaher to Edwin M. Borchard, 8 July 1941, Borchard Papers; R. A. Moore, Bulletin #415, 15 July 1941, Box 279, AFC Papers. See also AFC Research Bureau, “Another A.E.F.,” D id You Know* 9 (15 July 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 345. 52. “Addresses of President and Hull Before Pan American Union,” NYT, 15 April 1939,2; Gallup poll, 22 September 1939, Cantril, Public O pinion, 772. For other polls, see 772. 53. See, for example, Detzer, report to WIL National Board, 21-22 October 1939, WIL Papers. 54. Johnson, “War in America,” N Y W T , 12 September 1939,17; Nye, NYT, 14 September 1941,14; Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 27 September 1939, Borchard Papers. See also “The New War Propaganda,” America 61 (20 September 1939): 613. 55. Barnes, “Russian Tie-Up with Nazis,” N Y W T , 3 October 1939, 18. Some anti-interventionists found Canada lacking in enthusiasm for the conflict. See “Canada Votes,” New Republic 102 (5 Febru­ ary 1940): 165; “The War Is Unpopular in Canada,” D aily Worker, 13 January 1940,6. 56. Roosevelt, N Y T , 13 September 1939, 1; Johnson, SFN, 26 September 1939, 13. See also Paul Blakely, “The Monroe Doctrine Is a Policy, Not a Law,” America 61 (30 September 1939): 583; John Bas­ sett Moore to William Potter Lage, 23 September 1939, Moore Papers. 57. Lindbergh, “Talk on Arms Embargo,” text, N Y T , 14 October 1939,10. 58. “But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 26 October 1939,15; Hugh Johnson, SFN, 21 October 1939,13; 17 October 1939,17. Castle read the speech as a clumsy attempt to state that Canada should not be under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine if it went to war whenever Britain did. Diary, 16 October 1939. 59. See, for example, “Shoot the Works,” New Republic 101(1 November 1939): 366; Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow,” New York Herald Tribune, 17 October 1939, 21; Dorothy Thompson, “On the Record: Col. Lindbergh's Imperialism,” New York Herald 7Yibune, 20 October 1939,19. 60. “A Doctrine Should Work Both Ways,” Am erican Guardian, 6 October 1939, 4; “Heirs to the British Empire,” N YD N , 10 March 1940,47; typed memo on Dennett conversation with Tansill, en­ closed in Prescott Dennett to Ernest Lundeen, 14 December 1939, Box 234, Lundeen Papers. 61. “Mr. Churchill Turns to the New World,” C hristian C entury 57 (19 June 1940): 787. See also “Without Benefit of the Constitution,” C hristian C entury 57 (18 September 1940): 1136. 62. See, for example, Philip C. Jessup to Lloyd K. Garrison, 20 May 1940, Jessup Papers; William R. Castle, “What about the Monroe Doctrine Now?” Saturday Evening Post 213 (27 July 1940): 40. 63. “A Defensive Alliance with Canada,” CT, 19 June 1940,14. See also “It’s Time to Think of Amer­ ica,” 18 June 1940,12. 64. Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 7 June 1940,2. For dissent, see Nye quoted by Herman C. Kudlich, “The Watch Tower,” Steuben News (July 1940): 6. 65. Fred E. Pollock, “Roosevelt, the Ogdensburg Agreement, and the British Fleet: All Done with Mirrors," D iplom atic H istory 5 (Summer 1981): 203-19. 66. For example, see Capper, radio broadcast, 10 October 1940, in CR, A6296; MacNider, testi­ mony, HFAC, 22 January 1941,337; Charles A. Lindbergh, testimony, SFAC, 23 January 1941,427; Vandenberg, CR, 18 February 1941, 1105; Stuart Chase, “Harsh Realism for America,” Progressive, 22 March 1941,1. One minority voice, Norman Thomas, denied that he favored the defense of Canada, particularly if the British fleet were lodged there. Testimony, HFAC, 22 January 1941,337. 67. Hearst, “In the News,” SFE, 21 August 1940,1-2; 22 August 1940,9; “Defense Plans with Canada,” CT, 20 August 1940,10; “Economic Results of the Alliance,” 11 September 1940,12; “North American De­ fense,” 8 October 1940,12. See also CT, “The United States and Canada,” 2 December 1940,16. 68. “Insurance Against Invasion,” N YD N , 20 August 1940, 21. See also “The Consequences of Stumblebum Diplomacy,” N YD N , 24 August 1940,13; “Can the United States Be Invaded?” N Y D N , 18 August 1940, 37.

Notes to Pages 210-212

447

69. McCormick, broadcast of 23 June 1940, in Addresses, 11-12 (emphasis in original); “Today the Strongest Nation in the World,“ CT, 13 October 1940, graphic section, 2; McCormick, speech, WGN, 8 September 1940, in Addresses, 46-47. In the Pacific, said McCormick, “sturdyCanadians of the northwest“ would support American garrisons stationed in Alaska. For further comments on the strong defense po­ tential of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, see McCormick, SFRC, 6 February 1941,478. 70. See, for example, Sokolsky, “These Days,“ N ew York Sun , 6 September 1940,20; “Candor in the White House,“ Christian C entury 57 (4 September 1940): 1067. For mild criticism, see Dorothy Detzer to Hannah Clothier Hull and Emily Greene Batch, 21 August 1940, WIL Papers. In October, Detzer found FDR to be acting unilaterally by not informing the public that the United States would conduct joint military and naval staff activities with Canada. Dorothy Detzer to Katherine D. Blake, 31 Octo­ ber 1940, WIL Papers. 71. Villard,“Our Canadian Alliance,“ Christian C entury 57 (28 August 1940): 1054; Woodruff, CR, 22 August 1940,10,777; “Zero Hour,“ N ew Masses 36 (3 September 1940): 3. See also “New Stage in Policy,“ New Masses 36 (27 August 1940): 16, which predicted joint U.S.-Canadian occupation of British territory in the hemisphere. In April 1941, N ew Masses claimed that Wall Street was obtaining a mortgage on Canada's raw materials and a firmer grip on its economy and politics while the Cana­ dian working class was paying the heavy price. See “Pact with Canada“ 39 (21 April 1941): 19. 72. “Candor in the White House,“ Christian C entury 57 (4 September 1940): 1067. 73. Pollock, “Roosevelt,“ 219. 74. See, for example, Arthur Hale, “The World-Island,“ radio address, Scribner's Com m entator 9 (December 1940): 86-88. 75. [Dennis], “The Economic Consequences of American Intervention,“ unpub. ms., n.:*— Bc^er Armv and W“nat I: Means," CT. r aruarv m ; L2_ *2 W-ee-.er Vm.ersir. 0: M v -ica- 2Vv.. r Mav . 94 :. ; Wr.eeier estimated rwerttv-su tecs rc evi- n ~ e - t arc ta^.cs each m acer. C.v 22 \-.cust 194*1- 1l.”25. “5. ‘Ca* H t er Irvjoe America" Trace .V r v - r Tecemrer l^?- : 5. See aasc "Yecnrc Rj:e A” e> Arm: A— .e s / 071 1* Mav 194*1. 14. “4 W.l:~ me V S. Be In.vadec' Yes. rut W>a: 1 ’o r " CT. 4 une .94*1. 1

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a * _i*v *4 « . 0 *9* 5 >n. 31*. *S ".9**., . “v‘au ? s*, r une !9a 4,5.2: *'use. 4 ’«ne . 94»*. **-,.5: V*e. 2r i-Vrruanv . — . *52 r : r — .an meurne-.* see ’A >c_ 5-çger Aren* m e W \ir r Ve*ars/ / 7 ? V u - * 9a 7 "5. .m e berm. ‘ V v me xree\;r/ 2'1 Vr- ^ 1 . S. r:r or.Ian rc Jemtacv - a a :r o *ç " î’çe *ee N vrvta> B r .' u a n '^ m e r c a r i n*:;-«uas St -art Jr.. :6 Ociooer I94İ Box t~ arc !• Ocrcoer 1941 Sot 4L . A?C Papery L.r-rv v>.. r.:ec rumors that it was the German arms. ro t *re N ar P m v x cc^rrrGec the ?-e::r. ar.c trat H::.er w o -.i resign once tr.e Barr* or Russia was ccncu-dec. Frecerc* I L*nc* :rMr arc Mr*. P H. Grav îr- 2 Septem:««’ İSMİ. NCPW Paperv 28 Derr. i WrL L6~ 9 G>ox>er i94I : i: ‘ Peace Ls Not Far Distant.* v o a b^ncr 1'. ScvemSer 1941 3. Iff. Chester Bowles to R. Do-gLa> Stuart !r.. :6 October i 941. AFC Papers. v L.*>?v Xr.urcr.-r-Rwsev«;: Statement a Step Toward Peace." Peace .Arnci “ A -c -< 1^41 : 1: .V/T " A -g -i: ‘.> 4 1 4 . ir r e r term.* involved a rwenrv-the-vear German occupation o: northern R*usua and me LVrair.e. the reestab. :>r.ment of Poland, partial independence for Yu^osx.ta arc Greece, anc !ta.:ar! control of Eth.opia. Lipva. and Tun:*ia3:. C 7 7 A-gust 1941. 3: ‘In*:de Germans;’ L'ncenso^eJ I*.“ IS October I’M I : 4: Gadahv Vmvers: tv of Wucor.y.n f/u:.v C^um-uL 23 iJctooer İ94I. 1.

32. L:tyr»\ *D. sc us «ons of Post-War Worid Betin." Peace Auric*: 7 September 1941 : 2. 4. See a^o ‘Strict:-, w.m.n the Famuv’ Peace.Action 7 October 1*41 : 1-2: Libbv. tesrmorv. HFAC 14 vXt//>er 1941. S3 L.t-ov to Sorman Thomas. 3 September 1941. NCPW Papers. L.rrr*.

33. ‘ Suggestions of Dr. Edwin Borchard." enclosed with letter from Heien .Alfred to Dorren*. Detzer. 3 December 194L ’«ML Papers. 34. Greater Bowles to Herben Hoover. 2* November 1941. Hoover Papers, d ie d in ». Garrv CLfford. ‘A Sote on Chester Bodies %Pian to End Worid War II." Peace and Charge 14 Januars T .9>9 : I !t*-22 B w -ts as**d Hoover to introduce these terms. He also wanted the former president to su rest mat the Swiss. Swed.sh. and Turkish governments and perhaps the Vatican oner mediation services. 33. Herbert Hoover to Chester Bodies. 29 November 1941. Hoover Papers. See also Herbert Hoover to Alt Landon. 1 November 1V41 and 3 December Î941. Hoover Papers, fust a month before. Hoover had predicted peace talks between Crermanv and Britain. Smith. Hoove*. » 3 . 36. Hanford MacNider to Robert E. Wood. 11 fulv 1*4!. AFC Papers. Wood replied that a negoti­ ated peace was not a prime obrective of the AFC. though it had been mentioned bv various .AFC speak­ ers. Robert E. W^#od to Hanford MacNider. 14 Juiv 1*41. AFC Papers. .According to Libbv. Stuart op­ posed inclusion of a negotiated peace in the AFC platform on the grounds that it would be confused wirn appeasement. Frederick J. Libbv to Charles A. Lindbergh, 2* fulv 1941. AFC Papers. 37. Lindbergh, entry of 14 November 1941. Wamme Journals* 557. 38. Livingstone Hartiev and Donald C. Biaisdell."Hitler s Obiectiv« in Germany,*CDAAA. Washinr.on Om.e In ^ m a tio n Letter 23 4 luly 1941 : 2, Box 35. CDAAA Papers. See also Hartiev; "The Coming Hitler Peace Drive." Washington Office Informatton Letter IS 24 fulv 1941 •: 3. 39. lores enfrv of !2 fulv 1941. Secret LMary, 3:374: Roosevelt. S I T * 2 September 1941. 10; polls* C-antril. Public Opinion. 1136-37. 1166. 40. SIT. 10 June 1941. 1.7: Bailev and Rvan. Hitler vs. Roosevelt* 138-39. 41. Livingstone Hartiev and Donald C. Biaisdell. "Stop Press** CDAAA. Washington O^ice Infor*n a­ tion Letter 12 i 3 lune 1941 : 3; Hartiev and Biaisdell, "Polio;* Washington Ofhce Information Let&r 23 •20 lune 1941 : 2, Box 35. CDAAA Papers. 42. AFC Research Bureau, "Freedom of the Seas," Did You Know 3 3 26 June 1941 . m Doenecke* IDL\ 276: David A. Reed, testimony, SFRC, 22 October 1941, 72. For other protests, see William Den­ nis to Frederick J. Libbv, 20 lune 1941. NCPW Papers; Taft. CR* 3 November 1941,8430; minority re­ port, HFAC, entered m CP, 16 October 1941, A4692; Danaher, CR* 6 November 1941. 8369; Nye, 29 October 1941, 8311; Vandenberg. CP, 27 October 1941. 8255. Nye had first suspected British treach­ ery but, on learning the facts, withdrew his innuendo. Sewsweek* 23 June 1941,14. 43. "Robin Moor a New Lusitania?" S ’YDS\ 13 June 1941.29. See also Yandenbergs anxiety as noted in Robert A. Taft to Edwin M. Borchard. 3 Julv 1941, Borchard Papers. 44. Daily Worker, 11 June 1941.6. 45. “Memorandum on Contraband Material in the Cargo of the Robin Moor,* Did >bu Know? 1( 18 June 1941 in Doenecke, IDL\ 268-71; Richard A. Moore, Bulletin *339, 20 June 1941. Box 279, AFC Papers. See also O Connor, 9 October 1941, CP. 7685; Finerty, testimony, HFAC* 14 October 1941,20;

Notes to Pages 258-261

469

Vandenberg, CR, 27 October 1941,8255; HFAC, minority report, entered 16 October 1941, CR, A4692; Nye, CR, 29 October 1941,8311; Frederick ). Libby to Frank ). Murray, 5 November 1941, NCPW Pa­ pers; Frank Waldrop, “What Is Contraband?” W TH , 14 June 1941,13; Villard, testimony, SFRC, 23 Oc­ tober 1941,183; Finerty, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,194; Edwin M. Borchard to John A. Dana­ her, 29 October 1941, Borchard Papers. 46. Roosevelt, N Y T , 18 June 1941, 1; AFC Research Bureau, “Memorandum on Arming United States Merchant Vessels,” D id You Know?2 (21 June 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 272-75. 47. Roosevelt, address to Congress, 20 June 1941, in CR, 5391-92. He referred to difficulties with the French in 1799, the war against the Barbary pirates, the War of 1812, and the U.S. role in ousting the French from Mexico. 48. James MacGregor Burns, Soldier, 101. 49. Sokolsky, “These Days: Freedom of the Seas,” N ew York Sun, 10 July 1941,26; AFC Research Bu­ reau, “Freedom of the Seas,” D id You Know? 3 (26 June 1941), in Doenecke, /DU, 275-78. 50. Bailey and Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt, 147. 51. N Y T , 9 September 1941, 1,9; 10 September 1941,1,12; Bailey and Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt, 180. 52. Finerty, testimony, HFAC, 14 October 1941,20; Finerty, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,194; Villard, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941, 18; Wood statement in Sarles, “Story of America First,” 280-81. See also AFC Research Bureau, “One-Man War,” D id You Know? 22 (13 September 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 403-4; O'Connor, CR, 9 October 1941,7685; “Neither Cash nor Carry,” CT, 10 Sep­ tember 1941,20. 53. AFC Research Bureau, “Jekyll-and-Hyde Ships,” D id You Know? 24 (23 September 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 411-16 (quotation, 414; emphasis in original); Finerty, testimony, HFAC, 14 October 1941,39,46; Wood statement in Sarles, “Story of America First,” 281. 54. News of sinking, N Y T , 5 September 1941, 1, 4; McCarran and Danaher, N YT, 5 September 1941,4. 55. Roosevelt, address, text, N YT, 12 September 1941,4. 56. Livingstone Hartley and Frank S. Goodwin, “Hitler Forces the Issue,” CDAAA, Washington O f­ fice Inform ation Letter 35 (12 September 1941 ): 1, CDAAA Papers. In particular, the CDAAA dted the London Naval Treaty of 1930, which provided for the safety of the crews of all sunk merchant ships. Hartley and Goodwin, “Freedom of the Seas,” W ashington Office Inform ation Letter 36 (19 September 1941): 2, Box 35, CDAAA Papers. 57. Gallup poll, N Y T , 3 October 1941, 4. Twenty-eight percent disapproved; 10 percent had no opinion. See also White, FDR and the Press, 87. 58. Fish, CR, 22 September 1941,7508. Attorney Pennypacker supported the arming of merchant­ men, provided the ships were not permitted to carry contraband or enter combat zones or belligerent p o r ts . Testimony,SFRC,22 October 1941, 111. 59. Hoover, N Y T , 17 September 1941,1. 60. Lindbergh, entry of 11 September 1941, War W ithin, 221; Casde Diary, 14 September 1941; Philip C. Jessup to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 26 September 1941, Jessup Papers. Nye, S.R. 164,165, CR, 11 September 1941,7393; Clark, CR, 7393-94; R. Douglas Stuart Jr. to Mary Hillyer, 10 September 1941 (Box 61) AFC Papers; R. Douglas Stuart Jr. to Mary Hillyer, 10 September 1941, Box 61, AFC Papers. Nye sought an investigation by the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. Gark wanted the ship’s log submitted to the Senate. At first the AFC said the German attack was unjustified. “One-Man War,” in Doenecke, IDU, 404. 61. Norman Thomas to Burton K. Wheeler, 9 September 1941, Thomas Papers. See also Thomas to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 10 September 1941, Thomas Papers. For similar attacks on the U.S. presence in Iceland, see“Declaration of Elimination,” Uncensored 101 (6 September 1941): 2; “The Greer Incident,” CT, 6 September 1941,5. 62. “A Helpless Nation?” Christian C entury 58 (24 September 1941 ): 1166. 63. For the full text of the Stark report and responses to questions by Senator Walsh, see CR, 29 Oc­ tober 1941,8314-15.

470

Notes to Pages 261-262

64. Livingstone Hartley and Frank S. Goodwin, “The First Shot," CDAAA, W ashington Office Infor­ m ation Letter 43 (7 November 1941): 2, Box 35, CDAAA Papers.

65. See, for example, Shipstead, broadcast, NBC, 31 October 1941, in CR, 8425; Congressman Bradley, CR, 16 October 1941,8003-4; “President versus Admiral," S t Louis Post-Dispatch, 2 Novem­ ber 1941; “Mrs. Roosevelt," N YD N , 4 November 1941, 23; “An American Destroyer Is Torpedoed," Christian Century 58 (25 October 1941): 1324; “Comment," America 66 (25 October 1941): 59; “Mem­ orandum concerning Ships Thus Far Attacked or Sunk," attached to Edwin M. Borchard to Herbert Hoover, 30 October 1941, Borchard Papers; John T. Flynn, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941, 214; “Navy Gets Green Light," Gift 20 September 1941,1; Frank Gannett to Dexter Perkins, 17 November 1941, Gannett Papers (in which Gannett praises Perkins, a prominent historian, on the matter). 66. CT, 15 October 1941,12. 67. Amos Pinchot, open letter to President Roosevelt, 24 October 1941, AFC Princeton file. See also “Bismarck and Roosevelt," AFC New York Chapter Bulletin, 25 October 1941,4. For endorsement of the Pinchot letter, see “More about the U.S.S. Greer," N YD N , 29 October 1941,27; Frederick ). Libby to Frank J. Murray, 5 November 1941, NCPW Papers. 68. See, for example, “But Boake Carter Says," SFE, 22 October 1941, sect. 2,5; Lincoln Colcord to Amos Pinchot, 28 October 1941, Pinchot Papers; General Wood, statement of 17 October 1941, in Sar­ les, “Story of America First," 253; Burdick, CR, 13 November 1941,8863; “Planned U.S. Incidents,"A F C New York Chapter Bulletin, 20 September 1941,2. 69. lohn A. Danaher to Edwin M. Borchard, 29 October 1941, Borchard Papers; Nye, CR, 29 Octo­ ber 1941, 8307; Herbert Hoover to Edwin F. Borchard, 29 October 1941, Borchard Papers; Wheeler, CR, 5 November 1941,8518. 70. See, for example, Hoffman, CR, 15 September 1941,7413; Woodruff, CR, 17 September 1941, 7464; Rich, 7467. 71. Among the signers were Amos Pinchot, Philip C. Jessup, Charles A. Beard, George N. Peek, Johnson Hagood, Herbert W. Briggs, Kathleen Norris, Edwin S. Corwin, Edwin M. Borchard, journal­ ist Samuel Hopkins Adams, former Oklahoma governor Murray, railroad financier Robert R. Young, and theology professor John C. O’Brien. Many were active in America First. See AFC New York C hap­ ter Bulletin, 20 September 1941,1-2; N YT, 15 September 1941,2; Sarles, “Story of America First," 282. 72. Wood statement in Sarles, “Story of America First," 240. For a similar statement concerning un­ declared war, see Capper, broadcast, WIBWand Kansas network, 12 September 1941, in CR, 7404. 73. “One-Man War," 401-8; “Peace," AFC N ew York C hapter B ulletin, 20 September 1941, 1, 4 (quotation). 74. Lincoln Colcord to Edwin M. Borchard, 16 October 1941, Borchard Papers; Clay Judson to Page Hufty, 12 September 1941, Box 283, AFC Papers; “The Hidden Purpose," CT, 13 September 1941,1. 75. “One-Man War," 402-3,406 (quotation); “Fact or Fancy," Call, 27 September 1941,4. Cited by both was Hanson Baldwin, “What of the British Fleet?" Reader's Digest 39 (August 1941 ): 1-2. 76. News of sinking, N YT, 13 September 1941,1,2; Finerty, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,194. 77. Bailey and Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt, 184; Reynolds, Creation, 216. 78. N YT, 23 September 1941,1,4; Bailey and Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt, 188; Roosevelt to TomConnaily, 26 September 1941, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1214. 79. See, for example, Finerty, testimony, HFAC, 14 October 1941, 20; Villard, radio broadcast, 12 October 1941, in CR, 76; Danaher, CR, 6 November 1941, 8569; Edwin M. Borchard to Herbert Hoover, 31 October 1941, Borchard Papers. 80. Fish, CR, 23 September 1941, 7516. See also attached memo, Edwin M. Borchard to Senator Brewster, 4 November 1941, Borchard Papers; AFC Research Bureau, “Jekyil-and-Hyde Ships," D id You Know? 24 (23 September 1941), in Doenecke, IDU, 411-16. 81. Bradley, CR, 24 September 1941,7523; Amos Pinchot to Randolph Walker, 30 September 1941, Pinchot Papers. 82. For events, N YT, 4 October 1941,1,6. For anti-interventionists, see Finerty, testimony, HFAC 14 October 1941,20; Villard, radio broadcast, 12 October 1941, in Mary Hillyer, testimony, HFAC 14 October 1941, 76. Congressman O’Connor claimed that the /. C. White was lent to Britain and was under British direction. CR, 9 October 1941,7685.

Notes to Pages 263-264

471

83. Bailey and Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt, 192. 84. Reynolds, Creation, 217. 85. Attorney James Lipsig, an AFC staffer, found it to be generally established under international law that when a merchant ship was armed, it took on the character of an auxiliary warship and hence was not subject to the geographic limitations of the neutrality act. The state department, said Ruth Sarles, believed that the president had the authority, on his own, to order ships into combat zones. See Ruth Sarles to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 16 October 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 21. Sarles also asserted that the Maritime Commission believed that legislation was not required to provide for arming merchant ships, for the old lawon protection against pirates would suffice. Sarles to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 19 Sep­ tember 1941, Box 67, AFC Papers. Samuel B. Pettengill claimed the president could eliminate all com­ bat areas by proclamation. Pettengill to General Robert E Wood, 16 October 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 302. Historian Harry Rudin asserted the president possessed the authority to define war zones and send American ships into European waters. Yale [University] D aily News, 14 October 1941,1. 86. Roosevelt, message to Congress, CR, 9 October 1941,7757-58. 87. Livingstone Hartley and Frank S. Goodwin, “Points about Ship Arming," CDAAA, W ashington Office Inform ation Letter 40 (17 October 1941): 2, Box 35, CDAAA Papers; Hartley, “The Proof of the Pudding," W ashington Office Inform ation Letter 41 (24 October 1941): 3-4. 88. Fish, CR, 16 October 1941, 7954. See also Case, CR, 17 October 1941, 8040. Congressman Melvin J. Maas was one anti-interventionist who said the neutrality act should be repealed for; it “was never a workable law," “had no scientific basis,” and “was contrary to all traditional policies." Maas, U nited States News, 3 October 1941,28. 89. Wood in Sarles, “Story of America First," 254. 90. Shafer, CR, 16 October 1941, 7978; Short, CR, 17 October 1941, 8029; Beard, undated state­ ment, inserted by La Follette, SFRC, 24 October 1941, 249. See also O'Connor, CR, 9 October 1941, 785; Vorys, CR, 13 November 1941,8881. 91. Firing, Vandenberg, CR, 27 October 1941, 8257; targets, David A. Reed, testimony, SFRC, 22 October 1941,51-52; mines, House report, 12 October 1941, in CR, A4692. Signers included Chiperfield, Vorys, Mundt, and Jonkman. 92. Congressman Frank Crowther (Rep.-N.Y.), CR, 10 November 1941, 8747. See also David A. Reed, testimony, SFRC, 22 October 1941,51; AFC Research Bureau, “Did You KnowThese Things about Arming American Merchant Ships?" D id You Know? 27 (13 October 1941): 10, Box 280, AFC Papers. 93. B. C. Clark, CR, 1 November 1941,8408. The C T predicted it would be seven months before some ships were armed. See “Experts for War," 15 October 1941,12. 94. Shafer, CR, 16 October 1941,7978. See also Chiperfield, CR, 16 October 1941,7967; Colcord, testimony, SFRC, 24 October 1941,219. 95. Finerty, testimony, HFAC, 14 October 1941,22,25. 96. AFC Research Bureau, D id You Know? 27 (13 October 1941): 15-16. See also La Follette, 29 October 1941,8320, citing Arthur Krock, “In the Nation: The Value of Armament to Merchant Ships," N Y T , 2 October 1941,24; David A. Reed, testimony, SFRC, 22 October 1941,51; Warren D. Mullin, “The Neutrality Law Should Stand," Peace Action 7 (September 1941): 3. 97. Knox cited by Robert La Follette, CR, 29 October 1941,8320. For military columnists Freder­ ick Palmer and George Fielding Eliot, see La Follette, CR, 8319. See also Lieutenant S. D. Willingham, “Modem Submarine versus Major Warship," U S Naval Institute Proceedings 67 (April 1941 ): 513-20, cited by B. C. Clark, CR, 1 November 1941,8408. 98. Stark cited by La Follette, CR, 29 October 1941, 8321. For other citations of Stark, see O’Connor, CR, 15 October 1941,7902; Mundt, HFAC, 22 October 1941,41; Chiperfield, CR, 16 Oc­ tober 1941,7967. 99. AFC Research Bureau, “Did You Know These Things About Arming American Merchant Ships?" D id You Know? 27 (13 October 1941): 17, Box 279, AFC Papers; Woodruff, CR, 15 October 1941; Congressman Charles S. Dewey, CR, 16 October 1941,7965. 100. For Hyde, see Vandenberg, CR, 27 October 1941,8256. For Jessup, see La Follette, CR, 29 Octo­ ber 1941,8321; Jessup to Hiram Johnson, 18 October 1941, Jessup Papers. For Moore, see John Bassett Moore to Robert E Wood, 14 October 1941, Box 66, AFC Papers. For Borchard, see Edwin M. Borchard

472

Notes to Pages 264-266

to James Shanley, 13 October 1941, in HFAC, appendix, 82. See also AFC Research Bureau, D id You Know?, “Did You Know These Things,** 6-9. For affirmation of the continued viability of international law, see Vandenberg, CR, 27 October 1941,8256; Finerty, testimony, HFAC, 14 October 1941,35,37-38; David A. Reed, testimony, SFRC, 22 October 1941,52. 101. Edwin M. Borchard to Senator Tom Connally, 31 October 1941, Borchard Papers. Emphasis in original. 102. Wood statement, NYT, 10 October 1941,4; Robert E. Wood to Burton K. Wheeler, 9 October 1941, Box 55, AFC Papers. For other apprehensions of war, see Congressman John Jennings Jr., CR, 16 October 1941,7992; Rich, CR, 17 October 1941,803; Robsion, CR, 13 November 1941,8873. 103. Colcord, testimony, SFRC, 24 October 1941,219; Finerty, testimony, SFRC 23 October 1941, 191; AFC Research Bureau, “Did You Know That Elimination of the Neutrality Law Combat Zones Means War?** D id You Know? 28 (25 October 1941 ): 54, Box 280, AFC Papers. 104. For Bold Venture, see N Y T , 22 October 1941,1,3. For Teagle, see N Y T , 23 October 1941,1,6. 105. Finerty, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,194; Danaher, CR, 6 November 1941,8569. 106. N YT, 18 October 1941,1,3; Bailey and Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt, 197-98. 107. Villard, radio speech, WABC 12 October 1941, repotted in [New York University] Heights D aily News, 14 October 1941,2. 108. Finerty, testimony, HFAC 14 October 1941, 55; Finerty, testimony, SFRC 23 October 1941, 189. See also Cudahy, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,155. 109. For minority report, see CR, 16 October 1941,7967. For further endorsement of British reg­ istry, see R. Douglas Stuart Jr. to Alf Landon, 27 October 1941, Box 60, AFC Papers; Congressman Dewey, CR, 16 October 1941,7975; Mundt, CR, 17 October 1941,8013. 110. House vote, N Y T , 18 October 1941,1; Gallup poll, NYT, 19 October 1941,5. On the war zone issue, 40 percent were negative and 6 percent were undecided. For related polls, see Cantril, Public O pinion, 1128. 111. Bailey and Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt, 221. 112. See, for example, Edwin M. Borchard to James A. Shanley, 31 October 1941, in testimony, HFAC 81; Senator Theodore Bilbo, CR, 4 November 1941,8475; Cudahy, testimony, SFRC 23 Octo­ ber 1941,140; Flynn, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,203-4; Philip Jessup to Hiram Johnson, n.d., in testimony, SFRC, 252; Vandenberg, CR, 27 October 1941,8251; Taft, CR, 3 November 1941,8432; R. Douglas Stuart Jr. to Felix Morley, 16 October 1941, Box 66, AFC Papers; “Last Call for Congress,** N Y W T, 4 November 1941; Warren Mullin, “The Neutrality Act Should Stand,** Peace Action 7 (Sep­ tember 1941): 3; FOR executive committee, 21 October 1941,3, FOR Papers; “Comment,** America 66 (18 October 1941): 30; “Neutrality Repeal,** SFN, 26 September 1941,14. Libby was less apocalyptic, denying that repeal of the neutrality act would lead to total war so long as the hemispheric restriction on draftees still stood. Frederick J. Libby to Frank J. Murray, 5 November 1941, NCPW Papers. 113. David A. Reed, testimony, SFRC, 22 October 1941, 66; C hristian C entury 58 (22 October 1941): 1294-96; “One Way Passage** [AFC leaflet], 1. 114. NYT, 22 October 1941,1,3; Bailey and Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt, 198. 115. Villard, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,183; Vandenberg, CR, 27 October 1941,8255; Taft, CR, 3 November 1941,8430. See also Danaher, CR, 6 November 1941,8569; Nye, CR, 29 October 1941, 8311; David A. Reed, testimony, SFRC, 22 October 1941,74; Wheeler, CR, 5 November 1941,8522. For more cautious statements, see Finerty, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,194; Edwin M. Borchard to John A. Danaher, 29 October 1941, Borchard Papers. 116. Roosevelt, Navy Day address, text, NYT, 28 October 1941,4. For a critique of the speech, see Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 114-15. 117. “Roosevelt’s War,” N YD N , 21 October 1941, 25; Herbert Hoover to Edwin M. Borchard, 29 October 1941, Borchard Papers; Wheeler, CR, 5 November 1941,8528. See also Robert E. Wood, AFC press release, 27 October 1941, Box 278, AFC Papers; Vandenberg, CR, 27 October 1941,8255; Nye, CR, 29 October 1941,8311; Fish, CR, 17 October 1941,8030; Frank Gannett to Dexter Perkins, 17 No­ vember 1941, Gannett Papers, acknowledging as well Perkins’s concurrence; Burdick, CR, 13 Novem­ ber 1941,8863;“But Boake Carter Says,” SFE, 4 November 1941,9;“We Read a Day’s News," W allstreet

Notes to Pages 266-268

473

21 October 1941; “An American Destroyer Is Torpedoed” C hristian C entury 58 (29 October 1941): 1324; Hoffman, CR, 30 October 1941,8365; Edwin M. Borchard to John A. Danaher, 23 Octo­ ber 1941, Borchard Papers; Gay Judson to Amos Pinchot, 29 October 1941, Pinchot Papers; Amos Pinchot, open letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 24 October 1941, in CR, 8312. 118. “Get the British Out of Iceland,” CT, 18 October 1941,12; Vorys, CR, 17 October 1941,8105. See also Mundt, CR, 17 October 1941,8012; Short, CR, 8033. 119. See, for example, Hanford MacNider to Robert E. Wood, 28 October 1941, Box 286, AFC Pa­ pers; Raymond Moley, “Washington Tides,” Newsweek, 10 November 1941,21; Amos Pinchot to Elsie French Fitzsimon, 12 November 1941, Pinchot Papers; D. Worth Clark, Wheeler, and Taft, CR, 4 No­ vember 1941,8479. 120. Wood, AFC press release, n.d., Box 278, AFC Papers; “A Policy of Suicide,” CT, 29 October 1941,16. See also Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine: Presidential Demagogy,” Calk 8 Novem­ ber 1941,5. 121. John F. Bratzel and Leslie B. Rout Jr., “FDR and the Secret Map,” Wilson Q uarterly 9 (January 1995): 167-73; Cull, Selling War, 170-73. 122. Gark, CR, 4 November 1941, 8479; Allen, “FDR Finds ‘Secret Plan’ of Nazis 11 Years Late,” Call, 22 November 1941,2. 123. Wheeler, CR, 5 November 1941, 8529; La Follette, “What's Next for America?” 1 November 1941, in CR, A5043; Cudahy, testimony, SFRC, 23 October 1941,153; AFC Research Bureau, “Did You Know That Elimination of the Neutrality Law Combat Zones Means War?” D id You Know? 28 (25 Oc­ tober 1941): 52-58, Box 280, AFC Papers. See also Wiley, CR, 30 October 1941,8346; Capper, CR, 31 October 1941,8385; Felix Morley quoted in “The Drift,” Saturday Evening Post 214 (11 October 1941): 28. 124. Dennis, WFL 169 (30 October 1941): 3. Dennis, WFL 168 (23 October 1941): 3. 125. See, for example, see Wood, statement, 9 October 1941, in Sarles, “Story of America First,” 285-86. 126. Taft, CR, 30 October 1941,8338. Fish pegged U.S. shipping at seven million tons. CR, 12 No­ vember 1941,8763. 127. “One Way Passage” [AFC leaflet], 4-5. It said that whereas in September 1939 Britain had 21,000,000 tons, or 31 percent of the world’s shipping, it currently possessed 25,767,000 tons, or 45 percent of the world’s shipping. Taft estimated the British shipping loss at 5 percent. CR, 30 October 1941,8338. For additional use of British sources, see Mundt, CR, 12 November 1941,8768; “The Inner Enemies of the Republic,” CT, 9 October 1941,1. 128. Wheeler, CR, 5 November 1941,8517. The CDAAA conceded Churchill’s claims but noted that winter months—with their long nights, rough seas, and bad visibility—were more favorable for sub­ marine operations. Livingstone Hartley and Frank S. Goodwin, “Toward Victory in the Atlantic,” CDAAA, W ashington Office Inform ation Letter 44 (14 November 1941): 3, Box 35, CDAAA tapers. 129. Congressman H. Carl Andersen (Rep.-Minn.), CR, 6 October 1941, 7684. Congressman O’­ Connor went so far as deny that the British Empire had ever attempted to draw on its pool of man­ power. Of the four hundred million people in the empire, only four million were armed. See 7790. 130. N Y T , 5 November 1941,1,3; Bailey and Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt, 205-6. 131. N Y T , 1 November 1941,1,3,4; Bailey and Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt, 205. 132. For samples of anti-interventionist comment, see “Mrs. Roosevelt,” NYD N , 4 November 1941, 23; “The Americans Already Dead,” CT, 7 November 1941,14; FrankWaldrop, “Keep Cool,” W TH, 1 No­ vember 1941,14; Waldrop,“They Weep,” W TH , 2 November 1941, El; Taft, CR, 3 November 1941,8430. 133. Aiken, CR, 31 October 1941, 8393; Wheeler, CR, 6 November 1941, 8550, citing “Text of Krock's Talk to Columbia College Alumni,” N YT, 6 November 1941,4; Rich, CR, 5 November 1941, 8538; Pinchot, memo to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 3 December 1941, Box 284, AFC tapers; Nye, CR, 7 No­ vember 1941,860; Norman Thomas to Kansas C ity Times, 7 November 1941, Thomas tapers. 134. Voting on bill, CR, 7 November 1941,8680; voting on Clark motion, CR, 7 November 1941, 8675. On the latter, the vote was thirty-eight to forty-nine. 135. Hill, CR, 13 November 1941,8867. See also Dondero, CR, 13 November 1941,8853. Journal,

474

Notes to Pages 268-271

136. Pfeiffer, CR, 12 November 1941,8767. See also Vorys, Yale [University] Daily News, 28 Octo­ ber 1941. 137. Roosevelt in CR, 13 November 1941,8890-91; Dirksen, CR, 13 November 1941,8880. 138. Voting, CR, 13 November 1941,8891. 139. Wood statement, 14 November 1941, Box 23, AFC Papers; Cole, America F ini, 164; Cole, Lind­ bergh, 196. 140. Wilson, “FDR and the Riddle,” 31. For Gallup poll of 5 November 1941 on AEF, see Cantril, Public O pinion, 978. The remaining 7 percent was undecided. 141. Bailey and Ryan, H itler vs. Roosevelt, 213. 142. See, for example, Mundt and Woodruff in report of Fred Burdick, 16 November 1941, Box 284, AFC Papers; KAOWC press release, 14 November 1941, Socialist Party Papers; “Washington Sum­ mary,” NYD N , 15 November 1941, 15; John Haynes Holmes, “Editorial Comment,” U nity 127 (De­ cember 1941): 159; Burdick, report, 27 November 1941, Box 284, AFC Papers; Karl E. Mundt to Amos Pinchot, 4 November 1941, Pinchot Papers; Burton K. Wheeler to Norman Thomas, 25 November 1941, Thomas Papers. 143. “The Neutrality Act Is Discarded,” Christian C entury 58 (26 November 1941): 1459; John T. Flynn to Robert E. Wood, 11 November 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 139. See also Flynn to Wood, 16 No­ vember 1941, in Doenecke, IDU, 434. 144. Amos Pinchot to Arthur F. Bronwell, 21 November 1941; Pinchot to Karl Mundt, 21 Novem­ ber 1941, both in Pinchot Papers. 145. CT, 14 November 1941,14. See also Chamberlin Diary, 13 November 1941; Hiram W. John­ son to HiramW. Johnson Jr., 16 November 1941, Johnson Papers; “Comment,” America, 22 November 1941,170; Castle Diary, 8 November 1941. 146. Reynolds, Creation, 218-20. For quotation, 220. For Churchill's confidence, see 214. 147. Kahn, “United States Views,” 495. CHAPTER 19: THE DOM ESTIC FRONT

1. “Mr. Flynn on War Hysteria,” New Republic 103 (11 November 1940): 660. See also “The Pres­ ident’s War,” Christian Century 58 (8 January 1941): 47. 2. See, for example, Frank Hanighen, “Capitol Letter,” Common Sense 9 (July 1940): 13-14; Wal­ ter C. Frame, America 63 (21 September 1940): 651; Villard,“Our Canadian Alliance,” Christian Cen­ tury 57 (28 April 1940): 1054; “Fifth Column,” Uncensored 34 (25 May 1940): 3-4. See also “Short of Aid,” Uncensored 37 (15 June 1940): 2; “Fifth Column Notes,” Uncensored 38 (22 June 1940): 4; “Fifth Column News,” Uncensored 40 (6 July 1940): 1. 3. “They Rifled My Office, Too,” New Masses 36 (25 June 1940): 14-15; “News Notes of a Week,” New Republic 103 (29 July 1940): 134. See also“The Witch Hunt Begins,” New Republic 102 (3 June 1940): 745. 4. See, for example, John T. Flynn, “Other People's Money: Johnny, Get Your Gun,” New Repub­ lic 102 (27 May 1940): 728; "Other People's Money: The Price of Hysteria Is Reaction,” New Republic 102 (29 June 1940): 141; Dennis, WFL 95 (23 May 1940): 2. 5. C. Hartley Grattan to Sidney Hertzberg, 15 May 1940, Hertzberg Papers. 6. See, for example, Villard, “Rule by Fear,” Christian C entury 58 (26 February 1941 ): 288; Mor­ ton, Let's Think This M atter Through [pamphlet], in CR, 21 February 1941, A785. 7. Fisher, Idaho Daily Statesman, 17 January 1941. For other comparisons to Welles, see Con­ gressman Noble H. Johnson (Rep.-Ind.), CR, 21 June 1940, A4083; MacNider, testimony, SFRC 6 Feb­ ruary 1941,561; “Reaction,” Time, 27 May 1940,17; Holmes, “Nothing to Fear but Fear,” U nity 125 (1 July 1940): 131. 8. Woodruff, CR, 3 February 1941,503; Valentine, testimony, SFRC 5 February 1941,402. 9. Fish, CR, 28 April 1941,3350. See also Nye, “Loyalty and Unity,” speech to Steuben Society of America, 20 September 1941, in CR, 7626.

Notes to Pages 271-273

475

10. Edwin M. Bordiard to John Bassett Moore, 19 February 1941, Borchard Papers; Wheeler, CR, 1 March 1941,1607. See also “Are We to Have a New Spy Hunt?” Christian C entury 56 (20 September 1939): 1124; Nye, CR, 29 October 1941,8306. 11. Ickes, NIT, 14 April 1941,19; Villard, [University of) California [Los Angeles] D aily Bruin, 24 April 1941,1; William R. Castle to R. Douglas Stuart Jr., 17 September 1941, Box 63, AFC Papers. 12. Villard, “The Pattern for War Is Repeated," Christian C entury 58 (22 January 1941): 119. For Roosevelt's reference to slackers, see message to Congress, CR, 6 January 1941,6. For Hutchins, see “American Has a Choice," Progressive, 31 May 1941,9. 13. See, for example, Wheeler, speech to antiwar mobilization, Washington, D.C., 7 June 1940, CR A3676; Hugh Johnson, 30 September 1940, in Sargent, Bulletin #34, 3 February 1940, G etting US into War, 276 n. 6; Mencken, Baltim ore Sun, 29 September 1940; Fish, H arvard Crim son, 4 March 1940,1. 14. See, for example, Frazier, CR, 14 October 1939, 397; Sterling Morton, Let’s Think This M atter Through [pamphlet], in CR, 21 February 1941, A785; Sargent, Bulletin #34,3 February 1940, Getting US into War, 278 n. 11. 15. Thomas, Harvard [University] Crimson, 5 November 1940,3; Barnes cited by Nye, CR, 26 Febru­ ary 1941,1431. See also Barnes, “Peace for Liberty: Menace Lies in War,” N YW T, 19 February 1940,16. 16. Herbert Hoover to William J. Gross, 7 April 1941, Hoover Papers. 17. Sargent, Bulletin #34,3 February 1940, Getting US into War, 27; Barnes quoted by Nye, CR, 26 February 1941, 1431; Mayer, “I Think I'll Sit This One Out," Saturday Evening Post 212 (7 October 1939): 97. See also William Henry Chamberlin, “War: Shortcut to Fascism," American M ercury 51 (De­ cember 1940): 392; Norman Thomas to S. K. Ratcliffe, 8 October 1940, Thomas Papers. 18. Marcantonio, “There Shall Be No Gestapo in America," address, Mutual network, 12 June 1941, in CR, A2852; Krueger, [University of Chicago] D aily M aroon, 12 November 1941,1. 19. Dennis, WFL 103 (18 July 1940): 1; 150 (12 June 1941): 1. 20. “Snoops Wanted," Uncensored 5 (4 November 1939): 1; “Who’s Afraid?” Commonweal 31 (27 October 1939): 1; Sargent, Bulletin #35,9 February 1940, Getting US into War, 280-82; Burnham, “Al­ ternative to War," Commonweal 32 (12 July 1940): 245; Nye, CR, 23 August 1940,10,807; Chamberlin diary, 28 August 1940. 21. Krock, “In the Nation: The Consolidation Plan for Official Press Agents," NYT, 2 April 1941,22; “National Defense," Uncensored 79 (5 April 1941): 3; Julian Webb, “Conscripting the News," New Masses 39(20 May 1941): 9. 22. Krock, N YT, 28 September 1941,22, cited by Frank C. Hanighen, “The Coming Coup d’Etat," Progressive, 27 September 1941,5; Norman Thomas to Morris R. Cohen, 4 November 1941, Thomas Papers. See also John Bassett Moore to Harlan Fiske Stone, 19 July 1940, Moore Papers. 23. Corwin, [Princeton University] Daily Princetonian, 31 October 1940,2. For corroboration, see Cole, Lindbergh, 129; Richard W. Steele, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics," Politi­ cal Science Q uarterly 94 (Spring 1979): 20-21. For protests, see Wheeler, CR, 3 March 1941,1655; “Cab­ bages and Kings: Don't Be Afraid," Scribner*s Com m entator 9 (March 1941): 5-6; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine: Emotional Urges to War," Call, 1 November 1941,5. 24. Sargent, Bulletin #35,9 February 1940, Getting US into War, 282; Dorothy Detzer to Mrs. Mary Farquharson, 21 June 1940, W1L Papers. 25. For protests, see, for example, “Keeping Our Liberties," New Republic 101(4 October 1939): 228; Sargent, Bulletin #35,9 February 1940, Getting US into War, 282; resolutions, WIL annual meeting, Pittsburgh, 27-30 April 1940,3, WIL Papers. 26. La Follette amendments, “American Casualties," Uncensored 35 (1 June 1940): 3; anti-sabotage and FCC, “Civil Liberty," Uncensored 122 (22 November 1941): 3; Sumners in Lawrence Dennis to Harry Elmer Barnes, 28 November 1941, Barnes Papers. 27. For examples of opposition to the Smith Act, see Warren Mullin, director of the NCPW’s labor department, Washington Inform ation Newsletter 8,7 June 1940, 5, NCPW Papers; Maynard Krueger, [University of Chicago] D aily Maroon, 12 November 1941,1.

476

Notes to Pages 274-275

28. Sargent, Bulletin #34,3 February 1940, Getting US into War, 274; Thomas, [University of] Cal­ [Los Angeles] Daily Bruin, 23 September 1940,1; Thomas, “Your World and Mine: Americas Drift Toward Empire,” Call* 19 October 1940,5. 29. Norman Thomas to TomConnally, 31 July 1940, Thomas Papers; passage of House version, CR, 1 July 1940,9121-22; passage of Senate version, CR, 30 September 1940,12,828; acceptance by House, CR, 7 October 1940,13,344. 30. Burnham, “Alternative to War,” Commonweal 32 (12 July 1940): 246; Dennis, WFL 121 (20 No­ vember 1940): 3-4. 31. MacLeish, “The Irresponsibles,” address to American Philosophical Society, 19 April 1940, as reprinted in Nation 150 (18 May 1940): 618-23; “Post-War Writers and 'Pre-War Readers,* address to American Association for Adult Education, 23 May 1940, in New Republic 102 (10 June 1940): 790; em­ phasis in original. For background material, see Scott Donaldson, Archibald M acLeish An American Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 334-38. 32. See, for example, “From Philip Drunk to Philip Sober,” Christian C entury 57 (16 October 1940): 1269-70; Isidor Schneider, “Triumvirate of Disintegration,” New Masses 36 (25 June 1940): 17; John Haynes Holmes, “MacLeish and the Martial Spirit,” New Republic 102 (24 June 1940): 860; Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine,” Gaft 6 July 1940, 2; Samuel Sillon, “Archibald MacLeish, the Irre­ sponsible,” New Masses 35 (11 June 1940): 24; Sillon, “Authors of Surrender,” New Masses 37 (8 Octo­ ber 1940): 4-7; Sillon, “The Irrationals," New Masses 37 (29 October 1940): 20-22. For support of MacLeish, sec Philip Jessup to Van Wyck Brooks, 5 September 1940, Jessup Papers. 33. “The Ghost of Randolph Bourne,” Uncensored 39 (29 June 1940): 4; Morton Dauwen Zabel, “The Poet on Capitol Hill,” Partisan R eview s (January-February 1941): 2-19; Symes,“Hold That Line: Who Are the Irresponsibles?” Caft 5 October 1940,5. For endorsement of Zabel, see Sargent, Bulletin #34, Getting US into War, 275 n. 4. 34. Butler, address, text, N YT, 4 October 1941,14. 35. Clark, “Commotion at Columbia,” Newsweek» 14 October 1941,6; “Hail Columbia's Fuehrer,” CT, 8 October 1940,12; Holmes, letter to Columbia Spectator, 4 October 1940, Holmes Papers. See also Holmes, “Hitler Takes Over Momingside Heights,” U nity 126 (21 October 1940): 52; Flynn, “Other People*s Money: Fascists at Home,” New Republic 103 (14 October 1940): 525; Edwin M. Borchard to John Bassett Moore, 14 October 1940, Borchard Papers; “Nicholas Murray Butler—Semper Idem,” Christian Century 57 (16 October 1940): 1268; “Butler Heads War Drive in Universities,” Caft 19 Oc­ tober 1940,6; Quincy Howe, radio script, 4 October 1940, Jessup Papers; William Henry Chamberlin, “War: Shortcut to Fascism,” American M ercury 51 (December 1940): 395. 36. Columbia Spectator, 11 October 1940,1. 37. Sargent, Bulletin #37,9 February 1940, Getting US into War, 284-85 n. 6. See also Lillian Symes, “Hold That Line,” Cdft 21 December 1940,5. 38. “Advice for Radio Speakers—and Preachers,” Christian C entury 56 (20 September 1939): 1124. 39. Mellett, N YT, 23 February 1941,23; Richard W. Steele, Propaganda in an Open Society: The Roo­ sevelt Adm inistration and the Media, 1933-1941 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1985), 74. 40. “H.R. 3368,” Uncensored74 (1 March 1941): 4. See also Frank Hanighen to Cushman Reynolds, 27 February [1941 ], Hertzberg Papers. 41. YCAW, Frank Hanighen, “Capitol Letter: Minority Report on Lease-Lend Bill,” Common Sense 10 (February 1941): 53; Thomas, [University of] M ichigan Daily, 29 May 1941,1; Thomas, [Univer­ sity of] California [Los Angeles] D aily Bruin, 17 and 20 October 1941,1; Wheeler, CR, 5 November 1941,8516. 42. Miami, N YT, 4 May 1941,6; 6 May 1941,8; 11 May 1941,34; Oklahoma City, NYT, 27 August 1941,7. For other instances, see Doenecke, IDU, 71 n. 146. 43. See, for example, Norman Thomas to Ben Fischer, 10 February 1940, Socialist Party Papers; “Mr. Jackson and the FBI,” New Republic 102 (8 AprU 1940): 455. 44. “Policeman's Interpretation of History,” Uncensored 16 (20 January 1940): 2. See also “Jottings,” U nity 124 (5 February 1940): 170. 45. Nye, “We're Already in the War,” Look, 23 April 1940,11. ifornia

Notes to Pages 275-277

477

46. Nye noted in Reed Vernon, “Pro-War Forces Try to Smear Memory of Senator Lundeen,” C all 12 October 1940,8; “Hoover Investigates Nye,” New Republic 103 (22 July 1940): 101; Holmes, “Believe It or Not!“ U nity 125 (5 August 1940): 165. 47. Flynn, “Other People's Money: Who’s Behind Hoover?“ New Republic 102 (11 March 1940): 345. See also John T. Flynn to Bennett C. Gark, 15 February 1940, Flynn Papers. 48. “Special Supplement: J. Edgar Hoover,“ Uncensored 20 (17 February 1940): 1-2. In a private let­ ter to an NCPW official, editor Hertzberg said, “We are always anxious to do what we can to expose J. Edgar.“ Sidney Hertzberg to Clayton D. Coughran, 9 April 1940, Hertzberg Papers. 49. See, for example, “The Dies Committee's Third Term,“ New Republic 102 (29 January 1940): 132; Dorothy Detzer, minutes, WIL annual meeting, Pittsburgh, 27-30 April 1940,4; “Rewrite Job,“ UncensoredGQ (23 November 1940): 4; Dennis, WFL 122 (28 November 1940): 3; WFL 117 (24 Octo­ ber 1940): 3; Sargent, Bulletin #35,9 February 1940, G etting US into War, 280-82. 50. “Who’s Afraid?“ Commonweal 31 (27 October 1939): 1-2; Barnes, “Peace for Liberty: Menace Lies in War,“ N YW T, 19 February 1940,16; “Nazified,” America 63 (7 September 1940): 602-3. 51. Robert L. Bliss to Chicago FBI, 13 March 1941; W. S. Devereaux to Robert L Bliss, 27 March 1941, both in Box 285; R. Douglas Stuart Jr. to Janet Ayer Fairbank, 9 June 1941, Box 60, all in AFC Papers. 52. Edwin S. Webster Jr. to J. Edgar Hoover, 28 March 1941; J. Edgar Hoover to Edwin S. Webster Jr., 9 April 1941; America First Committee case file, 100-4712-21, the Papers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover Building, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as FBI Papers). 53. J. Edgar Hoover to Robert E. Wood, 17 October 1941, Box 60, AFC Papers; Lindbergh, entry of 7 June 1941, W artime Journals, 515. For the findings of two historians, see Douglas M. Charles and John P. Rossi, “FBI Surveillance and the Charles Lindbergh Investigation, 1939-1941,“ Historian 59 (Summer 1997): 831-47. 54. See in particular the memorandum, J. Edgar Hoover to Stephen Early, 1 March 1941, Official File #4330, Roosevelt Papers. Thanks to the Freedom of Information Act, the author received several thousand individual items of FBI material contained in case files entided “America First Committee” and “Charles Augustus Lindbergh.“ The files revealed that FBI field offices kept careful tabs on local AFC chapters and rallies. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, FBI reports on prewar AFC activ­ ities became even more extensive, sometimes taking the form of capsule histories, though at times these summaries were most inaccurate. See FBI Papers. For an account of the AFC’s relationship to the FBI, see Cole, Roosevelt, 484-87. 55. Wood to Dies in Richard E. Moore, press release, 13 November 1941, Box 278, AFC Papers. For similar sentiments, see Amos Pinchot to Christopher Emmet, 26 March 1940, Pinchot Papers. 56. Sarles, “Story of America First,“ 329. 57. Steele, “Franklin D. Roosevelt,” 15-32; Dallek, Roosevelt, 224-27; Charles F. Croog, “FBI Sur­ veillance and the Isolationist-Interventionist Debate, 1939-1941,“ Historian 54 (Spring 1992): 441-58; Douglas M. Charles, “Informing FDR: FBI Political Surveillance and the Isolationist-Interventionist Foreign Policy Debate, 1939-1945,“ Diplom atic H istory 24 (Spring 2000): 211-32; Robert E. Herstein, Roosevelt and Hitler: Prelude to War (New York: Paragon, 1989), 338. 58. Ickes, entry of 2 June 1940, Secret Diary, 3:197. See also entries of 26 May 1940,189; 15 June 1940,211. 59. Leo P. Ribuffo, The O ld Christian Right: The Protestant Right from the Great Depression to the Cold War (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), chap. 5. See also Geoffrey S. Smith, To Save a Nation: American Countersubversives, the New D eal and the Coming o f World War II (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 60. For the entire spectrum of accusations, see George Wolfskill and John A. Hudson, A ll B ut the People: Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Critics, 1933-1939 (New York: Macmillan, 1969). 61. See, for example, Philip Jessup, speech, Peace Day Assembly, [Bryn Mawr] College News, 24 April 1940, 2; Hiram W. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson Jr., 10 June 1940, Johnson Papers. For com­ ments from more conservative figures, see Danaher, CR, 24 February 1941,1312; Vandenberg, CR, 18 February 1941,1107; Frank Lowden to Norman Thomas, 15 August 1941, Thomas Papers; Frank Gan­ nett to Justin Nixon, 14 October 1941, Gannett Papers.

478

STotes to Pages 2/ / -2 8 0

62. Flvnn, “Cither Peopled Money: War on the Home Fronts New Republic 101 20 September 1939 : 186; “Other People s Money: Patriotism Backfires," S ew Republic 103 9 September 1940 : 332; r,ustav Stolper, C/crman Economy. 1H70-1940: Issues and Trends *NewYork: Revnal 8cHitchcock. 194*3 . 63. Holmes, "How Can Hitler Be Stopped?" Fellowship 5 September 1939 :4; Frederick I. Libbv to Mrs. S. Foster Hunt, 1 June 1940. NCPW Papers; Burnham, "Their Government." Socialist Appeal 9 September 1939,4; Hughes cited in Tobev, "A Replv to the War Cry," NBC red network. 7 July 1941. in CP. A3394; Kennedy, Boston Globe, 10 November 1940. 64. Hoover, “We Mast Keep Out," Saturday Evening Post 212 ; 28 October 1939 : 74. 63. La Follette, CP, 12 October 1939, 329; Libby, “The American Way: Say It with Votes," Peace Ac­ tion 7 'November 19411: 2. 66. Barnes, 'George Washington University] Hatchet, 17 December 1940.1; Borchard, memo, 10 Oc­ tober 1940, Borchard Papers; Dennis, WFL 112 ( 19 September 1940 : 4; Hutchins, speech, NBC red net­ work, 23 January 1941, in CP, A304; Chase, “Four Assumptions About the War," Uncensored, special sup­ plement '28 December 1940/: 3. See also Chase,“Balancing the Risks," Progressive 17 May 1941,5. 67. Utley, “Can Democracy Survive Total War?" Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and So­ cial Science 216 ' |uly 1941 >: 14. Reprinted in part as “Whither Bound?" Reader's Digest 39 (December 194b: 9-15. Dennis assisted Utley in preparing the Digest reprint. Lawrence Dennis to lohn W. Blod­ gett |r., 10 October 1941, Dennis Papers. 68. “Defending Democracy'," Christian Century 37 (5 June 19401: 727; Macdonald, “National De­ fense: The Case for Socialism," Partisan Review 1