Natural theology 9780976037040, 0976037041

Table of contents :
McInerny Natural Theology Part 1.pdf (p.1-100)
McInerny Natural Theology Part 2.pdf (p.101-181)
McInerny Natural Theology Part 1.pdf (p.1-100)
McInerny Natural Theology Part 2.pdf (p.101-181)

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· HOLY APOSTLES

Natural Theology

College & Seminary Library D.Q. Mcinemy !1 ii

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OCT O 7 2013

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Holy Apostles Seminary Library

The Priestly Fraternity of St. Peter Elmhurst, Pennsylvania

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2005

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Sancto Joanni Baptistae de la Salle Patrono Omnium Magistrorum

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CONIENTS

PREFACE.....•••......••••••......••.•.•.•.......•••......•....•••.•.••..••••...........••...........•

lNTRooucnoN • What Is Natural Theology? Natural Theology Is a Distinct Philosophical Science Natural Theology Is an Integral Part of Metaphysics The Specific Tasks of Natural Theology Arguments Against the Legitimacy of Natural Theology Proofs Other Than St. Thomas's Five Ways The Divine Nature The Divine Essence and the Divine Operations CHAPTER ONE • Man's Natural knowledge of God Is It Necessary To Prove God's Existence? Specific Forms of the "Not-Needed" Objection The Existence of God Is Not a Self-Evident Truth { >Man's Natural Knowledge of God : ass1~g to natural reason a capacity it simp ly does not have.If, taking exception to St. Augustine's point of view , we deny that the human mind has some kind of immediate knowled ge of transcendental truth, as we must, then we cannot appeal to such knowledge as a basis for proving the existence of God.

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distinction, in God, between essence and exis tence; they are one. What this means is that it is the very nature of God "to be." Because of the erroneous way the ontologist sees the rela tion between essence and existence he is forever exposed to the temptat ionof thinkingthat if he has a cl~ conceptual grasp of something (meaning, again, ~t he grasps the thing's essence), then he is thereby. entitled t~ e~tertam the possibilitythat the thing in questionactually exists. But this s~ply d?es not follow. Now, the ideawith which the onto logical argumentis dealing is not just any idea,butan ideathat is absolute lyunique,the idea of CJ:od. Does that make a difference as far as the force of the ontological argumentis concerned, giving it a legitimac ythat it would not have if it were dealing with any other idea? No, as we shall attempt to make clear in what follows. There will be three steps in our treatme nt of the ontological argument. First, we shall present the argumen t in full, accordin~ to the classic formulation of it given by St. Ans elm (1033-1109), ma work of bis called the Proslogion. Seco nd, we shall provide a detailed explication of the argument, in orde r to given full exposure to its inner workings. Finally, we shall submit the argument to careful, critical scrutiny, showing that it does not in fact succeed in what it intends to do. Here, then, is the ontological argument as expressed by St. Anselm. And so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art that which we beli eve. And, indeed, we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.Or is ther e no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, ther e is no God? (Psalm XIV, 1). But, at any rate, this very fool, whenhe hears of this being of which I speakabeing than which nothing greater can be conc eivedunderstandswhat he hears, and what he und erstands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist. For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceivesof whathe

Statement of the Ontological Argument We now turn to one of the most famous, and controversial, arguments for the existence of God, the onto logical argument. It is an argument we have already been introduced to; we saw, for instance, that it figures in one of the objections St. Tho mas deals with when he argues for the position that it is possible to prov e the existence of God. 19 Before we get into the particulars of the argument, we must first say a few words about the significance of its name. It is called the ontological arguments because it reflects the philosophical position ~own as ontologism. Ontologism, generally considered, is a point of view that tends to regard existence, on the natu ral level, as inseparable from essence. What this means, in practicalterm s, is that the ontologist su~poses that if he can have a clear and disti nct idea of something, which would put him in contact with the esse nce of the thing, then, because of the way essence and existence are related to one another he :'?uld have, with that idea, lmowledgeof the existence of the thing: !his is a ~enously defective way oflooking at things, for the ontologis.t is supposing that essence and existence are relat ed on the natural level thatis, within created being, in a way that sugg ests what can only obtain within the divinenature. In short, the ontologi st is confusing the natural and supernatural orders. As a matter of fact, there is only one being about whom one can say, indeed, must say, that essence necessar ily implies existence, and that is God Himself. To be most precise about it, there is no real

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PROOFS FOR THE ExlsTENcE OF Goo BEFORE

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PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD BEFO RE

will afterwards perform, he has it in his understan ding,

but he does not yet understand it to be, becau se he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it. Hence, even the fool is convinced that some thing exists in the understanding, at least, than whic h nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understoo d, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exist s in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater. Therefore, if that, than which nothing grea ter can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossibl e. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exist s both in the understanding and in reality." Explication of the Ontological Argument

In discussing St. Augustine's argument, above, we noted that it is marked by distinct Platonic influences. Somewhat the same thing can be said of St. Anselm's argument. This is easily explained, for St. Anselm was thoroughly Augustinian in his way of thinking, and it is quite natural, therefore, that he should have adopted the Platonic propensities of his great mentor. St. Anselm's motto was Fides Quaeren s Intellectum, "Faith Seeking Understanding." The spirit behind that motto, which is to say, the spirit of the man whose motto it was, is clearly shown in the very first sentence of the argument, in which St. Anselm prays that he might "understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art that which we believe." For him, it can rightly be said, the whol e purpose ofphilosophy, of the ordered exercise ofhuman reason, is to illuminate the faith. In this

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then, philosophy is very properly :rega rded as ancilla theologiae, "the handmaid of theology." . One of the disputed questions that continues to revolve around this argument is, Just to what extent did St. Anselm ~onsider th.e argument to be a demonstration in the strict sense? Did h~ have it in mind really to prove that God exists, or was the argument intended rather simply to make more explicit the nature of a God whose existence was already taken for granted? The second sentence of the arzument reads" "And, indeed, we belie ve that thou art a being than ;hich nothing greater can be conc eived." (emphasis added) Now, ifone begins by attesting to one's belie f in God, it would ~eem_that one is not involved in a project to prove God 's existence. Faith gives sure knowledge of God's existence, hence there would be no need to prove it. But to interpret the sentence just quoted in that way would be to read too much into it. By initially acknowle dging his believe in God, St. Anselm is not thereby telling us that he is not engaging in genuine natural theology in what follows. He is, after all, doing no more than what we are doin o as believers, in this cours e. We freely aclmowledge our belief but wemake no direct appeal to the knowledge it provides us withas,we exercise our natural reason as philosophers. St. Anselm's attitude in this regard is made clear in the sentence that immediately follows the one quoted just above. The fact that, at the very outset of the argument, St. Anselm introduces "the fool who says in his hear_t that there is no God" would seem clearly to indic ate that the argument is not directed toward believers, but toward those who deny the existence of God. I think we are justified, then, in unde rstanding the argument as intended to serve as a bonafide demonstra tion. The first key point of the argument is the obse rvation ~at e:7en the atheist must have a basic, working idea of God, otherwise his v~ry atheism would make no sense. One cannot coherently deny something unless he has some sort of understanding of what it is he is denying. Both theist and atheist must have some share d notions of what it is they are respectively affirming or denying. So, then, the atheist ~ aware of what he is referring to when he uses the term "God." He might say to us: 'cy es, I understand what you mean by 'God .' You mean a supreme being, the source of all being, the creator of the universe. I und~rstand the concept perfectly well, but I maintain that there is no such being that

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PROOFS FOR nm EXISTENCE OF Gon BEFORE

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answersto that description." To reiterate the first point: The atheist has firmly fixed in his mind an idea of God. Th_e ~ext_PointSt. Anselm makes in the argument is to draw a very clear distinction between purely mental existence and real, i.e., extramental, e~sten~e. He vividly brings home this point byusing an example of ~ art1s_t painter and his painting. The example holds up for our considerationthe stark difference between a conceived work of art and ~ exe~u~edwork of art. Before a painter picks up his brush and begins his artistic labors, he first forms an idea in his mind of what he wants to paint. And that may be a very precise idea. So, the artist, at this stage, ~derstands th~ work of~' but he understands it as existing only in his mind. And he is also quite aware of the difference between a work of art as existing only mentally, and its existing extra-mentally, as an act_uaIIy existing objective artifact, as well. As St. Anselm puts it, the artist, before executing the work, "has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be." But after he completes the painting, "he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists." Next, St. Anselm returns to the attitude of the atheist, the fool who says th~rds_no God. Like the artist, who has a clear idea of a painting not yet m existence, the atheist has a clear idea of God whose existence he d_eni~s. St. Anselm puts the case very strongly, asserting that the atheist is convinced that the proper understanding of "God" is of a being ''than which nothing greater can be conceived." That is his idea of God, and, as an idea, it is understood by him as existing in his own mind. Indeed, the atheist would argue, that is the onlyway"God" exists. There is nothing in the extra-mental world corresponding to that idea. The subsequent step in the argument is the most critical one. St. Anselm invites us to consider the following. We have in our minds a clear understanding of the meaning of"God," an idea that conceives God as a being "than which nothing greater can be conceived." As an id~a, it of course exists-mentally. But, St. Anselm argues, given the unique nature of this idea, it cannot exist only mentally. It must exist extra-mentally as well, which is to say, simply, it is an idea for which there is a corresponding entity in the extra-mental world, and that entity is God. . That is the nub of the argument. In order to be able to appreciate its fo~ce,we need first to accept St. Anselm's guiding assumption that real, i.e., extra-mental, existence is greater than mere mental existence.

PROOFS FOR TIIB EXISTENCE OF

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This we can easily do. An actually existing painting is immeasura?ly superior to the mere idea of a painting. Now, the idea of God: as a being "than which nothing greater can be conceived.," is a true idea, but rt would not be a true idea if it were only an idea. Let us suppose that it were only an idea. By doing so, we find ourselves in a contradictory position, for if this idea of God exists only as an idea, t~at would mean that in fact something greater than it could be conceived. And what would that something be? It would be something that exists in a manner greater than the manner in which an idea e~sts-i.e._, ~s an actually existing extra-mental reality. In order to avoid contradiction, then, and to have a true understanding of the idea of God as a being "than which nothing greater can be conceived," we must concede_that?od a~ally exists. It is impossible that He could exist only as an idea mom: minds, for such is an inferior form of existence in relation to actual existence, and God would not be in fact the greatest of beings if He existed in an inferior way, as no more than an idea in our minds. Criticism of the Ontological Argument St. Anselm's argument turns on a vitally important notion that is never explicitly expressed, and that is the notion that, with respect to the divine nature, essence implies existence. St. Anselm uses ~e phrase "than which nothing greater can be conceived," which certainly serves as a pointed descriptive phrase as applied to God. Without falsifying the saint's intent, I think we would be justified in substituting for that phrase another, namely, "a being whose very nature it is to be." . Now, it is of course quite true that, with God, essence 1:ecessarily implies existence, for in the divine nature essence and existence are one; the very meaning of God, so to speak, is "to be." But how do we know that about the divine nature? There are two ways we can come to know this truth, through faith, or through demonstration. But if we rely on either way, the argument is vitiated. If the knowledge com~s through faith, we can scarcely use it as a premiss in an argument that purports to prove the existence of God. "f!ow ~ould ~e expect to convince an atheist of the existence of God if he ts required to accept a premiss which would be self-evident only to a believer? The fact that essence and existence are one in God can be demonstrated, as St. Thomas shows,21 but there is no demonstration for the fact in this

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PRooFS FOR THE EX1sTENCE OF Gon BEFORE ST. THoM

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ar~ent. And because there is no demonstrationhere, maki ng evident the unity of essence and existence in God, it remainsnon-s elf-evident. Butzhatmeans, then, that it cannot serve as a premiss for an argument for premisses must be self-evidentlytrue. ' · · But there is a much more serious difficulty involved here if we ~ssume~ as ':e justifiably may, that the unity of essence and existence m God is being used as a premiss in the argument, and that is the fact that such knowledge has to do with the nature of God. But what is the wholeintent of the argument?It is to provethe existence of God. In any effo~ t? prove the existence of a being, we cannot use aay knowledge pertaining to the ~ature of the being; that would be assum ing the kind of knowledgewhich we couldnot be expected to know . First we must answerthe question,An sit? Whethersomething exists? Only when we have ans~ered that questionin the affirmativecan we go on to answer the question, Quid est? What is the natureofthis beinz whos e existence 0 we have ascertained? Int~rms of terminology we introducedearlier, whatwe have in the ontologicalargument,in effect, is a propter quid demo nstrationrather than a quia demonstration. A propter quid demonstra tion we recall is one that proceeds from cause to effect. But such a demonstration cannot properly?e used here, and.that is because the cause is nothing less than God Him.self, whose existence we are attem pting to prove. The argumentwas subjectto pointedcriticismin St. Anse lm's own day. A ~o~ by the name of Gaunilon, from the monastery at Marmoutier, m France, arguedthat one could conceive of a superlative entity, such as an Isle of the Blessed, but the fact that one can entertain an idea of such an entity by no means necessitatesits actua l existence. ~t. Anselm respo~ds to this criticism by first agreeing that we can indeedcome up with ~ll sorts offantasticideas which have nothingthat ~orrespon~ to them m the real world. But, he effectively argues, the idea of God is like no otherideathe human mind can conc eive . because . . . ' ' in conce1vm_g it, we must necessarily be thinking about a being , the S~ren:e_Bemg, who actually exists. St. Anselm is perfe ctly correct in mamtainingthat the idea of God is like no other idea we can think but o~ce again, we know that God must necessarily exist either thr~ugh faith or through demonstration. St. Thomas, alth?ugh he does so in his typically respe ctful way, takes senous exception to the ontological argument, and does not

PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF Gon BEFORE ST. THOMAS

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accept it as having true demonstrativeforce. In his respo n~e to the argument we find in the Summa Contra Gentiles, he points out, among other things, that there is nothing that shou ld lead us to believe, as St. Anselm seemingly assumes to be the case, that every atheist is going to conceive-of God as a being "than whic h a greater cannot be conceived." Human beings have shown them selvescapable of coming up with all sorts of wild ideas to whichthey attachth~ name "God." And St. Thomas reminds us that many men have conceived of God in purely material terms, as when, for example, they regard the physicalworld and God as one and the same thing. S~ch is ~he approach of the pantheists. If one thinks of God as_ a mate~albeing, as some eminentphilosophershave done, then one is not thinking of :

THE DIVJNE lmEuEcr 242

THE DIVINE lNrELLECT

the truth th Himself. Second, God is wi e on at y ctl rfe pe is d Go ble, know." things, makes all truth possi all of rce sou ve ati cre the as because He, s to which the nd, and He creates the thing for He creates the human mi "It therefore in order to know the truth. elf its s rm nfo co nd mi n huma in God [as at not only is truth founded "th , up s sum 14 We as om Th St. follows," reme and the first truth." sup the is He ut ],b ing be all the source of wrong, when the falsity when we get things human beings succumb to lect what they rminds do not faithfullyref ou in ed eiv nc co ve ha we is no ideas se God is truth itself, there cau be t Bu t. en res rep to d are intende n to reject Him y into which we can fall tha deeper nor more fatal falsit · rce of all truth, who, as the truth, is the sou God, Knowledge, Life sence of telyobvious proof for the pre The best and most immedia other things . There are any number of on oti f-m sel is life l cal what we ngs are things t as the most basic. Living thi involved, but this could coun n operation, tai detect life by observing a cer that move themselves. We at accounts for is not an operation. It is wh elf its life t Bu nt. me ve mo because usethey move; they move ca be ve ali t no are s ing Th operation. not something way, we can say that life is they are alive. Put another e is of the very if it were an accident. Lif attached to live things, as is what they are. substance of live things; it se they are are identified as such becau Well, then, all live things any way, in s ge ng that moves, that chan self-moving. Now, everythi a definite end." d that purpose is to attain an se, rpo pu a for so es do though they m oflife, and that is because, for est low the t en res rep es, and Plants (i.e., they nourish themselv d en an of e sak the for indeed act uce), they have duce fruit and by that reprod grow, so that they might pro is ordered. ard which their activity tow ds en the of ge led ow owledge no kn of life because with them kn m for r he hig a t en res rep Animals animal can be ically, sense knowledge. An enters into the picture, specif ., the fox chasing it pursues by its actions (e.g quite conscious of the ends se ends. They not consciously choose tho es do al im an the t bu ), bit the rab When we e in the form of instincts. tur na its of rt pa as ed lish are estab we find here the resented by human beings, reach that level oflife rep we could call it an altogether different kind; of ge led ow kn of ce sen pre ional creature. se, the knowledge of a rat sen t les ful the in ge led know

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. ssion of thi And it is precisely the posseon the highs r~tional know~edg~by human beings that establishes them cal life. Hum~ ous of thee::d:v::f physi beings are obviously consci e, but, what IS rsu pu y d oose th more, they consciously ch all that, the~e our kn~:1:~ :·. An~ yet, for to n tio ita lim nt h it ica nif sig a ~s ~ in this regard, for, thoug s or that thi se oo ch can se we t oo ch tha t e no tru rs p~cular good, we do t . the good just as such . Th a is, we will invariabl Y pursue what we . not do othe . perceiveto be good; we can . We are naturallyordered is ho G d rwise d us to be ate toward the good ' for that cre w o . B led ow kn the r de nsi co have seen, God. As we ut now let us ns h t of ge . ti.o d ita 1 Iim no kn t are tha re to the and w a ever . . ow e ge. It is perfect e be ge led ow kn e siv comprehen of the divine t that aus~ it IS knowledge essence itself Given the fac r and the less ate gr t ' as J-:t5t noted, the gre limited the knowledge the , we may e~~ :e le~s limited the life is d Go t tha de clu con know," ;:, o~ His know:Iedge ("to a,~ : be s Hi th wi e on is es added intelligere) ( be, esse). This fact giv truth g d Lo r Ou at wh to cy poignan way, the ' r says of Himself, "I am the and the life "16 St · Th omas offers a succinct of t en !em sta ry · . ere:"Butthatb . summa ture IS one and thesahenttruthsinvolvedh ge d h emgw~ose na the same with its knowled ' an w ose nature Is not in the least bit . determined b ieves the to ~tself, such a being ach al_ e~ e: !t ~: /o ad highest gr n God Himself a em~ IS none other thaof life." 17 on Therefore in God w. ssi pre ex e find the maximum '

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

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stigations into what are In this chapter we will continue our inve ations of the divine nature. commonly referred to as the internal oper one of those operations, the Having considered various aspects of tion to the second of those divine intellect, we will now give our atten internal operations, the divine will. ussion, it would be Inorder better to prepare ourselves for this disc of the general characteristics helpful if we were first to review some will? Of course, the responses of will. What is the nature and function of the knowledge we have of will we give to that question will be based on riences. We are creatures which is derived from our immediate expe liar with its functions. So, our possessed of a will, and we are quite fami human will. But because our point of departure in this discussion will be shall eventually be making principal concern is the divine will, we e of will to the divine will. In application of our human-based knowledg e any number of adjustments, doing so we shall obviously have to mak ral plane, as we had to do in moving from the natural to the supernatu discover that there are some when treating the divine intellect. We shall applied to the divine will, aspects of human will which can be h have no application at all. analogously as always, and some whic ful comparisons that can be Nonetheless, there are any number of fruit e will, and we shall attempt to made between human will and the divin can. That such comparisons derive as much benefit from those as we our human nature is, after all, are available should not surprise us, for

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ed in a very special way, for the effect of the divine.caus~ity, and inde ti. 1 ed m the image and likeness of God , th e essen a creat we have · f · been ustine, is that we were created m~~mg o which, according to St. Aug then, can be considered to be a ~tth mtell~ct and will. The human will, dim reflection of the divine will. intellect, constitute the two . 1:he human_will, along with the human nal soul. The intellect is the pnnc1?al faculties, or powers, of the ratio faculty, which is to say that ~?wmg faculty; the will is the appetitive ard from the subject, drawn it is the f~culty which is directed outw As we saw, being-actually to':~d t~gs o~er than the subject. of the human intellect, but exis~g things-is the proper object ility, or knowableness, or, by spec1fi_cally under ~e ~pect of intelligib object of the human will, but extens10~, truth. Being is also the proper lovable, or, simply, the good, under a diffe~ent aspect, the aspect of the s. In sum, we can say that the ~or the g~od is what :he will na~~ly love the will isfor the good, in that intellect 1~f~r truth, in that truth is its end; the good is its end. g, through the process of Wh~n ~e h~a_n intellect knows bein becomes what it knows. so abstr~ct10n, rt ~s1:111lates it to itself, and inable. The human will al so That is the most intimate kind of union imag 'th . ks is union ofa different kind see ~on WI that which it loves, but this on. The will loves, is drawn not a union assimilation but of associati good. It is the good which is tow:!1"d, ~ thing because it perceives it as the motivator" of the action of the will. as the intellectual appetite. . The will is known~ Scholastic parlance union with the intellect. The It ~s ~alled that because rt always works in it cannot ofitselfidentify will is naturally or~ered toward the good, but of the intellect. The intellect ~e good. For that 1t needs the assistance of the good. Itis impossible 1~lumines th~ will, informs it of the presence object of the act of willing the simply to will. There always has to be an something. The ~hat is willed, and that must be a known "s.omet~f intellect to lead it to the good. will, bhnd m 1tse~ needs ~e eyes of the always in terms of our total :"7he~ever we_ will something, then, it is will something knowingly, 1denti~ as rational creatures. We always the good. But the will, the ~onsc1ous of the _fac~ that we are pursuing which we possess. We have intellectual appetite, is not the only appetite ions, or basic emotionsa ':hole set of sense appetites-the pass but the good in this case is the which are also ordered toward the good,

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wo~d concupiscible, or material good. The appetite fo: foo~ their initial m tes, appeti sense The te. example of a sense appeti on of the directi and ce guidan nating movements are not under the illumi .tes. ' appeti tional intellect, and for this reason we call them non-ra toward the We have said that the human will is naturally ordered ve way. In this good. It is so ordered in a very general and comprehensi n, in that w_e sitatio neces is general ordering toward the good there Let us put this good. human beings cannot do otherwise than to want the nt way. How basic and important truth ofhuman psychology in a differe etely fulfilled, would we best describe a state in which we were compl we could goods the all in the sense that we had in our possession To say ~at we possibly desire? That would be a state of happiness. same thing as cannot do otherwise than to want the good is to say the ess. Human happin for desire that we have a deep-set and ineradicable against their going is, beings cannot not want to be happy, without, that the good, very nature. We always want the good, and we always pursue tunately-and but-note this-it is the good as perceived by us. Unfor y in human traged of perhaps this could be identified as the chief cau~e we must . life--our perceptions in this matter are often quite wrong So and an ~pparent, recognize an important distinction between a real good tive of the or false, good. A real good is one which is genuinely perfec h~d, other the o_n subject who comes to possess it. An apparent good, ect, subj the of is one whose possession will not only fail to be perfective but will prove to be positively harmful to the subject. er that When we examine closely the operation of the will we discov t distinc l severa are it involves some interesting complexity. There nce refere with movements or acts in the operation. To begin with, and volition, simple will, the of ent movem to the end, there is the most basic good_on the of ness aware which may be described as the elementary mg fol~ow y the part of the subject, and a turning toward that ~ood. ~losel b_y ':hi~h the upon that basic movement there is the act of mten~on, on indicates intenti of act The d. desire zood is not simply recognized but t. subjec ~ definite commitment to the good on the part of the means that >: Then come several acts of the will that are related to the first of :Whicll,? are to be employed in order to attain the intended end, the commitme arized articul is called consent. Consent is a general, non-p to take whatever means are necessary tn order to attain the

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0:MNIPOTENCE OF Go

If nity as a whole." mon to the Blessed Tri com is t bu n, rso Pe we h, any suc to d Trinity as ute creation to the Blesse we are right then to attrib vestiges, or t there are to be found tha e, stin gu Au St. th may argue, wi especially in rational n the created world, and thi wi y nit Tri the of , ces tra gustinian lines in that he thinks along Au ws sho as om Th St. . res creatu al creatures, en he writes: "In ration wh t den evi is as t, this respec ll, there is to be found ssed of intellect and wi therefore, who are posse ages, because in them Trinity in the form of im a representation of the the love which the word, the idea, and en we bet ish gu tin dis we can d, in creating man, 16 It is as if the Trinitarian Go " th. bo m for proceeds him. 'St. Thomas's Trinitarian nature upon left the stamp of His ted in our intellectual one. The Trinity is reflec ant ign po a is ent um arg as having been powers that mark us se tho rs, we po al on liti and vo speak are the of God. The words we ss ene lik and age im created in the age of the Father. And t as the Word is the im images of our ideas, jus g those things that at we know, by our willin wh on up s low fol e lov as just them together as and ideas, and binding rds wo r ou by ed ent are repres ther and the Son as the ost proceeds from the Fa it were, so the Holy Gh Love of both. 15

creation of creation, particularly the We tend to think of n." In a sens · happened "way back the t tha ing eth som as , universe which is unavo(· perspective, a perspective did, as viewed from our ear, and the er~~ . siderations. Time is lin framed by temporal con timeitsel , · · ·. time ago, indeed when ng alo en pp ha did rld wo the did not God is eternal. Creation we must remember that h thing{ e for God there is no suc time ago for God, becaus maln. · d, is happening in His ete or short. Creation, for Go ionjl view, we make a.distinct things from our point of t say that first God creat~ and conservation. We ,.

rur '

intaining in exist¢, what He has created, ma tb.at¥ , .· ,.

beings i.nftu.en.ce of Ris -power tb.e >1c ic\e,-a:,< · · · · · ~i'lCll.,\\l.en., \'ti \n.e 1aa1 ~~~\~'\\."~~

. ti · b . . conservation of thimgs m emg rs not a newbac 10n: b~t a c_ontinuation ing."I7Withth may ofthatactionthatgivesbe ato servationmmmd ' we . rightly think of conservation as contin . g, or extended, creation um · . b · :fi Obviously ' there would e no entrance int b em ut God's tho wi s oru g o equall ob . creative power, but it is should be, that we wi~ut ~o~, or at lea~t ng bei in ain rem t no ld cou g power. It is God od s conservm e enc T · profound 1'st eX Ii r ou ns of tai nt who sus every mome hi.s .•·•· s. ive r ou t" :•·· king truth th vo pro m being by htd ug Ve tho seI and con \ a creaturesthare ' Th St God," is is , · . . . .• . omas teaches ' som ethi ng at we know by faith ' but · ·.·. can l h we t tha th tru a is < it a so come to know thr oug natural reason. Th St c ue iss s thi on g In reflectin that there are two. ways i/ , . . omas notesce co nd sta der th t . un can } .: that we ned out nseIVation ' as a pro . .ss a IS tear . ir . -. Ind d. ly ·.c ect dir sm rin n1 lyo t10 ect Va dir seI ectcon i.· e1ther e m those . am . eX1. t · res Ved and .i: .: itu . th t . air y in seI pre Is e anons where somethin g a. 1s. ead enc st s . •·..·· ... . · h protected so that 1it may remain m ex1stenc at we know as a e, · 0,thw ·.. " h eo i som is t" rv nis nse tio co o rva ks w nse ne /.·.·.·.· ,co es m s manner; dhe see : f th ect asp t tha or s rld 0 thi wo ura.l e nat · ·.· .Jo preserve . , an en angered . ··•···. · · a wetlands area in zrv. en geograp hi~cal locale. a 0• ;arum.al species, say , or ··s· s somethin indire the ·. :· · · omeone who conseIVe i h h ctly1snotrespons1ple for gks . wh t tha Th of se con ist to on ·ery existence at1 see erv e e cons . rve. . . ·• ot bring a particular anicmal dn is simply g~to bemg; his intention it from passing out :r~~= . . · direct c is the kind of is Th . nly God can exercise ron vat ser on . . · · b · :·• ation by which a b em ved ser pre g 1s ute , so th ~ emg Ill the absol · !I1l moment to moment se int t lap 1t vatz no at ser . o 1 con fth ~ t, P" . a ine aoim can e ar . . ·•.1V . ·.•,.~ . =ucu -o.. , ~ kind .. oms o in tryin '.g,)1'tim e. · natures of t fully reveals to us the tha ty, ali us ca al fin or od It is finality, things are not only go rdingly observes that co ac as d om ere Th ord St. s. ing \thing of their be are also good in terms y the t bu es, of elv ms ms ter 'fu the they good in but most especially are God Himself oward their proper ends, ultimate end, which is ir the ard tow d ere ·. eir being ord t for the sake of which ides in their finality, tha res s ng thi of ss ne od go . e ale, as it were, encapsulated the ration ve ha we n rei the d of things toward : ey exist. An n for God's ordering pla e Th e. nc ide ov pr isely that .or• divine ect, and again, it is prec ell int ine div the in s . ·I,frends preexist omas makes plain: providence, as St. Th ine div l cal we h hic w · ··• ordering things se is just that plan for sen er op pr the in ce #'q.viden n of finality 1 may say, with the notio we e, nc ide ov Pr d." ai:dtheir en


. betwee~ ~ P an an ich th divine intellect. . as the con . i. e the divine intellect, wh to d B thius aptly referse divine intellect is the ongmatlngd.•·. ·.•• tth th . oe . a · g rl wo anm cre· ate·d 1 fall things me Inthe sec~n . > m which all things proceed. t as disposmg; ' . llec pnncip e o inte ine aks of the div source of all t~gs, that fro ordering o·f· > · .·· gh:;~e to execution, the actual m.e beer :Wh , tion ifi efi.n hed part things, re erence rs all o_ft all things to their ends.

tn!

i

< of Divine Providenc. e/ . d Wi1thin the Embrace ine nta Co Is ing ryth Eve an existif . ny w_ay, or operates asid tial pl .sts ma exi nce ste .· ·•· · Nothing in exi . The provire en rovidencelus . f di;;~. iingly The have be i.. . ive inc am_ o side the dohmens thing, outte, ive, compre is absolu

PROVIDENCE OF

Goo

289

Democritus ancient Greek philosophers some thinkers, such as the St. Thomas as o, us (c341-270 B.c.), wh (c460-c370 B.c.) and Epicur nce. Now, cha by verse was brought about notes, taught that the uni tely contrary to nt of view which is comple poi a is this , say to ss dle nee ans anything for if divine providence me e, enc vid pro ine div of ion the not t exists and that the source of everything tha at all, it means that God is ering everything care for His creation, ord He exercises continuing t He who orders thermore, given the fact tha Fur . end per pro its ard tow that this ordering nt, there is no possibility is omniscient and omnipote events. What God d or frustrated by chance process could be interrupte ing upon the lly ordered. Now, reflect orders is always successfu aspects: the , we detect in it two salient nce cha l cal we n eno nom phe order); ignorance constitutes a disruption of frustration of ends (which intain that the of a chance event. To ma on our part as to the cause se that did not nce is to say that it had a cau universe came about by cha was not the d end. In other words, it nde inte an it hin wit s pas encom a plan that was sting in the divine intellect, result of a specific plan preexi St. Thomas divine will. Other thinkers, realized by a free act of the verse, but they was providence in the uni re the t tha d itte adm es, not not to material spiritual substances only, claimed that it applied to . tly to this point presen substances. We will return y serve as that chance could in any wa In arguing against the notion Thomas makes ernance of the universe, St. gov the for n atio lan exp the evidence clearly ation that all empirical the common sense observ wrong-headed. lanation to be egregiously · · demonstrates such an exp m the orderly (and as a surprising departure fro ied ntif ide be can e anc Ch i rule. But what nce is the exception to the cha le); tab dic pre the re therefo universe? everywhere about us in the i:ovidence rs no~ external mediate because We call divine governance · Hims~lfwere subject to. of secondary ine plan in time, makes use div the ing ~ut exe 11: d, Go His creatures to the fact that God employs ca~es m domg so. Does t there is then tha His providential plan mean •... assist Him in carrying out re can be only t~e universe? It does not. The ;_mo~e than one governor of God. If we verse, and that is of course uni the of or ern gov gle t~ _s~ ity, as does St. the point of view of causal ('90ns1der the matter from ental causes h there are multiple instrum ;Thomas, we say that althoug

n

292

Go THE PROVIDENCEOF

OF Gon THE PROVIDENCE

res can be said God governs His creatu ich wh by ys wa e ers The div actually to be the diversity which is to d Go by nse po res to be a fitting is there, of course, res, a diversity which atu cre se g tho g on am found ity to be found amon ve action. The divers ati cre d's Go of ue e liq aus bec imperfect and ob represent , in however creatures can be said to ence itself God governs hness of the divine ess ric te ini inf the er, nn ma a single art is sufficient as expresses it, but that om Th St. as , art gle sin by a ich are to be found the diverse beings wh all of ds nee the ng ine art. 6 for meeti the recipients of that div are ich wh and rse ive in the un

carrying out ntribute to thepro · achin? the Ap se. cau 0;~~ ::~ ~: ~~ res atu cre (i.e., the_ ~any t is essential to d . d d by an idea tha re ends-then per of the divine plan), the their pro angl~, an of:iue s to ected by a eff matter from a ~fferent ance can only be ordering the ., s.e e+ nc rna ve go this line of reasoning is see :~i:::~evelops from this angle too we their proper end simply y S . d thin s toward single gove1:3-or. Th~ wa m. The goal of any or er batg.is best for the sting. Toem tow particula.c.rly hiintere cannot be derth t N , the best , he argues ' . or o m, ow means., ror ieve what then is the best. ingle governor can ach . n1 , s, to be put ces re pro we g e tte enn ord a ~at if a commi _Y o :s, rno ~e go ny ittee made up of the achieved by ma g ym ~a is he if as ost alm mi n a com is best. It is plish the . the umverse, eve uld not be able to accom wo t . . g :1~ re~e in charge of gove° we terms, :~t:' in more concrete ;~g ;,~ m; ru~ o!: ted v~ res, which most ele te final end of all creatu tim o w_e e " and therefore task. But if ul_ a_ t sentially "on the n tha e els ng thi no ms, is that it eit. To put it~ plainer ter is qumhi~vG ; he~ t:,t bes _ The d . elf ms is God Hiqu one can_ac only the intessentially perfect unity t~gs to :fleeting the all er ord ly per pro e, as only God can that there G d's governance ts on th diction to go on toinsay tr . . form of the e, anc ern ov So, en, o ar it is no ,co~ a t, tha in~ ant Gr d. Go is elf that all things back to Hims ad! ~;~ ~s Go of ns s1o res ne are multiple ex~ ific instanceofthedivi ansbyw _c ase a speer y es the various specificd me cit St Thomas tur in the good the . · · es en a al cre fin ir ves the as to th t God preser case when He preserves a soul f the a act the als~ be ce nan ver go His governance would ~:. ul! wo a~ ~ sue higher already possess, k G d moves a soul to see as is gr h ng fyi cti san om of Th te in a sta e o le cited by St. instances wther er exarnp exemplified in_c.those ano t ye ti ness of one per~on f . which the moral good . . ~on rec per ~ s degree son. He is refe~g behavior of another per s on ati situ se tho m reflected an engag~g d example, and it is oo f the o~ ect eff rk in has a salutary f divine providence at wo .·i g o_ . nce ene exp n for • to the commo . zht be the occasion h this as an mstance o iddin .. ii . that e sees son mig radica thought ld le of one perce lly, ofbi s les or Th ood examp fvi lif . eg mitment to_the) the wor · e;aking'a s~rious com :nd ~g ~o an ab n's diate. another perso I 1 arly reveals the me • ·.·• ty c:1 dio me ral e s His creatures to fulfill goodbye to mo e dc use mpGo t exaby ;:, ..c. ti on._ This las h . it of perrec pursuty ence, w ere quali of divine provid His divine plan.

nance Mediated Divine Gover ted quality of divine more closely the media We must now consider governance as mediated we describe the divine governance. To repeat, of His creatures. God through the mediation it ses rci exe d Go e becaus exists. Things exist nor of everything that ver go the and se cau e to remain is both the God, and nothing is abl by d ate cre re we y the only because en we reflect upon the ine governance. But wh div ut tho wi nce ste exi in diately, ·do we not s divine governance me Hi ses rci exe d Go t inish the divine fact tha which could be said to dim ing eth som t fac t tha in discover en to think that the reason otence? And are we ev sovereignty and omnip e He simply has no ce mediately is becaus nan ver go s Hi ses rci exe a task that is God ce of the universe being nan ver go the so, do to t ly with the choice bu therefore accomplish on can He ich wh and m, too huge for Hi His creatures? cooperation of inadequate way of t sort reflect a woefully tha of s ion est qu y, arl Cle represented to the mode of thinking ing nd po res In r. tte ma soning. He viewing this rsues two lines of rea pu as om Th St. s, ion by those quest rnance is to lead the t the whole idea of gove tha us ing ind rem by begins ove, to the effect l the point alluded to ab cal Re n. tio fec per to be achieved, governed best. How is the best to the is ce nan ver go of that the end very specific practical For St Thomas, one ? ms ter cal cti pra in · in order to perfect the taken by a governor be can t tha ent edi > exp the governed. And his own perfection to ate nic mu com to is d atures, but in ,governe with respect to His cre es do d Go at wh ely \this is precis ough the mediation of does this indirectly, thr ore cases than not He munication detract s indirect method of com thi t no es do t Bu . res creatu nicated? Not which is being commu t tha of cy ica eff sic om the intrin

g
n..ent· Did h . mmJ.n i e th g of al oW prov aqua edap . phys1co-theologica "'....,, g ·to 1 e'hm sh . · d in un ed y nc · ··. 0 muc and thhereb ermme his whole argument, end· by co "T · es rit w h He ? ta that the ; anti-me P ysical point of view e utm~st, therefore, . e th _; . of ct ite much ch ar ry ve e is an ho is always , ':orld whh . argument can prov tibility ofth k u ap cr wl ~ e wor s, not a eator nalm emate }:hampered by the ad . n hi yt er ev ea id h t f. · . e world to whose (Critique, p. 522, 9 an/ IS subJect." K of aim at al cip in pr has been to show th . mphasis his) The hs lis tab es r or he nn ot ca an g in Ytrung, one way or flletaphysical reason '

k

NOTES

amine con~epts.... " s,whose task is to ex er ph so lo hi "p to rs totally ~s~laced. 10. Kant refe e emphasis here is Th ). 1 45 p. , on as the examination of (Critique of Pure Re es indeed involve do is er ph so ilo ph e of the philosopher The task of th e principal concern Th . d se ily , ar tus nd ep co nc se co ly r. Non concepts, but on ich the concepts refe . wh er to ph gs so in th ilo e ph th y t er e motto of ev not concepts, bu th be ld ou sh !") is gs re but thin being referred to he res! ("Not concepts, ological principle em it in ist er ep fu s al iu sic 'pr as n cl 11. The llectuquod no te in in t es l hi Ni : ." senses In as follows was not first in the expressed in Latin at th t lec tel in e th e which is thing in sensu. "There is no dge, that knowledg le ow kn al ctu lle te r in ledgethat is other words, all ou knowledge, the know e ns se on up d se ba s, is their ultimate represented by idea in our mind have s ea id e Th . es ag e im representedby sens e world. th in te to an idea? gs in th source in nce ever be adequa rie pe ex n ca w ho or at no experience 12. Kant writes: "F s just in the fact th ist ns co r tte la e th of ant's question is The peculiar nature re Reason, p. 518) K Pu of ue iq rit (C " it. ea because the can ever be equal to be adequate to an id n ca e nc rie pe ex at th perience. There answered by saying other source but ex no s ha d an e, nc rie pe n experienceand idea derives from ex icalequalitybetwee at m he at m t ec rf pe e rrespondence is never anythinglik mpletely reliable co co al, re a is e er th t cause he looked idea, of course, bu above question be e th k as d ul co nt Ka e world outsidethe between the two. e mind itself, not th th in ce ur so r ei th ther than informing upon ideas as having int of view, ideas, ra po l ica og ol em ist our mind. mind. Given this ep us about the state of rm fo in , ld or w e th itous claim that we us about the state of cts of Kant's gratu pe as l ca xi do ra pa e ly informing us of 13. One of th that he is constant is f' el its in g in th ly, we can know cannot know "the e nature, supposed tru g se ho w at th edwith a penetratin various features of m comes accompani cis sti of no ag st re t's e an th hich nothing. It is as ifK e agnosticism by w ch is lacking to th hi w , thenthat very r elf we its po in g tic in os gn ot know the th nn l ca we ct fa in If onsible philosophica humanity is beset. permissible in resp im is d f," ul el co its at in wh , g gs phrase, "the thin nce or nature of thin nothing of the esse ow it has the ow kn kn e we ifw r do fo ow e, H ag us "in itself'? as g y, in eth m so to r ~h tity whi , seemingl it mean to refe d of an intrinsic iden se es ss f? po g el in its be an of th peculiar quality f from things other f,and separates it of failed to provide he at th rt pa is completein itsel ht on Kant's sig er or ov e er m to e du know the essences It was not tion that we do not en e. nt us co ca s hi be r on fo n ati io such demonstr y any demonstrat an e id ov pr t no sences or.·;, . He did we do know the es at the natures of things th e iv sit po f oo ct that we ,:, ble. The pr specificallyin the fa , there is none availa ge ua ng la in d un things inO" to be fo we did not know natures of things is ct fa in If . gs in with regard ords to th d be possible for us attach different w ul wo all at n io at in discrim themselves,then no

313

J.

)

':~e

zs:


· .·· gh:;~e to execution, the actual m.e beer :Wh , tion ifi efi.n hed part things, re erence rs all o_ft all things to their ends.

tn!

i

< of Divine Providenc. e/ . d Wi1thin the Embrace ine nta Co Is ing ryth Eve an existif . ny w_ay, or operates asid tial pl .sts ma exi nce ste .· ·•· · Nothing in exi . The provire en rovidencelus . f di;;~. iingly The have be i.. . ive inc am_ o side the dohmens thing, outte, ive, compre is absolu

PROVIDENCE OF

Goo

289

Democritus ancient Greek philosophers some thinkers, such as the St. Thomas as o, us (c341-270 B.c.), wh (c460-c370 B.c.) and Epicur nce. Now, cha by verse was brought about notes, taught that the uni tely contrary to nt of view which is comple poi a is this , say to ss dle nee ans anything for if divine providence me e, enc vid pro ine div of ion the not t exists and that the source of everything tha at all, it means that God is ering everything care for His creation, ord He exercises continuing t He who orders thermore, given the fact tha Fur . end per pro its ard tow that this ordering nt, there is no possibility is omniscient and omnipote events. What God d or frustrated by chance process could be interrupte ing upon the lly ordered. Now, reflect orders is always successfu aspects: the , we detect in it two salient nce cha l cal we n eno nom phe order); ignorance constitutes a disruption of frustration of ends (which intain that the of a chance event. To ma on our part as to the cause se that did not nce is to say that it had a cau universe came about by cha was not the d end. In other words, it nde inte an it hin wit s pas encom a plan that was sting in the divine intellect, result of a specific plan preexi St. Thomas divine will. Other thinkers, realized by a free act of the verse, but they was providence in the uni re the t tha d itte adm es, not not to material spiritual substances only, claimed that it applied to . tly to this point presen substances. We will return y serve as that chance could in any wa In arguing against the notion Thomas makes ernance of the universe, St. gov the for n atio lan exp the evidence clearly ation that all empirical the common sense observ wrong-headed. lanation to be egregiously · · demonstrates such an exp m the orderly (and as a surprising departure fro ied ntif ide be can e anc Ch i rule. But what nce is the exception to the cha le); tab dic pre the re therefo universe? everywhere about us in the i:ovidence rs no~ external mediate because We call divine governance · Hims~lfwere subject to. of secondary ine plan in time, makes use div the ing ~ut exe 11: d, Go His creatures to the fact that God employs ca~es m domg so. Does t there is then tha His providential plan mean •... assist Him in carrying out re can be only t~e universe? It does not. The ;_mo~e than one governor of God. If we verse, and that is of course uni the of or ern gov gle t~ _s~ ity, as does St. the point of view of causal ('90ns1der the matter from ental causes h there are multiple instrum ;Thomas, we say that althoug

n

292

Go THE PROVIDENCEOF

OF Gon THE PROVIDENCE

res can be said God governs His creatu ich wh by ys wa e ers The div actually to be the diversity which is to d Go by nse po res to be a fitting is there, of course, res, a diversity which atu cre se g tho g on am found ity to be found amon ve action. The divers ati cre d's Go of ue e liq aus bec imperfect and ob represent , in however creatures can be said to ence itself God governs hness of the divine ess ric te ini inf the er, nn ma a single art is sufficient as expresses it, but that om Th St. as , art gle sin by a ich are to be found the diverse beings wh all of ds nee the ng ine art. 6 for meeti the recipients of that div are ich wh and rse ive in the un

carrying out ntribute to thepro · achin? the Ap se. cau 0;~~ ::~ ~: ~~ res atu cre (i.e., the_ ~any t is essential to d . d d by an idea tha re ends-then per of the divine plan), the their pro angl~, an of:iue s to ected by a eff matter from a ~fferent ance can only be ordering the ., s.e e+ nc rna ve go this line of reasoning is see :~i:::~evelops from this angle too we their proper end simply y S . d thin s toward single gove1:3-or. Th~ wa m. The goal of any or er batg.is best for the sting. Toem tow particula.c.rly hiintere cannot be derth t N , the best , he argues ' . or o m, ow means., ror ieve what then is the best. ingle governor can ach . n1 , s, to be put ces re pro we g e tte enn ord a ~at if a commi _Y o :s, rno ~e go ny ittee made up of the achieved by ma g ym ~a is he if as ost alm mi n a com is best. It is plish the . the umverse, eve uld not be able to accom wo t . . g :1~ re~e in charge of gove° we terms, :~t:' in more concrete ;~g ;,~ m; ru~ o!: ted v~ res, which most ele te final end of all creatu tim o w_e e " and therefore task. But if ul_ a_ t sentially "on the n tha e els ng thi no ms, is that it eit. To put it~ plainer ter is qumhi~vG ; he~ t:,t bes _ The d . elf ms is God Hiqu one can_ac only the intessentially perfect unity t~gs to :fleeting the all er ord ly per pro e, as only God can that there G d's governance ts on th diction to go on toinsay tr . . form of the e, anc ern ov So, en, o ar it is no ,co~ a t, tha in~ ant Gr d. Go is elf that all things back to Hims ad! ~;~ ~s Go of ns s1o res ne are multiple ex~ ific instanceofthedivi ansbyw _c ase a speer y es the various specificd me cit St Thomas tur in the good the . · · es en a al cre fin ir ves the as to th t God preser case when He preserves a soul f the a act the als~ be ce nan ver go His governance would ~:. ul! wo a~ ~ sue higher already possess, k G d moves a soul to see as is gr h ng fyi cti san om of Th te in a sta e o le cited by St. instances wther er exarnp exemplified in_c.those ano t ye ti ness of one per~on f . which the moral good . . ~on rec per ~ s degree son. He is refe~g behavior of another per s on ati situ se tho m reflected an engag~g d example, and it is oo f the o~ ect eff rk in has a salutary f divine providence at wo .·i g o_ . nce ene exp n for • to the commo . zht be the occasion h this as an mstance o iddin .. ii . that e sees son mig radica thought ld le of one perce lly, ofbi s les or Th ood examp fvi lif . eg mitment to_the) the wor · e;aking'a s~rious com :nd ~g ~o an ab n's diate. another perso I 1 arly reveals the me • ·.·• ty c:1 dio me ral e s His creatures to fulfill goodbye to mo e dc use mpGo t exaby ;:, ..c. ti on._ This las h . it of perrec pursuty ence, w ere quali of divine provid His divine plan.

nance Mediated Divine Gover ted quality of divine more closely the media We must now consider governance as mediated we describe the divine governance. To repeat, of His creatures. God through the mediation it ses rci exe d Go e becaus exists. Things exist nor of everything that ver go the and se cau e to remain is both the God, and nothing is abl by d ate cre re we y the only because en we reflect upon the ine governance. But wh div ut tho wi nce ste exi in diately, ·do we not s divine governance me Hi ses rci exe d Go t inish the divine fact tha which could be said to dim ing eth som t fac t tha in discover en to think that the reason otence? And are we ev sovereignty and omnip e He simply has no ce mediately is becaus nan ver go s Hi ses rci exe a task that is God ce of the universe being nan ver go the so, do to t ly with the choice bu therefore accomplish on can He ich wh and m, too huge for Hi His creatures? cooperation of inadequate way of t sort reflect a woefully tha of s ion est qu y, arl Cle represented to the mode of thinking ing nd po res In r. tte ma soning. He viewing this rsues two lines of rea pu as om Th St. s, ion by those quest rnance is to lead the t the whole idea of gove tha us ing ind rem by begins ove, to the effect l the point alluded to ab cal Re n. tio fec per to be achieved, governed best. How is the best to the is ce nan ver go of that the end very specific practical For St Thomas, one ? ms ter cal cti pra in · in order to perfect the taken by a governor be can t tha ent edi > exp the governed. And his own perfection to ate nic mu com to is d atures, but in ,governe with respect to His cre es do d Go at wh ely \this is precis ough the mediation of does this indirectly, thr ore cases than not He munication detract s indirect method of com thi t no es do t Bu . res creatu nicated? Not which is being commu t tha of cy ica eff sic om the intrin

g
n..ent· Did h . mmJ.n i e th g of al oW prov aqua edap . phys1co-theologica "'....,, g ·to 1 e'hm sh . · d in un ed y nc · ··. 0 muc and thhereb ermme his whole argument, end· by co "T · es rit w h He ? ta that the ; anti-me P ysical point of view e utm~st, therefore, . e th _; . of ct ite much ch ar ry ve e is an ho is always , ':orld whh . argument can prov tibility ofth k u ap cr wl ~ e wor s, not a eator nalm emate }:hampered by the ad . n hi yt er ev ea id h t f. · . e world to whose (Critique, p. 522, 9 an/ IS subJect." K of aim at al cip in pr has been to show th . mphasis his) The hs lis tab es r or he nn ot ca an g in Ytrung, one way or flletaphysical reason '

k

NOTES

amine con~epts.... " s,whose task is to ex er ph so lo hi "p to rs totally ~s~laced. 10. Kant refe e emphasis here is Th ). 1 45 p. , on as the examination of (Critique of Pure Re es indeed involve do is er ph so ilo ph e of the philosopher The task of th e principal concern Th . d se ily , ar tus nd ep co nc se co ly r. Non concepts, but on ich the concepts refe . wh er to ph gs so in th ilo e ph th y t er e motto of ev not concepts, bu th be ld ou sh !") is gs re but thin being referred to he res! ("Not concepts, ological principle em it in ist er ep fu s al iu sic 'pr as n cl 11. The llectuquod no te in in t es l hi Ni : ." senses In as follows was not first in the expressed in Latin at th t lec tel in e th e which is thing in sensu. "There is no dge, that knowledg le ow kn al ctu lle te r in ledgethat is other words, all ou knowledge, the know e ns se on up d se ba s, is their ultimate represented by idea in our mind have s ea id e Th . es ag e im representedby sens e world. th in te to an idea? gs in th source in nce ever be adequa rie pe ex n ca w ho or at no experience 12. Kant writes: "F s just in the fact th ist ns co r tte la e th of ant's question is The peculiar nature re Reason, p. 518) K Pu of ue iq rit (C " it. ea because the can ever be equal to be adequate to an id n ca e nc rie pe ex at th perience. There answered by saying other source but ex no s ha d an e, nc rie pe n experienceand idea derives from ex icalequalitybetwee at m he at m t ec rf pe e rrespondence is never anythinglik mpletely reliable co co al, re a is e er th t cause he looked idea, of course, bu above question be e th k as d ul co nt Ka e world outsidethe between the two. e mind itself, not th th in ce ur so r ei th ther than informing upon ideas as having int of view, ideas, ra po l ica og ol em ist our mind. mind. Given this ep us about the state of rm fo in , ld or w e th itous claim that we us about the state of cts of Kant's gratu pe as l ca xi do ra pa e ly informing us of 13. One of th that he is constant is f' el its in g in th ly, we can know cannot know "the e nature, supposed tru g se ho w at th edwith a penetratin various features of m comes accompani cis sti of no ag st re t's e an th hich nothing. It is as ifK e agnosticism by w ch is lacking to th hi w , thenthat very r elf we its po in g tic in os gn ot know the th nn l ca we ct fa in If onsible philosophica humanity is beset. permissible in resp im is d f," ul el co its at in wh , g gs phrase, "the thin nce or nature of thin nothing of the esse ow it has the ow kn kn e we ifw r do fo ow e, H ag us "in itself'? as g y, in eth m so to r ~h tity whi , seemingl it mean to refe d of an intrinsic iden se es ss f? po g el in its be an of th peculiar quality f from things other f,and separates it of failed to provide he at th rt pa is completein itsel ht on Kant's sig er or ov e er m to e du know the essences It was not tion that we do not en e. nt us co ca s hi be r on fo n ati io such demonstr y any demonstrat an e id ov pr t no sences or.·;, . He did we do know the es at the natures of things th e iv sit po f oo ct that we ,:, ble. The pr specificallyin the fa , there is none availa ge ua ng la in d un things inO" to be fo we did not know natures of things is ct fa in If . gs in with regard ords to th d be possible for us attach different w ul wo all at n io at in discrim themselves,then no

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