Preparation for Natural Theology: With Kant’s Notes and the Danzig Rational Theology Transcript 9781474213837, 9781474213868, 9781474213851

Table of contents :
FC
Half title
Kant’s Sources in Translation
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgments
Series Editors’ Preface
Translators’ Introduction
1 Preparation for Natural Theology for Use in Academic Lectures
2 Kant’s Reflections in his Copy of Eberhard’s Preparation for Natural Theology
3 Danzig Rational Theology According to Baumbach
4 Concordances
German–English Glossary
English–German Glossary
Name Index
Index

Citation preview

Preparation for Natural Theology

Kant’s Sources in Translation The texts that shaped Kant’s thought Series Editors Lawrence Pasternack, Professor of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University, USA Pablo Muchnik, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Emerson College, USA Editorial Board Fred Beiser, Syracuse University, USA; Karin de Boer, KU Leuven, Belgium; Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, São Paulo State University, Brazil; Corey Dyck, Western University, Canada; Paul Guyer, Brown University, USA; Heiner Klemme, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Germany; Ricardo Pozzo, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy; Eric Watkins, University of California, San Diego, USA; Guenter Zoeller, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Germany.

The aim of this series is to retrieve the rich intellectual world that influenced Kant’s philosophical development. Many of these sources are in Latin or in German, and remain inaccessible to Anglophone readers. Available titles Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason, Georg Friedrich Meier Preparation for Natural Theology, Johann August Eberhard Forthcoming titles Ethica philosophica, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Initia philosophiae practicae primae acroamatice, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Jus naturae in usum auditorium, Gottfried Achenwall

Preparation for Natural Theology With Kant’s Notes and the Danzig Rational Theology Transcript Johann August Eberhard and Immanuel Kant Translated and edited with an introduction and notes by Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

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www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2016 Translation, introduction, and editorial material © Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers, 2016 This translation is based on: Vorbereitung zur natürlichen Theologie, Johann August Eberhard. Halle. 1781 Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, vol 18, issued by the Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter. 1928. Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, vol. 26.2.2 issued by the Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin and the Akademie der Wissenschaften Göttingen. Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1972. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the translators. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN:

HB: ePDF: ePub:

978-1-4742-1383-7 978-1-4742-1385-1 978-1-4742-1384-4

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Series: Kant’s Sources in Translation Typeset by Fakenham Prepress Solutions, Fakenham, Norfolk NR21 8NN

To William —Courtney D. Fugate To my parents, Lawrence and Anna-Marie —John Hymers

Contents Acknowledgments Series Editors’ Preface Translators’ Introduction 1 2

Preparation for Natural Theology for Use in Academic Lectures Kant’s Reflections in his Copy of Eberhard’s Preparation for Natural Theology 3 Danzig Rational Theology According to Baumbach 4 Concordances German–English Glossary English–German Glossary Name Index Index

viii ix xv 1 69 131 219 231 243 255 259

Acknowledgments We would like to thank Lawrence Pasternack and Pablo Muchnik for asking us to contribute to this series, Hanno Birken-Bertsch for advice on issues of German translation, and Frederick van Fleteren and Robert Dobie on issues of translation. We would also like to thank Andrew Wardell at Bloomsbury for his patience and help on this present work, and his colleagues Rachel Eisenhauer and Colleen Coalter belatedly for their excellent editorial work on our previous book. Courtney D. Fugate would like to thank the American University of Beirut as well as the Fox Center for Humanistic Inquiry at Emory University for support during the early stages of this project. John Hymers would like to thank Bob Zunjik for providing him with fascinating background material that hopefully someday will also become its own project, the students of his Metaphysics and Approaches to God classes for letting him try out this material on them, and the continued support and encouragement of La Salle University and the philosophy department in particular.

Series Editors’ Preface

—I— Before becoming a famous philosopher, Kant was a famous teacher. For over forty years, he lectured on a wide array of topics, ranging from metaphysics to mineralogy, physics to pedagogy, anthropology to logic. Before officially entering the ranks at the University of Königsberg with the Inaugural Dissertation (1771), Kant’s living depended on the popularity of his lectures. He took them very seriously, and used, for each of them, one or another of the textbooks recognized by the Prussian authorities. In many cases, he used even the same copy for decades. These copies, as a result, accumulated scores of marginal notes (often referred to as “Reflexionen”), which acted sometimes as reminders, sometimes as objections, and sometimes as springboards for Kant’s own thoughts. This wealth of material has been transcribed and printed in the Akademieausgabe von Immanuel Kants Gesammelten Werken. Likewise, most of the extant notes composed by students who attended Kant’s lectures have also been incorporated into the Akademieausgabe. Over the years, these resources have received modest attention, but, with Cambridge University Press’s translation of selected lectures and Reflexionen, interest in them, especially among Anglophone Kant scholars, has burgeoned. Unfortunately, however, it is common for interpreters to overlook the fact that Kant’s lecture notes are not his own writings, but transcriptions from his students. Similarly, his Reflexionen, though of his own hand, are often just glosses on some point made in the textbook from which he was teaching. These materials, therefore, should not be considered in isolation—they are an outgrowth of the manuals Kant was using, part of an implicit dialogue with these authors, and, as any teacher would attest, often open to students’ misrepresentation. As stand-alone pieces severed from this context, it is impossible to know whether a particular Reflexion or lecture passage conveys Kant’s restatement of the textbook content, or is instead a qualification, extrapolation, criticism, or merely a digression on Kant’s part.

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The goal of this series is to offer the tools necessary to reconstruct the context of Kant’s thought. Many of these sources are in Latin and in German, and have heretofore remained in the hands of specialists. Their reliable English translations will make them accessible to a much broader audience and help contemporary readers put Kant’s lectures, notes, and Reflexionen in perspective. The first phase of this project will focus on the most important philosophical textbooks Kant used throughout his teaching career. In addition to newly translated material, each volume will be accompanied by a system of concordances that will allow readers to correlate Kant’s Reflexionen and lectures to their corresponding textbook passages. In a second phase, the series will cast a broader net and offer translations of influential German and Latin texts of the eighteenth century that are not currently available in English, or need updating. Combined, these efforts promise to give Anglophone scholars a more comprehensive picture of the intellectual world that made possible the German Enlightenment.

—II— In the first volume of our series, the translation of Georg Friedrich Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre (Halle 1752), we presented one of the most enduring influences on Kant’s theoretical philosophy: the textbook he used throughout his logic courses during a period of forty years (1756–96). Our second volume, the translation of Johann August Eberhard’s Vorbereitung zur natürlichen Theologie zum Gebrauch akademischer Vorlesungen (Halle: 1781), does a comparable job, this time making explicit the background against which Kant developed his mature philosophy of religion. Kant lectured on rational theology over fifty times as part of his regular commitment to teaching metaphysics. He devoted, however, only four courses— in the spring semester of 1774, in the winter semesters of 1783/4 and 1785/6, and again in the spring of 1787—exclusively to this topic. One set of lecture notes ended up in the hands of Friedrich Theodor Rink, Kant’s famous editor, and were later anonymously edited and published by Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz as “Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion.”1 Among the Rink was responsible for the edition of Kant’s lectures on physical geography (1802) and pedagogy (1803).

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other notes to have survived, the Danzig is arguably the closest record we have to what actually transpired in the classroom, and appears for the first time in English in this volume. Like all Prussian professors at the time, Kant was required to adopt in his courses one of the manuals approved by the authorities. He naturally gravitated toward Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, one of the most influential examples of Wolffian rationalism. Part IV, “Theologia Naturalis” (§§ 800–1000), served Kant to organize the bulk of his course. The introductory section, however, drew primarily from Eberhard’s Vorbereitung.2 This choice of textbook, we believe, was not accidental. Besides being a rising star in the German Enlightenment, Johann August Eberhard (1739–1809) was the author of Neue Apologie des Socrates (1772). As explained in more detail in the Translators’ Introduction to this volume, in that book Eberhard had argued that salvation did not require revelation, and was hence open to Christians and heathens alike. In Eberhard’s mind, many important points of Christian orthodoxy, most notably the idea of eternal punishment and damnation, were alien to the spirit of Christianity: not only were there no traces of them in the Bible, but they opposed the primary goal of Scripture—the moral improvement of the sinner. Natural reason, all by itself, is able to ascertain the perfection of the world, its beauty and its goodness. All rational beings, whether they are Christians or not, have access to these truths. To avoid distorting them, religious believers must use the rational tools at their disposal, examine and purify traditional doctrine, and discard extraneous influences. Eberhard’s claims must have been music to the future author of Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793): Anyone acquainted with the two experiments mentioned in the second preface will recognize the family resemblance. Such affinity, however, is at first blush disconcerting. Eberhard is remembered in the history of philosophy not for his positive contribution to the rationalist tradition, but rather for his polemic with Kant.3 The controversy was carried out in a series of articles Eberhard published in the Philosophisches Magazin (1788–92) and the Philosophisches Archiv (1792–5). He had founded, edited, and skillfully used these journals with the explicit purpose of defending rationalism against its abuse in the first Critique. Kant was keenly aware of the Kant occasionally resorted also to Christoph Meiner’s Historia doctrinae de uno vero Deo (Lemgow: 1780), briefly mentioned in the appendix to the an-Pölitz. Henry Allison reconstructs the historical and philosophical context of the dispute in The Kant– Eberhard Controversy (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

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growing power of public opinion, and had encouraged J. G. Schultz, one of his friends and allies, to found the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung in 1785. Eberhard viewed this development with apprehension. Although he had expressed dissatisfaction with Kant’s critical philosophy in private letters, he now felt it was time to do so publicly. In the course of seven years, Eberhard focused most of his energy on arguing that Kant’s philosophy was largely derivative, a footnote on the work of Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, and in error whenever it pretended to be original. Throughout this dispute, Karl Leonhard Reinhold was Kant’s main spokesman. But the philosophical stakes were high, and Kant decided to intervene personally and pen a response, the 1790 essay “On a Discovery Whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason Is to Be Made Superfluous by an Older One” (AA 8: 187–251). Kant’s reply was slow in the making, partly because he was busy working on the third Critique at this time, and partly because he did not have first-hand knowledge of Eberhard’s criticisms until late in the game.4 The rebuttal has two parts. In the first, Kant argues that Eberhard misunderstood and obfuscated the fundamental tenet of his critical philosophy: since a priori concepts have no constitutive role to play beyond sensible intuition, all claims to knowledge must be limited to experience. The rationalist attempts to demonstrate the transcendental validity of the principle of sufficient reason and the objective reality of monads, it follows, are necessarily doomed to failure. In the second part, Kant defends the originality of his analytic–synthetic distinction, which Eberhard had conflated with the Leibnizian theory of predication. This mistake prevented Eberhard from appreciating its devastating consequences for the transcendent brand of metaphysics he was practicing. This brief summary should suffice to show that, despite appearances to the contrary, there is no contradiction in Kant’s ambivalent philosophical relation with Eberhard. Kant’s attraction to Eberhard’s philosophy of religion and his rejection of Eberhard’s dogmatic metaphysics are not inconsistent. On the contrary, they express a fundamental truth of Kant’s critical philosophy: as Kant pithily put it, “I had to deny knowledge (Wissen) in order to make room for faith (Glaube)” (KrV Bxxx). Once the rationalists understood the primacy of pure practical reason, much of their theology could be saved for the purposes of critical philosophy.

Or so he alleges in a 1789 letter to Reinhold, dated May 12 (AA 11: 33–40).

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—III— Eberhard published the Vorbereitung in 1781, the fateful year of the first Critique. He had intended it as a textbook for courses on natural theology, and therefore devoted the bulk of it to discussing the existence and attributes of God, and the sources of theological errors. Eberhard was then at the peak of his career. He was a professor at the prestigious University of Halle, and the acclaimed author of the Neue Apologie (1772) and Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens (1776). The latter had won the Prize of the Berlin Royal Society and presented a lucid articulation of the main claims of rationalist psychology.5 Given the interest in the field of rational theology triggered by Allen Wood’s pioneering work in the 1970s,6 and the heated current debates on how to make sense of Kant’s bewildering Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, it is of utmost importance to make available one of the major formative forces at the basis of Kant’s mature lectures on the philosophy of religion. In those lectures, Kant discusses at length the various proofs of God’s existence (along the lines of the first Critique), and develops a “moral theology” which defends the validity of our practical knowledge of God for the purposes of moral conduct, while forfeiting certainty on these matters. Such views constitute the backdrop of much contemporary discussion, and they cannot be properly appreciated without first reckoning with Eberhard’s Vorbereitung. Pablo Muchnik and Lawrence Pasternack

For a more comprehensive treatment of this book, and of the relevant sections of Eberhard’s corpus, see the Translators’ Introduction, pp. xxiv–xxviii. See Allen Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), and Kant’s Rational Theology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).

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Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) lectured on rational theology more than fifty times as part of his regular course on metaphysics and devoted a full course to it on at least three occasions in the 1780s. In the latter, he employed, among other works, Preparation for Natural Theology, a textbook written by Johann August Eberhard. Eberhard was an adherent of the tradition of Leibniz and Wolff, particularly in the form contained in Alexander Baumgarten’s influential Metaphysics, a textbook Kant also used. Eberhard himself was unquestionably one of the most established and respected of Kant’s contemporaries and a key defender of the broadly Leibnizian tradition in German popular and academic philosophy in the second half of the eighteenth century. While preparing his lectures, Kant compiled extensive notes on the blank pages he had interleaved into his personal copy of Eberhard’s textbook, and during their delivery Kant’s students produced detailed transcripts of what he said in the classroom. This volume contains the first complete English translation of Eberhard’s Preparation along with the notes Kant penned in his personal copy, accompanied by the Danzig transcript of the lectures that Kant likely delivered in the winter semester of 1783/4. Read together, these resources provide a rare and deeply informative glimpse into the workshop of Kant’s mind.

1. Johann August Eberhard (1739–1809)1 Johann August Eberhard was born in Halberstadt, Germany, on August 31, 1739 to Karl Christoph Eberhard, a teacher, cantor, and occasional author of articles on political topics that appeared in the local newspaper. It appears that nothing is known of Eberhard’s mother or of his childhood, except that he was educated at home, where his father possessed a particularly large library. For biographical details we have relied heavily on the account in Nicolai 1810, but have also taken into account Allison 1973, Gäbe 1959, Sprengel 1809, and Vaihinger 1892.

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In 1756, at the age of seventeen, Eberhard began studying theology at the University of Halle, famed for its many contributions to this field. By this time, the university had largely recovered from the suppression of free scholarship under Johann Justus Breithaupt and Joachim Lange (Nicolai 1810: 5–6), the same two who were instrumental in securing Christian Wolff ’s banishment from the university in 1723. Wolff, of course, himself returned triumphantly to Halle in 1740, and there, according to Friedrich Nicolai, so changed the philosophical landscape that by the time Eberhard attended the university “over the whole of Germany and over a great part of the rest of Europe there had spread a brighter light in philosophy, through which then in Halle itself the various sciences gradually became enlightened, particularly also theology” (ibid.). Two disciples in particular, Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten and Johann Salomo Semler, helped Wolff to reinvest the university with the “spirit of investigation” in all subjects, and in particular developed its training in ancient languages and literature. Of these two figures, the former, however, would have no direct effect on Eberhard due to his death in 1757, although his younger brother, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, would author the influential textbook Metaphysics (1739), which contained the specific version of Leibnizian philosophy that Eberhard would later make his own. Semler, on the other hand, who was in many ways a disciple of the elder Baumgarten, greatly influenced the young Eberhard’s training in theology and church history. Semler authored a great number of books over his long career, foremost of which was his four-volume Treatise on a Freer Investigation of the Canon (1771–5). His writings belong to the early Wolffian stages of theological rationalism in Germany, although Aner has denied that they go so far as to belong to the neology2 that Eberhard would later advance. Upon graduation from Halle, Eberhard returned to Halberstadt in 1759 to become the personal tutor of the eldest son of Julius August von der Horst, then president of the War and Domain Council (Kriegs- und Domänenkammer) of the Chamber of Minden, under King Fredrick II. The Seven Years’ War was then in full swing, and in the battle of Minden, which was a key stronghold for the Prussian army, Neology is specifically described in Aner 1929 as a movement characteristic of the middle period of the Enlightenment, which employed both historical and philosophical uses of reason to “correct” certain Christian doctrines its proponents took to be objectionable on such grounds (p. 4). It accepted the validity of both reason and revelation, and only sought, by the use of reason, to correct or purify religion of those elements it took to be unjustified later additions. Neology followed the earlier Wolffian period in which reason and revelation were considered to be independent and parallel, but never in contradiction, and preceded the more radical period of theological rationalism, which identified the core content of historical revelation with that of reason. See also Allison 1966: 80–95.

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von der Horst was taken prisoner by the French forces. However, Victor-François de Broglie, Second Duke of Broglie and Marshall of France, allowed von der Horst and his family to remain together in Westphalia along with Eberhard until the end of the war in 1763. Thereupon Eberhard returned to Halberstadt to take up the positions of vice-principal at the Martinischule and preacher at the Hospitalkirche zum Heiligen Geist while continuing his service under von der Horst. When his powerful patron was then called to Berlin in 1766, Eberhard again followed him. In Berlin he quickly made contact with the central figures of the German Enlightenment: Friedrich Nicolai, Moses Mendelsohn, and possibly also Ephraim Lessing. Eberhard quickly became almost an appendage to Mendelsohn, very often being seen following him around the streets of Berlin, and the two remained the closest of friends until Mendelsohn’s death in 1786. Eberhard first came to the public’s attention in 1772 through the publication of his New Apology of Socrates, or an Examination of the Blessedness of the Heathens. This was a clever and successful attempt to capitalize on the recent controversy in France over the publication of Jean-François Marmontel’s novel Bélisaire (1767), whose fifteenth chapter made a case for the salvation of virtuous non-Christians. Through its depiction of the mistreatment and eventual pardon of the Byzantine general Flavius Belisarius by the Christian Emperor Justinian I, Bélisaire had indirectly impeached the government of Louis XV. In France, Bélisaire quickly met with a nearly 200-page examination and censure from the Sorbonne’s Faculty of Theology for being, among other things, “false and opposed to reason and natural law, reckless, contrary to scripture, tradition and breathing heresy” (Censure: 3). The force of this reaction, which surprised many, in turn reignited the long-standing debate over religious tolerance throughout France, Holland, and—partly due to Eberhard’s New Apology—the German-speaking lands. According to the account of Friedrich Nicolai, the publication of the New Apology did far more than introduce an upstart enlightener to the public: it also prompted what many thought to be a justified criticism of Eberhard’s character. The issue was not that he defended such radical views, but that he did so while holding the official position of a preacher, the duty of which many thought required him to stay safely within accepted church doctrine. This same criticism was voiced not only by the conservatives, but even by many of the most enlightened. As a result, Eberhard’s career as a preacher in Berlin quickly became untenable.3 At first, he sought refuge by accepting a similar post in Nicolai also attributes Eberhard’s difficulties to shameful rumors that began to circulate suggesting that somehow Mendelssohn’s Jewishness was leading Eberhard to neglect his Christian duties. See Nicolai 1810: 23.

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the small town of Charlottenburg in 1774, although even for this he had first to secure the special approval of King Frederick II, likely through the good offices of von der Horst. The same troubles, however, only followed Eberhard to Charlottenberg and very soon he desired to return to his friends in Berlin. During this time, Eberhard managed to publish his second major work in 1776, the General Theory of Thought and Sensation, which won the prize competition of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin that same year. That this established his philosophical, if not his religious, orthodoxy is proven by his call to the post of Professor of Philosophy at the University of Halle in 1778, which he, however, only accepted with great reluctance (Nicolai 1810: 61). Even by the account of admirers such as Nicolai, Eberhard was a rather middling to poor lecturer, more suited to preaching than teaching, although he nevertheless managed to win an excellent reputation through his contact with students outside of the lecture hall. His reputation as an outstanding professor was further strengthened through his many publications, which were often undertaken explicitly for the sake of his students. Among his textbooks there are the Moral Doctrine of Reason (Sittenlehre der Vernunft, 1781, 1786), the Preparation for Natural Theology (Vorbereitung zur natürlichen Theologie, 1781),4 a new edition of the Meier translation of Alexander Baugmarten’s Metaphysics (Metaphysik, 1783),5 the Theory of the Beautiful Sciences (Theorie der schönen Wissenschaften, 1783, 1786, 1790), the Universal History of Philosophy (Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, 1788, 1796), and a Shorter Outline of Metaphysics: With a View to the Present State of Philosophy (Kurzer Abriss der Metaphysik: mit Rücksicht auf den gegenwärtigen Zustand der Philosophie, 1794). His more popular works include Amyntor: A History in Letters (Amyntor. Eine Geschichte in Briefen, 1782) – a work which largely repaired the damage done by the New Apology, though too late (Nicolai 1810: 47)—a Handbook of Aesthetics for Educated Readers of all Classes (Handbuch der Aesthetik für gebildete Leser aus allen Ständen, 4 vols., 1803–5, 1807–20), an historical investigation into the Augsburg Confession (Ist die Augburgische Confession eine Glaubensvorschrift der lutherischen Kirche?, 1795), two books relating to the atheism controversy surrounding Fichte, namely On the God of Professor Fichte and the Idols of his Opponents (Über den Gott des Herrn Professor Fichte und den Götzen seiner Gegner, 1799) and An Attempt at a More Precise Determination of the Disagreement between Professor Fichte and his Opponents Nicolai 1810: 36 incorrectly gives the date as 1787. See our translation of Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, which includes Eberhard’s few scattered notes and brief preface.

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(Versuch einer genauern Bestimmung des Streitpunktes zwischen Herrn Prof. Fichte und seinen Gegnern, 1799), a biography of Leibniz (Charakteristik des Freiherrn von Leibnitz, 1817), and, finally, The Spirit of Early Christianity (Der Geist des Urchristenthums, 3 vols, 1807–8). During his lifetime, Eberhard also published two collections of his occasional writings, the Miscellaneous Writings and New Miscellaneous Writings (Vermischte Schriften, 1784; Neue Vermischte Schriften, 1788). It is also notable that Eberhard produced a six-volume work on the German language together with Johann Gebhard Mass, entitled An Attempt at a Universal German Synonymic (1795–1802), which is now almost entirely forgotten, although it continued to be expanded and republished until 1853, eventually reaching twelve volumes. This was a rather typical work of the Enlightenment, which sought to further the education of the public under the premise that the intellectual progress of a nation is reflected in the precision and determinacy of its use of language. Each of the six volumes contains a number of entries, each headed by a group of words possessing roughly similar meanings. A given entry then discusses in remarkable detail the general respects in which the words are the same and the subtle ways in which their usages tend to differ, often citing examples from the best German writers for clarification. How important such projects were once thought to be can be gathered from Friedrich Nicolai’s estimation of the Universal German Synonymic as “an entirely classical work,” which “alone, had it been the only book that [Eberhard] had written, would forever secure him an honorable place in German literature” (Nicolai 1810: 43–4). Of course, Eberhard’s actual contributions to the history of philosophy and scholarship in general, whatever their true value, have been entirely overshadowed by his controversy with Kant. Since the general history of this encounter has already been told elsewhere, and indeed such that there remains little to add to the existing accounts,6 we will provide here only the basic facts. Kant had apparently gotten word of Eberhard’s opposition to the Critique as early as 1786 (Allison 1973: 10), but their disagreement only became public with Eberhard’s founding of the Philosophisches Magazin in 1788. It is often noted that this journal was founded in order to attack Kant’s philosophy, but we should also remember that it was actually the Critique of Pure Reason that first gave offense by attacking the rationalists in terms that were often less than respectful or clear. Far from ambushing the unsuspecting Kantians, the Philosophisches See, e.g. Allison 1973 and Zahn 1998. Much information and an assessment are given in Vaihinger 1892 vol. 2: 535–40.

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Magzin was intended to counter the Kantian Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, which had already been in existence since 1785.7 Given Kant’s actual reliance on so many other aspects of the work of Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, along with his shared defense of the existence of necessary truths of reason in opposition to empiricism, one can in part understand Eberhard’s confusion and perhaps also his resentment over Kant’s claim, or at least the claim of his followers, that the content of the Critique was utterly original. Friedrich Nicolai recalls in this connection that the young Kantians were not ashamed to claim that before Kant there had actually been no philosophy at all and that through the Critique of Pure Reason the most perfect philosophy had been achieved almost in one stroke (Nicolai 1810: 38). If nothing else, the Philosophisches Magazin (1788–92) and the Philosophisches Archiv (1793–5) that followed it generated a great deal of fruitful discussion of Kant’s work among not only philosophers, but also mathematicians and scientists. Of course, it also elicited Kant’s own important attempt to clarify the originality of his work in On a Discovery (1790). For this reason, Nicolai credits Eberhard’s efforts in particular, as later Vaihinger would also,8 with the great service of demanding a much more thorough examination the Critical philosophy, which in turn prompted many of the later developments in German philosophy.9 Eberhard died on January 6, 1809. In a special memorial published by the Berlin Academy, Friedrich Nicolai recalls that Eberhard had an extraordinary knowledge of philosophy, ancient and modern history, possessed an “unbelievably strong” knowledge of books of all sorts, that he had a powerful knowledge not only of ancient languages, but also of English, Dutch, Italian, and French, and that he loved art and poetry of all ages, especially music, which he learned from his father and continued to practice throughout his life. Yet, Nicolai adds, “he belongs, in my opinion, to the few scholars whose services to truth and to enlightenment are still greater than his scholarly fame” (Nicolai Vaihinger 1892 vol. 2: 535. Ibid.: 539–40. 9 Although Eberhard and his allies were certainly critical of Kant, and did indeed defend the claim that the Critique contained nothing original except for what was false in it, there was nothing slanderous or even really unfair in their criticisms. In fact, this general claim was not even new, since Eberhard had already implied as much in his preface to the edition of Meier’s translation of Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, which he issued in 1783 (Baumgarten 2013: 73). Moreover, far from discouraging the examination of Kant’s philosophy, Eberhard’s textbooks published both before and especially after the controversy contain clear, dispassionate, and largely accurate summaries of its central claims. So his treatment of Kant accords well with the picture of Eberhard’s character as depicted by Nicolai and others, and certainly did not merit Kant’s harsh reaction. As Vaihinger noted regarding Kant’s essay: “As sharp as the title, the tone is much too sharp, to the point of being unjust, indeed to the point of personal insult” (Vaihinger 1892 vol. 2: 537). See also Allison 1973: 13. 7 8



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1810: 55). In Nicolai’s estimation, Eberhard wrote with great facility, simplicity, and clarity, overcoming in large part the stiff academic style characteristic of Halle professors. As a person, he was loved by his friends, and highly respected by all his contemporaries and students. In another extended memorial, which appeared in the Neue Teutsche Merkur, Curt Sprengel—a longtime friend and colleague of Eberhard in Halle—wrote similarly that “pure humanity in the noblest sense was the chief feature in Eberhard’s character” (Sprengel, 1809: 284).

2. Eberhard’s thought: A sketch In this section, we propose to provide the reader with a better understanding of the origins of the Preparation for Natural Theology by describing in somewhat more detail the contents of Eberhard’s three most closely related works: the New Apology of Socrates (1772), The General Theory of Thought and Sensation (1776), and On the Concept of Philosophy and its Parts (1778).

2.1. New Apology of Socrates Despite its title, Eberhard’s New Apology touches on the character of Socrates only in its final section. The 450 preceding pages recount the details of the controversy over Bélisaire before examining several related questions—such as whether belief is necessary for salvation, whether heathen religions can lead to virtue, whether there are means to virtue other than religion, whether sinners will suffer eternal damnation, and whether the latter should be understood as real eternal torment or rather in some more refined metaphysical sense—both historically and philosophically. As Allison has noted, Eberhard’s approach to these problems is consistent and unified, which shows that he “saw more clearly than most, the systematic interconnection of the entire dogmatic complex” (Allison 1966: 40). Eberhard himself explains, for example, that The complete corruption of human nature through the original sin of Adam, the forgiveness of the sinner due to a vicarious satisfaction, the complete incapacity for virtue, supernatural works in human beings for bringing forth virtuous dispositions by means of a revealed doctrine of faith, the damnation of those who could not have accepted this doctrine, or have not held it, the dispensation of supernatural works according to an unconditioned decree; all of these stand

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in the closest connection with one another, each part supports the others: but it is also to be expected that the fall of one part will make the entire edifice at least totter. (Eberhard 1772: 62)

Because of this last point, Eberhard is able to leverage his more focused attack on just a couple of ideas to draw the general conclusion that most if not all of these other doctrines are foreign to the original spirit of Christianity, and that they can be found neither in the Bible nor in the writings of the Church Fathers, but only in certain exogenous additions made after Augustine. Such doctrines are not only controverted by the best historical scholarship, but also by the best philosophy, namely that articulated by Plato, Leibniz, Christian Wolff, and especially Alexander Baumgarten. Such philosophy, in Eberhard’s view, demonstrates that the whole of creation is ordered towards perfection and therefore towards the improvement of all God’s creatures. Thus, through true knowledge of creation and the observation of its beauty, we should expect even the non-Christian to be able to discover, love, and serve its creator. Moreover, if God’s ultimate end is the perfection of his creatures, then this is inconsistent with the doctrine of eternal damnation, unless it can be reinterpreted in the special metaphysical sense given to it by Baumgarten (Eberhard 1771: 427). The message of the New Apology is thus quite simply that we should accept the sufficiency of a natural theology based on reason for salvation and reject a crude interpretation of eternal damnation on both historical and philosophical grounds. Yet, in delivering this simple message, Eberhard displays an extraordinary knowledge of his sources. He seems to have read every relevant theological work by the Church Fathers and figures like Aquinas and Suarez, as well as all the modern literature in Latin, German, Dutch, French, and even English. His knowledge of philosophical literature is no less impressive, particularly in an age where even the foremost philosophers usually possessed nothing more than a second-hand knowledge of the classics. He cites or even quotes from the Greek of Plato’s Meno, Phaedo, Crito, Timeaus, Republic, Gorgias, Cratylus, Charmides, and Theatetus. He discusses in detail the views of the pre-Socratics, Xenophon’s depiction of Socrates, both Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics, the doctrines of Epicureans, the Stoics, and Cicero. Of the moderns, he discusses in detail the founders of the modern natural law tradition such as Grotius and Thomasius, as well as the philosophers Cudworth, Locke, Berkeley, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz (even the New Essays), Wolff, and Baumgarten, among many others. Eberhard’s remarkable interest in the



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history and literature of philosophy on display here is a characteristic feature of all his work, but particularly of his textbooks, as we will see in the Preparation itself. The new apology that follows the scholarly part of the work is presented as if made by Socrates himself in appeal to those Christians who would support his eternal damnation. Presupposed throughout is the view that reason properly cultivated and obeyed cannot but be of service to God, that what is true and what is good, what is justified by reason and what is commanded by God, what is proven and what is revealed—these things must lead equally to the proper service of the divine and therefore provide grounds for salvation. The difference between virtuous heathens and virtuous Christians is therefore a matter of degree, and not of kind. Far from a heathen deserving eternal damnation, Eberhard presents Socrates as an ideal philosopher who, through a heroic commitment to reason and truth and to the moral cultivation of his fellow human beings, is able to burst the bonds of heathenism from within. Although the central argument of the New Apology was evidently approved by the likes of Mendelssohn and Nicolai, it did not go far enough to please Lessing, who voiced his criticisms in two essays of 1773, “Leibniz on Eternal Punishments” and “Andreas Wissowatius’ Objections Against the Trinity.”10 The nature of the disagreement between Eberhard and Lessing is complex and concerns not only the relation between religion and reason, but also subtle issues regarding the proper way in which religious truths should be communicated. As Henry Allison has argued, while Eberhard accepted revelation, but sought to correct and purify existing religious doctrine by the standards of reason from what he regarded as being its historical accretions, “Lessing endeavored to defend the implicitly rational content of those very doctrines, such as the Trinity, original sin, and the justification through Christ … as obscure historically conditioned expressions of the ultimate nature of things, as the ways in which the human mind at a particular stage in its development attempted to relate itself to the Divine” (Allison 1966: 163). To Lessing’s mind, Eberhard’s approach leads to the enfeeblement of both religion and philosophy by trying to force the wrong kind of identity between them.11 How it does this is well illustrated in “Leibniz on Eternal Punishment,” in which Lessing takes issue with a number of statements Eberhard makes about Leibniz in the New Apology, but particularly with his suggestion that Leibniz’s public approval of In the following we have relied heavily on Allison 1966. See his letter to Karl Lessing, February 2, 1774. Quoted in Allison 1966: 84.

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the doctrine of eternal punishment was disingenuous. As Lessing comments, quoting Eberhard: “He took their doctrines as given, and attributed a tolerable sense to them, thereby reconciling them with his system.” Very good; but Herr Eberhard ought not to have added: “but without subscribing to them himself ”. For Leibniz did indeed subscribe to them, namely in that tolerable sense which he did not so much attribute to them but discover in them. That tolerable sense was truth, and how could he not subscribe to truth? (Lessing 2005: 46)

In short, Eberhard takes the doctrine of eternal punishment to be contrary to reason, and so cannot but think that Leibniz, realizing this, was being disingenuous in his public acceptance of it. Lessing, on the other hand, believes that the doctrine is perfectly consistent with reason if only we recognize that it is a religious and hence crude, though still correct and proper, way of expressing an acceptable rational truth. This he takes to be Leibniz’s understanding as well, and hence his desire to defend against the charge of dishonesty. In Lessing’s words, “Leibniz did not object to the ordinary doctrine of damnation, with all its exoteric reasons, and would even preferred to reinforce it with new reasons, simply because he realized that it was in closer agreement than the opposite doctrine with a major truth of his esoteric philosophy” (Lessing 2005: 49). Lessing summarized his own view in a private letter, stating “The hell which Mr. Eberhard does not want to be eternal does not exist at all, but the hell that does exist is eternal.”12 Eberhard has made the mistake, on Lessing’s view, of rejecting the doctrine of eternal punishment on the grounds that it is not a rationally adequate expression of the truth. What he has failed to realize, Lessing argues, is that, to the less educated, the crude and indeed rationally false doctrine may very well be a more effective way of communicating the actual truth than would be its denial.

2.2. General Theory of Thought and Sensation As one would expect from an essay to win the prize of the Berlin Academy,13 the contents of this work are not, on the whole, particularly original. In the main, Eberhard provides only a more clear and thorough restatement of the To Karl Lessing, July 14, 1773. Quoted in Gay 1968: 332. Dominated by philosophers of divided loyalties, the Berlin Academy tended to award its prizes based on the standpoint of whoever gained the upper hand during a given cycle and so not on intrinsic merit. This naturally invited essays defending existing views, rather than original ones. For a history of the Academy’s essay competitions, see Harnack 1901: 301–24.

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psychology of German rationalism as this is found in Leibniz, Wolff, and especially Baumgarten. After an introduction, in which he remarks that a more subtle examination of the faculty of sense constitutes one of the chief advancements of modern philosophy, Eberhard explains that his work has the goal of addressing the three issues demanded by the prize question, namely, to uncover the original conditions and rules of the powers of thinking and sensing as well as their respective laws, to explain their mutual dependency and influence on one another, and, finally, to determine to what extent an individual’s capacities and character depend on the quality of these powers (pp. 14–15). In the first part, Eberhard begins by defending the Leibnizian view that the soul is a single power of representation. If the soul were not a single power, he argues, but was composed of many, as he believes the language of the traditional faculty psychology to imply, then the relation between these powers would be totally incomprehensible. If, however, the soul consists in a single fundamental power, which is the sufficient ground of all its accidents, then this will be substance (p. 22). Thus, if it were composed of many distinct powers, then each would constitute a substance, and the soul would consist of many substances posited outside of one another, and would therefore be extended (ibid.). The same is clear from our inner consciousness of the identity of the mind in all its actions. If the soul were composed of many powers, then the consciousness in one power would not be aware of what happens in another power, and so different acts of representation such as sensing, thinking, and willing could not be present in one consciousness (pp. 23–5). The essential simplicity of the fundamental power of the soul is thus the absolute condition of personal and numerical identity throughout time (p. 25) and so also of our moral individuality (p. 26). Our experiences are thus best explained by the positing of a simple fundamental power at the basis of the soul, a supposition which is also most consistent with the principle of economy in the sciences. It was indeed through this very hypothesis, Eberhard explains, that transcendental psychology first became a genuine science in the modern period (p. 30). Having established the basic principle of his psychology, Eberhard proceeds in the second part of his work to examine the conditions under which the fundamental power of the soul expresses itself either as knowing or sensing, and the laws of the relation between these modifications of the soul (p. 31). As the common principle of all such modifications, the fundamental power of the soul must be characterized by what they have in common. Since they can all be analyzed into representations, at bottom the soul must be a striving to have representations (p. 33). Now, assuming such a principle, if we are able to

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account for the essential differences between the various kinds of representations that we actually have in terms of their being various modifications of it, then Eberhard believes that the goal of the second part of his work will be achieved. He thus proceeds to examine sensing and thinking, as well as the intermediate representations of passion and affection, to show that the differences between them are of two sorts. First, we always experience thinking as our own activity, but sensing as our passivity or suffering with respect to something outside of us (p. 35). But, second, our thoughts seem to be of objects outside of ourselves, while our sensing seems to be of our own inner state (p. 45). The first difference, according to Eberhard, can be explained by the fact that thinking, as distinct or more perfect representation, includes a greater awareness of its grounds, and thus of its origin in our other representations. This is lacking in sensing, and so in this latter we also lack an awareness of the internal grounds of our representations, and consequently ascribe them to an external ground. Those who deny Platonic reminiscence, and thus hold the soul to be a blank slate, do so in Eberhard’s view because they simply have not yet had thoughts themselves (p. 39). The second difference can be explained similarly as based on a natural illusion. Thinking, as more distinct, requires that we have a distinct representation not only of what we think, but also of ourselves as the subject of thought. Consequently, in thought we represent the object as different from ourselves, but misunderstand this to mean outside of ourselves. In sensing, on the other hand, we do not distinguish ourselves from what we think, and so seem to be more immediately aware only of ourselves. Hence, Eberhard concludes that sensing is distinguished from thinking only through the degree by which the fundamental power of the soul is limited. What is more limited contains more plurality, what is less limited more unity; what is more limited is more particular, what is less limited, more universal. So the sensible as such is plural, less unified, and particular, whereas what is thought is more unified and more universal. As less unified, sensing presents its manifold representations next to one another, and thus as parts of one representation, whereas thinking, as more unified, represents them within each other, and thus as distinct distinguishing marks of a single representation (pp. 58–61). As every higher and less limited degree of perfection presupposes the lower degrees, so all our knowledge begins with the senses and proceeds by the law of the development of perfection towards pure and completely distinct thought. In pure thought, if such is possible, there would therefore be no limitations, and thus both absolute universality and absolute determinate



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unity of distinct representation, which, following Plato, he terms the “idea.” Thus Eberhard reaches the remarkable conclusion that “the ideas, power and limitation are the most refined and highest concepts from which all appearances in the soul must be able to be derived, if psychology is to be a science” (p. 61). As Eberhard further explains, if all representations are distinguished merely by the degree through which the original power of representation is limited in them, then all psychological states and powers such as pleasure, displeasure, beauty, and desire must be understood in the same way. Pleasure, to take just one such state, must be understood as arising from the awareness of our own activity in a representation, and thus from the representation of unity. But the unity of the sensible as such, or beauty, is just the confusion of many representations as parts in one whole. The greater such unity is, the more beautiful it becomes. And so sensible unity remains essentially distinct from the unity of thought, which consists not in the confusion of parts in one whole, but in the subordination of distinct representations to one another as either distinguishing marks or as grounds. The laws of the beautiful, therefore, concern only the ways in which partial sensations are combined into total sensations in qualities, regions of space, and the succession of time. But to the unity represented sensibly in the beautiful, there also corresponds a unity and perfection that can be known only by thought, i.e. the good. This consists, according to Eberhard, in the distinct representation of the concepts and their distinguishing marks as well as of their real relations to one another as means and ends (p. 89). Relative good consist in the fittingness of means to some good. But if the series is not to be infinite or circular, we must finally arrive at the absolute good itself, which is power (Kraft). In this way we discover, according to Eberhard, the most transcendental concept of the good, which consists in “components of perfection, the subject of perfection, power, fittingness” (p. 90). Beauty is nothing but the sensible representation of this good, and it is only through the analysis of this by the mind and the abstraction of what is essential to it that we are able to discover the good, i.e. “its inner power and fittingness” according to the “simplest and most universal concept” (pp. 91–6). As Eberhard explains: The more the representation of the good approximates to the simple, the more is it an object of thought. This simple can be nothing other than the principle of sufficient reason. The first and highest in these predicaments are consequently reality, being, and the higher degree of being. Now, what is itself this being, or contains the grounds, therefore, of the operation, expansion, striving, and

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production of substances and qualities must be, and indeed reduplicatively, good. Hence, the simple in this will be found when the understanding follows the principle of sufficient reason. (pp. 94–5)

This “most perfect of all unity,” however, also produces in us the knowledge of the true (ibid.). Truth has its source in the first idea, which Eberhard explains is the absolutely simple that contains under itself all other concepts and judgments. Since these are unified in its concept as predicates, they can be known from it based on the principle of contradiction: Here there is the greatest unity, namely the identity of the concept itself, which is taken alone and separate from everything foreign. The source of truth can lie no higher than this identity, and the very first in judging must be—the idea predicated of itself, therefore still with nothing composite. And this predication of a representation of itself is so necessary, since it is the operation of the understanding itself. In the representation of two contradictory propositions the understanding destroys its own operation through this attempt to think these together . (p. 96)

Pure thinking is thus the idea predicated of itself (A = A), and so, unlike the sensible, it cannot change. Plato and Aristotle, Eberhard notes, had already for this reason attributed alterability and contingency to the sensible, and inalterability and necessity to science, while correctly recognizing that through the understanding we know what belongs to things as they are in themselves, but through the senses only what belongs to them relatively (p. 109). This summary covers less than half of Eberhard’s prize essay, and that only in the barest outline. Yet it contains the basis of the rest and provides a sufficient indication of the unique practical Platonism that lies at its basis. Clearly, for Eberhard, all ideas are innate because they are nothing but limitations of the fundamental power of the soul. The striving towards perfect knowledge of the true, through the unification of all our representations within the pure thought of the highest and unlimited idea, is, at the very same time, the striving towards the unification of all our acts under the absolute good, which is nothing but the unlimited fundamental power of the soul itself. The highest idea as truth itself is also the absolute good, and both lie within our very souls.

2.3. On the concept of philosophy and its parts This work is particularly informative about Eberhard’s views not long before the composition of the Preparation for Natural Theology, and moreover shows how



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central natural theology is to Eberhard’s overall conception of philosophy. Thus a brief examination of its main points is in order. In the introduction to this work, Eberhard explains his own way of teaching philosophy is indeed ultimately directed towards natural theology, writing that In lectures on each particular philosophical discipline, I will arrange everything so that I finally direct them further towards the most sublime end and the most sublime work of all rational thought, namely to the knowledge of God, to an end that must be the most important end of a student’s efforts not only as a future theologian, but also as a human being. (pp. 5–6)

This remark is twice echoed in the Preparation itself, where Eberhard laments Wolff ’s not having treated ontological concepts as he would have had he recognized more clearly that their most proper and important function lies in the knowledge of God. Indeed, according to Eberhard, natural theology constitutes the “chief part of metaphysics, in which all others unite as in their end, which therefore is the most noble work and the most perfect object of the thinking intellect” (p. 47). But why should this be the case? Why should natural theology be more fundamental than ontology or the other branches of special metaphysics? To answer this question sufficiently, we will first have to examine in a bit more detail Eberhard’s general view of philosophy. He begins his investigation by recalling to the reader’s mind the inherent difficulty of such an undertaking, which is clear from the disparity in the views we find even among the greatest philosophers. No other acquired skill or craft, he remarks, has faced such tremendous difficulties, particularly over such an extended amount of time. The difference between these and philosophy, according to Eberhard, lies in the fact that their method, object, and operations are all sensible, while it is an essential feature of those of philosophy that they are not. As Eberhard explains, “the material, which [philosophy] works upon, and the manner in which it works upon this material, must be something so extra-sensible that they can only be intuited by the pure understanding” (p. 8). To get a better handle on the problem, Eberhard therefore proposes to divide it into three parts, namely, into the question of the material of philosophy, that of its instrument, and finally that of its product. These, he explains, will be established through an examination of the historical origin of philosophy among the ancients. Although the beginnings of philosophy will always lie in obscurity, in Eberhard’s view it surely began from common experience and the application thereto of the powers of comparison and abstraction. In this way, all

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cultures have arrived at the concepts of permanence and change, substance and accident, the common and the particular, and the ideas of genus, species, and individual (p. 10). The true material of philosophy, however, was first isolated and adequately understood in the Platonic doctrine of the ideas. According to Eberhard, this began in an attempt to unify the ungraspably infinite and flowing manifold of experience through the conception of higher, general, and non-sensible concepts. Plato and the Platonic school realized that the only things that are “one, inalterable and universal,” and therefore graspable by the mind, are the concepts of “figure, motion, place, time and so forth” (p. 11). These special features of things grasped by the mind provide the only possible basis for judgments that can be true throughout all time and change, and so certain, universal, and necessary. According to Eberhard’s reconstruction, in this way Plato came to understand philosophy as containing “genuine pure rational knowledge,” indeed the “highest universal ideas of kinds” that alone “would provide the first ground of all human knowledge” (p. 12). We can arrive at them by ascending from the many and complex to the one and absolutely simple, and afterwards on the basis of the ideas we can descend to an understanding of the genuine unity present in the manifold. Both Plato and Aristotle, Eberhard claims, agreed in this and in the view that the first or highest ideas must be indemonstrably certain, known immediately by the intellect (Verstand), whereas all other things will be known with certainty from them, on the basis of demonstration, and thus through science. So the two chief ancients agreed that the material or basis of philosophy lies in the absolutely highest idea or ideas, whereas the distinctive product of philosophy is science, or apodictically certain knowledge (p. 14). Of course, as Eberhard points out, these ideas are not of the kind described by Locke and Berkeley, which are particular objects of sense or imagination, but rather pure supersensible and universal concepts. But how do we know that there are any such ideas? Eberhard answers this question indirectly by means of a standard argument from Leibniz: If there were no universal and necessary ideas, then there could be no science of any kind. The arguments for this are standard rationalist fare, and rest on the obvious insufficiency of the methods of induction or analogy to establish universal and necessary truths (pp. 16–22). So if there are sciences, then there must be supersensible ideas, for indeed “only ideas are the material of science” (p. 22). Thus Eberhard concludes: The universal ideas … are not objects of the senses; they are represented by the understanding and have a constancy and inalterability that the objects of the senses do not possess. The judgments that are composed from these have a



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constant truth; they are necessarily true, whereas the judgments of the senses have only a contingent truth. The latter can begin and cease to be true, whereas the former must be true eternally. They therefore provide what is called science, whereas only belief and conjecture is found in respect to what is sensible. So if the product of philosophy is more perfect, i.e. more distinct and certain knowledge, then there must be a knowledge that is more distinct and certain than the knowledge of the senses, namely the science of the necessary supersensible truths. (p. 23)

As in Leibniz, these “supersensible” ideas and truths must be derived either from the soul’s own intuition of itself or from some equally intrinsic source. As Eberhard further comments, These supersensible truths have this in common with all truths that concern the soul, namely that they (1) are not acquired through the external senses, (2) that we perceive in the soul itself the ideas from which they are composed. Both also possess (3) equal scientific certainty, since the soul can be just as well aware of its operations as of its ideas. (p. 39)

According to Eberhard, the class of supersensible ideas includes the so-called transcendental ideas, as well as those that Aristotle termed the categories (p. 40). Having outlined this ancient view of philosophy as the knowledge whose matter is the ideas and whose product is science, Eberhard immediately proceeds to argue that its apparent disagreement with more recent conceptions of philosophy is merely verbal. Wolff had defined philosophy as the science of the possible. But by the possible, Eberhard explains, Wolff meant in fact the inner possibilities of things, which is nothing but their constant eternal essences. Now Plato’s ideas are, Eberhard says, nothing but those things that truly are, the inalterable being that lies at the basis of all things. Thus both the ancient and the Wolffian conceptions of philosophy direct us to the first inalterable and necessary basis all things. “If only this could be an object of the pure understanding, an object, which it could intuit in itself without the help of external senses … then [Wolff ’s possibilities] would precisely be just what Plato called his ideas” (pp. 24–5). According to Eberhard, Baumgarten defined philosophy differently as “the science of those determinations of things that can be understood without the assumption of anything else, and can be proven without evidence” (p. 25).14 The source of this claim is unclear. In the Acroasis Logica, §1, Baumgarten defines philosophy as “the science of the qualities in things that are to be known without faith .” This is clearly not the same as saying these things are known “without evidence,” as Eberhard states. It thus seems probable that Eberhard is simply trying to force an agreement with his own Platonic conception of philosophy.

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By this latter requirement Eberhard conjectures that Baumgarten intended to indicate that the things known here lie beyond the senses, in the field of Platonic ideas, whereas by the former requirement he means to distinguish philosophy from mathematics, or the science of quantity. And true enough, on Baumgarten’s understanding, quantities are those determinations that can only be represented through the assumption of something else, whereas qualities are those that can be represented without such an assumption (Baumgarten 2013: §§69–77). Now, explains Eberhard, if we also recognize—as he is certain Baumgarten did—that the science of the possibles is equivalent to the science of the determinations of a thing either insofar as they relate to its essential determinations or insofar as they just are these essential determinations, then we can see that Eberhard’s definition amounts to the same as does Wolff ’s and so also Plato’s. Now, with his definition of philosophy in hand, Eberhard proceeds to an outline of its boundaries. Unlike many of his rationalist predecessors and contemporaries, Eberhard here says nothing about the finitude of human knowledge or the possible limits on the certainty of a human metaphysics. He rather presents it as the form of knowledge that is intrinsically easier and more natural to the soul, because it is absolutely simple, inalterable, and innate. By boundaries, then, Eberhard means particularly what sets it off from mathematics and natural science. As far as mathematics is concerned: If … we assume the concept of philosophy, that it is the science of supersensible things, and if we further assume that the science must resolve back to the first in the world of ideas, to what permits no further analysis, (the noeta): then clearly mathematics is no genuine science in the sense of Plato, and so according to his concept it cannot belong within the field of philosophy. (p. 30)

Mathematics, by treating those concepts that are first noticed to be permanent in comparison with the flow of experience, merely forms the transition point in our movement towards metaphysics. By contrast, metaphysics itself must begin from the first indemonstrable but certain intuitions of the understanding. Similarly, natural science concerns permanent principles of alteration, and the concepts in these principles are understood by metaphysics. But natural science itself only relates to metaphysics in this way, and as it were by accident, because such concepts just happen to be of use within it. We are now in a better position to understand the special position that Eberhard assigns to natural theology with respect to all other forms and domains of knowledge. Philosophy in its highest and most genuine form is a knowledge that begins from, and knows everything scientifically on the basis of, the purest



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and most complete knowledge of the supersensible ideas. But these ideas are known in this exceptional way only in the same act in which we inwardly intuit the idea of God. In the sensible realm, the ontological ideas such as unity and substantiality as well as the psychological ideas such as wisdom, goodness, and justice are present only with limitations, inconstantly, and alterably. In God alone are they found without any limitation and in the highest degree among the “infinite collection of his realities” (p. 48). The matter of natural theology is thus precisely the supersensible ideas. Since for Eberhard, as we saw above, the matter of philosophy is also the supersensible ideas, it follows that in a sense natural theology itself is just that inner core of philosophy that is responsible for preparing and presenting its specific matter. So, by bringing us to the knowledge of God as the only intuition of the supersensible ideas, natural theology has the role of raising the intellect from the domain of the senses to an immediate grasp of first principles. As Eberhard explains, “in this way refection elevates itself to intuition of the infinite invisible, the thought becomes sensing, the contemplation devotion. The devotion of the philosopher, purest and yet the most soulful devotion!” (p. 50). In conclusion, Eberhard brings all these lines of argument together to drive home the point that natural theology really is the goal and foundation of all philosophy, stating: Therefore, the ideas that make up the knowledge of God are nothing other than the supersensible and entirely genuine ideas, in their most perfect universality and purity, without any of the limitations and modifications with which they are found in sensible things, which so often inhibit their distinctness and spotlessness; the operations of our soul in which we intuit the spiritual being of God are immediately the most distinct part of the field of our soul; when we know, reflect, think, deliberate, infer, free from the fog of sensibility, from the tumult of the passions, from the tyranny of blind drives. Which science, therefore, is more the object of the entire pure understanding, which science deserves more the name of science, deserves more to be a part of philosophy, than this contemplative part of religion? The knowledge of God is the noblest work of the thinking understanding, and it procures for the understanding the greatest elevation of which it is capable. (p. 50)

2.4. Summary Of all of Kant’s predecessors and contemporaries, Eberhard comes the closest to sharing his understanding of the unique nature of metaphysical knowledge

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and the intimate relationship between metaphysics in general and rational theology in particular. Not even Leibniz or Mendelssohn, the two most Platonic of the preceding rationalists, went quite so far in expressly asserting the utter independence of metaphysical principles from everything sensible.15 Kant and Eberhard alone thus share the distinction of defining metaphysical knowledge as essentially of supersensible objects, or as consisting in the qualitatively distinct rational cognition based upon mere concepts.16 Indeed, it seems quite likely that Kant’s preference for the term übersinnliche after 1781 derives from his reading of Eberhard, who continually pointed to it as a central feature of his thought (see his comment to Baumgarten 2013: §1 and our fn d). More significantly still, they both arrived at this definition for essentially the same reason, namely, because they thought that securing the absolute certainty of the principles of science and morality, and establishing a genuinely universal measure of perfection, requires a qualitative separation of such things from everything sensible. It is not accidental that both Eberhard and Kant motivate their very conceptions of philosophy through an appeal to the insufficiency of empirical induction and see themselves ultimately as providing an apology for Plato.17 But the parallel extends still further in a way that at least suggests a deeper reason for Kant’s employment of Eberhard’s Preparation. Kant’s own account of metaphysics, both pre-Critical and Critical, culminates in transcendental theology, not so much because he thinks God is deserving of such an honorific place in human thought, but because, in Kant’s view, the idea of such a being is a necessary presupposition of the determination of any and every object of knowledge as such. Kant in fact holds that, whether this move is valid or not, human reason cannot but presuppose as given a collection of all possible realities, so that the individual can be thought of as possible through the limitation of this given totality. Under the title of the ideal of pure reason this Leibniz’s concessions to Locke in the New Essays are well known, although in principle his position is probably indistinguishable from Eberhard’s (see, e.g. Leibniz 1996: 79–82). The place where Leibniz comes closest is in his correspondence with Queen Sophie Charlotte. See his so-called “Letter on what is independent of sense and matter” of 1702 (Leibniz 2011, pp. 237–47) as well as his replies to Toland (Leibniz 2011: 257–77). Leibniz, however, always maintains the tie between intellectual and sensible representations, even after death. Thus in the above-mentioned letter, he writes: “The senses provide us with material for reasoning, and we never have thoughts so abstract that something sensible is not mixed in with them” (Leibniz 2011, p. 244). Wolff had gone further in this direction in emphasizing the “sanctum connubium” of experience and philosophy, while limiting the validity of many of Leibniz’s central doctrines to what is sensible (see Baumgarten 2013: 17–20). Eberhard is also more of a Platonist than Baumgarten in this respect (see Baumgarten 2013: 22–5). 16 Cf. in particular AA 4: 265 and B xiv. Fugate 2015 examines the origin of Kant’s definition of metaphysics in his lectures on metaphysics. 17 Eberhard’s lengthier apology for Plato is found in his Neue Vermischte Schriften, especially pp. 358–77. 15



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concept of God indeed provides the transcendental condition (in the idea, as Kant says) for the determination of the individual, as well as for the systematic unity of these under ends, and, finally, in his moral philosophy, for the complete unity of nature and freedom under the idea of the highest derived and original goods. In a word, although Kant rejects any dogmatic claims to knowledge regarding God in himself, still the idea of God proves to be indispensable as measure and ground of the perfection and completeness of reason, both theoretical and moral. As we saw in our examination of Eberhard’s work, he too locates in the idea of God the collection of all pure realities, the basis of all knowledge and the ground and goal or model of all moral activity. And just as Kant’s transcendental and moral theology provide the ultimate point of unity for human reason, Eberhard’s own transcendental theology, as presented in the Preparation, provides in his view the ultimate point of unity for all philosophy. Kant’s choice of Eberhard’s textbook makes perfect sense, then, because it allows him to illustrate in his lectures one of the key claims of his Critical philosophy, namely, that the most perfect dogmatism in fact really expresses the subjectively necessary structure of human reason, albeit under the illusion that this necessity is also objective.18

3. Kant’s reflections on Eberhard’s Preparation Kant lectured on rational or natural theology throughout his long career as a university professor, but only on a few occasions did he devote a special course to the subject. These were in the summer semester of 1774, the winter semesters of 1783/4 and 1785/6, and finally the summer semester of 1787. In these lectures, Kant revisits and even expands upon many pet ideas that had occupied him from his very earliest philosophical writings: the problem of theodicy, of the proper concept of God, of the derivation of his attributes, of the relation of the systematic unity of the universe to its divine cause, the various attempted proofs of God’s existence and their refutations, and even Kant’s own pre-Critical attempt at a new proof. Many passages are filled with the kind of grand reflections on the cosmos and its cause Kant had always admired in the work of Pope, Hutcheson, Newton, Maupertuis, and Rousseau. As Wood has recognized, the transcripts of Kant’s lectures on rational theology, which we will discuss in the Kant’s—so to speak—“incorporation-strategy” with respect to traditional dogmatism underlies much in his Critical writings, but is particularly evident in his reaction to Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours. See, e.g. Kant’s letter to C. G. Schütz, November 1785 (AA 10: 428).

18

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next section, constitute for this reason a singularly useful source for scholars on a number of important topics. In particular, they not only offer an unparalleled source for Kant’s views on a number of topics in natural theology, as Wood has noted (1978: 9–10), but also provide insight into his mature standpoint with respect to many of his pre-Critical doctrines, such as his own proof of God’s existence. But the transcripts are not our only record of Kant’s reflections on issues related to Eberhard’s textbook. Like many of the other manuals he employed, Kant had his personal copy of the Preparation interleaved with blank pages on which to take notes, try out ideas, and sketch parts of his lectures. He also did this in the margins and even between the lines of the printed text. This original copy of the Preparation has unfortunately been lost, but a transcription made by Erich Adickes appears in volume 28 of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften printed parallel with Eberhard’s textbook. Adickes divides the notes into two distinct groups, with the first dating from between 1783 and 1784 and the second dating between 1785 and 1788. Although it is now impossible to confirm the correctness of this dating, we have preserved it in our translation. We have also relied upon Adickes’ indication of the placement of the reflections in Kant’s personal copy. In our translation this is found immediately after the number of the reflection and the probable date of its composition. For example, the heading of the first note reads: “6206. 1783–4. E II. III.” This means that the reflection’s number is 6206, it was likely composed in the period 1783–4, and it was found on pages II and III of Eberhard’s manual according to its original pagination (indicated by the “E”). Since the blank interleaved pages of Kant’s personal copy were naturally not paginated, the placement of a reflection on one of these is indicated by the page opposite to where it was found followed by a prime symbol. So, if the example above had instead been “6206. 1783–4. E II'. III'.”, then the note would have been found not on pages II and III, but on the blank pages opposite them.

4. Kant’s lectures on rational theology and the Danzig transcript There are five extant transcriptions of Kant’s lectures on rational theology—the Coing, Pölitz, Magath, Volckmann, and Danzig transcripts. According to Beyer (1937), Naragon (2006), and Kreimendahl (1988), these transcripts are all records of the same lecture series, once again probably those of 1783/4. Pölitz,



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Volckmann, and Danzig have all been collected in AA 28 under the editorship of Gerhard Lehmann. Magath is found in AA 29, also by Lehmann, and in that form survives only as expansions and variants to Pölitz; for this reason it is not included in our concordance. Alongside its supplementary value, Magath is also noteworthy in that it generally does a more precise job of indicating the passages Kant cites than does Pölitz. Coing, as we have it today, consists only in two fragments of a lost manuscript; Kreimendahl (1988), who republished these in Kant Studien, is convinced that these are closely related to Danzig (1988: 326–7). Moreover, Kreimendahl claims that although the text adds little to our understanding of Kant, the parallels that it contains stand as “verification ” of the close relation between Pölitz, Volckmann, and Danzig. As it is a fragment, we have also not included it in the concordance. For detailed descriptions of the provenance and editorial history of these transcripts, the reader should consult Beyer (1937) and Naragon (2006). Of these transcripts, only Pölitz has been previously translated into English. Wood and Clark first published a translation in 1978, which was reworked for publication in the Cambridge Kant Edition by Wood and di Giovanni in 1996. The transcripts uniformly indicate that Kant used Eberhard and Baumgarten as source texts, but also that Kant devoted much more time to the discussion of Baumgarten than to Eberhard. As the Magath transcript adds: “it is true that these lectures are based on Eberhard; nevertheless, the great Kant follows Baumgarten’s natural theology more closely, because, according to his own admission, it gives more food for thought” (AA 29: 1054). Hence, Kant freely mentions the “the author” whenever referring either to Eberhard or Baumgarten; the notes to our translation specify when Kant is referring to Eberhard, and when to Baumgarten. There are around twenty-one direct references to Eberhard in the five lectures, and perhaps a few more taking into account Kant’s discussions Hume, Leibniz, Cudworth, and the Socinists, for instance (our translation of Danzig indicates ten direct reference to Eberhard, many of which overlap with the other lectures). Danzig refers to Eberhard more than do any of the other transcripts. Yet, the transcripts in general do not cite Eberhard sequentially or systematically, and the references tend to be found at the beginning of the transcripts (although there are exceptions to this rule, especially in Danzig). In contrast, Kant clearly works through his lectures with the framework of Baumgarten’s rational theology in mind; the transcripts indicate over a hundred direct references (our translation locates sixty-two separate references to Baumgarten, again many of which clearly overlap with the other transcripts). Although he does not discuss

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each of Baumgarten’s two hundred paragraphs, he does work through them sequentially and often in great detail. In sum, the transcripts generally follow the progress of Baumgarten’s rational theology, and cite Eberhard sporadically.

4.1. Content of the lectures as typified in Danzig Beyer holds that Danzig is the set of transcripts most faithful to the lectures, attributing to this fact its casual style, omissions, general roughness, and its brevity in comparison to Pölitz and Volckmann (Beyer 1937, xi–xii). From our familiarity with other transcriptions of Kant’s lectures, we believe this judgment to be correct. Indeed, this is the chief reason for our translation. The Pölitz transcript is almost certainly very far from what Kant said in the lecture hall. It is simply too polished and we know from other sources that Pölitz’s editorial practices were generally quite dubious (see Boswell 1988). Hence, a thorough familiarity with Danzig is necessary for any study of Pölitz. Nevertheless, by consulting the concordance at the end of this volume, the reader can easily see that the transcripts all follow the same basic structure, which is to be expected of such closely related texts. As published in AA 28, Pölitz has the most explicit and detailed table of contents, and so we have used it for the framework of our concordance even though the various sets of transcripts are not consistent in their use of headings. However, since Beyer holds that Danzig is the transcript most faithful to the lectures, our present account of the content of the lectures largely follows it. Beginning with a general introduction to the philosophical doctrine of religion, the lectures discuss the proofs for the existence of God within the wellknown framework of the Critique of Pure Reason. The ontological argument is demolished on the ground that existence is not a predicate; the limits of the cosmological and physicotheological arguments are demonstrated in that the latter only proves an architect, and needs a creator, which is provided by the former; the former in turn requires that the creator be demonstrated as God. But since this last proof is only demonstrated in the ontological argument, all three proofs are invalidated. However, the transcripts contain a generally sympathetic portrayal of moral theism, in which God is considered as the supreme legislator in the kingdom of morality and ends. After this introduction follow the two main parts of the lectures—(1) transcendental and (2) moral theology. The transcendental theology follows the familiar Kantian division into ontotheology, cosmotheology, and physicotheology, mirroring the preliminary treatment of the proofs in the general



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introduction, which Kant revisits in more detail in the transcendental theology. Ontotheology is seen as the preeminent form of transcendental theology as it is completely independent of experience, while cosmotheology, even though it refers to experience, remains transcendental in that its inferences stem from the principles of experience and not experience per se. His closing treatment of physicotheology, which grants the probable existence of God as necessary for understanding the design of the world and hence science, segues into the use of God as a practical postulate and hence moral theology. Thus, in the moral theology, Kant returns to his preliminary discussion of moral theism, sharply distinguishing moral theology from theological morality. While the transcendental theology gives us no certain knowledge of God and is therefore of no objective use to us, moral theology provides us with practical knowledge and thus undergirds our moral practice. This part is further divided into four sections. The first discusses the moral properties or attributes of God. Moral theology improves upon physicotheology, says Kant, because it gives us a moral concept of God, which consists of God’s holiness, beneficence, and justice. The second section discusses the nature and certainty of belief; its nature is that of a practical postulate, and belief is certain, says Kant, for anyone who would act morally. The third section looks at God as cause, considering him as a (1) cause of the world, which is to say, as cause of the effective nexus; as (2) creator of the world, which is to say as cause of the final nexus; and (3) ruler of the world, which is to say as cause of the moral nexus. It is not difficult to grasp why Kant’s discussion of providence is found in this section. The final section of the second part concerns revelation, where, among other things, Kant argues that external revelation (which occurs through God’s words and deeds) can only occur after internal revelation (which occurs through reason itself). This is not the Cartesian innate idea, which Kant considers to be a miracle that God would have to work continually in every rational being. Rather, revelation provides nothing that is not already contained in practical reason, which leads Kant, like Eberhard, to question the necessity of external revelation. Thus for Kant, revelation seems to be only for certain people at certain times. Although the complete transcripts follow each other quite closely, only Politz and Magath end with an appendix on the history of natural theology, which marks the largest structural difference among them. This is of interest, since this appendix corresponds somewhat to part one, section five of Eberhard, “the natural history of religion.”

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5. Vocabulary The choice of vocabulary for our translation of Eberhard’s Preparation has naturally been influenced by the work’s relevance to Kant’s philosophy. Since in translating Kant we have tried, with only a few exceptions, to follow the style and vocabulary of the now standard translations of his works, we have done likewise in our translation of Eberhard’s Preparation. Of course, every writer has a certain unique style and usage of terms (i.e. Kant draws a sharp distinction between moral and non-moral language, which must be respected, whereas Eberhard does not), and we have kept this in mind so as not to make Eberhard sound more Kantian than appropriate. We have naturally also availed ourselves of all available resources with respect to eighteenth-century German, but in particular the Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm, available online from the Universität Trier, the Thieme-Preusser: Neues vollständiges kritisches Wörterbuch der Englischen und Deutschen Sprache, revised and enlarged by Emanuel Wessely (Hamburg, 1883), The New and Complete Dictionary of the German and English Languages composed chiefly after the German Dictionaries of Mr. Adelung and of Mr. Schwan, enlarged by John Ebers (Leipzig, 1796–9), and finally the indispensable Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der hochdeutschen Mundart by Johann Christoph Adelung (1774– 86), available online at the Münchener Digitalisierungs Zentrum. As stated in our previous work, we believe the basic unit of meaning in many philosophical texts is in fact the argument. This is particularly the case in systematic philosophy, where the meaning of a term is fixed not by common usage, but built up from its structural relations to other terms. This conviction has led us to a few guidelines for translation, which will be visible in this volume. First, since arguments occur according to patterns in which the ordering of terms is essential, we try as diligently as possible to be faithful to the ordering of ideas in the original sentences, although this can at times sound unnatural. Second, we have tried to be as rigidly consistent as possible in our translation of individual terms and to translate cognate terms by cognate words. Third, and finally, we have resisted the temptation to present a smoother text through the use of editorial insertions or silent paraphrasing, and have left it to the reader to do the interpretive work where the original is genuinely ambiguous or even corrupt. There are a few terms in particular whose renderings require special comment.



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Erkennen, Erkenntnis/Erkenntnisse, Wissen, Wissenschaft || Knowing, knowledge/cognitions, apodictic/discursive knowledge, science The standard practice in Kant scholarship is to render these terms respectively as “to cognize,” “cognition,” “to know” or “knowledge,” and, finally, “science.” The idea behind these choices is clear and initially unobjectionable: In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant sometimes uses erkennen and its cognates in a way that seem to some scholars to be more general than the use of “to know” and its cognates in English. Kant also, with only a few exceptions, reserves wissen (the verb) for a more strict form of erkennen, which he defines in the first Critique as the holding to be true that “is both subjectively and objectively sufficient,” i.e. convincing and apodictically certain (cf. A822/B850). But on a second look this solution has serious drawbacks. First, Kant distinguishes erkennen from mere thinking (denken) (Bxxvi), and claims that the Critique of Pure Reason shows that we erkennen things only as objects of appearance, although we can still think of them as things in themselves. But in normal English usage, thinking, even mere thinking, is unquestionably a species of cognition. On the other side, the scope that Kant gives to Wissen is extraordinarily narrow, extending only to apodictically certain cognition (AA 4: 468). Could it possibly be true that Kant thinks that something must be apodictically certain to be knowledge? That history, biology, and chemistry are not forms of knowledge? That it is incorrect, for instance, to say that I know my own phone number? In German all of these things would be covered by Erkennentnis, but not by Wissen, according to Kant. And in any normal context, such Erkenntnis would be translated without any doubt as “knowledge.” Such reflections suggest that the current standard way of translating Kant is a distortion, and that rather than restricting knowledge to Wissen, we should broaden it to cover Erkenntnis, while finding for Wissen some term that picks out an appropriately certain species of knowledge. As it turns out, the Danzig lecture notes translated in this volume provide significant support for this view. In several passages, but most clearly at AA 28: 1271, Kant states that we must not ascribe Wissen to God, but rather Erkenntnis. According to the standard translations, this would be to say that we must not ascribe knowledge to God, but merely cognition. But this is almost the exact opposite of Kant’s intended meaning. His idea is rather that Wissen indeed only appears to be higher to us, because our imperfect and limited rational minds require the application of skill and argumentation to achieve the highest degree of certainty. Reason and discursion are precisely the tools by which we

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make up for our inherent deficiency. For a being such as God, however, the possession of such a tool must be the sign of something lower and less perfect. The thought experiment contained in the idea of a divine intellect in this way reveals, according to Kant, that there is thinkable an Erkenntnis that would be objectively certain without the need for science (Wissenschaft) and thus without the need for discursive knowledge (Wissen), which indeed would be essentially more perfect than the latter. It should also be noted that this argument is not a mere aside, but is really essential to understanding Kant’s reasons for rejecting much of traditional natural theology. For it means that the concept of God excludes those very things that, from the standpoint of human reason, make up all that is positive and more perfect in our knowledge. And if it excludes this, then it excludes all our attempts at representing it positively. Suffice it to say, the standard translation, which verbally enshrines the seeming superiority of Wissen over Erkenntnis, by rendering them respectively as “knowledge” and “cognition,” covers over this line of thought in Kant according to which—from the standpoint of reason’s ideas—the highest form of knowledge would more correctly be called Erkenntnis than Wissen. Admittedly, there is no perfectly satisfactory solution to all of these problems. In our translation, we have sought to avoid the more serious ones by rendering erkennen as “to know” (except for the difficult-to-render plural Erkenntnisse, which we translated as “cognitions”), and to render wissen (and Wissen) differently depending on the specific context. In a very few cases where the latter is clearly being used only casually, we have rendered it also as “to know.” Such a casual usage is found very often in the Danzig notes, and does not pose a serious danger of misinterpretation. But in those contexts where Kant stresses the objective certainty of Wissen, we have translated it as “apodictic knowledge.” This has the advantage of clearly indicating that what is at stake is a kind of Erkenntnis, or knowledge that is both demonstrated and certain. However, in a few instances noted in the text, Kant’s argument depends particularly on the discursive character of Wissen, and so here we have made this clear by rendering it as “discursive knowledge.” In all such cases we have provided the original term in to avoid ambiguity.

Glaube || Belief, faith There is no German equivalent to the English distinction between belief and faith; both fall under Glaube, which is equivalent to the Latin fides. Kant defines Glaube as the holding-to-be-true that is subjectively sufficient but objectively insufficient, but then goes on to distinguish three varieties—pragmatic, doctrinal,



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and moral Glaube (A822f./B850f.). While we translate the verb glauben always as “to believe,” the reader should note that we have departed from our general rule and rendered Glaube as either “belief ” or “faith” depending on context, in order to conform to standard English usage. This seemed most natural and also unlikely to cause any serious confusion.

Gottesgelahrtheit, Theologie || Theological Doctrine, Theology Both terms can normally be rendered as theology with no issues. However, in at least one instance it is impossible to understand Kant’s meaning without recognizing that Gottesgelahrtheit, which could perhaps literally be translated as “divine learnedness,” implies that it is something taught and learned, and thus, to Kant, not something that springs from one’s own use of pure reason. This, however, is not as clearly implied by the term Theologie.

Gut, Güte, Gütigkeit || Good, kindness, beneficence Unfortunately, it is impossible to preserve the morphological relation between these words in translation. The most important reason for this is that Gut nearly always has a strictly moral sense in Kant, whereas he specifically employs Güte and Gütigkeit in cases of non-moral goodness. This makes the last two extremely difficult to translate naturally.

Inbegriff || Collection Inbegriff is standardly translated as “sum-total,” but this, we think, is a small mistake created by the fact that it is very often found in larger phrases like Inbegriff aller Erscheinungen or “collection of all appearances,” thus with a following “of all.” A “collection of all” is a “sum-total,” but a “sum-total of all” (the standard translation) would be redundant, while always translating Inbegriff as “sum-total” obscures the fact that in Kant it is not always followed by “of all” and then has not the meaning of “sum-total,” but of “collection” (cf. AA 6: 125, 7: 36).

Moral, Moralität || Morals, morality In many cases, we would have preferred to translate Moral as morality, or at least it would have sounded more natural. But Kant uses both Moral and Moralität, and the former seems often to refer to a specific moral doctrine rather than to the concept of such a doctrine. We have tried to preserve this distinction by rendering the former as morals, changing singular verbs to plural when necessary, and the latter as morality.

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Selbständig, unabhängig || Self-standing, independent In normal circumstances, both of these words would be rendered “independent,” but this erases a possibly significant terminological distinction. Since we feel it should be left up to the reader to make the decision in such circumstances, we have chosen to render these terms rather more literally, if somewhat inelegantly.

6. Note on the texts and translations Our translation of Eberhard’s Preparation for Natural Theology is based upon the first German edition of 1781, but has been checked against and paginated according to the edition contained in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, 18: 491–606. Due to the roughness of the first edition’s printing, we have not attempted to indicate its use of various different fonts for English, German, and Latin words, or to reproduce devices like wide-spaced printing, which are sometimes nearly undetectable. We have only retained Eberhard’s use of bold type to stress various words or phrases in the body of text itself, which we have changed to italics. In reproducing his bibliographical lists, we have checked and, where necessary, corrected or supplemented the information he provides. We have only dropped Eberhard’s indication as to whether a book is printed quarto or octavo format, judging this to be of little interest today. As the original manuscripts have been lost, our translations of Kant’s notes and of the Danzig transcript is based entirely Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, 18 and 28. We have also made use of many of Erich Adickes’ excellent observations and suggestions in the former, acknowledgment of which is found in the notes to this volume. We would like to thank Walter de Gruyter for permission to use this material. All the translations of Kant’s notes in this volume are original, but we were happy to be able to consult the translations of Bowman, Guyer, and Rauscher found in Notes and Fragments in the few cases where these overlaps with the contents of that volume.

7. Abbreviations and conventions AA E Text

Kant’s gesammelte Schriften Pagination of the first edition of Eberhard’s Preparation Text struck out by Kant



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 Contains the original text when this is other than German, and occasionally also the original German for a word when we believe that this will clarify the translation [] Editorial insertion g Indicates that the text following was added by Kant at around the same time as the surrounding text was written, as indicated in AA s Indicates that the text following was added by Kant significantly after the composition of the surrounding text, as indicated in AA ' When following a page reference to the first edition of Eberhard’s Preparation, indicates the blank page opposite to it in Kant’s personal copy

8. Bibliography Allison, Henry (1966). Lessing and the Enlightenment. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Allison, Henry (1973). The Kant–Eberhard Controversy. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Aner, Karl (1929). Die Theologie der Lessingzeit. Halle: Max Niemeyer. Baumgarten, Alexander (1761). Acroasis Logica in Christianum L. B. De Wolff. Halle: Impensis Carol. Herm. Hemmerde. Baumgarten, Alexander (2013). Metaphysics: A Critical Translation with Kant’s Elucidations, Selected Notes, and Related Materials, translated and edited by Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers. London and New York: Bloomsbury. Beyer, Kurt (1937). Kants Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre. Halle: Akademischer Verlag. Boime, Albert (1980). “Marmontel’s ‘Belisaire’ and the Pre-Revolutionary Progressivism of David,” Art History, 3, 81–101. Boswell, Terry (1988). “On the Textual Authenticity of Kant’s Logic,” History and Philosophy of Logic, 9. 193–203. Censure de la Faculté de Théoleogie de Paris, Contre le Livre, qui a pour titre, “Bélisaire” (1767). Paris. Eberhard, Johann August (1772). Neue Apologie des Sokrates oder Untersuchung der Lehre von der Seligkeit der Heiden. Republished with a second volume in 1778. Berlin/Stettin. Eberhard, Johann August (1776). Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Emfindens. Berlin. Eberhard, Johann August (1778). Von dem Begriffe der Philosophie und ihren Theilen. Berlin.

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Eberhard, Johann August (1788). Neue vermischte Schriften. Halle. Fugate, Courtney (2015). “The Unity of Metaphysics in Kant’s Lectures.” In Reading Kant’s Lectures, edited by Robert R. Clewis. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter. Gay, Peter (1968). The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. The Rise of Modern Paganism. New York: Vintage. Gäbe, Lüder (1959). “Eberhard, Johann August.” In Neue Deutsche Biographie, 4. Duncker & Humblot: Berlin, 240–41. Also available online at Deutsche Biographie. Gawlina, Manfred (1996). Das Medusenhaupt der Kritik. Die Kontroverse zwischen Immanuel Kant und Johann August Eberhard. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter. Harnack, Adolf (1901). Geschichte königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, edition in one volume. Berlin: Georg Stilke. Hassler, Gerda (2000). Johann August Eberhard (1739–1809): ein streitbarer Geist an den Grenzen der Aufklärung. Halle: Hallescher Verlag. Kant, Immanuel (1902–). Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, 29 vols, issued by the Prussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (vols 1–22), the deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften (vol. 23), and the Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen (vols 24–9). Berlin and New York: de Gruyter. Kant, Immanuel (1978). Lectures on Philosophical Theology, translated by Allen W. Wood and Gertrude M. Clark. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Kant, Immanuel (1987). Critique of Judgement, translated with an introduction by Werner S. Pluhar. Hackett: Indianapolis. Kant, Immanuel (1995). Der Streit mit Johann August Eberhard, edited by Marion Lauschke and Manfred Zahn. Hamburg: Meiner. Kant, Immanuel (1996). Religion and Rational Theology, translated and edited by Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel (1998). Der Streit mit Johann August Eberhard, edited by Marion Lauschke and Manfred Zahn. Hamburg: Meiner. Kant, Immanuel (2005). Notes and Fragments, translated by Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Kertscher, Hans-Joachim and Ernst Stöckmann (2012). Ein Antipode Kants?: Johann August Eberhard im Spannungsfeld von spätaufklärischer Philosophie und Theologie. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter. Kreimendahl, Lothar (1988). “Kants Kolleg über Rationaltheologie. Fragmente einer bislang unbekannten Vorlesungsnachschrift.” Kant-Studien, 79, 318–28. Leibniz, G. W. (1996). New Essays on Human Understanding, translated and edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leibniz G. W. (2011). Leibniz and the Two Sophies: The Philosophical Correspondence, edited and translated by Lloyd Strickland. Toronto: Iter Inc. Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim (2005). Philosophical and Theological Writings, translated and edited by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.



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Naragon, Steve (2006). “Kant in the Classroom: Natural Theology Notes.” www. manchester.edu/kant/Notes/notesTheology.htm (last accessed May 2015). Nicolai, Friedrich (1810). Gedächtnisschrift auf Johann August Eberhard. Berlin and Stettin. Renwick, John (1974). Marmontel, Voltaire, and the Bélisaire Affair, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 121. Banbury: Voltaire Foundation. Sprengel, Curt (1809). “Johann August Eberhard, als Mensch und Bürger.” In Der Neue Teutsche Merkur, vol. 4, 283–96. Vaihinger, Hans (1892). Commentar zu “Kants Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,” 2 vols. Stuttgart, Berlin and Leipzig: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft. Wood, Allen W. (1978). “Translator’s Introduction.” In Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, translated by Allen W. Wood and Gertrude M. Clark. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 9–18. Zahn, Manfred (1998). “Der historische Kontext der Kant-Eberhard-Kontroverse.” In Immanuel Kant, Der Streit mit Johann August Eberhard, edited by Marion Lauschke and Manfred Zahn. Hamburg: Meiner, XIII–XL.

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by Johann August Eberhard Halle, the Orphanage, 1781

Preface These few sheets are intended for public lectures in which the prospective connoisseur of the philosophical sciences will be prepared for the study of so noble a part of it as is natural theology. Hence, everything is collected here that can be expected to interest one eager to learn the science and that could serve to guide them in their progress. The first goal should be achieved through the treatise on errors in natural theology, which cannot otherwise be prevented than by studying them scientifically, while the second goal should be achieved through instruction in how the concepts belonging to the knowledge of God are to be presented purely. It is precisely in view of this last goal that the investigations of other theologians and philosophers, who have worked in one or another field and with greater or lesser success, have been judged equitably but also precisely, and each has had its use determined. Occasionally something of the literature of this science has been inserted into this work to enable eager minds to judge the matter for themselves, and at the same time to acquaint them with the other helpful materials by use of which they can, through their own efforts, increase their proficiency in natural theology. I am convinced that what has been inserted is sufficient for the beginner, and I hope that such a selection will turn any learned persons who deign to take up these principles into lenient judges of it. I could myself name various works, which I have cited and do not fail to cite in lectures as well, that are now of little worth due to the great advancements that have since taken place in that part of the science treated by them. However, since one has nothing better to start from in

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such instances, the works cited must at least serve as themes from which one can advance, by means of one’s own reflection, through the application of extratheological knowledge to natural theology. However, if one should object to me that they do not see why this preparation must necessarily be separated from the lectures on natural theology that are usually found in metaphysics, then this is my answer: Firstly, the richness of the material and the brevity of time render it impossible to achieve all the previously mentioned goals in the usual way of presenting the subject. It also happens that every doctrinal system develops theological truths from one fundamental concept. Now, there surely must be some use in providing beginners with at least a brief historical glimpse at the doctrinal systems of other philosophers, and in showing them the superb harmony of truths in yet another light, or in showing them from how many standpoints contemplation can be raised to the intuition of the Divinity. Finally, I have unfortunately had to learn from experience that studious young people, though desirous of the knowledge of God, simply do not seem to be very convinced by the use of ontological, cosmological and psychological truths in natural theology and, as a result, allow their attention to flag in lectures regarding them. This is especially so now that, for some time, the speculative sciences have been subjected to much highly detrimental complaining, as if the most convenient highway led to the temple of truth, so that one must now, more than was necessary in Bilfinger’s time,1 encourage the youth to take up the exact sciences. Therefore, to meet the need of beginners, rather than merely railing against such weakness, and to allow them to get a feel for the uses of the most pure analysis of concepts, I have found it most effective to bring the extra-sensible concepts that make up the material for the knowledge of God closer to theology, and, just as in a logic of theology, to carry out the analysis of these where students immediately employ them. For experience has also taught me that all suggestions regarding the future necessity of pure derived concepts are mostly impotent, and that one usually finds disbelief more accommodating in these parts. I hope that this method may be effective for extending the pure concepts in religion, securing conviction of their truth, and applying what they teach—so greatly am I convinced of the beneficial influence of the knowledge of God. The more we Georg Bernhard Bilfinger (1693–1750), Professor of Philosophy and later of Mathematics and Theology at the University of Tübingen, author of Dilucidationes philosophicae de Deo, anima humana, mundo et generalibus rerum affectionibus (Philosophical Elucidations Concerning God, the Human Soul, the World and the General Affections of Things) published in 1725. Aside from his being a well-known adherent of the Leibnizian and Wolffian philosophies, it is unclear why Eberhard singles him out for mention.

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know God, the more happily will we live. “If you come to know God, you will be pleased .”2

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Introduction

1. Contents The preparation for natural theology is the science of the rules for forming the most perfect knowledge of God in the human understanding, and for communicating it. It will therefore contain a theoretical part, which will present the origination of the knowledge of God and the rules of its perfection, and a practical part, which will contain the rules for communicating this knowledge. 1. One can therefore view this preparation as a logic of natural theology, for in it the rules of general logic are applied to natural theology. 2. Regarding the citations, I refer to works that contain either the general philosophical or theological literature in which the literature concerning natural theology is also bound to appear, and limit myself to the best and most recent writings. More precisely, older works will only be cited when they contain special doctrines and theories, or if they are not classified accurately enough in the general bibliographies. Samuel Parker, Bishop of Oxford. Thoughts on God and Divine Providence against Atheists and Epicureans. (Oxford: e. Theatro Scheld, 1678) (London 1704) .4 Cf. J. G. Herder, Gott. An gnw~j, ti/ e)si qeo/j, h(di/wn e)/sh| (Gotha: 1787). Begriff is usually translated as “concept,” but also has the secondary meaning, evident here, of “contents” or “summary.” See John Ebers, The New and Complete Dictionary of the German and English Languages composed chiefly after the German Dictionaries of Mr. Adelung and of Mr. Schwan (Leipzig, 1796–9), vol. 1, p. 314. Kant also uses it in this sense at B168. 4 Unless the original title is an English-language book and cited as such by Eberhard (like the following reference to Samuel Clarke), we provide his reference verbatim in angle brackets to assist further research, although we disregard his typological conventions and leave out the quarto and octavo marks. When the citation is English, we reproduce it verbatim, without standardizing it. Where helpful, we provide further and more accurate bibliographical detail in the notes. We have always endeavored to find the editions that Eberhard himself would have had access to. 2 3

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Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (London: 1706). Latin edition 1713. German edition 1756. Excerpt in G. Burnet’s Abridgment of the Boyle Lectures,5 German translation, vol. 3, pp. 141ff. George Cheyne, Philosophical Principles of Religion Natural and Revealed, in two parts (London: 1715). 3rd edn (1724). W. Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated (1724).

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Johann Heinrich Winkler (ed.), Rational thoughts on the most serious matters and controversies in natural theology, along with a translation of M. Tullius Cicero’s three books on the being and attributes of the gods (Leipzig: 1793) . Demonstrative instruction in the method of dogmatic theology, delivered by G. H. Ribovio (1741). Part I, containing natural theology . Israel Gottlieb Canz, Thetico-Polemical Natural Theology .6 James Foster, Doctor of Divinity, Discourses on the Principal Branches of Natural Religion and social Virtue (London: 1749). 2 vols. In German (Jena 1751–53), 2 vols.7 Christian Willhelm Franz Walch’s Principles of Natural Theology (Göttingen: 1760). 2nd edn (1779) . Hermann Samuel Reimarus, The Primary Truths of Natural Religion in Ten Treatises, Comprehensively Explained and Defended. 2nd edn (1760), 3rd edn (1766) . J. Fr. W. Jerusalem, A Consideration of the Primary Truths of Religion (Brunswick: 1772) .

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Christian Friedrich Polzen, Natural Theology (Jena: 1777) . François Hemsterhuis, Aristaios: Or, On Divinity (Paris: 1779) . Rev. David Williams, Lectures on the universal Principles and Duties of Religion and Morality. 2 vols. (1780).

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2. The difference between theology and religion Here, however, knowledge of God must be taken in the greatest perfection that is possible for human beings, that is, it must be the richest, most correct, most distinct, most evident, and living knowledge, or, in short, it must be scientific or erudite. This is called theology , and religion contains every single degree of knowledge, even the lower. One does well to distinguish these two kinds of knowledge concerning God. Although every human being must indeed possess religion, not every human being needs to be a theologian. Moreover, various questions, doubts, and errors are important in speculative theology that are not important in practical religion.

3. The truth of the knowledge of God A genuine theologian must know with distinct conviction that this knowledge of God is true. To this belongs his being aware: 1. that the distinguishing marks belonging to the concept of God are real; 2. how this concept is formed in human understanding; 3. that the external object of this concept is actual .

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4. Errors in the knowledge of God

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Since theologians deal with these perfections of knowledge concerning God, they must also study its imperfections, and the various forms of religion that thus arise, both in individual human beings and in whole peoples. We will thus also have to speak of the errors of the human understanding that oppose the true knowledge of God.

5. Difficulties concerning the truth of the knowledge of God

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The difficulties arising with regard to the concept of God have two sources. The first is the spirituality of God; the second, his infinity. 1. Due to the weakness of its understanding, the human being can most easily form representations of things falling under the senses, and which its imagination can represent under an image. The simplicity of a spirit, however, does not allow of such representations. 2. The human being can compensate for this to a certain degree by observing and intuiting the attributes of a spirit in its own soul. However, these attributes belong to God in the highest degree, whereas the human being finds these in its own soul only along with many limitations. 1. For instance, the limits of the human understanding, and the connection in which it stands to the entire universe, requires that its clear knowledge begins with external sensations, the images of which still always accompany and facilitate even its supersensible knowledge. 2. A distinguishing mark belonging to the concept of God is true if it is possible in God, or accords with the other distinguishing marks in God, which is when it does not contradict any of those belonging to the highest being. Now, since all intuitive representations of the human being are either external sensations, whose object is composite, or internal sensations, whose object is finite, our true knowledge of God must therefore be supersensible and symbolic. However, it can be combined with intuitive knowledge, and indeed it must be, as soon as it is to become practical.

6. More precise determination of the requirements for an account of the knowledge of God Since we represent the highest being as the most perfect being, we must: 1) investigate which kinds of distinguishing marks belong to this most perfect being, such that we are certain of not having brought into its concept any



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that contradict the highest perfection; 2) show that a being whose concept is composed of such distinguishing marks has an internal 3) and also an external reality. 1. The internal reality of a concept is nothing other than its possibility, just as we understand its external reality to be its actuality. In order to prove the latter, it is required 1) that it be proven that actuality is contained in the concept of the most perfect being, or that it must be actual by virtue of its essence , 2) that this most perfect being, which we must represent as actual by virtue of its concept, also has an external or objective actuality, or that its concept has an actual object outside of our understanding. 2. The criticism that one cannot prove external or objective actuality from the fact that the actuality of the most perfect being is determined through its concept in the human understanding was already defended by scholastic philosophers, among whom in particular belongs a certain Gaulino, whose writings against Anselm of Canterbury are still extant.

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Anselm of Canterbury, Prosologion . Gaulino’s On behalf of the fool against the Proslogion of Anselm . Anselm’s Against the fool, or, an Apologetic . These writings are collected in the works of Anselm edited by Dom Gabriel Gerberon (1675),8 who also first discovered from the manuscripts the name of the then still-unknown opponent of Anselm.9

Born August 12, 1628; died March 29, 1711. Repentant French Dominican ex-Jansenist and editor of Anselm’s works: S. Anselmi opera omnia, necnon Eadmeri monachi Cantuar. Historia Novorum et alia opuscula, 2 vols. (Paris: 1721). This edition also comprises volumes 158 and 159 of Patrologia Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne (1854). 9 See PL 158: 241 n. 930. Elsewhere, Gerberon rejects François Pie’s claim that Robert Olkot was the author of the Liber pro Insipiente, on the grounds that Olkot was Anselm’s junior by 200 years (PL 158: 18). Reviewing the critical literature, Hick and McGill suggest that Gerberon’s evidence in selecting Gaunilo is questionable. See their The Many-Faced Argument (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2009), 7 n. 3. 8

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7. The uses and necessity of this cautious method This method is much needed if we want to procure for our knowledge of God all the truth, purity, and certainty of which it is capable in a finite but also well-trained understanding. But it is also particularly needed in the present circumstances, since some skeptical philosophers have raised difficulties against the internal and external truth of the concept of God. The apparent grounds upon which rest the objections against the internal truth of the concept of God are these:

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1. All distinguishing marks of the concept of God are negative.—From this it would certainly follow that concept of God is impossible and false.—However: a. Just because a concept contains some negative distinguishing marks does not mean straightaway that it is composed from mere negations. b. These negations concern merely the limits with which we perceive the affirmative distinguishing marks in finite things. c. Hence, they are merely apparent negations, since the negation is merely in the expression. 2. God is incomprehensible, but what is incomprehensible is also impossible and false.—However: a. If we call “incomprehensible” that about which the finite understanding cannot know everything, b. or that about which it cannot have a complete intuitive representation, then the impossibility of the concept does not follow from such incomprehensibility. c. In this sense only can God can be called incomprehensible. For, he himself can make a complete intuitive concept of his own entire essence, whereas the finite understanding can make a distinct concept of his essence insofar as is sufficient to distinguish God from finite things and his attributes from one another. Thomas Hobbes, Questions concerning liberty, necessity, and chance, against Doctor Bramhall, Bishop of Derry. First published in London (1656) . English. David Hume, Dialogues on natural Religion (1779). French: Dialogues sur la Religion naturelle. Ouvrage posthume de David Hume Ecuyer (Edinburgh: 1779), 2 vols.



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8. Outline of the following treatise10 Thus, in the first part of this preparation, namely in the theoretical part, the following sections are contained. I. On the Internal Truth of the Concept of God. II. On the External Truth. The first division of this second section will judge The a priori Proof of the External Truth or the Actuality of God In the second, the a posteriori proof. III. The third section will treat the errors that arise from the defects of religious knowledge. 1. In the first division, of Atheism, or the Denial of God. 2. In the second division, of Belief in Many Gods, or Polytheism. 3. In the third, of religious Superstition. IV. The fourth section will contain the natural history of religion. The second part will provide a practical manual for the communication of religious knowledge. I. The first section will contain its sensible communication through visions, miracles, etc. II. The second, its rational communication. 1. In the first division, through the knowledge of nature. 2. In the second division, through the instruction in universal concepts.

In the text itself, Ebehard does not closely follow this demarcation of parts, sections, and divisions.

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First Part. On the Formation of the Concept of God First Section. On the inner reality of the concept of God, or on the possibility of a most perfect being 9. Prerequisites for the proof of the possibility of a most perfect being

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If we desire to become certain of this internal reality, then we must ask: 1) Is the concept of an intellectual being, such as we apply this to God, a true concept? 2) Is the concept of an infinite being a true concept? To answer these questions, the following must be investigated: 1) Is the concept of the infinite itself a possible concept? 2) What is there in the concept of a being that possesses understanding that is compatible with that of the infinite? Johann Nikolas Tetens, professor of philosophy in Kiel, Concerning the reality of our concept of the Divinity, in Johann Andreas Cramer, Contributions towards the Advancement of Theological and other Important Fields of Knowledge. Kiel and Hamburg: Carl Ernst Bohn (1778), part two, chapter IV, 137–204 .

10. Pure realities

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The collection of all perfections is the collection of all realities. Now, it is impossible for something contradictory to arise from the combination of all realities. Realities are either pure or mixed. There is no difficulty with the former, since a reality can cancel a reality as little as a something can cancel something else. The latter, however, are those [realities] containing negations, and in this case the reality can be directly canceled in the negation that one would unify with it by putting them together. We must only separate from the concept of a finite reality all the distinguishing marks that follow from the concept of finitude. Thus, the finite understanding does not represent everything, does not represent simultaneously, and does not represent most distinctly. By contrast, the understanding having no boundaries represents everything simultaneously and most distinctly. A finite and an infinite understanding are therefore heterogeneous magnitudes with respect



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to one another, not sharing the same unit, and, generally, finite and infinite realities are like this. Hence, no metaphysically infinite reality can come to be even from infinitely many finite realities.

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11. Mixed realities In this case we must separate the negative aspect from the concept, after which we then retain something real . Regarding this real thing, one can say that it contradicts another reality as little as one can say, regarding the something , that it cancels the something, or regarding the nothing, that it cancels the nothing. Those distinguishing marks from which the negative aspect cannot be separated without cancelling the entire concept do not in the least belong to the highest being.

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12. The concept of the metaphysically infinite being The magnitude of a metaphysically infinite being is that of the being in which all perfections in the highest degree are collected together. And one such is the most perfect being that we call God. If it is to be supposed that a being encompassing the sum of all the realities of two infinite beings, or the sum of the realities of the infinite and the finite taken together, would be still greater, then one would have to show that a being could be made still greater through supplementation by the finite realities that, inasmuch as it is infinite, it already contains. 1. It is not sufficient, as some do, to attribute to God an infinite magnitude in the mathematical sense. For the infinitude of this magnitude is such only in relation to the finite understanding. The difference between mathematically and metaphysically infinite magnitudes consists namely in that the boundaries of the former are not determined through the concept of magnitude, whereas the boundaries of metaphysically infinite magnitude are not only not determined through the concept of magnitude, but rather also contradict it. 2. Hence, the metaphysically infinite cannot become greater through supplementation by a metaphysically infinite magnitude, and still less by a finite magnitude, since it already actually contains all the realities of the former, and all those of the latter eminently (per eminentiam). 3. Therefore, those err who maintain that God is only mathematically infinite,

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which is done by those who hold the concept of the metaphysically infinite not to be a true concept. See Thomas Hobbes, De cive: philosophical first principles, Chapter 15, §14 .11 Some Socinians have been blamed for this error, such as Faust Socin, Johann Crell and Conrad Vorstius. Yet, this blame appears to have been prompted by an ambiguity in the Latin word infinitus, which also means undeterminable (a)o/ristoj). Vorstius, however, quite correctly maintained that the essence of God is determinable (essentiam divinam esse finitam); we know of it certain determinations through which we can distinguish it from others.12

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To infinity, therefore, belongs 1. the collection of all perfections 2. in the absolutely highest degree. This infinitude of degree includes within itself the greatest fruitfulness of every perfection of the infinite. Therefore, every other perfection can be thought of as a consequence of every individual one. Thus, as soon as one reality is assumed in the highest degree, all of them must be assumed. 1. Hence, from any given attribute of God each of his remaining attributes can be derived. In this case, the concept of the former is taken to be the first concept in God. Now, since the essence is what is first in a thing, in God every attribute can be viewed as his essence. 2. Every attribute of God can be taken as the ground for a doctrine of natural theology. This has been done with various attributes by different philosophers. a. Wolff takes the concept of the necessary being as ground in his Natural Theology, volume one ,13 and that of the most perfect being in volume two of the same work.14 b. Sulzer takes the concept of the eternal being as his ground. Development of the Concept of the Eternal Being , in his Selected Philosophical Writings , 377.15 c. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten takes the concept of the most perfect being as ground.16 d. Immanuel Kant takes the concept of the necessary being as ground. The Only Possible Ground of Proof for a Demonstration of God’s Existence . (Königsberg: 1763).17 e. Lorenz Florenz Friedrich Crell takes the concept of independence as ground. The Infinity of the Creator of the World Proven from the Arrangement of Nature and from Ontological Grounds. (Helmstedt: 1778) .

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14. In regard to particular realities We must also investigate whether we still retain a real concept of the infinite being when we represent under determinate notions the realities that we attribute to it. This applies as much to the transcendental ones, as to those that we have abstracted from either immaterial or material things. One can without doubt attribute to the highest being those notions that have been called transcendental due to their universality. Of such kind are the concepts of substance, power, cause, effectiveness, independence. If these concepts are correctly abstracted, then they belong to the highest being in itself and not merely in an eminent way (per eminentiam). 1. Transcendental or ontological concepts are the most common and more common concepts, which therefore are contained in the simple as well as the composite, and in the necessary as well as in the contingent. They therefore contain no distinguishing marks that belong to the difference of these main genera of things. 2. Since in his ontology, Wolff did not immediately define these concepts in their highest universality, in natural theology he is forced to attribute them to the most perfect being eminently (per eminentiam).

Johann Georg Sulzer, Vermischten philosophischen Schriften (Leipzig: Weidmann und Reich, 1773), 377–88. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Metaphysica, 1st edn (Halle: C. H. Hemerde, 1739), §§803ff. 17 AA 2: 63–163. See esp. AA 2: 81ff. 15

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15. The pure abstraction of its concepts To make a concept pure, we must separate everything attached to it that stems from sensible representation or from the image of the imagination . Sensible abstraction already informs us that there is something positive in the concept, since it was first taken from a positive sensation. Therefore, that which remains afterwards when the sensible has been separated from it must necessarily be reality, i.e. something.

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1. As with other concepts (see 13, remark 2), here as well natural theology can be prepared in ontology when the concepts required in the former science are defined in the latter in a sufficiently supersensible or transcendental way that they can be employed without further preparation in natural theology. 2. Thus some, like Wolff, have defined the concept of power through the striving to act.18 The distinguishing mark of striving in this definition is left over from the abstraction of the inner sensation of the exertion of our finite power. If, therefore, the definition of power were accepted, then one could only attribute power to the highest being in an eminent way. 3. Leibniz, however, has already provided a more universal and consequently purer definition: power is the ground of actuality.19

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In the investigation into more determinate notions, we must descend as far as to the concept of the material and immaterial objects. Here we can at once note that the determinations of the former cannot be used in the concept of God; for all qualities that belong to a composite being as such directly contradict the infinite, since they exist in the composite (and what is therefore distributed among several), rather than entirely in one. For it is necessarily required by the concept of the highest perfection that one being possess everything.

Cf. Christian Wolff, Philosophia prima: sive ontologia (Frankfurt/Leipzig: Renger, 1729), §724: “power consists in the continual striving to act .” 19 He is referring to Leibniz’s doctrine of entelechies, or substantial forms, the law of the unfolding of simple substances. See, inter alia, his letters to de Volder in G. W. Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols (Berlin: 1875–90; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965), vol. 2, p. 252. Translated in G. W. Leibniz. Philosophical Essays; trans. and ed. Roger Ariew and Dan Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 176: “What I take to be the indivisible or complete monad is the substance endowed with primitive power.” See also Monodology §18 in G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. and ed. Leroy E. Loemker, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 644. See also Baumgarten 2013, §197ff. 18



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1. Thus by means of its concept, the infinite being (12) can possess no characteristics of a composite thing that belong to the latter’s co-presence or succession with others. Therefore, it cannot occupy a place, since that means being simultaneous with the whole of, or with a part of, imaginary space, and neither extension nor motion can be thought in it. 2. Excluding some Church Fathers, who have expressed themselves regarding God in too sensible of a way, those who have attributed extension to the infinite being are: a. The crass materialists, who deny the possibility of all simple substances, Thomas Hobbes, De homine, .20 Appendix to Leviathan, chapter 1 .21   The more subtle materialists, Johann Andreas Rüdiger, Divine physics, the correct middle way between superstition and atheism. Book 1, chapter 8, section 4 .22 b. The theoretical mystics, John Pordage, Divine and True Metaphysics , translated from the English by Metternich (1715).23

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17. Spatiality From this one can judge whether it can be said that God is infinitely extended, whether he is in infinite space, whether infinite space is an attribute of God, or indeed whether it is God himself. If in saying “God occupies infinite space” one Thomas Hobbes, Elementorum philosophiae. Sectio secunda. De Homine, in Opera philosophica (London: 1839), vol. 2, 1–132. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Sive de material, forma, et potestate civitatis ecclesiasticae et civilis, in Opera philosophica (London: 1841), vol. 3. The Latin edition of Leviathan contains an appendix not in the original English edition, and in the first chapter, which concerns the Nicene Creed, Hobbes claims that God is extended, or, in his words, “the substance of God exists equally in all flesh ” (vol. 3, 527–8). 22 Johann Andreas Rüdiger, Physica divina, eademque recta via inter superstitionem et atheismum media (Frankfurt am Main, 1716). 23 Eberhard may be mistaken about the book’s language since it bears a Latin title: Metaphysica Vera et Divina. (London, 1698). Our attempts to locate the 1698 edition have proven futile, but given his extensive Latin bibliography it seems likely that he wrote it in Latin. It appeared in German as Göttliche und wahre Metaphysica (Frankfurt/Leipzig, 1715). Johann Georg Theodor Graesse maintains the translation was at the hand of Lothar Bischer, but says that Metternich translated Pordage’s Sophia s. detectio coelestis sapientiae de mundo interno et externo. See J. G. T. Graesse, Handbuch der allgemeinen Literaturgeschichte aller bekannten Völker der Welt, von der ältesten bis auf die neueste Zeit, zum Selbststudium und für Vorlesungen (Leipzig: Arnoldische, 1850), vol. 4, 123 n. 5. The English preacher Pordage (1608–98) was an influential follower of Jacob Böhme. Pordage earned some very celebrated translators indeed, for none other than Turgenev went on to produce a Russian translation of his Metaphysica. 20

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only means this to signify the infinity of his actuality, or the unlimited sphere of his effectiveness, then in this most general concept there is indeed nothing left that contradicts the infinity of God, but there is also nothing left that is thought under the concept of space. 1. Some have named infinite place or space itself God. a. Some theoretical mystics, whose concepts were propagated among the Jews as a consequence of the Kabbalists. Philo, On flight and finding .24 Henry More, Handbook of metaphysics: Or, on incorporeal things (1679).25 John Raphson, Demonstration of God .26 b. Some mathematical researchers into nature, who have taken mathematical concepts over into metaphysics, David Derodon, Course on Philosophy. (Oranges: 1659) .

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2. Others have held infinite space to be an attribute of God, and in particular to be his sensorium.—However, since no determination can be thought in the infinite being that contradicts the concept of metaphysical infinity (12), and extension and spatiality are among such determinations (15), they cannot belong to God and they therefore also cannot be attributes of God. Isaac Newton, Optics, Latin translation by Samuel Clarke. (1740). 4th and most recent edition. Book III. Query 28. p. 298 .27 Samuel Clarke, in: the Digest of the various parts of philosophy, natural religion, history, mathematics, etc. concerning Messers Leibniz, Clarke, Newton, etc. (Laussane: 1759). 2 vols. First reply. .28 This representation of the infinite being cannot be improved by means of abstraction of what is imperfect, and so the expression [i.e. sensorium of God] cannot be rescued. For, since the essence of space consists in contiguous existence, contiguous existence thus cannot be separated from the concept of space (15, remark 1). However, those characteristics, whose concepts are entirely cancelled through abstraction from the imperfection they contain, cannot in the least be thought in the infinite being (10).

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18. The determinations of spirit The attributes of spirit, by contrast, are so constituted that they can be attributed to God, and indeed such that every imperfection is separated from them through abstraction. Therefore, we cannot in the least attribute to God those attributes of a spirit that are constituted such that their concepts are cancelled as soon we wish to separate from them whatever is imperfect (10); we can, however, do so with those constituted such that some perfection remains after the separation of what is imperfect, although only in regard to the remaining perfection. We must also take caution not to attribute to God whatever proceeds only from the sensible image, and which usually still adheres to our concepts after abstraction. 1. To the first kind belong forgetting, regret, and so forth. The error through which these kinds of distinguishing marks are introduced into the concept of God can only arise from the association of the ideas of external actions with judgments of the soul (an association in which the human being finds, with respect to itself, such distinguishing marks to be grounded) and the transferal of this association to God. 2. To the second kind belong the representations of the divine understanding that are fully distinct in God, but are sensible in the human being. They can therefore be thought in God if what is sensible is abstracted from them. When that does not happen, they introduce something erroneous into the concept of God. 3. From both kinds of errors arise crude concepts of God, which are This work was edited by Pierre Desmaizeaux.

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unavoidable for those whose language as yet contains only a few expressions for abstracted concepts, and who as yet also can think only a few abstract concepts. This does not, however, prevent the more practiced understanding from taking these cruder expressions in a purer sense. One must not forget this remark, if one wants to reflect on the language of Holy Scripture in such a way that it is compatible with the justice and greatest perfection of religion. – In earlier times, this was expressed through the old canon: What is said of God in a human way must be understood of God in a way that is proper to him.

19. Three kinds of determinations in God

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Therefore, what we attribute to God, we do so 1) through negation (via negationis), 2) through elevation, in an eminent way, or in an infinitely exceptional sense (via eminentiae), 3) through causality (via causalitatis). In the last-mentioned way, I infer that since certain attributes in the cause accompany the production of certain effects, such attributes must belong to the cause. This way provides what is positive in our knowledge of God, while we take the intuitive idea of these attributes from ourselves (e.g. as in the case of wisdom, which we infer from his effects) and attribute them to God after abstracting the limits and imperfections. 1. Since we obtain the intuitive concepts of the perfections of God through the inner sensation of the operations of our soul, and since the former are contained in the latter as finite perfections, we must abstract from such concepts those characteristics that belong to finitude.   Now, if these concepts are of the kind in which negations predominate, or from which we cannot abstract what is imperfect without cancelling the concepts themselves, then we must deny them of God (10). If, however, they are of the kind in which affirmations predominate, or that can have what is imperfect abstracted from them without canceling the concepts themselves, then we can affirm them of God, but only in an eminent way. 2. This last-mentioned way can be made much easier when it comes to non-sensible concepts, if the ontological and psychological concepts are immediately, in their own sciences, derived in a sufficiently general manner and thus defined in a sufficiently pure way (14, remark 1).



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20. Proofs of the external reality or the actuality of God The proofs of the external reality of God can be taken either from the concept of the metaphysically infinite or from the contingency of the world. The former are the proofs a priori; the latter, a posteriori. The proof based upon the concept of the metaphysically infinite was already attempted by some scholastic philosophers and theologians, after which it was renewed again by Descartes, and made more thorough by Leibniz. One must hence take care to present it correctly.

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1. Among the former, by Anselm of Canterbury (6, remark). 2. Descartes once again investigated this proof because he believed that a progression to infinity (progressus in infinitum), or an infinite series of mere effects, was possible. René Descartes, Letters. (Amsterdam: 1682). Part one. Letter 115. P. 369 .29 3. The warnings some make against this proof partly concern merely the way it was presented by Anselm and Descartes, and partly concern the proof itself. a. In particular, in their presentations one finds missing a preliminary proof of the possibility of a most perfect or infinite being. The reason for this is that, since the concept of such is not a concept of experience, its possibility must be given special demonstration if we want to be certain that it is not an erroneous or deceptive concept (notio deceptrix). St. Thomas30 had already noted this defect, and, after Leibniz drew attention to it,31 Wolff provided what was missing. Natural Theology, Part II §9 . In this Letter to Mesland, May 2, 1644, Descartes argues that proofs based on the supposed impossibility of the progression to infinity are incomplete until they are joined to an innate idea of God as first cause: “since my soul is finite, I cannot know if the series of causes is not infinite, unless I have in myself such an idea of the first cause ”; after all, such a progression to infinity is clearly visible “in the division of the parts of matter .” In: René Descartes, Epistolae: partim ab auctore latino sermone conscriptae partim ex Gallico translatae, in quibus omnis generis quaestiones philosophicae tractantur & explicantur plurimae difficultates, part I (Amsterdam: ex typographia Blaviana, 1682), 368–73. 30 Summa Theologica 1, Q2, Art 1. 31 See, for example: G. W. Leibniz, De summa rerum: metaphysical papers, 1675–1676, trans. and ed. G. H. R. Parkinson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992): “That a most perfect being exists ” (pp. 100–3) and “A definition of God, or, of an independent being ” (pp. 104–7). 29

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b. Some deny the inference of external actuality from internal actuality, while they maintain that the understanding can know with certainty something as actual, which yet has no objective actuality outside of the understanding. Pierre Daniel Huet, Review of the Cartesian Philosophy. (Helmstedt: 1690). Chapter 4, §5 .32 Samuel Werenfels, Judgment concerning Descartes’s argument for the existence of God begged from his idea .33 Samual Werenfels, Vindications of the judgment concerning Descartes’s argument for the existence of God against the apologetic letter on behalf of this argument and Appendix to the vindications of the judgment in his works.34 This controversy is conducted in a very animated way by Samuel Werenfels, Brillon,35 a doctor of the Sorbonne, and Desmaizeaux on the one side, and by Jacquelot36 on the other in pages of the Histoire de Ouvrages des savans and the Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres for the years 1701–3.37

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c. Some have denied that actuality is a perfection. Pierre Gassendi, Anti-Cartesian metaphysical inquiry: Or, doubts and instances against the Meditations and responses of René Descartes. Second doubt concerning Descartes’s Fifth Meditation 38 Huet was an early admirer of Descartes’ system but later fell away. See W. G. Tennemann, A Manual of the History of Philosophy, trans. Arthur Johnson (Oxford: Talboys, 1832), 347. 33 Samuel Werenfels, Iudicium de argumento Cartesii pro existentia dei, petito ab ejus idea. In Opuscula theologica, philosophica et philological (Basil: Joh. Ludovici Koenig, 1718), 645–59. 34 Vindiciae judicii de argumento Cartesii, contra epistolam apologeticam pro hoc argumento, in: Opuscula, 660–82. Concerning the second work, no such appendix seems to exist, and Eberhard’s reference to it is the only one we can find in the literature. 35 The French jurist Pierre-Jacques Brillon (1671–1736). 36 The Huguenot and controversialist Isaac Jacquelot (1647–1708). 37 Eberhard is referring to a controversy on the nature of atheism. See Alan Charles Kors, Atheism in France, 1650–1729. Volume 1: The Orthodox Sources of Disbelief (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 375. 38 Petri Gassendi, Metaphysica disquisitio anti-Cartesiana: Seu dubitationes et instantiae adversus Renati Cartesii Meditationes et responsa (Utrecht: Willem van de Water, 1691), 247ff. 32



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21. The proof itself This proof is conducted as follows: The most perfect being is possible, hence it is actual. For, actuality is a reality, and necessary actuality is the greatest actuality. Therefore, one must attribute to the most perfect being a necessary actuality. According to this proof, the understanding cannot represent the most perfect being otherwise than as actual. This is what Descartes called taking the idea of a thing from oneself, and attributing to it what is clearly and distinctly known of it. In this sense, Descartes can say that the idea of God is innate in us; for the human understanding itself forms the idea of the most perfect being through abstraction and logical composition, and attributes to it necessary actuality, because it notices that the idea of necessary actuality is contained in the idea of that being. 1. If, to facilitate the conception of a reality, we attempt to determine it through its opposite, then, since appearance is that which we perceive in a thing through confused representations, reality must be what we do not perceive in a thing merely through confused representations, and which rather is actually in it. Now, since our actuality is no mere appearance, it must be a reality. 2. This is therefore the way one should understand Descartes, when he says: the concept of the actuality of God is innate. That is to say, because we do not obtain the concept of God through the outer senses, but rather through attention to the operations of our soul combined with the abstraction and composition of the understanding, and from these concepts follows the existence of God: thus the soul can view this truth as one that it has not obtained from the outer senses, and that is therefore innate to it. Such truths and concepts Descartes also termed concepts taken from ourselves. 3. If Descartes therefore inferred God’s existence from the concept of God, then the correctness of this conclusion rests on whether the distinguishing mark of existence is contained in the concept of the most perfect being. Instances of contingent things, the actuality of which is not contained in their concept, do not therefore constitute an objection to this conclusion.

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22. Particular proof of the necessary actuality of the most perfect being Therefore, if we want to prove the actuality of the most perfect being, then we must prove that the most perfect being is also the necessary being; for it is thence also proven that the actuality of the most perfect being is a necessary actuality. A thing, however, is necessarily actual when the ground of its actuality is contained in the essence itself. Necessary actuality is therefore a reality, because it is possible as a reality together with the essence, since it is posited through the essence, and it is the greatest, since all the realities of the most perfect being are the greatest. Now, since the most perfect being must possess all perfections and indeed must do so in the highest degree, the most perfect being must be necessarily actual.

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1. The proof of the necessary actuality of the most perfect being can also be formulated as follows: If through the actuality of a possible thing some realities were not posited, then through it mere negations must be posited in the thing. It therefore remains a non-thing, which contradicts actuality. Through the actuality of the most perfect being the greatest realities are therefore posited, the collection of which constitutes the greatest reality. This actuality is necessary, because it is contained in the essence or concept of the most perfect being. 2. The proof of the objective actuality of the most perfect being can therefore be completed despite the judgment of some that the Cartesian proof does not extend so far. The proof upon which is grounded the certainty of ourselves consists of an intuitive judgment and a fundamental proposition, and therefore everything must be mathematically certain that follows from such premises. If, therefore, the objective actuality of God is derived from the same premises from which our own objective actuality follows, then it must be just as certain.—Aside from those writings noted in paragraph 20 remark 2 and in Johann Albert Fabricius’s A Selection of Arguments, chapter 10 39 the following belong here: Johannes Levinus Göden, A modest inquiry into the argument by which Descartes attempted to prove that both he and the existence of God follow a priori from the idea of a most perfect being .40 A philosophical dissertation in which it is inquired whether the existence of a necessarily existing being can be proven a priori from its idea just because it contains previously accepted attributes, written by Ane Dryfhoud to answer a question concerning the argument proposed by the most distinguished and erudite officers of the Legatum Stolpianum .41

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23. The proof a posteriori In the proof of the existence of God based upon experience (a posteriori) one begins from the contingent actuality of our souls, which one takes from both the contingency of their determinations and from the beginning of their existence. One, therefore, infers that they must have the ground of their actuality outside of them, and indeed in a necessary being, to the extent that one will not accept an infinite series of contingent causes (a rectilinear progression to infinity in the past ), which is something impossible. 1. The experience that lies at the basis of this proof is: my soul is actual. One could also take the actuality of the world in general or any of its other parts as a basis. However, since we have the greatest certainty of the actuality of our souls, which cannot be brought into doubt in the way that the actuality of things external to the soul can, it is best—also with a view to convincing the idealists and egoists—to begin with the experiential proposition that has here been taken as a ground. Johannes Levinus Göden, Modesta disquisitio argumenti, quo Cartesius, eumque secuti exsistentiam Dei a priori ex idea entis perfectissimi ac necessarii probare conati sunt (Leiden: 1768). 41 This and the previous work were prize essays written for the Legatum Stolpianum given by Leiden University; Göden’s essay won the prize in 1767. Immanuel Kant possessed a copy of the 1768 Verhandelingen, in which Dryfhoud’s contribution was published. See Ernst-Otto Onnasch. “Über das Stolpische Legat,” Schriften der Hölderlin-Gesellschaft, band 23/2: Materialien zum Bildungsgeschichtlichen Hintergrund von Hölderlin, Hegel und Schelling, ed. Michael Franz (Tübingen: Hölderlin-Gesellschaft, 2005), vol. 2, 511. Also see paragraph 23, remark 2 immediately below. Dryfhoud (1742–1827), also spelled Drijfhout, was a preacher at Weidum (1769), IJsselmonde (1771), Vlissingen (1779), and Middelburg (1781) in the Netherlands. As well, see paragraph 53, remark 3 below. 40

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2. Like the former (22, remark 2), this proof has been more closely investigated ever since the directors of the Legatum Stolpianum announced an essay competition concerning it in the year 1758. Consequently, in addition to the general works that belong to natural theology and to the doctrines concerning the existence of God, the proof has also been judged in those works occasioned by this competition. Here belong only the writings of the second and third classes, which one will find more fully referenced in: Johann Georg Walch, A selected theological library with annotations. Vol. I, p. 705 .42 To the second class belong: Samuel Clarke (1, remark 2)

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Immanuel Kant (13, remark) Johan Ernst Gunnerus, Proof of the Actuality and Uniqueness of God based on Reason. (Jena: 1748) . J. Bering, Prof. of Philosophy in Marburg, A More Thorough Proof of the Existence of God. (Giessen: 1780) . To the third class belong:

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Gottfried Arnold Maas,43 Johannes Monnickhof,44 Abraham Perrenot,45 Samuel Jordan,46 Treatises on the question whether the actuality of a Johann Georg Walch, Bibliotecha theologica selecta: Litteraris adnotationibus instructa (Jena: Sumtu Viduae Croeckerianae, 1757). 43 Maas won the 1759 prize of the Legatum Stolpianum with his “Demonstration that, from the fact that something now actually exists, a necessary, eternal, and immutable being is shown, the like of which is distinguished from this world ,” in Dissertationes Latinae et Belgicae ad Theologiam Naturalem Spectantes pro Praemio Legati Stolpiani Conscriptae, I/2 (Leiden: 1760), 1–72 44 Accessit winner of the Legatum Stolpianum. “A completely certain and concise demonstration that a necessary, eternal and immutable being, the like of which is distinct from this world, is shown from the fact that something now exists .” In Dissert. Stolpiani (1760), 73–108. 45 Accessit winner, Legatum Stolpianum. “Dissertation in which it is proven that God exists from the fact that there is something ” In Dissert. Stolpiani (1760), 109–54 46 Accessit winner, Legatum Stolpianum. “Dissertation in which it is proven that God exists from the 42



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necessary being follows from the fact that something is actual, in the Stolpianum dissertations of 1759. Adolph. Frid. Reinhard, A philosophical inquiry in which it is demonstrated that, from the fact that something exists, there is an eternal most perfect being distinct from the world. Hamburg: Schröderus (1761) . German translation by Gotthelf Hartmann Schramm (Leipzig: 1765).47

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24. The proof based upon final causes in the world There is yet another proof a posteriori, namely, the one based upon final causes . In this case one argues: If the things in the world are contiguous and follow after one another in such a way that they are mutually combined as means and ends, then they must have been so ordered by a being that possesses understanding. Now, one accepts that this combination actually exists in the world, and therefore judges that it must have a wise creator. 1. The manner in which order and perfection proceed from out of this connection of uses and ends in the universe can be determined still more precisely as follows. While the particular subordinate ends are determined through the final end of the universe, which is therefore the general end, this final end is consequently the final ground of the contiguity and succession of the larger parts of the universe, and through these are known the manner in which the smaller parts are mutually combined. 2. Just as the perfection in a work of art is determined through its end, according to which the larger parts, and consequently also the smaller parts in their turn, are ordered next to one another, we also judge the order and perfection we find in the world when we perceive general grounds through which the particular parts are determined, and when we therefore find in fact that there is something .” In Dissert. Stolpiani (1760), 155–82. 47 Adolph Friedrich Reinhold, Philosophische Untersuchung, worinnen aus dem, weil etwas ist, demonstriret wird, daß es ein vollkommenstes, ewiges, von der Welt unterschiedenes Wesen gebe, trans. Gotthelf Hartmann Schramm (Leipzig: Gollner, 1765).

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it more general and more particular laws and rules subordinated to one another.

25. Requirements for this proof It is beyond doubt that contingent things that are universally in the best combination presuppose a wise being, since wisdom is nothing other than insight into the connection of ends and means. However, here it must first be proven, 1) that such an order and combination is actually found in the world, 2) that this order is not by chance, 3) that it is not necessary.

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This order and perfection cannot be fully proven based upon experience. For, since the finite understanding has perfectly precise knowledge neither of all parts of the world, nor indeed of all the rules of perfection and what is subordinated to them, various things in this world must appear to it to be disorderly and imperfect. However, since from the visible connection among the parts of the world we can infer the invisible, and, from this, a general ground of the contiguity and succession of the parts and alterations of the world from which particular grounds may be derived, there must be order and perfection in the world. 1. This remark is required because the finite understanding cannot avoid perceiving disorder and confusion in an immeasurable whole, and indeed more so the greater and more composite this order happens to be. 2. The objection that can be made against the order and perfection of the world is already sufficiently undermined: a. If the sources of this appearance of disorder can be stated, which, since they are merely subjective, do not permit a correct inference of objective disorder. b. If the invisible order in the parts is deduced by means of a correct argument from the visible order in the whole, since without the former the latter can as little occur, as can something exist without a sufficient ground. For, the ground of the order in the whole must exist in the order that is in the parts.

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27. II. The order in the world not by chance Likewise, the order in the world cannot arise by chance.—For, the order in the states of the enduring parts of the world that we perceive through experience must be grounded in the order of the preceding states, and indeed, in such a way that the order of all succeeding states must have a ground in the preceding states all the way back to the first, extramundane ground; that is, if one does not want to accept something without any ground, or fall back into an infinite progression. 1. Even though Epicurean atheism is no longer as common in our time as it was previously, one nevertheless still finds examples of it, and thus its refutation is not entirely superfluous.48 David Hume (7, remark 2)

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2. In earlier times, when the general laws of nature were less known, it must have been easier to fall into this error. Now, however, it has entirely lost any sensible probability. Instead of this, i.e. instead of inferring merely the conditioned necessity of natural occurrences from the discovery of several laws of nature, some infer, with even more haste and from a defect in metaphysical principles, their unconditioned necessity. Hence, the fatalistic denial of God must be more common than Epicurean fatalism.

28. III. The order in the world is contingent The contingency of harmony can be easily noted by the human understanding once one becomes aware that its ground is not in the essence of what is ordered. Should it be further noted that this ground lies in a certain use, whose attainment agrees with what is ordered, and which therefore is related to the ordered as end to means, then one must ascribe the arrangement to a creator possessing understanding, who has represented to himself the end to which he has mutually combined the contingent things that exist together. 1. There are many orders that are necessary, and which are like those found in numerical series that have a law expressible in a general formula.49 – It is See Baumgarten’s preface to the third edition of his Metaphysics, and our footnote A on p. 78 (Baumgarten 2013: 77–8). 49 Eberhard is thinking here perhaps of the Leibniz-Gregory series for the calculation of π. Leibniz remarked on the immense beauty of this series in a letter to Wolff, only to add that it was no proof of design, because it, like all mathematical truths, was in his view absolutely necessary, rather than 48

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therefore a fallacy of sweeping generalization , when one holds the order in the world, without any particular proof, to be a contingent order. Christian Wolff, “On the method of demonstrating the existence of God from the order of nature.” In: Marburg leisure hours, in which the use of philosophy is applied publically and in private. (Marburg: 1730). Fall trimester, n. III .50 2. However, that the laws of order do not follow from the essence of what is ordered can be seen from the laws of motion. For: a. Any given body persists in motion or in rest until it is forced to alter its state by an external cause. b. When opposing actions are equal no motion follows. c. After such a conflict, motion follows in the direction and with the speed with which the body exerting the impact acts on the one suffering it. 3. Therefore, since the laws of motion have only a conditional necessity, while they are only necessary in connection or rest on the principle of sufficient reason, they must be unconditionally contingent.

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Adolf Friedrich von Reinhard, Metaphysical investigations into the law of movement. Translated from German by M. Formey. (Berlin: Pitra, 1764) . 4. Since the order of the universe rests on the law of gravitation, this kind of order is only conditionally necessary, and therefore unconditionally contingent, if this law is not itself unconditionally necessary. Some (Leonard Euler)51 hold it, along with all laws of motion, to be contingent. See: Leibniz, G. W., and Christian Wolff, Breifwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wolff. Edited by C. I. Gerhardt. (Halle: Schmidt, 1860), 152–3. For more on this and Wolff ’s similar use of the series as well as Kant’s rejection of its absolute necessity, see Fugate, Courtney D., “‘With a Philosophical Eye’: The Role of Mathematical Beauty in Kant’s Intellectual Development,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2015, 44, 759–88. 50 This lecture has been compiled in an omnibus edition as: Christian Wolff, De methodo exsistentiam Dei ex ordine naturae demonstrandi, in: Horæ subsecivæ Marbugenses quibus philosophia ad publicam privatamque utilitatem aptatur (Verona: Marcus Moroni, 1765), 367–73. 51 Leonhard Euler’s lively description of the unconditional necessity of gravity can be found in his popular work Letters to a German Princess, and especially in the encomium he bestowed upon Newton in letter 52 (“Discovery of universal Gravitation by Newton”). See also letters 45–54, explicitly concerning gravitation, and letters 55–68, concerning its universal effect on heavenly



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unconditionally necessary, while others (Bernoulli Comment. Petrop. Vol. I)52 hold it to be contingent, since the function du in ϕ dt = du may be greater or smaller, i.e. a body can fall more or less than fifteen feet53 in the first second.

29. Proof based upon the contingent nature of bodies There are innumerable arrangements in the world whose contingency is readily evident. Those that are necessary by virtue of higher laws are of course only conditionally necessary. That is, they are necessary insofar as they have their ground in these general laws. These general laws, however, are nothing other than consequences of the way in which the original power of bodies is limited, and it is readily evident that a finite power can be limited in more than one way. Since, however, from one established order another necessarily follows, they both must indeed be contingent in regard to actuality. 1. If we further resolve bodies into their final grounds, then the contingency of the order in the corporeal world follows from the contingent actuality of the simple parts, the contingent limitation of their power, and their contingent connection. 2. From this contingency, however, follows the actuality of the necessary being and those classes of divine perfections that can be derived from the concept of the necessary being, just as from order and perfection can be known those perfections belonging to God as the most perfect spirit.

30. Physicotheology. Teleology Those who have discovered the manifold uses of the unifying order of natural things have thus made an appreciable contribution to the knowledge of God from nature. Physicotheology is the science that bodies. Leonhard Euler, Lettres à une princesse d’Allemagne, sur différentes questions de physique et de philosophie, 2 vols. (Bern: Chez la Société Typographique, 1775), vol. 1. In English: Leonhard Euler, Letters of Euler on Different Subjects in Physics and Philosophy: Addressed to a German Princess, trans. Henry Hunter, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (London: Murray and Highley, 1802), vol. 1. 52 Daniel Bernoulli, “Test of the mechanical principles and geometrical demonstrations concerning the composition and resolution of forces,” in: Memoranda of the Imperial Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences, 14 vols. (St. Petersburg: Typis Academiae, 1726), vol. 1, 126–42 . 53 In 18th Century Halle, a foot was equivalent to approximately 288 mm. Today, an imperial foot is 304.8 mm.

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contains the principles for coming to know the existence and attributes of God from the order of nature. Since the uses to which God has ordered together the parts of the world are indeed their ends, and these ends therefore are the causes of this unified order, they are final causes. The science of final causes is teleology (experimental theology ). 1. We know a priori only the final end of the universe; we must come to know the subordinate ends through experience. The more we come to know the latter and their connection with the former, the more we learn the order and perfection of the world, and consequently the more we wonder at the wisdom and beneficence of its creator. 2. The science of physicotheology has long been known. Yet it was first provided with a name by William Derham.54 References to writings belonging here can be found in Johann Albert Fabricius’s A selection of arguments and a list of writings which preserved the truth of the Christian religion from atheists, Epicureans, deists or naturalists, idolators, Jews, and Muslims. (Hamburg: sumtu T. C. Felginer, 1725). Chapter VII . Among the ancients belong: Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Book IV, chap. 3. Galen († c. ad 201), “On the use of the parts ” in his works edited by Conrad Gesner (1562).55 [E 45]

Theophilus Protospatbarius, “The construction of the human body.” In J. A. Fabricius, Greek Library, vol. 12, 783 .56 Among the modern works that contain universal physicotheology are: Fénelon, Demonstration of the existence of God taken from the knowledge The English clergyman and natural philosopher William Derham (1657–1735). Galen, Omnia quae extant, in latinum sermonum conversa, ed. Conrad Gesner (Basel: 1562). 56 Fabricius provides a facing Latin translation of Protospatbarius’s Greek text: Jo. Alberti Fabricii, Bibliothecae Graecae. Volumen duodecimum (Hamburg: Sumtu Theodori Christophori Felgineri, 1724), 783–907. 54 55



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of nature (1712) ,57 for the first time. The folly and irrationableness of Atheism by Richard Bently (1692). Eight Boyle Lectures.—In Latin, Stultitia Et Irrationabilitas Atheismi. Octo Orationibus, Sacris, Habitis in Prælectione Instituta a Roberto Boyleo, translated by Ernst Daniel Jablonsky. (Berlin: Rüdiger, 1698).—In German: by Christoph Matthias Seidel, Hamburg (1715).—In Boyle Lectures, abridged, vol. 1.58 Bernhard van Neiwentyt, The correct use of world views. (Amsterdam: Wolters & Pauli, 1716) ;59 German translation with comments by Johann Andreas von Segner (1747).60 John Ray, The Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of Creation. (London: William Innys, 1714).—German translation by Kaspar Kalvör (1717).

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Christian Wolff, Rational thoughts on the aims of natural things. (Frankfurt and Leipzig: Renger, 1723) . William Derham, Physicotheology or a Demonstration of the being and Attributes of God from the Works of Nature. (London: William Innys, 1714). German by Joh. Alb. Fabricius (1732)61—in G. Burnet’s Boyle Lectures, abridged, vol. 4. Heinrich Sander, On the Beneficence and Wisdom of God in Nature. (Carlsruhe: Verlag der Schmiederischen Buchhandlung, 1778) . Heinrich Sander, On Nature and Religion for the One who Admires and François de Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon, Démonstration de l’existence de Dieu, tirée de la connaissance de la nature (Paris: Jacques Estienne, 1712). 58 G. Burnet, ed. Boyle Lectures. Abridged, with a general index, 4 vols (London: 1737). 59 Bernhard van Neiwentyt. Het Regt Gebruik der Werelt Beschouwingen (Amsterdam: Wolters & Pauli, 1717). 60 Bernhard van Neiwentyt. Rechter Gebrauch der Weltbetrachtung zur Erkenntniss der Mach, Weisheit, und Güte Göttes (Jena: Christian Heinrich Cuno, 1747). 61 Fabricius edited but did not translate the book: William Derham. Physico-Theologie, oder Naturleitung zu Gott, trans. Christian Ludwig Weiner (Hamburg: Christian Wilhelm Brand, 1732). 57

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Worships God. 2 vols. (Frankfurt and Leipzig: 1779/1780) . Heinrich Sander, On Foresight (also the fifth part of the book: “Nothing by Chance”). (Leibzig: Jacobäer, 1780) . Heinrich Sander, God, His Greatness, Wisdom and Beneficence from Nature. (Leipzig: Hilscher, 1780)

31. Two main classes of creatures. Their relation to each other If we want to discover God’s aims in the world, then we want to discover the causes of the union of their parts, and of the laws of their alterations. These causes are either general or particular. From the former we can gain knowledge of the arrangement and laws of the whole, whereas from the latter we can gain knowledge of the arrangement and laws of the parts. The universe contains two main classes of parts, the animate world and the inanimate world. [E 47]

If we perceive a connection of uses and ends in the world (30), and if we not only ascribe perfection to some of its parts by themselves, but rather also ascribe perfection to some because of their usefulness, then we must seek to determine which belong to unconditioned beneficence and which belong to the beneficence of utility.

32. The inanimate good, insofar as it is useful to the animate

[E 48]

The perfection of the universe consists in the harmony of its manifold in one. Its physical perfection is the harmony of its qualities, powers and parts in one end. If this end is in the thing itself, then it has an internal perfection, whereas if it is in another, then it has only an external perfection. An inanimate world has no internal perfection. The perfection of a body depends upon whether its parts and their union can be known from a certain general ground. This is contained in the uses and ends of the body, which must exist outside of it, and if one wants to arrive here finally at a sufficient ground, in a being that is



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not a body. Therefore, the composition of the inanimate world is nothing perfect in itself, and its goodness and perfection stem only from its usefulness to the animate. 1. The important proposition that the perfection of bodies must be judged from their particular uses and ends was already proven by Wolff. However, Reimarus was the first to show thoroughly and validly that these uses and ends finally exist in animate things. 2. In earlier times, the use of the corporeal world was limited to human beings. This use was extended when it was accepted that all large celestial bodies have rational inhabitants. However, difficulties still remained, which in part diminished after utilization by animate beings was recognized to be the general usefulness of the corporeal world. 3. The human being loses nothing by this, since the use of the less perfect classes of animate beings is subordinated to the use of the more perfect. Indeed, even more perfection arises through this manifoldness of uses and of their subordination in the world. 4. The modern doctrine of nature has recognized different and previously unnoticed uses as well as subordinations of these uses, and we can hope that always more such things will be discovered.

33. The determining ground of the perfection of the inanimate We nevertheless attribute a perfection to the actual inanimate world. The determining ground of its perfection must therefore exist outside of it. This ground cannot, however, be in something that is yet again inanimate, but rather must be in something animate. The aims relating to the existence and the arrangement of the inanimate world are therefore in the animate, and we must say that the world exists for use by animate things. In many cases we can discover the uses from experience. 1. There is no better way to convince ourselves of this than to compare the perfection of natural bodies and that of artificial bodies. There can be no other reason for why the eye is perfect, than there is for why the telescope is a perfect instrument. 2. This observation itself can even turn art into a means for the discovery of increasingly useful instruments, when it investigates the unified structure through which nature has achieved the same end. We have

[AA 18: 573]

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this heuristic artifice to thank for the splendid discovery of the achromatic telescope.62

[E 50]

34. The magnitude of perfection [AA 18: 574]

The perfection of the inanimate world is directly proportional to the number of living things for which it is useful, the magnitude and manifoldness of these uses, and the precision with which one use is combined with another. Therefore, the inanimate world is most perfect: 1. when it is useful for the greatest totality of living things, 2. when it is directed for the wellbeing of more perfect animate created things, 3. when these uses stand in the most perfect mutual subordination. This holds as much for the parts as for the whole, and since we discover evermore uses for the larger parts, and ever-greater extensiveness and subordination of those uses already known, and, furthermore, since in the smallest things we discover animate beings for which inanimate creation is useful: so our social pleasure, not to mention our amazement and adoration of the infinite goodness of God, must find nourishment in the enjoyment of life that is to be found in the immeasurable extension and equally immeasurable divisibility of the corporeal world.

[E 51]

35. The preservation and propagation of life Concerning the life of animate beings there is to be considered, 1) its origination and 2) its duration. Life arises with the organic body and endures as long as this endures. This duration is furthered through suitable nourishment, through which the parts that pass away are again replaced. The end of the greatest number [of living beings], and the greatest possible duration, as well as the greatest combination among them, is achieved when they mutually arise and are preserved by each other, and thus when they are combined with one another through nourishment and propagation.

[AA 18: 575]

1. These three ends cannot always be obtained at the same time, since in many cases a contradiction would arise thereby. In this case there must be an exception to the rules of perfection. If the duration of life is to be longer, Eberhard seems here to mean art in the broad sense. The problem of chromatic aberration in lenses was solved by the wine merchant and amateur naturalist Joseph Jackson Lister (1786–1869); see J. J. Lister, “On Some Properties in Achromatic Object-Glasses Applicable to the Improvement of the Microscope,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 1830, vol. 120, 187–200.

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then the number [living beings] must be smaller, and if their number is to be greater, then their duration must be shorter. 2. For some rational beings in particular, e.g. for the human being, important ends are achieved by combining animate beings through propagation, and since the destruction of their organic bodies is most intimately tied to this manner of propagation, this destruction is a means to great benefits, and is therefore no objection to the beneficence of God, particularly in the system of the continued duration of the soul after death.

[E 52]

J. J. Engel, “On the determination to death,” in: The philosopher for the world. (1775). Vol. 1 .63

36. The classes of animate beings Since matter can be brought together in infinitely many ways, there are also many kinds of animate beings and means of nourishment. We can bring the first under these main classes: 1) rational and 2) non-rational creatures. Animals can be divided into these six main classes: 1) mammals, 2) birds, 3) amphibians, 4) fish, 5) insects, and 6) worms. These six main classes comprise a great number of genera and species, not all of which are known to us.

37. Determination of the bodily structure of these classes In regard to their bodily structures, animals are partly similar to one another, and partly different, and for precisely this reason they can be brought into various divisions. The bodily structure of the various kinds harmonizes 1) with their nourishment, 2) with the element that surrounds them, 3) with the duration of life specific to their kind. Since not every part of the inanimate world could be suitable nourishment for the same animals, there had to be various kinds of animals for the various kinds of nourishment.—Since, however, in general the amount of certain kinds of nourishment is limited, the number of individual animals, as well as of kinds that enjoy the same nourishment, also had to be limited. And one kind had to be limited by another.

A dialogue. Johann Jakob Engel, “Ueber die Bestimmung zum Tode eine Unterredung,” in Der Philosoph für die Welt, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Dyckischen Buchhandlung, 1775), vol. 1, 146–80.

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38. The three main kinds of harmony between inanimate and animate beings [E 54]

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Inanimate creation therefore acts as a means for the wellbeing of animate beings 1) in general, and 2) according to their various kinds. Matter serves animate beings in three ways: 1) as the organic body, 2) as the element, 3) as nourishment. In this regard, there is again a threefold kind of harmony: 1) that of the arrangement of the body with the drives and desires of animate things, 2) that of the arrangement of the body with the element and nourishment, and 3) that of the drives with the element and nourishment. From this springs the similarity and infinite manifoldness of animate things in the world. The similarity leads us to the unity of the final end, whereas the manifoldness leads us to the number of means. 1. Because the industry and acumen of the natural historians have so greatly widened the field of physicotheology, and continue always to do so, it is becoming ever more impossible to gain an overview. Nevertheless, the complete knowledge and vivid feeling of the harmony between the animate and the inanimate in creation depends upon having such an overview. 2. Therefore, to facilitate this overview, it will be useful to classify the particular harmonic relations between the animate and the inanimate, whereby their number and difference will be more easily grasped and retained in mind, just as the extension of such knowledge will be furthered through newer discoveries by means of a simple interpolation among its main kinds. 3. To this end, the following attempt can serve: We observe in animals a precise harmony of their drives, organization, nourishment and element among one another, and with the end of preserving their life.—In specific, there is a harmony among: a. Organization and drive: 1. The organs of sense 2. The organs of locomotion, and these among themselves with the drives. b. Organization with nourishment and element: 1. The organs of locomotion 1. With nourishment 2. With the element. 2. The organs of sense with both and the organs of locomotion.



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c. Drives with the element and nourishment: 1. Desires and aversions harmonizing with the healthiness and harmfulness of nourishment 2. Harmony of the organs of sense with the organs of life.

[E 56]

39. Special physicotheology The number, shape, and position of the members that belong to life, motion, and sensation harmonize with their 1) drives, 2) element, 3) mode of nutrition, and 4) mode of propagation. From this one can therefore recognize the suitability of the kind and degree of their senses, their fineness and sharpness, as well as the suitability of the mode and degree of their mobility. The science that contains the principles for knowing the existence and attributes of God from the final causes of the special kinds of created beings is special physicotheology.

[AA 18: 577]

1. One can find the complete bibliography of special physicotheology in: Johann Georg Walch, A selected theological library with annotations. Vol. 1: 694–704 .64 Joh. Alb. Fabricius, Preface to the German translation65 of William Derham’s Astrotheology.66 2. They can be classified according to perceived uses and ends a. In regard to the elements: Johann Albert Fabricius, Hydrotheology: Or, an essay on the goodness, wisdom and the power of God, manifested in the creation of water,— French, translated by Joh. Alb. Fabricius (1734, 1741).67 Peter Ahlwardt, Brontotheology: Or rational and theological observations See paragraph 23, 2 for full reference. William Derham, Astrotheologie, oder Anweisung zu der Erkenntniss Gottes aus Betrachtung der himmlischen Körper, trans. J. A. Fabricius (Hamburg: sumtu T. C. Felginer, 1732). In paragraph 39, remark 2(a) immediately below, Eberhard indicates he uses the 1745 edition. Later editions of this translated work include Fabricius’s own Pyrotheologie. 66 William Derham, Astro-theology, Or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God: From a Survey of the Heavens (London: W. Innys, 1714). 67 Jean Albert Fabricius, Théologie de l’eau, ou, Essai sur la bonté, la sagesse et la puissance de Dieu, manifestées dans la creation de l’eau, trans. Jean Albert Fabricius (The Hague: Pierre Paupie, 1741). This is a translation of his own: Johann Albertus Fabricius. Hydrotheologie oder Versuch durch aufmerksame Betrachtung der Wasser die Menschen zur Liebe und Bewunderung ihres Schöpfers zu ermuntern (Hamburg: König & Richter, 1734; 1st edn, 1730). 64 65

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on lightning and thunder (1746) .68 Johann Albert Fabricius, Pyrotheology: Or, an attempt to inflame humans with love and admiration for their kindest, wisest, and most powerful Creator, after his Hydrotheology .69 Friedrich Christian Lesser, Lithotheology: i.e. a natural history and spiritual reflection on stone. Preface by Johann Albert Fabricius (1735) .70 b. In regard to the arrangement of the large celestial bodies: William Derham’s Astrotheology (1714). German by Fabricius (1745). c. In regard to animals, i. In general: Hermann Samuel Reimarus, General thoughts on the drives of animals, and in particular regarding their artificial drive for knowledge of the connection of the world, the creator and ourselves. (Hamburg: Johann Carl Bohn, 1760). 2nd edn (1762) . Hermann Samuel Reimarus, Preliminary Thoughts on the Particular Kinds of Artificial Drives, from his posthumous manuscript, edited and accompanied by some remarks and an appendix On the Nature of Zoophytes by Johann Albert. Heinrich Reimarus. (Hamburg: Johann Carl Bohn, 1773) . A Philosophical Survey of the Animal, from the English. (Leipzig: 1769). .71 J. J. Engels, “The Hawk. A Dialogue Concerning the Introduction of Predators into Nature.” In: The philosopher for the world. Vol. 2: 20–39. p. 24 . ii. In particular. Insects: Jan Swammerdam, Bible of Nature: Or, the history of insects rendered into fixed classes, ed. Hermann Boerhave (1736) .72 Friedrich Christian Lesser, Insecto-theology: Or, a rational and agreeable attempt concerning how a person could obtain lively knowledge and admiration of the omnipotence, wisdom, goodness, and justice of the great God through close attention to insects, which are otherwise little honored. 2 vols (1738)—French, with annotations by Pierre Lyonnet .73 Pierre Lyonnet, Anatomical treatise on the willow caterpillar (1762) .74 Eberhard does not provide an author or translator: John Bruckner. Philosophische Betrachtung über die thierische Schöpfung, aus dem Englischen, trans. Christian Garve (Leipzig: Dyckischen Buchhandlung, 1769). This is a translation of John Bruckner, A Philosophical Survey of the Animal Creation: An Essay (London: Johnson & Payne, 1768). The English was itself translated from John Bruckner, Théorie du système animal (Leiden: Chez Jean Luzac, 1767). 72 Jan Swammerdam, Biblia naturae: sive historia insectorum, in classes certas redacta / Bybel der nature: of historie der insecten, tot zeekere zoorten gebracht, Latin trans. by Hieronimus David Gaubius, ed. Hermann Boerhaave (Leiden: Isaak Severinus, Boudewyn and Pieter vander Aa, 1736). Latin and Dutch. 73 Friedrich Christian Lesser, Insecto-Theologia, Oder: Vernunfft- und Schrifftmäßiger Versuch, Wie ein Mensch durch aufmercksame Betrachtung derer sonst wenig geachteten Insecten Zu lebendiger Erkänntniß und Bewunderung der Allmacht, Weißheit, der Güte und Gerechtigkeit des grossen Gottes gelangen könne, 2 vols, 2nd exp. edn (Frankfurt: Blochberger, 1740, 1st edn 1738). French translation: Friedrich Christian Lesser. Theologie des insectes, ou demonstration des perfections de Dieu dans tout ce qui concerne les insects, trans. Pierre Lyonnet, 2 vols (The Hague: Chez Jean Swart, 1742). 74 Pierre Lyonnet, Traité anatomique de la chenille, qui ronge le bois de saule (The Hague: Pierre De Hondt, 1760). 71

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3. To the latter can yet be added: Schirach’s Melitto-theology,75 Rathlef ’s Acrido-theology,76 Lesser’s Petinotheology,77 and so forth. 4. Some of these works are certainly already ripe for significant improvement through the extension of natural science. In the meantime, they can always serve as guides as to how we can also use our increased and improved knowledge of nature for the glorification of God.

40. The use of these theological reflections on nature Should this mode of proof 1) not always have the highest degree of validity, 2) not have it for all, 3) and often be incorrectly applied, it still has the undeniable use of 1) being the easiest, 2) being moving, 3) being combined with pleasure, 4) being suited to a religious way of thinking and sensing. Thus the physicotheologians can indeed be rescued from the accusations made by those who have discarded the whole of physicotheology, particularly when it is employed with the appropriate caution (28, remark 1). Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Essay on Cosmology. (Leiden: Luzac, 1751). Preface .

41. Its determinations [E 60]

Whatever this mode of proof lacks in distinct rigor, it makes up for 1) in sensible evidence, 2) and in a conviction arising not from its individual parts but from the greater collection of several final causes. Its deficiency is always lessened through the increasingly correct insight into the series of efficient causes. It

Adam Gottlob Schirach, Melittotheology: The glorification of the glorious creator from the wonderful bee (Dresden: Waltherischen, 1767). 76 Ernst Ludwig Rathlef, Acrido-theology, or historical and theological considerations of the grasshopper (Hannover: Johann Christoph Richter, 1748). 77 Eberhard mistakenly attributes this book to Lesser. Johann Heinrich Zorn, Petino-theology: Or, the attempt to cheer people into admiration, love, and worship of their most-powerful, wise, and good creator through closer consideration of the bird , 2 vols (Pappenheim: Christian Rau, 1742). 75



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follows that this mode of proof is best suited to public religious instruction and the education of children in religious sensitivity.

42. The proof based upon the consensus of peoples The proof of the existence of God based upon the consensus of peoples has too many difficulties to be able to be employed with certainty. For: 1) it is entangled in the historical investigations that belong to the proof of the minor premise, 2) the major premise is also disputed, because among many peoples the knowledge of God is mixed with errors and superstition. It can only be used to draw attention to the harmony of religion with the laws of the power of thought, and of the growth of religious knowledge with the development of the understanding, and in this form it can be employed in common discourse for the production of sensible conviction.

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1. The validity of this proof has been disputed from time immemorial. Since Cicero in his philosophical works allows the philosophers of different schools to dispute with one another, one can as soon find instances that speak for this general harmony as one can find against it. Cicero, On the nature of the gods. Book 1, Chapters 17–23 .78 2. Among the modern authors, P. Bayle79 and J. Locke (Essay on the Human Understanding, book I, ch. 4)80 have most forcefully contested this universality, both from different motives.

Section II. On the Errors that Oppose the True Religion 43. The chief errors in religion Errors in the knowledge of God concern either his existence, or his essence and his attributes. The error that is possible with regard to God’s existence consists in one’s denying what must rather be affirmed; and this error is called In these chapters, Cicero appeals to the consensus gentium, that is, the universal human belief in the gods. To choose but one instance, Pierre Bayle points out the existence of atheistic peoples in his Continuation des pensées diverses, écrites à un docteur de Sorbonne, à l’occasion de la comete (Amsterdam: Uytwerf, 1722), §26. 80 John Locke, Essay on Human Understanding (London: 1689). In book 1, Chapter 4, Locke famously denies the innate ideas, and with that, the innate idea of God, and gives examples of peoples without gods. 78

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atheism or the denial of God. Errors regarding the attributes of God can be called superstition, broadly understood. Error with regard to the unity81 of God is polytheism,82 while error with regard to the remaining attributes is superstition, narrowly understood. Polytheism thus belongs to superstition in the broad sense insofar as we understand by the latter every error that does not concern the existence of God, but rather the manner of his actuality.

First Division. On Atheism 44. The possibility and actuality of the denial of God Atheism is the error of those who deny the existence of God. Since error is false knowledge that appears to us to be true, and since it is possible, due to the finitude of the human understanding, for false knowledge to appear to be true, error in general and so also atheism is possible and by means of experience [we can see that it is] actual in a few.

[AA 18: 581]

1. Those who have brought into question or even denied the possibility and actuality of the denial of God have been moved to this view through their respect for religion, since they believed that a truth a. is that much more certain when it is known by everyone, b. God’s actuality can be proven through universal agreement, (42) c. that this agreement rests on an innate clear concept or a universal perception of it. 2. However, a truth loses nothing of its certainty when it is denied by a few who have not improved their understanding to the point of knowing the grounds of this truth. If it is to become clear and distinct, however, the concept of God certainly requires this improvement of the understanding, even if it is innate in us (42, remark 2). Jenkin Thomas Phillips. History of Atheism, briefly recounted with a Preface by Christian Gotlieb Schwartz. (Altdorf: Kohlesium, 1713) .

Eberhard glosses “Einheit” with “Unicitaet,” which both translate as “unity.” Eberhard glosses “Vielgötterey” with “Polytheismus,” which both translate as “polytheism.”

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Johann Franz Buddeus. Theological Theses on Atheism and Superstition. (Jena: 1716) .83 German. 1717.

[E 64]

Jacob Friedrich Reimmann. Universal History of Atheism and of those falsely and correctly suspected of atheism. (Hildesheim: Ludolphum Schroeder, 1725) .

45. A more precise determination of the concept of the denial of God Since the atheist denies the existence of God: one is not an atheist, 1) who does not know the existence of God, or 2) who merely doubts it. Whoever does not know something at all, or at least has no distinct representation, can neither affirm it nor deny it. Now, it is possible for a person to have no representation of God at all, at least no distinct representation, and it is therefore possible for a person simply to not know the existence of God. Some call such a person a negative atheist, and those who deny the existence of God they call a positive atheist. 1. One indeed usually refers to all who do not affirm the existence of God under the general name of the atheists. However, one can also fail to affirm the actuality of a thing, simply because one does not have a concept of it. 2. To these negative atheists must thus be accounted those who are born deaf and dumb, those people who are raised among the wild animals, and peoples that still live in the state of the most remote wildness and deepest stupidity (44, remark 2). 3. There can be some among those who doubt who find no more ground for affirming the existence of God than for denying it. These can be called indifferentists.

46. The general internal sources of the denial of God The existence of God is proven, 1) from consideration of the world, which Ioan. Grancisci Buddei, Theses theologicae de atheismo et superstitione (Ienae: Ioan. Felic. Bielckium, 1717).

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requires a creator due to its contingency, 2) from consideration of the human soul, whose perfections we attribute in the highest degree to the most perfect being. Now, it is possible for a person to reflect neither upon the world in order to perceive its contingency, nor upon their own soul in order to form the concept of the most perfect being from the distinct concept of perfections. These general internal sources can in turn have particular internal and external grounds. To the internal belong a much higher degree of stupidity, licentiousness, or at least thoughtlessness, a shallow knowledge of nature, and vanity, through which one’s attention is directed more to the difficulties than to the grounds of religion. To the external belong a crude way of living, the refinement and debauchery of the age, and the public corruption of morals.

47. Of doubt

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Doubt is the state of the soul in which someone would give his approval to one side of a contradiction, without knowing the side to which he must give it, whether the affirmative or the negative. The cause of doubt is thus the representation of the insufficiency of the grounds on both sides of the contradiction, whether they be equal, or whether they are stronger or greater in number on one side, which provides the basis for the difference in the degree of probability. In the state of uncertainty we are missing the sufficient grounds of truth for holding a proposition to be true or to be false. More precisely, one could call the state of doubt that in which a person knows of just as many grounds for the truth of a proposition as for its falsity.

48. The practical denier of God Knowledge of the perfections of God should not be unfruitful knowledge, but should much rather have a moral influence on our actions. Knowledge has a moral influence on our actions when it becomes the motives of our actions. Taking the motives of one’s actions from the perfections of God is called serving God. One fearful of God takes the motives of his actions from religion. An atheist can take these from atheism. However, whoever takes the motives for his customary actions from the denial of the existence of God is a practical atheist, and his error is practical atheism.



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1. Since the laws of nature are also obligatory84 for the denier of God, it is not necessary for a theoretical denier of God to act contrary to his natural obligation. 2. However, since religion supplements and strengthens natural obligation, a theoretical denier of God can fail to observe certain laws of nature because of this denial, in which case he is first a practical denier of God. 3. The term practical denier of God is often taken in a broader sense, under which is also understood everyone who indeed knows religion but lives as a practical denier of God.

[E 68]

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49. The more refined denial of God Whoever knows the actuality of God, knows the actuality of the most perfect being of all. The world is not the most perfect being of all (12, remark 1.2); such a person knows therefore the actuality of a being distinct from the world. So whoever calls 1) the world itself, or 2) its parts, or 3) its powers God, is a denier of God. 1. This kind of more refined denial of God is as old as philosophy; for there have always been philosophers who have given the name God either to the world, or to some general part of it, such as air, fire, and so forth, or to some general power, such as the power of motion. 2. Among the modern philosophers, Benedict Spinoza belongs to the first kind, which some have called pantheism. B. d. S. Posthumous Works (1677) . And indeed in the Ethics demonstrated geometically, divided into five parts . German: B. v. S. Ethics, refuted by the famous philosopher of our time, Mr. Christian Wolff. Translated from the Latin (by Joh. Lorenz Schmidt). (Frankfurt and Leipzig: 1744). Among the most recent: System of nature by M. de Mirabeau, 2 vols. (London: 1770) .

Lit. “binding.” The interpretation of the laws of nature as expressing “obligations,” which may seem somewhat strange to the contemporary reader, has its proximate basis in Christian Wolff ’s Universal Practical Philosophy. See Christian Wolff, Philosophia Practica Universalis, 2 vols (Halle: 1744), esp. part 1, Ch. 2, and §129.

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3. To the third kind: On Man, his Intellectual Faculties and his Education. Posthumous work of Monsieur Helvétius. 2 vols (London: 1773), “The one who says movement is God is an atheist the least of all,” Book 1, p. 397 .

50. Refutation of the denial of God [E 70]

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Whoever denies the actuality of God must either 1) deny the possibility of a most perfect being, or 2) hold the world to be the most perfect being. Now, however, 1) the possibility of a most perfect being (9–11) and 2) the contingency of the world (23) have been proven; theoretical atheism is therefore an error.—Since God is the creator of the world, who has brought about the world for his glorification, and since, further, a being with understanding glorifies God when it adopts the motives of its actions from the attributes of God, it therefore cannot adopt the motives of its actions from the opposite, and practical atheism is an error. 1. In order to be convinced of the falsity of the more refined atheism in particular, one must form a determinate concept of the infinity of the most-perfect being (12, remark 1). 2. Aside from the older refutations of the denial of God in Johann Albert Fabricius, A Selection of Arguments and a Syllabus of Writings that Preserve the Truth of the Christian Religion, Chapter XII ,85 in particular that of B. Spinoza,    Ibid., Chapter XIII, 357, there belongs here the quite recent works occasioned by the System of Nature (50, remark 2). Observations on the Book Entitled “System of Nature,” by Johann von Castillon, (Berlin: Decker: 1771) . Philosophical Reflections on the System of Nature. By Georg Jonathan von Holland, (Paris: 1772) . German: Mr. Holland’s Philosophical Reflections on the System of Nature, translated from the French by J. L. Wetzel. (Bern: 1772). 2 parts. and by David Hume (7, remark 2) Letters to a philosophical Unbeliever containing an Examination of the principal Objections to the Doctrines of Natural Religion, and especially those contained in the Writings of Mr. Hume. By Joseph Priestley. (London: 1780).

51. Causes of the denial of God The causes of atheism can be 1) in the faculty of knowledge, 2) in the appetitive faculty. In the former there are either the 1) universal causes that atheism has in common with all errors, or 2) particular ones. The particular are 1) either incomplete concepts of God, the most perfect being, substantiality and perfection, or 2) of the world and its parts. The appetitive faculty has no immediate influence on the knowledge of truth or on conviction, but it does indeed have a mediated one (46, remark). This is found in an inclination to direct our attention more toward the doubts opposing the actuality of God, rather than toward the grounds supporting it. 1. The preliminary causes in the understanding are thus both ontological and cosmological errors. 2. There can therefore be no justified prejudice brought against religion if people extensively acquainted with other parts of learning have not been able to raise themselves to knowledge of the actuality of God. For, philosophical knowledge of God depends in particular on the correct ontological and cosmological concepts. Hence, if they have not concerned themselves with these sciences, then the errors in these must also entail errors in natural theology.

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52. The external causes Since our actual knowledge also has external contingent causes, our actual knowledge of God must also have the same. It is therefore possible for such knowledge to not be promoted by external circumstances, or indeed to be prevented by them. Precisely these circumstances are then the external causes of atheism. To these belong 1) the deficiency of an alternative instruction in

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natural theology, 2) the prevention of one’s own reflection regarding natural theology, 3) the visible corruption of the public religion through superstition, whereby the true propositions of religion are also rendered suspicious to the inexperienced.

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1. These in particular must be added still to those only touched upon above (46, remark), because they even more precisely state the means by which the denial of God can be prevented and the true knowledge of God promoted. 2. The second source clarifies for us in particular the disconcerting appearance in history that the most deniers of God arise precisely at the time when the sciences are being restored and when there exists the greatest abundance of public religious institutions, and that of these, most are found in those lands where public religion is most strongly upheld.—In both cases it is possible for there to be some who have sufficiently improved their understanding so that they can recognize the errors and misuses of public religion, but because they are however denied free investigation, they lack the opportunity for clarifying the concepts proper to natural theology (51, remarks 1, 2).

Section III. Second Division. On Polytheism 53. Introduction to the perfections of God

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To the knowledge of God also belongs the knowledge of his attributes. To these belong 1) those that belong to him insofar as he is the necessary being, 2) those that belong to him insofar as he is the most perfect being. The former can be called the non-moral, the latter the moral attributes. The attributes of God can be further divided into those by means of which he contains the proximal ground of the actuality of the world, and those by virtue of which he does not contain the proximal ground of the actuality of the world. The latter are the inactive attributes of God (attributa quiescentia); the former, the active attributes of God (attributa operativa). 1. This designation of the divine perfections, which are merely aids and ways of representing for the finite understanding of the human being, rest on the chief concept of God (13) from which they are derived. Since, however, there is the most exact connection between all the perfections of God, and thus from each of these all those remaining can be derived



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(13, remark 1), these distinctions can only rest on the closer or further connection in which the one kind of divine perfection stands in the human understanding to the assumed chief concept of the necessary being. 2. The perfections that immediately follow from the concept of the necessary being (self-subsistence (aseitas), independence, eternality, inalterability) make up the first class. Infinity, unity, simplicity, activity, spirituality and beatitude make up the second class. 3. A more precise development of these concepts was likewise occasioned by a prize question86 of the curators of the Legatum Stolpianum87 in the year 1762. “A treatise on the attributes that necessarily result from the existence of a necessary being, by Frederik Witteveen. To which three treatises have been the first being by Johan Hendrik de Ruyter.” (Leiden: 1764) .88 4. From among these attributes of God, one can distinguish those in particular that belong to his power, and to the power of a spirit, and which can be known more closely from his works. In Dutch, the question runs: “What are the attributes that result necessarily from the existence of a necessary being? .” The Latin version is slightly different: “What are those attributes that result necessarily from the existence of a necessary, three-fold, immutable, and extra-mundane being? ,” which seems to undermine its characterization as a question concerning natural theology. It attracted twelve submissions. See J. J. Fehr and A. Bouwman, Legatum Stolpianum: History and Archives of the Leiden Prize Competitions in Natural Theology and Moral Pphilosophy, 1754–2004 (Leiden: Leiden University Library, 2004), p. 246. 87 See the note in section 23 above. 88 Eberhard understandably abbreviates this Dutch greatly, and wrongly transcribes dewelke as de welke. According to the foundation’s practice, the book, however, was actually published under a Latin title, which naturally reflects the Latin version of the question: “A Treatise in Dutch by Frederik Witteveen, Minister of the Divine Word in Haskerhorne and Oldehassche, on the attributes that necessarily result from the existence of a necessary, three-fold, immutable, and extra-mundane being, having been given the prize of the Legatum Stolpianum on October 13, 1763: three dissertations concerning the same theme are added. The first is written by Johan Hendrik de Ruyter in Dutch, and the others are anonymous, the one in Dutch, and the other in Latin,” (Leiden: Sam. and Joh. Luchtmans, 1764) .” The anonymous accessit winners were A. Perrenot and J. D. Titius. See Fehr and Bouwman, Legatum Stolpianum, 246. 86

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54. Proof of the unity of God The first predicate that we must attribute to God, if we have correct knowledge of him, is his unity. The chief proof of the unity of God rests 1) on the concept of the highest perfection, which one cannot admit to being several, 2) on the connection in the realm of truths, 3) on the unity of the world. Besides these, there are some weaker [proofs], which can be employed at most as secondary proofs .

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1. There cannot be more than one infinite being. For, if there were two, then one could be distinguished from the other by nothing,—which would go against the principle of indiscernibles ,—or the one must contain a determination that the other lacks, which would be contrary to the concept of the infinite. 2. If we think of God as the most perfect spirit, then we must attribute to him the most distinct knowledge of the connection of truths. Now, since all truths are connected with one another, for him to know even one perfectly distinctly, he must know all. Consequently, the infinite understanding can in turn be admitted only once, because another could then be distinguished from the first through no representation. 3. Already according to the principle of sufficient ground we may not admit more than one infinite being as the cause of the world, since this same being is sufficient for the ground of the actuality of the world.— 4. The proof can also be carried out from the relation of God to the world: If the greatest internal and external possibility belongs to the infinite being, then due to the latter it must be the ground of the actuality of all contingent actual realities, and therefore there can only be one. Joh. Ernst Gunnerus (23, remark 2) Treatise on the Unity of the Divine Being with a Preface by H. Prof. Gottfr. Plouquet. (Tübingen: 1778). Essay on a New Strict Proof of the Unity of God in Joh. Gottl. Töllner’s Short collected writings. (1767). First collection. (1766). .



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Arist, a Philosophical Dialogue Concerning the Unity of God in Johann Andreas Cramer’s Papers. (9, remark) Second part, n. 1, 1. Essay on a Metaphysical Proof of the Uniqueness of God. Ibid. N. 2, 68. . The Uniqueness of God Examined from Several Points of View and Even Borne Out by the Testimony of Heathens by Justus Christian Hennings. (Altenburg: 1779). .

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55. Polytheism. Heathenism The error in the knowledge of God that concerns his unity is polytheism. Because, aside from the Jews, this error is held to be universal in the public religions of the peoples of the ancient world, who are called heathens according to Luther’s translation of the Bible, this error is also called heathenism (gentilism). This error is more difficult to avoid than is atheism, since, apart from the many things that must be known in advance, including the knowledge of the actuality of God, there are also the concepts of agreement and difference, and the truth of the universal connection in the world. 1. The word “heathen,” just like the word “barbarian” and many others, was originally a term of indifference, and meant just as much as “people.” However, since Luther’s translation of the Bible, which used it to signify the non-Jews and the non-Christians, it took on a pejorative meaning because all the peoples known to the Jews and the first Christians had a polytheistic public religion. 2. If this way of determining the meaning of the word agrees with the biblical and theological use of speech, then the given definition is correct.—It is strange that the determination of the essence of heathenism has met with so many difficulties, since one only has to look at what distinguished the Jewish religion from the other contemporary public religions known to

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the Jews.—Reusch defines it as error in the knowledge of God .89 Most correct is Ribov’s90 definition: The error concerning the dependence of all things on many gods, or with respect to [God’s] existence, or with respect to [God’s] governance .

56. The character of heathenism

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In the controversy over the heathen religions, 1) the public religion must be distinguished from the opinions of individual philosophers, 2) and the public religion must not be made [out to be] too perfect, or too imperfect. The former is done by those who also attribute to the public religion of the ancient peoples a more perfect knowledge of a single highest God; whereas the latter is done by those who entirely deny this of them and indeed also of all individual enlightened persons. It is safest to 1) admit that many heathen peoples know of a highest God aside from several subordinate divinities, 2) that they think of this being as material, 3) that they have, however, nevertheless combined materiality with his unity.—In the same way, one must correctly assess the significance of polytheism. 1. The Church Fathers themselves present the public religions of the most ancient heathen peoples in too partial of a light with the aim of converting their contemporaries that much more easily to the doctrine of Christianity— to these belong Justin Martyr, Clemens of Alexandria, Athenagoras,—or also to show that the concept of a single God is innate to the human being, to which one can count Tertullian, Arnobius and Minutius Felix. 2. Among the more recent philosophers who present them too favorably: Ralph Cudworth, Intellectual System of this Universe, or On the True Nature of Things. Translated from English by Johann Lorenz Mosheim. (Leiden: 1776) .91 Johann Peter Rausch. See his Systema Metaphysicum, §1092. Eberhard incorrectly locates this as §1093 in his Neue Apologie des Sokrates oder Untersuchung der Lehre von der Seligkeit der Heiden, 2nd and improved edition, 2 vols. (Frankfurt and Leipzig: 1737), vol. 1, 158. 90 Georg Heinrich Ribov, whose definition Eberhard also cites in his Neue Apologie des Sokrates. Here he also fails to locate the citation. 91 Radulphi Cudworthi systema intellectualis hujus universi seu de veris naturae rerum. Mosheim’s translation first appeared in 1733 in Jena; the Leiden edition, which Eberhard cites, actually came 89



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Hugo de Groot, On the Truth of the Christian Religion. Book 1, Chapter 1 .92 Herbert, Baron of Cherbury, On the Religions of the Gentiles. Chapters 13 and 14. .93 And those as too imperfect: Sam. Parker (1, remark 2), and Bayle, Continuation of the Various Thoughts, written to a Doctor of the Sorbonne, on the Occasion of a Comet which appeared in the month of December 1680. ,94 but with different motives.

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Section IV. Third Division. On Superstition 57. Definition and kinds of superstition The errors that stand opposed to the correct knowledge of the divine attributes are comprehended under the general name of theoretical superstition. Our knowledge of the divine attributes is connected to our service of God 95 and our assessment of the way God operates in the world. Hence in regard to these several errors are possible, which are based upon an erroneous knowledge of the divine attributes. The errors that concern the service of God are religious superstition, which, insofar as it influences our free actions, comprehends practical superstition within itself, whereas errors that concern his manner of operating in the world are physical superstition.—Since polytheism contains errors that stand opposed to the true knowledge of the essence and attributes of God, it belongs to superstition. 1. Since there is true knowledge of God (10, 11), only one who holds all knowledge of God to be false, or the denier of God (43), can call all religion superstition, and thus hold religion and superstition to be synonymous (Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, I: 64 96), a confusion of concepts to which the poor character of public religion can and, according to history, often also has greatly contributed (51, remark 2). 2. Physical superstition is closely connected with religious superstition; for, since physical superstition arises from an ignorance of the true ways in which God operates in the world through intermediate causes, it must admit extramundane causes of events in the world, whether these be immediate effects of God himself, or of finite extramundane beings. 3. Physical superstition is therefore very detrimental, since it neglects the true means to happiness, and takes its refuge in false means, in particular those that belong to religious superstition, such as magic, prophesy, and divination.

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Plutarch, On Superstition . Vol. 6 of Works , edited by Reiskii. Vol. 6.—German: in the Selected Moral Works of Plutarch in the third volume. (Zurich: 1773).—French in the Essay d’une Traduction nouvelle des Ouvres morales Plutarque. (Berlin: 1767). Anthony van Dale. Dissertations on the origin and progress of idolatry and superstition: on true and false prophecy, such as on the idolatrous divinations of the Jews. (Amsterdam: 1696) . Joh. Franc. Buddeaus (44, remark 2).

58. A more precise determination of the concept. Error in regard to the moral perfections of God

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The general ground of religious and physical superstition are the errors that oppose the correct knowledge of the attributes of God. Now, since the knowledge of some of God’s attributes is a proximal ground of our actions and judgments about the events of the world, and the knowledge of others, however, is a more remote ground (53, remark 1), the errors that oppose correct knowledge of the former belong more to superstition than those that oppose correct knowledge of the latter. Since, further, the moral and active attributes of God, according to our manner of knowing, are the proximal grounds of our actions and of God’s De natura rerum. In I: 62–79, Lucretius delights in the destruction of religion as superstition through the bravery of Greek science.

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effects in the world (53, remark 1), the errors that oppose correct knowledge of the moral perfections of God also belong in the same sense to superstition.

59. The wisdom, beneficence and righteousness of God The attributes of God that, according to our manner of representation, are the proximal grounds of the determination of our wills and of God’s effects in the world, are 1) the active, therefore his omnipotence, and 2) the moral, therefore those that belong to his most perfect understanding and to his best will, therefore his highest wisdom, beneficence, righteousness, and moral constancy . Whoever does not attribute wisdom and beneficence to God, or does not do so supremely, thinks only of God’s omnipotence; for otherwise such a person would not even think of God as a substance, or attribute to him a power. Such a person errs and his error is theoretical superstition. 1. Knowledge of the wisdom of God promotes knowledge of connection within the world: of the connection of the efficient causes and effects, of means and ends—thus of the conjunction of the parts of the world through both manners of reciprocal relations, of their effects from their natures thus according to particular rules, and thus in a particular order. 2. This knowledge presupposes many and manifold insights, and for this reason it is not surprising that an inexperienced faculty of reason is superstitious. Nevertheless, some knowledge of the order in the world can lead to the natural assumption of a universal order, since we are thereby protected against the fallacy of thinking that anything whose natural laws we cannot perceive does not follow according to any law, and convinces us that the wisdom of God proceeds in those unknown and incomprehensible parts of the world according to precisely the same rules of order that we perceive in the known and comprehensible parts, and to this extent are known and comprehensible.

60. Superstition is the most imperfect knowledge of God Power, to the extent that it is sufficient for effecting something, is potency , and that which is sufficient for effecting everything possible is omnipotence .—Whoever holds the world and its parts to be effects must believe that it has been brought about by a power apart from the world, thus that

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there is an extramundane substance that possesses potency. In order to feel the potency of God, it is hence enough to experience the actuality of the effects in the world, and to perceive in a confused way their contingency.

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1. Thus, since those who know only of God’s potency do not have a perfect knowledge of him—as to this also belongs the knowledge of his other perfections—this knowledge is imperfect, and to the extent that not having all perfections contradicts the concept of the most perfect being, it is also false. 2. Extremely palpable natural events, such as thunder, heavy gales and floods, can easily come to be ascribed to a potent being by inexperienced reason. Since they occur seldom, it is easy for inexperienced reason to feel their contingency, and to thus know that they must be effects. However, since it does not know the natural causes of these things, it holds them to be supernatural effects, and indeed, due to its ignorance of their good purposes, which is the reason they are interwoven into the connection of things, it holds them to be supernatural effects of an entirely or partly evil being.

61. Refutation of physical superstition God works rather according to the rules of the highest wisdom. Now, since it accords with these rules that everything in the world is as connected as possible, the events in the world follow as naturally as is allowed by the law of the best.97 The events in the world may thus be explained: The events in the corporeal world from the mechanism of bodies, and the events in the spiritual world from the laws of the power of representation. Whoever therefore explains the natural events in the world from the immediate influence of God or potent finite and, in particular, malevolent beings, is superstitious and errs (57).

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1. Through superstition , all unusual and inexplicable natural events are held to be immediate effects of God. Hence, when observed in large heavenly bodies and the greater parts of the earth, they have given occasion to astrology and divination; in the bodies of animals, to different kinds of prophesy; and in the human being, to suspicions of witchcraft. 2. This expectation of immediate influence is detrimental in particular to the judgment of the understanding and the decisions of the will. For when we believe something to be an immediate divine effect that is really an excess Cf. Baumgarten 2013: § 482.

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of the imagination, this brings about an adverse corruption of the natural conscience and can indeed produce wickedness.

62. Refutation of religious superstition By virtue of his highest beneficence, God is inclined to make the human being perfect in a higher degree. Therefore, the fear of the superstitious is a fear without love, and so it is servile fear. God does this [i.e. perfects the human being] 1) by means of obligation through natural laws, 2) and also through those obligations that belong to religion. So he commands us only to those actions whose motives are found in the nature of things; and no action is a part of religion except insofar as it is grounded in a correct knowledge of the divine perfections, and so also in his beneficence, and accords with the natural law. Consequently, 3) every religious action that does not accord with the laws of nature, or is indeed contrary to it, belongs to religious and practical superstition.

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1. The proposition here proven is of the greatest importance for the necessary determination of religion to the happiness of the human being. 2. If the proposition is incontrovertibly certain that: 1) natural law makes human beings happy, and 2) God is most beneficent, and thus can obligate human beings to nothing contrary to their happiness, then God cannot obligate human beings to something contrary to the natural law through supernatural revealed religion, and so every supernatural revealed religion can and must be tested by the natural law, and whatever is to be true in such religion must agree with such law.

63. The general sources of superstition Physical superstition arises from ignorance of the natural causes of the events in the world, and from the false premise: that of which I do not know the natural causes has none.—Since religious superstition rests on an erroneous knowledge of the divine attributes, of which the superstitious can thus have no true conviction, the proofs by which they are persuaded of such things must be faulty. And this they are, since the superstitious hold dogmatic truths to be true due to external grounds of truth. 1) When such a person accepts them purely based on the views of another. Then superstition can arise from faulty instruction. 2) When they hold such truths to be internal sensations, and accept them to be true as immediate experiences.

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1. Religious superstition arises, like all other errors, from ignorance of the correct grounds of truth. Some call the superstation that arises from the first source superstition in a more proper sense and contrast it with religious enthusiasm. 2. Superstition, however, arises from enthusiasm in those who hold internal experiences to be grounds of dogmatic truths. Now, since apart from their content, the internal sensations are distinguished only by the degree of their vividness, the enthusiast must assume the premise: what I represent very vividly as true, is true. 3. Hence religion cannot become more perfect without the use of reason. History also teaches that in times of ignorance, enthusiasm and superstition in the narrow sense were sometimes together, or sometimes in turns, the sources of false religions. In particular, history confirms that in these times all religious wars were either wars of superstition (remark 1 immediately above) with superstition, or of enthusiasm with superstition.

64. The power of superstition and its causes Superstition has great power. This arises 1) from the fact that it is in general an error that cannot be exchanged for the true propositions opposed to it until the understanding recognizes the premises of the latter; 2) from the fact that it is a habitual error from which the soul cannot at once be freed; 3) from the fact that it is a religious error, which is thus strengthened by the strong incentives of erroneous religious feelings .

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1. Only now at the end of this division can the famous dispute over the harmfulness of the denial of God and superstition be assessed. 2. Plutarch (57, remark 3) and Bayle held superstition to be more detrimental than the denial of God based on grounds from which the question cannot, however, be decided. For, it is not the case that God himself becomes internally less perfect through the religious errors of human beings, but much rather that human beings are obligated to avoid religious errors because through these they themselves become less perfect. Hence, we would judge God in a far too human of a way if we wanted to suppose that it would be more pleasing for him, as it is for human beings, to be known not at all, than to be known with imperfections. 3. We must therefore admit: a. that both are detrimental, insofar as they contain ignorance and error (44, 57),



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“Ignorance and blindness in regard to the gods divides itself at the very beginning into two streams, of which the one produces in hardened characters, as it were in stubborn soils, atheism, and the other in tender characters, as in moist soils, produces superstition98 .”

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b. that, however, neither absolutely necessarily has a universal and equal influence on a person’s disposition, and so their ethical harmfulness can be incidentally greater or less.

65. The essence and attributes of God The essence of God is the collection of all compossible perfections, his attributes (attributa), [i.e.] the affections that have their sufficient ground in the essence of God. The attributes of God are not materially , but formally distinct from his essence. For 1) they are not distinct from it, as are contingent modes from the essence, or 2) one essence separated from the other; rather they are only the concepts of particular determinations, which together make up the essence of God, or perfections, which are derived from it. They are thus only distinct from the essence of God insofar as they correspond to different concepts in the human understanding, which it must consider individually due to its limitations. 1. This collection can be expressed through each supreme perfection, which then, insofar as it is the highest and infinite, contains all the others within itself. These others, which are thought of as contained within [the single perfection] as distinguishing marks, are viewed as attributes of God. Each attribute of God can therefore also be viewed as his essence (13, remark 2).

Translation by Frank Cole Babbitt, “On Superstition,” in Plutarch’s Moralia, 15 vols (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1692/1928), vol. 2, 454. Eberhard’s text is reproduced verbatim; below are listed the variants as found in Bernardakis’ text, which Babbitt’s translation follows: Bernardakis, “De Superstitione,” in: Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia (Leipzig: Teubneri, 1888), vol. 1, 403. 99 d’ 100 toi~j 101 pepoi/hken 98

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66. I. The kinds of perfections possessed by God To the attributes that are appropriate to God as the necessary and most-perfect being , (53, remark 2), or to those that flow from the concept of the highest perfection, there belong 1) simplicity (simplicitas Dei), 2) infinity, 3) eternality or his entire actuality without beginning or end, 4) immensity, insofar as his perfections can be measured by no finite perfections, 5) omnipresence, insofar as he is aware of all actual things in the most precise manner, and really works in all actual things.

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1. By virtue of this simplicity we must not only think in God such an indivisibility of determinations as excludes all genuine composition, or what can be called physical simplicity, but rather also that which excludes all determinations of different kinds; for, the infinity of God means that each of his infinite perfections is the sufficient ground of all others (13, remark 1), from which follows that it indeed admits of no contingent, but rather only absolutely necessary determinations, and hence its simplicity is metaphysical or transcendental. 2. So the eternality of God is sufficiently distinguished from the eternal time of finite and contingent things. The eternality of God is accordingly 1) the greatest duration, i.e. the continuation of the greatest actuality without beginning and end. The greatest actuality is, however, the actuality of the infinite being, which consequently is everything that it can be in every moment of time, and so 2) it is without temporal progression and alteration. 3. The duration of the finite without beginning and end is therefore still always distinct from the eternality of the infinite being. The former is mathematically infinite and it is not valid to conclude from this to genuine metaphysical infinity. Incidentally, the precise determination of the eternality of God is first found in Boethius’s The Consolation of Philosophy , in which he defines it as “the perfect possession, all at once, of interminable life .”102 4. This concept of omnipresence, which agrees precisely with the use of speech, is so pure that no crude secondary concepts of spatiality (17) are contained in it.

Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, c. ad 524, book 5, Ch. 6.

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67. II. The attributes of the most perfect spirit The attributes of God that are grounded in the spirituality of God belong either to his understanding or to his will. The divine understanding, insofar as it is infinite, is infinitely distinguished from a created understanding, regardless of its similarity to the latter. 1) The created understanding does not always actually think; 2) it does not know everything possible, neither potentially nor actually; 3) it does not know with the most distinctness and greatest depth possible; 4) and it knows everything discursively . 1. If the existence of God is proven, then his most perfect understanding can be demonstrated from both the concept of the most perfect being in general and also from the production of the world. 2. The above differences between the infinite and the finite understanding are to be noted in order to make the divine understanding intuitive, and, so to say, capable of being felt when we are aware of the mathematically infinite extension, duration and divisibility of the world and its parts and of the very little that we know of this, as well as in order that we do not over hastily judge the divine understanding according to our own (18, remarks 2 and 3). 3. This feeling of the infinity of the divine understanding becomes still more vivid through consideration of the mathematically infinite contingency of the world, and the equally infinite amount of merely possible conjunctions of finite things.

68. A further comparison of the same with the finite understanding God hence has 1) no sensations, 2) no mental images , 3) neither abstract 4) nor symbolic knowledge; 5) he performs no logical deductions , and 6) he has no passions, even though he knows our sensations, mental images, logical deductions, and passions. Since the infinite understanding of God also cannot be limited by anything, God cannot be the world-soul; for the soul is limited by the body in its representations. 1. If, therefore, human language makes use of crude expressions through which the divine understanding is spoken of in such a way, these must be (18, remark 3) taken in a purer sense. 2. The opinion of those that hold God to be the world-soul is old and yet has

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recently been renewed with all its peculiarities by David Hume (7, remark 2). It is to be presumed that not all who represent God in this way have thought of all the ways in which he could be compared to the human soul. For: a. God’s self-subsistence means that no other being can influence him, as the body influences the soul, b. His infinity means that he cannot be limited by something, or that his representation is not progressive, as are the states of the world, just as the representations in the human soul come to develop according to the alterations of its body, c. His most perfect understanding means that he does not represent the world in part sensibly, as the human soul does its body.

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69. Omniscience

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Whoever knows everything possible most distinctly is omniscient; God is therefore omniscient. God’s omniscience is named according to the various objects of knowledge. It is the science of the possible (knowledge of simple intelligence ), insofar as everything that is unconditionally possible is its object; the science of the actual (free knowledge ), insofar as everything actual as well as future is its object; the middle science (middle knowledge ), insofar as the future under a certain condition is its object. 1. Since the very time it was first introduced, there have been controversies over middle knowledge in the theological schools of all three of the major Christian sects, particularly due to its influence on the doctrine of God’s decrees. It was first taught in published writings by Luis de Molina of the Society of Jesus. The harmony of free will with the gifts of grace, divine prescience, providence, predestination and reprobation. 3rd exp. and improv. ed. (Antwerp: 1609) .103 In part 4, disputation 53, sec. 4, para. 4 of his Liberi Arbitrii Concordia cum gratiae donis, Molina defines middle knowledge as “the knowledge of God considered in this manner as the relation to those things that, according to this hypothesis, would occur in the future depending on created free will .”

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2. If it is viewed as a species of the knowledge of the possible, namely of the conditionally possible, and indeed of that which is possible in a connection other than the actual one, then middle knowledge does not in the least encounter the difficulties that are raised more against the name than against the matter itself. 3. Insofar as the opposite of the objects of middle knowledge is conditionally impossible, its objects are to that extent conditionally necessary. A similar kind of knowledge is found in human understanding, e.g. in apagogical proofs, in the binary or quaternary arithmetic, and so forth.

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70. Wisdom To the omniscience of God belongs also his most distinct representation of the connection of all things, and so also of the connection of means and ends. Insight into this connection is wisdom. In the best world there is found the most perfect connection of means and ends. If, therefore, this world is the best, then it will be the mirror of the wisdom of God. It belongs to the perfections of the means that 1) the means are the least that can suffice for an end, and 2) the ends are the greatest that can be achieved through these means. This is the law of parsimony, the observation of which therefore accords with the highest wisdom. 1. Wisdom requires both the best means and the best ends. In regard to the former [it requires] all those without which the best ends could not be achieved, but also not more than these, or those that perfectly achieve the end and indeed by the shortest path. It thus acts according to the law of parsimony. 2. This law has also been found to be observed in the corporeal world and in its most universal laws of the communication of motion and the propagation of light. Leibniz in the Acta Eruditorum 1682.104 Essay on Cosmology by Mr. de Maupertuis (40, remark).

I.e. his “The sole principle of optics, catoptrics, and dioptrics ,” in: Acta Eruditorum June (1682), p. 185–90.

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71. Beneficence, holiness, righteousness

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To the will of God belongs 1) his beneficence, or the determination of his will to do everything to the benefit of creatures that they are receptive to, 2) his righteousness, or his proportional beneficence, 3) his holiness, or his moral perfection, through which all moral imperfections in him are abolished . The holiness of God in a wider sense extends to all his attributes, and indeed we must call his understanding, his will, and his potency holy. 1. The concept of righteousness must thus be elevated in order to preempt the misinterpretations to which the usual concept seems to be subjected. The beneficence of God, however, is perfectly proportional, while in the distribution of good acts it precisely follows the degree of perfection that a rational being has as a means to God’s universal end. His beneficence is thus determined by his wisdom. In this elevated sense, it can be said that God distributes to each what is his, i.e. as much kindness as agrees with the final end of creation, and so whatever he can give by virtue of his beneficence and wisdom. 2. This concept has been transferred from external perfection, or the dignity of a person, through which all imperfection, and particularly offenses of a higher degree, are excluded, to internal moral perfection, and finally to all perfection in general, insofar as through it all imperfections are abolished.

Section V. The Natural History of Religion 72. The actuality and character of natural theology

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There is a natural theology, i.e. scientific knowledge of the existence and attributes of God based on reason is possible.—For the existence of God and his attributes can be derived from the concept of God and the contingent design of the world.—Since, however, to this knowledge belongs many universal propositions of reason and distinct concepts, it is only actual in those who have attained the degree of the use of their understanding and reason that is required by this, and one’s actual religious knowledge stands in relation to the degree of the use of one’s understanding and reason.



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1. Some have maintained the actuality of natural theology, at times based on an incorrect representation of the end of the Holy Scriptures, at others based on a misunderstood respect for it and contempt of reason. Fausto Sozzini, Theological Lectures. Chapter 2 .105

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Yet some acute authors of this sect106 have maintained and demonstrated it very well, for instance Jan Crell, Martin Ruarus, and Jonasz Szlichtyng regarding Rom. I, 20.107 2. For this reason it is not to be wondered at that religion had first to be sensible, and that it becomes always purer with progress and improvement.

Second Part. On the Communication of Religious Knowledge Section I. On the Sensuous Manner of Communication 73. Its character and appropriateness Since many adults do not possess a high enough degree of the use of their reason so that through it they can know the actuality and attributes of God and the duties of religion sufficiently distinctly, correctly, and practically, it is a provision of grace that God has willed them to be instructed through the path of authority and faith.— 1. The universal necessity of higher instruction is best illuminated based on this character of the human understanding, namely, that instruction is still always needed, even in the higher degree of its education, in order

Fausto Socinus, Praelectiones Theologicae (Krakow: Typis Sebastiani Sternacii, 1609). i.e. the Socinians or Polish Brethren, and, after their expulsion from Poland, the Unitarians. Founded by the Italian Sozzini in Poland, they rejected orthodox Christian doctrines such as the Trinity and original sin. Most importantly to Baumgarten, Socinianism denies God’s knowledge of future contingencies (2013, §875). 107 “For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse” (New International Version). Regarding the Socinian exegesis, see Jan Crell, Commentary on the Letter of Paul to the Romans, composed by Jonasz Szlichtyng from his lectures (Kraków: Typis Sebastiani Sternacii, 1634) . 105 106

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to increase and correct its knowledge and to make this knowledge more evident and practical. 2. Those that are not capable of any particular degree of general rational knowledge, and thus of religious knowledge, can attain to little more than a historical knowledge of religion, and so to accept it based on testimony and authority with a belief that accords with reason. Still, rational knowledge, in as much as it admits the limits of its understanding, is always to be combined with testimony and authority, and is also actually combined with these in the Holy Scriptures. 3. Since human happiness depends on religion, both by itself and also in connection with the doctrine of morals, every provision of God through which more perfect knowledge of religion is produced and increased is most full of grace and love.

Section II. On the Rational Manner of Communication 74. Its certainty and character

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Since the actuality and perfections of God can be known based on his essence and concept (21, 22), and based on the actuality of the world (23), the knowledge of such is produced and made more perfect by everything that produces and promotes the knowledge of truer and purer perfections (14, 15, 16, 18), the contingency of the world and its parts (23) and the reciprocal conjunction of these as efficient causes and effects, ends and means (26-39), and the order and agreement of both the greater and smaller parts of the world. 1. Everything that the human being learns is either experience or general knowledge , and the latter concerns either quantities or qualities. Since general knowledge is improved through the general knowledge of both quantities and qualities, and, conversely, through experience, both, however, can produce the knowledge of God: the one, since it teaches us to better know the world as the work of God, the other, since it furthermore produces and elevates the concepts of the essence of God and his attributes—so all human knowledge can and must aim at religion. 3. However, it is particularly needful in the beginning that the understanding be made attentive to this connection of all human knowledge with religion, in order to perceive in the parts of the world their



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contingency and wise combination and to perceive in supersensible concepts that which religion makes into the distinguishing marks of the most perfect being. THE END

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Kant’s Reflections in his Copy of Eberhard’s Preparation for Natural Theology Introduction E § 1-8 6206. 1783–4. E II. III Human reason has the special attribute not only the po, in addition to what belongs to making a concept of a thing for a certain aim, not only to complete this concept by means of everything that constitutes it, but rather also to complete the object of the concept within the kind of things to which it belongs. To know the concept of a body, a person, [or] a plant, we are not satisfied with what would be sufficient for the common use of words; we seek it to become aware of these in all their distinguishing marks, from which emerges the definition when the law of parsimony is applied. But when we have counted the object among a certain kind of things, we moreover seek to think it completely with respect to this kind. Body belongs to matter, and what in its extension is not matter is empty space; hence we fashion for ourselves the concept of a perfectly solid body. It has cohesion; we think of a perfectly hard thing without worrying about whether such a thing is actual or even (g only) possible. So the completeness of a thing of a certain kind only serves us as the measuring stick for all the other concepts things, which we can fashion insofar as they are merely distinguished from one another according to magnitude. These magnitudes are alterable; one must compare them with [a magnitude] that is inalterable, that is, with the magnitude of a thing that contains everything that can be contained in its concept with respect to its kind. We can determine some of these concepts of completion, since we have all a determinate concept of what belongs to its completion that is at least negatively indicated in experience (e.g. the diameter among all the chords in a circle); others are constituted in such a way that we only think the

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completion, but cannot complete the concept itself. The concept of wellbeing is empirical; however, much lacking can still be lacking concerning satisfaction with one’s state. Now, a concept is necessary here, which lacks nothing in content, i.e. the greatest and best everlasting wellbeing, i.e. happiness (g E I: which we can never think determinately). When this also does not depend on contingent external causes, but rather arises from ourselves: Bliss. Now, we can still extend this concept of the wellbeing of a rational being when we add to what it enjoys also what it does, i.e. satisfaction with its person and the moral good. The complete moral good is supreme virtue. When this is itself free of all inclination toward evil: Holiness. Thus the holiness of will and blessedness of state, taken together, form the idea of heaven. On the other hand, because that which not whose concept consists in the relation of cause and effect, has two different sorts of opposite: a negative (=0), and a privative (=-), so one can think of a state that gives no satisfaction: misfortune, and insofar as the being contains the cause of this in itself: misery, and likewise in a will that intentionally acts contrary to all moral laws, and thus arises the idea of Hell. Hence: Heavenly joys and infernal torments

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Heavenly virtue and infernal vice

} Ideas.

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These ideas are completely necessary, even though no object corresponds to them. It is also not important whether something of this kind exists , but rather only: how we can better compare our concepts of what exists by comparing them together against a third as a common measure, even if this measure is indeed a mere idea. (The Julian period preceded the beginning of the world by 532 years.)1 Now, if we think of an individual according to these ideas, then it is the good or evil original being; for, neither is considered according to what it contains in itself, but rather according to that of which it is the cause. (If there is as much good in the world on the one hand as there is evil on the other, Taking into account the product of its nineteen-year Metonic lunar cycle and twenty-eight-year solar cycle, the exact same Julian calendar year repeats every 532 years. This cycle is called the Great Indiction. The Byzantian calendar, which is based on the Julian, fixes the date of the world’s creation at September 1, 5508 bc. Accordingly, we entered into the Fifteenth Indiction in 1941. See Hieromonk Cassian, A Scientific Examination of the Orthodox Church Calendar, or The Old Calendar and Science, eds. Archbishop Chrysostomos of Etna and Hieromonk Gregory (Etna: Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies, 1998).

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and if, just as motion cannot be conferred in one direction without precisely the same amount being produced or taken in the opposite direction, the law of isonomy , then the principle would thus indeed be good, but its product would necessarily contain as much evil as good.) Both would contain everything that is required for activity; however, one of them would indeed contain the ground of the reaction against the activit effect of the other. If the evil being is derived in regard to its existence but is still the cause, albeit limited, of all ills: then ill, or the Devil, is an imprecise idea, the extent of whose influence and effect remains unknown. If we think of a complete being not according to determined concepts of good and evil, but rather as a thing in general: Then this is the transcendental idea of a supreme being, which is also required in order for us to think the differences of all possible things in thoroughgoing determination with respect to something and nothing in general. First of all, everything is thought in one thing, in order to think it afterwards more in one thing, and less in another, through the mere limitation of the archetype. I always retain the same subject: a thing in general, and, through different limitations of the being that contains everything positive, I obtain all things insofar as they are something, and the differences rest, so to speak, on the combination of something with nothing in infinite space. The evil original being is also thought of as an infinite reality, but in effect as the counterplay to all causality of the former, since then the world contains no contradictions, but purely the conflict of aims. Apart from the necessity of the idea of a most perfect being for the concept of all other beings, reason also counts judges it also to be necessary for the existence of things. These, considered merely as things, can distinguish themselves only through reali negations, so only through limitations of a supreme reality. Now, the existence of limited things appears to be just as derivative as their concept, and, on the other hand, the existence of a being having all reality alone seems able to be original. Every shadow is only the remnant of the infinite nothing, namely the night, which, without the all-illuminating Sun, would fill up space. It thus seems natural that the light does not first exist mixed with shadow, but rather that [shadow] only arises through a greater or smaller limitation of sunlight, which must come first. The supreme reality can limit its own effect, through which it externally reveals its existence; however, a limited reality has in itself no sufficient principle of its possibility; consequently, its actuality is also to be regarded as dependent. There further arises from the principle of thoroughgoing determination, a thoroughgoing community of descent, and consequently the kinship of every possible thing, because it is only possible in a concept,

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since all negations are only possible through the bounding of the supreme reality.

6207. 1783–4. E III The principle of thor of the excluded middle , i.e. of determination, holds: that, if the concept is compared with one of two opposites , one of the two must belong to it. The principle of thoroughgoing determination says that the concept of a thing in general, in order to constitute the representation of an individual, must be compared with all possible opposing predicates , such that, when it has been determined with respect to one, in this determination it must be compared with the other opposing predicates , and so as a thing in general it can be thought determinate through relation to the most-real being alone. Through this it happens that a general concept thoroughly determines itself and becomes a concept of an individual being.

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The principle of thoroughgoing determination is a synthetic proposition; for, it requires that the concept of each thing stand in association with the concepts of everything possible and so to each determination there belongs still more that does not belong in the concept of the thing analytically, and, consequently, that the general concept be regarded only as a part of the concept that contains the predicates for everything possible.

6209. 1783–4. E I The principle of the excluded middle only says that of two opposite predicates , both together do not belong to a thing, or both cannot be removed from it, but not that it must necessarily be compared with all possible predicates or even, i.e. that it must only exist in relation to these and the determination according to the principle of excluded middle . This is the principle of thoroughgoing determination. The first is logical and denotes only the nature of disjunctive judgements, which contains Although this form is attested in Latin as the present active vocative plural of praedico, in this context Kant pluralizes this Latin word in German.

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the opposition of contradiction ; the second is metaphysical and indicates the derivation of the concept of each thing from the collection of all possibility, namely, the supreme reality. For a determinate concept of a thing (namely, not of what is common to many things, but rather of an individual), human understanding requires that it be distinguishable from everything possible through this very concept , because human understanding judges only through general concepts. It must therefore compare the concept with all possible predicates in the idea, and it thinks the thoroughgoing determination, which is nevertheless impossible for any understanding to carry out. It thus presupposes: in order to know a thing wholly, one need not only know everything that it contains, but moreover what it lacks, so that one also knows it in relation. The principle of determination is the excluded middle . The principle of thoroughgoing determination is: every individual thing (i.e. insofar as it is distinguished from all others; for, the a thing considered generally as species and kind is only distinguished from those that do not belong under this concept) is to be distinguished with respect to everything possible through its relation to the collection of every possible predicate.

6210. 1783–4. E I (g Theology. We can exhaust this object of knowledge; for it is not something given to us in itself.) Human reason requires a threefold completeness. 1. The completeness of the determination of a subject with respect to all possible predicates. 2. The completeness of the derivation of its existence from the existence of others. 3. The completeness of the derivation of the existence of all from one existence, i.e. the community of all in one single cause. Three ideas. 1. The completeness of the determination of a thing relative to a certain concept, e.g. the concept of figure, such as the rectilinear, when they are regular (such as the equilateral triangle, square) or the curvilinear: the circle. The determination from the principle of the end with respect to all ends: Morality, or even of an end that opposes all. Completeness of friendship. 2. The completeness of derivation. The independent existence, the first beginning, the cause that is not again something caused . The idea of freedom as a kind of causality that is not externally conditioned. The first

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human being. The beginning of the world or of chaos (beginning of order), finally the first existence in general. 3. Completeness of community. I.e. thoroughgoing determination of the many among one another through the dependence of their existence upon one. E.g. a commonwealth under a legislator. Unity of the Church under one head. The causality of many causes, insofar as it is thoroughly determined through their dependence on one. The world and God. We have 1. Only one concept of a thing in general, through which this is thoroughly determined: the most-real being ; 2. Only a concept which Insofar as this concept is the single one that requires no other for its determination, and is also an existence that is not a consequence of another existence, and so is that of an original being; 3. insofar as all other existence is derived and none, except this , is an original being, [do we have the concept of] the community of the origin of all things, consequently the complete concept of the connection of those things among one another. The best world.—The all-sufficient being: 1. as the highest being as subject; 2. the original being as cause; 3. the being of all beings as cause of all. Theology.

6211. 1783–4. E VI How can the maximum be a standard of our judgement, when the idea of it surpasses all of our given concepts? Because the limitations are positive, all of which I omit in the maximum . Thus because it is the pure idea, just as the concept of allness arises from plurality without limitation. Precisely so So the divine understanding is a pure understanding, the divine will a pure will, the divine presence pure, the [divine] eternality, etc. etc. The idea of the maximum is that which is the most determined and therefore also [the most] determining. The idea of the maximum alone is precise , e.g. perfect justice and morality.

6212. 1785–8. E VI The three tasks (g of metaphysics): To accommodate God, freedom, and immortality to the last three antinomies, where (if one takes this series conversely), simplicity, (g absolute) causality, and necessity altogether can be applied to the



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intelligible. That [i.e. the antionomy] of the magnitude of the world in space and time does not come under consideration here, because it is entirely limited to sensory conditions. Yet through its inadequacy to the unconditioned in general it can lead to the intelligible (the first initiator of the series).

6213. 1783–4. E VII From the above-mentioned grounds of reason’s natural need, with respect to the concepts that arise from itself, to ascend up to completeness the idea that completely determines each concept, there now emerges the concept of a most perfect being. 1. As a thing in general, 2. As a perfect nature (s according to psychological concepts), 3. as the most perfect principle of the system of all ends. Transcendental, natural, and moral perfection. The supreme being thu, now considered as the most perfect nature and at the same time as the highest good, is God. (g greatest transcendental perfection, greatest natural perfection, greatest practical perfection.) The system of our knowledge of God is now a science and is called theology. Questions. 1. How is theology as a possible science related to the faculty of our reason? Can it be brought to completeness, or does it remain, like others, always capable of extension? Answer. The object far surpasses human understanding, and what we could know about him, if it pleased him to reveal himself to us, stretches into infinity. However, what we can know through the light of reason about him can be measured completely precisely and the natural theology that is possible for human beings can be completely demonstrated, without indeed being able to hope for an extension of these insights. 2. Of what kind will these cognitions be (g expanding or amending), that can deliver us such a science[?] As knowledge of common sense (s as hypothesis for completing the nat chain of natural causes) they will contain various positive things, which however are evident to everyone even without science. As science, however, its business is merely negative: (a) to prevent errors, consequently to guard us from contradicting ourselves in concepts of supreme perfection; (b) while a healthy critique distinctly shows the limits of our reason, to place a limit on the sacrilege of imaginary sophists , who, through groundless arrogance , pretend to penetrate so deeply into the nature of things that they can suppose themselves able to refute the rational belief as a in such a being.

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3. What interest does reason have in this science? No speculative, but rather merely a practical interest, and indeed concerning the latter only the moral. This knowledge is not to make us into scholars but rather better human beings, or to give force and persistence to our already good intentions. It is to arise from morality and in turn to act back upon morality. (s It belongs not to physics but to morals.) 4. Will common understanding, in this respect, be enough for knowledge of God, which interests everybody, or are scholarship and deep speculation required? Common understanding, for the knowledge should be able to be demanded of each. 5. What is the minimum of theology? That it is at least possible that there is a God, and that nobody could know enough to refute us when we believe in him. 6. How far does knowledge go in this respect? Merely that our concept accords with itself and does not conflict with its own purpose. The object is a mere idea; thus, it cannot be given according to experiential concepts , and our positive knowledge here cannot be objectively certain .3

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Page I: (s theology, either rational or revealed .) (s Physicotheology from the prime mover .) The concept must be thoroughly determined a priori. This is only that of the most-real being . (g Hence this theology is the foundation of the rest.) 1. The original being (s neither the concept nor existence of which is derived) as the supreme being : Transcendental theology . (s This encompasses ontotheology and cosmotheology.) (sThe use of transcendental theology.) 2. The original being as the supreme intelligence (s living): Natural theology . See A822/B850, where Kant defines Wissen to be knowledge that is “both subjectively and objectively sufficient,” which latter he glosses as “certain.” See our discussion of Erkennen and Wissen in the Introduction. 4 The following is not from Kant’s copy of Eberhard’s preparation, but from a separate two-page note that Kant likely prepared for his natural theology lectures. 3



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3. The original being as the supreme good : Moral theology . (s The concept of God: 1. as* isolated concept a self-sufficient concept , 2. as boundary concept, 3. as architechtonic concept.) *(s Possibility from concepts, 2. necessity as ground of the series, 3. of the system.) One who merely accepts the first theology, maintains merely the cause of the world. (s Anselm: Ontotheology. Wolff: Cosmotheology.) One who also accepts the second theology, maintains it to be the author of the world. (s Physicotheology.) One who also accepts the third theology, maintains it to be the master of the world (s legislator). (s concept—nature—will of God) (s speculation or moral theology. Moral theology is not theological morals. In the latter, morals are derived from the existence of God; in the former, the existence and concept of God is determined by morals. Deism, theism. Relig.: moral theism . The world as a kingdom of nature, 2. of ends. 3. of grace. The principle for proving existence: 1. From mere concepts or experience in general; 2. From the object of particular experience, knowledge of the world; 3. From our ends. (s The most-real being as ground is the principle of all beings and their most-real being possibility.) Certainty is apodictic, or physical (s hypothetical), or moral. Knowing with complete certainty , supposing, and believing. (s The use of transcendental theology: negative.) Attributes. 1. transcendental theology: Purely ontological predicates. 1. Possibility (g complete) . (g Essence (g original)) (g Supreme being (of beings) as aggregate or ground. I limit only the consequences.) (s contra dogmatic atheists ) 2. Existence (g necessary) contra atheists . 3. Necessity contra the skeptics . 4. Substance (g not unique) contra Spinoza (g the world is not another) . 5. Immateriality contra anthropomorphism . 6. Unicity contra polytheism (g Manichaeism 7. Beyond the world contra the Stoics’ world soul . (s All-sufficiency contra the independence of matter .) 8. Infinite (s incommensurable) contra a more subtle anthropomorphism . (s We represent to ourselves the possibility of all finite things as derivative.) 9. Supreme perfection (g formal as consensus with all reality outside of it, thus not as destroyer but rather as preserver of reality) contra Manichaeism . 10. Eternity, omnipresense, omnipotence (all-sufficience) (g not only formal, but material). (s active attributes ) (s A cause that does not have a concurrent cause, e.g. a material cause of evil ). Immutability. Impassive. (s Whether the concept of God is a physically or morally necessary concept, necessary for better casuistry or action? First of all, determination of his idea as the foremost principle of every existence. Anthropomorphism. Either the concept of the original being comes from the concept of the supreme being, or vice versa. Contingency is inferred from the order of nature. The author’s understanding does not prove his necessity.) (s transcendental theology concerning the purity of the concept of God.) Page II: (g The moral proof of the existence of God. as a necessary hypothesis for speculative and practical interest.) Skeptical atheism is godlessness , dogmatic atheism: the denial of God . The first only contests the possibility of making a concept of God; the second, the possibility of the being itself. (g All concepts apart from that of the most-real being are undetermined with respect to the remaining predicates.) The unity follows from the all of reality , because space and time do not appear in the concept of the most-real being as noumenon ; otherwise there could be two beings with the same attributes in different places. (s The subjective necessity of reason to accept God holds objectively for us.)



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(g from concepts or from facts ) The ontological proof is one with the pure cosmological proof, save that in the first, necessity is inferred from the concept of the most-real being , and, in the second, from the necessity of any being at all (as independent existence, or foremost ground for what is actual) based on the concept of the most-real being . The first fails in that it considers the proposition “the most-real being exists” as analytic, since, after all, it is synthetic and, as such, cannot be proven. The second: in that it takes the concept of the relative necessity of the determination (of a thing (g in general) with respect to the (g opposing) predicates that can belong to a being in general) for a concept of the absolute necessity of the thing itself*; namely: in that it takes the most-real being to be thoroughly determined with respect to all its predicates and these as necessarily belong to it, this would be precisely no different than: it exists necessarily. Analytic necessity is again confused with the synthetic. *(g The mistake is actually this: that one believes the real nec that real necessity is to be inferred from the logical necessity of the predicates of a most-real being , namely, since only this concept is thoroughly determined with necessity. We should only say: we have thereby a necessary concept of a being, not: a concept of a necessary being.) (g The contingent is what exists only conditionally. Thus, only the unconditioned is necessary. We can only come to know this through the fact that it is the condition of everything else. Time and space are contingent forms of our own intuition.) (g Anthropomorphism is most opposed to the moral proof.) The theistic concept is a merely relative or regulative, but not absolute and constitutive anthropomorphism. The concept of God as a boundary concept of the knowledge of nature according to speculative laws of complete reason.

6215. 1785–8. E 2'. 3' E 2': We live in an age that has not had its equal in the history of human understanding. The human mind indeed has indeed probably exhausted every possibility for foolishness and madness that belongs to errant reason, and there are certainly ancient examples for all modern nonsense; however, that all kinds of absurdities and madness are manifesting themselves simultaneously and indeed openly while the true investigation of its reason conducts

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its business in public and in private: this the must be viewed as an inevitable misuse of a freedom to think that is only now beginning to sprout for the first time, which, just as in states that have overthrown despotism, must first produce anarchy and civil breakdown before, eventually, producing a legitimate civil state . The civil authorities do not meddle in any disputes that merely concern (g public (written)) thinking, except solely insofar as this concerns religion, because religion is in fact a mighty pillar of morality, and by means of this, there is civil peace security and cohesion . Internally cohesive states indeed permit free reign to these disputes as long as they remain among the learned; but as soon as they begin to cause the divisions and factions that, in the affairs of religion , commonly either produce partisanship against some and hate against others, they also become worried about the outcome, for the balance is hard to maintain. Letting Still, it is best that they let these things go and favor reason and science; for only in this way can the legitimate freedom of thought (in place of anarchy) and the supreme authority of reason (rather than the despotism of orthodoxy) emerge. (g Nothing is more damaging than the most impudent ignorance.) Nonsense rests, more often than not, on the blathering of religion without the preliminary determination of theology, and especially of that which originates in reason alone, and which also must be laid at the foundation of all other theology, whether based in history or immediate inspiration, as the criterion of correctness. Thus in our times especially, it is of the greatest relevance to produce to bring about a theology of mere reason that is well thought-out theol and completely executed throughout its whole extent, the latter of which can be done as it is not required to know everything that belongs to the object, but rather what human reason can know about God. If theology and religion are blended together, a confusion of concepts arises, in which one regards theology as a necessary consequence and duty of religion and therefore proceeds in advance as a partisan. With respect to the former, all speculative reason must first be left alone and free. In order for us to ascertain the mentality and consequently the subjective causes of the discord in human opinions here beforehand, and, for us to be able to examine and weigh them, and to uncover simultaneously the source from which the absurdities arise, and hence organize the history of the aberrations determinately, we must first and foremost contrast the genuine use of reason with the various delusions concerning the use of reason in general, and to consider this as of preeminent importance.



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Delusion is the maxim opinion of a freedom in thinking without die Ber5 consideration of the laws of reason. So it is grounded in the power of imagination or in the appearance of the senses. Mimicry. Presumptuous ignorance. The experiential use of reason is opposed to delusion. Not that it must take its ground precisely from experience, but rather on it must not think further than that as far as it according to laws of can be applied to experience according to laws, according to which this itself is possible. E 3': What is the experiential use of our reason? We can give all our concepts meaning, and our judgments reality, only insofar as that we them (g they) accord with the principles of an experience that is made possible thereby (indep they are paraphysical). All principles for explaining the things of experience that are not in accordance with the rules of a possible experience, but are rather unab transcendent [breaks off]

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6216. 1785–8. E 3' Someone accepts experiences (g as the) principles of experience that ... a in which reason may not be used, and is superstitious; or someone [accepts something] to be a principle of reason in regard to which all reliability no connection to experience is possible, and is enthusiastic. Or one denies everything that is not demonstrable either through reason or experience, and one is a non-believer. By contrast, one who also grants something as a necessary hypothesis for compl, insofar as it is indispensable for the completion of the theoretical or practical use of reason, is a believer. The believer indeed accepts something that cannot at all be an object of experience [breaks off]

6217. 1785–8. E 3' So someone who accepts an idea (g of reason) with which no laws of experience can accord, is enthusiastic; and one who accepts laws of appear experience incompatible with any use of reason, is superstitious. Someone who indeed recognizes as necessary the mutual harmony of reason and experience in an ob the judgement of th an object, but who at the same time will not grant any other By die Ber is doubtless meant die Berücksichtigung, a synonym for Rücksicht, i.e. “consideration.”

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object than that whose existence is sufficiently demonstrable through reason or experience, is a non-believer. (Hard cash.) Rational faith is the necessar the principle (g maxim) of reason to accept what is inevitably necessary in the for completing the series of grounds of reason that harmonizes completely with [its] empirical use. Now, the first in this series can be proven as a determinate object neither through reason nor by way of empirical inferences. So rational faith is inescapably necessary for complete empirical use [of reason] (under which I understand the deduction of the maxims of reason applied to the objects of experience). Enthusiasm is madness. Superstition [is] stupidity and non-belief [is] foolishness, i.e. reckless abandonment of the chief purpose (namely, of the completeness of the grounds for what in general can be the end of speculation or praxis). The inquiring use of reason, thus one which se concludes with a complete rational faith, is wisdom.

6218. 1785–8. E 3' The mentality [that works] according to ideas of which one can make no experiential use (g is enthusiasm). God, freedom, immortality are ideas of which one can make experiential use. But secret powers for manipulating nature, and spiritual intuitions , are ideas of which one can make no experiential use, precisely because they make experience impossible. The mentality of principles based on facts of which one can make no experiential use is superstition; e.g. forebodings, meaningful dreams, appearances of deceased persons. Non-belief is the principle of denying everything that cannot be an object of experience. For there are always subjective grounds for taking-to-be-true when sufficient objective ones are missing. However, the subjective ground with respect to the supersensible is reason that never satisfies itself sufficiently through the sensible in what is theoretical and moral.

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(g It) is supremely necessary to correct the speculative concept of God beforehand; however, its worth cannot be so highly tarnished that the moral [concept] need not provide him with the foremost determination. If one does not immediately ascribe to him a holy will, not even the unity of this being can yield a secure religion.



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The mentality of the of a reason that wholly removes itself from use in experience is fantasy . (Fruitless brooding .) (g Chimaera. Reverie.) [This sentence has subsequently been changed by additions as follows, but the words that no longer fit the new composition were not crossed out.] The mentality of a reason that conflicts with the principles of the experiential use is delusion. *Fantasy is: 1. Enthusiasm, i.e. a through fantasy that seeks to raise itself through a higher reason (g by means of pure intuition) above the reason that adheres only to experiential use (and is thus limited to it). 2. Superstition: a fantasy that wants to raise itself above (g the experiential use of) reason by means of (g empirical intuition) experience (its own, or that of another). (g Within this experience are included accounts of amazing effects (that conflict with all laws of experience), or wondrous incidents joined through fancy as cause and effect). The former is delusional (g madness), the latter stupidity. The first is of two different sorts: either that of the delusion of immediate epiphany, or that of exalted speculation, e.g. concerning astral nature spirits. Supposed derangement. *(g The transcendent use of reason is that which thus dares to judge without any possibility relation of this use of reason to possible experience. To this is diametrically opposed the denial of reason in regard to what departs completely from experience. Consequently, the denial of the experiential as well as of the transcendent of use of reason.) Non-belief is the maxim to grant no other use of reason in experience g ( consequently absolutely no use of reason) than with respect to an object of experience. Thus it must hold everything that is not an object of the senses to be either impossible (it can only do this if it considers the senses to be the only kind of knowledge through which objects are represented immediately as they are), or contrary to the empirical use of reason and thus to the maxim of its use in general, or at least the assumption of such things to be dispensable and completely groundless, e.g. regard God as as nothing, or yet (its presupposition) as completely dispensable and unnecessary for reason, because he is no object of experience. The first non-belief is empirical; the second sophistical or rationalistic, which believes opines that it can explains everything, or is even able to furnishes all moral practical laws with a sufficient motive power an influence of when and maintains an empirical use of reason, namely its power for producing good actions, although it indeed assumes mere objects of experience and no other actual things, but rather employs merely reason.

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A believer is the one who grants to his reason (g to accept) what is indispensably necessary for its completeness, whether in the theoretical or practical empirical use, even though reason cannot prove it. *(g The small number of those willing to believe who are capable of a rational faith based on moral interest. They6 want hard cash : either in knowledge or in the advantages of life.) The faith without which it is impossible to make even empirical use of reason itself completely satisfactorily, be it theoretical or practical, is a pure rational faith. Without a pure rational faith, (g the use of reason becomes) either boundless knowing (pansophy) or misology, the Selbstver7 suicide of reason. To become superstitious: people have a* natural propensity to this; they personify natural causes, know neither the regularity of nature nor the importance of the use of reason solely under the presupposition of that regularity. Thus when something is unusual, or when they desire (or dream) something fiercely, they are easily brought to imagine something that they cannot see, something which knows their wishes and can be persuaded or appeased by these. Superstition without determinate representations of its objects. *(g Enthusiasm is boastful (presumptuous) ignorance and a convulsive condition that is contagious through sympathy.) We can make no other applied use of reason, i.e. a use wherein the object is given (g immanent use), than when we can produce in thought what we think according to empirical laws.

6220. 1785–8. E 1' The delusion of honor due to fame after death. The delusion of honor due to the esteem for what has no inner worth. Moral perfection, although it cannot be entirely reached, is still no delusion. Enthusiastic and superstitious delusion. Yet God is no delusion. The experiential use of reason is the use of reason that according to rules can prove (g its reality) its truth through the presentation of its (concept and) principles in experience, even if one assumes something that is not an object of experience, e.g. the soul as an incorporeal being or pure morality. If one By “they,” Kant presumably means “most people.” By “Selbstver,” Kant perhaps meant “Selbstvernichtung” or “Selbstverstörung,” which both translate as “self-destruction.”

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also only assumes something like this without being able to prove it, then its assumption is still in accordance with the experiential use of reason with respect to the form of rea its application and the principles, just as we proceed in general with respect to hypotheses. Any use of reason that does not accord with the principles of the experiential use is delusion; e.g. to sense heavenly influence, to have influence over the spiritual realm. Every use of pure reason is either an experiential use, whose application to experience is possible, or a super- chimerical use of the same. The maxim of the latter is delusion. A mere object of experience will will provide the ground of the the former, or even an object of pure reason, but applied to objects of experience according to its rules. The first is the physical and the second the pure experiential use of pure reason. One who denies the possibility of the second is an unbeliever .

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6221. 1785–8. E 5'. 5 E 5': (g Reason’s need to think yet more beyond the things of experience, what cannot be experienced and due to the ends reason possesses, is the first cause for accepting the gods.) How did human beings first arrive at the opinion that invisible powers exist that they could not become acquainted with through the ordinary course of experience[?] Either 1. through the path of reason, or 2. of imagination; (g For the objects that neither experience nor reason has provided are merely possible through the imagination). On the first [path]: a. through rational proof, b. through rational faith; on the second: a. through enthusiasm (g rational intuition ), or b. superstition. The first path is not the one that human beings arrived at to start. On the second path, guidance by enthusiasm is also not the first since it presupposes trials, and also some beginnings of rational knowledge, that do not satisfy (g reason) imagination. So it is imagination without the guidelines of reason, consequently supported by illusory experience, without knowing (g requiring) its (g steady) regularity (as that wherein the experiential use of reason consists), i.e. superstition, which first introduced invisible powers or even forces.

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(g Rational faith is prior to rational proof. Both are grounded on reason’s striving for completeness.) These could merely have been powers of visible things (g empirical objects) that do not, however, stand under the law of experience: Fetish, manitou, talisman, or shadows of the dead (g objects of a past experience), or completely invisible ruling beings. The last only occurred under the condition of a civil constitution under leaders, and thus emerged the genuine concept of gods. Whether they first represent these as terrible, because misfortune and danger create superstition, to which also belong ardent hopes, or whether they represent as beneficent the provision of nature as these gods’ handiwork, cannot be the question. It could not have occurred to them that these gods actually were the authors of nature; they even took them to be things of nature (g or deceased human beings), who only had more power, all things of nature, but necessary in themselves. These gods had to be persons , otherwise they could not direct their superstitious wishes at them, but powerful without morality. However, they could not think of a God precisely because to be alone seems to be a misfortune, thus polytheism. Eventually they arrive at moral concepts: at a law and a legislator. Unity of God, and now all perfection.—Until this point sheer superstition, and now reason.—One was not satisfied with the influence on morals.—Now emerged enthusiasm. Neoplatonic sects last as long as rational proofs alone are to count.—Only rational faith with a consciousness of its ignorance can prevent enthusiasm. E 5: Rational knowledge is either subjective, i.e. knowledge of one’s own reason, or objective: knowledge of an object (g that is distinguished from us) through reason. The necessary presupposition of a first ground in the series of things subordinated to one another is not knowledge of the necessity of this first thing in itself. This would be knowledge of its absolute necessity, for which we are completely incapable. It is also not the known hypothetical necessity of the thing, but rather the knowledge of the subjective necessity of the hypothesis according to the principles of reason or, much rather, the assumption of an absolutely necessary thing. This necessity of a thing determined through concepts, which do not lie merely in pure reason, for the explanation of appearances or practical rules, is not knowledge , not opinion (hypothetical), but rather belief.



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6222. 1785–8. E 5 Among uncultivated human beings, God denotes a being that has reason and more power than all the arbitrarily active forces of nature known through experience. Yet sometimes lifeless things like fetishes and manitous are taken for such. Dead people.

6223. 1785–8. E 5. In and next to, and probably referring to E § 4 Reason requires quite a lot to satisfy itself in the conception of a foremost ground of things, especially not merely in pure use, but rather in use applied to all experience as well as morals. Nature and freedom.

E § 2. The difference between theology and religion 6224. 1785–8. E 4'. Referring to E § 2 The Religion is the consideration of moral laws as divine commandments. Morals teaches how we become good human beings, theology religion: how we become human beings pleasing to God. Morals teaches how we can be worthy of the highest good, religion how we can come to partake of it.

6225. 1783–8. E 4'. Referring to E § 2 Theology, insofar as it has influence on morals, is (moral) religion; insofar as it contains itself a a particular object of morals, it is a cult . This would presuppose religion. For religion, it is enough to believe; for the cult, one must know , otherwise it is hypocrisy.

6226. 1783–8. E 4'. Referring to E § 2 The moral religion is the one that thus makes human beings better. The cult is the religion that, if it is to be genuine, presupposes human beings who are already good, because they ought to take to heart the duty toward God himself.

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The mere possibility of divine existence is already sufficient for the moral religion, yet not as much as belief. Belief is absolutely necessary for the cult, but scarcely sufficient. Knowledge is required for genuine service of God; otherwise one is only worshipping to keep oneself safe in any case, but not out of conviction.

6227. 1783. E 4'. Referring to the end of E § 2

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Religion is the moral (not the pragmatic) disposition insofar as the knowledge of God is its ground. There is indeed no religion without knowledge of God; however, this must not be objectively certain knowledge ; it can only be a pure idea of God that is morally correct (although as speculation full of errors), and second, it can only contain the conviction that it is still possible that there be a God, or, moreover, a firm belief. Morality is not required for the first; if however it is present, then togeth in combination with that problematic judgment it can yield religion. For the latter an already morally good disposition is required. What is the minimum of theology that is necessary and sufficient for religion? (s I. (g With respect to existence:) the possibility of assuming a God . 2. With respect to the concept: the moral concept and the metaphysical concept that is combined with it. (The ancients had a cult without religion (g moral), consequently also without a theology based on reason, but rather tradition.) Philosophical theology cannot expand that minimum with respect to what is positive of God; however it can still bring it into a science through what is negative, through which the errors that are inevitable in common theology are prevented.—Philosophical (g rational) theology is not a theological doctrine ; that which has been revealed as grounded in ancient documents and ancient languages is alone a theological doctrine .8

Cf. Eberhard, Preparation, section 2 and especially Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, AA 5: 137n. Gottesgelahrtheit is correctly translated as “theology,” but this unfortunately obscures Kant’s present point: Unlike “theology,” the original term connotes a form of learning or learnedness (Gelehrsamkeit), which as he points out in the Critique of Practical Reason, further implies that it has its source in experience. Pure rational theology, having its source in reason alone, thus cannot be learned, and so is only improperly called Gottesgelahrtheit.

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E § 3. The truth of the knowledge of God 6228. 1783–4. E 5'. Referring to E § 3 Is our knowledge of God dignified and can we occupy ourselves with no other more dignified thing? The object has the highest dignity, however our knowledge of it is very impoverished: our knowledge usually only consists of the limitations of what we know, namely, only insofar as it is a creature. Thus our vocation is not to investigate what lies behind the divine nature, and this knowledge is of no value; except indeed: 1. To conclude and crown our knowledge of nature and morals by considering everything as proper to an infinite cause, and consequently in the supreme connection, likewise by representing our will as contained under the universal legislation in the kingdom of ends. 2. Not to investigate what God is, but rather: what we should be in relation to him; i.e. what use the idea of him can be to us.

6229. 1783–4. E 5'. Referring to the heading of § 3 Speculative truth (logical) consists here merely in the possibility of this concept. Practical [truth] in the necessity of the presupposition of this being with respect to all moral laws.

6230. 1783–4. E 5. Referring to E § 3 “the genuine theologian” Is there also a theologian of natural religion? Concerning knowledge , the philosopher only knows his own ignorance; i.e. he knows the boundaries of his reason; to this, however, also belongs science. It is precisely the bounding of nature in all respects that makes the concept of God necessary for us, but since he surpasses the concepts of nature, also unattainable like speculation.

6231. 1783–4. E 5'. In E § 3 Nr. 1, Kant interpolates at the end of the sentence that I thereby think something and can give it in examples.

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6232. 1783–4. E 5. Under E § 3 Among the Greeks: the natural philosopher Thales, the theologian Anaxagoras, Anaximander (natural philosopher ), Xenophanes (theologian ).

E § 4. Errors in the knowledge of God 6233. 1783–4. E 5'. Referring to “errors” in the title of § 4 Those that are not practical are, to that extent, also forgivable.

E § 5. Difficulties concerning the truth of the knowledge of God 6234. 1783–4. E 6'. Referring to the beginning of E § 5

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The genuine difficulty consists in that the concept is transcendent and absolutely none of its attributes can be given in any possible experience; consequently, no example can be provided for the concepts. We must should exclude everything sensory from it; then, however, nothing remains but concept without a corresponding intuition, thus without examples and application in concreto, except only according to analogy and symbols . Referring to E § 5 Nr. 1: The limits do not hinder us as much as the inclination to transcend them, and the self-conceit of reason and presumptuousness to introduce false judgments and to pass off incomprehensibility as impossibility.

6235. 1783–4. E 6' Moral theology has as a principle: If the laws of duty are firmly established a priori, and consequently flow necessarily from practical reason, but nevertheless have no power to move the will without the presupposition of a rational and morally perfect being as author of the whole of nature: then this presupposition is inseparable from practical reason, and the idea of God must not be established in accordance with the observation of nature, but rather in accordance



Kant’s Reflections in his Copy of Eberhard’s Preparation for Natural Theology 91

with the need of morality: here I am now spared every digression of speculation. I can declare speculation as completely incapable of achieving this end and only require that it cannot prove that there is no God, and have enough faith. There is no difficulty with the proposition, but rather with the speculative attainment of it.

6236. 1783–4. E 6' In moral theology can it is enough to presuppose that it is still possible that there is a God, and that nobody can ever prove God’s non-being; hence we are then authorized to take this existence as the hypothetical ground of a practical [law] in order, and indeed as required by, a necessary law. For these laws are absolutely necessary, but cannot become subjectively practical without that presupposition. The practical indifferentism of theology turns speculative theology into the only possible [theology], and, if the critique of reason is not favorable to it, it leads to skeptical atheism. Moral theology, however, allows a theism that, at the same time, can be critical with respect to speculative theology. Theology as a principle of virtue serves only to free morality from the hindrances that could be brought forth from the objection of an empty ideality. As the principle of religion, it is even a motive for virtue through duty toward a higher being. As principle of the service of God, it is the ground of actions whose effect is immediately directed at God.—A subjectively necessary hypothesis is when I see no other ground of explanation; an objectively necessary one is when I understand that no other explanation is possible for human reason.

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6237. 1783–4. E 6 The atheism of the doubt: skeptical (g which denies all knowledge and conviction of God). The dogmatic atheism of assertion (g which denies the existence of God). Critical (with respect to the faculty of pure and speculative reason) deism is moral. Physicotheological deism is in itself indeterminate and a source of all the theological errors contrary to religion, of polytheism, and of anthropomorphism. In physicotheology, I infer the existence of God from the contingent connection of ends, and hence this concept cannot be determined.

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6238. 1785–8. E 6 Even if neither reason nor nature were to prove to me the existence of the most perfect being, reason would still require a concept of such a being merely in order to to estimate, according to it, what is derivative.

6239. 1785–8.E. E 6' The supreme concept, (g which) lies at the ground of all things. 1. as the complete concept of a thing in general, 2. as the complete concept for nature as ground of explanation, 3. as the complete concept for the ends of rational beings. 1. God as the highest being. 2. God as the supreme universal cause. 3. God as the highest good. a) For pure speculative reason, b) for the empirical use of reason with respect to nature, c. for the practical [use of reason]. Always the unconditioned and at the same time complete.

6240. 1785–8. E 6' To believe a thing and its a being is distinguished from belief in this being. The latter is the presupposition of its existence as supreme practical ground, thus that in which I take a moral interest.

6241. 1785–8. E 6'

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First, the need of (g pure) reason with respect to (g the concept of) a complete thing in general: to serve as the foundation and measure of all others. Second, the need of reason with respect to an existence: to serve as a ground for all remaining existence. Third, the need of reason with respect to an existence that is only possible according to concepts, namely of the actually existent ends (of nature) or of the merely possible and as such still at the same time necessary ends (of freedom). For all of these, reason requires unity. 1. of det thoroughgoing determination



Kant’s Reflections in his Copy of Eberhard’s Preparation for Natural Theology 93

(g of each thing for itself), 2. of connection (g thoroughgoing) in a world, 3. of purposiveness.9 And [the need of reason] with respect to an existence: to serve as a ground for each remaining existence. Second, the need of reason with respect to an existence that is only possible according to concepts through nature, namely of the actually existent ends (of nature). Third: of what is only possible according to concepts through fr our freedom, to serve* as the principle (necessary ends (of freedom)). *(g A. The need for a (g first) thing with respect to those (g of the first of things) that are possible as caused . Prime Mover . B. The need for a (g first) thing with respect to (g the first of) those that are possible only (g as caused ) through according to concepts (purposiveness). (g of the first of causality according to concepts) C. The need for a (g first) thing with respect to that which is only possible apart from nature, so of freedom only through according to concepts, however in harmony with nature.)

6242. 1785–8. E 6' God is a concept (idea) of the first of all beings, which is the supreme cause of all the rest.

6243. 1785–8.E. E 6' The final end is moral theology. Therefore, the concept of God must be adequate (g [adequately] determined) for this.

6244. 1785–8. E 6' The minimum of rational theology for the sake of morals, that10 it makes people better. “It is possible that there is a God” is sufficient for religion, but not for the According to Adickes this existed in at least two previous versions. In the first version “the three needs of reason” related to: 1. the ontotheological, 2. the cosmological, 3. the physico theological and moral proofs of God’s existence, while in the second they related to: 1. the ontological and cosmological, 2. the cosmological, and 3. the moral proofs of God’s existence. The following paragraph is a re-write of this reflection, beginning from the end of the reflection’s first sentence. 10 This could also be “since” or “where.” 9

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cult; for, the cult does not presuppose mere belief, but rather objectively certain knowledge . The proposition: “one should believe” presupposes that the one who says this knows what (g he) wants to be believed. (g The minimum of rational theology is a concept of God that, to be sure, is consistent with itself and with reason’s need in principles, especially practical ones, and the possibility of his existence, consequently the authorization to assume (g to opine ) it. The maximum is the objectively certain knowledge , i.e. the (g complete) taking-to-be-true, insofar as it is grounded on proofs. The mean adequate to the least capacity adequate and the best will is belief, which is the recognition of the necessity of such a hypothesis for either its own theoretical or practical use (theoretical and practical belief).) (g For virtue belongs there is the minimum of theology (g sufficient for virtue), namely mere opinion; for fear of God (g religion) something greater , namely belief; for cult (service of God), the maximum of knowledge , namely objectively certain knowledge .)

E § 6. More precise determination of the requirements for an account of the knowledge of God 6245. 1783–4. E 7'

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Since the concept of the original being is completely negative, that is, since according to its possibility and existence, it does not stem from any other (and is not derivative), one does not know what it is; thus the concept of the first being should here lead to an a priori thoroughly determined concept. However, the concept of an original being is completely arbitrary, unless one presupposes that something exists ; in the latter case, however, is it necessary to assume such a being. Yet because some existence is then assumed, the proof is not ontological, but rather cosmological, but still transcendental. If the existence of the original being is only to be arrived at through ontological grounds of proof, then existence must be deduced from mere concepts and not precede a posteriori. On the ontological path, therefore, the one concept that includes existence within itself must be found from among the mere concepts of possible beings, and this is the appears to be the concept of the most-real being .



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This has the peculiarity in itself that, through a general concept, the object is both thoroughly determined and to this degree is similar to the concept of an existing being. However, since apart from the concept in its thoroughgoing determination there must still be something else in addition, namely, not a new determination, but rather the position of the thing in itself apart from the concept, i.e. existence, thoroughgoing determination cannot yet include existence, and the proposition: the most-real being exists, is not an analytic, but rather a synthetic proposition; consequently, it cannot be found through pure analysis.

6246. 1783–4. E 8 However, if the all of reality should be taken as the ground of the concepts of all things, why precisely [should] all reality [be grounded] in one being and not in many? Because the multiplicity of things as things in general only takes place through the differing limitation of unity, and so of the all of reality, each of these beings is consequently possible only through a greater only, and therefore the greatest can contain only original (not derivative) possibility. As much as beings that have shadows presuppose a foreign light through which they are illuminated, only that which no is light without any possible shadow, i.e. the original light, presupposes no foreign light.

6247. 1783–4. E 8' The question is whether for the concept of the original being the absolute necessity of its existence is also required. Can one not perhaps say: it is neither necessary in itself nor contingent in itself? For, both concern only respective position and the existence of what inheres, i.e. an incomplete being, which itself is no thing; it is indeed possible to think the non-existence of a subsistent being, although non-being can never be something that can befall it, if it is once considered to be existent, and indeed also not its origination. All the proofs of the existence of God and of the determination of his concept rest, in the end, on the transcendental proposition: “That the most perfect being is an original being (s original possibility and original existence )” or: “that conversely the original being is a most perfect being, and consequently there cannot be more such beings [and] all the rest are also derived from it.” The first of these propositions is the ground of ontotheology,

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where existence is inferred from the concept of his attributes. The second is the content of cosmotheology (s natural theology ), where conversely its concept is deduced from11 the concept of something in general. The physi So all theology is in fact built upon the transcendental concept of the most-real being . Physicotheology helps itself to the contingency of the things of this world (especially from the ground of their purposiveness), so as to infer a being distinguished from the world, but afterwards pursues the transcendental path, so as to deduce the concept and the existence of the most perfect being from this; to this degree it has no advantage over transcendental philosophy. But at this point it infers the (g psychological) attributes of the highest being as a highest intelligence from the particular attributes of this world and turns deism into theism. Moral theology joins to the kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature the concept of a sovereign in the kingdom of morals, and makes from the highest being the highest good. If ontotheology does not succeed, cosmotheology also does not succeed; if both, i.e. transcendental theology, do not succeed, physicotheology also does not, and consequentially, objectively certain knowledge overall does not. Thus belief then still remains. Cosmotheology declares God as a first cause of the contingent and in this possesses an advantage over ontotheology, because it points to free will (supreme intelligence ). Physicotheology points to a will that governs the world: the supreme command .

6248. 1785–8. E 8' The transcendental concept of God is not knowledge , because one can posit no object corresponding to it, e.g. the existence of a most-real being , through mere logical concepts but not categories, because the latter require intuitions upon which the former can be based. The allness in the concept of the most-real is not the same as logical universality (one in all); for the latter is distributive, the former, however, collective (many that constitute one), namely synthetic unity. Now, I cannot guess from my thoughts, whether objective reality belongs to this concept; I must adduce intuition, e.g. a circle. But this is About here Kant struck out the phrase auf das likely changing choice of formulation from auf … schliesst (“infer from”) to aus … gefolgert (“deduce from”).

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always sensuous and should not be applied to the most-real being , and I have no other intuition; so I cannot provide it with objective reality, i.e. my thoughts cannot be called knowledge of the object. Reality is that whose representation in itself contains a “to be” ; whether the lik I do not even properly understand what that would mean, although I do understand the logical “to be” in the relation of the concepts. I want an example, which is sensation (of the senses); but this cannot serve as an example for God; consequently, I cannot provide him with objective reality.

6249. 1785–8. E 7' To assume the existence of the unconditioned is, reason has an objective ground of knowledge . This knowledge is objectively certain. But, how should it be determined [?]. All concepts of possibility aside from the most-real are conditioned; for all are either most-real or limited , and for us the concept of the limited is always derivative with respect to the most-real . This alone is the original concept , namely, a non-derivative principle of knowledge , and, remarkably, in order to reprsent a possibility according to thoroughgoing determination, thus as complete, reason must conceive the principle of all possibility in that which is most-real ; however, the original being is not therefore immediately the principle of the being of all things. Of the original being , one should thinks that it is not only non derivative , but rather that it is itself a principle (not something based on a principle ). This is its negative general concept as that of the principle of the unconditioned. In order to determine it, I must think of it as the most-real , i.e. a subjective ground, i.e. [a] need of human reason and [a] necessary hypothesis simply to make the possibility of things thinkable. But when the practical need by which I am compelled to think (g it) is added, then there arises from this a belief, where theoretical and practical reason harmonize and nevertheless there is no insight. So 1. the subjective condition for thinking possibilities is taken for the objective condition of the possibility of the things themselves as dependent on a most-real being .

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2. The concept of the most-real as that of the all-sufficient ground or the being containing all reality be in itself. 3. The determination of this concept through predicates of intuition (because this [intuition] is sensuous and not adequate to it) is impossible. So I can think a most-real being through logical functions, but not bring it under categories through theoretical reason, because these refer merely to intuition. The proposition “that the unconditioned must not only be the condition of a kind of knowledge, but rather, at the same time, of all” follows from the fact that otherwise it would itself be limited and therefore its possibility would once again be conditioned.

First Part: On the formation of the concept of God

First Section: On the inner reality of the concept of God, or on the possibility of a most perfect being.

E § 9. Requirements for the proof of the possibility of a most perfect being 6250. 1783–4. E 13'. Referring to E § 9

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Whether it is an invention to ascend to the concept of a most perfect being. Whether a determination belongs to the concept of the most-real being can never be known reliably. Is it extended or not? Here we can only say that extension does not belong to it, because extension includes within itself limitations, being and non-being, and consequently non-being belongs to its Re determination. About this however we know nothing real. Where we believe ourselves to know something merely real, e.g. knowledge , it is uncertain whether or not it is in real conflict with some other real thing, which is still more fruitful, i.e. that their grounds do not cancel each other in the same subject, or reciprocally annihilate the consequences.



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6251. 1783–4. E 13'. Referring to the heading of § 9 (g independent:) The original being, (g perfect:) highest being,* (g all-sufficient:) The being of all beings. The word “infinite” can follow the very first. *(g This concept is such that it thoroughly determines its object, and, indeed, with respect to what lies at the ground of all opposite predicates , namely, the real. The supreme being is therefore the being of beings , for all manifoldness is that of limits. and therefore the supreme being is not derivative, but original . An idea as prototype .)

6252. 1783–4. E 4'. Referring to E § 2 Either we begin with the most-real or the necessary being and infer the latter concept from the former, or vice versa.

6253. 1785–8. E 13' The concept of a negation is a derived concept, for it presupposes the concept of reality. But it is also not by itself the concept of a thing (because each being must be something real and negation [is] therefore only the determination of something real). So it is only limitation, and, since the [concept] of a thing that is already in part negative presupposes precisely such limitation, the original concept upon which all thoroughgoing determination (g of a thing as a thing in general) rests is that of a most-real being . Thoroughgoing determination is an idea that cannot be executed in concreto (g as limited ), but [as] an idea of a thing as a thing in general it would be the idea of a thing as most-real . For the complete is the ground of possibility for determining everything incomplete as thing.

6254. 1785–8. E 13' The concept of a most-perfect being does not contain as much (g and is also not as determined) as the concept of the all-sufficient

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being (omnisufficientis); for even if no being were sufficient for everything possible, one being could still be a sufficient ground for the most possible being. Some moral concepts already contain the reference to this allness , without containing a superlative . These are only those of the wise, the holy, and the blessed, because all three the highe contain a reference to the highest good for knowledge, for the feel will as legislative, and for the same as good.

6255. 1785–8. E 13'

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A most perfect being, of whatever kind it may be, is thoroughly determined by this concept,* and if it is thought only according to metaphysical perfection, then it is also thoroughly determined through this concept (although the concepts of place and time cannot be encountered therein). Now we refer to something as merely possible insofar as it is still undetermined by its concept with respect to many predicates; for, the actual is thoroughly determined, although this does not make it actual. For even if I can say: “everything actual is thoroughly determined,” still I cannot say: “everything throughgoingly determined is actual.” *(g Therefore Plato’s ideas are represented as individual beings, which, inalterable and eternal, are the self-standing archetypes of things. As a thing in general (metaphysically 12), only one being is thoroughly determined13 by its concept. All other things can be considered as if they provide all possibilities through the omission of some determinations.)

6256. 1785–8. E 13' It is impossible to determine a concept thoroughly; it is, however, subjectively necessary to represent the thoroughgoing determination of a concept as the idea of the completeness of the concept, i.e. to represent the object without this subjective limitation, and thus we think each object insofar as it is posited in itself, namely in the completeness of the determination of the concept of an object in general. If this concept is at the same time that of a real object, i.e. of a thing (g consequently the concept of an object insofar as it is already more precisely determined), then its complete determination is the concept of the most-real being . No other concept would provide a rule Cf. BM §89, AA 17: 389. About here Kant strikes out the German besti, undoubtedly deciding to delay the term bestimmt (“determined”) until the end of the sentence.

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for determining the object with respect to each given predicate. Therefore it is the condition for applying the principle of thoroughgoing determination to an object that is thought a priori.

E § 10. Pure realities 6257. 1783–4. E 14'. Referring to E § 10 Whether one can actually think of many realities objectively, or one without limits? The greatest reality as ground is at the same time combined with all the others. Whoever posits one attribute of God, posits all.

6258. 1785–8. E 14'. Referring to E § 10 We seek to know true reality (g not phenomenal) only in order to test whether it can belong to God.

6259. 1785–8. E 14'. Referring to E § 10 Reality as a phenomenon is (g not) pure reality and does not belong to the most-real being . The ideal prototype all as logical . Requires everything positive of the understanding’s determinations of things. Namely, from that which is real in our (g possible) experience, we take merely that which belongs to the concept of the understanding. Dependence alone constitutes the sure mark of a reality as a phenomenon . Now, the question arises whether we can attribute only a single one to him, aside from the transcendental ones, which in fact are only the titles for concepts, or all of them that we can give in concreto, only by analogy .

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6260. 1783–4. E 15'. Referring to E § 10, Remark, fourth sentence: “A finite … like this” [AA 18: 535]

were this the case, we would not be able, through elevation to completeness, to make use of the concept of our understanding in order to represent the divine.

E § 11. Mixed realities 6261. 1783–4. TH 15. Referring to E § 11, second sentence: “contradicts” but indeed: that it may not be able to exist with it in one subject, without that is to say, may not be able to follow from one common ground.

6262. 1785–8. E 15'. Referring to E § 11

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All predicates of God are derived from either his concept as the original being (g his independence) or as the most-real . The first, which are at the same time those of absolute necessity, are the most certain.* (g e.g. Simple —immaterial.) Unity based on the concept of the most-real . *(g for, that the original being is a most-real being is itself only an hypothesis of inferring from the subjective conditions of reason to the objective.) Singleness means that every r the highest reality is not distributed in many things, and also cannot belong completely to many things. The first is follows from the simplicity of the original . We indeed cannot have insight into the possibility God of the concept of of God as the collection of all reality but (for, the possibility of the concept, that realities do not contradict one another, is not enough); for but still we can be certain that no one can make the opposite even comprehensible; for realities that conflict in a being must be phenomenal realities throughout, and they are not in God.



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6263. 1785–8. E 15'. Referring to E § 11? To E § 12? It makes a great difference whether one regards the most-real being , with respect to all reality, as its subject or as ground. According to the latter idea, beings with understanding could come from it, without it itself possessing understanding. For the cause is not required to have the quality of the effect. The expression: “God is the highest reality” is the genus , under which those two concepts stand as species .

E § 12. The concept of the metaphysically infinite being 6264. 1785–8. E 15'. Referring to the beginning of E § 12 The highest reality: 1. as content of the thing, 2. as ground. All reality and the all of reality in a as a single being. The all is the measuring stick of mere reason, which otherwise knows no limited unity.

6265. 1785–8. E 15'. Referring to the beginning of E § 12 Whether I should not more preferably say: one reality in its highest degree?

6266. 1783–4. E 16. Referring to E § 12, note 1, sentence 3 The Infinity is a mathematical concept. The14 given mathematically infinite magnitude is also determined through this concept, but only relatively to human understanding. It is that which, in relation to unity as measure, is greater than every number. The metaphysically infinite is what contains everything, consequently the entire possible magnitude of a certain reality.

6267. 1783–4. E 17. Referring to E § 12, note 3, concluding sentence: “determinable ” definite

Reading das for des, as Adickes says was originally there.

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E § 13. A more precise determination of the concept of infinity 6268. 1783–4. E 17. Referring to E § 13 [AA 18: 538]

inner infinity: extensive, intensive infinity. infinity in real relations: precisely as before.

6269. 1783–4. E 18'. Referring to E § 13 God as supreme being . Deism . The concept of the most-real being as supreme being determines itself thoroughly (g with respect to the (g ontological) predicates), but the [concept] of the infinite does not. Because all negations here are regarded as limits, the most-real being is the unlimited being . Whether each reality, insofar as it is determined absolutely completely (with respect to every possible reality), could not provide a central concept of the most-real being , and the highest understanding, the highest power, the eternal, the all-blessed , not each particularly,15 constitute the complete concept of God. If his existence can be understood a priori, then the supreme being is a necessary being. If a determinate concept of the absolute necessity of a being is possible, then through this its existence is also proven.

6270. 1783–4. E 18'. Probably in reference to E § 13, note 2, number 4

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Possibility and actuality are not distinguished in the thing in itself; but rather through the thing is merely possible in relation to the concept, and actual in relation to the completely determined intuition.—When I say: “a thing is possible,” this means: it can be (however not: because it can be, it is). (g Our concept of possibility concerns merely relations; the absolute allows no concept of possibility that would be distinguished from actuality.)

About here Kant struck out die Go.

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We can ask about each thing why it is, because we cannot derive its existence from a concept; but that does not make it contingent. Possibility Necessity and contingency are therefore only relations of things to the concept. Things are neither necessary nor contingent in themselves; they are exist, and their non-being can indeed be united with their concept alone; however, under the condition of connection with another existence, it their non-being is impossible; i.e. they can be regarded as necessary in a conditioned manner and yet as internally contingent according to the concept. But still in itself no such separation of conditions takes place, so neither conditioned nor unconditioned necessity. For possibility is only distinguished from actuality in relation to concepts. Only with respect to the idea of freedom is possibility distinguished from actuality. As appearances, actions are determined in time and space (the determining ground of actuality), and there actuality is the same as possibility, i.e. necessity. On the other hand, precisely these same actions are free in respect of the intellectual subject, who determines himself merely according to concepts, because these are nothing in themselves and are only possible with respect to the activity according to concepts as ways for representing this activity sensuously; thus the actions, as appearan the determination of the intellectual subject, are neither necessar sensuously necessary nor contingent, but rather are not sensuous at all and to that extent free from natural necessity. We cannot comprehend, i.e. know a priori and have insight into, the absolute possibility of a thing, for that is already itself insight into possibility without something being given; however, possibility is supposed to be known without and before actuality, and it is supposed to be synthetic. Synthetic impossibility can never be comprehended, e.g. that of a figure, where synthesis is not placed in advance at the ground i.e. a in our sensible intuition, through which the object is given a priori in respect of our sensibility. Hypothetical possibility can be comprehended if something is already given as actual, as well as the law of effects and causes. The absolute necessity of a thing is, however, completely beyond our concept; yet we understand that possibility precedes actuality only in respect to our concept, and that, in themselves, the one cannot be separated from the other.

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E § 14. In regard to particular realities 6271. 1783–4. E 19'. Referring to E § 14 [AA 18: 541]

Everything that belongs to its determinations, belongs to its essence , for it is thoroughly determined through its concept. Its possibility is not distinguished from actuality, so essence also not from its nature. Still, this is not yet a question of the existence but rather only of the concept of the most-real being .

6272. 1783–4. E 19'. Referring to E § 14, sentences 3–5 Transcendental concepts are only pure when one omits the conditions of their empirical use and in general all conditions of sensibility, e.g. the present or the cause from which something follows.

6273. 1783–4. E 19. Referring to E § 14, third sentence: “without doubt attribute” For through this we determine only a thing in general, without particularly limiting it and distinguishing it from the most-real being.

6274. 1785–8. E 19'. Referring to E § 14 First, it is essential to show what lies in the concept of the most-real being with respect to the ontological predicates, as insofar as it is considered according to content, or as ground. Afterwards, existence. 1. Analytical predicates. Ontological [predicates] apart from existence. 2. Synthetic: first,* the absolute, 2nd the relative [predicates] as cause of a given world. *(g for its absolute or relative existence of the in reference to a world. For Spinozism, God has no relative existence.)



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6275. 1785–8. E 19'. Referring to E § 14 (g The atheist admits no existence: the dogmatic (the denier of God) denies the possibility, the skeptic (the Godless) all proof of actuality.16 The former [denies] the concept, the latter [denies] the ground of proof.) The atheist must still admit the analytic predicates of God (g for one cannot dispute the possibility of such a being). The deist also admits the synthetic predicates, but merely the transcendental and not the physiological ones, from fear of anthropomorphism. The deist thus also has no moral use for the knowledge of God. Spinoza was no atheist in the transcendental sense, also no deist, for he denied only cosmotheology. He His error arose however from a false ontology, since he formulated the concept of a substance in such a way that there would only be a single one. (g One could quite apparently say for Spinozism: if all powers and faculties of a substance created and preserved by God are merely divine actions, if we can think of nothing in them except these, then one can not have any insight at all into how the subject of such powers and faculties is to be posited apart from God. On the other hand, however, if we perceive action in ourselves and reaction with respect to other things, then in turn it cannot be understood how we should be accidents , which can never be the subjects of action and suffering.) The is deist is usually such from modesty, the theist is such (g often) from arrogance. The reality relative existence of God as the world-creator, not as the world soul. The synthetic predicate of absolute existence, of relative existence. Singleness. A singular concept . Many gods, since they are necessary beings, would not stand in interaction . Manicheans. Cosmological argument. From alteration, we cannot infer contingency, but rather, if an infinite series is not allowed, we can infer only the necessity of a first [being], although we also cannot make its first action comprehensible. Ontological argument. From the concept of the most-real , the

Regarding Kant’s distinction between Gottesleugner and Ohngötter, see the Danziger Lectures on Rational Theology, AA 28: 1242, and 28: 1246, translated below.

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necessity of the existence. Cosmological argument. To infer from the concept of a necessary being its quality as the highest reality. In the cosmological proof, I infer either a first, which is without alteration (a prime mover ), from the concept of the dependence of all that is alteration, or a necessary [being] from contingency, and then I ask: which attributes does a necessary being have[?] But the necessity of existence does not permit any attributes at all to be derived from it and is absolutely incomprehensible.

6276. 1785–8. E 19 Through the predicate of existence I add nothing to the thing, but rather the thing itself to the concept. So in an existential proposition I go beyond the concept, not to a predicate different from what was thought in the concept, but rather to the thing itself to precisely with the same predicates, not more, not fewer, and only such that it as to, beyond the relative position [of predicates], the absolute position is thought as well (the complement of possibility ). The ground of illusion lies therein, that the concept of the most-real being contains every sort of determination , but all other [concepts] leave the object undetermined in many ways.

6277. 1785–8. E 20. On the bottom edge under E § 15, but still referring to E § 14

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The whole difficulty of transcendental theology rests in that fact that it is not possible to determine the concept of the absolute necessity of a thing, that is to say, that upon which its thinkability rests. The necessity of the proposition is absolute only if it is analytic; however, the absolute necessity of things is a synthetic proposition.* The deduction of this concept yields: that it is a necessary hypothesis. *(g one can offer no case of this, all is logical necessity. The opposite of no thing is contradictory.)

6278. 1785–8. E 20' According to Mendelssohn, God still knows the contingency of all things apart from himself, even in relation to his nature, and therefore the thoroughgoing natural or theoretical necessity contingency. At the same time, however, [he



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knows] their practically necessity through his will as the best, and thus the contingency of existing things is a proof of the existence of a cause possessing understanding, without which they could not have existed. He knows his own necessity absolutely (without our being able to comprehend it). However, since, apart from through nature, we have no concept of the way in which possible things can become actual other than through a will, we lay this concept, which is taken from experience and has only subjective validity, at the ground of things in themselves. If we substitute for the concept of contingency the concept that we can think, not the conditioned, but rather the unconditioned opposite, then the argument concludes as follows: what we cannot think otherwise than so, necessarily is so, not perhaps due to contradiction, but rather because otherwise no rule of thinking is provided us; thus we see that all are mere subjective presuppositions. In the cosmological argument (from the contingency of the world* ) one would have to infer the contingency of the world not from alterations, but rather from the limitations of the things of the world; however, then one would have to prove presuppose that which was to be proven, namely, that only the most-real being exists necessarily. However, if someone assumes that time and every alteration is not a determination of things, but rather only a particular form of their sensible intuition, then the world could still be necessary. *(g This argument, if it is conducted based on the alterations of the world, can17 only serve to demonstrate that the world cannot be the necessary being . It can also be conducted otherwise like this: If something exists, then a necessary being exists. But now [something does exist]. T[herefore a necessary being exists]. 18 However, no limited being can be necessary (because it is not thoroughly determined through its general concept, and consequently it is contingent whether it is limited to this extent, and not less or more); so the necessary being is unlimited. The alterations in the world still lead, in the end, only to contingency and a first being as a necessary one. So it only comes to this: what kind of attributes belong to it in order to know from the concept of such a being its necessary existence at the same time? Or is the possibility of an absolutely necessary being to be deduced from any other concept? (It is a synthetic proposition and so About here Kant struck out the German nur (“only”), only to reposition it in the sentence. Following Adickes’ suggestion.

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cannot be deduced from mere concepts at all.) Absolute necessity is a boundary concept at which we must arrive necessarily—just as in all cases we [must arrive necessarily] at what is first—without and which can only be assumed19 for the sake of what follows, without its being understood or comprehended for itself. To infer the existence of the most-real being as cause from [its] effects proves this only to be the most-real to the extent that it is a cause ; however [to infer the existence of the most-real being] from the possibilities of things, which are only regarded as the determinations of a single general possibility, namely that of the highest being, proves the existence of the most-real [being] as a collection [of all realities], and consequently also, if understanding20 is reality, that it has understanding . All errors consist in our holding of our own manner of determining or deriving or classifying concepts to be determinations of the things in themselves.—One can use Spinozism to overthrow dogmatism. The critical and practical philosopher fears nothing from such enthusiasts.)

6279. 1785–8. E 21' When we represent a thing, whatever it may be, according to a certain concept, and wish to represent this concept completely then along with everything that belongs to it outside of the understanding, we place thoroughgoing determination at the ground as the schema of each complete concept. The concept of a thing in general, as determinable according to this [schema] or as the mere subject of determination, is merely possible, as congruent with this schema outside of the understanding, is actual, and if it can be regarded as also posited outside of the understanding21 through the mere concept, necessary. The contingent is everything in a thing with respect to which it is indeterminate through its concept. Hence is the determin we call it appears to us that the necessary is that which is thoroughly determined through its concept.

About here Kant struck out kan (“can”), only to relocate it. About here Kant struck out ist (“is”), only to relocate it. 21 About here Kant struck out durch (“through”), only to relocate it. 19 20



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E § 15. Pure abstraction of their concepts 6280. 1785–8. E 21'. 22'. Referring to E §15, E 21': The conclusion reached through metabasis 22 is not permitted in logic, since I use what holds for one kind of things or knowledge as a principle for another kind of things or cognitions; but the transition to another kind for the sake of inference can still be permitted, or indeed be necessary, namely from the objective principles of reason to the subjective: 1. for the sake of the completeness of rational grounds in their derivation; 2. for the sake of the abstraction of rational grounds from all determining grounds of sensibility, and, due to their self-standingness, toward a method that should determine concepts completely a priori, as in moral [concepts]. No probabilty is valid in such a metabasis, but also no objectively certain knowledge ; rather, instead of the first there is the necessity of the idea, [and] instead of the second: hypothesis, which is indeed analogous to theoretical presuppositions, since I must presuppose something that is neither similar to anything I know I do not, nor which I can represent determinately to myself, yet which is necessary for my use of reason in order to acquire completeness or even the certainty of [its] empirical use. I in fact do not pass over to another thing, but rather to another way of using reason, and its necessity, insofar as it is to be practical, justifies the theoretical. Without morality, the hypothesis would always be ungrounded and a the purposiveness in the universe would lead at the very most merely to a Spinozism or emanation. But, lacking such a presupposition, morality has no prospect of connecting the objective principles of the will (the good) and the subjective (happiness). No system of nature corresponds to the system of reason (g and freedom), and thus the moral concept would pertain to a mere being of reason , which dissolves into nothing. The existence of a being that is only happy and without morality indeed has some value for this being, but not for a mere observer. The existence of a being that is only moral and without happiness has indeed the greatest value for an observer, but not for the subject itself. But the value of existence must be objectively as well as subjectively determined and certain. For I can well say: Kant transcribes “metabasis” as a Latin word, metabasin, but the rest in Greek (although without the accents and breathing marks that we have supplied). The entire expression means “passing over to another genus,” and it is one of the fallacies listed in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (75b9).

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I must be truthful, even if fortune should deny me all favor; but this applies only insofar as I am and live, and I exist as a good being. But I do not know why I should exist merely to act. Precisely the same will (in the idea), which commands me this, why it commanded my existence. I cannot agree to this. Therefore, morality is necessary in a conditioned manner, but in this case the condition (my existence) is not simply contingent [E 22'] but impossible for me to want. Therefore, the will does not harmonize according to matter with this in repect to form.—A necessary hypothesis of reason, which in transcendental theology, however, is itself only hypothetically necessary, namely under the subjective condition that I wish to explain. Morals provides the objective condition.

6281. 1785–8. E 23' Morality is clear by itself, if the rational being exists; but this being’s existence itself has no value for it if good behavior is not rewarded.

6282. 1785–8. E 22 [AA 18: 549]

The concept of the unconditionally necessary being is the most unavoidable and yet most unattainable concept of human speculative reason. The concept of the most-real was only subjectively necessary, that of the unconditioned existence is objectively [such]. To know this through reason means: to think repres it as necessary.—The necessity of the hypothesis is distinct from the necessity of the insight. The necessity of the thing can be divided like this: 1. in as much as the opposite of the being*, or 2. in as much as the possibility of all other things would have been cancelled thereby. *(g The possibility of the same thing; to understand the possibility of a necessary being means: to prove its actuality.)

6283. 1785–8. E 22' The exi The concept of an absolutely necessary being is a necessary hypothesis of our reason: for deriving everything limited from the unlimited: firstly in the series of the dependent to the independent (a negative concept), secondly in the series of the parts to the complete (most-real being ). The latter is only a greater facility, but not subjective necessity. By contrast, in



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morals this hypothesis for the agreement of nature with freedom is necessary, because otherwise this is a transcendent concept and therefore its laws are also transcendent, and so could not be subjectively practical. The difficulty with comprehending the absolutely necessary, and nevertheless the (g subjective) necessity, of assuming it, is common to the theologian and the atheist; hence the concept of the most-real being , as what is thus least opposed to him, is still a permitted hypothesis.—From this follows inalterability, not so much in the whole of time (because it [the most-real being] remains the same), as that it is not in time: Eternity. (Duration) without time. impassibility . Solitude . Mere concepts based on absolute necessity. Now these follow from the highest reality. In transcendental theology there is no anthropomorphism, and it is thus not necessary to ascribe something to God accord by analogy . (g The authorization, indeed, the subjective rational necessity to assume a most-real being rests upon the presupposition of a necessary being as the independent ground of what exists, a presupposition which is unavoidable even for the atheist. Now, such a being must still have certain attributes, and indeed such attributes as agree with its complete independence and at the same time with its adequacy to be the supreme ground of the contingent. We in fact cannot declare the objectively validity of this concept. But in our reason there is a single concept, which alone is originary for it with respect to the thoroughgoing determination of a thing and cannot be derived. This is the concept of the most-real . It is moreover a singular concept and suitable for the complete deduction and at the same time through this the kinship of all possibilities. Thus we have subj a subjectively sufficient ground for assuming such an existence. This is a rational faith, which objectively is neither certainty nor probability. Rational disbelief has nothing to say against this assumption, as a hypothesis. Even the advantage of the unity of reason damns its maxim.)

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E § 16. The determinations of what is simple 6284. 1785–8. E 22' God’s relative predicates (g with respect to the existence of other things) are not at all [found] in Spinozism, if by relation an external relation

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is understood. However, if by this an inner respect 23 is meant, and indeed of accidents to a substance and vice versa, then even there [i.e. in Spinozism] relative predicates are ascribed to God. Thus the relative predicates of God with the world: either 1. Of inherence: Spinozism. 2. Of dependence or causality according to the system of creation. 3. Of interaction according to the theory of the world soul. The system of causality (g according to substance) is either according to emanation or creation. The [system] of causality according to the form [is] either of the orig of its generation or its mere modification (thus a mixed cause: Matter and God. fate ). The relative predicates of God with respect to the state of other things. 1. Preservation. 2. Omnipresence. 3. Concurrence.

E § 17. Spatiality 6285. 1785–8. E 23'. Referring to the end of E § 17

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The things in space are all bound a priori to the condition of space. Were this something in itself, then it would also be necessary and God also bound to existence in it. God must be present to the things in themselves and thus also to thinking beings, and thereby turn the idea of space in them into the necessary condition of their external intuition.

E § 19. Three kinds of determinations in God 6286. 1783–4. E 26'. Referring to E § 19 The deist ascribes all reality to the highest being only in abstracto, but none in concreto. How should the theist now proceed in order to ascribe these in concreto to God? We proceed with the selection of realities (g as much) through negation as through eminence , but in the way that we ascribe realities in concreto to the highest being, according to analogy . through analogy . Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §37, where a distinction is drawn between a respect and a relation.

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Realities cannot be thought in concreto through mere understanding, but rather are always affected by the conditions of sensibility; so whenever possible I will first free the reality through reduction from what belongs to it as phenomenon (i.e. from what adheres sensibly to it ), for otherwise anthropomorphisms emerge. But thereafter the [I will] elevate them infinitely as noumenal reality (should all particular determinations in concreto be eliminated) through eminence . (The path of eminence must not be taken before reduction; for human perfection could also increase ad infinitum, without being different according to species .) But because the abolishment of everything sensuous also abolishes the concept in concreto, which would transform all theism into a mere deism, the way of application according to analogy remains, according to which I confess not to know how the divine attributes are constituted in themselves, but only that they are thought in relation to the world in the same way as human attributes to their products.

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E § 20. Proof of the external reality or the actuality of God 6287. 1783–4. E 28'. Referring to E § 20 1. Possibility (g against dogmatic atheism) of the most-real being : that all reality can be contained in a common ground, i.e. we do not understand real possibility, but rather merely the logical.* This is not directed against skeptical atheism, for it only doubts the proofs of actuality. *(g whether all perfections may be grafted onto a single stem and can emerge from an inner principle of precisely the same thing, we do not understand (although also not the opposite), various perfections may indeed be unified in human beings only with difficulty, e.g. great activity, zeal in careful examination and investigation, etc. etc. Against dogmatic atheism it is sufficient that we demonstrate the impossibility of proving that there is no highest being, because that would have to originate from the contradiction of this concept with itself; however, this does not yet allow us to understand the possibility. To counter skeptical atheism it is enough to demonstrate that not every way of reaching conviction is cut off just because the path of speculation does not

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furnish it (as the skeptical atheist concludes) (the Godless). Because even if speculative conviction does not take place, moral conviction is still possible. The speculative doubter is the one who maintains that a thing ought not to be assumed whenever its existence cannot be proven. This certainly is valid of all speculative knowledge. However, precisely the same person, if he is in all respects a doubter concerning the existence of God, is a skeptical atheist; but he is in no way entitled to be so, unless he holds that all moral laws are empty illusions, for then he also does not require that God be assumed in a practical respect. Whoever thus maintains that virtue is its own reward has no need to assume a God.)

E § 21. The proof itself [AA 18: 558]

6288. 1783–4. E 30'. Referring to E § 21 The most-real being is the original being , when [it] can be proven that all possibility only takes place in and through it. Existence from mere concepts.

6289. 1783–4. E 30'. Referring to E § 21 One could conclude in the same manner that every being that is most perfect in its kind exists, because it necessary existence is also perfection.

6290. 1783–4. E 30'. 30. Referring to E § 21 E 30': It does not follow that something would be possible actual just because it is possible according to a general concept. But that something would be actual just because it is thoroughly determined through its concept among everything possible and is distinguished as one thing from everything possible, means as much as: it is not longer merely a general concept, but rather the concept the representation of a single thing thoroughly determined through the concept in relation to everything possible. This relation to everything possible according to the principle of thoroughgoing determination is, according to concepts of reason, precisely the same as what the somewhere or sometime are according



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to the determinations of sensible intuition.* For space and time do not merely determine the intuition of a thing, but rather equally its individuality through the relation of place and moments in time, because possibility cannot be distinguished from actuality (g in) space and time, because both together consequently all contain within themselves all possibility in the appearance as substrata, which must be given beforehand. From this it only follows that the most-real being must be given prior to the real concept of all possibility, consequently just as space cannot be thought as possible beforehand but rather as given; but not as something an actual object in itself, but rather as a mere sensible form within which alone objects can be intuited, and consequently the most-real being not as object, but rather as the mere form of reason in its thoroughgoing determination for thinking the distinction of everything possible, consequently as an idea that is (subjectively) actual, yet before something is thought as possible; but from which it does not at all follow that the object of this idea is actual in itself. Nevertheless one sees that, with respect to the nature of human understanding (g and its concepts), a highest being is just as necessary as space and time are with respect to the nature of our sensibility and its intuition. E 30: *(g Something whose relation (g to everything possible) is determined in absolute space and time is actual. Just the same, that whose relation to everything possible is determined in the absolute representation of a thing in general is actual. Both belong to the thoroughgoing external determination with respect to possibility in general and therefore thereby also constitute the thoroughgoing inner determination of an individual .)

6291. 1785–8. E 30' The formal ground of possibility—the principle of contraction . The material ground of possibility—the principle of thoroughgoing determination . As a collection. The first concept of the absolute necessity of a being is (g logical, i.e.) this: that24 its nonbeing contradicts itself. The second concept of the absolute necessity of a being is metaphysical: that its nonbeing would abolish the possibility of all things. About here Kant struck out seyn (“being”), which may just have been a misspelling of sein (“its”).

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Proof of a common ground even of the possibilities of things from essential purposiveness.

6292. 1785–8. E 30'. 30

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E 30': The contingent harmony with ends can also perhaps be explained through mere chance, as the atheist would have it. However, the necessary harmony with ends cannot at all be thought if I assume that the essences of things are given independently by themselves; for then it is impossible that they should necessarily harmonize with the unity of the end (e.g. to catalogue geometric proportions). For this, one must necessarily take as ground the unity of the being from which all possibility is derived, [and] in which possibility and actuality are not distinguished; for only then do all things harmonize necessarily among one another with unity, because they originate from such.* E 30: *(g From the concept of the most-real being , one must therefore not infer its necessity (the inner impossibility of its non-being), but rather one must infer complete reality from absolute necessity (as the being whose abolishment itself abolishes everything possible, consequently of the possibility of a highest being as the highest ground, the being of beings ).

E § 22. Particular proof of the necessary actuality of the most-perfect being 6293. 1783–4. E 32'. Referring to E § 22

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If through this proof the objective necessity of the highest being is not exactly understood, the subjective necessity of its hypothesis as the substrate of all possibility (for the thoroughgoing determination of each thing in general) in our reason itself in its speculative use is still understood, even though this use is not necessary in itself.



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E § 23. The proof a posteriori 6294. 1783–4. E 34'. Referring to E § 23 If from the concept of a necessary being the highest reality of the same could be derived, one being among all possible beings would be determined as absolutely necessary, and here I would not have to take experience as a basis.

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6295. 1783–4. E 34. Referring to the heading of E § 23 Cosmological

6296. 1783–4. E 34' If it is impossible to prove the necessary being from the concept of the most-real , it is still that much less possible to prove its attributes (realities) from the concept of the necessary being .

6297. 1783–4. E 34'. 34. Referring to E § 23 E 34': The proof from the evidence of existing things of an original being and from this the conclusion that an original being is also the most-real being . This proof assumes that an original being is a (g an absolutely ) necessary being , and concludes that the absolutely necessary being can be no other than the most-real being . All of this occurs because we first apply the concepts of contingency and necessity to the existence of all things (not merely those that are conditioned) and hence think an original being , whose concept is merely negative, through a positive predicate, namely the absolute necessity of its existence. When we separate possibility from actuality, this indicates that we have not yet thoroughly determined our concept of the thing; for then the object becomes something only thought, which in one or another manner can be determined among all poss predicates with respect to which dessen it must indeed be thoroughly determined, if it is to exist. The distinction between possibility is al and actuality is thus no distinction of things, but rather of concepts.

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To the extent that a concept25 is still viewed as indeterminate in all sorts of ways, it constitutes the concept of a merely possible thing; however, when viewed objectively as determined, it constitutes the concept26 of an actual thing. The origin[al] being Conditioned is the existence that, a priori, can only be known under the presupposition of a cause; unconditioned is the existence that indeed either can still be know a priori yet without being a consequence , or nevertheless must itself be presupposed as a cause, even though it may indeed not be known a priori, consequently also not as something caused by something else . The cosmological proof presupposes the ontological. For if from the fact that something is a necessary being it follows that it is also the most-real (because this can only be a single being and the concept of the absolutely necessary being must be thoroughly determined, and consequently several beings ought not to be understood under this concept), so one must be able to conclude, conversely, that the absol: necessary most-real being is a necessary being , since they are interchangeable concepts. I cannot convert the proposition: “all triangles are figures,” because the predicate applies to more things than the triangle. However, if I find that the predicate is only uniquely and alone suitable to this subject, E 34: e.g.: “is enclosed on three sides,” I must be able to reverse it. Now the concl[clusion] procedes And since the proposition is certain a priori, its converse must also be certain for itself a priori, i.e. in the case before us necessity must flow from the concept of the abs: nec: most-real being. Principally, however, the inference proceeds from the necessary being to the most-real being in that the necessary being is not determinable in more than one manner, and consequently is only a single being, and this single being must already be distinguished through its concept from all contingent beings.

6298. 1783–4. E 35'. Referring to E § 23 We can ask why something is actual anywhere; for in this we presuppose possibility as independent from existence. But then the concept of possibility is also “a concept ” interpolated by Adickes. “concept ” interpolated by Adickes.

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independent of all actuality and experience. The logical [aspect of] of possibility, the principle of contradiction, is namely the possibility of the concept. But the possibility of things themselves requires more, namely synthesis. At the ground of this lies the actual nature of our sensibility and our understanding, and it extends no further than the objects of possible experience. But there also the possibility, e.g. of a building where none exists, is nothing but the determination of a concept through various predicates, [a possibility] which however does not yet extend to thoroughgoing determination, and consequently also to relations. We can never understand complete possibility, but because we cannot thoroughly and in concreto determine a concept exhaustively. For if could we do this, then to it would belong predicates that can only be taken from experience, and whose meaning also only consists in the relations of the cognitive faculties to possible experience.

6299. 1785–8. E 35'. Referring to E § 23 The cosmological proof: If something exists then something absolutely necessary exists; i.e. it must be impossible for it not to exist. If this essentially means: it must contradict itself, then no being is absolutely necessary . If this essentially means: I must presuppose its existence according to the laws of reason necessarily (not as necessary), then it is the necessity of the hypothesis. A priori synthetic propositions that refer to no object of th possible experience could never have objective necessity. However, they could indeed have the subjective [necessity]27 alone of the presupposition of reason of a most-real being as the substrate of all possibility in in the principle of thoroughgoing determination, and this is sufficient for us. Reason always combines one existence with another, and can posit nothing by itself; it is thus only the faculty for a priori combination, not for knowing absolute necessity in existence. Nevertheless, absolute necessity is an unavoidable presupposition of reason in its totality. So it is subjectively, not dogmatically, necessary.

Following Adickes.

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E § 24. Proof from final causes in the world 6300. 1785–8. E 36'. Referring to E § 24 [AA 18: 567]

Natural theology : God thought as cause of nature according to the analogy with natural causes, i.e. psychological predicates. Physicotheology. Spinoza assumes two attributes of divinity, extension and thought: the modification of the first is motion. However, he does not want motion to come from thinking, but rather immediately from the nature of the being, and then God is not a being distinct from the world. The inference from cosmotheology to the intellectuality of the original being would go as follows. The world is a series of states that follow one another. A being can only bring about the first beginning through freedom; but freedom presupposes understanding, consequently the original being is the highest intelligence . Prime Mover . This proof is better than the proof that intellect belongs to the highest reality.—The prevention of anthropomorphisms in theism—according to analogy and by way of reduction . Incomprehensible.—No example of him, not even something similar. Living God. Highest intelligence , supreme self-sufficiency (g blessedness). Supreme divinity (g will). At first only from physicotheological concepts, then from existence.

6301. 1785–8. E 36'. Referring to E § 24

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With respect to the highest and in-itself necessary being that can be known through nothing given in experience (as knowledge through appearances), the make-shift fashioning of yet a few natural concepts, which can have their examples in concreto, rests not on its being unfathomable, but rather on its incomprehensibility. The first has that in common with all things, the latter is proper to all its attributes. We consider its relative attributes only according to analogy, but do not carry over the absolute to it. These relations are thought through pure categories; but one cannot say: the analogue of these world-attributes belongs to it, for this would prove a similarity in constitution of the things; but we only want to say that to represent according to our own manner the possibility of things, we must think its [i.e. the highest being’s] attributes according to the same relations as those we represent in the world.



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E § 35. Preservation and propagation of life 6302. 1783–4. E 51'. Referring to E § 35 The preservation of species can either be regarded as completely natural or as requiring a supernatural influence. In the first case, the origin of species would also indeed need to be considered natural: for each generation is to be considered as a new origin insofar as there are so many external causes that can modify and alter the formative power, so that, unless there were a reactive principle, the regularity in propagation could not be explained according to general laws from a predisposition created at one moment. Especially if one accepts epigenesis.

[AA 18: 579]

6303. 1783–4. E 61' On moral theology. Here morality is taken as the basis of all theology. Conscience is 1. the faculty to become conscious of the rightness or the wrongness of one’s own actions. 2. The inner standing of this judging faculty, as a judge, to hold us accountable concerning the authorization of our actions. The supreme principle of conscience is: that nothing is permitted to be done that the agent is not completely certain it (in general) is permitted to do. We can undertake nothing at the risk of acting unjustly. An hypothesis whose denial carries with it the risk of doing wrong, but (g through) whose acceptance (g we) can never do wrong, is morally certain, and an obj its presupposition with the intention of fortifying morality is moral faith. Moral faith is therefore not taken from the harmony of our judgment with the object, but rather with our conscience. Matters of faith are those in which the morality of the taking-to-be-true is the essential thing. The existence of God and the future world are matters of faith for mere reason. With respect to speculation they are not of great importance, and cannot be apodictically proven. But if morality is assumed, then they are indispensable hypotheses for bringing it into activity. Here, the guiding principle of conscience, with respect to a morally good intention, is to pretend to no more conviction than we are capable of having, so that we are sure not to act unjustly in this knowledge.

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E § 49. More refined atheism 6304. 1785–8. E 69'. 34. Referring to E § 49, comment 2, “Spinoza” [AA 18: 597]

One and all .

E § 71. Beneficence, holiness, justice [AA 18: 598]

6305. 1785–8. E 101'. Referring to E § 71: On the humanlike in the expressions that still must be understood “as is fitting for God ”. On the Godlike in the idea of a perfect human being.

6306. 1785–8. E 102'. 34. Referring to E § 71, comment 1, sentence 2: “as means” never merely

6307. 1785–8. E 102'. Referring to E § 71

[AA 18: 599]

On God as the cause of the world. The ideal of humanity in its complete perfection is his firstborn son, the reflection of his glory, in him and through him all things were made he himself is eternal. Hence he is also called the selfstanding or original word* (the ground of becoming). He loves the world (g alone) only in him, and by relation to him the world creator is also called the Father of human beings in his Son, i.e. as his ectype . To bring human beings into this harmony with the ideal of the Son, the Sanctifying Spirit in him for eternity is the one who unifies the deficient creation with the most holy will through the aspiration to become like the ideal of the Son, and by supplementing deficiencies in justice.** He is the judge in us, the one who holds up the holy law before us and directs us according to it, but who also, through the ideal of humanity, supplements what justice we are lacking, if we are on the path to coming ever closer to him, and who brings us to infinite, continuous progress toward the ideal, and at the same time nearer to blessedness. In the imag consciousness of the first Adam, in whom we have all sinned, and with [in] the humble consciousness of the frailty of every (g human)



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virtue, which, however great it may be, can be overthrown by contingent tempting circumstances, and in the belief in a second Adam, i.e. a human being who withstands all such temptations, even the hardest, through ignominy and suffering, and [who] thereby proves the feasibility of what the holy law demands, and consequently that it is not an empty but rather a practical ideal: in the at-all-times progressive bette approach to this example of perfection in this spirit of humility and at the same time of hope, we can thereby become the objects of God’s love in his Son so that we become like him and justified with him. Here there are neither feelings and supernatural influences nor historical sources of knowledge, but rather mere human reason. *(g He is the uncreated, but still the archetype of the most glorious being that can be encountered in creation; the human being, who is like him as much as the limitations to which it is inevitably subjected as a creature permit, is united with him in one person.) **(g He proceeds from the Father and is sent in that by the Son. For because no creature is equal to the ideal of humanity, while no creature can be holy by means of creation , but rather only by means of freedom: thus the holy law aims at the influence of this law (g in) itself upon the will of creatures, but the beneficence of the Father with respect to the Son has the will to accept the creation through its filiation through the Son. So a morally up[lifting?] invigorating and preserving power of God is necessary for bringing the human being with closer to the ideal of humanity, for directing it internally according to the ideal , and for grounding and confirming faith in the ideal so as to aspire to an ever-progressing approach toward it. This Spirit is thus the means pleasing to God for actualizing the object of creation, humanity, in the namely the establishment of the community of a kingdom of God under laws, a beneficent administration, and a just court, and indeed under the paternalism only made possible through the filiation of the subjects.)

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Second Part. On the Communication of Religious Knowledge Section I. On the Means of Sensible Communication § 73. Its constitution and appropriateness 6308. 1785–8. E 105'. Referring to E § 73

[AA 18: 602]

In religion, the objective requirement is orthodoxy ,28 but the subjective is conscientiousness, i.e. pure examined sincerity in confession of what is taught as orthodox. If one to choses according to one’s best ability the as what one thinks to be orthodox, then one can have religion with complete conscientiousness, and in fact religion is only found in pure conscientiousness. Now, where there is no freedom of choice public investigation, where investigation is either forestalled by ingrained prejudice or blocked by compulsion, there religion is unconscientious, i.e. priestcraft or the subservience power of, slavish of God or hypocritical subservience under the pressure of pious observances. One should not call that religion: it is priestcraft. For religion must be conscientious, and to conscience belongs freedom. It cannot be said that the one thus who accepts even a true religion through compulsion proceeds conscientiously; for, he must know and even understand that something is his duty, and cannot rely on other assurances. What he does herein according to the moral laws of reason: the effort to commit oneself to righteousness etc. etc., that alone can be credited to him for the good; the rest is lost work and moreover a reckless and consequently dishonest and simple ingratiation.29 Priestcraft is everywhere the same: Catholicism and Protestantism are essentially distinct. Thus there are arch-catholic Protestants and indeed also protestant Catholics. Once one assumes the slightest that included among what we can do to please God there is something more than the good conduct of life, then there are no boundaries. If the character of the people becomes corrupted in one part, then this carries over to several parts as well. Certain observances still seem necessary for religious exercise education, and in these there must be a mechanism that is not easy to alter; but that it was with that they must be constituted such that even if they were unnecessary, or grounded on false narratives or pretended revelation, they would be are at least morally indifferent. But creeds concerning their truth Kant glosses Rechtgläubigkeit with orthodoxie , which both translate as “orthodoxy.” Cf. Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, AA 5: 264.

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are the a burden for the conscience. What I merely believe, need I cannot swear to (g as true), and it is indeed a guarantee for the moment to swear that I believe it, but I cannot swear that I will believe it forever, and becau consequently [I do] not take it upon myself to do so, and a lord always acts unjustly if he takes an office away from his servants (unless it is that of a teacher), yet not30 because they do not wish to act against conscience.

[AA 18: 603]

6309.1783–4. E 106'. Referring to E § 73 On sincerity, honesty, and righteousness. (g The opposite of sincerity is dishonesty, in a higher degree, falsehood, in the highest degree, lack of conscience, which is distinct from nefariousness). g (External sincerity (g in utterances to others) is truthfulness, inner sincerity is honesty, both together are righteousness, insofar as they,31 when examined are, are certain.) Upright of life and unsoiled by wickedness .32 This seems to be the easiest and the one thing that is within the faculty power command of the human being. For it means nothing more than: never to do something with the consciousness that it is unjust, or with (g the consciousness of) a surmountable ignorance of whether it is just. Nevertheless, this is the actual dishonesty rooted in our nature, which is the last to be laid aside, and everyone seeks to deceive themselves and everyone else. Truthfulness is what is required first of all. What is true is often difficult to make out; but one can be truthful in all cases simply, if only one wants to. The inclination to mere appearance, which the slaves of form nourish,33 is the effect and, in return, the cause of this ruination of character. Formality is certainly necessary in serious action, but the end (g and disposition) must be truthful. At most it can (g then) become pedantry. However, positing formalities as a surrogate for the disposition ruins attitudes in civil proceedings, in religion, and even in commerce . One can be honorable, but this alone does not make them honest, i.e. honor based on principles (toward others); righteousness is still something more, namely sincerity with respect to oneself in the sharpest self-examination. Job. The harm that arises from the sciences when “yet not ”: Adickes seems correct in saying that these words make no sense here, and are left over from a previous formulation. 31 About here Kant struck out the German preposition auf (“on”). 32 Horace, Odes 1: 22, 1. 33 Adickes suggests perhaps form dienen for formdiener, which we have not followed. 30

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one is not honest, from religion when one is not righteous. “What is truth?” is a logical question in religion, and in this point orthodoxy is different. “What is truthfulness and righteousness?” is a practical (moral) question, and in this case one can easily see that each must follow his own reason and conscience. The material of religion is: to be a better human being, the form: to adopt the manner and style of a disposition that surrenders to God through actions that in themselves contain no moral content. Therefore, formalities as final end or as the essence of religion. Oaths are formalities to rouse the conscience; otherwise, as declarations they are, as Christ indicates, absurd. But they cause great harm, like the signatures of the English clergy under the 39 Articles.34 They make the lie permissible, just not when it is sworn. The first part of education. The arguments from prudence (nothing is certain except what is conscientious),35 from utility , used as evidence of truth, corrupt the character. How many people hide their own uncertainty and speak loudly as if resolute, just because they deem it useful. Laying down a meaning in the Scriptures that one is not certain is found therein, if this meaning is only moral, means: to ascribe a good intention to it, which we are always obliged to do as long as the opposite is not proven and which is also the most noble. Ever do they ask: what may God do to make them blessed, not: what they must do to partake in blessedness, and they invariably believe, because they confess and praise that what he does, that they have done everything on their part to partake in blessedness, without being worthy of it, and thus to acquire heavenly favor through ingratiation, and they corrupt their character. (g Celebrations in religious matters are very awkward means. They are formalities as transactions . Formalities as methods are good in the judicature and religion. However, they must not supersede the real things; [they] are honestly intended.) The look of a person who is not sincere (he squints, a vacant look). Only freedom in thinking can produce sincere people; religious compulsion either produces hypocrites or at least people who are unconscientious, because they scrutinize nothing, since, having no choice in the matter, (g it) is of no help to them. Even freedom, of course, produces windbags and frivolous people.

Anglican clergy must take an oath of loyalty to the 39 Articles, established in 1563 to define Anglicanism. 35 Adickes identifies this clearly as an objection to the arg. a tuto, not its appositive. 34



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On Rational Means of Communication E § 74. Its certainty and constitution 6310. 1785–8. E 107' On the Son of God. Each creature has duties. For all of these there must be an exemplar . This exemplar cannot be found in any creature (g for no creature is completely adequate to any duty, since a temptation is still to be found before it that overthrows its good will), also not in the creator, for he has no duty, thus only in the one who proceeds from God, the one who serves humanity as an archetype insofar as he is a human being, but yet can only exist in God, the one thus who is bound to with his essence as the Son of God, i.e. in the idea of humanity within the divine understanding. (No one is good except the one God.)36 This exemplar is thus the God-man, and whoever is progressing toward this archetype is37 accepted by him. But even if the creature has this exemplar: from where does it get the faculty to be adequate thereto? It must get the faculty from itself, for otherwise this could not be attributed to it; but since no creature can be fully adequate to the exemplar at any point in time, there must be something i.e. the God-man that can serve it as a guide, and give it courage with respect to this progress ad infinitum. The creature also cannot take hold of this confidence out of itself. Therefore only when the creature takes comfort in the holy but also beneficent providence in the same measure as it makes use of its own powers, is it also equipped in its progress with a new (g greater) faculty for the future, or, failing this, even to be forsaken by it. This is the sanctifying spirit, the source of the moral life, who at the same time gives direction.

Adickes: Matthew 19.17; Mark 10.18. About here Kant struck out ist, only to put it back immediately.

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Danzig Rational Theology According to Baumbach The rational theology of Herr Prof. Immanuel Kant 19 July 1784 Introduction. Human reason requires, in every kind of knowledge, the idea of completeness (totality) as the measure of all other knowledge of the same kind so that it can determine the degree of this knowledge, and it makes such ideas actual for itself. This is evinced in all sciences, particularly however in the genuinely rational sciences. For example, with respect to the mutual connection of human beings we think the perfect idea of friendship. This is necessary for us (even though in the world no such friendship has ever existed or ever will) and indeed for the reason that we make it the measure of mutual love and determine the degree of this love according to it, to the extent that such love does or does not approximate to the totality; for if I limit what is complete in this idea in manifold ways, then from this arise the manifold lower degrees.—So if we lack such a complete idea, then we cannot in the least determine the lower degrees; for we do not know at all then whether or not something is lacking for completeness.— Such a complete concept is called a transcendental idea, since it is not and can never be encountered in experience, but rather in reason, since it indeed must provide the rule that is to be made into the principle for judging all things of such a kind. Thus I can think, for instance, of a perfect republic even though it does not exist and also hardly can exist as e.g. the author of the history of the Sevarites1 and Plato in The Republic thought; for, whoever has no

Originally published in English in 1675 as The History of the Sevarites or Sevarambi: A Nation Inhabiting Part of the Third Continent, Commonly called Terrae Australes Inconitae by Denis Vairasse d’Allais (c. 1630–72). See also note 123125 (AA 28: 1442).

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such complete idea of a perfect republic also cannot in the least know how to constitute a moderately good republic.— Since such an idea can neither be found in experience, nor can one indeed hope for it to be; it appears to be only an empty figment of the mind. But this it is not, since it is an indispensable basic measure of reason according to which to assess all things of the same kind. Now of such transcendental ideas there are three kinds:

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1. The complete determination of a thing in regard to all its possible predicates through the concept of it. This is the idea of God. Our reason requires, therefore, a being of such completeness. 2. The completeness of the derivation of a thing from another. This is determined only through a first being that is the first ground and not again a consequence. And that is absolute completeness; respective completeness belongs to every first thing of a species, as e.g. belongs to the first human being. 3. The completeness of interaction , that is, the thoroughgoing determination of the combination of the manifold; that is to say, the dependence of many on one. If in a republic one is to stand with the other in the most perfect connection, then they must stand under one. So here the totality of determination, of derivation, and of interaction .— The totality of the determination of a thing, that is, the concept of it, extends to details, and it is only most complete in regard to God; for in that case we determine all possible predicates. For example, in regard to regular figures, such as the square and the circle, angles and sides are determined through their concepts, and, with regard to the latter, the magnitude in a certain respect as well. In morals we have a perfect idea of righteousness, but not of complete beneficence. In regard to the idea of derivation the Catholics have the unity of their Church, and for reason this has something so charming about it that Leibniz preferred them in part to the Protestants. We make for ourselves a transcendental idea of heaven and hell. The former we picture as the maximum of virtue combined with the maximum of blessedness, which is an inner contentment of the soul that is dependent on no external cause; the latter, we picture as the maximum of evil combined with the maximum of unhappiness. According to these ideas we measure virtue and have heavenly virtue and infernal vice. From this we see our distance from the former and can strive



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to approach always more closely to the goal, since we recognize it. Heavenly virtues are those such that I find satisfaction in the good itself, without first allowing myself to be guided by motives. Infernal vices are those where I find satisfaction in evil itself. The devil has such vices, but human beings do not; for these do evil merely through pursuit of gain.—Such infernal vices, those that contradict human nature, are ingratitude, envy, and pleasure in the suffering of others . The happiness or unhappiness combined with this are not complete ideas; for they rest on sensation and are merely ideas of the imagination, which are different for every human being. Accordingly, the Greenlanders, the East Indians, the Muslims, and so forth, each represent heaven differently. As well, the Scottish have a different representation of hell.2 All these transcendental ideas are only necessary for reason’s sake, from which it does not follow, however, that they actually exist. We must have a complete idea of each thing; for otherwise the concept is not precise if it does not determine all predicates, and the concept serves us afterwards as measure.— The laws of morality must be presented in the greatest completeness and purity, even if they are also unachievable for us. For example, Rousseau’s Emile is the idea of a perfect education. It is not possible; for in this case a person must dedicate an entire life. But one must abstract from this; since it is contingent and can perhaps be alleviated.— The idea in an individual is an ideal; for example, the Cyrus of Xenophon is an idea of a perfect ruler, which Xenophon here presents in concreto.3 The Sethos of Terrasson4 is the ideal of a perfect being. The sage of the Stoics is an ideal.5

Note 12337f (AA 28: 1442) attempts to clarify this obscure remark with references to the anthropology transcripts, but does not really add to our understanding. However, perhaps Kant is referring to mediaeval representations of the Mouth of Hell, an open-mouth monster waiting to swallow sinners, which seem to have originated in Anglo-Saxon Britain. See: Gary D. Schmidt, The Iconography of the Mouth of Hell: Eighth-Century Britain to the Fifteenth Century (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1995). 3 i.e. in his Cyropaedia: The Education of Cyrus (early fourth century bc). 4 i.e. the pharaoh Seti I (c. 1294–79 bc). The novel Kant cites was originally published in French in 1730 as Sethos: histoire ou vie tirée des monuments-anecdotes de l’ancienne Egypt, traduite d’un manuscrit grec by Abbé Jean Terasson (1670–1750), and translated into English by Thomas Lediard as Life of Sethos, Taken from Private Memoirs of the Ancient Egyptians (London: Walthoe, 1732). The French work, stylized as a translation, was quite popular, and its influence was felt in Mozart’s Magic Flute. Also see note 123322 (AA 28: 1442). 5 As the editor reminds us (AA 28: 1442, n. 123323f), Kant discusses this in the Critique of Pure Reason (A 569 / B 597). 2

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This leads us to the idea of a highest perfection, a highest being. This concept is surely an idea, but necessary; for it is the most complete. The things in the world are to be seen as if half in light, half in shadow; that is, they have perfections and deficiencies, and hence without this concept [of a highest being] I can fully determine no thing in the world.— Is this highest being in a place?—No, that must limit it. The concept of the highest reality determines a thing precisely; for more than everything is nothing, and not-everything is less than everything.6 I can think of this being as the most perfect nature. I can also think of it as the highest good, a being of the highest morality and wisdom. So the highest being has the highest transcendental, natural, and practical perfection. Now the system of all our cognitions of the highest being is rational theology. Cognitions of God are common if they compose no system, [but] are science if they compose a system. So rational theology is a science. It does not contain, however, the system of all cognitions proper to God; for only God possesses that; that is archetypal theology ; but rather all cognitions we are capable of having of God; that is ectypal theology .7 Rational theology is therefore a complete system of the knowledge of God that is possible for the human being through reason.— We can actually know all knowledge of God that is possible for the human being, and so have an absolutely complete system; but the archetypal theology is inexhaustible for us, and we could not learn it entirely at once through revelation. Natural theology can therefore be brought to completion, so that nothing can ever be added to or taken away from it. It can determine its own boundaries completely and measure out its entire faculty. Which kind of cognitions will be most useful in this theology? The positive cognitions, which serve for extending [our knowledge], will be very limited; but the negative, through which we ward off errors, will be very useful for us; that is, theology as a science will teach us no more than common knowledge about God; but it will serve us in warding off errors and in this will We have supplied a missing period. C.f. Baumgarten 2013, §866, where Baumgarten distinguishes between theology broadly construed, and exemplary, or archetypal, theology. Also see our note b to that paragraph.

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take precedence over common knowledge; for in regard to the latter I know not the boundaries, and hence proceed in danger of falling into enthusiasm. I also do not know the sources and the connection, in order to defend myself against objections and doubts. —Theology does not serve to benefit natural philosophy; for to explain the occurrences in the latter theologically, not only does not help it, but is also very damaging to it. If I also find in the world great purposiveness, then I must not just soar up to God. It is entirely opposed to natural philosophy; for here I must call only upon causes that can be given in experience, where truth can be tested through experience, and through this alone can the knowledge of nature be extended.—It is said, however: the principle of calling upon God makes it such that we always search for wise ends. But then I must first make for myself a plan of the divine wisdom, of how this would be well composed, which [otherwise] may reveal too much conceit. One can proceed teleologically in the study of nature, and in particular presuppose purposiveness in regard to organic bodies, but in this one must not proceed theologically, since the word “God” is doubtless more comprehensible than the word “nature,” but I do not yet know God correctly, whereas I always have nature right at hand. Theology combined with morals yields religion, and that is its proper end. To the moral concept of God as a highest good belongs the best will, the highest power , the greatest duration, and so forth, in short a most perfect being . Along with moral perfection I must also think of natural perfection equally in the highest degree. The physical concept of God as an intelligence is entirely undetermined to the extent that I know him from the purposiveness and order of nature or know him from his effect. However, in this case I can at most infer great wisdom. Only the moral concept determines the concept of God completely. The determinate concept is the all . Hence the concept of God also belongs rather to morals than to physics. We first accept one cause here, and then several owing to the conflict in nature. Theology is not employed in a theoretical, but in a practical aim, in order to provide the moral laws with effect. Which interest does reason have in this science? Not a speculative one, but rather a practical, and, in particular, a moral interest. It is not to make us learned (for God’s knowledge is too elevated for us), but rather it is to make us into better human beings. It can give our moral disposition force and reality, and thus it is interesting for us. It is also useful to us on account of religion.— Yet we also have a speculative interest. From the concept of the maximum we can know all limits and thus also the limits of human reason. (Yes,

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it will be said, this is to explain the obscure through what is equally obscure .)—Here, however, that is not the case; for I think the concept of the maximum to myself more distinctly than all others; I need only to leave aside all experience. And according to this I can more determinately know human magnitude, since I see how much is yet missing from it. It may appear that we should know the world better than we do God; but the concept of the things in the world is indeed more extended, but not as determinate. Hence I must determine them according to the concept of the maximum of each. Hence people, and even the common person, pride themselves alike on the concept of God in order afterwards to be able to determine the concepts of other things more exactly according to their degree. The concept of God serves in this way often for speculation and for determining its concepts.—This, however, is nowhere nearly as important as the practical interest.— In this sense, however, the concept of God is not serviceable, if we would explain from it all the occurrences of nature.—That is what a lazy reason does. We must explain all natural occurrences from their natural causes; for this is why we have reason.— What kind of dignity does this theology have?—Among all the things of man, nothing has greater dignity than morality. Here the question arises, however, whether we have knowledge proportionate to the dignity of the object.—In morals we have it. So in this case the object and the knowledge have dignity.—Theology has an object that has the highest dignity. But theology itself does not have much dignity, since it is very limited.—The subjective value of a science is usually confused with the objective value.—If theology knew God just as he knows himself, then it would have the highest dignity, since through it we would learn all wisdom.—But theology nevertheless acquires a high dignity since it is the substratum and consummation of morality, and [so does] all natural religion, which is morality combined with the idea of God as a legislator.— Theology has dignity because it borrows its knowledge from morals. People often boast about the dignity of the object of which they speak in the belief that it also gives them a dignity; however, if the knowledge has no value, then it is all the more contemptible. Because of religion, theology has value and dignity. Provided that human beings have religion, they must already have knowledge of God, which must be capable of being the same for all. Were this not the case, then only some human beings would be capable of accepting religion and of



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observing their duties. Theology has true dignity if it is so suited to the healthy understanding that one does not need scholarship to acquire it. Inasmuch as it belongs to the sciences, this provides it with a polish. It is necessary as a science in the field of scholarship for the refutation of errors and the maintenance of its rightful knowledge; for theology as the knowledge of reason as a whole proceeds in great danger of being overthrown by objections. Because it is entirely surrounded by science, it must also be elevated to the rank of one. Hence it has merely a negative and no positive use for the extension of knowledge, for the most erudite understands what in theology belongs to and serves the practical no better than does the most common human understanding. The most common knowledge of God is sufficient for theology, but it has no determinate principle and is hence not understandable. Theology, as scholarship, thus serves merely as a bulwark against other scholarship. Errors are very damaging in theology, because on occasion they would alter morality. Speculative errors must be prevented also so that theology harmonizes with itself. Scholarship of God cannot, in this respect, be attributed to anyone, for in this case we would all know equally as much about God. In order to make our reason agree with itself and to harmonize the system of nature and freedom in the world with our reason, I can think of a being such as God, but I do not know his existence and whether he is also an intelligence and the highest good . In this case, I can only cite the need of reason to assume a highest degree of knowledge as its justification, because we are incapable of thinking something different or better in its place. A hypothesis of a divinity arises in part from subjective grounds, but we are justified since others do not know the object better than we do, and can satisfy us even less with regard to our own subject. Hence it is permitted to assume such hypotheses if thereby our knowledge harmonizes. Ancient philosophers divided themselves into physicists and those who concerned themselves with the nature of the divinity. The latter was theology. They even rose up to the highest being. The physicists explained it on the basis of nature, but their natural explanations were not assisted by experiments. Are there theologians of natural religion as well? – No, for its knowledge is not scholarship. – Theology is therefore not naturally well-grounded scholarship ; revealed religion is scholarship; for to it belongs philology, and so forth. Nevertheless, some ancient theologians called themselves philosophers, namely the Eleatic school.— Here Eberhard’s Preparation for Natural Theology is taken as our point of

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departure; but one will always have to go back to the author. Eberhard says here that the distinguishing marks of God have reality, i.e. that they can be thought.8 That is logical truth, but it does not yet mean that they have reality objectively. Religion is distinct from theology; for the former is knowledge of God combined with morality. What is the minimum of theology?9 Healthy understanding is the minimum of a correct understanding and hence we must see in every instance what insight this understanding can have into the whole of theology. If I consider theology as the basic concept of morality, then only the minimum of understanding must be presupposed. Not every human being can know the whole of natural theology. Thus, what is the smallest digest of theology that is still sufficient for religion for all human beings? This is therefore the concept of God, since everything perfect is always made infinite. And the minimum of theology is that every human being can still understand that a God is possible and that it is simply impossible to prove that there is no God at all.— This is certainly possible and understandable to the slightest understanding. Only, to make a sufficient concept of God, it must reflect on what appertains to thinking of God as a ruler of the world. Knowledge of the existence of God is not necessary for a universal religion and also it is too difficult for healthy reason. Reasonable belief is also not necessary for this. To be required to believe is not thinkable, since belief is an assent determined by grounds and therefore free. No one can be compelled to it. The common understanding makes a concept of God for itself, because to it this appears to be entirely rational since, through this concept, everything in the world harmonizes better and then also because of moral requirements. It represents such a God as possible. Moral religion is what makes us into better human beings because we surely understand the laws of morals, but through philosophy our wills cannot be given power sufficient to execute them. Cultic religion presupposes natural religion, and prescribes certain particular duties with respect to God. In such a case I must, however, already generally know beforehand that I am under obligation; for to want to worship God with an evil heart is nothing other than to seek to win his favor by deception. The pure understanding is not capable of [reaching] grounds of conviction regarding the existence of God, although Eberhard §6 (AA 18: 524). Kant asks this question several times in his notes on Eberhard: cf. R 6213 (AA 18: 499); R 6227 (AA 18: 516); and twice in R 6244 (AA 18: 532).

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it can still find this very agreeable to reason. Cult without conviction of God is hypocrisy. It must be a convincing taking-to-be-true based on theoretical and practical grounds. The maximum of theology would be the knowledge of the existence of God.10 And already the mere representation that a God is possible can provide morality with an incentive and be sufficient for religion. Certainly none of the Greek philosophers believed in anything more than possibility; for if it is possible that there is a God, then in regard to vice I must stand in fear, because he can exist, and so this already provides me with incentive for being virtuous.— Theology from a speculative point of view is not sufficient, but from a practical one it is still sufficient. But above all one must have a correct concept of God; for false concepts, when grounded merely on speculation, are damaging in that they can make us susceptible to attacks and in the long run they can represent completely chimerical concepts to us; but if they concern the practical, then they are more damaging still. Now, to the determination of the concept of theology.—God is the highest and most perfect being. And the system of knowledge of a most perfect being is theology. Ectypal theology is either 1) rational theology , and this is again speculative , when it rests on theoretical principles, which further is transcendental when the knowledge of God is derived through speculative pure reason, or natural , when it is derived from nature or from the concept of objects of experience; when rational theology rests on practical principles, [it is] moral theology. In rational theology the object is not thought up at will as in other sciences, but it is given through the nature of reason itself. The concept of God is in a general sense the concept of a supreme being, insofar as this is the cause of all other beings in the world. It is not innate in us, but rather acquired , so that reason, when it is cultivated, must necessarily arrive at it according to its own principles. God is an original being , because he is not derivative and is the cause of all other beings. Whether he is singular is not yet clear from this. (Some have even considered matter to belong to divinity.) However, this concept does not yet satisfy us; rather, we must also think an Cf. R6211 (AA 18: 497) and R6244 (AA 18: 523). A Germanized form of the Latin conquiro, conquirere, meaning to collect, to seek out, etc.; related to the English “conquer.”

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original being with understanding. Thus the most common employment of reason represents God as a creator with understanding, as a world-directing original being with understanding.12 The doctrine of the original being is theology. It can be rational and it can be revealed or empirical . Empirical theology is entirely impossible, since it must encounter its object in experience. The concept of God, however, is purely a concept of reason. The empirical path is not permitted. Here I can justifiably ask: from where does it get this concept? But it can be thought that an original being communicated this science to us immediately. Rational theology is theoretical and practical. The theology built upon theoretical principles is transcendental or natural. The one built upon practical principles is moral theology. Transcendental theology rests on entirely pure concepts; natural theology takes experience as ground, even though the principles of the employment of this experience are fully a priori.

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2) Revealed or empirical theology , which indeed would intuit or experience God immediately, and which we have of course attained through our own experience or through revelation.—Revealed theology is opposed to rational theology , not to natural theology , since the first of these is a part of the last. This is no longer pure like transcendental theology. Natural theology is either cosmotheology , which is derived from the concept of the world in general, or physicotheology , which is derived from the concept of the present world. God is the original being , which is the origin of all things; and this God is the highest and most perfect being , hence the being of beings ; that is a transcendental concept of God, which is the basis of transcendental philosophy.— If I consider the original being to also be the highest intelligence , then I derive this concept from experience in a moral sense, and so that is the concept of God that lies at the basis of natural theology.— It is called natural because nature is also the collection of all objects of experience, and I take what I know from nature.—Otherwise, rational theology is also called natural in opposition to the

In AA this is broken into two ungrammatical sentences, which clearly belong together as translated here.

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supernatural ; but the specific difference is revealed through the predicate “rational.” According to it, God is not merely the cause of the world, but rather also the creator of the world.— If I represent the original being as the highest good , then this is the concept of God that lies at the basis of moral theology.—In this case God is the supreme ground of the system of all moral ends, i.e. the highest good. In transcendental theology I view God merely as the cause of the world, in natural theology as the creator of the world, and in moral theology as the director of the world.— Here I apply the concept of God and investigate whether I can’t sustain belief in God on the basis of moral grounds.—Moral theology takes natural theology as its basis.— Whoever propounds no theology at all is an atheist.— Atheism is the thought that one opposes to the existence of God. It is skeptical if it says that it does not find sufficient ground to accept that there is a God; dogmatic, if it believes itself to have ground for accepting that there is no God. The former is still to be excused. It is still always prepared to accept God’s existence should it be proven. A godless person is one who is a dogmatic denier of God. He who propounds only transcendental theology is a deist, who, when he also propounds natural theology, is a theist. He who also accepts moral theology is a moral theist . There is still no [German] word for this. Natural theology is necessary, since otherwise theology would have no goal and no uses. The deist can distinguish God according to quantity, but not according to quality.13 Transcendental theology is of great utility as an introduction to other theologies; for it purifies theology of all anthropomorphism, but is in itself of no use, and [by itself] it is just as if I did not believe in a God.— Natural religion is not yet a foundation for religion, but rather first moral theology [is].— Moral theology is distinct from theological morals; for this latter is a morals that locates the principle of its obligation in the concept of God’s will. Philosophical morals are twofold. Some want to explain the obligation of our duties from free actions themselves; others presuppose a supreme being who See also AA 28: 1253 below.

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determines our laws. However, such theological morals really have no principle at all, because I must come to know the will of God first through morals; or if morals has a principle, then it can have no other than that the will of God has been revealed. Morals, however, must not be grounded on theology, but rather must have within itself the principle that is the ground of our good conduct. After this it can be combined with theology so as thereby to gain some force .— In moral theology, the concept of God is to determine our duties. But that is precisely the opposite, since our morals themselves must first determine the concept of God, where there are surely grounds for accepting this God with a firm belief, but which, nevertheless, have no power. Theological morals makes it so that we act virtuously purely from fear, purely from compulsion.—Thereby it does not teach us the repugnance of the action itself.—Natural morals must be thought independently of the concept of God and then it must be practiced due to its inner dignity and excellence. However, if we have taken an interest in morality , then we must also take an interest in the existence of God for the sake of the force that this provides to our morals. Speculative theology can be divided into ontotheology, cosmotheology, and physicotheology; the first considers God solely on the basis of transcendental concepts and views God as the principle of all possibility. Cosmotheology posits an existence, but also the minimum of existence. All proofs of the existence of God are: I. based on speculative philosophy. Here there are three proofs: a) From the concept of the most-real being . It was discovered by Anselm and is required for human reason. This is the ontological proof. b) From the contingency of the world , from the mere concept of a world; particularly championed by Leibniz and Wolff. This is the cosmological proof. c) The physicotheological proof based on the order, beauty and harmony of things. There are no other proofs. The proof of the ancients from the necessity of a prime mover amounts to the same as the cosmological proof; for here merely a contingency is assumed. The proof based on the confession of all peoples is not a proof at all; for general human delusions are found equally among all peoples; e.g. of the influence of stars on the destinies of human beings. This is a good investigation for anthropology.



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Transcendental theology 1) The Anselmian or Cartesian Proof. Our understanding cannot obtain a distinct concept of a thing if it does not know predicates of it. These are the distinguishing marks of a thing. Judgment arises from the predicate. All our judgments are affirmative or negative and so we think either by affirming or negating. Logic provides us the concepts. It does not engage itself, however, with the content of concepts, but rather with the use of concepts in judgments, unconcerned whether the thing exists or not. The thing whose concept contains a being is reality, and that whose concept contains non-being is negation. So here I look to the concept itself. Among all possible predicates of a thing some are reality, others negation; e.g. knowledge and ignorance; but in many cases reality and negation cannot be easily distinguished; e.g. gratification and pain. Is the latter merely negation or also reality? Some have believed the former. Here indifference is the negation. Many concepts have both being and non-being intermixed; e.g. extension is present, but not entirely; so it is also negation. Therefore not everything is pure reality. Negation is difficult to distinguish from this. Now our reason seeks to make a maximum from the concept [of reality]. Hence nothing is more natural than that the human being, since he discovers reality and negation in himself and in other things, forms for himself a being that has all realities. – Here I would think up a being that has the most complete existence. – What makes a thing, a thing? Now, that presupposes space; therefore reality or something positive must belong to a thing’s being or not being.—The thing that has pure reality in all predicates is complete as a thing. The distinction of all things, considered merely as things, consists in the difference in the limitation of the most-real being .—Non-being always presupposes being.—The being that is determined in regard to all positive predicates is a most-real being . All our cognitions of things are representations through concepts, which I always further determine until they are thoroughly determined, and then I have a concept of an individual . Every concept stands again under a still-higher concept and is the determination of a still higher one. All determinations are negative or positive. The concept of reality, however, always precedes

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that of negation; for negation is merely the cancellation of a reality; e.g. someone blind from birth knows nothing of light and darkness.— A being with all realities is the ground of the possibility of all things; for all other things are distinguished from it purely according to differences in negation. I see the possibility of all things as grounded in the most-real being ; for the negation through which things distinguish themselves presupposes a reality which is lacking in them. This we find in the most-real being.—It provides the basis for everything. It is like a penetrating light that at times is intermixed with shadow.— Why are all realties united in one being and not distributed among different beings? But then each different being would have to have reality and deficiency. Such a being cannot however be conceived, if I do not presuppose a being that has no deficiency. Therefore, I must have recourse to a most-real being. This is the most perfect being as a thing in general. The most perfect of a species of things would be very difficult to think; e.g. a perfect clock. A complete being has everything and from none. I can think such a being only as single; for several would be totally the same , and here I merely repeat my concept. Now, the second question is: Is there actually such a thing?—From the forgoing that does not at all yet follow. This thing is necessary for our reason, but this does not yet make it necessary. The concept is so necessary that it lies hidden obscurely in every human head.—The ontological proof shows the existence of this most-real being. It is said that a being that contained all realities must also contain existence, which lies in its concept as a reality. If this last were the case, then its existence is necessary, since it is inseparable from the concept. Were this proof entirely correct, then it would be the most magnificent proof; for it shows me the necessity of the existence of God, the unity of God and the complete concept of God, that God above which there is nothing. 2) The cosmological proof presupposes an existence, and through this is distinct from the transcendental proof. I take as a basis that in general something exists. If anything exists, then something must necessarily exist. Either the thing, which exists, exists necessarily or contingently. If the latter, then there is a cause of it and there must also be a being in the series that is not a contingent, but rather an absolutely necessary being.— Now, the question arises: How must its essence be constituted? The theist goes no further, but then he really has no theology; for I do not know whether there are one or several original beings ; whether it



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has limits or not. Previously we attempted to derive necessity from the concept; now we are to get the highest reality from the concept of necessity as well. This proof cannot be conducted unless I presuppose the transcendental proof. 3) The physicotheological proof is when I infer the existence of a creator from the existence of the present world. From the design of the world, I infer a powerful, great, wise creator. But I still do not know whether or not there is a higher being than this, whether or not there are several creators of the world. Here, the physicotheological proof must draw from the transcendental proof, so both of the other proofs come down to the transcendental one. If this fails, then so do the others.— In the ontological proof I infer the necessary being from the most-real being , whereas in the cosmological proof I infer the other way from the absolute being to the most-real being . Ontology and cosmology constitute transcendental theology; for even though I presuppose experience in cosmology, I still do not make inferences based upon principles of experience.— Now, if transcendental theology fails, then so does physicotheology. I infer a very great but not a greatest being. So I have no precise concept of God, and without that there is nothing. Hence one must take transcendental theology as a basis; physicotheology is knowledge of God from empirical principles. The ancients inferred the existence of God from physicotheology, and what different and confused concepts of God did they have [!]. They found contrary apparent purposes in the world; and so they inferred different gods. In mere physicotheology all concepts of God are unstable and uncertain; for where in this do I know the reach of God’s omnipotence and omniscience?— If we show the incompleteness of the speculative proof, then we do not deny the existence of God, but rather make room for the practical proof. Atheism is either skeptical, and all conviction of the existence of God and all certain knowledge of this is denied; [or] dogmatic, denying the existence of God in general.14 The skeptical atheist can have a religion; for he does not prove the impossibility of the existence of God; and if I merely believe the possibility of God, there can yet be religion. However, this is nevertheless a wretched state. This atheist is godless. Kant discusses these two types of atheism throughout his notes on Eberhard, but perhaps the most pointed distinction is found at 6275 (AA 18: 541).

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The dogmatic atheist is a denier of God who holds the existence of such a being to be ungrounded. However, since reason does not teach this and since no one can ever penetrate so far into the possibility of things so as to make out the fact that God is also possible,15 one can believe that there either is no dogmatic atheism at all, or that it would be maintained by someone based on evilness of the heart, or based on resentment over his adverse fortune; hence it would be the greatest foolishness. Critical or moral theism is that which maintains a conviction based upon practical grounds, while at the same time recognizing the weakness of speculative reason in this regard. In the first part, it is opposed to skeptical atheism, in the second to dogmatic deism. Hence it is not exposed to the attack of skeptical atheism; for this does not at all attack the existence of God, but rather the speculative proof of it. Critical awareness of our reason brings us to this. And through moral theism we are entirely secured against skeptical atheism. In it we consider God as the legislator in the kingdom of morality and ends.— All moral theology proceeds from morals, and we can recognize that all our duties flow from the idea of a freely acting being and from the nature of the action itself. It is not necessary for us to derive them from the will of another, or to prove them based on usefulness or harmfulness. So morality is generated entirely a priori. One can recognize duty as being apodictically necessary. Now if I recognize both the correctness and apodictic certainty of moral rules, then for me something is however still missing that gives me vigor and stimulus for obeying them. This comes from the fact that the human being is not purely rational, but rather also sensuous. We do not have happiness in advance, but rather are in need of it. Now, if I nevertheless sacrifice so many advantages, then I must still hope at some point I will be happy in return. I cannot expect this from nature; for here things often go worse for one who is honest than for one who cheats. Now, I still cannot dispense with happiness at all; for I am in need of it; so I must assume that there is another life, where my virtue will be rewarded and then also a being that thinks morally as do I, and so also will provide rewards. I must therefore assume a being who has all happiness in his power, and so is omnipotent; who knows the most-hidden incentives of actions, and so is omniscient; who is in all places and looks after virtue everywhere, and so is omnipresent; who exists in all times, and so is eternal; and finally who must also have a will that accords with the moral laws in every part, and so is a legislator. I thus know the correctness of the moral laws and wish to be able to obey them. Impossible?

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Moral theism does not rest on contingent laws, but on secure rules. Here I infer the legislator; in physicotheology I infer the creator of the world. Finally, in moral theology I can know the highest God; through physicotheology, however, only a very powerful being. Morals lead us also to the idea of a single highest being. Physicotheology teaches us nothing certain about this.

Transcendental theology If we want to form for ourselves a concept of the highest being, then we must consider it in three ways: God can be considered as the original being, as the highest being, and as the being of all beings. All existence is either original or derivative ; God’s existence is original. He is not something caused by another . This is a purely negative concept, and through this I do not think how an existence is, but rather I isolate this being through this concept; for if a being is caused by another , then it is in a connection. The second concept of God is that of the highest being. This has content; it signifies the highest reality. This is also the most perfect being, since it possesses all perfection in the highest degree. This is the being considered in itself. Now, I can also consider it in relation with other things as the highest and most perfect ground; insofar as everything comes from him and insofar as there is nothing that is not through him. These three concepts make up the entire main concept of God. The attribute of being the highest being is termed infinity; that he is the being of all beings is termed all-sufficiency. The concept of the highest being is the foundation of ontotheology; the concept of the original being is a concept and foundation of cosmotheology. It derives the original from the derivative existence. Ontotheology infers the original being from the concept of the highest being. I will therefore infer his original existence from the highest being, and, from this, I will infer him to be the being of all beings, and therefore proceed from ontotheology to cosmotheology and from there to physicotheology.

Ontotheology So here the concept I have of God is that of a highest being. In this I attribute the most perfect reality to God, since I consider him merely as a thing. I cannot

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represent a thing without realities. But it still has negations. However, I can only have something complete as a thing under the condition that one of each [pair of] possible contradictory predicates belongs to a thing. Such a thing is a most-real being . The idea of this is necessary for our reason. It is a being of reasoning reason . We can only think an object if we determine a universal concept more precisely. This stands, however, under a still higher concept. Reason represents that all objects of its knowledge must be determined in regard to all contradictory predicates. Otherwise reason cannot know them. So the concept of a most-real being is entirely necessary for reason; for each thing is still to be determined in regard to all contradictory predicates. Now, even if they have many negations, we cannot think them otherwise than by presupposing a reality; for in this case I cancel a certain reality, and so I still must know this.— Negations are therefore nothing other than limits of the concept of the highest reality. Since through this I remove realities, it therefore presupposes the highest reality. This concept of the most-real being has the peculiarity that through it the object is thoroughly determined! This occurs with no other concept. This concept is accordingly the standard of measure for all other things, according to which we can determine their degree.— The most-real being is the prototype of all beings. From this I can derive all beings, and they are not possible without it. Therefore, from it I can infer the being of beings . Now, if the possibility of other objects depends on this being, then its possibility must depend on none. So I see that the idea of reason is necessary; but it does not follow that it exists because of this.— God has all realities; but there are pure or impure realities. The author terms the latter mixed predicates,16 but the expression is not correct; for nothing cannot be mixed with something, rather something must be mixed with something.— Our concepts of things are hence purely positive or not. All things presented to us in experience have realities, for otherwise they would be nothing but negations. The realities of the highest being should be pure. That appears to be easy; but we must take all realities from the world, and there we find no pure reality. Now the question is whether the unity of reality or the multitude of reality comes first. A single pure reality completely thought already signifies God. This Eberhard §10f. (AA 28: 533ff.).

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is the point of the names of God: Jehovah means eternity. Theologians correctly say: He who posits a single attribute posits all. How is this possible? If I think of a reality as a ground without all limits, then it must be connected with all reality. Omniscience is not a ground unless combined with power and this with the greatest duration. No reality contradicts the others; for contradiction requires that I affirm or negate. So a negation belongs to it: A and non-A. So two realities cannot contradict each other. In the concept of the most-real being there is no contradiction. Its concept is therefore possible. However, it does not yet have objective reality for this reason. In experience, by contrast, we find that realities conflict with each other, or at least that one limits the effect of the others; e.g. thoughtfulness and swiftness or activity. It may well be possible with regard to the most-real being . So the concept of the most-real being is logically possible; but also no one can show me that it is a figment of the mind. The author says all limits must be abstracted from the realities;17 but that is so difficult that finally nothing remains but the concept of realities. For example, the understanding appears to be a pure reality; but it is the faculty of thinking discursively or through universal concepts, and if I must first know these through distinguishing marks, are those not limits? So in God the understanding must know things intuitively. But what do I understand by this?— If we merely think the highest understanding in God, then all the limitations still remain. The genuine concept of the most-real being is the all of reality . That is the genuine concept of God in transcendental theology. Through the “all” we can represent magnitude absolutely, otherwise merely comparatively. The most-real being can also be thought of as the maximum of reality ; but this concept is not as determinate; for if I know that a being is the highest in regard to its reality, I still do not know for this reason whether it also has all realities and how many.— The third concept that belongs to the most-real being is that of the infinite . The author distinguishes mathematical and metaphysical infinity;18 but that already presupposes science, which should Baumgarten 2013, §807ff. Eberhard §12 (AA 28: 536). Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §248.

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not be the case. The concept of the infinite is purely a mathematical concept, purely a relative concept. The infinite magnitude is that which, in relation to a measure taken as unit, is greater than all numbers. As in cosmic space .—This does not at all apply to the most-real being ; for from where do I get the measure? Only the most-real being itself is the fundamental measure, and aside from it I have no measure. The concept of the infinite does not determine the magnitude, but rather shows the incapacity of the human understanding for representing the magnitude.—In the concept of the most-real being I want to know the absolute magnitude, and I achieve this through the all of reality . Through the infinite I come to know neither absolute nor comparative magnitude. For this reason, it is good to know how far the human understanding goes. The concept of the infinite arouses astonishment by showing us our weakness, which the concept of the all does not do; however, it makes me none the wiser. Measure is not in the least determined through the concept of the infinite ; it can be great or small. Hence many an infinity can be more infinite than another. Accordingly, we must take something from the world as measure and yet it is not homogenous: and in this case the infinite determines yet no magnitude. The metaphysical infinite is explained through the all of reality; but that [i.e. the metaphysical infinite] does not imply its concept. But why is it necessary to use a mathematical concept in metaphysics?— With the infinite is associated the immeasurable.—The infinite does not indicate that a being is without limits; that is the unlimited .—Now, whether God is actually finite in a mathematical sense or not has nothing to do with the question of whether God has all realities, but rather serves to show the limits of human understanding. It shows that we cannot know with complete sufficiency the most-real being ; for the measure is heterogeneous, i.e. the realities in the world. One should say all-sufficient , since that perhaps better indicates that God is the ground of all realities. At least in this case I can infer conversely.—So we now arrive at the concept of God as the being of all beings, as the ground containing the possibility of all things. Now, the author comes to the realization that through one reality without limits all others follow



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and are posited.19 So, I can already express God through one reality without limits.— In transcendental theology I think God’s transcendental predicates, which are abstracted from every negation. To these belong his possibility, his essence , existence, necessity, substance, the unity of his substance and its simplicity, that this substance is different, that it is not only immaterial, but rather also not connected with the world, and so is also not the world soul. The God of the Tibetan Lama, who, according to his own pronouncements, exists among the select few of those holy (i.e. pious) people who are entirely purified through transmigration, is therefore no God; for this is a purely accidental , contingent connection. Eternity, omnipresence, power or omnipresence + impassibility.— After these we attempt to apply empirical predicates to God in cosmotheology. In correcting our concepts of God and abstracting from them what is contradictory, it is of infinite importance if I cannot know all things equally; for what is lacking can still always have some uses, and the lack can be easily compensated for; what is erroneous, however, will always be damaging. There are phenomenal realities , sensible realities, which are negations for the understanding, and noumenal realities , which are pure realities for the understanding; e.g. pain is a reality, but also at the same time negation, since it cancels another reality. Gratification is indeed a reality; since it is thus a furthering of existence. But in gratification we are affected by most things; we cannot say this about God, however. So, we can well ascribe gratification to him, but everything limited is left out; that is the way of reduction .— For us love is an inclination. This presupposes need and dependency. So, we cannot attribute it to God in such a manner. So for us there remain phenomenal realities , ontological predicates, that are pure realities, since I think them purely a priori. Hence we will first treat these.—I can say these of God absolutely; I attribute the phenomenal realities to God eminently after I have purified them by way of reduction . The transcendental concepts can be said of God simply . If we are to make use of these concepts, however, then we must always have conditions of sensibility, and these in turn have phenomena . If we separate the sensible, then we have concepts without the least use, i.e. empty Eberhard §13 (AA 28: 538).

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concepts. The cause is that from which the positing or existence of a thing follows according to a universal rule. If I ask, however: how is God the cause of the world, then I can think of the connection between cause and effect in no other way than in time. However, I cannot think of God in time. So, in order to apply the concept of God in concreto, we need to have the way of reduction .— Here we still determine nothing regarding the highest being, but rather provide in advance some warnings regarding errors that can slip into the concepts.— The transcendental concepts are attributed to God simply ; for they are pure concepts of the understanding, and so I need not fear attributing something sensible to him; for here I give God attributes that can be attributed to all things generally and can be said of him purely as a thing.—However, because this would be pure deism, which in the end would be of no use to us at all, since we cannot in this way distinguish God from other things, and since these attributes also have no significance insofar as they are not attributes given and attributed to God in concreto, distinguishing him not only from other things according to quantity, but also according to quality.20 Hence, for the concept of God I also need physicotheological concepts, which originate namely from the very first concepts whose reality I am perfectly convinced of, i.e. from the nature of my soul.— But here again there are difficulties; for in the attributes of my soul there are found various negations, which I must abstract, and I can apply such attributes to God only once they are pure realities. If I cannot abstract the negations, then the attributes are not at all suitable for being applied to God; e.g. if God is extended, then he would be in all places, and in one place would be one part and in another, another part. So, if God were partly present and therefore always deficiently present, then in no place could he act with his entire power. Then, however, he would be limited and that won’t do. Should I suppose, however, that he is entirely present in all places, that won’t do; because then he would be external to himself. In omnipresence, therefore, I must entirely exclude the concept of space.—Matter is extended, and hence God also cannot be material.— The author says: if I purify the realities taken from the experience of all negations, then the concept of God will be the concept of a spirit, wherein It seems clear that the idea of this fragment is completed in the fragment immediately below. See also AA 28: 1241 above.

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we think of the highest knowledge, understanding, wisdom, will, and hence freedom, nothing but pure realities and nothing corporeal.21— The author shows yet three ways though which we can arrive at a determinate concept of God, and these are: the way of negation , of eminence , and of causality .22 We proceed therefore by way of negation through reduction , when we abstract all negations from the realities in the world (or at least recognize that they must be abstracted, if we want to attribute them to God) and attribute them to God; e.g. our understanding knows a thing through distinguishing marks that it always further determines.—It cannot know all distinguishing marks of a thing, for otherwise it would become confused. This is therefore a limitation. So God cannot have such a discursive understanding, but rather a different one. But what kind? This I do not know; perhaps an intuitive one, but I also cannot understand the possibility of this, since I know of absolutely no other understanding than my own.—By way of negation I posit nothing positive, but rather purify the concept of errors. The second way is the way of eminence , which is when I attribute to him all attributes in the highest degree. But through this an impure reality, even when I think it in the highest degree, does not yet become a pure reality freed from its deficiencies, but rather these increase along with it; so the way of negation must come first. 3) [The third way is the] way of causality or better, as in Baumgarten: the way of analogy .23 Through this I do not know the divine attributes in themselves, but rather the relation of these to the world. It [i.e. the way of analogy] expresses itself just as human beneficence expresses the beneficence of God.—This is the most beautiful way, since here I am certain in the face of all objections and doubt, and I need to know nothing more than this of God. The deist attributes perfections to God in abstracto, the theist in concreto. But the concept of the first is of no use; for I cannot in the least apply the concept of God and I can draw no determinate consequences for moral and natural science.—Now, the question is: how should I proceed in the attribution of predicates in concreto?—Precaution concerning:

Eberhard §15 (AA 28: 546); see also §10 (AA 28: 534); §18 (AA 28: 553). Eberhard §19 (AA 28: 554) 23 Baumgarten 2013, §826. 21 22

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1) The choice of predicates 2) The way in which we attribute them to God. The way of negation aims at the first, the way of eminence at the second. The first precaution concerns the quality of predicates: that the sensible does not intrude; the second concerns the quantity: that I represent everything in the highest degree. But the latter is not without the former; for the former must always come first. Human understanding could increase infinitely, but would it then be a divine understanding? By the way of eminence , however, we do not at all approach closer to the concept of God. We always enlarge the deficiency together with the reality equally. The way of eminence is the easiest, and nearly all human beings have employed it and through this have fallen into great errors. They infinitely enlarged the great and beautiful things that they saw in nature. But the way of reduction , without the way of eminence , would not be of much help to me; for in abstracting everything sensible from the predicates, the predicates become ever smaller, so to me God would not appear greater at all. This was in regard to the choice; in regard to the way, however, it means: we should attribute to God everything by analogy. Some hold analogy to be an imperfect similarity with another thing. But God specifically is entirely distinguished from things and is not in the least similar to them.—But analogy is perfect similarity, not of the thing, but rather of the relation. A relation in the world is a proportion. Every proportion has two members. In a proportion I infer a fourth from three known members. Here the things can be entirely dissimilar. Effect and cause are a relation. In the world I find a connection of cause and effect; the world itself is a consequence whose cause is unknown. It will have no similarity with the world. But I can still make an inference based on the relation of God to the world; for from three members of a proportion I can infer the fourth. For instance, from happiness as the effect, I infer beneficence as the cause in the world, and then from the effect of the happiness of the entire world I infer beneficence. Through this analogy I do not know the being and the attributes of God, but rather the relation of the attributes of God to the world. All proofs of the existence of God are directed against atheism. We can envision , however, a skeptical atheism (i.e. godlessness) and dogmatic atheism (i.e. denial of God). This latter cannot prove the non-existence of God from experience, and hence it must do so a priori. However, then it must not only deny the mere actuality of God, but also the



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possibility; for a priori I cannot have insight into the actuality, but rather merely the possibility. And that which I know a priori must be necessary, or, the existence of God must be possible. If it cannot do that, then it cannot do anything. Against the dogmatic atheist I must and need only prove merely the possibility of God. God’s possibility. I can conduct its proof: a) Positively, if I can have insight into possibility. b) Negatively, if I show that God is not impossible, because there is nothing contradictory in him. But through this I have shown merely that the concept of God is possible, but not the thing.— Descartes thereby believed that he had already proven objective reality when he said: God has all realities. Realities cannot contradict each other; for otherwise there must be a negation and God must be alterable and at one moment have a reality and afterward a negation, or, in God there must be reality and negation together. However, since that is impossible, God is possible. The latter jumps to conclusions; for I can only infer from this that the concept of such a being is actual. So I know here merely the logical possibility, not the real possibility; for I cannot have insight into this from the principle of contradiction . In a being such as God all realities should rest on one ground. But from whence do we know whether it is possible for such diverse realities to be found together in one ground? From whence do we know, e.g. that thinking and transeunt activity can coexist? In the world we see that a person having a reality in the greatest degree has the others in turn in a smaller degree. People of deep thought have little activity and men of great activity and passion are always less great in regard to intellect. Such realities cannot be brought together; for they appear to contradict each other.— I indeed understand why all realities are not possible together in one principle, but I also cannot understand how they are possible together, since we do not see that in the world and the realities there are much dispersed. We see that human virtues are largely weak and spring from timidity; hence in his travels through Germany and England, Grimm saw in the largest prisons nothing but big-boned and strong people whose viciousness arose from awareness of their own strength.24 From everything I should infer that so many realities can hardly be unified in one human being. Johann Friedrich Karl Grimm, Bermerkungen eines Reisenden durch Deutschland, Frankreich, England und Holland. 5 vols (Altenburg: Richter, 1775). Vol. 3: 333 ff. Cf. AA 28: 44, note 125715.

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So I cannot prove to the dogmatic atheist that a God is really 25 possible,26 although indeed logically; and even less can he prove to me the impossibility of God; for this I can prove only from the principle of contradiction. The concept of God, however, does not contradict itself. The skeptical atheist doubts the existence of God because he holds the speculative proofs to be uncertain. We can refute him by conceding that all speculative proofs are unacceptable, but also that regardless of this one cannot doubt the existence of God, because there are still practical proofs. The skeptical atheist is entirely without ground; for he believes that if there are no speculative proofs, then there are no proofs at all.— So we have already refuted the atheist without having to prove the existence of God. We come now to the Cartesian proof, which is the foundation of all the other proofs. It has been accepted by many and also criticized by many, but we need it. The ease of this proof already makes it suspicious. It sounds like this: God is the most-real being ; therefore he is actual; for actuality is a reality. But if I can already think the actuality of a concept through my concept, then the thing is also necessary. If this proof were correct, then everything that is most perfect of its kind would exist; e.g. a most-prefect clock is possible; since, however, actuality is also a perfection, it is also actual. It is entirely false to view existence as a particular reality; for existence is a predicate of all predicates, reality of all realities. We can make everything into a logical predicate, even a thing itself. Logic abstracts from all content and indicates only the relation of concepts. So I can say the human being is existent; but from this it does not follow that every logical predicate is already a determination that can still be added by thought to the concept of a thing. But existence is no such constitutive predicate; for if I already have an entirely perfect concept of a thing, then I ask first, whether it exists or not. Through the existence of a thing I do not get a different concept of it; it is merely the absolute positing of a thing. I think here nothing new, but rather consider it in another way . If I think a thing as possible, actual and necessary, then I posit it always with exactly the same predicates. It indicates merely the various ways that a thing will be posited in relation to the understanding.— The Latin indicates that Kant has in mind real rather than merely logical possibility. AA reads “impossible,” which we believe to be an error.

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If I have thought of an entirely perfect concept of a thing, then I must still first ask: does it exist or not? And if I posit existence in addition, then my concept will be about nothing more prefect. Hence, existence does not belong to the perfect concept of the thing and so I cannot derive it from the perfect concept.— Even though this proof is incorrect, there is still the question whether or not it can provide a foundation as a hypothesis.—This is the concept of the most-real being . I can think all possible things as actual only insofar as they are thoroughly determined. Each thing is therefore determinable merely by the concept of the most-real being . In the possibility of things, our reason always takes the thoroughgoing determination of these same things as a foundation. The most-real being alone is actually thoroughly determined through its concept. So the most-real being is a foundation. Reason therefore also represents the most-real being as the ground of the possibility of all things, or that all concepts of things lie in it.—The real is the material of possibility. The most-real being is therefore the material of possibility. This is a substratum of our reason, [a substratum] of its necessary unity, from which all possibility is derived.— That which provides a foundation for all possibility, I accept as necessary. Here actuality is not distinguished from possibility, but rather it is accepted as actual. This is a subjective necessity; since the objective proofs fail, I can accept the subjective law as an objective one.—That which necessarily provides the foundation for possibility according to the subjective laws of our reason also provides the foundation for the objective things. This inference is hardly correct, but we can still accept it as a hypothesis. We cannot maintain the impossibility of that which is a substratum of all possibility; for otherwise we must in turn investigate the cause of its possibility; e.g. space is the foundation of the possibility of everything extended.—The most-real being is a substratum of all possibility. It is the first given , the material of possibility.—Even if this proof is not objectively valid, it is still subjectively valid for us, since it rests on the laws of our reason. Now, we come to the second, the cosmological proof. The difference between this proof and the previous one is: in the first I infer the necessary being from the most-real being , in the second the most-real from the necessary being . The cosmological proof rests on an existence. If I am immediately conscious through the senses of the existence of a thing, then that is experience. The

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collection of experience is the world. Everything the existence of which I am conscious is therefore world. Now, however, the proof is still transcendental, since it is conducted based on nothing but transcendental concepts and is merely founded upon an empirical knowledge.— Now, I infer first the existence of a necessary being . Everything existing is necessary or contingent. If my experience is contingent, then it must be an effect, and therefore must have a cause, and ultimately we must necessarily accept an original being . If something contingent exists, then also something necessary exists. There cannot be nothing but derivative beings without an original being . The original is necessary , just as the derivative beings are contingent .— So what kinds of attributes does the necessary being have? It must have attributes that taken together indicate the absolute necessity of the existence of the original being . So I must be able to infer existence from the concept of this being. This, however, is the ontological proof, and were it correct, then the cosmological proof would be unneeded. The proof is as follows: one of every two contradictory predicates necessarily belongs to the original being . Now, the most-real being is already determined with regard to all predicates through its concept, so the original being is a most-real being .— But it can also be a necessary thing that has negation . Why just a most-real being ?— And then there is still the question whether the most-real being also exists and must exist. In this proof I can merely infer that the concept of God is logically necessary for my reason, but not that it is really so, or that its existence is necessary. But these two have been mixed up. It is peculiar that [text breaks off] The first concept of the most-real being is possibility. We cannot have insight into this, even though its impossibility cannot be shown, since the concept does not contradict itself.— Is the most-real being a being of beings or a foundation of the possibility of all things?—From the fact that it is the cause of everything actual it does not follow that it is likewise the foundation of their actuality. Here one asks whether we must lay a unity as foundation, from which we can derive all the essences of things. It belongs to our understanding to think, in



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regard to the variety of the attributes of things, one thing with all predicates through the limitation of which the essence of others arises. I think the concept of the most-real being as determined by whichever of the two is real of all possible contradictory predicates. However, all concepts of things have realities and negations, which therefore presuppose realities. Now, since the most-real being contains all realities in itself, it is the substratum of the possibility of things, and these are distinguished from the most-real being merely though their negations.— If I say that the essence of all things is derived from the original being , then it follows from this that order, unity, harmony, and perfection, as lying in the essence of the things themselves, accordingly come from God, since he is the cause of the possibility of essence.— On this rests Herr. Prof. Kant’s only possible ground of proof for a demonstration of the existence of God.27 Namely, the author says: Since the most-real being is the foundation of all possibility, I must presuppose its actuality;28 for if I cancel it, then I cancel all material possibility, or the possibility of things; for by reason of this all data of possibility fall away. In this way God would therefore be necessary, because he is the ground of possibility. This proof is probative for our subject, or subjectively, but not objectively. But it is also already subjectively sufficient, and the proof and its subjective validity cannot be refuted. The order, beauty, and harmony of the world, which rests on such inalterable rules, come not from the will but from the essence of God. I can only ascribe to the divine will that which is contingent in a thing. All possibility consists of materials; the material is the reality. The formal difference of things is negation and the limitation of the most-real being . This being is therefore also the substratum of everything material, i.e. of possibility. The order of a thing in itself is grounded in the essence of the thing, and can be no different than it is. This essence , therefore, does not depend on God’s will. But these essences are derived from his essence. Hence it arises that all things in the world cohere so very harmoniously. We can A translation of this early work by Kant is contained in Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770, trans. and eds. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 28 Baumgarten 2013, §803ff, in which Baumgarten introduces the concept of God as the most perfect being, and which is especially developed in §806 as the most real being. In §820, Baumgarten comes closest to the ontological argument Kant here is sketching. And §824 comes closest to outlining God as the foundation of all possibility. 27

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hence always search and ask for the natural causes, without thereby believing that we could take anything from God.— Here I infer God’s actuality as a substratum of possibility from the possibility of all things in general. Therefore, I am not inferring God’s actuality from his concept. Since through the cancelation [of God’s actuality], I would cancel the material of possibility, God’s existence is necessary and is at least a universal hypothesis of our reason for the knowledge of possibility.— The author distinguishes the attributes of God into the inactive and the operative .29 A biblical expression. An attribute of God is inactive that can be thought with no action at all or no distinguishing mark of action ; the opposite is operative .— We ascribe attributes to God properly just as we think them, and by analogy as a relation of the divine attribute to the effect that is similar to the relation of my concept. The author says further: we ascribe analogues of modes to God.30 A mode is a contingent internal determination , e.g. erudition in human beings. We can think of no modes in God. We cannot think his omniscience to be contingent.— However, because he still produces effects that with us occur through contingent modes , we separate the contingent from the mode and ascribe it to God by way of reduction .31— He speaks here of holiness in a transcendental sense as fully free from error and all deficiency, and ascribes this as such to God.32— God is a being ; what kind of being? An original one ; but an original being is substance; for only accidents are derivative . Only things are called substances.— Is God single or are there several gods?33—The original being is one , because it is a singular concept . It is only the concept of a single thing that is thoroughly determined. What is thought of as thoroughly determined is a singular being . Baumgarten 2013, §815. Baumgarten 2013, §827. 31 Cf. R 6286 (AA 18: 554): “whenever possible I will first free the reality through reduction from what belongs to it as phenomenon (i.e. from what adheres sensibly to it ). See also Baumgarten 2013, §824. 32 Baumgarten 2013, §828. 33 Baumgarten 2013, §846. 29 30



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Were there many most-real beings , then the concept of the most-real being would be a species and indeterminate in many and various respects. The concept of God is the concept of a single being.—That goes against polytheism. All who have thought of many gods have only thought of them as original and not as most-real beings .— God is simple or immaterial. This follows from the unity of substance. Every real composite must be viewed as a multiplicity of substances that interact with each other. Now, if God were composite, then either every part would be a most-perfect being, and then there would be many most-perfect beings, which contradicts unity, or all parts would be partly real, partly negative . But in no case can an unlimited being arise from such limited beings; for the negation of reality in one is contrary34 to a reality and to the formal perfection of the most-real being . The limitation of the most-real being consists precisely in the distribution of realities. The unity in a composite is accidental; in a simple [thing], however, the unity is subsistent. Still more proofs. Every composite is divisible and alterable . In a composite, the parts are in relation . This is an external connection and separable and alterable. The relation of parts in a substance can be internally altered. If God, however, is necessary , then he is inalterable.—If God is necessary and composite , then are [text breaks off] God is inalterable.—Inalterability is 1. of concepts. Here every concept is inalterable in regard to its essence. 2. Of things. The author confuses the latter with the former.35 The concept of God is thoroughly determined, and therefore cannot be altered, and is therefore inalterable. Alteration is the succession of opposed determinations in one being . This presupposes time. Therefore a being that is not in time cannot be alterable.—We can attribute neither of two contradictorily opposed predicates when we cancel their condition; e.g. I cannot attribute motion and rest to God because he does not exist in space, i.e. the condition of these predicates.—I cannot derive

Reading wider for wieder. See Baumgarten 2013, §849, where Baumgarten argues that there is nothing successive (i.e. alterable) in God.

34 35

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the concept of inalterability from the necessity of God.—To think of God as inalterable in time is also false.— The concept of God’s inalterability is very important; e.g. I cannot think of God as merciful at one moment and as wrathful at another. Polytheism is nothing natural; for I would never be content with it; in everything the human being drives towards unity.—If I think of many equal highest beings, then one is already limited through the presence of the other.—We see in all religions [text breaks off] Now we come to the eternity of God.—The concept of time brings us to this concept. The magnitude of existence is duration. However, we can form no other concept of duration than through time. Eternity is duration without beginning or end. Beginning and end necessarily presuppose the concept of time. If I say: a thing is without beginning, then I represent to myself that there was no point of time before the existence of the thing; and if I represent it without end, then I think by this that with [its] non-being, no point of time can be thought any longer at all.— The concept of eternity is therefore necessarily affected by time. However, I can represent God to myself in no other way than as determinable through time; and if I also make his existence infinite and say that his existence fills all time, and then that is indeed thought humanly.— In time there are successions: a part of existence is already past, the other is still to be reached. The persistence of time is therefore a continual vanishing of existence and also constant beginning. So the concept of time does not at all apply to the most-real being ; for it constantly carries with itself limits and change. It is a continual limitation, since in its persistence it will always diminish. A most-real being , however, cannot at all be accompanied . It is said: the whole of time is at once together in God; but the words “at once” already indicate a point of time, and further this is a contradiction in terms ; for what is essential to time is precisely succession. I cannot in the least think eternity without time. In divine eternity we can represent to ourselves nothing more than the necessity of God’s existence. Everything else is anthropomorphic. To be sure, this concept is also inaccessible to us, but at least it is pure. The concept of eternity has more in common with omnipresence; for by means of the sensible concept of eternity God fills all time, and by means of the sensible concept of omnipresence God fills all space. It is just the same for omnipresence as it is for eternity; for it is subjected to precisely the same difficulties; for God



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cannot be in one place and then not in all others; or he must be extended and then he would be present in all places merely in part. The author has omnipresence.36 Divine omnipotence is the faculty that extends to the making actual of all things, or an all-sufficiency of God as a ground. I can think the most-real being internally according to content; but also relatively or externally as a perfect ground. Such is omnipotence; it does not need to be proven, since it lies in the concept of the most-real being .— It is absurd to say that God can only make the possible but not the impossible actual; for what is absolutely impossible, cannot be hypothetically possible.37 So through this I say nothing. There are very many presumptuous expressions for God; e.g. those concerning predestination . It is said by some, e.g. that their God was a tyrant. This expression diminishes God’s dignity and entirely vulgarizes his concept.— In this entire transcendental theology much caution prevails, which constitutes what is essential to it: namely, to avoid the anthropomorphism of representing God humanly. If God is represented in human form, then that is cruder anthropomorphism; if, however, he is represented according to the concepts of appearance in general, then this is subtle anthropomorphism.38 The former is easy to avoid; meanwhile, the concept of God will thereby become very limited, since God cannot at all be represented in this way. The more subtle anthropomorphism is very difficult to prevent, and is so deeply rooted that it can never be entirely uprooted; e.g. God in time, in space. Now that we have investigated the deist concept of God, we proceed to the investigation of theism or of the concept of the highest being as a highest intelligence .39 We now go from ontological to psychological concepts, where we presuppose some experience of the world. Here we must be very careful to avoid anthropomorphism. To the concept of intelligence belongs the faculty of knowing , of pleasure and displeasure ,40 and of appetition . What kind of ground do we have to accept that God is the highest intelligence ?—Our author, just like the others, 38 39 40 36 37

Baumgarten 2013, §956. Baumgarten 2013, §18. Baumgarten 2013, §848. Baumgarten 2013, §863ff. On pleasure and displeasure in God, see Baumgarten 2013, §892.

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says: distinct knowledge is a reality ;41 God is the most real being ; therefore … knowledge is also the purest reality.42 We know the power of knowing through experience in us or through inferences by analogy from the similarity of actions with those of ours upon others. Understanding is reality; for through it I can think pure reality. Now, however, the question is whether this reality can exist along with all other realities.— God is the first ground of all things, but can this emerge from his knowledge?— Some peoples believed that all kinds of rational creatures and all things would flow from the divine being; this being, however, would be the mere substratum and would not produce things through his understanding, but rather they would flow from him merely through a universal natural law. All systems of emanation among the ancients are based on this.— We can represent the most-real being to ourselves either 1) as a being that has all realities in itself, or 2) as a being that would be the ground of all realities. A person often communicates attributes to others, attributes which he himself does not have, and for this reason is called perfect; e.g. a mathematician teaches others to navigate a ship, although he has never navigated a ship himself.43— From the concept of the original being of all things it still does not yet follow that such a being has understanding; for perhaps the reality of understanding cannot be unified with the other realities. Hume already said this also.44 However, with respect to objects where our cognitions are bounded by the weakness of human reason, we are free to assume whatever appears to our understanding to be most rational, and here we can rather assume that the most-real being has understanding; because: 1) no one can prove to us the opposite, 2) because we can think great activity with an understanding, but without understanding no activity at all.— In order to determine this understanding of God further, we must again take the human soul as a basis. Baumgarten 2013, §863. Only the material before the first semicolon directly follows Baumgarten’s argument. 43 Cf. the third Critique: “(the Dutch naturalist Peter) Camper describes with great precision what the best shoe would have to be like, yet he was certainly unable to make one” (Pluhar translation, AA 5: 304). 44 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Edited with an introduction by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1935), 180, parts II–IV. Cf. AA:28, 1444, note 12665f. 41 42



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1) To God’s faculty of knowledge belongs understanding, not sensibility, since the latter is the faculty for the representation of things insofar as we are affected by them, a receptivity of the impressions and effects of other substances. But God, as an original and necessary being , can be affected by no other thing, and can stand in interaction with no other thing.— Here we must not make distinctness the distinguishing mark between intellectual and sensible representations, since sense representations can be very distinct, e.g. of space and time, and intellectual representations can be very obscure, e.g. as is fairness. This distinction of the Wolffian philosophy has in parts greatly hampered the progress of philosophy.45 I cannot attribute understanding to God for the reason that he has distinct concepts, but rather because he has no sensible representations (for sensibility is not suitable to the concept of an original being ).— We cannot represent the divine understanding as a discursive, but rather as an intuitive faculty of knowledge. It is of great importance in the whole of rational theology to see whether something is derived from the concept of a most-real being or from that of an original being . The derivation from the latter is much stronger; for in the concept of the most-real being I presuppose realities, and I must first ascertain whether these are [realities] and whether they all fit together. God’s knowledge is not sensuous; that contradicts the concept of the original being . That which is not sensuous, we generally call understanding. So God has understanding. Does he, however, have human understanding or not? No, he has an intuitive understanding. Our understanding is discursive, i.e. we know all things through general characteristics, which we progressively determine so that they signify an individual . But in this case I know the things merely successively and do not know all their predicates at once. That is, however, an obvious deficiency; hence God cannot have human understanding. He must have an Christian Wolff, Vernünftig Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, 5th ed. (Frankfurt and Leipzig: Renger, 1733), §957ff. Cf. AA 28: 1444, note 126628f . Wolff holds that human understanding is limited by sensibility, which results in obscure concepts. Thus the distinction between human and divine understanding is the obscurity of the former and the clarity of the latter, since the latter works without sensibility. See especially §960: “Because God has no experiences such as we do, he represents in a completely different manner than do we that which we are accustomed to representing unclearly and obscurely, that is, what we merely experience, e.g. the colours. Namely, since the divine understanding has pure clarity, it posits everything mutually outside of each other that we ourselves confuse together.”

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understanding that represents things at once, intuiting them as it were.46 Hence we can attribute a human understanding to God merely through analogy .— We know things merely a posteriori; for our knowledge is only possible through things being given to us. God knows a priori; for the existence of things is derived from God’s knowledge. An original being is dependent on no determination. Now, if God knew a posteriori, then his knowledge would be dependent on the things. That cannot be. So God has no empirical knowledge. Also to some extent we know things that do not exist through imagination; but we only put another form on things that are given to us in experience. I know the materials purely through sensibility. Our knowledge is therefore only ectypal in regard to the materials, but God’s knowledge is archetypal . So God’s understanding is the archetype of all things and the possibility of all things depends upon it. Can we perhaps represent beings inferior to God that are able to know the existence of things through pure understanding? No, only the creator can know the existence of a thing a priori; others can only know the existence of a thing through that thing’s influence upon them. I can indeed represent beforehand whatever can be brought about through a power; but whatever cannot be brought about by a power must become known to me through influence. Otherwise there is no connection between me and the thing.— All mystics and theosophists who claim now to know things in advance through the pure understanding have said that we intuit them in God. And it is true that if we intuit God, then we intuit in him the archetypes of all things. The mystics should have reserved this for the future alone. Plato was one of these, one who said that our soul was in God before birth and there intuited the archetypes of things. But in this manner one cannot comprehend how we are to know things in themselves at once through the understanding. However, this is more comprehensible when it happens through God’s intuition; for in regard to God, we represent matters such that he intuits things through understanding; in us, however, we see through sensibility. Such mystics fell into enthusiasm for the reason that they Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, §957: “Therefore, if you ponder the fact that even the smallest space and the smallest time in nature is occupied differently than the other, and at the same time imagine that God intuits everything at once, then one will be even more astonished by the size of the divine mind.”

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presumed knowledge of things through the understanding already in this life. About the future we can say nothing. But there is nothing in the least that indicates the possibility [of this] in the present life; for in that case we would have to have a special faculty and immediate divine influence. But also, such knowledge would be of no use to me for morality here, nor for anything else.— The author47 speaks in §869 of the intelligible and sensible world. These words refer to the sensitive , what I know by the senses, and to the intellectual , what I know by the understanding. So this concerns knowledge. A thing is sensible , however, that I can know purely through sensibility; but the object that I know through the understanding is intelligible . So this concerns the opposite. An object can be sensible and intelligible. It can have predicates that belong to appearance and also predicates that belong to knowledge of the thing itself. The sensible world and the intelligible world are therefore not two distinct worlds and two distinct totalities of things, but rather merely a distinct relation of things to our subject. The sensible world reveals48 the relationship of things to our sensibility or the summation of appearances, the intelligible world the relation of things to my understanding. This is the substratum of appearances, since something must lie at their basis, namely the thing itself. The knowledge of this we now call intelligible . The author says: if I know the sensible world distinctly, then that is already intelligible .49 But here he distinguishes the sensible and the intelligible merely logically. The intelligible world is the moral world; for morality is not an object of the senses. The intelligible world is not the world of the enthusiasts, but rather of rational human beings. But the physical world is sensible. Through experience we know merely appearances, the phenomenal world itself, but not things in themselves or the noumenal world . If one wishes to know the latter, then he must either be the creator of the things themselves, or he must able to intuit the highest being and even this being’s ideas. I.e. Baumgarten. This is perhaps a mistake. The German here in AA is enthüllt, a form of enthüllen, which means to reveal or disclose. More likely is enthält, which means to contain. 49 Baumgarten 2013, §869. 47 48

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One who believes in doing the latter already in this life is an enthusiast. Such was Madam Guyon.50 The Tibetan and Indian religions are associated with this. They are always atoning in order to kill everything bodily and to cast aside their selfhood ever further; and if everything bodily were cast aside, then one would become the highest being oneself and become engulfed by this. Similarly, there is also a sect in China of mystical self-annihilation.51 Spinoza’s opinion can be ascribed to this enthusiasm rather than to atheism.52—But I am not a highest being, since this is independent, while the human being is dependent. The human being is also not an accident ; for through the concept of I, I am indeed conscious of my substantiality. Spinoza defines substance: that which does not require the existence of another .53 But substance is: that which is not the predicate of another, but nevertheless can be something grounded .54—But, even if we can refute Spinoza, we do not have much insight on the other hand; for since we are beings grounded in a highest being, we are always existent purely through his power, and our actions are always divine actions. We hence appear also to not have proper substantiality. Here we discover our limits; we cannot explain fundamental powers.—

Jeanne-Marie Bouvier de la Motte-Guyon (1648–1717), a French mystic who exerted considerable influenced on Pietism, particularly in Germany. 51 Lehmann, pointing us to the Dohna Anthropology, identifies this sect as the Laokium (AA 28: 1445, n. 126914). 52 Kant here identifies Spinoza’s pantheism with that of the Tibetans (see AA 28: 1401 n. 5114-5) 53 This, of course, is quite incorrect. Spinoza actually defines substance as: “… that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that whose concept does not lack the concept of another thing through which it ought to be formed ” (Ethica, Book 1, Def. 3). 54 This comes very close to Baumgarten’s definition, and especially his defense of his own definition of substance in the preface to the second edition. “A being either cannot exist except as a determination of another (in something else), or it can. The former is an accident (a predicable or natural thing, whose being is belonging , sumbebhko/j), and the latter is a substance (a being subsisting per se, form, e)ntele/xeia, ou)si/a, u(po/stasij, e)ne/rgeia), because it can exist, although it is neither in something else, nor the determination of something else” (Metaphysics §191). Insofar as a substance can be something grounded, contrary to Spinoza, Baumgarten says “(in defining substance like this), I concede that no created substance can exist without being determined by, or the consequence of, another. However, “determined” differs sufficiently enough from the concepts of “determination” or “predicate” that the philosopher need not worry about some of the syllables and the agreement of the long vowels. Every created substance can exist without being the determination or predicate of another, even of God himself. God exists without being the predicate of anything else. And therefore He can exist in this manner. We thus have a definition that is neither applicable solely to God, like the Cartesian definition, nor solely to created substances, as is the case when one calls substance something enduring and modifiable” (Metaphysics, preface to the second edition, p. 86). As we read immediately, Kant still has problems with this formulation. 50



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The author says: theology, as it is known by God, is exemplary ,55 since we must seek to make our theology ever more similar to it.— Attention, abstraction, reflection, and comparison are discursive concepts; hence we cannot attribute them to the divine understanding.56 One ascribes the highest reason to God,57 but we cannot ascribe this to him; for reason is really the faculty compensating for the deficiency of our understanding, since reason seeks to bring forth through inferences what the understanding cannot know immediately. We now take note of the classification of the divine understanding into the knowledge of simple intelligence , free knowledge and middle knowledge . When possibility is considered in a thoroughgoing nexus with all other possible things, then one can say that what is possible in every nexus is also actual. In regard to God, therefore, since he knows everything possible in thoroughgoing nexus , there is no distinction between the possible and the actual. In him complete knowledge of possibility is likewise actuality. In that God knows himself and his nature, he knows everything possible, since the possible depends purely on his knowledge. This is the knowledge of simple intelligence .58 Insofar as God is conscious of his will, he knows everything actual, since it is what it is through his will; and this is God’s free knowledge .59— In the original being there lies the central concept that everything possible is derived from him, and he hence knows everything possible, insofar as he knows himself. God is the creator of things, either through the necessity of nature or through his free will. The former is the system of emanation. The knowledge of actuality is free , insofar as he is conscious of his choice that the things are to exist. If he is the cause of things through the necessity of his nature, then he would be conscious of the existence of things, insofar as he is conscious of the fruitfulness of his own nature. 57 58 59 55 56

Baumgarten 2013, §866. Baumgarten 2013, §870. Baumgarten 2013, §872. Baumgarten 2013, §874. Baumgarten 2013, §875.

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Suppose God were not himself the cause of all things and did not know them through consciousness of himself as their cause, then he could not know the things at all; for otherwise he would have to know the things through their influence on him. That, however, would be dependence on the things, but as God he is independent . The system according to which all things, including substances, have their ground in God is necessary if we are not to think of God as passible . If that is not the case, then his existence is not original, since there must be nothing in this that is the consequence of other things. We cannot represent him as able to know things in any other way than through sensibility, i.e. through the things affecting him. The author classifies God’s free knowledge into 1) recollection 60 in regard to the past; 2) the knowledge of vision in regard to the present and 3) foreknowledge in regard to the future.61 All of these expressions are deficiencies of knowledge and are unworthy of God. If I say them about human beings, then they would be something glorious, but not about God. With respect to God we must employ the expression “knowledge” , not “discursive knowing” 62 or “opining”; for those are attributes of human understanding. If I say of God: he discursively knows everything past, sees everything present and knows discursively beforehand everything future, then this is posited according to human sensibility and must be understood in a manner suitable for God . The three modes concern all the things of the sensible world, which are in space and time and, in view of the latter, are subject to these modes. In regard to God no time applies. It has been believed that God discursively knows the present more easily than what is past and particularly what is future. But if God knows the things through consciousness of himself, then to him it is entirely the same, regardless of in which time whatsoever the things may be.— How God would foresee the future free actions of human beings is no more The transcrip declines recordatio incorrectly; it should be rendered ablative as recordatione. Baumgarten 2013, §875. 62 Kant here seems to be using Wissen in place of the Latin scientia. Because its distinctive feature is its discursiveness, we have rendered it as discursive knowing, to distinguish it from erkennen, which we render simply as knowing. It is consistent with Kant’s point made earlier that God’s knowledge must be immediate and by the understanding, not by inference or discursively through reason. Likewise, discursive knowledge (Wissen), which is knowledge through reason, must not be ascribed to God, because it implies a deficiency. See our discussion of Erkennen and Wissen in the Introduction. 60 61



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difficult than how he foresees present human actions; for he does not see as we do; otherwise he would be passible. Since he knows purely through the extent to which he is conscious of himself and of his nature as the cause of their [i.e. the actions] causality, all difficulty falls equally away. Now, here one difficulty is indeed avoided, but a new one arises from this, namely: God is then regarded as the cause of the free actions of human beings. However, this difficulty always remains, whether one supposes that God knows all things in advance through knowledge of his own nature or not.— If God’s knowledge indeed creates a difficulty for human actions, then this however does not arise through theology, but through the concept of freedom in psychology. How freedom coexists with natural necessity is something resolved in psychology. God also has insight into this through his insight into things.—One must not take psychological difficulties for theological ones and introduce them here. Socinus believed that indeed God would know discursively the free actions of human beings that are past and present, but would know beforehand with difficulty and more as conjecture those that are future.63 But to respond to this only the following is required: in God there is no distinction between present actions and future actions. Therefore, if he knows everything present, then he also knows everything future.— There is still the middle knowledge , which means: God knows everything possible in other worlds, in short everything hypothetically possible.64 But that is already included when I say: God knows everything possible.— God’s knowledge is free , the author says.65 Knowledge that depends on the existence and influence of things is not free knowledge; for through the influence of things I become forced into knowledge of them. Knowledge upon which depends the cause of things is free; and God has such knowledge. The author here66 adumbrates that God is author and that he has created everything through his will. But that will be investigated later with the divine will.67 Baumgarten in fact holds that Socinus denies divine knowledge of future contingencies all together (Baumgarten 2013, §875). For more on Socinus, see Eberhard, paragraphs 12 and 72. 64 Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §876. On the hypothetically possible, see Metaphysics §16. 65 Baumgarten 2013, §875. 66 Perhaps Kant still means Metaphysics §875. Baumgarten does not actually speak of God as an author until Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1 (§§926–41) of the Metaphysics, especially in §940. 67 That is, in Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3 (§§890–925) of the Metaphysics: “The Will of God.” 63

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The infallibility of divine knowledge.68 Errors are not mere deficiencies, but rather faults and require a positive ground and an appearance that arises from the influence of things. But God cannot be deceived through the appearance of things; for his knowledge of things in no way depends upon them. In any case, the opposite is also negation and hence is contrary to the concept of the highest reality. God’s knowledge is inalterable. Knowledge of the present or vision in God yet appears to be different than when he knows the things merely as possible; for through existence indeed more is posited than through possibility. Hence the author says: knowledge of vision is an analogue of a mode .69 That is however not at all necessary; for here we must not think of God as in time, and when that is the case, we represent God, when he possibly represents the possible, also always as actual. Now, the author discusses the divine wisdom.70 We can think of two kinds of perfections of knowledge: 1) The theoretical through the distinction of common knowledge and science. Both perfections are merely human. For us, to a system belongs the unity of an idea, through which the location of its manifold is determined. That is not found in God, and we call God’s knowledge simply omniscience. Practical knowledge is: 1) Skillfulness, the perfection of means to preferred ends. 2) Prudence, the perfection of means to given ends that, however, are not entirely in our power, and 3) Wisdom, the perfection of the derivation of an end with respect to the system of all ends. We can attribute only wisdom to God. Skillfulness and prudence are not suitable here. Skillfulness and prudence can be combined with many imperfections; wisdom, however, can only be thought in the highest perfection. Skillfulness and prudence are perfections of a being that does not have everything in its power.— Wisdom is the subjective principle of the unity of all ends. Animals that act by instinct have desires; however, they have no ends. Ends presuppose understanding. Wisdom rests not on the amount and completeness, but rather on the unity of ends (of happiness). Wise is one who directs every particular end Baumgarten 2013, §879. Baumgarten 2013, §881. Note that Kant switches from scientia to cognitio. Baumgarten writes: “Ergo scientia dei libera est analogon modi,” where scientia libera is synonymous with scientia visionis. 70 Baumgarten 2013, §882–9. 68 69



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both in combination [with all others] and fully equips them in respect to the system of all ends.—Human beings indeed know something about wisdom, but where can one gain an insight into all ends?—The wisdom of God is clear from his reality. But this has been forgotten about his wisdom (of which the author is guilty); for wisdom belongs not to the faculty of knowledge, but rather to the will.— The word “wisdom” cannot properly be used for human beings. If a skillful and prudent person subjects himself to the laws of morality, then he is wise.— Wisdom is always maintaining harmony among all ends and always directing one’s actions in this way.— Human wisdom is when we direct all our actions in accordance with a principle of a system of ends that, for us, is merely possible. We have merely an idea of a possible wisdom, which we must seek ever further to achieve. The limited, derivative understanding seeks to arrive at the whole from the part; the original understanding, however, proceeds from the idea of the whole to the part. We see this difference between God and his creatures particularly in regard to wisdom. God proceeds from the overview of the whole of all ends to the individual ends. The human being, by contrast, seeks happiness by compiling parts. Happiness consists in the contentment with the whole of all inclinations, not merely present, but also future.—This is good, but merely the nominal definition; in contrast, we do not know the real definition, how such happiness is possible, and how it can arise. Only in morals does the human being proceed from the whole to the parts. Wisdom distinguishes God completely from creatures. It [is distinct] not only according to quantity, in that it acts most harmoniously with the complete system of ends, but rather also according to quality, in that in his knowledge, he passes from the whole to the parts.— The author discusses the means to final ends;71 this belongs, however, to the faculty of desire. Divine wisdom consists also in the agreement of choice with knowledge.72 A plan that requires improvement presupposes another plan and is imperfect.— To divine wisdom belongs complete unity in the choice of means to his end, Baumgarten 2013, §884ff. Nowhere in §§882–9 does Baumgarten refer to choice. But in E3643, attached to Metaphysics §882, Kant writes: “Wisdom is the knowledge of the good (of that which is good in its entirety (in all actual relations) from the idea of the whole as a ground of choice.” Two other elucidations in this section also refer to choice: E3655 (§887) and E3657 (§889), both included in our edition of the Metaphysics.

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the complete unity of plan. Whoever, therefore, represents God as having to improve his plan, represents God as imperfect.— The last § deals with omniscience and the author says: it is the knowledge of all things .73 He does not say: omniscience ; thus he calls it the knowledge of all.—Since God knows everything about things, his knowledge is already apodictic knowledge 74 and is not distinguished from it. The allness of his knowledge is omniscience . Science rests on a deficiency of understanding and cannot be attributed to God.— Now, something about Plato’s “ideas.” Initially, idea meant simulacrum , a likeness; afterwards it came to be taken as a concept of the understanding, what not only is not in experience, but rather also to which no experience is adequate. Ideas are thought in regard to human beings, also in regard to God. They are not copies of things, but rather archetypes of them through which they are merely possible. Rousseau says: to the construction of a house belong three things: 1) the idea in the mind of the master builder, 2) the image , the form of the house, which hardly approximates too closely to the idea, since the circumstances do not allow much of the idea to be implemented, 3) the appearance ,75 how the house appears. Now, he applies this beautifully: the moralist represents virtue in the idea; the writer of history represents it as it has been possessed by actual human beings; 3) the poet or the playwright represents only how it appears, merely the appearance .76— Plato said the divine cognitions of things would be ideas and these would be self-standing archetypes. These would be individual; for what would be determined according to all predicates would only be thinkable as individual. Afterwards, these platonic ideas have been misunderstood. They were later presented as substances. However, once the neo-platonic philosophy appeared in the third century, which interpreted all of Plato’s thoughts mystically, these ideas were made into substances; it was good to know them in order thereby to be capable of performing miracles.

Baumgarten 2013, §889. Previously we translated Wissen as “discursive knowledge,” because it was the discursiveness of Wissen that was central to his argument at that point. But Wissen is also apodictic or objectively sufficient knowledge. As it is this objective sufficiency of Wissen that now figures in Kant’s argument, we have translated it slightly differently. 75 The transcripts uses Rousseau’s French word here and below. 76 J. J. Rousseau, De l’imitation théatrale. Essai tiré des dialogues de Platon (1764). In Oeuvres Complètes. Tome Premier. (Paris: Hachette, 1862), 358–70. Also see note 127428 (AA 28:1446). 73 74



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Now comes the faculty of desire, which is either immanent to its own state, or transeunt.77 However, since God is all-sufficient, he can have no desire in regard to his state; for desire presupposes the object to be possible; now, however, in God no perfection is merely possible, but rather actual.— We cannot represent how God can desire something that is outside of himself; for this also appears to conflict with all-sufficiency, since God’s existence then must be imperfect. This desire appears to presuppose a consciousness of a deficiency regarding which I am discontented. Hence, it appears that one must entirely exclude desire from God, and hence Epicurus as well reserves eternal rest and indifference for the gods. Our faculty is three-fold: 1) the faculty of knowledge, 2) the faculty of pleasure and displeasure, 3) the faculty of desire. Beings are called alive, not because and if they possess the power of representation, but rather if their representations are causes of the actuality of things. The causality of the power of representation in regard to the actuality of objects is the faculty of desire. Therefore living beings have a faculty of desire. The faculty of ends is the will or the faculty of desire with the connection of the understanding. Pleasure is very distinct from knowledge. To be sure, one says pleasure is the knowledge of perfection, i.e. of the agreement of various things in one .78 But knowledge of perfection indeed stimulates pleasure; however it is not itself pleasure.79 Pleasure is the inner determining ground of activity, the representation that determines the subject to activity. So it does not relate to the object, but to the subject. Desire, therefore, necessarily presupposes pleasure.— So now we must deal with the concept of divine satisfaction and dissatisfaction.—The complete delight of God with his existence is repose in himself .80 This also called blessedness, beatitude Baumgarten 2013, §§890–925. Baumgarten calls pleasure “the intuition of perfection” (Metaphysics §655). And in the preface to the second edition, he uses the phrase Kant provides for perfection: perfection is when “various things agree in one ” (Metaphysics, preface to the 2nd edn, 87). See also Metaphysics §94, of which the formulation in the second preface is but a précis. 79 Cf. Baumgarten, Aesthetica §14: “The end of aesthetics is the perfection of sensitive knowledge, as such. This however is beauty .” 80 Baumgarten 2013, §892. Baumgarten’s precise formulation is acquiescentia in se ipso. See also Metaphysics §682, where the phrase is initiated as a psychological predicate. 77 78

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.81 It is distinguished from felicity in that it is a contentment with his existence that is independent, whereas the latter is contentment that is dependent.82 Our will is determined through the understanding as belonging to a needy being; God’s will is determined through the understanding as the will of an all-sufficient and blessed being. We consider God therefore: 1) as the highest understanding, 2) as the highest good in itself, or blessed.— Now, precisely because God is blessed, he is the cause of all things according to the analogy that a person is charitable when he possesses much and finds himself to be well. So God, because he is the highest good in itself, is also the highest good of all other things, i.e. also their cause.— We can conceive how things in the world can become the cause of the determinations of other things because they interact and depend upon one another. But how the universe itself should be able to produce something outside of itself, we cannot comprehend; for then it must produce substances. We cannot understand how an all-sufficient being can be the causality of others otherwise than when we represent that this happens through its understanding, since through this it can know its own relation to objects. Hence, we also cannot conceive of the causality of the world, because we cannot attribute understanding to it. The understanding’s causality of the actuality of the objects is will.— If I produce something without my representation containing the causality of this in itself, then I do not produce it through my will; e.g. the trees do not produce fruit through their will; for they do not know this, and their knowledge is also not the cause of the fruit. The causality of the highest being in regard to the actuality of objects lies in his understanding and not in the necessity of his nature; for, from the highest being as brute nature , mere nature, I cannot conceive of how it can be the cause of other things. Many savage peoples represent the highest being as an immeasurably fruitful nature. But without understanding a being cannot relate his causality to an object.— Baumgarten 2013, §923: “[God] is thus most distinctly conscious of these perfections, whence he enjoys these with supreme pleasure and is the most blessed .” 82 Baumgarten 2013, §924. Baumgarten does not seem to make this distinction: “God is supremely happy since (1) not only is every moral corruption and misery absent from him, but these are indeed neither physically nor morally possible in him; and since (2) he is the happiest independently and from himself , (3) without any alteration to his own goods, or any alteration to his intuition of these.” 81



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The self-sufficiency of God is called all-sufficiency, insofar as it is connected with the divine understanding, which knows all possible things outside of him. To self-sufficiency belongs not only satisfaction in himself and in his perfection, but rather also satisfaction in himself as the ground of all things and through the consciousness of this through the understanding. Satisfaction produces desire or will, which is the causality of things. Thus God has a will, insofar as he is an all-sufficient being .— That which is caused by the original supreme good will not be everything possible, but rather the greatest whole of everything possible, or the infinite supreme good .— God cannot will everything possible; for everything possible is not for this reason possible together; however, God wants everything that is possible together.— It is indeed said that: If God produces things external to himself, then it appears as if he needs them, and so as if God were not self-sufficient. But this is thought in a human way; for if we do something external to ourselves and judge something, we always lose a bit of our happiness; for we always need something, and the happiness of others belongs also to what we need. However, God is himself sufficient; he requires no others, but the satisfaction of his knowledge of things is a part of self-sufficiency, and this is the causality of his will.—

Physicotheology Here I infer the existence of a God, of a being with understanding, from the existence of the world. Based on transcendental concepts we see that only a being with understanding can be an original being .— Now the question is whether based on order, beauty, and perfection we can infer God as the cause.—If this inference is false, the entirety of physicotheology is nothing.— David Hume controverted the proof in his Dialogues on Natural Religion.83 His reason is that the mechanism of nature produces purposiveness, order, and indeed even the human understanding; however, the understanding cannot produce another understanding. He says he does not comprehend at all how such a perfect understanding, as is God, could have come about any Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 180. See AA: 28: 1447, note 127814.

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more than he comprehends how the mechanism of nature produces so many beautiful things. The one is just as unbelievable as the other.— The question is whether we understand better how a most perfect understanding is possible than we understand how a mechanism of nature could produce [such beautiful things]. It is not possible to understand the existence of a being in which all perfections are united; but such a being is still not impossible.— On the other hand, a nature without understanding is even less comprehensible; indeed, quite impossible; for the world is an aggregate of many substances, and thus has no understanding, since the understanding cannot be divided. One simply cannot represent an understanding as arising from the aggregate of things that have no understanding. Nature can have no principle of its perfection in itself.— Physicotheology thus has a completely sound foundation; namely, we can infer a rational being from the order of the world.— This was merely an introduction to the divine will. The author goes on to say that divine pleasure and displeasure are not sensuous, but rather intellectual.84 So too his will. Thus we cannot ascribe to God any ambition, etc.— The divine self-sufficiency is self-sufficient , since he requires the existence of no other thing for his existence.— Now the author arrives at divine freedom.85 The faculty of desire has the objects of desire, which however are not always ends. But if they are ends, then the faculty of desire is will.— A world, which is a system of all ends, evinces as much a creator having an understanding as one having a will. The purposive combination of things always presupposes understanding. Matter has no understanding; for a thing composed of many substances cannot have understanding; for the understanding cannot be divided, and so is not composite . However, a single subject can have understanding, and understanding can be thought in this, but not in matter.86 Therefore Hume’s conclusion is null.87— The divine faculty of desire is a will; it is always combined with understanding and reason. The original being is independent , and so requires no sensibility to be affected by things. It is the Baumgarten 2013, §891. Baumgarten 2013, §896. Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §742, and our note to that paragraph. 87 Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 20. See note 127814 (AA 28: 1447). 84 85 86



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most self-sufficient being ; therefore it requires no inclination to other things outside of itself. God thus has no faculty of desire through sensibility or through inclination, but rather a faculty of desire that is combined with understanding and reason, and this is will.— We can find satisfaction in things without interest, but we cannot choose anything without interest. The existence of the thing is indifferent to us.— In God, however, I simply cannot think of any interest. We must attribute an analogue of interest to God. We say: just as an act of beneficence is related to the will of a being who grants this deed, so too is the good in the world related to the will of God. So here it is a relation of beneficence.— People have a high estimation of the one who takes a great interest in the happiness or unhappiness of another. This, however, is a human error. The Stoics were therefore correct when they said that the wise person must have no compassion, but rather actively help. However, this actually appears to be impossible for people; for if one were to come to the point of being completely unmoved by the suffering of another, one would probably also not be beneficient. Sympathy hence appears to be the incentive to good actions.— The motive is either the good in the object, or this insofar as it comes to incite the subject.— God does not have a subjective motive; for he has and requires no incentive. God wills all the good that he knows, and he effects this as well, namely the greatest sum of all compossible goods. The freedom of the divine will. Freedom is the faculty to determine his actions independently of all inclination and stimuli . No stimuli are found in God; thus God is free. One can also call human freedom the faculty to will a priori. Divine freedom is not subject to as many (difficulties) as is human freedom; for humans belong to nature, thus to the mechanism of nature, and nevertheless the human being is free. But God is completely external to the world, and is determined by nothing external. God produced the world voluntarily; at the production there was no particular time, for God is not in space and time. Divine will is the determination of actions without any external or internal incentive. Now, I simply know nothing about how such a will can determine itself. I simply cannot represent this in concreto.

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I can represent no original cause without freedom. Were its causality determined through something else, then it would already be a derivative cause .— Freedom is transcendental in absolute spontaneity, i.e. a faculty to act independently of all external causes; or freedom is practical, i.e. the ability to act merely from reason, independent of stimuli .— Qualified spontaneity is that which ultimately still depends on an external cause, although only mediately.88 In the world, everything has qualified spontaneity ; for the arrangement of creatures still comes from God. An original being has absolute spontaneity; for there is nothing external to it that would be the external cause of its means. Freedom is practical when I act independently of all sensuous impulses, according to the prescriptions of reason alone. I must presuppose this practical freedom in humans, and indeed in the moral and in all the practical sciences, if their laws are to be valid. But this freedom is only a mere idea, and we cannot prove its actuality. However, whoever acts according to this idea and who believes that he must so act is actually free—indeed, not theoretically, but practically. I simply cannot imagine any sensitive impulses in God. The original being or the intelligent being is hence practically free, and it is impossible that he should not be free. There is no difficulty concerning freedom in God; however there is in humans since they are stimulated to everything through needs. The divine will cannot decide anything other than what it decides. The human being can also do otherwise than what it does. God thus appears not to be free, for one believes the latter to be that in which the true sign of freedom consists; the former is manifestly necessity. In God there is here a practical necessity. Freedom is a faculty to act according to rational satisfaction without partaking in stimuli and without following them. It is thus aimed merely at sensibility. And there must yet be a cause of action; for otherwise I cannot act. Because God, according to his nature, is necessary, his freedom is also necessary, or practical. The human being can also do the opposite because his reason cannot direct him in the manner that he wants. He indeed realizes the The transcript says “although only immediately,” which we take to be an error and have thus corrected.

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objective necessity, but cannot make it subjective within himself. In human beings this does not indicate freedom, but rather precisely the lack of it; for the very fact that humans also can and do act according to stimuli indicates their dependence on such. The more someone acts according to reason, the freer he therefore becomes. Based on this divinely necessary freedom, some wanted to prove that everything in him is natural necessity, not freedom.— Theological fatalism is when God does everything necessarily without freedom, without cause, according to a blind necessity. Yet, the natural necessity in the world has a cause; but in God it is fatality . One cannot attribute fatality to God; although it often appears inseparable from him. If, for instance, we represent God as in time, then we can think neither an external ground in time (since all parts of time are equal), nor an internal ground within God, for why he has created the world at this time and not at another. Crusius calls this freedom; but it is fatality.89 Fatalism is thereby refuted when I point out the cause of actions in God. Antecedent and consequent will have been distinguished.90 All will concerns either the general concept, or the thoroughly determined concept of a thing. The former is antecedent will , the latter consequent . We can also assume this distinction in God without the slightest difficulty; e.g. God in general wills that humans qua humans should become blessed, since each is an object of his goodness. However, human beings are distinct from one another; this one is good, that one, evil. God thus particularly wills that the good person should become blessed. This is also called decisive will. In human beings, however, this is deficient, so that the antecedent will [is] a provisional will and precedes the other in time,

Christian August Crusius (1751), Anweisung, vernünftig zu leben, §209. Christian August Crusius (1715–75) was a professor of philosophy and then theology at the University of Leipzig and foremost anti-Wolffian prior to Kant. Kant’s own pre-Critical criticisms of Leibniz and Wolff, particularly concerning the principle of sufficient reason, as well as Kant’s important prize essay concerning philosophical method, Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality (1764), were heavily influenced by Crusius. A biographical note as well as selections from Crusius’s Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason (1745) are found in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials, trans. Erick Watkins (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 132–79. Selections from his Anweisung are translated in Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, trans. by Jerome Schneewind (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 568–85. See also AA 28: 1281, note 128119. 90 Baumgarten 2013, §899. Cf. Thomas Aquinas ST I, Q. 19, Art. 6, ad 1. Kant’s following example concerning blessedness is quite similar to Thomas’s. 89

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and the consequent will can often abolish the first, and the causes of the will are the deficiencies of its knowledge. There is none of this in God. Both kinds are one will, and I consider God and his will in a different respect .— The proponent of predestination denies this kind of willing in God. There is nothing doubtful in the least regarding the antecedent will of God , since God knows and considers things according to all possible relations, thus also according to these relations.— The author says further: the will of God is inscrutable ;91 i.e. we can understand that what occurs in the world must be in complete accordance with the divine will; and that the divine will effectuates this with respect to the world. However, if we wish to discover the motives of God in his actions, then these are inscrutable to us, and it is also presumptuous to wish to determine them. Hence, we must consider them merely problematic. The will of God is hence partially hidden, and partially revealed. The constitution of many things is merely a natural consequence of higher ends, but an actual end. An end is that whose representation must precede with respect to our reason, although it is equally the last in the effective nexus , and indeed it is only a representation of some good for whose attainment I make use of a means. We also represent God as always thinking about the end; but this is judged too analogically with ourselves; e.g. The clouds cover the day in snow .92 Should the air, vapour, etc., be made as they are for the sake of this use? It is unfitting for us to think this way. Thus we can say: it is a natural consequence; but merely problematic; for here God’s will is inscrutable.— The end of the existence of things is unknown to us. Under the hypothesis of an end, the means to this end can indeed be understood distinctly. Certainly, we can assume wisdom throughout creation, but we must not seek to scrutinize it; for this is presumptuousness, since we thereby equate ourselves with God. Baumgarten 2013, §900. The phrase is difficult to translate and has been rendered almost literally. Kant’s point is clearly that the phrase suggests the clouds to be operating not just causally, but also employing the snow for some purpose, namely, to prevent the day from being a productive one. It could be rendered more loosely as The clouds snowed us in all day or simply The clouds made it a snow-day.

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Physicotheology becomes possible for me through the concept of God as a being with understanding and will. Hence one seeks to prove the existence of God based on the purposiveness and harmony of things in the world. But the transcendental predicates must always provide the ground.— When I represent God as acting according to ends, his will is incomprehensible and inscrutable. The divine will is without interest, and in it the contentment of the divine being does not depend on the existence of things. We cannot represent such willing. I cannot understand the possibility of the divine will, but also not the impossibility. I also cannot infer possibility from actuality, since nothing similar takes place in experience. Nevertheless, we must accept something incomprehensible here, because otherwise we cannot explain purposive things in the world. The human understanding completely lacks the means for determining divine purposes with certainty, and this is the inscrutability of the divine will.—

Moral theology As was already said in the introduction, moral theology is distinct from theological morals. In theological morals, morals are derived from the concept of God; but in moral theology the concept of God is derived from morals.— Now the question is: is the concept of God necessary with respect to nature, or morals? The latter; for in physicotheology it is not permitted to explain at once all the events of the world immediately based on the highest cause. It is lazy reason and even presumptuousness to wish to understand divine intentions immediately. I must rather always look to the most proximate causes that are in the world, since it is our duty to employ our reason merely where we can at the same time criticize it. Further, the concept of God that originates in physicotheology is indeterminate and of no use to me; moral theology has, however, a determinate concept of God.— On the other hand, the concept of God is necessary with respect to morals; for although all morals can be understood from the nature of a rational being and are therefore apodictically certain, yet morals, given the conditions that they bring about happiness, would thus appear to contradict the laws of nature in which the good is not always rewarded, and would provide an objection

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against morality, were one not to assume a highest, moral being who someday rewards virtue.— In this way, the moral concept of God is completely necessary, if we are not to regard the laws of morality as phantasms; however, morals do not emerge from the concept of God, but rather conversely, the concept of God, and indeed a completely determined concept, originates from morals. The concept of God is necessary for providing objective reality to moral laws, and further for providing them an incentive and sufficient power for directing our will. If the moral laws rest on the merely contingent arrangement of nature, e.g. on a particular feeling and not on reason, then they cannot lead us to the concept of God; for if, based on the desire to be happy, I infer a being that will make me happy, I must know the condition of happiness. For how do I know that the moral laws are this condition if I do not suppose that they are necessary and not contingent! However, morality consists in the condition under which I can become worthy of happiness. But as to the question of whether, if I am so worthy of happiness, I will also come to partake in it: for this the proof of God is necessary. Here it is not a mere hypothesis, but rather an actual practical postulate, and this concept is also of the greatest and constant use in morality, whereas it is forbidden to ever use the concept of God in physicotheology.— Further, morals also give the most complete concept of God, which physicotheology does not.— The moral concept of divinity consists in the concepts of holiness, beneficence, and justice. In this case,93 I take him to be a holy legislator, a beneficent provider and sustainer, and a righteous judge. We attribute the other properties to God insofar as they agree with these. The holiness of God is the first attribute, although we raise goodness above it. However, holiness is the first common condition under which God exercises his goodness, and hence this condition must go first. As well, God cannot be called a beneficent legislator; for law is norm and therefore cannot in the slightest allow lenience, but must first be rigorous . Holiness concerns human freedom. Beneficence concerns the happiness of creatures; but in a wise creator it is under the condition of holiness. God is omni-beneficent. The concept of justice is the concept of the limitation of divine goodness, by holiness, in regard to its distribution. God is a righteous but not beneficent The sentence could also be translated as beginning “Since I take …,” in which case it would be a fragment, possibly with the following sentence providing the remainder. Thus: “Since I take him to be …, we attribute …”

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and yielding judge. That would be the same as a legislator who permits what is forbidden by his laws. The governing of countries is a small symbol of divine government. With humans this is different. The legislator is supreme. This is the ruler , if he is sovereign. Under him is an administrator of the laws who stands under the law; and who is judged by a judge concerning whether or not his administration is good, a judge who also stands under a law. None of this can apply to God. These concepts are very old, and since among human beings they are divided into three persons, ancient peoples thought that there were three gods, each of whom carried out one of these functions. In the Indian religion Brahma is the legislator, Vishnu the ruler and sustainer, and Shiva the world-destroyer. They still worship this last god the most. In the Persian religion, Ahura Mazda is the legislator, Mithra the charitable son, and Ahriman (i.e. the bad man), the one who produces evil, but he is probably so-called because he punished, which one takes to be evil, and this was afterward confused with the vices, which are actually evil. The Egyptians had Osiris, Isis, and (Horus). The Germans had Odin the legislator, Freya or Freyer the goddess or god of love, charity, and Thor the god of thunder. These three attributes of God constitute the whole moral concept of God. Based on inclination, humans would wish for a god who made everything happy without any condition. Our reason however immediately restricts this wishedfor, unlimited will. Our inclination concerns happiness; reason concerns law and therefore goes first. Now we would expect happiness from mere beneficence, but here we have a pressing conscience, which pronounces judgement over our actions. This is completely impartial. We apply the three elements to the divinity.— Morality is the absolute system of all ends.—Happiness is a system of contingent ends, which is only necessary with respect to a certain subject.—We are not moved to a good action because of its utility, but rather in order to act according to a universal principle. We feel ourselves determined to act according to the idea of the system of all ends. We know this system to be necessary. Teleology is the system of contingent purposes, and cosmological teleology is physicotheology. Based on this, and on the contingency of ends, the physicotheologian infers the existence of God. However, in this case I assume the existence of God only as a hypothesis for explaining ends, and by means of this [argument] his existence becomes merely probable for me.

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Now [for a] more precise determination of the three divine moral perfections. 1) Holiness is the subjectively unlimited perfection of his will. The author explains holiness in general through perfection.94 Holiness is only found in God. Human beings have the inclination to evil and virtue consists in the overcoming of this. Every creature has needs and hence also desires and inclinations. If the desires extend too far, or are directed at the wrong objects, one must tame them. Desire is not subject to the power of the human being, but the will is. Holiness is not only concerned with willing, but rather also with desire. However, one can call a creature whose will is holy comparatively holy.— 2) Beneficence is an immediate satisfaction in the welfare of another. It is practical, when it is active. In the will of every created being our own welfare is also given a rank, and the beneficence of a created being is thus subjectively limited; for they are only beneficent to the extent that this agrees with their own advantage. However, the goodness of God is without any subjective limitation, although it has an objective limitation, namely: 3) Justice, which is the limitation of beneficence by holiness and permits beneficence under the condition that the creature makes itself worthy of it. So justice is a negative perfection. If God did not distinguish and were merely beneficent and not righteous, the villain who sought an advantage from this would still internally contemn himself. Objections against these attributes of God: 1) Against holiness. If God is holy, then whence evil ? By evil one here understands vice. This is evil because it is the universal object of contempt. On the other hand, the ill is the object of contempt merely for the one it affects. The ill is the ground of physical revulsion; evil is the ground of moral revulsion. 2) Against beneficence. If God is beneficent, then whence the ill in the world? 3) Against justice. If God is righteous, whence the unequal distribution of goods and evils in the world? This last objection is the most popular.—It is not the fortune but rather the misfortune and evil in the world that make one hope for a future, whereby, however, one already presupposes the justice of God.— If astronomy had not so greatly extended the theatre of the world, this Baumgarten 2013, §828.

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objection would be even more powerful; for we can think that the various limitations of the earth may belong to the manifold that prevails in the whole cosmos and is necessary in this respect.— Further we see that it is and was the goal of creation to leave us to our very own development and advancement to perfection, and for this it gave us the disposition and capacity. In this we find ourselves greater than an angel, which is already immediately perfect. Now it is necessary that we must work through all sorts of ills, and natural that many go astray. Leibniz’s Theodicy was written with the intention of refuting this objection. The Book of Job in the Old Testament aims at it, and is the most philosophical book in the Old Testament. Thus first: If now God is holy, whence comes evil? If we suppose another evil original being, then we can easily explain this. But if that is not the case, then there must exist a disposition towards this; for, after all, nothing can come from nothing. Nature has arranged things for the human being so that he should produce everything, even his moral goodness, through himself. If moral goodness were already found in nature, then it would be physical for him and of no merit. From this follows: the beginning of human perfection is coarseness. As an animal, he was perfect according to this determination. Then he began to cultivate himself through reason. In this attempt, until his reason had properly cultivated itself, many attempts must have miscarried for him; he must have been tempted by animal instinct, often stumbling about on the still soft road of reason—indeed, more stumbling about than progressing straight ahead. The ill is the punishment for the human being to the extent that he did not correctly use his reason. It is not for the individual to perfect himself completely, but rather the entire human species. This is what nature wanted. Each part is imperfect with respect to the whole. However, since we cannot survey the whole, we also cannot survey the relation of the parts to the whole. The evil that the human being considers to be a part, and regards as evil, cannot be evil with respect to the whole.95 But the human being can only act according to his insight, [which] is his duty. Could the human being have insight into the whole, then he would also not be evil; for that he does something evil, comes about because he does not have insight into the damaging consequences of it.— Alexander Pope’s Essay on Man influenced much of Kant’s thinking on issues of theodicy from the early 1750s onward and is clearly being alluded to here and in the following, e.g. “’Tis but a part we see, and not a whole.” (Epistle I, 60); “All partial Evil, universal Good; / And, spite of Pride, in erring Reason’s spite, / One truth is clear, ‘Whatever IS, is RIGHT.’” (Epistle I, 292–4).

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So when one asks why God has made evil, this is just as if one were to ask: why did not God make the part into the whole?96 The perfection of the human being consists in continual progress towards perfection.—Imperfect or faulty development of the seed of the good.97— If evil thus necessarily depends on the seed of the good, then God surely must have willed evil! No, God did not will evil, but rather the removal of evil through the progress of the good. Evil is necessary in a limited creature, and the good consists in the battle against the ill. God’s will also does not relate to evil as to a means, but rather evil is a necessary natural consequence. The battle against evil renders the good acquired thereby far more glorious, as if it were given to us without any condition. Evil has no seed. As an animal, the human being has instincts, which are also good with respect to animality. Reason initially serves his instincts; however, when it has later cultivated itself, it seeks to master the instincts and to limit them.—Now, if human beings do not attempt this, and their reason rather remains subject to the instincts, then from this evil arises. Instinct aims at everything; reason alone must limit desire with respect to objects.—So evil is nothing but incompleteness. Evil arises first in the development of reason and also disappears with its fuller development. St. Paul says: Sin comes through the law.98 I have the faculty of reason for making and understanding laws for myself—then first arises evil. There is no original seed of evil; for no human wishes something evil and wills to do something evil. He represents all evil that he does as good. There are vices that are partially loathsome, and some that are partially abhorrent; but some are both together; these are cowardice, slothfulness, and falsehood. But cowardice is still useful; for, first, then nobody would remain in battle, and, second, fear of others would prevent many still-greater vices. Slothfulness is necessary; for otherwise we would sap our powers too greatly through continual labour. Falsehood is also useful; for if people did not always prefer to conceal whatever there is to say in a certain case, then the wise could not distinguish themselves from the fools. Fairness, welfare, and honesty would in these cases completely fall away. Cf. Pope, Essay on Man: “Gradations just, has they pervading soul / Look’d thro’? or can a part contain the whole?” (Epistle I, 31–2). 97 Cf. Kant: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (AA 7:687, 695–6) 98 Romans 3.20: “For no one will be justified in His sight by the works of the law, because knowledge of sin comes through the law” (International Standard Version). See AA 28: 1447, note 128830f . 96



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In the world of the senses, the good is not possessed but rather only the progress towards the good. Thus happiness is not the possession of but rather only progress towards happiness.— If one says: if God is the author of our existence, then he is also the author of all that we do; this is not a moral but rather transcendental objection, for it concerns freedom. How could God be free in a being that is still wholly a creature and has its powers from a creator? It is has been said that God may bring about good actions, but then they would not be morally good. Said differently, God concurs with the good actions. This is dealt with in providence. The objection against beneficence. Our happiness, which we imagine, is an ideal that we cannot so easily give in concreto. If we represent contentment through the quelling of desire, then this presupposes that the needs, which agonise us, proceed from our condition, which is inherently something ill.— If we represent contentment without desire, such as we think in God, who exists in continual enjoyment, then such a human being, who is simply not active, seems to us to be completely useless. We have no concept of contentment except the progress towards contentment. The measure of happiness in a specific era simply cannot be determined through the concept of an infinite kindness. We cannot require that God should give us the supreme happiness that is merely possible. God wills to make his creatures happy, but one must estimate happiness according to the whole of existence and not according to a part of it. Perhaps this life does not yet constitute the whole of our existence. Perhaps the number of ills in this world is a necessary preparation for happiness in that world. So we do not know at all what our happiness can consist in, and hence we can determine nothing about it. We ask: why did God create me so? Every creature could ask this. It cannot be that all creatures are the most perfect, but rather there must be stages. One question is: how may I become worthy of happiness? Here, human beings say: “indeed, it’s not my fault; if only everyone else were better.” In this way one person conforms to the another in this world and thereby all remain evil. But there would not be a villain in the world; for he would see that everybody was good, and thus might feel ashamed of being evil. Due to the ills of life, we do not so much fear death, and it would be the

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greatest anguish for us to remain here on earth eternally; for all our pleasures would soon turn to disgust, and we would then experience the greatest tedium. If human virtue were always immediately rewarded with an equal measure of happiness, then morality would turn into a rule of prudence. In a world in which there is to be morality, vice must surely have its attractions and even afford a bit of fortune so that virtue does not arise from mere self-interest; for then it is not true virtue.— Is the best proof of God’s existence dogmatically or practically certain, or merely probable? The doctor can well choose medicine according to probability, because the human being must still die one day. But here probability is simply not in accordance with the end, not in accordance with the constitution [of the object]. Probability presupposes (1) that the possibility is certain, (2) that the grounds are merely part of all grounds for [this possible thing]. These grounds must be homogeneous with the grounds of other knowledge and inferred based on analogy. But it won’t work to say that based on events in the world it is probable that there is an author of it; for an author outside of the world is completely heterogeneous to the world. To assume God exists is merely a hypothesis for our reason, because otherwise we cannot explain many things. The expression “probability” thus does not apply to God; what I can know certainly is that something is outside of the world, but that is not yet the concept of God. [The first kind of]99 conviction of God’s existence is based on dogmatic grounds, which must be conducted either based merely on a priori grounds of the possibility of things; however, from possibility I can also infer actuality; or only based on the existence of the world, since I can indeed infer the existence of a being outside of the world; however, from effects I can only infer their causes and not anything more; from the order in world, I can infer wisdom, but nothing more. Thus I still do not have a complete concept of God. Now there is still a conviction from theoretical grounds when, in the interest of reason, I must accept something as a hypothesis. Thus, for instance, I cannot prove with practical certainty the non-being of a malicious demon, or that one does not influence the world. Nevertheless, it is still necessary for our reason to proceed as if there is no such thing. Thus the existence of God is a necessary hypothesis of our reason, which we must assume, partly so that we can explain The original makes use of an awkward “either” construction, which only makes sense when one gets to the mention of a second kind of conviction two paragraphs later. To clarify this, we have omitted the “either” and supplied the text in brackets.

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events in the world, and partly for the sake of totality. This hypothesis is necessary for the satisfaction of reason; but it is not necessary that reason arrives at satisfaction. It is perhaps better that reason never reaches completion. It100 only has subjective necessity. The second kind of certain conviction is that from practical grounds. It is also a hypothesis, however from practical grounds. If this presupposition is based on practical objective grounds, then it is a practical postulate or a moral faith. Practical necessity is the necessity of action. This necessity is either subjective, when it rests on sensible conditions, e.g. eating, or objective, when it rests on objective grounds of the will. The first is hypothetical, the second categorical, and moral faith is of this second sort. Moral laws are apodictically certain but they necessarily presuppose a God, because otherwise they would forfeit everything and we would not know why we should have followed them. It would be foolish to observe laws whose non-observance made us yet happier. In short, if there were no God, it would be a practical absurdity to act according to morality. Therefore, since the moral laws are apodictically certain, there must also necessarily be a God who loves precisely these laws, and will judge human beings according to them. This conviction of God’s existence is not only certain for every human being who thinks morally, but at the same time it also creates a better life. If the principle of morality were happiness, then the hypothesis that there is a God would be a hypothesis for an arbitrary purpose, but not necessary since happiness is not necessary. But it is necessary that the one who wants to be happy must be righteous, and the existence of God with respect to this is no mere hypothesis, but rather a practical postulate, and not opinion, but rather belief. Outside of opining and believing , apodictic knowing101 is the third degree of taking-to-be-true. Would it not be better if we had this? No; for thereby102 all morality would fall away. Through the complete certainty of the existence of God, the human being might envision reward and punishment so distinctly that we, in view of this, would only do the good, and in that case it would be self-interest and not morality. And now to some of the moral divine attributes. In this case too, we must above all guard ourselves against anthropomorphisms. So we must think The referent here could be either the hypothesis or reason. See our discussion of Erkennen and Wissen in the Introduction. 102 The original has davon, “of that,” which perhaps indicates that the sentence is incomplete or corrupt. 100 101

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attributes merely respectively and by analogy . We attribute these to him in order to determine our morality accordingly. God is said to be sincere so that people should also be sincere; for it is peculiar that people are invariably hypocritical towards God.— Justice is beneficence insofar as it is limited through holiness. So for us it is an incentive to moral conduct. Can we think justice as arbitrary or according to the order of nature or in accordance with the essence of things? Indeed, [in the second and third cases] justice is exalted.103 Are the torments of hell eternal?104 This has been greatly contested of late, but it cannot be correctly determined. The person who is evil here continually corrupts himself; consequently he must also believe that he will continually be corrupted there with each action, and in this corruption he has immeasurable prospects, which for us is eternity. So also with the good, which already lies in the nature of things. Justice is merely punitive and not remunerative . God punishes based on justice and only rewards with kindness. As well, I can expect reward from human beings through their justice when I have a right to it and have obligated another in turn through my service. But can we equally expect reward from divine justice? No, we have absolutely no right to such through our good works; rather these are what we owe , and everything good that we receive from him is undeserved grace. The Bible says: “When someone lends something to a poor person, thus he lends it to the Lord.”106 This is a lofty representation of God’s kindness, in that he would wish to repay us in the place of all the people upon whom we have bestowed a service. Since we can rightly demand reward from other people upon whom we have bestowed a service, so God takes upon himself their obligation, so to say, and repays to us what could not be repaid to us. This is a sublime kindness. The divine promises are merely expressions of his kindness; however, we cannot believe that on account of this we have the right to demand it of him, for According to Ebers 1896–9, vol. 2, 78, heben, even without the usual auf, could mean ether “exalted” or “removed” (or “abolished”). Both are possible here, depending on one’s interpretation. We interpret Kant as saying that the concept of justice as administered by means of nature and the essences of things, rather than supernaturally, is a higher concept of it, thus an “exalted” one; e.g. compare AA 28: 1084. However, since Kant would clearly regard the arbitrary justice also mentioned in the previous query as contradicting the necessity of the moral law, we have replaced the dadurch (“thereby”) of the original with the more specific text within brackets. However, if heben is taken to mean “abolish,” then the text in brackets should read “in the first case.” 104 Baumgarten 2013, §791. 105 Cf. The Metaphysics of Morals, AA 6: 227. 106 Proverbs 19.17. 103



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he gains absolutely nothing from this, and therefore I cannot demand it of him. Kindness is infinite where it is not limited by holiness. So justice is merely punitive justice . But how can God punish? If one denies this, this is Dippelianism.107 Punishments are (1) corrective , which aim at the betterment of the person. These however are expressions of beneficence toward the person who does evil; (2) exemplary , which occur for the sake of the betterment of the entirety of humankind; so these are also expressions of kindness and neither belongs to punitive justice. Now some say: There is no manner of punishment. However, there is yet a third, the vindictive punishment , where God punishes because one has done wrong . The former [kinds of punishments] take place lest wrong is done . Corrective and exemplary punishments do not arise from justice; however, they must still not conflict with justice; for if someone were punished merely in order to improve him or another, and yet did not deserve it, then it would indeed be unjust. But if he deserves it, then he must be punished, because he sinned. Thus vindictive punishments are the basis and without these no punitive justice can be thought. Whoever behaves evilly must suffer something ill, just like the one who behaves well will and must become happy. Both are necessarily connected, but why?—This we do not know; it’s enough that in God it is necessarily so; he cannot leave the evil unpunished, otherwise it would be permitted. “To offend God” is an anthropopathic expression, if it is supposed to mean robbing him of his contentment, disturbing him in the possession of his perfection, and so it is false. It means nothing more than breaching the law of God. Are punishments positive or natural?—Natural punishments are consequences of our actions according to the laws of nature, and positive [punishments] are consequences of our actions according to the mere choice of God. Both positive punishments and positive laws are possible. However, since they are not known to me through mere reason, I must stick purely to the natural punishments. I can already think natural punishment according to the universal government of the world. We represent God as the ruler in the kingdom of ends, and as creator in the kingdom of nature, and consider ourselves in view of this according to the whole of our existence. If we see ourselves on the path of Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §910, and our note note c to the paragraph.

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betterment, we have a joyful prospect for the future, since we can hope to grow ever in goodness. Thus the opposite as well with respect to evil. This immeasurable series is what we call eternity. But what can a human being who naturally converts shortly before his death on the deathbed, i.e. wisely resolves to be good, possibly hope for after his life is over?—Nothing; for he simply cannot know if he would even keep his decree.— All of the intentions of punishment first presuppose their legitimacy ; otherwise they would be unjust; thus vindictive punishment . The terminology of vindictive punishment and avenging justice is unfitting; for revenge presupposes a felt pain or insult that should be repaid precisely through such a pain or an even greater one.108 Justice is a limitation of kindness, thus kindness will not carry out justice; for this is a limitation of beneficence. Therefore, justice does not reward, but rather merely punishes. The justice of God is distributive justice . Among human beings, commutative justice is righteousness in their conduct.109 Culpability is immediately attached to a crime due to a violation of the law, even if evil consequences come to pass.— Divine justice punishes all culpable acts and can pardon nothing. We humans however cannot determine the ground of the culpability of our evil actions; for we cannot understand all the causes of the actions. If a religion teaches that man can solicit something from God, then it is a haven for all vices. The many who pray to and exalt God are often the greatest hypocrites.— On divine patience.—We represent distributive justice as a universal judgement day in which all of our deeds are revealed and we are judged accordingly.—In those who have not euthanized their consciences, God holds court every day.— We can expect the punishments of God purely according to the order of nature.—Virtue consists in the progress of the good towards the good; vice, in the regression from an evil to an even worse evil. Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §910. Wandel could also be meant to connote exchange or interaction among people. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant defines commutative justice as justice “holding between persons in their reciprocal intercourse among each other” (AA 6:297). The concept originates in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, Ch. 5.

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Divine punishment according to the order of nature is patience. Impartiality.—In God, that goes without saying. Partiality is the weakness where I attach myself to someone based on inclination. That cannot take place in God. Hence in God we can permit no predilection for a people or for a person. If we cannot explain something based on the universal providence of God, then we assume a particular providence. This, however, is due to the incapacity of our reason.— But even though this thought cannot be tolerated in theory, it still serves for greater peace of mind in practice. In this way, we often represent God as human, as if he were particularly kind to us, in order thereby to encourage ourselves to give that much more thanks to God. One believes that one is safeguarded against an ill; but very many natural ills serve as spurs driving us to useful actions that are necessary for us. Fairness is either an expression of commutative or distributive justice . It is not beneficence, but rather an obligation to the right that is not accompanied by compulsion. Strict right is that which is accompanied by the authorization to compel. It presupposes that this authorization must be externally valid. Not authority, but only our own conscience can compel us to fairness.— For God fairness is a strict right. Therefore, we must not believe that we are blameless before God when we have merely observed strict right.—The fact that people merely judge according to strict right derives from their incapacity, because they cannot know our thoughts and actions. Sincerity and frankness are human expressions. God has not withheld from us what we require, and if we will behave well, he will reveal even more to us.—God is described as sincere so that human beings should be equally sincere towards him, and this happens very rarely. In the investigation of matters of religion there must be sincerity and therefore freedom. God is absolutely immortal. That means his impossibility of passing away. Therefore, one should say: He alone is eternal. God is happy. The pleasure in one’s whole condition is welfare, and the maximum of this is happiness. The pleasure in his subject is self-contentment and, when it is completely independent from pleasure in an external condition, then it is bliss.—We can have satisfaction in our condition and dissatisfaction in our person. Hence the happy villain. To the greatest pleasure in a whole condition belongs the pleasure in our condition in the whole of our existence. Self-contentment could also be comprehended therein, but it is still distinct; for

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happiness and welfare do not rest upon ourselves, but rather upon the concurrence of other circumstances. What comes from us, rests on us, on freedom, what comes from outside, comes however from nature and fortune. I can be happy, and yet thereby discontent.— Self-contentment originates from the observance of morals. The Stoics say: Morals grant the greatest happiness. That, however, was hyperbolic; they did this in order to elevate virtue. However, a virtuous person is often unhappy; for the basis of happiness lies in physical causes, which depend on the course of nature and not on my will. However, self-contentment is greater than welfare. Now, does God even have a condition?—Condition is the totality of relations that belong not to his essence, but rather to his existence. I cannot derive the condition from the concept of a thing, but rather the condition is that which is further added to it.—In God, everything in him must be derived from his essence. Therefore, he has no condition, and so no proper happiness. But he is himself the object of supreme satisfaction, enjoys supreme selfcontentment, and is also the source of all contentment. His self-contentment depends on no external cause; hence it is bliss.— Human moral self-contentment indeed also depends on no external cause; but it can never take complete pleasure in its existence; for the human being depends too greatly on physical causes. Human happiness can never depend merely on moral causes, but rather the human being remains also partly dependent on physical causes.— The human being can never have bliss here. Human bliss consists in a continuous progress to towards bliss, and this progress will be infinite.— It is hence always incomprehensible when we hear that eternal life ought to consist in the greatest enjoyment of fortune. We do not hope for physical enjoyment in eternal life, but rather the acquisition of happiness through morality and the ever-further progress therein. And we can also hope for this since we will be independent of physical causes in the future world.— Moral interest thus compels us to assume the existence of God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul.— We must not proceed further lest we end up in presumptuousness.— We now consider God as the cause of the world, and indeed in three respects: (1) God as the causality of the effective nexus , or as the world’s cause. (2) As the causality of the final nexus , or as the world’s author. (3) As the causality of the moral nexus , or as the world’s ruler.



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God’s relationship to the world has been thought in various ways. Some think that God is not distinct from the world and that the world is a collection of God’s attributes. The world is thus one and the same as God. That was the opinion of various ancient sages and is called pantheism from pan . It is scarcely different from Spinoza’s system.110 Such opinions are more amply covered in Cudworth’s Intellectual System edited by Mosheim,111 and in Meiner’s The One True God .112 This is the system of inherence , which is opposed to the system of efficient causes , i.e. that God is a cause separate from the world. The system of efficient causes is either the system of emanation or of free causality . In the former, the world has its existence based on the necessity of divine nature; in the latter, it arises from God’s free will. The system of emanation , since it still distinguishes God from the world, is distinct from the system of Spinoza, which is actually a system of inherence . The system of emanation is crasser if one believes that all things were discharged from God, like light from the Sun. The author also refutes this, since he says if something were discharged from God, then he would be altered; further one part of God would be outside of another, and thus God would be composite.113—However, the ancient philosophers probably did not hold this crass concept, but rather represented the existence of the world as having necessarily sprung forth from the nature of God. The word “emanation ” is a figurative expression. God would therefore be the necessary cause of the substance of the world according to this system. This can be the case if the substances are parts of the cause. However, then they were already there in advance, and would not have sprung forth. Because of this God would also be divided and not supreme. This tells against the crasser system of emanation .— But against the more subtle .—Here we must first discuss the question: how is it possible that one substance can produce another? From experience I only see that substances can be causes of their own conditions, and of the conditions of other substances, but not that a substance is the cause of See Eberhard, §49. See our note on Cudworth and Mosheim in Eberhard, paragraph 56 above. 112 Christoph Meiner, The history of the doctrine concerning the true God, author and ruler of all things. . 2 vols. (Lemgow: Impensis Heredum Meyeri, 1780). 113 Both of these objections are found in Baumgarten 2013, §927. 110 111

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another substance. Rather, we find here that substance is persistent. But through reason I also cannot understand the possibility. We cannot understand how a substance, which ought to be for itself and thus not a predicate of another, still has its existence, and even its continued survival, from something else. From this it appears not to be a substance, or at least merely a qualified substance; for if its existence always depends on something else, then its existence is not subsistence, but rather inherence. Then we arrive at the system of Spinoza. In an absolutely necessary being we can regard the necessity of its nature merely as the ground of what is in it; for everything that flows from the necessity of the nature of a being also belongs to the being itself. All of the actions that flow from the necessity of God’s nature are only immanent actions . A necessary being can be the cause of things outside of itself, insofar as it has a representation of things possible outside of itself, and accordingly chooses strictly. We can represent God’s causality with respect to the things outside of himself merely through freedom ; for God’s choice is free, since it depends on no external influences.— If God is the causality of the world through freedom , then he is the author of the world . This again can be in a two-fold manner: either as architect, if he is merely the causality of the form of the substances, or as creator , if he is the causality of the substances. The ancients supposed the first and believed that matter is eternal, while they based themselves on the proposition: from nothing, nothing comes; to nothing, nothing returns . That is a necessary principle in natural science: namely, that substances persist, that they do not originate or disappear, and that they merely alter forms.— The existence of a world does not need to be thought such that it has a beginning, or that the world came to be. The beginning concerns merely the form, for it is an event.— The proposition: from nothing, nothing comes only applies to an origin of events within the world, and not to an origin of the cosmos , and that we do not treat as an event.— All substances in the world are contingent, since they are in interaction and one depends on the other. Accordingly, they exist merely as things caused by another , and their interaction is only possible if they all depend, with respect to their existence and their survival, upon another third cause.—For an architect to be possible, a



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creator is already required; for, if substances are there of themselves, then they can stand in no interaction at all. Thus, no architect is possible without their derivation from a third cause. We cannot comprehend the possibility of a creation because we cannot comprehend how it is possible for a substance to originate. Creation is an actuation of substance , and indeed from nothing ; for substance is the final substrate in a thing. So nothing can exist before this; thus it is creation from nothing .—Substance, insofar as it is considered as being brought forth from nothing, is a creature. This is the question: whether it ever occurred to the ancients to understand creation as an actuation from nothing . By holding God to be merely an architect, they had the advantage of ascribing the guilt of all ill and all evil to the constitution of matter; however, on the other hand, they thereby robbed God of his esteem.—As well, if God is architect of the world, then there is always something that God needs to assist in the world; for, in this case he must always form matter to the degree that its constitution permits. He cannot make its form equivalent to his idea. If, therefore, its form is somewhat altered due to its material constitution, then God must assist.—This is just like the case of a clock-maker. A clock-maker cannot make a clock such that it always runs; for due to its material constitution, the clock breaks down and he must repair it.— Creation 114 and conservation concern substances; governing and concurrence concern the form or the condition of substances in the world. Substance, insofar as it is something caused by another, is a creature .—Can we not think that a created substance could create another?—To the contrary, one argues: Each substance in the world is connected with the others through the respect of mutual influence and dependence .115 [If a created substance created another,] a substance would then suffer with respect to a substance created by it. Thus it would be passive to itself. However, that contradicts the concept.116 Therefore, The transcripts use certain English terms from here on, which will be indicated inline. Starting at Metaphysics §448, Baumgarten discusses the universal mutual interaction of substances, and concludes in §465 that this system must be the system of universal pre-established harmony. 116 The concept is that substance is power, or active (cf. Baumgarten 2013, §199). Kant’s discussion here mirrors Metaphysics §451. 114 115

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each creative substance is an extramundane substance .— Thus, God affects creatures, but the creatures do not affect him, and conversely we can say: only extramundane substance can be creative . God is therefore the only creator.— God is the author of the world through a simultaneous and instantaneous action , says the author.117 Does creation therefore exist only in one action, or in successive actions?—In God, we can only think his causality as a unity, not only in the actuation of the substances , but also of the alterations. In God, no succession takes place.— As well, God at present produces no new substances; for since he conserves the world through his creative power, the reason why he would wish to increase the world with new substances must lie in the constitution of the world. In this case, substances in the world would thus be the causes of new substances, and that would be absurd.— Creation concerns the existence of things. What does not exist is not a creature, or a being ; this concerns merely possibility, negation, ill, appearance.118 The author now talks about creation of the world based on freedom.119 This refers to supreme spontaneity , and we have already talked about this above.120—The system [of creation] through emanation cannot take place;121 for due to the nature of an absolutely necessary being, it is impossible that something should be outside of him. What flows from him, belongs to his very self. The causality of this [i.e. of emanation] presupposes a faculty for the representation of things possible outside of himself. So he is the cause through choice, or in accordance with knowledge of the object. The fact that it is free is easy to understand, for in him there is absolute spontaneity since the determination of the grounds of his will does not lie outside of him.— Now the author comes to the world itself.122 Divine choice can only have chosen the best among all possible worlds; for the best will is that which chooses the best objects. If a better object is possible and the author also has the Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §929. Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §931. 119 Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §933. 120 Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §932. 121 Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §927. 122 Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §§ 934–5. 117 118



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power for it, then a better will is also possible. Thus were a better world possible, so too a better will, a better author would be possible. The objections against optimism are nothing. One says: so, just as no greatest world is possible, so too is no most-perfect world. But against this we can say: if no most-perfect world is possible, so too is no most-perfect being possible. We indeed see many things in the world that we believe could have been perfect; however each part is imperfect, and we must first have an idea of the whole of the world and be able to compare it with all other possible worlds. But no human being is capable of this, and therefore none can prove the possibility of a better world through experience.— All philosophers hold and employ it as a principle that, in all organized bodies, everything invariably belonging to a species is purposive, even when we do not understand the end. By doing this reason suffers no harm, even if there are no ends. In this case, it has merely assumed ends at no cost. This principle, however, thereby produces the benefit that we always seek purposes and afterwards also often find them. If everything is purposiveness, then nothing can be counter-purposive and there is no true evil. The maxim that applies to organized bodies also applies to the whole of nature. Mountains spewing fire ravage countries with their lava, but precisely through this they render these lands the most fertile.—Priestly found that we would be vitalized in dephlogisticated air,123 since a light in the same burns with vitalized fire. But he also found that if we were always to live in dephlogisticated air, then we might also live that much shorter, because a light in this air burns rapidly. If our earth constituted the cosmos , then we would find its imperfections to be insurmountable difficulties with respect to optimism. But since the astronomers have so greatly expanded the world for us, they have also relieved us of these difficulties.— The theory of the best world is an unavoidable hypothesis for morality ; for in morals I must think that the greatest happiness also harmonizes with the greatest morality . The world is a world of sense and of understanding. Both are the most perfect in their kind, but each according to their concept; the world of sense is the most perfect of appearances according to empirical principles, and the I.e. oxygen, according to the now-obsolete phlogiston theory, championed by Joseph Priestly. According to the theory, the basis of combustion is phlogiston, but once the air is saturated with it, combustion stops. Hence the importance of dephlogisticated air, i.e. oxygen. Lacking phlogiston, it can be combined easily with it and thus burn better than regular, already phlogiston-saturated air. Cf. Joseph Priestly, Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of Air. 6 vols (London: J. Johnson, 1774–86), and AA 28: 1448, note 13021f .

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world of understanding is the most perfect of things-in-themselves according to intelligible principles.—So I can call the world in general either perfect or imperfect.—The world of sense is imperfect according to intelligible principles. In the intelligible world everything occurs according to moral principles and in agreement with them. In the world of sense this is not the case. But there is still perfection in this; for were it the case that the whole order of was arranged in accordance with morality, then every good action would be equally followed by an inevitable good fortune , and so virtue would be practiced out of self-interest. Evil is an object of disgust, but for this reason: so that we afterwards learn that much more to avoid it. In the whole, it does not derogate from nature’s perfection, but rather is necessary if the human being is to cultivate itself. And this is indeed a perfection of the world.—

On the end of creation

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The creation of the world has an objective but also a subjective end. The objective end is that which lies in its constitution, [and] is its perfection. The world is the system of ends and this124 constitutes the end of the world. To this extent the world is the supreme created good .— The value of the cosmos rests purely on the value of a rational being, and the value of the latter rests on the use of understanding and will, on the relation of these to ends according to a universal system of all ends, and this according to a principle according to which a universal system of ends is possible. Thus everything that such a being does is purposive; thus its whole existence, and so also the existence of the world, has a value.—The existence of things having no faculty of reason has in itself no value, but rather merely [has value] as a means of existence for a rational being.— If I act according to a principle according to which a universal system of purposes is possible, then I act morally; for if everyone acts according to moral principles, then all human beings have common and concordant purposes, and so here there is a universal system of ends.— This universal system of ends constitutes the proper goodness125 of Following Lehmann and reading diese for dieses. In most other instances Kant seems to contrast die Güte with das Gut, or the non-moral good with the moral good. For this reason we translate the former usually as kindness or benefit. Here, however, it seems as if either Kant or most likely the auditor has made a mistake.

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moral actions. Thus is suicide not permitted, because it disrupts the universal system of purposes by removing a member.— If a person wants to know whether something is permitted or not, he always asks himself if he would act such if it were a universal rule. Thus all morality is based on the idea of a universal system of ends, which is only possible through the freedom of the will.— To make this universal system of purposes actual is our vocation , and that we fulfil this vocation is the objective end in creation. The world as congruous with the moral laws is the supreme created good . Each rational being thus has for itself the end in the world that God has in general for the world, namely: to advance a universal system of ends to the extent that it is able. To act according to this universal system makes us into members of it.— Insofar as the world is the universal system of ends, it is the object of God’s supreme satisfaction. Happiness is the idea of the well-being that can only take place in a system of all ends. We must therefore behave well, if we wish to become happy.— The objective end is the supreme infinite good . It should thus be good in itself. This can consist in the fact that rational beings are happy according to the measure of their worthiness. That is the absolutely complete good that one can think. Nothing has any value except rational beings; however, even the latter have only a conditioned value: namely, insofar as they are moral. The most perfect world is the system of all ends through freedom. This rests on the morality of the rational being. Morals is the collection of rules according to which it is possible for the ends of all rational beings to constitute a system. The system of ends is absolutely good, and a member of it is absolutely good. The system of ends through nature, i.e. when nature harmonizes with my ends, is happiness. The personal perfection of the rational being is moral perfection. This and the perfection of its condition constitute the best world. Therefore, supreme moral and supreme physical perfection must coexist; hence this is the absolute perfection of the world, which can be a purpose of God. “Absolute” does not mean an unrestricted good, but rather that the world is good by itself.— Now we still wonder: what is the world good for?—Here we look at the subjective end. It can only be good because something is produced in God; for outside of the world there is nothing else but God. Thus, should the world be useful to God, then it must be the cause of something in God. This is quite naturally the representation of an active being. This has not only objective

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but also subjective motives, since something will be altered in his existence. The subjective motive is interest. The represented objective good can serve to approve the object. Now, however, I can approve something, it can please me, and its existence can nevertheless be indifferent to me. However, it belongs to desire that existence not be indifferent to me, that it interests me, and here a subjective motive must also be present.— Is there interest in God?—We must represent this in all finite beings, but not in God; for the supreme divine bliss cannot rest on the existence of anything contingent but rather on his own nature. But how can we make the production of the world understandable to ourselves?—God has the supreme satisfaction in his perfection of having such a world in its idea and in being able to produce it. If the world becomes actual, then God has thereby gained nothing. This is not the case with human beings. For example, he cannot convince himself of his good will until he puts it into practice.— Most people represent the matter like this: If God is simply everything , then he cannot wholly enjoy his happiness unless there exist things that know his perfection and derive their perfection and their happiness from his perfection. As if126 God created the world in order to escape eternal loneliness.— One says: God created the world for the sake of his own honor. That presupposes society and refers to the need of God to be in society. Nevertheless, it is still better and more suitable than if I say: For the sake of human happiness. Honor does not indicate: He created the world for the sake of happiness, but rather for the sake of perfection. God’s beneficence alone does not bring honor to him, but righteousness and wisdom must also be present. In our own interest we indeed wish that God is beneficent. Honor is the best expression that can be found for human weakness, if one will think God anthropopathically. In honor, all self-interest is far removed. We can find no motive through which an action more closely approximates actions that occur based on moral, i.e. objective, grounds.—There is vanity in honor, but human beings cannot completely cast that off. If we require merely the applause of the honest, then it is, while not angelically pure, still very good; for we cannot be more disinterested than this.—If we recount a good action to a friend, then we enjoy it once again.—If I say: someone is The transcript employs the subjunctive habe Gott die Welt erschaffen, which can indicate either conditionality or reported speech. So, in view of the context, Kant could also be indicating that this is what most people would say.

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without conscience, then that is terrible; but if I add to this: also without honor, then all is lost. Honor is something refined. Through honor, we would have inflicted on God a diminution of the moral perfection of his will, but for us humans it might well be said in a manner fitting for God .— With God there is no subjective purpose in the production of the world. God had merely the objective purpose, which was already sufficient to move him to create the world.—He is the most perfect being, and in virtue of this he has a faculty for producing what is most perfect. So for that reason he produced the world.—We can think no incentive in God.—Human beings need incentives, for their will is not good in itself. The human will is derivative ; it has needs, and these are always its subjective incentives. In God, there are no needs. His will is original . He is conscious of his own will as the supreme ground of all things outside of him, has satisfaction in this, and this is the causality of the world.—The beneficence of God is not an inclination to do something good for someone, but rather the idea to reward someone to the extent that he deserves.—God does not have a derived will , therefore also no incentives.— However, if we still wish to conclude according to the analogy, then we must say that God has created the world, not so that creatures love him, but rather so that that they honor him due to his perfection.—Honor is not only the most refined incentive in human beings, but on that account we praise him because he has made the world so perfect. With respect to kindness, however, we praise him for making the world so agreeable to us. (In love, the perfection of the world is merely relatively represented in view of human desires, however, in honor [it is represented] absolutely.)— The honor of God consists in the observance of the moral laws. God therefore created the world not due to the incentive of honor, but rather so as to provide a theatre for the moral observance of his will. He created the world so that we should conduct ourselves morally in it, and hence so that a reward should be granted to us according to our dignity. The honor of God consists thus in moral conduct. It is also in other ways believed to consist in exaltations; but so to wish to exalt God and to extol him as worthy according to all his properties is presumptuousness .—Presumptuous is that whose extent I cannot reach, and I cannot describe God, cannot fathom him according to his attributes.127—Most people represent God as a great lord This and the previous sentence are impossible to translate into English satisfactorily due to the play on Vermessenheit and Vermessen, both of which relate to messen, “to measure.” The idea is that we are presumptuous when we mistake the measure of something (Vermessen) that is too great for

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whom they must serve and seek to win over through all sorts of adulation and coaxing.— Rational beings can never serve merely as means in the system of purposes, but rather are always at the same time an end; for otherwise they would have no value, and the value of the whole world rests purely on the value of rational creatures. The human being can be used as a means, but then the accompanying end must again be a means to him as an end. It is therefore unjust to punish merely as a means to improve others. The human being is thus the center of the world. The system of ends is either a system of nature or of freedom. The system of nature is the mechanism of nature, where everything is connected together according to laws following the final and effective nexus . In the latter, the human being is the center. It is the relation of rational beings among one another through the laws of freedom. This is the system of freedom, but practical, and the former a physical system of all ends. Therefore, physical teleology and practical or pneumatic teleology. The laws of the latter are the moral laws.—Teleology is agreeable, but in connection with morals it becomes practical teleology . In history, everything seems disorderly and without end, merely arising based on private intentions. But when we are not familiar with the whole of something, it always appears disorderly to us. If we were familiar with the whole, then we would also find admirable traces of wisdom.— If we suppose a beginning of the world, then we must posit the causality of the cause also in time. However, if we are talking about a being outside of the world, then time disappears.—If we posit the divinity in time, even in an empty time in which there was only the divinity with the ability to create a world, then the causality would be an event and the cause itself, which it presupposes, would also be an event.— The world has neither a beginning, nor is it eternal. In the world of sense, or in the kingdom of appearances, there is no first. The things in the world are in time. But the world as the whole of all things is not in time, for time is only the form of our sensibility. In itself, the world has neither a beginning, nor is it eternal. In the world of sense, or in the kingdom of appearances, there is no first. Everything there is in a progression or a regression .—If us and that it is presumptuous to attempt something if its extent is beyond what we can properly measure.



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we talk about the world as the effect of God, then we are talking about the noumenon. This is the substrate . Here there is no beginning. The question of when or how long ago God created the world is the same as how long the year is in fathoms.128 We can say nothing further than: God is the cause of the world through freedom, and thus creator.—

On providence If we attribute original existence to matter, then neither creation nor conservation is necessary. Conservation is actuation of continuation. Original conservation is the conservation of substances. Human beings conserve only the form. Here the idea of substances seems to be lost. What only exists and continues through another does not appear to be a subject for itself but rather the effect of another. We can call human actions hidden divine actions. The “how” we cannot comprehend, just as we can never comprehend when we judge hyperphysically129 or beyond nature. But it is not a contradiction. Something can be caused by another and yet not, for that reason, be required to inhere in the cause as a predicate. This is where Spinoza erred. The word “subsistence ” is obviously equivocal. It is translated as “selfstanding,” i.e. the possibility of existing without cause, as well as the possibility of existing without inhering .— The conservation , i.e. divine operation , through which substances exist applies for all time. At no time can they exist by themselves. This is not the case with form. That can remain. Here no conservation is necessary. If only substances are conserved, then the accidents are conserved as well. Everything that is created rests on a cause for continuation. In God, there is no distinction with respect to creation and conservation ; for in God we cannot distinguish beginning and continuation. It is one and the same act ; in the world only do we make a distinction. It cannot be called a continued creation ; for

The fathom is a unit of length equaling six feet. Cf. Critique of Judgment, § 31. Judging hyperphysically is to judge while suspending all natural explanation.

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creation is the production of the origin or the beginning. A continual beginning is contradictory. We can form absolutely no concept of this. If we accept the more refined atheism, which all the ancient philosophers indeed held, namely that according to which God is only an architect, then conservation only concerns the form. The author calls conservation influence .130 This is incorrect; for, influence only concerns the form, while it presupposes something that it influences, i.e. substance. Concurrence is the nexus of co-causes or of coordinated causes. God does not concur with nature. That would be a miracle. Conservation is not concurrence ; for concurrence is the causality of an insufficient cause that is the complement which [together with other causes] yields the sufficient .— However, since the existence of the creature depends completely on God, God is thus the solitary cause of creatures. Otherwise, creatures must have had in themselves an ability for continuation; only it must not have been sufficient.— God does not concur with substance, i.e. with conservation ; for he is the solitary cause of its conservation . However, he also does not concur with the condition, or with the natural events in the world; for wherever God concurred, that would be a miracle. With natural events there should be no miracles. If God concurs, then the powers belonging to nature are not sufficient for an event. God thus supplies these. God is the supernatural cause. This is a miracle, since the cause is supernatural; consequently each act of concurrence is a miracle. Thus the one who accepts concurrence accepts miracles, and just as we must be suspicious of accepting miracles, so must we also be suspicious of using the expression. Such a judgment is inappropriate with respect to God. If we want to ascribe something to God, then we must ascribe everything to him. Those who always wish to dispossess something from nature appear to have the thought that nature is a self-standing principle; for if I merely accept God as an architect, then miracles are always possible.— Freedom is the faculty to act. We cannot comprehend this; for we can only make comprehensible what is comprehensible through natural laws. Freedom however is that which is not determined through natural laws. Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §951.

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Reason should have causality, i.e. the faculty to determine our will not according to matter, but rather such that it sets forth ends for the will. That it cannot do. However, if this is [so], if reason should be practical, then we must presuppose the idea of freedom. We all act necessarily under the idea of freedom. Neither its possibility nor impossibility can be proven. If this is so, then it is permitted to accept it. However, it is not only something permitted, but rather an idea to be presupposed. It is not possible to think of a concurrence of God with free actions. These are events in the world. If God is their determinate cause, then they are not free. But God also does not concur; for then he would not be a solitary cause . If I say that God concurs with determination of our wills, then this would again be a miracle. If God concurs with morality, then the human being has no moral value, because it cannot be imputed to him. Omnipresence is combined with conservation ; and indeed immediate omnipresence ; for God can give conservation to the creature just as little as he can give the power of creation to it. This omnipresence is the most intimate, i.e. God thereby works in the innermost of substances, i.e. the substantial or the first inner principle of the activity of substances. No substance is intimately present to others; for each can exist without the others; but [each is] externally present. All substances are in space. However, God does not determine their place through his conservation of them.132 But space is only possible through his conservation; for it is the universal condition of the reciprocal relation of substances, and substances can be in connection and interaction only in such a manner that their existence rests on one singular universal cause.— Local omnipresence is impossible; for then God would be outside of himself; hence it is only to be accepted virtually.133 Perhaps this should have been praesentia; for as written, it is orthographic in neither German (Präsent, with initial capital), nor in Latin. 132 This appears to contradict the Pölitz lecture notes at AA 28: 1108 lines 36f. and the Volckmann notes, which are largely identical to Pölitz, at AA 28: 1211 lines 34f. This may, however, be a case where the subtlety of Kant’s argument was lost on composers of the notes. He could simply be noting, for instance, that God’s conservation, by itself, does not determine place. It determines place only because substances are in space and God must therefore be thought to also conserve them in space, thereby determining their places. In other words, if substances were not in space or if the form of our outer intuition were not spatial, substances would have no determined places and yet his conservation of them could still be thought without contradiction. 133 Cf. AA 28: 1211. By virtually, Kant means no more than that space depends on God as cause. 131

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The concept of a world soul disappears. Soul is: being in interaction with matter, then also God [would be in interaction with matter], and then matter would again influence him.— The enthusiastic idea of the most intimate presence is that one imagines that one can feel it. In general, the human being cannot become certain that any single state of mind 134 comes from God. He would have had to explore his entire soul if he wanted to say this. It is presumptuous to reascribe everything frivolously to God by transcending the boundary of our understanding, which is to keep oneself within possible experience.— Providence is the foundation of the laws of nature. It is thus considered as contained in creation. Beneficent providence is provision . Divine government is the conservation of the world’s structure according to its universal laws. This thus concerns the conservation of the laws. The determination of individual parts in agreement with laws is guidance, or it is the determination of individual events in accordance with divine intentions. It concerns individual events that would not have followed in accordance with the universal laws of nature. The conservation of the powers of nature, i.e. what is substantial in all powers and through which they are the causes of alterations in the world, is called the general physical concurrence of God . However, this is false; for the solitary efficient cause never concurs. It indeed produces the powers entirely by itself. Here the coordinated and subordinated causes are confused. The special concurrence of God can indeed be thought, namely, where no natural law would be possible through which this or that event could have been brought about; e.g. some account the production of animals to this [special providence]; even if not the body, then still the soul. But we do not have the slightest ground to suppose this. It can indeed be thought as possible, but where is the proof? It is much rather to be supposed, since the essences of all things have their ground in God, that the course of nature will not require concurrence and supplementation.— We do not consider free actions as belonging to the course of nature, or the mechanism of nature, i.e. where every event has its ground in the former and is determined by it. In freedom, every action is to be viewed as not being Gesinnung is often properly translated by “disposition” in Kant’s published writings, but seems to be used here in a much wider sense.

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determined.—Moral concurrence is when I suppose a concurrence with respect to moral events.—If they are free, then they do not develop from the first arrangement that God laid out in the world. They are therefore not determined through what God laid out in creation. It appears that they are grounded on causality distinct from creation, on causality that is independent from the divine plan in creation. If so, then concurrence is thinkable, for there are two coordinated causes.— Providence is usually divided into universal and particular providence. We cannot take this in the same sense as in logic, namely where things are thought according to universal and particular predicates; but rather it is universal insofar as it concerns the whole and particular insofar as it concerns a part. It is not called universal but rather general , when God bears provision for things and kinds. One can have principles that in general are good. Here there are exceptions. In German we have no special word for this.135 So if divine providence is general , then this also presupposes exceptions and makes God anthropomorphic, who cannot possibly see everything, but who can only see on the whole; e.g. he has provided for the species on the whole, but not for individuals .— Human beings put a lot of effort into eradicating many species, but they can’t.136 That is something admirable. They also cannot disperse themselves very broadly. Here there is always care for the species, but not for the individual ; for the lion devours a human being without any need or right, when its instinct impels it to do so. There is a great difference between saying: Something is under the providence of God, and something occurs according to providence.137 The word “provision” expresses a certain prior deliberation with respect to that which is future. But for God there is nothing future. If we assume the providence of God as special , then the divine decree is grounded not on understanding but rather on experience. If it is grounded on understanding, then it determines everything according to a universal idea, and here absolutely no exceptions are found. Each individual exists through the divine will, everything is the work of God, and Note that Kant provides the English word “general” and the Latin generalis (generalem). Cf. Horace’s “you can get rid of nature with a pitchfork, but ever will it return ,” Ep. 1: X, 24. 137 This sentence is a comment on the margin. 135 136

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consequently there can be nothing in the world that is not perfectly determined in the divine decree. The direction of God can be divided into the ordinary and the extraordinary . All events are subject to ordinary and extraordinary divine direction; it does not follow from this that they follow from extraordinary direction. Extraordinary direction is when an event is made actual by God that cannot occur according to the order of the nature, and yet would be required for the highest good in the world .138—There is extraordinary direction when we say that divine cooperation would not be lacking if this event were necessary.139— One can deny extraordinary direction who denies the possibility of supernatural events or miracles. This person must either prove that they are not necessary for the ordinary highest good in the world; this he cannot do; or he must deny the existence of God. We ourselves must not presumptuously wish to determine what stands under extraordinary divine direction; for then we presume to say that this could not have occurred according to the course of nature.— Something occurs through an extraordinary direction when a single event is viewed as an end for which God applied its cause as a means. If the rule according to which an event occurs is the intention of God, then this is extraordinary direction. If we always suppose extraordinary direction, then for each single event there is always a particular divine decree; then events are connected according to no universal rules, and nature ceases. Extraordinary direction is nothing more and nothing less than a miracle, pre-established or occasional . If we take prayer as a means for making us surrender thankfully to the divine will, so that, were he to grant something, we would understand this to be agreeable; and were he not to do so, then we would also be satisfied—then this is good.—If it is a means for acquisition, then it is nothing. Then one of two things takes place. Either God, based on his beneficence, would notice that we have been mindful of him in prayer and would indicate the manner in which we should honor the divine goodness and wisdom; or we must have

In the third Critique, Kant says that the highest good in the world “consists in the combination of universal happiness, i.e. the greatest welfare of the rational beings in the world, with the supreme condition of their being good, namely, that they be moral in maximal conformity with the [moral] law” (Pluhar translation, §88 AA 453). 139 Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §§ 834, 835, and 860, where he argues for the possibility of miracles. 138



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intended to solicit God [thereby] and believe that for this reason he will depart from the decrees of his eternal wisdom. Prayer has only a moral use.— We must guard against ascribing something to the extraordinary direction of God. This is the principle of ignorance . We must suppose that everthing occurs according to ordinary direction, otherwise we act contrary to duty and, moreover, cannot defend it.— If a holy God rules the world, whence evil? Could he not prevent it? And if he could, then why does he not do so?140 The prevention of moral evils is at the same time the prevention of moral goods.—Each created rational creature has needs and thus sensuous incentives and thus the enticement to evil.— God admits evil. Is that not the same as saying that he permits it? – With both, the concept is non-impedition . This is either physical , i.e. admission, or moral , i.e. permission; the latter does not take place. After all, our reason recognizes laws, and God has set forth punishments for these in nature. At its commencement towards the good, the human being is in a state of innocence prior to the start of the development of this predisposition. Here everything in the human is good; but in the natural predisposition, he is also only at the beginning. His innocence is less than virtue; for it is merely negative; but virtue is positive.— If the predisposition develops, then sensibility first develops. It makes attempts, reason judges them, and makes rules. Then there is knowledge, and there sin and transgression arise.—Even if reason now knows these, it does not immediately have enough strength and proficiency to eradicate the old habits of sensibility. With animals, all natural predispositions develop themselves, which is not the case with human beings.—The origin of evil lies in creation.— God should not be merely governor of the world, but sovereign.—The heathens had the idea that the primordial being produced nothing but the form. The different departments are divided among different spirits. This is worse than inferring different events from a singular divinity through miracles. Here we know the laws of operation; with the inferior gods, not at all. In divine providence and government of the world we do not think of demons, and so on.— Many heterodox theologians are also enthusiasts. They accept many a being as created and then demand respect for it and assign to it who knows how This formulation echoes the famous Epicurean questions as posed by Hume. Dialogues on Natural Religion: X, 186.

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great a rank. This is nothing. Suppose that it had any amount of perfections whatsoever; then we are still completely equal to it in that we are creatures.— According to both ordinary and extraordinary direction, God is an immediate ruler.— God, the author says, is a monarch;141 supreme commander ; insofar as he is a person , he is a monarch. The monarch, insofar as he has unlimited power over thinking beings, is a despot, the author likewise says.142 This, however, is false. The despot wills blind obedience. But God wills that we should obey him because we understand that this is fair and good. He wills that we do it gladly and are not externally coerced. A monarchical government is twofold: 1) patriarchal, i.e. the government of a monarch as father, 2) despotic, i.e. the government of a monarch as despot.— Should “despot” mean something evil, then one can say that those laws are moral that can be known to be laws according to their nature; and they are despotic when they are not such; i.e. fasting. Through the former one can recognize the holiness and beneficence of the legislator. Is it advisable to cite ends as grounds and to ignore the effective nexus ?—We can explain everything according to universal laws of nature and yet accept that everything has its ground in a supremely wise being; for otherwise everything would not fit together. We can always presuppose that what occurs according to the laws of nature is wise. We must not aim to indicate the intentions of God, but rather to explain everything according to the laws of nature. How can our understanding know if this or that was divine intention!— Can we also suppose divine providence in human freedom?—We believe that the case here is precisely the same as with nature, although it is equally difficult for us to understand. I will derive everything from universal divine providence or from natural predispositions that were placed in human beings. We will certainly not get far, but yet we can do nothing else. We can explain nothing through individual divine direction.—We can presuppose that the human race must develop all of its predispositions.—We can even assume a teleological principle in history, as in nature. We will often err, but yet still also pay attention to many things that otherwise would have escaped us.— When something is viewed as subject to the divine decree, then is it subject to the conditioned decree, i.e. according to motives, or the unconditioned Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §974. Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §974. Rather than “thinking beings,” Baumgarten refers to “spirits ,” which he defines as intellectual substances in §402.

141 142



Danzig Rational Theology According to Baumbach

215

decree, i.e. without motives?—It is certain that if we are speaking about divine decrees, then we are always speaking very much according to human ideas. We can never imagine a choice in the divine will that does not agree with the concept of supreme perfection according to moral laws. This agreement is the motive and there is no choice without this. A representation, e.g. that God wills to make people unhappy without regard to their conduct and takes away all opportunities, means, and motives for the good so as to cloak his conduct towards human beings with the appearance of right , turns God into a tyrant. The cause of this lies partly in a false exegesis of the Holy Scriptures, and partly in the incomprehensible concept of freedom whose possibility cannot be explained, for otherwise it must be explained according to natural laws, which however is not possible since it has been excepted from them.— For speculative philosophy, natural necessity is better in other respects because it is comprehensible, even if natural necessity in itself also is not; for I cannot understand that because something is, something else is also there according to a universal rule. With freedom we enter an intelligible field, and here all comprehensibility comes to an end. But in practical philosophy we must assume freedom .143— The speculatively minded may well pardon the concepts of predestination and absolute decree ; but how theologians, whose end is morals, could foster them is incomprehensible. Here all esteem for God disappears, as do all punishments. Here a person has become a victim of another’s undeserved happiness.— Theology should not guide the use of reason in any other way but to serve to make it complete. This way we will not derive other duties from the knowledge of God; we will not now explain something otherwise than according to natural laws; but rather, we will guard against reason’s becoming lost in chimeras. We accept these things in order to understand the connection between the system of nature and the system of ends and to comprehend the use of reason in regard to nature and morals .— We will not derive the laws from the divine will. The legislator must not be the author, but rather the moral laws lie in the nature of things. If we derive them from the divine will, then this spoils all morals; for in this case God can also grant dispensation. But if it lies in the essence of things, then this is unacceptable; for it is impossible for a supreme wisdom to choose something In principle, the pronoun could refer to either freedom or comprehensibility.

143

[AA 28: 1316]

216

[AA 28: 1317]

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unwise. We do not see that morality is wise because God wills it, but rather because morals teaches it to us.—If we think of God as legislator, then we must also think of him as the Lord of nature; for if morals promise me nothing then they can demand nothing from me. A being reveals itself when it becomes the cause of the fact that one knows its existence and attributes. Revelation is the announcement of the hidden. A thing reveals itself to another insofar as it influences the latter. The existence of things becomes revealed to us: 1. through its effect on us and 2. through reason. They affect the senses, and reason recognizes from this the causes and their constitution.— God is a being whose complete concept we can never infer from his effects. Therefore, God cannot sufficiently reveal himself through his effects. For natural revelation through effects we must have the concept of order and purposiveness and that these belong to the highest of all beings. Before people cultivated their reason, they based their concept of God on fear, and they believed that they could win him through flattery.— Through contemplation of the world one obtains no adequate concept of God; for there is indeed much purpose, but also much conflict in the world. Hence, here I simply cannot infer a wisest being.— It is therefore very incorrect when one says that all people have believed in a God. They indeed believed in a powerful being, but not in a God, and accordingly their theology was of no help at all.— He can hence reveal himself to us according to his whole magnitude merely through reason, so that by reason we add what is needed to the effects in order to obtain a concept of God that is adequate to God.— God can also reveal himself through words. However, this presupposes concepts in us, and we must have these through reason. Hence, he cannot give a concept of himself that is greater than what our reason is capable of.—However, in external revelation through words I must first investigate through reason whether or not these words are adequate to our idea of God.— So before external revelation, which happens through words and effects, I must already have an idea of God, already have an internal revelation, which happens through reason itself.— One could also call it internal revelation, if God immediately produced in human beings a belief in him. However, that would then be a miracle and God would have to perform a miracle again forthwith so that the human being would continue to believe.—This would then be supernatural internal revelation, whereas that through reason would be natural.



Danzig Rational Theology According to Baumbach

217

This natural internal revelation lies at the basis of every external revelation through word and effect.— This natural internal revelation lies at the basis of every expression through word and work. However, for belief in God, speculative reason is not sufficient, but rather only common human understanding, when, namely, one takes it from morality. Revelation can give us no new concept of God other than that which we already have from reason.— The author talks about revelation as an announcement of the divine will.144 Does God not reveal himself through the moral law? Certainly! The human being sees that the moral law is no means for advancing one’s inclinations here, but rather it consists of prescriptions that we must observe without being concerned whether it makes us happy. We must not regard it as rules of prudence, but rather as duty.—And duty and law presuppose a legislator, and he himself is a moral being, which at the same time is endowed with the highest power, kindness, justice, and so on. This is the first conviction, the foundation of divine internal revelation, and to us that means conscience, practical reason. Now, nature also provides a greater intuitive conviction and also indicates nothing that should contradict morality. Thus to this degree does our conviction become belief.— What in revealed religion cannot be understood through reason one calls articles of faith in the strictest sense. Revealed religion can contain much that can indeed be understood through reason, but perhaps only later.—Natural religion also has articles of faith ; e.g. the existence of God is also not knowledge, but rather moral belief.— We don’t know if there are any articles of faith in the strictest sense that would be necessary for all humans.—Were this the case, then revelation would be absolutely necessary.—However, it could be that revelation is only necessary for certain people at certain times.—Revealed religion will contain articles of faith in both the broad and strict sense .— The latter go beyond our reason, and we don’t know if there are such things that are necessary for all human beings and yet go beyond reason.—There could be.— Cf. Baumgarten, Metaphysics, §982. Baumgarten says “revelation broadly speaking is when God signifies the divine mind .”

144

[AA 28: 1318]

218

[AA 28: 1319]

Preparation for Natural Theology

Yet we understand that only the person who has availed himself of natural revelation as much as he could is worthy of a higher revelation. If natural revelation is not sufficient for directing his will in a manner pleasing to God, then he can hope for something higher. It is not a question of whether God could so reveal something to us, but rather whether we can hope for it. The Bible itself says: Whoever does not use his talents well, not only will he not obtain more, but rather what he has shall be taken from him.145— The author now talks about the holy mysteries .146—A mystery is what should not become public, as well as what does not become public because nobody correctly understands it. There are many such things; e.g. that God is absolutely necessary, [or] how an all-sufficient being could create the world.— We also have a mystery in morality, namely: If the human being compares himself with the moral laws, then he finds himself always still unworthy of approval in his own eyes, and therefore cannot understand how the supreme legislator would permit him to share in happiness. Here the rule of reason is this: Do as much as you can, and hope that the divine beneficence will supplement it in a manner unknown to you, even if at the same time you do not know that he will. Surely we cannot understand whether we have done as much as we could have done.—Whether such mysteries will ever be unveiled is unknown to us.— The naturalist in the stricter sense is the one who accepts no strict revelation.147 This is a miracle, which he also denies. If he denies the possibility of revelation, he must deny the existence of God, or that revelation can contribute something to the moral perfection of the human being.—

Luke 19.26; Matthew 25.14–30. Baumgarten 2013, §996. 147 Cf. Baumgarten 2013, §1000. 145 146

4

Concordances Note on the Concordances We provide here two concordances. The first collates Eberhard’s Preparation for Natural Theology through two editions, Kant’s lectures, and Kant’s reflections. Column 1 lists the chapter titles in Eberhard’s Preparation, whereas column two gives their corresponding page numbers in Eberhard’s 1781 edition and column 3 their corresponding page numbers in Volume 18 of the Akademie Ausgabe. Column 4 identifies the locations in the Danzig transcript corresponding to the Preparation, according to the pagination in AA 18. Finally, column 5 lists the reflections that Kant wrote in his copy of the Preparation, listed by reflection number and page number in AA 18. The second table collates parallel passages in the Pölitz, Volckmann, and Danzig transcripts of Kant’s lectures, which are all found in AA 28. As should be clear, all the numbers refer to page numbers in AA 28. This concordance does not include the Magath or Coing transcript for the reasons explained in the introduction.

220

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Concordance 1 Eberhard 2 3 4 5 Preparation for Natural Eberhard AA: 18, Danzig Reflection Theology, by section number Eberhard number, AA and title  18 Preface i–vi 491–492 6206, 488–494 6207, 494  6208, 494–495 6209, 495  6210, 496–497 6211, 497 6212, 497  6213, 497–499  6214, 499–503  6215, 503–506 6222, 513  6223, 513 Introduction 1 513 1231–1235 1. Contents   1 513 2. The difference between theology and religion 4 515 1235–1239 6224, 515 6225, 515 6226, 515 6227, 516 3. The truth of the knowledge of God 5 517 1238–1239 6228, 517 6229, 517 6230, 517 6231, 517 6232, 518

Concordances

4. Errors in the knowledge of God 5 5. Difficulties concerning the truth of the knowledge of God. A104 6

518

518

221

1239

6233, 518

1232–1241 6234, 518–519 1264–1269 6235, 519  6236, 519–520 6238, 521 6239, 521 6240, 521  6241, 521–522 6242, 523 6243, 523 6244, 523 6. More precise determination of the requirements for an account of the knowledge of God 7 524 6245, 524 6246, 525  6247, 525–527 6248, 528  6249, 528–530 7. The uses and necessity of this cautious method 9 526 8. Outline of the following treatise 11 528 Chapter One: On the Formation of the Concept of God 13 530 Part One: On the inner reality of the concept of God, or on the possibility of a most perfect being 13 530 1243–1283

222

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9. Prerequisites for the proof of the possibility of a most perfect being 13

530 6250, 530–531 6251, 531 6252, 531  6253, 531–532 6254, 532  6255, 532–533 6256, 533 10. Pure realities 14 533 1249–1254 6257, 533 6258, 534 6259, 534 6260, 534 11. Mixed realities 15 535 1249–1254 6261, 535 6262, 535 6263, 536 12. The concept of the metaphysically infinite being 15 536 1251–1252 6264, 536 6265, 536  6266, 536–537 6267, 537 13. More precise determination of the concept of infinity 17 537 6268, 537 6269, 538  6270, 538–540 14. In regard to particular realities 19 540 6271, 540–541 6272, 541 6273, 541 6274, 541

Concordances

223

 6275, 541–543 6276, 543  2677, 543–544  6278, 544–546 6279, 546 15. The pure abstraction of its concepts 20 546 1254 6280, 546–548 6281, 548  6282, 548–549  6283, 549–550 16. The determinations of what is simple 21 550 1253 6284, 550–551 17. Spatiality 22 552 1254 6285, 552–553 18. The determinations of a spirit 25 553 1255–56 19. Three kinds of determinations in God 26 554 1254 6286, 554–555 20. Proofs of the external reality or the actuality of God 28 555 1257–58 6287, 555–557 21. The proof itself 30 557 1257–1259 6288, 557–558 6289, 558  6290, 558–559 6291, 560

224

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22. Particular proof of the necessary actuality of the most perfect being

32

561

1243–1245 6293, 561–562 1259–1261 23. The proof a posteriori 34 562 1245 6294, 562–563 1259–1261 6295, 563 6296, 563  2697, 563–565 6298, 565  6299, 565–566 24. The proof based upon final causes in the world 36 566 1245–1246 6300, 566–567  6301, 567–568 25. Requirements for this proof 37 568 1277 1282 26. I. Order and perfection in the world 37 568 1301–1302 27. II. The order in the world not by chance 39 569 6292, 560–561 28. The order in the world is contingent 40 569 1278 6278, 544–546 29. Proof based upon the contingent nature of bodies 42 570 30. Physicotheology. Teleology 43 571 1277–1283 31. Two main classes of creatures. Their relation to each other 46 572

Concordances

32. The inanimate good, insofar as it is useful to the animate 33. The Determining ground of the perfection of the inanimate 34. The magnitude of perfection 35. The preservation and propagation of animate beings 36. The classes of animate beings 37. Determination of the bodily structure of these classes 38. The three main kinds of harmony between inanimate and animate beings 39. Special physicotheology 40. The use of these theological reflections on nature 41. Its determinations 42. The proof based upon the consensus of peoples

225

47 572

49

573

50 573

51

574

6302, 574

52 575

53 575

53 56

575 576

59 59

578 578

60

578

1243 6303, 579–580

Part Two: On the errors that oppose the true religion 61 579 43. The chief errors in religion 61 579 Part Two: Division one: On atheism 62 580 1241 1246–1247 44. The possibility and actuality of the denial of God 62 580 1256

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45. A more precise determination of the concept of the denial of God 64 46. The universal internal sources of the denial of God 65 47. Of doubt 66

581

1256–1257

581 582 6237, 520–521

48. The practical denier of god 67 582 49. The more refined denial of god 68 583 1269 6304, 583 1297–1298 1308 50. Refutation of the denial of God 69 583 1302 6237, 520–521 51. Causes of the denial of God 71 584 1286–1287 52. The External Causes 72 585 Part Three, Division Two: On polytheism 73 585 1262–1265 53. Introduction to the perfections of God 73 585 1261 54. Proof of the unity of God 76 586 1262 55. Polytheism. Heathenism 78 587 1314 56. The character of heathenism 79 588 1297 Part Four, Division Three: On superstition 81 589 6216, 506  6217, 506–507 6218, 507  6220, 510–511

Concordances

57. Definition and kinds of superstition

81

227

589 6219, 507–510  6221, 511–513 58. A more precise determination of the concept 83 590 59. The wisdom, beneficence and righteousness of God 84 590 1283–1302 60. Superstition is the most imperfect knowledge of God 85 591 61. Refutation of physical superstition 87 591 62. Refutation of religious superstition 88 592 63. The general sources of superstition 89 592 6219, 507–510 64. The power of superstition and its causes 91 593 65. The essence and attributes of God 92 594 1263–1278 66. I. The kinds of perfections possessed by God 94 594 1249 1310–1311 67. II. The attributes of the most perfect spirit 95 595 1276–1277 68. A further comparison of the same with the finite understanding 97 596 1267–1269 69. Omniscience 98 596 1270–1274 70. Wisdom 100 597 1272–4  6217, 506–507 71. Beneficence, holiness, righteousness 101 597 1232 6305, 597 1286 6306, 598 1302–1314  6307, 598–600

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Part Five: The natural history of religion 103 598 72. The Actuality and Character of Natural Theology 103 598 1271 Chapter Two: On the communication of religious knowledge 105 601 1316 Part One: On the sensuous manner of communication 105 601 73. Its Character and fittingness 105 601 1316–1317 6308, 601 6309, 603 Part Two: On the rational manner of communication 107 1317–1319 74. Certainty and constitution of the same 107 1318–1319 6310, 605–606

Concordances

229

Concordance 2 Pölitz, Volckmann, and Danzig Introduction to the philosophical doctrine of religion  Different terms for the subjects of these different species of cognition   Ontological proof   Cosmological proof   Physicotheological proof   Moral theism First part: Transcendental theology   First section: Ontotheology  Second section: Cosmotheology   Third section: Physicotheology Second part: Moral theology  First section: On the moral properties of God  Second section: On the nature and certainty of moral belief  Third section: On God according to his causality   1. On God as the cause of the world   2. On God as the author of the world     On Providence   3. On God as the ruler of the world   Fourth Section: On Revelation Appendix: History of natural theology

Pölitz, AA 28

Volckmann, Danzig, AA 28 AA 28

993–1012

1131–1154

1231–1239

1001–1012 1144–1154 1239–1248 1004–1006 1144–1151 1243–1245 1006–1007 1144–1151 1245 1007–1010 1144–1151 1245–1246 1010–1012 1151–1154 1247–1248 1012–1070 1154–1181 1248–1283 1013–1047 1155–1181 1249–1259 1047–1062 1178–1179 1259–1277 1062–1070 1179–1181 1277–1283 1071–1121 1181–1125 1283–1316 1071–1081 1181–1188

1283–1290

1082–1091 1188–1193

1290–1297

1091–1117 1193–1221

1297–1316

1092–1093 1193–1194

1297–1300

1093–1113 1194–1217 1300–1312 1104–1113 1206–1217 1307–1312 1113–1117 1217–1221 1117–1121 1221–1125

1312–1316 1316–1319

1122–1126 —

—

German–English Glossary German English abändern alter (to) Aberglaube superstition Abhängigkeit dependence Ableitung deduction, derivation Abscheus revulsion Absicht purpose, aim absondern separate (to), abstract (to) Absonderung isolation, abstraction allerrealstes most-real being Allgegenwart omnipresence allgemein universal, general allgenugsam all-sufficient allgütig omnibeneficent Allheit allness Allseelige all-holy an sich selbst in itself Anerkennung recognition angemessen adequate annehmen suppose (to), accept (to) Annehmung assumption Anschauung intuition Anständigkeit fairness, honesty Antrieb impulse Art kind, manner, way Aufhebung abolishment Aufrichtigkeit sincerity ausbilden cultivate (to), develop (to) Ausdehnung extension Ausdrück expression ausüben carry out (to), exercise (to) bedeuten denote (to), mean (to)

232

German–English Glossary

Bedeutung meaning bedingt conditioned Bedingung condition bedürfen require, need (to) Bedürfnis need Befolgung observance Befriedigung fulfillment Befugnis authorization, warrant Begebenheit incident, event begehren desire (to) Begehrungsvermögen faculty of desire Begierde desire begreifen comprehend (to) Begrenzung boundary Begriff concept, contents Beharrlichkeit persistence Behauptung assertion Belohnung reward benahmen derogated Benennung designation beobachten observe (to) Beruhigung peace of mind Beschaffenheit constitution, quality Bescheidenheit modesty besonder particular bestehen consist (to), exist (to) bestimmen determine (to) Bestimmung determination, condition, vocation bestraffen punish (to) beten pray (to) bewahren preserve (to) bewegenden Kraft motive power Bewegungsgrund motive Bewegursache motive Beweis proof bewirken effect (to) Bewustseyn consciousness beziehen refer (to)



German–English Glossary

233

bildende Kraft formative power Billigkeit fairness Böse evil bürgerlich civil categorisch categorical Complacenz pleasure congruierend congruous corrumpirien corrupt (to) Cosmotheologie cosmotheology Darstellung demonstration Daseyn existence Dauer duration Demuth humility demüthig humble Denkungsart mentality Displicenz displeasure durchgangig, durchgängig thoroughgoing ectypon ectype, ectypal Ehrbarkeit honesty Eid oath Eifer zeal Eigendünkel self-conceit Eigennutz self-interest Eigenschaft attribute Eigenthümlich peculiar Einbildung imagination Einbildungskraft power of imagination Einrichtung arrangement Einschmeicheley ingratiation Einschrankung, Einschränkung limitation einsehen have insight into (to), understand (to), realize (to) Einsicht insight Elend misery empfinden sense (to) entstehen originate (to), come from (to) erbitten solicit something from (to) Erfahrung experience

234

German–English Glossary

Erfahrungsgesetze law of experience Erfordernis requirement erforschen scrutinize (to) erhabene sublime erhöhen elevate (to) erkennen know (to), recognize (to) Erkenntnis knowledge Erkentnisart kind of cognition Erklarung, Erklärung explanation erlaubten permit (to) Erleuchtung epiphany Erscheinung appearance Erweiterung extension Erziehung education Ewigkeit eternity exemplar exemplary existentialsatz existential proposition Existenz existence fähig capable Falschheit falsehood Fatalismus, Fatalität fatalism Faulheit laziness fehlerhafte erroneous Feigheit cowardice Formlichkeit, Förmlichkeit formality forschen investigate (to) forschend inquiring Fortdauer survival, persistence Fortgang progress Freiheit, Freyheit freedom fremde external, alien Frevel sacrilege fromm pious Fundament foundation furchtbar terrible Fähigkeit capacity Fürsorge, Vorsehung providence Fürwahrhalten take to be true (to)



German–English Glossary

235

ganze whole, entire Gattung species Gebot commandment Gebrauch custom, practice, use Gebrechlichkeit frailty Gefühl feeling Gegenstand object Gegentheil opposite Gegenwirkung reaction Geistlichen clergy Gelehrsamkeit scholarship gemeiner Verstand common understanding gemeiniglich commonly Gemeinschaft association Gemüth mind Genuß enjoyment gerechtfertigt justified Gerechtigkeit justice Gerichtstag judgment day geschlossen inferred Gesetz law Gesetzgeber legislator Gesetzgebung legislation Gesetzmaßigkeit, Gesetzmäßigkeit regularity Gesetzmäßig legitimate Gesinnung disposition Gewalt power Gewissen conscience gewissenhaft, Gewissenhaftigkeit conscientious, conscientiousness Glaube belief, faith Glaubensbekentnis creed Glaubenssache matter of faith Glück fortune, luck, happiness Glückseligkeit happiness Gnade mercy, grace Gott God Gottesdienst worship, service of God Gottesgelehrte theologian

236

German–English Glossary

Gottesleugner denier of God Gottesläugnung denial of God Gottheit divinity Grenzbegrif boundary concept Grillenfängerey nitpicking Große, Größe magnitude Grundlage basis Grundsatz principle Gunstbewerbung ingratiation Güte kindness Gütig beneficent Gütigkeit beneficence Hang inclination hassenswürdig loathsome Hauptzwek chief end heben cancel (to) Heiligkeit holiness Herrlichkeit glory heterogen heterogeneous Heuchler hypocrite Hindernis hindrance Hirngespinst phatasm hollisch infernal Inbegriff collection Integer upright Kenntniss knowledge, familiarity Kenzeichen mark Kindschaft filiation Klugheit prudence Kraft power Laster vice lauter sheer, pure Lebenswandel conduct Leichtigkeit facility leichtsinnig reckless leiden suffer (to) Lust pleasure Maastab, Maaß, Maß measure



German–English Glossary

Mangelhaft deficient, deficiently Mannigfaltigkeit manifoldness Meinen, Meynung opinion Menschheit humanity Merkmalen distinguishing marks Mitteilung communication Mitwirkung cooperation Mißfallen, mißfallen displeasure (to), displease (to) Moral morals Moralität morality Moraltheologie moral theology Muster exemplar Naturbegriff concept of nature Naturmechanismus mechanism of nature Naturnotwendigkeit natural necessity Naturursachen things of nature Neigung inclination Nichtsein non-being Nothwendigkeit necessity oberste supreme, superior offenbar revealed, manifest ohngötter godless omnisufficientia all-sufficient Ontotheologie ontotheology Pfaffenthum priestcraft Pflicht duty Phantasterey fantasy Physicotheologie physico-theology Postulat postulate Prototypon prototype Prüfung examination Qvaalen torments Rache revenge Realien realities realität reality Rechmäßigkeit legitimacy rechtgläubig orthodox Rechtschaffenheit righteousness

237

238

German–English Glossary

Rechtspflege judicature Redlichkeit honesty Regierung governing, government Reiche kingdom religionswiedrig contrary to religion Richter judge Richtmaas standard Richtschnur guiding principle rämlichkeit spatiality Rüksicht consideration Satz proposition Schwarmerey, schwarmerisch enthusiasm, enthusiastic Schein appearance, illusion schließen infer, conclude Schluß conclusion (to), inference (to) Schmerz pain schätzen estimate (to) Schöpfung creation Seeligkeit blessedness, bliss selbstgenugsam, Selbstgenugsamkeit self-sufficient, self-sufficiency Sinnenwelt world of sense sinnlich sensible, sensory Sinnlichkeit sensibility Sitten morals sittlich moral Sparsamkeit parsimony Strafgerechtigkeit punitive justice Strafwürdige culpable Suche quest, attempt Theologie theology Thorheit foolishness Thunlichkeit feasibility Tollheit madness Triebfeder incentive Träumerey reverie Tugend virtue tätig active Umfang extent



German–English Glossary

Umständ circumstance unabhängig independent unabsehlich immense Unbedingt unconditioned Unbegreiflich incomprehensible unendlich, unendlichkeit infinite, infinity Unerforschlichkeit inscrutability unerlaubt not permitted unfähig incapable ungerecht unjust ungereimt absurd Unglaube non-belief Unglük misfortune unrecht wrong Unterscheid distinction, difference unterscheiden distinguish (to), distinct Untersuchung investigation Unterthan subject Unterwürfigkeit subservience ununterbrochen continuous Unveranderlichkeit immutability unverdiente undeserved unvermeidlich inevitable Unvermögen impotence unverständig irrational unvollstandig incomplete, imperfect Unwissenheit ignorance Unzulanglichkeit inadequacy unüberwindlich insurmountable Urbegriff original concept Urbild archetype Urheber author Ursache cause Ursprung origin Urwesen primordial being verabscheuungswürdig abhorrent Verachtung contempt Veranderung alteration

239

240

German–English Glossary

Verbindlichkeit obligation vergelten repay (to) Verhalten behavior Verheißung promise verhälten behave (to) Verhältnis relationship, relation Verknüpfung connection verlangen require (to) verlassen rely (to) Verläugnung denial vermuthen suppose (to) Vermögen faculty vernehmen apprehend (to) Vernunft reason Vernunftbeweis rational proof Vernunfterkentnis rational knowledge Vernunftglaube rational faith Vernunftgründ rational ground Vernunftkenntnis rational cognition vernünfteln casuistry Verpflichtung obligation Versorger provider Verstand understanding Verstandeswelt world of the understanding verstandige Wesen beings having understanding Versuchung temptation verwandeln transmute Verwandtschaft kinship verzeihen pardon (to) verzeihlich forgivable Veränderung alteration Vielgötterey polytheism Vielheit multiplicity vollenden complete (to) Vollkommenheit perfection vollständ, vollständig, Vollständigkeit complete, completely, completeness Voraussetzung presupposition, assumption Vorbereitung preparation



German–English Glossary

241

vorhanden existent Vorsehung, Fürsorge providence Vorsorge provision Vorstellung representation Vorwarhalten take to be true (to) Wahl selection, choice Wahn, wahnwitz delusion, delusional wechselbegriffe reciprocal concepts Wechselseitig reciprocally Weltganzen cosmos Welturheber author of the world Werth value Wesen being, essence Wiederspruch contradiction Wirklichkeit actuality Wirkung effect Wissen knowledge, apodictic/discursive knowledge Wissenschaft science Wohlbefinden wellbeing Wohlfahrt welfare Wohlgefall satisfaction Wohlstand welfare wohltätig beneficent würdig, Würdigkeit worthy, worthiness Zeitraum era Zufällig, Zufälligkeit contingent, contingency Zufriedenheit contentment zusammenbestehen co-exist (to) Zusammenhang context, correspondance Zusammensetzung composition Zusammenstimmung harmony Zustand state, condition Zwang complusion Zweck, zweckmäßig, zweckmäßigkeit end, purposive, purposiveness zwingen compel (to) äußerung utterance, expression Übel ill, ills

242

German–English Glossary

Übereinstimung harmony übernatürlich supernatural überschreiten transcend (to) übersehen lose sight of (to), ignore (to) übersteigen surpass (to) Überzeugung conviction

English–German Glossary English German abhorrent verabscheuungswürdig abolishment Aufhebung absurd ungereimt active tätig actuality Wirklichkeit adequate angemessen all-holy Allseelige allness Allheit all-sufficient allgenugsam all-sufficient omnisufficientia alter (to) abändern alteration Veränderung appearance Erscheinung appearance, illusion Schein apprehend (to) vernehmen archetype Urbild arrangement Einrichtung assertion Behauptung association Gemeinschaft assumption Annehmung attribute Eigenschaft author Urheber author of the world Welturheber authorization, warrant Befugnis basis Grundlage behave (to) verhälten behavior Verhalten being, essence Wesen beings having understanding verstandige Wesen belief, faith Glaube beneficence Gütigkeit

244

English–German Glossary

beneficent Gütig, wohltätig blessedness, bliss Seeligkeit boundary Begrenzung boundary concept Grenzbegrif cancel (to) heben capable fähig capacity Fähigkeit carry out (to), exercise (to) ausüben casuistry vernünfteln categorical categorisch cause Ursache chief end Hauptzwek circumstance Umständ civil bürgerlich clergy Geistlichen co-exist (to) zusammenbestehen collection Inbegriff commandment Gebot common understanding gemeiner Verstand commonly gemeiniglich communication Mitteilung compel (to) zwingen complete (to) vollenden complete, completely, completeness vollständ, vollständig, Vollständigkeit complusion Zwang composition Zusammensetzung comprehend (to) begreifen concept of nature Naturbegriff concept, contents Begriff conclusion, inference Schluß condition Bedingung conditioned bedingt conduct Lebenswandel congruous congruierend connection Verknüpfung conscience Gewissen conscientious, conscientiousness gewissenhaft, Gewissenhaftigkeit



English–German Glossary

consciousness Bewustseyn consideration Rüksicht consist (to), exist (to) bestehen constitution, quality Beschaffenheit contempt Verachtung contentment Zufriedenheit context, correspondance zusammenhang contingent, contingency Zufällig, Zufälligkeit continuous ununterbrochen contradiction Wiederspruch contrary to religion Religionswiedrig conviction Überzeugung cooperation Mitwirkung corrupt (to) corrumpirien cosmos Weltganzen cosmotheology Cosmotheologie cowardice Feigheit creation Schöpfung creed Glaubensbekentnis culpable Strafwürdige cultivate, develop ausbilden custom, practice, use Gebrauch deduction, derivation Ableitung deficient, deficiently Mangelhaft delusion, delusional Wahn, Wahnwitz demonstration Darstellung denial Verläugnung denial of God Gottesläugnung denier of God Gottesleugner denote (to), mean (to) bedeuten dependence Abhängigkeit derogated benahmen designation Benennung desire Begierde desire (to) begehren determination, condition, vocation Bestimmung determine (to) bestimmen displeasure Displicenz

245

246

English–German Glossary

displeasure, displease (to) Mißfallen, mißfallen disposition Gesinnung distinction, difference Unterscheid distinguish (to), distinct unterscheiden distinguishing marks Merkmalen divinity Gottheit duration Dauer duty Pflicht ectype, ectypal ectypon education Erziehung effect Wirkung effect (to) bewirken elevate (to) erhöhen end, purposive, purposiveness Zweck, zweckmäßig, zweckmäßigkeit enjoyment Genuß enthusiasm, enthusiastic Schwarmerey, schwarmerisch epiphany Erleuchtung era Zeitraum erroneous fehlerhafte estimate (to) schätzen eternity Ewigkeit evil Böse examination Prüfung exemplar Muster exemplary exemplar existence Daseyn, Existenz existent vorhanden existential proposition existentialsatz experience Erfahrung explanation Erklarung, Erklärung expression Ausdrück extension Ausdehnung, Erweiterung extent Umfang external, alien fremde facility Leichtigkeit faculty Vermögen faculty of desire Begehrungsvermögen



English–German Glossary

fairness Billigkeit fairness, honesty Anständigkeit falsehood Falschheit fantasy Phantasterey fatalism Fatalismus, Fatalität feasibility Thunlichkeit feeling Gefühl filiation Kindschaft foolishness Thorheit forgivable verzeihlich formality Formlichkeit, Förmlichkeit formative power bildende Kraft fortune, luck, happiness Glück foundation fundament frailty Gebrechlichkeit freedom Freiheit, Freyheit fulfillment Befriedigung glory Herrlichkeit God Gott godless ohngötter governing, government Regierung guiding principle Richtschnur happiness Glückseligkeit harmony Zusammenstimmung, Übereinstimung have insight into, understand, realize (to) einsehen heterogeneous heterogen hindrance Hindernis Holiness Heiligkeit honesty Redlichkeit, Ehrbarkeit humanity Menschheit humble demüthig humility Demuth hypocrite Heuchler ignorance Unwissenheit ill, ills Übel imagination Einbildung immense unabsehlich

247

248

English–German Glossary

immutability Unveranderlichkeit impotence Unvermögen impulse Antrieb in itself an sich selbst inadequacy Unzulanglichkeit incapable unfähig incentive Triebfeder incident, event Begebenheit inclination Hang, Neigung incomplete, imperfect unvollstandig incomprehensible Unbegreiflich independent unabhängig inevitable unvermeidlich infer, conclude schließen infernal hollisch inferred geschlossen infinite, infinity unendlich, unendlichkeit ingratiation Einschmeicheley, Gunstbewerbung inquiring forschend inscrutability Unerforschlichkeit insight Einsicht insurmountable unüberwindlich intuition Anschauung investigate (to) forschen investigation Untersuchung irrational unverständig isolation, abstraction Absonderung judge Richter judgment day Gerichtstag judicature Rechtspflege justice Gerechtigkeit justified gerechtfertigt kind of cogntion Erkentnisart kind, manner, way Art kindness Güte kingdom Reiche kinship Verwandtschaft know (to), recognize (to) erkennen



English–German Glossary

249

knowledge Erkenntnis knowledge, apodictic/discursive Wissen knowledge, familiarity Kenntniss law Gesetz law of experience Erfahrungsgesetze laziness Faulheit legislation Gesetzgebung legislator Gesetzgeber legitimacy Rechtmäßigkeit legitimate Gesetzmäßig limitation Einschrankung, Einschränkung loathsome hassenswürdig lose sight of (to), ignore (to) übersehen madness Tollheit magnitude Große, Größe manifoldness Mannigfaltigkeit mark Kenzeichen matter of faith Glaubenssache meaning Bedeutung measure Maastab, Maaß, Maß mechanism of nature Naturmechanismus mentality Denkungsart mercy, grace Gnade mind Gemüth misery Elend misfortune Unglük modesty Bescheidenheit moral sittlich moral theology Moraltheologie morality Moralität morals Moral, Sitten most-real being allerrealstes motive Bewegungsgrund, Bewegursache motive power bewegenden Kraft multiplicity Vielheit natural necessity Naturnotwendigkeit necessity Nothwendigkeit need Bedürfnis

250

English–German Glossary

nitpicking Grillenfängerey non-being Nichtsein, Unglaube not permitted unerlaubt oath Eid object Gegenstand obligation Verbindlichkeit, Verpflichtung observance Befolgung observe (to) beobachten omnibeneficent allgütig omnipresence Allgegenwart ontotheology Ontotheologie opinion Meinen, Meynung opposite Gegentheil origin Ursprung original concept Urbegriff originate (to), come from (to) entstehen orthodox rechtgläubig pain Schmerz pardon (to) verzeihen parsimony Sparsamkeit particular besonder peace of mind Beruhigung peculiar Eigenthümlich perfection Vollkommenheit permit (to) erlaubten persistence Beharrlichkeit, Fortdauer phatasm Hirngespinst physico-theology Physicotheologie pious fromm pleasure Complacenz, Lust polytheism Vielgötterey postulate Postulat power Gewalt, Kraft power of imagination Einbildungskraft pray (to) beten preparation Vorbereitung preserve (to) bewahren presupposition, assumption Voraussetzung



English–German Glossary

251

priestcraft Pfaffenthum primordial being Urwesen principle Grundsatz progress Fortgang promise Verheißung proof Beweis proposition Satz prototype Prototypon providence Fürsorge, Vorsehung provider Versorger provision Vorsorge prudence Klugheit punish (to) bestraffen punitive justice Strafgerechtigkeit purpose, aim Absicht quest, attempt Suche rational cognition Vernunftkenntnis rational faith Vernunftglaube rational ground Vernunftgründ rational knowledge Vernunfterkentnis rational proof Vernunftbeweis reaction Gegenwirkung realities Realien reality realität reason Vernunft reciprocal concepts Wechselbegriffe reciprocally wechselseitig reckless leichtsinnig recognition Anerkennung refer (to) beziehen regularity Gesetzmaßigkeit, Gesetzmäßigkeit relationship, relation Verhältnis rely (to) verlassen repay (to) vergelten representation Vorstellung require (to) verlangen require (to), need (to) bedürfen requirement Erfordernis

252

English–German Glossary

revealed, manifest offenbar revenge Rache reverie Träumerey revulsion Abscheus reward Belohnung righteousness Rechtschaffenheit sacrilege Frevel satisfaction Wohlgefall scholarship Gelehrsamkeit science Wissenschaft scrutinize (to) erforschen selection, choice Wahl self-conceit Eigendünkel self-interest Eigennutz self-sufficient, self-sufficiency selbstgenugsam, Selbstgenugsamkeit sense (to) empfinden sensibility Sinnlichkeit sensible, sensory sinnlich separate (to), abstract (to) absondern sheer, pure lauter sincerity Aufrichtigkeit solicit something from, to erbitten spatiality Rämlichkeit species Gattung standard Richtmaas state, condition Zustand subject Unterthan sublime erhabene subservience Unterwürfigkeit suffer (to) leiden supernatural übernatürlich superstition Aberglaube suppose (to), accept (to) annehmen, vermuthen supreme, superior Oberste surpass (to) übersteigen survival Fortdauer take to be true (to) Fürwahrhalten, Vorwarhalten



English–German Glossary

temptation Versuchung terrible furchtbar theologian Gottesgelehrte theology Theologie things of nature Naturursachen thoroughgoing durchgangig, durchgängig torments Qvaalen transcend (to) überschreiten transmute verwandeln unconditioned Unbedingt understanding Verstand undeserved unverdiente universal, general allgemein unjust ungerecht upright Integer utterance, expression äußerung value Werth vice Laster virtue Tugend welfare Wohlfahrt, Wohlstand wellbeing Wohlbefinden whole, entire Ganze world of sense Sinnenwelt world of the understanding Verstandeswelt worship, service of God Gottesdienst worthy, worthiness würdig, Würdigkeit wrong unrecht zeal Eifer

253

Name Index Names in bold refer to the sources Eberhard cites. Adickes, Erich xxxvi, xliv Ahlwardt, Peter 37 Albert, Johann 39 Allison, Henry xix, xxi–xxii, xxiii Anaxagoras 90 Anaximander 90 Anselm of Cantebury, St. 7, 19–20, 77, 142, 143 Aristotle xxii, xxx, xxxi Arnobius of Sicca 52 Athenagoras 52 Augustine of Hippo xxii Baumgarten, Alexander xv, xvi, xviii, xx, xxii, xxv, xxxivn, 13, 65n., 114n. definition of philosophy xxxi–xxxii Kant’s use of xxxv–xxxviii Metaphysics xv, xvi, xviii, xxii, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxvii, xxxviii, 13, 14n., 27n., 56n., 65n., 114n., 134n., 149, 153, 159, 160, 161n., 163, 164, 167, 168n., 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 178, 181, 182, 186, 192n., 107n., 194n., 199n, 200, 208, 212n., 214, 217, 218 Baumgarten, Siegmund Jakob xvi Bayle, Pierre 41, 53 Belisarius, Favius xvii Bently, Richard 31 Bering, Johann 24 Berkeley, George Bishop of Cloyne xxii Bernoulli, Daniel 29 Beyer, Kurt xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii Bilfinger, Georg Bernhard 2 Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus 60 Böhme, Jacob 15n. Bowman, Curtis xliv Breithaupt, Johann Justus xvii Brillon, Pierre-Jacques 20

Bruckner, John 39 Burnet, Gilbert 4, 31 Canz, Israel Gottlieb 4 Castillon, Johann von 46 Cheyne, George 4 Cicero, M. Tullius xxii, 4, 41 Clark, Gertrude M. xxxvii Clarke, Samuel, 4 16, 24 Clemens of Alexandria 52 Cramer, Johann Andreas 10, 51 Crell, Johann 12, 13, 65 Crusius, Christian August 181 Cudworth, Ralph xxii, xxxvii, 52, 197 Dale, Anthony van 54 Derham, William 30, 37, 38 Derodon, David 16 Descartes, René xxii, 19–23, 143, 156, 168n. Desmaizeaux, Pierre 17n., 20 Dryfhoud, Ane 23 Eberhard, Johann August and the relation of natural theology to philosophy xxxii–xxxiii as Platonist xxviii biography of xiv–xxi critique of Kant xix–xx definition of philosophy xxix, xxxi–xxxiii General Theory of Thought and Sensation xxi, xxiv–xxviii idea of God xxxiii, xxxv Kant’s use of xxxv–xxxviii knowledge of languages xx, xxii New Apology for Socrates xvii, xxi–xxiv On the Concept of Philosophy and its Parts xxviii–xxxiii Philosophisches Archiv xx

256

Name Index

Philosophisches Magazin xix–xx Preparation for Natural theology 137–8, 149, 150–1, 152–3, 197 works of xviii Engel, Johann Jakob 35, 39 Epicurus 175, 213n. Euler, Leonard 28 Fabricius, Johann Albert 22, 30, 37, 39, 46 Fénelon, François de Salignac de la Mothe 30 Foster, James 4 Frederick II of Prussia xvi, xix Galen 30 Gassendi, Pierre 21 Gaulino of Marmoutier 7 Gerberon, Gabriel 7 Giovanni, George di xxxvii Göden, Johannes Levinus 23 Graesse, Johann Georg Theodor 15n. Grimm, Johann Friedrich Karl 155 Groot, Hugo de 53 Grotius, Hugo xxii Gunnerus, Johan Ernst 24, 50 Guyer, Paul xliv Helvétius, Claude Adrien 46 Hemsterhuis, François 5 Hennings, Justus Christian 50 Herbert, Baron of Cherbury 53 Herder, Johann Gottfried 3n. Hick, John 7 Hobbes, Thomas 8, 13, 15 Holland, Georg Jonathon von 46–7 Horace 127n., 211n. Horst, Julius August von der xvi–xvii, xviii Huet, Peter Daniel 20 Hume, David xxii, xxxi, xxxvii, 8, 27, 47, 62, 164, 177–8, 213n. Hutcheson, Rev. Francis xxii, xxxv Jacquelot, Isaac 20 Jerusalem, J. Fr. W. 5 Job 127 Justin Martyr 52 Justinian I xvii

Kant, Immanuel xxxiv, 3n., 13 choice of textbooks xxxv–xxxviii Critique of Judgement 164n., 207n. Critique of Pure Reason xiii, xix, xx, xxxviii, xli idea of God xxxv and the Legatus Stolpianum 23n. and metaphysics xxxiv on the proofs of God xxxv–xxxvi, xxxviii Only possible ground of a proof for a demonstration of God’s existence xxxv, xxxvi, 13, 24, 159 The Metaphysics of Morals 192 Kreimedahl, Lothar xxxvi, xxxvii Lang, Joachim xvi Leibniz, Gottfried xixvi, xx, xxii, xxiv, xxv, xxxi, xxxiv, xxxvii, 14, 16, 19, 63, 142, 187 Lesser, Friedrich Christian 38, 39 Lessing, Ephraim xvii, xxiii, xxiv Locke, John xxii, xxxivn., 41 Louis XV of France xvii Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus) 53–4 Luther, Martin 51 Lyonnet, Pierre 39–40 Maas, Gottfried Arnold 24 Marmontel, Jean-François xvii, xxi Mass, Johann Gebhard xix Maupertus, Pierre Louis Moreau de xxxv, 40, 63 McGill, Authur C. 7 Meiner, Christoph 197 Mendelson, Moses xxiv, xxxiv, xxxvn, 108 Mesland, Denis 19n. Minutius Felix 52 Mirabeau, Honoré Gabriel Riqueti comte de 45 Molina, Luis de 62 Monnickhof, Johannes 24 More, Henry 16 Mosheim, Johann Lorenz 52, 197 Motte-Guyon, Jeanne-Marie Bouvier de la (Madame Guyon) 169 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 133

Narragon, Steve xxxvi, xxxviii Neiwentyt, Bernhard van 31 Newton, Isaac xxxv, 16 Nicolai, Friedrich xvi, xvii, xx, xxi Olkot, Robert 7 Onnasch, Ernst 23 Parker, Samuel 3, 53 Paul of Tarsus, Saint 188 Perrenot, Abraham 24 Philo of Alexandria 16 Pie, François 7 Plato xxii, xxvii, xxvi, xxvii, xxx, xxxi, xxxivn, 100, 131, 166, 174 Plato, definition of Science xxxii Plutarch 54, 58–9 Polzen, Christian Friedrich 5 Pope, Alexander xxxv, 187n. Pordage, John 15 Priestly, Joseph 47, 201 Protospatharius, Theophilus 30

Name Index

257

Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of xxii Socin, Faust 12, 65, 171 Socrates xxiii, 131 Spinoza, Benedict xxiv, 45, 46, 77, 106, 107, 122, 124, 168, 197, 198, 207 Sprengel, Kurt xxi Stoics, the xxii Suárez, Francisco xxii Sulzer, Johann Georg 12, 13 Swammerdam, Jan 39 Szlichtyng, Jonasz 65 Terrason, Abbé Jean 133 Tertullian 52 Tetens, Johann Nikolas 10 Thales 90 Thomas Aquinas, St. xxii, 19, 181n. Töllner, Johann Gottlieb 50 Vorstius, Conrad 12

Raphson, Joannis 16 Raurus, Martin 65 Rauscher, Frederick xliv Ray, John 31 Reimarus, Hermann Samuel 4, 38–9 Reinhard, Adolf Friedrich 25, 28 Reusch, Johann Peter 52 Ribovio, Georg H. 4, 52 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques xxxv, 133, 174 Rüdiger, Johann Andreas 15 Ruyter, Johan Hendrik de 49

Walch, Christian Willhelm Franz 4, 24, 37 Werenfels, Samuel 20 Williams, David 5 Winkler, Johann Heinrich 4 Witteveen, Frederik 49 Wolff, Christian xv, xvi, xx, xxii, xxv, 12, 13, 20, 28, 31, 45, 77, 142, 165 definition of philosophy xxxi, xxxii definition of power 14 Wollaston, William 4 Wood, Allen xxxv–xxxvi, xxxvii

Sander, Heinrich 31 Semler, Johann Salomo xvi

Xenophon of Athens xxii 30, 133 Xenophones of Colophon 90

Index 39 Articles 128 abstraction 17, 18, 21, 169 way of 151, 152, 154 absurdity 79 accident 107, 114, 160 acrido-theology see physicotheology, special action 107 contingent 105 determined in time and space 105 free 170, 171, 210 immanent 198 moral 203 necessary 105 activity, transeunt 155 actual, as thoroughly determined by concept 100 actuality 20, 21, 71 see also possibility determining ground of 105 necessary 22–3 objective 7 as reality 156 Adam, first 124 second 124 administrator, of laws 185 Ahriman 185 Ahura Mazda 185 aims, conflicts of 71 air, dephlogisticated 201 all, as the determinate concept 135 all of reality 78, 95, 149, 150 allness 74, 100, 103, 174 all-sufficiency 78 alteration 161 presupposes time 161 analogy 90, 101, 113, 114, 115, 122, 182 as perfect similarity of the relation 154 way of 153, 154, 164, 166 anarchy 80 ancients, the 137, 142, 164, 198

three gods of the 185 angels 187 animals 35–7 act according to instinct not ends 172 anthropocentrism 141 anthropology 142 anthropomorphism 78, 79, 91, 113, 115, 191 crude 163 more subtle 78 subtle 163 in theism 122 antinomies 74–5 appearance 105, 127, 167 God not deceived by 172 kingdom of 206 appetite, faculty of 47, 163 archetype 125, 129 argument see proof art 33 astrology 56 astronomy 186, 201 astrotheology see physicotheology, special atheism 42–59, 107, 113, 118, 141, 168 actuality of 42–3 all proofs of God directed against 154 causes of 47–8 dogmatic 77, 78, 91, 107, 115, 141, 145–6, 154–6 Epicurean 27 more refined 45–7, 208 negative 43 positive 43 possibility of 42–3 practical 44–5 skeptical 91, 107, 115, 116, 141, 145, 154, 156 theoretical 45, 46 attention 169 attributes see also God, attributes of active 78

260 Index general 152 authority 65, 196 beatitude 175 becoming, ground of 124 beginning and end, presuppose time 162 behavior, good 112 being xxvii, 98, 143 absolute 145 absolutely necessary 112, 119 all-sufficient 74 animate, destruction of 35 complete 71, 112, 144 compound or composite 13–14 conditioned 98 contingent 13 derivative 99, 158 eternal 12 evil 71 first 107 good 112 highest or supreme 13, 71, 77, 78, 92, 96, 99, 104, 114, 116–17, 134, 135, 140, 147, 152, 163, 168, 176 incomplete 95 incorporeal 84 infinite 15, 16, 17, 19, 50 intelligent 180 limited 109 most perfect 6, 7, 14, 19–23, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 60, 67, 71, 75, 92, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 135, 139, 140, 144, 205 most possible 100 most-real 72, 74, 77, 79, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 119, 118, 120, 142, 144, 156, 157–9, 162–5   limitation of 143, 161   possibility of 149, 158   as prototype 148   as substrate 157, 159 necessary 12, 13, 22–23, 29, 60, 99, 104, 113, 119, 120, 145, 157–8, 198, 200   presupposition of, 113 of all beings 74, 99, 147, 151 of beings 140, 148, 158 original 70, 71, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 95, 97, 99, 102, 116, 119, 122, 139, 140,

141, 147, 158, 160, 164, 169, 177, 179    and absolute spontaneity 180    dependent on no determination 166    essence of all thing derived from 159   evil 70, 71, 187   good 70, 71    one or several 145 primordial 213 principle of for all things 97 rational 35, 70, 112, 203    may never serve as means but only ends 206 self sufficient 179 simple 13 singular 161 supreme see being, highest unconditionally necessary 112 unlimited 104, 161 wise 26, 214 beings, inivisible ruling 86 beings, living 175 belief 77, 81, 84, 86, 88, 92, 94, 96, 97, 191 free 138 moral 218 reasonable 138 and religion 87 beneficence 124–5, 132, 153, 154, 179, 184–6, 196, 205, 210, 212, 218 Bible, the 192 blessedness 100, 122, 128, 132, 175, 181 bliss, contentment independent of external condition 70, 196 bodies 28, 29, 32, 210 animate 33, 34–7 artificial 33 celestial 33 inanimate 33, 36 natural 33 organic 34–7 Brahma 185 brontotheology see physicotheology, special calendar, Julian 70 casuistry 78 categories 96, 98

Index pure 122 Catholicism 126, 132 causality, externally conditioned 73 system of 114, 197 cause, causality 13, 70, 71, 74, 83, 93, 153–4, 177, 206, 208, 211 cause and effect, law of 105 coordinated 210 derivative 180 efficient, system of 197 external 180 final 30 infinite 88 infinite series of contingent 23–41 material 78 moral 196 most proximate 183 natural 75, 84, 136 original 180 physical 196 presupposition of 120 solitary 208, 209 solitary efficient 210 subordinated 210 supreme universal 92–3 celebrations, religious 128 certainty 8, 20, 22, 24, 41, 42, 66–7, 77, 111, 113, 129, 146, 183, 191, 192 apodictic 77 complete 77 mathematical 22 moral 77 physical 77 character, corruption of 126–8 choice, divine 200 Christianity, Christians xxiii, xxiv, 30, 46, 51, 52, 53, 62 Church Fathers xxii, 15, 52 circle 96 clergy, English 128 co-causes, nexus of 208 Coing transcript xxxvi–xxxviii collection, of all perfections or realities 10, 11, 12, 22 command, supreme 96 commandments, divine 87, 112 common sense 75 community of descent 71 comparison 169

261

compassion 179 completeness 100, 102, 131, 133 as ground 69, 73, 74, 99 composite, real 161 composition, logical 21 compulsion 126, 196 only by own conscience 196 religious 128, 138 concept xxvii see also God, concept of abstract or abstracted 13, 14, 17, 18 boundary 77, 79, 110 complete 110 complete, as measure 133 conditioned 97 crude of God 18 deceptive 19 derivative 97 derived 99 determinate 73, 135 discursive 169 each a determination of a still higher 143 each stands under a still higher 143 empirical 69 empty 151–2 errors in 152 existence from mere 116 extra-sensible 2 false or chimerical 139 finite 10 general 72, 95, 97, 116, 109, 181 impossibility of 8 indeterminate 120 infinite 10, 13 intuitive 18 logical 96 mathematical 151 mixed 143 morally necessary 78 natural 122 negative 119 non-sensible 18 of highest perfection 14 of the most perfect being 19–23 original 97, 99 perfect 157 physically necessity 78 physicotheological 122, 152 possibility of 7, 10

262 Index psychological 18, 163 pure 2, 14, 152 regulative 79 relative 151 sensible 162 singular 113, 160 supreme 92 taken from oneself 21 transcendent 90, 113 transcendental or ontological 13, 14, 18, 96, 106, 151–2, 163, 177 universal 148 without corresponding intuition 90 concurrence 199 coordinated causes of 211 general physical of God 210 as miracle 208–9 moral 211 condition 196 of beings 161 objective for thinking possibilities 97 subjective for thinking possibilities 97 totality of relations belonging to existence 196 universal 209 conduct, moral 205 confusion xxvii, 26 connection 74, 166 external 161 of substances 209 supreme 88 conscience 57, 123, 128, 185, 208, 217 euthanized 194 lack of 127 conscientiousness 128 consciousness xxv, xxvi, 86, 124, 127, 170, 175, 177 consequence, natural 182 conservation 199, 207–10 as influence 208 constitution, civil 86 contentment 176, 189, 193 divine 183 without desire 189 contingency xxviii, xxxi, 13, 19, 23, 23, 26–9, 56, 78, 79, 96, 105, 110 natural 108 supreme ground of 113 theoretical 108

contradiction 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 16, 71, 72, 108, 109, 149, 151, 161, 162, 199, 207 and the collection of all realities 10 principle of xxviii, 117, 121, 155 conviction, of God’s existence 190–1 co-presence 15 cosmology, concept of highest being as foundation of 147 cosmos 187, 202 origin of 198 cosmotheology xxxix, 76, 77, 96, 107, 122, 140, 142 cowardice 188 creation 114, 125, 182, 207–9, 211 free 200 from nothing 199 objective end of 202 and origin of evil 213 possibility of incomprehensible 199 subjective end of 202 system of 114 creator see God, as creator wise 145 creatures 189 animate and non-animate 32 non-rational 35 rational 35, 164 creed 126 burden to conscience 127 Nicene 15n. culpability 194 cult 87, 88, 94, 139 and belief 88, 94 and knowledge 87 damnation xxi–xxiv Danzig transcript, relation to other transcripts xxxvi–xxxix darkness 144 day, judgement 194 dead, the 86, 87 death 35, 84 fear of 189 decree, absolute 215 divine 212, 214 deduction, complete 113 logical 61 deism 77, 96, 107, 114, 115, 141, 152, 163

Index abstract perfections of 153 critical 91 physicotheological 91 delusion 80–1, 83, 84, 85, 142 demons 213 dependence 168, 181 as mark of phenomenal reality 101 derivation, totality of 132 see also idea, transcendental desire, faculty of 175, 178–9 faculty of, immanent 175 faculty of, transeunt 175 human 205 despotism, despot 80 determination see also thoroughgoing determination and essence 106 negative 143 positive 143 principle of 73 science of xxxii totality of 132 Devil 71 difficulties, confusion of theological with psychological 171 dignity 136, 205 Dippelianism 193 direction, divine 212 extraordinary 212, 214 ordinary 212, 213, 214 disbelief, rational 113 disinterestedness 204 disorder 26 displeasure xxvii, 163, 175 divine 178 intellectual 178 disputes, religious 80 divination 54, 56 divinity, posited in time 206 documents, ancient 88 dogmatism xxxv, xxxvi, 110 doubt 44 duration, as magnitude of existence 162 duty, laws of 90 of creatures 129 moral 141, 142   as a priori 146 of particular religions 138 toward God or a higher being 87, 91

263

earth, limitations of in view of cosmos 187 not constitute whole cosmos 201 ectype 124 education 128 education, religious 126 effect see cause, causality effectiveness 13 effects, supernatural 56 egoism 24 emanation 111, 114, 164 system of 169, 197, 200 eminence, way of 13, 14, 115, 153–4 end, ends xxvii, xxxv, xxxviii, 25, 26, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 55, 63, 66, 73, 77, 92, 135 contingent connection of 91 final 25, 30, 36, 64, 93, 128 necessary 92, 93 system of 75, 141, 172, 206, 215 enjoyment, physical, hope for in eternal life 196 enthusiasm, religious 58, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 110, 135, 166–8, 210, 213 envy 133 epigenesis 123 error, errors 75, 151 cosmological 47 habitual 58 human 179 in knowledge of God 6, 41–59, 90 in natural theology 1 not deficiencies but faults 172 ontological 47 practical 90 refutation of 137 religious 58 speculative 137 theological 91 essence 77 not distinguished from nature 106 eternity 78, 113, 124, 194 events, natural 56 evil 71, 132, 138, 181, 187, 192–4 immutability of 78 human inclination toward 186 moral non-impedition of (permission) 213 necessary in limited creatures 188 no seed of 188

264 Index no true 201 not a means 188 not willed by God 188 nothing but incompleteness 188 object of disgust 202 physical non-impedition of (admission) 213 satisfaction in 133 unequal distribution of in world 186 excluded middle, principle of 72 existence 77, 92, 93, 106, 113 absolute 107 as complement of possibility 108 conditioned 120 derived 74, 147 end of 182 form of 207 infinite 162 necessity of 108 not a reality or predicate 156 only possible through concepts 93 original 74, 147, 207 as a perfection 116 as position 95, 108, 156–7 unconditioned 112, 120 value of 111 experience xxxii, 19, 69, 81, 85, 109, 121, 131–2, 135, 149, 164, 210, 211 in general 77 illusory 85 laws of 81, 86 object of 81–5 particular 77 presupposed in cosmotheology 145 principles of 81 things given in 166 extension 16, 61, 98, 152 as mixed concept 143 posited as divine attribute 122 fairness 188 faith 65, 125 articles of 117 matters of 123 moral 123, 191 rational 82, 84, 86, 113 fallacy, of sweeping generalization 28 falsehood 127, 188 fantasy 83

fasting, as despotic 214 fatalism, theological 181 favor, heavenly 128 felicity 176 fetish 86, 87 figure xxx filiation, of creation through the Son 125 flattery 216 foolishness 79, 82, 146 foreknowledge 170 form see intuition, space and time as forms of formalities, in religion 128 fortune 112, 186, 190 good 202 freedom 73, 74, 80, 82, 87, 93, 122, 128, 189, 208, 210 coexistence with natural necessity 171 of conscience 126 divine 179 in harmony with nature 93 human 179   and stimuli 181 idea of 105 intelligibility of 215 and original cause 180 practical 180 presupposes understanding 122 psychological concept of 171 system of 111, 206 transcendental 180 Freya or Freyer 185 future 162, 170–1, 211 generation 114 genus 103 God, see also knowledge of God, proofs of God active perfections of 54–5 activity of 49 actuality of 19, 21, 22, 45, 46, 47, 51, 115, 154 all-sufficiency of 147, 151, 163, 175–7 analytic predicates of 107 as architect xxxviii, 198–9, 208 attributes of xxxv, xxxix, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 30, 48–9, 53–57, 59–61, 90, 96, 101, 115, 152–3, 185   inactive 160

Index   operative 160    thought respectively by analogy 191–2 as author 171, 189, 196, 198, 200 beatitude of 49 beneficence of 55, 57, 64 causality of 198 as cause of world xxxix, 122, 124, 141, 196 as collection of all reality 102 as concept of reason 140 and contradiction 6 complete concept of 190 complete three-fold concept of 147 and the completeness of reason xxxv see also reason, need for completion concept of xxxvi, 6–8, 14, 17, 19–23, 42, 48, 64, 77, 78, 93, 94, 98, 136, 152, 154, 161    acquired not innate 139   necessary 158 consciousness of himself 169–70, 171, 177 as creator xxii, xxxviii, xxxix, 13, 25–9, 30, 38, 44–6, 140–1, 166, 167, 178, 194, 198–9, 207 delight of 175, 176 denial of 27, 42, 45–8, 58, 78, 154, 217 see also atheism, dogmatic as despot 214 determinations of by way of eminence, causality, and negation 18 as director 141 as distinct from world 24n., 25, 45, 122, 197 distinguished according to quality and quantity 141, 152 distinguished from the world 96, 151 distinguishing marks of 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 17, 59, 67, 69, 138 does not concur with nature 208 essence of 8, 12, 22, 41, 53, 59, 66, 151, 159   as determinable 12 as eternal 146 eternity of 49, 60, 162 existence of xiii, xxxv, xxxviii, xxxix, 13, 20–4, 28, 30, 31, 33, 37, 41–4, 49, 52, 61, 64, 71, 91, 151, 196

265 external to world 179 faculty of knowledge of 165 as Father 124–5 fear of 44, 94, 139, 216 free choice of 198 freedom of 153 as forgetting or regretful 17 as governor 213 as ground of all realities 151 as ground of practical law 91 grounds of 12, 13 as highest good 135 highest knowledge of 153 holiness of 64 holy will of 61, 82 hypothetical existence of 91 idea of xxxiii, 88, 90 immateriality of 151 immensity of 60 immortal 196 impassable 170, 171 impossibility of disproving existence of 138 inalterable 49, 161, 162 incomprehensibility of 8 independence of 49, 170 infallibility of 172 inferred physicotheologically from order, beauty, and perfection 177 infinite space as attribute of 16–17 infinity of 6, 49, 60, 62, 147 inscrutable will of 182–3 as an intelligence 135, 137 as judge 124, 185 kingdom of 125 knowledge of the contingency of things 108 law of 194 as legislator xxxix, 74, 77, 86, 136, 146, 147, 184, 185, 214–18 as lord 206 marks of 6 as measure and ground of perfection xxxv as metaphysically infinite being 11 as monarch 214 moral concept of 82, 135 moral constancy of 55 moral perfections of 54–5

266 Index necessary concept for morals 183, 184 negative marks of 8 no distinction between creation and conservation in 207 no interest in 204 no proper happiness of 196, 204 no relative existence of according to Spinozism 106 no sensibility in 165 no stimuli found in 179 no subjective motive in 179 no succession in 200 non-impossibility of 155, 156 see also impossibility of nothing contradictory in concept 155 as omnipotent 146 omnipotence of 55, 60 as omnipresent 146 omniscience of 62–3 as omniscient 146 paternalism of 125 perfection of 66, 177, 193, 204, 205 posited as extended in finite space 14, 15 posited as extended in infinite space 16–17 posited as not distinct from world 122, 197 possibility of 76, 88, 91, 102, 112, 146, 151, 155–6    as minimum of theology 76, 88, 138   and religion 93 possible existence of 94 power of 49 as practical postulate 184, 191 predicates of 102 produced world voluntarily 179 punishes according to justice 192 relation of attributes to the world 154 relative predicates of 114 representation of 102, 139, 163   as human 196    as in time 181 rewards with kindness 192 righteousness of 55, 64, 184 as ruler xxxix, 138    in kingdom of ends 194   of world 196 self-satisfaction of 177, 179, 196, 203–5

  without interest 179 self-subsistence of 49, 62 self-sufficient 178 service of 53, 88, 91, 94 as simple or immaterial 161 simplicity of 49, 60, 151 sincerity of 192 singular 107, 160–1 as singular 139 solicitation of 194, 212 source of all contentment 196 as sovereign 213 speculative concept of 82 as spirit 152 spirituality of 6, 49, 61 substance of 151 as supernatural cause 208 surrender to 128 synthetic predicates of 107 time and space posited as sensorium of 16–17 transcendental concept of 96, 140, 142 as tyrant 163, 215 unity of 49, 50, 52, 82, 86, 151 will of 109, 142, 153, 159 see also will, divine wisdom of 55, 56, 63, 64, 153 see also wisdom, divine as world creator 107 as world director 140 as world soul 107 Godlessness 107, 116, 141, 145, 154 see also atheism, skeptical God-man 129 gods, genuine concept of 86 inferior 213 not authors of nature 86 represented as beneficent 86 represented as persons 86 represented as terrible 86 represented as things of nature 86 good, highest 75, 95, 96, 100, 137, 141 moral 70, 71, 187, 213 progress toward 189 satisfaction in 133 seed of the 188 supreme infinite 203 transcendental concept of the xxvii unequal distribution of in world 186

Index goodness 181 194, 202 divine 212 moral 187 objective limitation of 186 subjective limitation of 186 government, 199 divine 185, 210 monarchical 214 universal of world 194 grace 66 undeserved 192 gratification 143 gratitude, toward God 196 gravitation 28–9 Greeks, ancient 90 Greenland 133 ground, all-sufficient 98 common 102, 115, 118 completeness of rational 111 highest 118 necessary being as 113 practical 139, 146 subjective 97 subjectively sufficient 113 supreme practical 92 theoretical 139 happiness 54, 57, 66, 70, 111, 132–3, 146, 154, 178–9, 183, 184, 189, 193, 195–6, 203, 204, 217 greatest harmonizes with greatest morality 201 human inclination toward 185 nature harmonizing with my ends 203 not necessary 191 not principle of morals 190, 191 progress toward 189 worthiness of 189 harmony 2, 27, 32 between animate and inanimate beings 36 contingent 118 heart, evil 138, 146 heathens, heathenism xxi, xxiii, 51–3, 213 heaven 70, 132 hell xxiv, 70, 132 eternal torments of 192 history 48, 206 holiness 100, 124, 160, 184, 186, 193, 193

267

Holy Scripture 18, 65, 66, 128, 215 honesty 127, 188 honor 127, 204 hope 125 Horus 185 human being, as animal 187–8 cultivated through reason 187 making us better 135 moral religions makes us better 138 rational 167 as rational and sensible 146 humanity, ideal of 124–5, 129 hydrotheology see physicotheology, special hypocrisy 87, 128, 139 towards God 192 hypothesis 102, 113, 157 necessary 81, 97, 108, 112 objectively necessary 91 subjectively necessary 91 universal 160 idea xxxi as archetype 174 complete of a thing 133 innate xxxviii, xxxii, xxxix, 19n, 21, 41n, 42, 52 limitation of complete 131 necessary 70 of genus xxx of individual xxx of species xxx of the imagination 133 ontological xxxiii ontological of substantiality xxxiii ontological of unity xxxiii Platonic xxvii, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, 100, 174 psychological, of goodness xxxiii   of justice xxxiii   of wisdom xxxiii supersensible xxxiii transcendental 71, 131–3 transcendental, as complete concept 131    necessary for reason 131, 133    three kinds of 132 universal 211 ideal, idea of individual as 133

268 Index idealism 23 ignorance 80, 84, 88 principle of 213 ill, ills 70, 186, 188, 189 193 result of incorrect use of reason 187 illusion, ground of 108 image 14 sensible 17 imagination xxx, 14, 57, 85, 166 immateriality 78, 102 immortality 74, 82 impartiality 185, 196 impassibility 113 impassiveness 78 imperfection 17, 64 impossibility, synthetic 105 impossible, absolutely 163 impulses, sensitive 180 incentive 58, 139, 146, 179, 184, 192, 205, 213 inclination 151, 179, 196, 205 incomprehensibility 122 independence 168, 179 as ground of God 13 India 133 indifference 143, 179 moral 126 indifferentism 43, 91 indiscernibles, principle of 50 inference 111, 120 from effects to cause 110 infinite, as immeasurable 151 infinity 75, 99, 104 difference between mathematical and metaphysical 11 in real relations 104 mathematical 11, 60, 61, 149–50 metaphysical 11, 12, 16, 60, 103, 149–50 progression to 23 influence 166, 171 and dependence, mutual 199 divine 167 heavenly 85 over spiritual realm 85 supernatural 125 ingratiation 126, 128 ingratitude 133 inherence 114, 198

system of 197 innocence, human 213 insecto-theology see physicotheology, special insight, necessary 112 instinct 172, 188, 211 intelligence, supreme or highest 76, 96, 122, 140, 163, 164 intention, good 128 morally good 123 interaction 132, 161, 176 of substances 209 interest 204 analogue of in God 179 moral 84, 92, 135, 142, 196 practical 78, 136 speculative 78, 135 intuition 96, 97 completely determined 104 of supersensible ideas xxxiii sensible 105 time and space as form of 79, 109, 114, 117 Isis 185 isonomy, law of 71 Jehova 149 Job, Book of 187 Judaism 16, 51 judgement xxx, 17, 56, 185 affirmative 143 disjunctive 72 false 90 hyperphysical 207 intuitive 22 negative 143 use of concepts 143 justice 74, 124 commutative 194, 196 distributive 194, 196 divine 192 limitation of beneficence by holiness 186, 192 limitation of divine goodness 184 limitation of kindness 194 as negative perfection 186 punitive 192, 193 remunerative 192 justification, by faith xxiii

Index Kabbalism 16 kind see species kindness 193 kingdom, of ends 77, 89, 96 of grace 77 of morals 96 of morals and ends 146 of nature 77, 96 knowledge of God xxix, xxxiii, xxxix, 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 18, 41, 44, 48, 80, 90, 134, 136, 164, 171 as apodictic 174 archetypal 174 boundaries of 134–5 errors in 110 moral use of 107 knowledge xxxi, xxxii, 86 a posteriori of things 166 apodictic and danger to morality 191 archetypal 166 as purest reality 164 as representation through concepts 143 common 172 degree of 131 discursive 61, 170 discursive, not belong to God 170 ectypal 166 faculty of 47, 163, 175 free 62, 169, 170–1 free, and the past 170 future 166 historical 66 human deficiencies in 181–2 intuitive faculty of in God 165–6 intuitive 6 metaphysical xxxiv middle 62, 63, 169, 171 negative 134 non-derivative principle of 97 objectively certain 94, 96, 97 of nature 135 of simple intelligence 169 of the possible 62, 63 of vision 170 positive 134 practical xxxix, 172 rational 66, 85 religious 66 sense xxxi

269 speculative 116 supersensible 6 symbolic 61 theoretical 172

languages, ancient 88 Laokium, the (Chinese mystical sect) 168 law, holy 125 contingent 147 general 123 moral 87, 88, 116, 126, 135, 142, 206, 215, 217   apodictically certain 191    lie in the nature of things 215   obedience to 146   observance of 205    only known according to their nature 214 natural xviii, xxiii, 57, 164, 208, 210, 215 necessary 91 practical 83, 91 speculative 79 transcendent 113 universal natural 164, 210 violation of 194 Legatum Stolpianum 23, 24, 25, 49 legislation, universal 88 legislator 185, see also God, as legislator as moral being, presupposed by duty and law 217 lie 128 life 34–7, 175 another 146 duration of 34–5 ends of 33, 34–5, 36 eternal 196 good conduct of 126 moral 129 present 167 propagation of 34–5 this life not constitute the whole of our existence 189 light 71, 95, 134, 144 limitation 90, 95, 98, 153 see also supreme reality, limitation of derived from unlimited 112 lithotheology see physicotheology, special logic 211

270 Index provides concepts 143 and relations of concepts 156 lord 127 love 66 as inclination 151 Luke, Book of 218n. madness 79 Magath transcript xxxvi–xxxvi, xxxix magic 54 magnitude 75 alterable 69 inalterable 69 infinite 11, 151 Manichaeism 78, 107 manitou 86, 87 Mark, Book of 218n. mark, distinguishing xxvi, 10, 11, 13, 17, 21, 69, 153 transcendental 101 mathematics xxxii matter 139, 152, 209 constitution of and evil 199 has no understanding 178 independence of 78 maximum 74 concept of 132, 135–6, 143 of theology 94 means xxi, xxvii, 25, 26, 27, 33, 35, 36, 48, 54, 55, 63, 64, 66 measure 151 as heterogeneous 151 unity as 103 melitto-theology see physicotheology, special mercifulness 162 metabasis 111 metaphysics x, xii, xv, xviii, xxii, xxix, xxxii, xxxiv, 2, 15, 16 see also Kant limits of xxxii relation to rational theology xxxiv, 2 three tasks of 74 mind xxv, xxvi, xxx minimum, of rational theology 93, 94 miracle 174, 212, 213, 217 misery 70 misfortune 70, 186 misology 84 Mithra 185

mode, analogue of 160, 172 as contingent internal determination 160 modification 114 morality 74, 76 80, 88, 142, 167, 201, 202, 216, 217 absolute system of all ends 185 based on universal system of ends 203 conditioned necessity 112 free 91 incentive for 139 necessary if the rational beings exist 112 not contradicted by nature 217 principles of xxxiv pure 84 theological xxxix morals 87, 112, 132, 135, 136, 142, 146, 183, 201, 203, 215, 216 apodictically certain 183 lead to idea of single highest being 147 most complete concept of God in 184 natural 142 not grounded on theology 142 philosophical 141 proceeds from whole to parts 173 self-grounding 142 theological 141, 142 most-real being see being, most-real motion xxx, 161 as modification of extension 122 laws of 63, 28–9 power of 45 motives 133 conditioned decree 214 unconditioned decree 214–15 Muslims 133 mysteries, holy 217 mysticism 166, 174 natural theology, definition of 64 naturalist, the 218 nature 87, 92 agreement with freedom 113 brute 176 as collection of all objects of experience 140 concepts of 88 course of 210, 212 as ground of explanation 92

Index kingdom of 194 laws of 27, 45, 57, 183, 193, 210, 214 mechanism of 179, 210, 178 no inherent principle of perfection 178 order of 30, 78, 135 perfection of 202 system of 111, 206, 215 universal laws of 214 necessity 74, 77 absolute 79, 86, 102, 104–5, 108, 110, 113, 119 analytic 79 blind 181 concept of 145 hypothetical 86, 112 logical 79, 108 natural 181, 215 objective 121, 181 practical 180 subjective 121 synthetic 79 what in a thing is thoroughly determined through its concept 110 negation 8, 72, 114, 144, 149, 151–2, 158 concept containing non–being 143 as derived concept 99 as limit 104 and realities 10, 11 way of 153, 154 Neoplatonism 86 nexus, effective xxxix, 182, 196, 206, 214 final xxxix, 196, 206 moral xxxix, 196 non-being 95, 98, 105 of necessary being, impossibility of 117 presupposes being 143 non-belief 77, 82, 83, 85 empirical 83 sophistical or rationalistic 83 Non-Christians, salvation of xviii, xxiii nothing 111 comes from nothing 198 noumenon 78, 115, 207 number 103 oaths 128 obedience, blind 214

271

object, actual 7 immaterial 14 in general 100 material 14 of the senses 83, 167 real 100 thoroughly determined 95 thought a priori 101 objection, to God based on beneficence 189 to God moral 186, 189 to God transcendental 189 obligation 192, 196 religious 138 occurrences, natural 136 Odin 185 Old Testament 187 omnipotence 78, 55–6, 145, 163 see also God, omnipotence of omnipresence 78, 114, 152, 209, 162 omniscience 145, 149, 174 not a mode 160 ontology 14 ontotheology xxxix, 76–7, 95–6, 142 concept of highest being as foundation of 147 opinion 86, 94 optimism, objections to 201 order 25–9, 177 as natural revelation 216 rules of 55 origin of all things, community of 74 orthodoxy 126 Osiris 185 pain 143 pansophy 84 pantheism 45 pardon, divine 194 parsimony, law of 63, 69 partiality 196 particular, the xxx passion xxvi, 61 past 162, 171 patience, divine 194 people, savage 176 peoples, confession of all 142, 216 perfection xii, xxii, xxvi, xxvii, xxxiv, xxxv, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 17, 21, 26, 27, 29,

272 Index 32, 33, 34, 47 187 see also collection of all perfections as agreement of many in one 175 continual perfection towards 188 divine 11, 12, 18, 29, 44, 48, 49, 54–5, 57, 66 see also God, attributes of, moral perfections of, active perfections of each as consequence of every other 12 external 32–4, 64 formal 161 highest 134 internal 32, 64 metaphysical 100 moral 75, 84, 135, 217 natural 75, 134, 135 personal 203 practical 134 supreme 78, 215 three-fold moral of the divine 186 transcendental 75, 134 unified in human beings 115 permanence xxx person 70 petino-theology see physicotheology, special phenomena 115, 151 philology, and religion 137 philosophers 88 ancient 137, 139, 208 critical and practical 110 philosophy 138 Critical xxxv instrument of xxix manner of xxix material of xxix, xxxiii neo-platonic 174 origin of xxix product of xxix relation to craft xxix relation to natural theology xxix, xxxii–xxxiii speculative 215 Wolffian 165 phlogiston 201 physicist, ancient 137 physicotheology xxxix, 29–41, 76–7, 122, 140, 142, 149, 177–83 as cosmological teleology 185

concept of creator as foundation of 147 indeterminate concept of God in 183, 184 and public religious instruction 41 special 37–41   acrido–theology 40   astrotheology 38   brontotheology 38   hydrotheology 38   insecto–theology 39   lithotheology 38   melitto–theology 40   petino–theology 40   pyrotheology 38 physics 135 place xxx, 15 plan, divine 211 pleasure xxvii complete 196 and displeasure, faculty of 163, 175 distinct from knowledge 175 divine 178 as knowledge of perfection 175 in the suffering of others 133 intellectual 178 turns into disgust 190 Polish Brethren see Socinism Pölitz transcript xxxvi–xxxix polytheism 42, 48–53, 78, 86, 86, 91, 107 not natural 162 possibility 20, 21, 77 collection of all 72 complete 121 derivative 95 distinction from actuality belongs to concepts not things 119 distinguished from actuality 105 formal ground of 117 hypothetical 105, 163, 171 in general 117 logical 115 material ground of 117 not distinguished from actuality 104, 106, 117–18 original 95 real 115 synthetic 105 possible, as still undetermined by concept 100

Index possibles, science of xxxii postulate, practical xxxix, 184, 191 power 13, 14, 55 finite 14, 29 formative 123 fundamental 169 invisible 85 motive 83, 90 original of bodies 29 universal 45 prayer 212 has only a moral use 213 predestination 163, 181, 215 predicates, logical 156 analytic 106 collection of all possibile 73 contradictory 148, 158, 159 mixed 148 of God relative 113 ontological 106 opposing 72, 99 particular 211 purely ontological 77 synthetic 106 transcendental 151, 183 universal 211 predisposition, natural 214 prejudice 126 preparation for natural theology, definition 2 practical 2 theoretical 2 present 171 preservation 114 presumptuousness 182, 183, 196, 205, 210, 212 priestcraft 126 prime mover 76, 93, 108, 122, 142 principles, empirical 202 empirical, presupposed in physicotheology 145 first xxxiii intelligible, and the sensible world 202 moral, and the intelligible world 202 teleological 214 probability, of God 190 promises, divine 192 proofs of God xxxv–xxxv, xxxviii, 7,

273

19–41, 43, 61, 94, 104, 109, 142, 154 a posteriori 19, 23–41 a posteriori from contingent bodies 29 a posteriori from final causes 25–9 a posteriori from the actuality of the soul 23–4 a posteriori, consensus of peoples 41, 42 a posteriori, physicotheology see physicotheology a priori 19–23 Anselmian or Cartesian 143–5, 156 apagogical 63 as probable 190 cosmological 79, 94, 107, 109, 116, 119–20, 144, 157   as transcendental 158    presupposes ontological proof 120 moral 78 objective invalidity of 157, 159 ontological 79, 107, 94–5, 143–5, 156    compared to cosmological 157 physicotheological 145 practical 145, 156 rational 85, 86 refutation of xxxv–xxxvi, 7– 81, 19–20 speculative 146   incompleteness of 145   unacceptable 156 subjective validity of 157, 159 transcendental 94 propagation of light, law of 63 prophesy 54, 56 proposition, a priori certain 120 analytic 72, 79, 95 existential 108 necessity of 108 synthetic 108, 109, 72, 79, 95 Protestantism 126, 132 prototype, idea as 99 Proverbs, Book of 192 providence 129, 210, 214 divine 213 general 211 particular 196, 211 universal 196, 211 prudence 128, 172–3, 217 psychology xxiv–xxviii

274 Index faculty xxv transcendental xxv punishment, corrective 193 divine 196 eternal xxiv exemplary 193 natural 193 positive 193 vindictive 193, 194 purposiveness 93, 96, 111, 118, 177, 178, 183, 201, 202 as natural revelation 216 of world 135 pyrotheology see physicotheology, special quantity, science of. see mathematics rational beings, ends of 92 rationalism xxx reaction 107 real, 99 as material of possibility 157 realities 12–4, 114, 115 see also collection of all realities collection of all possible xxxiv, 110 contradiction of in finite beings 102, 149, 155 impure 148 mixed 10, 11 and negation 10 non-contradiction of in God 102 noumenal 151 phenomenal 102, 151 possible conflicts of 98 sensible 151 reality, all 103, 115 completely determined 104 concept containing a being 143 concept of 99 external 7 greatest 101 highest 102, 103, 119, 145, 147 internal 7 limited 71 multitude of 148 objective 97, 138 of a concept 7 perfect 149 phenomenal 101

pure 101, 143, 148, 149, 151–3, 164 supreme 71, 72, 73 true 101 unity of 148 reason xviin, xviii, xix, xx, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, xxxv, xxxvi, xl, xliii, 24, 55, 56, 58, 64, 65, 66, 75, 78, 80, 88, 92, 97, 135, 185, 213 applied use of 84 being of 111 beyond 217 boundaries of 88 causality of 209 chimerical use of 85 complete empirical use of 82 completeness of 75, 79, 81, 84, 111 and completeness of concepts 69 contempt of 65 critique of 91, 183 empirical use of 92 errant 79 existence of God a necessary hypothesis of reason 190 experiential use of 81–85 faculty compensating for deficiency of finite understanding 169 faculty of 188 as faculty of a priori combination 121 harmonization of systems of nature and freedom 137 harmony with experience 81, 82 highest 169 human 131   limits of 136   weakness of 164 laws of 121 lazy 136, 183 maxims of 82 mere 103, 123 nature of 139 necessary hypothesis of 112 need of as cause for accepting gods 85 need of most perfect or most-real being 144, 148 need to assume highest degree of knowledge 137 needs of 92–3 objective conditions of 102 objective principles of 111

Index physical use of 85 practical xiii, xxxix, xxxx, 81, 84, 90, 92, 94, 97, 98, 111, 139, 140, 172, 190, 217 practical interest in theology 75 pure xxxv, xliv, 85, 86, 92, 139 self conceit of 90 speculative 80, 92, 112, 118, 217   weakness of 146 subjective conditions of 102 subjective principles of 111 system of 111 theoretical xxxvi, 81, 82, 84, 945, 97, 98, 111, 139, 140, 172, 190 transcendent use of 83 unity of 113 reasoning reason 148 recollection 170 reduction 122 way of 151–3, 160 reflection 169 relation 113 relation, external 113 religion 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 16, 18, 30, 31, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 80, 82, 91, 127, 139, 194 as combination of natural theology and morals 135 conscientiousness as subjective requirement 126 cultic 138 definition of 5 difference from theology 3 Egyptian 185 essence of 128 form of 128 German 185 Indian 185 Kant’s definition of 88 material of 128 moral 87, 138 natural 138, 217    as morality combined with idea of God as legislator 136 origin of various forms of 6 orthodoxy as objective requirement 126 Persian 185 public 48, 51, 52, 54

275

public, corruption of 48 revealed 57, 217   as scholarship 137 universal 138 repose 175 representation 110, 122, 154, 176, 182, 188, 198, 203, 215 confused 21 faculty of 200 intellectual 165 intuitive 6, 8 power of 175 sensible 14, 165 single fundamental power of xxv–xxix respect, as inner relation 114 rest 161 revelation xii, xvin, xxiii, xxxix, 134, 216 as announcement of divine will 217 external, through words and effects 216 higher 217 internal, as miracle (supernatural) 216    through reason (natural) 216–17 natural 216–17 pretended 126 strict 217 through moral law 217 reward 205 see also virtue, reward for right, strict 196 righteousness 127, 128, 132, 186, 194 Romans, Letter to the 188n. rule, universal 203, 215 ruler 185 salvation xxi–xxiv Sanctifying Spirit 124–5, 129 satisfaction and dissatisfaction, divine 175 School, Eleatic 137 science xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, 80, 127, 131, 135, 139, 149 as apodictically certain knowledge xxx as distinct from common knowledge 172 moral 153 natural xxxii, 153, 198    and the principles of alteration xxxii principles of xxxiv as system of cognitions 134 Scotland 133

276 Index self-annihilation 168 self-contentment 196 self-interest 190, 191, 202, 204 sensation xxiii–xxix, xxx, 14, 61, 97, 133 as active xxvi external 6 internal 6, 14, 18, 57–8 as passive xxvi sensibility 111, 121, 166, 170, 179, 213 conditions of 106, 115, 151 sensible intuition xiii, xxxiv, 105 shadows 71, 95, 134, 144 Shiva 185 simple 102 simplicity 14, 74 simultaneity 15 sin 188 and knowledge 188, 213 sincerity 127, 128, 196 singleness 102 skepticism 8, 77 see also atheism, skeptical skillfulness 172–3 slothfulness 188 Socinism xxxvii, 12, 13, 65 solitude 113 Son, firstborn of God 124–5, 129 sophism 75 soul xxv–xxix, xxxi–xxxiii, 2, 6, 17, 18, 23, 44, 84, 132, 152, 164, 166 immortality of 196 in interaction with matter 210 space xxvii, 15–17, 75, 79, 143, 151–2, 162–3, 161, 165, 170, 179, 209 see also sensible intuition, form of absolute 117 substrate of extension 157 species or kind 69, 73, 103, 115, 131, 144, 156, 211 as indeterminate 161 preservation of 123 speculation 88, 91, 91, 115, 123, 136 Spinozism 106, 110, 113, 114 see also Spinoza, Benedict false ontology of 107 spirit 213 determinations of attribute of 17 spontaneity, absolute 180 complete 200 qualified 180

stars, influence of 142 state, civil 80 Stoicism 78, 179, 196 stupidity 43, 44, 82, 83 subsistence 198 substance xxx, 13, 77, 114, 117, 160, 168, 170, 174, 197, 207–9 actuation of from nothing 199 concept of in Spinosa 107 condition of 199 extramundane as creative 200 interaction of 199 mundane as contingent 198 persistence of 198 qualified 198 substantiality, consciousness of my own 168 substrate 157, 164, 207 of morality 136 of possibility 118, 121, 160 succession 15 as essence of time 162 suffering 179 sufficient reason or ground, principle of xiii, xviii, xxix, 26, 28, 32, 44, 50, 59, 60 suicide 203 supersensible, science of xxxiii–iv superstition 15, 41–3, 48, 53–9, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86 origin of 57–8 practical 53, 57 religious 53, 54, 57 theoretical 55 physical 53–7 supreme reality, limitation of 71 symbol 90, 185 sympathy 179 synthesis 121 systems, doctrinal 2 talent talisman 86 tedium 190 teleology 30, 206 in study of nature 135 physical 206 practical or pneumatic 206 temptation 125, 129

Index theism 77, 91, 96, 115, 141, 163 attributes concrete perfections 153 critical 146 moral xxxix, 146–7 theodicy xxxv, 187, 213 theologians, ancient 137 heterodox 213 theology, archetypal 134 as basic concept of morality 138 as completing reason 215 confused with religion 80 definition 5 difference from religion 5, 87, 138 dignity of 136, 137, 1387 does not need scholarship 137 ectypal 134, 139 empirical, impossibility of 140 exemplary 169 experimental 30 Kant’s definition of 88 logic of 2, 3 maximum of 76, 138–9 minimum of for religion 88 moral xxxviii–xxxix, 77, 90, 91, 96, 123, 139–41, 183    as final end 93    determinate concept of God in 183    distinct from theological morals 183    knowledge of highest God 147    proceeds from morals 146 natural 139, 141    and natural philosophy 135    as basis of moral theology 141   completion of 134 negative use in the extension of knowledge 137 philosophical 88 practically considered 139 rational, opposed to supernatural theology 140–1   as practical 140   as theoretical 140   taxonomy of 139 relation to reason 75 revealed 76, 140 as revealed 88 as science 75, 88, 134, 137 speculative 139, 142 supernatural 141

277

as system of knowledge of most perfect being 139 transcendental xxxiv, xxxviii–xxxiv, 76, 77, 78, 108, 112, 113, 139, 141, 143–77    constituted by ontotheology and cosmotheology 145 theosophism 166 thing, absolute possibility of 105 complete 149 concept of determined by highest reality 134 constitution of 182 distinct concept of 143 in general 71, 72, 74, 75, 92, 96, 99, 106, 110 in itself, things in themselves 86, 95, 104, 109, 110, 114, 159, 166, 167, 202 limitations of 109 necessity of 112 things, harmony of in the world 183 order, beauty and harmony of 142, 159 practical necessity of 108–9 thinkability 108, 138, 174 Thor 185 thoroughgoing determination 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 79, 92, 94, 95, 97, 99, 100, 101, 106, 109, 110, 113, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 132, 143, 148, 157, 160, 161 principle of 71, 72, 73, 101, 116, 117, 121 thought, as divine attribute 122 discursive 149 freedom of 80, 81 rules of, 109 time xxx, xxvii, 15, 75, 79, 161–3, 165, 170, 179, 206 see also sensible intuition, form of absolute 117 not a determination 109 truth xxx, xxxi, 8, 128 contingent xxxi cosmological 2 dogmatic 58 logical 138 necessary xxx, xxxi ontological 2

278 Index practical 88 psychological 2 speculative 88 tested in experience 135 universal xxx unconditioned, the 75, 79, 92 unconscientiousness 126 understanding xxx, xxxi, 6, 20, 21, 56, 110, 115, 121, 151, 211 common 76, 137–8, 217 discursive 153, 165 divine or infinite 10, 11, 17, 50, 61, 62, 74, 129, 153, 154, 164, 165, 166, 169, 177 finite, limited, or human 3, 6, 7, 8, 10–11, 21, 26, 27, 42, 48, 49, 50, 59, 61, 63, 64, 69, 73, 75, 79, 80, 103, 117, 137, 150, 165, 166, 170, 173, 177, 183, 217    proceeds from parts to whole 173 highest 176 indivisibility of 178 intuitive in God 166 not composite 178–9 original 173 perfect 177–8 pure 74, 138, 166 as reality 164 unhappiness 132, 133, 179 unicity 78 unity, collective 96 natural human drive toward 162 of thought xxvii sensible xxvii synthetic 96 universality, distributive 96 logical 96 utility 128 vice 139, 186, 194 villain 186, 189, 196 virtue 91, 132, 139, 196, 213 frailty of human 124–5 not rewarded according to laws of nature 183 own reward 116 practiced out of self-interest 202 reward for 146

rewarded by moral being 183 self-interested as prudence 190 supreme 70 weakness of human 155 Vishnu 185 Volckmann transcript xxxvi–xxxix war, religious 58 welfare 188 as pleasure in one’s whole condition 195, 196 wellbeing 69–70 whole and part 173, 187–8 whole, human insight into the 187 wickedness 57, 127 will xxv, 56, 88, 138, 178 antecedent 181–2 consequent 181–2 decisive 181 derivative 205 divine 112, 171, 178, 180, 180, 211, 215 see also God, will of divine, no external or internal incentive 179   without interest 183 free 96 freedom of 196 God’s most holy 124 good 129, 204 holiness of 70 intellectual 178 as legislative 100 as making the possible actual 109 objective principles of 111 original 205 provisional 181 subjective principle of 111 wisdom 82, 136, 172–3, 179, 182 divine 135, 172, 212 see also God, wisdom of    distinct from creatures according to quantity and quality 173 not properly applied to human beings 173 supreme 215 unity of ends 172–3 wise 100 witchcraft 56 word, original 124

Index works, good 192 world, actuality of 23, 48, 50, 66 aggregate of substances 178 alteration of 107–10 animate 32, 34–7 arrangement of parts of 32 beginning of 74 best 63, 74, 200, 203    necessary hypothesis for morality 201 better possible 200–1 cause of xl, 50, 77 collection of experience 158 congruous with moral laws 203 contemplation of 216 contingency of 19, 23–41, 43–4, 109, 142 corporeal 56, 63 creator of 145 as effect of God 207 experience of 163 future 123 as God 45–6 government of 213 inanimate 32, 34, 36–7 in general 202 intelligible 167, 201

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   as moral world 167    as substrate of appearances 167 moral 167 no beginning 206 not eternal 206 not necessary being 109 noumenal 167 order and perfection of 26–9, 178 origin of 198 phenomenal 167 relation of God’s attributes to 115 sensible 167, 189, 201, 206 as series of states following one another 122 spiritual 56 as supreme created good 202 system of all ends 178 as system of ends 202 thoroughgoing connection of 93 value of as means of existence for rational beings 32, 33, 202, 206 world soul 61, 78, 107, 114, 151, 210 worship 40n., 88, 138, 185 see also God, service of wrathfulness 162