Contemporary Inter-regional Dialogue and Cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on Non-traditional Security Challenges 9780367272180, 9780367272166, 9781000022506, 9781000022278, 9781000022049

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Preface
List of abbreviations
Introduction
1 Key concepts
2 Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship from a non-traditional security perspective
3 The EU and the haze
4 The EU and the protection of the marine environment
5 The EU and illegal migration
6 The EU and counterterrorism
7 Summary of main findings
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Contemporary Inter-regional Dialogue and Cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on Non-traditional Security Challenges

This book provides an analysis of non-traditional security (NTS) crises and cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Southeast Asia. Using case studies – transboundary air pollution, marine life endangerment, illegal migration, and terrorism – from both Southeast Asia and Western Europe between 2009 and 2016, this book offers a contemporary understanding of the EU as a collective actor within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-EU and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) inter-­regional dialogue formats and affiliated programmes. Through new empirical insights into the regional and inter-regional institutional dynamics of the EU and ASEAN in times of crisis and rising nationalism in both regions the author demonstrates, in particular, the relevance of the EU as a security and normative actor and the value of inter-regionalism as a foreign and security tool of the EU in Southeast Asia. Thus, this book underlines the importance of regional organisations in the management of contemporary transboundary NTS challenges within global governance. Enhancing topical debates and offering a timely assessment of crisis-­ induced regionalism and inter-regionalism in world affairs, this book will be of interest to scholars studying International Relations, International Security, Southeast Asian Studies, European Studies, and Public Policy. Naila Maier-Knapp is lecturer at the University of Rostock, Germany. Her research focuses on the regional and inter-regional institutional dynamics of the EU and ASEAN, mainly in connection to non-traditional security challenges. She is the author of Southeast Asia and the European Union: non-­traditional security crises and cooperation, also published by Routledge (2014).

Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series

The aim of this series is to publish original, high-quality work by both new and established scholars on all aspects of Southeast Asia. Researching China in Southeast Asia Edited by Ngeow Chow Bing Religious Actors and Conflict Transformation in South East Asia Indonesia and the Philippines Edited by Jürgen Rüland, Christian von Lübke and Marcel M. Baumann Power Interconnection in Southeast Asia Anthony David Owen, Anton Finenko and Jacqueline Tao Contemporary Inter-regional Dialogue and Cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on Non-traditional Security Challenges Naila Maier-Knapp Securitising Singapore State Power and Global Threats Management Syed Mohammed Ad’ha Aljunied The European Union and Myanmar Interactions via ASEAN Ludovica Marchi The State and Religious Violence in Indonesia Minority Faiths and Vigilantism A’an Suryana

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/Routledge-Contemporary-Southeast-Asia-Series/book-series/RCSEA

Contemporary Inter-regional Dialogue and Cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on Non-traditional Security Challenges Naila Maier-Knapp

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Naila Maier-Knapp The right of Naila Maier-Knapp to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him/her/them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Maier-Knapp, Naila, author. Title: Contemporary inter-regional dialogue and cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on non-traditional security challenges. Non-traditional security crises and cooperation, 2009–2016 / Naila Maier-Knapp. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Series: Routledge contemporary Southeast Asia series | Includes bibliographical references. | Identifiers: LCCN 2019010625 | ISBN 9780367272180 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367272166 (ebook) | ISBN 9781000022506 (epub) | ISBN 9781000022278 (mobi) | ISBN 9781000022049 (adobe pdf) Subjects: LCSH: European Union countries—Foreign relations— Southeast Asia. | Southeast Asia—Foreign relations—European Union countries. | Security, International—European Union countries. | Security, International—Southeast Asia. | Security, International—International cooperation. | European Union— Security measures. Classification: LCC JZ1570.A55 M353 2019 | DDC 341.242/20959090512—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019010625 ISBN: 978-0-367-27218-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-27216-6 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

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Contents

List of figures List of tables Preface List of abbreviations

ix xi xiii xv

Introduction 1 1 Key concepts 13 2 Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship from a non-traditional security perspective 27 3 The EU and the haze 40 4 The EU and the protection of the marine environment 54 5 The EU and illegal migration 67 6 The EU and counterterrorism 81 7 Summary of main findings 96 Conclusion 112 Bibliography Index

119 127

Figures

4.1 Example of the impact of EU pressure on Thai fisheries 6.1 Filipino newspaper article in the aftermath of the beheading

61 82

Tables

3.1 Estimated losses and damages from forest fires and haze, June–October 2015 (USD millions) 42 3.2 Hectares burned by province, June–October 2015 43 3.3 Estimated loss in public revenue as a result of a one-year peatland moratorium 45 3.4 End uses of palm oil in the EU-27 in 2006–2012 in thousand metric tonnes 48 5.1 Overview of European Commission anti-trafficking projects and funding including core and additional projects, 2009–2015 78

Preface

This book picks up chronologically where Southeast Asia and the European Union: non-traditional security crises and cooperation ends, drawing upon more recent NTS case studies that have taken place between 2009 and 2016. While Chapter 3 on the haze and Chapter 4 on marine life protection of this book are designed similarly to the empirical discussions in the first book, concentrating on the ASEAN regional and ASEAN-EU inter-regional actions, this book departs from the Southeast Asian crisis focus of the first book. Specifically, it extends the narrative to EU regional crises on migration in Chapter 5 and on terrorism in C ­ hapter 6. Given that EU intra-regional institutional developments are considered seminal in understanding the EU’s degree of outward-orientation and external capacity, this EU crisis-centred perspective nicely complements the ASEAN crisis-centred perspective and enhances the analytical nuances of ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism. In addition to this broader geographic focus on crises, the use of ­‘ASEAN-EU’ and ‘EU-ASEAN’ needs to be explained in advance. This book generally uses an alphabetical ordering for composite designations, i.e. ASEAN-EU, although secondary as well as primary documents on the ASEAN-EU relationship have used the two above composite designations interchangeably. Even though this book acknowledges, first, that geography has been an important determinant for the composite designation used in official documents (e.g. ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting when in ASEAN and EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting when in the EU) and second, that activism and relational power have determined the ordering of this composite term in academic analyses, it sticks to the alphabetical principle of ordering. At the same time, this book accepts exceptions to this rule of order, when the composite designation is part of an established name or term, e.g. EU-ASEAN Migration and Border Management or EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership.

Abbreviations

ACCT ADMM ADMM+ AEC AEMM (before 1992) AEMM (after 1992) AICHR AIPA AMM AMMTC APSC APT ARF ARISE ASA ASEAN ASEF ASEM ASEP CBRN CIVCOM CLTRAP CMR CNN CRIMSON CSDP DCI DG DEVCO

ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus ASEAN Economic Community ASEAN-European Communities Ministerial Meeting ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime ASEAN Political and Security Community ASEAN Plus Three ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Regional Integration Support from the EU Association of Southeast Asia Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia-Europe Foundation Asia-Europe Meeting Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution Critical Maritime Routes Cable News Network CMR Monitoring Support and Evaluation Mechanism Common Security and Defence Policy Development Cooperation Instrument Directorate-General for International Development and Cooperation

xvi Abbreviations DG HOME DG JUST EAS ECHO EEAS EIDHR EP EU EUMC Europol FLEGT FMM Frontex FTA GDP GEF GHG GSG9 HLD ICRC IcSP IfS ILO IOM IS ISIL IUU JCC JCLEC JHA MEP NATO NGO NTS PCA PMC PSC PSI READI RRM SEANWFZ SEApeat SEARCCT

Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers East Asia Summit E  uropean Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations European External Action Service European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights European Parliament European Union European Union Military Committee European Police Office Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade Foreign Ministers’ Meeting European Border and Coast Guard Agency Free Trade Agreement Gross Domestic Product Global Environment Facility greenhouse gas Grenzschutzgruppe 9 High-Level Dialogue International Committee of the Red Cross Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace Instrument for Stability International Labour Organisation International Organisation for Migration Islamic State Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Joint Cooperation Committee Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation Justice and Home Affairs Member of European Parliament North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Governmental Organisation Non-Traditional Security Permanent Court of Arbitration post-ministerial conference Political and Security Community Pollutant Standard Index Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument Rapid Reaction Mechanism Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone S  ustainable Management of Peatland Forests in Southeast Asia Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism

Abbreviations  xvii SEATO SOM TAC TIP UK UN UNCLOS UNEP UNHCR UNODC US VPA WWF ZOPFAN

Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation Senior Officials’ Meeting Treaty of Amity and Cooperation Trafficking in Persons United Kingdom United Nations UN Convention on the Law of the Sea UN Environmental Programme UN High Commissioner for Refugees UN Office on Drugs and Crime United States Voluntary Partnership Agreement World Wide Fund for Nature Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality

Introduction

When Asian and European senior officials met on 12–13 May 2016 in Ulaanbaatar to discuss the future of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and prepare for the 11th ASEM Summit in a month’s time, both Asia and ­Europe were experiencing times of uncertainty: In Western Europe – within months to national elections of major EU member states – ­nationalist voices were on the rise. In particular, the migration crisis in the year before had impacted the political landscape of many European Union (EU) member states and seemingly normalised nationalist language in public debates and politics, foreshadowing difficult times for pro-EU parties across Western Europe. In the United Kingdom (UK) specifically, nationalist developments led to a fierce stand-off between pro- and anti-Brexit forces with only a few weeks to the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016. This was to be a fateful referendum for the UK and the EU as a whole. Since B ­ ritish accession to the European Communities in 1973, the EU as a collective political entity had been and still is working hard to overcome the differences between London and the capitals of continental Europe. The Brexit referendum was about to undo all of the cross-Channel achievements made throughout the decades. With the Eurozone and migration crisis pushing the EU to the brink of disintegration, a pro-Brexit vote appeared to some as the final straw for the EU to founder. At stake was not only the EU’s internal political cohesion but also its extra-regional institutional engagement and representation. The UK had and still has an important influence on the EU’s external political image and actor capability. This is the case especially for the EU’s political and security actor profile in Southeast Asia, considering that the UK is a participant in defence arrangements in the region and former colonial power. Even though fears of Brexit and the continuous ailing of Greece’s budget have been tarnishing the EU’s image in the eyes of the Southeast Asian officials attending the ASEM senior officials’ meeting (SOM) in Ulaanbaatar, an obstructive impact of these EU woes on the EU and its member states’ ASEM work agenda and other foreign policy programmes to Southeast Asia was not visible. Because of this impression of business-as-usual diplomacy, in May 2016, none of the senior officials and desk officers from the EU

2 Introduction and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region anticipated any serious issues that could necessitate changes to the conference agenda that they were preparing. Three days before the Summit in July 2016, this calm however changed: The ruling of the Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague on the matter of the South China Sea territorial dispute between the Philippines and China on 12 July 2016 had Southeast Asian officials preoccupied with tempering sensitivities. In addition to this ruling, the terrorist attack in Nice on 14 July 2016 – just hours before the official launch of the 11th ASEM Summit on 15 July 2016 – had senior officials, their teams, and delegations rushing adjustments to the agenda. ASEM’s non-binding format eased the making of ad hoc changes. It allowed the prioritisation of global terrorism on the agenda at short notice and an additional joint statement of condemnation supported by all 53 ASEM members: Following the recent terrorist attacks in Europe and Asia and in many other places, as we have seen in Nice a few hours before our Summit, we strongly condemn the heinous and cowardly terrorist attacks perpetrated, resulting in the unacceptable loss of innocent lives and countless injuries. We express our deep sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims, to the people and to the governments of various countries which have suffered from terrorist attacks resulting in the loss of innocent lives. We reaffirm our commitment to join forces to fight the plague of terrorism and underline the need to bring to justice those responsible for the attacks in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other obligations under international law. (ASEM members 2016) Even though Southeast Asian nationals were neither amongst the victims nor attackers in Nice, the Southeast Asian delegations at the 11th ASEM Summit understood the urgency of the moment and committed to enhance anti-terrorism cooperation with other ASEM members. Amongst others, individual Southeast Asian ASEM members proposed joint activities to counter extremism and radicalisation. In light of this proactive behaviour of some Southeast Asian – as well as some European and other Asian grouping  – delegations, it seemed that France’s terrorist crisis injected a new dynamism into the ASEM process, advancing the forum’s potential as a multilateral platform for the coordination of globally shared security concerns. Generally speaking, crises can exude urgency for governments to reach out and interact. This crisis-induced cooperation imperative in connection to shared security concerns can assist ASEM in overcoming its lack of institutionalisation and tendency to forum fatigue.1 Indeed, in the wake of the 11th ASEM Summit, there seemed to be such an effect, seeing questions of forum fatigue, that have been raised in the previous years, being shelved.2 Most importantly, the Nice attack revealed that ASEM does have the potential to act as an influence within global

Introduction  3 governance: ASEM acted as a platform, first, for its members to reprioritise their security agendas at the Ulaanbaatar Summit coherently and second, for emergency or initial response coordination, enabling timely preparation and streamlining of interests before these were discussed within other fora. The other above named crisis complicating the preparations for the 11th ASEM Summit was the arbitral award on the South China Sea territorial dispute between the Philippines and China. In contrast to the Nice attack, this issue was considered of higher political sensitivity amongst many of the ASEM members and was therefore not to be fully acknowledged in the plenary format of the ASEM Summit. European delegates, including the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, nevertheless opted to congratulate the Foreign Secretary of the Philippines at the sideline talks and other informal talking opportunities. The various political gestures of the European delegates in favour of the Philippines’ position in the dispute provided continuity and coherency of the EU’s overall position on the South China Sea matter. In this sense, the ruling on the territorial dispute between the Philippines and China was only a diplomatic crisis from the perspective of China. From the EU’s point-of-view, it created opportunity for the EU to reconcile divergent intra-regional opinions and interests and reassure Southeast Asia that the EU is committed to the rule of law and multilateralism in the region. These two very different introductory examples of crises showed the relevance of crises or shock events in explaining inter-regional dialogue dynamics, even within those inter-regional dialogue fora of considerable size and heterogeneity amongst the members. This book builds on this explanatory value of crises and focuses on the EU’s inter-regional interaction with Southeast Asia in connection to non-traditional security (NTS)3 crises to enhance contemporary literature on the EU as an international security and normative actor and hone insights of ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism as an EU foreign policy mechanism. This endeavour builds on the first book Southeast Asia and the European Union: non-traditional security crises and cooperation and ties into its multi-level and cross-sectoral approach to assess ASEAN and EU regional and ASEAN-EU inter-regional NTS crisis-related actions (cf. Maier-Knapp 2011; Maier-Knapp 2014b; Maier-Knapp 2016a; Maier-Knapp 2016b; Maier-Knapp 2017c; Maier-Knapp 2018b). While the regional level is drawn upon to complement interpretations and understandings of the inter-regional actions, it is not the main object of study. The analytical centre-point of this book is the inter-regional level to flesh out the research objective. For the purpose of analytical and narrational continuity, the research objective of this book – as touched upon in the previous paragraph – is similar to that of the first book: to develop understanding of the EU as a security and normative actor in Southeast Asia on the basis of ASEAN-EU inter-­ regional action in the context of NTS crises. Thus, the research objective is threefold, consisting of the following research dimensions: first, it seeks to

4 Introduction address the question of the EU as a collective security actor in Southeast Asia in the specific context of transboundary NTS crises; second, it aims to develop understanding about the extent to which the EU’s crisis-responsive support contributes to the idea of the EU as a normative actor in Southeast Asia, given that past and present EU extra-regional security/NTS actions are synonymous to and guided by, or should at least be compatible with, the EU’s normative identity; and third, by treating crisis-induced inter-regional action as the main cooperative avenue from which understandings of the EU as a collective normative and security actor are derived, inter-­regionalism as an effective foreign policy tool is revalued. In light of this tripartite research objective, it becomes clear that this monograph – also the first book – is ambitious and unique. Specifically, it sets itself apart from other contemporary analyses of cross-regional security relations of Western Europe and Southeast Asia in the following way: First, it differs from other studies because it premises an NTS crisis situation as the independent variable in understanding a regional organisation as international actor. Second, it puts forward that even though there are systemic,4 economic, and normative determinants that assist in explaining regional and inter-regional action, these determinants offer limited explanatory value individually when gauging the EU as an actor and ASEAN-EU inter-­regionalism in specific NTS crisis situations. In this book, these conventional determinants are integrated in the narrative and treated as descriptive nuances of the crisis-centred institutionalist and action-focused perspective. Thereby, more attention is paid to normative nuances than economic and systemic nuances, given the specific research interest of this book in the EU as a normative actor and the ability of crises to trigger compassion and the availability of material support from international partners. Moreover, because a mix of normative, economic, and systemic nuances underpinning EU regional and inter-regional action is likely to be observed in empiricism, this book refrains from a behaviouralist approach which pigeon-holes regional and inter-regional action with fixed parameters. Instead, this book uses the following three guiding questions derived from the research ­objective – which have been articulated similarly to the three guiding questions in the first book – to assess the responsive actions and narrow down the action-­u nderlying rationale. This re-articulation of the research objective into questions assists the reader in understanding and following the argumentation. It therefore serves both argumentation and structuration purposes, organising the empirical chapters coherently: Can the EU improve its profile as a collective actor as security actor in Southeast Asia through its assistance to this far away region in the wake of NTS crises? What impact do NTS crises in the EU have on this kind of assistance? Can transboundary NTS crises facilitate greater recognition of the EU as a normative actor who seeks to project norms as well as act on the basis of its norms internationally?

Introduction  5 What is the value of ASEAN-EU dialogue and cooperation on NTS crises for inter-regional security cooperation/inter-regionalism? If crises function as stimuli for enhanced interaction within the ASEAN-EU relationship, does this indicate that existing ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism does not carry sufficient weight to further inter-regional communication and coordination? Research question 1: EU as a security actor Similarly to the first book, this study provides an understanding of the EU as a security actor based on the EU as “an NTS actor” or rather an “actor on NTS threats” (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 9). The former description implies that the EU has strategies and capabilities for security action that would fall within the purview of NTS action, whereas the latter associates NTS as a quality of the threats and not as a characteristic of the actor. Both ­typologies – if not further defined – allow the actor to address NTS threats with any appropriate means at disposal. A military response, that is, a response with a state’s traditional security toolkit, is possible, but may not always be the most appropriate response. Indeed, the first book already demonstrated that the EU’s contributions to improving regional security and resilience of Southeast Asia in the context of NTS crises generally fell short of military and other traditional security means. The first book revealed that what could be considered as EU regional security support to Southeast Asia mainly took place through issue-specific inter-regional ASEAN-EU programmes which were funded either by the European Commission’s development cooperation or its geographic budget lines. The first book drew upon case studies between 1997 and 2009 to show the relevance of the NTS perspective in bridging between development and security rationales. The security-development nexus is inherent in the NTS perspective and at the heart of the second guiding question, which is concerned with the EU as a normative actor. In the context of these case studies of more recent times, ranging between 2009 and 2016, it is important to keep in mind that the nexus opens room for strategic and security elements to find their way into development cooperation. An example for this is the Instrument for Stability (IfS) or its successor the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) when used by the Directorate-General for International Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) to address sensitive traditional security topics: For instance, when DG DEVCO acted as the lead facilitator or implementor of IfS/IcSP projects addressing ethnic violence or terrorism, DG DEVCO and the implementing partners adopted a developmental approach for this.5 It can be said that the security-development rationale in contemporary institution-­building of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and other EU foreign and security structures increases functional convergence and fluidity amongst the EU foreign policy structures, while opening space for new actors to be considered as implementing partners.

6 Introduction Research question 2: EU as a normative actor Hypothetically, the above mentioned fluidity between the security and development sectors could, first, enhance coordination and output effectiveness and second, advance a more ‘humanized’ EU security agenda internationally. While the study of cross-sectoral interaction and norm diffusion both intra-­regionally and inter-regionally is undoubtedly an attractive field of study and contributes to understandings of the EU as an NTS actor, especially in the sense of a norm projector from inside-out, this book can only recognise the diffusion processes and their output dimension if there is a clear and significant causality between the regional processes and the normative impact at the ASEAN-EU inter-regional level. Indeed, from the outset, the crisis-centred research methodology of this book de-­emphasises a process-­oriented perspective that could account for intra- and inter-­regional norm-building processes. In this book, assessment of the EU’s normative action and interaction is only in connection to the immediate aftermath of the selected NTS crises, concentrating on the normative space and implications in that time, as well as the norms that have been incorporated into the crisis response. As mentioned above, this crisis-centred approach premises EU international solidarity as the key (normative) rationale for action: The EU as a responsible partner within an international society generally considers offering assistance in cases of severe crisis on grounds of appropriateness. Thereby, background knowledge of the EU’s identity, standard operating procedures on specific issues, and ratification of global conventions and norm frameworks is helpful for the validation of the level of normativity manifest in the assistance; with this book particularly taking note of EU’s promotion of multilateralism and rule of law. Through the EU’s promotion of these and other norms in its efforts of crisis assistance,6 the EU contributes to the institutionalisation and ordering of the anarchic international sphere and constructs an image of itself as a peace and security provider by other means than military force. This links the normative question of the EU as an actor to the previously discussed security actor question. Being caught up in great power rivalry, Southeast Asian countries consider this unconventional and broad security approach of the EU indeed as an interesting “alternative” security influence (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 8). Research question 3: value of inter-regionalism Whereas the first two guiding questions are concerned with the impact of crises on the conception of the EU as an actor and draw upon inter-­regionalism as a tool for making sense of the EU as an actor only, the third question treats inter-regionalism exclusively as the analytical subject, in the sense of a peace or security dividend in its own right. The third guiding question asks about the value and actor capability of EU-centred inter-regionalism from a

Introduction  7 global governance perspective. This also contributes to further specification of the EU’s uniqueness as a security and normative actor in Southeast Asia, enhancing the discussion of the previous two research questions. Starting point for the third research question is the assumption that, because of the lack of institutional integration at the inter-regional level, ASEAN-EU inter-­regionalism benefits from the policy processes and actions triggered by transboundary NTS crises. The crises can impact the inter-regional level directly, as the introductory discussion of the Nice Attack revealed, or indirectly through policy responses at the national and regional levels. Basically, through the third research question this book seeks to confirm that, because transboundary NTS crisis situations generally call for regional and international cooperation, they could provide integration impetus at the inter-­regional level. Specifically, these crises can compel members of inter-­ regional fora to engage on grounds of appropriateness and express political willingness to advance inter-regional cooperation on the global commons (Maier-Knapp 2010; Maier-Knapp 2014a). Even though the official ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-regional dialogue formats generally proceed according to multi-year programming and agendas of individual working groups, there is evidence that NTS transboundary crises have had and continue to have impact on inter-regional cooperation, providing additional – albeit irregular – integration stimulus. Noteworthy here is that the ASEM dialogue is more susceptible to NTS crisis dynamics than the ASEAN-EU dialogue. This is not to say that ASEM inter-regional dialogue and cooperation dynamics in connection to NTS crises are conducive to institution-building at the ASEM inter-regional level and could see ASEM being a structuring agent of the international system. The prospects are there. However, as the first book already summed up, the heterogeneity of the participants at both the ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-regional levels still complicates the extent to which inter-regional dynamics and actions unfold (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 113–114). By contrast, Jörn Dosch has provided a more positive assessment of ASEM’s potential as a structuring agent. His observation mainly builds on the rationalising, streamlining, and agenda-setting functions that ASEM has displayed from time to time in connection to transboundary NTS challenges: The EU concentrates its efforts in the area of soft or non-traditional security, focusing on good governance, the rule of law and the reduction of informal institutions (such as corruption), human and civil rights, terrorism, environmental challenges and, not least, economic stability or more specifically crisis solving and prevention. Here, the institutionalist notion of rationalizing and agenda-setting and comes into focus. It has become almost a routine matter for key ASEM members to put their main rallying points in international cooperation on the forum’s agenda and to re-emphasis[e] them in Declarations and Chairman’s

8 Introduction statements. That way the ASEM process can indeed be described as a framework which allows members to garner support for initiatives among like-minded states in non-traditional policy arenas and set the agenda in preparation for deeper institutionalized and/or global multilateral settings, such as UN conferences. (Dosch 2013: 12) Dosch’s judgement corresponds to institutionalist theoretical assumptions of inter-regionalism. These essentially premise that “[i]f realists highlight the balancing aspects and gauge ASEAN-EC relations on this basis, institutionalists make the institution-building, agenda-setting and rationalizing functions the litmus test for ASEAN-EC relations” (Rüland 2001: 12). These named functions of inter-regionalism provide orientation for the analysis and are substantiated and debated in Chapter 7 in the context of the third guiding research question. Beforehand, Chapter 3 until Chapter 6 will outline empirically relevant inter-regional actions, that is, the effective opportunity for the functions to be applied, if at all. Although Chapters 3 until 6 juxtapose the ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-regional activities with European Commission-ASEAN member state activities and other bilateral cross-regional interactions to identify inter-regionalism’s distinct value, they proceed strictly non-prescriptively based on a behaviouralist theoretical perspective focused on the actual crisis-related interaction only, leaving the debate of the functions of inter-regionalism to Chapter 7.

Methodology International Relations studies that have used behaviouralist approaches have generally paid primary attention to the day-to-day inter-institutional dynamics. This book departs from this regular non-crisis perspective and assesses action and interaction qualitatively through a crisis-centred lens in connection to a small number of case studies. The four case studies have been selected on the basis of their severity and cross-border impact. Although there are sectoral overlaps, the case studies concern different policy sectors. This premises a broad variance of actors and instruments involved in the narrative. This variety inherent in cross-level, -border, and -­ sectoral perspectives stresses the difficulty in theorising the EU as a coherent collective foreign and security policy actor. Thus, it is important to provide an initial conception of (the EU as) a collective actor, which will be further fleshed out in Chapter 1. For now, the following key actor assumptions can be given: (1) The case studies only take into account the major institutional heads acting in response to the crisis. (2) They acknowledge the role of non-­ governmental and civil society actors as implementing partners or complementary assistance providers. This can impact the actor image of the respective regional organisational actor either negatively or positively. (3) They acknowledge the central role of EEAS. At the same time, they take

Introduction  9 interest in accounting for crisis-relevant actions of those institutions within the EU that do not play a prominent role in shaping day-to-day foreign policies of the EU to Southeast Asia. This includes, for instance, institutions concerned with civil protection or the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The primary source of information for this study has been newspaper articles, official documents, and secondary literature concerning the ASEAN-EU relationship and sector-specific governance in the respective regions. Additionally, semi-structured interviews were conducted. The information retrieved through these interviews has been verified and mainly served as background information. Thus, quotations from the interviewees have been largely avoided. This helped avoid disruptions to the flow of the text. Further noteworthy is that this book is written in a language that is good-to-follow and accessible to laypersons, even though the used literature is suggestive of this book being designed for an academic and policy-­ making audience. Furthermore, by keeping the methodological tenets in this section concise, by providing a conceptual discussion and clarification in Chapter 1, and by following through with a chronologically organised narrative, this book does not overburden readers unfamiliar with the topic. Last but not least, in spite of the breadth of the research objective, this book is analytically focused and refrains from wider questions such as sector-­ specific comparisons or comparative perspectives to the first book, hence, facilitating effective communication of knowledge to the reader. Nevertheless, avid followers of regional and inter-regional dynamics in world affairs should not be discouraged from engaging in wider comparative research questions that may arise when reading this book.

Structure of the book The first part of this book consists of Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 1 begins with the discussion of the key concepts that pertain to the ASEAN-EU relationship from an NTS perspective. In addition to honing the concepts ‘actor’, ‘inter-regionalism’, and ‘NTS’ of the first book, this book takes interest in delving into the concept of ‘strategic partnership’, which has been one of the buzzwords in the ASEAN-EU relationship in more recent times. Chapter 2 embeds these concepts in an overview of ASEAN-EU NTS interaction, expanding the historical outline presented in the first book with more contemporary systemic and institutional developments. The second part of this book focuses on the empirical case studies. The chapters in the second part proceed chronologically and in accordance with the three guiding research questions. Whereas the first book and other publications on the ASEAN-EU relations have concentrated on NTS crises that have affected the ASEAN regional grouping only, this book assesses case studies from both regions. Notable is this book’s account of more recent NTS crises in the EU.

10 Introduction The second part of this book begins with Chapter 3 and ties into the first  book thematically by beginning with the case of the transboundary haze in Southeast Asia. The first section of Chapter 3 assesses the ASEAN regional integration dynamics and national measures that have taken place since the publication of the first book. Similarly to the assessment of the first book, Chapter 3 views continued Indonesian reference to non-­i nterference and national sovereignty critically, foregrounding the disruptive role Indonesia plays in ASEAN anti-haze cooperation and the pressure of neighbouring Singapore, compelling Indonesia to live up to its regional commitments. Then, Chapter 3 describes the EU’s assistance to Southeast Asia. Through the discussion of the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) initiative and other schemes that address the haze and fires indirectly, Chapter 3 expands on the significance of EU development cooperation, consumer pressure, and non-governmental actors. At the same time, there are EU funding schemes which address the haze issue directly, like the Sustainable Management of Peatland Forests in Southeast Asia (SEApeat) project from 2011 until 2015. Overall, Chapter 3 suggests that European awareness on the haze issue has increased and that the EU has become more interested in providing effective anti-haze support to Southeast Asia. Chapter 4 continues with the environmental dimension of NTS crises in Southeast Asia. However, in contrast to the developmental perspective of the discussion in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 draws upon the case of marine life protection in the South China Sea to demonstrate the intimate links between the NTS and traditional security perspectives in politicised environments. The South China Sea Project provides the main example to show that even technical and apolitical engagement for the protection of marine life cannot be completely dissociated from the political contexts in which actors operate. Based on a politicised and securitised understanding of the South China Sea, the remainder of Chapter 4 discusses various opportunities for enhanced ASEAN-EU security engagement, centring the work done in the area of maritime security and fisheries. Whereas Chapters 3 and 4 are a continuation of the Southeast Asian focus of the first book, Chapters 5 and 6 shift the crisis narrative to the EU. Chapters 5 and 6 concentrate on NTS issues that have affected the European continent severely. Concomitantly, they refer to individual instances of crisis in Southeast Asia to create cross-regional and inter-regional understanding. Chapter 5 begins with an examination of the refugee and migration crisis in the EU. This crisis has tested the EU as a regional polity to breaking point, and an end to the political quagmire is not yet in sight with further disintegration dynamics on the horizon, at the time of writing in 2017. The chapter goes on to discuss the inter-regional impact and the extent to which the case of the May crisis of the Rohingya boat people in Southeast Asia has informed the trajectory of ASEAN regional integration and ASEAN-EU interaction on the issue of migration. Chapter 5 concludes

Introduction  11 with a general account of the EU’s support to ASEAN on issues of human trafficking. Chapter 6 draws upon the series of terrorist attacks in the EU in 2015 and 2016 to outline, first, national and regional capacity-building and second, the impact of the intra-regional developments on ASEAN-EU inter-­ regionalism. The discussion focuses on two major attacks in France in 2015 and two ‘lone-wolf’ attacks in Germany in 2016 to develop understanding of the interactive dynamics between national and regional policy-making in the EU. The chapter then shifts focus to two terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, namely the Bangkok attack in 2015 and the Jakarta attack in 2016. In the final paragraphs of the chapter, various avenues for enhancing dialogue and cooperation between ASEAN and EU member states for effective combat of both terrorism and extremism are outlined. Looking into the future, it can be said that, in spite of the competency and mandate limitations for inter-­regional counterterrorism cooperation in the sense of regional organisational interaction, recent institutional developments in both regions suggest more room for EU supranational actors to explore dialogue and cooperation with Southeast Asian partners. The aim of Chapter 7 is to restate the key findings of the empirical chapters and provide an overall response to the three guiding questions. The discussions of the questions correlate, seeing the conception of the EU as a security actor intimately linked to the EU as a normative and inter-regional actor. Specifically, the chapters reveal that the NTS crisis-­c entred lens assists in working out cross-regional issue awareness and hence, enhanced actor sensitivity to the contiguity between security and NTS-­developmental themes. Although, in theory, this contiguity enhances the EU’s scope of inter-­regional action and recognition as a security actor in Southeast Asia, it complicates clear understanding of the EU’s security, as well as normative, profile on site. This having been said, the EU does not seek strategic engagement in Southeast Asia that could rival those activities of the EU and non-EU state powers with actual strategic stakes and military presence in the Asia-Pacific. The final chapter concludes with an overview of the main findings. It puts forward that there are crisis-induced developments at the national and regional levels that could see increased best-practice-sharing as well as capacity-­building across the two regions. The Conclusion chapter construes the broader impact of this study on conceptions of the EU as a collective actor as security actor in world affairs. In this context, it, however, cautions that the recognition of the EU as a political and security actor also hinges on the recipient of action, no matter how far perspectives of security and insecurity are stretched. Furthermore, it draws up the central characteristics of ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism in global governance and ends with key policy recommendations for the EU’s overall security approach to Southeast Asia and an outlook of what to expect in the next book, which examines NTS case studies between 2017 and 2023.

12 Introduction

Notes 1 International dialogue and cooperation on security are always more sensitive than other types of policy dialogue and cooperation, complicating any influence that a distinct ASEM approach could have on the global security agenda. At the same time, newer ASEM instruments are carving out greater space for security interaction and effective cooperation, improving ASEM’s profile in world affairs. For example, through the issue-based leadership mechanism introduced at the Helsinki Summit in 2006 interested members can further thematic clusters with like-minded members, irrespective of geographic belonging and the number of interested members. Furthermore, clustering in connection to niche areas allows those ASEM members that belong to a cluster to advance specific expert knowledge and develop an avant-garde role that could have an eventual functional impact on the structuration of global order. 2 It also needs to be said that this can be attributed to the agenda and activities of the Ulaanbaatar event more generally, which marked a special commemorative Summit within the life of ASEM. 3 The NTS perspective is distinct from the traditional security perspective because, amongst other characteristics, NTS challenges and crises do not originate in military aggression and other forms of state-vs.-state behaviour. At the same time, even though NTS issues mainly stem from conditions of underdevelopment and risk, they can become harmful to national security and a matter of traditional security response. This having been said, NTS challenges are often times transboundary and hence, require responses that go beyond the traditional capabilities of state security. This stresses regional cooperation for those states that are affected by the crisis and are in geographic proximity. 4 Because explanations and solutions to NTS crises do not normally lie within the power capabilities and games of state actors in the international system – unless they are instrumentalised as such for power projection, this book moves beyond the perspective of Realpolitik of traditional scholarly assessments concerned with security actors and actor capabilities in Southeast Asia. 5 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 6 Thus, the discussions within the individual chapters refer to these frameworks and normative backgrounds only when they pertain to the argumentation.

1 Key concepts

This chapter begins with the conceptual discussion of ‘strategic partnership’ and then proceeds with three concepts that have been examined in the first book: ‘actor’, ‘NTS’, and ‘inter-regionalism’. By embedding these four concepts within discussions that draw upon more recent ASEAN-EU contexts, the following paragraphs aim to offer new conceptual insights and generate more contemporary understandings germane to the following empirical chapters. Thus, this chapter acts as a source of knowledge, on which the empirical narratives and action interpretative assessments from ­Chapters 3 until 7 can build.

Strategic Partnership In the last decade, official interest in an EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership has increased. Especially since the 20th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) in Brussels on 23 July 2014 spelled out that both regional groupings will “work towards the upgrading of the partnership to a strategic one and tasked their senior officials to develop a roadmap for this goal”, there have been official efforts in moving the inter-regional relationship towards a higher plane of dialogue and cooperation (ASEAN and EU member states 2014: para. 2). In light of these positive signals suggesting an EUASEAN Strategic Partnership and therefore more momentum within the ­ASEAN-EU political and security dialogue in the near future, it is hightime to revisit the EU’s traditional understanding of a strategic partnership. Until now, conceptualisations of EU strategic partnerships have either centred on the geo-strategic restructuration of Eastern Europe in the 1990s or the EU’s relations with major state powers in a multipolar international system. Thus, even though the idea of a strategic partnership may be fairly new to the ASEAN-EU relationship, it is actually an old tool within the EU’s foreign and security policy repertoire. When strategic partnerships first emerged in the 1990s as an instrument of the EU to manage the post-Cold War situation in the Eastern neighbourhood, they mainly served to revalue the relations with selected countries of the former Soviet Union. For example, in the 1990s, the EU floated the idea

14  Key concepts of a strategic partnership within the dialogue with Ukraine to reassure it that it is of strategic importance to the EU. Ultimately, the EU gave Ukraine a special status through the Common Strategy Towards Ukraine. For some, this appeared like a ‘consolation prize’ after Ukraine had already conceded its nuclear weapons in the hope to gain candidate status for EU membership (Ferreira-Pereira and Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira 2015: 148). Other world powers have been making similar use of strategic partnerships; namely the United States (US) has been treating them as a ‘staple’ of US grand strategy post-Cold War to structure continental Europe (Kay 2000: 15). In summary, strategic partnerships then were essentially means of international security and order to reassure those former Soviet Union countries which were not immediately welcomed into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) security architecture that their allegiance to the US-led structure was acknowledged. One could say that these older US- or EU-centred strategic partnerships were mainly driven by strategic calculations in the military sense. Similar to this older generation of strategic partnerships, the new generation of EU strategic partnerships of the early 2000s originates in the uncertainty of an anarchic international system and the need for ordering. The new generation of EU strategic partnerships is designed to foster comprehensive dialogue and cooperation with major powers worldwide, underlining the EU’s vision of a multipolar global order as structure of the international system. This structuration on the basis of the strategic partnerships has so far focused on the EU relations with a group of ‘elite’ states. This focus emphasises the power capabilities of the major powers and implies a hierarchical structure of global order. Effective global management of contemporary complex challenges can benefit from the intensification of relations and coordination of goals and strategies amongst the world’s major powers (Maher 2016: 959). Similarly, Thomas Renard has expounded the managerial value of the current generation of EU strategic partnerships for global governance (2011: 5). Thereby, he makes further distinctions and refers to so-called true strategic partnerships. A true strategic partner can be defined as a key global player which has a pivotal role in solving global challenges – in the sense that the EU cannot hope to solve these issues without the positive contribution of that partner – and which is willing to cooperate with the EU to solve these challenges, preferably in a multilateral framework – e.g. by coordinating our position with those strategic partners in multilateral forums. (Renard 2011: 5) Generally speaking, the characteristics described by Renard and others build on an academic belief in the managerial and pacifying potential of the poles of power and the inclination to multilateralism due to the very multipolar nature of this elite grouping. While the managerial perspective justifies multipolarity, one has to keep in mind that this does not consequentially

Key concepts  15 equate with an opportunity for multilateralism per se, especially if the relations amongst the poles of power are not amicable and coordinated. Moreover, if so-called non-strategic partners are not given adequate channels and mechanisms to influence the structuration processes of multipolarity, it is questionable to what extent the poles of power will genuinely acknowledge the interests of smaller non-strategic partners and live up to multilateralism as a principle inherent to multipolarity. Although there have been a handful of EU institutions, meetings, and official publications that have attempted to clarify the purpose and parameters of this foreign policy tool with a view to promoting multipolarity of the international structure, it appears that, overall, they could not minimise the ambiguities and provide clear conceptual definitions (Grevi 2010). While vague definitions complicate the understanding and utility of an EU strategic partnership, there are some practical benefits which can be derived from the vagueness in wording; for example, in the sense of flexibility in the selection of actors and sectors for cooperation. In particular, within strategic partnerships that exhibit high levels of asymmetry and heterogeneity, this vagueness is not necessarily considered to be a disadvantage. For example, with a view to the inter-regional EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, flexibility in wording could be beneficial for ASEAN: first, because it is less restrictive in terms of the partners and would allow regional organisations to enter into strategic partnership negotiations with the EU and, second, because it enables customised technical and sectoral dialogues that meet the needs of the parties within that strategic partnership only. An example for the latter is the sectoral dialogue on drug matters of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership. EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership In light of ongoing questions about actor legitimacy of regional organisations as actors in the international system, a strategic partnership with ASEAN would serve as a source of ‘cumulative’ legitimacy: first, through the regional identity of the counterpart and, second, through the inter-­regional nature of the strategic partnership. In relation to the latter, the social or multilateral clout that inter-regional strategic partnerships carry is notable. That is, being a tool that builds on multilateral principles and social dynamics, inter-­regional strategic partnerships allow more active ­intra- and extra-­regional coordination than traditional strategic partnerships. This has positive influence on the EU’s multilateralist and overall institutional identity ­ SEAN-EU inter-regional both at home and overseas: On the one hand, an A strategic partnership – similarly to the other EU contemporary strategic ­partnerships  – would boost international recognition of the EU, namely EEAS. On the other hand, EU member states would build up more confidence in EEAS, leading to potential cost reductions involved in the maintenance of the EU member state delegations in third countries. Simultaneously, there

16  Key concepts are representational benefits for smaller EU economies with limited power capabilities, facilitating better expression of their political and security interests through the collective voice of EEAS (Engelbrekt 2012: 80, 63). In spite of the positive effects and power added for individual member states, an inter-regional strategic partnership also bears the risk of exacerbating political faultlines both at the intra- and inter-regional levels. Indeed, there are cleavages between the EU member states which suggest greater similarities between some EU and ASEAN member states. At the same time, the format and flexibility of an inter-regional strategic partnership could assist in overcoming these cleavages and centre a managerial approach in the ASEAN-EU relationship, moderating power and elitist perspectives. Indeed, it is in the interest of the EU – as a multilateral and multi-headed actor by definition – to avoid that strategic partnerships become a category purely defined by the bilateralisms of individual poles of power. In addition to ideational arguments in favour of an EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, the previous paragraphs have also pointed to the possible geo-strategic impact of an inter-regional strategic partnership. In particular, for the Asia-Pacific, any outside-in outreach that assists in creating a more stable power equilibrium is generally welcome. Indeed, in light of the EU’s standing strategic partnerships with India, China, Japan, and South Korea, the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership makes sense for more effective regional ordering and continuous ASEAN centrality in the Asia-Pacific security architecture. These systemic deliberations aside, EU relations with India, China, Japan, and South Korea generally involve considerable direct or indirect institutional enmeshment with Southeast Asian countries. Thus, in some ways, the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership is already taking shape incrementally by stealth through the various ASEAN interactions with the EU and the standing EU strategic partners in Asia. In spite of speedy Council Conclusions in 2015 in response to the Communication of the High Representative for the EU on Foreign and Security Policy and other EU efforts to realise the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership in the near future, there remain many questions for the European Commission to think about and answer to the member states. For instance, in regard to the EU’s security involvement in the Southeast Asian region: Although, from a European perspective, strategic partnerships do not prioritise political and military relations, it has become evident that the EU would like to see its offer of a strategic partnership lead to greater inclusion in the East Asian security architecture. Amongst others, it was said that “The move to an EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership should go hand in hand with the EU’s presence at the region’s strategic table” (European Commission 2015: 15). To what extent, are the negotiating Southeast Asian counterparts in a position to accommodate on this matter (Maier-Knapp 2018a)? Further questions that have arisen concern, for example, the commitment to “substantive action from both sides and concrete results” (ASEAN and EU member states 2016: para. 1). How can this be realised if there is continuous asymmetry in

Key concepts  17 organisational structures and capabilities? In light of these and many other questions, it is clear that the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership is not a panacea to vitalise the political and security dialogue between the two regions. At this point in time, it seems that, at best, it provides an additional means of legitimacy for regionalism and a new opportunity for the two regional organisations to advance their relationship.

Actor Various conceptualisations of the EU as a collective actor in world affairs, ranging from early accounts of actor capability of the European Communities to more recent concepts of EU civilian, ethical, and normative power, have contributed to an extensive body of literature which has inspired debates on regional organisations as global actors beyond EU centrism. Although this book and its prequel acknowledge the existing conceptualisations of the EU as an international actor, they do not draw upon these conceptualisations as a departure point for the analysis. As described in the Introduction, this book adopts a behaviouralist lens which treats the EU as an actor ex post, foregrounding the assessment of “threat perceptions, actions, inactions and interactions” to determine the EU as an actor (­Maier-Knapp 2014b: 15). That is, to restate essential points from the previous chapter: insights of actions are retrieved without normative or interpretive bias. The interpretation or prescription ensues the description of the action, crisis-centred motivation1 of action, and capabilities and will mainly take place in Chapter 7. Overall, the EU as an international actor consists of the sum of actions carried out by the multiple relevant regional – with focus on European Commission and EEAS – and member state structures. ­Chapter 2 will introduce some of these EU actors when discussing the central mechanisms that are available to the EU to engage Southeast Asia on NTS matters. These actors also include EU agencies like the European Police Office (Europol), which may become more involved in the ASEAN-EU relationship in the years to come with topics such as anti-money laundering, cybercrime, and counterterrorism gaining ground in the official ASEAN-EU dialogue.2 Furthermore, this book recognises the increasing importance of civil society, business, and other non-governmental actors working in Southeast Asia. NTS crisis situations in particular reveal the significance of non-­ governmental actors. For example, past experiences in disease outbreak response and crisis preparedness have seen, amongst others, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation acknowledged as an important provider of research funding. More prominent non-governmental actors operating as global players are the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Greenpeace, and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). The former was one of the most important assistance providers in the aftermath of the Boxing Day Tsunami, eclipsing the contributions of most of the countries in terms of financial amounts as well as expert personnel. The latter two have been

18  Key concepts prominent non-governmental organisations (NGOs) active on matters of the transboundary haze in Southeast Asia (­Maier-Knapp 2014b: 60). Because many of these organisations in Southeast Asia draw upon extra-regional experts and have considerable funding from international partners channelled through them, discerning distinct EU/Western European contributions is difficult. In light of evermore EU reliance on non-governmental actors as implementing partners, differentiation of the sources of funding is, however, integral to the question of the EU as an actor. As key financial contributors to NGO and civil society activities in the region, distinct actor recognition of the EU and its member states still leaves room for improvement. In addition to the European Commission’s humanitarian and development cooperation programmes, the European Parliament (EP) plays a key role in acting as the voice of the European peoples on matters of the EU’s external relations. The EP staunchly upholds the EU’s normative identity in Asia on complex issues like the South China Sea,3 sustainable palm oil, military government in Thailand, and the extra-judicial killings in the Philippines. Due to the economic interests at stake, the European Commission, EU member state, and EEAS officials have been generally more cautious in making statements of condemnation publicly than some of the Members of the EP(MEPs). It is in fact the duty of the MEPs to voice the discontent of the European public and compensate any normative identity conflict or shortcoming on the part of the European Commission and Council, if they are given the chance to state an official opinion on relevant matters or visit Southeast Asian countries, for instance, through EU-AIPA (ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly) initiatives. This is not to say that the MEPs speak to and about Southeast Asia with one voice. Indeed, depending on political partisanship and personal background, opinions vary on many issues. On a final note, it is important to keep in mind that this book “understands [the EU as] an actor narrowly in relation to specific NTS contexts, based on the selected NTS case studies only” (Maier-Knapp 2014: 15). Whereas the previous book centred on selected crisis situations mainly affecting the Southeast Asian region, this book takes greater empirical interest in the crisis affectedness of the EU. Perceptions and actions of the ASEAN region as the counterpart region are included in the narrative and assist in creating understanding of the EU’s behaviour and its self-awareness as an actor, however, they play a secondary role in answering the guiding questions.4 This having been said, even though the centrality of crises in this book stresses the EU as an actor sui generis and ex post and renders as a rule ideational and social deconstructions of inter-agential relations of minor significance – if not unnecessary, there are instances where, for example, ASEAN as the sociological other, non-governmental actors, or the UN global level clearly contribute to conceptions of the EU as a normative, NTS, and inter-regional actor in Southeast Asia. These instances encourage analytical excursions and normative references that support the overall empirical narrative.

Key concepts  19

Inter-regionalism The growing relevance of non-governmental actors in implementing ASEANEU inter-regional activities is furthermore inviting a conceptual revisit of inter-regionalism, as has been already put forward in the first book. This is high-time, considering that within Southeast Asian regionalism non-­ governmental actors have always played an important role in framing regional integration and NTS cross-border cooperation, constructing “causal stories that draw upon NTS ideas to guide the formation or transformation of regional institutions”, and recalibrating “current understandings of security and the regional norms legitimising contemporary institutions” (Zimmerman 2016: 86). Although this influence has been observed, it is important to note that the evidence through process-tracing has been to some extent haphazard (Stone 2011). From an EU perspective, these ­bottom-up ­influences – whether haphazard or not – are compatible with the EU approach to the region. This compatibility opens room for enhanced recognition of non-governmental actors and civil society at the ASEAN-EU inter-regional level. Proceeding from these assumptions and those of the first book, it is in particular Rüland’s conception of transregionalism which captures contemporary multi-stakeholder ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism, since it acknowledges the heterogeneity of governmental participants, the complexity of overlapping institutional memberships, as well as the role of national and transnational non-governmental and civil society actors (2002). At the same time, greater official recognition of the important role of non-­governmental actors in times of NTS crises does not mean effective influence in crisis management and sectoral governance. Oftentimes the effective space for these actors remains defined by national governments or supranational authorities. For example, at the inter-regional level, actual institutional space for non-governmental actors within the ASEAN-EU dialogue or ASEM has not aggrandised since the creation of the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) in 1997.5 Simultaneously, ASEAN intra-regional developments have been viewed ambiguously: Following international criticism about ASEAN’s lack of actual people-oriented institutions, Southeast Asian governments have finally managed to agree upon the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and establish it in 2009 to offer the people of ASEAN and the outside world an institutional address for human rights matters in Southeast Asia. While AICHR’s creation signalled ­ASEAN’s incremental institutional openness to civil societal concerns and influence, it remains to be seen whether AICHR can actually move beyond its delegated and semi-­official reputation as a ‘diplomatic club’ and be more than window-­dressing (­Maier-Knapp 2015). At the ASEAN-EU inter-­regional level, various invitations to the EU have boosted AICHR’s organisational status, complementing the people-oriented value of the

20  Key concepts EP-AIPA and Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP). In spite of AICHR’s improved status, its impact on official discourses still seems limited and subject to the extent to which the member state governments of the respective regional organisations allow AICHR to make its mark within inter-regionalism. In light of the regulated space for transnational and non-­governmental actors within ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism, this book prefers the understanding of inter-regionalism put forward in the first book. That is, it adopts the definition offered by Heiner Hänggi, Jürgen Rüland, Fredrik Söderbaum, and Luk van Langenhove, premising “interregionalism to be the interaction between regional cooperative arrangements” (Maier-Knapp 2014: 3). Inter-regional dialogues are defined as group-to-group dialogues with more or less regular meetings centering around exchanges of information and cooperation (projects) in specific policy fields (trade and investment, environment, crime prevention, narcotics trafficking etc.). It is based on a low level of institutionalization, usually at the ministerial, ambassadorial and senior officials’ levels, sometimes supplemented by permanent or ad hoc experts’ working groups. (Rüland 2001: 5) In addition to this definition, this book furthermore draws inspiration from the functions of inter-regionalism articulated by Rüland and some of the other authors named above to flesh out the third guiding question on the value of inter-regionalism.6 Of the handful of functions – balancing, agenda-­setting, rationalisation, institution-building, and identity-building – that Rüland and colleagues identified, the following three pertain to the institutionalist perspective: inter-regional institution- or capacity-building, agenda-setting or -controlling, and rationalisation. These three functions offer key theoretical orientation in Chapter 7 and will be complemented with other function-related interpretations gained throughout the empirical chapters. Institution-building processes at the international level generally exhibit some form of power and institutional balancing, even in connection to NTS crises. In the specific context of inter-regionalism, however, they appear less purposeful or power-centred. They seem like a by-product, given that crises are generally of sudden onset and draw upon standing national and regional mechanisms of response rather than inter-regional (institution-building) solutions. Thus far, crisis-induced institution-building at the inter-regional level has been sporadic, to say the least. If particular strong member states should recognise the opportunity for them to further economic or political interests through inter-regional institution-building in the wake of NTS crises, there may be a chance for security/NTS inter-regionalism to deepen

Key concepts  21 institutionally. While the limited institutionalisation of ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-regionalism in contemporary times dismisses such interpretations, there are individual inter-regional programmes and projects that can be seen in this light. For the time being, however, NTS crisis situations are first of all an opportunity for inter-regionalism in the sense of a trigger or accelerator of communication, coordination, and projection of assistance. This chimes with Rüland’s identified functions of rationalisation and ­agenda-setting, emphasising the potential of inter-regionalism for global consensus-building, streamlining of agendas, and taking pressure off global fora (2002: 7). Inter-regionalism thus acts as an embedded level within global governance, which allows the transmission of interests and norms between the regional and global levels. Although the diffusion of norms for institutional integration and identity-building within the counterpart is not a primary function to be considered in the empirical discussion, this book acknowledges that Hänggi, Gilson, and others have traced this kind of effect of EU-ASEAN/Asian inter-regionalism. Identity-building does not take place overnight. The crisis centrality and therefore, time-specific empirical evidence of this book does not provide the analytical setting for tracing processes of ­identity-building. Nevertheless, identity and norms do play a role in this book in relation to the question of the EU as a normative actor but are traced differently to approaches of those studies addressing identity-­ building and norm diffusion processes. This book pays attention to norm congruency in individual instances of action. Thereby, it aims to substantiate the question of EU normativity by comparing the EU’s principles and goals of action with the actual inter-regional actions. That is, the discussion to the question of the EU as a normative actor largely relates to the extent to which the EU vocalises and expresses its normative identity within the ASEAN-EU dialogue and programmes. Answering the question of normativity therefore neither requires the assessment of norm diffusion nor the treatment of inter-regionalism as a norm transmitter.7 In summary, this book has adopted the definition of inter-regionalism provided by the first book and expanded the previous conceptual discussion to include the following three aspects pertaining to the analysis of the third guiding research question: First, in spite of the increasing relevance of non-governmental actors, it is important to note that the dialogue space for non-governmental actors within regionalism and inter-regionalism is still controlled and officialised; second, in light of the institutionalist perspective of the prequel and this book, it is useful to embed the findings of the third guiding question in a discussion concerned with institutionalist functions of inter-regionalism, as will be done in Chapter 7; and third, the question of normativity within inter-regionalism has been further specified, premising that actions and programmes are to be assessed on the basis of norm congruency, vocalisation, and emulation, rather than norm diffusion.

22  Key concepts

Non-traditional security They are mainly non-military in nature, transnational in scope – n ­ either domestic nor purely interstate, come with very short notice, and are transmitted rapidly due to globalization and the communication revolution. As such, national solutions are rendered inadequate and would require comprehensive (political, economic and social responses), as well as humanitarian use of military force. (Caballero Anthony 2010: 202) Considered as a newer security concept of the post-Cold War period aimed at capturing newly emerging and unconventional security challenges which do not fall within the traditional state-vs.-state and military-vs.-military threat pattern of the Cold War days, NTS has become an established security concept within the EU’s relations with Southeast Asia, as will be illustrated in Chapter 2. This book treats the NTS security concept, first and foremost, as a rhetorical tool that describes a broad range of unconventional security threats. This is in line with the information from interviews with EEAS officials and writings of scholars, “who have argued that this concept functions as a tool … for categorising newly emerging security challenges in the 1990s and in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks … to express cooperative commonality with international partners” (Maier-Knapp 2016b: 414). Causally linked to this understanding of the NTS concept within the ASEAN-EU context is the recognition that there are a broad range of possible security providers to address these threats, ranging from traditional military actors to non-governmental actors. In keeping with this descriptive interpretation of the concept at the official levels, it must be noted here that the definition in the epigraph is already out of bounds for this book, given its prescription of military force for humanitarian purposes. This book does not adopt such an extended view of military capabilities. As stated above, this book’s definition of NTS merely acknowledges the broad spectrum of actors, including military actors. At the same time, this book accepts that Asian perspectives of the NTS concept have always considered statehood and non-interference as the main normative tenets (cf. Arase 2010: 831). David Arase explains that “NTS, despite its name, has organic links to traditional security norms and institutions. NTS is, in this sense, militarized, and can lead to closer traditional military cooperation” (Arase 2010: 829). This kind of argumentation implies that NTS cooperation between ASEAN states and the EU could advance European security and defence involvement in the region (Maier-Knapp 2016b: 417). This book does not discard the significance of military capabilities in NTS crisis situations and the increased opportunity for European military interaction with Southeast Asian partners.8 However, it is cautious in prescribing certain responsibilities to individual actors and indeed refrains from any type of NTS prescriptiveness for

Key concepts  23 traditional security actors, acknowledging only those capacities and capabilities pertaining to the ASEAN-EU NTS interaction illustrated in the empirical chapters. Because NTS crises pose emergency situations, authorities cannot always warrant that human rights and other civil liberties and principles of free societies won’t be abrogated. This implies that if European assistance is offered, requested, and accepted in these situations, it will be difficult for the EU to maintain the moral high ground and with this its commitment to its normative identity in the world, regardless of the type of contribution that the EU makes. Concomitantly, the help-receiving government could be facing political and normative issues that come with an invitation to foreign (security) assistance providers. In such contexts, the EU as a sender of assistance needs to be aware of the heightened sensitivities and possibility of political instrumentalisation. In light of these and other ambiguities underlying the nature of assistance in NTS crisis situations, this book believes that it is important to attenuate a socio-ontological perspective of the concept. This avoids prescriptiveness of the concept and allows better focus on the effective managerial capacity and behaviour of the regional organisations to answer the guiding research questions. This having been said, by focusing on regional organisations as actors in NTS crisis situations and de-emphasising the state as security provider, prescriptive effects are unavoidable from the outset. Over the last ten years, ASEAN-EU verbal reference to the NTS concept has become more frequent and reminiscent of the use of human security. By acknowledging threats like food scarcity or pandemic disease outbreaks as NTS challenges, attention to traditional security providers has mitigated and liberal values have become more important. Thus, based on the threat orientation and definition of the concept, a degree of prescriptiveness similar to the human security lens exists a priori and suggests that the use of the NTS concept is descriptive only at first glance. From an A ­ SEAN-EU perspective, NTS discourses have been rarely used along prescriptive lines, mainly because official ASEAN-EU statements and ­activities have preferred the use of the human security concept in defining the nature of the relevant response to the NTS threat (Maier-Knapp 2016b: 413–414). Although spo­ SEAN-EU dialogue radic reference to the NTS concept within the official A in the 1990s and in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks created an initial opportunity to start an inter-regional conversation on NTS recognisant of human rights and other normative concerns, contemporary inter-regional dialogue tends to focus on technical issues. Ultimately, however, it needs to be acknowledged that, Since the EU’s and the member states’ perspectives are by definition already liberal-democratic, direct reference to the prescriptive understanding of NTS as a framework concept for greater people-oriented action reinforcing human security is evidently de-emphasised. This is

24  Key concepts not to say, that NTS does not hold the potential to shape discourse on basic human needs normatively. (2016b: 414) Thus far, at the ASEAN-EU inter-regional level, the NTS language has been used mainly for diplomatic outreach and interest convergence with a view to creating further cooperative opportunity. This chimes with official Southeast Asian understandings which claim that the NTS concept acts less as a means of symbolic deterrence. It functions, first, as a perspective concerned with issues of lower sensitivity for Southeast Asian countries to engage and garner support from external partners … which could assist in stabilising the situation in the South China Sea. (Maier-Knapp 2016b: 412–413) Various Southeast Asian government officials have argued that their armed forces use the concept similarly to EU officials, treating NTS as a broad concept “beyond conventional security issues” to enter and advance cooperation with partners (Interview with Southeast Asian member state official 2016). At the same time, de facto, the unofficial position of many Southeast Asian governments and their military on NTS security providers has not altered, seeing continued proclivity to foreclose any involvement of civil society and other non-governmental actors. Deeming cross-country coordination amongst the ASEAN members to be more important at this point in time of the ASEAN Community-building process, ASEAN member state governments are largely neglecting the NTS conversation and cooperative opportunity with non-governmental actors and ensuring that the realms of action of governmental and non-governmental actors remain separated.

Conclusions In this chapter, four concepts pertaining to the empirical case studies were discussed. The chapter began with a discussion of strategic partnership. It was argued that an upgraded ASEAN-EU inter-regional relationship as strategic partnership will see security and hence, NTS dialogue and cooperation enhanced, not least due to the EU’s interest in membership/­ partnership of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+). Simultaneously, the respective ­regional organisations as actors would experience a boost of actor credibility and legitimacy. Next, the chapter delved into the concept of actor, drawing upon the insights of the previous book. Although the discussion remained fairly general about the actor definition and acknowledged ASEAN as the regional counterpart actor, it mainly served to draw up characteristics of the EU as a collective actor. In this context, it counted on a behaviouralist perspective, which relies on the following analytical parameters in creating

Key concepts  25 understanding of an NTS actor or actor on NTS issues: motivations, drivers, timeliness, goals, and capabilities of action. Furthermore, this perspective allows conclusions on the agential capacity of ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-­ regionalism and assists in construing the inter-regional level as an agent. The paragraphs on inter-regionalism also drew inspiration from the first book. Inter-regionalism in the first book was defined in the traditional sense, with regional organisations as the only actors. This view recognises, at most, officially created space for civil society and other non-­governmental influence on the official inter-regional dialogue process. It was noted that contemporary developments point to individual regional organisations and their member states indeed extending their control over the regional and inter-regional spaces for non-governmental and civil society actors. In light of this institutional bias of the concept/book, reference to transregionalism was brief. The discussion of inter-regionalism furthermore acknowledged the structuring influence on global governance that can be brought about by NTS crises, as exemplified in the introductory discussion on the terrorist attack in Nice. Although the evidence for this may be sparse and sporadic, there is global order structuring potential of ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-­ regionalism which deserves greater attention in Chapter 7. The section on the NTS concept also built on the conceptual discussion of the first book, reiterating the problematic dichotomy between the descriptive and prescriptive value of NTS for action. Specifically, both the ASEAN and EU sides agree on the value of the NTS concept as a tool for categorising a broad range of threats but differ in interpretations of the security providers/ provisions. This complicates the institutionalisation of both regional and inter-regional space for non-governmental assistance providers. Put more generally, the main divide seemingly originates in different conceptions of liberalism and statehood of the members of the respective regional organisations. In light of the conceptual ambiguities, the NTS concept has not had the appeal of a guiding concept which could cohere and steer ASEAN-EU security dialogue and cooperation. At the same time, growing significance of traditional security issues in the Asia-Pacific and enhanced arms acquisitions of individual countries in the region may necessitate an EEAS and ASEAN-EU revival of the NTS perspective in order to plug in and keep up with the traditional security developments in the Asia-Pacific.

Notes 1 The motivation is generally defined by the urgency that the selected crises exude. 2 In light of the relevance of EU agencies and other semi- or non-governmental actors in specific issue areas, it does not make sense to portray the EU as a unitary international actor. In particular, its multi-level institutional design consists of multiple stakeholders that display mutual influence across various levels of governance and actively seek an integrated approach on many occasions. Thus, the following chapters view inter-regionalism from an embedded perspective and on a case-by-case basis, discerning – if necessary – individual influences from

26  Key concepts other levels of governance if these act as decisive variables in determining the behaviour. 3 In 2017, I observed in the article, “The EU as an Actor in Southeast Asia in the wake of the South China Sea Arbitration” published by the European Foreign Affairs Review that statements on the South China Sea by individual MEPs impacted China’s diplomatic attitude towards the EU. As a direct reaction to some of the criticisms of the MEPs, China reprimanded MEPs, reminding them that the EU is not party to the disputes. Concomitantly, China commended those MEPs who displayed a more reserved stance on the issue. 4 They are considered negligible, because region-to-region interaction implies the revelation of interests and perceptions of the counterpart as part of the interactive process. That said, perception-centred approaches to the Asia-Pacific are useful in understanding the EU in regions geographically remote from Europe, where the EU is rather understood as a presence than an actor. For example, Martin Holland and Natalia Chaban of the National Centre for Research on Europe have conducted various studies building on a perception-centred methodology. 5 In the case of ASEF, it is important to note that, even though this inter-regional institution is designed to cater to the people of both regions, it is headed by career diplomats of the ASEM member states and thus follows the overall work agenda of the official ASEM process. 6 As stated in the Introduction, the functions are not derived and discussed immediately in the empirical case studies. They are touched upon here and there, but will be mainly applied in the analysis of Chapter 7, which relates the insights of the case studies with Rüland’s institutionalist functions. 7 Given that processes of emulation have been observed frequently and processes of direct influence/interference have been rarely accepted openly, there is literature which dismisses the norm diffusion ability of inter-regionalism. 8 This really applies only to the UK and France who still have defence arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. Although CSDP military capabilities could be projected to Southeast Asia, this does not appear likely for the time being, in light of EU security priorities closer to home.

2 Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship from a non-traditional security perspective

Building on the historical outline of the ASEAN-EU security relations and the discussion of the EU’s toolkit for the management of NTS crises in Chapter 1 of the first book, this chapter offers an updated historical-­ institutional context to better understand the actions of the EU with and within Southeast Asia in the succeeding empirical chapters. This interest in the longue durée perspective builds on the premise that the EU’s political and security interest in Southeast Asia is commensurate with the institutional development of the EU’s foreign and security policy (Maier-Knapp 2016a). Although this longue durée perspective departs from the crisis-­c entred lens of the empirical case studies, it complements and enhances the understandings gained through the crisis narrative. The following paragraphs embark on the longue durée perspective, first, by drawing up a historical overview of the ASEAN-EU security relations during the Cold War period. Thereby, attention is given to regional ­institution-building ­efforts in Southeast Asia and the ASEAN-­European Communities dialogue. Proceeding in broad brushstrokes, the chapter then lists political caesuras (the end of the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis as well as the Myanmar crisis in 1997, the September 11 attacks, and the Boxing Day Tsunami in ­December 2004) discussed in the first book, which ­p ertain to the ASEAN-EU security dialogue post-Cold War. The longue durée narrative concludes with more recent ASEAN-EU inter-regional developments of the past decade and the rise of NTS threats on the regional and inter-­regional agenda of ASEAN and the EU. Following the historical-­institutional outline, the chapter delves into contemporary EU political and security instruments, which are available to EU-­Southeast Asian activities preventing, managing, and fighting transboundary NTS crises.

Overview of ASEAN-EU security relations Although history has revealed the richness of Western European ties with the Southeast Asian region, as will be shown in the following paragraphs, it has not been until decolonisation and the state-­ building processes of modern-day Southeast Asia that we have seen

28  Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship inter-regional relations as we understand them today emerge with the means to address a broad range of security threats including NTS challenges: Against the backdrop of the Cold War, state-building processes in Southeast Asia took place in a volatile environment and necessitated additional institution-building at the regional level to fend off international influences and ensure national resilience and development. While the creation of the ­Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961, and the Greater Malayan Confederation in 1963 underlined this active pursuit of regional institution building, these early attempts at regional ordering lacked commitment. Growing confidence among the political elites of Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, I­ ndonesia, and the Philippines finally led to the inauguration of ASEAN on 8 August 1967. Over the years, various ASEAN treaties – including the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) – set out the scope of action for ASEAN’s regional security architecture and its political and security relations with the world. Beyond the centrality of Eastvs.-West rationalisations in the creation and design of ASEAN, Southeast Asian governments were motivated by calculations of economic attractiveness that a regional block could exude. In particular, interest in ­region-to-region trade relations with the European Communities was expressed early on. Following diplomatic efforts between the two regions, ASEAN-­European Communities relations were institutionalised in 1978 with the inaugural ASEAN-European Communities Ministerial Meeting (AEMM). In the early years of the AEMM, the trade and development relations were of primary importance to both sides, whereas political and security matters played a subordinate role. This is not to say that the political and security dimension was neglected. In fact, the signing of the Joint Statement on Political Issues on 8 March 1980 on the occasion of the second AEMM was a signal to the international partners of both regional groupings that the member states of ASEAN and the European Communities were committed to coordinating viewpoints on political and security issues of the East-West conflict. Furthermore, this political and security interaction saw NTS issues  – although not known as such – incorporated into the inter-­regional agenda: For example, Western European assistance to refugees and displaced persons under the UN umbrella at the Thai-Kampuchean border following the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978. Especially towards the end of the Cold War, from the mid-1980s onwards, NTS issues – environmental degradation, narcotics, and terrorism – were becoming fixed talking points on the inter-regional security agenda (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 21). With growing economic interdependence between the two regions – as well as other parts of the world – after the Cold War ended, interest in discussing NTS threats and risks enhanced. Although the transformation of the European Community to the EU in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty becoming effective in 1993 provided greater availability of tools to engage Southeast Asia on NTS matters, the post-Cold War period also saw the EU

Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship  29 being more critical of its developing partners in Southeast Asia. The EU started putting greater emphasis on political conditionality within its relations with the ‘Global South’, complicating the relationship with Southeast Asia and other regions. The most prominent example of ASEAN-EU ­inter-regional dispute following the EU’s emphasis of political conditionality was over Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN. The official ­ASEAN-EU dialogue was suspended from 1997 to 1999. This meant that the EU could not show official commitment to Southeast Asia when the region was hit by a series of severe NTS crises – namely the Asian financial crisis and transboundary haze – from 1997 until the early 2000s. These crises triggered a new wave of regional integration efforts in Southeast Asia and the wider East Asian region. The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) was created, drawing China closer to Southeast Asia and embedding it institutionally in an ASEAN-led regional architecture. Thus, one could say that when APT was in the making, the EU could not become involved in supporting and shaping regional integration of APT. With the resumption of the inter-regional dialogue in 1999, the EU clearly aimed at more pragmatism to compensate the missed opportunities for cooperation in the previous years. Amidst international activism and securitisation trends in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, this resumption of the EU’s official relations with ASEAN took place under favourable circumstances for international cooperation and saw ASEAN and the EU join forces, for instance, to produce a Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism at the 14th AEMM on 27–28 January 2003 in Brussels. Specifically, in the early 2000s, the shared threat of terrorism offered a common narrative to build confidence and spur cooperation after the years of low political confidence and engagement in the late 1990s. Chiming with this inter-regional rapprochement over terrorism was the US treatment of Southeast Asia as its Second Front in its War on ­Terror. Influenced by domestic politics and national threat perceptions, some European countries adopted elements of the US narrative in their view of Southeast Asia and started paying greater political attention to the region. For example, Denmark’s experience of Islamist terror attacks at home and on its embassies worldwide in the aftermath of the Mohammed cartoon controversy in 2005 sensitised Denmark’s policy-makers and public, raising awareness about regions in the world that could harbour or bring about terrorist threats to ­Europe (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 72). In this period of the early 2000s, securitised discourses gained ground in both regions, redefining security perspectives and approaches of the national governments and respective regional organisations, and with this ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism. Thus, the ­September 11 attacks were a watershed event – or a caesura as called by the first book – not only for the US and its foreign policy but also for the ASEAN-EU inter-­regional security dialogue (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 6). With worldwide securitisation processes post-September 11 well under way, the NTS concept and language entered the ASEAN-EU dialogue, albeit sporadically at first.

30  Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship In addition to the developments at the level of the international system, there have been institution-building processes at the ASEAN and the EU regional level within the past two decades, enhancing administrative, corresponding, and absorptive capacity conducive to greater ASEAN-EU ­inter-regionalism, including the political and security interaction between the two regional groupings. On the ASEAN side, it has been, in particular, the institution-building processes connected to the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC), paving the way for enhanced capacity to interact with the EU on a broad range of security and NTS matters. The Kuala ­Lumpur Declaration from 1997 and the Bali Concord II from 2003 provided initial impetus for APSC. The Vientiane Action Programme from 2004 to 2010 and the first APSC Blueprint published in 2009 further fleshed out APSC. The first APSC Blueprint has now been replaced by the second APSC Blueprint lasting until 2025. This new blueprint emphasises the cross-border nature of NTS issues and calls for enhanced cooperation at the regional level, suggesting that ASEAN documents are actively framing NTS challenges – despite possibility of its localised and domestic nature – per se as transboundary. In this context, special attention is paid to drug-trafficking, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, trafficking in ­p ersons, illicit trade of small arms and light weapons, piracy and robbery at sea, and terrorism. These themes are also found at the ASEAN-EU inter-­regional level in the following empirical chapters. Furthermore, the new blueprint pushes the role of academe and civil society actors, especially in the context of NTS issue management. On the EU side, the Western European Union and the treaties of the EU in the 1990s provided for a common external security capability. Further steps towards a regional security and defence capability were taken on the basis of the Treaty of Nice in 2001. These included the expansion of the conflict prevention competencies of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU Council and qualified majority voting in Pillar II. Moreover, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian ­Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) were established in the EU Council. And additionally, the role of the presidency was strengthened, especially through ­ oteborg the push of the Swedish presidency in 2001 for the adoption of the G programme. While this programme underlined the EU  presidency’s enhanced input in the foreign and security relations of the EU, effective impact of the EU presidency on the external relations of the EU takes place on an ad hoc basis and mainly in a delegated manner in close coordination with the EU Council and member states.1 In light of these and other regional foreign and security policy developments in the early 2000s, it can be furthermore said that the more security transformations were under way at the EU regional level, “the more the EU developed an interest in discuss[ing] security issues in East Asia”, as well as becoming involved in security-related projects in the Southeast  Asian

Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship  31 region (Dosch 2003: 494). In particular, with CSDP becoming operational in 2003, launching its first mission to Macedonia, the EU took interest in possible CSDP operations further away from home. The one and only CSDP mission – the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) – to Southeast Asia took place two years after the establishment of CSDP. It was a successful civilian mission, consisting of military and civilian personnel of the EU member states, five ASEAN member states as well as Switzerland and Norway, deployed for peace-making and -maintaining in Indonesia’s province of Aceh. Although the AMM lacked follow-up, it sent a strong signal to both the ASEAN and EU member states that in the future there may be greater opportunity to work together on peace-building and NTS matters within the civilian spectrum of CSDP (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 94–97). While intergovernmental CSDP operations in Southeast Asia appear unlikely against the backdrop of the current political climate in the EU, there are recent structural improvements of the EU that have expanded the European Commission’s political and security competencies overseas,2 allowing better collective engagement on NTS issues with Southeast Asia. Since 2011, the NTS rhetoric has become prominent in the ASEAN-EU and ASEM dialogue formats.3 Within the ASEM dialogue process, it has been mainly the ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meetings (FMMs), which have referred to the NTS concept consistently and explicated individual NTS threats and plans to cooperate on these. This ASEM FMM interest in the NTS concept was observable at the ASEM FMM in Hungary in 2011 or in India in 2013, in particular. Within the ASEAN-EU dialogue, the B ­ andar Seri Begawan Plan of Action lasting from 2013 until 2017 was seminal for various inter-regional activities on NTS issues. This Plan of Action was adopted at the 19th AEMM in 2012 in Brunei. It stressed “the need to enhance cooperation in political and security areas” more generally (ASEAN and EU member states 2012b: para. 9). In the context of NTS matters, the Plan of Action spelled out the extent to which NTS issues could serve as a vehicle for the enhancement of the overall political and security interaction between the two regional groupings in the coming years. It built on the previous commitments made at the 18th AEMM in Madrid in 2010. Furthermore, the 19th AEMM in Brunei launched the inter-regional programmes of ASEAN Regional Integration Support from the EU (ARISE) and Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI). Primary support to Southeast Asia through these schemes went towards regional integration assistance, including some projects that were concerned with NTS issues directly; for example, capacity-building in disaster management funded by READI. Subsequent ministerial meetings benefitted from the NTS or security cooperation momentum sparked by the 19th AEMM and sought to maintain these dynamics. For example, in July 2014, the ­Co-Chairs’ Statement of the 20th AEMM in Brussels acknowledged and reviewed the Plan of Action set out in Bandar Seri Begawan. The 20th AEMM displayed continuity of

32  Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship the main political and security conversations at the 19th AEMM, amongst others, emphasising regional integration support to ASEAN and ASEAN centrality in multilateral arrangements of the region, especially within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In connection to NTS issues, maritime security and related issues of anti-piracy and maritime law received particular attention on the Brussels agenda and within the Co-Chairs’ Statement. Heightened tensions in the South China Sea in 2013 and 2014 were instrumental for this interest and thus, the Co-Chairs’ Statement was also to be seen as a political signal to other international partners about EU backing of ­Southeast Asian regional security interests. Being a meeting format attended either by the foreign ministers or other high-ranking officials of the foreign ministries, the AEMM – as well as within the ASEM process4 the FMMs – has always devoted considerable time and space to NTS issues. That said, the period of the Bandar Seri B ­ egawan Plan of Action5 nevertheless seemed to have been the heyday of the official NTS rhetoric between ASEAN and the EU, since subsequent ministerial meetings, both at the ASEAN-EU and ASEM level, from 2015 onwards shifted the conversational focus to individual sub-categories of NTS threats like maritime security, food security, and counterterrorism. Furthermore noteworthy is that the salience of the NTS rhetoric from 2011 until 2014 within the AEMM and ASEM FMM saw traditional security issues in these dialogue fora de-emphasised – whether purposely or not – on various occasions. For instance, the Co-Chairs’ Statement at the 20th AEMM addressed traditional security concerns of the Middle East and Korean peninsula briefly towards the end of the Statement (ASEAN and EU member states 2014: para. 31). While the AEMM Co-Chairman’s Statement in 2014 still suggested modest interest in traditional security hotspots within the ASEAN-EU political and security dialogue due to the minimal space dedicated to them, the following AEMM in October 2016 recentred the traditional security agenda and stated the equal significance of traditional security and NTS issues.6 In spite of the potential of NTS to bridge between traditional security interests and economic interests and to open space for civil society actors at the regional and inter-regional levels, the official sides nowadays still seem unwilling to ­recalibrate NTS prescriptively and treat it as a strategic concept to cohere the security dialogue within the ASEAN-EU relationship in the long-run. From an EU perspective, the origins of the NTS concept and its use in the East Asian context complicate any strategic utility and direction of the NTS concept. Therefore, EU officials have been cautious when using the NTS concept and generally make sure that the NTS language does not move beyond the traditional bounds of its diplomatic function. Similarly, Southeast Asian officials concerned with ASEAN-EU relations are treating the NTS concept – as previously described in Chapter 1 – rather as a descriptive concept, disqualifying the prescriptive potential of NTS to guide the ­ASEAN-EU security relations at this point in time.

Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship  33

Relevant toolkit Don’t look at the EU only as an economic or trade partner, but also as a foreign policy and security partner. (Mogherini quoted in Ahmad and Tan 2015) The epigraph puts in a nutshell what appears to be the perennial problem that the EU is facing when interacting with and within Southeast Asia. This book and the first book are therefore much more than academic treatments of inter-regional NTS dialogue and cooperation. Their very existence dismantles the above stereotype of the EU being merely an economic power in global affairs. In particular, the following paragraphs will contribute to annulling this bias by informing the reader about the EU’s toolkit to support Southeast Asia on security matters. Whereas the first book centred on CSDP, the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), and IfS, this book shifts the toolkit focus to the dialogue mechanisms.7 It does this because, first, ASEAN-EU interaction on NTS matters largely takes place within above-mentioned inter-regional fora, namely the ­ASEAN-EU dialogue and ASEM, and affiliated programmes; second, intergovernmental CSDP has not been employed in Southeast Asia since the AMM in 2005; third, the European Commission’s ECHO and DCI have not altered significantly since they were presented in the first book; and, fourth, more pertinent supranational instruments to address NTS matters have emerged, namely the IcSP. In addition to the ASEAN-EU and ASEM dialogue mechanisms, the following paragraphs will provide an outline of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) +1 and the ARF. While the latter is not an inter-regional dialogue setting, it holds significance within the EU’s security approach to the region because it is the only regional security forum which offers the EU membership as a supranational actor to speak about security matters on behalf of its member states. This section will then conclude with a discussion of the European Commission’s IcSP, which is designed to address transregional NTS threats and support international partners in preventing and managing crisis and conflict situations. ASEAN-EU dialogue In the preceding historical-institutional overview, the main dialogue f­ orum for the EU’s NTS interaction with Southeast Asia was the ASEAN-EU ­dialogue/AEMM. In the succeeding chapters, the ASEAN-EU dialogue and affiliated programmes, with particular attention to the AEMM and the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), will be the main sites for action and interaction assessment.8 The JCC is primarily concerned with horizontal

34  Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship issues of development cooperation and technical support and thus, plays a subordinate – nevertheless complementary – role in shaping the ­ASEAN-EU security relations. The AEMM is the primer dialogue channel for the ­ASEAN-EU inter-regional security relations. It is a biennial dialogue of the foreign ministers, offering dialogue space to the members of ASEAN and the EU to discuss economic, sociocultural, and political and security interests. AEMM is supported by the SOM and guided by multi-annual plans of action. The security agenda resembles the one of the ARF and ASEM. In particular, AEMM discussions of traditional security problems frequently refer to debates and output of ARF, ASEM, and other relevant multilateral fora. At the same time, the membership base of the ASEAN-EU dialogue/ AEMM is narrower and allows topics on the security agenda which concern Southeast Asia specifically. This gives room for the treatment of security issues at the nexus of security and development, pertaining to the agenda of developing ASEAN member states as well as a sizeable proportion of the EU and its member state bureaucracies. Over many years, the interaction of the security and development agendas has informed the ASEAN-EU programmes and seen various of these programmes assist in intra-ASEAN confidence-building and shaping new modes of regional cooperation (Doidge 2007; Fraser 2010; Jetschke 2013). This normative and institutional impact of the EU in Southeast Asia suggests that the EU’s security actor capability is possibly more than meets the eye. That is, this capability cannot be captured through the examination of the operational functions of EU instruments. It requires deeper elaboration touching upon aspects of normative impact, as will be done in the individual case studies, if possible and required. As mentioned previously, process-tracing of the normative impact in the individual case studies would exceed the scope of this book. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind, when reading the following case studies, the premise that normative processes are taking place and norms are projected both directly and indirectly, even though these processes are only accounted in singular instances which pertain to the promotion of multilateralism and the rule of law. Asia-Europe Meeting ASEM came into being on 1 March 1996 when representatives of the EU member states, the European Commission, seven ASEAN countries, China, Japan, and South Korea met in Thailand. Over the years, membership broadened numerically to 53 members. Similar to the ASEAN-EU dialogue, ASEM is a comprehensive dialogue process. It consists of three dialogue pillars, of which the political and security dialogue is one. The ASEM political and security dialogue essentially mirrors the global agenda and is operationally concerned with confidence-building, information exchange, interest convergence, and the coordination of viewpoints that

Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship  35 could inform the security discourses and developments in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. ASEM’s political and security dialogue has the potential to enhance “transparency of policy positions, thus creating greater predictability for negotiations in global fora” (Rüland 2001: 26). It could “streamline the overburdened agenda of global organisations, keep in check the ensuing bottlenecks at the top level of the international system and thus prevent a suffocation of global institutions” (Rüland 2002: 7). The ASEM political and security dialogue targets a broader audience than the ASEAN-EU dialogue and draws upon less localised themes and interests. Hence, it offers little room to address security issues specific to Southeast Asian security. At the same time, ASEM’s global orientation and potential as a structuring agent of global governance needs to be put into perspective, since ASEM has exhibited such order structuring ability amongst its members mainly in crisis situations. In these instances, ASEM member states focused on improving communication, common interests, and shared understandings amongst each other in a distinct European-Asian fashion. ASEAN Post-ministerial Conference Existing analyses of the ASEAN-EU relationship focus traditionally on AEMM and tend to neglect the ASEAN PMC+1 format which generally takes place in conjunction with the annual ARF meeting and immediately after the ASEAN Summit and APT. This culmination of ASEAN-led events allows the EU to receive first-hand updates and provide input on matters pertaining to the ASEAN-EU relationship. From a security perspective, the concurrence of the ASEAN Summit, APT, and the ARF stresses the significance of the political and security dimension of the ASEAN-EU d ­ ialogue process temporarily. This makes the ASEAN PMC+1 very interesting for the EU, enabling unfiltered insights and updates on Southeast Asian regional security and diplomacy, as it happens and evolves on site. Simultaneously, these series of events give the attending EU officials the opportunity to show clearer contours of the EU’s security capability and interests in Southeast Asia. Within the study of the ASEAN-EU relationship, recognition of the ASEAN PMC+1 format is much needed for understanding the EU as a supranational security actor in Southeast Asia and enhancing existing treatments of the ASEAN-EU security relationship which have centred on AEMM and the ARF. At the same time, it needs to be said that the ASEAN PMC+1’s impact on the inter-regional ASEAN-EU dialogue process itself is limited, since the ASEAN PMC+1’s agenda is guided by the ASEAN-EU agenda. Thus, key themes and commitments align with those set out by AEMM, ASEAN-EU SOM, and JCC. In this sense, the added value and distinctiveness of the ASEAN PMC+1 lies within its opportunity for, first, EU real-time representation of security interests and first-hand information

36  Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship retrieval for the EEAS headquarters in Brussels and, second, reinforcement of the steps necessary to achieve an EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership. ASEAN Regional Forum The ARF is not an inter-regional dialogue forum. However, being the only ASEAN-centred multilateral security forum in the Asia-Pacific in which the EU participates as a collective actor on behalf of the member states, discussion of the ARF is necessary for any credible study of the EU as a security actor in Southeast Asia. The European Commission participates in the ARF dialogue process alongside the ten ASEAN member states, Australia, Bangladesh, China, India, Japan, Canada, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, East Timor, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sri Lanka, South Korea, and the USA. All of these members work closely with the ASEAN Secretariat when setting the ARF agenda and work programme, which are designed in accordance with a three-step organisational objective to ­develop: first, confidence-building capacity; second, capacity for preventive diplomacy; and, third, effective regional capacity for conflict management (Katsumata 2009: 84–86). The majority of the security challenges addressed in the ARF mirror wider Asia-Pacific and global security concerns. This has circumvented sensitivities and allowed progress from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy. ARF activities in the early 2000s demonstrate this (Haacke 2009: 443; Emmers and Tan 2011: 90). Confined EU competencies prior to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and considerable US lead on ­security discourses and approaches in the Asia-Pacific in connection to ARF developments in the late 1990s and early 2000s have seen the EU punch below its weight in terms of sharing its expertise and experience in these two steps (Maier-Knapp 2014a: 75–76). In recent times, however, there have been individual global security issues such as climate change and maritime security, which have become areas in which the EU has been demonstrating ­expertise and an avant-garde role in ARF, contributing to the first two organisational goals of the ARF more effectively. Moreover, various ARF field and tabletop disaster relief exercises since 2009 have suggested that some ARF activities have even moved beyond confidence-building and preventive diplomacy, facilitating the enhancement of synergy effects, operational standards, and interoperability amongst the members and hence, implying an opportunity for the EU to contribute to the codification of relevant conduct and capability for effective conflict management (­Maier-Knapp 2017d; Maier-Knapp 2019). Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace In 2014, the IcSP Regulation 230/2014 replaced the IfS Regulation 1717/2006. The IcSP Regulation allows the European Commission to provide financial

Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship  37 assistance worldwide to combat transregional security threats and prevent, as well as manage, situations of crisis. It is one of the few security instruments available to the European Commission in its external relations. Although it only provides for short-term financing of emergency and crisis situations overseas, IcSP can be employed without complex and lengthy decision-­making for a maximum period of either 30 or 36 months. The total budget of IcSP for the period of 2014 until 2020 is EUR2.3 billion managed by the S ­ ervice for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) and DG DEVCO. At the time of writing, a handful of IcSP projects were ongoing in Southeast Asia: ­Rakhine State in Myanmar and Mindanao in the ­Philippines.9 These projects are not designed to have direct impact on the conflict situation. Instead, they focus on civilian capacity-building for prevention and protection.10 FPI and DG DEVCO are the main actors in ensuring that the funded projects comply with the competencies spelled out in the IcSP Regulation. While the regulation allows DG DEVCO to address traditional security issues such as ethnic conflict, terrorism, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) directly, the implementation generally proceeds in line with the traditional development approach of DG DEVCO (Maier-Knapp 2017d; Maier-Knapp 2018a; ­Maier-Knapp 2019). As a result, no matter how cautious FPI and DG DEVCO are in their interpretation of the IcSP Regulation, IcSP remains sensitive because it de facto opens space for the European Commission to develop a more robust capacity for ad hoc and short-term external engagement. At the same time, scholars like Gänzle have de-emphasised the competitive elements inherent in IfS/IcSP and highlighted the intra-EU bridging function of IfS/IcSP (2009: 7).

Conclusions The aim of this chapter was to provide a historical-institutional context for the following empirical chapters. Thereby, the first part of this chapter recapitulated the historical overview of the prequel to this book and discussed systemic and institutional developments that have been seminal for ­ASEAN-EU interaction on NTS issues in more recent times. The remainder of the first section focused on meetings and statements of the ASEAN-EU and ASEM dialogue process between 2009 and 2016, outlining the current direction of inter-regionalisms on NTS issues pertaining to ASEAN and the EU. In this connection, the author concluded that despite enhanced NTS rhetoric from 2011 until 2014/15 within the two inter-regional dialogue fora, it appears that the NTS concept has remained vaguely defined by the official levels, functioning as a descriptive umbrella concept chiefly for diplomatic purposes like outreach and confidence-building. Although the heyday of the NTS rhetoric at the ASEAN-EU inter-regional level has subsided, with the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership on the horizon there may be a revival of the NTS language in the near future.

38  Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship In the second part of this chapter, the actual space for security interaction between the two regions was outlined through the discussion of, first, the relevant dialogue fora – ASEAN-EU dialogue, ASEM, ASEAN PMC+1, and ARF – and second, the European Commission’s emergency and security instrument, IcSP. In light of the heterogeneity of the members within the discussed dialogue fora, the discussion revealed that the EU’s security engagement in the region contributes mainly to confidence-building and capacity-building. In this context, the global security agenda – and not the regional security agenda – has been seminal in facilitating confidence-­ building and capacity-building activities. ASEAN states seem comfortable with this focus on the global agenda and do not see this as a disadvantage to their regional security interests, because there seems to be sufficient ­inter-regional space to engage on themes pertaining to the ASEAN regional security agenda, including those themes at the nexus of security and development. Conclusively, contemporary institutional progression – whether crisis-driven or not – of both regional groupings is raising the chances of an enhanced security and NTS dialogue between ASEAN and the EU in the years to come.

Notes 1 Domestic interests and power politics in Brussels have also played a role in the Council’s support of the work of the High Representative and EEAS. 2 Examples will be given in Chapters 5 and 6. 3 Official communication with European officials based in Southeast Asia confirms that NTS matters have experienced an upgrade within the ASEAN-EU dialogue and are addressed more regularly even within official bilateral interactions with individual Southeast Asian partners. Since the NTS concept covers a broad range of concerns – from issues of poverty and environmental disasters to transnational crime and terrorism, discussions of NTS matters have de facto revalued the ASEAN-EU dialogue politically. 4 Indeed, reference to ASEM makes sense, since the AEMMs frequently refer to the global UN level or the ASEM inter-regional level in relation to guidelines and best practices. For instance, within the 2014 Brussels Co-Chairs’ Statement, specific reference was made to the ASEM conference on disaster relief as “a template on best practices”. 5 This emphasis on NTS concerns from 2011 until 2014/15 within the AEMMs paralleled the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action and the EU’s budget cycle for a variety of ASEAN-EU regional integration support programmes. 6 Overall, the AEMM in 2014 and 2016 displayed continuity of the inter-­regional threat agenda, with the dialogue forum prioritising counterterrorism, maritime security, cyber security, preventive diplomacy, mediation, and crisis management. 7 Please note that similar discussions about the dialogue fora and IcSP have been presented by the author in “How the EU promotes Regional Security in Southeast Asia” published in 2018 by the Southeast Asian Studies working group of the University of Freiburg and the chapter “EU Unterstützung des ASEAN mit Hinblick auf die regionale Sicherheit Südostasiens” forthcoming in 2020 by Springer.

Overview of the ASEAN-EU relationship  39 8 This book acknowledges that there have been the occasional special summits like the ASEAN-EU Summit to commemorate forty years of the inter-regional relationship. These summits are, however, an exception to the rule. 9 According to www.icspmap.eu, nine IcSP projects were ongoing in Southeast Asia in 2017. While this website provides an up-to-date snapshot of the overall engagement in the region, it appears that mainly DG DEVCO sponsored activities are accounted. 10 Amongst others, the website www.icspmap.eu provides this figure for the period from 2014 until 2020.

3 The EU and the haze

This chapter draws upon the case of a major environmental concern in Southeast Asia, the transboundary haze. It builds on the haze discussion in the first book, which expounded the ASEAN regional and ASEAN-EU inter-regional responses to the severe haze in 1997, and assesses the ASEAN regional and ASEAN-EU inter-regional responses to the severe case of the haze in Southeast Asia in 2015. Focusing on this more recent case of the haze allows judgement on the extent to which ASEAN anti-haze regional cooperation and EU support efforts since the haze in 1997 have improved. In spite of the opportunity to draw up parallels and comparisons to the case study in the first book, this chapter avoids this and only seeks to enhance the insights of the first book with new empirical evidence that could help in updating and fleshing out understandings of the EU as an actor and ASEAN-EU inter-­ regionalism in the management of the Southeast Asian haze issue. In addition to the examination of the regional and inter-regional a­ nti-haze and anti-deforestation activities, this chapter takes a look at selected national perspectives and activities in Southeast Asia to adequately capture ASEAN impact on the agential potential of ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism. The following section thus takes note of the Indonesian and Singaporean responses. It begins with an outline of the haze crisis in 2015 and the ASEAN regional response to the haze crisis, before summarising the Indonesian and Singaporean perspectives and actions. The response to the haze of these two governments is noteworthy, first, because Indonesia’s questionable level of commitment to the ASEAN regional efforts has stalled the ASEAN ­anti-haze regional integration process and, second, because Singapore has pressed ahead with national legislative action to sanction Indonesian companies unilaterally. The remainder of the chapter then concentrates on the EU’s anti-haze support to Southeast Asia and examines selected initiatives between 2009 and 2016, which address the haze problem either directly or indirectly.

The severe case of the haze in 2015 and Southeast Asian haze management efforts Various studies concluded that the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emitted from Southeast Asia during the haze crisis in the last few months of

The EU and the haze  41 2015 was worse than the amount of GHG emitted during the entire episode of the severe haze of 1997. One study found that daily emissions from the fires in October 2015 exceeded CO2 emissions of the entire US economy; ­exceeding 15.95 million tonnes of CO2 a day (World Bank Group 2015). ­Indonesia – as the main culprit of the haze in the region, responsible for over 90%  of CO2 emissions from the region in 2015 alone and, therefore, Southeast Asia’s overall bad GHG balance in 2015 – was put under pressure by its neighbours and the world community, amongst others, at the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris at the end of 2015. Already by early September 2015, six provinces in Indonesia had declared state of emergency. By October 2015, the Pollutant Standard Index (PSI) reached excessive levels around the 20001 mark in some fire hotspots in Indonesia. Then, various news outlets, ranging from the international Cable News Network (CNN) to Indonesia’s own news agencies, quoted a representative of Indonesia’s Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Agency calling the haze crisis a “crime against humanity of extraordinary proportions” (Lamb 2015). With over 43 million people exposed to the smoke, 500,000 affected directly by respiratory diseases, and 19 deaths2 as of 28 October, Indonesian authorities seemingly failed, despite trying their best in closely monitoring the situation and making live updates to remote villages about the air pollution index (McKirdy 2015). In 2016, the World Bank Group tallied the negative impact of the 2015 haze crisis episode. It estimated that Indonesia had a loss of 1.9% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)3 in 2015 because of the forest fires and the haze between June and October 2015 (World Bank Group 2016). The World Bank Group furthermore presented the following loss and damage figures of the most severely affected provinces of Indonesia (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). In light of the fatality, loss, and damage illustrated in the tables on pages 42 and 43, it indeed was unavoidable that some Indonesians and international partners perceived and portrayed the forest fires and the haze crisis in 2015 as a criminal act, as mentioned above. Especially, when considering the geographic impact – Brunei, Thailand,4 Singapore,5 ­Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Cambodia6 were also affected, one could indeed get the impression that calling the haze of 2015 a ‘crime against humanity’ is rightly put. Whether this provides for a legal basis to hold multinational corporations, bribed local authorities, and greedy land-grabbers accountable for this ‘crime’ is, however, for further discussion elsewhere. When raising questions about liability, one could even ask about the role of Western European consumers. With about 15% of Indonesian palm oil exports going to the EU at the time of writing this chapter, the EU economic area is one of the world’s largest importers of palm oil from Indonesia. Furthermore, over the years, the EU has provided considerable subsidies to I­ ndonesian palm oil plantations through the EU’s global strategy to promote biofuel and other renewable sources of energy. These examples of European involvement in the palm oil complex make clear that the problem of the haze, if considered from the viewpoint of land-clearing

210 134 77 226 17 209 136 29 184 20 10 36 4 10 866

Data Source: Word Bank Group (2016: 6)

Agriculture Estate Crops Food Crops Environment Biodiversity loss Carbon emission Forestry Manufacturing and mining Trade Transportation Tourism Health Education Firefighting costs Total in USD millions

Jambi 181 134 47 229 24 204 304 183 292 31 116 22 4 11 1,373

Riau 1,033 260 773 1,205 72 1,133 972 133 290 81 118 28 9 49 3,919

South Sumatra 349 238 111 376 23 353 168 61 120 17 54 12 4 14 1,176

West Kalimantan 523 169 355 387 27 360 698 122 139 66 38 24 6 24 2,028

South Kalimantan 1,242 1,075 166 776 33 743 92 14 131 111 42 17 5 35 2,464

Central Kalimantan

Table 3.1  Estimated losses and damages from forest fires and haze, June–October 2015 (USD millions)

1,128 1,006 122 530 33 498 815 69 108 32 16 12 4 31 2,746

East Kalimantan

173 95 77 523 58 465 746 0 68 13 4 1 3 22 1,552

Papua

4,839 3,112 1,727 4,253 287 3,966 3,931 610 1,333 372 399 151 39 197 16,124

Total

The EU and the haze  43 Table 3.2  H  ectares burned by province, June–October 2015 Province South Sumatra Central Kalimantan East Kalimantan South Kalimantan West Kalimantan Papua Riau Jambi

Thousand hectares 608 429 388 292 178 268 139 123

Percent 23 16 15 11 7 10 5 5

Data Source: World Bank Group (2016: 1)

practices in Southeast Asia, is not a one-dimensional environmental problem that can be managed through international/EU anti-haze development cooperation. It is a multifaceted issue that touches upon core normative principles and economic aspects of the official ASEAN-EU relationship, demanding, for instance, more critical investigation into the EU’s external environmental programmes. In brief, the haze in Southeast Asia is an intricate regional problem, which goes beyond the regional dimension and intersects with broader international questions about trade interests, human health, and state survival. This chapter recognises this complexity and offers a timely discussion from a unique ASEAN-EU perspective, which is of high value for current scholarly and policy debates of the EU as a global actor in fighting environmental degradation and climate change.

Regional and national responses in Southeast Asia At the 11th Conference of the Parties of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution on 29 October 2015 in Hanoi, the ministers acknowledged the collaborative efforts taken by Indonesia and neighbouring countries. In particular, they welcomed the progress in implementing the Work Programme of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution and planning the ASEAN Transboundary Haze Pollution Control Fund (ASEAN member states 2015: para. 4). Specifically, the ministers gave recognition to the many activities under way or in the pipeline at the local, national, and regional level individually, as well as across these levels. Furthermore, the ministers acknowledged the cross-cutting impact of the haze, ranging from socio-cultural and economic aspects to legal and political concerns, and the work done to improve cross-sectoral information exchange. At the same time, the ministers noted that more could be done to implement the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution in its entirety and pointed to the crux of the problem lying in the management of peatland and forests. They therefore expressed that haze-preventive

44  The EU and the haze programmes like the ASEAN Peatland Management Strategy from 2016 until 2020 or the five-year Peatland Forest Project funded by Global Environment Facility deserve particular attention (ASEAN member states 2015: para. 4–11). Moreover, the ministers commended the progress/output of the EU-­sponsored haze-preventive SEApeat programme from 2011 until 2015 (ASEAN member states 2015: para.11). A few weeks after this meeting, in November 2015 at the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN heads of state also shared viewpoints about future anti-­haze cooperation. Even though their opinions were more cautious than those of the ministers at the 11th Conference to the Parties of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, they ratcheted up the pressure on Indonesia. In particular, Indonesia’s hesitant reaction to accept assistance and cooperate with partners had irritated the heads of state of the neighbouring countries and given them the impression that Indonesia continuously disregards the plight and sovereignty of its neighbours. Concomitantly, they realised that the effectiveness of the regional agreement and cooperation process will depend on Indonesia’s willingness to consent to actions and that individual ASEAN member states can only do so much. Thus, at the ASEAN Summit, even though Indonesia had ratified the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution at the end of 2014, questions about Indonesia’s dedication to the Agreement remained a central concern to the other leaders and dampened their hopes for effective institutional progress at the ASEAN regional level.7 Seen from the ­ASEAN-EU perspective, ASEAN regional institutional efforts in 2015 appeared to be in vain. Moreover, EU and European state actors, had the impression that Indonesia, as well as other ASEAN member states, could not see any entry points to consider EU assistance and call for ASEAN-EU efforts in that year. Indonesian perspective The negative light shed on Indonesia’s commitment to ASEAN regional anti-haze efforts in the preceding paragraphs should not suggest that Indonesia is prioritising its economic interests over good neighbourliness or human and environmental health per se:8 In 2015, beyond the previously mentioned PSI monitoring and warning efforts of national and local authorities, ­Indonesian authorities were responsible for orchestrating the firefighting response, dispatching over 20,000 military officers, police staff, and firefighters. In addition to this, at the policy level, the President called out a moratorium on the development of peatland on 23 October 2015 and made the commitment to establish a Peatland Restoration Agency on 1 December 2015.9 By framing these decisions along the lines of Indonesia’s commitment to address climate change, it seemed that economic priorities were downscaled and human and environmental health reprioritised. With these decisions Widodo risked intra-governmental conflict and revenue loss in

The EU and the haze  45 Table 3.3  E  stimated loss in public revenue as a result of a one-year peatland moratorium Province

Hectares One-time Land tax Personnel Royalties impacted licensing revenue tax revenue (annual) fees (annual) (annual)

Total annual revenue

Riau Central Kalimantan

975,000 539,071

184 100

28 16

95 46

21 9

40 29

Data Source: Word Bank Group (2016: 8)

exchange for securing a global public good, climate change (see Table 3.3 acting as an indicator of the loss in public revenue, if the moratorium was effective for a period of one year). At the same time, one could, however, say that even though the moratorium was designed to target and control the large-scale land-clearing efforts of big corporations, it would ultimately see the local communities and smallholders at the receiving end of this decision: first, through their dependency on the investments of the big corporations and, second, through potential difficulty in finding an alternative income, in light of palm fruit being the main high-yield crop for them. Singaporean perspective Over the years, Singapore has pursued a patient approach to the haze problem from Indonesia and mainly used ‘carrots’ without the ‘stick’. This has changed in recent years: Singapore is now using the ‘stick’ and putting more pressure on Indonesia to enforce its commitment to the ASEAN regional process in combatting the haze. Simultaneously, Singapore continues to offer anti-haze material support and financial assistance to Indonesia. For example, in 2015, Singapore expressed that its standard assistance package prior to the annual haze period (one C-130 aircraft for cloud seeding, two C-130 aircraft for firefighting, a team of the Singaporean Civil Defence Force to assist in assessment and planning of firefighting, sharing of high-­ resolution satellite pictures, one Chinook helicopter for firefighting) was again available for Indonesia to consider. This was declined by the Indonesian government. Once the PSI reached dangerous levels in September 2015, the National Environment Agency of Singapore had to act and ask for the names of the big companies with plantation operations in Indonesia – five of these are Singapore-based, Asia Pulp and Paper, Rimba Hutani Mas, Sebangun Bumi Andalas Wood Industries, Bumi Sriwijaya Sentosa, and Wachyuni Mandira – in order to take legal action through its national Transboundary Haze Pollution Act of 2014. After an Indonesian company director did not appear in court, a warrant was issued by Singapore in 2016, ordering detention of this director upon entry into Singapore. The Indonesian Ministry of

46  The EU and the haze Environment rejected Singapore’s use of its ­national Transboundary Haze Pollution Act of 2014 and reacted confrontationally, threatening Singapore with the termination or review of bilateral projects that relate to the two countries’ anti-haze agenda. Singaporean officials themselves are aware of the limitations and confrontational mode when using the Act, cautioning that the “use of state legislation to deal with a multi-faceted, transnational scourge is often limited in application” (The Straits Times 2014: A20). This caution is especially advisable in light of the role that Singapore-based companies and Singaporean investments play in Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s palm oil sector. A proactive civil society and consumer awareness/activism could ease the government’s work in this area. In fact, the Act has spelled out that when individuals are being directly affected in their well-being by the transboundary haze, they have the right to take legal matters in their own hands against Indonesian authorities and companies. This new space for civil society aside, the Act and its first-time use in 2015 by the Singaporean government has displayed effective pressure on Indonesia; amongst others, seeing Indonesia take speedier action in tackling the episode of the haze in 2016. More targeted use of the Act could be useful in pressuring individual ­sectors – namely the banking and palm oil investment sector – and avoiding confrontation with Indonesia. With the ASEAN Community-building process currently opening space for Southeast Asian banks to branch out to their ASEAN neighbours, the ASEAN governments are now in a unique position to influence this financial regionalisation of the major banks with principled lending, including more rigorous checks of investments and loans related to palm oil plantations in the region, and investment practices that could be beneficial for sustainable agriculture and land use. The haze problem and the integration of Southeast Asian finance systems and emergence of new investment opportunities are two sides of the same coin. They are to be acknowledged and reconciled within ASEAN regional anti-haze efforts, as well as when partnering with international actors like the EU and its member states, who can moreover inform European investors and companies in Southeast Asia on ethical and sustainable investment and business practices.

EU support Being an economic heavyweight in the Asia-Pacific, the EU takes interest in good conditions for investment and trade. Thus, the haze with its negative impact on local infrastructure and workforce – for example, the shutdown of airports and seaports – is undesirable from a European perspective. In addition to economic interests, the EU and its member states have pursued development cooperation with Southeast Asian countries to improve forestry and land management and promote renewable sources of energy, which have complemented the creation of socio-economically sound communities and stable (infra)structures for investment and trade to thrive. The EU and

The EU and the haze  47 its member states are interested in supporting ASEAN regional anti-haze integration efforts, if opportunity arises. However, instances of direct and tangible anti-haze assistance to ASEAN have been rare. The majority of relevant activities up until now would fall within the EU’s environmental dialogue and cooperation with Southeast Asia more generally, designed to cut across sectors and hence, address the haze issue only indirectly. Amongst others, EU biofuel subsidies have been of this kind of design. Initially, there was hope that they could act as an incentive to manage environmental problems, including landfires. Today, it appears that the subsidies have in fact empowered the Indonesian palm oil industry and authorities, while the unsustainable practice of burning land is still common to both smallholders and big corporations. As hinted previously, in view of Western Europe’s palm oil consumption (see Table 3.4 on page 48 for European end uses of palm oil in thousand metric tonnes), EU member states, the European Commission, European consumers as well as corporations must see themselves as part of the problem and in the line of fire for more action. Market power endows European actors with a powerful lever for international political influence. With the above-named EU import figure of Indonesian palm oil exports at 15%, there is indeed considerable potential for European market and consumer pressure to compel regulatory reforms and the creation of market mechanisms with ‘green’ teeth. The various cases of EU anti-dumping duties on biodiesel from Indonesia and Malaysia provide such an example of European consumer and industry pressure fuelling Council and Commission action. Yet, market mechanisms, that could directly lead to resolving the haze problem, are still in need of development. In addition to market pressure building on tariffs, duties, sanctions, consumer protest, and other mechanisms, the EU has the option to wield its economic power through market incentives. Certification schemes like the FLEGT initiative could induce behavioural change of the government and other stakeholders, resulting in enhanced interest in more sustainable management of forests and peatland. FLEGT is a voluntary partnership scheme between the EU and selected ASEAN member states, offering economic benefits through guaranteed EU market access for timber and wood products without lengthy import controls. It is a certification scheme that strengthens Southeast Asian state capacity in licensing processes and through stakes in the carbon market, emphasising country ownership and state sovereignty (Maier-Knapp 2014a: 228). Being aware of its public’s interest in environmental protection and stopping illegal timber trade, the EU has pushed this market- and state-driven scheme in a manner complementary to non-governmental activities and interests (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 51). At the same time, some concerns remain. These mainly revolve around the level of pro-governmentalism of the certification and verification processes. One of the concerns is that the scheme “competes with existing bottom-up non-governmental certification schemes that build on consumer pressure” directly. Furthermore, given that the role of the sovereign, in the sense of

5 60 100 60 30 73 3

480 220 300 38 200 110 40

+9,500% +267% +200% −37% +567% +51% +1,233%

170 n/a 250 – – – –

250 190 150 – – – –

2012 +47% n/a −40% – – – –

Change

2006

Change

2006

2012

Electricity and heat generation

Biodiesel production

Data Source: Gerasimchuk and Koh (2013: 8)

Netherlands Italy Germany UK Spain France Belgium

Country

484 390 415 828 231 262 388

2006 600 582 518 574 355 295 338

2012

+24% +49% +25% −31% +54% +13% −13%

Change

Other uses: mainly food but also personal care and also oleo-chemical products

Table 3.4  E  nd uses of palm oil in the EU-27 in 2006–2012 in thousand metric tonnes

659 450 765 888 261 335 391

2006

Total

1,330 992 968 612 555 405 378

2012

+102% +120% +27% −31% +113% +21% −3%

Change

The EU and the haze  49 state capacity and bureaucracy, is strengthened both within the processes of legality verification and certification, non-governmental interest groups and local communities rightly wonder about the extent of inclusiveness and the opportunity that FLEGT provides for the local economy and environmental interests (­Maier-Knapp 2014a: 228). Participation of non-governmental actors and local stakeholders in FLEGT exists, but takes place through FLEGT supporting projects or auditing and monitoring activities during the certification process and is therefore still controlled by the implementing authorities: FLEGT is not a panacea for Southeast Asia’s timber sector. The inclusion and implementation of participatory elements is desirable, but the realisation of these ultimately rests with the domestic authorities. Furthermore, it will only have a greater impact when its bilateral nature between the EU and selected individual ASEAN member states is superseded by a region-to-region scheme. This could ensure that even ­re-­exported products are certified. This, however, premises that S ­ outheast Asian countries manage to launch some form of regional cooperation in the jealously guarded timber sector; which is, furthermore, not a source of revenue for every ASEAN country. (Maier-Knapp 2014a: 229) Although some questions remain for both the European and Southeast Asian partners, there are meanwhile five Southeast Asian countries either negotiating or implementing the FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the EU. Of these, Indonesia is the only country that has ratified the VPA and started with the actual licensing. Being a FLEGT avant-garde country, Indonesia is sending the right signal to fellow ASEAN member states. While the haze problem is not addressed directly, it is understood that projects that allow attainment of greater government control and improved regulations provide conditions favourable for more effective fire and haze management. These EU schemes and activities, that only account for an indirect impact on the haze problem, should not suggest EU disinterest in addressing the haze conundrum. Rather, these schemes and activities of wider narratives, relating, for instance, to carbon emissions reduction, the fight against deforestation, and the combat of climate change, are of overall structural importance, creating an international environment conducive to possible anti-haze cross-border cooperative opportunities. Further noteworthy is that EU interest in the haze fluctuates, depending on the haze impact in any given year and the EU’s multi-annual programming to Southeast Asia. For example, the EU-ASEAN Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) Strategy for 2014–2020 dedicated funds to the SEApeat programme for direct support to ASEAN and its member states in addressing the haze problem between 2011 and 2015. SEApeat complemented the ASEAN Peatland Forests Project and made finances

50  The EU and the haze available for a team at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. The budget was EUR20 million with additional amounts of around EUR4 million from the German Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature and Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety and EUR556,000 from the grant beneficiaries themselves. The main objective of SEApeat was to sustain local livelihoods, combat transboundary haze, and enhance capacity for sustainable land management through collective action, implying a multi-country and multi-­stakeholder approach to reduce land fires. The stakeholders varied from project to project and included state actors, global institutions, local communities, and NGOs. Coordination between the different stakeholders has been key to the projects funded by SEApeat and allowed better integration of cross-cutting themes such as good governance and human rights. This multi-stakeholder approach of SEApeat is, however, not to be seen as EU regional integration support, since it only provided funding to the developing countries of ASEAN. It assisted in mitigating the ASEAN intra-regional development gap but did not strengthen political cohesion and official cooperation on the haze issue significantly.10 Another point that needs to be raised in this chapter is the EU’s ability to influence organisational behaviour of other regions through its role model existence as a regional organisational actor. Governmental and non-­ governmental actors view many of the European Commission’s policies and regulations as a benchmark for their region and country. In the context of the haze specifically, the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLTRAP) in Europe has caught the attention of a handful of Southeast Asian officials and pundits. It entered into force in 1983 as a binding legal instrument to reduce the emission of air pollutants. CLTRAP was initially designed to tackle the issue of acid rain in the EU only. Meanwhile, however, it has developed to an international convention with 51 ­signatories, including the US. While the various emission scandals across the ­European automobile industry in more recent times have tarnished the EU’s international image as a committed fighter against air pollutants, the overall international perception of the EU as an activist power at the forefront of combatting climate change and environmental degradation worldwide remains unwavering. CLTRAP and other international norms and standards coined by European experiences and knowledge play an important role in maintaining this conception of the EU. In addition to being a source of inspiration, the EU has impressed international partners through its dedication to science and research in the area of environmental protection and sustainable development. Various science and research schemes of the EU and its member states provide an avenue for cross-regional collaboration between Europe and Southeast Asia. For example, Euraxess offers European research funding opportunities to researchers from selected Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia. Considering that Indonesia and Malaysia are the main culprits of the haze

The EU and the haze  51 issue in Southeast Asia and the biggest producers of palm oil to the global market (85%), Euraxess could be an option for researchers to explore the cross-regional research potential in improving sustainable palm oil production and the management of transboundary air pollution. While EU research collaboration schemes are as a rule not designed to support policy-makers, policy-making, and policy decisions directly, individual ASEAN centres benefiting from EU development cooperation and regional integration support schemes have the attention of the official fund providers to make recommendations with policy impact. Moreover, most schemes allow co-funding that could link policy-making communities with academe and think tanks. For example, in the specific context of the haze, the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity in the Philippines, which has been supported by EU funds for the management of protected forest areas, could improve its ability to protect forests through new schemes that enhance linkages between the research and policy communities, including those belonging to the security sector. This example opens up a new avenue for traditional security actors – like the military which is an important corporate forest landowner in many Southeast Asian countries – to share capacity. At the same time, it demonstrates the contiguity of traditional security interests to NTS interests. This contiguity within the sphere of environmental protection will be further discussed in detail, albeit differently, not in the sense of the military as an economic stakeholder, in the following chapter concerned with the pollution of the marine environment in the South China Sea. The following chapter will raise interesting questions about the extent to which discourses of environmental protection lead to politicisation of EU support and militarisation of the seas.

Conclusions This chapter drew upon the case of the transboundary haze crisis in 2015 in Southeast Asia to illustrate Southeast Asian regional and ASEAN-EU inter-regional responses to the crisis, as well as outline wider discussions of ASEAN-EU cooperation that could assist forest and fire management in Southeast Asia. It tied into the haze crisis discussion of the first book and underlined that problems of domestic enforcement and regional institutional commitment persist. In particular, Indonesia’s level of commitment complicates the ASEAN regional anti-haze efforts. After discussion of the ASEAN regional and national efforts and attitudes, the chapter looked at EU interest in supporting Southeast Asia on the management of the transboundary haze and observed that interest has risen steadily, opening space for longer-term funding to address the haze problem directly, for example, through the SEApeat project from 2011 until 2015. Projects like SEApeat help raise EU visibility as a responsible economic power and political actor in Southeast Asia. That is, Western European actors have come to realise the cooperative opportunity and positive influence that targeted development support and technical contributions to combatting the haze can have

52  The EU and the haze on the EU’s global image as a ‘green’ economic power and an advocate for action against climate change. This chapter has mainly fleshed out the EU as a normative actor and market power and revealed that the security or NTS perspective is limited. At most, an NTS perspective is applicable in the context of domestic fire-­ fighting. For example, the Indonesian military is generally involved in fighting land and forest fires in the most affected provinces of Indonesia. At the ASEAN-EU inter-regional level, the discussion focussed on the multi-year EU schemes SEApeat and FLEGT. These schemes function independently from haze crisis situations and suggest that the EU did not adopt an NTS perspective when devising and operationalising them. In short, although the haze crisis of 2015 and previous haze crises in Southeast Asia have raised European awareness, ASEAN-EU inter-regional engagement in this area remains niche and low in securitised narratives. Thus, the consolidation of the NTS perspective within the ASEAN-EU relations in the context of the haze will remain limited, unless EU actors take greater interest in linking security and criminal themes with transboundary air pollution or illegal timber trade. This kind of framing would open space for a more securitised perspective of environmental protection.

Notes 1 This is the scalar system used by Singapore to measure air pollution. 2 This death toll does not include those deaths through traffic accidents caused by poor visibility. 3 Regions in Indonesia were affected unevenly. For instance, Asia Sentinel ­reported on 15 December 2015 that East Kalimantan had losses of 5.1% of its GDP. 4 In Southern Thailand, seven provinces were affected. Phuket suffered the most severe costs to tourism and other economic activity and had levels of over 200 µg per cubic metre measured at times, necessitating the local governor to urge high-risk population to stay inside and order the distribution of face masks and the opening of an ad hoc medical centre to address medical symptoms. 5 Singapore was most severely affected with schools having to close temporarily and vulnerable groups being asked to stay inside. Major events were cancelled or postponed. In Malaysia, similar warnings were issued and various events cancelled. 6 Cambodia and Malaysia are also suspected to be culprits of the haze problem in the region. 7 Press statements of prominent political figures in Indonesia have contributed to this low in confidence of the fellow ASEAN member states. For example, Jusuf Kalla said in early March 2015 that neighbouring ASEAN countries already enjoy eleven months of clean fresh air from Indonesia and therefore, they shouldn’t complain about one month of haze. 8 National legislation has advanced over time. Prominently, in 2009, Law 32/2009 was passed prohibiting land conversion through fire. Noteworthy are also the various measures that have been introduced to target the palm oil industry.

The EU and the haze  53 These include a mandatory certification scheme for palm oil plantations over 25 hectares, the Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil Initiative, and the voluntary scheme Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil for large companies. 9 In time for the November 2015 ASEAN Summit and the COP in Paris in late November/early December 2015. 10 Singapore and Brunei are industrialised, but being the worst-affected neighbours, it would have been good if SEApeat considered more input and participation from these countries.

4 The EU and the protection of the marine environment

In keeping with the theme of transboundary environmental pollution in Southeast Asia of Chapter 3, this chapter discusses marine life and environmental degradation in the South China Sea. Contemporary studies of security in the South China Sea have naturally given primary attention to questions of national sovereignty and military might. This chapter acknowledges this political context, but concentrates on the NTS perspective of the South China Sea. Specifically, it argues that the land reclamation efforts and flexing of military muscle are having a negative impact on the marine life and environment. Thus, on the one hand, this chapter recognises the contiguity of NTS challenges to traditional security concerns. On the other, it puts forward that the NTS rhetoric on the South China Sea does not necessarily have to be tied to traditional security interests. Nevertheless, in politicised environments, it is understood that political influence is generally unavoidable, even within technical discourses concerned with the management of NTS challenges. This chapter acknowledges this unavoidability of politicisation but prefers to focus on the NTS perspective as a means for depoliticisation. That is, by concentrating on the dialogue on NTS issues as a diplomatic device to avoid confrontation, build confidence, garner support, and eventually promote effective cooperation for issue management, this chapter de-emphasises interpretations of the NTS lens as a blunt means for power politics and political influence. For the EU, as a geographically remote international partner to the claimant countries in the South China Sea, this implies that maritime-­related NTS issues offer a good diplomatic entry point and an indirect pathway of showing political and security commitment (Maier-Knapp 2017a; Maier-­K napp 2019). Indeed, with the decision of the PCA on 12 July 2016 on the case of the territorial dispute between the Philippines and China – first touched upon in the Introduction  – NTS discourses have regained prominence in some circles in the Southeast Asian region that include EU actors. Submissions 9 until 12 of the ruling are encouraging this ‘revival’ of NTS discourses, since they call for the disputants to explore cooperation on NTS challenges in the South China Sea: Submissions 9 and 10  concern the protection of

The EU and the protection of the marine environment  55 Filipino fishermen and their traditional fishing grounds and Submissions 11 and 12(B) centre on the protection of the marine environment. In fact, by focusing on the correlation between military activities and marine and coastal degradation in the South China Sea, this chapter actually transcends the regional and inter-regional institutionalist or issue managerial narrative of this book and acts as a critique to the militarisation and securitisation tendencies in Southeast Asia, even though it understands that these processes are in some ways favourable for the EU’s security profile. This chapter begins with an outline of the cooperation opportunity connected to environmental issues in the South China Sea, focusing on the South China Sea Project. This is followed by a discussion of maritime NTS issues in the South China Sea other than environmental problems. By assessing the regional and inter-­r egional cooperative opportunity of the selected issue areas, this chapter can gauge the impact that the politicised/militarised context has on the EU’s scope of action and identify the extent to which EU actions could be subject to political instrumentalisation. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the problem of IUU fishing in Southeast Asia in 2015 and the EU’s pressure on Thailand in connection to IUU matters. The IUU case serves to underline this chapter’s central claim that there is always contiguity of NTS discourses to traditional security discourses in the context of the South China Sea. Then, in the remainder of this chapter, the EU’s overall approach to maritime security in the South China Sea is summarised.

Keeping the South China Sea ‘secure’: the non-traditional security perspective Current costs of the damage to the marine environment and the local livelihoods are unmeasurable, not least because there are creeping effects and spill-overs from activities like reef excavation and island building which will be felt over generations. Even in the unlikely scenario that the territorial disputes were resolved tomorrow and land reclamation activities would cease immediately, the severed marine environment would take years to recover, if it recovers at all. As suggested in the previous paragraph, emphasising environmental NTS issues in the South China Sea and revisiting their importance within national and regional narratives could assist in managing environmental problems as well as in the development of new pathways to mitigate the South China Sea conflict, attenuating the blunt use of nationalist rhetoric and militaristic methods to cement the respective territorial claims. At this point in time, however, the traditional security dimension still looms large in the South China Sea. Without an end to the territorial disputes in sight, a refocus on NTS issues may be overly optimistic. This scepticism is warranted, if one considers that China and Southeast Asian

56  The EU and the protection of the marine environment countries have regularly used the NTS framework to win over domestic audiences for political allegiance rather than for effective international dispute resolution efforts (Maier-Knapp 2017b: 290). What can be done when the provision of public goods such as clean air and water is treated as a commodity/tool of state power? How should the EU provide assistance in politically sensitive contexts, in which its goodwill and support to remedy environmental issues could be instrumentalised? The following discussion on the South China Sea Project sheds some light on this. The South China Sea Project Following a request for proposal assistance by the Co-ordinating Body for the Seas of East Asia to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) for a Global Environment Facility (GEF) grant in 1996, the South China Sea Project was prepared in 1997 and 1998 in collaboration with seven littoral states to the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand. After national focal points in the individual target countries drafted national reports on environmental problems and made suggestions for priority areas during the preparation phase, the actual implementation phase of the South China Sea Project centred on five priority areas concerning the protection of mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass, coastal wetlands, and fish stocks and their habitats in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand. The implementation was directed by UNEP and the national partners from 2002 until 2008. The rationale of the project was derived from the need to tackle the severe effects that rapid population growth and coastal development had had on the littoral countries. This rationale provided overall coherence for the project design and implementation across the participating countries, avoiding reference to the territorial disputes and military confrontations in the South China Sea. The implementation phase focused on monitoring and capacity-­building activities at various levels of governance and across various stakeholders. Amongst these stakeholders, academic institutions acted as key implementing partners, emphasising the scientific nature of the project and rejection of governmental and political influences.1 ­I ndeed, from the outset, it was stated that, due to the geopolitical sensitivity of the South China Sea, “no international or regional entities, other than UNEP be involved in the management of the project” (UNEP and GEF 2008: 1). The different thematic priorities of the individual partner countries were reconciled effectively by UNEP, so that by the end of the South China Sea Project in 2009, UNEP and GEF had four databases, over 1800 d ­ ocuments, seven regional training workshops, Google Earth connectivity with the project, and numerous other activities to show for the record (UNEP and GEF 2009: 41).

The EU and the protection of the marine environment  57 Even though governmental influence was kept at bay throughout the project with meetings and activities being predefined along technical and scientific lines, there were instances that suggest that the tensions in the South China Sea might have played a role in complicating the operationalisation of individual initiatives. Namely, the delay in the selection of some demonstration sites or China’s abstention from activities related to priority areas concerning the protection of coral reefs and the fisheries indicate that even within technically defined regional projects, political controversies can sneak in and interfere. While the division between policy and scientific components of the project were structurally predefined to allow most possible scientific freedom, ultimate expression of this scientific freedom depended on the national focal points. For example, Cambodia was represented across the priority areas through the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery and the Ministry of Environment only. By contrast, Thailand realised that some universities in Bangkok harboured advanced expertise in certain priority areas and hence, designated these universities as implementing partners. This divergence in representation stresses the practical difficulty in separating the political/policy dimension from science and research activities in the South China Sea. In this context, it needs to be added, however, that there were some projects which actively encouraged linkage of the policy and science communities. For instance, in the sensitive environment of the South China Sea, the role that UNEP played in the South China Sea Project could be indicative of the kind of NTS actor role that the EU could play in the region. Specifically, when the UN or other international partners to Southeast Asia appear unsuitable as project leaders, programmers, mediators, and dialogue facilitators, the EU may be the most appropriate alternative partner in both traditional security and NTS contexts. This reminds of the discussion of the EU’s role as an honest broker and peace implementor in the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Chapter 5 of the first book. In addition to this, the South China Sea Project has highlighted the important role of those international actors that possess considerable technical and legal expertise. In this connection, the EU’s sharing of legal standards and best practices in the area of sustainable fisheries, deep-sea fisheries, and other topics pertaining to sustainable seas is noteworthy and dovetails with past experiences, knowledge transfer, and eventual institutionalisation processes of the claimant countries: Although aforementioned opportunity for the EU to take on a leadership role on South China Sea issues – when the UN appears unsuitable – ­suggests some degree of actor competition, the EU generally adheres to UN standards and principles and aims to be complementary and a champion of multilateralism in the world.

58  The EU and the protection of the marine environment Even though the South China Sea Project has lacked follow-up at the regional level and only seen sporadic continuation of projects and discourses at the national level, its scientific approach and themes remain topical and offer interesting insights for international partners to Southeast Asia like the EU, with a view to current EU issues with some Southeast Asian fishing industry practices, in particular: Recent slavery scandals in the fish and shrimp industry of some Southeast Asian countries have led to increased European consumer and official pressure. With ever-growing ASEAN-EU investments and trade relations, especially considering recent bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations and ratifications with individual ASEAN member states, there are expectations amongst European consumers that the EU will use its economic leverage to shape trade with Southeast Asia in a sustainable manner. This implies that even though commitment to sustainability in some FTAs remains vaguely defined, the EU will very likely expand on issues of sustainability further down the line in the context of specific trade in goods and cooperation projects. For example, the EU-Vietnam FTA negotiations concluded formally in December 2015 without addressing the issue of mangrove protection and shrimp farming in Vietnam directly. The agreement only refers to general global guidelines and legal standards in Chapter 15 on Trade and Sustainable Development. Even though – or rather because – Chapter 15 is written in generalised and non-sector-specific terms, it offers a non-controversial foundation for the EU and Vietnam to further explore common definitions and guidelines on sustainable shrimp farming in the future. Ultimately, effective use of the EU’s economic lever for the protection of the marine environment and other maritime NTS issues in the South China Sea depends on the extent to which the EU deems coercive action to be necessary. For example, in October 2017, the EU employed its economic lever in connection to Vietnam’s fishing industry and issued Vietnam with a ‘yellow card’ to warn of Vietnam’s insufficient action against IUU. Interestingly, the European Commission reasoned in a press release on 23 October 2017 that this warning was a result of the “lack of action to address illegal fishing activities conducted by Vietnamese vessels in waters of neighbouring countries, including Pacific Small Island Developing States” (European ­Commission 2017). Although EU IUU pressure on Southeast Asia involves offers of reform assistance in the fisheries and is in that sense an indirect form of development cooperation, it is interesting to see that the European Commission has used its economic leverage with a country that it generally backs on matters of the South China Sea dispute. While IUU and the South China Sea dispute are two different matters, EU IUU interaction with claimant Southeast Asian countries opens the scope for EU regulatory influence on other NTS issues that may pertain to the South China Sea. This possible cross-linkage substantiates the EU as an influencer of norms in the region and could see adopted standards and legal reform impact questions of regional security more directly.

The EU and the protection of the marine environment  59 Other pertinent maritime NTS issues and the question of stakeholdership The previous section observed the contiguity of NTS issues to traditional security in the sensitive regional environment of the South China Sea and pointed to the potential of the NTS frame as a means to create an alternative technical and science-oriented discourse, which could assist in depoliticising, reaching out, building confidence, and redefining the South China Sea as a realm of multiple stakeholders beyond state and military actors. Those actors traditionally concerned with the protection of the marine environment remain nevertheless wary of the use of the NTS perspective. First, they are concerned about the functional and budgetary competition that comes with additional actors – namely military actors – taking on similar responsibilities. Second, military encroachment upon their competencies through the NTS frame renders the NTS frame futile for depoliticising the South China Sea and mitigating the tensions. With navies and coast guards of some Southeast Asian countries taking enhanced interest in NTS issues such as marine life poaching – not least to make their case for institutional modernisation, the ambiguity of the NTS perspective is likely to grow in the coming years. The militarisation of geography has evoked a militarisation of issue areas, raising concerns about a possible automatism of the military response in the South China Sea. EU officials have always been concerned about the militarisation impact of the NTS perspective. With contemporary authoritarian developments in Southeast Asia, this concern is more evident than before. At the same time, Southeast Asian officials frequently point to the double standards of ­European scepticism, given that there are some EU member states that have equipped their militaries with considerable competencies and capabilities to respond to a broad range of NTS crises that one might consider most suitably addressed by civilian authorities. For example, in the UK, the British Coastguard work under the jurisdiction of the Department for Environment and the Department for Tourism and hence, have responsibilities that are limited to rescue operations, monitoring, and surveillance. By contrast, the British navy holds considerable competencies that range from the territorial defence of the peaceful waters of the kingdom to humanitarian emergencies. This said, when comparing the state and non-state actors with stakes in keeping the waters of the UK peaceful with those stakeholders in the unpeaceful waters of the South China Sea, it becomes clear that extended military capabilities and competencies do not have to equate to aggressive military behaviour. Furthermore, in light of other actors than the navy involved in the protection of a country’s sovereignty at sea, namely coast guards or paramilitary vessels, connecting the NTS perspective with militarisation trends and levels of inter-state confidence and conflict in the sense of a corollary would fail to capture the regional security reality in both the Asia-Pacific and Western

60  The EU and the protection of the marine environment Europe adequately. At the same time, this makes clear, why some adopt the NTS perspective to make the case for enhanced cross-border cooperation of navies, maritime police, and coast guards: facilitation of more sensitive national capability-building and military modernisation otherwise impossible, if addressed directly. Persons using the NTS framework in this sense generally argue that a capabilities equilibrium is prerequisite for effective regional confidence-building and cooperation and that, therefore, the modernisation of navies and coast guards could deter aggressive behaviour at sea. While the expansion of coast guard or naval activities in grey areas where issues of marine life and environment protection coincide with territorial integrity would be a clumsy narrative that immediately rings alarm bells about the control of the state, other NTS challenges – that are widely accepted and established in their security relevance – such as piracy or terrorism at sea appear less controversial from the viewpoint of civilian actors and civil society. In the recent past, links between piracy and terrorism have been made in oceanic areas adjacent to the South China Sea like the Sulu Sea. With economic interests at stake and European lives at risk, the EU and EU member states have a commitment to their people to support relevant Southeast Asian authorities in their combat of piracy and globally linked terrorism. The ASEAN regional level has advanced the issue of piracy rather slowly, exhibiting effective security cooperation mainly at the sub-­regional level, with individual anti-piracy campaigns oftentimes associated with the fight against local insurgency groups. For instance, as part of the Second Front campaign of the USA in the wake of the September 11 attacks, increased sub-regional initiatives among the littoral states of the Malacca Straits were launched. Amongst others, the Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia Accord (MASLINDO) came into being in July 2004, allowing coordinated patrols at sea all year round. Another operation was the Eye in the Sky initiative of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia in 2005. This operation spelled out military cooperation both in the air and at sea. These sub-regional activities have primarily functioned as a deterrent, effectively seeing the number of piracy incidents in the Malacca Straits dropping in 2005 and 2006. These sub-regional operations against piracy and terrorism are positive signals to the international community and open space for outside partners like the EU to express interest in sharing capacity and collaborative efforts. Although the primary focus of this book is on the opportunity for the EU, it must be said that above-named ASEAN member states are particularly interested in keeping the regional powers engaged. US counterterrorism ­influence and cooperation with Southeast Asia has been a constant since the September 11 attacks. In addition to the USA, especially for the disputants in the South China Sea, committing China’s interest in counterterrorism and anti-piracy cooperation has been salient to the peace of Southeast Asian waters. Since China upholds the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the context of counterterrorism and anti-­piracy, there

The EU and the protection of the marine environment  61 seems to be genuine space for Sino-Southeast Asian development of codes of conduct for the South China Sea in niche areas that fall under counterterrorism and anti-piracy.2

The fisheries crisis in 2015 The preceding sections have revealed that an environmental and maritime NTS perspective in connection to the South China Sea proposes a broad spectrum of actors and actions – of which some are located in grey areas at the nexus of technical/development cooperation and security cooperation, complicating clear distinctions of what constitutes a security response or influence of the regional security order. This complexity of security interference was previously touched upon, for example, in connection to the EU’s IUU warning to Vietnam. This section will complement the case of Vietnam by expounding the EU’s external use of its regulation against IUU in ­Thailand (see for example Figure 4.1 below on EU IUU pressure on ­Thailand). This will assist in theorising how EU pressure on individual Southeast Asian countries on IUU matters can impact the security situation in the South China Sea and be considered as NTS action. In April 2015, the world’s third-biggest exporter of seafood, Thailand, was issued with a ‘yellow card’ and warned by the EU about possible sanctions, if it did not comply with IUU standards, after international media and human rights organisations revealed the exorbitant extent of human rights abuse and overfishing practices within Thailand’s fishing industry. These renewed reportings on slavery and unsustainable fishing practices in 2015 paralleled the international outcry over the stranded Rohingya boat people in May 2015 Figure 4.1  E  xample of the impact of EU pressure on Thai fisheries.

Source: Bangkok Post (2017)

62  The EU and the protection of the marine environment and the uncovering of human remains in so-called human trafficking camps at the border to Malaysia. Thus, in addition to the international pressure on the fisheries sector, Thailand was facing international condemnation of its management of human trafficking issues. Already in June 2014, the US had downgraded Thailand in its Trafficking in Persons report to a Tier 3 country – to the same level as North Korea – for its failure to act on human trafficking. EU pressure in 2015 chimed with this pressure from the US and other international actors, contributing to the momentum in fighting human trafficking at the Thai national level (Maier-Knapp 2017c: 14). This wave of international pressure in 2015 furthermore gave new impetus for ASEAN regional integration on fighting human trafficking and related issues of transnational crime. This regional momentum will be further detailed in Chapter 5 through the case of the Rohingya boat crisis of May 2015. In response to the EU’s 2015 pressure on Thailand’s fishing industry specifically, the Thai military government announced a package of measures in accordance with the Port State Measures Agreement. The measures included improved monitoring of fish production processes, consultation with local communities, better inspections of foreign vessels, as well as the registration of Thai fishing trawlers. Although these measures primarily aimed at reforming the fisheries sector, it is evident that these measures impacted legislation concerned with human trafficking and illegal migration. These measures would be implemented over the following years and subject to EU inspections and review of the ‘yellow card’. EU inspections on 20 ­January 2016 did not ease the pressure and, indeed, overall international pressure on ­Thailand increased in early 2016, compelling the Thai government in talks with the big seafood corporations to show some concrete results; pushing a major seafood-­processing factory, Gold Prize Tuna Canning, to pay first compensations. The economic leverage used by the EU in early 2016 demonstrates the extent to which the EU’s regulatory and normative identity is transferred to its external relations. Namely the Council Regulation 1005/2008 to prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and the Commission Regulation 1010/2009 laying down the rules for implementation of Regulation 1005/2008 ensure the coherency of standards and behaviour of the EU member states in international waters, on the one hand. On the other, these regulations, or parts of them, are externalised to influence the behav­ hilippines, and more recently Vietnam. iour and practices of Thailand, the P In this light, the issuance of a ‘yellow card’ does not appear as targeted action against Thailand’s military government, as some may claim about EU, US, and other Western pressure in 2014. At the same time, it is undebatable that asymmetrical power and economic relations between the EU and Thailand – as well as Southeast Asia as a whole – open space for economic leverage to be linked with political interests. This interpretation of the EU’s economic leverage as a large importer of seafood products from Southeast Asia should not suggest that the EU has opted for such linkage strategy of indirect criticism to avoid

The EU and the protection of the marine environment  63 direct condemnation of human rights violations in Southeast Asia per se. Rather, the European Commission is focusing on its core competencies and letting other EU institutions like the EP and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy pursue their human rights advocacy mandate more openly within the EU’s external relations. For example, the EP has been criticising Thailand’s military government on a regular basis and individual MEPs have been open about their political support in Thailand; for instance, by inviting ousted Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra to the EP in November 2015. In addition to the EP and the High Representative of the EU, NGOs have been important promoters and upholders of European values overseas: In the context of the IUU reforms specifically, it was reported that, amongst others, the Environmental Justice Foundation NGO assisted the Thai government in the reform process. This underlines the normative impact of targeted EU pressure on liberal spaces and democratic processes within international counterparts, even within states ruled by a military junta. This having been said, one needs to be cautious that Even though this kind of economic pressure is conducive to good governance and improves regulations in the fisheries and related sectors, it can also be viewed ambiguously since it both integrates and exposes the domestic level to forces of the global economy. Nevertheless, it has all in all enhanced the legal and institutional pathways for the Thai government to show greater dedication to democratic principles and human rights. (Maier-Knapp 2017c: 14) The EU’s IUU warning and the subsequent intensification of the national reforms in Thailand and Vietnam have been conducive to overall ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) building objectives in the fisheries sector in the sense that it assisted in cohering national standards across ASEAN member states indirectly, informing the ASEAN regional integration process in the fisheries sector bottom-up. With the fisheries being an ASEAN priority integration sector, ASEAN member states and external partners are interested in accelerating trade liberalisation, harmonising regulations, and hence, boosting overall conditions favourable for the establishment of a central intergovernmental body in this area. In brief, the culmination of crisis-induced pressure on Thailand and the ASEAN region in 2015 has contributed to AEC momentum, and also to that of the APSC as will be discussed in Chapter 5.

EU support on maritime security In recent years, the EEAS has been foregrounding regional capacity-­ building seminars on maritime-related matters in Southeast Asia and activity on maritime security in the ARF. For example, in the ARF, the EEAS

64  The EU and the protection of the marine environment has been promoting maritime security through seminars and workshops on ­UNCLOS, ship profiling, offshore oil spills, and a broad range of other matters pertaining to the South China Sea. With the EU being the co-chair of the ARF ­Inter-sessional Meeting on Maritime Security from 2017 until 2020, the EU will have the chance to enhance its maritime security profile. Since the ARF is by definition a security forum, EU engagement in the ARF is defined as security action, even though some of the workshops and activities are in their content and method not of a security nature. For instance, at the second ARF Seminar on UNCLOS on 28–29 May 2014 in Manila, European academics and legal experts were present, including a legal adviser to the EEAS who shared his expertise on the conservation of marine biological resources under the Common Fisheries Policy and outlined how this policy has meant as a rule equal access to the fishing grounds of other EU Member States for all EU fishermen (ARF member states 2014: para. 8). This example suggests that the ARF format does not strictly define and prescribe security action. Overall, on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea – be it within the ARF or other multilateral dialogue settings in the region, the EU and EU member state representatives have displayed consistency in their principled stance; although there are evidently economic and political interests with China that provide some limitations to EU consensus. Especially in instances of severe violation of international law, the EEAS and the High Representative of the EU have ensured overall consistency in the EU’s condemnation, reminding all parties to respect the rule of law and seek multilateral resolve.3 In addition to this verbal construction of the EU as an actor on maritime security in Southeast Asia by the High Representative and EEAS officials, the EEAS has been proactive in co-sponsoring the ­ASEAN-EU High-Level Dialogue (HLD) on maritime security. Complementary to the activities of the EEAS and other official entities of the EU apparatus have been the engagement of European civil society, academia, foundations, and other non-governmental organisations (Dosch and Maier-Knapp 2017; ­Maier-Knapp 2017a; Maier-Knapp 2017d; Maier-Knapp 2019). Although these non-governmental actors are not officially considered as stakeholders in the territorial disputes, effective civil societal participation within the domestic, regional, and inter-regional security politics of Southeast Asia is possible, however, largely conditioned by the extent to which Southeast Asian governments open dialogue space and make available resources. In addition to the ARF and the HLDs, there is IcSP, which could act as an avenue for greater EU engagement on maritime security in Southeast Asia. Given that IcSP has been used by the European Commission to fund maritime security activities elsewhere in the past, future EU engagement with Southeast Asian partners on maritime security matters might explore different types of IcSP-funded practical cooperation. Namely, the EEAS and Southeast Asian counterparts could look into the IcSP-supported ­Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) programme, initiated at the peak of the

The EU and the protection of the marine environment  65 piracy crisis at the Horn of Africa in 2009. It was brought to life to assist in securing shipping lanes and improving maritime governance in the longrun. In this programme, IcSP provided, for example, funding for Enhancing ­Maritime Security and Safety through Information Sharing and Capacity Building (MARSIC) in the Western Indian Ocean from 2010 until 2015 to set up three regional information-sharing centres, one in Yemen, one in Kenya, and one in Tanzania, as well as a training centre in Djibouti. With the CMR Monitoring Support and Evaluation Mechanism (CRIMSON) project under CMR being defined by a worldwide mandate and the CMR claiming in its mission statement that the maritime routes of Southeast Asia are of strategic importance to the EU, there seems to be opportunity for the EU to take inspiration and extend CRIMSON through IcSP to Southeast Asia.

Conclusions This chapter has drawn upon an environmental NTS perspective to discuss the case of marine life and environmental pollution in the South China Sea. In contrast to the previous case of the haze, this chapter pointed to the contiguity of traditional security to NTS and how militarised contexts generate new security links between sectors and actors that could work towards greater security cooperation at the ASEAN-EU ­i nter-regional level. Core issues of national sovereignty and territorial integrity were portrayed as pervasive and thus, the discussion suggested that political and security connotations of otherwise apolitical issues of environmental protection were unavoidable. This pervasiveness of the security dimension in the South China Sea has furthermore witnessed navies and coast guards showing greater interest in aspects of marine life and environmental protection. In spite of the statist ambiguities, the instrumentalisation of international assistance, and the potential to feed arms acquisitions and militarisation in the region, the chapter emphasised the potential of the NTS framework to defuse tensions and attenuate militarised perspectives. EU supranational and member state engagement on maritime-­related NTS matters and maritime security in Southeast Asia counts on this potential but has remained cautious, focusing on technical aspects of capacity-sharing and -building to cement the rule of law and multilateralism in the region. In the context of ‘inter-regional’ maritime security cooperation, the EU’s supranational political and security profile has enhanced over the years, especially through the ARF and EEAS co-sponsored HLDs. In spite of this rise in significance, EU insistence on diplomacy, multilateralism, and the rule of law within the ARF and EU bilateral activities with ASEAN member states can neither stop land reclamation processes nor reverse the environmental degradation processes that have set in because of the land reclamation processes. Similarly, EU promotion of civil society capacity, people-to-people relations, and science and research for the protection of

66  The EU and the protection of the marine environment the marine environment bottom-up is vital but can only achieve so much. From a Southeast Asian traditional security perspective, both Western European governmental and non-governmental efforts can neither stop the militarisation of the South China Sea by the claimant countries nor effectively hinder violent confrontation at sea. Thus, questions about EU effectiveness, first, as a security actor and, second, as an environmental actor in the South China Sea, if cooperation partnership is called for, persist and point to the limitations of the current construction of the EU’s NTS/security profile in Southeast Asia, a region in which security is largely defined by Realpolitik. In this context, and with a view to the EU FTAs with individual ASEAN member states, it appears that – also in the previous ­chapter – the EU’s explicit as well as tacit use of its economic weight is evermore seminal in shoring up EU environmental, political, and security interests in Southeast Asia.

Notes 1 It is important to note here that, given governmental sponsorship and affiliation of various academic institutions in Southeast Asia, governmental influence and politicisations cannot be fully discarded. 2 While this paragraph provides an initial reference to the cross-sectoral importance of counterterrorism within ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism, Chapter 5 will delve deeper into this opportunity from a European perspective. 3 For example, the office of the EU High Representative issued a statement of concern on the movements of the Chinese oil rig HD981 in May 2014. On 11 March 2016, the office of the EU High Representative raised concerns about China’s instalment of missiles in disputed territory in the South China Sea.

5 The EU and illegal migration

In an article from Reuters, published in the Bangkok Post on 21 June 2017, a study of the European Court of Auditors was cited to have expressed concern about the limited effectiveness of EU assistance to combat human trafficking in Southeast Asia. Bettina Jakobsen from the European Court of Auditors criticised the EU of having vague objectives and that the “EU must better prioritise how and where it spends its available resources so that the level of activity matches its financial commitments” (Reuters 2017). The article further commended the overall improvement in Southeast Asia in the past decade, but that it was difficult to assess the actual impact of EU and EU member state contributions, given the myriad of actors involved in fighting human trafficking in the region. Additionally, the ­newspaper article listed some recommendations made by the European Court of Auditors, emphasising the need for more effective engagement with local partners. With Southeast Asian governments being known for their relentless crackdown on illegal immigrants in the recent past, the European Court of ­Auditors could have been more specific about the local partners. At the same time, because the EU itself has struggled to keep the politicisation and dehumanisation of migrants and refugees at bay in the wake of the migration and refugee crisis in the EU over the last few years, effective external mainstreaming and communication of EU human rights standards is becoming more complicated. Incapable of a prompt and united solution amidst the refugee crisis of 2015, the EU had to see fundamental principles and the modus operandi building on the Dublin Agreement put in abeyance. The suspension of hitherto standing regional agreements has jeopardised the EU as a political entity and, furthermore, raised questions about the general management of shared governance in sensitive issue areas at the core of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. These EU woes have been followed with interest by Southeast Asian partners. Fortunately for the ASEAN-EU relationship, these issues have had limited impact on the inter-­ regional working level, which generally proceeds according to multi-year inter-regional programmes.

68  The EU and illegal migration Nevertheless, the sensitivities in relation to the topic of migration have risen and, as indicated above, impacted on the EU’s and its member states’ general fervour in promoting norms and rights in connection to migration issues in the world. This (self-)consciousness in its interaction with international partners is one amongst a handful of political concerns that have arisen in the wake of the refugee crisis and could influence the ASEAN-EU relations on matters of migration, tourism, and other forms of mobility and connectivity in the years to come. In light of this complexity and topicality of the migration issue in the EU and the possible impact on relations with Southeast Asia, this chapter is urgently needed. The following paragraphs begin with a brief conceptualisation of migration as an NTS threat and then proceed empirically with an outline of the refugee crisis in the EU in 2015 and the EU’s response to this. The discussion of the EU migration problem is followed by the case of the Rohingya boat people crisis in 2015 and an outline of the ASEAN experience in managing illegal and irregular migration. The remainder of the chapter will then refer to the ASEAN-EU perspective on illegal migration and bring the chapter to full circle by drawing upon insights from the previously mentioned study on EU anti-human trafficking support to Southeast Asia by the European Court of Auditors.

Migration as an NTS threat: some premises While migration has been a natural condition of mankind, recent migration and refugee crises in the EU and other parts of the world have foregrounded the threat that irregular migration poses to societies and states. In particular, the series of terrorist attacks in the EU from 2015 onwards fuelled connotations of threat, providing breeding ground for extremist ideologies. Even though a specific group of migrants – young men of Arabic appearance and Islamic faith – has been the main subject of politicisation and criminalisation by the state and media, the sheer size of the migration flow in 2015 overburdened European states and societies to the extent that migration in general, first, was perceived less as an opportunity for a country’s workforce or natural condition of the global economy and, second, ­frequently portrayed in the public space as a security threat to the nation-state as a whole. These processes have been sketched here to serve as background information only. Nevertheless, this excursion makes clear that migration has become increasingly viewed through a security prism in European societies and states. Whether these security discourses actually provide facts regarding the socio-economic costs of the intake of migrants or the actual criminal and terrorist potential of migrants is subordinate to the overall purpose of the discourses, which is to convey that the existing standard of living is endangered. This security-focused perspective keeps with the crisis-centred approach of this book. It is suggestive that the very fact that this irregular and sizeable flow of migrants in 2015 and 2016 has been perceived and ‘mis’-managed as a crisis has securitised

The EU and illegal migration  69 overall perceptions of the migration issue in 2015 as an NTS threat from the very outset. That is, securitisation processes and the understanding of migration as an NTS threat are inherent in the crisis situation and perpetuate pre-existing anti-immigration sentiments in society.

The EU refugee crisis and the EU regional perspective In 2014, the refugee problem was incipient and the Dublin System seemingly intact. Initial EU level responses to the refugee situation in Greece, Bulgaria, and Italy towards the end of the year suggested swift action taken by the Council of the EU. For example, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council meeting on 10 October 2014 entitled “Taking action to better manage migratory flows” promised help to these countries and by November 2014 the member states launched Operation Triton in the Mediterranean Sea and expanded the tasks of Operation Poseidon in the Aegean Sea. ­However, with Greece treating the refugee problem as a bargaining chip with the EU, the EU President and others had to step in to warn Greece that its financial crisis should not be tied to the refugee problem and that refugees should not pass through. Reminders to Greece of its commitment to EU law and solidarity seemed forlorn and by February 2015, amidst the EU’s ongoing squabbles with Greece about its financial situation, the migration and refugee crisis was in full swing at the EU’s Eastern border. At the same time, with asylum centres in North Africa exceeding their capacity, the EU’s Southern border required more assistance. By April 2015, the fatalities in the Mediterranean surmounted and put the EU under pressure to act. The EU was now in the midst of stemming the migration flows, protecting EU ­external borders, reducing illegal migration, and safeguarding the integrity of Schengen. In April 2015, when the European Council convened, agreeing on ­Operation Sophia to confront people smugglers and assist frontline states, solidarity was still the main game in town. A ten-point programme was devised, including the first-time official articulation of the relocation of refugees. This initial attempt to relocate 5,000 refugees and disburden frontline states and destination countries was, however, the beginning of a major political rift to divide and strain European policy-makers for the years to come. By the end of May 2015, the relocation and quota system was to take effect, but with member states like the UK and Poland objecting to ­Germany’s advance on this matter and intra-German opposition building up, the ­European Commission was under pressure to come up with a concrete plan for implementation. Meanwhile, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece were becoming ­i mpatient and started taking matters in their own hands to protect their borders. Other EU member states also added pressure on ­Brussels through their departure from standing regional principles and law.1 In July, modest success of the quota system was achieved through the JHA Council agreement on the relocation of 20,000 refugees.

70  The EU and illegal migration In attempting to push through the relocation of refugees, Germany sought a coalition of the willing in coordination with Turkey to uphold the Schengen system at least in spirit and avoid the ‘reborderisation’ within the EU. However, by September 2015, Germany itself installed border controls at the border to Austria after the European Commission permitted this after learning about the high numbers of refugees entering Germany at the Austrian-German border to that time. Irritated by this and various unilateral moves of the German chancellor, French support to Germany was waning.2 The French President, however, understood the need for a united French-German leadership to manage the crisis and backed Merkel in encouraging other EU member states to respect the decisions made in Brussels and follow through with the quota system. Even though the French-German divisions were seemingly patched up by mid-2015, other inter-state as well as intra-Commission3 cracks were still wide and the blame games in Western European capitals intensified in the summer heat of 2015. For example, in Germany, the Minister of Justice criticised social media for the lack of sensitivity and responsibility, failing to eliminate hate speech, in particular, anti-migrant and -government incitement. In the UK, debate heated about the funding of the crisis and whether the budget for overseas development aid should be used for incoming refugees. The most prominent political faultline was the one between Germany and ­Hungary and other Eastern EU member states who refused to share the burden. In brief, securing the EU’s borders was a more acceptable task to the Eastern EU members than the task of relocating refugees. By November 2015, Germany’s welcoming culture was changing and indeed, the government actively deterred refugees from leaving Afghanistan and some other countries, publicising that the Asylpaket II no longer accounted for asylum-seekers from these countries. In fact, the ­German government incentivised emigration of these people from Germany to their motherland by paying return premiums. By early 2016, many intra-EU ­borders were closed for refugees and seemingly, the refugee and migration crisis was under control. However, a climate of fear and distrust at all levels of governance lingered: richer EU member states were blaming poorer EU states for freeriding and not bearing the costs; small and rural townships were blaming the central government for slow financial disbursement and capacity support; inner-government and partisan fights; rise of new rightwing and populist parties that built on the failure of the EU and national governments; burden-sharing between border and transit countries. Significance of buffer states and development cooperation Another contentious issue that became political priority during the crisis was the management of the EU’s borders. This led to the revaluation of traditional partners at the EU’s external borders, for instance, Turkey and Libya. On the one hand, the outreach to these countries could be treated

The EU and illegal migration  71 as a genuine attempt to strengthen the buffer zone surrounding the EU’s geographic boundaries. On the other, it could be understood as a balancing act to weigh off intra-EU power struggles. Fortunately for the EU, ­Bulgaria accommodated the pro-asylum policies of the EU and NATO played a complementary role in fighting human trafficking, easing the pressure and reliance on EU neighbouring countries. In addition to the external border debate, the migration crisis fuelled worrisome nationalist narratives about the EU’s internal borders. The main focus was however on the protection of the EU’s external borders, seeing new legislation contributing to a more ‘­intelligent’ external border with focus on the role of information systems in the work of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and other actors.4 Through the introduction of new legislation, actors, and responsibilities calls for internal reborderisation of the EU were kept at bay and the EU’s territorial integrity was cemented. Thus, even though national capacity-building prevailed, this refocus on the EU’s external borders and territorial integrity allowed discourses favourable for capacity-building efforts at the regional level and within bilateral pacts with NATO, Libya, and other international partners, mitigating the dependency on the political will of the individual EU member states. In addition to the attention given to the external border of the EU, the crisis led to greater interest in dialogue and cooperation with Africa5 and, more generally, in development cooperation. In particular, the November 2015 Summit on Migration in Valetta and its Action Plan has to be seen in this light. Enhanced interest in questions concerned with migration and development cooperation also meant for some EU member states that selected overseas development funds were to be reconsidered for the domestic management of migrants from developing countries. Although these structural reconsiderations in individual countries in 2015 did not impact the EU and EU member states’ foreign and security policies to Southeast Asia directly, they point to the EU’s overall difficulty in reconciling domestic and international interests in times of NTS crisis. The remainder of this chapter will work out this complexity from an ASEAN-EU perspective. It begins with a discussion of ASEAN’s own migration and refugee crisis in 2015, before exploring the relevance of the migration topic within the ASEAN-EU work programme. It then concludes with a discussion of the extent to which the crises in the individual regions in 2015 have led to enhanced ASEAN-EU interaction and strengthened, if at all, the image of the EU as a political and security actor in Southeast Asia.

From the EU crisis to the ASEAN crisis In May 2015, Southeast Asia itself was confronted with a migration and refugee crisis of stateless Rohingya boat people fleeing from Myanmar. The scope and scale of the so-called May crisis of 2015 was not comparable to the immense magnitude of the crisis in the EU in 2015. Thus, the following

72  The EU and illegal migration paragraphs do not fantasise any cross-regional crisis comparisons. Examination of the crisis-responsive regional dynamics and discourses in ASEAN can nevertheless be useful because it reveals crisis-induced regional ­capacity-building, which could result in better understanding of the corresponding and absorptive capacity when interacting with the EU. In contrast to the disintegrative dynamics of the EU’s migration and refugee crisis experience described above, the May 2015 Rohingya boat people crisis in Southeast Asia acted rather as a catalyst or driver for regional institutional integration than a wedge dividing the ASEAN member states. The May crisis spurred new regional structures and transnational dialogue conducive to more intimate political engagement at relevant levels. These developments are illustrated in further detail in the following paragraphs, which begin by outlining the May 2015 crisis and then proceed to discuss the main national, ASEAN, and broader regional responses. The final part of this section then summarises the general ASEAN regional cooperation dynamics in relation to illegal migration, human trafficking, and transnational crime and links between the previous IUU discussion in Chapter 4. In a way, this section thus sets the scene for the examination of the larger Rohingya refugee crisis in 2017 in the sequel to this book. The Rohingya boat people crisis in May 2015 and the ASEAN response Thailand as an infamous source, transit, and destination country for forced labour – to which attention was called in Chapter 4 of this book in the context of the discussion of the fishing industry – has been under immense international pressure in recent times. Being home to 2–3 million foreign migrant workers, of which most of them come from Myanmar, revelations about the exploitative conditions that these migrants suffer have put the spotlight on the most vulnerable people within this group: stateless Rohingya people. According to the US Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, Thailand improved its anti-trafficking data collection and convicted 225 traffickers under the 2008 anti-­trafficking law and statutes. However, the overall situation of people smuggling and forced labour in 2013 and early 2014 suggested that “anti-trafficking law enforcement remained insufficient compared with the size of the problem in Thailand, and corruption at all levels hampered the success of these efforts” (US Department of State 2014: 373). With two consecutive waivers for Thailand following the US TIP report in 2012 and 2013, Thailand was not entitled to a third consecutive waiver according to the Trafficking ­Victims Protection Act and therefore, with the 2014 US TIP Report, Thailand was downgraded to Tier 3. This downgrading and the general international pressure on the military junta since the military coup of 22 May 2014 did not help Thailand’s quest for political stability. Thus, when in May 2015, a boat of Rohingya people neared the coastline of Thailand, Thailand’s Royal Navy followed standard procedure and was

The EU and illegal migration  73 quick to push this boat back to sea in order to protect Thailand’s borders and avoid international attention (Maier-Knapp 2017c: 12). Amidst international outcry of this treatment of the Rohingya boat people, Thailand allowed medical access and dropped off food from helicopters. Furthermore, in search for a multilateral solution, the government delegated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to seek dialogue with its ASEAN partners. On 20 May 2015, Thailand held a special meeting with the two destination countries of the Rohingya people, Malaysia and Indonesia. At this meeting, temporary asylum was considered for the boat people. Additionally, the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested a special ASEAN meeting to be held on 29 May 2015 with international partners, including Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Iran, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the USA, as well as UN agencies. International partners at the special meeting committed to support Thailand in its patrolling and surveillance efforts of the Andaman coastline. With the initiation of the special meeting in May, the Emergency ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in early July 2015, and a follow-up special meeting to the one in May in December 2015, the Thai government sent clear and timely signals to its international partners of its commitment to resolve the Rohingya boat people issue. While dialogue and cooperation on irregular migration at the sub-­ regional and ASEAN regional levels intensified through various activities, ranging from special meetings to bilateral voluntary return programmes to AMMTC activism on this issue under the Malaysian chairmanship in 20156, overall the sub-regional and regional responses avoided addressing the problem of the stateless Rohingya people directly. ASEAN engagement remained focused on border protection and fighting human trafficking, leaving discussion and resolve of the Rohingya boat people a problem to be addressed mainly at the Myanmar-UN bilateral level or within the broader Asia-Pacific Bali Process. The latter regional institution was initiated in 2002 and includes the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ­International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as partners. Here, the Bali Process partnership with IOM is noteworthy, because IOM has assumed an integral role in orchestrating humanitarian assistance and fighting for the rights of the Rohingya people over the years. With the last ministerial meeting of the Bali Process dating back to 2013, the May crisis 2015 acted as a catalyst, reviving institutional dynamics of the Bali Process. Until the May crisis, only the Ad Hoc Group of ­SOM was held regularly, steadily working off the agenda. In the wake of the crisis, the Ad ­ ellington learnt and expressed conHoc Group SOM on 16 May 2015 in W cern about the problem of irregular migration in the Bay of Bengal, stating that “there should be a standing item in future meetings on regional irregular migration trends, as useful context for discussions on specific issues” (Ad Hoc Group of Senior Officials 2015: para. 3). One and a half years later, the

74  The EU and illegal migration 11th Ad Hoc Group SOM in Colombo presented the report of the regional response to the May 2015 crisis. In addition to the May 2015 crisis, the migration crisis in the EU in 2015 provided momentum for the Bali Process, opening dialogue space for the Ad Hoc Group SOMs to boost international partnerships, including official partnerships with Southeast Asian regional centres of law enforcement and counterterrorism expertise – for example, the one with the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) commenced in June 2015 – for training and capacity-building purposes (Ad Hoc Group of Senior Officials 2015: para. 16). In March 2016, the Bali Process resumed at the ministerial level. It prioritised the topic of irregular and illegal migration in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. At the meeting, the ministers committed to end the deaths at sea through the adoption of the Bali Declaration on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime. The ministers stated in specific reference to the May crisis: The movements resulted in the tragic loss of life at sea, including approximately 70 during the crisis. The larger loss of life however was due to mistreatment and disease brought on or worsened by the smugglers. 3. We recall that although there was knowledge of maritime movements, it was the media reporting to the world on the ships stranded at sea, the discovery of graves and more profoundly the lack of coordination and agreement in the region that prompted action. This should not happen again. (Bali Process ministers 2016: para. 2 and 3) They acknowledged the actions taken by the ASEAN member states and relevant international organisations – ranging from search and rescue operations to provision of food and shelter to identity verification and repatriation efforts – and proposed new measures. These included an emergency consultation mechanism and instruments for coordination and liaison with ASEAN regional centres for more effective ASEAN capacity-building through Bali Process-ASEAN activity.

Migration in ASEAN-EU relations In 2015, with both ASEAN and the EU confronted with a migration and refugee crisis of their own, the topic of migration was highly sensitive to the members of the respective regional organisations and within the inter-­ regional dialogue between them. At the ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-­ regional level, members largely avoided the controversies from the national and regional levels by working according to set agendas and multi-annual work programmes. Instead of illegal migration, the statements of the official meetings and activities within the ASEAN-EU and ASEM dialogue process in 2015 and 2016 emphasised themes of cross-regional connectivity

The EU and illegal migration  75 and mobility. These two themes have persisted as the central frame for the topic of migration within inter-regionalism. In particular, connectivity has been an important buzzword at all levels of ASEAN-EU region-to-region activity, creating an amicable dialogue environment from the JCC and senior officials’ level to the ministerial and heads of state level. For example, in February 2015, at a critical time of the financial crisis in Greece and the EU refugee and migration crisis, the 22nd JCC meeting took place in ­Jakarta. It centred on connectivity and officially referred to the issue of (illegal) migration only in passing in the context of the ASEAN-EU project on migration and border management. A good example of the centrality of connectivity at the summitry level is the 11th ASEM Summit in Ulaanbaatar in 2016. Prominent use of the language of connectivity at this Summit points to the economic approach as the backbone of the Asia-/ ASEAN-EU relationship and the subordinate role of (illegal) migration as a stand-alone talking point. This having been said, there are inter-regional dialogue formats that have treated the issue of migration more politically. For instance, the ASEM FMMs have tended to deeper political discussions on regional migration issues due to the organisational mandate and the background of the attending representatives. This was observable amongst others in a closed-door retreat session at the 12th ASEM FMM: “We have shared cooperation ideas on the migration and refugee issue, which, as you know, is at the very top of the agenda both in Europe and in Asia” (Mogherini 2015b: 2). At the same time, ASEM meetings and other multilateral settings, where the two regions meet with other international partners to discuss shared security concerns and common global issues like illegal migration, display European proclivity to treat ASEAN and its member states as non-strategic partners and appeal mainly to China for greater international responsibility. This was observable, for example, at the above-mentioned ASEM Summit in 2016 when the German Chancellor expressed interest in seeing China help fight causes of migration to Europe, especially in countries like Syria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. This is not to say that the EU and EU member states do not consider the ASEAN region as a pole of power within their multipolar worldview. Current talks to upgrade the EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership to an EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, as described in Chapter 1, suggest indeed that there is increasing interest in discussing global concerns with Southeast Asian partners in areas that could be building blocks for global governance. The May 2015 crisis from an ASEAN-EU perspective In Europe, the Rohingya boat people crisis in May 2015 was reported in various public news outlets and raised awareness of the plight of the stateless Rohingya people. Most importantly, EU and EU member state officials based in Southeast Asia took greater interest in the issue and initiated

76  The EU and illegal migration support. For example, the European Commission and EEAS committed to (co-)funding for refugee camps, various studies and seminars on irregular migration and statelessness, and other activities in the region in 2015 and 2016. Overall, in the past five years, the EEAS has become a crucial partner to Southeast Asian countries for the promotion of inclusive conversations on the Rohingya issue in the region. The EU’s interest in bringing civil society into the conversation complements the regulatory approach of the ASEAN Secretariat and member states. Furthermore, since 2014, the EEAS has IcSP – superseding IfS – at its avail to assist in managing transregional threats and crisis or emerging crisis situations. For example, in 2017, IcSP was activated in connection to Rakhine State, from where most Rohingya refugees come.7 In addition to dialogue support, the EU addressed the problem of illegal migration of the Rohingya people in 2015 indirectly through IUU reform support in Thailand. Revelations of slavery and malpractice in Thailand’s seafood industry since 2013, described in Chapter 4, have drawn international and EU attention to the plight of illegal migrants in Thailand and the Southeast Asian region as a whole. In particular, in 2014, Thailand’s government perceived that the issue of slavery and malpractice in the fishing industry had European consumers wary and the European Commission and national governments concerned to the extent that Thailand deemed it necessary to reach out to the EU to “relieve EU slavery panic” (­Kamjan 2014). Government officials and big companies from Thailand joined forces touring the EU in November 2014 to restore the confidence of food importers in Europe. On 21 April 2015, the European Commission issued a ‘yellow card’ to warn the Thai government of its continued failure to comply with standards addressing IUU. In the aftermath of the ‘yellow card’, EU IUU reform assistance to Thailand focused on monitoring and supporting the reform process and project implementation by International Labour Organisation (ILO). EU representatives inspecting T ­ hailand’s practices in the seafood industry understand human trafficking as a related issue area and hence, called for more effective law enforcement to fight the whole complex of illegal fishing, human trafficking, organised crime, and forced labour in Thailand and the region. As observed in the previous chapter, if effective, IUU reforms targeting the fisheries could provide an entry point for wider cross-sectoral discussions of regional legalities and practices, they could possibly even assist in curbing slavery and illegal migration. This possible cross-sectoral influence through ASEAN-EU bilateral and inter-­regional action was already observed in Chapters 3 and 4 and will be further discussed in relation to anti-money laundering in Chapter 6. In addition to dialogue support and indirect influence through IUU reforms in the individual ASEAN member states, the European Commission and EEAS possess various human rights and people-to-people tools: ASEAN-EU mobility partnerships (e.g. the READI Human Rights Facility and EU Support to Higher Education in the ASEAN Region) and ASEM

The EU and illegal migration  77 (e.g. interfaith dialogues). Further funding schemes available to address human rights issues in Southeast Asia include tools of the Council, for example, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). DG DEVCO of the European Commission is an important provider of relevant aid. Its DCI has been the common budget line for supporting selected Southeast Asian countries in combatting human trafficking. DCI assistance is mainly driven by Directive 2011/36/EU, which has been designed for both internal and external actions against TIP. In light of this design, one can consider the EU’s TIP assistance to selected Southeast Asian countries through DCI and EIDHR as an extension of the EU’s internal standards and norms. This does not mean low demand orientation in DCI-/EIDHR-funded initiatives and their implementation, although the introductory criticism in the report by the European Court of Auditors may suggest this. Of course, there is always room to argue along the lines of the report and accuse the EU of failing to build up effective inter-governmental capacity and intelligence. At the same time, the listed projects below make clear that, even though EU assistance may not always partner with state agencies and target these, it complements the objectives of Southeast Asian governments by building resilient societies bottom-up and paying attention to vulnerable groups in society.

Conclusions This chapter began with an overview of the migration and refugee crisis in the EU and outlined how the crisis acted as a catalyst for institutional reform and integration, even though it challenged the EU considerably in its political and territorial integrity. The chapter then outlined the Rohingya boat people crisis in May 2015 to assess ASEAN regional institutional developments in the face of illegal migration and TIP crises. The discussion confirmed that the May crisis did indeed trigger enhanced ASEAN regional and sub-regional dialogue and cooperation efforts on human trafficking and transnational crime. Because of the ASEAN member states’ sensitivities, direct reference to resolving the issue of the stateless Rohingya people was made more broadly within the Bali Process, but avoided in most ASEAN formats. The May crisis also raised awareness amongst EU and EU member state representatives based in Southeast Asia and saw European actors making funding available for events and activities that addressed migration, migrant rights, and statelessness. For ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism on migration and refugee matters specifically, the crisis-induced institutional developments in the respective regions suggest that expanded regional capacity to address migration and refugee issues is allowing enhanced ASEAN-EU interaction on these topics in the years to come. Overall, the crises had marginal direct impact on the dialogue and cooperation on migration matters between ASEAN and the EU. The ­ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-regional dialogue and work formats in 2015 and 2016 generally followed the set multi-annual programmes. In this

Delegation in charge

Cambodia

Cambodia

Cambodia

Cambodia

Cambodia

Indonesia

Philippines

Philippines

Country

Cambodia

Cambodia

Cambodia

Cambodia

Cambodia

Indonesia

Philippines

Philippines

EIDHR/2010/246-141

EIDHR/2009/220-287

EIDHR/2010/253-189

DCI-MIGR/2013/282-889

EIDHR/2015/369-068

EIDHR/2011/272-403

EIDHR/2009/218-621

EIDHR/2011/272-402

Contract reference Safe migration and reduced trafficking (SMART) Enhancing capacity to address trafficking Enhancing the community to prevent human trafficking MIGRA ACTION – advocate, monitor, and communicate to combat human trafficking MIGRA-SAFE: safe labour migration Strengthening advocacy works and young people participation Private and public faces of violence against women Implementation of international and local laws on anti-child trafficking and other forms of child abuse

Project description (shortened)

172364

140121

99004

571000

475000

299878

188483

244855

EU funds

Core

Core

Core

Additional

Core

Core

Core

Core

Category

Table 5.1  Overview of European Commission anti-trafficking projects and funding including core and additional projects, 2009–2015

Indonesia

Thailand

Thailand

Thailand

Thailand

Thailand

Thailand

Vietnam Vietnam

Regional

Thailand

Thailand

Thailand

Thailand

Thailand

Thailand

Vietnam Vietnam

Data Source: Jakobsen et al. (2017)

Thailand

Myanmar

EIDHR/2010/248-231 EIDHR/2010/248-732

DCI-NSAPVD/2011/280-903

DCI-ASIE/2010/254-483

DCI-NSAPVD/

DCI-HUM/2015/371-801

DCI-MIGR/2008/153-312

DCI-HUM/2009/154-928

DCI-ASIE/2015/360-522

DCI-HUM/2009/155-012

Protection of vulnerable children in Myanmar from trafficking and other forms of harm EU-ASEAN migration and border management II Protecting migrant children from trafficking and exploitation in the Mekong sub-region Going back – Moving On: Economic and social empowerment of migrants Combatting unacceptable forms of work in the Thai fishing and seafood industry Empowering women’s networks to improve women’s rights protection Protection assistance to Myanmar refugees in Thailand To act toward a better inclusion of Burmese migrants Standing up against violence VESTA II 195366 251912

499331

963370

476633

3700000

1758813

584972

3200000

596963

Core Core

Additional

Additional

Additional

Core

Core

Core

Additional

Core

80  The EU and illegal migration context, the chapter delved deeper into the normative influence by pointing out the cases of EU legal and regulatory projections to Southeast Asia in connection to Council ­Regulation 1005/2008 and Directive 2011/36/EU. Indeed, the empirical discussion and the list of EU-funded anti-human trafficking projects suggest, from an EU perspective, that on matters of migration and anti-trafficking the EU as a collective international actor can be seen as an exemplary normative actor, upholding and integrating human rights and other values in its dialogue and cooperation efforts with Southeast Asia. To bring the chapter to full circle here and emphasise the EU’s normative qualities, it is suitable to refer once again to the study by the European Court of Auditors. Amongst others, the study commended the European Commission of being true to its normative identity throughout the listed projects in Table 5.1 (pages 78–79).

Notes 1 For example, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán angered the EU bureaucracy with his plans of building a fence at the Hungarian-Serbian border. This provoked Juncker to threaten Orbán with an exclusion of Hungary from the EU. 2 For instance, German-Turkish discussions to exchange non-Syrian refugees in the EU with Syrian refugees in Turkey irritated the French leadership. 3 For example, MEP Guy Verhofstadt took a swipe at the President of the ­European Commission for his failure to manage the refugee and asylum situation. 4 Additionally, in September 2015, the establishment of European border guards under an enhanced Frontex was suggested. These border guards would work closely with national authorities, contributing to smart and integrated border management. 5 Although focus has been on Africa, there have been various EEAS HLDs on migration with other external partners. 6 Being a transit and destination country of Rohingya refugees, Malaysia as the ASEAN chair took great interest in the migration agenda and, for example, pushed for the ratification of the ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons in November 2015. 7 This will be discussed in greater detail in the third book.

6 The EU and counterterrorism

In the Introduction of this book, reference was made to terrorism as an important topic on the regional as well as inter-­regional agenda of ASEAN and the EU. Within these regional organisations, terrorism, like no other transboundary NTS threat, has managed to shape national discourses favourable for security capacity-building both within and across national borders in an otherwise highly guarded realm. Although terrorism touches the very heart of national sovereignty and sees governments still reluctant to share intelligence, both the ASEAN and EU member states have recognised that the threat of global terrorism cannot be managed by individual countries alone. In the EU, the terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016 have provided momentum for enhanced interest in cross-­border coordination, facilitating more cohesive cross-border dialogue amongst the authorities of the EU member states than on the topic of migration.1 For the EU, the terrorist threat emanating from Southeast Asia is limited. Main concern for Europeans stems from the return of Southeast Asian fighters from Syria and Iraq. With Southeast Asia, being a popular holiday destination for EU citizens, the EU and its member states want to make sure ­ outheast that certain parts of the Philippines, Indonesia, and a few other S Asian countries are not becoming a safe haven for foreign and returning fighters, in which the rule of law wanes and local terrorist groups with global links operate. This concern became vivid to the German government in early 2017, when after three to four months in captivity a German sailor was decapitated by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a terrorist group which has links to Islamic State (IS). This beheading of a European citizen underlines the importance of counterterrorism dialogue and cooperation between the EU, the EU member states, and Southeast Asian governments. In this tragedy, counterterrorism interests of the Philippines aligned with the counterterrorism interests and foreign policy principles of the EU and its member states. While the fight against global terror is a key threat commonality on the agenda of the ASEAN and EU member states and alignment of counterterrorism interests appears as given, there are currently developments within a number of Southeast Asian countries, which complicate deeper counterterrorism dialogue and cooperation between European

82  The EU and counterterrorism and Southeast Asian actors. For example, in the context of the case of the beheading specifically, the incumbent Filipino president’s hard line on a variety of political and NTS issues, namely the War on Drugs, has made an open and progressive dialogue with the EU and its member states difficult. The past two decades indeed revealed a number of occasions, when incompatibilities between the EU’s principled foreign policy and the agenda and working method of the Southeast Asian counterpart stalled the ­ASEAN-EU official dialogue (Algieri 2007; Maier-Knapp 2010; Maier-Knapp 2014a; Manea 2008; Petersson 2006; Rüland 2001). At the same time, in the last two decades, there have also been instances in connection to counterterrorism cooperation between ASEAN and the EU, which revealed a lenient EU that did not attach human rights and other normative criteria to its support. This has been the case when the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) was used in the aftermath of the Bali bombings in 2002 (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 70). This is not to suggest that the projection of the EU’s normative identity in its relations with Southeast Asia is haphazard. However, in light of the second guiding research question, it is Figure 6.1  Filipino newspaper article in the aftermath of the beheading.

Source: The Philippine Star (2017)

The EU and counterterrorism  83 important to note that there is variability. The following empirical discussion seeks to substantiate all three guiding research questions in the context of counter terrorism by beginning with an outline of contemporary EU regional developments in the wake of the terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016 in the EU. Specifically, it looks at the case of the Munich homicide and Paris attacks, to show the extent to which EU intra-regional crises and crisis-induced capacity-­ building could be of interest to ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-­regionalism. The chapter then shifts the narrative to Southeast Asia and offers an assessment of the regional responses, or rather the lack thereof, to the terrorist attack at the Erawan Shrine in Bangkok in 2015 and the attacks in the central business district of Jakarta in early 2016. The remainder of the chapter will then relate these (intra-)2regional perspectives with the ASEAN-EU, ASEM, and the EEAS-Southeast Asian level of anti-terrorism interaction.

EU regional crises and institutional development It was ten to six in the evening of Friday 22 July 2016 when the first emergency calls reached police about a shooting at the Olympia shopping mall just a stone’s throw away from the Olympia Park in Munich, where the 1972 Summer Olympics took place, at which a Palestinian terrorist group took Israeli athletes hostage and killed them. Forty-four years onwards, in the evening rush hour of the 22 July, events were unfolding rapidly with massive police presence and helicopter surveillance in the Olympia shopping mall area. Germany’s elite special operations police unit Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG9) from Bonn was flown in, police from Baden-Württemberg and neighbouring Austria were alerted, and officers at the German-Czech border were informed that there may have been a terrorist attack. News spread rapidly across traditional and social media with live broadcast of the situation at the Olympia shopping mall. It appeared that the Free State of Bavaria was treating the situation in the sense of a worst-case scenario, as a national security crisis. There was fear that high fatality terrorism, as seen in Paris in January 2015 with the Charlie Hebdo attacks or in November 2015 with the Bataclan attacks and in Brussels with the attacks at a metro station and at the airport in Zaventem in March 2016, had reached German soil. After the Olympia Park shooting, there was an eight-month long investigation, which closed with a press conference stating that the attacker had been bullied and that the incident was a homicide. Similar mass shootings in Germany in the past, such as the case of Winnenden, have sparked the intensification of national laws on gun control and gun possession, but never led to a full-blown and cross-border coordinated counterterrorist response with assistance of special forces as in the case of this homicide in Munich. This suggests that Germany in 2016 – amidst the migration crisis, populist backlash, and the terror in the neighbouring countries – was a different German country to the one at the time of the 2009 Winnenden school shooting. Germany 2016 was politically sensitised and embroiled in messy security debates of fear.

84  The EU and counterterrorism The Munich attack reignited various aspects of existing national security debates, namely gun control, the deployment of the Bundeswehr in the case of a terrorist attack on homeland soil, and internet surveillance. Simultaneously, counterterrorism policy proposals under way within the EU bureaucracy and the regional agendas effective in the wake of the Paris and Brussels attacks experienced a new impetus. The major terrorist crisis to have spurred EU regional integration dynamics on counterterrorism in recent times was the Charlie Hebdo attack on 7 January 2015. The immediate policy response at the regional level started officially on 11 January 2015 with a special meeting of the EU member states, European Commission, and American representatives3 in Paris, centring on a two-pronged agenda of preventing propaganda and hindering travel movements from and to Syria. An informal meeting of the JHA Council followed on 29 January 2015 in Riga. This meeting was seminal for EU ­intra-regional cooperation, calling for the upscaling of national and regional capacity as well as the introduction of more executive measures in fighting and preventing terrorism. Amongst others, better tracing of terrorist finance, improved information exchange and data streamlining of Europol, further development of European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), and the upgrading process of the Schengen Information System were discussed to assist in detecting terrorists and persons living in the EU suspected of wanting to join a terrorist group. Moreover, the enhancement of cooperation with external partners was addressed, namely in connection to the EU’s strategic partners in the area of mutual legal assistance.4 At the same time, the JHA ministers admitted at this informal meeting that, even though many tools are readily available, they have not been applied in worst-case scenarios previously and that the immediate use of some tools for security purposes may be rushed. Two days after the European Council met on 12 February to discuss the issue of terrorism, another terrorist attack – possibly inspired by the ­Charlie Hebdo attack – took place in Copenhagen at an event where Swedish ­Muhammed cartoonist Lars Vilks was present. The Danish Prime Minister immediately announced new national measures against terrorism. These proceeded without significant EU coordination, given Denmark’s opt-out of EU Justice and the urgency of the situation. While the immediate response focused on national needs only, coordination with the EU and its member states took place at a later stage, given the fear of the migration-­terrorist nexus, as Denmark is a Schengen country. This attack spurred the migration-­terrorism security links in the public discourse of Western Europe and added pressure on the Council of the EU to act. This pressure on the Council soon surmounted with the Brussels attack on 22 March 2015. Against the backdrop of this series of terrorist attacks in the early months of 2015, it was high time that the European Agenda on Security was adopted in April 2015, giving direction for the institutional changes and innovations to fight the terrorist threat in Europe. The European Agenda

The EU and counterterrorism  85 on Security foresaw, for example, the establishment of a European counterterrorism centre within Europol and a revised Schengen system with additional checks. Incrementally, individual initiatives based on this agenda were being realised, for instance, the Task Force against online terrorism within Europol came into being on 22 July. Overall, in the summer of 2015, EU official discourse on counterterrorism heightened. Indeed, at all levels of society, fear of IS attacks increased and security perceptions sharpened, especially following IS’ call for terror in European holiday destinations. For the remainder of 2015, Western Europe remained in the grip of terrorist fear. In particular, France, which was confronted with attacks in St Quentin Fallavier on 26 June and on a Thalys train on 21 August. Thus, even though the JHA Council prioritised the issue of migration for the most of the 2015 working agenda, counterterrorism was never far behind in their work priority because of the series of attacks that year. The following Council Conclusions on Strengthening the Use of means of fighting Trafficking in Firearms adopted on 8 October provide a good overview of the various issues that emerged in the course of 2015 and the direction of institutional development: EMPHASISING that the renewed Internal Security Strategy 2015– 2020[1] identified inter alia tackling and preventing terrorism, reinforced border security and preventing and fighting serious and organised crime as priorities for the coming years in the field of European Union internal security, and recognised the serious threat the illegal firearms pose to the European Union internal security, NOTING that the terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, Copenhagen earlier this year and, more recently, the thwarted Thalys train attack on 21 August 2015, have shown the need to further strengthen the use of means of fighting trafficking of firearms,… 6. Present a proposal to revise Directive 91/477 of 18 June 1991 at the latest at the beginning of 2016 in order to strengthen the firearms legislative framework, for example to improve the sharing of information on firearms, reinforce their traceability, to standardise marking and to take into account the illegal trafficking through the Internet and Darknet, 7. Pending the revision of the Directive 91/477, submit at the latest by the end of 2015 a Commission Regulation for strong minimum standards for deactivation of firearms, 8. Inform COSI at regular intervals on the state of play of the implementation of the Action Plan on illicit trafficking in firearms between the EU and the South East Europe region (2015–2019) [9], 9. Continue working on the iARMS/SIS interoperability project in close cooperation with Europol, International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) and the Member States and to regularly inform COSI on the progress achieved with a view to enabling full interoperability between both systems in the near future. (Council of the EU 2015a)

86  The EU and counterterrorism The Bataclan attack on 13 November 2015 added urgency to implement the measures presented above. Measures concerned with the restriction of gun ownership, combat of arms smuggling, and cybercrime were already under way at both the national and regional levels.5 In the wake of the Bataclan attack, an extraordinary meeting of the JHA Council convened on 20 ­November under the Luxembourg Presidency. Other EU ministerial-level meetings also addressed the attack and possible assistance to France. For example, the Foreign Affairs Council met on 16 ­November and the EU Defence ­ ovember to discuss opportunities to Ministers’ Meeting took place on 17 N support France. At the Defence Ministers’ Meeting, the parties – including ­ ffairs and Security Policy the High Representative of the EU for Foreign A and the NATO Secretary General – reaffirmed their solidarity with France. For example, Mogherini said at the Defence Ministers’ Meeting that “Europe as a whole has been attacked. Today France sought the help and assistance of all of Europe” (Mogherini 2015a). The latter refers to Hollande’s invocation of Art. 42 paragraph 7, requesting mutual defence assistance from the other EU member states. While France’s use of the mutual defence clause of the Lisbon Treaty was backed by all EU member states unanimously at the Defence Ministers’ Meeting, it was unclear what the individual defence contributions would be. In the following days, clearer individual commitments transpired. For example, the UK allowed France to use its air base in Cyprus to fly attacks over Syria. Germany committed to support French troops in Mali. At the same time, France itself took the attack literally as a declaration of war and intensified air strikes against IS in Raqqa. At the intelligence-sharing level, the Bataclan attack triggered European Commission interest in creating a pan-EU intelligence agency; especially after learning that alleged accomplices had been arrested in Bavaria prior to the Bataclan attack. This said, the Charlie Hebdo attack had already triggered bilateral and regional integration efforts in this area, as noted in the Council Conclusions on 8 October in the context of the role of Europol on matters of cybercrime and cross-border investigations concerning firearms (Council of the EU 2015a: para. 10). In this light, the European Commission’s interest has to be seen as additional impetus for the cooperation efforts under way, reassuring the member states6 in their quest to bolster their national intelligence service and take greater account of the cross-border dimension of their work. In addition to the impact on the institutions and inter-institutional alignment and cooperation across borders, the Bataclan attack had a deep emotional impact on the peoples of the EU: In Spain, for example, which was mourning victims, the national psyche was at a low and the political parties suspended their campaigns for the general election. In Romania, which was mourning two victims, the tragedy brought up reminders of the horror of the night club fire in Bucharest. Although the latter was not a tragedy caused by terrorism, but by corruption.

The EU and counterterrorism  87 The Bataclan attack was an attack on the people of Europe and the idea of ­ urope itself. Nationalist discourses restrengthened across Europe and even E those Western European pro-asylum heads of state were starting to feel the pressure and link migration issues with terrorism. Overall, political action in response to the Bataclan attack was slow in progression. For example, one year after Bataclan, agreement on further tightening of the EU firearms legislation was still not brought about. Seemingly, it took another terrorist attack, the Breitscheidplatz attack in December 2016 in Berlin, to compel the EU bureaucracy to push through some access restrictions to semi-automatic guns. This furthermore reveals the significance of the big EU member states in advancing and reinforcing ­security- and defence-related institutional developments at the regional level. In 2015, it seemed that national debates on migration and terrorism and the unanimous decision-making procedures at the EU level had stalled reform of regional justice and security policies. While the EU is cautious not to over-react and pre-empt,7 this delay in reforms raises serious questions about the level of EU ‘crisis-proofness’.

Terror in Southeast Asia and the regional response Although the described terrorist attacks in the EU were far away and did not impact Southeast Asian communities overseas, the ASEAN member states followed with interest the developments in the EU. Of interest to Southeast Asian governments was and is the EU’s counterterrorism and counter-­piracy engagement mainly because it contributes to the security of Southeast Asian nationals inside and outside the EU. For example, EU counter-piracy measures in the Gulf of Aden led to the release of Southeast Asian nationals that were taken hostage by Somali pirates. Moreover, in light of the links between Southeast Asian terrorism and IS terrorism, attacks in the EU claimed by IS alerted the ASEAN member states and led some Southeast Governments to step up security capacity-building: The Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan attacks led to enhanced police capacity within many Southeast Asian capitals, primarily for the protection of foreign embassies. However, main momentum for Southeast Asian security capacity-building followed attacks in the region. These local(ised) attacks raised awareness about the need for cross-border information-sharing and coordination and triggered individual regional cooperation efforts. The following paragraphs discuss the major national and regional institutional developments in connection to the case of the Bangkok bombing in 2015 and the Jakarta attack in 2016. The remainder of the chapter then concludes with an assessment of the EU’s inter-regional and bilateral counterterrorism dialogue and cooperation with Southeast Asian partners.

88  The EU and counterterrorism Bangkok and Jakarta attacks On 17 August 2015, a bomb exploded in the heart of Bangkok at the Erawan shrine at the Ratchaprasong crossing, one of the busiest intersections in Thailand’s capital, killing 20 and injuring over 120. Initially, there were accusations against red shirt groups of the North of Thailand as well as rumours about Southern insurgents. Immediately following the attack, national security measures were beefed up. Suspicious communities and neighbourhoods in Bangkok – namely in Min Buri where young people from Thailand’s Southern provinces live – were checked as part of these measures, although police insisted that the attacks were not committed by insurgents from the South. Indeed, the police were quick to arrest Uighur suspects at the end of August and early September based on footage of closed-circuit television. With the suspects allegedly having links to the global Uighur movement and with this movement’s ongoing protest against the general Thai-Sino deportation policy, the Thai government managed to frame the bombing and Uighur issue as a national security problem and to be dealt with on a bilateral basis with China. International support for the investigations was offered from various countries, but Thailand’s police believed that it was capable of handling the matter by itself. A few months later, the Jakarta bombings shocked the region and compelled the police in Thailand to recheck certain neighbourhoods in Bangkok, sparking new life into the ongoing investigations of the Erawan attack. Even though fellow ASEAN member states were interested in the progress of the investigations in Thailand and although terrorism within their countries put pressure on Thai authorities to consider the international implications of the Erawan attack, it seemed that Thailand rejected any internationalisation of the Erawan attack beyond the Thai-Sino Uighur dimension. Two years later, however, the arrest of a suspect from the South of Thailand in Turkey internationalised the Erawan attack and visualised the hitherto opaqueness of the investigation process. The arrest indeed pointed to Thai authorities downplaying possible local links to insurgency movements in the South of the country. Thailand’s rejection of any connections between the Erawan attack and the Southern problem as well as international terrorism shielded it from international IS and terrorism alarmism, as was evident in the EU in 2016. The above-named Jakarta attack on 14 January 2016 killed seven people in the central business district of Jakarta. Terrorists linked to Bahrun Naim, which is a group linked to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and which had publicly praised the Bataclan attack and other attacks in ­Europe, claimed responsibility. Reportings of phone calls to Malaysia prior to the Jakarta attack revealed the international dimension and alarmed neighbouring countries as well as regional partners, which were then quick to step up national security measures. Given the confirmed international and IS dimensions of the attack, there was an urgency for Southeast Asian

The EU and counterterrorism  89 governments to move beyond national security measures and look into bilateral and regional efforts. The rise in regional and international vigilance towards Islamist terrorism following the Jakarta attack was in stark contrast to the Bangkok attack, which was subject to de-internationalisation efforts of Thailand. This having been said, even though the ASEAN Secretariat condemned both attacks and called for solidarity and commitment to work with the international community to fight all forms of terrorism, it seemed that both attacks had equally limited impact on ASEAN regional counterterrorism integration. Mainly those ASEAN member states, home to ­Islamist terrorist groups with proven ties to IS, pursued some form of active bilateral and sub-regional communication efforts. At the heart of the ASEAN regional dialogue and cooperation on counterterrorism is the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism adopted in 2001 and the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT). The latter acts as the framework agreement, providing guidelines for national and regional counterterrorism activities in line with international standards and definitions. It came into force in 2011, although it was not ratified by all ASEAN members then. While ACCT and other ASEAN counterterrorism agreements make up the key ASEAN body of counterterrorism rules for intra-regional dialogue and activities, AMMTC – see Chapter 5 – is the central regional dialogue framework for discussing counterterrorism. By treating terrorism as part of the purview of the ASEAN dialogue on transnational crime, the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN member states are defining, or rather predefining, terrorism as a criminal act of nonstate actors. This implies that counterterrorism is mainly understood from a state perspective in the sense of law enforcement. In addition to the law enforcement perspective, terrorism, being a cross-cutting issue, is regularly on the agenda of ASEAN security, defence, and human rights dialogue processes like ADMM or the AICHR, complementing ­A MMTC discussions. Overall, there is limited interest in the effective development and employment of existing legal tools at the regional level. At best, effective cooperation, in the sense of joint operations or intelligence-sharing, takes place at the sub-regional level amongst some agencies of the four ASEAN member states with proven IS-linked domestic terrorism. In the joint operations of these countries, maritime security and anti-piracy play an important role in counterterrorism.8 This chapter’s introductory discussion of the decapitation of a German sailor by the ASG in the Philippines confirms the significance of the maritime space to Southeast Asian terrorism and hence, underlines the security value of EU support to maritime security in the region, as explored in Chapter 4. At the ASEAN regional level, a handful of military exercises within ADMM and ADMM+ have made use of terror scenarios at sea. Here, it is important to note the role of the ASEAN chair in cohering the agenda across the different ASEAN dialogue processes. Since the ASEAN

90  The EU and counterterrorism chair acts as the chair of ADMM and ADMM+, as well as ARF, during the designated period of chairmanship, it is expected that under the chairmanship of the Philippines in 2017 and Singapore in 2018, terrorism and maritime security will be key regional security concerns addressed across the named ASEAN fora. In addition to the interests of the chair, international topicality of an issue also plays a role in informing the prioritisation and mainstreaming of a security concern. For example, the ADMM+ Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism Exercise FTX 20169 took place under the chairmanship of landlocked Laos, which is less concerned about Islamist terrorism at sea. This having been said, the actual proposal and planning of the exercise took place under the preceding chairmanship.

Inter-regional counterterrorism engagement By the 1980s, international terrorism had become a fixed talking point on the inter-regional ASEAN-EC ministerial agenda. Both regions committed to finding “political solutions to the problems which form the roots of terrorism” (ASEAN and EC member states 1988: para. 27). The 1990s displayed a different picture, seeing waning interest until the ­September 11 attacks (Maier-­K napp 2014b: 67). Since these attacks in New York City, global terrorism has remained a priority security concern on the ASEAN-EU inter-­regional agenda. At times, it even overshadowed entire summits and meetings, at which the ASEAN and EU counterparts participated. Namely the previously described Nice attack just a few hours before the 11th ASEM Summit or the September 11 attacks eleven days before the 4th ASEM Summit in Copenhagen overshadowed the ASEM process and influenced regional and national counterterrorism developments of the participants. The more recent attack in Nice saw, for example, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong say at the 11th ASEM Summit that “we know that terrorists have the intention to attack Singapore” and that there is need for enhanced preparedness (The Straits Times 2016b). He further said that it is impossible to prevent terrorist acts like the Nice attack through enhancement of national security measures alone. Cross-border cooperation is important and Singapore has displayed considerable progress with Malaysia and Indonesia in sharing intelligence since the September 11 attacks. Greater global efforts are, however, needed to fight, in particular, terrorist financing, radical ideology, and border security. The comments of the Prime Minister of Myanmar U Htin Kyaw to the press at the 11th ASEM Summit revealed similar emphasis on cross-border cooperation, stating that “the leaders exchanged views … in addressing common challenges of regional and international issues, including non-traditional security challenges, particularly the rise of terrorism and violent extremism” (The Global New Light of Myanmar 2016: 1). The example of the Nice attack shows the direct impact of a terrorist crisis in the EU on the inter-regional working level as well as on the ASEM participants’ reflective processes about their own regional and national

The EU and counterterrorism  91 preparedness. Moreover, the expressions of condolences and solidarity by the Southeast Asian and European leaders at these meetings are fortifying cross-regional emotional bonds within the dialogue process, strengthening so-to-speak a Schicksalsgemeinschaft of states in light of a common nonstate threat. Within the ASEAN-EU inter-regional context, statements of solidarity have been issued by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, for example, in the aftermath of the Bataclan attack (issued on 17 November 2015), Brussels attack (issued on 23 March 2016), the Nice attack (issued on 16 July 2016), and others. All of these statements emphasised commitment to working closely with the international community to fight terrorism in all its forms (ASEAN foreign ministers 2016a and 2016b). They express condolences to the government and the families of the victims, underlining the sense of a genuine cross-regional Schicksalsgemeinschaft. In spite of this acknowledgement of the victims and their families and the statements referring to terrorism “in all its forms” and cooperation with the “international community”, one cannot escape, as hinted above, a certain sense of statist self-assertion and portrayal of the state as the force of good. In this light, statements of condemnation and solidarity work as they should do in the sense that they demonstrate the inter-regional institutional connect, essentially confirming the relations between the states of the two regions. In addition to the inter-regional institutional connect, there are processes of institutional learning taking place across the regions, influencing the trajectory of regional and inter-regional integration. For example, as previously referred to in the second section of this chapter, Southeast Asian officials have admitted that the attacks in Europe have been viewed with concern and that they have raised alarm bells about one’s own security capacity. In particular, those ASEAN member states with foreign fighters in Syria and fearful of the extent of Islamist radicalisation in their own country are observing European actions closely. These irregular crisis-induced learning and regional awareness processes complement the ongoing implementation of national and regional work programmes in Southeast Asia. The September 11 attacks provided initial momentum for contemporary ASEAN-EU dialogue on counterterrorism. Then, it has been mainly the attacks within the respective regions that have driven the regional and external counterterrorism agendas. With the intensification of IS dominance in Syria and the terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere from early 2015 onwards, the terrorist threat was reprioritised on the inter-regional security agenda, after 2013 and 2014 saw priority given to maritime security and the South China Sea issue within the ASEAN-EU dialogue. For example, at the 21st AEMM in Bangkok from 13 to 14 October 2016, individual governments like Indonesia emphasised the cooperative potential of inter-­ regionalism and called for enhanced engagement on counterterrorism, deradicalisation, illegal migration, and human trafficking. This raised levels of EU member state interest in Indonesian approaches to counterterrorism. Other ASEAN-EU level meetings in 2015 and 2016 displayed

92  The EU and counterterrorism similar strong interest in terrorism, transnational crime, and related issues. For example, the joint communique of the 48th ASEAN FMM, the ASEAN member states noted the convening of the 4th ASEAN Plus European Union Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC + EU) Consultation on 11 June 2015 in Siem Reap, Cambodia. Both sides reaffirmed the commitments to intensify ASEAN-EU cooperation in the fight against terrorism and transnational organised crime. (ASEAN foreign ministers 2015: para. 104). Similarly, various ASEM meetings reconfirmed the centrality of the terrorist threat in 2015 and 2016. For example, Mogherini stated that migration and counterterrorism were discussed in-depth in a closed retreat session at the 12th ASEM FMM (Mogherini 2015b). Indeed, more generally, both within the ASEAN-EU and ASEM approach, the member states underline “the people-to-people approach in fighting extremism and terrorism, and acknowledg[ing] the importance of education in overcoming stereotypes” (Maier-Knapp 2014: 74). Maier-Knapp adds that the EU thus “acts in accordance with its normative identity and actively promotes its norms and values in line with UN resolutions and with respect for the UN Charter on Human Rights” (2014: 74). Today, UN multilateral frameworks continue to function as central reference frameworks both in the EU’s and ­ASEAN’s external relations, cementing the significance of multilateralism and rule of law within the ASEAN/Asian-EU interaction on counterterrorism matters. This was evident in the Chairman’s Statement of the 12th ASEM FMM in 2015, explicitly referring to the global level – namely the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy – in guiding counterterrorism cooperation between Asia and Europe (ASEM foreign ministers : para. 24). Within the ASEAN-EU context, this treatment of the threat of terrorism within broader narratives of multilateralism was, for instance, affirmed, amongst others, within the Bangkok Declaration of the 21st AEMM. In this declaration, reference was made, amongst others, to structural prevention and cross-border cooperation that respects “diversity, tolerance and moderation” (ASEAN and EU member states 2016: para. 10). These and other examples affirm the EU’s interest in upholding people-­orientation and multilateralism within ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-­regional dialogue on counterterrorism and consolidate the EU’s normative profile in the region. Already in the first book, the EU’s limited collective competencies in counterterrorism, on the one hand, and the difficulty in establishing workable inter-­regional commonalities, on the other,10 were outlined as inhibitors of any effective inter-regional cooperation on counterterrorism. The recent decade has nevertheless witnessed an incremental expansion of workable talking points. For instance, the Joint EU-UNODC initiative to support Southeast

The EU and counterterrorism  93 Asian countries on counterterrorism facilitated technical assistance in the area of inter-agency collaboration protocols, criminal justice systems, and cooperation for more effective ratification and enforcement of legal instruments, including those for fighting terrorist financing. This assistance was provided to Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Another example is the support given to regional centres on counterterrorism like SEARCCT. Amongst others, the assistance to SEARCCT resulted in a study on counter-­radicalisation published in 2016.11 The fight against radicalisation and extremism provides a non-controversial thematic field for the EU supranational level to make financial resources available to Southeast Asian partners. Another issue area that has emerged as a special area of engagement for the European Commission and EEAS over the years has been anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing. Even though current EU legislation, namely the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation, has only specified Laos as a high-risk third-world country in Southeast Asia, to which the Regulation is delegated, there seems to be need to revisit this classification of Laos and possibly expand the geographic scope in Southeast Asia, not least given the transnational dimension of terrorism and its financial flows. In conclusion, the EU and its member states understand that continuous awareness about terrorist developments in Southeast Asia is vital for the EU’s own fight against IS and global Islamist terror. In light of past experience with the Al Qaeda-Southeast Asian link of Southeast Asian terrorist groups, mainly in the context of radicalisation propaganda and training of recruits, incumbent authorities in Southeast Asia and the EU are warned that the current links between IS and terrorist groups operating in Southeast Asia could have implications beyond Southeast Asian extremists leaving to Syria to fight for IS. Indeed, the nearing defeat of IS in Syria at the time of writing and the return of Southeast Asian foreign fighters back to the ASEAN region could not only see radical Islamist ideology move across regions but also actual IS troops themselves seeking a safe haven in Southeast Asian countries.

Conclusions Between 2009 and 2016, counter-extremism and -terrorism dialogue and cooperation between the member states of the EU and ASEAN enhanced steadily and received additional integration momentum through IS terrorist attacks like the ISIL attack in Nice. Promotion of the transnational dimension of the cross-regional conversation on counterterrorism was also observable, seeing space enhanced for civil society and other non-­governmental actors to engage on topics related to extremism and radicalisation. Similar to the discussion of the ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-regional dialogue in the first book, covering the period from the early 1990s until 2005, this chapter demonstrated the continuity of the EU approach, thematic foci, and activities in assisting Southeast Asia. Simultaneously, new niche areas

94  The EU and counterterrorism of dialogue and cooperation at the hard security end of counterterrorism and -extremism were touched upon. These new niche areas create space for regional authorities and agencies – such as Europol or EUMC – hitherto uninvolved in the ASEAN-EU inter-regional conversation on counterterrorism to contribute to inter-regional capacity-building. In summary, the discussions in this chapter suggest that, even though counterterrorism is the prerogative of the member states of both regional organisations, existing EU supranational competencies that address global terrorism both directly and indirectly are expanding and could have positive impact on the inter-regional level. For example, the externalisation or delegation of the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation and other regulations assisted in carving out a distinct EU counterterrorism profile along regulatory lines in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Then there are the IfS- and IcSP-funded projects in Southeast Asia that also target provinces with local insurgency and terrorism, suggesting that the advancement of a ‘harder’ EU supranational security perspective does not necessarily encroach upon the competencies of the EU member states. These and other developments like the progress of the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership process are important signals to Southeast Asian partners that the EU as a collective actor is committed to consolidating a cohesive organisational security profile that takes greater account of the more robust security needs of the region. Concomitantly, the EU remains committed to its fundamental values and principles at the ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-regional level and therefore continuously counts on the people dimension in fighting extremism and terrorism in both regions.

Notes 1 As described in Chapter 5, links and influences exist between migration and terrorism and have been actively created in public discourses, assisting the cross-sectoral impact of policies and capacity. Nevertheless, a causality between the two policy fields does not exist per se and, indeed, such linkage should be avoided, if one does not want any religious bias informing European migration policies. 2 The word ‘intra-’ has been put in parentheses, because both ASEAN and EU institutional developments were not purely regional and, indeed, sub-regional bilateral and trilateral cooperation trends seemed to have been deeper in scope and effectiveness. 3 American solidarity is important, since France’s participation in the US-led coalition against IS has fuelled terrorism in France. 4 Once the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership is finalised, these deliberations of enhanced mutual legal assistance could also apply to the ASEAN member states. 5 For example, at the regional level, the former two issue areas were treated within the European Commission’s Action Plan on Fire Arms and Explosives presented in December 2015. 6 For example, in the week following Bataclan, the British government announced around 1900 new jobs within MI5 and MI6.

The EU and counterterrorism  95 7 Amongst others, in Germany, critical and suspicious voices about EU counterterrorism activism could be heard at high levels: On 4 April 2016, EurActiv cited the remarks that Hans-Georg Maaßen, President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, made to the Nürnberger Nachrichten. He was quoted to have questioned the utility of a EU counterterrorism centre in the fight against global terror, pointing to questions of institutional and functional duplication, given the existing European Counter Terrorism Centre within Europol which was established on 1 January 2016, amongst others, to facilitate data collection and exchange between the EU member states. His exact words were: Wenn man für mehr Bürokratie sorgen will, dann ist die Idee eines neuen europäischen Terror-Abwehr-Zentrums eine tolle Sache. Ansonsten würde so eine Institution rein gar nichts verändern. Sie wäre nur die überstürzte Reaktion auf einen Kampf, an dem die EU derzeit zu verzweifeln scheint. Gut, dass Innenminister de Maizière auf diesen Zug nicht aufspringt. 8 This chapter’s introductory discussion of the decapitation of a German sailor by the ASG in the Philippines confirms the significance of the maritime space to Southeast Asian terrorism and hence, reconfirms the value of EU support to maritime security in the region, as explored in Chapter 4. 9 FTX 2016 was a multinational 11-day exercise, which began on 3 May 2016. It consisted of tabletop exercises and operational drills related to both land-based and sea-based scenarios of terrorist attack. Prior to FTX 2016, there was only one counterterrorism exercise within ADMM+, CTX in Indonesia in September 2013. 10 In the first book, the example of the RRM following the Bali Bombings was given. The first book concluded that initial ambitions and plans to cooperate on counterterrorism post-Bali Bombings were scaled down significantly over time and in the end the agreed upon EU-ASEAN Border Management project was implemented through a bilateral ASEAN member state-EU project only. Thus, it is a bit surprising that funding within the current cycle of DG DEVCO has earmarked EUR3.2 million for the continuation of the EU–ASEAN Migration and Border Management Programme from 2015 until 2018. 11 Concomitantly, SEARCCT itself was and still is proactive in reaching out to conduct work within EU and Asian–EU schemes. This included, for instance, a SEARCCT proposal in collaboration with the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 15 June 2015 to organise an ASEM Symposium on Countering Radicalisation.

7 Summary of main findings

The previous chapters have demonstrated that the ASEAN-EU inter-­ regional security ­dialogue, and with this the inter-regional NTS dialogue, has come a long way since the first ministerial articulation of a common political and security agenda in the Joint Statement on Political Issues in 1980. In particular, they have shown the salience of transboundary NTS crises in spurring security discourses both at the national and regional levels, driving integration and institutional reform of the respective regional organisations. Some NTS crises raised awareness about the need for enhanced extra-regional cooperation and had impact on the ASEAN-EU/ASEM inter-­ regional agenda-setting and programming processes.1 In treating NTS crises as the analytical starting point, the empirical chapters centred, first, the actors’ level of crisis preparedness and managerial/governance capacity and, second, the NTS crisis-/challenge-relevant actions of the regional actors to create understanding of the regional and inter-regional institutional integration dynamics discussed. The following paragraphs will summarise the key insights of the individual empirical chapters and integrate these findings into the discussion of the three guiding research questions in the second part of this chapter.

Summary of Chapter 3 Chapter 3 presented the case of the transboundary haze crisis in Southeast Asia in 2015. It began by outlining selected national and ASEAN regional responses, making clear that Southeast Asian governments are finding it difficult to get the annual haze under control. In particular, the chapter portrayed Indonesia’s reluctance to commit to ASEAN regional initiatives and the growing impatience of some of the other ASEAN member states with Indonesia’s handling of the haze issue. The chapter then described ­Singaporean pressure on Indonesia. By taking legal measures against those Indonesian and multinational corporations identified as having been ­responsible for the severe haze episode in Singapore in 2015, the government of Singapore risked confrontation with Indonesia. In the eyes of the latter, this pressure transgressed the sanctity of national sovereignty, whereas

Summary of main findings  97 in the eyes of Singapore and other ASEAN member states the haze from ­Indonesia was violating national sovereignty. While anti-haze support by the EU and its member states did not manifest as a direct response to the 2015 haze crisis and has been rather sporadic throughout the years, direct European support to Indonesia on broader concerns of environmental protection and sustainable forest governance has been consistent and even deepened over the last decade. The increase in consumer power and pressure in Western Europe has provided an environment conducive to enhanced Western European engagement with Indonesia on environmental issues. For example, as the world’s largest importer of palm oil from Indonesia and as an important international subsidy provider for biofuels, the EU has been the target of European consumer pressure directly, as well as indirectly through NGOs and MEPs. Especially the latter have become more vocal on the biofuel issue in recent years, pressuring the European Commission to revise existing palm oil trade partnerships worldwide and even consider a palm oil ban, risking dispute with Malaysia and Indonesia.2 Although the pressure from the MEPs enhances the significance of the ASEAN-EU cross-regional conversation on palm oil and environmental protection, the palm oil issue in contemporary Southeast Asia is ultimately part of a broader debate of the EU as an international trade partner. It touches upon the dilemma of the EU’s normative commitment and economic interests in the region. Nevertheless, environmental protection and sustainability schemes which build on economic incentives remain desirable from a Western European and Southeast Asian policy-­ makers’ perspective and offer opportunity for enhanced ASEAN-EU inter-­r egionalism. For example, in regard to the haze issue, FLEGT was illustrated in the first book and in this book as a timber certification scheme that offers trade incentives to Southeast Asian partners and holds indirect potential to help with the haze issue. Even though these incentivised schemes can conflict with the EU’s goals of aid effectiveness and sustainable development, the EU’s overall normative image in Southeast Asia seems to benefit since the economic incentive is sufficient to open doors for alternative forms of ­normative impact (Maier-Knapp 2014a: 228). In the context of the normative discussion, Chapter 3 furthermore addressed the question of the EU as a security actor. Main reference was made to the Indonesian perspective, which regularly treats the haze as a question of national security.3 Today, the forest fires and the spread of the haze in Indonesia still oftentimes demand the deployment of military personnel and equipment to assist civilian forces and local communities. However, the role of the military nowadays differs significantly from the one prior to 1998, when questions of state integrity essentially revolved around the monopoly of force. At the same time, the regional security environment remains challenging and offers of military equipment for anti-haze

98  Summary of main findings assistance by fellow Southeast Asian governments remind ­Indonesia of its lack of military equipment compared with some of the countries in the neighbourhood. This feeds Indonesia’s sense of vulnerability. ­Perceptions of competition and preference for non-interference are still high amongst the ASEAN member states. Thus, even though Indonesia’s perceived vulnerability in the context of the haze is not considered along the lines of the region’s security balance, it gives insight into the crux of the controversy that surrounds NTS challenges and securitisation/militarisation processes for their management. For the EU, Southeast Asian use of the NTS perspective is seen ambiguously. The EU understands that overly broad and inclusive NTS discourses at the nexus of development and security can pose a conceptual and operational conundrum perpetuating militarisation and authoritarianism in the region. This conflict between EU normative interests and effective action with and within Southeast Asia is inherent in NTS perspectives, as was also elaborated in Chapter 4.

Summary of Chapter 4 Chapter 4 kept with the theme of transboundary environmental pollution in Southeast Asia of Chapter 3, but framed these issues – namely marine life and environment protection in the South China Sea – against the backdrop of the territorial tensions in the South China Sea. This case provided clearer links between environmental protection and both traditional security and NTS perspectives. Chapter 4 essentially argued that ASEAN-EU dialogue and ­cooperation on environmental issues and other NTS matters in the South China Sea cannot be seen detached from the politicised and militarised context. This means that even European apolitical development cooperation could be perceived as political and security influence. Amongst others, this pervasiveness of the security dimension has seen governments as well as navies and coast guards in the region display affinity to the NTS rhetoric in expanding their scope of action. In this context, the issue of political instrumentalisation of the NTS perspective was raised and some governmental narratives of ­protection – for example, creating marine life protection zones – were criticised as pseudo-narratives to justify to both domestic and international audiences the enhanced scope of action of those very state and military actors that have worsened the situation for the marine environment to begin with. In light of the politicisations involved and the overall tense situation of the South China Sea, EU supranational as well as member state engagement on maritime-related NTS matters in Southeast Asia has been cautious – yet not inactive, focusing on upholding rule of law, multilateralism, and diplomatic solutions through various projects concerned with issues of freedom of navigation and other NTS topics pertaining to maritime security and safety in the South China Sea both directly and indirectly. In connection to maritime security specifically, the EU managed to enhance its supranational

Summary of main findings  99 political and security profile effectively through the ARF and EEAS bilateral activities with individual ASEAN member states. Furthermore, ASEM and AEMM and affiliated meetings provided an interesting platform to address maritime security, freedom of navigation, and other relevant NTS or NTS-related issues. Further noteworthy in the context of maritime s­ ecurity, with a view to more executive and security-oriented engagement of the European Commission’s IcSP, is the EU-funded CRIMSON project, which states on its website that the maritime routes of Southeast Asia are of importance to the EU and that there is opportunity to extend CRIMSON to Southeast Asia. If this is to be realised, it would imply greater anchoring of maritime security within ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism. At the same time, the EU realises that the expansion of dialogue mechanisms to address maritime security cannot immediately stop land reclamation processes which endanger marine life and environment. Questions about actual effectiveness of the EU as a security actor, if dialogue and cooperation is called for by Southeast Asian partners, in the South China Sea persist and relate to broader issues of environmental protection and sustainable economic development in the region. On the question of the EU as a normative actor, amongst others, Chapter 4 referred to the security-­ economic-normative impact of the EU’s regulatory extension through the case of IUU. The chapter also highlighted the EU’s economic lever when pressing its normative agenda in talks on environmental or environment-­ related NTS issues. In this context, the example of the EU-Vietnam FTA was given, with particular reference to Chapter 15 on Trade and Sustainable Development within the EU-Vietnam FTA. While Chapter 15 is vague in wording and may not necessarily be a sign of EU political power and persuasion skills, it offers ample room for further specification of environmental interests, standards, and norms further down the line. Last but not least, the chapter pointed to the normative responsibility on the side of European shipping companies. In light of their significance for cross-regional trade flows, their commitment to environmentally sound and sustainable practices was outlined. It was furthermore suggested that these companies could assist in making the EU’s economic leverage more fungible, in the sense of political and security influence. After all, they are important contributors to the EU’s overall image and influence in economic, environmental, as well as normative terms in the region. In spite of highlighting the role of shipping companies and other European trade companies, the chapter included a word of caution, suggesting that enhanced recognition and responsibility of private actors could emphasise ‘economic ­inter-regionalism’, which may not have the desired political impact on ­ASEAN-EU ­inter-regionalism and its say on security issues in the South China Sea. Initial concerns in this regard were expressed, but ­require greater study of the links between the EU’s economic leverage and its ­security interests in the South China Sea.

100  Summary of main findings

Summary of Chapter 5 Chapter 5 shifted the empirical focus from NTS crises and challenges in Southeast Asia to contemporary NTS crises in the EU, to the migration and refugee crisis. This crisis in the EU in 2015 was the starting point for the discussion of the ASEAN and EU regional and inter-regional responses to the issue of migration. It was portrayed as a test for the Dublin system and other EU regional migration- and refugee-related policies, revealing considerable divergent attitudes amongst the EU member states. At the same time, the crisis led to enhanced regional integration, seeing, for example, the EU member states reprioritise the protection and ‘smartening’ of the EU’s external borders. Generally speaking, the migration and refugee crisis triggered a broad range of discourses, promoting enhanced capacity-building, particularly favourable for the area of justice and home affairs and defence and security. This security orientation was further fuelled by the series of terrorist attacks within the EU, tempting EU and member state officials to link issues of terrorism and extremism with illegal migration. Concomitantly, the EU and member state officials acknowledged other links and causalities within this migration-terrorism threat complex and displayed greater commitment to fight the root causes of illegal migration to the EU. As a consequence, the security-development rationale regained importance within the programming of EEAS and those units of the European Commission concerned with the EU’s external relations. It was suggested that official ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism could possibly benefit from this crisis-induced awareness of the security-development nexus within the EU’s foreign policy apparatus. Security interest and perspective convergence ­between the two regions on matters of illegal migration are nevertheless to be seen with some caution since newer crisis-induced institutional developments at the EU regional level could be hindersome for the ASEAN-EU ­inter-regional commitment to connectivity. For instance, the EU’s additional safeguards in the area of immigration and border protection do not provide for an environment conducive to the mobility of goods and people from Muslim Southeast Asian countries to the EU. Although this does not have a negative effect on the EU’s profile as a normative actor in Southeast Asia, it is not an advantage for the EU’s liberal-democratic image. At the same time, an ever-growing EU development cooperation budget for ASEAN and a continuous deepening of the ASEAN-EU work programme point to the autonomy of the ASEAN-EU multi-annual programming and the detachment of the inter-regional mode of cooperation from the woes at the regional level and protectionist noise of the individual EU member states. This gives the impression that the EU migration crisis did not have an impact on the EU’s normative profile within its political and security dialogue with Southeast Asia. Thus, at the ASEAN-EU engagement level, the utility of illegal migration crises as cooperation triggers/mechanisms for inter-regionalism seems limited. It appears that the EU’s DCI, EIDHR,

Summary of main findings  101 and other tools to address human rights and TIP concerns appear more relevant to the cooperation dynamics on issues of migration between the two regions. The employment of these EU tools generally complements the objectives of Southeast Asian governments, even though the projects listed in Chapter 5 have mainly served the purpose of building resilient societies bottom-up, engaging non-governmental actors as implementing partners, and empowering vulnerable population groups. This people-orientation of the EU chimes with discussions of the EU as a normative actor in the other chapters, which have highlighted the role of non-governmental actors as EU aid recipients and implementing partners. The case of the May Rohingya boat crisis, however, made clear that more can be done to protect vulnerable groups and that crisis situations call for greater EU visibility and support beyond the regular inter-regional or bilateral EU-Southeast Asian programming and toolkit. This is not to say that AMMTC4 and other ASEAN regional mechanisms are inactive and move merely in response to international pressure. Rather, on questions of TIP and illegal migration, Southeast Asian governments are reluctant to allow direct interference by fellow ASEAN or other governments. Thus, the ­specific case of the Rohingya boat people crisis did not allow considerable internationalisation of the issue, beyond the governmental and ASEAN regional measures outlined. On issues of regulated labour migration, in particular, migration of skilled labour, ASEAN holds greater competencies. Overall, on TIP and other illegal migration matters, it seems that the ­ASEAN-EU inter-regional and bilateral programmes will find it difficult to mobilise political willingness of Southeast Asian governments – but also EU member state governments – to address the Rohingya people issue directly.

Summary of Chapter 6 The series of terrorist attacks in the EU in 2015 and 2016 compelled institutional reform and capacity-building both at the national and regional levels. Key areas concerned police and military capacity, border security, and cross-border intelligence-sharing. In particular, the JHA Council played a leading role in navigating through the crises, devising reforms and specifying the priority areas of cooperation and capacity-building. Policy reforms and innovations have not only strengthened the capability of individual actors but also enhanced and diversified the EU’s body of regulations on counterterrorism. This could be of interest to other regional organisations and their member states, not least given the projection and extension of EU regulations to countries outside of the EU. For example, based on developments in the EU, the chapter suggested that further extension of regulations and directives, such as the anti-money laundering directives, may be considered through the ASEAN-EU inter-regional format in the years to come.5 Effective inter-regional counterterrorism cooperation, in the sense of ­i ntelligence-sharing and security operations between the two regional

102  Summary of main findings organisations, falls within the purview of the member states of ASEAN and the EU. The EU’s collective external actor capability is designed to be complementary to the member states’ counterterrorism prerogative and can address issues of terrorism in other regions only indirectly, for instance, through development cooperation or humanitarian emergency support. This implies that the main pathway of counterterrorism cooperation is through EU member state activities with ASEAN member state counterparts. Even if the inter-regional level provides for more institutional space for interaction and even if supranational/intergovernmental competencies in counterterrorism are expanded, the threat itself is affecting ASEAN and EU member states unequally, complicating inter-regional cooperation. Moreover, in Southeast Asia, the case of the Erawan attack showed that even if institutional mechanisms are available at the regional and inter-­ regional level and threat perceptions across all ASEAN and EU member states converge, there is always the chance that the affected ASEAN or EU member state will frame the attack as a domestic issue and reject international involvement. Most promising is the institutional space that is opened for ­ASEAN-EU and ASEM anti-terrorism activities involving civil society and NGOs to complement the official dialogue and cooperation activities in tackling extremism, radicalisation, and the root causes of terror.

Response to the research questions The book began with the premise that transboundary NTS crises can enhance regional and inter-regional institutional dialogue and cooperation dynamics. This was underlined through the introductory discussion of the Nice attack and its influence on the working agenda at 11th ASEM Summit in Ulaanbaatar. In particular, the Nice attack made clear that an NTS crisis in one region or even country can have direct impact on inter-­regionalism. Concomitantly, the Introduction chapter acknowledged that more commonly inter-­regionalism is shaped indirectly by the regional dynamics that ensue NTS crises. Both ­crisis-contingent direct and indirect modes of influence on inter-regionalism are irregular and complement the regular inter-­regional working mode. From Chapter 3 until Chapter 6 special attention was given to these modes of irregular influence on inter-­regionalism though an NTS crisis-centred narrative, which offered evidence for both regional and inter-regional dialogue and cooperation dynamics. The empirical chapters drew upon the three guiding research questions to structure and cohere the discussion. The following paragraphs will now abstract the key findings in the empirical chapters in accordance with the guiding research questions. They constitute the analytical core of this book, providing the main discussion to the research objective. Can the EU improve its profile as a collective actor as security actor in Southeast Asia through its assistance to this far away region in the wake of NTS crises? What impact do NTS crises in the EU have on this kind of assistance?

Summary of main findings  103 Asia matters to Europe and vice versa. We have a huge stake in each other’s success. I am much looking forward to discuss with ASEAN and other colleagues how we can build a stronger, modern partnership and address security challenges together. As EU we have a distinct role to play: as partner in integration with ASEAN and as a strong advocate of cooperative security and international law. (EEAS 2015) These and many other remarks made by the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy between 2009 and 2016 display the EU’s interest in strengthening its security profile with and within Southeast Asia. The empirical chapters confirmed this and suggested that the EU’s structural advancement, especially in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty coming into effect in 2009, has facilitated stronger outward-orientation to ­Southeast Asia along security lines. In particular, they pointed out that contemporary EU NTS crisis-related action and capacity-building could assist in enhancing the ASEAN-EU security dialogue and cooperation in the years to come.6 Building on the broad security perspective inherent in NTS and the contiguity of traditional security to NTS issues evident in some of the empirical chapters, there is ample room for EU support in the region to be considered as security or securitised action, irrespective of the type of EU actor, method, and tool at play.7 EU support is generally well-targeted and -thought through, complementing Southeast Asian governmental activities and providing resources when the local political leadership lacks resources or the willingness to devote resources to some NTS issues. Beyond the material dimension, there is also political utility of EU assistance in promoting specific norms and practices, including regional integration support to ASEAN: Whether it is Indonesia’s environment-economic dilemma in the case of the haze or ASEAN’s political reluctance to challenge the non-interference principle on humanitarian grounds, as in the case of the Rohingya people, EU/outside assistance to ASEAN appears to be a necessity at times in order to move ASEAN regional dialogue and cooperation forward; even if it is merely about nudging intra-regional dialogue in a certain direction favourable for the resolve of political, NTS, and traditional security issues. As an economic power short of strategic interests and military presence in the Southeast Asian region, the EU’s nudging and offer of support has been generally viewed positively, for example, seen as offering prospects of bringing a multitude of parties together and providing encouragement for regional conversations and ­effective actions. In spite of the increased recognition of the EU’s abilities in contributing to regional security, the securitisation of contexts and other ambiguities presented in the empirical chapters have shown that the EU itself finds it difficult to reconcile the political implications of its actions, especially if these actions are humanitarian or developmental. This difficulty is apparent

104  Summary of main findings in connection to EU NTS actions or actions on NTS issues that are oftentimes not located distinctly separate from other dimensions of EU action, like economic, humanitarian, and development actions. Indeed, guiding EU ­security concepts of human and comprehensive security are actively influencing European Commission and EEAS institution-building in a manner that is seeing the development and security spheres interact more frequently. The NTS concept as security perspective functions similarly and blurs the lines dividing security issues from economic, normative, and other issues. For instance, this vagueness of the concept impacts the identification of inter-­regional NTS actions or actions on NTS challenges. An example was given in Chapter 6 in connection to the DG DEVCO-UNODC project on counterterrorism. For this project, DG DEVCO of the European Commission addressed terrorism by means of their humanitarian and developmental expertise. This is not to say that the EU’s comprehensive security approach should discard any developmental means and methods if the identified security threats fall operationally largely within the purview of traditional security actors. However, it is a source of confusion, for partners and people unfamiliar with the nuances of the EU’s ever-evolving structure. That is, the EU’s institutional fluidity contingent on guiding security concepts like human security and comprehensive security is regularly reinventing and nuancing fields of competency to the degree that could be distorting outside conceptions of the EU as a security actor.8 Related to these blurred thematic and methodological lines, there is the problem of the “multiple heads of the EU [in any given sector, which] can complicate a clear regional perspective on the EU as an actor … [and] blur the recognition by the sociological other” (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 109). Here, it is important to restate the book’s action-centred approach which purposely de-emphasises the analytical value of outside perceptions and focuses on the most relevant actors, activities, and instruments to create greater understanding of the EU as an actor. At the same time, the discussions have shown that an improved EU security profile can only manifest if ASEAN corresponding and absorptive capacity is enhanced at both the national and regional level to better interact with the EU. In this context, perceptions by the sociological other play a tacit supporting role, as part of understanding ASEAN’s regional actions pertaining to EU cooperation interest on NTS challenges/crises. As a rule, EU instruments to act on this cooperation interest can only take off and hold continuous application in Southeast Asia, if there are corresponding partners in Southeast Asia to open room for such action. Viewed from this perspective, ASEAN recognition of EU support and progress in community-building is essential for the continuous deepening and expansion of ASEAN-EU interaction on NTS issues. Additionally, greater acknowledgement of the ASEAN Secretariat by international partners and the ratification of the ASEAN Charter is strengthening ASEAN’s international status and actor capacity to interact more effectively with the

Summary of main findings  105 EU.  Thereby, the ASEAN Secretariat's limited size and budget seemingly play a secondary role in regard to the inter-regional absorptive and corresponding capacity, since the EU is currently, first and foremost, interested in the liaison and coordination functions of the ASEAN Secretariat. The size and budget of the ASEAN Secretariat play an inhibiting role merely when initial contact between the cooperation partners proceeds to full-scale project design and implementation, raising questions of co-sponsoring. Most importantly in recent years, the ASEAN Secretariat and other Southeast Asian regional structures – such as the various regional centres affiliated or semi-­ associated with ASEAN – are exhibiting greater capacity in initiating and steering the regional work agenda and levels of integration. This more proactive scope of action is conducive to programmes on NTS issues with the EU. Can transboundary NTS crises facilitate greater recognition of the EU as a normative actor who seeks to project norms as well as act on the basis of its norms internationally? Central to this research question is the EU’s normative behaviour within ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism and the norm projection through this interaction. Thereby, the individual empirical chapters premised NTS crisis situations as the main determinants of the EU’s normative behaviour, because of the normative space that was opened through the NTS crises. That is, as a responsible actor within an international society, it is expected that the EU would express solidarity and offer help to Southeast Asia in severe NTS crisis situations. This crisis-centred perspective can be applied across sectors, placing importance on the act of offering support and the nature of the assistance itself. This is the first, more general, normative layer of the response to the guiding research question on the EU as a normative actor, which essentially asks whether the EU can be considered as a normative actor in the first place. The second layer of the response refers to norm congruency and consistency of the EU’s normative identity ex ante. It moves beyond the first layer to establish, first and foremost, whether there is congruency and consistency of the EU’s normative identity with its behaviour. This takes into account the influence of global normative frameworks on EU actions and premises that “As a general rule, if the overall rhetoric of the EU in relation to these NTS challenges displayed the EU’s liberal-­democratic agenda, there may be a case for describing the EU as a normative actor in terms of input” (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 111). Because the analytical focus of this book and the first book does not require lengthy norm-tracing, presupposing a core normative identity of the EU ex ante based, in essence, on its l­ iberal-democratic and multilateralist identity, reference to individual norms and normative frameworks pertaining to the identity of the EU as an actor were made only in individual instances of clear causality. In this context, the first book already cautioned that the input-output method of gauging normativity is ambiguous, because normative agendas

106  Summary of main findings may also serve as frames for realising material interests. This is especially the case when norms and values are compromised for the sake of effectiveness, even though “there may be implicit long-term normative goals involved” (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 111). Given the urgency and emergency of the crisis situation, the first normative layer of the response annuls these concerns to some degree by overriding as a rule cost-benefit calculations. This said, there are examples within both regions that demonstrate that some national or regional norms persist and discourage any form of wider action beyond expressions of solidarity and empathy. For example, in Chapter 3, intra-ASEAN anti-haze integration dynamics, or rather the lack thereof for many years, were discussed to make clear that the ­ASEAN-EU interaction could also be impacted bottom-up by normative issues of the individual Southeast Asian states. In the Introduction chapter and in the previous paragraph, it was explicated that intra-EU and -ASEAN norm diffusion processes are only accounted for if there is a clear causality between processes at the regional and ASEAN-EU inter-regional level. This does not mean that norms have to be explicitly defined within the assistance. Indeed, they can be implicit, embedded within technical support.9 In this context, it is appropriate to raise the point that the understanding of the EU as a normative actor in this book also builds to a large degree on the recognition or even inclusion of civil society and other non-­governmental actors within the implementation of ASEAN-EU activities. Already in the first book, it was said “that non-state actors are important actors involved in upholding EU identity and implementing EU projects. Implementing agencies have significant on-site presence and local knowledge” (Maier-Knapp 2014b: 109). In addition to NGOs and transnational civil society, some of the empirical case studies pointed to the role of the EP in vocalising human rights concerns and influencing the normative parameters of ASEAN-EU interaction, in particular, in relation to issues at which the European Commission has to assume a nuanced position considerate of the EU’s economic interests. The final characteristic of the EU as a normative actor has been in the sense of regulatory projection and norm externalisation observable in all empirical chapters. Chapters 3–5 provided evidence for EU externalisation of intra-­regional directives and regulations, while Chapters 5 and 6 illustrated the application of directives and regulations which already consist of an ­extra-EU mandate. When regulatory frameworks concerning anti-money laundering or human trafficking are extended beyond the EU’s borders, the act or process of this generally builds on a narrative that portrays the need of the EU to secure itself from outside-in, suggesting that some regulatory projection and externalisation are indeed not only legal and normative actions but also security actions, given the nature of the discourse and target. Thereby, the projection of norms should, as a rule, be consistent with the EU’s legal and normative identity, structuring order elsewhere in a manner

Summary of main findings  107 conducive to dialogue and peaceful coexistence and other guiding EU foreign policy norms and principles. Although the congruency between the EU’s normative identity and the act of externalisation can be detected credibly only in the long term, the very act of extending norms and providing input into external normative frameworks reveals that there is normative capacity of the EU at work and hence, allows an indicative conception of the EU as a normative actor. In this context, reference also needs to be made to those externalisation processes that function tacitly. For example, in Chapter 3, CLTRAP was outlined as a E ­ uropean institution worthy of emulation elsewhere, given its endurance and attractiveness to non-members who sought membership. This suggests that there are intangible or tacit externalisation processes that contribute to the EU’s normative profile by means of norm emulation. Economic incentives and prospect of cooperation offered by the EU can be conducive to norm emulation processes. What is the value of ASEAN-EU dialogue and cooperation on NTS crises for inter-regional security cooperation/inter-regionalism? If crises function as stimuli for enhanced interaction within the ASEAN-EU relationship, does this indicate that existing ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism does not carry sufficient weight to further inter-regional communication and coordination? Right at the very beginning of this book, this query on whether the ­ASEAN-EU inter-regional security dialogue has benefitted from the momentum provided by NTS crises was confirmed through the introductory discussion of the inter-regional reaction to the Nice attack in 2016. This discussion showed that in the immediate aftermath of an NTS crisis inter-­regional dialogue fora can be useful for the initial coordination of perspectives of a large number of states. In light of the affirmative opening of the book, the subsequent empirical chapters mainly served to substantiate this. The empirical chapters illustrated the contiguity between irregular crisis-induced inter-regional integration dynamics and regular inter-regional dialogue and cooperation and provided various nuances of inter-regionalism that point to the potential of inter-regionalism as a policy level in its own right. In spite of the affirmative beginning, the effective impact of NTS crises on inter-regional institutionalisation and integration throughout the empirical chapters was challenging to trace and seemingly dependent on the degree of crisis affectedness and magnitude. Thus, one could say that, at best, NTS crises further interest coordination and institutional capacity with a view to enhancing inter-regionalism’s ability to act as a clearing house which streamlines global agendas and disburdens other international dialogue fora,10 in the sense of a complementary dynamic or an irregular integration and institutionalisation impetus, as identified at the Introduction of this book. Indeed, it has been more common that developments at the regional and global level have reinforced the inter-regional agenda, although the empirical chapters have also revealed instances in which the inter-regional level

108  Summary of main findings has provided an alternative, parallel, or even counter-narrative to regional or global discourses. This was exemplified in Chapter 5: Whereas dominant national and regional discourses in Western Europe focused on irregular migration as a security and socio-economic challenge to all levels of society, the ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-regional dialogue fora – the 22nd JCC meeting in 2015 was used as an example – primarily framed the topic of migration and mobility along the lines of connectivity, hence, shifting the focus away from the negative connotations of the dominant illegal migration discourses in 2015 and 2016. This reminds of the institutionalist functions of agenda-setting and rationalisation introduced at the beginning of this book, in the sense that “interregional dialogues are instrumentalized by nation-states or regional groupings for advancing policies or themes that at this point do not resonate in global forums, interregional institutions adopt agenda-setting means” (Hänggi et al. 2006: 307–308). This is not to say that other international and global fora have not been proponents of connectivity. Rather, this book seeks to underline instances that juxtapose the national, regional, and ­inter-regional levels in a manner that demonstrates the actor capability of ASEAN-EU/ASEM inter-regionalism clearly and puts into perspective the influence of the national level. Growing official acknowledgement of epistemic communities and other non-governmental actors as implementing partners is enhancing cross-­ regional security and NTS awareness beyond the scope of the official channels of communication. These unofficial levels of security debate across the two regions generally complement the discussions and activities at the official inter-regional level, reinforcing dynamics of connectivity bottom-up. While these transnational dynamics can also be conducive to an enhanced ASEAN-EU official security dialogue, it is primarily up to the official representatives of the regions to ensure institutional continuity and determine the bottom-up intake in shaping interaction on sensitive issues. Current talks about an EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership indicate political commitment on the official side to an enhanced inter-regional security dialogue, even though the exact terms and conditions of this envisaged elevation of the relationship still need to be worked out. At the same time, it needs to be said that even if the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership is agreed on and ratified in the form of a written agreement, effective inter-regional security actions remain problematic, subject to the political willingness of the member states. To use a term common to analyses of inter-regionalism, one could say that the ‘multilateral utility’ of inter-regional security and NTS action may not evince in tangible output that can be counted in money figures or land gained or enemies killed. Rather, it is anticipated that intangible political effects, like reassurance or deterrence, will prevail. This more generalised and structure-oriented interpretation – as expressed above in connection to the EU’s norm projection and regulatory externalisation capacity – of multilateral utility slightly departs from

Summary of main findings  109 traditional understandings of Christopher Dent and other scholars who have centred multilateral utility of inter-regionalism on agenda-setting and rationalisation processes at the inter-regional level (Dent 2006: 121–126). In contrast to these traditional institutionalist perspectives that attenuate realist perspectives of balancing, the security prism of this book’s institutionalist approach is suggesting that multilateral utility, for example, in the sense of reassurance and political backing, may build on institutionalism and institutional peace, but foregrounds paradoxically the power b ­ alancing function.

Conclusions Because contemporary transboundary NTS crises in both regions are opening the scope of institution-building and inter-institutional interaction at all levels of governance, contributing to prospects of enhancing inter-regional security dialogue and cooperation, a revisit and expansion of standing conceptualisations of ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism is timely. The aim of this chapter was to restate the key findings of the empirical chapters and relate these to the three guiding questions. The responses to the individual questions correlate, seeing the conception of the EU as a security actor intimately linked to the EU as a normative and inter-regional actor. Overall, the case studies have shown that the EU is a unique type of security actor who first seeks to structure the environment in which it operates, creating a normative setting favourable for it as a multilateral actor with a comprehensive security perspective. In this context, the case studies have gauged inter-regional institutions and actions as useful supplementary tools for ASEAN and the EU in the management of common NTS concerns and crises, reinforcing efforts at the national, regional, and other international levels. At the same time, there is room for improvement: While there is the general potential of ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-regionalism to influence other levels of governance and shape global governance in individual NTS issue areas, the discussed case studies, on the one hand, have mainly illustrated EU-centred inter-­ regionalism as a foreign policy mechanism of the EU, amongst others, to support regional integration and cohesion elsewhere through interest convergence processes, best-practice-sharing, and the facilitation of multilateral dialogue formats of broad participation.11 On the other hand, EU-centred inter-­regionalism can be seen as a mechanism to strengthen the EU’s foreign policy apparatus and regional political cohesion from outside-in. The NTS crisis-centred lens showed enhanced cross-regional awareness of specific issue areas and sensitivity to the contiguity between security and NTS-developmental themes. Although it was acknowledged that this contiguity enhances the EU’s scope of action, it complicates clear recognition of the EU’s security, as well as normative, profile on site. This having been said, it was evident across all case studies that the EU does not necessarily seek

110  Summary of main findings a strategic approach to Southeast Asia that could rival those approaches of EU and non-EU state powers with actual military stakes and presence in the Asia-Pacific. The EU as a collective political entity is seemingly comfortable with its broad and comprehensive security engagement in the region along diplomatic and soft security lines, building in particular on themes that would fall under the NTS category and on the extension of its regulatory or normative frameworks in these NTS contexts. In keeping with the institutionalist and behaviouralist perspective of this book, the EU’s security and normative actor profile with and within Southeast Asia is not only made up of institutional givens and dynamics: A successfully synchronised and progressive normative and security profile can only be maintained if institutional prescriptions can be translated operationally. This includes, first and foremost, interactive space with civil society, specialist agencies, business communities, and other implementing partners. In particular, this premises, continued attention to the ­development of the people-to-people dimension in the sense of NTS-relevant educational programmes and expert exchange. In this context, it is furthermore important that there is continuous strengthening of the links between ­Western ­European geographic representations – mainly both EEAS and EU member states – amongst each other as well as with its representations in international institutions in order to ensure appropriate coordination with the implementing partners, activity recognition, agenda and execution consistency, on-site image, and representation.

Notes 1 As a rule, transboundary NTS crises are situations of urgency which compel state and regional authorities to help and protect the population immediately, de-emphasising cost-benefit calculations. The chapters showed that in instances of severe crisis, when national authorities lacked effective capacity to respond, governments would consider calls for or offers of help from international partners like the EU. 2 This was the case after the EP called for a ban of palm oil use in biofuel in 2018. Although this information from 2018 is outside of the analytical timeframe of the book, it is important to mention the EP’s activism here, given that the sequel to this book won’t be treating the haze as a case study. 3 Most clearly, this was exemplified during the haze crisis in 1997 and 1998, when the issue was one out of a handful of factors fuelling the Indonesian people’s anger and hence, leading to Suharto’s fall. 4 In particular, the rise of the terrorism agenda worldwide has informed ­AMMTC’s work agenda and increasingly seen issues of TIP linked to the terrorist threat. Thus, similarly to developments in the EU, the terrorist agenda has reinforced the security dimension of illegal migration issues and added impetus to security capacity-building efforts both at the national and regional level in Southeast Asia. 5 Many of the new directives concerned with counterterrorism have received additional impetus from the migration crisis and vice versa. This mutual influence of the policy narratives has also been source of concern, as expressed in Chapter 5

Summary of main findings  111 in the context of the criminalisation of Muslim migrant groups with possible implications for the mobility of Southeast Asian nationals to the EU. For example, the overhaul of the Data Retention Directive to strengthen information capacity at the external borders of the EU has to be seen in this light, because it has been informed by both EU migration and terrorism discourses. 6 For example, the reinforced role of Europol mentioned in Chapter 6 holds potential for greater extra-regional cooperation with actors in Southeast Asia, as will be explored in the sequel to this book. 7 This was most evident in the discussion of the South China Sea issue and maritime security in Chapter 4. 8 If actively employed at the EU level, the NTS concept with its broad scope of threats and security providers would do little to remedy this. 9 For example, when the EU seeks UN partners as additional implementing partners, this reinforces the EU’s normative commitment to multilateralism and actor diversity in its external relations, although the promotion of multilateralism might not be articulated as part of the mandate. 10 Generally speaking, actual reduction of the administrative burden at the global level is difficult to trace and can only be confirmed within those examples that do not involve or require assistance from other global institutions. 11 For example, the EEAS-sponsored HLDs on maritime security have demonstrated this ability of the EU to provide effective expertise and facilitate ­multi-stakeholder dialogue on security issues pertaining to Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

Studies of NTS crises in Southeast Asia in the late 1990s and more recent scholarly treatments of regional crises in the EU from 2008 onwards have confirmed the correlation between regional institutional integration and transboundary NTS crises and called for enhanced ASEAN-EU cooperative efforts on the basis of interest or threat convergence. Until recently, official and scholarly circles have paid scant attention to the direct impact of NTS crises on ASEAN-EU ­inter-regionalism. The discussion of the Nice attack in the Introduction chapter was a good example to make clear that NTS crises can have direct impact on Asian/ASEAN-EU inter-regional dialogue and cooperation dynamics and that the link between contemporary NTS crises and ­EU-Asian inter-regionalism deserves greater attention. The empirical exploration of this under-researched agenda proceeded from Chapter 3 onwards. The discussions of Chapter 3 until Chapter 6 focused on the NTS crisis response of the ­ASEAN-EU ­inter-regional level and made reference to ASEM inter-­regionalism, as well as other relevant ­international dialogue fora, to discern and embed the ­ASEAN-EU ­inter-regional findings. This crisis-­centred perspective was combined with behaviouralist methodology and applied consistently throughout the empirical chapters, working out interesting policy-relevant insights about the general management of NTS crises and challenges and enhancing existing academic knowledge of the first book Southeast Asia and the European Union: non-­ traditional security crises and cooperation on the EU as a politico-security and normative actor in a region far from Europe. This book drew upon case studies between 2009 and 2016 to complement the empirical insights from 1997 until 2009 of the first book. In light of the selected timeframe for analysis, one could say that this book responded to the three guiding questions from a post-Lisbon Treaty perspective, focusing on a time period when the EEAS and other relevant EU foreign policy structures were being set up and consolidated. Since 2009, there have also been ASEAN community-building advancements, suggesting enhanced Southeast Asian corresponding and absorptive capacity conducive to more effective inter-regional interaction with the EU on a broader range of NTS topics. Thus, the historical and institutional overview of Chapter 2 and the empirical case studies from Chapter 3 until Chapter 6 acknowledged

Conclusion  113 ­regional institution-building in both regions as a facilitator of inter-regional interaction and posited that there is a contingency between institutional ­integration at the inter-regional level and the institutional developments at the respective regional organisational level. Prior to the empirical assessment, this book furthermore distinguished between regular and irregular inter-­regional institutional dynamics and the variable levels of contingency between the regional and inter-regional levels. It was premised that, as a rule, regular inter-regional institutional dynamics, commonly based on the ASEAN-EU multi-annual work programmes, proceed seemingly independently from regional policy changes, even amidst crisis situations.1 Thus, even though, at the time of writing, woes of the refugee crisis and Eurozone crisis were preoccupying national and regional debates and shaping inward-oriented understandings of insecurity, the selected NTS crises only had minimal negative impact on the overall ASEAN-EU working level and multi-year cooperation agenda. The autonomy of ASEAN-EU inter-­ regionalism is further underlined by the contemporary rise of the EU budget for ASEAN regional integration support and the expansion of supranational foreign and security policy initiatives and instruments. In view of this and the preceding paragraph, some may treat the institutional crisis-­contingent inter-regional dynamic triggered in the wake of the Nice attack as an exception to the rule, rendering moot the role of NTS crises as independent variables triggering and accelerating inter-regional cooperation. At the same time, disintegration dynamics of NTS crises, especially in the EU in more recent times, have pointed to the continued necessity of crisis and risk awareness at all levels of governance, as NTS crises can transcend national and regional borders and affect all levels severely; particularly those levels that are less institutionalised and lack their own capabilities. This implies that, even though ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism mainly functions according to its own agenda, crisis-induced thematic and institutional prioritisations at the regional level need to be accounted, since down-the-line, when initiatives are being implemented across the regions, material resources and other ­capabilities of the national and regional levels become more important. Notable in all four empirical chapters was that this multi-level contingency pertained to best-practice-sharing as well as capacity-building in the area of justice and home affairs on the basis of the download of EU directives and regulations to the national level and the upload of these to the ASEAN-EU inter-regional level or EU foreign policy level. While processes of directive and regulation projection to Southeast Asia to fight various forms of organised and transboundary crime are not considered as security action in the traditional sense, they have assisted in carving out the EU’s security profile in Southeast Asia thematically, as well as in power relational terms. By ­inspiring – some might say compelling – processes of power (re)-­structuration, norm redefinition, and institutional ordering, these externalisation processes can influence standing power relations and the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific. This impact, however, largely depends on the political

114 Conclusion will and openness of the Southeast Asian counterparts. This is when NTS crisis situations prove to be useful in spurring behavioural change and the main reason why they are treated as an independent variable in this book: They exude urgency and hence, open space for recovery and renewal that is more favourable for ASEAN member states to call for outside assistance and for the EU to offer help, because authorities both within and outside the affected region become more aware of their humanitarian responsibilities and their role as actors within an international society. This humanitarian and ethical argumentation further presumes that more space could be provided for bottom-up influences and non-governmental actors to be heard by governmental actors. Indeed, across all four empirical chapters, greater official recognition of civil society and NGOs as complementary assistance providers in NTS crisis situations was ­detected. While ­ etail in this transnational business communities have not been discussed in d book, it is important to note – especially considering the stakes of ­European ­ hapter 4 – that shipping companies in the South China Sea presented in C ASEAN-EU and ASEM inter-regionalism has been actively opening space for the peoples of the two regions to interact and connect. This includes interactive opportunity in the weighty transnational business communities. The steady proliferation of bilateral trade agreements2 between the EU and ­individual ASEAN member states is an obvious example for the enhanced interactive space of the transnational business communities. Moreover, it has provided institutional anchors for all levels of the ­ASEAN-EU relationship. This ever-growing significance of the economic dimension – also through the NTS lens – invites to deeper exploration of the economic-­ security links, as well as their possible institutional conflicts and entrapments, at the ­ASEAN-EU inter-regional level. In summary, four decades since the official establishment of the inter-­ regional ASEAN-EU dialogue at the first AEMM in 1978 in Brussels, the economic dimension is still the driver of the official ASEAN-EU relationship. Its predominance has however become more embedded and given way to a more balanced and comprehensive perspective of the ASEAN-EU partnership, recognisant of the added value of ASEAN-EU security dialogue and cooperation for a stable world order. The growing significance of the political and security dimension of ASEAN-EU inter-regionalism has now given rise to talks about an EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, which – if successfully negotiated – could further gel the ASEAN-EU inter-regional security dialogue, heightening chances for more effective inter-regional ­dialogue and cooperation on NTS challenges and crises in the years to come.

The EU as an international actor in regions far from Europe This book has been an attempt to shed light on the contemporary relations between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’, promoting the ASEAN-EU inter-­regional level as a policy layer in its own right. The official language inside and outside

Conclusion  115 the respective regions suggests that there is still a long way to go, but that the political divides to be overcome are not only the ones across the regions. Indeed, in light of the crisis-responsive/-induced intra-regional dynamics in ASEAN and the EU discussed in the empirical chapters, it appears that the main political divides that need to be overcome in order to attain more effective regional and inter-regional cooperation on NTS issues are the ones within the regions themselves. Both official and scholarly voices have recognised this and revealed that, to the EU, ‘the East’ is not only East Asia. It is in fact more commonly understood as an intra-regional distinction between the older EU member states and the newer ones from the f­ ormer Soviet Union. For example, the President of the European Commission stated in his speech “State of the European Union: an ‘existential crisis’” to the EP on 14 September 2016 that, If we want to overcome the tragic divisions between East and West which have opened up in recent months. If we want to show that we can be fast and decisive on the things that really matter. If we want to show to the world that Europe is still a force capable of joint action. We have to get to work. (Juncker 2016) Already in the first book, the intra-regional faultlines were addressed and the Conclusion chapter of the first book summed up that geography is no longer a given reality or sole shaper of an East-West mindset. The first book furthermore suggested that the ‘tyranny of distance’ of the ASEAN-EU ­relations has to be put into perspective, especially when viewed from an NTS perspective, which builds on a broad threat spectrum that also accounts for socio-economic risk. In this light, a country like Singapore may have more in common with Germany and France than with fellow ASEAN member states like Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. Thus, the Conclusion chapter of the first book emphasised the importance of economic power – touched upon in the above section in connection to transnational business communities – and interdependence in shaping the security agenda and heralded the EU as a new type of security actor aware of the nexus between security and economics, or rather security and development. This broader view of security was also visible in this book and expressed through the ­renewed adoption of the NTS lens. Although the responses to the research questions presented in Chapter 7 have illustrated the policy relevance of the NTS perspective and the utility of this perspective for the advancement of the ASEAN-EU inter-regional security dialogue, it is important to keep in mind that the recognition of the EU as a contemporary security actor with and within Southeast Asia begins with European acceptance that the EU and its member states are not the primary strategic partners in the eyes of Southeast Asian dialogue partners, no matter how far perspectives of security and insecurity are redefined

116 Conclusion and stretched. Thus, past and present NTS crises and the ­subsequent cross-­ regional cooperative efforts to these crises can only do so much to flesh out the EU’s security profile. They can open some space for EU collective influence, mainly characterised by the EU’s supranational capacity in d ­ iplomacy, security-relevant regulatory externalisation, co-financing of security initiatives, and effective support of development issues that overlap with questions of security. This space is promising and propagates the EU’s external structuration agency and normative capacity. It furthermore confirms the value of the research question about the EU’s normative identity and underlines this question’s centrality in any study that attempts to ­conceptualise the EU as an NTS actor in Southeast Asia. Although contemporary political developments in the EU in the wake of the migration crisis and terrorist attacks seem to deflect from the heyday of human security as the central strategic concept guiding the institutional development of the EU’s foreign and security policy apparatus, continued EU insistence on intra-regional perspectives that void state centrality within contemporary regional security capacity-building is now more than ever vital, if the EU wants to maintain the integrity of its normative identity both inside and outside the EU’s borders. Specifically, from Southeast Asia’s point-of-view, there is the need for the EU to support the region normatively, as well as materially for normative purposes, in a manner that sees statist ‘might over right’ behaviour in the Southeast Asian neighbourhood minimised. While the EU stands for such an agenda per se, as stated above, contemporary political and security narratives and developments within the EU are raising questions about its international credibility as a normative tour de force. In addition to the impact on the EU’s normative profile, crisis-spurred nationalist developments within the EU – also those nationalist tendencies within ASEAN – need to be managed, because they interfere with the regional institutional lifecycles and cultures. In this context, the NTS ­approach is useful, since it supersedes institutionalism at the national level and could therefore function as a tool to mediate between the national and regional levels and control statist security narratives. At the same time, various conceptual issues remain, as outlined in Chapter 1, and suggest that the NTS perspective has not yet developed into a mature tool for the coherent management of the various levels of governance. At best, it is a means to bridge between state and regional organisational values and actions, ensuring that liberal and multilateral maxims at the regional level are acknowledged in contemporary regional security discourses and national capacity-building efforts. Despite some illiberal tendencies due to the political make-up of the counterpart, EU intra-regional cleavages, context of inter-regional action, or limitations of mandate, the NTS lens has served well overall in avoiding an empirical portrayal of the EU as an obsolescent security and normative actor in Southeast Asia. In particular, the NTS lens adequately highlighted

Conclusion  117 the EU’s multilateralist behaviour and gave limelight to its comprehensive approach to security actions, inclusive of developmental aspects and civil society actors and other non-governmental security providers as implementing agents. Whether this inclusive approach can strengthen the EU’s profile as a security partner to Southeast Asia in the long-run remains to be seen. For the time being, as this book has displayed, employing a broader NTS perspective on the ASEAN-EU relationship is helpful in bringing the EU into security conversations in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-­Pacific. The NTS lens is therefore both a conceptual as well as practical opportunity for the EU as an international actor in partner regions, where there is lack of coherent European strategic alignment and capability presence on site to begin with.

Construing broader perspectives In the previous book, the final chapter concluded with an outlook that was strongly influenced by developments on the Korean peninsula with an ­‘irrational’ leader and China’s display of assertiveness in the South China Sea (Maier-Knapp 2014b:125). It claimed that in such uncertain times in the Asia-Pacific, the EU’s involvement, championing diplomacy, humanism, and multilateralism, was more than ever needed. While the South China Sea concern still holds truth in the rationalisation and discussions of this book, the claim of North Korea’s irrational leadership in the previous book needs to be updated. Indeed, at the time of writing this book, it seemed that Kim Jong-Un was forfeiting anti-American posturing, tipping the regional power structure and balance towards the USA. Even though the security environment in the Asia-Pacific is known to be ever-changing, US vested interests in the region seem to have remained strong and its leadership in hedging China continues, albeit less elegantly than previous administrations. Overall, the systemic structure of the Asia-Pacific seems to be in the same strategic ­balance, more noise than actual deterioration tendencies. This observation, however, is not easing Southeast Asian worries, since de facto geo-political and -economic tensions in the region are still felt both inside and outside the region. Against this systemic backdrop, this book portrays the EU’s approach to NTS/security in Southeast Asia as the continuation of its traditional complementary role to US hard power influence in the region, building on structural and soft security impact and, in particular, the added value it offers to those ASEAN member states that are developing or rank developmental issues on top of their national security agenda. Thus, the NTS perspective offers room for the EU to appeal to Southeast Asia as a security actor in its own right and steer the ASEAN-EU inter-regional relationship in a manner favourable for greater EU strategic outward-orientation and influence on the security agenda of the Asia-Pacific region. The NTS perspective of this book has furthermore offered evidence of institutional integration efforts

118 Conclusion at the regional and inter-regional level across various sectors that challenge pessimistic crisis-stricken scholarly voices, which have overly focused on protectionist and regional disintegration dynamics that have ensued the ­recent transboundary NTS crises in the EU. This book thus raises hope for a post-crisis narrative of the next book, which concludes the trilogy by delving deeper into the regional and inter-regional institutional developments of ASEAN and the EU between 2017 and 2023 in connection to NTS issues of cybercrime, pandemics, natural disasters, food insecurity, and the CBRN threat.

Notes 1 The ASEAN/Asia-EU regional/country programmes and ministerial agendas therefore constitute the foundation or regular institutional determinant for ASEAN-EU inter-regional behaviour, despite some issues of politicisation and capacity dependency on the national and regional levels. 2 Exceptions are Cambodia and Laos, whose state of development is complicating initiation of bilateral agreement negotiations, and Thailand, whose FTA negotiations have stalled due to the coup and subsequent military government. At the time of writing of this book at the end of 2016, only negotiations with Singapore and Vietnam have progressed significantly with expected entry into force of the FTAs in the near future.

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Index

actor: capability 1, 34–5, 102, 108; ex ante 105; ex post 17–18; sui generis 18 agenda-setting 7–8, 20–1, 96, 108–9 anti-haze cooperation 10, 40–9, 97 anti-money laundering 17, 76, 93–4, 102, 106 anti-piracy 32, 60–1, 89 arbitral award 3 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution 43–4 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) 24, 89–90 ASEAN-EU: dialogue 5, 7, 17, 19, 21, 23, 29, 31, 33–5, 38, 91, 98, 107, 114; inter-regionalism 3–7, 11, 15, 19–20, 24, 27, 29–30, 34, 37, 40, 51–2, 65–6, 77, 90, 93, 97, 99, 100–1, 105–7, 112–15, 117 ASEAN-EU/European Communities Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) 13, 28–36, 91–2, 99, 114 ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) 19–20, 89 ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) 18, 20 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) 73, 89, 101 ASEAN Political and Security Community 30, 63 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 32–6, 38, 63–5, 89, 99 Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) 19 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): Foreign Ministers’ Meeting 31, 75, 92; Summit 1–3, 75, 90, 102 ASEM as structuring agent 7, 35 Bataclan 83, 86–8, 91, 94 behaviouralist 4, 8, 17, 24, 110, 112

bilateralism 16 British 1, 59 Brexit 1 civil society actors 8, 17–19, 24–5, 30, 32, 46, 60, 64–5, 76, 93, 102, 106, 110, 114, 117 Charlie Hebdo attack 83–4, 86–7 climate change 36, 41, 43–5, 49–50, 52 collective actor 4, 8, 11, 17, 24, 36, 94, 102 connectivity 56, 68, 74–5, 100, 108 counter terror 89–90, 92 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 9, 31, 33–4 confidence-building 15, 28–9, 34–6, 37, 38, 54, 59–60, 76 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLTRAP) 50, 107 crisis 1–4, 6–12, 17–23, 27, 29–30, 33, 34–6, 40–1, 51–2, 54, 61–3, 65, 67–80, 83–4, 87, 90–1, 96–7, 100–3, 105–7, 109, 112–16, 118 cross-border 8, 19, 30, 49, 60, 81, 83, 86–7, 90, 92, 101 cross-sectoral 3, 6, 43, 76 cumulative legitimacy 15 cybercrime 17, 86, 118 DG DEVCO 5, 37, 77, 104 Dosch, Jörn 7–8, 31, 64 economic leverage 58, 62, 99 European External Action Service (EEAS) 5, 8, 15–18, 22, 25, 36, 63–5, 76, 83, 93, 99, 100, 103–4, 111–12 Erawan attack 83, 88, 102 environmental protection 47, 50–2, 65, 97–9

128 Index European Commission 5, 8, 16–18, 31, 33–4, 36–8, 47, 50, 58, 63–4, 69, 70, 76–8, 80, 84, 86, 93, 97, 99–100, 104, 106, 115 European Court of Auditors 67–8, 77, 80 European Parliament 18, 20, 63, 97 Europol 17, 84–6, 93 extremism 2, 11, 90, 92–4, 100, 102 fisheries 10, 57–8, 61–4, 76 Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) 10, 47, 49, 52, 97 Forestry 42, 46, 49, 57 France 2, 11, 26, 48, 85–6, 94, 115 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 58, 66, 99 Frontex 71, 80 Germany 11, 48, 69–70, 83, 86, 94, 115 global actor 17 global challenges 14 global governance 7, 11, 14, 25, 35, 75, 109 greenhouse gas (GHG) 40–1 haze 10, 18, 29, 40–7, 49–52, 65, 96–8, 103 High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 3, 16, 63–4, 86, 103 high-level dialogue 64–5 human: security 23, 104, 116; trafficking 11, 62, 67–8, 71–3, 76–8, 80, 91, 106 illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU) 30, 55, 58, 61, 63, 72, 76, 80, 99 Indonesia 10, 28, 31, 40–53, 60, 73, 78–9, 81, 90–2, 95–8, 103, 110 instrumentalisation 23, 55–6, 65, 98 Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) 5, 33, 36–8, 64–5, 76, 94, 99 Instrument for Stability (IfS) 5, 33, 36, 37, 76, 94 institutionalist 4, 7–8, 20–1, 55, 108–10 international: society 6, 105, 114; solidarity 6, 106 inter-regionalism 3–11, 13, 15–16, 18–21, 23–5, 27–38, 40, 51–2, 55, 64–5, 67, 74–7, 80–1, 83, 87, 90–4, 96–7, 99–102, 104–9, 112–18 Islamic State (IS) 81, 88

Jakarta attack 11, 87–8 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 69, 84–6, 101 land reclamation 54–5, 65, 99 lone-wolf attack 11 managerial: capacity 14, 23, 96; perspective 14, 16 marine life protection 10, 54, 60, 65, 98–9 maritime security 10, 32, 36, 55, 63–5, 89, 90–1, 98–9 market pressure 47 May crisis 10, 71–4, 77 methodology 6, 8, 26, 112 migration 1, 10, 62, 67–81, 83–5, 87, 91–2, 100–1, 108, 116 militarisation 51, 55, 59–60, 65–6, 98 military response 5, 59 multi-headed actor 16 multilateral dialogue 64, 109 multipolar international system 13–14, 75 multipolarity 14–15 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 14, 71, 86 non-governmental organisation (NGO) 18, 63 Nice attack 2–3, 7, 90–1, 102, 107, 112–13 non-interference 10, 22, 98, 103 non-traditional security (NTS): perspective 5, 9, 25, 52, 54–5, 59–61, 65, 98, 115–17; rhetoric 31–3, 37, 54, 98 normative: actor 3–7, 21, 52, 80, 99–101, 105–7, 110, 112, 116; identity 4, 18, 21, 23, 62, 80, 82, 92, 105–7, 116 norm: externalisation 106; projection 34, 105, 108 palm oil 18, 41, 46–8, 51, 97 peace and security dividend 6 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 2, 54 politicisation 51, 54, 67–8 populist 70, 83 post-Cold War 13–14, 22, 27–8 post-Lisbon Treaty 112 posturing 117

Index  129 rationalisation 20, 21, 28, 57, 108, 109, 117 regional: capacity-building 11, 63, 72, 77, 84, 93; institution-building 27–8, 113 regulatory: extension 99, 110; projection 80, 106; transfer 62 research objective 3–4, 9, 102 Rohingya boat people 10, 61, 68, 71–3, 75, 77, 101 Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) 82 Rüland, Jürgen 8, 19, 20–1, 26, 35, 82 rule of law 3, 6, 7, 34, 65, 81, 92, 98 SEApeat 10, 44, 49, 50–2 security-development nexus 5, 100 Singapore 10, 28, 40–1, 45–6, 60, 89–90, 96–7, 115 South China Sea Project 10, 55–8 standard operating procedures 6 strategic partnership 9, 13–17, 24, 36, 37, 75, 94, 108, 114

streamlining function 3, 7, 21 systemic developments 9, 37 territorial dispute 2–3, 54–6, 64 territorial integrity 60, 65, 67, 71, 77 transregional 19, 25, 33–4, 37, 76 threat perceptions 17, 29, 102 traditional security actor 23, 51, 104 transboundary pollution 43–6, 50–2, 54, 98, 102 United Kingdom 1, 48, 59, 69–70, 86 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) 60, 64 United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 56–7 United States 36, 50, 60, 73, 117 Western Europe 1, 4, 18, 27–8, 30, 41, 47, 51, 60, 66, 70, 84–5, 87, 97, 108, 110